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Volume 35 From-De 84-03-09 To-À 84-03-13

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Vol 35

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EXAMINED BY / EXAMINÉ PAR
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DATE 2007-03-06

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TITLE—TITRE:

DISARMEMENT
MEASURES
PLANS ET PROPOSALS
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION (INITIATIVES)

DESARMEMENT
MESURES
PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS
TRUDEAU MISSION DE PAIX (INITIATIVES)

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28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

36

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

March 13, 1984.

IDDZ-0228

Ms. Irene Mock
1114 McQuarrie Ave.
Nelson, B.C.
V1L 1B2

Dear Ms. Mock:

Thank you for your letter of February 27 in which you question the Government's opposition to proposals for a comprehensive nuclear freeze.

While the motivation behind the comprehensive freeze proposal is clearly laudable, there are certain substantive difficulties which must be taken into account. First, a comprehensive freeze would lock into place certain destabilizing features of the current strategic balance. Also, certain aspects of the comprehensive freeze proposal are either unverifiable or extremely hard to verify, hence the negotiation of a comprehensive freeze would be lengthy and difficult. Another factor is that a comprehensive freeze might preclude certain programs whose effect would be enhanced crisis stability, e.g. improved command and control systems.

Of course, nuclear arsenals must be limited before they can eventually be reduced, but we are not persuaded that a comprehensive nuclear freeze is the best approach to that goal and we note that the freeze movement itself is now moving away from its earlier comprehensive proposal to a more differentiated approach.

Yours sincerely,

L.A. Delvoie

Chairman

Task Force Working Group

IRENE MOCK
1114 McQUARRIE AVE.
NELSON, B.C. V1L 1B2

27 Feb '84

Mr. L.A. Delvoie
Chairman, Task Force Working Group
Department of External Affairs
Ministry of External Affairs
OTTAWA

Dear Mr. Delvoie,


Thank you for your letter of February 17th. Unfortunately, you believe that world government is a utopian solution. I say unfortunately because in a world where sovereign nations will always war to protect sovereign interests there is no other solution than world government. The reason that the U.N. isn't working very well in its capacity to maintain peace in the world is because nations such as Canada do not support U.N. efforts. I know this is a bold assertion. Let me back it up: While Prime Minister Trudeau journeyed to the Far East in support of his peace initiative, the Canadian delegation to the United Nations' First Committee on disarmament voted AGAINST a resolution calling for a bilateral nuclear freeze. The resolution was co-sponsored by Mexico, Sweden, and Ecuador. It received the support of one NATO government (Greece), while four NATO governments (Denmark, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway) plus Australia were among those that abstained. Canada joined the rest of NATO to oppose the resolution, while all countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization supported it.

Can you explain why Canada opposed the nuclear freeze proposal? This makes no sense. Is Trudeau really sincere about his peace initiative? If so, you would think that he would have Canada vote for the freeze in the United Nations.

You say that "his current initiative has been ...to open lines of communication with the East; to catalyze other political leaders into devoting their resources to the cause of peace; to achieving more propitious conditions for a constructive working relationship between the superpowers." If so, why is Canada not taking a stand where it counts --in the UN and in testing the cruise missile??

I look forward to your reply.


Sincerely,



Irene Mock

OHMS

IRENE MOCK
1114 McQUARRIE AVE.
NELSON, V1L 1B2



Honourable Mr. Allan
MacEachen
Ministry of External Affairs
House of Commons
OTTAWA, ONT. K1A 0G2

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MONTREAL GAZETTE

DATE

MAR 13 1984

Trudeau peace mission masks preparation for war

DIALOGUE

**A column of opinion
and commentary
open to readers**

• Dr. Logan is a professor of psychology at John Abbott College.

By RICHARD LOGAN

For just a while, everybody was talking and worrying about nuclear war. The loud shouting between the superpowers had reminded us all that it really can happen. Frightening as this felt, it was a cause for optimism: Lifting the veil of psychological denial from a horror is the first step to doing something about it. For once, our governments were under pressure to reverse the arms race.

Now it begins to look as if that pressure has gone. Most people seem to believe, if they think about it at all any more, that things are getting better. The source of their renewed sense of security is that the superpowers have stopped shouting.

It may serve to make them feel more secure to feel that things have improved. In reality, however, nothing has changed. Just as many new weapons are being deployed and there are just as few agreements to stop — absolutely none — or even negotiations or even promises to negotiate. Each side says it wants peace but that the other side, because it is the aggressor, must back down first. That is what they have always said.

The pattern to which we are in danger of returning is not new. To change Theodore Roosevelt's phrase a bit, it is the pattern of talking softly and building more and more big sticks.

It so neatly satisfies two psychological defence mechanisms: first, the desperate need to deny the possibility of something so unprecedented, so awful, so beyond our capacity even to imagine as a nuclear holocaust; second, the need to believe that we are never the aggressor. Therefore, we have let our leaders talk of peace and prepare for destruction for 40 years.

For example, President Dwight Eisenhower warned of the uncontrolled power of the "military industrial complex" and counselled starkly that we must disarm or die. Yet under his direction the U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons grew from 1,000 to 18,000 — at a time

when the Soviets had hardly any at all.

John Kennedy told us that "the weapons of war must be abolished or they will abolish us." Yet he had come to power largely on the back of promises to rectify the "missile gap," a gap that in reality did not exist. With Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, he risked everything over the Cuban missiles. He began the deployment of 1,000 Minuteman missiles. And he began the Vietnam disaster — without even calling it a war.

Lyndon Johnson seldom spoke and probably seldom thought about nuclear war. He, like everyone else at the time, was much more engrossed in the deepening quagmire of Vietnam. Yet under his direction, the U.S. nuclear stockpile crept almost imperceptibly to 32,000 weapons. Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford are remembered for detente. Yet they oversaw the highly destabilizing, initially unilateral, installation of multiple warheads.

Never was the contradiction between soft words, which everyone heard, and aggressive actions, which no one noticed, more remarkable than in the case of Jimmy Carter. He was viewed as a gentle and peaceful man. In part, it even cost him the presidency. Yet he called for a "dramatic increase in warhead production," set in place the new policy of planning to win limited nuclear wars and ordered the deployment of dangerous new war-winning weapons — quite superfluous to the needs of deterrence — like the MX, Pershing 2 and cruise missiles.

Leonid Brezhnev spoke warmly of detente and warned that a nuclear war would mean "the destruction of civilization and perhaps the end of life itself on Earth."

Yet he engineered the steady buildup of the Soviet strategic arsenal until it matched that of the United States and ordered one of the most provocative developments of recent years: the deployment of more than 200 multi-warheaded SS-20s against European cities, in addition to the 600 SS-4s and SS-5s put there by Khrushchev — who also spoke of peace. And he began the Soviets' own Vietnam in Afghanistan.

Ironically, the best thing about U.S. President Ronald Reagan, and about the late Soviet leader Yuri Andropov too, was the very thing that drew most criticism: their loudness.

Because of their bellicosity, for once we could not pretend that the threat of nuclear extermination did not exist. Now, even Reagan has learned to speak in muted tones and the new Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko seems softly spoken too.

Both have asserted that a nuclear war cannot be won. Reagan, who on coming to office seemed so oblivious to what a nuclear war would mean, has even started warning of disaster (albeit in fatalistic biblical terms which suggest a belief that it is out of his hands): "I turn back to your ancient prophets in the Old Testament for the signs foretelling Armageddon and I find myself wondering if we're the generation that's going to see it come about."

Reagan's actions, however, tell us that in spite of his softened image his attitude has not changed one bit. He has already added enormously to what Carter began and shows no sign of letting up. He has asked Congress for a staggering 13 per cent increase in defence spending, adjusted for inflation — the largest single increase since the Second World War (in spite of a recent NATO study confirming that there has not been anything like the massive Soviet buildup he claims).

By 1990, 16,000 new nuclear weapons will have rolled off the U.S. production lines. The full machinery for trying to win limited nuclear wars will be in place. Billions will have been spent on space-based weapons. Although we know less about Soviet intentions, history tells us that they are sure to follow suit.

Probably Reagan's change of tone does not come from a change of attitude at all. It comes, rather, from his understanding, at last, that the public really is terrified of a nuclear holocaust, that it is not just a Communist conspiracy and that, in an election year especially, it pays to take account of that terror. So powerful is the human need to deny that which frightens us that he just might get away with it.

There has always been a peculiarly Canadian version of this psychological defence mechanism of clinging to soft words and ignoring what is really being done. We have always believed that we are a peacemaker and that the rest of the world sees us as such. From time to time, we have pointed our finger at the superpowers, secure in the belief that we have no part in the arms race.

Prime Minister Trudeau's peace mission slotted perfectly into this defence. It also allowed us another defence mechanism: the comforting belief that someone powerful is looking out for us, doing everything that can be done to protect us. Humans very easily hand over responsibility to a parental figure in return for a sense of safety. It's called charisma, and many felt the old stirrings of the Trudeau version when he set out on his mission.

This comforting self-image of ourselves, and of our leader too, is sadly at odds with the facts. Canada is very much a part of the arms race. Since the nuclear arms race began it has been a major exporter of uranium. It is also a front runner in the scramble by an ailing nuclear reactor industry to sell reactors to the Third World, reactors that are no longer in demand on domestic markets.

Nuclear reactor waste can be reprocessed into weapons material

There is no such thing as a peaceful atom. The waste from nuclear reactors can be reprocessed into weapons-grade material. For example, when India exploded its "peaceful atomic device" in 1974, it did so with the help of a reactor given to it by Canada. It was a copy of the NRX "experimental" reactor at Chalk River, which had provided plutonium for the early years of the U.S. bomb-building program. Shortly afterward, Canadian reactors were sold to Argentina and South Korea.

Trudeau breathed a sigh of relief when Reagan retracted his previously stated belief that a nuclear war can be limited and won. He assured us, on returning from his mission, that "the trend line of crisis has turned."

Yet Canada is deeply involved in producing the major instrument of the U.S. limited war winning policy, the cruise missile. Litton Systems received a \$26.4 million grant from Trudeau's government to build the guidance system for half of them. Now he has allowed it to be tested here.

With its incredible accuracy of just 10 to 30 metres, the cruise has a "counterforce" capability — the ability to "kill" hardened military targets — far in excess of any ballistic missile. Some 9,000 will be deployed on U.S. airplanes, ships and submarines around the planet (500 already are); 5,000 will have nuclear warheads. They will be a formidable means of policing the world with the threat of a limited nuclear attack.

Cruise is perfect buy for countries eager to join nuclear club

There are other new dangers in the cruise. It is virtually undetectable, especially on board ship, and so it will make verification of arms treaties — the last slender thread for holding back the arms race — impossible. Also, it is small, self-contained and inexpensive, selling for between \$2 million and \$6 million depending on the version. Thus it will be a perfect buy for Third World nations eager to join the nuclear club.

Two decades ago, Trudeau dubbed Liberal Leader Lester Pearson "the unfrocked prince of peace" for urging that Canadian forces should hold nuclear weapons. (Later, when in power, Pearson so ordered.) Six years ago, he advocated a policy of "suffocation" of the arms race — stifling it by banning the development and testing of new weapons. Now he has urged restraint by the superpowers. All fine words, just like those of the superpower leaders. But his actions have been in direct contradiction to them, just like theirs.

In politics, especially in the international politics of trust or mistrust, actions speak a good deal louder than words, as NDP Leader Ed Broadbent has argued in calling for a refusal to the cruise. Or, at least, words are likely to be seen as cheap if there are no actions to demonstrate their sincerity.

How much more might Trudeau's peace mission have made headlines around the world the way it did at home, how much more might he have been remembered as a peacemaker, if his words had been matched by his actions.

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. L.A. DELVOTTE

G. SMITH

K. CALDER

J. MCNEE

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Direction des affaires publiques
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(202) 785-1400

Louis

*Don't know
if you see this.
Tell you guys!*

cheers.

Patrice

*With the compliments
of the Public Affairs Division*

*De la part
de la Direction des affaires publiques*

cc

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Jan. 13

PRESS UPDATE

November & December 1983 Newspapers

<u>Major Press Stories -- December</u>	<u>Total Articles</u>
1. Medicare	289
2. Trudeau peace initiative	282
3. Throne Speech	202
4. Unemployment & layoffs	180
5. Macdonald Commission	174
6. State of the economy	161
7. Auditor general's report	115
8. Trudeau leadership	108
9. Taxation	106
10. Interest rates	101

THE ECONOMY

Economic debates have been reduced to a low level discussion, while the country is holding its breath for a Trudeau resignation. The Liberals are in no position to provide economic leadership; the Tories are cleverly refusing to play ball on anything the government throws their way, and business and labour are remarkably quiet on virtually every economic issue. (Perhaps all the discussion is occurring at Marc Lalonde's "consultations"!)

● State of the Economy -- November 262, December 161

- Economic insecurity has almost acquired the status of a permanent state of affairs, rather than a condition to end with a recovery. Much of this is due to continuing high unemployment. Positive forecasts appear to leave no impression on the uncertainty.
- A major drop in volume of press commentary on the economy in December. Positive up from 30 to 42%.

● Unemployment -- November 181, December 180

- Remains the major obstacle to perceptions of a genuine economic recovery. Statements about GNP growth or capital investment improvements are politically irrelevant in comparison with the fears or realities of unemployment.

- Solutions to the problem still have little clear focus in the press: government job creation programs have little credibility, but private sector growth is also not creating enough new jobs.
- Throne Speech job creation plans, including a new youth employment ministry, not taken seriously.
- Trade -- November 104, December 113
 - Fear of U.S. protectionism dominates trade discussion.
 - Increasing exports still being viewed as one solution to the unemployment problem.
- Interest rates -- November 42, December 101
 - Fear of upward trend in rates related to outlook for economic recovery.
 - Volume of commentary doubled in December, negative outlooks increased from 12 to 34%.

GOVERNMENT

Despite Throne Speech, there is perception of a government more reactive than pro-active, with the exception of MacGuigan's initiatives and the Medicare legislation.

- Medicare -- November 122, December 289
 - The major press story in December, but most earlier confrontation is gone.
 - By supporting the Canada Health Act, the Tories have deprived the Liberals of their major social policy issue. Medicare is now a non-partisan issue.
 - In the face of federal unity, the provinces, and even the CMA, have toned down their hostility.
- Trudeau Peace Initiative -- November 562, December 282
 - Initial response was positive: how could you criticize someone working for peace? But, some questions about political motives and chances of success were asked.
 - Positive response (over 50%) maintained in December, but press attention has diminished.

- Initiative has effectively removed Trudeau as a major player on domestic issues.
- Throne Speech -- December 202
 - The occasion was seen as marking the end of a session of Parliament, rather than an agenda for a new one.
 - The speech was interpreted politically, as a pre-election warmup. The result was very little serious analysis or reaction other than clues as to the timing of Trudeau's resignation.
 - Proposals contained in speech viewed as grab bag with no real direction.
- Macdonald Commission -- November 120, December 174
 - New sense of importance was attached to Commission as hearings received more attention.
 - Expectations that March interim report will be controversial by raising variety of options on Senate reform, unemployment and free trade.
- Auditor General's Report -- December 115
 - No surprises, only new versions of old criticisms.
 - Accountability issue prominent again. The general reaction was that Ottawa lacks the political will to deal with uncontrolled spending.
- Taxation -- November 84, December 106
 - Focus was on Revenue Canada tax quotas.
 - Conservatives may have created one of the most important issues for 1984 by capitalizing on grassroots resentment of arrogant bureaucrats in a very personal way.

POLITICAL

All political issues pale into insignificance compared with expectation of Trudeau's retirement.

- Trudeau -- November 49, December 108
 - Press reading all entrails of government action for clues as to timing of resignation.
 - Late year press generally assumed imminent resignation -- no later than February. Hints of delays spark traditional cynicism about Trudeau.

- By delaying his resignation into the New Year in order to continue his peace mission, Trudeau has missed the chance of using it as a means to exit gracefully from office.
- Federal Liberals -- November 234, December 362
 - Commentary on recent appointments: much praise for appointment of Jeanne Sauve as Governor General; considerable criticism of Jean Marchand to Canadian Transport Commission.
 - Commentary on likely Turner candidacy for party leader growing. Seen as shoo-in for leader.
- Mulroney -- November 55, December 50
 - Tory leader has had low press profile in past few months.
 - Positive press at lowest point since Convention, but negative has dropped even more.
 - Growing demand in Western press to know Tory policies, especially on NEP. Typical question: "Brian, where are you?"
- Federal Conservatives -- November 155, December 177
 - No change in perceptions of party (both positive and negative are stable.
 - Surprise defeat of government by Tories on tax bill wasn't taken seriously. "Playing politics" by any party underlines irrelevance of Parliament for Canadians.

William van Geest
365-6079

February 3, 1984

POINTS DE DISCUSSION PROPOSÉS

- L'initiative de paix procède de l'appartenance du Canada à l'Alliance de l'Atlantique Nord et au NORAD. Dans son discours du 9 février à la Chambre des communes, le Premier ministre a réitéré notre fidélité à l'OTAN et à ses politiques.
- On peut voir dans l'initiative un effort du Canada en vue de concrétiser l'engagement pris par les participants au sommet économique de Williamsburg de consacrer toutes leurs ressources politiques à la cause de la paix.
- Lors de ses rencontres avec les dirigeants de l'Europe de l'Ouest, le Premier ministre a pu constater que son initiative jouit d'un soutien considérable.
- Le Premier ministre s'est fait le porte-parole d'un grand nombre de Canadiens qui craignent profondément pour la sécurité de leur pays et veulent voir leur gouvernement faire tout son possible pour réduire les risques de guerre nucléaire.
- L'initiative est fondée sur la conviction qu'il ne saurait y avoir de progrès sur des propositions précises de contrôle des armements et de désarmement avant le rétablissement d'un dialogue plus constructif entre l'Est

-2-

et l'Ouest et l'élaboration d'un cadre politique global aux fins des relations entre les deux parties en présence.

- Au cours des derniers mois, des signes encourageants de progrès se sont fait jour: les deux superpuissances ont fait état du prix qu'elles attachent au dialogue politique; la Conférence de Stockholm s'est ouverte sur le rétablissement des contacts politiques entre l'Est et l'Ouest; des dirigeants occidentaux, y compris les Premiers ministres Trudeau et Thatcher, se sont rendus à l'Est pour ouvrir de nouvelles lignes de communication; et les négociations sur les réductions mutuelles et équilibrées des forces (MBFR) ont repris le 16 mars à Vienne.

- L'initiative de paix se poursuit au sein de l'OTAN, à la Conférence de Stockholm, aux négociations MBFR à Vienne, aux Nations Unies et à la Conférence sur le désarmement à Genève.



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SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS

- The point of departure for the initiative is Canada's membership in the North Atlantic Alliance and NORAD. The Prime Minister reiterated our commitment to NATO and its policies in his speech to the House of Commons on February 9.
- It can be seen as Canada's effort to make good the commitment made at the Williamsburg by the economic summit partners to devote their full political resources to the cause of peace.
- The Prime Minister found a strong echo and wide support for his initiative in his meetings with Western European leaders.
- The Prime Minister has been voicing the deep concerns of a great many Canadians who are worried that Canada's security is at stake and want their government to do what it can to lessen the risks of war in the nuclear age.
- The underlying conviction on which the initiative is based is that before progress can be made on specific arms control and disarmament proposals it is necessary to restore East-West relations to a more constructive basis, to establish an overall political framework for relations between the two sides.

...2/

- 2 -

- There have been encouraging signs of progress over the last few months: both superpowers have indicated the importance they attach to political dialogue; broad political contact between East and West was re-established at the Stockholm Conference; Western leaders, including the Prime Minister and Prime Minister Thatcher, have gone to the East to open lines of communication; the Mutual and Balance Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations resumed on March 16 in Vienna.
- The initiative continues to be pursued in NATO, at the Stockholm Conference, at MBFR in Vienna, at the United Nations and at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.



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22. Relevant supporting documentation is attached - La documentation pertinente est annexée <input type="checkbox"/> No Non <input type="checkbox"/> Yes (Please attach list) Oui (Veuillez annexer liste)							
23. Priority request - Priorité demandée: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4				24. Authority for first or second priority - Autorité invoquée pour première ou deuxième priorité PMIS TASK FORCE			
25. Observations or special requests - Observations ou demandes spéciales DOCUMENT IS FOR CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARIANS WHO WILL USE THIS DOCUMENT IN MEETINGS WITH FOREIGN PARLIAMENTARIANS. IF AT ALL POSSIBLE, COULD WE PLEASE HAVE THIS BY THE END OF 14 MAR.							
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26. Translator - Traducteur		27. Revisor - Réviseur		28. Typist - Copiste		29. No. of words - Nbre de mots	
30. Specialty - Spécialité		31. Target completion date - Date cible de livraison		32. Actual completion date - Date de livraison		33. Request number - Numéro de la demande EA - 16026	

INSTRUCTIONS

1. This request form is to be used only for texts involving translations TO or FROM ENGLISH and FRENCH. Form GC81 must be used for all requests involving translations to or from foreign languages or native Canadian languages.
2. ALWAYS supply two copies of the document to be translated. NEVER send the original.
3. **Box 2:** Use only the symbol of the work-unit where the authorizing officer (Box 4) works.
4. **Box 4:** The authorizing officer takes responsibility for the accuracy of all information provided in the Request for Translation, and for the linguistic quality of the text to be translated if it was prepared in the work-unit. (S) he may be:
 - a. the officer who is responsible for the use of the text; or
 - b. his/her superior (at any level).
5. **Box 8:** Provide the subject of the document only if it has no title. If a title changes please add the former title (within parentheses).
6. **Box 16:** Please use two digits for each day and month time-frame. E.g. April 1, 1983 would be written 1983:04:01. (This permits OCR machine reading).
7. **Box 22:** Please attach any reference material that may be of use to the translator, such as translations of similar previous texts, and the text of quotations in the other official language or related correspondence. Please also include any useful references such as the meaning of abbreviations or initials.
8. **Box 23:** Consult the Annex to Memorandum RRE 14 of March 1, 1983 which explains the working of the priority system that took effect on 1983:04:01.

INSTRUCTIONS

1. N'utiliser ce formulaire que pour les textes à traduire DE L'UNE À L'AUTRE DES LANGUES OFFICIELLES. Dans le cas des langues étrangères ou autochtones, utiliser le formulaire GC81.
2. TOUJOURS fournir deux exemplaires du document à traduire. Ne JAMAIS envoyer l'original.
3. **Case 2:** N'inscrire que le symbole de l'unité de travail de l'agent responsable (case 4).
4. **Case 4:** L'agent responsable répond de l'exactitude des renseignements fournis dans le présent formulaire et de la qualité linguistique du texte à traduire si celui-ci a été rédigé dans l'unité de travail. Il peut être:
 - a. l'agent responsable de l'utilisation du texte; ou
 - b. son supérieur (à n'importe quel niveau).
5. **Case 8.** N'inscrire le sujet du document que s'il n'a pas de titre. Si le titre a été modifié, inscrire le précédent entre parenthèses.
6. **Case 16.** Utiliser deux chiffres pour chaque dénomination temporelle. Par ex. le 1^{er} avril 1983 s'écrit 1983:04:01. Ceci afin d'en permettre la lecture optique (LOC).
7. **Case 22.** Annexer tout document pouvant être utile au traducteur, telles les traductions précédentes de textes semblables, le texte dans l'autre langue, des citations ou la correspondance se rapportant au texte à traduire. Fournir également tout renseignement utile, comme la signification des abréviations ou des initiales.
8. **Case 23.** On trouvera à l'Annexe de la note RRE 14 du 1^{er} mars 1983 des explications sur le mécanisme des priorités qui prend effet le 19 83-04-01.

PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE

ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

BACKGROUND

The Prime Minister's central purpose is to try to stop and reverse the worsening trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce international tensions and risks of confrontation. His chief proposal addresses the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the two superpowers. In the wake of the KAL downing, East-West relations appeared to have touched a low point. There has been little genuine political dialogue between the two sides and no real political framework for arms control and other negotiations. The Prime Minister is interested in seeing if more propitious conditions can be created for building a constructive, working relationship between East and West.

The initiative involves a number of specific proposals - (a) a conference of the five nuclear weapon states to limit strategic nuclear arsenals (b) a concerted political effort to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime (c) a political impetus by the West to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks in Vienna to try to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe by achieving a stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels (d) the inauguration of the Stockholm Conference at senior political level.

Also related to the initiative are proposals for (a) a ban on the testing and deployment of high altitude anti-satellite systems (b) a requirement that future strategic systems be verifiable by National Technical Means and (c) restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs.

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CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

1. Prime Minister's meeting with Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence and senior officials; creation of Task Force (September 21)
2. Prime Minister meets at Meach Lake with Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence, senior officials and ambassadors (October 7)
3. Prime Minister's letters to all NATO Heads of Government (October 22-25)
4. Prime Minister's speech at Guelph University (October 27)
5. Prime Minister's letters to Soviet and Chinese leaders (early November)
6. Prime Minister's meetings with President Mitterrand of France, Prime Minister Lubbers and Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands, Prime Minister Martens of Belgium, His Holiness the Pope, Prime Minister Craxi of Italy, Chancellor Kohl of West Germany, Prime Minister Thatcher of Great Britain (November 8-11)
7. Prime Minister's speech in Montreal (November 13)
8. Prime Minister's meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone (November 19)
9. Prime Minister's personal emissary (Geoffrey Pearson) visits Peking (November 21-22) and Moscow (November 25-26)
10. Prime Minister participates in Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in New Delhi (November 22-27)

- 11 Prime Minister's visit to Peking (November 28-29)
12. Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs participation in NATO ministerial meetings (December 8-9)
13. Prime Minister's meetings over six week period with leading experts on nuclear matters and East-West relations - Robert McNamara, General Rogers, General Brent Scowcroft, George Kennan, Members of the Harvard Nuclear Study Group, Georgi Arbatov. (October-November)
14. Prime Minister's visit to President Reagan in Washington (December 15)
15. Prime Minister's meeting with U.N. Secretary General (January 11)
16. Visit of Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang (January 16-20)
17. Prime Minister's visit to Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Romania (January 24 - February 2).
18. Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons (February 9).
19. Prime Minister's meeting with Soviet General Secretary Chernenko in Moscow (February 15).

REACTIONS

The Prime Minister has received encouraging support for the broad political purposes of the initiative in his consultations with European allies, the Chinese leadership, President Nakasone of Japan and President Reagan. The Prime Minister has found general agreement with his analysis of the dangerous state of East-West relations and the need for the re-establishment of political dialogue.

- 4 -

Also, Commonwealth Heads of Government specifically endorsed Prime Minister Trudeau's initiative in the Goa Declaration on International Security which reflected the Prime Minister's analysis of the gravity of the current situation and the importance of applying political will to the quest for international security. U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has commended and encouraged the Prime Minister's efforts.

The Prime Minister has engaged in dialogue with Eastern European leaders in Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Romania and has discussed East-West relations with Soviet General Secretary Chernenko, who described the initiative as useful and practical.

RESULTS

The degree of support which the Prime Minister has garnered for the main purposes of his initiative is of itself a positive result insofar as it may have a beneficial effect on the climate of East-West relations. The decisions taken at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels in early December were particularly significant in furthering the purposes of the initiative:

- (a) an undertaking by NATO foreign ministers to attend the opening of the Stockholm Conference, followed by a decision by the Warsaw Pact to have its ministers attend.
- (b). an undertaking to review the NATO position on the MBFR negotiations;
- (c) the "Brussels declaration" which pledges NATO to work for "genuine détente" and constructive dialogue with the East in recognition of their mutual security interests and eschews any attempt to seek superiority.
- (d) a decision to review the state of East-West relations to search for ways in which they might be improved.

- 5 -

There have been additional signs of progress. There has been some moderation of the strident rhetoric of both sides and both superpowers have recently indicated the importance they attach to political dialogue, President Reagan in his speech of January 15 and General Secretary Chernenko in his meeting with the Prime Minister.

Broad political contact between East and West was re-established at the beginning of the Stockholm Conference for the first time since the acrimonious conclusion of the Madrid Conference last September.

Western political leaders, including the Prime Minister and Prime Minister Thatcher, have gone to the East to open lines of communication.

It has been agreed that the MBFR negotiations will resume in Vienna on March 16.

These are all indications of a change in the deteriorating trend in East-West relations that was apparent in the autumn of 1983.

B. M. au

INITIATIVE DU PREMIER MINISTRE TOUCHANT LES RELATIONS EST-OUEST
ET LA SÉCURITÉ INTERNATIONALE

HISTORIQUE

L'objectif central du Premier ministre est de tenter d'arrêter et de renverser la tendance à la détérioration des relations Est-Ouest et, par voie de conséquence, de réduire les tensions internationales et les dangers d'affrontement. Sa principale proposition concerne la nécessité de redonner la confiance et de rétablir un dialogue politique de haut niveau entre l'Est et l'Ouest, et plus particulièrement entre les deux superpuissances. Après l'incident de l'aéronef des KAL, les relations Est-Ouest ont semblé avoir atteint un creux. Il y a peu de véritables discussions politiques entre les deux parties, et aucun cadre politique concret pour le contrôle des armements et les autres négociations. Le Premier ministre est intéressé à voir si des conditions plus propices peuvent être instaurées en vue de permettre des contacts constructifs entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

L'initiative comporte un certain nombre de propositions spécifiques - a) une conférence des cinq puissances nucléaires en vue de limiter les arsenaux nucléaires stratégiques; b) un effort politique concerté pour renforcer le régime de non-prolifération nucléaire; c) un réengagement politique de l'Occident envers les Pourparlers de Vienne sur des réductions mutuelles et équilibrées des forces pour tenter de hausser le seuil nucléaire en Europe en stabilisant l'équilibre des forces classiques à des niveaux d'armement moindres; d) l'inauguration de la Conférence de Stockholm à un niveau politique élevé.

-2-

L'initiative comporte également des propositions visant

- a) l'interdiction de la mise à l'essai et du déploiement de systèmes antisatellite de haute altitude; b) l'exigence que les futurs systèmes stratégiques puissent être vérifiés par des moyens techniques nationaux; et
- c) des restrictions posées à la mobilité des missiles balistiques intercontinentaux (ICBM).

CALENDRIER DES PRINCIPALES ACTIVITÉS

- 1. Le Premier ministre rencontre le Vice-premier ministre, le ministre de la Défense nationale et des hauts fonctionnaires; création d'un Groupe spécial (21 septembre).
- 2. Le Premier ministre rencontre le Vice-premier ministre, le ministre de la Défense nationale, des hauts fonctionnaires et des ambassadeurs au lac Meach (7 octobre).
- 3. Le Premier ministre envoie des lettres à tous les chefs de gouvernement de l'OTAN (22-25 octobre).
- 4. Le Premier ministre prononce une allocution à l'université de Guelph (27 octobre).
- 5. Le Premier ministre envoie des lettres aux dirigeants soviétique et chinois (début novembre).

-3-

6. Le Premier ministre rencontre le Président Mitterrand (France), le Premier ministre Lubbers et la Reine Beatrix (Pays-Bas), le Premier ministre Martens (Belgique), Sa Sainteté le Pape, le Premier ministre Craxi (Italie), le Chancelier Kohl (Allemagne de l'Ouest) et le Premier ministre Thatcher (Grande-Bretagne) (8-11 novembre).
7. Le Premier ministre prononce une allocution à Montréal (13 novembre).
8. Le Premier ministre rencontre le Premier ministre du Japon, M. Nakasone (19 novembre).
9. Le représentant personnel du Premier ministre (Geoffrey Pearson) visite Pékin (21-22 novembre) et Moscou (25-26 novembre).
10. Le Premier ministre participe à la Rencontre des Chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth à New Delhi (22-27 novembre).
11. Le Premier ministre se rend en visite à Pékin (28-29 novembre).
12. Le Vice-premier ministre et secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures participe aux réunions ministérielles de l'OTAN (8-9 décembre).
13. Le Premier ministre rencontre, sur une période de six semaines, d'éminents experts des questions nucléaires et des relations

-4-

Est-Ouest: Robert McNamara, le Général Rogers, le Général Brent Scowcroft, George Kennan, des membres du Harvard Nuclear Study Group, et Georgi Arbatov (octobre-novembre).

14. Le Premier ministre rend visite au Président Reagan à Washington (15 décembre).
15. Le Premier ministre rencontre le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies (11 janvier).
16. Visite du Premier ministre de la Chine, M. Zhao Ziyang (16-20 janvier).
17. Le Premier ministre se rend en visite en Tchécoslovaquie, en Allemagne de l'Est et en Roumanie (24 janvier - 2 février).
18. Discours du Premier ministre à la Chambre des communes (9 février).
19. Le Premier ministre rencontre le Secrétaire général soviétique Techerneko à Moscou (15 février).

- 5 -

REACTIONS

Le Premier ministre a reçu un appui encourageant pour les grands objectifs politiques de son initiative lors des consultations qu'il a eues avec les alliés européens, les dirigeants chinois, le Président Nakasone du Japon et le Président Reagan. Le Premier ministre a constaté que ses interlocuteurs partageaient généralement son analyse de l'état dangereux des relations Est-Ouest et qu'ils étaient conscients de la nécessité de rétablir le dialogue politique.

De plus, les Chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth ont spécifiquement endossé l'initiative du Premier ministre Trudeau dans la Déclaration de Goa sur la sécurité internationale, laquelle reflétait le point de vue du Premier ministre quant au sérieux de la situation actuelle ainsi qu'à l'importance de donner un nouvel élan politique à la recherche de la sécurité internationale. Le Secrétaire général Perez de Cuellar a loué et encouragé les efforts du Premier ministre.

Le Premier ministre a engagé le dialogue avec les dirigeants de l'Europe de l'Est en Tchécoslovaquie, en Allemagne de l'Est et en Roumanie, et il s'est entretenu des relations Est-Ouest avec le Secrétaire général soviétique Tchernenko, qui a décrit l'initiative de paix comme utile et positive.

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RÉSULTATS

L'appui que le Premier ministre a reçu pour les grands objectifs de son initiative est en soi un résultat positif en autant qu'il peut avoir un effet bénéfique sur le climat des relations Est-Ouest. Les décisions prises à la Réunion ministérielle de l'OTAN tenue à Bruxelles au début de décembre ont appuyé tout particulièrement les objectifs de l'initiative; elles comprenaient notamment:

- a) un engagement des ministres des Affaires étrangères de l'OTAN d'assister à l'ouverture de la Conférence de Stockholm, suivi d'une décision du Pacte de Varsovie de demander à ses ministres d'y assister également;
- b) un engagement de réexaminer la position de l'OTAN sur les négociations MBFR;
- c) la "Déclaration de Bruxelles" qui engage l'OTAN à rechercher une "détente véritable" ainsi qu'un dialogue constructif tenant compte des intérêts de sécurité du bloc de l'Est et excluant toute tentative pour obtenir la supériorité;
- d) une décision de revoir l'état des relations Est-Ouest pour rechercher des moyens de les améliorer.

- 7 -

D'autres signes de progrès se sont fait jour. Outre qu'elles ont atténué quelque peu la violence de leur rhétorique, les deux superpuissances ont indiqué récemment - le Président Reagan dans son discours du 15 janvier et le Secrétaire général Tchernenko lors de sa rencontre avec le Premier ministre - l'importance qu'elles attachent au dialogue politique.

La Conférence de Stockholm s'est ouverte sur le rétablissement des contacts politiques entre l'Est et l'Ouest pour la première fois depuis la clôture abrupte de la Conférence de Madrid en septembre dernier.

Des dirigeants politiques occidentaux, y compris les Premiers ministres Trudeau et Thatcher, se sont rendus à l'Est pour ouvrir de nouvelles lignes de communication.

Il a été convenu de reprendre les négociations MBFR à Vienne, le 16 mars. Tous ces faits indiquent un renversement de la tendance - visible à l'automne 1983 - à la détérioration des relations Est-Ouest.



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2. From (Work-Unit) - De (Unité de travail) IDDZ				3. Address - Adresse CH			
4. Authorizing Officer - Agent responsable JAMNELL				5. Title or rank - Titre ou rang MISTAKE FORCE			
6. Tel. No. - N° de tél. 55912				7. Signature <i>[Signature]</i>			
DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT TO BE TRANSLATED - DESCRIPTION DU DOCUMENT À TRADUIRE							
8. Title or Subject - Titre ou sujet PM'S INITIATIVE						9. Number of pages - Nbre de pages 5	
10. Type - Nature <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> report rapport <input type="checkbox"/> directive <input type="checkbox"/> correspondence <input type="checkbox"/> publication <input type="checkbox"/> work instrument instrument de travail <input type="checkbox"/> other autre			11. Destination - Diffusion <input type="checkbox"/> Outside the Public Service, and/or À l'extérieur de la fonction publique, et/ou <input type="checkbox"/> Within the Public Service À l'intérieur de la fonction publique			12. Source Language - Langue de départ ENGLISH	
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21. If the service requested is for amendment of a previously translated text, please indicate relevant request No. S'il s'agit de la modification d'une traduction antérieure, veuillez indiquer le n° de la demande antérieure							
22. Relevant supporting documentation is attached - La documentation pertinente est annexée <input type="checkbox"/> No Non <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes (Please attach list) Oui (Veuillez annexer liste) (PREVIOUS TRANSLATION)							
23. Priority request - Priorité demandée: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1 <input type="checkbox"/> 2 <input type="checkbox"/> 3 <input type="checkbox"/> 4				24. Authority for first or second priority - Autorité invoquée pour première ou deuxième priorité PRIME MINISTER'S TASK FORCE			
25. Observations or special requests - Observations ou demandes spéciales WE WOULD BE VERY GRATEFUL IF THIS REVISION COULD BE COMPLETED BY THE END OF THE DAY TOMORROW. (13 MAR.) IT IS REQUIRED FOR BRIEFING A GROUP OF PARLIAMENTARIANS.							
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W'S

TO/À PSR
FROM/DE • IDDZ

ACC 336 483	REF	DATE
FILE 20-THAI-9	DOSSIER	
→ 28-6-1 - TRU DEAL REAG MESSION		

Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date March 13, 1984	
Number/Numéro IDDZ-0225	

REFERENCE • Your memo of Feb. 15, 1984
RÉFÉRENCE
SUBJECT • Visit of Thai Prime Minister.
SUJET

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

-1-

DISTRIBUTION

Attached, as requested, is a brief on the
Prime Minister's initiative.


L.A. Delvoie

Chairman

Task Force Working Group

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE

ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

ISSUE

The purpose of this brief is to discuss the current status of the Prime Minister's initiative.

BACKGROUND

The Prime Minister's central purpose is to try to stop and reverse the worsening trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce international tensions and risks of confrontation. His chief proposal addresses the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the two superpowers. The PM is interested in seeing if by opening lines of communication to Moscow more propitious conditions can be created for political dialogue between Moscow and Washington.

The initiative involves a number of specific proposals - (a) a conference of the five nuclear weapon states to limit strategic nuclear arsenals (b) a concerted political effort to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime (c) a substantive Western response to the Eastern proposals on MBFR and a meeting at the Foreign Minister level in Vienna (d) the inauguration of the Stockholm CDE Meeting at senior political level.

Also related to the initiative, but not pursued personally by the PM with other governments, are proposals for (a) a ban on the testing and deployment of high altitude anti-satellite systems (b) a requirement that future strategic systems be verifiable by National Technical Means and (c) restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs.

RESULTS

The degree of support which the Prime Minister has garnered for the main purposes of his initiative is of itself a positive result insofar as it may have a beneficial effect on the climate of East-West relations. The decisions taken at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels in early December were particularly significant in furthering the purposes of the initiative:

.../2

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

- (a) an undertaking by NATO foreign ministers to attend the opening of the CDE in Stockholm (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (b) an undertaking to review the NATO negotiating position in the MBFR negotiations (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (c) the "Brussels Declaration" which places heavy emphasis on genuine détente and dialogue in East-West relations (an FRG initiative, actively supported by the Canadian delegation);
- (d) a mandate given the permanent NATO Council to review the current state of East-West relations and to report to the next NATO ministerial meeting on what actions might be taken to improve them.

There have been additional signs of progress. There has been some moderation of the strident rhetoric of both superpowers, which have recently indicated the importance they attach to political dialogue, President Reagan in his speech of January 15 and General Secretary Chernenko in his meeting with the Prime Minister.

Broad political contact between East and West was re-established at the beginning of the Stockholm Conference for the first time since the acrimonious conclusion of the Madrid Conference last September.

Western political leaders, including the Prime Minister and Prime Minister Thatcher, have gone to the East to open lines of communication.

It has been agreed that the MBFR negotiations will resume in Vienna on March 16.

These are all indications of a change in the deteriorating trend in East-West relations that was apparent in the autumn of 1983.

TALKING POINTS

You might wish to review the current status of the Canadian initiative.

118

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO

K1A 0G2

March 13, 1984.

IDDZ-0229

Ms Carol Seaborn, Staff
Parliamentary Centre for
Foreign Affairs and
Foreign Trade
275 Slater, 5th Floor
Ottawa, Ontario

Dear Ms. Seaborn:

... In response to your memorandum of February 22,
I write to forward a background brief, in English and
French, on the Prime Minister's initiative.

Talking points and briefing material on the
Stockholm Conference are now being translated and should
reach your office Thursday.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Gary J. Smith".

for Gary J. Smith
Task Force Working Group



Parliamentary Centre for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade

Le Centre Parlementaire pour les Affaires étrangères et le Commerce extérieur

MEMORANDUM TO Mr. Gary Smith February 22, 1984
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Division
Department of External Affairs

FROM Carol Seaborn, Staff
Canadian delegation to the 12th meeting
of the Canadian and European Parliaments

RE Preparation and Briefing of the Canadian Parliamentarians
prior to the meeting with the European Parliament's
delegation in Strasbourg, March 26 to 29, 1984

Thank you for agreeing to brief the Canadian MPs and Senators prior to their meeting next month with the delegation from the European Parliament. A copy of the draft agenda for this year's meeting is attached. Miss Aileen Nicholson, MP, Chairman of the Canada-European Parliamentary Association will lead the Canadian delegation and Sir James Scott-Hopkins, a British Conservative Euro-MP will lead the European delegation in the discussions at Strasbourg. A complete list of the Canadian delegation is not yet available. Nor have we been informed as to the make-up of the European delegation.

As we agreed by telephone, you will be briefing the Canadian delegation at luncheon on Tuesday, March 20 at 12:15 p.m. (Please check the enclosed briefing schedule.) The luncheon will be held in Room 574 of the Wellington Block (otherwise known as the South Block or the former Met Life Building) at the south-east corner of Bank and Wellington Streets.

Your briefing will cover the agenda topics of the Stockhold Conference and the Trudeau initiative in East-West relations.

For this year's briefings the Canadian Parliamentarians have requested that briefing officers provide the background material and briefing notes a week in advance of the briefing date. This will give the Parliamentarians time to read the

- 2 -

material and inform themselves to some extent beforehand. The idea is that your oral briefing on various subjects could be limited to introductory remarks -- a highlighting of the main points from Canada's perspective and, wherever possible, pointing out the possible different points of view of the European side. Subsequently a more thorough discussion of the topics can be opened up at the luncheon through questioning by the delegates.

Could you send me the briefing material in time for me to have it distributed at least one week before your briefing, please? It should be in both official languages. May I suggest that some talking points could be helpful to the Parliamentarians on these large subjects?

Please phone me (237-0143) if you have any problems or questions.

Encl.

TWELFTH MEETING OF DELEGATIONS FROM THE CANADIAN & EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS

STRASBOURG, MARCH 25-30, 1984

BRIEFING SCHEDULE FOR CANADIAN DELEGATION

Tuesday lunch	Wednesday lunch	Thursday lunch
<p>March 13, 12:15 p.m. R.574 Wellington Block</p> <p>Briefer: <u>W.A. Dymond</u> Director European Relations Division DEA</p> <p>Subjects: - Introduction to the E.C. - Overview of Can.E.C. trade - Fisheries - Newsprint - CAP irritants</p> <p>Note: any subjects not covered Tuesday will be carried over to Wednesday's briefing by Mr. Dymond.</p>	<p>March 14, 12:15 p.m. R.574 Wellington Block</p> <p>Briefers: <u>W.A. Dymond</u> Director European Relations Division DEA</p> <p><u>Mark Moher</u> Director Nuclear Division Energy, Transport & Science Bureau, DEA</p> <p>Subjects: - Liquor Board practices) Dymond - Canadian Import Policy) - Canada-Euratom Agreement) Moher on uranium supply)</p>	<p>March 15, 12:15 p.m. R.574 Wellington Block</p> <p>Briefer: <u>A.R.A. Gherson</u> Director-General European Community Relations DEA</p> <p>Subjects: - Overview and assessment of the European Community today - the European Parliament - the Framework Agreement</p>
<p>March 20, 12:15 p.m. R.574 Wellington Block</p> <p>Briefer: <u>Gary Smith</u> Director Arms Control and Disarmament Division DEA</p> <p>Subject: - The Stockholm Conference - The Trudeau initiative in East-West relations</p>	<p>March 21, 12:15 p.m. R.574 Wellington Block</p> <p>Briefers: <u>R. Elliott</u> Director General Middle East Bureau, DEA</p> <p><u>P. Sutherland</u>, Director International Financial and Investment Affairs Div. DEA</p> <p>Subjects: - The Middle East - Lebanon (Elliott) - New Canadian Banking legislation - Consensus on Competition on Export Credits (Sutherland)</p>	<p>March 22, 12:15 p.m. R.574 Wellington Block</p> <p>Briefer: <u>Stephen Heeney</u> Director Energy and Environment Div. DEA</p> <p>Subjects: 1. Environment: Forest conservation; acid rain 2. Energy: Update on Canadian situation; progress on the development of new energy sources.</p>



XIIth Annual Meeting
Strasbourg - March 25-30, 1984

DRAFT AGENDA

I) Bilateral Issues

1. The situation in the Fishing Industry after the recent Agreement between Canada and the E.C.
2. Newsprint Exports to the E.C.
3. Specific trade irritants under the CAP
 - a) Cereal Substitutes
 - b) Oil and Fats
 - c) Meat
4. Renewal of the Canada Euratom Agreement on Uranium Supply
5. Canadian Provincial Liquor Board Practices Regarding Imports of Spirits
6. New Canadian Import Policy
7. New Canadian Banking Legislation

II) Issues of Mutual Interest for Canada and the E.C.

1. Environment: Forest Conservation, Acid Rain
2. Energy: Update on Canadian Situation
Progress on the Development of
New Energy Sources
3. Consensus or Competition on Export Credit?

III) International Issues

1. The Stockholm Conference; the Trudeau initiative
2. Middle East-Lebanon

Canada Canada

TO/A The Canadian Embassy
PRAGUE

FROM/DE • The Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs, OTTAWA

REFERENCE • Your transmittal slip dated February 7
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Guest List - Banquet by PM Strougal
SUJET in honour of PM Trudeau, January 25


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UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
March 13, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0227

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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2. We would appreciate if you could arrange to send us a more legible copy.


The Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

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DATE

February 7, 1984

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Guest List - Banquet given by L. Strougal, Prime Minister
of the CSSR in Honour of PM Trudeau - January 25, 1984

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Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR

Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia

Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR

Prime Minister of the Republic of Azerbaijan

Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR

Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR

Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR

Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR and Chairman

of the State Commission for Coordination

Technical and Investment Development

Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR

Chairman of the State Planning Commission

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Minister of National Security of the USSR

Minister of Defense of the USSR

Minister of the Interior

Minister of the Health and Social

Minister of General Engineering

Minister of Microelectronics Industry

Minister of Agricultural Machinery

Minister of Transportation

Minister of Communications

Minister of the Federal Reserve Bank

Minister of the USSR, Deputy Chairman of

the State Planning Commission

Deputy Chairman of the National Front of the USSR

Mayor of the Capital of the USSR

Head of Bureau of the Presidential Administration

of the USSR

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Government of the USSR

Head of Press Department of the Ministry of
Presidium of Government of the USSR

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Presidium of Government of the USSR

Head of Department

Head of Department of the Ministry of
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Deputy Head of Department of Foreign Affairs
and Protocol of the Bureau of the Ministry of
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Interpreter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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TO/À DMF

FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET • Gary Hart on Defence and Arms Control

Security/Sécurité
RESTRICTED
Accession/Référence
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Date
March 13, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0226

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At my request, the Embassy in Washington sent us yesterday what it regards as the best available short statement of Senator Hart's views and positions on defence and arms control issues. It takes the form of an article which Hart recently published in "Arms Control Today". I attach a copy for your information.

2. On reading this article against the background of some of Senator Hart's recent public statements, I think that there is reason to bear in mind our Embassy's comment that:

"Despite having enunciated in some detail his positions on a range of issues, there remains some doubt about Hart's real dedication to those... This may reflect Hart's remarkable success in giving the impression that his place in the political right-left spectrum is all in the eye of the beholder."


L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

MESSAGE

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
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TO/A	TO EXTOTT LIDDZ BY FAX		
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Gary Hart

Overall View. The first test of security for America and its allies, indeed the only test, must be to freeze and then reverse the nuclear arms race. We must create new measures to prevent nuclear war through miscalculation and design a comprehensive effort to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists. The continued animosity and deep seated political and philosophical incompatibilities between the U.S. and the Soviet Union are the obvious obstacles to quick resolution of the arms race. Our primary challenge in the years to come will be our ability to manage relations with the Soviet Union so that neither country threatens the national security of the other. As President, I would seek a mutual, verifiable freeze on the production, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union. This would include a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and an Anti-satellite Treaty. And only I have urged a new approach—to initiate Strategic Talks on Prevention (STOP) with the Soviets to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by accident or miscalculation (See ACT, May 1982). In addition, I would:

- Urge immediate ratification of the SALT II Treaty as the most effective way to get greater control over the arms race.
- Seek to create a joint U.S.-Soviet crisis monitoring center to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation.
- Negotiate substantial reductions in current nuclear stockpiles, focused on destabilizing systems on each side.
- Seek general agreement on intermediate nuclear forces (INF) by combining these negotiations with START and proposing to incorporate British and French nuclear systems in the discussions.
- Put special emphasis on controlling the export of nuclear technology to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the prospect of terrorists obtaining nuclear materials.
- Promote an independent Arms Control and Disarmament Agency with the appointment of a director genuinely devoted to arms control who has my personal confidence.

I would also end the directionless and expensive concept of building "bargaining chip" systems, which

negotiating history has shown become constituency-ridden items impossible to "bargain" away. I see no need, for example, for systems such as the B-1 bomber or the MX missile, which are expensive and strategically obsolete and, in the case of the MX, essentially destabilizing to the strategic balance.

As a Senator and a supporter of the nuclear freeze movement, I fully understand the need for public support for national defense policy and the requirement for Congressional involvement. In arms control, this Administration continues to ignore public opinion and concern by its loose talk of "winnable nuclear war" and its rush to deploy destabilizing systems such as the MX.

I believe in the common sense of the American people. I believe they know a secure America means being more than just the greatest military power. I believe they have a vision of a secure America beyond the nuclear nightmare—an America at peace with itself as well as with the rest of the world.

Nuclear Force Modernization. Modernization of our nuclear forces is necessary and ongoing. The questions are those of systems to be selected and numbers to be procured. For years, the defense debate has been divided between "hawks" seeking more funds for defense and "doves" seeking less. Each argues that its position on defense is "better." In my view, more is not better; less is not better; only "better" is "better."

To underscore this position, I have prepared an alternative defense budget stressing military reform. I have urged the elimination of a variety of systems including the B-1 bomber, the MX ICBM, and the neutron bomb. I have urged this not because they are nuclear or expensive but because they are either obsolete, destabilizing or ineffective.

As President, I will direct a system by system review of current U.S. nuclear forces and projected changes. I will emphasize those that are stabilizing and survivable. I will eliminate those designed primarily for nuclear war-fighting, and those which generate destabilizing tensions or are redundant. I believe that a modern bomber employing advanced technology could be an effective, stabilizing element of our strategic deterrent. Likewise, I believe that any ICBM replacement should carry only a single warhead and be mobile to prevent the destabilizing perception of a first strike capability associated with the MX. The cruise missile could be considered such a weapon, and its slow speed makes it an even more unlikely first strike weapon. However, the small size and mobility of the cruise missile could present verification problems. Our cruise missile program must therefore be carefully and cautiously pursued so that cruise missiles, like all missiles, can be verifiably included in a freeze.

Equally important, however, I will seek to develop a more effective U.S. military establishment with more effective conventional forces. Such a reformed military establishment, armed with more cost-effective weapons and trained to emphasize firepower and maneuver rather than the current attrition tactics, will raise the nuclear threshold. Our military should be sufficiently strong so that any recourse to nuclear weapons will obviously be a last resort.

Space Warfare. It is a cruel and dangerous hoax for this Administration to promise an increase in American security through "Star Wars" weapons like anti-satellite systems and space-based ballistic missile defense sys-

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tems. Such systems can only endanger our security by creating an expensive and fruitless arms race in space and establishing an entirely new generation of weapons that would undermine deterrence and stability. We should negotiate a strengthened anti-ballistic missile treaty that more clearly prohibits space-based missile defense, and we should take advantage of the fact that effective anti-satellite weapons have yet to be tested by either side to negotiate a ban on these weapons.

President Reagan's "Star Wars" proposal of a ballistic missile defense in space is technically unworkable and strategically unsound. Any such system could be easily and inexpensively countered by further Soviet offensive deployments—if we can shoot down 1,000 missiles, they will build 2,000 or more. In addition, any space-based energy-beam system could not work against bombers and cruise missiles in the lower atmosphere. A space-based defensive system could also be attacked and destroyed by any number of means or evaded through decoys and other countermeasures. Overall, the technical problems of a space-based defense system are simply staggering. Richard DeLauer, Undersecretary of Defense for Research, recently testified before Congress that Reagan's proposed defense system poses eight serious technical problems, each of which would require an effort on the scale of the Apollo project or the Manhattan project to solve—if they can be solved at all. Since nuclear weapons are so devastating, this technically complex system would have to be 100 percent effective, which is for all practical purposes impossible.

While an effective low-altitude, anti-satellite capability is technically feasible, it is as strategically ill-advised as space-based defense. The threatened satellites are crucial in providing the intelligence and communications necessary to deter nuclear war and prevent nuclear accidents. We now have perhaps the best opportunity there will ever be to ban anti-satellite weapons. Once our small ASAT is tested against targets in space, verification will be extremely difficult. It is much easier to ban weapons on the drawing board than in the arsenals. Accordingly, I have cosponsored with Senators Hatfield and Tsongas a resolution calling on the Administration to negotiate a ban on ASAT weapons and prevent an arms race in space. We can ill afford to spend money on destabilizing space weapons when our stabilizing defense forces on earth need our continued support.

Nuclear Proliferation. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB) is a long time personal goal. It could serve as a precursor to the ultimate objective of a "freeze" on production and deployment of nuclear weapons as well as on their testing. There is no longer either technical or political need for continued testing—the need to assure the reliability of our weapons has been obviated by hundreds of past successful tests. Testing for the sake of testing is a policy of deliberate blindness. Consequently, a CTB would be timely and appropriate, moving us beyond the negotiated but never ratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) which we continue to observe. Some of the most extensive and potentially effective verification measures ever negotiated are incorporated in the CTB. The Administration, however, by failing to ratify the TTBT and professing disinterest in a CTB, which both Republican and Democratic predecessors had pursued, demonstrates its disinterest in even the first steps to real arms control.



I believe that the U.S. and other nuclear weapons states have a special responsibility to restrain the export of sensitive nuclear technologies, to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by other states, and to assure that nuclear weapons do not fall into the hands of extra national groups and terrorists. As President, I would recommend an international conference of nuclear weapon states to focus on steps to prevent nuclear proliferation (a treaty commitment to prohibit commercial plutonium production would be a positive step) and assure the security of existing nuclear weapons from seizure by terrorists.

Other Weapons. Since I first entered the Senate almost a decade ago, I have strongly opposed any increases in our existing stockpiles of chemical weapons (CW). Increases in our chemical weapons arsenal would not improve our security since our existing stockpile of such weapons is already a formidable deterrent. Producing more chemical weapons would only draw money from more important defense items, including training and equipping our troops so that chemical weapons cannot be effectively used against them. Ironically, this Administration has cut funds for such defenses against chemical weapons at the same time that it has asked for money to produce these weapons. Accordingly, I have cosponsored resolutions in the Senate supporting a ban on the production of new chemical weapons and urging negotiations toward CW limitation.

Concerning conventional defense, I have always supported strong U.S. conventional forces. I have devoted my efforts on the Senate Armed Services Committee to assuring not less defense or more defense, but better defense. A better defense requires more reliable, less complex weapons that can be less expensively built and more effectively used. By spending too much in the wrong areas, the Administration is leading to a three-fold defense debacle in procurement, readiness, and retainment. The detailed alternative defense budget that I have offered, by contrast, would save \$21 billion in FY 1984 alone, and by reducing the excesses of the current budget and adding to areas in need of funds, it would strengthen our defense as well. Finally, we need to reform our military tactics as well as our military forces, particularly in order to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe.

◊ See page 12.

Gary Hart . . . from page seven

This Administration's approach to conventional defense and its arms sales policies are also disconcerting. Arms sales to our friends and allies are indeed an important and necessary component of our defense and foreign policies. The frequently indiscriminate arms sales under this Administration, however, have made the world a more dangerous place, lent support to repressive governments, and generally increased the potential for military conflicts in the Third World. U.S. arms sales to the Third World in 1982 were a record \$15.3 billion, more than 20 percent higher than the previous high and 50 percent higher than those of the U.S.S.R. Our arms sales policies, like our defense policies in general, must be consistent with our peaceful and humanitarian ideals. We should renew talks with the Soviets, broken off during the Carter Administration, on sales of conventional weapons. While immediate results are unlikely, as such talks cannot achieve much given the present state of U.S.-Soviet relations, renewed negotiation would at least acknowledge the problem and perhaps establish a basis for future agreement.

Monitoring. The issue of verification lies at the heart of arms control. As a substitute for "trusting" the Soviets—which we should not—we must be able to assure that they hold to the letter of any agreement with us. And this means that our agreements cannot have any ambi-

guities or provisions upon which "agreement" is only the step before disagreement. An agreement under constant challenge erodes its original purpose and is little better than no agreement.

There are a wide range of challenges to Soviet behavior relating to many of our mutual arms control agreements: SALT I and SALT II, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Biological Warfare Convention. None of these challenges have been "proved" in a court of law and, of course, no such legal test is possible. Nevertheless, the range of alleged violations on these and other agreements has convinced many observers that violations have occurred. Soviet responses to our concerns frequently have been unconvincing.

The Soviets appear to take the position that it is our problem that we are not convinced by their answers and that it is our responsibility to prove that they are in compliance with any agreement. This is a fundamental difference in world outlook which is impossible to resolve short of a challenge-style, on-site inspection procedure. We should be working toward such a mechanism not as some distant abstract goal but as the basis for future agreements. Indeed, we are reaching the point with systems such as cruise missiles where conventional and nuclear systems are virtually indistinguishable and where the traditional approach of "national technical means" for verification (essentially satellite reconnaissance) will no longer suffice. In such instances, the only realistic approach will be a system of direct inspection. ■

TO/A PSR
FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE • Your memo of Feb. 15, 1984
RÉFÉRENCE
SUBJECT • Visit of Thai Prime Minister.
SUJET


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Date	March 13, 1984
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0225

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

-1-

DISTRIBUTION

Attached, as requested, is a brief on the
Prime Minister's initiative.


L.A. Delvoie

Chairman

Task Force Working Group

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE

ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

ISSUE

The purpose of this brief is to discuss the current status of the Prime Minister's initiative.

BACKGROUND

The Prime Minister's central purpose is to try to stop and reverse the worsening trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce international tensions and risks of confrontation. His chief proposal addresses the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the two superpowers. The PM is interested in seeing if by opening lines of communication to Moscow more propitious conditions can be created for political dialogue between Moscow and Washington.

The initiative involves a number of specific proposals - (a) a conference of the five nuclear weapon states to limit strategic nuclear arsenals (b) a concerted political effort to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime (c) a substantive Western response to the Eastern proposals on MBFR and a meeting at the Foreign Minister level in Vienna (d) the inauguration of the Stockholm CDE Meeting at senior political level.

Also related to the initiative, but not pursued personally by the PM with other governments, are proposals for (a) a ban on the testing and deployment of high altitude anti-satellite systems (b) a requirement that future strategic systems be verifiable by National Technical Means and (c) restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs.

RESULTS

The degree of support which the Prime Minister has garnered for the main purposes of his initiative is of itself a positive result insofar as it may have a beneficial effect on the climate of East-West relations. The decisions taken at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels in early December were particularly significant in furthering the purposes of the initiative:

.../2

- 2 -

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- (a) an undertaking by NATO foreign ministers to attend the opening of the CDE in Stockholm (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (b) an undertaking to review the NATO negotiating position in the MBFR negotiations (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (c) the "Brussels Declaration" which places heavy emphasis on genuine détente and dialogue in East-West relations (an FRG initiative, actively supported by the Canadian delegation);
- (d) a mandate given the permanent NATO Council to review the current state of East-West relations and to report to the next NATO ministerial meeting on what actions might be taken to improve them.

There have been additional signs of progress. There has been some moderation of the strident rhetoric of both superpowers, which have recently indicated the importance they attach to political dialogue, President Reagan in his speech of January 15 and General Secretary Chernenko in his meeting with the Prime Minister.

Broad political contact between East and West was re-established at the beginning of the Stockholm Conference for the first time since the acrimonious conclusion of the Madrid Conference last September.

Western political leaders, including the Prime Minister and Prime Minister Thatcher, have gone to the East to open lines of communication.

It has been agreed that the MBFR negotiations will resume in Vienna on March 16.

These are all indications of a change in the deteriorating trend in East-West relations that was apparent in the autumn of 1983.

TALKING POINTS

You might wish to review the current status of the Canadian initiative.

Canada Canada

TO/A Distribution List

FROM/DE • PSR

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SUBJECT •
SUJET • Visit of Prime Minister Prem of Thailand
to Canada

Mr. 14

*Mr. Mewee
A. J. J. J.*

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Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	February 15, 1984
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... Attached at Annex A is a list of briefing material which will be required for the forthcoming visit of Prime Minister Prem to Canada April 8 to 12, 1984. Prime Minister Prem will be visiting Ottawa April 10 and 11, during which time there will be substantive bilateral discussions between the Thai Prime Minister and Prime Minister Trudeau. During the course of his stay in Canada, Prime Minister Prem will also be visiting Vancouver and Toronto.

2. The attached outline lists briefing topics and identifies those divisions in this Department assigned primary drafting or coordinating responsibility. It is incumbent upon the action divisions to ensure that the briefs receive intra-and inter-departmental clearance, as necessary, before they are forwarded to PSR. (In cases where several divisions are involved the action division is underlined). Other government departments listed as primary drafters will be contacted directly by this division.


3. Briefs must be drafted in conformity with the instructions contained in the Under-Secretary's memorandum of February 3, 1983. Subject matter should be limited to two pages, single spaced, Courier 10 type and follow the format set out in Annex B. Talking points should be in the third person and limited to essential elements. They are to be prepared on a separate page and should be double spaced, Courier 10 type, with adequate space between individual discussion points to permit note taking. Responsive talking points should be so noted. A sample brief is attached at Annex C.

...

.../2

- 2 -

4. Briefs should be supplied to PSR in final form by Wednesday, March 14. Any questions or suggestions concerning the addition or deletion of briefs should be directed to Wendell Sanford (6-7350).



A. G. Vincent
Director
South and Southeast Asia
Relations Division

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ANNEX A

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER PREM: BRIEFS REQUIRED

OVERVIEW AND SCENARIO BOOK

Programme-----PSR
Overview-----PSR
Reflections on Thailand-----PSR
Gen. Prem's Preoccupations-----PSR
Thailand Fact Sheet-----PSR
Meeting Scenarios-----PSR
Biographical Notes-----PSR

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ANNEX A

BACKGROUND BRIEFING BOOK

GENERAL BACKGROUND BRIEFS

Thailand: Internal Political and Economic Situation----PSR

Thailand: Foreign Policy-----PSR

Canada/Thailand Bilateral Issues-----PSR/PST
CIDA/BST

DISCUSSION BRIEFS: MULTILATERAL POLITICAL ISSUES

ASEAN-----PSR

Pacific Community Concept-----PPR

Afghanistan-----PSR

Peace and Stability in Asia and the Pacific (ZOPFAN)----PSR

Japan and Southeast Asia-----PPR

China and Southeast Asia-----PER

Situation on the Korean Peninsula-----PER

PM's Initiative on East-West Relations in International
Security-----IDDZ

DISCUSSION BRIEFS: MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC ISSUES

North-South Dialogue-----EEA

World Economic Situation-----EER

International Commodity Trade (to discuss inter alia
International Tin Agreement
International Natural Rubber Agreement)-----EER

Export Earnings Stabilization-----EEA

GATT - Post Ministerial-----EPG

International Debt and Financial Situation-----EEF

Asian Development Bank-----PSR

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DISCUSSION BRIEFS: INDOCHINA

Cambodia: Internal Situation-----PER
Cambodia: Search for a Solution-----PER
Cambodia: Relief Operations-----PER/SIM
Vietnam: Development Assistance-----PER
Alleged Use of Chemical/Biological Weapons in Laos and
Cambodia-----PER/IDA/
PSR
Refugees-----PSP/IMU/
SIM/PER
Anti-Piracy Program-----PSR/SISR
Thai Relations with Vietnam and Laos-----PSR/PER

DISCUSSION BRIEFS: BILATERAL ISSUES

Major Trade and Commercial Objectives-----PST/TDO
Defence Related Trade Objectives-----TDO/PST
Trade in Textiles and Clothing-----EST/PST/EEA
Human Rights-----PSR/IMU
Expo '86-----SCE
Development Assistance-----CIDA/BST
Military Training Assistance-----IDR
Narcotics-----PSR
Academic Relations-----SCR
Cultural Relations (including Grands Ballets Canadiens)SCA
Transfer of Offenders-----SIC

ANNEX B

CLASSIFICATION

T I T L E

ISSUE

BACKGROUND

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CANADIAN POSITION

MALAYSIAN POSITION

ANNEX C

CONFIDENTIAL

THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
(ASEAN)

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), composed of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, was founded in 1967 to promote peace, stability and development in Southeast Asia. Canada regards ASEAN as an important element in promoting peace and security in Southeast Asia particularly through seeking a political solution to the continuing problem of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. The expansion of political cooperation on a variety of international issues between ASEAN countries has permitted it to achieve an enhanced significance. Commercially, the countries which comprise ASEAN are becoming an increasingly attractive market for a wide range of Canadian goods and services.

BACKGROUND

In 1974 PM Trudeau wrote in the Far Eastern Economic Review that "our support for ASEAN and relations with its member countries are an important element in Canada's goal of seeking closer relations with the Pacific region". In keeping with this perception, a formal "dialogue" relationship was established with ASEAN in 1976. At the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting with dialogue partner countries in Kuala Lumpur in 1980 Canada proposed an Economic Co-operation Agreement which came into effect in June 1982. Under its aegis a Joint Co-operation Committee of senior officials met for the first time in April 1983 to explore possibilities for cooperation in industrial, technical, commercial and developmental sectors. The next JCC will likely convene in September or October 1984 to assess progress and to identify new areas of cooperation.

A very important aspect of the Canada/ASEAN relationship is the participation of the SSEA in the annual ASEAN Foreign Ministers Post Ministerial Conference together with Foreign Ministers from other dialogue partner countries (USA, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the EEC). This event allows for an exchange of views with both ASEAN and dialogue partners, with the focus on issues affecting the Southeast Asian region. At the 1983 dialogue meeting in Bangkok, Canada strongly endorsed the ASEAN position on Cambodia and reaffirmed its commitment to providing a haven for refugees from the Indochina countries.

In economic terms the relationship is also significant. Two way trade between Canada and ASEAN has trebled during the past five years and now amounts to over \$1 billion annually; CIDA plans to triple its development assistance allocation to the ASEAN region - from \$7 to \$21 million per annum; there is of course a very substantial bilateral programme in Indonesia and a growing programme in Thailand; there are now over 10,000 students from ASEAN countries studying in Canada; Canadian investments in ASEAN have been growing significantly to slightly over \$1 billion. As the ASEAN economies continue to record impressive growth there is potential for

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considerable Canadian commercial involvement in a number of large infrastructure projects. The growth in Canadian interest in the region has also been reflected in the number of senior political figures who have visited the region including, in 1983, the Prime Minister, the SSEA, the Minister for International Trade, and the Defence Minister. In addition the region's economic vitality has attracted visiting delegations from provincial governments including Ontario (Premier Davis and Industry Minister Miller) and Alberta (Economic Development Minister Schmid).

CANADIAN POSITION

Canada strongly supports ASEAN as a group of free market economies presenting an attractive contrast to the totalitarian regimes in Indochina and a major factor for regional growth and stability. ASEAN countries generally adopt moderate positions within international organizations (UN, OPEC, LOS, Group of 77) and they have proved to be valuable interlocutors for Canada in this context. Canada has been an active supporter of ASEAN efforts to find a political solution to the problem in Cambodia. In addition Canada has earned considerable goodwill by accepting about 80,000 Indochinese refugees whose presence in ASEAN countries had the potential to create serious social problems. From a strategic and security point of view ASEAN is important as it straddles the vital sea lanes between Middle East oil suppliers and Japan, one of Canada's most important trading partners.

MALAYSIAN POSITION

Membership in ASEAN is the paramount foreign policy priority of the Malaysian government. Malaysia particularly appreciates the capacity of the ASEAN "club" of leaders not only to formulate joint policy approaches on issues such as Cambodia and Afghanistan but also to defuse potential disputes over issues such as boundary disagreements. This factor is of particular importance for Malaysia which during the early 1960's was in a state of armed confrontation with Indonesia; has ongoing boundary disagreements with the Philippines; a complex relationship with Singapore which withdrew from union with Malaysia; and a shared counter insurgency problem with Thailand. While the Cambodian question has been the prime external catalyst in helping to engender closer political co-operation within ASEAN, Malaysia sees benefit in other areas from continued involvement and support of this regional grouping. ASEAN has tended to act in concert in addressing international economic issues such as commodity agreements, the GATT, airline negotiations and textiles issues. Malaysia (and its ASEAN neighbours) have benefitted from presenting a strong unified voice particularly in their deliberations with developed countries.

TALKING POINTS

1. Responsive only

Canada does not recognize the North Korean régime, and its official contacts continue to be governed by that criterion, as will the question of entry to Canada by North Korean nationals.

2. Responsive only

In conformity with our international obligations and our respect of the principle of universality, Canada will permit entry of North Korean officials to attend ICAO meetings in Montreal, and will not bar North Korean involvement in other UN organizations.



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

13 MAR 84 162472
DELBY 140800

10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0224 13MAR84
TO/À TO BAGHDAD/McNAB DE McNEE
INFO
DISTR ---JA McNAB
REF FOR SEVERAL DAYS,PARENTS HAVE TRIED TO RING EMB UNSUCCESSFULLY.
SUBJ/SUJ GRATEFUL YOU CALL THEM IN FLORIDA (813)472-1358 MIDNIGHT THEIR
TIME IN NEXT FEW DAYS AND BY MIDNIGHT,THURS.15 AT LATEST.NO/NO
CAUSE FOR ALARM.CHEERS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. McNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE

001171

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
A EXTOTT/IDDZUNCLASSIFIED
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO.

DATE
13 MARCH 1984

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
1	CANADA: TRUDEAU'S PEACE INITIATIVE CONTINUES	
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
DATE	SIGNATURE	S.B. HANSON Canadian Embassy Belgrade

A

B1

B3

EXTOTT / 1DDZ

BORBA 03&04 03 84
VJESNIK 03 03 84

CANADA: TRUDEAU'S PEACE INITIATIVE CONTINUES

Ottawa (AP). - The peace initiative began by Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau in October of last year will continue despite the announced retirement of the statesman from the political scene.

This was stated by Louis Delvoie, chief of government committee that has been founded in order to continue the raised initiative on a world-wide basis.

mmt/40305-6

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BONN ZQAG8327 13MAR84

TO EXTOTT RCR DELIVER BY 131200

INFO CNGNY EMROTT/NASH

DISTR USS RGE RCD DMT EFB IFB IDDZ MINT SCD SCI

REF YOURTEL RCR0448 12MAR

---AMB MCPHAIL VISIT TO OTT:16-23 MAR

MCPHAILS TRAVEL PLANS NOW FINALIZED AS FOLLOWS:

WED 14MAR-DEP FRANKFURT PA 73 AT 1320 HRS,ARR NY JFK 1545 HRS

ARR 60TH STREET 1655 HRS.HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL.

THURS 15MAR-PROGRAM AT CONGEN NY-TO MEET FRG PRESS THAT COVERS
CDN AFFAIRS.

FRI 16MAR-ETA AT OTT 1115 HRS ON PM 33;1300-1500 HRS

HARRIS ACB.1615 ETD AC 166 TO MONCTON.WEEKEND SACKVILLE,NB

MILNER AV.TEL(506)536-1426 OR(506)536-1271.

RETURN TO OTT SUN 18MAR ETD AC 671 2045 HRS,ETA 2212 HRS

SKYLINE HOTEL.

ETD 23MAR AM-DEP FOR SYRACUSE NY.1700 HRS DEP FOR JFK ON PM 38.

HOTEL REQUESTED AIRPORT HILTON.

SORRY-MAR 23 - 30 - NO/NO LONGER AVAILABLE FOR SPEAKING ENGAGEMENTS
UNLESS SDACKVILLE MAR18.

UUU/005 131537Z ZQAG8327

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM ENATO YBGR6261 13MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO STKHM/SCDEL CANMILREPNATO VMBFR WSHDC BONN PARIS GENEV LDN

MOSCO NDEQOTT/CPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR IDAO IDAN IDDZ IDR RGX RBD

REF STKHM/SCDEL TEL 0261 12MAR

---STKHM CONF:PREPARATION FOR NATO MTG 20MAR

POL CTTEE HAS AGREED TO RECOMMENDATIONS PUT FORWARD BY CAUCUS IN STKHM CONCERNING AGENDA FOR FORTHCOMING REINFORCED MTG OF COUNCIL 20MAR. WHILE MAJORITY WAS IN FAVOUR OF SIMPLIFIED AGENDA, AS DEVISED BY CAUCUS, CHAIR HAS NONETHELESS ATTEMPTED TO PUT MORE FLESH INTO IT MUCH ALONG LINES OF PARA 1 OURTEL YBGR6235 06MAR, BUT TO NO/NO AVAIL AS IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THESE TOPICS WOULD BE RAISED ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. IN ANY EVENT, THIS HAS SERVED TO ILLUSTRATE PROBLEM FACING INNATL STAFF IN THAT UNDER PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS IT IS SOMEWHAT ISOLATED FROM WHAT GOES ON IN STKHM, HENCE CHAIRS ATTEMPTS AT BEEFING UP AGENDA SO AS TO ENSURE THAT ALL ANGLES ARE COVERED.

CCC/054 131657Z YBGR6261

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6260 13MAR84

T0 EXTOTT IDA

INFO CANMILREPNATO BRU STKHM/SCDEL VMBFR GENEV MOSCO PRMNY BERN
WSHDC LDN BONN PARIS ROME HAGUE OSLO LSBON MDRID VIENN ATHNS
ANKRA COPEN WSAW PRGUE BPEST BGRAD PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/
DSTRATA

DISTR MINA DMF IFE RGB RGX RBD RER IDDZ IDD IDR IDAO IDAN

REF OURTEL YFGR6254 09MAR

---STKHM CONF:SOVIET DEMARCHE

UK AND FRG WENT ON RECORD IN POL CTTEE 13MAR TO INDICATE THAT
NO/NO SOVIET DEMARCHE HAS BEEN MADE IN THEIR CAPITALS CONCERNING
STKHM CONF.THEY OFFERED NO/NO COMMENTS ON SUBSTANCE OF SOVIET NOTE
LEFT WITH IFE BY SOVIET AMB.NO/NO WORD FROM OTHER DELS PRIVATELY
OR OTHERWISE.

CCC/070 131530Z YBGR6260

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BGRAD ZLGR3472 13MAR84

TO EXTOTT RBR

INFO STKHM/SCDEL MOSCO BNATO WSHDC PARIS LDN BONN ROME PRGUE
WSAW PRMNY BUCST BPEST HNSKI OSLO COPEN HAGUE BRU MDRID ATHNS
VIENN VMBFR ANKRA PEKIN TOKYO CNBRA WLGTN NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CIS
PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR DMF RFB RGE RBRD RED ZSP ZSI RBT IDDZ CPD RBP IDA IDR FPR
REF YOURTEL RBR0395 28FEB(NOTAL)

---CHERNENKO SUCCESSION:YUGO VIEWS

SUMMARY:WE HAVE RECEIVED BRIEFING FROM MFA ON IMPRESSIONS
RECD DURING RECENT VISITS BY YUGO LEADERS TO MOSCO AND MFA
ASSESSMENT OF NEW SOV LEADERSHIP.YUGOS ANTICIPATE NO/NO
CHANGES IN SOV FOREIGN POLICY;THEY RECD STRONG IMPRESSION
THAT SOVS ANXIOUS TO NEGOTIATE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS,BUT
THAT CONCRETE/CONCRETE GESTURE BY WEST,HOWEVER SMALL,WILL
BE NEEDED TO GET THEM OUT OF CORNER INTO WHICH THEY HAVE
PAINTED THEMSELVES.IN ASSESSING SUCCESSION,YUGOS THOUGHT
THAT DUE WEIGHT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO CHERNENKOS CONSIDERABLE
EXPERIENCE,INCLUDING LENGTHY MEMBERSHIP ON CENTRAL CTTEE.
HOWEVER,HEAD OF STATE AND PARTY FUNCTIONS MIGHTS BE DIVIDED,
WITH GROMYKO BECOMING PRES OF PRESIDUM AND
TIKHONOV RETIRING SIGNIFICANTLY,ANDROPOV MEN
REMAIN IN PLACE.IN ESSENCE,YUGO VIEW APPEARS TO BE THAT IN

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PAGE TWO ZLGR3472 CONFD

SELECTING CHERNENKO, SOVS HAVE OPTED FOR CONTINUITY IN SHORT TERM BUT WITHOUT FORECLOSING FUTURE OPTIONS. STATUS OF SOMEWHAT UNUSUAL BILAT RELATIONSHIP REMAINS UNCHANGED, AND YUGOS HAD NO/NO DIFFICULTY IN GETTING SOVS TO RECONFIRM ITS BASIC PRINCIPLES.

2. REPORT: YUGO HEADS OF STATE AND PARTY MET CHERNENKO ON OCCASION OF ANDROPOV FUNERAL, BUT DID NOT/HAVE OPPORTUNITY FOR EXTENDED CONVERSATION. THIS INITIAL CONTACT WAS HOWEVER FOLLOWED 27 FEB-02 MAR BY WORKING VISIT BY YUGO VICE-PRES ZARKOVIC AND FORMIN MOJSOV, WHO HAD ONE-HR MTG WITH CHERNENKO.

3. FACT THAT YUGOS WERE NOT/NOT ACCORDED PRIVATE AUDIENCE WITH CHERNENKO AT TIME OF FUNERAL WAS OF SOME EMBASSASSMENT TO THEM. WHATEVER THE REASON FOR THIS, MFA INTERLOCUTORS WERE NATURALLY RELUCTANT TO MEET WITH US UNTIL AFTER ZARKOVIC HAD RETURNED.

4. WE MET 08 MAR WITH KOMATINA, HEAD OF EAST EUR DEPT IN MFA, AND BRIEFED HIM AS PER REFTTEL. IN RECIPROCATING WITH YUGO VIEWS ON SOV LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION, KOMATINA CONCENTRATED ON VISIT BY ZARKOVIC WHO, IN ADDITION TO MTGS WITH CHERNENKO AND GROMYKO, ALSO MET TWICE WITH KUZNETSOV. LATTER, AS ACTING PRES OF SUPREME SOVIET, WAS ZARKOVIC'S OFFICIAL HOST. MTGS WITH KUZNETSOV DEALT WITH FULL AGENDA OF BILAT AND INNATL TOPICS, GROMYKO MTG DEALT MAINLY WITH INNATL, AND CHERNENKO MTG MAINLY WITH BILAT.

5. CLEARLY MAIN YUGO GOAL IN VISIT, ASIDE FROM ASSESSING NEW LEADER, WAS TO RECONFIRM THAT UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP WITH USSR, AS

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DEFINED IN 1955 AND 1956 DECLARATION ON STATE AND PARTY RELNS ,
REMAINED UNCHANGED. THIS, AS KOMATINA EXPLAINED, WAS IMPORTANT
TO YUGOS NOT/NOT ONLY AS SMALL NON-ALIGNED CTRY, BUT BECAUSE OF
QUOTE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE UNQUOTE. YUGOS TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY
TO UNDERLINE THAT RELNS WITH USSR ARE BASED ON EQUALITY, RESPECT
FOR SOVEREIGNTY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, ETC, PARTICULARLY SINCE
THEY HAVE HAD DIFFICULTIES IN THE PAST OBTAINING WRITTEN
REITERATION OF SUCH CLAUSES. ON THE OTHER HAND,
SINCE TITO DIED, YUGOS HAVE GENERALLY FOUND MOSCOW VERY CAREFUL IN
ITS RELATIONS WITH PGRAD, NOT/NOT TO BE SEEN TO THREATEN YUGO AND
THUS MAKE THE QUOTE WESTERN OPTION UNQUOTE EVEN MORE ENTICING.
AS IT HAPPENED, CHERNENKO IMMEDIATELY CONFIRMED THIS BASIS FOR RELATIONSHIP,
AND YUGO PROPOSALS FOR COMMUNIQUE (WHICH REFERRED EXPLICITLY AND
PROMINENTLY TO 1955 AND 1956 AGREEMENTS) WERE ACCEPTED QUOTE MORE
EASILY THAN BEFORE UNQUOTE, EVEN ON INNATL ISSUES. IN BASIC
APPROACH THIS VISIT RESEMBLED THAT OF TIKHONOV TO YUGO IN 1983:
RATIONAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITHOUT POLEMICS, DESPITE DIFFERENCES.
YUGOS, OF COURSE, CLAIM TO BE COMPLETELY SATISFIED AND PROBABLY ARE.
6. ON BILAT SIDE, CHERNENKO REPEATED INVITATIONS FOR PRESIDENTS OF
YUGO STATE PRESIDENCY AND PARTY TO VISIT; PARTY VISIT WILL PROBABLY
BE FIRST TO TAKE PLACE. HE ALSO EMPHASIZED CONTINUITY OF USSR
FOREIGN POLICY WHICH, WHILE SATISFYING YUGOS IN BILATERAL TERMS
LEAVES THEM WORRIED ABOUT FURTHER E-W CONFRONTATION.

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7.ON INNATL QUESTIONS,KOMATINA FELT SOVIET TONE ON E-W ISSUES
WAS PERHAPS SOMEWHAT TOUGHER DURING ZARKOVIC VISIT THANAT TIME
OF FUNERAL.GROMYKO CONVINCED ZARKOVIC THAT USSR GENUINELY WANTED
TO NEGOTIATE ARMS-CONTROL AGREEMENTS WITH USA,BUT ONLY ON EQUAL
BASIS,NOT/NOT AS QUOTE JUNIOR PARTNER UNQUOTE.HERE THE EVIDENT
CONCERN WAS WITH EQUAL STATUS,NOT/NOT FIREPOWER ALONE.

THE ESSENTIAL YUGO CONCLUSION WAS THAT
USSR REQUIRES THAT USA MAKE CONCRETE/CONCRETE GESTURE(HOWEVER
SMALL)BEFORE NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE RE-STARTED;USA,FOR ALL ITS
SOFTER LANGUAGE,HAS STILL NOT/NOT COME FORWARD WITH ANY
SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSION.

8.KOMATINA NOTED THAT SOVIET PUBLIC POSITION WAS NOT/NOT TO
NEGOTIATE UNLESS PERSHING II DEPLOYMENT WAS REVOKED.HE WONDERED
HOWEVER WHETHER THIS SOVIET REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE WAS REALLY FIRM,
OR WHETHER SOVIETS WOULD RESPOND TO CONCESSION IN
ANOTHER FIELD(CF SCHULTZ-GROMYKO MTG IN STKHM).AT PRESENT,
HAVING PAINTED THEMSELVES INTO A CORNER,POLITICAL EXIGENGIES
WERE MORE IMPORTANT TO RUSSIANS THAN NUMBERS OF WEAPONS.WHEN
OFFERED EXAMPLE OF MBFR,KOMATINA THOUGHT THAT CONCRETE
CONCESSION IN THAT FORUM MIGHT DO.DURING THIS PART OF
CONVERSATION KOMATINA REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES POINT ABOUT SOVIET
NEED FOR CONCRETE CONCESSION [✓]TO SAME FACE,AND CONCLUDED BY QUOTING
GROMYKO TO EFFECT THAT EQUALITY(IE EQUAL TREATMENT)WAS NOT/NOT

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PAGE FIVE ZLGR3472 CONF

JUST MATTER OF PRESTIGE, BUT OF VITAL INTERESTS. IMPRESSION
CONVEYED BY KOMATINA WAS THAT RUSSIANS, GIVEN THEIR OWN CONCEPTION
OF THEIR SUPERPOWER STATUS COULD NEVER ACCEPT HUMILIATION;
THEY HAD PROBABLY DECIDED TO PURSUE DETENTE, BUT HAD NOT/NOT YET
FOUND WAY OUT OF THEIR PRESENT PREDICAMENT.

9. KOMATINA FELT THAT ALTHOUGH CHERNENKO COULD BE DESCRIBED
AS APPARATCHIK, HE WAS NEVERTHELESS VERY EXPERIENCED MAN AND HAD
BEEN MEMBER OF CENTRAL CTTEE FOR LONG TIME. HIS MEANING
APPARENTLY BEING THAT WHILE CHERNENKO'S EXPERIENCE AND PERSONALITY MAY
NOT/NOT BE IDEAL, THEY ARE BOTH USEFUL AND RELEVANT TO THE JOB FOR THE
TIME BEING. WITHOUT PROMPTING, KOMATINA SAID THAT YUGOS HAD
NOT/NOT NOTICED CHERNENKO HAD ANY DIFFICULTY IN BREATHING,
ALTHOUGH SUCH PROBLEM HAD BEEN REFERRED TO BY OTHERS.

10. IN UNOFFICIAL CONVERSATIONS, YUGOS RECEIVED IMPRESSION THAT
PARTY AND STATE FUNCTIONS MIGHT SOON BE SEPARATED, IE SOMEONE
OTHER THAN CHERNENKO, POSSIBLY GROMYKO, WOULD BECOME PRES OF
PRESIDIUM. THEY ALSO HEARD OF POSSIBLE TIKHONOV RETIREMENT; THIS
THEY BELIEVE WOULD BE SIGNIFICANT SINCE DEPARTURE HAS NEVER HAPPENED
THIS WAY BEFORE. GENERALLY, KOMATINA OBSERVED, ALTHOUGH
CONSIDERATIONS OF CONTINUITY MAY HAVE BEEN UPPERMOST IN SELECTION
OF CHERNENKO, GORBACHEV AND OTHER ANDROPOV PROTEGES HAD NOT/NOT BEEN
ECLIPSED AND REMAINED IN PLACE. IF PARTY AND STATE FUNCTIONS WERE
SEPARATED, THEREFORE, THE LATTER MIGHT BE ABLE TO EXERCISE MORE

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PAGE SIX ZLGR3472 CONFID

INFLUENCE THAN OTHERWISE.EVEN WITHIN PARTY,ANDROPOV NOMINEES
REMAINED IN PLACE ON POLITEURO.WHAT APPEARED TO BE ESSENTIAL TO
KREMLIN AT THIS TIME WAS CONTINUITY OF POLICY IN ALL MAJOR FIELDS.

11.INFO CONTAINED IN PARA 1 AND 4-10 INCLUSIVE WAS
OBTAINED IN CONFIDENCE FROM KOMATINA.

CCC/148 131500Z ZLGR3472

MF

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

UNCLASSIFIED

FM GENEV YTGR1846 13MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDA/SMITH IDDZ/DELVOIE

DISTR JCD JLO MCB

---CONSULTATIONS IN OTT 19-23MAR

GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD ARRANGE APPOINTMENT FOR LATE AFTERNOON WED
21MAR OR EARLY AM THUR 22MAR

BEESLEY

UUU/198 131700Z YTGR1846

CANADIAN
HIGH COMMISSION
LONDON

FILE CIRC DIARY

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

'84 MAR 13 14:00

F12/13
20-1-1-1 1/10

UNCLASSIFIED

FM LDN XNGR 0616 13MAR84

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ

INFO^{BH} NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DSTRATA/DNACPOL DE OT

DISTR RCR IDR IDA IDD MINA DMF RGB RBR RCM

---EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND ARMS CONTROL:DAVID OWEN SPEECH

REPEATED BELOW IS PARTICULARLY THOUGHTFUL INTERVENTION BY

DAVID OWEN, SDP LEADER, IN OTHERWISE DISAPPOINTING 09MAR

COMMONS DEBATE ON A PRIVATE MEMBER'S MOTION ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS:

ALSO REPEATED IS THE SPEECH BY FCO UNDERSECRETARY WHITNEY

IN WHICH HE OUTLINES QUOTE CONSISTENT UNQUOTE GOVT EFFORT TO

SEEK GOOD RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION THROUGH BROAD,PRAGMATIC

DIALOGUE.

2.COMCENTRE PLS SEND BY FACSIMILE.

J R SCHRAM/mg

POL & ECON

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J R SCHRAM

2 / 10

which was carefully drafted, which I think commanded a good deal of support throughout the House—a speech which he read—discursive, disjointed and uningenuous—he has entirely diminished himself and depressed, and possibly even destroyed, the debate which he initiated. I do not believe that, on reflection, he will think that his conduct was of any quality whatever.

This is an opportunity to debate one of the most important aspects of British foreign policy. Our relations with the Soviet Union go to the very root of our security and how we handle the Soviet Union, especially how we handle it in relationship to the United States, our principal ally, our NATO partners and the European Community within our membership of it. It is an aspect of British foreign policy that probably poses, over the next few years, the most difficult part of our developing foreign policy.

It is not profitable for me, especially in view of the hour, to debate the past. I have trenchant criticisms of the conduct of our relations with the Soviet Union during the past few years, but I very much welcome the change of plan that now seems to be part of the Government's settled view. Benefits will come not only to this country but, if the diplomatic skill at the Government's disposal is successfully harnessed, to our European friends and allies and peace will come to the world as a whole.

How can Britain use the new opportunity presented, now that the megaphonic diplomacy is over and, I hope, personal abuse is a thing of the past? What are our objectives? The Soviet Union's foreign policy has many facets, but one striking and permanent aspect is that it is immensely slow-moving. The Soviet Union's leadership moves cautiously. There is a thirst among its leaders for an ordered relationship with the West. The element of uncertainty and unpredictability, which started with the advent of President Carter in 1977, has caused many problems in East-West relations. Whatever one's view about politics, there is no doubt that the Soviet leadership look back somewhat wistfully to the predictability of the Kissinger-Nixon era. There is a lesson in that period for all of us, wherever we sit in the spectrum of Left-Right politics in both the United States and Europe. If progress is to be made with the Soviet Union and if detente, a word which I hope will not go out of the English language, is to be revived, progress must be made cautiously and carefully, avoiding putting too much strain on the system.

One of the legacies of the past and lessons to learn is that precipitate change can only work against progress. By its nature, detente has a Jekyll and Hyde quality. As the combination of co-operation and competition develops, especially as communication and contact improves, tensions occur in our relationships. We are becoming more conscious of what goes on in the Soviet Union, and the tendency grows to feel offended by what we see as flagrant breaches of human rights. There is a temptation for us to demand of the Soviet system more change and more adaptation to Western democratic standards than it is prepared to concede. The overriding interest of both East and West—the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact and the United States and NATO countries—is that there should be at least a greater degree of trust and understanding.

How can Britain take the new atmosphere forward? The answer is, cautiously. That is the first advice I would give to the Government. Mr. Chernenko's recent speech shows a few areas in which Britain could act on its own. We

10.48 am

Dr. David Owen (Plymouth, Devonport): The hon. Member for Tayside, North (Mr. Walker) started his debate with the good will of the House and with a motion

1106

1107

Soviet Union

9 MARCH 1984

Soviet Union 3/10

1108

face the fact that, predominantly, our influence will be felt through the various co-operative organisations to which we belong, especially NATO. Britain could respond by increasing contact, which in the past few years has been abysmal. The House may need to be reminded that in 1977 I was the last Foreign Secretary who had serious negotiations and discussions in Moscow with the Soviet Union. That is a long time ago. The way is now open for an early visit by the Foreign Secretary to Moscow, and I hope that we shall see such a visit before the summer is out.

The British Government should immediately respond to one particular part of Mr. Chernenko's speech. He asked for talks on the comprehensive test ban to be resumed. Those are the only nuclear talks to which Britain is a party as of right. They are tripartite talks. We entered into them in 1977. They made substantial progress in 1978, and for the first time the Soviet Union accepted on-site verification through the black box seismic devices. There were difficulties over the Soviet Union's demands, especially its unrealistic demands for a large number of seismic devices to be placed on our territory. The Soviet Union knew that all our testing facilities were in the United States. That problem began to be overcome. We may have to pay a certain unnecessary price for being party to the negotiations. There is now a realistic hope that Britain need have only a third of the seismic devices of those on Soviet and United States territory.

The negotiations were broken off at the end of 1979. In many ways that occurred as soon as the Prime Minister took office. The Prime Minister's scepticism about the comprehensive test ban was made known virtually within days of her taking office. I hope she will revise and rethink her attitude to the comprehensive test ban, because its value lies in its interlocking nature with the non-proliferation treaty. The only way that we can breathe new life into the non-proliferation treaty is if the non-nuclear weapons states sense that the nuclear weapons states are living up to their commitments to curb the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons while the non-nuclear weapons states restrict proliferation horizontally. There are now 10 states with the potential to make nuclear weapons. They are on the threshold of making a nuclear device and probably exploding it. If we do not do something to reinforce the non-proliferation treaty, in 15 years there could be 20 nuclear weapons countries; that is a circumstance fraught with danger.

Comprehensive test ban negotiations ought, therefore, to be pursued. It would be a sign of independence and in no way against the spirit of the comprehensive test ban negotiations if the Prime Minister were to write simultaneously to Mr. Reagan and Mr. Chernenko saying she believes the time has come to resume the negotiations. In a sense, that action would be asserting something necessary for those tripartite talks—that Britain has an independent position. The virtue of Britain being involved in the comprehensive test ban talks is that she can bring to those negotiations the worries of a lesser nuclear weapons state whose objective is minimum deterrence and whose problems are more akin to those of France and China, neither of which will, at least for some time, come into a comprehensive test ban agreement. The Prime Minister should take this opportunity. She would be taking a leaf out of the book of that former distinguished

Conservative Prime Minister who now sits as an Earl in the other place. He built a formidable reputation because of his commitment to the partial test ban treaty.

Dr. Alan Glyn (Windsor and Maidenhead): The right hon. Gentleman mentioned verification. Does he agree that the key to the matter is whether we can trust the verification system offered by the Russians?

Dr. Owen: Yes, I do. The negotiations are difficult, but, as I have said, there was a breakthrough in verification. The Soviet Union has always had great difficulty in allowing people to come on to its territory. In this case, the effect of people visiting can be taken over by seismic devices which cannot be broken open and changed. It is difficult to detect some of those small explosions made in underground testing. We all know the difficulties, but sometimes it is better to settle for something less than perfect. A treaty would be a significant step forward and not a very great risk.

I welcome the fact that the Soviets have now moved a little on verification in relation to chemical weapons. Successive British Governments have taken a good deal of interest in that matter. There is anxiety about the use of chemical weapons. Allegations have been made about their use in the Iraq-Iran war, although we do not know whether they are substantiated. There are allegations also of their use in Afghanistan and other Asian areas. A thrust against chemical warfare is every bit as important as what we do about nuclear weapons.

Britain will be part of the committee on disarmament, but ours is only one voice. We can put forward drafts and protocols, but we should not delude ourselves; our influence is marginal but important.

The next question is, where else can improvement take place? We should encourage the President of the United States and Congress, on a bipartisan basis, to build on the Scowcroft commission report and enter into a serious dialogue with the Soviet Union on strategic weapons. That dialogue is already underway. Intensive back-channel negotiations are plainly going on. The less we hear about the negotiations, the more likely they are to achieve results. In Europe, it has almost escaped our notice how much progress was made in the START talks. The most recent Soviet offer to come down to 1,800 launchers is a significant reduction on SALT II levels.

Whatever one's criticism of the Reagan Administration, it is important to put it firmly on record that they have kept, as has the Soviet Union, within the SALT II levels, despite the fact that the agreement has not been ratified by Congress.

The problem with the strategic negotiations is that the Soviet Union offered only to reduce warheads to 11,000. That is still high and nowhere near the 5,000 reduction in warheads advocated by the United States. There is some sign that the United States could accept the 1,800 launchers and compromise on about 7,000 warheads. That is extremely important. Europe has failed to understand that it is in our interests that the United States and Soviet Union should have confidence in their strategic deterrents. Although we are worried about intermediate missiles and battlefield nuclear weapons, the negotiations which will critically affect the super-power relationship is the strategic one. That means, basically, the second-strike weapon systems. If they have confidence in the inviolability of their second-strike capability, it is possible

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for them to accept negotiating positions in all other areas in which they will not always have parity or certainty of verification. That is something which Europe must understand.

We then come to the other areas of negotiation on nuclear weapons. I profoundly hope that NATO, whether it declares it or not, will effectively impose a freeze on future deployment of cruise and Pershing 2. Having taken the political decision to deploy, to which I believe it had no alternative, there is no military reason to increase the 16 cruise missiles at Greenham common, the 18 Pershing 2's in the Federal Republic of Germany, and the 16 that are being installed in Italy, at least until 1985. It would be wise not to exacerbate relations by further deployment. We have made the political point. We have refused to accept the Soviet veto on the deployment of intermediate weapons, which was politically impossible and would have been wrong for us to do. There is no doubt that it is a sensitive issue for the Soviets.

I feel that for a while we should put the INF talks onto the back burner of negotiations, make progress on START and in 1985 possibly bring INF and START together, as there was always, logically, a strong case for doing. It would mean Europe, effectively, defusing the controversy over intermediate missiles, watching for greater progress in arms control negotiations in the START talks, and Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union starting comprehensive test ban talks.

The only other negotiations which are due to start in a matter of weeks, are the mutual and balanced force reductions in Vienna. They have wound their weary way over a decade and have made little progress. They are hung up on data. The problem about the negotiating stance is that each side is almost in a position where to make an accommodation, it must admit that it has been lying about its figures for the past decade. That is bluntly the problem with the MBFR negotiations. A phase 1, 2 and 3 reduction must be accepted, and the parties must accept that the sides will only come together on an agreed data base on the second tranche. How that is arrived at is up to each side. It must be accepted that the verification procedures would take place only on the second tranche, when that is completed, or possibly the third tranche. In the meantime, one does not need to ratify the treaty; one starts to get ahead, and ratifies the treaty only when satisfied by verification at an agreed point in the reduction levels.

Great Britain, which is showing some signs of holding up MBFR, should relax a little on that matter. If it means the United States bringing home a few troops from Europe, it is not too heavy a price for us to pay. It is vital that the United States commitment of land forces in Europe remains. There are some signs that the Government have been hyper sensitive about this issue when the West German Government, who have held up MBFR over the past few years, at long last have begun to be rather more flexible in their negotiating position.

We cannot negotiate soundly with the Soviet Union unless we are sure of our security and of the strength and viability of NATO. We can afford to take a few risks in the negotiation to reduce nuclear weapons. I have never been one of those who believe that one should be an accountancy purist; over nuclear weapons, broad balance—rough parity—is sufficient.

The appalling danger of not beginning to wind down the level of nuclear armoury is so great that it justifies taking some marginal, calculated risks in terms of verification. One can do that only with the strength of a united NATO and the conventional capacity to resist and hold a conventional attack on NATO's central front and flanks. In that respect NATO must take a fundamental look at priorities for the next decade.

Europe must accept that disillusionment about Europe's capacity to commit itself to its own conventional defence is widespread in the United States. It crosses the political divide and is felt by Republicans and Democrats alike. One does not have to believe in a great deal of the detail and recommendations of Henry Kissinger's recent article in *Time*. I have doubts about many of its particulars; but it reflects an anxiety about NATO's direction and the European attitudes within NATO that we cannot afford to ignore.

It is vital that NATO responds, and this then relates closely to how we can then respond to the Soviet Union. The foreign ministers, in December in the NATO council, decided to appoint three wise men, in the traditional European way, to conduct a high-level review on the same lines as the Harmell report, which for NATO was an epoch-making report, bringing together the concepts of defence and detente. The problem is that that decision was discussed in closed session but, I gather, largely in the context of East-West relations. In December, East-West relations were depressing. That has now changed. The fundamental issue facing NATO is that the Governments are beginning to cross the East-West political barriers. The dialogue is beginning. The question for NATO is what it does about its conventional defence capacity. The study should focus on that issue first and foremost. The review should be set up when the NATO foreign ministers meet in Washington in May.

It is not enough to examine the strengthening of conventional defence forces only within the context of NATO. It must also be regarded in the context of the European Community. In 1986, when enlargement takes place, 11 of the European Community member states will be members of NATO. We will not be able to persuade the European electorate that we should improve our conventional defence fighting capacity if we cannot tie it in with industrial and technological development in Europe, in which we are falling behind, and with jobs in Europe.

There is a 10-to-one imbalance in defence procurement in favour of the United States in relation to Europe. That cannot be allowed to continue. It is contributing to Europe's technological inferiority and to the sense of an undue dominance by the United States. We must grapple with that. The European Community must examine the problem, because it has the power, the locus and the standing in industrial and technological areas.

We cannot continue to look at NATO in one box and the European Community in another. One of the suggestions that I put to the Secretary-General of NATO and the President of the Commission was that simultaneous studies should be commissioned by the European Community and NATO to examine the potential economic, industrial and technical implication 001187 improving our defence forces. I suggested membership, that at least one person should be on both

study groups, and that the secretariats should be linked. For international reasons, it is possible to commission the studies jointly.

We should receive reports on the studies in 1985, when NATO should make a forward commitment about what it will do for the next four years. The 1977-78 consensus on the 3 per cent. inflation-proof increase in defence spending is at an end. There is no hope of restoring that percentage figure. The present Government have a good record in living up to their commitments, but they have backed off from their commitment for 1986 onwards. We are offered only a 0.5 per cent. increase in defence spending. In view of the inflation forecast, that is unlikely to be a real-terms increase.

There is not a good enough response from any European country. SACEUR is asking for a 4 per cent. increase. He is crying for the moon because that cannot be achieved. We will probably have to move away from percentage commitments on defence budgets. We must allocate different responsibilities to different member states. We have to accept specialisation, but we must have an overall collective decision that can be maintained.

We can then adjust NATO's nuclear strategy, because it no longer carries conviction with a broad strand of public opinion in Britain. It has nothing to do with the unilateralists' campaign, although it is fuelling the unilateralists' demands. People will not accept that nuclear weapons should be used early in a conventional battle, within hours or days. They are right. It is a dangerous policy to propagate, because no serious politician would agree to authorise the use of battlefield nuclear weapons.

NATO is taking out battlefield nuclear weapons in dribs and drabs. It is losing political impact. It needs a dramatic decision to take out battlefield nuclear weapons from a corridor where it says there shall be no battlefield weapons. It says that it will not risk the danger of "lose or use", by an advancing conventional force overwhelming a battlefield nuclear weapons installation.

The politicians in NATO must now grasp that we have to make a political response to the unease about nuclear strategy. If we are to persuade people that we must improve our nuclear defences, they must sense that we are literally pulling back from the possibility of using nuclear weapons. We would still retain a nuclear deterrent, particularly a second-strike strategic nuclear deterrent. We would still go ahead with the initial deployment of intermediate missiles, but we would move towards the time when there is confidence by the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries that each side has sufficient conventional capacity to hold against an attack and that no one side can push through in a blitzkrieg on any of the fronts on which we face each other. If that can be done both sides can back right out of battlefield nuclear weapons. With the confidence that that will create we could also take out intermediate weapons and rely only on second-strike strategic weapons systems.

It is important that first the United States and the Soviet Union achieve some certainty about the second-strike capacity of nuclear deterrents. When that is achieved, we can start to remove the battlefield and intermediate nuclear weapons.

The negotiations will take time, but there is no doubt that by 1986-87, with commitment, a measure of good will and some political skill, a dialogue on nuclear weapons

with realistic verifiable and balanced reductions could begin. That must be the objective. The opportunity is there.

We can improve cultural and business relations. Britain has allowed its economic links with the Soviet Union to lapse too much, as it has some of our cultural links. Those links should be increased as much as possible. We should take a leaf out of the books of France and the Federal Republic of Germany, which have made more rapid inroads in that respect.

Atmosphere is important. I am not asking the Government to make concessions. The Soviet Union does not like negotiating with people who make concessions. The Soviets want a genuine balanced negotiation. They will be tough negotiators on their interests. Mr. Chernenko was very close to Brezhnev. The signs are that he takes the view that detente was in the Soviet interests. I believe that detente was in our interests.

The hon. Member for Tayside, North misreads Africa during the period of detente. He forgets that the Soviet Union was in Egypt and Somalia. It had considerable influence in Mozambique, Angola and many other countries. One of the West's victories was that by sensibly not aligning itself with apartheid in South Africa, it has virtually destroyed Soviet influence in Africa. Occasionally, let us be grateful for that successful period of diplomacy. The Soviet Union will try to exploit differences in other parts of the world.

In two areas we could make an important move in the Soviet direction. Mr. Gromyko particularly has never been prepared to accept that the Soviet Union can be shut out of an eventual Arab-Israeli peace settlement. He is right. The Russians have too much influence in that region to be completely pushed out. One of the mistakes of the Sadat initiative in Jerusalem was that at least part of its motivation was to ditch the Geneva conference and end Soviet influence.

I have a great understanding of many of Israel's genuine security problems, but it too has felt it possible to shut the Soviets out from all influence. I was interested that the Israeli Prime Minister said the other day that he would welcome closer contact with the Soviet Union. After all, the Soviet Union was one of the first countries to recognise Israel—but I know that things have changed since then.

The Soviets have influence in Syria. It is now important for the United States to tell the Soviet Union that at some future date a Geneva conference, with the United States and the Soviet Union as co-chairmen, might be appropriate. We should not shut the Soviets out of the Middle East dialogue.

The Soviet Union should not have vetoed the UN peace-keeping force in the Lebanon. I do not know the exact extent of the Soviets' demands. If they demanded that the United States fleet be removed wholly from the Mediterranean, that would have been absurd, but if they argued that they should pull back a reasonable distance from the Lebanon shore, the demand was justified. It would be interesting to hear from the Minister about the Soviet demand which the United States felt unable to fulfil. Relations in that area could be improved.

Relations could also be improved in regard to Iraq and Iran. I beg the Prime Minister—who said something quite different at Question Time from what the then Minister of State said when describing the Iranian crisis—not to assume that there is no role for the United Nations in the Gulf. The prospect of a multinational

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maritime force moving into the straits of Hormuz with the United States navy is one of the most dangerous that I could contemplate.

I know that peace-keeping by the United Nations is difficult, but it is virtually the only development that could influence those two countries, and there is merit in exploring the United Nations option before the straits of Hormuz are closed and we are faced with a serious crisis. There are parallels with the 1967 war.

I do not believe that Soviet influence in the area is necessarily hostile. The Shah always had close relations with the Soviet Union and Iran has always been a strange country in its relations with East and West. I know that the Soviet Union is supplying Iraq with arms, but it should not be automatically assumed that a resolution of the problems in the Gulf and the avoidance of major hostilities are matters in which the Soviet Union has no interest. I believe that the Soviets have more interest in stability than in creating difficulty.

Wiser diplomacy in the United States could start a dialogue to improve relations. We shall improve the nuclear and defence relationship if we can also act on the cultural, economic and global diplomatic fronts. All those matters need to be improved.

There is no need for concessions on important matters of principle. Ordered relationships between the Soviet Union and the United States are a must if we are to have a more peaceful world. I hope that this debate will make a modest contribution towards that end by guiding the Government over the next few months and years.

Several hon. Members rose—

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Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Ray Whitney): I join the rest of the House in congratulating my hon. Friend the Member for Tayside, North (Mr. Walker) on his good fortune in the ballot—as he said, 13 is a lucky number for him—and on the wide-ranging motion that he has given us the valuable opportunity to debate today. If I may say so, his speech ranged even more widely than his motion.

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There is some tendency, even in my hon. Friend's motion, to suggest that the Government's desire to improve relations with the Soviet Union is a recent phenomenon. I must lay that idea to rest, because it is simply not true. We have consistently sought good relations with the Soviet Union and shall certainly continue to do so. I am dismayed that the Opposition Front Bench spokesman, the hon. Member for Swansea, East, (Mr. Anderson), described the defence of our values and freedoms made by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister in Toronto as "going over the top". It is an essential part of the duties of the Government to defend those freedoms and it in no way implies any unwillingness to establish good relations with the Soviet Union.

First, therefore, the Government's attitude is not a recent phenomenon. In recent months, senior members of the Government have made a series of public statements pointing to the direction in which we are moving. We are ready to move, but in the right circumstances, and to grasp every genuine opportunity for dialogue with the Soviet Union. We recognise that that is in the interests of both East and West.

We have also made it clear that, in our view, arms control negotiations alone could not and should not bear the full weight of East-West relations. The dialogue between East and West should be widened and given much more substance. The British Government certainly have a role to play in that. Our present policy is by no means a seven days' wonder, an ad hoc or interim policy. As the Prime Minister said in Moscow last month, it is "a policy evolved over time that will be applied over time."

It is suggested in the motion, and has been suggested in some speeches today, that there have already been improvements in relations between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. That suggestion illustrates the understandable tendency, which we all share, to anticipate events. So far, we have only started on the spatework for building the foundations of a better relationship. To raise even the most unambitious edifice on those foundations will require skill and persistence on our part, and a very long haul. Above all, it will also require a substantial contribution from the Soviet Union in substance as well as goodwill. That is recognised on both sides of the House, but it is too easy to forget—there has been a tendency to forget it today—the other half of this complex and important equation.

The right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) correctly said that he was the last Foreign Secretary to visit Moscow for substantive talks. That was in 1977. Of course, my right hon. and learned Friend was there the

other day. The right hon. Gentleman said that he did not want to involve himself in history, and neither do I. However, he did not remind the House that since 1977 the actions which have set back the progress towards good relations—and actions are what matter—have been inspired not by the West, by this country or our allies, but by the Soviet Union. That is the problem. We look, therefore, for a response from the Soviet Union.

Dr. Glyn: Would not my hon. Friend agree that the key issue in connection with arms reductions, especially reductions in stocks of chemical weapons, is the extent to which the Soviet Union will allow us to verify them?

Mr. Whitney: I am happy to agree with my hon. Friend. I shall take up that point in a moment.

There has been an improvement in the atmosphere, which must be a matter for satisfaction on both sides. I believe that both sides were happy with the tone of the Prime Minister's short meeting with the new General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, on the occasion of President Andropov's funeral. That was a useful signpost in the right direction.

The first element that is required for improvement has already been suggested by the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport. The frequency of contacts between East and West must be increased. For the reasons that I have mentioned, there have been too few personal contacts in recent years. Given the appropriate safeguards, we are determined that there should be a change. The Prime Minister made it clear to Mr. Chernenko that she hoped that their meeting would lead to other contacts between Governments.

We are exploring with the Russians the possibilities of a range of other exchanges. The most immediate plans are already known to this House. My right hon. and learned Friend the Foreign Secretary announced on 24 January his intention of arranging with Mr. Gromyko a substantive meeting to follow their relatively brief encounter in Stockholm in January. He also informed the House that my right hon. Friend the Minister for Trade intends to visit the Soviet Union in May for the next meeting of the Anglo-Soviet Joint Commission. Other possibilities will be considered in due course. In the next few years we hope to welcome Soviet Ministers here, including those with a specific interest in trade. We do not wish to raise unrealistic expectations. We shall also take care to avoid rushing into ill-prepared summity. It is essential that the build up is gradual and that the channel of communication between the two Governments and directly with the Soviet leadership is opened.

We all recognise the problems of Soviet society. Its closed nature has been acknowledged today. It is crucial for us to get through on an individual level to the Soviet leadership so that there is no danger of misunderstanding. We always recognise that we live in a dangerous world so, however great the ideological and conceptual gap between East and West might be, we are determined to make every effort to establish an understanding between the leaders, the Governments and, as far as possible, the people. However, we must not fall into the trap of over-estimating what such contacts can achieve. Nor must we underestimate the time that will be needed to establish proper confidence. As many hon. Members have recognised, we are talking in terms of years rather than months.

The discernible change since the election of Mr. Chernenko is real, but there has not yet been a substantive alteration in the Soviet stance on major issues. That serves to emphasise the long-term nature of the process in which we are engaged. Doing nothing is the surest recipe for getting nowhere. We have no guarantee of success and are bound to encounter setbacks and disappointments but we have made a start and I assure the House that we intend to pursue a consistent approach for a long time.

We are not emphasising talk for its own sake. I hope that I can carry Opposition Members with me when I say that we are not recommending the abandonment of our own principles or suggesting that we should sweep under the carpet the awkward issues that certainly remain. We shall not achieve the necessary understanding by failing to say what we think or by failing to stand by what we believe to be right. We must be true to our principles and constantly make clear our unshakeable belief in democracy and the freedom of the individual. Speeches such as my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made in Toronto, to which the hon. Member for Swansea, East referred, demonstrate the principles that we must continue to uphold.

I do not believe that the chance of establishing a sensible relationship with the Soviet Union will be damaged by frankness or openness on our part. We must be ready to tackle the awkward issues with the Soviet Union and enter a realistic dialogue. We should continue to try to find common ground. In matters such as nuclear proliferation there are some grounds for hoping that if we persist we might achieve some success.

We cannot pursue the East-West dialogue in isolation, as is recognised in my hon. Friend's motion. We must do so in close co-ordination with our Allies. There must be a cohesive, co-ordinated and imaginative Allied approach. That is why I was disappointed today to hear again today the propensity of Opposition Members to attack the United States rather than to recognise the weaknesses of the Soviet Union.

The hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) rightly underlined some of the weaknesses in the Soviet system, but he said that the Soviet Union and the United States have a common approach to their regions. I disagree with the hon. Gentleman. The United States has made it clear, by President Reagan's speech in April, by the recommendations of the Kissinger committee and by the aid that it gave the Nicaraguan Government after the fall of General Somoza, that it recognises the social and economic needs of central America.

Mr. Winnick: Will the Minister comment on the way in which the democratic regime in Guatemala was destroyed by the United States in 1954—that is not challenged—how the democratic regime in Chile was de-stabilised, as can be seen from the information that has come out since the Freedom of Information Bill was passed in America, the way in which the Castro forces had to fight in the Bay of Pigs in 1961, and American support for the present murderous regime in El Salvador?

Mr. Whitney: The hon. Gentleman must go back to the 1950s and 1960s to make his point. He should also say that when President Castro came to power he was given a ticker-tape welcome in the streets of New York. When the Sandinistas came to power in Nicaragua, they were given \$118 million in the first 18 months of their

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existence. I remind him that the elections in El Salvador were designed to give the people of that country a voice, as are the elections to be held later this month — [Interruption.] The hon. Gentleman laughs at the word "elections". That shows the supposed even-handedness with which Labour Members treat the Soviet Union and the United States, which is dangerous when dealing with such serious matters. We shall not reach a correct balance in East-West relations if Opposition Members continue to have such a lopsided view.

Mr. Anderson: The Minister says that we have a lopsided view. Can he confirm whether the Government disagree with the United States arming, controlling and aiding the counter-revolutionaries who are trying to lay siege to the Nicaraguan Government? That issue has caused much dissension in America.

Mr. Whitney: The hon. Gentleman knows that we do not answer for the American Government. Of course we do not agree with every action of the American Government or Congress. The hon. Gentleman, with the hon. Member for Vauxhall (Mr. Holland), visited four central American countries in three days—or it might have been three countries in four days—and wrote an 80-page pamphlet entitled, "Kissinger's Kingdom?", which was a diatribe of anti-Americanism. One of their colleagues—I shall not mention his name—compared their effrontery with that of Spike Milligan who, at least with his tongue in his cheek and with some humour, entitled his autobiography, "Adolf Hitler: My part in his downfall."

Mr. Anderson: We spent one day less in the region than did the members of the Kissinger committee.

Mr. Whitney: The Kissinger committee devoted hundreds of hours and great resources to reaching a solution that provided for \$8 billion for the region. I should be surprised if that could be called military aggression and if it could be compared with Soviet action in Poland, other countries in eastern Europe or Afghanistan. I must continue; this is a vital subject, in which Labour Members can do much harm.

We must continue with our dialogue, aided by our friends. On defence and security, our objective must always be to find security at a lower level of weapons. We can only do this from a point of departure that ensures that our defences are fully adequate. We cannot be blackmailed by the threat of nuclear force. I am picking up the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Wells (Mr. Heathcoat-Amory). I assure him that we do not seek superiority or equality of weapons or men. The Alliance has made it clear that, although we do not say that we shall never use any of our weapons—this is the one point about no first use of nuclear weapons—we shall have, as my hon. Friend the Member for Tayside, North pointed out, no first use of any weapon. That is the important difference between the two sides. Nevertheless, we must maintain such forces as are required to make the price of attacking us too high to be worth taking a risk. Equally, we are dedicated to achieving progress in arms control, but it has to be balanced and verifiable in the reduction of both nuclear and conventional forces.

The right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) was somewhat ambitious in his suggestion that we

should relax our determination on the level of verification. This is most serious, and we look carefully at each individual aspect. As he will know from his experience Government, no Government would take any step that would weaken the reliability of verification, as that would not be sensible or responsible.

Dialogue and deterrence continue to be the twin pillars of NATO defence policy. We shall continue to make clear to the Soviet Union that peace, mutual security and the avoidance of any possible misunderstanding in defence is in the interests of both sides. That is why we are committed to achieving continuing arms control measures. We have seen this in the twin-track decision of 1979, which gave the Soviet Union the opportunity to halt the installation of the SS20s, which has done so much harm not only to the military position but to general East-West relations. However, from the beginning of the INF talks in November 1981, the Soviet Union increased SS2 deployment by about 50 per cent. It rejected the zero option and the offer of ceiling arrangements and finally walked away from the INF talks.

This gambit failed, as has the pressure put on Western democratic Governments by the peace movement. It is now recognised that we are determined to meet this Soviet threat, but also that we are ready to talk and to consider sensibly with the Soviet Union a means of finding a safe relationship. There is no lack of flexibility on our side. It is for the Russians to decide how far NATO deployment goes, by returning to the negotiating table and negotiating seriously. To take up the suggestion that we might instigate a few weapons now and stop, would be to hand the initiative back to the Soviet Union just as it is becoming clear that there is a chance to make progress.

The same approach is adopted by us towards strategic nuclear arms. At START in Geneva, the United States supported by its NATO allies, has proposed radical reductions in these weapons, including a cut of one third in the number of warheads carried by United States and Soviet strategic ballistic missiles.

Those talks were interrupted in December, again by the Soviets, whose intentions towards them remain unclear. If they are genuinely prepared to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenal, they could show that clearly by resuming the negotiations in earnest. If they did so, they would find that the West receptive to their legitimate security interest and ready to meet them half way.

The hon. Member for Swansea, East and the right hon. Member for Devonport raised the possibility of merging START and the INF talks. If the United States and Soviet Governments decided that combining the talks would increase the chances of progress, the British Government would have no objection in principle; but neither Government have suggested that combining them would help, and in the absence of a desire for merger by the two negotiators, bringing the talks together would only risk aggregating the two sets of practical obstacles.

A number of hon. Members have suggested that some further carrot or concession should be offered by the West to bring the Russians back to the negotiating table. I believe that that would be a mistake and that it would be wrong for the Russians to look for it. Indeed, they would look for it in vain.

The West believes in an immediate resumption of negotiations on intermediate-range and strategic nuclear weapons, but without any preconditions on either side. Unilateral western concessions at this stage would only

offer the hope of progress towards an agreement which would satisfy the security interests of the West, and that must remain our overriding concern.

Nuclear arms are not the only problem. In the unlikely event of a breakdown of peace in Europe, war would almost certainly begin with a conventional rather than a nuclear exchange. That is why NATO, as a defensive alliance, as we have repeatedly emphasised, will never use nuclear or non-nuclear weapons except in response to an attack.

The right hon. Member for Devonport made an important speech, as he always does on these matters, and again aired his views on the importance of more conventional weapons. Few hon. Members would differ with him on that, but he will recognise the resource implications involved. We look constantly at means of improving the balance and, as he knows, over the years the West has removed about 2,000 warheads, with no response from the Soviet Union, with no lessening of the risk of a nuclear war and with no lifting of the nuclear threshold.

There is, therefore, no soft option, no alternative, between conventional versus nuclear weapons, and any move to lift the nuclear threshold higher and higher has serious resource as well as security implications. I know that the right hon. Member for Devonport appreciates that fundamental point.

The emphasis at the conference convened in Stockholm in January is on security measures. From the first, the West has recognised that the Stockholm conference represents a unique opportunity to build a climate of confidence, and it is an opportunity for the Soviet Union to take. If it is successful, it will make force limitations and reductions much easier to achieve. Our aim at Stockholm is, therefore, to agree measures that are militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable and applicable to the whole of Europe. We hope that there will be a positive response to the initiatives that we have taken.

The Government and their allies attach similar importance to the conference on disarmament in Geneva in relation to multinational arms control and disarmament, and, on chemical weapons, the House will be aware that last month the United Kingdom tabled an important proposal on verification. We welcomed the recent Soviet statement on the continuous inspection and destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons. The Government will continue to play an active part and to seek agreement on a range of practical measures in arms control. We hope very much that the Soviet Union will join us.

The motion refers to freedom of movement and obstacles to trade. I think that we can all agree with what has been said on both sides of the House about the problems of movement. Of course, we are responsible for no problems of movement involving the Soviet Union except those to which the hon. Member for Oldham, Central and Royton (Mr. Lamond) referred, which involved the non-arrival of five gentlemen from Communist front organisations. I am sorry that the hon. Gentleman is not able to be with us for the conclusion of the debate.

As for the hon. Gentleman's challenge in volunteering to resign as vice-president of the World Peace Council, I welcome that and hope that before he resigns he will give us and the United Nations a clear statement on the funding of the council. The council is widely accepted as a front organisation. Basically, problems of movement apply

entirely in the Soviet Union. It is sadly true that there has been a drastic reduction in the level of Jewish and ethnic German emigration. In 1979, for example, 51,000 Jews were granted exit visas, in 1982, 2,600 were granted exit visas and last year the number fell to about half that figure. To put it mildly, these gestures sit uncomfortably with Soviet commitments in the Helsinki and Madrid documents.

I pay due tribute to the passionate and effective speech of my hon. Friend the Member for Bexleyheath (Mr. Townsend). My hon. Friend recognises the Government's commitment on the Hess issue. I hope that he recognises also that we face serious problems with the binding nature of the quadripartite agreement and the wider effects that might ensue should we break that agreement. It is the Soviet Union which is taking the inhumane line on the future of the 90-year-old Rudolf Hess.

I hope that the Soviet Union will remove any impediments to increased trade. Subject only to the compatibility of our security interests, we encourage British firms to take steps to increase trade between our two countries. We look forward to narrowing the trade gap, which is substantially in the Russians' favour. I have already mentioned that my right hon. Friend the Minister for Trade, will be in Moscow in May. I hope that flowing from that, and from the meeting of the British-Soviet joint commission, we shall have a further development and expansion of Soviet-British trade.

The feature which has emerged from the debate is the complex and interlocking nature of the issues raised in the motion. The thread that has run through the issues that I have tried to cover and those which have been mentioned by hon. Members on both sides of the House is the sense that there is now great potential, wherever we look, to improve Anglo-Soviet relations. There is potential to improve East-West relations generally. There is potential for progress in arms control and for increased trade. If we can realise some of the potential, we shall make a significant achievement to the peace and security of the world and the prosperity of our own people. We must recognise, however, that this process is bound to be slow and will require greater persistence and great determination. I promise the House that the Government will provide that persistence and determination and look forward to a Soviet response. I thank my hon. Friend for bringing this important motion to the House.

1.40 pm

ME

ACTION

R E S T R I C T E D

FM WSAW UMGR0490 13MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO BNATO VMBFR STKHM/SCDEL GENEV PRMNY MDRID LSBON ROME PCOOTT/FOWLER
PRGUE ATHNS NDHQOTT/ADM POL/CIPOL/DNACPOL LDN PARIS BPEST MOSCO BUCST
BONN WSHDC COPEN OSLO HAGUE BRU

DISTR DMF IFB IDD IDR IDRL RCR RSR RBD RER RGB URR FPR IMU IDA

---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE:CALL ON POLISH FOREIGN MINISTRY

AT HIS REQUEST AMB CALLED ON DIRECTOR DEPT III(NORTHAMERICAS)AND
DEPUTY DIR INNATL ORGANIZATIONS DIV OF POLISH FOREIGN MINISTRY TO
HAND OVER OCPY OF PMS 09FEB HOUSE OF COMMONS SPEECH AND TO REVIEW
WITH POLES PROGRESS OF PEACE INITIATIVE TO DATE.HE WAS GREETED BY
AN INFORMED AUDIENCE WHO EXPRESSED THEIR QUOTE DEEP APPRECIATION
UNQUOTE FOR THE PMS EFFORTS.THEY SEEMED PARTICULARLY ATTRACTED BY
PROPOSALS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON VIENN TALKS.BOTH SIDES VIEWED
AS ENCOURAGING FACT THAT WSHDC WAS CLEARLY STUDYING RECENTLY
ANNOUNCED WPO PROPOSALS FROM BUCST AND HAD NOT/NOT REJECTED THEM
OUT OF HAND.

2.AMB AND POLITICAL COUNSELLOR CALLED ON JAN KINAST DIR DEPT III
(NORTHAMERICAS)AND TADEUSZ STRULAK DEPUTY DIR INNATL ORGANIZATIONS
DIV 07MAR TO PRESENT THEM WITH COPY OF PMS SPEECH INITIATIVE
FOLLOWING HIS MTG WITH CHERNENKO AND IN LIGHT OF HIS ANNOUNCED
INTENTION TO RESIGN.AS THIS WAS FIRST FORMAL OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS
PMS PEACE PROPOSAL WITH POLISH OFFICIALS AMP COVERED IN CONSIDERABLE

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PAGE TWO UMGR0490 RESTR

DETAIL BACKGROUND TO INITIATIVE, PROPOSAL THAT FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS MEET, NEED FOR BOTH SIDES TO REVIEW CAREFULLY OTHERS POSITIONS TO SEE WHERE THEY CAN FIND COMMON GROUND AND ABOVE ALL NEED FOR MAJOR POWERS TO REJECT MEGAPHONE DIPLOMACY AND PUT SOME REAL POLITICAL WILL INTO DISARMAMENT DISCUSSIONS. HE EXPLAINED THAT WHILE PM HAD NO/NO PLANS FOR FURTHER TRAVEL IN SUPPORT OF INITIATIVE HIS MINISTERS AND AMBASSADORS HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CARRY ON PURSUING ITS OBJECTIVES.

3. THE POLES REPLIED THAT THEY WERE DEEPLY APPRECIATIVE OF THE PMS INITIATIVE PARTICULARLY UNDER THE PRESENT POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH IN THEIR WORDS WAS DEVOID OF DIALOGUE. STRULAK WHO DID MOST OF THE TALKING SAID THAT WHILE THEY FOUND PEACE INITIATIVE VERY INTERESTING MAIN OBJECTIVE FOR THEM WAS RESUMPTION OF MAJOR DISARMAMENT TALKS IN WHICH TWO BIG NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD TALK CONSTRUCTIVELY. NEVERTHELESS THERE WAS A GAMUT OF IDEAS IN PMS PROPOSALS. THEY CITED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS AN AREA WHERE CDA AND POLAND COOPERATE CLOSELY WITH THEIR COMMON UNGA INITIATIVE. ON QUESTION OF GLOBAL VS REGIONAL TREATY STRULAK SAID THAT POLES HAD CHOSEN REGIONAL APPROACH AND WERE BACKING EFFORTS TO BAN THESE WEAPONS IN EUROPE SOLELY BECAUSE THEY FELT AN AGREEMENT ON SUCH AN INITIATIVE WOULD BE EASIER TO OBTAIN AND COULD BE A FORERUNNER TO GLOEAL AGREEMENT. HE POINTED OUT THAT RECENT SOVIET PROPOSAL CONCERNING CONTROL OVER CONSTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS A

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PAGE THREE UMGR0490 RESTR

GOOD ONE AND THAT WPO WAS WAITING FOR A USA DRAFT IN REPLY. IT WAS SPECIFICALLY IN AREA OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS THAT POLES FELT THERE WERE GREATEST CHANCES OF SUCCESS AT GENEV. HE WELCOMED PMS EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN INITIATIVE. EXPLAINING THAT HE HAD BEEN CHIEF OF POLISH DEL TO MBFR TALKS FOR MANY YRS STRULAK SAID HE FOUND PMS PROPOSAL THAT MINS SHOULD MEET IN VIENN VERY INTERESTING. IT WAS MOVE ON SIDE OF WEST AFTER YEAR IN WHICH WPO HAD MADE NBR OF PROPOSALS WITHOUT REPLY INCLUDING ONE ON ASSOCIATED MEASURES COVERING PERMANENT ENTRY AND EXIT POINTS FOR INSPECTION. THIS HE SAID WAS CLOSE TO ORIGINAL WESTERN SUGGESTION. QUESTION OF DATA HE SAID COULD BE OVERCOME. THE VIENN TALKS HE SAID HAD BEEN STERILE ONLY FOR OUTSIDE OBSERVERS AND IN FACT THERE HAD BEEN SOME CONSIDERABLE MOVEMENT AND RAPPROCHEMENT WITHIN THE TALKS THEMSELVES. ENCOURAGEMENT WAS HOWEVER NEEDED. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT FOR POLAND WHICH FELL WITHIN THE ZONE OF THE AREA OF RESTRICTION.

4. STRULAK SAID THEY WOULD BE SATISFIED IF PMS INITIATIVE CONTINUES. THEY SAW MDRID AS A SIGN THAT AGREEMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED IN DIFFICULT PERIOD AND CITED STKHM CONF AS ONE OF GREAT ACHIEVEMENTS OF MDRID. KINAST REFERRED TO SUGGESTION OF CDN DEL HEAD IN STKHM THAT DURING BREAK IN CONF THERE SHOULD BE BILATERAL MTGS BETWEEN POLAND AND CDA. HE WANTS TO KNOW WHERE SUCH A MTG WOULD BE HELD IE IN OTT OR WSAW AND WHO WOULD PARTICIPATE. WE PROMISED TO GET BACK TO THEM ON THESE POINTS. THEIR INITIAL APPROACH TO AME DELWORTHS PROPOSAL WAS QUOTE

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PAGE FOUR UMGR0490 RESTR

WHY NOT UNQUOTE;THE IDEA WAS QUOTE ACCEPTABLE UNQUOTE.(IT WAS OUR IMPRESSION THAT KINAST WAS TALKING OF MTG OF HDS OF DEL TO STKHM CONF RATHER THAN POLITICAL DIRECTORS OR OTHER MFA SENIOR OFFICIALS WHOSE MTG COULD BE INTERPRETED AS POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS).

5.THE MTG THEN TURNED TO WPO PROPOSALS TABLED IN BUCST TWO DAYS PREVIOUSLY.STRULAK WHO CLAIMED TO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THEIR DRAFTING DESCRIBED THEM AS A VERY SERIOUS EFFORT TO OVERCOME PREVIOUS FAILURES IN E-W DISCUSSIONS ON MILITARY BUDGETS.THEY CONTAINED NEW APPROACH TO DEFINITION PROBLEM AND FURTHERMORE TIED MILITARY BUDGETS TO SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT MEASURES.

6.ON MORE GENERAL QUESTION OF EAST WEST RELSN AMB SUGGESTED THAT TONE OF WHITE HOUSE STATEMENTS HAD BEEN LOWERED SOMEWHAT.POLES WONDERED OUT LOUD WHETHER THIS WAS BECAUSE 84 WAS AN ELECTION YEAR.ASKED ABOUT CHERNENKO POLES REFERRED TO HIS 02FEB SPEECH AS CONCILIATORY. SOVIET APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL WOULD BE MEASURED AGAINST THE USA REACTION TO CHERNENKOS SPEECH AND LATEST WPO PROPOSALS EVEN THOUGH LATTER COVERED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ONLY.IF USA GIVES A POSITIVE RESPONSE IT WILL HELP RESTORE SOVIET CONFIDENCE IN SINCERITY OF USA ADMINISTRATION.AMB REPLIED SAME GOES FOR BOTH SIDES.POLES AGREED WITH HIM THAT IT WAS ENCOURAGING THAT THERE HAD NOT/NOT BEEN AN AUTOMATIC REJECTION FROM WSHDC OF WPO PROPOSALS.

7.THE MTG CONCLUDED WITH A DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL ISSUES WHICH WILL BE COVERED IN SEPARATE TELS.

CCC/127 131417Z UMGR0490

FILE/DOSSIER

WDC012/12

ACTION

SUBJ/SUJ

MF

28-6-1-1 Hudson
Peace
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COMMUNICATIONS
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CANADIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

FOR 100

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG R. LYSYHSYN

Gary Hart

Overall View. The first test of security for America and its allies, indeed the only test, must be to freeze and then reverse the nuclear arms race. We must create new measures to prevent nuclear war through miscalculation and design a comprehensive effort to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists. The continued animosity and deep seated political and philosophical incompatibilities between the U.S. and the Soviet Union are the obvious obstacles to quick resolution of the arms race. Our primary challenge in the years to come will be our ability to manage relations with the Soviet Union so that neither country threatens the national security of the other. As President, I would seek a mutual, verifiable freeze on the production, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union. This would include a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and an Anti-satellite Treaty. And only I have urged a new approach—to initiate Strategic Talks on Prevention (STOP) with the Soviets to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by accident or miscalculation (See ACT, May 1982). In addition, I would:

- Urge immediate ratification of the SALT II Treaty as the most effective way to get greater control over the arms race.
- Seek to create a joint U.S.-Soviet crisis monitoring center to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation.
- Negotiate substantial reductions in current nuclear stockpiles, focused on destabilizing systems on each side.
- Seek general agreement on intermediate nuclear forces (INF) by combining these negotiations with START and proposing to incorporate British and French nuclear systems in the discussions.
- Put special emphasis on controlling the export of nuclear technology to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the prospect of terrorists obtaining nuclear materials.
- Promote an independent Arms Control and Disarmament Agency with the appointment of a director genuinely devoted to arms control who has my personal confidence.

I would also end the directionless and expensive concept of building "bargaining chip" systems, which

negotiating history has shown become constituency-ridden items impossible to "bargain" away. I see no need, for example, for systems such as the B-1 bomber or the MX missile, which are expensive and strategically obsolete and, in the case of the MX, essentially destabilizing to the strategic balance.

As a Senator and a supporter of the nuclear freeze movement, I fully understand the need for public support for national defense policy and the requirement for Congressional involvement. In arms control, this Administration continues to ignore public opinion and concern by its loose talk of "winnable nuclear war" and its rush to deploy destabilizing systems such as the MX.

I believe in the common sense of the American people. I believe they know a secure America means being more than just the greatest military power. I believe they have a vision of a secure America beyond the nuclear nightmare—an America at peace with itself as well as with the rest of the world.

Nuclear Force Modernization. Modernization of our nuclear forces is necessary and ongoing. The questions are those of systems to be selected and numbers to be procured. For years, the defense debate has been divided between "hawks" seeking more funds for defense and "doves" seeking less. Each argues that its position on defense is "better." In my view, more is not better; less is not better; only "better" is "better."

To underscore this position, I have prepared an alternative defense budget stressing military reform. I have urged the elimination of a variety of systems including the B-1 bomber, the MX ICBM, and the neutron bomb. I have urged this not because they are nuclear or expensive but because they are either obsolete, destabilizing or ineffective.

As President, I will direct a system by system review of current U.S. nuclear forces and projected changes. I will emphasize those that are stabilizing and survivable. I will eliminate those designed primarily for nuclear war-fighting, and those which generate destabilizing tensions or are redundant. I believe that a modern bomber employing advanced technology could be an effective, stabilizing element of our strategic deterrent. Likewise, I believe that any ICBM replacement should carry only a single warhead and be mobile to prevent the destabilizing perception of a first strike capability associated with the MX. The cruise missile could be considered such a weapon, and its slow speed makes it an even more unlikely first strike weapon. However, the small size and mobility of the cruise missile could present verification problems. Our cruise missile program must therefore be carefully and cautiously pursued so that cruise missiles, like all missiles, can be verifiably included in a freeze.

Equally important, however, I will seek to develop a more effective U.S. military establishment with more effective conventional forces. Such a reformed military establishment, armed with more cost-effective weapons and trained to emphasize firepower and maneuver rather than the current attrition tactics, will raise the nuclear threshold. Our military should be sufficiently strong so that any recourse to nuclear weapons will obviously be a last resort.

Space Warfare. It is a cruel and dangerous hoax for this Administration to promise an increase in American security through "Star Wars" weapons like anti-satellite systems and space-based ballistic missile defense sys-

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tems. Such systems can only endanger our security by creating an expensive and fruitless arms race in space and establishing an entirely new generation of weapons that would undermine deterrence and stability. We should negotiate a strengthened anti-ballistic missile treaty that more clearly prohibits space-based missile defense, and we should take advantage of the fact that effective anti-satellite weapons have yet to be tested by either side to negotiate a ban on these weapons.

President Reagan's "Star Wars" proposal of a ballistic missile defense in space is technically unworkable and strategically unsound. Any such system could be easily and inexpensively countered by further Soviet offensive deployments—if we can shoot down 1,000 missiles, they will build 2,000 or more. In addition, any space-based energy-beam system could not work against bombers and cruise missiles in the lower atmosphere. A space-based defensive system could also be attacked and destroyed by any number of means or evaded through decoys and other countermeasures. Overall, the technical problems of a space-based defense system are simply staggering. Richard DeLauer, Undersecretary of Defense for Research, recently testified before Congress that Reagan's proposed defense system poses eight serious technical problems, each of which would require an effort on the scale of the Apollo project or the Manhattan project to solve—if they can be solved at all. Since nuclear weapons are so devastating, this technically complex system would have to be 100 percent effective, which is for all practical purposes impossible.

While an effective low-altitude, anti-satellite capability is technically feasible, it is as strategically ill-advised as space-based defense. The threatened satellites are crucial in providing the intelligence and communications necessary to deter nuclear war and prevent nuclear accidents. We now have perhaps the best opportunity there will ever be to ban anti-satellite weapons. Once our small ASAT is tested against targets in space, verification will be extremely difficult. It is much easier to ban weapons on the drawing board than in the arsenals. Accordingly, I have cosponsored with Senators Hatfield and Tsongas a resolution calling on the Administration to negotiate a ban on ASAT weapons and prevent an arms race in space. We can ill afford to spend money on destabilizing space weapons when our stabilizing defense forces on earth need our continued support.

Nuclear Proliferation. A Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTB) is a long time personal goal. It could serve as a precursor to the ultimate objective of a "freeze" on production and deployment of nuclear weapons as well as on their testing. There is no longer either technical or political need for continued testing—the need to assure the reliability of our weapons has been obviated by hundreds of past successful tests. Testing for the sake of testing is a policy of deliberate blindness. Consequently, a CTB would be timely and appropriate, moving us beyond the negotiated but never ratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) which we continue to observe. Some of the most extensive and potentially effective verification measures ever negotiated are incorporated in the CTB. The Administration, however, by failing to ratify the TTBT and professing disinterest in a CTB, which both Republican and Democratic predecessors had pursued, demonstrates its disinterest in even the first steps to real arms control.



I believe that the U.S. and other nuclear weapons states have a special responsibility to restrain the export of sensitive nuclear technologies, to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by other states, and to assure that nuclear weapons do not fall into the hands of extra national groups and terrorists. As President, I would recommend an international conference of nuclear weapon states to focus on steps to prevent nuclear proliferation (a treaty commitment to prohibit commercial plutonium production would be a positive step) and assure the security of existing nuclear weapons from seizure by terrorists.

Other Weapons. Since I first entered the Senate almost a decade ago, I have strongly opposed any increases in our existing stockpiles of chemical weapons (CW). Increases in our chemical weapons arsenal would not improve our security since our existing stockpile of such weapons is already a formidable deterrent. Producing more chemical weapons would only draw money from more important defense items, including training and equipping our troops so that chemical weapons cannot be effectively used against them. Ironically, this Administration has cut funds for such defenses against chemical weapons at the same time that it has asked for money to produce these weapons. Accordingly, I have cosponsored resolutions in the Senate supporting a ban on the production of new chemical weapons and urging negotiations toward CW limitation.

Concerning conventional defense, I have always supported strong U.S. conventional forces. I have devoted my efforts on the Senate Armed Services Committee to assuring not less defense or more defense, but better defense. A better defense requires more reliable, less complex weapons that can be less expensively built and more effectively used. By spending too much in the wrong areas, the Administration is leading to a three-fold defense debacle in procurement, readiness, and retainment. The detailed alternative defense budget that I have offered, by contrast, would save \$21 billion in FY 1984 alone, and by reducing the excesses of the current budget and adding to areas in need of funds, it would strengthen our defense as well. Finally, we need to reform our military tactics as well as our military forces, particularly in order to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe.

See page 12.

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STRATEG

Gary Hart . . . from page seven

This Administration's approach to conventional defense and its arms sales policies are also disconcerting. Arms sales to our friends and allies are indeed an important and necessary component of our defense and foreign policies. The frequently indiscriminate arms sales under this Administration, however, have made the world a more dangerous place, lent support to repressive governments, and generally increased the potential for military conflicts in the Third World. U.S. arms sales to the Third World in 1982 were a record \$15.3 billion, more than 20 percent higher than the previous high and 50 percent higher than those of the U.S.S.R. Our arms sales policies, like our defense policies in general, must be consistent with our peaceful and humanitarian ideals. We should renew talks with the Soviets, broken off during the Carter Administration, on sales of conventional weapons. While immediate results are unlikely, as such talks cannot achieve much given the present state of U.S.-Soviet relations, renewed negotiation would at least acknowledge the problem and perhaps establish a basis for future agreement.

Monitoring. The issue of verification lies at the heart of arms control. As a substitute for "trusting" the Soviets—which we should not—we must be able to assure that they hold to the letter of any agreement with us. And this means that our agreements cannot have any ambi-

guities or provisions upon which "agreement" is only the step before disagreement. An agreement under constant challenge erodes its original purpose and is little better than no agreement.

There are a wide range of challenges to Soviet behavior relating to many of our mutual arms control agreements: SALT I and SALT II, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Biological Warfare Convention. None of these challenges have been "proved" in a court of law and, of course, no such legal test is possible. Nevertheless, the range of alleged violations on these and other agreements has convinced many observers that violations have occurred. Soviet responses to our concerns frequently have been unconvincing.

The Soviets appear to take the position that it is our problem that we are not convinced by their answers and that it is our responsibility to prove that they are in compliance with any agreement. This is a fundamental difference in world outlook which is impossible to resolve short of a challenge-style, on-site inspection procedure. We should be working toward such a mechanism not as some distant abstract goal but as the basis for future agreements. Indeed, we are reaching the point with systems such as cruise missiles where conventional and nuclear systems are virtually indistinguishable and where the traditional approach of "national technical means" for verification (essentially satellite reconnaissance) will no longer suffice. In such instances, the only realistic approach will be a system of direct inspection. ■

L.A. DELVOIE 

G. SMITH 

~~K. CALDER~~

J. MCNEE 

 001202

EMBASSY OF JAPAN
OTTAWA

March 12, 1984

① Copies to:

PPD

IDDZ

CPD

PER

PED

PGO

for info.

② Mr. Robert Weir

③ File.

Dear Prime Minister Trudeau,

I am honoured and pleased to convey to you from Prime Minister Nakasone the enclosed message thanking you for your letter to him, including your views on your peace initiative efforts and commenting with sadness on your decision to step down from the Liberal Party leadership.

With warmest regards,

Yours sincerely,

K. Mikanagi

Kiyohisa Mikanagi
Ambassador of Japan

The Right Hon. Pierre E. Trudeau, P.C., Q.C., M.P.
Prime Minister of Canada

O T T A W A

Japanese Embassy is
delivering original
to Pco. Mikanagi had
originally asked to
deliver letter personally to
the Prime Minister but the
Prime Minister was not at home.
001203

EMBASSY OF JAPAN
OTTAWA

March 9, 1984

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I appreciated your letter of January 27 conveying your congratulations on my reappointment as Prime Minister. I read with immense interest your views on the meetings you have had with leaders of other nations concerning your current disarmament initiative. As I mentioned to you last November, I highly value your sincere efforts in bringing about an environment more conducive to true disarmament, a goal which I consider to be of supreme importance in the current international situation, and which we all must strive to attain with maximum efforts. When I visit China towards the end of this month, I hope I will be able to take up this subject with the Chinese leaders.

I am saddened to have learned of your recently expressed desire to step down from the long held party leadership post, and I sincerely hope that you will continue, even after leaving your current office, your valuable efforts in further strengthening the Japan-Canada relationship.

With my best regards,

Sincerely yours,

(signed)

Yasuhiro Nakasone
Prime Minister of Japan

The Right Hon. Pierre E. Trudeau, P.C., Q.C., M.P.
Prime Minister of Canada

O T T A W A

CONFIDENTIAL


March 12, 1984

IDDZ-0223

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R.R. Fowler)

Initiative: Draft letters to President Reagan
and General Secretary Chernenko

... We attach for your consideration draft letters
to President Reagan and General Secretary Chernenko.


E.A. Delvoie

Chairman

Task Force Working Group

cc: PMO/Axworthy

PCO/Osbaldeston

DND/Anderson

DEA/MINA USS DMF IFB

DRAFT

My dear Ron,

When we met in Washington in December we talked of some of the central principles, including several you put forward in your speech to the Japanese Diet, that govern your approach to the Soviet Union and to the gravest threat to humanity, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Since then I have had discussions with General Secretary Chernenko in Moscow and with other world leaders. In reflecting on these meetings and on all of the consultations I have had since I began my efforts last October to try to improve the climate of East-West relations, I have become more and more convinced that there is identifiable common ground between East and West. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons, illustrate that common ground:

- 1) Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- 2) Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- 3) Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or of surprise attack.

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- 2 -

- 4) Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- 5) Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- 6) Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- 7) Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- 8) Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- 9) both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- 10) Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I am writing to commend these principles to you and to ask you to endorse them. Before progress can be made on arms control and other critical issues we must reach agreement on an overall political framework, based on mutual interests, for relations between East and West. Today I am also writing to General Secretary Chernenko to seek his agreement to these ten points. I think that adoption of these fundamental principles by leaders of East and West

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- 3 -

would be a genuine step towards the sort of mutual understanding that is the prerequisite for a lasting peace.

At the same time, I want to seek out fruitful directions for progress on arms control. In a speech on November 13, I put forward several ideas for gearing down the momentum of the arms race. I am enclosing discussion papers on two proposals, one to restrict the mobility of ICBM's and another to require that future strategic systems be verifiable by National Technical Means. I would welcome your views on these ideas, which I am also bringing to the attention of General Secretary Chernenko.

DRAFT

Dear Mr. General Secretary,

May I first reiterate how very pleased I was to meet you last month in Moscow and to have the opportunity for a first exchange of views on East-West issues. Yours ideas on engaging in a practical and productive political dialogue are encouraging. They suggest real prospects for a constructive East-West relationship.

In reflecting on our meeting and on the other consultations I have had with many other world leaders since I began my peace initiative last October, I have become increasingly convinced that there is a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of recent statements by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age. I was particularly interested in the idea of "certain norms" to regulate relations amongst the nuclear powers, mentioned in your speech of March 2.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and

...2

common ground. The following ten points, which I first proposed to the Canadian House of Commons, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

- 1) Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- 2) Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- 3) Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or of surprise attack.
- 4) Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- 5) Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- 6) Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- 7) Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- 8) Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- 9) Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- 10) Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

...3/

- 3 -

I am writing to commend these principles to you and to ask you to endorse them. As part of the process in establishing the means for substantive progress in arms control and other critical negotiations, I believe it is essential that we reach agreement on an overall political framework, based on mutual interests and shared principles. Today I am also writing to President Reagan to seek his agreement to these ten points. I think that adoption of these fundamental principles by leaders of East and West would be a genuine step towards improved understanding and greater world stability.

At the same time, I want to seek out fruitful directions for progress on arms control. In a speech on November 13, I put forward several ideas for gearing down the momentum of the arms race. I am enclosing discussion papers on two proposals, one to restrict the mobility of ICBM's and another to require that future strategic systems be verifiable by National Technical Means. I would welcome your views on these ideas, which I am also bringing to the attention of President Reagan.

MF

CONFIDENTIAL

March 12, 1984

IDDZ-0222

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R. R. Fowler)

Peace Initiative - Disposition of Suffocation Proposals

The three suffocation proposals (a ban on the testing and deployment of high-altitude anti-satellite systems, agreement that states must demonstrate and ensure the verifiability of new strategic weapons systems and agreement to restrict the mobility of intercontinental ballistic missiles) were first spelled out in your Montreal speech of November 13. It was recognized at that time that they were more technical in nature than your other proposals and were not central to your initiative. Your speech indicated that they would be "introduced at the appropriate time and in the appropriate disarmament forum". Shortly thereafter the USA and, to a lesser extent, the UK privately expressed reservations about the proposals and a briefing team was dispatched to Washington at the end of November to consult with the Americans.

There was little further attention given to the three proposals until we introduced them into NATO toward the end of January and told our allies that it was our intention to circulate them in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva very early in the new session opening on February 7. There was an immediate negative reaction from a number of our key allies (France, FRG, UK, USA, Netherlands, Belgium and Italy) both as to the substance of the proposals, as well as to the process we intended to use to deal with them. Many queried our haste and stated in strong terms that we were not permitting adequate time for allied consultations to take place. Bearing this in mind, your February 9 House of Commons speech indicated that "following further consultations with our NATO allies the proposals would be circulated in the CD in the course of the current session".

As mentioned at our last meeting with you on February 22, it was decided to send Gary Smith and Ken Calder of the Task Force on a round of consultations to determine the exact nature of allied concerns and to alleviate these wherever possible. During the period of February 23 - March 2 they visited Washington, NATO Headquarters in Brussels, the Hague, Bonn and London. (The French had expressed their views direct to Smith earlier on.)

Smith and Calder found that the concerns clearly lie more with the process than the substance of the three

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proposals. There is no support at all amongst our allies for our proceeding unilaterally with the circulation of the proposals in the CD and the USA, France, UK and FRG in particular have strong and rather firm objections to such a course of action. These can be summarized as follows:

- 1) The verification and mobility proposals deal with strategic issues which concern bilateral negotiations between the USA and USSR and should be raised in the START context and not multilaterally in the CD.
- 2) These two issues directly affect Western security and should be subject to considered allied views. Even if it were our intention only to circulate the mobility and verification proposals and not attempt to negotiate them in Geneva, some other delegation would seize upon them and attempt to use them in an adversarial manner to the disadvantage of NATO and the USA.
- 3) Moving forward with the ASAT proposal at this time in Geneva will reemphasize the Soviet outer space treaty proposals and thereby fracture alliance unity. It would as well harden USA opposition to any movement on outer space arms control such as the initiation of an ad hoc working group on this subject.
- 4) Circulating the ASAT paper now would block progress rather than advance it and would result in exactly the opposite effect to that which we want.

Reaction to the substance of the proposals is detailed in the attached annex. The Europeans are not terribly interested in the mobility and verification proposals as they are strategic in nature and are of more direct concern to Washington and Moscow. The USA for its part, we have now found, does not have any serious problems with them. On our ASAT proposal, opinion is divided. The USA is opposed (while Washington states there are verification problems with our proposal, it seems clear that a good part of USA's difficulty lies with its desire not to agree to anything that might preclude its new efforts in the field of strategic defence - Star Wars). The Europeans on the other hand are most anxious to have an in-depth consultation on this subject within NATO in order to determine USA intentions vis-à-vis arms control aspects of outer space and have expressed their pleasure that our proposal apparently has precipitated such consultations. A meeting of experts will be held in Brussels on April 11 focussing on our ASAT proposal as well as a more general Dutch paper on arms control in outer space which also suggests a complete ban on ASAT.

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During the consultations Smith and Calder pointed out that it was Canada's intention to consult "exhaustively but not exhaustingly" with our allies on these proposals and that we were talking of weeks and not years.

Options

You could follow one of three courses of action:

A) To proceed with the circulation of our three proposals in Geneva

This would be in keeping with your February 9 speech but would cause a number of our allies considerable distress and would engender hostile reactions. The USA, in this event, has told us it would respond negatively to all three proposals and there is considerable indication the Europeans would follow suit. It would also not necessarily achieve our downstream objectives for these proposals and could prevent desired forward movement on ASAT, specifically the creation of an ad hoc working group on space in Geneva.

B) A midway approach

- i) As it was not our original intention to attempt to negotiate the verification and mobility proposals, our purpose would be served if these two ideas were directed to the two superpowers in personal correspondence from you to the USA and Soviet leaders. This would have the effect of focussing the attention of the two powers most concerned on these proposals. We have been told that the USA would welcome this and would respond positively in writing, something which you could then publicize. Delegations in Geneva could be informed of this action via a speech by our CD Ambassador and by possible circulation of your exchange of correspondence.
- ii) ASAT: We would participate actively in the April 11 NATO experts consultation with a view to drawing out USA intentions with regard to ASAT. We would also work to achieve the creation of an ad hoc working group on this subject in Geneva, to which we could then contribute our proposal for a high-altitude ban.

C) Drop the proposals

This would, of course, silence all the criticism from our allies but would not be in keeping with your stated

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intentions to bring these ideas to the attention of states and of the international arms control community. It would also remove the "leverage" we have achieved through your public statements which is most useful in encouraging forward movement by Washington on arms control in outer space.

We would recommend strongly Option B. Do you agree?



L. A. Delvoie

Chairman

Task Force Working Group

cc: PMO/Axworthy

PCO/Osbaldeston

DND/Anderson/CPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

EA/MINA/USS/DMF/IFB/IDD/IDR/IDA

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ANNEX

The USA, the UK, the FRG, the Netherlands, Norway Belgium and Italy commented on the substance of our three suffocation measures. Their reactions are as follows:

A. Ban on testing and deployment of high-altitude anti-satellite systems

The USA is not convinced that an ASAT ban, whether it be comprehensive as suggested by the Netherlands or partial as suggested by Canada, is either feasible or desirable. USA representatives have pointed out that it would be difficult in an arms control context to distinguish between dedicated ASAT systems and systems with a marginal ASAT capability such as the space shuttle. They have argued that any ASAT agreement may be unverifiable and, therefore, unnegotiable. Even if these problems could be overcome, they are not convinced that any ASAT ban would be desirable. In this respect they argue that such measures would adversely affect the research presently being undertaken in the area of strategic defence (Star Wars).

The UK, in contrast, believes that there is an urgent need to address the question of arms control as it pertains to activities in outer space. The UK believes that a partial measure as we have suggested is preferable, as a first step, to a comprehensive ASAT ban as suggested by the Netherlands. The UK concern over ASAT is closely related to a much greater concern over the development by the USA of strategic defence systems which, if copied by the USSR, would undermine the efficacy of their own strategic nuclear forces. The UK is not convinced that the practical problems posed by an ASAT ban, as presented by the USA, can be overcome. If they can be overcome, however, the UK would support our proposal or some variation of it.

The FRG also believes that the question of arms control as it pertains to activities in space cries out for attention. The FRG believes that an ASAT ban should be pursued and that a partial measure as we have suggested is more realistic than a comprehensive ban. As in the case of the UK, much of the FRG concern is related to the USA interest in developing strategic defensive systems. Like Canada, the FRG is not convinced that the verification problems inherent in any ASAT ban are insurmountable. The FRG might, however, put forward its own ASAT proposal which, while similar to the Canadian proposal in intent and effect, might be somewhat different in terms of modalities.

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The Netherlands shares our concern about ASAT weapons and believes that the problems of verification can be overcome. The Netherlands prefers, however, a comprehensive ASAT ban. Their criticism of our proposal is only that it does not go far enough.

The Norwegians believe that a comprehensive ASAT ban should remain the ultimate objective but recognize that in the present situation the Canadian proposal might represent a better approach. They are, therefore, in essential agreement with our proposal.

The French, Italians and Belgians all believe that the question of banning ASATs ought to be addressed. They have all responded favourably to our proposal without going into detail and without expressing a view as to whether it is preferable to a comprehensive ban.

B. An agreement that states must demonstrate and ensure the verifiability of new strategic weapons systems

The USA has said that it agrees in essence with the concept behind this proposal although it would express that concept somewhat differently were it drafting the proposal. The United States is not, however, in favour of negotiating arms control principles with the Soviet Union outside of the context of specific negotiations such as START. The USA representatives have indicated that if this proposal were put simultaneously and formally to the USA and the USSR they would respond favourably to it in a manner which could be published.

None of our European allies are terribly interested in this proposal as it pertains only to USA and USSR strategic systems. They essentially follow the USA lead in saying that they agree with the concept but doubt the practicality of a separate, formal agreement outside the context of START.

C. An agreement to restrict the mobility of intercontinental ballistic missiles

The United States has said that it generally agrees with the concept represented by this proposal. While it would not necessarily subscribe to all of the details in our discussion paper, the USA has indicated that it is pursuing essentially the same concept in the context of START. It is, however, difficult at this point for the USA to be precise on

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how this proposal would be implemented as that would be contingent on the characteristics of its own mobile ICBM which have yet to be decided. In essence, however, the USA agrees with the concept we have enunciated and have acknowledged it is not inconsistent with the Scowcroft Commission as was suggested earlier on.

Once again, our European allies are not terribly interested in this proposal as it pertains only to USA and USSR strategic systems. Since the USA accepts the validity of the substance of this proposal, none of the European allies would themselves be prepared to disagree with it. Like the USA and consistent with our original intentions, they believe that it should be pursued within the context of START.

RESTRICTED

March 12, 1984

IDDZ-0221

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R.R. Fowler)

Initiative: B.B.C. Radio's request for an interview

B.B.C. Radio's New York-based correspondent, James Cox, has requested a half-hour interview with you, principally on the initiative. It could be conducted in Ottawa and at a time of your choosing.

This interview would be heard in the U.K. and by an influential world-wide audience through the B.B.C.'s World Service and private stations which purchase selected B.B.C. programs.

Cox has submitted the following as a potential line of questioning:

- "1. The peace initiative - what has it achieved?
2. Is Canada uniquely placed to act as a peace broker between the super-powers? If so, why?
3. Is the peace initiative an attempt to define an international role for Canada?
4. Does the initiative have the extra benefit of giving Canadians a clearer sense of their own identity?
5. How does the Prime Minister see the state of the Atlantic alliance between the U.S.A. and U.K. since Canada has a special connection with both?
6. Is Canada more united as a nation now or is the alliance between francophones and anglophones still the principal domestic concern?


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7. Does the Prime Minister see the force of liberalism and social democracy becoming more powerful in western democracies?
8. Has the Prime Minister enjoyed being Prime Minister?
9. As a relatively young man (as world leaders go), what are the Prime Minister's plans for the future?"

Do you wish to do this interview?



L.A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

c.c. PMO/Axworthy/Coleman

PCO/Osbaldeston

DND/Anderson

DEA/MINA USS DMF IFB

Done - memo to PM
12/3/84
[Signature]
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Bcf [Signature]
1002-0221

UNCLASSIFIED

FM CNGNY YIGR0140 07MAR84

TO EXTOTT/UGP

INFO WSHDC PMO/AXWORTHY/FOWLER/COLEMAN LDN

DISTR UGB FPR IDDZ SCS RCR RCD

---BBC REQUEST FOR INTERVIEW WITH PM

RECENTLY APPOINTED BBC RADIO NY CORRESPONDENT JAMES COX, HAS REQUESTED INTERVIEW WITH PM. IN ADDITION TO NY, USA AND MEXICO COX COVERS CDA FROM NYC BASE.

2. COX HAS SHOWN STRONG INTEREST IN CDN AFFAIRS AND HAS IN DEPTH KNOWLEDGE OF CDN SCENE. IN PAST HAS COVERED SUCH ISSUES AS SOVEREIGNTY ASSOCIATION DEBATE.

3. PROPOSED INTERVIEW CLD TAKE PLACE IN OTT AT DATE/TIME OF PMS CHOOSING. COX REQUESTS HALF HOUR.

4. FOLLOWING IS POTENTIAL LINE OF QUESTIONING SUBMITTED BY COX:

- 1.* ^{the}PEACE INITIATIVE, WHAT HAS IT ACHIEVED?
- 2.* -IS CDA UNIQUELY PLACED TO ACT AS ^aPEACE BROKER BETWEEN ^{the}SUPER
- 3.* POWERS? IF SO, WHY?
 - IS ^{the}PEACE INITIATIVE ^{or}ATTEMPT TO DEFINE ^{on}INNATL ROLE FOR CDA?
 - DOES ^{the}INITIATIVE HAVE ^{the}EXTRA BENEFIT OF GIVING CDNS ^aCLEARER SENSE OF ^{their}OWN IDENTITY?
 - HOW DOES ^{the}PM SEE ^{the}STATE OF ^{the}ATLANTIC ALLIANCE BETWEEN USA AND UK SINCE CAN HAS ^aSPECIAL CONNECTION WITH BOTH?

...2

PAGE TWO UNCLASSIFIED YIGR0140

-IS CDA MORE UNITED AS NATION NOW OR IS ^{the} ALLIANCE BETWEEN FRANCO ^{the} PHONES
AND ANGLOPHONES STILL ^{the} PRINCIPLE DOMESTIC CONCERN?

-DOES ^{the} PM SEE ^{the} FORCE OF LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY BECOMING
MORE POWERFUL IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES?

-HAS ^{the} PM ENJOYED BEING ^{the} PM?

-AS ^a RELATIVELY YOUNG MAN (AS WORLD LEADERS GO), WHAT ARE ^{the} PMS PLANS
FOR ^{the} FUTURE? ^{the} ^{the}

5. WHILE PRECISE BROADCAST FORUM FOR INTERVIEW WILL BE FIRMLY ESTABLISHED ONCE APPROVAL IN PRINCIPLE OBTAINED, FOLLOWING RADIO 4/4 PROGS CLD BE USED FOR ALL OR PARTS OF INTERVIEW:

-WORLD TONIGHT -PROFILE -TODAY

MOREOVER SIMILAR COVERAGE WLD OBTAIN FOR BBC EXTERNAL SERVICES THROUGH AIRING ON VARIOUS WORLD SERVICE (SHORT-WAVE) PROGS IN ADDITION TO WIDE DISTRIBUTION TO PRIVATE STATIONS WORLDWIDE WHICH SUBSCRIBE TO BBC QUOTE TOPICAL TAPES UNQUOTE MARKETING PROG.

6. WE STRONGLY ENDORSE PROPOSAL AS INTERVIEW WLD BE GIVEN PROMINENT ATTENTION NOT ONLY IN UK BUT THROUGHOUT WORLD AND CLD RENEW INTEREST IN PEACE INITIATIVE. MOREOVER WE BELIEVE IT CLD STIMULATE GREATER INTEREST IN CDN ISSUES AND LEAD TO ENHANCED COVERAGE OF CDN AFFAIRS NOT ONLY ON PART OF BBC BUT AS WELL ON PART OF OTHER BRITISH MEDIA WHICH COVER CDA THROUGH NY BASED CORRESPONDENTS.

7. GRATEFUL YOUR EARLIEST ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND REPLY.

UUU/880 071900Z YIGR0140

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM OSLO WGGR3314 12MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO STKHM/SCDEL BNATO CANMILREPNATO VMBFR GENEV MOSCO PRMNY WSHDC
LDN BONN PARIS ROME HAGUE LSBON MDRID ATHNS ANKRA BRU COPEN WSAW
PRGUE EPEST BGRAD BUCST BERN VIENN NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/DSTRATA
PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA DMF IFB RGB RGX RBD RBR IDDZ IDD IDR IDAO IDAN RSR
REF YOURTEL IDA0310 07MAR BNATO TEL YBGR6254 09MAR

---STKHM CONF:SOVIET DEMARCHE

MFA ADVISE THAT ON 02MAR MINISTER-COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV OF USSR EMB
CALLED ON POL DIR RAVNE ON INSTRUCTIONS TO OUTLINE SOVIET ATTITUDES
AT STKHM. SMIRNOV LEFT NO/NO NOTES BUT SUBSTANCE OF HIS PRESENTATION
APPEARED TO BE ALONG LINES OF USSR PROVIDED MATERIAL IN OTTAWA.
AMONG FAMILIAR THEMES HE PUT SOME STRESS ON NEED TO RESOLVE LARGER
PROBLEMS BEFORE TACKLING LESSER ONES EG QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. HE
WAS REPORTEDLY NON-POLEMICAL IN HIS PRESENTATION AND NOT/NOT
NOTICEABLY HIGHLY NEGATIVE TO WESTERN EFFORTS AT STKHM.

2. ON SAME OCCASION SMIRNOV TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT GENERALLY
FAVOURABLY ON 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF SOVIET/NORWEGIAN RELATIONS
UNDERLINING PROPOSITION THAT USSR WISHES TO MAINTAIN BUSINESS AS
USUAL ATTITUDE WITH NORWAY DESPITE TREHOLT AFFAIR. SMIRNOV ALSO TOOK
OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS APPRECIATION FOR NORWEGIAN CONDOLENCES ON
DEATH OF ANDROPOV.

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3.WE UNDERSTAND SMIRNOV ALSO CALLED ON STATE SECRETARY KOLDING IN
PM WILLOCHS OFFICE TO CONVEY SAME OUTLINE OF SOVIET VIEWS ON STKHM
PROCEEDINGS.IN LIGHT OF ALL OF THIS IT MAY BE THAT NORWEGIAN REP AT
NATO MIGHT HAVE MORE TO CONTRIBUTE ON 14MAR.

CCC/061 131127Z WGGR3314

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

**CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM GENEV YTGR1687 12MAR84

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ

DISTR IDD IDR RED

REF WSHDC UNGR2901 01MAR

Spith
De Collier to note
MF

RETURN TO RENOYER AU	BICO	FOR FILING POUR - ETRE PORTE AU DOSSIER
ACC	REF	DATE
FILE	DOSSIER	
28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission		

---PMS INITIATIVE:CIRCULATION OF CDN PROPOSALS IN CD-OPTIONS

QUOTE:WE HAVE PREPARED A SHORT QUOTE OPTIONS UNQUOTE PAPER ON RANGE OF POSSIBILITIES WHICH MIGHT BE CONSIDERED IN CONTEXT OF PMS SUFFOCIATION PROPOSALS TO CD.YARDSTICKS WHICH MIGHT BE APPLIED TO ALL OUR SUGGESTED OPTIONS ARE:

A)THEIR ACCEPTABILITY TO OUR ALLIES(NOT/NOT IN THE SENSE THAT ANYONE SHOULD NECESSARILY HAVE A VETO,-RATHER TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE IMPLICATIONS OF OPEN OR DISCREET OPPOSITION IN THE CD FROM SOME OF OUR CLOSER ALLIES);

B)THE REACTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE EXPECTED FROM OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CD INCLUDING THE EASTERN EUROPEANS AND THE NNA;

C)THE REACTION OF CDN PUBLIC OPINION(INCLUDING NGOS,PEACE MOVEMENTS,ACADEMICS,THE MEDIA AND PARLIAMENTARIANS).

SUMMARY NOTES OF TALKING POINTS RAISED DURING CONSULTATIONS AT NATO POLITICAL CTTEE 28FEB(OURTEL YTGR1528 02MAR)SHOULD BE TREATED AS COMPANION PIECE.

2.QUOTE CIRCULATING UNQUOTE AND TABLING UNQUOTE

OPTIONS

PRESUMABLY IT IS NOT/NOT INTENDED MERELY TO MAKE SOME KIND OF GESTURE BUT RATHER THAT WE PROVIDE A CONSTRUCTIVE INPUT INTO

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THE AC/D PROCESS IN THE CD. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, ON TWO OF THE PROPOSALS IT IS INTENDED ONLY THAT CONCEPTS RATHER THAN SPECIFIC PROPOSALS BE DISCUSSED IN ORDER TO LOOSEN UP RIGID ATTITUDES, THEN THE CRITERION OF GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE ALLIANCE WOULD NOT/NOT NECESSARILY APPLY. IF HOWEVER IT IS INTENDED THAT ONE OR MORE OF THE PROPOSALS WOULD BE PUT FORTH (BY WHATEVER MEANS) WITH THE VIEW TO ENCOURAGING CONCRETE NEGOTIATIONS, THEN WE MUST AT LEAST CONSIDER: A) WHICH STATES MIGHT SUPPORT US; B) WHICH MIGHT OPPOSE US; AND C) WHAT RESULTS MIGHT REASONABLY BE EXPECTED. IN OTHER WORDS, TO WHAT EXTENT ARE THE PROPOSALS VIABLE (AND TO WHAT EXTENT DOES THIS MATTER).

3. A DISTINCTION MIGHT BE DRAWN BETWEEN THE TWO QUOTE STRATEGIC UNQUOTE PROPOSALS (AND IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT NONE OF THE THREE PROPOSALS CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS PER SE) AND THE QUOTE OUTER SPACE UNQUOTE PROPOSAL. THE QUOTE STRATEGIC UNQUOTE PROPOSALS DEAL WITH VERIFIABILITY AND MOBILITY OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS RESPECTIVELY, AND ULTIMATELY WOULD BE THE NEGOTIATING RESPONSIBILITY OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS, ALTHOUGH AFFECTING THE INTEREST OF ALL. THE OUTER SPACE PROPOSAL (DEALING WITH A BAN ON HIGH ALTITUDE ASAT SYSTEMS) REQUIRES A WIDER NEGOTIATING PROCESS, AND IN PROCEDURAL TERMS MIGHT BE TREATED SOMEWHAT DIFFERENTLY. THE RANGE OF OPTIONS INDICATED BELOW GO FROM MAXIMUM TO MINIMUM:

(1) QUOTE MAXIMUM OPTION UNQUOTE TO TABLE: COULD BE TABLED BY AMB

...3

THREE

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OR CDN PUBLIC PERSONAGE, COUPLED WITH INTRODUCTORY
SPEECH. IT HAS BEEN INDICATED TO A NUMBER OF ALLIES, HOWEVER, THAT
IT IS NOT/NOT INTENDED TO QUOTE TABLE UNQUOTE BUT RATHER ONLY
TO QUOTE CIRCULATE UNQUOTE. RESULTS OF DISCUSSIONS IN BRUSSELS
SUGGEST THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO GET AGREEMENT TO QUOTE
TABLE UNQUOTE THE OUTER SPACE PROPOSAL IF THE TWO STRATEGIC
PROPOSALS WERE DEALT WITH IN SOME OTHER WAY. THE ADVANTAGES OF
THIS VARIANT OF TABLING OPTION IS THAT IT WOULD SEEM TO REFLECT
THE ORIGINAL CDN INTENTION TO BRING TO THE CD IN AS FORCEFUL A
MANNER AS POSSIBLE THE THREE PROPOSALS PRESENTED BY THE PM: THE
DISADVANTAGE OF THIS OPTION IS THAT THE TWO QUOTE STRATEGIC
UNQUOTE PROPOSALS IN PARTICULAR HAVE, AS A RESULT OF
CONSULTATIONS IN WSHDC, NATO AND ELSEWHERE, INDICATED A CERTAIN
UNEASINESS ON THE PART OF SOME OF OUR ALLIES ABOUT CDAS
PURPOSE, THUS IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO DISPEL THIS UNEASINESS
BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH THIS OPTION. THIS OPTION WOULD PROBABLY
HAVE MAXIMUM IMPACT ON CDN PUBLIC OPINION, AND COULD ATTRACT AT
LEAST VERBAL SUPPORT FROM THE EASTERN EUROPEANS; AND CERTAINLY
MORE THAN VERBAL SUPPORT FROM THE NNA;

(2) ANOTHER TABLING OPTION VARIANT: TO PASS TO ALL HEADS OF CD
DELS AN EXPLNATORY LETTER ON THE PURPOSES OF THE THREE CDN
PROPOSALS, WITH THE TWO STRATEGIC PAPERS ATTACHED. THE OUTER
SPACE PROPOSAL COULD BE ATTACHED AND/OR TABLED WHEN (AND IF) THE
OUTER SPACE WORKING GROUP IS ESTABLISHED, AND THE LETTER COULD

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SO INDICATE.THE ADVANTAGE OF THIS VARIANT IS THAT IT WOULD
ACCURATELY REFLECT THE ANNOUNCED CDN INTENTION TO QUOTE
CIRCULATE UNQUOTE THE PROPOSALS IN THE CD;THE DISADVANTAGE IS
THAT UNLESS OUR CDN INTENTIONS AND PURPOSES WERE VERY CLEARLY
SPELLED OUT IN THE COVERING LETTER,THE PROPOSALS(CONCEPTS FOR
DISCUSSIONS INITIALLY ONLY BY TWO MAJOR POWERS)COULD WELL BE
MISUNDERSTOOD.MOREOVER,THE USA HAS CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN THAT
THE CD IS QUOTE INAPPROPRIATE UNQUOTE AS A BODY WHERE STRATEGIC
MATTERS SHOULD BE AIRE.DAPPLICATION OF YARDSTICKS WOULD MOST
LIKELY GIVE RESULTS SIMILAR TO THAT IN OPTION(1);

(3)A FURTHER VARIANT:TO PRESENT THE THREE CDN PROPOSALS TO THE
REPS OF THE TWO SUPERPOWERS IN THE CD,IN THE FORM OF A LETTER
WITH ATTACHMENTS.A FURTHER VARIATION ON THIS OPTION WOULD BE TO
DO SO WHILE AT THE SAME TIME INFORMING THE CD,IN A PRESENTATION
IN PLENARY,OF THE LETTERS AND THEIR CONTENTS.THE ADVANTAGES AND
DISADVANTAGES OF THIS VARIANT ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE IN VARIANTS
ABOVE.OF COURSE,IF ANYONE WANTED TO ADDRESS ANY OF THE
PROPOSALS IN THE CD IT WOULD BE HARD TO PREVENT IT;

(4)OPTION TO PRESENT THE IDEAS CONTAINED IN THE THREE CDN
PROPOSALS TO THE CD IN RESUME FORM IN A SPEECH,AND TO INDICATE
THAT THE RELATED PAPERS WOULD BE PASSED IN CAPITALS.THE
ADVANTAGES OF THIS VARIANT WOULD BE TO PUT THE PROPOSALS AT ONE
REMOVE FROM THE CD,THEREBY UNDERLINING OUR POSITION THAT THESE
PROPOSALS ARE NOT/NOT FOR IMMEDIATE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE

...5

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CD.DISADVANTAGE IS THAT OUR MAJOR NATO ALLIES COULD WELL
COMPLAIN THAT WE HAD GONE OUTSIDE THE EAST/WEST BARGAINING
FRAMEWORK, PARTICULARLY IN ORDER TO PUT OUR IDEAS TO OTHERS ONLY
MARGINALLY INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS; ANOTHER IS THAT SOME OF THE
40 CAPITALS, PARTICULARLY AMONGST THE NNA, MIGHT REQUEST
CONSIDERATION IN THE CD (ALTHOUGH SO FAR THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO SUCH
PRESSURE BASED ON THE PMS SPEECH IN THE HOUSE);

(5) THERE IS ALSO THE OPTION SUGGESTED BY OUR WSHDC EMB (REF
WSHDC TEL UNGR2091 01MAR) WHOSE MAJOR ADVANTAGE IS ITS
ACCEPTABILITY TO THE USA. WHETHER THIS OPTION WOULD SATISFY CDN
PUBLIC OPINION, PARTICULARLY THE PEACE MOVEMENTS, THE MEDIA AND
PARLIAMENTARIANS IS ANOTHER MATTER. SHOULD THIS OPTION BE
ADOPTED, SOME OF THE MORE PROMINENT PEACE ACTIVISTS COULD WELL
ARGUE THAT CDA WAS BACKING OFF ITS ORIGINAL INTENTIONS;

(6) SOME FORM OF CIRCULATION IS REQUIRED. ONE OPTION WHICH MIGHT
BE WORTH CONSIDERING WOULD BE TO PASS THE PAPERS TO THE
FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES IN THE CD UNDER COVER OF A LETTER
EXPLAINING THE PURPOSE OF THE PAPERS, AND INVITING THEM TO
CONSIDER HOW THE SUGGESTIONS IN THE PAPER CONTAINED MIGHT BEST BE
EMPLOYED. THIS OPTION WOULD LINK THE FIVE POWER CONCEPT TO THE
SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS, AND HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF BEING A
VARIATION ON WHAT IS KNOWN THE AMERICANS WILL ACCEPT. AT THE
SAME TIME HOWEVER THE FIVE POWER CONCEPT HAS NOT/NOT BEEN
UNEQUIVOCALLY ACCEPTED BY THOSE CONCERNED, AND LINKING THE TWO

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IDEAS TOGETHER, IT COULD BE ARGUED, COULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF DIMINISHING THE PROSPECTS FOR BOTH. NEVERTHELESS, THE STRENGTH BEHIND THIS IDEA FLOWS FROM JUST SUCH LINKAGE. THIS IDEA COULD BE IMPLEMENTED, FOR EXAMPLE, BY TABLING THE OUTER SPACE PROPOSAL IN THE CD BEFORE THE SPRING BREAK (IF THIS CAN BE MANAGED WITH OUR ALLIES) AND SENDING THE TWO STRATEGIC PROPOSALS TO THE AMBASSADORS OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES TO THE CD UNDER COVER OF A SUITABLY-WORDED LETTER. THE CONTENTS OF THE LETTER COULD BE CIRCULATED, IN RESUME FORM, TO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CD, WHICH COULD HAVE AN EXPLANATORY LETTER ATTACHED INDICATING THAT THESE IDEAS HAD BEEN PUT TO THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION.

4) THIS LAST OPTION, WHILE PERHAPS THE MOST ATTRACTIVE, IS STILL IMPERFECT, AND HAS A NUMBER OF LOOSE ENDS. FOR EXAMPLE, OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CD MAY WELL ASK TO SEE THE CONTENTS OF THE LETTERS AND A POLICY DECISION WOULD BE REQUIRED ON WHETHER OR NOT/NOT COPIES OF THE LETTERS COULD BE GIVEN TO OTHER CD MEMBERS ON A RESPONSIVE BASIS. ANOTHER RELATED, AND NEGATIVE FEATURE OF THIS OPTION, IS THAT SOME OF THE MORE SENSITIVE MEMBERS OF THE CD (EG INDIA) MAY WELL FEEL THAT THEY WERE BEING TREATED AS SECOND CLASS CITIZENS. WE WOULD, IN ANY EVENT, UNDOUBTEDLY BE ASKED BY DELS TO THE CD, (IRRESPECTIVE OF WHATEVER OUR COVERING LETTER WERE TO CONTAIN EXPLAINING THE PURPOSE, IN CD TERMS), FOR INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CDN STRATEGIC PROPOSALS AND IN PARTICULAR ...7

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HOW THEY RELATE TO OVERALL CDN ACD POLICIES, INCLUDING HOW WE
INTEND TO FOLLOW THROUGH. SIMILAR QUESTIONS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY
BE RAISED BY CDN MEDIA, PARLIAMENTARIANS AND PEACE GROUPS.

5) FOR REASONS GIVEN ABOVE, AND MEASURED AGAINST THE YARDSTICKS
INDICATED, THIS LAST OPTION SEEMS THE MOST ADVANTAGEOUS, ALTHOUGH FOR
IT TO BE PROPERLY IMPLEMENTED FURTHER EFFORTS WOULD HAVE TO BE
UNDERTAKEN TO ENSURE THAT QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP OF
THESE INITIATIVES TO OVERALL CDN ACD PROPOSALS AND PRECISE FOLLOW
THROUGH WOULD HAVE TO BE DISCUSSED IN DEPTH WITH OUR ALLIES,
AS INDEED WE HAVE RECOMMENDED PREVIOUSLY.

CCC/221 151320Z YTGR1687

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

Dr. Goldstein
Mr. [Signature]

mf.

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM WSHDC UNGR2125 12MAR84

TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 130900

INFO MOSCO LDN PARIS ENATO BUCST BPEST PRGUE WSAW BGRAD PRMNY GENEV
STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPB BONN ROME

DISTR MINA MINE RGB RBRD RCD RSR URR UGB IDD IDA IDDZ ZSI DMF ZSP

---USA/USSR RELNS

IN LAST COUPLE OF WEEKS THERE HAVE BEEN PERSISTENT RUMOURS AROUND
WSHDC THAT USA WAS INVOLVED IN SOME SECRET NEGS WITH USSR. WE KNEW
THAT AMB HARTMAN WAS IN TOWN FOR CONSULTATIONS AND BURT ACKNOWLEDGED
VAGUELY TO GOTLIEB THAT SOMETHING WAS GOING ON BUT SAID HE COULD
NOT/NOT SAY WHAT.

2. TODAY WE WERE TOLD THAT SHULTZ SAW DOBRYNIN LAST WEEK AND WE
RECEIVED A FAIRLY BROAD HINT THAT REAGAN SAW HIM TOO. DEPT. ASST
SECTY PALMER TOLD US THAT IN THESE MTGS USA ENGAGED IN HARD PROBING
OF USR ON POSSIBLE AREAS OF COOPERATION AND PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL.
USA HAD HOWEVER BEEN FIRMLY REBUFFED BY THE SOVS. PALMER SAID THAT
AT PRESENT HE CLD NOT/NOT TELL US ANYTHING MORE BUT THAT USA WAS
CONSCIOUS OF NEED TO BRIEF CDA AND OTHER CLOSE ALLIES ON CONTENT
OF THESE TALKS AND HOPED TO DO SO SOON. HE SAID HE CLD ASSURE US
THAT NO/NO NEGS WERE GOING ON IN THESE TALKS.

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PAGE TWO UNGR2125 SECRET CEO

3.HARTMAN MTG WITH GROMYKO ON SUNDAY WAS FOLLOWUP TO WSHDC MTGS.
PALMER CHARACTERIZED TASS REPORT OF HARTMAN/GROMYKO MTG(WHICH WE
HAVE SEEN ONLY EXTRACTS FROM)AS BEING PARTICULARLY UNHELPFUL.HE
SAID HE CLD NOT/NOT SAY HOW LONG REAGANS PATIENCE WILL LAST IF
HE KEEPS BEING SO FIRMLY REBUFFED BY SOVS BUT THAT FOR PRESENT
REAGAN IS DETERMINED TO KEEP TRYING TO FIND AREAS OF POTENTIAL
PROGRESS.

CCC/059 122237Z UNGR2125

MF
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R E S T R I C T E D

FM WSHDC UNGR2121 12MAR84

TO EXTOTT URR DELIVER BY 130800

INFO MOSCO ROME LDN PARIS BONN TOKYO PRMNY CNGNY PCOOTT/BALDESTON/
FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY NDHQOTT/ADM/POL/CPD FINOTT/SHANNON/IDR
DOTOTT/MIN PMDEL GENEV

BH ENVHULL DE OCI

REGAM ATNTA BOSTN BFALO CHCGO CLVND DTROT LNGLS NRLNS PHILA SFRAN
SEATL DE WDC

DISTR MINA MINT MINE USS DMF DMT TFB UGB LGB SFB PGB EFB RGE IFB
CCB GGB JCX GAD GMD GMR PED PPD PSD EED ETD EPD RSD RCD RCF RBD RBR
LCD LSC LCR LSR CPD BCD ZSP IDD IDDZ IDA IDR IMD URD URT URE UTD UTT
UGP

REF OURTELS UNGR2115 04MAR UNGR2082 29FEB UNGR2100 05MAR

---GARY HART

YOU REQUESTED AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF A SUCCESSFUL HART
CANDIDACY ON OUR INTERESTS. AS WE DO NOT/NOT FIGURE AS AN ISSUE IN THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL LANDSCAPE, HART--LIKE HIS DEMOCRATIC OR REPUBLICAN
COLLEAGUES--HAS NO/NO QUOTE CANADA POLICY UNQUOTE. HIS STAND ON ISSUES
OF CONCERN TO US THEREFORE HAS HAD TO BE INFERRED FROM HIS VOTING
RECORD IN THE SENATE, HIS PUBLIC PRONOUNCEMENTS IN THE NOMINATION
CAMPAIGN AND BEFORE; AND HIS POLICY POSNS AS SET OUT IN HIS RECENTLY
PUBLISHED BOOK QUOTE A NEW DEMOCRACY UNQUOTE.

2. WHILE HE HAS PORTRAYED HIMSELF IN THIS CAMPAIGN AS A QUOTE NEW

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POLITICIAN UNQUOTE A REVIEW OF HIS SENATE RECORD IN THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS REVEALS HIM TO BE ON THE LEFT SIDE OF MAINSTREAM DEMOCRATIC POLITICS. ANALYSES OF SENATE VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN TERMS OF DEGREE OF CONSERVATISM PUT HART IN THE SAME CATEGORY AS SENS MOYNIHAN AND BRADLEY. IN FACT HE HAS BEEN ONLY SLIGHTLY LESS LIBERAL THAN THE MOST LIBERAL OF ANY SENATE MEMBERS (SARBANES, DODD, CRANSTON, TSONGAS, LEVIN, REIGLE, EAGLETON AND METZENBOOM. ONE POINT OF NOTE IS THAT UNLIKE MANY OF HIS DEMOCRATIC COLLEAGUES HIS RELNS WITH ORGANIZED LABOUR HAVE NOT/NOT ALWAYS BEEN COMPLETELY HARMONIOUS. ON THE WHOLE HOWEVER HE HAS NOT/NOT STRAYED FAR FROM THE MAINSTREAM OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN HIS SENATE ROLE.

3. IN TERMS OF HIS SENATE EXPERIENCE, HIS QUOTE NEW IDEAS UNQUOTE HAVE BEEN MOST MANIFESTED IN AREA OF DEFENCE AND MILITARY POLICY. WHILE HE IS A MEMBER OF 3 SENATE CTTEES (ARMED SERVICES; BUDGET; AND ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS) HE IS MOST KNOWN THERE FOR HIS PROPOSALS ON MILITARY REFORM AND DEFENCE POLICY AND AS CO-FOUNDER OF MILITARY REFORM CAUCUS IN SENATE. IN OTHER POLICY AREAS HIS VIEWS HAVE BEEN MOST CLEARLY ENUNCIATED IN CURRENT CAMPAIGN AND IN HIS WRITING. IN MANY RESPECTS HIS QUOTE NEW IDEAS UNQUOTE HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY ARTICULATED BY OTHERS IN BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS HERE--SOMETHING WHICH HE HAS NOT/NOT DENIED. WHAT HE HAS DONE WITH THEM HOWEVER IS DRAW THEM TOGETHER TO INCORPORATE THEM INTO A COMPLETE PROGRAM WHICH MIGHT BE DESCRIBED AS ENTREPRENEURIAL/NEW DEAL WITH ITS EMPHASIS ON USING PRIVATE

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SECTOR TO STIMULATE NON-INFLATIONARY ECONOMIC GROWTH.HIS IDEAS IN THIS AREA REFLECT A GREAT DEAL OF WORK OF AMERICAN ACADEMICS SUCH AS ROBERT REICH,DANIEL BELL AND OTHERS WHO HAVE PROMULGATED POLICY OPTIONS FOR POST INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY.SOME OF HIS IDEAS ALSO REFLECT WESTERN EUROPEAN CONCEPTS SUCH AS JOINT LABOUR-INDUSTRY MANAGEMENT AND SO ON.

4.TO THE EXTENT THAT CONSISTENCY WILL APPLY TO HIS PROPOSALS AND POSNS IN THE LONGER RUN THIS IS WHAT CANDIDATE HART MAY MEAN FOR US.

5.TRADE POLICY:HE HAS ALREADY PROVEN HIMSELF TO BE ANTI-PROTECTION-IST IN NUMBER OF SENATE VOTES INCLUDING AUTO DOMESTIC CONTEXT AND BUY AMERICAN PROVISIONS IN PUBLIC WORKS PROJECTS.HART ATTRIBUTES USA TRADE DEFICIT TO VARIETY OF FACTORS SUCH AS:UNFAIR TRADING PRACTICES BY OTHER COUNTRIES;COST OF USA OIL IMPORT BILL;AND UNCOMPETITIVE PRICING OF USA EXPORTS.HARTS PROPOSED RESPONSE IS TO WORK TOWARDS PROMTING OPEN TRADE MARKET IN USA(WITH MAJOR EXCEPTION OF ENERGY IMPORTS)AND TAKING AGRESSIVE APPROACH TO INCREASING AMERICAN EXPORT POTENTIAL(WHICH IN TRUN RELATES TO HIS PROPOSALS FOR NATL INDUSTRIAL POLICY).HIS TRADE POLICY GOALS FALL INTO 3 MAIN AREAS:PROMOTION OF USA EXPORTS;MANAGING IMPORTS;STRENGTHENING AND EXPANDING GATT.PROM-OTION OF USA EXPROTS WOULD ENTAIL MULTIFACETED EFFORT AIMED AT PUT-TING TRADE POLICY INTO MORE CENTRAL POSITION IN AMERICAN POLICY-MAKING;POSSIBLE CREATION OF A NEW DEPT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY;CHANGES IN EXPORT FINANCING POLICY(EXPANDING ROLE OF EXIM BANK);EXPANDING

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OPERATIONS OF FOREIGN COMMERCIAL SERVICE;SEEKING A LARGER SHARE OF THIRD WORLD MARKETS;AND AGRESSIVELY PROMOTING USA AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS.IMPORT MANAGEMENT THRUST FOCUSES PRIMARILY ON MORE ACTIVE USE OF EXISTING GATT REMEDIES TOGETHER WITH RELIANCE ON INDUSTRIAL POLICY PROGRAMS RELATING TO INDUSTRIAL ADJUSTMENT(RETRAINING;EMPLOYMENT SUBSIDIES AND USE OF TEMPORARY TRADE RELIEF MEASURES SUCH AS TARIFFS WHICH WOULD BE UTILIZED TO FINANCE ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMS.ON GATT HE HAS ARGUED FOR STRENGTHENING AND IMPROVING MULTILATERAL SYSTEM THROUGH MORE INTENSIVE AND REGULAR NEGOTIATING SESSIONS AND THROUGH EXPANDING ITS COVERAGE TO INCLUDE ISSUES SUCH AS TRADE IN SERVICES,INVESTMENT,HIGH TECHNOLOGY TRADE AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS. ON BALANCE HARTS POSN ON TRADE POLICY ISSUES IS CONSIDERABLY LESS DISQUIETING THAN THAT OF WALTER MONDALES QUOTE FAIR TRADE UNQUOTE RHETORIC.

6.ON ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY HARTS ROLE IN SENATE HAS NOT/OT BEEN HIGH-PROFILE.MOREOVER IT IS NOT/NOT AN ISSUE ON WHICH HE HAS HAD A GREAT DEAL TO SAY OUTSIDE SENATE.HE HAS DESCRIBED HIMSELF AS A QUOTE CONSERVATIONIST UNQUOTE RATHER THAN AS AN ENVIRONMENTALIST.ON THE WHOLE HIS POSN ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES SEEMS TO HAVE MODERATED OVER LAST SEVERAL YEARS AS HE ATTEMPTED TO SAW OFF BETWEEN ENVIRONMENTALISTS AND INDUSTRY GRPS IN DEBATE OVER CLEAN AIR ACT FOR EXAMPLE.NONETHELESS HE DID SUPPORT ACID RAIN LEGISLATION IN 97TH CONGRESS(MITCHELL BILL WHICH CALLED FOR EIGHT MILLION TON REDUCTION IN 31 STATES EAST ...5

3E FIVE UNGR2121 RESTR

OF MISSISSIPPI OVER 12 YR PERIOD)AND HAS ADVOCATED ACID RAIN CONTROL PROGRAM IN CURRENT CAMPAIGN.ON OTHER ISSUES HE HAS SUPPORTED BIG WATER PROJECTS(PARTICULARLY FOR HIS HOME STTE)AND HAS BEEN MODERATE ON ASBESTOS CONTROL ISSUE(PERHAPS BECAUSE MANVILLE CORP IS HEADQUARTERED IN COLORADO).

7.HARTS POSN ON ENERGY POLICY IS UNIQUE AMONGST DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES --END AMERICAN DEPENDENCE ON ENERGY IMPORTS.HIS VIEWS ON ENERGY POLICY SEEM TO HAVE BEEN FORMULATED LARGELY IN CONTEXT OF COMBINATION OF NATL SECURITY AND TRADE POLICY RATIONALES.DEPENDENCE ON ENERGY IMPORTS(ALWAYS EXPRESSED AS MIDDLE EASTERN OIL)IS IN HARTS VIEW DETRIMENTAL TO AMERICAN INTERESTS IN 3 RESPECTS:USA CANNOT AFFORD TO BE DEPENDENT ON SUCH A POTENTIALLY TENUOUS SUPPLY OF ENERGY FOR NATL SECURITY REASONS;DEPENDENCE ON MIDEAST IN TURN POSES PROSPECT OF IRRATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVENTURISM WHICH WOULD DRAW USA INTO MIDEAST CONFLICT IN ORDER TO PROTECT ITS OIL SUPPLY;AND;FINALLY OIL COSTS TOO MUCH.AMONGST HIS PROPOSED RESPONSES TO ENERGY DEPENDENCE PROBLEM ARE:INCREASED CONSERVATION;DEREGULATION OF NATURAL GAS;PROMOTION OF ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES SUCH AS SOLAR POWER;ENHANCED USE OF EXISTING ENERGY SOURCES SUCH AS COAL AND NUCLEAR POWER(HART LED SENATE INVESTIGATION OF THREE MILE ISLAND ACCIDENT BUT DID NOT/NOT AS A RESULT CONDEMN USE OF NUCLEAR POWER IN USA);DEVELOPMENT OF PRACTICAL EMERGENCY OIL RATIONING SCHEME AND FULL USE OF STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE.ONE OF HIS MOST CONTROVERSIAL SUGGESTIONS HAS BEEN

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INTRODUCTION OF OIL IMPORT TARIFF WHICH WOULD BE USED TO FINANCE DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATE DOMESTIC ENERGY SOURCES AND WHICH WOULD OVER TIME DRIVE IMPORTED OIL OUT OF USA ENERGY MARKETS. GENERALLY ENVISAGED ROLE OF FEDERAL GOVT IN ENERGY FIELD WOULD BE TO: STIMULATE R&D INTO ALTERNATE ENERGY SOURCES AND PROMOTE CONSERVATION. HE WOULD HOWEVER ABOLISH SYNTHIC FUELD CORP. HART HAS NOT/NOT INDICATED WHETHER ENERGY SUPPLIES FROM EITHER MXICO OR CDA ARE CONSIDERED TO BE IN SAME CATEGORY AS MIDEAST OIL.

8. MAIN FEATURES OF HARTS CAMPAIGN PROGRAM HAVE CENTERED ON DOMESTIC ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEFENCE POLICY. ON FORMER HE HAS FOCUSED ON NATL INDUSTRIAL PROGRAM AND RELATED POLICIES DESIGNED TO RESHAPE AMERICAN ECONOMY TO BETTER RESPOND TO CHALLENGES IT FACES. AMONGST SPECIFIC ECONOMIC PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD ARE; HAVING FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD FOCUS ON INTEREST RATES RATHER THAN MONEY SUPPLY (TO WORK TOWARDS BRINGING MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY INTO HARMONY); ADJUSTMENTS IN USA BUDGET (REDUCING DEFENCE OUTLAYS); REFORM AND MODERNIZATION OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAM; DOING AWAY WITH LAST SCHEDULED TEN PERCENT PERSONAL TAX CUT; PROMOTION OF DEOMESTIC CAPITAL INVESTMENT (INCLUDING REFORM OF BUDGETARY PROCESS TO INCORPORATE CAPITAL BUDGET PLANNING). REFORM AND SIMPLIFICATION OF TAX SYSTEM THROUGH EITHER BRADLEY-GEPHARDT TAX PROPOSAL (FLATTER TAX RATE COMBINED WITH MINIMAL ALLOWABLE DEDUCTIONS) OR THROUGH CONSUMPTION BASED TAX SYSTEM IS ALSO PRINCIPAL FEATURE OF HARTS PROGRAM. INDUSTRIAL POLICY ENVISAGED BY HART WOULD HAVE NUMBER ...?

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OF THRUSTS INCLUDING OVERALL OBJECTIVE OF SEEKING BROADLY BASED
INDUSTRY-LABOUR-GOVT AGREEMENT ON ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS AF-
FECTING BOTH TRADITIONAL AND NEWLY DEVELOPING INDUSTRIES. TO STIMULATE
NEW INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT HART PROPOSES TO FREE UP RISK CAPITAL
INVESTMENT FUNDS THROUGH CHANGES IN EXISTING REGULATORY AND LEGAL
RESTRICTIONS. OLD INDUSTRY STRATEGY LARGELY CENTRES ON USE OF VARIETY
OF PROGRAMS DESIGNED TO RETRAIN LABOUR. MAJOR EMPHASIS IN PROGRAM
WOULD BE NEW EFFORT IN EDUCATION DESIGNED NOT/NOT ONLY TO RETRAIN
MEMBERS OF EXISTING WORK FORCE BUT AS WELL TO PREPARE NEW ONES FOR
ENTRY INTO NEW HIGH TECH INDUSTRIES.

9. HARTS DEFENCE POLICY PROPOSALS REVOLVE AROUND RETHINKING USA
DEFENCE STRATEGY; REMODELLING USA MILITARY ACCORDINGLY; AND ADOPTION OF
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL. HIS MAJOR CONCERN ON MILITARY
STRATEGY FRONT HAS BEEN RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF USA CONVENTIONAL NAVAL
SUPERIORITY TOGETHER WITH HAVING NATO PARTNERS SHARE GREATER BURDEN
OF COSTS IN THEIR OWN DEFENCE. AS WELL HE WOULD INSTITUTE CHANGES IN
TRNG; MANPOWER POLICY; MILITARY DOCTRINE (PROMOTION OF HIGHLY MANEOUV-
ERABLE FORCES); AND MILITARY PROCUREMENT (MORE EMPHASIS ON SMALLER,
SIMPLER WEAPONS SYSTEMS RATHER THAN ON COMPLEX BIG TICKET ITEMS). IN
ESSENCE HIS CONVENTIONAL MILITARY PROPOSALS ARE AIMED AT ENHANCING
AMERICAS CAPACITY TO CONDUCT A CONVENTIONAL WAR IN PART TO LESSEN
PROSPECTS FOR EARLY RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR FORCES. HARTS DEFENCE POLICY
PROPOSALS WOULD STILL REQUIRE 4-5 PERCENT GROWTH IN USA DEFENCE
BUDGET.

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10. IN REALM OF ARMS CONTROL HARTS AGENDA INVOLVES RANGE OF PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO IMPROVE AMERICAN CAPABILITY AND INCREASE COMMUNICATION WITH SOVIETS. WHILE HE OPPOSES B-1 BOMBER AND MX HE WOULD UPGRADE SUB-MARINE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. BEYOND STRENGTHENING OF AMERICAN DETERRENT HE IS CONCERNED WITH AVOIDING PROSPECT OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT THROUGH MISTAKE AND HAS THUS PROPOSED JOINT USA-USSR CRISIS CONTROL FACILITY; IMPROVED USA INTELLIGENCE EFFORT; AND AVOIDANCE OF DESTABILIZING WEAPON SYSTEMS. HE WOULD SEEK RATIFICATION OF SALT II; REAFFIRM ABM TREATY; PRESS FOR GREATER EFFORT IN NPT; SEEK AGREEMENT BANNING TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS; AND SEEK COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN.

11. ALL IN ALL AS CAN BE SEEN, HARTS POSN IN TERMS OF OUR INTERESTS ARE BETTER THAN THOSE OF HIS COLLEAGUES IN AREAS OF TRADE POLICY AND ABOUT THE SAME IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY. ENERGY POLICY IS A QUESTION-MARK IN HIS CASE IN TERMS OF USA SELF-SUFFICIENCY PROPOSAL. ON DEFENCE POLICY HIS CALL FOR GREATER EFFORT BY NATO ALLIES IS IN FACT ONE WHICH HIS DEMOCRATIC COLLEAGUES (EVEN JESSE JACKSON) SHARE.

12. DESPITE HAVING ENUNCIATED IN SOME DETAIL HIS POSN ON A RANGE OF ISSUES THERE REMAINS SOME DOUBT ABOUT HARTS REAL DEDICATION TO THOSE IN PART BECAUSE OF QUESTIONS ABOUT PERSONAL LIFE AND STYLE (EG HIS NAME CHANGE; HIS REAL AGE; HIS STUDIED IMITATION OF JOHN KENNEDY MANNERISMS) AND NO/NO LESS DUE TO FACT THAT DESPITE HAVING SERVED IN SENATE FOR 10 YRS VAST MAJORITY OF HIS COLLEAGUES THERE ARE UNANIMOUS IN JUDG-

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MENT THAT THEY DONT KNOW HIM WELL.THIS MAY REFLECT HARTS REMARKABLE
SUCCESS(NOT/NOT ONLY IN DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION CAMPAIGN BUT AS WELL IN
HIS LAST SENATE ELECTION)IN GIVING IMPRESSION THAT HIS PLACE IN
POLITICAL RIGHT-LEFT SPECTRUM IS ALL IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER.

CCC/086 122237Z UNGR2121

Mr. Cullen
Mr. [unclear]
MF.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDD0336 12MAR84

TO STKHM/SCDEL DELIVER BY 130900

INFO BNATO

DISTR DMF IFB RGB RBD RBR IDA IDAO IDDZ

REF YOURTEL SCDL0250 09MAR AND RBR TEL 427 08MAR

---STKHM CONF: INTERSESSIONAL BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS

YOUR SUGGESTION FOR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH SOVIETS AND EAST EUROPEANS DURING INTERSESSIONAL PERIOD EITHER IN CONTEXT OF BROAD EXCHANGE ON ACD ISSUES OR FOCUSSED ONLY ON STKHM CONF CONTAINS NUMBER OF ELEMENTS WHICH HAVE REQUIRED CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. IN GENERAL WE SEE MERIT IN BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE AS WAY OF KEEPING LINES TO EAST OPEN AND FOR REINFORCING MERITS OF WESTERN PROPOSALS. IN FACT, MAIN GOAL OF CDN SIDE WOULD BE TO PUSH HARD, IN BILATERAL CONTEXT, WESTERN CONCEPTS OF CSBM AND TO ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE EASTERN INTERLOCUTORS THAT BEST PROSPECTS FOR FRUITFUL OUTCOME AT CONF RESTED IN GRADUALIST APPROACH IN ACCORDANCE WITH MANDATE. IN PURSUING THIS OBJECTIVE WE WOULD NOT/WANT TO EVEN HINT AT POSSIBLE WESTERN COMPROMISES IN ORDER THAT THERE BE NO/NO MISINTERPRETATION OF SIGNALS.

2. WE CONSIDER STKHM CONF IMPORTANT ENOUGH IN ITS OWN RIGHT TO WARRANT BEING SOLE FOCUS FOR BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE. WHILE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT CONSULTS ON BROADRANGE OF ACD ISSUES MIGHT

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PAGE TWO IDD0336 CONFD

HAVE GREATER IMPACT THAN SINGLE ISSUE TALKS, WE WOULD PREFER LATTER APPROACH AS CONSIDERATION OF NEXT STEPS IN PM INITIATIVE IS NOT/NOT YET COMPLETED. AT SAME TIME WE AGREE THAT OBVIOUS INTERLOCUTORS WOULD BE THOSE WITH WHOM PM WAS UNABLE TO VISIT, IE BULGARIANS AND HUNGARIANS (POLES BEING ELIMINATED FROM PARTICIPATION BECAUSE OF BILATERAL SANCTIONS-RBR REFTEL). WITH REGARD TO EXCHANGE WITH SOVIETS YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT BILATERAL POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS AT DEPMIN LEVEL WILL BE HELD IN OTTAWA IN APPROXIMATELY SIX WEEKS AND PLANS ARE CURRENTLY BEING MADE FOR PETROVSKI, HEAD OF INNATL DEPT MFA (IFB EQUIVALENT) TO BE IN OTTAWA IN FALL FOR FULL EXCHANGE ON ACD ISSUES. BEARING THESE VISITS IN MIND, E/EUROPEAN BUREAU CONSIDERS THAT SCHEDULING OF ANOTHER MEETING IN THIS TIME FRAME WOULD BE CRODING AGENDA.

3. ALTHOUGH YOU DID NOT/NOT MENTION IT IN REFTEL, WE BELIEVE THAT TWO, AND POSSIBLY THREE NNA CAPITALS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN ANY CONSULTATION PROGRAMME PLANNED FOR THIS INTERSESSIONAL PERIOD. BASED ON YOUR REPORTS DURING PAST FEW WEEKS, PARTICULARLY THOSE DEALING WITH DEVELOPMENT OF NNA PROPOSALS THAT WERE TABLED LAST FRI, THERE WOULD SEEM TO BE GOOD GROUNDS FOR INCLUDING BGRAD AND EITHER OR BOTH OF VIENN AND BERN. IN ADDITION TO BEING MAJOR NNA PLAYERS EACH HAS SPECIFIC SECURITY CONCERNS WHICH SHOULD CAUSE THEM TO BE MUCH MORE SUPPORTIVE OF WESTERN PACKAGE THAN THEY HAVE BEEN TO DATE.

4. IN SUM, WE WOULD RECOMMEND SERIES OF BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS FOR ...3

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THIS INTERSESSIONAL PERIOD WHICH WOULD INCLUDE BPEST, BGRAD, SOFIA, VIENN AND BERN. IDEA THAT YOU BE ACCOMPANIED BY SOMEONE FROM OTTAWA IS SOUND AND WE WILL MAKE ARRANGEMENTS FOR SNIDER TO PARTICIPATE IN TALKS WITH YOU. GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD INFORM IDA OF BEST PERIOD IN YOUR APRIL SCHEDULE WHEN CONSULTATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE.

CCC/272 122316Z IDD0336

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM STKHM/SCDEL SCDL0263 12MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO BNATO CANMILREFNATO VMBFR VIENN WSHDC BONN PARIS GENEV
LDN MOSCO HSNKI BERN BGRAD BPEST NDHQOTT/CPD/DNACPOL/DSTRATA
DISTR IDAO IDAN IDDZ IDR RGX RBD RBR RSR
REF OURTEL SCDL0232 06MAR

---STKHM CONF:SITUATION REPORT:5-9MAR

SUMMARY:ALTHOUGH THIS WAS SUPPOSED TO BE NNAS WEEK,WHEN IN FACT
AFTER LONG WRANGLING AMONG THEMSELVES THEY FINALLY TABLED OMNIBUS
PROPOSAL,SHOW WAS REALLY STOLEN BY RUSSIANS.IN EXPLAINING WHAT
THEY HAD IN MIND BY EXPANDING CBMS IN FINAL ACT RUSSIANS REPEATED
OLD OFFERS,BUT FOR FIRST TIME HERE THEY BACKED UP WILL TO
NEGOTIATE CONCRETE CSBMS WITH DETAILS.STATELY SUCCESSION OF
POLISHED STATEMENTS,WHICH HAS CHARACTERIZED STKHM CONFERENCE SO
FAR,CAME ABRUPTLY TO HALT WHEN RUSSIANS INTERVENED TO REBUT
AMERICAN ATTEMPT TO SET NUCLEAR PICTURE RIGHT,AND EXERCISING RIGHT
OF REPLY AMERICANS CAME BACK TO REBUT SOVIET ASSERTIONS.DURING
INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS DELS ON ALL SIDES SPECULATED ABOUT HOW TO
STRUCTURE WORK AT NEXT SESSION WITH NOTION OF ESTABLISHING TWO
LOOSELY MANDATED WORKING GROUPS ATTRACTING MOST ATTENTION.

2.REPORT:FOLLOWING WEEKS OF RESTRAINT,WHEN THEY LET WFO MIS-
STATEMENTS PASS BY IN ORDER TO AVOID BEING DRAWN INTO DEBATE ON
NUCLEAR ISSUES,AMERICANS UNDER GUISE OF GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF
WESTERN CSBM PACKAGE DENIED THAT NATO INF HAD SPEED,RANGE OR

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PAGE TWO SCDL0263 CONFD

TO CONSTITUTE A FIRST STRIKE CAPABILITY. BUT 378 SOVIET SS20 MISSILES WITH 1134 WARHEADS, MOSTLY TARGETED ON WESTERN EUROPE, COULD BE LAUNCHED WITH LITTLE OR NO/NO WARNING AND AS SUCH WERE MAJOR THREAT. NONETHELESS, NATO DOUBLE TRACK DECISION WAS STILL IN EFFECT AND AMERICANS WAITED FOR RUSSIANS TO RETURN TO GENEVA WHICH WAS PROPER FORM FOR DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR ISSUES.

3. SOVIET DEL(GRINEVSKY) QUICKLY TOOK FLOOR TO REFUTE AMERICANS BY QUOTEING STATEMENT BY SACEUR THAT CIRCUMSTANCES COULD ARISE IN WHICH TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS MIGHT BE USED THUS PROVOKING EXCHANGE OF STRATEGIC STRIKES. USSR HAD LEFT GENEV BECAUSE AMERICANS HAD TURNED INF NEGOTIATIONS INT PROPAGANDA INSTRUMENT.

4. COMPLETING WHAT TURNED OUT TO BE KIND OF MINI-DEBATE ON NUCLEAR ISSUES AMERICANS CAME BACK IN EXERCISE OF RIGHT OF REPLY TO REPEAT THAT STKHM CONF WAS NOT/NOT PLACE TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR QUESTIONS AND QUOTE TO ENCOURAGE SOVIET UNION TO RETURN TO GENEV UNQUOTE.

5. GDR AND OTHER WPO LATER CLAIMED TO BE DISMAYED BY THIS RHETORICAL OUTBURST BETWEEN AMERICANS AND RUSSIANS. THEY WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT IT SHOULD OCCUR SO SOON AFTER- RUSSIANS HAD, IN WPO VIEW, MADE BIG STEP FORWARD BY DESCRIBING IN SOME DETAIL THEIR READINESS TO DEVELOP CPM PROVISIONS OF FINAL ACT BY MAKING THEM BROADER IN SCOPE AND GIVING THEM MORE WEIGHT. IN FACT, THESE DETAILS CONTAINED LITTEL SUESTANTIVE GOOD NEWS FOR WEST; THEY AMOUNTED TO CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY MANOEUVRES, WHICH WOULD INHABIT NATO TRAINING.

NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS INVOLVING GROUND, AIR OR SEA TRANSPORTATION, OBVIOUSLY AIMED AT COVERING USA RAPID DEPLOYMENT

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PAGE THREE SCDL0263 CONF

FORCE, AND EMPHASIZED ACTIVITIES IN SEA AREA AND AIR SPACE ADJACENT TO EUROPE, SUGGESTING RUSSIANS HAD NOT/NOT GIVEN UP THEIR ATTEMPT TO EXPAND ZONE OF APPLICATION OF CSMB WESTWARD. SEEN IN THIS LIGHT SOVIET STATEMENT, WHICH IN FACT WAS MOSTLY REHASH OF PROPOSALS INTENDED TO EMBARRASS WEST GOING BACK AS FAR AS 1977, WAS NOT/NOT REALLY MUCH OF A BREAKTHROUGH. OBSERVERS WERE SURPRISED, HOWEVER, THAT RUSSIANS MADE THIS MOVE SO SOON RATHER THAN WAITING FOR LAST DAY OR TWO OF SESSION WHICH WOULD BE MORE IN KEEPING WITH THEIR TACTICS.

6. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT MOSCO DECIDED TO ACT IN THIS WAS IN ORDER TO TAKE SOME WIND OUT OF NNA SAILS REALIZING THAT LATTERS PROPOSAL (TABLED AS SC-3 OF 09MAR) WOULD PARTLY REINFORCE WESTERN INITIATIVE ALREADY ON TABLE. AS IT TURNED OUT SC-3 DID CONTAIN A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS (APPROXLY 9 OUT OF 12) WHICH LIKE THOSE OF WEST WERE AIMED AT CREATING OPENNESS IN MILITARY AFFAIRS IN EUROPE. NNA DROPPED NOTION OF QUOTE COMMON SECURITY UNQUOTE, WHICH WAS IDENTIFIED WITH REPORT OF PALME COMMISSION INCLUDING SOME RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH ARE NOT/NOT POPULAR IN WESTERN QUARTERS. NOTION OF DEVELOPING CONCEPT OF NON-USE OF FORCE IN SOME WAY WAS RETAINED BUT APPARENTLY MOTIVATED BY REASONING SIMILAR TO OURS (OURTEL 2173 21FEB) NNA LINKED DEVELOPMENT OF NON-USE OF FORCE WITH ELABORATION OF METHOD FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. IN PRESENTING SC-3 SWEDES STATED THAT PROPOSAL WAS NOT/NOT INTENDED AS ANY KIND OF BALANCING ACT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST BUT REPRESENTED NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

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001248

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OF 8 CO-SPONSORS(LIECHENSTEIN WAS NOT/NOT INCLUDED).HOWEVER,NNA STILL PETAINED OPTION TO BRIDGE BUILD AT LATER DATE.

7.WITH MORE CARDS DEALT OUT ON TABLE THIS WAY AS FIRST SESSION OF STKHM CONFERENCE WAS DRAWING TO END,QUESTION OF HOW TO PLAY GAME IN TERMS OF SETTING UP WORKING GROUPS BECAME MORE URGENT. ATTEMPT IN WESTERN CAUCUS TO DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE THREATENED TO IGNITE DIFFERENCES AMONG ALLIES OVER CONSTRAINT MEASURES AND NON-USE OF FORCE AND WAS THUS PUT ASIDE.NNA WERE MOST ATTRACTED BY STRUCTURE(WHICH IS IN FACT OF AMERICAN INSPIRATION)FORESEEING TWO WORKING GROUPS:ONE WOULD DEAL WITH PROPOSALS WHICH WERE DIRECTLY RELATED TO DEVELOPMENT OF CBMS IN FINAL ACT;OTHER WOULD DEAL WITH NOVEL APPROACHES PRESUMABLY MEANING CONSTRAINT MEASURES, SO CALLED QUOTE COLLATERAL UNQUOTE MEASURES(SUCH AS PUBLISHING MILITARY BUDGETS)AND POLITICAL MEASURES,IF NON-USE OF FORCE. SOVIET INSISTANCE ON NEGOTIATING LATTER IN PARALLEL WITH CONCRETE CSBMS IS OF COURSE MAJOR TACTICAL PROBLEM FACING WEST NOW. LUMPING NON-USE OF FORCE IN POT POURRI OF OTHER NOTIONS,POSSIBLY INCLUDING PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES,MIGHT DISGUISE SUCH PARALLELISM ADEQUATELY TO MEET WSHDCS CONCERNS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM STKHM/SCDFL SCDL0261 12MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO VMBFR WSHDC BONN PARIS GENEV LDN MOSCO
NDHQOTT/CPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

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---STKHM CONF:WESTERN CAUCUS 09MAR:PREPARATIONS FOR NATO MTG 20MAR

SUMMARY:CAUCUS AGREED TO RECOMMEND TO NATO THAT AGENDA SHOULD
CONSISTS OF THREE POINTS:

(A)ASSESSMENT OF FIRST SESSION OF STKHM CONFD WHICH WOULD BE
PRESENTED BY CHAIRMAN OF DAY OF WESTERN CAUCUS(EITHER DENMARK OR
FRG)ON HIS OWN RESPONSIBILITY,BASED ON DRAFT SUBMITTED BY FRG
AND SUGGESTIONS FROM OTHER ALLIES;

(B)PROSPECTS FOR NEXT SESSION OF STKHM MTG IN FORM OF EXCHANGE
OF VIEWS AMONG ALLIES;

(C)RECOMMENDATION NOT/NOT TO INSTALL SAFE SPEECH FACILITY IN
WESTERN CAUCUS ROOM(SEE OURTEL SCDL0260 12MAR).

2.REPORT:FOLLOWING UP INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS,WESTERN CAUCUS
RESTRICTED TO HODS AND DEPUTIES CONSIDERED HOW TO STRUCTURE NATO
MTG ON 20MAR.INITIALY,VIEWS WERE DIVIDED:SOME ALLIES BELIEVED
THAT CAUCUS SHOULD PRESENT REPORT ASSESSING RESULTS OF FIRST
SESSION AS WELL AS IDENTIFYING PROBLEMS FOR SECOND SESSION AND
DRAWING CONCLUSIONS ABOUT HOW TO DEAL WITH THEM:OTHER ALLIES
THOUGHT THIS SCHEME WAS TOO AMBITIOUS AND IT WOULD NOT/NOT
BE POSSIBLE TO AGREE ON COMMON APPROACH.LATTER VIEW PREVAILED

...2

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PAGE TWO SCDL0261 CONF

WHEN FRG DRAFT REPORT, BASICALLY CONFINED TO ASSESSMENT OF FIRST SESSION, PROVED TO BE CONTROVERSIAL IN ANTICIPATING FUTURE PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTING HOW TO DEAL WITH THEM.

3. ALLIES ALSO CONSIDERED HOW BRU MACHINERY COULD BE BEST PUT TO WORK IN TERMS OF STKHM CONF. ALTHOUGH AMERICANS WERE SOMEWHAT RELUCTANT, MAJORITY AGREED THAT NATO SHOULD BE REQUESTED TO STUDY CONSTRAINT MEASURES (THOSE TABLED BY ROMANIA AND NNA AS WELL AS THOSE SUGGESTED BY WPO). WHILE IT WAS ANTICIPATED THAT CONCLUSIONS OF THIS STUDY WOULD REVEAL THAT ONE OF THESE MEASURES WAS ACCEPTABLE TO WEST, IT WAS AGREED THAT NATO SHOULD ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY OTHER QUOTE CONSTRAINT-LIKE UNQUOTE MEASURES WHICH WEST COULD POSSIBLY ESPOUSE. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT BRU MACHINERY SHOULD GIVE FIRST PRIORITY TO TYING UP LOOSE STRINGS IN NATO PACKAGE. WHILE SOME ALLIES SUCH AS NETHS AND BRITISH THOUGHT THAT BRU SHOULD BE ASKED TO LOOK INTO QUESTION OF NON-USE OF FORCE, POSSIBLY BY DRAWING UP QUOTE THIRTY YEAR HISTORY OF SOV INITIATIVES UNQUOTE, FRENCH AND AMERICANS WERE DEAD AGAINST RAISING ISSUE AT BRU FOR TIME BEING.

4. IT WAS AGREED THAT CHAIRMAN OF CAUCUS (BELGIUM) WOULD REPORT COLLECTIVE VIEW OF CAUCUS ON THREE-POINT AGENDA TO HIS NATO DEL, WHILE OTHER ALLIES WOULD REPORT INDIVIDUALLY TO CAPITALS ON THIS SUBJECT.

CCC/152 130900Z SCDL0261

L.A. DELVOIR

G. SMITH

~~K. CALDER~~

J. McNEE

DMF.

001252

RHT, p. 3, March 10-11/84

Pentagon Says New Missile Project Does Not Assure Protection of Public

By Charles Mohr
New York Times Service

WASHINGTON — Pentagon officials have conceded that they could not be sure a costly research program would result in a high degree of protection against nuclear missiles for the U.S. population.

The officials contended, however, that the groundwork for a high-technology defense was needed because the Soviet Union was about 10 years ahead in some aspects of such a system.

The Defense Department's witnesses, speaking Thursday before the Senate Armed Services Committee, also argued that a defense assuring the survival of a significant number of U.S. nuclear weapons would greatly add to deterrence against attack and thus add a "bonus" in population protection.

The chief witnesses were Fred C. Ikle, undersecretary of defense for policy; Richard D. DeLauer, undersecretary for research and engineering; and Robert S. Cooper, director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Accompanied by intelligence and techni-

cal specialists, they testified first in secret and then in public.

The administration is requesting that Congress appropriate \$1.98 billion for the 1985 fiscal year on research in advanced technologies that might permit development of a high-technology defense against nuclear missiles.

That is only about \$250 million more than had already been planned for such purposes before President Ronald Reagan gave a speech March 23 suggesting an effort to achieve such a defense.

The officials contemplate appropriations of about \$24 billion over a five-year period. The technologies include directed-energy weapons such as lasers and particle beams, optical and other means of pointing the beams accurately, high-speed data processing, methods of placing such equipment in space or employing space-based mirrors to reflect ground lasers, and ways to defend the system.

Mr. DeLauer said that the program was a research and development program and that there was no guarantee that any of the ideas would work.

"No decision has been made to

develop and deploy any weapons or other elements of the potential system," he said. "The aim of this program is to improve our knowledge of the relevant technologies."

Asked to elaborate on the military-related technologies in which the Soviet Union is believed to have a 10-year lead, Mr. DeLauer cited only large rockets to lift very heavy loads into space, saying that in such fields as high-speed data processing the United States had more "elegant" methods than the Soviet Union.

Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, a Democrat, questioned the witnesses about the feasibility of "population protection," noting that he could not find the concept in their testimony. Mr. Nunn said that in the March 23 speech, President Reagan had seemed to hold out the possibility of a defense so effective that it would make offensive nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete."

If the "American people wake up and find out" that the protection of missile silos and not people is the goal, Mr. Nunn said, "they may have a change of heart" about supporting the program.

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

L. A. DELVOIE 

~~G. SMITH~~


~~K. CALDER~~

J. MCNEE 



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The GAZETTE, Montreal, Saturday, March 10, 1984

Chilly U.S.-Soviet relations and a new generation of weapons threaten 40-year nuclear peace

By LESLIE H. GELB
New York Times

New and heightened fear of nuclear war seems to be gripping North Americans and Europeans. It is there in a movie about accidental war, in a television movie about Armageddon itself, in peace marches and the nuclear-freeze movement, in the superpowers' placing their missiles closer to each other's homelands, in the likelihood that nuclear strategy will emerge as a major issue in this year's U.S. presidential campaign.

The new fear is grounded in America's talk about being prepared to fight and win a nuclear war, and in the concern that Soviet leaders share this view.

"Fight" and "win" are new words in the lexicon of governmental nuclear strategy, and the concepts are fed by the deterioration in Soviet-American relations, by the large and powerful Soviet land-based missiles, and by the projected deployment of America's comparable MX missiles.

But while these developments are worrisome, they have not changed the basic reality of the nuclear age, which dawned 40 years ago: In a nuclear war there are only losers. Soviet and American leaders know this and have gone out of their way ever since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 to avoid direct confrontation.

However, the United States and the Soviet Union now are on the threshold of decisions that could make nuclear war seriously thinkable for the first time. In 10 to 15 years, new technologies now being developed and tested could, if deployed, fundamentally and irretrievably undermine the basic philosophy that has been the centre of both sides' nuclear strategy — mutual deterrence.

If the go-ahead is given to deploy these new technologies, a Soviet or American military planner could, before the end of this century, be able to make all of the following statements to his leaders for the first time:

"We can blind all their satellites, destroy their capital in five or six minutes before they can react and, with a few well-placed nuclear airbursts, we can knock out their whole communications network and make them sightless and headless.

"With new pinpoint-accurate missile warheads, I can guarantee that we can destroy virtually every missile in a silo, every submarine in port, and every bomber on an airfield.

"That will leave our adversaries only with missiles in their submarines at sea, and we are now able to locate and neutralize this ultimate retaliatory threat.

"Almost all of their few remaining missiles can be destroyed by our missile defence system.

"We may suffer a few million casualties, but our adversary will be thoroughly and finally defeated. And if we don't do it to him now, it is he who will be able to win by striking the first blow."

Nothing will ever be this simple, of course. Who is to say whether Moscow or Washington would reach this stage first? And how is one to foresee what the very competition to develop these technologies may lead to? But the overriding question for leaders in Moscow and Washington is: Can they manage these mounting nuclear threats?

An accidental war or surprise attack is considered unlikely

In the past, revolutions in nuclear technology came singly; now they are coming in one overwhelming package. The first revolution was from atomic weapons to far more devastating nuclear weapons. The second was from single-warhead to multiple-warhead missiles. But neither changed the basic idea that nuclear war could not be won. The revolutions on the horizon threaten that idea.

The American public is clearly worried that these new forces cannot be managed. A variety of recent opinion polls shows that 40 per cent to 50 per cent of Americans believe a nuclear war will occur before 1985.

A range of strategic experts interviewed said nuclear war was very remote, but not remote enough for comfort. When a group of mostly middle-of-the-road experts met not long ago in Colorado and were asked to rate the chances of a Soviet-American nuclear war before the end of the century, most responded that it was "unlikely" or one chance in 20 or one in 50, either of which is greater than the risk of an adult male's being killed in an automobile accident over the same period.

It is as if people have suddenly sensed a breakdown of the strange nuclear logic described so powerfully by Winston Churchill. "It may well be," he said, "that we shall, by a process of sublime irony, have reached a stage in this story where safety shall be the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation."


Ever since the Soviet Union joined the nuclear club with the United States in the early 1950s, this logic has created a kind of nuclear peace. Were it not for the fear of nuclear war, chances are that Moscow and Washington would have clashed militarily many times — over Berlin or Korea or the Middle East.

While nuclear weapons have helped to prevent war between the superpowers because of their threat of mutual annihilation, their existence has, paradoxically, also inhibited the peaceful settlement of disputes. Given the awesome power of these weapons, the superpowers could not fight and they did not have to compromise. Tensions were rarely reduced by diplomacy, but were held in check by fear.

The new and spreading anxiety today stems from the perception that this essential fear of nuclear holocaust is somehow being eroded.

And so it is, to some degree, by the evolution of nuclear doctrine, which is the way Soviet and American leaders think and talk

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Le Devoir, samedi 10 mars 1984

The Citizen, Ottawa, Saturday, March 10, 1984

Paramax à Montréal

par
Angèle Dagenais

Le Conseil de ville de Montréal sera appelé à entériner lundi matin la vente d'un terrain de 870,000 pieds carrés au prix de \$600,000 à la compagnie Paramax (firme Sperry-Univac) qui fabriquera l'équipement de communication électronique des six frégates que la marine canadienne doit fabriquer au Nouveau-Brunswick dans le cadre de ses engagements à l'OTAN.

Paramax s'installera donc dans la « Cité scientifique de Montréal » (ancien parc Royalmount au nord de la piste Blue Bonnets) et non pas à Dorval. En plus du Centre de Biotechnologie, ce site logera donc la compagnie Paramax qui s'engage à créer un complexe de \$6 millions et créer 500 emplois permanents dans le domaine de la haute technologie.

Paramax devra démolir à ses frais (\$275,000) l'ancien incinérateur Royalmount, a expliqué M. Yvon Lamarre, président du Comité exécutif de la Ville de Montréal, et effectuer des travaux de déblayage évalués à

\$370,000. La somme globale que devra investir Paramax dans ce terrain sera donc de \$1.245 million. La valeur marchande du terrain, a précisé M. Lamarre, est évaluée à \$1.25 million.

Cross-Canada cruise protests set for today

TORONTO (UPC) — Thousands of Canadians will join nation-wide anti-cruise demonstrations this weekend in the first major protest since the initial test of the missile in Canada, an anti-nuclear group spokeswoman predicted Friday.

Angela Browning, spokeswoman for the Toronto-based group Against Cruise Testing which is co-ordinating the rallies, said demonstrators in Toronto will be "joining thousands of Canadians from coast to coast" today in a national day of protest.

In Toronto protesters were to assemble in front of the downtown Liberal Party headquarters and march several city blocks past the American embassy to City Hall. Ontario NDP Leader Bob Rae was to address the demonstrators during the 45-minute rally.

Rae pledged his support for the protest at a news conference. He said world peace could only be attained through a "reduced reliance on nuclear weapons and a reduced commitment to a nuclear future."

Similar demonstrations were to be held in major centres across the country including Halifax, Regina, Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver.

In Winnipeg, about 130 placard-carrying demonstrators marched peacefully outside a federal office building Friday to protest the testing. Protest organizers said they held the march Friday to avoid conflict with International Women's Day events today.

A Federal Court judge ruled last Tuesday there was no evidence the constitutional right of Canadians to life, security and liberty was threatened by testing of unarmed U.S. cruise missiles in Canadian airspace.

Le Devoir, samedi 10 mars 1984

Cruise: exercice de déploiement en G-B

LONDRES (AFP) — Les premiers exercices de déploiement des missiles de croisière de l'OTAN hors de la base anglo-américaine de Greatham Common ont commencé dans la nuit de jeudi à hier, malgré l'opposition des « Femmes de la paix » qui campent depuis deux ans et demi devant les portes de la base.

Un convoi militaire a quitté le camp, situé à environ cent km à l'ouest de Londres, peu après minuit, pour effectuer le premier exercice de déploiement des missiles, a annoncé le ministère de la Défense.

Le convoi ne transportait pas de missiles « opérationnels », c'est-à-dire équipés de têtes nucléaires et de leur moyen de propulsion, a précisé le ministère. Aucune indication n'a été fournie sur la composition du convoi, sur sa destination, ni sur la

durée de ces manoeuvres. Le convoi est commandé par des officiers américains et comprend également du personnel de l'armée de l'air britannique, selon la même source.

Les premiers missiles de croisière étaient arrivés par avion le 14 novembre dernier des États-Unis à la base de Greatham Common, qui doit en accueillir un total de 96.

Depuis le début de cette semaine, les autorités britanniques ont fait démolir trois des six « camps de la paix » installés, pour le premier d'entre eux depuis septembre 1981, aux portes de la base. Mais les militantes pacifistes sont pour la plupart restées sur place, sans leurs abris de planches et de cartons, dormant dans des sacs de couchage à même le sol ou dans des tentes.

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and organize to deter nuclear war. Official language now stretches the meaning of deterrence to being prepared to fight, control and even win nuclear exchanges. It is a very fine line between deterrence and actual war-fighting in thought and deed, and the superpowers seem to be approaching that line.

The barriers to nuclear war are also being besieged by the deterioration in Soviet-American relations. Nuclear war would not occur in a vacuum. The conditions for conflict and confrontation exist now, and practically nothing is being done by either side to mitigate them.

But while thoughts and circumstances are necessary, they are not sufficient grounds for actually starting a nuclear war. The thoughts have been there before and the conditions were worse in the early 1950s and 1960s. Yet, there was no physical way at that time of winning a nuclear war at a cost planners considered acceptable.

That is what could change, in theory at least, before the end of this century. All the technological pieces of a "winning" puzzle could be in place by then: Anti-satellite weapons, missile warheads with improved accuracies, anti-submarine warfare capabilities and defence against ballistic missiles.

However remote the possibility of nuclear war — and the consensus among strategic thinkers is that it is and will remain extremely remote — it is becoming less remote all the time. Not now, but based on decisions being made now, this new technology could contribute to the dangerous illusion that nuclear wars can be fought much like an old-fashioned artillery duel — limited, controlled, prolonged, with a winner and a loser.

Given current frostiness, the possibilities for solving problems seem slim and the possibilities of trouble at least somewhat greater than before.

The U.S. does not see it that way. President Ronald Reagan, in a speech designed to resume a dialogue with Moscow, insisted that the world was "safer because now there is less danger that the Soviet leadership will underestimate our strength or question our resolve."

If it is true that Soviet leaders have been doubting American military power — although my sense is quite the contrary — it is in good part thanks to the fact that Reagan and his key aides have been publicly asserting American inferiority.

As for Moscow's having increased respect for American determination, there is something to that. My impression is that Soviet leaders do take Reagan more seriously than Jimmy Carter, and they do give him grudging respect for increasing military spending and sending the troops into Grenada. This is, after all, how they play the game themselves. At the same time, they do not think he is a man with whom they can do business.

But trouble spots and tensions are increasing and, as Reagan himself went on to say, "Such activity carries with it the risk of larger confrontations."

Several regional conflicts could trigger global confrontations:

• Moscow could decide to strike into Pakistan to root out the Afghan rebel base areas in the hope of putting an end to its long and

costly war in Afghanistan. The United States is "secretly" supplying the rebels and has commitments to Pakistan. What happens then?

• Either Israel or the United States could strike Syrian forces in Lebanon or in Syria itself. Syria is Moscow's last foothold in the Middle East, it has forces in Syria, and its credibility is very much at stake. Do Soviet leaders sit idly by?

• Or what happens if the Russians supply modern fighter aircraft to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, or if there is a Soviet-backed Vietnamese attack against Thailand, or a serious South African effort to overthrow the Marxist regime in Angola, or if the U.S. strikes against Iran in the event that that radical Islamic republic pursues its threat to close oil-supply routes?

None of these is far-fetched. The risks of direct Soviet-American confrontation are greater today than ever before; Moscow now has the capability to project military forces beyond its own shores. Until the last few years, only the United States could entertain such notions.

If any local dispute were to grow into a superpower crisis, current atmospherics could be more likely to breed escalation rather than restraint. Everything becomes much more trying when atmospherics are bad. Officials sitting around a table in the Kremlin or the White House will hesitate to suggest compromises for fear of appearing weak. Arms-control negotiations, which are like pulling teeth under the best of circumstances, grind to a halt in tense times.

Arms breakthroughs could erode principle of mutual deterrence

Compounding military might on both sides enhances mutual fear and perhaps deterrence as well, but it also feeds mutual suspicions, miscalculations and plain stupidity. Reagan, too, sees that more and more military power and fear are not enough to keep the peace and so proclaimed in a speech that "we want more than deterrence."

Some wars in history have been begun by fanatics and madmen, knowing they would perish in the end. But in most cases, wars have started by some kind of deliberate decision to protect or spread values and power and to survive, always to survive. The main contribution of the nuclear age to this calculus of war is to throw into sharp relief the question whether war and survival are compatible any longer.

A group at Harvard — Albert Carnesale, Paul Doty, Stanley Hoffmann, Samuel P. Huntington, Joseph S. Nye Jr. and Scott D. Sagan, all members of Harvard's nuclear study group — writes in *Living with Nuclear Weapons*:

"Ironically, the enormous horror of nuclear weapons' effects means that modern leaders have the equivalent of a crystal ball showing them the devastation at the end of a major war."

Thus far, every time leaders have gazed into that crystal ball they have avoided war

and have been extremely careful for the most part to avert even confrontation.

How could this crystal ball be shattered, they ask. Their answer, and the judgments of most of those who think about these things for a profession is: many ways, none likely at all, but some less remote than others:

All-out surprise attack in peacetime. This is generally considered to be the most remote. The absence of crisis means there would be no special stakes to provoke leaders to take such awful risks. Surprise would be extremely hard to achieve, given the intelligence warning systems on both sides.

By everyone's calculation, an all-out attack on military, industrial and civilian targets would still leave the victim with about 2,000 warheads and bombs. These would be more than enough to hurl the attacking society back into the Stone Age. For such an attack to be at all feasible, there would have to be an enormous alteration of the current nuclear balance, with one side gaining a clear advantage in deployed offensive and defensive technology. There is no reason to believe that will happen.

Accidental war. Contrary to much popular mythology, experts rate as very low the possibility of a war starting this way, and certainly far lower than 10 or 30 years ago. By all testimony, no man or boy computer genius can break into the strategic computer system. It does not operate through public telephone lines. Flocks of geese and a faulty computer chip have triggered alarms. But the rest of the system showed error right away, and no alerts were called.

Most nuclear weapons in the field, such as short-range missiles, have permissive action links, or PALs, which prevent firing without proper codes. In submarines and in silos, it takes at least two people to turn the necessary keys — after receiving the codes. If terrorists were to steal nuclear weapons, they would find the warhead swaddled in an almost impenetrable membrane, which, if penetrated, would lose its potential to explode.

Limited nuclear exchanges. These come in several varieties, with conservative strategists attaching low probability but high concern about them, and liberal strategists finding these scenarios Strange-lovian and nonsensical. All agree that it would make no sense for either side to attack one or several cities or a few land-based missiles. There would be nothing to gain and a lot to lose.

But conservatives continue to put credence in a scenario whereby, in a crisis, the Soviet Union launches attacks against American land-based missiles to denude the United States of forces capable of hitting Soviet missiles and thus to corner Washington into an impossible choice: Either attack Soviet population centers and bring retaliation against American cities, or do nothing.

For many reasons — including the necessity that such an attack be virtually perfect in destroying all the land-based missiles and killing relatively few civilians — this seems only marginally more plausible than the other limited-exchange scenarios.

Nuclear proliferation, third-country exchanges and catalytic war. Proliferation is a problem that worries all strategic

experts. They are not especially bothered by Britain, France and China having the capability, but newcomers are another matter. Right now, India has exploded a nuclear device; it is assumed Israel has a secret capability, and that South Africa is close. Many others have the necessary skills to build weapons, but no motivation. The most troublesome cases, where there are skills, high motivation and risk of usage, are Pakistan, Iraq, Argentina, Brazil and Libya.

Promethean power in the hands of nations always on the edge of or engaged in regional war, or in the hands of unstable regimes and fanatical leaders — this poses the greatest risk of nuclear weapons being exploded in anger.

If the Libyan leader Moammar Khadafi were to buy bombs and drop them on the United States, no easy matter, this would be highly unlikely to set off a Soviet-American war. But if Israel at some point in the future were to be on the verge of a serious defeat at the hands of its Arab neighbors and fired off some nuclear weapons as a warning, that could set other events into motion — Soviet response, American counterthreats and so on.

Conventional war escalating to nuclear war. This is the case that worries the experts most for this decade, and they do not regard it as being as remote as the other possibilities. Soviet and American leaders know this, too. They have gone far to stay out of harm's way. Washington doles out military aid to the Afghan rebels; it is all right to help them to sting the Russians, but too dangerous to challenge them outright. Moscow, so far as Washington knows, has told Syria not to expect Russian help if it shoots down more American aircraft.

But if this wariness were to break down and Soviet and American conventional forces were to start firing at each other and one side began to lose, the risks of escalation would be enormous.

If any Soviet leader contemplated using superior Soviet conventional power to overrun Western Europe, those risks — however small — would probably be enough to dissuade him. Once these two mighty armies embraced to kill, the systems would take over. Forces would be put on alert. Small moves would trigger bigger precautionary responses. The benefits of a pre-emptive strike, out of desperation, could appear to be the least unattractive alternative.

"My dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the earth," Reagan stated in his speech on East-West relations. Such pronouncements from the White House and the Kremlin have become ritualistic, but they are not realistic, and for political leaders in democracies to say so out loud would be political suicide, so illusions are reinforced and facts are ignored.

Take, for example, Reagan's own proposal for deep cuts in strategic arms. That means reducing each side's arsenal of about 7,500 long-range ballistic missile warheads to 5,000 by 1990 at the earliest. It does nothing about bombs or cruise-missile warheads, which on the American side at least will increase substantially in the coming years.

Beyond that, the best kept dirty little secret of most strategic experts is that they don't want sharp cuts in nuclear arsenals. What is more, their judgment seems sound. In the absence of many complex agreements on exactly what is to be reduced and

Nuclear escalation of conventional war worries experts most

banned, reductions in and of themselves could make the situation more dangerous.

Again, take Reagan's initial proposal. That called for a one-third cut in missile warheads from 7,500 to 5,000 and a one-half cut in missiles from 1,700 to 850, no more than half of which could be land-based missiles. The effect of the proposal was to increase the ratio of warheads to potential targets or missiles from 3-to-1 to 6-to-1.

In terms of war fighting, this would have made it easier for planners to argue that a successful first strike might be possible. Or, as the national-security expert Paul C. Warnke was fond of saying, "If the Russians had accepted Reagan's proposal, he would have been forced to reject it himself." As it was, Reagan substantially altered his proposal himself, for this and other reasons.

In nuclear doctrine, it is necessary to have choices between massive retaliation and surrender. But it is risky to assume, as current doctrine would have it, that once a war begins it can be controlled. And it is downright dangerous to believe there can be meaningful winners and losers, as some strategists in this administration believe.

What must be understood now is that the nuclear peace of the last 40 years could be transformed into a nuclear nightmare. What is in the offing is not simply another weapons system or two, not just another phase of the old arms race, but a package of technological breakthroughs that could revolutionize strategic capabilities and thinking.

In the last few years, and in the years immediately ahead, seed money has been and will be spent for revolutionary weapons. These are the following: warheads with pinpoint accuracy, missiles that can arrive on target far faster than existing ones, techniques to blow up and blind satellites in the sky, breakthroughs in anti-submarine warfare and defence against ballistic missiles.

Meanwhile, arms-control talks between the United States and the Soviet Union are getting nowhere. The two sides have not even been negotiating with each other for months.

Most lamentable, there seems to be a habit of mind developing among Soviet and American officials that the problems cannot be solved, that technology cannot be checked, a kind of combination of resignation and complacency. They have got used to both the competition and the nuclear peace. Mankind may not survive on that alone.

3/3

The GAZETTE, Montreal.

Saturday, March 10, 1984

Aircraft 'attack' France

PARIS (Reuters) — Combat aircraft from eight North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries will "attack" France later this month as part of a major 10-day exercise to test the efficiency of the French air force, French defence officials said yesterday.

Most of the country's air defence and strike force will be mobilized March 19 to 30 to deal with the "aggressors" from Canada, the United States and western Europe.

The exercise, code-named Airex 84, will involve troops protecting air bases and anti-aircraft missile regiments.

Apart from the raids by "hostile" aircraft, there will be simulated attacks on vital ground installations such as radar stations.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

MF-

TRANSMITTAL SLIP - NOTE D'ENVOI

TO/A DMF

FROM/DE IFB

SUBJECT/SUJET Centre for Defence and Arms Control
alias Canadian Institute for
International Peace and Security

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ	CONFIDENTIAL
FILE DOSSIER	
DATE	March 9, 1984

RECORD OF CONSULTATION - RAPPORT DE CONSULTATION

IFB-0069

COPIES SENT TO: (DIV. SYMBOLS) EXEMPLAIRES ADRESSÉS À: (SYMBOLS DE DIR.)	PREPARED IN CONSULTATION WITH (NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS AND DIVISIONAL SYMBOLS) ÉTABLI EN CONSULTATION AVEC (NOMS DES INDIVIDUS ET SYMBOLES DE DIRECTEUR)
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MINA (3)
MINT (2)
MINE
PARL SEC
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CMRR(2)
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CCB

IDDZ
PCO/Archdeacon
DND/Mathewson

One memorandum to the Minister for
signature please, if you agree.

Michael Shenstone

Michael Shenstone,
Assistant Deputy Minister,
Political and International
Security Affairs.

TO BE RETAINED WITH FILE COPY - A CONSERVER AVEC L'EXEMPLAIRE DESTINÉ AU DOSSIER

4/8/84 (2000 1711)

cc MINA (3)
MINT (2)
MINE
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IDD PSR
IDA CCB
IDR

ADM/Political and Defence Relations
Security Affairs
AFB/MICHAEL SHENSTONE 3-4228/jpt

CONFIDENTIAL

March 9, 1984.

Memorandum for:
The Deputy Prime Minister and
Secretary of State for External Affairs

c.c. Minister for International Trade
c.c. Minister for External Relations

SUBJECT: Centre for Defence and Arms Control
alias Canadian Institute for
International Peace and Security

The purpose of this memorandum is to obtain your approval of legislative drafting instructions for the proposed Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. This name is suggested, rather than the earlier "Centre for Defence and Arms Control", in order to distinguish the organization clearly from the recently created non-governmental "Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament", funded largely by Donner, which opened its doors in Ottawa last November.

The structure of the legislation would follow the general pattern of legislation for other bodies such as the Science Council and the IDRC. The proposed drafting instructions have been worked out jointly between ourselves, the PCO and DNE, but of course do not commit anyone.

We draw your attention to the following points:

Section 2. INTERPRETATION

The "Minister responsible" would not be specifically named; this would be done later by Order-in-Council. The chief formal relevance of the designation is that it determines to whom the Institute's annual report would be submitted (see Section 11, below). Only one Minister can be named for this purpose.

...2

- 2 -

Section 3. INSTITUTE ESTABLISHED

Note that there would be a 17-member Board, presided over by a Chairman, and including the chief executive officer of the Institute, to be known as its Executive Director. The title of President instead of Executive Director would be more consistent with the practice of other Crown corporations such as the IDRC, but we believe that Executive Director is much more in accord with the size and role envisaged for the Institute. The British "International Institute for Strategic Studies" and the "Stockholm International Peace Research Institute" both have a Chairman and a Director.

Section 4. OBJECTS

- Note that the general sphere of interest is described as "international peace and security, with particular emphasis on defence, arms control and disarmament". This formulation would permit work in related fields such as conflict studies or East-West relations, but ensure that the main stress is on defence, arms control and disarmament studies, where the need in Canada is greatest.

- Note also subsection (d), indicating among other things that research of interest to the Government of Canada would be among the objectives of the Institute.

Section 5. POWERS

Most of these provisions are normal for Crown corporations of this kind. However you may wish to pay particular attention to the first sentence of the subsection entitled "publication" at the top of page 3. This expresses what we understand is one of your principal concerns, i.e. that you should be able to call on the Institute for information or advice on a confidential basis when you wish to do so. We certainly agree that this is a legitimate requirement, but we are inclined to think that its explicit inclusion in the legislation, particularly with the restriction on publication, could render the passage of the bill more difficult and also undermine its credibility among the interested public.

...3

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

It is possible that the same objective could be achieved by an informal understanding between yourself, as the responsible Minister, and the Chairman and Executive Director whom the government will be appointing. The Science Council legislation does not provide for confidentiality of advice, but does provide that the Minister may refer matters to the Council for its consideration and advice, and that the Council "shall" investigate and report to the Minister on these matters. Perhaps a formula of this kind would suffice.

The second sentence of the sub-section poses no problems.

Section 6. ORGANIZATION

These provisions too are normal. Note that all appointments are by Governor-in-Council (presumably on the nomination of the responsible Minister); and that a minority of the Board (up to six out of seventeen) can be non-Canadian.

Sections 7 - 8 - 9

No problem.

Section 10. FINANCIAL

Note the "endowment" feature, which would yield something of the order of \$2 million for the Institute's use during its first year. It would be for consideration later where the initial \$20 million would come from -- we would hope and assume in the form of new money from Treasury Board.

You will also note the sharp contrast between the readiness to endow which the government would be displaying here and the repeated denials we have given to John Bruk and the Asia Pacific Foundation requests for the same mode of financing.

Section 11. REPORT

See our comment on Section 2, above.

Do you agree with these proposed drafting instructions, and more specifically, do you agree with our suggestion regarding the "publication" subsection as indicated above?

Michael Shenstone

Michael Shenstone
Deputy Minister
and

de MONTIGNY MARCHAND

de Montigny Marchand

001262

CONFIDENTIAL

March 9, 1984

Drafting Instructions for the Canadian Institute
for International Peace and Security Act

1. SHORT TITLE

The Canadian Institute for International Peace and
Security Act.

2. INTERPRETATION

Standard definitions of 'board', 'chairman',
'director', 'minister responsible', etc.

3. INSTITUTE ESTABLISHED

A corporation is hereby established to be called
the Canadian Institute for International Peace and
Security consisting of a Board of Directors that
is composed of a Chairman, Executive Director and
not more than 15 other directors to be appointed
as provided in section 6.

4. OBJECTS OF INSTITUTE

The general purpose of the Institute is to deepen
knowledge of the issues involved in
international peace and security, with particular
emphasis on defence, arms control and disarmament,
and specifically:

- a) to collect and promote the dissemination of
information and ideas on international peace
and security matters;
- b) to promote scholarships in these
matters in Canada;
- c) to bring together scholars, the media,
government officials, and others to examine
specific issues, and to publish the results
in a form that is widely available;

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

- d) to foster, to fund and to conduct research on international peace and security issues of particular interest to Canadians, or to the Government of Canada.

5. POWERS

The Institute shall have the powers of a natural person and in particular may:

- a) establish, maintain and operate information and data centres and facilities for research and other activities relevant to its objects;
- b) support or assist research in the areas of peace and security by governments, by international, public or private organizations and agencies, or by individuals;
- c) publish or otherwise disseminate scientific, technical or other information;
- d) enter into contracts or agreements with governments, with international public or private organizations and agencies, or with individuals;
- e) sponsor or support conferences, seminars and other meetings;
- f) acquire and hold real property etc.;
- g) acquire any property, money or securities by gift, bequest or otherwise, etc.;
- h) expend for the purposes of this Act, any monies appropriated by Parliament or accruing to the Institute from the endowment fund described in section 17, for the work of the Institute or received by the Institute through the conduct of its operations;
- i) establish and award scholarships or fellowships for study related to the objects of the Institute;
- j) do such other things as are conducive to the carrying out of the objects and to the exercise of the powers of the Institute.

Publication

Minister may direct Institute to undertake research or to provide advice to him, but Minister is not obliged to disclose contents of such research or advice and Institute is not free to do so without Minister's consent. Otherwise, the Institute shall be free to publish such reports, analyses and opinions as it considers necessary to give effect to its objects.

6. ORGANIZATION

- a) Chairman to be appointed by Governor in Council to hold office during pleasure for a term of three years;
- b) the Executive Director to be appointed by GiC to hold office during pleasure for a term of five years;
- c) each of the other directors with the exception of the Executive Director to be appointed by GiC to hold office during pleasure for three years in such a manner as to ensure as far as possible the expiration in any one year of fewer than one half of the directors so appointed;
- d) Chairman, Executive Director and any other retiring director to be eligible for reappointment to the Board in the same or in another capacity;
- e) Board to elect one of the directors to be Vice-Chairman of the Board;
- f) in absence of Chairman, Vice-Chairman to be able to exercise and perform all duties and functions of the Chairman, as laid out in the by-laws etc.;
- g) Executive Director to be the chief executive officer of the Institute, with supervision over and direction of the work and staff of the Institute;

- 4 -

CONFIDENTIAL

- h) Board empowered to authorize an officer of the Institute to act as Executive Director in the event of the absence or incapacitation of the Executive Director for a period not exceeding 60 days without GiC approval.

Remuneration

Chairman, Vice-Chairman and other directors to be paid only per diems and expenses (fixed by GiC); not to be full-time positions. Remuneration of Executive Director to be fixed by GiC.

Canadian Citizenship

The Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Executive Director and eight other directors must be Canadian citizens.

Officers and Employees

The Board may appoint such officers, agents and employees as are necessary for the proper conduct of the work of the Institute.

Head Office

National Capital Region.

Meetings of the Board

At least twice each year, with at least one such meeting at the head office of the Institute, and at such other times and places as the Chairman deems necessary.

7. BY-LAWS

Board empowered, with the approval of GiC, to make by-laws respecting duties and conduct of officers, conditions of employment and remuneration, composition and operation of Executive Committee, etc.

8. STATUS OF EMPLOYEES

Chairman, Executive Director and other directors, officers and employees are not part of the Public Service of Canada.

All employees to be deemed employed in the Public Service for the purposes of the PSSA and the Aeronautics Act.

9. CHARITABLE STATUS

The Institute shall be deemed to be a charitable institution for the purposes of the Income Tax Act.

10. FINANCIAL

Endowment

The Minister of Finance shall pay to the Institute an initial endowment of \$20 million. Additional amounts required for the operation of the Institute, including increases to the endowment, shall be paid out of such monies as are appropriated annually by Parliament for the purpose.

Audit

The Institute shall be audited by the Auditor General and a report made to the Institute and to the Minister.

11. REPORT

The Chairman of the Institute shall within four months of the termination of each fiscal year transmit to the Minister a report relating to the activities of the Institute for that fiscal year, etc., this report to be laid before Parliament etc.



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

Lloyd Francis

MP

No.
N°

A 06174

Subject
Sujet

*Resolution on peace initiatives by County
of Bruce*

Action div./Dir. responsable

Info. division(s)/Direction(s) informée(s)

Letter dated/Lettre en date du

84-03-09

Date rec'd in MINA
Date de réception à MINA

84-03-13

Date sent to div.
Date d'envoi à la dir.

84-03-13

Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by
L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par

84-03-20

Comments/Commentaires

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE

FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.

☐

Reply for signature of SSEA
Réponse pour la signature du SEAE

☐

Reply for the signature of
Réponse pour la signature de

☐

Reply by Division
Réponse de la direction

☒

For information and any necessary action
Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu

ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA
REGISTRY
LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE
TOUT CHANGEMENT

5-1047

Date received/Date reçu

March 14/84

Action officer/Agent responsable

Disposition

Date

For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA

AR-206177
IDA.



CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES
HOUSE OF COMMONS
CANADA

LE PRÉSIDENT
THE SPEAKER


O T T A W A
March 9, 1984

The Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, P.C., M.P.
Deputy Prime Minister and
Secretary of State for External Affairs
Room 209-S, Centre Block
House of Commons
O T T A W A

Dear Colleague:

For your information, I am sending you herewith
copy of the letter and resolution on peace initiatives received
from the County of Bruce.

Yours sincerely,



Lloyd Francis

Enclosures (2)

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
PRIME MINISTER
MAR 12 1984
CABINET DU VICE-
PREMIER MINISTRE

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES
HOUSE OF COMMONS
CANADA

LE PRÉSIDENT
THE SPEAKER

O T T A W A

Mr. J.W. Jamieson
Deputy Clerk-Treasurer
County of Bruce
P.O. Box 70
Walkerton, Ontario
N0G 2V0

Dear Mr. Jamieson:

Thank you for your letter of March 2, 1984, in which you inform us of the resolution adopted at your regular meeting held on February 28, 1984, supporting peace initiatives.

I am pleased to send copy of your letter and of the resolution to the attention of our Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, P.C., M.P.

Yours sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

Lloyd Francis, M.P.

Lloyd Francis

MAR - 9 1984

COUNTY OF BRUCE

00057

F. BUCKINGHAM, A.M.C.T.

COUNTY CLERK - TREASURER
AND ADMINISTRATOR



TELEPHONE (519) 881-1291
P.O. BOX 70, 30 PARK STREET
WALKERTON, ONTARIO
N0G 2V0

March 2, 1984

Office of the Speaker of the
House of Commons
Parliament Buildings
Ottawa, Ont.
K1A 0A6

Dear Sir:

Bruce County Council, at its regular meeting held on
February 28th, 1984, upon a motion of Council, endorsed the
enclosed resolution.

Yours truly,

J. W. Jamieson
Deputy Clerk-Treasurer

/ml
Encl.

THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF STONEY CREEK

RESOLUTION NO. 23-6

SESSION: DECEMBER 13, 1983

MOVED BY Councillor DiIanni

SECONDED BY Councillor Santarelli

WHEREAS nuclear disarmament is an issue of paramount importance affecting the lives of every resident in our municipality, let it be known that the City of Stoney Creek supports all initiatives by our Federal Parliament and the Prime Minister promoting peace among the superpowers and all nations, that this motion be circulated to all municipalities in Ontario with a population of over 15,000 people for support, and that a copy of the resolution be sent to the Speaker of the House of Commons.

Carried.

William L. Sears, Mayor

CONFIDENTIAL

FM WSHDC UNGR2120 09MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO BONN VMBFR LDN MOSCO GENEV PRMNY

SCDEL/STKHM NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/CIS/CORAE/ADMPOL/DIPOL/CPD/DSTRATA

DISTR IFB IDR IDA IDRA IDRL RGX RBD CPD IDD

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0219 08MAR

---MBFR:USA POSITION

STATE DEPT(HAWES)TELS US THAT THEY BELIEVE THAT THEY DO INDEED HAVE
A QUOTE FLEXIBLE UNQUOTE POSITION.FLEXIBILITY EXISTS IN(A)
WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER A MARGIN OF DISCREPANCY(IE THE BAND)(B)
WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS THE SIZE OF THIS MARGIN(C)WILLINGNESS TO
INITIALLY LIMIT DATA QUESTION TO COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT TROOPS
WHERE THERE IS NOW LESS DISAGREEMENT AND(D)WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS
DEFINITION OF THESE CATEGORIES.HAWES CLAIMS THERE IS NO/NO
FLEXIBILITY ON QUESTION OF REDUCTIONS BEFORE DATA AGREEMENT IS
REACHED.USA MADE THIS VERY CLEAR TO RUTH.PRESIDENTS DECISION ON
THIS ASPECT WAS VERY CLEAR AND THERE IS NO/NO INTENTION(OR DESIRE)
IN BUREAUCRACY TO GO BACK TO PRES ON THIS ISSUE AT THIS TIME.

2.FRG EMB SAYS IT DOES NOT/NOT KNOW ENOUGH ABOUT THE USA PROPOSAL
TO JUDGE FLEXIBILITY ON ANY LEVEL.THEY ARE HOWEVER CONCERNED THAT
USA WILL COME TO ALLIES WITH A POSITION THAT IS INSUFFICIENTLY
RESPONSIVE BUT WHICH IS INFLEXIBLE BECAUSE IT IS THE RESULT OF A
...2

PAGE TWO UNGR2120 CONF D

CAREFULLY BROKERED POSITION BETWEEN AGENCIES. FRG IS VERY FRUSTRATED IN ITS ATTEMPTS TO INFLUENCE THE FLESHING OUT OF THE CURRENT PROPOSAL BECAUSE USA HAS NOT/NOT TOLD THEM ABOUT THE PARAMETERS THEY ARE DISCUSSING.

3. IT APPEARS THAT THE INTERAGENCY STRUGGLE WHICH DELAYED USA ATTEMPT TO COME UP WITH THE NEW POSITION IS CONTINUING AND IS NOW INHIBITING THE ELABORATION OF THE PROPOSAL IN A MANNER THAT IS FULL ENOUGH TO PUT IT TO ALLIES. IF THE DISPUTE CANNOT/NOT BE RESOLVED BETWEEN AGENCIES IT WILL HAVE TO GO BACK TO THE PRES. WE ARE TOLD BY AN ACDA CONTACT THAT FRG IS ENCOURAGING THOSE SEEKING THE BROADER BAND TO FORCE ISSUE BACK TO PRES WHERE THEY HOPE CURRENT POSITION OF NO/NO REDUCTIONS BEFORE AGREEMENT ON DATA CAN BE RE-EXAMINED. CLEARLY SOME USA OFFICIALS AGREE WITH GERMANS ON THIS AND THIS MAY BE FLEXIBILITY TELTSCHIK REFERS TO. WE DOUBT HOWEVER THERE ARE ENOUGH PEOPLE IN ADMIN WHO BELIEVE THERE IS A CHANCE PRES WILL CHANGE HIS MIND ON THIS ISSUE TO BE ABLE TO CONFRONT HIM WITH QUESTION AGAIN, THUS THE VIEW WE GOT FROM STATE DEPT REPORTED IN PARA 1.

4. IN ARTICLE IN NYK TIMES 06MAR LESLIE GELB POINTS OUT THAT QUOTE VIRTUALLY ALL RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS SPEAK OF THEIR SCEPTICISM ABOUT THE VALUE OF ANY AGREEMENT UNQUOTE. BURT MADE SAME POINT TO AMB THIS WEEK. THIS ALSO SERVES TO REINFORCE VIEW THAT OFFICIALS ARE UNLIKELY TO SEEK TO HAVE REAGAN LOOK AT DATA VERIFICATION POSITION AGAIN.

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR2120 CONF

5. ONE CONTACT SUGGESTED WE SHLD NOT/NOT BE PUTTING TOO MUCH ON HOPE THAT NEW USA POSITION WILL PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY NEEDED TO GIVE IMPETUS TO MEFR. THIS POINT IS SUPPORTED BY GELB WHO WROTE QUOTE NEITHER WESTERN DIPLOMATS NOR ADMIN OFFICIALS SAID THEY BELIEVED THAT THE NEW AMERICAN POSITION HAD ANY CHANCE TO PRODUCE A BREAKTHROUGH UNQUOTE. OUR CONTACT SUGGESTED THAT INSTEAD WE SHLD WORK WITH GERMANS TO FIND WAY TO GET PRES REAGAN TO LOOK AT DATA QUESTION AGAIN. OUR CONTACT ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE DO NOT/NOT YET HAVE ENOUGH INFO TO BE ABLE TO SPECIFICALLY ARGUE AGAINST NEW USA POSITION, THIS IS BECAUSE THE POSITION STILL LACKS SPECIFICS. CONTACT SAID WE PROBABLY WLD NOT/NOT HAVE THIS KIND OF DETAIL FOR SOME TIME. HOWEVER, IF WE DISAGREE WITH VALIDITY OF THE USA POSITION THAT WEST SHLD NOT/NOT AGREE TO REDUCTIONS BEFORE DATA IS AGREED ON WE SHLD ARGUE FOR A CHANGE AS THE GERMANS ARE DOING.

6. PARAS 1-5 INCLUSIVE CONTAIN INFO RECEIVED IN CONFIDENCE FROM ACDA AND STATE DEPT.

CCC/230 092232Z UNGR2120

mf

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2119 09MAR84

TO EXTOTT RSR

INFO BANTO CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR GENEV PARIS
HAGUE OSLO COPEN ATHNS SCDEL/STKHM TAVIV JEDDA PCOOTT/FOWLER/
AXWORTHY NDHQOTT/ADMPOLE/DACPOL/DNACPOL/PPP/DSTRATA/CIS
DISTR IDD IFB MINA MINE MINT USS DMF IDA RBR RCR RSR RBD RCD RSD
CPD ZSI ZSP URR URT URE LCD LSD IDDZ GMR GMD GMT

REF OURTEL UNGR2114 08MAR

---VISIT OF KOHL TO WSHDC

HAVE DISCUSSED KOHL VISIT IN DETAIL WITH FRG EMB. READ OUT WE
RECEIVED FROM THEM CORRESPONDS VERY CLOSELY TO READ OUT GIVEN BY
STATE DEPT DOWN TO COMMENT THAT KOHL DID ALMOST ALL THE TALKING
HIMSELF.

2. EMB CONTACT CONFIRMED THAT KOHL STRONGLY BELIEVED THAT AFTER ALL
DISCUSSION OF INF AND ANTI-USA SENTIMENTS THAT WERE EXPRESSED IN
THAT DEBATE, IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR HIM TO REASSURE USA OF FRG
COMMITMENT TO NATO. IN FRG EMB VIEW PRES REAGAN RESPONDED VERY
POSITIVELY TO THIS REASSURANCE.

3. KOHL KNEW THAT IT WLD BE DIFFICULT IN AN ELECTION YR TO GET ANY
COMMITMENT FROM REAGAN ON A SUMMIT. NEVERTHELESS HE FELT THAT SUBJ
WAS SO IMPORTANT ESPECIALLY AFTER BREAK OFF OF INF TALKS THAT HE
HAD TO DISCUSS THE SUBJ IN DETAIL IF NOT/NOT PARTICULARLY FORCEFULLY.

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR2119 CONFD

KOHL ALSO FEELS THAT P II STATIONING IN FRG GIVES HIM A QUOTE MORAL ENTITLEMENT UNQUOTE TO PURSUE THIS QUESTION WITH REAGAN.

4. ONE OF ARGUMENTS THAT KOHL USED, AND WHICH SEEMED TO INTEREST REAGAN WAS THAT A SUMMIT WAS A USEFUL TOOL TO ENSURE THAT FOREIGN POLICY IN THE USSR DOES NOT/NOT REMAIN SOLELY IN GROMYKOS HANDS. KOHL VIEWS GROMYKO AS A STUMBLING BLOCK IN THE WAY OF IMPROVED RELS. GROMYKO APPARENTLY CARRIES TOO MUCH BAGGAGE FROM PAST E/W PROBLEMS.

5. KOHL ALSO FELT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS THE SUBJ OF E/W RELS AT LENGTH WITH REAGAN EVEN IF HE WAS NOT/NOT PURSUING A PARTICULAR GOAL AT THIS TIME BECAUSE HE IS AWARE THAT REAGAN REGARDS HIM AS IDEOLOGICALLY COMPATIBLE AND IT IS USEFUL FOR SOMEONE WHO IS COMPATIBLE TO BE WILLING TO OUTLINE FOR REAGAN THAT A CONSERVATIVE VIEWPOINT DOES NOT/NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT ONLY ONE TACTIC IS POSSIBLE FOR DEALING WITH THE USSR. IT IS KOHL'S HOPE THAT HE SUCCEEDED IN GETTING THE PRES TO THINK ABOUT E/W CO-OPERATION IN MOST POSITIVE TERMS.

6. PARAS 1-5 INCLUSIVE CONTAIN INFO RECEIVED IN CONFIDENCE FROM FRG EMB.

CCC/230 092232Z UNGR2119

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM GENEV YTGR1739 9MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO BONN HAGUE BRUOSLO ATHNS MDRID LSBON ANKRA WSHDC BNATO LDN

PARIS ROME PRMNY VMBFRWSAW PRGUE BPEST BGRAD STKHM/SCDEL

PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR FPR RBR RBD RBG UGB URR RBRD RBP RCR
RCD

REF BONN TEL ZQGR1092 7MAR

---PM INITIATIVE-SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS

AS BRIEF COMMENT ON REFTEL, YOU WILL NOTE THAT FRG AMB INDICATED THAT
QUOTE IN HISTORY OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS ONLY RW HAD BEEN BANNED
BEFORE DEVELOPMENT UNQUOTE AND SAID THAT TIME HAD COME TO MOVE INTO
AREA OF ANTICIPATORY ARMS CONTROL. THERE IS OF COURSE OUTER SPACE
TREATY, SEABED TREATY AND ANTARCTIC TREATY, ALL OF WHICH WERE AS
ANTICIPATORY IN NATURE AS WAS RW BAN.

2. ABM TREATY IS ALSO ANTICIPATORY IN THAT IT ALLOWS FOR RESTRICTING
ABM SYSTEMS TO ONE EACH SIDE. PERHAPS THIS TREATY WAS INSPIRATION
BEHIND GERMAN THOUGHT (PARA 7 REFTEL) THAT SINGLE ASAT SYSTEM BE
PERMITTED TO EACH SIDE, WITH COMPLETE BAN ON TESTING.

CCC/198 091630Z YTGR1739

Mr Smith
Dive told them
that we will handle
this *JAM*
123
1DDZ-0221
March 12, 84

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT UGP0473 09MAR84

TO CNGNY

INFO WSHDC ATNTA BOSTN BFALO CHCGO CLVND DALAS DTROT LNGLS MNPLS

NRLNS PHILA SFRAN SEATL

DISTR RWP UGB FPR IDDZ SCS RCR RCD

REF YOURTEL YIGR0140 07MAR

---BBC REQUEST FOR INTERVIEW WITH PM

REFTEL RECEIVED 09MAR AND TRANSMITTED TO RWP AROUND NOON SAME DAY
FOR ACTION.

2.SINCE THIS IS SECOND TEL RECEIVED WITHIN LAST FEW WEEKS FROM USA
SEEKING SIMILAR ASSISTANCE WITH PM INTERVIEW,WISH TO CALL YOUR
ATTN TO APPROPRIATE PROCEDURE.REQUESTS FOR APPTS/ASSISTANCE FOR
THIRD COUNTRY JOURNALISTS (IE REPORTING FOR MEDIA OUTSIDE USA AND
CDA) SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO APPROPRIATE PROGRAM DIVISION FOR ACTION,
WITH UGP ON DISTR LINE.THIS AVOIDS DELAYS ALL AROUND,ESPECIALLY IF
INFO OR DISTR ADDRESSEES WISH TO FOLLOW UP ON STATUS OF REQUEST.

UUU/273 100015Z UGP0473

Mr. Delvoire / Mr. Smith

AB This is primarily concerned with the initiative, I've told RWP that we would handle this request Jan 12/3/84

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT UGP0473 09MAR84

TO CNGNY

INFO WSHDC ATNTA BOSTN BFALO CHCGO CLVND DALAS DTROT LNGLS MNPLS

NRLNS PHILA SFRAN SEATL

DISTR RWP UGB FPR DDZ SCS RCR RCD

REF YOURTEL YIGR0140 07MAR

---BBC REQUEST FOR INTERVIEW WITH PM

REFTEL RECEIVED 09MAR AND TRANSMITTED TO RWP AROUND NOON SAME DAY FOR ACTION.

2.SINCE THIS IS SECOND TEL RECEIVED WITHIN LAST FEW WEEKS FROM USA SEEKING SIMILAR ASSISTANCE WITH PM INTERVIEW,WISH TO CALL YOUR ATTN TO APPROPRIATE PROCEDURE.REQUESTS FOR APPTS/ASSISTANCE FOR THIRD COUNTRY JOURNALISTS (IE REPORTING FOR MEDIA OUTSIDE USA AND CDA) SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO APPROPRIATE PROGRAM DIVISION FOR ACTION, WITH UGP ON DISTR LINE.THIS AVOIDS DELAYS ALL AROUND,ESPECIALLY IF INFO OR DISTR ADDRESSEES WISH TO FOLLOW UP ON STATUS OF REQUEST.

UUU/273 100015Z UGP0473

MF
ED

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HAGUE YWGR0393 09MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR GENEV PARIS OSLO

COPEN ATHNS STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER WSHDC PRMNY

NDHQOTT/AMPOL/DNACPOL/DIPOL/CPD/CSTRATA/CIS

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDAO IDAN IDR SCS RSR

REF OURTEL YWGR0382 01MAR

---RESUMPTION OF INF GENEV TALKS

ON RETURN FROM VISIT TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA ROVING AMB WIJNAENDTS
WHO HAD MET WITH SMITH AND CALDER IN HAGUE ON 01MAR84 IN
CONTEXT OF PMS INITIATIVE, TOLD US HE BELIEVED HE HAD DETECTED
HARDENING OF POSITION ON CZECH SIDE SINCE VISIT OF PM TRUDEAU.

2. WIJNAENDTS SAID CZECHS HAD ADOPTED VERY ANTI-AMERICAN
APPROACH DURING MTGS AND HD SEEMED TO EXCLUDE ANY EARLY DESIRE
TO RETURN TO INF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEV. IN THEIR VIEW BY
RESUMING INF TALKS, USSR WOULD BE HELPING RE-ELECTION OF PRES
REAGAN WHEN THEY HAD ABSOLUTELY NO/NO REASON TO DO SO.

HOWEVER, SHOULD IT BECOME CLEAR IN COURSE OF YR THAT PRES
REAGAN COULD BE RE-ELECTED, USSR MIGHT THEN RECONSIDER THEIR
PRESENT POSITION.

CCC/155 091612Z YWGR0393

7
**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0322 09MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO WSHDC BNATO GENEV CANMILREPNATO LDN ROME PARIS BONN VMBFR
HAGUE PEKIN TOKYO PRMNY NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/DACPOL/DNACPOL/
DSTRATA/CIS OSLO COPEN ATHNS WSAW BUCST BPEST ANKRA MDRID LSBON
STKHM/SCDEL

DISTR RGB LSD ETN MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR RBD ZSI MINE MINT
UGB IDD

---REACTION TO PMS INITIATIVE

FINNISH COLLEAGUE HAS SHARED WITH US SOVIET COMMENT ON ONE ASPECT
OF PMS INITIATIVE WHICH MERITS BRIEF MENTION.

2.DURING RECENT VISIT TO SOVIET MFA OF CHIEF OF POLITICAL
DEPT OF FINNISH MFA,LATTER NOTED WITH INTEREST APPARENT FOREIGN
POLICY INNOVATION IN CHERNENKOS ELECTORAL SPEECH OF 02MAR.

IN THIS SPEECH NEW GENSECTY LAID EMPHASIS ON SPECIAL
RESPONSIBILITIES OF NUCLEAR POWERS AND SUGGESTED THAT RELATIONS
BETWEEN THEM SHOULD BE REGULATED BY QUOTE CERTAIN NORMS UNQUOTE
(OURTEL XYGR0295 05MAR PARA5).

3.SOVIET CHIEF OF POLITICAL DEPT(PETROVSKY)IN EXPLAINING
THESE NORMS REFERRED TO PMS INITIATIVE AND SAID NORMS WERE
KIND OF SIMILAR IN CONCEPT TO PMS TEN COMMON PRINCIPLES.

CCC/144 091056Z XYGR0322



Government
of Canada

Gouvernement
du Canada

**ACTION FICHE DE
REQUEST SERVICE**

To — À

File No. — Dossier N°

Date

9/3/84

From — De

☐ Please call
Prière d'appeler

Tel. No. — N° de tél.

Ext. — Poste

☐ Returned your call
Vous a rappelé

☐ Will call again
Vous appellera

☐ Wants to see you
Désire vous voir

Date

Time — Heure

Message received by
Message reçu par

☐ Action
Donner suite

☐ Approval
Approbation

☐ Note & return
Noter et retourner

☐ Comments
Commentaires

☐ Draft reply
Projet de réponse

☐ Note & forward
Noter et faire suivre

☐ As requested
Comme demandé

☐ Signature

☐ Note & file
Noter et classer

CAN we discuss ?

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM STKHM/SCDEL SCDL0250 09MAR84

TO EXTOTT IDD DELIVER BY 091700

DISTR DMF IFB IDA RGB RBD

---STKHM CONF:WORK PROGRAM DURING INTER-SESSIONAL BREAK

YOU WILL RECALL FROM MY REPORT ON MY FIRST ENCOUNTER WITH GRINEVSKY, SHORTLY AFTER THIS CONF BEGAN, THAT POSSIBILITY WAS MENTIONED OF GRINEVSKY VISITING OTT OR MY VISITING MOSCO DURING BREAK PERIOD. I AM LUNCHING WITH GRINEVSKY ON TUE 13MAR AND IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO REVERT TO THESE POSSIBILITIES THEN.

2. AS WE HAVE REPORTED, IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT THE EASTERN EUROPEANS HAVE NO/NO CLEARLY THOUGHT OUT CONCEPTION OF HOW THEY WANT TO PURSUE THIS CONFERENCES WORK DURING THE INTER-SESSIONAL BREAK, AND THIS IS A REFLECTION OF THE UNCERTAINTY WHICH SURROUNDS THEIR WHOLE APPROACH. I CAN SEE SOME ADVANTAGE IN USING TIME AT OUR DISPOSAL TO PRESS THEM A LITTLE BIT BY A SERIES OF CONSULTATIONS IN CERTAIN EUROPEAN CAPITALS, BEGINNING OF COURSE WITH MOSCO.

3. SOME WEEKS AGO, THE PMS INITIATIVE RESULTED IN POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN BRLIN, PRGUE AND BUCST, AS WELL AS SUBSEQUENTLY IN MOSCO. THE THOUGHT OCCURS TO ME THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO AUGMENT THIS DIALOGUE, EVEN IF AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL, BY VISITS TO MOSCO AND TO THE OTHER THREE CAPITALS WHICH THE PM DID NOT/NOT VISIT, IE SOFIA, BPEST AND WSAW. SUCH A PATTERN OF ACTIVITIES WOULD DEMONSTRATE A CONTINUING CDN INTEREST IN DIALOGUE ON SECURITY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT WITH EASTERN EUROPE.

...2

17
MF
1002
you are not
short of opportunities
for foreign travel.
MO

PAGE TWO SCDL0250 CONF

4.FOCUS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS COULD BE ESSENTIALLY STKHM CONF AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING IN WHICH EVENT I WOULD BE QUITE PREPARED TO CONSTITUTE A ONE-MAN BAND.I BELIEVE,HOWEVER,THAT SUCH AN INITIATIVE WOULD HAVE GREATER IMPACT IF WE WERE AUGMENTED BY EXPERTISE ON A BROADER RANGE OF SUBJECTS THAN I WOULD FEEL FULLY COMFORTABLE IN NOW ATTEMPTING TO SPEAK ON AUTHORITATIVELY.WHAT I AM SAYING IS THAT THE MORE EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE A TEAM VISIT IN WHICH I WOULD BE JOINED BY EITHER DELVOIE OR SMITH FOR CONSULTATIONS IN THE CAPITALS CONCERNED.

5.YOUR REACTIONS BY 13MAR 0900 WOULD BE APPRECIATED.

CCC/152 091500Z SCDL0250



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES
ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

MF

F D		Lloyd Francis MP		No. A 06109
Subject Sujet		res by Town of Richmond Hill re PM's peace initiative		Action div./Dir. responsable IDDZ
Letter dated/Lettre en date du 84-03-08	Date rec'd in MINA Date de réception à MINA 84-03-12	Date sent to div. Date d'envoi à la dir. 84-03-12	Info. division(s)/Direction(s) informée(s)	
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par				84-03-19
Comments/Commentaires				

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE	Date received/Date reçu <i>March 12/84</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de	Action officer/Agent responsable <i>G. Mc Neely</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction <i>to note & file pls.</i>	Disposition <i>noted & filed</i>
<input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date <i>March 1984</i>
<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA REGISTRY LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT </div>	For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA

5-1047

A-06109

CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES
HOUSE OF COMMONS
CANADA

LE PRÉSIDENT
THE SPEAKER

O T T A W A
March 8, 1984

The Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, P.C., M.P.
Deputy Prime Minister and
Secretary of State for External Affairs
Room 209-S - Centre Block
House of Commons
O T T A W A

Dear Colleague:

For your information, I am sending you, herewith,
copy of the resolution adopted by the Council of the Corporation
of the Town of Richmond Hill, supporting the initiatives of the
Federal Government and the Prime Minister for promoting peace
among the superpowers and all nations.

Yours sincerely,

Lloyd Francis

Lloyd Francis

Enclosure



00048

MAR 5 2 49 PM '84

The Town of Richmond Hill

SPEAKER'S OF
LA PRESIDE

P.O. Box 300, 10,266 Yonge St.
Richmond Hill, Ontario
Canada L4C 4Y5
Tel: 884-8101


February 24, 1984

Mr. J. A. Brezina
City Clerk
The City of Stoney Creek
777 Highway No. 8, Box 9940
Stoney Creek, Ontario
L8G 4N9

Dear Mr. Brezina:


I am pleased to advise that the Council of the Corporation of the Town of Richmond Hill has endorsed your Council's resolution of December 13, 1983 supporting the initiatives of the Federal Government and the Prime Minister for promoting peace among the superpowers and all nations.

Yours truly,


R. J. Douglas
Town Clerk

RJD/lch

cc: Speaker ✓
House of Commons
Ottawa, Ontario



UN agency wants PM: Pelletier

By Warren Perley
United Press Canada

MONTREAL — Prime Minister Trudeau is being sought for a position with a UN agency after he retires in June, Canada's ambassador to the United Nations, Gérard Pelletier, said Wednesday.

Pelletier said he was telephoned in New York earlier in the day by Brad Morse, head of the United Nations Development Program.

"He said, 'Gérard, is it too early to talk about Trudeau, whether he wants to join the club,'" Pelletier said. "I said, 'well, wait until he is a full has-been; he's only a half has-been.'"

Trudeau announced his retirement last week. He has agreed to remain prime minister until after the Liberal party leadership convention in Ottawa June 14-17.

Morse, contacted at his New York apartment, was asked if Trudeau was being of-

fered a full-time, paid position with the agency.

"Of course not," he said, refusing further comment.

It was not known if the position, if offered and accepted, would involve Trudeau moving to New York.

Pelletier, in Montreal for a speech at McGill University, said Morse wanted Trudeau to attend a UNDP meeting in April.

"I said, 'listen, in April he'll still be the prime minister of Canada. You'll have to move your meeting to next June or early July, at least.'"

Pelletier described the agency as a group that includes former heads of state, including former West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt.

Immediately after Trudeau's resignation last week, the UN building in New York was buzzing with speculation that Trudeau

might join the world peace organization, Pelletier said.

Pelletier related a conversation between an Asian and African diplomat:

"One said to the other, 'you know, (UN Secretary General Javier) Perez de Cuellar has told everyone that he won't run again in two years. If that guy (Trudeau) did, it would be fun.'"

Pelletier, a close friend of Trudeau's for more than 30 years, said the prime minister would "without doubt consider with interest" any role as an international peace ambassador.

"He doesn't have any specific projects in mind to become a mediator," Pelletier said, "but he's obviously a man who is gifted for international action of some sort."

Trudeau, 64, one of 75 nominees for the 1984 Nobel Peace Prize, began a global peace crusade last October and subsequently visited the leaders of the world's five major nuclear nations — the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China.

25 from H8/6

Facing realities in Lebanon

The man on the hot seat in Lebanon right now is President Amin Gemayel. If he had any practical alternative to scrapping his May agreement with Israel, it was not apparent.

It's all very well for Israel to call Gemayel's submission to Syria's bidding a death sentence for Lebanon's independence and sovereignty. The May 17 agreement was a good one for Israel — and could have been a good one for Lebanon.

But Syria never accepted it. And Syria calls the shots for many of Lebanon's non-Christian factions who rely on Damascus for weapons and political support.

As long ago as last July, Syrian Prime Minister Abdul al-Kasm told *The Citizen* that Syria categorically rejected the U.S.-sponsored Israel-Lebanon agreement "because it was imposed by Israeli bayonets." He called it a "pact of submission" that was not supported by the Lebanese people.

In these circumstances — and given the withdrawal of most of the multinational force (MNF) from Beirut and the veto by the Soviet Union of a replacement UN

force — what else could Gemayel have done?

Now round two of the Lebanese national reconciliation talks seems about to start in Lausanne, Switzerland, next week. A few short weeks ago this possibility seemed like a pipedream.

Lausanne may not achieve permanent peace and sovereignty for Lebanon. But it has to be tried. The Lebanese people themselves — all of them — must decide whether they can live together and govern themselves in a single independent state.

Meanwhile Israel will have to work out its own arrangements with Lebanon's various ethnic groups to ensure the security of its northern border. It is reportedly already starting to do so.

And in time, Israel and Syria will have to agree on a *modus vivendi* within Lebanon. The only alternative would be a war between the two — and neither wants that.

Not a perfect solution by any means. But better than none. And Gemayel deserves some credit as he continues to try to save his country in the ways he judges best.

no standing with
not a UN agency
meeting of interaction
Yugoslavia, Moz
Mortimer
1/4th duty
with Devoire
Morse had
asked Pelletier
Thout p

MR SMITH

I had Stan Corbin on the phone from Britain
opposedly this report is all upside-down. They wanted
the PM to attend a meeting of interaction, a

Power play is rumored as Syrian Cabinet quits

From *London and New York Times*

DAMASCUS — Syria's 37-member Cabinet resigned on Tuesday night amid reports that a split has developed in the ruling elite.

Speculation about a shakeup of the 4-year-old Cabinet mounted during President Hafez Assad's two-month illness last year. Sources said it seemed the President wanted a vice-president to share his burden, but officials said yesterday that the post of vice-president would remain purely titular.

Diplomatic sources said a new Cabinet would probably be formed in the next few days and they did not expect any change in major foreign and domestic issues.

However, U.S. officials in Washington said they had received reports of a split in the Syrian leadership that reached a high point last week when shots were fired around the presidential palace.


According to reports from Western military attaches in Damascus, rivals hoping to succeed Mr. Assad put on competing shows of military force in the capital.

The core of the tension, U.S. officials said, seemed to be an effort by Rifaat Assad, the President's younger brother, to position himself as his brother's successor despite fierce opposition from the regular armed forces and some members of the ruling Baath Socialist Party. It was not clear which side the President supported.

The sources said the standoff between military units headed by Rifaat Assad and the regular armed forces, especially the 3rd Division, was especially striking because it coincided with Lebanese President Amin Gemayel's visit to Damascus and the accompanying triumph of Syrian foreign policy in Lebanon.

The struggle for future supremacy within the Syrian Government surfaced after Mr. Assad's heart attack last November, the sources said.

The Government, which is dominated by Alawites, a minority Shia Moslem sect that comprises less than 15 per cent of



Hafez Assad

Syria's population, had been regarded as stable until then.

During the President's illness, Rifaat Assad and other members of the ruling group began to vie openly for prominence. A series of "poster wars" ensued, in which photos of Rifaat Assad and others were plastered on buses, houses and public places.

"The President's illness shattered the equilibrium of the regime," one Western diplomat said. "Since then, a new balance has not been re-established."

Two weeks ago, the diplomat said, Mr. Assad was preparing to act on a series of promotions and shifts within the forces. Rifaat Assad was said to have strongly objected to them because they favored those loyal to Hickmat Shehabi, chief of staff of the armed forces, Shafiq Fayez, head of the 3rd Division, and Ali Buba, head of military intelligence, who all oppose the President's brother.

On Feb. 27, Rifaat Assad's 25,000-man "defence companies," which have acted as the regime's Praetorian Guard, were redeployed around the capital.

Surface-to-air missile batteries were moved on to the mountain overlooking the city and tarpaulins were removed from tanks positioned near the capital.

At the same time, defence company positions inside the city were doubled and two battalions of rocket launchers were positioned at the western entrance to Damascus. A large deployment of men and weapons at Mezzeh, a road junction on the outskirts of Damascus, appeared aimed at blocking the 3rd Division's entry into the city.

"In a very crude way, Rifaat was flexing his military muscle as a warning and a challenge to the regular military," one analyst said.

The 3rd Division commander, who is married to one of the President's sisters, did not respond, the sources said. But on Monday night, members of the 2,000-man palace guard headed by Adnan Mahkluf, another rival of Rifaat Assad, surrounded the presidential palace wearing helmets and carrying anti-tank weapons.

Shots were heard around the palace for the first time in the regime's history.

The next night, the regional command of the Baath party met. Reliable reports of what happened at the meeting were not available, but afterward the military tension eased considerably.

Nevertheless, the President has reportedly canceled all leave for soldiers based in Lebanon and southern Syria.

According to one report, Rifaat Assad's rocket batteries are still deployed on the Beirut-Damascus highway just outside the Syrian capital.

Western diplomats said Rifaat Assad had been seeking to replace Mustafa Tlas as Defence Minister, a move that is bitterly opposed by the armed forces.

Mr. Tlas asserted yesterday that the army was ready "to confront any plots."

He added in a statement published by Al Baath, organ of the Baath party, that the forces could handle any threat against the state.

Diplomatic sources said the Syrian Cabinet does not normally initiate policy, but follows outlines mapped out by the regional command of the Baath party.

Air Canada bars Guyanese from its flights

It seems to have escaped the notice of our eagle-eyed parliamentarians that the people's airline, Air Canada, has usurped the job of the Immigration Department.

It isn't every day that a government agency, responsible to the minister of transport, can, in effect, impose visas on visitors from a foreign country, a task normally the prerogative of the immigration minister with the approval of the federal cabinet.

Yet as of March 1, Air Canada took the law into its own hands and issued orders to its staff to refuse passage to Guyanese flying to Canada on Air Canada via Guyanese Airways, even if these people had paid-for tickets and long-held reservations.

This highly discriminatory action was not taken on racial grounds, as Air Canada is the first to assure us, but on economic grounds. Air Canada is sick and tired of paying the bills for housing and even returning those Guyanese, who, on asking for political asylum here, are denied entry after weeks or even months of detention and investigation by immigration officials.

As a result of Air Canada's unilateral action, instigated by one of its 18 vice-presidents who refuses to discuss the matter, the Canadian government has caved in and now is, apparently, issuing a type of visa at its office in Georgetown, Guyana.

An Immigration Department spokesman said that Immigration Minister John Roberts has proposed that visas be required for Guyanese, but so far cabinet has not approved this. So Guyana continues, officially, to be one of 80 countries where entry visas to Canada are not required.

But external affairs officials, in confirming that visas now are being issued, note that under existing guidelines, even if a visa is not necessary, it is written that if a visa would facilitate a person's entry to Canada it can be issued. And that is what is being done, although, as immigration officials will remind you, a visa does not ensure entry. That is determined by the immigration officer on the spot at the Toronto or Montreal airports, who presumably judges by the look on your face or the cut of your suit.

Air Canada and CP Air have been complaining for some time about the money they must spend for immigration's time-consuming procedures. If these airlines have transported a Guyanese, or any other foreigner to Canada who is refused entry, they are responsible for their lodging in an immigration detention centre until the case is decided. In the event it goes against the immigrant they must fly him or her back to their country of origin.

It has been estimated, an Air Canada spokesman said, that together Air Canada and CP Air paid about \$1.5 million last year alone for such passengers who were stopped at Toronto and Montreal.

This does not in any way justify Air Canada's high-handed action, which could be repeated by any airline that took an exception to people of any other Third World country who suddenly began to flood the air routes to Canada.

It is not up to Canada's national airline to make the decision that the Guyanese flying to Canada are not really political refugees, as many of them have been claiming. That is up to immigration, slow as their procedures are.

Air Canada's vice-presidents don't have to live in Guyana under the authoritarian regime of President Forbes Burnham or, being East Indians, suffer the harassment some have under the presidential party's goondas.

No one yet knows, least of all Air Canada vice-presidents, what the imposition of a visa procedure will mean to those legitimate refugees who now must proclaim their intention in Georgetown, whose airport officials are notorious for imposing exorbitant taxes or other obstacles on departing people.

Obviously the situation is an economic burden on Air Canada. But surely part of the problem is the time-consuming procedure that immigration requires to prove that a political refugee is genuine.

annual mtg. of former heads of govt. Clearly
the PM doesn't qualify. Corlson was going
to try to reach Pettitier.

Gallup

From page 1 story:
**Liberals trim PC lead
to 12 points in Gallup**

Ontario breakdown is about the same as the national result.

Ray Hnatyshyn, Tory MP for Saskatoon West, said Trudeau's initiative was carried out "with general Canadian support; indeed, with support on the part of our party."

Senator Keith Davey, a top Liberal strategist, said the closing of the gap between the two parties is "very dramatic evidence of voter volatility."

"It's about time the Liberals had some really happy news and this is it," he said. "The odds-on bet that (Tory Leader Brian) Mulroney will win the election are now being hedged."

Davey predicted the gap will continue to close because the Liberals will continue their upward momentum, especially around the time of the Liberal leadership convention in June.

Gerry Caplan, federal secretary of the NDP, called the latest poll "clearly a disappointing finding."

The question asked was: "If a federal election were held today, which party's candidate do you think you would favor?"

The result, by percentage, among decided voters:

	Liberal	Conservative	NDP	Other
February, 1984	36	48	13	2
January	32	52	15	2
December, 1983	30	53	15	2
October (4th week)	27	56	16	2
September (4th week)	26	55	16	2
September (1st week)	23	62	14	1
August	28	50	20	2
July	27	55	16	2
June	34	50	15	2
May	32	50	16	2
March (4th week)	27	52	19	2
March (1st week)	30	50	17	2
February	34	45	19	2
January	31	49	20	1
February, 1982	35	36	26	3
February, 1981	42	37	19	2
1980 election	44	32	20	3

No place for Canada

Canada should have nothing to do with the presidential election to be held in El Salvador later this month.

To send official observers, as the Salvadorean government has asked, would amount to Canadian approval of an election that is obviously unfair and undemocratic. Left wing politicians, who seem to have significant popular support, are boycotting the campaign, in part for fear of their lives.

The Canadian government has not yet replied to the request nor has it taken a position on the election itself.

Two years ago Ottawa turned down a similar invitation (on the grounds that the observers' role was not clearly defined), but said the election was a useful first step toward an eventual settlement of the civil war that has plagued the tiny Central American nation since 1980.

The 1982 election was not much of a first step toward justice, or even stability. Right wing death squads and left wing guerrillas continued their bloody battle.

Not much more is likely to come from the March 25 election.

The leading contender seems to be the ultra-conservative Roberto D'Aubuisson of the Republican Nationalist Alliance (ARENA), who is said to have close ties with the death squads. He frowns on any accommodation with the guerrillas. He apparently would rather kill them all.

Among the other candidates, only Jose Napoleon Duarte of the Christian Democrats is being taken seriously. But his support for land reform has led many observers to predict the conservative-controlled army would overthrow him if he won.

The United States government, which has invested much money and prestige in the battle against the guerrillas, is backing the election but seems less than excited by the leading candidates, particularly Mr. D'Aubuisson. It is warning the Salvadorean military, which is largely supporting Mr. D'Aubuisson, that continued U.S. aid depends on the curbing of right-wing death squad activity.

But such threats ring hollow. How serious they are can be gauged from Secretary of State George Shultz's recent testimony before a congressional committee. He linked military aid to human rights progress, but then said that there has been "a great deal of progress."

Ironically, that same day in El Salvador, a right wing death squad threatened to kill any journalists who "collaborate" with leftist guerrillas.

Anyone who says this is progress, or that a fair election is possible in such circumstances, has got to be kidding.

G.C.: RCR/Crête, Mader
RSR/Brazeau
MINA DMF IFB RGB RCD IDR
IDA IDDZ

Department of External Affairs



Canada

RCR/F. Nadeau/08782
RCR-0430
FILE DIARY CIRC CHRON

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

Mr. Schmidt's note -

*fold for until
April 1.*

Le 8 mars 1984

Le très Honorable Joe Clark, M.P.
Chambre des Communes
Pièce 163, Edifice de l'Est
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A6

Monsieur le député,

Veillez trouver, ci-joint, le programme que nous avons préparé de concert avec nos missions à Bonn, Bruxelles, Paris et Londres, à votre demande pour votre périple européen du 9 au 20 mars 1984.

Certains rendez-vous, particulièrement avec des personnalités politiques, restent à confirmer. Les missions canadiennes concernées seront en rapport avec l'Ambassade du pays visité à un moment donné pour vous tenir au courant des développements. A tout événement, chaque mission vous présentera un programme définitif à votre arrivée.

Dans l'ensemble, je suis convaincu que le programme déjà élaboré vous permettra, comme vous le souhaitez, de rencontrer le plus large éventail possible de personnalités politiques et d'experts sur les questions de contrôle des armements et de désarmement.

Veillez agréer, monsieur le député, l'expression de mes sentiments les meilleurs.

Le Sous-ministre adjoint
Secteur de l'Europe,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

A.R.A. GHERSON

& SIGNÉ L'ORIGINAL

pour
D. Molgat

BONN

<u>Date</u>	<u>Rendez-vous</u>	<u>Remarques</u>
<u>Samedi</u> <u>10 mars</u>		08h35: arrivée Francfort, LH 445, accueilli à l'aéroport par Ambassadeur Donald S. Mc et accompagné à Bonn. <u>Logement:</u> Konigshof Hotel Adenauer Allee 9- Tel. (228) 26010
<u>Dimanche</u> <u>11 mars</u>		
PM	Briefing donné par Amb. McPhail et agents de l'Ambassade sur la situation en RFA.	Ce briefing pourrait avoir lieu dans votre hôtel ou à la Résidence selon qu'il vous convient.
<u>A confirmer:</u>	Volkmar Deile	Considéré comme expert mieux qualifié sur mouvement de la RDA.
<u>Lundi</u> <u>12 mars</u>		
09h30	M. Alois Mertes (CDU) Ministre d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères	Genscher étant à Bruxelles, statut de Mertes équivaut à celui du Ministre J.L. Pèpin.
11h00	Phillip Jeninger, Ministre d'Etat au bureau du Chancelier Kohl et Horst Teltschik, Conseiller du Chancelier Kohl (Affaires étrangères).	Il y a une mince possibilité de visite de courtoisie auprès du Chancelier. A confirmer.
12h00	Déjeuner: ouvert.	
14h30	Volker Ruehe (CDU) Vice-président du caucus.	
16h00	Parti Vert: Petra Kelly et Gerd Bastien.	
17h30	Prof. Lubckmeier Fondation Friedrich Ebert (SPD)	
20h00	Dîner offert par l'Ambassadeur.	Entre autres invités: M. Karl Kaiser, Institut allemand de politique étrangère et Alfred Dregger, président du caucus parlementaire du CDU.

- 2 -

BONN (suite)

<u>Date</u>	<u>Rendez-vous</u>	<u>Remarques</u>
<u>Mardi</u> <u>13 mars</u>		
08h30	Ambassadeur Fred Ruth Ambassadeur de RFA au désarmement	
09h30	Klaus von Bulow Député SPD	Président du groupe de travail sur les questions de sécurité désarmement.
11h00	Major-général Tandecki Chef, Affaires politiques et militaires, Ministère de la Défense.	Possibilité de visite de conseil chez le Ministre de la Défense M. Manfred Woerner
13h15	Déjeuner offert par l'Ambassadeur.	Avec un député de chaque parti
15h30	Gerd Greune, Président de la Société de la paix allemande, Wolfgang Biermann.	
18h10	Départ pour Paris (de Cologne)	
<u>NOTE:</u>	Helmut Schmidt sera à Bruxelles durant votre visite à Bonn. von Staaden et Weitz sont présentement aux Etats-Unis.	

PARIS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Rendez-vous</u>	<u>Remarques</u>
<u>Mardi</u> <u>13 mars</u>	Paris	19h15: arrivée aéroport Charles de Gaulle, vol LH/AF 128 de Cologne. <u>Hébergement:</u> Hôtel Intercontinental
20h30	Briefing pré-visite par l'Ambassadeur Michel Dupuis et un agent de l'Ambassade.	
<u>Mercredi</u> <u>14 mars</u>		
10h00-12h00	Table-ronde à l'Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI).	
12h00	Tête-à-tête avec Mme Marie-France Garaud.	
13h00	Déjeuner de travail à la Résidence.	Avec experts et universitaires. Personnes invitées incluent: de Rose, Masson, Tatu, Hoffman, Robin. A confirmer.
17h30	Départ pour Vichy.	
20h30	Arrivée à Vichy et entretien avec M. Robert Ford.	
<u>Jeudi</u> <u>15 mars</u>		
06h35	Départ de Vichy.	
09h45	Arrivée à Paris.	
10h30	Table ronde avec les responsables du parti socialiste.	Organisée par M. Soppelsa, recteur à l'Université Paris I avec les responsables du désarmement et affaires stratégiques, incluant Bonniface, Bureau, Huntzinger.
12h00	Apéritif offert par M. Soppelsa.	
13h00	Déjeuner de travail avec les gouvernementaux.	A la Résidence. Personnes invitées mais à confirmer: Andreani, Puisseux, Renouard, Vedrine, Gergorin, Dorin.
19h55		Départ pour Bruxelles AF 648.

LONDRES

<u>Date</u>	<u>Rendez-vous</u>	<u>Remarques</u>
<u>Samedi</u> <u>17 mars</u>	Londres.	11h45: arrivée de Bruxelles, Vol SA 603. Accueilli par M. S.W.P. Bee Ministre-conseiller, Haut-Commissaire <u>Hébergement</u> : Hôtel Dorchester.
<u>Dimanche</u> <u>18 mars</u>		
16h00	M. Sonny Ramphal Secrétaire général, Secrétariat du Commonwealth	Pour le thé.
<u>Lundi</u> <u>19 mars</u>		
10h00	Haut-commissaire, Hon. Donald C. Jamieson	
11h00	M. Richard Luce Ministre d'Etat Foreign and Common- wealth Office	En compagnie d'officiels du FCO, responsables des questions du contrôle des armements et du désarmement.
12h00	David Owen Leader du SDP	
13h00	Déjeuner offert par le Haut-commissaire	Incluant des parlementaires, hauts fonctionnaires et militaires.
15h30	M. O'Neill Directeur Institute for Strategic Studies	
17h30	John Silken, M.P. Porte-parole du Labour Party en matière de défense et contrôle des armements.	
<u>Mardi</u> <u>20 mars</u>		
10h15	Prof. Lawrence Freedman Department of War Studies, Kings College.	
13h45	Départ pour le Canada AC 857.	
<u>NOTE:</u>	Le Premier ministre Thatcher et le secrétaire d'Etat Howe seront à Bruxelles pour le Sommet européen.	

R.P. Kirby/vg URR FILE DIARY DIV
CIRC WF 2-7560

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

MEMORANDUM

URT URE JLE IDR JLO EER EEF EEA LCR
RBR IDDZ GMR GAA ESE JLA

SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL
Sécurité

DATE March 8, 1984

NUMBER URR - 0195
Numéro

URR

MacEachen/Shultz Bilateral: April 1-2,
1984, Washington.

FILE	DOSSIER
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Sujet

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

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TDD

The next in the regular series of meetings between the DPM/SSEA and U.S. Secretary of State Shultz will take place in Washington April 1 and 2, 1984.

The programme is expected to begin on Sunday evening, April 1st, with a dinner followed by discussions Monday morning, April 2nd, and a lunch. There may be further discussions Monday afternoon prior to a closing pressconference.

2. This memorandum is to request input from you for the scenario briefing book. No separate background briefing book will be prepared. Scenarios therefore must be concise and self-contained. All inputs are required by March 20 to allow adequate time for final assembly and submission to the DPM/SSEA for the weekend of March 24.

3. In order to ensure that all the requisite issues are covered in the scenarios as well as consistency of format in preparation of the briefing material, we ask that a representative (preferably the scenario drafters) from each of the action addressees attend a meeting March 13 in the UGB A-6 Conference Room at 10:00 a.m.

4. Although the agenda has not yet been agreed to by either the Minister or the Secretary, the following are the core contributions required on the basis of informal consultations with the American Embassy:

Subject

Action Division

Bilateral

Acid Rain
Garrison Diversion
Toxic Waste

URE
URE
URE

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- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject

Action Division

Bilateral cont'd.

Skagit River Treaty	URE
Trade Issues	URT
ANGST	URE
Extraterritoriality	URT/JLE
North American Air Defence	
Modernization	IDR
U.S. Weapons Testing in Canada	IDR/TDU
Fisheries: Pacific Salmon	JLO/URR
Pelly Amendment	URT
Orlikow	JLA

Responsive

Flathead River	URE
Canada/USSR MOU on Aeroflot Use of	
Gander	RBR
NEP: Crown Share	URE
Natural Gas Pricing	URE
Border Broadcasting	URE
Copyright: Cable Retransmission	URE
Pharmaceuticals	URE
Trucking	URE
Canadian Export Controls (Protection	
of USA Technology)	ESE

Multilateral

Economic

International Economy: Summit and	
Recovery	EER
International Debt and Financial	
Situation	EEF
IDA	EEA

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- 3 -


CONFIDENTIAL

Subject

Action Division

Political

Central America	LCR
Grenada	LCR
NATO Strategy	IDR
East/West Relations	RBR
P.M.'s Peace Initiative	IDDZ
Middle East	GMR
Namibia	GAA


M.G. von Nostitz
Director
U.S. General Relations
Division



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

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MGTC/Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

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File/Dossier
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0219 08MAR84

TO/À

TO WSHDC

INFO

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INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO BONN VMBFR LDN MOSCO GENEV PRMNY STKHM/

REF

SCDEL NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/CIS/CORAE/ADMPOL/DIPOL/CPD/DSTRATA

SUBJ/SUJ

DISTR IFB IDR IDA IDRA IDRL RGX RBD CPD IDD

REF BNATO TEL YBGR6245 07MAR

---MBFR:USA POSITION

TELTSCHIK, CHANCELLOR KOHLS CHIEF FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER, TOLD DEPT
07MAR THAT DURING THEIR MTGS IN WSHDC EARLIER THIS WEEK WITH PRES
THAT DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER FRED RUTH HAD BEEN INFORMED BY SECTY
SHULTZ THAT USA POSITION ON MBFR WAS QUOTE FLEXIBLE UNQUOTE AND WAS
NOT/NOT CAST IN CONCRETE.

2.GRATEFUL IF BOTH BONN AND WSHDC FOLLOW UP ON THIS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG G.J. Smith/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG G.J. Smith

mf

C O N F I D E N T I A L

SUSPECTED DUPLICATE

EXISTENCE POSSIBLE D'UN DOUBLE

FM WSHDC UNGR2114 08MAR84

TO EXTOTT RSR

INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR GENEV PARIS
HAGUE OSLO COPEN ATHNS SCDEL/STKHM TAVIV JEDDA PCOOTT/FOWLER/
AXWORTHY NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DACPOL/DNACPOL/CPD/DSTRATA/CIS

DISTR IDD IFB MINA MINE MINT USS DMF IDA RBR RCR RSR RBD RCD RSD
CPD ZSI ZSP URR URT URE LCD LSD IDDZ GMR GMD GMT

---VISIT OF KOHL TO WSHDC

SUMMARY:VISIT OF HELMUT KOHL TO WSHDC 04-06MAR ATTRACTED BROAD PRESS
COVERAGE THAT FOCUSSED BASICALLY ON TWO ISSUES(1)SALE OF FRG ARMS TO
SAUDI ARABIA AND (2)KOHLS INTEREST IN A CHERNENKO/REAGAN SUMMIT.

PRIVATE TALKS,WHICH WERE LOW KEY AND NON-CONFRONTATIONAL WERE GENERAL
IN NATURE AND REFLECTED KOHLS DESIRE TO REASSURE USA ADMIN OF GERMAN
COMMITMENT TO NATO AND WESTERN DEFENCE AND TO URGE IMPROVED EAST/WEST
RELS.BROAD RANGE OF SUBJS DISCUSSED INCLUDED ALSO CW,POLAND,TRADE
WITH JAPAN AND FRG/GDR RELS.

2.REPORT:KOHL CAME TO WSHDC AT THIS TIME FOLLOWING REQUEST HE MADE
IN DEC FOR A VISIT IN FIRST QUARTER OF 84.FOR ALL PRE-VISIT RHETORIC
BOTH PRIVATE AND PUBLIC,KOHLS PRIVATE TALKS WITH PRES REAGAN,SEC
SHULTZ AND ON HILL WERE COMPLETELY NON-CONFRONTATIONAL,ONE CONTACT
SAID POSITIONS CLD HAVE BEEN MAILED-IN,ONLY SENSE OF CONFRONTATION
WAS IN PUBLIC MTGS THAT DEALT WITH FRG ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA.
KOHL TOLD AMERICANS HE SAW HIS VISIT TAKING PLACE WITHIN THE

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PAGE TWO UNGR2114 CONFD

FRAMEWORK OF INTRA-ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS THAT HAD WORKED SO WELL IN INF AND IF KOHL APPROACHED USA WITH KID GLOVES USA APPARENTLY HANDLED HIM SAME WAY.WE WERE TOLD MARVIN KALB OF NBC WAS ONLY PERSON WHO TREATED KOHL HARSHLY.KALB ASKED KOHL TO CUT DOWN HIS EXTREMELY LONG RESPONSES AT PRESS CLUB MTG.WE ARE TOLD THIS SAME LONG-WINDEDNESS WAS EVIDENT AT ALL OF KOHLS MTGS.

3.KOHL SEEMED PARTICULARLY ANXIOUS TO REASSURE HIS INTERLOCUTORS OF FRG COMMITMENT TO NATO AND TALKED AT GREAT LENGTH ON THIS SUBJ. HE WAS EXTREMELY UPBEAT ON THE SUBJ,GOING SO FAR AS TO SAY THAT FOR FRG NATO MEMBERSHIP WAS A VITAL COMPONENT OF THEIR NATL IDENTITY AND INDEED FRG NATL EXISTENCE WAS RESULT OF MEMBERSHIP IN NATO. KOHL SAID THAT HE,MITTERAND AND THATCHER HAD A PARTICULAR ROLE TO PLAY IN STRENGTHENING EUROPEAN ROLE IN NATO AND THEIR SIMILAR APPROACHES GAVE THEM A SPECIAL OPPORTUNITY.KOHL WAS PARTICULARLY POSITIVE IN EVALUATION OF HIS RELS WITH MITTERAND.

4.KOHL WAS EXTREMELY CRITICAL OF KISSINGER ARTICLE.HE RAISED IT IN ALMOST ALL HIS MTGS.HE SAID THAT WHILE KISSINGER HAD MADE SOME VALID POINTS IN HIS ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEMS THAT ALWAYS CONFRONT THE ALLIANCE,HIS SOLUTIONS WERE NONSENSE.KOHL ALSO CRITICIZED EAGLEBURGER REMARK ABOUT USA TURNING ITS PRIMARY ATTENTION TO ASIA AS BEING UNHELPFUL.

5.KOHL ALSO TALKED ABOUT PROBLEMS FACING EEC.HE EXPRESSED OPTIMISM THAT THESE WLD BE RESOLVED AND SAID THAT IMPROVING ECONOMIES WLD

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PAGE THREE UNGR2114 CONF

HELP. ONE OF MAJOR PROBLEMS IN EEC WAS THAT TOO MUCH ATTENTION HAD TO BE PAID IN EEC TO LIKES OF PAPANDREOU WHO DID NOT/NOT ALWAYS UNDERSTAND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILK AND SECURITY. IN RESPONSE PRES REAGAN TOLD KOHL THAT USA DID NOT/NOT ACCEPT THAT USA ECONOMIC POLICIES WERE CAUSE OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. ON WHOLE HOWEVER, KOHL WAS VERY UPBEAT ABOUT EUROPE AND POSSIBILITIES FOR STRENGTHENING IT.

6. KOHL EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT GROWING TREND TO PROTECTIONISM AND SAID HE WLD DO WHAT HE COULD TO RESIST IT PARTICULARLY AS A RESPONSE TO JAPAN. HE SAID HE WLD ENCOURAGE DEVELOPMENT OF MEANS OF GETTING AROUND JAPANS BARRIERS RATHER THAN PROTECTIONISM AS A RESPONSE TO JAPANESE TRADE PRACTICES.

7. ON EAST/WEST RELS KOHL URGED CONTINUING IMPROVEMENT IN RELS WHICH HE FELT WERE GOING WELL AND TALKED IN GENERAL WAY ABOUT NEED FOR A SUMMIT. ACCORDING TO STATE, HE DID NOT PUSH HARD. FRG EMB SAYS KOHL CHOSE NOT TO PUSH ISSUE HARD BECAUSE HE RECOGNIZED THAT IN AN ELECTION YR REAGANS OPTIONS ARE LIMITED. IN HIS COMMENTS ON DEPARTURE FROM WHITE HOUSE HE SEEMED TO RESPOND TO LINE REAGAN HAD PUSHED IN RESPONSE TO HIS COMMENTS, IE THAT MTG WLD HAVE TO ACCOMPLISH SOMETHING. STATE DEPT EXPRESSED BEMUSEMENT TO US AT HOW THIS ISSUE HAS PLAYED IN PRESS. IN USA IT HAS APPEARED KOHL WAS CONVINCED BY REAGAN, WHEREAS EUROPEAN PRESS HAS SUGGESTED KOHL PUSHED HARD FOR SUMMIT.

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PAGE FOUR UNGR2114 CONF

8.ON MBFR KOHL SPOKE ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS OF THE IMPORTANCE FRG ATTACHED TO ENSURING THAT WEST RESPONSE TO EAST PROPOSAL IS FORTHCOMING ENOUGH.HE DID NOT/NOT SUGGEST PRESENT USA POSITION WAS NOT/NOT,EXCEPT BY IMPLICATION.WE ARE TOLD AMB RUTH IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH ADMIRAL HOWE WAS MORE BLUNT IN OFFERING VIEW THAT NEW USA POSITION DID NOT/NOT GO FAR ENOUGH ON DATA ISSUE.

9.KOHL ALSO TALKED ABOUT THE NEED TO MOVE FORWARD ON OTHER ACT ISSUES AND PUSHED USA TO TABLE SOMETHING ON CW AS IT HAD PROMISED. CW ISSUE IS BECOMING A POLITICAL ISSUE IN FRG.KOHL BELIEVES THAT WEST HAD GRASPED THE INITIATIVE IN ARMS CONTROL ON THE INF ISSUE AND THAT WE SHLD DO WHATEVER WE CAN TO MAINTAIN IT.CW PROVIDED GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO.WE ARE TOLD HE RECEIVED SYMPATHETIC RESPONSE ON CW.

10.ON FRG/GDR RELS,KOHL EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH WAY THINGS ARE GOING.HE SAID HE HOPED THAT CURRENT LOW-KEY IMPROVEMENT WILL CONTINUE AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT WEST DOES NOT/NOT MAKE ANY SERIOUS MISTAKES IN HANDLING OF THE MATTER.HE URGED THAT DEALINGS WITH GDR BE WELL CO-ORDINATED IN ALLIANCE AND PARTICULARLY WITH FRG WHICH HAS GREATEST STAKE.USA TOOK KOHL COMMENT RE MISTAKES TO BE CAUTION AGAINST ANY CLUMSY ATTEMPT TO INCREASE SEPARATION OF GDR FROM USSR (IE USA POLICY OF DIFFERENTIATION).IN KOHL VIEW HOENECKER HAS MADE EFFECTIVE USE OF OPPORTUNITIES PROVIDED BY TWO SUCCESSIONS IN USSR TO GAIN HIMSELF A LITTLE MORE LEEWAY.WE SHLD BE SURE WE DO NOT/NOT

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PAGE FIVE UNGR2114 CONF

UNDO WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. PRESSURES ON KOHL FROM EAST GERMAN POPULATION MEANS HE NEEDS TO MAINTAIN THIS FLEXIBILITY.

11. WITH REGARD TO POLAND, KOHL URGED USA PARTICIPATION IN POLISH CHURCH AGRICULTURAL FUND. HE DID NOT/NOT HOWEVER RAISE SUBJ OF DEBT RESCHEDULING.

12. QUESTION OF FRG ARMS SALES TO SAUDI ARABIA WAS ONE OF MOST DOMINANT ISSUES IN PRESS. IT WAS CENTERPIECE OF KOHL'S MTG WITH JEWISH GROUPS AND WAS PROMINENT IN DISCUSSIONS ON HILL. KOHL DEFENDED FRG DECISION STRONGLY BUT PROMISED NO/NO QUOTE OFFENSIVE UNQUOTE WEAPONS WLD BE SOLD TO SAUDI ARABIA; HE SPECIFICALLY RULED OUT TANKS WHICH HE NOTED IRONICALLY WLD PROBABLY BE SOLD BY AMERICANS. IN MTG WITH SHULTZ SUBJ WAS DISCUSSED ONLY BRIEFLY. FRG HAD SOUGHT USA ADVICE ON SUBJ BEFORE KOHL'S VISIT TO ISRAEL. ON THIS OCCASION SHULTZ MERELY REITERATED USA POSITION WHICH IS THAT MATTER IS A BILATERAL ONE FOR FRG AND SAUDI ARABIA. USA BELIEVES THAT ISRAEL MUST ALWAYS BE ASSURED OF A QUALITATIVE ADVANTAGE OVER ITS NEIGHBORS, BUT USA ALSO SELLS ARMS TO SAUDI ARABIA.

13. SEC SHULTZ EXPRESSED IN FAIRLY STRONG TERMS USA PLEASURE THAT FRG HAD DECIDED TO SEND AN AMB TO EL SALVADOR EARLY, IN ADVANCE OF THE ELECTIONS.

14. PARAS 1-13 INCLUSIVE CONTAIN INFO RECEIVED IN CONFIDENCE FROM STATE DEPT.

15. WE WILL REPORT FURTHER AFTER WE HAVE HAD FURTHER OPP TO DISCUSS SUBJ WITH FRG EMB.

CCC/241 091605Z UNGR2114

m [signature] o/r [signature]
MF

INFO

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR0577 08MAR84

TO PCOOTT/FOWLER

INFO BNATO EXTOTT/MINA/DMF/IDDZ/IFB/USS/RGB PMOOTT/JOHNSON/COLEMAN
REF YOURTEL PC00229 01MAR

---CBC JOURNAL INTERVIEW WITH CARRINGTON, 02FEB

I DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH CARRINGTON ON 06FEB AND FELT THAT HE WAS FULLY CONSCIOUS THAT CDN MEDIA WERE EXPLOITING PMS REMARKS. I THINK HE ACCEPTED THAT PM MEANT TO ACKNOWLEDGE RATHER THAN TO SUPPORT DOUBTS ABOUT NATO NUCLEAR STRATEGY. ONE CAN BE SURE THAT AS OLD POLITICAL HAND WELL EXPERIENCED IN DEALING WITH TV MEDIUM CARRINGTON WAS QUITE AWARE BARBARA FRUM IN JOURNAL INTERVIEW WAS ATTEMPTING TO BE PROVOCATIVE BY MAKING CATEGORICAL INTERPRETATION OF PMS REMARKS. HE EASILY AVOIDED TRAP. I SEE NO/NO CAUSE TO WORRY ABOUT CARRINGTON BEING LEFT WITH IMPRESSIONS SUGGESTED BY FRUM. IN CIRCUMSTANCES I DO NOT/NOT SEE NEED AND WOULD PREFER NOT/NOT TO DRAW CARRINGTONS ATTENTION TO THIS MATTER AGAIN.

CCC/065 081715Z XNGR0577

m F

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR0564 08MAR84

TO EXTOTT/IDA DELIVER BY 080900

INFO BNATO VMBFR STKHM/SC DEL GENEV PRMNY MDRID LSBON ROME ATHNS
ANKRA PARIS WSHDC COPEN MOSCO PRGUE BPEST WSAW OSLO HAGUE BRU
BUCST NDHQOTT/ADMPOLE/DIPOL/DNACPOL

DISTR DMF IFB IDR (IDTZ IDRL RCR RSR RBD RBR RGB URR FPR IMU IDA
REF IDT0028 06MAR;BNATO YBGR 0237 07MAR

---ROMANIAN PROPOSAL ON NATO/WPO REDUCTION OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES
INITIAL BRITISH RESPONSE TO EASTERN DEFENCE BUDGET REDUCTION
PROPOSAL CLOSELY PARALLELS REACTION NOW EMERGING IN BRUSSELS.FULL
TEXT OF PROPOSAL WAS ONLY RECEIVED IN FCO 07MAR AND OFFICIALS ARE
STILL STUDYING IT;FCO HAS ISSUED PRELIMINARY STATEMENT CONFIRMING
THAT WHILE UK FAVOURS MAINTAINING MILITARY SPENDING AT LOWER
LEVELS,THIS MUST BE ACHIEVED BY BALANCED AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENT.
2.FCO SUGGESTS THAT BECAUSE SOVIETS HAVE SO FAR NOT PARTICIPATED
IN UN MILITARY BUDGET EXERCISE,IT IS THUS SOMEWHAT DISINGENUOUS
FOR THEM TO PUT FORWARD PARALLEL PROPOSAL,PRESUMABLY FOR
DISCUSSION IN STOCKHOLM.

3.ON OTHER HAND,FCO ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENCE DEPT OFFICIALS,
COGNIZANT OF RELUCTANCE AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL HERE TO GIVE ANY
APPEARANCE OF OBSTRUCTING ARMS CONTROL POTENTIAL,ARE ANXIOUS TO
EMPHASIZE BOTH PUBLICLY AND IN CONVERSATIONS WITH HIGH COMM

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PAGE TWO XNGR0564 CONFD

THAT WERE SOVIETS ABLE TO PROVIDE PRACTICAL SPECIFICS AND DETAILS,
BRITAIN(AND BY IMPLICATION ALLIANCE AS WHOLE)WOULD BE PREPARED TO
LOOK AT THEM SERIOUSLY.

4.IN MEANTIME,WHETHER IN WESTERN CAUCUS AT STOCKHOLM OR,BETTER,
WITHIN NATO,ALLIANCE SHOULD COME TO AGREEMENT ON COMMON LINE
WHICH IS REALISTIC IN ITS ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET PROPOSAL,BUT
NONBTHELESS INDICATES READINESS TO EXAMINE ANY REASONABLE IDEAS
WHICH COULD LEAD TO VERIFIABLE MILITARY BUDGET REDUCTIONS.

CCC/083 080954Z XNGR0564