

50209-40

[P+40T]

50209-40 Vol. 4

United States Military Activities Installations and  
Defence Activities in Canada - General Requirements  
and Canadian Policy -

File-Tex Vertical

Folder No. Sp. 2394-10








(d) "United States Defence Activities in Canada", 30 December 1954. Someone has already drawn red lines around the classified sections of this memo. While much of the information contained therein could readily be declassified, there are references (e.g. to the Navy's establishment at Shelburne) that remain sensitive today. For this reason, DND concurrence should be sought via their ATIP officials before these sections are released.

Finally, with reference to our discussion of PJBD records, I attach extracts from the Minutes of the Board's 72nd and 73rd meetings (June and October, 1953). Although we checked the records up to 1962, these were the only references to declassification, suggesting that no ongoing mechanism or procedure for year to year declassification was ever agreed to. I shall pursue this question at the forthcoming PJBD.

} Note for the  
screeners guide



J.T. Devlin  
Deputy Director  
Defence Relations Division

PJBD Mtg - Sept 28 - Oct 1, 1953

5. (CONFIDENTIAL) DECLASSIFICATION OF WARTIME P.J.B.D. RECORDS

The Canadian Chairman referred to Section 4 of the Board's Journal for June, 1953, which recorded the undertaking of the Canadian Section to recommend to the Canadian Government that it concur in the declassification of P.J.B.D. Recommendations 1 to 33 and the First Report of the Board. The Canadian Chairman stated that he was now authorized to inform the Board that the Canadian Government concurred in this action provided that no public attention would be drawn to the fact that these records had been declassified. He then stated that he wished to make it clear that the concurrence in the declassification of these records should not in any sense be construed as a

CONFIDENTIAL

precedent for declassification of P.J.B.D. records in the future. He said that it was the opinion of the Canadian Government that each case would have to be considered on its merits. It would be a different matter, of course, if the two Governments agreed as they had on occasions in the past that the substance of a specific P.J.B.D. Recommendation should be incorporated in a diplomatic agreement.

1-1000 10014 - June 17-18, 1983

4. (UNCLASSIFIED) DECLASSIFICATION OF WARTIME PJBD RECORDS

The State Department Member presented for the Board's

consideration a request for the declassification of certain wartime PJBD records, in particular Recommendations 1 through 33 and the First Report of the PJBD, which was approved by the Canadian Government on November 14, 1940 and by the United States Government on November 19, 1940. He noted that Recommendations 10, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 28, 32, and 33, as well as the First Report of the Board had already been made public or had been cited in substance in documents in the public domain. The State Department Member said that the Members of the United States Section, as well as their respective Services have agreed that formal action should be taken to declassify PJBD Recommendations 1 to 33 inclusive, and the First Report of the Board. The United States Section hoped that the Canadian Section would also agree that these documents could be declassified in order that they might be available for historical research.

The Canadian Chairman stated that the Canadian Section would recommend concurrence in the declassification of these PJBD records. He noted that the Canadian Section would have to obtain the approval of higher authority before giving a final decision.

50209-40  
93 | ✓

December 30, 1954.

UNITED STATES DEFENCE ACTIVITIES IN CANADA

The principle of joint participation has governed Canadian policy with respect to foreign military activities in Canada. The Ogdensburg Declaration, out of which grew the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, emphasized the joint responsibility of Canada and the United States for the defence of North America, and this theme has dominated the work of the Board for the past fourteen years. While Canada has cooperated fully with the United States in joint defence, the Canadian Government has been insistent on the recognition and preservation of those Canadian rights which affect the sovereignty of Canada.

Wartime Installations in Continued Operation

During the last war there were many U.S. defence activities and installations on Canadian soil, notably the Alaska Highway, a series of airfields, and weather stations. By the end of 1946 Canada had taken over nearly all of the installations. The only exclusively U.S. wartime installations remaining in Canada are:

- (1) The three areas in Newfoundland leased to the United States for 99 years under an agreement made in 1941, that is, prior to the entry of Newfoundland into Confederation. This agreement was modified in 1951 in accordance with the terms of a Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, and recorded  
(....2)

in an Exchange of Notes in February and March 1952. The NATO Status of Forces Agreement was made applicable to the Leased Bases by an Exchange of Notes dated April 28 and 30, 1952. This was followed by the extension to Newfoundland on June 1, 1952, of the Visiting Forces (U.S.A.) Act.

(2) Some land at R.C.A.F. Station Goose Bay. A 20-year lease has been concluded with the United States for the use by the U.S.A.F. of certain areas at Goose Bay. The Exchange of Notes covering the Lease took place on December 5, 1952. On November 28, 1952, it was announced in the House of Commons that permission had been granted for the deployment of a U.S.A.F. interceptor squadron at Goose Bay.

#### Post-War Activities

In addition to the operations at the Leased Bases and at R.C.A.F. Station Goose Bay, the following U.S. activities are now taking place on Canadian soil:

- (1) Joint Arctic Weather Stations. These are five in number and are jointly operated by Canada and the United States, each station being under the command of a Canadian meteorological officer. Strictly speaking, they are not defence installations.
- (2) Continental Radar Defense System. The principal developments during the past year with respect to North American defence have been related

(....3)

to the measures adopted by the Canadian and United States Governments to provide a comprehensive jointly operated system for warning of the approach of hostile aircraft and for the control of interceptor aircraft.

The system will consist of four main elements:

- (a) the main control and warning radar installations in the populated part of Canada (the jointly operated Pinetree network) and in the United States, which are now in operation; as regards the division of costs of the construction, operation and maintenance of the Pinetree stations, the Exchange of Notes of August 1 and 7, 1951, constituting the Pinetree Agreement, provides that this shall be on the basis of approximately one-third by Canada and two-thirds by the United States; the Agreement also provides that Canada may undertake to man stations which are a United States Air Force responsibility: in fact, the R.C.A.F. is already manning some of the stations assigned to the U.S.A.F. in Canada and more may be taken over at some future date if this is considered desirable;
- (b) a warning line north of the settled areas of Canada (the Mid-Canada Line) being built by Canada;
- (c) a warning line across the most northerly

(....4)

practicable part of North America (the Distant Early Warning Line), responsibility for the construction of which has been vested in the United States, although both countries will participate in the project;

(d) seaward extensions to the system on both flanks of the continent by the United States.

The establishment of the Mid-Canada Line, the DEW Line and the seaward extensions is just getting under way. They are large and costly projects being carried out under extremely difficult climatic and geographical circumstances, and will strain the resources available to carry them out.

There are 33 stations in the Pinetree network. Canada is financially responsible for 11, the United States for 22. At present Canada has undertaken to man the 11 stations for which it is financially responsible and 5 stations for which the United States is financially responsible. The effective date for the operation of the whole chain was July 1, 1954. The United States made an additional request through the Permanent Joint Board on Defense in September, 1952, for the establishment of 9 additional temporary radar stations in Canada. Approval to conduct site surveys was given to the United States by Note No. D-85 of April 2, 1953. Cabinet Defence Committee authorized the construction and operation of the stations by the U.S. Air Force, but the United States has not requested permission to begin work. The United States has now reduced the requirement to four stations - two in Ontario, one in British Columbia, and one in Nova Scotia.

The target date for the completion of the Mid-Canada Line is January, 1957, and the estimated cost is in the neighbourhood of \$150 million. It is estimated that it might take from 700 to 1,000 men to operate and maintain the line. The target date for the completion of the Distant Early Warning Line

(....5)

SECRET

SECRET

is mid-1957 and the estimated cost is in the neighbourhood of \$200 million. It is expected that it may take from 700 to 1,000 men to operate and maintain the line. It is anticipated that Canadian participation in the Distant Early Warning Line will be in the operation and maintenance phase rather than in the construction phase. It should be emphasized that the above figures are not much more than educated guesses. The novel character of the projects and the difficulties under which they are being carried out makes it almost impossible to provide accurate cost and manpower estimates.

(3) Global Communications Sites. The United States was granted permission by an Exchange of Notes of November 4 and 8, 1952, to construct and operate global communications facilities near Harmon Leased Base in Newfoundland. The Agreement provides for a flexible form of tenure which, in effect, permits the station to continue in operation only so long as Canada agrees that there is a continuing need for it in the mutual interest of both countries.

SECRET

Similar facilities are to be constructed at Goose Bay under the terms of the Goose Bay Lease, but the authorizing Notes have not yet been exchanged pending preparation of the legal description of the site.

(4) Torbay. The right to use a number of buildings and facilities at Torbay airport for administrative purposes has been granted to the United States on a terminable basis. The airfield is controlled by the R.C.A.F.

SECRET

The United States has been granted a renewable one-year lease (terminable on 30 days notice following consideration by the P.J.B.D.) to occupy all the unused buildings built at Torbay during the last war. The U.S.A.F. has established a general depot at Torbay Airport and makes extensive use of the airfield for administrative flights, since the

(....6)

nearby leased base at Pepperrell Air Force Base has no airfield of its own.

SECRET

(5) Frobisher Bay. In 1951, the United States was given permission to station about 150 men at Frobisher Bay to assist in U.S. operations in the Far North. The R.C.A.F. provides the commanding officer and operates the control tower.

(6) Churchill. There is a detachment of U.S. troops at Churchill working with Canadian forces on cold weather testing of military equipment.

(7) Haines-Fairbanks Pipeline. An Exchange of Notes on June 30, 1953, authorized the United States to construct for military purposes an oil pipeline between Haines and Fairbanks, Alaska, the route of which passes for a distance of 284 miles through the Northwest corner of British Columbia and the Yukon Territory. The United States has been granted an easement for the necessary right-of-way. In addition to meeting the United States needs, the pipeline will also be available to fill Canadian military requirements in the Northwest. When the line is not required for military purposes, civilian needs will be satisfied. The pipeline will be completed during the summer of 1955.

(8) Cape Christian, Baffin Island. The U.S. Coast Guard was authorized by an Exchange of Notes on May 1 and 3, 1954, to construct and operate a Loran (Long-Range Aid to Navigation) station, for the use of ships and aircraft, at Cape Christian, Baffin Island.

(....7)

(9) Shelburne, N.S. Under an Agreement concluded in 1954, an Oceanographic Research Station, to be operated jointly by the Royal Canadian Navy and the United States Navy, is being constructed at Shelburne, N.S. The construction is being done by a U.S. Navy Construction Battalion, using prefabricated materials supplied by the U.S. Navy.

SECRET

The Station is in fact an experimental sound search station for the long-range detection of submarines. The Exchange of Notes of May 1 and 6, 1954, refers to it as a Joint Experimental Station.

(10) Other U.S. Activities. The adoption of reciprocal arrangements under which the Air Forces of each of the two countries may intercept unidentified aircraft over the territory of the other, in accordance with a Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, was announced in the House of Commons on December 1, 1952. Interceptor aircraft must obey the rules of interception procedure laid down by the country over which the interception is made.

Procedures for the movement of ground forces, military equipment, aircraft and ships between the two countries have been much simplified during and since the war. Many joint exercises are carried out in Canada with a minimum of formality.

There are officers of the U.S. forces in Canadian headquarters and formations and Canadian officers in the United States. There is an exchange of students between the Staff Colleges of the two countries.

(....S)

The United States Return for September 30, 1954, lists a total of 14,931 United States servicemen in Canada at 40 locations. Most of these servicemen are at the Leased Bases and at Goose Bay, as shown by the following figures:

Goose Bay (RCAF Station)	3,654
Pepperrell Air Force Base	3,439
Harmon Air Force Base	3,583
Argentia Naval Station	1,290
McAndrew Air Force Base	1,227
	<hr/>
Total	12,953

The number of United States servicemen at other locations, particularly radar stations, is expected to increase, however.

SECRET

File No. 50209-40

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

*File Comb*  
**TOP SECRET**

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS EYES ONLY

*Copy on 50245-40*

December 8, 1954

50209-40  
6/6

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Attached for your information is the first of two papers by Defence Liaison (1) Division dealing with the air defence of North America. It outlines the nature of the very large programme for the establishment of air defence installations in Canada which we expect will be put forward by the United States for the period 1955 - 1960. The second paper, which is now in course of preparation, will deal with the problems which the implementation of the programme would raise for Canada and will suggest some possible courses of action.

2. In preparing these papers extensive use has been made of information which has been obtained "at the working level" from officers of the RCAF and USAF Air Defence Commands. The Chiefs of Staff would of course object strenuously if they knew that the information obtained in this way was being used to depict a programme which has yet to be submitted to the Chiefs themselves, let alone approved by them. For this reason the papers are being marked for "External Affairs Eyes Only". Experience has shown, however, that previous prognostications of this type prepared in External Affairs had proved to be quite accurate and it seems to me that even with the necessary limitation on their circulation these papers are well worth preparing for use within the Department.

*I suggest it would be inadvisable to mention this memo to your colleagues for the moment at least*  
*RAM.*

*RAM*

J. L.

*8.12.40(us)*

**FILE COPY**

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET** ~~TOP SECRET~~

**REDUIT A SECRET** EXTERNAL AFFAIRS EYES ONLY

THE AIR DEFENCE OF NORTH AMERICA - I

INTRODUCTION

1. On January 21, 1954, following a visit to Headquarters, USAF Air Defence Command, at Colorado Springs, the Canadian Section of the PJBD prepared a report summarizing the information obtained. The report stated:

"The most important conclusion to be drawn from all the discussions on the threat is that responsible United States officials are firmly of the opinion that the Soviet Union has now, or will have shortly, the capability of launching an atomic attack on North America on a scale sufficient to eliminate this continent as an effective source of resistance to the achievement of Soviet objectives. For this reason, the United States officials assert that, even to provide a margin of protection sufficient only to keep our losses to the point where we would have the ability to recuperate and retaliate, the North American air defence system must be greatly expanded and that it is necessary that this be done rapidly."

The report also stated that the features of the USAF presentation which the Canadian Section of the PJBD considered to be of most immediate importance to Canada were the expression of the United States Air Defence Command belief:

- "(a) in the necessity for an early warning line along the Arctic coast from Alaska to Baffin Island in addition to the line along the 55th parallel;

- 2 -

- (b) that integration of the North American air defence system is desirable;
- (c) that the depth of the "combat area" should be increased. Presumably this would mean fighter or guided missile bases in Canada."

2. Since the PJBD report was prepared, the United States H-Bomb tests have demonstrated the incredible power of thermonuclear weapons, analyses of the Russian H-Bomb tests of a year ago have revealed that the Soviet Union has a weapon as powerful as that of the United States, and the Soviet high-performance jet bomber has made its bow (at the last May Day parade). For some years there has been general agreement in the United States that North American defences against air attack are inadequate and that this situation must be corrected as rapidly as possible, but these events of the past few months have had the effect of converting into enthusiastic supporters many responsible United States officials who had previously questioned the scale and timing of the programme proposed by the U. S. Air Defence Command. Particular importance is attached to the protection of the Strategic Air Command bases required for the launching of retaliatory forces.

#### AIR DEFENCE PLAN

3. In the light of these facts it is clear that the United States will bend every effort during the next few years to build an air defence system capable of coping with high performance jet bombers armed with nuclear weapons. The main framework of this air defence system is already in being, but it still needs to have a roof put on it and be walled in. The basic plan, upon which the air defence experts of both countries are in general agreement should be in operation by 1960, is as follows:

- 3 -

- (a) Establishment of a distant early warning line as far away from the settled parts of the continent as possible, and long enough so that it cannot be avoided by "end-running tactics." The ultimate objective on the Atlantic side would be to tie the line to the European warning system. In the Pacific it will run from Alaska to Hawaii, and ultimately it might be extended as far as Wake Island.
- (b) Creation of a "combat area", with facilities for the control of intercepting aircraft and missiles, extending for as great a distance from the major target complexes as possible. The existing control facilities and interceptor bases are situated on the immediate fringe of the principal target areas. The next step will be to build a tactical early warning line about 400 miles ahead of existing installations. In Canada this will be the "Mongoose" or "55th parallel" line. In the United States sector this tactical early warning will be furnished by radar lines running down both the East and West coasts about 100 - 200 miles offshore and consisting of a combination of picket ships<sup>x</sup>, aircraft and "Texas Towers"<sup>†</sup>.

<sup>x</sup> Picket ships are small ships about the size of frigates or weather ships, equipped with radar and stationed at sea to detect aircraft approaching North America.

<sup>†</sup> Texas towers are "islands" anchored to the bed of the continental shelf about 100 miles offshore and equipped with radar. They were named after the oil drilling towers used off the coast of Texas.

. . . 4

- 4 -

As rapidly as possible after the tactical early warning lines are established, the control area will be expanded by the installation of additional heavy radar, until it reaches the tactical early warning line, thus extending the combat zone by about 400 miles to the North and 200 miles to the East and West.

- (c) Utilization of long-range interceptor aircraft and guided missiles to take advantage of the increased depth of the combat zone and to engage hostile aircraft at the greatest possible distance from their targets.
- (d) Utilization of close-support interceptors and short-range "anti-aircraft" guided missiles in the protection of specific urban areas, key bases, etc.

#### AIR DEFENCE PROGRAMME

4. Implementation of this plan, particularly by the target date of 1960, will be a tremendous task, and can only be accomplished by the willing partnership of the two countries. The initial tasks which concern Canada directly are as follows:

- (a) construction and operation of the Mongoose line by Canada - target date for operation January 1, 1957;
- (b) construction and operation of DEW line along the Arctic coast, primarily by the United States but with Canadian participation - target date for operation mid-1957;
- (c) modification of existing Pinetree radar stations to increase detecting height from

- 5 -

40,000 to 65,000 feet, the necessary equipment becoming available early in 1957;

- (d) adoption of much more stringent civil air regulations to compel aircraft to cross radar lines through designated corridors and to file flight plans - this matter is now under discussion between the RCAF and the Department of Transport and will probably require enabling legislation.

5. In addition to the above projects, which are already "on the programme", it can be expected that the following proposals will be put forward within the next few months:

- (a) installation of up to 110 semi-automatic gap-filler radars in the Pinetree system;
- (b) construction of five additional heavy radar stations to improve the coverage over the Gulf of St. Lawrence;
- (c) construction of eight heavy radar stations to close the gaps in the Pinetree chain between Manitoba and British Columbia, and the construction of six heavy radars north of the existing Pinetree stations in Northern Ontario to give added depth to the coverage in that area.

6. All the above measures are aimed at the improvement of warning and control facilities. There remains the question of how hostile aircraft can effectively be intercepted. The most immediate problem, of common concern to both the RCAF and the USAF, is that the long-range all-weather interceptor aircraft now in service do not have an effective ceiling high

. . . 6

- 6 -

enough to engage jet bombers at the altitude at which the latter can be expected to operate. How long it will be before improved interceptors can come into service remains to be seen, although it is hoped that it will be possible to raise the ceiling of the CF-100 to 53,000 feet by 1956 and to 58,000 feet by 1958. It is doubtful that the new Canadian interceptor (CF-105) will be available until 1959.

7. The first anti-aircraft guided missiles (Nike) are now coming into service in the United States, and the Canadian Services are considering obtaining a supply for Canadian use. One consequence of the adoption of Nike by the United States is that the long-deferred problem of the defence of border cities, e.g. Detroit, Niagara Falls, and Buffalo, and the stationing of U.S. anti-aircraft installations on Canadian territory, is likely to come to a head in the not-distant future.

8. At a later date - during the period 1959 - 1961 - the United States will be ready to proceed with the installation of long-range interceptor missiles, possibly armed with atomic war-heads. It may not be necessary for these G.M. units to be based in Canada, but the missiles themselves will be intended to function over Canadian territory, thus giving rise to difficult operational and control problems.

9. The United States has been giving a great deal of thought to the economics of air defence, and the current view in the U. S. Defence Department is that for the period prior to the time when the enemy can be expected to rely on inter-continental ballistic missiles<sup>x</sup>, the only way of obtaining a sufficiently high attrition

<sup>x</sup> A ballistic missile is one which is fired as a projectile and follows a ballistic trajectory, e.g. the V-2.

- 7 -

rate at a cost which would be within the bounds of reason is for our continental defence forces to use atomic weapons against enemy aircraft. The primary weapons would be air-to-air missiles armed with atomic warheads. They would be carried by our long-range interceptors and fired at the enemy while he was over the uninhabited parts of the continent (i.e. Canada) and over the ocean approaches. The development of these weapons is already in hand and will be pressed forward as rapidly as possible. It is expected that they will come into service in the autumn of 1956.

#### THE OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

10. It should be understood that all these measures, costly as they are, have only a transitory value. The day of the intercontinental ballistic missile is rapidly approaching, - current U. S. intelligence estimates assign to the Soviet Union the capability of having such a weapon in service by 1963 and possibly as early as 1960. Even if this estimate anticipates the event by a number of years the fact remains that within a relatively short period of time we shall be confronted with a weapon against which at this time there is no known effective defence.

#### PROBLEMS FACING THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT

11. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the programme outlined in this paper is not just a cloud on the horizon - it is a storm overhead. Over the period of the next five years the United States is going to press for the establishment in Canada of a series of costly defence installations. Stemming from this are a host of difficult problems with which the Canadian Government must come to grips. The following are some of the more important of these problems:

- 8 -

- (a) To what extent will Canada have, as a measure of sovereignty, to participate financially in, and to man these installations?
- (b) Where is the money and the manpower to be obtained, and to what extent will Canada have to reduce her NATO commitments to meet this requirement?
- (c) Will the existing arrangements for command and control be adequate, and if not, what steps should Canada take to ensure that the air defence system operates with maximum effectiveness and that at the same time Canadian interests are protected?
- (d) What is to be the Canadian policy with respect to the use of atomic weapons for defence and the arming of Canadian forces with atomic weapons?

12. In particular, the problem of command and control requires urgent consideration, since it will become increasingly difficult to modify current plans in the best interest of Canada as the costly programme for the provision of communications facilities advances during the coming year. A separate memorandum on this question is now being prepared.

*File Wm-B* **FILE COPY**

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

TOP SECRET

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS EYES ONLY

THE AIR DEFENCE OF NORTH AMERICA - II

In the preceding paper on the air defence of North America an account was given of the air defence plans and programme which the United States proposes for the period 1955-60. The purpose of this paper is to report on the most recent developments, as evidenced in the discussions which took place at the meeting of the Canada - United States Military Study Group (MSG) on February 7 and 8, 1955, at the U. S. Continental Air Defense Command Headquarters, Colorado Springs, and to comment on the implications for Canada arising therefrom. General Chidlaw, the Commanding General of Continental Air Defense Command (CONAD), and his senior staff officers, participated in most of the discussions.

2. The proceedings opened with a briefing by Major General Bergquist, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, CONAD. He outlined the U. S. air defence concept and programme for the next five years in almost exactly the same terms as were used in the External Affairs paper which preceded this one. In particular he drew attention to the plan to extend the interceptor control area (by the installation of 27 heavy radars) until it reaches the tactical early warning line, thus extending the combat zone by about 400 miles to the North and from 400 to 600 miles off both the Pacific and Atlantic coasts of the United States. The capacity of the interceptor control system is to be increased by the installation of

- 2 -

expensive semi-automatic electronic "tracking" equipment. Mention was also made of the intention to utilize long-range interceptor aircraft and guided missiles to take advantage of the increased depth of the combat zone and to engage hostile aircraft at the greatest possible distance from their targets. (See Charts Nos. 1 and 2 attached.) General Bergquist emphasized that the RCAF Air Defence Command had been consulted in the development of the plan, and that both the United States and Canadian ADCs were in general agreement as to the military necessity for the measures proposed. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff were in agreement with the concept, and funds for part of the programme (21 heavy radars) had been included in the 1956-57 budget.

3. Before proceeding to an account of the next phase of the MSG discussions it is necessary to recount a bit of past history. About 8 months ago the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, aware that the United States was likely to propose a major expansion of the North American air defence programme, authorized the RCAF ADC to enter into planning discussions with the USAF ADC, it being understood that no commitment was involved on either side. It was only at this time that the RCAF learned the full details of the USAF programme. The position of the RCAF was made more difficult by the fact that for some time the USAF ADC, assuming that Canada would not likely be willing or able to increase its commitments, had been developing plans in the expectation that the United States would have to provide and man all air defence installations required south of the Mid-Canada line (55th parallel) between the east end of Lake Superior and the western ranges of the Rocky Mountains.

4. The RCAF ADC, in approaching the problem, recognized the case for the establishment of large military installations and the development of elaborate and costly communications facilities in Canada in order to meet the threat of jet bombers armed with thermo-nuclear weapons. The ADC considered however that if

- 3 -

this were done in accordance with the United States assumptions regarding the level of Canadian participation, the resulting position would be intolerable for Canada. It would make a fiction of the existing command arrangements, based as they are on the concept that each country maintains command and control over all forces operating within its own territory. If the existing arrangements were continued they would nominally give control to the Canadian air defence commander over operations in Canada, but the absence of any Canadian air defence machinery in large areas of the country would make it impossible to exercise control effectively. Moreover the philosophy expressed in these arrangements does not provide for the situation which will develop when, in the course of the next four or five years, guided missile installations are established in the United States which will be aimed at potential targets over Canada.

5. As a consequence of the RCAF analysis of the situation from the Canadian point of view, the two ADCs launched a new command study, ignoring the existing arrangements and basing their work on two fundamental military precepts; the first, that the air defence of North America is an indivisible responsibility and that operational control should therefore be vested in a single commander; and second, that the forces assigned to the task must face in the probable directions of enemy approach and hold positions in sufficient depth to fight effectively.

6. The second phase of the MSG discussions consisted of a presentation by Air Commodore Annis, of RCAF ADC, of the plan which had been jointly developed by the two ADCs to reflect the concepts described above, it being understood that the proposals it incorporated represented the planners views only, and had not as yet been "bought" even by the Air Defence Commanders, let alone by any higher authority.

. . . 4

- 4 -

7. The plan envisages a Combined Air Defence Command Headquarters, headed by a U. S. officer. In peacetime he would be responsible for the operational standards of the air defence forces, and for planning of training exercises. Disposition of national forces and forward planning would continue to be under the control of U. S. or Canadian authorities as appropriate, and would be carried out in consultation with one another as at present. The RCAF describes this by the phrase "planning in unison" as contrasted with "integrated planning".

8. Under the Combined Air Defence Command there would be three Combined Air Defence Forces, North, East and West (see Chart No. 3). The Combined Northern Air Defence Force would be under command of a Canadian with an American deputy commander, and the area for which it would be responsible would embrace all of the settled parts of Canada with the exception of the British Columbia coastal area and the Eastern Townships - Maritime Provinces area. These areas would of course be parts of the Combined Western and Eastern Air Defence Forces respectively. The Northern Air Defence Force would consist of from 40,000 to 60,000 men, of which from 10,000 to 30,000 would be stationed in Canada. It would incorporate most of Canada's existing air defence forces, the balance being made up either of Canadians obtained from some other source, or of U.S.A.F. personnel. The numbers of personnel to be stationed in Canada would hinge on the question of whether fighters can operate effectively from south of the international boundary or whether additional bases are required in Canada. In the opinion of the RCAF planners there should be ten additional fighter bases in Canada in order to ensure that the air battle would be fought north of, rather than over, the heavily populated parts of the country. This would mean that the number of forces in Canada would be nearer the upper limit of 30,000 than the lower limit of 10,000 mentioned above.

. . . 5

- 5 -

9. The Western and Eastern Air Defence Forces would be commanded by United States officers with Canadian representation appropriate to the extent of participation by Canadian forces in these areas. The general principle that when an officer of one nation was in command his deputy would be from the other nation, would extend throughout that part of the command structure in which Canada would have an interest.

10. A number of significant points emerged from the discussion which followed this presentation. First, and possibly the most important, was the conviction of the American representatives that, irrespective of the organization to be adopted, the physical programme must be carried through substantially as planned. Their text was the recent statement by President Eisenhower that maintenance of the deterrent effect of Strategic Air Command and the development of an effective continental air defence were the two highest priority items in the United States military programme today, and they made it clear their views on air defence requirements were those of their Government.

11. A second point was that the Americans made no secret of the fact that the Continental Air Defence Command, which was created only last autumn, is a shaky edifice, and that there were strong differences of opinion between General Chidlaw and his army and navy deputies on the air defence tasks of the three services, and their coordination. This became particularly evident to the Canadians in the course of the discussion on the role of short range guided missiles such as Nike, and their deployment around heavily populated industrial areas, including such border cities as Detroit, Niagara Falls and Buffalo.

. . . 6

- 6 -

12. It was clear that although the U.S. A.D.C. recognized the military logic of the proposed combined command structure it anticipated that it might have considerable difficulty in convincing its Government that it should accept the necessity for vesting responsibility for the protection of a large area of that country in a Canadian air defence commander. The Canadians pointed out that this was a kind of difficulty with which they were not unfamiliar. General Chidlaw expressed the personal opinion that sooner or later some form of integration was inevitable, although he hoped that before it came he would have some time to put his own house in order. He added that in any event he thought that the initiative for any such move should come from Canada. This view was reiterated by a number of the other U. S. officers present.

13. There was considerable discussion of the time-relationship between the adoption of a combined command structure and the development of the installations and communications in the two countries over the next few years. The planners argued with conviction that a decision to establish a combined command structure, or at least to work in that direction, should be taken at once. They asserted that if this were not done the communications, combat direction centres, and other items of "infrastructure" would not be able to be adjusted at a later date except at very large expense and dislocation. In other words the communications and related facilities required for the semi-automatic operation of the air defence system which are now in the early stages of installation would have to be drastically re-arranged if the system of command were to be changed, and the longer the delay the greater the difficulty (and the greater the opposition). As the RCAF ADC sees the situation the existing command arrangements, organization, and plans for the deployment of weapons would not be the best for the air defence of the United States and Canada, although it is probably sufficiently effective that in the face

. . . 7

- 7 -

of internal difficulties, the United States authorities will not, of themselves, seek to change them. If Canada considers that the situation is developing in a manner detrimental to her interests (and the RCAF ADC believes that it is) then she must take the lead in pressing for a change.

14. It should be understood that at the present time the above views are held by RCAF ADC only. RCAF Headquarters has not yet made up its mind as to the position it should take. The ADC plans, if adopted, would require additional resources which presumably could be supplied only at the expense of some other commitment, e.g. the Air Division in Europe. RCAF HQ, in making recommendations to the Chiefs of Staff and the Government must therefore seek to balance the importance of its various operational responsibilities. Its judgment is bound to be affected by its reluctance to put itself in a position where its primary, if not its sole operational role is one of home defence.

15. Now that the subject has been raised in the MSG, the Chairman of the Canadian Section, who is the Vice Chief of the Air Staff, proposes to tell the story to the Air Staff and then to the Chiefs of Staff Committee. If the Chiefs of Staff give no indication of acting, or if, as they have sometimes done in the past, they take the position that unless or until the ADC plan is put forward as a formal requirement there is nothing for them to consider, then perhaps the Department of External Affairs should consider what it might do to have the matter considered by Ministers.

EXTRACT FROM

MINUTES OF 4/54 MEETING, M.C.C.

50209-140  
52/57  
Dec. 1 - 7, 1954

VI Review of Current Military Operating Requirements

- b. MIT Summer Study Group - Project LAMPLIGHT  
Ref.: Item XII d, Minutes of MCC Meeting 3/54  
MCCM-428

(CONFIDENTIAL) The United States Chairman referred to previous Minutes concerning Project LAMPLIGHT. He advised the Committee of his

understanding that the final report is expected by February, 1955. However, a briefing on the Study Group findings will be given sometime in January.

The Canadian Chairman brought up the subject of MCC representation at this briefing. He stated that, in view of the nature and scope of the LAMPLIGHT studies, it might be useful for the MCC to attend the briefing as a Committee and that a suggestion to this effect might be made to the appropriate United States authorities. Following discussion by the Committee, it was concluded that since there was a possibility certain members of the MCC might be attending the briefing in other capacities, the MCC as a Committee should wait until the list of those attending the briefing became available before taking any action.

It was agreed that the two Chairman would discuss the matter at the appropriate time possibly early in January.

*Extract from Minutes of MCC  
Meeting 3/54 held in Sept 54*

REVIEW OF CURRENT MILITARY OPERATING REQUIREMENTS

57209-46  
58 50

d. MIT Summer Study Group - Project "LAMPLIGHT"

The U.S. Chairman referred to MCCM-428, 10 August 54, in which the U.S. Section advised that some degree of coordination with various Canadian agencies might be desirable with regard to Project LAMPLIGHT. The U.S. Chairman asked if the meeting could be informed of any developments in this connection on the Canadian side.

The Canadian Chairman replied that two officials of MIT, the organization responsible for the supervision of the study, had been in Ottawa recently to invite Canadian participation. The Canadian Chairman continued that the decision had now been taken to include a group of ten Canadians, comprised of seven civilians from the Canadian Defense Research Board and three members of the Canadian Armed Forces, in the study.

The Canadian Chairman also mentioned the fact that it now appeared the terms of reference for the study had been expanded to provide for a thorough examination of the problem of air defense of the land mass of North America as well as the sea approaches to the continent. During discussion of the project, the question was raised concerning the relationship of the study to the Military Study Group (MSG) which, it was pointed out, had been formed to study the air defense of North America. The Canadian Chairman stated that one of the main reasons the MSG had been formed was so that agreed recommendations for an effective air defense system could be submitted to both governments. He continued that, in his opinion, any findings or recommendations arising from Project LAMPLIGHT would be in the nature of advice to the U.S. organizations sponsoring the project. Before any such recommendations could become part of jointly approved Canada-U.S. plans, they would have to be processed through one of the established agencies; e. g. the MSG or the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC).

The U.S. Chairman agreed that this was his understanding of the project as well.

tem XII

Review of Current Military Operating Requirements (Cont'd)

The Committee noted that the written report of Project LAMPLIGHT would probably be available by 1 February 55 and that an oral briefing would be given on the findings of the project at MIT sometime during January 1955.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS EYES ONLY

THE AIR DEFENCE OF NORTH AMERICA

INTRODUCTION

1. On January 21, 1954, following a visit to Headquarters, USAF Air Defence Command, at Colorado Springs, the Canadian Section of the PJBD prepared a report summarizing the information obtained. The report stated:

"The most important conclusion to be drawn from all the discussions on the threat is that responsible United States officials are firmly of the opinion that the Soviet Union has now, or will have shortly, the capability of launching an atomic attack on North America on a scale sufficient to eliminate this continent as an effective source of resistance to the achievement of Soviet objectives. For this reason, the United States Officials assert that, even to provide a margin of protection sufficient only to keep our losses to the point where we would have the ability to recuperate and retaliate, the North American air defence system must be greatly expanded and that it is necessary that this be done rapidly."

The report also stated that the features of the USAF presentation which the Canadian Section of the PJBD considered to be of most immediate importance to Canada were the expression of the United States Air Defence Command belief:

- "(a) in the necessity for an early warning line along the Arctic coast from Alaska to Baffin Island in addition to the line along the 55th parallel;
- (b) that integration of the North American air defence system is desirable;

- 2 -

(c) that the depth of the "combat area" should be increased. Presumably this would mean fighter or guided missile bases in Canada."

2. Since the PJBD report was prepared, the United States H-Bomb tests have demonstrated the incredible power of thermonuclear weapons, analyses of the Russian H-Bomb tests of a year ago have revealed that the Soviet Union has a weapon as powerful as that of the United States, and the Soviet high-performance jet bomber has made its bow (at the last May Day parade). For some years there has been general agreement in the United States that North American defences against air attack are inadequate and that this situation must be corrected as rapidly as possible, but these events of the past few months have had the effect of converting into enthusiastic supporters many responsible United States officials who had previously questioned the scale and timing of the program proposed by the U.S. Air Defence Command.

#### AIR DEFENCE PLAN

3. In the light of these facts it is clear that the United States will bend every effort during the next few years to build an air defence system capable of coping with high performance jet bombers armed with nuclear weapons. The main framework of this air defence system is already in being, but it still needs to have a roof put on it and be walled in. The basic plan, upon which the air defence experts of both countries are in general agreement should be in operation by 1960, is as follows:

(a) Establishment of a distant early warning line as far away from the settled parts of the continent as possible, and long enough so that it cannot be avoided by "end-running tactics."

- 3 -

The ultimate objective on the Atlantic side would be to tie the line to the European warning system. In the Pacific it will run from Alaska to Hawaii, and ultimately it might be extended as far as Wake Island.

- (b) Creation of a "combat area", with facilities for the control of intercepting aircraft and missiles, extending for as great a distance from the major target complexes as possible. The existing control facilities and interceptor bases are situated on the immediate fringe of the principal target areas. The next step will be to build a tactical early warning line about 400 miles ahead of existing installations. In Canada this will be the "Mongoose" or "55th parallel" line. In the United States sector this tactical early warning will be furnished by radar lines running down both the East and West coasts about 100 - 200 miles offshore and consisting of a combination of picket ships<sup>x</sup>, aircraft and "Texas Towers"<sup>†</sup>. As rapidly as possible after the tactical early warning lines are established, the control area will be expanded by the installation of additional heavy radar, until it reaches the tactical early warning line, thus extending the combat zone by about 400 miles to the North and 200 miles to the East and West.

<sup>x</sup> Picket ships are small ships about the size of frigates or weather ships, equipped with radar and stationed at sea to detect aircraft approaching North America.

<sup>†</sup> Texas towers are "islands" anchored to the bed of the continental shelf about 100 miles offshore and equipped with radar. They were named after the oil drilling towers used off the coast of Texas.

- 4 -

- (c) Utilization of long-range interceptor aircraft and guided missiles to take advantage of the increased depth of the combat zone and to engage hostile aircraft at the greatest possible distance from their targets.
- (d) Utilization of close-support interceptors and short-range "anti-aircraft" guided missiles in the protection of specific urban areas, key bases, etc.

#### AIR DEFENCE PROGRAMME

4. Implementation of this plan, particularly by the target date of 1960, will be a tremendous task, and can only be accomplished by the willing partnership of the two countries. The initial tasks which concern Canada directly are as follows:

- (a) construction and operation of the Mongoose line by Canada - target date for operation January 1, 1957;
- (b) construction and operation of DEW line along the Arctic coast, primarily by the United States but with Canadian participation - target date for operation uncertain - possibly 1958;
- (c) modification of existing Pinetree radar stations to increase detecting height from 40,000 to 55,000 feet, to be completed by mid - 1956;
- (d) adoption of much more stringent civil air regulations to compel aircraft to cross radar lines through designated corridors and to file flight plans - this matter is now under discussion between the RCAF and the Department of Transport and will probably require enabling legislation.

- 5 -

5. In addition to the above projects, which are already "on the programme", it can be expected that the following proposals will be put forward within the next few months:

- (a) installation of up to 60 semi-automatic gap-filler radars in the Pinetree system;
- (b) construction of additional heavy radar stations to improve the coverage over the Gulf of St. Lawrence;
- (c) construction of heavy radar stations to close the gaps in the Pinetree chain between Manitoba and British Columbia, and possibly the construction of additional heavy radar north of the existing Pinetree stations in Northern Ontario to give added depth to the coverage in that area.

6. All the above measures are aimed at the improvement of warning and control facilities. There remains the question of how hostile aircraft can effectively be intercepted. The most immediate problem, of common concern to both the RCAF and the USAF, is that the long-range all-weather interceptor aircraft now in service do not have an effective ceiling high enough to engage jet bombers at the altitude at which the latter can be expected to operate. How long it will be before improved interceptors can come into service is obscure, but 2 to 3 years is probably an optimistic estimate. It is doubtful that the new Canadian interceptor (CF-105) will be available until 1959.

7. The first anti-aircraft guided missiles (Nike) are now coming into service in the United States, and the Canadian Services are considering obtaining a supply for Canadian use. One consequence of the adoption of Nike by the United States is that the long-deferred problem of the defence of border cities, e.g. Detroit, Niagara Falls, and Buffalo, and the

stationing of U.S. anti-aircraft installations on Canadian territory, is likely to come to a head in the not-distant future.

8. At a later date - perhaps 5 years from now - the United States will be ready to proceed with the installation of long-range interceptor missiles, possibly armed with atomic war-heads. It may not be necessary for these G.M. units to be based in Canada, but the missiles themselves will be intended to function over Canadian territory, thus giving rise to operational and control problems, the answers to which it is difficult to foresee at this time.

9. The United States has been giving a great deal of thought to the economics of air defence, and the current view in the U.S. Defence Department is that for the period prior to the time when the enemy can be expected to rely on inter-continental ballistic missiles<sup>a</sup>, the only way of obtaining a sufficiently high attrition rate at a cost which would be within the bounds of reason is for our continental defence forces to use atomic weapons against enemy aircraft. The primary weapons would be air-to-air missiles armed with atomic warheads. They would be carried by our long-range interceptors and fired at the enemy while he was over the uninhabited parts of the continent (i.e. Canada) and over the ocean approaches. The development of these weapons is already in hand and will be pressed forward as rapidly as possible. They might well come into service in the next two or three years.

<sup>a</sup> A ballistic missile is one which is fired as a projectile and follows a ballistic trajectory, e.g. the V-2.

- 7 -

### THE PROBLEM FOR THE FUTURE

10. It should be understood that all these measures, costly as they are, have only a transitory value. The day of the intercontinental ballistic missile is rapidly approaching, - current U.S. intelligence estimates assign to the Soviet Union the capability of having such a weapon in service by 1960. Even if this estimate anticipates the event by a number of years the fact remains that within a relatively short period of time we shall be confronted with a weapon against which at this time there is no known effective defence.

### CONCLUSIONS

11. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the programme outlined in this paper is not just a cloud on the horizon - it is a storm overhead. Over the period of the next five years the United States is going to press for the establishment in Canada of a series of costly defence installations. Stemming from this are a host of difficult problems with which the Canadian Government must come to grips. The following are some of the more important of these problems:

- (a) To what extent will Canada have, as a measure of sovereignty, to participate financially in, and to man these installations?
- (b) Where is the money and the manpower to be obtained, and to what extent will Canada have to reduce her NATO commitments to meet this requirement?
- (c) Will the existing arrangements for command and control be adequate, and if not, what steps should Canada take to ensure that the air defence system operates with maximum effectiveness and that at the same time Canadian interests are protected?

- 8 -

(d) What is to be the Canadian policy with respect to the use of atomic weapons for defence and the arming of Canadian forces with atomic weapons?

12. In the past the Canadian Government has considered continental defence problems on very much of an ad hoc basis, attempting to settle each issue as it arose without relating it, except incidentally, to the larger picture. It would seem desirable that in future they should be approached on a different basis, taking into account probable subsequent developments.

Department of External Affairs,  
Ottawa, Ontario.  
September 21, 1954.

# INCOMING MESSAGE

# ORIGINAL

**FROM: THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, CANADIAN EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.**

**TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA**

Security Classification

**UNCLASSIFIED**

File No.  
*51209-40*

*52* | *50*

Priority

System  
**EN CLAIR**

No. **WA-951**

Date **May 28, 1954.** *Q.12*

Departmental  
Circulation

MINISTER  
UNDER/SEC  
D/UNDER/SEC  
A/UNDER/SEC'S  
POL/CO-ORD'N  
SECTION

Reference: Our letter No. 902 of May 22.

Subject: Proposed article on continental defence.

William A. Ulman has been in touch with us several times in the past week for information as to whether his request for interviews with Canadian authorities on the subject of continental defence will be granted. I would be grateful if you could let us know in the near future what decision is taken on Ulman's request which was dealt with in our letter under reference.

D - 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

DONE - COMALS SECTION

Date **31 MAY 1954**

References

*Refer*

*CCOS*

*American Div*

*DL (2)*

*Press Office*

*+ files*

*WMB*

*JH*

**5/31/54**

Security **CONFIDENTIAL**

MESSAGE FORM  
**OUTGOING**

File No. 50209-40	
54	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST, WASHINGTON

Message To Be Sent

AIR CYPHER

EN CLAIR

CODE

CYPHER

No. **EX-907**

Date May 28, 1954

For Communications Section Only  
**SENT - MAY 28 1954**

Priority

ORIGINATOR

(Signature)

**W.H.BARTON/jf**

(Name Typed)

Div. **D.L.(1)**

Local Tel. **7509**

APPROVED BY

(Signature)

(Name Typed)

Internal Distribution:

S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.

American *Done 3/11/54*

D.L.(2) *May 31/54*

Press Office *Inf. Div.*

Done **JF**

Date **6/1/54**

Copies Referred To:

**CCOS**

Done **JF**

Date **6/1/54**

Ext. 97 (Rev. 1/52)

**REFERENCE:** Your letter No. 902 of May 22.

**SUBJECT:** Proposed Article on Continental Defence.  
 Following from the <sup>Act's</sup> Under-Secretary.

1. I have discussed this matter with the Minister who feels that it is of some importance to know whether Ulman's articles have been commissioned by the Saturday Evening Post and the Reader's Digest, or whether he is preparing them on his own initiative in the expectation that these magazines will buy them. He also thought that it would be helpful to know just how far the United States Air Force is going in making available the information required for the articles. Possibly the Air Attache could help you in obtaining the answers to these questions.

2. The Minister is tentatively of the opinion that if the articles have been commissioned by the Saturday Evening Post and Reader's Digest, and if the USAF is genuinely co-operating then it would probably be desirable for the Canadian Government to do likewise. Any assistance, however, would be given only on the clear understanding that the article must be submitted to the Canadian authorities for security clearance and for vetting as to accuracy of facts.

3. We are referring your letter to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, in order to obtain the views of the

28.5.38/05)

- 2 -

Department of National Defence.

4. Of course, nothing should be said to Tulman on the basis of this telegram as we do not yet know the views of the Department of National Defence.

RECEIVED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1954 MAY 28 PM 4:57

001152

Refer to  
American  
D.L.(2)  
Press Office of *Def. Div.*

*Done 74*  
*31/5/54.*

CONFIDENTIAL

May 28, 1954

File No. 50209-40.

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,  
Department of National Defence,  
"A" Building,  
Ottawa, Ontario.

50209-40
54   50

Proposed Article on Continental Defence

Attached for your information is a copy of letter No. 902 from our Embassy in Washington, dated May 22, 1954, regarding an approach made to the Embassy by Wm. A. Ulman for assistance in the preparation of an article on continental defence. I should be grateful for your comments and for your views as to what reply should be made. You will recall that Ulman made a previous approach last October but was turned down.

2. I have discussed the matter with my Minister who considered that it was of some importance to know whether the article has been commissioned by the Saturday Evening Post and the Reader's Digest, or whether it is being prepared on the author's initiative. My Minister also thought that it would be useful to know how much assistance was being extended to the author by the United States Air Force. If the article has been commissioned, and if the USAF is co-operating, my Minister is tentatively of the opinion that it would be desirable for the Canadian Government to give assistance to Mr. Ulman subject to the requirement that the article be submitted for security clearance before publication. Attached is a copy of a telegram to our Embassy in Washington asking that an attempt be made to find the answers to the questions outlined above.

...2

- 2 -

3. Incidentally, it is our understanding that some months ago Mr. Serrell Hillman of Time Magazine approached the Deputy Minister of National Defence with a proposal to do an article on continental defence. Presumably if it were decided that the Canadian Government should assist Mr. Ulman, it would be desirable to consider giving the same kind of help to Mr. Hillman.

R. A. MacKAY

Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

COPY

50209-40  
WAB

Minister of National Defence

Ottawa, May 27, 1954.

Secret

General The Honourable A.G.L. McNaughton,  
P.C., C.H., C.B., C.M.B., D.S.O., M.Sc., LL.D.,  
Chairman,  
Canadian Section,  
Permanent Joint Board on Defence,  
East Block,  
Ottawa.

*Correspondence  
given to WAB by  
Gen. McNaughton  
WAB*

50209-40  
54 | 54

Dear Andy:

Enclosed is a copy of a letter from our Embassy at Washington, together with a copy of my reply and of the enclosures referred to in it.

I also enclose a copy of a letter from Arnold Heeney to me dated May 21 and of my reply to him.

In your relations with Dr. Hannah you are probably in a better position than anyone to find out what the Administration's attitude is and why Mr. Cole is taking the line he is.

Like everything else relating to continental defence, the matter is of such great importance to us and to our future relations with the United States that we must deal with it firmly but with the utmost discretion.

Yours sincerely,

(signed) Brooke Claxton

COPY

Ottawa, May 25, 1954.

CONFIDENTIAL

A. D. P. Heeney, Esq.,  
Canadian Ambassador to the United States,  
Washington, D.C.,  
U.S.A.

**FILE COPY**

Dear Arnold,

Reference your letter No. 828, May 13, 1954  
Subject: Continental Defence

When I saw Secretary of Defense Wilson on May 5, we discussed the speech by Representative Cole on April 29, in which he indicated his intention to introduce a bill to create the position of Assistant Secretary for Continental Defence. Mr. Wilson said that in his view this was not the way to deal with the matter. To appoint a new Assistant Secretary for a specific purpose would be like adding a fifth wheel to the coach.

Of course, this is obvious. There is no more reason for having an Assistant Secretary for a subject like continental defence than there would be to have an Assistant Secretary for any other geographical area. Any need for coordinating United States defence activities as between the Navy, Army, Air Force and any other agencies is a general need, to be dealt with generally and not by the appointment of a new official to deal with part of the field.

I think it will be found that in the United States Air Force alone, the lines are by no means clear. This, however, is largely due to the general difficulties inherent in the system of command of the USAF and most other air forces which almost of necessity have to combine one system of command over defined geographical areas and another system of command dealing with different functional operations, such as strategical command, air defence command, military air transport command, training command, air matériel command, etc., extending over most if not all of the geographical areas.

In his speech Representative Cole referred to negotiations between Canada and the United States having been pending for two years. As this is not the case, I felt it necessary to write Secretary Wilson, and I enclose a copy of my letter to him dated May 12.

You will also recall, in this connection, the joint statement which I tabled in the House on April 8, which appears as an appendix to Votes and Proceedings for that day.

This was also the occasion for some discussion during the opening of the general debate on the defence estimates on Thursday, May 20 and Friday, May 21 of last week, as you will see from the attached copies of Hansard at pages 4905, 4906, and 4985 to 4989.

Further to this it may interest you to learn that when we were in Washington Gerald Waring, one of the press correspondents with the party, interviewed Representative Cole. Mr. Cole spoke to him quite frankly along the lines of his speech. Waring himself decided not to make much use of this.

In his speech Representative Cole also suggests a unified command and in his interview with Waring he said he thought this might well be a Canadian. Mr. Cole made it quite evident that by unified command he meant a command having effective control over the location, composition and operations of all forces concerned with continental defence in both countries.

At the present time we have effective working arrangements under which Air Vice Marshal James, Air Officer Commanding Defence Command, with headquarters at RCAF Station, St. Hubert, receives intelligence of interceptions and these are communicated to SAC at Colorado Springs within a matter of seconds or minutes. I am confident that the air defences as presently planned in the Pinetree Operation will be fully complete and operational later this year. All our radar stations are now complete except for the two smaller stations on the west coast added into the plan later. The communication system is practically complete. All weather fighter squadrons will be organized and operational by the end of the year. Work is being pressed on to site the McGill Fence stations and start production of the equipment.

We have had a number of major exercises which have indicated that the results being obtained are at least as good as anything we anticipate. "Interceptions" have been carried out on nine out of ten "attacking" B-36 aircraft and good results also obtained on B-47. However, I did not say, as reported, that we could make nine out of ten kills, or anything of the kind. I emphasized that the only way of knowing the number of kills we could make was in actual battle, which I hope would not occur.

As this is a matter of great and increasing importance and urgency, Air Force Headquarters and the Joint Staff

- 3 -

should work closely with you to keep both External Affairs and this Department fully and immediately informed of all developments and statements and also, should work together to do everything possible to ensure that the matter is responsibly treated.

Yours sincerely,

(signed) Brooke Claxton

COPY

AIR MAIL

Ottawa, May 12, 1954.

Honourable Charles E. Wilson,  
Secretary of Defence,  
Washington, D. C.,  
U. S. A.

**FILE COPY**

Dear Mr. Secretary,

In a speech at Colgate University on April 29, 1954, Representative Cole made an important contribution to public understanding of some aspects of continental defence.

There are parts of this speech, however, which should be read against the background of the experience of the governments and armed forces of Canada and the United States.

The subject of continental defence against new means and methods of attack on North America has been under intense and urgent consideration at every level of those responsible in our two countries throughout the whole period beginning even before the end of the Second World War.

In the course of this there has not been an important point on which the representatives of the United States and Canada have failed to reach agreement.

In fact, the working agreement for the close co-operation of our forces has been closer and more effective than that ever achieved between any two countries.

This has been repeatedly emphasized by leaders in Canada and the United States. The most recent expressions of this agreement were contained in the President's statement on his visit here in November, 1953, and in the joint statement issued in both countries on April 8, 1954.

This has been the subject of intense, urgent and continuous consideration between yourself and your colleagues and their predecessors and myself, as well as between the Chiefs of Staff and the Commanding Officers of the various services and commands in Canada and the United States.

In this speech Mr. Cole made some suggestions regarding matters which are within the scope of the authority of yourself and others responsible for defence policy in your country.

- 2 -

Any suggestion that might be made by your government would, of course, receive the most serious consideration of the Canadian government.

There is another point, however, in his speech to which I should make express reference.

In his speech he said, "Negotiations with the Canadian government on the subject of where, how and by whom the first of such early warning lines would be built and operated have been in progress for nearly two years". I feel that on this you will agree that there have been no negotiations between our two countries which "have been in progress for nearly two years". What have been under way are studies by a number of different agencies in the United States, in Canada, and jointly, with a view to determining what further development of our continental defence system is required and how this can best be carried out.

There has been no delay in negotiation of any kind for which the government or services of either the United States or Canada could in any sense be held responsible.

Any misunderstanding on this point will only add to confusion, misunderstanding and difficulties in the way of working together as we have done in the past.

If Mr. Cole, or anyone else, has any reports of such a delay in negotiations for which we on our side are in any sense responsible, I would be only too glad to learn what they are so that any misinformation or misapprehension may be corrected in the light of the facts.

Yours sincerely,

(signed) Brooke Claxton

COPY

CANADIAN EMBASSY

Washington, D. C.

May 21, 1954.

PERSONAL AND SECRET

**FILE COPY**

Dear Brooke,

Yesterday at the New Zealand Embassy, where Leslie Munro was entertaining in honour of his Minister, I happened to sit next to Radford. We did not talk "business" to any extent, but I did have an opportunity of putting to him a question and eliciting a most categorical reply on the subject of co-operation and organization at the top for continental defence.

I introduced the subject by referring to Representative Cole's bill for the setting up of an Assistant Secretaryship "for continental defense", enquiring what he thought of the idea. He replied without hesitation that he was totally opposed to the proposition as it would "cut across" established lines of authority and confuse the work of the Chiefs of Staff. He did not think that the Cole proposal would succeed.

I then went on about the single command suggestion which Cole had revived in his recent speech, asking Radford whether, in his opinion, this step would increase the efficiency of our joint measures in peacetime; what would or should be done in war is another matter. I asked whether there was any gap in the present co-operation between the two countries in this matter. I had encountered none, and, indeed, we had on many occasions been reassured by the highest U.S. authorities that they could not ask for a more co-operative attitude than that displayed by Canadian authorities.

Radford again had no hesitation in replying quite categorically. The present system of co-operation was working well. There would be nothing to be gained by establishing a single command in present circumstances. As for Joe Alsop and his professional interest in raising the question (I had mentioned Alsop's tiresome pre-occupation with the Lincoln proposals), "He ought to be told to go and sell his papers". If the only thing that he (Radford) had to worry about was the extent of Canadian co-operation in continental defence, he could go fishing.

The Honourable Brooke Claxton,  
Minister of National Defence,  
Ottawa.

- 2 -

I thought you would be interested in this re-affirmation at the top military level of the assurances that you have already had elsewhere. The fact that Radford has himself been the representative of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in the special "meetings of consultation" between the United States and Canada in the past few months and is thus aware personally of what we are doing together, gives importance to his expression of opinion. On the other hand, it does not, of course, exclude the possibility that at some future time proposals for a unified command will not be put forward. But for the moment there is no evidence at all of this at the top level.

Charles Foulkes would probably be interested in this conversation, and you might pass this letter on to him. I am sending a copy to the Acting Under-Secretary, to be shown to the Minister on his return.

I have always found Radford very friendly, and have come to know him a bit, although our contacts have been for the most part "social". It should be remembered that he is generally credited with being a strong "interventionist" in the Southeast Asia business, and, indeed, that he probably shares many of Senator Knowland's views on Pacific policy, though not, I would suspect, for all the same reasons.

Yours sincerely,

A. D. P. Heeney

Ottawa, May 27, 1954.

Personal and Secret

A. D. P. Heeney, Esq.,  
Canadian Ambassador to the United States,  
Washington, D. C., U.S.A.

Dear Arnold,

Many thanks indeed for your letter of May 21. This was most helpful and very interesting.

I wonder if there is any way of trying to straighten out Mr. Cole? People in Washington told me that he was honest, responsible and usually well informed. Obviously somebody has put a bee in his bonnet.

When he was in Washington with H.E., Gerald Waring interviewed Mr. Cole and he elaborated on his proposals with great emphasis.

At visit to our Air Defence Command and one of the five principal radar stations, as well as a fighter squadron and seeing from the three different points an actual interception carried out would, I feel certain, lead him to change his tune completely. The businessmen who just did this were most impressed. In this connection you may have been the Financial Post for May 21 with the full page by Ronald McEachern.

However, I am certainly not going to let us be put in the position where we allow a Congressional committee to make a visit on a Canadian defence establishment.

Have you got any suggestion about this?

Perhaps some time you might speak to Mr. Wilson, Dr. Hannah, Mr. Douglas, General Twining or someone else and, if it seemed appropriate, ask what, if anything, could be done or said to get Mr. Cole straight.

In this general connection I dictated a letter on Monday dealing with George Glazebrook's letter on the subject. I have given a copy of this to Mike and to the Chairman

- 2 -

of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and they will send a copy of the Chairman of the Joint Staff.

I also wrote Mr. Wilson and referred to this in the House.

I do not suggest that we should make formal representations but I think it very desirable that all our people dealing with the Americans about these matters should know what our thinking here is and if a favourable opportunity presents itself, they might say a word which might help the Administration and put Mr. Cole or others on the right track.

Terry and Queenie greatly enjoyed their visit with you.

Yours sincerely,

(signed) Brooke Claxton

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

*File WMB  
External Affairs Eyes Only*

TO: ACTING UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE

FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS *WMB*

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: Continental Defence

Security **SECRET**

Date May 28, 1954

File No. 50209-40

~~50209-40~~

6

6

*Copy (without enclosure) on 50309-40*

Attached for your information are copies of a series of letters between the Minister of National Defence and our Ambassador in Washington and a cover letter from the Minister of National Defence to the Chairman, Canadian Section, PJBD, concerning continental defence and the recent speech of Representative Cole on this subject. I believe they will be of interest to you.

*Benjamin Rogers*  
Defence Liaison (1) Division

*P.S - These were given to Mr Barton by General McNaughton for "External Affairs Eyes Only"*

*File  
RMB*

*BR*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Subject.....

MAY 27 1954

50209-40  
 57 15K

Date.....

Publication.....

MONTREAL GAZETTE

Joseph and Stewart Alsop

# Matter of Fact

## The Soviets Catch Up

Washington. — The Soviet heavy bomber program is now approximately two years ahead of the schedule forecast for it by the American military intelligence analysis.

Because of this unforeseen success, the air-atomic striking power of the Soviet Union, now being reinforced with hydrogen bombs, may soon be fairly close to catching up with America's air-atomic striking power.

An American lead can no doubt be maintained. But two years are perhaps allowed, before this country is as gravely threatened by the Soviet Strategic Air Army, as the Soviet Union is now threatened by our Strategic Air Command.

This short run prospect, combined with the somewhat longer run but no less bleak prospects in the field of inter-continental guided missiles, can be expected to have far-reaching effects on American and free world planning and policy.

The world knows one — but only one — of the facts that form the basis of the foregoing new assessment. In the May Day air show at Moscow, the Red Air Force somewhat ostentatiously exhibited a new four-engined jet bomber. This plane, called the Tupolev-39, is comparable to our own B-52.

◆ ◆ ◆

The plane shown was undoubtedly a prototype, but the prototype is thought to have passed the flight test stage. Thus the Tupolev - 39 is probably ready to be ordered into full production.

Building this new four-engined jet would have to be regarded as a major and fairly chilling Soviet achievement, even if there were not more of the same. After all, although our own four-engined jet has been supposed to be in production for more than a year, the American Air Force actually has only two B-52s in service.

The real danger signal, however, was not the appearance of the Tupolev-39, which has already been described, but the discovery of the Tupolev-37, which has not been revealed until now.

The Tupolev-37 is also a jet engined strategic bomber, similar in size to our B-47. Its very large air intakes have caused some argument among the analysts. The point disputed is whether this is actually a two-engined jet, like the B-47; or whether it has two sets of two engines each, coupled together so that each set can be served by a single air intake.

In any case, the comparison to the B-47 is thought to be crudely accurate.

Moreover, nine of these new aircraft have been observed flying in formation together. For this and other reasons, the Tupolev-37 is supposed to be in full production already. Pentagon analysts now give an official estimate that the current output is approximately thirty planes per month.

Our B-47 production rate is of course higher than this; and a good many groups in the

Strategic Air Command have already exchanged the obsolescent B-50s and B-29s for the new twin-engined jet.

But with the Tupolev-37 coming off the line at the rate of thirty per month, the Soviet Strategic Air Army should have something like 720 of these bombers in service at the end of two years. By the end of two years, the Kremlin will also possess a sufficient stock of atomic and hydrogen bombs. With the new jets plus an adequate stock of weapons of total destruction, Soviet air striking power will become truly decisive.

That does not mean, of course, that all the Soviet Union's strategic air problems are now going to be magically solved. The Tupolev-37s, and perhaps the Tupolev-39s as well, will need refuelling to reach American targets; just as the B-47s will need refuelling to reach Soviet targets. Refuelling has not been practiced by the Russian air men as long or as intensively as by our air men. And there are also questions to be answered about the efficiency of Soviet advanced air bases.

On the other hand, the unexpected appearance of these planes means that we have made another foolishly optimistic miscalculation. It is very much like the miscalculation that was shown up by the Soviet atomic tests in September, 1949. And in a sense, the results are almost as grave.

With the growth of the stocks of atomic and hydrogen bombs on both sides of the world contest, the power to deliver the weapons of total destruction becomes even more vital than the weapons themselves. There is no use blinking our eyes to the fact that the Soviet delivery power will shortly be far greater than any of the American planners were prepared for.

◆ ◆ ◆

The time-jump which the Soviets have achieved is especially significant, because of the languid and loitering approach to the gigantic problem of American air defence. Two years have now passed since the Lincoln Project first rendered its famous report, outlining an effective American air defence for the atomic age. Nearly a year has passed since the Bull Report, by the Committee that was supposed to lay down the Eisenhower administration's final policy in this matter.

More money is being spent on air defence—spending is probably at the rate of \$5,000,000,000 a year by now — but the truly essential things have not been done and are not now being done. There is no promise yet of really adequate warning systems or really adequate interception systems for a really adequate command system.

The state of the work on warning systems is illustrative of the state of the whole problem. The earliest possible warning is of course the key to effective air defence. For budgetary and other reasons, how-

ever, the Administration decided last summer to start by trying to establish an intermediate warning line, the so-called McGill Line, crossing Canada at the 57th Parallel.

Pernickety negotiations for the establishment of this intermediate warning line have been carried on with the Canadians for many months. There have been difficulties, about sending in American personnel to man the radar equipment, about whether the equipment should be made in America or Canada, and so on. The joint Canadian-American establishment of the McGill Line has been agreed upon in principle, but the McGill Line is not yet being built.

By the same token, "Project Corrode" was belatedly set up to test the very advanced special equipment advocated by the Lincoln scientists for a much more advanced warning line, somewhere about the 72nd Parallel. This project has now been brilliantly successful. But until very recently, at least, nothing had been said to the Canadians about extending the warning system to this advanced line. Furthermore, little has been done to provide adequate sea-borne warning systems on this continent's ocean flanks, which will be so costly but are so obviously necessary.

◆ ◆ ◆

In the same fashion, the great value of early warning is that it gives you more than one opportunity to knock out the attacker. One fighter plane or rocket may have no more than a 15 per cent chance of making a kill. But if the attacker has to run the gauntlet of five interceptions by fighters or rockets, his chance of being knocked down will be 75 per cent.

Yet no serious effort is being made to fill in behind the McGill Line with a net of fighter and rocket bases. Once again, the question has not even been raised with the Canadians, unless this happened very recently. By the same token, a unified continental defence command is plainly needed. But this has neither been mentioned to the Canadians, nor even agreed upon between our own competing services.

In view of all these facts, the question now has to be asked whether the air defence opportunity has not been altogether missed. Two years ago, an all-out effort might have given us an air defence that would save two-thirds or three-quarters of our cities from destruction. With the new Soviet jet bombers already in the air, time may now be lacking to do this vital job.

And that another feature of the Moscow air show was the exhibition of an important new night fighter. Add further that the Soviets have been going all-out to improve their air defences since the end of the Second World War. It can then be seen why the appearance of the Soviet bomber has caused very deep concern.

(Copyright 1954, New York Herald Tribune, Inc.)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

*File  
WAB*

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Reference:.....

Subject: Continental Defence.....

*Copy on 50286-40*

Security:...RESTRICTED.....

No: *921*.....

Date: May 26, 1954.....

Enclosures: *2*.....

Air or Surface Mail:.....

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
<i>50209-40</i>	
<i>52</i>	<i>50</i>

References

D-1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

27 MAY 1954

I attach for your information, in the event that it does not appear in a Canadian newspaper, an editorial by the Alsop brothers which appears in today's (May 26) Washington Post and which deals with the problems of continental defence. As is usual with Alsop articles on this subject the attached editorial is sharply critical of the Administration's efforts to build up a really adequate early warning system.

*g-11*

2. The article is indicative once more of the access which the Alsops have to authoritative sources in the field of continental defence for it outlines the problems which at one time or another have arisen between Canada and the United States in the cooperative effort to improve continental defences:

- (a) the choice of equipment for the mid-Canada line,
- (b) the "back-up" to the warning lines in the way of fighter-inceptor bases and anti-aircraft installations,
- (c) the feasibility of the distant early warning line, and
- (d) the possible formation of a joint continental defence command.

3. We have had a tentative request for comment on the attached article from James Minifie, the Washington commentator for the CBC, although we are not certain with what persistence he will follow it up. In an informal conversation an officer from the Canadian Desk at the State Department expressed the opinion that the article would probably lead to further inquiries being made of the Defense and State Departments as to the progress in U.S.- Canadian negotiations.

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

*D*

*Sam Poyser*  
The Embassy.

# CANADIAN EMBASSY WASHINGTON

clipped for JJM

Subject The Soviets Catch Up.....  
(J. & S. Alsop)

# FILE COPY

Date May 26, 1954..... Publication Wash. Post and H.T.....

## The Soviets Catch Up

THE SOVIET heavy bomber program is now approximately two years ahead of the schedule forecast for it by the American military intelligence analysis.

Because of this unforeseen success, the air-atomic striking power of the Soviet Union, now being reinforced with hydrogen bombs, may soon be fairly close to catching up with America's air-atomic striking power.

An American lead can no doubt be maintained. But two years are perhaps allowed, before this country is as gravely threatened by the Soviet strategic air army, as the Soviet Union is now threatened by our strategic air command.

This short run prospect, combined with the somewhat longer run but no less bleak prospects in the field of inter-continental guided missiles, can be expected to have far-reaching effects on American and free world planning and policy.

The world knows one—but only one—of the facts that form the basis of the foregoing new assessment. In the May Day air show at Moscow, the Red air force somewhat ostentatiously exhibited a new four-engined jet bomber. This plane, called the Tupolev-39, is comparable to our own B-52.

THE PLANE shown was undoubtedly a prototype, but the prototype is thought to have passed the flight test stage. Thus the Tupolev-39 is probably ready to be ordered into full production.

Building this new four-engined jet would have to be regarded as a major and fairly chilling Soviet achievement, even if there were not more of the same.

The real danger signal, however, was not the appearance of the Tupolev-39, which has already been described, but the discovery of the Tupolev-37, which has not been revealed until now.

The Tupolev-37 is also a jet-engined strategic bomber, similar in size to our B-47. Its very large air intakes have caused some argument among the analysts. The point disputed is whether this is actually a two-engined jet, like the B-47, or whether it has two sets of two engines each, coupled together so that each set can be served by a single air intake.

MOREOVER, nine of these new aircraft have been observed flying in formation together. For this and other reasons, the Tupolev-37 is supposed to be in full production already. Pentagon analysts now give an official estimate that the current output is approximately 30 planes per month.

Our B-47 production rate is of course higher than this; and a good many groups in the strategic air command have already exchanged the obsolescent B-50s and B-29s for the new jet-engined jet.

But with the Tupolev-37 coming off the line at the rate of 30 per month, the Soviet strategic air army should have something like 720 of these bombers in service at the end of two years. By the end of two years, the Kremlin will also possess a sufficient stock of atomic and hydrogen bombs. With the new jets plus an adequate stock of weapons of total destruction, Soviet air striking power will become truly decisive.

That does not mean, of course, that all the Soviet Union's strategic air problems are now going to be magically solved. The Tupolev-37s, and perhaps the Tupolev-39s as well, will need refuelling to reach American targets; just as the B-47s will need refuelling to reach Soviet targets. Refuelling has not been practiced by the Russian air men as long or as intensively as by our air men.

ON THE OTHER hand, the unexpected appearance of these planes means that we have made another foolishly optimistic miscalculation. It is very much like the miscalculation that was shown up by the Soviet atomic tests in September, 1949. And in a sense, the results are almost as grave.

With the growth of the stocks of atomic and hydrogen bombs on both sides of the world contest, the power to deliver the weapons of total destruction becomes even more vital than the weapons themselves.

shortly be far greater than any of the American planners were prepared for.

The time-jump which the Soviets have achieved is especially significant, because of the languid and loitering approach to the gigantic problem of American air defense. Two years have now passed since the Lincoln Project first rendered its famous report, outlining an effective American air defense for the atomic age. Nearly a year has

passed since the Bull Report, by the committee that was supposed to lay down the Eisenhower Administration's final policy in this matter.

More money is being spent on air defense—spending is probably at the rate of five billion dollars a year by now—but the truly essential things have not been done and are not now being done. There is no promise yet of really adequate warning systems or really adequate interception systems for a really adequate command system.

THE STATE of the work on warning systems is illustrative of the state of the whole problem. The earliest possible warning is of course the key to effective air defense. For budgetary and other reasons, however, the Administration decided last summer to start by trying to establish an intermediate warning line, the so-called McGill line, crossing Canada at the fifty-seventh parallel.

Pernickety negotiations for the establishment of this intermediate warning line have been carried on with the Canadians for many months. There have been difficulties about sending in American personnel to man the radar equipment, about whether the equipment should be made in America or Canada, and so on. The joint Canadian-American establishment of the McGill line has been agreed upon in principle, but the McGill line is not yet being built.

By the same token, "Project Corrode" was belatedly set up to test the very advanced special equipment advocated by the Lincoln scientists for a much more advanced warning line, somewhere about the seventy-second parallel. This project has now been brilliantly successful. But until very recently, at least nothing had been said to the Canadians about extending the warning system to this advanced line.

IN THE SAME fashion, the great value of early warning is that it gives you more than one opportunity to knock out the attacker. One fighter plane or rocket may have no more than a 15 percent chance of making a kill. But if the attacker has to run the gauntlet of five interceptions by fighters or rockets, his chance of being knocked down will be 75 percent.

Yet no serious effort is being made to fill in behind the McGill line with a net of fighter and rocket bases. Once again, the question has not even been raised with the

Canadians, unless this happened very recently. By the same token, a unified continental defense command is plainly needed. But this has neither been mentioned to the Canadians, nor even agreed upon between our own competing services.

In view of all these facts, the question now has to be asked whether the air defense opportunity has not been altogether missed. Two years ago, an all-out effort might have given us an air defense that would save two thirds or three quarters of our cities from destruction. With the new Soviet jet bombers already in the air, time may now be lacking to do this vital job.

Add that another feature of the Moscow air show was the exhibition of an important new night fighter. Add further that the Soviets have been going all-out to improve their air defenses since the end of the second war. It can then be seen why the appearance of the Soviet bomber has caused very deep concern.

(Copyright, 1954, New York Herald Tribune, Inc.)

CANADA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE

CANADIAN SECTION

*File*  
*WNB*

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN  
EAST BLOCK, PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS  
OTTAWA

CONFIDENTIAL

May 26, 1954.

*M. Pearson*

50209-40  
57150

Dear Mr. Pearson,

You may be interested in reading the attached copy of a letter, dated May 7, 1954, from President Eisenhower to Dr. Hannah, the Chairman of the United States Section, Permanent Joint Board on Defence. It was sent on a personal basis to the Secretary of the Canadian Section of the Board by the Secretary of the United States Section.

This letter from the President, coupled with the replacement of the former United States Air Force Member of the PJBD by Major General Briggs, the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of the USAF, seems to me to demonstrate the increased importance attached by the United States Government to Canada-United States defence relations.

For your information, I am sending similar letter to Mr. Claxton and General Foulkes.

Yours sincerely,

*John Foulkes*

The Honourable L. B. Pearson,  
Secretary of State for External Affairs,  
Ottawa, Ontario.

26.5.32(us)  
26-5-19/55)

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON


May 7, 1954.

Dear Dr. Hannah:

As you know, I attach great importance to the maintenance of strong, mutually beneficial relationships between Canada and the United States.

This will confirm my request made in our recent conversation that, as Chairman of the U.S. Section, Permanent Joint Board on Defense, Canada--U.S., I would like to have you report to me in person at least every three months or more often if you consider it necessary.

Sincerely,



The Honorable John A. Hannah,  
Assistant Secretary of Defense,  
Pentagon,  
Washington, D.C.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

*File GMB*

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 902

Date: May 22, 1954

Enclosures:

Reference: Our Letter No. 2029 of October 22, 1953.

Air or Surface Mail:

Subject:

Post File No:

Proposed Article on Continental Defence.

Ottawa File No.	
50209-70	
54	58

References

D-1	
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

26 MAY 1954

William A. Ulman, whose article on continental defence in a Colliers issue of October 16, 1953 caused some security concern, has approached the Embassy again with a request for its cooperation in arranging interviews for him in Ottawa with service personnel and civilian officials most concerned with the problems of continental defence. He is preparing two further articles on continental defence for publication in November in the Saturday Evening Post and the Readers' Digest. (We understand that much the same material will be used in both magazines.) His approach was an engaging one--somewhat that of a self-assured penitent. He was distressed that his October article in Colliers created such an unfortunate impression but he was convinced that the fault, if there was any in the article, was not his responsibility. The information which we obtained after the publication of his Colliers article would tend to support this latter opinion; we have reported that censure was meted out to both Department of Defense officials (paragraph 6 of our despatch No. 1934 of October 8) and Colliers magazine (our despatch under reference).

2. Ulman told us that the USAF is giving him its fullest cooperation in the research which he is doing on the current article. The article will be concerned in the main with the "second stage" of continental defence operations, i.e. the actions which will be taken after receipt of warning. He will not be so concerned this time with the early warning radar lines but rather with the operations of interceptor aircraft. He hopes he can build a solid factual story around the exact actions taken by air-defence units when an alert is sounded. His story will stress the training operations of the Air Defence Command and will not be devoted in any significant degree to an examination of the likelihood of an actual attack. Much of the material, he hopes, will consist of descriptions of the qualities of aircraft, equipment and personnel which are in being or which are required for adequate interception forces. He intends to use only the material for which he can get complete security clearance. He believes

..2

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

D

-2-

that while there is enough material for an article on United States efforts in this field, a properly balanced article should include references to Canadian efforts as well. He expressed the hope, therefore, that at their convenience a few senior personnel in Ottawa would agree to grant him interviews. He was certain that United States Air Defence Command headquarters in Colorado Springs would be glad to indicate to the RCAF the kind of information which was being made available to him in the United States. Incidentally, Ulman is currently in the part-time employ of the United States Government as a public relations adviser to the agency which is, at the moment, conducting investigations into the affairs of the Federal Housing Administration.

3. We told Ulman that we would pass his request to Ottawa and agreed that if he was to get any information on Canadian activities in this field it could best be obtained in Ottawa and not through this Embassy. We are thoroughly conscious of the pitfalls which exist in dealing with correspondents on matters of such delicacy as continental defence; nor is Mr. Ulman's past record completely unsullied whatever his explanations may be. It seems to us, however, that, since the article is going to be published whether or not material is provided from Canadian sources, it is worth considering the desirability, from the Canadian point of view, of providing Ulman with as much material as security will allow. Such a course of action would be of practical value for three reasons, (a) it would provide an opportunity to emphasize the part which Canada is playing in the defence of the continent, (b) it would serve to publicize some of the results of original Canadian research on equipment and techniques of which there is little knowledge in the United States, and (c) it would provide Canadian authorities with an opportunity to vet the article which Ulman produces. The Saturday Evening Post enjoys one of the widest circulations of any magazine in United States and Canada and it seems important to us that, if an article on continental defence is to be published in it and circulated to such a wide audience, we should make every effort to ensure that the Canadian aspect of the question is properly handled.

4. Ulman told us that the final deadline by which he would have to gather his raw material would be the end of June. He is interested, of course, in getting what he can as soon as possible. I would be grateful, therefore, if you could let us know whether or not the Canadian authorities most concerned would agree to providing Ulman with some material and, if this is so, to indicate when it would be most convenient for Ulman to come to Ottawa.

  
The Embassy.

50209-40  
WAB



HEEN  
I. B. PEARSON

PERSONAL AND SECRET

*The Minister*

*Mr. Heeney*  
*DCK (H)*  
*Mr. Bert*  
*File*

Washington 6, D. C.,  
May 21st, 1954.

50209-40  
5-4150

Dear Bert:

The attached copy of a personal letter  
I have written to Brooke Claxton might be shown  
to the Minister on his return.

Yours sincerely,

*A. D. P. Heeney*

A. D. P. Heeney.

R. A. MacKay, Esq.,  
Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs,  
Ottawa, Canada.

26-5-2 (SS) E. arh.  
26.5.1 (US)

PERSONAL AND SECRET

**FILE COPY**

Washington, D. C.,  
May 21st, 1954.

Dear Brooke:

Yesterday at the New Zealand Embassy, where Leslie Munro was entertaining in honour of his Minister, I happened to sit next to Radford. We did not talk "business" to any extent, but I did have an opportunity of putting to him a question and eliciting a most categorical reply on the subject of co-operation and organization at the top for continental defence.

I introduced the subject by referring to Representative Cole's bill for the setting up of an Assistant Secretaryship "for continental defense", enquiring what he thought of the idea. He replied without hesitation that he was totally opposed to the proposition as it would "cut across" established lines of authority and confuse the work of the Chiefs of Staff. He did not think that the Cole proposal would succeed.

I then went on about the single command suggestion which Cole had revived in his recent speech, asking Radford whether, in his opinion, this step would increase the efficiency of our joint measures in peacetime; what would or should be done in war is another matter. I asked whether there was any gap in the present co-operation between the two countries in this matter. I had encountered none, and, indeed, we had on many occasions been reassured by the highest U.S. authorities that they could not ask for a more co-operative attitude than that displayed by Canadian authorities.

Radford again had no hesitation in replying quite categorically. The present system of co-operation was working/

The Hon. Brooke Claxton,  
Minister of National Defence,  
Ottawa, Canada.

001174

- 2 -

was working well. There would be nothing to be gained by establishing a single command in present circumstances. As for Joe Alsop and his professional interest in raising the question (I had mentioned Alsop's tiresome pre-occupation with the Lincoln proposals), "He ought to be told to go and sell his papers". If the only thing that he (Radford) had to worry about was the extent of Canadian co-operation in continental defence, he could go fishing.

I thought you would be interested in this re-affirmation at the top military level of the assurances that you have already had elsewhere. The fact that Radford has himself been the representative of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in the special "meetings of consultation" between the United States and Canada in the past few months and is thus aware personally of what we are doing together, gives importance to his expression of opinion. On the other hand, it does not, of course, exclude the possibility that at some future time proposals for a unified command will not be put forward. But for the moment there is no evidence at all of this at the top level.

Charles Foulkes would probably be interested in this conversation, and you might pass this letter on to him. I am sending a copy to the Acting Under-Secretary, to be shown to the Minister on his return.

I have always found Radford very friendly and have come to know him a bit, although our contacts have been for the most part "social". It should be remembered that he is generally credited with being a strong "interventionist" in the Southeast Asia business, and, indeed, that he probably shares many of Senator Knowland's views on Pacific policy, though not, I would suspect, for all the same reasons.

Yours sincerely,

A. D. P. Heeney.

EXTRACT FROM HANSARD FOR MAY 21, 1954  
(Pages 4986 - 4990)

Mr. Claxton:

50209-40
616

Then, the hon. member for Calgary North said that I had been saying that our defences were grand, that our defences were adequate, everything was rosy, and that this had been my stock tactic throughout the years. I always asked the hon. member for Calgary North—I hope he will excuse it because we are very good friends—when I said those things; when I said them, where I said them, and what are the quotations,—

**Mr. Harkness:** And I always indicated them.

**Mr. Claxton:** —and he has never indicated them yet.

**Mr. Harkness:** I always indicated them; I indicated them this afternoon.

**Mr. Claxton:** He said we had no anti-aircraft defence. Here, I am inclined to agree with him up to a certain point. At the present time, as I have indicated before, we are in a stage of transition. We have in Canada the latest anti-aircraft guns that there are. They are very expensive and the equipment, the predictor, the director, the tracking equipment and the firing equipment are very expensive. When you confront these guns with low flying high-speed jets or very high altitude jets, then their efficiency is much less than 100 per cent, let us say. We have been deliberately, as a deliberate calculated risk, not buying more of these guns and more of this equipment, but have that quantity which we think essential pending the arrival of ground-to-air rockets or guided missiles.

In that connection, of course, we have been following the United States and British work in this field. We have people working with them, and we have teams actually training with them. But there is not that type of equipment available yet in quantity for delivery.

With regard to airborne troops and aircraft, we have the aircraft necessary to carry

out the kind of lifts we consider is necessary to meet the kind of attack that might be made. This mobile striking force of three airborne divisions, artillery, engineers, medicals and the like, is not a brigade. It was originally planned as a brigade, but the concept changed and now it is planned to operate its units as three separate battalions. They are trained, and the exercises have shown that they do the job. In this connection, and in connection with civil defence to which other hon. members referred, I wish they could see and compare what we have in Canada with what there is in the various countries on the other side of the Atlantic, where the threat of an immediate attack and the consequences of an attack are far more imminent than they would be in our country. I wish hon. members could compare our position with regard to defence against air attack, either by radar backed by fighters and anti-aircraft guns, civil defence and ground observers and so on, with the state of organization that there is on the other side of the ocean. They would be surprised at the considerable progress made on this side relative to the other.

Then the hon. member referred to the build-up of staffs, and so on. We set out in the white paper the distribution of the Canadian armed forces. I doubt if you could get this information for any other country, as between the various components engaged in defence operations. They are to be found there, divided between the effective fighting forces, the administrative and training staffs; those in Korea, Germany and the like. It is extremely difficult to generalize about these things. We strive continuously to cut down the overhead, the staffs, and to make continuous comparisons with the corresponding picture in the United States and Britain. So far as I know the results are generally favourable, despite the fact that we have relatively smaller forces. Still, this is a thing that I agree must be fought for steadily, to reduce the overhead, to reduce the cost and reduce manpower.

In this connection, we are faced with the perplexing problem of having adequate staffs to answer the questions on the order paper.

I might mention one in the name of the hon. member for Calgary North, which appears on the *Routine Proceedings and Orders of the Day* for this day. I refer hon. members to page 11, order No. 10 in the name of Mr. Harkness, as follows:

What percentage of national defence buildings, on a space basis, are heated by fuel oil and by coal respectively.

And then No. 3:

How much oil is used per one thousand feet of floor space where oil heating is employed, and how much coal is used per one thousand feet of floor space where coal heating is employed?

Well, that is a nice one! I asked the department to find out how many buildings we had in national defence. They have made a survey and have found that apart from married quarters there are about 11,000. And we have about 20,000 married quarters. Married quarters are fairly standard, so we will place them to one side. But in order really to arrive at an answer to this question we would have to have a team of people go about and measure the cubic contents of each building, ascertain the square footage of space, and then—if we could possibly find it out—relate to that the quantity of oil and coal used to heat a particular building. And then we could give an answer which might mean something to someone, but certainly would not mean anything to anyone with whom I have discussed the question. But, as it is, we will try to do the best we can, and give the hon. member a fair answer.

**Mr. Harkness:** I would like to say to the minister, and I think he will agree, that in connection with any question I have asked that involved an undue amount of time to answer I have always been quite willing either to modify or to drop the question.

**Mr. Claxton:** I think that is right, yes.

**Mr. Harkness:** I thought the information I asked for would be available in the minister's records. If it is not available, then I am willing to drop it.

**Mr. Claxton:** Thank you, very much. I shall give answers to questions two and four, and give some indication with respect to the rest of the question, as well as we can. And we can talk it over. However, I do appreciate the hon. member's attitude.

**Mr. Fulton:** When you buy a building do you not know how many thousand cubic feet of space there are in it?

**Mr. Claxton:** Yes, we do; but quite a few of our buildings go back to the French regime, and we have no accurate information about them.

**Mr. Harkness:** Some of your methods go back to the French regime, too.

**Mr. Claxton:** Now, the hon. member also referred to our purchase of mobilization stores in excessive quantities. A good deal was made of this during the recent event in August. But I must say very little reference was made on that occasion to the information

that had been brought out by the defence expenditures committee of the House of Commons. However the fact is that we have had brought to our attention no example of excessive purchases of soft goods or hard goods for mobilization stores, with the single exception of those two dreadful things, serving forks and coffee pots. I admit guilt on both counts.

**Mr. Harkness:** And for the first time.

**Mr. Claxton:** Oh, no. As I have told hon. members, and as they must know, I suppose this resulted from someone fairly well down in the echelon applying the same multiplier to troops we would have on mobilization that was in effect at the end of the second world war, when we were feeding the troops at tables of six, and had not yet adopted the cafeteria system, which is now practically universal throughout the armed forces. That cut down the number we needed of serving forks and coffee pots very greatly.

However we are taking these into stores, and before very long they will all be absorbed, and nobody will be out a nickel. No doubt the defence estimates for the next year will be reduced by the amount of the forks and the coffee pots we have not had to buy.

The hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich, as usual, made a very constructive, helpful and moderate speech. As he and others proceeded to speak in this debate I could not help recalling the time up to seven years ago when the government and the Department of National Defence and the armed forces were being accused of doing too little and too late. Then as this debate has gone on it became pretty clear that the burden of the main opposition speeches was that we were doing too much, too soon. And then we could find a kind of antiphon; "Too little, too late, too much, too soon; too little, too late, too much, too soon", almost being said at the same time.

We did not as was suggested enter this operation of planning the post-war program, beginning in 1950, as a "crash" operation alone. We did not do that. But what I do suggest is that at that time, in 1950, with the outbreak of the Korean war, and with Czechoslovakia just having been brought behind the iron curtain, there was, generally speaking, throughout this country, as in every other country, a feeling that war was likely to come upon us at any time. And we had to prepare for that kind of emergency, as well as "the long pull". So we had to do a great many things as fast as we could, and also at the same time not do more than we felt we could support over "the long pull".

[Mr. Claxton.]

And Canada in this respect was somewhat unique. In the United States they have a system of government under which the administration can put forward estimates and requests for money which ultimately have to be dealt with by congress and which very frequently are changed in congress. In the other countries of our alliance there was always the certainty of mutual aid from the United States and, to a lesser extent, from Canada. However in our case if we put anything down as a commitment, as a planning figure, we had to be prepared to carry it out as a government and as a party, or else we would cease to be a government, and cease to be the party in power.

Everyone dealing with us knew that: We told them. Consequently every figure we put down had to be tested and tried by the standard: "Can we do this, not only this year, but next year, and the next, and the next?" And so our plans were realistic and, as it turned out, our calculations were quite surprisingly accurate. And we have done what we set out to do.

But I must say that the suggestion that we failed to anticipate that the Russians would have the atom bomb and jet aircraft really surprised me. Of course the plan was based on the assumption that they would have the atom bomb, and jet aircraft bombers, capable of delivering it. We worked out, on the basis of the intelligence information available to us, what the likely date would be at which each step would occur; and I must say we are still doing so. Whether or not we are proved right in our present planning for 1957, 1958, 1959 and 1960 will only be established if there is another war. I hope there is not another war; and we will never know if we were right, unless there is another war; but if we pass by the date for which we planned forces suitable to meet the threat at that time, then I think we have done the job that planning should do—match the plan to the estimated capacity of the potential enemy at the time. If he does not deliver the goods at that time, then we are one year ahead. We have bought one year of peace. That is the way military planning must and should work, but it has got to stretch forward almost indefinitely into the future, so long will be the time necessary to make this terribly complicated and complex equipment.

There was some suggestion about our still continuing to plan to fight with the equipment of the last world war or some other world war. At the present time there is no country on the face of the earth that has aircraft in the field to the extent that Canada has, competent to meet the Russian threat

at this time. If we had bought, as was suggested by one hon. member, Meteors and Vampires from the British we would have planes that would be at least a whole series back from the present planes we have.

On the other hand, the hon. member for Queens was comparing our aircraft, the Sabre with the Orenda, with some others, and I must say the figures he gave surprised me. I have had them checked and they surprised our people; but what I am sure he is comparing is an estimate of future possibilities with what we have in the field today. We have something coming along better than that estimate—we hope we have. That is what our plan is, to have the supersonic fighter to replace the F-36E and the supersonic all-weather fighter to replace the CF-100, some years ahead. Whether or not we can get them I do not know, but we are investing money so that we stay on top of this job, and have at the time when it is necessary the kind of equipment to down any enemy that comes. And that is the job of military planning. It is related to time, and the time today has to be a long, long way ahead.

Here I would like to correct one impression which apparently the press took from something I said, which was not intended at all. This was with regard to the results of an exercise that we had on air interception. I quote from what I said at page 4905 of *Hansard*:

The percentage of kills as they were counted in these exercises was extraordinarily high compared with any experience in the second world war. It was not one hundred per cent but it was about ninety per cent indicating a very successful operational state.

Then, I went on and said that I gave those figures by way of illustration of an operational state. I do not want to suggest for a second that if the enemy came over tonight our aircraft could get into the air and knock down nine out of ten. Nobody could say that; until the battle occurs you cannot say; until you know the conditions you cannot say. The enemy might come over on a night in which fighters could not get off the ground.

**Mr. Ferguson:** Can the minister give us a rough estimate of what they might do from the knowledge he has of the enemy and our defences? Can he give us that?

**Mr. Claxton:** I cannot.

**Mr. Ferguson:** Give us a rough estimate.

**Mr. Claxton:** I gave it just as fully as possible in the statement I made yesterday.

**Mr. Ferguson:** The minister cannot tell until the war is over. That is some answer.

**Mr. Claxton:** That is right.

**Mr. Ferguson:** That is not what the people of Canada want.

**Mr. Claxton:** Not "until the war is over", but until the attack occurs you cannot tell and nobody can tell how successful the defence is going to be against that attack. If the attack comes over at night and your aircraft are frozen to the ground with freezing rain the attack is going to be completely successful unless you have ground-to-air radar-guided missiles that will go up irrespective of conditions and no country has those in quantity yet.

**Mr. Ferguson:** If you had an earthquake that might help.

**Mr. Claxton:** That is right.

**Mr. Ferguson:** Under ordinary conditions what could happen?

**Mr. Claxton:** The full story that can be told I gave yesterday and today, and I do not propose to make any prognostications about it at all.

I have indicated the results of an exercise which we held under fairly realistic conditions. No exercise can be under completely realistic conditions. I do want to make it plain that that was what I was doing.

The hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich then referred to the expenditures on research and development. I am very glad to see that he would like to see those increased. We are getting, we feel, about as much money as can be usefully spent on this operation at the present time. It must be remembered that our research work and our development work, particularly research, is carried on in close co-operation with the national research council, with the universities, with industry, but also in the closest kind of partnership with our allies, particularly Britain and the United States. We aim not to overlap except in fields where it is really desirable that two or three approaches should be made to one problem at the same time. Altogether, I do not think it is possible to suggest that this co-operation in this field could be improved in any way.

But that brings to mind the importance of emphasizing that this whole business of defence planning is not carried out by the Minister of National Defence, the chiefs of staffs of Canada, the cabinet defence committee or the cabinet alone. It is carried out after close intimate discussion and consideration with our partners in the alliance. This is an alliance, and we have with the standing group in Washington a permanent representative in the person of Rear Admiral De Wolf,

head of the Canadian joint staff in Washington, sitting in with the permanent representatives of the chiefs of staff in consultation with the standing group. We have at Paris, Mr. Dana Wilgress, our ambassador to NATO, with a military staff sitting in there. We have integrated officers, integrated as part of SHAPE, as part of SACLANT, as part of the standing group staff, and so have other countries, and we are all doing this job in co-operation. Therefore, if we arrive at a major plan it has usually had the advantage of discussion with representatives of other countries, and it is designed to fit in with what they are doing. Our aim is to have an overall balance of forces, without each country having to have something of everything. And our balance of forces of course is related to our particular roles in the air and on the land in Europe and in Canada, and at sea in the anti-submarine escort work.

That brings me to references that have been made to the speech of Representative Cole. In this connection I must say I feel that Representative Cole when he said that some delay had occurred—not two years' delay—in negotiations with Canadians over continental defence, must have had in mind that some time had been taken by various groups of military personnel, scientists and others, to arrive at a plan of what additional steps should be taken. There has been no delay in this consideration that has been caused by Canadian participation. The problems involved are new; the magnitude of the task is formidable, and anything that has been decided upon would be expensive in manpower to make. It would only be chosen if it meant a series of continuing requirements, so that we here have had no recommendation from Canadian or American or joint groups that has not already been acted upon. There are no negotiations pending. There are no negotiations that have been pending for two years, and there are no negotiations that have been delayed as the term "negotiations" is ordinarily understood. I feel that what the Representative must have had in mind was consideration by military and scientific teams as to what was the best thing to do.

This question of continental defence was dealt with in a joint statement by both countries, which was tabled in the house on April 8, 1954, and it appears as an appendix to *Votes and Proceedings* of that day.

EXTRACT FROM HANSARD FOR MAY 21, 1954  
(pages 4951 - 4954)

50209-	40
6	6

Mr. Harkness:

Now, the phases of our defence preparations stem, of course, from the objectives of our defence policy which have been set out for the past few years in the annual white papers. With these objectives I think practically all of us in this chamber agree. The first of these objectives is the immediate defence of Canada from direct attack, and this, of course, is the primary and most important purpose of our defence, as it is in all other countries.

The defence of Canada from direct attack must also involve the continental defence of North America. I think also we all agree that the only probable method of attack, as was stated in the white paper on defence, is by air. Now, taking that as a premise, the first phase of our defence in the role of countering an attack on Canada by air is the provision and operation of a radar screen or series of screens supplemented by a ground observer corps.

Yesterday the minister spoke of the radar screen which is in existence. He stated that

the radar and interceptor scheme of the United States and Canada was now over 90 per cent completed and would be in complete operation by late summer or early autumn. Then he went on to say that kills in practice had been 90 per cent. He went on to say that gaps existed and that more early warning was required, that the McGill fence was going to be gone ahead with, and that the provision of all these things is extremely expensive.

However, I notice that this morning's *Gazette* has as its chief headline in connection with the minister's remarks one to the effect that our radar screen is 90 per cent completed and that the interception is 9 out of 10. I am afraid that this headline gives an extremely misleading idea to the House of Commons and to the Canadian people as a whole. It was pointed out yesterday by the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich that an American, the chairman of the joint committee on atomic energy, had pointed out that the early warning system, which was essential to the defence of both Canada and the United States, was not in existence. As a matter of fact, all that we have in the way of a radar, essentially, is a point system which protects us for only a short distance out. In view of the fact that enemy jet bombers would be on the targets probably within 20 minutes or a little bit more from the time they might be detected by many of the units of this radar screen, what we have gives little real protection.

There is no question that what we need is an early warning system far to the north. As was indicated in this article quoted yesterday by hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich, there have been many press releases in regard to this matter, in which a great deal of information along that line has been put out, most of which—particularly that with regard to the statement made by the minister yesterday—are bound to give the public the idea that all is well from this point of view, that we are completely protected and that we have little to worry about. The average man in the street, if he reads that 9 out of 10 enemy bombers in these practice raids are being knocked out, thinks the thing must be exceptionally good and that he is quite safe. As a matter of actual fact, during the last great war in a small

country like England, with a close-knit system of radar and large numbers of interceptors, the destruction of enemy bombers was approximately 1 in 10. Since that time, of course, radar has improved and jet interceptors have come into operation, and the performance is going to be considerably better. However, informed American sources

whom I have seen quoted have estimated that the probable kill be 1 in 4. The last thing I noticed in an American paper was a dispatch from Washington written by Lloyd Norman in which he says this:

Air force officials conceded that at best the air defence screen—

And this is in the United States where it is more highly developed than it is here.

—could stop no more than 3 out of every 10 Russian bombers.

I think the Minister of National Defence does no service to the Canadian people by giving them a false sense of security with regard to the radar screen which exists or rather with regard to the one which does not exist. It is much better to give the actual situation in connection with the matter. I am quite sure that the Russians are not deceived in that regard. I am quite certain that they do not believe for a minute that only 1 bomber out of 10 is going to get through to the targets.

The next phase in this role of protecting Canada against air attack is the provision of interceptor planes. The minister did not say much about that matter, but we know that the numbers of interceptor planes in Canada is extremely small. The interceptor plane for use here is the CF-100. We know that the production of CF-100's so far has not been great. We know that the number of squadrons formed has been extremely small. I do not know what that number is, but I feel fairly certain that it is not more than three. That means, of course, that we have not the interceptor planes here in Canada with which to make effective use of the radar screen which does exist or the radar screen which we will have when the McGill fence and the other early warning system comes into effect. In other words, from the point of view of interceptors, at the present time we are not entirely helpless but we are very close to it, especially in large parts of this country.

The interception role in the future, according to what we have been told, is going to be carried on to quite a considerable extent by reserve force interceptor squadrons of CF-100's. So far these reserve squadrons have not CF-100's. If they had them, they would not have trained personnel, who could man them and fight them effectively. One of the difficulties with regard to that matter particularly is the provision of navigators. In talking with some of the members of these reserve force interceptor squadrons which are to be equipped with CF-100's, I was told that they think they can train the pilots and keep them up to scratch but that it will be a more

or less impossible task for them to train the navigators and to keep them up to operational efficiency. In other words, it is the sort of thing which cannot be done by a man who spends his day working at some other occupation and does a certain amount of practice in the evenings, over week ends and so on.

It would seem fairly certain to me that if we are to have an effective interceptor force with which to make use of the radar screen, we must have in Canada considerably more regular force interceptor squadrons, whether they are CF-100 squadrons or those equipped with other planes. So far as this role is to be carried out by reserve force squadrons, they must be equipped to a greater extent than is apparently envisaged at the present time with permanent force personnel, particularly in the form of navigators.

A third phase of the defence of Canada is anti-aircraft defence to protect likely targets; that is, of course, in addition to the work of the interceptor planes. I have mentioned this matter for the last two or three years. As a matter of fact, on two or three occasions the minister has spoken of our anti-aircraft defence and I have pointed out—and I should like to do so again—that we have practically no ack-ack defence at the present time and have not had any, practically speaking, since the war. We have very few regular force personnel in active ack-ack batteries. While ack-ack defence is supposed to be carried on by reserve army anti-aircraft regiments, these reserve force ack-ack regiments have not the guns with which to do the job nor have they the personnel with which to do the job. If they had a full complement of guns they would not in most cases, in fact I think in all, even be able to look after them and man them. Apparently this situation continues to drift along from year to year. We have no "ack-ack" defence, and so far as I have been able to determine there is no improvement in the situation as time goes on. It seems to me that something definite should be done about the matter. The United States has now developed ground to air guided missiles, which are going to be the ack-ack weapons of the future, and I would hope that we might at least begin to train some people in their use and to get some of them into operation at a fairly early date.

When the minister is replying later to the various speeches that have been made, I should like him to say something about ack-ack defence and indicate what progress we have made, if any, with respect to ground to air guided missiles or even the ordinary type of rockets which can be used for that purpose. It seems to me that is one phase of the

defence of Canadian cities and targets generally on which really nothing at all has been done so far as one can see.

The fourth phase in the protection of Canada is the provision of airborne army troops and, of course, the planes to carry them so that these troops can land at any place in the northern part of Canada where enemy landings happen to be made for the purpose of establishing an air base or something of that sort, and thus be able to wipe out an enemy effort of that kind. Considerable progress has been made in this regard. We now have three parachute battalions each with quite a large number of trained parachute troops. From what I have seen of them they are extremely good, well trained and effective battalions. However, in the event of an enemy landing anywhere in the north for the purpose of seizing a northern airfield or of establishing one, we have not got sufficient planes to transport these troops. The troops are not of a great deal of use in that particular role unless we have the planes to transport them to their targets.

In addition, they are not concentrated so that they can be operated as a brigade. I should mention of course that there are also airborne artillery forces and engineers who, I think, are also quite good, but they are scattered right across the country and it would be extremely difficult to concentrate them on a place that had been attacked. With the number of planes we have it would be a slow operation and possibly not effective. I think it was demonstrated during the last war that it is no use to move in a few plane loads of paratroopers piecemeal. By the time more plane loads arrive, to reinforce them the first lot has been wiped out. It has to be done on a mass basis.

The fifth phase of the protection of Canada is the protection of coastal waters, harbour entrances and so on. I think probably this phase is more in hand than any other. We have a considerable number of naval vessels in commission that are available for this purpose, and they are probably reasonably adequate for it.

The sixth phase is the mobilization of our reserve forces for local defence and also to reinforce the regular army in the event that an enemy airborne landing is successful any place, and to guard against sabotage and so on. I am going to deal with the reserve forces later so I will not say any more at this point except to say that I do not think the reserve forces are up to this job. The reserve forces are too weak to carry out this role effectively.

Another extremely important phase of the defence of Canada is civil defence. It is

not under the minister's department. He mentioned it briefly yesterday. I do not propose to go into the matter in detail at this time, but I see that the minister in charge of civil defence is present and I should like to say that certainly civil defence in Canada at the present time is not in any state to meet any form of attack on the country. It is perhaps the weakest link of all so far as the protection of Canada against an enemy airborne attack is concerned.

To summarize my views on the primary role of our defence forces, the direct defence of Canada, we have not got the minimum defences necessary to meet this first requirement. I think the phases of our defence effort that I have mentioned are all weak except the naval. It seems quite apparent to me that we should have put primary emphasis on these phases of our defence effort and that we have failed to do so. In other words, from both points of view that I said at the beginning I was going to discuss this matter, it is an example of failure to place emphasis at the right place and failure to succeed in the various phases or roles which I have indicated.

EXTRACT FROM HANSARD FOR MAY 20, 1954  
(pages 4912 - 4914)

Mr. Pearkes:

50209-40
6 16

When we entered into this defence program in 1951 it was then assumed that Russia would not know how to manufacture, let alone stockpile, the A-bomb. The only threat to Canada, as was mentioned time and time again, was some diversionary raid. I must call the attention of the house to the fact that time and time again we on this side stressed what is now referred to as the importance of continental defence. It seems to me that, putting aside the possibility that Russia could manufacture the A-bomb, we were rather prepared to say that United States bombers, having the A-bomb at that time, would be able to deal with any threat anywhere in the world which Russia attempted to initiate and which in any way resembled a world war.

The failure to appreciate the fact that Russia would have the A-bomb in a very few years led us into the policy of crash thinking of the past few years. The minister used the term "crash thinking" this afternoon. We built up what were then considered conventional forces to meet other commitments than the danger of continental attack. Because the emphasis in the past few years has been along the lines of crash thinking I suggest we are not in a good position at the present time to project our defence programs into the future.

To emphasize that point I should like to call attention to the fact that all through these years only 2 per cent of the total defence appropriations have been allocated to defence research. We have been crash thinking. We have been building up for the moment without projecting our defence plans into the future because we believed that Russia could not have the A-bomb. We failed to take the long pull three or four years ago. Now we are asked to have a new look and to take the long pull. Had more money and a larger percentage of our defence estimates been devoted to research in those years which we are considering I think we should be in a better position today.

Today the Kremlin does possess, not only the A-bomb but even more advanced forms of what I will call nuclear bombs because it does not matter whether they are H-bombs, N-bombs or something else. They have a stock of bombs and they also have the heavy bombers so that they can deliver those bombs to this country. I think the TU-4's constitute the backbone of the Russian air force bombers and at the present time they are

being replaced by more modern jet planes. The result is that, in spite of wishful thinking, such cities as Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver and so on are now exposed to attack, as has been admitted today. It is of little comfort to those cities to know that if they are attacked United States bombers are available to retaliate. I certainly hope that this threat of massive retaliation will deter the would-be aggressor, but there are other strong deterrents the knowledge of which would, I think, make the would-be aggressor think twice, particularly if he realizes that any attack on a Canadian target would be extremely costly in terms of the results that he would be likely to achieve.

Now, a second strong deterrent has been referred to today, and I would describe it as an aggressive defensive measure, an adequate civil defence. The minister touched on the question of civil defence, but I am not going to say much about that. It seems to me that at the moment the trend is towards evacuating many of the larger cities if they are threatened as a target. I want to emphasize the importance of the time that is required in order to evacuate a city. Only a few days ago a test was carried out in a United States west coast city, and the thing that was driven home as a result of the test was the importance of plans made ahead of time and opportunities for warnings to put those plans into effect. However, there will be opportunity to discuss civil defence under the estimates of the Minister of National Health and Welfare.

It is only if we do have these strong local deterrents and the means of receiving the warning that the effect of any future atomic Pearl Harbour can be neutralized. An aggressive defence will become a fact only when we have immediately available, at or near Canadian targets, interceptor aircraft at all times and a generous distribution of the newest weapons such as guided missiles operating air to air and ground to air and the latest atomic devices that science can evolve. I am not sure, in spite of what the minister has told us today, that we do have a warning system in as effective a stage as he would indicate.

Let me just emphasize the importance of this early warning by calling attention to the fact that a bomber formation, which we will say has been located 100 miles away from here, would be over this very building in a matter of a few minutes. I think you will, therefore, realize the futility of relying solely on any local or point defence. I am pleased that the minister gave us some information regarding the McGill fence, which is an indication now there is some attempt

being made to get a warning system farther away than what might be described as the point defence or the inward and outward policy to which reference was made a year ago.

Last year when the estimates were presented the minister did not indicate there was going to be a substantial increase on the emphasis which would be placed on the defence of the North American continent. I am glad he has re-emphasized that this year. It will be recalled that when the President of the United States, General Eisenhower, was speaking here on November 14 he said that our security plans must now take into account the Soviet ability to employ an atomic attack on North America. Later in his speech he said that now is the time for action on all agreed measures.

The minister spoke on November 26 in the throne speech debate, and I replied on November 30, calling attention to what appeared to me to be the lack in that speech of any assurance that action was really being taken. My anxiety in that respect has now been renewed by a speech that was delivered on April 29 of this year by Mr. Sterling Cole, a representative of the state of New York and chairman of the joint committee on atomic energy. In dealing with the question of a radar screen or early warning device across this continent, he said:

... and yet four years after the need for such a warning line was pointed out, and two years after our scientists developed the equipment which would make such a line possible, it is still not in existence. Negotiations with the Canadian government on the subject of where, how, and by whom the first of such early warning lines would be built and operated have been in progress for nearly two years. Scarcely a week goes by that we are not reassured, through optimistic press releases, that these negotiations are proceeding harmoniously, satisfactorily and with the sense of urgency which the situation requires. We cannot detect enemy planes with press releases and comforting reassurances.

Then, a little later he said—mind you this is the chairman of the joint committee on atomic energy:

... and with all the earnestness at my command, I urge that we immediately cease studying the early warning problem, and immediately begin the actual construction of an advanced warning line.

**Mr. Claxton:** Will the hon. gentleman permit me to interrupt, because this is a rather important question. I should like to say one sentence, that is that there are no negotiations pending between the United States and Canada about this now or for one or two years or for any other time. There are none.

**Mr. Pearkes:** There are none?

**Mr. Claxton:** None.

**Mr. Pearkes:** I do not understand. I was going to ask a question about that, but no doubt the minister will enlarge upon it. I agree with him this is an important statement by someone who would appear to be an authority on this subject.

**Mr. Claxton:** In fairness, I believe he is thinking of the scientific and military discussions at their level to see what should be done, but there are no negotiations.

**Mr. Pearkes:** In this year's white paper the following statement is made at page 6:

In the past year considerable progress has been made in the construction of the joint Canadian-U.S. network of radar stations to provide early warning and communications facilities for directing squadrons of fighters. New radar installations of the most modern and powerful type have replaced practically all of the temporary mobile facilities which were in use since the second world war.

Then, this statement is made, and in the light of the remark the minister has just made I hope he will explain still further:

United States authorities have been kept fully informed of this project from the beginning.

I am rather at a loss to coincide those two statements. I hope the minister will take the opportunity to further inform the house, because on the one hand we have a seemingly important United States official referring to the fact that the line is not in existence and urging that actual construction of this warning system be now started.

I am further perturbed on this particular subject because I do notice at page 44 of this year's white paper the appropriation for electronics has been reduced from an estimate of \$114,799 last year to \$65,666 this year. In this respect the difference between the estimate for 1953-54, and the probable expenditures in that year, are explained in this same white paper as being due to the difficulty of forecasting accurately the rate of expenditure on a large number of production programs in varying stages of development for complicated equipment that is subject to change and modification, in order to assure that the end product is the most useful for the job to be done and the money expended. The paragraph in the white paper goes on to say:

This applies to all types of production but is especially true of contracts which entail quantity production of many components as in the case of electronics—

And so on.

We are told that 90 per cent of installations are complete—I believe that is the figure the minister mentioned this afternoon. Does that refer to the protective screen around certain selected targets or does it refer to the more general line scheme which

would give early warning? It would seem from the statements I have read that, while making progress, our warning system is probably not being developed as rapidly as we would wish. Complaint is made in the white paper as to the difficulty of getting production in the materials required. Therefore I repeat the question I asked on November 30, and which perhaps the minister will consider he answered a moment ago. I think, however, some further explanation should be given. My question is this: Are there any agreed measures between the United States and ourselves that are now being held in abeyance for any reason whatsoever, and are there any measures which are now held in abeyance upon which agreement should be reached without further delay? I think we should have an answer to that question.

File 50209-40  
 CMB

EXTRACT FROM HANSARD FOR MAY 20, 1954  
 (pages 4902 - 4906)

50209-	40
6	16

**Hon. Brooke Claxton (Minister of National Defence):** Mr. Chairman, in opening the general discussion on this item I express the hope that hon. members will agree that following the conclusion of the general discussion we should proceed to the discussion of the details in the same way as has been done in previous years. Hon. members have already had placed before them a white paper called "Canada's Defence Program 1954-55" and it is not my intention to go into any of the details covered in that white paper which, I believe, gives more complete and detailed information about our national defence than we have ever had submitted before, and also I believe as complete information as has been made available in any country.

What I should like to do, Mr. Chairman, is to bring up to date the examination of the international position from the defence point of view which I undertook to set out, in my speech here on November 26 of last year. I should particularly like to consider, and endeavour to arrive at a clear meaning of some of the expressions which have been bandied about in recent months. I refer particularly to expressions such as "massive retaliation", "the new look" and the "long haul". It is very important, I believe, that as we consider these expressions in the light of recent events, particularly those relating to Indo-China, we should carry out these considerations against the background of the events of recent years.

We should remember that it is only six years ago that Czechoslovakia, that gallant country, was brought behind the iron curtain, and it was only five years ago that the free nations decided that rather than fall separately they would stand together and they entered into the North Atlantic treaty. During that period they have built up their strength and the progress made is indeed remarkable, whether it be viewed from the point of view of political organization, military planning, military command, or actual physical forces in the field.

The history of the world shows nothing to match it. Today we have in NATO a team of fourteen nations with effective forces trained and working together to improve their quality as well as their quantity. That this effort has succeeded is indicated by the fact that during that period we have had no general war, and one of the major contributing factors to that result has unquestionably been the steady progressive build-up of strength, actual and potential, by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This policy of playing it from strength, which was agreed to five years ago on April 4, 1949, has paid dividends in terms of peace and security. The cost has

been heavy but not heavy compared with even a fraction of the cost of a general war. - Now, sir, while this policy has worked, it cannot be said with any confidence that there has been any change in the fundamental objectives of the Soviet union and those allied with her, the satellite powers. There has been a change in attitude, in behaviour and perhaps in manners. People are now invited out to dinner, and Mr. Vishinsky may cross the floor of the United Nations and exchange a joke with our Secretary of State for External Affairs. It may not be a very good joke; however, the fact that he does it indicates a change of manner and method, but no change in fundamental objective is apparent anywhere, and the North Atlantic treaty nations at their meeting in Paris affirmed their decision to continue to build up their strength on the assumption that there was no change in the fundamental Soviet objectives of imperialism and aggrandizement.

Against that background the secretary of state of the United States, the Hon. Mr. Dulles, made a very important speech at New York on January 12, this year. In that speech he said:

Local defence will always be important. But there is no local defence which alone will contain the mighty land power of the communist world. Local defences must be re-enforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power.

That expression "massive retaliatory power" or "massive retaliation" has been discussed and debated here as elsewhere ever since. I do not propose to follow the course of the debate we had on external affairs which was so largely related to consideration of this topic, but I should like in the first instance to refer to this from the military point of view.

Since that speech the world has become conscious of the fact that we now have a new and far more deadly and dreadful instrument of mass destruction, namely the H-bomb. This bomb has an explosive power which, it is estimated, may amount to five hundred times, or even more, that of the first A-bomb dropped at Bikini in 1945. Furthermore, this bomb is expensive but it is relatively easy to make. There is no reason why any powers having modern industrial know-how and engineering and scientific skills could not make the bomb.

We know that the Russians had an explosion of a thermonuclear character of a very advanced kind. In addition to the power of the bomb we know today that the United States has a stockpile of A-bombs which is equal in explosive force to the power of all the bombs and all the shells from aircraft or

guns used in every theatre of war in the second world war. We also know that the United States has aircraft—B-36 heavy bombers and B-47 jet bombers—with the ability to deliver these bombs in quantity. Likewise we know that the Russians have A-bombs. We know that they have had a thermonuclear explosion and that presumably they will go on—if they have not done so already—to have H-bombs. We know that they have medium bombers with the capacity to reach any part of North America, and we now know that they have jet bombers of medium and heavy types. Whether or not they have them in quantity remains to be seen.

We are therefore confronted with a relatively new situation in military affairs. The H-bomb is so much more powerful than was the A-bomb that it constitutes a weapon of a different character. Whatever one may think about its existence, we must recognize it. One may deplore the existence of the H-bomb. I deplore it. But the fact is that it does exist. One may deplore the fact that such a dreadful instrument of destruction has been brought into the world. But still, since the only potential enemy has within his control that destructive power and also has the ability to employ that destructive power, we can be grateful that our great, gallant and friendly ally, the United States, has it too—has it in larger quantities—and probably had it first.

I think there can be no doubt that the possession of this power of mass destruction is a powerful deterrent to war. There can be no doubt of that fact. Whether that will be the result remains to be seen. The consequences of the employment of an H-bomb or a number of A-bombs, with their destruction of the means of fighting, of cities and communications and the possibility that this rain of destruction may be launched on one's country, would certainly lead one to think a good many times before starting out on the course which would lead to that employment. I therefore believe—and I think this is generally recognized—that the possession by the United States of both the new weapons and the power to deliver them is a powerful deterrent to aggression. That having been said, it becomes evident at once that the ability to deliver the bombs is something which is fundamental and essential to their deterrent character. Unless the United States can deliver the bombs they might just as well not exist. Hence the ability of the United States to deliver the bombs becomes a matter of the most urgent and primary importance in the preservation of peace. That ability must be protected. This consideration

[Mr. Claxton.]

brings into focus and gives new emphasis to the whole question of continental defence.

Before I go on to deal with continental defence I should like to make one or two further observations about the employment of the new weapons as a deterrent to aggression. It may well be that their destructive power is so immense that they would be of little or no use in a limited war, even as a deterrent; because once one side uses a new bomb—an A-bomb or an H-bomb—the other side will almost certainly be triggered to an all-out effort, not knowing what is involved. Hence it may well be that the existence of these weapons is not going to prevent limited or small wars or put an end to them. It is within the recollection of all of us that the possession of the A-bomb did not deter the North Korean invasion. It did not prevent the entry of Chinese volunteers into North Korea. It did not deter the conquest of China. It did not prevent the Berlin blockade. It has not stopped the war in Indo-China. Consequently, it may well be that the very existence of these weapons, and the fact that they can be used only if you think an all-out war is about to begin, is beginning, or has begun, may increase the area in which we may have relatively small wars, pressure areas and the like—such as we have seen in Korea and Indo-China.

As I shall point out later, far from putting an end to the need for weapons of a conventional nature, I believe that the A-bomb and the H-bomb have if anything probably emphasized that need. We have just had a meeting of the chiefs of staff of all the North Atlantic treaty nations at Paris. Their purpose there was to consider the effect of the new weapons on all-over strategy and tactics. I know that I am breaking no confidence when I say that it was not suggested there that the existence of these new weapons would lead to any sudden reduction in quantity, quality or cost of conventional weapons. The fact is that we hardly have today in NATO the minimum quantity of weapons, planes, equipment, trained officers and men and communications to do the job of even enabling the employment of the new weapons through bold planning, and causing concentrations so that the new weapons would have a useful target, also of preventing the only potential enemy from overrunning Europe irrespective of where bombs were dropped.

I think I am right in saying that no nation, no national leader, no minister of defence, no chief of staff has so far suggested that the existence of and the ability to employ the new weapons should decrease

what we have of conventional weapons because what we have is the minimum required to enable us to do the job. That job is to permit the employment of the new weapons strategically and tactically and also to protect the ability to use them.

As part of that protection we have built up in North America a very important system of defences against air attack. This now goes under the name of continental defence, and you can see that with the Americans having bases in North America as well as elsewhere throughout the world they—or any other country that has atomic weapons and the capacity to deliver them—must be protected from air attack. This is becoming an increasingly important part of the joint activities of Canada and the United States in planning and carrying out our air defences. I dealt with this at some length on November 26 and I do not want to go over the same ground again, but I would remind hon. members that the components of any system of air defence consist, from the air force point of view, of radar to pick up and lead to the identification and interception of enemy raiders, a system of communications which instantly gives the intelligence received from the radarscope to fighter command, to enable the quick scrambling of the squadrons, and finally squadrons of fighter aircraft able instantly to get into the air and carry out an interception.

A good many hon. members visited St. Hubert R.C.A.F. station this session and saw there the air defence command headquarters for Canada. That command is operational today 24 hours a day. It receives intelligence of every aircraft coming under surveillance at any one of the radar stations. That aircraft is identified either as a friendly aircraft because it has filed a flight plan, because of its characteristics, or because we see it, or is not identified—in which event the fighters are scrambled and carry out an interception. Just last week at a radar station not far from here I saw interceptions carried out from the control room of the radar station to which had been hooked up the telephones of the pilots, of fighter command, of the radar operators, and of the plotters. These were hooked up to loudspeakers so that from the station we could hear the whole battle being carried out, and within a very few minutes the interceptions were successfully completed.

This system, as planned between the United States and Canada, is now more than 90 per cent complete and operational. These interceptions are carried out daily, night and day, in operations against B-36's and B-47

jets which have come over on simulated raids without the knowledge of the stations. The percentage of kills as they were counted in these exercises was extraordinarily high compared with any experience in the second world war. It was not one hundred per cent but it was above 90 per cent indicating a very successful operational state.

This is, I say, in operation today and the whole system as planned between the United States and Canada will be in complete operation by late summer or early autumn. The communications are hooked up so that within seconds or a minute or so of an aircraft being found on the radarscope at one of the radar stations the intelligence of that is received at air defence command and at Colorado Springs where the United States strategic air force is located. Communications are in effect on a 24-hour basis.

It is very risky for people charged with defence to make a prophecy. All we can do is to give opinions and not give assurances, but this system of defence against air attack has reached the stage today where if I were in charge of the Russian air force and were aiming to reach important targets in the United States I would not go across the lines of these radar defences. I would go some other way, and there are other ways.

I have mentioned 90 per cent. That is a figure which I have cited for purposes of illustration, but that is not enough when you are dealing with A and H-bombs. We cannot get 100 per cent—I am sure of that—because of the size of the country, the difficulty of carrying out construction and the tremendous cost in terms of men, equipment and money. However, we do need more early warning. We need it not only in order to carry out interception but also in order to economize on manpower. The first step towards having additional early warning has been announced in the construction of a new chain across Canada, north of the existing one, to use equipment which has generally been known as the McGill fence equipment. The purpose of this is to give additional early warning.

We have also had under consideration by scientists and military experts in the United States and Canada additional means of having early warning, and no doubt additional steps will be taken from time to time. This is an exceedingly costly operation. When we were up in the Arctic four weeks ago I was astonished to find that to keep a weather station employing nine men going took 340 tons of supplies a year, and that involved 30 round trips of a North Star aircraft from Resolute Bay to wherever the station was. It

also involved getting the supplies to Resolute by aircraft or ship. When we have to use 30 round trips of a heavy transport over these immense distances to supply a station employing nine men you can see how tremendous will be the task of increasing our defences in the far north. However, I am sure that more will have to be done and that it will be done.

I should add that to supplement the work of the air force against air attack we now have organizations of ground observers across Canada. There are now 65,000 volunteer members of this corps.

In addition to what is generally called active defence, that is defence by the armed forces against air attack, we have to consider also our position with regard to civil defence. The immediate responsibility for civil defence rests, of course, with the Department of National Health and Welfare, and the provincial and municipal authorities. There has been some tendency by some people here and elsewhere to take the view that the destructive power of the H bomb makes civil defence measures futile. Nothing could be further from the truth. For one thing the number of targets sufficiently important to justify the use of the H bomb is limited. Moreover, the new weapons put even greater emphasis on planned measures for dispersal and evacuation. Our plans must continue to receive the closest examination in the light of all the circumstances, but the planning and organization of civil defence measures must be pressed forward.

To meet the situation that would be created by an H bomb falling on a big city, there is no doubt that all the available civil defence resources must be developed and mobilized to the fullest possible extent. These local measures will have to be supplemented in turn by all the civilian resources and facilities of the surrounding area, and where those prove insufficient, by all the resources of our military personnel and equipment: navy, army and air force, active and reserve. So far as our military forces are concerned, if civil defence should need their help, the only higher priority demands on their services would be actual defence of the continent against landings by enemy forces, which are not now expected on any considerable scale. Training for action overseas would be of little use until the situation had been stabilized at home.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

50209-46  
15745  
39 J C

Subject U.S. - Can. Def.

Date MAY 15 1954 Publication Windsor D. Star

# Bolstering Of Defence Seen Needed

## General Says Windsor Strategic Point In Protecting Continent

The Russian hydrogen bomb threat will require Canada to pay closer attention to the development of Windsor's military forces, General Charles Foulkes, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D., chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, said yesterday at a civic luncheon given in his honor.

### TEAMWORK WITH U.S.

At the same time he stressed the co-operation which exists between the Canadian and American chiefs of staff and said there is no disagreement on United States and Canadian air defence.

General Foulkes warned that the defence program must be speeded because of the Russian H-bomb developments.

The civic luncheon was tendered by the city to honor General Foulkes, who was in Windsor as reviewing officer for the Windsor Centennial Warriors' Day program staged at Jackson Park last night.

There were 40 prominent Windsor citizens and military leaders attending the function.

General Foulkes said he was honored to come to Windsor during its 100th birthday festivities.

### RECALLS LONG ASSOCIATION

"The military affairs of Windsor have been of concern to me for a long time," General Foulkes said, as he recalled that 27 years ago, as a lieutenant in the Royal Canadian Regiment stationed at London, he came to Windsor to conduct provisional schools of instruction for the Essex Scottish Regiment.

During World War II, he said, he saw the military activities of this district carried overseas when he commanded the Second Canadian Division.

In Italy he had 417 Squadron and the 3rd Field Ambulance under his command. Both units were composed largely of Windsor district men.

"I watched with pride the growth of the military forces in this area and in the future we will have to pay more attention to it than we have because of the hydrogen bomb efforts carried out by Russia last August," he said.

### AREA DEFENCE VITAL

"The defence of this area is of great importance.

"The defence of North America is well under way but must be speeded because of the H-bomb developments," General Foulkes said.

"In Windsor, being close to the United States, you are influenced by what the U.S. does. The defence of Canada is closely tied with that of the United States and the U.S. and Canadian chiefs of staff work closely together," he said.

"Despite suggestion that Canada is lagging in its share of the North American defence program, I want to assure you that Canada is not dragging its feet in defence.

"There is no disagreement on U.S.-Canadian air defence. We have completed the radar defences in the north and will establish an early warning system in the north which will give us advance warning of an attack."

### NEED PRACTICAL IDEAS

"It is essential that we see that the scientific principles for defence which are proposed prove practical. In practice many ideas are not too practical. In the Arctic we have done a great deal of research but

it is difficult country in which to operate," he said.

To bring this point home to his audience, General Foulkes cited the problems of the U.S. and Canada in maintaining five weather stations inside the Arctic circle.

Each station requires nine men, and to keep those stations operating it takes six ships of 50,000 aggregate tons, one tanker and two icebreakers which bring supplies up to Resolution Bay during the one open month for navigation.

There are 3,600 tons of stores required for these five stations and 800 men are required on the ships to handle the loads.

Later, 30 four-engined aircraft are needed to airlift the supplies for one station.

"It sounds attractive to shoot down atomic carriers in the Arctic but it isn't practical," he said.

### RECRUITING DIFFICULTY

"The average Canadian doesn't like living like an eskimo and recruiting men for these northern jobs is difficult."

"I assure you that the air defence of North America is being provided and all that is practical is being done."

General Foulkes indicated that Canada often can do things a little quicker than they are done in the United States but hastened to assure that every effort is made to spend Canadian defence dollars on practical and lasting items.

The chairman of the chiefs of staff committee was introduced to the meeting by Lt.-Col. L. A. Deziel, O.B.E., who served on General Foulkes 2nd Canadian Division staff during World War II. Col. Deziel, who is also a controller, was acting mayor for the occasion.

He said General Foulkes started the war as a captain and later commanded the 2nd Canadian Division and the Canadian Corps. Besides being chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, General Foulkes is also Canada's representative on Nato.

*[Handwritten initials]*

*[Handwritten initials]*

PRESS CLIPPING SERVICE  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MAY 21 1954

"He won many battles and also won the hearts of his men and as long as the military affairs of this country are in his hands we need have no fear," Col. Deziel said.

Mayor Arthur J. Reaume who was attending the Optimist International sessions, in another ballroom at the Prince Edward Hotel appeared at the luncheon to extend an official welcome to General Foulkes.

### THOSE AT LUNCHEON

Attending the luncheon were, Lt.-Col. D. C. O'Brien, M.B.E., E.D., Magistrate Angus W. MacMillan, Lt.-Col. R. J. Gilmor, M.B.E., C.D., Right Rev. Wilfrid Langlois, D.P., John Fisher, British consul in Detroit; R. S. Bridge, Commander W. G. Curry, W. L. Clark, Col. Alan C. Prince, V.D., Hon. the Rev. M. C. Davies, speaker of the legislature; Lt.-Col. the Hon. William Griesinger, M.C., V.D., minister of public works; Judge Albert J. Gordon, Don F. Brown, M.P., Hugh A. Graybiel, Lt.-Col. A. J. Hodges, M.C., C.D., R. J. Cavanaugh, U.S. consul in Windsor; Mayor Roland C. Mott, of Riverside; Lt.-Col. H. Weir Alexander, A. E. Bryan, Canadian consul in Detroit; City Clerk C. V. Waters, Judge J. A. Legris, Crown Attorney Bruce J. S. Macdonald, O.B.E., Q.C., Lt.-Col. D. C. Warnica, E.D., Alderman Dr. Roy Perry, Joseph Mencil, W. T. Grant, Eli Goldin, Harry Rosenthal, Alderman Albert Long, C. H. Smith, W. D. McGregor, Alderman John Charlton, Anthony Kramer, Charles Bell, Q.C., Alderman John Wheelton, Alderman Archie Munroe, Rev. George Nan, Controller Robert M. Fuller and Col. R. L. Raymond, executive staff officer to General Foulkes.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

File 101  
27/10/54

Subject U.S. - Co. Deep

Date MAY 15 1954 Publication Windsor Star

# Must Guard Against Any Sneak Attack

## Windsor's Warriors Again May Be Needed, Staff Chief Declares

A warning that Soviet Russia will shortly possess mass destruction weapons and the means of delivering them on this continent was made last night by General Charles Foulkes, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D., chairman of the Canadian chiefs of staff, at Jackson Park.

### 14,000 LISTEN

Appearing as guest speaker at the Warriors' Day celebration, one of the feature attractions on the Windsor Centennial program, General Foulkes had an audience more than 4,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen from the United States and Canada; army cadets from Windsor high schools, and more than 10,000 spectators.

The ceremonies started out with a march past a saluting base set up at the south side park and ended with a feu de joie fired by Windsor's famed Essex Scottish Regiment.

General Foulkes prefaced his brief remarks with a few words of glowing praise for the Essex Scottish and for all other units recruited in this city. "You have produced in this city two major military units and many other supporting arms."

### COMMANDED DIVISION

He traced the origin of the Essex Scottish in 1927 through the prewar training years and on up to World War II. "In January, 1944, when I took over command of the 2nd Canadian Division, I had the Essex Scottish under my command.

"During the terrible battles of Caen and Falaise, we shared the same blood, sweat, tears and fright which accompany all soldiers when under fire for the first time. Both commanders and troops had very trying times during these terrific battles in the bridgehead, but we were able to win our battles, and by the time we crossed the Seine there was no better formation under Monty's command than the 2nd Division, and no better unit in the 2nd Division than the Essex Scottish."

He added that he had the privilege of being served by the 3rd General Hospital from Windsor during the Italian campaign and was given air support on many occasions by members of the 217th City of Windsor Squadron, R.C.A.F.

"In this fashion I have learned to respect the type of soldier and airman that comes from this great city of Windsor. I am proud to have been selected to talk to you tonight."

OK  
AL

PRESS CLIPPING SERVICE

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MAY 21 1954

### URNS TO FUTURE

Turning abruptly from the past to the present, General Foulkes spoke of the horrors that might be expected to accompany any war of the future. However, in spite of the belief that the day of the foot soldier is over, the general said that his role will be as great as ever.

"It may be necessary for us to change our organization, tactics and training to meet changing conditions but there will still be a need of well-trained, well-disciplined foot soldiers."

One of the major roles of those foot soldiers, in the opening phases of a new war at least, might be to assist civil defence in rescue and restoration in areas where severe damage has occurred.

### SURPRISE ATTACK DANGER

To him, no matter what the prospect for war or peace might be, it is imperative to be on guard against a surprise attack.

"It is still necessary for us to support our Western allies in holding Western Europe against any possible aggression and at the same time, along with our American partners, take all prac-

tical measures to ensure the defence of this continent from surprise attack.

"We must continue to train and be ready should the calamity of war overtake us. And if that war does come, I am confident that Windsor and its armed forces will respond as they have always done in the past hundred years to defend our freedom."

He welcomed United States forces participating in the ceremony and said that "these demonstrations of goodwill show the spirit necessary to solve the difficult problem of defending the continent."

He saw the United States and Canada working in close harmony to solve those defence problems and, in the end, bringing peace to a troubled world.

General Foulkes was introduced to the big crowd by Lt.-Col. L. A. Deziel, controller for the City of Windsor, who was appearing on behalf of Mayor Arthur J. Reaume.

50209-40  
[Handwritten signature]

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Subject U.S. - Canada - Def.

Date MAY 15 1954 Publication TORONTO TELEGRAM

OK

OK

PRESS CLIPPING SERVICE

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MAY 21 1954

# Foulkes Urges Canada-U.S. Defense Pact

Windsor, May 15 — (CP) — A firm alliance between the United States and Canada for the defense of the North American continent and for the support of the Allies in holding Western Europe against any possible aggression, was advocated last night by General Charles Foulkes, chairman of the Canadian chiefs of staff.

Speaking to more than 4,000 soldiers, sailors and airmen and to a crowd estimated at over 10,000 in Windsor's Jackson Park, General Foulkes said, "We must face the fact that Soviet Russia will shortly possess mass-destruction weapons and the means of delivering them on this continent."

"We must be prepared for the

use of atomic weapons in a tactical role on the battlefield. These changing conditions must, therefore, call for changes in our planning, training and organization."

No matter what changes were necessary, well-trained, well-disciplined foot soldiers would be needed as much as they ever were.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

*File WNB*

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: *828*

Date: May 13, 1954

Enclosures: *5*

Reference: Our teletype WA-758 of April 30

Subject: Continental Defence

*Refer ec os  
MND DMND  
APR 30 1954  
Secret  
Am  
Dir*

Air or Surface Mail: .....

Post File No: .....

D	-1
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	References
7	
8	
9	
10	

*Copy on 8934-A-8  
Copy on 50309-40  
Done 5/17/54*

Ottawa File No.	
<i>50209-40</i>	
<i>58</i>	<i>50</i>

14 MAY 1954

I attach for your information five copies of a bill (H.R.8967) which would create the position in the Defense Department of an Assistant Secretary for Continental Defense. The bill was introduced by Representative Cole, the Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, in fulfilment of the promise which he made in his speech of April 29. The relevant sections of that speech were contained in our telegram under reference and copies of the text of the full speech have been sent to you.

Internal Circulation

2. We discussed Representative Cole's action informally with the Canadian Desk at the State Department. Preliminary opinion there was that the bill would not be acted on at this session of Congress especially since it did not have the support of the executive branch of the government. It could not be entirely ignored, however. The sponsor was not just any Congressman, but the Chairman of an important and responsible committee. The matter of most immediate concern to the State Department is the fact that comment from the interested Departments will be requested as a matter of routine, even though the bill itself may languish in the Committee to which it has been referred. The main burden of this routine task will, in this instance, fall on the Department of Defense, but the State Department's interest in the bill is obvious. It was clear that no real thought had been given in the State Department to the substance of the proposal. We may expect that the intensity of the State Department's interest will be directly related to the efforts made by Representative Cole to push the bill through the Armed Services Committee. We expressed our interest in being kept informed on the progress of the bill and received the promise that we would be told of any developments.

Distribution to Posts

3. The bill is essentially a matter of United States concern since it would affect the organization of a Department of the United States Government. It is not, however, without interest to the Canadian Government. State Department officials have on a number of occasions in private conversation spoken of the difficulties in pursuing the subject of continental defence through the many interested sections of the Defense Department. The creation of a position for an Assistant Secretary responsible solely for continental defence matters would doubtless lend a greater cohesion to United States efforts in this field and bring into sharper focus the plans and objectives of the United States Government for the defence of the continent.

D

*(Signature)*  
The Embassy. 001191

FILE COPY

83<sup>D</sup> CONGRESS  
2<sup>D</sup> SESSION

# H. R. 8967

---

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MAY 3, 1954

MR. COLE of New York introduced the following bill; which was referred to the  
Committee on Armed Services

---

## A BILL

To create an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Continental  
Defense.

1        *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*  
3 That section 203 (b) of the National Security Act of 1947  
4 (61 Stat. 495), as amended, is amended to read as follows:  
5        “(b) There shall be four Assistant Secretaries of De-  
6 fense, one of whom shall be designated Assistant Secretary  
7 of Defense for the Continental Defense of the United States,  
8 who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by  
9 and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The As-  
10 sistant Secretaries shall perform such duties and exercise such  
11 powers as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe, and shall

1 take precedence in the Department of Defense after the  
2 Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the  
3 Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the  
4 Secretary of the Air Force.”

83<sup>rd</sup> CONGRESS  
2<sup>d</sup> SESSION

**H. R. 8967**

**A BILL**

To create an Assistant Secretary of Defense for  
Continental Defense.

By Mr. Cohn of New York

MAY 3, 1954

Referred to the Committee on Armed Services

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE  
MINISTER'S OFFICE

SEEN  
L. B. PEARSON

Memorandum

May 27, 1954.

Miss Macdonald

*M*

Mr. Claxton asked that the attached copies of correspondence exchanged between Mr. Heeney and himself on the subject of continental defence be forwarded to Mr. Pearson.

*Irene Dunn*

(Miss) I. Dunn,  
Private Secretary.

001194

28 - 5 - 24 (55)

C O P Y

*File  
CMB*

To: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA  
From: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

C O N F I D E N T I A L No. 828 May 13, 1954.

Reference: Our teletype WA 758 of April 30  
Subject: Continental Defence

50209-40  
5250

1. I attach for your information five copies of a bill (H.R.8967) which would create the position in the Defense Department of an Assistant Secretary for Continental Defense. The bill was introduced by Representative Cole, the Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, in fulfilment of the promise which he made in his speech of April 29. The relevant sections of that speech were contained in our telegram under reference and copies of the text of the full speech have been sent to you.

*9-13*

2. We discussed Representative Cole's action informally with the Canadian Desk at the State Department. Preliminary opinion there was that the bill would not be acted on at this session of Congress especially since it did not have the support of the executive branch of the government. It could not be entirely ignored, however. The sponsor was not just any Congressman, but the Chairman of an important and responsible committee. The matter of most immediate concern to the State Department is the fact that comment from the interested Departments will be requested as a matter of routine, even though the bill itself may languish in the Committee to which it has been referred. The main burden of this routine task will, in this instance, fall on the Department of Defense, but the State Department's interest in the bill is obvious. It was clear that no real thought had been given in the State Department to the substance of the proposal. We may expect that the intensity of the State Department's interest will be directly related to the efforts made by Representative Cole to push the bill through the Armed Services Committee. We expressed our interest in being kept informed on the progress of the bill and received the promise that we would be told of any developments.

D - 1	
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

JUN 1954

3. The ...

- 2 -

3. The bill is essentially a matter of United States concern since it would affect the organization of a Department of the United States Government. It is not, however, without interest to the Canadian Government. State Department officials have on a number of occasions in private conversation spoken of the difficulties in pursuing the subject of continental defence through the many interested sections of the Defense Department. The creation of a position for an Assistant Secretary responsible solely for continental defence matters would doubtless lend a greater cohesion to United States efforts in this field and bring into sharper focus the plans and objectives of the United States Government for the defence of the continent.

(Sgd) G. P. de T. Glazebrook

for The Embassy

C O P Y

83d CONGRESS  
2d Session

H. R. 8967

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

May 3, 1954

Mr. COLE of New York introduced the following bill; which  
was referred to the Committee on Armed Services

---

A BILL

To Create an Assistant Secretary of Defense for  
Continental Defense.

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-  
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,  
3 That section 203 (b) of the National Security Act of 1947  
4 (61 Stat.495), as amended, is amended to read as follows:  
5 "(b) There shall be four Assistant Secretaries of De-  
6 fense, one of whom shall be designated Assistant Secretary  
7 of Defense for the Continental Defense of the United States,  
8 who shall be appointed from civilian life by the President, by  
9 and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The As-  
10 sistant Secretaries shall perform such duties and exercise  
11 such powers as the Secretary of Defense may prescribe, and

83d CONGRESS  
2d Session

H. R. 8967

---

---

A BILL

To create an Assistant Secretary of Defense  
for Continental Defense.

---

By Mr. COLE of New York

---

May 3, 1954

Referred to the Committee on Armed Services

- 2 -

- 1 shall take precedence in the Department of Defense after
- 2 the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
- 3 the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and
- 4 the Secretary of the Air Force."

C O P Y

Ottawa, May 25, 1954.

Confidential

A. D. P. Heeney, Esq.,  
Canadian Ambassador to the United States,  
Washington, D.C.,  
U. S. A.

Dear Arnold,

Reference your letter No. 828, May 13, 1954  
Subject: Continental Defence

When I saw Secretary of Defense Wilson on May 5, we discussed the speech by Representative Cole on April 29, in which he indicated his intention to introduce a bill to create the position of Assistant Secretary for Continental Defence. Mr. Wilson said that in his view this was not the way to deal with the matter. To appoint a new Assistant Secretary for a specific purpose would be like adding a fifth wheel to the coach.

Of course, this is obvious. There is no more reason for having an Assistant Secretary for a subject like continental defence than there would be to have an Assistant Secretary for any other geographical area. Any need for coordinating United States defence activities as between the Navy, Army, Air Force and any other agencies is a general need, to be dealt with generally and not by the appointment of a new official to deal with part of the field.

I think it will be found that in the United States Air Force alone the lines are by no means clear. This, however, is largely due to the general difficulties inherent in the system of command of the U.S.A.F. and most other air forces, which almost of necessity have to combine one system of command over defined geographical areas and another system of command dealing with different functional operations, such as strategical command, air defence command, military air transport command, training command, air materiel command, etc., extending over most if not all of the geographical areas.

- 2 -

In his speech Representative Cole referred to negotiations between Canada and the United States having been pending for two years. As this is not the case, I felt it necessary to write Secretary Wilson, and I enclose a copy of my letter to him dated May 12.

You will also recall, in this connection, the joint statement which I tabled in the House on April 8, which appears as an appendix to Votes and Proceedings for that day.

This was also the occasion for some discussion during the opening of the general debate on the defence estimates on Thursday, May 20 and Friday, May 21 of last week, as you will see from the attached copies of Hansard at pages 4905, 4906 and 4955 to 4989.

Further to this it may interest you to learn that when we were in Washington Gerald Waring, one of the press correspondents with the party, interviewed Representative Cole. Mr. Cole spoke to him quite frankly along the lines of his speech. Waring himself decided not to make much use of this.

In his speech Representative Cole also suggests a unified command and in his interview with Waring he said he thought this might well be a Canadian. Mr. Cole made it quite evident that by unified command he meant a command having effective control over the location, composition and operations of all forces concerned with continental defence in both countries.

At the present time we have effective working arrangements under which Air Vice Marshal James, Air Officer Commanding Defence Command, with headquarters at R.C.A.F. Station, St. Hubert, receives intelligence of interceptions and these are communicated to SAC at Colorado Springs within a matter of seconds or minutes. I am confident that the air defences as presently planned in the Pinetree Operation will be fully complete and operational later this year. All our radar stations are now complete except for the two smaller stations on the west coast added into the plan later. The communication system is practically complete. All weather fighter squadrons will be organized and operational by the end of the year. Work is being pressed on to site the McGill Fence stations and start production of the equipment.

- 3 -

We have had a number of major exercises which have indicated that the results being obtained are at least as good as anything we anticipated. "Interceptions" have been carried out on nine out of ten "attacking" B-36 aircraft and good results also obtained on B-47. However, I did not say, as reported, that we could make nine out of ten kills, or anything of the kind. I emphasized that the only way of knowing the number of kills we could make was in actual battle, which I hope would not occur.

As this is a matter of great and increasing importance and urgency, Air Force Headquarters and the Joint Staff should work closely with you to keep both External Affairs and this Department fully and immediately informed of all developments and statements and also, should work together to do everything possible to ensure that the matter is responsibly treated.

Yours sincerely,

(Original signed by Brooke Claxton)

Ottawa, May 12, 1954.

AIR MAIL

Honourable Charles E. Wilson,  
Secretary of Defense,  
Washington, D.C.,  
U.S.A.

Dear Mr. Secretary,

In a speech at Colgate University on April 29, 1954, Representative Cole made an important contribution to public understanding of some aspects of continental defence.

There are parts of this speech, however, which should be read against the background of the experience of the governments and armed forces of Canada and the United States.

The subject of continental defence against new means and methods of attack on North America has been under intense and urgent consideration at every level of those responsible in our two countries throughout the whole period beginning even before the end of the Second World War.

In the course of this there has not been an important point on which the representatives of the United States and Canada have failed to reach agreement.

In fact, the working agreement for the close co-operation of our forces has been closer and more effective than that ever achieved between any two countries.

This has been repeatedly emphasized by leaders in Canada and the United States. The most recent expressions of this agreement were contained in the President's statement on his visit here in November, 1953, and in the joint statement issued in both countries on April 8, 1954.

This has been the subject of intense, urgent and continuous consideration between yourself and your colleagues and their predecessors and myself, as well as between the Chiefs of Staff and the Commanding Officers of the various services and commands in Canada and the United States.

In this speech Mr. Cole made some suggestions regarding matters which are within the scope of the authority

- 2 -

of yourself and others responsible for defence policy in your country.

Any suggestion that might be made by your government would, of course, receive the most serious consideration of the Canadian government.

There is another point, however, in his speech to which I should make express reference.

In his speech he said, "Negotiations with the Canadian government on the subject of where, how and by whom the first of such early warning lines would be built and operated have been in progress for nearly two years". I feel that on this you will agree that there have been no negotiations between our two countries which "have been in progress for nearly two years". What have been under way are studies by a number of different agencies in the United States, in Canada, and jointly, with a view to determining what further development of our continental defence system is required and how this can best be carried out.

There has been no delay in negotiation of any kind for which the government or services of either the United States or Canada could in any sense be held responsible.

Any misunderstanding on this point will only add to confusion, misunderstanding and difficulties in the way of working together as we have done in the past.

If Mr. Cole, or anyone else, has any reports of such a delay in negotiations for which we on our side are in any sense responsible, I would be only too glad to learn what they are so that any misinformation or misapprehension may be corrected in the light of the facts.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Brooke Claxton

C O P Y

CANADIAN EMBASSY

Washington, D.C.,  
May 21st, 1954.

PERSONAL AND SECRET

Dear Brooke:

Yesterday at the New Zealand Embassy, where Leslie Munro was entertaining in honour of his Minister, I happened to sit next to Radford. We did not talk "business" to any extent, but I did have an opportunity of putting to him a question and eliciting a most categorical reply on the subject of co-operation and organization at the top for continental defence.

I introduced the subject by referring to Representative Cole's bill for the setting up of an Assistant Secretaryship "for continental defense", enquiring what he thought of the idea. He replied without hesitation that he was totally opposed to the proposition as it would "cut across" established lines of authority and confuse the work of the Chiefs of Staff. He did not think that the Cole proposal would succeed.

I then went on about the single command suggestion which Cole had revived in his recent speech, asking Radford whether, in his opinion, this step would increase the efficiency of our joint measures in peacetime; what would or should be done in war is another matter. I asked whether there was any gap in the present co-operation between the two countries in this matter. I had encountered none, and, indeed, we had on many occasions been reassured by the highest U. S. authorities that they could not ask for a more co-operative attitude than that displayed by Canadian authorities.

Radford again had no hesitation in replying quite categorically. The present system of co-operation was working well. There would be nothing to be gained by establishing a single command in present circumstances.

As ....

The Hon. Brooke Claxton,  
Minister of National Defence,  
Ottawa, Canada.

- 2 -

As for Joe Alsop and his professional interest in raising the question (I had mentioned Alsop's tiresome pre-occupation with the Lincoln proposals), "He ought to be told to go and sell his papers". If the only thing that he (Radford) had to worry about was the extent of Canadian co-operation in continental defence, he could go fishing.

I thought you would be interested in this re-affirmation at the top military level of the assurances that you have already had elsewhere. The fact that Radford has himself been the representative of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in the special "meetings of consultation" between the United States and Canada in the past few months and is thus aware personally of what we are doing together, gives importance to his expression of opinion. On the other hand, it does not, of course, exclude the possibility that at some future time proposals for a unified command will not be put forward. But for the moment there is no evidence at all of this at the top level.

Charles Foulkes would probably be interested in this conversation, and you might pass this letter on to him. I am sending a copy to the Acting Under-Secretary, to be shown to the Minister on his return.

I have always found Radford very friendly and have come to know him a bit, although our contacts have been for the most part "social". It should be remembered that he is generally credited with being a strong "interventionist" in the Southeast Asia business, and, indeed, that he probably shares many of Senator Knowland's views on Pacific policy, though not, I would suspect, for all the same reasons.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) A.D.P. H.

A. D. P. Heeney.

COPY

Ottawa, May 27, 1954.

Personal and Secret

A.D.P. Heeney, Esq.,  
Canadian Ambassador to the United States,  
Washington, D.C.,  
U.S.A.

Dear Arnold:

Many thanks indeed for your letter of May 21. This was most helpful and very interesting.

I wonder if there is any way of trying to straighten out Mr. Cole? People in Washington told me that he was honest, responsible and usually well informed. Obviously somebody has put a bee in his bonnet.

When he was in Washington with H.E., Gerald Waring interviewed Mr. Cole and he elaborated on his proposals with great emphasis.

A visit to our Air Defence Command and one of the five principal radar stations, as well as a fighter squadron, and seeing from the three different points an actual interception carried out would, I feel certain, lead him to change his tune completely. The businessmen who just did this were most impressed. In this connection you may have seen the Financial Post for May 21 with the full page by Ronald McEachern.

However, I am certainly not going to let us be put in the position where we allow a Congressional committee to make a visit on a Canadian defence establishment.

Have you got any suggestion about this?

Perhaps some time you might speak to Mr. Wilson, Dr. Hannah, Mr. Douglas, General Twining or someone else and, if it seemed appropriate, ask what, if anything, could be done or said to get Mr. Cole straight.

In this general connection I dictated a letter on Monday dealing with George Glazebrook's letter on the subject. I have given a copy of this to Mike and

to ... 001206

- 2 -

to the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and they will send a copy to the Chairman of the Joint Staff.

I also wrote Mr. Wilson and referred to this in the House.

I do not suggest that we should make formal representations but I think it very desirable that all our people dealing with the Americans about these matters should know what our thinking here is and if a favourable opportunity presents itself, they might say a word which might help the Administration and put Mr. Cole or others on the right track.

Terry and Queenie greatly enjoyed their visit with you.

Yours sincerely,

Original signed by  
Brooke Claxton

Mr. Brown *KCS*  
To note + file  
*W+B*

SECRET

May 11, 1954.

50209-40  
54/54

*Mr. Barton*

MEMORANDUM FOR DEFENCE LIAISON (1) DIVISION:

U.S. Defence Installations  
in Canada - Standard Clauses

*Copy on 5138 A 40*

When Cabinet on April 29, 1954 approved the notes for a Loran station at Cape Christian, special attention was given to paras. 5(a) and 5(b).

During the discussion, the hope was expressed (although it is not stated in the discussion) that the ~~terms~~ *terms* provisions as set forth in paras. 5(a) and 5(b) would set a pattern in the establishment of joint Canada--U.S. installations in the north.

Will you please put this on an appropriate general file and keep it in mind in future negotiations.

M.H.W.

*11.5.25/55*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

*File*  
*WAB*

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Security: RESTRICTED.....

No: *783*.....

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Date: May 6, 1954.....

Enclosures: *2*.....

Reference: Your Letter No. D-556 of May 3, 1954

Air or Surface Mail:.....

Subject: Continental Defence

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
<i>50209-40</i>	
<i>52</i>	<i>50</i>

*Copy on 50210-40*

D-1
1
2
3
4

References
6
7
8
9
10

10 MAY 1954

*Q. 6*

I attach for your information two copies of the article by John G. Norris on continental defence which appeared in the April 25 issue of the Washington Post and Times-Herald and which was requested in your letter under reference. Mr. Norris is the regular reporter on military matters for the Washington Post and Times-Herald and is normally accurate and restrained in his writing on military affairs. In this instance he seems to have fallen into some of the errors of less well informed reporters who write on the subject of continental defence. In that sense his article is typical of a good number of the articles which have been appearing recently on the subject. It is a peculiar blend of fact and fiction which indicates the continuing strength of advocates of the distant early warning line in the United States. The article is based on the assumption that the distant early warning line has progressed beyond the experimental stage and has been accepted as an important element of the continental defence system planned by the United States Government. "An artists conception of the continental defence system now planned" which appeared with Mr. Norris' article is also attached for your edification. It seems to us that it is more likely to mislead the American reader than the potential enemy.

2. You will note two other interesting "facts" included in the article, namely, that the PINETREE chain is "American-manned" and that a decision has been taken to use the McGill Fence on the mid-Canada line.

*(Signature)*

The Embassy.

D

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

# CANADIAN EMBASSY WASHINGTON

FILE 1000

**Subject Automatic Arctic Radar Will Give U.S.  
Six Hours' Warning of Attack.**

**Date April 25, 1954**

**Publication Washington Post and  
Times-Herald**

**By John G. Norris**

Staff Reporter

ALONG THE remote northern coast of Alaska and Canada, near lonely Barter Island, some experiments that could affect your very survival were held last winter.

Scientists and military communications experts braved the Arctic rigors to pass judgment on radically new "automatic" radar which can make possible an effective continental defense system.

The field tests were successful, says the Air Force, and Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson has ordered a go-ahead on plans to build a chain of such early warning stations across the Arctic.

How crucial were the trials has been noted guardedly by Government officials. At stake was a decision on whether to build such a "distant early warning" radar screen to give advance notice of enemy planes coming over the North Pole—the shortest route from Russia—or whether to push our existing radar net in the United States and southern Canada as far north as economically practicable.

IN THE FIRST case, major American and Canadian cities and military bases would get some six hours' warning; the latter system would give them perhaps two hours. Today, we cannot count on more than a half hour's notice.

That is barely enough time to get interceptor planes into the air and anti-aircraft guns and missiles readied for a last-ditch fight. Four out of five of the bombers might get through to drop atomic or hydrogen bombs on American cities. That could mean death to 10 million of us, plus crushing blows at our ability to carry on a war.

American defense chiefs admit we are vulnerable today to Russian air attack. Secretary Wilson conceded this recently (though he rejected a suggestion we are "highly vulnerable"). But he stressed that enemy ability to penetrate our air defenses does not mean that we are going to be attacked.

We are "relatively secure" now, he insisted, because of our strategic bombing command. Russia, he said, is "more afraid of us than we are of them, and has been stressing a defensive buildup rather than offensive bombing operations aimed at the United States.

FOR THIS reason—and a conviction that preservation of the American economy is equally vital to victory in the Cold War—Wilson has opposed the vast expenditures some have urged to build an airtight defense against possible H-bomb attack.

Some such proposals call for spending 100 billion dollars or

more on interlinking radar defenses, built in depth over the entire continent, plus thousands of supersonic, all-weather interceptor planes and guided missiles.

Military men generally have opposed such programs as "aerial Maginot lines" which would ultimately lead the United States into a "fatal defensive-mindedness." They contend that the best defense is a good offense, and that we should put most of our money in retaliatory bombers and other mobile forces.

But the more thoughtful military men have realized that much greater emphasis on air defense was necessary if only to assure that our Strategic Air Command could do its job. For if Russia believed that a mass sneak raid could smash our SAC bases before our bombers could get into the air on their retaliatory mission, she might be encouraged to use the long-range A-bombers she has been building of late.

THUS THE question of building up our radar net has been a vital issue ever since Russia exploded its first atomic bomb in 1949. Until then, the United States had done little toward building a continental defense system. We authorized construction of a chain of warning stations along the borders and coasts of the Nation and around key installations like Oak Ridge. Now nearly complete, they have essentially the same type of radar that saved England in the Battle of Britain.

Like the "secret weapon" of 1940, these stations send out pulses of electric energy which bounce back at the speed of light when they hit an airplane or other mass. Such "echoes" indicate the direction, distance and altitude of the target by light "pips" on the radarscope.

WEAKNESSES of radar have been and continue to be these:

The range of any one station is limited to line of sight; it cannot "see" planes over the horizon.

Enemy aircraft can sneak in at low altitude and escape detection among hills and other ground objects.

The enemy can use electronic countermeasures to throw off watching radarmen.

In the northern areas, the aurora borealis does tricks to

radar reception and radio communication to rear areas.

Identification of targets always is a problem, particularly over a country like the United States where some 25,000 planes are in the air daily.

THE COST of manning a tight radar net "in depth" over an area the size of the North American continent would be a major item. Some 300 to 400 men are required to watch the scopes around the clock and provide cooks, guards and administrative personnel.

But in the Barter Island system, when a radar "sights" a plane it rings a bell at a distant control point. The warning is transmitted within seconds of the time the enemy aircraft come within range, according to a news release from Western Electric, maker of the system.

"Moreover," it says, "both the radar and the radio transmission which links it with the command centers are

proof against the magnetic storms which knock out conventional electronic equipment in the Arctic during substantial portions of the year."

These existing experimental stations, says the Pentagon, will be extended into a continuous chain from the present Alaskan net to the one around Thule, Greenland.

Such a Distant Early Warning Line — "DEW Line" — would give a minimum of six hours' warning to Air Defense Command Headquarters in Colorado of the approach of enemy bombers.

ONE BIG objection, however, has been that such a line, unless backed up by intermediate chains across Canada, would lend itself to harassing tactics by an enemy. The DEW Line could only warn that planes had crossed over. A series of interlocking lines would be needed to track them. An enemy could wear out the defenders by constant feints and then slip A-bombers through by dog-leg flights.

The answer is to install such intermediate warning lines. Already in operation is the American-manned "Pinetree Chain" running across the uppermost part of inhabited Canada.

Plans now call for building the "McGill Fence." Designed by McGill University scientists, magazine articles say it will cross Canada about the fifty-fourth parallel. That would give about two hours' warning to the United States.

Wilson's statement of two weeks ago said that the continental defense plan also will provide protection across the northeastern and northwestern approaches to North America. Navy picket ships and patrol planes will do that job.

Already in the Fleet are a few destroyers and submarines converted for radar picket duty. But their func-

tion is protection of the Fleet, and the Navy is asking funds to rebuild Liberty ships for use as regular picket stations. It also is buying a number of Lockheed Super Constellations with electronics gear to search for invaders.

ABOUT 10 PERCENT of defense spending next year—some \$3,700,000,000—will go for strictly continental defense measures. That includes not only radar, but research for and construction of interceptor planes and anti-aircraft guided missiles like the Nike.


This is far short of the defense plan advocated by American scientists. They not only would strengthen the present jerry-built air defense system within the United States, but would greatly step up preparations for an interlocking continental system in depth running from Hawaii to Alaska to Greenland to Iceland to the Azores.

The aim is a defense that would knock off perhaps nine out of 10 invading bombers. The 50 percent destruction hoped for from present plans would leave many cities and millions of people vulnerable to H-bombs, these scientists warn.

The military men answer that many of the missiles and other components of an airtight defense system will not be ready until about 1960. And meanwhile, major powers are working on the intercontinental ballistic guided mis-

sile. Radar promises to be no defense against a weapon that goes up into the ionosphere and comes down on the target from overhead.

This would give defenders only about nine seconds' warning. The only defense that seems possible is the threat of retaliation from our own missile launchers, constantly manned by crews which would just have time to press their own buttons before being blown to atoms. That, or some peaceful settlement of world differences.



### HOW RADAR SYSTEM OPERATES..

REMOTE AUTOMATIC STATION SIGNALS WARNING

MANNED EARLY-WARNING UNIT PICKS UP "BLIPS", LOCATES ON MAP AND SENDS ALERT TO:

GROUND INTERCEPTOR STATION

IMMEDIATELY, INTERCEPTOR PLANES ARE DISPATCHED AND ALERTS GO TO:

AIR DEFENSE CONTROL CENTER

HERE ALL REPORTS ARE PLOTTED ON HUGE MAP FOR OVERALL STRATEGY - WHILE ALERTS GO TO:

RADAR & STANDARD ANTI-AIRCRAFT UNITS:

INTERIOR RADAR STATIONS

MEANWHILE, DEFENSE DEPT. HAS RECEIVED ALL REPORTS, AND ALERTS

ALL DEFENSE UNITS... AND CIVIL DEFENSE AGENCIES.

Subject.....

Date.....

Publication.....

CANADIAN EMBASSY  
 WASHINGTON

This is an artist's conception of the continental defense system now planned. It includes an automatic radar chain across the Arctic; intermediate lines across Canada; existing systems in Alaska, the United States and Greenland, and picket ships and planes patrolling the north Pacific and north Atlantic oceans.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Reference: Your EX-734 of May 4, 1954.

Subject: Representative Cole's Speech on  
Continental Defence.

Security: none

No: 777

Date: May 6, 1954

Enclosures: 6

Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
51309-40	
53	58

*Copy on 51309-40*

*Refer*

References

D-1	
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

MAY 1954

*CCOS  
See Cabinet  
American Div  
+ return*

*Done  
5/17/54  
J. M.*

We attach for your information six additional  
copies of Representative Cole's speech of April 29 on  
continental defence.

*See transmittal  
slip dated 30 April 54  
on this file for text  
of Cole's speech*

*(unfiled)*  
The Embassy.

Internal  
Circulation

Distribution  
to Posts

D

From the office of Representative  
Sterling Cole (R.-N.Y.)  
Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

FOR RELEASE THURSDAY  
April 29, 1954  
7:00 P.M. (EDST)

Remarks of Representative Cole  
before the 135th Anniversary Banquet of Colgate University,  
at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York,  
Thursday, April 29, 1954 at ~~8:00~~ P. M.

9:30

To be identified in any fashion with an institution of learning such as Colgate University, which has endured for nearly a century and a half, is in itself a great distinction; to have attended and graduated from such an institution is a coveted privilege; to have served as Trustee of that University for a number of years is a rich experience; to have been invited by the alumni of such a school to address a gathering such as this commemorating the anniversary of the founding of that University by thirteen consecrated, devout, determined and enlightened men 135 years ago, is a high honor, and to be able to accept that invitation and discuss matters of great importance to our national security and welfare is a welcomed opportunity.

On behalf of all the alumni at this gathering tonight, may I express a word of greeting to all Colgate men everywhere. We wish you could be with us tonight, and we hope that the spirit that is Colgate may transport you to our midst.

Colgate graduates have never shirked the responsibilities of educated men in a free society. When our society has been exposed to peril, Colgate men have been found in the front ranks of those guarding its liberties and its freedoms.

It is about those freedoms that I wish to speak with you tonight--about the preservation of our national liberties in the age of atomic and hydrogen energy.

Two months ago, our Government began an historic series of hydrogen weapons tests at our Pacific Proving Grounds. None of us--and I include here the scientists whose brilliant attainments made these tests possible--will rejoice in the technical achievements of this latest series of nuclear tests. None of us can find comfort or satisfaction in the fact that man's ingenuity has now reached the point where a single hydrogen bomb, carried by a single plane, can eliminate the heart of the greatest city on earth. Yet that is the stark reality of the hydrogen era.

Three years ago, when our Government undertook the active development of thermonuclear weapons, all of us associated with our national atomic enterprise fervently hoped it would prove beyond the capacity of science to harness hydrogen energy for military purposes. We hoped that, by proving thermonuclear weapons could not be built, we might prove at the same time that the arsenals of the enemies of the free world could never be augmented by these dreadful armaments. But these hopes were quickly proven to be illusory. Today, hydrogen weapons are an appalling reality--on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

Today, some have suggested that our government unilaterally renounce additional tests of hydrogen weapons. To those offering such counsel, I would say this: The aim of the United States Government is not to build bigger and ever more destructive weapons without end. Our nuclear tests have been confined to devising weapons for which there exists a demonstrated military requirement. We are conducting these tests because it would invite disaster--not only for this nation but for all like-minded nations as well--to renounce the development of an armament which the enemies of our kind of world are themselves developing with all possible speed and priority.

We are not manufacturing hydrogen bombs because we believe they point the way toward bargain-basement defense budgets. We are not constructing these weapons because we think they can relieve us of the necessity of learning to live and work with our allies. We are not building hydrogen bombs because we see in them a cure--all for the root causes of world insecurity.

--2--

We are developing hydrogen energy for military purposes because we have no alternative--because despots embracing an alien and evil philosophy aimed at total world dominion have left us no other course. On the day the rulers of the Soviet Union demonstrate, by deed rather than word, that they are willing to join with other nations in regulating the output of nuclear weapons and all other instruments of war as well, we will gladly and eagerly end our efforts to harness the atom for military uses. More than that, we will not be found wanting or ungenerous in our desire to divert the skills, the monies, and the resources now allocated to military applications of nuclear energy to great programs for the betterment of mankind everywhere in the world.

When World War II ended, we were the sole possessors of atomic weapons. Our atomic monopoly, coupled with the superiority of our strategic Air Force, appeared to most Americans as our best and surest means of avoiding wholesale aggression by the Soviet Union. Many of us imagined that a decade might pass before the Soviets achieved their first atomic bomb, and still another decade before they could manufacture these weapons in significant numbers. Accordingly, our entire defensive posture was built around our ability to answer all-out communist aggression with an atomic counter-blow. Our efforts to develop a continental defense against the inevitable day when atomic war could proceed in opposite directions were half-hearted. In pre-Korea defense budgets, the demands of maintaining air-atomic supremacy and a bare minimum of conventional land and sea forces left but little leeway for building defenses against an atomic threat which then appeared many years, or even decades, in the future.

But that future is here today. Far from requiring decades to amass a significant stockpile of nuclear weapons, the men of the Kremlin possess such a stockpile at this very moment. To be sure, our own atomic striking power has been growing in the meantime at an ever-increasing rate. Despite the end of our atomic monopoly, the quantitative lead we possess over the Soviets in nuclear weapons, a lead which we must increase, and the ability to deliver them against the Soviet industrial and military heartland, remain our supreme deterrent against all-out war.

Strategies built primarily around the concept of passive defense have always proved self-defeating, and they would prove self-defeating now. In the last analysis, a nation must rely for its military security upon its ability to carry a war to the foe. Yet national strategy must keep pace with changes in the balance of world military power. A policy which made pre-eminent sense when the Soviets possessed no atomic stockpile must now be adjusted and broadened to take account of the Soviet Union's presently existing, and rapidly growing, ability to engage in two-way atomic war.

The grim statistics are these: Today, the Soviet dictators are capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons of such destructive power that a single bomb could destroy the heart of New York or Chicago or Washington. Today, the Soviet Union has planes capable of delivering such weapons--even if on one-way missions--against the majority of our critical target areas. Whether the Soviets could now mount an attack of such intensity and scope that our ability to retaliate would be eliminated may be open to debate. But three or four years from now, the Soviets will be able to launch a saturation attack against our nation--an attack so massive that our ability ultimately to prevail may be open to grave question.

Were an attack to occur this week, or this year, we would have no effective way of repelling it. At best--and this is very optimistic--we might intercept as many as one out of every four Soviet bombers. It is entirely possible, however, that the ratio of interception would be much less--and I assure you that in saying this I am not revealing any secrets to the Soviet Union. The rulers of Russia are probably better aware of our present inability to defend ourselves adequately against an atomic attack than are the American people themselves.

I join with all of you in fervently hoping that the Soviet overlords will reckon with our devastating retaliatory power, and conclude that a nuclear sneak attack against the cities of America would result in the ultimate ruin of those who perpetrated it. In the past, however, the Russian rulers have miscalculated our will to resist and our determination and ability to strike back against aggression--witness the invasion of Korea.

-3-

We shall therefore be rash to presume that the Soviets may not miscalculate it once more and seek to test our resolve in the crucible of intercontinental atomic battle. We may pray that this resolve will never be tested. Destroying Russian cities will not bring back to life American cities which have been gutted and ravaged by a nuclear Pearl Harbor. Leveling Russian industries will give us little consolation if American industries are first leveled.

Atomic vengeance is not enough.

Seen in proper perspective, the threat of atomic and hydrogen instant and massive retaliation is only one-half of our military effort to provide our homeland with security against nuclear attack. The other half consists of a dual program for continental defense and for civil defense, both of such scope and efficiency that an enemy will understand, without putting us to the test of battle, that a nuclear Pearl Harbor can never bring us to our knees.

Each day <sup>that</sup> an additional bomb enters the Soviet stockpile, on each occasion that yet another plane is assigned to the Soviet long-range Air Force, our need for an effective continental defense becomes more urgent. It is beyond our capacity to create a continental defense which would guarantee 100 per cent of success in repelling hostile aerial formations. It is within our capacity, however, to inflict such losses on raiding formations that an enemy will in all probability be dissuaded from casting the die for intercontinental atomic war and be kept from dealing us a mortal blow even if he does.

Until a few years ago, a continental defense system promising such degrees of success appeared out of the question. At the very height of their efficiency, the planes of the Royal Air Force and the guns of the Anti-aircraft Command destroyed less than 10 per cent of the bombing planes the Nazis hurled against the United Kingdom. In an era when the destructive force of block-busting aerial bombs was measured in hundreds of pounds of TNT, such a level of attrition sufficed to make a sustained bombing campaign unprofitable. But today, a single plane--a single plane, I repeat--on a single mission, can carry more destructive cargo than the total carried by the combined air forces of all the allies and all the Axis nations through all the six years of World War II. When a single hydrogen bomb delivered on target can spell the death of our largest American city, no real security can be found in a continental defense system intercepting only one bomber in ten. Yet, with the radar, the interceptor craft, and the anti-aircraft of World War II, a greater measure of success was impossible.

But beginning in 1950, American scientists--many of them the same men who had brought the atomic bomb to fruition--made a series of discoveries which promise to revolutionize the science of military defense as much as nuclear bombs have revolutionized offensive warfare. These have been called "technological break-throughs," but I prefer to call them "technological payoffs." Working undramatically but tirelessly and with brilliant efficiency in laboratories of both basic and applied research throughout our nation, our scientists, technicians, and engineers have devised radical new weapons and electronic devices which offer the promise of hitherto unattainable degrees of success in detecting, intercepting, and destroying any bombers which might be directed at the industries and cities of this nation.

With certain of these revolutionary developments you are no doubt familiar. Ground-to-air missiles have catapulted our ability to destroy enemy aircraft. The new generation of high performance jet interceptors, armed with rockets, will bring unprecedented efficiency to the operations of our Air Defense Command. Advances in the detection of aircraft, many of them still highly classified, are likewise here or in the offing.

Science, which has brought our nation the deterring power of our atomic and hydrogen stockpile, can now be our greatest helper in defending ourselves from these self-same weapons of mass destruction.

--4--

We must guard against one danger, however. We must not fall into the error of integrating these new weapons--some of which are already in production, and others still in the design stage--into a defensive system more suited for the defensive and offensive weapons of yesterday rather than for the armaments of today or tomorrow.

Traditionally, defense against bombing formations has been regarded as passive defense--as point defense. That is to say, the air defenses of World War II relied upon surrounding critical target areas with a close-in perimeter of anti-aircraft guns and nearby air bases, on which were stationed short-range interceptor aircraft. Against the comparatively low-speed bombers of World War II, with their payloads of conventional explosives, such a passive defense system offered a tolerable degree of protection. But not so today. Now, if we were to wait until enemy planes crossed our borders or approached our seacoasts before activating defensive tactics, we could secure no significant degree of protection whatsoever. A Russian TU-4 bomber--the plane which now constitutes the backbone of the Red air force--would be over this very building in less than 20 minutes after we detected it within 100 miles of New York Harbor. As the piston-driven planes of the Red air force are retired in favor of high-performance jet bombers, the futility of a military plan which relied exclusively upon local or point defense becomes all the more obvious.

If we are to defend ourselves against the planes of today and tomorrow, rather than the planes of yesterday, our first requirement is for advance warning of an impending attack. Today, we would have no more than a few minutes prior notice of approaching bomber formations. My own belief is that we imperatively need at least six hours of advance warning. So long as we are denied such prior notice of an attack, we cannot evacuate our target cities. Neither can we alert and commit to action more than a small fraction of our interceptor aircraft. No less ominous, the planes of our Strategic Air Command might be destroyed on the ground, before they could launch a retaliatory blow against an aggressor.

The scientists most knowledgeable concerning this problem are unanimous in believing that we need, and can have, an advance warning system which would detect enemy aircraft long before they reach our borders. The geographic position of our country superbly lends itself to securing such an alert. On the west, our nation is bounded by the vast stretches of the Pacific Ocean. On the east, 3000 miles of Atlantic Ocean, and our Western European allies separate us from our communist adversaries. On the north, 2000 miles of arctic waste stand between the Soviet Union and the populated areas of Canada. From whichever direction an attacking force might come--west, north, or east--it must traverse vast stretches of water or uninhabited land before reaching its destination, the cities of North America.

Space, sheer space, can be--if it is wisely used--an ally of untold worth in creating an effective continental defense system. Almost four years have passed since our scientists first proposed putting space to work by establishing an early warning line across the north of Canada, and extending it seaward to the east and the west by means of patrol aircraft and picket ships. More than two years have passed since the formidable technical problems involved in making a distant warning system both effective and economical were surmounted. And yet, four years after the need for such an early warning line was pointed out, and two years after our scientists developed the equipment which would make such a line possible, it is still not in existence. Negotiations with the Canadian Government on the subject of where, how, and by whom the first of such early warning lines would be built and operated have been in progress for nearly two years.

Scarcely a week goes by but that we are not reassured through optimistic press releases that these negotiations are proceeding harmoniously, satisfactorily, and with the sense of urgency which the situations require. We cannot detect enemy planes with press releases or comforting reassurances.

--5--

Literally dozens of excellent studies and reports have been made on the problem of continental defense. All of them agree that adequate advance warning of an enemy nuclear attack is the prerequisite of all other measures designed to improve our continental defenses, and that such a warning is possible. If we are subjected to atomic attack before such a system is in actual operation, there will be little satisfaction in the fact that the conclusions of our innumerable studies on continental defense were brilliantly correct. With all the earnestness at my command, I urge that we immediately cease studying the early warning problem and immediately begin the actual construction of an advance warning line.

Today, large sums of money are already being expended on continental defense. Still larger sums will be required in the future to keep our defenses ahead of step-ups in Soviet offensive power. The real need of the moment, however, is not for dollars but for decisions. The need is to translate into reality, as quickly as possible, preparations which are technologically possible and already funded by the Congress.

I have been assured by leading authorities that we can measurably accelerate the presently planned date on which an early warning line will be in operation with a very modest additional outlay of money. I have been assured in addition that significant improvements in the over-all effectiveness of our continental defenses during the next three years can be made--again without large outlays of dollars, if we put an end to further discussion and instead make positive decisions to get about this job with all possible speed.

One of the main problems now confronting us in this respect is the diffusion of responsibility for continental defense within our military establishment. There is no clear-cut line of command along which decisions are channeled from the top civilian planners within the defense establishment to the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy units engaged in continental defense. Simply getting to know the facts about continental defense requires traversing one of the most complicated bureaucratic mazes ever to exist in the Pentagon. It is now still more difficult to assign clear and definite responsibility for errors of omission or commission in this field.

In order to correct this situation, which to me is highly unsatisfactory, I plan to introduce legislation which would create a new position within the defense establishment--an Assistant Secretary for Continental Defense. To me it is completely ironical that in our whole vast Department of Defense there is no one, officer or civilian, whose responsibility is the defense of our homeland. Such an Assistant Secretary, who would sit in the highest councils of our military planners, would be charged with over-all responsibility for co-ordinating our continental defense effort. Subject of course to the authority of the Secretary of Defense, he would be responsible for drawing together the diverse continental defense activities of the three services into a coherent, integrated program aimed at bringing an effective defensive structure into being as quickly as possible. I earnestly believe that this single administrative step--centralizing responsibility for continental defense within the office of a new Assistant Secretary--will by itself significantly advance the day on which we will have more than token defenses against enemy attack.

The same logic which calls for centralization of the continental defense effort of our own Government argues even more compellingly for unification of the continental defense programs of Canada and the United States. Canada lies athwart the most direct air routes between the Soviet Union and our country's industrial heartland. Without the complete co-operation of our friends to the north, we simply cannot build a realistic continental defense system. In turn, the Canadians are no less dependent upon our assistance.

We Americans sometimes tend to forget, and I fear the Canadians do likewise, that Toronto and Ottawa and Montreal and Vancouver are today as exposed to atomic attack as our own cities, and that Canada's industries and centers of population would constitute prime targets in the event of an enemy assault. The contributions of Canada--in terms of military

--6--

manpower, armaments, and critical raw materials--loom ever larger in the defense of the free world, and in the event of all-out war, no aggressor could ignore opportunities for eliminating Canada's war potential. Moreover, if America and Canada deprive themselves of the advantages of defense-in-depth--and if we Americans are forced to build a continental defense system exclusively within our own borders, aerial formations unable to penetrate our nation would forcibly be diverted to target areas in our friendly neighbor to the north. The phrase "continental defense" was not coined accidentally. It is not simply the United States--it is all of North America which is today threatened and which must be protected.

Our two nations must develop an organization to provide a common response to a common threat. Such a common response, I believe, should not be limited to co-operation in the field of early warning of enemy attack. It should be extended to those measures required not only to detect, but to intercept and repel, approaching aerial formations long before they reach the cities of Canada or the United States. If we require enemy planes to penetrate successive barriers of defensive weapons before they reach a target, we shall dramatically alter for the better our ability to turn back--and thereby prevent--an assault against either of our two nations.

The political, tactical and logistic problems involved in creating a system of interception-in-depth are formidable--but they are far from insurmountable. On technical grounds, it is entirely possible to maintain and operate a complex of interceptor installations in the Arctic. It is entirely possible to extend such a system over the Atlantic and Pacific, through the use of hunter-killer forces modeled on the tactics our Navy has adopted in combatting the submarine menace.

I cite but one example of the defensive gains which would accrue from a system of active interception-in-depth. It is now practical to manufacture small-scale atomic weapons specifically designed for the interception of enemy aircraft. The destructive power of such weapons is such that a single atomic warhead would be far more effective than literally thousands of conventional anti-aircraft shells in repelling hostile planes. Yet who would welcome the prospect of using such weapons--for all their efficiency--near the centers of population of our two nations? The prospect, however, is completely different if missiles and rockets with atomic warheads could be employed far out to sea or far above the arctic wastes, remotely distant from any urban targets.

Yet surely we cannot begin to exploit all the possibilities for a realistic and effective continental defense through independent action of Canada and the United States, or through token co-ordination of our joint defensive efforts. I therefore propose that our Government, as speedily as possible, enter into a mutual continental defense pact with Canada, under the authority of the United Nations, comparable in purpose, scope and organization with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I would envisage as emerging from such a treaty a North American Continental Defense Organization. Army, Navy, and Air Force units from our two nations would be assigned to such a command in a manner akin to the land, sea, and air forces now stationed in Western Europe and reporting to SHAPE headquarters in Paris. Such a North American Continental Defense Organization would be headed by a supreme commander whose responsibility and authority in the field of continental defense would parallel those now exercised by General Gruenther in his position as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Europe.

Would not such a unified North American Defense Organization be radical and unprecedented? Yes--but no more radical or unprecedented than the threat we now face from the Soviet Union. I submit that all other considerations notwithstanding, it would be suicidal for Canada and the United States not to recognize the new dimensions to sovereignty brought by the threat of atomic and hydrogen warfare.

--7--

Continental defense, like any other military problem, involves combining human and material resources into an organizational structure of maximum efficiency. To build a continental defense commensurate with our peril, we therefore need three things: More and better weapons and detection devices for discovering, tracking, intercepting, and destroying enemy aircraft. We need unity of organization within our own continental defense effort--which can be brought about by establishing the position of assistant Secretary for Continental Defense. We need unity of organization with our Canadian friends--which can be brought about through a mutual defense pact by establishing a North American Continental Defense Command.

Far from representing a modern day version of isolationism, continental defense and isolationism are contradictory terms. Both in terms of the threat which has made it necessary and the measures which will make it effective, continental defense underscores the shrinking nature of our globe and the imperative necessity of working together with our allies toward the goal of a better future.

What the future holds for us no man can say with certainty. Heretofore, all prolonged armaments races in history have ended in war, and we shall be relying more on our hopes than on reason or precedent if we decide that the verdict of history will now be amended to take account of nuclear weapons. Yet we must admit these weapons have no parallel in earlier historic epochs--never before has man had within his grasp the capacity to destroy entire civilizations. Sir Winston Churchill, whose prophecies have been so many times correct--has voiced the hope that--in one of the great ironies of history--nuclear weapons, precisely because of the universal destruction which would follow in the wake of their widespread use, may usher in an era of altogether unexpected peace.

Even were this to come to pass, however, no person could cherish the prospect of a peace whose prolongation depended upon a balance of atomic terror. Moreover, we shall flaunt all the lessons of recorded history if ever we come to believe that the steel of armaments, even nuclear armaments--can be a permanent substitute for spiritual armament. In all probability, military deterring power can do no more than keep open the future for real peace. It can do no more than buy us time--precious and wasting time--which must be used to build a world in which peace rests not upon the threat of terrible reprisal, but upon the respect of man for his fellowman and the prospect for an enlightened justice between all men.

Those of us at this anniversary can well thank our beloved University for having taught us those spiritual armaments which have always been man's final sword in times of trouble. Never despairing as we face the future, let us--as alumni of Colgate, as Americans, and as men of goodwill--now bend our efforts to build the better world of the future--a world which we shall inevitably build if hewn with the cutlass of our spirit, championed by the sword of our hope, and if defended by the buckler of our faith.

oOo

Security UNCLASSIFIED.....

# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

File No.	
50209-40	
6	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST, WASHINGTON

Message To Be Sent	No. <i>EX-737</i>	Date May 4, 1954	For Communications Section Only
AIR CYPHER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		SENT - MAY 4 1954
EN CLAIR	<input type="checkbox"/>		
CODE	<input type="checkbox"/>		
CYPHER	<input type="checkbox"/>		

Priority

.....

ORIGINATOR

(Signature)

W.H.BARTON/jf

(Name Typed)

Div... D.L.(1)

Local Tel... 7509

APPROVED BY

(Signature)

(Name Typed)

Internal Distribution:

S. S. E. A. - U. S. S. E. A.

Done.....

Date... May 5/54

Copies Referred To:

Done.....

Date.....

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: Representative Cole's Speech on Continental Defence.

1. We should be grateful if you would obtain for us up to six additional copies of Representative Cole's speech of April 29 on Canada-United States Defence arrangements.

ACTING UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

RECEIVED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AFFAIRS

1954 MAY 4  
PM 2:34

001221

CANADA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE

CANADIAN SECTION

50209-40	
52	50

*File WMB*

4 May, 1954

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN  
EAST BLOCK, PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS  
OTTAWA

D-1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Dear Mr. Barton:

At General McNaughton's request I send you herewith the manuscript of an address given by Dr. John A. Hannah to the Detroit Economic Club on 19 April, 1954.

Yours sincerely,

*R. Sanders*

Secretary to  
General A. G. L. McNaughton

5 MAY 1954

W. H. Barton, Esq.,  
Secretary, Canadian Section,  
Permanent Joint Board on Defence,  
Ottawa.

D

FUTURE RELEASE

PLEASE NOTE DATE

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
OFFICE OF PUBLIC INFORMATION  
Washington 25, D. C.

NO. 349-54

HOLD FOR RELEASE  
UNTIL DELIVERY OF ADDRESS  
EXPECTED AT 12:00 NOON (EST)  
MONDAY, APRIL 19, 1954

LI 5-6700 Ext. 53201  
53176

ADDRESS BY  
DR. JOHN A. HANNAH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL)  
BEFORE THE DETROIT ECONOMIC CLUB  
SHERATON-CADILLAC HOTEL, DETROIT, MICHIGAN  
MONDAY, APRIL 19, 1954 -- 12:00 NOON (EST)

FILE COPY

DEFENDING OUR HERITAGE

It is a genuine pleasure to be back in Detroit again, among old friends and acquaintances, even though the role in which I appear is a different one than was in prospect when I accepted Mr. Crow's invitation many months ago. At that time, it seemed probable that I would be speaking to you today as the President of Michigan State College, not as an Assistant Secretary of Defense. I am looking forward to returning to Michigan, and to the comparative calm of a university campus, within a few months at most. Then perhaps there will be an opportunity to talk with you again about education -- a subject of no less importance than the one we are discussing today.

Perhaps, in view of the contributions made by Michigan State College to the building of our state's economy, it would not be presumptuous to remind you that Michigan State will be celebrating its centennial year - next year in 1955, beginning February 12, and that we hope for the interested co-operation of Michigan business and industry in the observance. All of you will be most welcome as visitors several times in the course of the centennial year, for which a great many interesting events have been planned, including what we hope will be a really significant industrial exposition.

But today, the defense of our country is in the forefront of our thoughts. The world being as it is, we must give far more time and attention to the defense of our country, and the things for which it stands, than any of us would wish were we in sole control of our own destiny. We are now spending nearly two-thirds of the total Federal budget on defense and defense-related activities; money which might be spent upon homes and schools and highways and hospitals -- in building a better country for all of us. The total cost of defense is hard to comprehend when expressed in billions; it is easier to understand when we say that we are spending your Federal tax dollars for defense at the rate of about \$25 per month for every man, woman, and child in the United States.

MORE

But this is no time for vain regrets, or wishful thinking; it is a time for sober realism. We must face the facts as they are. We must do what needs to be done to make our country, and our heritage, secure against any danger. And we must do these things, not with despondent reluctance, but with confidence that if we act manfully today, our children and grandchildren will see fewer shadows of uncertainty and doubt, and be freer than we have been to devote their energies to the development of good lives in a peaceful world.

We could leave them no finer example by which to pattern their lives than a resolute determination to meet the crises of our day with as much courage as our ancestors met and solved those they found. It is disturbing to hear so many speak so frequently of fear, and doubt, and dread, as though such emotions were justified. I hope that we would prefer to listen to those who have the realism to acknowledge difficulties, analyze them, and set about solving them, rather than to the Cassandras who are so limited in ability and faith that they wring their hands in self-pity and despair.

Of course we are living in a difficult world; of course our country is in danger; of course we must be constantly on the alert against those who would destroy our freedoms. But is our situation worse than it was when the thirteen colonies sought to break away from a powerful mother country, and establish themselves as a free nation on a bold new plan? Is the situation worse than it was when the violence of civil war threatened to split our country in two, or wreck it altogether? Is it worse than it was at the time of Pearl Harbor? It might be useful to recall occasionally that only 12 years ago, our Pacific fleet was out of commission; the Japanese were over-running Asia and threatening Australia, the Nazis were making great headway against the Russians and had almost all of Continental Europe in their grasp, submarines were sinking our ships within the sight of people on the Atlantic Coast, and people on our West Coast were living in fear of direct attack. Looking back, does it not seem probable that we are magnifying today's fears out of all proportion to the resources and capacity we have to dispel them?

Our country has always been able to rise to the occasion, and performs at its magnificent best under the stress of emergency. Even more remarkable is the fact that our country has always been able to produce the leaders it needed in times of stress -- men of courage and coolness and intelligence who could keep their feet on the ground even while their eyes were lifted to the stars. I for one believe that our country is now blessed again with such a leader and that, given the support he deserves, he will lead us through this troublous time as other great men have led our nation in times past.

Today, let us talk plainly about some of the difficulties with which we are confronted. We must have a clear understanding of the facts of the present situation if we are to make the wise decisions upon which our welfare and security depend.

The first fact we must face is that we, as a nation, are in direct conflict with an alien philosophy called Communism which disguises its purposes with slogans taking the name of democracy in vain. Communism stands as the absolute antithesis of democracy as we have known and practiced it here in the United States.

The second unpleasant fact is that in this conflict with Communism, we do not have a wide variety of choices of action, and time to debate and discuss at leisure. In the final analysis, we are confronted with two alternatives -- resist or surrender. It is just that simple. We have made the decision to resist. That decision was inevitable, in view of our history and traditions. Let us hope that we will never be persuaded to change our minds. We must not surrender -- either suddenly and completely, or slowly and in piecemeal fashion. We dare not do other than resist until we have won free at last of this latest menace to those precious benefits upon which we put such a high value. You know what they are -- the freedom to speak and think and write and worship as we please, the right to govern ourselves, the right to live our own lives, to engage in business, to enter professions, to climb as high as our inborn talents and energies will lift us. Here in this country -- and in the free nations associated with us -- we believe that these things are man's natural rights, granted to him by his Creator. Communism denies it. We root our faith in the unshaken belief that we will win through because God intends these truths to live and flourish on this earth until they are shared by all men in equality and in brotherhood.

Opposed to our belief that men were intended to be free within reasonable limits of self-control is the bald Communist plan to dominate the world. This has been established as the objective of Communism by the founders of their cynical faith. There is nothing in the history of the Soviet Union to indicate the slightest deviation or modification. They may weave and dodge and turn, as their philosophy permits them to do when the occasion demands, but as yet we have no reason to believe that the men in the Kremlin are aiming at anything less than a Communist world ruled from Moscow. This is their long-term objective, as determined by ruthless and cynical men drunk on love of personal power, and we may as well face the fact.

These days we hear many advocates of negotiation and compromise; we hear it said that we may find the men in the Kremlin to be reasonable and even amiable if we only give them the chance to show their better natures. It goes without saying that every possibility of negotiation should be exhausted; our government has amply demonstrated its willingness to settle our points of difference at the conference table. All of us agree that a treaty that actually put an end to war forever would be wonderful, possibly the greatest boon that could be conferred upon mankind. Even an agreement to outlaw any or all kinds of weapons, atom bombs included, would be of tremendous benefit to the persistent hope of lasting peace -- that is if it were an agreement among nations who would keep their word.

But we remember such things as the Hitler-Stalin pact, made with a sinister purpose, and broken for cynical reasons. We remember our own wartime agreements with Russia, and what has happened to them -- the failure to settle the lend-lease accounts for material which saved Stalin's skin, the failure up to now to return the ships we let them borrow in the dark early days of the war, the refusal to make a peace treaty with Austria, and the keeping of Red troops on the border of Free Europe, the travesty of the Berlin Corridor, the unwillingness to release the unwanted Red yoke from East Germany, and Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, the Balkan countries, and the Baltic States, and the long tedious, harrassing negotiations with their Communist Chinese and North Korean partners to bring a truce in Korea. We have ample reason to doubt whether any agreement with the Communists would be worth anything if it suited the selfish purposes of our adversaries to break it. These, too, are facts to be considered in the world of today.

Meanwhile, we must continue to resist Communism steadily and resolutely in the three areas in which the pressure can be applied against us. We must combat them skillfully and effectively in the sensitive area of propaganda, where they are not under the handicap of having to tell the truth. We must resist them resolutely and continually in the economic area, where the stakes are high. And we must be prepared to resist them in the military area. In the military area, we must be prepared to resist in two ways -- over the long period of time through which current tensions may persist, and in any sudden emergency. And, if by great misfortune we should be forced to the last extremity of waging war, we must be prepared to fight for our existence -- and this time, fight to win.

We must take into account the additional fact that recent developments in science and technology have changed the whole concept of military strategy.

Let us consider two simple examples. From the beginning of history, the emphasis in military development has been to improve the power and accuracy of weapons. The first consideration -- that of increased power -- has been amply taken care of in our atomic weapons. But many of us fail to realize that accuracy is no longer so important. Not long ago, we sought pinpoint accuracy for our bombs and guided missiles -- to get within a few yards of a target at worst; but today, with the tremendous power of the newer weapons, accuracy within a matter of thousands of yards may be good enough. This simplifies the problems of offense, and at the same time, makes the problem of defense tremendously more difficult. Another example; in World War II, an air force would be pleased with its efforts if it could shoot down 10 percent of an attacking flight of bombers consistently, and consider that it had a strong defense. Actually in World War II the R.A.F. discouraged the Luftwaffe by shooting down about 10 percent of the attacking planes over Britain. Today, a single bomber getting through the defensive screen would be able to inflict damage far surpassing the potential of a sky-full of bombers not long ago. Defense these days that is merely good is not good enough.

These facts serve to explain why we must establish and maintain air bases around the world, bases from which our planes can strike out in retaliation if any enemy should be so misguided as to take overt aggressive action against us. They serve to explain why it is desirable to tie in our defenses closely with those of other free nations, such as those in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and in the Pacific. They serve to explain why we must feel concern for conditions prevailing within the one-third of the world which is not now firmly allied with either the free nations or the Soviet empire.

They serve to explain why our military and diplomatic leaders are watching with such deep concern the developments in Indo-China. Hanging on the wall of my office in the Pentagon is a map of the world. One has to be familiar with geography to find Indo-China on that map easily; it does not even show the location of Dien-Bien-Phu. But the tragic events in that area affect the future of Detroit as much as they affect the destiny of Paris -- and they affect the destinies of London and Brussels and Ottawa and Canberra too.

One need not be a military strategist or an expert on geopolitics to understand why the outcome of the struggle in Indo-China is of so much concern to the free world. A little study of the map will show that a Red victory in Indo-China would open the gates to a conquest-seeking horde, with all of Burma, Thailand, India, the East Indies, and the Philippines in the path of danger.

Were those independent nations, and their resources, to fall into the hands of international communism under the leadership of Moscow, the situation of the free world might become precarious indeed. Almost everything our enemies now need by way of resources--oil, tin, rubber, the products of tropical agriculture--would become available in vast quantities, and at the same time the free world would be deprived of them. Then their great manpower advantages would begin to weigh very heavily in the scales that determine the balance of power.

This fact is one of immediate importance to everyone in Detroit, and in Michigan, and we must face it with calm realism.

It is against the background of facts we have been discussing that this administration made the decision to re-examine our military structure and alignment. We must remember that after World War II we liquidated the most powerful military force this or any other nation had ever built, and at the time of the Korean emergency, it was necessary to rebuild our war machine as quickly as possible on what the military call a "crash basis." Then, we began to build towards a particular peak year-of-crisis. But what after that? Of what size should our forces be? How should they be deployed? What effect would be exerted by such factors as the Soviet world threat, the existence of atomic weapons, our limited manpower, and the necessity for preserving a sound national economy for the long pull?

Questions such as these made necessary a reappraisal of our defense structure. The known facts, the possibilities, and the probabilities were considered carefully, and new decisions were made. There is no time today to go into detail, but I want to emphasize that we are not depending upon one arm of the service alone-- the Air Force and its great potential. We shall continue to have more than a million men in our Army and I hope a much larger and more effective Army Reserve, and a Navy second to none.

What is being attempted is more effective utilization of our advantages -- airpower, new weapons, and a high state of combat readiness. Of more particular interest to me in my area of responsibility involving some five million men and women on your Defense Department payroll is an increased emphasis on a better utilization of manpower, the eliminating of unnecessary jobs, and an increase in the ratio of men on the front line to men in the rear. We are accomplishing a great deal in these respects, so much that I can assure you that we will be able to achieve what everyone agrees we should have -- improved defense at a cost well within the economic capacity of the nation to support.

To leave our own country again for a moment, let us face another unpleasant truth in the fact that in many of the underdeveloped areas of the world in which we have a high stake, we are associated with governments which have long been known as colonial powers and, in the minds of the natives, have a reputation for selfish imperialism.

In these areas we are under serious handicaps when we try to enlist the support of native peoples in the struggle against international communism; they suspect our motives when they see that sometimes we support the very governments from which they are struggling to be free. To them, the Communist can speak with a siren voice of political freedom, economic improvement, land ownership, a better life in general. The Red may be speaking promises he knows he will not and cannot fulfill, but can we blame the poverty-stricken, disease-ridden native if he listens?

This particular difficulty for us is not limited to the areas under administration of colonial powers alone; it is found in many of the troubled areas of the world. We sometimes find ourselves uncomfortably allied with those who seek to maintain their feudal controls over a restless peasantry, or with those who pay only lip service to the ideals of democracy we Americans espouse.

The conditions of which I speak need not necessarily work to our disadvantage, as they do so often. We can recall with pride that our forefathers first gave ringing expression to the ideal of political liberty and personal freedom in the Declaration of Independence. We established here on this continent the first and best example of a nation of free men governing themselves. To understand the world today, we must realize that only now are hundreds of millions of people daring to dream of following the example we set so long ago. Let us acknowledge our obligation to those who aspire to follow us, even as we lay claim to their loyalties on this account.

Given the opportunity, we could understand them better and help them more than any other nation on earth, for the longings they feel are the longings Americans once felt just as keenly; the ambitions they hold today are the ambitions we have long since realized; the pattern many of them would prefer to follow is the pattern we ourselves have set for them. We need to realize upon this potential capital of goodwill and friendship; to help channel their inborn desires into the constructive paths which lead to freedom and political maturity and eventual independence. The alternative may well be to see them drift --or fight--their way into the iron arms of international communism. That, considering the impulses which motivate them, would be a tragic irony.

So much for some of the salient facts of the world situation. I hope that, in the light of these facts, the American people have irrevocably decided that we must prevent the further spread of communism if we are to preserve our own way of life. It is my firm belief that we cannot preserve our free institutions and great traditions if the greater part of the world falls into the hands of the Communist conspirators; I believe our people understand that we cannot maintain and improve our high standards of living and economic stability if the Communist concept is permitted to smother initiative and enterprise in other lands.

Oddly enough, no matter whether one looks at the situation from the standpoint of altruism--for which Americans are noted--or from the standpoint of the blindest self-interest--of which we are so often accused--the same course of action is the only one open to us. Whether we seek to improve the lot of mankind, or seek to save our own necks, the challenge is the same--stop Communism in its tracks! History has painted the warning too plainly to be ignored. We need only look back at the Rhineland, Ethiopia, and Manchuria, to see where in the past we might have resisted, but did not, to our eventual great detriment.

The facts of the situation as we have looked at them here are unpleasant facts. They, by themselves, might serve to justify the wailing of those who see only a dismal future for the free countries. But these facts do not stand by themselves. There are other facts which must be placed in the other pan of the balance to give us a true reading of the present situation.

One of the most heartening is that we have a strong, worthy, and valiant ally in the Dominion of Canada. Think what our position would be in this atomic age if beyond our northern border lay a country less staunchly dedicated to the ideals of freedom and political independence. Think how great would be our concern if that neighbor to the north were a nation given to indecision in moments of crisis, unwilling to pay the price of freedom, blind to the realities of the situation. Remember that between the United States and Russia lies only Canada--but thank God, Canada is there!

It must be obvious to all of you that the fortunes of our two great countries are bound closely together; here in Michigan, we have long enjoyed close association with our Canadian neighbors. But I am afraid that a great many Americans are not adequately aware how fortunate we are to have as our nearest neighbor on the side in which the danger lies an ally upon whom we can depend absolutely.

If Russia should attack the United States, the courses her bombers would follow lie across Canadian territory, or across the Canadian Sea frontiers. To have the benefit of an early warning of attack, we must place our picket lines far to the north, within Canadian territory. To intercept bombers bent on the destruction of Detroit, Chicago, Cleveland, Pittsburgh or New York, we must have air bases within Canadian territory.

Happily, the Canadians understand these things; they see that the defense of our two countries must be operated as a close partnership. They appreciate fully that for both of us, the only defense is a continental defense.

In recent weeks, it has been my great good fortune to visit many parts of Canada in my capacity as chairman of the U. S. Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense of our two countries. I have visited installations far beyond the normal outposts of civilization with Canadian defense officials; I have even flown over and around the North Pole and crawled into Eskimo igloos with them. As you know, they are wonderful people, proud as we are proud. They insist upon paying their fair share of the cost of continental defense; which is a very welcome attitude.

I suspect that sometimes we make things difficult for them, and that our American impetuosity sometimes tries them severely. I am afraid that too often we forget that we are only visitors in their domain, welcome to be sure, but with the obligation to behave ourselves as welcome visitors should behave.

It is no news to you that all across Canada there extend warning systems upon which our Air Force must depend if it is to defend the American homeland effectively. I am violating no security when I say that those and other installations will be constantly improved and extended, even out to sea, to protect Montreal and Toronto and Ottawa and London and Windsor and Winnipeg and Vancouver, as well as New York and Boston and Washington and Detroit and Pittsburgh, and Chicago and Seattle. Working on Research and development, in planning, and in operations, the Canadian and United States governments are close together, and will continue to be close together. The Canadians are good friends and strong allies; we are very lucky to have them.

We have many other assets, and these, too, are facts to be taken into account when we appraise our position in the world. For example, we have other allies of great strength and determination. Just a few days ago, the fifth anniversary of NATO was observed, and it should be pleasing to all of us to note the growing strength of that defensive alliance since the days when it was first established

under the leadership of General Eisenhower. NATO is a strong deterrent to aggression in Europe, and here too we are fortunate to have dependable allies in the cause of peace.

It is a fact, too, that the United States and the free nations associated with us possess tremendous resources--natural, industrial, and human. We may be sure that the sum total of these resources is something the Communists have taken into careful account, and that the total is one for which they have a healthy respect.

They are equally aware that the United States has powerful air forces. They are aware that we and our allies hold and intend to keep control of the seas. They can read maps as well as you and I, and it cannot have escaped their notice that the Communist entente faces in many directions air bases from which the big bombers can wing forth in defense of this country and our friends, if need be.

We have, as you know, an arsenal of atomic weapons, and probably have the lead in their development. We may not estimate the Communist potential in this area accurately, but we make no mistake about what we have, and it is an imposing array. Newspapers and magazines and radio commentators have speculated a great deal on this point in recent weeks, and on the power of specific weapons. I can neither confirm nor deny their estimates except to say that in most particulars, they have not been exaggerated. Possibly more important than what we now have is our capacity to produce still more, and that potential is very great indeed.

In this connection I have been interested in the current public discussion over the morals and ethics of using atomic weapons. A Washington minister last week deplored what he called "playing God" with the hydrogen bomb. As I see it, the question the American people--and those of the free world--will have to answer eventually boils down to this: is it any more immoral to kill 30,000 people and destroy a city in one split second than it is to kill 30,000 people one at a time, and destroy the city bit by bit over a period of weeks? Is a war won in 48 hours more immoral than a war won in 48 months?

I suspect that when we introduce the question of morality into problems of military strategy, all of us may get into deep water. I am not at all sure that any weapon to accomplish man's destruction is a moral weapon, in the strictest sense, just as I am not sure that a lingering death caused by conventional weapons is necessarily more humane than instantaneous death from the effects of the atom bombs, which some of the moralists seem to be suggesting.

The minister of whom I spoke takes the position that testing hydrogen bombs in the name of defense somehow transgresses a fundamental law of God. I confess that I am unable to follow such reasoning. If, by demonstrating our military power we can discourage those who would wage war upon us and destroy our freedoms, and we can better prepare ourselves to protect our precious rights--including the freedom to preach from an open pulpit--then I fail to see how we are inviting God's displeasure and risking His consuming wrath.

001231

This is not to say that we should place our reliance upon ships and planes and bombs and guns alone. What matters most in our defense as in all else, is what people believe, and whether they believe so strongly that they will pay whatever price is demanded of them to preserve and protect those beliefs.

If they believe that man is nothing, in and of himself, but is merely an entity to serve a soul-less state, then they surely can never be fully armed. If they believe that man is incapable of self-government and self-determination, if they believe there is no God to whom they owe their final allegiance, then they could never be secure, even though they were ringed with bulwarks of steel and stone, mountain high.

No, it is necessary to have more than bombs in our arsenal of defense. We must have some simple convictions, too, and hold them firmly, believe them deeply. We must have convictions of the kind that throughout history have sent men forth to fight beyond their skills, and to endure beyond their strengths, in defense of what they have held precious to them. We must believe in the dignity of the individual, respect for the truth, and in a good God. We must believe devoutly in government by law, not by men. We must hold and strengthen our convictions that a man has the right to work out his own destiny with due respect for the equal rights of others, that men can govern themselves, that they should have the right to worship as they choose, that there should be equal access to educational opportunity, and that the color of a man's skin or the locale of his birth should not be an obstacle in his path of progress.

Surely you agree that if we hold such beliefs as Americans-- and they have been our greatest strength in the past--then we must proceed to the ultimate belief that in the end, right will prevail against any might which may be brought against it. This is not to say that folded hands and bowed heads will turn aside any aggressor; we would be worse than fools to take such a view.

In the light of our culture and our heritage, we must clearly see and firmly believe that men possessed of such convictions can find the strength to meet any test. They are the free man's greatest armor; they give him the ultimate advantage, for I cannot believe that any man would fight as bravely, or endure as willingly for the right to be a slave.

END.

*File W.A.B.*  
**CONFIDENTIAL**

R.A. MacKay/NN  
May 4, 1954

*Original on  
10477-A-40*  
**MEMORANDUM FOR DEFENCE LIAISON (1)**  
Through Mr. Wershof

50209-40
----------

**U.S. Capital and Current Expenditures in Newfoundland**

Some time ago we sent information to Mr. Pickersgill about United States capital and current expenditures in Newfoundland. This information, I think, was based on correspondence I had with General Walsh, then USAF member on the PJBD. Indeed we may have sent copies of correspondence.

2. Mr. Pickersgill now wants to know if there is any possibility of getting the Americans to agree that this could be made available to the Newfoundland Commission that is preparing data for the forthcoming negotiations with the Federal Government in accordance with the terms of the union. I told Mr. Pickersgill that we would take it up with the U.S. authorities at an early date.

3. I am inclined to think the best approach would be from me to the present USAF member, since the information was obtained this way. If you see no objection, would you please draft a letter for my signature.

4. Mr. Pickersgill also would like a copy of the recommendation of the Board about a military highway across Newfoundland. I understand this has been declassified. We might, however, delay sending this until we have a reply from the U.S. authorities.

R. A. MacKAY

R.A.M.

Defence Liaison Officer  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON

Security: UNCLASSIFIED

No: 2556

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Date: May 3, 1954

Enclosures: -

Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No:

Reference:

Subject: Continental Defence

.....

.....

Ottawa File No.	
50209-40	
6	50

References

We should be grateful if you could send us a clipping of the article in the April 25, 1954, edition of the Washington Post and Times Herald dealing with continental defence.

BENJAMIN ROGERS  
FOR THE

ACTING UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

Date

MAY 1 1954

Publication

Newspaper

## 'Air Defenses Effective'

# Claxton Doubts Raids Via Canada

"An enemy would have to choose some other route" rather than fly over Canada to attack the United States, Defense Minister Brooke Claxton said yesterday in an interview in Esquimalt.

Because tests of Canada's air defenses have proved even more effective than expected, "I think any enemy would have to take these into consideration," the minister said.

The minister inspected HMC Dockyard and HMCS Naden yesterday morning, and inspected cadets at graduation ceremonies at Royal Roads in the afternoon. He left for Ottawa by plane last night.

"The first objective of an enemy, if war should come, would be to knock out the United States' potential," he said.

"Neither the States nor Canada can think of any way to improve the defense arrangements between the two countries," he added.

**'BEST POSSIBLE'**

Nobody concerned with defense ever uses the word "adequate" to describe defenses, he said, but he indicated that defense authorities in both countries are satisfied that the present working arrangement is the best one possible.

Enlistment in Canada's three armed forces is up to the government's expectations, he said. "There are about 20,000 Canadians serving abroad in seven countries, and one out of every four is a veteran of Korea," he said.

**NO PROSPECTS**

The minister said there has been no recent change in the attitude of the defense department toward Esquimalt's demands for rebuilding Admirals Road, which is used largely by navy vehicles, according to Esquimalt council.

"Every province in Canada has asked for this sort of thing," he said. "But as far as I know we have never paid for roads except those essential to defense."

"Circumstances would have to be extraordinary before my department could consider paying for roads."

50209-40
6 16

Talks on Canada-United States defense will be held in Washington next week by the defense minister and U.S. officials.

Mr. Claxton said he will make the trip with Governor-General Vincent Massey, May 3.

Mr. Massey will make the state visit to President Eisenhower as a return gesture for the visit to Ottawa of the U.S. chief executive. Mr. Claxton said he will mix business with the ceremonial side of the trip and talk with U.S. Defense Secretary Wilson and his colleagues.

File 30209-40  
WHB.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Subject.....

Date **MAY 1 1954**

Publication *Edmonton Journal*

50209-40  
54 | 54

### Rejects Idea Of Defence Pact

VICTORIA (CP) — Defence Minister Brooke Claxton said Friday Canada and the United States have had close defence co-operation since 1936 and "we need nothing more than we have now."

He was commenting on a speech by congressman W. Stirling Cole suggesting that Canada and the U.S. should sign a defence pact.

Mr. Claxton said in an interview that he can't think of any way of adding to the existing machinery for defence co-operation to improve it.

He said that Canada and the U.S. have the best defence arrangement of any two countries in the world.

Mr. Claxton will accompany Governor-General Vincent Massey to Washington May 3 and will confer with U.S. Defence Secretary Wilson.

The defence minister inspected the navy establishment near Victoria as the windup of a western Canadian tour.

He conferred with Rear Admiral J. C. Hibbard, flag officer Pacific coast, and the admiral's top aides. He went aboard the new minesweeper HMCS Comox and inspected the conversion job on the old destroyer HMCS Crescent.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Subject U.S. - Can. - Def.

Date MAY 1 1954

Publication

TORONTO TELEGRAM

50209-40  
54 | 54

## No Unified Command Needed

**A**N Arctic "early warning" system is perhaps the main problem of defense co-operation between Canada and the United States. Congressman W. Sterling Cole's speech raising the question of its adequacy intimately involves Canada. As chairman of the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Mr. Cole occupies a position in which he enjoys special sources of information, and he therefore commands attention for his views. Reports of his speech, however, suggest that on two key points his views are open to argument.

The first point concerns the "early warning" defense system, about which the known facts are few and most information is hidden for security reasons. However, early in April the Canadian Associate Minister of National Defense, Ralph

Campney, brought together much information on this matter in a public speech and he showed that co-operation in defense matters between Canada and the United States is well developed. Dealing with Arctic warning he said: "A network of radar stations equipped with the latest and most powerful apparatus is being built." This is based on approaches to the main industrial areas of North America, is partly in operation and "very shortly will be fully so." In addition, the projected "McGill fence," 5,000 miles in length, was recommended last October. It involves surveys of "hundreds of sites," and construction should begin this year. The news from the Canadian Arctic, as it involves American security, is much better than Mr. Cole has represented it.

Mr. Cole's second point is one

on which Canadian opinion will certainly disagree. He proposed a new defense treaty, under which a unified command might be established. The existing Canada-United States Joint Permanent Defense Agreement is actually working well though with little publicity. American criticism of it, if any, should come appropriately from responsible military authorities, not a Congressman. Co-operation under it has involved many problems of command, which have been settled more or less without rancor, but the command problem is by no means the foremost problem of Arctic defense. That a unified command would add anything to defense collaboration must be doubted, for any advantages it might confer would seem to be superficial when weighed against the valuable working partnership that has been built up. The physical difficulties of Arctic defense are immense and they do not justify complacency on either side of the border. The essential thing is unanimity of purpose, which does exist in large measure.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Subject U.S. Cont. Def.

Date APR 30 1954

Publication TORONTO TELEGRAM

# Canada Shuns Joint HQ

By **NORMAN CAMPBELL**  
Telegram Staff Reporter

Ottawa, April 30 — Proposals by the U.S. government's chief atomic spokesman for a unified continental defense command — which would give American generals authority over Canadian troops — meet with strong disapproval here.

Rep. Sterling Cole, chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, last night warned that at present this continent cannot protect itself against atomic or hydrogen bomb attack.

He said it would be "suicidal for Canada and the United States not to recognize the new dimensions to sovereignty brought about by this threat."

He proposed three remedial steps:

1. Conclusion of a mutual continental defense treaty with Canada establishing a unified command over defensive land, sea and airforces of the two countries.

2. Creation in the Department of Defense of a new post — an assistant secretary for continental defense — to correct a situation in which there is "no one, officer or civilian, whose responsibility is the defense of our homeland."

3. Cessation of talk and the start of accelerated action on constructing a distant line of detection of and retaliation against enemy planes with new electronic weapons so that the country would have at least six hours warning of an enemy attack.

### WEARY

Officials here indicated Canada is getting a little weary of suggestions by American politicians and retired generals that Canada's home defense force should be placed under American overall command now.

The fact is such suggestions have never been made at the official level. The U.S. government has never made any proposal to Canada, and the reception which unofficial proposals have met is apt to discourage such a step.

Cole's call for joint action was the second prod from U.S. sources. A few months ago it was General Omar Bradley, retired chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

50209-70  
54 | 54

### MEANS CONSCRIPTION

Nor can Ottawa understand why Cole should propose a continental defense pact along the lines of NATO. It is said here that the North American regional defense grouping within NATO provides exactly that. In fact, a continental defense pact already exists.

There is a joint U.S.-Canada defense board. This together with the pact within NATO is regarded as all that is necessary for peacetime. Should war arrive then Canada will be ready to consider an overall command.

It is felt here that if a continental defense command were set up, it would inevitably raise the question of conscription in Canada.

# INCOMING MESSAGE

# ORIGINAL

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification
UNCLASSIFIED
File No.
50209-40
32   50

*File*  
*FWNB*

Priority  
**IMPORTANT**

System  
**EN CLAIR**

No. **WA-758**

Date **April 30, 1954.**

Departmental Circulation  
MINISTER  
UNDER/SEC  
D/UNDER/SEC  
A/UNDER/SEC'S  
POL./CO-ORD'N  
SECTION

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

Reference:

Subject: **Continental defence: representative Cole's statement of April 29.**

*J-5*

I am including below the most significant passages concerning continental defence from the speech made in New York on April 29 by representative Cole, Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on atomic energy. Representative Cole's speech was a long one and the copies of it which we have just received are being sent today by ordinary airmail.

2. We shall send our comments on the speech as soon as possible contenting ourselves for the moment with offering the preliminary view that it may prove necessary for the Canadian and United States Governments either separately or jointly to offer some public comment on representative Cole's remarks.

3. The text of the sections of the speech in which you will be most immediately interested follow.

One of the main problems now confronting us in this respect is the diffusion of responsibility for continental defense within our military establishment. There is no clear-cut line of command along which decisions are channeled from the top civilian planners within the defense establishment to the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy units engaged in continental defense. Simply getting to know the facts about continental defense requires traversing one of the most complicated bureaucratic mazes ever to exist in the Pentagon. It is now still more difficult to assign clear and definite responsibility for errors of omission or commission in this field. In order to correct this situation, which to me is highly unsatisfactory, I plan to introduce legislation which would create a new position within the defense establishment--an assistant secretary for continental defense. To me it is completely ironical that in our whole vast department of defense there is no one, officer or civilian, whose responsibility is the defense of our homeland.

Done **13 MAY 1954**  
Date **MAY - 1 '54**

- References
- Mr. National Def
  - D.M. "
  - CCOS (5)
  - Sec Cal
  - USSEA
  - American Sw
  - Dh(2)
  - Pol. Coord. Sec.
  - Press office
  - Dh(1)
  - Gen MacNaughton
  - Prime Minister
  - London
  - CANAC
  - Gov. Gen.

Done *JF*  
Date **5/4/54.**

.....2

- 2 -

Such an assistant secretary, who would sit in the highest Councils of our military planners, would be charged with over-all responsibility for co-ordinating our continental defense effort. Subject of course to the authority of the Secretary of Defense, he would be responsible for drawing together the diverse continental defense activities of the three services into a coherent, integrated program aimed at bringing an effective defensive structure into being as quickly as possible. I earnestly believe that this single administrative step--centralizing responsibility for continental defense within the office of a new assistant secretary--will by itself significantly advance the day on which we will have more than token defenses against enemy attack.

The same logic which calls for centralization of the continental defense effort of our own government argues even more compellingly for unification of the continental defense programs of Canada and the United States. Canada lies athwart the most direct air routes between the Soviet Union and our country's industrial heartland. Without the complete cooperation of our friends to the north, we simply cannot build a realistic continental defense system. In turn, the Canadians are no less dependent upon our assistance.

We Americans sometimes tend to forget, and I fear the Canadians do likewise, that Toronto and Ottawa and Montreal and Vancouver are today as exposed to atomic attack as our own cities, and that Canada's industries and centers of population would constitute prime targets in the event of an enemy assault. The contributions of Canada--in terms of military manpower, armaments, and critical raw materials--loom ever larger in the defense of the free world, and in the event of all-out war, no aggressor could ignore opportunities for eliminating Canada's war potential. Moreover, if America and Canada deprive themselves of the advantages of defense-in-depth--and if we Americans are forced to build a continental defense system exclusively within our own borders, aerial formations unable to penetrate our nation would forcibly be diverted to target areas in our friendly neighbor to the north. The phrase "continental defense" was not coined accidentally. It is not simply the United States--it is all of North America which is today threatened and which must be protected.

Our two nations must develop an organization to provide a common response to a common threat. Such a common response, I believe, should not be limited to cooperation in the field of early warning of enemy attack. It should be extended to those measures required not only to detect, but to intercept and repel, approaching aerial formations long before they reach the cities of Canada or the United States. If we require enemy planes to penetrate successive barriers of defensive weapons before they reach a target, we shall dramatically alter for the better our ability to turn back--and thereby prevent--an assault against either of our two nations.

.....3

- 3 -

Yet surely we cannot begin to exploit all the possibilities for a realistic and effective continental defense through independent action of Canada and the United States, or through token co-ordination of our joint defensive efforts. I therefore propose that our government, as speedily as possible, enter into a mutual continental defense pact with Canada, under the authority of the United Nations, comparable in purpose, scope and organization with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I would envisage as emerging from such a treaty a north American continental defense organization. Army, Navy, and Air Force units from our two nations would be assigned to such a command in a manner akin to the land, sea, and air forces now stationed in Western Europe and reporting to SHAPE Headquarters in Paris. Such a north American continental defense organization would be headed by a supreme commander whose responsibility and authority in the field of continental defense would parallel those now exercised by General Gruenther in his position as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Europe.

Would not such a unified north American defense organization be radical and unprecedented? Yes--but no more radical or unprecedented than the threat we now face from the Soviet Union. I submit that all other considerations notwithstanding, it would be suicidal for Canada and the United States not to recognize the new dimensions to sovereignty brought by the threat of atomic and hydrogen warfare continental defense, like any other military problem, involves combining human and material resources into an organization structure of maximum efficiency. To build a continental defense commensurate with our peril, we therefore need three things: More and better weapons and detection devices for discovering, tracking, intercepting, and destroying enemy aircraft. We need unity of organization within our own continental defense effort--which can be brought about by establishing the position of assistant secretary for continental defense. We need unity of organization with our Canadian friends--which can be brought about through a mutual defense pact by establishing a north American continental defense command.

-----

disclosed under the Access to Information Act  
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1954 MAY 3 AM 9 10

001242

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

TO: The Department of External Affairs, OTTAWA

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, WASHINGTON, D.C.

The documents described below are for your information.

Despatching Authority... J.J. McCardle/jf

Security..... + File *File*

Date. April 30, 1954..... *5/4/54*

Air or ~~SURFAX~~..... Airmail.....

No. of enclosures..... 1

*Done 5/4/54*

*Min. of Nat. Def.*

*Sec/Cabinet*

*circ B.*

50209-40

52 58

Copies	
D-13	
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

Description

Speech by Representative Cole, New York  
April 29, 1954.

Reference: Our teletype No. WA-758  
of April 30.

Subject: Continental Defence. - Rep.  
Cole's Statement.

Also referred to:

*8.6*

*10*

4 MAY 1954

## INSTRUCTIONS

1. This form may be used in sending material for informational purposes from the Department to posts abroad and vice versa.
2. This form should *NOT* be used to cover documents requiring action.
3. The name of the person responsible for authorizing the despatch of the material should be shown opposite the words "Despatching Authority". This may be done by signature, name stamp or by any other suitable means.
4. The form should bear the security classification of the material it covers.
5. The column for "Copies" should indicate the number of copies of each document transmitted. The space for "No. of Enclosures" should show the total number of copies of all documents covered by the transmittal slip. This will facilitate checking on despatch and receipt of mail.

From the office of Representative  
Sterling Cole (R.-N.Y.)  
Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

FOR RELEASE THURSDAY  
April 29, 1954  
7:00 P.M. (EDST)

Remarks of Representative Cole  
before the 135th Anniversary Banquet of Colgate University,  
at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, New York,  
Thursday, April 29, 1954 at 8:00 P. M.

9:30

FILE COPY

To be identified in any fashion with an institution of learning such as Colgate University, which has endured for nearly a century and a half, is in itself a great distinction; to have attended and graduated from such an institution is a coveted privilege; to have served as Trustee of that University for a number of years is a rich experience; to have been invited by the alumni of such a school to address a gathering such as this commemorating the anniversary of the founding of that University by thirteen consecrated, devout, determined and enlightened men 135 years ago, is a high honor, and to be able to accept that invitation and discuss matters of great importance to our national security and welfare is a welcomed opportunity.

On behalf of all the alumni at this gathering tonight, may I express a word of greeting to all Colgate men everywhere. We wish you could be with us tonight, and we hope that the spirit that is Colgate may transport you to our midst.

Colgate graduates have never shirked the responsibilities of educated men in a free society. When our society has been exposed to peril, Colgate men have been found in the front ranks of those guarding its liberties and its freedoms.

It is about those freedoms that I wish to speak with you tonight--about the preservation of our national liberties in the age of atomic and hydrogen energy.

Two months ago, our Government began an historic series of hydrogen weapons tests at our Pacific Proving Grounds. None of us--and I include here the scientists whose brilliant attainments made these tests possible--will rejoice in the technical achievements of this latest series of nuclear tests. None of us can find comfort or satisfaction in the fact that man's ingenuity has now reached the point where a single hydrogen bomb, carried by a single plane, can eliminate the heart of the greatest city on earth. Yet that is the stark reality of the hydrogen era.

Three years ago, when our Government undertook the active development of thermonuclear weapons, all of us associated with our national atomic enterprise fervently hoped it would prove beyond the capacity of science to harness hydrogen energy for military purposes. We hoped that, by proving thermonuclear weapons could not be built, we might prove at the same time that the arsenals of the enemies of the free world could never be augmented by these dreadful armaments. But these hopes were quickly proven to be illusory. Today, hydrogen weapons are an appalling reality--on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

Today, some have suggested that our government unilaterally renounce additional tests of hydrogen weapons. To those offering such counsel, I would say this: The aim of the United States Government is not to build bigger and ever more destructive weapons without end. Our nuclear tests have been confined to devising weapons for which there exists a demonstrated military requirement. We are conducting these tests because it would invite disaster--not only for this nation but for all like-minded nations as well--to renounce the development of an armament which the enemies of our kind of world are themselves developing with all possible speed and priority.

We are not manufacturing hydrogen bombs because we believe they point the way toward bargain-basement defense budgets. We are not constructing these weapons because we think they can relieve us of the necessity of learning to live and work with our allies. We are not building hydrogen bombs because we see in them a cure-all for the root causes of world insecurity.

--2--

We are developing hydrogen energy for military purposes because we have no alternative---because despots embracing an alien and evil philosophy aimed at total world dominion have left us no other course. On the day the rulers of the Soviet Union demonstrate, by deed rather than word, that they are willing to join with other nations in regulating the output of nuclear weapons and all other instruments of war as well, we will gladly and eagerly end our efforts to harness the atom for military uses. More than that, we will not be found wanting or ungenerous in our desire to divert the skills, the monies, and the resources now allocated to military applications of nuclear energy to great programs for the betterment of mankind everywhere in the world.

When World War II ended, we were the sole possessors of atomic weapons. Our atomic monopoly, coupled with the superiority of our strategic Air Force, appeared to most Americans as our best and surest means of avoiding wholesale aggression by the Soviet Union. Many of us imagined that a decade might pass before the Soviets achieved their first atomic bomb, and still another decade before they could manufacture these weapons in significant numbers. Accordingly, our entire defensive posture was built around our ability to answer all-out communist aggression with an atomic counter-blow. Our efforts to develop a continental defense against the inevitable day when atomic war could proceed in opposite directions were half-hearted. In pre-Korea defense budgets, the demands of maintaining air-atomic supremacy and a bare minimum of conventional land and sea forces left but little leeway for building defenses against an atomic threat which then appeared many years, or even decades, in the future.

But that future is here today. Far from requiring decades to amass a significant stockpile of nuclear weapons, the men of the Kremlin possess such a stockpile at this very moment. To be sure, our own atomic striking power has been growing in the meantime at an ever-increasing rate. Despite the end of our atomic monopoly, the quantitative lead we possess over the Soviets in nuclear weapons, a lead which we must increase, and the ability to deliver them against the Soviet industrial and military heartland, remain our supreme deterrent against all-out war.

Strategies built primarily around the concept of passive defense have always proved self-defeating, and they would prove self-defeating now. In the last analysis, a nation must rely for its military security upon its ability to carry a war to the foe. Yet national strategy must keep pace with changes in the balance of world military power. A policy which made pre-eminent sense when the Soviets possessed no atomic stockpile must now be adjusted and broadened to take account of the Soviet Union's presently existing, and rapidly growing, ability to engage in two-way atomic war.

The grim statistics are these: Today, the Soviet dictators are capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons of such destructive power that a single bomb could destroy the heart of New York or Chicago or Washington. Today, the Soviet Union has planes capable of delivering such weapons--even if on one-way missions--against the majority of our critical target areas. Whether the Soviets could now mount an attack of such intensity and scope that our ability to retaliate would be eliminated may be open to debate. But three or four years from now, the Soviets will be able to launch a saturation attack against our nation--an attack so massive that our ability ultimately to prevail may be open to grave question.

Were an attack to occur this week, or this year, we would have no effective way of repelling it. At best--and this is very optimistic--we might intercept as many as one out of every four Soviet bombers. It is entirely possible, however, that the ratio of interception would be much less--and I assure you that in saying this I am not revealing any secrets to the Soviet Union. The rulers of Russia are probably better aware of our present inability to defend ourselves adequately against an atomic attack than are the American people themselves.

I join with all of you in fervently hoping that the Soviet overlords will reckon with our devastating retaliatory power, and conclude that a nuclear sneak attack against the cities of America would result in the ultimate ruin of those who perpetrated it. In the past, however, the Russian rulers have miscalculated our will to resist and our determination and ability to strike back against aggression--witness the invasion of Korea.

-3-

We shall therefore be rash to presume that the Soviets may not miscalculate it once more and seek to test our resolve in the crucible of intercontinental atomic battle. We may pray that this resolve will never be tested. Destroying Russian cities will not bring back to life American cities which have been gutted and ravaged by a nuclear Pearl Harbor. Leveling Russian industries will give us little consolation if American industries are first leveled.

Atomic vengeance is not enough.

Seen in proper perspective, the threat of atomic and hydrogen instant and massive retaliation is only one-half of our military effort to provide our homeland with security against nuclear attack. The other half consists of a dual program for continental defense and for civil defense, both of such scope and efficiency that an enemy will understand, without putting us to the test of battle, that a nuclear Pearl Harbor can never bring us to our knees.

Each day, <sup>that</sup> an additional bomb enters the Soviet stockpile, on each occasion that yet another plane is assigned to the Soviet long-range Air Force, our need for an effective continental defense becomes more urgent. It is beyond our capacity to create a continental defense which would guarantee 100 per cent of success in repelling hostile aerial formations. It is within our capacity, however, to inflict such losses on raiding formations that an enemy will in all probability be dissuaded from casting the die for intercontinental atomic war and be kept from dealing us a mortal blow even if he does.

Until a few years ago, a continental defense system promising such degrees of success appeared out of the question. At the very height of their efficiency, the planes of the Royal Air Force and the guns of the Anti-aircraft Command destroyed less than 10 per cent of the bombing planes the Nazis hurled against the United Kingdom. In an era when the destructive force of block-busting aerial bombs was measured in hundreds of pounds of TNT, such a level of attrition sufficed to make a sustained bombing campaign unprofitable. But today, a single plane--a single plane, I repeat--on a single mission, can carry more destructive cargo than the total carried by the combined air forces of all the allies and all the Axis nations through all the six years of World War II. When a single hydrogen bomb delivered on target can spell the death of our largest American city, no real security can be found in a continental defense system intercepting only one bomber in ten. Yet, with the radar, the interceptor craft, and the anti-aircraft of World War II, a greater measure of success was impossible.

But beginning in 1950, American scientists--many of them the same men who had brought the atomic bomb to fruition--made a series of discoveries which promise to revolutionize the science of military defense as much as nuclear bombs have revolutionized offensive warfare. These have been called "technological break-throughs," but I prefer to call them "technological payoffs." Working undramatically but tirelessly and with brilliant efficiency in laboratories of both basic and applied research throughout our nation, our scientists, technicians, and engineers have devised radical new weapons and electronic devices which offer the promise of hitherto unattainable degrees of success in detecting, intercepting, and destroying any bombers which might be directed at the industries and cities of this nation.

With certain of these revolutionary developments you are no doubt familiar. Ground-to-air missiles have catapulted our ability to destroy enemy aircraft. The new generation of high performance jet interceptors, armed with rockets, will bring unprecedented efficiency to the operations of our Air Defense Command. Advances in the detection of aircraft, many of them still highly classified, are likewise here or in the offing.

Science, which has brought our nation the deterring power of our atomic and hydrogen stockpile, can now be our greatest helper in defending ourselves from these self-same weapons of mass destruction.

--4--

We must guard against one danger, however. We must not fall into the error of integrating these new weapons--some of which are already in production, and others still in the design stage--into a defensive system more suited for the defensive and offensive weapons of yesterday rather than for the armaments of today or tomorrow.

Traditionally, defense against bombing formations has been regarded as passive defense--as point defense. That is to say, the air defenses of World War II relied upon surrounding critical target areas with a close-in perimeter of anti-aircraft guns and nearby air bases, on which were stationed short-range interceptor aircraft. Against the comparatively low-speed bombers of World War II, with their payloads of conventional explosives, such a passive defense system offered a tolerable degree of protection. But not so today. Now, if we were to wait until enemy planes crossed our borders or approached our seacoasts before activating defensive tactics, we could secure no significant degree of protection whatsoever. A Russian TU-4 bomber--the plane which now constitutes the backbone of the Red air force--would be over this very building in less than 20 minutes after we detected it within 100 miles of New York Harbor. As the piston-driven planes of the Red air force are retired in favor of high-performance jet bombers, the futility of a military plan which relied exclusively upon local or point defense becomes all the more obvious.

If we are to defend ourselves against the planes of today and tomorrow, rather than the planes of yesterday, our first requirement is for advance warning of an impending attack. Today, we would have no more than a few minutes prior notice of approaching bomber formations. My own belief is that we imperatively need at least six hours of advance warning. So long as we are denied such prior notice of an attack, we cannot evacuate our target cities. Neither can we alert and commit to action more than a small fraction of our interceptor aircraft. No less ominous, the planes of our Strategic Air Command might be destroyed on the ground, before they could launch a retaliatory blow against an aggressor.

The scientists most knowledgeable concerning this problem are unanimous in believing that we need, and can have, an advance warning system which would detect enemy aircraft long before they reach our borders. The geographic position of our country superbly lends itself to securing such an alert. On the west, our nation is bounded by the vast stretches of the Pacific Ocean. On the east, 3000 miles of Atlantic Ocean, and our Western European allies separate us from our communist adversaries. On the north, 2000 miles of arctic waste stand between the Soviet Union and the populated areas of Canada. From whichever direction an attacking force might come--west, north, or east--it must traverse vast stretches of water or uninhabited land before reaching its destination, the cities of North America.

Space, sheer space, can be--if it is wisely used--an ally of untold worth in creating an effective continental defense system. Almost four years have passed since our scientists first proposed putting space to work by establishing an early warning line across the north of Canada, and extending it seaward to the east and the west by means of patrol aircraft and picket ships. More than two years have passed since the formidable technical problems involved in making a distant warning system both effective and economical were surmounted. And yet, four years after the need for such an early warning line was pointed out, and two years after our scientists developed the equipment which would make such a line possible, it is still not in existence. Negotiations with the Canadian Government on the subject of where, how, and by whom the first of such early warning lines would be built and operated have been in progress for nearly two years.

Scarcely a week goes by but that we are not reassured through optimistic press releases that these negotiations are proceeding harmoniously, satisfactorily, and with the sense of urgency which the situations require. We cannot detect enemy planes with press releases or comforting reassurances.

--5--

Literally dozens of excellent studies and reports have been made on the problem of continental defense. All of them agree that adequate advance warning of an enemy nuclear attack is the prerequisite of all other measures designed to improve our continental defenses, and that such a warning is possible. If we are subjected to atomic attack before such a system is in actual operation, there will be little satisfaction in the fact that the conclusions of our innumerable studies on continental defense were brilliantly correct. With all the earnestness at my command, I urge that we immediately cease studying the early warning problem and immediately begin the actual construction of an advance warning line.

Today, large sums of money are already being expended on continental defense. Still larger sums will be required in the future to keep our defenses ahead of step-ups in Soviet offensive power. The real need of the moment, however, is not for dollars but for decisions. The need is to translate into reality, as quickly as possible, preparations which are technologically possible and already funded by the Congress.

I have been assured by leading authorities that we can measurably accelerate the presently planned date on which an early warning line will be in operation with a very modest additional outlay of money. I have been assured in addition that significant improvements in the over-all effectiveness of our continental defenses during the next three years can be made--again without large outlays of dollars, if we put an end to further discussion and instead make positive decisions to get about this job with all possible speed.

One of the main problems now confronting us in this respect is the diffusion of responsibility for continental defense within our military establishment. There is no clear-cut line of command along which decisions are channeled from the top civilian planners within the defense establishment to the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy units engaged in continental defense. Simply getting to know the facts about continental defense requires traversing one of the most complicated bureaucratic mazes ever to exist in the Pentagon. It is now still more difficult to assign clear and definite responsibility for errors of omission or commission in this field.

In order to correct this situation, which to me is highly unsatisfactory, I plan to introduce legislation which would create a new position within the defense establishment--an Assistant Secretary for Continental Defense. To me it is completely ironical that in our whole vast Department of Defense there is no one, officer or civilian, whose responsibility is the defense of our homeland. Such an Assistant Secretary, who would sit in the highest councils of our military planners, would be charged with over-all responsibility for co-ordinating our continental defense effort. Subject of course to the authority of the Secretary of Defense, he would be responsible for drawing together the diverse continental defense activities of the three services into a coherent, integrated program aimed at bringing an effective defensive structure into being as quickly as possible. I earnestly believe that this single administrative step--centralizing responsibility for continental defense within the office of a new Assistant Secretary--will by itself significantly advance the day on which we will have more than token defenses against enemy attack.

The same logic which calls for centralization of the continental defense effort of our own Government argues even more compellingly for unification of the continental defense programs of Canada and the United States. Canada lies athwart the most direct air routes between the Soviet Union and our country's industrial heartland. Without the complete co-operation of our friends to the north, we simply cannot build a realistic continental defense system. In turn, the Canadians are no less dependent upon our assistance.

We Americans sometimes tend to forget, and I fear the Canadians do likewise, that Toronto and Ottawa and Montreal and Vancouver are today as exposed to atomic attack as our own cities, and that Canada's industries and centers of population would constitute prime targets in the event of an enemy assault. The contributions of Canada--in terms of military

--6--

manpower, armaments, and critical raw materials--loom ever larger in the defense of the free world, and in the event of all-out war, no aggressor could ignore opportunities for eliminating Canada's war potential. Moreover, if America and Canada deprive themselves of the advantages of defense-in-depth--and if we Americans are forced to build a continental defense system exclusively within our own borders, aerial formations unable to penetrate our nation would forcibly be diverted to target areas in our friendly neighbor to the north. The phrase "continental defense" was not coined accidentally. It is not simply the United States--it is all of North America which is today threatened and which must be protected.

Our two nations must develop an organization to provide a common response to a common threat. Such a common response, I believe, should not be limited to co-operation in the field of early warning of enemy attack. It should be extended to those measures required not only to detect, but to intercept and repel, approaching aerial formations long before they reach the cities of Canada or the United States. If we require enemy planes to penetrate successive barriers of defensive weapons before they reach a target, we shall dramatically alter for the better our ability to turn back--and thereby prevent--an assault against either of our two nations.

The political, tactical and logistic problems involved in creating a system of interception-in-depth are formidable--but they are far from insurmountable. On technical grounds, it is entirely possible to maintain and operate a complex of interceptor installations in the Arctic. It is entirely possible to extend such a system over the Atlantic and Pacific, through the use of hunter-killer forces modeled on the tactics our Navy has adopted in combatting the submarine menace.

I cite but one example of the defensive gains which would accrue from a system of active interception-in-depth. It is now practical to manufacture small-scale atomic weapons specifically designed for the interception of enemy aircraft. The destructive power of such weapons is such that a single atomic warhead would be far more effective than literally thousands of conventional anti-aircraft shells in repelling hostile planes. Yet who would welcome the prospect of using such weapons--for all their efficiency--near the centers of population of our two nations? The prospect, however, is completely different if missiles and rockets with atomic warheads could be employed far out to sea or far above the arctic wastes, remotely distant from any urban targets.

Yet surely we cannot begin to exploit all the possibilities for a realistic and effective continental defense through independent action of Canada and the United States, or through token co-ordination of our joint defensive efforts. I therefore propose that our Government, as speedily as possible, enter into a mutual continental defense pact with Canada, under the authority of the United Nations, comparable in purpose, scope and organization with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I would envisage as emerging from such a treaty a North American Continental Defense Organization. Army, Navy, and Air Force units from our two nations would be assigned to such a command in a manner akin to the land, sea, and air forces now stationed in Western Europe and reporting to SHAPE headquarters in Paris. Such a North American Continental Defense Organization would be headed by a supreme commander whose responsibility and authority in the field of continental defense would parallel those now exercised by General Gruenther in his position as Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Europe.

Would not such a unified North American Defense Organization be radical and unprecedented? Yes--but no more radical or unprecedented than the threat we now face from the Soviet Union. I submit that all other considerations notwithstanding, it would be suicidal for Canada and the United States not to recognize the new dimensions to sovereignty brought by the threat of atomic and hydrogen warfare.

--7--

Continental defense, like any other military problem, involves combining human and material resources into an organizational structure of maximum efficiency. To build a continental defense commensurate with our peril, we therefore need three things: More and better weapons and detection devices for discovering, tracking, intercepting, and destroying enemy aircraft. We need unity of organization within our own continental defense effort--which can be brought about by establishing the position of assistant Secretary for Continental Defense. We need unity of organization with our Canadian friends--which can be brought about through a mutual defense pact by establishing a North American Continental Defense Command.

Far from representing a modern day version of isolationism, continental defense and isolationism are contradictory terms. Both in terms of the threat which has made it necessary and the measures which will make it effective, continental defense underscores the shrinking nature of our globe and the imperative necessity of working together with our allies toward the goal of a better future.

What the future holds for us no man can say with certainty. Heretofore, all prolonged armaments races in history have ended in war, and we shall be relying more on our hopes than on reason or precedent if we decide that the verdict of history will now be amended to take account of nuclear weapons. Yet we must admit these weapons have no parallel in earlier historic epochs--never before has man had within his grasp the capacity to destroy entire civilizations. Sir Winston Churchill, whose prophecies have been so many times correct--has voiced the hope that--in one of the great ironies of history--nuclear weapons, precisely because of the universal destruction which would follow in the wake of their widespread use, may usher in an era of altogether unexpected peace.

Even were this to come to pass, however, no person could cherish the prospect of a peace whose prolongation depended upon a balance of atomic terror. Moreover, we shall flaunt all the lessons of recorded history if ever we come to believe that the steel of armaments, even nuclear armaments--can be a permanent substitute for spiritual armament. In all probability, military deterring power can do no more than keep open the future for real peace. It can do no more than buy us time--precious and wasting time--which must be used to build a world in which peace rests not upon the threat of terrible reprisal, but upon the respect of man for his fellowman and the prospect for an enlightened justice between all men.

Those of us at this anniversary can well thank our beloved University for having taught us those spiritual armaments which have always been man's final sword in times of trouble. Never despairing as we face the future, let us--as alumni of Colgate, as Americans, and as men of goodwill--now bend our efforts to build the better world of the future--a world which we shall inevitably build if hewn with the outlass of our spirit, championed by the sword of our hope, and if defended by the buckler of our faith.

oOo

RESTRICTED

Security .....

MESSAGE FORM

OUTGOING

File No.	
50209-40	
58	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL,.....  
PARIS, FRANCE.....

*Copy on 50115-P-40*

Message To Be Sent

AIR CYPHER  
EN CLAIR  
CODE  
CYPHER *AUTO*

Priority

ORIGINATOR

(Signature)

*JGH* Halstead/ejk  
(Name Typed)  
D.L. (1)

Div.....  
3795

Local Tel.....

APPROVED BY

(Signature)

(Name Typed)

Internal Distribution:  
S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A. *Done Mc April 23/54*

Press Office  
Pol. Co-Ord.  
Information

Done.....  
Date... *Apr 26/54*

No. *261*      Date      April 22, 1954

For Communications Section Only  
SENT - APR 22 1954

REFERENCE: Your telegram No. 284 of April 14.

SUBJECT: Mr. Pearson's Speech.

We have finally located the remarks attributed to Mr. Pearson by the Netherlands representative. They were made at the conclusion of Mr. Pearson's address to the National Press Club, in Washington on March 15. That address was on the the subject of/United States "new look" and the remarks under reference were in fact addressed not to NATO but to United States-Canadian relations.

2. The relevant extract is as follows:

" The stakes are now higher than ever, and the necessity for cooperation and consultation greater than ever. It is essential that we work together in any new defence planning and policy - as we have already been working together in NATO - if the great coalition which we have formed for peace is not to be replaced by an entrenched Continentalism which, I can assure you, makes no great appeal to your northern neighbour as the best way to prevent war or defeat aggression, and which is not likely to provide a solid basis for good United States-Canadian relations.

" We have that basis now, I think, in a common devotion to freedom, law and justice; in a

common belief in the supremacy of the individual over the ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ state, and in a common fear of totalitarian tyranny, of subversive doctrines harnessed to the might of a great and aggressive communist empire which threatens to destroy those things in which we believe."

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL  
AFFAIRS

06:14:00  
11/11/70

RECEIVED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1954 APR 22 PM 6:00

001254

J.O.M. Halstead/ejr

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: ..... Press Office

Security ..... CONFIDENTIAL

Date ..... April 20, 1954

FROM: ..... Defence Liaison (1) Division

File No. 50209-40 50115-110		
50		6

REFERENCE: .....

Speech on NATO by Mr. Pearson

SUBJECT: .....

I attach a copy of telegram No. 284 of April 14, 1954, from our NATO Delegation in Paris asking us to identify the recent speech by Mr. Pearson in which reference was made to the fact that NATO countries had "a common devotion to freedom, law and justice . . . ., and a common belief in the supremacy of the individual over the state".

2. We have been unable to locate this reference in Mr. Pearson's speeches of NATO of which we have the text in this Division. I should be most grateful if you could assist us in finding the exact reference.

3. I am sending a similar memorandum to the Information Division, Political Co-Ordination Section and Miss M. E. Macdonald in the Minister's Office.

Benjamin Rogers  
Defence Liaison (1) Division

*Speech in Washington March 15. Copy given to Mr. Halstead Apr 20, 1954 - Minister's office also advised. BTH*

J.G.H. Halstead/ejk

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

*File  
MAI*

TO: ....Information Division.....

Security .CONFIDENTIAL.....

.....

Date ..... April 20, 1954.....

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division.....

File No. *50209-40*  
~~50115-7-40~~

REFERENCE: .....

6		6
---	--	---

SUBJECT: ... Speech on NATO by Mr. Pearson.....

I attach a copy of telegram No. 284 of April 14, 1954, from our NATO Delegation in Paris asking us to identify the recent speech by Mr. Pearson in which reference was made to the fact that NATO countries had "a common devotion to freedom, law and justice ....., and a common belief in the supremacy of the individual over the state".

2. We have been unable to locate this reference in Mr. Pearson's speeches on NATO of which we have the text in this Division. I should be most grateful if you could assist us in finding the exact reference.

3. I am sending a similar memorandum to the Political Co-Ordination Section, the Press Office and Miss M. E. Macdonald in the Minister's Office.

*Benjamin Rogers*  
Defence Liaison (1) Division

*Mr. Halstead  
has information  
24 look for  
in 24  
"U.S. Newlook" - No F NATO  
ref to Canada  
US Relations*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: .....Political.Co-Ordination.Section.....

Security confidential.....

Date .....April 20, 1954.....

FROM: .....Defence.Liaison.(1).Division.....

File No. 5020970		
<del>50115-3-40</del>		
6		6

REFERENCE: .....

SUBJECT: .....Speech on NATO by Mr. Pearson.....

I attach a copy of telegram No. 284 of April 14, 1954, from our NATO Delegation in Paris asking us to identify the recent speech by Mr. Pearson in which reference was made to the fact that NATO countries had "a common devotion to freedom, law and justice ....., and a common belief in the supremacy of the individual over the state".

*No action to be taken  
Mr. H. B. [unclear]  
April 22  
[unclear]*

2. We have been unable to locate this reference in Mr. Pearson's speeches on NATO of which we have the text in this Division. I should be most grateful if you could assist us in finding the exact reference.

3. I am sending a similar memorandum to the Press Office, Miss M. E. Macdonald in the Minister's Office and the Information Division.

*Howard - re  
Sov. note?  
Stansbury etc  
of 5 or 6*

*Benjamin Rogers*  
Defence Liaison (1) Division.

INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL

FROM: THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, PARIS.

Copy on 7802-40 "5"

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Copy on 50115-P-40

Security Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.

50209-40

52 50

Priority

System CYPHER-AUTO

No. 284

Date April 14, 1954.

Departmental Circulation

MINISTER UNDER/SEC D/UNDER/SEC A/UNDER/SEC POL/CO-ORD SECTION

14 APR 1954

Reference: Para.4(f) of our telegram No. 259 of April 8.

Subject: Speech on NATO by Mr. Pearson.

A number of delegations have asked the date and the text of the recent speech by Mr. Pearson to which reference was made by the Netherlands representative when the latest Soviet note was discussed in the Council on April 7. In this speech Mr. Pearson said that NATO countries had "a common devotion to freedom, law and justice....., and a common belief in the supremacy of the individual over the state".

2. We have been unable here from the material available to find the exact reference. Can you help?

References

Mr. Bellis Miss Macdonald Information Pol Co Sec Press office

w. memo. 20/54

J.N.

Done

Date

CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1964 APR 14 AM 11 25

001259

# INCOMING MESSAGE

# ORIGINAL

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

**CONFIDENTIAL**

File No.

50209-40

3450

Priority **IMPORTANT**

System **CYPHER-AUTO**

No. **WA-627**

Date **April 9, 1954.**

Departmental Circulation

MINISTER  
UNDER/SEC  
D/UNDER/SEC  
A/UNDER/SEC'S  
POL/CO-ORD'N  
SECTION

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

12/ APR 1954

DepONE-COMM'S SECTION

Date APR 10 '54

References

*Mr Clayton  
ccos*

Reference: **EX-587 of April 9.**

*J. H.*

Subject: **Public statement on continental defence.**

We have been assured by both State Department and Defence Department officials that the Secretary of Defence made no additional remarks at the time of issuance of the joint statement on continental defence.

*File  
WAB*

Done

Date

*Jt*  
*4/12/54*

1964 APR 12 AM 8 36

RECEIVED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTENSION SERVICE

~~1964 APR 10 AM 10 26~~

RECEIVED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTENSION SERVICE

001261

# INCOMING MESSAGE

# File ORIGINAL

FROM: *WMB*  
 THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification
<b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>
File No.
50209-40
6   50.

Priority	System	No.	Date
<b>IMPORTANT</b>	CYPHER-AUTO	WA-618	April 9, 1954

Departmental Circulation

MINISTER UNDER/SEC D/UNDER/SEC A/UNDER/SEC'S POL/CO-ORD'N SECTION

REF. COMM'S SECTION

Done: *WA-618*

Date:

Reference: Your teletype EX-570 of April 7.

Subject: Public statement on continental defence.

The story carried in today's New York Times (April 9) based on the agreed public statement issued on March 8 by our two governments seems to us to misconstrue thoroughly what the press release was intended to mean. Radio newscasts which we have heard echo the line taken in the New York Times story.

2. The Times story deals wrongly with three points of major importance:

(a) It is obviously based on the assumption that the radar line dealt with in the public statement is the "distant early warning line" advocated by the Lincoln Study Group. "The joint decision to proceed with a distant early warning system is a disappointment to those scientists who thought it wiser to push out the range of the existing Pine Tree Line, working from the inside outward rather than to extend the warning system from outside in."

(b) It suggests that the public statement indicates a decision to place less emphasis on the use of the McGill Fence. "The Canadian project (i.e., the McGill Fence) has not been discarded but dropped in priority, a defence official said."

(c) It suggests that the cost of the new radar screen will be divided on the basis of the exchange of notes between our governments in 1951 relating to the Pine Tree Project.

3. From a Canadian point of view, the news story could scarcely be more misleading. The problem presented, however, in attempting to clarify these mistaken impressions would be substantial. Any attempt to straighten out newsmen on the meaning of the public statement could only lead to the necessity of commenting in some detail on issues which have not been decided between our two governments. It might be necessary in clarifying the meaning of the statement to deal with differences of opinion or of emphasis between our two governments which might be blown up out of all proportion in further press stories.

4. In the light of the press treatment of the public statement, we would be grateful to know what line you would like us to take in answering any enquiries which are made to us.

.....

CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

15 APR 9 11 3 27

001264

Security **CONFIDENTIAL**

**MESSAGE FORM  
 OUTGOING**

File No. 50209-40	
6	50

**FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA**

**TO: HEAD OF POST, WASHINGTON**

Message To Be Sent

AIR CYPHER

EN CLAIR

CODE

CYPHER

No. **EX 587**

Date April 9, 1954

For Communications Section Only

SENT 5 APR 9 1954

Priority

**IMMEDIATE** *HW*

**REFERENCE:** Your WA 618 of April 9

**ORIGINATOR**

(Signature)  
W.H.BARTON/jf

(Name Typed)

Div. D.L.(1)

Local Tel. 7509

**SUBJECT:** Public Statement on Continental Defence.  
 Following from the Under-Secretary.

**APPROVED BY**

(Signature) *[Signature]*

(Name Typed)

1. I agree that any attempt to clarify the mistaken impression in the New York Times story would only lead to further complications. However, if any newsmen come to you and ask questions about the Press Release, then I think you might properly draw their attention to the exact phraseology of the text and attempt to ensure that they draw a correct conclusion as to its meaning.

Internal Distribution:

S. S. E. A. - U. S. S. E. A.

SSEA

2. I am referring your telegram and my reply to Mr. Pearson and Mr. Claxton. Unless you hear otherwise, you may assume that the policy indicated above should be followed in dealing with the Press.

Done *[Signature]*

Date April 12/54

3. From a press story here, we are under the impression that Mr. Wilson made some remarks additional to the agreed text of the joint announcement concerning the distant early warning project. It would be appreciated if you would send us the text of any remarks or statements made by the U.S. Defence Department over and above the text of the agreed statement.

Copies Referred To:

Minister of National Defence  
 CCOS

Done *[Signature]*

Date 12/4/54

SECRETARY OF STATE FROM EXTERNAL

AFFAIR: 001265

RECEIVED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1954 APR 9 PM 4:22

001266

50209-40  
6 6

CONFIDENTIAL

April 9, 1954

*File  
WMB*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Joint Statement on Continental Defence

Enclosed is a copy of WA-618 which has just been received from Washington, discussing the misleading story which appears in today's New York Times. Also enclosed is a copy of my interim reply to the Embassy and a copy of yesterday's official press release.

*Lapier*

As stated in my interim reply to Washington, it seems to me that it would do more harm than good for the Embassy, or the Canadian Government in Ottawa, to take the initiative in correcting the misleading parts of the New York Times story. However, if any newspapermen should approach the Embassy or this Department, or the Department of National Defence, it should be possible to direct their attention to the actual words of the joint announcement, and to point out that anything in the Times story that goes beyond the text is in the nature of unfounded speculation.

I am sending copies of this memorandum and enclosures to Mr. Claxton and General Foulkes.

*R.A.M.*

R.A.M.

9-4-42 (S.S.)  
9-4-64 (US)

Wash Post 9 April 54

6-103

# U.S., Canada Rush New Radar Defense

By John G. Norris  
Staff Reporter

Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson announced yesterday that a new Canadian-American radar warning system across northern Canada would be built to strengthen the Continental air defenses.

Designed to detect planes coming across the Polar cap, it will be north of the "Pinetree Chain" of aircraft warning stations which was started in 1950 and now is nearly complete. Preliminary surveys of the Far North system were started several months ago, and "work is already well advanced," Wilson disclosed.

The Defense chief also announced that the United States is expanding the warning system across the northeastern and northwestern sea approaches to North America. Plans call for long-range patrol planes, using much-improved radar, and Navy picket submarines and destroyers, to cover these ocean flanks.

### Extends Radar Range

These big planes, with their scanning radar, are particularly effective in the warning net. Their altitude greatly extends the range of the radar beyond the normal horizon limit of sets on the ground.

Wilson's statement, which coincided with one issued by Canada in Ottawa, marked the first official progress report given on the vital secret continental warning system.

The question of what type of radar net to build has been a matter of top-level dispute. One school urged building an airtight Arctic early warning system composed of many interlocking automatic stations to give Civil Defense officials time to evacuate cities before an atomic attack.

Another advocated building out from the southern Pinetree Chain. The trouble about a tight Arctic chain with a gap between it and Pinetree is that an enemy could send decoy planes through to produce constant alerts and evacuations.

Then bombers could slip through in the confusion.

What finally was decided, officials said, was to employ both systems to some extent. There will be a ring of advance stations—though not as many as at first urged—and intermediate stations to give "defense in depth."

In his statement, Wilson said that work on the Pinetree Chain has been going on under high priority for the last four years. Then he added:

"Long before the Pinetree project was approaching completion, the military planners of the two countries were engaged in an intensive study of what further steps might be desirable and practicable.

"In October, 1953, a team of military and scientific advisors representing both countries recommended that additional early warning should be provided by the establishment of a further radar system generally to the north of the settled territory in Canada.

### Many Difficult Problems

"The report of this team was considered by the Chiefs of Staff of each country later that same month. At a meeting in Washington in November, 1953, the Canadian representatives informed the United States authorities that the Canadian Government was prepared to proceed immediately with the necessary surveys and siting for the proposed new early warning radar system. This work is already well advanced.

"There are many difficult problems to be solved. . . . Much of the ground is inaccessible except by tractor train and helicopter. In many areas extreme temperatures are confronted for several months of the year. Many technical problems, including the interference of the auroral belt with electronic devices have had to be overcome."

Wash. Post 5/1/68 4 Apr 68

# Radars Net Guarding Continent Is Well Advanced, Wilson Says

Secretary of Defense Wilson said today the work of establishing a radar system across the rim of North America to warn of the approach of enemy atomic aircraft "is already well advanced."

The secretary, in a statement, did not give any indication where the units are being established except to say they are "generally to the north of the settled territory in Canada." But it was recalled that last September the Western Electric Co. announced establishment of the experimental units of the line of radar stations 1,200 miles from the North Pole "which will give United States defense forces at least six hours advance warning of an airborne threat from this direction."

A similar announcement was issued simultaneously in Ottawa.

Conceding that attacks might not only come across the Arctic region, Mr. Wilson said this country also is "extending the early warning barrier across the northeastern and northwestern seaward approaches to North America."

"Alaska radar system is coordinated with those in Canada and the continental United States and the development of airborne radar is well advanced," he added.

In his summary of progress on continental defenses—on which the Eisenhower administration has laid great stress—Mr. Wilson said the construction

of a large and costly radar chain, designed not only to detect enemy bombers, but also to control fighter aircraft engaged in interception, has been going on at "high priority" for the last four years.

He said the radar chain is known as the "pine tree" chain.

"Long before the pine tree project was approaching completion the military planners of the two countries were engaged in an intensive study of what might be desirable and practical," he continued.

Last October, he said, United States and Canadian military and scientific advisers recommended the establishment of the radar system near the North Pole. The following month Canada advised that it was "prepared to proceed immediately with the necessary surveys and sighting for the proposed new early warning radar system," he said. "This work is already well advanced."

He went on to state that there were many difficult problems involved.

In addition to the radar networks being set up Mr. Wilson said both countries were working continuously to improve air defense installations in the vicinity of major target areas. He added that unidentified aircraft were investigated by the most immediately available interceptor force, whether American or Canadian.

AMERICAN DIVISION. Copies For: Defence Liaison (1) Division  
Legal Division.

THIS SUMMARY MAY NOT BE COPIED, QUOTED OR REFERRED  
OUT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

*file*

AFTER CIRCULATION TO THE APPROPRIATE OFFICER  
IN THE DIVISION, IT SHOULD BE FILED.

50209-40  
*WMB*

APR. 8, 1954

*Mr Barton*  
*WMB*

TOP SECRET  
E.T.G./YSJ  
50209-40  
6 | 6

1954

Continental Defence; joint announcement  
by Canada and the United States.

At its meeting of April 8th, the Cabinet  
noted with approval the intention of the Minister  
of National Defence to table, in the House of  
Commons, that afternoon, a copy of a joint  
announcement by the governments of Canada and  
the United States with respect to continental  
defence.

EXTRACT FROM HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES

April 8, 1954.

*Rever*

**CONTINENTAL DEFENCE**

JOINT ANNOUNCEMENT BY CANADA AND  
UNITED STATES

**Hon. Brooke Claxton (Minister of National Defence):** Mr. Speaker, I have here a joint announcement by the governments of Canada and the United States with regard to continental defence. If I might have the permission of the house to do so, I would ask leave to table it and would ask that it be printed as an appendix to *Votes and Proceedings*, as I understand has been the practice in the past.

**Mr. Speaker:** Is it agreed?

**Some hon. Members:** Agreed.

50209-40  
616

PRESS RELEASE

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OTTAWA, CANADA

For Release at 2:30 p.m., E.S.T.,  
THURSDAY, April 8, 1954.

*Following is the text of a joint announcement by the Governments of Canada and the United States, which is being issued simultaneously in Ottawa and Washington at 2:30 P.M. EST, Thursday, April 8:*

Because of the possibility of aggressive air attacks against North America, the Canadian and United States Governments after the Second World War continued the cooperative arrangements for the defence of North America which had been brought into effect during the war. Since that time, there have been established in both countries fully manned radar screens for the detection of a potential enemy, and installations for interceptor aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons. At all stages, planning has been carried on between the two countries on a joint basis. Consultations and cooperation at all levels have been constant and completely satisfactory.

For some time now, the Canadian and United States Governments have been appraising the air defence system to define the steps required to strengthen our defences in the light of recent advances in the destructive capabilities of atomic weapons against targets in our two countries.

For the past four years, work has been going on at high priority on the construction of a large and costly radar chain which is required not only to detect enemy bombers but also to control fighter aircraft engaged in the task of interception. This radar chain is known as the Pinetree Chain.

Long before the Pinetree project was approaching completion, the military planners of the two countries were engaged in an intensive study of what further steps might be desirable and practicable. In October 1953, a team of military and scientific advisers representing both countries recommended that additional early warning should be provided by the establishment of a further radar system generally to the north of the settled territory in Canada. The report of this team was considered by the Chiefs of Staff of each country later that month. At a meeting in Washington in November 1953, the Canadian representatives informed the United States authorities that the Canadian Government was prepared to proceed immediately with the necessary surveys and siting for the proposed new early warning radar system. This work is already well advanced.

There are many difficult problems to be solved in establishing this additional early warning system in the Canadian north. The system will extend over thousands of miles and its survey will involve the examination of a great number of possible sites. Much of the ground is inaccessible except by tractor train and helicopter. In many areas, extreme temperatures are confronted for several months of the year. Many technical problems, including the interference of the auroral belt with electronic devices, have had to be overcome. In overcoming the various technical problems involved the United States Air Force is working closely with the Royal Canadian Air Force.

Security **SECRET**

# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

File No. 50209-40	
54	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST, WASHINGTON

Message To Be Sent

AIR CYPHER  
EN CLAIR  
CODE  
CYPHER  AUTO

Priority

IMPORTANT

ORIGINATOR

(Signature)  
W.H. Barton/jf

(Name Typed)

Div. D.L.(1)

Local Tel. 7509

APPROVED BY

(Signature)  
*[Signature]*

(Name Typed)

Internal Distribution:  
S.S.E.A.  U.S.S.E.A.

Done... *M.A.F.*

Date... *Apr. 7/54*

No. *EX-570* Date April 7, 1954

**SECRET** Communications Section Only

REFERENCE: Your telegram WA 598 of April 7.

SUBJECT: Public Statement on Continental Defence

- We realize that the release time of 2:30 P.M. precludes the statement being used in the afternoon or evening papers of April 8. However, since we will not know until noon of that day whether or not the statement will be given in the House, there is nothing we can do about it.
- The clean text of the statement which you request follows: BEGINS  
  
(Communications, please copy the attached press release). ENDS.
- We are also sending copies of the press release to you in tomorrow's bag. *Ends.*

Copies Referred To:

Done.....

Date.....

Ext. 97 (Rev. 1/52)

7, 4, 44 (U.S.)

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*  
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

RECEIVED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
FEDERAL AFFAIRS

1954 APR 7 PM 6:27

001273

FILE COPY



~~PRESS RELEASE~~

~~DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS~~  
~~OTTAWA CANADA~~

~~No. 20~~

FOR RELEASE AT 2:30 P.M. EST,  
THURSDAY, APRIL 8, 1954.

Following is the text of a joint announcement by the Governments of Canada and the United States, which is being issued simultaneously in Ottawa and Washington at 2:30 P.M. EST, Thursday, April 8:

Because of the possibility of aggressive air attacks against North America, the Canadian and United States Governments after the Second World War continued the cooperative arrangements for the defence of North America which had been brought into effect during the war. Since that time, there have been established in both countries fully manned radar screens for the detection of a potential enemy, and installations for interceptor aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons. At all stages, planning has been carried on between the two countries on a joint basis. Consultations and cooperation at all levels have been constant and completely satisfactory.

For some time now, the Canadian and United States Governments have been appraising the air defence system to define the steps required to strengthen our defences in the light of recent advances in the destructive capabilities of atomic weapons against targets in our two countries.

For the past four years, work has been going on at high priority on the construction of a large and costly radar chain which is required not only to detect enemy bombers but also to control fighter aircraft engaged in the task of interception. This radar chain is known as the Pinetree Chain.

Long before the Pinetree project was approaching completion, the military planners of the two countries were engaged in an intensive study of what further steps might be desirable and practicable. In October 1953, a team of military and scientific advisers representing both countries recommended that additional early warning should be provided by the establishment of a further radar system generally to the north of the settled territory in Canada. The report of this team was considered by the Chiefs of Staff of each country later that month. At a meeting in Washington in November 1953, the Canadian representatives informed the United States authorities that the Canadian Government was prepared to proceed immediately with the necessary surveys and siting for the proposed new early warning radar system. This work is already well advanced.

- 2 -

There are many difficult problems to be solved in establishing this additional early warning system in the Canadian north. The system will extend over thousands of miles and its survey will involve the examination of a great number of possible sites. Much of the ground is inaccessible except by tractor train and helicopter. In many areas, extreme temperatures are confronted for several months of the year. Many technical problems, including the interference of the auroral belt with electronic devices, have had to be overcome. In overcoming the various technical problems involved the United States Air Force is working closely with the Royal Canadian Air Force.

It is obviously just as important to have early warning of aircraft approaching target areas in North America from over the sea as from over Northern Canada. For this reason, the United States Government is extending the early warning barrier across the north-eastern and north-western seaward approaches to North America. The Alaska radar system is co-ordinated with those in Canada and the continental United States, and the development of airborne radar is well advanced.

In addition to these measures of common concern, both countries are working continuously to improve the air defence installations in the vicinity of the major target areas. Here too, cooperation between the United States and Canadian air defence commanders is close, and unidentified aircraft are investigated by the most immediately available interceptor force, whether Canadian or American.

The defence of North America is part of the defence of the North Atlantic region to which both Canada and the United States are pledged as signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. Thus, the cooperative arrangements for the defence of this continent and for the participation of Canadian and United States forces in the defence of Europe are simply two sides of the same coin, two parts of a world-wide objective, to preserve peace and to defend freedom.

*End of statement.*

-----

Security .S.E.C.R.E.T.....

# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

File No. 50209-40	
54	58

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST, LONDON... No. 444.....

REPEAT TO THE CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC  
COUNCIL, PARIS. No. 230

Message To Be Sent	No.	Date	For Communications Section Only
AIR CYPHER		April 7, 1954	SENT - APR 7 1954
EN CLAIR			
CODE			
CYPHER			

Priority
Auto
XX

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: Public Statement on Continental Defence.

Priority  
IMPORTANT MW

ORIGINATOR

(Signature)

W. H. Barton/ejk  
(Name Typed)

Div. D.L. (1)

Local Tel. 7509

The following is the text of a joint announcement by the Governments of Canada and the United States which is expected to be issued simultaneously in Ottawa and Washington at 2:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, Thursday, April 8. Text begins

(Communications: Please copy the text of attached press release)

Ends.

APPROVED BY

(Signature)

(Name Typed)

Internal Distribution:

S. S. E. A. ✓ U. S. S. E. A. ✓

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Done... MAS

Date... Apr. 8/54

Copies Referred To:

Done.....

Date.....

Ext. 97 (Rev. 1/52)

7,443 (U.S.)

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*  
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

RECEIVED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AFFAIRS

1954 APR 7 PM 6:27

001277

FILE COPY

PRESS RELEASE



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OTTAWA - CANADA

No. 20

FOR RELEASE AT 2:30 P.M. EST,  
THURSDAY, APRIL 8, 1954.

Following is the text of a joint announcement by the  
Governments of Canada and the United States, which is  
being issued simultaneously in Ottawa and Washington  
at 2:30 P.M. EST, Thursday, April 8:

*Begin*

Because of the possibility of aggressive air attacks against North America, the Canadian and United States Governments after the Second World War continued the cooperative arrangements for the defence of North America which had been brought into effect during the war. Since that time, there have been established in both countries fully manned radar screens for the detection of a potential enemy, and installations for interceptor aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons. At all stages, planning has been carried on between the two countries on a joint basis. Consultations and cooperation at all levels have been constant and completely satisfactory.

For some time now, the Canadian and United States Governments have been appraising the air defence system to define the steps required to strengthen our defences in the light of recent advances in the destructive capabilities of atomic weapons against targets in our two countries.

For the past four years, work has been going on at high priority on the construction of a large and costly radar chain which is required not only to detect enemy bombers but also to control fighter aircraft engaged in the task of interception. This radar chain is known as the Pinetree Chain.

Long before the Pinetree project was approaching completion, the military planners of the two countries were engaged in an intensive study of what further steps might be desirable and practicable. In October 1953, a team of military and scientific advisers representing both countries recommended that additional early warning should be provided by the establishment of a further radar system generally to the north of the settled territory in Canada. The report of this team was considered by the Chiefs of Staff of each country later that month. At a meeting in Washington in November 1953, the Canadian representatives informed the United States authorities that the Canadian Government was prepared to proceed immediately with the necessary surveys and siting for the proposed new early warning radar system. This work is already well advanced.

- 2 -

There are many difficult problems to be solved in establishing this additional early warning system in the Canadian north. The system will extend over thousands of miles and its survey will involve the examination of a great number of possible sites. Much of the ground is inaccessible except by tractor train and helicopter. In many areas, extreme temperatures are confronted for several months of the year. Many technical problems, including the interference of the auroral belt with electronic devices, have had to be overcome. In overcoming the various technical problems involved the United States Air Force is working closely with the Royal Canadian Air Force.

It is obviously just as important to have early warning of aircraft approaching target areas in North America from over the sea as from over Northern Canada. For this reason, the United States Government is extending the early warning barrier across the north-eastern and north-western seaward approaches to North America. The Alaska radar system is co-ordinated with those in Canada and the continental United States, and the development of airborne radar is well advanced.

In addition to these measures of common concern, both countries are working continuously to improve the air defence installations in the vicinity of the major target areas. Here too, cooperation between the United States and Canadian air defence commanders is close, and unidentified aircraft are investigated by the most immediately available interceptor force, whether Canadian or American.

The defence of North America is part of the defence of the North Atlantic region to which both Canada and the United States are pledged as signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty. Thus, the cooperative arrangements for the defence of this continent and for the participation of Canadian and United States forces in the defence of Europe are simply two sides of the same coin, two parts of a world-wide objective, to preserve peace and to defend freedom.

*End of joint announcement. Ends*

# INCOMING MESSAGE

# ORIGINAL

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

*File W-3*

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

**S E C R E T**

File No.

*58209-91*

*57 | 50*

Priority  
**IMPORTANT**

System  
**CYPHER-AUTO**

No. **WA-598**

Date **April 7, 1954.**

Departmental  
Circulation  
**MINISTER  
UNDER/SEC  
D/UNDER/SEC  
A/UNDER/SEC'S  
POL/CO-ORD 'N  
SECTION**

Reference: **Your telegram EX-559 of April 6.**

Subject: **Public statement on continental defence.**

*J-3*

We informed the Canadian desk on April 7 of your proposal to release the amended statement on continental defence at 2:30 p.m. on Thursday, April 8. The Canadian desk said that the statement would be released at the same time from the office of the Secretary of Defense in Washington.

2. We would be grateful if you could send us today a clean text of the statement which you intend to release so that we may be in a position to deal authoritatively with any inquiries which may be made of us tomorrow by the press.

3. You will realize, of course, that with a release time of 2:30 p.m. the statement will not be available for use in any of the afternoon and evening papers of April 8. A 12 noon release time would be necessary if you wished the statement to be carried in the afternoon and evening papers.

D < 1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Done **APR 1954**  
Date

References

Done  
Date

CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1954 APR 7 PM 4 : 40

001281

Defence Liaison (1)/W.H.Barton/jf

SECRET

*File*  
*CMO*

April 7, 1954.

50209-40  
34 | 54

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER:

Public Announcement on Continental Defence

The text of the attached public announcement on continental defence has been agreed between the Canadian and United States authorities, and arrangements have been made for its release in Ottawa and Washington at 2:30 P.M. on Thursday, April 8, 1954.

2. I understand that you wish to inform Cabinet of this at tomorrow morning's meeting and that, at that time, a decision will be reached as to whether the announcement will simply go out as a press release, or whether a Minister will make the announcement in the House.

J. W. HOLMES

*JW*  
R. A. M.

*Seen by*  
*Dr. MacKay.*

# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

File No. 50209-40	
57	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST, WASHINGTON.

Message To Be Sent	No. <i>EX-539</i>	Date April 6, 1954	For Communications Section Only SENT — APR 6 1954
--------------------	-------------------	-----------------------	--

AIR CYPHER  
EN CLAIR  
CODE  
CYPHER

AUTO  XX

Priority

**IMPORTANT** *mm*

ORIGINATOR

(Signature)  
W.H. Barton/er

(Name Typed)

Div. D.L. (1)

Local Tel. 7509

APPROVED BY

(Signature) *[Signature]*

(Name Typed)

Internal Distribution:

S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.

Done *[Signature]*

Date *April 7/54*

Copies Referred To:

*CC 03*

*Jim Mc Naughton*

Done *[Signature]*

Date *7/4/54*

REFERENCE: Your Telegram No. WA.587 of April 5, 1954

SUBJECT: Public Statement on Continental Defence.

You may inform the United States authorities that we agree with the amendments to the statement which they propose as set out in your Telegram No. WA.587 of April 5, 1954.

It is proposed that the statement should be released both in Ottawa and Washington at 2:30 p.m. on Thursday, April 8, 1954. The statement may be read in the House of Commons either by Mr. Claxton or Mr. Campney at that time or alternatively it is possible that it may simply be issued as a press release.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

RECEIVED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
GENERAL AFFAIRS

1954 APR 6 PM 5:40

001284

INCOMING MESSAGE

*File* ORIGINAL

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification	
SECRET	
File No.	
50209-40	
52	50

Priority <b>IMPORTANT</b>	System CYPHER-AUTO	No. WA-587	Date April 5, 1954. J.2
------------------------------	-----------------------	------------	-------------------------

Departmental Circulation  
MINISTER UNDER/SEC D/UNDER/SEC A/UNDER/SEC'S POL/CO-ORD'N SECTION

D-1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Reference: Your EX-505 and EX-506 of March 31 and our WA-576 of April 3.  
Subject: Draft public statement on continental defence.

- The following modifications in your draft are suggested by the Departments of Defense and State:
- (a) Para 1, add a new sentence at end of paragraph, to read "Consultations and co-operation at all levels have been constant and completely satisfactory."
  - (b) Para 4, put period after "well advanced" and delete remainder of paragraph;
  - (c) Para 5, line 3, delete "5,000" and insert "thousands of";
  - (d) Para 5, omit the sentence "to avoid...as possible";
  - (e) Para 6, omit the words "working on the formidable task of";
  - (f) Para 6, omit the word "Greenland" and consequently change "systems" to "system" and "are" to "is".

These changes, we think, will be self-explanatory. On the last one the State Department felt that Greenland should be left out unless the Danish Government was consulted.

2. It is understood here that the release of this statement in Ottawa will be on Tuesday or Wednesday at 2:30 p.m. The United States departments have agreed to coordinate their release according to which day you choose.

3. We should now be grateful to know whether you accept the proposed changes and if so when the announcement is to be made.

Done BOYLE-COMM-7-SECRETARY APR 6 1954  
Date APR 6 '54

References  
Gen. McNaughton  
~~Secretary~~  
CCOS - 5 copies  
Press Office - Done  
WHS

Done WHS  
Date

CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1954 APR 6 AM 8:42

001286

ORIGINAL

FROM:

THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

SECRET

File No.

50209-40

3250

Priority	System	No.	Date
IMPORTANT	CYPHER-AUTO	WA-576	April 3, 1954

Departmental Circulation

MINISTER

UNDER/SEC

D/UNDER/SEC

A/UNDER/SEC'S

PCL/DC-ORD/N

PROTECTOR

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

5 APR 1954

DONE - COMM'S SECTION

APR 5 - 54

Reference: Your EX-506 of March 31.

Subject: Proposed joint statement on continental defence.

This morning I saw Bedell Smith and he expressed his whole-hearted agreement with the proposal to issue in the immediate future a joint statement. He had not previously gone over our draft, but after glancing at it said he thought it was admirable; it occurred to him that the addition of a reference to "constant" and "satisfactory" consultation on this subject "at all levels" would be useful.

2. Bedell Smith will speak to the secretary and to Radford this morning and will try to let me have clearance on Monday morning so that if you wish, the statement may be made in the House of Commons on Monday afternoon, April 5th. Knowing the usual delays which attend such matters, I would not count on an agreed text being cleared by that time. On the other hand, it is just possible that we will be ready because of Bedell Smith's own personal interest in this subject.

.....

References

*Refer*

cc OS - 4 copies

Sec/cab.

+ File

WAG

Done

Date

CLASSIFIED  
CONFIDENTIAL  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1954 APR 5 AM 9 12

001288

# INCOMING MESSAGE

# COPY

*Original on 9974-40*

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

File No.

58289-40

50-52

Priority	System CYPHER-AUTO	No. WA-561	Date April 2, 1954.
----------	-----------------------	------------	---------------------

Departmental Circulation

MINISTER  
UNDER/SEC  
D/UNDER/SEC  
A/UNDER/SEC'S

POL/CO-ORD 'N  
SECTION

Reference:

Subject:

Please deliver today the following message to Dr. Solandt. Message Begins:

Henry Porter, Assistant Director of the Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University (which operates under a section T. contract with the Navy Department Bureau of Ordnance), told me yesterday that you were to participate in a seminar at Hopkins in Baltimore on Tuesday, April 6. He suggested that this might also be a convenient time for you to visit the Applied Physics Laboratory (in Washington) "for some discussions on air defense problems and guided missiles".

2. Porter, (who is a personal friend of mine) went on as follows: quote

We have just carried through in some detail an analysis of operational and economic factors in the defense of this continent against enemy air attack. This has been carried to the point which indicates the amount and distribution of the defenses, in qualitative terms, as a function of the threat and destruction, etc. For the first time, we feel we have an insight into the situation and can think logically concerning it. In addition, this analysis forms a method of comparing all possible weapons, not on their individual characteristics, but by the overall criterion of the cost to provide a given defence effectiveness". Unquote.

3. I do not know whether you would be able or wish to come on to Washington for this purpose on this occasion. Porter says that they would value your comments and criticism very highly. Could you let me know whether there is any possibility of your accepting this invitation? Message Ends.

.....

Done

Date

References

Done

Date

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

TO: FILE .....

Security ... TOP SECRET .....

FROM: W.H. BARTON .....

Date ..... April 2, 1954 .....

REFERENCE: .....

File No.		
50209-40		
54	54	

SUBJECT: Stationing of U.S. Fighter Squadron at Torbay.....

During the recent flight made by Mr. Claxton, General McNaughton and Dr. Hannah, the Chairman of the U.S. Section, PJBD, over the North Pole, Dr. Hannah raised, first with Mr. Claxton and later with General McNaughton, the question of stationing a U.S. fighter squadron at Torbay for the protection of the U.S. Northeast Command Headquarters. *The following was reported to me by Gen. McNaughton.*

2. Mr. Claxton made it clear to Dr. Hannah that the Canadian Government would not approve the basing of a U.S. squadron at Torbay. If a squadron really was required, a Canadian squadron would be put there. This squadron would probably be made up by reducing the reserve strength of the Air Division in Europe. Mr. Claxton considered that Canada was the only country to have fulfilled her NATO pledges, and that, for this reason, he could, with a clear conscience, reduce her NATO commitment by the amount required to meet this need. Dr. Hannah then said that it was the USAF view that a fighter squadron was essential for the protection of Northeast Command Headquarters and asked what the economic implications for the people of St. John's and Newfoundland generally would be if the Headquarters were moved to a place where it would be possible to provide fighter protection. Mr. Claxton said that it had always been realized that the Headquarters would close some day and that, as he was considering stationing a Canadian Army Battalion at St. John's, the buildings at Pepperrell could be used for its accommodation. The other buildings could be used by the Newfoundland Government for schools, hospitals, etc.

...2

- 2 -

3. General McNaughton, in his conversation with Dr. Hannah, spoke in a similar vein. He mentioned the expansion at Argentia which Dr. Hannah had previously indicated was planned and said that some of the surplus labour at St. John's could be employed at Argentia. General McNaughton asked if it would not be possible to station the fighter squadron at Argentia or Harmon instead of Torbay. He told Dr. Hannah that he doubted that it would be possible to discuss the subject other than cursorily at the April meeting of the PJBD, since the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and Cabinet Defence Committee would have to be consulted. General McNaughton undertook to give to the Board at the April meeting a report on the progress being made by the R.C.A.F. in improving the runway at Torbay so that jet fighters could use the airfield.



W. H. B.