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PLANS AND PROPOSALS
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION (INITIATIVES)

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MESURES
PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS
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
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
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28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission	13

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- Conrad Grebel College
Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G6
- ~~321 X 1634~~ 450 Rideau
Ottawa, Ontario K1N 7Z2
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Project Ploughshares

30 November 1983

Mr. Garry Smith, Director
Arms Control & Disarmament Division
Department of External Affairs
125 Sussex Dr.
Ottawa, Ont.

RETURN TO REVENIR AU	DOCUMENT DOSSIER	FILE ETRE
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28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission		

Dear Mr. Smith:

I am writing, as a representative of Project Ploughshares, to express our strong and enthusiastic support for the initiatives taken by the Prime Minister to reduce East-West tensions, and for the work done by Geoffrey Pearson and yourself towards this objective. Some of us have been giving support to a full page advertisement in support of the Prime Minister on this issue, to appear December 13th in the Globe and Mail.

You will agree, I think, when I say that our support, to be genuine, must also reflect our ongoing concern, which we have expressed many times, that Canada should be prepared to change its position on disarmament questions, as well as asking others to change theirs. We feel strongly that this willingness is the one missing ingredient in the five point proposals of Mr. Trudeau. In a news release issued November 28th we suggested that this willingness could be indicated in a concrete way if Canada was simply to abstain, as several other western nations have done, on the Swedish-Mexican resolution on the Freeze, to be voted on during the second week of September in the General Assembly (see enclosure). (We would of course prefer a «Yes» vote).

I would like to meet with you to discuss this and other related matters, whenever you have time.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,
Murray Thomson
Murray Thomson,
Education Coordinator

cc: Mr. Geoffrey Pearson, 199 Daly, Ottawa
Dr. Clarke MacDonald, Chairman, Project Ploughshares

The following churches and organizations have taken formal action to support the work of "Project Ploughshares": Anglican Church of Canada (PSR Unit), Canadian Council of Churches, Canadian Friends Service Committee, Canadian Catholic Organization for Development and Peace, Canadian Unitarian Council, Canadian University Service Overseas, Christian Church (Disciples), Christian Movement for Peace, Conrad Grebel College, Development Education Centre, Frontiers Foundation, Inter-Pares, Mennonite Central Committee, Native Council of Canada, Oxfam-Canada, Presbyterian Church in Canada, United Church of Canada, United Nations Association in Canada and Voice of Women.

NEWS RELEASE



Project Ploughshares

450 Rideau Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1N 5Z4

On November 22, 1983, the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly for a freeze on nuclear weapons. The resolution, sponsored by Mexico, Sweden and Ecuador, called for the US and USSR to freeze the production, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons systems for five years, subject to verification measures already agreed to in SALT I, SALT II and the partially-completed Comprehensive Test Ban Agreement.

The resolution passed 101 to 14, with 7 abstentions. Canada voted against while five members of the Western Bloc abstained (Australia, Denmark, Iceland, The Netherlands and Norway). Greece voted in favour of the freeze.

The resolution will be presented for a final vote in the General Assembly during the second week of December. It is possible for Canada to change its vote at that time. In a similar vote in 1982 two countries, Denmark and Iceland, changed their votes from 'no' to 'abstain' after vigorous debates in their respective Parliaments.

Project Ploughshares welcomes and supports the peace initiatives now being taken by Prime Minister Trudeau. It urges the Canadian Government to give concrete substance to these initiatives for reducing East-West tensions by changing its vote on the Freeze Resolution at the U.N. in December.

- 30 -

November 28, 1983

For further information:
Murray Thomson
613.236.4547

PM TASK FORCE

PM Trudeau Visit to Europe
(West), November 1983

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CANADIAN EYES ONLY

28-6-1-Trudeau

FIVE POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE

ISSUE:

This brief elaborates on the Prime Minister's reference in his Guelph speech to engaging all five nuclear weapons states in negotiations aimed at establishing global limits on their strategic nuclear arsenals.

BACKGROUND:

Negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons have always been bilateral, between the USA and the USSR. Although the UK, France and China possess strategic nuclear weapons, they have never participated in negotiations and thus their forces remain unconstrained by any international agreement. These three nuclear powers have, however, accepted the principle of their eventual involvement in such negotiations subject to various conditions.

In order to accommodate the legitimate security concerns of all parties, and in order to take account of the increasing importance of the three states not party to existing arms control arrangements, it seems not only logical but prudent to seek a framework within which all strategic nuclear forces can be discussed, and hopefully limited.

Proposals so far put forward to deal with the nuclear weapons of Britain, France and China have in all cases been unsatisfactory in one respect or another. Proposals for a five-power nuclear freeze do not address the need for reductions in the strategic weapons of the two superpowers. Proposals to aggregate the forces of Britain and France with those of the United States are not based on a proper appreciation of the nature of these forces and would result in according the USSR a preeminent position to which it has no legitimate claim.

CANADIAN POSITION:

In light of the factors outlined above, the Prime Minister might wish to take the lead in articulating the concept of a five-power (USA, USSR, Britain, France and China) strategic nuclear weapons conference. Such a call could be based on the following principles:

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CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- global strategic arms negotiations should not be conducted on a bloc to bloc or exclusively bilateral basis,
- no superpower has the right to claim pre-eminent nuclear position, and
- nuclear weapons states all have obligations to reduce their nuclear armaments under the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The primary aim of such a conference would be the establishment of global limits on all existing strategic nuclear weapons. Aggregation would be avoided by suggesting that national ceilings be established according to fixed ratios which allowed for parity as between the USA and the USSR. The agenda could also include strategic nuclear confidence building measures, measures for crisis management and measures to control the qualitative aspects of the strategic nuclear arms race. Such a conference would not be a substitute for existing bilateral negotiations.

By formally recognizing the rights of both the United States and the Soviet Union as strategic equals, neither superpower need fear that its equality with the other is in jeopardy. By relating the forces of the other declared nuclear powers to those of the superpowers, no state need fear that its security is threatened by the unlimited development of other arsenals. By establishing a framework which would formalize the relationship of superpower forces to those of the other 3 states, neither Britain nor France nor China need fear that its forces will be subject to unreasonable restraints, imposed without their consent or legitimate interests in mind.

The chances for a favourable reception of this proposal would be enhanced were it emphasized that the primary concern is to establish a global framework for the limitation of nuclear arsenals, not reductions in British, French or Chinese capabilities or inhibitions to their current modernization programs. Any concerns about the nature of the ratios under consideration could be assuaged by indicating that in our view these ratios should be the subject of negotiation, that all powers should have a right to veto arrangements which did not meet their approval and that the legitimate security interests of all participants should be respected. Questions as to the definition of 'strategic' should be left to the five powers themselves.

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CANADIAN EYES ONLY

POSITION OF OTHERS:

USA: The USA has not articulated a specific position on a proposal of this nature. It has, however, made it clear that it opposes the inclusion of the nuclear systems of other states in bilateral negotiations such as START and INF. It also insists upon the right to parity in nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union. This proposal takes account of these views. In addition, it does not interfere with the ongoing INF and START negotiations, or the INF modernization program.

USSR: The USSR has already suggested a five-power nuclear freeze. It might be reluctant, however, to forego its claim to the right to nuclear superiority over any other single power. On the other hand, the fixed-ratio approach could be seen as consecrating the Soviet position as a superpower and might have some appeal if it created an exclusive nuclear club not easily open to others, e.g. FRG. The proposal would offer the USSR the prospect of placing limits on French, British and Chinese forces, something which is clearly in its long-term interest.

CHINA: As indicated in Foreign Minister Wu's speech to the United Nations, September 27, China accepts the idea of a conference of all nuclear weapons states for the purpose of negotiating reductions, but only after the USA and the USSR have reduced their nuclear arsenals by 50%. The Canadian proposal, in contrast, seeks only, in the first stage, agreed limitations on nuclear weapons. It would offer the Chinese membership in an exclusive nuclear club without, given the present size of their forces, any cost. It would give the Chinese some possibility of influencing the strategic force postures of the superpowers, the structure of which ultimately determines the efficacy of their own forces. China also has an interest in slowing the pace of qualitative and quantitative change in USA and USSR nuclear forces.

FRANCE: The French government opposes the inclusion of French forces in any manner whatsoever in any negotiations in which France does not participate and in particular in the INF negotiations which do not deal with strategic forces. President Mitterrand recently stated, however, that he did not reject the idea of the five nuclear powers discussing together at some point a limitation on their strategic systems. He did, however, enunciate the following conditions:

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CANADIAN EYES ONLY

La première de ces conditions suppose que soit corrigée la différence fondamentale de nature et de quantité qui sépare l'armement des deux plus grandes puissances et des autres, ainsi que la différence qui sépare un pays qui risquerait de s'en servir pour asseoir sa puissance du pays qui serait contraint de s'en servir pour sa propre survie.

La deuxième condition découle du considérable écart existant entre les forces classiques ou conventionnelles, particulièrement en Europe, écart accru - et je le crains - par l'existence d'armes chimiques et biologiques dont une Convention devrait absolument interdire la fabrication et le stockage. La troisième condition exige que cesse la surenchère en matière d'armes antimissiles, anti-sous-marines et antisatellites.

In addition, the French would reject any form of aggregation with USA and UK nuclear forces. Despite the above, the French might be interested in the possibilities offered by the proposal for influencing the strategic force postures of the two superpowers. They might also be tempted by an possibilities this might offer to slow the pace of technological change relevant to the efficacy of their own nuclear forces, particularly if the latter are not thereby reduced or constrained from modernization.

UK: Mrs. Thatcher has made clear her view that British nuclear forces could not be included in INF because they are strategic or in START because they are bilateral negotiations. The British have also rejected the idea of any compensation for their forces for the USSR at the expense of the USA as this would give the USSR a preeminent nuclear position. The British have not, however, totally rejected the idea that their forces might at some point be subject to negotiations. In fact, Mrs. Thatcher was quoted as saying: "But if, between the two big powers the numbers went down massively and enormously, and we moved into a totally different world - a far greater reduction than I can foresee certainly with the next five years - then there may be circumstances when ours will have to be counted. But I cannot foresee that at the moment." British resistance to this proposal might be reduced if it is clear that the purpose is to secure limits, not reduce existing or planned British forces.

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CANADIAN EYES ONLY

NETHERLANDS: In September, on the occasion of a visit of PM Thatcher, PM Lubbers clearly expressed his view that UK and French nuclear forces would have to be included at some point in East/West negotiations. He stated quote "We think in the long run we must be able to have a negotiating process which does not exclude any type of nuclear arms". The Dutch Second Chamber also adopted a resolution calling for the inclusion of British and French nuclear missiles in East/West negotiations on nuclear weapons reductions.

ITALY: In September, during a visit to Paris, PM Craxi publically raised the possibility of a five power nuclear conference.

FRG: Although the German government has not expressed a view on the idea of a five power nuclear conference there is evidence that it has considered, and perhaps continues to consider, such an idea. The CDU/CSU caucus spokesman on disarmament recently expressed interest publicly in a five power nuclear conference. On October 5, the Chinese foreign minister claimed that Genscher agreed with the Chinese approach to this question.

BELGIUM: There is no evidence as to Belgian views.

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ANNEX A

Nuclear Forces of the Five Declared Nuclear States

Although the definition of forces to be included or excluded from a five power conference on nuclear arms limitation should be left to the participants, the following is a brief description of forces currently possessed by these states.

- (I) Britain : strategic forces : 64 SLBMs on 4 submarines (192 total strategic warheads)
- : theatre forces : Buccaneer, Jaguar, Tornado aircraft (about 190 aircraft)
- : when modernized with Trident II SLBM (about 1995) British strategic forces will possess approximately 500 warheads.
- (II) France : strategic forces : 80 SLBMs on 5 submarines (98 total strategic warheads)
- : 18 land-based missiles
- : theatre forces : Mirage, Jaguar and Super Etendard aircraft (about 145 aircraft)
- : when modernized (about 1995) French strategic forces will possess approximately 800 warheads.
- (III) China : strategic forces : 64 land-based missiles (76 total strategic warheads)
- : 12 SLBMs on 1 submarine
- : theatre forces : tactical aircraft and bombers (numbers unknown)
- : modernization plans unknown, but likely to expand.

...2

(IV) USSR : strategic forces : 1398 ICBMs (about 5900 warheads)
: 980 SLBMs on 80 submarines (about 1900 warheads)
: long-range bombers (about 143 aircraft)
: theatre forces : about 700 longer-range
missiles (about 1300 warheads)
: about 1400 shorter-range
missiles (about 1400 aircraft)
: bombers and aircraft (about 3100 aircraft)
: modernization plans depend on outcome of
START and INF negotiations.

(V) USA : strategic forces : 1045 ICBMs (about 2600 warheads)
: 568 SLBMs on 34 submarines (about 5150 warheads)
: long-range bombers (272 aircraft)
: theatre forces : aircraft (about 650 aircraft)
: 108 missiles (108 warheads)
(excludes 572 GLCM and
Pershing II)
: modernization plans depend on outcome of START
and INF negotiations.

NOTE: The above figures are not comprehensive.
They do not include tactical weapons.

file 28-2-2
FILE DOSSIER
28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission
28-COMSOC-1-USSR (Arbatov attended)



YORK UNIVERSITY
Research Programme in Strategic Studies
Programme de Recherche en Études Stratégiques
4700 KEELE STREET, DOWNSVIEW, ONTARIO M3J 1P3

What is the status of the request to underwrite the Roundtable in 1984?
RBR
running with this
done
this file

November 30, 1983

Mr. Montigny Marchand
Deputy Minister
Department of External Affairs
125 Sussex Drive
Ottawa, Ont. K1A 0G2

Dear Mr. Marchand,

Please find enclosed a copy of my observations from the (Canadian-Soviet) Round Table which was held in Moscow last June.

Given Mr. Trudeau's recent initiatives relating to restoring the East-West dialogue you may find the observations of some interest. Within this context the paper which is attached as Appendix B to the Report offers a number of suggestions regarding East-West Security Relations. Hopefully you will have some time to give it a perusal.

Thank you for your interest in this matter, I remain,

Yours sincerely,
R. B. Byers
R. B. Byers
Director

Encls.

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CABINET DU SOUS-SECRETAIRE
DEC 7 1983
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comments / observations
If you think it useful to do so, you may prepare reply.

12.9/057

International Security and Arms Control: Soviet Perspectives

Observations on the Soviet-Canadian Round Table, Moscow, July 1983

R.B. Byers, Director, Research Programme in Strategic Studies
York University, Toronto, Ontario

I. Background

In July 1983 the Institute of the United States and Canada in Moscow hosted a Soviet-Canadian Round Table. The major agenda items focused on the state of East-West relations with particular emphasis on the problems related to international security and arms control.

This report offers an assessment of the Soviet views expressed by senior members of the RUSAC including those of its Director Yuri Arbatov. (See appendix A for a list of Canadian and Soviet delegations).

The members of the Canadian delegation were invited as individuals and each of us expressed our own views on the current international situation.

In part, the Soviet perspectives emerged as a result of discussing a paper presented to the Soviet delegation by Professor Byers (see appendix B). In addition, a number of other issues were discussed but these will not be addressed in any detail in this report.

Prior to outlining Soviet perceptions it may, in the first instance, be of interest to offer several observations regarding possible Soviet motivations for the Round Table and the role of the IUSAC:

- 1) The Canadian Department of the Institute has historically maintained relatively close ties with a number of Canadians -- primarily academics -- with expertise in areas which the Institute has deemed important through their research objectives. For example, Canadian social history, political parties, ethnic groups, the Arctic, Canadian-American economic relations, etc.

- iii) A less benign interpretation is that the IUSAC is trying to manipulate selected Canadians who they perceive to be sympathetic to their views. This interpretation would suggest that the Institute is pursuing a mandate to shape, where possible, Western public opinion.
- iv) Finally it could be argued that the IUSAC is willing to pursue all avenues which offer any prospects -- however limited -- of re-establishing a meaningful dialogue on East-West issues.

Within this context it should be understood that the academics at the IUSAC are those most familiar with Western strategists and the state of the Western strategic debate. It is my view that they are probably the least hawkish academic group within the Soviet Union. Here contacts with members of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations generally adopt a much more hawkish view on issues related to East-West relations.

II. The International Political Environment: Soviet Perceptions

- 1. The state of the dialogue: The Soviets placed considerable emphasis on the breakdown of the dialogue between the two superpowers. From their perspective this situation is deemed to be both undesirable and dangerous. At the same time, however, it was emphasized that there is a need to re-establish the dialogue and listen to each other. This issue was raised on several occasions and was considered to be an important point from the Soviet perspective.

Nevertheless, it was argued that the political climate is not right for a Soviet-American summit given that the Soviet Union is not in a position where they can trust the outcome of such deliberations.

The Soviets did indicate, however, a willingness for foreign ministers to meet to see if there could be grounds for further discussions at the political level. Within this context it was argued that an attempt could be made to ascertain whether or not political accommodations could be made at the level of foreign ministers and then see if there could be grounds for proceeding to a summit meeting. Yet on balance it was argued that this could not be undertaken until the political environment changed in a more positive direction.

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2. American Intentions:

To a large extent the breakdown of the dialogue is, from a Soviet perspective, a function of deep mistrust of American intentions. They perceive that the United States is out to change the underlying bases of Soviet society. This is perceived to be a direct attack on the foundations of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This is clearly unacceptable as an objective and was stated as a major area of concern for the Soviet participants at the Round Table.

3. The American Domestic Situation:

The Soviets seem to place considerable emphasis on the domestic environment within the United States. Within this context the upcoming 1984 presidential election was referred to on a number of occasions. The Soviets made it abundantly clear that they hope for an administration in Washington which would be more conducive to maintaining a reasonable dialogue. Nevertheless, they expressed concern that the strong conservative element currently within the administration in Washington has had an adverse effect on the relationship. Thus there were references to the American pursuit of military programs which have tended -- from their perspective -- to destabilize the strategic environment.

Given the domestic situation and that 1984 will be an electoral year the Soviets appeared to be unwilling to undertake any major initiatives until the domestic situation in the United States is clarified.

4. General East-West Relations:

Within this context it was emphasized that the Soviet-American relationship does not embody the totality of East-West relations. Here it was pointed out that both sides can be influenced by their allies and thus there are some grounds to be less pessimistic than if one was only looking at the superpower relationship.

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It was suggested that the situation in Western Europe has changed and that there should be a greater realization of the extent of this change. Soviet spokesmen stated that we are facing a new stage in Europe as they are acquiring interests which are not necessarily commonly shared with American interests. Here references were made to the Soviet view that Europe constitutes a forward base for war for the United States, but for the Europeans it is their homeland and as such would be destroyed if a war should break out.

With respect to the economic situation the Soviets expressed the view that there would be lean economic years in the foreseeable future. In this sense it would be difficult for the Europeans to sustain their current standard of living.

It was argued, on balance, that Western Europe has not come to grips with this new situation.

5. The Third World:

With respect to the situation in the Third World the Soviet spokesmen made an attempt to decouple the Soviet-American situation with that existing in the Third World. Here it was argued that situations in the Third World should not adversely affect the relationship. From their perspective it was stated that we in the West must understand that there will be many changes in the Third World and that both superpowers will have to come to grips with their disappointments. In essence it was suggested that the United States should not let the Third World be a pretext for an adverse relationship between East and West. Furthermore, if East-West relations are able to be placed on some basis of normalization, then the situation in the Third World need not be one where confrontations occur.

III. The Strategic Environment: Soviet Perspectives

1. Soviet Strategic Positions:

The Soviet academics argued that Soviet views regarding strategic issues had been clarified during the past three years and specifically referred to the following as the basis of current Soviet strategic policy:

- There would be no winners in a nuclear war
- There is no attempt on the part of the Soviet Union to gain military superiority
- A limited nuclear war is not feasible
- That the Soviet Union advocates a no first policy with respect to nuclear weapons
- That a demilitarized nuclear Europe is in the security interests of the Soviet Union
- That there should be an attempt to eliminate battlefield nuclear weapons as they could lead to escalation in Europe.

2. Soviet Military Programmes:

Not surprisingly the Soviets placed little emphasis on their own military programmes. For example, a discussion on the need to have greater openness with respect to Soviet defence spending brought little or no response. Nevertheless, they raised the question of "how much is enough" with respect to defence spending. From their perspective this was considered to be an essential issue. Nevertheless, they were not able to offer any suggestion regarding how to come to grips with this particular issue.

3. Military Balance and Strategic Stability:

The Soviets placed considerable emphasis on issues relating to the military balance. It became quite clear that from their perspective this was considered an important issue.

The overall impression conveyed was one of convergence with American strategists with respect to the concern of measuring various elements of the strategic and Euro-strategic balance. Here I was given the impression that the Soviets are becoming as concerned as the Americans with trying to measure -- in finite detail -- the asymmetries which currently exist with respect to aspects of the military balance.

In terms of strategic stability it was pointed out that Western spokesmen have placed too much emphasis on the destabilizing impact of ICBMs. Within this context the issues were raised regarding American systems with similar characteristics (i.e., systems with first strike characteristics). Here specific reference was made to the fact that American SLBMs will have such capabilities if the Trident II D-5 is deployed.

4. Mutual Security and Deterrence:

It was stressed by the Soviets that there is a need to search for mutual security and an acceptance that nuclear weapons can only be utilized for one purpose and one purpose only -- that is for deterrence. Nevertheless, it was acknowledged that military doctrine seems to have been called into question by changes in military capabilities.

It was pointed out to us that there has been no world war for 38 years and this was a function of deterrence. This situation will continue for a decade or two, but there are dangerous nuclear systems being developed and the international strategic environment could become increasingly destabilized as a result of changes in military technology and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

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IV. Arms Control Considerations:

1. Détente and Arms Control:

There was considerable emphasis placed on the need to return to a state of détente and here arms control could be beneficial. Nevertheless, the Soviet academics had no clear view on how to proceed with respect to achieving their arms control objectives. It was stated on a number of occasions that no one seems to know what to do next given the breakdown in the Soviet-American dialogue. Within this context the question was raised as to whether it is now too late to do anything about the current situation.

2. Soviet Policy Preferences:

The Soviets reaffirmed their well known positions and offered no new initiatives. It was clear that their major preference was for a freeze on all nuclear weapons followed by a negotiation of an East-West non-aggression pact.

It was suggested on a number of occasions that time works against the parties involved in the negotiations. Given this situation the Soviet preferences could be summarized as follows:

- i) A postponement of the deployment of NATO's INF forces.
- ii) The ratification of SALT II.
- iii) If agreement could be reached on a freeze this would change the entire political and strategic environment (it was my sense that from the Soviet perspective this was the key to any meaningful breakthrough in the negotiations).
- iv) A willingness to consider the merge of the INF and START talks.
- v) It was agreed that deep cuts are important, especially in destabilizing systems with first strike characteristics.

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3. The INF Talks:

The Soviets gave the standard interpretation of their objections to the zero option and emphasized that Soviet and British Forces have been excluded from the negotiations. From their perspective the zero option does not sufficiently take into account the geo-strategic environment of the USSR. Here no other alternatives were presented other than those currently on the bargaining table.

Within the broader context of INF it was clearly stated that their ultimate objective is to achieve a denuclearized Europe.

V. Canadian Policy

The following points emerged during our discussion:

1. The Soviets would clearly welcome a more active Canadian policy. Presumably this, in part, is a function of their favourable perceptions of the role of Prime Minister Trudeau in the East-West debate.
2. The Soviets expressed understanding that Canada is part of NATO, but clearly indicated their opposition to the government's position on cruise missile testing. Nevertheless, this was not a contentious issue and the members of the Canadian delegation were not pressed on cruise testing.
3. On balance the Soviets expressed skepticism regarding the viability of nuclear weapon free zones. More specifically skepticism was expressed regarding extension of possible nuclear weapon free zones into the Arctic region. Here the Soviets asked what sort of security guarantees would be required by Canada if this was to be considered as a viable policy option.

VI. Observations on the Soviet Perspectives

1. There seemed to be an underlying inconsistency in the Soviet approach to East-West relations.

On the one hand considerable emphasis was placed on the fact that there had been a breakdown in the political dialogue between the two superpowers. Here it was argued that this dialogue had to be reestablished in order to break the cycle of distrust which currently exists. Nevertheless, there was no desire to proceed to a summit -- even if this summit would focus exclusively on broad political issues -- within this context it should be remembered that President Brezhnev proposed such a summit in 1981.

From my perspective the Soviet academics have really not come to grips on how to proceed in terms of re-establishing the dialogue. Nevertheless, there may be some wisdom in trying to have the dialogue re-established at the level of foreign ministers.

2. The underlying distrust of the current administration in Washington is clearly the major problem. The Soviets argue that even if you could reach an accommodation with President Reagan it would probably be undermined by his advisers.

The issue of the senior advisers to the president emerged as a major issue in the discussions. Given this situation there was an obvious tendency by the Soviets to write off the current administration and to see what happens in the next election. Within this context we did our best to encourage the Soviets to offer initiatives which would allow political accommodations to be reached. Yet it was my perception that this would probably not be the case.

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3. With respect to the arms negotiations I was left with the clear impression that the Soviets had no ideas as to how to proceed in terms of breaking the current deadlock. No new proposals were discussed during our visit. Furthermore, it was clear that the Soviets were not willing to budge from their current position. This, in part, could be a function that they were not able to discuss issues outside of a fairly limited set of parameters established by current party policy.

4. While the issue was not discussed in any detail, part of the current situation may be a function of the increased political role of the Soviet military regarding issues of international security and arms control. There is some evidence to suggest that in the post-Brezhnev era the role and influence of the Soviet military has increased. If this is correct then the degree of flexibility on the part of the Soviet Union with respect to arms limitations will probably be reduced.

5.2 *Surprise* In the final analysis the Soviet Union made it abundantly clear that they would pursue their own security interests. In this sense the bow in the direction of mutual security may not have been serious. That is, irrespective of the outcome of the arms talks the Soviets indicated that they would make sure their security interests are protected.

Appendix A

"Round-table on Canadian-Soviet Relations
Moscow, USSR
July 18-20, 1983

Soviet participants

1. Dr. Georgy Arbatov - director, Institute of USA & Canada
2. Dr. Leon Bagramov - head of department, IUSAC
3. Dr. Vladimir Gantman - head of department, IWEIA
4. Dr. Vitaly Zhurkin - deputy-director, IUSAC
5. Nicholai Izvekov - International information department CC, CPSU
6. Dr. Michael Milstein - head of section, IUSAC
7. Dr. Sergei Molotchkov - head of section, IUSAC
8. Dr. Nicholai Mostovetz - International department, CC CPSU
9. Victor Sukhodrev - deputy-head, 2nd ED, MIA USSR

Canadian participants

1. Prof. Roddick Byers - York University
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Comprehensive and Mutual Security: The Imperative of East-West Relations

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The state of East-West relations is, in large part, a function of the state of Soviet-American relations. For better or worse the leadership (or lack thereof) exercised by the two superpowers serves as a major touchstone for other members of NATO and the WPO. As such, power and leadership should entail responsibility to act in a manner which not only takes account of their own interests, but also the interests of the military and political alliances which they lead. Thus political leaders of the smaller states of NATO and the WPO express varying degrees of satisfaction or dismay at the way in which the superpowers conduct their relationship.

The current sense -- at least from NATO's perspective -- is generally one of dismay and disillusionment, coupled with a growing concern that the United States and the Soviet Union are unwilling or unable to manage their relationships in a constructive manner.

The underlying imperative of Soviet-American and East-West relations is the need for comprehensive and mutual security. This objective must be acknowledged as the priority of East-West relations. All other issues -- including discussions over developments elsewhere in the world are of secondary importance. Unless a security regime is established and agreed upon which is both comprehensive and mutual in scope, both superpowers will continue to pursue policies and doctrines which emphasize unilateral security for themselves.

At best the current trends would result in a long-term and expensive arms race which could expand into new areas of military activity -- e.g.: outer space. At worst one side or the other -- probably the United States -- could achieve a technological breakthrough which, in turn, would produce significant unilateral military advantages.

In either case, the military-strategic environment would become less stable and the perceived dangers of war -- especially nuclear war -- would be enhanced. If this should occur it would be much more difficult to reach the necessary political accommodations for the management of the East-West relations in non-military spheres of activity.

At the present time the political will necessary to manage a complex relationship which combines both conflictual and cooperative features is sadly lacking. The conflictual features of the relationship have been allowed to dominate, while the potential for cooperative endeavours have diminished.

Historically the conflictual features of the relationship have been an important and underlying component for both the United States and the Soviet Union. These can be summarized as follows:

- i) Fundamentally different and divergent political and economic systems along with opposing ideologies.
- ii) An acknowledgement by each superpower that the other is its major adversary. Thus military forces for both superpowers are developed and structured taking into account an adversarial relationship.
- iii) A lack of trust in the conduct of their bilateral relations.
- iv) Two highly armed military alliances which develop their doctrines and tactics from the perspective that the other is the "enemy".

Nevertheless, there have been features of the relationship which suggest that cooperation is recognized as important:

- i) Most importantly both superpowers and their military allies have a fundamental common interest in the avoidance of war -- especially nuclear war. Both the United States and the Soviet Union agree that nuclear war is not winnable.
- ii) In theory there has been a consensus that positive relations can be maintained despite the fundamental and underlying differences -- providing that neither side gains decisive unilateral advantages.
- iii) Both superpowers agree in theory -- and to some extent in practice -- that arms limitation agreements can enhance national security.

Yet under existing circumstances it is apparent that the following factors have been allowed to assume greater importance than in the past and as such have contributed to the deterioration of Soviet-American and East-West relations:

- i) Both the United States and the Soviet Union are continuing to employ excessively hostile rhetoric when addressing issues which are of mutual concern. In this respect both superpowers appear more interested in propaganda than in reaching accommodation and this has added to East-West tensions.
- ii) Each accuses the other of trying to achieve military superiority and preparing for war -- including nuclear war.
- iii) Each accuses the other of being primarily or exclusively responsible for the deterioration of the relationship and for the continuation of the arms race. In essence, neither is willing to accept the view that responsibility may lie in both Washington and Moscow.
- iv) Both the United States and the Soviet Union appear more interested in the pursuit of unilateral advantage than in the search for mutually acceptable common solutions to security problems.

Thus while the declaratory policy of the United States continues to emphasize mutual deterrence and the Soviet Union emphasizes equal security, in practice neither superpower seems to be placing primary emphasis on declared objectives. Both superpowers are currently proposing options in the nuclear arms talks or are pursuing programmes which either attempt to increase their own security at the expense of the other or focuses on the security weaknesses of the other side. A continuation of these trends would increase the sense of insecurity for both superpowers and for their respective military alliances.

Despite the current tensions between the two superpowers there remains agreement on one essential point: that is, the necessary to avoid war -- especially nuclear war. This is true within the European theatre where the dangers of escalation are readily apparent and also in terms of the need to avoid strategic nuclear war. The question remains, however, whether the current mechanisms and means for the achievement of this objective are adequate.

US/USSR
conventional
war is OK?

Each superpower must acknowledge the security concerns of the other side and formulate and initiate actions which will enhance mutual security. All attempts to gain unilateral advantage over the other should be rejected.

Thus it is necessary to place security within a broader context than is currently the case. The current trends indicate that it is no longer appropriate to separate the various aspects of security: that is, SALT from INF from MBFR from CSCE. In essence what must be adopted is a more integrated, comprehensive approach to security and to do this from the perspective of mutual security. This would allow for trade-offs given the asymmetries of the force structures of the United States, the Soviet Union and their respective military alliances.

Considerations of mutual security must include the entire spectrum of military capabilities -- both nuclear and non-nuclear. This means that both sides must appreciate that the costs -- military, political, and economic -- of continuing on the current path outweigh the gains. For example, attempts by either the United States or the Soviet Union to achieve clear military advantage is not viable given that a credible second strike capability will be retained at all costs and as such this constitutes the basis of mutual security.

With respect to the nuclear dimensions of mutual security the following should be adopted:

- i) The merger of the START (SALT) with the INF negotiations.

The new negotiating form should include all existing nuclear systems: long range strategic, intermediate, and tactical.?

Both superpowers should agree on a statement of security principles including: that nuclear deterrence must be mutual with the objective of retaining a credible second strike capability; that the state of the nuclear balance should be one of rough parity; that shifts in the balance should not call into doubt the second strike capability of either side; that command, control and communications (C³) capabilities must be sufficient to withstand a preemptive nuclear attack; and that in the event of a crisis, hasty decisions should not be required.

- ii) If these are established then a bilateral freeze on the testing and deployment of all new nuclear systems could be agreed upon in conjunction with points iii, iv, v and vi.
- iii) There should be deep cuts in existing strategic nuclear forces with emphasis on systems with first strike characteristics. Here it would be most helpful if the Soviets could agree that heavy ICBMs of the SS-18 type would be phased out and that the Americans would halt deployment of the MX.
- iv) The two sides should agree that all intermediate nuclear forces would be included in the negotiations, including both Soviet and Western forward based systems.
- v) For counting purposes the French and British nuclear forces could be included in the negotiations if all nuclear systems are taken into account.
- vi) All tactical nuclear weapons should be eliminated from the nuclear force structures of both sides. This would include land, air and sea based systems. In addition agreement should be reached that new tactical nuclear systems would not be employed in the future.

With respect to the non-nuclear dimensions the following should be adopted:

- i) An agreement within the MBFR framework is an essential component of the overall approach to comprehensive and mutual security. If rough parity is to exist in the nuclear sphere there must be corresponding parity of conventional forces. Such an agreement should agree on low force levels and include air and armour capabilities.
- ii) A separate chemical warfare (CW) agreement outside the context of the current CD negotiations should be concluded. This would have to include the demobilization of the Chemical Corps of both superpowers.

Concurrent agreements of both the nuclear and non-nuclear dimensions would produce a comprehensive security package which would enhance the security interests of both East and West. It would then be possible for both sides to agree to "no first use" and adopt the appropriate doctrine and tactics to implement such a strategy. This in turn could possibly lead to the consideration of a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the WPO.

In order to verify compliance of a comprehensive and mutual security package, the establishment of a joint NATO/WPO Monitoring Agency would be required. The agency would include the superpowers as well as representatives from the other states of NATO and the WPO.

The two superpowers would employ national technical means of verification, but cooperative verification measures, including onsite inspection would also be necessary. It may be appropriate to have military observation forces drawn from the non-nuclear members of the two alliances to ensure compliance.

The major problem, however, remains unresolved. That is, how to shift from the pursuit of unilateral security to acceptance of comprehensive and mutual security.

The first essential step is to break the current pattern of "Cold War" rhetoric of Washington and Moscow. The most effective way of changing the environment would be to have a Soviet-American Summit with the sole purpose of agreeing upon a statement of principles related to comprehensive and mutual security. The summit could lay out the underlying principles and reach political understandings regarding the security relationships between the two superpowers and their respective alliances. At this stage a bilateral moratorium on the testing and deployment of all new nuclear systems could be announced pending the outcome of stage 2. National technical means of verification could ensure compliance and no detailed negotiations on the moratorium would be required.

The second stage of implementation would be the negotiation of specific agreements based upon the statement of principles agreed upon at the summit. With a statement of principles negotiations should be able to proceed fairly quickly. The nuclear issues could be negotiated in a body separate from the non-nuclear dimensions. The two sets of negotiations must proceed in tandem and be closely integrated.

The third stage would be a NATO/WPO Summit to finalize the agreements based on the statement of principles. This could take the form of a separate summit to sign the necessary agreements between the two superpowers along with an alliance summit to place the agreements within the broader context of East-West security relations.

If a comprehensive and mutual security package could be agreed upon the immediate effect would be to reduce East-West tensions. This would provide a solid foundation for the management of East-West security relations and for the first time would allow a certain degree of trust to emerge in terms of Soviet-American relations. Furthermore it would allow the superpowers to address other political and economic aspects of the relationship in a more positive manner.

To: CPS / ~~MUTTER~~ BECKER
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--PMS MTG WITH DENG XIAO PING

SUMMARY: PM MET WITH DENG XIAO PING (MOST INFLUENTIAL CHINESE LEADER) FOR ONE HOUR 29NOV. WHILE HE SAID PMS EFFORTS WERE IMPORTANT HE DID NOT/NOT LEND SUPPORT TO PROPOSAL FOR FIVE POWER CONFERENCE NOR TO NPT. CHIEF CAUSE OF ARMS RACE, WHICH HE SAID WLD CONTINUE, WAS TWO SUPERPOWERS AND PRESSURE SHD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THEM. CHINA HAD ONLY INSIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. CHINA MAINTAINED VIEW HELD BY LATE CHAIRMAN MAO AND PREMIER CHOU THAT DANGER OF WAR EXISTED BUT IT WAS UNCLEAR WHEN IT MIGHT BREAK OUT. IT WAS POSSIBLE TO HAVE PEACE FOR FIVE OR TEN YEARS. CONSTRAINING FACTORS ON OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR WERE: (A) NUCLEAR DETERRENT HFLD BY CHINA AND FRANCE; (B) ALLIES OF USA AND USSR DID NOT/NOT WANT WAR; (C) PEACE MOVEMENTS; AND (D) KNOWLEDGE BY SUPERPOWERS THAT LARGE MAJORITY OF THEIR POPULATION WLD BE KILLED IN NUCLEAR EXCHANGE. CHINA SUGGESTED NOT/NOT TOO MUCH EMPHASIS BE PLACED ON PREVENTIVE HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION AS IT WLD BLUR ATTN OF PUBLIC AWAY FROM SUPERPOWERS AND IN ANY EVENT WLD NOT/NOT FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGE BALANCE OF POWER IN WORLD. INTERESTINGLY DENG SUGGESTED THAT POLICY

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CHINA DEVELOPED IN MID 1970 OF MOVING CLOSER TO USA AND EUROPE BECAUSE OF THREAT POSED BY USSR MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO ALTERATION BECAUSE OF RECENT ACTIONS OF USA WHICH HE SAID QUOTE AROUSE OUR ATTENTION UNQUOTE.

2. REPORT: PM TRUDEAU HAD HOUR LONG MTG THIS MORNING 29 NOV WITH DENG XIAO PING, CHAIRMAN OF SPECIAL ADVISORY CTTEE AND RECOGNIZED TO BE MOST POWERFUL OF CHINESE LEADERS. ONCE MEDIA CLEARED ROOM, DENG IMMEDIATELY GOT DOWN TO ISSUE AT HAND WITH REMARK THAT THERE WERE AREAS IN WHICH DIFFERENCES EXISTED BETWEEN CANADA AND CHINA AND THAT CHINA COULD NOT/NOT AGREE WITH CANADA ON EVERYTHING. PMS EFFORTS HOWEVER WERE IMPORTANT. PM SAID WE SHARED SAME OBJECTIVE; ALL OUR PEOPLE WANTED PEACE. IT WAS ALSO POLICY OF CHINESE GOVT, AS IT WAS CANADIAN, THAT TWO SUPER-POWERS SHOULD REDUCE THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS. QUESTION WAS HOW DO WE CREATE SUFFICIENT PRESSURE ON SUPERPOWERS TO REDUCE. PM SAID HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO DO THAT FROM HIS SIDE OF ATLANTIC ALLIANCE BY PROPOSING THAT POLITICIANS GET TOGETHER MORE FREQUENTLY TO DISCUSS IMPORTANT ISSUES. AS MEMBER OF NATO HOWEVER HE DID NOT/NOT HAVE MEANS TO BRING DIRECT PRESSURE ON SOVIET UNION BUT THOUGHT THAT OTHER FOUR NUCLEAR POWERS, INCLUDING CHINA, COULD BRING THIS PRESSURE TO BEAR.

3. DENG RESPONDED THAT CHINA HAD SOME NUCLEAR WEAPONS, LIKE FRANCE, AND THAT IN ITSELF THIS WAS FORM OF PRESSURE ON USSR. CHINA HAD SAID AGAIN AND AGAIN THAT ITS NUCLEAR ARSENAL WAS NOT/NOT

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SIGNIFICANT. IT ONLY REFLECTED FACT THAT OTHERS HAD NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SO DID CHINA, THEREFORE IF SOMEONE ATTEMPTED TO DESTROY CHINA, THEY WLD ALSO SUFFER FROM RETALIATION. SO WHILE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE EXPENSIVE, AND CHINA ONLY HAD INSIGNIFICANT NUMBER AND DID NOT/NOT INTEND TO INCREASE THEM SIGNIFICANTLY, THEY DID ACT AS DETERRENT. POSITION TAKEN BY CHINA THEREFORE WAS SAME AS THAT OF FRANCE. TOWARD END OF 1974 JUST AFTER VLADIVOSTOCK AGMT WAS SIGNED BETWEEN USA AND USSR, DENG SAID HE TOLD KISSINGER THAT DESPITE AGMT SOVIETS AND AMERICANS WLD CONTINUE THEIR ARMS RACE. INTERVENING EIGHT YEARS HAD PROVED HIS POINT. ARMS RACE WLD ALSO CONTINUE IN FUTURE. IT WAS INDEPENDENT OF WILL OF PEOPLE; RESULTS WLD BE SAME WHETHER OR NOT/NOT THERE WLD BE CHANGES IN LEADERSHIP OR GOVT IN USA OR USSR. HE HAD TOLD KISSINGER THAT QUOTE WHEN WATER TABLE RISES IN RIVER, POSITION OF BOAT ALSO RISES UNQUOTE. PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THIS, SITUATION WAS GETTING MORE AND MORE GRAVE QUOTE DANGER OF WAR EXISTS AND WE DO NOT/NOT KNOW WHEN IT WILL BREAK OUT UNQUOTE. THERE WERE HOWEVER RESTRAINTS. ALLIES OF USA AND ALLIES OF USSR DID NOT/NOT WANT TO FIGHT A WAR AND THEY ALL DESIRED PEACE. THERE WAS ALSO DESIRE FOR PEACE BY PEOPLE IN MANY COUNTRIES WHICH WAS GROWING EVER STRONGER AND WAS REFLECTED IN MANY PEACE MOVEMENTS. THIS DESIRE WAS FELT MORE STRONGLY IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES OF WHICH CHINA WAS MEMBER. CHINA HOPED THAT PEACE WLD LAST FOR AT LEAST 20 YEARS. PERIOD OF PEACE EXISTING THAT LONG WLD ENABLE

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CHINA TO CONCENTRATE ITS ENERGIES ON ITS DESIRE FOR MODERNIZATION OF CHINESE LIFE. SHD SITUATION OF WAR ARISE AGAINST CHINESE WILL HOWEVER IT WLD NOT/NOT BE END OF HUMAN RACE. WAR WOULD NOT/NOT DESTROY ENTIRE HUMAN RACE. TWO BILLION OF WORLDS POPULATION OF FOUR BILLION MIGHT DIE IN NUCLEAR WAR BUT TWO BILLION WOULD BE LEFT AND WOULD STILL LIVE ON IN THIS WORLD. SOVIET UNION AND USA WLD MAKE UP RATHER LARGER PROPORTION OF TWO BILLION KILLED. THIS KNOWLEDGE IN ITSELF WAS ALSO IMPORTANT FACTOR OF RESTRAINT ON SUPERPOWERS.

4. DENG SAID HE BELIEVED FORMER CHAIRMAN MAO AND PREMIER CHOU BOTH HAD TOLD PM IN 1973 THAT IN THEIR JUDGEMENT DANGER OF WAR EXISTED AND THEY DID NOT/NOT KNOW WHEN IT WLD BREAK OUT BUT IT WLD LIKFLY BE CONVENTIONAL RATHER THAN NUCLEAR WAR. DENG SAID CHINESE LEADERSHIP STILL ADHERED TO THIS POINT OF VIEW. THAT WAS WHY CHINA HAD ADVISED ITS FRIENDS IN WEST TO INCREASE THEIR CONVENTIONAL ARMS IN ORDER TO COUNTER USSR WHICH HAD GREATER CONVENTIONAL STRENGTH THAN USA AND ITS ALLIES COMBINED. IN THIS REGARD HOWEVER SOME CHANGES HAD TAKEN PLACE IN RECENT YEARS. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS POSSESSED BY WEST HAD IMPROVED IN TERMS OF QUALITY AND DENG BELIEVED THIS DEVELOPMENT ALSO CONSTITUTED RESTRAINT ON WAR.

IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO HAVE PEACE FOR QUOTE FIVE OR TEN YEARS AND POSSIBILITY WAS THERE FOR IT TO LAST EVEN LONGER UNQUOTE.

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5.PM ASKED FOR DENG'S VIEW ON DANGER OF OTHER COUNTRIES BECOMING NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES. DENG SAID THERE WOULD NOT/NOT BE MANY. IT WAS VERY EXPENSIVE. INDIA HAD SOME BUT QUOTE WHAT GOOD DOES IT DO INDIA UNQUOTE. JPN WAS POSSIBILITY BUT IT WAS RELYING ON PROTECTION FROM USA. SOME SAID ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA WANTED TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUT EVEN IF THEY HAD THEM THEY WOULD NOT/NOT PLAY AN INDEPENDENT ROLE. IT WAS QUOTE UNTHINKABLE UNQUOTE FOR ISRAEL OR SOUTH AFRICA TO UNLEASH NUCLEAR WAR UNLESS DIRECTED FROM QUOTE BEHIND SCREEN UNQUOTE BY USA. CHINA QUOTE DISAPPROVED UNQUOTE OF KIND OF NON-NUCLEAR POLICY (NPT) ADVOCATED BY TWO SUPERPOWERS, BUT IT WLD NOT/NOT ENGAGE IN PROLIFERATION. CHINA DID NOT/NOT HAVE CAPACITY. MOREOVER IT WOULD CONTRARY TO ITS OWN EXPERIENCE FOR CHINA TO HELP OTHERS IN THIS WAY; ^{China} CHINA HAD DEVELOPED NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY AS RESULT OF ITS OWN EFFORTS. DENG SAID HE REMEMBERED DISCUSSING HISTORY OF THIS WITH PM. IN 1963 UK, USA AND USSR SIGNED PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY. IT HAD LEFT QUOTE DEEP IMPRESSION UNQUOTE ON HIM BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN IN MOSCOW AT TIME AS HEAD OF CHINESE DELEGATION. THOSE NEGOTIATIONS WERE BROKEN OFF AT EXCTLY SAME TIME AS TREATY WAS SIGNED. KHRUSCHEV HAD GIVEN FAREWELL BANQUET FOR CHINESE BUT MADE NO/NO MENTION OF TREATY AND CHINESE DID NOT/NOT LEARN OF ITS SIGNATURE UNTIL THEY RETURNED TO PEKING. OF COURSE DENG SAID THAT TREATY WAS NOT/NOT BINDING ON CHINA WHICH DEVELOPED ITS OWN WFAPONS AND RELIED ON ITSELF TO DO SO. REASON WHY CHINA

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HAD TAKEN THIS POSITION ON ISSUE OF PREVENTING NUCLEAR PROLIFORATION DENG SAID WAS EXACTLY BECAUSE IT HAS HAD THIS EXPERIENCE.CHINA HAS SAID MANY TIMES THAT IT WAS NOT/NOT GOING TO CONTINUE DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS BECAUSE IT WISHED TO GIVE PRIORITY TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN FIELDS OF AGRICULTURE,SCIENCF AND EDUCATION.THEREFORE FOR CONSIDERABLE PERIOD INTO FUTURE CHINAS NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL ONLY HAVE QUOTE SYMBOLIC VALUE UNQUOTE.IT WLD BE EVEN MORE IMPOSSIBLE FOR INDIA TO DEVELOP IF IT DIRECTED TOO MUCH ENERGY TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS;IT WLD GET INTO MORE DIFFICULT POSITION BOTH INTERNATIONALLY AND AT HOME.NUCLEAR WEAPONS WLD ONLY WEAKEN NOT/NOT STRENGTHEN INDIA.SAME SITUATION WLD APPLY TO CHINA IF IT DEVOTED TOO MANY RESOURCES TO DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

6.DENG SUGGESTED THAT NOT/NOT TOO MUCH EMPHASIS SHD BE PLACED ON ISSUE OF PREVENTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION BECAUSE IT WLD QUOTE BLUR UNQUOTE ATTN OF PUBLIC WHICH SHD BE DIRECTED AT TWO SUPERPOWERS.DENG ADDED THAT EVEN IF THERE WERE ONE OR TWO MORE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES IT WLD NOT/NOT FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGE BALANCE OF POWER IN WORLD.HAVING SAID ALL THIS DENG STATED CHINA WLD STILL DISCUSS SUBJ.WHAT HE WISHED TO SAY WAS THAT WE SHD CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS ON OPPOSING ARMS RACE BETWEEN TWO SUPERPOWERS.WHILE IT WAS UNLIKELY TO HAVE MUCH EFFECT,IF PRESSURE WAS KEPT UP ON TWO SUPERPOWERS AND THEY FELT THEY MUST CONSTRAIN

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ARMS RACE, THEN PMS EFFORTS AND WHAT HE AND OTHERS, INCLUDING CHINA, HAVE DONE, WILL PROVE TO HAVE BEEN OF SIGNIFICANCE. TWO SUPERPOWERS SHD BE COMPELLED TO HEAR THIS KIND OF MESSAGE FROM TIME TO TIME.

7. PM SAID THIS WAS GOOD ADVICE BUT HE WAS NOT/NOT ADVOCATING THAT UK, FRANCE AND CHINA REDUCE THEIR ARSENALS BUT RATHER THAT THEY SHD COME TO TABLE IN ORDER TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE ON TWO SUPERPOWERS BECAUSE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS CLD APPLY MORE PRESSURE THAN CDA. PM SAID HE APPRECIATED ENCOURAGEMENT HE HAD RECEIVED FROM DENG TODAY AND FROM PREMIER ZHAO YESTERDAY TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS. HE WLD REMAIN OPTIMISTIC AS DENG SUGGESTED HE SHD BE.

8. AT THIS POINT, PM PREPARED TO END MTG BUT DENG INDICATED HE WISHED TO CONTINUE. HE ADDED THAT ANOTHER IMPORTANT KIND OF PRESSURE ON SUPERPOWERS WAS FOR COUNTRIES TO FOLLOW INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY. IN 1970S, EVERYONE APPRECIATED INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY PURSUED BY GEN DE GAULLE. IN 1970S AS FAR AS CHINA WAS CONCERNED, MAIN DANGER OF OUTBREAK OF WAR HAD BEEN FROM USSR AND CHINA PURSUED POLICY OF DRAWING CLOSER TO USA AND EUROPE: QUOTE THAT POLICY WAS FORMULATED IN LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES AT THAT TIME UNQUOTE. USSR WAS ON OFFENSIVE AT THAT TIME AND USA ON DEFENSIVE. IN RECENT YEARS HOWEVER THERE HAD BEEN SOME CHANGES. USSR WAS STILL BEING VERY AGGRESSIVE BUT CERTAIN RECENT ACTIONS BY USA HAD BEEN OF SAME CHARACTER. IN TERMS OF CHINA, ONE QUESTION WAS THAT OF TAIWAN. USA, INCLUDING SOME POLITICIANS IN GOVT AT

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PRESENT TIME WANTED TO CREATE TWO CHINAS.VERY AGGRESSIVE POLICY PURSUED BY ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA WAS REFLECTION OF USA POLICY AND THERE WERE ALSO PROBLEMS OF CENTRAL AMERICA AND LATIN AMERICA AS WELL AS PROBLEM OF ARGENTINA(FALKLAND)IT QUOTE WLD HAVE BEEN WISE FOR USA TO HAVE TAKEN NEUTRAL POSITION IN ARGENTINA UNQUOTE.INSTEAD,USA FULLY SUPPORTED UK.THERE WAS ALSO PROBLEM OF CARIBBEAN.USA HAD QUOTE FOUR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AROUND WORLD UNQUOTE,WHICH IT WAS INTENT ON MAINTAINING;KOREA,TAIWAN,SOUTH AFRICA AND ISRAEL.LATIN AMERICA WAS REGARDED AS BACKYARD OF USA. THIS WAS TRUE IN HISTORY AND WAS STILL TRUE NOW.CHINA WAS THEREFORE UNCERTAIN ABOUT USA POLICY.USA HAD DONE SOME THINGS SINCE BEGINNING OF THIS YEAR WHICH QUOTE SHD AROUSE OUR ATTN UNQUOTE.ALL COUNTRIES THEREFORE,INCLUDING CHINA,SHD FOLLOW INDEPENDENT POLICY IN THIS QUOTE GRAVE SITUATION UNQUOTE,AS SUCH A COURSE WAS AN EFFECTIVE CONSTRAINT ON TWO SUPERPOWERS.ONLY USA AND USSR WERE QUALIFIED TO FIGHT WORLD WAR,NO/NO ONE ELSE. CHINA OF COURSE HAD NOT/NOT EQUATED USA WITH USSR NOR HAD IT CHANGED ITS VIEW THAT SU WAS STILL MAIN SOURCE OF WAR.HOWEVER QUOTE IN RECENT YEARS OUR ATTN HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO FACT THAT THERE ARE TWO SUPERPOWERS NOT/NOT JUST ONE;THEREFORE DANGER OF WAR COMES FROM NOT/NOT ONLY ONE SOURCE BUT FROM TWO;BUT OF COURSE ONE WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE OTHER UNQUOTE.IN CHINESE VIEW THIS KIND OF INDEPENDENT POLICY WAS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS IN

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EFFORTS TOWARD PEACE.

9. DENG TURNED CONVERSATION AT THIS POINT TO USA POLICY TOWARD
TAIWAN AND RELATED ISSUE OF PREMIER ZHAOS VISIT TO USA (AND CDA)
IN JANUARY. THIS WILL BE REPORTED IN SEPARATE TEL BY EMB.

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MESSAGE

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REF YOURTEL XNGR 4188 OF NOV 24

---PM INITIATIVE

WE HAVE FOLLOWING INITIAL COMMENTS ON SOME ASPECTS OF YOUR MOST
INFORMATIVE REFTEL.

2. FIVE POWER CONFERENCE:

WE WERE WELL AWARE OF BRITISH CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET DEFENCE CAPABILI-
TIES WHEN WE FORMULATED OUR PROPOSAL. HAD WE WORKED THAT INTO PROPO-
SAL, HOWEVER, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN UNACCEPTABLE TO USA. FURTHERMORE, HAD
WE BENT OVER BACKWARDS ANY FURTHER TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT UK CONCERNS,
OUR PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN MANUFACTURED IN WHITE-
HALL. BRITAIN, FRANCE AND CHINA ALL HAVE COMMON INTEREST IN ENSURING
THAT SUPER-POWERS DO NOT GO STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE ROUTE. WE WOULD ARGUE
THAT FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE WOULD BE USEFUL VEHICLE FOR THEM TO
PRESENT THESE CONCERNS IN CONCERT.

3. AS TO UK CONCERNS ABOUT REDUCTIONS, OUR PROPOSAL ~~EXPLICITLY~~ ENVI-
SAGES SETTING LIMITS IN FORM OF RATIOS ONLY AFTER START AGREEMENT,
I.E. AFTER CUTS IN USA AND USSR FORCES, AND AFTER BRITISH AND FRENCH
MODERNIZATION. IT BEARS REPEATING THAT ACCORDING TO OUR PROPOSAL,

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UNLIKE OTHER PROPOSALS IN THIS FIELD, FIRST PHASE OF FIVE POWER CONFERENCE, FOLLOWING MODEL OF SALT I, WOULD HAVE AS ITS OBJECTIVE SETTING OF LIMITS. QUESTION OF REDUCTIONS WOULD ONLY ARISE AT SUBSEQUENT AND, GIVEN NATURE OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, MUCH LATER STAGE. QUESTION OF REDUCTION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES WOULD, THEREFORE, BE CONTINGENT UPON FURTHER USA AND USSR REDUCTIONS OVER AND ABOVE THOSE IN START I. IN SHORT, WE FIND IT DIFFICULT TO TAKE CONCERNS IN THIS RESPECT VERY SERIOUSLY.

4. IN LIGHT OF REFTEL IT ALSO BEARS REPEATING THAT PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD BY PM SPECIFICALLY ATTEMPTS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT BRITISH (AND FRENCH) STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND THEIR WELL-KNOWN ^{VIEWS} ~~OBJECTIONS TO INVOLVEMENT IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.~~

-FIRST, IT IS EXPLICITLY STATED THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE ON STATE-TO-STATE RATHER THAN BLOC-TO-BLOC BASIS. AGGREGATION OF BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES WITH THOSE OF UNITED STATES IS NOT IMPLIED. INDEED, PROPOSAL IF ACCEPTED WOULD ERASE ANY PROSPECT OF AGGREGATION.

-SECOND, PROPOSAL ENVISAGES ACTIVE PARTICIPATION BY ALL PARTIES. THIS AVOIDS UNACCEPTABLE DISCUSSION OF FORCES OF OTHER STATES BY SUPER-POWERS IN BILATERAL FORUM. SIMILARLY, EACH STATE WOULD RETAIN A VETO OVER ANY PROPOSED AGREEMENT.

-THIRD, WHILE PM HAS SUGGESTED THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN AS SOON

...3



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PAGE THREE IDDZ0230 CONF/CEO

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AS POSSIBLE DURING COURSE OF NEXT YEAR, IT IS NOT INTENDED THAT SUCH TALKS OCCUR WITHOUT ADEQUATE PREPARATION AT LOWER LEVELS, OR THAT SUCH TALKS SHOULD TAKE PLACE PRECIPITOUSLY.

-FOURTH, PROPOSAL DOES NOT ENVISAGE THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS BE IN ANY WAY CONSTRAINED EXCEPT INsofar AS THESE FORCES WOULD BE SUBJECT TO CEILING OF WARHEADS OR LAUNCHERS AFTER MODERNIZATION. THOSE CEILINGS WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE TO BE ESTABLISHED WITH BRITISH AND FRENCH CONCURRENCE.

-FIFTH, SHOULD ANY PARTY FIND THAT ITS NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS DICTATE THAT PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT ARE UNACCEPTABLE, WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE POSSIBLE UNDER AGREED NOTIFICATION PROVISIONS.

5. MILITARY TECHNOLOGY PROPOSALS:

CONTRADICTION ALLUDED TO IN PARA 5 YOUR REFTEL DOES NOT EXIST. IN NOVEMBER 13 SPEECH PM ~~EXPLICITLY~~ STATED THAT MOBILE MISSILES CONTRIBUTED TO STABILITY. OUR PROPOSAL IS NOT DESIGNED TO PREVENT DEGREE OF MOBILITY NECESSARY FOR INVULNERABILITY BUT ONLY TO PLACE SOME RESTRICTIONS ON MOBILITY, AS ENVISAGED IN INF, SO AS TO FACILITATE VERIFICATION.

6. WE OURSELVES SEE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN UK CONCERN OVER SOVIET DEFENCE CAPABILITIES AND THEIR APPARENT LACK OF CONCERN ON ASAT. AN ASAT BAN MAY NOT AFFECT THEIR ASSETS, BUT ASATS CERTAINLY WOULD. FACT THAT SOVIETS MAY BE ISOLATED IN CD IS TO US OF LITTLE COMFORT IF IN REAL WORLD ASAT DEVELOPMENT CONTINUES UNINHIBITED.



MESSAGE

-- FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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FM/DE
TO/À
INFO
DISTR
REF
SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0229 30NOV83 ~~GEN CARON~~
TO PMDEL/MSCAT (ATTN/FOWLER) **DELIVER BY 010800**
INFO PMO/AXWORTHY PCO/CARON WSHDC ~~PEKIN MOSCOW~~ **BONN** BNATO
DISTR MINA DMF ~~RGB RCR~~ **RGB RCR** IFB IDR IDA

---HELMUT SCHMIDT

RY I, FRG EMB ^{CONFERENCE} HAS ADVISED THAT SCHMIDT WILL PARTICIPATE AT QUOTE
UNIVERSAL SPEAKERS UNQUOTE IN TORONTO ON THURSDAY, DEC 8 (ETA TORON-
TO 10:00 PM WED, DEC 7; ETD ^{6:00 PM} DEC 8). SCHMIDT COMING IN FROM WASHING-
TON ^{AND} SUBSEQUENTLY PROCEEDING TO FORT LAUDERDALE. ADVISE IF PM WOULD
^{WISH} ~~TO~~ TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OF MEETING OR TELECON.

28-6-1-
3/11/83
Peace
Mississauga

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG J. CARON

IDDZ

5-5912

L.A. Delvoie
L.A. DELVOIE



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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31 NOV 83 00	4122
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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ

CONFIDENTIAL

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0228 30NOV83

TO/À

TO ^{PM DELY}MSCAT (ATTN FOWLER)

DELIVER BY 010800

INFO

DISTR

~~FM/CARON~~

REF

INFO PMO/AXWORTHY PCO/CARON WSHDC MOSCOW BNATO PEKIN

SUBJ/SUJ

DISTR MINA DMF UGB URR RGB IFB IDR IDA

REF OURTEL IDDZ0222 OF 29NOV

---VISIT TO WASHINGTON.

US EMBASSY ADVISED PCO THIS AM THAT WHITE HOUSE PREFERENCE FOR PM VISIT IS TUESDAY, DECEMBER 13 WITH FIRST FALL BACK DATE TUESDAY, DEC 20 AND SECOND, FRIDAY DEC 16. AS YOU KNOW, TORONTO FUNDRAISER IS ALREADY SCHEDULED FOR DEC 13 WHICH WOULD APPEAR TO ELIMINATE FIRST OPTION. NO ADDITIONAL COMMENTS WERE MADE RE INITIATIVE VS BILATERAL VISIT TRADE-OFF. WHILE HAVE NOT MADE COMMITMENTS FOR EARLY REPLY TO PROPOSAL, ADVISE IF YOU THINK PRELIMINARY RESPONSE CAN BE GIVEN PRIOR TO YOUR ARRIVAL DEC 5.

2. FYI DEP ASST SEC MEDAS CONFIRMED WITH UGB/BURNEY AT LUNCH TODAY THAT PRIORITY DATE FOR WHITE HOUSE IS 13DEC. MEDAS ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ~~IN REACTION TO~~ ^{WITH} NEWS REPORTS YESTERDAY WHICH SUGGESTED THAT PM MIGHT NOT/NOT GO TO WSHDC. (WE ARE AWARE OF COURSE THAT REPORTS OUT OF PEKING WERE BASED ON COMMENTS MADE BY PM PRIOR TO YOUR BEING NOTIFIED THAT WHITE HOUSE HAD SUGGESTED DATES.)

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG J. CARON

IDDZ

995-5912

SIG L.A. DELVOIE



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ
FM/DE
TO/À
INFO
DISTR
REF
SUBJ/SUJ

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0227 30NOV83

TO PMDEL/MSCAT (ATTN: FOWLER) DELIVER BY 010800

~~FM/CARON~~

INFO PMO/AXWORTHY PCO/CARON WSHDC ~~MOSEMAN~~ ~~SHAW~~ CNGNY

DISTR MINA DMF UGB URR RGB IFB IDR IDA

---PM APPEARANCE ON QUOTE GOOD MORNING AMERICA UNQUOTE (GMA)

FURTHER TO BRIEF DISCUSSION ON ABOVE DURING MONDAY S TELECON, ABC NEWS HAS CONTACTED CONG GEN NY TO CONFIRM THEIR INTEREST IN CONDUCTING ~~LIVE~~ INTERVIEW WITH PM PREFERABLY TUESDAY DEC 6 BUT ALTERNATIVELY WEDNESDAY DEC 7 ON THEIR MORNING SHOW QUOTE GOOD MORNING

AMERICA UNQUOTE. IN ORDER TO BE ~~LIVE~~ ^{LIVE,} INTERVIEW WOULD HAVE TO TAKE PLACE SHORTLY AFTER 07:00 AM/AM. PROPOSED FORMAT IS TO FOLLOW STANDARD 07:00 TO 07:05 AM/AM NEWS REPORT WITH INTERVIEW TO LAST 6 TO 10 MINUTES, ~~AND~~ ^{TO BE} CONDUCTED BY ~~BROCKMAN~~ ^{DAVID HARTMAN} THROUGH SATELITE LINK-UP. PRIMARY FOCUS OF INTERVIEW WOULD OF COURSE BE INITIATIVE, IN LIGHT OF PM S RECENT MEETINGS WITH NAKASONE, DENG, ZHAO, MRS GANDHI AND CHOGM. QUESTIONS RE QUOTE WHAT ~~RESULT~~ ^{NEXT} UNQUOTE CAN ALSO BE EXPECTED. BROADCAST COULD BE UNDERTAKEN FROM PM S OFFICE (OR 24 SUSSEX) OR ALTERNATIVELY IN CTV SPARKS STREET STUDIO (ABC S AFFILIATE) WHERE QUOTE VIDEO RETURN SYSTEM UNQUOTE WOULD ALLOW PM TO SEE ~~BROCKMAN~~ ^{HARTMAN} ASKING HIM QUESTIONS. ALTERNATIVE OF SENDING CORRESPONDENT IS ~~NOT~~ ^{NOT} FEASIBLE BUT ABC AND CONGEN BELIEVE THAT IMPACT OF INTERVIEW IS GREATLY HEIGHTENED.

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG J. CARON	IDDZ	5-5912	 SIG L.A. DELVOIE



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PAGE TWO IDDZ0227 CONF

NED BY HAVING ^{HARTMAN} BROCKAW (THE STAR OF THE MORNING AIRWAVES) WITH PUBLIC
~~IMAGE RAPIDLY APPROACHING (OF ARTICLE 23)~~) CONDUCT INTERVIEW HIMSELF.

2. GMA IS ABC S MORNING FLAGSHIP PROGRAM PULLING IN 20 MILLION VIEWERS.
 VIEWER PROFILE INDICATES THAT 07:00 TO 08:00 ^{PM} VIEWERS ARE MIDDLE TO
 UPPER MIDDLE CLASS.

3. FOR YOUR INFO NBC S TODAY SHOW ALSO ASKED FOR PM INTERVIEW. QUOTE
 TODAY UNQUOTE HAS SMALLER VIEWERSHIP (15 MILLION) AND DOES NOT
 HAVE HIGH PROFILE HOSTS. CONGEN HAS ADVISED THEM THAT QUOTE ONE OF
 THEIR COMPETITORS UNQUOTE IS ALREADY IN LINE. ABC NIGHTLINE ALSO
 MADE PRELIMINARY ENQUIRIES WITH SSEA S OFFICE FOR INTERVIEW IN
 CHICAGO BUT SUBSEQUENTLY WITHDREW.

4. AGREE WITH CONGEN ~~VIEW~~ THAT PM APPEARANCE ON NETWORK TV WOULD
 RAISE INITIATIVE PROFILE. NEVERTHELESS YOU ^{SHOULD} ~~MAY WISH TO~~ GIVE SERIOUS
 CONSIDERATION TO ^{ADVISABILITY} OF TV APPEARANCE PRIOR TO MEETING
 WITH US PRESIDENT. US ADMINISTRATION LIKELY SENSITIVE TO APPEARANCE
 OF GOING OVER PRESIDENT S HEAD DIRECTLY TO AMERICAN PEOPLE. ^{CAN}
~~OPTION WE MAY HAVE TO CONSIDER LATER~~ ^{ALSO YOU MAY WISH TO QUESTION WHETHER TUESDAY TIMING IS SUITABLE,}
^{IE. BEFORE RESULTS OF TRIP CAN BE}

5. ABC ^{ADVISES} ~~ADVISES~~ THAT FOR SCHEDULING PURPOSES, THEY REQUIRE RESPONSE ^{ASSESSED.}
 TO PROPOSAL BY WEEKEND. GRATEFUL YOUR VIEWS SOONEST.



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ UNCLASSIFIED 30 NOV 83 21 28Z 12 10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0226 30NOV83
TO/À TO PMDELKWAIT ^{ABU DHABI} DELIVER BY 010900
INFO
DISTR FOR FOWLER
REF INFO PC00TT/CARON
SUBJ/SUJ DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB RGB RBR
REF OURTEL IDDZ0225 30NOV

28-b-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

---POSSIBLE VISIT BY ROMANIAN EMISSARY
FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF ROMANIAN PROPOSALS AS SPELLED OUT IN DECLAR-
ATION PUBLISHED NOV25 BY ROMANIAN GOVT:
2.BEGINS.
(COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
L.A.Delvoie/sc SIG	IDDZ	5-5912	<i>L.A. Delvoie</i> L.A. Delvoie

QUOTE

- Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
- (1) That the new U.S. missiles which have been deployed in Europe be kept in storage and that the USSR should stop all work connected with the deployment of medium-range missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia.
 - (2) Until agreement is reached on a global ratio of super-power forces, two compromises are suggested:
 - (a) No U.S. missiles should be deployed in Europe; the USSR should withdraw, dismantle and store all medium-range missiles located in the European part of its territory until an agreement is reached and the USA should accordingly reduce its intermediate-range nuclear weapons on ships and planes targetting Eastern Europe; or
 - (b) The USA should deploy no medium-range missiles in Europe; the USSR could temporarily keep in the European part of their territory a number of nuclear warheads equal to the number of French and British warheads and the Soviet missiles should be sited at a distance from the West German border equal to the distance between Great Britain's and France's missiles from the territory of the USSR. When an agreement is reached the concomitant scrapping of both Soviet and American missiles should take place.
 - (3) A meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union and the USA this year and a summit meeting as soon as possible of American and Soviet leaders and a consultative meeting of Foreign Ministers of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries that would take place in parallel with the Soviet and American negotiations in Geneva in order to help the two superpowers to reach agreement on INF.

- 2 -

- (4) MBFR negotiations should be reactivated and there should also be a conference of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries for reduction of conventional weapons as well as military budgets.
- (5) The French and British missiles cannot be ignored; they should be included right from the beginning, but only in making a global estimation of the balance of forces between the two sides.
- (6) A call on European peoples to do everything to halt the siting of the new intermediate-range missiles and for the withdrawal and destruction of existing ones. *UNQUOTE*

000704



TO/À Mr. L. A. Delvoie

FROM/DE • J. McNee

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET • The Romanian Proposals

Security/Sécurité
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date November 29, 1983
Number/Numéro

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

The Romanian proposals, as spelled out in a declaration November 25 by the Romanian government, include:

DISTRIBUTION

QUOTE

- (1) That the new U.S. missiles which have been shipped to Europe be kept in storage and that the USSR should stop all work connected with the deployment of medium-range missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia.
- (2) Until agreement is reached on a global ratio of super-power forces, two compromises are suggested:
 - (a) No U.S. missiles should be deployed in Europe; the USSR should withdraw, dismantle and store all medium-range missiles located in the European part of its territory until an agreement is reached and the USA should accordingly reduce its intermediate-range nuclear weapons on ships and planes targetting Eastern Europe; or
 - (b) The USA should deploy no medium-range missiles in Europe; the USSR could temporarily keep in the European part of their territory a number of nuclear warheads equal to the number of French and British warheads and the Soviet missiles should be sited at a distance from the West German border equal to the distance between Great Britain's and France's missiles from the territory of the USSR. When an agreement is reached the concomitant scrapping of both Soviet and American missiles should take place.
- (3) A meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union and the USA this year and a summit meeting as soon as possible of American and Soviet leaders and a consultative meeting of Foreign Ministers of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries that would take place in parallel with the Soviet and American negotiations in Geneva in order to help the two superpowers to reach agreement on INF.

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- 2 -

- (4) MBFR negotiations should be reactivated and there should also be a conference of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries for reduction of conventional weapons as well as military budgets.
- (5) The French and British missiles cannot be ignored; they should be included right from the beginning, but only in making a global estimation of the balance of forces between the two sides.
- (6) A call on European peoples to do everything to halt the siting of the new intermediate-range missiles and for the withdrawal and destruction of existing ones." *UNQUOTE*


J. McNée



MESSAGE

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SECURITY /
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

30 NOV 83 21 29z 12 10

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SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0225 30NOV83
TO PMDELKWAIT *ABUDHABI* DELIVER BY- 010900.

FOR FOWLER

INFO BUCST PC00TT/CARON

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB RGB RBR

---POSSIBLE VISIT BY ROMANIAN EMISSARY

AS YOU KNOW, ROMANIAN PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU HAS RECENTLY PUT FORWARD A SERIES OF PROPOSALS IN AREA OF EAST-WEST RELNS AND INNATL SECURITY. (GIST OF THESE PROPOSALS REPEATED IN IMMEDLY FOLLOWING UNCLASSIFIED TEL.) CEAUSESCU HAS DECIDED TO DISPATCH SPECIAL EMISSARIES TO NUMBER OF CAPITALS TO EXPLAIN AND DISCUSS ROMANIAN PROPOSALS. ROMANIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE NOW PROPOSED TO US THAT VICE FORMIN DOLGU MIGHT VISIT OTT DEC5-6 FOR THIS PURPOSE, FOLLOWING SIMILAR VISIT TO WSHDC.

2. FOR REASONS WHICH WILL BE READILY APPARENT TO YOU IN LIGHT OF ROMANIA S SPECIAL POSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE, WE ARE INCLINED TO ACCEPT PROPOSED VISIT BY DOLGU. IT WOULD PERMIT US TO DISPLAY INTEREST IN ROMANIAN EFFORTS WHICH, WHILE NOT/NOT PARTICULARLY ATTRACTIVE TO US IN THEIR DETAIL, HAVE SOME MERIT IN THEIR OVERALL INTENT. MORE IMPORTANTLY, HOWEVER, IT WOULD PROVIDE US WITH OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN AND DISCUSS PM TRUDEAU INITIATIVE WITH ROMANIANS AT RELATIVELY SENIOR LEVEL AND THUS EXPAND BEYOND SOVIET UNION OUR CONTACTS WITH EASTERN BLOC ON THIS SUBJ.

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28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
L.A. Delvoie/sc SIG	IDDZ	5-5912	<i>L.A. Delvoie</i> SIG



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3.WE WOULD PROPOSE THAT DOLGU BE INVITED TO OTT FOR CONSULTATIONS
TO BE CHAIRED BY DMF, WITH POSSIBILITY OF SHORT COURTESY CALL ON
ACTING SSEA.GRATEFUL TO KNOW PMS REACTION TO THIS PROPOSAL ASAP
SINCE WE MUST PROVIDE RESPONSE TO ROMANIANS SOONEST.



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ: **C-O-N-F I D E N T I A L - CDN EYES ONLY** 30 NOV 83 20 4122 10

FM/DE: EXTOTT IDDZ0224 30NOV83
 TO/A: TO PMDELKWAIT ^{ASDBT} **DELIVER BY 010900**
 INFO: FOR FOWLER
 DISTR: INFO PC00TT/CARON
 REF: DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB RGB
 SUBJ/SUJ: REF FOWLER/CARON TELECON 29NOV
 ---PM INITIATIVE: NEXT STEPS?
 WE UNDERSTAND THAT IN COURSE OF REFTELECON YOU SUGGESTED THAT TASK FORCE PREPARE PAPER OUTLINING PROPOSALS FOR NEXT STEPS IN PM INITIATIVE, AND THAT THIS PAPER BE FORWARDED TO PMDELKWAIT BY FRI 02DEC.
 2. WHILE WE COULD INDEED DEVELOP HIGHLY THEORETICAL SCENARIO FOR NEXT COUPLE OF MONTHS, WE DOUBT THAT THIS WOULD BE OF ANY REAL VALUE. TAKING MATTERS BEYOND INVOLVEMENT OF DPM/SSEA IN FORTHCOMING NATO MTG AND POSSIBILITY OF PM VISIT TO WSHDC IN SECOND OR THIRD WEEK OF DEC WILL NECESSITATE OUR HAVING FROM PM AND PMDEL ASSESSMENT OF EVENTS OF LAST TWO WEEKS. IT IS ONLY ON BASIS OF THIS THAT WE CAN ENVISAGE CONCRETE AND PRACTICAL STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN WEEKS AHEAD.
 3. AS MATTERS NOW STAND WE HAVE USEFUL NARRATIVE REPORTS ON (A) PM VISIT TO TOKYO (B) PEARSON VISITS TO PEKIN AND MOSCO, AND (C) PM VISIT TO PEKIN. IN RELATION TO NONE/NONE OF THESE VISITS DO WE HAVE ANALYTICAL ASSESSMENTS OF THEIR RESULTS IN TERMS OF IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE OF PM INITIATIVE. IN CASE OF CHOGM WE HAVE LITTLE MORE THAN
 ...2

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
L.A. Delvoie/sc SIG	IDDZ	5-5912	<i>L.A. Delvoie</i> SIG



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PAGE TWO 12 | 10
IDZ0224 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

TEXTS OF PUBLISHED STATEMENTS. WE HAVE NO/NO INDICATION OF RESULTS
OF PM TRUDEAUS CONTACTS WITH INDIVIDUAL CWLTH LEADERS, NOR/NOR ANY
REAL QUOTE FEEL UNQUOTE FOR COLLECTIVE REACTIONS TO PMS ENTERPRISE
BEYOND THAT PROVIDED BY FREQUENTLY CONTRADICTIONARY MEDIA REPORTS.

4. FINALLY, AND MOST IMPORTANT, WE HAVE LITTLE IF ANY INDICATION OF
EVOLUTION OF PMS THINKING AS RESULT OF CONTACTS HE HAS HAD WITH
LEADERS IN ALL CAPITALS HE HAS VISITED SINCE LEAVING OTT NOV17.

5. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE BELIEVE THAT DEVELOPMENT OF SCENARIO
FOR THE FUTURE SHOULD AWAIT RETURN TO OTT OF PMDEL (AS WELL AS
PEARSON AND SMITH). IT IS ONLY IN LIGHT OF QUOTE DECANTING UNQUOTE
OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO TRACE COURSE FOR THE
FUTURE.



TO/A • DMF
FROM/DE • IDDZ

Thanks

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace mission

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET • British Views on East-West Relations

Security/Sécurité
CONFIDENTIAL-CDN EYES ONLY
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
November 30, 1983
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0223

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

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PCOOTT/Fowler

NDHQOTT/CP

Our High Commission in London has recently passed to us a copy of a dispatch dated September 29 from the British Chargé d'affaires in Moscow. Some of the conclusions drawn in this dispatch are interesting in terms of (a) the evolution of Prime Minister Thatcher's public posture on the state of East-West relations, (b) Prime Minister Trudeau's initiative on East-West relations and international security, and (c) the British Government's reaction to Prime Minister Trudeau's initiative. I reproduce below for your information the three concluding paragraphs of this dispatch.


"The Atlantic Alliance, and the US in particular, have to grapple with the situation in which East/West relations have deteriorated to a dangerous level of mutual suspicion and mutual incomprehension. The potential for a further decline is considerable. As I have already reported, the US/Soviet dialogue has all but atrophied. The vital arms control negotiations in Geneva take place in the worst possible political environment. There is a danger that in Moscow and Washington polemics will escalate to the point where propaganda replaces policy.

"Russia itself, which, but a few generations ago, was scarcely out of the Middle Ages, has now been brought to the threshold of what threatens to prove (for us, as well as for the Russians themselves) the most critical and dangerous phase in its internal development, as the irresistible force of its need for economic reform collides with the immovable object of its political system. During that phase the Russians are likely to be even more difficult for the rest of the world to handle.

"Present circumstances, compounded by the ignorance of the West of most of the Politburo, including Andropov, therefore provide a breeding ground for

1.12.25/05)

miscalculation. However unpalatable and difficult to sell to public opinion, there is no alternative to maintaining the dialogue with the Soviet Union. It is a policy which requires cold cynicism on the part of those called upon, at all levels, to implement it. (In his speech at the United Nations General Assembly earlier this week, President Reagan called diplomacy "the most honorable of professions": during my own years in Moscow I have often felt it akin to "the oldest".) But the present dangerous political vacuum must be filled. It is, in my view, not unduly alarmist to say that we are not too far from the point where the old Churchillian dictum that "jaw-jaw is better than war-war" has immediate relevance to East/West relations."



L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

FDP / L. Caron

WAS IGTON (B - WIRE) 30-Nov-83

FBIS 032

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

RENMIN RIBAO COMMENTS ON 'CORRECT WAY' TO ACHIEVE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

0W300839 BEIJING XINHUA IN ENGLISH 0803 GMT 30 NOV 83

(TEXT) BEIJING, NOVEMBER 30 (XPNHUA) -- THE CORRECT WAY TO ACHIEVE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT LIES IN THE CONVOCAATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE BASIS OF AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS ON REDUCING BY HALF THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, A CONFERENCE TO BE PARTICIPATED BY ALL NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES TO NEGOTIATE A GENERAL REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE "PEOPLE'S DAILY" COMMENTATOR POINTS OUT IN AN ARTICLE TODAY.

THE ARTICLE SAYS THAT THE U.S.-SOVIET GENEVA TALKS ON MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES HAVE BROKEN OFF RECENTLY. THE UNITED STATES HAS STARTED DEPLOYMENT OF ITS MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET UNION HAS ANNOUNCED AN INDEFINITE SUSPENSION OF THE TALKS AND COUNTER-DEPLOYMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE. THE CONTENTION BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS FOR NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY IN EUROPE HAS NOW ENTERED A STILL TENSER STAGE AND THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR HAS BECOME MORE SERIOUS.

HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE SHOWS, THE ARTICLE SAYS, THAT DISARMAMENT TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS HAVE BEEN GOING ON FOR MANY YEARS AND NUMEROUS PROPOSALS AND DRAFTS PUT FORWARD, BUT THEIR NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, FAR FROM BEING REDUCED HAVE INCREASED BOTH IN QUANTITY AND IN QUALITY.

AT THE CURRENT 38TH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THE CHINESE REPRESENTATIVE HAS MADE A NEW PROPOSAL ON REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS: AFTER THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE TAKEN PRACTICAL ACTION TO STOP TESTING, IMPROVING AND MANUFACTURING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND AGREED ON REDUCING BY HALF THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MEANS OF DELIVERY OF ALL TYPES, A WIDELY REPRESENTATIVE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SHOULD BE CONVENED WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES TO NEGOTIATE A GENERAL REDUCTION OF THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE ARTICLE SAYS.

IT SAYS, "CHINA'S NEW PROPOSAL, MADE IN THE LIGHT OF THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, HAS INDICATED CLEARLY THE LEADING STATES, THE FINAL OBJECTIVE, AND CONCRETE MEASURES OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, AND POINTED OUT A POSITIVE AND CORRECT WAY TO ACHIEVE NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT."

CHINA'S PERSISTENT POSITION ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT IS TO BAN AND DESTROY ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IT SAYS. CHINA'S NEW PROPOSAL PUT FORTH AT THE CURRENT U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY IS A CONCRETE STEP TO REALIZE THIS GOAL IN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.

AS FAR AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE CONCERNED, BOTH SUPERPOWERS HAVE THEIR OWN STRONG POINTS AND MATCH EACH OTHER IN STRENGTH. HOWEVER, WHILE ACCUSING EACH OTHER OF ATTEMPTING TO GAIN UNILATERAL SUPERIORITY, BOTH ARE TRYING TO OUTDO EACH OTHER IN ACHIEVING SUCH A SUPERIORITY UNDER THE PRETEXT OF "EQUILIBRIUM," IT SAYS.

THE TWO SUPERPOWERS HAVE OBTAINED A LARGE STOCK OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND POSED A GRAVE THREAT TO WORLD PEACE. IT IS WHOLLY

ARMAMENTS AND POSED A GRAVE THREAT TO WORLD PEACE. Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
JUSTIFIABLE TO DEMAND THAT THEY TAKE THE LEAD IN STOPPING TESTING,
IMPROVING AND MANUFACTURING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IN DRASTICALLY
REDUCING THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MEANS OF DELIVERY, THE ARTICLE
SAYS.

IT POINTS OUT THAT THE TWO SUPERPOWERS HAVE NO GROUNDS WHATSOEVER
TO REFUSE THIS. CONTENTION FOR NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY CAN ONLY MAKE
THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE GO ON FOR EVER, THEIR STEADILY ENLARGING
NUCLEAR ARSENALS THREATEN NOT ONLY THE SECURITY OF OTHERS BUT ALSO
THEMSELVES.

WHEN DEMANDING THAT THE SUPERPOWERS TAKE THE LEAD IN ARMS
REDUCTION, THE ARTICLE SAYS, WE DO NOT MEAN THAT THEY SHOULD BE THE
ONLY ONES TO TAKE SUCH ACTS. OUR NEW PROPOSAL SUGGESTS THAT ONCE
THE SUPERPOWERS HAVE REACHED AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCING THEIR NUCLEAR
ARSENALS BY HALF -- NOT WHEN THEY HAVE CARRIED OUT SUCH REDUCTIONS,
AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE SHOULD BE CONVENED TO DISCUSS THE
QUESTIONS CONCERNING JOINT REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY ALL
NUCLEAR COUNTRIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH RATIONAL PROPORTIONS UNTIL THE
FINAL ELIMINATION AND PROCEDURES AT A LATER STAGE OF ALL SUCH
WEAPONS. AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS IN THIS RESPECT
FIRST CAN NOT ONLY CREATE AN ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL TRUST BETWEEN
THEM BUT CAN WIN THE CONFIDENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES AND ELIMINATE ALL
POSSIBLE INTERFERENCE SO THAT NUCLEAR REDUCTION CAN BECOME A NON-
STOP PROCESS.

THE ARTICLE POINTS OUT THAT CHINA'S NEW PROPOSAL SHOWS AGAIN THAT
CHINA, AS A NUCLEAR COUNTRY, IS ALWAYS READY TO ASSUME ITS
RESPONSIBILITY IN ARMS REDUCTION WHEN THE RIGHT TIME COMES.
HOWEVER, IF THE SUPERPOWERS WHICH POSSESS THE BIGGEST NUCLEAR
ARSENALS REFUSE TO UNDERTAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF TAKING THE LEAD
IN REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUT TRY TO TIE UP COUNTRIES WITH A SMALL
NUMBER OF SUCH WEAPONS IN A SIMULTANEOUS FREEZE OF NUCLEAR ARMS,
CHINA WILL NEVER TAKE PART IN SUCH A DEAL.

IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT, THE ARTICLE SAYS, THAT CHINA PROPOSED
AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AS A STEP IN THE WHOLE PROCESS OF
NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION. IT IS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FROM THE
PROPOSAL OF A "WORLD ARMS REDUCTION CONFERENCE" WHICH HAS NEITHER
CLEAR AIMS, NOR CONCRETE MEASURES. FOR SOME TIME, ONE SUPERPOWER
HAS REPEATEDLY CALLED FOR SUCH A WORLD CONFERENCE, BUT HAS
REMAINED SILENT ON THE SPECIAL DUTIES OF THE SUPERPOWERS ON NUCLEAR
ARMS REDUCTION AND THE NEED FOR THEM TO TAKE ACTIONS FIRST. SUCH A
CONFERENCE INDISCRIMINATELY CALLS ON ALL COUNTRIES TO REDUCE ARMS
WITHOUT DEFINING THE SPECIAL DUTIES OF THE SUPERPOWERS. THEREFORE,
IT CANNOT STOP THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS, NOR CAN IT
CONVINCE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE SUPERPOWERS' SINCERITY.
CONSEQUENTLY, IT CANNOT ATTAIN THE AIM OF DISARMAMENT EXPECTED BY
THE PEOPLES AND THUS HAS NO PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE.

THE ARTICLE NOTES THAT THE SMALL AMOUNT OF NUCLEAR ARMS CHINA
POSSESSES IS SOLELY FOR DEALING WITH THE NUCLEAR THREAT OF THE
SUPERPOWERS. CHINA WILL NEVER THREATEN ANYONE OR SEEK HEGEMONY WITH
NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND WILL NEVER BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.
CHINA'S NEW PROPOSAL FULLY MANIFESTS THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S PEACE
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S CONSISTENT SINCERE DESIRE
FOR NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION.

30 NOV 0940Z WW

['END OF TEXT']

FADP/Lotie

WAS (GTON (B - WIRE) 30-Nov-83

FBI 030

PRC SPOKESMAN URGES U.S.-USSR TO CARRY OUT DISARMAMENT IN 'EARNEST'

0W300901 BEIJING XINHUA IN ENGLISH 0841 GMT 30 NOV 83

(TEXT) BEIJING, NOVEMBER 30 (XINHUA) -- CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN TODAY URGED THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES TO CARRY OUT DISARMAMENT IN REAL EARNEST RATHER THAN USE NEGOTIATIONS TO COVER UP THEIR RIVALRY FOR NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE SECURITY AND INTERESTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES.

WANG ZHENYU, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, SAID THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW MISSILES BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES AFTER THE SUSPENSION OF SOVIET-U.S. INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES NEGOTIATIONS "ESCALATES NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, MAKING THE SITUATION IN EUROPE MORE TENSE AND POSING A GRAVE THREAT TO WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY."

IN A WEEKLY NEWS BRIEFING, WANG SAID "THE SOVIET-U.S. NEGOTIATIONS THAT HAVE BEEN UNDERWAY FOR TWO YEARS ARE SUSPENDED BECAUSE OF THE SOVIET UNION'S WALKOUT. IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, EACH OF THEM TRIES HARD TO STRENGTHEN ITSELF AND WEAKEN THE OTHER SIDE UNDER THE PRETEXT OF SEEKING A 'BALANCE'."

"WITH THE SUSPENSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE STARTED ONE AFTER THE OTHER TO DEPLOY NEW MISSILES, EACHING TRYING TO SURPASS THE OTHER LIKE A BOAT GOING UP WITH RISE OF THE RIVER, THUS FURTHER ESCALATING THE ALREADY INTENSIFIED NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, MAKING THE SITUATION IN EUROPE MORE TENSE AND POSING A GRAVE THREAT TO WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY."

"THE SOVIET-U.S. DISPUTE OVER INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR ARMS IS THE OUTCOME OF THEIR RIVALRY IN EUROPE AND THEIR NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. THE PEOPLE OF EUROPEAN COUNTRIES HAVE EXPRESSED GRAVE CONCERN AND ANXIETY OVER THIS DEVELOPMENT AND LAUNCHED A MAMMOTH ANTI-NUCLEAR MOVEMENT, THE MAIN THRUST OF WHICH REFLECTS THE EUROPEAN PEOPLE'S LEGITIMATE DEMAND FOR PEACE AND THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS BY THE TWO SUPERPOWERS, AND AGAINST WAR AND NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. WE UNDERSTAND AND SUPPORT IT."

"THE CHINESE PEOPLE LOVE PEACE AND DESIRE A STABLE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH TO CARRY OUT PEACEFUL NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION. CHINA HAS ALWAYS OPPOSED THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES IN ANY PART OF THE WORLD AND MAINTAINED THAT THEY SHOULD TAKE THE LEAD IN DRASTICALLY REDUCING AND DESTROYING THEIR HUGE NUCLEAR ARSENALS."

"IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT CHINA, AS AN ASIAN COUNTRY, ALSO OPPOSES SOVIET-U.S. NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN ASIA. WE HOLD THAT THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALREADY DEPLOYED IN ASIA SHOULD BE DRASTICALLY REDUCED OR DISMANTLED. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CARRY OUT DISARMAMENT IN REAL EARNEST RATHER THAN USE THE NEGOTIATIONS TO COVER UP THEIR RIVALRY FOR NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE SECURITY AND INTERESTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES."

30 NOV 0926Z WW

000715



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

REFERRED BY THE OFFICE
OF THE SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR EXTERNAL
AFFAIRS, MINISTER'S
REGISTRY - LETTERS

TRANSMIS PAR LE CABINET
DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT
AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES
DOSSIERS DU MINISTÈRE -
LETTRES

5-2723

To/À
AU

TDIA

1DDZ *WU T/F*
members



FOR INFORMATION AND ANY NECESSARY ACTION
POUR EXAMEN ET SUITE À DONNER, S'IL Y A LIEU



THIS LETTER HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED
ON A ACCUSÉ RÉCEPTION DE CETTE LETTRE



BY TELEPHONE/PAR TÉLÉPHONE



BY LETTER (Copy attached)/PAR LETTRE (Copie-jointe)

REMARKS/REMARQUES

Jan

Signature

83-12-06

000716

P.O. Box 87

Spruce Home, Ssstkewsu
S0J 2N0

30 November 1983

Honourable Allan MacEwen
Minister For External Affairs
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario, K1A 0A6

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

Dear Mr. MacEwen,

Enclosed please find a copy of a letter I have sent to my local
member of Parliament, Mr. Stan Houdebo.

I support Mr. Trudeau's efforts on behalf of nuclear disarmament.

Sincerely,

Myles J. MacDonald

November 29 1983

Dear Mr. Howlett,

Last week I wrote you a letter which I did not send to you because I did not get around to making a fair copy of it. Here I'm finally stopping all other activity to try again with the hope that this letter is at least legible!

I listen to news reports on CBC radio all day long and day after day. Lately I've been listening to the reports of Mr. Trudeau's peace initiative. The reports are sometimes contradictory as to what sort of reception the Prime Minister's efforts are meeting with among the world's leaders etc. I notice too that very little if anything is reported about what sort of backing Mr. Trudeau has from the Canadian Parliament.

One brief report last week mentioned Mr. Crosby's questioning of who Mr. Trudeau thought he was to be putting himself forward like this on the international stage. The report irritated me as do so many of the reports which if they do not condemn the efforts of the Prime Minister do little to cheer them on.

I keep waiting for a spokesman from the N.D.P. or even the Conservatives to step forward and say something to the effect that the issue Mr. Trudeau is dealing with is far above national politics and that anyone trying to do anything to avert the threat of nuclear war should be encouraged and aided by any and all moral and ethical means possible.

My own day to day problems and concerns are small indeed when I think about all the issues confronting our nation and the world today. And all of these weighty matters are trivial when I weigh them against the piles of weapons which are waiting to end all our cares and concerns.

Are we all asleep? Are we all living in a dream world? We go on here from day to day wondering whether another day will even come in some cases. But for the most part we shrug our shoulders assume tomorrow will come and go about our business. The issue of nuclear war is too big for most people to find it thinkable or believable. Just trying to overcome my own apathy and lethargy to write a letter like this gives me some inkling of the degree of indifference and apathy generally of nearly everyone when it comes to trying to do something to make the world

up to its neck.

Mobs are cheering for the Alger in Toronto while other men miles away sit waiting for orders to press the button which will end all cheer for whatever cause.

Please do what you can to support the Prime Minister's efforts. I can see all sorts of political motives for his present activities and no doubt you could point to even more. This issue of nuclear war is of such overwhelming importance, however that regardless of what the multi-layered motivation may be or may not be in the case of Mr. Trudeau his efforts should be supported by all of us. When the bombs start dropping it will make little difference what one's political persuasion happened to be.

at the least peace march in Prince Albert you told me that letters do make a difference. The taxation problems facing artists are trivial indeed compared to human survival.


I could go on but I think I've made my point. Now I'll go back to my own personal dreamworld and the worries about putting groceries on the table for another week etc. But I'll keep listening and keep hoping and having managed to write this one letter maybe I'll now get going on some more before it is too late to write any.

Yours Truly,
Myles J. MacDonald
P.O. Box 87
Spruce Home, Saskatchewan
S0J 2N0

CC

The Prime Minister
Minister For External Affairs
Minister for Defense
Leader Of The Opposition

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM MOSCO XYGR4187 30NOV83
TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 300900
DISTR UDDZ MINA IDR RBRD
REF YOURTEL RBR0686 25NOV



---EAST-WEST RELATIONS, MOSCO PERSPECTIVE

OUR COLLECTIVE THOUGHTS ON THIS SUBJECT ARE SET OUT IN OURTEL XYGR4123 OF 15NOV83 WHICH WAS DRAFTED BY MUNDELL, BUT CONSIDERED CAREFULLY BY GREY AND ME. ALTHOUGH THAT TEL DEALS MAINLY WITH INF, IT IS REALLY AN ESSAY ON THE SOVIET VIEW OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AND IN MY OPINION A COMPREHENSIVE ONE. I HOPE YOU WILL TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT WHEN PREPARING PAPERS FOR DPM/SSEA. HOWEVER, SINCE YOU ARE KIND ENOUGH TO ASK FOR MY PERSONAL CONTRIBUTION, I WILL SET DOWN SOME THOUGHTS WHICH ARE CERTAINLY NOT/NOT IN CONFLICT WITH XYGR4123, BUT PERHAPS DIFFERENT IN EMPHASIS.

2. I AM CONVINCED THAT PRESENT TENSION IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS STEMS ESSENTIALLY FROM SOV MISCALCULATION, FIRST WHEN THEY EMBARKED ON THEIR INF MODERNIZATION PROGRAM IN 1972, AND SECOND WHEN THEY BEGAN TO DEPLOY THE RESULT, THE SS20, IN 1977. THE MISCALCULATION WAS THAT BECAUSE THE WEST HAD ACCEPTED SOVIET MISSILES POINTED AT WESTERN EUROPE FOR TEN YEARS PREVIOUSLY, IT WOULD CONTINUE TO ACCEPT THEM IN IMPROVED FORM. THEY DID NOT/NOT OFFER TO NEGOTIATE EITHER DEVELOPMENT OR DEPLOYMENT, AND THEY DID NOT/NOT ANTICIPATE THAT ABOUT THIS TIME THE AMERICANS THEMSELVES, IN THE ...2

PAGE TWO XYGR4187 CONF

PERSON OF HENRY KISSINGER, WOULD DISCOVER A CREDIBILITY GAP, A GROWING UNEASE ON THE PART OF WEST EUROPEANS (ESPECIALLY WEST GERMANS) THAT THEY MIGHT NOT/NOT BE ABLE TO COUNT ON AMERICAN NUCLEAR SUPPORT IN FACE OF SOVIET ATTACK OR NUCLEAR INTIMIDATION. HELMUT SCHMIDT THEN DESCRIBED HOW THIS CREDIBILITY GAP, GROWING AS THE NEW SOV WEAPONS WERE DEPLOYED, WOULD LEAD TO QUOTE DECOUPLING UNQUOTE AND THE WEAKENING IF NOT/NOT DISINTEGRATION OF THE ALLIANCE IF SOMETHING WERE NOT/NOT DONE ABOUT IT. THUS THE RUSSIANS HAVE TO CONTEMPLATE DISAGREEABLE REALITY THAT THEY BROUGHT ON THEMSELVES NOT/NOT ONLY THE DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE OF NEW AMERICAN MISSILES, BUT THAT THEY MAY ALSO HAVE CONTRIBUTED SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN IN 1981. I BELIEVE THE ARABS SAY THAT ANY FOOL CAN GET A DONKEY UP A MINARET, BUT IT TAKES A WISE MAN TO GET HIM DOWN. ESSENCE OF PRESENT SOVIET POSITION, AND THEIR VIEW OF THEIR RELATIONS WITH USA AND THE WEST GENERALLY, IS THAT THEY ARE NOW WONDERING HOW TO GET THEIR DONKEY DOWN.

3. OF COURSE IN PUBLIC, AND PROBABLY IN PRIVATE TOO, THEY BLAME THE WEST FOR THEIR PREDICAMENT. MARSHAL USTINOV, IN A LONG ARTICLE PUBLISHED 19 NOV 83, POINTS OUT THAT SOVIET-FRG COMMUNIQUE, SIGNED IN 1978, SPOKE OF EQUALITY OF FORCES IN EUROPE. IF YOU WERE AFRAID OF THE SS20, WHY DID YOU NOT/NOT SAY SO THEN, THE MARSHAL IS ASKING. IN TALKING TO PEOPLE LIKE ME, SOVIET APOLOGISTS SUCH AS ARBATOV AND YAKOVLEV INSIST THAT THE SS20 SCARE, THE CREDIBILITY GAP AND QUOTE DECOUPLING UNQUOTE WERE ALL INVENTED AFTER THE FACT TO JUSTIFY DEPLOYMENT, RATHER THAN THE OTHER WAY AROUND. BUT

...3

PAGE THREE XYGR4187 CONF

THOSE ARGUMENTS CAN BE DISMISSED. THE SOVIETS NEGLECTED TO TAKE SUFFICIENT ACCOUNT OF PROBABLE WEST EUROPEAN REACTION WHEN THEY BROUGHT OUT THEIR NEW WEAPONS.

4. THE PERIOD OF INF NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE SEEN IN TWO (OR MORE) WAYS. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE HARTMAN SEES IT VERY SIMPLY: THE SOVIET MILITARY WERE IN CHARGE AND TOLD THE NEGOTIATORS THAT IN NO/NO CIRCUMSTANCES WERE THEY TO AGREE TO DEPLOYMENT OF A SINGLE USA MISSILE. (THAT DOES NOT/NOT SQUARE WELL WITH THE WALK IN THE WOODS FORMULA). SOVIET INSISTENCE ON COUNTING BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES WAS AN OBVIOUS RED HERRING. I SEE IT DIFFERENTLY. SOVS ARE WELL AWARE OF SERIOUS TALK ON BOTH SIDES OF ATLANTIC ABOUT EUROPEANS ACCEPTING MORE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR OWN DEFENCE. BOTH THE PROVISION OF HARDWARE AND THE TAKING OF DECISIONS. WHEN THE BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES ARE MODERNIZED, THEY WILL EACH BE FORMIDABLE. NOBODY WOULD PREDICT NOW THAT THEY MIGHT ONE DAY FORM THE BASIS OF A UNIFIED EUROPEAN DETERRENT, BUT IT IS A POSSIBILITY SOVS WOULD NOT/NOT HAVE LEFT OUT OF ACCOUNT. I BELIEVE IT MOST IMPROBABLE THAT THEY WOULD TIE THEIR HANDS VIS-A-VIS THE USA. ONLY TO FIND YEARS LATER THAT THREAT CAME FROM ANOTHER QUARTER. THIS IS WHY CONCEPT OF EQUAL SECURITY, AS THEY UNDERSTAND IT, IS NOT/NOT WHOLLY IRRATIONAL, EVEN THOUGH IT MAY BE UNREASONABLE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW.

5. I BELIEVE SITUATION I HAVE DESCRIBED TO BE AT HEART OF PRESENT EAST-WEST TENSION. RUSSIANS ARE ANGRY AND FRUSTRATED ABOUT INF, AND WONDERING WHERE TO GO NEXT. IT DOES NOT/NOT HELP THAT THEY MAINLY THEMSELVES TO BLAME. BUT THERE IS ANOTHER BIG ELEMENT, WHICH

...4

PAGE FOUR XYGR4187 CONF

IS THE REAGAN ADMIN,OR RATHER THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE REAGAN ADMIN.
THEIR DISLIKE AND DISTRUST OF ADMIN IS GENUINE,PROFOUND AND VOICED
WITH SHRILL ITERATION.ANDROPOVS 15NOV STATEMENT ANNOUNCING SOVIET
WITHDRAWAL FROM INF TALKS CONTAINS PARA TO EFFECT THAT USA HAS
DECLARED A QUOTE CRUSADE AGAINST SOCIALISM AS A SOCIAL SYSTEM
UNQUOTE,AND IS BASING ITS POLICIES ON THIS QUOTE RECKLESS PREMISE
UNQUOTE.WATCHING SOVIET TV IN PAST TEN DAYS I HAVE NOTED HOW
CONSISTENTLY THIS PASSAGE IS PICKED OUT FOR EMPHASIS IN FACTORY
MEETINGS ETC.I THINK WE HAVE TO TAKE IT SERIOUSLY.WHAT REALLY
WORRIES THEM IS WELL-DOCUMENTED DESIRE OF SOME MEMBERS OF ADMIN
TO QUOTE DO TECHNOLOGICAL END-RUN UNQUOTE(WSHDC TEL UNGER2431
23NOV83),AND THUS GAIN UPPER HAND.SOVIETS KNOW THAT USA FINDS
THEIR ANTI-SATELLITE PROPOSAL UNACCEPTABLE AND WILL NOT/NOT BE
SURPRISED WHEN THEY LEARN THAT OURS TOO IS UNACCEPTABLE IN WSHDC.
IN PROPAGANDA HERE IT IS CONSTANT THEME THAT USA IS SEEKING NOT/
NOT PARITY BUT SUPERIORITY.GEORGIY ARBATOV,WHOM WE DO NOT/NOT
HAVE TO BELIEVE ALL THE TIME BUT WHO MUST ALWAYS BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY
AMERICANS HERE THINK OF HIM AS TOTALLY VENAL PROPAGANDIST)SAYS IN
HIS RECENT BOOK QUOTE THE GOAL IS MILITARY SUPERIORITY.I THINK
THEY SERIOUSLY BELIEVE IN IT AND ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE IT UNQUOTE,
AND ON NEXT PAGE QUOTE CHALLENGED BY USA AS WE WERE AFTER WORLD
WAR II,WE HAD TO REGARD DEFENSE AS OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY.HERE LIES
TRUE ORIGIN OF THE ARMS RACE.IT WAS,AND STILL IS,IMPOSED ON US
UNQUOTE.ONE CAN TAKE THE QUOTE CHALLENGED UNQUOTE PART WITH GRAIN
OF SALT,BUT THAT THE MODERN CHALLENGE TO KEEP UP TECHNOLOGICALLY

...5

PAGE FIVE XYGR4187 CONF

IS A SEVERE PROBLEM FOR SOVS CANNOT, I THINK, BE DISPUTED. PROSPECT OF SPENDING BILLIONS OF STAR WAR TECHNOLOGY MUST BE DAUNTING TO THEM. WHETHER THEY THINK THAT USA MILITARY SUPERIORITY, ONCE GAINED, WOULD THEN BE USED IN QUOTE CRUSADE UNQUOTE AGAINST THEM ONE DOES NOT/NOT KNOW. IT IS A CHANCE THEY WILL NOT/NOT TAKE. GRENADA CAPER WAS USEFUL TO THEM AND THEY HAVE EXPLOITED IT TO FULL. BUT IT MUST ALSO HAVE WORRIED THEM AS SIGN OF NEUROTIC BEHAVIOUR WHICH WOULD BE REGARDED AS CHARACTERISTIC OF THIS ADMIN. MORAL OF THIS IS THAT THEIR POLICIES WILL BE CALCULATED IN PART ON DESIRE TO DENY REAGAN ANYTHING WHICH WOULD HELP TO REELECT HIM. AS I READ USA NEWSPAPERS REAGAN POLITICAL ADVISERS SEEM TO THINK THAT WHAT THEIR MAN NEEDS MOST TO WIN IS SOME KIND OF ACD AGREEMENT OR TANGIBLE PROGRESS TOWARDS ONE. I THINK SOVIETS WILL GO FAR OUT OF THEIR WAY TO DENY HIM THIS. IF NEVERTHELESS HE IS REELECTED, THEY WILL OF COURSE HAVE TO RECONSIDER.

6. I RETURN TO SOVIET MISCALCULATION. TEN YEARS AFTER THEY LAUNCHED THEIR MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, THEY FIND THEMSELVES NO/NO MORE SECURE THAN THEY WERE, POSSIBLY LESS. THANKS TO THEIR ACTION, WORLD ITSELF IS LESS SECURE. PEACE MOVEMENT IN WEST HAS PROVEN ITSELF IF NOT/NOT PAPER TIGER AT LEAST NOT/NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO TAKE ON POPULARLY ELECTED GOVTS WITH MANDATE TO TACKLE DEFENSE PROBLEMS. SOVS ARE GENERALLY PERCEIVED AS HAVING NEGOTIATED IN BAD FAITH (THEIR POSITION NEVER REALLY CHANGED THROUGHOUT INF TALKS) AND THEY EVEN FAILED TO PERSUADE MOST PEOPLE OF THEIR REAL CONCERN ABOUT BRITISH AND FRENCH FORCES. THAT IS, I THINK, SITUATION THEY ARE IN, AND IT

...6

PAGE SIX XYGR4187 CONFD

WILL ALONG WITH WAY THEY PERCEIVE REAGAN AND HIS CLOSE ADVISERS, SHAPE MOST OF WHAT THEY DO IN FOREIGN POLICY FIELD, ESPECIALLY EAST-WEST, OVER NEXT YEAR OR MORE.

7. BUT EVENTUALLY THEY WILL HAVE TO RETURN TO TABLE. I THINK THEY WILL NOT/NOT RETURN TO INF TABLE AS IT WAS. WHETHER THEY TRY TO INCORPORATE INF WITH START OR INTEREST THEMSELVES IN FIVE-POWER NEGS AS PROPOSED BY PM, I SUSPECT THEY DO NOT/NOT YET KNOW. THEY HAVE ALREADY SAID THAT NATO DEPLOYMENT CHANGES SITUATION IN START TALKS IN THAT PERSHING 2 AND CRUISE ARE, FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW, STRATEGIC (SINCE THEY WILL LAND IN THE SOVIET UNION) AND WILL THEREFORE MODIFY SOV POSITION. IT IS SHORT STEP FROM THERE TO DEMAND THAT BRIT AND FRENCH FORCES (ALSO STRATEGIC BECAUSE SEA BASED) SHOULD ALSO BE INCLUDED.

8. THIS IS DILEMMA FOR PMS MISSION. SOVS WILL BE GLAD ENOUGH TO HAVE DIALOGUE WITH PM AND OTHER ALLIES OF USA. BUT I DOUBT IF ANY AMOUNT OF URGING WILL PROPEL THEM INTO DIALOGUE WITH USA ITSELF UNTIL THEY HAVE ANALYSED CONSEQUENCES OF INF FAILURE, STRAIGHTENED OUT THEIR LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS, AND ASSURED THEMSELVES THAT THEY HAVE DONE ALL THEY CAN TO HELP BRING ABOUT REAGAN'S DEFEAT. I THINK WE CAN SAFELY IGNORE SOMEWHAT SILLY CONVERSATIONS NOW TAKING PLACE BETWEEN GROMYKO AND HARTMAN (SPECIFICALLY INSTRUCTED ON THIS POINT BY REAGAN) CONCERNING SHARPLY IDEOLOGICAL TONE OF CURRENT PROPAGANDA ON BOTH SIDES. SOVS ARE AS WOUNDED BY BY REFS TO QUOTE CLOSING PAGE OF HISTORY ON THEM UNQUOTE AND QUOTE LEAVING THEM IN ASHCAN OF HISTORY UNQUOTE AS WE WERE A FEW

...7

PAGE SEVEN XYGR4187 CONFD

YEARS AGO BY KHRUSHCHEVS DECLARATION THAT QUOTE WE WILL BURY
YOU UNQUOTE. SUCH REMARKS ARE CHILDISH AND DIVORCED FROM REALITY.
AND IT IS A PITY WE HAVE GONE BACK TO THEM. REALITY IS NOT/NOT
WHAT THEY SAY ABOUT ONE ANOTHER BUT WHAT THEY THINK ABOUT ONE
ANOTHERS INTENTIONS. MAKING MOST GENEROUS POSSIBLE ALLOWANCE
FOR RHETORIC AND MEGAPHONE DIPLOMACY, I THINK NEVERTHELESS THAT
SOVS DO NOT/NOT BELIEVE PRESENT USA ADMIN IS INTERESTED IN
CAPPING ARMS RACE ON BASIS OF EQUALITY, HOWEVER DEFINED. IF PM
WERE CONVINCED OTHERWISE, IT WOULD BE USEFUL INDEED FOR HIM TO
COME HERE AND SAY SO TO ANDROPOV. SUCH AN ASSERTION FROM CDN PM
WOULD BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY HERE AND MIGHT LEAD TO EXAMINATION OF
SOVIET ASSUMPTIONS, AND EVEN (DESPITE WHAT I SAY ABOVE) TO FURTHER
EXAMINATION WITH USA ITSELF. SOVS, DESPITE ALL EFFORT THEY PUT INTO
FATHOMING EVENTS AND PERSONALITIES IN USA, AND CHARACTER OF COUNTRY
ITSELF, ARE ALWAYS LOOKING THROUGH GLASS DARKLY. THEY ARE TOO
IMPRESSED BY OMINOUS SOUNDS UTTERED BY HAWKS IN ADMIN, AND
BADLY INFORMED, INDEED CONFUSED BY THEIR OWN PROPAGANDA, ABOUT
COUNTER-BALANCES WHICH EXIST. IF WE SEE SITUATION DIFFERENTLY, AS I
THINK WE DO, I CAN IMAGINE NOTHING MORE USEFUL THAN TO TALK, AT
LEVEL OF HEAD OF CDN GOVT, ABOUT OUR UNDERSTANDING OF PRESENT
USA POLICIES, SIGNIFICANCE OF RHETORIC, AND POSSIBLE WAYS FORWARD
ROBERTS.

CCC/095 300945Z XYGR4187

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYGR3068 30NOV83

TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 301200

INFO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE
WSHDC MOSCO BNATO GENEV TOKYO WSAW BPEST PRGUE BGRAD STKHM CMBRA
HSNKI/CDEDEL WLGTN VIENN PEKIN DELHI PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CIS/
ADMPOC/CPP/DGIS PRMNY VMBFR

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR RBD FPR IDD IDR
IDA IDDZ RBRD IDX ZSP RBP ZSI

REF OURTEL UYGR3061 29NOV

---INF:ROM INITIATIVE:SPECIAL ENVOY TO USA AND CDA

LEARNED THAT VICE MIN DOLGU WILL BE RECD IN WSHDC BRIEFLY BY
EAGLEBURGER BUT THAT OTHER MTGS WILL TAKE PLACE AT LEVEL OF ASSISTANT
UNDER-SECTY AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT UNDER-SECTY. IF YOU WISH YOU MAY
ALSO REDUCE HIS PROGRAM IN OTT TO ONE DAY. UNDERSTAND THAT HE
MIGHT GO TO UN NY AFTER HIS PASSAGE IN OTT.

CCC/181 301320Z UYGR3068

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Done

30/11/83

UNCLASSIFIED

FM TOKYO UIGR2750 30NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

---PEARSON/SMITH ARRIVAL

PEARSON AND SMITH ARRIVE OTT 1615 HRS 01DEC ON AC138 FROM VNCVR.

INFORM PEARSONS WIFE AT 234-4229 AND SMITHS WIFE AT 728-9373.

UUU/195 300620Z UIGR2750

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission

JFM

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM DELHI WBGR2714 30NOV83

TO EXTOTT PSR DELIVER BY 300900

INFO PMDEL PEKIN WSHDC LDN PARIS MOSCO ISBAD CLMBO PRMNY BNATO
PCOOTT/FOWLER/OSBALDESTON

DISTR DMF MINA MINE MINT DMT PGB PSD PST ETN IDDZ FPR IMC ZSI RBR
---PM MTG WITH MRS GANDHI 29NOV

MR TRUDEAU AND MRS GANDHI MET FOR APPROX TWENTY MINUTES TUES EVENING
IMMED FOLLOWING FORMERS RETURN TO DELHI FROM PEKIN. MRS GANDHI
DESCRIBED VERY BRIEFLY TO MR TRUDEAU DEVELOPMENTS DURING HIS
ABSENCE. HE FOR HIS PART BRIEFED MRS GANDHI ON RESULTS OF CHINA
TRIP. BILATERAL MATTERS WERE NOT/NOT DISCUSSED.

2. MRS GANDHI NOTED HER SATISFACTION AT PROLONGATION OF RAMPHAL
FOR THIRD TERM. SHE SAID THAT THIS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED, NOT/NOT
WITHOUT DIFFICULTY BECAUSE OF RESERVATIONS OF PM ADAMS.

3. RAMPHAL JOINED TWO PMS FOR FEW MOMENTS. MR TRUDEAU CONGRATULATED
BOTH MRS GANDHI AND SEC GEN VERY WARMLY ON SUCCESS OF MTG. HE SAID
THAT GRENADA CONCENSUS IN PARTICULAR HAD BEEN REAL GAIN. HE ALSO
STRESSED VALUE OF GOA RETREAT AND SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW RETREATS
MUST REMAIN AS PART OF CHOGM.

4. ON CHINA VISIT, PM PROVIDED BROAD-GRUSH OUTLINE OF DISCUSSIONS
WITH CHINESE LEADERS. HE SAID THAT REACTION OF LATTER WAS SIMILAR
TO THAT OF MRS GANDHI, IE GO AFTER SUPERPOWERS FIRST. PM ADDED THAT

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28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
mission

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CHINESE HAD GENERALLY BEEN VERY HELPFUL AND ENCOURAGING.

5. PM SAID THAT DENG, LIKE MRS GANDHI, HAD TAKEN LINE THAT THEY WOULD QUOTE NOT/NOT GIVE IN TO NPT BLACKMAIL UNQUOTE. ALTHOUGH DENG RECOGNIZED DANGER IN HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION, HE HELD BRIEF QUOTE EVEN AS YOU DO UNQUOTE TO KEEP OPTIONS OPEN.

MRS GANDHI AT THIS POINT INTERJECTED QUOTE WE DO NOT/NOT HOLD BRIEF FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNQUOTE.

6. MR TRUDEAU USED OPPORTUNITY TO REITERATE TO MRS GANDHI HIS SERIOUS CONCERN OVER PROLIFERATION AND GROWING NUCLEAR RISKS. HE SAID THAT IF ONE COULD MAKE PNE, ONE COULD ALSO MAKE BOMB. STAGE HAD BEEN PEACHED HOWEVER WHERE OTHERS, SUCH AS ISREAL, SOUTH AFRICA AND PAKISTAN, COULD ALSO PUT COMPONENTS TOGETHER AND BUILD UP ARSENAL CAPABLE OF DOING GREAT DEAL OF DAMAGE.

7. MTG WAS WARM AND CORDIAL. MRS GANDHI WAS OBVIOUSLY PELASED WITH OVERALL SUCCESS OF CHOGM AND STATEMENTS MTG HAD PRODUCED. PM FOR HIS PART WAS VERY SATISFIED WITH DISCUSSIONS IN CHINA AND PARTICULARLY WITH EXPLICIT CHOGM ENDORSEMENT OF HIS INITIATIVE.

CCC/06E 301022Z WBGR2714

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MF
28-6-1-Trudeau Peace mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM WSHDC UNGR2480 30NOV83
TO EXTOTT LIDDZ

INFO BNATO MOSCO PMDELKWAIT BONN PARIS LDN PEKIN PCOOTT/FOWLER
DISTR MINA USS DMF RBR IDA IDD IDR UGB URR RBD PER

---PMS INITIATIVE:CONSULTATIONS WITH USA

AS DISCUSSED SEPARATELY IN OTT WITH BURNEY AND DELVOIE AND THEN
WITH HANCOCK, WE SHOULD PROBABLY TRY TO EXTRACT FROM VARIOUS CONVER-
SATIONS IN PEKIN AND MOSCO THOSE COMMENTS OF INTERLOCUTORS OF PM
TRUDEAU AND OF PEARSON WHICH BEAR UPON USA INTERESTS AND WHOSE
VERBAL PASSING TO USA IS NOT/NOT BREACH OF CONFIDENCE.

2. WE APPRECIATE DPM/SSEA WILL BE HIGHLIGHTING PMS ACTIVITIES DURING
HIS MTG WITH SHULTZ 09DEC BUT WE DOUBT IF ANY OF LIMITED TIME
AVAILABLE SHOULD BE USED FOR THIS SORT OF REPORTING FUNCTION.

3. IN FACT, DOING THIS ASAP IN ADVANCE OF SHULTZ/MACFACHEN MTG COULD
MAKE FOR BETTER DISCUSSION IN BRU.

4. YOU WILL APPRECIATE THAT MAKING THIS SORT OF INFO AVAILABLE
HERE IS GREAT HELP TO EMB IN MAINTAINING OUR SIDE OF POLICY LEVEL
GIVE AND TAKE WITH ADMIN AND WE WOULD REQUEST THAT THIS THEREFORE
BE DONE HERE AND NOT/NOT IN OTT.

CCC/059 0103307 UNGR2480

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned 1DDZ
Person CF
Local Time 1442

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2476 30NOV83
TO EXTOTT 1DDZ DELIVER BY 301500

*28-6-1 - Bureau Peace
Mission*

INFO BNATO MOSCO PMDELKWAIT
DISTR ~~UPR~~ ~~PBR~~ ~~IBA~~ ~~UCB~~ ~~MINA~~ ~~USS~~ ~~DMF~~ ~~LFB~~ ~~RFB~~ ~~IDD~~ ~~LR~~

REF OURTEL UNGR2468 23NOV

---PMS INITIATIVE:USA VIEWS ON MBFR

ONE OF MOST POSITIVE ELEMENTS OF CALDER-HAGAN VISIT TO WSHDC WAS NATURE OF COMMENTS MADE TO US BY BOB DEAN, DEPT. DIR OF BUREAU OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS ON MBFR. OUR REFTEL SET OUT IN SOME DETAIL NATURE OF ARGUMENT WITHIN ADMIN ON MBFR. DEAN'S COMMENTS WERE CONSISTENT WITH EARLIER INFO THAT SHULTZ IS AMONG THOSE WHO SUPPORT IDEA OF TRYING TO GET PROGRESS IN MBFR. WE BELIEVE DEAN MADE THESE COMMENTS IN ORDER TO ENCOURAGE US TO CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS ON MBFR ASPECTS OF PMS INITIATIVE.

2. DEAN SAID USA HAS BEEN LOOKING AT POSSIBLE INITIATIVES IN MBFR TO FIND A WAY AROUND THE DATE IMPASSE. THERE IS NO/NO DECISION YET BUT USA IS STILL CONSIDERING POSSIBILITIES. ONE POSSIBILITY IS TO ENSURE FRONT END VERIFICATION AS WELL AS AGREED FINAL LIMITS. DEAN WENT ON TO QUOTE SEC SHULTZ AS HAVING SAID THAT HE DID NOT/NOT UNDERSTAND WHY IF YOU CAN VERIFY WITHDRAWALS AND FINAL RESULT YOU NEED TO HAVE AGREEMENT ON DATA. THIS POSITION IS DIRECTLY COUNTER TO USA POLICY AND IS THE BASIS OF OUR JUDGEMENT THAT DEAN'S WAS

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_____ Division 1700
_____ Person
_____ Unit 1000

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SHULZ A DOMMER
1000

PAGE TWO UNGR2476 CONF

SEEKING TO CONVEY ENCOURAGEMENT TO US.HE WAS IN EFFECT INVITING
US TO SUPPORT SHULTZ IN AN UNRESOLVED USA DEBATE.

3.OTHER MEMBERS OF ADMIN,INCLUDING THOSE IN STATE HOWEVER WILL
MAINTAIN THEIR POSITION THAT MBER IS FLAWED NEG AND WILL CONTINUE
THEIR RESISTANCE.

CCC/230 301851Z UNGR2476

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
Mission

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

CONFIDENTIAL CDN EYES ONLY **CDN EYES ONLY**
FM WSHDC UNGR2479 30NOV83 **RESERVE AUX CDNS**

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO PCOOTT/OSBALDESTON/ARCHDEACON PEKIN LDN PMDELKWAIT/MASSE/
SHENSTONE

DISTR DMF IDA IDR

REF PEKIN TEL PMCL0125 28NOV

---ESTABLISHMENT OF INVENTORY OF ARMS REDUCTION PROPOSALS

HAVE FAXED TO YOU CHRONOLOGIES ON INF AND START POSITIONS PREPARED
BY ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION.THESE GIVE DATES AND SPOKESMEN MAKING
PROPOSAL.FORUM IS ALSO GIVEN IN SOME CASES.THESE ARE COMPLETE TO
27NOV.ALSO HAVE FAXED CLIPPING OF ARTICLE BY DAVID JOHNSON OF
CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFO LISTING 28 DIFFERENT RECENT SOV ARMS
CONTROL PROPOSALS.ARTICLE IS DATED 29MAY BUT MAY STILL BE USEFUL.
IT DOES NOT/NOT GIVE FORUMS,DTES OR SPOKESMEN.

2.ARE ALSO SENDING WITH GOSSAGE TOMORROW FOLLOWING MATERIAL FROM
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE:DOCUMENT DATED 23AUG:THE SOV
POSITION IN START AND SOV REACTION TO USA START PROPOSALS.SIMILAR
DOC FOR INF DATED 10NOV.THESE DOCS CITE REACTIONS IN PRAVDA/TASS
ETC AS WELL AS THOSE OF OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN.

3.WE ARE ALSO SENDING A SALT II CHRONOLOGY PREPARED BY CRS IN 1978.

CCC/059 302151Z UNGR2479

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2477 30NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO BNATO MOSCO PMDELKWAIT PRMNY PEKIN PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN

ROME HAGUE BONN PARIS LDN BRU NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD

DISTR URR RBR IDA UGB MINA USS DMF IFB RGB IDD IDR URR

---PMS INITIATIVE: VISIT TO WSHDC OF CALDER AND HAGAN

SUMMARY: IN A SERIES OF MTGS CALDER AND HAGAN HAD WITH STATE DEPT, ACDA AND DOD MIDDLE-LEVEL OFFICIALS ON THE SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS IN THE PMS INITIATIVE THE FOLLOWING POINTS EMERGED: (A) THE PROPOSALS CDA HAS PUT FORWARD, PARTICULARLY ON ASAT AND LIMITING MOBILITY OF ICBMS ARE OF THE KIND BEING SERIOUSLY STUDIED BY USA GOVT OFFICIALS; (B) HOWEVER THE USA IS NOT/NOT IN A POSITION, BECAUSE OF INTERNAL DEBATES AND INCOMPLETE WORK WITHIN THE GOVT TO ESPOUSE (OR FOR THAT MATTER TO DECLARE ITSELF OPPOSED TO) ANY OF THESE PROPOSALS; (C) GENERAL REACTION TO PMS INITIATIVE AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE IS POSITIVE HOWEVER GREAT CONCERN EXISTED AND TO SOME EXTENT STILL EXISTS OVER THE TIMING; (D) AS THERE ARE INDIVIDUALS WITHIN THE ADMIN (MANY IN FACT) WHO ARE OPPOSED TO ARMS CONTROL GENERALLY AND PARTICULARLY IN SPACE, THESE MAY SPEAK OUT AGAINST PMS SPECIFIC PROPOSALS; (E) VERIFICATION IS USUALLY CITED AS THE PROBLEM WITH CDN AND OTHER ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS. ESSENTIALLY THIS IS OFTEN AN EXCUSE RATHER THAN A REASON. ALL ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS INEVITABLY REQUIRE THAT A POLITICAL (RATHER THAN TECHNICAL) JUDGEMENT BE MADE ON WHAT CONSTITUTES

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PAGE TWO UNGR2477 CONFID

ADEQUATE VERIFICATION;(F)THERE IS GREAT RELUCTANCE WITHIN ADMIN TO COMMIT ITSELF TO ANY AC PROPOSAL THAT WLD LIMIT ITS ABILITY TO DEVELOP OR APPLY FUTURE TECHNOLOGY THAT MIGHT AT A LATER TIME BE CONSIDERED USEFUL TO USA;(G)THERE IS EVIDENCE THAT THE INITIATIVE ON THE MPFR MAY HAVE SUPPORT IN PART OF ADMIN--SHULTZ WAS CITED AS BEING IN FAVOUR OF PUTTING ASIDE DATA PROBLEM IF ADEQUATE VERIFICATION CAN BE OBTAINED;(H)USA REMAINS SUPPORTIVE OF FIVE POWER CONFERENCE QUOTE IN PRINCIPLE UNQUOTE.AT TIME IT WAS FIRST SUGGESTED USA WAS VERY CONCERNED THAT IT WLD BE UNHELPFUL RED HERRING IN THE INF DEPLOYMENT PROCESS.CONCERN NOW IS THAT USA DOES NOT/NOT WISH TO HAVE SUBJ BECOME CAUSE OF A DIVISIVE DEBATE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

2.IN ALL MTGS OUR INTERLOCUTORS WERE WELL INFORMED,INTERESTED AND VERY CANDID ESPECIALLY IN THOSE COMMENTS RELATING TO NATURE OF OPPOSITION TO ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS GENERALLY WITHIN ADMIN.IT MUST BE NOTED THAT THE OFFICIALS SEEN WERE ALL OF LEVEL OF DEPTY ASST SEC AND BELOW,WHICH MEANS CAREER OFFICIALS.WE THEREFORE DID NOT/NOT ENCOUNTER HIGHER LEVEL APPOINTEES SUCH AS BURT AND PERLE WHO ARE HARDER LINERS AND HAVE BEEN SOURCES OF SOME OF CRITICISM WE HAVE HEARD IN PAST AND WHO ARE UNFORTUNATELY CLOSER TO POLICY MAKING CENTRE THAN THOSE WE MET.NEVERTHELESS WE CAN TAKE ENCOURAGEMENT FROM SERIOUSNESS AND POSITIVE INTEREST WITH WHICH CALDER AND HAGAN WERE RECEIVED.

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3.REPORT:CALDER AND HAGAN MET WITH A SERIES OF STATE DEPT,DOD AND ACDA OFFICIALS(LIST IN LAST PARA)TO DISCUSS SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS OF PMS INITIATIVE.TALKS FOCUSED ON THESE PROPOSALS BUT SEVERAL INTERLOCUTORS ASKED QUESTIONS AND OFFERED COMMENTS ON INITIATIVE GENERALLY.ON FIVE POWER CONFERENCE,AND MBFR.IT WAS CLEAR THAT USA ADMIN IS LOCKED IN A SERIOUS DEBATE ABOUT ARMS CONTROL GENERALLY AND THAT AS A RESULT WORK ON SPECIFICS HAS BECOME BOGGED DOWN.THERE IS NO/NO CONSENSUS.FREQUENTLY OUR INTERLOCUTORS CAUTIONED THAT THE OPINIONS THEY WERE OFFERING WERE PERSONAL BECAUSE NO/NO OFFICIAL USA POSITIN EXISTS ON A PARTICULAR QUESTION.VERIFICATION WAS OFTEN CITED AS THE PROBLEM WITH SPECIFIC AC PROPOSALS.SOMETIMES PROBLEM WITH VERIFICATION WAS OFFERED AS A GENUINE CONCERN.SOMETIMES IT WAS OFFERED AS A CONCERN THAT HAD TO BE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED TO ENSURE CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR ANY AGREEMENT.WHAT WAS CLEAR WAS THAT THOSE INVOLVED IN DAY TO DAY GRAPPLING WITH AC PROBLEMS WERE EXTREMELY DEFENSIVE ON THIS SUBJ AS IT IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE CRITICISM THAT HARDLINERS CAN USE.MORE SENIOR CONTACTS(HAWES AND HOINKES) ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ANY AC PROPOSAL CAN BE HELD UP BY SAYING IT IS NOT/NOT FULLY VERIFIABLE AND THAT IN THE END A POLITICAL DECISION HAS TO BE MADE ON HOW MUCH VERIFICATION IS ENOUGH AND HOW BIG A QUOTE LEAP OF FAITH UNQUOTE USA IS WILLING TO MAKE.THEY AND OTHERS ALL SAID LEAP WAS NOT/NOT VERY BIG.WE ALSO SENSED IN USA COMMENTS A STRONG RELUCTANCE TO UNDERTAKE AC MEASURES THT WLD HAVE EFFECT

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PAGE FOUR UNGR2477 CONF D

OF INHIBITING USAS ABILITY TO EMPLOY OR DEVELOP NEW TECHNOLOGY. THIS WAS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF THE ASAT AREA BECAUSE OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ASAT AND ABM TECHNOLOGY (PRES REAGAN IS EXPECTED TO APPROVE AT TODAY'S NSC MTG AN ENHANCED ABM RESEARCH PROGRAM.)

4. PMS INITIATIVE: ALL INTERLOCUTORS WERE INTERESTED IN HEARING SOME BACKGROUND TO PMS INITIATIVE AND CONTEXT IN WHICH WE WERE PUTTING FORWARD SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS. INHERENT QUESTION WAS QUOTE WHY THESE PROPOSALS AND NOT/NOT OTHERS? UNQUOTE. ALL APPRECIATED CALDERS PRESENTATION ON THIS AND HIS ENUNCIATION OF PRINCIPLES OF NOT/NOT INTERFERING WITH INF DEPLOYMENT, NOT/NOT INVOLVING OURSELVES IN INF/ START NEGS, CONSISTENCY WITH CM TESTING N CDA, AND NEGOTIABILITY. ONLY QUESTION ABOUT THE VALUE OF THE INITIATIVE WAS ABOUT TIMING AND EVEN THIS TENDED TO BE PUT MORE OFTEN IN THE CONTEXT OF THE FIVE POWER PROPOSAL RATHER THAN OF THE INITIATIVE DIRECTLY. IT WAS NEVERTHELESS IMPLIED THAT THE SAME CONCERNS APPLIED TO BOTH.

5. FIVE POWER CONFERENCE: DOBBINS, DEAN AND NOSENZO ALL EXPRESSED CONCERN WITH TIMING OF FIVE POWER CONFERENCE. DEAN EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT PROPOSAL WLD NOT/NOT BE UNDERSTOOD, OR WLD BE PERVERTED BY USSR AND THUS BE USED TO JUSTIFY SOV CLAIM TO EQUALITY WITH ALL WESTERN SYSTEMS. ALL SAID USA HAS NO/NO OBJECTION TO IDEA IN PRINCIPLE BUT THAT AT TIME OF ITS FIRST BEING PROPOSED THEY WERE CONCERNED IT WLD BECOME FOCUS OF A MOVEMENT TO PUT OFF INF DEPLOYMENT UNTIL SUCH A CONFERENCE HAD BEEN GIVEN A CHANCE TO PRODUCE RESULTS. FEAR STILL

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EXISTS THAT IDEA CLD INHIBIT START NEGS,BUT DOBBINS ACKNOWLEDGED USA HAD BEEN WRONG ON THIS CONCERN AND THAT IT HAD NOT/NOT BECOME FOCUS OF ATTEMPT TO DISRUPT NEGS OR DELAY INF DEPLOYMENT.HOWEVER UK AND FR ARE OPPOSED TO THE PROPOSAL AND USA VIEW IS THAT IT WLD BE A MISTAKE TO BEING AN ARGUMENT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE OVER THE IDEA.USA WLD NOT / NOT JOIN IN SUCH AN ARGUMENT AGAINST UK AND FR.

6.MBFR:SEE OURTEL UNGR2476 OF 30NOV.

7.ASAT:WE WERE TOLD USA IS ALSO CONSIDERING SIMILAR PROPOSAL.BUT CLEAR IMPRESSION WAS CONVEYED THAT INTERNAL DEBATE WLD NOT PERMIT APPROVAL.OPPOSITION ARGUMENTS FOCUS ON VERIFIABILITY AND LIMITING EFFECT SUCH AGREEMENT MAY HAVE ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS THAT USA MIGHT FIND USEFUL ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO ABM.VERIFICATION ARGUMENTS ARE AS FOLLOWS:A LOW ALTITUDE SYSTEM CAN EASILY BECOME A HIGH ALTITUDE SYSTEM BY ADDING A BOOSTER.OR INDEED A HIGH ALTITUDE SYSTEM CLD BE DISGUISED AS A LOW ALTITUDE SYSTEM BY TESTING IT AT LOW LEVELS.FOR EXAMPLE USA BELIEVES CURRENT USSR SYSTEM IS CAPABLE AT ALTITUDE OF UP TO 5000 MILES EVEN THOUGH IT HAS ONLY BEEN TESTED AT ABOUT 1200 MILES.

8.NOSENZO POINTED OUT THAT OPPOSITION TO ASAT AGREEMENTS ALSO COME FROM THOSE INTERESTED IN DEVELOPING ABM CAPABILITY.THEY BELIEVE THAT AN ASAT SYSTEM MAY BE A STEP ALONG THE WAY TO AN EFFECTIVE ABM SYSTEM.ANY AGREEMENT USA ENTERS INTO ON ASAT WILL HAVE TO ALLOW FOR USA TO CONTINUE WORK ON ABM.

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9. DOBBINS SAID SIMILAR THINGS IN A MORE GENERAL WAY SAYING THAT THERE IS CURRENTLY VERY LITTLE SUPPORT IN ADMIN FOR AC IN SPACE AND EVEN THOSE WHO FAVOUR IT ARE PUTTING THEIR ENERGIES ON AC ELSEWHERE BECAUSE THEY KNOW THEY CAN HAVE ONLY SO MUCH IMPACT ON ADMIN AND THEY BELIEVE THERE ARE OTHER AREAS OF HIGHER PRIORITY.

10. USA HOWEVER APPRECIATES THAT POLITICALLY IT MUST DO SOMETHING TO RESPOND TO THE USSR ON ASAT. THEY ARE THEREFORE ALSO LOOKING AT LESS AMBITIOUS SPACE AC MEASURES SUCH AS A BAN ON FIRING AT SATEL-LITES OF OTHERS AND ALSO SOME CBMS.

11. LIMITING MOBILITY OF ICBMS: USA IS ALSO STUDYING PROBLEM OF ENSURING VERIFIABILITY OF ICBMS BY LIMITING MOBILITY. OF COURSE A TENSION EXISTS BETWEEN SURVIVABILITY AND VERIFIABILITY, AND USA HAS NOT/NOT DECIDED HOW MUCH OF ONE IT IS WILLING TO GIVE UP TO ENSURE THE OTHER. THE BASIS OF THE USA PROBLEM AT THIS POINT IS THAT THEY HAVE NO/NO IDEA OF WHAT THEIR MOBILE SYSTEM WILL LOOK LIKE. FOR EXAMPLE HARDNESS OF LAUNCHERS WILL GREATLY AFFECT HOW NARROW LIMITS CAN BE AGREED TO ON RANGE OF MOBILITY. USA VIEW IS THAT THE SYSTEM THEY DEVELOP WILL DETERMINE THE NATURE OF THE AC AGREEMENT NOT VICE VERSA. USA WILL, HOWEVER, BE TELLING SOVS THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS IN START MOBILITY LIMITS ON ICBMS.

12. VERIFICATION BY NTM: DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJ WAS LEAST CONCLUSIVE. USA MADE CLEAR THAT IN THEIR VIEW TWO FACTORS IN ABILITY TO TRUST RUSSIANS AND EXISTING TECHNOLOGY (CRUISE MISSILES) MADE IT MOST UNLIKELY THAT USA CAN EVER IN FUTURE HAVE ENOUGH CONFIDENCE TO ACCEPT AND SELL TO CONGRESS ARMS CONTROL PACKAGE BASED ONLY ON NTM.

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PAGE SEVEN UNGR2477 CONF

WHILE SOME LIKED THE IDEA OF DEVELOPING WEAPONS SYSTEMS WITH VERIFICATION IN MIND, THEY FELT THAT CDN PROPOSAL LEFT OPEN THE POSSIBILITY (THEY SUGGESTED LIKELIHOOD) OF AN IMPASSE BEING REACHED IN WHICH SOVS WLD SIMPLY ASSERT THEIR SYSTEM WAS VERIFIABLE WHILE USA WLD SAY IT WAS NOT/NOT. CONVERSELY USA WLD NOT/NOT WANT TO GET ITSELF INTO AN AGREEMENT IN WHICH SOVS CLD BLOCK NEW USA WEAPON SYSTEM BY CLAIMING SYSTEM WAS NOT VERIFIABLE BY NTM. THERE ARE ALSO CERTAIN ASPECTS TO AC THAT CANNOT/NOT BE DEALT WITH BY NTM ALONE SUCH AS QUESTION OF RELOADS.

13. GOOD PART OF DISCUSSION WAS AIMED AT CLARIFYING CDN PROPOSAL TO OUR INTERLOCUTORS AND TO STRESS THAT WE SAW PROPOSAL AS MEANS TO ENSURE THAT IN THOSE AREAS WHERE ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION MEASURES SUCH AS MONITORS OR ONSIGHT INSPECTION CLD NOT/NOT BE AGREED THERE WAS A COMPULSION TO ENSURE VERIFIABILITY CLD BE ACHIEVED BY NTM. USA INTERLOCUTORS WERE ADAMANT HOWEVER THAT THEIR NEEDS WERE BEYOND NTM AND THAT PROPOSAL AS NOW FORMULATED WAS NOT/NOT ACCEPTABLE. DOBBINS SUGGESTED THAT IF PROPOSAL WAS MORE POSITIVELY WORDED USA MIGHT BE ABLE TO GO ALONG. HE SUGGESTED (INFORMALLY) PROPOSAL IN WHICH STATES UNDERTAKE A POSITIVE OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE MEANS OF VERIFICATION FOR NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS. PROBLEM HOWEVER BOILS DOWN TO FACT THAT PROPOSAL DEALS IN ABSTRACT OR WITH WEAPONS IN GENERAL WAY WHEREAS VERIFICATION IS BEST CONSIDERED IN REGARD TO SPECIFIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

PAGE EIGHT UNGR2477 CONF

14. DIR OF PM BUREAU POLICY PLANNING STAFF INVITED US TO CONSULT INFORMALLY WITH A ON VERIFICATION ISSUES AS QUESTIONS CAME UP. HE SAID HIS STAFF WLD BE GLAD TO ASSIST US, ON SPECIFICS. (WE WILL REPORT SEPARATELY ON CONVERSATION ON CDAS INTENTION TO DEVOTE RESOURCES TO VERIFICATION.)

15. LIST OF THOSE MET BY CALDER AND HAGAN:

COL JIM BLACKWELL: OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, BUREAU OF POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS (PM/P) STATE DEPT, CO-CHAIRMAN OF CONSOLIDATED VERIFICATION GROUP FOR INF/START;

SALLY HORN: DIR, ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION POLICY, ISP DOD, DOD CO-CHAIRMAN OF CONSOLIDATED VERIFICATION GROUP;

BOB MONTGOMERY: OFFICE OF CDN AFFAIRS, STATE;

COL BOB WATERS: OFFICE OF SECURITY AND POL AFFAIRS, EUROPEAN BUREAU, STATE DEPT (EUR/RPM);

PAT MOON: EUR/RPM;

LOU NOSENZO: ACTING ASST DIR, STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, ACDA;

STAN RIVELES: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC PROGRAMS, ACDA;

BOB DEAN: DEPTY DIR, BUREAU OF PM AFFAIRS, STATE;

COL JOHN GORDON: DIR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POLICY, PM BUREAU, STATE (PM/SNP);

RICK BARDZELL: PM/SNP;

JIM DOBBINS: DEPTY ASST SEC/EUR;

JOHN HAWES: DIR, EUR/RPM

MARY LIB HOINKES: DEPTY ASST DIR, MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS, ACDA;

RICHARD CLARKE: DIR, PM/P.

CCC/059 010325Z UNGR2477

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INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

NOV

FM PMOOTT PM01464 30DEC83

28-6-1-Trudeau
Peace
mission

TO PMDELABDBI/COLEMAN DELIVER BY 010800

INFO EXOTTT IDDZ

--TRANSCRIPT OF THE SCRUM GIVEN BY THE PM FOLLOWING
A MEETING WITH LEADERS OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES,
29NOV83.

TRANSCRIPTION D UNE ENTREVUE SUR LE VIF DONNEE PAR LE
PM A LA SUITE D UNE REUNION AVEC LES LEADERS DES
EMIRATS ARABES UNIS, A ABU DHABI, LE 29 NOVEMBRE 1983.

MR. TRUDEAU: I HAD A GOOD DAY. I MET THE
PRESIDENT, THIS MORNING, WITH SEVERAL OF HIS MINISTERS.
HE HAPPENS TO BE ALSO THE RULER, AS YOU KNOW, OF ABU DHABI.
I ALSO MET SHEIK MOHAMMAD IN DUBAI, AT THE GAS PLANT. I
DISCUSSED WITH THE VARIOUS MINISTERS SUBJECTS THAT WERE
MAINLY INNATL, SOME BILATERAL. THEY WERE HAPPY TO
KNOW THAT WE WERE WILLING TO OPEN AN EMBASSY IN THE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES. IT ALSO IS A WISH THAT THE CDN
BUSINESSMEN HAD EXPRESSED VERY STRONGLY.

SO, I THINK EVERYBODY IS HAPPY, EXCEPT THE MINISTER OF
FINANCE WHO IS GOING TO HAVE TO PAY FOR IT ALL. I MEAN
THE CDN MINISTER OF FINANCE.

...EN FRANCAIS.

EH BIEN, C ETAIT UNE VISITE COURTE MAIS FOR PROFITABLE,

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PAGE TWO PM01464 UNCLAS

JE CROIS. J AI RENCONTRE LE PRESIDENT DE LA FEDERATION,
CE MATIN. ON A DISCUTE DE QUESTIONS INNATLES, SURTOUT
DE GUERRE ET PAIX. CET APRES-MIDI, J AI FAIT UNE VISITE
AU SHEIK MOHAMMAD DE DUBAI, QUI EST UN DES ETATS DE LA
FEDERATION. NOUS AVONS EGALEMENT PARLE DE QUESTIONS BILATERALES.
J AI VU DES HOMMES D AFFAIRES CDNS, PEUT-ETRE 30 OU 40 EN NOMBRE,
ET CA M A ETONNE DE VOIR LE SENS DE L ENTREPRISE QUE CES
GENS D AFFAIRES AVAIENT. ILS DEMANDAIENT UNE SEULE
CHOSE, C EST QUE NOUS OUVRIONS UNE AMBASSADE ICI. ET,
COMME LE CONSEIL DES MINISTRES A DECIDE LA SEMAINE DERNIERE
QUE NOUS ALLIONS OUVRIR UNE AMBASSADE ICI, J AI ETE HEUREUX
DE LEUR DIRE ET DE LE DIRE EGALEMENT AUX MINISTRES D ICI.
Q. VOUS DITES QUE VOUS AVEZ PARLE DE PAIX, M. TRUDEAU.

EST-CE QUE (INAUDIBLE)

A ACCORDE A VOTRE MISSION, SURTOUT AU PLAN DU SOMMET DES
CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES, COMMENT EST-CE QUE CA PEUT VOUS
AIDER A FAIRE PRESSION SUR LES SUPER-GRANDS?.

R. C EST UN APPUI DE PLUS, MAIS CA NE PEUT PAS, EN SOI, AVOIR
UNE GRANDE INFLUENCE SUR LES ETATS-UNIS D AMERIQUE OU SUR
L UNION SOVIETIQUE. MAIS, COMME VOUS LE SAVEZ,

L INTENTION QUE J AI C EST D ESSAYER DE POLITISER

TOUTE CETTE QUESTION ET DE RECRUTER LE PLUS

GRAND NOMBRE POSSIBLE DE CHEFS D ETAT ET DE GOUVERNEMENT A LA

PAGE THREE PM01464 UNCLAS

CAUSE DE LA PAIX.ET,EN CE SENS-LA,L INTERET QUE LE
SHEIK A MANIFESTE POUR TOUTE CETTE ENTREPRISE - C EST LUI
QUI A OUVERT LE SUJET DE CONVERSATION,QUI EN A LONGUEMENT
PARLE CA M A BEAUCOUP INTERESSE.JE NE M Y ATTENDAIS PAS.
JE PENSAIS QUE L ON DISCUTERAIT SURTOUT QUESTIONS BILATERALES
ICI.

Q.I WOULD LIKE YOU TO ELABORATE ON THE
SUBJECT OF THE DISCUSSIONS YOU HAVE HAD WITH(INAUDIBLE)

A.THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT WAS MAINLY TO
ESTABLISH BILATERAL RELATIONS...NOT TO ESTABLISH
THEM - WE ALREADY HAVE BILATERAL RELATIONS - BUT TO INTENSIFY
THEM,TO INCREASE THEM.FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF MY RELATIONS
WITH THE GOVERNMENT,I WAS INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING
AREAS WHERE WE COULD SHOW GREATER COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO
COUNTRIES,AND IT IS IN THIS CONTEXT THAT I WAS HAPPY TO
ANNOUNCE THE OPENING OF AN EMBASSY HERE.

MY PURPOSE,ALSO,IS TO ENCOURAGE CDN
BUSINESSMEN WHO HAVE BEEN HERE FOR SOME YEARS AND
WHO FEEL THAT THEY HAVE NOT HAD,PERHAPS,SUFFICIENT SUPPORT
BY THE GOVT IN OTT.BY COMING HERE,I THINK I CAN
INDICATE TO THEM THAT WE KNOW THEIR INTERESTS HERE ARE
BENEFICIAL TO CDA AS WELL AS TO THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES.

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THOSE ARE THE MAIN PURPOSES.

I HAD HOPED TO DISCUSS QUESTION OF PEACE AND DISARMAMENT AND DISCUSS, PERHAPS A BIT, THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE AREA, WHICH WE DID. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR, THE MIDDLE-EAST SITUATION GENERALLY, THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. THESE ARE ALL SUBJECTS WE TOUCHED UPON AND, AS I WAS SAYING IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION IN FRENCH, I WAS HAPPY THAT THEY BOTH SHOWED-THE SHEIK MOHAMMAD, THIS AFTERNOON, AND THE PRESIDENT, HIS EXCELLENCY, THIS MORNING-THAT THEY WERE VERY INTERESTED IN THE TALKS WE HAD HAD IN NEW DELHI ON THE QUESTION OF INCREASED TENSIONS AND INNATL SECURITY. THE PRESIDENT ASKED ME ABOUT THE DISCUSSIONS THERE, SO I WAS HAPPY TO BRING HIM THE ESSENCE OF WHAT WE HAD DISCUSSED IN DELHI AND INDEED, WHAT I HAD DISCUSSED IN CHINA YESTERDAY MORNING.

Q. PRIME MINISTER, IN PEKING, ON MONDAY, YOU SAID THAT AT THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE, SOME PEOPLE HAVE A GREAT POSSIBILITY OF WORKING TOGETHER WITH YOU ON THE PEACE INITIATIVE... (INAUDIBLE) COULD YOU IDENTIFY THE ONES THAT (INAUDIBLE) AND WHAT ROLE THEY MIGHT TAKE. WOULD THEY TRAVEL WITH YOU OR WHAT?.

A. JUST A POINT ON STAGE ONE OF YOUR QUESTION.

I THINK YOU QUOTED ME AS SAYING IT WAS FINISHED.

IF I SAID THAT, I DID NOT MEAN IT WAS FINISHED, FINISHED. I MEANT THAT THERE WOULD BE A KIND OF... QUESTIONS WOULD BE

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ANSWERED AT THE NATO SUMMIT IN BRUSSELS IN A COUPLE OF WEEKS TIME, WHERE WE WILL KNOW WHAT HAPPENS TO SOME OF MY PROPOSALS CONCERNING VIENNA AND STOCKHOLM MEETINGS ON DISARMAMENT.

SO, IN THAT SENSE-I AM NOT CORRECTING YOU

AS TO TIMING-BUT I THINK THAT AT THAT POINT I

WILL HAVE TO ASSESS WHERE I GO FROM HERE AND WHETHER A TRIP TO MOSCOW AND WSHDC IS WARRANTED. I WILL ALSO

BE ASSESSING THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE QUESTION THAT

YOU ASK: IS IT TIME NOW TO RETURN TO PRESIDENT KAUNDA S SUGGESTIONS FOR A LARGER GROUP. THAT WAS ONE SUGGESTION

THAT THE PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR WORLD ORDER PUT FORWARD. THEY

ARE TRYING TO FORM A GROUP OF LEADERS WHO WOULD LOBBY THE

SUPERPOWERS. YOU KNOW, I THINK THAT I SAID YESTERDAY IN PEKING,

THAT THE CHINESE PM IS TALKING OF SOME KIND OF A

LARGER GROUP WHICH MAY BE LARGER THAN THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS.

THESE ARE ALL OPTIONS THAT I WILL STUDY AND

CONSIDER AND ACT UPON, IF ACTION IS WARRANTED,

AFTER WE HAVE SEEN THE RESULTS OF THE NATO MEETING IN BRUSSELS.

Q. (INAUDIBLE)

A. WE DIDNT GO INTO THE DETAILS CONCERNING THE PALESTINIAN

PROBLEM, AND I DIDNT HAVE A CHANCE TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH

YOUR LEADERS HERE ON THAT. BUT THE CDN POSITION IS WELL

KNOWN. WOULD YOU LIKE ME TO STATE IT AGAIN.

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Q. YES, PLEASE.

A. WE FEEL THAT THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE HAVE THE RIGHT TO A HOMELAND IN THE WEST BANK AND IN GAZA. AND WE THEREFORE FEEL THAT THEY MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, INTO ANY SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDDLE-EASTERN PROBLEMS. THAT IS OUR GENERAL POSITION IN REGARDS TO THE PALESTINIANS. WE HAVE RELATIONS... WE DO NOT RECOGNIZE THE PLO AS THE ONLY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, WE SAY THAT IT IS FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TO DECIDE WHO WILL SPEAK FOR THEM. IT IS NOT UP TO US TO SAY WHO SHOULD SPEAK FOR THEM, BUT WE DO HAVE CONTACTS WITH THE PLO, I BELIEVE ESSENTIALLY, THROUGH AN INFORMATION OFFICE THE PLO HAS IN TORONTO, CANADA.

Q. PM, DID YOU RECEIVE A LETTER FROM SOVIET PRESIDENT ANDROPOV. ONE HAS ALREADY BEEN SENT TO PM GANDHI, AND I WAS WONDERING IF LATELY YOU HAVE RECEIVED A LETTER.

A. IF LATELY MEANS WITHIN THE LAST FEW DAYS, THE ANSWER IS THAT I HAVENT OPENED MY MAIL, I HAVENT SEEN ANY.

Q. YOUVE HAD NO COMMUNICATION FROM MR. ANDROPOV.

A. YES, I HAVE AN ANSWER TO MY LETTER, BUT THAT WAS MAYBE TEN DAYS AGO.

Q.

A. NO. I DONT KNOW IF HE WROTE TO MRS GANDHI, OR DID SHE WRITE HIM. I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT SHE WROTE HIM.

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Q. SHE DIDNT MENTION IT LAST NIGHT WHEN YOU MET WITH HER.

A. NO.

Q. SIR, DID YOU DISCUSS THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE-EAST DURING THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE IN NEW DELHI.

A. YES, THE DISCUSSIONS DID TAKE PLACE ON THE MIDDLE-EAST AND THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION AT THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE. THE VIEWS THAT ARE CONTAINED ARE PRETTY WELL ALONG THE LINES OF THE STATEMENT WE HAD MADE AT MELBOURNE, TWO YEARS AGO. THERE IS NOT MUCH EVOLUTION ON THE POSITION THERE. IN ESSENCE, WHAT THE COMMUNIQUE SAYS, AND I AM SURE YOU WILL HAVE COPIES OF IT, BUT IN ESSENCE, IT SAYS THAT SOME GOVTS WERE SAYING THAT THE PLO IS THE LEGITIMATE SPOKESMAN FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, AND SOME GOVTS WERE ADVOCATING THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. BUT THAT EXPRESSION MEANS THAT SOME GOVTS MEAN THAT IT IS NOT UNANIMOUS, THAT SOME SAY YES AND SOME SAY NO.

Q. YOU HAVE SAID THAT YOU DO NOT CONSIDER THE PLO AS THE ONLY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PALESTINIANS. DO YOU CONSIDER IT AS ONE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES.

A. I DIDNT SAY I DIDNT CONSIDER IT AS THE QUOTE ONLY UNQUOTE. I SAID THAT IT WAS NOT CDAS POLICY TO SAY WHO SHOULD SPEAK FOR THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. THEY CAN CHOOSE THE SPOKESMAN, AND IT IS NOT FOR US TO SAY: WELL, THESE

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ARE YOUR SPOKESMEN AND THOSE ARE NOT YOUR SPOKESMEN. I THINK IT IS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT NOW THAT THE PLO ITSELF SEEMS VERY DIVIDED, AND I AM GLAD WE HAVE TAKEN THAT POSITION TO THE PALESTINIANS: YOU DECIDE WHO YOUR SPOKESMEN ARE, DON'T ASK US TO TELL.

Q. WOULD CDN OFFICIALS BE PREPARED TO MEET WITH PLO OFFICIALS IN THE FUTURE.

A. YES, THEY HAVE MET IN THE PAST, AS I SAY.

THEY HAVE MET, I BELIEVE, SOMETIMES ABROAD, BUT ESSENTIALLY, IN CDA, I THINK THE CONTACT IS THROUGH THE PLO INFORMATION OFFICE IN TORONTO.

Q. PM, YOU MENTIONED STOCKHOLM A FEW MOMENTS AGO.

I WAS WONDERING IF YOU COULD TELL US WHAT PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE...

A. I GUESS, IDEALLY, IF IT WERE A DIFFERENT DATE,

IT WOULD BE SOMETHING I WOULD LIKE TO WORK

FOR, BUT IT IS LESS THAN A MONTH AND HALF AWAY, I DON'T

THINK THAT IDEA IS ACHIEVABLE. IF HEADS OF STATE BEGIN DRAFTING

EACH OTHER TO GO, THAT WOULD BE GREAT, BUT I AM NOT CONSIDERING

THAT AS A REALISTIC POSSIBILITY. ANOTHER WHY I DON'T THINK

IT'S TOO REALISTIC IS THAT IT IS WITHIN DAYS OF THE STATE

OF THE UNION ADDRESS IN THE UNITED STATES AND I THINK IT IS

UNLIKELY THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD. BUT, WHEN I SAY QUOTE AT

A HIGH POLITICAL LEVEL UNQUOTE I HOPE IT WILL BE AT THE LEVEL OF

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FOREIGN MINISTERS.AND,IF PRODUCTIVE,I WOULD THINK THEY SHOULD CONSIDER THE POSSIBILITY OF A HEAD OF STATE-HEAD OF GOVT LEVEL MEETING AT SOME POINT.

Q.OF THE 35?

A.OF THE 35...

Q.A QUICK GENERAL QUESTION...

A.AS WE HAD IN HELSINKI,IN 1975.

Q....WILL YOU BE SATISFIED WITH YOUR PEACE INITIATIVE IF YOU ACHIEVE A MARGINAL CLEARING OF THE AIR AND OF THESE SUPERPOWER TENSIONS,BUT NOT ACHIEVE ANY OF THE SPECIFIC PROPOSAL THAT YOU PUT FORWARD.

A.WOULD I BE SATISFIED.I AM SATISFIED NOW.I AM SATISFIED THAT I HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE POLITICIZATION OF THE WHOLE SUBJECT.CERTAINLY,I AM SATISFIED BEYOND MY EXPECTATIONS AT THE ATTITUDE OF MY FELLOW COMMONWEALTH LEADERS,AND I AM SATISFIED WITH EVERY OTHER CONVERSATION I HAVE HAD.I DONT MEAN THAT I AM SELF-SATISFIED,I JUST MEAN THAT I THINK THERE IS OBVIOUSLY A WILL IN ALL THE POLITICAL LEADERS I HAVE SEEN WHICH CORRESPONDS TO MY OWN,THAT WE SHOULD REALLY INVOLVE OURSELVES AS POLITICIANS IN THIS.I FIND IT VERY SATISFYING.YOU KNOW, HOW DO YOU MAKE THE HORSE DRINK ONCE YOU HAVE BROUGHT IT TO WATER IS ANOTHER QUESTION,BUT I THINK IT IS SOMETHING THAT...

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WE ARE ON THE VERGE OF CONSIDERING THAT DRINK.

Q. THAT IS THE POINT I WAS REALLY

MAKING. PEOPLE CONSIDER THAT MORE IMPORTANT, THAT CLEARING
OF THE AIR, THAT INJECTION OF THE POLITICAL ENERGIES THAN
THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE STRATEGIC (INAUDIBLE).

A. WELL, I THINK A COUNTRY IN CDA'S ROLE-

AT LEAST IN MY ROLE-I DON'T CONSIDER THAT I

COULD DO MUCH MORE. I AM NOT A DIPLOMAT, I AM NOT

A NEGOTIATOR, I AM NOT A GO-BETWEEN, AND I DON'T THINK I

CAN BRING MESSAGES FROM REAGAN TO ANDROPOV AND BACK. AND I

CAN'T SPEAK NICELY TO EVERYBODY AND SAY: QUOTE YES, YOU'RE RIGHT

OF COURSE BUT THE OTHER FOLLOW IS WRONG, AND TELL THE OTHER

FELLOW YOU'RE RIGHT BUT HE'S WRONG, BUT LET'S GET TOGETHER UNQUOTE.

I DON'T THINK I AM CUT OUT FOR THAT ROLE. AS I SAY, MY AIM

WAS ESSENTIALLY TO THE THIRD RAIL, TO INJECT POLITICAL

ENERGY INTO IT. AND WHETHER THAT ENERGY IS USED CONSTRUCTIVELY

AND SOON, IS SOMETHING WHICH WILL HAVE TO COME OUT OF THE

PROCESS. I WILL CERTAINLY DO MY BEST TO MAKE IT HAPPEN, BUT

I KNOW THAT MY LIMITATIONS STOP ONCE I HAVE SEEN THEM AND

SAID: QUOTE OKAY, WE MUST DO SOMETHING UNQUOTE, AND THEY SAY QUOTE

YES UNQUOTE. WHAT HAS BEEN, I THINK, REVEALING AND NICE, AS FAR AS

I AM CONCERNED, IS THAT SO MANY UNEXPECTED PEOPLE DID TAKE THAT

POINT OF VIEW. YOU LOOK AT THE COMMONWEALTH STATEMENT IN

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DELHI, AND YOU SEE PEOPLE WITH SOME PRETTY RADICALLY OPPOSITE POINTS OF VIEW-FROM MRS. GANDHI TO KAUNDA TO MARGARET THATCHER, TO ROBERT HAWKE-AND YOU SEE THEM ALL SAYING THE SAME THING: QUOTE YES, THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS MUST TALK TOGETHER, YES THERE IS A DANGER IN THE FURTHER SPREADING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, YES IT IS IMPORTANT THAT POLITICIANS INTENSIFY THEIR COMMUNICATIONS UNQUOTE, AND SO ON.

THAT IS JUST WRITING DOWN THE KIND OF REACTION I HAVE HAD FROM MOST EVERY OTHER LEADER, WHICH I DONT THINK I WOULD HAVE SAID WOULD HAVE HAPPENED AS RECENTLY AS WILLIAMSBURG, WHERE THE MESSAGE WAS: LETS SHOW THE SOVIETS THAT WE ARE GOING TO HANG TOUGH. I THINK THAT WHAT HAPPENED IS THAT WE ALL HUNG TOUGH AND THE SOVIETS HUNG TOUGH TOO. AND NOW, WERE SAYING: OK STAGE ONE IS OVER. ITS ANOTHER STAGE I AM TALKING. WHAT DO WE DO NOW THAT WE HAVE ALL HUNG TOUGH?. WEVE GOT TO BEGIN TO TALK. AND THAT WHAT IS HAPPENING.

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28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
Mission

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FM EXTOTT FPR1145 30NOV83

TO WSHDC PMDEL/ABDBI DELIVER BY 010900

INFO BNATO DELHI MOSCO PEKIN BRU BREEC LDN PARIS POECD BONN GENEV
TOKYO NDHQOTT/ADM/POL/DG PCOOTT PMOOTT/FOWLER HAGUE ROME MXICO
ATNTA BOSTN BFALO CHCGO CLVND DALAS DTROT LNGLS MNPLS NRLNS CNGNY
PHILA SFRAN SEATL

DISTR IDDZ IDA IDD IDR UGB URR RBR ZSI IFB URT RBD RGB

--DPM/SSEA PRESS CONF IN CHCGO 29NOV 1000 HRS-CDA/USA RELS AND
PM TRUDEAUS PEACE INITIATIVE.

TEXT BEGINS:

DPM/SSEA: WE CAN HAVE A VERY INTIMATE CONVERSATION THIS MORNING
ABOUT WHATEVER SUBJECTS INTEREST US. I AM MAINLY TALKING AT NOON
ABOUT CANADA-USA RELATIONS, AND SOME WORDS ABOUT THE PRIME MINISTERS
PEACE INITIATIVE, WHICH HAS OCCUPIED HIS ATTENTION ALMOST FULL TIME
FOR THE PAST NUMBER OF WEEKS. I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT WHEN A CANADIAN
MINISTER COMES TO THE UNITED STATES TO AN IMPORTANT CENTRE LIKE
CHCGO, THAT HE OUGHT TO UNDERLINE THE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP THAT EXISTS
BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES. IT IS ALMOST TRITE TO REPEAT
THE NATURE OF THAT RELATIONSHIP. THE EXTENT OF TRADE, INVESTMENT,
COMMUNICATIONS, TRAVEL; THE MANY WAYS IN WHICH OUR ECONOMIES INTER-ACT.
BECAUSE WE INTER-ACT IN SO MANY WAYS, WE HAVE, UNDOUBTEDLY, PROBLEMS
AND THE JOB FOR GOVERNMENT ON BOTH SIDES IS TO MANAGE THE
RELATIONSHIP IN AN EFFECTIVE AND COMPETENT WAY. THAT IS WHY MR SHULTZ

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AND I HAVE AGREED, THE FIRST TIME WE MET, TO DEAL WITH OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS ON A REGULAR BASIS. THAT MEANS THAT WE HAVE MET FOUR TIMES A YEAR. THE LAST MEETING WAS IN HALIFAX AND IT REPRESENTED THE FIFTH BILATERAL MEETING WE HELD ON CANADIAN-USA RELATIONS. I THINK IT IS CORRECT TO SAY THAT WE HAVE MADE PROGRESS IN DEALING WITH A NUMBER OF OUR COMMON PROBLEMS, THAT WE ARE SEIZED WITH THOSE THAT STILL REMAIN OUTSTANDING, AND THAT ONE CAN DESCRIBE THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, AS I SAY IN THE TEXT, QUOTE IS IN PRETTY GOOD SHAPE UNQUOTE. IT IS IN GOOD SHAPE. THE ESTABLISHED METHODS OF CONSULTATION HAVE WORKED AND THEY HAVE PROVIDED A BASIS FOR DEALING NOT/NOT ONLY WITH BILATERAL QUESTIONS, BUT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SURVIVE EVEN DISAGREEMENTS WE HAVE, FROM TIME TO TIME, ON INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS. I THINK THAT IS ALL POSITIVE. THE PRIME MINISTER, AS YOU KNOW, IS CURRENTLY TRYING TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THE BAD STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE LATEST EVIDENCE OF THE SITUATION IS THE BREAK-OFF OF THE TALKS IN GENEV ON ARMS REDUCTIONS. WE ARE CERTAINLY AWARE IN CANADA OF THE DEEP ANXIETY WHICH PREVAILS ABOUT THE PRESENT STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, THE ABSENCE OF ANY DIALOGUE AND THE SEEMING GROWING DISTRUST ON ONE SIDE AND THE OTHER. WE DONT THINK THAT IS VERY HEALTHY, WE DONT THINK IT IS AN ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH ARMS CONTROLS TALKS CAN SUCCEED, AND WE ARE, THEREFORE, TRYING IN OUR OWN WAY TO SEE WHETHER SOME STEPS CAN BE TAKEN TO MOVE THE SITUATION INTO A MORE PRODUCTIVE ATMOSPHERE. IN ADDITION TO THAT MAIN POLITICAL THRUST OF

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THE PRIME MINISTER, WHICH IS THE KEY FACTOR OF HIS EFFORTS, HE HAS MADE A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE WITH THE INTENTION OF PROVIDING SOME MECHANISMS OR SOME OPPORTUNITIES BY WHICH AND THROUGH WHICH THIS DIALOGUE COULD RESUME, OR COULD ACCELERATE. SO, THERE YOU ARE, THATS ALL I WANT TO SAY.

Q: MARK HYMANS OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS:CHCGO.

...IN YOUR SPEECH THIS AFTERNOON YOU SAY CANADIANS ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED THE ACRIMONY NOW PREVAILING IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS HAS BECOME A GREATER BARRIER TO ARMS REDUCTION THAN IS NECESSARY AND DESIRABLE. CAN YOU AMPLIFY A BIT ON THAT? IS THE DISTRUST AT SUCH A LEVEL NOW THAT POSITIVE PROPOSALS FOR ARMS REDUCTIONS ARE IGNORED BY BOTH SIDES?

DPM/SSEA: THERE ARE GOOD PROPOSALS ON THE TABLE. THERE HAVE BEEN GOOD PROPOSALS. YOU KNOW THAT THE UNITED STATES IS THE COUNTRY AT THE TABLE, AT THE INF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEV. BUT THE UNITED STATES HAS CONSULTED WITH ALL ITS NATO ALLIES, NOT/NOT ONLY IN DEVELOPING ITS PROPOSALS BUT ALSO IN PRESENTING THEM TO THE SOVIET UNION. WE CERTAINLY, AT ONE POINT, IN CANADA WE BECAME FASCINATED BY THE EXERCISE OF DEVELOPING NEW PROPOSALS, WHETHER IT MAY BE THAT SOME NEW PROPOSAL COULD BE DEVELOPED THAT WOULD BE MORE LIKELY TO SUCCEED THAN ANY OF THE OTHERS. I THINK THE OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN DOING THE SAME. WE HAVE REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT IT IS NOT/NOT THE ABSENCE OF GOOD PROPOSALS THAT HAS PREVENTED THE SUCCESS OR PROGRESS

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OF THE INF TALKS, IT IS OBVIOUSLY THE VERY BAD POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE THAT PREVAILS AT THE PRESENT TIME, AND THE FACT THAT BOTH SIDES ARE DISTRUSTFUL OF THE OTHER AND NOT/NOT IN A SENSE, READY TO CREATE THE FOUNDATION FOR THE ACCEPTANCE OF ARMS PROPOSALS. THAT IS WHAT I MEAN, THERE IS NO/NO SHORTAGE OF GOOD PROPOSALS. THEY HAVE BEEN BROUGHT FORWARD, BUT PEOPLE AREN'T READY TO MOVE AHEAD AND PROVIDE THE POLITICAL THRUST BECAUSE THEY ARE FEARFUL OF THE OTHER. I DON'T THINK WE ARE GOING TO COME UP WITH A BETTER, OR MORE INGENIOUS ARMS PROPOSAL THAT IS GOING TO OPEN THE DOOR TO SUCCESS.

Q: MR MINISTER, THE CHINESE INDICATED TO PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU THIS MORNING, THAT THEY WERE UNWILLING TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO A FIVE-POWER SUMMIT NEXT YEAR FEELING THAT THE INITIATIVE SHOULD COME FROM THE SUPER-POWERS FIRST. HOW DO YOU SEE THIS AS A SET-BACK?

DPM/SSEA: WELL, THE PRIME MINISTER, AS YOU KNOW, HAS CALLED FOR A MEETING OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS AS A WAY OF PROVIDING SOME DIALOGUE AND DEALING WITH THE QUESTION OF STRATEGIC ARMS. THE CHINESE AND OTHERS HAVE HELD TO THE VIEW THAT SUCH A MEETING SHOULDNT BE HELD UNTIL THE TWO SUPER-POWERS MADE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN THEIR ARMS. DO I REGARD IT AS A SET-BACK? OBVIOUSLY, IT WOULD BE MORE PLEASING IF THE PROPOSAL HAD BEEN FULLY ACCEPTED. BUT I DON'T REGARD IT AS A SET-BACK TO THE OVERALL EFFORT. BECAUSE THE OVERALL EFFORT IS GREATER THAN THE COLLECTION OF EACH SPECIFIC PROPOSAL. THE OVERALL EFFORT SEEKS TO CREATE A BETTER ATMOSPHERE, A BETTER DIALOGUE AND MORE

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TRUST. IF IT CAN BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT THE FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE OR DELAYING THAT, THEN OF COURSE THE MAJOR OBJECTIVE WOULD BE ACHIEVED. I HAVE ARGUED FROM THE BEGINNING THAT EVEN IF A NUMBER OF THE SPECIFICS WERE NOT/NOT ACCEPTED, NEVERTHELESS WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS DOING IS ABSOLUTELY ON THE MARK. WE KNOW THAT WE ARE NOT/NOT A BIG POWER, WE CANNOT SHAKE-UP THE WORLD, BUT I THINK WE BELIEVE THAT WE OUGHT TO MAKE AN EFFORT. THE FACT IS, ALL THE COUNTRIES WHERE THE PRIME MINISTER HAS MET THE LEADERS HAVE WELCOMED AND ENCOURAGED HIS EFFORTS. THERE HAVE BEEN RESERVATIONS ABOUT SOME OF THE SPECIFICS AND I THINK THAT WHAT HAS BEEN REVEALED IN THE COURSE OF HIS EFFORTS IS THE PREMISE UPON WHICH HE BEGAN HAS BEEN FULLY DEMONSTRATED IN WHAT HE HAS FOUND, NAMELY, THAT THERE IS A VERY HIGH LEVEL OF A VERY STRONG SENSE OF, LET US SAY, DISTRUST.

Q: WHAT EXACTLY IS THE ROOT OF THAT DISTRUST? IS THE RHETORIC ON BOTH SIDES SO HIGH THAT A RAPPROCHEMENT, LIKE IN THE EARLY 1970S BETWEEN BREZHNEV AND NIXON, IS THAT NOW POSSIBLE TO ATTAIN, OR WHAT WILL BE NEEDED, AND ARE BOTH SIDES TO BLAME?

DPM/SSEA: I THINK IT WILL REQUIRE BOTH SIDES TO MAKE MOVES OF SOME KIND, IN ORDER TO MAKE SOME PROGRESS. ARE BOTH SIDES TO BLAME? I DON'T THINK THERE IS ANY DOUBT THAT THE RUSSIANS FEEL VERY DEEPLY OFFENDED AT BEING DESCRIBED AS THE FOCUS OF EVIL IN THE WORLD, THAT IMPACT UPON THEM HAS BEEN GREATER THAN ANYONE WOULD EXPECT. THAT IS RHETORIC, AND WE ARE ALL ACCUSTOMED TO RHETORIC. BUT SOMETIMES THE RHETORIC HITS

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HOME IN A WAY THAT MIGHT NOT/NOT BE FULLY EXPECTED. WHAT IS REQUIRED IS CERTAINLY THE ACCEPTANCE THAT BOTH SUPER-POWERS HAVE TO LIVE ON THIS PLANET, AND HAVE TO LEARN TO GET-ALONG TOGETHER. THERE ARE VERY STRONG REASONS WHY EACH OF THEM OUGHT TO SEEK THAT, ALONG WITH THE REST OF US. CANADA IS NOT/NOT A SUPER-POWER, BUT CANADA AND OTHER COUNTRIES ALSO HAVE A STAKE IN THE FUTURE AND I AM SURE IT IS IN THE MUTUAL INTEREST OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES TO CREATE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE TENSION DECREASES, UNDER WHICH THEIR SECURITY IS NOT/NOT CONSTANTLY UNDER THREAT. I THINK THE PERCEPTIONS THAT EACH HAVE OF THE OTHER, IN SOME WAYS, MAY BE RIGHT AND OTHERS QUITE WRONG.

Q: ARE THEY WRONG?

DPM/SSEA: I THINK AT THE MOMENT, I WOULD SAY THAT THE WEST, THE UNITED STATES AND THE NATO COUNTRIES HAVE, UNDOUBTEDLY, INFLICTED A MAJOR POLITICAL DEFEAT ON THE SOVIET UNION IN THE FACT THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES IN EUROPE IS GOING FORWARD. IT HAS BEEN A MAJOR EFFORT OF THE SOVIET UNION, IN THE LAST NUMBER OF YEARS, TO FRUSTRATE THE INTENTION OF THE NATO ALLIES TO DEPLOY THESE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES IN EUROPE. THEY HAVE INVESTED MAJOR EFFORTS TOWARDS THAT OBJECTIVE-AND THEY HAVE FAILED. DEPLOYMENT IS GOING FORWARD; PARLIAMENTS IN EUROPE HAVE VOTED IN FAVOUR OF THE DEPLOYMENT: THE UNITED KINGDOM, ITALY AND WEST GERMANY. YOU CAN IMAGINE THAT AT THE MOMENT THERE IS A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF QUESTIONING IN THE SOVIET UNION.

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I DONT THINK IT WOULD BE QUITE RIGHT AT THE MOMENT TO PERCEIVE THE SOVIET UNION AS THE EVER-SUCCESSFUL SUPER-POWER, AND THE EVER-THREATENING SUPER-POWER.

DPM/SSEA: WE WANT THE SOVIET UNION TO COME BACK TO THE TABLE. THEY HAVE LEFT BECAUSE THEY HAVE SAID FOR SO LONG THAT THEY WOULD TAKE ACTION OF THIS KIND. IT WAS ALMOST PART OF THE SCRIPT. WE WANT THEM BACK AND IN LIGHT OF THE POLITICAL SUCCESS OF THE NATO EFFORT, IT CERTAINLY PROVIDES AN OCCASION FOR THE UNITED STATES AND OTHERS TO OPERATE FROM THAT SENSE OF STRENGTH WHICH THEY HAVE EXPERIENCED. IF THE REVERSE HAD TAKEN PLACE, IF ONE PARLIAMENT AFTER THE OTHER HAD SAID QUOTE NO/NO UNQUOTE TO THE DEPLOYMENT AND IT HAD BEEN STOPPED, THAT WOULD HAVE BEEN QUITE A DIFFERENT POLITICAL SITUATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES. IT IS NOT/NOT EASY FOR THE EUROPEANS, OR FOR ANYBODY WHO IS INVOLVED, BUT THAT SUCCESS TAKEN WITH THE ANXIETY THAT IS EXPRESSED BY THE PUBLIC WITH THE FEAR OF NUCLEAR WAR CERTAINLY ARGUES FOR SOME NEW EFFORTS. THE PRIME MINISTER IS TRYING TO PROPOSE A NUMBER OF NEW EFFORTS.

IF SOMEONE COMES UP WITH A BETTER ONE, FINE.

BUT HE HAS TALKED ABOUT THE FIVE-POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE, ABOUT THE RENEWED EMPHASIS IN THE MUTUAL-BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS TALKS IN VIENN, ABOUT EXPLOITING MORE EFFECTIVELY THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE. YOU KNOW, IF WE TURN A DEAF EAR TO ALL OF THESE PROPOSALS, WHAT ARE WE GOING TO DO, LET THE SITUATION DRIFT ON? WE ARE ALLIES OF

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THE UNITED STATES, WE ARE PART OF NATO, WE HAVE SUPPORTED THE TWO-TRACK DECISION, WE HAVE DECIDED TO TEST THE CRUISE MISSILE. SO WE ARE PART OF THE ALLIANCE, BUT WE ARE ALSO PART OF THE PLANET AND PART OF THE CONCERN ABOUT HOW WE ARE GOING TO TACKLE THIS DIFFICULT SITUATION. ANYWAY, THATS A LOT OF TALK, I HAVE ANSWERED WITH ONE QUESTION.

Q: YOU MAKE A TACIT REFERENCE TO ACID RAIN IN YOUR NOTES SAYING THAT THINGS WOULD BE BETTER OFF IF SOME CONCRETE PROPOSALS WERE FORTHCOMING FROM THE UNITED STATES. DO YOU SEE PROGRESS IN THAT AREA AT ALL, OR HAS IT STALLED?

DPM/SSEA: WELL, I THINK THERE HAS BEEN PROGRESS SINCE MR SHULTZ AND I GOT INTO THE PICTURE. IT HAS MOVED TO THE EXTENT AT LEAST THAT WE DONT DISAGREE OVER THE IMPACT OF SULPHUR EMISSIONS. AT ONE POINT THERE WAS DIFFICULTY OR DISAGREEMENT ON THE FACTS OR THE SIGNS. BUT WE HAVE OVERCOME THAT AND MR RUCKELSHAUS IS ATTEMPTING TO PUT TOGETHER WITHIN THE ADMINISTRATION PROPOSALS THAT CAN BE IMPLEMENTED TO REDUCE THE ACID RAIN PROBLEM. WE ARE READY, IN CANADA, WE ARE READY WITH THE PROVINCES, WE ARE READY WITH THE UNITED STATES. WE KNOW THAT WE CANNOT DO IT ALONE. IF WE DO OUR DAMNEDEST, UNLESS THERE IS COOPERATION FROM THE UNITED STATES, WE WILL STILL HAVE AN ACID RAIN PROBLEM. SO WE ARE ENCOURAGED BY THE EMPHASIS THAT MR SHULTZ AND MR RUCKELSHAUS HAVE GIVEN THIS PROBLEM, BUT WE ARE STILL EXPRESSING OUR DISAPPOINTMENT THAT CONCRETE AGREEMENTS HAVE NOT/NOT YET BEEN REACHED; CONCRETE PLANS HAVE NOT/NOT BEEN FORMULATED IN THE USA.

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Q: ARE YOU MORE OPTIMISTIC NOW, THAT YOU ARE NO/NO LONGER DEALING WITH ANNE CORSAGE OR MR WATT?

DPM/SSEA: I NEVER LOOKED AT IT THAT WAY. I DEAL WITH MR SHULTZ, AND AT OUR LAST MEETING WE MET MR RUCKELSHAUS, I WAS CERTAINLY IMPRESSED WITH HIS DEDICATION TO SEEKING A SOLUTION. SO ACID RAIN IS A VERY BIG THING IN CANADA. WE WILL NEVER REST UNTIL WE GET SOLUTIONS, BECAUSE IT IS VERY FUNDAMENTAL TO THE FUTURE OF THE CANADIAN ENVIRONMENT, AND TO THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENT, I WOULD TAKE IT.

Q: YOU TOUCHED BRIEFLY ON PROTECTIONISM, IN YOUR SPEECH. THERE ARE GROWING PROTECTIONIST CRIES FROM CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, DO YOU HAVE ANY SPECIFIC EXAMPLES ABOUT WHERE THAT IS AFFECTING CANADA-US TRADE? OR ANY FEARS THAT IT MIGHT..?

DPM/SSEA: WELL WE HAVE HAD, FROM TIME TO TIME, REFLECTIONS OF THE PROTECTIONIST SENTIMENT. I THINK THAT WE HAD IT IN THE LUMBER TRADE, AN EFFORT TO RESTRICT CANADIAN SALES IN THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE OF CERTAIN PRACTICES THAT WERE ALLEGED TO EXIST IN CANADA. THAT IS ONE PROBLEM THAT HAS BEEN CLEARED-UP. AT THE PRESENT TIME WE HAVE PROBLEMS WITH SPECIALTY STEEL, WITH CEMENT, WITH FISH, POTATOES. SO THAT, YOU KNOW, THERE ARE EFFORTS IN THESE AREAS TO PROTECT AMERICAN MARKET AGAINST CANADIAN EXPORTS. IN THE CASE OF SPECIALTY STEEL OF COURSE, THAT HAS BEEN ONE TO WHICH WE TAKE THE DEEPEST EXCEPTION. FISH AND POTATOES ARE STILL UNDER REVIEW. BUT THESE ARE SOME EXAMPLES, WE HAD A PROBLEM

...10

PAGE TEN FPR1145 UNCLAS

IN TIMBER-THAT HAS BEEN SETTLED.WE HAD A PROBLEM IN TRUCKING-THAT
HAS BEEN SETTLED.I THINK WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE THEM.BUT WE HAVE
TO HANDLE THEM ONE BY ONE.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

DPM/SSEA: THANK YOU.

TEXT ENDS

UUU/240 302144Z FPR1145

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

**CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM PEKIN WJGR0921 30NOV83

TO EXTOTT (IDDZ) DELIVER BY 300830

MF
ED
28-6-1 - Hudson Peace Mission

INFO PMDELKWAIT MOSCO TOKYO WSHDC LDN PARIS ROME HAGUE BRU

PRMNY PCOOTT/CARON BONN BNATO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CP

DISTR MINA DMF IDR IDA RBR PER PED RCR RGB RBR RBD ZSI PED EEA

REF OURTEL 0920 30NOV

---PMS MTG WITH DENG XIAOPING:SINO/USA RELNS

SUMMARY--DURING PMS VISIT DENG XIAOPING TOLD PM THAT REGARDLESS OF WHAT HAPPENED REGARDING PREMIER ZHOU ZIYANGS VISIT TO USA PREMIER WOULD PROCEED WITH INTENDED VISIT TO CDA.DENG TOLD PM THAT CURRENT DISPUTE WITH USA OVER RECENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTION WAS FAR MORE SERIOUS THAN RECENT DIFFERENCES SUCH AS THOSE OVER TEXTILES,TENNIS PLAYER HU NA OR GRAIN.DENG'S COMMENTS ECHO THOSE PARTY SECTY HU YAO BANG HAS MADE DURING VISIT TO JPN CASTING DOUBT ON ZHAO VISIT TO USA.

2.REPORT--SEPARATE TEL REPORTS ON DENG'S COMMENTS ON INTERNATL AND SECURITY POLICIES OF USSR AND USA.(REF OURTEL 0920 30NOV)AT CONCLUSION OF CONVERSATION DENG REFERRED TO PREMIER ZHAOS JAN VISIT TO CDA.VISIT TO USA,HE ADDED,STILL RAISED PROBLEMS.

3.HE MENTIONED RECENT ACTION BY CONGRESS IN PASSING APPROPRIATIONS BILL RELATING TO INTERNATL INSTITUTIONS WHICH CONTD PHRASE TO EFFECT THAT TAIWAN SHOULD REMAIN FULL MEMBER OF ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK(ASDB).THIS ACTION DENG SAID WAS WORSE THAN TAIWAN RELNS ACT.

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PAGE TWO WJGR0921 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

AND HE ASKED, WHAT WERE INTENTIONS OF AMERICAN GOVT. IT WAS CREATING TWO CHINAS ON ISSUE OF ASDB. DISPUTE WAS MUCH MORE SERIOUS THAN DIFFERENCES THAT HAD ARISEN OVER TEXTILES, TENNIS PLAYER HU NA OR GRAIN.

4. DENG SAID THAT CHINESE JUST COULD NOT/NOT UNDERSTAND WHY USA GOVT STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF STRENGTHENING SINO/USA RELNS ON ONE HAND BUT TOOK STEPS LIKE THIS. USA HAD TAKEN ACTION TO IMPROVE RELNS BY AMENDING PROCEDURES FOR TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER. NOW THERE APPEARED SUCH RESOLUTIONS. (DENG WAS ALSO THINKING OF SENATE FOREIGN RELNS CTTEE RESOLUTION ON QUOTE FUTURE OF TAIWAN UNQUOTE). USA GOVT OFFERED EXPLANATION THAT RESOLUTIONS WERE WORK OF FEW MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. HE DID NOT/NOT UNDERSTAND WHY IF USA GOVT HAD KNOWLEDGE OF THESE KINDS OF ACTIONS IT DID NOTHING TO PREVENT THEM.

5. RECENT INCIDENTS, HE SAID, HAD ONLY INCREASED OUR SENSE OF MISTRUST. USA HAD OFTEN PLAYED THIS KIND OF TRICK BEFORE BY BLAMING DIVISION OF POWERS FOR ACTIONS OF US CONGRESS OR JUDICIARY. HOWEVER CHINESE HAD DISCOVERED THAT OTHERS DID THINGS DIFFERENTLY. RECENTLY WHEN SOME SWISS BUSINESSMEN WANTED TO SELL WEAPONS TO TAIWAN, SWISS GOVT HAD TAKEN ACTION TO STOP THEM. DENG EMPHASIZED THAT IN THEIR APPROACH TO PROBLEM CHINESE WOULD BE PRUDENT. THEY WOULD SEE WHAT POSN PRES REAGAN TAKES AND THEN DECIDE IF EXCHANGE OF HEAD OF GOVT VISITS WOULD STILL TAKE PLACE. HE ASSURED PM THAT IN EVENT ZHAO ZIYANG DID NOT/NOT GO TO USA HE WOULD STILL VISIT CDA.

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PAGE THREE WJGR0921 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

6. PM SAID THAT HE WELL UNDERSTOOD PROBLEM DENG HAD POINTED OUT; CDA HAD SIMILAR EXPERIENCES. USA ADMIN WOULD SUCCESSFULLY NEGOTIATE AN AGREEMENT, SUCH AS CDA/USA AGREEMENTS ON FISHERIES AND MARITIME BOUNDARIES THEN CONGRESS WOULD REJECT IT. THESE WERE, HE SAID, AN INEVITABLE CONSEQUENCE OF A SYSTEM WHERE CONGRESS WAS PERMITTED TO CHECK AUTHORITY OF ADMIN. THERE WAS NOT/NOT MUCH OTHER GOVTS COULD DO ABOUT IT OTHER THAN TO PUT PRESSURE ON MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. NO/NO DOUBT HE SAID THIS WAS SOMETHING CHINESE AUTHORITIES WERE DOING.

7. AS FOOTNOTE WE SHOULD MENTION THAT DENG'S CONVERSATION WITH PM CONCLUDED WITH DENG RAISING QUOTE PRIVATE MATTER UNQUOTE. HIS SON HAD RECD MEDICAL TREATMENT IN CDA AND FOR THIS DENG EXPRESSED TO THE PM HIS THANKS. PM MENTIONED THAT HE HAD VISITED SON IN HOSPITAL AND ASKED DENG TO CONVEY GREETINGS TO HIM.

CCC/002 300710Z WJGR0921

28-6-1-Hudson Peace Mission
WF
RJ

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

**CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM PMDELPEKIN WJGR0920 30NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 300830

INFO PMDELKWAIT MOSCO TOKYO WSHDC LDN PARIS ROME HAGUE BRU

PRMNY PCOOTT/CRON BONN BNATO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CP

DISTR MINA DMF IDR IDA RBR PER PED RCR RGB RBR RBD ZSI

---PMS MTG WITH DENG XIAO PING

SUMMARY:PM MET WITH DENG XIAO PING(MOST INFLUENTIAL CHINESE LEADER)FOR ONE HOUR 29NOV.WHILE HE SAID PMS EFFORTS WERE IMPORTANT HE DID NOT/NOT LEND SUPPORT TO PROPOSAL FOR FIVE POWER CONFERENCE NOR TO NPT.CHIEF CAUSE OF ARMS RACE,WHICH HE SAID WLD CONTINUE. WAS TWO SUPERPOWERS AND PRESSURE SHD BE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THEM. CHINA HAD ONLY INSIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.CHINA MAINTAINED VIEW HELD BY LATE CHAIRMAN MAO AND PREMIER CHOU THAT DANGER OF WAR EXISTED BUT IT WAS UNCLEAR WHEN IT MIGHT BREAK OUT. IT WAS POSSIBLE TO HAVE PEACE FOR FIVE OR TEN YEARS.CONSTRAINING FACTORS ON OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR WERE:(A)NUCLEAR DETERRENT HFLD BY CHINA AND FRANCE;(B)ALLIES OF USA AND USSR DID NOT/NOT WANT WAR;(C)PEACE MOVEMENTS;AND(D)KNOWLEDGE BY SUPERPOWERS THAT LARGE MAJORITY OF THEIR POPULATION WLD BE KILLED IN NUCLEAR EXCHANGE. CHINA SUGGESTED NOT/NOT TOO MUCH EMPHASIS BE PLACED ON PREVENTIVE HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION AS IT WLD BLUR ATTN OF PUBLIC AWAY FROM SUPERPOWERS AND IN ANY EVENT WLD NOT/NOT FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGE BALANCE OF POWER IN WORLD.INTERESTINGLY DENG SUGGESTED THAT POLICY

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PAGE TWO WJGR0920 CONF D CN EYES ONLY

CHINA DEVELOPED IN MID 1970 OF MOVING CLOSER TO USA AND EUROPE BECAUSE OF THREAT POSED BY USSR MIGHT BE SUBJECT TO ALTERATION BECAUSE OF RECENT ACTIONS OF USA WHICH HE SAID QUOTE AROUSE OUR ATTENTION UNQUOTE.

2.REPORT:PM TRUDEAU HAD HOUR LONG MTG THIS MORNING 29NOV WITH DENG XIAO PING,CHAIRMAN OF SPECIAL ADVISORY CTTEE AND RECOGNIZED TO BE MOST POWERFUL OF CHINESE LEADERS.ONCE MEDIA CLEARED ROOM, DENG IMMED GOT DOWN TO ISSUE AT HAND WITH REMARK THAT THERE WERE AREAS IN WHICH DIFFERENCES EXISTED BETWEEN CDA AND CHINA AND THAT CHINA CLD NOT/NOT AGREE WITH CANADA ON EVERYTHING.PMS EFFORTS HOWEVER WERE IMPORTANT.PM SAID WE SHARED SAME OBJECTIVE;ALL OUR PEOPLE WANTED PEACE.IT WAS ALSO POLICY OF CHINESE GOVT.AS IT WAS CDN,THAT TWO SUPER-POWERS SHD REDUCE THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS. QUESTION WAS HOW DO WE CREATE SUFFICIENT PRESSURE ON SUPERPOWERS TO REDUCE.PM SAID HE WAS ATTEMPTING TO DO THAT FROM HIS SIDE OF ATLANTIC ALLIANCE BY PROPOSING THAT POLITICIANS GET TOGETHER MORE FREQUENTLY TO DISCUSS IMPORTANT ISSUES.AS MEMBER OF NATO HOWEVER HE DID NOT/NOT HAVE MEANS TO BRING DIRECT PRESSURE ON SOVIET UNION BUT THOUGHT THAT OTHER FOUR NUCLEAR POWERS,INCLUDING CHINA, CLD BRING THIS PRESSURE TO BEAR.

3.DENG RESPONDED THAT CHINA HAD SOME NUCLEAR WEAPONS,LIKE FRANCE, AND THAT IN ITSELF THIS WAS FORM OF PRESSURE ON USSR.CHINA HAD SAID AGAIN AND AGAIN THAT ITS NUCLEAR ARSENAL WAS NOT/NOT

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PAGE THREE WJGR0920 CONF D CDN EYES ONLY

SIGNIFICANT. IT ONLY REFLECTED FACT THAT OTHERS HAD NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SO DID CHINA, THEREFORE IF SOMEONE ATTEMPTED TO DESTROY CHINA, THEY WLD ALSO SUFFER FROM RETALIATION. SO WHILE NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE EXPENSIVE, AND CHINA ONLY HAD INSIGNIFICANT NUMBER AND DID NOT/NOT INTEND TO INCREASE THEM SIGNIFICANTLY, THEY DID ACT AS DETERRENT. POSITION TAKEN BY CHINA THEREFORE WAS SAME AS THAT OF FRANCE. TOWARD END OF 1974 JUST AFTER VLADIVOSTOCK AGMT WAS SIGNED BETWEEN USA AND USSR, DENG SAID HE TOLD KISSINGER THAT DESPITE AGMT SOVIETS AND AMERICANS WLD CONTINUE THEIR ARMS RACE. INTERVENING EIGHT YEARS HAD PROVED HIS POINT. ARMS RACE WLD ALSO CONTINUE IN FUTURE. IT WAS INDEPENDENT OF WILL OF PEOPLE; RESULTS WLD BE SAME WHETHER OR NOT/NOT THERE WLD BE CHANGES IN LEADERSHIP OR GOVT IN USA OR USSR. HE HAD TOLD KISSINGER THAT QUOTE WHEN WATER TABLE RISES IN RIVER, POSITION OF BOAT ALSO RISES UNQUOTE. PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THIS, SITUATION WAS GETTING MORE AND MORE GRAVE QUOTE DANGER OF WAR EXISTS AND WE DO NOT/NOT KNOW WHEN IT WILL BREAK OUT UNQUOTE. THERE WERE HOWEVER RESTRAINTS. ALLIES OF USA AND ALLIES OF USSR DID NOT/NOT WANT TO FIGHT A WAR AND THEY ALL DESIRED PEACE. THERE WAS ALSO DESIRE FOR PEACE BY PEOPLE IN MANY COUNTRIES WHICH WAS GROWING EVER STRONGER AND WAS REFLECTED IN MANY PEACE MOVEMENTS. THIS DESIRE WAS FELT MORE STRONGLY IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES OF WHICH CHINA WAS MEMBER. CHINA HOPED THAT PEACE WLD LAST FOR AT LEAST 20 YEARS. PERIOD OF PEACE EXISTING THAT LONG WLD ENABLE

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PAGE FOUR WJGR0920 CONF D CN EYES ONLY

CHINA TO CONCENTRATE ITS ENERGIES ON ITS DESIRE FOR MODERNIZATION OF CHINESE LIFE. SHD SITUATION OF WAR ARISE AGAINST CHINESE WILL HOWEVER IT WLD NOT/NOT BE END OF HUMAN RACE. WAR WOULD NOT/NOT DESTROY ENTIRE HUMAN RACE. TWO BILLION OF WORLDS POPULATION OF FOUR BILLION MIGHT DIE IN NUCLEAR WAR BUT TWO BILLION WOULD BE LEFT AND WOULD STILL LIVE ON IN THIS WORLD. SOVIET UNION AND USA WLD MAKE UP RATHER LARGER PROPORTION OF TWO BILLION KILLED. THIS KNOWLEDGE IN ITSELF WAS ALSO IMPORTANT FACTOR OF RESTRAINT ON SUPERPOWERS.

4. DENG SAID HE BELIEVED FORMER CHAIRMAN MAO AND PREMIER CHOU BOTH HAD TOLD PM IN 1973 THAT IN THEIR JUDGEMENT DANGER OF WAR EXISTED AND THEY DID NOT/NOT KNOW WHEN IT WLD BREAK OUT BUT IT WLD LIKELY BE CONVENTIONAL RATHER THAN NUCLEAR WAR. DENG SAID CHINESE LEADERSHIP STILL ADHERED TO THIS POINT OF VIEW. THAT WAS WHY CHINA HAD ADVISED ITS FRIENDS IN WEST TO INCREASE THEIR CONVENTIONAL ARMS IN ORDER TO COUNTER USSR WHICH HAD GREATER CONVENTIONAL STRENGTH THAN USA AND ITS ALLIES COMBINED. IN THIS REGARD HOWEVER SOME CHANGES HAD TAKEN PLACE IN RECENT YEARS. CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS POSSESSED BY WEST HAD IMPROVED IN TERMS OF QUALITY AND DENG BELIEVED THIS DEVELOPMENT ALSO CONSTITUTED RESTRAINT ON WAR. IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO HAVE PEACE FOR QUOTE FIVE OR TEN YEARS AND POSSIBILITY WAS THERE FOR IT TO LAST EVEN LONGER UNQUOTE.

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PAGE FIVE WJGR0920 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

5.PM ASKED FOR DENG'S VIEW ON DANGER OF OTHER COUNTRIES BECOMING NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES.DENG SAID THERE WOULD NOT/NOT BE MANY.IT WAS VERY EXPENSIVE.INDIA HAD SOME BUT QUOTE WHAT GOOD DOES IT DO INDIA UNQUOTE.JPN WAS POSSIBILITY BUT IT WAS RELYING ON PROTECTION FROM USA.SOME SAID ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA WANTED TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS BUT EVEN IF THEY HAD THEM THEY WOULD NOT/NOT PLAY AN INDEPENDENT ROLE.IT WAS QUOTE UNTHINKABLE UNQUOTE FOR ISRAEL OR SOUTH AFRICA TO UNLEASH NUCLEAR WAR UNLESS DIRECTED FROM QUOTE BEHIND SCREEN UNQUOTE BY USA.CHINA QUOTE DISAPPROVED UNQUOTE OF KIND OF NON-NUCLEAR POLICY(NPT)ADVOCATED BY TWO SUPERPOWERS.BUT IT WLD NOT/NOT ENGAGE IN PROLIFERATION.CHINA DID NOT/NOT HAVE CAPACITY.MOREOVER IT WOULD^{BE} CONTRARY TO ITS OWN EXPERIENCE FOR CHINA TO HELP OTHERS IN THIS WAY;CHINA HAD DEVELOPED NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY AS RESULT OF ITS OWN EFFORTS.DENG SAID HE REMEMBERED DISCUSSING HISTORY OF THIS WITH PM.IN 1963 UK,USA AND USSR SIGNED PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY.IT HAD LEFT QUOTE DEEP IMPRESSION UNQUOTE ON HIM BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN IN MOSCOW AT TIME AS HEAD OF CHINESE DELEGATION.THOSE NEGOTIATIONS WERE BROKEN OFF AT EXCTLY SAME TIME AS TREATY WAS SIGNED.KHRUSCHEV HAD GIVEN FAREWELL BANQUET FOR CHINESE BUT MADE NO/NO MENTION OF TREATY AND CHINESE DID NOT/NOT LEARN OF ITS SIGNATURE UNTIL THEY RETURNED TO PEKING.OF COURSE DENG SAID THAT TREATY WAS NOT/NOT BINDING ON CHINA WHICH DEVELOPED ITS OWN WEAPONS AND RELIED ON ITSELF TO DO SO.REASON WHY CHINA

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PAGE SIX WJGR0920 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

HAD TAKEN THIS POSITION ON ISSUE OF PREVENTING NUCLEAR PROLIFORATION DENG SAID WAS EXACTLY BECAUSE IT HAS HAD THIS EXPERIENCE.CHINA HAS SAID MANY TIMES THAT IT WAS NOT/NOT GOING TO CONTINUE DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS BECAUSE IT WISHED TO GIVE PRIORITY TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN FIELDS OF AGRICULTURE,SCIENCE AND EDUCATION.THEREFORE FOR CONSIDERABLE PERIOD INTO FUTURE CHINAS NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL ONLY HAVE QUOTE SYMBOLIC VALUE UNQUOTE.IT WLD BE EVEN MORE IMPOSSIBLE FOR INDIA TO DEVELOP IF IT DIRECTED TOO MUCH ENERGY TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS;IT WLD GET INTO MORE DIFFICULT POSITION BOTH INTERNATIONALLY AND AT HOME.NUCLEAR WEAPONS WLD ONLY WEAKEN NOT/NOT STRENGTHEN INDIA.SAME SITUATION WLD APPLY TO CHINA IF IT DEVOTED TOO MANY RESOURCES TO DEVELOPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

6.DENG SUGGESTED THAT NOT/NOT TOO MUCH EMPHASIS SHD BE PLACED ON ISSUE OF PREVENTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION BECAUSE IT WLD QUOTE BLUR UNQUOTE ATTN OF PUBLIC WHICH SHD BE DIRECTED AT TWO SUPERPOWERS.DENG ADDED THAT EVEN IF THERE WERE ONE OR TWO MORE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES IT WLD NOT/NOT FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGE BALANCE OF POWER IN WORLD.HAVING SAID ALL THIS DENG STATED CHINA WLD STILL DISCUSS SUBJ.WHAT HE WISHED TO SAY WAS THAT WE SHD CONCENTRATE OUR EFFORTS ON OPPOSING ARMS RACE BETWEEN TWO SUPERPOWERS.WHILE IT WAS UNLIKELY TO HAVE MUCH EFFECT,IF PRESSURE WAS KEPT UP ON TWO SUPERPOWERS AND THEY FELT THEY MUST CONSTRAIN ...7

PAGE SEVEN WJGR0920 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

ARMS RACE, THEN PMS EFFORTS AND WHAT HE AND OTHERS, INCLUDING CHINA, HAVE DONE, WILL PROVE TO HAVE BEEN OF SIGNIFICANCE. TWO SUPERPOWERS SHD BE COMPELLED TO HEAR THIS KIND OF MESSAGE FROM TIME TO TIME. 7. PM SAID THIS WAS GOOD ADVICE BUT HE WAS NOT/NOT ADVOCATING THAT UK, FRANCE AND CHINA REDUCE THEIR ARSENALS BUT RATHER THAT THEY SHD COME TO TABLE IN ORDER TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE ON TWO SUPERPOWERS BECAUSE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS CLD APPLY MORE PRESSURE THAN CDA. PM SAID HE APPRECIATED ENCOURAGEMENT HE HAD RECEIVED FROM DENG TODAY AND FROM PREMIER ZHAO YESTERDAY TO CONTINUE HIS EFFORTS. HE WLD REMAIN OPTIMISTIC AS DENG SUGGESTED HE SHD BE.

8. AT THIS POINT, PM PREPARED TO END MTG BUT DENG INDICATED HE WISHED TO CONTINUE. HE ADDED THAT ANOTHER IMPORTANT KIND OF PRESSURE ON SUPERPOWERS WAS FOR COUNTRIES TO FOLLOW INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY. IN 1970S, EVERYONE APPRECIATED INDEPENDENT FOREIGN POLICY PURSUED BY GEN DE GAULLE. IN 1970S AS FAR AS CHINA WAS CONCERNED, MAIN DANGER OF OUTBREAK OF WAR HAD BEEN FROM USSR AND CHINA PURSUED POLICY OF DRAWING CLOSER TO USA AND EUROPE: QUOTE THAT POLICY WAS FORMULATED IN LIGHT OF CIRCUMSTANCES AT THAT TIME UNQUOTE. USSR WAS ON OFFENSIVE AT THAT TIME AND USA ON DEFENSIVE. IN RECENT YEARS HOWEVER THERE HAD BEEN SOME CHANGES. USSR WAS STILL BEING VERY AGGRESSIVE BUT CERTAIN RECENT ACTIONS BY USA HAD BEEN OF SAME CHARACTER. IN TERMS OF CHINA, ONE QUESTION WAS THAT OF TAIWAN. USA, INCLUDING SOME POLITICIANS IN GOVT AT

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PAGE EIGHT WJGR0920 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

PRESENT TIME WANTED TO CREATE TWO CHINAS.VERY AGGRESSIVE POLICY PURSUED BY ISRAEL AND SOUTH AFRICA WAS REFLECTION OF USA POLICY AND THERE WERE ALSO PROBLEMS OF CENTRAL AMERICA AND LATIN AMERICA AS WELL AS PROBLEM OF ARGENTINA(FALKLAND)IT QUOTE WLD HAVE BEEN WISE FOR USA TO HAVE TAKEN NEUTRAL POSITION IN ARGENTINA UNQUOTE.INSTEAD,USA FULLY SUPPORTED UK.THERE WAS ALSO PROBLEM OF CARIBBEAN.USA HAD QUOTE FOUR AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AROUND WORLD UNQUOTE,WHICH IT WAS INTENT ON MAINTAINING;KOREA,TAIWAN,SOUTH AFRICA AND ISRAEL.LATIN AMERICA WAS REGARDED AS BACKYARD OF USA. THIS WAS TRUE IN HISTORY AND WAS STILL TRUE NOW.CHINA WAS THEREFORE UNCERTAIN ABOUT USA POLICY.USA HAD DONE SOME THINGS SINCE BEGINNING OF THIS YEAR WHICH QUOTE SHD AROUSE OUR ATTN UNQUOTE.ALL COUNTRIES THEREFORE,INCLUDING CHINA,SHD FOLLOW INDEPENDENT POLICY IN THIS QUOTE GRAVE SITUATION UNQUOTE,AS SUCH A COURSE WAS AN EFFECTIVE CONSTRAINT ON TWO SUPERPOWERS.ONLY USA AND USSR WERE QUALIFIED TO FIGHT WORLD WAR,NO/NO ONE ELSE. CHINA OF COURSE HAD NOT/NOT EQUATED USA WITH USSR NOR HAD IT CHANGED ITS VIEW THAT SU WAS STILL MAIN SOURCE OF WAR.HOWEVER QUOTE IN RECENT YEARS OUR ATTN HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO FACT THAT THERE ARE TWO SUPERPOWERS NOT/NOT JUST ONE;THEREFORE DANGER OF WAR COMES FROM NOT/NOT ONLY ONE SOURCE BUT FROM TWO;BUT OF COURSE ONE WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE OTHER UNQUOTE.IN CHINESE VIEW THIS KIND OF INDEPENDENT POLICY WAS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS IN

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PAGE NINE WJGR0920 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY
EFFORTS TOWARD PEACE.

9.DENG TURNED CONVERSATION AT THIS POINT TO USA POLICY TOWARD
TAIWAN AND RELATED ISSUE OF PREMIER ZHAOS VISIT TO USA(AND CDA)
IN JANUARY.THIS WILL BE REPORTED IN SEPARATE TEL BY EMB.

CCC/002 300815Z WJGR0920

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

28-6-1-*Trudeau Peace Mission* MF
B

R E S T R I C T E D

FM DELHI WBGR0576 30NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/CIS/ADM POL/ CPP/DGIS VMBFR

DISTR DMF USS PSR IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RBR IDA RSR RCD RCR RBD
IDR IDD RBRD IDX ZSP ZSI

---PMS DISARM INITIATIVE:INDIA PRESS REACTION

PMS PEACE INITIATIVE RECEIVED GOOD COVERAGE FROM INDIAN PRESS DURING CHOGM.HIS REPLY TO MRS GANDHIS OPEING ADDRESS RECEIVED MAXIMUM PUBLICITY,ESPECIALLY HIS PLEA TO SAVE MANKIND FROM NUCLEAR THREAT.THE STATESMAN(LARGE CIRCULATION,MUCH RESPECTED) REPORTED THAT THE COMMONWEALTH LEADERS HAD ANOINTED MR TRUDEAU THE QUOTE PRINCE OF PEACE UNQUOTE AND NOTED THAT HE WAS EXPECTED TO BRING BACK GOOD NEWS FROM PEKIN.HOWEVER IT ALSO STATED THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE WHAT THE GOA DECLARATION WILL ACHIEVE ON THE GROUND AS MOSCO HAS NEVER TAKEN MUCH NOTICE OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND WSHDC IS BOUND TO BE OUTRAGED AT BEING TREATED AT PAR WITH ITS ADVERSARY.NO/NO EDITORIALS HAVE APPEARED BUT GENERAL TONE OF REPORTS IS POSITIVE.

2.REPORTS OF PMS QUOTE AIR DASH TO PEKIN UNQUOTE WERE LARGELY FACTUAL WITH NO/NO EDITORIAL COMMENT.HOWEVER PRESS TRUST OF INDIA REPORTED FROM PEKIN QUOTE COLD CHINESE RESPONSE TO TRUDEAU UNQUOTE IN CONTRAST TO OTHER REPORTS WHICH MENTIONED QUOTE USFFUL UNQUOTE TALKS OR WERE MORE POSITIVE.QUOTE TIME OF INDIA UNQUOTE

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PAGE TWO WBGR0576 RESTR

(ALSO RESPECTED AND WIDELY READ)REPORTED THAT MR TRUDEAU TOLD MRS GANDHI THAT CHINESE LEADERS HAD WELCOMED GOA DECLARATION ON INTERNATL SECURITY.

3.WE WOULD SUM UP BY SAYING THAT THUS FAR TRUDEAU INITIATIVE HAS BEEN TREATED AS NEWSWORTHY DURING CHOGM BUT HAS NOT/NOT RECEIVED THOUGHTFUL EDITORIAL ANALYSIS.

4.WE WILL BE FORWARDING TO IMC COMPLETE SET OF CLIPPINGS ON CHOGM COVERAGE WHICH WILL ALSO CONTAIN ARTICLES ON PEACE INITITATIVE.

CCC/282 010352Z WBGR0576

External Affairs / Affaires extérieures
Canada

action

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

WDC 006 / 30/086	
	1009

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ UNCLASSIFIED - FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

FM/DE FM WSHDC POLO539 30NOV83

TO/A TO EXTOTT/IDDZ

NFO ---INF - 9 PAGES

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SUBJ/SUJ

28-6-1 - Hudson Peace Mission

FOR/TOD COMMUNICATIONS
NOV 30 20 14 '83
CANADIAN EMBASSY
OTTAWA

DICTATOR/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG *[Signature]*
R.J. LYSYSHYN/th

288

000778

CHRONOLOGY OF US AND SOVIET PROPOSALS AT THE NEGOTIATIONS ON
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF) IN GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

UNITED STATES INF POSITION

The U.S. contends that there is presently an imbalance in INF systems because the U.S.S.R. has 560 land-based missiles - the SS-4 and SS-20 - which can strike all Western European targets while NATO has no comparable systems deployed. In December 1979, NATO decided to redress this imbalance by deploying 464 US ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and 108 Pershing II intermediate-range missiles.

The US position at INF has been based on two tenets. First, it insists that all Soviet INF missiles be counted, including those deployed in the central and eastern regions of the USSR (about 117), contending that the SS-20 is mobile and can be moved west to strike European targets. Second, it refuses to include the present 162 British and French intermediate-range missiles in the talks, claiming that they are independent nuclear forces over which the US has no control.

ZERO-ZERO Proposal: On Nov. 18, 1981, President Reagan proposed cancelling the deployment of all 572 Pershing IIs and GLCMs in exchange for elimination of all Soviet SS-20s, SS-4s, and SS-5s (All SS-5s have since been dismantled. There are presently about 200 SS-4 and 360 SS-20 missiles worldwide, carrying a total of about 1,300 warheads). On February 2, 1982, during the first negotiating round, the U.S. tabled a treaty that embodied this proposal.

Interim Proposal: On March 30, 1983, President Reagan proposed an "interim agreement" that would reduce the planned deployment of Pershing IIs and GLCMs if the U.S.S.R. would reduce their IRBM warheads to an equal level. (Because the SS-20 is MIRVed, this would give the U.S. a 3:1 missile advantage). The US offered the USSR a demonstrative range of anywhere between 50 and 450 warheads. There would be no ban on specific systems. All Soviet SS-20s would be included in the reductions. The Soviets would not be compensated for British and French systems. Aircraft would not be included. Short-range systems would be frozen at current levels.

On September 26, 1983, in a speech to the UN, President Reagan outlined three additional modifications in the US proposal that had been tabled in Geneva. First, US INF deployments in Europe would not off-set the number of Soviet SS-20s world-wide, though the US would retain the right to maintain an equivalent number of missiles and deploy them elsewhere. Second, the US would be "flexible" on the issue of aircraft limits, and would be willing to consider aircraft in the initial phase of an INF agreement. Third, the US would address the mix of Pershing IIs and GLCMs and would be willing to discuss reducing the level of Pershing IIs.

3 de 9

SOVIET INF POSITION

The U.S.S.R. contends that the SS-20 is only a modernization and replacement of the SS-4s and SS-5s that have been targeted on Europe for years. It holds that a balance of nuclear forces in Europe presently exists, when one considers the many nuclear aircraft and submarine launched missiles the U.S. has there and includes British and French forces (each side, the USSR claims, have about 1,000 systems). According to the Soviets the zero-zero proposal forces them to unilaterally disarm while leaving existing NATO INF forces undisturbed. The Soviets refuse to accept any limitations on SS-20s in the Eastern USSR, saying they are directed against China, and insisting they cannot strike Europe.

The Soviets have proposed "a mutually acceptable agreement on the basis of equality and equal security and to overcome the dangerous situation which is becoming imminent as a result of the NATO decision to deploy the latest American missiles in Western Europe."

February 6, 1982: The Soviets tabled a draft treaty that would limit medium-range nuclear weapons (combat radius above 1000 kilometers) deployed in Europe, in adjacent waters or intended for use in Europe.

I. Types of weapons to be covered - would include those with ranges between 1,000 and 5,000 kilometers, SLEMs constructed before 1965, and nuclear capable aircraft. Also, limits on missiles with ranges between 500 and 1,000 kilometers. A freeze on missiles in Asia. No GLCMs or SLCMs with ranges above 500 kilometers anywhere in the world.

II. The zone of reductions - to extend from the mid-Atlantic to 20 degrees east longitude (just west of Novosibirsk) from the Arctic to Africa.

III. Scheme of reductions - Both sides would reduce to 600 units by the end of 1985 and 300 units by 1990. Within the 300, each side must have equal numbers of missiles and aircraft. Each side could determine which weapons to reduce and carry out replacements and modernization of armaments "whose framework is to be determined additionally." Reduction would include destruction of missiles, but possibility of withdrawing armaments behind agreed lines would not be excluded. Adequate control of compliance. During negotiations, each side would abstain from new deployments and medium-range weapons would be frozen qualitatively and quantitatively.

March 16, 1982: President Brezhnev announced that the USSR would unilaterally cease deploying medium-range armaments in the European USSR. He added that the moratorium would apply both quantitatively and qualitatively. He also announced a unilateral reduction in Soviet medium-range missiles (presumably SS-4s and 5s). He said the moratorium would be in effect until the US began "practical preparations to

-3-

mid-Atlantic to the Urals and from the Arctic to Africa. Over five years existing medium-range missiles and bombers would be reduced to 300 units each for the USSR and NATO. French and British weapons would be included in the NATO totals, though they need not be committed to anything in the agreement. No new weapons would be permitted, including the Pershing II and GLCM. Weapons outside the zone must be deployed "in such a way that the weapons of one side could not reach the targets of the other side in said zone." Measures would be included to "limit nuclear weapons with a range of less than 1,000 kilometers."

December 16, 1982: Yuri Andropov, who succeeded Brezhnev as general secretary of the CPSU, during a speech commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Union, added to the above proposal: "[W]e are prepared to agree that the Soviet Union should retain in Europe only as many missiles as are kept there by Britain and France, and not one more.... If later, the number of British and French missiles were scaled down, the number of Soviet ones would be further reduced by that same number. Along with this there must also be an accord on reducing to equal levels on both sides the number of medium-range nuclear delivery aircraft stationed in this region by the USSR and the NATO countries." (The Soviets maintain that the British and French have 162 missiles.)

May 3, 1983: General Secretary Andropov proposed equal levels in delivery vehicles and warheads with NATO (according to the Soviets, NATO has 162 missiles and several times more warheads). If the British and French reduced their warheads, the Soviet Union would reduce as much. Asian-based SS-20s were not mentioned.

October 26, 1983: Andropov clarified elements of the Soviet proposal. First, he said that reductions to equal levels of warheads would mean that the Soviets would have to reduce their SS-20s in Europe to "approximately 140". Second, they would, in the event of an agreement, cease deploying SS-20s in Asia. Third, he reiterated that all SS-20s and SS-4s in excess of the limit would be dismantled and mentioned that all SS-5s had already been dismantled. Finally, he offered "additional flexibility" on medium-range aircraft by saying that the USSR was prepared to agree to "a mutually acceptable quantitative range...substantially different from the range proposed by us previously." The number and types of aircraft to be included would be negotiated.

November 13, 1983: There are conflicting reports that on this date, chief Soviet negotiator Kvitsinsky informally suggested a new proposal to US negotiator Nitze. According to US and West German officials, Kvitsinsky proposed that, if the US would abandon attempts to deploy Pershing II and GLCM, the Soviets would reduce their SS-20s in the

5 de 9

-4-

November 23, 1983: Following the vote in the West German parliament reaffirming support for the deployment of Pershing II missiles in December, and as the first Pershing IIs were being delivered, Kvitsinsky announced that "The present round of negotiations has been discontinued and no date has been set for a resumption."

MITZE-KVITSINSKY FRAMEWORK: In July, 1982, the chief negotiators for the US and the USSR at the INF talks, Ambassadors Paul Nitze and Yuli Kvitsinsky, conducted their famous "Walk in the woods", a series of conversations outside the formal negotiations. On July 16, Nitze put together with Kvitsinsky an 11 point package that might constitute a final agreement. Its heading read, "This is a joint exploratory package for the consideration of both governments; it is not an offer or a proposal by either government." An outline follows.

- 1) The agreement covers medium-range (1,000-5,500 km.) nuclear systems based in Europe.
- 2) Each side will be limited in Europe to 75 land-based missile launchers.
- 3) The Soviet 75 may be SS-20 launchers, each launcher carrying one missile.
- 4) The eastern boundary of Europe is defined as the line of longitude 60 degrees east. However, because of its range, the limit on the SS-20 applies over a wider area, the eastern boundary being longitude 80 degrees east.
- 5) East of the 80 degree line, the USSR will be permitted 90 SS-20 launchers.
- 6) No other SS-20 launchers will be deployed.
- 7) The aircraft covered by this agreement will be, on the US side, F-111 bombers, and on the Soviet side, Backfire, Badger and Blinder bombers deployed with the Air Force (excludes Naval Aviation). Neither side will deploy more than 150 of these types in Europe.
- 8) Missiles with ranges between 500-1,000 km. will be held to existing numbers and capabilities. Subject to these restrictions, they may be modernized. (This covered the SS-22 and arguably the SS-23, but allowed NATO to upgrade the accuracy of the Pershing IA).

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CHRONOLOGY OF US AND SOVIET STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION PROPOSALS
IN GENEVA, SWITZERLAND (As of November 27, 1983)

UNITED STATES POSITION

The US believes that the negotiations should concentrate on the most "destabilizing" nuclear systems, which it defines as ballistic missiles, especially MIRVed ICBMs. The SALT II Treaty was rejected by the US administration for not containing "real reductions" nor sufficiently restricting certain Soviet systems, such as the Backfire bomber and heavy missiles. US START proposals have concentrated on limiting areas of Soviet strength, notably its ICBMs, which it insists are the most threatening to deterrence. Bombers should not be subject to the same restrictions as ballistic missiles because they are not as destabilizing and must penetrate Soviet air defenses.

Round I (June-July 1982): Presented basic proposal as outlined in President's Eureka speech. Two-phased approach to negotiations. First phase, each side to reduce total ballistic missile RVs to 5,000, of which no more than 2500 could be on ICBMs. Total missile launchers not to exceed 850. In second phase, direct and substantial reductions in missile throw weight to below current U.S. level.

Round II (October-November 1982): Unknown.

Round III (February-March 1983): Tabled a draft treaty on confidence building measures. It would require each side to provide prior notification of all missile test launches, exercises involving more than 50 bombers in a 24-hour period, and any significant increase in submarines at sea. Also tabled the "basic elements" of a START agreement. It included all of the previous elements plus added "collateral restraints" on Soviet MIRVed ICBMs and heavy missiles of 210 and 110, respectively. Stated that cruise missile restrictions were open to discussion but must include all types of cruise missiles, not only long-range.

Round IV (June-July 1983): Tabled a draft treaty that offered to drop the 850/2500/210/110 restrictions in favor of a direct throw weight restriction of "X" million kilograms which would have to be a "reasonable" number though not necessarily as low as the current U.S. level of 1.8 million kilograms. Offered to set launcher limit between 850 and Soviet proposal. Each side to be limited to 400 heavy bombers (including Backfire but not FB-111). The total number of ALCMs could not exceed an average of 20 per bomber. Proposed a ban on all telemetry encryption.

Round V (October-November 1983): US proposed that a working group be established to study a new US formula for reductions known as "build-down". The US also presented a general idea of how build down would work and, on November 17, introduced treaty language combining build-down with its previous proposal.

Build-down involves the dismantling of existing missile warheads as new ones are introduced. "Variable ratios" would be used, depending on the type of weapon system being introduced. One possible formula, presented to the Soviets: 2:1 for MIRVed ICBMs, 3:2 for SLBMs, and

-2-

No precise formula for incorporating bombers and cruise missiles has yet been presented to the Soviets, though the US did explain to the USSR, in general, how a bomber build-down could work. The US may propose a concurrent build-down for bombers based on a launch-platform, and not an aggregate weapon basis. How build-down would affect US cruise missile deployments, has not been decided or explained to the USSR. A second build-down in "destructive capacity" or throw-weight has also been proposed. The Soviets have rejected build-down or any working group to study it.

SOVIET UNION

USSR START POSITION

The Soviet Union believes that any START agreement should be based on "equality and equal security" and build on what has already been achieved, meaning the SALT I and II agreements. Their draft treaty bears a close resemblance to the SALT II framework, though it involves a 20-25% cut in SALT II limits and sub-ceilings. The Soviets allege that all US START proposals have had the intention of forcing the emasculation of Soviet strategic forces and undermining the state of strategic parity that was codified by the SALT II treaty.

Round I: Layed out general principles of agreement. Some specific proposals, including a three-staged 25% reduction in the SALT II limits and sub-limits (see Round III). Proposed a freeze on new deployments, a limit of between 4-6 new submarines of the US Trident and Soviet Typhoon types and a ban on all cruise missiles with ranges above 600 km. Also proposed a substantial reduction to equal levels of "nuclear charges".

Round II: Layed out basic principles of agreement and general description of proposals. Some more specific limits (see Round III). Stated that its START proposal was contingent on no buildup of forward-based systems. Also proposed confidence building measures and a working group to examine such measures.

Round III: Soviets tabled a draft treaty laying out all specific limits. The three-staged proposal would work as follows:

Phase one: reduction to 2,250 delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLEMs and heavy bombers) by 1985. Also by 1985, a reduction to SALT II MIRVed sublimits (aggregate of 1320 MIRVed missiles and bombers equipped for long-range ALCMs, 1200 MIRVed missiles, and 820 MIRVed ICBMs).

Phase two: reduction to 2,000 delivery vehicles and 750 MIRVed ICBMs by 1987.

Phase three: reduction to 1,800 delivery vehicles by 1989. Sublimits of 1,200 on MIRVed missile launchers and heavy bombers equipped to carry long-range ALCMs. A limit of 1,080 on MIRVed missiles, and a limit of 680 on MIRVed ICBMs.

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The dreaded Soviet arms li

By DAVID T. JOHNSON

ON MARCH 16 Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev announced a Soviet freeze on the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. Brezhnev also repeated Soviet proposals for reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons in Europe in the U.S.-Soviet negotiations currently underway in Geneva. Reagan administration officials quickly dismissed the Brezhnev announcement as "a propaganda gesture."

This is just the latest in a series of Soviet proposals for arms limitation. Soviet spokespersons say their government has made more than 100 proposals on arms control and disarmament in recent years. Few, if any, have been considered seriously or even noticed in the U.S.

It has been traditional U.S. government practice, going back to the late 1940s, to construe Soviet arms control offers as mere propaganda, unworthy of positive re-

Admiral Stansfield Turner, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, recently expressed Soviet self-interest in arms control this way:

I think that they realize that they must avoid an arms race with us, from their point of view, and therefore they probably feel today that having secured their position as a superpower through the use of these arms that they could afford a mutual reduction. I do not think they think in a war-fighting mode nearly as much as we are in this country — that is, how you actually would get involved in this kind of a conflict. And therefore, I also think they would be more amenable to these reductions.

It may be useful to provide a brief inventory of recent Soviet arms control proposals. The status of U.S.-Soviet negotiations is indicated where appropriate.

1. Immediate resumption of negotiations on limiting strategic arms between the U.S. and the Soviet Union; not insisting on the terms of the SALT II treaty. (Talks are expected to resume this spring or summer.)

2. The holding of negotiations on a comprehensive treaty on the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of stockpiles until their complete elimination.

3. Prepared to limit the deployment of new strategic submarines such as the U.S. Trident and the Soviet Typhoon; would agree to banning the modernization of existing and the development of new ballistic missiles for submarines.

4. Setting up a competent international committee of eminent scientists which would demonstrate the vital necessity of preventing a nuclear catastrophe.

5. Further discussions on the problem of preventing a surprise attack or the unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons.

6. Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests; willing to enter into agreement with U.S. and United Kingdom even if France and China do not; willing to ban so-called peaceful tests. (Negotiations in abeyance since 1980.)

7. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world (areas mentioned include Northern Europe, Balkans, Africa, Middle East, Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean).

8. Withdrawal of nuclear-armed naval vessels from the Mediterranean and the deployment of nuclear

states which have renounced nuclear weapons and acquisition of nuclear weapons. They have proposed of an international declaration of the first use of nuclear weapons as the gravest crime against mankind.

11. An international convention for the prohibition of the production, deployment and use of nuclear weapons. Soviets have declared they will not appear in other countries.

12. Various proposals for the reduction of nuclear weapons in and for Europe from about 1,000 systems on each side today to 1,000 by 1990 or the total elimination of medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and intermediate range weapons in Europe. (Negotiations began in 1981.)

13. Treaty on the prohibition of the production of biological weapons. (Discussion at UN Committee on Disarmament.)

14. A NATO-Warsaw Pact agreement on the first use of either nuclear or conventional weapons.

15. Proposal that the Warsaw Pact alliances in Europe and the

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not admit new members and a conference should be set up.

16. Expanding confidence building measures in Europe, such as military exercises and large-scale maneuvers, exchanges of observation posts, etc. (Meetings on Helsinki Accords.)

17. Prepared to hold confidence building measures in the East.

18. Various proposals for the reduction of conventional forces. (Negotiations in Vienna.)

19. Various proposals for the reduction of naval forces in the world.

20. The limitation of military forces in the Indian Ocean. (Talks suspended.)

21. Agreement on the supply of conventional



sponse by our side. In the 1950s the Soviets emphasized grandiose proposals for general and complete disarmament and seemed indifferent to the requirements for verification of arms control treaties. It was easy for Americans to question Soviet intentions.

But since then some 15 arms control treaties and agreements have been signed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. A few years ago the two governments were engaged in negotiations and discussions on a wide range of further agreements.

Increased concern about the dangers of war and the enormous burden of the arms race has helped to stimulate Soviet interest in alternatives to arms expansion. The particular fear a new round of



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forum

Soviet arms limitations

insfield Turner, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, reassessed Soviet self-interest in this way:

...that they realize that they are in an arms race with us, from their point of view, and therefore they probably feel today that having their position as a superpower through the use of these arms would afford a mutual reduction. They do not think they think in a big mode nearly as much as this country — that is, how they would get involved in a conflict. And therefore, they think they would be more likely to these reductions.

...willing to provide a brief inventory of Soviet arms control proposals of U.S.-Soviet negotiations where appropriate.

...the resumption of negotiating strategic arms between the Soviet Union; not insisting on the SALT II treaty. (Talks are to resume this spring or summer.)

...ending of negotiations on a new treaty on the cessation of production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of their complete elimination.

...to limit the deployment of nuclear submarines such as the U.S. Typhoon; would limit the modernization of the development of new ballistic

states which have renounced the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and have no nuclear weapons on their territory. They have proposed the adoption of an international declaration proclaiming the first use of nuclear weapons the gravest crime against mankind.

11. An international convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron weapons. Soviets have declared they will not begin manufacturing such weapons if they do not appear in other countries.

12. Various proposals for limiting nuclear weapons in and for Europe, including reduction from about 1,000 medium-range systems on each side today to about 300 in 1990 or the total elimination of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and intended for use in Europe. (Negotiations began in November 1981.)

13. Treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons. (Discussions continuing at UN Committee on Disarmament.)

14. A NATO-Warsaw Pact treaty on no first use of either nuclear or conventional weapons.

15. Proposal that the existing military alliances in Europe and elsewhere should

IN MY OPINION

not admit new members and no new blocs should be set up.

16. Expanding confidence building measures in Europe, such as notification of mili-

...tarily to developing countries. (Talks suspended since 1979.)

22. A treaty on the prohibition of the deployment of any type of weapon in space. (Negotiations on limiting anti-satellite warfare suspended since 1979.)



23. Treaty on the prohibition of chemical warfare. (Negotiations suspended since 1980.)

24. The prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction (such as lasers and particle beam weapons).

25. Agreement on military budget reductions, with some savings going to aid developing countries.

26. A world treaty on the renunciation of the use of force in international relations.

27. Calling of a special session of the UN Security Council with the participation of the top leaders of its members in order to look for keys to improving the international situation and preventing war.

28. Willing to hold discussions with the U.S. on a code of conduct for relations with developing countries.

action

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PEKIN WJGR0924 29NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO PMDELKWAIT MOSCO TOKYO WSHDC LDN PARIS ROME HAGUE BRU

PRMNY PCOOTT/CARON BONN BNATO NDHQOTT/ADM POL/ CPP

DISTR MINA DMF IDR IDA RBR PER PED RCR RGB RBR RBD ZSI

---PMS VISIT-CHINESE PRESS COVERAGE

PEOPLES DAILY OF 29NOV CARRIED TWO STORIES ABOUT PM VISIT AND DISCUSSIONS WITH PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG. ONE ARTICLE QUOTED EXTENSIVELY FROM TOASTS AT WELCOMING BANQUET. OTHER READS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE

PREMIER OF STATE COUNCIL ZHAO ZIYANG HELD TALKS THIS AFTERNOON WITH CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER PEIRRE E TRUDEAU.

IT IS KNOWN THAT BOTH SIDES EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND IN PARTICULAR, DISARMAMENT AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU ARRIVED IN BEIJING THIS MORNING AND IS HERE FOR A WORKING VISIT UPON THE INVITATION BY THE CHINESE GOVT.

TRUDEAU SAID DURING THE TALKS: THERE IS GREAT TENSION IN THE CURRENT WORLD SITUATION. WE HOPE THAT MORE AND MORE POLITICAL LEADERS WILL SHOW MORE CONCERN OVER THE TENSE SITUATION AND TAKE PART IN EASING THE TENSION.

ZHAO ZIYANG SAID: THE CHINESE GOVT UNDERSTAND VERY MUCH PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S CONCERN OVER THE WORSENING OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. ZHAO ZIYANG EXPRESSED APPRECIATION OF PRIME MINISTER

...2

PAGE TWO WJGR0924 UNCLAS

TRUDEAUS EFFORTS IN IMPROVING EAST-WEST RELATIONS AS WELL AS
EASING WORLD TENSION.

ZHAO ZIYANG REITERATED CHINESE GOVERNMENTS CONSISTANT STAND ON
DISARMAMENT AND SAID THAT CHINA WILL MAKE A SERIOUS STUDY OF
PROPOSALS ON DISARMAMENT MADE BY PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU AND
LEADERS OF OTHER COUNTRIES.

THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS AGREED THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO
DISCUSS MAJOR ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST NEXT JANUARY.

UNQUOTE.

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KWAIT LDN IMMED TT 437 SQN TRENTON IMMED DE CAF

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---PMS VISIT TO ASIA/GULF STATES-NOV83

PM AND DEL ARRIVED ABDBI NOV30/30 AS SCHEDULED. ACCOMMODATED AT
INTERCFONTINENTAL HOTEL TEL 363.777 DEL OFFICE ROOM 1734. MEDIA
SAME HOTEL. CREW SHERATON 823.333.

2. DEPARTING ABDBI DEC01/01 1000HRS FOR MUSCAT OMAN.

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28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

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General Assembly

Distr.
GENERAL

A/38/2*
30 November 1983
ENGLISH

ORIGINAL: ARABIC/CHINESE
ENGLISH/FRENCH
RUSSIAN/SPANISH

Thirty-eighth session

REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

16 June 1982-15 June 1983

28-6-1 - Judeau Peace
Mission

W.A.K.
When you have a spare hour or two
you might want to read the art.
- Alex
11 Jan 84

* The present document will subsequently be issued in final form as
Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-eighth Session, Supplement No. 2
(A/38/2).

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Part III

MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

Chapter 13

WORK OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE

783. The Military Staff Committee functioned continuously under the draft rules of procedure during the period under review and held a total of 26 meetings without considering matters of substance.

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Canadian Embassy



ACC	REF	DATE
FILE	DOSSIER	
28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission		
CC 20 - CARIB - 1-3		
Ambassade du Canada		
CC 20 - AMERICA LAT - 1-3		

Jakarta, Indonesia

November 29, 1983

Dear Al,

Further to your talks with Mohammed Hasan, Head of the Americas Division in DEPLU (i.e. DFA) here, I just want to confirm his very strong interest in two points you discussed with him:

1. The Prime Minister's peace initiatives
2. The political situation in Latin America and the Caribbean

Since your departure, I have spoken to him a couple of times. He asks me all about the latest BBC reports on the P.M.'s peace pilgrimage and then peppers me with questions about places like Belize, Guyana and Surinam. You may be interested to know that the Indonesians do have an Embassy in Paramaribo; it seems that the Dutch sent over large numbers of Javanese workers some generations ago. For this reason Hasan does have some coverage of developments in the area, but it certainly needs a balanced perspective. You did mention that you would put Ambassador Djalal in touch with the appropriate people in the Department. The point of my letter is just to confirm with you that there is a very hearty appetite for information on these subjects here. Providing information to the Indonesians about this region in a more or less organized way would certainly make our job easier here.

Regards,

Jon J. Scott
Jon J. Scott
Counsellor

Mr. R.A. Kilpatrick
Assistant Deputy Minister
(PGB)
Asia and Pacific
Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Ontario



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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FROM CARON
---PM TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON

TO REITERATE POINTS MADE IN TELECON : RECEIVED CALL AT 09:30 AM
(TUESDAY 29) FM ROUSE, US EMBASSY, ADVISING THAT STATE HAD JUST INFOR-
MED HIM THAT WHITE HOUSE SCHEDULING MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE AT
1000 AM. HE REQUESTED THAT WE INFORM HIM, BY 1000 AM IF POSSIBLE,
WHICH DATE IN DECEMBER WOULD NOT ^{JUST} BE CONVENIENT FOR PM S MEETING
WITH US PRESIDENT. HE FURTHER ADVISED THAT US PRESIDENT S SCHEDULE
FOR THE NEXT FEW MONTHS WAS SUCH THAT US ADMINISTRATION COULD NOT
ENTERTAINED BOTH AN INITIATIVE VISIT AND A BILATERAL VISIT AND
THAT ACCORDINGLY WE WOULD HAVE TO INDICATE PREFERENCE FOR ONE OR
THE OTHER.

2. AFTER DISCUSSING MATTER WITH IDDZ AND URR, CONTACTED ROUSE TO LET
HIM KNOW THAT IN ABSENCE OF PRIME MINISTER, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO
PROVIDE A REPLY ON SUCH INCREDIBLY SHORT NOTICE. ALSO SUGGESTED THAT
INITIATIVE AGENDA AND BILATERAL AGENDA WERE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT.
PROMISED NEVERTHELESS TO GET BACK TO US EMBASSY ON THE MATTER WITHIN
THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

3. GRATEFUL YOUR VIEWS

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

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
J. CARON

[Signature]
SIG L.A. DELVOIE

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TRANSCRIPT OF A SCRUM FOLLOWING THE PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING
WITH CHAIRMAN DENG XIAOPING, PEKING, NOVEMBER 29, 1983

TRANSCRIPTION DES COMMENTAIRES DU PREMIER MINISTRE LORS D'UNE
RENCONTRE AVEC LA PRESSE A LA SUITE DE SA RÉUNION AVEC LE
PRÉSIDENT DENG XIAOPING, A PÉKING, LE 29 NOVEMBRE 1983



[Handwritten signature]
[Handwritten initials]
[Handwritten circled text]

28-6-1- TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION
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FAIR E

Q: Comment ça s'est passé, M. le Premier ministre?

R: Ca c'est bien passé.

Q: Est-ce que vous avez abordé d'autres questions que celles que vous avez abordées hier?

R: Il a fait un tour d'horizon plus large. Nous avons concentré la discussion sur la question de l'initiative de paix, mais le président a fait un tour d'horizon beaucoup plus large touchant le Proche-Orient, les Caraïbes, l'Amérique du Sud, l'Afrique du Sud, Taiwan, la Corée et tout.

Q: Was the Chairman any more or less encouraging than the Premier yesterday?

A: He was equally encouraging as the Premier had been yesterday. He insisted that I must continue on my peace initiative to inject greater political will among the various leaders. As in the case of the Premier, he said that will must be exercised especially to get the two superpowers to reduce their nuclear arsenals. In that sense, the thrust of his message was the same as the Premier's -- that it is important to politicize the question, but we must begin first getting a reduction from the superpowers. I pointed out to him that I would certainly continue doing everything I could in that direction, but that I felt that the three other nuclear powers had a particular responsibility to put the pressure on, and, that they were in a better position to put pressure than a non-nuclear power like Canada.

Q: So, the Chairman raised the same objections as the Premier did yesterday in respect of the five-power conference?

A: No, he did not refer to the five-power conference in order to make objections. He made the same observations that, in order of priority, the superpowers must take the initiative.

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Q: Prime Minister, the Chinese have reservations about two points in your programme. You say you are encouraged; how do you feel encouraged?

A: What are the two points?

Q: The NPT and the five-power conference?

A: I feel encouraged because they say the politicizing, the injection of political will, is very important. In a sense, the - what you call - two objections are linked to the same attitude they have: that the two superpowers are responsible for the most grave aspect of the heightened tension, and that pressure must be put on them. I am encouraged in the sense that they had no answer for my comment that I am willing to put pressure on them, but I think the dynamics of the five-power conference will be pursued. Just because they haven't jumped at the idea doesn't mean that it is not a good one and an essential one. It is easy for others to tell me "go on, develop pressures, continue seeing political leaders," but it is also important for the three nuclear powers to realize that they have a direct role to play. So far, they haven't - you are quite right - indicated that they wanted to play it at this five-power forum yet. They do say that they are, including China, prepared to go to the five-power forum at a certain stage when the superpowers have done certain things. That is, as you know, the position of China and of France and of Britain. You are into the "chicken and egg" syndrome: that the superpowers will not do certain things, unless we do certain things and "we" includes not only me; it includes, I suggest, Margaret Thatcher, François Mitterand and Premier Zhao.

Q: Prime Minister, I understand that you have been asked to ... (inaudible) the Soviet Union. Will you take them up on that offer?

A: I was invited to the Soviet Union a year ago this month by Premier Andropov, and that invitation has been repeated in various forms and messages. My answer has been the same, it is the same answer I give to you: I will go to the Soviet Union if I think I can make progress with my peace initiative.

Q: And do you think it can help?

A: It depends if I want to be optimistic or pessimistic. I am generally inclined to be optimistic, but I think it is still

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important, as I said yesterday, that we wait to see how the Goa declaration filters through to the various members of the alliances - - the Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact Alliance --. It will depend a great deal on what happens in Brussels when the foreign ministers of the Atlantic Alliance meet.

Q: Prime Minister, if you don't go to Moscow, how are you possibly going to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union? How do you see that next stage?

A: Well, I don't want to be in the position of doing the running for the three nuclear powers. It is all very well for them to encourage me to put pressure on the superpowers, but I made it clear from the very beginning of my initiative that I did not see my role as one of an intermediary between Washington and Moscow. I will not go there - to either Washington or Moscow - if it is to try and be a broker between the two. I have to feel that there is something else happening, and that "something else", I made it clear at the outset, is an injection of political will on the margins, on the periphery. None of us are in Geneva. None of us are at the negotiating table. We can only influence those at the negotiating table if pressure is put on those two, not only from their populations, but from their friends and allies. That is essentially what I am doing and, therefore, it doesn't follow that I have to go to Moscow or Peking.

Once again, I was very encouraged by the support I got from the Commonwealth leaders, but I want to see further how the members of the Atlantic Alliance react at their meeting in Brussels, before answering this or that question.

Q: Did Chairman Deng have any comment to make on the recent break-off of the strategic arms talks in Geneva by the Soviet Union?

A: Not directly. I do not want to speak for him. He can do that. But I'd say, by implication, he feels that the arms race is going to go on for some time yet.

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MP

CONFIDENTIAL

November 29, 1983

IDDZ-0221

Memorandum for the Acting Secretary
of State for External Affairs.

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

SUBJECT: PM Initiative: Visit to Peking.

Further to our briefing note yesterday for your appearance before the Standing Committee, the Prime Minister met with Premier Zhao yesterday and is to meet Vice Premier Deng today.

We have not yet received official reports on these meetings but in a press scrum the PM said yesterday:

1. Zhao is supportive of the effort "to inject new political energy into the search for peace between East and West".
2. On the idea of a conference of the five nuclear powers, Zhao is in favour, but only as one of the eventual possibilities: he sees the most immediate problem as one of concentrating pressure on the super-powers to reduce their armaments.
3. The P.M. said the next stage is to consider whether it would be useful for him to go to Moscow and Washington. This will depend in part on the reaction NATO Foreign Ministers, at their meeting December 8, give to the proposals Mr. MacEachen will put to them on MBFR and CDE.

If questioned by the Standing Committee you might say that the Chinese have been supportive of the PM's broad political purpose, but with reservations on specific proposals, and that the P.M. is meeting Vice Premier Deng today.

L.A. Delvoie
for L.A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

cc: DMF/Mr. Marchand
DMT/Mr. Johnstone

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TRANSCRIPT OF AN THE PRIME MINISTER'S INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD GWYN
OF THE TORONTO STAR ON THE FLIGHT FROM PEKING TO NEW DELHI,
NOVEMBER 29, 1983

TRANSCRIPTION D'UNE ENTREVUE ACCORDÉE PAR LE PREMIER MINISTRE À
RICHARD GWYN DU TORONTO STAR, EN ROUTE DE PEKIN À LA
NOUVELLE-DELHI, LE MARDI 29 NOVEMBRE 1983

Q. Sir, to start. At mid-day you sounded a bit discouraged, a bit down. Are you?

A. No, I am not. I don't know how I could have sounded that way. No. Things turned out about as I thought they would. Maybe they did not turn out the way you thought they would -- you of the media. I know the words "are you discouraged", came back both last night and today, but the answer is no.

JB-6-1-~~the~~ *Peace Mission*

Q. Are you at all frustrated that you seem to be having difficulty translating political interest into political will, that is, expressions of goodwill and encouragement into an actual concrete commitment by the various leaders you have been seeing?

A. Well, I guess we will see. There has been that expression of good will as you say, but my interpretation is that it is more than: "We can't go but wish you luck on your journey."

It would seem to me that the reception that the initiative had at the Commonwealth meeting and their desire to explicitly support the initiative -- which I certainly did not ask for; they supported it in the communiqué but, as I think I indicated, they volunteered around the table to come with me or assist me in whatever way I found useful -- to me that indicated that they were willing to do more than wish me well on my journey. They were prepared to take the risks of the journey with me. As for the NATO end of it, I guess the answer to your question will have

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to await the NATO Foreign Ministers' Meeting in December. It is true to say that they all wished me well when I visited the various NATO countries in Europe. We will see if they are also prepared to inject their political will along with the one I am trying to inject. But once again, the fact of issuing a Special Communiqué in Goa and associating themselves with my initiative and with specific aspects of it to me, is an act of political will by some forty-six political leaders. So that's why I say it is not something I am doing alone. It is something they want to work at in whatever way they can.

Q. You stressed that meeting in Brussels several times. Will Mr. MacEachen be making some specific proposal, something new at that meeting?

A. No. Not anything radically new. He will be culling from his opposite numbers, the answer to the questions I put specifically in my communications to the fifteen other NATO leaders when I wrote to them after my European trip saying: "Here are the things we discussed. Here are the suggestions I put forward. Time is running out. Will you be represented in Stockholm -- yes or no -- at a political level? And at the same time eventually for Vienna -- yes or no".

Q. Back to this question of the difficulty of the potential action, of translating good will into actual action. Take the five-power conference which (inaudible) at mid-day press conference. Now, does it frustrate you that the other people have all said the problem lies with the two big guys, not with us?

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A. Well, it does not frustrate me. It is like your question: Does it discourage me. No, because that is what I expected them to say. These powers, these three nuclear non-superpowers, have stated their views on these things. They have established policies, just like the United States and the Soviet Union have established policies. The name of the game is not to just talk to them once and see them change their mind. The name of the game is to, as I put it at the very outset, change the trend-line. And I think these three are, in a sense, perhaps committing the same misperception as a lot of Canadians at the outset, who thought that I was setting myself out to reconcile the two superpowers and to bring messages to them and to try to explain one to the other. And I think that -- well you would know -- that I made it quite clear at the outset that that is not what I was trying to do. And when the three nuclear non-superpowers tell me we must first influence the two superpowers, I say, "Right, and that is what I am trying to do. Now you tell me what you are trying to do to influence the two superpowers, and is not one way of influencing them, to put the kind of proposition that I have explained?"

I think the three -- certainly Margaret Thatcher and Prime Minister Zhao -- their reaction is explained in part by an apprehension that they both had that I was coming to tell them that they both had, that I was coming to tell them that they were naughty nuclear powers, that they should reduce their armament. And most of their time was spent in diffensively explaining to me that it was not "fair" to come to them until I convinced the superpowers. And it took a long while to get the message through that I really was not coming to the three to get them to reduce their level of armaments, even of nuclear armaments. I was coming to the three so that they could put pressure on the superpowers to reduce their level of armaments to a level where it would be possible for the British, French and Chinese also to consider limiting or reducing theirs. And I think it is perceived completely differently when I explained. I

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think Mitterrand understood that from the outset. And that is why they are the most positive of the three to the idea of the five-power meeting. But as you know the Chinese, long before I talked about a five power conference, they had talked about it and they said there should be one but only after the two superpowers had agreed to reduce by half, their nuclear weapons systems. So the ideas they are floating around -- just like Mrs. Thatcher who kept saying again and again: "It is a great idea but it can only be used once, therefore don't force us to go to the table yet" -- that is fine you know. I am just begging you: Don't take five years to do it. Help me create circumstances where we can get the two superpowers to make enough progress -- or apparent willingness to progress -- at Geneva, that then you can sit down collectively. You know that doesn't mean the five have to meet together in January or March, but it means that they must begin exploring together the need eventually for them to meet if indeed the three want to do to the two, what they are asking me to do to the two.

Q. That five-power conference. Is it really an attempt to find some acceptable substitute for the Geneva talks?

A. No, in no sense. The Geneva talks must go on. The two superpowers must reach agreement amongst themselves. They hold ninety-five percent of the world's strategic arms. The other three only hold five percent. So those talks must go on but the perversity of the situation is that nobody can sort out how you can make them progress in Geneva and what I am trying to do, and what I think my colleagues are supporting me in, is to try to get movement out of those two superpowers. As I told Chairman Deng this morning, "I can talk to my NATO colleagues -- I have been talking to them -- but I cannot talk to the Soviets and I cannot influence them as a member of an alliance unless I have some other movement. Now what are you going to do?" I leave them with the question and hopefully the dynamic works on its own.

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Q. What can you yourself now do? You are into "Stage Two" in your own phrase. Are you going to give another speech, a sort of Guelph, Montreal, a third speech in that series?

A. Well, in fairness, I won't be able to answer that until I have seen the reaction in Brussels. That is only a couple of weeks away and I will see. Maybe if we are, in our terms, successful in Brussels, I will be able to go on into Stage Two and maybe go to Moscow and say: "Well, look. Here is what happened in Brussels, and of course, the United States was present in Brussels and, therefore that means that they are prepared to politicize -- shall we say -- the Stockholm Conference. What are you prepared to do?". I may not even have to go to Moscow. Maybe Moscow will read the Communiqué out of Brussels and say, "It is obvious that we have to go too." Conversely, if Brussels is a failure, then I will have to go back to Stage One and start talking the thing up again and saying: "Look, see here. It is all very well to tell me to keep on my political mission, but you let me down in Brussels, or you changed your mind, and what happens? And now that the Soviets have abandoned at Geneva, what do we do? Do we just sit on our hands and wait until after the next presidential election? Is that soon enough or should we make more effort?"

So, I have no means of reading the signals of what will happen in Brussels. I do know that Allan MacEachen, our Foreign minister, is determined to press them for answers.

Q. You said today, and several times earlier, that you will only go to Moscow if you can do some good there. Surely, in fact, you have to go to Moscow because it is only by going there that you can find out if you can do some good.

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A. I think that is logically correct. But if, shall we say, because of President Andropov's state of health, they are not -- I don't necessarily have to see him -- but if I am not in a position to see Gromyko or Gorbachev, or somebody else because, though they would see me, they are not in a position to take any positions on anything -- I mean that as a hypothesis -- then perhaps there would be no point in going, though there is an argument for going one way or another in the sense that I have been talking about the need for dialogue and political communication. And much as I saw Arbatov in Tokyo, because I wanted to follow my own theory about the need for communication, it might be useful to go to Moscow anyhow. But it might mean that I would have to wait longer than otherwise would be convenient in Stage Two.

Q. In your Stage Two, the culminating points are, of course, Moscow and Washington. What is your thinking about the psychology and the practical considerations in which you go to first, and roughly what time you go to whichever you go to first and then whichever you go to second?

A. Well, I think it is always quite clear that I wanted to see three lesser of the five nuclear powers before seeing the two superpowers. That is why I found it so helpful that the Chinese would see me now even though they are coming to Canada in a month and a half, because waiting for them for a month and a half would have meant perhaps only looking at Moscow in February and Washington and so on. Whereas now, in a sense, timing has been telescoped. And I am very grateful for that. Of which of the two I would see first I can make an argument -- and I probably will after the fact saying it was good that I saw so and so before so and so, but to be quite honest, it will depend on their own timing. President Reagan has said he wanted to see me; President Andropov, (that) he wanted to see me. I am

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available as of the middle half of December and I will go whenever any or either of them wants to see me. But they have timings of their own and I certainly won't be choosy and sort of say: "Well, no, your date comes too soon Mr. So-and-So. I would rather see the other one first". But as I began answering your question, you can make arguments for both. I think both would probably rather be the second to see me, in the sense that they would find out first what the other said. But in a sense, I have seen President Reagan a lot of times in the past few years. We know each other well. So, if I had my druthers, I suppose it would be better for me to see the Soviets first so that I could catch up on my knowledge of them rather than see President Reagan yet once again.

Q. You have indicated that from some time from mid-December on, you would be available, or whatever word one uses, to go to Moscow, to go to Washington, in whatever order. In terms of the total span ahead of you for your mission to succeed or fail -- however one defines success or failure -- how long are you looking at roughly?

A. I would guess that after I had seen those two -- and I have just answered that I cannot nail that down within a month or two -- but after I have seen the two superpowers, and now that I have seen so many of the non-aligned powers, it would be time to assess then what you call success or failure. I perhaps put it in different terms because I don't think one will know whether I was successful or whether I failed, until one reads future events over the next many, many months. What I mean to say is that in an operation like this, the process is the success in itself or the failure. You don't have to succeed in order to try, and you don't have to win in order to fight. I think it is the debate itself which will or not have been started which is what I wanted to create -- the political debate, the political input. Now that political input may take years, may

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take months, may take days. But that will, in a sense, take place without me or certainly without me being prime mover of it. It will be dynamic of its own. And that is what I hope will happen: that our peoples who all want peace -- and that is certainly on both sides of the alliance -- will see that their political leaders are actively negotiating -- engaged, bargaining, participating. And I think that will bring a change in the trend-line, to use my expression again. It will mean that rather than sitting back a bit helplessly as we all have been, and seeing the things go from bad to worse, we will be all not sitting on our hands wringing them -- I guess it is a bad metaphor -- we will not be wringing our hands or sitting on them. We will be trying to make things happen. And I say it might be modest things like a political presence at Stockholm, or a deadline given to the officials meeting there, or a reporting process set up for Vienna. In other words, the peace process will become part of our political preoccupations. It has been part of the political preoccupation of our peoples but we have been all somewhat helpless in saying, as I have heard here in China and as I have heard elsewhere: "You know, there is nothing we can do about it until the superpowers become more reasonable".

Well, I hold that there are things that we can do about it, to make the superpowers become more reasonable and we will see that, I suppose, after I have been to Moscow and after we have seen the answer in Vienna. I would suppose at that stage, some other operation will have to begin. Certainly, I can't go around, many, many months seeing the same people over again, repeating the same message. If it hasn't taken a visible step of its own, someone else will have to carry on, maybe the Kaunda suggestion for forming a group of nations. It may be Premier Zhao's suggestion for enlarging the group of five to -- I wasn't quite able to define what he meant in his own mind -- but it sounded to me like a sort of Cancun type of summit where you .../9

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would have (not only) the superpowers but several others. These (are) all third stages or new operations which can only be put together after, I think, in my mind, after this one has shown what it leads to.

Q. If you succeed in whatever one measures success -- and I appreciate this can be modest or difficult to measure in the immediate -- or if you fail but have clearly given it your best shot, will you have completed your mission as Prime Minister?

A. Well, I guess that is linked to your previous question of timing. I have always held from the outset, and I think some other people have too, that it did not matter too much whether the thing went on after I had ceased being Prime Minister. I always held that I should start it while I am Prime Minister because then you can collect more IOU's and so on and perhaps be more convincing and have greater access. But to take an example which wouldn't help you in getting the answer you want to get, if this thing sucked me in for several years and I am going to be Prime Minister for several years, it doesn't mean that the thing would necessarily stop. I think it had to start while I was Prime Minister. Now that's the general answer. If you want me to be more precise, from the earlier dates I gave you, I suppose in a couple of months we will know if I can be more useful continuing or not. And by then, I suppose we will also know whether I am going to run again in the next election or whether I am not. And I don't know the answer to either now, I honestly don't. But I would guess that, as any political analyst would assume, if I am going to run again I should announce it not too late in the new year. And if I am not going to run again I should. It doesn't mean I will, but that is what I would be thinking if I were advising from the outside.

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Q. You said at the press conference that you did not see your role as being that of an intermediary between the U.S. and Russia. But in fact, isn't an intermediary needed? I mean, the two powers are still shouting at each other and it is going to take someone to go between them, talking softly.

A. Well, I still do not see myself doing that. I don't have the skills. I don't have the taste. I don't want to waste my time explaining each to the other. I have some ideas which I think stand or fall on themselves and if they want to listen to them and say: "Oh well, he is giving us a middle way between another extreme", that is fine, but I don't attempt to do that. I try to see what is reasonably possible and preach that. I don't have the talents of a diplomat. I don't talk to them with the patience that says: "I know you are right in many ways, but you have to understand the other fellow who doesn't admit that you are right, and I know you are right and he is wrong", but when I go to the other guy I will tell him that he is right and you are wrong. That is not my way. Therefore, I am not an intermediary. I think that there should be some intermediaries. It is an important role. I think -- for instance, when I am talking of the Warsaw Pact and the NATO pact ministers meeting in either Stockholm or in Vienna -- I think there will be intermediaries; somebody should be set up as intermediaries. Maybe Lord Carrington will be able to play that role of intermediary. He can talk to both sides. But it is not my role, nor is it my disposition.

Gwyn: Thank you very much, sir.

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FPR-D. Buckley-Jones-5-1874-ah

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CBC: The Chinese Chairman, Deng Xiaoping, says he likes Prime Minister Trudeau's peace plan but China cannot go along with all of its provisions. Deng met the Prime Minister in the Great Hall of the People in Peking. He said China and Canada are in different positions and the Chinese cannot do all that Mr. Trudeau wants. But Mr. Deng encouraged the Prime Minister to press ahead with his initiatives. We get the details from our National Affairs reporter Brian Kelleher.

B.K.: The comments of Deng Xiaoping were made just as pictures were being taken at the start of his meeting today with Mr. Trudeau. Referring to the Canadian Peace Initiative the Chinese leader said we are in different positions. We cannot do exactly as you advocate in some respects, but your efforts are important. Mr. Trudeau answered that he thought he and China had the same objectives. At that point the doors were closed on the meeting. Mr. Trudeau said after the meeting today that Chairman Deng had repeated China's position that it's up to the super-powers first to reduce their arsenals before smaller nuclear powers have to do anything.

P.E.T.: "I merely pointed out to him that I would certainly continue doing everything I could in that direction, but that I felt that the three other nuclear powers had a particular responsibility to put the pressure and that they were in a better position to put pressure than a non-nuclear power like Canada".

B.K.: Mr. Trudeau says just because China has not agreed to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or to attend a Conference of all five nuclear powers does not mean that the idea of such a conference is dead. He says the dynamics of such a meeting will continue to be explored. Brian Kelleher, CBC News, Peking.

D. Buckley-Jones

D. Buckley-Jones
Deputy Director
Media Relations Division

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Trudeau May Have Something

Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau of Canada, convinced that an atmosphere of mutual animosity is getting in the way of nuclear-arms agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, has embarked on an ambitious diplomatic effort to defuse tensions by creating a new international forum for arms-control discussions. From what is known of the Trudeau plan, it is unlikely to do any harm and might do a great deal of good.

Trudeau tested European reactions in quick visits to seven capitals last week. This week he plans to touch base with Washington before going on to Tokyo next weekend.

Details of the Canadian leader's plan are still vague. But his main proposal is to broaden arms-control talks to include France, Great Britain and China, along with the United States and the Soviet Union.

Aides to Trudeau say that such talks would be independent of existing negotiations between the superpowers. But the prime minister obviously believes that an enlarged forum of the sort that he proposes will become especially important if the Soviets walk out of the Euromissile negotiations in Geneva, as they have threatened to do if U.S.-supplied cruise and Pershing 2 missiles are deployed in Western Europe.

President Reagan made still another effort Monday to avert a collapse of the talks. U.S. negotiators handed the Soviets a new proposal that would limit each side to 420 warheads on medium-range nuclear missiles worldwide. Since the Soviet SS-20 missiles have three warheads each, that would require the Russians to reduce their SS-20 force from 360 in the European and Asian parts of the Soviet Union to 140. Washington made it clear that it would not insist on matching the Russians warhead-for-warhead in Europe.

Soviet leader Yuri V. Andropov himself has offered to reduce the SS-20 force deployed against Western Europe to 140 missiles, but only if no U.S.-supplied missiles are deployed in Western Europe by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Even before the amended Reagan offer was made

official, Moscow dismissed it as "patently unacceptable." Meanwhile, cruise missiles already have begun to arrive in Britain for deployment before the year is out.

Thus the stage may be set for a Soviet walkout not only from the Euromissile talks but also, if past threats are to be believed, from the strategic arms negotiations and the long-running talks on mutual troop reductions in Central Europe.

Whether or not the Soviets carry their war of nerves that far, the Trudeau plan is worth consideration.

Arms-control negotiations are awesomely complex even when only two parties are talking. They become much more so when the circle is expanded. It is not very realistic, therefore, to think that the nuts and bolts of U.S.-Soviet nuclear-arms reductions can be worked out in a multilateral setting. Furthermore, it is far from clear—despite the friendly reception that Trudeau got in Europe last week—that the Chinese or even the British and the French are ready to throw their own nuclear forces onto the bargaining table.

What five-power talks might be able to do, however, is to provide a forum in which U.S. and Soviet diplomats could talk without losing face. This is especially important with regard to Moscow, given all the doors that the Russians have slammed behind them.

The Trudeau proposal comes at a time of uncertainty over Andropov's health and speculation that Soviet policies—in arms control and other areas—may be on hold until the leadership situation is clarified. The West cannot affect the power struggle, if one is indeed under way, but it is important to keep the lines to Moscow open just in case an opportunity for better relations does arise.

In sum, an enlarged forum of the sort proposed by the Canadian leader is no magic solution; certainly it is no substitute for direct talks between the great powers. But as a way of keeping the East-West political dialogue going when bilateral contacts between Moscow and Washington have turned sour, it is well worth considering.

Trudeau opens own arms limitation push

Editor's note: The following article is excerpted from an address by Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau at the University of Guelph in Ontario Oct. 27. The address was the opening statement in Trudeau's new personal disarmament initiative, which he then took to the capitals of France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Britain and Italy, as well as to the Vatican, earlier this month.

I am deeply troubled: by an intellectual climate of acrimony and uncertainty; by the parlous state of East-West relations; by a superpower relationship which is dangerously confrontational; and by a widening gap between military strategy and political purpose. All these reveal most profoundly the urgent need to assert the pre-eminence of the mind of man over machines of war.

There is today an ominous rhythm of crisis. Not just an arms crisis. It is a crisis of confidence in ourselves, a crisis of faith in others. How can we change that ominous rhythm?

I believe that a raising of the nuclear threshold in Europe is a concept of the first importance. It would not be an easy or an inexpensive task. But even as I am attracted to this concept in its application to Europe, I am troubled by a broader implication. Non-nuclear weapons are in an advanced state of technology, and are widely marketed. Sea-skimming missiles, laser-guided bombs and fragmentation weapons are available for distribution. Is it the purpose of nuclear arms control to make the world safe for conventional warfare?

Surely a basic term is missing in this equation: It is the encouragement of an equilibrium of conventional arms and forces, balanced at lower rather than higher levels. An agreed framework of conventional deterrence against armed aggression — but significantly reducing any dangerous concentration of forces.

This is to some extent the task of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks (MBFR) in Vienna. But those talks will not succeed unless their importance in terms of military strategy is developed within a wider framework of East-West confidence and political will.

The debate over East-West economic relations — which haunts every Western council — reveals the fundamental and unresolved question of how much economic interdependence is desirable between the two systems. Some say less. Some say more. Those who argue for less are often, paradoxically, the first to advocate the punitive merit of economic sanctions — which are only effective if interdependence exists, and if Soviet behavior is modified by the expectation of economic benefit. Moreover, some who argue for economic sanctions in the civilian sector apparently believe that this will influence Soviet military spending. Yet they may add that there is little if any relationship between civilian and military economies in the Soviet Union.

This particular debate tends also to lay open one of the most gaping self-inflicted wounds of the current period. That is the unfortunate tendency for a discussion which starts off about East-West relations to wind up in the fratricide of West-West relations. There have been days when I, or Ronald Reagan, or Margaret Thatcher may seem to have been accused, for whatever reason or passion of the moment, of posing a greater threat to the security of the West than do the Russians and their associates.

It is almost as though the diversity, pluralism, and freedom of expression which we are determined to preserve through the alliance, are not seen as appropriate within the alliance.

The alliance in arms against itself is a paradox rich with historical allusion. NATO will avoid that fate if we are wise. But institutions cannot...



The San Diego Union/David Mollering

With Syrian and Libyan money, guns and occasionally troops, rebels took only six months to drive Arafat out of eastern Lebanon, finally to trap him in Tripoli.

Having lost militarily, Arafat must now fight to keep political control of the PLO.

In his favor, he has the backing of moderate Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt — of whom have had their problems with Syria and view with suspicion the growth of Syrian power. But these countries could not prevent him from pushing Arafat out of power.

Arafat also has the support of a majority of the Palestinian people. He is the only Palestinian leader recognized by much of the world.

Without his power base in the West Bank and Gaza, Arafat's struggle...

gnized by much of the world.

Without his power base in the and with no guerrilla strike to command, that support d wither. In addition, he must now face the ma of being a loser.

guard?

pressurization damages the ice system and can even crush ssile."

y officials decline to com-on Bush's remarks. Requests erview active duty subma-were turned down. The Navy does not want to spotlight the ho man its nuclear arsenal or discuss which vessels carry nu-weapons.

it is clear that even in this computers and robots and in-guidance systems, the quality crew — or even more import-e stability of the crew — still a lot. And the Navy realizes

one wants an unhappy sailor seas, for example. So, the men, training for the very day will receive the ultimate in bad get only good news from home on their 70-day missions.

censored the messages twice, said. "Once when the wives them in on shore and again our radio operator received Those familygrams were bland by the time the sailors em."

Nevertheless, even in the serious r Navy pranksters abound. familygram sent off by the of the Simon Bolivar to their spouses at sea said: "One of regnant. Guess who?"

Navy is proud of its Person-reliability Program (PRP) at its counterparts in the Air and at nuclear assembly is designed to remove any nder such temporary or per-ot stress that his job perform-would be affected.

re serious is drug use which xpulsion from the program. 800 Navy personnel were out last year for drug use.

James Osborn, now retired, anded the first Poseidon sub-e, the George Washington. He the pressures of nuclear cru-re "grossly overestimated."

y guys were so busy working hey did no think too much of he said. "How much thought you devote to how you fit into ategic picture? You were so trying to stay ahead by prac-It's the same now."

The alliance in arms against itself is a paradox rich with historical allusion. NATO will avoid that fate if we are wise. But institutions cannot grow to meet new challenges if their level of debate — their intellectual universe of dis-course — does not expand to meet the changing realities of our environment.

As Canadians, we know where we stand. We have a distinguished record of accomplishment in working for international peace and security. NATO has without doubt been one of the instruments preventing nuclear war for the past 35 years. Canada has done pioneering work in the United Nations and else-where on arms control and disarmament. Our nuclear power industry has perforce made us experts on safeguards agreements and has given us a special commitment to the cause of non-proliferation. We have continuously pressed for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, for a convention to prohibit chemical weapons, and for the prohibition of all weapons for use in outer space.

We have played our part in periods of co-operation, and pulled our weight in periods of confrontation. We have identified a distinctive Canadian space in East-West relations, determined by our history and geography, by our membership in NATO, by successive waves of immigration, by such priorities as trade and human rights, and by that sense of realism which is both the achievement and the comfort of the middle-power's middle age.

I don't believe we had any illusions about the short-lived and much-maligned period of *détente*. I certainly have no embarrassment about my own part in that process, bred in a conjuncture of geopolitics, economic aspirations and collective leadership on both sides.

But the process too soon became part of the problem. The main achieve-ments of the late '60s and early '70s were carried forward with difficulty, perhaps with an overload of linkage. Historians may reflect on the reasons why 1975 was the year which saw both the high point of the formal structure of *détente* in the conclusion of the Helsinki Final Act — and the imminent erosion of its broader purpose as a result of Soviet-Cuban adventurism in Angola.

Détente rapidly showed signs of a process being drained of its substance. Core issues were held hostage by one side or the other — human rights, economic cooperation, hegemony in key spheres of influence. *Détente* became both divisible and reversible.

And yet, I am not ready to call *détente* a failure. There were clear benefits of stability and cooperation. Its long-term impact, for example, on Soviet elites cannot yet be judged. Moreover, it did coincide with, or provoke, an important impulse in the early '70s which seems to have been lost without trace. It is the impulse toward political dialogue, toward regular consultation at the most senior levels of the East-West system.

With the loss of that impulse, and in the absence of high politics in the East-West relationship, it is not surprising that any shred of trust or confidence in the intentions of the other side appears to have vanished as well. Also missing, and this troubles me deeply, is much trace of political craft and creativity directed at ameliorating the intentions of the other side. There is a disturbing complacency, a readiness to adapt to the worse rather than to exert our influence for the better. We are, in short, de-politicizing the most important political relationship we have.

The responsibility for this lies partly, but by no means exclusively, with both superpowers. The United States and the Soviet Union outstrip the rest of us in their global reach, their armaments and their leadership responsibilities. Naturally, they differ greatly — and I am not committing the fallacy of describing them as equals in any moral sense at all. Nevertheless, they breathe an atmosphere common to themselves, and share a global perception according to which even remote events can threaten their interests or their associates.

And there are some other features which both powers have in common: continental land-mass and considerable economic self-sufficiency; ambivalent relationships with Europe and with Asia; complexities of demography; a central focus on each other in their policies; spasms of unilateralism and isolationism.

It is therefore facile to deny the grave responsibilities which are shared in Washington and Moscow, or to deny that what both seem to lack at the present time is a political vision of a world wherein their nations can live in peace. What is essential to assert is that, just as war is too important to leave to the generals, so the relationship between the superpowers may have become too charged with animosity for East-West relations to be entrusted to them alone.

I believe that military strategy must, above all, serve a comprehensive set of political objectives and controls, which dominate and give purpose to modern weapons and to military doctrine. Our central purpose must be to create a stable environment of increased security for both East and West. We must aim at suppressing those nearly instinctive fears, frustrations or ambi-tions which have so often been the reason for resorting to the use of force.

See TRUDEAU on Page C-6

Trudeau: A new arms limitation bid

Continued from C-5

Therefore, it is essential to Western purposes, in my judgment, to maintain in our policies elements of communication, negotiation and transparency about our own intentions — plus a measure of incentive for the Soviet Union first to clarify, and then to modify, its own objectives towards the West.

This was, in a limited sense, the philosophy which underpinned the NATO response to the Soviet build-up of SS-20 missiles in Europe. We had to ask ourselves what purpose of political intimidation could be served by that build-up. That is why we decided to respond with a two-track approach — deployment and negotiations. This approach has given the Soviet Union both the clear incentive to reach agreement and the table at which to do so. I and my fellow NATO heads of government remain firmly committed to that two-track decision.

The tragic shooting down of the Korean airliner raises further questions about military dominance on the Soviet side. Is the Soviet military system edging beyond the reach of the political authorities? Are we contributing to such a trend by the absence of regular contact with the Soviet leadership?

These considerations suggest that our two-track decision may also require, as the time for deployment comes closer, a "third rail" of high-level political energy to speed the course of agreement — a third rail through which might run the current of our broader political purposes, including our determination not to be intimidated.

The risk of accident or miscalculation is too great for us not to begin to repair the lines of communication with our adversaries. The level of tension is too high for us not to revive a more constructive approach to the containment of crises. The degree of mutual mistrust is too intense for us not to try to rebuild confidence through active political contact and consultation.

Because the trend is for arms negotiations, like military strategy itself, to become ever more distanced from the political energy of the participants, I have mentioned the MBFR talks in Vienna. That forum has labored for over 10 years and produced very little by way of results. Those talks require urgent political attention if they are to move off dead center. Over the years, other leaders and I have made several proposals in that direction — proposals which now merit wider support.


We have high hopes for the Conference on Disarmament in Europe, established by the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), and due to open in Stockholm next January. Canada will do its utmost to make that conference productive. We recognize the importance of agreement on confidence-building measures of a military nature. But these negotiations, important as they are, will not advance our larger hopes if they proceed in a political vacuum. The delicate framework of security in Europe cannot be balanced on the fate of one or two sets of negotiations alone. These negotiations must be grounded in a structure of stable East-West understanding: reciprocal acknowledgement of legitimate security needs, regular high-level dialogue, and a determined approach to crisis management. Here, again, we require that jolt of political energy which I have described as the third rail.

In short, we must take positive political steps in order to reverse the dangerously downward trend-line in East-West relations.

(There are forms) of escapism which we indulge in at our peril. (One) is the escapism of allowing shrill rhetoric to become a substitute for foreign policy, of letting inertia become a substitute for will, of making a desert and calling it peace.

INS policy rejects

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Field Newspaper Syndicate

is on a roll

winner in some important states against a weak candidate, whose support was further eroded by third party candidate (Anderson may run again, but is unlikely to get anything he won before.) Increased black voting alone would swing some big states from Mr. Reagan's column to the side others voted as they did last time.

is micro-perspective of negatives for Mr. Reagan there is no view, already discussed, but also the lack of a strong Democratic contender. That race now is a two-man affair between senator and vice president Walter Mondale and astronaut-in Glenn. The five other white male candidates are going possibly for the number two spot on the ticket. But then read: The Rev. Jesse Jackson.

ians tiptoe around the Jackson question, but in private, that view is truly negative. Yes, he probably will add a million blacks to the registration polls — he already has done that — even though he is not going to be nominated or elected vote in November next year should be the highest Democratic ever and it could be critical in big electoral states. Jesse, for all that, the white politicians say.

more than counter-balancing, in the view of many, is so out loud. Jackson is the best orator of all the times, yes, but what language! What potential for incitement, even hatred, among whites, the kind of thing that would swing the vote on the other side. It is all right to talk of a "house to White House." That's politics, but "our want it all" constitute intemperate and inflammatory. Subtlety will be more of it as the campaign heats up and diminish in the eyes of blacks.

is to bargain with the nominee for concessions. Election day is not likely to be a glittering scene, very damaging to the party whose convention is causing uneasiness because of that city's situation.

in the history books, Jackson's candidacy is a milestone. But right now it looks more like a political blunder. The liberal *New Republic* magazine's campaign "an exercise in false hopes" and much of the thinking now about Jackson and his is conjecture. But it won't be six months

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Page 1

Le pèlerinage empierré de M. Trudeau

De Montréal: Alain Borgognon

■ Pour « vendre » ses plans de paix, Pierre Elliott Trudeau est devenu comme voyageur! A peine rentré d'une tournée des principales capitales européennes: Eire, Royaume-Uni, France, Italie, Espagne, Portugal, Grèce, Japon, le Bangladesh, l'Inde; et les petits pays pétroliers du Golfe. En même temps, il demande à son ambassade à Washington « d'être active » et il croque un échantillon personnel à Pékin et à Moscou.

L'initiative de paix de M. Trudeau repose sur trois points. Tout d'abord donner une impulsion politique de haut niveau aux tables de négociations « et si possible associer les cinq grands ensemble, au moins quatre ». Ensuite relancer les discussions, comme celles de Vienne, qui traquent de l'équilibre des forces classiques et « du réajustement des mécanismes en Europe ». Enfin, restreindre les problèmes quantitatifs dans le domaine de la sécurité collective, et en particulier les problèmes de la sécurité nucléaire. Des réunions régionales de premier ordre, il apparaît sans surprise que le leadership point de ce plan qui a été adopté par le G7 fait que les hommes politiques, les techniciens et les diplomates de tous les continents se sont réunis à Paris. Pierre Elliott Trudeau dit avoir été très impressionné par son initiative de paix. Il a été très bien reçu partout publiquement, sans exception.

Bonn, Rome, Bruxelles et La Haye, on a encouragé le premier ministre canadien à poursuivre ses efforts. Reste à savoir si ces encouragements sont seulement diplomatiques - car tout le monde est pour la paix - ou s'ils sont vraiment sincères!

Washington plutôt « frais »

A Washington en tout cas, on accueille plutôt « fraîchement » l'initiative de Pierre Trudeau. Bien sûr, on partage les sentiments qui animent le leader canadien, mais en même temps on met subtilement et d'instinct en garde contre toute ingérence dans les négociations Est-Ouest. Vendredi dernier à New York, dans le cadre d'une réunion d'experts en matière de défense, un haut fonctionnaire américain allait jusqu'à déclarer: « Le Canada ne jouit pas de l'autorité morale qu'il croit posséder. » Inutile de dire que cette phrase n'est pas passée in-

notée. En effet, une telle phrase est en soi, pour les politiciens américains, une initiative de paix de Pierre Trudeau, même si elle est émise par un haut fonctionnaire. Ce soutien n'est pas partagé. Mais de la même manière il n'est pas partagé par les politiciens français. La question de la sécurité collective pour que la Mission-Blanche des négociations de Vienne soit plus « enthousiasmante » est de son côté du côté de la France. Au Canada, les initiatives internationales du premier ministre sont perçues avec une certaine ambiguïté. Tout le monde est pour la paix et, dans ce contexte, on se félicite de tout geste susceptible de désamorcer les tensions Est-Ouest. Mais les citoyens s'interrogent sur l'utilité des voyages de M. Trudeau. Cela sert-il vraiment à quelque chose? Quel poids le Canada a-t-il dans ce dossier? M. Trudeau est-il mieux placé que, par exemple, M.M. Mitterrand ou Kohl, pour faire pression sur la Mission-Blanche ou le Kommissar? Etc... Les questions sont nombreuses et les réponses fournies par Ottawa n'y répondent pas forcément.

La popularité de Pierre Trudeau est au plus bas actuellement au Canada. De là à se demander si le premier ministre va chercher sur la scène internationale les satisfactions qu'il n'a pas chez lui, il n'y a qu'un pas que beaucoup franchissent! La droite canadienne se montre particulièrement sévère contre le Chef du gouvernement à qui elle reproche de ne pas comprendre que la paix passe par un renforcement de l'OTAN, un organisme que M. Trudeau a plutôt négligé durant la majeure partie de ses 14 ans de pouvoir.

De leur côté, les partisans du premier ministre font valoir que Pierre Trudeau profite de son expérience - il est le plus ancien des leaders occidentaux - pour jouer un rôle positif au niveau international, un rôle qui, de surcroît, rehausse l'image du Canada à l'étranger.

De nombreux observateurs, qui suivent le leader canadien depuis des années, pensent que c'est quelque part entre le désir d'aider à faire la paix dans le monde et un souci électoral légitime de la part de chef d'une formation politique en crise de popularité, que se situent les véritables motivations de Pierre Elliott.

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D ENTENTE(APPEL POUR REPRISE DIALOGUE EST-OUEST,COOPERATION
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28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

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CONCRETISER ENGAGEMENT DU VOLET DEFENSE DU TRAITE D AMITIE DE 1963, VOLET QUI AVAIT ETE NEGLIGE PAR PASSE. CONSULTATIONS ONT PERMIS A CES DEUX PARTENAIRES ESSENTIELS DE L EUROPE DE POUSSER PLUS AVANT LEURS RELATIONS DNS 4/4 CATEGORIES GENERALES SUIVANTES: (1) EST-OUEST (2) CEE (3) CRISES INTERNATIONALES (4) PROJETS BILATERAUX. / NATURE ETENDUE ET VARIEE DES CONSULTATIONS FUT CERTES DEMONTREE PAR IMPORTANCE DELFRA OU MITTERAND S EST FAIT ACCOMPAGNE DE SON PM ET 9/9 MINISTRES CHEYSSON, DELORS, HERNU, ROCARD, FABIUS, AVICE, CHANGENAGOR, MEXANDEAU ET HERVE).

2. EST-OUEST: CONSULTATIONS SE TENAIENT AU LENDEMAIN DE DEBAT DU BUNDESTAG SUR STATIONNEMENT INF ET ON S EST FELICITE DU VOTE FINAL QUI A CONFIRME APPUI POLITIQUE INTACTE AU CHANCELIER. ANALYSE DES DEUX CHEFS D ETAT SUR POSITION D URSS CONCORDENT: ECHEC D URSS DANS SA TENTATIVE DE DIVISER L EUOROPE PAR SON OPINION PUBLIQUE; URSS DEVAIT SE RETIRER DES NEGOCIATIONS DE GENEVE POUR NE PAS PERDRE FACE; CONVICTON QU URSS REVIENDRA EN FIN DE COMPTE A TABLE DE NEGOCIATIONS. DANS CE CONTEXTE, DECLARATION COMMUNE FUT EMISE LANCANT APPEL A URSS DE REPREDRE NEGOCIATIONS ET EXPRIMANT VOLONTE DE MAINTENIR DIALOGUE POLITIQUE. CETTE DECLARATION EST TOUT A FAIT CONFORME A POSITION OCCIDENTALE ET NE PRESENTE AUCUN NOUVEAUTE. MITTERAND, SANS PARLER DE JOUER ROLE D INTERMEDIAIRE ENTRE SUPERPUISSANCES, A REITRE SA VOLONTE DU TOUT FAIRE ET SON POUVOIR POUR ARRIVER A SOLUTION

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NEGOCIEE. EXCLUSION DES MISSILES FRA ET BRITS DES NEGOCIATIONS
INF EST POSITION COMMUNE ACQUISE; DISCOURS DE MITTERAND DEVANT
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ENTREE DANS CEE. MANQUE D ACCORD SUR CE DOSSIER CEE FUT PRESENTE A PRESSE SANS INSISTANCE, CHAQUE COTE VOULANT EVITER D EMBARRASSER L AUTRE.

4. PROBLEMES INTERNATIONAUX: PEU DE NOUVEAU EST RESSORTI DES DISCUSSIONS SUR SITU INNTALE. CHYPRE: FRA ET RFA SONT SATISFAITES DE REACTION MODEREE DE GRECE DANS CE DOSSIER ET ELLES SONT CONFIANTES QUE CHYPRE POURRA ETRE TENU SINON A LECART DU MOINS EN MARGE DE REUNION MINISTERIELLE DE L OTAN. ON NOTE AUSSI AVEC SATISFACTION RETENUE DEMONTREE PAR PAYS ISLAMIQUES QUI N ONT PAS/PAS RECONNU REGIME DENKTASH. MOYEN-ORIENT: ON SE QUESTIONNE SUR ROLE DES 10/10 VIA-A-VIS LIBAN MAIS AUCUNE REPOSE N APPARAIT. CONFLIT ENTRE PALESTINIENS ET PROBLEMES D ARAFAT N ONT RIEN DE REJOUISSANT POUR AVENIR ET DEVELOPPEMENT D UNE SOLUTION AU PROBLEME PALESTINIEN. IRAN-IRAK: ON Y DENOTE PEU DE MOUVEMENT. POSITION D URSS A QUELQUE PEU EVOLUEE MAIS ON NE PREVOIT AUCUN DEBLOCAGE RAPIDE MALGRE CERTAINS SIGNAUX DE PART D IRAN PERMETTANT D ESPERER A PLUS GRANDE VOLONTE DE TROUVER SOLUTION NEGOCIEE.

5. RELATIONS BILATERALES-DEFENSE: CET ELEMENT FUT PEUT-ETRE LE PLUS VISIBLE DEVELOPPEMENT DE CES 42IEME CONSULTATIONS. FRA ET RFA ONT REUSSI A ETOFFER LEUR ENGAGEMENT DE COOPERATION MILITAIRE ACCRUE. ON REMARQUE QUE DECISION D AVOIR REUNION BI-ANNUELLE DES MIN DEFENSE DANS EFFORT DE VITALISER TRAITE DE L ELYSEE DE 1963 DANS SON VOLET DEFENSE A PORT FRUITS CONCRETS.

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PAGE CINQ ZQGR4017 CONFD

FAILLITE DU PROJET CONJOINT DE CHAR FRANCO-ALLEMAND AVAIT LAISSE QUELQUES CICATRICES. CETTE FOIS GOUV ALLEMAND A MIEUX PREPARE SES ARRIERES NOTAMMENT AUPRES DES PARLEMENTAIRES ET ON S EST TROUVE EN MESURE D ANNONCER NOTAMMENT PROJET DE RECHERCHE ET DEVELOPPEMENT D UN HELICOPTERE ANTI-CHAR FRANCO-ALLEMAND DES ANNEES 1990. RFA Y CONTRIBUERA DM 900 MIO POUR RECHERCHE; RFA ET FRANCE ACHETERONT 200 HELICOPTERES (DM 3.2 MIA) CHACUN EN 1990-91. EN PARALLELE A CE PROJET, ON VEUT DEVELOPPER MISSILES ANTI-CHAR (3E GENERATION) POUR CET HELICOPTERE QUI SERA EQUIPE AU DEBUT DE 8 MISSILES HOT/HOT. CET IMPORTANT PROJET EST SUJET A PRESENTATION DES ETUDES TECHNIQUES DES FIRMES MBB (RFA) ET SNIAS (FRANCE). AUTRES PROJETS SONT PREVUS A TITRE DE COOPERATION MILITAIRE NOTAMMENT AU NIVEAU DE NOUVEAUX TYPES DE MUNITIONS (DETAILS INCONNUS). COOPERATION MILIT BILATERALE CONSTITUE UN SUCCES PERSONNEL POUR CHANCELIER KOHL CAR IL A REUSSI A SOIGNER BLESSURES LAISSEES PAR INCAPACITE DE SCHMIDT DE RESPECTER SES ENGAGEMENTS A EGARD D UN CHAR COMMUN (FAUTE DE SOUTIEN AU BUNDESTAG).

6. BILATERALE-AUTRES: PLUSIEURS AUTRES AJUSTEMENTS QUI PEUVENT ENTRER DANS CATEGORIE CIT DETAILS FINCI FURENT CONCLUS. CES CIT DETAILS FINCI DEMONTRENT TOUTEFOIS PROFENDEUR DES RELATIONS BILATERALES ET ETENDUE DES ACCORDS EXISTANTS. (1) AINSI ON A REVISE ACCORD SUR ECHANGE DE

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PAGE SIX ZQGR4017 CONFD

JEUNESSE(CECI A LIEU A TOUS 10/10 ANS);ON A OPERE QUELQUES
AMELIORATIONS TECHNIQUES SANS MODIFIER LE FOND(EN 20 ANS,
4 MIO DE JEUNES FRANCAIS ET ALLEMANDS ONT PARTICIPE A DIVERSES
ACTIVITES SOUS CET ACCORD).(2)SECTEUR POSTAL:A COMPTER
MARS 1984,CITOYENS POURRONT RETIRER A ETRANGER FONDS A PARTIR
COMPTE BANCAIRE QU ILS DETIENNENT AUPRES DE POSTE;A COMPTER 1986.
TELEPHONE-AUTOMOBILE POURRA ETRE UTILISE POUR APPELS DANS AUTRE
PAYS;AUCUN ACCORD SUR CABLO-DISTRIBUTION(3)ENVIRONNEMENT:MITTERAND
A PROMIS PARTICIPATION DE FRANCE A CONFERENCE EUROPEENNE QUE KOHL
VEUT TENIR A MUNICH EN 1984

(4)MITTERAND SE RENDRA DEBUT JAN CHEZ KOHL A LUDWIGSHAFEN POUR
CONSULTATIONS INFORMELLES AU DEBUT DE SA PRESIDENCE DE CEE.

7.CONCLUSION:ELEMENTS CI-HAUTS DEMONTRENT VOLONTE D AJOUTER
SUBSTANCE AUX ENGAGEMENT POLITIQUES EN S APPUYANT SUR CADRE
JURIDIQUE DU TRAITE DE L ELYSEE DE 1963(EG SECTEUR DEFENSE
NOTAMMENT).42E CONSULTATIONS FURENT AU FOND TRES NORMALES
ET SAINES ENTRE CES DEUX PARTENAIRES INDISPENSABLES L UN DE
L AUTRE.PROBLEMES DE DEBALANCE DU COMMERCE BILATERAL EN
FAVEUR DE RFA,DES DIFFICULTES DE LA CEE N ONT PAS PORTE
OMBRAGE AU DIALOGUE POLITIQUE.SOULIGNON ENFIN QUE KOHL
A REITERE APPEL A SOUTIEN FRANCAIS SUR QUESTION ALLEMANDE.
A L ADRESSE DE PRESSE FRANCAISE TRADITIONNELLEMENT SCEPTIQUE
DE DIRECTION DE RFA SUR OPTIONS POLITIQUES A LONG TERME

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PAGE SEPT ZQGR4017 CONFD


(NEUTRALISME, REUNIFICATION ETC), KOHL A ASSURE PARTIE
FRANCAISE QUE RFA NE S AVENTURERA PAS/PAS CIT DANS REVES
NEUTRALISTES IRREALISTES FINCIT.

CCC/005 021037Z ZQGR4017

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYGR3061 29NOV83

TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 290900



INFO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUF
WSHDC MOSCO BNATO GENEV TOKYO WSAW BPEST PRGUF BGRAD STKHM CNBRA
HSNKI/CDEDEL WLGTN VIENN PEKIN DELHI PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CIS/
ADMPOL/PPP/DGIS PRMNY VMBFR

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR RBD FPR IDD IDR
IDA IDD7 RBRD IDX ZSP RBP ZSI

REF OURTEL UYGR3047 28NOV

---INF:ROM INITIATIVE:SPECIAL ENVOY TO CDA

THIS MORNING, WITH R NOYES ROBERTS, DEP DIR EXPO 86, MET MME GROZA TO
DISCUSS ROM PARTICIPATION IN THAT EXPO. AFTER MTG MME GROZA ASKED ME
TO DISCUSS ANOTHER QUESTION. SHE TOLD ME THAT PRES CEAUSESCU HAS
EXPRESSED DESIRE THAT A SPECIAL ENVOY ALSO BE SENT TO OTT FOR
CONSULTATIONS REGARDING SPECIFIC PROBLEMS BEING OBJECT OF RECENT
DECLARATION OF ROM GOVT (SEE OUR REFTTEL). SHE ASKED ME TO TRANSMIT THIS
REQUEST WITHOUT DELAY. SHE DID NOT/NOT ELABORATE ON FACTORS EXPLAINING
CHANGE OF MIND.

2. ROM GOVT ENVISAGE, IF THIS IS CONVENIENT TO US IN SPITE OF THE SHORT
NOTICE, TO SEND TO OTT VICE MIN DOLGU WHO IS LEAVING TODAY FOR WSHDC.
DOLGU WILL BE IN WSHDC NOV30-DEC3. HE COULD GO FOR CONSULTATIONS TO
OTT DEC5 AND 6 IF THIS IS AGREEABLE TO YOU. AS I MENTIONED IN PREVIOUS
TEL, DOLGU WAS ALSO ROM SPECIAL ENVOY TO MOSCO. IT COULD THEREFORE BE

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PAGE TWO UYGR3061 CONF

INTERESTING TO DISCUSS WITH HIM RESULTS OF HIS SOV AND AMERICAN VISITS.

3.MME GROZA ALSO STATED THAT DOLGU VISIT COULD PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE AND ITS PRELIMINARY RESULTS AS WELL AS POSSIBILITY OF CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN ROM AND CDA IN CONTEXT OF PHASE II OF PMS INITIATIVE,IF IT EVER TAKES OFF.

4.ROM AUTHORITIES WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD PROVIDE ANSWER BY 03DEC.GRATEFUL ALSO FOR ANY INDICATION YOU MIGHT HAVE ON POSSIBLE INTERLOCUTORS FOR DOLGU.I ASSUME THAT IF YOU CANNOT/NOT RECEIVE VICE MIN DOLGU ON SUGGESTED DATES,ROMS WOULD BE PREPARED TO SEND SOMEONE ELSE AT MORE CONVENIENT TIME FOR YOU BUT BELIEVE EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO SPEAK WITH DOLGU IN VIEW OF FACT THAT HE IS PROBABLY BEST INFORMED ENVOY REGARDING INITIATIVE.DOLGU SPEAKS EXCELLENT FRENCH AND SOME ENGLISH.

5.ALSO LEARNED THAT IN RELATION TO DOLGU VISIT TO WSHDC,RACEANU WILL NOT/NOT BE ABLE TO COME TO OTT BEFORE DEC3.HE HAS BEEN ASKED TO ASSIST DOLGU ON HIS MISSION IN ABSENCE OF ROM POLITICAL COUNSELLOR FROM WSHDC.ROM AUTHORITIES REGRET VERY MUCH INCONVENIENCE CAUSED BY THIS DELAY IN VIEW OF INTERESTING PROGRAM WHICH HAD BEEN PREPARED FOR RACFANU

SIMARD

CCC/181 291130Z UYGR3061

MF
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ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM WSHDC UNGR2474 29NOV83
TO EXTOTT IDDZ URR
INFO ENATO MOSCO PMDELKWAIT

28-6-1 = Trudeau Peace
mission

DISTR RBR IDA UGB MINA USS DMF IFB RGB IDD IDR

---PMS INITIATIVE:VISIT TO WASHDC

RICK BURT PHONED GOTLIEB THIS PM TO TELL HIM THAT WHILE IT IS NOT/
NOT YET FINAL IT LOOKS LIKE A TIME HAS BEEN ARRANGED FOR PM TO
VISIT WSHDC BEFORE CHRISTMAS,PROBABLY THIRD WEEK IN DEC.WILL ADVISE
AS SOON AS SOMETHING MORE DEFINITE IS ARRANGED.

CCC/059 292242Z UNGR2474

**ACTION
SUIVE A DONNER**

*Secret to Protocol
for action 30/11/83
[Signature]*

UNCLASSIFIED

FM HAGUE YWFC1803 29NOV83

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ

INFO PMOOTT/BROWN PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR RCR RSR RWP

---PMS VISIT-FINANCIAL CODING

*28-6-1-Thudreau Peace
Mission*

ARE BEGINNING TO RECEIVE BILLS NOW FOR EXPENSES ASSOCIATED WITH
PMS VISIT, EG BUSES FOR CDN JOURNALISTS, EXPENSES FOR NOV11
COMMEMORATIVE CEREMONY AT GROESBEEK CDN WAR CEMETERY ETC.
GRATEFUL FOR CODING ASAP IN ORDER THAT WE MAY SETTLE ACCOUNTS.
UUU/155 300827Z YWFC1803

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
Mission

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT FPR1144 29NOV83

TO ABDBI/PMDEL DELIVER BY 010900

INFO PEKIN BNATO BRU BREEC LDN WSHDC CNGNY PARIS PRMNY ROME BONN
MOSCO GENEV TOKYO NDHQOTT/ADM/POL/DG PCOOTT PMOOTT/FOWLER DELHI
DISTR IDDZ IDA IDD IDR UGB URR RBR ZSI

---TRANSCRIPT CBC TV NATL 29NOV-PMS PEACE INIT-PEKIN

QUOTE:

CBC: GOOD EVENING. PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU MET CHINAS MOST POWERFUL
LEADER TODAY TO TRY TO SELL HIS PEACE PROPOSALS. BUT TRUDEAU WASNT
HAPPY AFTER AN HOUR OF TALKING WITH DENG ZIAOPING. TRUDEAU EVEN
HINTED HE WONT TAKE HIS PROPOSALS TO MOSCOW OR WASHINGTON UNLESS
HE GETS MORE SUPPORT. DAVID HALTON REPORTS.

D.H.: THE PRIME MINISTER WAS BACK AT THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE
TODAY FOR A MEETING THAT WAS MUCH MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE ONE HE
HAD HERE YESTERDAY WITH THE CHINESE PREMIER. THIS TIME TRUDEAU WAS
TAKING HIS PEACE PROPOSALS TO DENG XIAOPING, CHAIRMAN OF CHINAS
MILITARY COMMISSION, CHAIRMAN OF ITS COUNCIL OF ADVISERS AND BY FAR
THE MOST POWERFUL MAN IN THE COUNTRY. THE MEETING BEGAN WITH
PLEASANTRIES, TRUDEAU RECALLING THAT HE WAS OUT OF POWER IN 1979
WHEN HE LAST MET DENG AND HAD ASKED FOR THE CHINESE LEADERS ADVICE.

P.E.T.: QUOTE...AND I ASKED YOU THE SECRET TO GET BACK INTO
GOVERNMENT. YOU TOLD ME THE ONLY SECRET WAS PATIENCE UNQUOTE.

D.H.: BUT ONCE AIDES AND REPORTERS HAD BEEN USHERED OUT, TRUDEAU WAS

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PAGE TWO FPR1144 UNCLAS

IN FOR A DISAPPOINTMENT. WHILE ENCOURAGING THE PRIME MINISTER TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE SUPERPOWERS TO LIMIT THEIR NUCLEAR ARMS, DENG SAID HE DOESNT FEEL THE TIME IS RIGHT FOR TRUDEAUS PROPOSED DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE THAT WOULD BRING THE THREE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS—BRITAIN, FRANCE AND CHINA TO THE BARGAINING TABLE WITH THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION. AFTERWARDS, TRUDEAU ADMITTED THAT THE CHINESE COOLNESS TO A FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE IS SHARED BY THE BRITISH AND FRENCH, AND WITHOUT STRONGER SUPPORT FROM THESE THREE COUNTRIES TRUDEAU HINTED THAT HE MIGHT SHELVE HIS PLAN TO GO TO MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON.

P.E.T. QUOTE I DONT WANT TO BE IN THE POSITION OF DOING THE RUNNING FOR THE THREE NUCLEAR POWERS. IT IS ALL VERY WELL FOR THEM TO ENCOURAGE ME TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE SUPERPOWERS AND I WILL NOT GO THERE, TO EITHER MOSCOW OR WASHINGTON, IF IT IS TO TRY AND BE A PROKER BETWEEN THE TWO UNQUOTE.

D.H.: SO TRUDEAU LEFT PEKING TODAY WITH THE SAME RESPONSE FROM THE CHINESE LEADERS AS HE HAS GOT ON OTHER STAGES OF HIS PEACE TOUR: AND THATS ENDORSEMENT OF THE GENERAL GOALS OF HIS PEACE MISSION, BUT NOT OF THE METHODS HE IS PROPOSING TO ACHIEVE THEM. DAVID HALTON, CBC NEWS, PEKING.

UNQUOTE.

UUU/291 302004Z FPR1144

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
mission

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT FPR1140 29NOV83

TO PMDELDELHI

INFO PEKIN ENATO WSHDC CNGNY PRMNY MOSCO BRU BREFC LDN PARIS ROME
BONN TOKYO GENEV NDHQOTT/ADM/POL/DG PCOOTT PMOOTT/FOWLER
DISTR (IDD7 IDR IDA IDD UGB URR RBR ZSI

...CBC TRANSCRIPT 29NOV:PM TRUDEAU PEACE INIT-PEKIN

QUOTE CBC 0900 29NOV-PM TRUDEAUS PEACE INITIATIVE-PEKING

CBC:THE CHINESE CHAIRMAN, DENG XIAOPING, SAYS HE LIKES PM TRUDEAUS
PEACE PLAN BUT CHINA CANNOT GO ALONG WITH ALL OF ITS PROVISIONS.
DENG MET THE PM IN THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE IN PEKIN. HE SAID
CHINA AND CANADA ARE IN DIFFERENT POSITIONS AND THE CHINESE CANNOT DO
ALL THAT MR TRUDEAU WANTS. BUT MR DENG ENCOURAGED THE PM TO PRESS
AHEAD WITH HIS INITIATIVES. WE GET THE DETAILS FROM OUR NATL
AFFAIRS REPORTER BRIAN KELLEHER.

B.K.:THE COMMENTS OF DENG XIAOPING WERE MADE JUST AS PICTURES WERE
BEING TAKEN AT THE START OF HIS MEETING TODAY WITH MR TRUDEAU.
REFERRING TO THE CDN PEACE INITIATIVE THE CHINESE LEADER SAID WE
ARE IN DIFFERENT POSITIONS. WE CANNOT DO EXACTLY AS YOU ADVOCATE IN
SOME RESPECTS, BUT YOUR EFFORTS ARE IMPORTANT. MR TRUDEAU ANSWERED
THAT HE THOUGHT HE AND CHINA HAD THE SAME OBJECTIVES. AT THAT POINT
THE DOORS WERE CLOSED ON THE MEETING. MR TRUDEAU SAID AFTER THE
MEETING TODAY THAT CHAIRMAN DENG HAD REPEATED CHINA'S POSITION AND
ITS UP TO THE SUPERPOWERS FIRST TO REDUCE THEIR ARSENALS BEFORE
SMALLER NUCLEAR POWERS HAVE TO DO ANYTHING.

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PAGE TWO FPR1140 UNCLAS

P.E.T.:QUOTE I MERELY POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT I WOULD CERTAINLY
CONTINUE DOING EVERYTHING I COULD IN THAT DIRECTION,BUT THAT I
FELT THAT THE THREE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS HAD A PARTICULAR
RESPONSIBILITY TO PUT THE PRESSURE AND THAT THEY WERE IN A BETTER
POSITION TO PUT PRESSURE THAN A NON-NUCLEAR POWER LIKE CDA UNQUOTE.
B.K.:MR TRUDEAU SAYS JUST BECAUSE CHINA HAS NOT AGREED TO SIGN THE
NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY OR TO ATTEND A CONF OF ALL FIVE
NUCLEAR POWERS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THE IDEA OF SUCH A CONF IS DEAD.
HE SAYS THE DYNAMICS OF SUCH A MEETING WILL CONTINUE TO BE EXPLORED.
BRIAN KELLEHER,CBC NEWS,PFKING.

UNQUOTE

UUU/189 2922027 FPR1140

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MF
LD

28-6-1-*Trudeau Peace Mission*

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PEKIN WJGR0924 29NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO PMDELKWAIT MOSCO TOKYO WSHDC LDN PARIS ROME HAGUE BRU

PRMNY PCOOTT/CARON BONN BNATO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CP

DISTR MINA DMF IDR IDA RBR PER PED RCR RGB RBR RBD ZSI

---PMS VISIT-CHINESE PRESS COVERAGE

PEOPLES DAILY OF 29NOV CARRIED TWO STORIES ABOUT PM VISIT AND DISCUSSIONS WITH PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG. ONE ARTICLE QUOTED EXTENSIVELY FROM TOASTS AT WELCOMING BANQUET. OTHER READS AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE

PREMIER OF STATE COUNCIL ZHAO ZIYANG HELD TALKS THIS AFTERNOON WITH CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER PEIRRE E TRUDEAU.

IT IS KNOWN THAT BOTH SIDES EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND IN PARTICULAR, DISARMAMENT AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU ARRIVED IN BEIJING THIS MORNING AND IS HERE FOR A WORKING VISIT UPON THE INVITATION BY THE CHINESE GOVT.

TRUDEAU SAID DURING THE TALKS: THERE IS GREAT TENSION IN THE CURRENT WORLD SITUATION. WE HOPE THAT MORE AND MORE POLITICAL LEADERS WILL SHOW MORE CONCERN OVER THE TENSE SITUATION AND TAKE PART IN EASING THE TENSION.

ZHAO ZIYANG SAID: THE CHINESE GOVT UNDERSTAND VERY MUCH PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S CONCERN OVER THE WORSENING OF INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. ZHAO ZIYANG EXPRESSED APPRECIATION OF PRIME MINISTER

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PAGE TWO WJGR0924 UNCLAS

TRUDEAUS EFFORTS IN IMPROVING EAST-WEST RELATIONS AS WELL AS
EASING WORLD TENSION.

ZHAO ZIYANG REITERATED CHINESE GOVERNMENTS CONSISTANT STAND ON
DISARMAMENT AND SAID THAT CHINA WILL MAKE A SERIOUS STUDY OF
PROPOSALS ON DISARMAMENT MADE BY PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU AND
LEADERS OF OTHER COUNTRIES.

THE TWO PRIME MINISTERS AGREED THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO
DISCUSS MAJOR ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST NEXT JANUARY.

UNQUOTE.

UUU/002 010410Z WJGR0924

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

MF
[Signature]

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
mission

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PEKIN WJGR0919 29NOV83

TO EXTOTT *L*IDDZ

INFO PMDELKWAIT MOSCO TOKYO WSHDC LDN PARIS ROME HAGUE BRU PRMNY

PCOOTT/CRON BONN BNATO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CP

DISTR MINA DMF IDR IDA RBR PER PED RCR RGB RBR RBD ZSI

--PMS VISIT

FOLLOWING ARE TEXTS OF SPEECHES GIVEN BY PREMIER ZHAO AND PM
TRUDEAU AT BANQUET 28NOV:

(A) TOAST BY PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG QUOTE IT IS OUR GREAT PLEASURE
THAT PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU HAS COME TO CHINA ON A WORKING VISIT
AFTER HIS TOUR OF SOME EUROPEAN AND ASIAN COUNTRIES. ON BEHALF OF
THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE, I WOULD LIKE TO EXTEND TO YOU,
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE PRIME MINISTER, OUR WARM WELCOME.

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU IS A WELL-KNOWN OLD FRIEND OF THE CHINESE
PEOPLE, WHO HAS VISITED CHINA ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS AND MADE
POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
BETWEEN CHINA AND CANA AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR FRIENDLY
RELATIONS AND COOPERATION. WE HIGHLY APPRECIATE ALL THIS. I PERSONALLY
HAD THE OPPORTUNITY OF MAKING YOUR ACQUAINTANCE IN SICHUAN IN 1979
AND MEETING YOU AGAIN DURING THE CANCUN MEETING IN 1981. TODAY WE
ARE HAVING A REUNION AS OLD FRIENDS, WHICH IS PARTICULARLY HEART-
WARMING.

AT PRESENT, THE WORLD IS FAR FROM TRANQUIL, AND THE INTERNATIONAL
SITUATION HAS BECOME MORE TURBULENT. TO SAFEGUARD PEACE IS NOW A

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REMOVED FROM
PUBLIC DOMAIN

PAGE TWO WJGR0919 UNCLAS

MATTER OF PRIME IMPORTANCE AND OF UNIVERSAL CONCERN OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IT IS OUR CONSISTENT VIEW THAT THE ROOT
CAUSE OF THE CURRENT WORLD TENSION LIES IN THE GLOBAL RIVALRY
BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. RESOLUTE STRUGGLES MUST BE WAGED AGAINST
HEGEMONISM IN ALL ITS MANIFESTATIONS BEFORE WORLD PEACE CAN BE
EFFECTIVELY PRESERVED.

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE PRIME MINISTER IS MOST CONCERNED ABOUT THE
CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND HAS MADE A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT
INITIATIVES AIMED AT EASING THE EAST-WEST RELATIONS. WE DEEPLY
ADMIRE THIS SPIRIT OF YOURS, PRIME MINISTER. THIS AFTERNOON, WE HAD
AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST, AND THE TWO SIDES
HELD MANY SIMILAR VIEWS ON THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.
THESE TALKS HELPED ENHANCE OUR MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND PROVED
VERY USEFUL.

VERY SOON I WILL PAY A GOODWILL VISIT TO CANADA AT YOUR INVITATION.
I LOOK FORWARD TO MEETING YOUR GREAT PEOPLE, LEARNING YOUR
EXPERIENCES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND RESUMING OUR EXCHANGE
OF VIEWS ON ISSUES OF COMMON INTEREST DURING MY VISIT. I AM CONVINCED
THAT THE EXCHANGE OF VISITS BY LEADERS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES WILL
HELP PROMOTE OUR MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND THE FRIENDLY RELATIONS
AND COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, AS WELL AS BENEFIT
THE CAUSE OF MAINTAINING WORLD PEACE, WHICH IS AN ISSUE OF UNIVERSAL
CONCERN.

NOW, I PROPOSE A TOAST UNQUOTE.

...3

PAGE THREE WJGR0919 UNCLAS

(B)REMARKS BY PM TRUDEAU QUOTE MR PRIME MINISTER.

I SHOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION FOR YOUR VERY KIND WORDS OF WELCOME AND FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO RENEW OUR PERSONAL ACQUAINTANCE.MAY I THANK YOU MOST SINCERELY FOR THE GENEROUS HOSPITALITY WHICH YOU AND YOUR COLLEAGUES HAVE EXTENDED TO ME.I AM ALL THE MORE GRATEFUL BECAUSE OF THE VERY SHORT NOTICE WITH WHICH THIS TRIP WAS ARRANGED.

(FRANCAIS) THIS IS MY FIFTH VISIT TO THIS GREAT COUNTRY.FROM THE TIME WHEN I FIRST CAME HERE AS A STUDENT.AND MY LATER VISITS IN OTHER CAPACITIES.I FELT CONFIDENT THAT CHINA WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL IN ITS EFFORT TO BUILD A NEW AND BETTER LIFE FOR ITS CITIZENS.THAT SUCCESS IS BEING ACHIEVED.THE TREMENDOUS PROGRESS WHICH IS NOW SO CLEARLY EVIDENT GIVES THE CHINESE PEOPLE EVERY RIGHT TO BE PROUD OF THEIR ACCOMPLISHMENTS.THOSE ACCOMPLISHMENTS HAVE GIVEN TO CHINA ADDED REASON TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE AND SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS.WE IN CANADA PAY CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE VIEWS OF CHINA ON ALL IMPORTANT QUESTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.THAT IS WHY I AM HERE TODAY.

AS I WROTE YOU SOME WEEKS AGO,I HAVE FOR SOME TIME BEEN DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THE GROWING THREAT TO WORLD PEACE.I HAVE BECOME CONVINCED THAT ACTION MUST BE TAKEN BY POLITICAL LEADERS TO ARREST THE DETERIORATION IN THE CLIMATE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, AND TO TAKE POSITIVE STEPS IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE.IT IS CLEAR THAT

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PAGE FOUR WJGR0919 UNCLAS

YOU SHARE OUR CONCERN. CHINA'S STATUS AS ONE OF THE SELECT GROUP OF NUCLEAR-ARMED POWERS GIVES YOUR GOVERNMENT SPECIAL INSIGHTS INTO THE PRESENT WORLD SITUATION. AS A PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL YOU ALSO HAVE A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR WORLD PEACE. OUR TALKS THIS AFTERNOON HAVE ALREADY DEMONSTRATED TO ME THAT YOU TAKE THIS RESPONSIBILITY WITH GREAT SERIOUSNESS.

AS PART OF THE INITIATIVE ON WHICH I AM ENGAGED, CANADA IS PURSUING SEVERAL PURPOSES WHICH WE ARE DISCUSSING WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS. THESE PURPOSES ARE TO WORK FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ATMOSPHERE OF CONFIDENCE IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS; TO REINFORCE EFFORTS TO STOP THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS; AND VARIOUS SPECIFIC MEASURES IN THE DISARMAMENT FIELD, SUCH AS, A BAN ON THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS. THERE ARE MANY PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH EACH ONE OF OUR PROPOSALS, BUT WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF CHINA WILL EXAMINE THEM CAREFULLY. IN TURN WE ARE ANXIOUS TO HEAR FROM YOU WHAT ACTIONS SHOULD IN YOUR VIEW BE TAKEN TO REINFORCE INTERNATIONAL PEACE.

MY VISIT TO YOU ON THIS OCCASION IS ALL TOO BRIEF--BUT I AM CONSOLED BY THE FACT THAT IN LESS THAN TWO MONTHS WE WILL BE ABLE TO RENEW OUR DISCUSSIONS IN CANADA. THE WEATHER IN OTTAWA IN JANUARY WILL BE COLD--COLDER EVEN THAN IN PEKING--BUT WE SHALL TRY TO MAKE UP FOR THIS BY EXTENDING TO YOU THE WARMEST WELCOMES,

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PAGE FIVE WJGR0919 UNCLAS

AS INDEED I HAVE RECEIVED HERE.WE SHALL ALL BE LOOKING FORWARD TO
YOUR VISIT.IT WILL PERMIT US TO MOVE STILL FURTHER ALONG THE ROAD
TO OUR COMMON GOAL OF LASTING PEACE BETWEEN THE PEOPLES OF THE
WORLD;AND IT WILL MAKE STILL STRONGER OUR TIES OF COOPERATION
AND FRIENDSHIP.

MAY I NOW PROPOSE A TOAST.UNQUOTE

UUU/002 300640Z WJGR0919

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

MF
28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LAGOS XKGR0276 29NOV83

TO EXTOTT *LPA* 1DDZ

INFO WSHDC LDN BONN BNATO CNBRA CHOGMDEL/DELHI

DISTR ZSS ZSP ZEP ZSI GAA RBD RBR IDR GAAD IMC *1DD new 1DPO 1DAN*

---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE

AT YUGOSLAV NATL DAY RECEPTION, RUSSIAN AMB INQUIRED AS TO RESULTS OF PMS VISIT TO PRC. AFTER EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR WHAT HE CLEARLY INTIMATED WOULD BE A FUTILE ATTEMPT AT CONCILIATION, HE THEN PROCEEDED INTO EMOTIONAL DIATRIBE AGAINST USA BAD FAITH IN NEGOTIATIONS. RISING TO A FINE PITCH, HE CONCLUDED QUOTE IT MUST BE CLEAR TO USA THAT IS IS INTOLERABLE TO US TO HAVE SOVIET SOIL IN REACH OF USA CRUISE AND PERSHING WHEN WE DO NOT/NOT HAVE, AS YET THE SAME CAPACITY FOR OUR SS.20S. IT WILL COST US A LOT OF MONEY. BUT WE WILL HAVE NO/NO RECOURSE BUT TO INCREASE OUR SEABORNE MISSILES. WE CANT AFFORD TO LET REAGAN RAISE HIS HAND TO US WITHOUT RESPONDING. UNQUOTE. AS TO DIVORCING FRENCH AND UK WEAPONS FROM USA ARSENAL FOR PURPOSES OF DISCUSSIONS, HE ASKED, QUOTE DO YOU THINK IT WILL MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE TO A RUSSIAN WHERE THE BOMB THAT FALLS ON HIM WAS MADE UNQUOTE. HE WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT RESUMPTION OF ARMS LIMITATION TALKS, AND SUGGESTED QUOTE MAYBE IN THREE YEARS WHEN WE ARE BACK TO PARITY UNQUOTE

LAMBERT

CCC/203 301050Z XKGR0276

External Affairs / Affaires extérieures
Canada / Canada

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER MESSAGE

MF

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

TOR/TOD
COMMUNICATIONS

Nov 29 19 47 '83
12
CANADIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

1/2

SECURITY /
SÉCURITÉ

FM/DE
TO/A
INFO
DISTR
REF
SUBJ/SUJ

UNCLASSIFIED

WSHDC BA 251 29NOV83
EXTOTT/IDDZ

MIXED REVIEWS FOR TRUDEAU

COMCENTRE: PLEASE FAX ATTACHED.

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIGP. GOSSAGE/AM	PUBLIC AFFAIRS	X 206	<i>[Signature]</i> SIG H. ADAMS/P. GOSSAGE

HAR TO - 1DD 2/10/71 AWA

7/2

Overoptimistic? In El Salvador, adversity breeds its own form of optimism. For example, this year's zero economic growth is being regarded as significant progress after four years of decline.

PARIS TO THE RESCUE

Not only U.S. flexes military muscle in the Caribbean region. So does France, after attacks by terrorists seeking independence from Paris. Some 100 French gendarmes rushed to the island of Guadeloupe, after six bomb blasts on November 13-14 injured 20. Reinforcements were sent to Cayenne, French Guiana, to cap explosions of violence there. Both spots, as well as island of Martinique, had been ripped by bombs earlier.

Secessionist movement called the Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance is believed behind escalating violence in all three places. It commands scant popular support, but tension between locals and French settlers, plus the long distance from Paris, makes breeding ground for trouble.

Prompt show of force means no change in French policy toward its overseas departments and territories. Paris will be generous toward bids for decentralization, will tolerate no breach of law and order.

TROUBLE IN SUDAN

Rising unrest in Sudan triggers concern in U.S., dominates scheduled Washington talks between Presidents Reagan and Nimeiri in late November. Behind the worry: Sudan borders pro-Western Egypt, sits across Red Sea from Saudi Arabia, is a bulwark against Soviet expansion in region.

True, instability in Sudan is hardly novel. Nimeiri has survived 14 coup attempts since 1969. But now he's really feeling the heat.

Mainly Christian southern Sudan contends Nimeiri's creation of three regional governments in the south is a ploy to impose Moslem rule.

Non-Moslems resent Nimeiri's recent promulgation of Islamic law. Radical Libya, Marxist Ethiopia foment rebellion among the dissenters.

What Nimeiri seeks from Washington is more money, more arms. The U.S. funneled some 75 million dollars' worth of military and economic aid to Sudan last year, is reluctant to deepen the American commitment.

America won't turn off the tap to Khartoum. But Nimeiri will have to make moves to heal north-south gulf if he wants U.S. to kick in more.

MIXED REVIEWS FOR TRUDEAU

Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau's crusade to halt a superpower arms race rouses a gamut of reactions, from good try to mischief-making. Trudeau whipped off to six European capitals in mid-November to sound out Western allies' views of a broad strategy for disarmament. No sale.

Publicly, he has received a few high marks for admirable intentions. Privately, many wonder just what he hoped to accomplish. They note that U.S., Russia have haggled over arms for years with little results.

Grumbling in Washington is fiercer. Some U.S. officials feel trip spread confusion, sent wrong signals, could cause "a lot of mischief."

Fact is, cynics in Canada and abroad see Trudeau's whirlwind jaunt aimed at home consumption. They regard it as a bid to boost flagging fortunes of his governing Liberals, as a signal that he may be changing his mind about stepping down as Prime Minister after 14 years in power.

Patrick
See you
see
This is not
very good

MF
LD

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR0198 29NOV83

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ

28-6-1-Hudson Peace
mission

INFO PMDELKWAIT MOSCO BNATO PRMNY CNGNY PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN
VMBFR CANMILREPNATO BONN LDN GENEV STKHM NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/DNACPOL/
CID/CORAE/ADMPOL/PPP/DIPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB URGB URR RGB UGB RBR IDD IDR IDA IDPA IDRL
RGX RED RCR RCD RSR RSRD CPD

REF OURTEL UNGR0186 25NOV

--FAST-WEST RELATIONS:CDN INITIATIVES

FURTHER TO REPORT(SEE REFTEL)OF EARLIER CONVERSATIONS AMB HAS HAD
WITH PRIVATE PERSONALITIES AND EXPERTS IN WSHDC ON THIS SUBJECT,
SOME OF IDFAS OF FUTURE FOREIGN AFFAIRS EDITOR BILL HYLAND(WHO MET
WITH PM IN NY EARLIER THIS MONTH)MERIT SEPARATE REPORT.WHILE HYLAND
SEES DEFINITE NEED FOR IMPROVED TYPE OF DISCOURSE WITH SOVIET
LEADERS HE IS DOUBTFUL ABOUT PROSPECTS REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WILL
MOVE THAT WAY NEXT YEAR.IF LOSSES FROM POLITICAL RIGHT OUTWEIFHS
GAINS FROM MIDDLE,MOVE IN SUCH DIRECTION MIGHT NOT/NOT OCCUR.HE
JUDGES CHANCES AT 50-50.HE SEES MODERATE WHITE HOUSE WING OF BUSH,
BAKER AND DARMAN NOT/NOT PUSHING HARD IN DIRECTION OF CHANGE AT
THIS TIME.HOWEVER,PRES REAGAN PEACTED WITH STRONG PERSONAL INTEREST
TO RECENT PROPOSALS OF SENS NUNN AND WARNER FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT
CENTRE(HYLAND AND SCOWCROFT WERE AMONG THE AUTHORS)BUT OFFICIALS
REACTION WAS COOL.HYLAND RECOGNIZES REAGAN AND WHITE HOUSE WILL

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR0188 CONF

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BE ANXIOUS TO KEEP MAXIMUM CONTROL OF HIS OWN OPTIONS BUT HE SEES MERIT IN PM SUGGESTING TO PRES REAGAN WHEN HE SEES HIM, CDAS WILLINGNESS TO HOST FOUR (OR FIVE) POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE ON CDM SOIL. AS HE MENTIONED AT LUNCHEON IN NY PURPOSE WOULD NOT/NOT BE TO DEAL WITH NUMBERS (WITH HE BELIEVES IS A NON/NON-STARTER) BUT CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN PARTICULAR, INCLUDING AVOIDANCE OF WAR BY ACCIDENT, MISCALCULATION, NUCLEAR TERRORISM, NON-PROLIFERATION, ETC. HE DOUBTS CHINESE WOULD COME BUT OTHERS MIGHT FIND CONFERENCE OF THIS TYPE MORE ATTRACTIVE IDEA. OBVIOUSLY IT COULD BE SEEN AS PART I OF TWO-STAGE AFFAIR. WE PASS THESE IDEAS TO YOU FOR WHAT THEY ARE WORTH.

CCC/059 292325Z UNGR0188



CANADA

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS
OF THE
CANADIAN
EMBASSY

AVEC LES HOMMAGES
DE
L'AMBASSADE DU
CANADA

TO: EXTOTT/RSR

FROM: Canadian Embassy
Ankara, Turkey

ASR
Mr. Sterling

28-6-1-Trudeau/Pasin
Mussouri
CC 20-1-1 A7

GÜNAYDIN, November 29, 1983

Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau in Peking

Trudeau went from India to China yesterday in order to explain to the officials in Peking his proposals on the subject of "nuclear disarmament". Prime Minister Trudeau will then visit Moscow and Washington.

Özal has Pasin in Mind as Foreign Minister

Pasin, the Minister of State in charge of economic ~~aff~~ affairs in the Ulusu government, is expected to become Foreign Minister in the Özal government. An official of the Motherland Party pointed out that as their government will give priority to economic matters, they wanted to have as Foreign Minister a person who knows economics well. Sermet Refik Pasin had been appointed Minister of State following Özal's resignation.

RSR

Mr. Sterling

Military Headline Summary

According to F. German daily Frankfurter Rundschau, an airport is to be built in Northern Cyprus for the American Rapid Deployment Force.

(GÜNAYDIN, November 19, 1983)

Deputy Chief of Staff of the USSR Gen. Lebedev stated to M.A. Birand of Milliyet that the nuclear weapons in Turkey did not pose a threat for the USSR, but it would be different if Pershing-2 and Cruise missiles were installed.

(MILLİYET, November 20)

Bids called for the construction of a NATO air base at Çorlu, Thrace, a project ^{in Greece} has opposed for 3 years.

(HÜRRIYET, November 27)

Foreign Minister Türkmen stated to M.A. Birand that Turkey extended limited supply facilities to the multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon.

(MILLİYET, November 27)

Head of the Middle East Division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry Safrancuk stated to M.A. Birand that the Russians had never accused Turkey of massacring the Armenians and that they were against individual terrorism by Armenians or others.

(MILLİYET, November 27)

Visiting U.S. Senator Codevilla stated in Istanbul that if Turkey prepared a ~~plan for~~ military plan for solving the Middle East question and listed her requirements, the necessary aid would be extended.

(GÜNAYDIN, November 27)

Denktas said they were not thinking of letting the Americans build a base in Northern Cyprus.

(GÜNAYDIN, November 28)

Turkey may send military advisers and sell mortars and other light weapons to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

(CUMHURİYET, November 28)

1002

MF
RD

28-6-1-Hudson
Peace
Mission

INFO

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**CORRECTED COPY
EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE**

FM PMDELDELHI PMDL0154 29NOV83

TO PMOOTT/HUDCN DELIVER BY 291700

INFO PEKIN MOSCO WSHDC EXTOTT LDZ FPR

---SCRUM TRANSCRIPT-BEIJING

TRANSCRIPT OF A SCRUM FOLLOWING THE PRIME MINISTERS MEETING WITH
CHAIRMAN DENG XIAOPING, BEIJING, 29NOV83

TRANSCRIPTION D UNE ENTREVUE SUR LE VIF ACCORDEE PAR LE
PREMIER MINISTRE A LA SUITE D UNE REUNION AVEC M DENG XIAOPING,
PRESIDENT DU CONSEIL CENTRALE, A PEKIN, LE 29NOV83

Q.COMMENT CA S EST PASSE, M LE PREMIER MINISTRE?

R.CA S EST BIEN PASSE.

Q.EST-CE QUE VOUS AVEZ ABORDE D AUTRES QUESTIONS QUE CELLES
QUE VOUS AVEZ ABORDEES HIER?

R.IL A FAIT UN TOUR D HORIZON PLUS LARGE.NOUS AVONS CONCENTRE
LA DISCUSSION SUR LA QUESTION DE L INITIATIVE DE PAIX,MAIS LE
CHAIRMAN A FAIT UN TOUR D HORIZON BEAUCOUP PLUS LARGE TOUCHANT
LA PROCHE-ORIENT,TOUCHANT LES CARAIBES,L AMERIQUE DU SUD,
L AFRIQUE DU SUD,TAIWAN,KOREE ET TOUT.

Q.WAS THE CHAIRMAN ANY MORE OR LESS ENCOURAGING THAN THE PREMIER
YESTERDAY?

A.HE WAS EQUALLY ENCOURAGING AS THE PREMIER HAD BEEN YESTERDAY.
HE INSISTED THAT I MUST CONTINUE ON MY PEACE INITIATIVE TO
INJECT GREATER POLITICAL WILL AMONG THE VARIOUS LEADERS.AS IN THE

...2

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE TWO PMDL0154 UNCLAS

CASE OF THE PREMIER, HE SAID THAT WILL MUST BE EXERCISED ESPECIALLY TO GET THE TWO SUPERPOWERS TO REDUCE THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS. IN THAT SENSE, THE THRUST OF HIS MESSAGE WAS THE SAME AS THE PREMIERS: THAT ITS IMPORTANT TO POLITICIZE THE QUESTION. BUT WE MUST BEGIN FIRST GETTING A REDUCTION FROM THE SUPER-POWERS. I MERELY POINTED OUT TO HIM THAT I WOULD CERTAINLY CONTINUE DOING EVERYTHING I COULD IN THAT DIRECTION, BUT THAT I FELT THAT THE THREE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS HAD A PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY TO PUT THE PRESSURE(ON), AND, THAT THEY WERE IN A BETTER POSITION TO PUT PRESSURE THAN A NON-NUCLEAR POWER LIKE CANADA.

Q. SO, THE CHAIRMAN RAISED THE SAME OBJECTIONS AS THE PREMIER DID YESTERDAY IN RESPECT OF THE FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE?

A. NO/NO, HE DID NOT/NOT REFER TO THE FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE IN ORDER TO MAKE OBJECTIONS. HE MADE THE SAME OBSERVATIONS THAT, IN ORDER OF PRIORITY, THE SUPER-POWERS MUST TAKE THE INITIATIVE.

Q. PRIME MINISTER (THE CHINESE) HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT TWO POINTS IN YOUR PROGRAMME. YOU SAY YOU ARE ENCOURAGED; HOW TO YOU FEEL ENCOURAGED?

A. WHAT ARE THE TWO POINTS?

Q. THE NPT AND THE FIVE POWER CONFERENCE?

A. I FEEL ENCOURAGED BECAUSE THEY SAY THE POLITICIZING, THE INJECTION OF POLITICAL WILL, IS VERY IMPORTANT. IN A SENSE, THE-- WHAT YOU CALL-- TWO OBJECTIONS ARE LINKED TO THE SAME ATTITUDE

...3

PAGE THREE PMDL0154 UNCLAS

THEY HAVE: THAT THE TWO SUPERPOWERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MOST GRAVE ASPECT OF THE HEIGHTENED TENSION, AND THAT PRESSURE MUST BE PUT ON THEM. I'M ENCOURAGED IN THE SENSE THAT THEY HAD NO/NO ANSWER FOR MY COMMENT THAT I'M WILLING TO PUT PRESSURE ON THEM, BUT I THINK THE DYNAMICS OF THE FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE WILL BE PURSUED. JUST BECAUSE THEY HAVEN'T JUMPED AT THE IDEA DOESN'T MEAN THAT IT IS NOT/NOT A GOOD ONE AND AN ESSENTIAL ONE. IT'S EASY FOR OTHERS TO TELL ME, QUOTE GO ON. DEVELOP PRESSURES. . . CONTINUE SEEING POLITICAL LEADERS, UNQUOTE BUT IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT FOR THE THREE NUCLEAR POWERS TO REALIZE THAT THEY HAVE A DIRECT ROLE TO PLAY. SO FAR, THEY HAVEN'T--YOU'RE QUITE RIGHT--INDICATED THAT THEY WANTED TO PLAY IT AT THIS FIVE-POWER FORUM YET. THEY DO SAY THAT THEY ARE--INCLUDING CHINA--PREPARED TO GO TO THE FIVE-POWER FORUM AT A CERTAIN STAGE WHEN THE SUPERPOWERS HAVE DONE CERTAIN THINGS. THAT IS, AS YOU KNOW, THE POSITION OF CHINA AND OF FRANCE AND OF BRITAIN. YOU'RE INTO THE QUOTE CHICKEN AND EGG UNQUOTE SYNDROME: THAT THE SUPERPOWERS WILL NOT/NOT DO CERTAIN THINGS, UNLESS WE DO CERTAIN THINGS. AND QUOTE WE UNQUOTE INCLUDES NOT/NOT ONLY ME; IT INCLUDES, I SUGGEST, MARGARET THATCHER, FRANCOIS MITTERRAND AND PREMIER ZHAO.

Q. MR. PRIME MINISTER, I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAVE BEEN ASKED TO THE SOVIET UNION. WILL YOU TAKE THEM UP ON THAT OFFER?

...4

PAGE FOUR PMPL0154 UNCLAS

A. I HAVE BEEN INVITED TO THE SOVIET UNION A YEAR AGO THIS MONTH BY PREMIER ANDROPOV, AND THAT INVITATION HAS BEEN REPEATED IN VARIOUS FORMS AND MESSAGES. MY ANSWER HAS BEEN THE SAME. ITS THE SAME ANSWER I GIVE TO YOU: I WILL GO TO THE SOVIET UNION IF I THINK I CAN MAKE PROGRESS WITH MY PEACE INITIATIVE.

Q. AND DO YOU THINK IT CAN HELP?

A. IT DEPENDS IF I WANT TO BE OPTIMISTIC OR PESSIMISTIC. I AM GENERALLY INCLINED TO BE OPTIMISTIC, BUT I THINK IT IS STILL IMPORTANT, AS I SAID YESTERDAY, THAT WE WAIT TO SEE HOW THE GOA DECLARATION FILTERS THROUGH TO THE VARIOUS MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCES--THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE AND THE WARSAW PACT ALLIANCE. IT WILL DEPEND A GREAT DEAL ON WHAT HAPPENS IN BRUSSELS WHEN THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE MEET.

Q. PRIME MINISTER, IF YOU DON'T GO TO MOSCOW, HOW ARE YOU POSSIBLY GOING TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE SOVIET UNION? HOW DO YOU SEE THAT NEXT STAGE?

A. WELL, I DON'T WANT TO BE IN THE POSITION OF DOING THE RUNNING FOR THE THREE NUCLEAR POWERS. ITS ALL VERY WELL FOR THEM TO ENCOURAGE ME TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE SUPER POWERS, BUT I MADE IT CLEAR FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF MY INITIATIVE THAT IT DID NOT/NOT SEE MY ROLE AS ONE OF AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW. I WILL NOT/NOT GO THERE--TO EITHER MOSCOW OR WASHINGTON--IF IT IS TO TRY AND BE A BROKER BETWEEN

PAGE FIVE PMDL0154 UNCLAS

THE TWO. I HAVE TO FEEL THAT THERE IS SOMETHING ELSE HAPPENING,
AND THAT QUOTE SOMETHING ELSE UNQUOTE--I MADE IT CLEAR AT THE
OUTSET--IS AN INJECTION OF POLITICAL WILL ON THE MARGINS, ON THE
PERIPHERY. NONE OF US ARE IN GENEVA, NONE OF US ARE AT THE
NEGOTIATING TABLE, WE CAN ONLY INFLUENCE THOSE AT THE NEGOTIATING
TABLE IF PRESSURE IS PUT ON THOSE TWO NOT/NOT ONLY FROM
THEIR POPULATIONS, BUT FROM THEIR FRIENDS AND ALLIES. THAT IS
ESSENTIALLY WHAT I AM DOING AND, THEREFORE, IT DOES NOT FOLLOW
THAT I HAVE TO GO TO MOSCOW OR PEKING.

ONCE AGAIN, I WAS VERY ENCOURAGED BY THE SUPPORT I GOT FROM THE
COMMONWEALTH LEADERS, BUT I WANT TO SEE FURTHER HOW THE MEMBERS
OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE REACT AT THEIR MEETING IN BRUSSELS--
BEFORE ANSWERING THIS OR THAT QUESTION..

Q. DID CHAIRMAN DENG HAVE ANY COMMENT TO MAKE ON THE RECENT
BREAK-OFF OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS IN GENEVA BY THE
SOVIET UNION?

A. NOT/NOT DIRECTLY. I DON'T WANT TO SPEAK FOR HIM. HE CAN DO
THAT. BUT I'D SAY, BY IMPLICATION, HE FEELS THAT THE ARMS RACE
IS GOING TO GO ON FOR SOME TIME YET.

UUU/282 291805Z PMDL0154

MF

28-6-1 - Bureau Peace
mission.

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FM PMDELDELHI PMDL0146 29NOV83

TO EXTOTT DMT DELIVER BY 291200

INFO LSAKA DSLAM HRARE PRET PRMNY WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN NROBI LAGOS
ACCRA KNSHA YUNDE ABDJN DAKAR ADDIS PCOOTT/CARON
DISTR MINA MINE MINT CIDDZ RSR IMD IMC GAA PER PPR GAT PSR LCD LCR
EFB EED EPD EER EEF EEA EPT

---CHOGM-DECLARATIONS AND FINAL COMMUNIQUE

HEADS OF GOVT APPROVED TEXTS THIS MORNING OF FOLLOWING: (1) GOA
DECLARATION ON INNATL SECURITY BASED ON PMS INITIATIVE (2) DELHI
STATEMENT ON ECONOMIC ACTION AND (3) FINAL COMMUNIQUE.

2. GOA DECLARATION HAS ALRFADY BEEN FORWARDED TO OTT. STATEMENT ON
ECONOMIC ACTION (DEALING WITH ESTABLISHMENT OF COMWELTH CONSULT-
ATIVE GROUP) BEING SENT WITH OUR BACKGROUND COMMENTS SOONEST.

3. TRUE TO FORM, LENGTHY COMMUNIQUE DEALT WITH VAST COLLECTION OF
SUBJECTS MOST NOTABLY GRENADA AND CYPRUS ON BOTH OF WHICH A
CONSENSUS WAS REACHED. TEXTS OF THOSE PARAS ALREADY FORWARDED
TO YOU. PARA ON NAMIBIA FROM MUCH LONGER SOUTHERN AFRICA SECTION
FOLLOWS TODAY ALONG WITH THAT ON MIDEAST.

4. OTHER PARAS OF LESSER IMMED INTEREST BUT TRADITIONALLY PART OF
CHOGM COMMUNIQUE INCLUDE AFGHANISTAN SOUTHEAST ASIA (KAMPUCHEA)
BELIZE, INDIAN OCEAN, LAW OF THE SEA, MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY, SOUTH
PACIFIC, CENTRAL AMERICA AND GUYANA, FOOD AND AGRIC, EMPLOYMENT AND
LABOUR, CFTC.

5. FUNCTIONAL COOPERATION SECTION WILL APPEAR AS SEPARATE
ANNEX.

UUU/090 291159Z PMDL0146

MF

**CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY
FM PMDELDELHI PMDL0145 29NOV83
TO EXTOTT RSR DELIVER BY 2910000

28-6-1-Turkey Peace Mission

INFO CANDELNY TAVIV ANKRA ATHNS GENEV VIENN BNATO PESCO BREEC BRU
BERUT CAIRO LDN COPEN STKHM CNBRA HSNKI DUBLN WSHDC PARIS HAGUE
OSLO BONN LSBON MDRID ROME MSCOW TOKYO PEKIN DHAKA LAGOS LSAKA
GRGTN PCOOTT/CARON NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DIPOL/DGIS/DMPC
DISTR MINA MINE MINT FPR USS DMF DMFX RGB IFB CPD PCR RSD SID
SIDG IDD IDDZ IDR IMD IMU IMC JLA JLO GMD GMR ZSP ZSI URR
---CHOGM-CYPRUS

DISCUSSION OF CYPRUS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION ON MORNING OF 25NOV WAS
FAIRLY BRIEF AND NOT/NOT PARTICULARLY HEATED. KYPRIANOU (WHO HAD JUST
ARRIVED IN DELHI) MADE PREDICTABLE PRESENTATION INCLUDING FOLLOWING
POINTS: (A) UDI COULD NOT/NOT HAVE TAKEN PLACE WITHOUT TURKISH TROOPS
AND WAS KNOWN TO TURKISH GOVT IN ADVANCE; (B) CALL FOR NON-RECOGNITION
WAS NOT/NOT ENOUGH-SITUATION HAD TO BE REVERSED, AND IF REVERSAL DID
NOT/NOT OCCUR, MANDATORY MEASURES UNDER UN CHARTER MIGHT HAVE TO BE
TAKEN; (C) IT WAS MISLEADING TO SUGGEST THAT RELIGION WAS A FACTOR
IN CYPRUS-FOREIGN INTERFERENCE WAS CAUSE OF PROBLEM; (D) PART OF
COMWEL HAD BEEN CUT OFF AND HIS GOVT NEEDED SUPPORT AND DETERMINED
ACTION FROM ALL; (E) HSNKI CSCE FINAL ACT HAD BEEN VIOLATED;
(F) SECURITY IN CYPRUS LAY IN UNITY. NOT/NOT PARTITION; (G) HIS GOVT
WOULD GUARANTEE SECURITY OF ALL INDIVIDUALS.

2. BANGLADFSH (ERSHAD): INNATL TALKS NEEDED. UNFORTUNATE TWO COMMUNIT-
IES NOT/NOT ABLE TO LIVE IN PEACE. HOPE PRESIDENT KYPRIANOU AND

PAGE TWO PMDL0145 CONF D CDN EYES ONLY

QUOTE LEADER OF TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY UNQUOTE COULD COME TOGETHER IN UNITED CYPRUS.WE RESPECTED LATE PRESIDENT MAKARIOS AND WELCOMED FACT THAT COUP AGAINST HIM WAS PUT DOWN.WE OFFER GOOD OFFICES TO TRY BRING TWO COMMUNITIES TOGETHER.

3.GUYANA:APPRECIATE ERSHADS OFFER TO MEDIATE BUT UDI MUST NOT/NOT BE CONDONED.PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS IN CYPRUS WAS THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM.SUPPORT KYPRIANOU AND URGE FACILITATION OF NEGOTIATIONS VIA UN.(PM TRUDEAU INTERVENED TO CLARIFY THAT ABOVE REF TO FOREIGN TROOPS DID NOT/NOT MEAN UNFICYP CONTINGENTS).

4.KYPRIANOU CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE HAD SOME DIFFERENCES WITH ERSHAD BUT DID NOT/NOT DOUBT HIS INTENTION TO HELP.DID NOT/NOT SEE PROBLEM AS DISPUTE BETWEEN TWO COMMUNITIES.

5.DISCUSSION WAS CONTINUED IN GOA DURING FOUR HOUR SESSION AMONG HOGS ALONE ON CYPRUS TEXT FOR COMMUNIQUE,WHICH PM LEFT HALF HOUR BEFORE END.ACCORDING TO HIS DEBRIEFING HE INTERVENED TO STRESS THAT BASIC REALITY WAS 40,000 TURKISH TROOPS ON ISLAND AND TURKEYS STATUS AS ALLY OF USA MORE IMPORTANT THAN GREECE.CEASELESS TALK ABOUT INNATL LAW OR KYPRIANOU POSITION THAT HE COUD ONLY NEGOTIATE AFTER DEPARTURE OF TURKISH TROOPS WAS NOT/NOT REALISTIC,OBVIOUSLY THERE HAD TO BE A FEDERAL BIPARTITE STATE.(RECIPIENTS PROTECT THIS PARA,WHICH IS BASED ON VERY BRIEF AND INCOMPLETE ACCOUNT.WE HAVE NO/NO OTHER DETAILS OF GOA DISCUSSION ON CYPRUS).

5.SECRETARIAT TRANSCRIPT OF EXECUTIVE SESSION DEBATE WILL BE BROUGHT BACK BY DEL FOR INFO OF RSR AND FURTHER DISTR.

6.BANGLADESH HAS RESERVED POSITION ON COMMUNIQUE.ERSHAD WAS NOT/NOT IN GOA.

CCC/090 290927Z PMDL0145

MF

28-6-1-T Trudeau Peace
mission

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMDELDELHI PMDL0140 29NOV83

TO EXTOTT RSR DELIVER BY 290900

INFO CANDELNY TAVIV ANKARA ATHENS GENEV VIENA BNATO PESCO BREEC
BRU BERUT CAIRO LDN COPEN STKHM CNBRA HNSKI DUBLN WSHDC PARIS
HAGUE OSLO BONN LSBON MDRID ROME MOSCO TOKYO PEKIN LAGOS LSAKA
GRGTN PCOOTT/CARON NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DIPOL/DGIS/DMPC DELHI
DISTR MINA MINE MINT FPR USS DMF DMFX RGB IFB CPD PCR RSD SID
SIDG IDD DDZ IDR IMD IMU IMC JLA JLO GMFD GMR ZSP ZSI URR

---CHOGM COMMUNIQUE:CYPRUS

FOLLOWING TEXT AGREED BY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AT GOA NOV26 WILL
BE INCLUDED IN CHOGM COMMUNIQUE TO BE ISSUED THIS AFTERNOON:
QUOTE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT CONDEMNED THE DECLARATION BY THE TURKISH
CYPRIOT AUTHORITIES ISSUED ON 15 NOVEMBER 1983 TO CREATE A
SECESSIONIST STATE IN NORTHERN CYPRUS. IN THE AREA UNDER FOREIGN
OCCUPATION. FULLY ENDORSING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 541, THEY
DENOUNCED THE DECLARATION AS LEGALLY INVALID AND REITERATED THE
CALL FOR ITS NON-RECOGNITION AND IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL. THEY FURTHER
CALLED UPON ALL STATES NOT TO FACILITATE OR IN ANY WAY ASSIST THE
ILLEGAL SECESSIONIST ENTITY. THEY REGARDED THIS ILLEGAL ACT AS A
CHALLENGE TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND DEMANDED THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RELEVANT UN RESOLUTIONS ON CYPPUS.

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PAGE TWO PMDL0140 UNCLAS

AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT FOR A MEMBER COUNTRY OF THE COMMONWEALTH, HEADS OF GOVERNMENT, REAFFIRMING THEIR LUSAKA AND MELBOURNE COMMUNIQUE AND RECALLING THE RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS, PLEDGED THEIR RENEWED SUPPORT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, UNITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS; AND IN THIS RESPECT, THEY EXPRESSED THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH THEIR COLLEAGUE THE PRESIDENT OF CYPRUS.

THEY AGREED TO ESTABLISH A SPECIAL COMMONWEALTH ACTION GROUP ON CYPRUS AT HIGH LEVEL TO ASSIST IN SECURING COMPLIANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 541. THE GROUP WOULD CONSIST OF THE FOLLOWING FIVE COUNTRIES, TOGETHER WITH THE SECRETARY-GENERAL: AUSTRALIA, GUYANA, INDIA, NIGERIA AND ZAMBIA.

FINALLY, THEY URGED ALL STATES AND THE TWO COMMUNITIES IN CYPRUS TO REFRAIN FROM ANY ACTION WHICH MIGHT FURTHER EXACERBATE THE SITUATION.
UNQUOTE

UUU/068 291014Z PMDL0140

28-6-1- Trudeau
Peace Mission F

INFO

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PEKIN PMDL0127 29NOV83

TO DELHI FLASH

INFO EXTOTT IDDZ

REF EXTOTT TEL IDDZ0219 28NOV

---PM INITIATIVE

REFTEL RECD HERE BUT NOT/NOT COPIED TO YOU.TEXT IS AS FOLLOWS
QUOTE GRATEFUL FOR REPORTS ON CHOGM AND PEKIN VISIT AS ACTING
SSEA REAGAN APPEARS BEFORE SCEAND 29 1530 AND HAS ASKED FOR
UP-DATE ON PM INITIATIVE.UNQUOTE.

2.PLS ENSURE REPORTS ON GRENADA,CYPRUS AND REMAINING CHOGM ISSUES
ARE AVAILABLE TO IDDZ.IDDZ WILL ALREADY HAVE RECD YOURTEL PMDEL
0107 27NOV CONTAINING TEXT OF QUOTE GOA COMMONWEALTH DECLARATION
ON INTERNATL SECURITY UNQUOTE.WE WOULD DRAW THEIR ATTN TO PARA
6 OF DECLARATION WHICH OFFERS SPECIFIC SUPPORT TO MR TRUDEAUS
INITIATIVE.EMB PEKIN WILL REPORT SEPARATELY ON PMS MTG WITH ZHAO
YESTERDAY AND DENG LATER TODAY.

3.PMO PRESS OFFICE IN OTT WILL BE ABLE TO PROVIDE TRANSCRIPT
OF PMS PRESS CONFERENCE FOLLOWING MTG WITH ZHAO YESTERDAY.

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DENG XIAOPING HOLDS TALKS WITH CANADA'S TRUDEAU

0W290648 BEIJING XINHUA IN ENGLISH 0629 GMT 29 NOV 83

(TEXT) BEIJING, NOVEMBER 29 (XINHUA) AA DENG XIAOPING, CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL ADVISORY COMMISSION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, DISCUSSED MAJOR INTERNATIONAL ISSUES HERE THIS MORNING WITH CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU AND HIS AIDES.

CHAIRMAN DENG TOLD TRUDEAU: "YOU HAVE BEEN WORKING FOR EASING THE TENSE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. SUCH EFFORTS ARE VERY IMPORTANT."

TRUDEAU SAID THAT THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT APPRECIATED CHINA'S POSITION OF DEMANDING THE TWO SUPERPOWERS TO REDUCE THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS. CANADA AND CHINA SHARED THE OBJECTIVE OF RESPONDING TO THE PEOPLE'S ASPIRATION FOR PEACE, HE ADDED.

DENG XIAOPING SAID, "WE SHOULD LET THE SUPERPOWERS CONSTANTLY HEAR THE VOICE OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES OPPOSING THEIR NUCLEAR ARMAMENT RACE." HE REITERATED CHINA'S STAND ON DISARMAMENT.

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU AND HIS PARTY ARE SCHEDULED TO LEAVE HERE FOR INDIA THIS AFTERNOON.

29 NOV 0722Z WM

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace mission

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission JB
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FBI'S 030 KSEE 017)

MORE ON DENG XIAOPING; TRUDEAU MEETING IN BEIJING

04291011 TOKYO KYODO LIN ENGLISH 1003 GMT 29 NOV 83

(TEXT) BEIJING NOV 29 KYODO -- CHINA'S STRONGMAN DENG XIAOPING REFUSED TUESDAY TO GIVE HIS WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT TO CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER PIERRE TRUDEAU'S PROPOSAL FOR REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

DENG, CHAIRMAN OF THE CENTRAL ADVISORY COMMISSION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, MET WITH TRUDEAU AT THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE.

TRUDEAU REPORTEDLY SOUGHT CHINA'S COOPERATION IN HIS PROPOSAL FOR A MEETING IN 1984 OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS -- THE UNITED STATES, SOVIET UNION, BRITAIN, FRANCE AND CHINA -- TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION.

DENG WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT HE THOUGHT THE FIVE NATIONS FIRST MUST TRY TO REDUCE THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

HE PAID TRIBUTE TO THE CANADIAN LEADER FOR HIS EFFORTS TO SEEK NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. HOWEVER, HE TOLD TRUDEAU THAT CHINA DISAGREED WITH HIM ON SEVERAL POINTS.

TRUDEAU SAID DENG, HOWEVER, EXPRESSED CHINA'S READINESS TO ATTEND A MEETING OF THE NATIONS IN POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE FUTURE.

29 NOV 1032Z MW

Fax to VIDDZ/OTTAWA
11/29/83

Overoptimistic? In El Salvador, adversity breeds its own form of optimism. For example, this year's zero economic growth is being hailed as significant progress after four years of decline.

28-6-1-Trudeau
Peace
Mission

PARIS
TO THE
RESCUE

Not only U.S. flexes military muscle in the Caribbean region. So does France, after attacks by terrorists seeking independence from Paris.

Some 100 French gendarmes rushed to the island of Guadeloupe, after six bomb blasts on November 13-14 injured 20. Reinforcements were sent to Cayenne, French Guiana, to cap explosions of violence there. Both spots, as well as island of Martinique, had been ripped by bombs earlier.

Secessionist movement called the Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance is believed behind escalating violence in all three places. It commands scant popular support, but tension between locals and French settlers, plus the long distance from Paris, makes breeding ground for trouble.

Prompt show of force means no change in French policy toward its overseas departments and territories. Paris will be generous toward bids for decentralization, will tolerate no breach of law and order.

TROUBLE
IN SUDAN

Rising unrest in Sudan triggers concern in U.S., dominates scheduled Washington talks between Presidents Reagan and Nimeiri in late November.

Behind the worry: Sudan borders pro-Western Egypt, sits across Red Sea from Saudi Arabia, is a bulwark against Soviet expansion in region.

True, instability in Sudan is hardly novel. Nimeiri has survived 14 coup attempts since 1969. But now he's really feeling the heat.

Mainly Christian southern Sudan contends Nimeiri's creation of three regional governments in the south is a ploy to impose Moslem rule.

Non-Moslems resent Nimeiri's recent promulgation of Islamic law.

Radical Libya, Marxist Ethiopia foment rebellion among the dissenters.

What Nimeiri seeks from Washington is more money, more arms. The U.S. funneled some 75 million dollars' worth of military and economic aid to Sudan last year, is reluctant to deepen the American commitment.

America won't turn off the tap to Khartoum. But Nimeiri will have to make moves to heal north-south gulf if he wants U.S. to kick in more.

MIXED
REVIEWS
FOR
TRUDEAU

Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau's crusade to halt a superpower arms race rouses a gamut of reactions, from good try to mischief-making.

Trudeau whipped off to six European capitals in mid-November to sound out Western allies' views of a broad strategy for disarmament. No sale.

Publicly, he has received a few high marks for admirable intentions.

Privately, many wonder just what he hoped to accomplish. They note that U.S., Russia have haggled over arms for years with little results.

Grumbling in Washington is fiercer. Some U.S. officials feel trip spread confusion, sent wrong signals, could cause "a lot of mischief."

Fact is, cynics in Canada and abroad see Trudeau's whirlwind jaunt aimed at home consumption. They regard it as a bid to boost flagging fortunes of his governing Liberals, as a signal that he may be changing his mind about stepping down as Prime Minister after 14 years in power.

Patricia
Did you
see P
This is not
very good

Office of the Under-Secretary Bureau du sous-secrétaire				
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PER

SCRUM GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER FOLLOWING A MEETING WITH ZHAO ZIYANG, PREMIER OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF CHINA, PEKING, NOVEMBER 28, 1983

28-6-1-^{AC}TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION JB
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20-1-1-1-9-PR-FAR E.

TRANSCRIPTION D'UNE ENTREVUE SUR LE VIF ACCORDÉE PAR LE PREMIER MINISTRE À LA SUITE D'UNE RENCONTRE AVEC M. ZHAO ZIYANG, PREMIER MINISTRE DE LA REPUBLIQUE POPULAIRE CHINOISE LE 28 NOVEMBRE 1983.

Mr. Trudeau: Well, I feel very encouraged from my working session with Premier Ziyang and he was quite encouraging in my efforts to seek greater political participation in the peace effort. He was curious as to the discussion I had in Europe with my counterparts and indeed with the results obtained in Goa in our declaration on international security. He asked me questions about those aspects and as a general conclusion I feel that by the interest he showed, by the time he took, by the fact that he received me at such short notice, and by his words, the Premier is supportive of the effort to politicize the issue and to inject new political energy into the search for peace between East and West, particularly.

Je sors très encouragé de cette rencontre avec le Premier ministre Ziyang, il s'est montré très intéressé au récit de mes négociations avec les autres chefs européens, également aux progrès qui étaient faits et en Inde où nous nous sommes mis d'accord sur une déclaration pour la recherche de la sécurité. Beaucoup dans le sens de mon initiative, c'est-à-dire l'importance de politiser la question, de réintroduire un dialogue entre les participants, particulièrement entre les deux super-grands, afin que nous débloquions un peu cette poursuite vers la paix.

- 2 -

That's about the general impressions.

Q. Est-ce que vous lui avez soumis M. le Premier ministre, l'idée d'un sommet des cinq puissances nucléaires et si oui, quelle a été sa réaction?

A. Sur le sommet des cinq puissances nucléaires sa réaction n'a pas été tellement différente de celle de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne. L'idée d'un sommet lui plaît et je ne veux pas entrer dans les détails de sa position. Il l'a explicitée aux Nations-Unies et d'ailleurs c'est pas à moi de parler pour lui, mais en gros l'idée lui plaît mais seulement comme une des éventualités possibles. Il voit comme le problème immédiat et le plus important de concentrer sur les deux super-grands, les deux super-puissances, et de mettre la pression sur eux pour qu'ils prennent des initiatives pour réduire leur arsenal nucléaire avant que nous envisagions une rencontre des cinq.

Q. Isn't that a wee bit discouraging, Prime Minister (inaudible)---?

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- 3 -

A. A wee bit discouraging? I guess it depends on the timing one has in mind. The Premier made quite clear that in his mind the important thing was to put pressure on the two super-powers, that was the first thing. And he didn't see the five power conference as useful immediately in a sense that it would divert attention from the need to put pressure on the super-powers. I pointed out to him, as I had to Margaret Thatcher and to President Mitterrand, that one of the ways of creating pressure would be to seek to establish principals around which a five power conference would be held. And I spelled out those principals before; that there not be a block to block negotiations; that each participant arrive at the table as a sovereign power; that I recognize that the arsenals of the super-powers was out of all proportions to those of the three other nuclear powers. So the real discussion is on timing: how soon and in what way do we achieve success in putting pressure on the super-powers. I keep feeling, even after my meeting with those three nuclear powers, that if we just wait for things to unlock in Geneva we might wait a long, long time. I ended the discussion with suggesting that the presence of a country like China in those discussions, at some point, would be beneficial because China is not seeking to have an arsenal which would be anywhere close to the super-powers, and China is a peace loving country. But there is as you put it, a difference in perception on the urgency of that five-power meeting.

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Q. Prime minister what about the Premier offering suggestions as to ways that he would like to put pressure on the two super-powers?

A. Yes, once again I don't want to elaborate too much on his own thoughts, but at the end of the meeting he said that it was very important to continue the political work that I was engaged upon and that we should get more and more nations to build up pressure on the super-powers and he alluded to his ideas that he expressed at the United Nations, that there might be a group of nations which could create that pressure. I do not want to elaborate on what he had in mind but it sounded to me as something not too different from what Kenneth Kaounda suggested and what was supported at the Commonwealth meeting that I'd be joined at some point in my efforts by a group of other nations to create that kind of political pressure.

Q. Did he mention any other nations?

A. No.

Q. And you're response to that proposal?

A. Well as I told President Kaounda and I didn't give any specific response here, I just accepted it as his suggestion. But when we were in discussion in New Delhi because it came up on the first day, I had to point out that at this stage I was acting as a member of an alliance, of the Atlantic alliance. And it would be unrealistic for me to try at this stage to meet with members of non-aligned nations such as President Kaounda was suggesting, to go to my fellow alliance leaders and suggest they do this or that.

.../5

I said that I thought, very well, after the first stage of my pilgrimage had been achieved, that indeed I think the effort could be taken up collectively by a larger group of nations. But that is something they are thinking about. And, I repeat, in a sense I think that my satisfaction is that the Commonwealth nations, some 46 of them, unanimously supported my efforts and said that they would be pleased to cooperate with them in some future way to be decided. But I think that is the first injection of political will in a massive sense when a quarter of the world's people represented at the Commonwealth are agreeing with the idea of taking political action. I did point that out to Premier Ziyang and I think it is indeed in a sense, the end of stage one, of whatever I had to do.

Q. Did (inaudible) spread any news about when exactly you would be going to Moscow, now or later?

A. I didn't raise that with him nor did he express views directly on that but he kept repeating as indeed some of my colleagues in Goa and in Delhi did, that we must not lose sight that it is the super-powers which are leading the arms race. In numerical terms that is absolutely self-evident; some 95 per cent of strategic weapons are in the hands of the super-powers and the other three only represent something like five. In that sense he didn't talk (inaudible) going to Moscow but he obviously feels that pressure should be put on Moscow and on Washington.

Q. Prime Minister, speaking about going to Moscow or Washington, is it worthwhile, and if so when?

A. It will depend in part on what sort of reactions I get from Moscow and from Washington; it will depend also on what success we have on the 8th of December when minister MacEachen brings to our NATO colleagues the proposals on Vienna and on Stockholm. I am not in

possession of an immediate invitation, I mean in a sense that there are no dates, on any visits to Moscow and Washington, but as you know I have been invited by President Reagan in his recent letter and I have been invited twice this year by Mr. Andropov to visit them. But as I said specifically in the latter case, I don't want to visit unless I feel that I can make some further steps and I would perhaps be in a better position to see that after the meeting in Brussels.

Q. Prime Minister, how did Premier Ziyang evaluate the Soviets build up on the side of Soviet border?

A. He didn't comment on that specifically.

Q. You mentioned that this was the end of the stage one, could you tell us what stage two might involve?

A. Well, as I indicated, I've seen the members of the alliance, many of them; I have written to them all. I've been at the Commonwealth. Now I suppose stage two might be to consider whether it is useful for me to go to Moscow or to Washington, and on that, as I say, I want further time to reflect.

Q. (inaudible) Prime minister did the Chinese explain their reluctance to sign the (inaudible)?

A. Yes their position is not too different from that of the many of the non-aligned in Goa. It is a well known position that there is some unfairness to the NPT, in the sense that it is asking the lot of us - all nations except five - to not achieve a nuclear armaments position; there's something unfair in that it denies our right to do so. But on the other hand everybody is afraid of

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nuclear proliferation. So they say on the one hand, there is a sovereign right to do so, but on the other hand, they say it would be undesirable to do so. And Premier Ziyang made it quite clear that he did not encourage proliferation; that he would not support proliferation, but that he could not go on record as opposing it, which is pretty close to what some of the non-aligned nations have also said. Notwithstanding that, I got out of Goa, as you know, an agreement that we should take steps to prevent a wider spread of nuclear weapons.

So, people are torn between the principle of the sovereign right to do things and the factual undesirability of doing those things. And that is why some of them, even like Julius Nyerere who says: "I am never going to have a nuclear arm, and I don't want to proliferate, but I am not sure I want to say that I don't have a right to do so." And, of course, my approach to that has been to say, well, maybe there can be a bargain, and maybe you can say: you the non-aligned, particularly you, the Third World states that you will give up your sovereign right to proliferate if, and only if, the superpowers and the other three cease the arms race and begin reducing and use the fruits of that reduction to development in the Third World.

That is the kind of bargain I have left with them to (inaudible) in suggesting there will be another Commonwealth Conference two years from now and maybe there could be some thought of a conditional adherence to the NPT, the conditions being that the nuclear powers hold their end of the bargain first and begin to limit and then reduce. And then, that being the case, the non-nuclear powers would have greater incentives to go on record against proliferation.

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28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

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---PMS INITIATIVE-MONTL SPEECH

UNDERSTAND FROM REFTTEL THAT WSAW RECEIVED TEXT OF PMS
 MONTL SPEECH. WE HAVE NOT/NOT AND WOULD LIKE TO HAVE IT
 FOR CSSR GOVT. IN GENERAL, WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT OTHER POSTS
 ARE GETTING, WE FEEL WE ARE NOT/NOT WELL INFORMED ABOUT PMS
 PEACE INITIATIVE, SOMETIMES LEARNING OF EVENTS DAYS LATE;
 COULD WE BE KEPT MORE IN THE PICTURE? RECOGNIZE THAT
 CSSR IS NOT/NOT A PRIORITY COUNTRY IN THIS CONTEXT AND
 THAT MOMENTUM OF INITIATIVES NOT/NOT ENTIRELY WITHIN DEPT.

CCC/175 290830Z WOGR1336

Spoke to John McDoe → he will reply to Prague



MESSAGE

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28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

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28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

M.F.

CONFIDENTIAL

Arms Control and Disarmament: Chinese View

In the Chinese view, the main cause of East-West tension is the struggle of the two superpowers for world hegemony. At the same time, they see the superpowers as being in a stalemate with neither being able or prepared to launch a war. Relations are strained as both are intent on replenishing their nuclear stockpiles. As the arms race goes on, tension will continue to mount.

The Chinese insist that they favour genuine disarmament measures and that they have put forward positive proposals. At UNSSOD II, they proposed that the two superpowers should take the lead in the disarmament process: they should cease testing, improving and producing nuclear weapons and reduce all types of nuclear weapons and delivery systems by 50 percent. Following this, other nuclear weapon states would do the same, reducing the number of systems according to an agreed ratio. At the UNGA last September, Foreign Minister Wu proposed that the five-nuclear powers participate in an international conference to negotiate a reduction in their stocks of nuclear weapons. This was a slight advance from their UNSSOD II position. The Chinese continue to believe, however, that the first steps must be taken by the USA and USSR which hold, collectively, the vast majority of nuclear weapons. Only after the two superpowers have signed an agreement reducing their weapons inventories by 50 percent should a full meeting with the five nuclear powers take place.

The Chinese also proposed at UNSSOD II that conventional weapons should be reduced with the superpowers taking the lead. They have added, however, that small and medium-sized countries are entitled to retain whatever levels of arms they think necessary to assure their own defence against aggression.

In talks with Canadian officials, the Chinese have demonstrated a lack of enthusiasm for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Although a nuclear power, China has very few nuclear arms compared with the two superpowers and has stated from the very beginning that it would never be the first to use nuclear arms. It insists that it is not prepared to spend large amounts of money to develop additional nuclear weapons. In the Chinese view, the conclusion of a CTBT should be linked to an agreement to reduce nuclear arms.

The Chinese have also been negative regarding an international seismic data exchange system. In private talks with Canadian officials, they have made it clear that China

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CONFIDENTIAL

would not participate in such a network. They want nothing to do with the idea.

As for horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, Chinese officials have indicated that China does not accept the NPT because it is an unequal treaty. They claim that this does not mean that China does not take the non-proliferation issue seriously. China would take no action to encourage proliferation. In its view, the principal danger comes from the USA/USSR arms race.

The Chinese have expressed concern about Soviet SS-20 deployments in Asia. Japan and China are said, by the Chinese, to be agreed that 108 Soviet SS-20's are aimed at Far Eastern countries. The Chinese have urged the Japanese to make a joint approach to the USSR with an appeal that the USSR not deploy new weapons in Asia and to destroy old ones.

The Chinese have indicated no sympathy for the idea of unilateral disarmament. Both superpowers have to disarm if worldwide tension is to be eliminated. If the USSR refuses to do so, the Chinese could understand the need for Western nations to take defensive measures such as INF deployment.

China has recently been showing interest in the Geneva INF negotiations because of the implications of an eventual INF agreement regarding a greater SS-20 threat to the East. The Chinese have expressed a hope that the INF negotiations would lead to a genuine agreement, but have been pessimistic about the chances of success. In their view, the USSR wants to maintain its nuclear superiority in Europe in order to undermine the USA/European relationship as well as to undermine the relationship among the European countries. The USA's objective is also nuclear superiority. The Soviet leaders, according to the Chinese, may have decided to await the outcome of the 1984 USA elections before making an effort to settle the current impasse in the INF negotiations. The present Soviet leaders were not likely to want to do anything to strengthen President Reagan's domestic position.

 *United Nations*
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**
THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION
*Official Records**



8
FIRST COMMITTEE
5th meeting
held on
Tuesday, 18 October 1983
at 3 p.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway)

CONTENTS

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

Statements were made by:

Mr. Tsvetkov (Bulgaria)
Mr. Gauci (Malta)
Mr. Murin (Czechoslovakia)
Mr. Qian Jiadong (China)
Mr. Callejas (Honduras)
Mr. Gbeho (Ghana)

*This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned *within one week of the date of publication* to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate fascicle for each Committee.

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20 October 1983
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43-45

(Mr. Murin, Czechoslovakia)

I hope that the discussion of the questions of the condemnation of nuclear war and the nuclear-arms freeze, and all the other priority items on our agenda relating to the curbing of the arms race and disarmament, will this year lead to substantive and positive results in the interest of the maintenance of peace and the strengthening of the security of the peoples.

The solution of these important, complex problems of our time calls, first of all, for the political will of States to engage in a constructive exchange of views and to co-operate in the preparation of agreements based on mutual respect for the principles of equality and equal security.

For our part, we sincerely desire the achievement of this objective.

The delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has limited its statement today to a few extremely important aspects of the question of the prevention of nuclear war and the solution of other problems connected with nuclear armaments. We reserve our right to speak later to set out our position on other items on the agenda.

Mr. QIAN Jiadong (China) (interpretation from Chinese): First of all, Sir, on behalf of the Chinese delegation, I would like to extend to you my hearty congratulations on your election to the chairmanship of our Committee. This is the first time I have taken part in the work of this Committee and it gives me great pleasure to work with you, Mr. Chairman, and the other officers of the Committee, as well as all the representatives present. I shall certainly try my very best to further the work of this Committee.

A/C.1/38/PV.5

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(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

Over the past year, the world situation has continued to be beset with tensions and turmoils as a result of the intense rivalry between the two super-Powers. While old issues remain unsettled, new issues keep emerging one after another. Some regions remain to be engulfed by war flames, and armed aggression and occupation are being continued. The independence and sovereignty of many States have not been given their due respect and world peace and security are under serious threat.

In the field of armaments, the arms race between the super-Powers has become even more acute instead of being relaxed. Under the pretext of "maintaining parity", each side is trying to seek and maintain military supremacy over the other. Both sides are expanding, improving and renewing their arsenals at an unprecedented rate and scope. A new round of arms race is under way. The two sides are increasing the variety and quantity of their nuclear weapons, raising the hitting accuracy, survival capability and destructive power of their nuclear weapon systems and improving the means of commanding, control and communications for a nuclear war. To complement their nuclear strike force on the earth, they have furthermore in recent years been enthusiastically developing outer space weaponry based on the latest scientific and technological developments. At the same time, continuing their efforts to strengthen their conventional armaments, they are also developing heavy conventional weapons using newer technology and employing greater destructive power. These are by no means exaggerated descriptions, but a reality witnessed by the average people every day. The arms race has become an important component in the super-Powers' endeavour to realize their strategic targets.

The super-Powers' arms race has not only posed a direct threat to the peace and security of all States, but has also increased the danger of the outbreak of a new world war. This cannot but arouse the grave concern of the people throughout the world. Peace-loving countries and peoples strongly demand that aggression, expansion and the arms race be halted. They have worked tirelessly for disarmament. It is not at all accidental that in recent years a massive peace movement has emerged in some countries, the mainstream of which reflects the just desire for peace of the broad sections of people in these countries.

B. h

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(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

However, contrary to the wishes of the peoples of the world, the super-Powers have shown no sincerity in disarmament, verbally professing disarmament only for the purpose of covering up their frenzied arms race. No progress at all has been made in the field of disarmament despite innumerable rounds of bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations and countless meetings and conferences devoted to disarmament. Fierce bargaining is going on between the two super-Powers in START and intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) negotiations. The proposals put forward by each side are all designed to weaken the other and maintain its own supremacy. Owing to the contention and confrontation between the super-Powers, the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva has achieved virtually no progress of substance on any item on its agenda. The number of resolutions that our Committee adopts each year has been on the increase, but they hardly provide solutions to real problems. It is fully justified for people of all countries to feel strongly dissatisfied with all this.

Like other peoples in the world, the Chinese people love peace and aspire to a peaceful international environment in which they can build up their own country. China has consistently pursued a policy of safeguarding world peace and opposing hegemonism. China favours disarmament. We are for genuine disarmament and against sham disarmament. We oppose arms expansion under the camouflage of disarmament. In order to promote disarmament, China put forward at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament a proposal for disarmament, outlining its objectives, measures, verification and negotiation. The basic principles underlining this proposal are as follows: First, disarmament cannot be separated from the struggle to safeguard international security and oppose hegemonism. Secondly, the two super-Powers should take the lead in disarmament. Thirdly, nuclear disarmament should go hand in hand with conventional disarmament. Fourthly, small and medium-sized States are entitled to maintain their necessary forces for national defence; the disarmament process should in no way jeopardize the independence, sovereignty and security of any State. Fifthly, disarmament agreements should include strict and effective measures for

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(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

international verification. Sixthly, all States should participate on an equal footing in the discussion, negotiation, and supervision of the implementation of disarmament agreements. In our view these principles are comprehensive and fair as they are based on the consideration of the interests of all sides.

As nuclear weapons have unprecedented and enormous destructive power, nuclear disarmament draws particular concern of the people of the world. In accordance with the above-mentioned basic principles, China put forward at the second special session on disarmament a proposal concerning the cessation of development, and reduction, of nuclear weapons by nuclear States, calling on the two super-Powers to take the lead in cutting, by a wide margin, their nuclear weapons and means of delivery of various types. In order to promote further nuclear disarmament, the Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian recently proposed before the General Assembly that after the Soviet Union and the United States have taken practical action to stop testing, improving and manufacturing nuclear weapons and agreed on reducing by half their nuclear weapons and means of delivery of all types, a widely-representative international conference should be convened with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States to negotiate the general reduction of nuclear weapons by all nuclear weapon States. The starting point of this proposal by the Chinese Government is to make nuclear disarmament a continuous, uninterrupted process so as to achieve the final goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons.

The final document of the first special session on disarmament correctly pointed out that States with the largest nuclear arsenals bear a special responsibility for disarmament. It is entirely reasonable that nuclear disarmament should start with the two super-Powers. They were the first to get themselves armed with nuclear weapons and then they launched a continuous nuclear arms race. It is therefore only natural that they should be asked to take action first in nuclear disarmament. They possess over

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(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

95 per cent of the nuclear weapons in the world. Only a substantial reduction of nuclear weapons on their part can render nuclear disarmament really significant. And even after a 50 per cent reduction on their part, they would still be left with nuclear weapons that far exceed the nuclear weapons of all the other nuclear weapon States put together, and they would still have the "overkill" capabilities.

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(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

Other nuclear States should, of course, also undertake their responsibility concerning nuclear disarmament. On the very day when China first successfully conducted its nuclear test, it undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. China has developed a limited nuclear force for self-defence and for breaking the super-Powers' nuclear monopoly and promoting nuclear disarmament. China has just proposed that an international conference be convened after the super-Powers have agreed on reducing their nuclear weapons by half - not after they have actually carried out such reduction - to discuss matters concerning the reduction of nuclear weapons by all nuclear States, which will be implemented at a later stage according to a reasonable ratio and procedure, and lead to the complete destruction of all nuclear weapons. This further testifies to China's consistent and responsible approach towards nuclear disarmament.

China's proposal on nuclear disarmament is based on the reality of the nuclear armaments in the world today. It is therefore fair and reasonable, as well as practical. We hope it will receive serious consideration and a positive response from the parties concerned.

I should also like to say a few words on the proposals for a "nuclear freeze". We maintain that it is quite understandable for some non-aligned and neutral States to have proposed a "nuclear freeze" in order to make the super-Powers stop their nuclear arms race. However, the fact that a nuclear Power with a gigantic nuclear arsenal which is intensifying its efforts in every possible way to seek nuclear supremacy has also put forward a similar proposal cannot but make people ponder over its real motives. "Freezing" alone, if not accompanied by concrete measures for reducing and destroying nuclear weapons, could only in effect legitimize and perpetuate the nuclear arsenals of the super-Powers, which will enable them to maintain their nuclear hegemony and pose a menace to the people of various countries. This obviously is detrimental to genuine nuclear disarmament; nor is it conducive to the maintenance of international peace and security.

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(Mr. Qian Jiadong, China)

People are now deeply concerned about the super-Powers' intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe and Asia. Naturally, China too is much concerned about it. We hold that all the nuclear weapons reduced, no matter from where, should not be moved to other regions but should be destroyed; the reduction of nuclear weapons should not be confined to the European region either. The Soviet Union should reduce by a wide margin the large amount of intermediate-range nuclear missiles already deployed in Asia and the Far East, so that the grave threat to which the countries in this region are exposed may be lessened.

Nuclear disarmament can in no way be carried out in isolation. It should be integrated with the struggle against the hegemonism of the super-Powers if it is to achieve any results. The super-Powers must change their course of behaviour and shoulder in earnest their special responsibility towards disarmament so as to reach agreement truly conducive to nuclear disarmament. China is ready to work together with all peace-loving countries and peoples for the urgent task of nuclear disarmament, which has a direct impact on world peace and security. We are convinced that nuclear weapons will eventually be destroyed by mankind, and not vice versa.

Mr. CALLEJAS (Honduras) (interpretation from Spanish): Since this is the first time I have spoken in the Committee, I should like, on behalf of my delegation, most warmly to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of this Committee, which is a guarantee that our work will be guided with your characteristic talent and dynamism.

The number of items on disarmament allocated to the First Committee is clear proof of the vital importance of this question for all the peoples of the world.

The fact that as long ago as 1959 the General Assembly set itself the final goal of achieving an agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, defining this question as the most important one facing the world, also demonstrates the complexity of the problems involved in this issue.

S. Hanson
Defence Relations Division
2-9368

SECRET

November 16, 1983

IDR-4365

Memorandum for the Deputy Prime Minister
and Secretary of State for External Affairs

cc: Minister of State (International Trade)
cc: Minister of State (External Relations)

Subject: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) Negotiations

PURPOSE:

To inform you of the latest developments in the US/Soviet INF negotiations in Geneva, including the Soviet reaction to the latest elaboration of the United States position and an informal proposal by the Soviet side.

BACKGROUND:

The United States negotiator has informed his Soviet counterpart that the USA could accept a global ceiling of 420 long-range INF warheads. The Soviet negotiator said he was sure that Moscow would not accept the proposal. A TASS article has already rejected it.

The Soviet negotiator had already called on his United States counterpart November 13 to suggest that if the United States proposed equal reductions of 572 warheads in European-based INF, then the Soviet Union would be prepared to accept it. Between the older SS-4s and SS-5s as well as the SS-20s, the Soviet Union now has over 900 warheads on missiles in Europe. The Soviet Union would thus be left with 120 SS-20 missiles (360 warheads) in Europe and the United States with none. He reaffirmed that the Soviet Union could accept equal reductions only if the United States reduced to zero. British and French forces would not be explicitly mentioned in the agreement, although compensation for them would be sought "in an appropriate future negotiating forum". In these future negotiations, NATO would be given credit for the 120 remaining SS-20s in Europe.

The Soviet negotiator also said, on instructions, that if NATO INF deployments proceeded the Geneva negotiations would cease.

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Because the Soviet proposal would preserve a substantial Soviet monopoly of long-range INF, it is not acceptable to the United States. In the USA view, the dropping of the explicit Soviet demand to be compensated for British and French INF confirms that those forces are not really a major Soviet concern, although the proposal would still give the Soviet Union de facto compensation for them. In the light of the Soviet Union's unwillingness to make the proposal formally themselves, the USA are inclined to question the seriousness of the approach.

The USA also believe that in making this approach the Soviet Union was attempting to strengthen its public position. We, on the other hand, are not certain that the Soviets would espouse publicly something which they were not willing to propose formally behind closed doors.

M. Shenstone
Assistant Deputy Minister
(Political and International
Security Affairs)

de Montigny Marchand

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O.A Chistoff
Arms Control and
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ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT IN THE
UNITED NATIONS AND THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ISSUE

The results of the work of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva over the past year will provide the Soviet bloc with both the impetus and the ammunition to try to make life difficult for the West at UNGA 38, as already witnessed by three new Soviet proposals.

BACKGROUND

Although the Geneva Committee on Disarmament (soon to be called the Conference on Disarmament) is regarded as the main multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament, it has shown little negotiating dynamic over the past year. Procedural and other matters have acted as a distraction to substantive issues. With the exception of the chemical weapons question, the CD has not demonstrated an ability to reach agreement on any substantive issue before it. The Negative Security Assurances Working Group is virtually dead. The Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament Working Group has met irregularly but without any conclusion. The highly politicized issue of the Prevention of Nuclear War has degenerated into a procedural question whether or not to establish a negotiating Working Group, with the West being cast in a negative light because of its resistance to establishing yet another Working Group. The issue of a Radiological Weapons Treaty has reached an impasse with serious differences of approach between the USA and the USSR, on the other hand, and the Neutrals and Non-Aligned. As for Outer Space, the issue has centred on whether or not to establish a Working Group with a mandate for negotiation. The USA has resisted the idea of negotiations even if they were to take place at some unspecified future date. Although at the end of the 1983 session the USA agreed to an anodyne mandate for the working group, the USSR withheld final consensus on the draft mandate. Debate continues over the issue whether the Nuclear Test Ban Working Group's mandate should be enlarged with the Western nuclear weapon states (UK, USA) remaining strongly against. This position has put the West at a disadvantage. Only the Chemical Weapons Working Group, which was chaired by Canada this year, is alive and has called for "intensive negotiations" at the outset of the 1984 session "aimed at the final elaboration of a convention at the earliest date."

The reaction of CD members to the lack of progress in the CD has been frustration and disillusionment with the CD, although the experience with the Chemical Weapons Working Group has shown that if used in the right way, on the right subject under the right conditions and with enough determination, the CD retains a potential for negotiation. On the basis of the CD experience, the process of consensus building at the UNGA will be difficult with strong support likely for Soviet-sponsored declaratory resolutions and less support for alternative Western resolutions.

BULGARIAN POSITION

Bulgaria's position at the UNGA will be entirely supportive of the USSR. The efforts of the Soviet Union and its allies to divide the Western Group will be redoubled this year in anticipation of the stationing of Pershing II and Cruise missiles in Western Europe. The UNGA provides the Soviets with a better chance of putting the West on the defensive than does the CD. Even though the Soviet bloc's record in the CD on matters of substance and detail has been weak, it will be seeking at UNGA 38 to show itself as being in the forefront on disarmament initiatives and the West as obstructionist.

On August 18, Soviet President Andropov proposed a new draft treaty on "Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space against Earth" which has been submitted to the UNGA. A number of its provisions have strong public appeal, including the complete prohibition of development of any space-based weapons for hitting targets on earth, in the air or in outer space, a prohibition of the testing and deployment of new anti-satellite systems and the elimination of existing systems.

In an attempt to exploit the Western negative attitude towards the Prevention of Nuclear War issue which is a highly emotional one for the Neutral and Non-Aligned group and which got nowhere in the CD, the Soviets have put forward a draft resolution at UNGA 38 which condemns nuclear war and declares as criminal acts the formulation, enunciation and dissemination of doctrines designed to substantiate the legitimacy of the first use of nuclear weapons and the admissibility of unleashing nuclear war.

The USSR has also submitted a draft resolution proposing a nuclear arms freeze "under appropriate verification" and pointing to "the urgent need to intensify efforts aimed at a speedy achievement of agreements on

substantial limitations of, and radical reductions in nuclear arms with a view to their complete elimination as the ultimate goal."

CANADIAN POSITION

We agree with Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar's assessment about the central importance of the question of disarmament and arms limitation. We are, however, disappointed at the results of the efforts in this field during 1983 and we would like to see the UN's potential to make a contribution strengthened.

The general position of Canada on most arms control and disarmament issues is well-known. Our priorities are: (1) to support strongly negotiations to limit and reduce nuclear arms; (2) to promote early progress towards the realization of a multilateral comprehensive test ban treaty; (3) to assist in preparing a convention which would completely prohibit chemical weapons; (4) to promote the evolution of an effective non-proliferation regime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty; (5) to work towards the objective of prohibiting the development, testing and deployment of all weapons for use in outer space; (6) to participate actively in negotiations to limit and reduce conventional forces; (7) to strive, step-by-step, to achieve general and complete disarmament, consistent with the legitimate security needs of states.

The strategy of suffocation, which is meant to arrest the dynamics of the strategic nuclear arms race through the realization of four inter-related verifiable agreements designed to reduce the "technological impulse" (a comprehensive test ban treaty; a ban on the flight-testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles; a ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; and an agreement to limit and then progressively to reduce military spending on new strategic weapons systems) continues to be actively promoted in international fora, in particular at the United Nations. Canada has called for the resumption of UK-USA-USSR talks on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. In the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva we are participating in the working group on a nuclear test ban and, also, in the work of the Seismic Experts Group which is developing an international verification system for an eventual test ban treaty. We have also continued efforts to effect implementation of the second and third elements of the strategy.

We have urged the CD to establish a Working Group on Outer Space to examine the issues involved. We have

succeeded, as chairman of the CD's Working Group on Chemical Weapons, to obtain for the first time a complete document approved by consensus which outlines the elements of agreement and of remaining differences on a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. It is our hope that the Working Group might be able to work toward a final elaboration of a convention by the end of 1984. Canada's interest in the development of international verification mechanisms is well-known. We believe verification is an absolute necessity if we are to make real progress in disarmament and arms control negotiations. We have, therefore, assigned a high priority to research in this area and have increased our funding of such activities in Canada.

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TALKING POINTS

- We are concerned about current international tensions and we wish to do everything possible to help avoid an irretrievable deterioration in the security situation.
- Our objective is to try to halt the arms race, not only the nuclear arms race but the conventional arms race.
- We do not place our reliance on declaratory resolutions which promise restraint without making provisions for verification to ensure that promises are kept. We prefer to see concrete agreements rather than hortatory type resolutions that omit specifics regarding implementation and adherence.
- We are studying the Soviet proposals on the "Condemnation of nuclear war" and a "Nuclear Arms Freeze" which fall into the category of declarations about which we have reservations. The Soviet proposal on outer space is more substantive and deserves serious study. It would have been more productive if this proposal had been submitted to the CD rather than the UNGA.
- It is unfortunate that consensus on the mandate for the Outer Space Working Group was withheld at the last moment.

- For our part, we would like to see some concrete progress on outer space and chemical weapons. We think the Committee on Disarmament (CD) should begin to address the substantive details relating to the prohibition of weapons for use in outer space and should set up a Working Committee. We would also like to see the CD get on with the drafting of a convention banning the use of chemical weapons. We hope Bulgaria will support efforts for a constructive and strengthened consensus resolution at the UNGA in order to ensure that the CD Working Group proceeds towards the final elaboration of a convention on chemical weapons quickly. We would like to see it make substantial progress by the end of the 1984 session.

- We have always attached special importance to the development of international verification mechanisms and we have assigned a high priority to research in this area. We would like to improve the CD's effectiveness in this area and we are increasing our support of research activities which will help the CD in the technical and practical aspects of verification.

CONFIDENTIALINTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF)ISSUE:

The INF negotiations reconvened September 6. This Round will be the last one before NATO deployments are scheduled to begin. Prospects for an eleventh hour interim agreement remain grim.

BACKGROUND:

In March 1983, after it became clear that the zero option was unattainable in the foreseeable future, a proposal to negotiate an interim agreement to limit NATO INF missile deployment if the Soviet Union agreed to reduce its warheads on similar missiles to an equal level on a global basis was tabled in Geneva. Gromyko publicly rejected the proposal on the grounds that it does not take into account UK and French missiles, ignores US nuclear-capable aircraft in Western Europe and on carriers, and would affect Soviet INF missiles in Asian USSR. The USA later tabled a new draft agreement incorporating the interim agreement proposal. This new draft will not replace the zero option draft treaty which will also remain on the table. Recent communiqués, including the ones issued at Williamsburg in May and at the NAC meeting in June, called on Moscow to negotiate seriously and reiterated the determination of NATO members to redress the INF balance in Europe, preferably through negotiation but by new deployment if necessary.

The stick and carrot method favoured by the USSR in recent months has been aimed at dividing the Alliance on the INF issue by encouraging public pressure on Western governments in an attempt to delay deployments scheduled to begin before the end of the year. Marginal changes in the Soviet position alternating with threats of retaliation with Soviet deployments if NATO goes ahead with its nuclear modernization programme have been orchestrated for maximum public impact in the West. Without changing its position on central issues the Soviet Union altered its position in May to accept warheads as well as delivery vehicles as the basis of an INF agreement. At the end of August Mr. Andropov announced that any missiles withdrawn from Europe in an INF agreement would be destroyed and not re-deployed. Allied governments generally gave a guarded welcome to these Soviet announcements while rejecting the inclusion of French and UK missiles in the INF negotiations.

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NEW U.S. INITIATIVE:

The new US proposals outlined in President Reagan's letter of September 15 to the Prime Minister and discussed at the emergency SCG meeting of September 19 in Brussels were announced officially by President Reagan in his UNGA speech on September 26. These proposals feature the three following elements: 1) the US would be prepared not to offset all Soviet SS-20 deployments through US missile deployments in Western Europe; 2) an offer to discuss limits on dual-capable aircraft for inclusion in a first phase INF agreement; and 3) the offer to apportion eventual reductions in US INF deployments between Pershing II and cruise missiles.

These proposals have been well received by NATO Allies in general. A Council press statement was issued on September 28 pledging support for the new US approach. In his reply to President Reagan's letter, Prime Minister Trudeau supported in principle the substance of the new proposals and welcomed them as an important step forward. He added that the new US approach demonstrated constructive flexibility which it was hoped would be matched by the USSR. Your speech to the UN General Assembly reiterated this support.

The initial Soviet public reaction to the new INF proposals was predictably quite negative. In an oblique response to Reagan's UNGA speech Foreign Minister Gromyko described them as "lopsided proposals" meant to block an agreement. On September 28, Secretary-General Andropov said the proposals were unacceptable without giving specific comments and warned that US INF deployments would receive an "appropriate response", presumably referring to retaliation through additional Soviet deployments. We consider that these high level public reactions are not Moscow's last word on the new US approach and that a more forthcoming reaction in the negotiations is possible.

CANADIAN POSITION:

The Canadian Government participated in the NATO 1979 two-track decision for which it has several times reiterated its support. Convinced that the zero option was unattainable in the present situation, we have given our support to the new US proposal tabled on March 29 which meets major Canadian criteria as a realistic compromise solution for an interim agreement at equal, lower levels of armaments. We have stressed the importance of an adequate verification regime, and recommended that greater public prominence be given to the INF confidence building measures.

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Like other NATO governments, Canada gave a guarded welcome to the recent Soviet moves in the negotiations and the Prime Minister stressed that these moves, however limited, are the result of Allied perseverance and that the bargaining process should go on. Mr. MacEachen issued a communiqué on August 29, welcoming the Andropov statement that missiles reduced would be destroyed but deplored the lack of Soviet movement on central issues in the negotiations.

The Canadian position at the last NAC meeting and the Williamsburg discussions on security reflected our desire to give the USSR a clear and unequivocal message to the effect that we are prepared to do everything in our power to reach a negotiated settlement of the INF dispute but that it is incumbent on the USSR to make a serious move. We have made it equally clear that Canada will not hesitate to do its share in strengthening NATO deterrence if this is the only course left open.

During his recent visit to Greece, Prime Minister Trudeau rejected the Greek proposal to postpone NATO INF deployments beyond December 1983, pointing out that this would only delay progress in the negotiations.

POSITION OF ALLIES:

In the three countries scheduled to receive new missiles on their territory at the end of the year, the UK, Germany and Italy, the governments have seen their mandates strengthened after recent elections. All three intend to proceed with initial deployments in December even in the face of strong political and public opposition which is expected to increase as the deadline approaches. Opposition to INF deployment in Italy is somewhat weaker than in Germany and the UK, although there could be a spillover from Germany in the next few months. Demonstrated American willingness to negotiate seriously in an effort to achieve a compromise in Geneva is an important element which will influence support for deployments in those countries.

Norway and particularly Denmark face political opposition to the deployment schedule in their respective parliaments. The Danish parliament passed a resolution in May supporting a delay in Western INF deployments while negotiations continue. The Greek government, consistent with its refusal to support the deployment timetable, has more recently proposed to EEC governments that INF deployment be deferred for some six months to give the Geneva negotiations more time to achieve results. This proposal was rejected by the basing countries, the USA and other allies including Canada.

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While they have periodically reiterated their support for the 1979 two-track decision, Belgium and the Netherlands have not yet fully committed themselves to accepting deployment on their respective territory (48 GLCMs in each country). Although sites have been chosen and work on infrastructure will go ahead, both have deferred a final decision dependent on progress in the negotiations within the next twelve to eighteen months since they are not scheduled to accept the missiles for a couple of years.

In relation to NATO INF deployments, during the recent visit of Chancellor Kohl to Moscow important differences were noted between Soviet public threats of countermeasures and private bilateral talks in which the Soviet side was much less direct. No hints were given to Mr. Kohl that the INF negotiations would break off after initial deployments, but rather there were clear signs that the East/West dialogue would continue.

A.A. Despres
Defence Relations Division
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CONFIDENTIAL

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS (MBFR)

ISSUE

On June 23, 1983, the East tabled a revised draft treaty which embodies earlier proposals and includes concessions on verification. This move constitutes a response to the July 8, 1982 comprehensive Western draft treaty proposal. This latest Eastern move puts the onus on the West to make a substantive counterproposal and could be an indication that real progress towards an MBFR agreement is now at last possible.

BACKGROUND

While some progress has been made in the Vienna negotiations in the last ten years, work has been difficult and slow. Neither side has been sufficiently anxious to reach agreement to be prepared to pay the price currently demanded by the other side. The data issue - that is, failure to reach agreement on the actual present strength of Warsaw Pact forces in the area of proposed reductions, which NATO maintains is about 160,000 greater than admitted by the Soviet Union - continues to be a principal obstacle to progress. In addition, the Soviet Union had so far rejected the package of verification measures which the NATO countries regard as essential. Underlying this disagreement are more fundamental factors such as Soviet perception of its need to maintain massive forces in Eastern Europe in order to keep its satellites in line, the requirement that to achieve parity the East would have to accept larger reductions than the West and the marked advantage the USSR has over the United States and its allies because of its geographic proximity to the area of reductions.

THE WESTERN DRAFT TREATY

The draft treaty tabled by the West on July 8, 1982 proposes that within the framework of a single agreement all direct participants - that is, the USA, UK, FRG, the Benelux countries and Canada on the Western side and the USSR, GDR, Poland and CSSR on the Eastern side - would undertake a binding obligation to reduce to a common collective ceiling of approximately 900,000 ground and air force manpower, including approximately 700,000 ground forces. These reductions would be in four stages over a period of seven years with the USA and the USSR withdrawing 13,000 and 30,000 troops respectively in the first year after conclusion of the agreement. The proposal carefully maintains the essential Western requirement of agreement before signature on the size of the forces to be reduced and limited and of adequate verification measures. The Eastern reaction has been consistently negative, insisting that the Western draft cannot serve as the basis for an agreement.

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EASTERN PROPOSAL

On February 17, 1983 the East proposed that both sides reduce their forces to equal collective levels of 900,000 men (700,000 ground forces and 200,000 air force) with each side determining its reduction numbers without prior agreement on the present level of forces in the area. As a first step, the USA and USSR would remove 13,000 and 20,000 ground forces respectively, with their armaments, on the basis of "mutual example" outside the framework of a formal agreement. Following these initial US and Soviet reductions, the armed forces and armaments of both sides in the area would be collectively frozen pending the negotiation of the further reductions to parity.

The revised Eastern draft treaty tabled on June 23, 1983 which embodies the above proposal also includes substantial changes in the East's position on verification, accepting the principle of on-site verification, albeit with freedom to refuse individual requests for inspection, and permanent entry and exit points with observers. While still rejecting Western requirements for agreement on data, the East claims that it has now provided adequate verification measures to verify that substantial reductions are being taken and ceilings respected. In effect, the East is now proposing a trade-off to the West between data and verification.

CANADIAN POSITION

Canada fully shares the NATO position on the basic objective of the negotiations, the achievement of parity, at a significantly reduced level, of military manpower in the forces of the two alliances confronting each other in central Europe. Such reductions and limitations combined with real parity would reduce the risk of successful surprise attack by the East, would serve to reduce tensions and improve the climate of East-West relations, and help to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe.

The East has now accepted the Western formula that only participants with "major formations" in the area should take "a significant share" of reductions. Under this formula Canada would not be required to reduce its forces by any fixed proportion. Moreover, as the East accepts the principle of the collective nature of reductions and limitations, an individual participant such as Canada would remain free to increase its forces provided the increase was matched by a decrease on the same side.

We consider that the February 17 proposal and June 23 revised draft treaty constitute a substantial Eastern move in the negotiations which could indicate that Moscow is at last

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ready to work seriously for an agreement. If NATO countries are prepared to make an equally substantive response including concessions on the data question, we are optimistic that a break in the log jam could result.

POSITION OF ALLIES

In general terms there appears to be a high level of Alliance agreement regarding MBFR objectives, strategy and tactics, with differences primarily those of emphasis and degree. The greatest reservation regarding the MBFR process appears to lie with the French, who do not participate in the negotiations. In varying degrees most of the Allies, and in particular the USA, the FRG and the UK are showing an intensified interest in MBFR and in the possibility of achieving a sound agreement that would help to demonstrate to their public that the arms control process is still viable and is being vigorously pursued. The acceptance by the East of more stringent verification measures as evident in the recent Eastern draft treaty is seen as an encouraging development in this direction. The West now needs to evaluate its position and agree on a possible counter-proposal taking into account the possibility offered by the MBFR forum for strengthening the Alliance's overall public posture on arms control. The US MBFR Ambassador has been authorized by Washington to explore informally with his Soviet counterpart the possibility of a trade-off on data and verification which would be acceptable to both alliances.

The UK under Mrs. Thatcher has been the most hard line Western participant in the negotiations. They have expressed doubts that the recent Eastern move related to verification justifies a substantive Western counter-proposal which we understand may be put forward by the Germans later this year. We believe they would nevertheless join a consensus to table new Western proposals.

MBFR

TALKING POINTS

- In our view the February 17 proposal and June 23 revised draft treaty including a move towards the Western position on verification constitute a substantial Eastern move in the MBFR negotiations. It may be an indication that the Soviet Union is finally prepared to work seriously toward an agreement.
- The Alliance must carefully review its position in the negotiations in order to prepare a substantive counter-proposal which will take advantage of the limited flexibility shown by the East. The possibility of a Western concession on data should be explored as a means of inducing further Eastern movement in the hope of breaking the log jam.
- The next few months could at last present an opportunity to make real progress in these talks. Notwithstanding the serious obstacles which still remain, the most important of these being the Eastern refusal to accept the need for a data agreement, the MBFR negotiations are closer to agreement than any of the other major arms control talks. We must take advantage of this situation.

A.A. Després
Defence Relations Division
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CONFIDENTIAL

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS (START)

ISSUE:

The Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) which began more than a year ago have been generally overshadowed by the INF negotiations. This situation is likely to continue at least until 1984. Both sides have altered their stance in recent rounds. The US has introduced a new element of flexibility in its position as a result of the Scowcroft Commission Report, while the Soviet Union has provided more details on its position and dropped the proposed ban on ALCMs and limits on certain types of submarines. The recent adoption of the "build-down" concept by President Reagan could facilitate progress in the Talks which reconvened on October 5.

BACKGROUND:

A. The United States Position

During the START negotiations, the United States has placed high priority on securing reductions of deployed ballistic missiles and their warheads, with particular emphasis on land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) in which the Soviet Union has a clear edge on total number, number of warheads, throw-weight and megatonnage. Under the US proposal, each side would be limited to 5000 ballistic missile warheads, with no more than half on land-based missiles. In the document it tabled in March, the US also gave tangible confirmation of its position that everything is on the table by discussing two areas in which the Soviet Union has shown a special interest, limitations on heavy bombers and on air-launched cruise missiles. The proposal would limit heavy bombers to 400, compared to 573 permitted under SALT II, but would include within that total the Soviet Backfire bomber, which was excluded under the earlier agreement. Limits on ALCMs were essentially carried over from SALT II. The US also proposed an agreement on Confidence Building Measures.

President Reagan has accepted the recommendation of the Scowcroft Commission Report, to deploy 100 MX missiles but look toward future development of a smaller, mobile, single warhead "Midgetman". This proposal is designed to give the US an immediate counter to the modern heavy Soviet ICBMs if these cannot be limited under a START agreement, but to work towards a more secure, less destabilizing land-based system for the future. To obtain Senate support for the MX Reagan

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promised to put forward a new approach on arms control including a new START position. This new approach was announced in two phases. On June 8 the President re-emphasized warheads as the unit of account in START maintaining the proposed limit of 5000 but dropping the proposed missile ceiling of 850 for ICBMs and SLBMs combined. Mr. Reagan also broadened the margin of negotiating flexibility given to START Ambassador Rowny to explore compromises. On October 4, the President announced a START proposal based on the "build-down" concept. This new proposal, the aim of which is to gradually reduce by a yearly percentage the strategic nuclear forces of both sides to agreed limits, links reductions to modernization. It would establish ratios by which existing warheads would be withdrawn as new ones are deployed. Further flexibility was given Ambassador Rowny to negotiate trade-offs with the Soviet Union taking into account Soviet advantages in missiles and US advantages in bombers.

B. The Soviet Position

The USSR would follow the START pattern reducing nuclear delivery vehicles by 25 percent to 1800 by 1990. In recent proposals the Soviet Union finally provided the breakdown of the proposed 1800 ceiling. It would include sublimits of 1200 on MIRVed missiles and ALCM equipped bombers of which no more than 1080 can be MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs. Within this latter limit no more than 680 can be MIRVed ICBMs. In effect this proposal would leave intact the Soviet heavy missile force of 308 SS-18 and 330 SS-19. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has made two changes of considerable importance in their position: (1) They have dropped their proposed ban on air-launched cruise missiles in favour of imposing limits on them as in the SALT II agreement and (2) removed their proposed limit on typhoon and trident class submarines proposing instead to ban new types of SLBMs except for one new type for each side. The Soviet side still refuses to address limits on warheads and the question of throw-weight. They continue to say that their START proposals are contingent on a resolution of INF.

CANADIAN POSITION:

Although we have been briefed periodically about START, we and the other Allies have not had the same opportunity as in the INF Talks to engage in regular consultations with the USA and influence policy. We expressed satisfaction that the START process finally got underway last year, and that in the meantime both sides have agreed to respect the main provisions

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of SALT II even though it has not been ratified. We agree with the US emphasis on limitations on the more destabilizing systems, the ICBMs. We have welcomed the new US proposals which introduce an element of greater flexibility in the US START position and could lead to progress if the Soviet Union responds positively.

Since the Soviet Union is known to be testing long-range cruise missiles, we have been concerned that the US approach to the negotiations might result in actual Soviet deployment of ALCMs in their bomber force, with the consequent implications such a development could have for the air defence of North America, where we are joint partners in NORAD. We are therefore pleased that the US has recently clarified its willingness to negotiate on bombers as well as missiles.

With the recent US build-down proposal and the earlier proposal to remove the 850 limit on ICBMs and SLBMs and changes in the Soviet position, particularly the dropping of the ban on ALCMs which were allowed under SALT II, we are convinced that more progress is indeed possible in START.

POSITION OF ALLIES:

While European allies strongly support the strategic talks, because of the public visibility and urgency given to INF due to the deployment calendar and the fact that they are more directly and politically involved, the START negotiations while objectively more important in substance, have not pre-occupied governments very much. Furthermore peace and anti-nuclear movements have concentrated nearly exclusively on blocking INF deployments. This situation is likely to continue for some time although an INF agreement would presumably have to be worked out in the context of START, in part because of the Soviet requirement to somehow take into account the French and UK strategic deterrents.

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East-West Military Balance
Soviet Perceptions and Policies

- On a global basis, the military forces of the West (USA and NATO) and East (USSR and WPO) are probably in rough balance, although if present trends continue the balance will shift in favour of the East.
- On a regional basis, e.g. Europe, the balance increasingly favours the Soviet Union and WPO.
- For the past twenty years the Soviets have relentlessly pursued a policy of military expansion, thought to have had its principal impetus in the "humiliation" of the Cuban missile crisis when the unquestioned USA strategic nuclear superiority prevailed.
- The Soviets have achieved:
 - a) strategic nuclear parity with the USA, thereby largely negating USA "extended deterrence" in Europe and making necessary the NATO TNF modernization program;
 - b) a powerful "blue water" Navy rivalling that of the USA and greatly enhancing Soviet ability to "project" power and influence abroad, e.g. in Africa.

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- c) nuclear superiority in Europe, while preserving and indeed increasing their conventional superiority in the European theatre.
- The Soviets have strongly favoured SALT and especially the SALT II treaty, which they see as recognizing and codifying their achievement of strategic equality with the USA. For reasons of cost alone they do not wish to see this newly-won equality threatened by a further "round" of strategic weapons competition with the USA.
- The Soviets have shown little interest (except for their customary propaganda) in other areas of arms control and disarmament, where they see their present position to be advantageous (e.g. MBFR).

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7 October 1983

PRESS CONFERENCE BY SOVIET UNION

Vladimir F. Petrovsky, Head of the International Organizations Department of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, held a press conference this afternoon to describe three new proposals submitted by the Soviet Union to the current session of the General Assembly, as well as to discuss other questions relating to disarmament.

In an opening statement, he said that the three new proposals, presented earlier this week by Soviet Ambassador Oleg Troyanovsky, had as their common theme the prevention of nuclear war. While the Soviet Union had previously made proposals on this issue to the Assembly, the present situation in the world, particularly with regard to the possibility of nuclear war, had greatly deteriorated. Not only were doctrines on the acceptability of nuclear war still being espoused by certain countries, but actual measures were being undertaken to build up nuclear weapons and to create the potential for a first strike, which increased the dangers of a nuclear war.

At this particularly difficult moment in time, he said, it was necessary to undertake practical measures, concentrating on less controversial questions which were of concern to all people and which would allow the international community to increase the effectiveness of the United Nations, one of whose aims was to serve as the focal point of agreed actions among nations. From this point of view, the problem of nuclear war was an enemy of all member States.

Thus, Mr. Petrovsky went on, the adoption of a declaration condemning nuclear war was important. Taking into account the current international situation, characterized by mistrust among nations, particularly with regard to intentions to use nuclear weapons for first-strike purposes, a declaration as proposed by the Soviet Union, condemning nuclear war and proclaiming nuclear war and all doctrines and conceptions which would admit the possibility of such a war as a crime against humanity, would be an important factor in creating a favourable climate -- a kind of "moral-psychological atmosphere" for improving the international atmosphere.

He said the Soviet Union was also proposing that the current session of the General Assembly again strongly call for a freeze on nuclear weapons. In making this proposal, once again, the Soviet Union was also supporting efforts to achieve a drastic reduction of nuclear weapons and would be ready to support all draft resolutions submitted to the Assembly on disarmament questions. But, from the point of view of effectiveness and from the standpoint of verification, the easiest and most effective measure that could be taken at this time would be a freeze on nuclear weapons, he said.

The final Soviet proposal being made to the current session was to prohibit the use of force in outer space and from outer space against earth. A practical measure towards this goal would be the conclusion of the treaty.

(more)

Soviet Union Press Conference

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New elements in the Soviet proposal dealt not only with political and legal obligations, but also included a comprehensive ban on the testing and deployment in outer space of any space-based weapons designed to destroy targets on the earth, in the air and in outer space and, at the same time, provided for the complete renunciation of the development of new anti-satellite systems and the elimination of existing systems. The Soviet Union would be prepared to conduct separate talks on anti-satellite systems with the United States on a bilateral basis.

He recalled that his country had undertaken unilaterally not to be the first to place any kind of anti-weapon in outer space.

The Soviet Union believed that the ideas contained in its three initiatives could provide the basis for united action by Member States. He hoped that by making proposals that were acceptable to the broad majority of Member States, a practical contribution would be made to changing the climate in the world.

Asked what the response had been to the Soviet proposals, Mr. Petrovsky replied that there had been various types of response but, over all, his impression was that, in general, the response had been favourable and had been regarded as a manifestation of the Soviet Union's desire to find a solution at least to some of the outstanding questions on the agenda of the Assembly.

He was then asked about elements in the Soviet proposal on the nuclear weapons freeze which would meet objections made in the past that no provisions were made for verification.

Mr. Petrovsky replied that the proposals would be verified by national means in the possession of Member States. The Soviet Union was also ready to consider what other verification possibilities existed in the field. What was very important, he added, was to begin negotiations. It had been shown in the past that whenever there was a desire to negotiate, it was possible to reach solutions to difficult questions, including questions of verification.

Was the Soviet Union, he was then asked, willing to tie in the question of non-first-use of conventional weapons with the non-first-use of nuclear weapons? He replied that the Soviet Union had made its proposal on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons taking into account the primary danger posed by them and its view that such a proposal would constitute a good first step. He recalled that when the Soviet Union had submitted its proposal, the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had expressed the view that the proposal did not go far enough, that it should also encompass the non-first-use of conventional weapons. Last January, the Warsaw Pact countries had proposed the conclusion of a treaty, the core of which was an obligation not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons. A definite response to this proposal was still being awaited.

Mr. Petrovsky was then asked to describe the Soviet Union's reaction to President Reagan's "build-down" proposal. He replied that the proposal provided nothing that was new. The semantics had changed, but the substance

(more)

Soviet Union Press Conference

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had not changed. The aim of the proposal was "to achieve the unilateral disarmament of the Soviet Union", to deprive it of its preponderance in the field of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The proposal did not take into account the principles of equality and equal security which had been the basis of previously successful strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two countries, he said. Although the proposal was called "building down", its practical effect was to disarm the Soviet Union and to arm the United States.

Asked to describe the views of the Soviet Union on chemical weapons, he said that the problem of chemical weapons was of high priority. Negotiations on the subject had been under way for a long time in the Committee on Disarmament, but the "bone of contention" was verification. The NATO members had insisted on on-site inspection with regard to the destruction of chemical weapons and the production of toxin chemicals, and the Soviet Union had accepted that approach.

However, he continued, as soon as the Soviet Union had accepted the idea of on-site inspection, NATO had made new proposals, going far beyond its original view with respect to chemicals for military purposes, to demand verification with respect to chemicals used for civilian purposes. This raised the question as to whether verification was really an obstacle to the settlement of negotiations on disarmament.

Next, Mr. Petrovsky was asked to comment on press reports today that American intelligence officials believe that the Soviet military in fact did not know that the Korean Airlines aircraft was a civilian aircraft. He said this demonstrated how correct the Soviet Union had been in its explanation of "this provocation with the Korean flight". This "adds a new and very important element to the picture". With respect to this issue, the Soviet Union had raised eight questions with the United States and had yet to receive a reply. Sooner or later, he added, the real story behind the organization of this provocation against the Soviet Union would become known -- hopefully sooner.

He was asked if the Soviet Union's shooting down of the Korean airliner was "a mistake". He replied that the operation had taken place at a time when the United States was putting into effect a variety of other intelligence operations in the region in question, not only the RC-135 aircraft, but also a reconnaissance satellite. The Soviet pilots had obeyed the orders given to them by their military command "to stop this flight". Given the picture of how the situation developed, correspondents could make their own judgements. The Soviet Union was "very sorry for the tragic loss of human life; it was a very tragic event". But responsibility for the matter rested with those who had organized the operation.

* * * * *

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR4046 21OCT

TO EX10TT RBR

INFC PCOOTT/FOWLER NENQOTT/DMPOL/DGIS ENATO WSHDC LDN PARIS ROMM
TOKYO PEKIN PRMNY CNGNY WSAW PRGUE BGRAD PPEST EUCST SEOUL MANIL
BERN BRU COPEN GENEV HSNKI LSKON STKHM HAGUE VIENN MXICO
LISR MINA MINE MINT USS DMF RPE RCE RSD RBRD IDD IDP ETT ZSP FPR
PER PPR PEE SIO SIOA SID IDDZ IFB SIC JLO JLA JCD LCD LCR LGR ZSI

INF: SOVIET POSTN

SUMMARY: AS INF CRUNCH APPROACHES, SOVS FIND THEMSELVES IN
UNCOMFORTABLE TRANSITIONAL POSTN. SOV PROPAGANDA AND NEGOTIATING
POSTNS HITHERTO HAVE BEEN PREMISED ON IDEA THAT NEW NATO INF
DEPLOYMENTS WLD BE NEAR-CATASTROPHIC DEVELOPMENT WHICH WLD
UTTERLY TRANSFORM EAST-WEST RELNS AND MUST AT ALL COSTS BE
PREVENTED. NOW, WITH COMMENCEMENT OF SUCH DEPLOYMENT IN FEW WEEKS A
LIKELIHOOD, SOVS CONFRONT TASK OF CARRYING ON AS IF DEPLOYMENT CAN
BE PREVENTED WHILE AT SAME TIME POSITIONING THEMSELVES FOR QUOTE
RESPONSE MEASURES UNQUOTE WHICH MAINTAIN THEIR POLITICAL CREDI-
PIL-
ITY WHILE BEING CONSISTENT WITH THEIR LONG-TERM INTERESTS. ALL
SIGNS ARE THAT THEY HAVE NOT/NOT DECIDED HOW TO PROCEED IN ANY
POST-DEPLOYMENT PHASE AND ARE CAREFULLY LEAVING OPEN ALL OPTIONS.
THEIR DECISIONS WILL BOTH BE CONDITIONED BY AND HAVE MAJOR
CONSEQUENT EFFECTS ON BROAD EAST-WEST RELNS, ALL ARMS CONTROL
NEGOTIATING FORA, INTER-GERMAN RELNS AND RELNS WITHIN SOCIALIST
BLOC.

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2. REPORT: INF CRUNCH POINT IS RAPIDLY APPROACHING AND INCREASINGLY INTENSE POLITICAL GAMES ARE BEING PLAYED OUT ON EACH SIDE OF AND ACROSS EAST-WEST DIVIDE. OUTCOME FROM THESE POLITICAL MANOEUVRES WILL HAVE MAJOR IMPACT ON POLITICAL CONTEXT IN WHICH EAST-WEST RELNS WILL BE PURSUED IN COMING YEARS.

3. SOV AUTHORITIES NOW FIND THEMSELVES AT ESPECIALLY AWKWARD TRANSITION POINT. THEIR PROPAGANDA AND SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATING POSITIONS HITHERTO HAVE BEEN PREMISED ON IDEA THAT NEW NATO INF DEPLOYMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH 1979 TWO-TRACK DECISION WLD BE NEAR-CATAclysmic EVENT WHICH WLD UTTERLY TRANSFORM EAST-WEST RELNS BY TRIGGERING A NEW MAJOR DESTRUCTIVE SPIRAL IN NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND VITIATING POLITICAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF 1970S DETENTE ERA. SOVS GEARED POLICY AND ITS PRESENTATION TO PREVENTING, OR AT LEAST DELAYING (WHICH THEY PROBABLY CONSIDERED WLD LIKELY LEAD TO SAME END RESULT) SCHEDULED NATO DEPLOYMENTS. THEY NOW SEEM ABOUT TO FAIL IN ATTAINMENT OF THIS OBJECTIVE: NATO UNITY HAS HELD, DEPLOYMENTS SEEM POLITICALLY MANAGEABLE FOR GOVTS OF COUNTRIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED AND THERE SEEMS LITTLE PROSPECT OF AGMT AT GENEV. YET SOVS CERTAINLY DO NOT/WANT UNCONTROLLED PROLIFERATION OF NEGATIVE POLITICAL-MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS ALONG LINES THEIR PROPAGANDA HAS FORESEEN. SOVS NOW CONFRONTED WITH NEED TO DEVISE POST-DEPLOYMENT RESPONSES WHICH PROTECT THEIR POLITICAL CREDIBILITY AND MEET PERCEIVED LONG-TERM SECURITY-MILITARY NEEDS.

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4. WHAT TO DO? ALL SIGNS ARE THAT SOVS HAVE NOT/NOT YET DECIDED HOW TO PROCEED IN POST-DEPLOYMENT PHASE AND ARE TAKING CARE TO KEEP OPEN BROAD RANGE OF OPTIONS. RECENT OFFICIAL SOV/WPO STATEMENTS (ANDROPOV 25SEP STATEMENT, SOFIA COMMUNIQUE, BERLIN USSR/GDR COMMUNIQUE, GROMYKOS BERLIN SPEECH) VARY IN TERMS OF TONAL ACCENTS AND SUBSTANTIVE EMPHASES. THEIR MOST NOTABLE COMMON DENOMINATOR IS THAT THEY SAY NOTHING/NOTHING OF ANY PRECISION ABOUT WHAT SOVS INTEND TO DO IN EVENT OF COMMENCEMENT OF NATO INF DEPLOYMENTS.

5. ANDROPOV STATEMENT WAS TOUGHEST IN TONE, BUT NOTABLY IMPRECISE IN DISCUSSING LATEST USA INF PROPOSALS (SEE OURTEL XYGR4009 06OCT). SOFIA COMMUNIQUE WAS SOFTEST IN TONE AND PERHAPS EVEN MORE AMBIGUOUS ON SOV RESPONSES TO ANY NATO INF DEPLOYMENTS, REFLECTING PROPAGANDA OBJECTIVES VISA-A-VIS WESTERN ANTI-DEPLOYMENT MOVEMENTS, ESPECIALLY IN FRG AND, PERHAPS, CONSIDERATIONS ARISING FROM INTRA-WPO POLITICAL SENSITIVITIES (OURTEL 4027 17OCT83). GROMYKOS 17OCT DINNER SPEECH IN BERLIN IS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THAT IT ELABORATES MORE SPECIFICALLY ON SOV OBJECTIONS TO LATEST USA INF PROPOSALS WHILE REMAINING SILENT ON POSSIBLE SOV RESPONSE MEASURES. JOINT COMMUNIQUE EMERGING FROM GROMYKOS VISIT TO GDR IS MOST NOTABLE FOR IMPLICATION THAT NATO DEPLOYMENT ACTIONS CLD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES FOR RELNS BETWEEN TWO GERMANIES.

6. GROMYKOS DINNER SPEECH SPELLS OUT, WITH STIFF BUT CAREFULLY CONTROLLED RHETORICAL FLOURISHES, SOV THINKING ON LATEST USA INF PROPOSALS (IN TERMS ALMOST IDENTICAL TO THOSE SET OUT IN A 04OCT

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PRAVDA EDITORIAL). MOST BASICALLY, THERE HAVE BEEN QUOTE NO/NO
CHANGES WHATSOEVER UNQUOTE IN USA POSTN ON QUOTE THE TWO KEY ISSUES
--REGARDING NON-DEPLOYMENT OF USA MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE AND
TAKING INTO ACCOUNT BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR MEANS UNQUOTE.
SPECIFICS OF USA PROPOSALS ARE ALSO SEEN AS OBJECTIONABLE, VIZ:
(1) RE USA QUOTE GLOBAL APPROACH UNQUOTE, GROMYKO ASSESED THAT THIS
TRANSLATES INTO USA ATTEMPTING TO RESERVE RIGHT TO DEPLOY QUOTE
IN ADDITION TO THE USA FORWARD-BASED NUCLEAR WEAPONS THAT ALREADY
EXIST IN EUROPE AND ASIA AS MANY NEW MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES AS IS
THE NUMBER OF SUCH MISSILES IN THE ENTIRE TERRITORY OF THE USSR
UNQUOTE. ONLY NEW ELEMENT, ACCORDING TO GROMYKO, IS THAT USA PROMISES
NOT/NOT TO DEPLOY ALL SUCH MISSILES IN EUROPE, BUT ONLY CERTAIN
NUMBER, WITH REMAINDER BEING DEPLOYED ELSEWHERE, WHICH IS CERTAIN
TO BE SOMEWHERE NEAR USSR. (INTERESTINGLY, GROMYKO IN SAME SPEECH
SEEMS TO MAKE SOVIET COUNTER-CLAIM TO POSITION ANALOGOUS TO THAT
HE ATTRIBUTES TO USA, EG QUOTE THE SOVIET UNION IN ANY CASE
-THROUGH AGREEMENT, IF USA CONSENTS TO IT, OR WITHOUT IT-WILL HAVE A
CORRESPONDENT EQUIVALENT TO ITS WEAPONS AIMED AT IT AND ITS ALLIES
UNQUOTE).

(2) RE USA READINESS TO DISCUSS QUOTE MIX UNQUOTE OF INF MISSILES
IN WESTERN EUROPE, GROMYKO SAID THIS IS QUOTE BASED ON SAME
UNACCEPTABLE AND ABSURD PREMISE THAT SOV UNION SHOULD REDUCE ITS
MISSILES, WHILE THE USA, ON CONTRARY, SHOULD DEPLOY ITS OWN, REMAINING
FREE, AT THAT, TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF PERSHING 2 MISSILES

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IT WLD LIKE TO DEPLOY IN WESTERN EUROPE. IF THIS IS A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH, THEN WHAT IS CYNICISM? UNQUOTE.

(3) RE USA READINESS TO DISCUSS INCLUDING AIRCRAFT IN AGREEMENT. GROMYKO TERMED THIS AS BEING CONDITIONAL ON UNACCEPTABLE DEMANDS, EG A) ACCEPTANCE OF DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN MISSILES IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE; AND B) USA WLD QUOTE HANDPICK UNQUOTE TYPES OF AIRCRAFT TO BE INCLUDED SO AS TO COVER ALL SOV AIRCRAFT OF CERTAIN RANGE WHILE LEAVING CERTAIN TYPES OF USA MEDIUM-RANGE PLANES PLUS ALLIES PLANES IN PLACE.

7. CLEARLY, MOST OF DETAILED OBJECTIONS VOICED BY GROMYKO AMOUNT TO DISINGENUOUS POCKETING OF USA MOVES WHILE BELITTLING THEIR IMPORT. ESSENCE OF SOV POLITICAL OBJECTION IS SUMMED UP IN FORMULA, REPEATED IN BOTH GROMYKO AND ANDROPOV STATEMENTS, THAT QUOTE IT IS STILL BEING PROPOSED TO AGREE ONLY ON HOW MANY SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE MISSILES ARE TO BE CUT AND HOW MANY USA MISSILES ARE TO BE DEPLOYED IN EUROPE IN ADDITION TO THE SWOLLEN NUCLEAR ARSENALS ALREADY IN THE POSSESSION OF THE NATO BLOCK COUNTRIES UNQUOTE. GROMYKO SAID NOTHING ON POSSIBLE SOV RESPONSES TO DEPLOYMENTS.

8. COMMUNIQUE FROM GROMYKO'S VISIT TO GDR RESORTED TO FORMULA EVEN MORE COMPRESSED AND ENIGMATIC THAN SOFIA COMMUNIQUE. TWO FMS QUOTE EXPRESSED CONVICTION THAT AGREEMENT IN GENEVA IS POSSIBLE SO FAR UNTIL THE NEW AMERICAN MISSILES ARE DEPLOYED IN WESTERN EUROPE. PUT TO PREVENT THIS POSSIBILITY FROM BEING MISSED IT IS NECESSARY FOR USA AND NATO AS A WHOLE TO RESORT TO ATTEMPTS TO ACHIEVE UNILATERAL ...6

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MILITARY ADVANTAGES AND TO ADOPT SERIOUS ATTITUDE TO CONDUCT OF TALKS AIMED AT ACHIEVING ACCORD ON BASIS OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY OF THE SIDES UNQUOTE. BERLIN COMMUNIQUE DID HOWEVER SOUND MORE OMINOUS NOTE ON POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF DELICACY FOR INTRA-GERMAN RELATIONS. QUOTE THE TURNING OF WEST GERMAN TERRITORY INTO A LAUNCHING PAD FOR NUCLEAR-MISSILE WEAPONS AIMED AGAINST SOCIALIST COUNTRIES... WOULD CONTRADICT THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF THE MOSCOW AND BERLIN TREATIES AND WOULD INFLICT SERIOUS DAMAGE TO THE FRCS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE GDR UNQUOTE.

9. THE FLURRY OF DIVERGENT WARNINGS, RECRIMINATIONS AND ALARMS, WHICH OCCASIONALLY HINT AT PLEADING, REFLECTS, WE THINK, CURRENT TRANSITIONAL MOMENT AT WHICH SOVIET LEADERSHIP FINDS ITSELF, WITH ATTENDANT UNCERTAINTIES ON PART OF SOVIET POLICY-MAKERS. POINT HAS NOT/NOT YET COME AT WHICH THEY CAN OVERTLY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THEIR EFFORTS TO STOP DEPLOYMENT HAVE FAILED. RHETORIC OF ALARM MUST THEREFORE BE MAINTAINED, THOUGH IN MANNER WHICH AVOIDS BRUTAL WARNING OF THREATS WHICH WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE IN PROPAGANDA TERMS. AT SAME TIME GROUNDBREAK MUST BE LAID FOR POST-DEPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MANNER WHICH WILL HAVE SOME SEMBLANCE OF POLITICAL CONSISTENCY WHILE PROVIDING ROOM FOR CONTROLLED PURSUIT OF LONGER-TERM POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC INTERESTS.

10. SUBSEQUENT TEL WILL ADDRESS CONSIDERATIONS WHICH SOVIET POLICY-MAKERS ARE LIKELY NOW DEBATING INTENSELY AMONG THEMSELVES.

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CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

Unofficial translation

S T A T E M E N T

BY VLADIMIR F. PETROVSKY, USSR REPRESENTATIVE IN
THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,
AT ITS THIRTY-EIGHTH SESSION ON QUESTIONS
DEALING WITH THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR

October 17, 1963

Mr. Chairman,

Removing the threat of nuclear war as well as limiting and halting the nuclear arms race are the priority items on this Committee's agenda. This is the number one global problem in the true sense of this expression, and it is crucial not only for solving other problems common to entire humanity, but also for the very survival of life on our planet.

The Soviet delegation fully shares the concern about the increasingly ominous shape that the risk of nuclear war is taking on, which has been voiced during this session's general debate in General Assembly plenary meetings. This risk is primarily the result of the unchecked nuclear arms race unleashed by those who are seeking to acquire military superiority in a bid to impose their will on other countries and peoples and to halt and reverse the objective processes of world development.

It would appear that the US and NATO nuclear arsenals are packed to capacity, and yet the weapons assembly lines continue to be accelerated, as if in some sort of a frenzy. Whatever kind of armaments there is, it is being either built up or replaced by another even more deadly.

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Strategic offensive forces are undergoing upgrading and improvement at full speed, while weapons are being developed on the basis of the latest achievements of science and technology in an obvious endeavour to acquire a nuclear first-strike capability. Plans to deploy new medium-range missiles in Western Europe, which promote illusions about a possibility of remaining outside a "nuclear exchange", are aimed at moving nuclear arms as close as possible to their targets.

There can be no doubt that Europe is now the neuralgic centre of the international scene.

Deployment of new US missiles in Europe would substantially complicate the entire world situation, dramatically exacerbate nuclear confrontation and result in an increased threat of nuclear war. If US missiles are actually deployed in Europe, the Soviet Union will have no alternative but to take appropriate countermeasures.

The arms race which is being spurred by the USA is not confined to one continent alone. New attempts are being made to secure the deployment of neutron weapons in Western Europe and in other regions. Over a wide geographic area-- from Diego Garcia to Okinawa, across the expanse of the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans--land and waters are being saturated with nuclear arms to pursue a pathological desire to add more of such arms where they are already in place and to deploy them where there are none.

The nuclear arms race to which a qualitatively new dimension is being added, increases the risk of outbreak of war, including by accident or technical error. The situation is being made worse by the fact that in conditions of a nuclear race, as if millions of human lives were not at stake, all sorts of doctrines and concepts of "limited" and "protracted" nuclear war, or "selective" and "counter-force" nuclear strikes are being launched with criminal nonchalance; underlying them is the same reliance on the first use of nuclear arms.

It is obvious to any sober-minded person that thinking of the unthinkable, namely, of the admissibility of nuclear war, means ignoring the single most important reality of the nuclear and space age: any nuclear war, were it to be unleashed, will inevitably become world-wide. This is the fatal threshold, the crossing of which can exterminate life on earth itself.

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Every time eminent scientists, physicists, physicians, ecologists, or military experts lift the veil covering hypothetical nuclear missile war scenarios they reveal a truly ominous abyss having little in common with speculative calculations of the bellicose strategists who, in effect, think in pre-nuclear war terms. To hear them, nuclear war is just a variety of conventional war but with "more extensive consequences". If real facts are accepted, however, the soldier's conventional view of war is as outdated as the strait-forward, helmeted Mars in a painting by Velasquez compared to the apocalypse in Pablo Picasso's Guernica.

Final documents adopted by the Third World Congress of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War held last summer point to the fact that all-out nuclear war would instantly kill hundreds of thousands of people, calling in question the future of those who would have survived the initial attack: medicine would be powerless to provide effective aid to the survivors: future generations would inherit a violated biosphere on a planet poisoned by radioactivity; long-term ecological consequences of nuclear explosions will catch up with new generations; indeed if account is taken of all that is known, and more importantly, of all that is still unknown about consequences of nuclear explosions there is a danger that human life on our planet will cease to exist. Similar conclusions have also been reached by scientists working in other fields and by sober-minded politicians and military figures.

It is quite evident that the preaching of reliance on force, above all in its nuclear manifestation, sacrilegiously proclaimed as "political realism", constitutes biological nihilism and therefore political nihilism as well, for nuclear war is a road of no return. A truly realistic policy cannot be predicated on a possibility of experimenting with our planet to ascertain its abilities to survive nuclear holocaust. As the Soviet Union has been constantly reminding there can be no victors in nuclear war.

People on all continents are right in asking a question: can the slide towards a nuclear abyss be arrested and another course in world politics be found?

Our reply to this is unequivocally affirmative. The post-war history proves that the threat of nuclear war can be averted. Humanity has gained experience in strengthening peace and international security. For an entire decade international relations were developing in a spirit of detente. This is a valuable asset of the international community. And no other alternative exists.

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The gravity of the existing situation and the present level of the danger of war urgently require a return to the policy of detente and to a joint search for ways of preventing the nuclear threat.

What is now the essence of the problem of assuring peace and international security?

Most succinctly it can be expressed in this way--maintenance of the approximate military strategic equilibrium existing in Europe and on a global scale between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO and between the USSR and the USA. This equilibrium makes an objective contribution to the preservation of peace. Reluctance to accept this reality and a striving for military superiority and destabilization of the military political situation lead to an escalation of the arms race and a greater threat of nuclear war.

The Soviet Union has done and will continue to do its utmost to preserve this equilibrium and to seek reduction and limitation of arms on the basis of the existing equilibrium so that approximate parity at any given moment would be preserved but at an increasingly lower level. This position is realistic, scientifically and politically sound and is in keeping with the interests of both sides and the cause of world peace.

In this context it is crucial that the nuclear powers strictly adhere to a defensive doctrine. It is precisely such a doctrine that forms the basis for the building of the Soviet Armed Forces including their nuclear components. Yes, we are maintaining the combat readiness of our armed forces at an appropriate level taking into account the threats against our security. But we are doing this because we have to. The arms race has always been imposed on us from outside.

Preventive wars of any type or scale and concepts of preemptive nuclear strikes are alien to the Soviet military doctrine.

Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, President of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, has pointed out in his recent statement that "we do not separate the wellbeing of our people and the security of the Soviet State from, let alone oppose to, the wellbeing and security of other peoples and other countries. In the nuclear age one cannot look at the world through the prism of narrow egoistic interests. Responsible statesmen have one choice--to do all they can to prevent nuclear catastrophe. Any other position is short-sighted, more so, suicidal." As pointed out in the communique of the just concluded Sofia meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty States, the Soviet Union together with its allies is offering an alternative to nuclear catastrophe--a comprehensive set of proposals aimed at averting the threat of nuclear war, halting the arms race and attaining disarmament and detente.

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The Soviet Union believes that efforts are needed to create reliable material, political, legal, moral, psychological and other guarantees for preventing nuclear war at every level--unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral. Our intentions are matched by specific deeds.

The Soviet Union has assumed the unilateral obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This has been a decisive and bold move considering that the United States and other NATO nuclear powers find the unleashing of nuclear war possible and have not moved a finger to respond to this Soviet action in any way. The obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is not a mere declaration. In military terms it means that more attention will be paid in the building of armed forces to the objectives of preventing armed conflicts from becoming nuclear, thus necessitating the introduction of even stricter standards in training troops and staff officers, determining the composition of armaments and instituting even more rigorous control which excludes an unauthorized launching of nuclear weapons--from tactical to strategic. If other nuclear States which have not done so followed this example set by the USSR this would be tantamount in practice to the renunciation in general of the use of nuclear weapons.

The truly tangible steps taken unilaterally by the Soviet Union are also the following:

- The cessation in 1962 of further deployment of medium-range missiles in the European part of the USSR and, moreover, a reduction of part of these armaments:

- The non-stationing of additional medium-range missiles beyond the Urals where they would have Western Europe within their range.

This year yet another significant move has been added to the Soviet Union's record of unilateral peace initiatives--the USSR has assumed an obligation not to be the first to place any type of anti-satellite weapons in outer space, i.e. It has declared a unilateral moratorium on such launches for as long as other States, including the United States, refrain from placing any type of anti-satellite weapons in outer space. This decision is yet another demonstration of the good will of the Soviet Union and its determination to contribute in actual fact to the elimination of the threat of war.

The importance of unilateral actions in terms of preventing nuclear war is self-evident. At the same time, of course, unilateral efforts alone are not enough.

The Soviet Union has taken a very responsible approach towards the ongoing talks between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe and on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms.

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We believe that these talks should not be conducted merely for talks' sake but for the sake of reaching concrete results, and we are firmly convinced that agreements are quite possible to reach in these negotiations on the basis of strict compliance with the principle of equality and equal security. But, just as it is impossible to applaud with one hand, the efforts of one side alone are obviously not enough to get results in the talks. This has been very clearly demonstrated by the state of affairs at these talks.

Let us now turn to the negotiations on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe that have now entered the decisive stage.

As far back as two years ago the Soviet Union proposed a truly zero option for Europe--to eliminate all nuclear systems there both medium-range and tactical. Since NATO was not prepared for such a radical solution--and the USSR is still willing to do so today--the Soviet Union proposed a not so radical yet far-reaching option: to renounce the deployment of any new medium-range systems in Europe and to reduce all the existing systems roughly by two thirds leaving 300 such systems on the USSR and NATO sides respectively.

In view of Western claims that such option would be unfair because the USSR could supposedly retain within these 300 systems more missiles than NATO has at its disposal, the Soviet side declared that it was willing to keep--after reductions in Europe--exactly as many medium-range missiles as Britain and France have. Accordingly, the two sides would be left with equal numbers of nuclear-capable aircraft of medium radius of action. Besides, we consented to negotiating equal numbers not only of delivery vehicles (i.e. missiles and aircraft) but also of warheads on them.

As a result, the Soviet Union would have in the European zone far fewer medium-range missiles and warheads on these missiles than before 1976 when it did not have SS-20 missiles at all.

Finally, quite recently the USSR has taken another major step towards a positive solution to the problem of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. In the event a mutually acceptable agreement was reached--including the renunciation by the US to deploy new missiles in Europe--the Soviet Union, while reducing its own medium-range missiles in the European part of the country to a level equal to the number of missiles Britain and France have, would eliminate all the missiles to be reduced. In that case a significant number of SS-20 missiles would also be dismantled. Thus a major real disarmament measure has been proposed with a view to considerably facilitating agreement.

The United States has adopted a different kind of approach at the negotiations. For a long time the US has proposed that the USSR reduce to zero, i.e. destroy all its medium-range missiles and not only in the

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European but also in the Eastern part of the country, while NATO would not destroy a single missile or plane. In other words the purport of this proposal, which can be called a zero option only as a mockery of common sense, boils down to zero missiles for the USSR and zero reductions for NATO.

Another variety of this lop-sided position is found in the so-called "interim solution", proposed by the US, under which the USSR would, on the one hand, have to reduce its medium-range nuclear arsenal and, on the other hand, to bless the deployment in Europe of a certain number of new US missiles in addition to the already existing British and French missiles and the forward-based systems of the US itself in Europe.

The United States now continues to press for such a solution which would enable it in any event to begin at the end of 1983 the deployment of its new medium-range missiles in Western Europe in addition to the American forward-based nuclear systems already in place there. The US is merely covering it up with talk about some kind of US flexibility in the Geneva talks. Another "helping" of this "flexibility" has just been dished out. The deception inherent in it has become evident this time too. The essence of the so-called latest move in the US position amounts as before to a proposal to reach agreement on how many Soviet medium-range missiles are to be reduced and how many new American missiles are to be deployed in Europe in addition to the nuclear arsenal NATO already has.

The current US position not only precludes the possibility of reaching agreement but is devoid of elementary common sense altogether. How is it possible, say, to find even a remotely reasonable justification for the refusal to take into account the British and French missiles in the overall balance of nuclear arms? The British and French systems, capable of destroying targets on the territory of the USSR and its allies, even now constitute a significant component in NATO's nuclear arsenal.

The stubborn reluctance of the United States to take them into a count is clearly intended to delay the talks and to deploy its missiles in Western Europe by claiming the intransigence of the Soviet Union. Capable of destroying targets deep inside the territory of the Soviet Union, these missiles are designed to become a downright addition to the US nuclear arsenal and to upset in NATO's favour the existing regional and global balance. However, it is not only targets on the Soviet territory but also those in some other countries, including African and Asian countries, that may turn out to be in the sights of these new American missiles.

The Soviet Union together with the other Warsaw Treaty countries continues to be firmly in favour of reaching early agreement in the negotiations,

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that would provide for a renunciation of the deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles and an appropriate reduction of the existing medium-range nuclear systems in Europe. As emphasized in the communique issued by the Committee of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty States on October 14, 1983, in Sofia, Bulgaria, "the possibility of reaching at the Geneva negotiations an agreement consonant with the interests of the peoples of the world still exists. In this context it was pointed out that if no agreement was reached in the talks before the end of this year it would be necessary for the negotiations to continue for the purpose of reaching it in the conditions of the US and its NATO allies waiving the deadline they themselves established for the deployment of new medium-range nuclear missiles." In such conditions the USSR is willing to observe the freeze it has declared unilaterally on medium-range missile systems deployed in the European part of its territory and to carry out a unilateral reduction of such systems, that began when the freeze was declared, as a major contribution to the creation of conditions to bring the talks to a successful completion.

A situation similar to that in the talks on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe is developing at another Geneva forum-- the negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms.

At these talks the Soviet Union is proposing as a first step to freeze strategic nuclear arsenals of both sides, and not only to forgo any increase in the present number of missiles but also to forgo the development and testing of new types and kinds of strategic arms as well as to limit to the maximum possible extent the modernization of the existing systems. But this would only be a first step. The Soviet proposals call for deep reductions of strategic weapons in their entirety in the interests of enhancing the overall military strategic stability. Specifically, the draft treaty tabled by the Soviet delegation at the Geneva talks proposes that the existing arsenals of both sides be reduced by approximately 25 per cent to equal levels. The number of nuclear warheads on these arms would also be cut substantially to equal agreed ceilings. All channels for the continuation of the strategic arms race would be blocked: there would be a ban on the deployment of long-range cruise missiles and other new kinds of strategic systems, and the possibilities for competition between the two sides in a qualitative upgrading of their arms would be limited to the utmost. All these limitations and reductions would be, of course, subject to verification. The Soviet Union then would be prepared to move towards even deeper reductions.

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Here too the US position is aimed at obtaining unilateral military advantages rather than an honest agreement. The reductions as proposed by the US would affect the Soviet strategic arsenal to a considerably greater degree than the American arsenal. It is true, though, that from time to time the US side engages in a tactical gliding around some important problems facing the negotiations. However, this does not change the overall picture.

Thus, as soon as the US felt that it wanted to ensure a future deployment of another ICBM--the Midgetman--in addition to the latest MX ICBMs, which are to increase the US nuclear arsenal by at least 1,000 high-yield warheads, the US delegation in Geneva hastened to declare its readiness to "adjust" its position.

The US delegation declared its willingness to raise its earlier proposed limit of 850 on deployed sea- and land-based ballistic missiles.

The same is true of the recent US idea of a "build-down". Even according to US mass media estimates that idea would in effect mean a faster reduction of land-based ICBMs which constitute the backbone of the USSR strategic nuclear forces, than of sea-based missiles which are more important for the USA. The thrust of the new US proposal is to channel the strategic arms race towards a qualitative improvement of missiles and bombers rather than to curb it. Thus, that proposal is by no means a step forward, but at best a move sideways.

Though the negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms have so far failed to advance the Soviet Union together with other socialist countries believes that progress is feasible at these negotiations too if the other side also strives for it not in words but in deeds.

While recognizing the special responsibility of the USSR and the USA for averting nuclear war we believe at the same time that active multilateral efforts are required of all states of this planet irrespective of their size, geographical location, social system and of whether they possess nuclear weapons or not or of whether they are members of some military political grouping or are non-aligned. Only joint efforts by all those who cherish peace can contain those who are pushing the world towards the abyss and hinder the unraveling of intricate political knots and the achievement of constructive agreements.

The recent Madrid meeting of States participating in the CSCE has demonstrated that neither the present-day world tensions nor considerable differences in national policies are an insurmountable obstacle to finding areas of agreement in order to produce solutions which clear up the horizons of world politics.

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We attach exceptional importance to the UN, the most representative international forum. UN decisions aimed at the prevention of nuclear war and the curbing of the arms race, and expressing the will of the UN Member States, carry great moral and political authority and have a significant potential for influencing policies of States positively.

The recent report of the UN Secretary-General on the work of the Organization rightly notes that the task of eliminating the threat of nuclear war "should override the differences of interest and ideology which separate the membership."

In our view, the 38th General Assembly session can and should make its own meaningful contribution to the cause of reducing the military threat and strengthening universal security. Today more than ever, it is important for the UN Member States to be fully aware of themselves as the united nations determined to act for the sake of saving the present and future generations from nuclear annihilation.

Considering the utmost importance of uniting efforts in the struggle against the nuclear threat, the Soviet Union has submitted to this session of the UN General Assembly a draft declaration on the condemnation of nuclear war. It proposes that the General Assembly condemn nuclear war resolutely, unconditionally and for all time as the most hideous of all crimes that can be committed against the peoples of the world and as a gross violation of the foremost human right--the right to life.

It is imperative that the UN Member States declare as criminal acts the formulation, enunciation, dissemination and propaganda of political and military doctrines and concepts designed to substantiate the "legitimacy" of the first use of nuclear weapons and, generally, the "admissibility" of unleashing nuclear war.

This stand of the Soviet Union is an organic expression of its approach based on principle towards the questions of war and peace. V.I. Lenin pointed out that "socialists have always condemned wars between peoples as barbaric and atrocious." (Complete Works, Vol. 26, p. 311 of the Rus. Ed.)

At the same time this Soviet proposal is a follow-up to recent UN decisions. Two years ago the United Nations adopted the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe which solemnly proclaimed that those officials who would decide to be the first to use nuclear weapons would be neither justified, nor forgiven; and a year ago it adopted a resolution calling upon all the nuclear powers that have not yet done so, to follow the example set by the USSR and assume an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The adoption at this session of a declaration condemning nuclear war in all its forms and manifestations would contribute to the creation of a political climate that would make the actions of those

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who are devising plans for the first use of nuclear weapons more difficult, build confidence among States and thus contribute to the implementation of practical measures to limit and reduce nuclear arms. This would become another UN large-scale political action aimed at removing the nuclear threat.

The Soviet Union believes that the condemnation of nuclear war should be effectively backed up by practical steps to curb the nuclear arms race.

In this respect a freeze on nuclear armaments in qualitative and quantitative terms by all States possessing them would be an extremely timely and feasible measure. The majority of the countries of the world and the broadest sectors of world opinion have supported it. The UN has come in favour of freezing nuclear arsenals. We respect this will of the peoples and are actively working for its realization.

Last June the Soviet Union advanced a concrete proposal to this effect addressed to all the nuclear States. Unfortunately it has not found a positive response on their part. Today we again focus attention on this question, proposing that the General Assembly adopt a resolution, entitled "Nuclear arms freeze", whose draft the Soviet delegation is submitting to the First Committee. Its essence is to reach an agreement between all the States possessing nuclear weapons to cease the build-up of all components of nuclear arsenals including all kinds of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and nuclear weapons, not to deploy nuclear arms of new kinds and types, to declare a moratorium on all tests of nuclear weapons and on tests of nuclear weapons and on tests of new kinds and types of their delivery vehicles, as well as to stop the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of manufacturing nuclear weapons.

It goes without saying that a nuclear freeze under appropriate verification would be most effective were it to be carried out simultaneously by all the nuclear powers. Such a freeze could be of indefinite duration or be limited in time, which could be negotiated by the nuclear States. At the same time the Soviet Union considers it possible that the proposed freeze would initially become effective as regards the USSR and the USA by way of example to the other nuclear States for taking similar steps in the nearest possible future.

A nuclear freeze, which is both effective and relatively easy to achieve, would make a contribution to the strengthening of strategic stability by removing apprehensions to the effect that the deployment of new systems of nuclear weapons would have a destabilizing effect. As a result, the risk of outbreak of nuclear conflict would greatly diminish. Correspondingly, the degree of trust among nuclear-weapon States would sharply increase and a breakthrough in improving the overall atmosphere in the world would materialize.

Naturally, a freeze is not an end in itself, for the threat of nuclear war exists even at the present level of military confrontation. That is why

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we consider a nuclear freeze as a major step towards halting the nuclear arms race, reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons.

The complete and general cessation and prohibition of tests of such weapons would erect a reliable barrier in the way of the escalating risk of nuclear war due to qualitative upgrading of nuclear weapons. It is important that the General Assembly calls upon the Committee on Disarmament to elaborate a draft treaty on this subject as a matter of highest priority. "The Basic Provisions of a Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear-Weapon Tests" submitted by the USSR to the 37th session of the UN General Assembly represent a good basis for an early agreement on this matter.

Pending the conclusion of such a treaty we are proposing a moratorium on all nuclear explosions. As a practical step in this direction, the Soviet Union reaffirms its readiness to give effect to the Soviet-American treaties on limiting underground nuclear-weapon tests (1974) and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (1976), provided the United States acts likewise.

Unfortunately, the US position with respect to the mentioned threshold treaties as well as with respect to the problem of the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests indicates that this arms limitation measure has also fallen victim to nuclear programmes under which the Pentagon intends to develop and produce about 17,000 new nuclear weapons within six years. And while before attempts were made to conceal its unconstructive approach by references to verification complexities and other spurious arguments, a recently published reply by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency to a Congressional Commission inquiry dots all the i's. The reply states that nuclear tests are necessary for developing and modernizing warheads, for maintaining the dependability of the stockpiled arsenals and for evaluating the effect of the use of nuclear arms.

At the same time, as demonstrated by the discussion of this problem in the Committee on Disarmament, the overwhelming majority of States are attaching tremendous importance to it and are putting forward concrete considerations in this respect. The Soviet Union is prepared to consider in a constructive spirit proposals of other states aimed at facilitating the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. In this context we take note of the initiative put forward by Sweden that has introduced its draft treaty in the Committee on Disarmament.

The USSR is advocating most resolutely the immediate and concrete elaboration of a nuclear disarmament programme the realization of which would lead to a complete one hundred per cent elimination of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union is naturally prepared to negotiate such

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verification which would guarantee its realization by the nuclear States. A thorough consideration of this question has led us to the conclusion that for the purposes of verification of specific nuclear disarmament measures the IAEA experience in control procedures could also be used.

In an atmosphere of an escalating nuclear threat the task of strengthening the non-proliferation regime becomes particularly urgent due, above all, to a possible acquisition of nuclear arms by Israel and South Africa. Prospects of some other States, in particular Pakistan, acquiring nuclear weapons is another cause for concern. The spread of nuclear arms over our planet and particularly their appearance in areas where the threat of war is highest would undoubtedly do considerable harm to both regional and international security.

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The Soviet Union is actively supporting the idea of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world, in particular in northern Europe and in the Balkans, in the Middle East and in Africa. It views favourably a proposal to create a zone free from battlefield nuclear weapons along the line separating NATO and the Warsaw Treaty.

We are advocating a speedy solution to the question of strengthening non-nuclear States security guarantees by way of concluding an international convention on this issue, and implementation of General Assembly resolutions calling to refrain from building up nuclear weapons on foreign territories and improving them qualitatively. It is high time to begin negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.

In order to multiply efforts aimed at averting nuclear war as well as at solving other arms limitation questions we think it necessary to intensify the work at the Geneva multilateral disarmament forum. We would like to express the hope that the transformation of the Committee into the Conference on Disarmament would not only change the name but also the state of affairs. It is time to move from endless procedural debates to substantive negotiations on problems which are known to require an early solution.

Reaffirming its previous proposals and putting forward new ones the Soviet Union declares its readiness to act together with all countries irrespective of their socio-political systems, together with all those advocating the strengthening of peace and international security.

The calendar of historic dates also reminds^{US} that this is both necessary and possible. This October marks the 40th anniversary of the Moscow meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the US

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and Britain which in the face of a threat of fascist barbarism decided in principle to create an international organization for the maintenance of international peace and security. It was based on the principle of joint actions in the name of peace by States with different social systems. Abiding by that principle the States of the anti-Hitler coalition were victorious in World War II. That principle has withstood the test of time: today its implementation is no less relevant than it was 40 years ago, because once again humanity must see to it that reason triumphs over barbarism, this time over the barbarism of nuclear maniacs.

Humanity has not lost, nor can it lose reason. This is forcefully demonstrated by the upsurge of the anti-missile and anti-war movement in Europe and on other continents, made up of people of various social, political and religious affiliations. In this context I would especially like to emphasize the importance of decisions of the World Assembly for Peace and Life, Against Nuclear War, held in Prague last June, the very name of which reflects the main demands of peace-loving public opinion. Today as never before it is imperative for all peoples and for every human being to realize the impending menace in order to pool their efforts in the struggle for their survival. The United Nations is also called upon to promote this objective.

It has taken a long time for humanity to evolve. It may take an instant to exterminate it. Today history does not offer much time to a search for solutions. We must choose the most effective of them without delay. The USSR proposals on that score have been set forth. Undoubtedly, we are prepared to consider without prejudice any other proposals aimed at overcoming the nuclear threat. What is needed now is action, an exercise of political will on the part of all States. As for the Soviet Union, it will not be found wanting. The Soviet Union has always been and will continue to be a resolute and consistent fighter for the prevention of nuclear catastrophe, for world peace, detente and disarmament. We are willing to do everything in our power and we expect other States to act likewise.

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Agenda items 62 and 66

GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Letter dated 28 October 1983 from the Permanent Representative of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you the attached text of the replies by Y. V. Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, to questions from the newspaper Pravda.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this text to be circulated as an official document of the United Nations General Assembly under agenda items 62 (General and complete disarmament) and 66 (Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security) of the thirty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

O. TROYANOVSKY

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Annex

Y. V. ANDROPOV'S ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FROM THE NEWSPAPER PRAVDA

QUESTION: What is the situation regarding the Soviet-American talks in Geneva on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe? Is there any progress whatsoever there?

ANSWER: Unfortunately, there is no advance in the direction of an understanding at the talks. The impasse continues there. The reason for this, I believe, is now clear even to the most devoted allies of the United States and it is only bloc loyalty that prevents them from admitting this openly.

In the two years of negotiations, the Soviet Union has convincingly demonstrated that it is ready to accept bold solutions for the sake of averting the nuclear danger from Europe and strengthening security on our continent and in the whole world. The proposals made by us provide for a wide range of possible measures: from substantial reductions of medium-range nuclear weapons to total liquidation of both tactical and medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. They contain all the necessary elements for a mutually acceptable understanding that does not damage anybody's interests - those of the USSR and its allies, or those of the United States or the Western European States.

Numerous statements have been made lately in Washington to the effect that the United States also wants agreement and that it has started displaying greater flexibility at the talks. We have made a thorough analysis of all these statements and of what is being said by the American delegation in Geneva. It turns out that the American flexibility does not go further than words. As to the essence of the United States line, it remains unchanged: to procure for itself a considerable military superiority over the USSR by deploying new American missiles in Europe.

It is, of course, impossible to count on progress at the talks as long as the United States keeps to its unrealistic, one-sided position according to which the USSR would have to reduce its medium-range nuclear arms while the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty allies would build them up.

QUESTION: Have all possibilities of reaching an understanding been exhausted?

ANSWER: This depends first of all on the United States, on whether it is prepared to switch to a business-like discussion. As to the Soviet Union, it is not giving up the search for an understanding until the United States makes that impossible by its actions.

We have displayed and are displaying flexibility in finding concrete solutions while observing one imperative requirement: the balance of forces in Europe as regards medium-range nuclear arms must not be disrupted. The level of these arms on both sides can and must be radically lowered, but in such a manner as to leave the ratio of forces between them unchanged.

This means, firstly, that new American missiles should not be deployed in Europe, because this would sharply alter the entire military strategic situation to the advantage of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secondly, account should be taken on both sides of all the nuclear weapons of the corresponding range without any exclusions whatsoever.

We shall not retreat from this just demand. But within the framework of this principled approach we are, I repeat, displaying flexibility and constructiveness. Today, too, I can speak of some of our additional steps in this respect.

First. The Soviet Union, as is well known, has expressed readiness to reach agreement on the reduction of medium-range nuclear arms in Europe to the same levels for both sides as regards both delivery vehicles (missiles and aircraft) and the warheads carried by them. Some people query: what will the Soviet Union do if, in order to ensure equality in the number of warheads in the possession of the USSR, on the one side, and the United Kingdom and France, on the other side, it is compelled to have a smaller number of missile launchers than NATO already has?

Well, we are prepared for this too. We are not deterred by the fact that, with such an approach and having in mind the present number of warheads on British and French missiles, the USSR could have in Europe about 140 SS-20 launchers, that is noticeably less than the number of medium-range missile launchers in the possession of the United Kingdom and France.

Second. Not so long ago it was stated by us that, in the event of the attainment of a mutually acceptable agreement, including the renunciation by the United States of the deployment of missiles in Europe, the Soviet Union would liquidate all its missiles to be reduced in the European zone instead of redeploying them in the East. And again there are queries: could it happen that, parallel to the liquidation of missiles in the European part of the Soviet Union, there would be a build-up of such missiles in its eastern areas and they could then be moved from the East to the West?

There are no grounds at all for such apprehensions. But, to remove all doubts on this score altogether, I can explicitly say: there will be no redeployment of Soviet missiles from East to West; in the event of the attainment of an agreement on the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe and its entry into force, from that moment an end will be put also to the deployment of SS-20 missiles in the eastern areas of the USSR. And we will firmly proceed on this basis, provided that no substantial changes take place in the strategic situation in the Asian region. This means, first of all, that the United States will not deploy new medium-range nuclear weapons in areas from which they could reach the eastern part of the territory of the USSR.

Third. It is sometimes alleged that our proposal that after the reductions each side should retain not more than 300 medium-range nuclear delivery vehicles greatly cuts down the number of United States aircraft of that range.

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It is not our intention to squeeze the United States, although for the sake of fairness it should be noted that Soviet medium-range aircraft are not based in other countries from which they could reach the territory of the United States.

But here too we are prepared to show additional flexibility: to establish for the USSR and NATO equal total levels of medium-range delivery aircraft in a mutually acceptable quantitative series, even if substantially different from what we proposed earlier. The concrete figures for these levels could be agreed upon as could the composition of the delivery aircraft subject to limitation.

There is a way out of the impasse in which the Geneva talks have got themselves. It is only necessary to make use of it. If the United States were to show a genuine desire to reach mutually acceptable accord, not much time would be required to work out the agreement.

QUESTION: Some people in the West suggest that as a gesture of goodwill the Soviet Union could already now proceed to a unilateral reduction of its missiles in Europe. What can you say to that?

ANSWER: Yes, we are aware of such appeals. Sometimes they come also from people who are genuinely concerned about the preservation of peace in Europe.

We are not found wanting when it comes to goodwill. On our part, there has been no shortage of steps, including unilateral ones, aimed at creating the most favourable atmosphere possible for the attainment of success at the talks.

I will remind you that a year and a half ago the USSR introduced a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in its European part. And in spite of all kinds of slander that moratorium is being unflinchingly observed. The further deployment of missiles was halted also beyond the Urals, in areas from which they could reach West European countries.

Moreover, during the time the talks have been held, the Soviet Union has retired tens of its medium-range missiles in Europe. By now all the SS-5 missiles previously deployed in the European zone, which, incidentally, had a no lesser range than the SS-20s while exceeding them greatly in yield of warhead, have been withdrawn from our military arsenal.

Those who call on the USSR to reduce unilaterally the number of its medium-range missiles are perhaps unaware of the fact that actually we are already doing so. Both the Government of the United States and the Governments of other NATO countries are of course well informed of the real state of affairs. However, they are concealing the truth from their peoples and deceiving them.

Meanwhile Washington is stubbornly pursuing the aim of proceeding in the very near future to the deployment of its Pershing and cruise missiles in Western Europe. There is nothing to indicate that the United States would be prepared to forgo such deployment if the Soviet Union continued to reduce unilaterally its missiles even further. On the contrary, everything points to the opposite. For this reason the

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Soviet Union, naturally, cannot and will not risk its security and that of its allies.

It would be another matter if the United States renounced the stationing of its missiles in Europe within the announced deadlines and thereby offered the possibility for continuing the talks and the search for mutually acceptable solutions. In that event we could proceed even now to the reduction of our SS-4 missiles (and we have more than 200 of them) and complete their elimination in the course of 1984-1985. And if it proved possible to conclude an agreement in Geneva on a fair basis, as we have repeatedly said a significant part of the presently existing SS-20 missiles would, of course, also be eliminated.

QUESTION: Statements are being made in Western capitals that with the commencement of the deployment of the United States missiles the talks supposedly will get a new impulse and become more productive. How are such statements to be assessed?

ANSWER: This is an utter deception designed to stifle the intensity of the struggle by the West European peoples against the appearance of United States nuclear missiles in Europe.

Everything must be totally clear here: the appearance of new United States missiles in Western Europe will make a continuation of the present talks in Geneva impossible. On the other hand, the Geneva talks can be continued if the United States does not proceed to the actual stationing of the missiles.

June 1983

USSR nuclear arms control and disarmament initiatives/negotiating positions
in the United Nations and Committee on Disarmament

<u>Item/Issue</u>	<u>Soviet Position</u>	<u>Canadian Position</u>
<u>Approach to nuclear disarmament</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Spelled out in Document CD/4 of February 1, 1979 which lumps together for negotiation all aspects of nuclear weapons. - In the CD fully supports NNA calls for "the establishment of an ad hoc working group....for negotiations on nuclear disarmament within the Committee, including the elaboration of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in Paragraph 50 of the UNSSOD I Final Document...." 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Soviet approach is not practical. It lacks the precision of a realistic sequence of building security on the basis of controlling and reducing nuclear arms (such as the policy of stabilization enunciated by the Prime Minister at UNSSOD II). - We <u>do not support</u> the establishment of such a working group. Our position is that it is not necessary to re-negotiate Paragraph 50 of the UNSSOD I Final Document. The role of the CD is to negotiate <u>specific</u> agreements of a multilateral nature and not to redraft the paragraphs of the Final Document devoted to the question of nuclear disarmament.
<u>Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - At UNGA 37, the USSR tabled a resolution on CTB which called for a <u>moratorium</u> on nuclear testing, pending the realization of a CTBT. - The resolution's annex on "<u>Basic Provisions of a Treaty on the Complete and General Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons Tests</u>" has been tabled in the CD as a working document. This paper (an update of a Soviet 1975 draft treaty text) represents the USSR's own particular interpretation of the Trilateral Report (Document CD/130 of July 30, 1980). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Canada has <u>opposed</u> the various proposals for a <u>moratorium</u>. A moratorium would not be verifiable, would not place any legal obligations on any party, and could be dissolved at will. It could also result in the suspension of serious negotiations for a test ban treaty. - The Soviet paper is <u>not very helpful</u>. It glosses over or ignores the really complex verification issues, minimizes the importance of reaching an agreement in the trilateral negotiations (recessed in November 1980) and unrealistically implies that a CTBT can be completely negotiated multilaterally without prior agreement among the UK/USA/USSR on the key elements of a treaty.

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<u>Item/Issue</u>	<u>Soviet Position</u>	<u>Canadian Position</u>
- <u>CTBT (contd)</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- The annex reflects the Soviet approach to the work of the <u>Seismic Experts Group</u> in the CD. On the key question (unresolved in the Trilateral or in the Seismic Experts Group) of what the international seismic data centres will be expected to do under a CTBT, the USSR continues to insist that the centres would only "<u>process seismic data without interpreting the nature of the seismic events</u>".- Since April 1982, when a Nuclear Test Ban (NTB) Working Group was formed in the CD with a mandate to initially focus on verification and compliance issues, the Soviet Union has been trying to <u>broaden the mandate</u> and urging the undertaking of <u>early negotiations</u> in the working group on a treaty text.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Canada is working towards the development of the International Seismic Data Exchange (ISDE) as a full-fledged <u>international verification system</u> for an eventual CTBT. This will require the routine rapid transfer of <u>Level II (waveform) data required for "interpreting the nature of seismic events"</u>.- In the CD on February 18, 1982 Canada proposed a <u>step-by-step</u> approach towards a CTBT. Consistent with that approach we believe that the NTB Working Group should proceed on the basis of its <u>existing mandate</u>, the terms of which have yet to be fulfilled. <u>Negotiations</u> on a treaty text are premature.
- <u>Ban on production of fissionable material for weapons purposes</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Should be included for negotiation along with other measures (i.e., per CD/4).	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Should be negotiated as a separate verifiable agreement, at an appropriate stage of the work of the CD.
- <u>Freeze on nuclear weapons</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- As a first step towards the reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals, NWS should "agree on a simultaneous suspension (freezing) of the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, and also of the production of fissionable material for the purposes of manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons".	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- Soviet (and some other) freeze proposals are not acceptable because: (1) they do not call for the negotiation of separate agreements; (2) an immediate global freeze would have the disadvantage of acting as a disincentive to negotiations on reduction of existing arsenals; (3) accepting a freeze without verification would mean that compliance would be virtually impossible to ascertain; (4) we consider it essential, through the INF and START negotiations, to seek to establish a balance at the lowest possible level of weaponry and then institute a freeze at that reduced level.

<u>Item/Issue</u>	<u>Soviet Position</u>	<u>Canadian Position</u>
- Declarations that the <u>first use of nuclear weapons</u> would be a violation of the UN Charter and a crime against humanity.	- At UNSSOD II the USSR made a unilateral pledge on non-first-use of nuclear weapons (thus joining China which did so at the time of UNSSOD I).	- Canada has not supported the various proposals on non-first-use of nuclear weapons because: (1) Article 2.4 of the UN Charter already requires that Member States not resort to use of force against other states except in self-defence in conformity with Article 51; (2) Canada is a member of NATO whose defence strategy envisages the possibility of using nuclear weapons first under certain circumstances, as it is based upon a flexible and balanced range of appropriate responses, conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression.
- <u>Non-stationing of nuclear weapons</u> on the territories of states where there are no such weapons at present.	- Since UNSSOD I the USSR and its allies have been calling for an international agreement on non-stationing and since 1980 for a separate working group on this subject in the CD.	- Canada has not supported the non-stationing proposal for the following reasons: (1) it is clearly designed to undermine NATO cohesion and solidarity; (2) it is meant to encourage members of NATO to renounce the option of accepting nuclear weapons even in time of crisis; (3) it would make it impossible for NATO to station weapons on the territory of any new members; (4) it purports to limit the sovereign right of self-defence.
Negative Security Assurances (NSA): Effective international arrangements to assure NNWS against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. At the time of UNSSOD I, all five NWS made unilateral	- The Soviet pledge covers states "which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no <u>nuclear weapons on their territory or under their jurisdiction or control</u> ". - The USSR has continued to insist that its own assurance, including the <u>non-stationing provision</u> , serve as the model for an international <u>convention</u> on the subject.	- Canada supports the USA/UK pledges which cover states parties to the NPT or comparable non-proliferation commitment, except in the case of an attack on them or their allies by such a state in association with a nuclear weapon state. - While not supporting the Soviet approach, Canada, consistent with its non-proliferation objectives, has supported the Pakistani approach to this issue which is more objective and balanced in that it recognizes possible legally-binding mechanisms other than a convention. At this point in time,

<u>Item/Issue</u>	<u>Soviet Position</u>	<u>Canadian Position</u>
- <u>NSA (contd)</u> pledges. Since 1979 an NSA Working Group in the CD has been trying to formulate a <u>single common assurance and serious disagreements</u> remain on both the substance and form of a possible common approach.		it is highly unlikely that a convention could be concluded, unless the USSR agrees to amend its assurance (i.e., remove non-stationing) to bring it more in line with those of the USA, UK and France. The new French assurance (announced at UNSSOD II, brings the French position in line with those of the UK and USA) and efforts in the CD to resolve the problem of the search for a "common formula" on NSA by the device of a Security Council resolution, suggest that there might be an opportunity in the CD to make some progress.
- <u>Prohibition of the Nuclear Neutron Weapon</u>	- Since the time of UNSSOD I, the USSR has been calling for negotiations in the CD "in an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a <u>convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons</u> ".	- Since the <u>ERW</u> (enhanced radiation weapon) is only one particular type of nuclear weapon, it should be considered in negotiations on limitations and reductions of nuclear arms. There is <u>no</u> good reason for giving it special treatment or for making special provisions with respect to it in treaty form.
- <u>Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) in Europe</u>	- The WPO Prague Declaration of January 5, 1983 stated as follows: "The States represented at the meeting speak in favour of proposals to establish NWFZ in the North of Europe, in the Balkans and in other parts of the continent, and to turn the Mediterranean into a Zone of Peace and cooperation. They advocate appropriate talks on these questions."	- The objective of any arms control and disarmament initiative, including the concept of a NWFZ, is to enhance <u>security</u> . Consistent with its <u>non-proliferation objectives</u> , Canada has been <u>sympathetic, in principle</u> , to the concept of NWFZ where they are feasible in the sense of commanding support of countries in the area and where they would promote regional and international <u>stability</u> . The various proposals for European NWFZ which have been put forward in the last 25 years or so have invariably <u>failed to meet the test</u> .



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Information

M.F.

28 November 1983

IMMEDIATE RELEASE

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S
PEACE INITIATIVE AT THE
COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
NEW DELHI
NOVEMBER 22-27, 1983

28-6-1-Trudeau
Peace
Mission

As part of his ongoing peace initiative, Prime Minister Trudeau urged the Commonwealth Heads of Government at their meeting in New Delhi last week to support his plea for a genuine political dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Attached is the text of the Commonwealth statement, the first formal communication to come out of the week long meeting, which said the Conference welcomed the call of Prime Minister Trudeau. "We support his efforts to restore active political contact and communication among all the nuclear weapon powers," the statement said, "and are willing to help these and other such efforts in all appropriate ways."

Mr. Trudeau arrived in Peking today to continue his peace mission which so far has taken him to six European capitals, Tokyo and New Delhi.

The Commonwealth G.O.A. Declaration on International Security

As we meet together in India at the end of 1983, representing a quarter of the world's people, from every continent and many regions, we have shared both our concerns and our hopes for international security. Despite differences of approach which affect the way we analyse and judge events, it is our perception that relationships between the world major military alliances are in danger of becoming more confrontational. In the context of heightened tensions and the continuing build up of nuclear arsenals, the future of civilisation as we know it, could be threatened. None of our countries or peoples would be insulated from that fate. We are alarmed by increasing disregard for the moral and legal principles which should govern the conduct of states, by the degree to which the ethic of peaceful settlement of disputes is being eroded and by the readiness of nations to resort to the illegal use of force. At this time of crisis, we believe it to be imperative that the Soviet Union and the United States should summon up the political vision of a world in which their nations can live in peace. Their first objective must be to work for the resumption of a genuine political dialogue between themselves leading to the relaxation of tensions. We believe that Commonwealth governments can make a practical contribution in encouraging them to do so and in promoting a larger measure of international understanding than now exists. Essential to that enlargement of understanding is the need to increase contacts at a variety of levels between the governments and the peoples of the East and the West. A concerted effort is required to restore constructive dialogue to the conduct of East-West relations.

Only thus, can a climate of confidence be rebuilt in place of the prevailing one of fear and mistrust. In all these pursuits, we emphasize the supreme importance of political will. We, therefore, welcome Prime Minister Trudeau's call for a new political dimension in the quest for international security. We support his efforts to restore active political contact and communications among all the nuclear weapon powers and are willing to help these and other such efforts in all appropriate ways. As Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has so consistently emphasized, the central issue in securing wider progress on disarmament is the stopping of the nuclear arms race. These are the essential steps for progress and working towards the world's relief from the menace of nuclear weapons and their wider spread. If the resources released by disarmament were ploughed back in some measure into world development, the needs of the developing countries, which are in the forefront of our concern could be significantly met. We are concerned also over the diminishing capacity of international institutions. They play an effective role in world affairs. Rejecting that negative trend, we pledge our renewed support for the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter. There is, in our view, an urgent need to consider what practical steps can be taken to strengthen the United Nations system and to improve its capacity to fulfil the objectives of the Charter. We are particularly concerned at the vulnerability of small states to external attacks and interference in their affairs. These

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
countries are members of the international community which must respect their independence and at the very least have a moral obligation to provide effectively for their territorial integrity. We have separately agreed on an urgent study of these issues. Additionally, however, we will play our part in helping the international community to make an appropriate response to the United Nations Secretary General's call for strengthening of collective security in keeping with the Charter. Meeting here in India, we cannot emphasize too strongly our belief that the ethic of non-violence must be at the heart of all efforts to ensure peace and harmony in the world. That ethic requires close adherence to the principles of peaceful settlement. Only by such a commitment on all sides will the world's people enjoy an environment of true international security. Finally, we retain faith in human capacity to overcome the dangers and difficulties that threaten the world, and to secure for all its peoples the prospects of a more peaceful international environment. We shall work together to fulfil that faith.

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CONFIDENTIAL

November 28, 1983

IDDZ-0220



Memorandum for the Acting Secretary
of State for External Affairs.

PM Initiative on East-West Relations
and International Security

As requested, we attach some brief notes on this subject for your appearance before the standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, on November 29.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "L.A. Delvoie".

L.A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

cc: DMF/Mr. Marchand
DMT/Mr. Johnstone

NOTES ON PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE ON
EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Purpose and Proposals

The Prime Minister's principal purpose is to arrest and reverse the downward trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce the international tensions and risks of confrontation to which this trend has given rise.

The Prime Minister's chief proposal relates to the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the superpowers; to create a political framework for ongoing sectoral or technical negotiations between the two sides.

Subsidiary to this is a series of proposals in the field of arms control and disarmament which have substantive merit in themselves, and which, if they permitted sectoral progress, would contribute to improving the general climate in East-West relations:

- (a) A comprehensive approach to the limitation and then the reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals by means of a conference of the five nuclear weapons states (USA, USSR, UK, France, China).
- (b) A concerted endeavour at the political level to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and especially to increase the number of states adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty prior to the NPT Review Conference in 1985.

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- (c) A substantive Western response to the proposals put forward earlier this year by the East in the MBFR negotiations, and the injection of political momentum into these negotiations by means of a Foreign Ministers meeting in Vienna to coincide roughly with the tabling of a new Western proposal.
- (d) The inauguration of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) at senior political level in order to give this important conference political impetus at the outset (complementarity of military confidence building and political confidence building).

Although not integral to his initiative as pursued personally with other governments, the Prime Minister has also put forward publicly proposals relating to:

- (a) the mobility of ICBMs
- (b) high altitude anti-satellite systems
- (c) the verification of new weapons systems by national technical means

Programme

The Prime Minister's public programme has so far involved giving speeches in Guelph (October 27) and Montreal (November 13). His diplomatic and/or private programme has included:

- (a) letters to all NATO heads of government (October 22-25).

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- (b) letters to Soviet and Chinese leaders (early November).
- (c) meetings with President Mitterrand of France, Chancellor Kohl of the FRG, PM Lubbers and Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands, PM Martens of Belgium, HH the Pope, PM Craxi of Italy, PM Thatcher of the UK, PM Nakasone of Japan, President Kaunda of Zambia, General Ershad of Bangladesh, Commonwealth Heads of Government in New Delhi, Premier Zhao of China.
- (d) private meetings with Robert McNamara, General Rogers (SACEUR), George Kennan, General Brent Scowcroft, members of the Harvard Nuclear Study Group, Georgi Arbatov.
- (e) further letters to all NATO heads of government (November 17-18).
- (f) telephone conversation with President Reagan (November 17).
- (g) letters to PM Hawke and PM Muldoon (November 18).
- (h) the dispatch of a personal emissary (Geoffrey Pearson) to Moscow and Peking (November 21-27).
- (i) participation in Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) and furthering initiative in that forum.
- (j) DPM/SSEA to propose at the NATO Foreign Minister's meeting in Brussels on December 8:
 - (a) that all NATO members will be represented at a high political level at the inaugural meeting of the Stockholm conference on January 17; and

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- (b) that NATO will respond to the latest Eastern proposals on MBFR early in the new year and will be prepared to follow-up its response with a meeting in Vienna at the Foreign Minister level.

Next Steps

Visits by the PM to Washington and Moscow are being considered. We hope that a meeting with President Reagan can be arranged soon; the PM's personal emissary will be briefing him on the prospects for a visit to Moscow.

Reactions

The reactions of governments which have so far given an indication of their thinking about the PM's initiative may be very roughly summarized as follows:

- USA : Generally supportive of broad purpose, but serious reservations about some specific proposals
- France : Positive and generally supportive, with reservations as to timing
- FRG : Positive and generally supportive
- Belgium : Very positive, with some reservations as to timing
- Holland : Very positive, with some reservations as to timing
- Italy : Generally supportive, but no very well-defined reaction

- 5 -

UK : Generally supportive of broad purpose, but
reservations about some specific proposals

Norway : Very positive and fully supportive

Spain : Very positive

Denmark : Very positive and fully supportive

Japan : Very positive and fully supportive

USSR : Interested and cautiously positive

PRC : Mildly supportive of broad political purpose, but
with reservations on specific proposals

CHOGM : Commonwealth leaders specifically endorsed the Prime
Minister's initiative in the Goa Declaration on International
Security: "We... welcome Prime Minister Trudeau's call for a new
political dimension in the quest for international security. We
support his efforts to restore active political contact and
communications among all the nuclear weapon powers and are willing
to help these and other such efforts in all appropriate ways."

Canadian Public Opinion, to judge by CBC Radio's
"Cross Country Check-Up" and letters to the editor, is very much in
favour of the initiative.



MESSAGE

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Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

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---PM INITIATIVE

GRATEFUL FOR REPORTS ON CHOGM AND PEKIN VISIT AS ACTING SSEA
REAGAN APPEARS BEFORE SCEAND 29 1530 AND HAS ASKED FOR UP-DATE ON
PM INITIATIVE.

28-6-1-Tudor Peace Mission

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28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
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MF

SCRUM GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER FOLLOWING A MEETING WITH ZHAO ZIYANG, PREMIER OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF CHINA, PEKING, NOVEMBER 28, 1983

TRANSCRIPTION D'UNE ENTREVUE SUR LE VIF ACCORDÉE PAR LE PREMIER MINISTRE À LA SUITE D'UNE RENCONTRE AVEC M. ZHAO ZIYANG, PREMIER MINISTRE DE LA REPUBLIQUE POPULAIRE CHINOISE LE 28 NOVEMBRE 1983.

Mr. Trudeau: Well, I feel very encouraged from my working session with Premier Ziyang and he was quite encouraging in my efforts to seek greater political participation in the peace effort. He was curious as to the discussion I had in Europe with my counterparts and indeed with the results obtained in Goa in our declaration on international security. He asked me questions about those aspects and as a general conclusion I feel that by the interest he showed, by the time he took, by the fact that he received me at such short notice, and by his words, the Premier is supportive of the effort to politicize the issue and to inject new political energy into the search for peace between East and West, particularly.

Je sors très encouragé de cette rencontre avec le Premier ministre Ziyang, il s'est montré très intéressé au récit de mes négociations avec les autres chefs européens, également aux progrès qui étaient faits et en Inde où nous nous sommes mis d'accord sur une déclaration pour la recherche de la sécurité. Beaucoup dans le sens de mon initiative, c'est-à-dire l'importance de politiser la question, de réintroduire un dialogue entre les participants, particulièrement entre les deux super-grands, afin que nous débloquions un peu cette poursuite vers la paix.

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- 2 -

That's about the general impressions.

Q. Est-ce que vous lui avez soumis M. le Premier ministre, l'idée d'un sommet des cinq puissances nucléaires et si oui, quelle a été sa réaction?

A. Sur le sommet des cinq puissances nucléaires sa réaction n'a pas été tellement différente de celle de la France et de la Grande-Bretagne. L'idée d'un sommet lui plaît et je ne veux pas entrer dans les détails de sa position. Il l'a explicitée aux Nations-Unies et d'ailleurs c'est pas à moi de parler pour lui, mais en gros l'idée lui plaît mais seulement comme une des éventualités possibles. Il voit comme le problème immédiat et le plus important de concentrer sur les deux super-grands, les deux super-puissances, et de mettre la pression sur eux pour qu'ils prennent des initiatives pour réduire leur arsenal nucléaire avant que nous envisagions une rencontre des cinq.

Q. Isn't that a wee bit discouraging, Prime Minister (inaudible)---?

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- 3 -

A. A wee bit discouraging? I guess it depends on the timing one has in mind. The Premier made quite clear that in his mind the important thing was to put pressure on the two super-powers, that was the first thing. And he didn't see the five power conference as useful immediately in a sense that it would divert attention from the need to put pressure on the super-powers. I pointed out to him, as I had to Margaret Thatcher and to President Mitterrand, that one of the ways of creating pressure would be to seek to establish principals around which a five power conference would be held. And I spelled out those principals before; that there not be a block to block negotiations; that each participant arrive at the table as a sovereign power; that I recognize that the arsenals of the super-powers was out of all proportions to those of the three other nuclear powers. So the real discussion is on timing: how soon and in what way do we achieve success in putting pressure on the super-powers. I keep feeling, even after my meeting with those three nuclear powers, that if we just wait for things to unlock in Geneva we might wait a long, long time. I ended the discussion with suggesting that the presence of a country like China in those discussions, at some point, would be beneficial because China is not seeking to have an arsenal which would be anywhere close to the super-powers, and China is a peace loving country. But there is as you put it, a difference in perception on the urgency of that five-power meeting.

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- 4 -

Q. Prime minister what about the Premier offering suggestions as to ways that he would like to put pressure on the two super-powers?

A. Yes, once again I don't want to elaborate too much on his own thoughts, but at the end of the meeting he said that it was very important to continue the political work that I was engaged upon and that we should get more and more nations to build up pressure on the super-powers and he alluded to his ideas that he expressed at the United Nations, that there might be a group of nations which could create that pressure. I do not want to elaborate on what he had in mind but it sounded to me as something not too different from what Kenneth Kaounda suggested and what was supported at the Commonwealth meeting that I'd be joined at some point in my efforts by a group of other nations to create that kind of political pressure.

Q. Did he mention any other nations?

A. No.

Q. And you're response to that proposal?

A. Well as I told President Kaounda and I didn't give any specific response here, I just accepted it as his suggestion. But when we were in discussion in New Delhi because it came up on the first day, I had to point out that at this stage I was acting as a member of an alliance, of the Atlantic alliance. And it would be unrealistic for me to try at this stage to meet with members of non-aligned nations such as President Kaounda was suggesting, to go to my fellow alliance leaders and suggest they do this or that.

.../5

I said that I thought, very well, after the first stage of my pilgrimage had been achieved, that indeed I think the effort could be taken up collectively by a larger group of nations. But that is something they are thinking about. And, I repeat, in a sense I think that my satisfaction is that the Commonwealth nations, some 46 of them, unanimously supported my efforts and said that they would be pleased to cooperate with them in some future way to be decided. But I think that is the first injection of political will in a massive sense when a quarter of the world's people represented at the Commonwealth are agreeing with the idea of taking political action. I did point that out to Premier Ziyang and I think it is indeed in a sense, the end of stage one, of whatever I had to do.

Q. Did (inaudible) spread any news about when exactly you would be going to Moscow, now or later?

A. I didn't raise that with him nor did he express views directly on that but he kept repeating as indeed some of my colleagues in Goa and in Delhi did, that we must not lose sight that it is the super-powers which are leading the arms race. In numerical terms that is absolutely self-evident; some 95 per cent of strategic weapons are in the hands of the super-powers and the other three only represent something like five. In that sense he didn't talk (inaudible) going to Moscow but he obviously feels that pressure should be put on Moscow and on Washington.

Q. Prime Minister, speaking about going to Moscow or Washington, is it worthwhile, and if so when?

A. It will depend in part on what sort of reactions I get from Moscow and from Washington; it will depend also on what success we have on the 8th of December when minister MacEachen brings to our NATO colleagues the proposals on Vienna and on Stockholm. I am not in

possession of an immediate invitation, I mean in a sense that there are no dates, on any visits to Moscow and Washington, but as you know I have been invited by President Reagan in his recent letter and I have been invited twice this year by Mr. Andropov to visit them. But as I said specifically in the latter case, I don't want to visit unless I feel that I can make some further steps and I would perhaps be in a better position to see that after the meeting in Brussels.

Q. Prime Minister, how did Premier Ziyang evaluate the Soviets build up on the side of Soviet border?

A. He didn't comment on that specifically.

Q. You mentioned that this was the end of the stage one, could you tell us what stage two might involve?

A. Well, as I indicated, I've seen the members of the alliance, many of them; I have written to them all. I've been at the Commonwealth. Now I suppose stage two might be to consider whether it is useful for me to go to Moscow or to Washington, and on that, as I say, I want further time to reflect.

Q. (inaudible) Prime minister did the Chinese explains their reluctance to sign the (inaudible)?

A. Yes their position is not too different from that of the many of the non-aligned in Goa. It is a well known position that there is some unfairness to the NPT, in the sense that it is asking the lot of us - all nations except five - to not achieve a nuclear armaments position; there's something unfair in that it denies our right to do so. But on the other hand everybody is afraid of

.../7

nuclear proliferation. So they say on the one hand, there is a sovereign right to do so, but on the other hand, they say it would be undesirable to do so. And Premier Ziyang made it quite clear that he did not encourage proliferation; that he would not support proliferation, but that he could not go on record as opposing it, which is pretty close to what some of the non-aligned nations have also said. Notwithstanding that, I got out of Goa, as you know, an agreement that we should take steps to prevent a wider spread of nuclear weapons.

So, people are torn between the principle of the sovereign right to do things and the factual undesirability of doing those things. And that is why some of them, even like Julius Nyerere who says: "I am never going to have a nuclear arm, and I don't want to proliferate, but I am not sure I want to say that I don't have a right to do so." And, of course, my approach to that has been to say, well, maybe there can be a bargain, and maybe you can say: you the non-aligned, particularly you, the Third World states that you will give up your sovereign right to proliferate if, and only if, the superpowers and the other three cease the arms race and begin reducing and use the fruits of that reduction to development in the Third World.

That is the kind of bargain I have left with them to (inaudible) in suggesting there will be another Commonwealth Conference two years from now and maybe there could be some thought of a conditional adherence to the NPT, the conditions being that the nuclear powers hold their end of the bargain first and begin to limit and then reduce. And then, that being the case, the non-nuclear powers would have greater incentives to go on record against proliferation.

TO/A
FROM/DE
REFERENCE
RÉFÉRENCE
SUBJECT
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FILE
FPR

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

CBC 0800 Nov 28 -
Prime Minister Trudeau's Peace Plan -
PEKING

Security/Sécurité
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Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
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Number/Numéro
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ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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CBC: The Prime Minister says he is encouraged by the first round of meetings with Chinese leaders to discuss his Peace Initiative. He met for 90 minutes with Premier Zhao Ziyang in Peking and he says Mr. Zhao is quite receptive to the peace plan. Mr. Trudeau hopes to get the same kind of support from other Chinese leaders as his talks continue. Our National Affairs reporter, Brian Kelleher, is travelling with the Prime Minister.

B.K.: Prime Minister Trudeau says he may indeed be at the end of Stage I of his Peace Initiative, but he is not ready to launch immediately into Stage II which would involve trips to Moscow and Washington. Mr. Trudeau flew into Peking just after dawn this morning, met with his peace emissaries Geoffrey Pearson and Gary Smith, who had arrived from Moscow and then drove down Peking's main street, the Avenue of Everlasting Peace to an hour and one half meeting with Premier Zhao Ziyang. Mr. Trudeau says the Chinese Premier encouraged him to continue his peace efforts but China is not ready at this time to agree to sign the nuclear non-proliferation treaty or to join in the five-nation nuclear disarmament conference suggested by Mr. Trudeau. China wants pressure put, instead, on the two super-powers to reduce their arsenals, but Mr. Trudeau is not ready to go immediately to either Moscow or Washington to apply that pressure personally.

P.E.T.: "It will depend, in part, on what further reactions I get from Moscow and Washington. It will depend, also, on what success we have on the 8th of December, when Foreign Minister MacEachen brings to our NATO colleagues the proposals on Vienna and on Stockholm".

B.K.: Vienna has negotiations to reduce conventional forces in Europe. Stockholm has a scheduled European Security Conference in January. Mr. Trudeau will not meet tomorrow with Deng Xiaoping, the Chairman of China's Advisory Council before returning to New Delhi to pick up his trip to the Persian Gulf. Brian Kelleher, CBC News, Peking.

D. Buckley-Jones
D. Buckley-Jones
Deputy Director
Media Relations Division

ACTION
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28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

MF

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FM WSHDC UNFC8109 28NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ ATNTA BOSTN BFALO CHCGO CLVND DALAS DTROT LNGLS
MNPLS NRLNS PHILA SFRAN SEATL CNGNY

---CHOGM AND PM INITIATIVE:GOA COMWEL DECLARATION ON INNATL
SECURITY

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF COMWEL DECLARATION ON INNATL SECURITY FROM
DELHI.THIS CAN BE PASSED TO MEDIA CONTACTS.

2.IN ADDITION, DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO POSITIVE ARTICLE ON PMS
ROLE IN GETTING THIS THROUGH IN 28NOV NYORK TIMES PAGE A-8.

3.PM, AS YOU MAY KNOW, HAS GONE TO PEKIN TO PURSUE INITIATIVE
AND WE WILL COMMUNICATE WITH YOU ANY RESULTS OF THAT MTG ASAP.

QUOTE FOLLOWING IS TEXT

---CHOGM AND PM INITIATIVE:GOA COMWEL DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY

CHOGM

NEW DELHI-1983

THE COMMONWEALTH GOA DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AS WE MEET TOGETHER IN INDIA AT THE END OF 1983, REPRESENTING
A QUARTER OF THE WORLDS PEOPLE, FROM EVERY CONTINENT AND MANY
REGIONS, WE HAVE SHARED BOTH OUR CONCERNS AND OUR HOPES FOR
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. DESPITE DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH WHICH
AFFECT THE WAY WE ANALYSE AND JUDGE EVENTS, IT IS OUR

...2

PAGE TWO UNFC8109 UNCLAS

PERCEPTION THAT RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE WORLD MAJOR MILITARY ALLIANCES ARE IN DANGER OF BECOMING MORE CONFRONTATIONAL. IN THE CONTEXT OF HEIGHTENED TENSIONS AND THE CONTINUING BUILD UP OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS, THE FUTURE OF CIVILISATION AS WE KNOW IT, COULD BE THREATENED. NONE OF OUR COUNTRIES OR PEOPLES WOULD BE INSULATED FROM THAT FATE. WE ARE ALARMED BY INCREASING DISREGARD FOR THE MORAL AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD GOVERN THE CONDUCT OF STATES, BY THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE ETHIC OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IS BEING ERODED AND BY THE READINESS OF NATIONS TO RESORT TO THE ILLEGAL USE OF FORCE. AT THIS TIME OF CRISIS, WE BELIEVE IT TO BE IMPERATIVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES SHOULD SUMMON UP THE POLITICAL VISION OF A WORLD IN WHICH THEIR NATIONS CAN LIVE IN PEACE. THEIR FIRST OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO WORK FOR THE RESUMPTION OF A GENUINE POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN THEMSELVES LEADING TO RELAXATION OF TENSIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENTS CAN MAKE A PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTION IN ENCOURAGING THEM TO DO SO AND IN PROMOTING A LARGER MEASURE OF INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING THAN NOW EXISTS. ESSENTIAL TO THAT ENLARGEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING IS THE NEED TO INCREASE CONTACTS AT A VARIETY OF LEVELS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS AND THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST AND THE WEST. A CONCERTED EFFORT IS REQUIRED TO RESOTRE

...3

PAGE THREE UNFC8109 UNCLAS

CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE TO THE CONDUCT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

ONLY THUS, CAN A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE BE REBUILT IN PLACE OF THE PREVAILING ONE OF FEAR AND MISTRUST. IN ALL THESE PURSUITS, WE EMPHASISE THE SUPREME IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL WILL.

WE, THEREFORE, WELCOME PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S CALL FOR A NEW POLITICAL DIMENSION IN THE QUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.

WE SUPPORT HIS EFFORTS TO RESTORE ACTIVE POLITICAL CONTACT AND COMMUNICATIONS AMONG ALL THE NUCLEAR WEAPON POWERS AND ARE WILLING TO HELP THESE AND OTHER SUCH EFFORTS IN ALL APPROPRIATE WAYS.

AS PRIME MINISTER INDIRA GANDHI HAS SO CONSISTENTLY EMPHASISED, THE CENTRAL ISSUE IN SECURING WIDER PROGRESS ON DISARMAMENT IN THE STOPPING OF THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. THESE ARE ESSENTIAL STEPS

FOR PROGRESS AND WORKING TOWARDS THE WORLD'S RELIEF FROM THE MENACE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEIR WIDER SPREAD. IF THE

RESOURCES RELEASED BY DISARMAMENT WERE PLOUGHED BACK IN SOME MEASURE INTO WORLD DEVELOPMENT, THE NEEDS OF THE DEVELOPING

COUNTRIES, WHICH ARE IN THE FOREFRONT OF OUR CONCERN COULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY MET. WE ARE CONCERNED ALSO OVER THE DIMINISHING

CAPACITY OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS. THEY PLAY AN EFFECTIVE ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS. REJECTING THAT NEGATIVE TREND, WE PLEDGE

OUR RENEWED SUPPORT FOR THE PRINCIPLES ENSHRINED IN THE

UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. THERE IS, IN OUR VIEWS, AN URGENT NEED

TO CONSIDER WHAT PRACTICAL STEPS CAN BE TAKEN TO STRENGTHEN THE

UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM AND TO IMPROVE ITS CAPACITY TO FULFIL

THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CHARTER. WE ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED

...4

PAGE FOUR UNFC8109 UNCLAS

AT THE VULNERABILITY OF SMALL STATES TO EXTERNAL ATTACKS AND INTERFERENCE IN THEIR AFFAIRS. THESE COUNTRIES ARE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WHICH MUST RESPECT THEIR INDEPENDENCE AND AT THE VERY LEAST HAVE A MORAL OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE EFFECTIVELY FOR THEIR TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. WE HAVE SEPARATELY AGREED ON AN URGENT STUDY OF THESE ISSUES. ADDITIONALLY, HOWEVER, WE WILL PLAY OUR PART IN HELPING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO MAKE AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY GENERALS CALL FOR STRENGTHENING OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN KEEPING WITH THE CHARTER. MEETING HERE IN INDIA, WE CANNOT/NOT EMPHASISE TOO STRONGLY OUR BELIEF THAT THE ETHIC OF NON-VIOLENCE MUST BE AT THE HEART OF ALL EFFORTS TO ENSURE PEACE AND HARMONY IN THE WORLD. THAT ETHIC REQUIRES CLOSE ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. ONLY BY SUCH A COMMITMENT ON ALL SIDES WILL THE WORLDS PEOPLE ENJOY AN ENVIRONMENT OF TRUE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. FINALLY, WE RETAIN FAITH IN HUMAN CAPACITY TO OVERCOME THE DANGERS AND DIFFICULTIES THAT THREATEN THE WORLD, AND TO SECURE FOR ALL ITS PEOPLE THE PROSPECTS OF A MORE PEACEFUL INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. WE SHALL WORK TOEGTHER TO FULFIL THAT FAITH.

UUU/230 281814Z UNFC8109

HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON.

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FAX LDN

MP
004/28

1/3

MESSAGE
1993 NOV 28

16:45

SUSPECTED DUPLICATE
EXISTENCE POSSIBLE D'UN DOUBLE

Mr. Gassage

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FM LDN XNGR 4214 28NOV83

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---PM INITIATIVE:BRITISH REACTION

ATTACHED ARE SELF-EXPLANATORY ARTICLES ON PRIME MINISTERS
INITIATIVE FROM MONDAY 28NOV GUARDIAN AND DAILY TELEGRAPH.

2.COMCENTRE PLS SEND BY FACSIMILE.

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
Mission

JR SCHRAM/mg

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370

J SCHRAM

000955

Trudeau out to end arms race deadlock

From Patrick Keefley,
in New Delhi

The Prime Minister of Canada, Mr. Trudeau, caused surprise during the final stages of the Commonwealth summit here by an abrupt and unscheduled departure for China, taking with him policy initiatives intended to help to break the present deadlock in negotiations between the nuclear powers.

As the mission was unanimously endorsed by the Commonwealth prime ministers and presidents meeting in what was called their "weekend retreat" at the coastal resort of Goa, it is clear that Mrs. Thatcher has been persuaded to swallow her

Italy rebuffs warning on missiles, page 5.

well-known reservations about the whole idea behind the Trudeau mission.

It is believed that the Commonwealth Secretary-General Mr. Shridath Ramphal, has blurred what is in fact a U-turn for Mrs. Thatcher by wrapping up the Trudeau plan in a three-page document entitled the Goa Declaration on International Security. The document praises the Thatcher plans for practical steps to re-open dialogue with the Warsaw Pact.

The Goa Declaration also re-

fers to a task force on "the vulnerability of small states" which is to make a study of immediate problems such as Cyprus and Grenada.

The Goa document embodies Mrs. Thatcher's sentiments when it refers to the build-up of nuclear arsenals and the urgency of resuming "genuine political dialogue," and goes on to say that it is essential to the enlargement of understanding that there should be increased contacts at a variety of levels between East and West.

The document calls upon the superpowers to resume discussions, declaring: "We believe it to be imperative that the Soviet Union and the United States should summon up the political vision of a world in which their nations can live in peace." It gives broad backing to Mr. Trudeau's plan to bring all five of the nuclear powers together for negotiations.

Mr. Trudeau will return to New Delhi several hours after the final ceremony, but in time to make a personal report on his mission to Mrs. Gandhi.

When Mr. Trudeau sits down with the Chinese leaders in Peking this afternoon, he will be arguing the merits of his proposal that China and the other four nuclear powers assemble at summit level to agree on a new approach to arms control negotiations.

m/3

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1983

135, FLEET STREET, LONDON, E.C.4.

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DAILY TELEGRAPH

GOA'S IVORY TOWER

MOST PEOPLE, invited to Goa for a weekend, would no doubt make much of the sea and the sand. It cannot be the ideal place for very rapid serious thinking. Needless to say, the Commonwealth leaders have spent the past few days there, if not exactly thinking, then putting the world to rights on a scale unprecedented even for them. Surrounded by expensive luxury, it must be very easy in such a place to forget the limits of one's powers and to issue Caesarean exhortations to the world.

There is no obvious harm in urging Russia and America to resume "a genuine political dialogue." This declaration will no doubt have plunged men in Moscow and Washington into a mood of deep self-recrimination. It was ludicrously described by British sources as "a major achievement," and is seen as something of a triumph for that master practitioner of summitry, Mr TRUDEAU, who has sheered off to Peking for a couple of days. Equally, one does not suppose that much damage will be caused by the setting up of a Commonwealth group which will try to solve the crisis in Cyprus. The leaders of Australia, Guyana, India, Nigeria and Zambia will address themselves to this problem. Can they honestly expect to succeed? Other than their membership of the Commonwealth, these five countries have nothing whatsoever in common with Cyprus, and their leaders have the least possible chance imaginable of reversing the *status quo*.

Such, of course, is the stuff of many summits where meaningless communiqués must be ritually produced. The difference is that as a group the Commonwealth has no power (having no proper unity) and its declarations are consequently more than usually empty. This fact must surely be perceived by the rest of the world. One wonders, therefore, whether Britain's interests are best served by identifying ourselves with lofty projects which the Commonwealth is in no position to prosecute. The Commonwealth is a legacy of Empire and a *folie de grandeur* in which Britain, the old mother country, can apparently reassume something of her old swagger. The paradox is that we are probably taken more seriously when we speak alone, or in conjunction with united and properly powerful voices, than when we wrap ourselves in Commonwealth accommodations. If a weekend in Goa has taught Mrs THATCHER that, it would have served its purpose.

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MWZ
[Signature]

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR4180 28NOV83

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

TO EXTOTT IDAN IDDZ

INFO WSHDC BNATO VMBFR LDN PARIS BGRAD BUCST BPEST WSAW

PRGUE NDRQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD PCOOT/FOWLER

DISTR IFB RGB RBR RCD RSR UGB URR IDD IDA IDRA ZSI

---MTG WITH GEORGIY ARBATOV

ARBATOV RECEIVED ME 24NOV83 AFTER HIS RETURN FROM TOKYO AND CONVERSATION WITH PM (PEKING TEL WJGR0865 21NOV). ALTHOUGH I SPENT INTERESTING HOUR WITH HIM I WILL NOT/NOT REPORT CONVERSATION BECAUSE IT COVERED GROUND FAMILIAR TO MOST OF US FROM MY PREDECESSORS TELS. HOWEVER, HE MADE ONE POINT NEW TO ME. LIKE YAKOVLEV WHEN I MET HIM (OURTEL XYGR4125 14NOV) AND KORNIENKO IN HIS CONVERSATION WITH PEARSON (OURTEL XYGR2176 26NOV), ARBATOV WENT ON AT SOME LENGTH ABOUT DESTABILIZING CHARACTER OF PERSHING 2. IT WAS FIRST-STRIKE WEAPON; DEPLOYMENT OF IT WAS NOT/NOT DETERRENCE, IT WAS PREPARATION FOR WAR. I SAID I DID NOT/NOT SEE HOW PERSHING COULD BE FIRST-STRIKE WEAPON WHILE SOVS RETAINED SUBMARINE BASED DETERRENT. MOREOVER, I SAID I UNDERSTOOD PERSHING COULD NOT/NOT REACH MOSCOW FROM BASES IN FRG. ARBATOV CONCEDED THE SUBMARINE POINT, ADDING ONLY THAT POSSIBILITY EXISTED OF WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT WHICH WOULD NEUTRALIZE SEA-BASED MISSILES. HOWEVER I WAS, HE SAID, WRONG ABOUT RANGE OF PERSHING. WHEN HE HAD FIRST HEARD USA CONTENTION THAT PERSHING COULD NOT/NOT REACH MOSCOW, HE HAD PHONED OGARKOV (SOV CHIEF OF GEN STAFF) TO KNOW TRUTH. OGARKOV SAID PERSHING HAD BEEN TESTED OVER DISTANCES

...2

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE TWO XYGR4180 CONF

WHICH WOULD CARRY IT WELL BEYOND MOSCOW FROM PLANNED BASES.
PERHAPS USA INTENDED NOT/NOT TO FUEL IT COMPLETELY.BUT HOW
WERE SOVS TO VERIFY THAT?

2.I SHOULD REPORT ALSO,ALTHOUGH THIS NOW OVERTAKEN BY MORE
AUTHORITATIVE INFO,THAT ARBATOV TOLD ME THAT WHEN HE RETURNED
FROM TOKYO HE HAD QUOTE PHONED A COUPLE OF PEOPLE UNQUOTE ABOUT
PROSPECTS OF PM VISIT.HE HAD IMPRESSION THAT PM WOULD BE RECEIVED.
IF HE WANTED TO COME,QUOTE IN SECOND HALF OF DEC UNQUOTE.THIS
MAY STILL TURN OUT TO BE TRUE,BUT FINAL(AND LESS PRECISE)WORD
CAME FROM GROMYKO(OURTEL XYGR9907 25NOV83.

3.ARBATOV SUGGESTED THAT WE MEET FROM TIME TO TIME,CONTINUING
A LONG RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HIS INSTITUTE AND CDN AMBS.

CCC/095 281402Z XYGR4180

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
mission

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FM EXTOTT FPR1131 28NOV83

TO PEKIN/PMDEL DELHI/PMDEL DELIVER BY 290900

INFO BNATO WSHDC CNGNY PRMNY MOSCO BRU BREEC LDN PARIS BONN ROME

TOKYO GENEV NDHQOTT/ADM/POL/DG PCOOTT PMOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR IDDZ UGB RBR URR IDR IDA IDD ZSI

--PM TRUDEAU PEACE PLAN:PEKIN AND CDA AM INTERVIEW WITH B NELSON

QUOTE:CBC 0800 NOV28-PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAUS PEACE PLAN-PEKIN

CBC:THE PRIME MINISTER SAYS HE IS ENCOURAGED BY THE FIRST ROUND OF MEETINGS WITH CHINESE LEADERS TO DISCUSS HIS PEACE INITIATIVE.HE MET FOR 90 MINUTES WITH PREMIER ZHAO ZIVANG OF PEKIN AND HE SAYS MR ZHAO IS QUITE RECEPTIVE TO THE PEACE PLAN.MR TRUDEAU HOPES TO GET THE SAME KIND OF SUPPORT FROM OTHER CHINESE LEADERS AS HIS TALKS CONTINUE.OUR NATIONAL AFFAIRS REPORTER,BRIAN KELLEHER,IS TRAVELLING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER.

BK:PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU SAYS HE MAY INDEED BE AT THE END OF STAGE I OF HIS PEACE INITIATIVE,BUT HE IS NOT/NOT READY TO LAUNCH IMMEDIATELY INTO STAGE II WHICH WOULD INVOLVE TRIPS TO MOSCO AND WSHDC.MR TRUDEAU FLEW TO PEKIN JUST AFTER DAWN THIS MORNING,MET WITH HIS PEACE EMISSARIES GEOFFREY PEARSON AND GARY SMITH,WHO HAD ARRIVED FROM MOSCO AND THEN DROVE DOWN PEKINS MAIN STREET,THE AVENUE OF EVERLASTING PEACE TO AN HOUR AND ONE HALF MEETING WITH PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG.MR TRUDEAU SAYS THE CHINESE PREMIER ENCOURAGED

...2

PAGE TWO FPR1131 UNCLAS

HIM TO CONTINUE HIS PEACE EFFORTS BUT CHINA IS NOT/NOT READY AT THIS TIME TO AGREE TO SIGN THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY OR TO JOIN IN THE FIVE-NATION NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE SUGGESTED BY MR TRUDEAU. CHINA WANTS PRESSURE PUT, INSTEAD, ON THE TWO SUPER-POWERS TO REDUCE THEIR ARSENALS, BUT MR TRUDEAU IS NOT/NOT READY TO GO IMMEDIATELY TO EITHER MOSCO OR WSHDC TO APPLY THAT PRESSURE PERSONALLY.

PET: IT WILL DEPEND, IN PART, ON WHAT FURTHER REACTIONS I GET FROM MOSCO AND WSHDC. IT WILL DEPEND, ALSO, ON WHAT SUCCESS WE HAVE ON THE 8TH OF DECEMBER, WHEN FOREIGN MINISTER MACEACHEN BRINGS TO OUR NATO COLLEAGUES THE PROPOSALS ON VIENN AND ON STKHM.

BK: VIENN HAS NEGOTIATIONS TO REDUCE CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE. STKHM HAS A SCHEDULED EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE IN JAN. MR TRUDEAU WILL NOT/NOT MEET TOMORROW WITH DENG ZIAOPING, THE CHAIRMAN OF CHINA'S ADVISORY COUNCIL BEFORE RETURNING TO DELHI TO PICK UP HIS TRIP TO THE PERSIAN GULF. BRIAN KELLEHER, CBC NEWS PEKIN.

CDA AM-PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S PEACE PLAN-INTERVIEW WITH BRIAN NELSON NOV 28, 0800

CDA AM: PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU SAYS CHINESE PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG SUPPORTS HIS EFFORTS TO INJECT NEW POLITICAL ENERGY INTO THE SEARCH

...3

PAGE THREE FPR1131 UNCLAS

FOR PEACE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. TRUDEAU TOLD REPORTERS AFTER MEETING WITH ZHAO IN PEKIN TODAY, THAT THE PREMIER HAS ALSO ENDORSED TRUDEAU'S CALL FOR A NUCLEAR POWERS CONFERENCE. IN PEKIN, WE REACHED CTV'S BRIAN NELSON. BRIAN CAN YOU TELL ME HOW THE PRIME MINISTER WAS TREATED IN CHINA?

BN: WELL, NORM, THE PRIME MINISTER WAS TREATED VERY WARMLY AND VERY CORDIALLY BY THE CHINESE AND I THINK IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT HE WAS GIVEN A GOOD HEARING. HE HAS PRESENTED HIS PROPOSALS TO PREMIER ZHAO THIS AFTERNOON, BUT THE CHINESE SEEM TO HAVE FOUND AT LEAST TWO OBJECTIONS TO HIS PLAN. THE FIRST ONE DEALS WITH MR TRUDEAU'S PROPOSAL THAT ALL FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS ATTEND A SUMMIT MEETING. THE CHINESE SAY THAT WHAT THEY WANT IS THE WORLD TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE TWO MAJOR SUPER-POWERS, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT UNTIL SOME PRESSURE IS PUT TO BEAR ON THOSE TWO, HOLDING A FIVE-POWER SUMMIT WOULD BE NEEDLESS. THE OTHER OBJECTION THEY HAD WITH THE PRIME MINISTER'S PROPOSALS DEALS WITH THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. CHINA, AS YET, HASN'T SIGNED THAT TREATY. IT'S MR TRUDEAU'S CONTENTION THAT IF SOME OF THE OTHER NATIONS IN THE WORLD WOULD SIGN IT, THIS WOULD BE AN ENCOURAGEMENT TO THE SOVIET UNION AND TO THE UNITED STATES TO REDUCE THEIR ARSENALS. THE CHINESE SEE IT FROM THE OTHER SIDE. THEY SEE IT AS A WAY OUT FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES TO NOT/NOT REDUCE THEIR ARSENALS, AND AT THE SAME TIME, BINDING A LOT OF NATIONS WHO HAVE NO/NO INTENTION OF

...4

PAGE FOUR FPR1131 UNCLAS

HAVING A BOMB, FROM CREATING ANY NUCLEAR POWER OF THEIR OWN.

CDA AM: IF NOTHING ELSE, BRIAN, DOES THIS TRIP TO CHINA GIVE NEW MOMENTUM TO THE PRIME MINISTERS PEACE INITIATIVE?

BN: WELL, ITS HARD TO SAY AT THIS POINT. THE CHINESE ARE VERY ENCOURAGING TOWARDS THE PRIME MINISTER IN A GENERAL SENSE, BUT WITHOUT THE SUPPORT OF THOSE TWO MAJOR PROPOSALS OF HIS, MR TRUDEAU MIGHT BE GOING AROUND IN CIRCLES. HE SEEMS TO BE ENCOURAGED ON THE ONE HAND, BUT I THINK HE IS A LITTLE WORRIED ON THE OTHER.

CDA AM: DO YOU KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT HIS MEETING TOMORROW WITH DENG XIAOPING, WHO IS THE HEAD MAN OF COURSE IN CHINA?

BN: NO/NO, NOTHING MORE THAN THE FACT THAT IT IS SCHEDULED. I HAVNT HAD THE CHANCE TO TALK TO ANY OF HIS OFFICIALS SINCE THE MEETINGS TODAY, AND THE DINNER WHICH ENDED JUST ABOUT AN HOUR AGO. BUT I WOULD IMAGINE THAT MR TRUDEAU WILL TRY TO PUSH HIS PROPOSALS A LITTLE FURTHER WITH CHAIRMAN DENG IN THE HOPES THAT THE RESPONSE THAT HE RECEIVED THIS AFTERNOON COULD BE IMPROVED UPON.

CDA AM: HAVE YOU HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A TRIP TO MOSCO? OR IS THAT DEFINITELY OUT NOW?

BN: WELL, MR TRUDEAU SAID, IN A NEWS CONFERENCE WITH CANADIAN REPORTERS FOLLOWING THE MEETING THIS AFTERNOON, THAT HE IS NOT/NOT LOOKING TO GO TO MOSCO OR TO WSHDC UNTIL THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEET IN BRU ON THE 8TH OF DEC. BUT REPORTERS FOLLOWING HIM AROUND ARE PPETTY WELL IMMUNE TO THAT SORT OF THING, AND THE WAY THIS TRIP HAS BEEN GOING, NOBODY IS LAYING ANY BETS.

...5

PAGE FIVE FPR1131 UNCLAS

CDA AM: BRIAN, YOU HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING THE PRIME MINISTER ON THIS WHOLE TRIP. THE COMMONWEALTH MINISTERS HAVE COME OUT WITH A DECLARATION NOW SUPPORTING THE PEACE INITIATIVE AND YET YOU STILL GET THE IMPRESSION THAT THERE IS A KIND OF QUOTE LUKE-WARM UNQUOTE FEELING ABOUT THIS WHOLE IDEA. WHAT IS YOUR READING, AS FAR AS THE COMMONWEALTH MINISTERS ARE CONCERNED?

BN: WELL, THE PROBLEM IS TO GET 45, 46, - THERE ARE A TOTAL OF 48 NATIONS IN THE COMMONWEALTH, TO AGREE ON ANY ONE PARTICULAR POINT. THE COMMONWEALTH JUST DOESN'T OPERATE IN THAT WAY, IN THE FIRST PLACE. THEY TRY TO REACH SOME KIND OF CONSENSUS. THE WHOLE OBJECT IS TO WATER IT DOWN, UNTIL THERE IS THE LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR ACCEPTABLE TO ALL. MR TRUDEAU HAS FIVE PROPOSALS AND EVERYBODY CAN FIND OBJECTIONS TO AT LEAST ONE OF THEM. THAT'S HIS PROBLEM, SO THAT HE GOT A VERY STRONG GENERAL ENDORSEMENT, BUT YOU WILL NOTICE IN THAT DECLARATION BY THE COMMONWEALTH LEADERS, AN ABSENCE OF ANY DETAIL, ANY SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO HIS PROPOSALS, BECAUSE THERE ARE JUST TOO MANY DIFFERENCES OF OPINION BETWEEN THE NATIONS INVOLVED.

CDA AM: HE SAID THIS TRIP TO CHINA ENDS THE FIRST STAGE OF HIS TRIP. WHAT HAS HE ACHIEVED WITH THIS FIRST STAGE?

BN: I AM SORRY, WHAT DID HE SEE??

CDA AM: NO/NO. I AM ASKING, WHAT HAS HE ACHIEVED WITH THIS FIRST STAGE OF THE PEACE INITIATIVE TRIP?

...6

PAGE SIX FPR1131 UNCLAS

BN: WELL, HE HAS SUCCEEDED IN ROUNDING UP A LOT OF SUPPORT FROM THE COMMONWEALTH, AND HE BELIEVES HE HAS AT LEAST THE MORAL SUPPORT OF THE CHINESE AND HE HAS THE MORAL SUPPORT OF A LOT OF NATO NATIONS. THAT ACHIEVED, HE SAYS HE IS NOW LOOKING FORWARD TO PHASE II, AND THAT IS HEADING OFF TO MOSCO TO MEET THE SOVIETS AND TO WSHDC TO MEET THE AMERICANS. BUT AS I SAID EARLIER, HE IS HOLDING OFF ON THAT UNTIL AFTER THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS GET TOGETHER ON THE 8TH OF DEC.

CDA AM: BRIAN, THANK YOU FOR TALKING WITH US. CTVS BRIAN NELSON IN PEKIN. UNQUOTE.

UUU/240 281857Z FPR1131

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

WASHINGTON POST - PR INITIATIVE COLUMN BY JOSEPH KRAFT

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Joseph Kraft

Trying to Resume The Dialogue

Moral leadership in international affairs comes hard these days. Three recent efforts by figures of stature—the pope, Indira Gandhi and Pierre Trudeau—define parts of the problem.

A main difficulty is that the moral stance of President Reagan works against discourse with rival systems. So in the wake of the latest break between Washington and Moscow, it seems clear that new conditions will have to be found for a resumption of the dialogue.

The travels of John Paul make the case most poignantly. His pilgrimages for peace touched the soul of Poland. Millions of his countrymen turned out to bear witness during his visit last summer.

But the realities of superpower politics required a rendering unto Caesar. To spare Poland a Soviet crackdown that the United States could not prevent, John Paul came to terms with the military dictator, Wojciech Jaruzelski. Now Jaruzelski is consolidating his power. While the worst have not taken charge in Poland, the best have had to give ground.

Gandhi's foray came in September at the United Nations. As head of the nonaligned movement, she had worked for most of the year to assemble world leaders on behalf of peace and disarmament. Several important figures—including President Francois Mitterrand of France and Prime Minister Olof Palme of Sweden—responded to her call.

But, on the whole, the turnout was disappointing. Russia and its friends lent no support. Reagan jeered at "pseudo nonalignment" and "pseudo arms control." The hard times experienced with special force in France and Sweden muted the words of Mitterrand and Palme. For better or worse, world recession has robbed social democracy of its moral force.

Prime Minister Trudeau is still plugging away on his crusade. In two remarkable speeches in Canada, he has called for a "political impulse"—including a summit meeting of the five nuclear powers—to push arms control beyond technical mumbo jumbo. He raised the matter in direct talks with European leaders two weeks ago. He has opened correspondence on the subject with Reagan. An emissary—Geoffrey Pearson, the son of former prime minister Lester Pearson—has been dispatched to Russia and China. Trudeau himself is now pushing the theme at the Commonwealth conference in New Delhi.

But events have eclipsed Trudeau's initiative to the point of making it a deep, dark secret to the world at large. Each leader approached by Trudeau has found it easy to buck the problem to other leaders. Though the prime minister's approach is very practical, lack of result has fostered in Canada a suspicion that his initiative is a political ploy.

The American presidency, as Franklin Roosevelt once proclaimed, is "preeminently . . . a place of moral leadership." Reagan clearly shares that view. He has found great political favor by appeals to the traditional virtues of religion, family, self-reliance and courage.

Far more than most presidents, moreover, Reagan carries ethical principle beyond the water's edge. He likes nothing better than assailing communism as a system. Hence his famous attack on the Russians and their friends as the "focus of evil."

Moscow, for all its vaunted toughness, turns out to be keenly sensitive to such charges. The Russians, like most parvenus, set great store by status. The challenge to their legitimacy thrown down by Reagan counts for something in the Soviet decision to break off the Big Two dialogue in the Geneva arms control talks.

An unmendable breach has, so far, not occurred. But even a broken dialogue carries real costs. For while it lasts, serious problems go untended—problems like the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the faults in crisis communication between the two capitals and the dangerous rivalry building up in the Mideast. As long as there is no forward motion on those matters, pressures will build, here and abroad, for more flexibility. Since hardly anybody expects Moscow to give, the onus will fall on Washington.

So there is a strong American interest in the resumption of discourse on a new basis. As the case of the pope illustrates, the thrust cannot be primarily moral; the discussion has to bear directly on practical questions. As the failure of Gandhi suggests, the initiative cannot come from the left side of the political spectrum. Nor, as the Trudeau experience indicates, does even a medium-size power have the heft to force the pace.

A fourth condition, underlined by the recent break at Geneva, is that the legitimacy of Soviet power must be, at least implicitly, accepted. Which leads to a fifth condition that will cause some to despair and others to hope. The final condition for a resumption of dialogue is that the lead has to come from Washington.

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Sujet

Date November 28

Publication NEW YORK TIMES

A 'DIALOGUE' PLEA BY COMMONWEALTH

Nations Meeting in India Urge U.S. and Soviet to Discuss Political Differences

By WILLIAM E. STEVENS

Special to The New York Times

GOA, India, Nov. 27 — The Commonwealth nations, expressing alarm at what they said was a rising level of violence and confrontation in the world, called on the United States and Soviet Union today to resume "a genuine political dialogue."

In the first formal communication to come out of the weeklong meeting that began last Tuesday in New Delhi, the Commonwealth nations said they sought to "make a practical contribution" to help promote an eventual United States-Soviet political understanding.

The statement said the conference welcomed the call of Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau of Canada for "a new political dimension" involving other nations as mediators.

"We support his efforts to restore active political contact and communication among all the nuclear weapon powers," the statement said, "and are willing to help these and other such efforts in all appropriate ways."

Arms Talks Breakdown an Issue

The statement said it was "imperative that the Soviet Union and the United States should summon up the political vision of a world in which their nations can live in peace."

Officials close to the deliberations said the insertion of the word "political" in the text grew out of statements by some Commonwealth leaders in which they expressed doubt that arms limitation talks between the United States and Soviet Union could succeed while they are in the hands of "technicians" rather than high-ranking political leaders.

Mr. Trudeau is scheduled to arrive in Peking Monday to continue a peace mission that has taken him to a number of capitals, and will eventually take him to Washington and Moscow.

Mr. Trudeau was said to be pleased



Associated Press

In Goa, India, President Spyros Kyprianou of Cyprus, left, talks to Prime Minister Robert Hawke of Australia. Nearby, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore talks to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of Britain.

with today's declaration and the backing of the Commonwealth. The Canadian leader is due to return to the Commonwealth meeting on Tuesday, the final day of the conference.

The Commonwealth leaders returned to New Delhi this afternoon after a two-day weekend retreat in this resort on the western coast of India.

Agreement Reached on Grenada

As they did, Shridath S. Rampal, the Commonwealth Secretary General, confirmed that agreement had been reached on a Commonwealth approach to the Grenada situation. The agree-

ment was reported to contain a call for a withdrawal of all foreign troops from Grenada and an offer to replace them with a peacekeeping force drawn from Commonwealth countries.

Mr. Rampal said the details of the Grenada agreement would be presented as part of the meeting's final communiqué on Tuesday in New Delhi.

The Goa declaration issued today drew particular attention for the first time to "the vulnerability of small states to external attack and interference in their affairs."

The declaration said the Commonwealth conference had separately

agreed to undertake a study of ways to guarantee the territorial integrity of small nations.

"Despite differences of approach which affect the way we analyse and judge events," the statement said, "it is our perception that relations between the world's major military alliances are in danger of becoming more confrontational."

It is essential to the "enlargement of understanding" between the United States and Soviet Union, the declaration said, "to increase contacts at a variety of levels between the Governments and peoples of East and West."

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


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28 November 1983

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S
PEACE INITIATIVE AT THE
COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING
NEW DELHI
NOVEMBER 22-27, 1983

As part of his ongoing peace initiative, Prime Minister Trudeau urged the Commonwealth Heads of Government at their meeting in New Delhi last week to support his plea for a genuine political dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Attached is the text of the Commonwealth statement, the first formal communication to come out of the week long meeting, which said the Conference welcomed the call of Prime Minister Trudeau. "We support his efforts to restore active political contact and communication among all the nuclear weapon powers," the statement said, "and are willing to help these and other such efforts in all appropriate ways."

Mr. Trudeau arrived in Peking today to continue his peace mission which so far has taken him to six European capitals, Tokyo and New Delhi.

The Commonwealth G.O.A. Declaration on International Security

As we meet together in India at the end of 1983, representing a quarter of the world's people, from every continent and many regions, we have shared both our concerns and our hopes for international security. Despite differences of approach which affect the way we analyse and judge events, it is our perception that relationships between the world major military alliances are in danger of becoming more confrontational. In the context of heightened tensions and the continuing build up of nuclear arsenals, the future of civilisation as we know it, could be threatened. None of our countries or peoples would be insulated from that fate. We are alarmed by increasing disregard for the moral and legal principles which should govern the conduct of states, by the degree to which the ethic of peaceful settlement of disputes is being eroded and by the readiness of nations to resort to the illegal use of force. At this time of crisis, we believe it to be imperative that the Soviet Union and the United States should summon up the political vision of a world in which their nations can live in peace. Their first objective must be to work for the resumption of a genuine political dialogue between themselves leading to the relaxation of tensions. We believe that Commonwealth governments can make a practical contribution in encouraging them to do so and in promoting a larger measure of international understanding than now exists. Essential to that enlargement of understanding is the need to increase contacts at a variety of levels between the governments and the peoples of the East and the West. A concerted effort is required to restore constructive dialogue to the conduct of East-West relations.

Only thus, can a climate of confidence be rebuilt in place of the prevailing one of fear and mistrust. In all these pursuits, we emphasize the supreme importance of political will. We, therefore, welcome Prime Minister Trudeau's call for a new political dimension in the quest for international security. We support his efforts to restore active political contact and communications among all the nuclear weapon powers and are willing to help these and other such efforts in all appropriate ways. As Prime Minister Indira Gandhi has so consistently emphasized, the central issue in securing wider progress on disarmament is the stopping of the nuclear arms race. These are the essential steps for progress and working towards the world's relief from the menace of nuclear weapons and their wider spread. If the resources released by disarmament were ploughed back in some measure into world development, the needs of the developing countries, which are in the forefront of our concern could be significantly met. We are concerned also over the diminishing capacity of international institutions. They play an effective role in world affairs. Rejecting that negative trend, we pledge our renewed support for the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter. There is, in our view, an urgent need to consider what practical steps can be taken to strengthen the United Nations system and to improve its capacity to fulfil the objectives of the Charter. We are particularly concerned at the vulnerability of small states to external attacks and interference in their affairs. These

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countries are members of the international community which must respect their independence and at the very least have a moral obligation to provide effectively for their territorial integrity. We have separately agreed on an urgent study of these issues. Additionally, however, we will play our part in helping the international community to make an appropriate response to the United Nations Secretary General's call for strengthening of collective security in keeping with the Charter. Meeting here in India, we cannot emphasize too strongly our belief that the ethic of non-violence must be at the heart of all efforts to ensure peace and harmony in the world. That ethic requires close adherence to the principles of peaceful settlement. Only by such a commitment on all sides will the world's people enjoy an environment of true international security. Finally, we retain faith in human capacity to overcome the dangers and difficulties that threaten the world, and to secure for all its peoples the prospects of a more peaceful international environment. We shall work together to fulfil that faith.

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