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MINISTÈRE  
DES  
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TITLE—TITRE:

POLITICAL AFFAIRS - POLICY AND BACKGROUND  
- FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS - UNITED STATES  
OF AMERICA - UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST  
REPUBLIC

AFFAIRES POLITIQUES - POLITIQUE ET  
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VOLUME

23



TO/À RGB  
FROM/DE • RBR

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • LETTER TO SSEA FROM GEORGE SHULTZ  
SUJET

*RBR*  
*to note &  
file  
for*

RBR/POETSCHKE/6-2633/PAL

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Attached is self-explanatory correspondence from Secretary of State George Shultz to Mr. Clark concerning the forthcoming visit of Shevardnadze to Washington.

R. Poetschke  
Deputy Director  
USSR and Eastern  
Europe Relations  
Division



**SECRET**


EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES  
OTTAWA, CANADA

October 27, 1987

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have the honor to transmit a copy of a letter to you from Secretary of State George P. Shultz which was received electronically at the Embassy today. There will be no signed original.

Sincerely,

  
Thomas M. T. Niles  
Ambassador

The Right Honorable  
Joe Clark, P.C., M.P.,  
Secretary of State for External Affairs,  
Ottawa.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

October 27, 1987

Dear Joe:

I wanted to bring you up to date on what is turning out to be a rapidly evolving situation with respect to future high-level US-Soviet contacts.

Our Ambassador in Moscow was called in by Foreign Minister Shevardnadze the morning of October 27. Shevardnadze proposed that he visit the United States in the near future to deliver the letter Gorbachev said during my Moscow visit he would be sending the President. President Reagan has agreed to accept Shevardnadze's offer to come to Washington, and I have instructed Ambassador Matlock to inform the Foreign Minister he will be welcome. There will be a joint announcement of the visit Thursday.

As we prepare for the visit, I will value as I have in the past the steadfast support we have always been able to count upon from you and our other Allies.

Sincerely,

George P. Shultz

The Right Honorable  
Joe Clark, P.C., M.P.,  
Secretary of State for External Affairs,  
Ottawa.

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---SHEVARNADZE VISIT TO WSHDC

MEDIA CARRIED RUMOUR LATE TODAY THAT SHEVARNADZE WILL BE ARRIVING  
IN WSHDC ON THURSDAY AND WILL MEET WITH REAGAN ON FRIDAY. STATE  
DEPT SOURCE TOLD US HE WAS NOT/NOT IN POSITION TO CONFIRM STORY,  
BUT HE DID NOT/NOT DENY IT AND HE TOLD US TO QUOTE HOLD ON TO YOUR  
HAT UNQUOTE. VISIT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN ARRANGED DURING CALL WHICH  
U.S. AMB MATLOCK PAID ON SHEVARNADZE EARLIER TODAY. JOINT  
ANNOUNCEMENT IS EXPECTED TOMORROW.

2. WHILE WE CAN ONLY SPECULATE AT PRESENT, REASON FOR VISIT IS  
SURELY CONNECTED TO BREAKDOWN OF MOSCO ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS  
LAST WEEK. IT MAY WELL BE THAT BRINKMANSHIP BEING CONDUCTED BY  
BOTH SIDES (SEE OUR REFTTEL) HAS UNNERVED AT LEAST ONE OF PLAYERS,  
BUT BOTH CLEARLY HAVE AN INTEREST IN RETRIEVING SITU IF POSSIBLE.  
WHETHER THAT IS, IN FACT, POSSIBLE IS ANOTHER MATTER. MAYBE AGMT

...2



CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE TWO UNGR2011 CONF

CAN BE REACHED TO CONCLUDE AND SIGN INF AGMT(SOMEWHERE,SOMEHOW)  
BUT IF SOVIETS ARE EXPECTING MAJOR REVERSAL OF US POSITION REAGAN[  
ON SDI ANY TIME SOON THEY ARE IN FOR DISAPPOINTMENT.ONLY YESTERDAY,  
REAGAN DESCRIBED SDI AS QUOTE CORNERSTONE OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY  
POLICY UNQUOTE.

3.EMERGENCY MTG OF KIND ENVISAGED COULD HAVE CATALYTIC EFFECT ON  
ENTRENCHED POSITIONS,BUT IF IT FAILS IT COULD ALSO MAKE IT EVEN  
MORE DIFFICULT TO BREAK IMPASSE.MAYBE A LITTLE MORE TIME SHOULD  
HAVE BEEN LEFT FOR TWO SIDES TO DIGEST RESULTS OF MOSCOW  
DISCUSSIONS.

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REF BNATO TEL YGBR6869 26OCT MOSCO TEL XYGR1856 26OCT

---AMERICAN SOVIET RELNS: AN END TO ARMS NEGOTIATIONS?

SUMMARY:SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MTG IN MOSCO LAST WEEK ADVANCE ARMS  
CONTROL AGENDA,BUT IT ALSO COULD SPELL END OF ARMS  
CONTROL NEGS WITH REAGAN ADMIN. AS BOTH BNATO AND MOSCO  
HAVE REPORTED,MTG CAME CLOSE TO WRAPPING UP FINAL DETAILS  
OF INF AGMT,AND IT BROKE NEW GROUND TOWARDS START AGMT WHICH NOW  
APPEARS ONLY FEW MONTHS AWAY FROM CONCLUSION. HOWEVER,MOSCO  
DISCUSSION ALSO MADE IT CLEAR THAT COMMON OBJECTIVES WHICH TWO  
SIDES SHARE IN RESPECT OF INF AND START DO NOT/NOT EXTEND TO  
DEFENCE AND SPACE SECTORS.SOVIETS ARE CONTINUING TO HOLD TO VIEW  
THAT REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY  
SEVERE CONSTRAINTS ON RESEARCHING BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCES,  
WHILE REAGAN ADMIN REFUSES TO DISCUSS ANY CONSTRAINTS WHICH COULD  
INHIBIT SEARCH FOR EFFECTIVE DEFENCE SYSTEM.

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PAGE TWO UNGR2010 CONF

2. IF THERE IS WAY OUT OF IMPASSE, IT PROBABLY LIES IN NIMBLE MIND OF PAUL NITZE, WHO HAS BEEN PROMOTING COMPROMISE ON SDI TESTING. TO DATE, HE HAS BEEN ENCOURAGED BY GEORGE SHULTZ, WHOSE OWN DOGGED NEGOTIATING STYLE HAS LARGLEY BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR PROGRESS MADE SINCE REYKJAVIK. BUT SHULTZS MANNER OF DEALING WITH GORBACHEV MAY WELL HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO HARDENING OF SOVIET POSN WHICH PRODUCED BREAKDOWN IN MOSCO TALKS. GORBACHEV, FOR HIS PART, MAY HAVE OVERPLAYED STRONG HAND HE HOLDS. IN MEANTIME, REAGAN CONTINUES TO ADHERE TO MAXIMALIST POSN ON SDI, AND IT WILL BE UP TO HIS CLOSEST CONFIDANTS AND CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP TO TRY TO CONVINCE HIM THAT HE CAN HAVE ARMS CONTROL AND SDI TOO.

3. QUESTION OF WHETHER INF AGMT WOULD BE SIGNED OUTSIDE OF SUMMIT WAS NOT/NOT DISCUSSED DURING MOSCO TALKS, BUT HAS SINCE BEEN RAISED BY BOTH SIDES AS POSSIBILITY. NEITHER SEEMS VERY KEEN ON IDEA, HOWEVER, AND BOTH ARE PROBABLY HOPING SOMETHING CAN STILL BE WORKED OUT ON DEFENCE/SPACE ISSUES IN NEXT FEW WEEKS. THAT WOULD PERMIT (A) WASHINGTON SUMMIT BEFORE END OF YEAR, AT WHICH INF TREATY WILL BE SIGNED AND QUOTE KEY PROVISIONS UNQUOTE OF START/DEFENCE/SPACE AGMT WILL BE AGREED UPON, AND (B) MOSCO SUMMIT IN SPRING, AT WHICH START/DEFENCE/SPACE TREATY WILL BE SIGNED.

4. REPORT: AMERICAN/SOVIET DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCO LAST WEEK PRODUCED NUMBER OF IMPORTANT BREAKTHROUGHS IN ARMS CONTROL, AND THESE SHOULD NOT/NOT BE OBSCURED BY DISAPPOINTMENT OVER FAILURE TO SET DATE FOR SUMMIT. IN BRIEF, MAIN ACCOMPLISHMENTS WERE AS FLWS:

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PAGE THREE UNGR2010 CONF

5. INF:

AGMT WAS FINALLY REACHED ON MAIN ELEMENTS OF DESTRUCTION SCHEDULE FOR MISSILES AND WARHEADS TO BE COVERED IN ZERO/ZERO INF AGMT.

(A) LONG RANGE MISSILES WILL BE ELIMINATED WITHIN THREE YEARS LESS 15 DAYS (INSTEAD OF FIVE SOUGHT BY SOVIETS), ON CONDITION THAT CERTAIN PERCENTAGE OF THESE (I.E. 20 TO 25 PERCENT) CAN BE DESTROYED DURING FIRST SIX MONTHS OF AGMT BY QUOTE LAUNCH TO DESTROY UNQUOTE METHOD, THAT IS FIRING THEM OFF INTO SEA OR DESTROYING THEM IN FLIGHT.

(B) SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES WILL BE ELIMINATED WITHIN 18 MONTHS (OR 12 MONTHS IF IT PROVES TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE). SOVIETS HAD PROPOSED RETAINING 80 TO 100 OF THESE BEYOND DEADLINE, AS NOTIONAL TRADE-OFF FOR GERMAN PIAS UNTIL THESE HAD BEEN FINALLY REMOVED, BUT AMERICANS COUNTERED WITH DEMAND U.S. BE PERMITTED TO KEEP SIMILAR NUMBER ON ITS TERRITORY FOR SAME PERIOD. SOVIETS THEREAFTER DID NOT/NOT RETURN TO ISSUE, SO IT REMAINS UNCERTAIN WHERE ISSUE NOW STANDS. (NITZE ACKNOWLEDGES UNCERTAINTY, WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN HAS SAID SOVIETS DROPPED IDEA, AND ACDA DIRECTOR ADELMAN BELIEVES IT IS STILL ON TABLE.)

(C) WARHEADS ON GERMAN PIAS WILL BE ELIMINATED IN LAST FIFTEEN DAYS OF THREE YEAR DESTRUCTION PERIOD FOR LRINF.

(D) VERY DIFFICULT NEGS ON VERIFICATION ISSUES DID NOT/NOT PRODUCE COMPLETE CONCURRENCE, BUT DID CLOSE GAPS BETWEEN TWO SIDES TO WITHIN QUOTE MANAGEABLE RANGE FOR GENEVA NEGOTIATORS UNQUOTE.

PAGE FOUR UNGR2010 CONF D

PRINCIPAL ISSUE WAS CHALLENGE ON-SITE INSPECTION AFTER MISSILES HAVE BEEN DESTROYED. ACCORDING TO NITZE, TWO SIDES ARE NOW GENERALLY AGREED THAT 10 TO 15 INSPECTIONS WILL BE PERMITTED A YEAR, THAT INSPECTING SIDE WOULD NOT/HAVE TO DECLARE WHICH SITE IT WISHED TO VISIT UNTIL ARRIVAL AT PORT OF ENTRY, AND THAT RECEIVING STATE WOULD HAVE TO ALLOW INSPECTION TO BEGIN NO/NO MORE THAN SIX HOURS LATER. THEY ALSO AGREED TO BEGIN NECESSARY EXCHANGE OF DATA ON MISSILE PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT SITES THIS WEEK (IN GENEVA). NOT/NOT RESOLVED APPARENTLY WAS SOVIET DEMAND TO BE ALLOWED TO INSPECT INF SITES IN WESTERN EUROPE, AND U.S. DEMAND TO BE ALLOWED TO INSPECT SOME SOVIET MOBILE ICBM FACILITIES.

6. AT END OF MTG, SHEVARDNADZE TOLD AMERICANS HE THOUGHT IT SHOULD NOW TAKE NO/NO MORE THAN FIVE TO SIX WEEKS TO CONCLUDE THE AGMT. SINCE ALL FOCUS WAS ON SUBSTANCE OF AGMT, THERE WAS NO/NO DISCUSSION OF WHEN OR HOW INF AGMT MIGHT BE SIGNED (I.E. IF NOT/NOT AT SUMMIT).

7. START:

STRATEGIC SYSTEMS WERE MAIN ISSUES DISCUSSED BY GORBACHEV AND SHULTZ DURING THEIR FIVE-HOUR MTG. PRIOR TO MTG, TWO SIDES HAD ALREADY AGREED ON GLOBAL CEILINGS OF 6000 WARHEADS AND 1600 MISSILES, AND ON PRINCIPLE OF 50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN THROW WEIGHT. SOVIETS HAD ALSO BEGUN TO DISCUSS POSSIBILITY OF AGREEING

...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR2010 CONF D

TO SUB-CEILINGS.

(A) IN MOSCOW GORBACHEV PROPOSED WARHEAD SUB-CEILINGS OF 3300 TO 3000 FOR ICBMS, 2000 TO 1800 FOR SLBMS, AND 900 TO 800 FOR ALCMS. NUMBERS PROPOSED WERE UNACCEPTABLE TO ADMIN, SINCE THEY WOULD REQUIRE U.S. TO UNDERTAKE MAJOR INCREASE IN ICBM LEVEL AND MAJOR DECREASE IN SLBM LEVEL (MIRRORING RESTRUCTURING OF SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES IMPLIED IN U.S. PROPOSED SUB-CEILINGS). BUT SINCE LOWER RANGES OF SOVIET-PROPOSED ICBM/SLBM CEILINGS TOTAL 4800 FOR ALL BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS, AS DESIRED BY ADMIN, SOVIET PROPOSALS CONVINCED SHULTZ THAT TWO SIDES WOULD EVENTUALLY BE ABLE TO QUOTE MAKE IT IN THIS AREA UNQUOTE. ACCORDING TO NITZE, QUOTE IF SOVIETS COULD AGREE ON 4800, WE COULD AGREE ON SOME FLEXIBILITY ON THE ICBM LIMIT UNQUOTE.

(B) U.S. SIDE CONTINUED TO DEMAND BAN ON MOBILE ICBMS, BUT INVITED SOVIETS TO MAKE SUGGESTIONS FOR ALLEVIATING VERIFICATION PROBLEM ASSOCIATED WITH THESE MISSILES, SO THAT AT LEAST SOME MIGHT BE PERMITTED.

8. THESE ACCOMPLISHMENTS NOTWITHSTANDING, WHEN DISCUSSIONS TURNED TO DEFENCE/SPACE ISSUES IT WAS CLEAR TWO SIDES REMAINED AS FAR APART AS EVER. QUESTION FOR MOSCO MTG WAS WHETHER SOVIETS WOULD SETTLE FOR WHAT HAD ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED OR INSIST ON

...6



PAGE SIX UNGR2010 CONF

CORRESPONDING PROGRESS ON REST OF ARMS CONTROL AGENDA BEFORE GOING TO SUMMIT. RELATED QUESTION WAS WHETHER, IF LATTER, AMERICANS COULD FIND WAY TO FINESSE DIFFERENCES ON DEFENCE/SPACE ISSUES TO PERMIT SUMMIT TO GO AHEAD. AS IT TURNED OUT, GORBACHEV DISPLAYED GOOD DEAL OF CONCERN IN HIS MTG WITH SHULTZ ABOUT PROSPECTS OF EVENTUALLY SETTLING DIFFERENCES OVER DEFENCE AND SPACE, AND HE WAS NOT/NOT REASSURED BY SHULTZ RESPONSE.

9. FLWING RATHER ACRIMONIOUS EXCHANGE ON UNRELATED SUBJECTS (A U.S. REPORT ON SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES ABOUT WHICH GORBACHEV COMPLAINED TO SHULTZ, AND SEC OF STATES REJOINDER ABOUT SOVIET PROPANGA CHARGING US WITH SPREADING AIDS, SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND DESTRUCTION OF KOREAN AIRLINER), GORBACHEV ASKED SHULTZ WHAT HE COULD EXPECT OUT OF SUMMIT MTG WITH REAGAN. SPECIFICALLY, IN SHULTZ WORDS, GORBACHEV ASKED WHETHER SUMMIT WOULD QUOTE PRODUCE AGMTS ON A COMBINATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS AND SPACE DEFENCE THAT WOULD WOULD BE, SORT OF, AGMTS IN PRINCIPLE, AND THEN NEGOTIATORS WOULD WORK ON THEM, RECOGNIZING THAT VERIFICATION WOULD BE EXTRAORDINARILY DIFFICULT UNQUOTE. BY HIS OWN ACCOUNT, SHULTZ REPLIED QUOTE I CANNOT/NOT GUARANTEE THAT AT ALL. THERE IS A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION. THE PRESIDENT AND ALL OF US ARE DETERMINED THAT WE ARE GOING TO FIND THE ANSWER TO THIS ...7

PAGE SEVEN UNGR2010 CONFID

QUESTION ABOUT DEFENDING OURSELVES.WE ARE NOT/NOT GOING TO BE STOPPED FROM THAT UNQUOTE.UNDOUBTEDLY SHAKEN BY SUCH UNCOMPROMISING LANGUAGE.GORBACHEV RESPONDED QUOTE HE WOULD HAVE TO THINK ABOUT THAT UNQUOTE,AND HE UNDERTOOK TO WRITE REAGAN ON SUBJ (LETTER IS EXPECTED VERY SHORTLY).

10.AFTER FACT,AMERICANS EXPRESSED SURPRISE AT WHAT THEY DESCRIBED AS GORBACHEVS UNCOMPROMISING POSITION.SHULTZ SAID HE WAS QUOTE NOT/NOT SURE WHAT IT IS THAT MAKES HIM FEEL HE IS NOT/NOT QUITE COMFORTABLE WITH THE WAY THINGS ARE ARRANGED UNQUOTE,WHILE OTHERS POINTED OUT THAT NEITHER PREVIOUS DAYS DISCUSSION NOR/NOT LAST MONTHS SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MTG IN WSHDC HAD LEFT THEM WITH IMPRESSION SOVIETS WOULD INSIST ON STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK BEING IN PLACE BEFORE SUMMIT COULD BE HELD.SOME EVEN ARGUED IT HAD BEEN SHEVARDNADZE WHO HAD QUOTE PROPOSED UNQUOTE FALL SUMMIT MTG IN WSHDC WITHOUT SPECIFYING NEED FOR FRAMEWORK AGMT,AND THEY SPECULATED THAT HE MIGHT HAVE EXCEEDED HIS AUTHORITY IN DOING SO,OR THAT HE AND GORBACHEV HAD BEEN CHASTISED BY POLITBURO FOR BEING TOO ACCOMMODATING TOWARDS AN AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION SO OBVIOUSLY IN DOMESTIC TROUBLE.STATE DEPT SOURCE TOLD US INTERNAL INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT HAD COME UP WITH HOST OF CONTRADICTORY REASONS FOR SOVIET POSN.

11.IT IS INCONTROVERTIBLE,HOWEVER,THAT SOVIETS ALL ALONG HAVE ...8

PAGE EIGHT UNGR2010 CONFID

WANTED AT LEAST QUOTE KEY PROVISIONS UNQUOTE ON START/DEFENCE/  
SPACE TO BE AGREED TO AT SUMMIT. GORBACHEV SAID SO IN HIS MARCH  
SPEECH AND SOVIETS HAVE NEVER SINCE RENOUNCED THIS OBJECTIVE,  
THOUGH ADMITTEDLY PURSUING IT IN MINOR KEY SINCE SUMMER.  
SHEVARDNADZE, AFTER ALL, MADE SOME INNOVATIVE PROPOSALS ON SDI  
TESTING AND ABM TREATY DURING WASHINGTON MTG (WHICH AMERICANS  
SUMMARILY REJECTED) SO IT IS NOT/NOT AS IF SOVIETS LOST ALL  
INTEREST IN ADVANCING THEIR VIEWS IN STRATEGIC AREA. IN FINAL ANALYSIS;  
IT WOULD BE UNTENABLE FROM SECURITY PERSPECTIVE FOR SOVIETS TO  
AGREE TO 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN THEIR OFFENSIVE FORCES WHILE  
EXPOSING THEMSELVES TO POSSIBILITY THAT THEIR REMAINING FORCES WOULD  
BE INSUFFICIENT TO DETER AMERICAN ATTACK, IF AMERICANS DEPLOY SDI  
SYSTEM.

12. THEY HAVE NOT APPARENTLY, RULED OUT PROSPECT OF ACHIEVING  
THEIR OBJECTIVE IN TIME REMAINING THIS YEAR. DESPITE  
GORBACHEV TELLING SHULTZ HE WOULD HAVE TO THINK ABOUT SUMMIT A  
LITTLE MORE, SOVIET LEADER REPEATED SEVERAL TIMES DURING MTG THAT  
HE WANTED TO COME TO WSHDC THIS YEAR (HE REFERRED EXPLICITLY TO  
WSHDC AS VENUE), AND TASS ACCOUNT OF MOSCO TALKS SPOKE OF  
FORTHCOMING MTG AND QUOTE MTG WHICH IS BEING  
PLANNED THIS YEAR UNQUOTE. TASS ACCOUNT ALSO QUOTE GORBACHEV AS  
...9



PAGE NINE UNGR2010 CONF

SUGGESTING THAT NO/NO TIME BE LOST NEGOTIATING QUOTE AN ACCORD ON THE KEY PROVISIONS OF FUTURE AGMTS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND SPACE UNQUOTE. IN STATEMENT, HE PERSONALLY EXPRESSED HOPE THAT QUOTE ONE AND A HALF MONTHS ARE ENOUGH TO WORK OUT AND DULY PREPARE ALL THIS. I AM READY TO VISIT THE U.S. BUT SO FAR I AM PUT ON MY GUARD BY POSSIBLE RESULTS UNQUOTE.

13. IN MANNER REMINISCENT OF THEIR FIRST REACTIONS TO COLLAPSE OF REYKJAVIK SUMMIT, MANY IN ADMIN HAVE CHOSEN TO IGNORE SOME OF THESE MORE POSITIVE INDICATORS IN ORDER TO ACCENTUATE THE NEGATIVE. THUS PRESIDENT HAS SAID U.S. IS IN NO/NO HURRY AND QUOTE WE CERTAINLY WILL NOT/NOT BE PUSHED INTO SACRIFICING ESSENTIAL INTERESTS JUST TO HAVE A MTG UNQUOTE. SHULTZ HAS SAID SUMMIT WOULD BE HELD WHEN GORBACHEV WAS READY, BUT HE WARNED THAT QUOTE IF HE WAITS TOO LONG, MAYBE WE WON'T BE READY UNQUOTE. HE SAID ADMIN HAD QUOTE ONLY A FINITE AMOUNT OF PATIENCE UNQUOTE.

14. IRONY IN ALL THIS IS THAT SOVIET POSITION ON SDI HAS EVOLVED CONSIDERABLY SINCE REYKJAVIK, AND PRECISELY IN DIRECTION CHIEF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATOR NITZE HAS BEEN ENCOURAGING. TODAY, IT CANNOT REASONABLY BE DESCRIBED AS BEING INTENDED TO QUOTE KILL UNQUOTE SDI, BUT RATHER TO PUT SOME CONSTRAINTS ON SDI TESTING TO KEEP PROGRAM LARGELY IN CONFORMITY WITH ABM TREATY. FLEXIBILITY ON MATTER DISPLAYED BY SHEVARDNADZE AT WSHDC MTG (ON THRESHOLD LIST OF PERMITTING TESTING) APPEARED TO HAVE DISAPPEARED DURING GENEVA

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PAGE TEN UNGR2010 CONF D

DISCUSSIONS WHICH FOLLOWED, BUT ACCORDING TO NITZE REAPPEARED IN MOSCO. NITZE, FOR HIS PART, HAS BEEN WORKING ON ELABORATING GUIDELINES FOR TESTING PGM WHICH WOULD BOTH MEET SOVIET CONCERNS AND ALLOW MUCH OF SDI PGM TO CONTINUE. (IN SUPPORT OF HIS EFFORTS, HE HAS BROUGHT INTO HIS OFFICE ASHTON CARTER, ONE OF FOREMOST ACADEMIC AUTHORITIES ON THEORY AND PRACTICE OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENCE.)

15. YET DECISION ON WHETHER TO COMPROMISE ULTIMATELY RESTS WITH PRESIDENT, WHO REMAINS ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO ANY QUOTE ADJUSTMENTS UNQUOTE IN SDI PGM AND ANY NEGOTIATION OF SUCH ADJUSTMENTS. IN QUITE HEATED RESPONSE TO QUESTION POSED BY EUROPEAN JOURNALIST ON FRIDAY, REAGAN REPEATED HIS VIEW THAT POLICY OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION (MAD) EMBODIED IN ABM TREATY WAS MAD, AND HE WOULD NOT/NOT PERMIT PROSPECT OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEM TO BE TURNED INTO BARGAINING CHIP. HE IS ENCOURAGED IN THIS VIEW BY DEF SECTY WEINBERGER, BUT FEW OTHERS IN WHITE HOUSE OR CABINET APPEAR TO BE AS OPPOSED AS HE IS EVEN TO MODEST CONSTRAINTS ON SDI RESEARCH AND TEST SCHEDULE. PERHAPS, AS IN CASE OF HIS OPPOSITION TO TAX INCREASES, PRESIDENT CAN BE TALKED INTO MODERATING HIS POSN BY CONFIDANTS (SUCH AS HIS WIFE, CHIEF OF STAFF BAKER, NSC DIRECTOR CARLUCCI AND OTHERS INCLUDING SHULTZ). BUT IT TOOK STOCK ...11

PAGE ELEVEN UNGR2010 CONF

MARKET MELT-DOWN TO GET TO CHANGE HIS MIND ON TAXES AND SO FAR THERE IS NOTHING COMPARABLE,(THANK GOD) TO SHAKE HIS RESOLVE ON SDI.

16.OTHER POSSIBLE SOURCE OF INFLUENCE ON PRESIDENT IS CONGRESS.

SOME DEMOCRATIC LEADERS,LIKE SEN SAM NUNN,HAVE CRITICIZED ADMIN FOR REFUSING TO NEGOTIATE WITH SOVIETS ON SCOPE OF SDI TESTS,AND BOTH SENATE AND HOUSE PASSED RESOLUTIONS SEVERAL WEEKS AGO PROHIBITING SDI TESTS WHICH WOULD VIOLATE TRADITIONAL

INTERPRETATION OF ABM TREATY.PRESIDENT HAS THREATENED TO EXERCISE VETO AND COULD PROBABLY SUSTAIN ONE,BUT NUNN AND OTHERS HAVE THREATENED IN TURN TO WITHHOLD DEFENCE FUNDING.IN MEANTIME,BOTH HOUSE HAVE APPROVED SDI FUNDING WELL BELOW LEVEL REQUESTED BY ADMIN.WRITING IS CLEARLY ON WALL,THEREFORE,AS TO WHAT CAN BE EXPECTED IF DEMOCRATS CAPTURE WHITE HOUSE NEXT YEAR.IN LIGHT OF THIS,REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP,WHILE NOT/NOT BREAKING RANKS WITH PRESIDENT,CAN BE EXPECTED TO URGE HIM TO COMPROMISE ON SDI TESTING FOR SAKE OF POLITICAL BENEFITS ACCRUING FM SUMMIT.

17.BUT POSSIBILITY EXISTS PRESIDENT WILL REMAIN UNMOVED,AND WHOLE ARMS CONTROL EDIFICE CONSTRUCTED SO LABORIOUSLY OVER LAST SEVERAL YEARS WILL COLLAPSE.ONE WONDERS,THEN,IF GORBACHEV MAY NOT/NOT BE OVERPLAYING STRONG HAND HE NOW HOLDS.

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ATHNS LSBN MDRID PEKIN TOKYO CNBRA WLGTH GENEV VCSCE PRMNY  
VMBFR CANMILREPNATO PCOOTT/SANDI PMOOTT/BURNEY  
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DISTR MINA MINT USS DMC IDRL IDRA IDD IDX IDA IDAN IDAV IDAO  
IFB INP IND UGB URR URD ESN RGB RER RBD RBP RBT

---USA/USSR FOREIGN MINS CONSULTATIONS:SHULTZ VISIT TO MOSCO

SUMMARY:AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ EMERGED FROM TWO DAYS  
OF INTENSE NEGOTIATIONS WITH GORBACHEV AND SHEVARNADZE WITH  
AGREEMENT ON EVERY MAJOR ISSUE OF INF TREATY LEAVING WHAT WAS  
DESCRIBED AS ONLY A FEW DETAILS REGARDING VERIFICATION WHICH  
SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN A FEW WEEKS.BOTH SHEVARNADZE AND SHULTZ  
REPORTED PROGRESS ON START ISSUES BUT SOVIETS HELD FAST TO THEIR  
QUOTE PRINCIPLED POSITIONS UNQUOTE LINKING PRESERVATION AND  
STRENGTHENING OF ABM TREATY TO CONCLUSION OF RADICAL REDUCTION  
IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS.SUMMIT DOES NOT/NOT APPEAR LIKELY THIS  
YEAR:GORBACHEV INSISTED ON PROGRESS REGARDING LINKED ABM TREATY  
AND START AS CONDITION FOR HIS TRIP TO WSHDC.INF TREATY HAS NOT/  
NOT BEEN LINKED AGAIN TO STRATEGIC/DEFENCE QUESTIONS BUT IF  
GORBACHEV DOES NOT/NOT TRAVEL TO USA TO SIGN IT,OTHER ARRANGEMENTS,  
AS YET UNDEFINED,WILL BE MADE.DESPITE IMPASSE ON STRATEGIC/

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PAGE TWO NYGR1856 CONF

DEFENCE ISSUES BOTH SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE EXPRESSED CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM ABOUT STATE OF RELATIONSHIP BUT NO/NO EARLY RETURN MTG AT MINISTERS LEVEL IS ENVISAGED. SOVIETS, IN OUR VIEW, HAVING ACHIEVED INF AGREEMENT HAD LITTLE TO GAIN BY CONCESSIONS ON DEFENCES AS IT APPEARS THAT SOVIET ASSESSMENT IS THAT SDI WILL NEVER BE REALIZED AND MAY WELL BE REPUDIATED BY NEXT PRESIDENT. PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE GOES TO USSR FOR HAVING MADE KEY INF CONCESSIONS AND PUT FORWARD NEW START PROPOSALS WHILE CONCEDING NOTHING/NOTHING TOWARDS SDI. LATTER RESULT PROBABLY SATISFIED DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPERATIVES IN BOTH CAMPS.

2. REPORT: SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ AND HIS DELEGATION ARRIVED IN MOSCO IN NINETEENTH CENTURY STYLE BY TRAIN TO DISCUSS THE UNIQUELY TWENTIETH CENTURY ISSUES OF NUCLEAR WAR AND THE EXOTICA OF TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY SPACE BASED WEAPONRY AS WELL AS THE STANDARD AGENDA ITEMS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL ISSUES AND BILATERAL QUESTIONS. BOTH SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE GAVE PRESS BRIEFINGS ON EVENING OF 23 OCT AFTER LONG AND INTENSE NEGOTIATING SESSIONS WHICH INCLUDED FIVE HOUR MTG BETWEEN GORBACHEV AND SHULTZ (FOUR AND ONE HALF HOURS BY SHULTZ WATCH). BOTH FOREIGN MINS EXPRESSED THEIR SATISFACTION AT THE BUSINESS-LIKE AND EVEN FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE OF THE TALKS. SHEVARDNADZE DESCRIBED THE MTGS AS QUOTE USEFUL AND RESULTATIVE UNQUOTE WHILE SHULTZ CHARACTERIZED HIS CONTACTS WITH SOVIET FM AS QUOTE UNFAILINGLY PRODUCTIVE UNQUOTE. SHEVARDNADZE STATED THAT HIS IMPRESSION WAS THAT QUOTE IN RECENT

...3

PAGE THREE XYGR1856 CONFD

TIMES IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, SOMETHING IS CHANGING FOR THE BETTER UNQUOTE. PRESS CONFERENCES DIFFERED SIGNIFICANTLY IN STYLE; SHEVARDNADZE FLANKED BY BESSMERTNYKH, KARPOV AND GERASIMOV WAS RELAXED AND OFFERED CONSIDERABLE DETAIL IN HIS NINETY MINUTES. SHULTZ, APPEARING SOMEWHAT DISAPPOINTED, WAS MORE CONCISE IN HIS COMMENTS WHICH LAST SLIGHTLY MORE THAN THIRTY MINUTES. DETAILS OF COMMENTS ON ARMS CONTROL AND GENERAL RELATIONS ISSUES FOLLOWS; SEPARATE TEL WILL COVER MIDEAST, WHICH WAS ONLY REGIONAL ISSUE COMMENTED ON IN ANY DETAIL BY FMS AND MIN PRESS CONFERENCE.

3. INF: BOTH MINISTERS AGREED THAT TALKS HAD RESOLVED ALL OUTSTANDING ISSUES ON INF AGREEMENT LEAVING DETAILS OF VERIFICATION WHICH, ACCORDING TO SHEVARDNADZE, SHOULD TAKE GENEVA DELS APPROX 2 OR 3 WEEKS TO WORK OUT. NEITHER SHULTZ NOR SHEVARDNADZE CHARACTERIZED THESE DETAILS AS QUOTE AN OBSTACLE UNQUOTE. AGREEMENT WOULD THUS BE READY FOR SIGNATURE IN NEAR FUTURE. SHEVARDNADZE DESCRIBED MAIN OBSTACLES WHICH WERE RESOLVED AS: QUOTE VERY DELICATE AND COMPLICATED UNQUOTE INF ISSUE (HE PRIASED POSITIVE ROLES OF GDR, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND FRG IN THAT ORDER FOR HELPING TO SOLVE INF PROBLEMS); FINAL FORMULA OF DATES FOR ELIMINATION OF INF AND SRINF ASSETS AS WELL AS PROCEDURES FOR DOING SO; AND, EXCHANGE OF DATA ON INF/SRINF. ONLY LACK OF TIME HAD NOT/NOT PERMITTED RESOLUTION OF FINAL VERIFICATION QUESTIONS. GORBACHEV, ACCORDING TO SOVIET FM, HAD INSTRUCTED HIM THAT INF AGREEMENT WAS TO BE COMPLETELY AGREED DURING SHULTZ VISIT;

...4

PAGE FOUR XYGR1856 CONF

SHEVARDNADZE HOPED (TO LAUGHTER OF AUDIENCE) THAT HE HAD COME CLOSE ENOUGH AND THAT HIS GENEV EXPERTS (GLANCE IN THEIR DIRECTION) WOULD NOT/NOT LET HIM DOWN, EVEN IF SOME TECHNICAL PROBLEMS WERE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT. ASKED WHETHER INF AGREEMENT WOULD BE SIGNED IF GORBACHEV DOES NOT/NOT GO TO USA FOR SUMMIT, SHEVARDNADZE STATED UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT INF TREATY WOULD BE SIGNED, IT HAD NOT/NOT BEEN RELINKED TO START/ABM PACKAGE BUT THAT HE DID NOT/NOT KNOW WHEN OR WHERE THE TREATY WOULD BE SIGNED.

4. TESTING. SHEVARDNADZE STATED THAT DATES HAD BEEN AGREED FOR QUOTE WIDE RANGING UNQUOTE TALKS ON NUCLEAR TESTING AND DESCRIBED THIS ACCOMPLISHMENT AS QUOTE VERY IMPORTANT UNQUOTE. SHULTZ MADE NO/NO MENTION OF THIS.

5. STRATEGIC/DEFENCE ISSUES: SHEVARDNADZE EMPHASIZED ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS THAT ACHIEVEMENT OF 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS COUPLED WITH THE STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE ABM TREATY IS (QUOTING GORBACHEV) QUOTE THE CARDINAL PROBLEM OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AT PRESENT UNQUOTE. THIS HAD BEEN AGREED BILATERALLY DURING HIS SEPT TALKS WITH REAGAN AND SHULTZ, ACCORDING TO SHEVARDNADZE WHO DESCRIBED THIS QUOTE CENTRAL PROBLEM UNQUOTE OF THE RELATIONSHIP AS BEING OF QUOTE PRINCIPLED IMPORTANCE UNQUOTE. WITHOUT PRIOR AGREEMENT THAT THE NEXT SUMMIT WOULD PERMIT THE SIGNING OF A DOCUMENT SETTING OUT THE KEY PROVISIONS OF AN AGREEMENT RADICALLY REDUCING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS

...5

PAGE SIX XYGR1856 CONF

LEGAL RIGHT UNDER ABM TREATY TO PURSUE RESEARCH ON DEFENCES AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES AND TO DEPLOY DEFENCES SHOULD RESULTS CONFIRM DEFENCE TO BE FEASIBLE. SHULTZ DESCRIBED SOVIETS START/ABM LINKAGE AS QUOTE NOT/NOT WARRANTED UNQUOTE: HE SAID THAT ORIGINAL INTENT OF ABM TREATY IN RESTRICTING DEFENCE WAS DECREASE IN OFFENCES WHICH HAD NOT/NOT HAPPENED. OFFENCES HAD GROWN BY FOUR TIMES SINCE 1972 AND IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, RESEARCH ON DEFENCES WAS QUOTE PERFECTLY CONSISTENT UNQUOTE WITH ABM TREATY. QUOTE MORE IMPORTANT UNQUOTE THAN TREATY WAS INTENT OF PRESIDENT TO ENHANCE NATIONAL SECURITY OF USA AND ITS ALLIES. SHULTZ ADMITTED THAT ALTHOUGH CONCEPT OF PREDICTABILITY BY GUARANTEEING NO/NO EXIT FROM ABM READY FOR FIXED PERIOD WAS GOOD, THE OBJECTIVES OF TWO SIDES WERE SIMPLY NOT/NOT COMPATIBLE AND THAT HE QUOTE COULD NOT/NOT SEE HOW THEY COULD EVER COME TO CLOSURE UNQUOTE ON ISSUE OF SPACE DEFENCES.

8. SHEVARDNADZE REEMPHASIZED SOVIET DISRE FOR 10 YEAR GUARANTEE OF ABM TREATY IN FORM IT WAS SIGNED AND RATIFIED. HE DESCRIBED SOVIET EFFORTS AFTER REYKJAVIK TO ACCOMMODATE USA DESIRE FOR EXPLORATORY RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING, IE, LIST OF DEFICES (TESTING OF WHICH WOULD BE PERMITTED IN SPACE) WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS HAVING QUOTE PRINCIPLED IMPORTANCE FOR REACHING AGREEMENT ON COMPLIANCE WITH ABM TREATY WITHIN THE AGREED PERIOD UNQUOTE. IN THIS STATEMENT THERE IS A HINT THAT USSR MAY NOT/NOT CONSIDER ITSELF BOUND BY ABM TREATY SHOULD USA TESTING IN SPACE GO

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PAGE SEVEN XYGR1856 CONF D

BEYOND PARAMETERS SET OUT IN SOVIET LIST OF PERMITTED SPACE TESTING.

9. SHEVARDNADZE POINTED OUT THAT OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF STATES, INCLUDING MANY AMERICAN ALLIES, AGREE WITH SOVIET POSITION ON SID. HE STATED THAT USA WAS NOT/NOT SERIOUS IN DISCUSSIONS OF ABM TREATY AND MADE IT CLEAR IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET MEDIA QUESTION (OBVIOUSLY PREPLANNED), THAT SOVIETS SUSPECTED THAT USA WAS USING ABM/SDI IMPASSE AS PRETEXT TO SCUTTLE ENTIRE NEGOTIATION ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS, ESPECIALLY WHEN USSR HAD MADE SO MANY CONCESSIONS IE, ON NUMERICAL SUBLEVELS IN TRIAD. IN REEMPHASIZING QUOTE PRINCIPLED IMPORTANCE FOR SOVIET AMERICAN RELATIONS UNQUOTE OF 50 PERCENT STRATEGIC FORCE REDUCTIONS LINKED WITH PRESERVATION OF ABM TREATY, IT IS CLEAR THAT SHEVARDNADZE HAS SET LIMIT ON SCOPE FOR IMPROVEMENT IN BILATERAL RELATIONS, DESPITE MODESTLY POSITIVE ATMOSPHERICS OF SHULTZ VISIT.

10. ANOTHER PLANTED SOVIET MEDIA QUESTION ALLEGED THAT SOVIETS SEEMED TO BE MAKING ALL THE PROPOSALS AND CONCESSIONS, INCLUDING POSSIBLE FURTHER ONES IN A LETTER TO REAGAN WHICH GORBACHEV PROMISED TO SHULTZ. SHEVARDNADZE MADE IT CLEAR THAT SOVIET PROPOSALS ON START HAD RECEIVED NO/NO SPECIFIC ANSWERS AND INDICATED THAT USSR MAY NOW AWAIT SOME MOVEMENT FROM USA SIDE (ANOTHER SOVIET QUOTE CONCESSION UNQUOTE WHICH SHEVARDNADZE MENTIONED IN PASSING; SUSPENSION OF CONSTRUCTION OF KRASNYYARSK RADAR IF USA WOULD ALSO DO SO ON SIMILAR RADAR BEING BUILT AT

...8

PAGE EIGHT XYGR1856 CONF

LINGDALES IN SCOTLAND, WAS NOT/NOT MENTIONED BY SHULTZ).

11. WITH THE SUMMIT APPARENTLY OFF THE AGENDA FOR AN INDEFINITE PERIOD, WHERE DOES THE USA/USSR RELATIONSHIP, ESPECIALLY ON ARMS CONTROL, GO FROM HERE? ALTHOUGH BOTH SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THEIR RECENT MEETINGS, NEITHER SAW ANY REASON TO MEET AGAIN IN NEAR FUTURE. THE GENEV TALKS WILL CONTINUE AND CONTACTS PERHPAS AT DEPUTY FM LEVEL ARE POSSIBLE BUT NOTHING HAS BEEN DISCUSSED, ACCORDING TO SHEVARDNADZE.

GORBACHEV REMAINS READY TO MEET REAGAN TO SIGN THE INF TREATY BUT MAINLY TO BLESS THE KEY

PROVISIONS OF A STRATEGIC AND DEFENCE AGREEMENT. GORBACHEV WILL WRITE DIRECTLY TO REAGAN; SHULTZ SAID THAT USA WOULD AWAIT ITS ARRIVAL IMPLYING THAT HE EXPECTED CONCESSIONS (ON ABM TREATY) WHILE SHEVARDNADZE SAID LETTER WOULD RECAPITULATE EXISTING STATE OF PLAY.

12. FOR THE SOVIETS, THIS <sup>RESULT, EVEN IF IT</sup> ~~RESULT~~ <sup>EVEN IF IT</sup> IS AN IMPASSE IS QUITE SATISFACTORY. THEY HAVE ELIMINATED THE PERSHING 2, MUCH FEARED FOR ITS ACCURACY AND SHORT FLIGHT TIME AS WELL AS THE GLCMs. THE COST WAS BEARABLE: OBSOLETE SS-4s, UNUSEABLE SRINF AND WHATEVER MILITARY ADVTANTAGE SACRIFICED WITH THE SS-20s IS MORE THAN RECOMPENSED BY A PROPAGANDA COUP. USEFUL DISARRAY HAS BEEN FOMENTED IN NATO, ESPECIALLY IN KEY USA ALLIES SUCH AS THE FRG. THE SOVIETS NOW APPEAR CONFIDENT THAT SDI WILL NOT/NOT SURVIVE THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY AND WILL BE DONE IN BY BUDGET CUTTERS IF NOT/NOT BY

...9

PAGE NINE XYGR1856 CONF

TECHNICAL INFEASIBILITY. SHOULD SDI BE REDUCED TO A MORE LIMITED CONCEPT OF EARTH BASED DEFENCES OF KEY INSTALLATIONS, THE SOVIETS CAN PROBABLY LIVE WITH THAT, AS THEIR RESEARCH (BY THEIR OWN ADMISSION), HAS COVERED THEIR OPTIONS IN THIS DIRECTION. THE EXISTING STRATEGIC BALANCE IS A RELIABLE, IF UNLOVELY, DETERRENT AND IS PROBABLY NOT/NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO SUDDEN BREAKOUT BY EITHER SIDE, EITHER THROUGH SPACE BASED DEFENCES, WHICH EVEN IF BUILT, THE SOVIETS ARE CONFIDENT THEY CAN COUNTER CHEAPER THAN THE DEFENCES CAN BE BUILT OR BY STEALTH TECHNOLOGY FOR AIR BREATHERS. INDEED, IT CAN BE ARGUED THAT THE GRADUAL SWITCH TO MOBILE ICBMS, JUST NOW BEGINNING, ENHANCES STABILITY BY REDUCING THE POSSIBILITY OF A SUCCESSFUL FIRST STRIKE. NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTRES WILL SOON BE IN PLACE AND, FINALLY, THERE IS SOME LIKELIHOOD THAT THE NEXT AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION MAY BE LESS BELLICOSE AND MORE PRONE TO NEGOTIATE DEEP CUTS WHILE LIMITING STRATEGIC DEFENCES. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, GORBACHEV'S UNWILLINGNESS TO COURT DOMESTIC POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES THROUGH CONCESSIONS ON POINT HE HAS CONSISTENTLY STUCK TO (SDI) IS HARDLY SURPRISING. OVERALL ATMOSPHERE OF VISIT, HOWEVER, WAS POSITIVE ENOUGH TO AVOID PUBLIC COOLING IN RELATIONSHIP AND TO LEAVE POSITIVE IMAGE OF GORBACHEV POLICIES INTACT.

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USS SPEAKING NOTES FOR SCEAIT

23 Sep 87

Mr. Chairman,

I am pleased to appear today before the Committee to discuss the results of the meetings in Washington last week between U.S. Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

There can be no question about the importance of the talks. Quite apart from the specific agreements reached, I was particularly struck by the positive atmosphere surrounding the discussions. Both sides appeared determined to ensure that progress should be achieved and that the normalization of their relationship, begun at the Geneva Summit meeting two years ago, should continue.

The meetings in Washington focussed primarily on the four principal aspects of the Soviet-American relationship - arms control, regional issues, human rights, and bilateral relations. The USA has long insisted that the relationship cannot be one-dimensional and, restricted to arms control only. The Soviets have tended to stress the latter, which is not surprising insofar as the only area in which they can compete with the United States on an equal footing is in terms of military power.

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The agreement in principal on INF will eliminate all American and Soviet missiles globally between the ranges of 500 and 5000 kilometers. Currently, there are 336 American INF missiles deployed in Europe and over 700 Soviet missiles deployed against European and Asian targets. It will be the first nuclear arms reduction agreement in history.

The INF negotiations have followed a long and tortuous path. You will recall NATO's double-track decision of December, 1979, when the Alliance decided to deploy Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe in response to the Soviet triple-warhead SS-20 missile which first appeared in 1975. NATO indicated that it was willing to negotiate limitations on these missile systems with the Soviets. This was followed by President Reagan's zero option proposal of 1981. It is noteworthy that it has taken 6 years for the Soviets to accept what the USA basically proposed in 1981.

Following its boycott of the Geneva negotiations which began with NATO's INF deployments in November, 1983, the USSR returned to the negotiating table in March, 1985. At last year's Reykjavik Summit, the leaders agreed on the terms of an interim INF agreement that would eliminate missiles in Europe and limit both sides to 100 INF warheads globally. Mr. Gorbachov, however, linked an INF agreement to the resolution of strategic arms and space/defence issues. This linkage was

removed last February. Mr. Shultz then went to Moscow in April and proposed the global elimination of shorter-range INF missiles as part of an agreement. However, Mr. Gorbachov agreed only to eliminate Soviet SRINF missiles in Europe. This was followed by the NATO Foreign Ministers' Reykjavik communique in June which endorsed the so-called "double-zero" option - zero shorter and longer-range Soviet and American INF missiles globally. The USSR accepted this proposal in late July, but then sought to include the FRG's 72 Pershing I A's in the agreement. Chancellor Kohl announced in late August that these missiles would be unilaterally withdrawn upon the full implementation of an INF agreement.

However, some thorny issues remain to be resolved, particularly the verification provisions and reductions schedule. The Soviet Union has not yet responded to the new U.S. verification package tabled in Geneva on September 15. Furthermore, the two sides have not agreed on how long it should take to eliminate these missiles. The USA has proposed 1 year for SRINF and 3 years for LRINF. The USSR is insisting on 2 and 5 years respectively. Given that both sides are committed to a summit meeting later this fall, some hard bargaining remains in Geneva. Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine these issues not being resolved in light of the commitment made in Washington last Friday.

The other issue worthy of special attention was the decision to resume negotiations on nuclear testing by the end of the year. In referring to these new negotiations, Mr. Shultz has indicated the USA will adopt a step-by-step approach beginning first with a discussion of verification, the strengthening of the existing Threshold Test Ban (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties (PNET), followed by further consideration of limitations in testing. Negotiations on a CTB have been undertaken in the past on a trilateral basis (USA/USSR/UK) and bilaterally between the superpowers. The possibility of reviving the talks on a bilateral basis has now resurfaced. Any resultant treaty, like the 1962 Partial Test Ban Treaty, would probably be opened to other countries.

Thus, as a multilateral agreement, it would be of direct relevance to Canada and the Verification Research Programme. The SSEA has indicated publicly that Canada would be prepared to contribute to any verification arrangements coming out of these negotiations; particularly, in terms of an international seismic monitoring system. Canadian efforts are aimed at contributing to the verification of an eventual CTB. Some of this seismic research and the capabilities developed may have direct relevance to American/Soviet discussion on verifying the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions and Threshold Test Ban Treaties. The results of these activities are available to the USA and USSR through the CD, scientific contacts, and bilateral government to government contacts.

A list of projects within the Verification Research Programme relating to seismic detection both in the area of systems development and of applied research is included among the handouts available to you. Also available is one of our brochures on seismic verification.

Another area of particular importance to Canada is the question of strategic arms. We were pleased by the commitment of both sides to accelerate their negotiations on strategic reductions. Both have agreed on a goal of 50% reductions in strategic systems to 1600 delivery vehicles and 6000 warheads. Both sides have recently tabled draft treaties in Geneva. It is significant to note that officials in both countries have indicated that a strategic arms agreement within the Reagan Administration's term of office is not impossible.

Nevertheless, many difficult obstacles remain and at this point, it is hard to imagine a START agreement in the immediate future. Both the USA and USSR have established a linkage between START and space/defence issues.

The USA will commit itself to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) until 1994 if the USSR agrees to significant reductions in offensive strategic systems. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has insisted space/defence



issues be resolved to its satisfaction before it will agree to reductions. Throughout, the USSR has been attempting to negotiate limitations on SDI research and testing more restrictive than the current terms of the ABM Treaty. The USA has been attempting to engage the USSR in a discussion of the relationship between strategic offence and defence. From our point of view, the Government is awaiting the results of the SDI program before adopting a position on the validity of strategic defences. This being said, a mutual transition to a greater dependences on defences could, under certain circumstances enhance stability, particularly if combined with significant reductions in offensive forces. Despite a substantial gap in the positions of both countries on such issues as ballistic missile sub-limits, mobile systems, verification, and of course space/defence, we will be urging both super powers to continue their efforts to reach a strategic arms agreement in the period ahead.

I would like to close, Mr. Chairman, by briefly addressing the other issues of the Soviet-American agenda. Both Mr. Shultz and Mr. Shevardnadze termed their exchanges on regional issues, human rights and bilateral relations as "frank, thorough and useful." I think one can interpret from this that there were disagreements, but that both sides remain committed to continued efforts to resolve differences. Afghanistan and the situation in the Persian Gulf highlighted the exchanges on regional issues. Mr. Shultz specifically

referred to the improved behaviour of the Soviet Union in the area of human rights. Finally, the most noteworthy development on the bilateral side was the signing of an agreement to establish nuclear risk reduction centres in each capital, aimed at building confidence and reducing the risk of accidental nuclear war.

These conclude my opening remarks, Mr. Chairman. I would welcome questions from the Committee.

### QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

- Q. What is status of USA Pershing Ia missiles and warheads in terms of the INF agreement?
- A. Any American P Ia SRINF missiles located in the USA will be destroyed as part of the agreement. Pershing Ias belonging to the FRG will not be part of the agreement. When the latter are unilaterally withdrawn by the German government, the USA-controlled warheads will then revert to the American inventory and be dealt with in the same way as those under the agreement. This compromise was worked out in Washington last week.
- Q. What verification provisions are anticipated for the INF agreement?
- A. These have yet to be agreed upon. Current USA proposals focus on the principle of on-site inspections. This may or may not relate to missile operating bases, production and maintenance facilities, and destruction sites. With the Soviet acceptance of the elimination of all INF missiles, the verification regime can be simplified. It is easier to verify a complete ban than a regime where residual systems remained.
- Q. Will the warheads be destroyed as part of the agreement?
- A. Both the USA and USSR have recognized that the entire elimination of warheads would present insurmountable verification problems. In Washington they agreed that fissionable material and guidance systems would be removed from the re-entry vehicle (RV) before it was destroyed along with the launcher.
- Q. How will an INF agreement and the elimination of ground-launched cruise missiles affect our cruise missile testing agreement with the USA?
- A. It will not affect our participation in the program. The system in question is the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) which is part of the USA's strategic arsenal and thus not part of an INF agreement.
- Q. How will an INF agreement affect NATO's nuclear posture?
- A. The elimination of an entire class of missiles will enhance Alliance security to the extent that it will remove the SS-20 threat to Europe. However it will also reduce some of the flexibility in our strategy of flexible response. This may require some adjustment in NATO's posture in other areas, particularly in its theatre nuclear and conventional forces.

- 2 -

- Q. Will Canada be expected to increase its commitment to NATO in the wake of an INF agreement?
- A. NATO is currently examining those adjustments which may be necessary in its force posture after INF. It would be premature for me to comment on the nature of these possible compensatory measures or their implications for the member countries of the Alliance.
- Q. What is Canada's position on the USA's decision to proceed with validation-of-concept experiments for 6 SDI technologies?
- A. USA officials have indicated that these experiments will be fully consistent with the ABM Treaty. The Administration is committed to consultation with Congress and its Western allies before undertaking any move from the traditional to a broader interpretation of the ABM Treaty.
- Q. In the wake of an INF agreement, will the Government reconsider its decision to acquire nuclear-powered submarines?
- A. The decision to acquire SSNs was based on our perceived national security requirements. These will remain unchanged with or without an INF agreement. Indeed, it can be argued that Canada's contribution to the collective security of the Alliance will assume greater importance with the elimination of NATO's INF missiles.
- Q. Can you comment on the recent visit by USA Congressional officials to the Krasnoyarsk radar site?
- A. Given the traditional Soviet penchant for secrecy, this visit was indeed remarkable. Nevertheless, "glasnost" is no replacement for compliance with arms control agreements. The Krasnoyarsk radar, whatever its final purpose may be, appears to remain a violation of the ABM Treaty because of its geographic orientation.
- Q. Should the USA not open up the radar sites at Thule, Greenland and Fylingdales, U.K. to Soviet inspection?
- A. These two US early warning radars, unlike Krasnoyarsk, existed before the signing of the 1972 ABM Treaty and were therefore exempted from the agreement. The USSR has in the past offered to trade Krasnoyarsk for Thule and Fylingdales, but the USA has rightfully rejected this. The USA has no obligation to undertake a reciprocal visit.

R.E. Stansfield  
Defence Relations Division  
995-9296

CONFIDENTIAL

September 18, 1987

IDR-3012

Memorandum for:  
The Secretary of State for External Affairs

cc Minister for International Trade  
cc Minister for External Relations

SUBJECT:

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This memorandum comments on the results of the meetings between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze this week as background for your session with Mr. Shultz and other Western Foreign Ministers on September 21, in New York.

BACKGROUND:

The talks between Messrs. Shultz and Shevardnadze were apparently remarkable for their warmth and positive atmosphere. The significance of this is best appreciated when juxtaposed against President Reagan's "evil empire" speech of only four years ago. Perceptions seem to have been well-placed that a new, dynamic Soviet leader seeking to reform the Soviet Union and its relationship with the rest of the world, combined with an aging American President seeking his legacy in history could afford a window of opportunity for progress in East-West relations. The improvement of the Soviet-American relationship in recent months, as epitomized by the tentative agreement on INF, augurs well for the future, but it will also be important that the current euphoria not lead to false hopes for early progress in other negotiations or a fundamental change in the superpower relationship. The West will also need to ensure that the future arms control agenda meets its own objectives and priorities.

The tentative agreement on intermediate-range missiles came after a marathon negotiating session and an additional unplanned meeting with the President on September 17. Previous obstacles to an agreement, the verification provisions and the disposal of the missiles warheads, were apparently resolved. In an elegant finesse of the problem of the American-controlled warheads for the FRG's Pershing 1A missiles, it was agreed that these warheads will revert to the American inventory when the

- 2 -

missiles are withdrawn unilaterally by the West Germans early in the next decade and US-FRG cooperative arrangements are subsequently ended. They will then be destroyed under the terms of the INF agreement. Secretary Shultz has indicated that, despite the tentative agreement reached, some "technical details" remain to be worked out. Among these is the reductions schedule, an issue considered to be of major significance prior to this week's meetings. This no longer, however, seems sufficient to block a summit meeting now planned for later this fall.

There was also significant and unexpected progress in other areas of arms control. In particular, the USA has agreed to begin "full-scale stage-by-stage" negotiations on nuclear testing by the end of the year. This is a major reversal of policy by the Reagan Administration which had not resumed the trilateral CTB negotiations after 1980, and which had expressed some discomfort with the concept of a test ban. Mr. Shultz indicated on September 18 that the USA will pursue a step-by-step approach (which has always been its preference) beginning with verification, the strengthening of the existing TTBT and PNET, and then the question of reduced testing.

Mr. Shultz also made some interesting comments on the other aspects of the Geneva Talks, i.e. strategic arms and space/defence. His positive references to the Soviet proposal to reduce its heavy ICBMs by 50% indicate the USA may find this an acceptable solution to its concerns about sub-limits on ICBM and heavy ICBM warheads. Recent comments on both sides about the possibility of a strategic arms agreement in 1988 are encouraging, but much depends on a resolution of space/defence issues, upon which there was apparently little progress in Washington.

Mr. Shultz indicated that a thorough and useful airing of views on other aspects of the bilateral relationship also took place. Specifically, he noted improvements in Soviet behaviour in the area of human rights and a "searching" discussion on Afghanistan.

He has termed his meetings with Mr. Shevardnadze as an "important beginning". This is consistent with the comments expressed in your earlier letter to the Secretary of State in which you welcomed the possibility of an INF agreement, while underlining that the significance of an accord should be neither overestimated, nor underestimated. At your meeting in New York on September 21, you might, while congratulating Mr. Shultz on the significant results achieved in Washington, nevertheless wish to reinforce the view that much work remains to be done in other areas. We must ensure that the momentum

- 3 -

generated in the INF sphere is reflected in similar progress elsewhere, and that the West is clear on where it is going and what it wants to achieve in the post-INF world.

World reaction has, not surprisingly, been uniformly positive. All have welcomed both the INF agreement and the decision to resume negotiations on nuclear testing. Major Western leaders, notably Sir Geoffrey Howe and Lord Carrington, have at the same time indicated that in the euphoria of an INF agreement, Western security interests and the necessity for progress in other areas, such as conventional arms control, not be neglected.

RECOMMENDATION:

Suggested talking points for your use on September 21 are attached.

*Alan Sullivan*

Alan Sullivan  
Assistant Deputy Minister  
Political and International  
Security Affairs

*J.H. Taylor*

J.H. Taylor

*While the INF agreement will be unprecedented, in that it will lead to the disappearance of weapons, the euphoria is more a matter of public reaction than a reaction of Western governments, to the extent one can judge at this stage. Certainly the uneasiness of our European allies, especially the FRG, has been no secret, and President Reagan, in announcing the agreement, described the talks as "frank" - which means there were disagreements - and referred as well to the continued existence of "serious differences in many areas" between the USA and the USSR.*

*JHT*

000039

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Talking Points

- I want to join with my colleagues in extending my warmest congratulations to you and to the President on the historic agreement which you have achieved with the USSR on intermediate-range missiles.
  
- In looking back over the history of the INF negotiations, we should all be under no illusions about who is responsible for the success of the talks. It has been the validity of Western proposals dating back to the original double-track decision of 1979 and the 1981 zero option, together with Western solidarity and cohesion which brought the Soviet Union to the negotiating table in the first place and which ultimately resulted in an agreement that will eliminate a major threat to Western security.
  
- We must now look forward to the future. We must ensure that the momentum generated in the INF sphere is reflected in similar progress in other arms control areas in the months ahead - strategic arms, chemical weapons and conventional forces. Mr. Gorbachov and the Soviet Union must not be let off the hook.
  
- I welcome the USA's commitment to accelerate the negotiations on strategic reductions. I am encouraged by recent comments by both Soviet and American officials that a START agreement in 1988 is not an impossible goal. An accord which resulted in 50% reductions, combined with an INF agreement, would be a truly remarkable achievement. I welcome too the



agreement to begin new negotiations on nuclear testing. Discussions on verification, the strengthening of existing treaties, and a step-by-step approach to testing will be a useful contribution to the ACD process.

- Without a doubt, last week's events marked a significant milestone in Soviet-American and East-West relations. We must all work together not only to ensure that progress continues to be made in all areas of the relationship, but that future developments meet Western objectives and interests, particularly in the security field.

- You may be assured of Canada's continued support and cooperation in these efforts.



Office of the  
Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

Cabinet du  
Secrétaire d'Etat  
aux Affaires extérieures

TO/À: IDR

Date Sep 25/87

FROM/DE: MINA


REFERENCE/RÉFÉRENCE:

Your memorandum IDR-3012 of September 18, 1987

SUBJECT/SUJET: Minister's decision/Décision du Ministre

September 21 Meeting of Western Foreign  
Ministers

Seen by SSEA.





External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

TRANSMITTAL SLIP - NOTE D'ENVOI

TO/À USS (through ~~IFB~~ and IDD)  
FROM/DE IDR  
SUBJECT/SUJET MEMORANDUM TO THE SSEA:  
September 21 Meeting of  
Western Foreign Ministers  
ATTACHMENT  
PIÈCE JOINTE 1

IDR/R. Stansfield/5-9296/

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Date September 18, 1987

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JOINT COMMUNIQUE

SEPTEMBER 17, 1987

SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE HAVE COMPLETED THREE DAYS OF THOROUGH AND USEFUL DISCUSSIONS ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER REVIEWED THE FULL SPECTRUM OF QUESTIONS REGARDING NUCLEAR, CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS ARMS CONTROL. IN PARTICULAR, THE TWO MINISTERS, TOGETHER WITH THEIR ADVISERS, CONDUCTED INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES. THIS RESULTED IN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO CONCLUDE A TREATY. THE GENEVA DELEGATIONS OF BOTH SIDES HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO WORK INTENSIVELY TO RESOLVE REMAINING TECHNICAL ISSUES AND PROMPTLY TO COMPLETE A DRAFT TREATY TEXT. THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER AGREED THAT A SIMILARLY INTENSIVE EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO ACHIEVE A TREATY ON 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE GENEVA NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS.

HAVING DISCUSSED QUESTIONS RELATED TO NUCLEAR TESTING, THE TWO SIDES AGREED TO BEGIN, BEFORE DECEMBER 1, 1987, FULL-SCALE STAGE-BY-STAGE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL BE CONDUCTED IN A SINGLE FORUM. THEY APPROVED A SEPARATE STATEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT.

THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER ALSO DISCUSSED REGIONAL ISSUES.

THE TWO SIDES DISCUSSED A BROAD RANGE OF ISSUES CONCERNING BILATERAL RELATIONS. A WORK PROGRAM WAS AGREED, TO BE IMPLEMENTED IN 1987-1988, DESIGNED TO INTENSIFY JOINT EFFORTS IN VARIOUS AREAS OF U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION.

A CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES AND HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS TOOK PLACE.

SECRETARY SHULTZ AND FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE AGREED THAT AN ADDITIONAL MEETING IS NEEDED TO REVIEW THE RESULTS OF THE WORK IN ALL OF THESE AREAS, INCLUDING THE EFFORTS OF THE DELEGATIONS IN THE GENEVA NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS. THEY AGREED THAT THIS MEETING WOULD TAKE PLACE IN MOSCOW IN THE SECOND HALF OF OCTOBER.

IN ORDER TO SIGN A TREATY ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES AND TO COVER THE FULL RANGE OF

ISSUES IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, A SUMMIT BETWEEN PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV WILL TAKE PLACE. THE SUMMIT WILL BE HELD IN THE FALL OF 1987, WITH EXACT DATES TO BE DETERMINED DURING THE TALKS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN MOSCOW IN OCTOBER.

000044

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SEPTEMBER 17, 1987

U.S.-SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT  
NUCLEAR TESTING

THE US AND SOVIET SIDES HAVE AGREED TO BEGIN BEFORE DECEMBER 1, 1987, FULLSCALE STAGE-BY-STAGE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL BE CONDUCTED IN A SINGLE FORUM. IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS THE SIDES AS THE FIRST STEP WILL AGREE UPON EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION MEASURES WHICH WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO RATIFY THE US-USSR THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY OF 1974 AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY OF 1976, AND PROCEED TO NEGOTIATING FURTHER INTERMEDIATE LIMITATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING LEADING TO THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF THE COMPLETE CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTING AS PART OF AN EFFECTIVE DISARMAMENT PROCESS. THIS PROCESS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, WOULD PURSUE, AS THE FIRST PRIORITY, THE GOAL OF THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND, ULTIMATELY, THEIR ELIMINATION. FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE ELABORATION OF IMPROVED VERIFICATION MEASURES FOR THE US-USSR TREATIES OF 1974 AND 1976 THE SIDES INTEND TO DESIGN AND CONDUCT JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENTS AT EACH OTHER'S TEST SITES. THESE VERIFICATION MEASURES WILL, TO THE EXTENT APPROPRIATE, BE USED IN FURTHER NUCLEAR TEST LIMITATION AGREEMENTS WHICH MAY SUBSEQUENTLY BE REACHED.

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000045

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BRIEFING POINTS

SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE MEETING  
SEPTEMBER 15-17, 1987

GENERAL ASSESSMENT

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-- THE DISCUSSIONS DID WHAT WE HOPED THEY WOULD DO -- GIVE AN IMPULSE TO WORK IN MANY DIFFERENT AREAS. THE TWO SIDES PARTED WITH A SENSE THAT THEY ARE IN A GOOD POSITION TO MOVE ACROSS A QUALITATIVE THRESHOLD IN OUR RELATIONSHIP.

\* THE TWO SIDES PACKED A LOT INTO THE VISIT:

\* AT THE WHITE HOUSE ON SEPTEMBER 15, THE SECRETARY AND FOREIGN MINISTER SIGNED THE NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTER AGREEMENT. SHEVARDNADZE MET WITH THE PRESIDENT FOR ABOUT AN HOUR, AND THEN CONTINUED DISCUSSIONS OVER LUNCH. THE PRESIDENT COVERED ALL ASPECTS OF THE U.S.-SOVIET AGENDA.

OVER THE COURSE OF THE THREE DAYS, THE SECRETARY MET WITH SHEVARDNADZE PRIVATELY, AND WITH ADVISORS, OVER LUNCH OR DINNER, FOR A TOTAL OF ABOUT 24 HOURS.

-- ADDITIONALLY, U.S. AND SOVIET EXPERTS MET IN VARIOUS WORKING GROUPS ON HALF A DOZEN SUBJECTS, AND THEY COVERED THE GROUND THOROUGHLY.

- IN SHORT, BOTH SIDES WORKED HARD, AND WE MADE PROGRESS ON THE BASIS OF OUR FOUR-POINT AGENDA - HUMAN RIGHTS, ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL AFFAIRS, AND BILATERAL ISSUES.

HUMAN RIGHTS

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\* HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, AS ALWAYS, OCCUPIED A PROMINENT PLACE IN THE DISCUSSIONS. THE TALKS THIS TIME DEEPENED THE CHANNELS FOR DISCUSSING THESE MATTERS.

- A BROAD RANGE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED, INCLUDING FREEDOM OF RELIGION, EMIGRATION, DIVIDED SPOUSES AND SPLIT MARRIAGES, DIVIDED FAMILIES, DUAL NATIONALS, POLITICAL PRISONERS, AND ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY.

-- THERE HAVE BEEN IMPROVEMENTS THIS YEAR IN THE SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PICTURE, IN SOME AREAS MORE THAN OTHERS. WHILE THE SECRETARY ACKNOWLEDGED WHAT HAS BEEN DONE, HE ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT THERE IS A LONG WAY TO GO.

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000046

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- 2 -

- IN PARTICULAR, THE U.S. SIDE EMPHASIZED THAT INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES COULD BE MADE WHICH WOULD HELP ENSURE PROGRESS IN THE FUTURE, FOR EXAMPLE:

THE SOVIETS ARE ALREADY WORKING ON JUDICIAL REFORM.

THEY SHOULD BE UPGED TO ELIMINATE ENTIRELY THE LAWS WHICH LIMIT POLITICAL EXPRESSION AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.

THOSE REFUSED PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE ON STATE SECURITY GROUNDS SHOULD BE TOLD EXACTLY WHY THEY WERE REFUSED AND HOW LONG THE PROHIBITION WILL LAST.

-- THE SOVIETS WOULD FIND THAT THESE CHANGES WOULD NOT ONLY GAIN CREDIT ABROAD, BUT WOULD HAVE A BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON SOVIET SOCIETY.

- FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE WAS RECEPTIVE TO U.S. PRESENTATIONS ON THESE ISSUES AND SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD STUDY THE LISTS THAT WERE HANDED OVER AND FOLLOW UP.

THE SOVIET SIDE RAISED A NUMBER OF THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS WITH THE U.S. SIDE. THE U.S. AGREED TO STAND READY TO RECEIVE SIMILAR EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN, AND RESPOND TO THEM IN THE FUTURE.

-- BESIDES INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE SECRETARY AND SHEVARDNADZE ON THESE ISSUES, USEFUL WORKING DISCUSSIONS WERE ALSO HELD, HEADED BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS SCHIFTER AND HIS INTERLOCUTOR IN THE MFA, MR. RESHETOV.

#### REGIONAL ISSUES

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- DISCUSSION FOCUSED ESSENTIALLY ON TWO ISSUES: AFGHANISTAN AND THE PERSIAN GULF SITUATION.

THE EXCHANGE ON THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR WAS GENERALLY POSITIVE.

- BOTH SIDES NOTED THE COOPERATION ACHIEVED IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL IN PASSING RESOLUTION 598, AND SAID THAT THEY WOULD STAY IN TOUCH IN DEVELOPING A RESPONSE IN THE COUNCIL TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S REPORT ON HIS TRIP TO THE REGION.

-- THE SECRETARY HAD A THOROUGH AND SEARCHING EXCHANGE ON AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIETS AGAIN EMPHASIZED THAT THEY HAVE MADE A DECISION IN PRINCIPLE TO WITHDRAW BUT PROVIDED FEW DETAILS OF HOW THEY PLAN TO PROCEED.

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000047

UNCLASSIFIED

- 3 -

" THE U.S. SIDE WELCOMED THIS ASSERTION BUT STATED THAT IT WAS NOT POLITICALLY CREDIBLE, SHORT OF MORE CONVINCING SOVIET ACTIONS.

-- THE U.S. STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF A PROMPT SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEUTRAL INTERIM GOVERNMENT AS ESSENTIAL TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT, NEUTRAL AND NONALIGNED AFGHANISTAN.

#### BILATERAL ISSUES

ON BILATERAL ISSUES, THE SIDES DEVELOPED A USEFUL WORK PROGRAM FOR THE COMING MONTHS.

- ON EXCHANGES, THIS INCLUDES:

. -- DISCUSSIONS ON POSSIBLE COOPERATION IN AREAS SUCH AS TRANSPORTATION.

- ECONOMIC AREAS SUCH AS FISHERIES AND GRAIN.

. PRACTICAL SUBJECTS SUCH AS MARITIME SEARCH AND RESCUE, AND AIR AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION SECURITY.

. - AND, EXPANDING CULTURAL AND PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGES, ESPECIALLY INVOLVING YOUNG PEOPLE. THIS IS SOMETHING THE PRESIDENT FEELS DEEPLY ABOUT.

-- BOTH THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING EFFECTIVE, SECURE FACILITIES FOR THE U.S. EMBASSY IN MOSCOW.

THE SIDES WILL BE CONTINUING THESE DISCUSSIONS.

#### ARMS CONTROL

-- EXCHANGES ON ARMS CONTROL WERE VERY ACTIVE, BOTH BEFORE AND DURING THE MINISTERIAL.

THE U.S. TABLED NEW PROPOSALS ON INF IN GENEVA ON MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 14.

000048

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- 4 -

THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S VISIT BEGAN ON TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, WITH THE SIGNING OF THE NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTRE (NRRC) AGREEMENT.

THROUGHOUT THE COURSE OF THE MINISTERIAL, INTENSIVE DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD ON ALL THE MAIN SUBJECTS BOTH BETWEEN

THE SECRETARY AND SHEVARDNADZE AND AT THE EXPERT LEVEL IN WORKING GROUPS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER BROUGHT HIS SENIOR ADVISORS ON A NUMBER OF ARMS CONTROL SUBJECTS, AND U.S. NEGOTIATORS AND OTHER EXPERTS WERE ALSO ON HAND.

- THE DISCUSSIONS THROUGHOUT WERE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND ORIENTED TOWARDS CLARIFYING POSITIONS AND SOLVING PROBLEMS.

- THE NST WORKING GROUP, HEADED BY AMBASSADOR NITZE ON THE U.S. SIDE AND AMBASSADOR KARPOV ON THE SOVIET SIDE, HAD A VERY THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES.

-- IN ADDITION TO THIS GROUP ON NST ISSUES, WORKING SESSIONS WERE HELD ON NUCLEAR TESTING (HEADED BY ACDA DIRECTOR KEN ADELMAN AND MFA EXPERT GOLOVKO), CHEMICAL WEAPONS (ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE ALLEN HOLMES AND AMBASSADOR NAZARKIN), AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES (AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE LEDOGAR AND AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY). IN PLENARY MEETINGS, NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION ISSUES WERE ALSO COVERED.

-- OVERALL, THE RESULTS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS WERE VERY POSITIVE.

INF

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-- THE TWO MINISTERS, TOGETHER WITH THEIR ADVISORS, CONDUCTED INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES. THIS RESULTED IN AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO CONCLUDE A TREATY.

-- THE GENEVA DELEGATIONS OF BOTH SIDES HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO WORK INTENSIVELY TO RESOLVE REMAINING TECHNICAL ISSUES AND PROMPTLY TO COMPLETE A DRAFT TREATY TEXT.

MUCH WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE IN GENEVA -- FOR INSTANCE, ON VERIFICATION PROCEDURES AND A SCHEDULE OF REDUCTIONS. BUT, AS A RESULT OF THE MINISTERS' DISCUSSIONS, THERE IS NO REASON PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS CANNOT BE FOUND AND AN INF TREATY CONCLUDED IN SHORT ORDER.

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000049

UNCLASSIFIED

- 5 -

-- THE QUESTION OF WHAT HAPPENS TO THE WARHEADS THAT ARE REMOVED FROM INF MISSILES WAS DISCUSSED AND RESOLVED.

BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT BEFORE AN INF MISSILE IS DESTROYED, ITS REENTRY VEHICLE WILL BE REMOVED, THE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND THE GUIDANCE SYSTEM WILL BE REMOVED AND

RETURNED TO NATIONAL AUTHORITIES, AND THE REMAINING REENTRY VEHICLE WILL BE ELIMINATED UNDER AGREED PROCEDURES.

-- AS FOR THE U.S. WARHEADS FOR GERMAN PERSHING MISSILES WHICH ARE MAINTAINED UNDER A PROGRAM OF COOPERATION BETWEEN ALLIES, CHANCELLOR KOHL MADE A STATEMENT ON AUGUST 26 THAT WHEN CERTAIN CONDITIONS ARE MET, THE GERMAN PERSHING'S WILL BE DISMANTLED.

- SO, AT THE END OF THE TIME WHEN THE LAST U.S. AND SOVIET INF MISSILES ARE ELIMINATED, THE CONDITIONS ESTABLISHED BY CHANCELLOR KOHL'S AUGUST 26 STATEMENT WILL BE MET, AND THE U.S./GERMAN PROGRAM OF COOPERATION WILL HAVE CEASED.

- AT THAT TIME, THE U.S. REENTRY VEHICLES WILL BE WITHDRAWN AND SUBJECT TO THE SAME PROCEDURES USED TO ELIMINATE THE REENTRY VEHICLES OF U.S. AND SOVIET INF MISSILES.

" THE U.S. HAS NOT AND WILL NOT CONSTRAIN THIRD COUNTRY FORCES OR PROGRAMS OF COOPERATION WITH OUR ALLIES IN A BILATERAL AGREEMENT SUCH AS THE INF TREATY. THE ACTION TAKEN BY CHANCELLOR KOHL REMOVED THE ARTIFICIAL OBSTACLE TO AN INF AGREEMENT. AS A RESULT OF DISCUSSIONS HELD DURING THE MINISTERIAL, THIS IS NOW COMPLETELY CLEAR.

START

-- THERE WAS A GOOD DISCUSSION OF START BOTH BY THE MINISTERS AND BY EXPERTS.

-- BOTH SIDES EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF START AND DISCUSSED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A TREATY IN THE NEAR TERM.

- SOME PROGRESS WAS MADE, SPECIFICALLY:

SOVIETS PUT BACK ON THE TABLE AND UPDATED THEIR EARLIER PROPOSAL TO LIMIT WEAPONS ON ANY ONE LEG OF THE TRIAD TO 60 PERCENT OF THE RV TOTAL. THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY OFFERED THIS IN THE CONTEXT OF 8000 RVs. APPLYING 60 PERCENT TO THE CURRENT RV CAP RESULTS IN 3600 RVs ON ANY ONE LEG OF THE TRIAD. WE BELIEVE LIMITS SHOULD APPLY TO ICBMS ONLY, THE MOST DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS, AND BE SLIGHTLY LOWER (3300).

000050

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- 6 -

-- SOVIETS AGREED THEY COULD EXPRESS 50 PERCENT CUT IN HEAVY ICBMS (SS-18S) IN TERMS OF WARHEADS (1542). COUNTING WARHEADS RATHER THAN JUST MISSILES IS A MORE USEFUL METHOD OF ACCOUNTABILITY.

-- SOVIETS STATED THAT A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN THROW-WEIGHT WOULD RESULT FROM THEIR START PROPOSAL AND THAT THEIR THROW-WEIGHT WOULD NOT SUBSEQUENTLY INCREASE. THE SOVIETS STILL ARE RESISTING CODIFYING THIS COMMITMENT IN A TREATY.

- THE SOVIETS AGREED TO CONSIDER THE SEVEN YEAR REDUCTION PERIOD WE PREFER.

- NEVERTHELESS, THE BIG QUESTIONS REMAIN -- SUCH AS THE NEED FOR A SUBLIMIT ON BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS (THE US HAS PROPOSED 4800) AND THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO LINK START TO FURTHER AGREEMENTS ON DEFENSE.

DEFENSE AND SPACE ARE ALREADY HEAVILY REGULATED BY EXISTING AGREEMENTS, AND OUR EFFORT NOW SHOULD FOCUS ON A TREATY CALLING FOR 50 REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE FORCES.

-- THE JCINT STATEMENT ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING EXPRESSES THE INTENTION OF THE TWO SIDES TO PUSH FORWARD ON A START TREATY.

-- WE WILL KEEP AT THIS AS OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY.

#### DEFENSE AND SPACE -----

DISCUSSED BOTH BY THE MINISTERS AND EXPERTS.

- THE SIDES ELABORATED THEIR POSITIONS, WHICH WAS USEFUL, BUT THERE WAS NOT ANY NARROWING OF DIFFERENCES.

- OVERALL, THE SIDES AGREE ON THE CONCEPT OF A PERIOD OF NONWITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY, IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT ON 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS.

- IN RESPONSE TO STATED SOVIET CONCERNS ABOUT STRATEGIC DEFENSE, THE U.S. HAS PROPOSED VARIOUS MEASURES AIMED AT ENSURING PREDICTABILITY BETWEEN THE SIDES.

- BUT MANY DIFFERENCES CONTINUE TO SEPARATE THE TWO SIDES, INCLUDING THE LENGTH OF TIME FOR THE NONWITHDRAWAL PERIOD AND SOVIET EFFORTS TO PLACE RESTRICTIONS ON THE SDI PROGRAM THAT GO BEYOND THE ABM TREATY.

-- THE SIDES WILL CONTINUE TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES.

#### NUCLEAR TESTING -----

-- ON SEPTEMBER 17, THE SIDES ISSUED A JOINT STATEMENT ON

000051

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- 7 -

BEGINNING FULL-SCALE STAGE-BY-STAGE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING.

- THE AGREEMENT TO START NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR TESTING RESULTS FROM WORK AT MANY DIFFERENT LEVELS OVER THE LAST YEAR, INCLUDING THE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY AT REYKJAVIK, AND EXPERTS MEETINGS IN GENEVA AND WASHINGTON.

-- THE AGREED FIRST STEP IS TO WORK OUT EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION MEASURES THAT WILL ENABLE US TO RATIFY THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN AND PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION TREATIES, AND REMOVE THE COMPLIANCE CONCERNS THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE RAISED CONCERNING THESE TREATIES. THIS TASK SHOULD BE COMPLETED QUICKLY, SO THAT THE TREATIES CAN BE RATIFIED. WE CAN THEN GO ON TO TALK ABOUT OTHER STEPS.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

-- MOST OF THE DISCUSSION ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES WAS HELD BETWEEN AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE LEDOGAR AND SOVIET AMBASSADOR GRINEVSKY, ALTHOUGH THE MINISTERS ALSO HAD AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE SUBJECT.

- ESSENTIALLY, THE SIDES AGREED TO WORK WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE ALLIES TO MOVE FORWARD WITH DISPATCH IN THE VIENNA DISCUSSIONS IN VIENNA ON A MANDATE FOR CONVENTIONAL STABILITY NEGOTIATIONS.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

- U.S. AND SOVIET EXPERTS HAD A FULL SET OF DISCUSSIONS RELATED TO THE MULTILATERAL CW NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. THE MINISTERS ALSO BRIEFLY ADDRESSED CW ISSUES.

THESE TALKS RESULTED IN A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF WHERE WORK NEEDS TO BE DONE BILATERALLY ON CONFIDENCEBUILDING AND VERIFICATION ISSUES. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT BOTH SIDES' NEGOTIATORS WILL MEET IN DECEMBER ON THESE AND OTHER ISSUES.

- THERE IS AN ACTIVE WORK PROGRAM IN THE COMING MONTHS, INCLUDING RECIPROCAL VISITS TO CW FACILITIES.

- BOTH SIDES ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT THE INCREASE OF STATES POSSESSING A CW CAPABILITY IS BOTH DANGEROUS AND GREATLY COMPLICATES EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE OUR SHARED GOAL OF AN EFFECTIVE, VERIFIABLE GLOBAL BAN.

- 8 -

## FOLLOW-UP

-- THE JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE VISIT NOT ONLY SUMMARIZED THE RESULTS OF THE MINISTERIAL BUT ALSO LAID OUT A ROUGH AGENDA FOR THE COMING MONTHS.

THE MINISTERS AGREED TO MEET AGAIN IN MOSCOW IN THE SECOND HALF OF OCTOBER TO REVIEW THE RESULTS OF THE WORK IN ALL THE AREAS, INCLUDING THE EFFORTS OF THE DELEGATIONS IN THE GENEVA NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS.

ADDITIONALLY, THE SIDES RECORDED THEIR AGREEMENT THAT THE PRESIDENT AND THE GENERAL SECRETARY WILL HOLD A SUMMIT SOMETIME THIS FALL.

- AT GENEVA, THE PRESIDENT INVITED GORBACHEV TO COME TO THE UNITED STATES. THE GENERAL SECRETARY ACCEPTED, AND THAT ACCEPTANCE WAS CONFIRMED IN REYKJAVIK. THE DETAILS OF THE SUMMIT -- IN PARTICULAR PRECISE DATES -- WILL BE CONSIDERED WHEN SECRETARY SHULTZ TRAVELS TO MOSCOW.

MUCH WORK OBVIOUSLY NEEDS TO BE DONE IN PREPARATION FOR A SUMMIT -- NOT ONLY ON HAMMERING OUT THE FINAL DETAILS OF AN INF AGREEMENT BUT ON THE WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES. MUCH OF THE CRUCIAL WORK AT THIS STAGE WILL BE DONE BY EXPERTS AT A WORKING LEVEL, INCLUDING THE DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA.

- THE PROCESS THAT IS FIRMLY IN PLACE HAS SERVED US WELL AND WILL PROVIDE THE FRAMEWORK FOR MOVING AHEAD IN THE MONTHS TO COME.

## BEGIN QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: HOW WAS THE FRG PERSHING ISSUE RESOLVED?

A: - OUR ESTABLISHED PROGRAM OF COOPERATION WITH THE FRG WILL NOT COME UNDER THE TREATY. THE SOVIETS IN EFFECT

ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE US-CONTROLLED REENTRY VEHICLES FOR THE FRG PIAS ARE NOT LIMITED BY THE BILATERAL US-SOVIET INF TREATY. WITH THE FINAL ELIMINATION OF US AND SOVIET INF MISSILE SYSTEMS, CHANCELLOR KOHL HAS SAID, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC WILL NOT MODERNIZE ITS PIAS AND WILL DISMANTLE THEM. AS A RESULT THE EXISTING PROGRAM OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE US AND FRG CONCERNING PIA MISSILE SYSTEMS WILL END. AT THAT TIME THE US-CONTROLLED REENTRY VEHICLES FOR THE PIAS WILL BE SIMPLY U.S. REENTRY VEHICLES, WHICH COME UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE INF TREATY AND WILL BE PROMPTLY WITHDRAWN AND SUBJECTED TO THE SAME ELIMINATION PROCEDURES AS OTHER US AND SOVIET REENTRY VEHICLES.

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000053

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- 9 -

Q: DOES THE RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE UNDERCUT CHANCELLOR KOHL'S POSITION?

A: - NO. IT WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WITHOUT THE CHANCELLOR'S STATESMANLIKE APPROACH. THE RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE IS FULLY IN KEEPING WITH THE CHANCELLOR'S POSITION. WE HAVE, MOREOVER, CONSULTED WITH THE FRG. THEY HAVE EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE MANNER IN WHICH THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN RESOLVED.

Q: WILL THE US NOT BE REQUIRED TO WITHDRAW THE REENTRY VEHICLES FOR THE FRG BEFORE THE FRG ELIMINATES ITS MISSILES?

A: -" THE FRG VIA CHANCELLOR KOHL'S STATEMENT HAS SAID THAT, WITH THE FINAL ELIMINATION OF US AND SOVIET INF MISSILE SYSTEMS IN ACCORD WITH THE PROVISIONS OF A - SATISFACTORY U.S.-SOVIET INF TREATY, IT WILL NOT MODERNIZE ITS PIAS AND WILL DISMANTLE THEM. WHEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES DESCRIBED BY KOHL'S STATEMENT HAVE BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, THE EXISTING PROGRAM OF COOPERATION, UNDER WHICH THE REENTRY VEHICLES WERE OUTSIDE THE TREATY LIMITATIONS, WILL CEASE TO EXIST. AT THAT POINT THE REENTRY VEHICLES WILL COME UNDER THE TREATY'S PROVISIONS AND BECOME SUBJECT TO THE AGREED UPON PROCEDURES FOR ELIMINATION OF REENTRY VEHICLES.

Q: BUT WHEN EXACTLY WILL THE US WITHDRAW THE REENTRY VEHICLES?

A: -" WE WILL UNDERTAKE TO WITHDRAW THE RVS PROMPTLY UPON THE PRACTICAL ACTUALIZATION OF THE CHANCELLOR'S STATEMENT WHICH IN TURN IS LINKED TO THE FINAL ELIMINATION OF US AND SOVIET INF MISSILE SYSTEMS. WE WILL INFORM THE FRG OF THE SCHEDULE OF REDUCTION AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE US AND THE USSR FOR U.S. AND SOVIET INF MISSILES AND WORK OUT THE PRECISE TECHNICAL DETAILS FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE RVS. THE FRG HAS TOLD US THEY SUPPORT SUCH AN APPROACH.

Q: WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY APPLYING THE SAME PROCEDURES AND FOR THE FRG PIA REENTRY VEHICLES AS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF US AND SOVIET REENTRY VEHICLES?

A: THE SIDES HAVE AGREED IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE METHODS FOR ELIMINATING THEIR RVS SUBJECT TO THE TERMS OF THE INF TREATY. ONCE THE RVS NOW MADE AVAILABLE TO THE FRG UNDER THE ESTABLISHED PROGRAM OF COOPERATION REVERT TO BEING SIMPLY U.S. RV'S, I.E., WHEN CHANCELLOR KOHL'S STATEMENT BECOMES OPERATIVE UPON THE FINAL ELIMINATION OF US AND SOVIET INF MISSILE SYSTEMS AND THE ESTABLISHED US-FRG PROGRAM OF COOPERATION CEASES TO EXIST -- THE US WILL PROMPTLY WITHDRAW THE RVS AND ELIMINATE THE RVS IN THE SAME MANNER AS IT HAS AGREED TO ELIMINATE ITS OTHER INF RVS.

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- 10 -

Q: WHAT ABOUT THE QUESTION OF THE PHASING OF REDUCTIONS?

A: AS A NEXT STEP, WE AND THE SOVIETS HAVE AGREED TO ADD TO OUR INF DELEGATION IN GENEVA, EXPERTS ON THE SUBJECT OF THE DESTRUCTION OF BALLISTIC MISSILES. THE AIM IS TO DETERMINE IF A 3-YEAR PERIOD OF REDUCTIONS FOR INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES (IRMS) AND A 1-YEAR PERIOD OF REDUCTIONS FOR SHORT RANGE MISSILES (SRMS) AS PROPOSED BY THE US IS TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE FOR BOTH SIDES. IN ANY CASE, WE HOPE TO COME TO AN EARLY RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE.

Q: VERIFICATION.

A: THE SOVIETS HAVE ASKED FOR TIME TO REVIEW THE IMPORTANT NEW MATERIALS ON VERIFICATION WHICH WE TABLED ON SEPTEMBER 14. THE SIDES AGREE ON THE NEED FOR AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REGIME AND ON THE NEED TO COMPLETE WORK ON THIS ISSUE AS PART OF AN INF TREATY.

000055

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Government  
of Canada

Gouvernement  
du Canada

TRANSMITTAL NOTE AND RECEIPT  
NOTE D'ENVOI ET REÇU

File No. — N° du dossier

BNATO - TS-913

TO — À

WSHDC  
MOSCO  
VCSCE  
VMBFR  
EXTOTT / RBR  
By Ott: URR/IDR/CP

ORIGINATOR AND ADDRESS — INITIATEUR ET ADRESSE

D. SNIDER  
CANADIAN DELEGATION TO NATO  
BRUSSELS

Security Classification — Classification de sécurité

☒ Confidential  
Confidentiel

☐ Secret

☐ Top Secret  
Très Secret

☐

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☐ With Enclosure(s)  
Avec annexe(s)

☐ Without Enclosure  
Sans annexe

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RECEIVED — REÇU

OCT 22 1987

IN IDD

Originator's Signature — Signature de l'initiateur

*Jean Red*  
for D SNIDER/jr  
Signature

23SEP87  
Date

Received By — Reçu par

Signature

Date

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7540-21-874-1328

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**Pages 57 to / à 58**  
**are withheld pursuant to sections**  
**sont retenues en vertu des articles**

**13(1)(a), 13(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act**  
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External Affairs  
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OCT 22 1987

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OF THE SECRETARY OF  
STATE FOR EXTERNAL  
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TRANSMIS PAR LE CABINET  
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AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES  
SECTION DES DOSSIERS  
DU MINISTRE

992-6428 or 995-1047  
ou

*IDR / Stansfield*

TO/À  
AU

*IDD*

☐ FOR INFORMATION AND ANY NECESSARY ACTION  
POUR EXAMEN ET SUITE À DONNER, S'IL Y A LIEU

☐ FOR DIVISIONAL REPLY  
POUR RÉPONSE PAR LA DIRECTION

REMARKS/REMARQUES

Ref: A-*07605-87*

Herewith is the original letter that  
the SSEA had kept.

Please replace the photocopy with this  
original and ensure that the  
original is sent with the reply.

This is most important as the SSEA  
needs to have the original when  
signing the reply.

*Jm*

Signature

*22/10/87.*

Date

000059

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CABINET DU SECRETAIRE D'ETAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES

ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

From/De : GEORGE P SHULTZ  
UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE

No. : A-07605-87

Subject/ USA-USSR RELATIONS, INF AGREEMENT ETC  
Objet: DISARMEMENT \* DESARMEMENT

Action div./Dir. resp.: IDD  
Info div(s)/Dir(s) informee(s): URD, MINA/WHITE

Let./Tel. dated  
Let./Tel. en date du  
-----  
15 OCT 87

Date sent to division  
Date d'envoi a la direction  
-----  
21 OCT 87

Deadline date  
Echeance  
-----  
\*\*04 NOV 87\*\*

Comments/Commentaires

SSEA SIGNATURE IF REQUIRED. ORIG TO SSEA

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ACTION REQUIRED/SUITE A DONNER

FOR DIVISIONAL USE  
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☒ Reply for signature of SSEA  
Reponse pour la signature du SEAE

Date received/Date recue

*October 21, 1987*

☐ Reply for the signature of  
Reponse pour la signature de

Action officer/Agent resp.

*NR Stanfield*

☐ Reply by division  
Reponse de la direction

Disposition and/et date

*more reply required. Reply to  
earlier SSEA letter.*

☒ For information and any necessary action  
Pour examen et suite a donner, s'il y a lieu

*Overruled by events in  
any case. SSEA will see  
Shultz 24 Oct*

☐ CAMPAIGN: Reply for signature of SSEA  
CAMPAGNE: Reponse pour la signature du SEAE

*3288*

☐ CAMPAIGN: Reply by division  
CAMPAGNE: Reponse de la direction

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Reserve a MINA

☐ CAMPAIGN: For information and any necessary action  
CAMPAGNE: Pour examen et suite a donner, s'il y a lieu

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White - Return to MINA registry when action completed

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Yellow - Divisional secretary Green - File with original incoming letter

Jaune Secretaire de direction Verte Au dossier avec la lettre recue

C O N F I D E N T I A L  
FM WSHDC UNGR1963 15SEP87

TO EXTOTT URGB

INFO TT NDHQOTT/ADM POL/ASSOCADM POL/ DE CAT  
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---SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE BILATERAL

ACTION		FOR FILING	
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FILE	20-USA-1-3-USSR		DOSSIER
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JOHN WHITEHEAD, DEPT. SECY OF STATE TOLD AMB GOTLIEB AT LUNCH TODAY THAT MAJOR ACROSS-THE-BOARD NEGS HAD BEEN LAUNCHED BY SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE. FIVE-MINUTE TETE-A-TETE THIS MORNING STRETCHED TO THREE HOURS DURATION. AFTERWARDS, SHEVARDNADZE WENT TO WHITE HOUSE FOR SIGNATURE CEREMONY ON RISK REDUCTION CENTRES. IN TETE-A-TETE MAIN SUBJ OF DISCUSSION WAS APPARENTLY HUMAN RIGHTS AND JEWISH IMMIGRATION AND MAIN DVPT WAS THAT SHEVARDNADZE SHOWED HIMSELF TO BE VERY FORTHCOMING. APPARENTLY HE INDICATED THAT SOVIETS KNEW THEY HAD TO CHANGE POLICY AND THAT THEY WLD DO SO BUT WEST HAD TO UNDERSTAND THAT SUCH CHANGES TAKE TIME. ON JEWISH IMMIGRATION WHITEHEAD SAID THAT LAST YEAR 3000 ? HAD BEEN ALLOWED TO LEAVE WHEREAS THIS YEAR FIGURES WERE RUNNING AT ANNUAL RATE OF 10000 OR SO. SHEVARDNADZE APPARENTLY UNDERScoreD THAT SOVIETS UNDERSTOOD THAT EVEN MORE HAD TO BE DONE.

2. SOVIETS AND AMERICANS AGREED TO SET UP FOUR COMMITTEES TO WORK 24 HOURS A DAY (LITERALLY, BY MEANS OF SEPARATE SHIFTS) ON FOUR TOPICS: INF, START, REGIONAL ISSUES, AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND BILATERAL AFFAIRS. VAST TEAMS WERE NOW AT WORK ON BOTH SIDES. ALL IN ALL IT ADDED UP TO MAJOR ACROSS-THE-BOARD NEGOTIATIONS.

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External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

MESSAGE

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Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

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File/Dossier

20-USA-1-3-USSR

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SUBJ/SUJ

---PRES REAGAN SPEECH IN L.A. - 26AUG

A WORD OF THANKS FOR TIMELY REPORT ON PRES'S L.A. SPEECH ON  
EAST/WEST RELATIONS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

K. COOK/jj  
SIG

URRG

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MJ MOHER  
SIG

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**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

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---PRES REAGAN SPEECH IN L.A. - 26AUG87

IF SOVIET REACTION TO PRES REAGAN'S MAJOR SPEECH ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS GIVEN IN L.A. YESTERDAY WAS HARSHLY CRITICAL, LOCAL REACTION WAS MOSTLY POSITIVE AND SEEN AS HOLDING OUT PROMISE FOR AN EARLY MEDIUM RANGE ARMS ACCORD. THE L.A. TIMES, NORMALLY NO/NO FAN OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN POLICY, DESCRIBED THE SPEECH AS THE MOST BALANCED MSG ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS OF REAGAN PRESIDENCY - QUOTE A MSG OF GUARDED HOPE UNQUOTE. THE REALITY IS SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN.

2. WHILE REAGAN RECOGNIZED OPPTY PRESENTED BY GLASNOST AND EXPRESSED HOPE FOR QUOTE FAR REACHING, ENDURING CHANGE UNQUOTE IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS, HE REITERATED FEARS AND CONCERNS OVER SOVIET POLICIES AND PRODDING SOVIETS ON REFORMS SUCH AS REMOVAL OF BERLIN WALL, WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN AND ALLOWING EAST EUROPEAN NATIONS A MEASURE OF SELF DETERMINATION. PRES REMARKS IN THIS AREA WERE STERNLY WORDED WHILE GIVING NO/NO GROUND ON U.S. POLICIES OPPOSED BY SOVIETS. NAMELY, HE DEFENDED SDI AS QUOTE THE RIGHT DECISION AT THE RIGHT TIME UNQUOTE AND CAST U.S. AID TO REBELS IN NICARAGUA, ANGOLA AND AFGHANISTAN AS PART OF U.S. CRUSADE FOR FREEDOM. PRES STAUNCHLY REAFFIRMED HIS FAMILIAR TWIN PILLARS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AS ELIMINATING FEAR OF NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST AND RESISTING EXPANSION OF TOTALITARIANISM.

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PAGE TWO XOGR0759 UNCLAS

3. THIS WEEK'S DEVELOPMENTS ON ARMS TALKS SET THE STAGE FOR MOST IMPORTANT PART OF SPEECH. PRES SAID U.S. AND SOVIETS WERE NEAR INF AGMT AND HE WELCOMED CHANCELLOR KOHL'S OFFER TO SCRAP WEST GERMAN PERSHING MISSILES. THIS EFFECTIVELY REMOVED QUOTE LAST ARTIFICIAL BARRIER UNQUOTE IN WAY OF REACHING AGMT, AND PRES EXPRESSED HOPE THAT SOVIETS WILL NOW DEMONSTRATE SUBSTANCE BEHIND THEIR RHETORIC - IE. THAT THEY GENUINELY WANT A STABILIZING INF AGMT. WHILE PRES DID NOT/NOT GO INTO DETAIL ON U.S. OFFER EARLIER THIS WEEK TO SIMPLIFY THE MEANS BY WHICH THE TWO SUPER-POWERS VERIFY COMPLIANCE, HE DID SAY THAT U.S. WILL RELY NOT/NOT ON TRUST, BUT ON VERIFICATION THAT ARMS AGMT IS BEING IMPLEMENTED. HE ADDED THAT EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REQUIRES QUOTE MORE THAN UNILATERAL TECHNICAL MEANS UNQUOTE. REAGAN ALSO EXPRESSED NEED TO MOVE AHEAD RAPIDLY ON GOAL OF 50/50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES. IN DESCRIBING THESE HOPED FOR ARMS AGMTS AS QUOTE GREAT ACHIEVEMENTS UNQUOTE, REAGAN ADMONISHED WESTERN PRESS TO QUOTE KEEP THE REAL RECORD OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS IN MIND UNQUOTE WARNING THAT IF AND WHEN SOVIETS QUOTE REALIZE THAT ATTEMPTS TO MANIPULATE THE MEDIA WILL NOT/NOT WORK, BETTER THE CHANCES ARE FOR SIGNING AN AGMT UNQUOTE.

4. FOR WHAT ITS WORTH, PRES LOOKED FIT AND VIGOROUS AND DELIVERED SPEECH FLAWLESSLY TO AN ENTHUSIASTIC AUDIENCE OF 1700/1700 CIVIC LEADERS, PRESS AND FOREIGN REPS. WHATEVER HIS TRAVAILS IN WSHDC, S. CALIF IS STILL REAGAN COUNTRY. FULL TEXT OF SPEECH BEING FORWARDED SEPARATELY BY FAX.

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Communiste 8/8

## THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary  
(Santa Barbara, California)

Embargoed for Release until 1:00 pm PDT  
4:00 pm EDT  
Wednesday, August 26, 1987

TEXT OF THE ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT  
TO THE

1987 8 TOWN HALL OF CALIFORNIA LUNCHEON MEETING

Century Plaza Hotel  
Wednesday, August 26, 1987

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I am delighted to be here. And I'm grateful for this opportunity to address the Town Hall of California meeting and for the chance to be heard at the Chautauqua Conference in New York where citizens of the United States and the Soviet Union are meeting together. East Coast or West Coast, our purpose is the same: to promote freer and more open communications between the peoples of all nations and to advance together the cause of peace and world freedom.

In February of 1945, as he first began meeting with Roosevelt and Stalin at Yalta, much the same purpose preoccupied Winston Churchill. He felt a great sense of urgency and said to his daughter: "I do not suppose that at any moment in history has the agony of the world been so great or widespread. Tonight the sun goes down on more suffering than ever before in the world."

It was not just the misery of World War II that appalled him, Churchill said; he also harbored a great fear that "...new struggles may arise out of those we are successfully ending." About the Great Powers meeting in Yalta, he added, "If [we] quarrel, our children are undone."

We know now the Great Powers did agree at Yalta; difficult issues were raised and resolved; agreements were reached; in a narrow sense, the summit conference was successful; the meeting produced tangible diplomatic results. Among these was an endorsement of the rights upheld in the Atlantic Charter, rights that would "afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."

So, too, the right to self-determination of Eastern European nations like Poland were -- at least on paper -- guaranteed. But in a matter of months, Churchill's worst fears were realized; the Yalta guarantees of freedom and human rights in Eastern Europe became undone; and, as democracy died in Poland, the era of Allied cooperation ended.

What followed is known to us now as the postwar era; a time of tense exchanges and often dangerous confrontations between East and West; our "long twilight struggle," as President Kennedy called it.

And so, 40 years ago, far from ending the world strife and human suffering that so haunted Churchill, the Great Powers embarked on an era of Cold War conflict. Perceiving a grave threat to our own security and the freedom of our allies in Western Europe, the

MORE



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External Affairs Affaires extérieures  
Canada Canada

MESSAGE

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MGTC/DIARY/CIRC/FILE P.1/8  
MGTC/JOURNAL/CIRC/DOSSIER

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

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AUG 28 1987

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TO EXTOTT(URR)

INFO

INFO WSHDC CNGNY SFRAN CHCGO DE OTT MSCOW BNATO BONN

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SUBJ/SUJ

---PRES REAGAN SPEECH IN L.A. - 26AUG87

PLEASE FIND FOLLOWING 7/7 PAGES OF ABOVE SPEECH GIVEN TO THE  
TOWN HALL OF CALIFORNIA LUNCHEON MTG AT THE CENTURY PLAZA HOTEL.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

M. MCKECHNIE  
SIG

POL./ECON. AFFAIRS 687-7432

M. MCKECHNIE  
SIG

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Page 2

people of the United States put in place the major elements of America's bipartisan foreign policy for the next four decades. In 1947, the Marshall Plan began the reconstruction of Europe; in 1947, the Truman Doctrine supported the independence of Greece and Turkey and established the principle of assistance to nations struggling for democracy and against the imposition of totalitarian rule.

In the 40 years since -- for eight American administrations and twenty Congresses -- the basis of America's foreign policy principles held firm: opposition to totalitarianism, the advocacy of democratic reform and human rights, and the promotion of worldwide prosperity and freedom, all on the foundation of a strong defense and resolute commitment to allies and friends.

When this Administration took office, our own sense of these longstanding goals was keen. But we were also aware that much needed to be done to restore their vigor and vibrancy. The structure and purpose of American foreign policy had decayed in the 1970's.

But as we worked to restore the traditionally upright and forceful posture of the United States in the world and reinvigorate a foreign policy that had maintained allied security for 40 years, we also sought to break out of the stalemate of the Cold War; to push forward with new initiatives that might help the world evolve beyond the postwar era. We sought more than a shaky world peace atop the volcano of potential nuclear destruction; we sought something beyond accepted spheres of influence and tense stand-offs between the totalitarian and the democratic worlds. In short, we sought ways to dispel rather than live with the two great darkening clouds of the postwar era: the danger of nuclear holocaust and the expansion of totalitarian rule.

In dealing with the nuclear threat, the United States said it would no longer pursue merely arms control -- the management, limitation, or controlled growth of existing arsenals. The United States, together with our NATO allies, would seek instead deep verifiable reductions in these arsenals -- arms reduction, not just arms control. We sought to do it by moving beyond the status quo -- a mere *modus vivendi* -- in the arms race.

In addition to opening negotiations to reduce arms in several categories, we did something even more revolutionary in order to end nuclear fear. We launched a new program of research into defensive means of preventing ballistic missile attack. By doing so, we attempted to maintain deterrence while seeking to move away from the concept of mutual assured destruction -- to render it obsolete, to take the advantage out of building more and more offensive missiles and more and more warheads, at last to remove from the world the specter of military powers holding each other hostage to nuclear retaliation. In short, we sought to establish the feasibility of a defensive shield that would render the use of ballistic missiles fruitless.

This was the meaning of our decision to move forward with S.D.I.; and I believe it was the right decision at the right time.

But while we sought arms reduction and defensive deterrence, we never lost sight of the fact that nations do not disagree because they are armed; they are armed because they disagree on very important matters of human life and liberty. The fundamental

MORE

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Page 3

differences between totalitarian and democratic rule remained; we could not gloss over them, nor could we be content anymore with accepted spheres of influence, a world only half-free. That is why we sought to advance the cause of personal freedom wherever opportunities existed to do so. Sometimes this meant support for liberalization; sometimes support for liberation.

In regional conflicts, for example, we elaborated a new policy of helping democratic insurgents in their battle to bring self-determination and human rights to their own countries -- this doctrine was first spelled out in our decision to assist the people of Afghanistan in their fight against Soviet invasion and occupation.

It was also part of our decision to assist the people of Nicaragua in their battle to restore the integrity of their 1979 revolution and make that government keep its promise of democratic rule.

Our current efforts in Angola in support of freedom fighters constitute the most recent extension of this policy.

In the area of human rights, our challenges to the Soviet Union became direct; we observed with Andrei Sakharov that true peace in the world could come only when governments observed and recognized the human rights of their citizens. Similarly, in our bilateral relationships -- cultural and political exchanges, for example -- we sought from the Soviets a new willingness to open this process up to larger and more diverse groups.

And finally undergirding all of this was our commitment to public candor about the nature of totalitarian rule and about the ultimate objective of United States foreign policy: peace, yes, but world freedom, as well. We refused to believe that it was somehow an act of belligerence to proclaim publicly the crucial moral distinctions between democracy and totalitarianism.

And in my address to the British Parliament in 1982, when I noted the peaceful extension of human liberty was the ultimate goal of American foreign policy, I also pointed out that history's momentum resided instead with the cause of democracy and world freedom. And I offered hope that the increasing failure of statist economies would lead to demands for political change. I asked, in short, for a "crusade for freedom" that would spread democracy and promote democratic institutions throughout the world.

As I have said before, we believe that such public affirmations were not only necessary for the protection and extension of freedom but, far from adding to world tensions, crucial to reducing them and helping the pursuit of peace. Public candor and realism about and with the Soviets have helped the peace process; they were a signal to our Soviet counterparts that any compulsion to exploit Western illusions must be resisted because such illusions no longer exist.

Our foreign policy then has been an attempt both to reassert the traditional elements of America's postwar strategy while at the same time moving beyond the doctrines of mutual assured destruction or containment -- our goal has been to break the deadlock of the past, to seek a forward strategy; a forward strategy for world peace; a forward strategy for world freedom.

MORE

XGGR 1419

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Page 4

We have not forsaken deterrence or containment -- but working with our allies we have sought something even beyond these doctrines. We have sought the elimination of the threat of nuclear weapons and an end to the threat of totalitarianism.

Today, we see this strategy -- a strategy of hope -- at work. We are moving towards reductions in nuclear arms. S.D.I. is now underway; our offer to share the benefits of strategic defense remains open to all, including the Soviet Union. In regional conflicts like Afghanistan and Central America, the Soviet Union and its clients have, thus far, shown all too little real willingness to move toward peace with real self-determination for the people. But the forces of freedom grow steadily in strength and they put ever greater pressure on the forces of totalitarianism. The paths to peace with freedom are open if Moscow decides to stop imposing its self-styled revolutions.

In another area, we have found a parallel interest with the Soviet Union in a political end to the Iran-Iraq war; we hope we can build together on this despite our differences. And finally, in the Soviet Union itself, we see movement towards more openness, possibly even progress towards respect for human rights and economic reform.

And all of these developments weigh on our minds; we ponder their meaning; we ask ourselves: Are we entering a truly new phase in East-West relations? Is far-reaching, enduring change in the postwar stand-off now possible? Do we have at last the chance envisioned by Churchill to end the agony of the twentieth century?

Surely, these are our hopes. But let honesty compel us to acknowledge we have fears and deep concerns as well. And while we acknowledge the interesting changes in the Soviet Union, we know too that any Western standard for democracy is still a very distant one for the Soviets; we know what real democracy constitutes; we understand its implications.

It means the rule of law for the leaders as well as the people. It involves limitations on the power of the state over the people. It means orderly debate and meaningful votes. It means liberation of the captive people from the thralls of a ruling elite that presumes to know the peoples' good better than the people.

So while there is hope today, there is also uncertainty. That is why we know we must deal with the Soviet Union as it has been and as it is, not as we would hope it to be.

And yet we cannot rest with this. The opportunity before us is too great to let pass by. That is why in the past year we have challenged the Soviets with our own expectations -- ways of showing us and the world their seriousness about fundamental improvements. It is why we have set down guideposts and pointers towards a better relationship with the Soviet Union.

For 2 years we have been asking the Soviets to join in discussing a cooperative approach towards a transition to defensive deterrence that threatens no one. In April of 1987, we asked that a date be set this year for rapid and complete withdrawal from Afghanistan; in June, that the Soviets join us in alleviating the divisions of Berlin and begin with the dismantling of the Berlin Wall; in July, that the Soviets move

MORE

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Page 5

toward self-determination in East Europe and rescind the Brezhnev Doctrine. Of course, these are significant democratic steps. But steps such as these are required for a fundamental improvement in relations between East and West.

Today, I want to propose another step that Soviet leaders could take, a realistic step that would greatly help our efforts to reduce arms. We are near an historic agreement that could eliminate a whole class of missiles. If it is signed we shall rely, not on trust, but on the evidence of our own eyes that it is being implemented. As the Russians say, "Doveriyai no Proveryai" -- trust but verify. And that we shall do.

But effective verification requires more than unilateral technical means. Even on-site inspection is not a panacea. Especially as we address the ambitious agenda of arms reduction ahead. We need to seek compliance with existing agreements all too often violated by the U.S.S.R. We also need to see more openness, a departure from the habits of secrecy that have so long applied to Soviet military affairs.

I say to the Soviet leadership, it is time to show some glasnost in your military affairs. First, publish a valid budget of your military expenditures -- just as we do. Second, reveal to the Soviet people and the world the size and composition of the Soviet armed forces. Third, open for debate in your Supreme Soviet the big issues of military policy and weapons -- just as we do. These steps would contribute to greater understanding between us, and also to the good sense of your own decisions on the grave matters of armaments and military posture.

The immediate agenda of arms reduction is clear. We can wrap up an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear missiles promptly. There are still issues to be worked out. Our delegation in Geneva has already pointed the way to simplifying verification requirements now that we have agreed to the total elimination of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles.

We have also repeatedly pointed out that the last-minute demand by the Soviets concerning West German Pershing 1-A missiles was without foundation. Earlier today, Chancellor Kohl removed even this artificial obstacle from consideration. We are therefore hopeful that the Soviet Union will demonstrate that there is substance behind the rhetoric they have repeated so often of late -- that they genuinely want a stabilizing INF agreement. If so, they will move to meet our proposals constructively rather than erect additional barriers to agreement.

We also need to move ahead rapidly on the goal Mr. Gorbachev and I agreed to at Reykjavik last fall, a 50-percent reduction in strategic nuclear forces. These would be great achievements.

Let me pause and make note of something that will advance the cause of all these negotiations. I think it is vital that western reporters and editors keep the real record of these negotiations in mind. I note, for example, that the other day The Economist ran a kind of "Believe-It-Or-Not" type item in which it reminded its readership that it had been the United States that first proposed the zero-option in the I.N.F. negotiations and first proposed the 50-percent reductions in strategic weapons. I would simply say that as soon as the Soviets realize that attempts to manipulate the media on these negotiations will not work, the better the chances are of treaty documents eventually getting signed.

MORE

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Page 6

So, too, as most of you know, we have pursued our 4-part agenda with the Soviets of human rights, arms reductions, resolution of regional conflicts, and bilateral issues. All parts must advance if the relationship as a whole is to advance. Let me stress the serious concern about Soviet actions in one of these areas -- regional conflicts. The fact remains that, in Afghanistan, Soviet occupation forces are still waging a war of indiscriminate bombing and civilian massacre against a Moslem people whose only crime is to love their country and their faith. In Central America, Soviet bloc arms deliveries have been speeded up during the past year -- increasing by more than 100 percent.

So while talking about reforms at home, the Soviet Union has stepped up its efforts to impose a failed system on others. I stress that speaking up about such actions is a matter of conscience to the West; and that Soviet actions in these areas are being viewed with the utmost concern. I cannot overemphasize this point.

But let me again note that the progress we have seen in East-West relations flows from the new strength and resolution we have brought to American foreign policy and from the boldness of our initiatives for peace. We are also seeing a Soviet leadership that appears more willing to address the problems that have divided East and West so long and to seek agreements based on mutual benefit.

Perhaps the final measure of this new resolve can be found in the growth of democracy throughout the world. Only a decade ago, democracy was under attack throughout Latin America -- today, more than 90 percent of Latin Americans live in nations that are now democratic or headed decisively in that direction.

A recent U.N. General Assembly session on Africa called for more personal freedom and a reduction of government power in order to spur economic progress. We have also seen dramatic democratic gains in the past few years in nations like the Philippines and South Korea -- even places like China have shown an openness towards economic reform.

Above all, the old solutions of the twentieth century for the world's woes -- solutions calling for more and more state power concentrated in the hands of smaller and smaller elites -- have come under fire everywhere, especially among the intellectuals. The new idea of a nexus between economic and political freedom as the principal vehicle of social progress is catching on.

In looking back over these past 6-1/2 years, then, I cannot help but reflect on the most dramatic change to my own eyes: the exciting new prospects for the democratic cause. A feeling of energy and hope prevails; statism has lost the intellectuals; and everywhere one turns, nations and people are seeking the fulfillment of their age-old aspirations for self-government and self-determination.

Perhaps, then, we may finally progress beyond the postwar stand-off -- and fulfill the promises made at Yalta but never acted upon. Perhaps, it is not too much to ask for initial steps towards democratic rule and free elections. And I hope to address this matter more fully before the United Nations General Assembly.

MORE

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Page 7

Yes, we may then live at the moment Churchill once anticipated; a moment when the world would have a chance to redeem the opportunity it missed four decades ago; a chance for the "broad, sunlit uplands" of freedom -- a chance to end the terrible agony of the twentieth century and the twin threats of nuclear war and totalitarian ideology. A chance, above all, to see humanity live and prosper under that form of government Churchill called the worst form of government -- except, as he said, for all the others: democracy.

This is the opportunity before us; it is one we must seize now for ourselves, for future generations.

Thank you and God bless you.

\* \* \*

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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---INTERNATIONAL SITUATION-VIEWS OF NSC DIRECTOR

SUMMARY:DURING A BRIEF BUT WIDE RANGING TETE-A-TETE WITH AME 22JUL,  
NSC DIRECTOR CARLUCCI CONVEYED SENSE OF OPTIMISM OVER FUTURE COURSE  
OF INNATL EVENTS.STALEMATE AT GENEVA HAD PROMPTED SOVIETS TO WITHDRAW  
FOR CONSULTATIONS,BUT GORBACHEV WOULD BE MAKING ANNOUNCEMENT THAT DAY  
WHICH WOULD LIKELY HELP TO BREAK IMPASSE.HE SEEMED TO WANT TO DEAL  
WITH REAGAN,THOUGH INF AGMT WOULD BE NO/NO BONANZA.SUMMIT MTG WAS DUE  
IN NOV IN AFGHANISTAN,MUJAHADEEN WERE DOING VERY WELL WITH HELP OF  
STINGER MISSILES AND GORBACHEV WAS LOOKING FOR WAY OUT.IN ANGOLA,  
UNITA WAS MAKING GAINS.IN CENTRAL AMERICA,CONTRAS WERE GROWING STRON-  
GER AND USA WAS DEVELOPING NEW PEACE PLAN WHICH HAD GOOD PROSPECT OF  
GARNERING BIPARTISAN SUPPORT IN CONGRESS.IT MIGHT EVEN ENJOY SOME  
SUPPORT IN REGION.IN GULF,IF ALL WENT WELL WITH FIRST CONVOY,ADMIN  
WOULD BE ABLE TO LAY CLAIM TO AN IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY VICTORY.

2.REPORT:GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS AND SOVIET POLICY.

ANTICIPATING NEWS OUT OF MOSCOW THAT DAY,CARLUCCI NOTED THAT SOVIETS  
HAD WITHDRAWN FROM GENEVA AND WERE CONSULTING ON NEXT STEPS IN ARMS  
CONTROL NEGS.EXPECTED ANNOUNCEMENT BY GORBACHEV WOULD LIKELY HELP TO  
MOVE INF TALKS FORWARD.SOVIETS,HE SAID,HAD AGREED TO SUMMIT IN NOV

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PAGE TWO UNGR1892 CONF

(WE ASSUME HE MEANT IN PRINCIPLE).BUT THEY WERE INTERESTED IN INF  
AGMT MAINLY FOR POLITICAL REASONS,AS MEANS FOR DIVIDING EUROPEANS,  
NOT/NOT FOR ANY INTRINSIC MILITARY REASONS.AMBIVALENCE IN GERMAN POSN  
WAS EVIDENCE OF OPENING WHICH SOVIETS HOPE COULD BE EXPLOITED.GER-  
MANS,CARLUCCI THOUGHT,WOULD PROPOSE TRADING OFF ASIAN MISSILES FOR  
PERSHING IAS.DOUBLE ZERO OPTION CERTAINLY REMAINED USA PREFERENCE.  
WHATEVER DEAL WAS EVENTUALLY STRUCK WOULD BE GOOD ONE HE SAID BUT  
NO/NO GREAT BONANZA.STRATEGIC SYSTEMS WERE STILL MAIN SHOW.

3.CARLUCCI NOTED THAT GORBACHEV WAS EXPECTED SHORTLY TO INTRODUCE NEW  
QUOTE MODERATE UNQUOTE FOREIGN POLICY.HE HAD TOLDPM GANDHI THAT HE  
WANTED TO DEAL WITH REAGAN,SINCE REAGAN WAS PRESIDENT WHO COULD  
DELIVER AN ARMS CONTROL.HE WAS NOT/NOT INTERESTED IN WAITING FOR TWO  
OR THREE YRS AND HAVING TO START OVER WITH A QUOTE OUTSIDER UNQUOTE.

#### 4.AFGHANISTAN.

IN AFGHANISTAN,CARLUCCI SAID SOVIETS WERE REALLY HURTING.MUJAHADEEN  
HAD BEEN DOING VERY WELL RECENTLY,PARTICULARLY SINCE ACQUIRING STIN-  
GER MISSILES,AND HAD SHOT DOWN SEVERAL SOVIET AIRCRAFT.AS RESULT,  
SOVIETS WERE ANXIOUS TO GET OUT,BUT THEY STILL WANTED TO RETAIN CON-  
TROL OF COUNTRY.GORBACHEV WAS TRYING TO FIND A WAY TO DO THIS.

#### 5.ANGOLA.

IN ANGOLA,CARLUCCI SAID UNITA FORCES WERE GAINING STRENGTH OVER MPLA.  
LATTER WAS BEGINNING TO FEEL EFFECTS AND TO LOOK FOR WAY TO GET  
CUBANS OUT.

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PAGE THREE UNGR1892 CONF

6.CENTRAL AMERICA.

LIKEWISE IN NICARAGUA,CARLUCCI SAID CONTRA FORCES WERE GAINING STRENGTH ON THE GROUND.ON DIPLOMATIC FRONT HE SAID ADMIN WAS DEVELOPING NEW PEACE PLAN FOR REGION,AND HE THOUGHT THERE WAS GOOD CHANCE OF GARNERING BIPARTISAN SUPPORT FOR IT IN CONGRESS.INDEED IT WAS BEING DRAWN UP PRECISELY WITH THIS IN MIND.THE ARIAS PROPOSAL WAS A GOOD ONE BUT IT HAD ENCOUNTERED PROBLEMS.IN CARLUCCIS VIEW,ARIAS COULD PROBABLY SUPPORT USA PLAN.

7.GULF OF IRAN.

CARLUCCI NOTED THAT REFLAGGED KUWAITI TANKERS WITH THEIR USA ESCORTS WERE THAT AFTERNOON TRAVERSING STRAIT.IF ALL WENT WELL,IT WOULD REPRESENT GREAT FOREIGN POLICY VICTORY FOR USA AND DISARM CRITICS BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD.WHEN GOTLIEB ASKED WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN LATER,CARLUCCI REPLIED THAT IMPORTANT THING WAS FOR USA TO GET THROUGH CURRENT PERIOD UNSCATHED.IF THAT HAPPENED,ADMINS ENEMIES WOULD HAVE TO RECOGNIZE MERITS OF ITS APPROACH(NO/MATTER WHAT HAPPENED LATER).

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**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

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---MIDDLE EAST:MURPHY/POLYAKOV TALKS

IN RECENT CONVERSATION WITH EMB AMERICAN CHARGE (PLS PROTECT)

MADE FOLLOWING POINTS IN EVALUATING MURPHY/POLYAKOV MT:

(A) ABOVE ALL AMERICANS WRE SURPRISED AND PLEASED BY QUOTE  
DIFFERENT DYNAMIC UNQUOTE OF MOST RECENT USA/SOVIET DISCUSSION  
ON MIDDLE EAST.WHILE SOVIET FORMAL PRESENTATION OF POSITIONS  
WAS TRADITIONAL AND CONTAINED NOTHING NEW TO RAISE ANY INTEREST,  
WHAT WAS ENCOURAGING IN AMERICAN VIEW WAS NEW SOVIET WILLINGNESS  
TO ENGAGE IN ACTIVE DIALOGUE ONCE SET PIECES HAD BEEN PUT  
ASIDE.AS RESULT,LUNCHES,DINNERS,COFFEE BREAKS DURING  
DISCUSSIONS PROVED MOST PRODUCTIVE TIME OF MTG.THERE WAS  
NEW GIVE-AND-TAKE ON SOVIET PART WHICH ENCOURAGE AMERICANS  
TO PLACE GREATER WEIGHT THAN THEY HAD IN PAST ON DISTINCTION  
BETWEEN FORMAL POSITIONS AND HINTS PUT FORWARD DURING MORE  
RELAXED CONVERSATIONS;

(B) IN AMERICAN VIEW SOVIETS APPEARED NOT/NOT TO BE TOTALLY  
UP-TO-DATE ON MIDDLE EAST REALITIES AND THUS A BIT OUT OF  
THE PICTURE.FOR EXAMPLE,POLYAKOV AND HIS COLLEAGUES SEEMED  
SURPRISED AT DEGREE OF CONSENSUS WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN

PAGE TWO UHGR0532 CONF

ACHIEVED BETWEEN JORDAN/EGYPT/ISRAEL ON QUESTION OF INTERNATL  
CONF. FROM THIS INFO GAP AMERICANS DEDUCE NO/NO LACK OF  
SOVIET HOMEWORK BUT FACT THAT AMMAN AND CAIRO ARE NOT/NOT  
PROVIDING MOSCO WITH FULL DETAILS OF DEVELOPMENTS. FOR EXAMPLE  
AT END OF FIRST MORNINGS SESSION POLYAKOV REQUESTED THAT  
AFTERNOON MTG BE CANCELLED BECAUSE SOVIETS NEEDED TIME TO  
DIGEST NEW INFO THEY HAD RECEIVED DURING MORNING. LIKEWISE  
AT END OF TALKS POLYAKOV TOLD MURPHY THAT HE AND HIS COLLEGAUSE  
NEEDED TO DO SOME SERIOUS THINKING ONCE THEY GOT BACK TO MOSCO;

(C) SOVIETS APPEARED PREOCCUPIED ABOVE ALL WITH ROLE OF  
PLO AT ANY INTERNATL CONF FORMALLY RESTATING POSITION THAT  
PLO MUST CONSTITUTE SEPARATE AND EQUAL DEL. NONETHELESS,  
WHEN PRESSED BY MURPHY THAT SUCH CONDITON WAS NON-STARTER,  
POLYAKOV REPLIED THAT SOVIETS WANTED TO BE QUOTE FLEXIBLE  
UNQUOTE. POLYAKOV DID NOT/NOT REPLY TO MURPHYS POINT THAT  
FLEXIBILITY WAS NOT/NOT EVIDENT IN SOVIET PROMOTION OF  
REENTRY INTO PLO MAINSTREAM, AT ALGIERS PNC MTG, OF EXTREMIST  
ELEMENTS SUCH AS HABASH;

(D) SOVIETS CONFIRMED THAT MOSCO WAS PREPARED TO OPEN QUOTE  
POLITICAL CHANNEL UNQUOTE TO ISRAEL. THEY DID NOT/NOT EXPAND  
ON THIS;

(E) IN SUM, AMERICANS WERE NOT/NOT DISCOURAGED BY MURPHY/POLYAKOV  
MTG AND DETECTED QUOTE INTERESTING SIGNS UNQUOTE PARTICULARLY  
IN THE GIVE-AND-TAKE OF DISCUSSIONS WHICH WAS FREER THAN IN PAST.  
WHAT AMERICANS ARE NOW WATCHING FOR ARE SIGNS THAT THESE QUOTE  
HINTS UNQUOTE WILL HAVE SOME PRACTICAL RESULT.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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---USA/USSR RELATIONS

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SUMMARY:USA EMB DCM COMBS BRIEFLY REVIEWED CURRENT STATE OF USA/  
USSR RELATIONSHIP AT NATO GROUP MTG 14JUL.NO/NO DATE HAD BEEN SET  
FOR SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MTG IN WSHDC,HE SAID.SOVIET STALL ON ACD  
COULD BE TACTICAL,HE THOUGHT,WITH STRESS ON ENDGAME AND PIAS.WSHDC  
VIEW WAS THAT NATO POSITION WAS SOUND,THAT ALLIANCE SHOULD NOT/  
NOT BE FORCED INTO COMPROMISES NOT/NOT IN ITS INTEREST AND THAT  
THEY SHOULD BE PATIENT.OTHERWISE,BILATERAL AGENDA WAS MOVING AHEAD,  
WITH SOVIETS INDICATING INTEREST IN HIGHER LEVEL TALKS ON  
AFGHANISTAN.

2.REPORT:USA,COMBS SAID,HAD PROPOSED TWO JUL DATES FOR SHULTZ/  
SHEVARDNADZE MTG,BUT THEY HAD ALREADY PASSED.LATE JUL WAS NEXT  
POSSIBILITY,THOUGH WITH SHULTZ GOING ON VACATION IN AUG,HE DID  
NOT/NOT KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN.USA AMB MATLOCK MET WITH VORONTSEV  
AND KORNIENKO 10JUL BEFORE DEPARTING FOR CONSULTATIONS IN WSHDC.  
THEY TOLD HIM SHEVARDNADZE WANTED TO MEET WITH SHULTZ,BUT DEVELOP-  
MENTS IN GENEVA DID NOT/NOT JUSTIFY IT.

3.SOVIETS WERE STALLING,COMBS THOUGHT,WITH STRESS ON GERMAN PIAS.

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PAGE TWO XYGR1153 CONF

STALL INTENDED TO GENEVA WHERE USA SIDE SAW NO/NO ENGAGEMENT ON KEY ISSUES.WHY,HOWEVER,WAS UNCLEAR.COMBS WAS SCEPTICAL ABOUT IDEA SOVIETS WERE WAITING TO SEE HOW WEAKENED REAGAN WAS BY IRANGATE. INSTEAD,HE THOUGHT SOVIETS WERE INTO TACTICS OF ENDGAME,PRESSURING FOR MORE.SOVIET AMB DUBININ WAS IN MOSCOW IN CONNECTION WITH RECENT CENTRAL CTTEE PLENUM.HE TOLD SHULTZ ABOUT MTG HE ATTENDED WITH GORBACHEV(AND DOBRYNIN PRESUMABLY).IMPLICATION WAS THAT GORBACHEV HIMSELF HAD SAID THEY SHOULD SLOW THINGS DOWN AND WAIT FOR WHILE. 4.COMBS DISCOUNTED CURRENT ARBATOV LINE THAT SOVIETS WERE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT DOING DEAL WITH REAGAN AS RESULT OF WEST BERLIN SPEECH.VISITING DARTMOUTH GRP AND STROBE TALBOTT SEPARATELY GOT SAME MESSAGE.SOVIETS,THEY WERE TOLD,HAD NOT/NOT CHANGED MINDS, BUT WERE THINKING ABOUT GETTING MORE,IE INF PLUS FRAMEWORK AGMT INCL SPACE.IF USA RESPONSE WAS NEGATIVE,THEY WOULD TAKE SECOND LOOK AT SUMMIT,LEAVING TWO SIDES IN STANDOFF.WSHDC VIEW,COMBS STRESSED,WAS THAT NATO POSITION WAS SOUND,THAT ALLIANCE SHOULD NOT/NOT BE FORCED INTO CONCESSIONS NOT/NOT IN ITS INTEREST AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE PATIENT.

5.WITH EXCEPTION OF GENEVA,COMBS SAID,BILATERAL AGENDA WAS MOVING AHEAD.THEY WERE GOING THROUGH CYCLE OF REGIONAL CONSULTATIONS, MOST RECENTLY ON MIDDLE EAST WITH MURPHY AND POLYAKOV.SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED THEY WANT TO DISCUSS AFGHANISTAN AGAIN,BUT AT HIGHER

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PAGE THREE XYGR1153 CONF

LEVEL(IE ARMACOST/VORONTSEV).TALKS HAD NOT/NOT YET BEEN AGREED,  
THOUGH COMBS SPECULATED SOVIETS MIGHT HAVE SOME NEW WRINKLE ON  
NATL RECONCILIATION.

6.ON IRAN/IRAQ,COMBS SAID USA UN AMB WALTERS HAD LEFT MOSCOW  
APPARENTLY CONFIDENT SECOND RESOLUTION COULD BE PASSED AND THAT  
SOVIETS HAD COME CLOSE TO SAYING THEY WOULD GO ALONG ON SANCTIONS.  
COMBS HIMSELF,HOWEVER,WAS MORE CAUTIOUS,NOTING WALTERS HAD  
KISSINGER-LIKE TENDENCY TO SHADE POSITIVE TO GET MOMENTUM.REPORTING  
FROM PRC,WALTERS SAID HE GOT POSITIVE RESPONSE FROM CHINESE ON  
SANCTIONS,THOUGH THEY WANTED TO CONSULT CAREFULLY SO AS NOT/NOT TO  
SLIGHT NON-PERMANENT SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS.WALTERS WAS CONFIDENT  
PRC WOULD NOT/NOT VETO OR ABSTAIN ON RESOLUTION,DEPENDING ON WHAT  
OTHERS DID.IN BEIJING,WALTERS ALSO HAD PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH  
CHINESE AUTHORITIES,REITERATING USA CONCERNS ABOUT SILKWORM MISSILE.  
7.COMBS WAS UPBEAT ABOUT NEW GENERATION AT SOVIET MFA NOW HANDLING  
USA AFFAIRS.VORONTSEV,BESSMERTNYKH AND OTHERS WERE,HE SAID,  
EASIER TO DEAL WITH.BESSMERTNYKH AND USA SIDE OF HOUSE RECENTLY  
HOSTED THIRTY COUPLES FROM EMB FOR RELAXING DAY AT MFA DACHA.  
8.PRECEDING CONTAINS INFO PROVIDED IN CONFIDENCE BY REP OF FOREIGN  
GOVT AND MUST BE PROTECTED.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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---US/SOVIET RELNS-MTG WITH ARMACOST

INSERT AND AMEND REFTTEL TO READ AS FOLLOWS

PAGE TWO, PARA FOUR, LINE ELEVEN QUOTE

HE MIGHT DELAY SUMMIT MTG UNTIL NEXT YR.72 PIAS DID NOT/NOT LIKELY  
HOLD MUCH ...ETC. UNQUOTE.

FOR MITC, AMEND AND PROTECT, PLEASE.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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---US/SOVIET RELNS-MTG WITH ARMACOST

AMB CALLED ON UNDERSECTY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS ARMACOST TODAY, INTER  
ALIA, TO REVIEW STATE OF U.S./SOVIET RELNS AND ARMS CONTROL AGENDA.

2.ARMACOST CONFIRMED THERE HAS BEEN SOME SLIPPAGE IN SETTING  
DATE FOR SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MTG, WITH NO/NO DATE YET SET.

COMBINATION OF DOMESTIC PREOCCUPATION IN USSR AND DIFFICULTY OF INF  
ISSUES STILL TO BE SETTLED PROVIDED MOST OF EXPLANATION.

3.ARMACOST NOTED THAT GORBACHEV APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN  
PREOCCUPIED WITH DOMESTIC SITU OVER LAST SEVERAL YEARS,  
SECURING MTG OF CENTRAL CTTEE PLENUM AND APPROVAL FOR MANY  
(IF NOT ALL) OF LAWS REQUIRED TO IMPLEMENT REFORM PGM. HE HAD  
ALSO MADE SKILLFUL USE OF CESSNA INCIDENT TO PREVAIL OVER  
MILITARY. BUT HE HAD NOT/NOT GOT EVERYTHING HE WANTED, AND  
WAS LIKELY TO CONTINUE TO ENCOUNTER OPPOSITION TO HIS REFORMS  
FROM WORKERS, PEASANTS AND PARTY BUREAUCRACY WORRIED ABOUT  
FUTURE OF ITS PRIVILEGES.

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PAGE TWO UNGR1873 CONF

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, ARMACOST SAID, GORBACHEV COULD UNDOUBTEDLY BENEFIT FROM PUBLICITY ATTENDING SUMMIT MTG AND AGMT ON INF. BUT THERE WAS NO/NO COMPELLING REASON FOR EARLY RESOLUTION OF OUTSTANDING INF ISSUES ON HIS PART. PERSHING ISSUE HE PROBABLY SAW AS ONE OVER WHICH HE COULD SOW SOME DISCORD IN FRG, AND BETWEEN FRG AND ITS ALLIES. FOR THIS REASON, HE WAS PROBABLY INCLINED TO LET PROCESS WORK FOR A WHILE, BUT IN DUE COURSE ARMACOST THOUGHT HE WOULD AGREE ON SETTLEMENT. U.S. SUPPOSED GORBACHEV SAW INF AGMT AS HELPFUL NOT/NOT ONLY ON ITS MERITS BUT ALSO AS MEANS OF CONSOLIDATING HIS POSN DOMESTICALLY. BUT SINCE HE WAS NOW STRONGER, HE MIGHT HOLD MUCH MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE FOR SOVIETS, BUT GORBACHEV PROBABLY WOULD TRY TO RESIST LEGITIMIZE THEIR EXISTANCE IN AN INF AGMT FOR POLITICAL REASONS. ARMACOST SAID HE HOPED RECENT SOVIET CASUALNESS IN NEGS DID NOT/NOT EXTEND TO SOVIETS MISSING OPPORTUNITY THEY HAD TO REACH AGMT WITH A U.S. PRESIDENT WHO COULD DELIVER UNQUOTE. TIME WAS MOVING ON.

5. AS FOR KIND OF INF SETTLEMENT POSSIBLE, ARMACOST SAID IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO GET GLOBAL ZERO/ZERO SOLUTION, BUT 72/72 WAS ALSO CONCEIVABLE MUCH AS IT WOULD COMPOUND VERIFICATION PROBLEMS ON BOTH SIDES.

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**ACTION**  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM MOSCO XYGR1151 07JUL87

TO EXTOTE GMR IMMED

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PEKIN TOKYO PARIS ROME PCCOTT/MORDEN PMOOTT/BURNEY

DISTR MINA USS DMC IFB GMD IMU INP GMRD URR CPP RBR RBD URD

REF ZJGR0775 02JUL

---IRAN/IRAQ/MIDEAST

GEN VERNON WALTERS WAS IN MOSCO LAST WEEK. I SPOKE BRIEFLY TO HIM  
AS WELL AS TO USA AMB MATLOCK AT 04JUL RECEPTION(HELD 03JUL).

FROM THEM AND OTHERS SUBSEQUENTLY I GLEANED THE FOLLOWING:(A)USSR  
AND USA HAVE AGREED ON A CH VII RESLN ON IRAN/IRAQ WAR BUT  
QUESTION OF SANCTIONS REMAINS OPEN FOR DISCUSSION;(B)PRES REAGAN  
WANTS SC RESLN ADOPTED IN MID-JUL AND AMERICANS WOULD LIKE SHULTZ  
TO REP USA PROVIDED SHEVARDNADZE IS THERE TOO,BUT SOVIETS ARE ONLY  
PREPARED TO THINK ABOUT IDEA;AND(C)CHINESE STILL HAVE SOME MINOR  
DIFFICULTIES WITH TEXT OF RESLN WHICH WALTERS HOPES TO DEAL WITH  
DURING QUICK TRIP TO PEKIN.

2.I UNDERSTAND(BUT NOT/NOT FROM HIM)THAT GEN WALTERS WAS TO  
PROCEED FROM PEKIN TO TOKYO AND THEN BACK TO DMCUS WHICH LENDS  
CREDIBILITY TO SPECULATION THAT WALTERS WHILE IN MOSCO DISCUSSED  
MIDEAST IN DEPTH INCLUDING MIDEAST CONF PROPOSAL.FURTHERMORE,  
THIS FITS IN WITH DMCUS REPORT ABOUT IMMINENT ARRIVAL THERE OF  
SPECIAL AMERICAN ENVOY.

TURNER

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**ACTION**  
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REF NOTRETEL UNGR2906 25OCT85

---CONSULTATIONS EU/URSS SUR ASIE DE LEST:WSHDC 10-11JUN86

SOMMAIRE:LORS SECONDE SESSION DISCUSSIONS BILATERALES EU/URSS SUR ASIE DE LEST(WSHDC 10-11JUN),DEUX PAYS ONT PU,UNE FOIS DE PLUS, CONSTATER AMPLEUR DIVERGENCE DE VUES QUI LES SEparent SUR ENSEMBLE DES PROBLEMES DS CETTE REGION DU MONDE.DEUX PARTIS SE SONT TOUT DE MEME MIS D ACCORD POUR APPUYER DIALOGUE ENTRE LES DEUX COREES ET POUR FAVORISER REGLEMENT POLITIQUE AU CMABODGE.AMERICAINS ONT CLAIREMENT REPOUSSE TOUTE IDEE D APPLIQUER MODLE CONF HNSKI A L ASIE TEL QUE PRECONISE PAR SOVIETIQUES(CIT ASIAN SECURITY CONF FINCIT)EN RAISON NOTAMMENT DE CERTAINS CONFLITS FRONTALIERS OU TERRITORIAUX DEMEURES JUSQU A MAINTENANS SANS SOLUTION.AMERICAINS ONT FORTEMENT ENCOURAGE SOVIETIQUES A ENGAGER NEGS AVEC JPN SUR PROBLEMES TERRITOIRES SEPTENTRIONAUX ET A TROUVER SOLUTION AUX TROIS OBSTACLES INVOQUES PAR RPC DS SES RELNS BILATERALES AVEC URSS.DE PLUS, AMERICAINS S ATTENDENT A UNE ACTIVITE ACCRUE DE PART DES SOVIETIQUES EN ASIE DU SUD ET NOTAMMENT AUPRES PAYS DE L ANASE.VISIT SHEVARDNADZE L ANNEE PROCHAINE EN INDONESIE(APPELEE A ETRE SUIVIE PAR D AUTRES

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PAGE DEUX UNGR1059 CONFD

VISITES DE PERSONNALITES SOVIETIQUES) SERAIT EN VOIE DE PREPARATION. SOVIETIQUES N ONT PAS SOULEVE LEUR PARTICIPATION AU PEC-PECC V OU QUESTION DES PHILS. FINALEMENT, AMERICAINS ONT ACCEPTE INVITATION DES SOVS A POURSUIVRE CES DISCUSSIONS BILATERALES SUR ASIE DE L EST L ANNEE PROCHAINE A MOSCO.

2. RAPPORT: AVONS ETE INVITE AU DEPT ETAT AINSI QU AUTRES COLLEGUES DES PAYS DE L OTAN POUR UN COMPTE RENDU SUR DISCUSSIONS EU/URSS QUI ONT EU LIEU A WSHDC 10-11 JUN DERNIER (PREMIERES DISCUSSIONS SUR CETTE REGION ONT EU LIEU L ANNEE DERNIERE A MOSCO-NOTRE REFTEL). GASTON SIGUR, SOUS SEC ETAT AUX AFFAIRES DE L ASIE DE L EST ET DU PACIFIQUE DIRIGEAIT DEL AMERICAINE ALORS QUE DEL SOVIETIQUE ETAIT DIRIGEE PAR IGOR ROGAJCHEV (CHEF BU BUREAU DES PAYS SOCIALISTES D ASIE). DISCUSSIONS ONT D ABORD PORTE SUR ASPECTS PLUS GENERAUX DES PROBLEMES DE L ASIE DE L EST ET DU SUD EST PUIS SUR PROBLEMES PLUS SPECIFIQUES (PAYS DE L ANASE (CIT ASEAN FINCIT), CAMBODGE/VIETNAM, RPC, COREE DU NORD ET DU SUD, JPN, MICRONESIE ET TRAITE DE NON-PROLIF NUCLEAIRE DS PACIFIQUE SUD (CIT SPNFZ FINCIT)). CES DISCUSSIONS SE SONT DERoulees DS ATMOSPHERE PLUTOT DETENDUE (CIT BUSINESS LIKE FINCIT) SANS DOUTE, D APRES INTERLOCUTEUR AMERICAIN, EN RAISON ABSENCE DE KAPITSA QUI AVAIT DIRIGE DEL SOVIETIQUE L ANNEE DERNIERE.

3. REVUE GENERALE DES PROBLEMES DE LA REGION: DE L AVIS DE NOTRE INTERLOCUTEUR, APPROCHE DES SOVS A SURTOUT CONSISTE A METTRE DE L AVANT DES PROPOSTIONS DE CONCEPTION PLUTOT GLOBALE SUR LA PAIX ET

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PAGE TROIS UNGR1059 CONF D

LA SECURITE EN ASIE DE L EST, A FAIRE PEU DE CAS DU DYNAMISME ET INDEPENDANCE DES PAYS DE CETTE REGION ET A PROPOSER COOPERATION EU/URSS EN VUE TROUVER SOLUTION AUX PROBLEMES DE LA REGION. EN CE QUI CONCERNE PREMIER POINT SOVS ONT FORTEMENT INSISTE SUR CONF SUR SECURITE EN ASIE (CIT ASIAN SECURITY CONF FINCIT) ET BESOINS D ACCROITRE CONFIANCE DS CETTE REGION. A CET EGARD, SOVS AURAIENT SOUMIS, POUR FINS DE DISCUSSIONS, DES PROPOSITIONS DETAILLEES SE RAPPROCHANT DES MESURES PRECONISEES DS CADRE CONF D HSNKI.

4. APPROCHE DES AMERICAINS A CONSISTE A SOULIGNER CERTAINS SITUS GENERATRICES DE TENSION DS REGION ABORDEE. LEUR DESIR D ENTREtenir DES RELNS AMICALES AVEC PAYS DE CETTE REGION ET L EXPANSION QUASI-NATURELLE DES RELNS ECONOMIQUES ET COMMERCIALES ENTRE EU ET CES MEMES PAYS. PRINCIPAL PROBLEME DE LA REGION RESULTE SURTOUT DES INTERVENTIONS OU DU ROLE JOUE PAR UNION SOVIETIQUE ET SES ALLIES DS CETTE REGION: PRESENCE MILITAIRE SOV ACCRUE, FOURNITURE D ARMEMENTS SOPHISTIQUES A COREE DU NORD, APPUI AU VIETNAM, ET FINALEMENT REFUS SOVIETIQUE DE DISCUTER DES TERRITOIRES SEPTENTRIONAUX AVEC JPN. REPS AMERICAINS ONT EGALEMENT FAIT VALOIR QUE MODELE HSNKI NE S APPLIQUE PAS AU CONTEXTE DE L ASIE DE L EST PUISQUE CERTAINS PROBLEMES REGIONAUX (FRONTALIERS ON TERRITORIAUX) DEMEURENT TOUJOURS SANS SOLUTION OU PARCE QUE CERTAINS CONFLITS DE NATURE PLUS POLITIQUE SONT TOUJOURS TRES ACTIFS. AMERICAINS ONT DONC SURTOUT TENTE D ORIENTER DISCUSSIONS VERS PROBLEMES PLUS SPECIFIQUES.

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PAGE QUATRE UNGR1059 CONF

5. LORS DERNIERE SESSION DE DISCUSSIONS, DEUX DELS SE SONT MIS D ACCORD POUR APPUYER DIALOGUE ENTRE COREE DU SUD ET DU NORD ET ENCOURAGER RECHERCHE SOLUTION POLITIQUE AU CAMBODGE, TOUT EN CONSTATANT DIVERGENCES DE VUES QUANT AUX MOYENS APPROPRIES POUR PROMOUVOIR CES DEUX OBJECTIFS. EN RAISON DE CET ACCORD, SI PARTIEL SOIT-IL, REPS AMERICAINS ONT ACCEPTE INVITATION DES SOVS DE CONTINUER CES DISCUSSIONS BILATERALES SUR ASIE DE L EST QUI, EN PRINCIPE, AURONT LIEU A MOSCO L ETE PROCHAIN.

6. QUESTIONS PLUS SPECIFIQUES: TRAITE NON PROLIF NUCLEAIRE DS PACIFIQUE SUD CIT SOUTH PACIFIC NUCLEAR FREE ZONE (SPNFZ) FINCIT. AMERICAINS ONT FAIT VALOIR QU ILS RECONNAISSAIENT PREOCCUPATIONS DE PAYS DE CETTE REGION EN CE QUI A TRAIT A PROLIF ARMES NUCLEAIRES ET QU ILS ABORDAIENT LE TRAITE ET SES PROTOCOLES AVEC OUVERTURE D ESPRIT. ILS ONT AUSSI FAIT REMARQUER AUX SOVS QUE CETTE REGION DU PACIFIQUE SUD SE TOURNE VERS EU POUR ASSURER SA PROPRE SECURITE ET SOULIGNE FAIT QUE CETTE MEME REGION N A PAS IMPOSE DE LIMITES QUELCONQUES AUX CAPACITES AMERICAINES D Y OPERER. PAR CONTRE, IL REVIENT A LA FRANCE ET AUX ETATS DE LA REGION DE TROUVER SOLUTION AUX PROBLEMES RELATIFS AUX EXPERIENCES NUCLEAIRES FRANCAISES, PROBLEMES QUE EU NE PEUVENT OU NE DOIVENT TENTER DE RESOUDRE. POSITION AMERICAINE A L EGARD DU TRAITE ET DES PROTOCOLES N EST PAS ENCORE ARRETEE. SOVS ONT POUR LEUR PART INDIQUE QU ILS S INTERROGAIENT SUR CERTAINES FORMULES OU CERTAINS MOTS EMPLOYES DS TRAITE ET SES PROTOCOLES. ILS ONT AUSSI DECLARE

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QU ILS APPUYAIENT CE TRAITE QUI EN SOMME CONSTITUE UN PAS IMPORTANT VERS NON-PROLIFERATION NUCLEAIRE DS PACIFIQUE SUD.

7.RELATIONS SINO-SOVS:SOVS ONT BEAUCOUP INSISTE POUR SOULIGNER AMELIORATION LEURS RELNS BILATERALES AVEC CHINE.A CET EGARD,ILS ONT EVOQUE FAIT QUE ANTAGONISME DES CHINOIS VIS-A-VIS URSS AVAIT DIMINUE, QUE CONTACTS DS DOMAINE SPORTIF ET DE L EDUCATION ETAIENT MAINTENUS ET QUE GOUVT RPC AVAIT DIMINUE FORCES ARMEES CHINOISES D UN MILLION D HOMMES TEMOIGNANT AINSI DE SA CONFIANCE A L EGARD DES RUSSES.SOVS ONT DS L ENSEMBLE CONCLU QUE LEURS RELNS BILATERALRES AVEC CHINE CONTINUERONT DE S AMELIORER ET QUE GOUVT RPC ETAIT PLUTOT PREOCCUPE PAR ETAT DES RELNS ENTRE DEUX SUPER-PUISSANCES.EN CONTRE-PIED AUX THESES SOVS DEL AMERICAINE A EXPLIQUE REDUCTION TROUPES CHINOISES COMME ETANT PLUTOT EFFORT DE LA PART GOUVT RPC DE MODERNISER ARMEE CHINOISE ET MENTIONNE FAIT QUE TROUPES CHINOISES ETAIENT TOUJOURS POSTEES AU NORD DE LA CHINE,A LA FRONTIERE SINO-SOVS,ET AU SUD,A LA FRONTIERE SINO-VIET.DE PLUS,AMERICAINS ONT SOULGINE FAIT QUE CHINE ET AUTRES PAYS ASIATIQUES N ONT PAS ENCORE REAGI A PROPOSTION DE CONVOQUER CONF EN VUE D ASSURER SECURITE EN ASIE ET ONT FINALEMENT INVITE SOVS A TROUVER SOLUTION AUX TROIS OBSTACLES INVOQUES PAR GOUVT RPC DS SES RELNS AVEC URSS.EN CONCLUSION SUR CETTE QUESTION, SOVS ONT EMIS DES COMMENTAIRES PLUTOT CRITIQUES A L EGARD DES RELNS BILATERALES SINO-AMERICAINES ET INDIQUE QUE QUALITE ET QUANTITE ASPECT MILITAIRE DE CES RELNS SERONT SURVEILLEES DE PRES.

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PAGE SIX UNGR1059 CONF D

8.CAMBODGE/VIET:SOVS ONT ADOPTE LIGNE DURE ET ONT EGALEMENT REJETE PROPOSITION EN HUIT POINTS SOUMISE PAR GOUVT COALITION KAMPUCHEA DEMOCRATIQUE.ILS ONT DECLARE QUE VIETNAM N ACCEPTERA JAMAIS DE NEGOCIER ACCORD SOUS CONTRAINTE ET QUE L AIDE AMERICAINE AU CAMBODGE EMPECHERAIT VERITABLE DIALOGUE.SOVS ONT AUSSI EVOQUE DIVISIONS AU SEIN PAYS ANASE(CIT ASEAN FINCIT)ET MENTIONNE QUE CES DERNIERS ETAIENT PLUS PREOCCUPES PAR CHINE.

9.COREE:SOVS N ONT GUERE ETE PLUS FLEXIBLES LORS DISCUSSION SUR COREE DU NORD ET DU SUD.ILS ONT PRETENDU QUE COREE DU SUD MANIFESTAIT CERTAINE AGRESSIVITE VIS-A-VIS COREE DU NORD ET QUE SOUTENIR INVERSE ETAIT FAIRE PREUVE DE NAIVETE(CE A QUOI AMERICAINS ONT REPONDU EN SE REFERANT AUX INCIDENTS DE RANGOON DE OCT83).EN CE QUI A TRAIT AUX JEUX OLYMPIQUES ET S OPPOSAIENT A L INCLUSION DE TOUTE QUESTION POLITIQUE DS CE MOUVEMENT.SOVS N ONT PAS,POUR AUTANT,CONFIRME OU DONNE MOINDRE INDICE QUANT A LEUR INTENTION DE PARTICIPER AUX JEUX DE SEOUL.AMERICAINS ONT RAPPELE QUE,SUR TOUTE CETTE QUESTION,ILS FAVORISAIENT DIALOGUE COREE DU NORD/COREE DU SUD DS CADRE DES REUNIONS DE LAUSANNE.

10.JPN:PROBLEME TERRITOIRES SEPTENTRIONAUX A ETE SOULEVE PAR DEL AMERICAINE ET CETTE DERNIERE A FORTEMENT INVITE SOVS A ENGAGER NEGS SUR CETTE QUESTION.SOVS ONT DE LEUR COTE FAIT ALLUSION A MONTEE DU MILITARISME NIPPON ET ACCUSE EU D ENCOURAGER CE DERNIER EN INCITANT ET APPUYANT JPN A JOUER ROLE PLUS ACTIF DS LE MONDE.EN REPONSE,

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AMERICAINS ONT INVITE SOVS A ANALYSER TRANSFORMATION AU SEIN SOCIETE JPNAISE(CONSTITUTION JPNSAISE,PSYCHOLOGIE ESSENTIELLEMENT ANTI-MILITARISTE SOCIETE JPNAISE)ET ONT CONCLUE QUE DISCUSSIONS EN COURS SUR TOUTE CETTE QUESTION AU JPN MEME CONSTITUAIT EN SOI SIGNE POSITIF.

11.MICRONESIE:SOVS ONT ACCUSE AMERICAINS DE TRANSFORMER CES ILES EN BASES MILITAIRE AMERICAINE ALORS QUE DEL AMERICAINE A INSISTE POUR LEUR INDIQUER QUE VETO SOVIETIQUE AU CONSEIL DE SECURITE LORSQUE QUESTION SERA ABORDEE L AUTOMNE PROCHAIN SERA PLUTOT MAL VU PAR GOUVT AMERICAIN.

12.EN REPONSE A UNE QUESTION SUR PRESENCE SOV EN ASIE DU SUD EST, INTERLOCUTEUR AMERICAIN A NOTE QUE SUITE DECLARATION GORBACHEV DU 23AVR DERNIER GOUVT AMERICAIN S ATTEND A UNE ACTIVITE ACCRUE DE PART DU GOUVT SOV DS CETTE REGION ET QUE VISISTE SHEVARDNADZE EN INDONESIE COURANT ANNEE PROCHAINE EST EN VOIE DE PREPARATION(CIT BEING WORKED OUT FINCIT).D AUTRE PART,BIEN QUE SOVS N AIENT PAS SOULEVE FORMELLEMENT LEUR PARTICIPATION EVENTUELLE AU PEC/PECC V,DEL AMERICAINE EN ARRIVE A CONCLUSION QUE D APRES LEUR COMMENTAIRES SOVS AURAIENT IMPLICITEMENT LAISSE ENTENDRE QUE GOUVT AMERICAIN VOULAIT LES EXCLURE DE CE GROUPEMENT.EN TOUT ETAT DE CAUSE,FONCTIONNAIRES AMERICAINS IGNORENT SI SOVS ENTENDENT REVENIR A LA CHARGE SUR CETTE QUESTION EN PARTICULIER DS PROCHE AVENIR.INTERLOCUTEUR AMERICAIN A EGALEMENT SOULIGNE FAIT QUE SOVS N ONT PAS SOULEVE QUESTION DES PHILS

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External Affairs      Affaires extérieures  
Canada                Canada  
Under-Secretary      Sous-secrétaire

CONFIDENTIAL

, June 29, 1987

To: ~~IFB~~ IDD IDA IDR

cc: RBD RBR UGB

Subject: Soviet-American Negotiations

The U.S. Ambassador told Don Campbell and me today that the U.S. negotiator was making progress in persuading his Soviet counterpart to agree to the complete abolition of INF missiles world-wide. Niles asked that, if there were a suitable opportunity, Canadian spokesmen in contact with Soviet representatives should speak in favour of this outcome. He suggested that one persuasive argument in favour of this solution, as opposed to retaining 100 warheads on each side, was that the problem of verifying the agreement was much easier to deal with if the missiles were totally done away with.

J. H. T.

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BAF d/n

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JUN 01 '87 11:32 CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASH

External Affairs    Affaires extérieures  
Canada                Canada

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MESSAGE

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---PRESS CLIPPING WASHINGTON POST 31MAY87

QUOTE U.S. POLICY IN GULF COMPLICATES RELATIONS WITH SOVIETS,  
CHINESE UNQUOTE.

COMCENTRE PLSE FAX ATTACHED TWO PAGES.

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C.E. GARRARD

A30 SUNDAY, MAY 31, 1987

THE WASHINGTON POST

# U.S. Policy in Gulf Complicates Relations With Soviets, Chinese

*Cooperation Sought at United Nations to Halt Flow of Arms to Iran*

By Don Oberdorfer  
Washington Post Staff Writer

The Reagan administration's newest phase of activity in the Persian Gulf has complicated U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and China, the rival giants of international communism.

Developments of the past few days have revealed intensified U.S. opposition to the Soviet military presence in the gulf and deepening U.S. concern about the Chinese-supplied Silkworm missile, considered the most threatening recent addition to Iran's arsenal.

At the same time, the Reagan administration, whose secret arms deals with Iran are the subject of congressional hearings, has been asking for Soviet and Chinese cooperation at the United Nations to cut off the flow of arms to Iran. China is reported to be the main hold-out from this effort among the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council.

President Reagan said Friday that U.S. naval activity in the Persian Gulf is based in part on a determination that the strategic sea lanes there "will not be allowed to come under the control of the Soviet Union."

The same day, Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy, the administration's senior Middle East specialist, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that "what is driving our policy at this point" is that "we don't want the Soviets to get a handle on a vital lifeline" for the world's oil supply. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard L. Armitage, at the same hearing, said that the U.S. interest militarily is "to limit or eliminate" the Soviet presence in the Persian Gulf.

Murphy said that a Soviet naval frigate began a prolonged patrol in the gulf for the first time last September after the Iranian navy boarded a Soviet arms ship and impounded it temporarily in an Iranian port. Murphy said seven Soviet ships are in the gulf or just outside it, a substantial increase in the usual Soviet naval presence in that area.

The possibility of a more visible and politically important Soviet role, as a protector of capitalist Kuwait's oil shipping, helped spur the

administration to decide to take on that job itself. As a result, the United States will place 11 Kuwaiti tankers under the U.S. flag and U.S. naval protection.

The Persian Gulf is 800 miles from Soviet territory and about 7,000 miles from U.S. territory. But Murphy said "it is our vital interest, not their vital interest" at stake there because of western dependence on the oil that passes through it. The Soviet Union, being an oil exporter, has no such dependence.

In a more cooperative dimension, Washington and Moscow have discussed for months their mutual interests in the Persian Gulf and ways

*Developments of the past few days have revealed intensified U.S. opposition to the Soviet military presence in the gulf and deepening U.S. concern about the Chinese-supplied Silkworm missile, considered the most threatening recent addition to Iran's arsenal.*

to bring the Iran-Iraq war to a conclusion. Another round of talks that will include this point is expected to take place in Europe next month.

Soviet cooperation is essential if the United States is to succeed in the drive for a U.N. General Assembly resolution leading to the imposition of a worldwide arms embargo against Iran. The Soviet Union is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and also the No. 1 arms supplier to Iraq, an activity that has brought no U.S. objection.

The effort at the United Nations

is to forge a two-phase squeeze on Iran: first a call to Iran and Iraq to cease fire and return to international boundaries and, second, "enforcement measures" such as a worldwide arms embargo if and when Iran rejects this appeal as expected. Iraq is expected to agree to the resolution and, thus, would not be penalized.

U.S. diplomats said the Soviets appear to be willing to go along despite the clash with Washington on other aspects of its gulf activity. A Soviet Foreign Ministry statement Wednesday attacked the United States for using the Persian Gulf situation "to build up its military presence there," yet called for "collective international efforts, above all within the U.N. framework" to end the Iran-Iraq war.

China, Moscow's main rival and the most important U.S. friend within the world communist camp, is reported to be the main stumbling block to the U.N.-sponsored arms embargo against Iran.

Between 1983 and 1986, China emerged as the fourth-largest arms supplier to the Third World (behind the Soviet Union, the United States and France), according to a Congressional Research Service report this month. According to U.S. officials, China last year became Iran's No. 1 source of weapons. Iran is China's best arms customer, officials said.

An extensive diplomatic campaign has been mounted to persuade the Chinese government to join a U.N. arms embargo against Iran. Recently an Arab League delegation visited Beijing for this purpose, followed quickly by a senior Iranian Foreign Ministry official making the counterargument.

Chinese diplomats at the United Nations have not rejected the plan to impose the arms ban on Iran, according to U.S. sources, but instead have said they have "no instructions" from home about what stand to take. State Department officials said they are hopeful that China will agree shortly to join the drive so it can be unveiled within the next week or two.

China's decision to supply Iran with the antiship Silkworm missile, a copy of the Soviet-made Styx missile, has been a sore spot for months in Sino-American relations. Now that Kuwaiti tankers under the U.S. flag and U.S. warships are about to become vulnerable to this

JUN 01 '87 11:33 CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASH

P.28

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BY JAMES H.W. ATHERTON—THE WASHINGTON POST

Assistant Defense Secretary Armitage, left, and Assistant Secretary of State Murphy give Foreign Relations testimony.

weapon, which could threaten all shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, the issue is becoming more explosive.

Murphy said in testimony May 19 that China's supply of the Silkworm to Iran is "most unwelcome and disturbing" and that Washington as well as other concerned governments have told Beijing and Tehran of "the seriousness with which we take the Silkworm threat." At the White House and State Department last week, there were hints that,

U.S. warplanes will attack the Chinese-supplied missiles if they are deployed to threaten U.S. forces and if Iranian actions provide a justification for such action.

Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger and Secretary of State George P. Shultz are reported to have protested the shipment of the Silkworm missiles and other weapons to Iran during recent trips to Beijing. And the issue is reported to have been discussed here during the recent visit of Yang Shangkun, a

member of the Chinese Communist Party Politburo and vice chairman of China's Military Commission.

Murphy said Friday that Iran agreed last year to spend \$700 million to purchase the Silkworm missile system for possible use in blocking the Strait of Hormuz. Chinese officials, in public and private, are said to deny that China is supplying the arms.

"Maybe it is happening in a restaurant in downtown Shanghai," an exasperated Murphy told reporters.

DEN DANSKE REPRÆSENTATION  
VED DET NORDATLANTISKE RÅD

ELEGATION DE DANEMARK  
OTAN-NATO  
BRUXELLES

Mr. George W. Jaeger,  
Deputy Assistant Secretary General  
and Director, Political Directorate  
Room I-206

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Dear Mr. Jaeger,

As promised, I attach a transcript of the verbal account that I gave in the Political Committee on 5th inst., regarding the Soviet briefing in Copenhagen on Secretary Shultz's visit to Moscow in mid-April.

Yours sincerely,

Karsten Petersen

Copy with attachment to Members of the Political Committee and IMS Representative.

DANI DELEGATION  
TO NATO

File No. 105.D.34

7 May 1987

SOVIET BRIEFING ON SECRETARY SHULTZ's VISIT TO MOSCOW

On 24 April in Copenhagen, the Head of Department for Security and Cooperation in Europe in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Deryabin presented to the Danish Permanent Under Secretary for Foreign Political Affairs an exposé of Soviet views on the visit. From that exposé, the following may be highlighted:

The essential issue had been the INF one, regarding which the Soviet side saw a possibility for an agreement in the course of 5-6 months. The Soviet delegation in Geneva had already put forward concrete proposals and thereby put the American delegation in a difficult situation, as it would only receive instructions later. The Soviet side understood that the West European countries had problems on this score and was therefore ready to take concrete steps also regarding short-range, tactical missiles. But the Soviet side insisted on the liquidation/physical destruction of the missiles, not merely the transfer of them. In order to take account of the West European wishes the Soviet side had proposed to draft some key sentences on the shorter range (i.e. 500-1000 km) intermediate range missiles. The Soviet Union was ready to do away with these weapons in the course of one year. This might be seen as a recognition of Soviet preponderance in this field. Moscow suggested that the issue of the tactical missiles in the Asian area be solved in the same way as in the INF field, i.e. by a limitation of their number. This was a not insignificant issue, as 25-30% of the missiles were to be found in the Asian area.



- 2 -

As regards INF missiles generally, the Soviet side wanted no new "counting game" or step-wise solutions, but the simple approach of a zero-solution. On this, the Soviet side was in almost total agreement with the US, but not with all the West European countries. However, the US wanted to retain the right to convert Pershing II to Pershing I B. But from a strictly military point of view this was an attempt at cheating, as these missiles might be readily reconverted. Nor would the Soviet Union accept that land-based cruise missiles were changed into sea-based ones.

(The exposé on START followed well-known, standard lines).

Space and defence weapons were the thorniest problem. In this field, nothing had happened since Reykjavik. There would be no solution regarding strategic weapons, if the US deployed SDI. But the Soviet Union had not only recorded the distance between positions, but had also clarified her own. Gorbachev had specified that the Soviet Union would allow research to go on within institutes, testing areas ("poligony") and factories. But there had to be a clear ban on anti-satellite and space-to-earth weapons. The Soviet Union had proposed a procedure which could create progress. According to the ABM-Treaty the parties were to meet every fifth year. Next time they might meet at the level of Minister or Deputy Minister of Defence.

7 May 1987



Government  
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File No. — N° du dossier

(BN) TS-736

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REFERENCE/COPY NO. — N° DE RÉFÉRENCE

DESCRIPTION

From the Danish Delegation (their ref. 105.D.34)

Subject: SOVIET BRIEFING ON SEC SHULTZ'S VISIT TO MOSCOW.

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NORWEGIAN DELEGATION

TO NATO

NATO RESTRICTED

Subject: Soviet representative informs about meetings  
----- between Shultz and Gorbachev/Shevardnadze. -----

The head of the CSCE-division in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Mr. J. Deryabin visited Oslo 22 April 1987 for consultations primarily on CSCE-matters. However, he also asked for a meeting with Foreign Minister Stoltenberg, in order to give Norwegian authorities a briefing concerning the latest development with regard to the NST negotiations.

According to Mr. Deryabin, Soviet authorities recognized the strong Western European interest in a satisfactory solution to the SRINF problems within the framework of a LRINF agreement. Thus, the Soviet Union had proposed to include a commitment to eliminate all SRINF missiles in Europe with a range between 500 and 1000 km within a year. Deryabin added that, with regard to SRINFs in Asia, the Soviet Union envisaged a solution along the same lines as for LRINF, which would permit the Soviet Union to maintain a small number of missiles.

Missiles with a range below 500 km should, according to Mr. Deryabin, be included in future negotiations on conventional forces. The Soviet Union was also willing to eliminate these weapons.

Responding to a critical remark by Mr. Deryabin concerning the question of US deployment of remaining LRINFs in Alaska, the Norwegian Foreign Minister stressed that this problem would be solved by also eliminating the last 100 warheads. Mr. Deryabin made it clear that a global zero-solution would be difficult, since this would affect the relationship between the Soviet Union and other countries.

NATO RESTRICTED .../2

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With regard to START the Soviet Union had confirmed its proposal for a 50% reduction within 5 years. However, the USA now favoured a reduction period of 7 years, which represented a step backwards compared to the understanding from Reykjavik. Furthermore, Shultz had repeated the US requirements for sub-ceilings. This could make it necessary for the Soviet Union to revert to its previous position of counting each SRAM as one warhead, in stead of the counting rule agreed upon at Reykjavik.

According to Mr. Deryabin, the Soviet Union had proposed that the forthcoming meeting for the ABM-treaty should take place at the level of defense ministers. This review should include a detailed discussion of the Thule and Krasnoyarsk radars.

Finally, Mr. Deryabin said that, in the absence of concrete agreements on START and space issues, Gorbachev had proposed to work out certain principles, which could form the basis for subsequent negotiations. Such agreed principles and a LRINF agreement could form the outcome of a Washington summit meeting.

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DESCRIPTION

From the Norwegian Delegation (2-page report)

Subject: Soviet representative informs about meetings  
between Shultz and Gorbachev/Shevardnadze.

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
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---SHULTZ VISIT TO MOSCO:ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS

SHULTZ REPORT TO FMS IN COUNCIL TODAY DEALT WITH SECURITY SIDE OF

TALKS IN MOSCO CONCENTRATING ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON LRINF/SRINF

QUESTION.PRINCIPLE TASK NOW BEFORE ALLIANCE AND WHICH HAD TO BE

SETTLED QUICKLY WAS HOW ALLIES WOULD RESPOND TO SOV ZERO SRINF

PROPOSAL.SHULTZ OUTLINED THREE POSSIBLE RESPONSES:

A)TOTAL ACCEPTANCE - ATTRACTIVE PUBLICLY BUT MIGHT UNDERMINE FLEXIBLE  
RESPONSE IF CURRENT DETERRENT POSTURE IS NOT/NOT AUGMENTED;

B)REJECTION - WOULD IMPLY WE WERE PREPARED TO DEPLOY NEW SYTEMS,AND  
WOULD BE SUBJ TO PUBLIC CRITICISM FOR TURNING DOWN OFFER OF  
UNILATERAL SOV DISARMAMENT;AND

C)COUNTERPROPOSAL OF EQUAL CEILING AT LOWER LEVEL - WOULD AVOID  
UNDERMINING FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND CRITICISM THAT REJECTION WOULD

...2

PAGE TWO-YBGR8745 SECRET

BRING BUT WOULD REQUIRE SOME DEPLOYMENT/CONVERSION. CHOICES WOULD BE DIFFICULT BUT MUST BE MADE SOON. ALTHO TIME FOR RESPONSE WAS LIMITED, IT WAS CLEAR THERE WERE DIFFERENCES AMONG ALLIES OVER CHOICES. COUNCIL AGREED THAT STUDY OF OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS WOULD BEGIN AT HLG MTG NEXT WEEK AND WOULD CONTINUE AT SCG MTG 28 APR. BOTH WOULD REPORT SOON THEREAFTER TO COUNCIL WHERE DECISION WOULD BE TAKEN, PERHAPS AS EARLY AS FIRST WEEK OF MAY.

2. REPORT: PRACTICALLY ALL OF SHULTZ REPORT DWELT ON SECURITY ISSUES WITH FOCUS ON INF. ON NON-INF ISSUES NOT/NOT MENTIONED IN MEDIA REPORTS, SHULTZ REPORTED THAT:

- USA EXPECTS TO TABLE DRAFT START TREATY AT BEGINNING OF NEXT ROUND.
- START AND D AND S TALKS WILL BEGIN 05 MAY TO ALLOW PREP TIME FOR DRAFTING TREATY AND RECUPERATION OF KAMPELMAN (LEHMAN INDICATED PRIVATELY TO SMITH USA FLEXIBILITY ON DURATION OF ABMT ADHERENCE).
- NUCLEAR TESTING: TWO SIDES WILL CONTINUE TO EXPLORE ADVANTAGES OF TWO VERIFICATION SYSTEMS - SEISMIC AND CORRTX-TO PERMIT RATIFICATION OF TWO TREATIES.
- CW: AGMT TO OBSERVE EACH OTHERS DESTRUCTION SYSTEMS. USA PLANT OPEN NOW, SOVS SOMETIME IN FUTURE.
- RISK REDUCTION CENTRES: EXPECT AGMT AT NEXT SESSION.

3. MOST SIGNIFICANT NEWS ON LRINF WAS ANNOUNCEMENT THAT SOVS INTEND TO TABLE DRAFT LRINF TREATY, INCLUDING VERIFICATION PROVISIONS AT

...3

PAGE THREE YBGR8745 SECRET

BEGINNING OF NEXT ROUND. THIS WILL PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE IF SOV INTENTIONS ON VERIFICATION MATCH THEIR RHETORIC. USA CONTINUES TO PUSH ZERO GLOBAL LRINF SOLUTION BUT IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT EQUAL LIMITS AT 100/100 IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE TREATY. SOVIETS HOWEVER ARE OBJECTING TO ALASKA DEPLOYMENT.

4. SHULTZ DESCRIBED GORBACHEV ZERO SRINF PROPOSAL AS PRINCIPLE ISSUE FACING ALLIANCE AND ONE WHICH REQUIRED CLEAR DECISION QUICKLY. SOVS HAVE PROPOSED UPON SIGNING OF INF TO WITHDRAW SRINF FROM CSSR AND GDR AND DESTROY WITHIN ONE YEAR. REMAINDER WOULD BE SUBJ TO NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE ZERO IN EUR. SOVS TALK OF SYSTEMS IN 500-1000 KM RANGE, USA NAMES SS-12/22 AND SS-23. USA REJECTED REGIONAL APPROACH AND INSISTED ON GLOBALITY. GORBACHEV APPEARED TO ACCEPT THIS CONDITION. ACCORDING TO SHULTZ ONE YEAR TIME FRAME REDUCES CHANCE OF WEST DEPLOYING NEW SYSTEM, THUS DEFEATING RIGHT TO EQUALITY PRINCIPLE. USA HAD FOUR CRITERIA FOR POSSIBLE SRINF AGMT - INVOLVE FINITE NUMBER; GLOBALITY; INTEGRAL PART OF INF AGMT; AND ONLY INVOLVE USA AND USSR SYSTEMS. RESPONDING TO QUESTION FROM GENSCHER, SHULTZ SAID THAT LAST CRITERION WOULD EXCLUDE PIAS UNDER FRG AIR FORCE CONTROL. HE ALSO CAUTIONED GENSCHER NOT/NOT TO INJECT FRG PIAS INTO DEBATE AS THEY ARE NOT/NOT NOW ON TABLE AND MOREOVER WOULD CREATE OPENING FOR INCLUSION OF UK AND FR SYSTEMS. SHULTZ EMPHASIZED FORCEFULLY THAT AT ISSUE WERE SRINF SYSTEMS ONLY. ALTHOUGH GORBACHEV HAS REFERRED GENERICALLY TO BROADER RANGE, SNF

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PAGE FOUR YBGR8745 SECRET

SYSTEMS ARE NOT/NOT ON TABLE AS FAR AS USA IS CONCERNED.

5. SHULTZ THEN OUTLINED THREE POSSIBLE APPROACHES WHICH ALLIANCE COULD TAKE. ESSENTIALLY CHOICE WAS ABOUT APPROPRIATE LEVEL OF SRINF BELOW WHICH WE WOULD NOT/NOT REDUCE. NEED TO RECOGNIZE POSITION AND STICK TO IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN ACTUAL LOCATION OF IT. WHILE NONE/NONE OF CHOICES WAS EASY AND WOULD DRAW CRITICISM FROM ONE SECTOR OF PUBLIC OR OTHER, WHATEVER WE CHOOSE, WE HAVE SUCCEEDED IN ACHIEVING 1979 GOAL IE ELIMINATION OF SS-20 IN EUR. FOLLOWING ARE SHULTZ OPTIONS:

(A) ACCEPTANCE OF ZERO SRINF PROPOSALS PROVIDED CRITERIA ARE MET. WOULD MEAN WE HAD LEVERAGED P II AND GLCM DEPLOYMENTS INTO REMOVAL OF SS-4, 20, 12/22 AND 23. IT WOULD AVOID NEW DEPLOYMENTS AND WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY LARGE SEGMENT OF PUBLIC. ON OTHER HAND ACCEPTANCE COULD ADD MOMENTUM TO DENUCLEARIZATION OF EUR WHILE CONVENTIONAL FORCE IMBALANCE EXISTED. IT COULD ALSO UNDERMINE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE IF CURRENT DETERRENT POSTURE WAS NOT/NOT AUGMENTED.

(B) TOTAL REJECTION EVEN IF PROPOSAL MEETS CRITERIA. THIS WOULD IMPLY READINESS TO DEPLOY USA SRINF SYSTEMS AND POLITICAL FALLOUT THAT THAT WOULD ENTAIL. ALLIES WOULD FACE PUBLIC CRITICISM FANNED BY SOV PROPAGANDA OVER DEPLOYMENT AND OVER REJECTION OF SOV UNILATERAL DISARM OFFER. WEST WOULD NEED COHERENT AGMT IN FAVOUR OF DEPLOYMENT. AS WELL, IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT CONGRESS WOULD ALLOCATE FUNDS FOR NEW SYSTEM, MAKING CONVERSION OF P II TO PIB ONLY OPTION, WHICH RESTRICTED

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PAGE FIVE YBGR8745 SECRET

TOTAL NUMBER OF WARHEADS/

(C) COUNTERPROPOSAL, IE EQUAL GLOBAL CEILING AT LEVEL DETERMINED BY WHAT COULD BE REALISTICALLY SET ACCORDING TO POLITICAL AND MILITARY CRITERIA. CEILING AT SOV EVENTUAL LEVEL (CURRENT LEVEN MINUS THOSE DEPLOYED IN GDR AND CSSR) WITH RIGHT TO MATCH WAS ONE OPTION - 80 LAUNCHERS WITH PROBABLY 500 WARHEADS. HOWEVER WE MUST BE FULLY PREPARED TO DEPLOY TO LEVEL WE SET AND PROCEED WITH CONVERSION. THIRD OPTION WOULD AVOID PROBLEMS INHERENT IN ACCEPTANCE OPTION AND WOULD MAINTAIN NUCLEAR DETERRENCE. THIS WAS CURRENT ALLIANCE POSITION. AS WELL, BY SELECTING THIS OPTION, WE WOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH MRS THATCHER, SAYING THAT EUROPEAN SECURITY DEPENDS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. 6. FROM USA POINT OF VIEW, AS LONG AS CONVENTIONAL AND CW IMBALANCES EXIST AND UNTIL WEST COMES UP WITH BETTER STRATEGY THAN FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. ALLIANCE MUST STICK TO ITS STRATEGY. IN CIRCUMSTANCES, USA WOULD DEPLOY SYSTEMS WHICH ALLIANCE REQUIRED. SLBMS COMMITTED TO SACEUR AND F-111S REMAIN IN INVENTORY AND CAN HOLD SOV TARGETS AT RISK. SNF WAS STILL AVAILABLE BUT WE NEEDED TO PAY ATTENTION TO NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION CALLED FOR IN MONTEBELLO DECISION. STUDY OF WHOLE ISSUE SHOULD BEGIN AT HLG MTG WEEK AND CONTINUE AT SCG MTG 28 APR. BOTH WOULD REPORT TO COUNCIL IMMEDIATELY WHICH WOULD THEN TAKE DECISION. SPEAKING PERSONALLY, SHULTZ BELIEVED THAT LINE SHOULD BE DRAWN SOMEWHERE ABOVE ZERO SRINF, BUT WHEREVER WE DREW LINE, WE WOULD HAVE TO LIVE WITH CONSEQUENCES.

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PAGE SIX YBGR8745 SECRET

7. UNPREPARED YET TO DISCUSS CONCLUSIVELY CHOICES, MOST FMS/PERMREPS WHO SPOKE, WITH NOTABLE EXCEPTIONS OF GENSCHER AND TO LESSER EXTENT HOWE, NIBBLED AT EDGES OF ISSUE. NUMBER, BUT NOT/NOT ALL, IMPLIED MORE COMFORT WITH THIRD OPTION, IE ACHIEVING LOWER LEVELS BUT ONES WHICH WOULD STILL PERMIT FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. SOME SEEMED MORE TEMPTED BY 0-0 SRINF. IN LONG IMPROMPTU STATEMENT, GENSCHER RECALLED THAT COHESION HAD CARRIED ALLIANCE THIS FAR BUT MAJOR TEST WAS IN OFFING. HE AGREED WITH SHULTZ THAT WE HAD TO ASCERTAIN LEVEL BASED ON MAINTAINING OUR SECURITY NEEDS AND THEN STICK TO IT. WHATEVER CHOICE, AND EACH REQUIRED CAREFUL INVESTIGATION, IT HAD TO ENHANCE NOT/NOT DIMINISH SECURITY. HE RECALLED EARLIER GERMAN RESERVATIONS ABOUT P II CONVERSION BUT THEN SUGGESTED TILT TOWARD THIRD OPTION BY STRESSING THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF CHOICE WILL REQUIRE RESOLVE - QUOTE WE ALL KNOW WHAT THAT MEANS UNQUOTE. GENSCHER ALSO STRESSED THAT STUDY OF OPTIONS HAD TO INCLUDE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF ACD ISSUES INCLUDING CONVENTIONAL NEGS AND CW. WITE REGARD TO FORMER, ALLIANCE. HAD TO PUT ASIDE PROCEDURAL DISPUTES AND COME UP WITH SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS TO GET NEGS UNDERWAY. WE ALSO HAD TO REMIND PUBLID THAT WESTS POLICIES ON NUCLEAR DETERRENCE HAD ITS ORIGINS IN EASTS CONVENTIONAL SUPERIORITY.

8. HOWE COVERED SOME GROUND AND MADE PITCH FOR NUANCED PUBLIC HANDLING OF TERMS QUOTE DRAWING LINE UNQUOTE AND QUOTE DENUCLEARIZATION OF EUROPE UNQUOTE. FORMER IMPLIED DEBATE WAS ONLY ABOUT MISSILES AND

...?

PAGE SEVEN YBGR8745 SECRET

OVERLOOKED NONSTRATEGIC AND ON-NUCLEAR RESPONSE. TERM TO BE USED SHOULD INCLUDE QUOTE WHERE TO STRIKE BALANCE UNQUOTE. DENUCLEARIZATION SUGGESTED FALLACY THAT ONLY NATO STOOD BETWEEN NO/NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUR. IT ALSO ACCEPTED LEGITIMACY OF ONLY SOVS HAVING RIGHT TO DEPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUR. HOWE CONCLUDED BY CAUTIONING THAT WEST SHOULD NOT/NOT ALLOW ITSELF TO BE QUOTE HUSTLED UNQUOTE INTO ACCEPTING SOV PROPOSALS WHICH WERE ATTRACTIVE ON SURFACE BUT HAD SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR WEST'S SECURITY. AS RESULT OF TIME LIMITATION IMPOSED BY SHULTZ EARLY DEPARTURE SSEA CONFINED COMMENTS TO URGING COLLEAGUES TO SET EARLY DEADLINE AND CLEAR PROCEDURES FOR DECISION-MAKING PROCESS.

9. NET RESULT OF SHULTZ BRIEFING IS THAT USA HAS TO MIX METAPHOR, PUT HOT POTATO SQUARELY IN EUROPEAN COURT AND IS FORCING THEM TO TAKE DECISION ON ISSUE WHICH DIRECTLY AFFECTS THEM. COMING ON HEELS OF SEN NUNNS SUGGESTION EARLIER IN WEEK OF FIFTY PERCENT USA/USSR TROOP WITHDRAWALS, SHULTZ'S CHOICES WILL GIVE EUR ALLIES PLENTY TO CHEW ON (FRG COLLEAGUE TOLD US THAT AUSWIRTEGES AMT WILL BE WORKING ALL WEEKEND). AT THIS POINT ALLIES APPEAR DIVIDED ON OPTIONS - SP, GR, DEN AND NOR WILL NOTED ATTRACTION OF ACCEPTANCE OF SOV OFFER; NETH FM WAS AMBIVALENT, GENSCHER LEANED TOWARDS OPTION THREE WHICH BELG, ITAL AND LUX APPEARED TO FAVOUR. UK AND FR POSITIONS ARE WELL KNOWN. IN END, IT MAY BE THAT ALLIES WILL OPT FOR APPROACH SIMILAR TO NITZES QUOTE IDEA UNQUOTE (REFTEL) WHICH LINKS SRINF TO LEVEL TO ...8

PAGE EIGHT YBGR8745 SECRET

ELIMINATION OF CONVENTIONAL DISPARITIES. WHATEVER OUTCOME OF HLG AND  
SCG REPORTS TO COUNCIL WE WOULD NOT/NOT RULE OUT PROSPECT OF FURTHER  
COUNCIL MTG AT FM LEVEL SOMETIME IN EARLY MAY. IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER,  
COUNCIL IN PERM SESSION HAS BEEN CHARGED WITH TRYING TO COME UP WITH  
A CONSENSUS.

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PRESS RELEASE (87)17

16 April 1987

MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

The Secretary General commented as follows at the end of today's meeting at which Secretary Shultz briefed the North Atlantic Council on his visit to Moscow:

We are grateful to Secretary Shultz for his detailed report on his talks in Moscow. His briefing followed Ambassador Nitze's consultations with the Council last week enroute to Moscow. The Secretary's visit to the Soviet Union was thus firmly embedded in an Alliance context.

We stressed the importance of the Soviet-American talks, and in particular welcomed the fact that the Secretary's visit has demonstrated further movement in vital areas of arms control and that it has enhanced the prospects for reaching an INF agreement.

We took careful note of the Secretary's report on a new Soviet offer for a phased elimination of shorter range INF missiles. We affirmed our intention to work together on these issues, mindful of the overall European security context. Ministers and Permanent Representatives agreed that the Council in permanent session and its appropriate subsidiary expert bodies should begin immediately to consider the implications to allied security of the proposals under negotiation. This work will take into account the complex interrelationship between Alliance and Warsaw Pact conventional and nuclear weapons as well as Soviet superiority in chemical forces.

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COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE (87)17

16 avril 1987

REUNION DU CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

Le Secrétaire général a fait les commentaires ci-après à l'issue de la réunion que le Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord a tenue aujourd'hui pour entendre un exposé de M. Shultz, secrétaire d'Etat américain, sur sa visite à Moscou :

Nous savons gré à M. Shultz de nous -avoir rendu compte en détail des entretiens qu'il a eus à Moscou. Son exposé faisait suite aux consultations qui se sont déroulées la semaine dernière entre les membres du Conseil et M. Nitze, avant le départ de celui-ci pour la capitale soviétique. La visite de M. Shultz s'est donc inscrite indiscutablement dans le contexte de l'Alliance.

Nous avons souligné l'importance des pourparlers soviéto-américains et, en particulier, nous avons noté avec satisfaction que cette visite a montré qu'un nouveau pas avait été franchi dans des secteurs essentiels de la maîtrise des armements et qu'elle avait amélioré les perspectives d'un accord sur les FNL.

Nous avons pris note avec grande attention de l'exposé fait par M. Shultz sur une nouvelle offre soviétique visant l'élimination progressive des missiles des FNI à courte portée. Nous avons affirmé notre intention de travailler ensemble sur ces questions, en ayant à l'esprit le contexte global de la sécurité européenne. Les ministres et les représentants permanents sont convenus que le Conseil en session permanente, et les organismes spécialisés qui en dépendent, devraient commencer immédiatement à étudier les incidences pour la sécurité alliée des propositions en négociation. Cette étude devra tenir compte de la corrélation complexe qui existe entre les arsenaux classiques et nucléaires de l'Alliance et du Pacte de Varsovie, ainsi que de la supériorité de l'URSS dans le domaine des armes chimiques.

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WALL STREET JOURNAL - April 16, 1987

## Hard-Liner's Influence Gains in Kremlin

By MARK D'ANASTASIO

Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

MOSCOW—A Soviet propagandist who spent several months studying in New York City and who views the U.S. as an implacable enemy is emerging as Mikhail Gorbachev's leading strategist.

Alexander Yakovlev, a 63-year-old former ambassador to Canada, has already achieved paramount influence over the thinking of the Soviet leader. He is widely credited with inspiring Mr. Gorbachev's policy of glasnost, or openness, and his approach to revitalizing the Soviet economy.



Alexander Yakovlev

Little is known about the precise history of the two men's relationship. They are believed to have known each other for more than a decade and are said to have been favorites of the late Mikhail Suslov, former czar of Soviet communist ideology. But Soviet watchers say there is no doubt about the influence of Mr. Yakovlev on Mr. Gorbachev and, thus, on Soviet policy. Diplomats in Moscow refer to them as "soul mates" and one calls Mr. Yakovlev "the brains behind Gorbachev."

As a result, Western diplomats are focusing on the balding, portly Mr. Yakovlev with sudden intensity and are scrutinizing his writings with new urgency. Some believe Mr. Gorbachev is trying to maneuver his protege into the No. 2 spot now held by Egor Ligachev, a conservative, go-slow type.

A close look at Mr. Yakovlev reveals a man born of peasant parents who is a first-generation member of the intelligentsia. On the substantive side, what is most striking is the pervasiveness of anti-Americanism in his thinking about East-West relations. An exchange student at Columbia University in New York in 1959, he routinely flails at the U.S. in his writings. He has described America as a land of "deep amorality built on a convulsive worship of success." And he has denounced "its messianic idea of ownership of the world that is characteristic of the American social fabric."

Mr. Yakovlev's views on the U.S. come across as more hard-line than those of other Soviet experts on America, such as Georgi Arbatov, director of the U.S.A. and Canada Institute, and Anatoly Dobrynin, the party secretary for foreign affairs who served as Moscow's ambassador to Washington for more than two decades. While the latter two men consider Ronald Reagan's presidency less conducive to improved relations than that of his predecessors, Mr. Yakovlev argues that all U.S. presidents, as heads of America's "ruling circles," are inherently equal threats to world peace.

### Sudden Departure

In the introduction to his 1985 book "On the Edge of the Abyss: From Truman to Reagan," he writes that all eight U.S. chief executives in the post-World War II years have used the same methods "to sow fear of an outside danger, instill chauvinism, justify the growth of militarism and aggression, brainwash the people so they won't think about whatever the ruling forces feel is undesirable, and generate prewar hysteria."

Comments one Western diplomat, "The thing you have to understand about Yakovlev is that this guy, who in many ways is

Gorbachev's intellectual mentor, has the profoundest misgivings about everything American."

His misgivings spring from a deeply held Marxism and have by all accounts permeated the thinking of Mr. Gorbachev, who makes frequent references to the so-called ruling military-industrial circles that he believes dictate American policy.

The same distrust of America may have contributed to Mr. Yakovlev's fall from power in the early 1970s when the late Leonid Brezhnev was pursuing detente with the U.S. At that time, Mr. Yakovlev, who held a key Kremlin post—that of acting propaganda chief—was suddenly exiled to relative obscurity in Ottawa, where he languished for a decade. Then in 1983, when Mr. Gorbachev visited Canada as party secretary in charge of agriculture, the two men met again.

Three months later, Mr. Yakovlev, who holds a doctorate in historical sciences and is a member of the economics department of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, was invited to take up the post of director of the prestigious Moscow Institute for World Economics and International Relations. That appointment by the late Yuri Andropov attracted attention in the West. The interest intensified when Mr. Yakovlev accompanied Mr. Gorbachev on a trip to London in December 1984.

Within a few months, Mr. Gorbachev won the Kremlin's top job. Mr. Yakovlev rode his friend's coattails back into the party's inner sanctum. He was named a full member of the Central Committee, to which all the nation's highest officials belong, and made chief of its propaganda department. Last year he won a spot on the 12-member Secretariat and in addition to his propaganda duties, took charge of culture as well. This gives him ultimate control over Soviet newspapers and television, literature, theater and education.

### Liberal Borrowings

The extent of his influence became apparent one month after Mr. Gorbachev took power. At the April 1985 party plenum, the new leader spelled out his course for economic and social renewal, stunning the world with his call for a "deep transformation" in the way Russia is run.

What struck some Western analysts was that his plan, obviously long in the making, read like a survey of Mr. Yakovlev's own scholarly and journalistic writings. "When Gorbachev wasn't paraphrasing Yakovlev, he was quoting him directly," says Rodolfo Brancoli, an author and former Moscow bureau chief for the Italian daily La Repubblica.

One Western analyst with detailed knowledge of Mr. Yakovlev's publications and speeches says Mr. Gorbachev's designs for the Soviet Union today remain "pure Yakovlev."

The strategy is aimed at spurring economic growth and thereby giving the Soviets the means by which to close their industrial and technological gap with the West. Mr. Yakovlev believes any foreign assistance should come primarily from Western Europe and Japan.

This would require a shift in foreign policy emphasis away from the U.S., which is deemed an unreliable economic partner, and an aggressive public-relations cam-

paign to improve the country's badly tarnished image abroad.

This past January, Mr. Yakovlev was elevated to non-voting, or candidate, membership in the Politburo. Western experts say he's virtually assured of getting a voting seat at the next Central Committee plenum, possibly this summer.

The final act in his rivalry with Mr. Ligachev could then be played out in the Secretariat. Those practiced in the art of reading the tea leaves of Kremlin politics predict he'll win responsibility for party ideology, traditionally the domain of the Soviet Union's second-most powerful apparatchik. It's a portfolio currently held by Mr. Ligachev.

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R. E. Stansfield  
Defence Relations Division  
995-9296

SECRET

April 15, 1987

Memorandum for:  
The Secretary of State for External Affairs

cc: Minister for International Trade  
cc: Minister for External Relations

SUBJECT: Briefing by USA Secretary of State Shultz  
to the North Atlantic Council, Brussels,  
April 16, 1987

... You will find attached a comprehensive scenario  
brief on issues likely to be addressed by Secretary of State  
Shultz on April 16 in Brussels, along with suggested points  
you may wish to register during the meeting.



Alan Sullivan,  
Assistant Deputy Minister,  
Political and International  
Security Affairs.



J. H. Taylor

15 APR 87 15 36

SECRET (with attachments)

Secretary of State Shultz NAC Briefing  
April 16, 1987

Scenario Notes

General

- The Shultz visit to Moscow has taken place amidst a gradual yet marked improvement in USA/USSR relations. Despite considerable domestic controversy in the USA over the Moscow embassy spy scandal, the American Administration has made a conscious effort to separate this issue from the broader Soviet-American agenda. This is confirmed by the nature and tenor of President Reagan's letter to the Prime Minister of April 11 (attached), in which the former outlined his perception of current relations between the superpowers and commented favourably on recent progress in the relationship.
- Part of this apparent progress has been the desire of the USA Administration to reassert once again its authority in the foreign policy field after months of malaise brought on by the Irangate scandal. The President is actively seeking a foreign policy success not only to divert public attention from the recent controversy, but also to cap the final two years of his presidency. A major arms control accord appears to be his primary goal in this regard.
- Secretary Shultz must also recapture for the USA the role of major Western interlocuter with the USSR, following the highly successful visit to the Soviet Union by Prime Minister Thatcher in March. During her visit, Mrs. Thatcher maintained a high profile on East-West and arms control issues, undoubtedly with an eye to influencing pre-election audiences in the UK. The USSR effectively stage-managed its own role in acting as gracious host throughout, wooing Mrs. Thatcher and not missing the opportunity to tweak USA sensitivities at the same time.
- While arms control has received by far the greatest amount of public attention in connection with the Shultz visit, there have been more subtle yet equally significant

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- 2 -

SECRET

developments in other areas which undoubtedly influenced Mr. Shultz's decision to go to Moscow. The Soviets, for their part, appear keen to move Soviet-American relations forward, as their courteous and business-like reception of Mr. Shultz would seem to have indicated.

- Divisions within the Administration on the nature of the USA's relationship with the USSR continue, however, to be an open wound. The meeting to hammer out the USA arms control positions prior to Secretary Shultz's departure for Moscow is reported to have been the most bitter and angry of the current Administration. The resulting hardening of USA policy constitutes a tough response to Gorbachov's public diplomacy. It is significant to note that the Department of Defense (DOD) insisted that Mr. Shultz's instructions be enshrined as a National Security Decision Directive, effectively denying him any flexibility in his discussions in Moscow. This is a most unusual development.

- There is little argument now within the Administration about the benefits of negotiating firmly. The debate now is about how far the Soviets can be pushed. The debate is dividing along the usual lines, with State Department arguing that if an agreement is to be achieved then flexibility is now required, the USA having achieved its goals with its toughness. DOD is arguing, predictably, that the USA should continue to hang tough.

- DOD has also continued to argue that the broad interpretation of the ABM Treaty is needed. It appeared earlier that the case drawn up by Judge Sofaer had been shot full of holes by Senator Nunn. We are told too that the record of the current negotiations (those begun in March 1985) up to the time of the reinterpretation in November 1985 is even more damning as it makes clear that the "States practice" argument goes directly against the Sofaer interpretation. Nevertheless, DOD persists in its view. The SDIO report on the tests which would require a broad interpretation is due at the end of April and could precipitate another public debate. In addition, we have been told that Mr. Shultz's public statements that a deployment decision will not be taken for 1-2 years are being down-played at the official level (NSC-Carlucci) as representing only "George's thinking". A guide to the ABM Treaty debate is attached.

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- 3 -

SECRET

- A new element that has arisen which complicates the debate is that the Joint Chiefs of Staff after years of sitting back and letting the civilians fight it out have now entered the fray. In part this was the result of the offer to eliminate ballistic missiles. However their concerns are broader and include marked uneasiness with the goal of 50 percent reductions, unhappiness with the short reduction period, and particular concern on SRINF. We understand that the Joint Chiefs would strenuously oppose a zero-zero SRINF proposal. The verification issue has not yet been resolved with the Joint Chiefs either. Because the Joint Chiefs have up to now not been tainted as one of the participants in the debate and are not seen as anti-arms control, their views will have considerable impact.

- In addition, General Rogers, who is annoyed at being "fired" as SACEUR, is making known his opposition to a zero-zero INF agreement to anyone who will listen. He, too, will have considerable impact in the USA debate.

- In his letter to the Prime Minister, President Reagan noted progress in all four areas that he has designated as important to the future of USA/USSR relations. He indicated that the two nations have begun a new cycle in discussions on regional issues. New contacts have been made in the bilateral field, particularly in the commercial sphere. Positive Soviet steps in the areas of human rights also received special attention by the President. Once again, while the embassy spy scandal is mentioned, the President's words are measured and non-polemical. Nevertheless, the field of arms control remains by far the most important item in the portfolio.

# 1. Arms Control and Disarmament

## The Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks

- The current Geneva arms negotiations began in March, 1985. The agreed objectives of the negotiations are:

a) prevention of an arms race in space and its termination on earth;

b) limitation and reduction of nuclear arms; and

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- 4 -

SECRET

c) strengthening of strategic stability.

- The negotiations cover three categories of weapons: strategic nuclear or START (systems with a range of 5000+ kilometers), intermediate-range nuclear or INF (500-5000 kilometers), and space/defence arms. They are conducted in three sub-groups and are to be considered "in their inter-relationship".

Canadian Position: Canada has throughout the negotiations supported the USA's goals of seeking radical reductions in strategic offensive arms, the elimination of intermediate-range forces, and a discussion with the USSR on the possibility of moving away from deterrence based on mutual assured destruction to a greater dependence on defences against ballistic missiles.

- Arms control discussions entered a period of retrenchment after the Reykjavik Summit as both sides jockeyed for position in Geneva in attempting to promote their individual assessments and interpretations of what was discussed there. While the Summit may have proven to be a watershed in the superpower relationship in the area of nuclear arms control, it also raised many more questions than it answered. The sweeping nature of the proposals discussed in Reykjavik also focussed attention for the first time on the inter-relationship between the nuclear and conventional spheres, and the interdependence among the various sub-aspects in each. The importance of negotiating arms control agreements dealing with one or more of these sub-aspects, while analyzing their effect on the other areas of the nuclear-conventional balance, has been re-emphasized. The denuclearization of Europe, for example, has serious implications for the conventional imbalance favouring the East. Likewise, significant reductions in strategic forces have similar implications for other areas. This demands a coherent approach to arms control, one which does not lose sight of the reality that the West must have a nuclear capability to ensure its security.

Canadian Position: We welcomed the Reykjavik Summit as an important watershed in USA/USSR and East/West relations. Far from being a failure, the meeting was historic in that both superpowers seemed prepared for the first time to consider the possibility of a less nuclear world.

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- 5 -

SECRET

- The USA, which throughout the Geneva talks has sought significant reductions in the Soviet heavy ICBM force through sub-limits on delivery vehicles, warheads, and throwweights, indicated in Reykjavik that it was prepared to commit itself to the virtual elimination of all ballistic missiles over a ten-year period. At the same time, in an effort to engage the USSR in a discussion of the possibility of mutually moving away from the concept of mutual assured destruction to a greater dependence on defence in the strategic equation, the USA agreed to a ten-year non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. On INF, the USA sought to sever the linkage re-established by the USSR at Reykjavik, which predicated INF reductions upon agreement on START and space/defence issues.

- While the USSR positions on START and INF appeared to be superficially close to the USA position, Mr. Gorbachov at the Summit linked agreement in these two areas to a resolution of the current impasse on strategic defence and progress on the issue of nuclear testing. The USSR sought to limit all SDI research to the laboratory. In addition the second phase of the Soviet strategic arms proposal envisioned the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a ten-year period, which the Soviets insist President Reagan agreed to at Reykjavik.

#### INF

- Despite these differences, USA steadfastness at the negotiating table was rewarded on February 28 by the Soviet return to its pre-Reykjavik position in accepting that it would be possible to negotiate a separate INF agreement. The USA subsequently tabled a draft INF treaty during the last round in Geneva. The two sides are agreed that longer-range (LRINF) missiles should be eliminated from Europe with a remaining global ceiling of 100 warheads each. In addition, it is agreed that constraints on shorter-range INF (SRINF - 500-1000 kms) missiles are necessary. The USA has emphasized five criteria in dealing with SRINF systems including:

- a) provision for USA/USSR equality;
- b) global application;
- c) inclusion in an INF Treaty;
- d) exclusivity to USA and Soviet systems only;
- e) effective verification.

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- 6 -

SECRET

- The Soviet Union enjoys an 8-1 superiority in SRINF missiles (table attached). Mr. Gorbachov has now been reported, however, to have offered during the Shultz visit to include a commitment to eliminate SRINF in any INF agreement. While this would be a welcome development, it is not clear if the initiative meets the remaining USA SRINF criteria. Further, Gorbachov's offer to also eliminate all remaining short-range and tactical weapons is likely to increase Western European fears about the denuclearization of Europe, and transatlantic decoupling.

- Mr. Shultz was authorized to discuss the complete elimination of LRINF systems globally, which is an ultimate aim of the INF negotiations, but there does not appear to have been Soviet movement in this area. He is not likely to have responded to Gorbachov's SRINF offer as the Administration is committed to Alliance consultations beforehand. A zero/zero SRINF or even zero/zero nuclear scenario in Europe would have serious implications for Alliance security.

Canadian Position: We publicly welcomed the Soviet decision to delink the INF and strategic agreements, thus returning to their position of over a year ago. We have agreed with our NATO allies that the issues of SRINF and verification must be satisfactorily addressed in any agreement, and we have supported the five USA SRINF criteria. The zero/zero SRINF option proposed by the Soviets will require careful study within the Alliance, particularly in view of its public relations appeal.

#### START

- Mr. Shultz has also carried to Moscow a new strategic arms proposal which appears to be a further step back from Reykjavik. A number of other options which offered concessions to the USSR were reportedly rejected by the President. In it, the USA proposes 50% reductions in strategic nuclear forces over a seven-year period instead of five years. The second phase proposal discussed at Reykjavik of the complete elimination of ballistic missiles over ten years is absent. This new proposal reflects the concern of strategic planners and the military in the USA and the Alliance about the ramifications of a world without ballistic missiles. There has been no indication of a Soviet response.

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- 7 -

SECRET

Canadian Position: We have supported the USA first-phase approach of 50% reductions, while expressing reservations about the concept of eliminating ballistic missiles entirely, as this would have significant implications for North American air defence. Thus the absence of a reference to the elimination of BMs in the new USA proposal is welcome. While on the surface the decision to extend 50% reductions over a longer seven-year period is not a positive development, this idea may indeed be welcomed by the Soviets. We are nevertheless concerned by the continuing lack of flexibility in seeking to resolve outstanding issues and believe it could be useful to indicate our interest in negotiating reductions beyond 50%.

#### Space/Defence

A further hardening in the USA position on space/defence issues is also evident. President Reagan has proposed a commitment to the ABM Treaty until 1994 with both sides free to deploy anti-ballistic missile defences after that date. In Reykjavik, both sides had agreed to a ten-year commitment. It is not clear either what the USA means by a "commitment" to the ABM Treaty, given the current controversy over the broad versus the narrow interpretation, but clearly the new proposal is consistent with the Administration's desire to proceed apace with the SDI program. Further, Mr. Shultz has been instructed not to discuss clarifications or clearer definitions of the Treaty while in Moscow. This is precisely, however, what Mr. Gorbachov has proposed. He has hinted at some flexibility in the Soviet position on research and testing, without offering specific details.

Canadian Position: We have supported the USA's efforts to engage the USSR in a discussion about the possibility of a mutual transition to a greater dependence on defence in the strategic equation. At the same time, in the absence of any agreement in Geneva to this end, we continue to support the narrow or restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty for strategic and political, rather than legal, reasons. The new USA proposal for a commitment to the ABM Treaty only until 1994 is disconcerting, as is the Administration's continuing interest in pursuing the broad interpretation.

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- 8 -

SECRET

### Conventional Arms Control

- The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks (MBFR) have been proceeding in Vienna since 1973 without much success; though they have registered some progress they have produced no agreement. The talks have been concerned with central Europe and have involved only members of NATO (minus France) and the Warsaw Pact.

- At the Halifax NAC last May, Ministers agreed to call for new talks between the two alliances on conventional arms control in Europe "from the Atlantic to the Urals". They established a High Level Task Force to work out Alliance positions and arrange for the new negotiations. Its work led to Ministers' "Brussels Declaration" at the last NAC which called for distinct negotiations (a) between the countries of the alliances on conventional stability at lower levels, and (b) among the 35 countries of the CSCE process on further confidence- and security-building measures, i.e., a continuation of the Stockholm process. Informal talks among the 23 member states of the two alliances have been taking place in Vienna to work out a mandate for new negotiations. Preliminary exchanges have been useful and it is evident the East is prepared to enter into new negotiations while burying the MBFR talks, where its position has become untenable.

- Major differences in approach to the new talks in Vienna have been apparent, however, not only between East and West, but within the Alliance itself. Feuding between the USA and France over the relationship of the Group 23 talks and the CSCE process remains unresolved in the HLTF, with the former calling for negotiations outside of the CSCE and the latter insisting on linkage. This dispute has also had a direct bearing on the poor Western performance thus far in the security basket of the CSCE FUM. The East has been quick to exploit Western disarray in publicly calling for new negotiations among the 35.

- The East has also suggested that it favours the inclusion of tactical nuclear and chemical weapons in any new conventional negotiations. This is not acceptable to the West as these issues are more relevant to other negotiating forums. The East has also been vague about verification, an aspect that will be vitally important in any conventional reductions agreement.

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- 9 -

SECRET

- The main goal of the West will be to redress existing imbalances, preferably, but not necessarily, through reductions. Mr. Gorbachov in his statement of April 10 acknowledged, the existence of "certain asymmetries" in the balance of forces and this could be a welcome development.

Canadian Position: We have actively encouraged the other members of the Alliance not to allow short-term procedural differences to overshadow the more important longer-term substantive issues which remain to be agreed upon in the Group 23 mandate talks. Canada could support some kind of formal linkage between the 23 and the 35 which did not compromise Canadian interests in any new conventional stability negotiations, i.e. negotiations must be restricted to the nations of the two alliances.

CTB

- At the Reykjavik Summit, the USA and USSR agreed to resume talks on nuclear testing in Geneva. Although a number of subsequent meetings have taken place, the sides have differed on how to characterize the goal of the talks. The USSR wished to resume negotiations only if it was explicitly clear that the ultimate goal was the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban agreement. The USA insisted on an incremental approach, beginning with the discussion of strengthened verification provisions for the Threshold Test Ban and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties.

- Since the end of the Soviet testing moratorium in February, there have been some tentative indications of a more forthcoming Soviet position on how to characterize the negotiations. The Soviets appear to be offering a formula in which the ultimate goal of a test ban is left unstated. Instead, negotiations would begin on both verification of the TTBT and PNET and on further limitations on testing. Secretary Shultz went on to Moscow with instructions to reject this proposal. The USA continues to insist that the first stage of a negotiation discuss only improved verification of the TTBT and PNET.

Canadian Position: We agree that there should be no rigid link between discussions on improved verification for the TTBT and PNET and further limitations. While we would agree that the talks could proceed in parallel if no such rigid link is made, we can understand USA concern that the Soviets would make such a link at a further stage in the talks.

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- 10 -

SECRET

### Chemical Weapons

- After a two-year period of stonewalling, the USSR in the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament became notably more forthcoming on several aspects of verification of a CW ban. This process has continued during the 1987 CD session.

- During the 1987 session, the Soviet Delegation made the first ever public official acknowledgement that the USSR possesses CW stocks. (The USA in 1986 actually tabled at the CD comprehensive information about the location, composition and quantities of CW stocks in the USA.)

- The major outstanding issue of difficulty concerns challenge inspections. The USA remains adamant that short-notice on-site inspection following a challenge must be mandatory in all circumstances whereas the USSR insists on retaining a qualified right of refusal. The USSR has accepted as a basis for possible compromise a British proposal made last year whereby challenge inspections would be mandatory in almost all circumstances, with the challenged state being in all cases obligated to demonstrate compliance. The USA has not commented on the UK proposal, and is reported to be displeased with it.

- Most of the 'new' Soviet proposals in substance amount to little more than their catching up with the positions of most non-WPO participants in the CD. Nevertheless, the Soviets and their allies have now clearly gone over to the offensive in attempting to cast the West in the role of posing obstacles to the early conclusion of a CW treaty.

- Although major negotiating progress has been made since early 1986, there are some grounds for uncertainty, whether either the USA or the USSR in reality desires the early conclusion of a CW treaty (USA production of binary CW is scheduled to begin late this year).

Canadian Position: Many difficult details remain to be worked out in the CW negotiations and Canada doubts that a CW ban can be concluded this year. We should not accept any artificial deadlines.

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- 11 -

SECRET

We should press the USSR to continue the more forthcoming attitude to verification which it has shown over the past year. Canada also hopes the USA will take an active, positive role in current attempts to overcome differences on the critically important issue of challenge inspections'.

## 2. Regional Issues

- This issue continues to be dominated by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and Middle Eastern questions. President Reagan specifically raised the issue of Afghanistan in his April 11 letter to the Prime Minister. He was critical of the lengthy withdrawal timetable proposed by the USSR and the possibility of a pro-Soviet regime afterward. Secretary Shultz has pressed the USSR during his visit to move forward on this issue, indicating the USA's readiness to endorse a withdrawal agreement consistent with UN resolutions. In the Middle East, the USA has perceived an erosion of Soviet standing in the area. The USA expects no agreements on regional issues but the recent series of regional experts meetings have been useful in sensitizing each to the other's strategic interests.

Canadian Position: We have continued to press the USSR to withdraw from Afghanistan, while also maintaining our support for Pakistan. We have recently made a demarche in Moscow to this effect, and have encouraged the USA to seek a role in the process.

## 3. Bilateral Issues:

- Setting aside the continuing ill-will surrounding the Moscow embassy spy scandal, there alternatively appears to have been significant progress in this particular aspect of superpower relations in past months. Recent experts-level meetings on a number of issues have been marked by hard work and good atmospherics on both sides. A new exchanges agreement was recently implemented, and there have also been discussions on consular and administrative issues. Commercial contacts are generally on the increase. Mr. Shultz has signed a civilian space cooperation agreement, while in Moscow.

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Points to Register with Mr. Shultz

1. We are encouraged that despite recent events involving the USA Embassy in Moscow, the Administration has not allowed this irritant to overshadow the progress being made in other areas of the relationship.

2. The SRINF issue has been the major obstacle to an INF agreement. Does the latest Gorbachov offer satisfy all 5 USA criteria on SRINF? Do we really want 0/0 SRINF or even 0/0 nuclear weapons in Europe? It is imperative the Alliance study the implications of such a scenario on an urgent basis.

3. We support the USA goal of 50% reductions but wonder about the decision to structure these reductions over seven years. Why was this proposed as a concession to the USSR rather than something else, i.e. dropping the ban on mobile missiles?

4. We are uncomfortable with the 1994 deadline for an end to the ABM Treaty. Previously, the ten-year commitment to the Treaty was linked to the elimination of ballistic missiles.



- 2 -

SECRET

5. Will the USA not seek to explore the differences between the two sides on space/defence issues, including the ABM Treaty? The USSR now seems prepared to do so.

6. Human rights is also an area of particular concern to Canada. Is there a relationship between Gorbachov's new openness policy and increased emigration levels in recent months? How can we encourage further positive developments in this area?

7. Can Mr. Shultz comment on the nature of the civilian space agreement?

Points to Register with European Allies

1. Canada has supported the necessity for satisfactory SRINF constraints, while not losing sight of the opportunity to eliminate over 1000 Soviet long-range INF warheads currently targeted on Europe. It is not clear, however, that an eventual 0/0 SRINF proposal is in Allied interests. Would my European colleagues agree?

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SECRET

2. The vision of a less nuclear Europe also makes it even more important to effectively address the conventional imbalance in Europe. The West must move forward in the conventional mandate talks underway in Vienna and come to an early agreement amongst ourselves about what we wish to negotiate with the East.

SOVIET/WARSAW PACT - NATO FORCE COMPARISON

FACT SHEET for SSEA NAC Consultations, 16 April

GLOBAL THEATRE BALLISTIC MISSILES OF RANGES 5000 Km AND BELOW

	<u>SYSTEM</u>	<u>RANGE (Km)</u>	<u>LAUNCHERS</u>
<u>A. LRINF (RANGE BAND 1000-5000 Km)</u>			
(1) SOVIET/WP	SS-4	2,000	112
	SS-20	5,000	441 (3 x warheads)
		<u>Total</u>	553 (1435 warheads)
(2) NATO	P II	1,800	108
	GLCM	2,500	<u>208</u>
		<u>Total</u>	316
<u>B. SRINF (RANGE BAND 500-1000 Km)</u>			
(1) SOVIET/WP	SS-23	500	12
	SS-12/22 (Scaleboard)	900	<u>110</u>
		<u>Total</u>	122
(2) NATO	P I A	750	72
<u>C. SNF (RANGE BAND BELOW 500 Km)</u>			
(1) SOVIET/WP	SCUD B	300	634
	SS-21	100	124
	FROG	70	<u>672</u>
		<u>Total</u>	1,430
(2) NATO	LANCE	115	88 (12 more available in 30 days)

Brussels, April 16, 1987



Office of the  
Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

Cabinet du  
Secrétaire d'État  
aux Affaires extérieures

TO/À: IDR

Date April 30/87

FROM/DE: MINA


REFERENCE/RÉFÉRENCE:

Your memorandum IDR-1406 of April 15, 1987

SUBJECT/SUJET: Minister's decision/Décision du Ministre

Briefing by USA Secretary of State Shultz to the  
North Atlantic Council, Brussels, April 16/87

Seen by SSEA.





External Affairs / Affaires extérieures  
Canada / Canada

TRANSMITTAL SLIP - NOTE D'ENVOI

TO/À USS (through IFB and IDD) <sup>AND</sup>

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SUBJECT/SUJET Briefing by USA Secretary of  
State Shultz to the North  
Atlantic Council, Brussels.

ATTACHMENT / PIÈCE JOINTE Memorandum to the Secretary of State for  
External Affairs (IDR-1406)

Security / Sécurité	SECRET
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Date	April 15, 1987

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20-USA-1-3-USSR

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MESSAGE

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TO/À	TO MOSCO		
INFO	INFO BNATO WSHDC LDN		
DISTR	DISTR RBD ISS ESE IDA IDR INP URR		
REF			
SUBJ/SUJ	---SOVIET ELECTRONIC SPYING ALLEGATIONS:USE OF CDN-MADE EQUIPMENT		
MAKAROV, MINISTER-COUNSELLOR OF SOVIET EMBASSY, WAS CALLED IN MORNING OF APR14 TO BE GIVEN INFORMAL CDN RESPONSE TO ALLEGATIONS MADE BY SPOKESPERSON FOR SOVIET EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON TO THE EFFECT THAT SINCE COMPONENTS MARKED MADE IN CDA HAD BEEN FOUND AT SOVIET EMBASSY IN WSHDC, CDNS MAY HAVE COOPERATED WITH USA INTELLIGENCE IN BUGGING EMBASSY.			
2.MAKAROV WAS TOLD THAT A-WE WERE AMAZED THAT SOMEONE WOULD MAKE SUCH ALLEGATIONS BASED ON PURE SPECULATION B-WE WERE CONCERNED THIS KIND OF ALLEGATION WAS MADE IN THE CONTEXT OF A PRESS CONFERENCE AND HAD NOT BEEN BROUGHT TO OUR ATTENTION BY EITHER THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OR THE SOVIET EMBASSY C-WE WERE INCLINED TO TREAT THE ALLEGATIONS AS LACKING SERIOUSNESS, BEING SPURIOUS SPECULATION.FINALLY MAKAROV WAS ASKED WHAT CONCLUSIONS WE SHOULD DRAW FROM THIS ATTEMPT TO INVOLVE CDA IN THE CURRENT IMBROGLIO.			
3.MAKAROV DID NOT RESPOND DIRECTLY TO OUR COMMENTS. HE NOTED THAT <del>HE HAD TAKEN POSITION OF QUOTE NO-HO COMMENT UNQUOTE IN</del> RESPONSE TO MEDIA ENQUIRIES. HE ALSO			

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

G. BRETON  
SIG

DIVISION/DIRECTION

RBR

TELEPHONE

996-3606

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG D.R.T. FRASER

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PAGE TWO RBR0984 CONF

12

10

RECALLED THAT THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE SOVIET SPOKESPERSON  
IN WSHDC MENTIONED POSSIBILITY CDA MAY HAVE <sup>HAD</sup> NOTHING TO  
DO WITH SUPPLYING OF EQUIPMENT IN QUESTION. ON SITUATION  
AT USA EMB IN MOSCO, HE COMMENTED THAT USA HAD BROUGHT CURRENT  
ORDEAL UPON THEMSELVES. HE ALSO VOICED DOUBTS ABOUT LIKELIHOOD  
OF REACHING AND COMPROMISING COMCENTRE IN ANY EMBASSY.

*file*

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18



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of Canada

Gouvernement  
du Canada

**TRANSMITTAL NOTE AND RECEIPT**  
**NOTE D'ENVOI ET REÇU**

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TS - 690

TO — À

MOSCOW, WASHINGTON  
EXTOTT/RBR ←

by Ottawa: INP PSR GMR PNRE LCR

ORIGINATOR AND ADDRESS — INITIATEUR ET ADRESSE

CANADIAN DELEGATION TO NATO  
M. Grinius

Security Classification — Classification de sécurité

☒ NATO  
☒ Confidential  
Confidentiel ☐ Secret ☐ Top Secret  
Très Secret ☐

☒ With Enclosure(s)  
Avec annexe(s) ☐ Without Enclosure  
Sans annexe

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
DESCRIPTION

From the United States Mission

One letter by John S. Davision, Deputy Political Advisor

"Summary of discussions in Moscow, March 16 and 17, by Under-Secretary  
of State Michael Armacost"

Total: 5 pages



Originator's Signature — Signature de l'initiateur

Received By — Reçu par

Signature

14/4/87  
Date

Signature

Date



**Pages 138 to / à 142**  
**are withheld pursuant to sections**  
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**13(1)(a), 13(1)(b)**

**of the Access to Information Act**  
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MESSAGE

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SECURITY  
SÉCURITÉ

**S E C R E T**

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FM EXTOTT IDR1394 13APR87

TO WSHDC

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RBR URD URR INP CPD CPDA CPP

REF YOURTEL UNGR1617 10APR

---SHULTZ **V**ISIT:REAGAN LET TO PM

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF 11 APR LETTER FROM PRESIDENT TO PM.

CONCERNING AGENDA FOR SHULTZ VISIT TO MOSCOW.

2.(COMCENTRE PLEASE COPY ATTACHED 3 PAGES).

RETURN TO REVOYER AU	12 FOR FILING POUR - ETRE PORTE AU DOSSIER	10
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IDR

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SIG D. KARSGAARD

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ACTION

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BAG WSHDC LDN BONN PARIS DE OTT

DISTR IFB IDD IDX URR RBR IDA IDAO IDAN IDRL IDRA CPDA

REF OURTEL YBGR6325 10APR

---SHULTZ VISIT TO MOSCO:ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS-NITZE STATEMENT  
ATTACHED IS A COPY OF SPEAKING NOTES USED BY PAUL NITZE WHEN  
INFORMING COUNCIL OF APPROACH WHICH SEC STATE SHULTZ WOULD TAKE  
WHEN DICUSSING ACD ISSUES IN MOSCO.

2.THOMAS DID NOT/NOT SPEAK FROM A PREPARED TEXT.

3.QUOTE STATEMENT BY AMEASSADOR PAUL H NITZE AND DEPUTY ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY CHARLES THOMAS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL  
10APR87

MR CHAIRMAN:

ON THE EVE OF THE MOSCOW MEETINGS OF SECRETARY SHULTZ WITH THE  
SOVIET LEADERSHIP,THE SECRETARY ASKED US TO CONSULT WITH THE  
COUNCIL TODAY TO SHARE WITH YOU HIS THOUGHTS AND THOSE OF PRESIDENT  
REAGAN REGARDING THE POTENTIAL FOR THESE MEETINGS.SECRETARY SHULTZ  
WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS.THEY WILL BE MADE KNOWN TO SECRETARY  
SHULTZ BEFORE HE MEETS WITH SOVIET LEADERS EARLY NEXT WEEK.

SECRETARY SHULTZ INTENDS TO DEAL WITH THE FULL SPECTRUM OF ISSUES

...2

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PAGE TWO YBGR6329 SECRET

BETWEEN US; THAT IS, HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL PROBLEMS, BILATERAL ISSUES AND ARMS CONTROL. I WILL FIRST DEAL WITH NST ARMS CONTROL MATTERS AND THEN DEFER TO DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY THOMAS FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE REMAINDER OF THE SECRETARYS AGENDA FOR MOSCOW.

INF

GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEVS STATEMENT OF 28 FEB THAT A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE, WITHOUT ANY LINKAGE TO OTHER AREAS OF ARMS CONTROL, REMOVED A SIGNIFICANT OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS--AN OBSTACLE THAT THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES HAD EMPLACED. THE UNITED STATES AGREED TO EXTEND THE INF NEGOTIATING ROUND IN ORDER TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS THAT THIS DECISION MIGHT OFFER. WE ALSO TABLED A DRAFT TREATY INCLUDING THE PROVISIONS FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION OF AN INF AGREEMENT SO THAT THE NEGOTIATORS COULD BEGIN TO IMPLEMENT IN DETAIL SUCH PROGRESS AS WE HAD ALREADY MADE IN PRINCIPLE.

SINCE 1981, OUR POSITION, BASED ON EXTENSIVE ALLIED CONSULTATION, HAS BEEN AND REMAINS THAT THERE MUST BE CONSTRAINTS ON SHORTER-RANGE INF IN ANY INF AGREEMENT. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY MADE CLEAR THAT BY SRINF WE MEAN SYSTEMS WITH A RANGE GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO THAT OF THE SS-23, BUT LESS THAN THAT OF THE PERSHING II. SINCE NEITHER SIDE HAD SYSTEMS WITH RANGES BETWEEN THAT OF THE SCALEBOARD (APPROXIMATELY 900 KM) AND THE PERSHING II (1800 KM), WE WOULD BAN SYSTEMS IN THAT RANGE AS PART OF AN INF AGREEMENT. SYSTEMS OF SHORTER RANGE THAN THE

...3

PAGE THREE YBGR6329 SECRET

SS-23 ARE NOT/NOT AND HAVE NOT/NOT BEEN IN THE CATEGORY OF SYSTEMS WE SEEK TO CONSTRAIN IN AN INITIAL INF AGREEMENT. WE SHOULD, HOWEVER, INTENSIFY OUR EFFORTS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE TO DETERMINE HOW WE MAY WISH TO APPROACH POSSIBLE LIMITS ON SUCH STILL SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS IN ANY FUTURE TALKS.

THE SOVIET POSITION ON SRINF APPEARS TO BE IN FLUX. FOLLOWING GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEVS 28 FEB STATEMENT, THE SOVIETS INSISTED THAT AN INITIAL INF AGREEMENT NOT/NOT INCLUDE ANY BINDING CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF, BUT COULD BE THE SUBJECT OF SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. IT NOW APPEARS THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE DECIDED TO RETURN TO THEIR REYKJAVIK POSITION--NAMELY, THAT THERE BE SOME CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF IN AN INITIAL INF AGREEMENT, BUT THAT THESE CONSTRAINTS CONSIST OF FREEZING THE CURRENT US/SOVIET INEQUALITIES IN EUROPE.

WHEN THE SECRETARY IS IN MOSCOW, HE WILL REPEAT THAT CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF MUST MEET THE CRITERIA THAT WE HAVE WORKED OUT TOGETHER WITH OUR ALLIES:

- THEY MUST PROVIDE FOR US/SOVIET EQUALITY;
- THEY MUST APPLY GLOBALLY;
- THEY MUST BE PART OF AN INITIAL INF TREATY;
- THEY MUST DEAL WITH U.S. AND SOVIET SYSTEMS ONLY; AND
- THEY MUST BE EFFECTIVELY VERIFIABLE.

WE CANNOT ACCEPT A TREATY THAT WOULD PERMIT AN INCREASE IN SOVIET SRINF SYSTEMS. BUT THERE IS ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WE MUST CONSIDER. THE

...4

PAGE FOUR YBGR6329 SECRET

SOVIETS COULD OFFER CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF THAT MEET ALL THE ABOVE CRITERIA, BUT WHICH SET A CEILING SIGNIFICANTLY BELOW THEIR CURRENT SRINF LEVELS. (INDEED, SOME SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE HINTED THAT THEY ARE CONTEMPLATING OFFERING A QUOTE ZERO OUTCOME UNQUOTE IN SRINF.) WHILE SUCH AN OFFER WOULD REDUCE THE SRINF THREAT THE SOVIET UNION POSES, IT WOULD ALSO LIMIT OUR RIGHT TO DEPLOY SRINF SYSTEMS TO COUNTER THE SOVIET THREAT. IF THE SOVIETS WERE TO MAKE SUCH AN OFFER IN MOSCOW, THE SECRETARY INTENDS NEITHER TO ACCEPT IT OR REJECT IT, BUT TO ELICIT DETAILS AND THEN CONSULT WITH YOU AND OTHER ALLIES. HE TRUSTS HE WOULD HAVE YOUR SUPPORT IN THIS APPROACH.

IT IS IMPORTANT TO BEGIN THINKING NOW ABOUT THE FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN ASSESSING SUCH AN OFFER. OUR INF DETERRENT SYSTEMS SHOULD NOT/NOT NECESSARILY BE CONSIDERED AS ONE-FOR-ONE EQUIVALENTS TO SOVIET INF SYSTEMS. THEY SERVE A RANGE OF MILITARY ROLES WHICH CONTRIBUTE IN SPECIFIC WAYS TO DETERRENCE. (THIS APPLIES AS WELL TO SNF NUCLEAR SYSTEMS, THAT IS, THOSE WITH A RANGE LESS THAN THOSE OF SRINF. SNF SYSTEMS HAVE, OF COURSE, NOT/NOT BE INCLUDED IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.) THUS, WHILE THERE IS LITTLE QUESTION THAT AN LRINF ZERO OUTCOME IS A NET BENEFIT TO OUR COMMON SECURITY, WE SHOULD CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE EFFECT ON OUR INTERESTS OF ELIMINATING SRINF, OR OF ACCEPTING AN EQUAL SRINF LEVEL SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER THAN THE CURRENT SOVIET LEVEL.

ONE IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN CONSIDERING SUCH A DECISION IS THAT THE

...5

PAGE FIVE YBGR6329 SECRET

UNITED STATES HAS NO/NO SRINF SYSTEMS DEPLOYED. ANOTHER IS THAT THE ALLIANCE HAS MADE NO/NO RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF ANY SUCH SYSTEMS BY THE UNITED STATES. A THIRD IS THAT THE SOVIETS CURRENTLY DEPLOY 110 SS-12B SCALEBOARD LAUNCHERS (66 OF THESE ARE WEST OF THE URALS), AND 12 SS-23 LAUNCHERS (ALL OF THEM WEST OF THE URALS). YET ANOTHER IS THAT AN OFFER THAT WOULD IN EFFECT CONSTITUTE UNILATERAL SOVIET DISARMAMENT IN THIS CATEGORY OF WEAPONS COULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO WESTERN PUBLICS.

WE SHOULD NOT/NOT, HOWEVER, PLACE EXCESSIVE RESTRICTIONS ON OUR OWN NUCLEAR DEPLOYMENT OPTIONS WHILE CURENT CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCES REMAIN. WE SHOULD DETERMINE THE NEED AND THE AVAILABILITY OF REALISTIC OPTIONS TO MAINTAIN OUR SECURITY.

LET ME NOW TURN TO START.

STABILIZING AND VERIFIABLE REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES WOULD PROVIDE GREAT BENEFIT TO US ALL. WE HAVE BEEN NEGOTIATING ON THIS SUBJECT FOR SOME TIME AND SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS WAS MADE AT REYKJAVIK. WE HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS ON MANY OF THE FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS.

WE HOPE NOW TO NAIL DOWN THE REMAINING CENTRAL PROVISIONS OF AN AGREEMENT. IN THIS REGARD, WE HOPE THE NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA WILL SOON BEGIN DRAFTING A JOINT START TREATY TEXT.

WE AND THE SOVIETS ARE AGREED ON THE CONCEPT OF 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. WE ARE ALSO AGREED ON

...6



PAGE SIX YBGR6329 SECRET

CEILINGS OF 6000 WARHEADS AND 1600 MISSILES AND HEAVY BOMBERS; A HEAVY BOMBER COUNTING RULE HAS ALSO BEEN AGREED TO IMPLEMENT THESE REDUCTIONS. THIS AN EXCELLENT BEGINNING, AND BOTH SIDES HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS ACHIEVEMENT.

HAVING AGREED TO REDUCE TO 6000 WARHEADS, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD NOW CONCENTRATE ON ESTABLISHING SUBLIMITS ON PARTICULARLY DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS. BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS REPRESENT THE MAJORITY OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS ON BOTH SIDES AND THE PRIMARY THREAT TO STABILITY. TO REDUCE THEM IN A PREDICATABLE AND STABILIZING MANNER, WE SHOULD HAVE AN OVERALL SUBLIMIT ON BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS. WE SHOULD NOT/NOT ALLOW ALL 6000 WARHEADS TO BE ON BALLISTIC MISSILES.

ACCORDINGLY, WE PROPOSE A 4800 SUBCEILING. THIS IS APPROXIMATELY HALF THE CURRENT SOVIET NUMBER OF BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS, AND IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS. THE 4800 WOULD APPLY EQUALLY TO BOTH SIDES AND WOULD RESULT IN SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS BY BOTH SIDES.

IT IS ALSO CONSISTENT WITH A PROPOSAL MADE BY THE SOVIETS A FEW MONTHS AGO TO LIMIT BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS TO 80-85 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF WARHEADS. EIGHTY PERCENT OF 6000 WOULD BE 4800.

ICBM WARHEADS POSE A SPECIAL THREAT TO STABILITY. FOR THIS REASON, WE PROPOSE A SUBLIMIT OF 3300 ICBM WARHEADS. AGAIN, THIS LEVEL IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS.

THE SOVIETS ONCE PROPOSED TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF WARHEADS IN ANY

...7

PAGE SEVEN YBGR6329 SECRET

ONE COMPONENT OF THE STRATEGIC TRIAD TO 60 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF WARHEADS, A LEVEL NOT/NOT FAR FROM OUR CURRENT PROPOSAL.

WE WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO SETTLE THIS ISSUE IN MOSCOW.

HOWEVER, THERE ARE THREE KINDS OF ICBMS THAT REQUIRE SPECIAL TREATMENT:

--HEAVY ICBMS ARE OF SPECIAL CONCERN. IN RECOGNITION OF THIS, THE SOVIETS PROPOSED TO REDUCE THEIR HEAVY ICBMS BY 50 PERCENT WHICH IMPLIES ABOUT 1500 WARHEADS, ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET PROPOSAL HAS NOT/NOT BEEN PRESENTED WITH AN EXACT NUMBER.

--THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IS HELPFUL BUT DOES NOT/NOT ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF OTHER DANGEROUS ICBMS; THAT IS, ICBMS WITH MORE THAN SIX WARHEADS ALSO REQUIRE SPECIAL ATTENTION BECAUSE OF THE THREAT THEY POSE TO STABILITY.

--MOBILE ICBMS POSE DIFFICULT VERIFICATION PROBLEMS. FOR THIS REASON, WE PROPOSE TO BAN MOBILE ICBMS.

OUR PROPOSED 1650 SUBLIMIT WOULD ENSURE THAT WARHEADS ON HEAVY ICBMS AND HIGHLY FRACTIONATED ICBMS WOULD BE REDUCED SUBSTANTIALLY, SO THAT THE 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS WOULD BE IMPLEMENTED IN A MANNER THAT WOULD ENHANCE STABILITY. THE BAN ON MOBILE ICBMS SERVES THE SAME PURPOSE.

ANOTHER ISSUE WE HOPE TO SETTLE IN MOSCOW IS HOW TO APPLY THE PRINCIPLE OF 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS TO THROWWEIGHT. THE SOVIETS HAVE SUGGESTED A UNILATERAL STATEMENT. WE WELCOME THIS RECOGNITION OF THE

...8

PAGE EIGHT YBGR6329 SECRET

NEED TO ENSURE THAT THE REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES WILL RESULT IN A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN MISSILE THROWWEIGHT BELOW THE PRESENT SOVIET LEVEL. HOWEVER, WE WILL INSIST THAT THIS REDUCTION BE GUARANTEED BY DIRECT OR INDIRECT METHODS IN ANY AGREEMENT.

WE ASSUME THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IN EFFECT WOULD REPRESENT A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE ITS MISSILE THROWWEIGHT BY 50 PERCENT OVER THE REDUCTION PERIOD. TO BE ACCEPTABLE, SUCH A COMMITMENT WOULD ALSO HAVE TO ENSURE THAT SOVIET THROWWEIGHT DID NOT/NOT EXCEED THIS NEW LEVEL IN LATER YEARS. ONCE AGAIN, WE WILL ENSURE THIS BY WAY OF DIRECT OR INDIRECT LIMITS INCORPORATED IN ANY AGREEMENT.

IN SUM, WE ENVISION A PROCESS IN WHICH THE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE CARRIED OUT EVENLY OVER A PERIOD OF SEVEN YEARS FROM THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT.

WE HAVE DECIDED, ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF OUR JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, THAT MILITARY SUFFICIENCY CAN BE BETTER ASSURED IF THE 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS ARE SPREAD OVER SEVEN RATHER THAN FIVE YEARS.

PROVISIONS FOR VERIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED ARE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE START AGREEMENT. SOME USEFUL GENERAL STATEMENTS ON VERIFICATION WERE AGREED IN REYKJAVIK AND HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN RECORDED IN GENEVA. AMBASSADOR LEHMAN WILL ADVANCE OUR SPECIFIC IDEAS ON VERIFICATION OF A START AGREEMENT AT THE NEXT ROUND.

WE ARE PREPARED TO WORK AT COMPLETING AN AGREEMENT AS SOON AS

...9

PAGE NINE YBGR6329 SECRET

POSSIBLE, PERHAPS EVEN THIS YEAR.

LET ME KNOW TURN TO DEFENSE AND SPACE.

WE ARE PLANNING TO MAKE A NEW PROPOSAL ON DEFENSE AND SPACE, DESIGNED TO BREAK THE DEADLOCK THERE AND CLEAR THE WAY FOR START REDUCTIONS.

YOU WILL RECALL WE AGREED AT REYKJAVIK ON THE CONCEPT OF NONWITHDRAWAL FROM THE ABM TREATY FOR 10 YEARS, THROUGH 1996, CONDITIONED ON IMPLEMENTATION OF 50 PERCENT START CUTS DURING THE FIRST FIVE YEARS AND ELIMINATION OF OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES DURING THE SECOND FIVE YEARS. THE IDEA WAS TO ENSURE PREDICTABILITY IN THE STRATEGIC REGIME OF THE NEXT DECADE, WHILE ALLOWING BOTH SIDES TO CONTINUE THEIR EFFORTS TO EXPLORE THE POTENTIAL FOR DEFENSES. WE WERE WILLING TO COMMIT TO SUCH AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF NONWITHDRAWAL BECAUSE OF THE ASSOCIATED ELIMINATION OF ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES.

FURTHER PROGRESS HAS BEEN BLOCKED, HOWEVER, BY DISAGREEMENT OVER THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSIVE CUTS DURING THE SECOND FIVE YEARS. WE HAVE, AS A CONSEQUENCE, DECIDED TO FOCUS ON THE 50 PERCENT START CUTS AS OUR TOP PRIORITY FOR STRATEGIC ARMS; REDUCTIONS OF THIS ORDER WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT STEP IN ITSELF.

ACCORDINGLY, OUR NEW PROPOSAL IS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE PREDICTABILITY ON THE DEFENSIVE SIDE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 50 PERCENT CUTS ON THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SIDE.

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PAGE TEN YBGR6329 SECRET

WE ARE PREPARED TO AGREE TO A MUTUAL COMMITMENT THROUGH 1994 NOT/NOT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE ABM TREATY IN ORDER TO DEPLOY OPERATIONAL DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS WHOSE UNILATERAL DEPLOYMENT PRESENTLY IS NOT/NOT PERMITTED UNDER THE TREATY.

THIS COMMITMENT WOULD BE CONTINGENT ON IMPLEMENTATION AS SCHEDULED OF AGREED START REDUCTIONS:IT WOULD NOT/NOT ALTER THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF THE SIDES UNDER CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW TO WITHDRAW IN THE EVENT OF MATERIAL BREACH OR JEOPARDY TO SUPREME NATIONAL INTERESTS.

TO ENSURE THE VIABILITY OF SUCH A COMMITMENT,IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE SOVIET SIDE REDRESS ITS CURRENT VIOLATION OF THE ABM TREATY.

AFTER 1994,EITHER SIDE COULD DEPLOY DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS OF ITS CHOOSING,UNLESS MUTUALLY AGREED OTHERWISE.

WE ARE THUS OFFERING A SYSTEM OF CONSTRAINTS OF DEFENSE THAT WOULD ENSURE PREDICTABILITY INTO THE MID-1990S.

TO FURTHER ENHANCE PREDICTABILITY,WE ARE PREPARED TO ESTABLISH AN ANNUAL EXCHANGE OF DATA ON THE PLANNED STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE ACTIVITIES OF THE SIDES.

OUR PREVIOUS PROPOSALS FOR QUOTE OPEN LABORATORIES UNQUOTE AND FOR RECIPROCAL OBSERVATIONS OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE TESTING ALSO REMAIN ON THE TABLE.

WE SEE THIS NEW PACKAGE AS HAVING THE FOLLOWING IMPORTANT

...11

PAGE ELEVEN YBGR6329 SECRET

ADVANTAGES:

-IT RETAINS AN APPROACH COMPARABLE TO THAT WHICH WAS AGREED UPON  
AT REYKJAVIK;

-IT DEFERS THE DIFFICULT ISSUE OF OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS BEYOND 50  
PERCENT, ENHANCING THE CHANCES FOR AGREEMENT ON THE INITIAL STEP  
WHICH IS OUR TOP PRIORITY;

-IT ALLOWS BOTH SIDES TO CONTINUE ROBUST PROGRAMS TO EXPLORE  
THE POTENTIAL FOR STRATEGIC DEFENSE.

THIS COMPLETES MY PORTION, MR CHAIRMAN; MR THOMAS WILL CONTINUE.

CCC/054 131536Z YBGR6329



HOUSE OF COMMONS BOOK - BRIEFING NOTE  
LIVRE DE LA CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES - NOTES D'INFORMATION

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20-4-CSCE-VIENN				SCC-2 (1)	
cc 1-11-IDR-2				Classification	
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				Section	

Subject/Highlights    Sujet/Points saillants

Conventional Arms Control - Soviet General-Secretary Gorbachov has called for a meeting of CSCE Foreign Ministers to discuss conventional arms control in Europe.

Source

Prague speech, April 10, 1987.

Assessment    Evaluation

- In his Prague speech, Gorbachov suggested a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the 35 CSCE countries take place to approve a mandate for new conventional stability negotiations in Europe.
- Representatives of the 23 member nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact have been meeting informally since February to agree on the elements of such a mandate.
- Progress in these talks has been satisfactory, but one issue which remains to be resolved is the relationship between the Alliance 23 talks and the 35-nation CSCE process. The West insists that any new negotiations be limited to the nations of the two alliances, while the East has called for new negotiations among the 35.
- Gorbachov has also suggested these new conventional stability talks deal with tactical nuclear weapons, which the West believes should be the subject of separate negotiations.

Suggested Reply    Réponse suggérée

- We welcome Mr. Gorbachov's apparent interest in getting new conventional stability talks in Europe underway as soon as possible.
- We have insisted however that any such new talks be limited to the 23 nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact only, as the two alliances maintain by far the largest armed forces on the continent.
- Representatives of these 23 countries, including Canada, have been meeting since February to agree upon a mandate for these new negotiations.
- We have been pleased with the progress made thus far.
- We do not therefore see the need for a foreign minister level meeting to provide further stimulus, nor do we support the concept of such a meeting involving all 35 nations of the CSCE process.

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

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INFO PCOOTT/SELIAC/MORDEN MOSCO

DISTR MINA USS RGB RBD UGB URD URR IFB INP ISD ISS

---SOVIET EMBASSY LISTENING DEVICES--ALLEGATIONS OF CDN COMPLICITY  
FLWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF SOVIET EMB FIRST SECRETARY VIACHESLAV  
BOROVIKOV'S REMARKS ON CDN INVOLVEMENT IN USA BUGGING OF SOVIET EMB,  
AT PRESS CONF HELD HERE ON FRIDAY.

2.QUOTE FURTHER, YOU CAN SEE EXAMPLES OF THE CORD SYSTEMS OF VARIOUS  
LISTENING DEVICES. ALL SORTS OF TUBES, CORDS, AND OTHER ELECTRIC DEVICES  
ARE USED IN ORDER TO PUT THEM TOGETHER. I WOULD LIKE TO INVITE YOUR  
ATTN ESPECIALLY TO THIS SMALL PIECE OF CORD. SUCH THINGS CAN BE MFGD  
ONLY ON SPECIAL ORDERS AND ONLY AT FACTORIES. INSIDE, THERE ARE TWO  
WIRES, FORTLORE WIRES--YOU CAN SEE THEM, WHICH PRACTICALLY DO NOT/NOT  
DIFFER FROM THE OUTSIDE FROM OTHER WIRES INSIDE.

3. AND INCIDENTALLY, THERE IS A MARKING ON THE WIRE QUOTE MADE IN CDA  
UNQUOTE. SO ONE CAN SUPPOSE THAT EITHER THE AMERICAN SPECIAL SERVICES  
WERE WORKING ON THAT IN COOPERATION WITH THEIR CDN COLLEAGUES, OR  
THEY WERE TRYING TO COVER UP THEIR ROLE IN BUILDING THIS DEVICE BY  
CDN MARKING. WELL, MAYBE IT IS NOT/NOT THE BEST WAY TO DO IT, BECAUSE  
ANY REASONABLE PERSON UNDERSTANDS THAT CDN SPECIAL SERVICES HAVE MANY  
CONCERNS IN CDA AS WELL. SO THEY HAVE NO/NO NEED, REALLY, TO BRING THEIR  
ACTIVITY OVER TO THE USA AND TO TRY TO PENETRATE SOVIET OFFICES IN  
THE USA UNQUOTE.

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**ACTION  
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APR 13 '87 13:04 CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASH

External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

MGTC/DIARY/CIRC/FILE P.1  
MGTC/JOURNAL/CIRC/DOSSIER

Accession/Référence

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File/Dossier


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	---USA EMB IN MOSCO: SECURITY CATASTROPE		
	ATTACHED PLS FIND SELF-EXPLANATORY REPORTS RE USA EMB IN MOSCOW.		
	(COMCENTRE PLS FAX ATTACHED 11 PAGES.)		

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P.2

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EMBASSY FACT SHEET  
APRIL 7, 1987

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INCHING TOWARDS A NEW EMBASSY IN MOSCOW:  
AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS

PREPARED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE  
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT -- OCTOBER 1986

FOR BACKGROUND

A year after the U.S. recognized the Soviet Union, William C. Bullitt, our first ambassador to the USSR, reported in January 1934 that Stalin had promised him a new embassy site in Moscow on Lenin Hills overlooking the Moscow River. (Bullitt envisioned constructing a replica of Jefferson's Monticello on Lenin Hills.) For the next five years we negotiated with the Soviets on quality assurances on construction materials, permission to use foreign (including American) laborers to construct an embassy, duty-free import of construction materials, the Lenin Hills chancery site, and Soviet demands that we use a Soviet company to construct the new building. The discussions were fruitless, so funds which had been earmarked for Moscow were diverted to Central American posts in 1937. Discussions on new embassy construction ended completely in 1939.

As a result, the Embassy staff moved into small temporary quarters on Ulitsa Mokhovaya near Red Square. Legend has it that Stalin, who lived in an apartment in the Kremlin, frequently complained that he woke up mornings seeing the British Union Jack and the American Stars and Stripes outside his windows. He insisted that both embassies move. The British still occupy their chancery opposite the Kremlin, but will still eventually have to relocate. Our offices were inadequate in any event, so we moved in 1953.

The Soviets offered us our present chancery building on Ulitsa Chaikovskovo. However, they insisted upon renovating the building before we occupied it. Americans were not permitted to supervise the renovations. In fact, the Soviets were so secretive about the renovations that, at one point, the future chancery was shrouded in tarpaulins while the Soviets worked inside.

APR 13 '87 13:05 CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASH

P.3

UNCLASSIFIED

3/12

## SEARCHING FOR SITES

We quickly outgrew the Ulitsa Chaikovoskovo chancery. Likewise, the Soviets were bursting at the seams in their 16th Street chancery in Washington. As a result, in 1963 the Soviets tried unsuccessfully to get a new chancery site in the Bonnie Brae subdivision of Chevy Chase. Through a series of court cases, the community successfully blocked construction.

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400  
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

EMBASSY FACT SHEET  
4/7/87

-2-

To avoid future squabbles over zoning, we began searching for land owned by the U.S. Government in Washington as possible Soviet chancery sites. We investigated two sites -- the Bureau of Standards site (now the International Chancery Project) and the Veterans' Administration Hospital site on Mt. Alto. The Soviets had not previously indicated an interest in either site.

For the next two years officers from all interested U.S. Government agencies discussed, and eventually agreed to, the acceptability the Mt. Alto site. The Soviets, however, were not universally enthusiastic about the Mt. Alto site. In November 1966 they complained that we had showed them only one site -- Mt. Alto -- which was "not very favorable" because of its distance from the center of the city and from government buildings.

However, after a brief Soviet dalliance with the idea of building a chancery at Tregaron in Cleveland Park, in 1969 we signed an exchange of sites agreement, giving the Soviets an 85-year lease for 12.5 acres in Mt. Alto.

Meanwhile, in Moscow we were also looking for an appropriate site for our new embassy. The Soviets again offered a site high atop Lenin Hills overlooking Moscow, but we balked, concluding that the site was too inaccessible and too far from the center of the city. We focused instead on a site the Soviets offered behind the existing chancery. The site was topographically lower than the existing chancery and in an area slated for urban renewal. However, the site was centrally located, overlooking the Moscow River, within walking distance of the Ambassador's Residence, across the street from the site of the new RSFSR (Russian Republic) Council of Ministers building and the headquarters of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, and near major thoroughfares and several metro stations; in short, it was on prime Moscow real estate. (The site is not, as legend has it, in a swamp. This characterization crept into the rhetoric about the site as a result of some drainage problems during excavation.) Congressman Wayne Hays travelled to Moscow in September 1967 and concluded that his Foreign Affairs subcommittee would support this site.

We negotiated for several years on the precise size and shape of the plot of land. Eventually in 1969 we accepted -- with Congress and other interested U.S. Government agencies interposing no objections -- an 85-year lease for a 10-acre site for the

APR 13 '87 13:06 CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASH

P.4

**UNCLASSIFIED**

4/12

chancery compound, plus the 1.8-acre site of the Ambassador's Residence, Spaso House.

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400  
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

EMBASSY FACT SHEET  
4/7/87

-3-

At Soviet suggestion, negotiations on sites and construction had been separated into two tracks. According to the Soviets, the sites agreement had to be approved at the highest levels of Soviet government; the conditions of construction could be ironed out by technicians. Separating the negotiations would speed up the process, the Soviets said. To encourage a speedy conclusion of agreements, the eventual exchange-of-sites agreement stipulated that we would agree to conditions of construction within 120 days. However, our negotiations dragged on for 3 years. One of the major sticking points was the height of the Soviet buildings on Mt. Alto and of our new chancery in Moscow.

#### NEGOTIATING CHANCERY HEIGHTS

After long, arduous negotiations, we finally settled the height issue as a part of the conditions of construction agreement signed in 1972. The Soviets agreed that our new chancery in Moscow could be 176 meters (above sea level) tall. At that height, our building would be about 9 meters lower than our existing chancery, but slightly taller than the nearby CMEA (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance) building. Our new chancery would nevertheless be dwarfed by the nearby "Stalinist Gothic" apartment building. All of the interested U.S. Government entities -- including Congress --, eventually agreed to this arrangement.

Meanwhile, in Washington the Mt. Alto height issue raged between the Soviets, the State Department, and the National Capital Planning Commission. The issue was complicated by the fact that the new Soviet chancery is in an area of Washington where building heights are strictly controlled. Eventually, however, the Soviets reluctantly accepted the 136.21-meter (above sea level) height limitation which the National Capital Planning Commission had placed on their buildings on Mt. Alto.

#### CONDITIONS OF CONSTRUCTION

The exchange-of-sites agreement was only the first major hurdle. The second, reaching an agreement on conditions of construction, was like building a house of cards during a windstorm. The haggling over conditions grew so acrimonious that both sides at times considered giving up the negotiations. The 120-day deadline for agreement (set in the exchange-of-sites agreement) was extended

**UNCLASSIFIED**

5/12

repeatedly.

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400  
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIAEMBASSY FACT SHEET  
4/7/87

-4-

We submitted our initial draft conditions of construction to the Soviets in January 1968. Nineteen months passed before the Soviets submitted their counterproposals. Their demands were, for the most part, "categorically unacceptable" to the U.S. Among other things, the Soviets stipulated that:

- Soviet contractors would carry out basic construction;
- Soviets would control all phases of construction in Moscow (According to the Soviet law, they said, foreigners could not supervise construction of buildings in the Soviet Union);
- Soviet firms would survey the property and prepare design drawings;
- our plans had to take into consideration not only local construction norms and rules, but also local technology and methods of erection (In other words, we had to agree to design a building the Soviets would be capable of constructing);
- we would use Soviet construction materials;
- we had to pay for Soviet goods and labor with hard currency;
- up to 40 Americans could do the interior finishing work on the buildings, but only 10-12 American administrative and technical people would be permitted on the construction site for limited supervision and control of Soviet contractors; and
- Americans would have only very limited access to the construction site.

We recognized from the start that common Soviet construction techniques and materials would fall well below U.S. standards. (As if to validate our fears, a balcony in the Soviet-constructed new French Embassy in Moscow collapsed in the late 1970s.) We also knew that Soviet inefficiency would inevitably drag out the length of construction.

Among other things, we insisted on

- maintaining control over the construction of our new office building;
- unrestricted access to the construction site;
- guarantees that we could bring in enough technicians and security personnel to supervise the Soviets and thereby maintain the security of the construction site;

**UNCLASSIFIED**

6/12

- competitive bidding to decide who would construct our chancery compound;
- no restrictions (or import duties) on construction materials and equipment;
- parallel ("brick-by-brick") progress on construction in Moscow and Washington; and

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400  
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

EMBASSY FACT SHEET  
4/7/87

-5-

- simultaneous occupancy of our respective chanceries. (The Swedes had not made this a requirement when they built their embassy in Moscow. As a result, the Soviets moved into new quarters in Stockholm long before construction on the Swedish embassy in Moscow was completed. The Swedes, lacking any leverage to prevent Soviet construction delays, then faced continued difficulty getting Soviet cooperation on embassy construction.)

The longer the negotiations dragged on, however, the more both sides moved, albeit at a snail's pace, from their original positions. The Soviets agreed that we could do the finishing work in the building and loosened their restrictions on the number of Americans permitted on site. They agreed to let third-country workers install equipment we purchased in third countries. They also agreed to simultaneous occupancy of the chanceries.

In March 1970 we also began to back away from our original position. We began considering using Soviet workers to construct our building, but using our designs and under our supervision. We realized that, from a practical standpoint, some Soviet labor and Soviet materials would have to be used for the new building. We hinted that, in order to meet Soviet requirements for generating hard currency, we would permit the Soviets to build a portion of our building. We suggested that the Soviets could excavate the site, construct the structural frame of the office building, and build the residential portion of the project.

In September 1971 we sent a team of architects to Moscow to tour a number of Soviet industrial facilities and a number of recently completed Soviet-constructed buildings. The team was supposed to evaluate Soviet construction capabilities and prepare a report on the type of building we wanted and the type of construction required.

No architectural and engineering drawings had been prepared at this point. However, the architects concluded that it would be possible to build our embassy compound in Moscow with substantial input of Soviet materials and labor. They reported that pre-cast concrete would be adequate to ensure the structural integrity of the building.

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7/12

In July 1972, a seven-man interagency team concluded two exhausting weeks of discussions with the Soviets and agreed to a long list of conditions. The team worked out a formula whereby construction of the new office building was to be divided into two stages, with the Soviets performing all basic structural work in stage one (using Soviet labor and Soviet materials) and Americans (or third-country nationals) doing the finishing work in stage two. In effect, we could be our own overall builder-developer for the entire project and our own general contractors for stage 2.

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400  
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

EMBASSY FACT SHEET  
4/7/87

-6-

In addition:

- We were given unrestricted access to the site during construction.
- We were permitted to install our own windows, doors, final roofing, all mechanical and electrical equipment, final wiring, plumbing and other systems.
- We could supply our own exterior facing, as well as specialists who would supervise and instruct Soviet laborers on how to install the (brick) facing.

The groundwork had been laid for a workable compromise. Some of the reasons cited in various Soviet and American sources for agreeing to use Soviet labor and materials included:

- All other foreign embassies in Moscow had been built by the Soviets
- The Soviets pledged their "full cooperation" to get qualified Soviet workers for the American embassy project.
- We didn't want to let the Soviets build Mt. Alto by themselves. The counterintelligence challenge of monitoring the large number of Soviet construction workers in the U.S. would have been too great.
- Importing large numbers of American construction workers into Moscow might have posed more personnel security problems than the physical security advantages of building our own building.
- The French had tried to build their new Embassy in Moscow themselves and had eventually, in exasperation, given up. They let the Soviets finish the project.
- Problems of language and convoluted Soviet building regulations would have slowed our progress if we used only American workers and materials.
- It would have cost too much to import an "army" of American construction workers to build our compound. We estimated in 1969 that we would need 150-200 Seabees, Marines, and contract personnel to build our embassy in Moscow.

As the differences between the two sides narrowed, pressures to conclude an agreement increased. On October 3, 1972, at the height of detente, the State Department got word from the White House that

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8/12

the President wanted an agreement on conditions of construction before Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko left the U.S. for Moscow the next day. Despite this pressure from the White House, no agreement was forthcoming. Two months later, after three-and-one-half years of negotiations, Secretary of State Rogers personally intervened. In a December 1, 1972, memo to Secretary Rogers, EUR Assistant Secretary Stoessel stated, "Yesterday you directed me to sign the Agreement on the Condition of Construction of Embassy Complexes."

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400  
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

EMBASSY FACT SHEET  
4/7/87

-7-

The agreement was signed on December 4, 1972 at 11:30 a.m. President Nixon sent a congratulatory memo to Secretary Rogers on December 15, noting that "it is particularly appropriate that this agreement ... for improved diplomatic facilities should come at a time of expanding, improving US-Soviet relations."

#### PROTOCOL OF 1977

However, the agreements we had nailed down in 1972 with the Soviets on conditions of construction turned out to be moving targets. Negotiations to refine these conditions of construction dragged on without success for five more years. Secretary of State Vance's planned trip to Moscow in 1977 broke the logjam. Eager for an agreement for Vance to sign in Moscow, Soviet and American negotiators signed a Protocol of negotiations on construction in March 1977. The final cost would then be determined when the actual construction contracts were signed. We agreed that the calculation of our Moscow construction costs would be based on the prices of constructing similar buildings in Washington.

Although an exchange-of-sites agreement had been signed in 1969, neither side took possession of their respective plots of land until 1977. In the 1977 Protocol, both sides agreed to a simultaneous exchange of sites on March 30, 1977.

#### CONSTRUCTING NEW CHANDERIES

Once the Soviets had possession of their site, they were eager to begin construction of their school, clubhouse and apartments. Although we weren't ready to begin construction in Moscow, we agreed to let the Soviets begin construction on Mt. Alto immediately in exchange for a new American school, 14 new apartments for official Americans, warehouse space, and a new dacha site in Moscow.

Our construction in Moscow was not scheduled to begin until over a year later in May 1978. However, even that date proved optimistic. The Soviet buildings (school, clubhouse, and apartments) on Mt. Alto were completed in 1979 by the time we signed our construction agreement to begin construction in Moscow.

Once their buildings on Mt. Alto were completed, the Soviets



APR 13 '87 13:09 CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASH

P.9

**UNCLASSIFIED**

9/12

began pressing us to let them move into the buildings. Since we hadn't even started construction in Moscow, we refused. Construction contract talks in Moscow had stalled, since we refused to accept Soviet construction costs which we considered unreasonable. We finally agreed to permit occupancy of Mt. Alto if the Soviets would agree to a fair construction price for our Moscow chancery. The Soviets eventually agreed.

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400  
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

EMBASSY FACT SHEET  
4/7/87

-8-

On June 30, 1979, we signed a construction contract with the Soviet firm, SVSI. The following year, in September of 1980, Assistant Secretary Tom Tracy signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Corps of Engineers to provide four experienced technical personnel -- one electrical engineer, a mechanical engineer, an architect, a logistic scheduler -- to assist with the construction of the new office building. These technical personnel, along with over 30 Seabees, the FBO project management team, security personnel, and three American contractor firms, now form the core of our American construction team in Moscow.

Despite the agreements contained in the 1977 Protocol, we failed to obtain the promised warehouse or dacha sites in Moscow because we refused to pay the exorbitant annual fees the Soviets demanded for the properties. The impasse broke in 1979 when the Soviets suddenly proposed a swap of properties -- the warehouse and dacha sites in Moscow in exchange for additional land (4 acres) for the Soviets at their recreational site at Pioneer Point, Maryland.

The Soviets, using American labor, continued their rapid pace of construction in Washington and in mid-1982 began building the structural shells of the remaining buildings on their Mt. Alto compound -- the chancery, consulate, and reception hall. These structures were completed in 1985. Soviet workers are now completing interior finishing work in those buildings.

The Soviets were able to build their buildings in Washington much more quickly than we were able to build in Moscow, in part because the Soviets did not have to negotiate the series of bureaucratic hurdles and delays we have faced in Moscow. In 1985 we tried to change that. We brought Mt. Alto construction under control of the newly-established Office of Foreign Missions (OFM). OFM now controls the acquisition of all building materials and services the Soviets need for their construction at Mt. Alto.

Security concerns, Congressional pressure, Soviet construction delays, and the transition to an all-Soviet labor force at Mt. Alto, all argued for excluding Soviet workers from the new office building in Moscow. Without any advance notice, Soviet workers were locked out of the new chancery building after they left the site late Saturday evening, August 17, 1985. Americans will complete the

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10/12

interior finishing work and remaining construction in the office building.

Five of the eight buildings on our Moscow compound are now completed and occupied, or ready for occupancy. Two more buildings will be completed by the end of this year. At that time, only the office building will remain under construction.

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400  
NEWS FOR THE NEWS MEDIA

EMBASSY FACT SHEET  
4/7/87

-3-

Problems will continue to plague us in Moscow. However, barring other as-yet-unforeseen problems, the vision born in 1934 and resuscitated in 1963 -- occupying a new chancery in Moscow -- is scheduled to become a reality in 1989.

FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE 202-347-1400  
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**SOVIET-EMBASSY REPORT**

MOSCOW (AP) -- HERE IS THE TEXT OF A REPORT DISTRIBUTED BY U.S. REPS. DAN MICA, D-FLA., AND OLYMPIA SNOWE, R-MAINE, AT A NEWS CONFERENCE TODAY FOLLOWING THEIR TOUR OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES IN MOSCOW.

MICA AND MS. SNOWE ARE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE AND WERE INVESTIGATING SUSPECTED ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AT THE CURRENT U.S. EMBASSY AND A NEW AMERICAN MISSION UNDER CONSTRUCTION. THEIR REPORT WAS ENTITLED, MAJOR FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

1. THE EMBASSY SECURITY SYSTEM -- THE DELEGATION FOUND THAT THE EMBASSY'S SECURITY SYSTEM HAS SERIOUS SHORTCOMINGS AND IS FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED IN BOTH PHYSICAL AND PERSONNEL AREAS. THE LACK OF REDUNDANCY IS A PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT PROBLEM. THE ALARM SYSTEM DOES NOT HAVE EVENT RECORDERS. THEREFORE, THE AFTER-HOURS SECURITY SYSTEM ULTIMATELY DEPENDS ON THE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF TWO INDIVIDUALS WHO CAN OVERRIDE THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM AND PERMIT ACCESS TO THE MOST SENSITIVE AREAS OF THE EMBASSY BY UNAUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THIS INADEQUATE SYSTEM IS USED AT ALL OF OUR DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AROUND THE WORLD WHERE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IS KEPT AND SENSITIVE ACTIVITIES ARE CONDUCTED, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE SECURITY SYSTEM BE OVERHAULED.

2. ATTITUDES TOWARD SECURITY -- IN THE CASE OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW, THE DELEGATION FOUND A NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD MARINES ON THE PART OF KEY PERSONNEL. DURING 1986, MARINE SECURITY GUARDS RECORDED 137 SECURITY VIOLATIONS. THESE VIOLATIONS INCLUDED LEAVING SAFES OPEN OVERNIGHT AND LEAVING CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS UNSECURED AND UNATTENDED. THE USE OF IDENTIFICATION BADGES, ONLY RECENTLY IMPLEMENTED, WAS RESISTED AND RESENTED BY KEY EMBASSY PERSONNEL. THIS LAX ATTITUDE AND LACK OF LEADERSHIP IN THE SECURITY AREA BY THE SENIOR STAFF IN THE EMBASSY MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE BREAKDOWN IN THE SECURITY SYSTEM WHICH LED TO THE PENETRATION OF THE EMBASSY.

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SOVIET-EMBASSY REPORT, 1ST ADD (N055)

3. SECURITY CLEARANCE PROCEDURES -- CURRENTLY, STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY PERSONNEL AND MARINE SECURITY GUARDS ARE NOT REQUIRED TO TAKE POLYGRAPH TESTS AS A CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT, UNLIKE EMPLOYEES OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES. AT THE VERY LEAST, STATE DEPARTMENT AND MARINE SECURITY GUARD PERSONNEL SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO TAKE POLYGRAPH TESTS WHEN INITIALLY EMPLOYED AND PRIOR TO REASSIGNMENT TO OTHER POSTS.

4. MARINE GUARD PROGRAM -- THE USE OF THE MARINE SECURITY GUARD SYSTEM IN ITS PRESENT FORM MAY BE UNSUITABLE IN AREAS WHERE THE INTELLIGENCE THREAT AGAINST THE EMBASSY IS AS HIGH AS IT IS IN THE EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES.

5. THE PRESENT EMBASSY BUILDING -- THE PRESENT EMBASSY BUILDING WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A FEW MINIMAL AREAS IS GROSSLY INADEQUATE FOR SECURITY PURPOSES. THE BUILDING IS ALSO A FIRETRAP AND UNSAFE BY ACCEPTED STANDARDS FOR GENERAL WORKING CONDITIONS.

6. THE NEW OFFICE BUILDING -- THE NEW OFFICE BUILDING DESIGNED TO REPLACE THE EXISTING BUILDING IS FAR FROM COMPLETION BECAUSE OF SERIOUS SECURITY AND CONSTRUCTION-RELATED PROBLEMS. BASED ON INFORMATION COLLECTED IT IS OUR ESTIMATE THAT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE OF OCCUPANCY IS AT LEAST FIVE YEARS AWAY, IF EVER. THEREFORE, GIVEN THE INADEQUACY OF THE EXISTING CHANCERY BUILDING AND THE DELAY IN COMPLETING CONSTRUCTION OF THE NEW OFFICE BUILDING, WE RECOMMEND THAT THE SECRETARY OF STATE URGENTLY EXAMINE AND EXPLORE INTERIM MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE EXISTING CONDITIONS.

FUTURE ACTIONS -- THE SUBCOMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE TO CONDUCT ITS INVESTIGATION OF THIS MATTER. THE DELEGATION WILL BRIEF THE HOUSE LEADERSHIP AND NOTIFY THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF OUR MORE EXTENSIVE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS UPON OUR RETURN. IN ADDITION, THE SUBCOMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE TO REQUEST RELEVANT DOCUMENTS AND RECORDS FROM THE ADMINISTRATION AS PART OF ITS ONGOING OVERSIGHT OF THE ADEQUACY OF TECHNICAL SECURITY AT AMERICAN EMBASSIES IN HIGH-THREAT AREAS, PARTICULARLY IN THE EASTERN BLOC.

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---US ARMS CONTROL POLICY-SOME IMPORTANT CHANGES

SUMMARY:ON WED OF THIS WEEK,PRESIDENT SIGNED OFF ON AN ARMS CONTROL POLICY WHICH SHULTZ IS TO CARRY TO MOSCOW FOR MTG WITE SHEVARDNADZE BEGINNING MONDAY.POLICY GENERALLY TOUGHENS U.S.NEGOTIATING STANCE AND INCORPORATES SOME IMPORTANT CHANGES,WHICH WIDEN RATHER THAN NARROW GAPS BETWEEN AMERICAN AND SOVIET POSNS.FALL-OUT FROM SOVIET ESPIONAGE COUP AGAINST U.S.EMBASSY APPEARS LARGELY TO BLAME.

CHANGES INCLUDE FLWING:

(A)50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS ARE NOW TO BE SCHEDULED OVER SEVEN YRS FROM TIME TREATY TAKES EFFECT,RATHER THAN FIVE AS DISCUSSED AT REYKJAVIK;

(B)PERIOD FOR NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM AMB TREATY IS NOW TO BE SEVEN YRS FROM TIME TREATY TAKES EFFECT,RATHER TEAN TEN AS HERETOFORE DISCUSSED.SHULTZ IS NOT/NOT TO PURSUE DISCUSSIONS AIMED AT FRIDGING DIFFERENCES OVER WHAT TESTING IS PERMITTED OR NOT/NOT BY ABM TREATY;

(C)THERE ARE TO BE NO/NO TALKS ON NUCLEAR TESTING UNTIL AGREEMENT

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PAGE TWO UNGR1617..CONF

IS REACHED ON VERIFICATION MEASURES FOR TWO UNRATIFIED TESTING TREATIES.

2.U.S.POSN ON IMF REMAINS UNCHANGED,BUT IT IS NOW UNLIKELY THAT OUTLINE OF AN IMF AGREEMENT CAN BE ACHIEVED DURING SHULTZ VISIT,AS HAD BEEN HOPED FEW WEEKS AGO.

3.REPORT:FLWING NSPG MTG WED,PRESIDENT WROTE TO GORBACHEV(AND SUBSEQUENTLY TO ALLIED LEADERS)OUTLINING ADMINS ARMS CONTROL POLICY ON EVE OF SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MTG IN MOSCO NEXT WEEK.(SHULTZ IS ALSO TO MEET WITH GORACHEV,RYZHKOV AND GROMYKO DURING ALMOST THREE DAYS HE IS IN SOVIET CAPITAL.)LET TO GORBACHEV,WHICH WAS LARGELY DRAFTED BY STATE DEPT,IS SOFT IN TONE BUT CARRIES HARD AND GENERALLY UNCOMPROMISING MSG.IT REFLECTS COMPROMISE BETWEEN SHULTZ AND STATE WHO WANT TO KEEP OPEN POSSIBILITY OF AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT BEFORE END OF REAGAN ADMIN,AND ALMOST ALL OTEER PLAYERS WHO ARE DETERMINED TO SHOW NO/NO FLEXIBILITY IN FACE OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE COUP AGAINST U.S.EMBASSY IN MOSCOW.STATE DEPT SOURCE TOLD US TODAY SOVIETS WILL WONDER AT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TONE AND CONTENTS OF LETTER AND HOPEFULLY CONCLUDE THAT PRESIDENT DOES STILL WANT AN AGREEMENT.

4.STRATEGIC SYSTEMS:U.S.POSN ON START IS NOT/NOT ANYMORE FLEXIBLE THAN BEFORE,BUT IT WILL BE CHARACTERIZED AS OFFERING CONCESSION TO SOVIETS.MAIN CHANGE IS TO PROPOSE THAT 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC SYSTEMS BE PHASED OVER SEVEN YRS RATHER THAN FIVE.U.S. RATIONALE IS THAT NEITHER AMERICAN NOR/NOR SOVIET MILITARY WERE

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PAGE THREE UNGR1617 CONF

HAPPY WITH 5 YR TIME FRAME AND BOTH WANT MORE TIME TO BE ABLE TO IMPLEMENT REDUCTIONS. U.S. WILL, ACCORDINGLY, PRESENT CHANGE AS MOVE IN SOVIET DIRECTION. (INCIDENTALLY, ACCORDING TO STATE SOURCE, NEITHER SIDE HAS SHOWN ANY INTEREST AT ALL RECENTLY IN REYKJAVIK IDEA OF COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS).

U.S. POSN ON MOBILE ICBMS AND SUBLIMITS, ETC REMAINS UNCHANGED.

5. INF: THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO CHANGE IN USA POSN ON IMF. THERE IS BROAD INTER-AGENCY AGREEMENT THAT SHULTZ SHOULD SEEK CLARIFICATION OF SOVIET POSN AND LEAVE TO LATER DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIES HOW TO RESPOND.

6. DEFENCE/SPACE ISSUES:

USA POSITION ON ABM TREATY HAS HARDENED PERCEPTIBLY, AS RESULT OF PRESIDENTIAL DECISION TO REDUCE TIME FRAME FOR TREATY NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM 10 TO 7 YRS (NOT/NOT 5 AS REPORTED IN BOTH NY TIMES AND WSHDC POST). IN FACT PRESIDENTIAL DECISION CITES YEAR 1994, SO THE LONGER THERE IS DELAY IN CONCLUDING AGREEMENT THE SHORTER NON-WITHDRAWAL PERIOD BECOMES. U.S. RATIONALE IS THAT SOVIETS HAVE BEEN INSISTING ON LINK BETWEEN OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS AND SEVEN YR PERIOD MAINTAINS THIS LINK. SHULTZ WILL ARGUE IN MOSCOW THAT NON-WITHDRAWAL FOR SEVEN YEARS GIVES SOVIETS IMPORTANT MEASURE OF PREDICTABILITY.

7. PRESIDENT HAS RECONFIRMED EARLIER DECISION THAT THERE IS TO BE NO/NO DISCUSSION OF WHAT IS PERMITTED OR NOT/NOT PERMITTED BY ABM TREATY IN FIELD OF TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT. US OFFICIAL RATIONALE IS OUR QUOTE PROTECT MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY IN NEGS UNQUOTE BUT

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PAGE FOUR UNGR1617 CONF

OUR STATE DEPT SOURCE TOLD US PRIVATELY THAT ADMIN HAS NO/NO INTENTION OF NEGOTIATING ANYTHING IN ABM/SDI AREA UNLESS IT IS CODIFICATION OF EXISTING ADMIN POSN (NOTWITHSTANDING STRONG CONGRESSIONAL OPPOSITION WHICH COULD EVENTUALLY TAKE FORM OF LEGISLATION MANDATING ADHERENCE TO TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATION, AND CUTTING OFF FUNDING FOR TESTING AND DEVELOPMENT BEYOND WHAT IS PERMITTED BY THAT INTERPRETATION). THIS IS ENTIRELY CONSISTENT WITH HARD-LINE DOD POSITION EXPRESSED BY GAFFNEY AND OTHERS.

8. NUCLEAR TESTING: U.S. POSN IS TO CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THERE BE NO/NO DISCUSSION OF COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN, AND NO/NO DISCUSSION OF TESTING LIMITATIONS UNTIL SOVIETS AGREE TO NEW VERIFICATION MEASURES FOR EXISTING UNRATIFIED TESTING TREATIES (TTET AND PNET). SHULTZ HAD ARGUED FOR FLEXIBILITY IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET FLEXIBILITY AT LATEST BILATERAL EXPERTS MTG, WHEN LATTER HAD SUGGESTED CTB COULD BE PUT OFF TO LONG TERM. BUT HE WAS MINORITY OF ONE AT NSPG MTG.

9. CONCLUSION: BARELY A MONTH AGO, SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MTG WAS BEING DESCRIBED AS PREPARATORY MTG FOR SUMMIT. IT WAS ONLY QUESTION OF SORTING OUT MINOR DETAILS OF INF AGREEMENT. WHETHER MTG WILL ACCOMPLISH VERY MUCH NOW IS IN DOUBT, THOUGH INF SITUATION COULD CLARIFY A LITTLE. SHULTZ IS BEING ACCOMPANIED TO MOSCOW BY VERY LARGE INCLUDING MOST OF U.S. ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATING TEAM (WITH EXCEPTION OF KAMPELMAN WHO IS STILL RECOVERING FROM HIS HEART ATTACK). THAT WOULD NORMALLY MEAN THAT U.S. WAS READY FOR SERIOUS NEGOTIATING, AND WHO CAN REALLY SAY IT IS NOT/NOT? BUT FROM FOREGOING, ODDS ARE NOT/NOT VERY GOOD.

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---SHULTZ VISIT TO MOSCO:ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS-IS FLEXIBLE

RESPONSE AT ISSUE?

NITZE/THOMAS BRIEFING OF COUNCIL TODAY PROVIDED LITTLE INFO NOT/NOT  
ALREADY AVAILAELE FROM OTHER SOURCES - NITZE COMMENTS ON LRINF/  
SRINF WERE REPEAT OF SHULTZ LET OF 06APR AND THOSE ON START AND  
DEFENCE AND SPACE WERE CONFIRMATION OF INFO IN AP WIRE REPORT.SITU  
AT LUNCHEON WAS ANOTHER MATTER AS NITZE PROVIDED FURTHER USA  
THOUGHTS ON ABM COMPLIANCE AND ON HANDLING OF SRINF ISSUE.AS  
EXPECTED PERM REPS FOCUSSED COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS ON ISSUES RAISED  
IN SHULTZ LETTER OF 06APR.ALL AGREED THAT ANY SOV MOVE ON SRINF  
WOULD HAVE TO BE SUBJ OF URGENT ALLIANCE CONSULTAITONS.IT WAS ALSO  
AGREED THAT IN EVENT SOVS REVEAL SUCH PROPOSAL TO PUBLIC(WHICH HAS  
JUST HAPPENED)ALLIES WOULD INDICATE THAT IT WILL BE SUBJ OF  
CONSULTATIONS AT NATO STARTING 16APR.MORE SPECIFICALLY IT WOULD BE

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PAGE TWO YBGR6325 CONF

DAMAGING IF ANY MADE PREMATURE POSITIVE RESPONSE. THOMAS COVERED NON-ACD ISSUES IN PREDICTABLE TERMS (SEE FOLLOWING TEL).

2. REPORT: IN ADDITION TO REPEATING CONTENTS OF SHULTZ LET ON INF/SRINF NITZE INFORMED COUNCIL THAT SHULTZ HOPED TO GET SOV AGMT TO BEGIN DRAFTING ON START AGMT. REDUCTION OF FIFTY PERCENT HAD BEEN AGREED, NOW IT WAS TIME TO AGREE ON SUBLIMITS. SHULTZ WOULD PROPOSE SUB-LIMIT OF 4800/4800 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS OF WHICH 3300/3300 WOULD BE LIMITED TO ICBM. APPLICATION OF FIFTY PERCENT WARHEAD REDUCTIONS TO REDUCTION OF THROW WEIGHTS WOULD HAVE TO BE GUARANTEED EITHER DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY IN AGMT SO THAT THROW WEIGHT LIMIT COULD NOT/NOT BE EXCEEDED SOMETIME DOWN ROAD. AS SUBSEQUENT FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTION HAD CAUSED PROBLEMS IN REYKJAVIK (NOT/NOT TO MENTION IN ALLIANCE) SHULTZ WOULD FOCUS ON FIRST FIFTY ACCOMPANIED BY COMMITMENT OF NON-WITHDRAWAL FROM ABM TREATY VALID UNTIL 1994. AT LUNCHEON NITZE TOLD PERM REPS THAT FOR SOVS KEY DEFENCE AND SPACE ISSUE WAS AVERTING DEPLOYMENT WHICH THEY BELIEVED SHOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE BY MUTUAL AGR AFTER PROPOSED MORATORIUM. NEW USA OFFER EXTENDS DECISION DATE FURTHER INTO THE FUTURE, BUT USA IS NOT/NOT THEN PREPARED TO BE CONSTRAINED. IN HIS 28 FEB SPEECH GORBACHEV FOCUSED ONLY ON NON-DEPLOYMENT. NITZE STATED IN RESPONSE TO SMITH QUESTION QUOTE ABM INTERPRETATION IS USA DOMESTIC ISSUE AND HENCE HAS BECOME ALLIANCE ONE UNQUOTE. SOVS DO NOT/NOT RAISE INTERPRETATION ISSUE IE BROAD OR NARROW AND THEY HAVE ...3

PAGE THREE YBGR6325 CONFD

NOT/NOT DECLARED THEMSELVES ONE WAY OR ANOTHER ON IT.THEY BASE THEIR CONCERN ABOUT SDI ON DEPLOYMENT POSSIBILITY.NITZE WAS CONVINCED THAT IF SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE FOR WHAT HAPPENS AFTER MORATORIUM,TESTING ISSUE WILL FADE AWAY(WISHFUL THINKING?).

3.ASKED ALSO BY SMITH TO ELABORATE ON USA CALL ON SOVS TO QUOTE REDRESS ABM VIOLATIONS UNQUOTE,NITZE STATED THAT THERE WAS JUST ONE - KRASNOYARSK RADAR - AND RE-DRESSAL MEANT DISMANTLING.SOVS HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO DISMANTLE IF USA FOREGOES MODERNIZATION OF THULE AND FLYINGDALES.SUMMING UP NITZE SAID THAT DEFENCE AND SPACE TALKS HAD BOILED DOWN TO DEPLOYMENT AND KRASNOYARSK.

4.ALL PERM REPS ADDRESSED INF/SRINF ISSUE RAISED IN SHULTZ LETTER. THERE WAS CONSENSUS THAT IS SOV PROPOSAL ON SRINF IS MADE THAT IT SHOULD BE SUBJ TO ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS.CLEARLY CONCERNED WITH PUBLIC HANDLING ASPECTS SHOULD SOVS MAKE PROPOSAL PUBLIC PERM REPS AGREED THAT ALLIED PUBLIC REACTION SHOULD BE BASED ON LINE CONTAINED IN SHULTZ LETTER.ALLIES ALSO AGREED THAT FIVE CONSTRAINTS ENUMERATED IN 1981 HAD TO BE INCLUDED IN INF AGMT ALTHO FRG PERM REP REVEALED THAT KOHL HAD TOLD REAGAN THIS WEEK THAT QUOTE IF WE WISHED TO AVOID ZERO SRINF IN CONTEXT OF LRINF AGMT THEN PERHAPS NO/NO CONSTRAINTS COULD BE SOLUTION UNQUOTE.THIS PROMPTED NETH AMB TO PLEAD WITH FRG NOT/NOT TO BRING THIS SUGGESTION INTO OPEN

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PAGE FOUR YBGR6325 CONF

BECAUSE CONSTRAINTS HAD BEEN ALLIANCE POLICY SINCE 1981. HE TOLD SMITH PRIVATELY NETH WAS UNSURE GENSCHER AGREED WITH THIS POSITION. SMITH SPOKE ALONG LINES CONTAINED IN DRAFT OF SSEA REPLY TO SHULTZ, DRAWING IN PARTICULAR ON PARAS THREE TO SEVEN.

5. THERE WAS GENERAL AGMT THAT ZERO SRINF WOULD HAVE DAMAGING CONSEQUENCES FOR FLEXIBLE RESPONSE GIVEN CURRENT CONVENTIONAL AND CW IMBALANCES. RESPONSE, WHICH NITZE INDICATED PRIVATELY, WAS REASSURING. AT SAME TIME IT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED TO BE DIFFICULT ISSUE TO HANDLE IN PUBLIC. AT LUNCHEON NITZE REVEALED THAT ONE QUOTE IDEA UNQUOTE THAT HE WAS TOYING WITH WOULD CALL FOR LIMIT OF SRINF IN 150/1000 KM RANGE TO BE SET ON BASIS OF WHAT EUROPEANS BELIEVED THEY NEEDED AND ON USA VIEW OF WHAT WAS MILITARILY REQUIRED AND POLITICALLY SUSTAINABLE - PERHAPS AT 100-200 LEVEL. THIS LEVEL WOULD REMAIN IN EFFECT UNTIL CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE WAS RESOLVED. THIS WOULD HAVE ADVANTAGE OF KEEPING NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL NEGOTIATIONS IN SEPARATE FORA BUT NONETHELESS RECOGNIZED LINKAGE. SINCE PUBLIC UNDERSTOOD CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE, LINKAGE WITH WHY ZERO SRINF COULD NOT/NOT NOW BE ACCEPTED WOULD, AS CONSEQUENCE BE BETTER UNDERSTOOD. FROM NODDING OF HEADS AROUND TABLE IDEA SEEMED TO FIND RECEPTIVE AUDIENCE, PARTICULARLY FROM ALTENBURG, CHM OF MC.

6. NUMBER OF PERM REPS MADE REF TO NEED TO STUDY CONSEQUENCES FOR ALLIANCE STRATEGY THAT REDUCED LEVELS OF SRINF WOULD HAVE. PICKING UP ON SMITHS OBSERVATION THAT WE SHOULD EXAMINE EFFECT REDUCED OR ...5

PAGE FIVE YBGR6325 CONF

ZERO SRINF WOULD HAVE ON OUR FORCE STRUCTURE AND ON CREDIBILITY OF DETERRENT POSTURE, USA PERM REP SUGGESTED ANOTHER APPROACH: RATHER THAN NEGOTIATING WITH SOVS SYSTEM BY SYSTEM AND THEN STUDYING EFFECT REDUCTION OR ELIMINATION OF ONE SYSTEM WOULD HAVE ON STRATEGY, WE SHOULD DETERMINE FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS IN LIGHT OF OUR STRATEGIC POLICIES (MC-14/3) AND THEN NEGOTIATE. IN OTHER WORDS ALLIANCE FORCE STRUCTURE SHOULD BE BASED ON AGREED STRATEGY RATHER THAN ON MATCHING SYSTEM FOR SYSTEM. IN THIS REGARD ALTENBERG INFORMED PERM REPS THAT HE HAD RECD AND CIRCULATED TWO PAPERS ON INF AND SRINF RECD FROM SHAPE.

7. FOLLOWING COMMENTS MADE DURING QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION PROVIDE RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS IN REFTTEL:

(A) RANGE OF 500 KM WAS SELECTED BECAUSE IT CORRESPONDS TO USA UNDERSTANDING OF RANGE OF SS-23. ACTUAL DISTANCE IS NOT/NOT ALL THAT RELEVANT; USA INSISTS SS-23 BE INCLUDED IN SRINF NEGS.

(B) GLITMAN STATED THAT CONVERSION IS SOV SMOKE-SCREEN FOR ATTEMPTING TO DENY RIGHT TO MATCH. IF USA HAS RIGHT TO EQUALITY HOW THEY ACHIEVE IT IS IRRELEVANT. IF CONVERSION WAS CHOSEN AS WAY TO REACH EQUALITY IT WOULD BE DONE IN SUCH WAY AS NOT/NOT TO PROVIDE SOVS WITH EXCUSE TO CIRCUMVENT.

(C) USA HAS FOUGHT AND WILL CONTINUE TO FIGHT TO ENSURE THAT DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT ARE EXCLUDED FROM INF AND SUBSEQUENT SRINF NEGS. SOVS HAD ACCEPTED POINT IN INF NEGS.

(D) TESTING-USA WILL PURSUE RATIFICATION OF TWO TREATIES BUT WITH ENHANCED VERIFICATION PROVISIONS.

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TO EXTOTT (RER)

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---USA EMB IN MOSCO:SECURITY CATASTROPHE

SUMMARY:USA EMB IN MOSCO HAS SUFFERED SECURITY CATASTROPHE OF APPARENTLY UNPRECEDENTED PROPORTIONS.COLLAPSE OF MARINES PROTECTIVE SERVICE MAY HAVE COMPROMISED NOT/NOT ONLY OPERATIONS OF MOSCO EMB AND POSSIBLY OTHERS,BUT ALSO PERHAPS ELEMENTS OF USA NEGOTIATING POSITION IN ARMS CONTROL NEGS(THOUGH ADMIN IS DENYING THAT).WHAT IT HAS CERTAINLY DONE IS PROMPT EXTENSIVE SERIES OF HIGH LEVEL INVESTIGATIONS INTO WHAT IT HAS ALL COST,WHY IT HAPPENED,AND HOW IT COULD BE PREVENTED IN FUTURE,THOSE WITH RESPONSIBILITY IN AREA ARE TAKING COVER AND CONGRESS IS IN HUNT FOR PERSONS TO BLAME.FOR ADMIN, IT WAS PRECISELY WRONG PROBLEM AT WRONG TIME,IT HAS DONE SERIOUS DAMAGE TO AMERICAN/SOV RELNS AND UNDERMINED PROSPECTS FOR AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT IN NEAR TERM.SHULTZ IS PRECEEDING TO MOSCO FOR HIS MTG WITH SHEVARDNADZE DESPITE ADVERSE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH HE WILL HAVE TO OPERATE.HE HAS BEEN TOLD TO MAKE SECURITY ISSUE MAJOR ITEM OF AGENDA.

2.ASSUME CDN EXPERTS ARE EXAMINING WHETHER THIS BREACH OF USA SECURITY/COMMUNICATIONS HAS ANY IMPLICATIONS FOR CDN SYSTEM

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PAGE TWO UNGR1612 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

3. REPORT: ON TUE OF THIS WEEK, PRES ANNOUNCED SERIES OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO MOSCO EMB SECURITY CRISIS. SEVERAL WERE ALREADY UNDER WAY INCLUDING:

(A) INTERAGENCY DAMAGE ASSESSMENT BEGUN BY NSC DIR CARLUCCI TWO WEEKS AGO; (B) SEPARATE STATE AND DEFENCE DEPT REVIEWS OF SECURITY AT EMB IN MOSCO, VIENN, ROME AND POSSIBLY ELSEWHERE; AND (C) 70-PERSON NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION.

4. IN ADDITION, REAGAN SAID HE HAD ASKED:

(D) FORMER DEFENCE SECTY LAIRD TO CHAIR AN ASSESSMENT REVIEW PANEL INCLUDING FORMER CIA DIR HELMS AND RETIRED JCS CHMN GEN VESSEY,

(E) AMB ANNE ARMSTRONG OF PRESIDENTS FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD (PFIAB) TO EXAMINE PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES USED TO PROTECT EMB FACILITIES ABROAD.

(F) BOTHE TO EVALUATE CONDITION OF NEW EMB BLDG NOW UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN MOSCO, TO ASCERTAIN QUOTE WHETHER IT WILL EVER BE SECURE OR WHETHER IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO DESTROY AND REBUILT IT UNQUOTE, TASK ON WHICH FORMER DEFENCE SECTY AND CIA DIR SCHLESINGER, AN INTERAGENCY GROUP OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS, AND NATL BUREAU OF STANDARDS HAVE ALL SEPARATELY BEEN AT WORK SINCE BEFORE LATEST REVELATIONS.

(G) FINALLY, SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENCE HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON FUTURE MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY PERSONNEL AT USA EMBASSIES, WITH RESPECT TO THEIR SELECTION, LENGTH OF ASSIGNMENT AND SUPERVISION. REPORTS ARE TO BE SUBMITTED WITHIN 90 DAYS AND

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PAGE THREE UNGR1612 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

COORDINATED BY NSC, WHICH IS TO MAKE COMPREHENSIVE RECOMMENDATIONS TO PRES ON QUOTE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND ACCOUNTABILITY UNQUOTE.

5. SCOPE AND STATUS OF THESE INVESTIGATIONS TESTIFY TO ALARM WHICH HAS ARISEN HERE OVER REVELATIONS THAT MARINE SGT CLAYTON LONETREE, CPL ARNOLD BRACY AND PERHAPS OTHERS ALLOWED SOV NATLS ACCESS TO MOST SECURE SECTIONS OF MOSCO EMB CHANCERY, (AND THAT SGT JOHN WEIRICK PERMITTED SAME THING AT LEININGRAD CONSULATE). ADMIN HAS NOT/NOT DISGUISED SERIOUSNESS OF SITU, BUT IN PUBLIC HAS BEEN VERY RELUCTANT TO DIVULGE DETAILS OF SECURITY BREACH OR OF DAMAGE SUSTAINED. MOST AUTHORITATIVE PUBLIC REMARKS ON MATTER HAVE BEEN THOSE OF ASST SECTY OF STATE ROBERT LAMB, WHO SAID THIS WEEK THAT DEPT WAS OPERATING ON QUOTE WORST CASE UNQUOTE ASSUMPTIONS. MORE SPECIFICALLY, HE SAID THAT AS RESULT OF SOVS HAVING HAD ACCESS TO SECURE SECTION OF EMB, THERE HAD BEEN SERIOUS LOSS OF CLASSIFIED INFO AND SOVS HAD BEEN ABLE QUOTE AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO COMPROMISE OUR CRYPTOGRAPHIC EQPT AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEYING MATERIALS UNQUOTE IN EMB COMMUNICATIONS CENTRE, AS WELL AS TO COMPROMISE SAFE-SPEECH ROOMS. (HE SAID HE HAD BEEN ASSURED CODES THEMSELVES HAD NOT/NOT BEEN COMPROMISED). MOREOVER, EMBASSYS WHOLE COMPLEX OF ELECTRONIC ALARMS, MONITORS AND OTHER SURVEILLANCE DEVICES COULD NO/NO LONGER BE REILED ON FOR SECURITY. LAMB ALSO POINTED OUT THAT AS BREACH OF SECURITY COULD NOT/NOT BE CONSIDERED SIMPLY MARINE CORPS PROBLEM, MANAGEMENT OF ENTIRE SECURITY ...4



PAGE FOUR UNGR1612 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

OVERSIGHT SYSTEM AT EMB HAD BEEN CALLED INTO QUESTION AND HAD TO BE LOOKED INTO.

6. DESPITE THESE PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS, ADMIN HAS TRIED TO DOWNPLAY DAMAGE WHICH AFFAIR MAY HAVE DONE. THUS CARLUCCI OBSERVED AFTER PRESIDENT'S ANNOUNCEMENT ON 27 APR THAT MANY OF USA POSNS ON ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL ISSUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS WERE ALREADY IN PUBLIC DOMAINE, AND INSOFAR AS PARTICULAR POSITIONS ON ARMS CONTROL WERE CONCERNED, SINCE FINAL DECISIONS HAD NOT/NOT YET BEEN TAKEN ON POSITIONS SHULTZ WOULD CARRY WITH HIM TO MOSCO THEY COULD NOT/NOT HAVE BEEN COMPROMISED. (THOSE DECISIONS WERE ONLY TAKEN WED OF THIS WEEK). ON OTHER HAND, WASHINGTON TIMES REPORTED TODAY THAT IT HAD LEARNED FROM OFFICIAL SOURCES NOT/NOT ONLY THAT USA ARMS CONTROL STRATEGY HAD BEEN COMPROMISED BUT ALSO THAT USA TECHNIQUES FOR MONITORING SOV COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN COMPROMISED. IN ADDITION, IT HAD BEEN TOLD NUMBER OF RUSSIANS WORKING FOR USA INTELLIGENCE HAS BEEN UNCOVERED AND KILLED IN PAST YEAR. ADMIN HAS ALSO BEEN RELUCTANT TO ASSUME MUCH BLAME. IT HAS OBSERVED THAT CHAIN OF COMMAND RUNS FROM MARINES THROUGH STATE SECURITY STAFF TO SECTY, BUT SHULTZ'S ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY YESTERDAY SOUNDED MORE OBLIGATORY THAN CONVINCING.

7. CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS, WHO LAST WEEK RECEIVED CONFIDENTIAL ADMIN BRIEFING, HAVE NOT/NOT ONLY EXPRESSED GOOD DEAL MORE ALARM, BUT HAVE ALSO BEEN MORE CRITICAL OF THOSE IN POSNS OF RESPONSIBILITY. ON

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PAGE FIVE UNGR1612 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

WEEKEND, SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY (D-VERMONT), WHO IS ON SENATE SELECT CTTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, DESCRIBED SITU AS MAJOR COUP FOR USSR. HAVING ACHIEVED ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS AREA, HE SAID IT WAS PROBABLE SOVS HAD INFILTRATED A CRYPTO EXPERT, AND AS CONSEQUENCE, MIGHT NOW BE IN POSN TO DECYPHER PAST MSGS. (STATE DEPT HAS TEAM REVIEWING THESE ALREADY TO ASSESS POSSIBLE DAMAGE). REP DANIEL MIC (D-FLA), CHMN OF HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCTTEE ON INNATL OPERATIONS, DESCRIBED SITUATION AS QUOTE A SECUEITY, DIPLOMATIC AND INTELLIGENCE DISASTER OF FIRST MAGNITUDE UNQUOTE. REPLACING CRYPTOGRAPHIC AND OTHER EQPT ALONE HE ESTIMATED WOULD COST MORE THAN DLRS 20 MILLION. AFTER HE AND RANKING REPUBLICAN ON SUBCTTEE, CONGRESSWOMAN OLYMPIA SNOW (R-MAINE) PAID INSPECTION VISIT TO MOSCO OVER WEEKEND, THEY REPORTED THAT QUOTE EMBASSYS SECURITY SYSTEM HAS SERIOUS SHORTCOMINGS AND IS FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED IN BOTH PHYSICAL AND PERSONNEL AREAS UNQUOTE. LACK OF REDUNDANCY WAS PARTICULAR PROBLEM, AND ALARM SYSTEM DID NOT/HAVE EVENT RECORDERS (DEPENDING THEREFORE ON QUOTE TRUSTWORTHINESS OF TWO INDIVIDUALS WHO CAN OVERRIDE THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM AND PERMIT ACCESS TO MOST SENSITIVE AREAS OF THE EMB BY UNAUTHORIZED INDIVIDUALS UNQUOTE). THEY ALSO REPORTED QUOTE NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS MARINES UNQUOTE ON PART OF KEY EMB PERSONNEL, LAX ATTITUDE TOWARD SECURITY VIOLATIONS (OF WHICH THER WERE 137 IN 1986), RESISTANCE AND RESENTMENT OVER RECENT INTRODUCTION OF IDENTIFICATION BADGES, AND LACK OF LEADERSHIP BY SNR STAFF. NEW BLDG, THEY REPORTED, HAD ...6.

PAGE SIX UNGR1612 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

SUCH SERIOUS SECURITY PROBLEMS THAT EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE OF OCCUPANCY WAS AT LEAST FIVER YEARS AWAY QUOTE IF EVER UNQUOTE. E.MICA/SNOWE REPORT(COPY BY FAX TO SELECTED ADDRESSEES)WILL VERY LIKELY STIMULATE CONVENING FOR FIRST TIME OF ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW BOARD(WRITTEN INTO LAW AFTER BERUT BOMBING)TO WHICH SENIOR ADMIN OFFICIALS WILL BE CALLED TO ACCOUNT FOR THEIR ACTIONS.AMONG THOSE MOST LIKELY TO BE CALLED WILL BE CURRENT REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER FREDERICK MECKE AND FORMER AMB ARTHUR HARTMAN.ATTENTION IS LIVELY TO FOCUS NOT/NOT ONLY ON LONETREE/BRACY AFFAIR,BUT PERHAPS EVEN MORE ON MANAGEMENT OF CONSTRUCTION OF NEW USA EMB BLDG IN MOSCO.THERE HAS ALREADY BEEN A VIGOROUS POINTING OF FINGERS OVER WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR SELECTION OF SITE(WHICH HAS BEEN CRITICIZED FOR BEING AT VERY LOW EVLEVATION AND HENCE LIKELY TO BE OBJECT RATHER THAN SUBJECT OF SURVEILLANCE,COMPARED TO HILL ON WHICH NEW SOV EMB IS BEING BUILT IN WSBDC),AND OVER WHO PERMITTED CONSTRUCTION SCHEDULE WHICH ALLOWED SOVS SUCH EASY OPPORTUNITIES TO BUG CONSTRUCTION MATERIALS BEFORE THEY WERE BROUGHT ON SITE(COMPARED TO VERY VIGOROUS SOV POLICING PRACTICE DESCRIBED THIS WEEK BY USA CONTRACTOR WHO PUT UP SOV CHANCERY).IN RESPONSE,STATE DEPT HAS RFLEASED FACT SHEET WHICH RECOUNTS HISTORY OF EMB CONSTRUCTION ISSUE(COPIES BY FAX TO SELECTED ADDRESSEES)EXTENDING RESPONSIBILITY ALL THE WAY BACK TO JOHNSON ADMIN.

S.MEANWHILE,FIFTY MEMBER CONGRESSIONAL DEL HEADED BY HOUSE SPEAKER ...7

PAGE SEVEN UNGR1612 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

WRIGHT WILL BE DESCENDING ON MOSCO ON TUE, INTER ALIA TO FURTHER SCRUTINIZE SECURITY SITUATION, AND SENATOR DOLE HAS SAID HE WILL INTRODUCE LEGISLATION FOR MANDATORY DEATH PENALTY FOR THOSE CAUGHT IN ESPIONAGE.

12. NOTWITHSTANDING ALL INVESTIGATIONS WHICH HAVE BEGUN AND PUBLIC CONTROVERSY WHICH HAS ARISEN, ADMIN HAS MOVED QUICKLY TO CONTAIN DAMAGE AND TO TRY TO PREPARE FOR SHULTZ VISIT TO MOSCO BEGGING MON. SOME OF MOST NOTEWORTHY MEASURES HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING:

(I) ROTATION BACK TO USA OF ALL 28 MARINES CURRENTLY STATIONED IN MOSCO, AS PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE AND TO FACILITATE INVESTIGATIONS. ACCORDING TO ADMIN, FEW OF RETURNING MARINES SERVED IN MOSCO AT SAME TIME AS LONETREE AND BRACY, AND THERE IS NO/NO EVIDENCE AT PRESENT ANY OF THEM ARE IMPLICATED IN ANY WRONGDOING. THEY ARE TO BE REPLACED BY 28 OTHERS CURRENTLY STATIONED AFROAD OR AT MARINE HQS AT QUANTICO, VIRGINIA. FOURTEEN HAVE ALREADY BEEN ASSEMBLED IN FRANKFURT AND ARE AWAITING SOV ENTRY VISAS. ALL HAVE BEEN SPECIALLY SELECTED AND ARE EXPERIENCED MARINE SECURITY GUARDS THOUGH NOT/NOT IN MOSCO. AS SOON AS REPLACEMENTS GO IN, INCUMBENTS WILL BE LEAVING (THOUGH THEY IN TURN WILL HAVE TO WAIT FOR EXIT VISAS). WHOLE EXERCISE IS EXPECTED TO BE COMPLETED BEFORE END OF THIS MONTH. AS STOP-GAP, ADMIN IS SENDING SECURITY SPECIALISTS IN AS MEMBERS OF SHULTZ DEL.

(II) CURRENT REGIONAL SECURITY OFFICER, FREDERICK MECKE, HAS RETURNED TO WSEDC TEMPORARILY FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH SECURITY OFFICIALS, AND A  
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PAGE EIGHT UNGR1612 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

REPLACEMENT WILL BE SENT OUT SHORTLY. STATE DEPT HAS ALSO BEGUN TO INTERVIEW OTHER EMB EMPLOYEES. ACCORDING TO ASST SECTY LAMB, MECKES RECORD IN MOSCO HAS BEEN GOOD SINCE HE ARRIVED IN SEP85 AND HE IS NOT/NOT UNDER SUSPICION. (BUT HE DIDNT LOOK PARTICULARLY HAPPY WHEN WE SAY HIM IN STATE DEPT TODAY).

(III) AMB WILLIAM BROWN HAS BEEN RECALLED TEMPORARILY FM PNGKK AND DESIGNATED SPECIAL STATE DEPT COORDINATOR FOR ALL ACTIVITIES RELATED TO MOSCO EMB SECURITY SITU, WITH PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY FOR RESTORING EMB QUOTE TO SECURE OPERATING CAPABILITY UNQUOTE. CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN TO CREATING SPECIAL MOSCO SECURITY REVIEW BOARD TO ASSIST IN TASK. BROWN IS ONE OF STATE DEPTS MOST EXPERIENCED SOVIETOLOGISTS (AS WELL AS FORMER MARINE). HE IS TO REPORT DIRECTLY TO SHULTZ (WHO IS ANOTHER FORMER MARINE).

(IV) AS PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE, ASSUMPTION IS BEING MADE THAT COMMUNICATIONS TO AND FROM MOSCO HAVE BEEN COMPROMISED. AS RESULT, ALL CLASSIFIED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN WSHDC AND EMB HAVE BEEN TERMINATED, AND MSGS ARE BEING HAND-CARRIED DAILY BETWEEN WSHDC AND/OR FRANKFURT AND MOSCO. LIMITED CAPACITY SECURE CABLE AND VOICE SYSTEMS WILL, HOWEVER, BE AVAILABLE DURING SHULTZ VISIT, AS RESULT OF WHITE HOUSE LOANING STATE DEPT PRESIDENTS MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS UNIT WHICH CAN LINK UP WITH SATELLITE. UNIT IS BEING FLOWN TO MOSCO TODAY AND WILL BE PARKED IN UNDERGROUND GARAGE OF NEW EMB BLDG. (STATE CONTACT TELLS US SOME THOUGHT HAS BEEN GIVEN TO TAKING UP UK OFFER OF USE OF BRIT ...9

PAGE NINE UNGR1612 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

EMB COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES, BUT NOT/NOT UNTIL AFTER SHULTZ VISIT IS OVER). ON ASSUMPTION MOST OF EMBASSYS SAFE-SPEECH ROOMS HAVE ALSO BEEN COMPROMISED (ONE APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN OUT OF REACH), ADDITIONAL SAFE-SPEECH BUBBLES ARE BEING CONSTRUCTED OUT OF MATERIALS AVAILABLE AT CONSTRUCTION SITE OR BROUGHT IN FROM USA.

(V) PRES HAS CONFIRMED THAT SOVS WILL NOT/NOT BE ALLOWED INTO THEIR NEW QUARTERS HERE UNTIL USA CAN OCCUPY SECURE NEW BDLG IN MOSCO.

11. CONCLUSION: USA EMB MOSCO HAS SUSTAINED JUST ABOUT HEAVIEST SECURITY LOSSES IMAGINABLE AND ON VERY EVE OF ARRIVAL OF 170 PERSON SHULTZ DEL AND 50 PERSON CONGRESSIONAL DEL. PEOPLE ARE COPING AS BEST THEY CAN, BUT IT IS OBVIOUS FROM OUR CONTACTS HERE THAT STRAIN IS ENORMOUS. MOREOVER, POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE HAS BECOME VERY GLOOMY, AND SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MTG IS NO/NO LONGER BEING DESCRIBED AS PREPARATORY TO SUMMIT.

12. WE ASSUME OUR OWN SECURITY EXPERTS ARE EXAMINING WHETHER APPARENT COMPROMISE OF AMERICAN CRYPTO EQPT COULD HAVE ANY IMPLICATIONS FOR OUR OWN SYSTEM.

CCC/230 102221Z UNGR1612



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COURTEL IDR 1354 APR 09

SUBJ/SUJ

NITZE BRIEFING TO NAC: SSEA LETTER TO SHULTZ

FURTHER TO REFTTEL, ATTACHED IS TEXT OF LETTER WE HAVE  
RECOMMENDED SSEA SEND IN RESPONSE TO SHULTZ APR 06  
LETTER ON INF. YOU MAY WISH TO DRAW ON ITS CONTENTS FOR  
PURPOSES OF NITZE BRIEFING. HOWEVER, AS IT HAS YET TO  
BE SIGNED, YOU SHOULD NOT ATTRIBUTE CONTENTS/VIEWS TO  
SSEA.

(COMCENTER PLS FAX ATTACHED)

**SECRET**

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2-7921

D. KARSGAARD

SIG

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The Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, P.C., M.P.  
Secretary of State for External Affairs



Canada

Le très hon. Joe Clark, C.P., député  
Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures

SECRET

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A OG2

Dear George:

I want to thank you for your letter of April 6, and express my appreciation for the opportunity to comment on the issue of intermediate-range nuclear forces prior to your departure for Moscow.

Once again, as I did during your visit to Ottawa earlier this week, let me express our continuing strong support for the USA negotiating approach on INF at the Geneva talks. It has been USA firmness at the negotiating table that has resulted in a Soviet return to its pre-Reykjavik position on the possibility of a separate INF agreement. Allied solidarity on this issue has also been an important factor. Only when INF had lost its propaganda value and its utility as a means of dividing the Alliance did the USSR begin to negotiate seriously. Continued Alliance cohesion and support for American efforts to secure an agreement will therefore be paramount.

I agree that the Soviet position on short-range INF is ambiguous. I am convinced that the USSR is aware of Western concerns on SRINF, as indicated by General Secretary Gorbachov's commitment in his February 28 statement to remove SS-22 and SS-23 missiles deployed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia in 1983. The question remains, however, whether the Soviet Union is really interested in eliminating such systems or is merely manoeuvring to maintain its SRINF advantage.

I fully support the five criteria for constraints on SRINF which you are pursuing in the context of an INF agreement. Clearly, SRINF constraints should be included in an initial INF Treaty and the provision made for USA/Soviet equality in these missile systems.

The Honourable George Shultz,  
Secretary of State,  
Washington, D.C.

.../2



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- 2 -

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3/3

On the question of what level of SRINF constraints would be most acceptable to the Alliance, I see three possible options - an agreed ceiling at current Soviet levels, a balance at lower than current Soviet levels, and zero/zero SRINF. An agreed ceiling at current Soviet levels would only be acceptable if NATO were able to match the Soviet levels. As there has not up until now been a stated requirement for the Alliance to have SRINF missiles in such quantity, and as such deployment might present us with political difficulties, I am not attracted by this option.

I am more attracted to option two. The merit of this approach would be that the deployment of a limited number of NATO SRINF missiles, if feasible and necessary, would increase flexible options in this range band. It might also prove more politically acceptable to European publics than deployment in large numbers. At the same time, the Soviet threat would be reduced. A major factor in determining the level at which the balance should be struck must be determined, however, by the military requirement.

Finally, I see the third option of a zero/zero SRINF outcome as a potential long-term goal, but one likely to be determined by follow-on INF negotiations. The eventual disposition of shorter-range systems, and efforts to correct the conventional force imbalance in Europe will also need to be taken into account. Clearly zero/zero would be most desirable from a verification point of view, but its impact on Alliance security must be carefully analyzed.

Once again, I appreciate the opportunity for exchanging views on this issue. I extend to you my best wishes for a successful and fruitful trip to the USSR next week and I look forward to our meeting in Brussels on April 16.

Yours sincerely,



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---THOMAS/NITZE 10APR BRIEFING TO NAC

SHULTZ VISIT TAKING PLACE AMIDST GRADUAL YET MARKED IMPROVEMENT

IN USA/USSR RELATIONS. CURRENT USA EMBASSY SPY SCANDAL AND

ITS CHRONOLOGICAL RELATIONSHIP TO VISIT HAS FAMILIAR RING

OF LAST FALLS DANILOFF-REYKJAVIK CONUNDRUM, YET DOES NOT/NOT

SEEM TO HAVE POISONED ATMOSPHERE NOR/NOT HAMPERED PREPARATIONS.

ANTICIPATION OF INF AGREEMENT IN WAKE OF USSR FEB28 ANNOUNCEMENT

HAS GARNERED GOOD DEAL OF PUBLIC AND PRESS ATTENTION IN CONNECTION

WITH VISIT, BUT THERE HAVE BEEN OTHER MORE SUBTLE YET EQUALLY

SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER AREAS WHICH HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY

INFLUENCED SHULTZ DECISION TO GO TO MOSCO. WE DOUBT IN THIS

VEIN THAT SHULTZ WOULD HAVE GONE TO USSR ONLY TO DISCUSS

INF. RISK OF RETURNING EMPTY-HANDED WAS TOO GREAT. RATHER

USA ADMIN MAY SEE THIS AS OPPORTUNITY TO REINVIGORATE ITS

FOREIGN POLICY PURSUITS IN AFTERMATH OF IRANGATE, WHILE USSR

...2

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PAGE TWO IDR1354 CONFD

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AT LEAST IMPLICIT

IS LIKELY TO SEEK <sup>L</sup>USA ENDORSEMENT OF RECENT GORBACHOV POLICY INITIATIVES ON NUMBER OF FRONTS, IE DOMESTIC REFORM, RENEWED BILATERAL COMMERCIAL CONTACTS, HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL ISSUES. 2. WSHDC REFTL PROVIDED GOOD COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW OF STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS AND POSSIBLE SUBJECTS SHULTZ MAY RAISE IN MOSCO. WE CAN ADD NOTHING FURTHER TO THEIR THOROUGH ANALYSIS. WE EXPECT PRIMARY INTEREST AT 10APR NAC MTG WILL FOCUS, HOWEVER, ON ARMS CONTROL, WITH EUROPEANS SEEKING CLARIFICATION OF USA INF POSITION IN WAKE OF SHULTZ 06APR LET TO COLLEAGUES. DISCUSSION MAY ALSO TOUCH UPON CONVENTIONAL STABILITY, CSCE, HUMAN RIGHTS (IN LIGHT OF PERSISTENT RUMOURS ABOUT JEWISH EMIGRATION), AND EFFECTS OF GORBACHOV DOMESTIC POLICIES. WE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN THIS REGARD IN USA VIEWS ON CURRENT STATE OF BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, PROGNOSIS FOR FUTURE, AND FACTORS WHICH HAVE GENERATED SHULTZ TRIP, IE IS REAGAN/GORBACHOV USA SUMMIT IMMINENT?

3. ON INF IN PARTICULAR, WE WOULD AGREE WITH USA VIEW THAT SOVIET POSITION IS IN FLUX. IT IS ALSO APPARENT FROM SHULTZ LETTER, HOWEVER, THAT USA DOES NOT/NOT YET KNOW WHICH WAY TO JUMP. IN THIS CONTEXT, EUROPEAN VIEWS WILL BE DECISIVE.

CDA  
ON OTHER HAND CAN AFFORD TO BE FLEXIBLE. IT IS CLEAR NEVERTHELESS THAT FULL MILITARY APPRECIATION OF POSSIBLE OUTCOMES SHOULD BE PRIORITY. ~~SUBSEQUENT TEL TO WSHDC CONTAINING S-SEA RESPONSE~~

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PAGE THREE IDR1354 CONFD

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~~TO SHULTZ LET WILL PROVIDE FURTHER BACKGROUND TO CDN VIEWS  
ON THIS ISSUE.~~

4. YOU MAY WISH TO CONSIDER RAISING FOLLOWING QUESTIONS ON  
SPECIFIC ASPECTS OF VISIT. ARMS CONTROL: A. WHY DOES USA  
DEFINITION OF SRINF BEGIN AT 500KMS AND NOT/NOT INCLUDE SCUD  
B WITH RANGE OF 300 KMS? 1984 EDITION OF QUOTE NATO/WP FORCE  
COMPARISONS UNQUOTE INCLUDES SCUD UNDER SRINF MISSILE SYSTEMS.  
B. DOES USA ENVISAGE PHASED APPROACH TO LRINF WITHDRAWALS  
SUCH THAT SRINF COULD BE DEALT WITH DURING INITIAL DRAWDOWN  
STAGES? IF NOT/NOT, MIGHT SUCH A PHASED APPROACH PROVIDE  
ASSURANCE THAT O/O LRINF AGREEMENT <sup>WOULD</sup> ~~NOT~~ NOT/NOT BE REPLACED  
WITH DISADVANTAGEOUS SRINF IMBALANCE?

C. WE ASSUME USA POSITION ON SRINF REFERS TO MISSILES ONLY,  
AND NOT/NOT NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT. DOES USSR ACCEPT THIS  
CONCEPT?

D. WHAT IS RATIONALE FOR DELAYING BEGINNING OF START/SPACE/DEFENCE  
PORTIONS OF NEXT ROUND BUT NOT/NOT INF? WILL SHULTZ BE PRESENTING  
NEW PROPOSALS ON START/SPACE/DEFENCE WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY  
SUCH A DELAY?

E. CAN USA COMMENT ON SIGNIFICANCE OF SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT  
REGARDING NUCLEAR TESTING NEGOTIATIONS?

5. HUMAN RIGHTS: A. COULD USA COMMENT ON RECENT RUMOURS REGARDING  
MORE LIBERAL SOVIET POLICY ON JEWISH EMIGRATION?

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PAGE FOUR IDR1354 CONFD

B.DO SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN EXIT PERMITS IN RECENT MONTHS  
GIVE GROUNDS FOR INCREASED OPTIMISM IN THIS AREA?

C.DOES USA SEE SUCH <sup>C</sup>ACTIONS AS PRIMARILY PROPAGANDISTIC OR  
SIGNAL OF REAL CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY? IF LATTER, WHAT IS  
REASONING BEHIND SUCH CHANGE?

6.REGIONAL ISSUES:A. WILL SHULTZ BE EXPLORING SOVIET POSITION  
ON AFGHANISTAN WITHDRAWALS?

B.DOES USA SEE ROLE FOR ITSELF IN SETTLEMENT PROCESS?

7.BILATERAL: A. CAN USA REPS COMMENT ON SOVIET ECONOMIC REFORMS  
AND WHETHER THEY SEE POSITIVE EFFECTS <sup>FOR</sup> ~~ON~~ USA/USSR COMMERCIAL/  
ECONOMIC CONTACTS?

B.IS THERE ENOUGH CURRENT AGREEMENT ON ISSUES OF SUBSTANCE  
WHICH COULD WARRANT EARLY DECISION FOR FURTHER SUMMIT MTG?

8. THIS TEL CLEARED WITH RBR AND URR.

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

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---SHULTZ VISIT TO USSR:ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS

MINISTERIAL ATTENDANCE:NETH DEL HAS CONFIRMED THAT VAN DEN BROEK  
WILL ATTEND.

2.AT PERMREPS LUNCHEON TODAY USA PERMREP REGISTERED CONCERN OVER  
FACT THAT ONLY SIX FMS HAD INDICATED INTENTION TO ATTEND.QUOTE  
JUNIOR MINISTERS DO NOT/NOT COUNT UNQUOTE.SIDE TRIP TO BRU WOULD  
COST USG DLRS ONE MILLION(2/2 PLANES,100/100 PEOPLE).MORE  
IMPORTANTLY,SHULTZ WAS BRIEFING ALLIES BEFORE BRIEFING PRES.ALLIES  
SHOULD BE AWARE,SAID USA PERMREP,THAT SHULTZ SET STORE IN ALLIANCE  
CONSULTATIONS BUT LOW ATTENDANCE WAS SENDING WRONG SIGNAL.

3.ON WEEKEND USA COLLEAGUE TOLD US THAT FRUSTRATION WAS DIRECTED  
MORE AT THOSE FROM EC WHO COMPLAINED ABOUT USA ACTING ON ITS OWN  
BUT THEN DECLINED TO TAKE UP OFFER TO MEET WITH SHULTZ TO DISCUSS  
TALKS.LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR 16APR MTG WAS SURE WAY TO STIFLE  
WILLINGNESS TO CONSULT.

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TO/A USS(through RGB and RRD)  
FROM/DE • RBR  
REFERENCE • Moscow Telegram XYGR0625 Apr 2  
REFFERENCE  
SUBJECT • Lonetree Affair: Implications for  
SUJET the Visit of President Reagan

Security/Sécurité <b>SECRET</b>
Accession/Référence 494906
File/Dossier 20-USA-1-3-USSR A7
Date April 3, 1987
Number/Numéro RBR-0899

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

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We attach a report from our Embassy in Moscow that describes a very serious situation at the USA Embassy there. The damage to the national security of the USA, and for that matter of the Allies, is important. Possibly more important, however, is the effect on the Reagan Administration.

- According to the NBC news today, the President's Intelligence Advisory Committee warned two years ago that the security situation at the Moscow Embassy was at risk. It is not known whether anything was done about this warning.
- Secretary Shultz' political authority could be affected by fall-out from the chaos at the Embassy.
- The Administration may have to re-think its negotiating strategy if it believes that the Soviets have an accurate knowledge of USA positions.
- As one more disaster in what has been a series, this cannot but have affected the Administration's perceptions of the Soviet threat. Moreover, should the full dimensions of this become public, the Administration's ability to exercise leadership in East/West relations could be weakened.

2. You may wish to take this into account in any briefing of the Prime Minister and the SSEA for their meetings next week.

*D.R.T. Fraser*  
D.R.T. Fraser  
Director  
USSR and Eastern Europe  
Relations Division

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ACTION

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---LONETREE AFFAIR:ROCK BOTTOM

USA EMB COLLEAGUE 21APR CONFIRMED MEDIA DAMAGE REPORTS ABOUT LONETREE AFFAIR.EMB,HE SAID,WAS TOTALLY PENETRATED.COMCENTRE HAD BEEN STRIPPED.USE OF ELECTRIC TYPEWRITERS AND WORD PROCESSORS HAD BEEN FORBIDDEN.OFFICERS WERE WRITING REPORTS IN LONGHAND. EVERYTHING WAS BEING CHANELLED THROUGH CHARGE AND SHIPPED OUT BY BAG TO FRANKFURT WHERE IT WOULD BE REASSEMBLED.FORMER COLLEAGUE NOW AT USA EMB BRUSSELS LAST WEEK TOLD US HE AND WIFE WHO IS SECRETARY WERE BEING DISPATCHED TO FRANKFURT FOR TWO WEEK STINT.

cc: ISD/Sym  
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2.MORE TELLING.MOSCOW COLLEAGUE SAID THEY HAD YET TO RECEIVE GUIDANCE FROM EMB MGT ON HOW TO COPE WITH SITU,WHAT REPORTING PRIORITIES SHOULD BE.HIGHPOWERED OFFICERS,HE SAID,USED TO IMMEDIATE FEEDBACK,WERE QUOTE CLIMBING WALLS UNQUOTE.SOME WERE SAYING THEY WOULD BE HAPPY TO LEAVE TOMORROW.LONETREE AFFAIR, COLLEAGUE SAID,WHILE EXTREME,WAS ONLY ONE MORE BLOW TO DETERIORATING MORALE AT EMB.

3.MORALE PROBLEM SEEMS TO BE NASTY COMBINATION OF UNTOWARD EVENTS (SPY DUST,CHEMNOBYL,DANILOFF EXPULSIONS),LAIDBACK MGT STYLE AND BROKEN DOWN COMMUNICATIONS.FEELINGS OF ISOLATION AND

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GARRISON MENTALITY FROM MOVE ONTO NEW EMB COMPOUND HAVE FURTHER  
COMPLICATED SITU. FORMER USA AMB HARTMAN DURING LAST YR WAS AWAY  
GREAT DEAL. CHARGE COMES WHOSE ARRIVAL COINCIDED WITH SPY DUST  
AFFAIR DOES NOT/NOT SEEM TO HAVE SHAKEN IT OFF. EMB STAFF,  
COLLEAGUE SAID, CONSIDERED HIM STANDOFFISH AND UNINVOLVED. EMB  
WAS INCREASINGLY UNHAPPY WORLD, WITH MARINES GIVING IMPRESSION  
OF BEING LAW UNTO THEMSELVES.

4. COLLEAGUE SAID USA STATE DEPT UNDERSECTY ARMACOST GOT EARFUL  
DURING RECENT MOSCO VISIT. ON RETURN TO WSHDC, HE INFORMED SHULTZ  
WHO IMMEDIATELY CALLED MATLOCK. SHULTZ TOLD MATLOCK MORALE SITU  
IN MOSCO HAD HIT ROCK BOTTOM AND THAT HE HAD WORK CUT OUT FOR HIM.  
MATLOCK THEN GOT ONTO PHONE TO COMES WHO, COLLEAGUE SAID, SEEMED  
FOR FIRST TIME WORRIED ABOUT HIS OWN FUTURE. MANY USA EMB STAFF  
WE KNOW RESENT MATLOCK, BLAMING HIM FOR RECALL OF HARTMAN AND  
REMOVAL OF SOVIET STAFF. WHETHER LONETREE AFFAIR HAS CHANGED THAT  
WILL BECOME EVIDENT WHEN NEW AMB ARRIVES LATER TODAY.

6. PRECEDING CONTAINS INFO PROVIDED ON PERSONAL BASIS AND FOR  
OBVIOUS REASONS MUST BE MOST CAREFULLY PROTECTED. PLSE SHARE  
CONTENTS WITH RRD/ISS.

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REF BNATO TEL YBGR6268 25MAR

---AMERICAN/SOV RELNS ON EVE OF SHULTZ VISIT TO MOSCO

SUMMARY:SECTY SHULTZ WILL BE VISITING MOSCO 13-15APR.VISIT CULTIMATES SERIES OF BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS OVER LAST SEVERAL MONTHS,AND WILL SET TONE FOR FUTURE.THERE IS SOME OPTIMISM HERE ABOUT NEAR TERM PROSPECTS,BUT IT APPEARS UNLIKELY ANY MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH WILL OCCUR DURING VISIT.RATHER VISIT WILL BE OCASION FOR TAKING STOCK ON BOTH SIDES AND FOR DETERMINING NEXT STEPS ON ROAD TO POSSIBLE SUMMIT BEFORE END OF REAGAN ADMIN.

2.MOST IMPORTANT SUBJ FOR DISCUSSION WILL BE ARMS CONTROL,IN PARTICULAR PROSPECTS OF ACHIEVING AN INF SETTLEMENT.HUMAN RIGHTS ARE ALSO LIKELY TO ATTRACT ATTN,WITH FOCUS ON JEWISH EMIGRATION.THIRD CATEGORY AREA COULD BE REGIONAL ISSUES,ESPECIALLY AFGHANISTAN AND MIDEAST,THOUGH TIME MAY NOT/NOT PERMIT MUCH ATTN TO BE PAID IT. FINALLY,SELECTED BILATERAL ISSUES MIGHT BE DISCUSSED,INCLUDING POSSIBLE SIGNING OF CIVILIAN SPACE COOPERATION AGREEMENT.

3.REPORT:AMERICAN/SOV RELNS HAVE BEEN RECEIVING A LOT OF ATTN RECENTLY ON BOTH SIDES.ACCORDING TO STATES SNR SOVIETOLOGIST TOM

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PAGE TWO UNGR1591 CONFID

SIMONS(DAS/EUR),THERE HAS BEEN MUCH HARD WORK AND GOOD SPIRIT IN BILATERAL ENCOUNTERS HELD SINCE SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MET END OF LAST YEAR.THESE INVOLVED NOT/NOT ONLY NEGS AT GENEV,BUT ALSO SEVERAL REGIONAL EXPERTS MTGS,BILATERAL REVIEW COMMISSION MTG,AND UNDERSECTY ARMACOST VISIT TO MOSCO 15/16MAR.THUS,BY TIME SHULTZ ARRIVES IN SOV CAPITAL,ENTIRE BILATERAL AGENDA(ARMS CONTROL,HUMAN RIGHTS,REGIONAL ISSUES AND BILATERAL ISSUES)WILL HAVE HAD THOROUGH AIRING.

4.REVIEW OF THAT AGENDA DOES NOT/NOT SUGGEST ANY MAJOR BREAKTHROUGHS ARE POSSIBLE DURING SHULTZ VISIT,BUT SIMONS SAID ADMIN WAS MODERATELY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT NEAR TERM.THERE WERE TWO REASONS.FIRST,WHEN ARMACOST HAD TOLD SOVS ADMIN WAS PREPARED FOR INTENSIVE EFFORTS,HE HAD RECEIVED FROM DOBRYNIN RESPONSE THAT GORBACHEV WAS PERSONALLY DEVOTED TO ACHIEVING POSITIVE RESULTS IN RELATIONSHIP.SHULTZ VISIT,HE HAD BEEN TOLD,REPRESENTED POTENTIAL TURNING POINT IN RELATIONSHIP.THESE WERE PROMISING SIGNALS,SIMONS SAID.SECONDLY,ADMIN WAS COMING AROUND TO VIEW THAT GORBACHEV GOVT WAS NOT/NOT JUST REGIME MORE ADEPT THAN ITS PREDECESSOR AT APPEARING REASONABLE.IT ALSO APPEARED INCREASINGLY TO BE EXPERIMENTAL REGIME,WILLING TO ENGAGE IN FOREIGN POLICY PROCESSES WHOSE OUTCOME COULD NOT/NOT NECESSARILY BE GUARANTEED IN ADVANCE,FOR SAKE OF POSSIBLE BENEFITS WHICH MIGHT ACCRUE.SINCE REGIME ALSO APPEARED TO WANT TO MOVE CAREFULLY,GIVING DUE CONSIDERATION TO COST OF NEW INNATL VENTURES TO EXISTING RELATIONSHIPS,FUTURE SEEMED TO HOLD POSSIBILITES NOT/NOT HITHERTO EXPECTED.AS ANOTHER STATE DEPT

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PAGE THREE UNGR1591 CONF

OFFICER TOLD US FEW WEEKS AGO, NEITHER SIDE IS IN FACT SURE WHERE DISCUSSIONS WILL LEAD, BUT BOTH SEE VALUE IN PROCESS AND THERE WAS ALWAYS POSSIBILITY OF PLEASANT SURPRISES.

5.(A) ARMS CONTROL:

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PAGE FOUR UNGR1591 CONF

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5. TWO MOST IMPORTANT REGIONAL ISSUES FOR TWO SIDES AT PRESENT ARE AFGHANISTAN AND MIDEAST. ON AFGHAN, ADMIN BELIEVES THERE HAS BEEN IMPORTANT NARROWING OF POSNS DURING PROXIMITY TALKS, BUT THERE IS STILL DISTANCE TO GO. SOVS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN THINKING HARD ABOUT

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PAGE FIVE UNGR1591 CONF

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PAGE SIX UNGR1591 CONF

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7. ON IRAN/IRAQ WAR, TWO SIDES CONTINUE TO SHARE COMMON OBJECTIVE OF END OF WAR WITH NO/NO VICTORS AND NO/NO VANQUISHED. SIMONS SAID SOVS LIKED SECURITY COUNCIL TALKS BECAUSE IT GAVE THEM A ROLE, BUT THEY WERE EAGER TO CONTINUE BILATERAL TALKS. THEY WERE SKEPTICAL ABOUT ANY EMBARGO, NOT/NOT OUT OF PRINCIPLE BUT IN BELIEF ONE COULD NOT/NOT BE ENFORCED.

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PAGE SEVEN UNGR1591 CONF

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**ACTION**  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

///CORRECTED COPY///

FM WSHDC UNGR1591 02APR87

TO EXTOTT LRBR URR DELIVER BY 031100

INFO PCOOTT/MORDEN BNATO MOSCO VCSCE GENEV

TT NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/DIPOL/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/ DE CAF

DISTR USS UGB URD RGB RGBA RBD IIB IDD IDR IDA

REF BNATO TEL YBGR6268 25MAR

---AMERICAN/SOV RELNS ON EVE OF SHULTZ VISIT TO MOSCO

SUMMARY:SECTY SHULTZ WILL BE VISITING MOSCO 13-15APR.VISIT CULTIMATES SERIES OF BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS OVER LAST SEVERAL MONTHS,AND WILL SET TONE FOR FUTURE.THERE IS SOME OPTIMISM HERE ABOUT NEARTERM PROSPECTS,BUT IT APPEARS UNLIKELY ANY MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH WILL OCCUR DURING VISIT.RATHER VISIT WILL BE OCASION FOR TAKING STOCK ON POTH SIDES AND FOR DETERMINING NEXT STEPS ON ROAD TO POSSIFLE SUMMIT BEFORE END OF REAGAN ADMIN.

2.MOST IMPORTANT SUBJ FOR DISCUSSION WILL BE ARMS CONTROL,IN PARTICULAR PROSPECTS OF ACHIEVING AN INF SETTLEMENT.HUMAN RIGHTS ARE ALSO LIKELY TO ATTRACT ATTN,WITH FOCUS ON JEWISH EMIGPATION.TEIRD CATEGORY AREA COULD BE REGIONAL ISSUES,ESPECIALLY AFGHANISTAN AND MIDEAST,THOUGH TIME MAY NOT/NOT PERMIT MUCH ATTN TO BE PAID IT. FINALLY,SELECTED BILATERAL ISSUES MIGHT FE DISCUSSED,INCLUDING POSSIBLE SIGNING OF CIVILIAN SPACE COOPERATION AGREEMENT.

3.REPORT:AMERICAN/SOV RELNS HAVE BEEN RECEIVING A LOT OF ATTN RECENTLY ON BOTH SIDES.ACCORDING TO STATES SNR SOVIETOLOGIST TOM

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RETURN TO **BICO** POUR - ETRE  
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SIMONS(DAS/EUR),THERE HAS BEEN MUCH HARD WORK AND GOOD SPIRIT IN BILATERAL ENCOUNTERS HELD SINCE SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MET END OF LAST YEAR.THESE INVOLVED NOT/NOT ONLY NEGS AT GENEV,BUT ALSO SEVERAL REGIONAL EXPERTS MTGS,BILATERAL REVIEW COMMISSION MTG,AND UNDERSTCTY ARMACOST VISIT TO MOSCO 15/16MAR.THUS,BY TIME SHULTZ ARRIVES IN SOV CAPITAL,ENTIRE BILATERAL AGENDA(ARMS CONTROL,HUMAN RIGHTS,REGIONAL ISSUES AND BILATERAL ISSUES)WILL HAVE HAD THOROUGH AIRING.

4.REVIEW OF THAT AGENDA DOES NOT/NOT SUGGEST ANY MAJOR BREAKTHROUGES ARE POSSIBLE DURING SHULTZ VISIT,BUT SIMONS SAID ADMIN WAS MODERATELY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT NEAR TERM.THERE WERE TWO REASONS.FIRST,WHEN ARMACOST HAD TOLD SOVS ADMIN WAS PREPARED FOR INTENSIVE EFFORTS,HE HAD RECEIVED FROM DOBRYNIN RESPONSE THAT GORBACHEV WAS PERSONALLY DEVOTED TO ACHIEVING POSITIVE RESULTS IN RELATIONSHIP.SHULTZ VISIT,HE HAD BEEN TOLD,REPRESENTED POTENTIAL TURNING POINT IN RELATIONSHIP.THESE WERE PROMISING SIGNALS,SIMONS SAID.SECONDLY,ADMIN WAS COMING AROUND TO VIEW THAT GORBACHEV GOVT WAS NOT/NOT JUST REGIME MORE ADEPT THAN ITS PREDECESSOR AT APPEARING REASONABLE.IT ALSO APPEARED INCREASINGLY TO BE EXPERIMENTAL REGIME,WILLING TO ENGAGE IN FOREIGN POLICY PROCESSES WHOSE OUTCOME COULD NOT/NOT NECESSARILY BE GUARANTEED IN ADVANCE,FOR SAKE OF POSSIBLE BENEFITS WHICH MIGHT ACCRUE.SINCE REGIME ALSO APPEARED TO WANT TO MOVE CAREFULLY,GIVING DUE CONSIDERATION TO COST OF NEW INNATL VENTURES TO EXISTING RELATIONSHIPS,FUTURE SEEMED TO HOLD POSSIBILITES NOT/NOT HITHERTO EXPECTED.AS ANOTHER STATE DEPT

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PAGE THREE UNGR1591 CONF

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PAGE SIX UNGR1591 CONFID

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PAGE SEVEN UNGR1591 CONF

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CCC/230 031459Z UNGR1591

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

**CORRECTED COPY**  
**EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6237 18MAR87

TO EXTCTT LDR DELIVER BY 181400

INFO CANMILREPNATO WSHDC MOSCO BONN PARIS ROME HAGUE BRU OSLO

ANKRA ATHENS LSBON LDN COPEN PCOOTT/MORDEN

TT NDHQOTT/ADM POL/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/ DE CAF

BAG MDRID DE PAR

DISTR MINA USS IFB RGB IDD IDRA IDRL RBD CPP RBR

REF OURTEL YBGR6234 17MAR(NOTAL)

---SHULTZ VISIT TO MOSCO

LEDOGAR CONFIRMED IN COUNCIL TODAY THAT SHULTZ WOULD STOP OVER IN  
BRU ON 16APR ON WAY HOME FROM MOSCO. COUNCIL WILL MEET 16APR 09:00  
TO HEAR HIS REPORT. LEGOGAR WARNED THAT MTG WOULD HAVE TO BE  
STRUCTURED TO PERMIT SHULTZ TO DEPART BRU AT 11:00.

2. WE WILL CANVAS OTHER DELS TOWARD END OF WEEK TO DETERMINE  
INTENTIONS OF THEIR FMS.

CCC/054 181540Z YBGR6237

RETURN TO RENOYER AU		B130		FOR FILING POUR - ETRE PORTE AU DOSSIER	
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cc 27-4-NATO-3-1-USA					



**ACTION**  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATC YBGR6234 17MAR87

TO EXTOTT 1DR

INFO CANMILREPNATO WSHDC MOSCO PMOOTT

TT NDHQCTT/ADMPOL/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS IFB RGB IDD IDRA IDRL RBD CPP RBR

---SHULTZ VISIT TO MOSCO

USA DEP PERM REP REPORTED AT PERM REPS LUNCHEON TODAY THAT IN ALL PROBABILITY SHULTZ WOULD STOP OFF IN BRU TO BRIEF ALLIES 16APR ON WAY HOME FROM MOSCO. WHILE FINAL DECISION HAS NOT/NOT YET BEEN TAKEN, IT IS CURRENTLY ENVISAGED THAT SHULTZ WOULD BRIEF COUNCIL SOMETIME EARLY DURING MORNING OF 16APR(0930-1130).

2. IN VIEW OF BUILD-UP BEING GIVEN TO SHULTZ VISIT TO MOSCO, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO INF NEGOTIATIONS, WE WOULD EXPECT THAT FMS OF BASING COUNTRIES MIGHT MAKE SPECIAL EFFORT TO ATTEND COUNCIL BRIEFING ALTHO IT WILL NOT/NOT BE BILLED AS MINISTERIAL MTG. IF THEIR INTENTIONS WERE KNOWN EARLY ENOUGH OTHER FMS EG NOR, MIGHT ALSO DECIDE TO ATTEND. THIS LEADS US TO ASK WHETHER SSEA WOULD WISH TO JOIN HIS COLLEAGUES FOR MTG WITH SHULTZ. ATTENDANCE AT MTG WOULD PROBABLY TAKE FORTY-EIGHT HOURS OF SSEAS SCHEDULE JUST BEFORE FASTER TO ATTEND MTG ON WHICH IN ANY EVENT CANDEL WILL REPORT EXTENSIVELY. BRIEFING WOULD BE SEEN PUBLICLY AS ANOTHER IN SERIES OF FULL CONSULTATION AMONG ALLIES SUCH AS ONE WHICH FOLLOWED REYKJAVIK SUMMIT.

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PAGE TWO YBGR6234 CONFD

3. AT THIS STAGE THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO THOUGHT GIVEN TO DESIGNATING MEETING AS QUOTE HIGH LEVEL UNQUOTE IE SUBSTITUTION OF FMS BY STATE SECTRIES OR POL DIRS. RATHER INTENTION, ENUNCIATED TENTATIVELY AMONG PERM REPS WOULD BE FOR SOME MINISTERIAL COLLEAGUES TO JOIN PERM REPS IN ORDER TO RECIPROCATE GESTURE BY SHULTZ. GRATEFUL TO RECEIVE YOUR EARLY REACTION TO FOREGOING.

CCC/247 171738Z YBGR6234

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VMFFF VCSCF WSAW PRGUE BGRAD EPIST BUCST PEKIN TOKYO PRMNY  
PCOCTT/MORDIN

TT NDIQCTT/DNACPOL DGIS/CIS/DSTRATA/ DF CAF

IISTR URD URR REL REP RET IDD IDX IDA IDR IDRA IDAV IFB FSN CPD  
CFF CPLA INF INI RGB UGE USS MINA PGB PSD PSP GMR

---SOVIET/USA RELATIONS:ARMS CONTROL

IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION 11MAR I ASKED MFA DEPUTY MINISTER  
BESSMIERTNYKH WHY DR YAKOVLEV DURING CURRENT VISIT TO  
SPAIN HAD DESCRIBED SOVIET/USA RELATIONS AS QUOTE FRANKLY  
HAD UNQUOTE.I FOUND THIS INCONSISTENT WITH INDICATIONS  
THAT AT LEAST ON ARMS CONTROL FRONT CONTACTS WERE NOW  
MORE BUSINESSLIKE,REGULAR AND CONSTRUCTIVE ESPECIALLY  
SINCE VORONTSOV HAD APPEARED ON THE SCENE IN GENEV.  
ALSO OF COURSE GENSEC GORBACHEVS DECLARED WILLINGNESS  
TO CONCLUDE SEPARATE INF AGMT HAD BEEN PRETTY WELL  
RECEIVED BY NATO COUNTRIES AND CREATED POSSIBILITY  
FOR NEW BURST OF ACTIVITY IN WHICH USA WAS THE OTHER  
MAJOR ACTIVE PLAYER.I THOUGHT THEREFORE THAT DR YAKOVLEV  
WAS BEING UNIDULY NEGATIVE.

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PAGE TWO XYGR0495 CONF

2. FESSMERTNYKH REPLIED THAT ON THE CONTRARY YAKOVLEV  
ASSESSMENT WAS CORRECT. MORE INFORMAL NATURE AND BETTER  
TONE OF MTGS IN GENEV HAD NOT/NOT CHANGED SITUATION  
WHERE NO/NO REAL PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE. THIS WAS  
WHY POLITBUREAU HAD REVIEWED STATE OF PLAY TO DETERMINE  
HOW TO MOVE THINGS FORWARD AND CONCLUDED THAT RIGHT  
COURSE WAS TO TRY FOR QUOTE QUICK AGMT UNQUOTE ON MEDIUM  
RANGE MISSILES. PROPOSAL HAD BEEN MADE BY GENSEC GORBACHEV  
AND INDEED REACTION HAD BEEN GOOD AND QUOTE EVEN NOT/NOT  
BAD FROM WFINBERGER UNQUOTE.

3. FESSMERTNYKH SAID AMERICAN DRAFT INF TREATY WAS  
NOW BEING STUDIED AND HE HAD NOT/NOT PERSONALLY REACHED  
FIRM CONCLUSIONS ABOUT IT. INITIAL INTERNAL SOVIET  
EVALUATION WAS NEGATIVE HOWEVER SINCE DRAFT CONTAINED  
VARIETY OF ELEMENTS SOME OF THEM NEW WHICH APPEARED  
DESIGNED TO INSURE THAT NO/NO AGMT COULD BE REACHED. IF  
THESE ELEMENTS WERE INSERTED FOR TACTICAL OR BARGAINING  
REASONS THAT WAS ONE THING BUT HE FEARED THEY WERE  
MORE THAN THAT. SOME PEOPLE ON AMERICAN SIDE SIMPLY  
DID NOT/NOT WANT AN AGREEMENT. FESSMERTNYKH ALSO NOTED  
THAT USSR WAS LOOKING AT INCOMPLETE DRAFT AND HAD YET  
TO SEE SECTION ON VERIFICATION. THAT WOULD PROVE IMPORTANT  
SINCE SOVIET UNION WAS INTERESTED IN STRICTEST POSSIBLE

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PAGE THREE XYGR2495 CONF

VERIFICATION MEASURES. WHEN I ACCUSED BESSMERTNYKH  
OF TALKING MORE LIKE A CDN THAN THE CDNS HE LAUGHED  
BUT INSISTED ON GREAT IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION ASPECTS.  
USA ALREADY KNEW EXACTLY WHERE SOVIET MISSILE BASES  
WERE BUT HOW WAS USSR TO BE REASSURED IF IT COULD NOT/NOT  
VISIT FREELY ALL KINDS OF POSSIBLE SITES IN AMERICA?

4. IN COURSE OF CONVERSATION AS I PURSUED VARIOUS LINES  
OF ENQUIRY BESSMERTNYKH MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:

A) BASIC PURPOSE OF INF AGMT WAS TO ENSURE THAT NEITHER  
SIDE COULD REACH TERRITORY OF OTHER SIDE WITH MEDIUM  
RANGE MISSILES-THIS WOULD DICTATE EXACTLY WHERE 100  
WARHEADS OF EACH PARTY WERE PLACED:

B) SPECIFICALLY, CONCEPT OF ASIA IN SOVIET TERMS WOULD  
HAVE TO BE CONSISTENT WITH THIS BASIC PURPOSE OF AGMT  
AND IN THIS CONNECTION 80 DEGREE LINE QUOTE COULD BE  
DISCUSSED UNQUOTE WHILE AT OTHER END OF SOVIET LANDMASS  
THERE COULD BE NO/NO MISSILES IN, FOR EXAMPLE, KAMCHATKA:

C) EQUALLY SPECIFICALLY, ON AMERICAN SIDE ALASKA WAS NOT/  
NOT EXCLUDED AS SITE IT WAS A VERY BIG TERRITORY) PUT  
EXACTLY WHERE IN ALASKA WAS THE ISSUE:

D) AMERICAN TALK OF CONVERSION OF WEAPONS RATHER THAN  
DESTRUCTION WAS NOT/NOT WELL RECEIVED IN MOSCOW: AND

...4

PAGE FOUR XYGR0495 CONF

1) INF AGMT COULD BE CONCLUDED IN 3-4 MONTHS IF WILL  
EXISTED ON AMERICAN SIDE BUT SOVIETS REMAINED VERY  
SCPTICAL OF AMERICAN TRUE INTENTIONS BECAUSE OF THEIR  
PERSISTENT TENDENCY TO RAISE THE ANTE EACH TIME AGMT  
SEEMED NEAR.

5. REVERTING TO YAKOVLEV STATEMENT IN MADRID BISSMERTNYAK  
INSISTED THAT SOVIET/USA RELATIONS WERE INDEED VERY  
BAD. NO/NO DEVELOPMENTS ON ACD FRONT HAD GIVEN THE SOVIETS  
REASON TO CHANGE THEIR VIEWS AND THERE WERE QUOTE MANY  
OTHER IRRITANTS AS WELL UNQUOTE. THIS APPEARED TO BE A  
REFERENCE TO USA STANCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AS WELL AS TO  
ALLEGED AMERICAN INTERVENTION TO QUOTE BLEED UNQUOTE SOVIETS  
IN AFGHANISTAN. ON THIS BISSMERTNYAK SAID THAT SOVIET UNION  
WISHED TO WITHDRAW AND LEAVE BEHIND COALITION GOVT EMBRACING  
ALL FACTIONS BUT IT WAS NOT/NOT SIMPLY GOING TO WALK OUT. TO  
BORROW AMERICAN PHRASEOLOGY USSR OCCUPIED QUOTE POSITION OF  
STRENGTH UNQUOTE IN AFGHANISTAN AND COULD STAY INDEFINITELY  
IF IT HAD TO DO SO.

6. IN CONCLUSION BISSMERTNYAK DESCRIBED SCHULTZ VISIT  
IN APR AS VERY IMPORTANT BECAUSE IT WOULD DETERMINE  
THE PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET/USA RELATIONS FOR THE NEXT  
TWO YEARS IE UNTIL THE END OF THE REAGAN ERA. IN THIS

...5

PAGE FIVE XYGR0495 CONF

CONNECTION BESSMERTNYAKH ADDED THAT HE WAS GLAD TO SEE  
RIAGAN MAKING RECOVERY FROM IRAN/CONTRA DEBACLE. IT  
WAS IN NOBODY'S INTERESTS AND CERTAINLY NOT/NOT THAT OF  
USSR THAT USA BE HEADED BY A WEAK PRESIDENT.

7. THIS EXCHANGE OCCURRED TOWARDS END OF ROUGHLY 92 MIN  
CONVERSATION MUCH OF WHICH WAS DEVOTED WITH BESSMERTNYAKH'S  
ENCOURAGEMENT TO BILATERAL QUESTIONS: KEY POINTS ARE BEING  
REPORTED SEPARATELY

TURNER

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SOVIET/AMERICAN RELATIONS					

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IMPRESSIONS OF THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP

Issue

A correct assessment of the priorities, policies and tactics of the Gorbachev leadership is crucial to the development of coherent and credible positions.

Background

None of the new Soviet leaders fit the mould of the stereotypical Russian, or at least the international image created by Gromyko and Brezhnev. But questions remain about what kind of change they represent and what implications this has for the West.

To date, there is broad agreement that Soviet leaders have adopted a more sophisticated, open and vigorous approach to public relations that requires deft handling by the West. There is also agreement that, despite increased activity in Europe and Asia, their main foreign policy preoccupation is the United States.

Beyond style and the USA, there is no agreed assessment:

- on whether Soviet diplomacy towards Europe and Asia reflects a significant change in political approach or merely fine-tuning of traditional wedge-driving between allies of the USA;
- on the depth of Soviet economic problems and thus on the need and their willingness to contemplate real defence expenditure reductions;
- on Gorbachev's determination to introduce substantive economic reforms, because of the potential political and social consequences;
- on the degree of Soviet interest in and commitment to the Third World and, thus, the prospects for regional crises that would upset superpower strategic negotiations.



- 2 -

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### USA Position

The Reagan Administration continues to deal with the Soviet Union through an ideological prism. American analysts concede that the USSR is in the throes of change. When USA policy options are under consideration, however, Soviet changes tend to be dismissed as propaganda, or as wedge-driving or actions otherwise inimical to USA interests.

### Canadian Position

We do not think that Soviet aims have changed, but see signs of a significant evolution of policies and tactics. The apparent reluctance or inability of the Reagan Administration to acknowledge these changes and their impact, especially in Europe, could lead to greater isolation of the USA if American perceptions differ significantly from those of other Allies.

We have seen Shevardnadze perform well in deflecting human rights issues, but neither real flexibility nor a departure from traditional positions. Shevardnadze and Vorotnikov (and economic authorities to whom Canada seems to enjoy better access than most) have been fairly candid about the leadership's economic orientation and problems. And Canada has recently achieved, after 15 years of effort, remarkable access to the Soviet Arctic.

At the present time, Canadian/Soviet relations are active on a wide range of issues. They do not have the intensity of Soviet/American contacts nor the breadth of Soviet/European relations. They tend to reflect, more than in past years, a better appreciation of our economic and humanitarian interests both domestically and in the USSR.



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

MESSAGE

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---VISITE DU MAE RAIMOND:QUESTIONS POLITIQUES INTERNATIONALES  
ECHANGES SUR GRANDES QUESTIONS INTERNATIONALES ONT PRIS PLACE  
PRINCIPALEMENT DURANT DEJEUNER DE TRAVAIL. DEUX MINS ONT ABORDE  
SUJETS SUIVANTS: EST/UEST, SITUATION A MOSCOU, L APRES REYKJAVIC  
ET CSCE. SUR CSCE, MAE FRANCAIS A INFORME SEAE D UNE NOUVELLE  
PROPOSITION FRANCAISE CONCERNANT MISE EN PLACE D UN NOUVEAU PROCESSUS  
DE VERIFICATION POUR TRAITER QUESTION DES DROITS DE L HOMME. CETTE  
PROPOSITION POURRAIT CONSTITUER REPONSE OCCIDENTALE A PROPOSITION  
SOVIETIQUE DE TENIR CONFERENCE A MOSCOU.

2. EST/UEST. MAE RAIMOND A D ABORD FAIT UN ANALYSE DU NOUVEAU  
LEADERSHIP SOVIETIQUE. LES CHANGEMENTS DE PERSONNES ET DE STYLE  
A MOSCOU COMMANDE LA PRUDENCE DE LA PART DE L ALLIANCE. L ERE  
DES DIRIGEANTS SOVIETIQUES SCLEROSSES, AUX STRATEGIES ET TACTIQUES  
FACILEMENT PREVISIBLES EST BEL ET BIEN TERMINEE. L ARRIVEE DE  
GORBACHEV ET L EMERGEANCE D UNE NOUVELLE GENERATION DE DIRIGEANTS

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PLUS JEUNES, PLUS DYNAMIQUES ET PLUS IMAGINATIFS NE SE TRADUIRONT, PAS SELON MAE FRANCAIS, PAR DES CHANGEMENTS IDEOLOGIQUES MAIS PLUTOT PAR UNE PLUS GRANDE SOUPLESSE ET UNE PLUS GRANDE HABILETE AU NIVEAU DES IDEES, DE LA STRATEGIE ET DES TACTIQUES NOTAMMENT A L'EGARD DE L'OPINION PUBLIQUE OCCIDENTALE. SEAE A DIT PARTAGER CETTE ANALYSE ET A CONCLU EN REITERANT QUE L'ALLIANCE, FACE A CETTE NOUVELLE SITUATION, SE DEVRA D'ETRE VIGILANTE PARTICULIEREMENT AU NIVEAU DE LA PROPAGANDE.

3. RAIMOND A POURSUIVI EN NOTANT QUE LE FACTEUR INTERESSANT DANS LE RETOUR DE SAKHAROV A MOSCOU AVAIT ETE L'ACCES AUX MEDIA QUE LUI AVAIENT AUTORISE LES DIRIGEANTS SOVIETIQUES. SELON FRANCAIS, CELA CONFIRME QUE CETTE ACTION S'INSCRIRAIT, EN PREMIER LIEU, DANS L'OFFENSIVE DE PROPAGANDE DE MOSCOU. IL EST <sup>POSSIBLE</sup> ~~PROBABLE~~ QUE CE SERA UN GESTE ISOLE, UNIQUE, QUI NE SIGNIFIE PAS NECESSAIREMENT UN CHANGEMENT FONDAMENTAL DANS LA POLITIQUE SOVIETIQUE. <sup>RA</sup>

4. L'APRES REYKJAVIC. RAIMOND ESTIME QUE LES CHANCES D'ARRIVER A UN ACCORD EN 87/88 SONT BONNES. A SON AVIS, SOVIETIQUES PREFERERONT TRANSIGER AVEC UN REAGAN ET UNE ADMINISTRATION QU'ILS CONNAISSENT DEJA D'AUTANT QU'A LEURS YEUX TOUT EVENTUEL ACCORD ENGAGERA LES FUTURES ADMINISTRATIONS AMERICAINES. SEAE A TOUTEFOIS FAIT REMARQUER QU'IL FALLAIT S'ATTENDRE A CE QUE LE CONGRES, MAINTENANT QU'IL ETAIT DOMINE PAR LES DEMOCRATES, ADOPTER ~~UNE~~ UNE ATTITUDE TRES

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DURE CE QUI POURRAIT COMPLIQUER SITUATION. EN CONCLUSION, RAIMOND MENTIONNA QUE TANT LES FRANCAIS QUE LES BRITANNIQUES INSISTERONT POUR ETRE CONSULTES PAR LES AMERICAINS PREALABLEMENT A TOUT ACCORD. IL ETAIT CLAIR A SES YEUX QUE PLUSIEURS MEMBRES DE L ALLIANCE AVAIENT DES VUES DIFFIERENTES DE CELLES DES AMERICAINS ET QU IL FALLAIT EN TENIR COMPTE. C ETAIT LE CAS POUR LE CDA A AJOUTE SEAE ET DEUX MINS ONT RECONNU QUE L ALLIANCE AVAIT DU PAIN SUR LA PLANCHE ET QUE LES DISCUSSIONS, SUITE A REYKJAVIC, SERAIENT BEAUCOUP PLUS SUBSTANTIELLES QU APARAVANT.

5. TEST DES MISSILES CRUISE AU CDA. A UNE QUESTION DE LA DELEGATION FRANCAISE SUR ATTITUDE DE L OPINION PUBLIQUE FACE A CES TESTS, SEAE N A PAS CACHE QUE PROBLEMES TECHNIQUES QU AVAIENT EPROUVES TESTS ONT EU IMPACTS NEGATIFS. S IL DEVAIT Y AVOIR DE NOUVELLES DIFFICULTES TECHNIQUES AU COURS DES PROCHAINS TESTS, CELA POURRAIT CAUSER DE REELS PROBLEMES CAR L OPINION PUBLIQUE POURRAIT SE BRAQUER. DE L AVIS DU SEAE, L EDUCATION DE L OPINION PUBLIQUE SERA UNE TACHE ENCORE PLUS DIFFICILE QUE PAR LE PASSE. EN ECHO, MIN RAIMOND A REPONDU QUE L EDUCATION DE L OPINION PUBLIQUE DOIT DEVENIR UNE PRIORITE ELEVEE ET CONSTANTE POUR LES GOUVERNEMENTS OCCIDENTAUX.

6. CSCE. DROITS DE L HOMME. RAIMOND A PROFITE DE DERNIERE SEANCE DE TRAVAIL AVEC SEAE POUR LUI FAIRE PART DE NOUVELLE PROPOSITION FRANCAISE TOUCHANT DISCUSSIONS SUR DROITS DE L HOMME AU SEIN DE

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CSCE. APRES AVOIR RAPPELE OPPOSITION DE PARIS AU PROJ DE CONF  
DE <sup>M</sup>SOSCO, RAIMOND A FAIR SAVOIR QUE FRANCAIS SOUHAITERAIENT PLUTOT  
MISE EN PLACE D UN PROCESSUS DE VERIFICATION AU SEIN DES 35 SUR  
DROITS DE L HOMME. IL S AGIRAIT D UN PROCESSUS DE VERIFICATION  
CONCRET, PROGRESSIF QUI AURAIT SOIN D EVITER DISCUSSIONS SUR LES  
PRINCIPES POUR SE CONCENTRER SUR PROGRES CONCRETS ACCOMPLIS. FRANCAIS  
ENVISAGERAIENT AINSI UNE OU DEUX REUNIONS, AD HOC, AU NIVEAU DES  
FONCTIONNAIRES QUI AURONT POUR BUT DE FAIRE BILAN ET DE VERIFIER  
PROGRES ET ENGAGEMENTS DES DIFFERENTS GOUVERNEMENTS AU NIVEAU  
DES CAS HUMANITAIRES. CE N EST QUE SUR LA BASE DES RESULTANTS  
DE CES REUNIONS QUE 35 DECIDERAIENT DE L OPPORTUNITE DE TENIR  
UNE GRANDE CONFERENCE COMME LE SOUHAITENT LES SOVIETIQUES, A MOSCOU  
OU AILLEURS D AJOUTER D ABOVILLE. PROPOSITION FRANCAISE A DEJA  
ETE PRESENTEE AUX 12 AINSI QU A SCHULTZ QUI AURAIT SEMBLE INTERESSE,  
SELON MAE RAIMOND. PARTIE CDNNE A QUALIFIE PROPOSITION FRANCAISE  
DE TRES INTERESSANTE. CETTE PROPOSITION POURRAIT FAIRE L OBJET  
D UNE DEMARCHE FORMELLE PAR FRANCAIS AU COURS DES PROCHAINES SEMAINES.



External Affairs      Affaires extérieures  
Canada                Canada  
Under-Secretary      Sous-secrétaire

USS #15

CONFIDENTIAL

January 12, 1987

Mr. John C. Whitehead  
Deputy Secretary  
Department of State  
Washington, D.C.

ACC	DATE
714811	
FILE	DOSSIER
20-USA-1-3-	USSR
LOC	
A7-	NC

Dear Mr. ~~Whitehead~~ *John*;

I am sending for your personal interest a report written a couple of months ago by a former Canadian Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Robert Ford served in this capacity during 1964-80, a testimony of the high regard of successive Canadian Governments for his expertise in Soviet Affairs. I think you will find that American foreign service officers shared this high regard.

In addition to serving recently as the Canadian Government's Advisor on East-West Relations, Mr. Ford is a member of the Palme Commission. He attended a meeting of the Commission in Budapest shortly after the Reykjavik Summit, and had several long conversations with Georgi Arbatov. Those conversations are summarized in the attached report. Mr. Ford also remarked that, naturally, he was aware Arbatov is a consummate advocate of Soviet policy. But Arbatov's comments could be of interest in helping to shed light on Soviet thinking on key issues in East-West relations.

I hope you will find Robert Ford's report of some value at this important junction in relations with the Soviet Union. I am also sending a copy to Tom Niles.

Yours sincerely,

*JH Taylor*

J.H. Taylor

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REPORT BY ROBERT FORD  
FORMER AMBASSADOR TO THE USSR  
NOVEMBER 6, 1986

At the Palme Commission meeting in Budapest, I had the opportunity for one long tête-à-tête with Arbatov and a dinner session with him and David Owen. I am reporting the talks in full, although I am aware some of this will probably be already known.

Arbatov said that the Reykjavik meeting which he attended was curiously emotional on both sides. The Soviets were surprised that the US "Kremlinologists" were surprised at what even Shultz called breath-taking Soviet proposals. They should have taken seriously the numerous Soviet speeches and proposals over the previous year, instead of dismissing everything out of Moscow as merely "declaratory". He criticised all of the Geneva talks as ridiculously bureaucratic, and even counter-productive, because they satisfied public opinion that something was being done, whereas they served merely as an excuse for continuing the arms race. The Soviets had been dismayed to learn that the American delegation in Geneva was putting up a building to house their staff. Arbatov said Gorbachev had no confidence in the Geneva talks, and had gone to Iceland with high hopes of cutting through the bureaucratic red tape.

Arbatov also blamed the US experts for convincing the White House that Gorbachev was faced with such strong opposition that his margin of manoeuvre was very limited. On the contrary, Gorbachev was well-entrenched and had convinced his colleagues that it was absolutely necessary to break out of the vicious circle. The proposals which he presented to President Reagan the first morning at Reykjavik were Gorbachev's work. Arbatov said he had gone into seclusion for a few days and dreamed up the idea of the proposals, which he had been careful to draft with compromises on all of the issues to meet US requirements.

The Soviets were surprised but pleased to see President Reagan's positive reaction, and it was obvious to them that the US experts were horrified by the verbal agreement to end all nuclear weapons. When the experts met there was complete silence on the US side. When the Soviets spelled out the agreement, the US asked for time out, and when they recovered Nitze tried to temporise. The Soviets noted that the military officials were arguing all the time with Nitze. After the second 1 hour and 45 minute break, the US returned with proposals identical

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

with those they had presented in September, and which had already been answered by Gorbachev. When the Soviets pointed this out, there was a very long and "theatrical" pause. Finally, Nitze said the US proposals were good ones. Another silence, then Perle said that the Soviet offer of a 50 percent reduction would give the Soviets more warheads. The Soviets then consulted Gorbachev who said warheads on the delivery vehicles would be equal.

Nevertheless, the experts finally reached an agreement on strategic nuclear weapons and on INF, including Asia etc. (Arbatov added that it was almost comical to find Perle objecting to the Soviet proposal for on-site inspection.) But the experts were unable to agree on the ABM treaty or a test ban treaty. On the latter, Arbatov said that the US experts were opposed even to having talks on a CTB. They wanted to call them "negotiations about test bans".

But, of course, all broke down on SDI. Arbatov said that President Reagan was emotional and practically begged Gorbachev to accept his proposals, saying "why cannot you do this for me"? So Gorbachev asked Reagan to do something for him, saying "if you insist on this, it means you want a new arms race". But they noted that when Gorbachev asked President Reagan why SDI would be needed if all nuclear weapons were destroyed, he answered, after some hesitation, against a mad man - not against the possibility of cheating.

Arbatov said the Soviets were very disturbed since Iceland by misleading and contradictory statements coming out of Washington. They are convinced that the primary element is American domestic politics, as well as uncertainty about what President Reagan wants. The Soviets think he has three aims, and he cannot decide which has priority: to go down in history as a man who secured peace; to win Republican control of the Congress; or to build a fantasy defence against all nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, the Soviets believe that an agreement between the USA and USSR can eventually be reached, but that the Americans are not yet ready. The impasse can be broken in due course, but it is not possible to do so through Geneva-type talks. The momentum of Reykjavik, in spite of everything, has to be maintained - otherwise the situation will become uncontrollable. He cited sea-based cruise missiles as a case in point. The USSR is almost ready to produce them and, therefore, very shortly the US advantage will disappear. This is the situation in every sphere, he claimed.



- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Concerning the reciprocal expulsion of diplomats, Arbatov that said once again the Americans failed to understand Gorbachev, when they thought that he was going to blink over the Gerasimov/Danilov affair. Arbatov admitted that Gerasimov may have been indiscreet, but he was set up by the FBI on the eve of the Iceland summit, and it looked to Moscow as if President Reagan was trying to test Gorbachev. The expulsion of 25 Soviets from the U.N. was not a surprise, but again the timing made it part of the picture, as it appeared in Moscow, as an attempt to show up Gorbachev. Then, after the failure in Reykjavik and "the Reagan lies about what happened", Gorbachev was obliged to react by expelling 5 more "American spies" from Moscow.

But the American counter-reaction of expelling 55 Soviets from the USA was totally unjustified and aroused real fury in Moscow. Arbatov said that it would be a serious mistake to think that Gorbachev can be pushed around and, if the Americans kept up this game, he was prepared to go as far as closing consulates and even limiting personal visitors to the US Ambassador. The big question in Moscow, he said, was whether this was part of an overall campaign on the part of US officials to prevent an arms agreement and détente. He had been disturbed at the negative reaction of the US experts in Iceland, and could not dismiss the possibility of an effort to stop further progress. On the other hand, there were strong elements in the USA, including Shultz, who seemed to want an agreement. Then Arbatov added, almost as an after-thought, that the Soviets had wondered at the time, and in fact were still speculating, why no one in the US delegation, from President Reagan on down, had questioned the Soviets about what confining SDI to the laboratory meant. They were inclined to think it was because the officials had won, and we did not want President Reagan to agree to the elimination of nuclear weapons, and, therefore, used SDI as means of avoiding an agreement.

Then Arbatov said that the Americans did not seem to take Soviet warnings seriously. He recalled that in February, 1980, the Soviet Government had reacted to the "unjustified expulsions" of Soviet diplomats from Canada by withdrawing most Soviet support staff from the Canadian Embassy. He also added that this had been a clear warning to the US and other Embassies that they were prepared to use this weapon. I said that, indeed, I remembered it, including an unmistakable message from the Soviet Foreign Ministry to the US Embassy through me, to study what had happened to the Canadian Embassy as an indication of their vulnerability.

- 4 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Nevertheless, Arbatov believed that all of this was marginal to the main issue, and in due course relations could probably get back to the main issues again. In this connection, it is worth noting that in the meeting that the Palme Commissioners had with Janos Kadar, the latter said that it was no secret that "we need arms reductions - all the Warsaw Pact countries". He was certain Gorbachev wanted this, and he was optimistic that an agreement was possible, although this might still be sometime off.

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À The Canadian Embassy, WASHINGTONNO.  
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Jan. 13, 1987

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<p>The Under-Secretary would appreciate it if the enclosed letter (copy attached for your information) could be deliver to Mr. John C. Whitehead, Deputy Secretary, Department of State on his behalf</p> <p>CC: WSHDC RBD UGB IDD</p>	
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À  Alice Power Office of the Under-Secretary(USS) OTTAWA
DATE	SIGNATURE	

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---FORD ARBATOV CONVERSATION

FORD PLEASED TO HAVE <sup>5</sup>HIS REPORT PASSED TO WHITEHEAD WITH  
MODIFICATIONS PROPOSED IN REFTTEL.

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Mr. Taylor

I will have a clean  
copy done up by word-processing.

RM

Noted  
Thanks. My only  
worry now is that  
John Whitehead  
may no longer be  
in office by the time  
I write. Please prepare a  
covering letter as  
well as above.

R the  
distribution,  
please. JAT 1/12

John  
Gordon  
1/12/87

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---DANILOFF AFFAIR POSTSCRIPT

WITH SEVERAL COLLEAGUES I SPENT TWO HOURS YESTERDAY WITH DANILOFF  
AND HIS WIFE AT LUXEMBOURG AMBS RESIDENCE. I THOUGHT IT WORTHWHILE  
TO REPORT ON SOME OF HIGHLIGHTS OF INTERESTING DISCUSSION WHICH  
ENSUED.

2. DANILOFF IS CONVINCED THAT REASON FOR HIS ARREST WAS KGB DESIRE  
TO GET BACK THEIR MAN ZAKHAROV WHO HAD BEEN ARRESTED IN NEW YORK.  
THERE WERE SEVERAL OPTIONS AMONGST THOSE WITHOUT DIPLOMATIC  
IMMUNITY. PICKING UP BUSINESSMAN WAS REJECTED FOR NEGATIVE EFFECTS  
IT MIGHT HAVE ON EFFORTS TO EXPAND TRADE. THERE WERE TWO JOURNALISTS  
IN ANY EVENT ABOUT TO LEAVE, BUT ONE WAS IN S AFRICA, LEAVING  
DANILOFF. IT WAS NEVER DIFFICULT TO CONTRIVE ARREST OF A JOURNALIST  
FOR SPYING.

3. BELIEF WAS THAT GORBACHEV HAD AGREED, AND THAT DOPRYNIN AND  
YAKOVLEV HAD BEEN VERY MUCH INVOLVED IN PLANNING. SECONDARY  
MOTIVATION OF SOVIETS WAS TO PUT OFF IMPENDING REAGAN-GORBACHEV  
SUMMIT, AND SUBSTITUTE FOR IT MINI-SUMMIT WHICH EVENTUALLY TOOK  
PLACE IN REYKJAVIK. GORBACHEV COULD NOT/RISK AGAIN COMING OUT

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SECOND BEST IN FULL-SCALE SUMMIT AS HE HAD. IN GENEVA, FOLLOWING WHICH MILITARY WAS HIGHLY CRITICAL.

4. FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW DANILOFF ARREST WORKED WELL FOR SOVIETS - KGB GOT BACK ITS MAN AND MINI-SUMMIT OCCURRED. SOVIETS UNDER-ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF AMERICAN REACTION, BUT THEN DANILOFF SAID HE WOULD NOT/HAVE FORESEEN IT EITHER. AND IN ICELAND GORBACHEV PUT FORWARD CAREFULLY WORKED OUT OFFER REAGAN QUOTE COULD NOT/NOT REFUSE UNQUOTE DESIGNED TO BLOCK SDI, BUT TO SOVIETS SURPRISE, REAGAN DID REFUSE.

5. ON OTHER SUBJECTS, DANILOFF SAID GORBACHEV WAS TRYING TO BRING INTELLECTUALS ON-SIDE. THIS WAS IMPORTANT FACTOR IN RETURN OF SAKHAROV FROM GORKY. GORBACHEV WOULD ALSO GENUINELY LIKE TO EXTRICATE RED ARMY FROM AFGHANISTAN, A WAR TO WHICH THERE WAS GROWING RESISTANCE IN USSR, BUT IT WAS HARD TO SEE HOW THIS COULD BE DONE.

6. DANILOFF IS SERENE AND BALANCED IN HIS JUDGEMENTS. HE IS WRITING BOOK WHICH WILL FIT TOGETHER HIS GREAT-GREAT GRANDFATHERS ARREST IN 1820 (ON WHICH HE HAS DOCUMENTS) AND HIS OWN, TRYING TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT CONTINUITY IN RUSSIA. HE IS SAD THAT AS VICTIM OF SPY INCIDENT, LIKELY CONSEQUENCE IS THAT HE WILL NEVER BE ALLOWED TO RETURN TO MOSCOW TO SEE HIS FRIENDS

SMITH

CCC/054 121150Z YBGR8005

## EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

TO Under-Secretary of State  
A for External Affairs, Ottawa URR

FROM Canadian Consulate General  
De San Francisco

REFERENCE  
Référence

SUBJECT GARY HART IN KOREA AND THE SOVIET UNION  
Sujet



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RETURN TO BICO POUR - ETRE  
RENOYER AU PORTE AU DOSSIER

AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES REF DATE  
URR 520208 JAN 16 1987

URRG URRP URRS DOSSIER

SECURITY Unclassified  
Sécurité 20-USA-1-3-USSR  
JAN 14 1988 20-KORIS-1-3-USA

DATE January 8, 1987

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MOSCOW

Senator Gary Hart spent ten days in the latter part of December visiting Korea and the Soviet Union. The Korean visit (December 10-13) was to participate in an international trade conference; the Soviet visit (December 14-18) was as a guest of the Supreme Soviet. The Denver Post Washington correspondent, Patrick Yack accompanied the Senator and the following report is based on his despatches. An end of journey diary is attached to this letter, and the other clippings will be forwarded separately to Ottawa. (7)

2. The Korean conference was in part sponsored by the Center For a New Democracy, a Washington think tank organized in support of Senator Hart and his presidential ambitions. The conference was attended by a varied field of representatives from 14 Pacific Basin countries and the United States. Hart made an opening day presentation urging participating countries to open their markets to American products or to face back lash from the USA. He told the audience that the USA "can only keep resisting trade pressures if other nations take positive steps as well."


3. While in Korea, Hart met with President Chun Doo-hwan and reassured him of his commitment to keeping a strong military presence in the country. After the meeting, he said "I told him, to the extent that I represented some leadership within the Democratic Party, that our party would support a very strong relationship between our two countries. I rejected the isolationist label that a lot in our party like to wear sometimes." The Senator also met with Korean Foreign Minister Choi Kwang-soo, and with the leaders of opposition parties, including Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung. He also made the usual visit to the demilitarized zone. He left Korea December 13, and during his stopover in Japan had breakfast with US Ambassador Mike Mansfield.

4. In Moscow, Senator Hart met with premier Gorbachev, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, former Ambassador Dobrynin, and members of the Supreme Soviet. He also had dinner with Yegeny Yevtushenko, visited the Institute for Outer Space, and, at this request, visited Yasnaya Polyana the estate where Tolstoy was born, raised and buried. The meeting with Gorbachev lasted three and a half hours, but there was no report of what the two discussed although a press conference was held at its conclusion. Correspondent Yack did file a report on Hart's views on arms control which he said were

- 2 -

registered by Hart in Moscow. According to Yack, Hart now feels the Iceland summit "is the starting point now for everything". Hart said "Ronald Reagan legitimized sweeping arms control proposals, proposals that would have been laughable before." Hart repeated his support for SDI research, and he would be willing to ban full-scale testing, production and advanced engineering in SDI fields if the Soviets would agree to deep cuts in ballistic and medium range nuclear missiles. During the midterm elections, Hart wrote an open letter on arms control to Mikhail Gorbachev, published in the Denver Post; this will be sent under separate cover to IDA.

5. During his visit to the Soviet Union, Senator Hart was informed that Inna Meiman had been given approval to leave Russia. The 55-year old woman has a stepdaughter in Boulder, Colorado and the Senator had made representations over the past five years for her release. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze also informed the Senator of two other approved departures, Sona Eikhenvald, and Rimma Bravve.

  
Consulate General



downplay the significance or the breadth of their research.

Ask the leader of the group, Kuzal Sagdeev, what types of research they would like to be doing if they were not compelled to develop a space defense system. He sidesteps the question, but Hart jumps in and says, "You didn't answer Mr. Yack's question." Alarmed by Hart's comment, Sagdeev sheepishly says they would be interested in sponsoring with the United States a joint mission to Mars.

Hart cancels his night at the

opera and has dinner with Dobrynin instead.

## TUESDAY, DEC. 16

MOSCOW — Hart's meeting with Gorbachev makes the front pages of Pravda.

Hart says he never likes to wear hats but has brought along his rabbit fur hat.

The big black hat somehow does not look right with Hart's big black cowboy boots, but Hart keeps it on throughout the day. He cannot recall if he bought the hat during a past trip to the Soviet Union or China.

We have lunch at Clapp's house, a modern, two-floor townhouse inside the American Embassy compound. Not everyone assigned to Moscow lives on the embassy grounds. Some live in apartments, but this decision has its drawbacks, according to Clapp. She says the KGB will often pay a visit while you are away, even if it means breaking down your doors. Sometimes they leave little calling cards, she says. One is spraying your apartment with a scent reminiscent of your pet's bowel movements. Clapp said a Marine came home one day to find that someone had drilled holes in his expensive cowboy boots. So you want to join the foreign service, eh?

While Hart meets with Shevardnadze, the rest of the group decides to go to the market, a place where the Soviets can practice a little capitalism.

Here they can sell everything from flowers to pigs feet, and they can pocket whatever they make, which is usually quite a bit. One family selling fruit, travels two days and more than 1,000 miles to come to Moscow once a year to set up shop in the market.

Prices are exorbitant. A pound and a half of grapes cost about \$8. A pound and a half of rabbit, \$10. But the market is full and no one seems to be complaining.

The poet Yegeny Yevtushenko is

the closest thing the Soviets have to a movie idol. When he walks down the streets of Moscow he is hounded for autographs.

He has invited Hart and his friends to join him for dinner at his dacha outside Moscow. A Hunter S. Thompson-like figure, Yevtushenko lives in a two-story cabin littered with books and memorabilia from around the world.

He fixes a powerful drink he calls a blitz. It's part lemon juice, part liquor, part wine. We are told to move our straws up and down inside the glass and sip various levels of the drink. Seated at a wooden picnic table, we toast the night away with vodka.

## WEDNESDAY, DEC. 17

TULA — Hart always has been an admirer of Leo Tolstoy, the Russian novelist. The Soviets have agreed to drive him to Yasnaya Polyana, the estate where Tolstoy was born, raised and buried.

The Coloradan is chauffeured to Tula, about two hours south of Moscow, the town closest to Yasnaya Polyana. His motorcade, five cars long, excluding the three police cars, is a spectacle to watch as it zooms through the countryside, forcing cars and trucks to the side of the road and prompting peasants to look up

from their chores and stare.

In wintertime, Moscow is a colorless city. The sky is bleached white. The ground is covered with snow. Most of the buildings are buff-colored. What neon exists is usually black and white. As we drive through rural areas of the Soviet Union, the world starts to take on some color. Farmers who live along the highway have painted their little houses in greens and blues and reds.

Hart spends more than an hour at Yasnaya Polyana. The tour is capped off by a walk — in subfreezing temperatures — to Tolstoy's burial site.

We are guests of the executive committee for Tula — the governing body for the region. We are taken to a private dining hall, where Hart is treated like a king during a seven-course meal. The menu: white wine, cherry and apple juice, sturgeon, sardines, caviar, salmon, spiced apples and cabbage, potatoes, crab, borscht, prunes and whipped cream, cookies, candy, chocolate, ice cream and coffee.

## THURSDAY, DEC. 18

MOSCOW — Wilson, Hart's aide, and I are assigned to a car that will take us to the airport. About 500 yards away from the terminal, our driver fails to negotiate a turn and we slide gracefully into the railing. No one is hurt, but it does shake us up a bit. A police car appears from nowhere to check the damage to the car.

One of our Soviet hosts gets a laugh from the incident. "You Americans would not be happy if you left the Soviet Union without being chased by police cars," he says.

## THURSDAY, DEC. 18

VIENNA — To rest and unwind, Hart, his daughter, Wilson and I fly to Austria. The two Harts go to the opera to see "The Bartered Bride." But both are so tired they catnap throughout the performance.

## FRIDAY, DEC. 19

ABOARD PAN AM FLIGHT NO. 61 — During the flight back home, Hart cannot help falling asleep, and neither can I.

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\* LEGI-TECH                      02/22/86              INTRODUCTION REPORT \*  
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INTRODUCTION DATE: 02/10/86  
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AB 2969              WEAPONS: STUN GUNS  
PEACE

THIS BILL WOULD REPEAL THE PROVISION AUTHORIZING  
CERTIFICATED OR CLASSIFIED EMPLOYEES OF THE  
PUBLIC SCHOOLS TO BRING OR POSSESS A STUN GUN  
FOR SELF-DEFENSE PURPOSES.

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AB 2970              TAXATION: DISALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTIONS: ORDINARY  
MOORE              AND NECESSARY BUSINESS EXPENSES

THIS BILL WOULD DISALLOW A DEDUCTION FOR  
EXPENSES, AS DEFINED, INCURRED BY A TAXPAYER  
IN CONNECTION WITH A PRIVATE CLUB, AS DEFINED,  
WHICH DISCRIMINATES ON THE BASIS OF AGE, SEX,  
RACE, RELIGION, OR NATIONAL ORIGIN.

-----  
AB 2971              ARCHITECTURE  
MOORE

THIS BILL WOULD REDEFINE THE PRACTICE OF  
ARCHITECTURE AND WOULD SPECIFY THAT THE PRACTICE  
OF ARCHITECTURE IS DEFINED AS THE OFFERING OR  
RENDERING, AND BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR, SPECIFIED  
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES.

-----  
AB 2972              PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYMENT  
MOORE

EXISTING LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE THAT THE BUDGET  
FOR THE FIRST YEAR OF THE PERSONNEL COMMISSION  
OF A SCHOOL DISTRICT SHALL BE DETERMINED BY THE  
GOVERNING BOARD. THIS BILL WOULD ENACT THOSE  
PROVISIONS AND ALSO REQUIRE THE GOVERNING  
BOARD TO ADVANCE FUNDS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT  
OF THE WORK OF THE PERSONNEL COMMISSION.

determine how to beat the traffic jam by reading a computerized sign that tells motorists of backlogs. Traffic is monitored by helicopters, and the information they gather is fed into a computer, which spits out the findings onto the illuminated signs. They remind me of the signs you see prior to entering the Eisenhower Tunnel.

Everyone is up for a special dinner. So Desaix Anderson, the No. 2 man at the American Embassy, takes us to a place called the Country Boy, a quaint place where two chefs, dressed in native costumes, cook on an open grill. The cooks use long spatulas to deliver your food in front of you.

Anderson and I choose to stay up late. We go to a section of town frequented mostly by Japanese. We pick a tiny little bar big enough for six people. We sit with our legs crossed on the floor and drink sake. The other customers grill me with question after question about Colorado, American politics, sports, Ronald Reagan, trade issues and girls.

At 2 a.m., when we start to go back to the hotel, I am amazed that the traffic is bumper-to-bumper. It seems no one goes to sleep in this town.

#### SUNDAY, DEC. 14

TOKYO — Hart breakfasts with U.S. Ambassador Mike Mansfield, the former Senate majority leader from Montana. The gentlemanly Mansfield was one of Hart's favorites in the Senate. Hart and his daughter, Andrea (his wife Lee has flown back to the United States) spend about an hour and a half at the ambassador's estate.

#### SUNDAY, DEC. 14

MOSCOW — Aboard our Air France airliner, we descend through a thick blanket of clouds. Although it is barely 4 p.m. it is already dark in Moscow. Snow is falling lightly at the Sheremetyevo Airport, the airport built especially to handle traffic for the 1980 Olympics.

A Soviet delegation made up of members of the Supreme Soviet, the country's parliament, greets us. Included in the group is Alexei Yeliseev, a former cosmonaut who flew in space three times. Hart asks Yeliseev if he is the Soviet's answer to Sen. John Glenn. Yeliseev does not fully understand Hart's attempt at humor. He laughs and says no.

We are taken to a special waiting room at the airport where we are given our programs — or schedules — neatly typed and bound in a light blue pamphlet.

Priscilla Clapp of the U.S. Embassy joins us. She will serve as our mother hen, watchdog and unofficial translator during our stay.

Seated at a large conference table, Hart scans the schedule to see if his request to meet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has been met. Instead of giving Hart the names of officials with whom

Please see **NOTEBOOK** on 3-E

#### NOTEBOOK from Page 1-E

he will meet, the Soviets simply list "reserved time" on the program. Hart will find out later that he will see Gorbachev, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and former ambassador to the United States, Anatoliy Dobrynin.

We are assigned private cars and driven to the National Hotel. Built at the turn of the century, this ornate little inn faces the famous cobble stones of Red Square and the high walls of the Kremlin.

After checking in we immediately wander up to Hart's suite on the penthouse floor. The Soviets have given him fresh fruit, juices, and lemon pastries shaped like hearts. The furniture in the room is in the style of French provincial. It is old but somewhat classy.

We are joined in Hart's suite by Stephen Cohen, a Princeton professor and expert on the Soviet Union. He also speaks fluent Russian and he will help Hart, who only understands how to say hello, goodbye and thank you.

Bob Loup, a Denver businessman who is active in trying to help Soviet Jews emigrate comes to the room too. Cohen and Loup have been invited by Hart to join the group in Moscow.

The consensus is that our room is bugged. So Hart turns on his big color television set and cranks up the volume. Over the familiar strains of the Nutcracker Suite, we hash out the details of the schedule. Instead of saying something important, however, we write it down and pass the sheet of paper around the table. I can't believe we are doing this. It seems too surreal.

Hart calls me to his balcony. We stand in the snow and look out at the giant red stars that are

perched upon towering steeples in Red Square. We have no trouble seeing them although the snow, whipped about by a strong wind, is falling steadily. We also can see a big Soviet flag flapping furiously above the square. I definitely feel like a stranger in a strange land. "Welcome to Moscow," Hart says.

After a supper of fish stew — a favorite of Peter the First, our waiter tells us — we bundle up in coats and hats and walk over to Red Square.

Despite the snow, the bitter cold (we later find out it is about 20 degrees below zero) and the powerful winds, the square is bustling with activity.

Some stand silently in front of the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and watch as the guards, clad in winter hats and knee-length coats,

change shifts.

Others scan the display windows of GUM, a state-owned department store that has decorated its windows for the holidays. Cohen explains that some Soviets still celebrate Christmas, but all of them celebrate New Year's Eve. Presents are given on both occasions.

On the way back to the hotel, I am greeted by a young Soviet who wants to know if I am an American. He offers to buy my baseball cap (I have not had time to purchase a fur hat). I tell him no thanks. "No problem," he responds.

#### MONDAY, DEC. 15

MOSCOW — While Hart and his daughter meet with Gorbachev, the rest of us are taken to a museum inside the Kremlin. For three hours we are shown millions of dollars worth of diamonds, rubies, sapphires and other precious stones that once belonged to the czars.

Hart is greeted back at the hotel by a small force of foreign correspondents who ask him about his meeting with Gorbachev. Afterwards, we have lunch — more fish — in the private dining room that has been set up for us.

At the Institute for Outer Space Research, Hart is introduced to a dozen Soviet scientists, at least one of whom is working on the Soviet's equivalent to our Strategic Defense Initiative. Hart wants to know more about their "star wars" program, but his hosts repeatedly

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\* LEGI-TECH                      02/22/86              INTRODUCTION REPORT \*  
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INTRODUCTION DATE: 02/11/86  
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AB 2981              REAL ESTATE SYNDICATIONS  
BRADLEY

THIS BILL WOULD REQUIRE PERSONS SELLING BENEFICIAL INTERESTS IN DEFINED REAL ESTATE SYNDICATIONS, EXCLUDING BONA FIDE REALES, TO PROVIDE PROSPECTIVE INVESTORS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF REAL ESTATE WITH SPECIFIED INFORMATION ON THE REAL ESTATE SYNDICATION.

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AB 2982              LOCAL EDUCATIONAL AGENCY EMPLOYEES: MEMBERSHIP ON  
BRADLEY              GOVERNING BOARDS

THIS BILL WOULD PROVIDE THAT NO PERSON MAY FILE A DECLARATION OF CANDIDACY FOR MEMBERSHIP, OR SERVE AS A MEMBER OF ANY COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, SCHOOL DISTRICT GOVERNING BOARD, OR COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT GOVERNING BOARD, WHO IS EMPLOYED BY THE SAME OR ANY ADJOINING COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, SCHOOL DISTRICT, OR COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT, RESPECTIVELY.

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AB 2983              PART TIME SERVICE CREDIT STRS: STANDARD REVISION  
BRADLEY

THIS BILL WOULD DELETE THE SERVICE CREDIT PROVISIONS FOR K-12 MEMBERS UNDER THE CURRENT STATE TEACHER'S RETIREMENT LAW AND WOULD INSTEAD BASE THE SERVICE CREDIT FOR THOSE MEMBERS ON THE SAME COMPUTATION AS IS CURRENTLY PRESCRIBED FOR COMMUNITY COLLEGE MEMBERS.

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AB 2984              INCOME TAXES: BANK AND CORPORATION TAXES: CREDITS:  
BRADLEY              UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK REMOVAL

THIS BILL WOULD ALLOW A CREDIT EQUAL TO 75% OF THE COST INCURRED BY THE TAXPAYER, NOT TO EXCEED A SPECIFIED AMOUNT, FOR THE OBTAINING AND ANALYZING OF SOIL SAMPLES, THE INSTALLATION OF MONITORING WELLS AND, IF NEEDED, THE COSTS CONNECTED WITH REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF AN UNDERGROUND STORAGE TANK IN ORDER TO COMPLY WITH SPECIFIED STATUTES.

Denver Post  
December 23/86

# Bits 'n' pieces from Hart's global jaunt

Denver Post Washington Bureau Chief Patrick Yack accompanied Sen. Gary Hart on his recent trip to an international trade conference in Seoul, South Korea, and to Moscow for a top-level meeting with Soviet officials. Following are excerpts from Yack's notebook.

By Patrick Yack  
Denver Post Washington Bureau Chief

## TUESDAY, DEC. 9

NEW YORK — The folks at Korean Airlines say their non-stop flight from New York to Seoul is the longest on the books right now. It takes almost 16 hours to fly halfway around the world. Two movies are played: "The Karate Kid II" and "Legal Eagles." I've seen both, but it is entertaining to listen to Robert Redford's voice dubbed over in Korean.

Gary Hart is excited about his trip to South Korea and the Soviet Union. He knows the odds are good that he will meet with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow.

He is accompanied by his wife, Lee, and his daughter, Andrea. Only one aide is brought along, Doug Wilson. Hart is traveling to Korea to host a conference on international trade.

## WEDNESDAY, DEC. 10

SEOUL — When we arrive at the airport, Hart is mobbed by more than a dozen newspaper photographers and television cameramen. He is an automatic hit.

We stay at the Lotte Hotel, a gigantic hotel that appears to stretch into the heavens. The lobby is stirring with activity, as what seems like scores of uniformed bellmen hurry back and forth. A chamber group is playing Christmas carols in the lobby lounge.

For some reason, that I am never able to discern, the Koreans are very conscientious about fires. In every hallway of the Lotte is a fire extinguisher. My closet also was equipped with an oxygen mask.

## THURSDAY, DEC. 11

SEOUL — Hart has scheduled a meeting with South Korean President Chun Doo-whan. He is driven to the American Embassy, where he is stopped at the front gate.

The area underneath the car's hood is checked, presumably for bombs. So is the trunk. Hart is driven to the entrance of the embassy, where he meets U.S. Ambassador James Lilley. The two men climb into a limousine that takes them to the Blue House, the residence and office of the president.

The meeting is private, although a dozen photographers are allowed

into the sitting room to take pictures. Chun speaks in Korean, which is translated for Hart.

Korea's Foreign Minister Choi Kwang Soo sits in on the meeting. He tells Hart that he has visited Colorado Springs and the Broadmoor Hotel. "Good golf course," he says.

As he will do for the entire trip, Hart brings along a coffee table book of Colorado photographs to leave for his hosts. The two men visit for less than an hour.

For much of the afternoon, Hart meets with leaders of the opposition party, who shower Hart with gifts and serve him ginseng tea.

In a ceremony, complete with speeches and group pictures, Hart also is given an honorary doctorate degree (in law) by Inha University.

## FRIDAY, DEC. 12

SEOUL — A busload of conference participants is hauled to the Demilitarized Zone, the line

that divides the two Koreas. Hart is flown to the area by helicopter and meets the others for a briefing.

We are taken to a special meeting room, half of which is in North Korea and half of which is in South Korea.

When Americans occupy the building, the door leading to North Korea is locked. When Americans leave the building, the door is unlocked.

Hart was told that, once, when an American soldier unlocked the door, some North Koreans tried to

pull him onto their side. Now, while an American soldier unlocks the door, he holds onto one of his comrades with one hand.

Outside the building, Hart and his traveling party stare across at another building. In front, stands a North Korean guard, who stares at us through binoculars. Hart is protected by a half dozen American troops, all of whom have some sort of black belt in the martial arts.

Tonight, I decide to skip the conference dinner and eat at a Korean restaurant. I enjoy the thin, crisp pieces of seaweed and the variety of raw fish. However, the octopus tastes as bad as it sounds.

Like everyone else in the room, I am asked to sing with the band. I am a terrible singer, but no one seems to care. I am given a songbook of tunes that the band knows. I sing a Beatles song, "Yesterday," a Korean favorite. I am amused by one of the lines, which somehow got lost in the translation. It went something like: "Yesterday . . . I'm not half the moon I used to be . . ."

## SATURDAY, DEC. 13

TOKYO — Since we cannot take a flight from Seoul to Moscow, we fly first to Japan to overnight.

During the drive from Tokyo's airport to town, I am immediately taken by Japanese genius. Along the freeway, drivers can

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\* LEGI-TECH                      02/22/86              INTRODUCTION REPORT \*  
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INTRODUCTION DATE: 02/11/86  
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AB 2985              DANGEROUS WEAPONS  
ELDER

THIS BILL WOULD SPECIFY THAT MANUFACTURING,  
IMPORTATION, SALE, LENDING, OR POSSESSION OF ANY  
KNIFE PROPELLED BY A SPRING OR ANY OTHER  
MECHANISM AN OFFENSE PUNISHABLE AS A FELONY OR  
MISDEMEANOR.

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AB 2986              PUBLIC SAFETY DISASTER REIMBURSEMENT FUND  
ELDER

THIS BILL WOULD CREATE THE PUBLIC SAFETY DISASTER  
REIMBURSEMENT FUND, WHICH WOULD BE APPROPRIATED  
TO THE OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SERVICES.

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AB 2987              ARSON: REWARDS  
SEBASTIANI

THIS BILL WOULD PROVIDE FOR A \$10,000 REWARD TO BE  
PAID TO ANY PERSON WHOSE INFORMATION LEADS TO THE  
ARREST AND CONVICTION, OR COMMITMENT TO A PUBLIC  
FACILITY, OF ANY PERSON WHO WILLFULLY AND  
MALICIOUSLY SETS FIRE, OR ATTEMPTS TO SET FIRE, TO  
ANY PROPERTY INCLUDED IN A STATE RESPONSIBILITY  
AREA WHICH RESULTS IN DEATH OR GREAT BODILY INJURY  
TO ANYONE INCLUDING FIRE PROTECTION PERSONNEL.

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AB 2988              MEDI-CAL  
FRIZZELLE

THIS BILL WOULD REQUIRE THE STATE DEPARTMENT OF  
HEALTH SERVICES TO ESTABLISH A PILOT PROGRAM  
IN EACH OF 3 PARTICIPATING COUNTIES, WHEREBY  
ELIGIBLE MEDI-CAL RECIPIENTS ARE PROVIDED  
VOUCHERS, FOR PAYMENT FOR MEDI-CAL COVERED  
BENEFITS TO HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS WHO AGREE WITH  
THE DEPARTMENT TO ACCEPT THE VOUCHERS IN THE  
SAME MANNER AS REIMBURSEMENT BY THE STATE  
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SERVICES.



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TO MOSCO

INFO

INFO ~~FOR~~ SJOSE HAVAN GTMLA WSHDC WDOAS PRMNY ~~MOSCO~~ LDN PARIS BRU

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~~PCOOTT~~ PCOOTT/MORDEN CIDA HULL/BML

SUBJ/SUJ

DISTR LGB LCD LCT LSD LSR UGB URD URR IMD IMU RCD RCR RBD RBR

IDR IDRL

---SOVIET STATEMENT ON CENTRAL AMERICA

SOVIET AMB CALLED ON ACTING LGB 18NOV ON INSTRUCTIONS TO  
DELIVER SOVIET STATEMENT, TEXT OF WHICH IS SET OUT IN LCR2550  
OF 20NOV. AMB S PRESENTATION WAS ~~ENTIRELY~~ PREDICTABLE. HE  
CLAIMED THE SITUATION IN NICARAGUA WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY  
DANGEROUS AS A RESULT OF THE USA S AGGRESSIVE ACTIONS. HE  
CALLED ON CANADA TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH THE USA TO PREVENT A  
NEW OUTBREAK OF VIOLENCE AND SAID THAT THE SOVIET UNION THOUGHT  
THE SAN JOSE III MEETING OF EC, CENTRAL AMERICA, CONTADORA, AND  
CONTADORA SUPPORT GROUP FOREIGN MINISTERS DUE TO BE HELD IN  
GUATEMALA IN FEBRUARY COULD PLAY A STABILIZING ROLE. FINALLY HE  
DECLARED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS NOT/NOT SEEKING  
CONFRONTATION WITH THE USA IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND REMAINED  
WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH THE USA AND THE CONTADORA GROUP TO  
ACHIEVE A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

2. IN REPLY AMB WAS TOLD THAT CANADA SHARED SOVIET CONCERN

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

... 2  
DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

D<sup>S</sup>G PEARCE/MABB

LCR

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MESSAGE

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FM/DE TO/À INFO DISTR REF SUBJ/SUJ	<p>ABOUT THE INCREASE IN TENSION IN THE REGION AND HAD CLEARLY STATED ITS <del>INDEPENDENT</del> VIEWS, MOST RECENTLY <del>IN A STATEMENT</del> IN THE UNGA DEBATE ON CENTRAL AMERICA ON 17NOV. CANADA DIFFERED FROM THE SOVIET UNION, HOWEVER, IN <sup>OUR ANALYSIS OF THE CAUSES</sup> <del>THAT WE REGRET ANY ACTION BY</del> <del>OF TENSION AND IN OUR VIEW OF NATURE OF DESIRABLE</del> <del>THIRD PARTIES WHICH CONSTITUTES INTERFERENCE IN THE AFFAIRS OF</del> <del>OUTCOME. FURTHER, WHILE</del> <del>THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION. WE REGRET USA AID TO THE CONTRAS</del> <del>WE ALSO REGRET EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE TO THE</del> <sup>GUERRILLAS</sup> <del>REBELS</del> IN EL SALVADOR. <del>THE</del> AMB MADE THE EXTRAORDINARY CLAIM THAT THE SOVIET <sup>NOT/NOT ONLY HAD</sup> <del>UNION HAD</del> NO/NO BASES IN NICARAGUA <sup>BUT ALSO</sup> <del>AND</del> PROVIDED NO/NO MILITARY <sup>the latter part of the</sup> EQUIPMENT TO NICARAGUA; <sup>A</sup> <del>CLAIM WHICH</del> WAS MET WITH POLITE SCEPTICISM.</p>		

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The Report represents a consensus of the Task Force. The group believes it to be an important contribution to the debate on Soviet policy and East-West relations. Specific policy recommendations should not, however, be attributed to individual members of the Task Force. The signatories of the Report participated in their personal capacity. Affiliations are for identification only.

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# How Should America Respond to Gorbachev's Challenge?

## A REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON SOVIET NEW THINKING

October 10, 1987

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Convened under  
the auspices of the  
Institute for East-West  
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## Table of Contents

Foreword	5
Preface	7
<hr/>	
Executive Summary	9
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Report of the Task Force	15
I.    Introduction: Gorbachev's Policy is Different	15
II.   Foreign Policy Trends Under Gorbachev	16
III.  Domestic Policy Under Gorbachev	20
IV.  Western Interests and Policy Responses	25
V.    Conclusion	33
<hr/>	
About the Institute for East-West Security Studies	35

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## Foreword

Recent signs of important changes in Soviet thinking about its domestic and foreign affairs pose important new challenges and opportunities. Taken together with major reforms being undertaken in most other European socialist countries, these changes call for a process of policy reexamination in the West and a new dialogue between East and West on ways to create a more stable and cooperative relationship.

These changes in the East have not yet been fully responded to by the West. It is increasingly clear that they represent more than a change in style or rhetoric. What then are the implications of these changes for Western policy? How should America and its allies respond to Gorbachev's challenge?

With this in mind, the New York-based Institute for East-West Security Studies, an independent European-American public policy research center, convened a bipartisan 38-member Task Force of prominent Americans to examine the content and policy implications of the new thinking and propose policy recommendations. The Task Force members met six times over an eight-month period in Washington and New York. European officials and specialists, together with members of the U.S. Congress, participated in specific Task Force meetings.

This bipartisan American Task Force represents the first stage of a multi-year process by which the Institute for East-West Security Studies intends to engage Americans, Europeans, and Soviets in a systematic discussion of the changing relationship between East and West. The Institute regards this Task Force study as a necessary first step towards establishing a new East-West dialogue and looks forward to contributing to and broadening that dialogue. Following the work of this American Task Force, the Institute plans to initiate a second Task Force with broad European participation designed to carry the discussions further.

The Board of Directors of the Institute expresses its

appreciation to the members of the Task Force, both for their dedication during the eight-month process which led to this report, as well as for their important substantive contributions. The successful conclusion of a written report with which all members of the Task Force concurred is due in great measure to the exceptional chairmanship of Joseph Nye and Whitney MacMillan, and to the skills of Institute staff members Allen Lynch and Keith Wind. Special appreciation is also paid to Robert Legvold, John Hardt, Marshall Goldman, and Richard Ullman, members of the Task Force who contributed working papers to the six sessions.

The Institute is deeply grateful to the Carnegie Corporation of New York, The Ford Foundation, George Soros, and Harold Newman for their financial support of this Task Force project. Individual members of the Task Force—Dan Rose, Steve Swid, Mike Forrestal, Guenther van Well, and Harold Newman—graciously opened up their homes for the meetings of the Task Force. Their hospitality is deeply appreciated.

Several members of the Institute staff deserve particular recognition for the success of this report, including Task Force coordinator Keith Wind, principal drafting rapporteur Dr. Allen Lynch, Director of Studies F. Stephen Larrabee, Claire Gordon, Peter B. Kaufman, and Ian Richardson. Special thanks are paid to Amy Lew, who typed the manuscript through seemingly endless revisions. Finally, I'd like to express my personal appreciation to my colleagues on the Institute Board of Directors for their foresight and commitment to making this project possible.

The members of the Task Force believe that this report is an important contribution to the East-West dialogue and are working to make its contents widely known among the policy communities in East and West. The Institute for East-West Security Studies is proud to have sponsored this study and looks forward to continuing the process which this Task Force has begun.

John Edwin Mroz  
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New York  
October 10, 1987

## Preface

The changes that Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has recently launched in both domestic and foreign policy have captured world attention. On a range of key issues—from domestic economic reform to nuclear arms control to emigration—Gorbachev's leadership has revised long-standing Soviet positions and in the process challenged the United States and its allies to reexamine many of the assumptions behind their own policies toward the Soviet Union.

The following report on Soviet policies under Gorbachev and their impact on Western interests and responses represents the first concerted effort in the United States to analyze and evaluate the significance of Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policies and their implications for East-West relations. More specifically, the report proposes a series of policy recommendations and goals which respond to the new opportunities presented by the changes in the Soviet Union.

The report appears at a critical juncture in U.S.-Soviet relations, as the two superpowers are about to convene a summit and sign a treaty eliminating intermediate-range nuclear missiles. This event provides an appropriate occasion to examine the broader spectrum of U.S.-Soviet and East-West relations, and the next steps the two sides could take to enhance international stability and put their relations on a stable footing over the long term. The broad scope of the report responds to the need to address all of the sources of instability in the East-West relationship—military, political, economic, ideological—in order to construct a sounder long-term foundation for peace.

The bipartisan character of the report underlines the strong consensus reached on the need to reexamine America's Soviet policy and engage the Soviet leadership in a process aimed at a long-term and stable relaxation of tensions. We feel that the report is a noteworthy contribution to the debate now emerging in the United States over the future direction of U.S.-Soviet and

East-West relations and that the analysis and conclusions it puts forth deserve to be taken as a point of departure in that debate.

#### Task Force Co-Chairmen

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## Executive Summary

### Key Findings

In the face of domestic economic stagnation, widespread social apathy, and a widening technological gap vis-à-vis the West, Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has undertaken the most far-reaching revamping of the Soviet system in over half a century. While the Soviet Union remains a closed communist society, Gorbachev has challenged a whole series of ingrained practices and attitudes, from strictly centralized economic management to an often militarized foreign policy, which has been the basis for Soviet policy since Stalin's time. In foreign affairs, he has introduced new concepts and new flexibility into Soviet diplomacy. Yet the West has not come to terms with these changes.

Balancing Soviet power and maintaining a strong Western alliance remain central to U.S. national interests. By the same token, the U.S. and its allies have a long-term interest in encouraging the moderation of Soviet power. Because the Soviet Union is a global power, Gorbachev's initiatives demand an active response by the United States and its Western allies. In many areas, from arms control to emigration, the Soviet Union has begun to make changes in directions long advocated by the West. While far from complete, these changes present new opportunities, and challenges, which the West should not ignore. The Task Force strongly recommends that the United States and its Western allies welcome the reformist tendencies that Gorbachev has set in motion and encourage those which promote a moderation of Soviet power. Toward that end, the U.S. and its allies should engage the Soviet Union in an effort to explore possibilities for agreement and resolve key points of tension.

A purely reactive Western approach in the face of the new Soviet policy is not an acceptable option, the Task Force believes. Western policies as well as Gorbachev's domestic policy priority are bound to affect Soviet foreign policy. There is considerable

uncertainty about the long-term success of Gorbachev's reforms. Nevertheless, over time, the new course chosen by Gorbachev will affect the ways in which the Soviet Union carries out its role as a superpower. A more subtle and flexible Soviet diplomacy requires the West to develop a broader and more active policy toward the Soviet Union, including standards to define and meet common security requirements in a rapidly changing international environment. Failure to do so would sacrifice the diplomatic initiative to the Soviet Union as well as abdicate our responsibility to future generations to pursue prospects for substantially improving relations between East and West.

### What is Changing in Soviet Foreign and Domestic Policy?

The West needs to think anew about specific changes the Soviet Union has made in its own policies. Many of these changes are only beginnings and ultimate Soviet intentions remain unclear, but it is important to note that some of them move toward long-standing Western preferences:

- *Arms Control* — The USSR adopted the Western proposal of a zero option on the INF issue. In addition, the USSR has moved toward the Western positions on verification, including on-site inspection. It has also raised the prospect of asymmetrical conventional force reductions in central Europe. It has accepted the principle of deep reductions in offensive strategic weapons and proposed a concept of "sufficiency" in military forces.
- *Role of the Military* — There has been a reduction in the Soviet military's role and influence in the highest policy-making councils, and Gorbachev has made clear to the military that they have to accept spending restraints and greater openness in the dissemination of military information.
- *The International Economy* — Gorbachev has placed special emphasis on reducing Soviet autarky by increasing trade, joint ventures, and expressing an interest in cooperating with such major international organizations as GATT.

- *The Domestic Economy* — Gorbachev has initiated a major decentralization of operational responsibility for the economy, and he clearly intends to move toward a more flexible, modern, and efficient economic planning and management. He has admitted the inadequacy of Soviet statistics and called for more accurate economic information.
- *Human Rights* — In the fields of culture and dissent, Gorbachev has displayed a degree of openness and toleration unthinkable just three years ago. In the area of emigration, the change has been less dramatic but Gorbachev has increased the emigration of Soviet Jews, Germans and other groups. While *glasnost* has a long way to go, it has clearly led to progress on human rights, which has been a major concern of the West.
- *Regional Issues* — While Gorbachev has as yet made no significant effort to scale back existing Soviet global commitments, he has given a lower priority to the military expansion of Soviet interests in the Third World than his predecessors.
- *Eastern Europe* — While urging closer and more "efficient" economic integration, Gorbachev has permitted a somewhat more flexible expression of specific national interests in Eastern Europe than his predecessors.

### Agenda for Action

These changes in Soviet policies and the prospect of a Soviet-American INF treaty and summit by the end of this year highlight the need to tackle a wide range of problems in East-West relations. The Task Force recommends that as first steps Western policy choices focus on five key areas:

- *Security Issues* — The U.S. and its NATO allies should intensify talks with the Warsaw Pact aimed at reducing conventional forces and eliminating offensive strike potentials, particularly those designed for surprise attack. Given the geographical differences and existing force imbalances, new approaches must include asymmetrical reductions of forward-based armored units, which present the greatest threat of surprise attack.

Both sides need to move rapidly to conclude an agreement on deep cuts in strategic offensive nuclear forces. These reductions should be designed to enhance strategic stability and eliminate the capacity to launch a crippling first strike. At the same time, both sides need to find ways to strengthen the ABM Treaty and to ensure that any research on strategic defensive systems is consistent with preservation of the Treaty.

The West should push for a rapid conclusion of the global Geneva chemical weapons negotiations, including the establishment of an international verification regime. Such an agreement would help increase confidence in Europe at a time when some are concerned over the implications of the elimination of medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles from the continent.

- *International Economic Issues* — Except in a precisely defined area of strategic technologies, which entails tighter, more efficient COCOM regulations, expanded East-West trade is in our interest. The West should welcome Soviet efforts to develop the legal foundation for a system of equitable joint ventures. While Western governments should not subsidize credits, neither should they oppose the extension of private credit through normal commercial rates and practices to the Soviet Union. The prospect of observer status in the GATT and IMF should be used to encourage greater openness and information about the Soviet economy.

If the Soviet Union demonstrates heightened respect for human rights, the U.S. government and Congress should consider bringing their policy in congruence with U.S. allies by reevaluating the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments restricting trade with and credit to the USSR. The West should aim to normalize the framework for trade with all Warsaw Treaty countries, on the basis of mutual and reciprocal interests.

In addition, the U.S.-Soviet umbrella agreements on scientific and technological cooperation should be revived and expanded, on the basis of full reciprocity.

- *Human Rights* — The West should welcome increased *glasnost* while continuing to make clear to the Soviet government that its observance of internationally recognized human

rights is the mark of a civilized power and a condition for truly collaborative relations between the Soviet Union and the West. The West should insist that the Soviet Union fully live up to the commitments it undertook under the Helsinki Final Act to encourage the free movement of people, ideas, and information across international boundaries.

- *Regional Issues* — In Afghanistan, the West must continue to make clear that Soviet occupation of that country poses strict limits to genuine collaboration between the USSR and the West. Conversely, a rapid Soviet withdrawal, with sufficient international guarantees, would be a forceful demonstration that the "new political thinking" has specific policy implications.

In other areas of conflict which could lead to possible superpower confrontation—such as Central America, southern Africa, and the Persian Gulf—the West should intensify discussions aimed at clarifying interests and creating conditions for greater stability. Within this framework, U.S.-Soviet meetings on regional issues should be upgraded as part of a regularized summit process. The purpose would be to seek solutions to these problems in conjunction with other concerned parties.

In the Arab-Israeli dispute, the U.S. and USSR should work together to advance a peace process which guarantees the territorial integrity and interests of all states and parties.

- *Political Dialogue* — U.S.-Soviet summit meetings, as well as meetings at other governmental and non-governmental levels, should be held on a regular basis.

## Conclusion

The West must have no illusions about the need to balance Soviet power, but neither should it overlook opportunities to encourage the Soviet Union to be a more responsible and integrated member of the international community. Although the long-term success of Gorbachev's policy remains uncertain, the process he has launched holds out a promise of a further moderation of Soviet power and an opportunity to develop and institutionalize areas of cooperation in the East-West relationship.

Some in the West worry about giving the Soviet Union a "breathing spell." They fear that Gorbachev's economic reforms will simply strengthen the USSR in the long run. But Soviet economic and social problems will not be quickly solved. In the meantime, greater openness and pluralization should be welcomed for their own sake as well as for the effect they can have in moderating the way Soviet power is used.

In order to seize the opportunities offered by new Soviet policies, the U.S. and its allies need to respond creatively to Gorbachev's initiatives. In order to do that, the West must be clear about its own policy objectives and priorities. New political thinking in the East requires new policy thinking in the West.

## Report of the Task Force

### I. Introduction: Gorbachev's Policy Is Different

After two and a half years in power, Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev has made it clear to both domestic and foreign audiences that he intends to carry out a thorough restructuring of the Soviet system in an effort to make the Soviet economy capable of effectively assimilating the opportunities offered by contemporary science, technology, and methods of management. Concerned that the Soviet system inherited from the Brezhnev period had become ossified, with consequences for the USSR's international standing as well as its material well-being, the new Soviet leadership has called into question a whole series of institutional arrangements and attitudes—ranging from a strictly centralized economic management system to an often militarized foreign policy—that has provided the foundation for Soviet policy for nearly sixty years. Not content with the kind of administrative adjustments that ever since Khrushchev's time have been the Soviet substitute for meaningful reform, Gorbachev has repeatedly underscored the need for structural economic reform and, just as important, for social and political reforms in order to sustain the economy over the long run.

The sheer magnitude of change that is currently being attempted in a country of the size and international import of the USSR would of itself demand the world's attention. The interest of the international community is further engaged by the emphasis the Gorbachev leadership has placed on aligning Soviet foreign policy more closely with long-term internal requirements, particularly the modernization of the economy. This has entailed an evident rethinking in Soviet policy circles about the requirements of foreign and security policy in an age characterized by mutual nuclear deterrence and global interdependence.



## II. Foreign Policy Trends Under Gorbachev

When Gorbachev became General Secretary in March 1985, many Western observers assumed that, due to the pressing nature of domestic affairs—especially in the economy—Soviet foreign policy would show little innovation at first. Yet Gorbachev's actions and statements, particularly since the 27th Party Congress in February/March 1986, suggest that his foreign policy perspective differs significantly from that of his predecessors. While change is currently often more noticeable on the conceptual than the policy level, the new Soviet leadership seems to recognize that serious economic and technological deficiencies jeopardize the USSR's international position, and that reversing these trends requires not only major economic modernization but also many new foreign policy approaches.

It is important when considering the foreign policy implications of Gorbachev's initiatives and statements not to focus unduly on the concept of "new thinking" as such, which has been advanced by Gorbachev and his associates as a general rubric for the General Secretary's approach to international affairs. Any "new thinking" takes place within a historical context of adaptation by the Soviet leadership to external realities. It is this broader pattern, and not any particular slogan, that should be the focus of Western attention.

In many ways, the world view that Gorbachev and his colleagues have been formulating represents an explicit crystallization of tendencies that have been present—often in piecemeal form—in Soviet policy circles since Nikita Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech at the 20th Party Congress in 1956. But the resultant synthesis of new and traditional elements constitutes a distinctly "Gorbachevian" perspective which seeks to integrate domestic and foreign policy in a mutually reinforcing combination.

*First*, the Soviet leadership has concluded that the USSR's international relationships should be subordinated to the prime task of economic modernization at home. Gorbachev's desire for domestic reform has led him to search for structures of stability in critical areas—in arms control, most visibly—which would provide a durable and predictable framework for the resource choices that must be made in the coming decade and beyond. The need for such stability assumes double importance for Gorbachev since instability in the USSR's foreign relations could

affect not only the politics of resource allocation but the viability of Gorbachev's own political position.

*Second*, the Gorbachev leadership has concluded that a favorable international environment can only be created on the basis of a political accommodation with the leading industrial powers, and above all with the United States, which remains the focal point of Soviet attention in foreign affairs. The Soviet choice for accommodation thus represents more than a "tactical" adjustment to shifting circumstances, the "breathing spell" that some in the West have detected. Rather, it reflects a strategic reevaluation of the international environment and of the international factors affecting the USSR's global position.

*Third*, there has been a major reexamination of security issues. Top Soviet officials, including the Soviet military, stress that a nuclear war cannot under any circumstances be won. As a corollary the leadership now argues, with implicit criticism of Soviet security policy under Brezhnev, that security cannot be obtained through military means alone. Security in the nuclear age is said to be mutual in character and, due to the destructive potential of modern weaponry, a common concern of all countries. Relatedly, Soviet policy analysts and Gorbachev himself claim to reject nuclear weapons as a durable guarantor of peace. They assert that even nuclear parity, which they continue to regard as a major historical achievement of socialism, could cease to be capable of ensuring stability in the face of an unregulated arms competition between East and West. Nuclear arms control thus assumes priority as a means of reducing the external threat, limiting resource requirements for the military, and establishing a framework of stability in East-West strategic relations, although the effect on Soviet arms programs and deployments is still unclear.

*Fourth*, the Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence is being revised. Key Soviet policy analysts now interpret peaceful coexistence less as a form of class struggle—the traditional Soviet viewpoint—and more as a long-lasting condition in which states with different social and political systems will have to learn how to live with each other for the indefinite future. As Yevgeny Primakov, a close advisor to Gorbachev, recently noted in a key article in *Pravda*, peaceful coexistence is no longer regarded "as a breathing space" by the Soviets. "Interstate relations," he emphasized, "cannot be the sphere in which the outcome of the confrontation between world socialism and world capitalism

is settled."\* Such coexistence is said to imply not the simple absence of war but instead an international order in which not only military strength but relations of confidence and cooperation prevail, and "global problems"—the arms race, ecological problems, Third World development—can be resolved on a collaborative basis.

Finally, the Gorbachev leadership evidences increasing recognition of the multipolar and interdependent character of contemporary international relations. This view is reflected in a growing tendency on the part of the USSR to deal directly with key regional actors, such as China and Japan in the Far East, Egypt and Israel in the Middle East, and Mexico in Central America. The main goal has been to reduce the USSR's diplomatic isolation, which was increasingly evident in the late Brezhnev era, and to multiply Soviet options. If this process continues, the West can expect increasingly sophisticated and pragmatic Soviet policies throughout the world.

Of course, rhetoric and policy are two different things, and the world will have to wait to see just how far shifts in attitude and doctrine will be reflected in practice. It is thus difficult to gauge precisely how the "new thinking" has affected foreign policy. Yet, significantly, changes in Soviet policy in specific areas—agreement to the U.S. proposal of the zero option, rejected by the Brezhnev/Andropov leadership, on the INF issue; and interest in participation in GATT and the IMF as well as key Asian/Pacific economic organizations—does suggest deeper changes that are more than a response to tactical opportunities.

Most significant, recent changes in Soviet statements on European conventional arms issues, especially a stated willingness to accept asymmetrical reductions in conventional forces and a restructuring of forces and operational doctrines so as to eliminate offensive capabilities, open possibilities for meaningful conventional arms negotiation which could enhance East-West security. How far these changes will go remains unclear. Gorbachev and his associates seem to have realized that the USSR cannot achieve its desired world of radical nuclear reductions without changes in its own conventional force posture as well. As yet, these changes have been largely rhetorical. However, given the special legitimizing function of political

rhetoric in communist systems, such changes should not be dismissed out of hand.

Clearly, an important motivation behind the new Soviet policies is to strengthen the USSR as an international presence over the long term. Some Western observers have thus wondered whether the West would not be more threatened by the success of Gorbachev's policies than by their failure. Such an interpretation misreads the stakes that are involved in Gorbachev's course of reform. First, Gorbachev has admitted that his comprehensive reform will not be achieved overnight; rather, it is a process seen as spanning decades. Second, to the extent that it is within Soviet capacity—which remains considerable—no politically significant sector in the USSR will permit a weakening of Soviet power. The issue for the West really involves the question, *what kind of USSR does it wish to see emerge from the process of internal revitalization and how will it use the power at its disposal?* The reform course that Gorbachev has chosen, by encouraging the formation and institutionalization of interests and social sectors long underrepresented in Soviet policy-making, could over time affect the way in which the USSR relates to the outside world. Clearly, Gorbachev has no intention of significantly relaxing the Communist Party's monopoly of power and its control over the Soviet public agenda. Yet, if the ways in which power is exercised are modified so as to multiply those voices within the Soviet system who have an objective interest in cooperative relationships with the outside world, it could well change the way the Soviet Union conducts its foreign affairs.

While the motivating factors behind the Soviet reform process are overwhelmingly domestic in character, they open new, albeit limited possibilities for constructive Western policies to advance the common interest in a more stable, cooperative, and mutually beneficial international order. The way that Gorbachev has launched the reform process, by stressing the tight linkage between internal and foreign policy and by a series of doctrinal statements and policy initiatives aimed at intensifying the USSR's ties with the international community, opens new opportunities for more thoughtful, creative Western policy toward the USSR.

\*Pravda, July 9, 1987, p. 4.

### III. Domestic Policy Under Gorbachev

Gorbachev's primary goal is to revitalize a stagnant Soviet system from within. This requires a restructuring of the Soviet economy to improve economic productivity and more effectively assimilate contemporary technological developments into the daily Soviet economy. In the 1970s the Soviet economy maintained average growth rates of 4-5 percent per year, while in the 1980s that figure dropped to 1-2 percent. Gorbachev has shown himself intensely aware of the *relative* economic/technological backwardness of the USSR compared to such key rivals as the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. He is far less satisfied than previous Soviet leaders with enumerating past Soviet accomplishments and is determined to force the Soviet economy to confront demanding international standards. Gorbachev believes that the USSR's ability to maintain its international position will depend on its economic performance at home and that the USSR "has no choice" but to enter on the path of radical reform, as he put it to the January 1987 meeting of the Communist Party's Central Committee.

Gorbachev's basic choice for structural reform has raised fundamental issues of strategy and means. Most important, perhaps, Gorbachev's economic program implies a serious restructuring of Soviet resource allocation. The choices involved are not simply limited to tradeoffs between military expenditures and consumption, as is often assumed in the West, but includes those among military expenditure, consumption, and the civilian economic investment essential to the long-term soundness of the Soviet economy, and, by extension, the power base of the USSR's international position. That Gorbachev is acutely aware of these tradeoffs is shown by his application of *perestroika*, or restructuring, to the military, which has had to accept constraints on military spending. Indeed, the adoption of the concept of "reasonable sufficiency" by the new Soviet leadership—which remains to be defined in operational terms—appears to reflect an effort to limit demands upon scarce resources and an understanding of the limits to the military and political utility of armed force in general and nuclear weapons in particular. Under these circumstances a general relaxation of international tensions, with a corresponding relaxation of military demands upon scarce resources, is central to the viability of Gorbachev's program.

The key elements of Gorbachev's domestic reform include a combination of economic, social, and political measures. In the economic field, the focus is on:

(1) *Structural Reorganization* — Under Gorbachev's strategy, the system of planning will shift toward strategic centralization, with less detailed and more indicative-type planning coming from the central agencies. More control over general planning and strategy will be held by the responsible political leaders at the top, while responsibility for day-to-day management decision-making will be decentralized to the local level, to the farms and factories, operating under a market-simulating mechanism in which the enterprise is expected to perform as a self-financing, self-managing center. Prototypes of this institutional restructuring are found in the fields of agriculture and foreign trade, with the establishment of the State Agro-Industrial Commission, which combines the functions of several agricultural ministries, and the State Commission for Foreign Economic Contacts, which supersedes many of the functions of the Foreign Trade Ministry. Inherent in Gorbachev's approach is the assumption that central planning of the framework of development is both compatible with, and a precondition for, the development of market forces at the decentralized management level of farms and factories, as it assures bureaucratic acceptance of local self-management, self-financing, and autonomy.

(2) *Improved Productivity* — Gorbachev understands better than any previous Soviet leader that the Soviet economy has reached a basic impasse in its development: sufficient growth can no longer be assured through the simple expansion of increasingly scarce resources such as land, labor, and capital but rather must take place on the basis of dramatically improved productivity of available resources. There will, for example, be a labor shortage of nearly 19 million workers during the current five-year plan. Gorbachev thus wants to create a more efficient economy that will use material and human resources better and will generate output that approaches the world level of quality. This strategy appears to take as its model the transformation of the postwar Western industrial economies, in which efficient technological systems were introduced to significantly increase the productivity of energy, agricultural resources, manpower, and other inputs to production. The Gorbachev leadership in general has made clear the rationale for replacing a system based on extensive

but wasteful production with processes that display greater efficiency and quality. As Gorbachev noted in his 1986 Party Congress speech: "A national economy which possesses enormous resources has run up against a shortage of them." Nevertheless, the process is not without risks: the wager upon human capital can be won only in the long run, while the prospect of a drop in the standard of living in the short run adds to the social pressures facing Gorbachev. How the economic reform unfolds thus bears close observation.

(3) *A Soviet Technological-Information Revolution* — Computer applications, microelectronics, the use of lasers and robotics are all part of the dramatic change occurring in the economies of the Western industrial nations. Gorbachev has repeatedly stressed that the USSR must not fall further behind in this new frontier of science, technology, and economic development. Given the serious shortcomings of the Soviet economy in this area, the central challenge of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) may be in its technological message. Civilian technological dynamism drives U.S. SDI research programs and, whether or not the military defense vision of SDI is credible or attainable, many of its technological components are. Thus, SDI symbolizes a further, potentially serious erosion of Soviet claims to being an economic superpower; and because of its uneven economic base, the USSR may become a more technologically inferior military power. The Gorbachev leadership is thus determined to dramatically raise the technological level of key economic sectors, which will at the same time raise the dilemma facing the West as it decides upon the scope of technological transfer to its competitor in the East. However, the climate needed for scientific inquiry, communication, and rapid technological progress is antithetical to one in which a closed, controlled state influences key developments in the scientific sector. The unleashing of Soviet scientific capability and the full utilization of Soviet technical talents requires a more open, equitable system. The release of Andrei Sakharov and the relaxation on internal discussion (*glasnost'*) may represent first steps in that direction.

(4) *A More Open and Interdependent Foreign Economic Sector* — If the Soviet economy is to make progress in this new technological revolution, it must at least selectively join the world market. Thus Gorbachev has called for controlled interdependence with the West (as well as closer economic integration with the USSR's East European allies). Reform of Soviet foreign

economic institutions is aimed at promoting direct contact and cooperation between Soviet enterprises and those of their trading partners in Eastern Europe and the West. Soviet officials have identified Western machinery imports as playing a significant role in the planned technical progress of the Soviet economy. Soviet foreign trade bodies have already been reorganized to provide greater flexibility in trade relations and a framework for joint ventures. Finally, the financing of imports will require a shift in priority toward export orientation and acceptance of increased dependence on foreign imports. If this process advances far enough, the export sector may come to challenge the military-industrial complex for priority in resource allocation.

Gorbachev's economic strategy thus requires a thorough overhaul of the Stalinist economic structure that has prevailed in the USSR since 1929. Certainly, the purely economic difficulties and dislocations associated with such a task—unemployment, plant closings, elimination of subsidized pricing of basic goods—will be daunting. What is more, the economic reform that Gorbachev has proposed necessarily entails important social and political reforms as well, since powerful vested interests as well as deep social inertia remain with a stake in the existing system. Gorbachev's program is thus truly comprehensive. Its success will depend not only on the logic of economic plans but on Gorbachev's skill as a politician to convince the Soviet people that they have a future that is worth possible short-term sacrifices, or at least changes.

It is with this awareness that Gorbachev has advanced the twin concepts of "democratization" and *glasnost'*. "Democratization," in the specific sense used by Gorbachev, should not be confused with the Western meaning of the term but rather be seen as serving two closely related functions: as a means of purging those in the party leadership and bureaucracy resistant to Gorbachev's program (by forcing them to compete with party candidates more sympathetic to Gorbachev's vision); and as a way over the longer term to make party officials more accountable to the party and local constituencies they represent (e.g., by increasing the role of the local soviets, or government councils).

This appears to be the meaning of the electoral reform recently initiated in the USSR: while elections would remain open only

to party-approved candidates, the relative decentralization of political accountability implied by multiple candidates for select offices would mean a party leadership that is more responsive to local influences. As both spur and complement to the decentralization of economic management, Gorbachev's "democratization" could result in a more flexible political system, at least as far as domestic policy is concerned.

The policy of *glasnost*, or greater openness of public discussion, espoused by Gorbachev is aimed at influencing the attitude of Soviet society as a whole (and not simply the political-governmental leadership). Whereas "democratization" seems designed as a complement to the political and personnel changes Gorbachev requires to introduce his programs, *glasnost*, while encouraging criticism of those in the bureaucracy opposed to Gorbachev's policies, is also aimed at eliciting the voluntary collaboration of society—especially the intelligentsia—in Gorbachev's restructuring of the Soviet system. While there remain definite limits to the debate about the course of Soviet society—especially when it touches upon foreign and defense policy—the intention to shake up rigid hierarchies and promote more independence of thought appears real, with consequences (such as the current anti-Stalin discussion) that perhaps Gorbachev himself may not be able to contain. In any event, Gorbachev appears willing to risk a certain loosening of the reins as the price for both discrediting counterproductive practices and attracting the "white collar" intelligentsia—who are essential to his technology-intensive, creativity-oriented cause—to his side. In this sense, *glasnost* represents a component part of Gorbachev's broader policy and not a short-term expedient aimed at domestic or foreign audiences.

#### IV. Western Interests and Policy Responses

The Task Force's review of Soviet domestic and foreign policy under the Gorbachev leadership leads to the conclusion that the Western powers should welcome and encourage the reformist inclinations initiated by Gorbachev, which hold out the promise of moderating Soviet power. Taking into account the largely internal determinants of Soviet domestic policy, the West should take advantage of the possibilities of encouraging those elements in Soviet policy that best advance Western interests. The importance of a united, consistent Western policy is underscored by the series of recent changes in Soviet policy, all of which correspond to long-standing Western preferences. To recapitulate:

1. *Arms Control* — The USSR adopted the Western proposal of a zero option on the INF issue. In addition, the USSR has moved toward the Western positions on verification, including on-site inspection. It has also raised the prospect of asymmetrical reductions in conventional forces in Europe. It accepted the principle of deep reductions in offensive strategic weapons and proposed the concept of "sufficiency" in military forces.
2. *Role of the Military* — There has been a reduction in the Soviet military's role and influence in the highest policy-making councils, and Gorbachev has made clear to the military that they have to accept spending restraints and greater openness in the dissemination of military information.
3. *The International Economy* — Gorbachev has placed special emphasis on reducing Soviet autarky by increasing trade, joint ventures, and expressing an interest in cooperating with such major international economic organizations as GATT.
4. *The Domestic Economy* — Gorbachev has initiated a major decentralization of operational responsibility for the economy and clearly intends to move toward a more flexible, modern, and efficient economic planning and implementation. He has admitted the inadequacy of Soviet statistics and called for more accurate economic information.

5. *Human Rights* — In the fields of culture and dissent, Gorbachev has displayed a degree of openness and toleration unthinkable just three years ago. In the area of emigration, the change has been less dramatic but Gorbachev has increased the emigration rates of Soviet Jews, Germans and other groups. While *glasnost* has a long way to go, it has clearly led to progress on human rights, which has been a major concern of the West.
6. *Regional Issues* — While Gorbachev has as yet made no significant effort to scale back existing Soviet global commitments, he has given a lower priority to the military expansion of Soviet interests in the Third World than his predecessors.
7. *Eastern Europe* — While urging closer and more "efficient" economic integration, Gorbachev has permitted a somewhat more flexible expression of specific national interests in Eastern Europe than his predecessors.

If the West desires to encourage these tendencies, and to take advantage of the opportunity they offer for a durable relaxation of tensions in East-West relations, it must begin to formulate a more creative policy toward the Soviet Union. The explicit recognition of interdependence by the Soviet leadership and the effort to subordinate foreign to domestic policy provides an opportunity to develop a system of Soviet-Western relations based on competitive but not militarized interstate relations.

Toward this end, the Western powers should intensify consultations among themselves regarding future policy toward the USSR. Until there is a Western consensus about policy objectives, priorities, and the tradeoffs among them, no course of action can be effective over the long term. Western efforts should be geared to testing Soviet readiness to resolve points of tension in the East-West relationship, thereby addressing Western geopolitical concerns and affording the USSR the international stability and reduced military expenditures that a program of genuine domestic reform requires. The focus of these efforts should be on constraining the use of armed force as a means of change. Exacting standards for restraint in international conduct, as well as strict measures of verifying and enforcing compliance, would have to be developed. Yet, if a framework of understanding could be reached in this critical

area, whole new areas for long-term East-West collaboration would emerge.

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An agenda for action, which could provide the basis for an effective Western consensus, would include the following:

*Security Issues* — The prospect of a U.S.-Soviet agreement on eliminating intermediate-range nuclear missiles (INF) by the end of this year represents an important achievement in nuclear arms control and symbolizes a hopeful change in the tenor of East-West relations. Progress has proved possible due to the missiles' secondary military significance and a radical reevaluation of the Soviet negotiating position. If an INF treaty is to translate into durable progress on the core security issues facing East and West, however, both Moscow and the West need to act upon the central fact emerging from the INF discussion: that nuclear and conventional force issues cannot be treated in isolation from one another. A series of recent signals from Moscow and other Warsaw Treaty countries indicates a willingness to explore asymmetrical reductions in conventional forces based in Europe and, just as important, to enter into discussions with the Western powers about ways of reducing the offensive potential of forces based in Europe. The Soviet leadership appears to have come to the conclusion that it cannot secure a further diminution in NATO's nuclear presence on the continent without at the same time addressing the issue of its own conventional posture and operational doctrine.

There is every reason, therefore, for the West to test Gorbachev and initiate alliance-to-alliance talks aimed at developing criteria for putting such concepts into practice. At the same time, the Western powers need to face two central issues: (1) How much do they in fact desire—given the possible geopolitical consequences—conventional arms reductions that would witness a significant reduction in the numbers, and change in the nature, of Soviet (and necessarily U.S.) forces in Europe? (2) What is the West itself prepared to trade off in order to achieve such reductions? Difficult tradeoffs will be necessary if progress is to be made on this central issue of East-West security. While other issues remain on the agenda, especially those involving strategic nuclear arms control, Soviet willingness to reexamine the character of its conventional commitment in central Europe

would constitute a watershed in the East-West confrontation, affecting the justification for the Western nuclear posture. Toward this end, military staffs and political directorates in the key Western capitals should begin planning realistic security options for a post-INF Europe. This includes both arms control proposals adapted to the changing circumstances and more effective, non-threatening defensive postures and missions for the remaining conventional forces. Absent that, the West will once again find itself—as in the recent INF debate—on the defensive in the face of imaginative Soviet arms control initiatives and incapable of rendering creative responses and initiatives on its own. Thus:

- The U.S. and its NATO allies should intensify talks with the Warsaw Pact aimed at reducing conventional forces and eliminating offensive strike potentials, particularly those designed for a surprise attack. Given the geographical differences and existing force imbalances, new approaches must include asymmetrical reductions of forward-based armored units, which present the greatest threat of surprise attack.
- Both sides need to move rapidly to conclude an agreement on deep cuts in strategic offensive nuclear forces. These reductions should be designed to enhance strategic stability and eliminate the capacity to launch a crippling first strike. At the same time, they need to find ways to strengthen the ABM Treaty and to ensure that any research on strategic defensive systems is consistent with preservation of the Treaty.
- The West should push for a rapid conclusion of the global Geneva chemical weapons negotiations, including the establishment of an international verification regime. Such an agreement would lead to increased confidence in Europe at a time when some are concerned over the elimination of medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles from the continent.

*International Economic Policy* — The sweeping economic reform undertaken by the Gorbachev leadership offers important new opportunities for East-West economic cooperation. The greater autonomy being given to certain enterprises involved in foreign trade, the increasing emphasis on joint ventures, and the interest that has been expressed in greater Soviet involvement with such

international economic institutions as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), all raise the possibility of a qualitatively new level of East-West economic contacts.

As the West reviews its economic relationships with the USSR, the overriding standard for its policies should be the ways in which economic ties with the USSR affect the Soviet role in the international community. Certainly, there is broad scope—except in a precisely defined area of strategic technologies, which entails tighter, more efficient COCOM regulations—for free exchange of goods and services between Moscow and the West, and deals which reflect the true cost of the items exchanged should be encouraged. It is thus a mistake for Western governments to prevent the USSR from receiving private credits at commercial rates. An expansion of Soviet economic contacts on the global market would heighten incentives within the USSR to compete abroad and thus increase pressure on the choice of resource allocation within the country. The same holds true for any realistic joint venture policy, which will have to meet rigorous market requirements if it is to succeed: relevant prices (to avoid dumping charges), adequate repatriation of capital, and opening up the Soviet market to joint venture products. Such a policy, based upon expanding Soviet-Western trade on the basis of market value, would tend to complicate Soviet decision-making on both resource allocation and policy toward the West and introduce factors for restraint into the Soviet policy process.

Consequently, the Task Force recommends that:

- Western governments, in collaboration with the private sector, should welcome the Soviet effort to develop the legal foundation for a system of equitable joint ventures. Key sectors for such collaboration include: energy equipment, machinery, transport, communications, agricultural technology, and financial services.
- While Western governments should not subsidize credits, neither should they oppose the extension of private credit at commercial rates.
- Provided that Moscow demonstrates that operational decentralization of the economy is genuine—so that prices reflect approximate opportunity costs—and that *glasnost* is extended to the international economic sphere by supplying detailed and reliable information relating to markets and



production, the West should give consideration to granting the USSR observer status in GATT and possibly in the International Monetary Fund.

- If the Soviet Union demonstrates heightened respect for human rights, the U.S. government and Congress should consider bringing their policy in congruence with U.S. allies by reevaluating the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments restricting trade with and credit to the USSR. The West should aim to normalize the framework for trade with all Warsaw Treaty countries, on the basis of mutual and reciprocal interests.
- The U.S.-Soviet umbrella agreements on scientific and technological cooperation should be revived and expanded, possibly in connection with the next summit meeting, on the basis of full reciprocity.

*Human Rights* — Western governments and private citizens should welcome increased *glasnost* while continuing to insist to the Soviet leadership that its observance of internationally recognized human rights is the mark of a civilized power and a condition for truly collaborative relations between the Soviet Union and the West. The West should insist that the Soviet Union fully live up to the commitments it undertook under the Helsinki Final Act to encourage the free movement of people, ideas, and information across international boundaries. Moreover, it is simply a fact of political life that progressive improvement in Soviet treatment of its own citizens would also make it easier for the U.S. government to press for most-favored-nation trading status for the USSR.

*Regional Issues* — A key test of Soviet willingness to align its international policy with its long-term domestic requirements will be its readiness to cooperate with the international community in resolving points of tension in areas of regional instability. Two kinds of situations should be addressed: (1) the special case of Afghanistan, where the USSR has directly invaded a sovereign state, and (2) areas where regional conflicts, compounded by the tensions between levels of economic and social development, on the one hand, and insufficient political institutions, on the other, threaten to spill over into great-power confrontation, as in the Middle East, Central America, and southern Africa.

A rapid Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is an important litmus test of Soviet desire for international stability. To the extent that the Gorbachev leadership keeps that country under Soviet occupation, its actions will belie its words to the effect that the USSR is committed to peaceful coexistence among states, regardless of social or political system. Certainly, the West, in cooperation with the international community and the United Nations, should make every effort to provide international guarantees that Afghan territory not be used to the detriment of Soviet security interests. At the same time, the Soviet leadership needs to recognize, in accordance with its assumed international obligations, that the Afghan people have the right to establish a government of their choice, irrespective of Soviet preference.

- The West must make clear to the Soviet leadership that continued Soviet occupation of Afghanistan poses strict limits to genuine collaboration between the USSR and the West, and that, conversely, a rapid Soviet withdrawal would be a forceful demonstration that the "new political thinking" has specific policy implications.

In other regions, such as the Middle East, where the superpowers are less directly engaged but the possibility of a local conflict exploding into a great-power confrontation remains imminent, the USSR and the concerned Western powers should begin exploring practical arrangements to defuse tensions and provide for stability. This effort must proceed from the recognition that, in the Arab-Israeli dispute, for example, where the two superpowers' interests are deeply rooted in geography and political commitment, there can be no effective peace that excludes one or the other. In that region, the Gorbachev leadership has launched a series of initiatives aimed at shoring up Soviet influence throughout the area—most notably by restoring the political dialogue with Israel—and putting the USSR potentially in the position to act positively toward a peace settlement.

- In areas of conflict which could lead to possible superpower confrontation—such as Central America, southern Africa, and the Persian Gulf—the West should intensify discussions aimed at clarifying interests and creating conditions of greater stability. The existing framework of periodic U.S.-



Soviet meetings on regional issues should be upgraded as part of a regularized summit process. The purpose would be to go beyond an exposition of each side's positions to the discussion of possible solutions to these problems.

- In the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Task Force recommends that the United States and the Soviet Union work together to advance a peace process which guarantees the territorial integrity and interests of all states and parties.

*Substantive Political Dialogue* — Moscow and the West need jointly to explore the kind of international order each seeks in the decades ahead. It is vital that the mistakes of the early 1970s, in which each side put forth conflicting concepts of detente under the same rubric, not be repeated. Consequently, both sides need to initiate high-level political talks on an ongoing basis to explore the operational compatibility between the Soviet doctrine of peaceful coexistence—traditionally seen by the USSR as a form of the class struggle—and the Western concept of detente, which seeks to normalize governmental relations while quarantining the ideological dispute between East and West from international relationships.

- The Task Force thus recommends that U.S.-Soviet summit meetings, as well as meetings at other governmental and non-governmental levels, be held on a regular basis.

## V. Conclusion

The Gorbachev leadership has defined a clear age. in domestic policy and intends to harness its foreign policy to serve that end. In all of its policy decisions, therefore, the West needs to be clear about its goals, priorities, and the tradeoffs among them. Indeed, that is a *sine qua non* if Western policy is to be effective and constructive in the face of Gorbachev's "new thinking" in foreign affairs. The West no longer has the luxury of inaction, which it appeared to enjoy during the waning Brezhnev years and the rapid series of Soviet successions.

The West should thus not be indifferent or merely reactive to Gorbachev's policies. *First*, such an attitude would put the West perpetually on the defensive, leaving Gorbachev to define the policy agenda himself. The disarray caused by Soviet acceptance of the Western position on the zero option on the INF issue underscores the need for the West to reexamine long-held positions and define a policy agenda more in accordance with its own definition of interests.

*Second*, a "wait and see" attitude by the West would consciously forfeit opportunities to encourage Soviet adaptation to international conditions. *Finally*, a Western failure to respond creatively to the opportunities offered by the new directions in Soviet policy would indicate indifference as to the fate of Gorbachev's policy, which is considerably more outward-looking and interested in collaborative international relationships than any in the recent Soviet past. Western policy choices as well as Gorbachev's domestic policy priority are bound to affect Soviet foreign policy. Domestic economic reform requires a stable international environment. The West should explore every possibility—consistent with its own interests—to engage the Soviet leadership in the effort to improve East-West relations, and to make clear to the USSR the requirements of being a constructive international partner.

Viewed historically, current Soviet attitudes toward foreign affairs, which suggest a more realistic Soviet adaptation to the international environment, may be interpreted as confirmation of a patient Western policy combining military strength and political flexibility. Ironically, many of the contemporary Soviet statements on "mutual security" and "interdependence" echo prevailing Western views of the early 1970s. In response to a series of aggressive projections of political-military power by

the USSR in the mid- to late-1970s, culminating in the invasion of Afghanistan, the West, and especially the U.S., quickly shed this rhetoric, downplaying arms control and collaborative security approaches. In certain ways, the West remains transfixed by the image of Soviet power that developed during the late 1970s, while the Soviets themselves are adopting approaches comparable to those widespread in the West in the early 1970s. To break this cycle, both must adapt creatively to the break that the Gorbachev leadership is making with important aspects of the Soviet past. The West can test the seriousness of Soviet initiatives by encouraging the USSR to continue developing negotiable proposals and practical approaches to issues of common security. The West must also be prepared to consider the practical consequences of its own policies, and to advance more creative initiatives. For that to happen, and yield results, there will have to be new political thinking in both East and West.

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Recent task force report on "Soviet New  
Thinking" from the New York based Institute  
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