

CLASSIFIED

File No. Dossier 28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION
Volume 446 From-De 83-11-05 To-À 83-11-09

CLASSIFIÉ

VOLS ACCESSION NO. 18815

2003

TITLE—TITRE:

DISARMEMENT
MEASURES
PLANS AND PROPOSALS
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION (INITIATIVES)

DESARMEMENT
MESURES
PLAND ET PROPOSITIONS
TRUDEAU MISSION DE PAIX (INITIATIVES)

gbc

ATIP
SCREENING

Retention period—Période de retention:

20Y (7A-13D) J

DUMMY ACC: 98-28
NOW:
BOX#

ACCESS TO INFORMATION
L'ACCÈS À L'INFORMATION
EXAMINED BY / EXAMINÉ PAR
DATE Apr 18/06
C. 1/06

DEPARTMENT
OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

2003



Government
of Canada

Gouvernement
du Canada

CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET

DATED FROM
À COMPTER DU

83-11-05

TO
JUSQU'AU

83-11-09

AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - À METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER

DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS

FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTÉRIEURE VOIR

FILE NO. - DOSSIER N°

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

VOLUME

7

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM TOKYO UIGR2015 09NOV83

TO FXTOTT PPR

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/SMITH

DISTR USS DMF PGB PPD IDD IDDZ XDV

REF YOURTEL PPR0406 08NOV

---PMS INITIATIVE-CONSULTATIONS WITH JPN

YOU WILL BE AWARE THAT JPNSE MFA ROUTINELY BRIEFS ITS PRESS CLUB ON UPCOMING EVENTS, WITH EMBARGO ON THOSE THAT HAVE NOT/NOT YET BEEN FORMALLY ANNOUNCED. EMBARGO IS, HOWEVER, FREQUENTLY BROKEN WHEN IT IS KNOWN EVENT HAS BEEN AGREED TO BY BOTH SIDES. WE HAVE NOT/NOT YET, HOWEVER, SEEN ANY REF TO PM TRUDEAU VISIT IN LOCAL PRESS WHICH, AT MOMENT, SEEN ANY REF TO PM TRUDEAU VISIT IN LOCAL PRESS WHICH, AT MOMENT, IS PREOCCUPIED WITH RFAGAN VISIT AND CONTINUING OPPOSITION BOYCOTT OF DIET. FIRST NORTHAM DIV MFA, MOREOVER, SEEMED SURPRISED AT LEAK; THEY TOO WILL REFRAIN FROM FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT, BUT WILL CONFIRM VISIT ALONG LINES OF REFTEL.

CCC/232 090550Z UIGR2015

ACC 339221-TE
FILE 28-6-10-*Trudeau*
CC 20-CDA-9-PM *Peace Mission*

ACC	REF	DATE
FILE		DOSSIER

MESSAGE
MGTC CIRC DIARY FILE

9 NOV 83 FILE NO 012

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ

CONFIDENTIAL

FM EXTOTT RBD022 09NOV83

TO ROME/PM DEL/FOWLER DELIVER BY
INFO PMOOTT/MOORE

091700

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION	
20-1-1	
	44

DISTR IDDZ

FOWLER FROM HANCOCK

---DRAFT PM INITIATIVE SPEECH,MTL,13NOV

NOTE FOLLOWING POINTS ABOUT DRAFT.

2.TONE IS PERHAPS TWO NOTCHES DOWN FROM GUELPH TO EMPHASIZE
BUSINESSLIKE ON WITH THE JOB NATURE OF MESSAGE.SAME WITH MOST
IMAGES AND OTHER DEVICES.PRESENTATION OF PROPOSALS IS DELIBERATELY
STRAIGHTFORWARD(I TRIED FOR LUCID) PARTLY FOR AUDIENCE,PARTLY FOR
PRESS AND PARTLY TO RETAIN THE TRUDOVIAN IMPRINT START TO FINISH.
HE SHOULD NOT/NOT SOUND LIKE A RANDCORP BULLETIN HAS INTERRUPTED
HIM IN THE MIDDLE PASSAGE.

3.MOTIFS IN MY OWN MIND FOR MESSAGE WERE(A) TOMORROW THE WORLD
(B)I'VE GOT THE MO AND (C) I AIN'T ALONE.HENCE THE STRESS ON
GLOBAL THEME,THIRD WORLD TURBULENCE,NORTH/SOUTH CONNECTIONS,AND
WHAT HAPPENS NEXT.THIS SEEMED LOGICAL STEP BEYOND GUELPH EVEN IF
SEEMING TO DIVERT FOCUS SOMEWHAT FROM SUPERPOWERS.TAKE COMFORT
FROM JUST ISSUED TRILATERAL COMMISSION REPORT(GERARD SMITH ET ALL)
WHICH SAYS HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION NEEDS MUCH HIGHER PRIORITY.

4.HAVE ALSO TONED DOWN THE POINT ABOUT ICBM MOBILITY AND
VERIFICATION.RISK HERE IS PARALLEL WITH CRUISE.PROBLEM MAY STILL

.../2

DRAFTED DACTEUR

DIVISION DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED, APPROUVÉ

P.J.A. Hancock/cb

RBD

2-5303

SIG Peter J.A. Hancock



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
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PAGE TWO RBD022 CONFD

EXIST.

5.TEXT IS OK WITH TASK FORCE,WITH POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF KENMAN
QUOTE ON LAST PAGE,WHICH TASK FORCE BELIEVES MIGHT BE INTERPRETED
AS CALLING INTO QUESTION CURRENT NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.
IT HAS BENEFITTED FROM COMMENTS JIM MOORE BUT NOT/NOT PENDING YOUR
JUDGMENT FROM HIS OWN STEAM AND PRESS.

6.BUONA NOTTE.



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

A-7

MGTC FILE CIRC DIARY

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28-6-1-TRUDEAU		PEACE	
442		MISSION	
12	44	10	

SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE FM EXTOTT RBR0542 09NOV83
TO/À TO MOSCO <DELBY100900
INFO
DISTR INFO LDN PARIS BONN WSHDC ROME HAGUE BRU BNATO PCOOTT/FOWLER
REF DISTR DMF IDDZ IDD IDA RBP RBT RGB URR RBRD
SUBJ/SUJ REF YOURTELS XYGR4102 04NOV,XYGR4105 08NOV

---PM's LET TO ANDROPOV

ON 8 NOV,SOV CHARGE NOVIKOV MET RBD AND TASK FORCE CHMAN DELVOIE TO
OBTAIN COPY OF LET FROM PM TO ANDROPOV.

2.IN BRIEF CONVERSATION,NOVIKOV WAS TOLD PURPOSE OF PROPOSED VISIT
BY EMISSARY WOULD BE TO DEEPEN DIALOGUE WITH USSR,TO ENSURE SOV
GOV'T IS FULLY INFORMED OF PM's INITIATIVE AND TO EXPLORE WAYS IN
WHICH CONSULTATIONS MIGHT BE CARRIED FURTHER.

3.CONCERNING VISIT OF PM TO WESTERN EUROPE,NOVIKOV WAS TOLD PM WOULD
BE OUTLINING HIS CONCERNS ABOUT EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND GENERAL
LEVEL OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND CONSULTING LEADERS TO GAIN THEIR
VIEWS ON WAYS TO IMPROVE POLITICAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING MECHANISMS
AND TO REESTABLISH HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL DIALOGUE.NOVIKOV WAS ADVISED
THAT AFTER HIS RETURN FROM EUROPE,PM WOULD LIKELY MAKE PUBLIC
STATEMENT ABOUT NEXT STEPS IN HIS INITIATIVE.

4.NOVIKOV ASKED ABOUT USA REACTION TO PM's VIEWS.WE DESCRIBED IT AS
GENERALLY POSITIVE BUT STILL PRELIMINARY AS PM HAD NOT YET RECEIVED
PRESIDENT REAGAN's REPLY TO HIS LET,DESPITE PRESS REPORTS TO

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG M.T.MACE/lb

RBR

2-2783

SIG B.M.MAWHINNEY

000378



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Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE TWO RBR0542 CONFD

12

10

CONTRARY.

5. IN CONCLUDING CONVERSATION, RBD EMPHASIZED THREE SALIENT ELEMENTS
IN PM'S LET: A) DEPTH OF CONCERN ABOUT LEVEL OF EAST-WEST TENSION. B)
IMPORTANCE PM PLACES ON PERSONAL ATTENTION OF ANDROPOV TO CONTENTS
OF LET. C) REALISTIC APPROACH BEING TAKEN ON NEED FOR CONCRETE STEPS
AND POSITIVE RESULTS.



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MGTC M. FILE DIARY

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	R E S T R I C T E D	9 NOV 83 20 30Z	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0110 09NOV83	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; display: inline-block;"> 28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission </div>	
TO/A	TO BONN <u>DELIVER BY 100800</u>		
INFO			
DISTR	DISTR IFB RGB RCR		
REF	REF YOURTEL ZQGR4075 OF NOV 08 AND FOWLER/DELVOIE TELECON NOV 08		
SUBJ/SUJ	---PM VISIT TO BONN-MTG WITH VOGEL WE AGREE WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATION THAT PM NOT/NOT SEE VOGEL. AGREE ALSO THAT AMB MIGHT SEE VOGEL ON FRIDAY FOR PURPOSE SUGGESTED REFTEL. PM DEL/FOWLER CONCURS.		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG L.A. DELVOIE	IDDZ	5-2394	SIG <i>L.A. Delvoie</i> L.A. DELVOIE



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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9 NOV 83 18 24Z 10

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0109 09NOV83

TO/À TO PMDEL ROME DELIVER BY 092100

INFO FOR FOWLER

REF INFO WSHDC

SUBJ/SUJ DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB

---PM INITIATIVE-MSG FROM PRES REAGAN

LATEST WORD FROM EMB WSHDC IS THAT PRES REAGAN LEFT WSHDC YESTERDAY
WITHOUT HAVING SIGNED REPLY TO PM TRUDEAU. PRES HAS LET WITH HIM IN
TOKYO AND EMB CONTACTS IN USA ADMIN ARE HOPING IT WILL BE SIGNED

THERE ~~THEN~~ AND DESPATCHED TO US WITHIN NEXT 24HRS. SHALL KEEP YOU INFORMED.

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

L.A.Delvoie/sc

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG

SIG

L.A.Delvoie

000381



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

R E S T R I C T E D

9 NOV 83 17 51 Z 10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0108 09NOV83

TO/À

TO WSHDC

~~IMMEDIATE~~

INFO

DISTR

---PM S INITIATIVE TD: P.GOSSAGE

REF

THIS TEL IS AUTHORITY FOR P.GOSSAGE TRAVEL TO OTT 10-13 NOV.CODING

SUBJ/SUJ

IS 014-825-825-027-0902(EXP) AND 014-825-825-027-0920(ADV)

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIC

J. MCNEE

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I A L	9 NOV 83	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0107 09NOV83	28-6-1- Trudeau Peace mission	
TO/À	TO PEKIN	DELIVER BY 100900	
INFO			
DISTR	INFO WSHDC LDN PARIS BRU HAGUE ROME BONN MOSCO PCOOTT/FOWLER		
REF	NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD		
SUBJ/SUJ	DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB PGB PED PER PPR RGB RCD RBD IDR IDA CPD		
---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INNATL SECURITY			
WE PROVIDE BELOW TEXT OF LETTER FROM PM TRUDEAU TO PREMIER ZHAO			
(ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW BY BAG).YOU SHOULD DELIVER THIS MESSAGE AT HIGH			
LEVEL ASAP.			
2.IN HANDING OVER LET,YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT WE WOULD HOPE THAT			
PM SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE MENTIONED IN LET COULD PROCEED TO PEKING			
IMMED AFTER PARTICIPATING IN PM VISIT TO TOKYO 19NOV,I.E.FOR MTGS			
IN PEKING 21NOV AND/OR 22NOV.			
3.WE WOULD PROPOSE THAT PM REP HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE CHINESE			
AUTHORITIES AT SENIOR LEVEL(E.G.AT VICE MINISTER LEVEL) WITH FULL			
EXPLANATION OF PM INITIATIVE AND SEEK REACTIONS TO IT.BEARING IN			
MIND TRANSLATION REQUIREMENTS,WE ESTIMATE THIS MIGHT REQUIRE			
SESSION LASTING 3 OR 4 HOURS.PM REP SHOULD ALSO HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO			
CALL ON FOREIGN MIN WU TO EXPLAIN INITIATIVE IN GENERAL TERMS AND			
TO STRESS IMPORTANCE WHICH PM ATTACHES TO CONSULTATIONS WITH PRC			
AND TO FORTHCOMING VISIT TO CDA OF PREMIER ZHAO.(WE BELIEVE THAT FM			
WILL BE IN PEKING NOV21-22 PRIOR TO DEPARTING FOR TOKYO ON NOV23.)			
...2			

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

L.A.Delvoie/sc

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG

L.A. Delvoie
SIG L.A.Delvoie



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PAGE TWO IDDZ0107 CONFD

4. SHALL ADVISE NAME OF PM PERSONAL REP ASAP.

5. TEXT BEGINS. QUOTE

(COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)

TEXT ENDS.

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

QUOTE

Dear Mr. Premier:

For some months now I have been deeply concerned by the state of East-West relations and by the international security situation. I have been particularly troubled by the absence of any high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. My concerns have been sharply increased in recent weeks by the tragic destruction of a civilian passenger aircraft, by events in Lebanon, and by developments in Grenada.

I have come to the conclusion that action must be taken in the cause of peace to arrest the deterioration in both the state and climate of international relations. I have developed a number of ideas and proposals which I hope may go some way towards achieving this objective. In the days ahead I shall be discussing some of these ideas with European leaders in order to elicit their views and reactions, and to seek their support for my general plan of action.

His Excellency Zhao Ziyang
Premier of the People's Republic of China
Peking

- 2 -

I would also welcome the opportunity to obtain your views and those of your government regarding my proposals. While I very much look forward to discussing these matters when you visit Ottawa in two months' time, I think there would be merit in having my thinking outlined to you at an earlier date. I would therefore propose to send a personal ^{representative} ~~emissary~~ to Peking to review with your senior officials a range of proposals which I have in mind. These include an approach to political confidence-building and ways of taking a global approach to the limitation of nuclear weapons, including both the key role of all five nuclear powers and the vital question of nuclear non-proliferation.

I attach the highest importance to an exchange of views with the Government of the People's Republic of China on these vital questions, as I indicated to Foreign Minister Wu in Ottawa last month, and I hope that it will be possible for your government to receive my personal ^{representative} ~~emissary~~ within the next two to three weeks.

I take this opportunity, Mr. Premier, to send you my best personal wishes.

Yours sincerely,

Pierre Elliott Trudeau

UNQUOTE

mf

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0107 09NOV83

TO PEKIN DELIVER BY 100900

INFO WSDHC LDN PARIS BRU HAGUE ROME BONN MOSCO PCGOTT/FOWLER

NDHQOTT/MDN/CDS/ADMPOI/CPP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR PGB PED PER PPR RGB RCD RBD CPD

---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST-WEST RELNS AND INNATL SECURITY

WE PROVIDE BELOW TEXT OF LET FROM PM TRUDEAU TO PREMIER ZHAO(ORIGIN-
AL TO FOLLOW BY BAG).YOU SHOULD DELIVER THIS MSG AT HIGH LEVEL ASAP.

2.IN HANDING OVER LET,YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT WE WOULD HOPE THAT
PM SPECIAL REP MENTIONED IN LET COULD PROVED TO PEKIN IMMED AFTER
PARTICIPATING IN PM VISIT TO TOKYO 19NOV,IE FOR MTGS IN PEKIN 21NOV
AND/OR 22NOV.

3.WE WOULD PROPOSE THAT PM REP HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO PROVIDE CHINESE
AUTHORITIES AT SENIOR LEVEL(EG AT VICE MIN LEVEL)WITH FULL EXPLANA-
TION OF PM INITIATIVE AND SEEK REACTIONS TO IT.BEARING IN MIND
TRANSLATION REQUIREMENTS,WE ESTIMATE THIS MIGHT REQUIRE SESSION
LASTING 3 OR 4 HOURS.PM REP SHOULD ALSO HAVE OPPORTUNITY TO CALL
ON FOREIGN MIN WU TO EXPLAIN INITIATIVE IN GENERAL TERMS AND TO
STRESS IMPORTANCE WHICH PM ATTACHES TO CONSULTATIONS WITH PRC AND
TO FORTHCOMING VISIT TO CDA OF PREMIER ZHAO.(WE BELIEVE THAT FM
WILL BE IN PEKIN 21-22NOV PRIOR TO DEPARTING FOR TOKYO ON 23NOV).

4.SHALL ADVISE NAME OF PM PERSONAL REP ASAP.

5.TEXT BEGINS:QUOTE DEAR MR PREMIER:

...2

PAGE TWO IDDZ0107 CONF D

FOR SOME MONTHS NOW I HAVE BEEN DEEPLY CONCERNED BY THE STATE OF EAST-WEST RELNS AND BY THE INNATL SECURITY SITUATION. I HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY TROUBLED BY THE ABSENCE OF ANY HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, AND PARTICULARLY BETWEEN THE USA AND THE SOVIET UNION. MY CONCERNS HAVE BEEN SHARPLY INCREASED IN RECENT WEEKS BY THE TRAGIC DESTRUCTION OF A CIVILIAN PASSENGER AIRCRAFT, BY EVENTS IN LEBANON, AND BY DEVELOPMENTS IN GRENADA.

I HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT ACTION MUST BE TAKEN IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE TO ARREST THE DETERIORATION IN BOTH THE STATE AND CLIMATE OF INNATL RELNS. I HAVE DEVELOPED A NBR OF IDEAS AND PROPOSALS WHICH I HOPE MAY GO SOME WAY TOWARDS ACHIEVING THIS OBJECTIVE. IN THE DAYS AHEAD I SHALL BE DISCUSSING SOME OF THESE IDEAS WITH EUROPEAN LEADERS IN ORDER TO ELICIT THEIR VIEWS AND REACTIONS, AND TO SEEK THEIR SUPPORT FOR MY GENERAL PLAN OF ACTION.

I WOULD ALSO WELCOME THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN YOUR VIEWS AND THOSE OF YOUR GOVT REGARDING THESE MATTERS WHEN YOU VISIT OTTAWA IN TWO MONTHS' TIME, I THINK THERE WOULD BE MERIT IN HAVING MY THINKING OUTLINED TO YOU AT AN EARLIER DATE. I WOULD THEREFORE PROPOSE TO SEND A PERSONAL REP TO PEKIN TO REVIEW WITH YOUR SENIOR OFFICIALS A RANGE OF PROPOSALS WHICH I HAVE IN MIND. THESE INCLUDE AN APPROACH TO POLITICAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING AND WAYS OF TAKING A GLOBAL APPROACH TO THE LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INCLUDING BOTH THE KEY ROLE OF ALL FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS AND THE VITAL QUESTION OF NUCLEAR NON-PRO-
...3

PAGE THREE IDDZ0107 CONFD

LIFERATION.

I ATTACH THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE TO AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH THE GOVT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THESE VITAL QUESTIONS, AS I INDICATED TO FOREIGN MIN WU IN OTTAWA LAST MONTH, AND I HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR YOUR GOVT TO RECEIVE MY PERSONAL REP WITHIN THE NEXT TWO TO THREE WEEKS.

I TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY, MR PREMIER, TO SEND YOU MY BEST PERSONAL WISHES.

YOURS SINCERELY,

PIERRE ELLIOT TRUDEAU

UNQUOTE TEXT ENDS.

CCC/021 091825Z IDDZ0107



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ **C O N F I D E N T I A L**

12 10
9 Nov 83 16 01z

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0106 09NOV83

TO/À TO ROME ~~DELIVER BY 0900Z~~ **FLASH**

INFO
DISTR ~~DESTR RDD~~

REF REF OURTEL IDDZ0102 08NOV

SUBJ/SUJ ---PM INITIATIVE

28-6-1-Hudson Peace Mission

QUOTED BELOW IS TEXT OF DRAFT SPEECH. ESSENTIAL YOU PREPARE AS
INSTRUCTED REFTEL FOR PM/FOWLER ON ARRIVAL.

2.TEXT BEGINS. QUOTE.

(COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED).

UNQUOTE.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG P. Hancock/sc

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG

[Signature]

000390

External Affairs Affaires extérieures
Canada Canada

MGTC M. FILE DIARY
FILE/DOSSIER

MESSAGE

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SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

9 NOV 83 10 12Z 10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0105 09NOV83

TO/À

TO ROME/PM DEL/COLEMAN

~~DELIVER BY 091700~~

IMMED

INFO

DISTR

REF YOURTEL YWGR0753 09NOV FM HAGUE

REF

---PM S INITIATIVE - GLOBE EDITORIAL OF 03NOV AND GWINS ARTICLE IN
OTTAWA CITIZEN OF 02NOV.

SUBJ/SUJ

FLWG ARTICLES REQUESTED IN YOUR REFTEL.

(COMCENTRE PLSE COPY ATTACHED ARTICLES).

28-6-1-Tudor Place
mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG J. McNEE

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE

13

Desarmement

SUBJECT/SUJET			GLOBE AND MAIL	
PUBLICATION	DATE			
IDA JLO RSR				
IDD SCI RWP				
IDR ZSI URR	NOV - 2 1983			
IMU-2 RCR RBR				

The third rail

Canadians are understandably skeptical about Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's crusade to curb the nuclear arms race. The odds are long that he can succeed where so many others have failed. His initiative could even backfire, and be exploited by the Kremlin to undermine Western unity.

But if this mission invites skepticism, it defies cynicism. Too much of the Canadian reaction thus far has centred on the political motivations behind the Trudeau initiative. Mr. Trudeau is presumed to have embarked on his crusade in order to extend his lease on 24 Sussex Drive, or in order to terminate his lease there in a blaze of personal glory.

Such assumptions ignore the fact that this is no sudden interest in world affairs on the Prime Minister's part. He has been a consistent advocate of reducing international tensions, and has previously been personally involved in defusing confrontation within the Commonwealth and in efforts to lessen North-South friction.

His inability to bridge the North-South gap was due both to the international recession and to his failure to go beyond a vague espousal of "global negotiations." The lesson of that earlier crusade is that his arms control initiative will have to include precise proposals rather than mere exhortations to reasonableness.

But, pending the specifics, Mr. Trudeau is entitled to vigorous, non-partisan support for his efforts to break the super-power impasse and develop a momentum favorable to the cause of arms reduction. Without such support at home, he will stand no chance of making Canada's limited influence count abroad.

Mr. Trudeau is addressing the super-powers as the senior statesman of the West, and he rates a respectful hearing in world capitals on that basis

alone. But, on this issue at least, he is also the authentic voice of the Canadian people. He articulates the hope for a peaceful world which all Canadians share.

When he calls on the super-powers to approach their arms talks in a spirit of compromise, he is urging them to resolve this, the most dangerous confrontation threatening humanity, in the spirit in which Canadians have traditionally defused their own internal confrontations.

When he tells the Kremlin and the White House that the survival of humanity requires that they make a supreme act of political will to defy the blind forces of determinism, he speaks from the experience of a nation whose own endurance as an independent entity has required such an assertion of human purpose over manifest destiny.

Mr. Trudeau is thus attempting to summon the lessons of Canada's past as sign-posts for the super-power leaders whose decisions will affect Canada's future. Even his sternest critics, while not absolving him of his domestic failures, should urge the Prime Minister onward to success in this international mission.

Instead, some Canadians insist that if Mr. Trudeau wants to play the "helpful fixer," he should start with the Canadian economy and leave the nuclear arms negotiations to foreign leaders. But if Canadians cede to others all responsibility for solving the nuclear stand-off, we become an audience instead of an actor in the determination of our fate.

There are times in the history of every nation when self-interest requires that its leaders look beyond the pocket-book concerns of day-to-day politics and tackle an issue of transcendental importance. This is one of those times; this is one of those issues.

Better that Trudeau try, and fail, than not to try

A friend went to the movies the other day, but before the film actually began a policeman strode down the aisle, turned around to face the audience, and cleared his throat to make an announcement.

All he had to say was that some patrons' cars were parked illegally and would be towed away unless moved. But she remembers thinking, with a sudden stab of fear, "that he was going to tell us to hurry home because of some new disaster."

The shooting down of the Korean airliner. The killing of U.S. marines and French paratroopers in Beirut. The imminent deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe. The invasion of Grenada. We are all jumpier these days than we've ever been since the Cuban missile crisis of 1961. Those whose memories go back that far will remember people then talking, among their families, among friends, about what they should do and where they should go if the bombs fell, and whether they should hoard canned goods.

The rivalry between the super-powers

isn't new, other than in the crudeness of its current rhetoric. Impelled more by vanity than by ideology, the U.S. and Soviet Russia have competed with each other for four decades now, and will continue to compete for several decades yet.

The change rather is in the rest of us who are at one and the same time spectators to and bit players in the power game. We are beginning to give up on the idea, or the ideal, that there is any way to regulate international affairs other than by some stalemate of brute forces. Out of exhaustion perhaps, or out of a conviction of impotence, we are experiencing "a crisis of confidence in ourselves, a crisis of faith in others," in Prime Minister Trudeau's phrase of last week.

Some of this self-doubt shows itself in the comments being made by a number of observers about Trudeau's so-called "peace initiative." His attempt is being dismissed by many as inspired only by political or personal motives.

No doubt Trudeau's motives are



Richard Gwyn

mixed, as are those of most politicians on most occasions. My own guess, for what it's worth, is that ego or the chance to perform on the world's stage influences him rather than the remote prospect of any domestic political advantages.

But while it is well worthwhile taking guard against being taken in — yet again — by Trudeau, it surely is worth a hell of a lot more to stand far back enough from the personal and the political to gain a value-free perspective on what it is that Trudeau is trying to do, for East-West relations, for us, and perhaps for himself as well.

As I read his speeches and comments in the Commons, Trudeau is trying to

re-inject hope and trust into the international debate.

That's all. But if it happens, it will be everything. Without the qualities of hope and trust, the talks at Geneva or elsewhere will continue as they now are, as exercises in propaganda interspersed with sterile arguments about how many missiles of one type are equivalent to how many missiles of another type.

In his speech in Guelph last week, Trudeau said, "Missing, and this troubles me deeply, is much trace of political craft and creativity directed at ameliorating the intentions of the other side. There is a disturbing readiness to adapt to the worst rather than to exert our influence for the better."

He then delivered his essential message: "We are, in short, de-politicizing the most important political relationship we have."

Trudeau's five-capital trip to Europe is an attempt to convince the politicians to re-enter the negotiations that they have, until now, abdicated to the generals and the technicians.

His chances of accomplishing any-

thing are marginal, at best. But they are not non-existent. One small encouraging sign has been the absence of unattributed, dismissive comments by high officials in Washington. Also heartening is that British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher apparently wants Trudeau to call on her; she's a "hawk," but as she showed by her critical comments about the U.S. invasion of Grenada, Thatcher doesn't fly in only one direction.

Obviously enough, Trudeau can only get anywhere if the political leaders in Washington and Moscow decide to move. But it is possible — just — that Trudeau might be able to make it easier for Reagan and Yuri Andropov to move if they want to by creating around them a political climate in which there is, perhaps only as wishful thinking, some hope and a small amount of trust.

All of this said, it's most probable, after the Korean airliner after Beirut, after the Pershing IIs and the cruise missiles, after Grenada, that Trudeau will fail. But better for us for him to try and fail than for neither him nor anyone else to have tried at all.



MF

TO/À

DMF

FROM/DE

GMD

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCESUBJECT •
SUJETLETTER FROM DPM/SSEA TO SECRETARY
OF STATE SHULTZ

OK
a good cautious draft!
28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission
6/

Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	November 9, 1983
Number/Numéro	GMD-239

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

We spoke this morning about how an appropriate reference to the perceived danger of some sort of United States act of reprisal for the October 23 bombing of the Marines HQ in Lebanon might be introduced into the draft letter to Mr. Shultz for which we are seeking the approval of the DPM/SSEA.

2. Given that all the factors in this equation seemingly remain variables (vide Washington telegram 2419 of 8 November), you may agree that the desirable reference in the letter should be fairly cautious. Perhaps a paragraph right at the end of the letter as drafted would serve best.

3. On this basis, I submit for your consideration a draft final paragraph to the letter to Shultz. Perhaps it could read as follows:

1. As I review these observations on my recent visit to the region, I am aware that you are grappling with the agonizing problem of how your Government might respond effectively and constructively to the brutal attack of October 23 on the Marines headquarters in Lebanon. I fully appreciate the pressures faced by the Administration to react in some appropriate and understandable manner, while avoiding, as President Reagan has said, any temptation to "strike out blindly." In weighing the available options, I know you will have very much in mind the special and positive role which the United States is uniquely qualified to play, and for which your friends in the area look to you, in promoting the eventual establishment of peace with justice in the region. / /

...2

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

4. If you find this sort of language acceptable, perhaps you could let me know urgently, so that I could arrange to have such an addition to the draft letter approved in time for your use tomorrow in Washington.

Robert Elliott

Robert Elliott
Director General
Middle East Bureau

DMF

It is important that our reference not imply that we would consider any retaliatory U.S. action to be wrong.

I think Bob's formulation is appropriate in this respect

J.H.

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8 Travel Advance/Avance de voyage No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/>		9 Taking Classified Papers Emporte des documents classifiés <input type="checkbox"/> ZSS	
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12 Purpose of Travel/Objet du voyage

Temporary duty on PM Task Force (IDDZ)

13 City and Country/Ville et pays Depart Washington, D.C.	14 Dates Nov. 10/83	15 Additional Information/Renseignements supplémentaires (circle ONE in each Category) (Dans i, ii et iii, encercler la réponse appropriée.)
Arrive Ottawa	Nov. 10/83	(i) Type of Travel: Insp (RIP only) (i) But du voyage: Insp. (RIP seulement)
Depart Ottawa	Nov. 13/83	Liaison/Liaison
Arrive Washington, D/C/	Nov. 13/83	Conf/Conf.
(All reservations made)		Training/Formation
Certified as required by Sec. 25 (1) of the F.A. Act. Certifié conformément au para. 25 (1) de la loi sur l'admin. fin.		Other/Autre
D.C. Reson For Deputy Head - chef adjoint		(ii) ADMship PFZ PTD PFG (ii) SMA PFC PUA PTE
		(iii) Overtime/Leave Implications YES NO (iii) Répercussions en termes d'heures suppl./de congés OUI NON
		(iv) Estimated Total Cost \$ (iv) Coût total prévu

17 Approved and Certified that Funds are available and have been committed within the budget of the Bureau or Division concerned. Approuvé; certifié en outre que des fonds sont disponibles et ont été engagés dans le cadre du budget du bureau ou de la direction en cause.	Date 2/11/83	ADM or A/USSEA/SMA ou SSEAE/S
---	-----------------	-------------------------------

19 FE/CF	Coding/Codage
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Date 10/11/83	Recommended by Recommandée par

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Local Time.....

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE PARIS WIFC6666 09NOV83

A EXTOTT LIEDZ LIVRAISON 091500

INFO BREFC ANKRA COPFN OSLO WSHDC MOSCO CNGNY GENEV TOKYO

HAGUE ROME BONN LDN NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CFP BNATO MDRID

CANMILREPNATO LSBON ATHNS PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR RSR FPR XDV MGT RGB RCR RBD

---VISITE PM,PRESSE FRANCAISE

EN DEFIT D UNE ABONDANCE EXCEPTIONNELLE D INFORMATIONS,NOTAMMENT
RELATIVES A LA VISITE D ETAT DU PRESIDENT ALGERIEN EN FRANCE,ET
MALGRE LE CARACTERE NECESSAIREMENT UN PEU MYSTERIEUX DES ENTRETIENS
TRUDEAU-MITTERRAND,VISITE PM ET SON INITIATIVE DE PAIX FONT L OBJET
DANS PRESSE FRANCAISE DE COUVERTURE TOUT A FAIT SATISFAISANTE ET
TRES SYMPATHIQUE.PLUPART DES JOURNAUX REPRENENT SYNTHESE DIFFUSEE
MARDI SOIR PAR AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE DEPECHEES 0257/0258 AMN-FY60/
FY81) SUR SERVICE AMERIQUE DU NORD QUE RECEVEZ.

2.ON Y TROUVE NOTAMMENT INFORMATIONS D ORIGINE ELYSEENNE QUI
SOULIGNENT CIT IDENTITE DE VUES FINCIT ET SATISFACTION DE PRESIDENT
QUANT A CIT SOUTIEN DETERMINE DU CANADA A DOUBLE DECISION OTAN SUR
DEPLOIEMENT DES PERSHINGS EN CAS D ECHEC DES NEGOCIATIONS DE GENEVE
ET NON-PRISE EN COMPTE DES ARSENAUX NUCLEAIRES FRANCAIS ET
BRITANNIQUES FINCIT.

...2

Canada
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02-11-09 A 1.132

PAGE DEUX WIFC6666 CONFD

3. UN DE NOS CONTACTS PRIVILEGIES DANS LA PRESSE FRANCAISE NOUS A CONFIE QUE PORTF-PAROLE ELYSEE VAUZELLES) AVAIT TENU A SOULIGNER QUE LE PRESIDENT AVAIT TOUT SPECIALEMENT APPRECIE QUE PM AIT SOUHAITE LE VOIR EN PREMIER LIEU.

4. PRESSE AUDIO-VISUELLE A EGALEMENT FAIT BRIEVE MENTION AVEC RAPIDES IMAGES AU MOINS SUR DEUX CHAINES) DES ENTRETIENS ET DE L'INITIATIVE CIT DU PELERIN DE LA PAIX FINCI.

5. NOMBREUSES DEMANDES D'INFORMATION DE FOND SONT SATISFAITES PAR NOS SERVICES DE PRESSE SUR BASE DISCOURS DE GULPH. JOURNALISTES FRANCAIS ATTENDENT, COMME NOUS, PROCHAIN DISCOURS QUI FERAIT SYNTHESE DE TOURNEE EUROPEENNE ET MARQUERAIT AINSI NOUVELLE ETAPE DE L'INITIATIVE CANADIENNE. COMPRENDREZ A CET EGARD QU'IL SERA ESSENTIEL NOUS ADRESSER TEXTE DISCOURS DU 15/11 D.Q.P.

6. NOTONS AVEC SATISFACTION COMPREHENSION QUANT A NECESSEITE DE DISCRETION, ET SYMPATHIE MANIFESTEE A L'ENDROIT DE NOTRE PM, NON SEULEMENT DE LA PART PRESSE FRANCAISE MAIS EGALEMENT CORRESPONDANTS ETRANGERS A PARIS TELS NEWSWEEK, REUTERS, UPI, LOS ANGELES TIMES, ETC...

CCC/190 091723Z WIFC6666

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM ATHNS ZFGR5739 09NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 090900

INFO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUF
WSHDC MOSCO BNATO PRMNY CNGNY GENEV TOKYO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN
NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPP

SFAX CHCGO LNGLS DE OTT

DISTR RGB RSR RCR FPR XDV RBD MGT

---PMS INITIATIVE

AS YOU MAY KNOW,PAPANDREOU WAS AWAY IN UK WITH HIS AIDES FOR
CONSULTATION WITH MRS THATCHER ON RUN-UP TO ATHNS SUMMIT;OUR 10NOV
MTG,HOWEVER WITH MAHERITSAS,HEAD OF PMS DIPLOMATIC CABINET SHOULD
PROVIDE INDICATION OF PAPANDREOUS REACTION TO PM TRUDEAUS LETTER
AND SPEECH.

2.IN MEANTIME,WOULD LIKE TO SUPPORT REQUEST IN BONN TEL 4055 02NOV
FOR SHORT SUMMARY TO BE RECEIVED IN ADVANCE FOR TRANSLATION PURPOSES.
IN ADDITION TO NATIONAL HOLIDAY HERE 28OCT AND COMPETITION FROM
GRENADA,SPARSENESS OF GREEK MEDIA REACTION SO FAR HAD MUCH TO DO
WITH LANGUAGE IMPEDIMENT AND IT IS CLEAR THAT IN FUTURE OUR ABILITY
TO GET MEDIA ATTENTION WILL DEPEND ON OUR BEING ABLE TO PROVIDE SHORT
(NO/NO MORE THAN 2/2 PAGES)TEXT IN GREEK,AND THEREFORE HAVE IT IN
ADVANCE IN ENGLISH OR FRENCH.TRUST THIS WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR NEXT
INSTALMENT

CCC/038 091215Z ZFGR5739

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission

ACTION

INFO

R E S T R I C T E D

FM BONN ZQGR4078 09NOV83

TO ROME/PMDEL DELIVER BY 091700

INFO EXTOTT LIDDA 2

DISTR XDV RCR

REF OURTEL ZQGR4070 07NOV

---PM VISIT TO BONN-PROTOCOL ETC

ARRIVAL CEREMONY AT SONDER POSITION OF COLOGNE/BONN AIRPORT
WILL BE SAME AS IT WAS FOR LAST PM VISIT IN NOV82 IE RED
CARPET AND HONOUR GUARD AT FOOT OF AIRPLANE RAMP.AMB WILL
GO UP RAMP INTO PLANE TO WELCOME PM AND WILL THEN INTRODUCE
HIM TO HERR BAUCH(ASSISTANT CHIEF OF PROTOCOL),WHO WILL
BE WAITING AT FOOT OF RAMP.THERE WILL BE NO/NO NATIONAL
ANTHEMS AND NO/NO REVIEW OF GUARDS.AFTER SHORT PAUSE
TO ALLOW DEL TO SETTLE INTO CARS AND FOR ANY PRESS PHOTOS,
MOTORCADE LEAVES FOR HOTEL.IN SLIGHT CHANGE TO REFTTEL
LINE-UP,CAR ORDER AS FOLLOWS-POLICE CAR,BAUCH IN PROTOCOL
CAR,MOTORCYCLE ESCORT,PM AND AMB,SECURITY CAR(BEAULIEU),
FOWLER AND EDELSTEIN IN CAR ONE,JOHNSON AND COLEMAN IN CAR
TWO,SMITH BROWN AND KARSGAARD IN CAR THREE,PROTOCOL CAR,POLICE
CAR.

2.FOWLER AND SMITH WILL TRAVEL TO AND FROM CHANCELLERY IN
CAR NUMBER ONE.

...2

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

PAGE TWO ZQGR4078 RESTR

3.ON DEPARTURE BAUCH WILL BE PRESENT.HE AND AMB WILL ACCOMPANY
PM FROM HOTEL TO AIRPORT.MOTORCASE WILL BE SAME AS FOR
ARRIVAL EXCEPT THAT FOWLER AND JOHNSON WILL BE IN CAR NUMBER
ONE AND SMITH AND COLEMAN IN CAR NUMBER TWO AND BROWN AND KARSGAARD
IN CAR NUMBER THREE.

CCC/005 091450Z ZQGR4078

ACTION
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Person _____
Local Time _____

U N C L A S S I F I E D

FM LDN XNGR4043 09NOV83

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ DELIVER BY 090900

INFO ROME/PM DEL DELIVER BY 091500

INFO PARIS HAGUE BONN BRU BNATO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/CPF/DIPOL

WSHDC BDGTM KNGTN ISBAD PSPAN GRTN HAVAN PRNCE MXICO CRCAS

BGOTA SJOSE GTMLA CNBRA WLGTN LAGOS DELHI MDRID GENEV VIENN

PESCO ATHNS MOSCO WDOAS RCMPOTT/DCOMMR JENSEN PRMNY

DISTR MINA MINT MINE USS DMF UGB RBG RCD RSR ITD RBR RSR RCR IDA

IDR LGB LCD LCR LSR URR IFB IMD IMC SIO ZSP ZSI ZSS FPR JLO JLA

CCB CMR CGD CGL CPD

REF OURTFLS XNGR4036 08NOV XNGR4042 09NOV

---POST GRENADA EAST/WEST AND UK/US RFLNS:P M THATCHER VIEWS

IN HIS DISCUSSIONS 08NOV WITH DMF,SIR JULIAN BULLARD REFERRED

TO INTERVIEW PRIME MINISTER THATCHER HAD GRANTED DAILY MAIL IN

WHICH SHE SPOKE ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS,AND UK/US RELATIONS.

FOLLOWING ARE EXCERPTS FROM INTERVIEW. QUOTING DAILY MAIL:

Q.THE FEELING MANY HAD IS THAT AMERICANS HAVE BEHAVED EXTREMELY
BADLY,TRFATING BRITAIN WITH SCANT COURTESY AND YOU,PRIME MINISTER,
WITH SOME CONTEMPT IN NOT KEEPING YOU INFORMED.ON OTHER HAND,
PEOPLE ALSO THINK AMERICANS WERE ABSOLUTELY RIGHT IN GOING INTO
GRENADA.HAVENT WE GOT WORST OF BOTH WORLDS?

A.SHE HAD ALWAYS MADE IT CLEAR IN HER SPEECHES WHERE THE WEST

...2

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

PAGE TWO XNGR4043 UNCLAS

STOOD, SHE REPLIED. IT DOESN'T INITIATE ATTACKS. IT DOESN'T NEED TO ADVANCE ITS IDEAS BY MILITARY FORCE. BUT NO RULE IN POLITICS IS ABSOLUTE. THERE ARE TIMES, EVEN WHEN YOU HOLD THAT FUNDAMENTAL POSITION, THAT YOU MAY BE ENTITLED TO GO IN. BUT IN THIS CASE I BELIEVE THERE HAVE TO BE OVERWHELMING REASONS.

Q. AND YOU DID NOT THINK THERE WERE OVERWHELMING REASONS IN GRENADA?

A. FROM OUR VIEWPOINT, NO... I SAW A TRICKY PROBLEM IN THE MARXIST WORLD, WHERE ONE MARXIST HAD DEPOSED AND MURDERED ANOTHER MARXIST. THAT WAS A FANTASTIC OPPORTUNITY FOR A DEMARCHE... THAT IS THE WAY I WOULD HAVE TACKLED IT... WE SEE THE LARGER ISSUES. YOU MAY SAY THAT THE AMERICANS COULD NOT HAVE THIS IN THEIR BACKYARD BUT LOOK AT THE MAP. SEE HOW FAR GRENADA IS AWAY FROM AMERICA. THEN LOOK HOW CLOSE CUBA IS TO THE UNITED STATES, TO FLORIDA. WELL, CUBA IS A MUCH BIGGER DANGER... YOU DON'T GO INTO CUBA BECAUSE YOU DON'T LIKE THE CUBAN ATTITUDES. BUT YOU GO INTO GRENADA BECAUSE CUBA IS THERE. CAN YOU NOT SEE THE POINT?... THE US TOOK A DIFFERENT VIEW FROM US. I AM NOT GOING TO BE ANTI-AMERICAN. WE HAVE HAD A SLIGHT DIFFERENCE OF OPINION. IT MIGHT MAKE THINGS DIFFICULT FOR ME. BUT IN THE END I AM NOT GOING TO LET THIS UNDERMINE BRITISH INTERESTS.

WE HAVE A JOB TO DO HERE. WE HAVE TO GET CRUISE MISSILES SITED IN PURSUIT OF THE NATO DECISION AND WE HAVE TO TAKE THE LEAD IN ...3

PAGE THREE XNGR4043 UNCLAS

DOING IT.THE DEBATE IN GERMANY WILL COME UP AFTER US SO WE HAVE TO TAKE THE LEAD IN DOING THAT.THAT IS THE MOST IMPORTANT THING IN EAST/WEST TERMS.

Q.YOU HAVE HAD TO BITE ON THE BULLET.THE GOVT HAS HAD TO TAKE ALL THIS DOMESTIC FLACK BECAUSE YOU KNEW THAT CRUISE WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE?

A.THATS RIGHT.YOU DO NOT IN FACT PUT A THING LIKE THAT IN JEOPARDY. I COULD NOT ALLOW THIS DIFFERENCE TO UNDERMINE THE ALLIANCE.SO WE TOOK THE CRUISE DEBATE AND WE TOOK IT HEAD ON.THE AMERICANS CAN RELY ON ME ABSOLUTELY IN DEFENCE AND IN EVERYTHING IN WHICH I BELIEVE.I WOULD NOT DREAM OF UNDERMINING THE ALLIANCE...BUT IT LEAVES SOME QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED-COMMUNICATIONS QUESTIONS... HOW CONSULTATION IS CARRIED ON.

2. PM THATCHER THEN DISCUSSED DIFFICULTY WHICH ANY US DECISION TO RESUME ARMS SUPPLY TO ARGENTINA WOULD CAUSE HER GOVT.QUOTE THAT WOULD BE THE SINGLE MOST DIFFICULT THING FOR ME UNQUOTE.)

3.ON THE SOVIET UNION,MRS THATCHER SAID SHE HAD MADE SPEECHES ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION AND MOSCO WHICH SHOULD BE EXAMINED MORE CLOSELY.SHE DID NOT LIKE THE COMMUNISTS OR THEIR SYSTEM.QUOTE WE MAY NOT LIKE THEM BUT WE HAVE TO LIVE ON THE SAME PLANET.THEREFORE,WHEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE RIGHT,WE MUST TALK TO THE LEADERSHIP.BUT EVERYTIME YOU THINK YOU MUST GET CLOSER TO

...4

PAGE FOUR XNGR4043 UNCLAS

DIALOGUE, SOMETHING HAPPENS - AFGHANISTAN STARTED FIRST AND THEN THE KOREAN AIRLINER. BUT WE DO, WE WILL HAVE TO TALK TO THEM MORE. I AM ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED IN MY OWN MIND OF THAT.

IF WE SAW THEM MORE OFTEN THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR MISUNDERSTANDING EACH OTHER WOULD BE LESS AND THAT IS VERY IMPORTANT. BRITAIN COULD PERHAPS NOW PLAY A BIGGER ROLE IN THIS AND TO SOME EXTENT HER STAND OVER GRENADA MIGHT BE HELPFUL. THEY KNOW THAT IF I SAY WE UPHOLD INTERNATIONAL LAW, WE DON'T GO IN UNLESS THERE ARE OVERWHELMING REASONS. THEY KNOW THAT IF I SAY SOMETHING I WILL STICK BY IT. THAT IS A VERY MUCH BETTER BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION. THEY ARE NOT UNCERTAIN. THEY WILL ALSO SEE THAT WHETHER I LIKE OR DISLIKE ANY REGIME, I DO RESPECT OTHER PEOPLES BOUNDARIES UNQUOTE.

Q. SO YOU WANT A DIALOGUE?

A. YES.

Q. WOULD YOU GO TO MOSCOW?

A. NO, NO I AM NOT THINKING OF GOING TO MOSCOW. I DON'T THINK YOU START BY GOING STRAIGHT TO THE TOP. WE HAVE TO CONSIDER WHAT ARE THE BEST LEVELS AND MORE OF THEM ARE STILL TO COME OUT.

IT IS STILL A LITTLE BIT DIFFICULT BECAUSE OF THE KOREAN AIRLINER, SO DON'T RUSH AND SAY MOSCOW. I DON'T THINK IT IS NECESSARILY THE BEST THING FOR THE WHOLE WESTERN WORLD TO BEAT A PATH TO MOSCOW. I THINK IT PROBABLY HELPS IF SOME OF THE SOVIET LEADERS COME OUT

...5

PAGE FIVE XNGR4043 UNCLAS

AND SEE MORE OF OUR WAY OF LIFE.

Q.ARE YOU NOT WORRIED ABOUT INCREASING DEMAND FOR DUAL KEY
SYSTEM?

A.PERHAPS WE HAVE NOT PUT OUR VIEW ACROSS VIGOROUSLY ENOUGH.
FRANKLY,IF YOU LOOK AT THE PROSPECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR,IT IS TOTALLY
AND UTTERLY HORRIFIC AND THAT IS,I HOPE,THE VIEWPOINT WHICH
THE SOVIET UNION TAKES AND THAT IS WHY ONE WANTS TO TALK TO THEM.
THAT MEANS THAT THE POSSESSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON BOTH SIDES
IS WHAT KEEPS THE PEACE.IT KEPT THE PEACE,NOT ONLY NUCLEAR BUT
CONVENTIONAL PEACE.AND TO THOSE WHO SAY QUOTE ABANDON ALL NUCLEAR
WEAPONS UNQUOTE I SAY,DONT YOU REALIZE THAT WILL PUT US BACK IN
THE POSITION BEFORE WORLD WAR II AND OPPONENTS MIGHT CONTEMPLATE
CONVENTIONAL WAR AGAIN?

UUU/253 091306Z XNGR4043

PAGE TWO XNGR4042 CONF

INTERNAL SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS, WHERE ON ISSUES SUCH AS THE POSITION OF ANDROPOV VIS A VIS PARTY, MILITARY, OR ULTIMATE SUCCESSION, UK MAY NOT SHARE ALL IMPLICATIONS OF PMS LETTER AND SPEECH; C) IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST/WEST AND WEST/WEST COHESION IN US INVASION OF GRENADA (WHILE PM THATCHER TOOK VERY MUCH TO HEART EVIDENT BREAKDOWN IN CONSULTATIONS, BRITISH ALSO RECOGNIZE CRITICAL DIFFERENCE IN DEGREE BETWEEN AMERICAN ACTION IN GRENADA AND SOVIET IMPLEMENTATION OF BREZHNEV DOCTRINE IN AFGHANISTAN, AND SEE AS PARAMOUNT AT TIME OF INF DEPLOYMENT NEED TO PRESERVE TRANSATLANTIC SOLIDARITY) D) OVERALL POST-INF EAST/WEST RLNS, WHICH BULLARD CHARACTERIZED AS STILL UNPREDICTABLE, BUT NOT LIKELY TO BE AS GLOOMY AS SOME SUGGEST: AS PM THATCHER WILL TELL CHANCELLOR KOHL 09NOV, BRITISH RESOLVE ON INF WILL NOT WEAKEN.

2. REPORT: IN REPLY TO DMF REFERENCE TO TIMING OF PM TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE AND HIS QUERY ABOUT BRITISH ASSESSMENT OF INFLUENCE WHICH INSTINCTIVE AND PERVASIVE ANTI-SOVIET THINKING MAY HAVE ON US DECISION-MAKING, BULLARD REFERRED TO PM TRUDEAU'S GUELPH SPEECH SUGGESTING THAT IT INFERRED AN ATTITUDE OF WHAT HE CALLED QUOTE EQUIDISTANCE UNQUOTE BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS WHICH UK GOVT COULD NOT FULLY SUBSCRIBE TO AT LEAST IN PUBLIC: WHATEVER PM THATCHER MIGHT SAY TO PM TRUDEAU IN PRIVATE, BRITISH GOVT WOULD BE UNEASY WITH LINE OF ARGUMENT WHICH HAD SUCH FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS FOR

...3

PAGE THREE XNGR4042 CONF

ALLIANCE COHESION. DMF COMMENTED THAT WHILE CANADIANS MIGHT ARGUE PUBLICLY THAT SUPERPOWERS SHARE DEGREE OF SYMMETRY, IN ORDER PARTLY TO AVOID FUELING SOVIET PARANOIA, IN ACTION, CANADIAN GOVT WOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF ITS MEMBERSHIP IN ALLIANCE, AND OF ITS PROFOUND IMPLICATIONS FOR CANADIAN POLICY TOWARDS SOVIET UNION. DMF ASKED BULLARD WHETHER HE FELT USA HAD RELIABLE SENSE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET UNION; CANADA FOR INSTANCE WAS INCLINED TO CHALLENGE EVIDENT US ASSESSMENT THAT SOVIET ECONOMY IS ON POINT OF BREAKING DOWN, - THAT NUDGE IN RIGHT DIRECTION MIGHT HAVE EFFECT OF CHOKING OFF THE RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO SOVIET MILITARY. BULLARD, NOTING THAT UK HAD BEEN OVER SIMILAR GROUND WITH USA ALMOST CONTINUOUSLY SINCE PIPELINE DEBATE, SAID THAT UK ASSESSMENTS MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR TO GIVE COGENT PICTURE OF WHAT WAS ACTUALLY HAPPENING IN SOVIET UNION. THIS WAS EVIDENT ON SUCCESSION QUESTION, BUT ALSO INHIBITED FORMULATION OF SOUND JUDGEMENT ON ECONOMIC AND OTHER POLITICAL ISSUES. UK RECOGNIZES THERE ARE PEOPLE IN WSHDC WHO BELIEVE THAT ALL FOREIGN POLICY MUST BE SEEN IN CONTEXT OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS, AND THAT SOLE CRITERIA FOR USA POLICY SHOULD BE WHETHER OR NOT PARTICULAR COURSE OF ACTION PROMOTES INTERESTS OF WEST OVER THOSE OF SOVIET UNION: THERE ARE ALSO SUCH PEOPLE IN LONDON. PM THATCHER HAS TAKEN CLOSE INTEREST IN SOVIET UNION FOLLOWING HER JUNE ELECTION VICTORY, AND HER RECENT

...4

PAGE FOUR XNGR4042 CONF

SPEECHES IN WSHDC AND TO CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONFERENCE IN BLACKPOOL (AS WELL AS INTERVIEW GIVEN TO DAILY MAIL-EXTRACTS IN FOLLOWING TEL XNGR 4043) SUGGEST THAT SHE NOW BELIEVES THAT WEST MUST TO LARGE EXTENT ACCEPT THAT SOVIETS ARE NOT GOING TO CHANGE. SOVIET ECONOMY HAS MORE RESILIENCE THAN MANY HAD SUPPOSED, AND ANY EFFECT WEST MIGHT HAVE THROUGH ECONOMIC CONTROLS OR ACTIONS WOULD NOT BE PROFOUND.

3. IN RESPONSE TO DMF'S QUERY AS TO SOVIET REACTION TO KAL INCIDENT, BULLARD SUGGESTED THAT BRITISH DID NOT SHARE VIEW THAT ANDROPOV HAD BEEN UNABLE TO FREE HIMSELF FROM INCREASING MILITARY INFLUENCE. BULLARD SAID BRITISH ARE MORE INCLINED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN INCIDENT IN PROGRESS, WHERE DEFENCES DID NOT WORK AND MILITARY IMPLEMENTED STANDING ORDERS WITHOUT SEEKING HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL DECISION, AND SUBSEQUENT POLITICAL MANAGEMENT OF SITUATION, WHERE ALTHOUGH ANDROPOV'S REACTION WAS NOTICEABLY DELAYED, HIS EVENTUAL RESPONSE WAS TYPICAL OF APPROACH WHICH ANY SEC-GEN WOULD HAVE TAKEN IN PURSUIT OF WHAT HE WOULD SEE AS ESSENTIAL SHOW OF PATRIOTIC NATIONAL SOLIDARITY.

4. DMF COMMENTED THAT EVEN IF ANDROPOV WERE TO REGAIN HEALTH, HE MIGHT BE RELUCTANT TO GIVE REAGAN ELECTORAL ADVANTAGE WHICH SUMMIT IN 1984 MIGHT BRING. BULLARD AGREED THAT SOVIETS WOULD HAVE NO WISH TO FACILITATE REAGAN'S ELECTORAL SUCCESS; HE OBSERVED THAT ...5

PAGE FIVE XNGR4042 CONF

SOVIETS WERE REALISTS, AND RECOGNIZE LIMITS OF THEIR INFLUENCE ON US DEVELOPMENTS. HE SUSPECTED THAT SOVIETS WOULD NOT SEE SUMMIT AS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE IN TERMS OF USA DOMESTIC ELECTORAL ISSUES, OR OF SUCH VALUE TO THEM AS THEY MIGHT CONSIDER CONCESSION ON ARMS CONTROL, POLAND, OR AFGHANISTAN. ULTIMATELY QUESTION OF SUMMIT WAS ONE OF PRESTIGE AND TIMING, AND OF COURSE OF ACTION WHICH SOVIETS BELIEVED WOULD BRING THEM GREATEST BENEFIT.

5. TURNING TO EFFECT OF GRENADA ON EAST/WEST AND WEST/WEST TIES, DMF ASKED WHETHER AMERICAN INVASION HAD QUOTE WASTED VIRGINITY UNQUOTE OF WESTERN CAMP AND IRREPARABLY DAMAGED USA AUTHORITY. BULLARDS RESPONSE WAS THAT ON ONE HAND, UK, LIKE CANADA, WERE PIQUED AT NOT HAVING BEEN CONSULTED—QUOTE MRS THATCHER TOOK VERY MUCH TO HEART WHAT SHE SAW AS BREAKDOWN IN CONSULTATIONS UNQUOTE. IMMEDIATE EFFECT IN EAST/WEST TERMS HAS BEEN TO GIVE NOT ONLY SOVIET PROPAGANDISTS BUT LARGE NUMBER OF OTHERS GOOD BASIS TO QUESTION BOTH ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY, AND DIFFERENCE BETWEEN APPLICATION OF MUNROE AND BREZHNEV DOCTRINES. BRITISH GOVT NONETHELESS SAW DIFFERENCE BETWEEN USA OPERATION IN GRENADA AND SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AS BEING ONE OF DEGREE, —AND DEGREE SO GREAT AS TO AMOUNT TO DIFFERENCE IN KIND. ESPECIALLY WHEN ONE TOOK INTO ACCOUNT REACTION OF POPULATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF INVASION. GOVT ASSESSMENT HERE NOW IS THAT INVASION WOULD RECEDF

...6

PAGE SIX XNGR4042 CONF

IN IMPORTANCE IN TRANSATLANTIC TERMS, AND THAT GOVT HAS BEEN RIGHT TO INSIST FROM OUTSET ON SEPARATING QUESTION OF INF DEPLOYMENT FROM US ACTIONS IN CARIBBEAN. (IN INTERESTING ASIDE, BULLARD, CHOOSING WORDS CAREFULLY, SAID THAT CONVERSATIONS UP TO LAST MINUTE BETWEEN QUOTE LONDON UNQUOTE AND GRENADA GOV GEN HAD NOT MENTIONED POSSIBILITY OF INVASION; HE SAID THAT UK HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE THROUGH QUOTE QUITE DIFFERENT MIDDLE LEVEL USA) SOURCES UNQUOTE THAT INVASION WOULD NOT TAKE PLACE).

6. DMF ASKED BULLARD WHETHER IN HIS VIEW SOVIETS REACTED ONLY TO EVIDENCE OF FIRM RESOLVE, MODIFYING POSITIONS ONLY WHEN FORCED TO AND WHEN DIGNITY ALLOWED; OR WHETHER SOVIET POSTURE IS DICTATED MORE BY CALCULATED RESPONSES TO WHAT HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS RATCHETING UPWARDS IN MANNER WHICH CLEARLY CONCERNED CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER. BULLARD REPLIED THAT PM THATCHER SAW NEED FOR COMBINATION OF BOTH APPROACHES—AND NEED FOR APPROPRIATE WESTERN RESPONSE. ON ONE HAND, PM WOULD CERTAINLY NOT WEAKEN IN HER APPROACH TO DEPLOYMENT OR TO SOVIET UNION IN GENERAL,—QUOTE THIS WILL BE HER MESSAGE TO CHANCELLOR KOHL IN BONN TODAY AND WEDNESDAY UNQUOTE,—ON OTHER HAND, HER MORE RECENT SPEECHES STRESS NEED FOR CONTINUING HARDHEADED DIALOGUE. BULLARD DID NOT BELIEVE BRITISH SAW INF AS SUCH A QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE AS SOVIETS MADE OUT, (PERHAPS BECAUSE UK HAD LIVED SO LONG UNDER THREAT).

...?

PAGE SEVEN XNGR4042 CONFD

HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOVIETS MUST EVENTUALLY RESPOND TO DEPLOYMENT, BUT SUGGESTED THAT WHILE SUBSTANTIAL, THIS MIGHT NOT BE IN SUCH MEASURE AS TO NECESSITATE YET FURTHER WESTERN DEPLOYMENTS. HE WONDERED ALOUD WHETHER SOVIET RESPONSE COULD NOT TAKE FORM OF MOVEMENT OF SOVIET SYSTEMS INTO GDR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, WITH DEPLOYMENT OF SS-20S IN EASTERN SIBERIA, PERHAPS AUGMENTED BY MORE SUBMARINES. BRITISH WOULD ALSO NOT BE SURPRISED IF SOVIETS CHOSE TO RAISE TENSION IN SOUTH KOREA, OR IN BERLIN, PAKISTAN OR YUGOSLAVIA.

7. DMF COMMENTED THAT RAISING TENSION IN SOUTH KOREA WOULD MAKE GOOD WORKING HYPOTHESIS FOR SOVIETS IF ONLY BECAUSE OF PROXIMITY TO JAPAN, -COMMENT WHICH BULLARD TOOK UP, AND REINFORCED THROUGH SUGGESTING THAT JAPAN SHOULD BE MORE FULLY INVOLVED IN WESTERN DECISION-MAKING. BOTH DMF AND BULLARD AGREED JAPAN WAS QUOTE SLEEPING FACTOR UNQUOTE, TO WHICH WITH REMAINDER OF ASIA) SOVIETS POSSIBLY ATTACH GREATER STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE THAN DOES WEST. IN THIS CONTEXT, BULLARD ASKED DMF WHAT CANADIAN VIEWS WERE ON QUOTE BUILDING UP POLITICAL ELEMENT IN ECONOMIC SUMMIT UNQUOTE. DMF TOLD BULLARD THAT WHEN HE HAD RAISED THIS AT 06 NOV LONDON SHERPAS MTG HE HAD RECEIVED SHARPLY ADVERSE REACTIONS FROM OTHER INCLUDING FRENCH AND BRITISH) SHERPAS. NONETHELESS IN POST-DEPLOYMENT ATMOSPHERE, THERE WOULD BE STRONG

...8

PAGE EIGHT XNGR4042 CONF


REASONS FOR POLITICAL STOCKTAKING AT LONDON SUMMIT. BULLARD SAID THAT FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWE HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO SEEK PROMISING LINES TO BRING JAPAN INTO CLOSER POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS: IT WAS BULLARD'S PERSONAL VIEW WHICH HE SAID HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED WITH HOWE OR PRIME MINISTER THATCHER), THAT THIS MIGHT BE DONE AT LEAST ON MARGINS OF SUMMIT NEGOTIATIONS BULLARD ASKED THAT THIS PERSONAL OPINION BE TREATED AS SUCH AND THUS PROTECTED). HE AND DMF AGREED TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS ON RANGE OF EAST/WEST ISSUES (AND ON JAPAN) INsofar AS SUCCESSIVE DMF VISITS TO LONDON FOR FUTURE SHERPA MEETINGS MIGHT ALLOW.

P. FOREGOING HAS NOT BEEN SEEN BY DMF AND MAY THUS BE SUBJECT TO CORRECTION.

CCC/253 091305Z XNGR4042

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MF



UNCLASSIFIED

FM BRU ZVFC3610 09NOV83

TO BONN/BROADBRIDGE IMMED

INFO EXTOTT IDDZ

---ACREDITATION CDN MEDIA IN GERMANY

FOLLOWING REQUEST HERE IS LIST OF CDN MEDIA CONTINGENT ACCOMPANYING
PMS TOUR WITH PASSPORT NUMBERS

NAME	COMPANY	PASSPORT NUMBER
MICHAEL PARSONS	CTV	MA 675968
PAUL LACHAPELLE	RC	CK5880028
DANIELLE CLOUTIER	SRC	FB461636
JEAN-MICHEL LEFRINCE	SRC	CK448015
BERNARD SEGUIN	SRC	JC430005
JEFFREY SIMPSON	GLOBE AND MAIL	ZL025635
DAVID HALTON	CBC	EM104749
JOHN WALKER	SOUTHAM	EM101197
PAUL KORING	CP	MA470160
FIONA CONWAY	CTV	MA192222
DAVID VIERREAU	TORONTO STAR	CK231648
ROBERT EVANS	CTV	FD474899
VERN FREEDLANDER	CTV	PD742245
MIREILLE MASSE	RADIO CANADA	GF184404
PATRICK BROWN	CBC	C696894

...2

PAGF TWO ZVFC3610 UNCLAS

PIERRE APRIL PC

JC270267

JACQUES HUDON ASSOCIATE PRESS

SS082355

SECRETARY TO PM

FROM PMOOTT/HAUGE/HUDON

UUU/126 091144Z ZVFC3610

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PRMNY WKGR2477 09NOV83

TO FXTOTT EEA

INFO CNBRA WLGTN DELHI WSHDC WIBRD WIMF POECD PARIS LFN
CIDA HULL/MFD FINOTT/GLORIEUX/IPD/IER/IFD PCOOTT/DURAND
BH BOFCOTT DE OTT

DISTR DMF DMT EFB IMC IMU EER EEF EED IMD IDDZ


CIDA YDA YVP

---COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVT MEETING(CHOGM):ECONOMIC AND
COOPERATION ISSUES

AT NOV 4 MTG WITH COMMONWEALTH PERM REPS TO UN.COMWEL
SEC GEN RAMPHAL OUTLINED POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS AT NEW DELHI
CFOGM AND ASKED FOR SUGGESTIONS FROM PERM REPS.POLITICAL
ISSUES HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN SEPARATE TELS.FOLLOWING
REVIEWS AGENDA ITEM ON WORLD ECONOMIC ISSUES.VALUE OF COMWEL
REPORTS,AND AREAS OF COMWEL FUNCTIONAL COOPERATION.

2. RAMPHAL OPENED DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC ISSUES BY NOTING
THAT MCINTYRE REPORT HAD HAD INTERNATIONAL IMPACT.SUBSEQUENT
CHOGM MTG HAD PROMPTED SIMILAR REPORTS.STEMMING FROM
LAST MTG WAS REPORT ON PROTECTIONISM WHICH HE FELT WAS
PROBABLY BEST DOCUMENT ON THIS SUBJECT AND HAD INFLUENCED
GATT MTG.REPORT ON NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE WAS ALSO FRANK AND
HAD INFLUENCED SECOND BRANDT REPORT.HE FELT REPORT ON
NORTH/SOUTH DIALOGUE WOULD ALSO INFLUENCE DISCUSSIONS

...2



PAGE TWO WKGR2477 CONF

AT DELHI CHOGM. ALSO AT CHOGM WILL BE STUDY WHICH EMERGED FROM COMWEL FINANCE MINISTERS MTG, LARGELY AT INITIATIVE OF PM MULDOON, TO STUDY REFORM OF WORLD INTERNATIONAL FINANCING AND TRADING SYSTEM. IN RAMPHALS VIEW, THIS REPORT PREPARED BY HELLEINER ETAL WAS REALISTIC IN JUDGING THE FUTILITY OF EITHER THE UN OR THE INDIVIDUAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AS IDEAL FORUM FOR REFORM. SUGGESTION THAT MINISTERS, HEADS OF INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIATS COULD BECOME INVOLVED, TOGETHER WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF FINANCIAL AND TRADING COMPANIES WAS USEFUL ALTERNATIVE, ESPECIALLY SINCE IT ENVISAGED INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AT END RATHER THAN BEGINNING OF INTENSIVE PREPARATORY PROCESS. IT WILL REMAIN TO BE SEEN IF COMWEL HAS ROLE BUT IN RAMPHALS WORDS, IF PRIME MINISTERS GHANDI AND THATCHER COULD FIND AN AGREEMENT, THE WORLD COULD.

3. AT DELHI, DISCUSSION OF WORLD ECONOMIC ISSUES WILL BE INTRODUCED BY NZ PM MULDOON FOLLOWED BY TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO.

4. IN SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS, PERM REPS FOCUSED ON VALUE OF COMWEL ECONOMIC REPORTS. VIRTUALLY ALL SPEAKERS FELT REPORTS ON VARIOUS ECONOMIC ISSUES HAD BEEN VALUABLE. MAIN DISAPPOINTMENT WAS THAT REPORTS HAD NOT RECEIVED MORE ATTENTION IN UN. BANGLADESH SUGGESTED REPORTS SHOULD BE WOVEN INTO G77 PROCESS. REPORT ON BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS COULD HAVE QUITE CONSIDERABLE POTENTIAL IMPACT IN NEW YORK FOLLOWING CHOGM. SOLE

...3.

PAGE THREE WKGR2477 CONF

DISSENTING VOICE AMONG SPEAKERS WAS MALTA WHO FELT THERE ARE
ALREADY TOO MANY REPORTS. THEN ADMITTED HE HAD NOT READ ANY OF
COMWLE REPORTS. GUYANA SUGGESTED REPORTS MIGHT HAVE MORE IMPACT
IF THERE WERE MORE OF A DYNAMIC LINK BETWEEN COMWEL SECRETARIAT
AND UN ESPECIALLY SINCE THERE WAS A CERTAIN INSULARITY IN THE UN.
RAMPHAL REACTED TO SUGGESTIONS BY NOTING THAT OECD HAD ALREADY
REQUESTED COPIES OF HELLEINER REPORT FOR STUDY GROUP. PROBLEM
SEEMS TO BE MORE WITH SOUTH WHICH SHOULD ADOPT MORE METHODOICAL
APPROACH. PERHAPS COMWEL COUNTRIES SHOULD PRESENT REPORTS IN
VARIOUS REGIONAL OR OTHER GROUPS. PERHAPS G77 SHOULD INVITE SEC GEN
TO SPEAK TO REPORTS. STUDY GROUPS WERE ANOTHER POSSIBILITY.

5. IN RESPONSE TO RAMPHAL'S REQUEST FOR SUGGESTIONS ON POSSIBLE
THEMES OR TOPICS FOR CHOGM, UK PERM REP ON PERSONAL BASIS
SUGGESTED DUAL QUESTIONS OF FOOD AND POPULATION MIGHT BE
REVIEWED SINCE COMMONWEALTH IS PERHAPS UNIQUELY QUALIFIED TO
PROVIDE LEADERSHIP IN THIS AREA. THIS SUGGESTION WAS SUPPORTED
BY SEVERAL PERM REPS, INCLUDING CDN PERM REP WHO NOTED THAT
WORLD FOOD SITUATION REQUIRED MORE ATTENTION. RECENT
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SCIENTIFIC REPORTS SUGGESTED THAT CHANGING
CLIMATE COULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE IMPACT ON AGRICULTURE IN
DECADES AHEAD. OTHER REPS SUPPORTING IDEA OF FOOD AND POPULATION
AS PRIORITY SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION INCLUDED CYPRUS, SIERRA LEONE
AND GHANA.

...4

PAGE FOUR WKGR2477 CONF

6.ON FUNCTIONAL COOPERATION WITHIN COMWEL,RAMPHAL VERY BRIEFLY
REVIEWED LIKELY TOPICS AT CHOGM.THESE INCLUDED STUDENT MOBILITY.
YOUTH PROGRAM,COMMONWEALTH SCIENCE PROGRAM,WOMEN AND DEVELOPMENT.
COMMONWEALTH FOUNDATION,CULTURAL ISSUES,AND TRADE UNION COOPERATION.

CCC/017 101825Z WKGR2477

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

NONCLASSIFIE

DE CANDELNY WKGR2471 09NOV81

A EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE
WSHDC DELHI MOSCO BNATO CNGNY GENEV TOKYO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/
COLEMAN NDHQOTT/MND/CDG/ADMPOL/CFP
DISTR RGB RSR RCR FPR XDV RBD MGT IMC

---PMS INITIATIVE

AVONS JUGE INTERESSANT VOUS FRLANT AU NOM DU GROUPE, A AJOUTE QU IL APPLA
UDISSAIT LES PRO-

POSITIONS CONCRETES CONTENUES DANS LE DISCOURS DE GUFLPH.

2.VOUS TRANSMETTRONS PAR FAC PROCES VERBATIM DE CETTE PRMIERE
REUNION DES QU IL NOUS PARVIENDRA.

UUU/119 100010Z WKGR2471

28-6-1 = Trudeau Peace
Mission

MF
BJ

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM PRMNY WKS2464 09NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ MGTC IMMED

INFO HAGUE/PMDFL/FOWLER IMMED LDN PARIS DELHI BNATO WSHDC MOSCO

GENEV CNBRA NDHQOTT/DIPOL

DISTR IMC IDA IDR IDD CPD RCM RCD ZSI IFB MINE MINA IMU RRR

REF OURTEL WKGR2455 08NOV

---COMWEL HEADS OF GOVT MTC(CHOGM):PM INITIATIVE

AMEND INFO LINE REFTL TO INCLUDE PARIS AS ADDRESSEE.

2.PARIS:REFTL ROUTED YOUR MISSION.

CCC/085 091904Z WKS2464

ACTION COPY

C O N F I D E N T I A L NO/NO DISTRIBUTION

FM PC00TT PC01270 09NOV83

TO ROME/PMDEL FOWLER DELIVER BY 100900

---DRAFT SPEECH NUMBER THREE

IVANS DRAFT SPEECH FLOWS WELL, MAKES SOME
EXCELLENT POINTS AND WILL BE A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION TO
SPEECH III.

HOWEVER THERE IS ONE IMPORTANT IDEA WHICH DOES
NOT/NOT WITHSTAND ANALYSIS AND WEAKENS THE WHOLE. PAGE 4,
SECOND FULL PARA IN EFFECT MAKES THE QUOTE WINDOW OF
VULNERABILITY UNQUOTE ARGUMENT FOR BOTH SIDES. SCOWCROFT AND
OTHERS HAVE SAID THAT THERE IS NO/NO SUCH WINDOW OF
VULNERABILITY FOR THE US BECAUSE THE SUBMARINE LAUNCHED
AND BOMBER(AIRBORNE ALERT)LAUNCHED FORCES ARE INVULNERABLE
AND ARE SUFFICIENT TO DESTROY AN ADVERSARY MANY TIMES
OVER. THUS A PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK BY EITHER SIDE AGAINST THE
LAND BASED ICBMS OF THE OTHER IS DETERRED NOW, AS IT HAS
BEEN FOR YEARS, BY THE CERTAINTY OF AN UNACCEPTABLY
DESTRUCTIVE RESPONSE. THIS ARGUMENT APPLIES EQUALLY TO PAGE
2, QUOTE THAT IS NO/NO LONGER THE CASE UNQUOTE.

THOUGH THE PERSHING II IS NOT/NOT NAMED IT IS
CHARACTERISED BY IMPLICATION AS TERRIBLY DESTABILISING, QUOTE
THIS KIND OF FORCE POSTURE IS MADNESS UNQUOTE(PAGE 4). THE
PM WOULD NOT/NOT WISH TO MAKE SUCH A STATEMENT, GIVEN HIS FIRM
SUPPORT FOR PERSHING DEPLOYMENTS.

...2

MF
28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission
6

PAGE TWO PC01270 CONF D NO/NO DISTRIBUTION

THERE IS A MINOR ERROR, BOTTOM OF PAGE 11, CANADA
IS ONE OF FIVE (BELGIUM, UK, FRANCE, US) NOT/NOT ONE OF
THREE WHO PERMANENTLY STATION TROOPS IN WEST GERMANY.

AS A COMPLETE SPEECH, THE MAJOR WEAKNESS IN OUR
VIEW STEMS FROM THE VERY STRENGTH AND ELOQUENCE OF THE
TEXT. AS ONE READS, THE INEVITABLE QUESTION ARISES: WHAT IS
TO BE DONE? THE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION MUST BE INFERRED,
EXCEPT FOR THE SPECIFIC STATEMENTS THAT CANADA WILL INCREASE
SPENDING ON VERIFICATION MEASURES, AND WILL ALSO ADVOCATE
QUOTE JAW-JAW RATHER THAN WAR WAR UNQUOTE. SOMETHING MORE
THAN THAT SEEMS NECESSARY TO COMPLETE A SPEECH WHICH SO
ELOQUENTLY STATES OUR CURRENT PREDICAMENT.

IN SUM, A USEFUL BEGINNING FOR WORK ON
SPEECH III. BUT NOT/NOT YET SPEECH III ITSELF.

CCC/001 092039Z PC01270

FM EXTOTT XDV1094 09NOV83

TO TOYKO DELIVER BY 100900

INFO PMOOTT/DURDIN/SMITH PCOOTT/TURAND ROME/PMDEL

DELIVER BY 100900

DISTR PPR IDDZ

REF OURTEL XDV1090 09NOV83

---MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS

FOLLOWING ITEMS ON MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN PREPARED BY PMO
FOR ACTION AND FOLLOW-UP BY EMB MEDIA CO-ORDINATOR PRIOR TO
VISIT.

2.ACCREDITATION:WHAT WILL HOST GOVERNMENT REQUIRE FROM US FOR MEDIA ACCREDITATION FOR VISIT?CDN MEDIA TRAVELLING WITH PM WILL BE WEARING ACCREDITATION BADGES WITH PHOTOGRAPHS PREPARED BY PMO PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.PERHAPS THIS WILL MEET JPNSE REQUIREMENTS. JPNSE GOVT SHOULD KNOW THAT APPROXIMATELY 25/25 CDN NEWS MEDIA WILL ARRIVE ON PMS AIRCRAFT.

3.ACCOMMODATION:30/30 MEDIA ROOMS(SWB)SHOULD BE ON SAME FLOOR OR FLOORS AS CLOSE TOGETHER AS POSSIBLE TO FACILITATE BAGGAGE DISTRIBUTION AND EASE OF COMMUNICATIONS.A SUITE SHOULD BE RESERVED AMONG MEDIA ROOMS FOR B.SMITH.EMB PRESS COORDINATOR AND ANY OF HIS STAFF SUPPORTING PRESS OPERATIONS SHOULD RESIDE IN HOTEL FOR DURATION OF VISIT.ADVISE NAME AND HOME PHONE NUMBER OF EMB MEDIA COORDINATOR.ALL MEDIA SHOULD BE

...2

PAGE TWO XDV1094 RESTR

PRE-REGISTERED.LIST OF ACCOMPANYING PRESS TO FOLLOW FROM PMO.

4.MEDIA WORKING ROOM IN HOTEL:WILL REQUIRE 4/4 TELEPHONES WITH DIRECT-DIAL LONG DISTANCE INSTALLED IN LARGE WORKING ROOM.ROOM SHOULD BE SET UP WITH WORK TABLES AND CHAIRS WITH AREA FOR BRIEFING.


5.TRANSPORT:WILL REQUIRE 2/2 LARGE BUSES TO TRANSPORT MEDIA AND TWO SMALL MINIVANS FOR TV CREWS THROUGHOUT VISIT.PRESS SECRETARY WILL REQUIRE CAR AND DRIVER.

6.COSTS OF MEDIA WORKING ROOM AND TRANSPORT FACILITIES WILL BE MET FROM FINANCIAL CODING FROM OTTAWA(SFE REFTTEL).SEND COSTS OF HOTEL ROOMS IN BOTH JPNSE YEN AND CDN DLRS.MEDIA PAY FOR THEIR OWN ROOMS,FOOD AND FILING COSTS,I.E.,TELEX AND LONG DISTANCE CHARGES.

7.PHOTO OPPORTUNITIES:PLEASE ADVISE SIZE OF POOLS JPNSE WILL ALLOW ACCESS TO ON PHOTO OPPORTUNITIES.

8.WOULD APPRECIATE NAME AND HOME PHONE NUMBER OF EME MEDIA COORDINATOR ASAP AS DURDIN WILL CALL EARLY NEXT WEEK TO DISCUSS FURTHER DETAILS.

CCC/291 092328Z XDV1094



R E S T R I C T E D

FM EXTOTT XDV1091 09NOV83

TO TOKYO DELIVER BY 100900

INFO PCOOTT/DURAND PMOOTT/DURDIN/SMITH RCMPOTT/VIP5 NDHQOTT/DACT3-3
TT TRENTON 437SQN DE CAF CIDAULL/BSB FINOTT/GLORIEUX ROME/PMDFI

DELIVER BY 100900

DISTR USS DMF PGB PPD PPR IDDZ MGT

REF OURTEL XDV1090 09NOV

--PMS INITIATIVE:VISIT TO JAPAN-NOV83

FOLLOWING IS TENTATIVE LIST OF OFFICIALS ACCOMPANYING PM ON
AIRCRAFT IN ORDER OF PRECEDENCE FOR PLANNING PURPOSES(EG,HOTEL
ROOM AND CAR ASSIGNMENTS).

-RIGHT HONOURABLE PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU-PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA.

-MR.M.MASSE-UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

-MR.T.AXWORTHY-PRINCIPAL SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

-MR.R.R.FOWLER-ASSISTANT SECRETARY TO CABINET,FOREIGN AND DEFENCE
POLICY,PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE.

-MR.A.R.WRIGHT-VICE PRESIDENT,ASIA BRANCH,CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT AGENCY


-MR.J.E.JOHNSON-EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

-MR.E.G.DRAKE-DIRECTOR GENERAL,SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
BUREAU,EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

...2

PAGE TWO XDV1091 RESTR

- MR.G.B.GLORIEUX-GENERAL DIRECTOR,INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND FINANCE,DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE.
 - MR.R.COLEMAN-PRESS SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER.
 - MR.A.G.VINCENT-DIRECTOR,SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA RELATIONS DIVISION,EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
 - MR.P.D.DURAND-FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY SECRETARIAT,PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE.
 - MR.B.SMITH-ASSOCIATE PRESS SECRETARY,PRIME MINISTERS OFFICE.
 - MISS C.VIAU-PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER.
 - MR.B.V.JOHNSTONE-ASSISTANT CHIEF OF PROTOCOL,EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
 - MISS M.DURDIN-SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRIME MINISTER.
 - MR.G.M.CARTER-SPECIAL SECURITY LIAISON TO THE PRIME MINISTER.
SUPPORT STAFF
 - MR.R.COOPER-OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHER,PRIME MINISTERS OFFICE.
 - MR.L.BOURQUE-COMMUNICATOR,EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
 - MR.W.HORNER-SFCURITY GUARD,EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.
 - MISS C.CARDINAL-SECRETARY,PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE.
 - MR.J.DESCHAMBAULT-BAGGAGE ASSISTANT-PRIME MINISTERS OFFICE.
 - MR.L.ROBILLARD-SOUND TECHNICIAN,PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE.
- 2.REALIZE ONLY 21/21 OFFICIALS ACCOMPANYING PM AND 25/25 SWB REQUESTED.AS STATED ABOVE LIST IS QUOTE TENTATIVE UNQUOTE AND SUBJ TO CHANGE.WILL NOTIFY YOU OF ANY CHANGES ASAP.
- 3.FOR PROGRAMME PURPOSES,AMB FOLLOWS PM IN LIST OF PRECEDENCE.
- CCC/291 092329Z XDV1091



R E S T R I C T E D

FM EXTOTT XDV1090 09NOV83

TO TOKYO DELIVER BY 100900

INFO PCOOTT/DURAND PMOOTT/DURDIN/SMITH RCMPOTT/VIPS NDCOOTT/DAOTS-3

ROME/PMDEL TT ATOC TRENTON 437SQN DE CAF DELIVER BY 100900

DISTR USS DMF PGR IPD PFR IDD IDDZ MGT

REF FOSTFR/GILLETT TELCON 07/08NOV

--PMS INITIATIVE:VISIT TO TOKYO 09NOV

XDV IS RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATION OF ALL ADMIN AND LOGISTIC MATTERS RELATED TO PMS TRAVEL OUTSIDE CDA.GRATEFULL ALL CORRESPONDENCE ON THESE AND RELATED MATTERS BE DIRECTED TO XDV.ON PROGRAMME AND/OR SUBSTANCE MATTERS,PLS ENSURE XDV ON DISTR.AS STATED TELCON.NO/NO TIME FOR USUAL ADVANCE TRIP RE PMS TRAVEL.PMS TRIP TO JAPAN EARLIER THIS YEAR WILL BE GOOD PRECEDENT FOR GUIDANCE.MEDIA QUESTIONS WILL BE ADDRESSED IN SEPARATE TEL.

2.DELEGATION:DEL FOR TOKYO PORTION OF TRIP HAS NOT/NOT BEEN NAMED BUT WILL PROBABLY BE PM,AMB,PLUS 6 APPROX).

3.ACCOMMODATION:(A)OFFICIALS-IF NEW OTANI CAN 1)PROVIDE TRADITIONAL STYLE ROOM AND 2)JPNSF SECURITY HAVE THEIR ROOM,THEN USE OTANI.IF THESE TWO POINTS CAN BE MET USE OTANI.PLEASE KEEP OTHER OFFICIALS ROOMS,INCLUDING OFFICE ALL ON ONE FLOOR.IF NOT/NOT,THEN ASK FOR OKURA.CONFIRM.IF POSSIBLE ALL ROOMS INCLUDING

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PAGE TWO XDV1090 RESTR

OFFICE SHOULD BE ON SAME FLOOR OF HOTEL.WILL REQUIRE TRADITIONAL SUITE WITH 2/2 BEDROOMS FOR PM AND 25/25 SWB FOR ACCOMPANYING OFFICIALS.ROOMS FOR JOHNSON EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT)AND CARTER(RCMP LIAISON OFFICER)SHOULD BE ADJACENT.CONFIRM.HOWEVER IF OTANI USED UNDER CRITERIA OUTLINED ABOVE,PM CAN BE SEPARATED FROM OTHERS.(B)MEDIA-REQUIRE 30/30 SWB IN WING/TOWER SEPARATE FROM OFFICIALS ACCOMMODATION.CONFIRM. C)CREW-REQUIRE 17/17 SWB AT TOKYO PRINCE AT SHIBA PARK.CONFIRM. E)ASSUME ALL ROOMS WILL BE PREREGISTERED.NAMES OF OFFICIALS AND MEDIA TO FOLLOW.CREW NAMES GIVEN IN 437SQN OPS 401 08NOV.(D)REQUIRE SWB FOR DEL OFFICE AND CDA-BASED SCY REQUIRED TO LIVE IN HOTEL DURING PERIOD OF VISIT IN ROOM ADJACENT TO OFFICE.ADVISE NAME.OFFICE TO BE EQUIPPED WITH TYPEWRITER WE ARE ONLY BRINGING 220V ONES FOR REMAINDER OF TRIP).TYPING TABLE(NOT/NOT DESK),STATIONERY,SMALL PHOTOCOPIER(IF NECESSARY RENT USING CODING GIVEN BELOW).XDV/JOHNSTONES ROOM SHOULD BE LOCATED CLOSE TO OFFICE. F)WHERE WILL KEYS BE?(G)CAN MEMBER OF EMB BE ON DUTY IN HOTEL ON ARRIVAL TO ASSIST WITH ARRIVAL FORMALITIES? H)IF POSSIBLE HAVE FLOOR PLAN OF HOTEL AVAILABLE ON ARRIVAL SHOWING ASSIGNED ROOMS.(I)ADVISE COST OF ROOMS IN BOTH JPNSE YEN AND CDN DLRS.

4.PMS SUITE A): ADVISE HOTEL THAT IN PMS SUITE THERE SHOULD BE

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SMALL REFRIGERATOR STOCKED WITH FRESH MILK, ORANGE JUICE, BOTTLED WATER, BEER, CANDY AND FRESH FRUIT. FRESH RED ROSE IS REQUIRED EACH DAY FOR BOUTONNIERE-THIS IS A MUST. E) PMS SUITE SHOULD BE LOCATED IN QUIET AREA. THIS IS IMPORTANT AS PM LIKES TO SLEEP WITH HIS WINDOW OPEN. IF POSSIBLE SUITE SHOULD HAVE TWO BEDROOMS. IMPORTANT THAT BELLS FROM TELEPHONES IN PMS ROOMS (INCLUDING BATHROOMS) ARE DISCONNECTED. ALL TELEPHONE CALLS SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO JOHNSON (EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT) FIRST, VIA PMS PRIVATE SECRETARY) SECOND JOHNSTONE THIRD, AND DEL OFFICE FOURTH. ALL MAIL AND PARCELS SHOULD GO THROUGH SECURITY AND BE GIVEN TO B.V. JOHNSTONE.

5. FINANCE A) ADVISE IF YOU FORESEE ANY UNUSUAL EXPENSES REQUIRING PRIOR APPROVAL. EXPENSES DIRECTLY/DIRECTLY RELATED TO VISIT, FG, ACCOMMODATION, CAR OR EQPT RENTAL, ETC, CODE 014-760-760-014 AS APPLICABLE). ALL EXPENSES SUBJ HQ APPROVAL DOES NOT/NOT INCLUDE HOSPITALITY OR OVERTIME). B) ALL OFFICIALS WILL BE GIVEN ACCOUNTABLE ADVANCES IN ORDER TO SETTLE HOTEL ACCOUNTS. (C) COST OF ROOM FOR OFFICE TO BE SETTLED BY POST USING ABOVE CODING. WE PAY FOR SCYS ROOM AND RELATED EXPENSES. D) SHOULD ACCOUNTS NOT/NOT BE SETTLED ON DEPARTURE, PAY FROM POST ACCOUNTS AND ADVISE XIV BY TEL WITH NAMES AND AMOUNTS. (F) PROGRAMME: ASSUME POST WILL PROVIDE PROGRAMME. WILL EMB SUPPLEMENT WITH OWN IN MORE DEPTH WORKING TYPE
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PAGE FOUR XDV1090 RESTR

PROGRAMME)? WHEN FORWARDING PROGRAMME DETAILS TO OTT, ENSURE THAT ALL TIMES ARE INCLUDED, EG, AIRPORT TO HOTEL, HOTEL TO MTG PLACE, ETC. ALSO BAGGAGE PICKUP TIME.

6. LOCAL TRANSPORTATION: A) WILL REQUIRE SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF VEHICLES TO MOVE PM AND OFFICIALS TO HOTEL ON ARRIVAL. REQUIRE TWO 25-30 SEAT BUSES FOR MEDIA AND TWO LARGE BAGGAGE TRUCKS AT SAME TIME. CONFIRM. ASSUME JPNSE SECURITY WILL PROVIDE LIMO AND SECURITY CARS FOR PM. CONFIRM. RENT EXTRA VEHICLES USING ABOVE CODING IF REQUIRED AND ADVISE XDV. FOR MTGS SAT 19 NOV, IN ADDITION TO PMS LIMO AND SECURITY CARS, WILL REQUIRE 2/2 SEDANS FOR DFL. FOR DEPARTURE, WILL HAVE TO MOVE ALL OFFICIALS, MEDIA AND BAGGAGE/EQPT. (B) WILL VEHICLES BE MARKED FOR EASY IDENTIFICATION (FLAG FOLDER AND/OR NUMBER)? (C) TO ASSIST IN GETTING DFL/OFFICIALS INTO CARS, APPRECIATE IT IF SEATING ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE PROVIDED IN ADVANCE.

7. AIR TRANSPORT: (A) PM, OFFICIALS AND MEDIA WILL ARRIVE TOKYO 19 NOV AT 1730 HOURS VIA CAF BOEING 707. DND TRYING FOR CLEARANCE AT HANEDA AIRPORT. ADVISE ANTICIPATED TRAVEL TIME TO HOTEL FROM BOTH HANEDA AND NARITA AND RETURN TIMES, ETD 19 NOV 1730 HOURS.

8. BAGGAGE: A) ALL BAGS WILL BE MARKED FOR EASE IN IDENTIFICATION (AS YOU KNOW, JOHNSTONE HAS FOOLPROOF SYSTEM). (B) NO/NO NEEDED FOR DFL/OFFICIALS/MEDIA TO REMAIN AT AIRPORT FOR BAGGAGE AS IT CAN

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FOLLOW.XDV/JOHNSTONE WILL REMAIN BEHIND TO ASSIST.

8.ARRIVAL:XDV OFFICER WILL HAVE PPTS.EMB STAFF MEMBER SHOULD BE AT AIRPORT TO MEET HIM WITH ANY NECESSARY ARRIVAL CARDS. B)ASSUME DFL/OFFICIALS WILL BE TAKEN IF NECESSARY TO VIP LOUNGE FOR PPT FORMALITIES AND WILL DEPART FROM THERE FOR MOTORCADE.(C)APPRECIATE ARRIVAL SCENARIO(FG,WHO WILL MEET.WHERE WILL CARS BE,ETC).

9.DEL OFFICE:AS MENTIONED CDA-BASED SCY SHOULD BE ASSIGNED AND MOVE INTO HOTEL IN ROOM ADJACENT TO OFFICE DURING PERIOD OF VISIT.WORK FOR SCY WILL BE ASSIGNED BY XDV OFFICER.

10.SECURITY:ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE BY XDV OFFICE TO SECURE CLASSIFIED MATERIAL AT NIGHT.

11.COMMUNICATIONS:(A)SEE MGT TEL4617 03NOV. B)ARRANGEMENTS SHOULD BE MADE TO ENSURE 5/6 COPIES NOT/NOT FAXS) OF ALL TELS ARE DELIVERED TO XDV OFFICER ON ARRIVAL HOTEL 18NOV AND AT 2730 HOURS 19NOV IN ADDITION TO TELS SPECIFICALLY ADDRESSED TO PMS DFI.COPIES OF ALL TELS RECEIVED BY POST SHOULD BE PROVIDED,WITH OBVIOUS EXCEPTION OF PERS INFO AND ROUTINE ADMIN TELS).TIMING OF DELIVERY TO HOTEL IS CRUCIAL. C)PRESS SCAN:WILL ADVISE LATER ON NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED.(D)SWITCHBOARD:WILL REQUIRE EXTENDED HOURS OF OPERATION(INCLUDING SAT 19NOV).WILL ADVISE SPECIFICS LATER.

12.KITS:ASSUME KITS WILL BE PLACED IN EACH ROOM CONTAINING CITY MAPS AND GEN TOURIST INFO.THESE SHOULD BE SUPPLEMENTED WITH HOTEL

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ROOMING LIST. TEL NUMBERS OF MISSION STAFF BOTH OFFICE AND HOME AND
RECOMMENDED MEDICAL FACILITIES.

13. DRESS: ADVISE ANY SPECIAL TYPE OF CLOTHING REQUIRED.

14. WEATHER: WHAT WILL WEATHER BE LIKE DURING PERIOD OF VISIT?

15. MEDIA: WILL ADVISE ASAP ON MEDIA REQUIREMENTS.

16. REGRFT LFNGTH, BUT TRYING TO TOUCH ALL BASFS. FOSTERS TELEPHONE
NUMBERS: BUS 992-2971; HOME 745-1858.

CCC/291 092329Z XDV1090

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Division Phoned

Person

Time

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HAGUF YWGR0755 09NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 091400

ROMF PMDEL DELIVER BY 100900

INFO PMDEL IMMED PCOOTT/FOWLER LDN BONN BRU MOSCO IARIS BNATO

NDHOOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD WSHDC PRMNY GENEV

DISTR MINA USS DMF UGB IFB IDD IDR IFB IDA RGV RCD RSR RSD RCR RBR

---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST/WEST RELNS:MTGS IN HAGUE

SUMMARY:

MTGS IN HAGUE WENT EXTREMELY WFL. PM LUBBERS MET PM TRUDFAU AT AIRPORT AND ACCOMPANIED TO GUEST HOUSE WHERE FRIENDLY AND LIVELY EXCHANGES CONTINUED MOST OF EVENING AND EARLY NEXT MORNING. BOTH PM LUBBERS AND FM VAN DEN BROEK SHARED CDN CONCERNS ABOUT PRESENT STATE OF EAST-WEST RELNS. HAD SOME DIFFERING DIAGNOSES ABOUT CAUSES OF PRESENT TENSIONS, AGREED SOMETHING NEEDED TO BE DONE TO IMPROVE SITUATION, THOUGH MOST APPROPRIATE TIMING WOULD BE AFTER DEPLOYMENT HAD BEGUN. BROADLY SUPPORTED PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD BY FM TRUDEAU AND ENCOURAGED HIM TO PROCEED WITH MISSION. NO/NO REPORT YET AVAILABLE ON CONVERSATION WITH QUEEN BEATRIX.

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NOV 11 1983
S-44KOC 4 3113

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2.REPORT:MTGS WITH PM LUBBERS AND FM VAN DEN BROEK TOOK PLACE IN RELAXED AND TRANQUIL SETTING OF PMS OFFICIAL RESIDENCE, WITH NEARLY THREE HOURS OF LIVELY AND OCCASIONALLY VERY FRANK DISCUSSION OVER DRINKS AND DINNER ON NOV08.THE TWO PMS MET FOR TETE A TETE OVER BREAKFAST NOV09 WITH INTENTION OF TRYING TO PULL TOGETHER SOME OF THREADS OF PREVIOUS EVENINGS DISCUSSION.SINCE NO/NO OFFICIAL WAS WITH PM FOR BREAKFAST MTG OR FOR SUBSEQUENT MTG WITH QUEEN BEATRIX,THIS TEL WILL NEED TO BE SUPPLEMENTED BY REPORT ON DEBRIEFING FROM IM DEL. THIS TEL NOT/NOT SEEN BY PM DEL BEFORE DEPARTURE.

3.SINCE BOTH PM LUBBERS AND FM VAN DEN BROEK HAD OBVIOUSLY READ CAREFULLY PM TRUDEAUS LETTER AND GUELPH SPEECH, IT WAS NOT/NOT NECESSARY FOR CDN PM TO REPEAT MESSAGE IN DETAIL.RATHER, DISCUSSION MOVED OVER VARIETY OF EAST/WEST ISSUES AND PERHAPS FOCUSED MORE ON ANALYSIS THAN ON FUTURE COURSES OF ACTION. DUTCH INTERLOCUTORS WERE CLEARLY VERY RESPONSIVE TO PM TRUDEAUS CONCERNS AND SHARED MANY OF HIS PERCEPTIONS.SOME PARTS OF THEIR ANALYSIS LED THEM IN SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS THAN CDN ANALYSIS.THERE WAS BROAD AGREEMENT HOWEVER ON NEED FOR ACTION TO IMPROVE EAST/WEST DIALOGUE AND TO TAKE SPECIFIC INITIATIVES ALTHOUGH TIMING WAS SEEN TO BE IMPORTANT.

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4. DUTCH REACTIONS TO PM TRUDEAU'S MESSAGE NEED TO BE SEEN IN FOLLOWING CONTEXT WHICH CAME OUT CLEARLY DURING EXCHANGES. FIRST DUTCH GOVT HAS NO/NOT YET TAKEN FINAL DECISION ON INF DEPLOYMENT IN COUNTRY AND PM LUBBERS HIMSELF HAS DOUBTS ABOUT NUCLEAR ROLE ASSIGNED TO NETHS AND NEED TO STATION NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN COUNTRY HE ASKED HOW CDA HAD GOT AROUND ISSUE.). SECOND THERE ARE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW BETWEEN PM LUBBERS AND FM VAN DEN BROEK WITH LATTER BEING MORE HAWKISH IN ATTITUDE TO SOVIET UNION. THIRD, THERE IS TRADITIONAL DUTCH CAUTION IN WANTING TO WEIGH ISSUES VERY CAREFULLY BEFORE TAKING DECISIONS OR MAKING COMMITMENTS.

5. DUTCH ANALYSIS OF CURRENT SITUATION LED PM LUBBERS TO MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS, NOT/NOT ALL OF WHICH ARE SELF-CONSISTENT:

A) IN TIMES OF ECONOMIC DIFFICULTY SUCH AS EUROPEAN COUNTRIES CONTINUE TO FACE, POPULATIONS WILL RESPECT THOSE LEADERS WHO ACT TOUGH (THATCHER IN FALKLANDS OR REAGAN IN GRENADA) AND DO NOT/NOT GIVE IN TO BULLYING TACTICS FROM USSR. THERE IS SWING TO GREATER CONSERVATISM IN EUROPE. EVEN IN NETHS THE INTERNATIONALISM OF PAST DECADES HAS BEEN WEAKENING IN TERMS OF BOTH NORTH/SOUTH AND EAST/WEST). THUS ONE SHOULD NOT/NOT THINK OF EUROPE AS BEING MORE PACIFIST THAN IN PAST AND LOOKING FOR DEALS WITH SOVIET UNION.

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B) DUTCH ANALYSIS OF SITUATION IN MOSCOW DOES NOT/NOT LEAD THEM TO HAVE PARTICULAR CONCERN ABOUT GROWING MILITARY INFLUENCE OR LOSS OF CONTROL BY CIVILIANS. RATHER THEY SEEM SOVIET GOVT AS HAVING BACKED SELF INTO CORNER THROUGH PROPAGANDA AND IT WOULD TAKE TIME FOR MOSCOW TO SET NEW COURSE. RUSSIANS HAD TO BE FIRST CONVINCED THAT EUROPEAN PEACE MOVEMENTS WOULD NOT/NOT SOLVE RUSSIAN PROBLEMS IN EUROPE.

C) FACT THAT SALT 2 HAD NO/NOT BEEN RATIFIED BY AMERICAN CONGRESS TENDED TO SHOW THAT EVEN RATIONAL AND BALANCED AGREEMENTS REACHED WITH MOSCOW COULD NOT/NOT ALWAYS BE IMPLEMENTED IN WEST.

D) RUSSIANS AS WELL AS AMERICANS WERE HARDBALLING IT IN GENEV TALKS AND IT WAS MOST UNLIKELY NOW THAT THESE WOULD LEAD ANYWHERE IN SHORT TERM. IT WAS ALREADY TOO LATE TO STOP INF DEPLOYMENT IN EUROPE. BRITAIN, FRG AND ITALY WOULD GO AHEAD THOUGH NOT/NOT FOR TIME BEING AT LEAST NETHS AND BELGIUM). IT WAS ALSO PSYCHOLOGICALLY IMPORTANT FOR THE USA TO HAVE EVIDENCE THAT EUROPEAN ALLIES WERE PREPARED TO GO AHEAD WITH DEPLOYMENT.

F) NATO WAS IMPORTANT TO NETHS AND HAD BROAD SUPPORT FROM DUTCH PEOPLE. QUESTION WAS WHETHER NATO COULD BE MORE THAN A MILITARY ALLIANCE FOR DEFENCE AND HAVE BROAD POLITICAL ROLE IN PROMOTION OF EAST/WEST RELNS. (HERE THERE WERE OBVIOUS

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DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FM LUBBERS AND FM VAN DEN BROEK, WITH
FORMER IMPLYING POLITICAL COOPERATION AND DIALOGUE WITH
SOVIET UNION HAD TO TAKE PLACE OUTSIDE NATO WHILE LATTER
THOUGHT IT POSSIBLE AND INDEED ESSENTIAL TO BUILD UP
POLITICAL COOPERATION WITHIN NATO).

F) IMPORTANT EARLY STEP IN NETHS VIEW WOULD BE TO IMPROVE
CONSULTATION PROCESS BETWEEN EUROPE AND UNITED STATES.
GRENADA INCIDENT HAD COME AS SHOCK AND SHOWED DISARRAY IN
ALLIANCE WHICH NEEDED TO BE HEALED.

6. THESE TYPES OF POINTS, WHICH WERE SPREAD THROUGHOUT
CONVERSATION, SEEMED TO LEAD DUTCH INTERLOCUTORS TO TWO
CONCLUSIONS IN RESPONSE TO PMS GENERAL PRESENTATION: YES,
THERE WAS NEED FOR EFFORT BY MIDDLE POWERS TO PROMOTE
BETTER DIALOGUE BETWEEN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON AND TO EASE
TENSIONS; TIME FOR SUCH INITIATIVE WOULD BE POSSIBLY NEXT
SPRING, NOT/NOT EARLIER.

7. MAIN REASON FOR SUCH DEFERRAL OF ACTION OR EVEN SENDING
OF CLEAR SIGNAL TO MOSCOW, IN DUTCH VIEW, WAS INF DEPLOYMENT
ISSUE. IT WAS ALREADY TOO LATE TO STOP IT. IN FM LUBBERS
VIEW ANYTHING WHICH HELPED DEPLOYMENT WAS GOOD AND ANYTHING
WHICH HINDERED IT SHOULD BE AVOIDED. RUSSIANS WOULD
PROBABLY WITHDRAW FROM GENEV. TWO SIDES WOULD NEED TO
REFLECT ON IMPASSE. ONLY THEN INITIATIVE TO BRING SIDES

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TOGETHER WOULD BE INVALUABLE. FM VAN DEN BROEK IN PARTICULAR INTERVENED SEVERAL TIMES TO STATE HE DID NOT/NOT SHARE PESSIMISM OF THOSE WHO THOUGHT DEPLOYMENT WOULD MAKE FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS IMPOSSIBLE. QUOTE LET DEPLOYMENT BEGIN UNQUOTE WAS HIS THEME, MEANING TIME TO NEGOTIATE FURTHER WITH RUSSIANS WOULD BE DURING PERIOD AFTER SITING OF PERSHING AND CRUISE MISSILES IN BRITAIN, FRG AND ITALY BUT BEFORE NETHS AND BELGIUM.

8. WILL NOT/NOT IN THIS TEL ATTEMPT TO SUMMARIZE POINTS MADE BY PM TRUDEAU SINCE THEY WERE VARIATIONS ON THEMES KNOWN TO YOU. HE REPLIED TO DUTCH QUESTIONS ELEGANTLY AND EFFECTIVELY AND GENTLY STEERED CONVERSATION INTO POSSIBILITIES OF ACTION PROGRAM FOR FUTURE. IN PROCESS HE STRESSED CDN COMMITMENT TO NATO AND TWO-TRACK DECISION, NEED FOR POLITICIANS TO GIVE GREATER ATTENTION AND GUIDANCE TO EAST-WEST TALKS, RATIONALE FOR QUOTE THIRD RAIL UNQUOTE, AND REASONS FOR CDN CONCERN ABOUT PRESENT SITUATION. BOTH FM LUBBERS AND FM VAN DEN BROEK REACTED WARMLY TO HIS PRESENTATION AND FORMER REMARKED AFTERWARDS HOW MUCH HE HAD ENJOYED CUT AND THRUST OF EXCHANGES.

9. SORTS OF CONCLUSIONS WHICH WERE REACHED SEEMED TO BE ALONG FOLLOWING LINES.

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A) A) NETHS VERY MUCH WELCOMED GENERAL INITIATIVE BY PM TRUDFAU AND HOPED HE WOULD GO AHEAD WITH IT AFTER CONSULTATION WITH OTHER EUROPEAN PARTNERS. PM LUBBERS AGREED WITH PM TRUDEAU THAT NO/NO OPTIMISTIC SCENARIO WAS LIKELY TO HAPPEN UNLESS THEY HELPED TO MAKE IT HAPPEN.

B) MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENN SHOULD BE TAKEN MORE SERIOUSLY AND EFFORT MADE TO GET THEM OUT OF QUOTE HAIR-SPLITTING, ACCOUNTANCY UNQUOTE STAGE. SOVIET UNION HAD MADE NO/NOT UNREASONABLE PROPOSITION AND THIS SHOULD BE REPLIED TO SUBSTANTIVELY. IF WE CANNOT/NOT MOVE LEVELS DOWN IN MBFR THEN WE WILL HAVE TO MOVE UP TO MATCH USSR AND THIS WOULD BE COSTLY AND UNPOPULAR. WE EITHER HAVE TO KILL MBFR OR ELSE TRY ONE LAST POLITICAL IMPULSE.

C) STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CDE SHOULD ALSO BE SUBJECT OF POLITICAL GUIDANCE FROM MINISTERSCHFYSSON HAD SAID HE AND OTHER EUROPEAN MINISTERS WOULD ATTEND AND POSSIBLY SCHULZ IF OTHERS DID) AND DELEGATIONS SHOULD TO TO STKHM WITH CLEAR POLITICAL STRATEGY IN MIND.

D) PM LUBBERS WAS MILDLY SUPPORTIVE OF IDEA OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWER CONFERENCE AND ASKED ABOUT MITTERRANDS RESPONSE. HE DID NOT/NOT BELIEVE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES WOULD WANT TO ACCEPT MONOPOLY OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS OR ACCEPT A SELF-LIMITATION ON HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION SO LONG AS THE FIVE DID NOT/NOT ACCEPT ADEQUATE VERIFICATION PROCEDURES FOR THEMSELVES.

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E)EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO GIVE BROADER POLITICAL INPUT TO NATO.AFTER WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION ON PROPER ROLE OF NATO THERE SEEMED TO BE CONSENSUS WITH PM TRUDEAUS SUMMARY THAT WHILE NATO SHOULD NOT/NOT BE ALL OUR FOREIGN POLICY IN EAST-WEST RELNS. IT SHOULD HAVE IMPORTANT ROLE IN POLICY AS WELL AS OPERATIONAL ASPECTS.CERTAIN POLITICAL QUESTIONS HOWEVER HAD TO BE KEPT OUTSIDE NATO TO ALLOW EXPRESSIONS OF DIFFERING VIEWS WITHOUT BEING SEEN AS DISLOYAL TO WESTERN UNITY.

10.THESE CONCLUSIONS MAY WELL OF COURSE HAVE BEEN EXPANDED OR MADE MORE SPECIFIC THE NEXT MORNING.

SMITH

CCC/029 091637Z YWGR0755

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HAGUE YWGR0753 09NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 090900


INFO ROME

---PMS INITIATIVE

GRATEFUL YOU COPY TO FM DEL/COLEMAN IN ROME TEXT OF GLOBE
EDITORIAL OF THURS 03NOV ENTITLED QUOTE THIRD RAIL UNQUOTE
AND GWINS ARTICLE IN OTT CITIZEN OF 02NOV ENTITLED QUOTE
BETTER TO TRY AND FAIL THAN NOT TO TRY AT ALL UNQUOTE.

PMS DEL ARRIVES ROME 09NOV AT 17H50.

CCC/029 091151Z YWGR0753



ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE BRU ZVGR0523 09NOV83

A FXTOTT IDDZ

LIVRAISON 091430

Division Phoned ✓

Person 15-5.2

Total Time 15.46

28-6-1 - Trudeau
Mississauga

INFO PREFC PCOOTT/FOWLER LDN BONN ROME ROME/PMDEL HAGUE MOSCO BNATO
NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD PARIS

DISTR MINA USS DMF UGB IFB IDD IDR IFB IDA RGB RCD RSR RST RCR RBR
REF NOTRETEL ZVGR0521 07NOV

---INITIATIVE DU PM:RELATIONS EST/OUEST-ENTRETIEN AVEC

PM/MARTENS/MRE TINDEMANS

SOMMAIRE:LES BELGES PARTAGENT LARGEMENT L ANALYSE CONNF DE
L ETAT DES RELS EST-OUEST ET EN PARTICULIER LES DANGERS QUE
RECELENT L ABSENCE DE DIALOGUE AU SOMMET ENTRE LES SUPERPUISSANCE,
L INFLUENCE APPAREMMENT CROISSANTE DES MILITAIRES
EN URSS ET LES PERSPECTIVES DE PROLIFERATION DES ARMES
NUCLEAIRES CHEZ LES PAYS QUI NE LES POSSEDENT PAS DEJA.MARTENS
S ESTDECLARE PLEINEMENT D ACCORD AVEC L INITIATIVE ET,EN
TERMES GENERAUX,AVEC LES MESURES CONCRETES PROPOSEES PAR PM
TRUDEAU SOIT LA RELANCE DU DIALOGUE ENTRE LES SUPERPUISSANCES,LA
CREATION D UN DISPOSITIF PERMETTANT AUX PAYS ALLIES DE JOUER UN ROLE
REEL,LA NECESSITE DE DONNER UNE IMPULSION POLITIQUE AUX DISCUSSIONS
DE L OTAN AINSI QUE CELLES DES MBR ET DE LA CDE ET ENFIN LA
PROPOSITION DE TENIR UNE CONFERENCE DES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES
(MILITAIRES).IL NE SOUSESTIME PAS POUR AUTANT LES OBSTACLES DE

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RECEIVED
JAN 10 1980
COTE A DOMINIQUE

PAGE-DEUX ZVGR0523 CONF

PARCOURS DONT LE MOINDRE N EST PAS CELUI D OBTENIR L ORFILLE DES
SUPERPUISSANCES ET, EN PARTICULIER, CELLE DU PRES REAGAN.

2. RAPPORT: LES ENTRETIENS AU PALAIS D EGMONT REUNISSAIENT PM
MARTENS, LE MRE TINDEMANS, LE DIRGEN DES AFF POL AU MAE CAHEN
VANDER ESPT CHEF DU CABINET AU MAE ET DE WAEVER, AGENT DETACHE
DU MAE AUPRES DU BUREAU DU PM DU COTE BELGE, ET DU COTE CDN.
LA PM, AMB, FOWLER ET SMITH ILS ONT DURE UN PEU MOINS DE DEUX HEURES.

3. LES CONVERSATIONS SURVENANT AU COURS DU DEBAT PARLEMENTAIRE
BELGE SUR LA MISE EN OEUVRE DE LA DOUBLE DECISION DE L OTAN
DE DEC 79, SE DEVAIENT DE PORTER D ABORD SUR CE SUJET PUISQUE LE GOUV
ESTIME QUE LE DEBAT SE CONCLURA EN FAIT PAR UN VOTE (GAGNE D AVANCE)
DE CONFIANCE OU DE NON-CONFIANCE AU GOUV, COMME LE FAISAIT
REMARQUER D EMBLEE, LE MIN DES AFF ECON, MARC FYSKENS, VENU
ACCUEILLIR LE PM A L AEROPORT. QUANT A LA REACTION PROBABLE
DES RUSSES AU DEBUT D IMPLANTATION DES EUROMISSILES, LES SIGNAUX
SONT CONTRADICTOIRES, DE DIRE TINDEMANS, COMME IL ARRIVE SI
SOUVENT AVEC LES SOVIETIQUES. ON PENSE QU ILS DEVRONT REVENIR ASSFZ
TOT A LA TABLE DE NEGOCIATIONS, S ILS DECIDENT DE LA QUITTER. GROMYKO
SOUSHAITE VISITER BRU EN DEC, AVANT LA DECISION FINALE DU GOUV BELGE,
SANS DOUTE DANS L ESPOIR DE L INFLUENCER, MAIS LES BELGES INSISTENT
POUR FEB POUR DES RAISONS EVIDENTES. LE PM A ETE FERME AU COURS DU
DEBAT ET N A NULLEMENT L INTENTION DE FLECHIR.

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PAGE TROIS ZVGR0523 CONF

4. TRAHISSANT L HESITATION SIGNALEE PLUS TOT, TINDEMANS INQUIET DE A L INFLUENCE CROISSANTE DES MILITAIRES SOVIETIQUES A MOSCOW S INTERROGE D ABORD SUR LA QUESTION DE SAVOIR SI L INITIATIVE TRUDEAU N ATTEINDRA PAS SA PLUS GRANDE UTILITE APRES JANVIER, UNE FOIS LES DECISIONS SUR LES EUROMISSILES FINALEMENT PRISES DANS LES CINQ PAYS DIRECTEMENT CONCERNES. LE PM TRUDEAU, SANS EXCLURE LA POSSIBILITE DE DEVELOPPEMENTS IMPREVUS, PRESENTA SON INITIATIVE COMME ESSENTIELLEMENT A MOYEN TERME, NE REMETTANT PAS EN CAUSE LES DECISIONS ANTERIEURES, MAIS PROFITANT DE TOUTES LES OCCASIONS POUR AGIR A LA MARGE AFIN D AMENER LES SUPERPUISSANCES A RETABLIR LE DIALOGUE DONT LE BESOIN SE FAIT SENTIR DE FACON SI URGENTE. FAUT-IL RESTER SUR LA DEFENSIVE OU TENTER DE REPONDRE A CERTAINES SUGGESTIONS DE MOSCOW ET TENTER DE CREER UNE NOUVELLE DYNAMIQUE? TINDEMANS SE RALLIE ET DECLARE L INITIATIVE TRUDEAU DES PLUS UTILES DES MAINTENANT EN CE QU ELLE DEMONTE UNE FOIS DE PLUS LA BONNE FOI OCCIDENTALE.

5. PM TRUDEAU RAPPELLE ALORS LES GRANDES LIGNES DE SON ANALYSE DE LA SITUATION EST-OUEST TELLE QUI NOUS LA CONNAISSONS. LE TEMPS PRESSE. ALORS QUE L APRES-CUBA AVAIT ETE RICHE EN INITIATIVES ET ACCORDS DIVERS, CHACUN RESTE DEPUIS DES ANNEES SUR DES POSITIONS ARRÊTÉES. LE MOMENT N EST-IL PAS VENU DE REPENSER PAR EXEMPLE LE PRINCIPE DU CIT NO FIRST USE FINEST OU DU CIT NO EARLY USE FINEST? UN TEL PROCESSUS DE REEXAMEN NE SAURAIT ETRE MÊME A BIEN QUE SI LES GRANDS RENOUENT ...4

PAGE FOUR ZVGR0523 CONF

LE DIALOGUE CE QUI AVAIT PARU POSSIBLE POUR LE PRINTEMPS PROCHAIN
DANS L'ECHÉANCIER DU PRES REAGAN MAIS QUI SEMBLE DEVOIR ÊTRE
REPORTÉ SUITE À LA DESCENTE PAR LES RUSSES DE L'APPAREIL KAL.

6. PEUT-ÊTRE POURRAIT-ON AMORCER LA REPRISE PAR PERSONNES INTERPOSÉES
QUI S'EMPLOIERAIENT À DÉLIMITER UN CONSENSUS LATENT SUR CERTAINS
POINTS MAIS QUI N'EST PAS APPARENT. NE POURRAIT-ON PROCÉDER EN
DONNANT UNE IMPLUSION POLITIQUE NOUVELLE ENTRE ALLIÉS AUX
DISCUSSIONS DE L'OTAN, ET AVEC L'AUTRE CAMP AUX NÉGOCIATIONS
DES MEFER ET À LA CDE? LES MAF NE POURRAIENT-ILS SE RENCONTRER
À STOCKHOLM, NE POURRAIT-ON ENVISAGER AU MOMENT OPPORTUN UNE RÉUNION
DES MAF DE L'OTAN ET DU PDV? LES SOVIÉTIQUES AVAIENT ENTROUVÉ
IL Y A DÉJÀ HUIT MOIS LA PORTE À UNE ÉVENTUELLE VÉRIFICATION
DES ARMEMENTS. IL FAUT SE PENCHER SUR LES ÉLÉMENTS D'UNE RÉPONSE. LE
PRES REAGAN SEMBLE BIEN DISPOSÉ POUR SA PART À L'ENDROIT D'UNE
INITIATIVE DE PAIX.

7. SANS RÉPONDRE EN DÉTAIL À CHAQUE POINT SOULÈVÉ, TINDÉMAN
RAPPELLE QUE GROMYKO SOUHAITERAIT UNE RENCONTRE AU NIVEAU
MINISTÉRIEL À STKHLM ET CAHEN AJOUTE QUE LES DIX Y SÉRAIENT
PLUTÔT FAVORABLES. LE PM TRUDEAU SUGGÈRE QU'ON EN DISCUTE À
LA CONF MIN DE DEC DE L'OTAN.

8. PM TRUDEAU FAIT ALORS ÉTAT DE CERTAINES IDÉES RELATIVES À LA
NON-PROLIFÉRATION QU'IL POURRAIT LANCER LORS DE LA CCEGC

...5

PAGE FIVE ZVGR0523 CONF

(COMMONWEALTH) EN VUE D'UN RENONCEMENT A LA NUCLEAIRISATION DES UNS
SI LES AUTRES S'ENGAGEAIENT A LA LIMITATION DE LA PROLIFERATION
VERTICALE. LES HESITATIONS DE BEAUCOUP DE PAYS DU TIERS MONDE SONT
BIEN CONNUES, MAIS DEVANT LA MENACE QU'UNE GUERRE NUCLEAIRE PUISSE
ETRE DECLENCHEE EN DIVERS POINTS DU GLOBE PAR UN BON NOMBRE DE PAYS,
ILS POURRAIENT ETRE PRETS A EXAMINER UNE FORMULE COMPORTANT DES
ENGAGEMENTS MUTUELS. LES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES MILITAIRES
POURRAIENT ENTRER EN NEGOCIATIONS A TITRE INDIVIDUEL ET NON
PAS DE BLOC A BLOC. LE PM INDIQUA QU'IL FERAIT UNE TELLE
PROPOSITION PAR ECRIT AU PM CHINOIS QUI DOIT LUI RENDRE VISITE
EN JAN 84. IL ESPERE UN CONSENSUS ENTRE FRANCAIS, BRITANNIQUES
ET CHINOIS AVANT DE SOULEVER LA QUESTION AVEC WSHC ET MOSCOU
QUI POURRAIENT Y VOIR UN MOYEN D'ABORDER LE PROBLEME SOUS UN
ANGLE NOUVEAU.

9. LE PM TRUDEAU SUGGERA QU'IL FALLAIT EN SOMME A L'OCCIDENT UN
NOUVEAU RAPPORT D'ORIENTATION DU TYPE HARMEL QUI SOIT UNE
ADAPTATION DE NOS DOCTRINES A DES REALITES NOUVELLES. LE NOUVEAU
SEC GEN DE L'OTAN SERAIT SANS DOUTE SUSCEPTIBLE DE FAIRE UNE
CONTRIBUTION MAJEURE AU RENOUVEAU DU DIALOGUE AU SEIN DE L'ALLIANCE.
LE PM MARTENS OPINA ET COMMENTA, NON SANS AMERTUME, SUR LES
CONSULTATIONS PRO FORMA AUXQUELLES SE LIVRENT SOUVENT LES EUA
SANS QUE LEURS ALLIES N'AIENT GUERE DE CHANCE D'EXERCER

...6

PAGE SIX ZVGR0523 CONF

UNE INFLUENCE REELLE. CIT IL FAUT POUVOIR DIRE A REAGAN CE QUE
NOUS NOUS DISONS ICI FINCIT. IL DECLARA EN CONCLUSION DE L'ENTRETIEN
(QUE TINDEMANS AVAIT DU QUITTER A MI-TEMPS POUR RETOURNER EN
CHAMBRE), QU'IL ETAIT CIT PLEINEMENT D'ACCORD AVEC L'INITIATIVE ET
LES PROPOSITIONS DU PM FINCIT TOUT EN SE DEMANDANT COMMENT ON
POUVAIT ARRIVER VERITABLEMENT A MOTIVER NOS ALLIES AMERICAINS... SANS
PARLER DES SOVIETIQUES. LES DEUX PM CONCLURENT QUE L'ECHECANCE 83 DOIT
ETRE FRANCHIE DANS LA FERMETE, MAIS QU'IL FAUT TROUVER UN STYLE
NOUVEAU DES RAPPORTS EST-OUEST.

10. L'ACCUEIL PAR EYSKENS ET LES ENTRETIENS AU COURS D'UN DEJEUNER
AU PALAIS D'EGMONT) QUELQUE PEU CONDENSES EN RAISON DES DEBATS
PARLAI, ONT ETE DES PLUS CORDIAUX QU'OIQUE LES INTERLOCUTEURS
BELGES AIENT EU PEINE A CACHER LES EFFETS D'UNE NUIT
PARTIELLEMENT BLANCHE, N'AYANT PU QUITTER A LA MANIERE BELGE LA
CHAMBRE DES REPRESENTANTS QU'A TROIS HRES DU MATIN.

IL FAUDRA AUSSI VOIR LE DETAIL CAR LES BELGES SE SENTENT SURTOUT
A L'AISE EN COMPAGNIE EUROPEENNE. LA PARTIE BELGE NOUS A EGALEMENT
INDIQUE QU'ELLE SOUHAITE POURSUIVRE ETROITEMENT LES CONSULTATIONS.
LA PREMIERE ETAPE CONSISTERA BIEN SUR DE NOTRE PART A LES INFORMER
SANS RETARD DE LA SYNTHESE QUE LE PM TRUDEAU TIRERA DE SA VISITE
POUR LE PUBLIC EN GENERAL ET, PLUS PARTICULIEREMENT, POUR LES

...7

PAGE SEVEN ZVGR0523 CONF

HOMOLOGUES VISITS.

11. NOUS TRANSMETTRONS AU MAE LE DOCU DE TRAVAIL QUE NOUS A LAISSE
FOWLER INTITULE CIT CONFERENCE DES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES
FINCIT.

FORTIFR

CCC/126 091758Z ZVGR0523

MF
nd

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

28-6-1-1 - Trudeau Peace
6 mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PARIS WISV0317 09NOV83

TO FXTOTT/IDDZ

INFO BRU PCOOTT/FOWLER LDN BONN ROME HAGUE MOSCO BNATO

NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOI/CPD

DISTR MINA USS DMF UGB IFB IDD IDR IDA RGB RCD RSR RSD RCR RBR

REF OURTEL WIGP5273 08NOV

---INITIATIVE DU PM:RELATIONS EST/OUEST-ENTRETIEN PM/PRFS MITTERRAND
IN PARA 3 PAGE TWO PLSE AMEND TO READ(IN PART)QUOTE COURSE AUX
ARMEMENTS S ACCELERAIT.IL FALLAIT TENTER DE RETABLIR DIALOGUE;
DESARMEMENT ETAIT DEvenu UNQUOTE.

IN PARA 4 MIDDLE OF PAGE THREE TO READ IN PART QUOTE PM A RAFFELF
PESSIMISME DE HELMUT SCHMIDT SUR PROLIFERATION UNQUOTE.

CCC/074 091647Z WISV0317

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT RBD0022 09NOV83

TO PMDELROMF/FOWLER DELIVER BY 091700

INFO PMOOTT/MOORE

DISTR IDDZ

FROM HANCOCK

---DRAFT PM INITIATIVE SPEECH, MONTL 13NOV

NOTE FOLLOWING POINTS ABOUT DRAFT.

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace mission

2. TONE IS PERHAPS TWO NOTCHES DOWN FROM GUELPH TO EMPHASIZE
BUSINESSLIKE ON WITH THE JOB NATURE OF MESSAGE. SAME WITH MOST
IMAGES AND OTHER DEVICES. PRESENTATION OF PROPOSALS IS DELIBERATELY
STRAIGHTFORWARD (I TRIED FOR LUCID) PARTLY FOR AUDIENCE, PARTLY FOR
PRESS AND PARTLY TO RETAIN THE TRUDOVIAN IMPRINT START TO FINISH.
HE SHOULD NOT/NOT SOUND LIKE A RANDCORP BULLETIN HAS INTERRUPTED
HIM IN THE MIDDLE PASSAGE.

3. MOTIFS IN MY OWN MIND FOR MESSAGE WERE (A) TOMORROW THE WORLD
(B) I'VE GOT THE MO AND (C) I AIN'T ALONE. HENCE THE STRESS ON GLOBAL
THEME, THIRD WORLD TURBULENCE, NORTH/SOUTH CONNECTIONS, AND WHAT
HAPPENS NEXT. THIS SEEMED LOGICAL STEP BEYOND GUELPH EVEN IF
SEEMING TO DIVERT FOCUS SOMEWHAT FROM SUPERPOWERS. TAKE COMFORT
FROM JUST ISSUED TRILATERAL COMMISSION REPORT (GERRAD SMITH ET AL)
WHICH SAYS HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION NEEDS MUCH HIGHER PRIORITY.

4. HAVE ALSO TONED DOWN THE POINT ABOUT ICBM MOBILITY AND
VERIFICATION. RISK HERE IS PARALLEL WITH CRUISE. PROBLEM MAY STILL

...2

PAGE TWO RBD0022 CONF

EXIST.


5. TEXT IS OK WITH TASK FORCE, WITH POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF KENMAN
QUOTE ON LAST PAGE, WHICH TASK FORCE BELIEVES MIGHT BE INTERPRETED
AS CALLING INTO QUESTION CURRENT NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.
IT HAS BENEFITED FROM COMMENTS JIM MOORE BUT NOT/NOT PENDING YOUR
JUDGMENT FROM HIS OWN STEAM AND PRESS.

6. BUONA NOTTE.

CCC/207 091601Z RBD0022

52394

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**



UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMDELROME PMDL0003 09NOV83

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ XDV DELIVER BY 091630

INFO BONN LDN PARIS HAGUE BRU PMOOTT/JOHNSON/FOWLER PCOOTT/FOWLER
RCMPOTT/VIP5

---PM INITIATIVE-TRAVEL

FM AND DEL ARR ROME 1745 HRS LOCAL.

2.OFFICE AT HOTEL DE LA VILLE, ROOM 727, TEL 06)679 8941.

UUU/013 092129Z PMDL0003

*This is the
wrong number
we called
twice -
Correct number
is 6733*

Shes

External Affairs Canada / Affaires extérieures Canada

MGTC M. FILE DIARY

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

9 NOV 83 0119Z 121 10

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I A L		
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ08NOV83		
TO/À	TO PM DEL HAGUE/FOR FOWLER		
INFO	REF FOWLER/DELVOIE TELECON NOV 08		
DISTR	---		
REF	LET TO PM TRUDEAU FROM PM GANDHI.		
SUBJ/SUJ	FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF GANDHI LETTER:		
	QUOTE		
	(COMCENTRE, PLSE COPY ATTACHED TEXT) UNQUOTE.		
	<div data-bbox="389 819 860 1155" data-label="Text"> <p>28-6-1-Trudeau Place Mission</p> </div>		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE

IDDZ

995-2394

SIG

L.A. Delvoie
L.A. DELVOIE

000455

November 8, 1983

Letter from Indira Gandhi to Prime Minister Trudeau

"Dear Pierre,

I am grateful to you for joining us in the informal get-together of the Heads of State/Government in New York. I am conscious how difficult it must have been for you to spare the time. Your constructive and positive approach was appreciated by me and other participants. I hope you also found the exercise of interest.

It was felt by all that our discussions helped in clarifying some of the issues of global concern. At least as regards international monetary and financial matters, we came near to consensus.

At the meeting itself it was mentioned that the momentum generated by the New York dialogue should be kept up. How can this be done? It is hardly reasonable to expect Heads of State/Government to travel abroad every few months for such consultations. At the same time, we cannot expect progress on such crucial and delicate issues to be achieved at official level. I shall greatly value your suggestions. We can discuss this question further when you are here in November.

Looking forward to meeting you, and with good wishes.

Indira"

UNQUOTE

6: RCR

5-2395

MF

28-6-1-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

le 3 novembre 1983

Monsieur le Premier Ministre,

Le Président du Conseil, Monsieur Bettino Craxi, vient de me charger de vous transmettre le message ci-joint.

Je saisis cette occasion pour souhaiter le succès le plus complet à la mission, si délicate et importante, que vous allez entreprendre.

Veuillez croire, Monsieur le Premier Ministre, aux sentiments de ma plus haute considération.

Francesco Paolo Fulci

Le très honorable Pierre Elliott Trudeau
Premier Ministre du Canada

O t t a w a

Caro Primo Ministro,

La ringrazio del Suo gentile messaggio, trasmessomi tramite il Suo Ambasciatore a Roma, relativo alle iniziative che Ella intende proporre per dare nuovo impulso ai negoziati fra est ed ovest.

Condivido lo spirito e la sostanza delle Sue parole che sono perfettamente in sintonia con quanto da me sempre sostenuto ed ancora recentemente ribadito in Parlamento, circa la necessità di dover sempre continuare ad esplorare ogni possibile via per creare un clima di maggiore fiducia nei rapporti internazionali ed un'intesa ragionevole con l'Unione Sovietica in materia di disarmo e di controllo degli armamenti.

Sarò pertanto lieto di riceverLa a Roma il 10 novembre prossimo e di poter avere direttamente con Lei uno scambio di valutazioni sui temi, che ci stanno tanto a cuore, della pace e della sicurezza nel mondo.

Nell'attesa di vederLa presto, Le invio, caro Primo Ministro, il mio più cordiale saluto.

Bettino Craxi

Traduction non-officielle

Cher Premier Ministre,

Je vous remercie de l'aimable message, m'a été transmis par Votre Ambassadeur à Rome, concernant les initiatives que vous avez l'intention de prendre en vue de donner une nouvelle impulsion aux négociations entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

Je partage l'esprit et la substance de vos mots, qui sont parfaitement en harmonie avec ce que j'ai toujours soutenu, en le réaffirmant aussi dernièrement au Parlement, au sujet de la nécessité de continuer toujours à explorer tous les moyens pour créer un climat de plus grande confiance des relations internationales et arriver à une entente raisonnable avec l'Union Soviétique en matière de désarmement et de contrôle des armements.

Je serai donc heureux de vous recevoir à Rome le 10 novembre prochain et de pouvoir échanger directement avec vous des évaluations au sujet des thèmes qui nous tiennent à coeur, la paix et la sécurité dans le monde.

Dans l'attente de vous rencontrer bientôt, je vous envoie, cher Premier Ministre, mes saluts les plus cordiales.

Bettino Craxi

**CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM PRMNY WKGR2455 08NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 090900

INFO HAGUF/PMDEL/FOWLER DELIVER BY 090900 LDN DELHI BNATO

WSHDC MOSCO GENEV CNBRA NDHOOTT/DIPOL

DISTR IMC IDA IDR IDD CPD RCM RCD ZSI IFB MINE MINA IMU RPR 2

---COMWEL HEADS OF GOVT MTG(CHOGM):PM INITIATIVE

SENATOR PITFIELD OUTLINER TO PERMIS MTG WITH AUSTRALIAN

DISARMAMENT AMBASSADOR BUTLER, HELD AT LATTERS REQUEST, ON NOV7 TO
REVIFW INNATL PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES LIKELY TO BE DISCUSSED AT
DELHI CHOGM. BUTLER REVIEWED HIS NOV6 DISCUSSIONS WITH COMWEL SECGEN
RAMPHAL ON TACTICS FOR MTG, INCLUDING POSSIBLE JOINT ACTION BY CDA
AND AUSTRALIA TO DRAFT INNATL PEACE AND SECURITY COMMUNIQUE.

2. BUTLER NOTED THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ATTEND CHOGM AS
AUSTRALIAN PM HAWKES DISARMAMENT ADVISER. HE HAD ARRANGED TO SEE
SHENSTONE IN OTT NOV15/16 AS WELL.

3. IN BUTLERS VIEW, PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT,
NOT/NOT THE LEAST BECAUSE CDA WAS NATO MEMBER AND HAS GOOD CONTACTS
INTERNATIONALLY. BUTLER FELT CDN APPROACH PARALLELS AUSTRALIAN
APPROACH. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE HAD DISCUSSED POSSIBLE INITIATIVES AT
DELHI WITH RAMPHAL ON NOV6. ACCORDING TO BUTLERS REPORT, RAMPHAL FELT
GRAVITY OF SITUATION COULD NOT/NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED. WHAT WAS
NEEDED WAS MAJOR, LOFTY, PRINCIPLED DECLARATION ON INNATL SECURITY
SITUATION. DECLARATION SHOULD NOT/NOT BE TOO DETAILED, HOWEVER, IN
ORDER TO OBTAIN SUPPORT FROM PM GANDHI GIVEN HER DOMESTIC CONCERNS.

...2

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
Document divulgué en vertu de la loi sur l'accès à l'information

RETURN TO BICO POUR - ETRE
RENOYER AU PORTE AU DOSSIER

REF DATE

FILE DOSSIER

28-6-1-Trudeau Race
Mission

Take force
rep of
CHOGM?

PAGE TWO WKGR2455 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

IN RAMPHALS VIEW, TWO POLES OF DELHI COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE INNATL SECURITY AND INNATL ECONOMIC SITUATION, WITH REST OF ISSUES SUPPRESSED AS AFTER-THOUGHTS IN COMMUNIQUE. RAMPHAL FELT INNATL SECURITY ASPECTS OF COMMUNIQUE SHOULD UNDERLINE URGENCY OF SITUATION AS WELL AS RELATIONSHIP WITH ECONOMIC ISSUES EG ARMS EXPENDITURE.

4. ACCORDING TO PUTLER, RAMPHAL SUGGESTED AUSTRALIA AND CDA SHOULD GET TOGETHER AND DO A DRAFT WHICH HE COULD IN TURN SELL TO GANDHI. GANDHI WOULD THEN TAKE IT DIRECTLY TO EXECUTIVE CTTEE AND AVOID SENIOR OFFICIALS MTG IN ADVANCE OF CHOGM. IN TERMS OF MTG TACTICS, RAMPHAL ENVISAGED PM OPENING DEBATE FOLLOWED BY NYFREERE, THATCHER AND GANDHI (QUOTE ACTING AS BRIDGE UNQUOTE) FOLLOWED BY SHAGARI. RAMPHAL HAS WRITTEN TO HAWKE SUGGESTING HE PARTICIPATE IN DEBATE. SCENARIO SEEMS INTENDED TO NEUTRALIZE OR AT LEAST DILUTE EXPECTED HARD LINE COMMENTS BY PM THATCHER.

5. RAMPHAL ALSO SUGGESTED THAT CHOGM SHOULD GO BEYOND DECLARATION. RAMPHAL HAD IDEA THAT SMALL GRP OF HOGS MIGHT GO TO MOSCO AND WSHDC TO BRING DECLARATION TO THE ATTENTION OF THOSE GOVTS. IN HIS VIEW GRP MIGHT INCLUDE GANDHI, SHAGARI, HAWKE AND TRUDEAU. BUTLER SUGGESTED TO RAMPHAL THAT CHOGM MIGHT ALSO MANDATE STUDY ON ARMS EXPENDITURES. RAMPHAL NOTED THAT APPROACH AT CHOGM WOULD HAVE TO AVOID QUESTION OF NUCLEAR TESTING IN ORDER TO GET GANDHI ON SIDE. ACCORDING TO BUTLER, RAMPHAL FELT THATCHERS VIEWS COULD BE CIRCUMVENTED IN

(3) Joint Group Visit?


...3

PAGE THREE WKGR2455 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

PREPARATION OF COMMUNIQUE. RAMPHAL SAID HE EXPECTED TO SEE PM
TRUDEAU THIS WEEKEND TO DISCUSS ABOVE IDEAS FURTHER.

6. NOT/NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR IN ALL THIS, IS DEGREE OF AUTHORITY FROM
CNBRA CARRIED BY BUTLER BOTH FOR HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH RAMPHAL
WHERE HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AUSTLN UNPERM REP WOOLCOTT) AND
PITFIELD.

CCC/265 090015Z WKGR2455



DDZ/J. McNEE/5-2394

CONFIDENTIAL

November 8, 1983.

Mr. Archdeacon reported on his call from the PM Del:

- (1) letter to China can go as written;
- (2) letter to Mrs. Ghandi cannot go;
a tel will be coming to explain how it should be redrafted;
- (3) Burrell's speech: 3rd draft - Archdeacon will be bringing it (with PM's comments?) over this pm.
- (4) Hancock version: PM wants to see it tomorrow evening Rome time at the latest; Task Force to vet it for fact. Full text to be sent, not telegraphese. We are to send Rome a message to alert them and request that they be ready to type it double-spaced for PM; *(d) we drafted a reply.*
- (5) Mitterand - meeting went very well; ambassador will report;
- (6) Reagan reply - press keeps asking if it has arrived; this is proving a distraction;
- (7) Possible visit to Russia and China - PM asks for advice on how, when, and what order? As SSEA has designated Pearson as emissary to Moscow, would it not make sense for Pearson

...2

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

to go to Peking, too? If the timing is impossible for Pearson to do both, what do we suggest? Emissaries should be accompanied by Task Force members. If our emissary is to go to Peking, he could go with PM to Tokyo. PM wants the SSEA's views.

(8) DAM/BURT - message for BURNEY :

P.M. knows we've said "no" to him seeing them in Europe, but he asks the official External Affairs view on who should see them when e.g. SSEA in Ottawa next week? (Archdeacon will follow-up with Burney, but asks that we alert Burney).

JSW

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO Canadian Delegation to the North Atlantic Council
À SSELSS

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDDZ-0103 DATE Nov. 8/83

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<p>Ref: Your telegram YBGR2448 of November 8, 1983</p> <p><u>PM's Speech at Guelph</u></p> <p>Attached is copy of French version of above speech.</p> <p><i>28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission</i></p> <p><i>Kerni</i></p>	
14/NOV/83	<i>[Signature]</i>	RETURN TO / RETOURNER À L. A. Delvoie - IDDZ External Affairs, Ottawa

DATE

SIGNATURE

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

MGTC/DIARY/CIRC/CHRON/FILE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

8 Nov 83 23 02z

SECURITY/SECURITE **C O N F I D E N T I A L** 12 10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT PPR0398 08NOV83
TO/A TO CNBRA WLGTN
INFO
DISTR DISTR IDDZ PGB PPD IMC
REF REF OURTEL IDDZ0079 04NOV
SUBJ/SUJ

ACC	305570	REF
FILE	28- West-1- CDA	DOSSIER
BY	CCDA-1-1-1	
ATTN:	28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION	

---PMS INITIATIVE: BRIEFING FOR AUSTLN AND HZ HICOMMS

GARY SMITH, MEMBER OF TASK FORCE AND DIRECTOR OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION (IDA) BRIEFED DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONERS OF AUSTL (BAILEY) AND NZ (BEATH, ACCOMPANIED BY SECOND SECTY STEWART) JOINTLY 01NOV ON PRIME MINISTERS INITIATIVE ON PEACE AND SECURITY.

2.SMITH OPENED BY GIVING BAILEY AND BEATH COPIES OF CONFIDENTIAL BACKGROUND GUIDANCE ~~AND~~ TRANSMITTED TO POSTS 26OCT ON PMS GUELPH SPEECH.SMITH TRACED PMS INITIATIVE BACK TO WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT WHEN PM HAD PRESSED SUCCESSFULLY FOR INCLUSION IN QUOTE STATEMENT ON SECURITY UNQUOTE OF COMMITMENT TO DEVOTE QUOTE OUR FULL POLITICAL RESOURCES TO REDUCING THE THREAT OF WAR UNQUOTE.PM HAD BEEN GALVANIZED INTO ACTION TO REVERSE DOWNWARD TREND IN E/W RELATIONS BY KAL INCIDENT WHICH HAD DEMONSTRATED THAT RISK OF ONE SIDE MISREADING OTHER SIDES INTENTIONS HAD INCREASED.PMS OBJECTIVE WAS TO BUILD QUOTE SAFETY NET UNQUOTE AROUND E/W RELATIONS.CDA CONTINUED TO ADHERE TO NORAD AND NATO POLICY AND HAD REAFFIRMED DECISIONS ON CRUISE TESTING AND TWO-TRACK APPROACH (DEPLOYMENT AND NEGOTIATIONS) ON INF

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

D. MCLELLAN/mw

PPR

7-7939

SIG

P. SLYFIELD



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
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PAGE TWO PPR0398 CONF

12

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(INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES). ~~DECISION ON INF WAS~~
~~DUE IN DEC~~ ^{AND} CDA SUPPORTED ITS ALLIES ON DEPLOYMENT BUT IF NATO
DEPLOYED AND USSR REACTED AS IT SAID IT WOULD E/W CLIMATE WOULD
DETERIORATE FURTHER. HENCE PM SAW NEED FOR INITIATIVE NOW TO BUILD
SAFETY NET BY ADDING TO TWO-TRACK DECISION QUOTE THIRD RAIL
UNQUOTE OF HIGH POLITICAL ENERGY TO SPEED COURSE OF AGREEMENT.
3. BEATH SAID PMS GENERAL THEME WOULD BE ^{WELL} RECEIVED ~~WELL~~ IN
WLGTN AS NZ HAD BENEFITED FROM DETENTE (USSR HAD BECOME IMPORTANT
NZ EXPORT MARKET) AND NZ GOVT WAS WORRIED INCREASINGLY BY SHRILL
NATURE OF SUPERPOWER DIALOGUE. BEATH ASKED IF PM WOULD RAISE HIS
INITIATIVE ~~AT~~ AT CHOGM.
4. SMITH REPLIED THAT COMWEALTH SEC GEN RAMPHAL WANTED E/W
RELATIONS AND DISARMAMENT PLACED NEAR TOP OF AGENDA AND HAD
ASKED PM TO LEAD OFF ON THESE ISSUES. IT REMAINED TO BE WORKED
OUT HOW COMWEALTH WOULD ADDRESS THESE ISSUES.
5. SMITH EXPLAINED THAT PMS INITIATIVE WAS BEING ^{PURSUED} ~~PROMOTED~~ ALONG
QUOTE CRITICAL PATH UNQUOTE. PM WAS MEETING VARIETY OF PEOPLE TO
EDUCATE HIMSELF ON ISSUE; EG HE LUNCED WITH MCNAMARA 25 OCT AND
GEN ROGERS (SACEUR) 26 OCT AND ^{MET NUMBER OF USA} ~~MEMBER OF~~ SPECIALISTS ~~AT~~
~~HARVARD~~ ON WEEKEND. HE HAD WRITTEN ALL NATO LEADERS (AND MIGHT
ALSO WRITE MULDOON AND HAWKE) AND WOULD MEET SIX EUROPEAN
LEADERS BEFORE CHOGM. HE HAD DELIVERED SPEECH AT GUELPH 27 OCT

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~~AND WOULD~~ ^{MIGHT} DELIVER ANOTHER (IN MTL) BETWEEN HIS RETURN FROM
EUROPE AND DEPARTURE FOR CHOGM.

6. BAILEY ASKED WHAT FORM CONSULTATIONS WITH US GOVT HAD TAKEN.

SMITH REPLIED THAT ~~MAGEACHEN~~ ^{SSEA} HAD BRIEFED SCHULTZ ON INITIATIVE

DURING LATTERS VISIT TO NS TWO WEEKS EARLIER. ~~HENCE~~ ^{AND HAD SENT} PM ~~LET~~ ^{LET} TO

REAGAN ~~WAS FOLLOW UP~~ ^{SHORTLY} RESPONSE FROM REAGAN WAS EXPECTED ~~LATER IN DAY~~

~~(1 NOV) OR 02 NOV~~ BEATH ASKED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE CONSULTATIONS

WITH PRC. SMITH REPLIED THAT CHINESE PM WOULD VISIT CDA IN JAN.

7. BAILEY ASKED WHAT PMS SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WERE. SMITH REPLIED

THAT WHILE PM STILL HAD TO DISCUSS THEM WITH OUR NATO ALLIES,

THEY COULD BE READ BETWEEN LINES TOWARD END OF PMS SPEECH.

(A) INCLUSION OF CHINA, UK AND FRANCE WITH USA AND USSR IN NEGOT-

IATIONS AIMED AT ESTABLISHING GLOBAL LIMITS ON NUCLEAR ARSENALS

TO ARREST VERTICAL PROLIFERATION. CDA WAS NOT/NOT CALLING, HOWEVER

FOR ~~CONVERTING~~ ^{COUNTING} OF FR AND UK WARHEADS IN INF NEGOTIATIONS.

(B) RAISING NUCLEAR THRESHOLD, PREFERABLY BY MBFR AGMT OR

ELSE BY INCREASING CONVENTIONAL STRENGTH OF NATO IF MBFR TALKS DO

NOT/NOT PRODUCE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. (C) STRENGTHENING OF NPT TO

CURTAIN HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION, ^{ESPECIALLY TO} ~~TO ELEVEN~~ NEAR-NUCLEAR STATES.

8. IN CONCLUDING SMITH STRESSED THAT CDA WAS NOT/NOT ACTING AS

QUOTE GO-BETWEEN OR SHUTTLE-DIPLOMAT UNQUOTE BUT WAS ATTEMPTING

TO CREATE CLIMATE FOR E/W TALKS. CDA WAS AWARE ^{OF} AND SUITABLY CAUTIOUS

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ABOUT RISK THAT USSR MIGHT ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT PMS INITIATIVE
WITH VIEW TO DISAGGREGATING WEST.

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

MGTC/DIARY/CIRC/CHRON/FILE

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SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ
C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE FM EXTOTT PPR0413 08NOV83

TO/A TO TOKYO < DELIVER BY 100900

INFO INFO PC00TT/FOWLER PM00TT/SMITH

REF DISTR USS DMF PGB PPD IDD IDZ IMC XDV
SUBJ/SUJ ---PM PEACE INITIATIVE: CONSULTS WITH JPN

AS YOU NOW KNOW FROM TELECONS WITH XDV, PMS PARTY NOW SCHEDULED
TO ARRIVE TOKYO 1730 18NOV AND DEPART 1730 19NOV.

2.XDV IS HENCEFORTH RESPONSIBLE AT THIS END FOR ALL LOGISTICS
MATTERS ASSOCIATED WITH VISIT INCLUDING (AMONG QUESTIONS RAISED
YOURTEL UIGR1915 07NOV) LIST OF PM DEL PREPARATION OF PGM,
ACCOMMODATION, AND DEALINGS WITH PRESS.XDV WILL BE SENDING YOU
FULLEST POSSIBLE DETAILS IMMEDIATELY.ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS OR
SUGGESTIONS YOU HAVE ON THESE OR OTHER LOGISTICS MATTERS SHOULD
ACCORDINGLY BE ADDRESSED TO XDV.

3.UNDERSTAND ATOC HAS ALREADY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH YOU ABOUT
AIRCRAFT OVERFLIGHT AND LANDING CLEARANCES.

4.ALL QUESTIONS ON SUBSTANCE OF PEACE INITIATIVE SHOULD BE
ADDRESSED TO IDDZ.

5.IN ADDITION TO MATERIAL IDDI³ IS PROVIDING ON SUBSTANCE OF
PEACE INITIATIVE, WE ARE PREPARING FOR PM BIO NOTES ON
NAKASONE AND FOREIGN MIN ABE AND BRIEFS ON JPNSE SECURITY/
DISARMAMENT CONCERNS AND POLICIES AND CURRENT JPNSE POLITICAL

...2

DATE	
ACU	28-6-1-TRADEALL PEACE MISSION
FILE	20-1-1-1
BY HAND	CC-20-1A-9-AM-TRADE
ATTN:	

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG P.SLYFIELD/mw

PPR

7-7939

SIG P.SLYFIELD



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SITUATION.FOR YOUR OWN INFO ONLY, ALTHOUGH PM WISHES TO CONFINE
DISCUSSION ENTIRELY TO PEACE INITIATIVE, WE ARE ALSO PREPARING
PURELY DEFENSIVE BRIEF ON AUTO ISSUE IN CASE IT IS RAISED BY
NAKASONE.WE INTEND TO SUGGEST TO PM THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO
MAKE SOME POSITIVE REFERENCE DURING INFORMAL CONVERSATION
WITH NAKASONE TO JPNS RECENT ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION MEASURES.
6.JPNS EMB HERE IS PRESSING HARD UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM
GAIMUSHO FOR ALL DETAILS POSSIBLE ^{ON} ~~RE~~ SUBSTANCE AND LOGISTICS
OF VISIT.WE HAVE INFORMED THEM THAT WE CONSIDER YOU PRIME
CHANNEL FOR COMMUNICATION WITH JPNS AUTHORITIES IN TOKYO ON
PLANS FOR VISIT BUT ARE KEEPING THEM GENERALLY INFORMED.YOU MAY
WISH TO ENCOURAGE GAIMUSHO TO PUT QUESTIONS ^{ABOUT} ~~RE~~ SUBSTANCE AND
LOGISTICS TO YOU TO AVOID OR AT LEAST LIMIT CONFUSION THAT
DOUBLE CHANNELING CAN CAUSE.



MGTC MP/FILE DIARY

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

9 Nov 83

0119Z

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FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0102 08NOV83

TO/À

TO ROME DELIVER BY 090900

INFO

DISTR

INFO PC00TT/FOWLER ~~NDHQ0TT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPP~~

REF

DISTR ~~MINA USS DMF LEB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR IDD IDR IDA USS RBR RBD~~

SUBJ/SUJ

~~RCD~~

---PM INITIATIVE

FULL TEXT OF PM S NEXT SPEECH AS PART OF INITIATIVE WILL BE SENT
YOU DURING COURSE OF ^{LATE AFTERNOON} 9 NOV.

2. GRATEFUL YOU BE PREPARED TO HAVE TEXT TYPED IN DOUBLE SPACE

SPEECH FORMAT ^{SO} PM CAN REVIEW IT ~~BY 090900~~ ^{UPON ARRIVAL.}

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SG

J. McNEE

IDDZ

5-2394

SIC

L.A. DELVOIE



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	UNCLASSIFIED	08 NOV 83 23 03Z	121	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0101 08NOV83			
TO/À	TO HAGUE/PMDEL/SMITH IMMEDIATE			
INFO	---			
DISTR	---PM INITIATIVE: GLOBE AND MAIL ARTICLE.			
REF	FLWG ARTICLE BY JEFFREY SIMPSON APPEARED IN 08NOV GLOBE AND MAIL.			
SUBJ/SUJ	(PLSE COMCENTRE COPY ATTACHED)			
<div>28-6-1-Tudor Peace Mission</div>				

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. McNEE

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE

000473

SUBJECT/SUJET

GLOBE AND MAIL

PUBLICATION

DATE

NOV - 8 1983

Omens not good without a plan

WE AWAIT with equal measures of impatience and ignorance the arrival in Europe this morning of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, bearing we know not what from Canada.

Is the Great Disarmer coming to shore up his political position at home? Is he going to dispense rhetorical hearts and flowers about the hideous perils of the nuclear age? Or does he actually have a plan for defusing nuclear tension?

His elegant speech at Guelph left everyone guessing. A splendid evocation of the problem it surely was. But we have been down this path with Mr. Trudeau at least once before.

Three years ago, Mr. Trudeau caught the North-South bug. It fired his interest. Bureaucrats were dispatched to far-flung capitals to see what could be done. And the Prime Minister flew around the world, dancing in the Arabian desert, exploring the ancient market in Sanaa and poking along the Amazon in quest of answers.

The problem then, as now, was the aimlessness of the mission. People had been talking ad nauseam about the North-South split. A forest of reports had appeared. The trick was to select from the myriad of ideas concrete proposals which might be sold to the countries of North and South.

Even if the Prime Minister had formulated such a package, it was always an open question if Canada had enough leverage to be a catalyst. And did we have as much credibility as we chose to believe after several years of declining aid budgets and import restraints?

It never appeared to those of us chronicling the Prime Minister's travels that he had such a package. A few general ideas, yes. Fine intentions, yes. But a collection of proposals with enough built-in compromises to satisfy the key countries of North and South, no. The whole initiative collapsed in a few piously expressed sentiments in the communique of the Montebello summit.

Now we head down another path wondering, as before, does he have a plan? And, if so, does Canada have the leverage to do anything with it?

Certainly the Prime Minister's initiative has caused some ripples in Western Europe, including a front-page editorial in

EUROPE

JEFFREY SIMPSON

In PARIS



Le Monde. Maybe there are bigger waves behind the scenes, but the NATO defence ministers were luke warm about Mr. Trudeau's plans at their meeting last week. The Americans are reliably reported to be cool.

The Prime Minister would be foolish to lock himself into fixed positions. That would be asking for nit-picking trouble. But he does need some general proposals around which the West Europeans can rally.

The first cruise missiles are due in Britain in three weeks. Deployment in Germany and Italy will follow shortly thereafter.

What realistically can be done? My guess — and it's only a guess — is that the Prime Minister has several things in mind. First, a meeting of a small group of NATO countries to consider alternatives to nuclear-reduction strategy. Second, several ways of reducing or eliminating nuclear and conventional weapons within a strip of territory in central Europe. Third, the possibility of delaying deployment of the Pershing-2 missiles which the Soviets fear much more than the cruise.

What he also wants is better debate within NATO. He left last year's NATO ministerial meeting in Bonn as irritated as some of us had ever seen him.

Canada is without missiles to throw into the negotiating equation. A refusal to test the cruise won't matter at Geneva. We spend less per capita on defence than any NATO country except Luxembourg. In short, we're bit players in the game of realpolitik. We're also inconsistent — arguing maybe the Soviets made a mistake in shooting down the Korean airliner, then leading the pack with retaliatory measures.

Without any discernible leverage and bearing no publicly stated game plan, the Prime Minister arrives in Europe. Those who live under the mushroom cloud can only wish him well, but the early omens for success are not encouraging.

CONFIDENTIAL

November 8, 1983

IDR-4237

NOTE FOR THE EAST/WEST TASK FORCE (IDZ)

Subject: Preparations for the Ministerial Meeting of
the North Atlantic Council - Brussels, December 8-9

While in no way wishing to press, and recognizing that much will flow from the Prime Minister's current trip to European capitals, at your convenience we would like to discuss the following in connection with the NATO Ministerial meeting:

- (a) Organization of briefing material for the DPM/SSEA. Would you wish to prepare a separate brief or briefs, or perhaps even a separate book?
- (b) Writing of the scenario/overview for the DPM/SSEA. The scenario is usually a comprehensive piece for use in the unstructured super-restricted session involving Ministers and Permanent Representatives. We will require your assistance in its preparation.
- (c) Should the DPM/SSEA make it known that he will brief Ministers on the initiative in the super-restricted session, to inform them of the state of play and contemplated next steps, or should it simply be left open for Mr. MacEachen to decide what to say as circumstances develop?
- (d) Will the DPM/SSEA be involved in any specific bilateral meetings as a follow-up to the Prime Minister's efforts?
- (e) Will any Task Force officials wish to travel to Brussels with the DPM/SSEA (and review matters with Ambassador Taylor at the same time)?
- (f) To what extent will we wish to brief Mr. Blais who will be attending the Defence Planning Committee meeting DEcember 6-7, at which the initiative might arise or questions might be asked?

Brian Herman
Defence Relations Division

cc IDR/Mr. Francis

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM VMEFR XTDR0210 22NOV83

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INFO BNATO

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REF OURTEL XTDR0209 22NOV

---MBFR AND NAC MINISTERIAL

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT TEXT OF BRIEF ON MEFR NEGS FOR NAC MINISTERIAL.

TEXT BEGINS:

THE MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS(MEFR) NEGOTIATIONS

THE PURPOSE OF THIS BRIEF IS TO SUGGEST THAT THE DECEMBER MINISTERIAL MEETING PRESENTS AN APPROPRIATE OCCASION FOR YOU TO PROPOSE THAT THE ALLIANCE CARRY OUT,AS A MATTER OF URGENCY,A REVIEW OF THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION IN MBFR IN THE LIGHT OF THE RECENT EASTERN PROPOSALS IN ORDER THAT A WESTERN RESPONSE IN THE FORM OF A COUNTERPROPOSAL OR INITIATIVE MAY BE PUT FORWARD EARLY IN 1984.YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO SUGGEST THAT ONCE NEW NEGOTIATING MATERIAL HAS BEEN DEVELOPED,IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO FOLLOW IT UP WITH AN INDICATION OF THE WILLINGNESS OF WESTERN MINISTERS OF COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE TALKS TO HOLD A PLENARY MEETING IN VIENN AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL AND AN INVITATION TO THE EASTERN SIDE TO TAKE PART.

BACKGROUND

2.IN VIENN THE EAST HAS BEEN EMITTING HINTS AND VEILED THREATS THAT IT MIGHT DECIDE TO TERMINATE OR SUSPEND THE NEGOTIATIONS IF THE PLANNED INF DEPLOYMENT BEGINS AS SCHEDULED AND/OR IF THE WEST FAILS TO MAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE TO THE RECENT EASTERN PROPOSALS BY THE END OF THE CURRENT ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS ON DECEMBER 15.THE

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PREVAILING VIEW AMONG THE ALLIES IS THAT THIS IS A BLUFF WHICH THE EAST WILL NOT/WANT TO CARRY OUT, BUT AN ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE FATE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS MAY PERSIST AT THE TIME OF THE MINISTERIAL.

3. IN THE TEN YEARS OF NEGOTIATIONS ON MEFR, AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF ISSUES. THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THESE ARE AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS TO EQUAL CEILINGS (PARITY) ON BOTH SIDES IN CENTRAL EUROPE OF 700,000 GROUND FORCES AND 900,000 GROUND AND AIR FORCES COMBINED AND AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON THE NEED FOR COOPERATIVE VERIFICATION MEASURES SUCH AS ON-SITE INSPECTION, EXIT-ENTRY POINTS MANNED BY OBSERVERS AND AN EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON FORCES REMAINING IN THE AREA. BUT THERE REMAINS A LIST OF BASIC ISSUES ON WHICH THE TWO SIDES ARE DIVIDED--INCLUDING DATA, SPECIFIC MODALITIES FOR VERIFICATION MEASURES, ARMAMENTS REDUCTIONS, AIR FORCE SUB-CEILINGS, EXCEPTIONS FOR NATO REINFORCEMENT EXERCISES, TRANSIT THROUGH THE REDUCTIONS AREA AND THE APPLICATION OF SOME CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES TO THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION. THESE ISSUES SOUND TECHNICAL. AND IN SOME CASES THEY ARE. HOWEVER, IN VARYING DEGREES THEY INVOLVE FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY INTERESTS AND PERCEPTIONS OF BOTH SIDES AND THEY ALL WILL HAVE TO BE RESOLVED FOR A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT TO BE ACHIEVED. OF THESE UNRESOLVED ISSUES THE TWO OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE AND ON WHICH PARTICULAR ATTENTION IS BEING FOCUSED AT THE MOMENT ARE DATA AND VERIFICATION.

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THE DATA ISSUE

4. THE DATA ISSUE IS A DISPUTE BETWEEN THE SIDES ABOUT THE BASIC FACTS OF THE SITUATION--THAT IS, THE NUMBER OF EASTERN FORCES IN THE CENTRAL EUROPEAN AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND CONSEQUENTLY THE NUMBER OF TROOPES THE EAST WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE TO REACH THE AGREED PARITY LEVEL. ACCORDING TO WESTERN ASSESSMENTS, THE DATA SUBMITTED BY THE EAST AND THEIR CLAIM THAT A STATE OF PARITY EXISTS NOW UNDER-STATE THE SIZE OF EASTERN GROUND FORCES ALONE BY AT LEAST 160,000 MEN. EVEN ALLOWING FOR A MARGIN OF ERROR OF FIVE TO TEN PERCENT EITHER WAY IN THE WESTERN FIGURE, A DISCREPANCY OF THIS SIZE IS OF CONSIDERABLE MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. ACCORDINGLY, THE WESTERN SIDE HAS INSISTED THAT THE DATA DISPUTE MUST BE RESOLVED PRIOR TO THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT SO THAT THE EASTERN REDUCTIONS REQUIRED TO REACH PARITY CAN BE KNOWN AND SPECIFIED IN THE AGREEMENT AND THUS CAN BE EFFECTIVELY VERIFIED DURING THE REDUCTION PROCESS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE EAST HAS ADAMANTLY REFUSED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE INFORMATION TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE SIZE OF WARSAW PACT FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE OR TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE FURTHER. THUS, THE DATA ISSUE CONSTITUTES A MAJOR DEADLOCK IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

RECENT EASTERN PROPOSALS

5. THE NEW PROPOSALS WHICH THE EAST HAS BEEN PUTTING FORWARD IN THE CURRENT YEAR SEEK TO CIRCUMVENT THE DATA ISSUE BY IN EFFECT SETTING IT ASIDE THROUGHOUT THE REDUCTION PROCESS AS SOMETHING THAT CAN BE RESOLVED THROUGH THE VERIFICATION OF FINAL CEILINGS. IN BRIEF, THE EAST'S PROPOSALS CONSIST OF THREE LOOSELY CONNECTED PARTS.

6. THE FIRST PART IS AN INITIAL SYMBOLIC WITHDRAWAL OF 13,000 US AND 20,000 SOVIET FORCES ALONG WITH THEIR ARMAMENTS WITHIN ONE

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YEAR ON THE BASIS OF MUTUAL EXAMPLE. WHILE THIS PROPOSAL IS IN KEEPING WITH THE AGREED PRINCIPLE THAT THE MAJOR MILITARY POWER ON EACH SIDE SHOULD TAKE THE FIRST REDUCTION STEPS, THE INITIAL US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS WOULD BE OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF AN AGREEMENT AND NO/NO LIMITATION AND COOPERATIVE VERIFICATION OF THE SOVIET AND US FORCES REMAINING IN THE AREA AFTER INITIAL REDUCTIONS IS PROVIDED FOR.

7. THE SECOND PART IS A COLLECTIVE FREEZE OR NO-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON THE FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA FOLLOWING THE INITIAL US-SOVIET REDUCTIONS AND PENDING THE NEGOTIATION OF AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS TO PARITY. BUT THE FREEZE LEVELS WOULD NOT/NOT BE NUMERICALLY SPECIFIED AND WOULD NOT/NOT BE SUBJECT TO ANY COOPERATIVE VERIFICATION MEASURES.

8. THE THIRD PART, EMBODIED IN THE EASTERN DRAFT AGREEMENT TEXT TABLED LAST JUNE, ENVISAGES REDUCTIONS OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AND THEIR ARMAMENTS WITHIN THREE YEARS TO THE AGREED COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILINGS OF 900,000 (WITH SEPARATE SUB-CEILINGS OF 700,000 GROUND FORCES AND 200,000 AIR FORCES). EACH SIDE WOULD DETERMINE FOR ITSELF THE AMOUNT OF REDUCTIONS NECESSARY TO REACH PARITY, THUS AVOIDING THE WESTERN REQUIREMENT FOR PRIOR AGREEMENT ON FORCE LEVELS. THE EAST INCLUDES A SET OF COOPERATIVE MEASURES (INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION IF THE SIDE TO BE INSPECTED AGREES, EXIT-ENTRY POINTS WITH OBSERVERS AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON FORCES REMAINING IN THE AREA) TO HELP VERIFY THAT THE FINAL CEILINGS HAVE BEEN REACHED

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AND ARE ADHERED TO THROUGHOUT THE LIFE OF THE AGREEMENT. IN ADDITION, IN RESPONSE TO WESTERN PROBING THE EAST HAS RECENTLY MODIFIED ITS POSITION ON OBSERVATION OF THE REDUCTIONS THEMSELVES, TO THE EFFECT THAT QUOTE THE BULK UNQUOTE OF THEM WOULD BE NUMERICALLY SPECIFIED AND SUBJECT TO OBSERVATION ON THE BASIS OF THE PLANS TO BE EXCHANGED PRIOR TO CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT.

9. IN ESSENCE THE EASTERN PROPOSALS AMOUNT TO AN IMPLICIT PROPOSITION THAT IN RETURN FOR THE WEST'S ABANDONING ITS REQUIREMENT FOR AGREEMENT ON DATA PRIOR TO THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT, THE EAST WOULD ACCEPT VERIFICATION MEASURES SOMEWHAT MORE CLOSELY APPROXIMATING THOSE CONSIDERED NECESSARY BY THE WEST. HOWEVER, A MAJOR FLAW IN THE EASTERN PROPOSAL IS THAT THE WEST WOULD HAVE TO CARRY OUT ALL ITS REDUCTIONS WITHOUT BEING ABLE, UNTIL THE REDUCTION PROCESS WAS COMPLETE, TO VERIFY BY COOPERATIVE MEASURES THAT THE REDUCTIONS ACTUALLY TAKEN BY THE EAST WOULD EXCEED THOSE CALLED FOR UNDER THEIR OFFICIAL DATA BY 100,000 TROOPS AND THUS BE SUFFICIENT TO REACH PARITY. (IN MBFR JARGON, THIS IS THE QUOTE PIG IN A POKER UNQUOTE PROBLEM.)

WESTERN POSITION

10. THE WESTERN SIDE HAS BEEN CRITICIZING THE SERIOUS WEAKNESSES IN THE EASTERN PROPOSALS, ATTEMPTING TO DEVELOP FURTHER AREAS OF CONVERGENCE AND PROBING FOR EASTERN FLEXIBILITY--WITH SOME SUCCESS THIS ROUND IN ELICITING EASTERN MOVEMENT ON THE OBSERVATION OF MOST OF THE REDUCTION PROCESS. BUT THE TEAM OF WESTERN NEGOTIATORS

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IN VIENNA HAS NOT/NOT BEEN IN A POSITION TO MEET THE INCREASINGLY
VEHEMENT EASTERN DEMANDS THAT THE WEST GIVE AN ANSWER IN PRINCIPLE
TO THE ESSENCE OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS WITHOUT FURTHER QUOTE
DELAY UNQUOTE. ANY SUCH ANSWER WOULD OF COURSE REQUIRE THE AUTHOR-
ISATION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, IN WHICH THE ALLIES DETERMINE
THEIR COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATING POSITION IN MBFR AND THEN ISSUE IT
IN THE FORM OF GUIDANCE FOR THE WESTERN TEAM OF NEGOTIATORS TO THE
EASTERN PROPOSALS. WHILE IN VIEW OF THE QUOTE PIG IN A POKE UNQUOTE
PROBLEM IDENTIFIED ABOVE, THESE PROPOSALS ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO ANY
OF OUR WESTERN PARTNERS IN THEIR PRESENT FORM, THE WESTERN SIDE
NEEDS TO DEVELOP A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE IN THE FORM OF A COUNTER-
PROPOSAL OR INITIATIVE THAT CAN BE PUT FORWARD AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE
IN THE NEXT NEGOTIATING ROUND (ASSUMING, OF COURSE, THAT THE EAST
DOES NOT/NOT BREAK OFF THE NEGOTIATIONS).

NATO REVIEW OF THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION

11. IN THIS SITUATION THE MINISTERIAL PROVIDES A TIMELY OPPORTUNITY
TO URGE THAT THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION BE REVIEWED WITHIN
NATO IN THE LIGHT OF THE TACTICAL SITUATION CREATED BY THE EASTERN
PROPOSALS IN ORDER THAT GUIDANCE CONTAINING CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATING
MATERIAL CAN BE PROVIDED EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR. SUCH A REVIEW WILL
REQUIRE INPUTS FROM CAPITALS AND WILL HAVE TO BE PURSUED VIGOROUSLY
IF IT IS TO PRODUCE RESULTS IN A TIMELY WAY. FOR, GIVEN THE MIXED
VIEWS OF SOME OF THE ALLIES ON THE NEED FOR NEW NEGOTIATING
MATERIAL, THERE IS A DANGER THAT THE REVIEW WILL BE SIDETRACKED OR
TRAIL OFF INCONCLUSIVELY.

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POSITIONS OF OTHERS

12.THERE IS NO/NO SHORTAGE OF POLITICAL WILL SURROUNDING THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS,BUT IT CAN PUSH IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS.THERE WOULD LIKELY BE A CONSENSUS IN NATO THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD CONTINUE AND THAT IT WOULD BE A PITY IF THE EAST TERMINATED THEM.(SUCH A TERMINATION WOULD,INCIDENTALLY,PROBABLY ANSWER DEFINITELY THE LONG-STANDING QUESTION WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION HAS THE POLITICAL WILL TO ACCEPT REDUCTIONS TO PARITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE UNDER AN IRON-CLAD VERIFICATION SYSTEM,INCLUDING THE SIZEABLE REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET FORCES IN EASTERN EUROPE THAT WOULD BE REQUIRED.)THERE ALSO SEEMS TO BE A BROAD MEASURE OF AGREEMENT THAT A NATO REVIEW OF THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING SITUATION,WHICH THE VIENN NEGOTIATORS HAVE BEEN UNANIMOUSLY RECOMMENDING SINCE LAST JUNE,IS CALLED FOR. HOWEVER,VIEWS ON WHAT SUCH A REVIEW SHOULD LEAD TO MAY DIFFER CONSIDERABLY;AT LEAST THIS SEEMS TO BE TRUE IN THE CASE OF THE THREE KEY WESTERN PLAYERS,BONN,WASHINGTON AND LONDON.

13.THE FRG,WHICH CURRENTLY SEEMS TO FAVOUR A MORE FLEXIBLE POSITION IN THE NEGOTIATIONS DESPITE MR GENSCHER S LONG-STANDING RESERVATIONS ABOUT THEM,HAS BEEN WORKING SINCE LAST JUNE ON A FORMULA FOR A POSITIVE WESTERN COUNTER-PROPOSAL THAT WOULD USE THE VERIFICATION SYSTEM UNDER AN AGREEMENT TO TRY TO RESOLVE THE DATA DISPUTE.THIS FORMULA SEEMS TO FALL SOMEWHERE BETWEEN OUR PRESENT POSITION ON AGREEMENT ON DATA PRIOR TO AN AGREEMENT AND THE EASTERN ...8

PAGE EIGHT XTDR0210 CONF

POSITION ON VERIFICATION OF FINAL CEILINGS ONLY. BUT THE FRG CONCEPT IS NOT/NOT KNOWN IN DETAIL AND BONN NOW SEEMS RETICENT ABOUT DISCUSSING IT IN VIEW OF THE NEGATIVE REACTION IT HAS RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON. IT IS TO BE HOPED THAT THE NATO REVIEW PROCESS WILL ENCOURAGE BONN TO PUT ITS IDEAS FORWARD SO THEY CAN BE CONSIDERED COLLECTIVELY.

14. IN THE USA THERE SEEM TO BE DIVIDED VIEWS WITHIN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE DESIRABILITY AT THIS TIME OF SEEKING NEW WESTERN NEGOTIATING MATERIAL, BUT THE NEGATIVE VIEWS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, INCLUDING THOSE OF MR WEINBERGER, ON THE FRG FORMULA APPARENTLY PREVAILED IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE KOREAN AIRLINER AFFAIR AND THE ANTICIPATION OF A SOVIET BREAK-OFF OF THE GENEVA INF NEGOTIATIONS. WHETHER THE US POSITION MIGHT CHANGE IN THE NEW YEAR IF THE FRG PROPOSAL WERE BROUGHT FORWARD AND IT, OR SOMETHING LIKE IT, WERE SUPPORTED BY A NUMBER OF THE ALLIES REMAINS TO BE SEEN.

15. FOR ITS PART THE UK HAS GRAVE DOUBTS WHETHER ANY MAJOR DEPARTURE FROM THE NEGOTIATING POSITION REFLECTED IN THE WEST S JULY 1982 DRAFT TREATY PROPOSAL IS REQUIRED. IN ITS VIEW THE WEST S POSITION IS SOUND, HAS PRODUCED SOME EASTERN MOVEMENT AND MAY CONTINUE TO DO SO. THE UK CAN BE EXPECTED TO RESIST STRONGLY ANY FORMULA THAT IN ITS VIEW WOULD FACILITATE SOVIET CHEATING.

POSSIBLE MBFR MINISTERIAL MEETING

16. THE UNCERTAINTY AT THIS STAGE ABOUT WHAT THE NATO REVIEW PROCESS WILL BE ABLE TO COME UP WITH AND HOW SOON IS CLOSELY RELATED TO

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PAGE NINE XTDR0210 CONFD

YOUR INTEREST IN SUGGESTING AN MBFR MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL IN THE LATE WINTER OR EARLY SPRING OF 1984. IF IT SHOULD MEET WITH APPROVAL IN PRINCIPLE, THE IDEA OF SUCH A MEETING COULD SERVE AS A SPUR TO THE NATO REVIEW PROCESS. BUT SUCH A MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL WOULD NOT/NOT BE AN ATTRACTIVE PROSPECT TO YOUR COLLEAGUES IF THEY WOULD HAVE TO FACE EASTERN CHARGES NEXT YEAR OF WESTERN DELAY AND IMMOBILITY WITH NO/NO CONSTRUCTIVE WESTERN RESPONSE OR COUNTER-PROPOSAL AVAILABLE OR IN PLAY. THUS, DETERMINING WHETHER THE WEST WILL BE ABLE TO DEVELOP SUCH A RESPONSE IN GOOD TIME IS LIKELY TO BE SEEN AS LOGICALLY PRIOR TO TAKING ANY DEFINITIVE WESTERN DECISION ON SUCH A MEETING AND PROPOSING IT TO THE EAST. ON THE OTHER HAND, PROVIDED THE WESTERN SIDE CAN COME UP WITH AN INITIATIVE OR COUNTER-PROPOSAL IN A TIMELY WAY, A MBFR PLENARY MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL MIGHT PROVE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES AS SYMBOLISING A DESIRE TO SPEED UP THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. TEXT ENDS.

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---MBFR AND NAC MINISTERIAL

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REFLECTING BOTH ELEMENTS SUGGESTED YOURTEL IDR-4345 15NOV.

TEXT BEGINS:

TALKING POINTS

1. OUR NEGOTIATORS IN VIENN ARE CLEARLY IN NEED OF NEW GUIDANCE
ON THE KEY QUESTION OF HOW TO RESPOND TO THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS.
2. THE EASTERN PROPOSALS ARE NOT/NOT ACCEPTABLE IN THEIR PRESENT
FORM BUT THE WESTERN SIDE NEEDS TO MAKE--AND TO BE SEEN TO BE
MAKING--A CONSTRUCTIVE RESPONSE SOON IN THE FORM OF A COUNTER-
PROPOSAL OR INITIATIVE OF ITS OWN, NOT/NOT JUST A REITERATION OF
OUR JULY 1982 POSITION.
3. THE COMMENCEMENT OF NEW EFFORTS IN THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE IN
JANUARY TO ACHIEVE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN EUROPE--
IMPORTANT AS THAT IS--SHOULD NOT/NOT BE ALLOWED TO DETRACT FROM
THE EFFORTS AND RESOURCES NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE A SHODD AGREEMENT
IN VIENN ON FORCE REDUCTIONS TO PARITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE.
4. IT IS NOW URGENT THAT OUR NEGOTIATING POSITION BE REVIEWED
COLLECTIVELY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE IN THE LIGHT OF THE TACTICAL
SITUATION CREATED BY THE EASTERN PORPOSALS. THAT REVIEW MUST IE

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*Additional
PM*

PAGE TWO XTDR0211 CONF

INSTITUTED IMMEDIATELY (ASSUMING IT STILL HAS NOT/NOT STARTED BY THE TIME OF THE MINISTERIAL) AND BE PURSUED VIGOROUSLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL INPUT FROM CAPITALS. THE OBJECTIVE SHOULD BE TO DEVELOP NEW NEGOTIATING MATERIAL THAT CAN BE PUT FORWARD IN VIENNA EARLY IN THE NEW YEAR.

5. IT IS MY VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL, ONCE WE HAVE WORKED OUT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE A NEW NEGOTIATING STANCE IN THE FORM OF A WESTERN COUNTER-PROPOSAL OR INITIATIVE, FOR THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE WESTERN NATIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE TALKS TO INDICATE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO HOLD A PLENARY MEETING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL AND TO INVITE OUR EASTERN COLLEAGUES TO JOIN US. SUCH A MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL WOULD, I BELIEVE, SERVE TO GIVE THE VIENNA TALKS THE POLITICAL IMPETUS NEEDED TO ACCELERATE THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

TEXT ENDS

CCC/076 220915Z XTDR0211



TO/À IDDZ/Mr. John McKree

FROM/DE • IMD/Gaby Warren

REFERENCE • Smith/Puddington Telecon of October 19, 1983
RÉFÉRENCESUBJECT • CHOQM:Global Political Issues:Trudeau
SUJET Introduction

Security/Sécurité

CONFIDENTIAL

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8 November 1983

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ANNEXES

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As discussed in the reftelecon we would like to suggest that Prime Minister Trudeau include in his introductory remarks on the Global political situation a reference to the deteriorating multilateral system and the need to strengthen the UN. Should the Prime Minister agree you might wish to draw on the following paragraphs in preparing notes for his use on this aspect.

2. "We all recognize, of course, that many of the most vital and potentially dangerous of these issues are widely perceived as essentially the concerns of the super-powers and of their allies in what have come to be known as East and West. It is important that we recognize also, however, that they are issues which affect and, indeed, threaten all the nations and peoples of the world. They are issues which are of legitimate concern in all of our variety of multilateral interrelationships, including those within the Commonwealth, but even more so, perhaps, those within the United Nations system of international organizations. We members of the Commonwealth represent if not a microcosm then a reflection on a smaller scale of the membership of the United Nations system. We are all staunch supporters of that system and as such we must strive together and with our non-Commonwealth friends to encourage and promote its revitalization as a forum in which all of its member states can contribute positively and constructively to the resolution of the paramount problems which affect us all.

3. It has been said, and in large measure acknowledged, that the multilateral system, and particularly the United Nations system of international institutions, is undergoing a crisis of confidence. I think we can all agree on that. We can agree also, probably, that this is a situation which demands redress; what is difficult is to agree on what form that redress should take. It is tempting, perhaps, to reach out for new solutions, even, it may be suggested, in new institutions. That, in my view, is not what is required. I submit to you that what is required is not the creation of new international mechanisms or even a drastic reform of existing ones. Our challenge, it seems to me, is to find practical means of reaffirming our common commitment to the unassailable principles and ideals of the United Nations Charter and to those multilateral

...2

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

institutions which we have created collectively to promote the implementation of those principles and ideals.

4. In preparation for this Commonwealth meeting the Secretariat has distributed to us copies of the reports of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for 1982 and 1983 and of the report of September of this year by the President of the Security Council. These reports merit our most careful study and reflection. Canada, for its part, has already pledged its commitment to the achievement of the Secretary-General's objective which is no less than the reinvigoration of the whole of the United Nations system with a view to ensuring that it will be able to discharge in the most effective way possible the responsibilities with which the international community has invested it. I urge all of you here today to join me in striving to work with the Secretary-General towards the attainment of that objective."



G.I. Warren
Director General
Multilateral Affairs Bureau



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of Canada

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EAST WEST OUTLOOK

(Formerly JUST FOR THE PRESS)
Carl Marcy, Editor

AMERICAN COMMITTEE
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By & 1DDZ

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Soviet Downing of Korean Airliner

Statement on behalf of the American Committee on East-West Accord
by Robert D. Schmidt, President

The downing of the Korean civilian airliner with its tragic loss of life is a bitter blow and setback to all who have worked to normalize relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Members of the American Committee in particular understand that relations between the two societies have never been easy. In May 1983 at the annual meeting, Co-Chairman George Kennan characterized the Soviet regime as having . . .

"a relatively high general sense of insecurity, a marked sensitivity to conditions in border regions, a tendency to overdo in the peacetime cultivation of military strength, and above all, a positively neurotic passion for secrecy. And as one of the consequences of this passion for secrecy, it has what seems to be a veritable obsession with espionage, in both the offensive and defensive senses—an obsession that often gets in the way of normal and relaxed relations with other countries."

Yet, if anything, the destruction of the Korean airliner by Soviet authorities illustrates with painful clarity the danger mankind faces should accident or premeditation unleash the ultimate weapon. The United States has never pursued nuclear arms control as a favor to the Soviet Union, but rather in the security interests of our country, our allies and friends. Accordingly, the American Committee on East-West Accord concurs with President Reagan's statement that . . .

"we cannot, we must not, give up our effort to reduce the arsenal of destructive weapons threatening the world." This act, he said, makes us "more determined than ever to reduce and if possible eliminate the threat hanging over mankind."

The stakes are too high to do anything but redouble our efforts to control and reduce significantly nuclear weapons in both countries. □

The American Committee on East-West Accord is incorporated as a tax-exempt, independent educational organization aimed at improving East-West relations, with special focus on U.S.-Soviet relations. The editor is responsible for the contents of *East-West Outlook*.

Misperceptions Can Kill You

(Excerpts from the remarks of former Senator J. W. Fulbright at the Duke University Seminar on Living History, September 22, 1983, Senator Fulbright is a member of the American Committee on East-West Accord.)

* * * *

There are many facets to our relations with the rest of the world, a very complex world indeed, but overriding all of them and the most difficult and dangerous of all is our relations with the other Superpower, the Soviet Union. So I think it appropriate to consider that facet first.

The recent tragic destruction of the Korean airliner should focus our attention upon the importance of a better understanding of the Soviet Union. In a recent article in *The Washington Post*, Robert Kaiser wrote that the shooting down of the airliner, "was characteristic and predictable behavior—behavior that reflects a value system and a society that are profoundly different from our own, despite our stubborn efforts to will it otherwise."

This brief sentence suggests that if we are to avoid the ultimate disaster of a major conflict with the Russians, it is imperative that we understand their value system and society which is so profoundly different from our own. Without such an understanding we will surely continue to make mistakes in judgment in dealing with them which could be disastrous. In order to understand them, we must be cognizant of their historical experiences, their government, and their culture as a whole. In a very real sense, the future of the world is hostage to the ability of the Soviets and the Americans to evaluate correctly their intentions toward each other.

In foreign, as in personal relations, our inferences are shaped as much by how we look at a person, or a situation, as by what we actually see. There are few foreign countries of which we do not have certain preconceptions—to their good or ill intentions—and these exert a powerful influence on our evaluation of their specific acts or policies.

Some years ago, the noted philosopher-psychologist, Dr. Erich Fromm, put the matter in these words:

"The lack of objectivity, as far as foreign nations is concerned, is notorious. From one day to the next, another nation is made out to be utterly depraved and fiendish, while one's own nation stands for everything that is good and noble. Every action of the enemy is judged by one standard—every action by oneself by another. Even good deeds by the enemy are considered a sign of particular devilishness meant to deceive us and the world, while our bad deeds are necessary and justified by our noble goals which we serve."

When we ruthlessly took possession of the Philippines after the war with Spain it was to "Christianize and civilize" them in the words of President McKinley. When Russia invaded and occupied Afghanistan, it was to subdue and exploit them. When our friend Israel shot down the Libyan civilian plane in which 108 passengers died near the Suez Canal in 1973, we showed little concern about it, but when that Russian pilot shot down the Korean plane, it was an act of deliberate terrorism calling for world-wide sanctions.

This difference in our view between two quite similar acts, one by a friendly country, the other by the Soviets, prompts me to recall the advice of perhaps the wisest President we have ever had (our first) when he said in his farewell address:

"The nation which indulges toward another an habitual



Senator J. W. Fulbright

hatred, or an habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest."

* * * *

Some time ago Professor Stephen Cohen of Princeton observed: "Soviet Russia has been on our minds—a virtual obsession—for more than 60 years. During those 60 years, far more has changed in the Soviet Union—and in the world—than in our perception and ideas."

This obsession with the Russians has caused us to oscillate between regarding them as uncouth, primitive barbarians, unworthy of our respect, on the one hand, and exaggerating their military power and diplomatic achievements, on the other.

In the hearings to which I referred a moment ago, Dr. Edward Hall, a distinguished anthropologist said:

"Culture is much more than mere custom that can be shed like a suit of clothes. It controls man's perception of the world about him. It also controls his behavior in deep and persistent ways, many of which are outside his conscious awareness and therefore beyond his control. Like an iceberg, culture hides much more than it reveals, and strangely enough, what it hides it hides most effectively from its own participants."

Thus, we are quite unaware of the fact that we judge the actions of the Russians by moral standards quite different from those by which we judge the actions of our friends the Israelis or of ourselves. Our culture "controls our perceptions" and the reality is "outside our conscious awareness."

Our cultural differences with the Russians are always beneath the surface and seem to nurture a virulent kind of animosity which surfaces at every provocation. It is this, basic animosity which accounts to a large extent for the vehemence of our reaction to the shooting down of the Korean plane.

Let there be no misunderstanding, I do not wish to minimize the difficulty and complexity of dealing with the Russians with military power comparable to our own, but it is a challenge which we must meet if we are to have a reasonable chance to avoid a nuclear war.

See Fulbright, page 3

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Fulbright, continued

After the atomic bombs were dropped on two Japanese cities the Americans in 1945, Albert Einstein, who contributed so much to the development of those weapons, commented:

"Now everything has changed except our manner of thinking. Thus we are drifting toward a catastrophe beyond comparison. We shall require a new manner of thinking if mankind is to survive."

* * * *

I recognize that in the present environment of recrimination, provocative rhetoric and profound revulsion over the plane incident, to suggest that we moderate or change our thoughts or policies toward the Russians will be regarded as quixotic, eccentric, or unpatriotic. However, unless we do so, I believe a conflict will result. Not only must we change our "manner of thinking" about our relations, but we must endeavor to change the attitude of the Russians as well. This cannot be achieved by building more weapons, or by threatening gestures. It can only be done by a persistent and consistent pursuit of what were called "confidence building" measures during the brief period of detente in 1972. Such measures were primarily joint ventures in many diverse fields of endeavors including such matters as trade, cultural exchange, research projects in medicine, space, pollution of the environment and the most difficult of all, arms control.

This policy of peaceful co-existence should consist of a balance between cooperation and competition, with the emphasis upon cooperation, it would make a difference in the long run if we spent as much on cultural exchanges as we do on Radio Liberty. As Sigmund Freud said in his famous letter to Einstein, "Obstacles to a change in our manner of thinking are not in our environment; they are in the workings of the human mind." Cultural exchanges are an effective way to affect the workings of the mind if pursued over a reasonable period of time.

* * * *

Americans seem to be unaware of the fact that we do not maintain in our government any institute or group of people seriously devoted to the study of the Soviet Union and its policies.

In Moscow the government has for years supported an Institute of American and Canadian studies with approximately 350 trained people who strive to understand our country and the policies of our government. In a recent article in *The Washington Post*, the associate director of the Rockefeller Foundation John Stremlau wrote:

"In its competition with the Soviet Union the United States continues to function as a dinosaur. While the country willingly expends nearly \$250 billion on defense, our annual production of Ph.D.'s with advanced training for analyzing Soviet foreign policy rarely exceeds seven or eight. . . . Rarely is there any part of the world where Soviet involvement is the continuing concern of more than one or two individuals. All too often it is the concern of none." As a result of this neglect to study the Soviets, our people in and out of government, labor under a variety of illusions about the Russians or as Stremlau wrote with "a dangerous and self inflicted ignorance which must be combated." One illusion which we cherish is that the Soviet Union is an economic basket case, competent only in military production. Anyone who disputes this illusion will likely be

labeled an appeaser or Soviet apologist. Professor Stephen Cohen recently pointed out that "between 1950 and 1980 the per capita real consumption at least tripled in Russia." It is largely unknown in the U.S. that several of our important corporations have purchased advanced technology from the Soviets. John W. Kiser, a former research consultant to the Department of State, puts it this way:

"But if the U.S.S.R. is so backward, how has it managed to build Titanium submarines capable of going 40 miles an hour—faster than any of ours? Why are companies such as Bristol Meyers, Dupont and 3M buying potential drugs and surgical devices from the U.S.S.R.? Why are Kaiser Aluminum and Olin Corp. acquiring sophisticated manufacturing know-how from the Soviets?"

The idea that because the Soviet government imposes an inefficient, centralized control over its economy and that sufficient economic pressure from us and our allies will cause it to collapse is simply wishful thinking. It is a huge country, some three times the size of the United States, with ample natural resources and a population of 260 million energetic and talented people, and that is a fact which we ignore at our peril.

There is little if any prospect that Russia will collapse economically, that it will be torn by internal revolution or that it will voluntarily retire from the competition for influence in the third world. It is a rival great power and we must deal with it and find the means to lessen the virulence of our mutual animosity if we are to avoid a nuclear catastrophe. If the current tension is allowed to continue or to increase another incident as horrible or worse than that of Flight 007 will surely occur and it could and probably would bring on the conflict which we all wish to avoid.

To avoid such a dismal demise to our democratic experiment, there is another change in our present posture that is of critical importance. Except among the socialist countries and not all of them, the Soviet Union has not been accepted nor granted the respect which it believes it deserves as a great power. Its government wishes to be regarded as legitimate and as an equal by the United States. This ambition has been thwarted partly by its own inept diplomacy, its unrealistic illusion of infallibility and to a great extent by the attitude and treatment of the United States.

* * * *

The treatment of Khrushchev by our government during his visit in 1959, not only in Washington, but in California as well as other cities, lent support to his theme that the U.S. did not accept the legitimacy of the government of the Soviet Union. He was denied a reception in a joint session of Congress which theretofore was customary for any head of state visiting Washington in an official capacity. President Eisenhower did personally receive Khrushchev at Camp David where they had an interesting and satisfactory meeting. That relationship, however, was under unfortunate circumstances disrupted by the U-2 incident just prior to the scheduled summit meeting in Paris in May, 1960.

Mr. Khrushchev subsequently made the serious mistake of putting missiles in Cuba and under pressure from us took them out. The failure of his policy toward the U.S. probably contributed significantly to his disgrace and ouster from Soviet leadership.

The failure of subsequent efforts to establish more normal relations in 1972 with the trade bill and the SALT II treaty in 1979, is evidence that in fact we are unwilling to meet Khrushchev's condition of the acceptance of their

See Fulbright, page 4

Fulbright, Continued

social system in which case, in Khrushchev's words "we would hardly be able to avoid a conflict."

For nearly 40 years we have relied upon the deterrence of nuclear weapons to preserve the peace. They are a powerful and persuasive reason to avoid a conflict, but the danger is that the reaction to each succeeding incident

escalates in the degree of outrage and there seems to be no progress in establishing confidence between the two super-powers. This ever increasing emotional pressure is likely to erupt in a challenge or ultimatum which cannot be controlled just as World War I erupted from an incident of minor significance in itself. Once the gauntlet is taken up, there will be no turning back. □

A Low Risk Initiative—Rejected

"At this late stage something more is needed to show the U.S. is serious about arms control . . . If the answer is still 'nyet', then everybody would know who said it." (*Flora Lewis, The New York Times, March 25, 1983.*)

"Now's a good time for President Reagan to seize the initiative in Soviet-American relations—and the 1984 Presidential campaign—by declaring a six month moratorium on nuclear testing and challenging Moscow to do the same." (*Tom Wicker, The New York Times, August 15, 1983.*)

"The ideal nuclear arms control initiative would be one which either the United States or the Soviet Union could put forth without endangering the security of either nation; which would be simple enough not to involve extensive wrangling among the experts; which would be concrete, verifiable, and recognized worldwide as sincere; which would virtually mandate reciprocal action; and which if accepted by both nations would be a clear step toward reducing the danger of nuclear war.

"President Reagan or General Secretary Andropov—even the United States Congress—could grasp such an initiative by stating without equivocation that beginning at a time certain—that—all underground tests of nuclear weapons would be suspended for a fixed period of time or until the other party renewed tests. If the other party failed to reciprocate, underground tests would be resumed. Congress could compel the Administration to take such an initiative by prohibiting the expenditure of funds for as long as the other party observed such a moratorium.

"At the present time there are no restraints on new weapons developments; technology is outpacing politics. There is no reciprocal trust on which to build restraints. The growing concern that arms control negotiations in the present format will not be productive has spawned proposals in the dozens—most of which involve further time-consuming refinements and negotiations.

"Why not a mutual moratorium on all tests of nuclear weapons—a moratorium which hopefully might continue until the madness of the present race has been met by agreement for deep cuts in existing weaponry?

"There is precedent for such a moratorium. In March 1958 the Soviet Union announced it was discontinuing *all* tests of nuclear weapons. It appealed to other nuclear powers to take similar action, adding, however, that the Soviet Union would "naturally be free" to resume testing if others did not stop. President Eisenhower rejected the proposal. Some tests, he said, could be conducted "under conditions of secrecy." The Soviets thereupon resumed testing which continued until November 1958. By then, however, test ban negotiations were underway and on the initiative of President Eisenhower the negotiating powers refrained from testing nuclear weapons for three years. This "mutual voluntary moratorium" ended in September 1961 when the Soviets, after noting the French had renewed tests, resumed testing, followed two weeks later by the United States.

"But the example had been set. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and President Kennedy pressed negotiations with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, and in August 1963 Averell Harriman concluded a treaty between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. which bans nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space, and under water.

"Testing was driven underground. After a flurry of tests, they have now leveled off to about fifty per year equally divided between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (France conducts about ten such tests each year). The Threshold Test Ban Treaty signed in 1974, observed but unratified, limits the size of underground tests to 150 kilotons. . . .

"For the United States to suspend all underground tests for a period of time and to continue such suspension if the Soviet Union follows suit is not as daring or as expensive a departure from the traditional approach as the calls for restructuring our nuclear deterrent by building single warhead missiles. Consider the advantages, however, of the U.S. initiating a limited unilateral moratorium on underground tests which

- Would not endanger the security of the United States. If the Soviets were to reject the moratorium by continuing tests, the U.S. would renew its testing.
- Would virtually mandate reciprocal action.
- Would, if ignored, expose the mendacity of the other side.
- Would, if accepted by both parties, reduce the danger of nuclear war by preventing the testing of new and old weapons.

"Finally, to end on a political note, if President Reagan were to grasp the initiative and propose a moratorium on testing it would provide at least a partial answer to those Americans who doubt the sincerity of his commitment to stopping the nuclear arms race. If General Secretary Andropov were to propose a moratorium on testing, how would the United States respond?" (*Carl Marcy, The Christian Science Monitor, June 8, 1983.*)

"The U.S. should announce a suspension of underground tests for a period of a year, during which it will . . . expect a similar moratorium on the part of the Soviet Union . . ." (*Stanley Hoffmann, East/West OUTLOOK, June 1983*)

Initiative, continued

"When I was in Moscow recently, I discussed a moratorium on all underground nuclear tests for six months with Soviet officials. They said that if the United States were to initiate a six-month ban on nuclear testing, the Soviet Union would most certainly follow suit." (Fred Warner Neal, *Los Angeles Times*, July 28, 1983)

"Mr. President, without testing, the nuclear arms race would lose most of its drive and force. Both sides could of course continue to produce the same old weapons. But we would have won a stability on which we could build effective arms control." (Senator William Proxmire, D., Wis., *Congressional Record*, June 14, 1983)

"Most authorities agree that putting an end to nuclear tests would be perhaps the most consequential arms control step now available to the superpowers." (Tom Wicker, *The New York Times*, August 19, 1983)

"If testing of existing and new . . . nuclear weapons were precluded, there would be a growing loss of confidence in their reliability and in the assumption that a given . . . bomb would function. . . . No military commander or political leader would have much confidence in the success of a preemptive strike by weapons that had not been recently tested or demonstrated." Jerome B. Wiesner, *The New York Times*, July 11, 1983)

"Without testing, it is almost impossible to design new, more advanced nuclear weapons . . ." (Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, as reported in the *Annapolis Evening Capital*, August 30, 1983)

"... the technical capabilities needed to police a comprehensive test ban down to explosions of very small size unquestionably exist; the issues to be resolved are political." (Lynn R. Sykes and Jack F. Everden, geophysists, *Scientific American*, October 1982)

August 17, 1983

The Honorable Kenneth L. Adelman
Director
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Dear Mr. Adelman:

As you will see from the enclosures, the idea of the U.S. initiating a moratorium on underground nuclear tests to see if the Soviet Union would follow suit is getting some attention in the press. Several members of Congress have expressed to me an interest in such an initiative originating in the Congress.

In these circumstances it occurred to me that the subject is one which officials of ACDA, if they have not done so already, might want to examine as an initiative which might suitably originate with the United States.

I have been assured by prominent seismologists that verification of a total moratorium on underground tests by national technical means is practical.

Sincerely yours,

Carl Marcy

September 12, 1983

Dear Mr. Marcy:

Thank you for your letter of August 17, 1983, in which you discuss the idea of the United States initiating a moratorium on underground nuclear tests and verification of the moratorium by national technical means.

The problems associated with ensuring effective verification of a testing moratorium and our experiences with the previous test moratorium give rise to serious concerns regarding the key question about such an agreement is, as you point out in your article, whether it is verifiable. The seismic verification of a cessation of nuclear testing continues to be a controversial subject among the experts in academia, industry and the government, and it is questionable that national technical means alone could provide adequate confidence. With the amount of uncertainty attached to verification, the Administration has found it imprudent to resume negotiations on a CTB treaty at this time. As you know, those negotiations were discontinued during the previous Administration. A comprehensive ban on nuclear testing remains, however, a long-term goal of the Administration.

With regard to our experiences from the 1959-61 moratorium, you will recall the Soviets conducted over 40 tests in 10 weeks with 14 of these tests in the multimegaton range, the largest more than 50 megatons, in 1961. This was a clear indication that under the moratorium the Soviets had conducted the research and development necessary to launch quickly an impressive test program.

In sum, we cannot achieve our long-term goal of a comprehensive test ban treaty until we can ensure that it could be effectively verified. A unilateral moratorium not only presents the same verification concerns, but by its nature does not offer the possibilities for any negotiated cooperative verification measures.

Sincerely,

Kenneth L. Adelman
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

(Editor's note: In 1962, the last year of unrestricted testing, 48 atmospheric tests were conducted by the U.S., 50 such tests by the U.S.S.R.; the next year the U.S. conducted 50 underground tests, the U.S.S.R. 12. Herbert York, *Scientific American*, October 1983.) □

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Survival—The Common Interest

by William Attwood

The Hiroshima bomb and all its monstrous progeny have now been around longer than most people on earth have been alive. A whole generation has grown to maturity accustomed and seemingly reconciled to the continual stockpiling of nuclear devices. At rallies protesting the spiralling arms race, the old and middle-aged often outnumber the young. And no wonder: the super bombs, after all, haven't killed anybody in nearly forty years; so why worry? But to those of us who have been involved, even peripherally, in atomic and then nuclear developments, this generalized worldwide nonchalance about the doomsday weapons is becoming increasingly frightening and frustrating.

My own experience with efforts to contain the atomic threat goes back to March, 1946, when, as a young reporter in the New York Herald Tribune's Washington bureau, I got my first front-page by-line on a story about the release of the historic Baruch-Lilienthal-Acheson Report. I can still remember the first words of that story: "The blunt fact that mankind faces self-destruction unless the United Nations controls atomic power was made very plain today in a 77-page report. . . ."

The offer contained in the report—that the U.S. would turn over its atomic know-how (we had no bombs left at the time) to an international commission—was submitted to the Russians, who promptly rejected it. Stalin, outvoted ten to one in U.N., saw the offer as an American trick to keep the monopoly of this new super weapon in Western hands. He preferred playing catch-up, and by 1949 the Russians had detonated their first atomic bomb. The world has lived in the grip of the cold war and under the shadow of the mushroom cloud ever since.

There were statesmen in those days more far-sighted than those in power today. Winston Churchill, speaking at Fulton, Mo., in that same spring of 1946, warned: "The dark ages may return—the stone age may return on the gleaming wings of science; and what might now shower immeasurable blessings upon mankind, may even bring about its total destruction. Beware, I say! Time may be short."

Public men today talk of deterrence; many decline even to look for a better alternative to keep the fragile peace. Yet what has protected us so far is not so much the threat of retaliation as the relative sanity of the leadership that has existed in Washington and Moscow since Stalin's death; and what is most likely to drive that leadership mad in the long run is the strain of maintaining a credible and ever-escalating deterrent force in an age of rapid technological innovation.

"Time may be short," said Churchill. The time is now a great deal shorter but you can't yet find a corresponding sense of urgency anywhere in the world except among the usual activist minority—growing in numbers but still not in command. It's hard for most people even to imagine that the things we've built could wipe out all living creatures save the radioactive-resistant cockroach. We have had this capacity for too short a time fully to appreciate how obsolete have become the rules of the martial games we have played for so long. As Einstein said, "The splitting of the atom has changed everything save our mode of thinking, and thus we drift towards unparalleled catastrophe."

An article by Michael Novak to which the National Re-



Mr. Attwood, a member of the Board of Directors of the American Committee on East-West Accord, is an author, a former U.S. Ambassador, and former Chairman of the Board of Newsday.

view devoted an entire issue in April has provided the scholarly rationale for all those who cling to the concept of perpetual deterrence, equate U.S. security with nuclear superiority and are still frozen in a pre-1945 geopolitical mind-set.

Novak partisans oppose both a no-first-use declaration and all freeze proposals with the argument that they would lock us into a position of inferiority. Yet not only did the redoubtable Dr. Kissinger say recently that he wouldn't trade our war-making arsenal for that of the Russians, but the numerical, who's-ahead argument is meaningless at current levels of megatonnage and delivery systems. To cite a now familiar metaphor, we and the Russians are two boys in a murky cellar, ankle-deep in gasoline, one holding eight kitchen matches and the other, seven. Does the boy with eight matches enjoy superiority?

Novak's other major error is his assumption—one long shared by many members of the foreign policy establishment since the darkest days of Stalinism—that the Red Army is poised and eager to invade Western Europe. Anyone who has lately visited the Soviet Union—a nation beset by a multitude of problems, mired in bureaucratic inefficiency, ideologically bankrupt, despotic, paranoid, barely able to keep its captive nations and ethnic minorities in line—would find it hard to believe that the Russians would risk nuclear devastation simply to subjugate and administer nations that would prove as intractable as Afghanistan and far more subversive to the discipline of the occupying forces. The Russians like cheap victories; this is one of many reasons why they haven't messed with the Finns, who, while unprotected by NATO, are nevertheless as ready as they were in 1940 to resist any invader, whatever the odds. This assumption of Soviet intentions stems of course from our traditional inability to put ourselves in others' shoes—a failing that can be as crippling in diplomacy as in marriage or business.

But whatever their intentions, we can be fairly sure that the Russians can be trusted to act in their own self-interest;

Attwood, continued

that their interest, like ours, is clearly to avoid being incinerated—that the arms race strains their economy at least as much as it does ours, and that we therefore have a common motive in defusing our continuing geopolitical rivalry.

It is also clear that the principal obstacle to arms control and reduction is and always has been intense mutual suspicion, quite justified on our part, at least in the immediate postwar years, and endemic in the Russian psyche. Regrettably we sometimes contribute to their paranoia (and abet the fortunes of the most xenophobic and militaristic elements in Soviet politics) by our own pronouncements about prevailing over the forces of evil.

It is axiomatic that one does not enhance one's own security by adding to the insecurity of one's opponent, yet we are acting today as if the opposite were true. Nor is anyone in power heeding the advice of Henry L. Stimson, who said in 1945: "The chief lesson I have learned in a long life is that the only way you can make a man trustworthy is to trust him, and the surest way to make him untrustworthy is to distrust him and show your distrust."

I would not advocate trusting the Russians across the board, but I do think that we can trust them to act in their own interest as they conceive it.

Living with deterrence means living in a world where more and more doomsday engines are deployed all over the planet, with the corresponding increase in the probability of computer error. This is what makes appealing the idea of a freeze on the production and deployment of these preposterous devices that are supposedly intended, not for use, but for intimidation. Personally, while I'd welcome a freeze as an interim step, I think it would be easier to get the process of negotiation moving again by ratifying Salt II—which has already been hammered out and signed. It only sets limits (and the original treaty would have to be updated) but it is more of a start than START since it would require no further drawdown, suspicion-laden negotiations with the Russians. And it would represent motion in the direction of cooperation and away from confrontation on a matter of vital mutual interest, motion towards deep cuts in, and the eventual elimination of these insane weapons.

Back in 1955, the scientists seemed more optimistic than they are today. I remember visiting the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory—which its isolated residents then called "The Hill"—and listening to them talk with pride about their work because they sincerely felt that what they were designing were weapons so fearful that they were bound to abolish war forever. Later that year I met a former Cabinet member of the Truman Administration who had had to deal with the problems of peace in our time, and I told him of my talk with the nuclear scientists.

"They may be right," he said. "I hope they are. But personally I can't help worrying about the possibility that we or the Communists will blunder into a war that would be the ruin of us all. The trouble with scientists is that they sometimes assume that the people—and politicians—are as rational as they are themselves."

Today, nearly twenty years later, I believe the odds are slightly in favor of survival of the human experiment, though a limited number of nuclear explosions or accidents may be necessary before the full realization of what horrors we have accumulated in our arsenals has penetrated the entire population. I suspect that one day we, or our descendants, will look back on these decades of deterrence and an escalating arms race as an interlude of lunacy in human

history. That's why many who believe as I do devote a part of our time and energy to organizations like the American Committee on East-West Accord. We agree with E. M. Forster's observation: "Though we cannot expect to love one another, we must learn to put up with one another. Otherwise we shall all of us perish." And we'd also like to be able to say, either in our old age, or at the moment of the blinding flash, that we did what we could to avert disaster—just as I'm glad in retrospect that I played my part (and paid my dues—a permanent limp being the most visible memento) in the hot war of the forties and the cold war of the fifties and sixties.

In fact, as a veteran cold warrior, my quarrel (if that's the word) with Ronald Reagan, is that the decline of American influence, which began under Carter, has accelerated since 1981 as our preoccupations become increasingly irrelevant to a world in revolutionary turmoil. It disturbs me that the Soviets, who have nothing to offer the so-called emerging nations but discredited slogans, are still able, here and there and largely by default, to score some points and affect the course of history. Yet it's so easy to outmaneuver them, as I found out twenty years ago in Guinea, if you combine firmness with compassion and, above all, understanding.

Understanding—of our friends as well as our foes and of the world as it is today and not as it was before July, 1945—that has clearly become the essential word. For with mutual understanding, our civilization can survive and prosper; without it, there is good reason to believe that our time is up. And we will have no one to blame but ourselves. As Walt Kelly's Pogo Possum used to say, "We have met the enemy, and he is us." □

Statement by Former Senator Jacob K. Javits

In view of the inhuman and reprehensible shooting down of the Korean airliner by the U.S.S.R. with the loss of innocent lives in which I believe the Soviet action and justification is a disgrace to world peace and world morality, I would not press the initiative set forth in my article entitled: "The Russians: Trade and Linkage" published in the OUT-LOOK of September 1983 at this time. When the U.S.S.R. has shown an adequate sense of responsibility respecting this dreadful tragedy, a resumption of normal policy contacts may be in order. It is obvious that my piece was written and published before this dreadful tragedy took place.

A CANDIDATE'S OATH

When I take the oath of office as President I will swear to preserve, protect, and defend the United States. In the nuclear age I know of no way to preserve the United States, to protect it, or to defend it more important than to arrive at a fair and comprehensive nuclear settlement with the Soviet Union. This I intend to do.

Common Sense in U.S.—Soviet Trade

Edited by Margaret Chapman and Carl Marcy

(Published by the American Committee on East-West Accord, August 1983, 173 pages, \$5)

This book brings together the views of twenty practical, experienced, and politically diverse authors—businessmen, economists, academics—on the subject of trade between the United States and the Soviet Union. (See April 1983 OUTLOOK for Table of Contents.)

With remarkable unanimity, the authors agree that the United States has managed to "shoot itself in the foot" as it tried to use trade as a political weapon. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment did not achieve its purpose—to force the Soviet Union to agree to expanded emigration; the on again-off again grain embargo hurt the American farmer more than it hurt the Russians and did not persuade them to leave Afghanistan; efforts to inhibit construction of the Soviet gas pipeline to Western Europe failed to stop the project and at the same time cost thousands of American jobs and managed to alienate our allies.

Publication of this book at a time when tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union have been heightened by the downing of the Korean airliner may be viewed by some as most unfortunate. On the contrary, the words of Robert Schmidt, President of the American Committee on East-West Accord, are as timely now as when written for the Foreword many weeks before the airliner tragedy: "It is high time to look at our trade with the U.S.S.R. without emotion, with utilization of the best information possible, and with an honest effort to correct the errors of the past."

Complimentary copies of COMMON SENSE IN U.S.—SOVIET TRADE have been sent to all Members of Congress, key officials in the Executive Branch, the Diplomatic Corps, and to the media.

Appraisal of the pluses and minuses of U.S.—Soviet trade comes at a time when the export policies of the United States are under intensive review. □

The Kind of Letter We Like to Receive

"Thank you for your July 6th letter of appreciation of my contribution to your organization.

"I don't ordinarily write thank you to thank you letters, but then I have never before received a thank you note from a real person (as opposed to a computer). In fact, in most cases I receive no letter at all or, worse a letter asking for even more of my generous support.

"In any event, I thought you might be interested in how I heard of your organization. After having read *The Nuclear Delusion* by Mr. Kennan, I noticed the book jacket listed your group as being

one the author was associated with. As I was rather impressed (or frightened in a way) by the book, I was naturally drawn towards looking into the Committee on East-West Accord.

"I don't know if the surprise you mentioned was because I happen to be an ordinary individual, not a CEO of a Fortune 500 company or a former Ambassador, but thanks anyway for the letter. I look forward to getting newsletters from you and hearing more of your efforts, to educate the American public." □

American Committee on East-West Accord
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(202) 546-1700

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AT REGULAR PERMREPS LUNCH 08NOV FRG PERMREP CIRCULATED

COPY OF CEAUSESCUS PERSONAL MSG TO FRG CHANCELLOR KOHL

04NOV AS FOLLOWS:

2.QUOTE

THE FOLLOWING IS AN UNOFFICIAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE
ABOVE MESSAGE:

QUOTE DEAR MR CHANCELLOR,

I AM ADDRESSING MYSELF TO YOU ONCE AGAIN IN COCCENTION WITH
THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE FORTHCOMING TRANSITION TO THE
DEPLOYMENT OF US INF ON THE TERRITORIES OF SEVERAL
WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES INCLUDING THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF GERMANY.

THE ROMANIAN PEOPLE AND ALL OTHER EUROPEAN PEOPLES A...2

PAGE TWO YBGR7091 CONFD

RACE, THE PROTECTION OF THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO LIFE AND THE PROTECTION AGAINST THE DANGER OF A NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE. THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT PEACE AND SECURITY CANNOT/NOT BE SAFEGUARDED BY NEW WEAPONS BUT BY THEIR REDUCTION.

ROMANIA ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THE CESSATION OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW INF IN EUROPE AND TO THE WITHDRAWAL AND DESTRUCTION OF THOSE WHICH EXIST AND IS OF THE OPINION THAT NOT/NOT ALL POSSIBILITIES FOR COMPROMISE HAVE BEEN EXPLOITED AND THAT IT WILL STILL BE POSSIBLE TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT AT THE SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA.

IT IS TRUE THAT NO/NO AGREEMENT HAS SO FAR BEEN ACHIEVED IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, BUT IMPORTANT PROPOSALS WERE MADE BY THE UNITED STATES AS WELL AS BY THE USSR, INCLUDING THOSE IN THE INTERVIEW GRANTED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR TO PRAVDA ON 27 OCTOBER 1983, WHICH HAVE BROUGHT THE MUTUAL POSITIONS MUCH CLOSER; THIS PROVES THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO COME TO A CORRESPONDING AGREEMENT.

IT IS NOW ESSENTIAL THAT EFFORTS ARE MADE IN GENEVA TO REACH A BALANCED AGREEMENT, EVEN IF IT IS NOT/NOT PERFECT AND EVEN IF NOT/NOT ALL THE PROBLEMS ARE SOLVED. AT ANY RATE, THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE US MISSILES IN YOUR COUNTRY AND IN OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES MUST BE PREVENTED, AND THE WITHDRAWAL AND COMPLETE DESTRUCTION OF THE LARGEST PART OF THE SOVIET INF MUST BE

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PAGE THREE YBGR7091 CONFD

ACHIEVED.

IN ORDER THAT SUCH AN IMPORANT PRIORITY OBJECTIVE CAN BE REALIZED, ONE MIGHT AGREE NOT/NOT TO TAKE THE FRENCH AND BRITISH SYSTEMS INTO ACCOUNT BUT TO INCLUDE THEM IN THE CALCULATION OF THE OVERALL BALANCE OF NUCLEAR FORCES BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES WHICH COULD BE THE SUBJECT OF LATER NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM.

IN VIEW OF OUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FUTURE OF OUR PEOPLES AND PEACE AND SECURITY ON THE CONTINENT, I FEEL THAT THE ACTIVITIES NOW HAVE TO BE STRENGTHENED AND THAT WE HAVE TO APPLY TO THE USSR AND THE UNITED STATES DIRECT SO THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONTINUED AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE NEW INF IS AVOIDED.

IN THE SPIRIT OF THE MESSAGE WHICH I SENT YOU IN AUGUST OF THIS YEAR, I AM ADDRESSING MYSELF AGAIN TO YOU WITH THE APPEAL THAT THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND YOU PERSONALLY SHOULD DEMAND AND TAKE THE CORRESPONDING ACTION TO ENSURE THAT AN AGREEMENT IS REACHED WHICH LEADS TO THE NON-DEPLOYMENT OF THE NEW INF OR AT LEAST TO A POSTPONEMENT OF DEPLOYMENT UNTIL THE END OF 1984 OR THE BEGINNING OF 1985, SO THAT THE SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS CAN BE CONTINUED IN THE MEANTIME AND THE SOVIET UNION NO/NO LONGER DEPLOYS ANY NEW MISSILES AND REDUCES A NUMBER OF THE EXISTING MISSILES IN ACCORDANCE WITH

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ITS STATEMENTS.

IN THIS SPIRIT, ROMANIA BELIEVES THAT A MEETING OF ALL NATO MEMBER STATES AND THE MEMBER STATES OF THE WARSAW PACT WOULD BE VERY IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS EXCLUSIVELY THE PROBLEM OF INF IN EUROPE AND TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN AGREEMENT AT THE SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA, SO THAT THESE LEAD TO THE NON-DEPLOYMENT OF THE NEW INF AND TO THE WITHDRAWAL AND DESTRUCTION OF THE EXISTING ONES.

IN ADDITION, I BELIEVE THAT THE ORGANIZATION OF A SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT MEETING WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD HAVE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON INTERNATIONAL LIFE AND WOULD BE WELCOMED BY ALL EUROPEAN PEOPLES, EVEN IF IT SHOULD ONLY LEAD TO THE NON-DEPLOYMENT OF THE NEW MISSILES AND THE REDUCTION AND DESTRUCTION OF THE EXISTING ONES.

AS YOU ARE AWARE, THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDERTOOK TO PREVENT THE FURTHER SPREAD OF THESE WEAPONS, NOT/NOT TO TRANSFER THEM TO ANYONE ELSE AND NOT/NOT TO ACCEPT NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR SYSTEMS DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY FROM ANY SIDE.

DEPLOYMENT IN SOME COUNTRIES OF WESTERN EUROPE AND EASTERN EUROPE AS SUCH IN FACT VIOLATES THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

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- NO MORE
TRUE WITH
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(IE NO COUNTRIES WHICH
DO NOT NOW HAVE A
NUCLEAR ROLE WILL
ASSUME ONE WITH
DEPLOYMENT.

ALSO, ALL INF WEAPONS
WILL HAVE "ONE (IE AM-000501
KEY")

PAGE FIVE YBGR7091 CONFD

AND CREATES A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT WHICH COULD CERTAINLY STIMULATE OTHER COUNTRIES TO ACT IN THE DIRECTION OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF SIMILAR WEAPONS ON THEIR TERRITORIES.

IF ONE DRAWS CONCLUSIONS FROM THE HARSH LESSONS OF HISTORY AND FROM THE FACT THAT BOTH WORLD WARS OF THIS CENTURY STARTED FROM EUROPE, THE PEOPLES OF THE CONTINENT AND ESPECIALLY YOUR PEOPLE ARE VITALLY INTERESTED TO DO EVERYTHING TO PREVENT THE OUTBREAK OF A NEW CONFLAGRATION WHICH WOULD LEAD TO THE DESTRUCTION OF HUMAN LIFE AND OF CIVILIZATION.

THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE NEW MISSILES ON GERMAN TERRITORY IN FACT LEADS TO THE TRANSFORMATION OF THIS AREA INTO A VERITABLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARSENAL AND REPRESENTS A DANGER TO THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC WHICH WOULD BECOME THE FIRST TARGETS IN CASE OF A NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION WHICH WOULD BE BOUND TO LEAD TO THEIR COMPLETE DESTRUCTION.

I AM STATING MY CONVICTION THAT YOU AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY WILL ACT TO CEASE THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE NEW MISSILES AND IN FAVOUR OF THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AIM OF ACHIEVING BALANCE WITH EQUAL SECURITY FOR BOTH SIDES NOT/NOT BY INCREASING BUT BY REDUCING ARMAMENTS, WHICH WOULD CORRESPOND TO THE INTERESTS OF YOUR PEOPLE, ALL PEOPLES, OF PEACE AND OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY UNQUOTE.

UNQUOTE.

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PAGE TWO YBGR7090 CONF

NOUS JUGONS CERTES QU IL EST NECESSAIRE DE TROUVER
LES MOYENS DE PARTLER AVEC L URSS ET QU UNE POLITIQUE DE
PRESSION ECONOMIQUE OU DE BLOCUS EST INADEQUATE.RESTE POUR
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M ANDROPOV A ANNONCE QUE MOSCOU INTERROMPRAIT LES
NEGOCIATIONS DE GENEVE QUAND AURAIT COMMENCE LE DEPLOIEMENT
AMERICAIN.OR,QUAND L URSS A SURARME,LES OCCIDENTAUX ONT
ATTENDU DES ANNEE AVANT DE CHERCHER A RETABLIR L EQUILIBRE.
ILS ONT ACCEPTE DE NEGOCIER PENDANT CETTE PHASE.IL SERAIT
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UNQUOTE.

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**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I E L

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---INITIATIVE DU FM: RELATIONS EST/OUFST - ENTRETIEN PM/PRES MITTERRAND

RÉSUMÉ: AU COURS DES ENTRETIENS D AUJOURD HUI 08NOV A ELYSÉE PRES MITTERRAND A DONNE REACTION TRÈS FAVORABLE AUX INITIATIVES ET A DÉMARCHÉ DU FM. SES COMMENTAIRES SUR PROPOSITION D UNE CONFÉRENCE DES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES ONT DÉPASSÉ LES RÉFLEXIONS FRANCAISES CONNUES JUSQU A

PRÉSENT ET CONFIRMENT UNE DISPOSITION DE FRANCE A VOIR CDA PRENDRE DES INITIATIVES A CE SUJET. IL EN VA DE MEME POUR LA CDE OU LA FRANCE PARTAGE AVEC NOUS LA VOLONTE D Y ASSURER IMPULSION POLITIQUE. TOUT EN ANALYSANT LES DIFFICULTES PRES MITTERRAND A SOUHAITE SUCCES DES DEMARCHES DU FM.

RAPPORT: ENTRETIENS A ELYSÉE REUNISSAIENT DU CÔTÉ FRANCAIS LE PRES, CHEYSSON, BIANCO, ATTALI ET VEDRINE ET DU CÔTÉ CDN LE FM, AMB, FOWLER ET SMITH ET ONT DURÉ ENVIRON DEUX HEURES.

3. FM A OUVERT DISCUSSION EN SE RÉFÉRANT A SA LET AU PRES QUI RÉSUMAIT SES PRÉOCCUPATIONS. AU COURS DES ANNÉES 70 RELATIONS EST/OUFST

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MF
28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission
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PAGE DEUX WIGR5273 CONF

AVAIENT VU CERTAINS PROGRES MAIS PLUS RECEMMENT LE FOSSE S ETAIT ELARGI ET, COMME L AVAIT REMARQUE PRES AUX NATIONS UNIES, COURSE AUX DESARMEMENTS S ACCELERAIT. IL FALLAIT TENTER DE RETABLIR DIALOGUE; ARMEMENT ETAIT DEvenu AFFAIRE DE COMPTABLE DONT HOMMES POLITIQUES DEVENAIENT TROP ABSENTS. DIALOGUE OUEST/OUEST A WILLIAMSBURG AVAIT ETE DECEVANT; COMMENT ALORS REPRENDRE DIALOGUE EST/OUEST? ARRIVEE DE CARRINGTON A OTAN Y FACILITERAIT PEUT-ETRE MEILLEUR DIALOGUE POLITIQUE MAIS IL S AGISSAIT D ETAPPE ULTERIEURE. NOUS DEVIONS MAINTENANT FAIRE PREUVE DE SOLIDARITE ET DEMONTRER AUX SOVIETIQUES NOTRE FERMETE AU SUJET DES DEUX VOIES DE L OTAN. MAIS IL FALLAIT AUSSI CONVAINCRE SOVIETIQUES QU UN DIALOGUE POLITIQUE DEVAIT ETRE RETABLI. RFAGAN SEMBLAIT S Y PREPARER POUR PRINTEMPS 84 AVANT KAL MAIS EVENEMENTS AVAIENT PRIS TOURNURE POUR LE PIRE. IL FAUDRAIT DEMONTRER POSSIBILITE D ACCORDS, ECHANGER DES IDEES COMMUNES OU CREER UN CADRE A REPRISE DE COMMUNICATION. CES EFFORTS CORRESPONDAIENT AUX PREOCCUPATIONS DES POPULATIONS OCCIDENTALES SUR POSSIBILITE D UNE GUERRE NUCLEAIRE. PM A RAPPELE INVITATION QU IL A A SE RENDRE A MOSCO. VISITE KOHL N AVAIT PAS PRODUIT GRAND CHOSE ET GRANDE DIFFICULTE DU DIALOGUE ANDROPOV/ RFAGAN ETAIT EVIDENTE. MALGRE TOUT PM VOULAIT CONTRIBUER AUX EFFORTS POUR CHANGER UNE PENTE DESCENDANTE.

4. PM A FAIT ALLUSION AUX PROPOSITIONS SUIVANTES: 1) DEBLOCAGE NEGOCIATIONS DE VIENNE QUI POURRAIENT REDONNER UNE CERTAINE CONFIANCE;

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PAGE TROIS WIGR5273 CONF

2) CONFERENCE DES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES. IL LIAIT CETTE PROPOSITION AUX DISCOURS QU IL POURRAIT TENIR A NELLE DELHIE AUX CHEFS GOUVS COMMONWEALTH. IL Y ETAIT CONVIE A OUVRIR DEBAT SUR DESARMEMENT ET PAIX ET IL SE PROPOSAIT DE REPRENDRE CERTAINES IDEES EXPRIMEES DEVANT ONU PAR PRES MITTERRAND. AINSI MENTIONNERAIT-IL EFFORTS POUR EMPECHER PROLIFERATION HORIZONTALE ET RAPPORT AVEC PROLIFERATION VERTICALE. MEME SI CERTAINS PAYS DU TIERS MONDE EPROUVAIENT QUELQUE FIERTE DEVANT EXPLOSION INDE NON-PROLIFERATION HORIZONTALE ETAIT BIEN COMPRISE DANS LEURS RANGS. IL ETAIT BON DE RAPPELER QUE DEVELOPPEMENT POUVAIT ETRE RELIE AU DESARMEMENT. PM A RAPPELE PESSIMISME DE SMITH SUR PROLIFERATION HORIZONTALE QUE LUI-MEME NE PARTAGEAIT PAS. TIERS MONDE ACCUSAIT PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES DE S ADONNER A PROLIFERATION VERTICALE; CONFERENCE DES CINQ POURRAIT REPONDRE A CES CRITIQUES. PM A DECRIT PLUS PARTICULIEREMENT SA CONCEPTION D UNE TELLE CONFERENCE OU NEGOCIATIONS NE SE FERAIENT NI BILATERALEMENT ENTRE SUPER PUISSANCES NI DE BLOC A BLOC MAIS OU LES CINQ PARTICIPERAIENT COMME PAYS SOUVERAINS. UN PAYS NON-NUCLEAIRE COMME CDA N AVAIT PAS DESIR DE S INTERPOSER MAIS IL ETAIT SOUHAITABLE QUE PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES DEMONTRENT QUE LEURS AMBITIONS N ETAIENT PAS ILLIMITEES.

5. CES SUJETS, MBFR, CONFERENCE DES CINQ ET CONFERENCE DE STOCKHOLM OU PM SOUHAITAIT VOIR S AFFIRMER UNE VOLONTE POLITIQUE SERAIENT PARMI PRINCIPAUX SUJETS D ENTRETIENS DURANT SON PERIPLE.

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PAGE QUATRE WIGR5273 CONF

6. PRES MITTERRAND A REPONDU QUE S IL S AGISSAIT D ENGAGER UN NOUVEAU PROCESSUS DE DESARMEMENT IL NE SE REFUSAIT NULLEMENT A RENCONTRER DES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES. IL NE FALLAIT CEPENDANT PAS SE LAISSER LEURRER PAR FAUSE ARITHMETIQUE PAR LAQUELLE ON METTAIT DANS LES MEMES CALCULS LES SS-20 SOVIETIQUES A TROIS TETES ET LES MISSILES FRANCAIS ET ANGLAIS A UNE TETE. AU DELA DES 98 MISSILES FRANCAIS ET 64 MISSILES ANGLAIS IL N Y AVAIT PLUS RIEN ALORS QUE L ARSENAL STRATEGIQUE DES GRANDES PUISSANCES COMPTAIT 9000 TETES NUCLEAIRES. AVANT D ENGLOBER ARMES NUCLEAIRES FRANCAISES DANS LEURS CALCULS LES DEUX GRANDS DEVAIENT ABAISSER LEURS ARMEMENTS. FRANCE N ETAIT PAS A GENEVE ET UNION SOVIETIQUE RECLAMAIT QUE SOUSMARINS FRANCAIS SOIENT COMPTES ALORS QUE NI SOUSMARINS SOVIETIQUES NI SOUSMARINS AMERICAINS N ENTRENT DANS LEURS CALCULS. SOUSMARINS FRANCAIS ETAIENT POURTANT EGALEMENT STRATEGIQUES. PRES MITTERRAND AJOUTAIT QUE SI ETATS UNIS N AVAIENT PLUS D ARMES NUCLEAIRES EN EUROPE UNION SOVIETIQUE POURRAIT S Y AVANCER ET SEULS FRANCAIS ET ANGLAIS AURAIENT UN ARSENAL NUCLEAIRE POUR SE DEFENDRE. ILS NE LE FERAIENT QUE POUR DEFENDRE LEURS TERRITOIRES; AINSI UNION SOVIETIQUE POURRAIT GAGNER LA GUERRE SANS L AVOIR LIVREE. PRES MITTERRAND AJOUTAIT QUE FRANCE REFUSAIT D ETRE CONSIDEREE COMME PIERRE D ACHOPPEMENT AUX NEGOCIATIONS DE GENEVE AINSI QUE TOUT ARGUMENT L ACCUSANT DE NE PAS VOULOIR SE LIVRER A UN DESARMEMENT NUCLEAIRE.

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PAGE CINQ WIGR5273 CONF

7. PRES MITTERRAND A RAPPELE QU IL ETAIT REVENU DE WILLIAMSBURG CONVAINCUE QUE ETATS UNIS NE VOULAIENT PAS ACCORD A CONFERENCE DE GENEV. IL ETAIT SUR QU A PARTIR DE DEC IL Y AURAIT DES PERSHINGS ET DES CRUISES EN EUROPE. L UNION SOVIETIQUE INTERROMPERAIT NEGOCIATION POUR SAUVER FACE. IL N Y AURAIT PAS DE GUERRE MAIS APRES UN OU DEUX MOIS DE TENSIONS UNION SOVIETIQUE CHERCHERAIT DE NOUVEAU UNE NEGOCIATION. TEMPS SERAIT VENU POUR DES IDEES NOUVELLES Y COMPRIS IDEE D UNE CONFERENCE A CINQ. SUPERS PUISSANCES VOUDRAIENT PEUT ETRE ALORS DISCUTER BILATERALEMENT MAIS IL CROYAIT QUE VU DEPLOIEMENT DES PERSHINGS DANS DIFFERENTS PAYS DE L OTAN D AUTRES PAYS SERAIENT IMPLIQUES. QUOIQU IL EN SOIT PRES MITTERRAND NE POUVAIT ACCEPTER QUE SEULS LES RUSSES AIENT DES INF. DESEQUILIBRE EXISTANT DEVAIT ETRE CORRIGE PAR DEPLOIEMENT DES PERSHINGS ET DES CRUISES. CE SERAIT AUTREMENT ACCEPTER MONOPOLE RUSSE ET EN FAIT ACCEPTER DECOUPLAGE. AVEC CONSEQUENCES DECRISES PLUS HAUT UNION SOVIETIQUE POURRAIT S EMPARER DE ALLEMAGNE SANS QU IL Y AIT DE REACTION.

8. MITTERRAND EST REVENU AU THEME QU AUCUNE INTERVENTION AUPRES DES RUSSES N AURAIT MOINDRE CHANCE D ABOUTIR AVANT DEPLOIEMENT DES PERSHINGS. IL EN AVAIT PREVENU KOHL AVANT SON VOYAGE A MOSCO. C EST APRES INSTALLATION DES PERSHINGS QUE VIENDRAIT LE JEU DIPLOMATIQUE. IL FALLAIT GARDER SES CARTES POUR NE PAS LES JETER PREMATUREMENT DANS LE FEU.

9. PM S EST DECLARE PARTAGER LARGEMENT ANALYSE DU PRES SUR INF ET

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PAGE SIX WIGR5273 CONFD

RECONNAITRE VALIDITE DE POSITION FRANCAISE. BON NOMBRE DE PROPOSITIONS DE NEGOCIATIONS AVAIENT ETE FAITES A GENEVE ET AURAIENT PU ETRE SUIVIES MAIS DETERMINATION POLITIQUE MANQUAIT. A DELHI IL VOUDRAIT MENTIONNER INTERET D UNE CONFERENCE A CINQ ET ENCOURAGER PAYS EN VOIE DE DEVELOPPEMENT A FAIRE PRESSION SUR LES GRANDS.

10. PM A EXPRIME SOUHAIT DU CDA DE VOIR CONFERENCE DE STOCKHOLM IMPREGNEE D UNE VOLONTE POLITIQUE QUI POURRAIT EMPECHER REPETITION DE CONFERENCE MBER DE VIENNE DONT L EXTREME LENTEUR ETAIT SOURCE DE DESAPPOINTEMENT. IL A RESUME SITUATION A VIENNE ET FAIT ETAT DES PROPOSITIONS ALLEMANDES QUE NI CHEYSSON NI PRES MITTERRAND NE SEMBLAIENT CONNAITRE.

11. CHEYSSON A MENTIONNE QUE GROMYKO, HOWE, GENSHER ET LUI-MEME SE RENDRAIENT A STOCKHOLM ET QUE SCHULZ ALLAIT CONSIDERER SA PARTICIPATION. AINSI PREOCCUPATIONS DE FRANCE

ALLAIENT DANS SENS DES OBSERVATIONS DU PM. PM A AJOUTE QU IL SOUHAITAIT QU UN DIALOGUE POLITIQUE REUSSE A STOCKHOLM PUISSE ETRE AUSSI REALISE A VIENNE. CELA POSERAIT PEUT ETRE QUESTION DU SEUIL NUCLEAIRE ET NECESSITE DE L FLEVER.

12. EN CONCLUSION PRES MITTERRAND A DECLARE QUE PROJET DU PM N AVAIT RIEN QUI POUVAIT CHOQUER FRANCE CAR IL PARTAGEAIT SON ANALYSE ET SES PREOCCUPATIONS. IL DOUTAIT DE QUALITE DE DIPLOMATIE AMERICAINE ET IL SOUHAITAIT SUCCES DE DEMARCHE DU PM. ENTRE AUTRE L IDEE D UNE CONFERENCE DES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES LUI SEMBLAIT UNE BONNE IDEE.

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PAGE SEPT WIGR5273 CONFD

13. ENTRETIENS SE SONT DEROULES DANS UNE ATMOSPHERE DE TRES GRANDE FRANCHISE ET CORDIALITE. INTERLOCUTEURS FRANCAIS MANIFESTENT DESIR DE SUIVRE DEMARCHE DU PM AU COURS DES SEMAINES A VENIR.

14. CE TEL N A PAS ETE VU PAR PMDEL AVANT SON DEPART DE PARIS ET EST DONC SUJET A CORRECTION

DUPUY

CCC/190 081935Z WIGR5273

Adrian

28-6-1-Muscleau Peace
6 | Mission

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE PARIS WIGR5272 08NOV83

A EXTOTT IDDZ LIVRAISON 081400

INFO BRU/PM DEL IMMED PCOOTT/FOWLER LDN BONN ROME HAGUF BRU MOSCO

BNATO NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CFP

DISTR MINA USS DMF UGB IFB IDD IDR IFB IDA RGB RCD RSR RSD RCR RPR

---INITIATIVE DU PM: RELATIONS EST/OUEST

CE MESSAGE VOUS DONNERA LES POINTS ESSENTIELS DES ENTRETIENS D AUJOUR-
D HUI, 08NOV, ENTRE PM ET PRES MITTERRAND. NOUS RAPPORTONS DETAILS
DES CONVERSATIONS DANS TELS SEPARÉS.

2. IL EST CLAIR QUE LETTRE DU PM AU PRES, NOS CONTACTS PREALABLES
AVEC HAUTS FONCTIONNAIRES FRANCAIS ET LEUR LECTURE DU DISCOURS DE
GUELPH AVAIENT BIEN PREPARE LE TERRAIN. EN EFFET PRES A PARTAGE
D EMBLE ANALYSE DE SITUATION EST/OUEST PRESENTEE PAR PM AINSI QUE SA
PERCEPTION DES ECHANGES TROP RESTREINTS ENTRE RESPONSABLES POLITIQUES
DE L OUEST SUR PROBLEMES EST/OUEST. PRES MITTERRAND A PROFITE DE
CETTE RENCONTRE POUR REITERER POINT DE VUE DE FRANCE SUR INF ET SA
CRITIQUE PERSONNELLE DES SOMMETS. SES OBSERVATIONS LES PLUS ORIGINA-
LES ONT PORTE SUR LES ECHEANCES DE LA DEMARCHE DU PM, PROPOSITION
D UNE CONFERENCE A CINO ET NATURE DE CONFERENCE DE STOCKHOLM.

3. MITTERRAND PREND POUR ACQUIS QUE NEGOCIATION DE GENEV VA ECHOUER
ET QUE DEPLOIEMENT DES PERSHING ET CRUISE COMMENCERA TEL QUE PREVU.
SOVIETIQUES SE RETIRERONT DE GENEV POUR SAUVER LA FACE ET AUCUNE

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PAGE DEUX WIGR5272 CONF

DEMARCHE VISANT SOIT CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS SOIT RESTORATION DU DIALOGUE POLITIQUE NE POURRA REUSSIR AVANT QUE CES EVENEMENTS SOIENT ACCOMPLIS. IL S EN SUIVRA UNE PERIODE DE TENSIONS MAIS AU BOUT DE DEUX OU TROIS MOIS MOSCO VOUDRA REPRENDRE DIALOGUE. IL RESTE A VOIR SI REACTION DE WSHDC SERA FAVORABLE. C EST DURANT CETTE PERIODE CRITIQUE ET PAS AVANT QUE DES INITIATIVES TELLES QUE CELLE PROPOSEE PAR PM POURRAIENT ETRE LES MIEUX VENUES.

4. SUR CONFERENCE A CINQ PRESIDENT A NOTE ATTENTIVEMENT EXPOSE DETAILLE QUE LUI EN A FAIT PM RAPPELANT POSITIONS FRANCAISES. IL A CEPENDANT DECRIE CETTE PROPOSITION COMME ETANT PRECISEMENT PARMI IDEES QUI POURRAIENT CONTRIBUER AU REDEMARRAGE DU DIALOGUE. TENEUR DE SES PROPOS S EST AVeree PLUS POSITIVE QUE DECLARATIONS FRANCAISES PASSEES AIENT PU SUGGERER. IL N EST PAS EXAGERE DE PARLER DE SOUTIEN FRANCAIS A CETTE INITIATIVE.

5. QUANT A STKM, CHEYSSON A CONFIRME QUE HOWE, GENSHER, GROMYKO ET LUI-MEME AVAIENT ACCEPTE DE S Y RENDRE ET QUE SCHULTZ DEVAIT MAINTENANT CONSIDERER D EN FAIRE AUTANT. IL Y AVAIT DONC UN MOUVEMENT EN MARCHÉ POUR ASSURER UNE FORTE PRESENCE MINISTERIELLE A STKM, CE QUI ALLAIT DANS SENS DES PREOCCUPATIONS CDNNES.

6. PRES A CONCLU QUE CIT LE PROJÉT DU PM N A RIEN QUI PUISSE NOUS CHOQUER FINCIT SI DELICAT SOIT-IL, IL RENCONTRAIT PREOCCUPATIONS DE LA FRANCE. PRES FORMULAIT A SON EGARD DES VOUUX DE REUSSITE.


PAGE TROIS WIGR5272 CONFD

7. IL SERA EVIDENT A LECTURE DES PARAS PRECEDENTS Q'UF ATMOSPHERE
DES ENTRETIENS A ETE EMPREINTE D UNE TRES GRANDE CORDIALITE ET QU EN
DEPIT DE VISITE SIMULTANEE DU PRES DE ALGERIE EN FRANCE, ELYSEE A
DONNE PRUVE DE L IMPORTANTE QU IL ACCORDAIT A VISITE PM PAR CARAC-
TERE DETAILLE DE SA REACTION A SON INITIATIVE

DUPUY

CCC/190 081740Z WIGR5272

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER



C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR4105 08NOV83

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ

INFO LDN PARIS WSHDC BONN ROME HAGUE BRU BNATO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RBR IDD IDA RBD RBP

REF MYTFL XYGR4102 04NOV

---PM INITIATIVE

IN REFTTEL I NEGLECTED TO SAY THAT I TOLD RYZHOV LEVEL AT WHICH EMISSARY WOULD WANT TO HAVE HIS DISCUSSIONS. WHAT I SAID EXACTLY WAS THAT HE(OR SHE) WOULD WISH TO MEET, IN ADDITION TO RYZHOV AND HIS COLLEAGUES (WHOM I COULD NOT/NOT VERY WELL IGNORE) GROMYKO AND PERSONS AT POLITICAL LEVEL IN CENTRAL CTTEE SECRETARIAT AND ON ANDROPOVS STAFF. I MADE IT CLEAR THAT LEVEL OF RECEPTION WAS IMPORTANT FOR US. RYZHOV MADE NO/NO COMMENT.

2. ON 07NOV AT KREMLIN RECEPTION I SAW SUSLOV (HEAD OF SECOND EUROPEAN DEPT MFA). HE TOLD ME THAT LET HAD BEEN DELIVERED AND THAT THERE WOULD BE REPLY WITHIN FEW DAYS.

3. PRAVDA OF 06NOV ANNOUNCED THAT 05NOV GROMYKO HAD RECEIVED MEXICAN AMB WHO HAD DELIVERED LET FROM MEXICAN PRESIDENT TO ANDROPOV. ACCORDING TO PRAVDA THERE WAS EXCHANGE ON INTERNATL MATTERS, INCLUDING GRENADA ABOUT WHICH TWO COUNTRIES HAD IDENTICAL VIEWS. MEXICAN AMB IS SAID TO HAVE EXPRESSED HIGH OPINION OF SOV INITIATIVE ON INF. I DO NOT/NOT THINK WE NEED FEEL OUR NOSES OUT OF JOINT THAT PMS LET WAS DELIVERED AT LOWER LEVEL AND WITHOUT

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PAGE TWO XYGR4105 CONF

PUBLICITY.MEXICAN LET UNDOUBTEDLY DEALT WITHGRENADA AND SOVS WOULD
WANT TO EXPLOIT OCCASION TO REINFORCE THEIR PUBLIC POSITION ON
THAT SUBJ

ROBERTS

CCC/144 081130Z XYGR4105

R E S T R I C T E D

FM PRMNY WKGR2457 08NOV83

TO FXTOTT IMC

INFO LDN DELHI BNATO WSHDC MOSCO PRET HRARE LSAXA DSLAM GENFV

PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DIPOL

DISTR IDDZ GAA GAD LCD IDA IDR IDD CPD RCM RCD ZSI IFB MINE MINA
LSD LSR IMU RBR

---COMWEL HEADS OF GOVT MTG:POLITICAL ISSUES

COMWEL SEC-GEN RAMPHAL MET WITH COMWEL PERM REPS TO UN ON NOV4.DUAL
OBJECTIVES OF MTG WERE TO BRIEF PERM REPS IN INTL DEVFLOPMENTS OF
INTEREST TO COMWEL AND TO SEEK PERM REPS VIEWS ON POSSIBLE ISSUES
AT NEW DELHI COMWEL HEADS OF GOVT MTG(CHOGM).DISCUSSION COVERED
POLITICAL,ECONOMIC AND FUNCTIONAL ISSUES,INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL
PEACE AND SECURITY,SOUTHERN AFRICA,FALKLAND ISLANDS,COMWEL REPORTS
ON ECONOMIC ISSUES,COMWEL FUNCTIONAL COOPERATION AND GRENADA.THIS
TEL FOCUSSES ON POLITICAL SUBJECTS EXCEPT GRENADA WHICH WAS SUBJECT
OF SEPARATE TEL OURTEL WKGR2424 04NOV).HIGHLIGHTS INCLUDED REFERENCE
TO PM TRUDEAU'S APPROACH TO E/W RELATIONS AND RAMPHAL'S IDEA THAT
COALITION OF MIDDLE POWERS,INCLUDING CDA,SHOULD ASSERT INFLUENCE
ON SUPERPOWERS.SEPARATE TELS FOLLOW ON ECONOMIC AND FUNCTIONAL
ISSUES AND ON SUBSEQUENT MTG ON INTL SECURITY ISSUES BETWEEN SFN
PITFIELD AND AUSTRALIAN DISARM AMB BUTLER.

2.RAMPHAL BEGAN BY OUTLINING AGENDA AND EXPECTED DEVELOPMENTS AT
DELHI CHOGM.WHILE STRESSING THAT HEADS OF GOVTS AND STATES(HOGS)

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PAGE TWO WKGR2457 RESTR

WOULD WANT TO ENSURE MTG HAD THEIR PERSONAL STAMP, HE FELT THAT DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE DIVIDED INTO THREE TRANCHES: WORLD POLITICAL TRENDS, INCLUDING SPECIAL DISCUSSION ON SOUTHERN AFRICA; WORLD ECONOMIC ISSUES; AND UN FUNCTIONAL COOPERATION. IN GENERAL TERMS, RAMPHAL FELT COMWEL, WHICH WAS NOT/NOT BLOC, COULD BRING QUOTE HEALING TOUCH UNQUOTE TO TROUBLED WORLD. HE WAS TRYING TO HAVE DELHI MTG CONSCIOUSLY EXPLORE ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND WHICH COULD IN TURN ENCOURAGE OTHER INNATL LEADERS. EMPHASIS WOULD BE ON INFORMALITY, NOT/NOT ON COMMUNIQUE DRAFTING. AS EXAMPLE OF EMPHASIS ON HOGS ROLE, DELS HEADED BY MINISTERS AS OPPOSED TO HOGS WOULD AGAIN HAVE LOWER PRIORITY IN SPEAKING ORDER WHILE DELS HEADED BY OFFICIALS WOULD ONLY BE AUDITORS. DISCUSSIONS UNDER THREE HEADINGS WOULD BE WIDE RANGING AND AWAY FROM QUOTE SPECIAL DISCUSSIONS UNQUOTE OF KEY ISSUES EXCEPT FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA.

3. ON WORLD POLITICAL TRENDS, SEC-GEN RECOGNIZED HOGS WOULD WISH TO TOUCH ON REGIONAL ISSUES SUCH AS KAMPUCHEA OR CENTRAL AMERICA BUT MAIN FOCUS WOULD BE ON WIDER QUESTIONS, SUCH AS E/W RELNS, ARMS RACE, AND INNATL QUOTE FLASH POINTS UNQUOTE. PM TRUDEAU WOULD OPEN SESSION BY STATEMENT WOULD BE RESULT OF MUCH INTELLECTUAL ENERGY AND WOULD LIKELY FOCUS ON BROAD ISSUE OF QUOTE THIRD RAIL OF DISARMAMENT UNQUOTE, WITHOUT GETTING INTO SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT SUB-ISSUES. RAMPHAL HOPED RESULTS MIGHT PARALLEL 1961 CHOGM WHICH SET OF DISARMAMENT PRINCIPLES WHICH BECAME SORT OF INTL GUIDELINES FOR

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PAGE THREE WKGR2457 RESTR

SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS. IN RESPONSE TO AUSTRALIAN SUGGESTION RAMPHAL SAID SECRETARIAT HAD NOT/NOT PREPARED STATEMENT ON INTL SECURITY BUT HAD SOME IDEAS. SECRETARIAT WAS READY TO SIT DOWN IN ADVANCE OF CHOGM AND DISCUSS THEM. HE FELT TOTAL PREOCCUPATION OF SUPERPOWERS IN E/W ISSUES PRESENTED GREAT DANGER FOR ALL COUNTRIES. COMWEL AS A WHOLE HAD RECOGNIZED VALUE OF NON-ALIGNMENT. PERHAPS TIME HAD COME FOR SOME MIDDLEPOWERS, SUCH AS CDA, AUSTRALIA, NIGERIA, INDIA, BRAZIL AND NORDICS TO ASSERT INFLUENCE ON SUPERPOWERS. RAMPHAL SAID HE HAD MADE SPEECH ON THIS IDEA IN AUSTRALIA.

4. CDN PERM REP UNDERLINED PM TRUDEAU'S INTEREST AND CONCERNS ON F/W ISSUES WHICH WERE NOT/NOT PROBLEM FOR EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA ALONE. MFANWHILE THREAT EXISTED THAT UN COULD BECOME IRRELEVANT. THAT ALSO HAD WIDER IMPLICATIONS FOR MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY, INCLUDING COMWEL. CHANAIAN REP FELT DELHI COMMUNIQUE ON INTL SECURITY SHOULD ALSO SUPPORT REGIONAL INITIATIVES EG HELSINKI MTG. CHOGM MIGHT ALSO FOCUS ON CRISIS MGT AND HOW TO IMPROVE RESOURCES OF COMWEL SECRETARIAT IN CRISIS MTG.

5. ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, WHICH WILL BE SUBJECT OF SPECIAL DISCUSSION AT DFLHI, RAMPHAL BEGAN BY REVIEWING RECENT DEVELOPMENTS. HE ALSO FELT TWO OPTIONS WERE OPEN: PENETRATING BUT RITUALISTIC DISCUSSION LEADING TO AGREEMENT ON ISSUES SUCH AS LINKAGE OR ALTERNATIVELY MORE INTIMATE DISCUSSION IN CLOSED MTG, PERHAPS INVOLVING COMWEL MEMBERS OF FRONT LINE STATES AND CONTACT GROUP PLUS FEW OTHERS, TO EXPLORE

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PAGE FOUR WKGR2457 RESTR

WHAT IS FEASIBLE.DECISION ON TYPE OF MTG WOULD BE GUIDED BY AFRICAN
HOGS VIEWS.DISCUSSION WOULD BE PEGGED TO SA CTTEE REPORT AND WOULD
ALSO TOUCH ON PRACTICAL ISSUES SUCH AS REFUGEES AND EDUCATION USING
LOW-COST SATELLITE.

6.IN RESPONSE TO MALTESE SUGGESTION THAT COMWEL COUNTRIES REP ON
SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT HAVE CREATIVE ROLE IN SC IF SOME IDFAS CAME
FROM CHOGM,RAMPHAL NOTED THAT SC RESPONSE TO SEC GENS REPORT WAS
NOT/NOT A QUOTE FINAL DOCUMENT UNQUOTE,AND THAT THERE WAS STILL
ROOM FOR PROGRESS.GUYANA AND CYPRUS SUPPORTED CHOGM DISCUSSION OF
THIS ISSUE.

7.UK PERM REP SUGGESTED ON PERSONAL BASIS THAT CHOGM MIGHT EXAMINE
DISTINCTIVE COMWEL QUOTE INSTINCT FOR DEMOCRACY UNQUOTE INCLUDING
DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE.NIGERIA AND CYPRUS EXPRESSED INTEREST IN IDFA.
RAMPHAL REACTED CAUTIOUSLY TO IDEA,SAYING THAT IT COULD BE RAISED
AT CHOGM BUT IT MIGHT BETTER BE FIRST RAISED AT SENIOR OFFICIALS
MTG.HE NOTED THAT WHILE COMWEL WAS COMMITTED TO DEMOCRACY AS
PRINCIPLE BUT REALITIES WERE SOMETIMES DIFFERENT.THAT SAID,HE HAD
NOTED DISTURBING TREND FOR GOVTS TO EMPHASIZE NATIONALISM AT EXPENSE
OF INTERNATIONALISM.

8.ON FALKLANDS,UK PERM REP REVIEWS BRIT POSITION,WHILE ARGENTINA
HAD ELECTED NEW DEMOCRATIC GOVT,BRITS WERE STILL DEALING WITH IN
SITU MILITARY GOVT.HE HOPED NEW DEMOCRATIC GOVT WOULD RECOGNIZE
DEM RIGHTS OF FALKLANDERS WHO HAD QUOTE INALIENABLE RIGHT OF SELF-

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PAGE FIVE WKGR2457 RESTR

DETERMINATION UNQUOTE.WHILE UK GOVT WOULD WELCOME QUOTE DIALOGUING
UNQUOTE TO RESTORE NORMALCY,IN CANNOT/NOT ACCEPT NEGOTIATIONS IN
TERMS USED IN RESLN.HE STRESSED NEED FOR INTERESTS OF PEOPLE TO BE
PARAMOUNT,A PHRASE IN CHARTER ART 73 BUT NOT/NOT IN ARGENTINE DRAFT
RESLN.HE ENDED WITH APPEAL FOR COMWEL SUPPORT DURING UNGA DEBATE.

CCC/265 090307Z WKGR2457

**CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM PRMNY WKGR2455 08NOV83

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ DELIVER BY 090900

INFO HAGUF/PMDEL/FOWLER DELIVER BY 090900 LDN DELHI BNATO

WSHDC MOSCO GENEV CNBRA NDHOOTT/DIPOL

DISTR IMC IDA IDR IDD CPD RCM PCD ZSI IFB MINE MINA IMU RPR

---COMWEL HEADS OF GOVT MTG(CHOGM):PM INITIATIVE

SENATOR PITFIELD OUTLINER TO PERMIS MTG WITH AUSTRALIAN

DISARMAMENT AMBASSADOR BUTLER, HELD AT LATTERS REQUEST, ON NOV7 TO
REVIEW INNATL PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES LIKELY TO BE DISCUSSED AT
DELHI CHOGM. BUTLER REVIEWED HIS NOV6 DISCUSSIONS WITH COMWEL SEC GEN
RAMPHAL ON TACTICS FOR MTG, INCLUDING POSSIBLE JOINT ACTION BY CDA
AND AUSTRALIA TO DRAFT INNATL PEACE AND SECURITY COMMUNIQUE.

2. BUTLER NOTED THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ATTEND CHOGM AS
AUSTRALIAN PM HAWKES DISARMAMENT ADVISER. HE HAD ARRANGED TO SEE
SHENSTONE IN OTT NOV15/16 AS WELL.

3. IN BUTLERS VIEW, PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT,
NOT/NOT THE LEAST BECAUSE CDA WAS NATO MEMBER AND HAS GOOD CONTACTS
INTERNATIONALLY. BUTLER FELT CDN APPROACH PARALLELS AUSTRALIAN
APPROACH. IN THIS CONTEXT, HE HAD DISCUSSED POSSIBLE INITIATIVES AT
DELHI WITH RAMPHAL ON NOV6. ACCORDING TO BUTLERS REPORT, RAMPHAL FELT
GRAVITY OF SITUATION COULD NOT/NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED. WHAT WAS
NEEDED WAS MAJOR, LOFTY, PRINCIPLED DECLARATION ON INNATL SECURITY
SITUATION. DECLARATION SHOULD NOT/NOT BE TOO DETAILED, HOWEVER, IN
ORDER TO OBTAIN SUPPORT FROM PM GANDHI GIVEN HER DOMESTIC CONCERNS.

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MF
28-6-1- Trudeau Peace mission

PAGE TWO WKGR2455 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

IN RAMPHAL'S VIEW, TWO POLES OF DELHI COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE INNATL SECURITY AND INNATL ECONOMIC SITUATION, WITH REST OF ISSUES SUPPRESSED AS AFTER-THOUGHTS IN COMMUNIQUE. RAMPHAL FELT INNATL SECURITY ASPECTS OF COMMUNIQUE SHOULD UNDERLINE URGENCY OF SITUATION AS WELL AS RELATIONSHIP WITH ECONOMIC ISSUES EG ARMS EXPENDITURE.

4. ACCORDING TO PUTLER, RAMPHAL SUGGESTED AUSTRALIA AND CDA SHOULD GET TOGETHER AND DO A DRAFT WHICH HE COULD IN TURN SELL TO GANDHI. GANDHI WOULD THEN TAKE IT DIRECTLY TO EXECUTIVE CTTEE AND AVOID SENIOR OFFICIALS MTG IN ADVANCE OF CHOGM. IN TERMS OF MTG TACTICS, RAMPHAL ENVISAGED PM OPENING DEBATE FOLLOWED BY NYERERE, THATCHER AND GANDHI (QUOTE ACTING AS BRIDGE UNQUOTE) FOLLOWED BY SHAGARI. RAMPHAL HAS WRITTEN TO HAWKE SUGGESTING HE PARTICIPATE IN DEBATE. SCENARIO SEEMS INTENDED TO NEUTRALIZE OR AT LEAST DILUTE EXPECTED HARD LINE COMMENTS BY PM THATCHER.

5. RAMPHAL ALSO SUGGESTED THAT CHOGM SHOULD GO BEYOND DECLARATION. RAMPHAL HAD IDEA THAT SMALL GRP OF HOGS MIGHT GO TO MOSCO AND WSHDC TO BRING DECLARATION TO THE ATTENTION OF THOSE GOVTS. IN HIS VIEW GRP MIGHT INCLUDE GANDHI, SHAGARI, HAWKE AND TRUDEAU. BUTLER SUGGESTED TO RAMPHAL THAT CHOGM MIGHT ALSO MANDATE STUDY ON ARMS EXPENDITURES. RAMPHAL NOTED THAT APPROACH AT CHOGM WOULD HAVE TO AVOID QUESTION OF NUCLEAR TESTING IN ORDER TO GET GANDHI ON SIDE. ACCORDING TO BUTLER, RAMPHAL FELT THATCHER'S VIEWS COULD BE CIRCUMVENTED IN

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PAGE THREE WKGR2455 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

PREPARATION OF COMMUNIQUE. RAMPHAL SAID HE EXPECTED TO SEE PM
TRUDEAU THIS WEEKEND TO DISCUSS ABOVE IDEAS FURTHER.

6. NOT/NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR IN ALL THIS, IS DEGREE OF AUTHORITY FROM
CNBRA CARRIED BY BUTLER BOTH FOR HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH RAMPHAL
WHERE HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY AUSTLN UNPERM REP WOOLCOTT) AND
PITFIELD.

CCC/265 090015Z WKGR2455

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Shirley
Pls send copy
of French version of NATO
they bag to 3 NATO + file
Division Phoned _____
Person _____
Local Time _____

NONCLASSIFIE

DE BNATO YBGR2448 08NOV83

A EXTOTT IDDZ LIVRAISON 091200

INFO BRU MDRID


DISTR IDR

---DISCOURS PM A GUELPH

20-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission
6

PARTAGEONS PREOCCUPATION MADRID RE DISPONIBILITE EN TEMPS
UTILE DU TEXTE DU PM A GUELPH EN FRANCAIS. QUANT A NOUS,
NOUS NE L AVONS JAMAIS RECU EN FRANCAIS. AVONS EMPRUNTE
TELEX DE BRU POUR DISTRIBUTION AU CIRC MAIS EN RAISON DE
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UUU/070 081416Z YBGR2448



C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDA1269 08NOV83

TO HSINKI/CDEDEL DELWORTH ONLY DELIVER BY 090900


DISTR IDAO IDAN IDDZ

---CDF-PRIME MINISTERS INITIATIVE

YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT DURING MEETINGS WITH EUROPEAN INTERLOCUTORS
PM WILL PROPOSE THAT CONF BE GIVEN VISIBLE POLITICAL IMPFTUS AT
OUTSET EG BY BFING INAUGURATED AT HEAD OF GOVT OR FOREIGN MINISTER
LEVEL.

2.WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF REACTION.

CCC/032 082357Z IDA1269



INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMOOTT PM01268 08NOV83

TO PMDELHAGUE PARIS BRU ROME BONN LDN DELIVER BY 090900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER EXTOTT IDDZ PPR

---PM INITIATIVE-VISIT TO JPN

IN RESPONSE TO LEAK TO CDN PRESS/TOKYO, HAVE CONFIRMED THAT
PM WILL VISIT TOKYO EN ROUTE TO CHOGM TO MEET PM NAKASONF.

NO/NO FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT ENVISAGED BEFORE PM S RETURN.

UUU/075 082150Z PM01268

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT PPR0413 08NOV83

TO TOKYO DELIVER BY 100900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/SMITH

DISTR USS DMF PGB PPD IDD IDZ IMC XDV TID TIM

---PM PEACE INITIATIVE: CONSULTS WITH JPN

AS YOU NOW KNOW FROM TELECONS WITH XDV, PMS PARTY NOW SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE TOKYO 1730 18NOV AND DEPART 1730 19NOV.

2.XDV IS HENCEFORTH RESPONSIBLE AT THIS END FOR ALL LOGISTICS MATTERS ASSOCIATED WITH VISIT INCLUDING AMONG QUESTIONS RAISED YOURTEL UIGR1915 07NOV) LIST OF PM DEL PREPARATION OF PGM, ACCOMMODATION, AND DEALINGS WITH PRESS.XDV WILL BE SENDING YOU FULLEST POSSIBLE DETAILS IMMEDIATELY.ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS OR SUGGESTIONS YOU HAVE ON THESE OR OTHER LOGISTICS MATTERS SHOULD ACCORDINGLY BE ADDRESSED TO XDV.

3.UNDERSTAND ATOC HAS ALREADY BEEN IN TOUCH WITH YOU ABOUT AIRCRAFT OVERFLIGHT AND LANDING CLEARANCES.

4.ALL QUESTIONS ON SUBSTANCE OF PEACE INITIATIVE SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO IDDZ.

5.IN ADDITION TO MATERIAL IDDZ IS PROVIDING ON SUBSTANCE OF PEACE INITIATIVE, WE ARE PREPARING FOR PM BIO NOTES ON NAKASONE AND FOREIGN MIN ABE AND BRIEFS ON JPNSE SECURITY/ DISARMAMENT CONCERNS AND POLICIES AND CURRENT JPNSE POLITICAL

...2

28-6-1-Troudeau Peace Mission

PAGE TWO PPR0413 CONFD

SITUATION.FOR YOUR OWN INFO ONLY,ALTHOUGH PM WISHES TO CONFINF
DISCUSSION ENTIRELY TO PEACE INITIATIVE, WE ARE ALSO PREPARING
PURELY DEFENSIVE BRIEF ON AUTO ISSUE IN CASE IT IS RAISED BY
NAKASONE.WE INTEND TO SUGGEST TO PM THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO
MAKE SOME POSITIVE REFERENCE DURING INFORMAL CONVERSATION
WITH NAKASONE TO JPNS RECENT ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION MEASURES.
6.JPNSE EMB HERE IS PRESSING HARD UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM
GAIMUSHO FOR ALL DETAILS POSSIBLE ON SUBSTANCE AND LOGISTICS
OF VISIT.WE HAVE INFORMED THEM THAT WE CONSIDER YOU PRIME
CHANNEL FOR COMMUNICATION WITH JPNSE AUTHORITIES IN TOKYO ON
PLANS FOR VISIT BUT ARE KEEPING THEM GENERALLY INFORMED.YOU MAY
WISH TO ENCOURAGE GAIMUSHO TO PUT QUESTIONS ABOUT SUBSTANCE AND
LOGISTICS TO YOU TO AVOID OR AT LEAST LIMIT CONFUSION THAT
DOUBLE CHANNELING CAN CAUSE.

CCC/291 092245Z PPR0413

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT PPR0406 08NOV83

TO TOKYO DELIVER BY 090900


INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/SMITH

DISTR USS DMF PGB PPD IDD IDDZ XDV


---PMS INITIATIVE-CONSULTATIONS WITH JPN

OWING TO NEWS LEAK, APPARENTLY ORIGINATING IN TOKYO, PMO IS NOW
CONFIRMING, WITHOUT FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT, THAT PM PLANS TO VISIT
TOKYO TO DISCUSS HIS PEACE INITIATIVE WITH NAKASONE ON 19NOV FM
ROUTE TO CHOGM. YOU MAY DO SAME. OTHER VISIT DETAILS TO FOLLOW ASAP.

CCC/278 082316Z PPR0406



C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM EXTOTT PPR0398 08NOV83
TO CNBRA WLGTN
DISTR (IDDZ PGB PPD IMC
REF OURTFL IDDZ0079 04NOV



---PMS INITIATIVE: BRIEFING FOR AUSTLN AND HZ HICOMMS
GARY SMITH, MEMBER OF TASK FORCE AND DIRECTOR OF ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION (IDA) BRIEFED DEPUTY HIGH COMMISSIONERS
OF AUSTL (BAILEY) AND NZ (BEATH, ACCOMPANIED BY SECOND SECTY
STEWART) JOINTLY 01NOV ON PRIME MINISTERS INITIATIVE ON PEACE
AND SECURITY.

2.SMITH OPENED BY GIVING BAILEY AND BEATH COPIES OF CONFIDENTIAL
BACKGROUND GUIDANCE TRANSMITTED TO POSTS 26OCT ON PMS GUEFLH
SPEECH.SMITH TRACED PMS INITIATIVE BACK TO WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT
WHEN PM HAD PRESSED SUCCESSFULLY FOR INCLUSION IN QUOTE
STATEMENT ON SECURITY UNQUOTE OF COMMITMENT TO DEVOTE QUOTE
OUR FULL POLITICAL RESOURCES TO REDUCING THE THREAT OF WAR
UNQUOTE.PM HAD BEEN GALVANIZED INTO ACTION TO REVERSE DOWNWARD
TREND IN E/W RELATIONS BY KAL INCIDENT WHICH HAD DEMONSTRATED
THAT RISK OF ONE SIDE MISREADING OTHER SIDES INTENTIONS HAD
INCREASED.PMS OBJECTIVE WAS TO BUILD QUOTE SAFETY NET UNQUOTE
AROUND E/W RELATIONS.CDA CONTINUED TO ADHERE TO NORAD AND NATO
POLICY AND HAD REAFFIRMED DECISIONS ON CRUISE TESTING AND TWO-
TRACK APPROACH (DEPLOYMENT AND NEGOTIATIONS) ON INF

...2

PAGE TWO PPR0398 CONF

(INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES).CDA SUPPORTED ITS ALLIES ON DEPLOYMENT BUT IF NATO DEPLOYED AND USSR REACTED AT IT SAID IT WOULD E/W CLIMATE WOULD DETERIORATE FURTHER.HENCE PM SAW NEED FOR INITIATIVE NOW TO BUILD SAFETY NET BY ADDING TO TWO-TRACK DECISION QUOTE THIRD RAIL UNQUOTE OF HIGH POLITICAL ENERGY TO SPEED COURSE OF AGREEMENT.

3.BEATH SAID PMS GENERAL THEME WOULD BE RECEIVED WELL IN WLGTH AS NZ HAD BENEFITED FROM DETENT (USSR HAD BECOME IMPORTANT NZ EXPORT MARKET) AND NZ GOVT WAS WORRIED INCREASINGLY BY SHRILL NATURE OF SUPERPOWER DIALOGUE.BEATH ASKED IF PM WOULD RAISE HIS INITIATIVE AT CHOGM.

4.SMITH REPLIED THAT COMWEALTH SEC GEN RAMPHAL WANTED E/W RELATIONS AND DISARMAMENT PLACED NEAR TOP OF AGENDA AND HAD ASKED PM TO LEAD OFF ON THESE ISSUES.IT REMAINED TO BE WORKED OUT HOW COMWEALTH WOULD ADDRESS THESE ISSUES.

5.SMITH EXPLAINED THAT PMS INITIATIVE WAS BEING PURSUED ALONG QUOTE CRITICAL PATH UNQUOTE.PM WAS MEETING VARIETY OF PEOPL TO EDUCATE HIMSELF ON ISSUE;EG HE LUNCHEDED WITH MCNAMARA 25OCT AND GEN ROGERS(SACFOR)26 OCT AND MET NUMBFR OF USA SPECIALISTS ON WEEKEND. HE HAD WRITTEN ALL NATO LEADERS AND MIGHT ALSO WRITE MULDOON AND HAWKE)AND WOULD MEET SIX EUROPEAN LEADERS BEFORE CHOGM.HE HAD DELIVERED SPEECH AT GUELPH 27OCT

...3

PAGE THREE PPR0393 CONF

AND MIGHT DELIVER ANOTHER IN MTL) BETWEEN HIS RETURN FROM EUROPE AND DEPARTURE FOR CHOGM.

6. BAILEY ASKED WHAT FORM CONSULTATIONS WITH JS GOVT HAD TAKEN. SMITH REPLIED THAT SSEA HAD BRIEFED SCHULTZ ON INITIATIVE DURING LATTERS VISIT TO NS TWO WEEKS EARLIER; AND PM HAD SENT TO LET TO REAGAN. RESPONSE FROM REAGAN WAS EXPECTED SHORTLY.

BEATH ASKED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE CONSULTATIONS WITH PRC. SMITH REPLIED THAT CHINESE PM WOULD VISIT CDA IN JAN.

7. BAILEY ASKED WHAT PMS SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WERE. SMITH REPLIED THAT WHILE PM STILL HAD TO DISCUSS THEM WITH OUR NATO ALLIES, THEY COULD BE READ BETWEEN LINES TOWARD END OF PMS SPEECH.

A) INCLUSION OF CHINA, UK AND FRANCE WITH USA AND USSR IN NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT ESTABLISHING GLOBAL LIMITS ON NUCLEAR ARSENALS TO ARREST VERTICAL PROLIFERATION. CDA WAS NOT/NOT CALLING, HOWEVER FOR COUNTING OF FR AND UK WARHEADS IN INF NEGOTIATIONS.

B) RAISING NUCLEAR THRESHOLD PREFERABLY BY MBFR AGMT OR ELSE BY INCREASING CONVENTIONAL STRENGTH OF NATO IF MBFR TALKS DO NOT/NOT PRODUCE SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. (C) STRENGTHENING OF NPT TO CURTAIL HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION, ESPECIALLY TO NEAR-NUCLEAR STATES.

8. IN CONCLUDING SMITH STRESSED THAT CDA WAS NOT/NOT ACTING AS QUOTE GO-BETWEEN OR SHUTTLE-DIPLOMAT UNQUOTE BUT WAS ATTEMPTING TO CREATE CLIMATE FOR E/W TALKS. CDA WAS AWARE OF AND SUITABLY

...4

PAGE FOUR PPR0398 CONFD

CAUTIOUS ABOUT RISK THAT USSR MIGHT ATTEMPT TO EXPLOIT PMS
INITIATIVE WITH VIEW TO DISAGGREGATING WEST.

CCC/165 082302Z PPR0398



TO/À

Task Force (Smith)

FROM/DE

PSR (through PSD)

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET

Draft letter from P.M. Trudeau to
P.M. Gandhi

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

...

Attached is a proposed text of a letter from
P.M. Trudeau to P.M. Gandhi concerning Mr. Trudeau's
initiative and the Commonwealth Conference.

A. G. Vincent
Director
South & Southeast Asia
Relations Division

Mr. M. Meen
to return

PSR/A.G. Vincent/2-6807/nj

Security/Sécurité

SECRET

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

28-61-Trudeau

Peace Mission

Date

November 7, 1983

Number/Numéro

PSR - 2871

A. G. Vincent/PSR
PERSONAL AND SECRET

D R A F T Letter to Prime Minister Gandhi

My dear Prime Minister,

I am writing as a follow-up to my conversations with you when we met in New York this September. As you know, I have since embarked on an initiative directed towards identifying possibilities for reducing tensions between the superpowers. I have acted at this time because I believe that the international environment has deteriorated dangerously and that, if we are to reduce the threat posed by the incalculable horrors of a nuclear war, this trend must soon be reversed.

I am very conscious of the fact that it was a similar concern about the worsening global political and economic climate which prompted you, in your role as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, to call together a number of national leaders for the meetings in New York. I was glad to attend because I believe very strongly that the only way we can hope to emerge from our current awesome international problems is to work together towards solutions. It was my conclusion that the New York meetings achieved very much what you intended - that is a relatively informal exchange of views on issues without the need to adopt structured positions based on established national postures. This in fact, through a different process, is very much what I have since been trying to achieve on an East-West context. I concluded that I should begin my efforts through a major speech which would endeavour to highlight the need to cut through the accretion of hostility and

.../2

- 2 -

PERSONAL AND SECRET

distrust which has so seriously clogged the process of East/West negotiations on arms control.

I considered the next step should be to consult directly with a number of heads of government to gain the benefit of their views as to how we should act. I am beginning this process with my trip to Europe this week which will take me to France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.

This brings me to my purpose in writing to you at this time. Fate moves mysteriously, but it is remarkable that you are simultaneously Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement and host to this year's Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. It is in the context of both these capacities that I am proposing to you that India and Canada should act together, using the unique environment of the Commonwealth Conference as a Forum, towards reversing the present alarming trend in world affairs. The Commonwealth setting would seem particularly appropriate for such an effort - after all it was the statemanship of Jawaharlal Nehru and Lester Pearson which in 1949 made possible the creation of the modern multiracial Commonwealth.

I believe we should seek to emulate them in a different context. The first Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting to be held in India can materially advance the single cause which is of greatest importance to all the Commonwealth members - that is the goal of world peace.

.../3

000538

- 3 -

PERSONAL AND SECRET

In referring to world peace I should state squarely what I mean. The vital necessity is to reverse the seemingly endless spiral of nuclear proliferation - that is both "vertical" proliferation and "horizontal" proliferation. There is of course a massive range of issues and national concerns which relate to disarmament. When we come down to the nub, however, we must face one salient reality - either this generation of world leaders must reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons; and prevent their spread; or we bequeath to our peoples a future where the chances of global destruction increase every day.

It is an interesting historic accident that India and Canada should have an opportunity to act in coordination on this issue. It is, after all, our own bilateral disagreement on nuclear policy which in the past has placed the greatest strain on our relationship. Yet, in spite of our different perspectives on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and our different security concerns, I believe both our countries provide a remarkable example of nuclear restraint. India has shown its capacity to become a nuclear weapons state but has refrained from doing so. Likewise, in spite of possessing the scientific knowledge and technical capacity to create nuclear weapons, Canada has renounced this option.

Let me therefore place a proposal before you.

.../4

- 4 -

PERSONAL AND SECRET

agreed

As you have asked that I lead off the discussion on international political events, I would intend to take the opportunity to focus my own comments on the objectives of my initiative and how I see options developing following my discussions with a number of world leaders. I would hope we might then work towards some sort of a Commonwealth declaration on nuclear proliferation which would in effect place added pressure on the nuclear weapons states to move forward with meaningful negotiations on nuclear arms limitations. The most dramatic and, I believe the most effective, means of conveying this message might be through a Commonwealth renunciation of any addition to the number of nuclear weapons states. I realize that such a pledge would pose difficulties for India - but for this precise reason I believe it would place India in a clear leadership role in marshalling the influence of Commonwealth and non-aligned nations against all forms of nuclear proliferation. It would also be made absolutely clear that such a self-denying commitment would be directly contingent upon early and clear signs of progress by the nuclear weapons states towards halting vertical nuclear proliferation.

I wanted to put the foregoing thoughts to you without delay in order to obtain your reaction so that we can consider possible strategies at CHOGM. I hope to have developed my own ideas further before we meet in New Delhi. The essence of my perception, however, is that the atmospherics of international relations - and particularly the relations between the superpowers - must be changed as a pre-requisite to real progress towards peace. With this in mind, it is

- 5 -

PERSONAL AND SECRET

my firm view that the New Delhi Conference, under your Chairmanship, can make a historic contribution in sending an unequivocal message to the superpowers.

I fear this letter has been long, but it is an issue which merits any degree of attention. I very much look forward to your response.

Yours sincerely,

P. E. Trudeau

EX-3502
(212) 246-7424

ACTION
10/3

UNCLASSIFIED
NONCLASSIFIÉ

Facsimile
TRANSMISSION

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission
fac-similé

Our file/no. dossier:

NYC 19

NO. GRPA-100 DATE 8 November 1983

PAGES THREE
(incl. cover)
(y compris la page
couverture)

FROM: Canadian Consulate General
DU : Consulat général du Canada
NEW YORK

SECTION: GRPA
Mr./M^{lle}
M./Mad. A. DONOHUE

TO : Mr./Ms.
A : M./Mad.

Department:
Service : EXTOTT/IDDZ

Phone :
Téléphone :

Subject :
Objet : REF OUR TEL YIGR0706 07 November 1983

SUBJ.: PM INITIATIVE ON EAST WEST - FRG RADIO COVERAGE

AS PROMISED IN REF TEL TEXTS ATTACHED.

2 of 3

WDR 1, Politik am Morgen
28.10.1983, 7.05 - 7.20 Uhr

Ansgar Skriver

"So wie Krieg zu wichtig ist als ihn den Generalen zu ueberlassen, ist die Beziehung zwischen den Supermaechten zu sehr mit Feindseligkeit belastet, als dass die Ost-West-Beziehungen allein ihnen auszuvertrauen waeren." Dies ist ein Satz aus einer seit Wochen mit grossem Stab vorbereiteten Grundsatzrede, die der kanadische Ministerpraesident Pierre Trudeau gestern Abend an der Guelph-Universitaet in Ontario vor einer Konferenz ueber Strategien fuer Friede und Sicherheit im Atomzeitalter gehalten hat. Er kuendigte eine Reise nach Europa an, um mit fuehrenden Politikern zu beraten. Am 8. November wird er den franzoesischen Praesidenten Mitterand in Paris, am 10. November Bundeskanzler Kohl in Bonn treffen.

Trudeau will, sozusagen in letzter Minute, vor dem drohenden Scheitern der Genfer Verhandlungen und der Stationierung neuer Mittelstreckenraketen in Europa eine grosse Anstrengung zur Vermittlung zwischen den USA und der Sowjetunion unternehmen. Zu der Zweigleisigkeit des NATO-Doppelbeschlusses, so sagt er, muesse jetzt eine "dritte Schiene" kommen, auf der er sich bemuehen will, den gefaehrlichen Abwaertstrend in den Ost-West-Beziehungen aufzuhalten. Er habe, so teilte Trudeau mit, diese Woche einen Prozess eingehender Diskussion mit Praesident Reagan begonnen und plant offensichtlich, nach Konsultationen mit anderen Staats- und Regierungschefs auch den sowjetischen Parteifuehrer Andropov ins Gespraeche zu ziehen.

Seine "dritte Schiene" soll ein politischer Energiestoss sein, um die Atmosphaere der Verhandlungen zwischen den Grossmaechten zu beeinflussen und zu verbessern. Vertrauensbildung, Stabilitaet, Ruestungskontrolle und politischer Wille seien die Themen, die nicht nur unsere Zeit, sondern auch unsere Leben beherrschen. Trudeau sucht nach Wegen, die Supermaechte von ihrer Konzentration auf militaerische Staerke hin zu einem regulaeren und produktiven Dialog zu ziehen, hin zu einem Verstaendnis fuer Verantwortung, das ihrer Macht entspricht. Nach Trudeaus Ueberzeugung muss militaerische Strategie politischen Zielen dienen, die modernen Waffen und Militaerdoktrinen einen Sinn geben. Fuer den Westen sei es wesentlich, in seiner Politik Elemente der Kommunikation, Verhandlung und Transparenz ueber die eigenen Absichten aufrechtzuerhalten und der Sowjetunion Anreiz zu geben, ihre eigenen Ziele gegenueber dem Westen erst klarzulegen und dann zu veraendern.

Als Ministerpraesident des NATO-Mitglieds Kanada steht Trudeau zum NATO-Doppelbeschluss, will aber jetzt mehr tun. Einer seiner Kernsaetze: "Das Risiko eines Zufalls oder einer Fehlkalkulation ist fuer uns zu gross, als dass wir nicht beginnen sollten, die Kommunikationswege mit unseren Widersachern zu reparieren. Das Ausmass der Spannung ist zu hoch, als dass wir nicht eine konstruktive Einstellung zur Krisenbegrenzung wiederbeleben sollten. Das wechelseitige Misstrauen ist zu stark, als dass wir nicht versuchen sollten, Vertrauen wiederaufzubauen durch aktive politische Kontakte und Konsultationen."

Pierre Trudeau aus Kanada will diese Initiative versuchen.

3 of 3

NDA 3. Fruehkurier
28.10.1983, 6.10 - 8.00 Uhr

Ansgar Skriver

Der kanadische Ministerpraesident Pierre Trudeau hat gestern abend an der Guelph-Universitaet nahe Toronto eine aufruettelnde Rede gehalten. Er will einen Vermittlungsversuch zwischen Ost und West unternehmen; mit Praesident Reagan hat er diese Woche eine eingehende Diskussion begonnen. Am 8. und 10. November sind Gespraechе mit Praesident Mitterand in Paris und Bundeskanzler Kohl in Bonn vorgesehen. Einen Moskau-Besuch hat er noch nicht erwaeht, aber er laege in der Logik dessen, was Trudeau wenige Wochen vor der Stationierungs-Ausfuehrung des NATO-Doppelbeschlusses im Dezember vorhat.


Seine Sorge gilt nicht nur dem nuklearen Wettruesten, sondern auch dem technischen Fortschritt sogenannter konventioneller Waffen. Seine Frage lautet: "Ist es der Zweck nuklearer Ruestungskontrolle, die Welt fuer konventionelle Kriegfuehrung reif zu machen?"

Eine weitere Beobachtung: es gebe die unglueckliche Tendenz einer Diskussion, die ueber Ost-West-Beziehungen beginne und im Bruedermord von West-West-Beziehungen ende. Zuweilen wuerden er, Ronald Reagan oder Margaret Thatcher derart angegriffen, als ob sie eine groessere Bedrohung fuer die Sicherheit des Westens darstellten als die Russen und ihre Verbuendeten. Aber Trudeau ist mit der gegenwaertigen Lage hoechst unzufrieden, da Vertrauen in die Absichten der jeweils anderen Seite geschwunden sei. Man sei allgemein eher bereit, sich auf das Schlimmste einzustellen als Einfluss zum Besseren auszuueben. Die wichtigsten politischen Beziehungen wuerden entpolitisiert.

Der kanadische Ministerpraesident, der an seiner Beteiligung am NATO-Doppelbeschluss festhaelt, will von der Ueberbetonung des Militaerischen in den Ost-West-Beziehungen wegkommen und der Politik mit dem Ziel von mehr Sicherheit fuer beide Seiten wieder Vorrang verschaffen. Er spricht davon, neben der Zweigleisigkeit des Doppelbeschlusses muesse jetzt auf einer "dritten Schiene" gefahren werden, um Kontakte, Dialog, Konsultation wiederherzustellen.

Das soll nach seiner Vorstellung ein Schuss politischer Energie sein, um der Gefahr zu begegnen, die aus Zufall oder Fehlkalkulation erwaechst. Trudeau will alles daran setzen, dass die Stockholmer KSZE-Abruestungskonferenz im Januar produktiv wird und man dort ueber vertrauensbildende Massnahmen nicht in einem politischen Vakuum spricht. Gebraucht wuerde eine wechselseitige Anerkennung legitimer Sicherheitsbeduerfnisse, staendiger Dialog auf hoher Ebene und entschlossene Bereitschaft zur Krisenbeherrschung. Ohne ein Mindestmass beiderseitiger Achtung gehe es nicht.

Man wird sehen, ob der Appell des kanadischen Ministerpraesidenten gehoert wird, schrille Rhetorik duerfe nicht laenger mehr Ersatz fuer Aussenpolitik sein.



MR
ED

Division Phoned 100-53394
Person CF
Local Time 1505

UNCLASSIFIED

FM HAGUE PMDL0002 08NOV83

TO EXTOTT 1DDZ XDV DELIVER BY 081600

INFO PMOTT/JOHNSON/COLFMAN PCOOTT/FOWLER FLASH PARIS BRU ROMF BONN

LDN RCMPOTT/VIP5 IMMED

DISTR MGT

---PM INITIATIVE

PM AND DEL ARRIVED HAGUE 09NOV 1700Z.

2. PM AT DUTCH PM RESIDENCE PHONE 070-544400.

3. OFFICE AT HOTEL DES INDES PHONE 070-469553 ROOM 80.

UUU/029 081920Z PMDL0002

November 8, 1983

Letter from Indira Gandhi to Prime Minister Trudeau

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
Mission

"Dear Pierre,

I am grateful to you for joining us in the informal get-together of the Heads of State/Government in New York. I am conscious how difficult it must have been for you to spare the time. Your constructive and positive approach was appreciated by me and other participants. I hope you also found the exercise of interest.

It was felt by all that our discussions helped in clarifying some of the issues of global concern. At least as regards international monetary and financial matters, we came near to consensus.

At the meeting itself it was mentioned that the momentum generated by the New York dialogue should be kept up. How can this be done? It is hardly reasonable to expect Heads of State/Government to travel abroad every few months for such consultations. At the same time, we cannot expect progress on such crucial and delicate issues to be achieved at official level. I shall greatly value your suggestions. We can discuss this question further when you are here in November.

Looking forward to meeting you, and with good wishes.

Indira"

INFO

MF
D

R E S T R I C T E D

FM BONN ZOGR4075 08NOV83

TO HAGUE/PMDEL DELIVER BY 081700

INFO EXTOTT 1DDZ

DISTR RGB RCR

---PM VISIT TO BONN-MTG WITH VOGEL

OFFICE OF SPD CHAIRMAN VOGEL HAS CALLED US TO ASK IF THERE IS
ANY POSSIBILITY OF MTG WITH PM DURING HIS VISIT TO BONN.

AS YOU KNOW, RANGE OF EAST-WEST ISSUES, CONCENTRATING ON INF
DEPLOYMENT, HAS BECOME SENSITIVE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ISSUE AND
FOR THIS REASON, AS WELL AS TIGHT SCHEDULE, WE WOULD RECOMMEND
AGAINST PM MEETING WITH VOGEL. AS ALTERNATIVE, IF YOU AGREE, AMB
COULD MEET WITH VOGEL ON FRIDAY AND PASS ALONG ANYTHING OF VALUE
VOGEL HAD TO SAY. GRATEFUL RESPONSE ASAP.

CCC/007 081545Z ZOGR4075

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

PM VISIT TO EUROPE - November 8-11, 1983

Monday, November 7 p.m. Leave Ottawa

Tuesday, November 8 a.m. Arrive Orly Airport, Paris

Go to hotel

1200 Meet President Mitterrand at the Elysée
to
1530

1530 Press briefing

1600 Depart for airport

1630 Depart airport for The Hague

1800 Arrive The Hague

Check in at hotel

1730 Dinner with PM Lubbers

Overnight in The Hague

Wednesday, November 9 a.m. Press briefing (?)

Depart for Belgium

1100 Participate in Canada Week remembrance ceremony at WWII site in Belgium

Arrive hotel in Brussels

mid-afternoon Meeting with PM Martens

early evening Depart for Rome

Arrive hotel

Thursday, November 10 1100 Meeting with PM Craxi

1200 Lunch with PM Craxi

1430 Leave for airport

1700 Arrive Bonn

Proceed to hotel

1800 Meeting with Chancellor Kohl

1930 Dinner with Chancellor Kohl
to
2100

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Friday, November 11 a.m. Depart for Netherlands
Participate in Remembrance Day ceremony
p.m. Depart by 1500 hrs. for Montreal

INFO 08-6-1 - Trudeau Pedal Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR4076 08NOV83

TO HAGUE/PMDEL/FOWLER DELIVER BY 081700

INFO EXTOTT ADDZ

DISTR RGB RCR XDV

REF OURTEL ZQGR4070 07NOV TO XDV

---PM INITIATIVE-MTG WITH KOHL

AS INDICATED REFTTEL, ACCOMPANYING CHANCELLOR FOR TALKS WITH FM WILL BE HIS DIPLO ADVISER TELTSCHIK AND NEW MFA STATE SECRETARY (DM), MEYER-LANDRUT. FOURTH WILL BE INTERPRETER (WEBER). LIMITED NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS AND THEIR POSITIONS/BACKGROUNDS INDICATE CHANCELLOR IS RESPONDING SERIOUSLY TO PMS WISH FOR INTENSIVE DISCUSSION. FOLLOWING ARE SOME NOTES ON TELTSCHIK AND LANDRUT.

2. TELTSCHIK. ALTHOUGH YOUNG (43) TELTSCHIK HAS BEEN ONE OF KOHL'S CLOSEST ADVISERS FOR OVER TEN YEARS. IN THE CHANCELLOR'S OFFICE HE IS RESPONSIBLE FOR FOREIGN POLICY, INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS AND EXTERNAL SECURITY POLICY AND HIS VIEWS HAVE A MAJOR INFLUENCE ON KOHL AND ON FORMULATION/PRESENTATION OF FRG FOREIGN POLICY. AS INDICATED IN OURTEL (ZQGR1025 OF NOV03 AND 2951 OF SEP28, TELTSCHIK'S PRINCIPAL CURRENT PREOCCUPATION IS WITH DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FOREIGN DEVELOPMENTS. HIS OBJECTIVE IS TO KEEP LID ON PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO INF STATIONING; HENCE HIS ENDORSEMENT OF USA PUBLIC DIPLOMACY APPROACH TO GENEV NEGOTIATIONS.

3. TELTSCHIK HAS SOLID BACKGROUND IN EAST-WEST QUESTIONS. HE STUDIED ...2

PAGE TWO ZQGR4076 CONF

E-W RELATIONS AT OTTO SUHR INSTITUTE IN BERLIN AND WAS FROM 1970-72 HEAD OF CDU HQ OFFICE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INNER-GERMAN RELATIONS. WHEN KOHL WAS MINISTER-PRESIDENT OF RHINELAND-PALATINATE (1969-1976) TELTSCHIK WROTE HIS SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY EG ON PLANNED AGREEMENT. TELTSCHIK ACCOMPANIES KOHL ON ALL HIS TRIPS ABROAD AND WAS WITH HIM LAST WEEK IN THE FAR EAST.

4. MEYER LANDRUT. IN OFFICE ONLY ONE WEEK MEYER-LANDRUT HAS MOST RECENTLY SERVED AS AMB IN MOSCO. YOUNG (54) TO BE NAMED MFA STATE SECRETARY (DEPMIN). MEYER-LANDRUT HAS EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE WITH EAST-BLOC. HE WAS BORN IN ESTONIA (REVAL) AND TOOK SLAVIC STUDIES, EAST EUROPEAN HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY AT UNIVERSITIES OF GOTTINGEN AND ZAGREB. HIS FIRST POSTING WAS TO MOSCO (OTHERS WERE TOKYO AND BRAZZAVILLE). MEYER-LANDRUT IS LARGELY UNKNOWN QUANTITY FOR US BUT HE COMES WITH REPUTATION FOR HAVING CLEAR AND QUICK MIND. OBVIOUSLY HE ENJOYS CONFIDENCE OF CDU FOREIGN-POLICY ESTABLISHMENT. LANGUAGE ABILITY INCLUDES RUSSIAN, SERBO-CROAT, ENGLISH, FRENCH, SWEDISH.

CCC/007 081530Z ZQGR4076

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D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T E

DE BRU ZVAG5111 08NOV83

A EXTOTT ADDZ LIVRAISON 081000

HAGUE IMMED

INFO BREEC PARIS BNATO CANMILREPNATO

DISTR XDV MGT RGB RCR RSR RBD

---PROJET DE PROGRAMME-VISITE DU PM A BRUXELLES-MERCREDI 09NOV

11H05 ARRIVE DU PM-AEROPORT DE MELS BROEK(BRUXELLES)

ACCUEILLI PAR AMBASSADEURS FORTIER, TAYLOR ET GIGNAC

VOITURE NBR 1

PREMIER MINISTRE

LIMOUSINE

AMBASSADEUR FORTIER

REPRESENTANT BELGE

ESCORTE

M BEAULIEU AVEC GENDARMERIE

BELGE

VOITURE NBR 2

RR FOWLER

CHEVROLET CAPRICE

JE JOHNSON

CD-2509

G SMITH

VOITURE BNR 3

R COLEMAN

FORD GRENADA

ES BROWN

CD-2501

AB ASSELIN(AMBASSADE)

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PAGE DEUX ZVAG5111 RESTR

VOITURE NBR 4

BAGAGES

MINIBUS

G.BEAUCHAMP(AMBASSADE)

CD-2508

11H35 ARRIVEE A L HOTEL AMIGO ET INSTALLION

PREENREGISTREMENT ET TELEGRAMMES R.POULIN

12H55 DEPART HOTEL AMIGO POUR PALAIS D EGMONT

LIMOUSINE

P.M. TRUDEAU

AMBASSADEUR FORTIER

VOITURE NBR 3

RR FOWLER

FORD GRENADA

G SMITH

ESCORTE

POLICIERS BELGES(AVEC M BEAULIUE)

13H00 ARRIVEE AU PALAIS D EGMONT

SEANCE D ACCUEIL-PRESENCE DE JOURNALISTES BELGES ET

CANADIENS-PHOTOGRAPHES ET CAMERAMEN

15H00 CLOTURE OFFICIELLE DE REUNION

PRESENCE DE JOURNALISTES BELGES ET CANADIENS(BREVE RFNCONTRF)

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PAGE TROIS ZVAG5111 RESTR

15H05 DEPART PALAIS D EGMONT POUR AEROPORT DE MELS BROEK

LIMOUSINE

P.M. TRUDEAU

ESCORTE

POLICIERS BELGES(AVEC M.BEAULIEU)

VOITURE NBR 3

RR FOWLER

G SMITH

15H05 DEPART HOTEL AMIGO POUR AEROPORT

VOITURE NBR 2

JE JOHNSON

CHEVROLET CAPRICE

R COLEMAN

CD-2509

ES BROWN

AB ASSELIN

VOITURE NBR 4

BAGAGES

MINIBUS

G BEAUCHAMP

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15H35 DEPART

AEROPORT DE MELS BROEK

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*Nuclear Peace
Mission*

28-6-1

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR4036 08NOV83

TO HAGUE DELIVER 081200 EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER 090800
INFO PARIS BONN ROME BRU BNATO PCOOTT/FOWLER DELIVER 081400
DISTR MINA USS DMF UGB RBG RCD RSD IDD RBR RSR RCR IDA IDR
REF OURTEL XNGR3082 02NOV

---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST/WEST RFLS:INITIAL BRITISH REACTION TO
DISARMAMENT ASPECTS

PLEASE BRING FOLLOWING TEL TO ATTENTION OF PMDEL IMMEDIATELY.

SUMMARY:DMF MET FCO ASST UNDERSECTY RESPONSIBLE FOR DEFENCE AND
ARMS CONTROL CARTLEDGE 07NOV TO SKETCH OUT IN GENERAL TERMS
THINKING BEHIND PMS INITIATIVES ON ARMS CONTROL.DMF DESCRIBED
PMS TIMING IMPERATIVES AS PRIMARILY DEDICATED TO QUOTE POST
DEPLOYMENT UNQUOTE ENVIRONMENT POINTING TO 1984 WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING
FIVE YEAR CALENDAR.HE THEN DESCRIBED IN DETAIL SUBSTANTIVE POINTS
WHICH PM WAS TENTATIVELY CONSIDERING AND ON WHICH HE MIGHT SEEK
MRS THATCHERS VIEWS.CARTLEDGE DESCRIBED MOTIVATION BEHIND
INITIATIVE(WHICH HE SAID WAS QUOTE EXTREMELY INTERESTING UNQUOTE)
AS REFLECTING FRUSTRATION ON EAST/WEST SITUATION WHICH HE KNEW
MRS THATCHER SHARED WITH CDN PM.HE NONETHELESS MADE NUMBER OF
SPECIFIC COMMENTS WHICH HE SAID REFLECTED SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT
PERSPECTIVE ON STATE OF ARMS CONTROL NEGS AND USA ATTITUDES:
MBFR;AND UK DETERRENT.

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2.REPORT:WITH CAVEAT THAT HE COULD GIVE ONLY INITIAL AND VERY PERSONAL REACTION,CARTLEDGE SUGGESTED THAT ARMS CONTROL TALKS MUST BE SEEN IN CONTEXT OF POLAND,AFGHANISTAN,AND KAL;AND THAT GIVEN THESE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS IT WAS QUOTE SURPRISING THERE HAS BEEN AS MUCH MOVEMENT AS THERE HAS BEEN UNQUOTE.IN PARTICULAR CARTLEDGE SAW DIFFERENT PERCEPTION HERE OF STATE OF MIND IN WSHDC,AND SUGGESTED PRESENT USA ADMIN HAS SHOWN(FOR WHATEVER REASON)MARKED CHANGE IN ATTITUDE TOWARDS ARMS CONTROL SINCE OBTAINING CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL FOR MX MISSILE PROGRAM,AND EUROPEAN ELECTIONS:USA POSITIONS IN INF AND START SHOW FLEXIBILITY AND ARE AIMED AT REMOVING HURDLES WHICH HAVE HITHERTO BEEN INSUPERABLE TO SOVIET SIDE;EVEN IN MBFR THERE HAS BEEN RECENT MOVEMENT WHICH CANNOT/NOT BE DISCOUNTED.

3.ON MBFR SPECIFICALLY,CARTLEDGE ADMITTED UK ARE SEEN AS QUOTE BAD GUYS UNQUOTE.HE REITERATED BRITISH SCEPTICISM OVER MOVEMENT FOR MOVEMENTS SAKE,IN PARTICULAR PROPOSALS TO GIVE UP PRIOR DATA AGREEMENT IN EXCHANGE FOR HAZILY DEFINED VERIFICATION.

4.CDE:CARTLEDGE SUGGESTED THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT CDE BECOMING BOGGED DOWN:QUOTE IN FACT,REPORTS FROM HELSINKI ARE NOT/NOT THAT DISCOURAGING UNQUOTE.HE ARGUED THAT THERE WAS SOME DANGER OF PUTTING TOO MUCH WEIGHT ON CDE AND THEREBY RUNNING RISK OF PLAYING INTO HANDS OF THOSE WHO SEE CDE

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PAGE THREE XNGR4036 CONF

AS PERMANENT, DECLARATORY PROCESS. WITHIN ITS LIMITED TERMS OF REFERENCE, CDE WILL HAVE USEFUL ROLE TO PLAY IN MODERATING EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIP.

5. THIRD COUNTRY DETERRENTS: CARTLEDGE EXPRESSED FRANK RELIEF AT ASSURANCES THAT IT WAS NOT/NOT CDN INTENTION TO PROPOSE INCLUSION OF THIRD COUNTRY DETERRENTS IN CURRENT GNVA INF NEGS. HE NONETHELESS REMAINS CONCERNED AT IMPLICATIONS WHICH MAY ARISE FROM ANY PROPOSAL FOR WIDER NEGS, OR FOR DISCUSSION OF RATIOS AMONG FIVE NWS. OFFICIALS HERE ARE CONSTANTLY REVIEWING LEVEL OF MINIMUM DETERRENT BUT AT MOMENT CARTLEDGE CAN SEE LITTLE CHANCE OF GOING BEYOND FORMULATION USED BY FOREIGN SECTY HOWE AT UNGA: IE, THAT BRITISH DETERRENT WOULD ONLY BE CONSIDERED IN GNVA PROCESS WERE THERE TO BE SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS ON PART OF SUPERPOWERS. IN UK VIEW THIS CRITERIA IS UNLIKELY TO BE MET IN NEAR FUTURE, AND CARTLEDGE SUGGESTED PM THATCHER WOULD MAKE THIS POINT FORCEFULLY IN HER TALKS WITH MR TRUDEAU.

6. ON QUESTION OF MERGER OF GNVA TALKS, CARTLEDGE DESCRIBED BRITISH AS FLEXIBLE, BUT SUGGESTED THEY HAVE RECEIVED CONFLICTING SUPERPOWER REACTIONS TO EARLIER SIMILAR PROPOSALS. IDEA IS WORTH EXPLORING, BUT THROWS UP IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS, FG, IN EXPANDED FIVE POWER TALKS THE RUSSIANS WOULD SEE THEMSELVES AS FACING FOUR HOSTILE POWERS; THIS WOULD DO NOTHING TO MOVE THEM AWAY FROM

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CURRENT OBSESSION OF NEEDING AS MANY WEAPONS AS ALL OTHER POWERS COMBINED.

7. OTHER AREAS: (A) NPT: CARTLEDGE ASSURED DMF THAT BRITISH FULLY SHARE CDN PREOCCUPATIONS: THEY ATTACH IMPORTANCE TO FINDING WAY OF BREAKING RISING ANTIPATHY ON PART OF BOTH SIGNATORIES AND NON-SIGNATORIES, AND AGREE THAT IT IS QUOTE DESPERATELY IMPORTANT UNQUOTE TO ENSURE THAT NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE NOT/NOT FAIL, AND TO DEVELOP INCENTIVES ENHANCING BENEFITS ATTACHED TO STATUS OF SIGNATORIES BETTER TO CONTRAST WITH NON-SIGNATORIES. (B) FREEZE ON ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS: AGAIN, CARTLEDGE DESCRIBED BRITISH AS IN AGREEMENT WITH CONCEPT. HE NONETHELESS POINTED OUT THAT IT MIGHT BE UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT SOVIETS TO MAKE CONCESSIONS WHEN THEY WERE ALREADY AHEAD ON LOW LEVEL A-SAT. (C) BANNING OF HIGHLY MOBILE WEAPONS AND WEAPONS WHICH CANNOT BE VERIFIED. WHILE CARTLEDGE CHARACTERIZED THESE AS NEW AND WORTHWHILE THOUGHTS, HE FORESAW POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS IN FORMER FOR TOTALLY SEABASED BRITISH DETERRENT, AND SOME DIFFICULTY FOR LATTER IN PERSUADING SUPERPOWERS OF ITS WORKABILITY.

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FM PMDELPHARIS PMDL0001 08NOV83

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INFO PMOOTT/JOHNSON/COLEMAN PCOOTT/FOWLER HAGUE BRU ROME BONN LDN
DISTR MGT

---PM INITIATIVE

PM AND DEL ARR PARIS 0825 HRES. AT HOTEL RITZ TEL 260.38.30
OFFICE 335.

2. APPRECIATE IF TELS PACKS COULD BE LIMITED TO TELS RELATIVE TO
PM INITIATIVE, GRENADA, CHOGM, MATTERS OF URGENCY AND DEL ADMIN.

UUU/118 081345Z PMDL0001

Master file

CONFÉRENCE DES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLÉAIRES

*28-6-1-Trudeau
Peace Mission*

I Objet

Le présent document trace les grandes lignes d'une initiative qui pourrait permettre de structurer la limitation des armements des cinq États officiellement dotés de l'arme nucléaire.

II Genèse

Seules les superpuissances ont jusqu'à maintenant mené des négociations visant à limiter leurs armements nucléaires stratégiques. Les trois autres États officiellement dotés de l'arme nucléaire (France, Grande-Bretagne et Chine) n'y ont pas participé, et leurs arsenaux ne sont toujours assujettis à aucun accord international.

III Proposition

Un cadre de réglementation des forces nucléaires assurerait une prévisibilité globale de l'équilibre stratégique, et réduirait ainsi les incitations à accroître les capacités de dissuasion. Si les négociations produisaient une entente sur les forces stratégiques permises à chaque partie, il en résulterait la limitation d'un accroissement de ces forces au-delà des niveaux convenus. Cette prévisibilité, conjuguée au plafond quantitatif imposé aux forces nationales, augmenterait parallèlement les chances d'une réduction sensible des armes.

La présente initiative vise à éviter les sérieuses lacunes inhérentes à d'autres propositions du même genre. Ce sont notamment l'agréation inacceptable des forces britanniques, françaises et américaines; la prise en compte des forces d'autres États dans des pourparlers bilatéraux; et les restrictions injustifiées et inacceptables imposées aux forces de dissuasion nationales en l'absence de réductions sensibles des forces des superpuissances.

Les points suivants se veulent des principes et considérations d'ordre général ayant trait à la substance et au processus des négociations visant l'élaboration d'un accord sur la limitation globale des armements nucléaires.

Processus

- a) Les négociations officielles devraient être précédées de consultations au sein de groupes de travail de façon à établir l'ordre du jour, le mandat et les principes directeurs des pourparlers subséquents.
- b) Ces rencontres préliminaires devraient être convoquées sous conditions préalables trop contraignantes, sauf en ce qui touche l'entente sur le but global du processus. Il faut éviter les exigences préalables quant au fond qui risquent d'enlever à l'intérêt d'une éventuelle participation.

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- c) Les pourparlers ne devraient pas être menés au niveau des blocs, mais plutôt au niveau des États. Chaque État garderait un droit de veto sur la substance de tout accord.

Substance

- a) Le but global des négociations serait de parvenir à une entente sur des coefficients fixes pour les forces stratégiques nationales.
- b) Pour qu'ils soient acceptés par les superpuissances, ces coefficients devraient refléter l'égalité de jure des superpuissances, de façon à éviter les lacunes inhérentes à des approches comme les actuelles propositions soviétiques sur les FNI.
- c) Les coefficients actuels devraient faire l'objet de négociations.
- d) L'unité de compte serait négociable, mais il serait probablement plus facile d'en venir à une entente si "les ogives des vecteurs d'armes nucléaires stratégiques" étaient adoptées comme l'unité de mesure. Cette formule aurait l'avantage de correspondre aux principes défendus par les Occidentaux et les Soviétiques dans les négociations FNI et START; d'encourager l'adoption graduelle de systèmes à ogive unique moins vulnérables et l'abandon progressif des systèmes mirvés vulnérables et déstabilisateurs; d'empêcher que l'on contourne l'esprit de l'accord en plaçant un plus grand nombre d'ogives sur un nombre fixe de lanceurs; et de ne pas "handicaper" les forces britanniques, françaises et chinoises dont le potentiel mirvé est généralement moins important.
- e) Les programmes de modernisation actuellement projetés devraient être pris en compte dans les coefficients négociés, afin d'assurer une entente.
- f) Ces négociations et l'accord qui en résulterait ne viendraient remplacer ni les actuels pourparlers START et FNI, ni leurs successeurs, mais devraient plutôt en constituer un complément. Si les circonstances l'exigent, l'accord pourrait être renégocié en fonction du résultat de ces autres négociations. Ces autres accords ne pourraient toutefois dépasser les niveaux convenus dans l'accord global. Mais ils pourraient imposer de nouvelles contraintes et mesures de réduction des arsenaux qui viendraient s'ajouter aux mesures convenues entre les cinq puissances.
- g) Les parties devraient être autorisées à se retirer de l'accord selon une procédure de notification adéquate (à négocier) dans des situations où elles perçoivent une menace à leur sécurité nationale.
- h) Les programmes de perfectionnement qualitatif qui ne violent pas les coefficients convenus seraient autorisés, sous réserve des autres accords de contrôle des armements.

- 3 -

- i) Seraient englobés tous les systèmes aériens, terrestres et maritimes dont on conviendrait, par voie de négociation, qu'ils sont de nature stratégique.
- j) Si les participants jugeaient que certaines armes, sans être de portée intercontinentale, sont tout de même de nature stratégique, pourraient être combinées avec celles de portée intercontinentale, et les parties pourraient déployer leurs systèmes là où elles le jugent approprié, sous réserve des restrictions prévues par d'autres accords de contrôle des armements. (Ce qui pourrait imposer un compromis entre les forces intercontinentales et de théâtre des superpuissances, compromis qui pourrait réduire l'intérêt d'une course aux armements sur le théâtre européen tout en permettant, dans les déploiements de théâtre, des dissymétries qui pourraient régler certains problèmes qui surgissent dans les actuelles négociations FNI à Genève).
- k) Il serait probablement nécessaire (et souhaitable) d'associer des totaux numériques spécifiques aux coefficients convenus et d'empêcher ainsi des relèvements quantitatifs au-delà des coefficients convenus, qui légitimeraient des rajustements proportionnels de la taille des forces des autres parties.
- l) Afin d'accommoder les actuels efforts de contrôle des armements, il se pourrait que l'établissement de coefficients précis doive attendre le résultat des négociations SIIARI et FNI. Ces négociations fourniront la prévisibilité nécessaire à l'établissement de coefficients réalistes. Afin de faciliter une entente dans le cadre des pourparlers SIIARI et FNI, il serait souhaitable que les superpuissances s'engagent à mener des pourparlers globaux dans le contexte de ces autres accords, si ces derniers devaient être négociés.
- m) D'autres restrictions qualitatives convenues pourraient être négociées au besoin par les parties, tout comme des mesures connexes visant à renforcer la gestion des situations de crise ainsi que la confiance entre les parties. Il pourrait notamment s'agir:
 - i) d'une interdiction des systèmes d'armes antisatellite de haute altitude;
 - ii) de la vérifiabilité des moyens techniques nationaux;
 - iii) de la limitation de la mobilité des ICBM.

OBJET

Ce document propose trois mesures limitées et spécifiques susceptibles de mieux stabiliser les relations stratégiques et d'imposer des limitations à la mise au point de techniques militaires.

A. INTERDICTION DE LA MISE À L'ESSAI ET DU DÉPLOIEMENT DE SYSTÈMES ANTISATELLITE DE HAUTE ALTITUDE

Les systèmes à satellites remplissent actuellement certaines fonctions vitales pour les superpuissances: vérification, alerte avancée et communications stratégiques/navigation. La mise au point de systèmes conçus pour détruire ces satellites porterait atteinte à la crédibilité des forces de dissuasion, se traduirait par une instabilité considérable et entraverait le processus de vérification ainsi que le maintien d'un élément de prévisibilité dans les perceptions que les superpuissances se font des programmes et ressources militaires. Les deux superpuissances mènent depuis un certain temps des activités de recherche-développement touchant des armes antisatellite qui seraient utilisées dans les couches inférieures de l'atmosphère (basse altitude). Ces mêmes activités, pour ce qui concerne les couches supérieures de l'atmosphère (haute altitude), sont beaucoup moins avancées. C'est dans ce secteur que des nouveaux développements seraient le plus déstabilisateurs, du fait qu'ils menaceraient le fonctionnement de satellites affectés à des communications vitales. Une interdiction aurait donc un effet stabilisateur et pourrait être à l'origine d'autres mesures pour restreindre les activités à basse altitude.

Les superpuissances ont déjà mené des pourparlers sur les systèmes antisatellite. Ces pourparlers ont toutefois été rompus par les États-Unis. Mais, étant donné qu'aucune des superpuissances n'est sur le point de déployer un système de haute altitude, les deux États pourraient accueillir favorablement l'idée d'une interdiction. L'initiative pourrait par la suite favoriser d'autres restrictions touchant ces systèmes. Américains et Soviétiques ne sont déjà dotés d'importants systèmes de basse altitude. Ayant déjà une capacité opérationnelle, les Soviétiques pu tentent d'un gel alors même que les États-Unis mettent leur propre système à l'essai. Les chances de succès d'une initiative de l'extérieur dans le domaine des systèmes de basse altitude seraient par conséquent négligeables, et les motifs la sous-tendant pourraient être vus avec suspicion.

Ce qui n'est pas le cas pour les systèmes de haute altitude, dont l'utilisation restreinte serait également plus facile à vérifier que celle des systèmes de basse altitude.

La perspective d'une limitation de la mise au point de systèmes antisatellite dans l'espace atmosphérique, ou de tels systèmes destinés à être utilisés dans les couches supérieures de l'atmosphère, serait probablement bien vue par les autres membres de l'Alliance, préoccupés par l'éventualité que chacune des superpuissances se dote de forces de défense stratégiques qui rendraient tous les autres États vulnérables.

B. RESTRICTION DE LA MOBILITÉ DES ICBM, ET RESTRICTIONS DE
LA FRÉQUENCE DE LEUR DÉPLACEMENT

Dans l'avenir, les deux superpuissances pourraient utiliser des ICBM mobiles pour assurer l'invulnérabilité de leurs forces. En fait, les Soviétiques ont proposé que les ICBM mobiles soient inclus dans les pourparlers START. Mais la mobilité pose un problème en ce qui concerne la vérification des accords de contrôle des armements, contribuant de ce fait à alimenter la méfiance et la crainte.

Des restrictions quant à l'aire de déplacement à la fréquence des déplacements favoriseraient grandement les possibilités de vérification et auraient par conséquent un effet stabilisateur. De plus, ces restrictions n'empêcheraient pas nécessairement les systèmes de maintenir leur invulnérabilité relative.

Bien que l'URSS ait déployé un missile mobile de portée intermédiaire (le SS-20), il se pourrait que, pour des raisons de vérification, les deux superpuissances acceptent une restriction réciproque dans le cas de systèmes intercontinentaux non encore déployés. Les Russes se sont toujours montrés plus réticents que les Américains à permettre que l'on vérifie leurs déploiements. Il se pourrait donc qu'ils aient certaines hésitations à modifier leurs futurs programmes de déploiement de missiles stratégiques mobiles. Toutefois, si l'incapacité de s'entendre sur ce point devait inciter les Américains à déployer de façon non vérifiable des ICBM mobiles (Midgetman), la perspective d'une entente ne serait peut-être pas sans attrait.

C. EXIGENCE QUE LES FUTURS SYSTÈMES D'ARMES STRATÉGIQUES SOIENT
VÉRIFIABLES PAR DES MOYENS TECHNIQUES NATIONAUX

Les accords réalistes et stabilisateurs en matière de contrôle des armements ont jusqu'à maintenant reposé sur la capacité de les vérifier par ce que l'on appelle les moyens techniques nationaux - principalement des systèmes à satellites. Toutefois, certaines nouvelles technologies en matière d'armes stratégiques nuisent à ce processus, tout comme certaines modes plausibles de déploiement fondés sur la dissimulation. Un accord qui garantirait la vérifiabilité des futurs systèmes d'armes stratégiques aurait une valeur considérable.

On peut supposer que les deux superpuissances (pour ne pas mentionner les autres pays touchés par leur rivalité) ont les mêmes préoccupations dans ce domaine. Un accord est donc théoriquement possible. Même si l'Union soviétique s'est toujours montrée moins préoccupée par la vérifiabilité, il lui serait difficile de rejeter une proposition qui tiendrait si directement compte de son insistance constante sur les "moyens techniques nationaux".

Les préoccupations des Alliés seraient prises en compte si chaque grand partenaire avait l'assurance de ne subir, par ce moyen, aucun désavantage stratégique. Le public aurait l'assurance que l'un des principaux obstacles à une entente sur la limitation des armes stratégiques pourrait être surmonté du moins en partie.

1102

~~Devote~~

See suggestion para 2

- I think some variant
of Tab 2 is still
worth

000565

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T

DE BUCST UYGR2909 07NOV83

A EXTOTT RBR

INFO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE
WSHDC MOSCO BNATO GENEV TOKYO WSAW BFEST PRGUE BGRAD STKHM CNBRA
HSNKI/CDEDEL WLGTN VIENN PEKIN DELHI PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CIS/
ADMPOL/PPP/DGIS

BH VMBFR DE VNA CNGNY DF NYK

SFAX CHCGO LNGLS DE OTT

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGE RSD RSR RCD RCR RBD FPR IDP IDR

IDA IDDZ RBRD IDX ZSP ZSI RPP

RFF NOTRETEL UYGR2842 01NOV

---RENCONTRE AVEC S ANDREI

AI FTE CONVOQUE SAMEDI 08NOV PAR S ANDREI, MIN DES AFF ETRANGERES. BUT
DE LA RENCONTRE ETAIT DE REITERER INVITATION OFFICIELLE A PM TRUDEAU
POUR ECHANGES DE VUES SUR DIALOGUE EST-OUEST ET SECURITE INNATLE
AVEC PRES CFAUSESCU FT DE TRANSMETTRE TROIS PROPOSITIONS SUIVANTES.
PRES CFAUSESCU CROIT QUE LES POSITIONS DES DEUX PARTIES AUX
NEGOCIATIONS SUR EURO-MISSILES SE SONT QUELQUE PEU RAPPROCHES
SUIVANT DERNIERES OFFRES. PRESIDENT CROIT QU IL N EST PAS NECESSAIRE
DE PRENDRE EN COMPTE DANS UNE PREMIERE PHASE MISSILES FRANCAIS ET
BRITANNIQUES. CEUX-CI DOIVENT ETRE CONSIDERES DANS CALCUL DU RAPPORT
GLOBAL DES FORCES. NEGOCIATIONS DE GENEVE DOIVENT REUSSIR, DFPLOIEMENT
NE DOIT PAS/PAS AVOIR LIEU ET SOVIETIQUES DOIVENT COMMENCER

PAGE DEUX UYGR2909 RESTR

DESTRUCTION DES SS-20. PM TRUDEAU DOIT AGIR AUPRES DES DEUX SUPER-
PUISSANCES A CETTE FIN.

2. PRES CEAUSESCU SUGGERE AUSSI DANS CE BUT UNE RENCONTRE DES MIN DES
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SERAIT DE DISCUTER QUESTION DES MISSILES ET AIMERAIT AVOIR NOTRE
REACTION A CETTE SUGGESTION.

3. ENFIN SOMMET USA-URSS DEVRAIT AVOIR LIEU SE NECESSAIRE POUR DEFINIR
COMPROMIS.

4. MESSAGE SEMBLABLE A ETE SE CROIS TRANSMIS PAR S ANDREI AUX AUTRES
AMBASSADEURS DES PAYS MEMBRES DE LA CSCE. SEULE DIFFERENCE EST QUE
LA PLUPART ONT ETE RECU EN GROUPE. LES NEUTRES EUROPEENS SORTAIENT
QUAND JE SUIS ENTRE. L HONNEUR D UNE AUDIENCE INDIVIDUELLE M A SANS
DOUTE ETE ACCORDES POUR REPETER DE NOUVEAU INVITATION AU PM TRUDEAU
A VENIR DISCUTER DE SON INITIATIVE AVEC PRES CEAUSESCU

SIMARD

CCC/181 071130Z UYGR2909

*Would
just force
meat to
know of
this?*

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

Dear Mr. Premier:

For some months now I have been deeply concerned by the state of East-West relations and by the international security situation. I have been particularly troubled by the absence of any high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. My concerns have been sharply increased in recent weeks by the tragic destruction of a civilian passenger aircraft, by events in Lebanon, and by developments in Grenada.

I have come to the conclusion that action must be taken in the cause of peace to arrest the deterioration in both the state and climate of international relations. I have developed a number of ideas and proposals which I hope may go some way towards achieving this objective. In the days ahead I shall be discussing some of these ideas with European leaders in order to elicit their views and reactions, and to seek their support for my general plan of action.

His Excellency Zhao Ziyang
Premier of the People's Republic of China
Peking

- 2 -

I would also welcome the opportunity to obtain your views and those of your government regarding my proposals. While I very much look forward to discussing these matters when you visit Ottawa in two months' time, I think there would be merit in having my thinking outlined to you at an earlier date. I would therefore propose to send a personal emissary to Peking to review with your senior officials a range of proposals which I have in mind. These include an approach to political confidence-building and ways of taking a global approach to the limitation of nuclear weapons, including both the key role of all five nuclear powers and the vital question of nuclear non-proliferation.

I attach the highest importance to an exchange of views with the Government of the People's Republic of China on these vital questions, as I indicated to Foreign Minister Wu in Ottawa last month, and I hope that it will be possible for your government to receive my personal emissary within the next two to three weeks.

I take this opportunity, Mr. Premier, to send you my best personal wishes.

Yours sincerely,

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
ÀCanadian Embassy
Copenhagen, Denmark

NO. IDDZ-0100 DATE Nov. 7/83

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

QUANTITY
QUANTITÉ

DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION

REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE

P.M. Initiative

Letter from P.M. Trudeau to P.M. Poul Schluter

(Ref. our telegram IDDZ-0028 of October 25, 1983.)

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE
MISSION
20-7-1-1

	9
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RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

21/11/83
DATE

SIGNATURE

L.A. DELVOIE - IDDZ
External Affairs, Ottawa

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO Canadian Embassy
À Oslo, Norway

NO. IDDZ-0095 DATE Nov. 7/83

CONFIDENTIAL

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<p><u>P.M. Initiative</u></p> <p>Letter from P.M. Trudeau to P.M. Kaare Willoch (Oslo) and to P.M. Steingrímur Hermannsson (Iceland)</p> <p>Ref. our telegram IDDZ-0028 of October 25, 1983.</p>	
<p>21/11/83.</p> <p>DATE</p>		<p>28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION</p> <p>NOV 21 1983</p>
<p>RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION</p>		<p>RETURN TO / RETOURNER À</p> <p>L.A. Delvoie - IDDZ</p> <p>External Affairs, OTTAWA</p>
<p><i>A. Delvoie</i></p> <p>SIGNATURE</p>		

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
À
Canadian Embassy
LISBON

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
CONFIDENTIAL
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDDZ-0093 DATE Nov. 7/83

DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION

REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE

P.M. Initiative

Letter from P.M. Trudeau to P.M. Mario Soares
(Ref. our telegram IDDZ-0028 of October 25, 1983)

28-6-1-TRUDEAU
PEACE MISSION
~~20-7-1-~~
9

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

L.A. Delvoie - IDDZ
External Affairs, OTTAWA

DATE

SIGNATURE

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE

External Affairs Canada / Affaires extérieures Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

MGTC/DIARY/CIRC/CHRON/FILE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

7 Nov 83 22 10 2 10

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM/DE FM EXTOTT PPR0395 07NOV83
TO/À TO TOKYO DELIVER BY 0800
INFO INFO PC00TT/FOWLER
DISTR DISTR USS DMF PGB PPD IDD
REF REF YOURTEL UIGR1915 07NOV

1100
28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION
FILE 20111
LY HAND 20-CA-9-PM-FAR
ATTN:

---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE: CONSULTATIONS WITH JPN
WILL PROVIDE DETAILED ANSWERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO QUESTIONS
POSED REFTEL.WE UNDERSTAND VISIT MAY NOT/NOT BE ANNOUNCED FOR
UP TO ONE WEEK, PERHAPS IN SPEECH PM TO GIVE LIBERAL PARTY

FUNCTION IN MTRL SUNDAY 13NOV.WILL CONFIRM ~~PMS WISH~~ ~~PRESENT INITIATION~~
PMS WISH WITH NAKASONE ENTIRELY
HOWEVER IS THAT DISCUSSION BE ~~ENTIRELY~~ CONFINED TO PMS INITIATIVE ~~ALTHOUGH~~
WE PLAN TO PREPARE BACKGROUND DEFENSIVE BRIEFS ON ONE OR
TWO BILATERAL ISSUES (EG AUTOS) IN CASE JPNSE SIDE RAISE THEM.

~~WE MAY ALSO SUGGEST PM TAKE POSITIVE REF TO JPNSE ECON~~
~~INTERRELATION MEASURES.~~

YOU SHOULD INFORM JPESE
AUTHORITIES ACCORDINGLY.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

P.SLYFIELD/mw

PPR

7-7939

SIG

P.SLYFIELD

000574

CONFIDENTIAL

November 17, 1983

IDDZ-0090

305983

~~20-1-1-1~~

28-6-1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R. R. Fowler)

Initiative: Contacts with China

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE
MISSION

We have agreed, I believe, that it would be desirable to establish contact with the Chinese Government at an appropriate moment in the course of your initiative on East-West relations and international security. (The critical path in the original "Blue Book" discussed at Meach Lake on October 7 spoke of a letter or personal emissary to Peking in early November.)

In light of developments to date, including the fact that you will be putting forward a proposal for a five-nuclear-power approach to the limitation of strategic weapons, we consider that contact should now be made with the Chinese Government. We would propose the following steps:

- (a) despatch of a letter from you to Prime Minister Zhao within the next few days
- (b) despatch of a special emissary to Peking to explain to the Chinese authorities in more detail the nature and scope of your initiative
- (c) full discussion of the initiative with Prime Minister Zhao when he visits Ottawa in mid-January

We attach for your consideration a draft letter to PM Zhao.

We should be grateful to know if you agree with this proposed course of action.

L. A. Delvoie

Chairman

Task Force Working Group

cc: PCO/Mr. Osbaldeston
EA/Mr. Shenstone
DND/Mr. Anderson

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

Dear Mr. Premier:

For some months now I have been deeply concerned by the state of East-West relations and by the international security situation. I have been particularly troubled by the absence of any high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. My concerns have been sharply increased in recent weeks by the tragic destruction of a civilian passenger aircraft, by events in Lebanon, and by developments in Grenada.

I have come to the conclusion that action must be taken in the cause of peace to arrest the deterioration in both the state and climate of international relations. I have developed a number of ideas and proposals which I hope may go some way towards achieving this objective. In the days ahead I shall be discussing some of these ideas with European leaders in order to elicit their views and reactions, and to seek their support for my general plan of action.

His Excellency Zhao Ziyang
Premier of the People's Republic of China
Peking

- 2 -

I would also welcome the opportunity to obtain your views and those of your government regarding my proposals. While I very much look forward to discussing these matters when you visit Ottawa in two months' time, I think there would be merit in having my thinking outlined to you at an earlier date. I would therefore propose to send a personal emissary to Peking to review with your senior officials a range of proposals which I have in mind. These include an approach to political confidence-building and ways of taking a global approach to the limitation of nuclear weapons, including both the key role of all five nuclear powers and the vital question of nuclear non-proliferation.

I attach the highest importance to an exchange of views with the Government of the People's Republic of China on these vital questions, as I indicated to Foreign Minister Wu in Ottawa last month, and I hope that it will be possible for your government to receive my personal emissary within the next two to three weeks.

I take this opportunity, Mr. Premier, to send you my best personal wishes.

Yours sincerely,

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO Canadian Embassy
À ANKARA, Turkey

CONFIDENTIAL

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDDZ-0097 DATE Nov. 7/83

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<p><u>P.M. Initiative</u></p> <p>Letter from P.M. Trudeau to President of Turkey, General Kenan Evren.</p> <p>(Ref. our telegram IDDZ-0028 of October 25, 1983.)</p> <div style="text-align: right;"> <p>28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION</p> <p>20-7-1-1</p> <p>9</p> </div>	
<p>RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION</p> <p>Nov 18/83</p> <p>DATE</p>		<p>RETURN TO / RETOURNER À</p> <p>L.A. Delvoie - IDDZ</p> <p>External Affairs, Ottawa</p>
<p><i>E. Budinger</i></p> <p>SIGNATURE</p>		

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CHGO

EXTOTT/URR

PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CFP

MINA USS DMF IFB UCB RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR IDD IDR FPR IDDZ GEA

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REL JAC 13 1983
FILE - TRUDEAU PENCE
28-6-20-1-1-1
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NOV 7 1983
URR
NOV 7 1983
ACTION
INFO

---PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE ON NUCLEAR TENSIONS---CHICAGO

SO FAR WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DEVELOP FOLLOWING TO BRING GUELPH

SPEECH TO PUBLIC ATTENTION.

1. SUN OCT 30--10:30 AM RADIO NEWS AND COMMENT PROGRAM,
WBEZ, CGO PUBLIC RADIO, CONSUL GENERAL WAS INTERVIEWED FOR
FIVE MINUTE DISCUSSION OF SPEECH AND THRUST OF PM'S
INITIATIVE.
2. MON OCT. 31--DISTRIBUTION OF APPROX 100 COPIES OF SPEECH
AT U. OF CGO SEMINAR OF US/SOVIET RELATIONS. KEY NOTE
SPEAKER WAS DEP SEC OF STATE VAN DAM, PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED
DAVID ROCKEFELLER, MALCOM LOON; MACMILLAN, CHAIRMAN
CARGILL, HARRISON SALISBURY, SEN PERCY, BRENT SCOWCROFT.
EVENING SPEAKER WAS BREZINSKI. ATTENDANCE 500 PLUS,
MADE UP OF SENIOR BUSINESS AND BANKING LEADERS, DIRECTORS
OF CORPORATIONS, CORP GOVT RELATIONS OFFICERS, ACADEMICS
AND STUDENTS. SPEECH HAS SINCE BEEN WELL COMMENTED ON BY
SEVERAL PEOPLE WE ARE PLEASED TOOK TIME TO READ IT.
3. COPIES MAILED TO EDITORS OF CGO TRIBUNE, SUN-TIMES,
ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, GLOBE DEMOCRAT, KANSAS CITY STAR,

.../2

(312)

427-1031

ROBERT H. GAYNER

000579

2/2

RESTRICTED 5891 61

YFGR2825

PAGE 2

MILWAUKEE JOURNAL, SENTINEL. EXCELLENT COMMENTS FROM

TRIBUNE, SUN. TIMES AND POST DISPATCH. NO EDITORIALS SO FAR.

4. COPY PASSED TO, READ BY AND DISCUSSED WITH MEMBER OF EDITORIAL
BOARD OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTIST, MONTHLY CIRC OF 30000 NUCLEAR
SCIENTISTS AND EXECUTIVES ACROSS U.S. SPEECH IS TO BE
PUBLISHED IN JANUARY ISSUE WITH QUOTE LAUDATORY INTRODUCTION
UNQUOTE. LAST MONTHS BULLETIN CARRIED IN EXTENSU REVIEW OF PM'S
LETTER TO CANADIAN PEOPLE AND CRITICAL RESPONSE FROM KOSTA
TSIPI'S, BEING FAXED SEPARATELY OTT AND WSHDC.
END.

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION
2 20-1-1-1
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D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T

DE BUCST-UYGR2909 07NOV83

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INFO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE
WSHDC MOSCO BNATO GENEV TOKYO WSAW BPEST PRGUE BGRAD STKHM CNBRA
HSNKI/CDEDEL WLGTN VIENN PEKIN DELHI PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CIS/
ADMPOI/CPP/DGIS

BH VMBFR DE VNA CNGNY DE NYK

SFAX CHCGO LNGLS DE OTT

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR RBD FPR IDD IDR

IDA IDDZ RBRD IDX ZSP ZSI RBP

REF NOTRFTL UYGR2842 01NOV

---RENCONTRE AVEC S ANDREI

AI FTE CONVOQUE SAMEDI 05NOV PAR S ANDREI, MIN DES AFF ETRANGERES. BUT
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BRITANNIQUES. CEUX-CI DOIVENT ETRE CONSIDERES DANS CALCUL DU RAPPORT
GLOBAL DES FORCES. NEGOCIATIONS DE GENEVE DOIVENT REUSSIR, DEPLOIEMENT
NE DOIT PAS/PAS AVOIR LIEU ET SOVIETIQUES DOIVENT COMMENCER

...2

PAGE DEUX UYGR2909 RESTR

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DOUTE ETE ACCORDES POUR REPETER DE NOUVEAU INVITATION AU PM TRUDEAU
A VENIR DISCUTER DE SON INITIATIVE AVEC PRES CEAUSESCU

SIMARD

CCC/181 071130Z UYGR2909

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
UNCLASSIFIED

FM CNGNY YIGR0706 07NOV83

TO FXTOTT/IDDZ

INFO WSHDC BONN HMBERG

DISTR SCA UGP URR FPR



---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST WEST - FRG RADIO COVERAGE

WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT WIDE DISSEMINATION OF THRUST OF PM INITIATIVE IN FR WAS PROVIDED ON FRG RADIO NETWORKS, WDR 1, NDR 2.

2. BOTH NETWORKS CARRIED REPORTS FROM NYORK FILED BY NYORK CORRESPONDENT ANSGAR SKRIVER WITH WHOM THIS POST HAS CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP, AND TO WHOM WE PROVIDED ADVANCE NOTICE AND TEXT.

3. WDR CARRIED DISPATCH ON QUOTE POLITIK AM MORGEN UNQUOTE ON 28OCT AT 7:05 AM, WHILE SAME DAY 6:10 AM NDR 2 PROG QUOTE FRUEH KURIER UNQUOTE BROADCAST SIMILAR REPORT.

4. TEXTS PROVIDED TO US BY DKRIVER FAXED TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ONLY.

UUU/880 071040Z YIGR0706

7 novembre 1983

NOTES POUR UNE ALLOCUTION DU PREMIER MINISTRE
SUR LA PAIX ET LE DÉSARMEMENT
MONTREAL, LE 13 NOVEMBRE 1983

Mesdames,
Messieurs,
Chers amis,

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
mission

Texte

[Je vous remercie d'être venus de nouveau si nombreux à ce déjeuner-bénéfice du Parti libéral du Canada.]

Au cours des dernières années, j'ai profité de ces rencontres pour faire le point sur l'avenir du Québec et du Canada. Élargissant aujourd'hui notre horizon, j'aimerais vous parler de paix, de désarmement et de notre avenir comme habitants d'un monde en désarroi.

Notre rencontre s'inscrit dans la longue tradition démocratique de notre pays, et votre présence ici témoigne de la vigueur de cette tradition. Nous pouvons être fiers du dynamisme et de la diversité de notre vie politique et avoir foi en notre avenir.

- 2 -

Si cet avenir dépendait uniquement de nous, nous n'aurions aucune espèce d'inquiétude à avoir. De nos jours, cependant, aucun État ne peut se targuer d'être seul maître de son destin. Nous partageons cette terre avec quelque 160 autres pays, et l'interaction à l'échelle planétaire qui s'ensuit influe sur notre sécurité et notre économie, comme sur la qualité de notre environnement et celle de notre vie.

Mais les gouvernements de ces 160 pays sont loin d'être les seuls protagonistes. Il existe une multitude d'alliances, d'associations régionales, d'institutions internationales telles que les Nations Unies, de sociétés multinationales, de groupements commerciaux, de cartels, d'intérêts particuliers et de groupes de pression de tout genre.

Vous et moi, nos familles, nos compatriotes, les gouvernements et les entreprises, évoluons tous sur la scène mondiale, où se jouent nos espoirs, nos angoisses, nos échecs et nos réussites. Mais trois grandes tendances inquiétantes se profilent à l'horizon qui risquent, en se conjuguant, de mettre un terme à toute vie sur cette terre.

- 3 -

La première est le recours croissant à la force pour régler les différends internationaux. Malgré la déclaration solennelle contenue dans la Charte des Nations Unies, selon laquelle "les membres de l'Organisation s'abstiennent, dans leurs relations internationales, de recourir à la menace ou à l'emploi de la force", nous avons connu, depuis 1945, quelque 130 conflits qui ont entraîné la perte de 35 millions de vies humaines.

L'habitude de l'agression se répand. Le processus politique fait place aux solutions militaires. C'est le règne de la belligérance et des propos menaçants. Les gouvernements naissent et tombent par les armes. La tendance est universelle, et elle va en s'accroissant.

Cette brutalisation de la vie politique devient particulièrement inquiétante lorsqu'elle a pour cause les conflits entre des idéologies et est soutenue par des armes sophistiquées. Des armes dont la fabrication absorbe annuellement quelque 600 milliards de dollars, arsenaux nucléaires et classiques mis ensemble. Des armes qui engloutissent une tranche

- 4 -

beaucoup trop importante des budgets des pays du tiers monde, qui sont appauvris et paralysés par le commerce des armements. Des armes qui incitent de plus en plus à la violence et excluent les moyens pacifiques et politiques de régler les différends.

La deuxième tendance est l'effritement constant du régime international destiné à prévenir la prolifération des armes nucléaires.

Essentiellement, cette prolifération revêt une double dimension. Nous l'appelons verticale pour désigner la mise sur pied, par les cinq États nucléaires, États-Unis, URSS, France, Royaume-Uni et Chine, de programmes d'armement nucléaire de plus en plus importants et s'appuyant sur des moyens de destruction de plus en plus raffinés. Et nous parlons de prolifération horizontale pour caractériser la propagation éventuelle des armes nucléaires dans d'autres États. Certains parmi ceux-ci ont actuellement les moyens de produire des armes nucléaires. D'autres sont sur le point de le faire.

- 5 -

Nous nous préoccupons actuellement du besoin évident d'en arriver par des moyens politiques à restreindre les arsenaux des cinq puissances nucléaires. Mais, d'un point de vue mondial et à court terme, les conséquences de la prolifération horizontale apparaissent tout aussi graves. En fait, elles le sont peut-être davantage, car le recours aux armes nucléaires par d'autres États ne serait pas contenu par la certitude de destruction mutuelle que possèdent les cinq puissances dotées de ces armes.

La conclusion du Traité sur la non-prolifération, entré en vigueur en 1970 et qui doit être révisé en 1985, visait précisément à empêcher la prolifération tant horizontale que verticale. Ce traité représentait un pacte implicite entre les États nucléaires et les autres. D'une part, les puissances nucléaires s'engageaient à poursuivre de bonne foi leurs négociations sur la limitation des armements et de la diffusion de leur technologie ^{MILITAIRE} dans ce domaine. De leur côté, les autres États convenaient de renoncer à l'emploi de l'énergie nucléaire à des fins militaires à condition de bénéficier des avantages de son utilisation pacifique dans des secteurs comme l'énergie, la médecine ou l'agriculture.

- 6 -

Mais ce pacte semble être en train de se rompre. Il est ballotté entre le désir de paix et la stratégie militaire, ~~de ses signataires~~. Les États tant nucléaires que non nucléaires, pays de l'Est comme de l'Ouest, du Nord comme du Sud, préoccupés par leur survie, par leur souveraineté ou par des conflits actuels, doivent maintenant décider si ce pacte est toujours valable.

La troisième tendance, qui menace l'ensemble de la planète, est la dégradation des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest, plus particulièrement des rapports entre les deux superpuissances. Dans un discours prononcé à Guelph, il y a deux semaines, je déplorais l'absence de haute politique dans les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest, et la tendance des négociations sur la limitation des armements à se dérouler en dehors de toute structure de compréhension et de respect des besoins de sécurité des parties. J'ai réaffirmé notre adhésion à la stratégie à deux volets de l'OTAN, et exprimé l'espoir d'y ajouter un troisième volet, caractérisé par l'énergie politique, le dialogue et la confiance, afin de contrer la dégradation des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

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Examinons ensemble ces trois tendances l'une par rapport à l'autre: recours accru à la force, risque grandissant de prolifération des armes nucléaires et rapports imprégnés d'animosité entre les superpuissances. Il est évident que seule une approche globale visant la paix et la sécurité peut renverser le cours sinistre amorcé par ces tendances.

Avec la montée de la tension, en effet, les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest sont particulièrement sensibles aux événements survenant à la périphérie. On constate une instabilité endémique dans des régions généralement reconnues comme faisant partie de la sphère d'influence de l'une ou de l'autre superpuissance. Dans d'autres points volatiles du globe, le Moyen-Orient en est l'exemple patent, tous les éléments d'une conflagration se trouvent réunis.

Et l'extension au tiers monde des rivalités entre l'Est l'Ouest atteindra son point culminant et le plus dangereux si, malgré le Traité sur la non-prolifération, les forces en présence -- belligérants ou simples antagonistes -- commencent à se doter d'armes nucléaires.

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En tant que Canadiens, notre loyauté va d'abord à la communauté occidentale; nous recherchons la sécurité sur ce continent et en Europe. Mais notre loyauté, nos intérêts nationaux et internationaux, ne s'arrêtent pas là.

La situation géographique du Canada en bordure du Pacifique nous assure des relations privilégiées avec le Japon, la Chine, l'Association des Nations de l'Asie du Sud-Est et, bien entendu, l'Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande. Notre vaste programme d'aide au développement s'étend à de nombreux pays éloignés géographiquement, mais avec lesquels nous sommes étroitement liés. Notre prestige au sein de la francophonie et du Commonwealth nous fait un devoir de partager l'ensemble des préoccupations politiques, économiques et de sécurité avec lesquelles notre rayonnement nous met en contact.

C'est pourquoi, avant même d'entreprendre mon initiative pour améliorer les perspectives de paix, j'ai décidé que notre démarche devait avoir une portée globale et s'étendre à tous les domaines. Une telle approche est dictée par la complexité de l'interaction

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entre le désarmement et le développement, entre l'animosité des superpuissances et les rivalités au sein du tiers monde, entre le recours à la force et la disponibilité des armes, entre les équilibres nucléaires en Europe et en Asie.

Il est certain que le représentant d'un seul pays ne peut promettre de miracle, et encore moins en accomplir. Je ne me fais aucune illusion sur la complexité des problèmes en cause. J'estime toutefois essentiel de rechercher la stabilité à un certain nombre de points sur la pente où nous sommes engagés et de reconnaître qu'à notre époque, la paix et la sécurité sont inséparables. Nous nous devons de reconnaître également le nouveau caractère global de la sécurité.

Je ne suis d'ailleurs pas seul à penser ainsi. D'autres dirigeants partagent mes préoccupations. Et un nombre croissant de leaders sont déterminés à subordonner la science de la guerre à l'art de la politique. Leur appui m'encourage.

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Vous n'ignorez pas que je rentre d'Europe, où j'ai eu des entretiens avec des dirigeants de pays de l'Alliance atlantique, avec Sa Sainteté le Pape et avec Sa Majesté la Reine des Pays-Bas. Je reviens au pays avec le sentiment que nos amis et alliés partagent ma conviction quant à l'urgence de la situation, et avec l'assurance qu'ils examineront personnellement les propositions que je leur ai soumises. Ils m'ont par ailleurs clairement exprimé leur appui pour mon initiative et ils ont convenu en particulier du besoin d'ajouter à notre stratégie un troisième volet pour rétablir la confiance et les communications et donner une impulsion politique nouvelle à nos rapports avec l'autre partie. Enfin, je reviens de cette mission avec un engagement renforcé.

J'ai soumis à mes collègues européens, afin qu'ils puissent les étudier et les raffiner en fonction de leurs propres vues, les éléments d'un programme de gestion de la crise actuelle. Permettez-moi de vous exposer quelques-uns de ces éléments.

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Le premier porte sur la nécessité d'établir une tribune pour la négociation des limites globales à fixer aux arsenaux des cinq États nucléaires. Ce projet est sans préjudice des négociations sur les forces nucléaires de portée moyenne et des pourparlers START entre les États-Unis et l'URSS. Mais ces entretiens ne s'étendent pas, et c'est normal, aux forces nucléaires de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France, ni de la Chine.

Ce que nous devons rechercher pour ces cinq États, c'est une tribune de négociation qui reconnaîtrait le droit des États-Unis et de l'URSS à l'égalité stratégique ou à ce qu'un récent rapport de la Commission trilatérale appelait "la parité inévitable". Une tribune qui fournirait un cadre stable, légitime et mutuellement acceptable où puissent s'établir un rapport entre les forces des superpuissances et celles des trois autres États dotés d'armes nucléaires.

Ainsi, ni la Grande-Bretagne, ni la France, ni la Chine n'aurait à craindre que ses forces soient soumises à des restrictions décrétées sans tenir compte de ses intérêts nationaux définis selon ses vœux.

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Une fois que les niveaux nationaux d'armements auraient été établis, les cinq puissances nucléaires pourraient commencer à discuter des réductions prévues dans le Traité sur la non-prolifération, ainsi que des mesures pour contrôler l'aspect qualitatif de la course aux armes nucléaires stratégiques.

Le deuxième élément du programme serait de renforcer les ~~dispositions~~ du Traité sur la non-prolifération, ce pacte dont je vous ai déjà parlé entre les pays dotés d'armes nucléaires et ceux qui en sont dépourvus. Quelque 119 nations ont signé ce Traité, mais un certain nombre d'États importants n'y ont pas encore adhéré, dont plusieurs ont dès maintenant, ou auront bientôt les moyens de mettre au point leurs propres armes nucléaires.

Si les cinq puissances nucléaires prenaient l'initiative de mieux respecter les obligations que leur impose le Traité sur la non-prolifération, je pense que les autres partenaires n'hésiteraient pas, collectivement, à tenter de convaincre les pays non signataires d'y adhérer. Nous devons sans aucun doute trouver des moyens supplémentaires d'inciter les États du tiers monde à renoncer aux armes nucléaires. Il

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doit y avoir un rapport direct entre le désarmement et le développement. Et nous devons aussi veiller à ce que des garanties étendues et adéquates président à tout transfert de technologie nucléaire à des fins pacifiques, quel que soit le pays fournisseur. Le Canada a fait un travail de pionnier dans ce domaine des garanties, et il continuera à oeuvrer à leur renforcement.

Les deux éléments du programme que je viens d'exposer portent sur la dimension globale de la sécurité à l'ère nucléaire. Mais il faut aussi reconnaître qu'il y a, au coeur de l'Europe, une concentration alarmante de forces classiques aussi bien que nucléaires. Une guerre sur le vieux continent risquerait de détruire tout ce que chaque camp désire préserver.

La question du déséquilibre actuel entre les forces classiques des deux camps est revenue fréquemment dans mes entretiens avec les dirigeants européens. En effet, les forces classiques du Pacte de Varsovie sont nettement supérieures à celles des pays de l'OTAN. On craint donc en Europe de l'Ouest

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que les pays du Pacte ne soient tentés de miser sur cette supériorité pour risquer une attaque. Les dirigeants occidentaux pourraient alors se voir obligés de recourir aux armes nucléaires sous peine de subir une défaite.

Tant que ce déséquilibre persistera, le risque d'un recours rapide aux armes nucléaires demeurera présent. C'est pourquoi nous affirmons que le seuil nucléaire est actuellement trop bas. Et, bien sûr, personne ne saurait être certain que l'utilisation d'armes nucléaires en Europe ne mènera pas à des représailles nucléaires encore plus massives à l'échelle intercontinentale. Nous croyons donc que la seule façon de relever le seuil nucléaire est d'établir un meilleur équilibre entre les forces classiques.

Comment, dès lors, réaliser cet équilibre? Voilà la question à laquelle tente de répondre le troisième élément du programme.

La solution simple mais coûteuse serait d'augmenter les forces classiques des pays de l'Ouest jusqu'à ce qu'elles rejoignent celles du Pacte de Varsovie.

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Je considère cela comme une solution de dernier recours. La façon la plus intelligente de procéder serait que les deux camps réduisent leurs forces classiques à des niveaux mutuellement acceptables. C'est précisément cet objectif que nous poursuivons depuis dix ans dans le cadre des négociations sur les réductions mutuelles et équilibrées des forces, qui se déroulent à Vienne. Certains indices laissent croire aujourd'hui que les choses avancent, mais à un rythme encore beaucoup trop lent. Et il reste des questions cruciales à trancher. Mais les chances d'en arriver finalement à une entente sont suffisamment réelles pour que les dirigeants des pays de l'Est et de l'Ouest prennent la peine de donner un nouvel élan politique aux négociations de Vienne.

Une autre négociation s'ouvrira en janvier à Stockholm. Son seul titre de "Conférence sur le rétablissement de la confiance et de la sécurité et sur le désarmement en Europe" indique la complexité des problèmes auxquels elle s'attaque. Il importe que cette conférence ne s'enlise pas dans les disputes de procédure ou le jargon technique. Sa première tâche est de négocier des mesures susceptibles de rétablir la

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confiance en matière d'activités militaires classiques. Mais les travaux de la Conférence tourneront court s'ils ne sont pas soutenus par des gestes de confiance politique telle la présence inspirante des ministres dès l'ouverture des discussions.

Le quatrième élément du programme est lié à cette stratégie de l'asphyxie que j'ai proposée pour la première fois lors de la session extraordinaire des Nations Unies sur le désarmement, en 1978. Cette stratégie, dont la mise en oeuvre requiert et réclame toujours l'appui des cinq puissances nucléaires, doit être raffinée pour tenir compte des progrès de la technologie. Les mesures de contrôle des armements doivent tenir compte des nouvelles technologies qui, par leur nature même, nous éloigneraient de la stabilité que nous cherchons à établir.

Je songe à une entente pour interdire la mise au point et le déploiement de systèmes anti-satellites à haute altitude. De tels armes menacent, en effet, l'ensemble des moyens de communication dont nous dépendons pour gérer les crises. Que l'une ou l'autre des parties en présence

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soit privée de son réseau de commandement et de conduite des opérations pendant un conflit et elle se trouverait totalement démunie au moment même où le maintien de la stabilité dépendrait précisément de sa capacité de prévoir, de réagir et de ne pas céder à la panique pour riposter à l'aveuglette.

Aucune des superpuissances n'a encore mis au point un système anti-satellites à haute altitude. Une interdiction de le faire est donc parfaitement négociable. Sans une entente de ce genre, on devra dépenser des deux côtés des sommes énormes qui pourraient être employées à des fins plus constructives. Sans une entente, on se lancera dans une surenchère sujette aux accidents et aux erreurs de calcul. Un succès à ce chapitre contribuerait par contre à relancer les négociations sur les systèmes anti-satellites fonctionnant à basse altitude.

Un autre élément me semble aussi menacer l'équilibre entre les forces, à savoir, la possibilité que les armes stratégiques intercontinentales deviennent tellement mobiles qu'il soit pratiquement impossible de les repérer. Cela pourrait remettre en question la capacité des deux camps, ou de tout organisme international, à vérifier l'application

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des ententes de limitation des armements. Pour sa part, le Canada continue à consacrer ses énergies et ses ressources à l'étude des problèmes de vérification, dont dépendront la durabilité et la crédibilité des mesures de contrôle.

La possibilité d'un contrôle véritable des armements se trouverait considérablement accrue si l'on se préoccupait des problèmes de vérification au moment de la mise au point d'un nouveau système stratégique plutôt que d'attendre l'étape des négociations.

J'ai donc l'intention de soumettre, en temps opportun et aux autorités compétentes en matière de désarmement, des documents réclamant une entente internationale en vue d'interdire la mise au point et le déploiement de systèmes anti-satellites à haute altitude, de limiter la mobilité excessive des missiles balistiques intercontinentaux et d'exiger que tout nouveau système d'armements stratégiques soit entièrement vérifiable par les moyens techniques nationaux.

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Il s'agit là de mesures importantes dont les détails sont souvent de nature technique. " Mais, si nous parvenons à donner une impulsion politique à l'idée d'asseoir les cinq grands à une même table de négociation, si nous obtenons un nouvel engagement politique à l'égard du Traité sur la non-prolifération, si nous redonnons un élan aux négociations de Vienne sur la question de l'équilibre des forces classiques et du relèvement du seuil nucléaire en Europe, si enfin nous nous appliquons à restreindre les progrès qualitatifs dans le domaine de la technologie stratégique de façon à favoriser la vérification, alors nous aurons suscité une approche vraiment globale des problèmes de paix et de sécurité.

Comme je l'ai souligné à mes collègues européens, il est essentiel que ce programme commun, ce filet de sécurité dont dépend notre survie, soit soutenu par les leaders politiques au plus haut niveau; que nos entretiens à l'échelle nationale et internationale reçoivent une véritable relance politique et que nous travaillions à définir les intérêts toujours plus nombreux qui nous rendent solidaires, à commencer par notre condition humaine et notre avenir commun sur cette planète.

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Traduction

Lors de ma tournée en Europe, j'ai été encouragé de voir à quel point mes objectifs * rejoignaient ceux des leaders que j'ai rencontrés. Et j'aimerais confirmer ce soir mon intention de me rendre à Tokyo pour y rencontrer le premier ministre Nakasone.

La participation du Japon à la déclaration de Williamsburg dans laquelle les dirigeants des pays industrialisés convenaient, en mai dernier, d'utiliser toutes leurs ressources politiques pour réduire les dangers de guerre, est sans doute un précédent historique mais aussi un reflet du monde où nous vivons. Ma visite au Japon veut témoigner de l'indivisibilité de la sécurité universelle à l'ère atomique.

Je peux aussi vous dire que je prends actuellement des mesures pour intensifier nos consultations avec Washington et Moscou, ces deux grandes puissances dont tant de choses dépendent. Et je suis en mesure d'ajouter que des consultations ont déjà été amorcées avec le gouvernement de la Chine.

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C'est avec empressement que je prendrai part aux discussions sur la paix et la sécurité lors de la conférence des chefs de gouvernement du Commonwealth, à New Delhi, vers la fin du mois. Je suis particulièrement impatient de m'entretenir avec le premier ministre Indira Gandhi sur la question de la non-prolifération et de connaître ses vues, en tant que présidente du Conseil des pays non alignés, sur les liens à établir entre désarmement et développement.

Je suis satisfait des progrès accomplis et de l'accueil réservé à mes propositions. Je suis néanmoins conscient des critiques que suscite chez certains la démarche étapiste que nous favorisons. Certains lui préféreraient la passion simpliste d'un projet utopique. D'autres sont paralysés par la complexité des enjeux. Je suis d'avis qu'il faut "faire" la paix progressivement, avec prudence et réalisme. Nous devons éviter de brusquer une confiance politique des plus fragiles, et construire plutôt avec précaution en tâchant de nous retrouver sur un terrain commun.

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Une action politique s'impose avec d'autant plus d'urgence que la multiplication des conflits et des confrontations risque de déborder notre aptitude à comprendre ce qui se passe et notre capacité d'y remédier.

Lorsqu'il inventa la dynamite, en 1867, Alfred Nobel croyait que la perspective effarante d'une application militaire de sa découverte forcerait les nations à vivre en paix. Aujourd'hui la puissance d'une bombe nucléaire est sans commune mesure avec la force des explosifs classiques, et devant pareille démesure, notre esprit vacille.

Texte

La paix et la sécurité ne sont pas de froides abstractions. Elles sont la garantie de l'avenir de l'humanité, de l'épanouissement de l'esprit humain et de la survie de notre planète.

En mai 1982, j'ai abordé ce même thème de la sécurité et de la paix lors d'une cérémonie de collation des grades à l'université Notre-Dame, en Indiana. J'étais préoccupé par la confusion

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apparente qui régnait dans les relations Est-Ouest et
par ~~le besoin de~~ *la tendance à vouloir* créer des liens entre des questions
en apparence étrangères. Les paroles que je disais
alors restent vraies:

"On ne saurait nier la nécessité fondamentale
de contenir une course aux armements qui menace la
survie du genre humain.

On ne saurait nier non plus que pour arriver
à contenir cette menace, ceux qui peuvent la brandir
doivent se parler et se comprendre.


De toute évidence, la limitation des
armements est une question d'intérêt mutuel. Et son
importance pour le maintien de la stabilité, voire la
survie de l'humanité, devrait primer toute autre
considération."

Car le choix qui s'impose à nous est clair et
pressant. Ou bien nous nous laissons entraîner par le
courant aveugle qui nous mène à la guerre nucléaire.
Ou bien nous rassemblons nos forces et nous travaillons
ensemble à maîtriser les forces qui pèsent sur nous,
sur nos enfants et sur cette planète.

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Quant à moi, j'ai fait mon choix. J'ai
choisi de lutter. Et je sais que je peux compter sur
votre appui.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIEL



NOTE À: M. Louis Delvoie
DE: André Burelle
OBJET: Deuxième discours sur la paix et le
désarmement

Vous trouverez ci-joint, en quinze copies, le
texte français intégral du deuxième discours du Premier
ministre sur la paix et le désarmement.

Vous noterez p. 13-14 l'ajout d'un passage
pouvant servir de pierre d'attente à l'opération Gandhi
si jamais elle avait lieu.

Tout commentaire supplémentaire sur les
résultats de la tournée européenne du P.M. pourrait se
greffer au premier paragraphe de la page 21 qui aborde
actuellement le sujet de façon elliptique.

J'enverrai cet après-midi au Premier ministre
un texte en gros caractères, avec suggestion d'un
passage en anglais au cas où le discours servirait à
Montréal.

Un texte anglais intégral sera disponible
mercredi, toujours au cas où.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, likely belonging to André Burelle.

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
6/ mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2411 07NOV83

TO FXTOTT UGB DELIVER BY 071500

INFO MOSCO BNATO PRMNY CNGNY PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMFOL/CP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB (IDDZ URR RGB UPD RBR IDD IDR IDA

---DAM TRIP TO EUROPE

DAM ITINERARY AS FOLLOWS:

MONDAY 07NOV: AM LDN

PM PARIS

EVENING ROME

TUESDAY 08NOV :AM BONN

EVENING BRUSSELS

NIGHT THE HAGUE

WEDNESDAY 09NOV: AM THE HAGUE

PM BRUSSELS

EVENING RETURN TO USA.

CCC/231 071847Z UNGR2411

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
6/ mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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PMOOTT/AXWORTHY

DISTR DMF MINA USS IDD IDDZ URR

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---DAM VISIT TO EUROPE/CDA

THIS WILL CONFIRM THAT:

(A)SSEA IS NOT/NOT AVAILABLE TO MEET WITH DAM ON FRI 11NOV EITHER
IN OTT OR HALIFAX;

(B)SSEA DOES HOWEVER WISH TO MEET WITH DAM.MTG COULD BE
ACCOMMODATED IN OTT ON MON 14NOV OR TUES 15NOV;

(C)PRIME MINISTERS EUROPEAN SCHEDULE IS FULLY COMMITTED AND MTG
WITH DAM AND BURT CANNOT/NOT BE ACCOMMODATED;

(D)PRIME MINISTER IS SCHEDULED TO BE IN OTT FOR PART OF 14NOV
AND ALL OF 15NOV.SUBJ TO FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH SSFA, THERE
MAY BE OPPORTUNITY FOR PM TO MEET WITH DAM IN OTT DURING VISIT
14NOV OR 15NOV.

2.POINTS (A),(B) AND (C) ARE BEING TRANSMITTED TO USA EMB OTT.

WE LEAVE POINT (D) FOR YOU TO PLAY IN WSHDC AS APPROPRIATE.

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CONFIDENTIAL

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
(A)Canadian Embassy
Copenhagen, DenmarkNO. **IDDZ-0100** DATE **Nov. 7/83**QUANT.
QUANTITÉ

DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION

REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE

P.M. Initiative

Letter from P.M. Trudeau to P.M. Poul Schluefer

(Ref. our telegram IDDZ-0028 of October 25, 1983.)

*28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
Mission*

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

L.A. DELVOIE - IDDZ
External Affairs, Ottawa

DATE

SIGNATURE

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION


TO
ÀCanadian Embassy
Madrid, Spain


NO. IDDZ-0099

DATE Nov. 7/83

CONFIDENTIAL

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<p><u>P.M. Initiative</u></p> <p>Letter from P.M. Trudeau to President Felipe González Márquez (Ref. our telegram IDDZ-0028 of October 25, 1983.)</p>	
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
22 novembre 1983 DATE	 SIGNATURE	L.A. DELVOIE - IDDZ External Affairs, Ottawa



TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO Canadian Embassy
À Athens, Greece

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDDZ-0098 DATE Nov. 7/83

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<p><u>P.M. Initiative</u></p> <p>Letter from P.M. Trudeau to P.M. Andreas Papandreou</p> <p>(Ref. our telegram IDDA-0028 of October 25, 1983.)</p>	
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
DATE	SIGNATURE	L.A. DELVOIE - IDDZ External Affairs, Ottawa

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
ÀCanadian Embassy
KARA, Turkey**CONFIDENTIAL**NO. **IDDZ-0097** DATE **Nov. 7/83**

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<p><u>P.M. Initiative</u></p> <p>Letter from P.M. Trudeau to President of Turkey, General Kenan Evren.</p> <p>(Ref. our telegram IDDZ-0028 of October 25, 1983.)</p>	
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
		L.A. Delvoie - IDDZ External Affairs, Ottawa
DATE	SIGNATURE	

*MF
Not Sent*

CONFIDENTIAL

November 7, 1983

IDDZ-0096

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R. R. *Bowler*)

Initiative - Letter to PM Gandhi

Attached for your consideration is a draft letter to Prime Minister Gandhi, which I hope adequately reflects the views which you expressed at our last meeting.

L. A. Delvoie

L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

cc: PCO/Mr. Osbaldeston
EA/Mr. Shenstone
DND/Mr. Anderson

28-6-1-Tyroneau Peace
Mission

DRAFT Letter to Prime Minister Gandhi

My dear Prime Minister,

I am writing as a follow-up to my conversations with you when we met in New York this September. As you know, I have since embarked on an initiative directed towards identifying possibilities for reducing tensions between East and West. I have acted at this time because I believe that the international environment has deteriorated dangerously and that, if we are to reduce the threat posed by the incalculable horrors of a nuclear war, this trend must soon be reversed.

I am very conscious of the fact that it was a similar concern about the worsening global political and economic climate which prompted you, in your role as Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, to call together a number of national leaders for the meetings in New York. I was glad to attend because I believe very strongly that the only way we can hope to emerge from our current awesome international problems is to work together towards solutions.

Since then I have developed a number of proposals on East-West relations and international security about which I am consulting several heads of government to gain the benefit of their views as to how best to proceed. I am beginning this process with a trip to Europe this week which will take me to France, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom

- 2 -

This brings me to my purpose in writing to you at this time. Fate moves mysteriously, but it is remarkable that you are simultaneously Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement and host to this year's Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting. ~~It is in the context of both these capacities that I am proposing to you that India and Canada should act together, using the unique environment of the Commonwealth Conference as a forum, towards reversing the present alarming trend in world affairs, when the gap between N + S, and the gap between E + W, is growing alarmingly. The Commonwealth setting would seem particularly appropriate for such an effort - after all it was the~~ ~~manship of your father, Jawaharlal Nehru, and of Lester Pearson which in 1949 made possible the creation of the modern multiracial Commonwealth.~~

In that double capacity you can guide our discussions so that our concerns for peace can be linked to our concerns for development. I, and many states-others, would be prepared to support you in this.

~~I believe we should seek to emulate them in a different context. The first Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting to be held in India can materially advance the single cause which is of greatest importance to all the Commonwealth members - that is, the goal of world peace.~~

~~The most dangerous aspect of the arms race is, in my view, nuclear proliferation. In referring to world peace I should state squarely what I mean.~~

~~The vital necessity is to reverse the spiral and risks of nuclear proliferation - that is, both "vertical" proliferation and "horizontal" proliferation. There is, of course, a massive range of issues and national concerns which relate to disarmament. When we come down to~~

- 3 -

the nub, however, we must face one salient reality -
either this generation of world leaders must reduce the
numbers of nuclear weapons, and prevent their spread, or
we bequeath to our peoples a future where the chances of
global destruction ^{will have immeasurably increased.} increase every day.

Let me therefore place a proposal before you.

As you have agreed that I lead off the
discussion on international political events at the
Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, I would intend
~~to take the opportunity to focus my own comments on the~~
~~objectives of my initiative and how I see options developing~~ ^{from} ~~style~~ }
following my discussions with a number of world leaders. I
would hope you and I might then work towards achieving
support for a Commonwealth position on the responsibilities
of nuclear weapons states to reduce their arsenals and on
the responsibilities of other states to renounce the
acquisition of nuclear weapons. I believe this would place
India in a clear leadership role in marshalling the
influence of both Commonwealth and non-aligned nations
against all forms of nuclear proliferation.

[Shell out
this "increased"
better]

I wanted to put the foregoing thoughts to you
without delay in order to obtain your reaction so that we
can consider possible strategies at CHOGM. I hope to have
developed my own ideas further before we meet in New Delhi.
The essence of my perception, however, is that the atmos-
pherics of international relations - and particularly the

- 4 -

relations between the superpowers - must be changed as a prerequisite to real progress towards peace. With this in mind, it is my firm view that the New Delhi Conference, under your Chairmanship, can make a historic contribution in sending an unequivocal message to the world.

I fear this letter has been long, but it is an issue which merits any degree of attention. I very much look forward to your response.

Yours sincerely,

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE -- NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
À
Canadian Embassy
Oslo, Norway

CONFIDENTIAL

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDDZ-0095 DATE Nov. 7/83

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<p><u>P.M. Initiative</u></p> <p>Letter from P.M. Trudeau to P.M. Kaare Willoch (Oslo) and to P.M. Steingrímur Hermannsson (Iceland)</p> <p>Ref. our telegram IDDZ-0028 of October 25, 1983.</p> <p>28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission</p>	
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
		L.A. Delvoie - IDDZ External Affairs, OTTAWA
DATE	SIGNATURE	

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
ÀCanadian Embassy
Brussels, Belgium

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20-1-2

NO. IDDZ-0094 DATE NOV. 7/83


QUANTITY
QUANTITÉ

DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION

REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE

P.M. Initiative

Letter from P.M. Trudeau to P.M. Pierre Werner (Luxembourg)
(Ref. our telegram IDDZ-0026 of October 25, 1983.)



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L.A. DELVOIE - IDDZ
External Affairs, Ottawa

DATE

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TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

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WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

TO Canadian Embassy
À LI ONNO. **IDDZ-0093** DATE **Nov. 7/83**

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<u>P.M. Initiative</u> Letter from P.M. Trudeau to P.M. Mario Soares (Ref. our telegram IDDZ-0028 of October 25, 1983)	

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

L.A. Delvoie - IDDZ
External Affairs, OTTAWA

DATE

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SMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

MF

CONFIDENTIAL

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

TO: Canadian Embassy
À: WASHINGTON, D.C.

NO. IDDZ-0092

DATE Nov 7/83

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<p><u>P.M. Initiative</u></p> <p>Letter from P.M. Trudeau to President Reagan (ref our telegram IDDZ-0025 of October 25/83)</p>	

Torne

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

L.A. Delvoie - IDDZ
External Affairs, OTTAWANov 15/83
DATER. J. Lyons
SIGNATURE

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE

000623



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER



Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ **C O N F I D E N T I A L** 8 NOV 83 00 17 12 10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0091 07NOV83
TO/A TO ROME **LIVRAISON 080900**
INFO INFO PC00TT/ARCHDEACON VATCN
DISTR DISTR XDV MGT RGB RCR RSR RBD
REF
SUBJ/SUJ REF VOTRETEL WTAG0409 07NOV

---INITIATIVE DU PM:VISITE AU VATICAN

PERSONNES QUI ACCOMPAGNERONT PM JUSQU A L ANTICHAMBRE SONT:BEAULNE,
FOWLER,JOHNSON(ADJOINT EXECUTIF DU PM),SMITH.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
M. ARCHDEACON/sc 	IDDZ	5-2394	 SIG L.A. DELVOIE

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE ROME WTAG0409 07NOV83

A FXTOTT (IDDZ LIVRAISON 071400

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON VATCN

DISTR MGT RGB RCR RSR RBD

REF VOTRETEL IDDS0082 05NOV

---INITIATIVE DU PM:VISITE A ROME ET AU VATICAN

POUR AUDIENCE AVEC SAINT-PERE VOUS SAVEZ SANS DOUTE QUE PM SFRA RECU
EN STRICT TETE-A-TETE PAR JEAN-PAUL II.PROTOCOLE DE LA MAISON PONTI-
FICALE AURAIT CEPENDANT BESOIN DE SAVOIR NOMS DES PERSONNES QUI
ACCOMPAGNERONT LE PM JUSQU A L ANTICHAMBRE DE LA BIBLIOTHEQUE OU SE
TIENDRA LA RENCONTRE.PRIERE AVISER POUR 080900.

CCC/013 071653Z WTAG0409

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
Mission

000626

OTTAWA, K1A OA2

Dear ~~Mr.~~ Premier: *How*

For some months now I have been deeply concerned by the state of East-West relations and by the international security situation. I have been particularly troubled by the absence of any high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. My concerns have been sharply increased in recent weeks by the tragic destruction of a civilian passenger aircraft, by events in Lebanon, and by developments in Grenada.

I have come to the conclusion that action must be taken in the cause of peace to arrest the deterioration in both the state and climate of international relations. I have developed a number of ideas and proposals which I hope may go some way towards achieving this objective. In the days ahead I shall be discussing some of these ideas with European leaders in order to elicit their views and reactions, and to seek their support for my general plan of action.

His Excellency Zhao Ziyang
Premier of the People's Republic of China
Peking

- 2 -

I would also welcome the opportunity to obtain your views and those of your government regarding my proposals. While I very much look forward to discussing these matters when you visit Ottawa in two months' time, I think there would be merit in having my thinking outlined to you at an earlier date. I would therefore propose to send a personal emissary to Peking to review with your senior officials a range of proposals which I have in mind. These include an approach to political confidence-building and ways of taking a global approach to the limitation of nuclear weapons, including both the key role of all five nuclear powers and the vital question of nuclear non-proliferation.

I attach the highest importance to an exchange of views with the Government of the People's Republic of China on these vital questions, as I indicated to Foreign Minister Wu in Ottawa last month, and I hope that it will be possible for your government to receive my personal emissary within the next two to three weeks.

I take this opportunity, ~~Mr.~~ ^{Has} Premier, to send you my best personal wishes.

Yours sincerely,

TRAVEL AUTHORITY AUTORISATION DE VOYAGE

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1 Name/Nom Gary J. SMITH		2 Division/Direction IDDZ	
3 Class and Grade/Catégorie et classe FS-3		4 Telephone/Téléphone Home Residence 728-9373 Office Bureau 5-2394	
5 Departure Date/Date de départ Nov. 7, 1983		6 Returning Date/Date de retour November 11, 1983	
8 Travel Advance/Avance de voyage No <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> \$400.		9 Taking Classified Papers Emporter des documents classifiés <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ZSS	
11 Salary Cheque(s) (for deposit to your bank during your absence/Chèque(s) de traitement (à déposer à votre banque pendant votre absence)) ABRT			

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12 Purpose of Travel/Objet du voyage					

To accompany Prime Minister on European tour re Initiative on East-West Relations and International Security

13 City and Country/Ville et pays Paris, Hague, Brussels Rome, Bonn, London (Transportation provided by DND) All hotel accommodations have been arranged.		14 Dates Nov. 7 - 11		15 Additional Information/Renseignements supplémentaires (circle ONE in each Category) (Dans i, ii et iii, encirclez la réponse appropriée.) (i) Type of Travel: Insp (RIP only) (ii) But du voyage: Insp. (RIP seulement) Liaison/Liaison Conf/Conf. Training/Formation Other/Autre (iii) ADMship (iv) SALA PFZ PTD PIG PFC PUA PTE PTT PUM PUI (iii) Overtime/Leave Implications (iii) Répercussions en termes d'heures suppl./de congé (iv) Estimated Total Cost (iv) Coût total prévu	
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28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission

16		17 Approved and Certified that Funds are available and have been committed within the budget of the Division concerned. Approuvé et certifié en outre que des fonds sont disponibles et ont été engagés dans le cadre du budget du bureau ou de la direction en cause.	
Nov. 3/83 Date		Gary J. Smith Originator/Source	
		Date	
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		Coding/Codage	
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Date		Recommended by Recommandée par	

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
FIONA NELSON

TRUSTEE, WARD 5
TORONTO BOARD OF EDUCATION

155 COLLEGE STREET
TORONTO, CANADA M5T 1P6

November 7, 1983

Mr. Gary Smith
Disarmament Division
Department of External Affairs
Lester Pearson Building
Ottawa, Canada



Dear Mr. Smith:

I was a participant in the disarmament conference at Guelph University, October 27-30. It was a superb conference! I was most impressed with the calibre and number of speakers, and "balance" of the presentations.

I hope that your division continues to do this sort of thing. It is public education of the most valuable kind.



Please extend my congratulations to all those who were involved.

Yours faithfully,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Fiona Nelson".

FIONA NELSON
Trustee, Ward 5

FN:dp



Mr. Gary Smith
Disarmament Division
Department of External Affairs
Lester Pearson Building
Ottawa, Canada

155 COLLEGE STREET
TORONTO, ONTARIO
M5T 1P6

000632



TO/À • MINA USS DMF IFB CCB **RED**
• RGB RCR RSR RBD CPD IDR IDA
FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • PM Initiative on East-West Relations and
SUJET • International Security - Visit to Europe

Security/Sécurité

CONFIDENTIAL

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

Date

November 7, 1983

Number/Numéro

IDDZ-0089

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

Attached for your information and retention are
copies of the two briefing books prepared for the Prime
Minister for his visit to Western Europe this week.

L. A. Delvoie
L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

OTHER DISTRIBUTION

*via
Gary
Smith*

BONN
ROME
PARIS
HAGUE
BRUSSELS
LONDON

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission
6

*See Background
Briefs in
File
Pocket*

*via
Ken Calder*

DND - 6
MND
CDS
DM
ADM POL
CPP
Calder


IDR - Brian Herman - 1 copy of each

PPR Mr. Lonett - 1 " " "

Mr. Pearson - 1 " " "

Mr. Delworth - 1 " " "

INEO



UNCLASSIFIED

FM PARIS WIFC6643 07NOV83

TO PMOOTT/COLEMAN DE HUDON DELIVER BY 070900

INFO EXTOTT IDDZ

---MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS-PARIS

FOLLOWING IS THE PRESS PROGRAM FOR PMS VISIT TO PARIS. ARRANGEMENTS
MADE WITH ELYSEES PRESS PEOPLE.

2. WILL MEET TODAY WITH CBC AND CTV PRODUCERS TO ORGANIZE POOLS FOR
PMS END OF TALKS WITH MITTERRAND AND ARRIVAL TO HAGUE. BUSES RESERVA-
TIONS ALREADY MADE ACCORDINGLY.

3. CDN MEDIA WILL BE AT ORLY FOR ARRIVAL OF THE PRIME MINISTER.

4. PRESS PROGRAM FOR PARIS:

0700: DEPART DU CAR DES JOURNALISTES DE L HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL POUR
L AEROPORT D ORLY.

0800: ARRIVEE DU PM A PARIS (ORLY). ORLY-OUEST, SALON D HONNEUR.

0815: RETOUR DU CAR A L HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL.

1145: DEPART DU CAR DE L HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL POUR LE PALAIS DE
L ELYSEE.

1215: DEBUT DES ENTRETIENS MITTERRAND-TRUDEAU. SESSION DE PHOTOS (POOL).

1230: DEPART DU CAR DE L ELYSEE POUR L AMBASSADE DU CANADA.

1235: GOUTER ET SESSION D INFORMATION (ASPECTS TECHNIQUES SUIVANT) A
L AMBASSADE DU CANADA (SALLE POLYVALENTE).

1430: DEPART DU CAR DE L AMBASSADE POUR L ELYSEE.

...2

PAGE TWO WIFC6643 UNCLASSIFIED

1515:FIN PREVUE DES ENTRETIENS MITTERRAND-TRUDEAU

1530:DEPART DU CAR DU PALAIS DE L ELYSEE POUR L AEROPORT DU BOURGET

1630:DEPART DES AVIONS POUR LA HAYE

1715:ARRIVEE A ROTTERDAM.

UUU/272 071405Z WIFC6643

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Mr. Smith
+ MFE
by

Division Phoned _____
Person _____
Local Time _____

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE PARIS WIGR5255 07NOV83

A EXTOTT/IDDZ LIVRAISON 070900

INFO BRU ROME HAGUE BONN

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
--- VISITE DU PM TRUDEAU A PARIS

CONCERNANT DEJFNER A ELYSEE 08NOV, RECEVONS CONFIRMATION QUE COTE FRANCAIS Y PRENDRONT PART OUTRE PRES: MRE CHEYSSON, BIANCO (SEC GEN DE ELYSEE), ATTALI ET VEDRINE (CONSEILLERS PRESIDENTIELS). DONC FORMULE RETENUE EST CINQ PLUS QUATRE.

2. CONCERNANT ENTRETEN PRECEDENT DEJEUNER, FORMAT DEFINITIF DEMEURE TOUJOURS A PRECISER (I.E. SOIT TETE A TETE SOIT RESTREINT SOIT AUTRE). EN FAIT N AURONS PRECISIONS FINALES QUE VERS 17H00 CE JOUR DE ELYSEE, EN RAISON DEBUT DE VISITE CHADLI: VOUS AVISERONS DONC VRAISEMBLABLEMENT A ARRIVEE DE DEL A PARIS.

CCC/272 071037Z WIGR5255

28-6-1- Trudeau Place
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R F S T R I C T E D

FM BRU ZVAG5108 07NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 071400

INFO PARIS HAGUE BONN ROME PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTRIDDZ

RFF YOURTEL XDV1067 03NOV

---PM INITIATIVE ADMIN/ROOMING LIST

HOTEL AMIGO ROOM LIST AS FOLLOW:

PRIME MINISTER-SUITE 601-03

FOWLER-639

JOHNSON-607

COLEMAN-641


SMITH-643

BROWN-636

BEAULIEU-610

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R F S T R I C T E D

FM OSLO WGGR4282 07NOV83

TO FXTOTT IDDZ

INFO COPEN MDRID LSBON ATHNS ANKRA BNATO WSHDC PCOOTT/FOWLER

NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD

DISTR DMF IFB RGB IDD IDR IDA RSR RBD

REF OURTFL WGGR4256 01NOV

---PMS INITIATIVE ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS

OUR NUDGE TO DOMINANT NORWEGIAN DAILY NEWSPAPER AFTENPOSTEN HAS NOW RESULTED IN ANALYTICAL QUOTE COMMENTARY UNQUOTE WHICH CORRECTS EARLIER MISLEADING REPORT AND DOES FULL JUSTICE TO INTENTIONS OF PMS GUELPH SPEECH.COMMENTARY ALLUDES TO EARLIER CALLS TO SUFFOCATE ARMS RACE AND EXPRESSES SOME CONCERN THAT PMS FORTHCOMING EUROPEAN VISITS MAY BE MET WITH SOME SCEPTICISM IN FACE OF SUGGESTIONS AT HOME THAT PM IS SEEKING DOMESTIC POLITICAL BENEFIT.THE QUOTE THIRD RAIL UNQUOTE IS CITED IN RELATION TO PMS HOLDING FIRMLY TO TWO TRACK NATO DECISION.

2.NORWEGIAN PRESS WILL NO/NO DOUBT NOTE PROGRESS OF PMS EUROPEAN VISITS.

CCC/061 081011Z WGGR4282

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR4070 07NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 071200

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON/COLEMAN RCMPOTT/VIPS PARIS HAGUE

DISR/IDDZ MGT RGB RCR

---PM VISIT TO BONN

FOLLOWING IS DRAFT PROGRAMME FOR BONN AS IT STANDS 071500H.

10NOV-1700-ARRIVAL OF PRESS AT COLOGNE/BONN SONDER POSITION.

EMBASSY PROVIDES TRANSP TO CHANCELLERY

1730-ARRIVAL OF PM AND DEL AT COLOGNE/BONN AIRPORT(SONDER

POSITION).MET BY AMB AND BAUCH(ASSISTANT CHIEF PROTOCOL)

1735-DEPARTURE FOR STEIGENBERGER HOTEL

-PROTOCOL CAR

-MOTORCYCLE ESCORT

-FMS CAR,AMB,

-SECURITY CAR,BEAULIEU

-FOWLER,JOHNSON,SMITH(CAR NBR 1)

-COLEMAN,BROWN(CAR NBR 2)

1755-ARRIVAL AT STEIGENBERGER HOTEL

1825-LEAVE STEIGENBERG FOR CHANCELLERY

(PM,AMBASSADOR IN ONE CAR,FOWLER,SMITH AND BEAULIEU

IN SECOND)

...2

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission

PAGE TWO ZQGR4070 CONF

1930-ARRIVE AT CHANCELLERY.PHOTO

OPPORTUNITY FOR PRESS.BEGIN TALKS WITH CHANCELLOR
(WHO IS ACCOMPANIED BY MFA STATE SECRETARY LANDFUT,
TELTSCHIK AND INTERPRETER.

1930-DINNER IN CHANCELLERY

2130-LEAVE CHANCELLERY FOR STEIGENBERGER
(POSSIBLE PRESS SCRUM AT CHANCELLERY)

2300-PRESS DEPART FROM COLOGNE/BONN AIRPORT.

11NOV-0830-DEPART HOTEL STEIGENBERGER

0855-DEPART COLOGNE/BONN AIRPORT FOR VOLKEL MILITARY AIRPORT.

CCC/005 071513Z ZQGR4070

MF
HJ

R E S T R I C T E D

FM BONN ZOGR4068 07NOV83

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INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR LIDDZ

REF YOURTEL XDV1067 03NOV

---PM INITIATIVE-ADMIN

ROOM LIST FOR DEL IN STEIGENBERGER HOTEL AS FOLLOWS:

803-804 PM

803 T. JOHNSON

704 Y BEAULIEU

722 R FOWLER

721 R COLEMAN

720 G SMITH

719 E BROWN 718 C GAUER (DEL OFFICE)

2. YOU WILL NOTE BEAULIEU IS NOT/NEXT TO PM BUT
DIRECTLY UNDERNEATH ON 17TH FLOOR NEXT TO STAIRWELL.
THIS IS ROOM INSP. THIVIERGE HAD DURING LAST PM VISIT
NOV82. GERMAN SECURITY INSIST ON HAVING ROOM ON 18TH
FLOOR NEAR PM.

CCC/005 071241Z ZOGR4068

28-6-1-Thudau Peace
Mission
6

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM LDN XNGR4018 07NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDR DELIVER BY 070900

INFO BNATO NDHQOTT/CPP/DNACPOL CANMILREPNATO WSHDC BONN ROME

BRU HAGUE

DISTR IFB (IDDZ RGB RCD RCR

REF OURTELS 3066 01NOV 3079 02NOV BNATO YBGR7072 04NOV

---DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE

FURTHER TO PARA 4 BRUSSELS REFTTEL, WE DRAW ATTENTION TO OUR
REFTELS WHERE WE REPORTED THAT FOREIGN SECRETARY HESELTINE HAD
TOLD COMMONS 31OCT THAT CRUISE MISSILE EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN
ARRIVING FOR SOME TIME: THAT ERECTORS AND LAUNCHERS WILL BE
QUOTE ARRIVING SHORTLY UNQUOTE: AND THAT HE WOULD MAKE FURTHER
STATEMENT TO HOUSE PRIOR TO ARRIVAL OF MISSILES THEMSELVES.
OURTEL 3079 POINTED OUT THAT US GALAXY PLANES HAVE BEEN SEEN
UNLOADING LARGE EQUIPMENT: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE HAS NOW CONFIRMED
QUOTE OFF RECORD UNQUOTE THAT ERECTORS AND LAUNCHERS AS WELL AS
OTHER MAJOR PORTIONS OF EQUIPMENT ARE IN PROCESS OF ARRIVING AT
GREENHAM MISSILE SITE. DATE OF ARRIVAL OF MISSILES THEMSELVES IS
EXPECTED IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING 21NOV BUNDESTAG DEBATE. FINAL DATE
FOR IOC HAS NOT/NOT BEEN ANNOUNCED BUT WILL CLEARLY BE IN LAST TWO
WEEKS OF DECEMBER.

CCC/065 071203Z XNGR4018

MF
12

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T

DE BUCST UYGR2909 07NOV83

A EXTOTT RBR

INFO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE
WSHDC MOSCO BNATO GENEV TOKYO WSAW BFEST PRGUE BGRAD STKHM CNBRA
HSNKI/CDEDEL WLGTN VIENN PEKIN DELHI PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CIS/
ADMPOI/CPP/DGIS

BH VMBFR DE VNA CNGNY DE NYK

SFAX CHCGO LNLIS DE OTT

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGF RSD RSR RCD RCR RBD FPR IDD IDR

IDA/IDDZ RBRD IDX ZSP ZSI RBP

REF NOTRFTL UYGR2842 01NOV

---RENCONTRF AVEC S ANDREI

AI FTE CONVOQUE SAMEDI 05NOV PAR S ANDREI, MIN DES AFF ETRANGERFS. BUT
DE LA RENCONTRE ETAIT DE REITERER INVITATION OFFICIELLE A PM TRUDEAU
POUR ECHANGES DE VUES SUR DIALOGUE EST-OUEST ET SECURITE INNATLE
AVEC PRES CEAUSESCU ET DE TRANSMETTRE TROIS PROPOSITIONS SUIVANTES.
PRES CEAUSESCU CROIT QUE LES POSITIONS DES DEUX PARTIES AUX
NEGOCIATIONS SUR EURO-MISSILES SE SONT QUELQUE PEU RAPPROCHES
SUIVANT DERNIERES OFFRES. PRESIDENT CROIT QU IL N EST PAS NECESSAIRE
DE PRENDRE EN COMPTE DANS UNE PREMIERE PHASE MISSILES FRANCAIS ET
BRITANNIQUES. CEUX-CI DOIVENT ETRE CONSIDERES DANS CALCUL DU RAPPORT
GLOBAL DES FORCES. NEGOCIATIONS DE GENEVE DOIVENT REUSSIR, DEPLOIEMENT
NE DOIT PAS/PAS AVOIR LIEU ET SOVIETIQUES DOIVENT COMMENCER

...2

PAGE DEUX UYGR2909 RESTR

DESTRUCTION DES SS-20. PM TRUDEAU DOIT AGIR AUPRES DES DEUX SUPR-
PUISSANCES A CETTE FIN.

2. PRES CEAUSESCU SUGGERE AUSSI DANS CE BUT UNE RENCONTRE DES MIN DES
AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DE L OTAN ET DU PACTE DE VARSOVIE DONT L OBJET
SERAIT DE DISCUTER QUESTION DES MISSILES ET AIMERAIT AVOIR NOTRE
REACTION A CETTE SUGGESTION.

3. ENFIN SOMMET USA-URSS DEVRAIT AVOIR LIEU SE NECESSAIRE POUR DEFINIR
COMPROMIS.

4. MESSAGE SEMBLABLE A ETE SE CROIS TRANSMIS PAR S ANDREI AUX AUTRES
AMBASSADEURS DES PAYS MEMBRES DE LA CSCE. SEULE DIFFERENCE EST QUE
LA PLUPART ONT ETE RECU EN GROUPE. LES NEUTRES EUROPEENS SORTAIENT
QUAND JE SUIS ENTRE. L HONNEUR D UNE AUDIENCE INDIVIDUELLE M A SANS
DOUTE ETE ACCORDES POUR REPETER DE NOUVEAU INVITATION AU PM TRUDEAU
A VENIR DISCUTER DE SON INITIATIVE AVEC PRES CEAUSESCU

SIMARD

CCC/181 071130Z UYGR2909

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Division Phoned _____
Person _____
Local Time _____

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM TOKYO UIGR1915 07NOV83

TO FXTOTT/PPR DELIVER BY 070900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR USS DMF P73 IPD IDD

REF OURTEL UIGR1898 05NOV

---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE: CONSULTATIONS WITH JPN

TO FACILITATE PROGRAM PLANNING, WILL REQUIRE INFO ON FOLLOWING ASAP:

(A) AIRCRAFT OVERFLIGHT AND LANDING CLEARANCE HANEDA, TO INCLUDE
USUAL FLT INFO AND LIST OF PASSENGERS AND CREW C/W PASSPORT NUMBERS
AND DATES OF BIRTH; PRESUME ONLY PM AND IMMEDIATE PARTY WOULD LEAVE
AIRPORT PREMISES. MFA REQUIRES NOTE VERBALLY ON THIS SUBJECT SOONEST.

(B) LIST OF PM DEL. SINCE LUNCHEON IS APPARENTLY TO BE IN JPNSF
PAVILION AT AKASAKA PALACE, MAXIMUM NUMBER THAT CAN BE SEATED
COMFORTABLY IS SIXTEEN INCLUDING INTERPRETERS AND NOTETAKERS IF,
FIGHT PER SIDE. JPNSF PROPOSE MTG WHICH IS TO TAKE PLACE IMMEDIATELY
BEFORE LUNCHEON BE LTD TO FOUR PER SIDE, INCLUDING INTERPRETERS.

(C) AGENDA: WE PRESUME DISCUSSION WILL BE LARGELY CONFINED TO PMS
INITIATIVE. YOU WILL BE AWARE THAT VISIT TAKES PLACE SIX DAYS AFTER
DEPT OF PRES REAGAN AND THREE DAYS BEFORE ARRIVAL OF HU YAORANG
(NOW ARRIVING 23/23NOV; NOT/NOT 20/20NOV).

(D) PRESS CONFERENCE: THIS COULD BEST BE HELD AT PMS IMMEDIATELY AFTER
LUNCHEON WITH NAKASONE, IE, ABOUT 1500 HRS. IF JOINT PRESS CONF
ENVISAGED. THIS WOULD PRESUMABLY TAKE PLACE AT AKASAKA PALACE.

(E) WHEN WILL VISIT BE ANNOUNCED?

CCC/232 070530Z UIGR1915

000645

1002

INFO

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
Mission

MF
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UNCLASSIFIED

FM HAGUE YWGR1785 07NOV83

TO TT CFF LAHR/444 SQN/CAPT MURPHY IMMED DE CAF

INFO BONN EXTOTT IDDZ

REF OTT TEL IDDZ0082 05NOV

---PMS VISIT

REFTEL NOV5 FROM OTT INDICATES THAT LATEST SCENARIO HAS PM LEAVING
BONN BY CHALLENGER 11NOV AM FOR VOCKEL AIR BASE NETHS. DUTCH AIR
FORCE WILL BE TASKED TO PROVIDE HELICOPTER FOR PMS PARTY FROM VOCKEL
TO GROESBEEK CEREMONY AND RETURN. WILL KEEP YOU POSTED HOWEVER
APPEARS NOW THAT YR ASSISTANCE NO/NO LONGER REQUIRED. MANY THANKS.
UUU/155 071342Z YWGR1785

NFO

[Handwritten signature]

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMOOTT PM01259 07NOV83

TO ROME IMMED

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER EXTOTT *[Handwritten L]* IDDZ

DISTR XDV

RFF YOURTEL WTGR0404 04NOV

---ITALIAN LIBERAL PARTY PRESIDENT MALAGODI

LIBERAL INNATL WAS IN ERROR. PURPOSE OF CONTACT WAS SIMPLY TO
INFORM MALAGODI AS MATTER OF COURTESY THAT PM WOULD BE IN ROME.
PM WILL BE UNABLE TO MEET WITH HIM.

UUU/075 072052Z PM01259

[Handwritten box containing:]
28-6-1- *[Handwritten: Thurman Peace Mission]*
[Handwritten: 6]

28

INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMOOTT PM01250 07NOV83

TO ROME IMMED


INFO PARIS/HUDON EXTOTT IDDZ

---PM TRIP TO EUROPE 7-11NOV: MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS

ANGELO PERSICILLI, OF MTV TRNTO WILL ARRIVE ROME THUR MORNING
10NOV TO COVER PM TRUDEAU VISIT; RETURNING TO CDA FRI 11NOV.

2. PLEASE ARRANGE ACCREDITATION, IF REQUIRED, AND ACCOMMODATION
AT HOTEL DE LA VILLE FOR NIGHT OF 10NOV. WHILE HE IS NOT/NOT
TRAVELLING ON MEDIA CHARTER, HE SHOULD BE TREATED AS MEMBER OF
CDN MEDIA IN EVERY OTHER WAY.

UUU/204 071601Z PM01250



C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT XDV1078 07NOV83

TO LDN DELIVER BY 071700

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR IDDZ

REF OURTEL XDV1048 07NOV

---PMS IINITIATIVE:HOTEL RESERVATIONS

IF NOT/NOT ALREADY DONE SO,PLEASE CANCEL RESERVATIONS AT CLARIDGES
FOR NOV11/11.

CCC/302 071130Z XDV1078

28-6-1-Thudreau Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HAGUE YWAG0902 07NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 071000

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTRUIDDZ

RFF YOURTEL XDV1060 NOV3

~~---PMS VISIT-ADMIN:SECRETARIAL~~

NAME OF SCY-JACKY ASLING.

2.HOTFL IS SAME AS DELEGATION.HOTFL DES INDES (070)469553.ROOM
NUMBER 80/80.

CCC/029 070856Z YWAG0902

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
6 Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HAGUE YWAG0901 07NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 071000

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR LIEDZ

REF YOURTEL XDV1067 NOV03

---PM INITIATIVE-ADMIN:HOTEL

FOLLOWING ROOMS PREREGISTERED AT HOTEL DES INDFS. HOTEL ADDRESS

LANGE VOORHOUT 54-56, 2514 EG DEN HAAG, TELEPHONE (070) 469553.

Z.R.COLEMAN-ROOM 77/77; E. BROWN-ROOM 82/82; Y.BEAULIEU-

ROOM 75/75.

CCC/029 070856Z YWAG0901

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MF
20

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PEKIN WJGR0826 07NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO NDQHOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPM MOSCO WSHDC

DISTR IDA RBR RSR PFR PSR PER

RFF YOURTEL IDDZ0049 27OCT

---PMS SPEECH AT GUELPH UNIVERSITY

AMB CALLED ON ZHU QI ZHEN, DIRECTOR MFAS AMERICAS AND
OCEANIC AFFAIRS DEPT, 01NOV, TO DELIVER COPY OF PMS SPEECH
AT GUELPH UNIVERSITY. ZHU DID NOT/NOT COMMENT ON SPEECH OTHER
THAN TO NOTE THAT HE HAD SEEN CHINESE TRANSLATION OF PARTS OF
IT INCLUDING FIVE ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN CONCLUDING PARAS. HE
NOTED THAT FM WU XUE QIAN HAD DISCUSSED ARMS CONTROL ISSUES WITH
PM DURING RECENT VISIT TO OTT AND CHINESE IMPRESSION WAS THAT
THERE WAS CLOSE IDENTITY OF VIEWS BETWEEN CDA AND CHINA. WE
HAD HOPED TO ELICIT REACTION FROM MFA AFTER CHINESE HAVE HAD
CHANCE TO STUDY SPEECH BEFORE CONFIRMING DELIVERY TO CHINESE
OF PMS SPEECH. HOWEVER WE HAVE NOT/NOT YET HEARD BACK FROM ZHU.
2. IT IS OUR OWN ASSESSMENT THAT THERE ARE PARTS OF SPEECH THAT
WILL APPEAL TO CHINESE LEADERSHIP, IN PARTICULAR THOSE WHERE
RESPONSIBILITIES OF SUPERPOWERS FOR PRESENT STATE OF EAST/WEST
RELATIONSHIP ARE DISCUSSED. AS YOU KNOW CHINESE GO GOOD DEAL
FURTHER THAN PM. FOR CHINESE BOTH SUPERPOWERS ARE HEGEMONISTS
BECAUSE OF POLICIES IN VARIOUS PARTS OF WORLD. (GRENADA HAS

...2

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
Mission

PAGE TWO WJGR0826 CONFD

NOW BEEN ADDED TO USA SIDE OF LEDGER).HOWEVER ALTHOUGH CHINA
EQUATES TWO IN ITS PUBLIC RHETORIC(TO ANNOYANCE OF USA LEADERS),
IN PRIVATE CHINESE OFFICIALS WILL ADMIT THAT FOR TIME BEING
GREATEST THREAT TO CHINA COMES FROM USSR.

3.ON ARMS CONTROL CHINA HAS IN GENL TERMS BEEN PUBLICLY
SUPPORTIVE OF EFFORTS TO REDUCE NUMBERS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
HOWEVER CHINA BELIFVES TWO SUPERPOWERS SHOULD SHOW WAY EITHER
BY REDUCING ARSENALS BY 50 PERCENT OR BY ENTERING INTO
COMMITMENT TO DO SO.OTHER INTERESTED COUNTRIES SHOULD THEN
BE INVOLVED IN CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS FURTHER REDUCTIONS.CHINESE
SEE THEIR WEAPONS AS BEING DEVELOPED FOR PURPOSES OF SELF-DEFENCE
AND POINT OUT THAT BECAUSE OF THEIR LIMITED SIZE THEIR NUCLEAR
FORCES CAN ONLY HAVE A DETERRENT USE.WE SUSPECT THEREFORE THAT
THEY WILL WANT TO KNOW GOOD DEAL MORE ABOUT PMS PROPOSAL THAT
ALL FIVE NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATES ENGAGE IN NEGNS AIMED AT
ESTABLISHING GLOBAL LIMITS ON THEIR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS
BEFORE THEY WOULD CONSIDER ENDORSING IT.

CCC/299 070811Z WJGR0826

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HAGUE YWGR0752 07NOV83

TO FXTOTT (IDDZ IMMED PARIS URGENT-DELIVER TO PM DEL ON ARRIVAL
BONN ROME BRU LDN

INFO CANDELNATO WSHDC MOSCO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RSR RCR RBD RBR UGR URR CPT ITR IDA
RFF YOURTEL IDDZ0074 03NOV

---PM INITIATIVE-CALL ON PM LUBBERS

THERE WAS OPPORTUNITY TODAY IN HOUR LONG PRIVATE MTG WITH
PM LUBBERS TO REVIEW WITH HIM PERSONALLY PERSPECTIVES
HE WILL BRING TO WORKING DINNER TUESDAY EVENING. LUBBERS
SAID HE HAD READ CAREFULLY PM TRUDEAUS LETTER OF OCT25
AND HIS GUELPH SPEECH AND FOUND IDEAS AND PROPOSALS IN
THEM WERE VERY MUCH IN LINE WITH HIS OWN THINKING,
ALTHOUGH THERE WERE SOME AREAS WHERE HE WOULD PLACE SLIGHTLY
DIFFERENT NUANCE. HE WARMLY WELCOMED PM TRUDEAUS
INITIATIVE IN COMING TO CONSULT IN EUROPEAN CAPITALS AND
THOUGHT TIMING WAS GOOD. HE HOPED DINNER DISCUSSION
COULD BE STRUCTURED TO LEAD OFF WITH ANALYSIS OF CURRENT
SITUATION AND MOVE QUICKLY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON COURSES
OF ACTION FOR FUTURE. THERE WOULD NO/NO TIME
LIMIT IN DINNER DISCUSSION WHICH COULD CONTINUE WELL INTO
EVENING IF PM TRUDEAU NOT/NOT TOO TIRED (HAVE JUST LEARNED THAT
PM LUBBERS INTENDS TO STAY OVERNIGHT AT GUEST HOUSE AND
WOULD THEREFORE BE AVAILABLE TO CONTINUE CONVERSATION
OVER BREAKFAST).

...2

PAGE TWO YWGR0752 CONF

2. IN COMMENTING ON GUELPH SPEECH AND CURRENT STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, PM LUBBERS MADE FOLLOWING POINTS WHICH HE OBVIOUSLY DID NOT/NOT INTEND TO BE COMPREHENSIVE BUT RATHER TO BE SUPPORTIVE OF CANADIAN INITIATIVE:

A) HE AGREED THAT ONE OF CENTRAL PROBLEMS WAS NEED TO BUILD UP BETTER DIALOGUE AND CONFIDENCE BETWEEN KREMLIN AND WHITE HOUSE.

B) HE WAS NOT/NOT QUITE SO CONCERNED ABOUT SITUATION IN MOSCOW WITH RESPECT TO REPORTED GROWING MILITARY INFLUENCE AND THIS OPINION HAD BEEN REINFORCED THROUGH RECENT CONVERSATION WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL WHO GAVE REASSURING ASSESSMENT.

C) HE WAS CONVINCED SOVIET LEADERSHIP WAS CAUGHT UP IN ITS OWN PSYCHOLOGICAL GAME FROM WHICH IT COULD NOT/NOT EXTRICATE ITSELF AND WHERE AMERICAN POLICIES DID NOT/NOT HELP RESOLUTION OF INTERNAL RUSSIAN TENSIONS.

D) HE AGREED IT WAS IMPORTANT TO TRY TO PERSUADE PRESIDENT REAGAN TO BE A LITTLE LESS IDEOLOGICAL AND PRONE TO SEEING ISSUES IN SIMPLE BLACK AND WHITE.

E) LUBBERS HIMSELF HAD MADE PROPOSAL TO REAGAN (WHICH HE SAID WAS NOT/NOT PUBLIC AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE GUARDED) WHICH WOULD HAVE LINKED ON TIME BASIS PROGRESS BETWEEN DISMANTLING OF SS 20 S AND DELAYS ON INF DEPLOYMENT - I.F. FOR EVERY CERTAIN NUMBER OF SS20 S WHICH SOVIETS REMOVED, WEST WOULD AGREE TO DELAY INF DEPLOYMENT BY CERTAIN NUMBER OF MONTHS.

...3

PAGE THREE YWGR0752 CONF

OVER TIME,CONFIDENCE WOULD BE CREATED AND INF DEPLOYMENT
MADE UNNECESSARY.REAGAN AND WEINBERGER HAD REJECTED
DUTCH INITIATIVE ON GROUNDS THAT ONCE INF DEPLOYMENT WAS
DELAYED IT COULD NOT/NOT BE EASILY RESTARTED; AND
RUSSIANS WOULD PLAY CYNICAL GAME,DISMANTLING JUST ENOUGH
SS20 S TO PUT PERMANENT CRIMP INTO NATO DECISION ON INF
DEPLOYMENT.

F) RUSSIANS UNFORTUNATELY TOOK EUROPEAN AND NORTH AMERICAN
PEACE MOVEMENTS AND DEMONSTRATIONS SERIOUSLY ENOUGH TO
THINK THAT FURTHER BULLYING TACTICS WOULD STRENGTHEN SUCH
MOVEMENTS AND LEAD WESTERN GOVERNMENTS TO CHANGE POLICIES.

G) FOR NETHERLANDS,ROLE OF NATO IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS WAS
IMPORTANT.LUBBERS FEARED RATCHET EFFECT IN NATO UNDER
WHICH EACH SUCCESSIVE DECISION BY NATO MADE RELATIONS WITH
SOVIET BLOC A LITTLE MORE TAUT AND LOCKED DEFENCE POLICIES
INTO GREATER RIGIDITIES.HE APPRECIATED NEED TO HAVE
STRONG ALLIANCE AND BE SUPPORTIVE MEMBER.ARFA HE WOULD
LIKE TO EXPLORE HOWEVER IS HOW INDIVIDUAL NATO MEMBERS CAN
MAKE OWN VIEWS KNOWN WITHOUT BEING ACCUSED BY WASHINGTON OF
BEING WEAK OR DISLOYAL.

SMITH

CCC/029 071711Z YWGR0752

action


UNCLASSIFIED

FM CNGNY YIGR0706 07NOV83

TO FXTOTT/IDDZ

INFO WSHDC BONN HMBERG

DISTR SCA UGP URR FPR



---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST WEST - FRG RADIO COVERAGE

WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT WIDE DISSEMINATION OF THRUST OF PM INITIATIVE IN FR WAS PROVIDED ON FRG RADIO NETWORKS, WDR 1, NDR 2.

2. BOTH NETWORKS CARRIED REPORTS FROM NYORK FILED BY NYORK CORRESPONDENT ANSGAR SKRIVER WITH WHOM THIS POST HAS CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIP, AND TO WHOM WE PROVIDED ADVANCE NOTICE AND TEXT.

3. WDR CARRIED DISPATCH ON QUOTE POLITIK AM MORGEN UNQUOTE ON 28OCT AT 7:05 AM, WHILE SAME DAY 6:10 AM NDR 2 PROG QUOTE FRUEH KURIER UNQUOTE BROADCAST SIMILAR REPORT.

4. TEXTS PROVIDED TO US BY DKRIVER FAXED TO ACTION ADDRESSEE ONLY.

UUU/880 071040Z YIGR0706

CTION
SUITE A DONNER

Division Phoned

Person

Local Time

NONCLASSIFIE

DF BRU ZVGR0520 07NOV83

A EXTOTT/LIDDZ LIVRAISON 071100

INFO BREC ANKRA COPEN OSLO WSHDC MOSCO CNGNY GENFV TOKYO

PARIS HAGUE ROME BONN LDN NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD BNATO MDRID

CANMILREFNATO LSBN ATHNS PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR RSR FPR XDV MGT RGB RCR RPD

REF CONVERSATION TELEPHONIQUE 05NOV FORTIER/SMITH

---INITIATIVE DU PM: BRIEFING POUR LA PRESSE

N AYANT RIEN RECU D OTT A CE SUJET, NOUS AVONS DISTRIBUE

AUJOURD HUI A L OCCASION D UN DEJEUNER AVEC QUELQUES UNS DES

PRINCIPAUX JOURNALISTES BELGES, DOCUMENTATION D INFO SUIVANT

SOUS TITRE CIT LE CDA, LA PAIX ET LE DESARMEMENT FINCI.

2. QUOI QU IMPORIVSE, NOUS ESPERONS QU IL NE CONTIENT PAS D ERREUR

OU D OMISSION ET POURRAIT ETRE UTILE A LA PRESSE POUR FAIRE

VALOIR LES TITRES EXCEPTIONNELS DU CDA ET DU PM A PRENDRE

L INITIATIVE EN CETTE MATIERE.

3. TEXTE CIT:

LE CANADA, LA PAIX ET LE DESARMEMENT

(DOCUMENT D INFORMATION D ARRIERE PLAN)

1914-1945 LE CANADA A PARTICIPE ET A FAIT UNE CONTRIBUTION

IMPORTANTE AUX VICTOIRES DES ALLIES DANS LES DEUX

GUERRES MONDIALES

DEPUIS LE DEBUT DE L ERE NUCLEAIRE, LE CANADA A

...2

PAGE DEUX ZVGR0520 NONCLAS

PARTICIPIE ACTIVEMENT A TOUS LES PRINCIPAUX EFFORTS
EN VUE DU DESARMEMENT NUCLEAIRE ET CONVENTIONNEL
ET A TRAVAILLE POUR TENTER D ASSURER QUE L ENERGIE
NUCLEAIRE SOIT EMPLOYEE A DES FINS PACIFIQUES

1945 LE CANADA ETAIT UN DES TROIS ETATS SIGNATAIRES(AVEC
LES ETATS-UNIS ET LE ROYAUME-UNI)DE LA DECLARATION
SUR L ENERGIE ATOMIQUE,QUI A INSTITUTE LA COMMISSION
DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L ENERGIE ATOMIQUE

1946 LE CANADA S EST ENGAGE VOLONTAIREMENT A NE PAS PRODUIRE
D ARME NUCLEAIRE,QUOIQ IL FUT DOTE DE SA PROPRE
TECHNOLOGIE NUCLEAIRE(LE CANDU)ET DE RESSOURCES
CONSIDERABLES DE MATERIAUX NUCLEAIRES

1948-9 LE CANADA A ETE UN DES INSTIGATEURS ET MEMBRES
FONDATEURS DE L OTAN,ET A PARTICIPE ACTIVEMENT A
L ORGANISATION CIVILE ET MILITAIRE SOUTENANT LEUR
ROLE DANS LA SECURITE COLLECTIVE

1950 LE CANADA PARTICIPE AU SEIN DES FORCES DES NATIONS
UNIES A LA GUERRE DE COREE

1952 ETABLISSEMENT DE LA COMMISSION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR
LE DESARMEMENT DONT LES MEMBRES DU CONSFIL DE SECURITE
ET LE CANADA SONT MEMBRES(EN 1958 CETTE COMMISSION A
ETE ETENDUE A TOUS LES MEMBRES DES NATIONS UNIES)

...3

PAGE TROIS ZVGR0520 NONCLAS

1956 LESTER B PEARSON, ALORS MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES
DU CANADA RECOIT LE PRIX NOBEL DE LA PAIX POUR LA
RESOLUTION DE LA CRISE DE SUEZ PAR LA CREATION DES
PREMIERES FORCES DE LA PAIX DES NATIONS UNIES

LE CANADA A ETE UN DES PARTICIPANTS DES LE DEBUT DES
FORCES DE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX DES NATIONS UNIES (SUEZ,
PROCHE ORIENT, CONGO, CHYPRE, KASHMIR) ET D INDOCHINE

1959 LE CANADA EST UN DES CINQ PAYS OCCIDENTAUX MEMBRES DU
COMITE DES DIX PAYS SUR LE DESARMEMENT (NATIONS UNIES)

1961 LE CANADA A ETE MEMBRE ACTIF DU COMITE DES 18 PAYS SUR
LE DESARMEMENT (NATIONS UNIES)

1962 LE CANADA A SOUMIS UN PROJET DE DECLARATION POUR
INTERDIRE LES ARMES NUCLEAIRES DANS L ESPACE AU
COMITE DES 18 NATIONS SUR LE DESARMEMENT A GENEVE.
CETTE INITIATIVE, PARMI D AUTRES A PRELUDE AU TRAITE
DE L ESPACE EN 1967

1968-1970 LE CANADA A ETE L UN DES INSTIGATEURS DES NEGOCIATIONS
QUI ONT ABOUTI DANS LE TRAITE SUR LA NON-FROLIFERATION
DES ARMES NUCLEAIRES

LES ANNEES 1970

LE CANADA A EU UNE FORTE PARTICIPATION LORS DES

...4

PAGE FOUR ZVGR0520 NONCLAS

RENCONTRES DE LA SESSION EXTRAORDINAIRE DES NATIONS
UNIES SUR LE DESARMEMENT. DANS CE CONTEXTE, LE
PREMIER MINISTRE DU CANADA, PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU
A PRIS L'INITIATIVE DE SOUMETTRE LA CIT STRATEGIE DE
L'ASPHYXIE FINCIT PROPOSANT L'ARRET ET LE CONTROLE DES
RECHERCHES ET DEVELOPPEMENTS TECHNIQUES DES ARMEMENTS
NUCLEAIRES

1979 LE CANADA A APPUYE ET CONTINUE D'APPUYER LA CIT DOUBLER
DECISION FINCIT DE L'OTAN DE DECEMBRE 1979 DE DEPLOYER LES
MISSILES DE CROISIERE ET PERSHING EN EUROPE ET AU
MEME MOMENT D'ENTREPRENDRE LES NEGOCIATIONS SUR LES
MISSILES A MOYENNE PORTEE A GENEVE AFIN DE REDUIRE
LE NOMBRE DE CES MISSILES EN EUROPE

DANS LE CONTEXTE DE CETTE DECISION, EN 1983 LE CANADA
A SIGNE UN ACCORD AVEC LES ETATS-UNIS PERMETTANT LES
ESSAIS DE MISSILES DE CROISIERE AU CANADA

PRINTEMPS 83

LE PREMIER MINISTRE TRUDEAU A PRONE AU SOMMET DES
SEPT PUISSANCES INDUSTRIALISEES DE WILLIAMSBURG UN
PLUS GRAND ENGAGEMENT DES PARTICIPANTS EN MATIERE
DE CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS ET DE RECHERCHE DE VOIES
CONCRETES VERS LA DEFENSE DE LA PAIX

...5

PAGE FIVE ZVGR0520 NONCLAS

OCTOBRE 1983

DISCOURS DU PREMIER MINISTRE TRUDEAU A L'UNIVERSITE
DE GUELPH LANCANT SON INITIATIVE POUR RANIMER LE
DIALOGUE EST/OUEST ET REDUIRE LES TENSIONS ENTRE
LES SUPERPUISSANCES AFIN DE PERMETTRE ENTRE AUTRES,
UNE ATMOSPHERE PLUS CONSTRUCTIVE AUX NEGOCIATIONS
EN MATIERE DES DESARMEMENT NUCLEAIRE ET CONVENTIONNEL

FINCIT.

UUU/126 071454Z ZVGR0520

ME
ED

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
Mission
6

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE BRU ZVGR0519 07NOV83

A FXTOTT XDV LIVRAISON 070900

INFO BREEC PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON HAGUE BONN ROME BNATO
PARIS

DISTR (IDDZ

REF NOTRETEL ZVGR0514 03NOV

---INITIATIVE DU PM:VISITE A BRUXELLES

CONFIRMONS CONVERSATION DU 5NOV ENTRE FORTIER-GARY SMITH.

ENTRETIEN AVEC PM MARTENS ET MRE TINDEMANS ACCOMPAGNE DE

DEUX COLLABORATEURS AURA LIEU A L OCCASION D UN DEJEUNER

QUI SE TIENDRA AU PALAIS D EGMONT A COMPTER DE 13H00 ET

EN PRINCIPF JUSQU A 15H00, QUOIQUE LES CONVERSATIONS PUISSENT

FORT BIEN SE PROLONGER EN FAIT POUR UNE HEURE DE PLUS SI

TEL EST LE DESIR DES PARTICIPANTS TOUT AU MOINS AVEC L UN

DES DEUX PRINCIPAUX INTERLOCUTEURS BELGES.

2.NOS SUGGESTIONS D ORDRE DU JOUR ONT ETE ACCEPTEES AD

REFERENDUM ET L ON PEUT DONC PREVOIR QUE APRES BREFVE

INTRODUCTION DE PM TRUDEAU, MARTENS REAGISSE A L ANALYSE

CDNNE DE LA SITUATION EST-OUEST, APRES QUOI LES QUESTIONS

PLUS SPECIFIQUES SERAIENT ABORDEES L UNE PARES L AUTRE,

LA PARTIE CDNNE PRECISANT SI POSSIBLE SES PROPOSITIONS

SPECIFIQUES.

2.ON PREND POUR ACQUIS QUE PHOTOGRAPHES ACCOMPAGNANT LE PM

...2

PAGE DEUX ZVGR0519 CONFID

VOUDRONT SE TROUVER A L'ENTREE DU PALAIS D'EGMONT AU DEBUT
DE LA REUNION AINSI QUE TOUS LES JOURNALISTES A LA FIN. LA
SEANCE D'INFORMATION PREVUE DANS NOTRE TEL ZVFC3601 04 NOV AURA
DONC LIEU AU CENTRE CULTUREL DE 13H15 A 14H45, SANDWICHES, VIN ET
CAFE ETANT OFFERTS AUX JOURNALISTES. PRIERE CONFIRMER SI CET
ARRANGEMENT EST ACCEPTABLE A LA PRESSE.

CCC/133 071145Z ZVGR0519

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Division *Peace*
Person *mission*
Local Time

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM ROME WTGR0406 07NOV83

TO EXTOTT (IDDZ) DELIVER BY 070930

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER LDN BONN PARIS HAGUE BRU MOSCO BNATO
NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADM POL/CPP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDD IDR IFB IDA RGB RCD RSR RSD RCR

---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS: ITALIAN REACTION

ANTONIO BADINI, FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER TO PM CRAXI, INFORMED US LATF
FRI THAT CRAXI HAD CONFIRMED TIMES FOR MTGS WITH PM TRUDEAU,

IF 1045-1130 TETE-A-TETE FOLLOWED BY LUNCH STARTING AT 1300
(INTERVENING TIME BEING TAKEN UP WITH CALL ON POPE). BADINI

WILL BE NOTETAKER FOR TETE-A-TETE AND AMBASSADOR WILL ATTEND WITH PM;
LUNCH WILL BE FIVE ASIDE INCLUDING VFRY PROBABLY FM ANDRFOTTI
AND THREE OFFICIALS, BADINI, DIRGEN OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS AT MFA
BOTTAI AND PMS POLITICAL ADVISER ACQUAVIVA.

2. TURNING TO SUBSTANCE OF PMS INITIATIVE, BADINI SAID THEY SHARED
FULLY CONCERN EXPRESSED BY PM TRUDEAU ABOUT DETERIORATING STATE OF
EAST-WEST RELATIONS. INDEED HE DESCRIBED PRESENT JUNCTURE AS QUOTE
VERY DANGEROUS MOMENT UNQUOTE. CONTRIBUTING TO SENSE OF FOREBODING
WAS UNPROMISING STATE OF INF NEGOTIATIONS IN WHICH PM CRAXI HAD
TAKEN A KEEN PERSONAL INTEREST AND FELT CONSIDERABLE FRUSTRATION. HE
SAID CRAXI WAS PARTICULARLY DISAPPOINTED NOT/NOT TO HAVE RECEIVED
ANY RESPONSE TO LONG LET HE HAD PERSONALLY DRAFTED TO ANDROPOV
LAST MONTH (TEXT SENT TO IDA) WHICH COVERED NOT/NOT ONLY INF BUT ALSO
PROSPECTS FOR RENEWAL OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN ITALY AND USSR.
CRAXI HAS HIS OWN VIEW OF GENEV NEGOTIATIONS WHICH HE WOULD BE

...2

PAGE TWO WTGR0406 CONF

PLEASED TO SHARE WITH PM TRUDEAU. HE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO HEAR TRUDEAU'S THOUGHTS ON WHY SOVIETS HAVE BEEN SO INTRANSIGENT IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

3. ACCORDING TO BADINI, BASIC AIM OF SOVIETS IS TO DIVIDE THE WEST. ANY CHANCE THEY PERCEIVE TO SUCCEED IN THIS OBJECTIVE, THEY WILL PURSUE IT. THEY WILL PURSUE IT AS LONG AS THERE IS ANY CHANCE OF ACHIEVING THEIR GOAL. THEIR STUBBORNNESS IN INF CONTEXT WAS DEMONSTRATION OF THIS. ANY MOVE BY A WESTERN COUNTRY WILL BE ACCEPTED BY USSR TO EXTENT IT PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLOIT DIVS IN WEST. IN BADINI'S VIEW, THESE HARSH ASSESSMENTS ARE PROBABLY AN ACCURATE REFLECTION OF SOVIETS PRESENT STATE OF MIND. (THIS MAY SOUND LIKE OVERLY SIMPLISTIC INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES. IN EFFECT WHAT SOVIETS APPEAR TO BE SEEKING IN INF IS A MINIMIZATION OF USA ROLE IN PREFERENCE TO MODERNIZATION AND AUGMENTATION OF ITS MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE. BY SAME TOKEN USSR APPEARS TO WANT TO EQUATE ITS OWN INF DEPLOYMENT TO THAT OF FRANCE AND UK).

4. DESPITE HAZARDS INVOLVED IN DEALING WITH SOVIETS IN THESE VERY DIFFICULT TIMES (BADINI RECALLED BAD EXPERIENCE OF KOHL/ANDROPOV MTG), THEY CONSIDERED IT MOST IMPORTANT TO KEEP OPEN POSSIBILITIES FOR CONTACT BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS, INCLUDING AT HIGHEST LEVEL OF REAGAN AND ANDROPOV, EVEN IF THEY WERE NOT/NOT IN POSITION TO MEET NOW. MEANWHILE OTHER COUNTRIES COULD BEGIN THE PROCESS. ITALY, FOR ONE, HAD IN MIND THAT, ESPECIALLY IF INF NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD FAIL, THEY WOULD LIKE TO MAKE SOME KIND OF APPROACH EARLY NEXT YEAR.

...3

PAGE THREE WTGR0406 CONF

ONE PROBLEM BADINI SAW WAS THAT USSR WAS NOT/NOT REALLY INTERESTED IN CONTACTS PER SE (UNLESS AS MEANS OF EXPLOITING DIVS); HE ADDED THAT THEY WERE NOT/NOT INTERESTED IN CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS EITHER. RENEWAL OF ITALY'S RELATIONS WITH USSR WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO INVOLVE SOME PRACTICAL MEANS, EG IN CULTURAL OR TRADE SPHERES. THEY HAD IN MIND SOMETHING ECONOMIC, SUCH AS A DECISION TO BUY SOVIET NATURAL GAS IF IT IS ECONOMIC IN RETURN FOR A USSR COMMITMENT TO BUY SOME ADDITIONAL ITALIAN PRODUCTS.

5. THUS ITALIANS HAVE FORMULATED SOME TENTATIVE IDEAS OF THEIR OWN ON HOW THEY MIGHT TRY TO DEVELOP THEIR RELATIONS WITH USSR AND THIS WAS HINTED AT IN CRAXI'S LET TO ANDROPOV. BADINI REPEATED THAT THEY THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO WORK IN A PRACTICAL DIMENSION, AIMING FOR A BALANCED RESULT, IF SOME BENEFITS FOR BOTH SIDES. TO EXTENT SUCH EFFORTS BY ITALY AND OTHERS WERE ABLE TO PROVIDE MUTUAL BENEFITS, THEY WOULD BE A STABILIZING FACTOR.

6. BADINI SAID IN CONCLUSION THAT THEY WERE VERY MUCH LOOKING FORWARD TO RECEIVING TRUDEAU, TO HEARING HIS IDEAS AND ALSO SOME OF VIEWS HE MIGHT HAVE RECEIVED FROM OTHER LEADERS BEFORE REACHING ROME.

CCC/191 071227Z WTGR0406

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
ÀThe Canadian Embassy
BONN**CONFIDENTIAL**

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. **IDDZ-0088**DATE **Nov. 5/83**

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<u>P.M. Initiative</u> Letter from P.M. Trudeau to Chancellor Kohl (ref our telegram IDDZ-0029 of October 25, 1983)	
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À Gary J. Smith External Affairs - IDDZ Ottawa
DATE	SIGNATURE	

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE -- NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
À**The Canadian Embassy
ROME****CONFIDENTIAL**

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO.

IDDZ-0087

DATE

Nov. 5/83

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<p><u>P.M. Initiative</u></p> <p>Letter from P.M. Trudeau to President Craxi</p> <p>(ref our telegram IDDZ-0027 of October 25, 1983)</p>	
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
DATE	SIGNATURE	Gary J. Smith External Affairs - IDDZ Ottawa

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

CONFIDENTIAL

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

TO
À**The Canadian Embassy
The Hague**NO. **IDDZ-0086** DATE **Nov. 5/83**

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<p><u>P.M. Initiative</u></p> <p>Letter from P/M. Trudeau to P.M. Lubbers</p> <p>(ref our telegram IDDZ-0027 of October 25, 1983)</p>	
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
DATE	SIGNATURE	<p>Gary J. Smith External Affairs - IDDZ Ottawa</p>

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
À**The Canadian High Commission
LONDON****CONFIDENTIAL**

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. **IDDZ-0085** DATE **Nov. 5/83**

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<p><u>P.M. Initiative</u></p> <p>Letter from P.M. Trudeau to P.M. Thatcher</p> <p>(ref our telegram IDDZ-0031 of October 25, 1983)</p>	
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
DATE	SIGNATURE	Gary J. Smith External Affairs - IDDZ Ottawa

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION


CONFIDENTIAL

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

TO The Canadian Embassy
À IS

NO. IDDZ-0084

DATE Nov. 5/83

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<p><u>P.M. Initiative</u></p> <p>Letter from P.M. Trudeau to President Mitterrand</p> <p>(ref our telegram IDDZ-0030 of Oct. 25/83)</p>	
8/11/83 DATE	 SIGNATURE	RETURN TO / RETOURNER À Gary J. Smith External Affairs - IDDZ Ottawa

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RECEPTION

TO
ÀCanadian Embassy
Brussels

CONFIDENTIAL

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO.

IDDZ-0083

DATE

Nov. 5/83

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<p><u>P.M. Initiative</u></p> <p>Letter from P.M. Trudeau to P.M. Martens (ref our telegram IDDZ-0026 of Oct. 25/83)</p>	

CANADIAN EMBASSY
BRUSSELS

Rec'd 21 NOV. 1983

BRUXELLES
AMBASSADE DU CANADA

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

Gary J. Smith
External Affairs - IDDZ
Ottawa

DATE

SIGNATURE

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

**CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM TOKYO UIGR1898 5NOV83

TO FXTOTT/PPR FLASH

INFO FCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR USS DMF PPD IDD PGB

RFF YOURTFL PPR0376 04NOV

---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE:CONSULTATIONS WITH JEN

PM NAKASONE LOOKS FORWARD TO MEETING WITH PM TRUDEAU 19NOV

FROM 1120-1430 HOURS,AND REQUESTS MR TRUDEAU JOIN HIM FOR LUNCHEON
AKASAKA PLACE.

STFERS

CCC/195 050310Z UIGR1898

20-1-1-1
28-6-1-1
D.O. PHONED PEACE
MISSION
10:25 Pm. 04 NOV.

Mayon
Done X.H.
Resmide copy 7/11
for my WF
to file this
2/11

Informed PCO/Caron and
DDZ/Smith by phone.
PCO has been informed
by duty officer on weekend.

2/11/83



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0082 05NOV83

TO/À

TO PARIS HAGUE BRU ROME BONN LDN DELIVER BY 070800

INFO

DISTR

INFO PC00TT/FOWLER PM00TT/JOHNSON/COLEMAN ATOC/TRENTON 412 SQN

REF

OTTAWA NDHQOTT/DAOT3-3 HQ CFE/LAHR RCMPOTT/VIP5 (IMMED) *12*

SUBJ/SUJ

DISTR XDV MGT RGB RCR RSR RBD

REF TEL XDV1074 04NOV

---PM INITIATIVE-EUROPE 1983

FLWG IS REVISED PM PROGRAMME INCORPORATING INFO REC D NOV 5/5. SEE

ESPECIALLY PORTION ON WED, NOV 9/9.

(COMCENTRE PLS COPY ATTACHED).

128-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG *J. HARLICK*

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG *L.A. DELVOIE*

000675

5 / NOVEMBER 1983

**VISIT OF THE
PRIME MINISTER
TO
EUROPE**

NOVEMBER 1983

OTTAWA

Monday, November 7

Local Time

- 1845 hours Members of the official party arrive at Hangar 11, CFB Ottawa South and board aircraft
- 1910 hours - Prime Minister Trudeau arrives at Hangar 11 and boards aircraft (Ambassadors will say goodbye)
- 1915 hours - Departure from Ottawa

PARIS

Tuesday, November 8

Local Time

- 0800 hours - Arrival in Paris
Orly Airport
- 0920 hours - Arrive at the Ritz Hotel
15 Place Vendôme
- 1210 hours - Depart from Hotel for Elysée
- 1230 hours - Meeting and working lunch with President Mitterrand (4+4)
Elysée
- 1545 hours - Departure for Airport from Elysée
- 1700 hours - Depart Paris
Orly Airport
- 1800 hours - Arrival at The Hague
Valkenberg Military Airport
(PM Lubbers will meet and accompany to Residence)
- 1820 hours - Arrival at Dutch Prime Minister's Residence
Catshuis
(Prime Minister, Fowler, Johnson, G. Smith. Remainder of delegation will say at Hotel des Indes, Lange Voorhout 54-56)
- 2000 hours - Working Dinner given by Prime Minister Lubbers (5+5)
Catshuis

THE HAGUE

Wenesday, November 9

Local Time

- 0850 hours - Depart Catshuis for the Palace
- 0900 hours - Audience with Queen Beatrix (Prime Minister only)
- 1000 hours - Depart the Palace
- 1020 hours - Depart The Hague
Valkenberg Military Airport
- 1105 hours - Arrival in Brussels
Melsbroek Airport
- 1135 hours - Arrival at Hotel Amigo
1-3 Rue del Amigo
- 1300-1500 hours - Working lunch given by Prime Minister Martens
Palais d'Egmont
- 1505 hours - Departure for Airport
- 1535 hours - Departure Brussels
Melsbroek Airport
- 1750 hours - Arrival in Rome
Ciampino Airport
- 1820 hours - Arrive at Hassler Villa Medici Hotel
Piazza Trinita d'Monti
(Prime Minister, Johnson, Beaulieu. Remainder of delegation will stay at Grand Hotel de la Ville, Via Sistina 69)
- Evening free

ROME

Thursday, November 10

Local Time

- 1045 hours - Meeting with Prime Minister Craxi (5+5)
Palazzio Chigi
- 1140 hours - Depart for Vatican
- 1200-1240 hours - Audience with Pope John Paul II
The Vatican
- 1300 hours - Working lunch with Prime Minister Craxi (5+5)
Villa Madama
- 1430 hours - Departure for Airport
- 1500 hours - Depart Rome
Ciampino Airport
- 1745 hours - Arrive Bonn
Bonn/Cologne Airport
- 1800 hours - Arrive Steigenberger Hotel
Am Bundeskanzler Platz
- 1830 hours - Meeting with Chancellor Kohl (time to be confirmed) (4+4)
Chancellor's Office
- 1930 hours - Dinner with Chancellor Kohl

BONN

Friday, November 11

Local Time

- 0830 hours - Depart Hotel Steigenberger
- 0855 hours - Depart Bonn
Bonn/Cologne Airport
- 0925 hours - Arrive Volkel Military Airport
Depart for Groesbeek by helicopter
- 0945 hours - Arrive Groesbeek Cemetery
- 0950 hours - Remembrance Ceremony
Groesbeek Cemetery
- 1035 hours - Depart Groesbeek Cemetery by helicopter for
Volkel Military Airport

1045 hours - Depart Netherlands
Volkel Military Airport

1045 hours - Arrive London
Heathrow Airport

1200-1430 hours - Working lunch with Prime Minister Thatcher
(4+4)
10 Downing Street

1435 hours - Departure for Airport

1600 hours - Depart London
Gatwick Airport

1830 hours - Arrive Ottawa
Hangar 11, CFB Ottawa (South)

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM TOKYO UIGR1898 5NOV83

TO EXTOTT/PPR FLASH

INFO FCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR USS DMF PPD IDD PGB

RFF YOURTEL PPR0376 04NOV

---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE:CONSULTATIONS WITH JFN

PM NAKASONE LOOKS FORWARD TO MEETING WITH PM TRUDEAU 19NOV

FROM 1120-1430 HOURS,AND REQUESTS MR TRUDEAU JOIN HIM FOR LUNCHFON
AKASAKA PLACE.

STFERS

CCC/195 050310Z UIGR1898

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION
20-1-1-P
28-6-1
D.O. PHONED
10:25 P.m. 04 NOV.

Mayon
Done X.H.
As make copy
for my WF
to file this
2/11/83

Informed PCO Caron and
IDDZ (Smith by phone.
PCO has been informed
by duty officer on weekend.

2/11/83

TO The Canadian High Commission
A LONDON

NO. IDDZ-0085 DATE Nov. 5/83

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE
-70-1-1-1 MISSION

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
ÀThe Canadian Embassy
BONN

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CONFIDENTIAL
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO.

IDDZ-0088

DATE

Nov. 5/83

QUANTITY
QUANTITÉ

DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION

REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE

P.M. Initiative

Letter from P.M. Trudeau to Chancellor Kohl
(ref our telegram IDDZ-0029 of October 25, 1983)

28-6-1- TRUDEAU PEACE
~~30-1-1-1~~ MISSION

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

28-11-83

DATE

[Signature]
SIGNATURE

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

Gary J. Smith
External Affairs - IDDZ
Ottawa

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flècheSECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

5 NOV 83 20 11 2

12

10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0081 05NOV83

TO/À

TO HAGUE

INFO

Deliver by 070800
DISTR: IFB, RGB, IDR, RSD, RSR, FPR, XDX

DISTR

REF HARLICK/PILLARELLA TELECON 04NOV

REF

---PM INITIATIVE: GROESBEEK CEREMONY 11NOV

SUBJ/SUJ

AS AGREED REFTelecon, GRATEFUL YOU PREPARE GROESBEEK WAR CEMETERY
SCENARIO BRIEF FOR INCLUSION IN PM SCENARIO BRIEFING BOOK DURING
HIS VISIT TO HAGUE 08-09NOV. BRIEF SHOULD PROVIDE BACKGROUND INFO ON
GROESBEEK SITE ITSELF, OUTLINE OF REMEMBRANCE CEREMONIES AND INDICA-
TION OF WHO WILL BE PRESENT. AS PROMISED, FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF REMARKS
WHICH PM COULD USE AT GROESBEEK SHOULD HE BE CALLED UPON TO SPEAK.
PLEASE INCLUDE AS ATTACHMENT TO SCENARIO BRIEF. (PLEASE FILL IN
NUMBER OF DUTCH WHO HAVE DIED IN TWO WORLD WARS IN PARA7 OF REMARKS.)
2.TEXT BEGINS. QUOTE.

(COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)

UNQUOTE.

28-6-1-1 Hudson Peace Mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

sid. Harlick/sc

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG

L.A. Deluote
L.A. DELUOTE

000684

QUOTE

~~Speech~~ ^{Remarks} Notes for ~~Speech~~ by

Prime Minister Trudeau

Groesbeek Canadian War Cemetery

Nijmegen, The Netherlands

November 11, 1983

Today we are here to remember the sacrifice of
Canadians who died restoring peace and freedom to the people
of The Netherlands.

PART PLAYED BY CANADIAN TROOPS IN THE
The liberation of The Netherlands by Canadian

~~troops~~ in 1945 is one of the reasons why the friendship
between our two nations is so strong and enduring. Out of
the wastage of war was born mutual admiration and deep
respect.

Those Canadians who marched into The Netherlands
38 years ago knew of the great hardships suffered by a
population which had been prisoner in its own land for five
years. They had defied death in order to assist Allied
servicemen escape enemy capture. In particular, our troops
personally knew the members of the Princess Irene Brigade
who landed with the Canadians in Normandy and helped to
liberate their own country.

Many of those Canadians were invited back to
The Netherlands in 1980 and warmth of that welcome will
never be forgotten.

...2

- 2 -

We also recall that today marks the 65th anniversary of the signing of The Armistice ending the First World War. "The war to end all wars" was ended and millions the world over prayed that their sons and daughters would never again be called upon to fight.

However, the 2,300 Canadians buried here and those buried at Holten, Reichwald and Rheinberg are tragic proof that so many more young men and women had to meet the price of the failure of nations to live together in harmony.

Today, on the 65th anniversary of the event that gave birth to Remembrance Day, we can best honour the memory of the 110,000 Canadians and (blank) Dutch who have died in the two world ^w wars by dedicating ourselves to that most heroic yet elusive of causes - peace on earth,

I am sure that all of us gathered here today, and our fellow countryman at home, share this commitment fully.

Today political leaders throughout the world are being asked by their peoples to work with dedication to achieve this goal. For my part, I have been examining ways to increase the degree of political confidence between ^East and ^West and so reduce the threat of war. My trip to Europe is part of this effort and I have been greatly

...3

- 3 -

encouraged by the support for reduced international tensions which I have found among all the leaders whom I have visited.

Our efforts for peace must not slacken. ~~Our~~
~~RESPONSIBILITY~~
~~commitment to future generations is plain.~~ Our debt to
past generations is only all too evident here at Groesbeek.
OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO FUTURE GENERATIONS IS PLAIN.
Let us pledge that we will honour the sacrifice of the
soldiers buried around us by ensuring that no cemeteries
or memorials to future combattants need ever be constructed
again.

UNQUOTE

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
Mission

CONFIDENTIAL

November 5, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Subject: Visit to Japan

Mr. Nakasone is pleased to receive you in
Tokyo on Saturday, November 19, for lunch at the
Akasaka Palace.


/ R.R. Fowler