

CSC 2195

SECRET

RETURN BY HAND TO:

FILE NUMBER: CSC 2195

CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF

Department of National Defence

JBMDS STAFF STUDIES, GENERAL

from 18 out 60
to 21 Feb 63

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CROSS REFERENCES

FILE NO.	SUBJECT

**“B.F.” — DO NOT HOLD — THIS FILE WHEN
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FILE: CSC 1558-2 (D/CJS)

Address reply to

Chairman,
Chiefs of Staff,
Ottawa

Document
Classification: **SECRET**

DATE: 21 Feb 63

Joint Staff Memorandum

SUBJECT: 106th Meeting MC/PS - 20 Feb 63

DESCRIPTION: Tel JSW 63 to CCOS dated 21 Feb 63 from CJS(W)

1. The attached document is referred to:

CCOS
CNS
CGS
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JS/DSS ✓

CJS }
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SO/LOG }

2. It is requested that action be taken by:

JS/DSS CIRCULATION			
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[Signature]
(R.L. Purves) Col
Brigadier
for Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

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**Pages 5 to / à 6
are withheld pursuant to section
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13(1)(b)

**of the Access to Information Act
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

2195

ADDRESS BY
THE HONOURABLE DOUGLAS S. HARKNESS
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
AT THE
ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE ROYAL CANADIAN ARMoured CORPS ASSOCIATION
OTTAWA, ONTARIO
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 19, 1962 - 10:00 A.M. EDT

May I say how pleased I am to be able once again to accept your kind invitation to address the members of the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps Association.

When I spoke to you in Calgary last October, a number of events of very grave and far reaching importance were occupying the thoughts of all free peoples. I referred in particular to the situation in Berlin, and the resumption of nuclear testing.

Now, twelve months later we have been hearing a good deal about events in Cuba, but this should not cause us to overlook the fact that a much more serious situation continues to exist with regard to Berlin.

You will recall the many attempts which have been made to weaken the Western position in Berlin including the Berlin blockade and the construction of the "wall". Mr. Khrushchev now says that he is about to sign a "peace treaty" with the so-called German Democratic Republic. And he says that when this happens all Western rights in Berlin will come to an end. Herr Ulbricht's government will have the right to cut off Western land and air

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access to the city.

Of course, if Mr. Khrushchev wants to sign a peace treaty with his local agents in Berlin that is his business. What we in the West cannot for one moment accept is that the signature of a so-called peace treaty between the USSR and the puppet regime in East Germany would end Western rights in Berlin. The people of Berlin have been given the most solemn assurances by all NATO governments including our own. It is to be hoped that the Soviet government understands very clearly that these assurances mean exactly what they say.

Some people may ask, why should we risk war for the sake of Berlin? The answer is that the issue is not simply Berlin. It is whether or not the Soviet Union is to dominate the continent of Europe and to impose its policies, its institutions and its ideology upon the nations of Western Europe. In the largest sense the issue is whether free nations governed by democratically elected governments can offer a sustained and effective resistance to Soviet imperialism.

The fact is that the survival of freedom and democracy depends upon the maintenance of adequate military power and, if necessary, the determination to use this power.

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This is the purpose of the system of collective defence which has been constructed in the North Atlantic Treaty area. Naturally, we hope that no such necessity will ever arise. But as Mr. Khrushchev has made clear, this hope is a reasonable one if, and only if, the nations of the West possess the necessary power and determination.

Canada, like other nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, has freely and of her own volition accepted very heavy obligations towards the common defence. We have done this because we recognize the reality of the threat and the necessity for defence. We also recognize the importance of the principle of partnership on which the collective defence of the North Atlantic Community is based. If there is to be a democratic community of free nations then the middle powers such as Canada must be willing to accept their fair share of the common burden. The details of our defence programs and activities are a matter for discussion and criticism. What should not be a matter for controversy, however, is the necessity for a common defence of the Western community of nations, or Canada's ability and duty to share in this responsibility.

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We must be resolute in our belief that war is not inevitable and that a combination of strength and patience will deter the Soviets from further aggression and persuade them to seek settlement of differences by peaceful negotiation.

In a sense, communism is the conscience of the free world. It is continually intriguing, fanning suspicion and fomenting anti-western movements. The Communists follow our every action with a critical eye in the hope of finding some propaganda advantage to be used against the democratic world. The Communists, for example, await with great expectation the coming of another disastrous depression to our highly industrialized society. They seek to aggravate by every means the differences existing between East and West, between the industrialized and the less developed areas of the world. They endeavour to capitalize on every national prejudice and try to poison every potential difference between free men.

With this knowledge we must maintain strong defences, be patient allies and good friends, and endeavour to strengthen our determination and moral purpose. We cannot hope to find ready-made solutions. Only the eradication of fear and the establishment of mutual confidence among nations will provide the basic solution.

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With this in mind, I thought it might be appropriate to once again outline for you the broad aspects of our defence policy and, in particular, to refer to our national survival program and the tasks of the Militia.

To build toward peace and maintain the free world's security requires action in every field of human enterprise. It can be done by the free nations of the world working together in close co-operation, trying to solve their difficulties, sharing their common burdens and pursuing their common goals. While this calls for diplomacy, trade and technical assistance, military co-operation is the basic requirement.

I imagine it must be pretty obvious to everyone that, in this age of nuclear submarines and intercontinental ballistic missiles, the Canadian forces alone could not protect the territorial integrity of our country. We can only attain a reasonable degree of security when we pool our resources with those of other countries of the free world.

The existence of our nation's armed forces has two objectives. First, to maintain peace by helping to prevent the outbreak of a third world war and second, through military defensive alliances, to prevent any free nation

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from falling within the communist orbit. The best way to achieve this aim is for Canada to play a full and active part in NATO, in the defence of the North American continent through NORAD, and to participate in the United Nations. To do this requires, on the part of Canada, the acceptance of a number of grave responsibilities and some serious sacrifices in money and manpower contributions.

As you can well understand, our armed forces must be prepared to participate in a variety of military actions. The utmost degree of flexibility is necessary. To this end the training, organization and equipment of the forces is directed toward the highest efficiency in participating, along with our allies, in any one of the various types of warfare in which the Western Alliance might become involved.

On occasion, criticism is levelled at the Defence Department because 70-75% of the defence budget is allocated to personnel, operating and maintenance costs, leaving what appears to be a relatively small percentage available for the acquisition of new equipment. When Canada agreed twelve years ago to build up her forces in support of NATO, we were practically unarmed. As a result, heavy expenditures for both equipment and construction had to be borne in the initial stages of the buildup with a lessening

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impact in recent years. Having selected rearmament programs involving far more complex and sophisticated equipment, there is a greater need to-day to expend funds in training increased numbers of personnel to operate and maintain this equipment. The amount allocated for equipment in recent years has been spent on completing the rearmament program and in providing for modifications or new equipment which will improve the operational capability of our major weaponry.

With advanced weapon systems and a greater number of personnel in the Services trained to operate and maintain such equipment, our contribution to the overall effectiveness of the defence forces of the Western Alliances is increased, and the likelihood of an attack occurring diminishes. However, as long as the possibility exists of such an eventuality, the government feels steps must be taken to ensure some form of national survival should all efforts fail to prevent war and a nuclear attack be made against this continent.

This leads me into that portion of my talk which deals with survival measures. I should emphasize that what we are doing in no way indicates a sense of panic or a belief in the inevitability of war. Rather, it is a course of

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action taken in recognition of the fact that the Soviet Union has the capability to initiate an attack against this continent and we have no positive guarantee that such an attack might not take place.

The Emergency Measures Organization has been made responsible for co-ordination of planning for the continuity of government in wartime, planning for the general control of communications and road transport, not only among federal departments, but with provinces and, through them, with municipalities.

Within the framework of the Emergency Measures Organization, the Civil Defence Order of 1959 charged the Minister of National Defence with the responsibility of exercising certain powers, duties and functions in connection with national survival. One particular phase of this responsibility is determining the location of a nuclear explosion, the pattern of fallout, and ensuring that the necessary warning of fallout is given to the public.

The Army was designated as the responsible agency within the Department of National Defence for the establishment and operation of the system to perform this function. As a result, the organization of the Nuclear Detonation and Fallout Reporting System was approved and is now in the process of being established across Canada.

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To fulfill the Army's assigned functions, Nuclear Detonation Reporting Posts are located in groups of at least three, surrounding each of the 16 Canadian cities that have been assumed as the most likely places where nuclear blasts might occur. Each post will have direct communication with the appropriate Provincial Warning Centre by radio with standby emergency power available. These communications probably will also be tied in with the Target Area Headquarters for the applicable city.

In addition, Fallout Reporting Posts located throughout both the populated, and some of the less populated, areas of the country are being established to determine and report fallout as it occurs in such locations. These posts will rely on existing communications, which will be tied into the most convenient system which enables the speediest transmission to the Provincial Warning Centre.

Nuclear analysis prediction and plotting staffs at the Federal Warning Centre and each of the Provincial Warning Centres are being provided by the Regular Army.

Centres will be established as necessary and operated by military personnel to monitor reports coming in from Fallout Reporting Posts. Their location will depend on the volume of traffic to be handled en route to the Provincial

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Warning Centre, the routing of communications, and the necessity for intermediate plotting.

It is readily apparent that existing military installations and communications, manpower and financial restrictions do not permit the degree of coverage and continuity necessary to fully implement the program as conceived. Full use will have to be made of all existing facilities. This means the Army, both Regular and Militia, other services, federal, provincial and municipal agencies, as well as private companies, such as railways and utilities, will be called upon to help establish the Nuclear Detonation and Fallout Reporting System.

As you are all aware, the government has found it necessary to adopt certain measures to help the Canadian economy over its temporary foreign exchange difficulties. Defence expenditures absorb a substantial percentage of the taxpayer's dollar and it is only natural that my department should be asked to do what it can to help meet this situation.

In reaching decisions on where economies can be made, every effort has been taken to minimize any adverse effect on Canada's contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the defence of the North American continent

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and the United Nations.

Some of these economies will have an effect on the Army's national survival program temporarily. As an example, it is necessary to delay construction of some of the Reporting Stations, which in turn delays the installation of certain equipments which are now being delivered. However, none of these restrictions lessens in any way the Army's responsibilities, but it does mean that the program will not be carried out as expeditiously as originally intended.

I need hardly tell you the Militia has a vital part to play in support of the national survival program. The primary role includes re-entry operations, first-aid training and decontamination. The Militia is charged with tasks such as bridge building, road clearance and rescue work. In time of an emergency they would also be asked to carry out internal security duties.

In addition, the Militia may be called upon to support and augment operations of the regular field forces. This includes the provision of a source of skilled individuals and, possibly, of replacement units should the necessity to increase existing strengths of ground forces in an emergency arise. This necessity would depend upon the

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course of operations and, to a large extent, on the degree of destruction or disorganization which has occurred.

All of these duties obviously call for as high a standard of military training as can reasonably be maintained.

I look upon a strong, well organized, well trained and well distributed Militia as being more important to our national security than ever before in our history. The Special Militia Training Courses instituted last winter could not have been undertaken if the members of the Militia across Canada had not co-operated so wholeheartedly to ensure success. Over 70,000 completed the four six-week courses and by participating in the instruction of these people, the members of the Militia helped to achieve a high standard of training within their various units. An encouraging outcome of this great effort was an overall increase of 20,000 in the strength of the Militia during the past twelve months.

Some of you may be wondering whether there has been any change in the tasks assigned to the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps units of the Regular and Reserve Army in recent months. The answer is "no".

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To-day an armoured regiment is stationed in Europe as part of Canada's commitment to NATO. A reconnaissance squadron patrols the border between Egypt and Israel, and in Canada the Corps has three regular and twenty-six Militia regiments. The knowledge and skill attained during the Second World War, and the advances made in technological know-how since then have combined to provide members of the Royal Canadian Armoured Corps, both regular and militia, with the ability to carry on in a manner befitting the high standard and tradition of the Corps.

In conclusion, may I sum up by saying that I have tried to outline briefly for you to-day the way in which Canada is endeavouring to assist in the preservation of world peace and the security of our country with specific reference to some of the new tasks assigned to the Army, both Regular and Militia, in survival operations.

The support of Associations such as yours which, over the years have shown an interest in defence matters, is of primary concern to all who are responsible for formulating defence policy. It is important that there be understanding of our defence policy by the Canadian people as a whole. Through you and other like Associations, much can be done to keep the people informed on all aspects of defence.

Address reply to

FILE: CC 1564-2 (D/CJS)

Chairman,
Chiefs of Staff,
Ottawa

Document
Classification: NATO - RESTRICTED
DATE: 26 Sep 62

Joint Staff Memorandum

SUBJECT: Internal Structure, Relationships and Procedures of
the NATO Military Authorities

DESCRIPTION: JCM-108-62 dated 19 Sep 62

1. The attached document is referred to:

CCOS	053
CHS	054
CGS	055
CAS	056
DM	057
JS/DSS	058

CJS	-	File
JPS(M)	-	"

2. It is requested that action be taken by:

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S.S. & T.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		
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R.B. Kingstone
for (R.L. Purves) Col
Brigadier
for Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

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COPY NO. 058

NORTH ATLANTIC MILITARY COMMITTEE
COMITE MILITAIRE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

MCM-108-62

19 September 1962


MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE
IN PERMANENT SESSION

SUBJECT: Internal Structure, Relationships and
Procedures of the NATO Military Authorities

1. At its meeting on 19 September, the Standing Group directed the planning team to prepare a draft paper for its consideration on return from the M CCS tour. This paper to contain the historical background to the problem and an analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of the various proposals received to date from countries in response to MCM-58-62 dated 18 April.

2. Replies are still awaited from six countries and two major commanders. Nevertheless, if any document, even a discussion paper, is to be ready in time for the M CCS in December, it is necessary to proceed with the study now.

3. As the Standing Group will subsequently wish to obtain the comments of the MCPS on this paper, those members who will be together with their Chiefs of Staff on the tour may wish to take the opportunity to discuss the subject with them.



N. S. GRANT
Captain, Royal Navy
Deputy Secretary

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MCM-108-62

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This document consists
of one page

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MAIN FILE No. CSC 2195 (JS/DSS)

T.D. No. 1

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE - OTTAWA

CONFIDENTIAL

TEMPORARY DOCKET

Joint Staff Working Paper: REDUCTIONS IN THE CANADA'S COMMITMENTS
MAJOR ALTERNATIVES

REFERRED	REMARKS	DATE OF PASS	INITIALS	DATE OF P.A.	INITIALS	DATE OF B.F.	CENTRAL REGISTRY	INSPECTED IN C.R. BY
A/CJS		15 Aug	Ans.					
CCOS		15 Aug	RGK					
CJS		4 Sep 62	P	4 Sep 62	RGK			RGK
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T.D. No.

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REFERRED TO *C/S*

FILE *2195*

CHG'D TO *TD-1*

MEMORANDUM

14 Aug 62

Chairman
Chiefs of Staff

1. This is a revised version of the Reduction in Programmes paper.
2. We have tried to concentrate on two points:
 - (a) The whole subject must be looked at with due regard to the long term consequences;
 - (b) From a purely strategic point of view basing the RCAF air division in Canada seems to make sense.
3. May we have direction, please, as to :
 - (a) Do you wish the paper circulated to COSC? or
 - (b) Do you feel that further revision is needed?

*note spoke re this
L.H. Ave*


Paul F. Peter y6

(P.F. Peter)
Group Captain

A/Director of Strategic Studies


CCOS

Spelling and typographical
errors are being corrected on
"mats".


(P.F. Peter)
Group Captain
A/Director of Strategic Studies

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CONFIDENTIAL
CSC 2195 (JS/DSS)
dated: 13 Aug 62

Joint Staff Working Paper

REDUCTIONS IN THE CANADA'S DEFENCE COMMITMENTS

MAJOR ALTERNATIVES

INTRODUCTION

1. In view of Canada's present budgetary and foreign exchange difficulties it is inevitable that consideration should be given to possible reductions in Canada's defence commitments. The purpose of this paper is to examine the implications of such reductions. The aim is to identify the major options and to discuss in general terms the probable consequences.

GENERAL APPROACH

2. This paper is concerned primarily with the possible abandonment of major commitments. Certain savings, mainly of a short term nature, could be made within existing commitments at the expense of some sacrifice in operational readiness and effectiveness. This option is not discussed in detail. However, it is believed self-evident that all feasible savings of this kind should be considered before withdrawing from major commitments.

3. Reduction in operational commitments involves a substantial number of possible options. The budgetary and financial savings would depend not only upon the option chosen but also upon the manner in which measures were implemented. The present paper does not attempt to estimate the extent of potential savings; this would require a lengthy and detailed study. For the purposes of the present study the important point is that the nature of the potential savings is not in question. These would be measurable in terms of fewer dollars in the Canadian defence budget, reduced demands for foreign exchange, and fewer men in the defence forces.

4. As against these savings, there would be certain budgetary off-sets, especially in the short term, arising out of problems of industrial and regional adjustment, reduction in employment, losses in tax revenue, accelerated retirement and other benefits to prematurely discharged personnel. However, the principal "cost" to Canada would lie in loss of prestige and bargaining power, and the consequent indirect damage to Canadian national interests. The principal disadvantage would not lie in the enhancement of the direct military threat to Canada. This is a consequence of Canada's strategic situation and the general nature of the North Atlantic security system.

5. The rationale of Canadian defence rests upon two propositions: as a North Atlantic nation, Canada is, almost regardless of her treaty obligations, a participant in the North Atlantic system of collective security; and, within this system, it is important from the point of view of distinctively Canadian interests that Canada should make some more-than-token military contribution. Withdrawal by Canada from her existing commitments would have an adverse effect upon Western security as a whole, and therefore upon Canadian security. However, the consequences to Canada herself, would be primarily political and, using the world in the broadest sense, diplomatic.

6. By reducing her military contribution to NATO Canada would tend to call into question the political and military solidarity of the alliance. In so doing Canada would tend to run afoul of two of the most sensitive issues of Western policy; the resentment of the United States that she has been forced to carry single-handedly so large a portion of the total burden of Western security, and the fears of the major European nations that the United States may some day abandon them or do a bargain with the USSR at their expense.

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7. At best, reductions in Canada's contribution to Western defence would involve serious risks to Canada's prestige and influence. At worst the consequences could be extremely far-reaching. What is at issue is Canada's international "image". Damage to this "image" has ramifications extending to such areas as the scramble for foreign investment, the competition for immigrants, commercial competition, and Canada's ability to hold skilled manpower against the attraction of the USA. These are imponderables but they are by no means unimportant; in the long run they may well prove central to Canadian national survival.

8. Unquestionably, much would depend upon the manner in which reductions were made. If it were clear that Canada was faced with compelling necessity and that all feasible alternatives had been exhausted, then Canada might reasonably count upon the understanding, and, within limits, the sympathy of her allies. If, however, Canada's allies were to believe that she had acted irresponsibly and with little regard to her international obligations and responsibilities, then they might be under considerable pressure, both domestically and internationally, to demonstrate their disapproval.

9. It is unlikely that Canada can count upon any marked sympathy from her major European allies with respect to her current budgetary and exchange difficulties. These nations are likely to be more impressed by the fact that Canada enjoys the closest approach to the American standard of living. The nature of Canada's economic difficulties is not easily translated into European terms; nor is there any great incentive to do so. Any sympathy the Europeans might otherwise feel for Canada is likely to be restrained by the belief that special consideration accorded to Canada would establish a precedent for more onerous concessions towards the United States.

10. This calls attention to the importance of imponderables and of circumstances which are, to an important degree, beyond Canada's control. It follows that the disadvantages to Canada must be regarded in the nature of risks rather than of certainties. These risks would be materially less if it were possible to produce a military rationale, or at least a plausible rationalization, for the measures adopted.

11. Whatever course of action is adopted, explanations will have to be given both to Canada's allies and to Canadian public opinion. It is not possible for Canada to employ one set of arguments to her NATO allies and an entirely different set of arguments domestically. It follows that such withdrawals involve the aims and purposes of Canadian national policy in the very broadest sense, since they concern Canada's prestige and bargaining power vis-à-vis those nations with which our national interests are most directly involved. They also involve the national consensus which is in the long run a sine qua non of an effective defence policy.

12. Reduction in Canadian defence commitments involves in essence, a balancing of tangible gains against intangible losses. Expressed in the most general terms, the latter is primarily a matter of prestige. However, damage to prestige would, beyond any reasonable doubt, also involve damage to specific Canadian interests. The nature of these interests and the extent to which they are or are not vulnerable is a matter for political judgement, and is, therefore, beyond the scope of the present paper. It is, however, appropriate to call attention to the nature of the transaction.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

13. Since reduction in Canada's defence commitments involves decisions of historic importance bearing upon Canada's position within the Western community of nations as well as the aims and purposes of Canadian policy, it is appropriate to begin with a review of Canadian defence policies since 1945. This is a more complicated story than is generally realized.

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14. In the post-war reorganization, the Canadian regular forces were re-constituted at several times their pre-war strength, though still on a cadre basis. The primary role of the regular establishment, was to furnish a mobilization base. It was judged unnecessary to provide strong peacetime forces. The philosophy of Canadian defence was therefore essentially "traditional"; a mobilization cadre and a mobilization period. The aim of the post-war reorganization was primarily to reduce the mobilization period.

15. The post-war regular forces included small operational components. The strategic mission of these forces was defined primarily in terms of a potential commitment to the UN and the defence of North America. The latter was, to some considerable degree, a "political" requirement arising from the need for Canada to participate in North American defence planning on terms of nominal equality with the United States. Although the ready components of the regular forces were stronger than those which had previously been maintained by Canada, they were still extremely small. No permanent overseas commitments were envisaged, and in this respect there was no departure from Canada's traditional policy.

16. The post-war defence establishment included what was for Canada a significant innovation, namely a capability for research and development. This was regarded as a part of the mobilization base and also as providing a basis for Canadian technical collaboration with the USA and UK. In the latter respect the primary aim was to encourage technical and operational standardization between the USA and Britain.

17. In the period 1950-53, there was a major change. The specific decisions made during this period were taken under immense pressure, and did not seem in themselves to be revolutionary. However, it is clear, at least in retrospect, that they involved a drastic change in Canada's defence philosophy.

18. The most conspicuous occurrence during this period was a roughly three-fold expansion in the regular forces and in the defence budget. By 1953, Canada had accepted specific and quite sizable operational commitments in Korea, Northwest Europe, the Western Atlantic and for the air defence of North America. These involved forces-in-being rather than mobilization potential; in strategic terms, a transference from credit to cash.

19. The post-Korean expansion had very broad implications with respect to the philosophy of Canadian defence. One very important consequence was to introduce the new principle of specialization of missions. Canada abandoned any serious attempt to maintain truly balanced forces, or to preserve a substantial range of options. With comparatively minor exceptions, Canada's defence programmes now made sense only in relation to the total capabilities of the entire NATO group of nations. The restrictive nature of this constraint became more apparent as a result of the budgetary squeeze which occurred during the period 1955-1962 and the changes in military technology and strategy which took place during the late fifties.

20. During the years 1954-1962, there was, apart from the withdrawal of Canadian forces from Korea, no major change in Canadian defence programmes and commitments. There were, however, a number of important evolutionary developments. The total effect of these developments was to reduce the importance of Canada's military role in Western defence. These developments have also, to some extent, called into question the value of Canada's defence effort and the national consensus in support of Canadian defence policies.

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THE MILITARY THREAT

21. During the period 1947-1954, the threat of Soviet military aggression appeared both real and immediate. Since Stalin's death in 1953, Soviet policy has become more flexible and apparently less menacing. The passage of time is also a consideration. As the years have passed, overt military action has seemed to many Canadians increasing unlikely.

22. However, Mr Krushchev has made it clear that Soviet policy is based upon the exploitation of power including military power. Hopes for a general détente or a comprehensive disarmament agreement have been disappointed. Soviet actions, especially with regard to Berlin, have demonstrated that although Soviet policy is not irresponsible, Soviet military power is a reality to which the West can never be indifferent. For the foreseeable future, a vital part of the Western answer must include countervailing military force.

THE BUDGETARY SQUEEZE

23. Since 1954, the Canadian defence budget, measured in dollars, has declined from approximately 2 billions to roughly 1.6 billions - a decrease of 20%. At the same time there has been a substantial increase in operating costs. The result has been a cost "squeeze". The most visible result of this squeeze is a trend towards reduction in operating forces and in the proportion of the defence dollar devoted to new equipment. The cost squeeze has tended to bring about a reduction in Canada's contribution to Western defence measured in absolute terms. In relative terms the reduction is even more marked. Whereas in 1953 defence accounted for almost 10% of Canada's GNP, in 1962 this figure is roughly 4%. During this period the defence budgets of other nations, including the USSR, have tended to increase measured in absolute terms.

24. The increase in the operating costs of the Canadian defence forces is often ascribed to Parkinson's law. In fact, the most important factor has been a general inflationary movement. Other important considerations are:

- (a) The increased operating and maintenance costs of more complex weapons systems such as the CF101 and CF 104;
- (b) Increased overheads which go with more complex equipment;
- (c) A general improvement in conditions of service in order to permit the services to retain an adequate number of highly qualified technicians.
- (c) An accumulation of minor commitments including those to the UN.

25. Since 1954, there has been a general downwards trend in operational forces. For example, the army has disbanded one complete brigade and has nearly eliminated its divisional units. The RCAF fighter force has been reduced from nine squadrons of 25 aircraft (total 225) to five squadrons of twelve aircraft (total 60). The RCAF air division is in process of further reduction from its original strength of twelve squadrons of 25 aircraft (total 300) to eight squadrons of 18 aircraft (total 144). Banshee fighters of the RCN are now being eliminated from the operational inventory without replacement.

DEVELOPMENTS IN MILITARY TECHNOLOGY AND STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

26. During the period 1954-1960, developments in military technology and in strategic doctrine tended, on the whole, to reduce the strategic significance of Canada's geography and of Canada's military contribution to NATO. This tendency has been reinforced by the diminishing trend of the Canadian defence budget and, even more strongly, by European recovery which has tended to shift the balance between Europe and North America in favour of the Europeans.

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27. However, these trends have not operated altogether uniformly or consistently, and they are, to some extent, being reversed. Under the Kennedy administration there is a new emphasis upon a "wider liberty of choice", and the largely novel strategic concept has been adopted of "controlled nuclear response". These developments reflect the political and military necessities imposed by the approach of the USSR towards nuclear parity. There is no reason to think that they are temporary or ephemeral.

NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE

28. During the fifties, there was, under the influence of the "New Look", a steady trend towards increased reliance for the defence of Europe upon the long-range nuclear capability of the US Strategic Air Command. This trend was somewhat camouflaged by increased attention to limited war and especially to limited atomic war. A point not widely appreciated was that reliance upon the ability to fight a tactical atomic war in Western Europe was, to a large extent, a means of transferring the burden of European defence to the North American continent and especially to the strike-second capability of SAC. In these circumstances, and especially in view of the increasing Soviet capability for bomber attack on North America, Canada's contribution to North American air defence was of vital importance to the defence of the entire NATO area.

29. With the appearance of the Sputniks and the impending build-up of the Soviet ICBM force it was widely believed that defence against bombers would cease to have any particular relevance, since Soviet ICBMs could easily circumvent the bomber defences in order to destroy North American cities and airfields. This view was very generally accepted in 1959. Since then it has become clear that the Soviet bomber force will remain an important component of the total Soviet threat to North America for many years to come. This is especially true of the Soviet first-strike threat, that is the Soviet threat which the USA tends to attract upon itself in consequence of its commitment to the defence of the European members of NATO. Thus the Canadian contribution to North American air defence will remain, as it has been in the past, an important contribution to the security of the entire NATO area.

30. The significance of defence against the bomber may tend to increase somewhat during the next few years. A significant point will be reached when the USSR acquires enough missiles to be reasonably sure of destroying all or nearly all SAC bomber bases in an initial strike, since at this point the next item on the agenda from the Soviet point of view will be the destruction of the North American based missile force and the US national command system. For this purpose, the primary weapon is likely to be the Soviet bomber force, owing to the fact that weight of attack and accuracy are necessary which are probably not economically achievable using ICBMs. To deny the USSR such a capability will probably not require a build-up of North American air defences, but it will be necessary to maintain a level of defence sufficient to deny to Soviet bombers anything approaching a free ride.

THEATRE FORCES IN EUROPE

31. In the early fifties the Canadian air division and the Canadian brigade (which, it was expected, might be increased to a division) represented a significant portion of the total military forces available on the central front. Having regard to the operational efficiency of the forces available, Canada's military contribution compared favourably with those of Britain and France. During the later fifties the relative significance of Canada's military contribution tended to decline. A major factor was the increasing strength and efficiency of European forces and especially the progress of West German rearmament. Changes in military technology also played a part; in particular, the diminished value of fighter defences in Europe and the increasing obsolescence of the equipment of the Canadian air division.

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32. However, the most important consideration was the increasing nuclearization of NATO strategy. As already pointed out, the effect of this development was to transfer the military burden of European defence from theatre forces under SACEUR to the North American based strategic deterrent. The role of US forces in Europe was, to some very considerable extent, to provide tangible proof of the United States commitment, or, putting it frankly, to serve as hostages. The presence of Canadian forces was important as evidence of a political commitment, and in blunting the Soviet political offensive aimed at the removal of US forces from Europe. In view of the increasing emphasis upon short-war concepts by SACEUR the movement of the remainder of Canada's infantry division to Europe seemed increasingly unrealistic and improbable.

33. Since Soviet pressures upon NATO are primarily political, the political solidarity of NATO is at least as important as its military effectiveness. It is also true that in an alliance of democratic nations there are only a few ways in which political solidarity can be displayed and demonstrated. Of these, collective defence is by all odds the most convincing. It does not, therefore, denigrate the importance of Canada's military contribution to NATO during the late fifties to say that our military forces in Europe were more important from a political point of view than in terms of their military effectiveness.

34. A new emphasis upon "a wider freedom of choice" tends to alter the situation. Collective defence continues to be important as evidence of political commitment and intent. However, within the concept of collective defence, the actual operational capabilities of the forces available to SACEUR are tending to become more significant. This is true of the Canadian forces in Europe, although it is fair to add that these forces are not likely again to be as significant from a military point of view as they were in the period 1951-1955.

DEFENCE OF NORTH ATLANTIC SEA COMMUNICATIONS

35. A similar evolution has taken place with respect to the defence of North Atlantic sea communications. In the early days of NATO the strategy of the alliance was based upon two major requirements. The first was a land/air defence of Western Europe which would deny the USSR the ability to overrun Western Europe. A bridgehead on the European continent must be held until US strategic airpower could be brought into play. However, it is not expected that US strategic airpower could do more than destroy the impetus of the Soviet attack. A successful outcome was believed to depend, as it did in the Second World war, upon bringing to bear the manpower and industrial capacity of the North American continent. The second vital requirement was, therefore, the defence of North Atlantic sea communications against the increasing Soviet submarine threat.

36. In essence, the military policy of NATO was a somewhat modified version of the strategy employed by the Western nations in the Second World War. It was recognized that the war could be lost in two ways; by the loss of Western Europe and by the cutting of communications between Europe and North America. The defence of North Atlantic sea-lanes was therefore a vital military task no less important than the land defence of Western Europe.

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37. In the middle fifties, the increasing nuclearization of NATO strategy tended to transfer the burden of European defence to the North American - based strategic deterrent force. The same could be said of the defence of North Atlantic sea communications, and, in fact, the strategic rationale of SACLANT's mission became increasingly questionable. As SACEUR's operational concept became one of short war involving the large-scale use of nuclear weapons, the necessity, and even the value, of the direct defence of North Atlantic sea communications was placed in doubt. An all-out Soviet submarine offensive in the North Atlantic would have represented, beyond any question, an attempt to sever the jugular vein of the North Atlantic community. In the circumstances of the middle and late fifties such an action on the part of the USSR would have invited not only nuclear retaliation upon Soviet submarine bases but a complete first-strike by the US Strategic Air Command. A more limited submarine offensive in the Atlantic would, from the Soviet point of view, have involved very great risks without offering the prospect of decisive results. One could, therefore, without great difficulty reach the conclusion that the direct defence of North Atlantic sea communications had ceased to make any particular sense.

38. Again, however, the trend towards reduced reliance upon nuclear weapons tends to call this line of reasoning into question. It is no longer very clear that a Soviet submarine offensive in the North Atlantic would invite an immediate nuclear response. Although an all-out Soviet submarine offensive might well, from the Soviet point of view, involve unacceptable risks this is not necessarily true of a more limited operation in a particular geographical area. This point gains further relevance if one assumes, as it seems increasingly necessary to do, that considerable military operations could take place in the NATO area without the use of nuclear weapons. Such operations, by making evident Western reluctance to employ nuclear weapons, would tend to diminish Soviet inhibitions upon the employment of its submarine force.

39. Defence of North America against Soviet missile-launching submarines is a special case which is too complicated to discuss in the present paper. It can be said that at present the strategic necessity for such defence is open to question. However, it must be added that the new US policy of controlled nuclear response tends to increase the strategic value of such defence and to render it technically and economically more feasible. The necessity for large scale expenditures upon such defences has yet to be demonstrated, but one cannot assume that such defences will not become necessary.

TECHNOLOGICAL AND STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS - SUMMARY

40. During the middle and late fifties, the general trend in military technology and in strategic concepts seemed likely to diminish, almost to the vanishing point, the significance of Canadian geography and the purely military significance of Canadian forces in Europe. The new emphasis upon "a wider liberty of choice" and "controlled nuclear response" represents at least a partial reversal of this trend. The reason, to a large extent, boils down to the fact that "a wider liberty of choice" for the West provides also "a wider liberty of choice" to the Soviet Union. Thus the agenda of plausible military contingencies have been expanded and the range of necessary Western capabilities has increased. This is the price of diminished reliance upon nuclear weapons, and, one may hope, of a more flexible Western policy.

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

41. During the early fifties two major military systems of Canadian design were brought into operation - the CF 100 and the mid-Canada line.

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However the success of the CF 100 was followed by the fiasco of the Arrow. From this it was concluded that the costs of development of major weapons systems have risen so sharply that they are beyond Canada's capacity. In fact the lesson of the Arrow has been somewhat overdrawn. The Arrow was a special case - an immensely complex weapons system and one which was also super-specialized. In the case of less complex weapons and equipment Canada has enjoyed some notable successes. Nevertheless, the Arrow, has served to make clear the very great costs as well as the risks of major development. The experience of the Arrow has dramatized the fact that Canada can continue to equip her forces with modern equipment only in terms of partnership and collaboration with her larger allies.

42. Standardization, which might have provided a partial solution to this problem, has not, in fact, done so. It has been possible to achieve a remarkably free exchange of the results of applied research as between Britain, Canada and the USA, and, to a lesser extent, within NATO. However, in the field of equipment design, successes have been few and, often enough, illusory. The high-water mark of NATO standardization was the adoption of the so-called NATO standard round. Yet, at present, only about 15% of NATO small arms weapons employ this ammunition.

43. In 1959, following the cancellation of the Arrow, Canada embarked upon the policy of production - sharing with the United States. This has been extended to development-sharing and research-sharing. The corollary is that in future Canada must look to the United States for the procurement of major equipment. It is to be hoped that purchases from the United States will be balanced by sales to the United States. However, it must be admitted that these developments place a significant limitation upon Canada's freedom of choice. It is probable that with the further development of the Common Market and the pursuit of a European military equipment programmes Canada will be tied even more closely to the United States. As a result, Canadian forces will be operationally and logistically compatible with those of the United States, but joint operations with European nations, including Britain, are likely to involve formidable difficulties, especially in the field of logistics.

ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL CAPACITY

44. At the present time Canada is devoting roughly 4% of GNP to defence. This compares with 10% in the USA and about 7% in Britain. To this extent the burden of defence in Canada is not especially severe. There is little doubt that the share of national resources directed to defence could be increased, and would be increased if important national interests were believed to be at stake. Canada's current budgetary problems cannot be ignored. However, it is fair to say that the budgetary situation is not in itself compelling. It does not dictate a decrease in the Canadian defence budget, and, if the need were clear, it would not prevent an increase.

45. During the early fifties an important constraint upon Canadian defence commitments was the ability to recruit by voluntary means a sufficient number of men of appropriate age and medical category. In recent years this problem has become less severe owing to the increase in population, the improvement in conditions of service, the accumulation of a cadre of career personnel and, at times, the existence of unemployment. Except in the case of certain technical specialists recruiting is not likely to represent within the foreseeable future a serious limitation upon Canada's defence activities.

46. A new constraint is now being imposed by Canada's foreign exchange problems. During the recent past this constraint has not been acutely felt owing to the continued flow of investment funds into Canada from the United States. Recent events have shown that a foreign exchange balance based upon this resource is at best precarious. It might therefore be concluded that

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military activities which place a continued drain upon Canada's balance of payments position must be eliminated unless it is possible to arrange for compensating off-sets.

47. So far as the United States is concerned, available evidence suggests that Canada has broken even or, perhaps, better than broken even on military account. During the early and middle fifties the United States tended to gain heavily on equipment purchases, but this was off-set by US construction in Canada (especially the DEW Line) and by expenditures of US personnel stationed in Canada. In recent years the latter have declined, but US military equipment purchases have tended to increase. The US has given a general assurance that transactions on military account between the two countries will remain in balance. So far this promise has been kept.

48. With respect to Europe, the reduction of Canada's adverse balance of payments on military account is likely to be a valid and necessary preoccupation of Canadian policy. It is worth noticing that Canada's total payments with Western Europe are roughly in balance. This could be advanced as an argument that there is no compulsion on Canada's part to withdraw her forces from Europe. It would, very probably, be advanced by the European nations as an argument against the need for special concessions to Canada, and more particularly so since the US balance of payments with Europe is unfavourable owing largely to military expenditures.

49. Assuming that Canada's current exchange difficulties may not be susceptible to quick solutions, it appears that one must draw the following conclusions:

- (a) The balancing of Canada's international payments on military account must be a major aim of Canadian policy;
- (b) Experience has shown that, a tolerable balance can be secured vis-a-vis the United States;
- (c) There is little likelihood that such a balance can be achieved with respect to Western Europe short of the withdrawal of Canadian forces from Europe.

50. Canada's balance of payments problems are probably not in themselves a compelling reason for withdrawal of Canadian forces from Europe. It seems probable, however, that the maintenance of forces in Europe can be justified only in terms of very clear military necessity and the direct involvement of Canadian national interests.

REDUCTION IN COMMITMENTS- MAJOR OPTIONS

51. In considering possible reductions in Canada's defence commitments there are four major functional areas which require examination:

Option 1. Forces allocated to North American Defence.

- (a) RCAF Bombers and Fighters;
- (b) RCAF radars;
- (c) West Coast Maritime Forces;
- (d) East Coast Maritime Forces (SACLANT).

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Option 2. Forces Stationed in Europe

- (a) Withdrawal of army brigade and/or RCAF air division with disbandment of forces;
- (b) Withdrawal of army brigade and/or RCAF air division without disbandment.

Option 3. Forces in Canada earmarked for SACEUR

- (a) Disbandment in whole or part of three brigade groups and divisional headquarters units stationed in Canada.

Option 4. National Survival

- (a) Reduction or disbandment of Militia units, disbandment of target area headquarters.

It is convenient to consider these Options in reverse order beginning with Option 4.

OPTION 4 - NATIONAL SURVIVAL

52. Since this is the only Canadian military commitment which can be reduced without bringing into question Canada's external commitments, a prima facie case exists that it should be the first candidate.

53. In favour of such reductions it can be said that the value of present armed forces activities directly chargeable to National Survival is in some cases open to considerable doubt. On the other side of the question it must be noted that disbandment of reserve units would be likely to involve substantial domestic political complications. In view of the public attention which has been given to National Survival it is also questionable if a reduction in armed forces programmes is possible short of a reformulation of the national policy. At very least this would require considerable time. It also seems evident that there can be no serious question of reduction in DND responsibilities for National Survival.

54. It is concluded that there is a prima facie case in favour of a review of DND programmes and activities chargeable to National Survival and that this should be done before reducing Canada's external commitments. It is not clear that any very substantial savings can be made. The latter question would require detailed investigation.

OPTION 3 - FORCES IN CANADA EARMARKED FOR SACEUR

55. The principal arguments in favour of this course are:

- (a) It is unlikely that the remainder of the division and its equipment could be moved to Europe following the outbreak of war;
- (b) Even if it could be moved to Europe, one division would be a distinctly marginal increment to the forces available to SACEUR;
- (c) Existing equipment holdings are insufficient to equip a division for war against a first-class enemy.

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56. On the other side of the question it should be said:

- (a) It is no longer implausible, at least from a military point of view, that the remainder of the Canadian infantry division might be moved to Europe during a period of acute tension such as a more severe Berlin Crisis.
- (b) Any significant reduction in the army's field force units would tend to reduce the army to a pure cadre basis. This is a more serious consideration than in 1947, since there was then a large reserve of trained manpower of military age and category.
- (c) Reduction in the army's field forces would tend to reduce Canada's ability to respond to UN and similar tasks including domestic emergencies;
- (d) For general political reasons it is desirable to maintain some regular troops across the whole of Canada. In this respect the Canadian army is already stretched very thin.
- (e) A major reduction of army field force units in Canada would make it extremely difficult to carry out rotation of the brigade group in Germany.

57. In terms of the rationale which has been applied to Canadian defence activities during the past eight years the army in Canada is a logical candidate for reduction. This would involve drawing back from a NATO commitment, but it might be said this commitment has become, in practical terms, somewhat fictional. On the other hand, the army in Canada, like the RCAF air transport force, is an ace in the hole. It offers the Canadian government the means of responding to unforeseen and unforeseeable events..

58. It is concluded that a high priority should be attached to the retention of the field units of the regular army in Canada. In the event that savings are judged to be essential, these should be achieved by restricting establishments rather than by disbanding units, since the former would retain the option of building up again to full strength in the shortest possible period of time.

OPTION 2- FORCES STATION IN EUROPE

59. In the case of the forces in Europe there are two major options involving substantially different considerations:

- (a) Withdrawal and disbandment of forces; and
- (b) Withdrawal of forces to North America in the expectation that these forces could be returned in case of necessity.

In the latter case the principal saving would be in reduced demands for foreign exchange. Savings in operating costs might or might not be achieved depending upon the nature of the arrangements for the prompt return of these forces.

60. On general political grounds, Canada must be reluctant to call into question the political and military solidarity of NATO. It would be particularly unfortunate if Canada were to be charged with responsibility for initiating a general movement in this direction. There is also the larger question of Canada's future role within the North Atlantic community. In this respect a number of somewhat contradictory considerations are involved:

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- (a) Canada's major interests lie within the North Atlantic group of nations. This is the result of Canada's geographical location and the nature of her major interests. These are more fundamental considerations than Canada's obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty;
- (b) The future pattern of relations within the North Atlantic community is likely to take the form of a dialogue between the nations of Western Europe and the United States. Regardless of the outcome of the Common Market negotiations, it is likely that Britain will lean increasingly towards Europe, and Canada will, of necessity, lean towards the United States;
- (c) From every point of view it is important that Canada should participate in the trans-Atlantic dialogue in her own right;
- (d) It is not possible for a nation of Canada's size and potential strength to pursue an Icelandic-style policy of a political presence without responsibilities.

61. Withdrawal from Europe raises two questions. The first is whether or not there is a compelling military case for the continued stationing of Canadian forces in Europe. In view of the relative population and industrial capacity of Canada and the major nations of Western Europe it seems obvious that the answer to this question is no. The second question is whether or not there are at stake considerations of Canadian national interest which would justify continued Canadian participation in the European system of collective defence; or, to be more specific, which would render it inadvisable for Canada to withdraw from such participation other than in step with the Americans.

62. It is obvious that the latter question involves a complex series of political judgements. Perhaps the clearest statement which can be made is that Canada would not wish to incur the charge of acting irresponsibly. In this respect a good deal of sting could be taken out of the issue if it were possible to define a role within the European strategy of NATO for Canadian forces normally based in Canada. The discussion which follows is addressed primarily to this specific question.

THE RCAF AIR DIVISION

63. The original mission of the Canadian air division in Europe was air defence. With the passage of time the aircraft became obsolete, but, even more important, the mission itself became obsolescent. As a result the air division is now being converted to the nuclear strike-reconnaissance mission.

64. In view of the vulnerability of NATO airfields, not only to nuclear attack but to surprise attack with high explosive weapons, there is a strong and even a compelling case for basing a substantial part of NATO tactical air forces in North America under normal circumstances. In case of necessity aircraft could be ferried across the Atlantic. A very strong argument can be made, therefore, that the basing of the greater part of RCAF air division in Canada is not only possible but strategically advisable.

65. A relevant consideration is that the new emphasis upon "a wider range of choice" implies an increased requirement for general purpose tactical aircraft equipped primarily for the employment of high explosive weapons. It would seem that Canada is particularly well placed to contribute in this way and in the long run this should be Canada's principal contribution to the defence of Western Europe. With respect to the immediate future, it is necessary to recognize that Canada has accepted specific commitments with regard to the strike-reconnaissance mission and that the CF 104 is a highly specialized aircraft.

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66. It is concluded that careful consideration should be given to the possibility of basing the RCAF air division in Canada. It must be said that this would involve substantial operational, technical and logistic problems which would require detailed examination. Pending the results of such examination it cannot be said that this course is feasible. However, in terms of general strategic considerations, this course seems to be not only feasible but also advantageous.

THE BRIGADE GROUP IN GERMANY

67. It is obvious that one brigade group (or even one division) is not a large contribution to the strength of forces on the Central Front. It is inherently uneconomical to station North American forces in Europe and this is most particularly true in terms of a force as small as a brigade group. From a purely military point of view, there is, therefore, no compelling argument for the continued stationing of Canadian soldiers in Europe. On ground of general economy there is a presumptive case that Canada's military contribution to NATO should be made in some other area.

68. With regard to the possible withdrawal of the brigade group, three points should be noted. The first is that from a psychological point of view a contribution in ground forces is likely to outweigh any other in the eyes of the Europeans. This arises from the primacy of armies in European military history, and the fact that armies are regarded as representative of the national will and purpose in a way which navies and air forces are not.

69. The second point is that withdrawal of the Canadian brigade could easily trigger off a serious question with regard to the command and deployment of Northern Army Group. As matters stand, the British claim to the command of Northern Army Group is vulnerable, since the Germans are supplying more troops. From the German point of view, the weakness of Northern Army Group is a matter for national concern. In the event of anything approaching a military showdown over Berlin it would be a serious military weakness. It is very doubtful if consideration of this question can be postponed indefinitely. However, from a strictly Canadian point of view, it would be desirable that Canada should not be charged with responsibility for exploding the mine.

70. Finally, the withdrawal of the Canadian brigade from Northern Army Group would from the British point of view involve a weakening and drawing back from the historic Commonwealth tie. This could have a considerable impact upon British public opinion. It might be particularly inopportune if this question were to come to the fore during the period of Britain's negotiations with the Common Market.

71. A number of measures are available ^{which} with would serve to take some of the sting out of these issues. In order to preserve the political and psychological advantage of a commitment of army forces without incurring the necessity of stationing Canadian forces in Europe, Canada could undertake to contribute troops to SACEUR's strategic reserve. It can be said the operational and strategic value of this reserve is not in question, and will be further increased under the new policy of "flexible response". There is also no great disadvantage in stationing a part of this reserve in North America provided airlift could be made available in an emergency.

72. The smallest force capable of maintaining a distinctively Canadian identity would be a battalion group. However, this would be somewhat precarious and a brigade group would be a more viable force. Such a force might be an airborne brigade, and it is worth noting that a wholly regular army is better placed to produce forces of this kind than most European armies. Components of this force could be air-lifted to Europe for participation in NATO exercises. It is possible that by participating in the NATO strategic reserve Canada's claims to political and military consultation would be strengthened rather than reduced.

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73. Nevertheless, in the circumstances which actually prevail within NATO it is doubtful if Canada's allies would regard the withdrawal of the Canadian brigade group in any light except that of unilateral disengagement. Although a sound strategic case can be made for Canada's participation in a NATO strategic reserve part of which would normally be based in North America, it seems unlikely that this argument could be made to carry conviction to Canada's European allies.

74. In this respect, one must bear in mind that President Kennedy's policy of "a wider range of choice" is not accepted by several of the major NATO nations. This policy will remain an aspiration unless and until the major European nations can be persuaded to increase the strength and efficiency of the forces contributed to SACEUR. For Canada to raise the question of the withdrawal of the Canadian brigade group during the period of the present policy debate within NATO seems clearly inopportune. The European members of the alliance would tend to regard this as confirmation of their suspicion that the current US initiative is a preliminary to US disengagement- although the Americans may deceive themselves on this point. From the US point of view Canada's action would at very least appear untimely.

75. It is concluded that from a strictly military point of view, a plausible case can be made for the withdrawal of the Canadian brigade group from Europe and its allocation to a NATO strategic reserve. On more general grounds it is considered that the attempt to pursue this course would involve excessive risks to Canada's influence and prestige. This would also conflict with any proposal advanced with regard to the air division. In the longer term the transference of the Canadian brigade group from Northern Army Group to the NATO strategic reserve may become feasible. However, it is considered that this should be deferred until circumstances are more favourable.

OPTION 1 - FORCES ALLOCATED TO NORTH AMERICAN DEFENCE

76. Reduction in forces allocated to North American defence concerns mainly Canada's relationship with the United States. The guarantee of the North Atlantic Treaty includes North America. It is also true that North American defence bears directly upon the defence of NATO Europe. However, it is also obvious that North American defence is of primary concern to the United States and Canada. In considering Canada's role in North American defence it is necessary to take into account more specific Canadian interests and a longer time scale than in the case of NATO. It may be debatable if Canada should be in Europe, but there can be no question as to whether or not Canada will remain part of North America.

OPTION 1 (c) - EAST COAST MARITIME FORCES

77. Maritime forces on the East Coast are allocated to SACLANT and thus fall within the NATO rubric. From Canada's point of view the fundamental consideration is that Canada has a continuing interest in the North Atlantic and is bound to maintain a naval establishment on the East Coast. For the reasons already discussed it is evident that defence of Atlantic communications against submarines will be a matter for continuing concern. If Canada were not prepared to assume responsibility for defence of the Canadian Atlantic sub-area this responsibility would necessarily be assumed by the United States, and it would be difficult for Canada to refuse a US request for further naval and air bases on Canada's Atlantic coast.

OPTION 1 (d) - WEST COAST MARITIME FORCES

78. The strategic rationale for West Coast Maritime forces is not as clear as in the case of the East Coast. It may be pointed out, however, that Canada is a Pacific power, and in terms of long term national interests the maintenance of a naval establishment on Pacific Coast is a national necessity.

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Disbandment of the naval establishment on the West Coast would tend to weaken the bonds of national unity and might have very far-reaching consequences.

OPTION 1 (a) - RCAF Fighters and/or Bomarcs

79. As long as RCAF fighters are not equipped with nuclear warheads their contribution to the kill-potential of the North American air defence system is small and that of the Canadian-based Bomarcs is nil. It could therefore be argued that this particular commitment could be abandoned with comparatively little disadvantage to Western security. This course might appear particularly palatable as an apparent solution to the problem of nuclear weapons.

80. However the vital point is that the issue cannot, in terms of essential Canadian interests, be formulated in this way. For the reasons already discussed North American defences against manned bombers will continue to be an important requirement of Western security for as far ahead as can be foreseen. The issue is whether or not Canada must recognize a responsibility for the control of her own airspace. If she did not, it would be extremely difficult for Canada to refuse a US request to station US fighters on Canadian bases.

81. Canada's present contribution to North American air defence is close to the minimum which permits Canada to maintain an effective claim to the exercise of sovereignty in Canadian airspace. In fact, it can easily be argued that as long as Canadian air defence forces are not equipped with nuclear weapons the strength of Canadian air defence forces is less than the minimum required for the safeguarding of essential Canadian interests vis-a-vis the United States, and that at present Canada is trading primarily upon past performance and the promise of future performance.

82. It is concluded that reductions in Canada's contribution to North American air defence should not be considered. For Canada to renounce the right and obligation to control her own airspace would involve giving very large hostages to fortune. The long term consequences are uncertain. The important point is that the risks cannot be justified if there is a feasible alternative.

OPTION 1 (b) RCAF Radars

83. Disbandment of the active air defence components of the RCAF would represent a significant loss to North American security, but this could probably be made good either by the stationing of US forces in Canada or by the expansion and redeployment of US active air defences. Disbandment of the Canadian radar systems is an entirely different matter. If carried out unilaterally by Canada, this would from the point of view of the USA amount almost to an unfriendly act and would invite the maximum pressure of which the USA is capable short of the use of force.

84. It is therefore concluded that no serious consideration can be given to the disbandment of the Canadian radar systems. It may, however, be possible to consider reductions in manning standards and disbandment of one or two marginal radars. These would come in the category of economies within existing operational commitments.

OPTION 1 - NORTH AMERICAN DEFENCE

85. It is concluded that Canada cannot withdraw from any existing commitment to North American defence. This is a matter of vital long-term interests bearing upon Canada's future relations with the United States. It is not simply a matter of honouring Canada's obligations and commitments to NATO and to North American defence.

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CONCLUSIONS

86. The major conclusion which emerges from the present paper is that withdrawal from existing Canadian defence commitments involves questions relating to Canada's most vital national interests and the aims and purposes of Canadian policy. The matter should be approached in full awareness of this fact.

87. There is a "natural" hierarchy with regard to the order in which measures should be considered:

Priority 1. Measures not involving reduction in operational commitments. In terms of the larger aims of Canadian policy, this should not only be done but should be seen to be done before there is any question of withdrawing from or modifying operational commitments.

Priority 2. National Survival Operations. This is primarily a matter of rationalising existing activities since there can be no question of withdrawal from major responsibilities.

Priority 3. Return to Canada of Canadian forces in Europe. For the reasons discussed in the paper this need not necessarily mean the cessation of Canadian participation in the European system of collective defence.

Priority 4. Reduction in army field force units stationed in Canada.

It is concluded that there can be no serious question of withdrawing from any existing commitment to North American defence.

88. With regard to the withdrawal of Canadian forces from Europe, it is considered that first priority should be given to the basing of the greater part of the RCAF air division in Canada. However, before proceeding with this proposal, operational, technical and logistic feasibility would need to be carefully considered.

89. In the longer term it may be feasible to withdraw the Canadian brigade group in Germany from Northern Army Group into NATO strategic reserve and to base the brigade in Canada. For the present this proposal seems to be inopportune in view of the major policy debate which is underway within NATO.

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CSC 2189

AUG 1 1982

Deputy Minister,
Department of National Defence,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Responsibility for Military
Research and Development

I am attaching a memorandum prepared by my staff concerning the Draft Report on military research and development prepared for the Glasco Commission. As you are no doubt aware the principal recommendation of this report is that responsibility for development as well as for research should be assumed by DRB.

I understand that very detailed criticisms of the draft report were prepared by the armed services, and were submitted to the Glasco Commission after discussion by the PSOC. Less detailed and much milder comments were submitted separately by DRB. In neither case did the comments address themselves to the principal point at issue, namely whether or not DRB should assume responsibility for development as well as for research. However, it seems clear that the armed forces are strongly opposed (and by implication in favour of the present division of responsibilities) whereas DRB is in favour.

The two important points it seems to me are these: firstly, this question has been raised and is likely to be raised again, and, secondly, the Department as a whole has no considered position and would probably have some difficulty in establishing one. As long as the latter is the case the issue represents a potential embarrassment to the department.

As you will see, my staff have recommended the formation of an ad hoc inter-service committee reporting to the Chiefs of Staff with the object of thrashing out a departmental position. It seems to me that this idea has a certain amount of merit. However, I believe that if such an exercise were to be useful it would be necessary for the Committee to concentrate upon the question of organizational responsibility, and to avoid, in so far as possible, questions of general philosophy. In order to achieve this I would envisage the committee being provided with guidance along the following lines:

- (a) The armed services will retain responsibility for "design authority";
 - (b) The career prospects of service technical officers must not be impaired;
 - (c) The policies of production - sharing, development - sharing, and research - sharing will be continued, and DND must give to these policies the maximum possible support.
- 8)

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

My Staff have recommended that such a committee should have a "neutral" chairman which means that the chairman would have to come from the Deputy Minister's side of the house. I think that this is probably correct. Consequently, if we were to proceed with this proposal the direction of the enterprise would make considerable demands upon the time of a senior officer of your staff.

I am not committed to this idea but I can see advantages in it. I have no strong views on the proper division of responsibility for research and development but I think it is inadvisable that the department should go on attempting to beg the question as we seem to have done in our comments to the Glassco Commission. If at all possible I believe we should try to hammer out some agreed position within the department.

I would invite you to give this problem some thought. If the ad hoc committee seems to you to have merit we could perhaps raise the matter jointly in the Chiefs of Staff. Perhaps you can think of some more attractive course of action. The important point, I believe, is that we are faced with a real issue, which we cannot brush aside indefinitely.

Original signed by
F.R. Miller
(F.R. Miller)
Air Chief Marshal
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

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RESTRICTED
(Enclosure SECRET) *pp 2195*



JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

CSC 2181-1 (JIC)

5 July, 1962.

Ottawa, Ontario

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIC:

STRATEGIC WEAPONS SURVEY

Enclosure: (1) Letter from the Acting Director
of Strategic Studies (CSC 2195
JS/DSS) of 26 Jun 62

The Acting Chairman has directed that the item at
enclosure (1) be circulated to all members.

2. This subject will be considered at the meeting of the
Committee on 18 July, 1962.

E. A. Cureton
(E.A. Cureton)
Acting Secretary

Enc.

EAC/2-5459/1c

cc: CJS
JIS (2)
SOJIR
SOCI
→ JS/DSS

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C O P Y

SECRET

CSC 2195 (JS/DSS)

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

JOINT STAFF

26 Jun 62

Chairman,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

Strategic Weapons Survey

1. In November 1959 the then Joint Ballistic Missile Defence Staff submitted a report to the Chiefs of Staff Committee entitled "An Initial Survey of the Ballistic Missile Problem". This report contained a reasonably comprehensive appreciation of the technical, military and strategic aspects of this problem as of November 1959. Particular attention was given to the implications from the Canadian point of view.

2. The Directorate of Strategic Studies, which is the successor to JBMDS, has now been instructed to carry out an updating of the November 1959 paper to be completed for presentation to the Chiefs of Staff in the early part of November. It is already clear that the problem of defence against the ballistic missile has "merged" with more general questions concerning strategic weapons and advanced technology. Consequently the new study will of necessity involve a reasonably comprehensive assessment of the entire field of strategic weapons.

3. The study will involve two periods:

(a) the mid-term, 1967-1972;

(b) the long term, after 1972;

on main
on the basis that the problems of principal concern to the CSC are long term rather than short term.

4. Although a great deal of relevant information is available in CANUS and other readily accessible documents, there are certain specific questions with regard to which it seems appropriate to invite the views of the JIC. These are:

- (a) the demise of the missile gap. The JIC might care to express an opinion from the intelligence point of view as to how the missile gap came into existence, to what extent it was incorporated in current intelligence, and what factors have now led to its disappearance. In raising this question I have in mind the fact that the missile gap is almost certain to figure in discussions by the CSC and it would be desirable to have available the considered views of the Canadian intelligence community. It would also be useful to have an up to date catalogue of Soviet ICBM characteristics;

- 2 -

SECRET

- (b) an appreciation of Soviet progress in the field of ABM defence. It would be desirable to include the following:
 - (i) what is known or surmised with regard to the Soviet terminal systems;
 - (ii) any inferences which can be drawn from the recent series of Soviet nuclear tests;
 - (iii) anything that is known concerning the Soviet interest in "exotic" systems such as particle-beams or defensive satellites;
- (c) changes in Soviet strategic doctrine and policy over the past two years. I have in mind an assessment of the statements of Soviet leaders in the light of what is known of Soviet military programmes and activities;
- (d) probable Chinese progress in the field of nuclear weapons and strategic delivery systems. I have in mind the argument, which is sometimes advanced, that within the time-frame 1965-75 the threat of attack by Red China has a bearing upon the US decision to procure NIKE ZEUS. It would be useful to know whether or not the JIC consider the potential threat from Red China has any relevance;
- (e) what is known concerning Soviet interests and programmes in the field of military satellites. I have in mind the following:
 - (i) offensive weapons carriers;
 - (ii) defensive weapons carriers;
 - (iii) strategic reconnaissance;
 - (iv) communications;
 - (v) missile warning;
- (f) The JIC appreciation of the Soviet capability for the production of strategic weapons, with emphasis upon missiles and anti-missile systems, and the constraints which are likely to operate upon the USSR with regard to the utilization of this productive capacity;
- (g) whatever evidence is available with regard to Soviet programmes directed towards the development of a capability for satellite interception and destruction;
- (h) an assessment of Soviet Civil Defence programmes and activities including the inferences which may be drawn with regard to Soviet strategic policy;
- (j) the pros and cons of POLARIS type strategic weapons systems.

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5. It is realized that in some cases the evidence available in Canada may be scant. If so, it is considered that a clear statement to this effect would be useful to JS/DSS and the Chiefs of Staff as delineating an area of genuine uncertainty. For the purposes of this particular study a clear statement that no relevant information is available would be more useful than an extrapolation made without supporting evidence from US programmes. We intend to point out, so far as we are able, areas of genuine uncertainty. We do not feel compelled to reach more definite conclusions than is warranted by the available evidence.

6. It may be that with regard to some of the above questions the JIC will feel that it is worthwhile to prepare papers. If so, I would suggest a target date for completion of 1 Oct 62 in order that JS/DSS may have time to incorporate the JIC contribution in the completed appreciation.

7. The security classification of the JS/DSS appreciation will be TOP SECRET/CANADIAN EYES ONLY. Any relevant material which might have to be given special classification will not be included in the report although it might be brought to the attention of the Chiefs of Staff in some other way.

8. The above suggestions are highly tentative. If you see any merit in doing so, I would be glad to discuss them with you or with the Committee.

9. We are now digesting the material in CANUS. As a result we are likely to have a series of detailed questions, the object of which will be to ascertain the degree of confidence which should be placed in the statements made in CANUS. This will be the subject of a separate letter when we have completed our review.

(sgd) (P.F. Peter)
Group Captain
A/Director of Strategic Studies

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SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CANADA

REPLY TO BE ADDRESSED TO:
THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA

Ottawa, July 3, 1962.

Dear Paul,

①

This is to let you know that I have received your letter of June 26 addressed to me as Chairman of the JIC, entitled "Strategic Weapons Survey".

Your request is, of course, a very comprehensive one and at this stage I can only assure you that I shall have it considered in a preliminary manner by the JIC as soon as possible. At that time perhaps I could then get in touch with you and let you know how we propose to deal with it.

All the best.

Yours sincerely,

G.K. Grande

G.K. Grande,
Chairman,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

77

Group Captain Paul F. Peter,
A/Director of Strategic Studies,
Joint Staff,
Department of National Defence,
Ottawa.

②

SCAD

This is "interim reply" from chairman JIC.

③ OR- file *ph*

Paul F. Peter
A/D SS000047
6 JUL 1962



Department of National Defence

JOINT STAFF

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. CSC 2195 (JS/DSS)

D L II

ADDRESS REPLY TO
CHAIRMAN
CHIEFS OF STAFF,
OTTAWA.

26 Jun 62

[Handwritten signature]

Chairman,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

Strategic Weapons Survey

1. In November 1959 the then Joint Ballistic Missile Defence Staff submitted a report to the Chiefs of Staff Committee entitled "An Initial Survey of the Ballistic Missile Problem". This report contained a reasonably comprehensive appreciation of the technical, military and strategic aspects of this problem as of November 1959. Particular attention was given to the implications from the Canadian point of view.
2. The Directorate of Strategic Studies, which is the successor to JBMDs, has now been instructed to carry out an up-dating of the November 1959 paper to be completed for presentation to the Chiefs of Staff in the early part of November. It is already clear that the problem of defence against the ballistic missile has "merged" with more general questions concerning strategic weapons and advance technology. Consequently the new study will of necessity involve a reasonably comprehensive assessment of the entire field of strategic weapons.
3. The study will involve two periods:
 - (a) the mid-term, 1967-1972;
 - (b) the long term, after 1972;on the basis that the problems of principal concern to the CSC are long term rather than short term.
4. Although a great deal of relevant information is available in CANUS and other readily accessible documents, there are certain specific questions with regard to which it seems appropriate to invite the views of the JIC. These are:
 - (a) the demise of the missile gap. The JIC might care to express an opinion from the intelligence point of view as to how the missile gap came into existence, to what extent it was incorporated in current intelligence, and what factors have now led to its disappearance. In raising this question I have in mind the fact that the missile gap is almost certain to figure in discussions by the CSC and it would be desirable to have available the considered views of the Canadian intelligence community. It would also be useful to have an up to date catalogue of Soviet ICBM characteristics;

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- 2 -

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- (c) changes in Soviet strategic doctrine and policy over the past two years. I have in mind an assessment of the statements of Soviet leaders in the light of what is known of Soviet military programmes and activities;
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- (g) whatever evidence is available with regard to Soviet programmes directed towards the development of a capability for strategic interception and destruction;
- (h) an assessment of Soviet Civil Defence programmes and activities including the inferences which may be drawn with regard to Soviet strategic policy;
- (j) the pros and cons of POLARIS type strategic weapons systems.

5. It is realized that in some cases the evidence available in the field is limited and that the JIC must make the best use of this evidence.

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- (i) what is known or surmised with regard to the Soviet terminal system;
- (ii) any inferences which can be drawn from the recent series of Soviet nuclear tests;
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
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(P.F. Peter)

Group Captain

A/Director of Strategic Studies

Scrubber A memo - May 1962.

The Shelter - Control Society

Arthur I. Wasker.

① Belief that shelter has profound social implications - "the shelter-control society."

② "Because of its uniquely potent psychological and social appeal to survival instincts it would be extremely difficult to limit the program to any predetermined maximum."

③ The demand for disciplined obedience to authority extended to the entire population would be entirely new in US life.

④ ... creating stresses and strains in the community would be amplified

⑤ In the long run such a development would make it more likely that conflicts between the USSR and the US would lead to the use of force.

⑥ View that shelters would impede negotiation and disarmament.
- alienation of USA from its allies.

*NB Original on Joint Staff
file CSC 2127-1
L. V. Coille*

CONFIDENTIAL

CSC 2195 (JS/DSS)

16 Nov 61

Coordinator,
Joint Staff.

National Survival Policy

1. It is now almost three years since the present policy on National Survival was adopted. During this time strategic concepts have changed as the impact of the ICBM has been more clearly appreciated. We have also learned a good deal from studies and exercises and from international events.

2. It therefore appears that the time is near when there should be at least a reconsideration of the present policy for National Survival, and especially the role of DND. In this respect there appear to be two major points.

3. The first is that we should recognize as an important planning case a period of severe tension leading to a greatly increased risk of thermonuclear war. It seems clear that a genuine surprise attack - a sudden bolt out of the blue - is most unlikely. However, periods of severe tension, quite possibly existing that over Berlin, are only too probable. As Mr. Khrushchev has demonstrated the nuclear stalemate is conducive to such situations. It is a fact, however, that present National Survival plans emphasize the bolt out of the blue almost to the exclusion of any other possibility.

4. Once we admit the possibility (and indeed likelihood) of such periods of severe tension certain consequences follow:

- (a) It is quite reasonable to plan for mobilization of military and civil defence personnel and to carry out some indoctrination of the civil population on an emergency basis;
- (b) Some evacuation of main target areas on a voluntary or compulsory basis is not ruled out. It would be prudent to make plans and to carry out some preliminary preparations;
- (c) It would be sensible to make plans for the construction of emergency shelter and for the stockpiling of supplies to be implemented in an acute emergency.

5. The advantage of this procedure is that it is likely to result in the production of plans which are better suited to the nature of a probable emergency. It would also avoid, in some degree, the dilemma of existing National Survival preparations. At present the Canadian people are not acutely concerned by the danger of thermonuclear attack and there is a limit with regard to the actions which can be taken. However, an efficient plan for National Survival would demand the participation of essentially the entire population and the taking of some quite drastic actions.

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CONFIDENTIAL

By recognising the likelihood of periods of acute tension it would in some measure be made clear that preparations in order to be able to make preparations are in fact extremely sensible. This should also answer some of the criticisms which have been made of National Survival preparations both on the grounds that they are excessively alarmist and that they are not alarmist enough.

6. The second major point relates to the role of the armed services and especially the army. At present the major roles of the army are warning and re-entry and these are the only roles for which any very thorough preparation and planning have been conducted. However, it seems clear that a major responsibility would devolve upon the armed forces to render comprehensive assistance to civil government and quite probably to replace for a time particular segments of the civil government, especially at municipal level, which for one reason or another had ceased to function.

7. No one can be very dogmatic about this, but it is quite conceivable that in terms of the survival of the nation the efficient discharge of this responsibility would represent a greater contribution than could be achieved by digging people out of the rubble. The discharge of this role would not be easy. It bears some resemblance to Military Government with regard to which the Canadian services have had little experience. It is, however, clear that if the services are to perform at all adequately there must be planning, indoctrination and training. This is not something which could be improvised after the event with any real hope of success.

8. In this connection there is a constitutional issue which would have to be faced. There is quite properly reluctance to contemplate displacement of the civil authorities by the military. In spite of the frequent reference to "martial law" there is in fact no such thing under the Common Law or statute. But scarcely any one doubts that in the immediate aftermath of a thermonuclear attack something like martial law would necessarily prevail in substantial areas of Canada. The alternative would be no law at all.

9. In order to deal with this problem it would have to be made very clear that the military role is to support the civil authority as long as there is any civil authority to support. The civil authorities would still be responsible for making every prudent preparation to discharge their responsibilities in an emergency. It would be the job of the military to offer all possible assistance - as in fact is already being done. Provided these points were made very clear it should be apparent that the establishment of a military role in emergency government would be more likely to result in the maintenance of effective civil government rather than less likely.

10. Assuming that the above points are well taken, the question arises of an appropriate occasion for putting them forward. Such an occasion may be the post-mortem on Exercise SOCSIM II.

11. If these points were accepted by the Government, the logical method of implementation would be a revision of Privy Council Order on National Survival. This would not be a genuine change but rather an amplification of this directive on the basis of achievements to date and in the light of further knowledge and experience.

A
(N.J. Sutherland)
JB/DSS

File
2/95

26/27 Sep 61

THE ROLE OF THE ARMED SERVICES

IN NATIONAL SURVIVAL

INTRODUCTION

May I say first how very much I appreciate the opportunity of talking to you on the role of the armed forces in national survival and explaining the subject to you. We have been given heavy responsibilities in this field and have, I believe, made some progress in planning and equipping ourselves so that, in the event of emergency, we shall be able to take on our duties with reasonable hope of success. We are anxious that people should be acquainted with our plans so that we may go forward together in preparing ourselves to carry out those duties that will be vital if Canada is attacked. With the recent governmental approval of our plans for re-entry operations and of the acceleration of our plans, the need for close cooperation between the army and other authorities has become more important than ever.

If a nation is to survive nuclear attack, it is imperative that there be effective plans covering all aspects of national survival and that every man and woman in the nation play his or her part in this vitally important process. The survival of a nation, as opposed to the survival of individuals in the country, must involve many matters other than those having to do only with the immediate post-attack situation. There must, for instance, be arrangements under which we may ensure the continued existence of government at all levels. There must, of course, be plans for the immediate relief of those in stricken areas, but there must also be plans to ensure the resuscitation and the recovery of the country as a whole: its people, its economy, and so on. There must also be the ability to reconstitute the armed forces because they may and probably will be needed for the continued prosecution of the war very shortly after the initial nuclear attack. I mention these points because, while I shall be speaking only of the role of the services, these broader responsibilities must be borne in mind.

On 28 October 1960, the Minister stated that "If a nuclear attack took place, national survival would become the primary task of all our defence forces." Thus all three services, navy, army, and air force, both regular and reserve components, are to be involved in survival operations. However, within the Department of National Defence, the overall responsibility for planning survival operations, and for controlling them in the event that they must be carried out, is allotted to the

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Chief of the General Staff. The army, then, is the primary service in National Defence in respect of all survival matters, with the navy and air force and the facilities of the Defence Research Board supporting and assisting the army to the greatest extent possible, consistent with their other duties in active defence matters. I shall, therefore, refer to the army alone in the remainder of my talk.

The Privy Council Order known as the Civil Defence Order of 1959, became effective 1 September 1959. It allots responsibilities to four ministers of the Crown: the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Health and Welfare, the Minister of Justice, and the Minister of National Defence. The first three have many responsibilities, and important ones, but time will not permit me to discuss them. I propose, therefore, to confine my remarks today to those allotted to the Minister of National Defence. These are:

- a. Warning the public of the likelihood and imminence of attack.
- b. Determining locations of nuclear detonations and the patterns of radioactive fallout and, again, warning the public.
- c. Assessment of damage and casualties following an attack.
- d. Re-entering those areas that have been seriously contaminated or seriously damaged, rescuing survivors, administering first aid, sorting the casualties and commencing medical treatment for them.
- e. Directing the police and fire services in the stricken areas.
- f. Directing the restoration of water supply and sewage disposal utilities in the stricken areas.
- g. Supporting the civil power in maintenance of law and order, where necessary and when requested.
- h. Providing communications necessary to enable the army to carry out the above tasks and the Federal Government to continue to govern on an emergency basis following an attack on our country.

I am sure you realize that many responsibilities continue to lie with the provinces and municipalities and that in many cases the role of federal departments is that of assisting the provinces. I would stress, however, that in the case of National Defence, the only task involving assistance to provinces is that of assisting them to maintain law and order. The other seven have all been allotted specifically to us and our efforts at the moment are aimed toward taking them on.

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- 3 -

My talk will be in four parts: first, certain basic assumptions; second, the warning system; third, the Nuclear Detonation and Fallout Reporting System; and, fourth, re-entry operations. We shall have a 20-minute break in the middle during which I hope you will see our equipment display. Officers will be available to answer your questions about it. At the conclusion of my talk, I will be happy to have your questions on the subject generally.

ASSUMPTIONS

Our work in survival must have a basis from which we may plan. This is provided by the following assumptions.

In respect of the period of warning that may be expected:

- a. We can not rely on definite strategical warning, or warning of a day or more.
- b. We believe the present primary threat to be that of attack by manned bombers armed with nuclear weapons. Such attacks would probably allow us up to three hours tactical warning.
- c. We believe, further, that the primary threat will change shortly to a missile attack, still with nuclear warheads. The probable tactical warning that we may receive at that time will be reduced to some 15 minutes, or possibly less.

In respect of weapons, we assume the use of 5 MT weapons, either air- or surface-burst.

From a national survival planning point of view, we have assumed that 16 of our major cities must be considered to be possible targets. Of these, the nine most likely are: Edmonton, Halifax, Hamilton, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Vancouver, Windsor, and Winnipeg. The remaining seven, considered less likely are: Calgary, London, Niagara Falls, Quebec, Saint John NB, St John's Nfld, and Victoria.

We assume that a few random bombs might detonate on or over Canadian territory. These are most likely in the southern parts of Canada with possibly the greatest density in eastern Ontario and western Quebec.

We believe that the implementing of present plans for the maintenance of control in the country by the civil government will ensure that the civil government should be able, in general, to maintain control.

In the matter of the maintenance of law and order, we assume that, in the first few days following an attack, the general public would probably be dazed and in a state of shock and that it would react favourably to leadership.

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We believe, further, that if serious shortages of food, clothing, gasoline, and other essential commodities were to develop later on after an attack, there might be a need for the military to assist civil authority in the maintenance of law and order. We believe, however, that such a period would unlikely coincide with the initial rescue phase.

We assume that if all the 16 cities mentioned above were each struck in an attack, something over one million people would need to be rescued.

Now may I turn to the warning system.

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THE WARNING SYSTEM

We have designed our warning system on the basis that a system, effective today, will be useful tomorrow only if its speed of operation can be adjusted to cope with tomorrow's weapons. The importance of having such a warning system in being, with access to all relevant intelligence and tactical information, and continuously manned, can not be overstressed.

In the air defence of North America, warning from the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) is sent directly to Headquarters North American Air Defence Command (HQ NORAD) at Colorado Springs. Warnings from the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line, and the Mid-Canada and Pinetree Lines go directly to NORAD Regions and, in some cases, directly to HQ NORAD also. HQ NORAD is thus the only source of complete and up-to-date early warning information, while air defence regional combat centres are the sources of localized up-to-date tactical information once the attacking aircraft come within range of the Pinetree radar chain. (The sources of information and the method of passing it to NORAD agencies are shown on charts.)

To alert the public, and to direct the people to listen to their local radio stations for instructions, sirens are needed. Their provision, maintenance and control are our responsibilities. Similarly, the provision of communication links to broadcast stations allocated a civil defence role rests with us.

Now I would like to show you a diagram of the warning system. Here we have the circuits carrying information from the sources of tactical and strategic information to our federal warning centre. From this centre information feeds outward to provincial warning centres. Information on nuclear detonations, damage and fallout can be fed back along other existing channels or on these circuits. Looking at a typical province, the warning feeds out to target areas and zone headquarters. Siren control circuits fan out to centres of population. Other connections are provided to emergency broadcast networks.

Here we have a demonstration of the operation of the warning system. May I first remind you of the DEW Line, the Mid-Canada Line, the Pinetree Line, HQ NORAD, NORAD Regional HQ, where we have Canadian army warning staffs, and our federal and provincial warning centres in each province. The sequence is as follows.

Aircraft are detected approaching the DEW Line. A message is passed to HQ NORAD indicating that unknown aircraft have been detected. HQ NORAD checks the identity of aircraft in these areas. HQ NORAD has decided that this is an attack and active air defence installations are placed at maximum readiness.

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Canadian warning officers at NORAD regions and at the Federal Warning Centre in Ottawa are informed. The Federal Warning Officer in Ottawa requests authority to sound a national survival alert. The authority is given and the national survival alert is sent to provinces. The national survival alert is passed over the networks within provinces to municipalities and the sirens will sound to call people to the radio.

Meanwhile, the attack is continuing and provincial warning centres are kept informed. As the enemy continues on his course he will be detected and tracked at the Pine-tree Line. While this is going on, other waves of the attack are located on the East and West coasts and their positions are followed as they approach.

Canadian Army warning officers at NORAD regions and the Federal Warning Centre in Ottawa are kept informed. The national survival "Take Cover" warning goes out to provinces and is relayed to municipalities. The sirens will sound the "Take Cover", which may be ordered by the army in Ottawa or in the provinces.

The national network has been in operation for the last two years, our Federal Warning Centre in Ottawa, and our ten provincial warning centres are manned 24-hours a day, every day. We have established warning elements, army officers, at the NORAD Regional Headquarters at St Hubert (Montreal); and at Tacoma, Washington; Kansas City, Missouri; and Madison, Wisconsin. We have a liaison officer at HQ NORAD. One officer can not, of course, give us 24-hour coverage and, therefore, we use St Hubert as our main source of information.

Thus we are now able to pass warnings with no delay to the provincial level and on to municipalities. We have authority to extend our siren coverage in municipalities and to obtain the equipment that will permit us to operate at speeds consistent with the coming missile threat. This work is going ahead and, by the end of the year, we should have nearly 1000 sirens installed. By mid-1962, we expect to have some 1500 sirens in operation.

Sirens are not the complete answer to alerting the public. They are particularly effective as outside warning devices, but, naturally, are less effective indoors. For this reason we are following the development of an indoor warning device in the United States known as the National Emergency Alarm Repeater, or NEAR, System. This is a system that operates over power lines and can provide a warning in any building connected to the power networks. It is not yet ready however.

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NUCLEAR DETONATION AND FALLOUT REPORTING SYSTEM

Nuclear detonations might occur over our probable target areas, but random bursts might occur anywhere. Fallout patterns vary with the wind and weather, and our proximity to probable major target areas in the USA constitutes a serious hazard to Canada. There could be a serious radiation situation in Canada without a single nuclear weapon having fallen on Canada. Thus we must have a Nuclear Detonation and Fallout Reporting System.

A Nuclear Detonation and Fallout Reporting System must include certain essential components:

- a. A means of locating nuclear detonations and determining the size of bomb, the time of the detonation, and the height of burst in each case. To do this we have located three Nuclear Detonation Reporting Posts around each of our likely targets taking advantage of existing Department of National Defence or other federal installations. Personnel to man these posts are drawn from the parent installation and suitable equipment has been provided so that they may carry out their tasks on an interim basis. Further equipment is on order to give these posts more complete capability.
- b. These Nuclear Detonation Reporting Posts must report to Nuclear Analysis and Fallout Prediction Centres located in our provincial warning centres. Here fallout predictions will be made based on the information received from Nuclear Detonation Reporting Posts and passed out to the public by our warning system. These predictions are made now, every day -- twice a day, for training and so that we would have immediate information if a nuclear strike occurred now without warning.
- c. Then we must have a means for measuring actual fallout as it spreads down-wind from the point of burst. To do so, we need fallout reporting posts throughout our populated areas generally about 45 miles apart east and west, and 15 miles apart north and south. These posts are being located with existing installations of various federal departments and probably other agencies of provincial and municipal governments. This system of fallout reporting posts will involve some 2000 stations throughout the country. About 7-800 have been installed so far. All of these are being equipped with radiation measuring equipment. Also, we will be giving extra equipment to about one-third of these posts to enable them to determine the location of random bursts.

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- d. We must also have a Nuclear Data Collection Agency in the Federal Warning Centre. This is also in being.
- e. Finally, the system must be tied together with communications that will remain in operation following an attack.

All of these posts must be given fallout protection if they are to be effective when fallout is down. This is being done.

We must exchange nuclear detonation and fallout intensity data with appropriate agencies in the USA. Our warning officers at NORAD regions have direct communications with provincial nuclear analysis centres, and will be able to provide filtered information to those interested in the United States. They will also provide channels for the passage of similar information from the USA to Canada.

I would like to demonstrate on this board how the system is intended to function.

These are the NUDET reporting posts for the target cities of Montreal and Quebec. The white lights indicate the three posts around each of the targets. Posts are located as follows:

Montreal - St Jerome, Valleyfield, St Hyacinthe

Quebec - Valcartier, St Sylvester, Montmagny

The yellow lights indicate fallout reporting posts in Quebec and a few in Ontario. You will notice that in many areas the desired coverage of 45 x 15 miles had not been achieved when this board was built. We are arranging for additional posts to improve this situation.

The blue lights indicate filter centres for Quebec. They are located at St Jerome and Valcartier and are linked with the fallout reporting posts. They will communicate their information to the Provincial Warning Centre. They are needed to digest information from fallout reporting posts to avoid swamping the provincial warning centres with information from the large numbers of reporting posts.

The green light shows the Quebec Provincial Warning Centre at Valcartier. The Provincial Warning Centre is responsible for the preparation of fallout predictions, warning messages, isodose contour lines and area coverage diagrams, and also for forwarding this information to the Federal Warning Centre.

The amber light indicates the regional warning information centre at the NORAD regional headquarters at St Hubert. It is through this centre that information is passed to the US authorities. The regional warning information centre is directly linked to the provincial warning centre as we saw in the warning system.

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The detonation occurs over Montreal. The three white flashing lights indicate the NUDET posts for Montreal. These record the location, yield, height of burst and time of detonation and pass this information to the Quebec Provincial Warning Centre, indicated by the green flashing light. The Provincial Warning Centre passes this information to the Federal Warning Centre.

The Provincial Warning Centre prepares a fallout prediction based on the winds forecast for that period. The blue pattern indicates the predicted possible fallout area defining Zone 1 and Zone 2. This prediction was based on a 5 megaton detonation with a height of burst of 500 meters and an effective wind of 20 MPH, related to the forecast of the morning of 7 May 61. This plot is approximately 190 miles long. It is emphasized that this is a prediction only and is somewhat larger than the actual area of fallout for such a detonation.

The red pattern now developing in 2-hour intervals, each of approximately 40 miles, records an actual pattern on the basis of measurement influenced by the varying wind conditions.

The yellow flashing lights indicate the fallout reporting posts recording radiation readings as the fallout particles descend to the ground.

You will notice that the red pattern lies within the predicted area and is somewhat smaller than the predicted plot. Under these circumstances, it would now be possible to release personnel outside the actual fallout pattern for other tasks.

The blue flashing lights indicate that the fallout reporting posts are advising the filter centres of their intensity readings and timings. While the green flashing light indicates that the Provincial Warning Centre is being advised of all recordings. This information will enable the Provincial Warning Centre to prepare the actual fallout plot in terms of isodose contour lines and to revise the warning messages to the public.

The amber flashing light indicates that information is being passed to the regional warning information centre at St Hubert and that they are advising the appropriate US authorities.

The yellow flashing lights indicate that all fallout reporting posts remain on the alert to record possible radiation in their areas of interest.

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This has been a very brief description of the national Nuclear Detonation and Fallout Reporting System, which has been approved and is now being brought into being. It will be capable of assessing, forecasting, measuring and warning the public of the radiation situation following a nuclear attack. It will be capable of coping with the current threat, and with certain changes can be adapted to an automatic detonation sensing system when suitable equipment becomes available.

You realize that the national system can not provide the intimate information of nuclear radiation and contamination on a block-by-block or farm-by-farm basis. There is a definite need for such an organization at municipal and county levels. We are developing plans and the Federal Government has bought some equipment so that provincial and municipal agencies will be able to undertake the establishment of radiation monitoring elements in their areas of responsibility.

May I now turn to re-entry operations.

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RE-ENTRY OPERATIONS

The aim of re-entry operations is to save lives.

In discussing re-entry operations we think of them as including rescue, first aid, and the evacuation of all of those from the immediate area of damage. They also include sorting the casualties and the commencement of medical treatment. Additionally, they include the decontamination of those brought out from contaminated areas together with some of their equipment. We include also the control of traffic and movement of people in the damaged areas and the direction of police and fire services. We must also include direction of the restoration of certain utilities in these areas but this is bound to take lower priority than life saving.

We believe that it is reasonable to think of the post-attack period in three phases: (a) the life-saving phase--a period lasting only two or three days, though possibly a day or so longer, (b) the survival-of-the-nation phase--a period when other emergency work, less urgent than life saving, takes place, and (c) the restoration phase--a period that will go on for a very long time before the nation is restored to what will be normal conditions following the attack. In re-entry operations we are considering only the life-saving phase. Other of our activities will be required particularly during the survival-of-the-nation phase.

If our target cities were struck by nuclear weapons, there would be two immediate problems of overwhelming importance. These would be to establish, or re-establish control in the stricken areas and to bring to bear as large a rescue force as possible in those areas. Experience in peacetime and wartime disasters has shown that there is little time to conduct rescue if it is to be effective. Very little rescue can be successful after forty-eight hours have elapsed. Therefore, all our plans must provide for the immediate re-establishment of control and for bringing to bear the maximum rescue force immediately following nuclear strikes. The first few minutes or the first hour or two would be vital, but it is in this same time that there would be the greatest confusion, chaos, and disruption of the normal means of communication. For this reason, we are convinced that our plans must be capable of being implemented either automatically or alternatively with the very minimum of orders from superior authority. This means that we must decentralize our authority. It is essential also that we have variations to our plan prepared and rehearsed to take account of unusual winds or of unexpected patterns of attack. Our plan must be simple and clearly understood by all those taking part in it if we are to achieve success. Rehearsals are of paramount importance.

With these thoughts in mind, we were led to the conclusion that success in re-entry operations demanded the establishment, in peacetime, of headquarters associated with each probable target area. We are in process of establishing these now. A commander and an alternative

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commander are being nominated in each case and the headquarters will be manned by skeleton staffs as soon as they are established. These staffs have been selected and the senior officers from each are in Arnprior at the moment on a two week course. They will commence work in their respective target cities on the conclusion of the course.

These Target Area Headquarters staffs will have a tremendous amount to do, particularly in the early stages of organization. There is a mass of detail that would have to be available in emergency, not only at municipal, but also at higher levels of government. Thus an important task of Target Area HQ staffs will be to compile data books, and keep them up-to-date, which will include essential matters such as suitability of routes for outgoing and incoming traffic; likelihood of bottlenecks that will need special treatment; areas of particular fire danger and conversely areas that should provide fire breaks; types of construction; daily and other fluctuations of population; location of key utilities and distribution systems; distribution of police and fire personnel and resources; location and availability of vehicles, mechanical equipment, accommodation and food supplies; location of various municipal officials and their alternates; and many other matters. Target Area HQ staffs will have to work in close cooperation with officials in the municipalities concerned. I would hope that if municipalities are considering the establishment of emergency headquarters clear of possible areas of damage, they might think of doing this in conjunction with us. If they could locate their emergency headquarters near our Target Area HQ, coordination in the event of emergency would certainly be facilitated.

Let us now take a look at a typical city. Here is one located at the junction of two rivers. This ring is drawn at a radius of 20 miles, so it is a large city. Damage from a nuclear attack near the centre of this city would effectively divide it into sectors. This is normally the case. We feel, therefore, that we should plan on such a division and you will notice the boundary lines dividing the city into sectors in our planning. We have located Sector HQ and the Target Area HQ. One of the Sector HQ will act as alternative Target Area HQ. In locating HQ, one must consider the likelihood of radioactive fallout and here we have attempted to site our HQ as much as possible outside the most likely areas of fallout.

In studying many disasters, there is a common pattern of behaviour. In every case there has been an immediate convergence on the scene of the disaster. People of all sorts will converge on the scene for a number of reasons and their movement is almost automatic. It has been found that there are definite types of motivations of convergers: (1) the returners, (2) the anxious, (3) the helpers, (4) the curious, and (5) the exploiters. Experience has also shown that a negative approach on the part of authorities, ie, to attempt to restrict movement and disperse the convergers, has usually been unsuccessful. Regardless of the motives of these people, they have normally carried out useful

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work especially when leadership was provided. It behooves us, therefore, to have an organization that will accept these convergers, direct their efforts in accordance with a sensible plan, and thus make maximum use of immediately available man power. We are attempting now to establish militia units, some of them very small, in appropriate places from this point of view.

There is, in addition, a need for a warden service made up of people trained for emergency action. The wardens are needed to organize survivors immediately, to organize fire fighting immediately and, through their leadership and advice to the survivors, keep down initial chaos and confusion. Surviving members of the regular forces and militia in the stricken areas would also play an important role in this regard.

We have changed our organization for rescue and now intend to use slightly smaller rescue units than we envisaged originally. This chart shows their organization in outline. In general each is formed on the basis of a rather large cadre, from the regular army or the militia, which is built up to full strength through the employment of civilians who have always volunteered in the past and will do so again. I should point out that we would need them only during the very few days of the life-saving period. Our aim is to establish something over two hundred of these columns and, in general, the rescue and other equipment that we have bought or have ordered will equip this number. These Mobile Survival Columns will operate under the control of Mobile Survival Groups, each of which will be made up of one, two, or more Mobile Survival Columns plus the various supporting elements that they need for communications, decontamination, road clearance and heavy rescue work, feeding, transportation and so on. The organization of a typical Mobile Survival Group is shown on this chart.

Our staffs at Army HQ, Commands, and Areas, are working on this basis now and are conducting detailed planning so as to be able to provide these units as early as possible. I should add that our training has been going on well for the last couple of years with the result that both the regular army and the militia are thoroughly familiar with survival problems. In many cases, orders have been issued to units setting forth their tasks, assembly areas, and so on, so that they know now exactly what would be expected of them if we were to be attacked.

I would like now to attempt to illustrate our concept of re-entry operations by means of a demonstration of an operation being conducted into Ottawa.

To give you some impression as to the sequence of events in a re-entry operation, may I direct your attention to this board. It shows Ottawa and the

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country lying to the SW of the city, an area 27 miles square. You will note the scale in miles.

The wind is of great importance when considering the effects of nuclear attack. In Ottawa the mean wind affecting fallout is normally some 30 miles an hour out of the south-west as indicated by this arrow. It is for this reason that we have placed Ottawa in the NE corner of this particular map.

The Target Area HQ has been established at Almonte, some 28 miles up-wind from Parliament Hill, and we show one sector HQ at Carp, about 17 miles up-wind from the centre of the city. Other sectors with their associated HQ have been established but space does not permit their being shown on this map.

Rescue and support units of the re-entry force either exist or are to be organized in the general area some 20 to 150 miles from Ottawa. Each of these units will play its part in the re-entry plan and will be given a designated area of operations. Traffic Posts will be located on all main routes leading into the city and militia living in their immediate vicinity will man them.

An attack is made on the city. The NUDET was a 5 MT weapon, surface burst, with ground zero the centre of Ottawa.

The damage zones from blast are shown. The A zone is an area of complete destruction about two miles radius. The B zone is an area of severe damage and extends to a radius of about five miles from ground zero. Many heavily constructed buildings will remain standing but all will probably require rebuilding. The C zone is an area of less severe damage whose radius would be about eight miles. Many buildings will be repairable. The D zone is the final area of damage and extends to a radius of about twelve miles from ground zero. In this zone repairs will be necessary but many of the buildings will remain habitable after the attack.

The second effect of nuclear explosion is heat. Many fires will be started in the centre of the city, some from the immediate effects of the explosion others from secondary effects, such as broken gas mains, short-circuited power lines, etc. Fires are likely to occur well beyond the range of blast damage as shown on the board. This fact lends great emphasis to the need for training the public in preventing fires and in the use of first aid fire fighting equipment. Some 20% of the fires could be extinguished if dealt with immediately.

The third effect of the explosion is that of radiation. Initial radiation will be confined to a very small area within which there will have been, in any event, complete destruction. The radiation with which we are particularly concerned is that which results from

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radioactive fallout. Serious contamination from this, that is contamination that would result in sickness or in death, is likely to extend only a short distance up-wind but may extend 150 to 175 miles down-wind depending on the wind strength at the time. Limits must be set for radiation doses in respect of those working in contaminated areas if we are to avoid loss of personnel. Limits that have been established are: (a) In normal operations personnel should not be exposed to doses in excess of 100 roentgens over a period of six weeks. (b) In emergency this exposure of 100 roentgens may be accepted in a period of 48 hours. (c) In any event the total radiation dose should not exceed 200 roentgens. These limits mean that workers should not normally be permitted to work in areas where the dose rate exceeds 10 roentgens per hour, and administrative units should not be sited in areas where the dose rate exceeds 1 roentgen per hour. To fix these boundaries, we mark the 10 roentgens per hour line as the Red Line and the 1 roentgen line as the Green Line.

Now the casualties. Inside the A ring, the zone of complete destruction, there would be no survivors and rescue in this zone would be pointless. In the B zone, however, those who took cover in the basements of heavily constructed buildings would likely be safe and possibly uninjured and would need to be rescued. There should, in fact, be fairly substantial numbers of rescuables in this zone. It is in the C zone that the greatest rescue problem will exist. There would be many who could survive -- even among those who were outside at the time of the blast -- if they were brought out and given treatment quickly. In the D, or outer zone, there would be a good many minor casualties but, in most cases, they would not be trapped by debris and would be able to get out with very little assistance. The greatest rescue tasks would lie, therefore, in the C and B zones.

Looking at the board, you may say that Ottawa has been completely obliterated and that there is no point in shelters and little point in rescue. But please remember that there are, and always will be, errors in delivery -- particularly if missiles are fired in quantity. Thus ground zero could easily be some distance from the centre of the city and Parliament Hill could easily be in the C or D rings. But also remember that, even if the weapon were to miss Ottawa completely, which is possible, there would still be the radiation menace from this bomb or others.

Immediately after an attack occurs, units of the re-entry force must react on the minimum of orders and preferably automatically.

Target Area HQ commences work at once with its peace-time staff and is brought up to operational strength and sends out the reconnaissance troop immediately. Traffic Posts are manned and Sector HQ personnel go to their posts. Rescue and support units assemble and commence to move to their pre-designated areas of responsibility. If the attack is significantly off the expected ground zero, some areas may not have been damaged as expected. Also, changes of wind may free certain areas

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from the threat of fallout but threaten others. Orders to divert units from their planned routes and tasks will be sent, if necessary, over the radio nets or through the Traffic Posts on the routes.

In the meantime, reconnaissance detachments will be reporting damage, fires, and radiation intensities. From these reports the information maps are built up in HQ, and Red and Green Lines are established on them.

The first group of rescue units are shown moving in to the damaged area. They dismount when they reach the area where rescue is needed. In the meantime the next group of rescue units is moving in. They will also dismount when it is necessary for them to commence rescue work. All of these rescue units are working on a pre-arranged plan and must move on foot from this time onward.

Support units will establish mobile survival group support areas outside the Green Line as close as possible to their planned locations. Here will be established centres for decontamination of rescuers and rescued, mass feeding for the same, rest centres for rescuers where their contaminated clothing may be exchanged, and the HQ of the pool of transport.

As rescue units and volunteers arrive from greater distances, or are obtained from among the rescued, further columns will be sent into the damaged areas. At this time it may be necessary to relieve the rescuers on a shift basis. We would expect, however, that rescuers would probably work some 24 to 36 hours in the initial 48-hour period.

Road clearance and heavy rescue equipment and units are provided by the army engineers in the form of engineer composite squadrons. Roads will be cleared in accordance with the pre-arranged plan, adjusted as necessary by Target Area HQ, while heavy rescue work will be carried out in support of mobile survival columns. Here we see a second group of engineers coming in for work.

Medical units will be set up on the axis of each mobile survival column just outside the Green Line. They will receive casualties brought out to the roads by rescuers and carried by our transport to these medical sections. Here the casualties will be sorted and medical treatment will commence. Evacuation from these points is the responsibility of civil authority.

Under our previous plans we did not have a firm and definite means of employing the large numbers of civilians that would be necessary in the event of attack. Thus, the effectiveness of rescue operations would have been limited and only a small percentage of those needing rescue could have been saved. Using the combination of

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regular columns and cadre columns that I have described above, our studies indicate that we could save a very much higher percentage of those needing rescue. It would be physically impossible to save 100% of those needing rescue and indeed it is hard to give any indication of just how high a percentage could be saved. We believe, however, that after training on this system we would be able to save pretty well all of those who could normally be considered to be rescuable.

I might add that our accelerated programme, announced in the House earlier this month by the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence, will enable us to complete many of our programmes much earlier than would otherwise have been the case. Success depends on the whole-hearted support from both the regulars and the militia. Thus the militia training plan for the 100,000 can make a tremendous difference in the results obtainable. I must stress, however, that this will not remove the need for civilian volunteers in the event of attack -- it will mean that we will be in a better position to absorb the volunteers and employ them to greater effect.

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CONCLUSION

One hears a good deal of talk about apathy and defeatism in respect of civil defence and sweeping statements have been made to the effect that in the event of nuclear attack the situation would be hopeless and that the human race would perish. "On the Beach", by Neville Shute, did tremendous damage by filling our people with incorrect information. Indeed, this sort of feeling is most likely to result from ignorance, or misinformation, or both. The facts are entirely different. There is no question in my mind but that the more you study this problem the more you realize that much can be done to save lives and property and so minimize the effects of these horrible weapons. Fallout shelters, if built, could save millions of lives in Canada alone. Adequate plans, if implemented at all levels of government, could save hundreds of thousands of lives; and I believe that a disciplined rescue force -- and I stress the word disciplined -- properly trained, and adequately equipped, could again save hundreds of thousands of lives.

We pray that war -- particularly nuclear war -- will never occur. But it is possible. For that reason we must know the problems that would face us and understand the great task that we would have to undertake. We believe we do and that the problems can be solved and the task can be undertaken through hard work and devotion to duty in the same way as any other operation of war. We are getting on with it as quickly as we can.

JS/DSS TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Director 

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
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NOTES ON TALK BY A/C/M MILLER, CCOS, TO THE
DRB SENIOR OFFICERS' CONFERENCE, THURSDAY, 2 NOV 1961

The CCOS opened his talk by defining the basic defence policy as being to preserve our way of life. In considering the matter, however, it was necessary to recognize that there were three distinct divisions of government policy. These were: foreign policy, domestic policy and defence policy. He liked to think that defence policy is in support of foreign policy. However, these are often in conflict but there must be considerable interplay.

In groping for a way to preserve our way of life, there were a number of alternatives. A country could emulate Switzerland and attempt to be a true neutral. It could be part of a group; and other alternatives could be found. Canada has already been through this type of analysis, although not consciously.

Canada has a long history of working in coalitions. These have included: the Commonwealth, the League of Nations and the United Nations and, on the military side, the alliances of both World War I and World War II, as well as the current participation in NATO. In discussing these, the CCOS said "Coalitionmanship is not an easy art to practise." He explained by pointing out that a member of the coalition must be prepared to compromise and yet the members must stick together. It is only through presenting a united front that any form of deterrence is obtained. Being in a coalition is not easy.

Turning to the matter of the threat, he said that at the government level the main difficulty is having a clear understanding of what we are up against. Some people view the Russians as just another group of people like ourselves. His personal view is that they are living a managed revolution. Their aim is to communize the world. This they intend to do short of war, if possible, but will use every means open to them. The greatest fallacy is to think they want a settlement now. There is a possibility that this view may change in time.

In arriving at any approach to the subjects of disarmament, disengagement or economics, one must be governed by which of the two above possibilities is correct -- are we confronted with just another group of people like ourselves or a managed revolution aiming to communize the world. He believes the Russians are determined to communize the world and hence does not look for a settlement through Berlin or a disengagement or other such means. He questions the wisdom of even considering this in the case of a country, such as Canada, which has favoured

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working within a coalition. In considering these possibilities, what would be done with our coalitions such as NATO and NORAD.

Turning to deterrence, he noted that this was a composite of a lot of things. It is a position of power with many facets. It is the hope of Western Europe and, in fact, of the whole world. The deterrent posture is being sought because it is recognized that war is not the best way of settling differences today. With regard to what constitutes deterrence, the CCOS said that an important part is the will of the coalition to stand together. The physical components are such things as the USAF Strategic Command, the Shield Forces in Europe, and even basement shelters might be included. In this regard the totality of effort was the important point.

Turning to the current activities in the cold war, he noted that the threat of Berlin is intended more to frighten the NATO members out of the coalition than the two and a half million Germans who lived there. Russia is a political animal and Krushchev is not sure that he can control military operations if they were once started and hence he will try all other means first. A part of the deterrent must be to make clear to the Russians that military venture will not be profitable. In order to estimate how this should be done, it is necessary to view the problem from the position of the Russian General Staff. Thus we should look on our future plans from this point of view.

The greatest single factor of concern today is the nuclear explosive. It is not clear when we will learn to live with it, but the fact must be accepted that it is here. It is providing by far the greatest area for thought, particularly as there is enough already packaged in the world today to wipe out civilization as we know it. The horror of this situation seems to hypnotize people. The real challenge of our time is how to deal with it in the present international climate and this must be done because the problem is not going to go away. The fascination and horror which has resulted from the fact of the nuclear explosive has produced many different reactions in people. John Foster Dulles, at one time, held that massive retaliation was the only answer to the atomic bomb. The US has since moved away from this position as it is not considered credible. As a result, nuclear weapons will probably not be used in small border incursions. In support of this, one should note that Kennedy's advisers have recently come up with a third possibility -- conventional war. This third possibility is placed between massive nuclear warfare

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and retreat.

Nuclear war -- Conventional War -- Retreat

In the view of the CCOS, it is not possible to go back to conventional warfare as long as nuclear warheads exist. Irrespective of the opening stages of a war, the ultimate result will always be escalation. Beginning a conflict with conventional weapons will merely provide time for further negotiations before the "BIG BANG".

At the present time we cannot discern where we are going. In Western Europe, which is the one place where east and west stand face to face, we have made little attempt to match the Russians with guns and bayonets. Until there is some parity in conventional weapons in western Europe, there can only be a few days until the west will be forced to use nuclear weapons. Is this sufficient time to negotiate? This is one of several such questions which have not been thought through. We must be in a position in times of extreme tension to force a pause before nuclear exchange. This area of study has spawned a great deal of speaking and writing and among the students have been included many scientists.

Scientists have also devoted considerable study to the third choice -- conventional war. The CCOS has some mistrust for the application of the scientific method to this subject. There is a danger of applying laboratory methods to human relations and there is a danger of losing sight of the fact that part of all deterrence is the uncertainty of human reaction. An example of this was the Korean War.

Turning to some more specific aspects of the Canadian position in defence, he noted that one of the advantages of a coalition is that all members did not have to have everything. This has been particularly true in Canada where each of our Services has limited its role to certain areas in which contributions can be made. The Navy has concentrated on anti-submarine warfare. This has been questioned by some people and often the question is asked as to how will the submarine devolve. There are a great many difficult problems to be resolved in this area and in this there is a lot for DRB to do. It is not as glamorous as work on the ICBM and space, but from the Canadian point of view, it is very important.

He turned to air defence and noted this was a greatly over-simplified subject. To examine it, it is necessary to go back to the deterrent. The common question today is why are there manned aircraft? In his view there will probably be manned aircraft for a very long time. The existence of a few enemy bombers will force the maintenance in being of interceptors. It is obvious that if there is no air defence that air liners could be used to deliver weapons. In addition, aircraft continue to be the most accurate way of

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delivering an attack. The only logical conclusion that can be drawn from this is that a balance must be maintained between offence and defence in this field.

The Army was faced with the problem of the atomic battlefield. It is hard to see how this could be managed. During one large exercise at SHAPE, it was found that the use of just under 300 nuclear weapons wiped out all localities of any consequence in Western Europe. Notwithstanding this fact, the planning of weapons' stocks for the Army in Europe resulted in requesting atomic warheads in the thousands and ten thousands. In the same way as the Services have limited their fields of effort, so must the work of DRB be in limited fields.

Looking ahead for possible changes in NATO, the CCOS made the following remarks. The vulnerability of airfields in Europe is such that one can only anticipate the replacement of the present form of tactical air support with missiles and with V/STOL aircraft. It can be expected that the role of the Air Forces in Europe will probably change very markedly in the next six years. On the other hand, in the Army no significant difference can be anticipated. The present build up in support of the third choice (conventional war) will likely result in a new level of force. It is sensible to build up the Canadian brigade to a division before it is needed, because the shipping problem is so tremendous that it is unlikely that any such build up could be achieved on a timely basis after things have reached a crisis point. The Canadian Navy has been making a detailed study of other roles that they may seek as a diversion from their sole one of anti-submarine warfare. While this is still in the study stage, they are looking for areas which are a little less specialized.

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CCOS. V. 118-113
26/25

ESO	7
PSO	7

The attached report
has some bearing upon
the 'Cold War' paper
that I passed to you
recently.

W. A. Lock.
Brig

DSS

25-Sep-61

Return to DSS

PA 295-000078

Extract from New York Times - 14 Sep 61

KENNEDY SETS UP 'COLD WAR' STUDY

4-Man Panel is Appraising Psychological Tactics

By Joseph A. Loftus

President Kennedy has set up a Cabinet-level group to draft a program for waging psychological and political warfare.

The group consists of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, the President's brother; Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, military representative of the President, and U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

The Communists' apparent ability to repress world reaction unfavorable to them, and to dominate the news as they choose with demonstrations that seem spontaneous, led to the creation of the new study group.

When the Russians resumed nuclear testing and many nations accepted the news apathetically, Administration officials were appalled. They speculated on what would have happened throughout the world if the United States had unilaterally broken the moratorium on nuclear testing.

United States embassies, they estimated, would have been picketed, perhaps stoned, and the demonstrations would have appeared to be spontaneous.

The sealing of East Berlin at its western boundary aroused no strong world protest. On the other hand, if a United States Ambassador visits a foreign nation and is jeered or threatened by a mob, the mob action, in the opinion of President Kennedy, dominates the news of the day, and the purpose and accomplishments of the Ambassador's trip become submerged.

Government officials are aware that the Communist apparatus in most cases sparks these demonstrations in foreign lands. Why neutrals and nonaligned nations remain silent in the face of Soviet nuclear explosions, they believe, derives from more subtle causes.

No one has suggested that the answer is to organize groups to stone Russian embassies, but the President believes that something must be found to combat Communist techniques in "cold war" psychological tactics.

The informal group - the President prefers not to call it a committee - was set up to find the answers. No Government agency now has the responsibility to conduct psychological warfare or to make broad policy and plans in that area.

Cuts Across Agencies

Such operations cut across several departments and agencies. They involve intelligence, propaganda, subversion and diplomacy.

President Harry S. Truman, on the advice of the Budget Bureau and others, set up the Psychological Strategy Board under Gordon Gray. Represented on it were the State and Defense Departments and the Central Intelligence Agency. It lacked the power to compel action.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower set up a group under William Jackson to advise him in this field. The recommendations led to making the United States Information Agency Independent of the State Department.

Later, the Operations Coordinating Board was established to follow through on "cold war" decisions of the President and the National Security Council.

President Eisenhower also appointed C. D. Jackson, who was succeeded eventually by Nelson A. Rockefeller, as special assistant for "cold war" planning.

In all cases, these individuals reportedly were frustrated by the statutory agencies.

- 2 -

Soon after taking office, President Kennedy abolished the Operations Coordinating Board, which had set up numerous sub-committees and was considered to be making doubtful headway.

Mr. Kennedy's four-man group is not an operations unit. It is understood to have held one or two meetings, and has little or no staff. Its assignment is to advise the President on what needs to be done, feasible ways of getting it done, and who should bear the responsibility.

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Behind the Headlines

CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY IN A NUCLEAR AGE

by

GENERAL CHARLES FOULKES

20¢

VOL. XXI

MAY, 1961

No. 1

Published by the
CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 000081

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CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY IN A NUCLEAR AGE

General Charles Foulkes, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D., L.L.D., D.Sc., was until he retired in 1960, Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee. He is at present living in Victoria, B.C.

The historical background

IN ORDER to appreciate the problem of defence it might be helpful if we examined the various stages of the development of defence policy from 1939 to the present day. In this way it is hoped to show how the changing threat and the technological development of weapons has been the major influence in the evolution of our defence policy.

The pre-1939 scene

Prior to 1939 Canada was able to derive a considerable amount of security from her geographical position. The then available weapons precluded a direct attack on Canada, at least in the early stages of a war. Therefore Canada could afford the luxury of waiting until the war broke out before deciding what action, if any, it would take. In the last war Parliament was called and it took about two weeks before the process of declaring war was accomplished. While Canada provided substantial forces in the last war, it did not undertake the provisioning or the equipping of its forces nor did it take part in the overall direction of the war. Canada was prepared to leave these responsibilities to the U.K. and later on in the war to both the U.K. and the United States.

However, the developments in technology brought about a new situation. The last war left a legacy of long-range methods of attack which could reach several thousand miles. It also negated the previous immunity from attack which Canada had enjoyed for a long time because of geography. The long-range bomber, the snorkel submarine and the paratrooper created a direct potential threat to Canada. These innovations were to have a profound effect on Canadian defence policy. No longer could we "wait and see." Geography no longer provided security from attack but posed a new problem of defending our sovereignty in areas previously considered wholly unsuitable for military operations and therefore immune from attack. Therefore, when considering the post-war plans the Chiefs of Staff had to make provision for the defence of our coastal areas, airspace and territory including the Arctic.

The post-war scene

Shortly after the end of the war the U. S. Defence Secretaries invited Canada to continue the close collaboration in the defence of North America which was established in 1940 as a result of the Ogdensburg Declaration and other Canadian-American accords. As Canada was now vulnerable to direct attack, it was considered in the best interests of this country to agree to the U. S. proposals and continue joint defence planning with the Americans. These arrangements were expanded to include exchange of information in the fields of intelligence, weapons, research and development. Joint defence plans were prepared for the approval of the Chiefs of Staff of both countries. The broad concept agreed to was that for the defence of territorial areas and coastal waters each country would provide its own arrangements but there would be a mutual reinforcing scheme. However, in the field of air defence a quite different treatment was necessary. There were no boundaries up-stairs, and the most direct air routes to the U. S. major targets were through Canada. Therefore, air defence was to be a joint effort from the start. It is important to keep this point in mind: that the decision for joint air defence was taken in 1946 not 1958, as some of the critics claim when discussing NORAD.

The next event which was to affect our post-war defence planning was the creation of the United Nations at San Francisco in 1945. The Charter of the U. N. included provisions for regional defence arrangements and for collective efforts to maintain the peace. It was necessary, therefore, to provide in our post-war planning for the possibility of a U. N. commitment. It so happened that the type of ground and air forces for maintaining our sovereignty in the Arctic were also suitable for a possible U. N. commitment. Therefore, no special forces were held or equipped for U.N. purposes. Another influence on our post-war planning was the decision to withdraw our division from the occupation force in Germany. This action terminated the U.K. responsibility for equipping and provisioning of Canadian forces which had existed for a very long time, actually from the days of Wolfe. It can be seen that our post-war defence policy was influenced by a closer link with the U. S. in planning for the defence of Canada, a considerable lessening of our close ties with the U.K., and the possibility of military action under the U. N. This was the defence picture in 1946.

The U.K. authorities soon became aware of the lessening of the close association that had existed with Canada and the U.K. in defence during the last war. Field Marshal Montgomery, who had just become Chief of the Imperial General Staff, took advantage of a visit he was making to North America, to use his own

words, "to put this matter right." Monty proposed that the Chiefs of Staff of Canada, the U.K. and the U.S. should, with the blessing of the heads of government, set up tripartite arrangements for discussions on intelligence, strategy, tactics, research and weapon development and should draw up plans for dealing with a major aggression. These proposals were agreed to, and much was accomplished in the next few years. These arrangements were to remain secret and were only revealed by Monty in his Memoirs a year ago.*

The establishment of NATO

The next important event to affect our defence policy occurred in 1948. In February, 1948, Czechoslovakia was snatched behind the Iron Curtain. This event caused consternation in London, Washington and Ottawa. President Truman issued a declaration pledging U.S. support to all European nations who would resist Soviet aggression. This was followed the next day by a similar statement in Ottawa. Within the next few days President Truman issued an invitation for political and military officials of Canada and the U.K. to meet with U.S. officials in Washington to devise ways and means of implementing the pledges made in Ottawa and Washington. The talks that followed were the first which led to the establishment of NATO in April, 1949. Canada took a leading part in working out the organization of the political and military organs of the alliance. The tripartite military arrangements which had been set up three years before were put to work and produced an emergency defence plan for the NATO area.

It might be appropriate at this time to note that the purpose of setting up NATO was to prevent any further aggression in the NATO area. In this, its major role, NATO has certainly succeeded, and it is important to bear this in mind when criticizing the shortcomings of the alliance.

Canadian acceptance of the North Atlantic Treaty marked a drastic change in Canadian foreign and defence policy. For the first time in history Canada was accepting military commitments in advance of war. Second, Canada was agreeing to the stationing of troops outside Canada in peacetime, quite a step from the pre-war policy of sheltering behind our immunity.

You will recall that the early organization of NATO provided for a series of regional groups of countries who could mutually support each other if attacked.

These were:

Northern Group — Norway and Denmark.

*Bernard Law, Viscount Montgomery of Alemain, *The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery*, Glasgow, William Collins Sons and Co. Ltd., 1960, pp. 445-51.

- Central Group — France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom, supported by Canada and the United States.
- Southern Group — Italy, France, and later Greece and Turkey.
- Canada - U.S. Group — responsible for the defence of the Canada-U.S. Region, for supporting Europe and providing the strategical counter-offensive.

It will be observed that the Canada - U.S. defence arrangements came under the NATO umbrella in 1949.

The military organization of NATO provided for a Military Committee made up of a chief of staff from each country. This group met periodically to discuss broad military policy, but there was a need for an executive agent to draw up plans and transact day-to-day business. As one of the outstanding problems was the defence of West Germany, it was decided that the occupying powers, the U.K., the U.S. and France, who were responsible for the defence of Germany, should become the Standing Group. This body became the agent of the Military Committee responsible for planning the defence of the NATO area against attack.

As a result of this decision, the tripartite organization for planning against a major aggression was disbanded and the Standing Group took over the responsibility. Canada lost the preferential position it had held with the U.K. and the U.S. in strategical planning. By 1950 Canadian defence policy was wholly concerned with NATO and with the U.N.

When General Eisenhower took over as Supreme Allied Commander, he visited all the NATO countries including Canada to secure forces to form the *shield* in Europe. The European partners had little or nothing in the shape of fighting forces, equipment or trained leaders. Eisenhower appealed to the Canadian Government to make the greatest possible contribution of forces and equipment in the shortest time to demonstrate clearly that North America was determined to back NATO completely. As and when the European partners gained strength, the North American troops could be brought home.

Canada decided to make the following immediate contribution for the defence of Europe and the North Atlantic:

1. A brigade group to be built up to a division after the first day of mobilization followed by a Corps headquarters and a second division if this was found to be necessary.

2. An air division of 12 squadrons of day-fighters.
3. A naval contingent of 42 ships and 48 maritime aircraft.

This included every ship we had — and some were in bad condition. These ships and aircraft were to be supplied within the first 180 days of the war. This commitment was to give us some concern when the concept of war was changed because of the altering threat. The defence arrangements for this continent were to consist of:

1. A brigade group of airportable troops for the defence of Canada.
2. An air group of 19 squadrons for air defence; 9 regular, 10 auxiliary.
3. A naval force of coast defence ships and aircraft.

These forces were to be built up to full strength after the commencement of hostilities, in accordance with the pattern of a conventional war of the 1945 variety. The responsibility for the nuclear counter-offensive was to be left exclusively to the United States.

Nuclear weapons: the loss of the Western monopoly

However, in 1949 the Soviet Union announced the explosion of an atomic bomb two years ahead of the prediction. The experts had formerly considered 1952 as the earliest date, but they did not expect the build-up of a useful stockpile until 1958. This Soviet achievement caused a serious reappraisal of the possible Soviet threat. It now looked as if a Soviet nuclear strike might be possible in two or three years. This appreciation meant that nuclear weapons might be available at the outset of an attack and therefore the previous conception of building our forces after the opening of hostilities did not appear valid. If we were to meet a sudden onslaught the defensive forces must be on the spot, trained and ready to fight. The use of reserves and auxiliaries were no longer valid as they would not be trained and fit to fight in a nuclear war. This new concept had serious repercussions for Canada. Could we meet all our commitments before D-Day? To do so would certainly mean larger regular forces, more equipment and more training facilities, all of which would cost more. If these additions were not forthcoming then we would have to revoke some of our promises.

In the midst of this reappraisal in 1950 the Korean War broke out and the Government decided to support the U.N. and participate in the conflict. At the same time there was concern about the spreading of the conflict into an East-West struggle and perhaps a third world war. Therefore, the Government decided not to denude the country of its trained troops but to raise and train additional

forces for Korea, leaving the Mobile Brigade Group and the air defence forces to deal with any threat to Canada.

So by 1951 Canada was:

1. Training and despatching troops for the NATO shield in Europe.
2. Raising and training troops for the U.N. force in Korea.
3. Refitting and despatching ships and maritime aircraft for NATO defence in the North Atlantic.
4. Training and exercising ground and air defence forces for the territorial defence of Canada in case the Korean War developed into something bigger.

This effort boosted the defence budget to an all-time high of \$2 billion.

The threat of Soviet attack on the West

As mentioned earlier, there was considerable concern regarding the possibility of Soviet intervention to support the Chinese in Korea. This concern, along with the evidence of the production of new types of long-range bombers in the Soviet Union, posed a potential threat to North America. Therefore steps were taken to accelerate the build-up of the joint air defences of the continent. The construction of the *Pinetree* Line was hastened to completion to provide for radar cover for the most likely approaches between Labrador and the Great Lakes. The Canadian Government agreed to construct the Mid-Canada Line, and the U.S. began to plan for the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line. These three warning chains and their communications formed an integrated early warning system for North America. This system was to provide four or five hours warning of a bomber attack, which was necessary to allow the U.S. Strategic Air Force time to get off the ground in order to avoid destruction and launch their counter-offensive. These warning arrangements were a very expensive undertaking, with Canada paying one-third of the cost and the U.S. two-thirds, but there was real anxiety at that time about the possibility of a Soviet air attack.

The development of the deterrent

As noted before, in the preliminary NATO planning the U.S. was responsible for the retaliatory forces. While the U.S. Strategic Air Force was not part of the NATO forces, it was committed to support the shield forces, and the Strategic Air Force developed plans with both the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). Originally the Strategic Air Force consisted of a large number of heavy and medium bomber squadrons and a large stockpile of atomic bombs.

These bombers were stationed on a large number of bases in continental U.S., the U.K., Pakistan, Okinawa, the Philippines and Turkey, with refuelling bases in Canada, Greenland and Alaska. The number of bombers available and their wide dispersion provide an ample force for the deterrent role. It was originally planned that the U.S. would be solely responsible for this expensive and difficult task. However, the U.K. became quite concerned about nuclear policy after the passing of the McMahon Act, which curtailed the release of nuclear information from the U.S. to other nations except on a strictly reciprocal basis. This meant that the U.K. would have access to U.S. information only if the U.K. had something to offer in the same field. There was also some concern as to whether in all circumstances the U.S. Strategic Air Force could be depended on completely to deter Soviet threats of attacks on the United Kingdom, which the U.K. authorities considered was much more vulnerable than the United States. Furthermore, there was the question of the close relation between the nuclear research for weapon development and the use of plutonium for the development of power, in which the U.K. had a vital interest. There was also the question of prestige. However, the U.K. authorities decided to go into nuclear production and the setting up of a Strategic Bomber Force. This decision has proved costly and disappointing. It marked the first spread of nuclear weapons in the West and their possession became a mark of prestige. The high cost of this venture forced the U.K. to cut its forces in Europe at a time when its leadership on the Continent was so important.

New military weapons: their evolution in the 'fifties

In the early 1950's the U.S. developed a series of tactical nuclear weapons, air defence rockets with atomic warheads such as GENIE and NIKE and later the BOMARC, bombardment weapons such as SERGEANT, CORPORAL and HONEST JOHN, and an atomic cannon to please the gunners but not of very much use. In the naval field there were atomic depth charges and atomic torpedoes. As it was anticipated that the Soviet forces would very shortly be equipped with these types of weapons and as the NATO partners were failing to meet their conventional force goals, the U.S. offered to provide the NATO countries with these weapons under certain conditions. These conditions were that the weapons be stockpiled under NATO arrangements but be maintained and remain in U.S. custody until released by order of the President. This safeguard was included to ensure that the weapons would be used only for the purpose intended, that is, the defence of the NATO area. There were some misgivings in the NATO Council but the weapons were accepted under the U.S.

conditions. These conditions called for each NATO country to negotiate a bilateral agreement with the United States. Canada agreed to this proposal in 1957 but so far has not negotiated such an agreement.

The next development in the nuclear field which was to have a pronounced effect on our defence policy was the introduction of ballistic missiles into the arsenals of the East and West. Here again the Soviet Union produced its ballistic rockets not only earlier than expected but also produced missiles with much greater accuracy and reliability than had been forecast by the Western experts. This achievement has seriously altered the concept of war and provided a whole series of unanswered problems. Ballistic missiles have removed the threat from the earth and pushed it into outer space in a matter of a few years. It reduced the warning time from four or five hours to fifteen or twenty minutes and created a defence problem which seems to defy solution, at least for the present time. While a great deal of money is being spent and a vast research effort is being devoted to the solution of this problem, the solution seems a long way off.

This dilemma is most serious for the West, as we are on the defensive and will not start a preventive war or carry out a pre-emptive strike. Therefore, the present deterrent is in jeopardy and some believe it is no longer effective in deterring aggression. However, if there is no direct defence against the ballistic missile, then we are forced to explore other means such as improving the effectiveness of the deterrent.

This question of the effectiveness and viability of the deterrent is being widely discussed and perhaps a word should be said about it. *To be effective the Western deterrent must be such that it can accept the Soviet first strike and still deliver an unacceptable amount of punishment on the Soviet Union.* Therefore the security of the deterrent force is of paramount importance. The U.S. Strategic Air Force has worked out procedures for maintaining an airborne alert for its bomber forces and a system of despatching a bomber force on a recall mission in advance of a hostile strike. But similar systems are not possible for ballistic missiles. Once the missiles are launched they cannot be recalled. Other methods must be sought to ensure that the whole missile force is not destroyed by a Soviet first strike.

The security of the missile is being sought by three methods: hardening, dispersal and mobility. Vast sums have been spent on hardening of the missile sites, which involves construction of underground emplacements of steel and concrete. The accuracy which has been achieved by Soviet missiles and the difficulty of keeping

locations secret in the West has compromised any security by the hardening process. Therefore, more attention is now being directed to mobility and dispersion. The *Polaris* missile operating from a nuclear submarine provides both mobility and dispersal. This is perhaps an ideal form of deterrent, but it is a very expensive one. Other forms of mobility are being tried out for the *Polaris*, such as barges and small harbour craft which will be much cheaper. Other developments are proceeding, *e.g.*, the mobile *Minuteman* missile which can be mounted on a railway car and, because it has solid fuel, is much more reliable and can be prepared to fire in a few minutes. This type of missile can be readily moved about and can be fired from railway sidings and freight yards.

There is no doubt that for the deterrent to be effective in preventing a Soviet attack we must be able to convince the Russians that they cannot destroy all the forces of retaliation with the first blow. It is sometimes suggested that Canada should offer facilities for the mobility and dispersal of the deterrent. There are many problems raised by this suggestion, but if we believe that the deterrent is our only effective defence perhaps we should face up to the difficulties. There is no doubt that with this terrific amount of destruction only fifteen minutes away no avenue of preventing this holocaust should be left unexplored. But it is doubtful if there is any satisfactory military answer to this dreadful problem. The military scientists can foresee all kinds of additional devices for spreading destruction from outer space, in shorter time and in larger doses, but to prevent this happening seems at present to defy solution.

The Canadian defence scene: 1961

To sum up the development of defence policy to date:

1. It is the changing threat and the advances in technology which force adjustments and changes in defence policy and not, as some critics say, the whims and the wails of the generals.
2. In the last 20 years we have seen Canadian defence policy develop from the time when we relied for our security on our isolated geographical position to today when the threat is leaving this planet and soaring into outer space.
3. I submit that there is no direct defence for Canada no matter how much we are prepared to spend. All we can do is to seek through collective arrangements some security by supporting the deterrent in Europe, in the North Atlantic, and in North America, and shortly in outer space. At the same time we must continue our efforts in the U.N. to maintain the peace and assist in preventing local incidents from developing into general war.

4. In these uncertain circumstances we cannot expect adequate, satisfying and cheap defence, with all the risks being taken by the military. That day is gone forever. At the best the defence policy can be expected to be a series of compromises which are bound not to please everybody and will involve more sacrifices of sovereignty, prestige and perhaps wealth.

Canadian defence policy: the alternatives

There appear from time to time criticisms of defence policy and suggested solutions to the defence problem in Canada. These proposals range from the suggestion that Canada should become a nuclear power with its own deterrent to various forms of neutrality. In the light of this background of the development of defence policy it might be helpful to discuss some of these proposals in search of a better answer to the present defence dilemma.

The question of neutrality

When in search of a national solution to avoid nuclear destruction it is only natural to turn to the age-old fallacy of neutrality, even though it is obvious to all that neutrality did not save Belgium in the First World War nor Holland in the second conflict. Would neutrality really save Canada from destruction in an all but nuclear war involving the United States and the Soviet Union? While Canada can revoke its solemn treaties with its friends, it cannot negate geography. Canada is physically joined to the United States just like the Siamese twins. If one of the twins gets hurt the other one suffers. It is just as impossible to separate the defence of Canada from that of the United States as it would be to separate the Siamese twins and expect them to survive. In a nuclear war Canada could not hope to escape grave damage and loss of life. Radiation, blast and fallout have no respect for national boundaries. What would Canada achieve from neutrality? Certainly not immunity from destruction. On the contrary, it would lose its influence with the United States and with its NATO partners, and it is doubtful if it would enhance its prestige in the United Nations.

A further suggestion has been put forward that Canada should withdraw its forces from the NATO command in Europe, cancel the air defence arrangements with the United States and place all the Canadian armed forces under the United Nations. In order to examine carefully this proposal it might be advisable to deal with the withdrawal of Canadian forces from the NATO commands and later examine the feasibility and desirability of placing the forces under the United Nations.

Should Canada withdraw from NATO?

It has been mentioned earlier that our contribution to the shield

forces in Europe consists of a Brigade Group of three battalions and supporting troops, and an Air Division of 12 squadrons. As far as the Brigade Group is concerned, from a purely military standpoint, its withdrawal would not be significant. With the build-up of the German forces the Brigade should be taken out of its present forward role, and the Germans should take over the defending of their own border. Whether the Brigade should be given another role or brought home is a political decision. However, this is the only operational role the Army has, and it is doubtful if you can maintain a fighting force just by practising survival.

The Air Division is being re-equipped. Eight of the present day-fighter squadrons are to be converted to a reconnaissance strike role and are to be equipped with the F-104 strike aircraft. This new role requires the use of a small atomic bomb, and although the aircraft is useless in this role without it, so far arrangements for obtaining these weapons have not been completed. There is no role for this formation in Canada and, therefore, if it is brought home, it would probably be disbanded.

While, from a purely military standpoint, the European partners should now be able to look after their own territorial defence, there are serious political and psychological considerations. A decision to bring the Canadian troops home might be misinterpreted by Mr. Khrushchev as the beginning of the breakup of NATO (which is of course one of the Soviet Union's announced aims) and by our partners in NATO as the start of Canadian neutrality or withdrawal to *Fortress America*.

Should Canada withdraw from NORAD?

This is a question that is generally misunderstood. As mentioned earlier, the decision to undertake joint air defence was made in 1946 not in 1958. The setting up of the integrated headquarters in Colorado Springs which became known as NORAD was the last step in co-ordinating the whole of the air defence of the continent which had been developed over the past fifteen years. Some of the argument for the abandonment of the air defence organization may be based on the assumption that bomber attacks are now outmoded and therefore there is no need for such defences. Bombers are still the most accurate and flexible delivery system for mass destruction weapons. Rockets are now being developed which can be launched from bomber aircraft at long ranges, something like 1000 miles, and these rockets carry a megaton warhead. This provides a new form of mobility to the retaliatory weapon and decreases the risk of destruction of the deterrent by a first strike. The U.K. have abandoned their extensive *Blue Strike* missile pro-

gramme because of its vulnerability and are planning to adopt the U.S. Skybolt airborne missile in their Vulcan bombers. It is my opinion that it is premature to abandon an efficient working system until we are sure that the Russians have scrapped all their bombers and it has been established that the NORAD organization is of no use against the airborne type of missile. It should be remembered also that NORAD is responsible for the operation of the ballistic missile early warning system which is now in operation. A satellite early warning system known as MIDAS will come into operation in about 1965. If and when a missile defence system is developed, NORAD will operate the system.

There is also another important advantage to Canada in fully co-operating with the U.S. in the defence of this continent. This action puts Canada in a preferential position because, as we are full partners in the defence of North America, we have to be consulted every time the U.S. contemplates using force anywhere in the world. This consultation is necessary as this use of force may bring about retaliation and our joint air defences must be in a high state of readiness. Therefore, we are in a very favourable position to influence U.S. policy. This is worth keeping, and I see little to be gained and much to be lost in severing our close defence relations with the United States. Right enough, we should not spend much more on bomber defence, but it is important to keep this close and intimate defence relationship.

Should Canada commit all its forces to the U.N.?

As mentioned earlier, we have been aware of possible U.N. commitments since 1946. Since that time Canada has played a part second to no other country in providing military personnel for United Nations mediatory forces and for the international truce commissions in Indochina. This has been a very important contribution by Canada to the maintenance of stability in the Middle East, Southeast Asia and Africa, and the provision of such forces is given a high priority in Canadian defence planning. It would be helpful, of course, if a United Nations Emergency Force could be set up on a permanent stand-by basis to avoid improvisation in emergencies. If this could be done, Canada should certainly make its appropriate contribution. There has, however, been too much opposition to this proposal on the part of the Soviet bloc and the uncommitted countries to allow it to be accomplished. In addition, it has had to be recognized that there are different requirements for each emergency. In Indochina the need was largely for officers. For the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East we were asked to supply officers and men in customary military formations. In the Congo, there were political reasons for preferring African

and Asian troops, and Canada was asked for specialists such as signallers and air force transport personnel.

While the policy of our services should be flexible enough to cope with these important requests for international service, it is quite another matter to suggest that the provision of such forces should be the sole aim of our military preparations. We cannot have a healthy army, navy, or air force without a rounded programme.

It should be borne in mind, furthermore, that these international mediatory functions are quite different in kind from broader ideas of a United Nations army or police force with which they are often confused. They are quite different from the United Nations Command which fought in Korea. This latter was composed of components from armed forces of various countries supplementing the army of the United States, which also directed the military strategy. The job of the United Nations forces in the Middle East and the Congo is to supervise not to fight against aggression. It may be that eventually this concept of an international force will grow into the reality of a United Nations armed force able to enforce the will of the United Nations. It is very hard to see, however, how such a force to combat aggression can have any meaning until the great powers have drastically disarmed. Until that time, what kind of international army could resist the armies of the Soviet Union or China — or even of Israel or Cuba? We can all hope that the day of disarmament and an international police force will come, but it would be a grave mistake to base our defence policy on the illusion that that day had come.

To say, therefore, that Canada should put all its forces at the disposal of the United Nations is to talk nonsense. The United Nations, as now constituted, cannot dispose of forces in this way. The Security Council can ask member governments to contribute their forces in certain ways to help keep the peace. When called upon to do so, the best contribution a country can make is to produce troops from effective and well-trained national forces. It should be constant Canadian policy to make our armed forces available for United Nations service and even to declare that they will be used only for purposes consistent with the U.N. Charter. This does not mean, however, that Canada or any other country is expected to turn over its forces to the direction of a non-existent United Nations command to be used in accordance with the will of any fleeting majority in the Security Council or the General Assembly.

Should Canada become a nuclear power?

As none of these previous suggestions seem to provide a satis-

factory alternative solution to the defence problem, it may be useful to examine the proposal put forward by Lt. Gen. G. G. Simonds in *The Times* in November, 1958, that Canada should become a nuclear power and possess its own deterrent.

There is no doubt Canada has plenty of uranium and possesses the scientific and technical skills to produce nuclear weapons. However, it is doubtful if there is any need to augment the existing stockpiles of nuclear mass destruction weapons. While there is a lot of loose talk about the size of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, it is generally agreed that there are sufficient weapons available to cause wholesale destruction. The Canadian production of nuclear weapons is advocated in some quarters as a means of giving Canada complete control of the use of the nuclear weapons whereas if U.S. weapons are stockpiled for the use of Canadian troops, the weapons cannot be used except by U.S. consent. This argument does not appear to have much validity as it is inconceivable that Canada would wish to use nuclear weapons, except in the event of an East-West struggle, as an ally of the United States. Furthermore, the production of nuclear weapons is a very expensive process. As there is really no case for the production of mass destruction nuclear weapons by Canada and as the Canadian requirements for tactical nuclear weapons is relatively small, it is doubtful if it would be worth while going into production to meet these small requirements. Unlike other types of weapons few, if any, will be required for practice. Therefore, once the stockpile is built up, the production facility would have to be shut down. It appears doubtful if there is any real advantage in Canada's becoming a nuclear power and having its own deterrent, or even manufacturing Canadian requirements of tactical nuclear weapons.

Canada has tried consistently to prevent any extension of the nuclear club. If Canada was to undertake the production of its own requirements of nuclear weapons it would no doubt open the way for other powers to follow the Canadian lead. Therefore, we should refrain from action which would encourage any widening of the nuclear club's membership, even though we should realize that the permission of the United States will be required to use nuclear weapons and also that such an arrangement may prove militarily inconvenient. On the other hand, if we really believe that the deterrent is our only hope of avoiding destruction, then Canada could contribute a great deal to security and reliability of the deterrent not by adding to the present over-stocked stockpile but by offering facilities in Canada for the deployment of part of the deterrent force. There are in Canada plenty of remote areas where missiles could be located with very little chance of detection; plenty

of lakes and rivers where the *Polaris* missile could be moved about undetected; plenty of railway sidings where the *Minuteman* missile on a railway car could be moved about. There is no doubt it will need some courage to overcome the ardent objections of the anti-Americans and the neutralists, but if we want to avoid the nuclear destruction which is just fifteen minutes away then we should overcome these objections.

There is left the problem of providing tactical nuclear weapons for the Canadian forces. This issue still seems to be in question and deserves close examination.

Should Canada possess tactical nuclear weapons?

There is a tendency for some critics to lump together tactical nuclear weapons, e.g. warheads for the *Honest John* support weapon, and mass destruction weapons such as the multi-megaton cobalt bomb, and condemn the acquisition of all types of nuclear weapons. This type of approach condemns the weapon because of the nature of the explosive content and not because of its destructive power. These critics ignore the problem of Canadian troops facing an adversary armed with superior nuclear weapons. Therefore, it may be helpful in understanding this complicated issue first, to discuss the types of weapons required by the Canadian forces and the proposals for storage, control and custody of the nuclear components before giving consideration to the desirability of acquiring these weapons.

Canada has accepted a forward task for the Brigade Group in the Shield forces in Europe which requires heavy support for its infantry. The Government has agreed to provide for this support the *Honest John* 762 mm. close-support rocket which requires an atomic warhead. This is the same equipment which is being used by the other NATO partners in the Shield force.

As I mentioned earlier, the air division is being re-equipped. Eight of the day-fighter squadrons are being converted to reconnaissance strike squadrons, and the Government has decided to equip these squadrons with the F-104 strike aircraft which is to be armed with a small atomic bomb. To carry out these roles which the Government has accepted, these atomic weapons are necessary. Canadian maritime forces of ships and aircraft have been allotted an anti-submarine role in the North Atlantic. The most effective method of carrying out their tasks is by using atomic depth charges and atomic torpedoes. These weapons are essential to deal with the missile-carrying atomic submarine which has the capability of attacking Canadian ports and shipping.

The *Bomarc* missile requires an atomic warhead and two of these air defence missiles will be located in Canada. If any new fighters are procured to replace the CF-100, these fighters will require an air-to-air atomic missile. These warheads will be supplied and maintained by the United States. They will be stockpiled under NATO or national arrangements, guarded by NATO or national forces as applicable but will be maintained by and remain in the custody of the U.S. until released by the President to the Supreme Allied Commander (SACEUR) or the country concerned. The reason for this veto on their use is to ensure that the weapons are used only for the purpose intended; that is, for the defence of the NATO area. This appears to be a very prudent safeguard.

This issue is sometimes clouded by the objection to the U.S. maintaining custody of the nuclear components. The statement is frequently made that Canada should not have anything to do with weapons that are not completely under Canadian control. This fear does not stand up to close examination. These weapons are manufactured and paid for by the U.S. and are not *bought* by Canada; they remain the property of the United States. They are provided solely for joint use or for multilateral defence of the NATO area which includes Canada. The U.S. law restricts the release of nuclear components to the President. This is a safeguard to ensure that they are not used for any other purpose. This release is not an order to use them; it is only a release to the country concerned. The decision to use the weapons, like the decision to go to war, is a national government decision.

It may be argued that such restrictions are not necessary for Canada. We are nice people and object to not being trusted. But here again we must remember that the rules were made to deal not only with Canada but also with all the nations with which the U.S. has defence arrangements. However, it is difficult to visualize the occasion when we would want to use nuclear weapons and the U.S. would not.

Perhaps a homely illustration can be used to clarify this point of dual control. It has sometimes been described as two keys to the cupboard; the U.S. has one and we have the other. It is very similar to a safety deposit box in the bank. The bank ensures that you are the authorized tenant of the box before the bank employee will insert his key which allows you to have access to your property. This action ensures that you meet the bank's conditions which have been laid down to fulfil the obligation the bank has accepted to safeguard your property while in its custody. But it does not in any way infringe on your rights to do what you like with the contents of the box. The same is true in regard to the release by the Presi-

dent. The President assesses that the conditions laid down for the use of the weapons has been met and releases them. What happens after that is a Canadian matter.

The only remaining issue is whether these nuclear components for tactical nuclear weapons should be acquired from the United States for use by the Canadian armed forces in Europe, in the North Atlantic and in Canada.

From a purely military standpoint there is no doubt that in order to carry out the tasks that the Government has accepted in Europe, in the Atlantic and in North America, these nuclear weapons and warheads are required. To ask the Canadian serviceman to fight with weapons inferior to those of the enemy has never been Canadian policy and I hope it never will be. The Prime Minister has said on several occasions that the Canadian forces will be well-equipped and trained for the Canadian share in balanced, collective defence. If for any reason the most modern and efficient weapons are not to be obtained, then the roles and tasks that Canada has accepted should be revoked or modified. Under no circumstances, however, should the Canadian serviceman be expected to carry out military tasks with equipment inferior to that of the enemy.

Conclusion

I am convinced that in the world today we have gone so far in the production of force and in making it so readily available that I seriously question the use of force as an instrument of policy. Once one of the Great Powers resorts to the use of force to attain a political objective, it has no alternative to using more and more force until the objective is attained or until the Power capitulates. In this process the world may be destroyed.

In the civilized world we have ceased to allow the use of force to settle personal differences; fighting, threatening and duelling are no longer tolerated. No longer do men carry swords and side-arms to be able to defend themselves and settle their differences with their fellow men. The courts and their officers have been set up for the purpose of settling individual differences and disputes. It is my view that nations big and small are going to be forced to adopt a code similar to the one they insist on for their nationals.

I take issue with those who say, "Let us go back to conventional weapons," as if it was all right to settle disputes by conventional means whereby only the soldiery get killed but the world is saved from destruction. Can you really turn back the clock? If you can, why not turn it right back to bows and arrows, or better still, clubs? Would reverting to conventional weapons and turning all

the uranium over for peaceful purposes save the world if force was still used as an instrument of policy?

Suppose the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to destroy all the nuclear weapons and each side played the game — which is a very big *if*. Then the U.S. and the Soviet Union had differences and decided to go to war with the conventional weapons they had available. Each would continue to use more and more force as it became available. While the atomic bombs may have been destroyed, the scientists and technicians would still possess the know-how, as you cannot brainwash the scientist. The experts tell me that if the fission material is available for the production of power it would take only a few days before the production of bombs could be started. The rate of production may be slow, but the nuclear war would be again possible with all its accompanying horrors. Therefore the destruction of the existing stockpile does not appear to be a real answer to this dilemma. I have come to the conclusion that the use of force as an instrument to attain political aims must be abandoned.

This of course is a long-term aim, but it has taken many years to convince the individual that the rule of force is outmoded and it will *no doubt* take a *long time* to do this for nations. What should we do in the meantime?

Until the abandonment of the use of force is fully accepted, it is important to seek some stability in the nuclear forces of the East and the West. Should these nuclear forces become imbalanced, the temptation to use them will become greater. While we cannot do anything to stabilize the Eastern nuclear force, we can assist in stabilizing the Western deterrent by offering facilities for mobility and dispersal of the U.S. Strategic Air Force. These are so necessary for the West because the West must be prepared to accept the first blow and still be ready to retaliate. I am sure this aspect needs very careful consideration. We should always bear in mind that peace for Canada can be attained only through peace for the world, and unless we are prepared to take some risks, take some more responsibility, and make some sacrifices of sovereignty and prestige, we may not avoid the nuclear destruction which is only fifteen minutes away.

I doubt whether the U.S. or the Soviet Union plan an all-out nuclear war. Both appreciate the consequences, but neither trusts the other, and therefore they are loath to disarm. The greatest danger today and in the foreseeable future is a war by accident or miscalculation or from a local conflict degenerating into a major struggle with neither of the Great Powers willing to back down. The chances of an accidental war are increasing every day with the

development of devices which will detect missiles immediately after they have been launched. There was an incident some time ago when the missile-detecting radar at Thule picked up an unidentified object and caused some consternation. When the U.S. and the Soviet Union start testing multiple launching of rockets and satellites without notice these detection devices will pick up these missiles heading into space. These may well be mistaken for the commencement of a hostile strike, causing the other side to release the retaliation weapons and bring on the war that no one wants. This is a very acute and increasing danger, and an agreement is urgently needed on the mutual reporting of all proposed test flights of missiles and satellites and a strict control on the commencement of retaliation. This is a very complex problem, but so much is at stake that it needs clarification.

We must continue, no matter how tiresome and provoking it is, to support fully the U.N. in its efforts to solve the complicated international problems and maintain the peace. It is vitally important that the middle powers such as Canada should undertake these tasks so that intervention by the giants — the U.S. and the Soviet Union — is never made necessary by the refusal of the middle powers to take over this responsibility. If the giants come in, then it will only mean they would come in from opposite sides and perhaps take up positions from which they could not back down, leading to a conflict which no one wants.

In the meantime we must continue to maintain modest, well-equipped forces to carry out these roles in the United Nations and support the deterrent in Europe, the Atlantic and North America until the use of force as an instrument of policy is abandoned.

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For Further Reading

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Study Questions

1. Canada's armed forces at present carry out duties under the U.N., in Europe, in the North Atlantic and in North America. Bearing in mind the limitations of a middle power's military capacities, do you think Canada has overextended itself in its present and varied military duties? If so, what are the alternatives to this policy?
2. Discuss the pros and cons of establishing a permanent United Nations Emergency Force.
3. Canada's extensive military commitments are often said to be in contradiction to the Canadian efforts to further a disarmament agreement. Discuss.
4. General Foulkes maintains that if Canada is to meet its current, military obligations, which the Government has indicated it will do, then Canadian armed forces must be armed with nuclear weapons. Debate this thesis.
5. Compare and contrast Canadian defence policy before and during World War II and after 1945. Identify the major changes. What are the chief factors that have caused such changes?

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Printed by Associated Printers Ltd., Toronto.



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THE NATURE OF THE DISARMAMENT PROBLEM

J. E. Keyston, O.B.E., D.Phil., a physicist and Vice-Chairman of the Defence Research Board of Canada, contributes this article in a private capacity.

INTRODUCTION

IN A WORLD into which the thermonuclear weapon and long-range ballistic missile have recently been ushered there has arisen a new earnestness in man's desire to outlaw war. Concern over the very survival of humanity motivates us to deeper thinking about the problem of eliminating the root causes of human conflict, but the more deeply we ponder this fundamental problem the more clearly we recognize that the time-scale for effecting an adequate change in human nature could not be less than thousands of years. Is there not then, we ask, something more hopeful, practical and immediate that could be done towards outlawing war? Interest naturally focuses on national armaments, the instruments of war. Could not some international control of national armaments contribute to prevention of war? Is it not obvious sense for all humanity to strive for disarmament?

It is peace we all want, but peace and disarmament are not synonyms. We want disarmament of a type and measure that will contribute to peace; we do not want any kind or degree of disarmament that may encourage war or hazard our freedom and liberty.

The object of this pamphlet is to examine how, what measure and what kind of disarmament may contribute to peace, and to glimpse some directions in which it is realistic to look for progress towards the main aim.

Three major difficulties have had to be faced in writing this pamphlet. One has been that of adequately covering the main facets of the disarmament problem in the few pages allotted. Disarmament is a topic that leads into extraordinary complexities and interplay of military strategy and technology, with politics and psychology. The second difficulty has been that of treating the topic with adequate objectivity. It is so natural to ignore or underrate viewpoints that are not one's own. The third difficulty has been that of avoiding presumptuous or ignorant criticism of the armaments policy of any particular nation.

In an endeavour to overcome the two last-mentioned difficulties resort has been had in Part I to examining the broad dis-

armament problems that would be expected to arise on a fictitious earth peopled by only two nations.

Part II, using the conclusions from Part I as background, furnishes a commentary on some of the specific disarmament issues facing us in the real world of today.

Part III expresses a viewpoint on Canada's opportunity for contributing to the disarmament objective.

The whole, it is hoped, will clarify many aspects of the disarmament problem and, by revealing that there is more to the topic than meets the eye, will whet the reader's appetite for wider and deeper study. A list of authoritative books on disarmament is appended.

PART I

DISARMAMENT IN A SIMPLIFIED WORLD

1. Simplifying Assumptions

Let us assume there are only two nations in the world. Nation A and Nation D, equally large and having similar resources. There are many differences between A and D, maybe in form of government, way of life, living standards, religious outlook, ideology, educational systems and other characteristics, and they have different past histories and future aspirations. Nation A, for a complex array of reasons, counts among his aspirations some that cannot be achieved without injury to some of D's interests. Perhaps he envies something D possesses, or perhaps he feels interest in pressing upon D's people some features of his own way of life; whatever it may be, we are justified in saying he is aggressive ("A" for aggression-oriented). Nation D is well aware of A's aspirations but is not willing to accede to encroachment on his interests by A; he recognizes a need to be on the defensive against A ("D" is for defence-oriented).

We will assume that in the years preceding 1965 the two nations have indulged in a keen arms race which has piled up the means of attack to a near approach to sensible limits and is in a phase in which main effort shifts to concentration on defensive measures. Each nation has developed and produced tactical nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear weapons. The tactical variety are weapons for use by armies, navies and air forces in fighting each other; they are generally of the kiloton magnitude in explosive power (one kiloton power equals the power of one thousand tons of T.N.T.). The strategic variety are weapons for attack on

cities and industrial plants,* they are generally of the megaton magnitude in explosive power (one megaton power equals the power of one million tons of T.N.T.).

At this stage of full armament each country possesses:—

- (a) An army of large operational strength deployed close behind and along the common land frontier of A and D. These armies are equipped with both conventional weapons and tactical nuclear weapons, and all requisite air support. These are known as the Tactical Forces.
- (b) An array of long-range ballistic missile batteries located two thousand miles or more behind the frontier in such dispersed, protected or mobile sites that the enemy cannot hope to destroy them. Available for these forces is a stockpile of strategic nuclear weapons, amply large enough to provide sufficient missiles for getting through any defences and causing virtual annihilation of life and property in the cities of the other nation. These missile systems are known as the Strategic Nuclear Deterrent Forces.
- (c) On the vast ocean that divides A and D, the 'other way round' the world, each has large fleets of surface warships and submarines having a multitude of offensive and defensive purposes. These are known simply as the Naval Forces.

As it makes no sense on the balance of military and economic considerations to build up greater stockpiles of nuclear weapons or to devote more of each nation's manpower and industrial effort to military ends, the arms race continues primarily in the form of a scientific and technological race to develop new and improved forms of weapons, counter-measures, equipments, communications, vehicles, components, materials, reconnaissance devices and such other things as will ensure that the continued modernization of the forces leads to enhancement of their fighting effectiveness.

This state of full armament of each side has not yet produced or been attended by any armed hostilities. Nations A and D can be said to be in peaceful co-existence. There is, of course, continuous tension between them because there is no doubt from the actions, proclamations and general behaviour of A's leaders that they have aggressive aspirations with regard to D. (Reciprocally A's leaders assert that it is D's armaments programme that has set the pace in the arms race, and which is evidence of aggressive-mindedness on the part of D!)

*It is assumed that in 1965 the strategic weapons bases are inviolable to attack by strategic weapons.

2. The Balance of Fear

Nations A and D, having evolved through a normal course of human history, have often been at war in the past. Until the twentieth century their wars were fought out between their armed forces; during the twentieth century their wars have been more 'total', involving the mobilization of civilians as well as military manpower, and have included numerous civilians in the casualty lists. Each country has been invaded by the other, cities near the frontier have been devastated and ports have been bombarded, but neither has suffered anything like total devastation of land, property and population. What may happen in a future war looks very different however, due to the advent of the strategic nuclear weapons and the threat of total devastation they pose. The all-out 'blitzing' of each country by the other promises to kill most of the city dwellers by the direct effects of the nuclear explosive and almost everybody else by the radioactive after-effects. A quite new element has been introduced into their political and military thinking; formerly A and D were often deterred from war over long periods because the balance of their armed forces made it quite uncertain which could win a war, but now they both have reason to fear the consequences of war, successful or unsuccessful, more than they fear each other.

This *balance of fear* introduced by the strategic nuclear weapons is a far more potent deterrent to war than was the deterrent provided by balanced conventionally armed forces. The terms *nuclear stalemate* or *state of stable deterrence* are also used to describe the situation brought about by balanced strategic nuclear weapon strength.

Because of the *balance of fear*, A and D peacefully co-exist despite the continuous tension between them, but the peace has its worries for both of them. One main reason for this is that there might be an outbreak of war by accident or miscalculation with catastrophic consequences. Another reason is that the maintenance of so much investment of national resources in the armed forces handicaps the possible rate of national economic and social advance. These are reasons why, despite their different basic attitudes towards disarmament, both A and D have some common interests in investigating to what extent some degree of disarmament by both sides, which would not upset the balance of armed strength, would be beneficial and practicable. However, since any disarmament negotiations necessarily take a long time to bring to a point of fruition, the first priority for both A and D is to investigate how, during a period of full armament, they can minimize the risk of outbreak of devastating nuclear war.

3. Prevention of War by Accident or Miscalculation

Some fool may press the button that sends off the nuclear ballistic missiles that causes the other side to retaliate by firing their missiles — and almost everybody will soon be dead.

Some frontier incident, some mistake as to where the frontier runs, some attempt to see how strongly the enemy holds his front line, some offensive aircraft wandering off course over enemy territory, some local provocation, some miscalculation that results in a specific act being treated as more hostile or serious than it actually was intended, may cause one side to fire conventional weapons against the other, then tactical nuclear weapons, then strategical nuclear weapons — and almost everybody will soon be dead.

The process of build up from accident or miscalculation to major war does not in fact appear so simple, automatic or likely when studied in detail as it can be made to sound or seem to the layman, but there is plenty of scope nevertheless for making the process more difficult.

How can peace between A and D be made safer by ensuring that accidents or miscalculations do not result in 'chain reactions' that trigger off all-out nuclear war?

One obvious line of approach is for each of the forces to minimize risks of accident by instituting rigid disciplines, cross-checks, organizational arrangements and controls that rule out the possibility of the world being put at the mercy of 'trigger-happy' individuals. Major hostile reactions must be made subject to deliberate, direct personal authorizations by Premiers or Presidents of A and D. Such measures are the interest and responsibility of each government separately.

A highly important course that lends itself to negotiation and agreement between A and D should be the institution of agreed arrangements towards ensuring that any *massive* retaliation shall not also be *instant*.

The requirement is to work out arrangements whereby, immediately upon the occurrence of a hostile incident that may perhaps be due to accident, misunderstanding, miscalculation or misjudgement, *e.g.*, the arrival and explosion of one of A's nuclear missiles within D's territory, or vice versa) there is established instant and reliable communication between the heads of state of A and D to make possible the exchange of information and explanation of the incident. Rules are needed to determine who takes the initiative in this kind of consultation, and for establishing how

any explanation of the incident is made subject to satisfactory checking. It should not be difficult to follow procedures, pre-arranged during peacetime, for investigating hostile incidents and arresting their consequences; it is sure to be very difficult to improvise careful and restrained action and consultation at a time when emotion has been fanned by an 'incident' that may have caused up to half a million casualties.

In the case of incidents involving the armies that face one another across the frontier, there is the same need for agreed procedures for immediate investigation to minimize the chance that the incident may inflame A and D into large-scale hostilities. They should endeavour to agree on instant consultation at the top level of government before either uses nuclear, bacteriological, chemical or other mass destruction weapons in retaliation against attack by conventional weapons much less capable of destruction of life.

A very practical safeguard that could be taken to minimize the risks of clashes, accidental or otherwise, between the armies of A and D lies in negotiating an agreement to locate the front line of each army at a substantial distance away from the actual frontier, leaving in between the armies a 'no man's land' or neutral zone in which no arms or forces are located. (This kind of precaution is referred to as a 'disengagement' measure.) Although missiles and aircraft can reach across any distance, there is a definite conflict-prevention value in the establishment of a neutral zone between armies and this value increases as the neutral zone is made wider. The same concept of a neutral zone can have application to the common air and ocean in which the air and naval forces of A and D operate.

4. Disarmament — General

It has been indicated that both A and D recognize some very unsatisfactory features in maintaining the military condition of the full armaments which produce the *balance of fear*. They thus both have interest in some degree of disarmament and are motivated to examine at what lower level they would be willing to balance their forces and how they would arrange to make the transition from full armament to the agreed lower level of balanced forces.

Let us examine some of the problems involved in answering these questions.

How few strategic nuclear missiles, how few tactical divisions, how few naval forces — and corresponding defensive equipment —

would A or D be willing to accept if the other would agree to have roughly the same?

This question, which is so very fundamental to the disarmament problem, leads into a highly complex array of political, military and scientific considerations only a few of which can be indicated in a short survey.

5. Total Nuclear Disarmament

To the disarmament idealist the objective must be that Nations A and D totally disarm themselves, or at least reduce their forces to the small sizes required for maintaining internal law and order. Since the nuclear weapons are vastly more militarily effective than conventional weapons, it would go a long way towards meeting the idealists' hope if A and D could agree to abolish all nuclear weapons.

Let us ask, then, why A and D should not abolish and outlaw nuclear armaments.

The first answer to this question has already been stated but is important enough to warrant re-stating. It is that from D's point of view the introduction of strategic nuclear weapons has given him a far greater confidence of deterring A from military aggression than he was ever before able to gain from maintaining parity with A in conventionally armed strength. Why should he sacrifice this advantage that has come his way?

The second answer to the total nuclear disarmament proposition is that it would be plain foolishness for D to agree to it knowing that it would require but a quick, well-planned, secret production of a few nuclear weapons by A to furnish a decisive military advantage over D. Security would be stripped from D, the defence-oriented nation, satisfied with what it has; domination would be offered all too easily to the bully who covets what is not his own.

Nation A can well afford to declare the ideal-sounding objective of total disarmament, knowing it to be the condition that would serve his ends very well. Nation D has to proclaim that he is opposed to total nuclear disarmament—which unfortunately sounds as though he likes nuclear weapons, although in reality it means that he likes stability in the prospect of peace.

Assume however that for some sufficient reason D should feel motivated, in consort with A, to agree on attainment of a state of total abolition of strategic nuclear weapons. In this case D would at least consider it necessary that the disarmament should be accompanied by an inspection and control system for ensuring

that A could not suddenly produce nuclear arms in violation of the agreement. This matter of inspection of nuclear disarmament warrants some examination.

6. Inspection and Control of Nuclear Disarmament

In theory it should be possible for D to feel reasonably secure in the presence of a nuclear weapons ban if it were arranged that D could post in A's territory a corps of disarmament inspectors who could detect any signs of nuclear arms production by A and transmit the information to D in time for him to provide adequate defence or balancing deterrent armaments. In practice there would be most formidable difficulties in making the inspection adequately thorough and speedy in operation. Let us look at some of the snags.

Bearing in mind what a big military advantage is conferred on one nation by only a few strategic nuclear weapons if the other nation has none, is it realistic to expect that inspection of a total nuclear weapons test ban can be adequately effective if either A or D retain the capacity for manufacture of nuclear explosive material for legitimate peacetime applications?

To date the peaceful applications of nuclear energy which require the use of nuclear explosive materials, or produce such materials as by-products, are not very extensive nor very diverse. But the natural advance of nuclear science and technology will soon change the situation. There will be more nuclear power stations producing more nuclear explosive by-products. Nuclear explosives will find valuable application to large-scale, earth-moving projects, shale-oil production, underground engineering, salt-water distillation, ice clearing, weather control and other civil purposes. And, on top of all, scientific research promises new, better, simpler and cheaper ways of releasing nuclear explosive energy from materials used at present and other elementary ones to be developed.

Could any corps of inspectors 'police' all the sites where nuclear explosive material is being produced, directly or as by-product, sufficiently frequently, continuously and thoroughly to detect the diversion of material in amounts adequate for making strategic nuclear weapons in secret places? Is it likely that A or D could seriously attempt to clamp down on the civil uses of nuclear energy or the forward march of nuclear technology in order to make easier a nuclear weapon inspection scheme? The answer is that they could not succeed in such an endeavour even if they tried. The search for and the civil application of new scientific knowledge are not susceptible to restraint that can possibly be effective, except perhaps very locally and very temporarily;

they are intimate components of the inexorable process of human evolution.

It seems very obvious that inspection to detect production of strategic nuclear weapons could not be effective if production of tactical nuclear weapons were permitted. For inspection reasons alone, total strategic nuclear weapons disarmament must surely amount to the same thing as total banning of all nuclear weapons.

And what of the prospect that D's inspectors will discover that totally new weapon that may have emerged from a 'break-through' in some research laboratory, assuming that A does not wish to give away his new secret?

An important point to be recognized in connection with any scheme for arms inspection in country A by inspectors from D is that the inspectors are present by favour of A and can only operate in accordance with procedures acceptable to A. And they can be sent packing back to D in the instant A decides to implement some carefully foreplanned switch-over of his factories into a sudden arms-production programme.

The fact is that in practice there can be no such thing as a foolproof arrangement of inspection of total nuclear disarmament. If Nation A or Nation D has strong motivation to 'cheat' on agreement to limit or ban manufacture of nuclear weapons they could succeed in doing so.

Total nuclear disarmament and total strategic nuclear disarmament, with or without inspection, appear to be ruled out as a practicable arrangement acceptable to both A and D. The reasoning has not, however, covered one debatable eventuality. This rests on the conjecture that if all nuclear weapons were banned, a reasonably good peacetime inspection of the ban were arranged, and war should break out between the conventionally armed forces of A and D, it would in fact be found that A and D would not have resort to use of nuclear weapons even though they *could* produce them in militarily significant quantities.* The question whether conventional war would remain conventional in the presence of nuclear weapon "know-how" is one that could only be answered by the experience of hostilities and finds no place in plans for the preservation of peace. The more significant question that is raised by this conjecture is whether the existence of nuclear "know-how" alone, without the actual nuclear weapons, may be a sufficient deterrent of hostilities. Bearing in mind the basic assumption that "Nation A, for one reason and another, has some

*This conjecture is mainly derived from the experience that Nazi Germany and her opponents possessed poison gas in World War II but did not use it, but the parallel is poor for a variety of technical reasons.

ambitions that cannot be satisfied without injury to D's interests" it is difficult to imagine the circumstances in which D would put his trust in nuclear weapon "know-how" to deter aggression by A. Even to be a month later than A in translating nuclear "know-how" into nuclear weapons could be disastrous, so swift is the tempo of nuclear war likely to be.

The conclusion is unavoidable that in the world of A and D the introduction of total disarmament in respect of strategic nuclear weapons or of all nuclear weapons cannot contribute to the stability of peace. To defence-oriented Nation D in particular the absence of strategic nuclear weapons gives much less assurance of peace and security than the presence in each country of sufficient strategic nuclear weapon strength to produce some *balance of fear*.

The question remaining for exploration is to what extent D could be satisfied to agree with A on something less than 'full' nuclear armament and conventional force strength. Is there not some level of nuclear armament between zero and 'full' stockpiling that is more acceptable than either extreme? And cannot conventionally equipped forces be balanced at less than 'full' strength?

7. Partial Disarmament

The question of how far A and D may see it in their interests to reduce their balance of armed strength from an existing level to a lower level leads into a complex array of interlocking political, military and scientific considerations. It will be helpful first to examine some of the military considerations.

While Nations A and D are assumed to be equally large and having similar resources, it must be presumed that they look quite different on the map; one is a compact area, the other much more spread out and irregular in shape; one has mountains along its land frontier, the other a wide plain; one has a much longer coast line than the other; one has its cities near its frontiers, the other's cities are mainly well inland; one has far less city-dwellers than the other; there are important climatic differences between them, the industrial skills and products of the two peoples are different. The consequence of these and other differences is that, in the assumed state of full and balanced armaments, the armies, navies and air forces of the two nations are quite different from each other in regard to the numbers, types and quality of armament with which each is provided. Nation A may have more tanks, more infantry weapons, less bomber aircraft, more submarines, less anti-submarine ships, less assault craft, better communications, poorer radars, more men in the navy, less in the air force, the

same numbers in the army but nevertheless more front-line troops than D. Some of these differences may derive from military tradition, some may be difficult to explain for any reason, but most are due to the plain and simple fact that the military task of attacking D and defending against D is a quite different one from the task of attacking A and defending against A — and demands a different composition of forces and equipment.

It adds up to the experience that national forces in over-all balance are not balanced in detail. This is true whether we are talking about 'full' armament, or any less level of armament. It is the basic reason why one cannot derive a new level of balanced armaments by applying a simple 'cut-down' formula to an existing level of balanced armaments. If A and D, presumed roughly in balance and fully armamented, cut down their manpower and equipment in every detail by, say, one half, or by the same numbers of each kind of servicemen and equipment, they will surely find themselves in serious imbalance of fighting strength. (It must be remembered, moreover, that unless A and D have first agreed to count each other's armaments they are only guessing at what each other's armed strength actually is at the start of 'cut-down').

The fact is that a balance of armed strength is not an equation between numbers of men and armaments on one side and similar numbers on the other, but a military judgement in the light of a specific military situation and the possible changes in the military situation. (The term 'balanced armaments' that has been used is a simplification that may well mislead the reader into thinking only of military equipment and not sufficiently of their application and deployment in relation to the overall military situation.) It might even be possible for D to have more of each kind of weapon and defensive equipment than A, yet be in a militarily inferior position because differences between the terrain near the frontier and between the lengths of lines of communications make it much easier for A than D to speedily concentrate his forces at some selected battle position.

Any suggestion by A that both A and D should cut their forces by so many men, or by so many arms of such and such a type, necessarily involves D in the complex task of forming a military judgement of the way in which such a cut will affect his ability to 'hold' any aggression A may embark upon. Scientific and technical calculations may be of help to D's military commanders in forming their judgement, but only a partial help. There is much in this judgement process that is necessarily incalculable and inexact, and in the end, the judgement embraces a fairly wide

area of military risk and uncertainty. The headstrong pace at which science and technology are now advancing greatly decreases the assurance with which the final judgement of adequate parity of armed strength is reached. Who knows what advantage, offensive or defensive, science may tomorrow confer upon A or D?

Despite all the difficulties, the military chiefs of A and D, if required to do so by their political masters, can find some directions in which they could effect reduction in men and or arms below the full armament level and each still regard his forces as adequately in balance with those of his opponent. But, in general, the greater the reductions that were agreed upon the more each of their judgements of balance becomes liable to be vitiated by the unassessable, intangible, unknown and unforeseeable aspects of the present and future military situation. The lower the levels of balanced forces, the less flexible they are to accommodate errors and uncertainties.

The unsureness, the insecurity of a presumed balance of military strength between two nations, increases as the military strength of both nations decreases. This is inherent in the military problem; it is quite independent of how sincerely interested the military or the politicians are in disarmament.

Let us assume now that A and D have succeeded in agreeing on reductions of military manpower and weapons that will leave each nation satisfied with the balance between the two forces. How do A and D actually effect these reductions in strength?

It is evident that if D takes a month to reduce his forces to the new lower level while A takes a year to make the corresponding reduction in his forces, there will be an eleven-month period in which A has the military advantage over D. Similarly there will be a temporary imbalance created if the reduction of specific categories of weapon gets out of phase, *e.g.*, if D reduces his anti-submarine ships ahead of a corresponding reduction of A's submarines.

The maintenance of a balance of forces accordingly needs to be continuous during the actual disarmament process. This involves reaching agreement between A and D on the time-phasing of agreed arms reduction. It also involves agreement to establish mutual disarmament inspection by A and D to give assurance to each that the reduction of arms and manpower are proceeding in accordance with the agreed time-scale.

This outline analysis of the balanced disarmament problem indicates that A and D will have to weigh the following broad

considerations when deciding by how much they want to effect a balanced reduction of armaments. The more they disarm:

- (a) The more they reduce the economic burden of armaments.
- (b) The less immediately serious would be the consequences of a war by accident or miscalculation.
- (c) The less becomes the chance of triggering off a war by sheer accident.
- (d) The easier it becomes for one side to grasp decisive military advantage over the other by disrespecting a disarmament agreement, particularly in regard to strategic nuclear weapons production.
- (e) The more thorough any disarmament inspection scheme will need to be.

From these considerations each government has to form a political judgement as to how far its national interests and aspirations will encourage it to go in disarmament negotiations with the other nation. For the aggressor-minded A and the defensive-minded D, the national interests and aspirations are different, and so are the military risks each can feel justified in taking. Each nation will accordingly reach a different judgement as to how far it feels justified in disarming. Agreement on disarmament can, at most, go as far as the lesser degree of disarmament judged acceptable by A or D.

There is thus no technical or military way of determining how much less than full disarmament would represent an 'optimum' level at which to balance the military forces of A and D. It is essentially a matter of complex political judgement and compromise into which military and scientific judgements and forecasts are important factors.

8. Partial Disarmament Studies

Complex as may be the political, military and scientific aspects of the partial disarmament problem, it behooves both A and D to study them intensively and continuously in the hope of uncovering first one direction then another in which some reduction can be agreed, however small, in their armed strengths. It benefits both nations if such disarmament studies and negotiations do no more than aid agreements to avoid further increases in armaments. It is of benefit to increase understanding of the partial disarmament problem from both the viewpoint of one's own nation and the other nation. The understanding of the problem of partial disarmament in this new era of *balance of fear* is still only very superficial in many aspects, and the need and scope for studies is very great.

9. Experimental Inspection

Both A and D must realize that the future holds very little hope for agreement on any disarmament steps unless some inspection can be arranged within each others' territory. Much can be theorized about the snags inherent in mutual arms inspection but, until there is some experience of inspection, it cannot be judged how real the theoretical snags may prove, nor how they may be mitigated. The introduction of an arms inspection scheme, inefficient as it may be, is an important experiment required in the interest of adding some realism and experience to arms inspection theory.

10. The Root of the Difficulty

From the preceding survey one regrettably draws the conclusion that A and D are going to find that the negotiation of a substantial alleviation of their armament burdens will be a very long and difficult process. The reason for this disappointing prospect is very clear. It goes back to the definition of Nation A, who "for a complex array of reasons, counts among his aspirations some that cannot be achieved without injury to some of D's interests" and of Nation D who is "not willing to accede to encroachment on his interests by A". The basic obstacle to disarmament is the human conflict between interests of A and D. What kind of political, economic, social, cultural or spiritual steps can A and D take to diminish the amplitude of their conflict and reduce the time-scale for its elimination? These questions do not come within the scope of a disarmament study; they are of a much more fundamental genre. Until they are resolved the basic causes of war will remain, and among these causes armaments themselves figure only to a secondary extent.

PART II

DISARMAMENT IN OUR WORLD

1. The Nature of the Soviet and Western Approaches to Disarmament

When we turn from the simple world of A and D to the real world in which we live the disarmament issues are, of course, complicated by the facts that the two great powers, the Communists and the West, are themselves not single nations but groups of nations, and by the existence of many other nations whose future development, intentions, military strength and affiliations can only be surmised. But the paramount difficulty facing

the West in making progress in disarmament is not the technical intricacy of the problem arising from its multi-national nature, but the blunt fact that the people with whom we have to try to reach agreement are men possessed of the motivations, objectives, resources and position of the Soviet Government. Stark realism demands that any and all thinking in the West, by individuals or governments, about our approach to disarmament shall be based on an appreciation of the position of the Russians with whom any deal has to be made.

The Soviet Union has the objective of spreading Communism throughout the whole world. This is her avowed and regularly re-avowed policy, and there is no element of doubt about it. Her post-war annexation of East European states, her actions in Hungary, Africa, Laos, Cuba and elsewhere are in line with this policy. Quite fundamentally and irrevocably she is aggressively oriented against the West. To succeed in this aggression she is ready at any place or time to resort to cold war or hot war or both insofar as they may further her overall political objective. Soviet interest in all disarmament proposals is accordingly from two angles:

- (a) Can they contribute to a relative betterment of her position for waging military hostilities?
- (b) Can they lead to relative improvement of her strength in waging cold war?

Both considerations are *always* clearly in the Soviet mind, but in recent years her interest in disarmament has been concentrated to the larger extent on (b) for two logical reasons. One has been the improbability of getting out of the position of nuclear stalemate and indulging in hot war with the West to any advantage, and the other has been her post-war experience of gratifying success in the waging of cold war.

The West, on the other hand, approaches disarmament with sincerity as a means of reducing the chances and the horrors of hot war, and of easing the burden of preparing for hot war. To the West, disarmament proposals are put forward, judged or accepted solely in relation to their impact on our ability to maintain adequate military defensiveness against hot war attack by the Soviet Union.

It is only a slight over-simplification to say that disarmament is currently being approached by the U.S.S.R. and the West in relation to two totally different aspects of the conflict between them. This unquestionably is the basic factor that bedevils disarmament progress and confuses the public. And most unfortu-

nately for the West, where public opinion is of some significance and impact, the mere confusion of our public counts as a cold war success for the Soviet Union.

In all the circumstances there are two courses open to the West in continuing the pursuit of disarmament:

- (i) To play Khrushchev at his own game of using disarmament as a pawn in the cold war contest.
- (ii) To continue to treat disarmament as strictly related to the mitigation of hot war chances, consequences and preparatory costs.

The former can be summarily written off for two good reasons. The first is that it would be repugnant, both to public and to government leaders in the Western democracies, to transform disarmament debate and negotiation into a mere playing to the gallery of the uncommitted nations. The second reason is that the diversity and independence of the Western group of nations virtually ensures that the West would be outsmarted in any attempt to combine in a cold war chess game against the Russian master with disarmament used as a pawn.

The West must adhere to the second course and continue to pursue disarmament with patience and sincerity as a means of reducing the risk of war and the economic burden of defence. To this end, to avoid deflection of purpose and to achieve solidarity, there is a need for much closer co-operation and integration of disarmament thinking, studies and action among the NATO nations. An approach to disarmament that is different from the Soviet, every whit as single-minded, but derived from many voices, speaking with both harmony and sincerity, could indeed, though directed only at the Russians, be most impressive to the neutral nations.

There is just a chance that a stronger, clearer, more unified Western striving for some kind or degree of disarmament might persuade the Soviet Government that its political interests would be better served by more attention to the aspects of disarmament that interest us. It is probably more realistic to assume, however, that disarmament proposals will continue to be approached from the two very different angles — cold war by the U.S.S.R., and hot war by the West. In this case, it is at least incumbent on the West to do everything possible to prevent the U.S.S.R. gaining cold war capital from the situation. This involves a major programme of education of neutral nations, and of our own public, in the nature of this curious disarmament 'contest' between two sides pursuing different objectives and using different rules.

Just how far the nations are from a reasonable level of general education in the fundamentals of disarmament can be recognized from the fact that, by and large, Khrushchev was able to gain a favourable balance of world applause for his proposals to the United Nations that complete and general disarmament should be achieved by all nations on earth within a period of four years. The ridiculously, unrealistic nature of his proposition, coupled with the great military advantage it would give to the Soviet Union if achievable, did not produce the international ridicule of the Soviet Union it deserved. By all too many it was judged not as the piece of cold war gamesmanship it actually was, but as though it were a sincere contribution to the outlawing of hot war.

What Khrushchev is particularly aware of is that in the Western democracies government policy is affected by public opinion, that our devotion to freedom of expression of thought and opinion gives him a chance to impose his viewpoints on our public opinion and thereby gain entry into our government policy. His opportunity is particularly good in the field of disarmament played from the cold war angle because there is probably no international topic in whose subtleties the public are less educated and discerning than that of cold war tactics. Nothing in our history or our schooling gives us a glimmer of understanding of the arts and crafts of cold-war-manship.

The task of preventing Khrushchev from trading upon our sincere interest in disarmament and manipulating it to our cold war disadvantage thus falls not only on the leaders of our Western democratic governments, but also to an important extent, upon all of us. In this context, while it is inadmissible in our free and liberal society for government to instruct the public in the way it should think about disarmament, it is surely permissible to issue a general warning of the following kind: — "Is your thinking and talking about disarmament issues exactly the way Khrushchev would like it to be? If so, please re-check your reasoning, lest inadvertently you aid his objectives." In times of hot war the fifth column can ravage a nation's defences; in times of cold war the same function can be performed by innocent patriots parading idealistic disarmament banners down roads paved with good intentions.

2. Immediate Arms Limitation Issues

Because the Soviet approach to disarmament is so different in kind and sincerity from the Western approach, it is not predictable in what particular disarmament directions there is any special hope of reaching agreements. The technically simple prospects

may be intermeshed with formidable difficulties, while technically intricate propositions may in some cases gather promise by striking simultaneously some note of appeal to both parties. The promise of each disarmament proposal should be tested by the careful, patient, painstaking experience of negotiation around the East-West conference table. There are, however, some discernible priorities; some issues that demand more immediate attention than others, of which two examples will be mentioned very briefly.

(i) *Limiting the Nuclear Club*

It is currently the general opinion that the risk of outbreak of nuclear war by accident or design will increase somewhat in proportion to the number of nations who have possession of offensive nuclear arms. This has given rise to a strong incentive to limit the possession of nuclear weapons to those countries — the U.S.A., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R. — who now have stockpiles of strategic nuclear weapons. (In popular terms, to limit membership of the "Nuclear Club".) France, however, as we know, is already well on the way to possessing her own nuclear weapons, while the advance of nuclear technology for civil applications will inexorably bring the "know-how" for manufacture of nuclear weapons within reach of many more nations.

Should the "nuclear club" nations agree not to supply offensive nuclear weapons to other nations, including their own direct allies? Or, if they must supply them to their allies, should they retain control of their use in peacetime?

Any nation wanting to manufacture its own nuclear weapons must first develop them, and development involves a series of tests of the weapons. Can the non-nuclear nations be brought into an international agreement to refrain from development of nuclear arms? Is it technically possible to detect tests of nuclear weapons? If so, can agreement be reached to establish a world-wide net of detecting stations so that nations embarking on nuclear weapon development can be detected in the act? Could not agreement be reached to establish, if only as a small-scale experiment, some international inspection scheme to cover nuclear tests or even nuclear weapons production? Some progress in devising and operating armaments inspection schemes is essential to any practical progress in armaments limitation or disarmament.

Assuming there is international agreement to refrain from development of nuclear weapons, and there is the technical possibility of detecting any violator of the agreement, what sanctions can be applied to cause the violator to desist? Is there any effective sanction other than the use of armed force?

As this is being written, there are international negotiations in progress in Geneva towards seeking ways and means of reaching agreement on a nuclear weapons test ban that can be adequately policed and enforced. It is too early to predict the outcome of negotiations in this technically and politically most involved matter. But if the Geneva talks do not lead to a nuclear test ban inspection scheme between the nuclear powers, could not all the non-nuclear nations band together to institute an inspection scheme within their own territories? This would be one way of arresting the spread of nuclear weapons manufacture, of testing out the techniques of inspection and at the same time of affording a significant chance of detecting further testing within the frontiers of the nuclear powers.

(ii) *Control of the Consequences of Military Accidents and Miscalculation*

The realistic prospect is that at best any practical progress that can be made in nuclear disarmament will be very slow, and that for many years we will have to live in the presence of large stockpiles of devastating nuclear weapons. Nothing can be of higher priority than development of means for minimizing the risks of nuclear accidents that might trigger-off war, or of chain reactions of provocation and counter-provocation that build up to unwanted war.*

Far too little attention, in my view, has been paid as yet, either within the NATO community or between NATO and the U.S.S.R., to the examination and discussion of controls, procedures and channels of communication for use in the event of accidental or miscalculated warlike incidents. And since both the Soviet Union and the West have an interest in preventing an outbreak of all-out war by accident or miscalculation, there should be practical promise of useful cooperation and agreement in this direction.

The 'neutral zone' concept,* as a useful means of reducing the risk of armed clashes, is a simple proposition from the technical angle, but the problem of its introduction between the Soviet and NATO armies in Europe becomes choked with political complications associated with German re-unification and re-armament.

3. Some Specific Features of the Disarmament Problem

In transposing our thinking about disarmament from the simplified world of A and D to our real world, account must be taken of very many complicating features additional to the broad

*See pp. 3-4 for an earlier reference to this topic.

*Loc. cit.

bedevilment explained in paragraph 1 above. Space allows only an outline mention of some of these major complicating features:—

- (i) Militarily speaking, and to a large extent politically also, the Communist world is a secret society. Because of this, the West is relatively greatly handicapped in disarmament negotiations by lack of access to all kinds of relevant information. For the same reason the Communist world is particularly antipathetic to proposals for introducing inspectors into their military installations.
- (ii) The Communist world is a relatively compact land mass with a military potential that is primarily dependent on internal land and air communications. The NATO alliance is a relatively dispersed community with a military potential primarily reliant upon extended sea communications.
- (iii) In Europe there is great disparity in favour of the U.S.S.R. between her forces and NATO's in respect of military manpower and conventional fire-power. This imbalance of conventional strength can be offset by NATO by tactical nuclear weapon strength. The situation makes for great difficulty in examining nuclear weapon disarmament by itself or conventional weapon disarmament by itself and forces negotiation into the still more difficult direction of endeavouring to equate so much nuclear strength to so much conventional strength.
- (iv) Several of the NATO nations—the U.S., the U.K., and France in particular—have commitments to provide substantial armed forces for the protection of other countries and dependencies far outside the NATO region, and beyond the area in which the armed forces of the Communist bloc are deployed. How should these forces fit into any armament balance or disarmament cut-backs between the U.S.S.R. and the West?
- (v) The military and political policies of the NATO alliance are inevitably subjected to strains and variations as a consequence of the diverse and independent nature of the NATO nations, and the changes in governments resulting from the democratic electoral process. In contrast the Soviet system imparts much more constancy and long-term assurance to their military and political policies.

4. China

The prospects for negotiation and agreement in nuclear weapon disarmament between NATO and the Soviet bloc are already

greatly clouded by the realization that within ten years China may well evolve as a great nuclear power. The Chinese display an exceptionally ruthless character and they are a colossally numerous people. If any country on earth can possibly absorb casualties of a hundred million and concomitant suffering that could result from strategic nuclear bombardment, it is China.

How can China be persuaded to desist from becoming a nuclear weapon power? Alternatively, how can she be brought within a stabilized state of peaceful co-existence based on a three party (NATO, the U.S.S.R., China) balance of fear? How far can NATO or the U.S.S.R. feel able to cut back on nuclear deterrent capability until some military understandings are reached with China?

If China cannot be dissuaded in time from joining the nuclear weapon nations, would India feel impelled to become a nuclear power? Or Australia? If the threat of massive nuclear retaliation may be no effective deterrent to Chinese aggressiveness, what other deterrents are possible?

5. An International Police Force

In any one country reliance is placed on a police force for maintaining the respect of individuals for law and order. A relatively small, armed and well-trained police force can regulate law and order between millions of individuals who have few arms and no military organization. Could not total disarmament, or a very substantial degree of disarmament, be made consistent with peace between nations by providing an international police force to preserve respect for international law and order?

There are problems and difficulties galore in relating this concept to practicability, but all are relatively minor in comparison with the exceptional difficulties presented by the problem of control of an international force.

International disputes are never clear-cut issues in which it is easy to make a quick and universally agreed decision as to which of the disputants is in the right and which is in the wrong. The prerequisites for determining when and on which side to employ an international police force are an agreed international legal code and an international readiness to respect and enforce it. There have existed and do exist today various rules of conduct subscribed to by a sufficient number of nations to represent useful, partial contributions towards formulation and establishment of a universal legal code. There is also the International Court of Justice at The Hague to which international disputes can be

referred for judgement. These are useful beginnings towards the establishment of an international law and a machinery for its expert interpretation, but they are no more than bare beginnings. Ahead there lies an immense task of studying, negotiating, and agreeing among all nations the details of the "thou shalt nots" of international behaviour. A much greater, more determined, more continuous, patient effort is needed to support the objectives of the International Law Commission of the United Nations. Pessimism about general acceptance of an international code of conduct, or extended international legal machinery, should not be allowed to handicap the work of study and formulation.

The realist, however, cannot be other than profoundly pessimistic over the prospects of creating international willingness to abide by the findings of an international court of justice as the basis for directing the intervention, in a dispute, of an international police force. The enforcement of international law cannot be made dependent on the size of the nation decreed to be the aggressor or provoker. We cannot reconcile veto powers with justice. In a world presumed to be largely disarmed, the international police force must especially gain the confidence of the small nations as their protector against the big powers.

The tasks of building up international law and the means and will for its enforcement are very, very long term. Nevertheless, they can and should be patiently pursued as disarmament measures inch forward in parallel.

PART III

THE CANADIAN ROLE IN DISARMAMENT

Where lies Canada's opportunity to make a contribution in the field of disarmament? Has Canada any special role to play, any particular position of international advantage? Is there anything in our history, our tradition, our geography, our military situation or our capability that amounts to a special asset in this field of striving?

The most pertinent conclusions that come from pondering such questions are, I suggest:

- (a) We are recognized as having a sincere desire to contribute to the objective of disarmament.
- (b) Of the smaller military powers, we have the best up-to-date knowledge and appreciation of military potentialities, factors and trends.

- (c) We accept international affiliations and responsibilities but are averse to external domination of our thinking and expression.

If these are fair self-appraisals they justify us in believing that Canada could gain a position of very high respect and influence in world disarmament councils. But whether we achieve this potential depends primarily on what quality and quantity of continuous effort we actually devote to examination and analysis of this exceedingly intricate subject in all its facets. No disarmament negotiator from Canada or from any other country can succeed if handicapped by a less than powerful source of background reference.

Canada's greatest disarmament opportunity lies in recognizing, in full measure, the value and need of a strong, continuous study of disarmament and in adding this reinforcement to her current qualifications.

In due course — not speedily — the addition of expertise *in* disarmament to devotion *to* disarmament can promise Canada a position of leadership of the smaller powers, and very substantial influence upon the policies and progress of the great powers.

For Study and Discussion

[The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, publisher of this and other series of pamphlets, special memoranda, reports, books and the INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL (a quarterly), maintains a Library to assist teachers, researchers, and Institute members. Inquiries are invited. Write or phone (WALnut 3-7369), 230 Bloor Street West, Toronto 5, Ontario.]

For Further Reading

Books

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- Frye, William R., "A UN Peace Force". *Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 257*, New York, Public Affairs Committee (in collaboration with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), 1957.
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Study Questions

1. In any nuclear disarmament agreement that is reached, there arises the grave problem that the West's safety may be endangered because of the overwhelming Soviet superiority in conventional forces. Discuss the implications of this statement.
2. Compare and contrast Soviet and Western approaches toward disarmament. Identify the strengths and weaknesses in each side's approach.
3. The author suggests ". . . there can be no such thing as a foolproof arrangement of inspection of total nuclear disarmament". Discuss.
4. What are the pros and cons of establishing an international police force to maintain and enforce a disarmament agreement?
5. Examine the problems of a) "disengagement" and b) limiting membership in the nuclear "club".
6. Dr. Keyston proposes that if current disarmament talks among the great powers break down, an inspection scheme should be established among all non-nuclear nations. Discuss this proposal. Is this the kind of diplomatic initiative Canada should take in disarmament talks? What is the role of a middle power in this field?

The Canadian Atlantic Co-ordinating Committee

- assists the programmes of its two participating bodies, the Canadian Institute of International Affairs and the United Nations Association in Canada, insofar as this work concerns the Atlantic Community
- distributes materials to adult education groups, current affairs study groups and high school students on NATO
- enquiries are invited to the address below

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CANADIAN ATLANTIC CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE**

230 Bloor Street West, Toronto 5, Ontario

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Date: 29 May 61

JOINT STAFF MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: President's State of the Union Message (25 May)

DESCRIPTION: Message No. 1699 of 26 May 61 - from WASH to External
Joint Staff Signals amendment of 27 May 61

1. The attached document is referred to:

CCOS
CAS
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JBMDs ✓

(for info)

2. It is requested that action be taken by:

JBMDs Circulation		PA 2193 ✓
Chief	✓	
Planning	✓	
Technical	✓	
Research	✓	
Tech Pers	T1	T2 T3
Disarmament	✓	

R. G. Kingstone
for (R. C. Weston) Col
Air Commodore,
for Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

RGK/6-7321/

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

-----SIGNALS MEMO-----

FM JOINT STAFF SIGCEN

TO CR

BT

U N C L A S S I F I E D

FOLLOWING INFORMATION RCVD FROM WASHDC

REF OURTEL 1699 MAY26

PRESIDENTS STATE OF THE UNION MSG(MAY25)

ORIGINATORS REQUEST AMEND WORDS IN PARA THREE FIRST SENTENCE.

FRONTIER TO READ FURTHER RPT FURTHER. NEW TO READ NON RPT NON.

SENTENCE SHOULD NOW READ AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE A FURTHER REINFORCEMENT OF OUR OWN CAPACITY TO DETER

OR RESIST NON NUCLEAR AGGRESSION UNQUOTE.

27 MAY 61

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OO HCMRO PP HUPNL PP HUPSP PP HUPEN
DE MCPBU
O P 261849Z
FM WASHDC MAY26/61 UNCLAS
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TT BONN BRU PRIORITY FM LDN

TT ROME PRIORITY FM GVE

AIRMAIL COPEN OSLO LISBON ANKARA ATHENS FM LDN

CCCS OTT DND OTT DEFPD OTT FINANCE OTT OPIMMED FM OTT

REF OURTEL 1692 MAY25

PRESIDENTS STATE OF THE UNION MSG(MAY25)

IN OUR REFTEL WE OUTLINED THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PRESIDENTS RECOMMEN-
DATIONS ON ECONOMIC MATTERS. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF THE REMAIN-
DER OF THE PRESIDENTS ADDRESS WHICH DEALS PRIMARILY WITH DEFENCE,
DISARMAMENT AND SPACE EXPLORATION. COPIES OF THE FULL TEXT OF THE MSG
AS DELIVERED ARE GOING FORWARD BY BAG TODAY(MAY26).

2. QUOTE OUR PARTNERSHIP IN SELF DEFENCE UNQUOTE

THE PRESIDENT SPOKE OF THE NEED TO QUOTE KEEP OUR DEFENSES STRONG-
AND TO COOPERATE WITH OTHERS IN A PARTNERSHIP OF SELF-DEFENCE UNQUOTE.
HE MENTIONED IN PARTICULAR THE TASK OF STRENGTHENING NATO AND SEATO.
QUOTE TO MEET THE CHANGING CONDITIONS OF POWER UNQUOTE IT HAD BEEN
DECIDED TO INCREASE THE QUOTE EMPHASIS UNQUOTE ON NATO CONVENTIONAL
STRENGTH BUT AT THE SAME TIME TO CONFIRM THE NEED FOR A STRONG
QUOTE NATO NUCLEAR DETERRENT, HENCE USA INTENTION QUOTE TO COMMIT TO
THE NATO COMMAND... THE FIVE POLARIS SUBMARINES... WITH THE POSSI-

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BILITY IF NEEDED, OF MORE TO COME UNQUOTE. THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME NEEDED NEW EMPHASIS, QUOTE THE EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING MUST BE TAILORED TO LEGITIMATE LOCAL NEEDS AND TO OUR FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICIES, NOT RPT NOT TO OUR SUPPLY OF MILITARY STOCKS OR A LOCAL LEADERS DESIRE FOR MILITARY DISPLAY UNQUOTE. THE DIMENSION OF NEEDS HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN FULLY FORESEEN WHEN THE FIRST REQUEST FOR 1.6 BILLION DOLLARS HAD BEEN REQUESTED FOR THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMME. CONGRESS WAS THEREFORE BEING REQUESTED TO PROVIDE A TOTAL OF 1.835 BILLION DOLLARS. THE PRESIDENT RECOGNIZED QUOTE STRONG PRESSURES AGAINST... MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE UNQUOTE BUT HE ADDED, QUOTE WE CANNOT MERELY STATE OUR OPPOSITION TO TOTALITARIAN ADVANCE WITHOUT PAYING THE PRICE OF HELPING THOSE NOW UNDER THE GREATEST PRESSURES UNQUOTE.

3. QUOTE OUR OWN MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE SHIELD UNQUOTE

THE PRESIDENT HAD DIRECTED QUOTE A ^{FURTHER} FRONTIER REINFORCEMENT OF OUR OWN CAPACITY TO DETER OR RESIST NEW NUCLEAR AGGRESSION UNQUOTE. WITH ONE EXCEPTION (THE MARINE CORPS) THERE WAS NO RPT NO NEED FOR QUOTE LARGE NEW LEVIES OF MEN... WHAT IS NEEDED IS RATHER A CHANGE OF POSITION TO GIVE US STILL FURTHER INCREASES ON FLEXIBILITY UNQUOTE. TO THIS END THE SEC OF DEFENCE HAD BEEN CHARGED TO QUOTE UNDERTAKE A REORGANIZATION AND MODERNIZATION OF THE ARMY'S DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE, TO INCREASE ITS NON-NUCLEAR FIREPOWER, TO IMPROVE ITS TACTICAL MOBILITY IN ANY ENVIRONMENT, TO INSURE ITS FLEXIBILITY TO MEET ANY DIRECT OR INDIRECT THREAT, TO FACILITATE ITS COORDINATION WITH OUR MAJOR ALLIES, AND TO PROVIDE MORE MODERN MECHANIZED DIVS IN EUROPE

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AND BRING OUR EQUIPMENT UP TO DATE, AND NEW AIRBORNE BRIGADES IN BOTH THE PACIFIC AND EUROPE UNQUOTE. SECONDLY, CONGRESS WAS ASKED TO PROVIDE AN ADDITIONAL 100 MILLION DOLLARS TO ENABLE A BEGINNING OF PROCUREMENT OF THE MOST MODERN MATERIAL: NEW HELICOPTERS, ARMoured PERSONNEL CARRIERS AND HOWITZERS WERE EXAMPLES. THIRD, THE SEC OF DEFENCE WAS TO QUOTE EXPAND RAPIDLY AND SUBSTANTIALLY, IN COOPERATION WITH OUR ALLIES, THE ORIENTATION OF EXISTING FORCES FOR CONDUCT OF NON-NUCLEAR WAR OF ALL KINDS UNQUOTE. FOURTH, PLANS WERE BEING DEVELOPED TO MAKE POSSIBLE A MUCH MORE RAPID DEVELOPMENT OF THE MAJOR POSITIONS OF THE HIGHLY TRAINED RESERVE FORCES. THE INTENTION WAS THAT THE COMBAT POWER OF THE ARMY SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF BEING DOUBLED IN LESS THAN TWO MONTHS RATHER THAN NEARLY NINE MONTHS AS HERETOFORE REQUIRED. FIFTH, CONGRESS WAS ASKED FOR 60 MILLION DOLLARS TO INCREASE MARINE CORPS STRENGTH TO 190,000, QUOTE TO ENHANCE THE ALREADY FORMIDABLE ABILITY OF THE MARINE CORPS TO RESPOND TO LIMITED WAR EMERGENCIES UNQUOTE. SIXTH, THE WHOLE INTELLIGENCE EFFORT WAS TO BE REVIEWED AND ITS COORDINATION WITH OTHER ELEMENTS OF POLICY ASSURED.

4. QUOTE CIVIL DEFENCE UNQUOTE

A QUOTE CONSISTENT POLICY UNQUOTE HAD NEVER BEEN ADOPTED IN THE PAST. THE ADMIN HAD TAKEN QUOTE A HARD LOOK UNQUOTE AT CIVIL DEFENCE. QUOTE IT CANNOT BE OBTAINED CHEAPLY. IT CANNOT GIVE AN ASSURANCE OF ELAST PROTECTION THAT WILL BE PROOF AGAINST SURPRISE ATTACK OR GUARANTEED AGAINST OBSOLESCENCE OR DESTRUCTION. AND IT CANNOT DETER A NUCLEAR ATTACK UNQUOTE. THE DETERRENT CONCEPT, FOR WHICH CIVIL

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DEFENCE QUOTE WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE AN ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE UNQUOTE
ASSUMED RATIONAL CALCULATION. THE HISTORY OF THE PLANET WAS SUFFI-
CIENT TO REMIND US OF QUOTE THE POSSIBILITIES OF AN IRRATIONAL
ATTACK, A MISCALCULATION, AN ACCIDENTAL WAR OR A WAR OF ESCALATION
UNQUOTE. THIS WAS THE BASIS ON WHICH CIVIL DEFENCE WAS JUSTIFIED
QUOTE AS INSURANCE UNQUOTE. QUOTE ONCE THE VALIDITY OF THIS CONCEPT
IS RECOGNIZED, THERE IS NO RPT NO POINT IN DELAYING THE INITIATION
OF A NATION-WIDE LONG-RANGE PROGRAMME OF IDENTIFYING PRESENT FALLOUT
SHELTER CAPACITY AND PROVIDING SHELTER IN ^{NEW} NEED AND EXISTING STRUC-
TURES UNQUOTE. QUOTE EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE OF THE ENTIRE PROGRAMME
NOT RPT NOT ONLY REQUIRES NEW LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND MORE FUNDS,
BUT ALSO SOUND ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. UNQUOTE RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THE PROGRAMME WAS TO BE ASSIGNED TO THE SEC OF DEFENCE. QUOTE IT
IS IMPORTANT THAT THIS FUNCTION REMAIN CIVILIAN IN NATURE AND
LEADERSHIP. UNQUOTE THE OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENCE MOBILIZATION
TO BE CALLED THE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PLANNING WOULD BE RECONSTE-
TUEDD AS A SMALL STAFF AGENCY TO ASSIST IN COORDINATION. A MUCH
STRENGTHENED FEDERAL-STATE CIVIL DEFENCE PROGRAMME WOULD BE SUBMIT-
TED TO CONGRESS. FEDERAL FUNDS WOULD BE REQUIRED AND FINANCIAL PAR-
TICIPATION WOULD ALSO BE QUOTE REQUIRED UNQUOTE FROM STATE AND LOCAL
GOVTS AND FROM PRIVATE CITIZENS. THE PRESIDENT FORECAST THAT APPRO-
PRIATION REQUESTS FOR CIVIL DEFENCE IN 1962 WOULD BE MORE THAN TRIPLE
PENDING REQUESTS AND WOULD BE SUBSEQUENTLY INCREASED. QUOTE ~~SHARPLY~~ UNQUOTE

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DISARMAMENT

THE PRESIDENT EMPHASIZED QUOTE THE STRONGEST HOPE UNQUOTE FOR QUOTE THE CREATION OF AN ORDERLY WORLD WHERE DISARMAMENT WILL BE POSSIBLE. OUR ARMS DO NOT RPT NOT PREPARE FOR WAR--THEY ARE EFFORTS TO DISCOURAGE AND RESIST THE ADVENTURES OF OTHERS THAT COULD END IN WAR UNQUOTE. THE PRESIDENT REFERRED TO QUOTE CONCRETE PROPOSALS UNQUOTE PUT FORWARD IN THE TEST BAN TALKS TO MAKE CLEAR THE WISH QUOTE TO MEET THE SOVIET HALF WAY IN AN EFFECTIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY--THE FIRST SIGNIFICANT BUT ESSENTIAL STOP ON THE ROAD TOWARDS DISARMAMENT UNQUOTE. THE SOVIET RESPONSE HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN WHAT HAD BEEN HOPED FOR BUT QUOTE WE INTEND TO GO THE LAST MILE IN PATIENCE TO SECURE THIS GAIN IF WE CAN UNQUOTE. MEANWHILE DISARMAMENT WOULD BE KEPT QUOTE HIGH ON OUR AGENDA--TO MAKE AN INTENSIFIED EFFORT TO DEVELOP ACCEPTABLE POLITICAL AND TECHNICAL ALTERNATIVES TO THE PRESENT ARMS RACE UNQUOTE. TO THIS END THE PRESIDENT STATED HIS INTENTION TO SEND A MEASURE TO CONGRESS QUOTE TO ESTABLISH A STRENGTHENED AND ENLARGED DISARMAMENT AGENCY UNQUOTE.

6. SPACE.

THE IMPACT OF DRAMATIC ACHIEVEMENTS IN SPACE QUOTE ON THE MINDS OF MEN EVERYWHERE, WHO ARE ATTEMPTING TO MAKE A DETERMINATION OF WHICH ROAD THEY SHOULD TAKE UNQUOTE SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE CLEAR. NOW IT WAS TIME FOR USA QUOTE TO TAKE A CLEARLY LEADING ROLE IN SPACE ACHIEVEMENT, WHICH IN MANY WAYS MAY HOLD THE KEY TO OUR FUTURE ON EARTH UNQUOTE. THE RESOURCES AND TALENTS WERE AVAILABLE BUT THE FACT WAS THAT USA HAD NEVER MADE QUOTE THE NATIONAL DECISIONS OR MARSHALLED

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THE NATIONAL RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR SUCH LEADERSHIP UNQUOTE, BEARING IN MIND THE SOVIET HEAD START AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF FURTHER IMPRESSIVE SOVIET SUCCESSES IT COULD NOT RPT NOT BE GUARANTEED THAT USA WOULD QUOTE ONE DAY BE FIRST BUT WE CAN GUARANTEE THAT ANY FAILURE TO MAKE THIS EFFORT WILL MAKE US LAST UNQUOTE. THIS WAS NOT RPT NOT QUOTE MERELY A RACE UNQUOTE. WHATEVER MANKIND MUST UNDERTAKE QUOTE FREE MEN MUST FULLY SHARE UNQUOTE. THE PRESIDENT THEREFORE ASKED CONGRESS TO PROVIDE FUNDS FOR THE FOLLOWING NATIONAL GOALS:

(1) ACHIEVING THE LANDING OF A MAN ON THE MOON AND RETURNING HIM TO EARTH SAFELY BEFORE THIS DECADE ENDS.

(2) ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROVER NUCLEAR ROCKET (AN ADDITIONAL 25 MILLION DOLLARS).

(3) ACCELERATING THE USAS PRESENT LEADERSHIP IN COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITES (AN ADDITIONAL 50 MILLION DOLLARS).

(4) ACCELERATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SATELLITE SYSTEM FOR WORLD-WIDE WEATHER OBSERVATION (AN ADDITIONAL 75 MILLION DOLLARS).

PURSuing THESE GOALS WOULD REQUIRE 531 MILLION DOLLARS IN FY 1962 AND AN ESTIMATED SEVEN TO NINE BILLION DOLLARS OVER THE NEXT FIVE YEARS. THE PRESIDENT ADDED, QUOTE IF WE ARE TO GO ONLY HALF WAY, OR REDUCE OUR SIGHTS IN THE FACE OF DIFFICULTY, IN MY JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE BETTER NOT RPT NOT TO GO AT ALL UNQUOTE. NEW OBJECTIVES AND NEW MONEY WERE NOT RPT NOT ENOUGH--QUOTE THIS DECISION DEMANDS A MAJOR NATIONAL COMMITMENT OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL MANPOWER, MATERIAL AND FACILITIES, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR DIVERSION FROM OTHER IMPORTANT ACTIVITIES WHERE THEY ARE ALREADY THINLY SPREAD. IT MEANS

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A DEGREE OF DEDICATION, ORGANIZATION AND DISCIPLINE WHICH HAVE NOT
EPT NOT ALWAYS CHARACTERIZED OUR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS.
IT MEANS WE CANNOT AFFORD UNDUE WORK STOPPAGES, INFLATED COST OF
MATERIAL OR TALENT, WASTEFUL INTER-AGENCY RIVALRIES, OR A HIGH TURNOVER
OF KEY PERSONNEL UNQUOTE.

7. CONCLUSION

THE PRESIDENT SAID, QUOTE... IN MY JUDGMENT, THIS IS A MOST SERIOUS
TIME IN THE LIFE OF OUR COUNTRY AND IN THE LIFE OF FREEDOM AROUND
THE GLOBE UNQUOTE. IT WAS THEREFORE THE PRESIDENTS DUTY TO MAKE HIS
RECOMMENDATIONS TO CONGRESS SO THAT THEY COULD REACH THEIR OWN
CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE COURSE TO BE TAKEN IN THE COMMON INTERESTS
WITH THE PRESIDENTS JUDGMENT BEFORE THEM. THE PRESIDENT CONCLUDED,
QUOTE WE ARE DETERMINED, AS A NATION IN 1961 THAT FREEDOM SHALL
SURVIVE AND SUCCEED... AND WHATEVER THE PERIL AND SETBACKS, WE HAVE
SOME VERY LARGE ADVANTAGES UNQUOTE; QUOTE WE ARE ON THE SIDE OF
LIBERTY... WHICH HAS BEEN WINNING OUT ALL OVER THE GLOBE UNQUOTE;
QUOTE WE HAVE FRIENDS AND ALLIES... WHO SHARE OUR DEVOTION TO FREEDOM
UNQUOTE; A SINCERE DESIRE FOR PEACE AND LASTLY THE WILLINGNESS OF THE
AMERICAN PEOPLE QUOTE TO PAY THE PRICE UNQUOTE WHICH WOULD INVOLVE
SOME INCONVENIENCE, OR SOME HARDSHIP OR SOME SACRIFICE FOR ALL.

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723/26 MAY 61

CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EDGAR TARR HOUSE

230 BLOOR STREET WEST, TORONTO 5

PA 2,95

May 25, 1961

Dear Brigadier Waldock:


Conference on "Problems of Canadian Independence"

We have received your registration card for our Annual Conference in Montreal on June 10 and 11.

As requested we have reserved^{one} tickets for the dinner in Redpath Hall on Saturday, June 10 and these may be picked up and paid for at the C.I.I.A. Registration Desk at Sir George Williams University on Friday, June 9 from 7.00 p.m. to 8.30 p.m. or before noon on June 10. Dress will be informal.

It has now been decided that the conference will begin at 9.30 a.m. on Saturday morning with a brief plenary session at which three statements will be presented by experts on the three aspects of our theme. At about 10.30 p.m. we will break up into round tables. The co-operation of participants would be appreciated so that the sessions may start on time.

Yours sincerely,



Conference Secretary

EAN:hs

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CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

28th Annual Study Conference on

PROBLEMS OF CANADIAN INDEPENDENCE

to be held at
SIR GEORGE WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY
Montreal, June 10 and 11, 1961

WEEKEND PROGRAMME

Friday, June 9

7.00 p.m. - 8.30 p.m.	REGISTRATION at Sir George Williams University
8.00 p.m.	Nation Council Meeting

Saturday, June 10

9.00 a.m. - 12.30 p.m.	REGISTRATION at Sir George Williams University
9.30 a.m. - 12.00 noon	ROUND TABLES
2.00 p.m. - 4.30 p.m.	ROUND TABLES
6.45 p.m.	ANNUAL DINNER, Redpath Hall, McGill University

Sunday, June 11

9.30 a.m. - 12.00 noon	ROUND TABLES
2.00 p.m. - 4.00 p.m.	PLENARY SESSION

* * * * *

ROUND TABLE RESERVATIONS

The CIIA registration card should be mailed by May 10. MONTREAL MEMBERS are urged to mail the registration card to ensure that a place will be reserved for them at the round table chosen and at the dinner.

ANNUAL DINNER

The guest speaker at the Annual Dinner on Saturday June 10, at 6.45 p.m. will be His Excellency Mr. Frederick Bolland, President of the United Nations General Assembly.

Tickets for the dinner, at \$5.00 each, must be reserved by filling in the registration card. Reserved tickets should be picked up at the CIIA Registration desk at the Conference before noon on Saturday, June 10.

REDUCED RAIL AND AIR FARES

An identification certificate and information on how to participate in the Convention Rates will be forwarded on request by the Registrar, Conference of Learned Societies, McGill University, Montreal.

LIVING ACCOMMODATION

See the enclosed information from the Conference headquarters. Return the registration forms as early as possible and not later than May 10 direct to McGill University which is looking after all accommodation.

CONFERENCE RULES

The round table discussions are private and confidential and may be attended only by accredited CIIA members and by guests invited by the National Office. There will be no entry to round tables or the plenary session without a lapel badge.

CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
230 Bloor Street West,
Toronto.

Complete CONFERENCE DOCUMENTATION, lapel badges and dinner tickets which have been reserved will be available at the CIIA desk.

REGISTRATION FEE

\$2.00

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AGENDA

Problems of Canadian Independence

In order that attention should be directed to the central question of Canadian independence rather than to any one aspect in isolation, each round table will consider all three subjects: foreign policy, economic policy, and defence policy. To enable discussion leaders to move about, the programmes of the round tables will be staggered. On Sunday afternoon there will be a plenary session at which attention will be directed to the interdependence of the problems of independence.

The following agenda is intended as a guide to preliminary thinking. As each round table will cover all three subjects, a simplified version of the agenda will be prepared for the Conference. It is hoped that attention can be maintained on the central theme of the extent to which Canadian policy has been, can be, and should be independent rather than on well-threshed specific issues of foreign, economic, and defence policy.

I. FOREIGN POLICY

A. Commonwealth

What, if any, vestigial limitations on Canadian independence are imposed by the relationship to the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth in general? Does the Commonwealth association weaken or strengthen Canadian independence?

B. Bilateral Relations with the United States

Are present institutions, such as the International Joint Commission, adequate for contemporary border problems? Should they be reformed or supplemented? Is international law on the subject adequate?

What handicaps and advantages does Canada possess in negotiating with the United States over water-ways and other boundary matters? What kind of pressures are most effective in this kind of bargaining?

C. Multilateral Relations

What is the significance of Nato membership for Canadian independence? What influence have the smaller powers on Nato strategy and policy?

Does Nato membership inhibit the Canadian role as a middle power?

Would the Canadian role in the world be strengthened by membership in the O.A.S.?

Are there problems of priorities in our overlapping commitments to the Commonwealth, NATO, and the U.N.?

What is the appropriate Canadian attitude to blocs in the United Nations?

Has Canadian independence been strengthened by its role in the United Nations? Do the demands of independence conflict with the requirements of constructive international statesmanship? What, in general terms, is the desirable Canadian posture in the United Nations?

D. Public Opinion

Is there a connection between the independence of Canadian opinion and media of opinion and the independence of Canadian foreign policy?

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E. The Role of a "Middle Power"

What is a "middle power"? Is this an appropriate or advisable classification for Canada?

What have been Canada's principal achievements and notable failures as a "middle power"?

How does a middle power exert influence effectively on the powers whose policies are more decisive? By diplomacy, blackmail, moral suasion, public denunciation?

Is Canada's role as a middle power likely to be affected by recent shifts of power in the world?

Is "neutralism" necessary or desirable to strengthen Canada's hand as an effective middle power?

What are the handicaps and advantages of alliances for a country like Canada?

To what extent is Canadian policy on major political questions such as China, Korea, disarmament, Congo determined or affected by the pressures of our economic and defence policies and commitments?

II. ECONOMIC POLICY

A. Advantages and Disadvantages in the Present Situation

What have been the benefits or disadvantages to Canadians of foreign investment in our economic development? Of the conversion of national industries into branch plants? Of the association of labour unions with foreign unions?

What has been the effect on our cultural, community, educational resources? What has been the effect on our human resources?

To what extent have foreign economic interests influenced Canadian external relations? In our attitudes to China, Cuba, U.S.S.R. for example?

Is Canadian economic development restricted or assisted by GATT?

B. Canadian Economic Activity Abroad

The role now played by Canadian industries in the international scene. How important are they for Canadian independence? for the projection of the Canadian image abroad? for Canadian morale?

What are the prospects for increasing this sector of the economy?

What is the significance of Canadian economic assistance programmes for Canadian independence?

C. Proposed Alignments

What are the advantages and disadvantages for Canada of the following associations:

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5.

Free trade with the United Kingdom or the Commonwealth in general?

Participation in the European Free Trade Area or the European Economic Community?

Continental economic union?

III. DEFENCE POLICY

A. NATO

Should Canada's present commitments to Nato be revised in the light of changing circumstances?

Does the Nato commitment unnecessarily limit our power of decision over peace and war?

Has Canada an adequate voice in Nato military planning?

B. NORAD

What is the present Canadian commitment to NORAD?

What influence does Canada have on decisions affecting defence of this continent?

Are there risks involved in the stationing of foreign troops on Canadian soil?

To what extent are questions of Canadian sovereignty involved in the decision whether or not to have nuclear weapons on Canadian soil?

C. United Nations

How significant has been the Canadian contributions to United Nations mediatory forces and the Indo-China truce commissions? What has been the effect of their activities on Canadian diplomacy? Is this a contribution which can or should be increased in scale? Should this be Canada's sole military activity?

What would be an intelligent approach by Canada to the question of arms control, including disarmament?

D. Neutralism or Alliances

What are the defence arguments for and against a complete or limited withdrawal of Canada from Norad and Nato commitments?

What alternative defence programmes could be devised for Canada?

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Suggested Reading List on Problems of Canadian Independence

Books and Pamphlets

- Aitken, H.G.J. et al. The American economic impact on Canada. Duke University Press, Durham, 1959. 176 p.
- Alexander, Fred. Canadian and foreign policy: the record of an independent investigation. University of Toronto Press, 1960. 160 p.
- Brewin, Andrew, and Kenneth McNaught. Debate on defence: two viewpoints on Canadian foreign policy. Ontario Woodsworth Memorial Foundation, Toronto, 1960. 27 p.
- Brewster, Kingman. Law and United States business in Canada. Canadian-American Committee, Montreal, 1960. 30 p.
- Canada, Army. A brief history of the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence 1940-1960. Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1960. 16 p.
- Canada, Dep't of Defence Production. Canada-United States defence production sharing. Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1960. 122 p.
- Caves, Richard E. and R.H. Hollon. The Canadian Economy: Prospects and Retrospect. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1959. 676 p.
- Coyne, J.E. Balance of payments problems in North America. Remarks to Economic Club of New York, March 7, 1961. Ottawa, 1961. 19 p.
- Gellner, John. Problems of Canadian defence, "Behind the Headlines", C.I.I.A., Toronto, 1958. 14 p.
- Hutchison, Bruce. At the Crossroads (article on Canada and Europe), Winnipeg Free Press Pamphlet No. 66. 1960. 46 p.
- Keenleyside, Hugh, et al. The growth of Canadian policies in external affairs. Duke University Press, Durham, 1960. 174 p.
- Keyfitz, Nathan, Canada and the Colombo Plan. "Behind the Headlines", C.I.I.A., Toronto, 1961. 15 p.
- Lindeman, John and Donald Armstrong. Policies and practices of United States subsidiaries in Canada. Canadian-American Committee, Montreal, 1961. 82 p.
- Macdonald, H.I. Canada's foreign economic policy, "Behind the Headlines", C.I.I.A., Toronto, 1960. 15 p.
- Masson, Francis and J.B. Whiteley. Barriers to trade between Canada and the United States, Canadian-American Committee, Montreal, 1960. 97 p.
- Minifie, James M. Peacemaker or powder-monkey. McClelland & Stewart, Toronto, 1960. 174 p.
- Reuber, Grant L. The growth and changing composition of trade between Canada and the United States. Canadian-American Committee, Montreal, 1960. 85 p.
- Smith, J.M. Foreign investment in Canada, "Behind the Headlines", C.I.I.A., Toronto, 1959. 16 p.
- Southworth, Constant and W.W. Buchanan. Changes in trade restrictions between Canada and the United States. Canadian-American Committee, Montreal, 1960. 65 p.
- Stovel, John A. Canada in the world economy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1959. 377 p.
- United Church, Committee on the Church and International Affairs. The winds of change. Toronto, Sept. 1960. 78 p.
- Fox, Annette B. The power of small states; diplomacy in World War II. University of Chicago, 1959. 211 p.

Periodical Articles

- Bank of Nova Scotia Review, April, 1960. European integration and Canadian trade. April, 1960.
- Brewin, F.A. Canadian foreign policy. The need for maturity. Canadian Forum, February, 1961.

7.

- Caves, Richard E. Europe's unification and Canadian trade. Canadian Journal of Economic and Political Science. August, 1959.
- Conant, Melvin, Canada and continental defence: an American view. International Journal, summer, 1960.
- Duffy, Robert. Canadian foreign policy in trouble. International Journal, autumn, 1959.
- Johnson, Harry G. Canada's foreign trade problems. International Journal, summer, 1960.
- LePan, D.V. What does it really cost to be a Canadian? Financial Post, March 4, 1961.
- MacLennan, Hugh. Anti-Americanism in Canada. Harper's Magazine, March, 1961.
- Matthews, Roy A. Canada and economic union. International Journal, summer, 1959.
- Newman, P.C. Atoms, NATO and NORAD - The coming election issue. Maclean's. March 25, 1961.
- Ritchie, R.E. Problems of a defence policy for Canada. International Journal, summer, 1959.
- Sharpe, Duane. The folly of neutralism. Canadian Commentator, December, 1960.
- Silcox, C.E. Peacemaker or powder-monkey: a review. Canadian Commentator, April, 1960.
- Spencer, Robert A. Parliament and foreign policy. International Journal, autumn, 1960.
- Symons, T.H.B. Canada: reluctant satellite? Canadian Forum. September, 1960.

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CONFERENCE OF LEARNED SOCIETIES

JUNE 1st to 16th, 1961

McGILL UNIVERSITY

SIR GEORGE WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY

UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL

INSTRUCTIONS AND INFORMATION FOR DELEGATES

During the June 1960 meetings of the National Conference of Canadian Universities and Colleges reference was made to the continually growing number of societies and delegates attending the annual conference of the Learned Societies, and it was recognized that, even at the present level of attendance, if all societies are to meet at the same place during a reasonably brief period of time, the locations selected for the annual conference must be restricted to those with sufficient residence and meeting accommodation to meet the needs of the delegates. Generally speaking, these requirements have the effect of confining the conferences to the larger universities, and some of the smaller institutions have advocated an occasional regional grouping of the conferences, with several institutions in the area each acting as host to several societies.

It was therefore proposed that, for the 1961 Conferences of the Learned Societies, Université de Montréal, Sir George Williams University and McGill University act as joint hosts. Because of the limited residence accommodation at the three Montreal institutions, particularly at Université de Montréal and Sir George Williams University, it has been necessary in some cases to schedule meetings and residence accommodation at different locations. Even though the available residence accommodation is fully utilized, there will be a shortage of rooms between June 7th and 10th, and it will be necessary for those who cannot be provided with University accommodation to stay in hotels and tourist rooms.

I. PRELIMINARY REGISTRATION:

Each delegate is asked to complete the two accompanying Registration Forms which should be returned NOT LATER THAN MAY 10th, 1961 to:

The Conference Registrar,
McGill University,
Montreal 2, P.Q.

II. REGISTRATION ON ARRIVAL:

Each delegate must register between 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. at the Registration Office of the University which is host to his Society (see Form No. 2 to determine which University is host and which provides residence accommodation) as soon as possible after arrival. Delegates may, of course, go first to the University residence or hotel where accommodation has been reserved.

III. MAIL:

Delegates should have all mail and telegrams addressed to them as follows:

In care of CONFERENCE OF LEARNED SOCIETIES
Name of University which is host to your Society
Montreal, P.Q.

IV. TELEPHONE NUMBERS:

McGill University — VIctor 4-6311 — (Night VIctor 4-6762)

Sir George Williams University — VIctor 4-0131 — (Night VIctor 9-4171)

Université de Montréal — REgent 3-9951 — (Night REgent 3-9800)

V. CASHIER:

Payment in advance for Room and Board should be made at the University residence in which the delegate is staying.

VI. IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATES:

Delegates requiring travel warrants are asked to indicate this on their Registration forms. These warrants ensure reduced fares, and they will be mailed to delegates who state that they need them.

VII. LOCAL TRANSPORTATION:

Bus service between the places of meeting and the various residences will be available. Information in this regard will be given by the Registration Office of the host University of your Society.

VIII. ACCOMMODATION:

In the various University residences both single and double room accommodation will be available. The cost of bed and breakfast will be about \$5.00. (Full particulars will be forwarded by the University concerned when notice of your reservation is sent to you.)

Delegates will not be asked to share a room unless:

- a) they especially request double accommodation and indicate on their application form the name of a room-mate who has agreed to this arrangement.
- b) their request for Residence accommodation is received after all single rooms have already been allocated.

It is stressed again that not all delegates can be accommodated in University residences on certain dates, and many delegates may prefer, in any event, to reserve their own hotel accommodation. Delegates who intend to bring their wives are reminded that although every effort will be made to give them the University accommodation they request, it may in some cases be necessary to accommodate them in adjoining single rooms. Information concerning hotels, motels, and tourist lodges may be obtained by writing to:

Montreal Tourist and Convention Bureau, Inc.,
2055 Peel St., Montreal 2.

Blocks of rooms have been tentatively reserved at the following hotels:

Berkeley Hotel, 1188 Sherbrooke Street West, Montreal 2, — 10 twin-bedded rooms.

Laurentien Hotel, Dominion Square, Montreal 2, — 25 single and 25 double rooms.

Mount Royal Hotel, 1455 Peel Street, Montreal 2, — 50 double-bedded rooms.

Delegates must make their reservation directly with the hotel, identifying themselves as delegates either to the Learned Societies Conference or to the meetings of their particular Societies. Hotel reservations will be accepted up to May 15th, 1961.

(Français au verso)

Form No. 1

CONFERENCE OF LEARNED SOCIETIES - MONTREAL, 1961

McGill University - Sir George Williams University - Université de Montréal

PRELIMINARY REGISTRATION FORM

NOTE: All delegates are asked to complete and return Forms No. 1 and 2.

The Conference Registrar,
McGill University,
Montreal 2, P.Q.

Please mail this form not later than MAY 10th.

Mr.
From: Mrs.
Miss (Surname, please print) (Given name)
Academic Title.....
Attending Meeting(s) of.....
My wife accompanies me.....
Address for future correspondence.....

ACCOMMODATION: (Please check)

I shall make my own off campus reservations for accommodation.....

I shall require accommodation in the University Residences as indicated below.....

My wife will also require Residence accommodation.....

Single Room (men).....
Single Room (women).....
Double Room (men)..... with.....(name)
Double Room (women)..... with.....(name)
Double Room (husband and wife).....

ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE:

Checking out time from University Residences is 9:00 a.m. each day.
(But luggage may be left with the porter in the Residence until departure).

I plan to arrive in Montreal on June.....
(date of arrival)

at approximately.....A.M.
(time of arrival) P.M.

and intend to leave on June..... at approximately.....A.M.
(date of departure) (time of departure) P.M.

IDENTIFICATION CERTIFICATES:

I shall require a Railway Warrant
Yes No

000162

(English other side)

Formule No. 1

CONFERENCE DES SOCIETES SAVANTES - MONTREAL, 1961

McGill University - Sir George Williams University - Université de Montréal

FEUILLE D'INSCRIPTION PRELIMINAIRE

NOTE: Tous les délégués sont priés de retourner les formules no. 1 et no. 2 dûment remplies à:

The Conference Registrar,
McGill University,
Montreal 2, P.Q.

S'il-vous-plaît, mettre cette formule à la poste avant le 10 mai.

De: M. _____
Mme _____ (Nom, en lettres moulées) _____ (Prénom)

Titre académique _____

Je participe au congrès de _____

Ma femme m'accompagnera _____

M'adresser toute correspondance à _____

LOGEMENT: (S.V.P. marquer d'un crochet)

Je ferai moi-même mes réservations en dehors du campus _____

Je voudrais retenir une chambre dans les résidences universitaires _____

Ma femme voudrait également être logée dans les résidences universitaires _____

Chambre simple (homme) _____

Chambre simple (femme) _____

Chambre double (homme) _____ avec _____ (nom)

Chambre double (femme) _____ avec _____ (nom)

Chambre double (mari et femme) _____

ARRIVEE ET DEPART:

Les congressistes logés dans les résidences universitaires seront priés de laisser leur chambre à 9:00 a.m. le jour du départ.

(Ils pourront cependant laisser leur bagage à la résidence jusqu'à leur départ).

Je compte arriver à Montréal le _____ (date) vers _____ (heure) _____ A.M.
P.M.

Je compte partir de Montréal le _____ (date) vers _____ (heure) _____ A.M.
P.M.

CERTIFICAT D'IDENTIFICATION:

J'aurai besoin d'un certificat d'identification pour le chemin de fer _____
oui non

(Français au verso)

Form No. 2

CONFERENCE OF LEARNED SOCIETIES - MONTREAL, 1961

McGill University - Sir George Williams University - Université de Montréal

Name.....

Academic Title.....

Address.....

I shall be in
residence at.....
(name of University or Hotel)

University.....

June		Place of Meeting (Host Univ.)	Residence Accommodation at	Please check meetings you will attend
1-2-3	Canadian Association of Geographers.....	McG	McG	
1-2-3	Cdn. Psychological Association.....	UM	McG & UM	
3-4-5-6-7	Univ. Teachers of Home Economics.....	McG	McG	
3-4-5-6-7	Canadian Mathematical Congress.....	SGW	McG	
4-5-6-7	Royal Society.....	McG	McG	
4-5-6	Assoc. of Canadian Laws Teachers.....	UM	UM	
5-6-7	Cdn. Assoc. of Prof. of Education.....	Mac	Mac	
5-6-7	E.I.C. — Engineering Ed.....	McG	McG	
6-7	Royal Meteorological Society.....	UM	UM	
5-6-7	Cdn. Assoc. for Adult Education.....	SGW	McG	
6-7	Cdn. Catholic Historical Assoc.....	UM	McG	
7-8-9	Cdn. Conf. Univ. Schools of Nursing.....	McG		
7-8-9-10	Cdn. Assoc. of Physicists.....	SGW	SGW	
8-9-10	N.C.C.U.C.....	McG	McG	
8-9-10	Cdn. Historical Assoc.....	UM	McG & UM	
8-9-10	Cdn. Political Science Assoc.....	UM	McG	
10-11	Cdn. Inst. International Affairs.....	SGW	McG	
10	Cdn. Assoc. of Rhodes Scholars.....	McG	None	
10-11	Humanities Research Council.....	UM	None	
10	Social Science Research Council.....	UM	None	
11-12	Cdn. Political Sc. Assoc. Statistical Conf.....	SGW	McG	
11-12	Cdn. Assoc. of Directors of Ext. & S.S.....	SGW	McG	
11-12	Classical Association.....	UM	UM	
12-13	C.A.U.T.....	McG	McG	
12-13	Assoc. of Cdn. School of Com. & Bus. Ad.....	SGW	McG	
12-13-14	Assoc. Cdn. Univ. Teachers of English....	UM	McG	
12-13-14	Assoc. Cdn. Univ. Teachers of French.....	UM	McG	
12-13-14	Cdn. Assoc. of Slavists.....	UM	UM	
13-14	Cdn. Philosophical Assoc.....	SGW	SGW	
13-14-15-16	Univ. Counselling & Placement Assoc.....	SGW	McG	
14-15-16	Cdn. Linguistic Association.....	UM	McG	
15-16	Humanities Association.....	UM	McG & UM	

(English other side)

Formule No. 2

CONFERENCE DES SOCIETES SAVANTES - MONTREAL, 1961

McGill University - Sir George Williams University - Université de Montréal

Nom.....

Titre académique.....

Adresse.....

Je logerai à.....
(nom de l'Université ou Hôtel)

Université.....

Juin		Lieu du Congrès (Hôte)	Logement à	J'assisterai aux réunions de 1961 (s.v.p. crochez)
1-2-3	Association canadienne des Géographes..	McG	McG	
1-2-3	Association canadienne des Psychologues	UM	McG & UM	
3-4-5-6-7	Ass. des prof. d'enseignement ménager des Universités canadiennes.....	McG	McG	
3-4-5-6-7	Congrès des mathématiciens du Canada..	SGW	McG	
4-5-6-7	Société Royale du Canada.....	McG	McG	
4-5-6	Ass. des prof. de droit au Canada.....	UM	UM	
5-6-7	Ass. Can. des prof. d'Education.....	Mac	Mac	
5-6-7	Inst. de génie du Canada, Congrès sur les études en génie.....	McG	McG	
6-7	Société Royale de Météorologie.....	UM	UM	
5-6-7	Ass. Canadienne pour l'éd. des adultes...	SGW	McG	
6-7	Ass. cath. canadienne d'Histoire.....	UM	McG	
7-8-9	Ass. des Infirmières canadiennes.....	McG		
7-8-9-10	Association can. des Physiciens.....	SGW	SGW	
8-9-10	Ass. des Universités canadiennes.....	McG	McG	
8-9-10	Soc. Historique du Canada.....	UM	McG & UM	
8-9-10	Ass. Can. des Sciences Politiques.....	UM	McG	
10-11	Inst. Canadien des Aff. Internationales...	SGW	McG	
10	Ass. Canadienne des Bourses Rhodes.....	McG		
10-11	Conseil Canadien des Recherches dans les Humanités.....	UM		
10	Conseil Canadien des Recherches en Sciences Sociales.....	UM		
11-12	Ass. Can. des Sciences Politiques. Con- grès sur la statistique.....	SGW	McG	
11-12	Ass. Can. des directeurs de l'Extension de l'Enseignement des cours d'été.....	SGW	McG	
11-12	Ass. des Études classiques au Canada....	UM	UM	
12-13	Ass. Can. des Professeurs d'Universités..	McG	McG	
12-13	Ass. des Ecoles Can. de Commerce et d'Administration d'Affaires.....	SGW	McG	
12-13-14	Ass. des Prof. d'anglais des Universités Canadiennes.....	UM	McG	
12-13-14	Ass. des Prof. de français des Universités canadiennes.....	UM	McG	
12-13-14	Ass. canadienne des Slavistes.....	UM	UM	
13-14	Ass. canadienne de Philosophie.....	SGW	SGW	
13-14-15-16	Ass. Universitaire de plac. et d'orient.....	SGW	McG	
14-15-16	Ass. canadienne de linguistique.....	UM	McG	
15-16	Ass. canadienne des Humanités.....	UM	McG & UM	

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IV. NUMERO DE TELEPHONE:

McGill University — VICTOR 4-6311 — (Soir VICTOR 4-6762)

Sir George Williams University — VICTOR 4-0131 — (Soir VICTOR 9-4171)

Université de Montréal — REGENT 3-9951 — (Soir REGENT 3-9800)

V. CAISSE:

Les congressistes voudront bien payer d'avance leur chambre et pension à la résidence de l'Université où ils séjourneront.

VI. CERTIFICAT D'INSCRIPTION:

Les congressistes désirant obtenir un certificat d'inscription sont priés de l'indiquer sur leur feuille d'inscription. Ces certificats permettent d'obtenir des réductions de tarif de voyage. Ils seront envoyés directement aux congressistes qui en feront la demande.

VII. TRANSPORT LOCAL:

Un service d'autobus entre les différents lieux de congrès et de résidence sera à la disposition des congressistes. Vous obtiendrez les détails concernant ce service en vous adressant au Bureau d'inscription de l'Université qui est l'hôte de votre société.

VIII. LOGEMENT:

Les congressistes qui le désirent pourront loger dans les résidences universitaires. On peut obtenir une chambre simple ou une chambre double. Le prix d'un lit et petit déjeuner sera environ \$5.00. (Les détails complets seront envoyés par l'Université concernée avec votre avis de réservation.)

Les congressistes ne seront pas invités à partager une chambre à moins que:

- a) ils en fassent la demande spéciale et qu'ils indiquent sur leur formule de demande, le nom de leur collègue qui désire partager la chambre.
- b) Sur réception de leur demande, toutes les chambres simples de la résidence soient déjà réservées.

Il est de nouveau rappelé que pendant une certaine période, les congressistes ne pourront pas tous trouver un logement aux résidences des universités; dans cette éventualité plusieurs préféreront peut-être faire eux-mêmes leur réservation dans un hôtel. L'Université tentera de répondre de son mieux à la demande de logement d'un congressiste accompagné de son épouse mais il sera peut-être nécessaire de loger les conjoints dans des chambres simples adjacentes. Vous pouvez obtenir une liste des hôtels, motels, et maisons de touristes recommandés en vous adressant à:

L'office Montréalais du Tourisme et des Congrès,
2055 rue Peel, Montréal 2.

Un certain nombre de chambres ont été réservé dans les hôtels suivantes:

Hôtel Berkeley, 1188 ouest, rue Sherbrooke, Montréal 2, — 10 chambres avec lits jumeaux.

Hôtel Laurentien, Dominion Square, Montréal 2, — 25 chambres simples, 25 chambres doubles.

Hôtel Mount Royal, 1455 rue Peel, Montréal 2, — 50 chambres doubles.

Les congressistes devront faire leurs réservations directement à l'hôtel en s'identifiant comme un congressiste de la Conférence des Sociétés Savantes ou de leur société particulière. Les hôtels recevront les demandes de réservation jusqu'au 15 mai 1961.

CONFERENCE DES SOCIETES SAVANTES

Du 1^{er} au 16^{ième} JUIN, 1961

McGILL UNIVERSITY
SIR GEORGE WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY
UNIVERSITÉ DE MONTRÉAL

RENSEIGNEMENTS GENERAUX A L'USAGE DES CONGRESSISTES

A sa réunion du mois de juin 1960 la Conférence nationale des universités et collèges canadiens a étudié le problème de l'accroissement du nombre des sociétés et des délégués qui participent à la Conférence annuelle des sociétés savantes. Vu que toutes les sociétés se rencontrent au même endroit pendant une période de temps relativement brève, il a été convenu qu'au rythme présent des participations à la Conférence des Sociétés savantes il fallait limiter le choix du siège de cette Conférence aux endroits pouvant offrir les facilités de logement, nécessaires aux délégués. En général, cette exigence a pour effet de confiner les conférences aux universités les plus peuplées, ou, à quelques institutions plus petites se groupant dans une même région, chacune étant l'hôte de quelques sociétés.

Il fut alors proposé que l'Université de Montréal, Sir George Williams University et McGill University agissent comme hôtes conjoints à la Conférence des Sociétés savantes de l'année 1961. A cause des facilités restreintes de logement offertes par ces trois institutions montréalaises, particulièrement par l'Université de Montréal et Sir George Williams University, il a été parfois nécessaire de situer le lieu de la résidence et le lieu de la conférence à des endroits différents. Même en utilisant pleinement les possibilités de logement il restera quand même une pénurie de chambres entre le 7 et le 10 du mois de juin et les délégués qui n'auront pu trouver de logement dans l'une des universités devront nécessairement demeurer dans un hôtel ou une chambre pour touriste.

I. INSCRIPTION PREALABLE:

Tous les congressistes sont priés de remplir les deux feuilles d'inscription ci-jointes et de les retourner AVANT LE 10 MAI 1961 à:

The Conference Registrar,
McGill University,
Montreal 2, P.Q.

II. INSCRIPTION A L'ARRIVEE:

Tous les congressistes doivent s'inscrire, entre 8.00 A.M. et 5.00 P.M. au Bureau d'inscription de l'Université qui est l'hôte de sa société (voir la formule no. 2 pour déterminer l'Université qui est l'hôte et celle qui peut offrir le logement). Les congressistes peuvent évidemment aller d'abord à la Résidence de l'Université ou à l'hôtel où ils ont déjà une réservation.

III. COURRIER:

Les congressistes voudront bien faire adresser leur courrier et leurs télégrammes comme suit:

CONFERENCE DES SOCIETES SAVANTES
a/s Nom de l'Université qui est l'hôte de votre société
Montréal, P.Q.



28th Annual Study Conference on

PROBLEMS OF CANADIAN INDEPENDENCE

Sir George Williams University
Montreal, Quebec

June 10 and 11, 1961

CONFERENCE DOCUMENTATION

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CANADIAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EDGAR TARR HOUSE

230 BLOOR STREET WEST, TORONTO 5

34

REGISTRATION FEE: \$2.00

INFORMATION
and
REGULATIONS

All discussions in the round tables are confidential. No member of the Conference may attribute any statement or remark either to the Institute or to the person making it. The nature of the Institute prevents the adoption of resolutions by the Conference.

PLENARY SESSIONS

The Conference will begin at 9.30 a.m. on Saturday with a brief plenary session at which three statements will be presented by experts on the three aspects of the agenda. At about 10.30 a.m. we will break up into round tables (see pages 4-7 for round table distribution and location).

On Sunday at 2.00 p.m. the Conference will reconvene in Plenary Session in Birks Hall at which time there will be a general discussion introduced by a panel.

The statements at the opening plenary will be presented by:

Foreign Policy: Representative of Ottawa Men's Branch
Study Group on External Policy

Economic Policy: Dr. Clarence Barber

Defence Policy: Dr. John Keyston

The Chairman of the final plenary session will be Mr. D.V. LePan. Members of the panel will be Mr. Barber, Dr. Keyston, and Mr. Douglas Anglin.

ROUND TABLES

will sit concurrently -- see pages 4-7 for Round Table distribution and location. So that the experts may sit in at all round tables, the programme will be staggered. The agenda will be discussed in the following order:

	<u>ROUND TABLE A</u>	<u>ROUND TABLE B</u>	<u>ROUND TABLE C</u>	<u>ROUND TABLE D.</u>
Saturday morning:	Foreign Policy	Economic Policy	Defence Policy	Foreign Policy
Saturday afternoon:	Economic Policy	Defence Policy	Foreign Policy	Economic Policy
Sunday morning:	Defence Policy	Foreign Policy	Economic Policy	Defence Policy

Members are requested to remain at the round tables to which they are assigned and to wear their lapel badges to assure admission to the meetings.

ANNUAL DINNER

will be held in Redpath Hall, McGill University, on Saturday, June 10 at 6.45 p.m. for 7.15 p.m. The guest speaker will be His Excellency Mr. Frederick Boland, President of the General Assembly of the United Nations and Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations.

WEEKEND PROGRAMME

FRIDAY, June 9

7:00 p.m. - 8:30 p.m.	C.I.I.A. REGISTRATION	Main Entrance Lobby Sir George Williams University
8:00 p.m.	MEETING of the National Council of the C.I.I.A.	Ross Room (6th floor, Sir George Williams University)

SATURDAY, June 10

9:00 a.m. - 12:30 p.m.	REGISTRATION	Main Entrance Lobby Sir George Williams University
9:30 a.m. - 10:30 a.m.	PLENARY SESSION	Willington Room (2nd floor, Stanley St. side, Central Y.M.C.A., adjoining Sir George Williams University)
10:30 a.m. - 12 noon	ROUND TABLES	see pages 4 - 7 for round table distribution & location
2:00 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.	ROUND TABLES	see pages 4 - 7
4:30 p.m. - 5:30 p.m.	RECEPTION given by Sir George Williams University to those attending the conference	
6:45 p.m. for 7:15 p.m.	ANNUAL DINNER AND ADDRESS by His Excellency, Mr. Frederick Boland	Redpath Hall, McGill University

SUNDAY, June 11

9:30 a.m. - 12 noon	ROUND TABLES	see pages 4 - 7
2:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.	PLENARY SESSION	Birks Hall (1st floor, Sir George Williams University)

<u>CONFERENCE STAFF</u>	Mr. John W. Holmes	President, C.I.I.A.
	Miss Edna Neale (Conference Secretary)	Office Manager, C.I.I.A.
	Mr. Edward D. Greathed	Public Education and Speakers' Secretary, C.I.I.A.
	Miss Diana Joule	

PUBLICATIONS DISPLAY

You are invited to inspect the display
of recent C.I.I.A. books and pamphlets.
Over the weekend the special discount for
members is available to Conference guests.

AGENDA FOR THE ROUND TABLES

Problems of Canadian Independence

A. FOREIGN POLICY

1. On strictly bilateral issues (boundaries, waterways, etc.) can we negotiate as equals with the United States?
2. In the formulation of Canadian policy on an issue of international importance, to what extent should we be influenced by our association with:
 - a) The Commonwealth
 - b) NATO?
3. Is there a particular role for a "middle power"?
Is this an appropriate role for Canada?
4. What of the alternatives: isolation, neutralism, unrestricted devotion to NATO, unrestricted devotion to the United Nations?

B. ECONOMIC POLICY

1. In which specific ways, if any, is our foreign policy determined or limited by our economic relations with the United States:

because of United States investment in primary industry?

because of the policies of U.S. subsidiaries?

because of U.S. influence on our "mass media"?
2. Would our independence be strengthened or limited by:

association with a European economic unit

Atlantic free trade

Commonwealth free trade

Continental economic union?

C. DEFENCE POLICY

1. Is Canadian foreign policy limited by our association with NORAD?
If so, is this necessary or unnecessary?
2. Will our defence alliances be necessary in the foreseeable future?
3. To what extent should Canada's military policy be concentrated on U.N. and other mediatory and supervisory activities?
4. What should be the Canadian policy on disarmament?

PERSONNEL
OF THE
ROUND TABLES

ROUND TABLE A

MEETING PLACE: Conference Room, 2nd Floor, Central Y.M.C.A. Building
adjoining Sir George Williams University

CHAIRMAN: Mrs. John Bird (Ottawa)

RECORDER: H.P. Habib (Montreal)

ANSTENSEN, Ansten (Saskatoon)	KEMP, Mrs. H.R. (Ottawa)
ARMSTRONG, Mrs. C.H.A. (Toronto)	LAIRD, E.O. (Ottawa)
BLACK, Miss Barri (Montreal)	LANDO, Barry M. (Vancouver)
BOURNE, C.B. (Vancouver)	MATTHEWS, Roy. A. (Montreal)
BRYCE, R.B. (Ottawa)	MAYO, Henry B. (London)
CAMERON, Dr. Margaret (Saskatoon)	McCURDY, Earle C. (Montreal)
CHAPIN, Vincent L. (Ottawa)	McLEOD, Alex N. (Toronto)
CHEVRIER, Douglas (Winnipeg)	MUNZER, Mrs. Egbert (Montreal)
CORNELL, Paul G. (Waterloo)	NELLES, J. Gordon (Montreal)
DUCKWORTH, M.W. (Sackville)	PRENTICE, Mrs. Norman (Montreal)
DUFFETT, W. (Ottawa)	RIDDELL, W.A. (Regina)
EDMONDS, George W. (Toronto)	ROBINSON, David A. (Hamilton)
FORSEY, Eugene (Ottawa)	SCOTT, A.D. (Vancouver)
GELBER, Marvin (Toronto)	SENIOR, Hereward (Victoria)
GOVIN, Senator L.M. (Montreal)	SMITH, Arthur J.R. (Montreal)
HEHNER, Eric (Ottawa)	SOUTH, James R. (Montreal)
HENSON, Mrs. Ralph (Toronto)	SOWARD, F.H. (Vancouver)
HOBBES, V.G. (Montreal)	SWINTON, Mrs. K.R. (Toronto)
HOFFMANN, Ralf L. (Montreal)	TURNER, J. Douglas (Ottawa)
HULL, W.H.N. (Winnipeg)	WHITELEY, Mrs. A.S. (Ottawa)
JACKSON, Robert J. (London)	WILLOUGHBY, William R. (Canton, N.Y.)
JAMIESON, Robert (Toronto)	WINSPEAR, Dr. Mary (Montreal)
JURGENSEN, J.C.R. (Ottawa)	

PERSONNEL
OF THE
ROUND TABLES

ROUND TABLE B

MEETING PLACE: Ross Room (library reading room, 6th floor, Sir
George Williams University)
CHAIRMAN: J. Harvey Perry (Toronto)
RECORDER: F.A.F. Kung (Montreal)

ANDREW, G.C. (Vancouver)	LALANDE, L. (Montreal)
ANGLIN, Douglas G. (Ottawa)	LAMBERT, William B. (Montreal)
BADGER, John (Toronto)	LOWER, A.R.M. (Kingston)
BAKER, Mrs. Charlotte M. (Toronto)	MACDONALD, H.I. (Toronto)
BARTON, W.H. (Ottawa)	MALKIN, Ben (Ottawa)
BELL, Russell (Ottawa)	MARTIN, Joseph E. (Winnipeg)
BREWIN, Andrew (Toronto)	McDOUGALL, Miss Christina (Toronto)
BUDDEN, William H. (Montreal)	McINTYRE, J.A. (London)
BURKE, His Excellency S.M. (Ottawa)	McNIVEN, Miss Catherine (Vancouver)
COTTINGHAM, Miss Mollie E. (Vancouver)	MEYNELL, David B. (Toronto)
CRAIG, G.M. (Toronto)	MORIN, Jacques-Yvan (Montreal)
CREAN, John F. (Toronto)	NEWMAN, Walter Carman (Winnipeg)
CUMMING, N. Robert (Ottawa)	PACEY, Desmond (Fredericton)
DAVIES, G.O.B. (Vancouver)	PERINBAM, Lewis (Ottawa)
DOBELL, W.M. (Ottawa)	PRESTON, Richard A. (Kingston)
DRABBLE, B.J. (Ottawa)	SAMSON, Gerald (Toronto)
FERGUSON, David M. (Toronto)	SHARWOOD, Gordon R. (New York, Tor.Br.Mem)
FRITSCHKE, W. (Saskatoon)	SIMPSON, George W. (Saskatoon)
GRAHAM, John F. (Halifax)	SKILLING, H.G. (Toronto)
HANRAHAN, Miss Margaret (Montreal)	SPENCE, Miss Helen (Ottawa)
HECKLE, Arnold (Montreal)	STOVEL, H.V. (Montreal)
HOPKINSON, Richard A. (Montreal)	TYRRELL, T.A.C. (Toronto)
JUVET, C.S. (Ottawa)	WHITELEY, Albert S. (Ottawa)

PERSONNEL
OF THE
ROUND TABLES

ROUND TABLE C

MEETING PLACE: Library Alcove (6th floor, Sir George Williams
CHAIRMAN: M.O. Morgan (St. John's) University
RECORDER: P.C. Noble (Montreal)

BRADY, Alexander (Toronto)	KEMP, H.R. (Ottawa)
BUCK, Mrs. Hart (Toronto)	KOESTER, C.B. (Regina)
BUXTON, Mrs. George (Ottawa)	LAMED, S. (Montreal)
CAMPBELL, Henry G. (Toronto)	LAMONT, Miss Katharine (Montreal)
CURTIS, G.F. (Vancouver)	LYON, Peyton V. (London)
FERGUSON, G.V. (Montreal)	MAIONE, Very Rev. Patrick G. (Montreal)
FLAHERTY, Frank (Ottawa)	MANCHESTER, Alan K. (Durham, N.C.)
FRENCH, G.S. (Hamilton)	MARTIN, Paul (Ottawa)
GARNEAU, Mrs. George (Montreal)	McCONNELL, R. Wayne (Montreal)
GELBER, Miss Sylva M. (Ottawa)	POUND, Miss Marjorie (Ottawa)
GELLEY, T.F. (Kingston)	RICHARDSON, S. (Montreal)
GHERSON, Randolph (Ottawa)	ROACH, Edward Hugh (Montreal)
GIBSON, Mrs. J. Douglas (Toronto)	STRUTHERS, R.R. (Toronto)
HANSON, E.J. (Edmonton)	SUTHERLAND, S.H. (Toronto)
HAY, D.O. (Ottawa)	SWINTON, Kurt R. (Toronto)
HECKLE, Mrs. Arnold (Montreal)	THRESHER, James H. (Montreal)
HENSON, Ralph (Toronto)	TOTEN, J.E. (Montreal)
HICKS, Anthony R. (Montreal)	TRENT, Mrs. David G. (Ottawa)
HILL, Miss O. Mary (Ottawa)	WALDOCK, Brig. D.A.G. (Ottawa)
HOLLAND, William L. (Vancouver)	WAINES, Mrs. W.J. (Winnipeg)
HOPE, Mrs. John A. (Toronto)	WALLACE, Miss Elizabeth (Toronto)
JENKINS, John S. (Toronto)	WEIL, Mrs. Mary (Montreal)
KELSON, Robert (London)	

PERSONNEL
OF THE
ROUND TABLES

ROUND TABLE D

MEETING PLACE: Room 230 (2nd floor, Sir George Williams University)
CHAIRMAN: W.J. Waines (Winnipeg)
RECORDER: Mrs. John Richardson (Montreal)

BALLANTYNE, M.G. (Montreal)	LINGARD, C. Cecil (Ottawa)
BARKER, Mrs. C.L. (Winnipeg)	MacSPORRAN, Miss Maysie S. (Montreal)
BELSHAW, Cyril S. (Vancouver)	MADDEN, John (London)
BLUE, R.C.S. (Toronto)	MATHEWS, A.T. (Toronto)
BOSNITCH, S.D. (Fredericton)	MEISEL, J. (Kingston)
BOWEN, J.A.C. (Toronto)	MOWAT, Herbert A. (Toronto)
BREWIN, Mrs. Andrew (Toronto)	MORRISON, N.M. (Ottawa)
BRUBACHER, Albert (Kitchener)	NOBLE, Miss Frances (Montreal)
BRYCE, G. Gordon (Toronto)	PASIC, N. (Toronto)
BUCK, Hart (Toronto)	PERINBAM, Mrs. Lewis (Ottawa)
BUXTON, George (Ottawa)	PRINCE, Ewart A. (Montreal)
CLARK, M.G. (Montreal)	RICHARDSON, B.T. (Toronto)
CONWAY, J.S. (Vancouver)	ROGERS, Douglas H. (Kingston)
CREAN, J.G. (Toronto)	SCHINDELER, Fred F. (Toronto)
EAYRS, James (Toronto)	SCOTT, Douglas (Hamilton)
FERGUSON, Mrs. G.V. (Montreal)	SINCLAIR, Sol (Winnipeg)
GEARY, C.D. (Ottawa)	SOLANDT, O.M. (Montreal)
GHERSON, Mrs. Randolph (Ottawa)	TRENT, David (Ottawa)
GIBSON, J. Douglas (Toronto)	UNDERHILL, Frank H. (Ottawa)
GILPIN, J. (Toronto)	VAN DER BRUGH, P.G.F.H. (Ottawa)
GOLDBLOOM, Mrs. Victor (Montreal)	WHYTE, Miss Edith M. (Ottawa)
GORDON, Stanley T. (New York)	WILSON, Robert R. (Durham, N.C.)
LAWSON, R.W. (Ottawa)	WADE, Mason (Rochester, N.Y.)

This Who's Who contains the names and identities of conferees received to June 6.

WHO'S WHO
OF THE
CONFERENCE

ANDREW, G.C.	Professor and Deputy to the President, University of British Columbia, Vancouver.
ANGLIN, Douglas G.	Associate Professor of Political Science, Carleton University, Ottawa.
ANSTENSEN, Ansten	Professor and Head, Department of Germanic Languages, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon.
ARMSTRONG, Mrs. C.H.A.	47 Elgin Avenue, Toronto. Member of National Council and National Executive Committee, C.I.I.A.
BADGER, John	Director of Canadian Commentator, Theatre Canada, Canadian Teacher; 1624 Waters Edge, Clarkson, Ont.
BAKER, Mrs. Charlotte M.	540 Blythwood Road, Toronto.
BALLANTYNE, M.G.	Writer and Lecturer; 233 Notre Dame Street West, Montreal.
BARBER, Clarence L.	Professor of Political Economy; 320 Kingsway Avenue, Winnipeg.
BARBER, Mrs. C.L.	Housewife, 320 Kingsway Avenue, Winnipeg.
BARTON, W.H.	Head, Defence Liaison Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.
BELL, Russell	Assistant Director of Research, Canadian Labour Congress, 100 Argyle Avenue, Ottawa.
BELSHAW, Cyril S.	Director, Regional Training Centre for United Nations Fellows and Associate Professor of Anthropology, University of British Columbia, Vancouver.
BIRD, Mrs. John	Free Lance Journalist and broadcaster on international affairs. Vice-Chairman Ottawa Women's Branch, C.I.I.A.
BLACK, Miss Barri	Secretary, Greenshields & Co. Inc., 507 Place d'Armes, Montreal.
BLUE, R.C.S.	Retired; R.R. #2, Aurora, Ontario. Member, National Council, C.I.I.A.
BOLAND, H.E. Frederick	President of the General Assembly of the United Nations and Permanent Representative of Ireland to the United Nations.
BOSNITCH, S.D.	Assistant Professor of History, Carleton Hall, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton.
BOURNE, C.B.	Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, Vancouver. Chairman Vancouver Men's Branch, C.I.I.A.
BOWEN, J.A.C.	Civil Engineer; 70 - 36th Street, Toronto
BRADY, Alexander	Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto; 147 Boulton Drive, Toronto. Chairman National Research Committee, member National Council, National Executive Committee, C.I.I.A.
BREWIN, Andrew	Lawyer; 54 Rathnally Avenue, Toronto. Member National Council, National Executive and Rowell Trust Sub-Committee, C.I.I.A.
BREWIN, Mrs. Andrew	Housewife, 54 Rathnally Avenue, Toronto.
BRUBACHER, Albert	Purchasing Agent; 91 Stirling Avenue North, Kitchener.
BRYCE, G. Gordon	Canada Permanent Mortgage Corp., 320 Bay Street, Toronto.
BRYCE, R.B.	Clerk of the Privy Council Office, Ottawa.
BUCK, Hart	Statistician, The Toronto-Dominion Bank, Toronto.
BUCK, Mrs. Hart	Housewife, 36 Riverview Heights, Toronto.

WHO'S WHO OF THE CONFERENCE (cont'd)

BUDDEN, William H. Chairman, McLean, Budden Limited, Investment Advisors, 1062 Sun Life Bldg., Montreal. General member National Council and National Executive Committee, C.I.I.A.

BURCHELL, Charles J. Barrister, C.P.R. Building, Halifax, N.S. Chairman National Council, C.I.I.A.

BURKE, His Excellency Mr. S.M. High Commissioner for Pakistan in Canada, 505 Wilbrod Street, Ottawa.

BUXTON, George Professor of Political Science, University of Ottawa; 2063 Knightsbridge Road, Ottawa. Member National Council, C.I.I.A.

BUXTON, Mrs. George 2063 Knightsbridge Road, Ottawa.

CAMERON, Dr. Margaret M. Professor of French, University of Saskatchewan; 844 Saskatchewan Crescent East, Saskatoon. Representative to National Council for Saskatoon Women, C.I.I.A.

CAMPBELL, Henry C. Chief Librarian, Toronto Public Library; 373 Glengrove Avenue, Toronto.

CHAPIN, Vincent L. Assistant Director, International Trade Relations Branch, Department of Trade and Commerce, Ottawa.

CHEVRIER, Douglas Registrar, The University of Manitoba; 257 Harvard Avenue, Winnipeg.

CLARK, M.G. Alcan International Limited, 1260 Sun Life Building, Montreal.

CONWAY, J.S. Assistant Professor, Department of History and International Studies, University of British Columbia, Vancouver. Secretary Vancouver Men's Branch, C.I.I.A.

CORNELL, Paul G. Professor of History, Chairman of Department, University of Waterloo, Waterloo.

COTTINGHAM, Miss Mollie E. Associate Professor, Faculty of Education, University of British Columbia; 1855 West 15th Avenue, Vancouver. Vancouver Women's Branch representative to National Council, C.I.I.A.

CRAIG, G.M. Assistant Professor, Department of History, University of Toronto; 137 Roxborough Street East, Toronto.

CREAN, John F. Under graduate, Trinity College, University of Toronto; 161 Forest Hill Road, Toronto.

CREAN, J.G. President, Crean Hats of Canada, 18 Balmuto Street, Toronto.

CUMMING, N. Robert International Trade Relations Branch, Department of Trade and Commerce; Apt. 202, 330 Metcalfe Street, Ottawa. Secretary Ottawa Men's Branch, C.I.I.A.

CURTIS, G.F. Dean of Law, University of British Columbia, Vancouver. Branch representative to National Council, C.I.I.A.

DAVIES, G.O.B. Associate Professor, Executive Assistant to President, University of British Columbia, Vancouver.

DOBELL, W.M. National Research Council; Apt. 51, 265 Daly Avenue, Ottawa.

DRABBLE, B.J. Assistant Chief, Research Department, Bank of Canada, Ottawa.

DUCKWORTH, M.W. Director, Department of Extension, Mount Allison University, Sackville, N.B.

DUFFETT, W. Dominion Statistician; 506 Driveway, Ottawa.

EAYRS, James Member of the Department of Political Economy, University of Toronto; 23 Ellis Park Road, Toronto. Co-editor, International Journal, C.I.I.A.

WHO'S WHO OF THE CONFERENCE (cont'd)

EDMONDS, George W.	Lawyer, 287 Inglewood Drive, Toronto.
FERGUSON, David M.	Consultant; 161 St. George Street, Apt. 701, Toronto.
FERGUSON, G.V.	Editor, Montreal Star, Montreal. Honorary Chairman, National Council, member Finance Advisory Committee, C.I.I.A.
FERGUSON, Mrs. G.V.	Housewife, 1 Forden Avenue, Westmount, Montreal.
FLAHERTY, Frank	Publisher, Buchanan's Bulletin; 53 Queen Street, Ottawa.
FORSEY, Eugene	Research Director, Canadian Labour Congress, 100 Argyle Avenue, Ottawa.
FRENCH, G.S.	Professor of History, McMaster University, Hamilton. Chairman of Hamilton Branch and representative to National Council, C.I.I.A.
FRITSCH, W., M.D.	Associate Professor of Anatomy, University of Saskatchewan; 209 Garrison Crescent, Saskatoon.
GARNEAU, Mrs. George	Part-time newscommentator, C.B.C.; 23 Willow Avenue, Westmount, Montreal.
GEARY, C.D.	Third Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner for New Zealand, Ottawa.
GELBER, Marvin	Business Executive, 205 Richmond Street West, Toronto. Chairman Journal Advisory Committee, member National Council and National Executive Committee, C.I.I.A.
GELBER, Miss Sylva M.	Health Insurance Administrative Officer, Department of National Health and Welfare; 550 Driveway, Ottawa.
GELLEY, T.F.	Registrar of the Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston.
GHERSON, Randolph	General Relations Division, International Trade Re- lations Branch, Department of Trade and Commerce; 566 Edison Avenue, Ottawa.
GHERSON, Mrs. R.	Housewife, 566 Edison Avenue, Ottawa.
GIBSON, J. Douglas	Banker; 406 Glenayr Road, Toronto. Vice Chairman, National Council and Chairman National Executive Committee, C.I.I.A.
GIBSON, Mrs. J. Douglas	Economist; 406 Glenayr Road, Toronto.
GILPIN, J.C.	Branch Manager; 493A Parkside Drive, Toronto.
GOLDBLOOM, Mrs. Victor	5 Grove Park, Westmount, Montreal.
GORDON, Stanley T.	Foundation Executive, The Ford Foundation, 477 Madison Avenue, New York.
GOVIN, Senator L.M., Q.C.	Senator and Advocate; Room 33, 204 Notre Dame Street West, Montreal.
GRAHAM, John F.	Professor of Economics, Dalhousie University, Halifax.
HANRAHAN, Miss Margaret	Secretary; Apt. 2, 3433 Peel Street, Montreal.
HABIB, H.P.	Graduate Student, McGill University, Montreal.
HANSON, Dr. E.J.	Professor and Head, Department of Political Economy, University of Alberta, Edmonton.
HAY, D.O.	High Commissioner for Australia, 100 Sparks Street, Ottawa.
HECKLE, Arnold	Principal United Kingdom Trade Commissioner for the Province of Quebec; 635 Dorchester Blvd. West, Montreal.
HECKLE, Mrs. Arnold	c/o 635 Dorchester Blvd. West, Montreal.
HEHNER, Eric	Director, Corporation House Ltd., 160 Laurier Avenue West, Ottawa. Chairman, Ottawa Men's Branch, C.I.I.A.
HENSON, Ralph	Broker; 17 Chestnut Park Avenue, Toronto. Member of National Council, National Executive and Public Education Committee, C.I.I.A.

WHO'S WHO OF THE CONFERENCE (cont'd)

HENSON, Mrs. Ralph	17 Chestnut Park Avenue, Toronto.
HICKS, Anthony R.	Secretary, Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, Dominion Square, Montreal.
HILL, Miss O. Mary	Editor, "Foreign Trade"; 21 Chapleau Avenue, Ottawa.
HOBBES, V.G.	Trust Company Officer; 520 Victoria Avenue, Westmount, Montreal.
HOFFMANN, Ralf L.	Business Executive; 2095 Hanover Road, Town of Mt. Royal.
HOLLAND, William L.	Head, Department of Asian Studies, University of British Columbia, Editor of <u>Pacific Affairs</u> , Vancouver.
HOPE, Mrs. John A.	310 Riverview Drive, Toronto.
HOPKINSON, Richard A.	Systems Analyst, Aluminum Co. of Canada Ltd; Apt. 3, 2035 Closse Street, Montreal.
HULL, W.H.N.	Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations; Box 112, University of Manitoba, Winnipeg.
JACKSON, Robert J.	Graduate Student, Teaching Fellow, University of Western Ontario; 1876 Dumont Street, London.
JAMIESON, Robert	Assistant News Editor, Financial Post, 481 University Avenue, Toronto.
JENKINS, John S.	Economist, Room 1416, 620 University Avenue, Toronto.
JUVET, C.S.	Administrative Officer, External Aid Office; 635 Brierwood Avenue, Ottawa.
JURGENSEN, J.C.R.	Bank of Canada; Apt. 1, 258 Daly Avenue, Ottawa.
KELSON, Robert	Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Western Ontario, London.
KEMP, H.R.	Economist; 126 Stanley Avenue, Ottawa.
KEMP, Mrs. H.R.	Housewife; 126 Stanley Avenue, Ottawa.
KEYSTON, Dr. J.E.	Vice-Chairman, Defence Research Board; 10 Ellesmere Place, Rockcliffe, Ottawa.
KOESTER, C.B.	Clerk of the Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan; 87 Angus Crescent, Regina.
KUNG, F.A.F.	Graduate Student, McGill University, Montreal.
LAIRD, E.O.	United Kingdom High Commissioner's Office, Ottawa.
LALANDE, L.	Lawyer, 276 St. James Street, Montreal.
LAMBERT, William B.	Vice-President, Alcan International Ltd.; 6 Braeside Place, Montreal.
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LAMONT, Miss Katharine	Headmistress, The Study; 3555 Atwater Avenue, Montreal.
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11/16
CSC 2195-5(CJS)

26 April 1961

Chairman,
Canadian Joint Staff,
2450 Massachusetts Ave.,
Washington 8, D.C.,
U.S.A.

With reference to your CJS 262-1-5
of 12 Apr 61, attached for information is one
copy each of the following papers:

- (a) The effect upon the defence of NATO
Europe of restrictions upon the first
use of tactical nuclear weapons.
(Reference 663rd Meeting Chiefs of
Staff Committee Item II paragraph
4 (a).
- (b) Disarmament and the Deterrent. (Ref-
erence 662nd Meeting Chiefs of Staff
Committee, Item I).

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
R C. WESTON

(R. C. Weston)
Air Commodore,
for Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.

RCU/2-4971/armn

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CJS 262-1-5 JBMS
2195-5

MEMORANDUM

12 Apr 61

A/C R.C. Weston

JBMS Papers

1 The following is a list of the various papers which we would like to obtain for study and reference purposes:

CSC approved distribution
to USSEA, ~~Chairman~~
CJS(L) & CJS(W)

(a) UN Sponsored Military Forces - d/18 Nov 60
(Reference 674th Meeting Chiefs of Staff
Committee, Item IV). 1 Mar 61 ✓

USSEA
Disarmament Adviser

✓ (b) The effect upon the defence of NATO Europe of restrictions upon the first use of tactical nuclear weapons. (Reference 663rd Meeting Chiefs of Staff Committee Item II paragraph 4 (a)). X ✓

USSEA
Disarmament Adviser

X (c) Factors affecting the future of US overseas bases. (Reference 663rd Meeting Chiefs of Staff Committee, Item II Paragraph 4 (d)). X ✓

Cabinet Secretary

USSEA

Disarmament Adviser

✓ (d) Disarmament and the Deterrent. (Reference 662nd Meeting Chiefs of Staff Committee, Item I). X ✓

Chairman CJS(L) - on request

(M. M. Hendrick)
Air Vice-Marshal
Chairman
Canadian Joint Staff

Excerpt from

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

Minutes of the 684th Meeting Held
at 0930 hrs on 23 February 1961
In the office of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff
National Defence Headquarters

II. COMMONWEALTH DEFENCE COOPERATION (CONFIDENTIAL)
(CSC: 7.2 TD:5 of 14 & 15 Feb 61)

Document considered: JBMDS paper dated 10 Feb 61

2. During consideration of this item, discussion centered around the examples of Commonwealth cooperation shown in the paper.

3. The Chief of the General Staff stated that while he would not recommend inclusion of specific mention of proposed UK infantry battalion training in Canada, it was his understanding that examples in the paper would not exclude such cooperation.

3. The Chief of Naval Staff suggested that note should be made of the fact that the RCN is committed to the provision of radio stations at Halifax and Vancouver which are an integral part of Commonwealth world-wide communication network.

5. The Chief of the Air Staff felt that some examples quoted in the paper tended to give the impression that there was possibility of more extensive Commonwealth cooperation than was in fact practical.

6. The Chairman, Defence Research Board suggested the possibility of some elaboration of scientific activities in para. 12.

7. Following further discussion it was agreed that the general nature of the paper would not be served by including specific examples.

8. The Committee approved the paper as presented.

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Approved by CSC at 684th meeting on 23 Feb 61
& passed by CCOS to Minister

CONFIDENTIAL

CSC 7.2 (JBMDs)

10 Feb 61

JOINT STAFF

COMMONWEALTH DEFENCE CO-OPERATION

SUMMARY

AIM

1. To review broadly Commonwealth defence co-operation and Canadian participation in it.

CONCLUSIONS

2. It is concluded that:

- (a) political and strategic considerations render it improbable that a Commonwealth defence policy will be either proposed or adopted,
- (b) joint Commonwealth defence operations, except on a special and restricted basis unlikely to involve Canada, cannot now be foreseen,
- (c) the grouping of Commonwealth contingents within a UN force or within a regional defence force to simplify operational and logistical problems is a possibility,
- (d) in so far as political, financial and security considerations permit, military co-operation between Commonwealth countries in the fields of training and exchange of information is desirable as a contribution to the strength of the free world, and requests for assistance from the newer Commonwealth countries in the form of exchange or loan of personnel should be favourably considered,
- (e) Canadian participation in Commonwealth defence exercises can be justified:
 - (i) to train senior officers at those higher military levels or in those defence areas where experience is not readily available in Canada,
 - (ii) to cater for the possibility that Commonwealth forces might be grouped together within a UN force, and
 - (iii) to assist the newer members of the Commonwealth to achieve maturity in the defence field,

in which cases the exercises should be designed, to avoid political misinterpretation,

- (f) the adoption of Canadian military equipment by other Commonwealth countries could be a desirable by-product of defence co-operation.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CSC 7.2 (JBMS)

10 Feb 61

JOINT STAFF

COMMONWEALTH DEFENCE CO-OPERATION

AIM

1. To review broadly Commonwealth defence co-operation and Canadian participation in it.

COMMONWEALTH DEFENCE ACTIVITIES

2. Each of the independent members of the Commonwealth - the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Ghana, Malaya and Nigeria - is completely responsible for its own defence, as for all other aspects of its internal and external affairs. There is no central organization for defence in the Commonwealth, but there is close liaison between the governments and valuable practical co-operation among the Services.
3. Membership in the Commonwealth imposes no formal collective security agreements. Individual member countries may assume special international obligations for the maintenance of peace and security. They are all members of the United Nations and some of them are members of one or more regional defence alliances (eg NATO, SEATO, CENTO, ANZUS).
4. Defence problems are frequently discussed at Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conferences, usually in separate meetings of ministers concerned with the defence problems of particular regions. Co-operation among the Services is to be found in combined exercises, joint research activities, exchange and training of personnel, and arrangements for the joint use of areas geographically suitable for training and equipment testing.
5. To varying degrees, the armed forces of Commonwealth countries have common language, doctrine, equipment and procedures which facilitate military co-operation.

COMMONWEALTH DEFENCE OPERATIONS

6. There is no Commonwealth defence policy. Political and strategic considerations render it unlikely that such a policy will be either proposed or adopted in the future.
7. The Commonwealth countries have divergent political objectives as frequently demonstrated by their positions in the UN. The UK's colonial policies, liberal though they may be, are subject to periodic criticism from the newer members of the Commonwealth. Some of these newer members lean heavily towards neutralism and most of them are anxious to avoid international commitments which might threaten their recently acquired independence of action. India and Pakistan have quarreled over Kashmir and South Africa has tended to become isolated because of its racial policies.
8. Strategically, the Commonwealth is widely dispersed throughout the world and relatively vulnerable. A Commonwealth collective security system would be global in nature, but it would lack the military strength to function effectively as a global security system. Where collective security is desired, it can usually be better achieved through regional defence pacts involving countries outside the Commonwealth.

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9. Within a UN military force, it might on occasion be considered desirable to group together the contingents supplied by Commonwealth countries, in order to take operational and logistical advantage of their similar language, equipment, training and procedures. The Commonwealth Division in Korea was an example of such a grouping. Within a regional defence alliance, a similar grouping of Commonwealth forces is possible.

10. Broadly speaking however, there seems to be little likelihood of joint Commonwealth defence operations taking place as such, except on a special and restricted basis as in Malaya where the UK, Australian and New Zealand forces have been assisting in the campaign against the Communist terrorists remaining after Malayan independence was achieved.

COMMONWEALTH DEFENCE CONFERENCES AND EXERCISES

11. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff has for a number of years held a conference and exercises for senior officers of the British Army to which Chiefs of Staff of other Commonwealth countries have been invited. The First Sea Lord and the UK Chief of Air Staff have also held occasional conferences along the same lines which have usually been attended by their Commonwealth colleagues.

12. There have been regular Commonwealth conferences on defence science and also conferences on special subjects such as that held in Australia in 1959 on the effects of tropical conditions on military stores.

13. More recently, the first of a series of biennial inter-service studies (Exercise UNIFLEX) to discuss strategy and modern defence problems of interest to the armed forces of the Commonwealth was held at the RAF College in 1959. It was attended by the UK Minister of Defence, First Lord of the Admiralty, Secretary of State for Air, the UK Chiefs of Staff and senior commanders, and also by senior commanders, in many cases Chiefs of Staff, from Commonwealth countries including Canada. The second of these studies (Exercise UNISON) is due to take place in the UK in August 1961.

COMMONWEALTH DEFENCE TRAINING

14. The Imperial Defence College and the Joint Services Staff College in the UK are both attended by officers from the other Commonwealth countries, including Canada. The aim of the I.D.C. has been defined as being to provide 'a body of senior officers of the fighting Services, and civil officials, who will be capable of holding high commands and key appointments in the structure of Commonwealth defence, both in peace and war; men who have not only a full grasp of their own special subjects but a sound knowledge of how those subjects dovetail into the complete Commonwealth effort'.

15. Students from other Commonwealth countries also attend the staff colleges, cadet training colleges and specialized training courses of all three UK Services. Commonwealth Service training institutions such as the Canadian National Defence College, the staff colleges of Canada, Australia, India and Pakistan, and the Australian, Indian and Pakistan military academies also accept students from other Commonwealth countries.

16. There is a constant interchange of personnel and equipment between the three Services and the UK and the other Commonwealth countries for training purposes. For example, a squadron of RN submarines is based at Halifax for RCN anti-submarine training and another submarine squadron is similarly based at Sydney for RAN and RNZN training.

17. In particular, every assistance in training, equipment and personnel has been given by the UK to the new Asian and African members of the Commonwealth. Numbers of UK officers and men have been seconded to these countries to assist them during the build-up of their own Services.

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CANADIAN PARTICIPATION

18. Canadian defence policy provides for the participation of Canadian forces in the following defence commitments:

- (a) defence of North America,
- (b) NATO, and
- (c) United Nations security forces.

None of these commitments has a Commonwealth connotation, nor are there any Commonwealth defence agreements involving Canada. The possibility exists that, within a UN force, it would be advantageous to group a Canadian contingent together with contingents from other Commonwealth countries.

19. It is in the general interests of Canadian national security to strengthen the ability of the free world to resist the advances of Communism. This objective is advanced by the encouragement of members of the Commonwealth, especially the newer members, to improve the effectiveness of their defence effort. In so far as political, financial and security considerations permit, therefore, military co-operation among Commonwealth countries can be justified in the fields of training and exchange of information on common problems. Failure to meet requests for assistance from the newer members of the Commonwealth may lead them to seek assistance from countries unfriendly to the West. Where appropriate, Canada can assist and be assisted by exchanging military personnel for training purposes and by attending defence conferences.

20. While Canadian participation in Commonwealth defence exercises might have political overtones and be difficult to justify on the basis of operational commitments, declining to participate could also be politically sensitive.

21. Canadian participation in Commonwealth sponsored defence exercises, not specifically related to defence of the Commonwealth, could be justified for the purpose of acquainting senior officers with the problems of strategy and command at those higher military levels or in those defence areas where experience is not readily available in Canada. Participation could also be justified on the basis that Canadian forces might be grouped with other Commonwealth forces within a future UN security force. Lastly, participation by the older members of the Commonwealth, including Canada, would assist the newer members towards achieving maturity in the defence field and, as such, represents a contribution to the strength of the free world. For these purposes, the exercises should be designed around hypothetical defence situations not open to political misinterpretation.

22. Commonwealth defence conferences often include demonstrations of military equipment. These could provide opportunities for encouraging the adoption of Canadian produced equipment by other countries with consequent benefit to the Canadian Services and defence industry.

CONCLUSIONS

23. It is concluded that:

- (a) political and strategic considerations render it improbable that a Commonwealth defence policy will be either proposed or adopted.
- (b) joint Commonwealth defence operations, except on a special and restricted basis unlikely to involve Canada, cannot now be foreseen,
- (c) the grouping of Commonwealth contingents within a UN force or within a regional defence force to simplify operational and logistical problems is a possibility,

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(d) in so far as political, financial and security considerations permit, military co-operation between Commonwealth countries in the fields of training and exchange of information is desirable as a contribution to the strength of the free world, and requests for assistance from the newer Commonwealth countries in the form of exchange or loan of personnel should be favourably considered,

(e) Canadian participation in Commonwealth defence exercises can be justified:

- (i) to train senior officers at those higher military levels or in those defence areas where experience is not readily available in Canada,
- (ii) to cater for the possibility that Commonwealth forces might be grouped together within a UN force, and
- (iii) to assist the newer members of the Commonwealth to achieve maturity in the defence field,

in which cases the exercises should be designed to avoid political misinterpretation,

(f) the adoption of Canadian military equipment by other Commonwealth countries could be a desirable by-product of defence co-operation.

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Extract from

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
Minutes of the 680th Meeting
Held at 1015 hours on 24 January 1961

Commonwealth Defence Policy (SECRET)

Canadian military participation in Exercise UNISON, a Commonwealth military paper exercise, to be held in the United Kingdom during August 1961, was discussed. Canada has been invited by the UK Defence Chief, Earl Mountbatten, to present a paper on how to increase inter-dependence in military matters within the Commonwealth, and the Chairman requested the views of the Chiefs of Staff on this proposal.

It was agreed that an appreciation on Commonwealth defence policy should be prepared by the JBMS with the object of showing, if possible, the extent Canada might participate in collective Commonwealth operations in the future.

ADDRESS TO C.I.A.
GENERAL CHARLES FOULKES
FEB-MAR 1961

CONFIDENTIAL

CANADIAN DEFENCE POLICY AND THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

In order to appreciate the problem of defence it might be helpful if I took you through the various stages of the development of defence policy from 1939 to the present day. In this way I hope to show how the changing threat and the technological development of weapons has been the major influence in the development of our defence policy.

Prior to 1939 Canada was able to derive a considerable amount of security from her geographical position. The then available weapons of war precluded a direct attack on Canada, at least in the early stages of a war. Therefore Canada could afford the luxury of waiting until the war broke out before deciding what action if any Canada would take. In the last war parliament was called and it took about two weeks before the process of declaring war was accomplished. While Canada provided substantial forces in the last war, we did not undertake the provisioning or the equipping of our forces nor did we take part in the overall direction of the war. Canada was prepared to leave these responsibilities to the U.K. and later on in the war to both the U.K. and the U.S.

However the developments in technology brought about a new situation. The last war left a legacy of long range methods of attack which could reach several thousands of miles and negated the previous immunity from attack which Canada had enjoyed since 1814 because of geography. The long range bomber, the snorkel submarine and the paratrooper created a direct potential threat to Canada. These innovations were to have a profound effect on Canadian defence policy. No longer could we "wait and see". Geography no longer provided security from attack but posed a new problem of defending our sovereignty in areas previously considered wholly unsuitable for military operations and therefore immune from attack. Therefore when considering the post-war plans the Chiefs of Staff had to make provision for the defence of our coastal areas, airspace and territory including the Arctic.

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Shortly after the end of the war the U.S. Defence Secretaries invited Canada to continue the close collaboration in the defence of North America, which was established in 1940 as a result of the Ogdensburg Declaration and other Canadian-U.S. accords. As it was realized that Canada was now vulnerable to direct attack, it was considered in the best interests of Canada to agree to the U.S. proposals and continue joint defence planning with the U.S. These arrangements were expanded to include exchange of information in the fields of intelligence, weapons and research and development. Joint defence plans were prepared for the approval of the Chiefs of Staff of both countries. The broad defence concept which was agreed to was that for the defence of the coastal waters and for territorial defence each country would provide its own defence arrangements but there would be a mutual reinforcing scheme. However in the field of air defence a quite different treatment was necessary. There were no boundaries upstairs and the most direct air routes to the U.S. major targets were through Canada; therefore air defence was to be a joint effort from the start. It is important to keep this point in mind, that the decision for joint air defence was taken in 1946 not 1958, which some of the critics claim when discussing NORAD.

The next event which was to affect our post-war defence planning was the creation of the U.N. at San Francisco. The charter of the U.N. included provisions for regional defence arrangements and for collective efforts to maintain the peace. So that in our post-war planning the possibility of a U.N. commitment had to be provided for. It so happened that the type of ground and air forces for maintaining our sovereignty in the Arctic were also suitable for a possible U.N. commitment. Therefore no special forces were held or equipped for U.N. purposes. Another influence on our post-war planning was the decision to withdraw our division from the occupation force in Germany. This action virtually severed the last vestige of U.K. direction of Canadian forces which had existed for a very long time, actually from the days of Wolfe.

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So that our post-war defence policy was influenced by a closer link with the U.S. in planning for the defence of Canada, a considerable lessening of our close ties with the U.K., and the possibility of military action under the U.N. This was the defence picture in 1946.

The U.K. authorities soon became aware of the lessening of the close association that had existed with Canada and the U.K. in defence in the last war. Field Marshal Montgomery, who had just become C.I.G.S., took advantage of a visit he was making to North America, to use his own words, "to put this matter right". Monty proposed that the Chiefs of Staff of Canada, the U.K. and U.S. should, with the blessing of the heads of State, set up tripartite arrangements for discussions on intelligence, strategy, tactics, research and weapon development and should draw up plans for dealing with a major aggression. These proposals were agreed to and much was accomplished in the next few years. These arrangements were to remain secret and were only revealed by Monty in his Memoires a year ago.

The next most important event to affect our defence policy occurred in 1948. You will recall that in February 1948 Czechoslovakia was snatched behind the Iron Curtain. This event caused consternation in London, Washington and Ottawa. President Truman issued a declaration pledging U.S. support to all European nations who would resist Soviet aggression. This was followed the next day by a similar statement in Ottawa. Within the next few days President Truman issued an invitation for political and military officials of Canada and the U.K. to meet with U.S. officials in Washington to devise ways and means of implementing the pledges made in Ottawa and Washington. I attended these meetings with Mike Pearson, who was then Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, and it was here that the arrangements for the setting up of NATO were worked out. Canada took a leading part in working out the organization of the political and military

organs of the alliance. The tripartite military arrangements which had been set up three years before were put to work and produced an emergency defence plan for the NATO area.

I think it might be appropriate at this time to draw to your attention that the purpose of setting up NATO was to prevent any further aggression in the NATO area. In this, its major role, NATO has certainly succeeded, and it is important to bear this in mind when criticising the shortcomings of the alliance.

Canadian acceptance of the North Atlantic Treaty marks a drastic change in Canadian foreign and defence policy. For the first time in history Canada was accepting military commitments in advance of a war. Secondly Canada was agreeing to station troops outside of Canada in peacetime, quite a step from the time we sheltered behind our immunity in the prewar days.

You will recall that the early organization of NATO provided for a series of regional groups of countries who could mutually support each other if attacked.

These were:

- Northern Group - consisting of Norway and Denmark.
- Central Group - consisting of France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, and U.K., and supported by Canada and the U.S.
- Southern Group - Italy, France, and later Greece and Turkey.
- Canada-U.S. Group - responsible for defence of Canada-U.S. Region, for supporting Europe and providing the strategical counter-offensive.

You will observe that the Canada-U.S. defence arrangements came under the NATO umbrella in 1949.

The Military organization of NATO provided for a Military Committee made up of a Chief of Staff from each country. This group met periodically and decided broad military policy, but there was a need for an executive agent to draw up plans and transact day-to-day business. As one of the outstanding problems was the defence of West Germany it was decided that the occupying powers, U.K., U.S. and France, who were responsible for the defence of

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Germany, should become the Standing Group. This body became the agent of the Military Committee responsible for planning for the defence of the NATO area against attack.

As a result of this decision the tripartite organization for planning against a major aggression was disbanded and the Standing Group took over the responsibility and Canada lost the preferential position it had held with U.K. and U.S. in strategical planning and in the setting up of NATO. So that by 1950 Canadian Defence Policy was wholly concerned in NATO and the U.N.

When General Eisenhower took over as Supreme Allied Commander, he visited all the NATO countries including Canada to secure forces to form the shield in Europe. The European partners had little or nothing in the shape of fighting forces, equipment or trained leaders. Eisenhower appealed to the Canadian Government to make the greatest possible contribution of forces and equipment in the shortest time to clearly demonstrate that North America was determined to back NATO to the full. As and when the European partners gained strength, the North American troops could be brought home.

Canada decided to make the following contribution:

- a. Brigade Group immediately, to be built up to a Division after D-Day, followed by a Corps HQ and a second Division if needs called for such a build-up.
- b. Air Division of 12 squadrons of day fighters, as soon as possible.
- c. 42 ships and 48 maritime aircraft.

Every ship we had - and some were in bad shape. These ships and aircraft were to be supplied between D and D+180. This commitment was to give us some concern when the concept of war was changed because of the changing threat.

In North America

- (1) A Brigade Group of airportable troops for the defence of Canada.
- (2) 19 squadrons for air defence; 9 regular, 10 auxiliary.
- (3) Coast defence ships and aircraft.

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You will notice that these forces were to be built up to full strength after the commencement of hostilities, which was the pattern of a conventional war of the 1945 variety, with the U.S. holding the monopoly on the nuclear strategic forces.

However you will recall that in 1949 the Soviet Union announced the explosion of an atomic bomb. Two years ahead of the prediction. Formerly the experts considered 1952 as the earliest date, but they did not expect the build-up of a useful stockpile until 1958. This Soviet achievement caused a serious re-appraisal of the possible Soviet threat. It now looked as if a Soviet nuclear strike might be possible in two or three years. This appreciation meant that nuclear weapons might be available at the outset of an attack and therefore the previous conception of building our forces after the opening of hostilities did not appear valid. If we were to meet a sudden onslaught the defensive forces must be on the spot, trained and ready to fight. The use of reserves and auxiliaries was no longer valid, as they would not be trained and fit to fight in a nuclear war. This new concept had serious repercussions for Canada. Could we meet all our commitments before D-Day? To do so would certainly mean more Regulars, more equipment and more training facilities, all of which would cost more. If these additions were not forthcoming then we must revoke some of our promises.

In the midst of this reappraisal in 1950 the Korean War broke out and the Government decided to support the U.N. and participate in the struggle. At the same time there was concern about the spreading of the conflict into an East-West struggle and perhaps a Third World War. Therefore the Government decided not to denude the country of its trained troops but to raise and train additional forces for Korea, leaving the Mobile Brigade Group and the Air Defence Forces to deal with any threat to Canada.

So by 1951 Canada was:

- a. Training and despatching troops for the NATO shield in Europe.
- b. Raising and training troops for U.N. force in Korea.
- c. Refitting and despatching ships and maritime aircraft for NATO defence in the North Atlantic.
- d. Training and exercising ground and air defence forces for the territorial defence of Canada in case the Korean War developed into something bigger.

This effort boosted the defence budget to an all-time high of \$2 billion.

I mentioned earlier that there was considerable concern regarding the possibility of Soviet intervention to support the Chinese. This concern, along with the evidence of the production of new types of long-range bombers in the Soviet Union, posed a potential threat to North America. Therefore steps were taken to accelerate the build-up of the Joint Air Defences of the continent. The construction of the Pine Tree Line was hastened to completion to provide for radar cover for the most likely approaches between Labrador and the Great Lakes. The Canadian Government agreed to construct the Mid-Canada Line and the U.S. began to plan for the DEW Line. These three warning chains and their communications form an integrated early warning system for North America. This system was to provide four to five hours' warning of a bomber attack, which was necessary to allow the U.S. Strategic Air Force time to get off the ground to avoid destruction and launch their counter-offensive. These warning arrangements were a very expensive undertaking, with Canada paying one-third of the cost and the U.S. two-thirds; but you will recall there was real anxiety at that time about the possibility of a Soviet air attack.

Perhaps this would be an appropriate time to talk about the deterrent. You will recall that I mentioned earlier that in the preliminary NATO planning the U.S. was responsible for the retaliatory forces. While the U.S. Strategic Air Force was not part of the NATO forces, it was committed to support the shield forces and the Strategic Air Force developed plans with both SACEUR

and SACLAN. Originally the Strategic Air Force consisted of a large number of heavy and medium bomber squadrons and a large stockpile of atomic bombs.

These bombers were based on a large number of bases in continental U.S. and overseas bases in the U.K., Pakistan, Okinawa, and in the Philippines and Turkey, with refuelling bases in Canada (Goose Bay, Frobisher, Namao and Churchill), Greenland and Alaska. The number of bombers available and their wide dispersion provide an ample force for the deterrent role. As I mentioned earlier, it was originally planned that the U.S. would be solely responsible for this expensive and difficult task. However the U.K. became quite concerned about nuclear matters after the Fuchs case and the passing of the McMahon Act, which curtailed the release of nuclear information to other nations except on a strictly reciprocal basis. This meant that the U.K. would only have access to U.S. information if the U.K. had something to offer in the same field. Furthermore there was the question of the close relation between the nuclear research for weapon development and the use of plutonium for the development of power, in which the U.K. had a vital interest. There was also the question of prestige. The U.K. authorities, much against advice, decided to go into nuclear production and the setting up of a Strategic Bomber Force. This decision has proven very costly and disappointing. It marked the first spread of nuclear weapons in the West and their possession became a mark of prestige. The high cost of this venture forced the U.K. to cut her forces in Europe at a time when U.K. leadership on the continent was so important.

Now let us look at tactical nuclear weapons and the problems they create. In the early 1950's the U.S. developed a series of tactical nuclear weapons, air defence rockets with atomic warheads such as GENIE and NIKE and later BOMARC, bombardment weapons such as SERGEANT, CORPORAL and HONEST JOHN, and an atomic cannon to please the gunners but not of too much use. In the naval field there were atomic depth charges and atomic torpedoes. As it was anticipated that the Soviet forces would very shortly be

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equipped with these types of weapons and as the NATO partners were failing to meet their conventional force goals, the U.S. offered to provide the NATO countries with these weapons under certain conditions. These conditions were that the weapons be stockpiled under NATO arrangements but be maintained and remain in U.S. custody until released by order of the President. This safeguard was included to ensure that the weapons would be used only for the purpose intended, that is the defence of the NATO area. Perhaps some of you can think of other circumstances in which the use of these weapons, or the threat to use them, might be most undesirable. There were some misgivings in the NATO Council but the weapons were accepted under the U.S. conditions. These conditions called for each NATO country to negotiate a bilateral agreement with the U.S. Canada agreed to this proposal in 1956 but so far has not negotiated the bilateral agreement.

The next development in the nuclear field which was to have a pronounced effect on our defence policy was the introduction of ballistic missiles into the arsenals of the east and west. Here again the Soviet Union produced its ballistic rockets not only earlier than expected but produced missiles with much greater accuracy and reliability than had been forecast by the western experts. This achievement has seriously altered the concept of war and provided a whole series of unanswered problems.

This innovation removed defence from the earth and pushed it into outer space in a matter of a few years. It reduced the warning time from four to five hours to 15 or 20 minutes and created a defence problem which seems to defy solution, at least for the present time. While a great deal of money is being spent and a vast research effort is being devoted to the solution of this problem, the solution seems a long way off. (NIKE - HERCULES).

This dilemma is most serious for the west as we are on the defensive and will not start a preventative war or carry out a pre-emptive strike. Therefore the present deterrent is in jeopardy and some believe it is no longer

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effective in deterring aggression. However if there is no direct defence against the ballistic missile then we are forced to explore other means such as improving the effectiveness of the deterrent.

This question of the effectiveness and viability of the deterrent is being widely discussed and perhaps I should say a word about it. Some of you may have heard Professor Aeyres discussing this on a television programme last autumn. To be effective the Western deterrent must be such that it can accept the Soviet first strike and still deliver an unacceptable amount of punishment on the Soviet Union. Therefore the security of the deterrent force is of paramount importance. The U.S. Strategic Air Force have worked out procedures for maintaining an airborne alert for its bomber forces and a system of despatching a bomber force on a recall mission in advance of a hostile strike. But similar systems are not possible for ballistic missiles. Once launched they cannot be recalled. So other methods have to be sought to ensure that the whole missile force is not destroyed by a Soviet first strike.

The security of the missile is being sought by three methods: Hardening, Dispersal and Mobility. Vast sums have been spent on hardening of the missile sites, which involves construction of underground emplacements of steel and concrete. The accuracy which has been achieved by the Soviet missile and the difficulty of keeping locations secret in the West has nullified any security by the hardening process. Therefore more attention is now being directed to mobility and dispersion. The POLARIS missile operating from a nuclear submarine provides both mobility and dispersal. This is perhaps an ideal form of deterrent, but it is a very expensive one. Other forms of mobility are being tried out for the POLARIS, such as barges and small harbour craft which will be much cheaper. Other developments are proceeding, such as the mobile MINUTEMAN missile which can be mounted on a railway car and, because it has solid fuel, is much more reliable and can be ready to fire in a

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few minutes. This type of missile can be readily moved about and can be fired from railway sidings and freight yards.

There is no doubt that for the deterrent to be effective in preventing a Soviet attack we must be able to convince the Soviets that they cannot destroy all the forces of retaliation with the first blow. It is sometimes suggested that Canada should offer facilities for the mobility and dispersal of the deterrent. Perhaps you may wish to discuss this question later in the question period, as it raises many problems. But if we believe that the deterrent is our only effective defence perhaps we should face up to the difficulties. There is no doubt in my mind that with this terrific amount of destruction only fifteen minutes away, no avenue of preventing this holocaust should be left unexplored. But I doubt if there is any satisfactory military answer to this dreadful problem. We can foresee all kinds of additional devices for spreading destruction from outer space, in shorter time, and in larger doses, but to prevent this happening seems at present to defy solution.

To sum up the development of defence policy to date:

- (1) I have tried to make it clear that it is the changing threat and the advances in technology which force adjustments and changes in defence policy and not, as some critics say, the whims and the wails of the Generals.
- (2) In the last 20 years we have seen the development of defence policy from the time we relied for our security on our isolated geographical position to today, when the threat is leaving this planet and soaring into outer space.
- (3) I submit that there is no direct defence for Canada no matter how much we are prepared to spend. All we can do is to seek through collective arrangements some security by supporting the deterrent in Europe, the North Atlantic, and in North America, and shortly in outer space.

At the same time we must continue our efforts in the U.N. in maintaining the peace and assisting in preventing local incidents from developing into general war.

- (4) In these uncertain circumstances we cannot expect adequate, satisfying and cheap defence, with all the risks being taken by the military. That day is gone forever. At the best it will be a series of compromises, which are bound not to please everybody and will involve more sacrifices of sovereignty, prestige and perhaps wealth.

I hope with this background we can pass to a lively discussion on some of the outstanding problems which I would like to outline:

- (1) Is there a better answer to our Defence Dilemma?

What about full or partial neutrality we hear so much about these days.

- a. Withdrawal from NATO.
- b. Withdrawal from Air Defence and NORAD.
- c. Place all our forces under the United Nations.

- (2) Should Canada acquire nuclear weapons?

- a. What weapons do we need? and why do we need them?
- b. How would these weapons be controlled?
- c. Should they be acquired?

- (3) Should Canada offer facilities for the deterrent as suggested by Professor Aeyres?

- (4) Can we afford our present policy and its commitments with the increased cost of equipment?

Can we afford the luxury of three Services?

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NOTES FOR USE AT DISCUSSION

Question 1 - Is there a better answer to our Defence Dilemma?

What about Neutrality? James M. Minifie thinks so.

What is the case for Canadian neutrality?

It's cheap, it saves money, it's morally right, it's the Christian approach - these are the cries of the pacifist. The social worker says that the arms race inevitably leads to war. Are these statements really true? Have the wars of the last century been a result of an arms race? I submit that this is not borne out by the facts. The First World War was the result of ambition of the Kaiser and his war lords, who thought that they could get away with attacking France because France was not ready to fight; they questioned whether Britain would support France, and if she did she was unprepared; and it was not expected that the U.S. would intervene. In the Second World War the same can be said. Hitler was sure he could get away with it. He knew the weak state of France and the U.K. The same can be said for the Pacific: the weakness of the U.S. and U.K. in the Far East gave the Japanese the opportunity to strike with almost impunity. There was certainly no arms race here. Some critics point out with some justification that the last war might have been avoided if the French and the U.K. had taken a strong stand when Hitler walked into the Rhineland. So much for history.

Would neutrality save Canada from destruction in a nuclear war?

While we can revoke our solemn treaties with our allies, we cannot negate geography. You will recall that I mentioned earlier that we derived some security in the earlier years from our geographical position. Now our position on this planet, like it or not, ties in with any military action involving the U.S. Even if the Soviet Union respected or even believed in our neutrality, we could not avoid grave damage and loss of life in a war involving the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

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What would we achieve by neutrality? Certainly not immunity from destruction. But we would lose our influence with the U.S. and in NATO, and it is doubtful if it would enhance our prestige in the U.K. It would align Canada with Switzerland.

(a) Should we withdraw from NATO or reduce our commitments in Europe?

I presume when referring to NATO most people think of Allied Command Europe. I have already mentioned our contributions to the shield forces in Europe, of a Brigade Group of three battalions and supporting troops, and an Air Division of 12 squadrons. As far as the Brigade Group is concerned, from a purely military standpoint the withdrawal of the Brigade Group is not significant. With the build-up of the German forces the brigade should be taken out of its present forward role, and the Germans should take over the defending of their own Border. Whether the Brigade should be given another role or brought home is a political decision. However this is the only operational role the Army has and I am doubtful if you can maintain a fighting force by just practising survival.

The Air Division is being re-equipped. Eight of the present day-fighter squadrons are to be converted to a reconnaissance strike role and are to be equipped with the 104 strike aircraft. This new role requires the use of a small atomic bomb and the aircraft is useless in this role without it, but so far arrangements for obtaining these weapons have not been completed. There is no role for this formation in Canada and therefore if it is brought home it would likely be disbanded.

While from a purely military standpoint the European partners should now be able to look after their own territorial defence, there are serious political and psychological considerations. A decision to bring the Canadian troops home might be misinterpreted by Mr. K. as the beginning of the breakup of NATO, which is of course one of the Soviet's announced aims; and by our partners in NATO as the start of Canadian neutrality or withdrawal to Fortress America.

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(b) Now let us look at withdrawal from NORAD.

This is a question that is generally misunderstood. As I mentioned earlier, the decision to undertake joint air defence was made in 1946 not 1958. The setting up of the integrated headquarters in Colorado Springs which became known as NORAD was the last step in co-ordinating the whole of the air defence of the continent which had been developed over the past fifteen years. Some of the argument for the abandonment of the air defence organization may be based on the assumption that bomber attacks are now outmoded and therefore there is no need of defences. Bombers are still the most accurate and flexible delivery system for mass destruction weapons. Rockets are now being developed which can be launched from bomber aircraft at long ranges, something like 1000 miles, and these rockets carry a megaton warhead. This provides a new form of mobility to the retaliatory weapon and decreases the risk of destruction of the deterrent by a first strike. The U.K. have abandoned their extensive Blue Strike missile programme because of its vulnerability and are planning to adopt the U.S. Skybolt airborne missile in their Vulcan bombers. It is my opinion that it is premature to abandon an efficient working system until we are sure that the Soviets have scrapped all their bombers, and it has been established that the NORAD organization is no use against the airborne type of missile. Also it should be remembered that NORAD is responsible for the operation of the ballistic missile early warning system which is now in operation. A satellite early warning system known as MIDAS will come into operation in about 1965. If and when a missile defence system is developed, NORAD will operate the system.

There is also another important advantage to Canada in fully co-operating with the U.S. in defence of this continent. This action puts Canada in a preferential position because, as we are full partners in the defence of

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North America, we have to be consulted every time the U.S. contemplates using force anywhere in the world, as this use of force may bring about retaliation and our joint air defences must be in a high state of readiness. Therefore we are in a very favourable position to influence U.S. policy. This is worth keeping, and I see little to be gained and much to be lost in severing our close defence relations with the U.S. Right enough we should not spend much more on bomber defence, but it is important to keep this close and intimate defence relationship.

(c) Should we place all our forces under the U.N.?

I mentioned earlier that we have been aware of possible U.N. commitments since 1946. We have tried without too much success to anticipate possible U.N. commitments. Twice we have prepared a battalion and twice the U.N. wanted something else. Nasser would not have the Queens Own because perhaps the name alone appeared to be too British; and we did not have any more luck with the Congo. As far as I know, neither the Secretary General nor the Security Council want a U.N. force under U.N. command as a permanent U.N. Organization. Therefore it appears a bit ridiculous to offer a Canadian component to a non-existing force. I also wonder whether the sponsors of this idea would be so keen if the Soviet Plans for the re-organization of the Secretary General office ever come into effect. It would be a bit tricky if a Soviet member of the secretariat was able to commit Canadian forces to intervene in, say, South Africa to prevent enforcement of the policy of apartheid. There does not appear to be much chance of a U.N. combat action like Korea taking place again because of the present composition of the Security Council and the Assembly. The present indication seems to be for more of the police type of action like the Palestine intervention and the present Congo operation.

Question 2 - Should Canada acquire nuclear weapons?

- (a) What weapons do we need and why do we need them?

Brigade Group in Europe

Canada has accepted a forward task in the Shield Force in Europe which requires heavy support for its infantry. The Government has agreed to provide for this support the Honest John 762 mm close-support rocket, which requires an atomic warhead. This is the same equipment which is being used by the other NATO partners in the shield force.

Air Division in Europe

As I mentioned earlier the Air Division is being re-equipped. Eight of the day fighter squadrons are being converted to reconnaissance strike squadrons and the Government has decided to equip these squadrons with the 104 strike aircraft which is to be armed with a small atomic bomb. To carry out these roles which the Government has accepted, these atomic weapons are necessary.

- (b) Custody and control in Europe

These warheads will be supplied and paid for by the U.S. They will be stockpiled under NATO arrangements, guarded by NATO forces, but will be maintained by and remain in the custody of the U.S. until released by the President to the Supreme Allied Commander or the country concerned. The reason for this veto on their use is to ensure that the weapons are only used for the purpose intended; that is, for the defence of the NATO area. This appears to me to be a very prudent safeguard. This release by the President is not an order to use them or a decision to go to war; the decision to go to war is a government decision.

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Nuclear Weapons for Forces in Canada

Canadian maritime forces of ships and aircraft have been allotted an anti-submarine role in the North Atlantic. The most effective method to carry out their tasks is by using atomic depth charges and atomic torpedoes. These weapons are essential to deal with the missile-carrying atomic submarine, which has the capability of attacking Canadian ports and shipping. These weapons would be stored on Canadian bases but would remain in U.S. custody until released. The same principle would apply if these weapons were stored on Canadian ships. A U.S. officer would have custody.

Air Defence Forces

The Bomarc missile requires an atomic warhead and two Bomarcs are in Canada. If any new fighters are procured to replace the CF.100, these fighters will require an air-to-air atomic missile. The same arrangements apply for control of these warheads but some adjustments have to be arranged to allow instant action by air defence forces.

(c) Should these weapons be acquired?

There are efforts being made in some quarters to fog this issue of acquiring nuclear weapons by objecting to the U.S. maintaining custody of the weapons. The statement is frequently made that Canada should not have anything to do with weapons that are not completely under Canadian control. This is a lame excuse that does not stand up to close examination. These weapons are manufactured and paid for by the U.S. and are not bought by Canada; they remain the property of the U.S. They are provided solely for joint use or for multilateral defence of the NATO area which includes Canada. The U.S. Law requires the President to release them. This is a safeguard to ensure that they are not used for any other purpose. This release is not an order to use them; it is only a release to the country concerned. The decision to use the weapons, like the decision to go to war, is a national government decision.

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You may argue that such restrictions are not necessary for Canada. We are nice people and don't like not being trusted. But here again we must remember that the rules were not made to deal only with Canada but for all the other nations with which the U.S. has defence arrangements. You no doubt can think up some who would really require some watching if nuclear weapons were placed at their disposal. However I cannot visualize the occasion when we would want to use nuclear weapons and the U.S. did not.

Perhaps I can use a homely illustration to clarify this point of dual control, which has sometimes been described as two keys to the cupboard; - the U.S. has one and we have the other. It is very like a safety deposit box in the bank. The bank ensures that you are the authorized tenant of the box before the bank employee will insert his key which allows you to have access to your property. This action ensures that you meet the bank's conditions, which the bank has laid down to fulfil the obligation it has accepted to safeguard your property while in their custody. But it does not in any way infringe on your rights to do what you like with the contents of the box. The same is true in regard to the release by the President. The President assesses that the condition laid down for the use of the weapons has been met and releases them. What happens after that is a Canadian matter. Canada can use them or send them back.

Now the question is, should we acquire these nuclear weapons?

Let us be quite clear that what we are talking about is the tactical nuclear weapon I have mentioned earlier and not weapons of mass destruction.

From a purely military standpoint there is no doubt that, in order to carry out the tasks that the government has accepted in Europe, in the Atlantic and in North America, these nuclear weapons and warheads are

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required. To ask the Canadian Serviceman to fight with weapons inferior to those of the enemy has never been Canadian policy and I hope it never will be. The Prime Minister has said on several occasions that the Canadian forces will be well equipped and trained for the Canadian share in balanced collective defence. If for any reason the most modern and efficient weapons are not to be obtained, then the roles and tasks that Canada has accepted should be revoked or modified, but under no circumstances should the Canadian Serviceman be expected to carry out military tasks with equipment inferior to that of the enemy.

Question 3 -

Should Canada offer facilities for the dispersal of the deterrent?

There is no doubt that if we really believe that the deterrent is our only hope of avoiding destruction we should do everything to assist in the preservation of this force against destruction by a Soviet first strike. There is in Canada plenty of remote areas where missiles could be located. Plenty of lakes and rivers where the Polaris missile could be moved about to avoid detection. Plenty of rail sidings where the Minuteman on railway cars could be stationed. There is no doubt we have the facilities, but should they be offered? Perhaps you would like to comment on this one.

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Question 4 - Can we afford our present policy and its commitments, with the continued increase in the cost of equipment?

You will recall that when I discussed our NATO commitments I mentioned that these undertakings were made at a time when it was expected to use reserves for completing our forces to wartime strength. However this is not now possible under present conditions of nuclear war. The result has been that there has been a steady increase in the requirements of personnel, training facilities and operating costs. The budget for defence has been steadily dropping since Korea with the result that the amount of money available for equipment has been steadily reduced. At the same time the cost of military equipment has been increasing manyfold. For example the F.86 cost in the neighbourhood of one-quarter of a million dollars, whereas its successor will cost in the order of two million, about eight times the previous cost.

Therefore there is a real dilemma facing the Services. Do we cut the commitments, fire some personnel, or go without modern equipment, or raise the defence budget? This is not a new problem. It has been with the Department for the last five years. If this situation continues, Canada will have the best dressed, best paid, poorest equipped force in the world.

Can we afford the luxury of three Services for a force of 120,000, about the strength of a wartime Corps?

Is there not some room for economy here?

Three administrations - three procurement branches - three separate command systems.

Changing conditions.

Army and Navy flies - some suggest Air Force grounded.

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THE SOLUTION

I am convinced that we have gone so far in the production of force and in making it so readily available, I seriously question the use of force as an instrument of policy. Once one of the Great Powers resorts to the use of force to attain a political objective it has no other alternative than to continue to use more and more force until the objective is attained or it capitulates. In this process the world may be destroyed. In other words the Soviet Union and the U.S. are like two scorpions in a bottle, each one capable of destroying the other but only at the risk of being destroyed itself.

In the civilized world we have ceased to allow the use of force to settle personal differences; fighting, threatening and duelling are no longer tolerated. No longer do men carry swords and side arms to be able to defend themselves and settle their differences with their fellow men. The Courts and their officers have been set up for this purpose of settling individual differences and disputes. It is my view that nations big and small are going to be forced to adopt a similar code to the one they insist on for their nationals.

I take issue with those who say let us go back to conventional weapons, as if it was alright to settle disputes by conventional means when only the soldiery get killed but the world is saved from destruction. Can you really turn back the clock? If you can, why not turn it right back to bows and arrows, or better still, clubs. Would reverting to conventional weapons and turning all the uranium over for peaceful purposes save the world if force was still used as an instrument of policy?

Suppose the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to destroy all the nuclear weapons, and each side played the game, which is a very big "if". Then the U.S. and the Soviet Union had differences and decided to go to war with the conventional weapons they had available. Each would continue to use more and more force as it became available. While the atomic bombs

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may have been destroyed, the scientists and technicians would still possess the know-how, as you cannot brainwash the scientist. The experts tell me that if the fission material is available for the production of power it would take only a few days before the production of bombs could be started. Right enough the rate of production may be slow, but the nuclear war would be again possible with all the accompanying horrors. Therefore the destruction of the existing stockpiles does not appear to be a real answer to this dilemma. I have somewhat reluctantly come to the conclusion that the use of force as an instrument to attain political aims must be abandoned.

This of course is a long-term aim but has taken fifty years to convince the individual that the rule of force is outmoded and it will no doubt take a long time to do this for nations. What should we do in the meantime?

Until the abandonment of the use of force is fully accepted, it is important to seek some stability in the nuclear forces of the east and west. Should these nuclear forces become imbalanced the temptation to use them will become greater. While we cannot do anything in regard to stabilizing the eastern nuclear force, we can assist in stabilizing the western deterrent by offering facilities for mobility and dispersion of the U.S. Strategical Force. These are so necessary for the west because the west must be prepared to accept the first blow and still be ready to retaliate. I am sure this aspect needs very careful consideration. We should always bear in mind that peace for Canada can only be attained through peace for the world, and unless we are prepared to take some risks, take some more responsibility, and make some sacrifices of sovereignty and prestige, we may not avoid this nuclear destruction, which is only fifteen minutes away.

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I doubt whether either the U.S. or the Soviet Union plan an all-out nuclear war. Both appreciate the consequences. But neither trusts the other, and therefore they are loath to disarm. The greatest danger today and in the foreseeable future is a war by accident or miscalculation or from a local conflict degenerating into a major struggle with neither of the great powers willing to back down. The chances of an accidental war are increasing every day with the development of missile detection devices which will detect missiles immediately after they have been launched. There was an incident some time ago when the missile-detecting radar at Thule picked up an unidentified object and caused some consternation. When the U.S. and the Soviet Union start testing multiple launching of rockets and satellites without notice these detection devices will pick up these missiles heading into space and they may well be mistaken as the commencement of a hostile strike, and the other side might well loose off the retaliation weapons and bring on the war that no one wants. This is a very acute and increasing danger and an agreement is urgently needed on the mutual reporting of all proposed test flights of missiles and satellites, and a strict control on the commencement of retaliation. This is a very complex problem but so much is at stake that it needs sorting out.

Secondly we must continue, no matter how tiresome and provoking it is, to fully support the U.N. in its efforts to solve the complicated international problems and maintain the peace. It is vitally important that the middle powers, such as Canada, should undertake these tasks so that intervention by the giants - the U.S. and the Soviet Union - is never made necessary by the refusal of the middle powers to take over this responsibility. If the giants come in, then it will only mean they would come in from opposite sides and perhaps take up positions from which they could not back down and lead to a conflict which no one wants.

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In the meantime we must continue to maintain modest, well-equipped forces to carry out these roles in the United Nations and support the deterrent in Europe, the Atlantic and North America until the use of force as an instrument of policy is abandoned.

To sum up this suggested policy:

- (a) Strive for abandonment of the use of force as an instrument of political policy as a long-term aim.
- (b) Shorter term: Assist as much as possible in stabilizing the nuclear deterrent and preventing an imbalance which could lead to a rash act.
- (c) Urge a reporting system on missile and satellite launching to avoid miscalculation of intention.
- (d) Continue and even enhance the support to the U.N. in solving world problems by the middle powers, no matter how awkward and provoking this may be.
- (e) For some time to come, maintain small, well equipped forces to carry out these tasks.

JBMDS TRANSMITTAL SLIP

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CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

Address by
The Honourable Douglas S. Harkness, P.C., G.M., E.D., M.P.,
Minister of National Defence
to the
Montreal United Services Institute
Friday, February 10, 1961, 8:00 p.m. EST

I should first of all like to thank the Montreal United Services Institute for inviting me to say a few words here this evening. I am, of course, delighted to be given the opportunity of speaking to the members of an association who have always expressed a very keen interest in defence matters.

A few weeks ago I returned from a tour of a number of important defence establishments in Canada and in the United States. On that tour I visited the RCAF Stations at Cold Lake and Namao and the Army installations at Calgary. In the United States I stopped at Colorado Springs to visit the headquarters of the North American Air Defence Command. I held some discussions there with the Commander in Chief of NORAD, General Kuter and the Deputy Commander of NORAD, Air Marshal Roy Slemon of the RCAF. From Colorado Springs I flew on to Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha which is the nerve centre of the Strategic Air Command. I intend to say a few words to you tonight about some of the thoughts which have been prompted by my visit to these important defence centres.

It has often seemed to me that to sell a security program year after year is a particularly difficult task, for in a way it is like trying to convince a healthy man to buy enough

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life insurance. We know that a certain amount of life insurance is necessary - it is something that everyone should have - however it is always difficult to dig down deep in our pockets year after year and come up willingly with the money that is needed for adequate coverage. I feel that one of the most effective ways of maintaining an enlightened public opinion, which is so important to a successful security program, is by speaking to well-informed groups such as yours.

When the defence picture is undergoing so many changes so rapidly, it is a good thing to return to first principles and ask ourselves why we are supporting this rather large defence machine. Basically, the free nations must engage in what could almost be described as a total defence in order to counter the continuing threat posed by the hostile communist regimes. There is no use trying to ignore the fact that this threat includes the determination of the Sino-Soviet bloc to achieve world domination. This could be done by either military means or by such non-military means as diplomacy, economic penetration, propaganda and subversion. Surely we all recognize now, from events that have taken place during the past 15 years, that the communist threat is not solely military, and that the other elements are equally dangerous to our security. This is why I prefer to talk in terms of a security program rather than of a defence program.

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I wish to emphasize that the government deals with our total security through a number of departments and agencies, such as the Prime Minister's office, National Defence, External Affairs, Trade and Commerce, National Health and Welfare, Finance and the Department of Justice to which the RCMP reports. While the subject of the inter-play of government agencies and their effect on our total security is indeed a fascinating one, tonight I want to confine my remarks to the military aspect of the threat.

Let there be no mistake about the importance of the military threat to our security. It consists of a substantial Soviet nuclear capability made up of manned bombers and missiles, the submarine menace, and the large conventional forces of both the Soviet and Chinese-communist regimes. Another element of the threat is the promotion and support by the communist regimes of subversive elements within free societies and the use by the communists of economic resources, backed by their vast military strength, to exploit weaknesses and unrest throughout the world.

Now, what are the measures that we can take to counter this threat which faces us? Certainly we would be mistaken if we thought for one moment that the only answer is greater military strength. However, I should like to deal first, by way of introduction, with the military aspect. The first implement which the West

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must have is a strong military force to deter war, and, to be adequate it must be capable of waging war if war is forced upon us. Such military strength must include an effectively secure and sufficiently alert nuclear retaliatory striking force. As far as the free world is concerned, this nuclear striking force is concentrated in the United States at the bases of the Strategic Air Command, the headquarters of which I visited last month. Other parts of this force are stationed at SAC bases spread throughout the world. More recently a whole new concept - what I would almost describe as a revolutionary concept - has been introduced, namely Polaris submarines which can retaliate from the depths of the oceans.

Let me make it perfectly clear that Canada does not contribute directly to the retaliatory forces, but we do assist in the warning and the protection of those forces based in the United States, by means of our radar lines, interceptor squadrons and, our soon-to-be installed, anti-bomber missile sites.

By adequate military strength I also mean that the West must have forces which will include the means of controlling the seas, with emphasis on anti-submarine warfare. This is the role which has been assigned to the Royal Canadian Navy and we assist, along with our other NATO allies, in this task. The West must also have mobile forces, composed of land, sea and air elements

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suitably deployed and transportable, which are capable of deterring or coping with limited war situations. Along with this military strength must be a state of preparedness in the civilian community.

It is obvious that a force of this kind cannot be built up and maintained by one nation. How often have we heard people ask: what is the point of a small country like Canada maintaining a defence force in an age when we cannot possibly compete with the great powers? This, of course, is a sad case of mistaken judgement because the great powers in the free world need us just as much as we need them. No country, not even the United States, can effectively defend itself alone. Defence has become a very complicated thing - don't let anyone tell you otherwise - and if the free world is to remain secure it calls for the co-operation of all the nations that belong to it. That is why Canada, in conjunction with the other NATO countries is pursuing its present defence policies. We recognize that we cannot build up a massive ICBM force - nor do we want to do this - we recognize that we cannot afford a great fleet of nuclear submarines - we recognize that the means just do not exist in this country to build up endless numbers of squadrons of interceptors - but we can make a meaningful contribution to a very large force which is made up of the ships, aircraft, missiles and ground forces contributed by all 15 countries of the

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NATO alliance.

Another important element in our overall security program is the total strength of the alliances to which we belong. The security arrangements we have with other free nations enhance our own defence and, of course, the collective political and military posture of the whole democratic world. Sound political development and economic growth in these countries are necessary not only to counter the communist threat but also to sustain the values and institutions of freedom. Therefore political wisdom and economic strength become basic elements in our security.

The last point which I should like to mention and it is perhaps one of the most important - is domestic support. By this I mean an understanding by the man in the street of the nature of the threat confronting us and what must be done to meet it.

The whole defence situation has changed radically from what it was ten years ago. The vulnerability of the North American continent to direct attack, the ever-increasing cost of modern armaments, the urgency of the technological race, the emergence of the under-developed countries, and the consequent increase in nationalism, are only a few of the problems which now confront policy-makers and the public. The situation has been altered not only by our own vulnerability but by the expansion of the means by which the communist world threatens the

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West. It has become necessary to devote immense intellectual and material resources to problems other than the purely military threat which was the major concern some years ago.

I personally feel that it is extremely important for the general public to understand the issues at stake. I do not think these are nearly as well known and appreciated as they should be, and this is demonstrated by some of the major trends of criticism we have heard recently that are so unsound that they do cause real concern to those who are informed about defence matters. It is very easy to criticize, and I welcome it as it means that Canadians are thinking about defence, but that criticism should be constructive. Unfortunately, it is often based on very dangerous misconceptions.

From time to time we hear individuals analyzing the threat as though it were nothing but a simple and obvious puzzle, and such individuals readily offer us a panacea for all our problems. I am thinking at the moment of a book published recently by an American advocating that Canada should withdraw from NATO and the joint defence of the North American continent under NORAD. One newspaper, in its editorial column, described the thesis of this book as being unrealistic, dishonest and unjust. The editorial went on to say that certainly it is true that no one could win a nuclear war. That

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is the very truth that preserves the peace, for the only defence in the nuclear age is the knowledge that nuclear retaliation would hurt an aggressor as seriously as he hurts his victim. Under these circumstances, nuclear war is only likely to start if one side acquires some technological breakthrough which, while ensuring its own survival, would spell certain defeat for its enemy. It follows, therefore, that the free world has a vital interest in America's strength. To talk of unilateral disarmament is to be utterly unrealistic. Only if both sides disarmed simultaneously and with adequate safeguards would real improvement be made. Above all, it is nonsense to think that Canada could remain neutral and untouched by a future war. Geographically, she is located between the Soviet Union and the United States. Whether an ally or neutral, she would certainly be in the nuclear firing-line.

Recently we heard a number of other proposals that would involve a drastic change in Canada's defence policy. One of these was that Canada should withdraw, to a large extent, from the active air defence of Canada and the North American continent. This proposal, it seems to me, leaves a number of important questions unanswered. Do the proponents of this plan assume that there is no longer a bomber threat to this continent or

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do they envisage a situation which would call for the establishment of United States air bases across Canada in lieu of Canadian squadrons? Another question comes to mind in that these United States aircraft would, of course, be more effective if they were armed with nuclear weapons; do they suggest that the United States squadrons should be equipped with nuclear weapons? This must be the case although I find it somewhat paradoxical in that the same people have fiercely opposed such weapons for the RCAF. Do they also suggest that the stationing of United States aircraft in Canada would be more in keeping with Canadian sovereignty?

Another important question arises in connection with Canada withdrawing from an active air defence role. Do these people really believe that Canada would be entitled to a strong voice in the determination of the defence of the North American continent if we should withdraw our contribution to its air defence?

Then, of course, we hear other voices which propose that since there is no real defence at this time against the increasing threat of the ICBM, Canada should have no defence at all, and should throw in the sponge right here and now. Do these individuals seriously maintain that if the United States were attacked, Canada would not be involved and Canadian territory and the Canadian people would not suffer the

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slightest scratch? These are only a few of the questions that come to my mind and I can assure you that there are many many more arising from these rather peculiar and often contradictory proposals.

As one commentator has suggested, once we have cut ourselves adrift from our present allies, the neutrals would rapidly lose interest in us. Devoid of our unique influence in Washington and deprived of the sources of intelligence which make us one of the better-informed middle powers, we should be relegated to the rear ranks of the neutral chorus. At the same time, no country of remotely comparable power has Canada's opportunity to exercise influence in Washington and NATO. The responsible player in the international game makes the most of the cards he has been dealt. We should invite jeers rather than cheers if we attempted to play India's game with Canada's hand.

In all frankness I must say that I am also more than a little weary of the rantings of some of the arm-chair strategists or rather escapists who are forever appearing in print at the slightest provocation. I might add that it would probably be a good thing if they did some hard thinking before they sent their letters off to their local editors. Please do not misunderstand me, I am not one who is opposed to controversy about defence matters. Surely if there were no controversy it would mean that our country was stagnating.

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However, I do think that we should stop kidding ourselves about Canada and look at the facts. We Canadians by geography, by culture, by tradition and by our very sense of freedom are firmly committed to a contribution to the defence of the democratic world. It seems to me that there is very little point of hiding our heads in the sand and expecting someone else to do our job for us.

Of course there may have to be changes from time to time in the structure and composition of NATO. Of course there may have to be changes in the part that Canada will play in this alliance. However, this is no reason for Canadians to say that there is nothing that we can do in defence of the Western world and the North American continent. What we must do is look at the whole picture and decide what we can do best and then go ahead and make our contribution. Isn't this the very purpose of an organization like NATO?

I think that a certain amount of the criticism levelled at our defence program is born out of a type of frustration, I might add a misguided frustration, because we can't build nuclear submarines and ICBM's. Well - if these critics could understand Canada's place in the overall defence picture, they would know that the government does not want to build these things but rather participate in the defence of Canada and the free world in other ways.

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I should like to conclude my address this evening by referring to a topic which I know is of interest to you, the role of the Militia in national survival. I should, first of all, point out that awful as the consequences would be, the possibility of war cannot be completely ruled out. The government has, therefore, taken steps to ensure that in such a time of disaster some organization should exist to institute measures that would ensure survival. In this regard, the Regular Army and Militia forces in Canada have been organized for survival operations.

The primary role of the Militia in survival operations will include re-entry operations, first aid training and decontamination. The Militia will be charged with tasks such as bridge building, road clearance and rescue work. They will also be asked to carry out internal security duties.

The Militia may be called upon to support and augment operations of the regular field forces. This includes the provision of a source of skilled individuals and possibly of replacement units should the necessity to increase existing strengths of ground forces in an emergency arise. This necessity would be dependent upon the course of operations and to a large extent on the degree of destruction or disorganization which has occurred.

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All of these duties obviously call for as high a standard of military training as can reasonably be maintained. It follows also that the Militia should continue to be organized, in the main, on a field force basis.

I look upon a strong, well organized, well trained and well distributed Militia as being more important to our national security than ever before in our history. Within the past few years, for the first time, all parts of Canada are exposed to the danger of extremely destructive attack which will fall, if it comes, on all segments of the population.

The only way in which we can survive such an attack as a nation is by an efficient civil defence and survival organization. The Regular and Reserve Army have the primary responsibility for the survival operations, for maintaining order, maintaining communications, making possible orderly re-organization of the communities attacked and of the nation as a whole. They also have the task of preventing or beating down any subsequent attempt at occupation of the country by foreign forces.

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These are formidable tasks of the utmost basic importance. We depend upon the Militia to maintain the necessary interest and level of training in their respective corps which will make possible the fulfilment of these responsibilities.

I have spoken to you tonight in the role that I think you wished me to speak - that of Minister of Defence. As you can see, the Minister of Defence is faced with many problems and harassed by a certain amount of criticism. I have tried to cover a good deal of ground in my talk - I hope that I have made the point that the only way that we are going to preserve our way of life is by helping ourselves and our allies to protect their freedom as well as our own. We, as Canadians, have a useful role to play as a partner in the Western alliance and we would be abdicating our responsibilities if we refused to perform it.



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF

Brig. Waddell,
Chief J.B.M.D.S.

The CCOS would appreciate
if you would speak to him
about the attached letter
from Mr. Byrne after you
have digested the contents.

M. L. Reynolds, Col
Principal Staff Officer
to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff

OCT 21 1960

Discussed with CCOS
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PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE



BUREAU DU COUNCIL OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL

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Ottawa, October 18th, 1960.

Air Marshal F.R. Miller,
Chairman,
Chiefs of Staff,
OTTAWA.

Dear Air Marshal Miller,

In the studies of our defence policy which are now getting underway, I think we should plan to take into account the probability that disarmament will continue to be a declared objective of Canada and other countries in the foreseeable future and also the possibility that some sort of disarmament agreement may be reached in the next few years. It is impossible of course to predict what forms of agreement may be arrived at, or indeed even to measure with any confidence the likelihood of progress in the disarmament field, but it would seem nevertheless that we should give some consideration to such questions if we are to see both the possibilities and the problems of our future defence policy in context.

My very preliminary thinking on this aspect of the studies is that there are at least three implications of disarmament on defence policy which should be examined. One of these arises from the fact that given the world context of the Cold War and the strongly-felt aspirations of our own people we shall have at the very least to continue to espouse and promote disarmament as a major objective, and that our defence policies must be capable of acceptance as being consistent with and not antagonistic to the pursuit of that objective.

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Secondly, as part of our study of means to improve our defence position over the next few years we should perhaps search for measures of disarmament that, if agreed upon and implemented, would make positive contributions to our security. This is not to say that we should try to discover proposals whose implementation might give the West a military advantage over the Communists; indeed such proposals are hardly worth working on because the chances of obtaining agreement on them are nil. But there may be measures which would increase the security of both sides by decreasing the danger of war, and on which we might reasonably hope for agreement precisely because they did not give either side a measurable advantage. The disappointing history of past negotiations, to find ways of reducing the danger of surprise attack, for instance, should not I think prevent us from searching for possible new measures of mutual advantage. The identification of such areas for negotiation might well put a new light on what our future defence arrangements should be.

The third and related factor we should take into account is, of course, the impact that future disarmament agreements might have on our defence programmes. The possibilities of such agreements may put a premium on flexibility in our future policies. You may think that there is some advantage, in dealing with this aspect, in trying to make some sort of assessment of what portions of disarmament proposals already made are most likely to result in agreement, as well as a study of what other areas of mutual benefit may be exploited in the near future.

These ideas are really meant only to suggest to you that disarmament provides part of the context in which a study of our defence policies

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should be carried out, and to attempt to set out in a very general way some of the questions we should ask ourselves about disarmament at the same time as we are examining defence. Perhaps you have already given some thought to this part of the problem and have reached some conclusions about it. I should be grateful to have your comments or ideas. Later on we might discuss in more specific terms the way in which disarmament might be taken account of in the defence studies.

I am sending a letter similar to this to Mr. N.A. Robertson.

Yours sincerely,

R. B. Bryce

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UK Representatives:

Mr. Harold Watkinson
Sir Edward Playfair
Air Marshal A. Earle, representing C.D.S.

Canadian Representatives:

Mr. Douglas S. Harkness
Mr. George Drew
Air Marshal F.R. Miller
Major-General G. Kitching

C/5B MDS - personal.

No distribution - Please return!

PW

1. After Mr. Harkness had agreed that he would like to hear the UK views on some of the current problems, Mr. Watkinson said he would like to pass on to Mr. Harkness present British thoughts about NATO and about their studies on the rest of the world.
2. On the subject of the NATO deterrent, Mr. Watkinson said that the British had no more information than we probably had in Canada. They had received no special briefing from the U.S. They were working on vague hints together with Mr. Watkinson's informal talks with General Norstad and other Americans. He said that the British Government realised that if a formal offer was made by the U.S. to give NATO its own nuclear weapons, it would be one of the most generous offers in the history of Alliances and one that deserved special consideration. Although he had had no formal consultations with the Americans, he was sure that they would come up with some plan to reinforce Mr. Herter's earlier offers and to replace the land-based Polaris suggestions which had gone so sour during the past year.
3. Mr. Watkinson went on to say that one problem of particular concern to the UK Government was the "over-kill" capacity which has been built up, not only in Strategic Air Command, but also in NATO. He remarked that already General Norstad controlled a very large number of nuclear forces, including the Sixth Fleet. With the increasing introduction of lower yield tactical weapons and the possibility of a NATO-owned nuclear force, he said that he was becoming particularly concerned about the question of control and the ultimate responsibility for the use of these weapons. He said the British Cabinet had so far only had a first look at this problem and that some of his colleagues felt that possibly there would be many disadvantages in trying to delineate responsibilities for multi-national controls at this time. At present Kruschov knew that the decision would be an American one - he is impressed with the American determination to use these weapons if necessary, and it is for consideration whether it is not better to leave the control with the U.S. rather than get into a NATO wrangle which could only impress Kruschov with the weakness of the NATO Command system. Mr. Watkinson said he felt Mr. Harkness should know that, in his opinion, Europe is more frightened that the U.S. will not use nuclear weapons in the defence of Europe than they are that they will use them in a trigger-happy way. They feel that the U.S. might hesitate too long for fear of Russian retaliation on American cities. Thus the UK rather feel that it is better to leave the question of control in the rather confused state it is for the time being.
4. On the question of NATO policy of nuclear weapons, Mr. Watkinson said that he saw them being under SACEUR's control subject to certain political strings. He did not feel that this NATO-owned deterrent was a military necessity, but that if it would help to overcome some of the major political problems in Europe, then it was worth supporting. He said he felt that the Germans would think it was a good thing to have a special NATO force, primarily because their whole defence structure is based on NATO. Questioned on the

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subject of Germany, Mr. Watkinson told the Minister that one of the anomalies that it is very difficult for the British to understand is that the NATO countries of Europe appear not to bear grudges against the Germans who occupied them in the Second World War, whereas the UK seem to harbour a considerable anti-German feeling. He said that from the UK point of view this was very difficult to understand. The French might prove difficult, and one of the problems that we would have to face if the Americans came up with an offer in December is what action we would take if the French were to make an unilateral decision to refuse this American offer. He said that the UK Government felt that French support was so essential that they would hesitate to go against the French opposition. They would be prepared to make considerable changes and modifications in order to bring France in as a willing partner.

5. Mr. Watkinson said that one of the major problems in setting up this separate NATO force would be co-ordination in the use of the various weapons. Already the U.S. has had to set up an organisation to co-ordinate the targetting of US nuclear forces - this would now have to be tied in with the NATO target system as well as that of the UK-owned deterrent and possibly later with the French. In connection with the possible Polaris programme for NATO, the UK did not agree with the Americans in the priority they gave to missiles. The UK believe that the VTOL aircraft development should keep pace with that of the missile. He stressed that the aircraft can be recalled from a mission, whereas the missile could not.

6. Questioned by Mr. Harkness as to the form in which the US offer might be made, Mr. Watkinson stressed again that the UK always kept in mind that if an offer was made along the lines which have appeared in the press and other reports, it would be one of the most generous offers ever made within an Alliance. He said he understood that possibly Mr. Eisenhower might make the offer himself after the Election and when he had had an opportunity of discussing it with the incoming President. It was possible that if Mr. Kennedy was elected he might disagree with the plans of the present Administration. However, the UK felt that Mr. Kennedy's advisers had already been briefed by the present Administration and might, therefore, continue with this item of US policy. He said that the UK were hoping that the offer would not contain items of detail but would be fairly nebulous in order to allow time for nations to digest the repercussions in the NATO Council. He said he understood from M. Spaak (who is the only person to his knowledge who has discussed this problem with the US), that the American offer would be a conditional one and that the rest of NATO would be asked to match whatever contribution was made by the US. For instance, the US might offer five nuclear submarines each with sixteen Polaris - a total of eighty missiles. They would then expect NATO to produce a similar missile capability. When questioned by Mr. Harkness as to who would "control" these two different forces, Mr. Watkinson said that this was a facet of the problem that the UK had not yet considered, and he agreed that similar arrangements would cause a great many problems and headaches.

7. In discussing the importance of France within the NATO framework, Mr. Watkinson said he hoped that the Minister would have the opportunity of asking M. Messmer, the French MOD, during his talk on Wednesday just what the French reaction might be to an American offer of a NATO force. He said that he had not seen M. Messmer recently, and that he hoped Mr. Harkness could pass on to him any French views about the NATO force expressed by M. Messmer.

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8. In summing up on the question of a possible American offer of a NATO deterrent, Mr. Watkinson said that the UK feel that the Americans will make some form of offer at the Ministerial meetings in order to support their previous offer of IRBMs, and because they feel that unless something dramatic is done this year NATO might well fall to pieces. When this offer is made, the UK feel that it cannot be turned down as was their offer last year of IRBMs. Therefore, the UK hope that when the offer is made it will be in general terms which will allow broad discussion at the meetings followed by some six months of detailed discussions amongst the Permanent Representatives in the NATO Council.

9. On the subject of nuclear weapons generally, Mr. Watkinson said that the UK -

- (a) accept the need for a deterrent;
- (b) agree to a limited number of IRBMs only, since they feel the vertical take-off aircraft would give us better value since it can be recalled;
- (c) agree with tactical weapons subject to normal controls.

He said that his Department was preparing a paper on the possibility of nuclear war and the future of nuclears generally. He would arrange for CDS to pass a copy to CCOS on completion in about three months.

10. Mr. Harkness asked if the UK had considered what effect an offer by the Americans of a nuclear force to NATO would have on Soviet policy, with China, East Germany and the other satellites. He wondered if the US had really thought this through. Mr. Watkinson said that from information given him, the US offer was based on a requirement to compete with the Soviet Union who have not stopped production of their bombers, MRBMs or ICBMs. UK Intelligence reported that the Soviet have a considerable number of missiles poised at present in East Germany, and he fully supported the recent statement by Mr. Macmillan in the House that while we must continue to negotiate, we must only speak from strength. He felt that this consideration was motivating the Americans and that it might over-ride their concern about the repercussions within China and East Germany. He felt we should take heart from the fact that the deterrent was working and that we had achieved considerable unity in NATO. In considering the many factors involved we should not make the ground rules too definite at present in any system of disposition and control.

11. Air Marshal Earle then spoke about recent studies by the British Chiefs of Staff. He said that he had been concerned during the past eighteen months with a re-appraisal of the future short of global war. However, recently as a result of a paper which had been approved by the Prime Minister, the Chiefs were now turning their attention to the problems of the next ten years, including nuclear war. The Government paper had forecast areas of special interest and the Chiefs of Staff had then sat down to discuss their force requirements. Their early findings are that the force requirements will not be too different from their present plans. However, the report is still being processed and is yet to be tied in to the economic and political factors which might affect it. He remarked that the Chiefs were particularly pleased to have an opportunity of taking part in this study as they now felt that the Ministers had a better appreciation of the military requirements than before.

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12. On the subject of the Brigade, Mr. Harkness remarked that we continued to be concerned about the logistic support since it was the only item for which we were criticized at SHAPE. Mr. Watkinson said that the UK was doing all it could to get a better logistic plan. He went on to say that he understood that agreement had been reached between the CIGS and CGS on the question of a Canadian General taking over command of a British Division in November 1961. Mr. Watkinson went on to say that he hoped in any change of role for the Brigade that we would bear in mind the importance of the Canadian Brigade to the British Corps. He said that the withdrawal of the Canadian Brigade from Northern Army Group would be "catastrophic", and in his opinion would seriously effect the British effort in NATO. Mr. Harkness remarked that one way of helping in the logistic problems might be for us to obtain our supplies through US channels, since this would ensure a continued supply in the event of war.

13. On the question of anti-aircraft defence within 1st British Corps, Mr. Watkinson said that the decision had been taken to go ahead with the THUNDERBIRD Mark II - an anti-aircraft missile which in the opinion of the British is far superior to HAWK. The UK decision is at present Secret and there has been no announcement made.

14. On the question of BOBCAT, Mr. Watkinson said that the UK requirement was different from the Canadian. The British A.P.C. was required to operate under different conditions, and he had been advised that very little could be done to build the different concepts together. However, he would write a personal letter to Mr. Harkness giving the UK position in regard to BOBCAT and would also include the UK views on HELLER and the Canadian counter motor radar.

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