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Volume 33 From-De 84-02-21 To-À 84-02-27

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28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION  
Vol 33

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*R. 468-668*

TITLE—TITRE:

DISARMEMENT  
MEASURES  
PLANS AND PROPOSALS  
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION ( INITIATIVES )

DESARMEMENT  
MESURES  
PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS  
TRUDEAU MISSION DE PAIX ( INITIATIVES )

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
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# CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET

DATED FROM  
À COMPTER DU

84-02-21

TO  
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84-02-27

AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - À METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER

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FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTÉRIEURE VOIR

FILE NO. - DOSSIER N°

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission

VOLUME

34



Government of Canada  
Privy Council Office

Gouvernement du Canada  
Bureau du Conseil privé

Ottawa, Canada  
K1A 0A3

*File*

Date: *27 February, 1984*

*Answered  
Apr. 5/84*

*IDR-1259*

MEMORANDUM TO: *Mr. R. Francis, (IDD)*  
*Director General, International Security*  
*and Arms Control Bureau*

Letter to the Prime Minister from

*SOHN MARKS*

<i>Peace initiatives</i>	
<i>28-6-1-TAWDEAU</i>	

PMO Ref. No: *11053016*

We have arranged with the Under Secretary's office that the Department's services can be drawn upon in preparing replies to letters which the Prime Minister has received on foreign affairs.

I would be grateful if you could arrange for a reply (within seven working days) to the attached letter for signature at the appropriate level within the Department of External Affairs and with copies to PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier) and External Affairs/CMR/Johnston. I would also welcome your advice on alternative ways of dealing with the matter, if appropriate.

If you have any questions, please call me at 5-6073.

Maurice D. Archdeacon  
Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat

c.c. PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)  
PCO/Judy Cameron  
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston

RECEIVED - REÇU
FEB 28 1984
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PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE - BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ

CONTROL FORM - PRIME MINISTER'S CORRESPONDENCE

FORMULAIRE DE CONTRÔLE - CORRESPONDANCE DU PREMIER MINISTRE

TO/A: Mr. Fowler

CC: Messrs. Osbaldeston, Darling, Clark (our file)

RE: LETTER FROM/LETTRE DE:  
John Marks

DATE:  
February 14, 1984

SUBJECT/SUJET:  
Peace Initiatives

CORRESPONDENCE NO/NO DE LA CORRESPONDANCE:  
4053 016

Judy Cameron

DATE:  
February 24, 1984

REPLY PREPARED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SIGNATURE.  
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DU PREMIER MINISTRE.


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REFERRED TO ANOTHER MINISTER THROUGH JUDY CAMERON TO MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.  
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ADDITIONAL REMARKS/OBSERVATIONS ADDITIONNELLES:

# Search for Common Ground



February 14, 1984

The Rt. Hon. Pierre Elliott Trudeau  
Prime Minister of Canada  
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0A2  
Canada

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Having talked with Sean Moore and Patrick Gossage, I am writing in behalf of Search for Common Ground to offer support for your current international initiative.

We think that what you are doing is incredibly important. Your vision is inspiring and critically needed in the current world political climate.

In your Montreal speech, you said, "We must work with due respect for the fragility of political trust, for the importance of building carefully, for the need to search out common ground on which to stand..." That articulates what our organization is doing, and we would be proud to contribute in some appropriate way to your efforts.

Our sense is that you have a unique role to play that comes from Canada not being a superpower and not having all the accompanying baggage -- or calcified bureaucratic structure. On the other hand, your non-super power status risks your being accused of meddling. The trick would seem to be how to take the given of Canada's size and use it as an advantage, not a liability, (or how to transform the glass from being half empty to half full).

We have spun out a metaphor, the first part of which you might have heard, that would seem appropriate to Canada's role:

The Soviet Union and the United States are like two little boys standing knee deep in a room full of gasoline. One clutches ten matches and the other holds seven. The one with ten somehow feels secure because he has more; while the one with seven is trying to figure out how to get to eleven. And the two boys are not alone in the room; others are there with their own matches; and still others want to get in.

Arms control negotiations, to date, have mostly concerned reaching agreement at nine matches. And almost no one seems to be paying any attention to the fact that the boys are up to their

*Handwritten signature and initials*

2.

knees in gasoline and that one spark will turn the room into an inferno.

Most attention is focused on finding different combinations of matches -- or configurations of the triad. Obviously, these are important questions: Certain combinations are more or less incendiary -- or at least destabilizing. It is our view, however, that Canada's most useful role will not come from finding that ever-elusive, perfect mix. Actually, we do not believe that such a mix exists. In any case, in the technical arena, Canada is playing catch-up ball and cannot possibly hope to convince the Americans and the Russians that its experts know better than theirs.

We believe your unique opportunity is to lead the way in draining the gasoline from the room.

In our view, the way to empty the gasoline -- or to reduce the threat -- is to create an environment or a framework of greater safety, in which the matches are held -- in which international security policy is made. The world will only move into a state of greater safety when decision-makers in both countries operate in a political climate in which they feel secure enough to reduce the current danger.

In other words, we suggest that you move beyond the content of great power interaction and deal with the context in which they interact. Once the context -- or the framework or the paradigm or the climate -- is shifted, the content then will follow. For example, with his opening to Peking, Richard Nixon brought about a shift in the context of US-Chinese relations in a way that eventually resulted in all bilateral disputes being defused. (Whereas the US and China had fought each other directly in Korea and indirectly in Vietnam, after the Nixon-induced shift, the US ceased to be threatened by the Chinese nuclear arsenal, and anyone suggesting arms control talks between the two nations would be laughed at.) Sadat brought about a similar shift with his trip to the Knesset. Reagan might have done the same at the time of Brezhnev's or Andropov's funerals.

In fact, you are already taking a similar approach in your efforts to bring together leaders of the five principal nuclear powers.

Search for Common Ground would like to offer some additional thoughts on how you might catalyze a fundamental shift in the international security arena.

Some possibilities include:

1. Launching a campaign to promote "global security" as the way to really have national security. As presently defined by the great powers, "national security" is an obsolete and dangerous concept. Given the destructive power of nuclear weapons, the nation-state cannot possibly protect its citizens.

3.

The shift will involve the nuclear powers realizing that their security depends on the others and cannot be won at others' expense; that all of them are in this boat together and there is no way for one end to tip over while the other stays afloat. Simply put, we are talking about a campaign to expand the definition of national security so it brings in global security.

2. Securing from the nuclear states' leaders a shared commitment to creating a context of peace. While setting up a Big 5 conference on the particulars of arms control might take forever, you might institute a summit -- or a much less complicated 5-way teleconference -- at which each leader gave his personal commitment to work for a world beyond war. Such declarations could have a profound effect on the world climate.

3. Launching a worldwide campaign to establish the idea that a fundamental shift is possible. Very few people want the world to continue in the dangerous direction it is going; yet they have virtually no idea that other alternatives are possible. In effect, this campaign would involve establishing the possibility that things do not have to be as they are in the international security arena.

I am attaching for your information some material describing Search for Common Ground.

I would welcome the opportunity to discuss such ideas with you or your Task Force at a time and place of your convenience. ||

With respect and admiration,



John Marks  
Director

cc. Patrick Gossage  
Sean Moore

# Search for Common Ground

## SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND

"We shall require a substantially new manner of  
thinking if mankind is to survive."

-- Albert Einstein

2.

## BREAKTHROUGHS

It is hard to believe that less than 150 years ago information traveled only as fast as a horse could run.

At that time, no "realist" even dreamed of telephones, television, computers, or the other means of modern communication we take for granted today.

Those visionaries who brought about each of these remarkable technological advances had three things in common:

- \* the ability to reach beyond prevailing limits of thought;
- \* unshakable confidence that those limits could be breached;
- \* a dynamic drive to bypass the obvious and find a better way.

In short, profound breakthroughs came out of shifts in thinking coupled with a commitment on the practical level to succeed.

## THE CHALLENGE

Today, all of us face a crucial challenge:

- \* How to break out of conventional wisdom;
- \* How to tap the creativity and innovation that is the hallmark of our nation;
- \* How to solve the most pressing problem our country and we, as individuals, have ever faced: Namely, MAKING THE WORLD SECURE.

## SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND

SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND, a non-partisan, non-profit organization based in Washington, DC, is dedicated to bringing about a fundamental shift in the way nations act so that international security is assured. It is responding to the challenge by organizing programs designed to promote fresh and innovative approaches on security issues.

As its name indicates, SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND constantly looks for ways to find common ground among individuals, organizations, and nations. It is determined to move beyond the "us-against-the-Russians" view, just as it is determined to bypass the equally narrow "us-against-the-Pentagon" perspective. It rejects as incredibly dangerous in the nuclear age the idea that countries can "win" their security at the expense of others.

3.

Search for Common Ground carries out a broad range of programs based on the following simple, yet universal assumptions:

- \* That all people, no matter what their political views, want to feel secure;
- \* That common ground exists among Americans and all nations of the world;
- \* That this common ground can be expanded to advance peaceful resolution of conflict.

PROGRAM: CONCRETE STEPS TOWARD GENUINE SECURITY

While its vision is lofty, Search for Common Ground is very much rooted in the real world. It provides a unique forum for finding workable ways to build a framework of real security. In effect, it is doing R & D work for the planet.

Search for Common Ground has set up an innovative policy-making and action-oriented process. It works like this:

Workshops. Every three months, Search for Common Ground brings together for a two-day workshop a group of about 50 highly skilled, talented individuals from all over the political spectrum. Each participant has a strong interest in the security issue, and their ranks so far include a US Senator, two retired generals, former deputy director of the Bureau of the Budget, a former CIA deputy director known for his conservative views, key staff from the Freeze and Ground Zero, representatives of liberal and conservative think-tanks, three best-selling authors, a Pulitzer Prize winning professor, two Republican activists, several business leaders, and two network television reporters.

Started in October, 1983 in Washington, these workshops provide attendees the opportunity to examine their own underlying assumptions on international security issues and to consider in a "win-win" environment what is necessary for real security.

The workshops enable attendees to:

- \* Move beyond conventional wisdom;
- \* Unblock their creative processes;
- \* Break out of patterns of thought that limit innovation and problem solving.

The workshops brim with vitality. They become incubators for new policy initiatives.

4.

Some examples from the January, 1984 workshop include:

\* Non-threatening Military. A Marine colonel came up with a simple but extremely powerful idea: Having a military that makes America secure without making other countries insecure. SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND has started a mixed military-civilian working group to flesh out and bring life to this idea.

\* Common Security. While looking closely at their underlying beliefs, several participants realized that the phrase "national security" has become a contradiction in terms, since no nation can any longer protect its citizens in the nuclear age. The working group formed as a result of this realization is mapping out a strategy for a broadly based campaign to change in the language the phrase "national security" to the more accurate "common" or "global security."

\* Economic Interdependence. A best-selling author, who is also chief executive officer of his own company, recognized that while traveling around the world giving speeches, he could play a significant role by speaking out on the theme of world peace through world trade. He pledged to develop the theme in every one of the roughly 200 speeches he gives during 1984 and to work with a group put together through SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND to develop ways to make this idea a reality.

It should be understood that SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND does not claim to have the answers. It is not the common ground. Its role is to catalyze projects and activities that make a substantial contribution to building a new framework for how nations act to assure their security.

#### BACKGROUND

Founded in early 1982 as the Nuclear Network, the organization broadened its base and became SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND in May, 1983. It is non-partisan and tax-exempt. Its director is John Marks, a former Foreign Service Officer, former executive assistant to the ranking Republican member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and author.

The following are some of SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND's completed projects:

\* "Peace Child" SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND co-produced this musical play at Washington's Kennedy Center in December, 1982. Starring Susannah York and over 200 children, the play uses song and drama to demonstrate a safe world is possible and that children and adults have the power to achieve it. After nine months operating out of SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND's Washington office, the Peace Child Foundation became a fully independent entity, which is now working with a wide range of educational and civic groups to have "Peace Child" performed around the country.

5.

\*Business Executives for National Security (BENS) -- During 1982, the organization provided catalytic advisory services in the formation of BENS, an organization of business executives dedicated to putting forth "a common sense business voice" on security issues. Starting from scratch, BENS grew within four months into an independent, non-partisan, fully-staffed group with national outreach dedicated to providing business leadership for responsible approaches to security questions.

\*Mt. Freedom Conference -- SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND convened in the summer of 1982 a three-day conference for 50 original thinkers to find fresh and innovative ways of dealing with the question of national security. Out of this meeting came a network of individuals working on specific projects designed to have an immediate impact on the way nations deal with security issues. For example, out of this conference came a collaboration between Richard Smoke of the San Francisco Institute for Peace and Bill Ury of the Harvard Negotiation Project which has resulted in major studies on nuclear crisis control and on lessening the possibility of accidental nuclear war.

For complete information on how you and/or your organization can support and participate in SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND, please write or call:

SEARCH FOR COMMON GROUND  
Suite 1126  
1346 Connecticut Avenue NW  
Washington, DC 20036

202-835-0777

# Search for Common Ground

## THE COMMON GROUND WORKSHOP

People working in the national security field tend to be frustrated by their inability to establish genuine security. At the Common Ground Workshop, such people will have the opportunity to examine in detail the question of what is necessary in order to have a safe world. And they will be asked to go deeper -- to discover the underlying assumptions which govern their beliefs on national security.

### What Will Happen?

Fifty people will come together for the Common Ground Workshop at the Carnegie Conference Center in Washington on April 28th and 29th. A skilled workshop leader will guide the participants through a structured process. They will interact with the workshop leader and with each other in plenary and small group sessions. The participants will have the opportunity to:

- \* Move beyond conventional wisdom;
- \* Break out of the thought patterns which limit their freedom of action;
- \* Generate breakthroughs.

### Who Will Be There?

Participants will include policy makers, legislators, defense contractors, peace activists, academics, and representatives of think tanks, foundations, business, and the military services. They will reflect the major viewpoints along the political spectrum: conservative and liberal, pro and anti. While those present may disagree on many issues, by choosing to attend, they will be committing themselves to:

- \* Examining what they believe to be true on national security issues and why they believe it;
- \* Being open to the idea that there may be things they do not know, the knowing of which could cause a breakthrough in the national security debate.

2.

### Search for Common Ground

Search for Common Ground is a non-profit, non-partisan organization located in Washington, D.C. It is dedicated to bringing about a fundamental shift in the way nations act so that international security is assured. John Marks, a former Foreign Service Officer, Senate aide, and author, is the organization's director. Carolyn Long, a former Vice President of the TransCentury Corporation and specialist in international development, is director of this workshop. More information on other people involved in the organization and on specific projects is available upon request.

### The Origins

The first Common Ground Workshop was held on October 1st and 2nd, 1983 in Washington, and the second was on January 14th and 15th, 1984. The workshops grew out of a series of discussion meetings started at the home of board president Patricia Aburdene and her husband, John Naisbitt, author of Megatrends. These meetings involved key people from all over the national security community -- people who, like almost everyone, rarely talk to those with whom they disagree. The promise generated by the meetings led to the workshops at which 48 participants came together each time, under the banner of searching for common ground. Most found the experience exciting and stimulating. They saw the possibility of creating breakthroughs in national security.

### The Workshop Design

The Common Ground Workshop will be led by a trained workshop leader. The workshop will be designed to enable the participants to produce breakthroughs in their lives and work. Search for Common Ground has worked closely with a variety of experts in the international security and organizational development fields to develop a powerful and effective workshop methodology. This methodology reflects no single approach and has been designed specifically by Search for Common Ground.

### The Particulars

The Common Ground Workshop will take place at the Carnegie Conference Center on the 8th floor of 11 Dupont Circle NW, Washington, DC 20036. (The building entrance is at 1511 New Hampshire Avenue NW.)

The Workshop will start at 9:00 AM on both Saturday, April 28th and Sunday, April 29th. It will end each day at 7:30 PM, and there will be breaks for coffee and lunch.

4053 016

February 23, 1984.

Mr. John Marks,  
Director,  
Search for Common Ground,  
Suite 1126,  
1346 Connecticut Avenue N.W.,  
Washington, D.C. 20036  
U. S. A.

Dear Mr. Marks:

On behalf of the Prime Minister, I acknowledge your letter of February 14.

Please be assured that it and the enclosed document will be brought to Mr. Trudeau's attention.

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed by  
Original signé par  
Marie-Andrée Bastien,  
Correspondence Director.

Original to R. Fowler

MAB/lc

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



*Dr. Calder*  
*M. Smith*  
AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES  
*m. [unclear]*  
*J.M.F.*

TO  
A File

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FROM  
De John Schram  
Political and Economic Affairs

DATE February 27, 1984

REFERENCE  
Référence

NUMBER  
Numéro

SUBJECT  
Sujet Future of U.S. Strategic Programmes:  
Dr. Henry Rowen Discussion, IISS

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Henry Rowen, a Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford, California, former President of the Rand Corporation, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, spoke February 24th to a private discussion meeting of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (his remarks are thus not attributable). The meeting was attended by a number of Foreign Office officials, one of whom (please protect) characterized Rowen as a conservative, hard-line apologist for current U.S. strategic policies. Certainly his approach to the U.S. SDI programme did nothing to allay British concerns over the implications in the initiative for broader NATO strategic policy.

2. Reviewing current U.S. strategic programmes (ie. major investment in command and communications; development of Trident D5, SLCM and B1 bombers to be followed by advanced technical bombers and ALCMs; ICBMs including the MX (which Rowen described as an elaborate compromise which pleased neither him nor anyone else; and development of the midgetman), he noted that these were based largely on a substantial increase in defence spending over the 1970's which was still well below that of the 1950's and 1960's, and which would continue to increase for domestic political reasons even under Mondale were he to become President.

3. Rowen told his audience that he agreed with U.S. ABM development not only on strategic grounds, but also as an essential reaction to continuing Soviet ABM developments. He argued strongly that the U.S. ABM programme was very much a long term initiative, that there could be no concrete result before the early 2000's, and that its medium term impact in terms of financing or strategic planning would be minimal. (He thus differed from estimates given U.K. officials by the U.S. briefing team recently in London (ourtel 351, 15 Feb), who spoke of some laser ABM systems being a practical possibility by the mid-1990's.) Rowen dismissed suggestions from FCO officials that the programme would quickly "gather its own momentum", and that its implementatic was thus not as problematical at this stage as Rowen made out. He also side-stepped audience suggestions that the time was in fact ripe for an outer space arms control agreement. He told his

audience that far from pressing for such an agreement, Western countries must "look carefully at what's going on in space" and must weigh what one would give up through an arms control agreement with what use is now and will be increasingly made of space for Western defence.

4. Reviewing Soviet strategic concerns, Rowen again emphasized Soviet ABM planning as a "important difference" between U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. He also referred to substantial Soviet investment in protecting command and control mechanisms, - an area where the U.S. had fallen behind, and which now needed to be strengthened. He argued that Soviet defence spending over the past decade (and until recently) had left the U.S.A. no alternative but to seek to match Soviet advances.

5. As American officials have done elsewhere (courtel 441, 27 Feb), Rowen argued that while the Soviets may want to avoid war at all costs, they do not believe a nuclear conflict is impossible, nor that one could not be survived.

6. On arms control, Rowen was pessimistic: he called the broad arms control experience "disappointing for the United States"; the U.S. had presented serious practical proposals based on certain assumptions of shared interests. The Soviets evidently did not in fact share these, and Soviet behaviour had induced the Senate not to ratify SALT II, - with hindsight, a good decision particularly in light of mounting evidence that the Soviets have not kept their side of the bargain. (Rowen again side-stepped a member of his audience who suggested that having not ratified SALT II, the U.S. could not now criticize the Soviet Union for not adhering to it.) Rowen concluded that unless something were to change dramatically on the Soviet side, prospects for arms control and disarmament are "totally unpromising". He distinguished arms control agreements, and actual progress on arms control and disarmament from a defence point of view, suggesting that while an agreement might be reached, - for instance in START, - for political reasons, it would not influence the parameters of defence strategy materially. He said that any decisions made by this or future American administrations on defence policy, including arms control, will be made on a unilateral basis, and will not really be affected by arms control "deals" - which in effect are relevant only to fringe issues.

7. Looking to the future, Rowen argued that the U.S.A. faces a dilemma; "there is not much stomach for nuclear competition, yet Soviet successes are forcing increased spending and research. Congress votes money without enthusiasm, amid a general consensus that there is already too much nuclear hardware. There is little confidence that arms control and disarmament measures could make much difference, but at the

- 3 -

RESTRICTED

same time America is confronted by Soviet superiority, and thus current programmes, including the MX, will be pursued."



John Schram



External Affairs  
Canada

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -  
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Canada

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
February 27/84

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS  
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OF  
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R.P. McDougall  
East Asia Relations Division/PER

EXT. 916 (82/10)

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*JB*  
*Alor*  
*Plan -> LADZ*

VF818 129

PRC'S QIAN JIADONG ADDRESSES GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

OM162000 BEIJING XINHUA IN ENGLISH 1945 GMT 16 FEB 84

(TEXT) GENEVA, FEBRUARY 16 (XINHUA) -- THE KEY TO ACHIEVING PROGRESS ON DISARMAMENT LIES WITH THE TWO SUPERPOWERS -- WHETHER THEY ARE GENUINELY PREPARED TO TAKE UP THEIR SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARDS DISARMAMENT AND WHETHER THEY HAVE THE GENUINE DESIRE TO DO SO, CHINESE DELEGATION LEADER QIAN JIADONG TOLD THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT HERE TODAY.

QIAN STRESSED THAT THE ARMS RACE BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS HAS CONTINUED TO DEVELOP AND, IN PARTICULAR, WITH THE BREAKDOWN OF THE U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE BETWEEN THEM HAS TURNED WHITE HOT.

FACTS HAVE MADE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR COMES FROM THE TWO SUPERPOWERS WHICH POSSESS THE LARGEST NUCLEAR ARSENAL, THE CHINESE DELEGATION LEADER SAID, ADDING THAT ONLY WHEN CESSATION OF THE ARMS RACE AND MASSIVE CUT OF THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE EFFECTED BY THE SUPERPOWERS, COULD THE REDUCTION OF THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR BE OF ANY REAL SIGNIFICANCE.

HE RENEWED CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER MU XUEQIAN'S PROPOSAL AT THE 38TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY WHICH CALLS ON THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION TO TAKE THE LEAD IN COMING TO AN AGREEMENT ON A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION OF THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MEANS OF DELIVERY OF ALL TYPES, AND THEREAFTER, A WIDELY REPRESENTATIVE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE BE CONVENED WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES.

THE CHINESE DELEGATION LEADER ALSO CALLED FOR WORKING OUT MEASURES AIMED AT BANNING EACH AND EVERY TYPE OF OUTER-SPACE WEAPONS.

16 FEB 2042Z MM



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

FPR-jf-5-1874

TO/À - DOSSIER

FROM/DE • FPR

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Discours de l'honorable Jean-Luc Pepin  
SUJET au Club des Relations internationales-  
16 février 1984

*MV*  
*W*

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Vous trouverez, ci-joint, la version  
intégrale du discours de l'honorable Jean-Luc Pepin,  
ministre des relations extérieures, donné au Club  
des Relations internationales, à Montréal, le  
16 février 1984.

le Directeur du  
Service de Presse,

*John J. Noble*  
John J. Noble

Discours de l'honorable Jean-Luc Pepin,  
ministre des relations extérieures,  
au Club des Relations internationales  
Montréal, le 16 février 1984

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Mesdames et Messieurs,

J'avoue que je suis un peu inquiet en vous adressant la parole. D'abord, je n'ai rien de sensationnel à vous dire, contrairement à l'invitation qu'on vient de me faire. Deuxièmement, vous travaillez sur ce congrès depuis sept mois. Moi, je travaille depuis sept jours sur mon discours. Il y a devant moi des personnes éminemment qualifiées qui vous adresseront la parole d'ailleurs, demain, je pense. Et c'est toujours un peu intimidant pour un politicien de parler devant des experts. Parce que, pour bien parler de ce sujet-là qui est les propositions de paix du Canada, il faudrait avoir réfléchi beaucoup plus que je ne l'ai fait, il faudrait aussi avoir participé soi-même aux négociations que M. Trudeau a engagées depuis quelques mois.

Vous savez peut-être qu'en politique, aujourd'hui, quand vous êtes ministre, il y a certains sujets sur lesquels vous devez devenir sinon aussi expert, presque aussi expert que les spécialistes. Dans mon cas, j'étais devenu assez compétent sur la question du "crow", du Nid-de-Corbeau, et autres choses semblables où, simplement par la fréquentation quotidienne du sujet et des grands spécialistes et l'enquête quotidienne, on devient très compétent. Tout ça pour vous dire que, sur le sujet dont je traite ce soir, je n'ai que les connaissances acquises il y a 20 ans quand j'enseignais ce sujet-là. Je n'ai que l'expérience d'avoir expliqué les propositions de M. Trudeau à certains chefs de gouvernement au cours de certains voyages que j'ai faits récemment. Je n'ai que l'expérience d'avoir lu les dépêches venant d'un peu partout au cours des nombreuses visites que M. Trudeau a faites dans les semaines récentes.

Donc, je ne suis pas un spécialiste, je ne suis pas un général, je suis un généraliste. Alors, je vais vous parler de ces choses-là en termes très généraux mais non sans avoir souligné d'abord que si on veut approfondir le moins ces sujets-là, très rapidement on entre dans des questions d'une technique très avancée. Je pense que vous.

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en êtes conscients. Je voulais simplement vous le répéter. Il y a deux conséquences à ça. La première, c'est que je suis accompagné d'un fonctionnaire, M. Després, qui va monter à l'estrade après que j'aurai terminé. C'est un fonctionnaire qui traite de ce sujet-là au ministère des Affaires extérieures. Alors, vous voyez comment je suis prudent. Jean-Luc le Prudent. C'est-à-dire que je sais très bien que vous allez avoir des questions auxquelles je ne pourrai pas répondre, et c'est pourquoi M. Després est avec moi et dès que je serai de court, je vais demander ses services. La deuxième raison, c'est que j'aurai beaucoup de plaisir à vous écouter, certains d'entre vous connaissant ces questions-là mieux que celui qui vous en parle.

Si je suis venu, c'est premièrement, paraît-il, que vous avez insisté et, deuxièmement, c'est que j'ai pensé, j'ai toujours pensé que la meilleure façon de s'informer d'un sujet rapidement, c'est d'avoir à faire un discours sur le sujet. Alors, merci d'avoir contribué à ma propre information.

Alors, deux parties à mon discours. Alors, premièrement, le quoi, le pourquoi et le quoi des initiatives de M. Trudeau et la deuxième partie, simplement des jugements, des réactions sur ce qui s'est passé. Alors, première partie: pourquoi et quoi? Je vais laisser le côté historique. Ce serait un peu long d'expliquer comment tout cela s'est fabriqué mais je tiens à répéter l'importance que la conférence du Sommet de Williamsburg a eue dans la détermination de M. Trudeau. Vous avez entendu ses mots: "bust your ass for peace". Vous avez sûrement entendu M. Trudeau prononcé ces mots-là. Et, bien, il l'a senti très fortement ce besoin qu'il a exprimé à Williamsburg et surtout le besoin d'être conséquent avec lui-même et de donner tout ce qu'il avait d'énergie à cette initiative.

Le pourquoi. Rapidement d'abord, la détérioration des relations est-ouest depuis quelques années. Vous connaissez ces choses-là. La détérioration, c'est évidemment un concept relatif mais tout le monde est d'accord pour dire que la situation actuelle est d'après certains la pire depuis la crise cubaine de 1962. Et, là, peut-être, si vous regardez les événements des récents mois, des récentes années et si vous les accumulez, si vous les conjuguez, vous vous apercevez que ça fait un ensemble pas mal dramatique. Vous avez la question de l'Afghanistan et de la Pologne. Vous avez l'affaire du Boeing 007 de Corée et là je vous

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rappelle ces événements-là. Vous les voyez assez facilement devant vous. Quand l'affaire du Boeing s'est présentée, ça s'adonnait que j'étais Premier ministre par interim, acting Prime Minister, en anglais ça se traduit Premier ministre acteur.' A ce moment-là, c'est moi qui ai eu à traiter de ce problème-là. Ceux qui m'ont vu ont peut-être compris que je prenais une position très, très prudente. J'ai été le premier à parler d'un accident. Ça m'a valu un amoncellement de lettres, de personnes enragées qui ont dit que je n'avais aucune colonne vertébrale, des choses comme ça et, vous vous rappelez les mots que même le gouvernement du Canada a employés pour qualifier cet acte. Donc, il y avait, il y a un ton dans les relations internationales très acerbe, très direct, très fort. Je rappelle l'invasion de la Grenade, la position du Canada vous la connaissez dans ce domaine-là, dans cette affaire-là étant que les parties en cause, ceux qui ont fait l'opération "rescue", l'opération de sauvetage, n'ont pas d'après nous épuisé tous les moyens des règlements pacifiques des conflits comme nous y engage la charte des Nations-Unies. La lenteur des négociations diplomatiques de paix, le MBFR ....(inaudible), la CSCE la conférence pour la sécurité et la coopération en Europe, trois ans, la conférence de Madrid, trois ans. Vous imaginez la frustration de ceux qui y étaient. L'interruption plus récente des négociations INF et des négociations START. Encore une fois, vous voyez le caractère pas mal négatif de tous ces événements, très négatif de tous ces événements. L'aggravation de la situation au Moyen-Orient, en Amérique centrale, en Afrique du Sud, où il y a continuellement un caractère Est-Ouest. Où il y a, sinon une rivalité, du moins une perception que les Russes ou d'autres font là des choses qui ne sont pas très catholiques. Je pense également à l'incertitude du pouvoir en URSS qui vient de se terminer. Je pense à la supériorité des forces de Varsovie, au déploiement des missiles en Europe qu'on vient d'invoquer, je pense aussi au réarmement ou à la force de l'armement américain qui, vu de l'autre côté, paraît comme étant une volonté américaine d'établir sa supériorité dans ce domaine. Alors tous ces événements-là, ensemble, vous donnent une bonne raison que justifiait l'initiative de paix du gouvernement du Canada de M. Trudeau.

La deuxième raison de cette initiative, c'est la situation de l'opinion publique au Canada. Un peu partout, mais au Canada, en particulier, puisque ma perspective en est une du Canada. Un peu partout dans le monde on a peur de l'attaque préventive. On a peur de l'accident nucléaire. D'autant plus que le gouvernement du Canada fidèle aux "two tracks", aux deux voies de l'OTAN, accepte le fait du missile Cruise. D'autant plus que le mouvement pacifiste au Canada

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grandit, M. Trudeau ayant compris tout ça, évidemment.

Plus fondamentale encore comme raison de l'initiative du gouvernement du Canada, c'est peut-être une conception du rôle des puissances moyennes dans le monde en ce qui a trait au maintien de la paix, en particulier. Et, alors, ce rôle-là consiste à dire, de façon schématique, que la paix est une chose trop importante pour être reléguée exclusivement aux superpuissances. Une chose tellement importante que les puissances moyennes en particulier doivent s'en occuper d'une façon très immédiate et très constante. D'autant plus que la diplomatie de la paix et de la guerre est paraissant excessive. Dans son discours de l'autre jour, à la Chambre des communes, M. Trudeau disait qu'il y avait une forte différence entre la façon des leaders de l'Europe de l'Est de parler en public et de parler en privé. Et ça, encore une fois, c'est une observation à faire; dans ces questions-là, très, très souvent, on emploie le tambour de résonance.

Une autre raison de l'intervention de l'initiative de M. Trudeau c'est évidemment une conception de la diplomatie au Canada associée à la personne de M. Pearson qui consiste à être d'abord extrêmement actif. Nous sommes activistes en politique extérieure. Je pense que dans tous les pays du monde où vous allez aller, quand vous rencontrerez des gens qui parlent de ce sujet-là, ils vont reconnaître que le Canada a une présence considérable dans le monde pour un pays de 25 millions d'habitants. Nous avons aussi une assez bonne réputation du côté de notre diplomatie. Je pense par exemple à ce que le Russe Gorbatchev disait à Mme Sauvé. Quand Mme Sauvé est allée en URSS dernièrement avec une délégation de parlementaires, M. Gorbatchev a félicité le Canada pour la conduite de sa politique extérieure qui, disait-il, a "un caractère de rationalité remarquable". Alors, donc, cette diplomatie du Canada active, rationnelle, elle réclame continuellement le droit de parole. A ce sujet-là, vous avez vu dans le discours de M. Trudeau récemment en Chambre un passage qui est à mon avis très, très beau, où M. Trudeau dit que nous avons payé nos droits à la communauté internationale. Nous payons nos taxes universelles. Par conséquent, nous avons le droit de parole. Nous sommes juridiquement pris entre les deux plus grandes puissances du monde, nous sommes ethniquement, politiquement en Europe, nous sommes industriellement entre le nord et le sud et, par conséquent, nous avons acquis le droit de parole et nous allons nous en servir.

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Finalement, comme raison de l'initiative de Trudeau, la personnalité de M. Trudeau lui-même. Ce n'est pas, je pense, une des raisons fondamentales. Je donne plus d'importance à mes autres raisons, c'est-à-dire au fait que le monde avait atteint un degré d'angoisse assez considérable, la tradition diplomatique du Canada, le fait que nous avons droit de parole, etc. sont des raisons à mon avis plus importantes. Mais la personnalité de M. Trudeau joue un rôle, ici. Dans un grand nombre de situations, vous avez pu observer un certain nombre d'inspirations philosophiques de base chez M. Trudeau. La première, c'est la fameuse application du principe des poids et des contrepoids. M. Trudeau est disciple de Poluvius qui avant Jésus-Christ avait une théorie de la nécessité d'équilibrer les choses continuellement. M. Trudeau pratique cette philosophie constamment mais en politique extérieure surtout. Il garde ses ouvertures, il garde ses possibilités continuellement disponibles. Un autre aspect de sa personnalité qui se reflète dans l'initiative dont je parle c'est sa conviction, un peu féroce, de la supériorité du politique sur l'administratif. C'est un terme que M. Trudeau répète très souvent, un terme très fort, à mon avis. Répétant continuellement que nous ne sommes pas en politique pour faire l'administration des affaires courantes, nous sommes en politique pour faire les grands changements pour mener les grandes batailles. Aussi joue un rôle son style direct, personnel. Il a dit récemment qu'il n'était pas diplomate mais il l'est à sa façon. Comme vous le savez, je pense qu'il va laisser une empreinte assez importante dans ce domaine-là non seulement par ses idées mais par son style. Laissez tomber les notes, on va se parler dans le nez. C'est une façon d'aborder la diplomatie qui est évidemment fort intéressante.

Maintenant, qu'est-ce que c'est l'initiative Trudeau? Le quoi. Le but principal, on vous l'a dit souvent, je le répète, c'est renverser les tendances. Alors, quelles sont ces tendances? De croire à l'équilibre de la terreur, de s'en remettre aux superpuissances, de laisser ça aux experts. En passant, je vous raconte une expérience que j'ai vécue à Madrid pour illustrer ce thème, le thème de laisser ça aux experts. A la conférence de Madrid, à la conférence de la sécurité et de la coopération en Europe, j'étais avec les membres de la délégation du Canada, évidemment, et le chef d'une délégation étrangère s'est amené et nous a déclaré tout ça comme si c'était révolutionnaire: "J'ai un problème épouvantable, mon ministre a décidé d'écrire son propre discours". Effrayant comme idée. Comme le ministre a

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fait un excellent discours, après la réunion, après le discours du ministre, je me suis précipité pour féliciter le ministre de son discours et je me suis retourné vers le chef de la délégation de ce pays pour le féliciter de l'aide qu'il avait sûrement apportée à son ministre dans son entreprise.

Je dis ça comme illustration de ce thème qu'il y avait une tendance, pour les politiciens c'est une paresse à laisser ces questions si importantes quelles qu'elles soient à d'autres qu'à eux-mêmes, les élus du peuple. Alors de dire également la tendance de dire moins que de dire plus que ce qu'on pense et l'initiative de M. Trudeau consiste à rétablir la volonté politique, l'énergie politique comme il appelle ça, le dialogue politique qu'un ami appelle le multilogue politique parce qu'il y a plus de deux qui sont en cause. Surtout de rétablir la confiance et les instruments de la confiance c'est le but de la conférence de Stockholm pour éviter les surprises. C'est aussi, je pense, que M. Trudeau lui-même l'a illustré très bien au cours de son plus récent voyage, de démontrer aux Russes que les portes sont ouvertes, que l'Ouest ne cherche pas à les isoler, que la coopération est aussi dans leur intérêt. C'est je pense sur ce but principal de son initiative, -il y a deux buts dans l'initiative de Trudeau -il y a ce but principal que je viens de définir; il y a des buts secondaires uxquels je passe maintenant.

Alors quels sont les buts secondaires ou les propositions spécifiques? Quelques observations d'abord. M. Trudeau sait très bien que les objectifs spécifiques que je vais mentionner sont fort discutables. Il sait très bien que tout ça n'a pas une vérité d'évangile. Il croit aussi à l'effet global et à l'effet cumulatif des propositions spécifiques que je vais mentionner maintenant. Je dis ça en le soulignant parce que très souvent dans la presse on oublie qu'il y a une certaine interdépendance entre les différentes propositions que M. Trudeau a faites récemment. Et, troisièmement comme observation, c'est le caractère évolutif de l'initiative de M. Trudeau. C'est à remarquer au début. Ses idées étaient X et elles se sont précisées, elles se sont amplifiées à mesure que ses voyages se présentaient. Il y a un aspect expérimental dans l'entreprise, dans l'initiative de M. Trudeau qui, je pense, vaut la peine d'être souligné.

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Quelles sont maintenant les propositions spécifiques elles-mêmes? Je les résume avec des chiffres cinq, cent dix neuf, deux, trente-cinq. 5, 119, 2, 35, c'est la façon que j'ai de mémoriser ces choses-là. Le cinq est évidemment la conférence qu'il a proposée des cinq puissances nucléaires dans le but évidemment de limiter les armes nucléaires stratégiques sans porter ombrage aux négociations à deux, les négociations de l'INF et du START. L'idée générale ici, c'est d'établir le principe de l'égalité entre les Russes et les Américains et ensuite d'établir le principe de la proportion ou d'un quotient ou d'un pourcentage valable pour les trois autres. C'est ça qui est l'idée fondamentale de cette conférence. C'est pour établir un équilibre, c'est pour établir un barème entre les cinq puissances nucléaires.

Alors, cet équilibre établi, le principe visant, on s'attaquera après ça à la réduction elle-même. En d'autres termes, on va faire un plafond puis après ça on verra à s'occuper du plancher. Voilà une façon imagée de décrire ces choses-là. On peut se demander pourquoi cet intérêt de M. Trudeau dans cette conférence des cinq puissances nucléaires qui, d'après plusieurs, serait au centre même de ce qu'on appelle l'initiative de M. Trudeau. Et, bien, l'explication facile, c'est la suivante et je pense qu'elle est vraie. Pendant longtemps on a concentré sur les deux grandes puissances et les efforts nucléaires des trois autres étaient - le mot "forts", c'est insignifiant - peu importants comparés aux efforts américains et russes. Par conséquent, on négligeait cet aspect des trois autres puissances nucléaires dans l'effort de désarmement ou de contrôle des armements.

Et, bien, il s'est produit une certaine prise d'importance de l'Europe dans ces problèmes-là à la suite des événements que vous connaissez et il est concret que deux de ces trois grandes puissances, c'est-à-dire la France et le Royaume Uni, sont dans l'Europe, que leur force nucléaire augmente, que les prévisions sont qu'elles vont continuer à augmenter et à devenir de plus en plus perfectionnées et par conséquent à cause justement de l'augmentation des forces nucléaires française et anglaise, à cause de l'importance de l'Europe, il devient de plus en plus important d'associer les autres à l'effort de contrôle des armements nucléaires parmi les cinq puissances. C'est comme ça que je m'explique cette chose. J'espère que ça vous suffit comme explication, moi ça me suffit, en tout cas. Ça m'explique pourquoi, pourquoi

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on s'est moins préoccupé des trois et exclusivement des deux. Ca explique pourquoi aujourd'hui il devient plus important d'établir des proportions entre les cinq eux-mêmes. Alors ça, c'est le premier élément des propositions spécifiques de M. Trudeau.

Le deuxième élément le 119. Alors, je répète, 5, 119. Le 119, c'est évidemment l'effort commun pour renforcer le traité de non-prolifération que 119 ont signé jusqu'à maintenant. L'effort consisterait à convaincre d'autres de signer cet accord surtout les petits états de façon à élargir l'intérêt du monde dans le désarmement et le contrôle des armes; de les amener à mieux respecter les obligations d'accords, ceux qu'ils ont signés, qu'ils ont contractés; de stimuler le transfert de technologie à des fins pacifiques et aussi non sans importance, et M. Trudeau l'a souligné quelquefois d'établir le rapport entre désarmement et développement pour intéresser les pays en voie de développement. Alors, l'idée, ici, c'est de dire surtout aux petits pays, surtout aux pays en voie de développement, c'est de dire: "Ecoutez, vous avez un intérêt, vous autres, personnel au désarmement, au contrôle des armes, puisque ce que, du moins en principe, ce qu'on ne dépensera pas pour acheter des armes, et, bien, ça sera une possibilité du moins qu'une partie de ces sommes soient mises à votre disposition pour votre développement." Alors ça, c'est le deuxième élément, le deuxième volet de l'initiative de Trudeau, c'est-à-dire, le renforcement du traité de non-prolifération.

Le troisième, c'est faire avancer, faire progresser les négociations MBFR à Vienne. Négociations, comme vous le savez, entre les deux blocs sur les forces conventionnelles et M. Trudeau dixit de stimuler la réponse de l'Ouest aux propositions de l'Est dans ce domaine-là. On m'a expliqué, il y a quelques minutes, que ces propositions de l'Est étaient essentiellement des propositions que l'Ouest a faites il y a quelques mois et que l'Est a reprises à son compte en les amendant à des fins particulières. Alors, ici, ça c'est le problème de base : la réduction des armes nucléaires non seulement la parité mais la réduction aussi entre les deux blocs. Il s'agit, comme vous le savez, de relever le seuil nucléaire, c'est-à-dire le moment où retarder le point, le moment où il faudra utiliser les armes nucléaires. Alors, en d'autres mots on baisse avec une réduction des armes conventionnelles les possibilités qu'il y a surtout, s'il y a la parité entre les deux blocs, les possibilités qu'on soit forcé de part et d'autre à utiliser les armes

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nucléaires. C'est la troisième partie de l'initiative de Trudeau.

La quatrième, c'est de hausser pour éviter qu'elle ne s'enlise le niveau de participation politique à la conférence de Stockholm. Alors, vous savez tous ici, puisque vous vous préparez à cette réunion depuis plusieurs mois, que c'est pour ça que le 35 ici c'est le nombre des pays de la conférence de Stockholm. 5, c'est le groupe des nucléaires; 119, c'est le groupe de non-prolifération; 2, c'est les deux blocs du MBFR et 35, c'est le nombre de pays à la conférence de Stockholm qui se tient présentement. Cette conférence de Stockholm, à mon avis, est d'une importance considérable. Certains diront peut-être que c'est la plus importante de toutes ces conférences qui ont eu lieu présentement. Pourquoi ça? C'est sûrement la plus politique de toutes ces conférences. Parce que dans les autres conférences, on parle des actifs militaires des différents pays en cause. On se demande comment les réduire, comment les limiter. Ici, on parle des intentions des pays. On dépasse le côté si vous voulez purement équipement militaire pour entrer dans le domaine de la psychologie, pour essayer, pour se demander comment on peut empêcher des malentendus, comment on peut empêcher des suspicions, des préoccupations négatives de la part des différents pays. C'est ça que la conférence de Stockholm essaie de faire. Elle essaie d'établir la transparence, la visibilité, briser la spirale de l'inflation militaire en établissant des règles de conduite pour les forces terrestres en Europe d'abord, mais possiblement ailleurs aussi.

à court

Le sujet, comme vous le savez, avait déjà été couvert par la convention d'Helsinki en 75 mais d'une façon partielle, d'une façon également purement déclaratoire et n'avait pas été appliqué avec une énergie considérable aussi. Alors, à Stockholm, dans une première phase, on va discuter donc des moyens d'augmenter la confiance. Il ne s'agit pas seulement de moyens psychologiques; il s'agit d'une série de moyens que j'ai dans mes notes, des moyens d'information comme la révélation de la composition, d'allocations, des manoeuvres, des prévisions militaires des pays en cause, comme la vérification des observateurs, etc. Alors, l'idée générale ici étant d'empêcher justement les malentendus, d'empêcher les préoccupations non justifiées. Alors, voilà les quatre points essentiels des propositions de M. Trudeau.

Il y en a une série d'autres qui relèvent de la stratégie de l'asphyxie que M. Trudeau avait proposés en 1978 et qui sont d'un caractère plus technique encore. Je les énumère seulement: interdire l'essai

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et le déploiement de systèmes antisatellites à haute altitude. Pourquoi ça? C'est parce qu'ils menacent l'ensemble des moyens de communication pour la gestion des crises. L'idée c'est que si on permet de développer ces systèmes antisatellites à haute altitude et, bien, on va couper comme ça les possibilités d'information et de communication des pays en cause. Le danger c'est que coupés de leurs communications ils paniquent et fassent des choses tout à fait peu recommandables. Un autre aspect de cette série exigeait que tout système d'armement stratégique soit entièrement vérifiable par les moyens techniques nationaux, c'est-à-dire satellites, surveillance électronique et agents. Ici, l'idée, ça serait que quand on développe un système, un système d'armement, on développe en même temps les moyens de le contrôler. La troisième idée de cette série technique, comme je l'appelle, c'est limiter la mobilité des missiles balistiques internationaux et ici le problème fort complexe et vous le voyez maintenant pourquoi je disais au début que ça devient très technique, ça me dépasse de toute évidence, dès qu'on entre dans ces aspects tout à fait particuliers. Il s'agit ici donc de limiter la mobilité des missiles balistiques intercontinentaux parce qu'ils sont trop mobiles, ils ne seront pas vérifiables, puis, s'ils sont trop fixes, et bien, on risque que le pays en difficulté puisse les faire partir de toute façon pour ne pas qu'ils tombent dans les mains des ennemis.

Alors, voilà le quoi et le pourquoi de l'initiative de M. Trudeau en termes très généraux, évidemment, les seuls que je comprenne. J'espère que ça vous sert. Pour moi, en tout cas, ça m'a servi de vous l'expliquer. Deuxièmement, quelle a été la réaction des différents pays, surtout ceux qu'il a visités personnellement, à l'initiative de M. Trudeau? L'effort qu'il a fait. Ceux qui d'entre vous voyagent souvent savent ce que ça veut dire que de se ballader à travers le monde comme il l'a fait, l'effort qu'il a fait physiquement. Et bien, je dis que si M. Trudeau n'a pas le prix Nobel de la paix, il mérite au moins une médaille des Jeux Olympiques pour l'effort qu'il a déployé au cours des semaines les plus récents.

Intéressant aussi pour les politiciens d'analyser. J'espère qu'il va y avoir des thèses de maîtrise, au moins sur ces sujets-là, la technique de l'effort qu'il a fait et qu'il fait. Ça commence par un discours et, ensuite, suivent des lettres envoyées aux différents intéressés, la visite elle-même. Un discours

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au retour et des lettres envoyées aux intéressés. Il y a une technique là, de la négociation internationale qui m'apparaît très utile à étudier. Quand je regarde cette technique, je pense à Fred Perry qui m'a enseigné à jouer au tennis. Perry disait qu'au tennis frapper la balle, c'était presque sans importance; ce qui est important, c'est la préparation du coup et le "follow-through" après avoir donné le coup. Même chose en diplomatie. Ce qui est important, c'est la préparation; l'exécution est très importante de toute évidence, mais la préparation et l'après rencontre est évidemment d'une très, très grande importance aussi.

Alors, j'aimerais parler des visites. Le type de visites que fait M. Trudeau, c'est donc très personnel, pas mal informel, un petit peu théâtral, juste ce qu'il faut, sur une période de temps limité. Il faut que ça se fasse dans une période de temps assez limitée. Si c'est trop court, ça a moins d'effet, si c'est trop long, l'effet diminue également. Alors, il a fait ces visites-là aux chefs de gouvernement, d'organismes internationaux, à des spécialistes du sujet, à des intellectuels, à des électeurs également. Je fais remarquer en passant que M. Trudeau a acquis une connaissance fort approfondie du sujet dans tous ses aspects. Je l'ai entendu parler de ces questions-là. Il en parle avec une abondance et une connaissance technique même. Ça rejoint ce que je vous disais au début. C'est qu'en politique aujourd'hui quand vous êtes, en tant que politicien, mêlé à un sujet comme celui-là, il faut que vous puissiez acquérir, que vous ayez acquis une connaissance technique pas mal avancée quand même. En d'autres termes, si vous êtes celui qui doit négocier des sujets de cette complexité, c'est évidemment essentiel d'en connaître les éléments principaux.

Mais dans la diplomatie contemporaine, c'est pas mal essentiel d'en connaître les détails techniques aussi. Evidemment, moins que ceux qui vous conseillent, mais passablement en profondeur aussi. Je vous fais remarquer ça à titre d'ancien professeur de sciences politiques. Question intéressante aussi: "Est-ce que M. Trudeau est le seul politicien qui, de mémoire d'homme, ait fait ce genre d'exercice-là avant de passer à la retraite? Et bien, si vous regardez la majorité de ceux qui font des missions comme celle-là - M. Pearson, en tête, habituellement font ces choses-là après être sortis de la politique active. Le seul exemple qu'on ait pu me citer de chef actif, de chef en poste qui ait fait un effort semblable, c'est le Président des Etats-Unis, Carter,

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au moment du Camp David. Mais, c'est très différent comme style puisque dans son cas ça couvre un domaine beaucoup plus limité que l'initiative de M. Trudeau et il fait venir les autres à lui plutôt que d'aller les voir aussi. C'est peut-être un détail mais qui vaut la peine d'être souligné en passant.

On accuse M. Trudeau d'un certain nombre de choses au sujet de cette initiative. On l'accuse de ne pas avoir impliqué, de ne pas avoir associé à son effort les chefs de partis du Canada. Discutons sur ça. L'autre jour, M. Mulroney, en Chambre disait qu'il regrettait que les chefs des autres partis n'aient pas été associés au Premier ministre dans cet effort-là disant que ça aurait aidé le consensus au Canada à se développer. Mais, quelques minutes après, comme vous l'avez vu, il est parti dans une condamnation du manque d'efforts du Canada dans sa politique d'armement et sa politique militaire. Alors, c'est peu probable que l'effort puisse se faire de façon conjuguée.

On a regretté aussi que M. Trudeau, je dis ça en tant que professeur de sciences politiques pour ceux que ça intéressent ces questions-là, qu'il n'a pas suffisamment associé ses ministres à la conduite de cet effort. En ce qui a trait à M. MacEachen, évidemment, ça ne s'applique pas. Même en ce qui a trait à moi parce que j'ai voyagé passablement depuis quelques mois et partout où je suis allé en Colombie, au Brésil, dans les Antilles, j'ai parlé de l'initiative de M. Trudeau et dans certains cas le chef du gouvernement du pays en cause, quelques jours ou quelques heures après, faisait une déclaration de sympathie à l'égard de l'initiative de M. Trudeau.

On a regretté aussi qu'il n'implique pas suffisamment le Parlement dans cet effort-là. C'est discutable aussi. Tout ce que je puis dire, c'est qu'il y a eu un certain nombre de débats, de discours, d'abord en Chambre, de M. Trudeau sur cette initiative. Il y a eu quelques débats, surtout sur les essais Cruise, mais ça portait quand même en partie sur l'effort de M. Trudeau.

On a regretté aussi qu'il n'ait trop intimement associé le Parti libéral à son initiative. Je dis ça en passant pour vous faire sourire. On a regretté, par exemple, que M. Trudeau n'ait fait un grand discours sur ce sujet-là devant une convention à Montréal du Parti libéral. Réfléchissons un petit peu sur ça. Je pense que, d'abord si vous regardez les dates, M. Trudeau

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était rentré de son voyage le 11; il repartait le 17; il avait plusieurs choses à faire. Ceux qui le connaissent savent très bien qu'il aime figner ses discours. Alors, il n'y avait peu de temps pour lui pour se préparer. Et, finalement, je pense que plus fondamental que ça, on aurait dû le féliciter de traiter d'un sujet aussi important devant une réunion partisane. Puisque les partis politiques sont quand même des entités extrêmement importantes dans un pays démocratique, c'est une condition même de la démocratie à mon avis. Alors, qu'est-ce qu'il y a de mauvais à parler devant un parti politique d'un sujet d'une importance comme celle-là? On aurait dû le féliciter plutôt que de réciter des choses que tout le monde voulait. Tout le monde voulait qu'il parte. Il leur a imposé, si vous voulez, un sujet d'une importance et d'un sérieux extraordinaire. Moi, pour ma part, j'ai regretté qu'on ait fait tellement du train là-dessus.

Quelle a été la réaction des pays visités et des autres aussi? Bien, là, je pense qu'on peut dire qu'il y a eu un très large accord sur l'analyse de la gravité de la situation et sur le besoin que souligne M. Trudeau d'une façon très forte de rétablir le dialogue politique. Il serait très intéressant mais il faudrait y passer pas mal de temps pour analyser la réaction de chacun des ces pays: France, Italie, Commonwealth, Chine, URSS, Etats-Unis, etc., d'analyser ce qu'ils ont fait, ce qu'ils ont dit et pourquoi ils ont dit ce qu'ils ont dit. Ça demanderait une analyse en profondeur que je ne peux pas faire de toute évidence pour plusieurs raisons. La première, c'est que ça prendrait beaucoup de temps. La deuxième, ça serait diplomatiquement très dangereux pour moi et pour ceux qui m'accompagnent.

C'est évident que si la réaction française à l'égard de l'initiative de M. Trudeau sur ceci et sur cela, etc, parce qu'il y a des convictions en France, il y a des intérêts, il y a des préjugés en cause qui font qu'ils ne voient pas les choses de la même façon que M. Trudeau les voit. La majorité des réserves, et j'ai lu à peu près tout ce qu'il y a eu de télégrammes sur ce sujet, la majorité des réserves qui sont faites par les pays qui ne sont pas d'accord sur les spécificités des propositions que M. Trudeau fait, c'est que le timing n'est pas loin, ce n'est pas le temps de faire ça maintenant. Attendons après la réunion du MBFR. Attendons après la réunion du START. Voyons si l'INF ne peut pas faire des choses avant. M. Trudeau n'a pas raison sur les questions de "timing" ou sur les questions de conditions. Il y en a certains qui seraient prêts à faire, disons, la réunion la conférence des cinq nucléaires, mais à condition que, par exemple, dans le cas des Chinois qui voulaient une

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réduction de 50% des armes avant le départ. Alors, chacun donc ayant des vues particulières. Tout ça pour dire que M. Trudeau, je pense, aura eu un succès considérable sur le but principal de son initiative mais beaucoup moindre, évidemment sur les propositions spécifiques qu'il a formulées à ce moment-là.

Les résultats, un peu tôt pour en juger. C'est évident que si ces choses-là devaient se réaliser dans un mois, deux mois, un an, et bien, la vue qu'on aura à ce moment-là de l'initiative de M. Trudeau sera très différente de celle qu'on a ce soir. C'est une vérité de La Palice que je vous énonce.

En ce qui a trait au but principal, je le répète autant au Canada qu'ailleurs dans le monde, je pense qu'il a gagné la sympathie. D'ailleurs, il était parti, comme dirait l'ancien Président Kennedy, avec un optimisme sans illusion. Je pense qu'il était optimiste mais qu'il n'avait pas d'illusions sur les difficultés qu'il allait rencontrer sur son chemin. Je pense que la contribution de l'initiative Trudeau est certaine en ce qui a trait à la prise de conscience des dangers et des besoins et on le voit aussi dans certains gestes qui ont été posés depuis. Mais ça, évidemment, si je vous dis que c'est important dans telle ou telle décision vous avez raison de me dire en retour que je suis sympathique à mon chef et que j'ai tendance à biaiser les choses en ma faveur et en sa faveur. Je pense que l'histoire dira que certaines décisions par exemple, sur la participation des hommes politiques au Sommet des ministres des Affaires extérieures à Stockholm, doit passablement à l'initiative de M. Trudeau. On vous dira que la décision de l'OTAN de revoir, de réviser ses vues et de participer le 16 mars à la réunion du MBRF doit pas mal. Encore une fois, c'est difficile de départager également ce que ces décisions-là doivent à la position du Canada et à l'initiative de M. Trudeau. Il faut quand même mettre les choses en place. Alors, tout ça, pour dire que je pense qu'on va reconnaître que ça eu un effet en général très bénéfique. Pour les spécificités, comme dirait Joe Clark, et bien, il va y avoir autant d'opinions qu'il va y avoir de cerveaux en cause.

La rencontre d'hier à Moscou, à mon avis, est très importante. M. Tchernenko disait à M. Trudeau que son initiative est "utile et pratique". Utile et pratique, bon. Alors, ce sont des mots, mais c'est bien comme point de départ. "Le Secrétaire général n'est pas revenu sur le passé", nous a dit M. Trudeau dans sa conférence de presse. A mon avis, c'est important, mais

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l'histoire dira que c'est très important ou un petit peu important. Le fait qu'il n'ait pas, qu'il n'ait pas essayé de repasser, de remâcher tout le passé et les déclarations contre, etc, est assez favorable également. La nécessité de la détente: M. Trudeau nous a dit que le Secrétaire général Tchernenko a répété plusieurs fois le mot de détente et, ici, c'est un mot qui appartient aux années 70 comme vous le savez, qui appartient à Brejnev alors que peut-être, consciemment, inconsciemment l'histoire dira que le Secrétaire général voulait laisser entendre à Trudeau qu'on revenait à la période précédente, peut-être, peut-être, peut-être. C'est intéressant. Il nous faudra un Freud, ce soir, pour analyser tout ça en termes freudiens. Alors, de toute façon, la nécessité de la détente est importante à souligner pour nous. La nécessité de "réduire la menace nucléaire de façon significative", c'est Tchernenko qui a dit ça. La nécessité, je le répète, de réduire la menace nucléaire de manière significative et son insistance continuelle sur l'égalité entre les deux Grands. "L'URSS, encore prête à reprendre les négociations avec les pays de l'Ouest", citation de M. Trudeau, "n'importe où, de n'importe quelle façon sur laquelle les deux parties pourraient s'entendre". Ça m'a paru important parce que c'est une négation, c'est un changement de position par rapport au départ des Russes de la conférence de l'INF. C'est eux qui ont quitté. Tchernenko dit maintenant: " Nous sommes prêts à retourner, n'importe où, n'importe quand." Ça m'a l'air assez important. Ça m'a l'air, si je juge seulement par les mots.

Alors, vous allez me dire peut-être que ce sont-là des mots qui ne signifient pas grand chose, ce sont des mots de politesse. Mais, alors, je dirai peut-être que vous avez raison, on verra plus tard. Mais, il y a, je pense, un caractère normatif dans les déclarations comme celles-là et, par conséquent, elles ont leur portée. Ce sont des mots que les chefs politiques prononcent mais comme le monde entier est au courant des mots que le chef politique a prononcés, bien, ça constitue pour lui un certain engagement pour l'avenir. Et voilà, mesdames et messieurs, je vous ai parlé du pourquoi, du quoi, du comment et des résultats de l'initiative de M. Trudeau. Merci.

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NO. 27 February 84 DATE

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RUDÉ PRAVO, February 25, 1984 ( page 6 )

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Our reader's inquiry

ON PREMIER TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE

A reader L.J. from Prague 2 asked our editorial office about details on Canadian Premier Pierre Trudeau's standpoints presented in the course of his visit to Czechoslovakia.

As known, Pierre Trudeau, Canada's Prime Minister came with initiative to hold " the so called " meeting of the Five i.e. meeting of the five countries possessing nuclear arms. ( USSR, USA, G.B., France and China/, a year ago. The meeting was supposed to make commitments about non-proliferation and subsequent reduction of nuclear arsenal of the parties concerned. It was not a new proposal at all. Political declaration of the Warsaw Pact member countries had already appealed for making such commitments, at the beginning of the last year.

Before coming to Czechoslovakia, Canadian Premier paid visits to six Western European capitals, Peking, Tokio, etc. After a stay in Czechoslovakia, he left for G.D.R. and Romania.

6/3/84  
INFORMATION  
Pierre Trudeau is a leader of the country - a signatory of the so called dual decision by NATO Pact of December 1979-the decision that cleared the way for bringing new US nuclear, medium-range missiles to Europe. So far, Trudeau has never dissociated himself, in public, from that decision. However, through his statements, he expressed concern over consequences that might arise from deploying the missiles on European Continent. He also recommended, inter alia, the US - Soviet talks to be resumed without regard to the installation of the US first-strike missiles.

However, he does not take into account that a dialogue from the position of force as conceived by the U.S. and some of her allies is not acceptable for the socialist countries. And its just the position of force, the U.S.

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and other NATO member-countries are trying to build up by means of deploying new US nuclear missiles in Europe.

On the one hand, Pierre Trudeau expresses real concern over peace by declaring nuclear war inadmissible and calling for a return to the policy of relaxation and improving international relations, but on the other hand, he is not able to free himself from "the logic" of the NATO Pact thinking refusing to acknowledge the principle of equality and equal security of the two sides, as to the issue of nuclear weapons in Europe. As far as his proposal for the meeting of "the Five" is concerned, it is worth recalling, the Soviet Union and his allies have several times called for holding similar even summit meetings, at which, agreements of fundamental character concerning the next development of international relations would be concluded.

Two-side freeze and reduction of nuclear arsenal of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. might constitute a first step to be followed by all nuclear powers. However, a conclusion of such agreements is stubbornly opposed by the U.S.

So, the Canadian Premier should address himself, first, to the leaders of the Western countries, in particular, to those of the U.S.A. In the course of the talk with Konstantin Tchernenko in Moscow, on February 15, on the occasion of Pierre Trudeau's attending Andropov's funeral, the Soviet side re-emphasized its will for conducting just and equal political dialogue with all countries aimed at reaching concrete agreements.

by Miroslav Fládr

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## NA DOTAZ ČTENÁŘE

### K iniciativě premiéra Trudeaua

Na podrobnosti k postojům kanadského premiéra Pierra Trudeaua při jeho návštěvě v ČSSR, která se uskotočila ve dnech 25. a 26. ledna, se ptá čtenář L. J. z Prahy 2

Předseda vlády Kanady Pierre Trudeau přišel, jak známo, už loni s iniciativou uspořádat tzv. schůzku pěti, tedy konferenci pěti jaderných států (Sovětského svazu, USA, Velké Británie, Francie a Číny), která by měla přijmout závazky o nerozšířování a následném snížení jaderných arzenálů zúčastněných stran. Nejde o návrh nikterak nový. Takové závazky navrhla přijmout mj. pražská Politická deklarace členských států Varšavské smlouvy na počátku loňského roku.

Kanadský premiér už před návštěvou Československa scestoval šest západoevropských hlavních měst, Peking, Tokio atd. Z ČSSR pak odejel na návštěvu NDR a Rumunska.

Pierre Trudeau je představitelem země, která připojila svůj podpis pod tzv. dvojitý rozhodnutí paktu NATO z prosince 1978, jež otevřelo cestu novým americkým jaderným raketám středního doletu do Evropy. Od tohoto rozhodnutí se zatím nikdy veřejně nedistancoval. Jeho prohlášení ukazují, že současně s tím má však obavy z důsledků rozmístování těchto raket na evropském kontinentě. Doporučuje také mj., aby se obnovily sovětsko-americké rozhovory bez ohledu na instalaci amerických raket prvního úderu.

Nebere ale ohled na skutečnost, že dialog z pozice síly, jak si ho představují Spojené státy a někteří jejich spojenci, není pro socialistické země přijatelný. A právě takovou pozici síly se USA a další státy NATO pokoušejí vybudovat rozmístováním nových amerických jaderných raket v Evropě.

Na jedné straně má tedy Pierre Trudeau reálné obavy o mír, prohlašuje jadernou válku za neptípustnou a vyslovuje se pro návrat k politice uvolnění, k zlepšení mezinárodní situace, ale na straně druhé se není schopen vymenit z „logiky“ myšlení Severoatlantického paktu,

kteří v otázce jaderných zbraní v Evropě odmítá uznat zásadu rovnosti a stejné bezpečnosti obou stran. Pokud jde o jeho návrh tzv. schůzky pěti, je třeba připomenout, že Sovětský svaz a jeho spojenci už nejdnou vyzvali k podobným setkáním i na nejvyšší úrovni, na nichž by byly uzavřeny dohody zásadního charakteru pro další vývoj mezinárodních vztahů.

Prvním krokem by mělo být dvoustranné zmaření a snížení jaderných arzenálů SSSR a USA, které by pak bylo rozšířeno na všechny jaderné mocnosti. Dosažení těchto dohod však tyračejně blokuje americká strana.

Kanadský premiér by se tedy měl v první řadě obrátit na vedoucí představitele západních zemí, svých spojenců, a především na Spojené státy. Při setkání s Konstantinem Černěnkem 15. února v Moskvě, kam Pierre Trudeau přijel na pohřeb Jurije Andropova, bylo sovětskou stranou znovu zdůrazněno, že „SSSR se zasazuje o politický dialog se všemi zeměmi, který musí být veden na spravedlivém a rovnoprávném základě a musí být zaměřen na dosažení konkrétních dohod.“

MIROSLAV FLÁDR



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 AT NATO TOMORROW. PLS PASS TEXT REPRODUCED BELOW TO SMITH/CALDER.

2.QUOTE:

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---MBFR:REVIEW OF WESTERN POSITION

WE NOTE WITH PLEASURE THAT REVIEW OF ALLIANCE POSITION ON MBFR WILL BE ONE OF TWO PRINCIPAL ITEMS ON KOHL AGENDA FOR MTG WITH PRES REAGAN LATER THIS WEEK. WE ALSO HEAR THAT USA GOVT HAS NOW COMPLETED ITS INTERNAL EXAMINATION OF ISSUE AND THAT NEW USA POSITION HAS BEEN BLESSED BY PRES REAGAN(EMB WSHDC WILL BE PURSUING THIS). UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE DO NOT/NOT CONSIDER IT NECESSARY THAT PM SEND PERSONAL MSG TO KOHL ON MBFR AT THIS TIME. PM WILL PROBABLY IN ANY EVENT BE SENDING MSG TO KOHL ON ANOTHER ASPECT OF HIS INITIATIVE WITHIN NEXT TWO WEEKS, AND IT SEEMS DESIRABLE NOT/NOT TO OVERLOAD THIS CIRCUIT OR TO DEBASE COINAGE.

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---PARIS-BONN AND EUROPE

WE READ YOUR REFTEL WITH CONSIDERABLE INTEREST. AS CONTRIBUTION TO EXCHANGE OF INFO ON THIS SUBJ, WE REPRODUCE BELOW EXTRACT FROM NOTES WE TOOK AT TWENTY-FIRST WEHRKUNDE CONF HELD IN MUNICH FEB10-12.

2. QUOTE: PROFESSOR JACQUES HUNTZINGER, SENIOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS ADVISER TO THE FRENCH SOCIALIST PARTY, SAID THAT WESTERN EUROPEANS SHOULD BEGIN TO PUBLICLY ASK QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT THEY CAN DO TO ENSURE THEIR OWN DEFENCE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS QUESTION SHOULD BE RAISED WITHOUT ANY PREJUDICE TO THE CONTINUED EXISTENCE OF NATO AND TO ITS TRANS-ATLANTIC CHARACTER; RATHER, THE FIRST STEP SHOULD BE TO FIND A DISTINCTIVE EUROPEAN ROLE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, QUOTE UN PILIER EUROPEEN UNQUOTE. THE BASIS FOR THIS WAS TO BE FOUND IN INCREASED FRANCO-GERMAN POLITICAL AND MILITARY COOPERATION, INCLUDING IN SUCH AREAS AS RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCES AND TACTICAL

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PAGE TWO IDDZ0206 RESTR

NUCLEAR WEAPONS(!!).HE SUGGESTED IT COULD BE PURSUED AND BROADENED  
UNDER THE AEGIS OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION(WEU),THE ONLY EXTANT  
EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION WITH A MANDATE IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY.  
3.HUNTZINGER'S VIEWS ON A NEW ROLE FOR A REVITALIZED WEU WERE  
ENDORSED BY ONE OR TWO OTHER FRENCH SPEAKERS WITH SOCIALIST LEAN-  
INGS,BUT CONTESTED BY A GAULLIST AND TWO GERMAN PARTICIPANTS.THE  
LATTER SUGGESTED THAT TRYING TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS INVOLVING THE  
SEVEN MEMBER STATES OF THE WEU WOULD TEND TO LEAVE THE THREE OTHER  
MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OUT IN THE COLD,AND CUT ACROSS  
EFFORTS TO IMPROVE POLITICAL COOPERATION AMONG THE TEN.UNQUOTE.

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*left to me by Baker  
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+ forwarded to NATO by tel  
+ Monday - file*

THE THREE CANADIAN PROPOSALS FOR ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY,  
PLANNED FOR CIRCULATION AT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT.  
UK REACTION ADDITIONAL TO THAT CIRCULATED IN THE POLITICAL  
COMMITTEE ON 2 FEBRUARY

1. THE UK RECOGNISES THE GREAT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THREE  
PROPOSALS. IF WE ACCEPT THAT ALLIANCE ARMS CONTROL POLICY FORMS  
AN ESSENTIAL PART OF OUR SECURITY POLICY THEN MAJOR ARMS  
CONTROL QUESTIONS ARE OF DIRECT CONCERN TO WESTERN SECURITY.  
AS SUCH THE UK WOULD LIKE TO SEE NEW PROPOSALS DISCUSSED FULLY  
AMONGST ALLIED GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES AT NATO  
HEADQUARTERS IN BRUSSELS BEFORE THEY ARE PUT FORWARD AS OFFICIAL  
VIEWS OF INDIVIDUAL ALLIED GOVERNMENTS.

2. THE UK IS THEREFORE ANXIOUS FOR A FULL DISCUSSION ABOUT EACH  
OF THE PROPOSALS PRIOR TO ANY ACTION IN THE CONFERENCE ON  
DISARMAMENT. EXAMPLES OF QUESTIONS WHICH THE UK WOULD LIKE  
PUT FORWARD AT THESE DISCUSSIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

MEASURE 1: BAN ON THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF HIGH ALTITUDE  
ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS.

UK CONFIDENTIAL

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- IS THERE NOT A RISK THAT THIS PROPOSAL, TABLED NOW, WILL ENCOURAGE THE RUSSIANS TO ADVOCATE NEGOTIATION ON THE BASIS OF THEIR DRAFTY TREATY, WHICH CONTAINS UNSATISFACTORY DEFINITIONS AND VERIFICATION?

- ON VERIFICATION, WHAT SPECIFIC PROPOSALS DO THE CANADIANS HAVE IN MIND TO ENSURE NO HIGH-ALTITUDE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT? HOW, FOR EXAMPLE, COULD LOW-ALTITUDE ASAT TESTING BE DIFFERENTIATED FROM TESTING OF POTENTIAL HIGH-ALTITUDE SYSTEMS?

- IS IT NOT IMPORTANT TO AGREE AMONGST THE ALLIES WHAT VERIFICATION SHOULD COMPRISE AND HOW IT MIGHT BE APPLIED, BEFORE CIRCULATING PAPER?

- WHAT SPECIFIC IDEAS DO THE CANADIANS HAVE ON THE MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL ALTITUDE OF EXISTING AND DEVELOPING SYSTEMS? IS THERE NOT A SERIOUS NEED FOR THESE TO BE CLARIFIED BEFORE ENTERING INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS? (CANADIAN PROPOSAL ITSELF SUGGESTS THIS COULD BE DIFFICULT PROBLEM).

- THE PROPOSAL FOR A STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE BEGS MANY QUESTIONS. HOW WOULD IT WORK? WHICH STATES PARTIES COULD BE MEMBERS? HOW COULD THE WEST ASSURE THAT ITS INTERESTS WERE NOT OVERRULED? WHY SHOULD THE WEST BE OBLIGED TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION?

- LASTLY, THERE ARE MANY PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION, GIVEN, AS THE CANADIANS ACKNOWLEDGE, EXISTENCE OF MANY DEVICES WITH A MARGINAL ASAT CAPABILITY. OUGHT THESE NOT TO BE FULLY EXPLORED FIRST BEFORE TABLING A PAPER?

THE PAPER EXPRESSES THE HOPE THAT SATELLITES NOW IN LOW EARTH ORBIT WILL BE MOVED OUT INTO HIGHER ORBIT, BUT WHAT HAPPENS IF THE RUSSIANS MOVE THEIR REAL-TIME TARGETTING SATELLITES, WHICH ARE THE ONES WHICH THE AMERICANS CONSIDER MOST DESTABILISING, OUT INTO AN ORBIT WHERE THEY WOULD BE PROTECTED BY THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT?

MEASURE 2: AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH STATES WOULD HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE THE VERIFIABILITY OF NEW STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS.

- WOULD AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT ABOUT THE VERIFIABILITY OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS IN GENERAL NOT REPRESENT A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL POLICY BY ADDRESSING A PRINCIPLE OF ARMS CONTROL IN THE ABSTRACT, RATHER THAN SPECIFIC WEAPON SYSTEMS OR CATEGORIES OF WEAPON SYSTEMS?

- WOULD THE NEED FOR STATES TO DEMONSTRATE IN ADVANCE THE VERIFIABILITY OF THEIR NEW STRATEGIC WEAPON SYSTEMS NOT RUN THE RISK OF OTHER STATES BLOCKING ALL PLANNED MODERNISATION SYSTEMS IF THEY SO CHOSE, REGARDLESS OF THE OBJECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE VERIFICATION SUGGESTED?

UK CONFIDENTIAL

- WOULD NOT THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE THE VERIFIABILITY OF NEW SYSTEMS RUN THE RISK OF BEING ONE-SIDED IN FAVOUR OF THE SOVIET UNION, WHERE THE GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT BE UNDER PRESSURE FROM PARLIAMENTARY OR PUBLIC OPINION TO ACCEPT REASONABLE PROVISIONS FOR THE VERIFICATION OF NEW WESTERN SYSTEMS?

- MIGHT NOT THE NEED TO DEMONSTRATE VERIFIABILITY ENCOURAGE THE TREND TOWARDS THE MOST READILY VERIFIABLE SYSTEMS, ESPECIALLY LARGE, FIXED, LAND-BASED MISSILES, AT THE EXPENSE OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS GENERALLY HELD TO HAVE A MORE STABILISING EFFECT?

- MIGHT NOT THE RISK OF HAVING NEW SYSTEMS REJECTED ON THE GROUNDS OF ALLEGED UNVERIFIABILITY DISCOURAGE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES FROM AGREEING IN ARMS CONTROL TALKS TO REDUCE OR ELIMINATE OTHER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS?

- MIGHT NOT THE STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION, WHICH CURRENTLY SERVES A FUNCTION ANALOGOUS TO THAT OF A COURT OF APPEAL, NEED TO BE RADICALLY CHANGED IN NATURE TO SERVE THE FUNCTION OF A WEAPONS AUTHORISATION COMMITTEE?

MEASURE 3: AGREEMENT TO RESTRICT MOBILITY OF ICBMS

- TO WHAT EXTENT WOULD SUCH AN AGREEMENT BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE STRATEGIC DOCTRINES OF THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION REPORT?

- WOULD THERE BE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MOBILITY OF SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES, IF ICBM VERIFIABILITY REQUIRES LIMITATIONS ON DEPLOYMENT AREAS AND THE FREQUENCY OF MISSILE MOVEMENTS?

- WOULD THERE NOT BE IMPLICATIONS FOR PERSHING II AND GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES WHICH COULD SUGGEST RESTRICTIONS ON THEIR MOVEMENTS AND CHOICES OF DEPLOYMENT SITES AWAY FROM THE MAIN OPERATING BASES?

3. BEFORE THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT CIRCULATES THESE MEASURES IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT THE UK GOVERNMENT LOOKS FORWARD TO A FULL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS.''

UK CONFIDENTIAL

000595

UK CONFIDENTIAL

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WJ

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

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FM GENEV YTGR1395 27FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 270900

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0204 24FEB MYTEL YTGR1385 24FEB

---ACD:BNATO CONSULTATIONS

AS EXPLAINED IN MY REFTEL WE HAD ARRANGED FOR SKINNER TO BE ON LEAVE  
EARLY PART OF THIS WEEK (WITH NO/NO PHONE WHERE HE WAS PLANNING TO  
STAY) ON BASIS OF EARLIER INDICATIONS FROM IDA. IT PROVED POSSIBLE TO  
GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM HOWEVER, AND HE HAS RETURNED IN ORDER TO ATTEND  
BNATO CONSULTATIONS AS REQUESTED

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CANADIAN  
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LONDON

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---USA STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE(SDI)AND COMMAND BUNKERS:

SUNDAY TIMES REPORTS

FOLLOWING ARE TWO ARTICLES PUBLISHED IN 26FEB SUNDAY TIMES.

2.COMCENTRE PLS SEND BY FACSIMILE.

J R SCHRAM/mg

POL & ECON

370

J R SCHRAM

21

# Soviet super-silo scheme uncovered

by Jon Connell,  
Defence Correspondent

NEW evidence has emerged about the extent of Soviet preparations for fighting a nuclear war. The Russians are thought to have built a network of command and control bunkers which are so hard that they could withstand direct hits from any nuclear warhead in the American arsenal. Intelligence sources in Washington believe the bunkers are buried as much as 100 yards below ground, under layers of reinforced concrete.

The discovery is seen as further evidence, as one American official put it, "that some elements of the Soviet leadership believe they could fight and win a nuclear war".

So far, three of the super-hardened bunkers - clearly intended to provide invulnerable centres from which high-ranking Soviet officials could direct a conflict with the west - have been identified. Their exact locations are secret, but two are within 100 miles of

Moscow and the third is in the Ukraine.

Precisely how hard the bunkers are is still in question, but one US intelligence source said last week: "The fact is, we don't have anything which makes a crater that deep."

To deal with such bunkers, one proposal is the development of "earth penetrator" warheads, which would be designed to plunge deep into the ground before exploding.

Some officials, however, point out that, if America were to explode a large warhead over one of the bunkers - delivered, say, by the highly accurate MX missile now being tested - this would at the very least cut off those inside by shattering their communications links, even though it might not destroy the bunker itself.

At present, the US has nothing comparable with the super-hardened bunkers. In the event of nuclear war, the plan is to get the president airborne, in the so-called "Looking Glass" plane, from which - in theory - he would command the American forces.

Star wars, page 21

# How 'star wars' could scuttle Polaris

**NATO**  
Jon Connell explains why the Europeans are worried

AMERICAN officials who briefed European governments on President Reagan's "star wars" initiative, have reported back to Washington that Britain is the Nato ally most sceptical about it. The scheme entails spending \$20 billion or more over the next five years on research into possible defence against nuclear attack. Washington sources believe that the principal reason for British scepticism is a fear of the consequences it might have for Britain's own independent nuclear deterrent.

The concern, also expressed in Paris (France has its own deterrent too), is that if the United States presses ahead, the Russians will redouble their own "star wars" effort. That, in turn, could lead to Russia deploying an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system which, though not good enough to keep out a huge attack by America, could annihilate the nuclear forces of Britain and France. If the scheme went ahead, these forces, therefore, would lose their credibility, and the two countries would become vulnerable to nuclear blackmail.

The British government is particularly sensitive since it has just spent £1 billion on modernising Polaris nuclear submarines by adding warheads and decoys. It is also planning to spend £10 billion on

the new Trident submarine system to replace Polaris.

One Pentagon official characterised Britain's stance as "entirely self-serving". But according to US sources, British officials also raised broader concerns. They are worried about how the scheme might affect Nato strategy. Does not a plan that envisages a world where nuclear missiles are unable to reach their targets undermine the whole basis of deterrence and increase the chances of a conventional war in Europe? These fears were echoed in other European capitals, particularly Bonn.

However, the American claim argued forcefully that the Russians already appear to be working flat out on their own research into anti-missile technologies. They are better placed than America to build an ABM system quickly.

The most striking evidence of this appeared to emerge late last summer with the American discovery that the Russians are building a huge new radar near the village of Abalakovo, in the heart of Siberia. The evidence is still viewed sceptically in other Nato capitals, but Washington believes the construction amounts to the most flagrant case so far of Russian cheating on arms-control agreements and that it greatly strengthens the case for pressing ahead with ABM research.

The site of the new Soviet radar was picked up by pure accident. US reconnaissance satellites had given the area little coverage over the last few



Four ways that a Russian missile might be shot down

years, partly because the Americans did not think the Russians would cheat on the ABM treaty signed in 1972. This allows the superpowers to build new phased-array radars close to their borders - but not inland. Radars on the border are considered vital to provide early warning of a possible attack, but radars inland can be used as the basis for an ABM system because they have much better lines of sight to track incoming warheads.

Intelligence analyst studying a rare photograph of the area spotted a distinctive new structure, about 100 yards and several storeys high. Alarm bells started ringing. It became clear that the shape was indeed a radar, and that it had been in construction for almost three years.

The significance of the radar, however, is still fiercely disputed. Some believe it is intended purely for early warning and that the practical difficulties of building on the

northern border drove the Russians to choose an inland site. Others contend that it is in the perfect position to enable the Russians to build a second limited ABM system (they are permitted one, found Moscow under the treaty). The radar covers a pie-shaped wedge facing towards the Pacific - precisely the flight path American submarine-launched missiles would have to take if aimed at the South.

But, despite disagreements over detail, Washington officials agree the radar constitutes a clear breach of the ABM treaty. The Russians themselves say it is for "space tracking", a claim dismissed in Washington as implausible. To be the radar is set at the wrong angle for following activity in space.

Moreover, Pentagon officials see the radar as the latest in a series of developments that arouse suspicion. The Russians, for example, tested a modern anti-aircraft system, the SA-12 at heights of about 100,000 ft. As one insider put it: "I don't know of any aircraft that flies at that height."

There are strong pressures on Reagan, however, from western Europe and from the US congress, to reach an agreement with the Russians not to develop certain technologies. One area in particular is seen as ripe for an agreement: the development of anti-satellite weapons - missiles or space vehicles that can be fired at from the ground to destroy communications satellites and reconnaissance satellites.

Anti-satellite (Asat) weapons further advanced than more exotic "star wars" are being tested. Each side is currently testing a system. Many or controllers would like to see at least a limited ban on Asat agreed. The Reagan administration, however, which is due to deliver its ideas on 1 subject to congress next month, is unlikely to press for such a ban.

Washington officials believe that since much of the technology being developed in Asat is similar to that being studied for anti-missile systems, a ban on the former would severely restrict research in the latter. Secondly, Asats are small and can be easily hidden, so the problems of verifying a Asat ban would be formidable.

Though the prospects of arm control in space may already be fading, the cost of full development of "star wars" technology would be prohibitive. The Pentagon's research director, Richard DeLauer, recently told the armed services committee of the house of representatives that the cost of a full anti-missile system would be "staggering". Eight technical problems, each as difficult as developing the first atomic bomb, if no more so, would have to be solved.

It is noted in Washington that Reagan, though the strongest advocate of anti-missile defence, did not sack DeLauer. Nor, despite pressure from enthusiasts, did he even mention "star wars" in his State of the Union message last month.

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0257 27FEB84

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ

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LDN PARIS ROME PRMNY VMBFR GENEV WSAW PRGUE BPEST BGRAD STKHM/  
SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY  
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR FPR RBR RBD RBG UGB URR RBRD RBP  
---PM TRUDEAUS VISIT TO MOSCO:13-15FEB

SUMMARY:

PMS MAIN POLITICAL PURPOSE IN COMING TO MOSCOW WAS TO SEE NEW  
SOVIET LEADER AND COMPLETE, AS HE PUT IT IN HIS PRESS CONF,  
THIS CYCLE OF HIS INITIATIVE. WHAT PM SAID TO CHERNENKO WAS WELL  
RECEIVED AND WELL UNDERSTOOD. BUT AS SECONDARY BENEFITS, SOVS  
WILL NOT/NOT BE INSENSITIVE TO PMS PRESENCE AT CEREMONIAL  
OCCASIONS, NOR WILL THE VISIT BE UNIMPORTANT AT LEVEL OF  
BILATERAL RELATIONS.

REPORT:

2. PMS VISIT TO MOSCOW, FEB13-15, HAD THREE PURPOSES. FIRST WAS  
TO SEE ONE SOVIET LEADER BURIED AND ANOTHER INSTALLED IN HIS  
PLACE (MORE PRECISELY IN ONE OF HIS PLACES). IT WOULD  
BE CYNICAL AND WRONG TO SUPPOSE THAT RUSSIANS ARE INSENSITIVE TO  
CEREMONIAL ASPECT OF PMS ATTENDANCE, EVEN THOUGH THEY KNEW HE HAD  
OTHER REASONS FOR COMING. MANY WESTERN COUNTRIES WERE REPRESENTED

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PAGE TWO XYGR0257 CONF D

AT LOWER LEVELS, OR AT CEREMONIAL LEVELS. AND PM HAD TO HIS CREDIT THAT HE WAS PRESENT ALSO FOR LAST OF THESE AFFAIRS (WHICH, WITH CHERNENKOS RESUSCITATION, THREATEN TO BECOME ANNUAL) LONG BEFORE HE UNDERTOOK HIS SPECIAL MISSION. THAT PM WAS THERE WITH, FOR EXAMPLE, ONLY TWO OTHER ECONOMIC SUMMIT PARTICIPANTS (KOHL AND THATCHER) AND WITH LESS THAN TOP LEVEL ATTENDANCE FROM MOST OTHER NATO COUNTRIES (NOT/NOT TO MENTION CHINA) SURELY SAYS SOMETHING TO NEW SOVIET LEADER ABOUT WILLINGNESS OF CDN GOVT AND ITS HEAD TO KEEP CHANNELS OPEN.

3. THAT MEANS BILATERAL RELATIONS. IN HIS TALK WITH CHERNENKO, PM DELIBERATELY ESCHEWED BILATERAL MATTERS (EXCEPT TO SAY THAT THEY EXISTED, AND THAT HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS WERE HIGH ON LIST). HOWEVER, IT IS INEVITABLE THAT PMS ATTENDANCE AT FUNERAL WILL HAVE ITS EFFECT. FOR THE SOVS, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT PM CAME TO CEREMONY, AND IMPORTANT THAT THEY WERE ABLE TO HELP HIM COMPLETE THIS CYCLE OF HIS INITIATIVE. BUT THEY WILL INEVITABLY, AND I THINK CORRECTLY, READ INTO PMS PRESENCE A WILLINGNESS TO REVIVE THE MORIBUND BILATERAL AGENDA. THAT HANCOCK WAS HERE AT SAME TIME TO REHEARSE THAT AGENDA WITH THEM WILL REINFORCE THE IMPRESSION. DO THEY THINK WE HAVE FORGOTTEN AFGHAN, FAMILY REUNIFICATION AND KAL? NOT/NOT IF THEY HAVE BEEN LISTENING. BUT THEY WANT TO TACKLE SOME AT LEAST OF THE BILATERAL QUESTIONS—ESPECIALLY ACADEMIC AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES, WHERE THERE ARE SIGNS OF WILLINGNESS TO GIVE A BETTER BREAK TO OUR PROFESSORS AND ARTISTS—

...3

PAGE THREE XYGR0257 CONFD

AND I BELIEVE THEY WOULD READ THE PMS PRESENCE IN MOSCOW AS  
A SIGNAL OF ASSENT.

4. THE THIRD OF THE PMS PURPOSES WAS TO COMPLETE THIS QUOTE CYCLY  
UNQUOTE AS HE PUT IT IN HIS PRESS CONF, OF HIS PERSONAL MISSION.  
CERTAINLY HE COMPLETED IT IN THE PHYSICAL SENSE OF SEEING AND  
TALKING ABOUT THIS SUBJECT TO THE ONLY REMAINING POLITICAL LEADER  
OF AN IMPORTANT POWER. MOREOVER, HE TALKED ALMOST ONLY ABOUT THIS  
SUBJECT, AND MADE HIS MESSAGE SHORT AND ABSOLUTELY CLEAR. HE  
STAYED AWAY FROM PARTICULAR ARMS CONTROL MEASURES (WHICH GROMYKO  
WOULD NO/NO DOUBT HAVE HAD TO FIELD), APPEALLING INSTEAD TO  
CHERNENKO AS A FELLOW POLITICIAN, SOMEBODY WITH POWER IN HIS HANDS  
AND THEREFORE CAPABLE OF MAKING THINGS HAPPEN.

5. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO KNOW WHAT EFFECT PM HAD. ONE THING WAS CLEAR  
TO ME, THAT BOTH CHERNENKO AND GROMYKO WERE THIS TIME FULLY  
FAMILIAR WITH WHAT THE PM WAS TRYING TO DO. WHEN I DELIVERED THE  
FIRST MESSAGE ABOUT THE PMS INITIATIVE AND QUOTE SPECIAL EMISSARY  
UNQUOTE TO VICE-FORMIN RYZHOV, I WAS GREETED WITH SOME PUZZLEMENT  
AND INCREDULITY. EVEN WHEN PEARSON CAME TO SEE KORNIENKO AND  
GROMYKO, THERE WAS A SHADE OF RETICENCE AND DEFENSIVENESS ON THEIR  
SIDE (AS THOUGH THE PM WAS TAKING SPECIAL AIM AT THEM). THIS TIME,  
IT SEEMED TO ME, CHERNENKO (AND GROMYKO WHO HAD DOUBTLESS BRIEFED  
HIM) WERE AT HOME WITH WHAT THE PM WAS SAYING AND DID NOT/NOT  
APPEAR TO SUSPECT HIM OF BEING EITHER AN AMERICAN AGENT OR A  
MISGUIDED ENTHUSIAST.

...4

PAGE FOUR XYGR0257 CONF

6. ANOTHER QUESTION HAS TO BE ASKED AND AN ANSWER ATTEMPTED. TO WHAT EXTENT DO THE RUSSIANS SEE THE PMS RECENT ACTIVITY AS SERVING THEIR PARTICULAR INTERESTS, POSSIBLY CAUSING TROUBLE IN THE ALLIANCE, EMBARRASSING THE AMERICANS IN SEVERAL SPECIFIC WAYS (ESPECIALLY THE SUFFOCATION MEASURES) AND PROMOTING THEIR OWN DECLAMATORY THEMES OF QUOTE NON-FIRST USE UNQUOTE AND QUOTE NON USE OF FORCE UNQUOTE? THEY HAVE, OF COURSE, PICKED UP ALL THE STATIC FROM THE PMS WASHINGTON VISIT AND FROM DAVOS. SUSLOV HAS SPOKEN TO ME ABOUT BOTH. IT WILL SHOCK THEM LESS THAN IT SHOCKED RAYMOND BARRE TO HEAR THE PM TALK ABOUT A NUCLEAR CREDIBILITY GAP. NEVERTHELESS, THEY LIKE SUCH THINGS AND PROBABLY POCKETED THE PMS DAVOS REMARKS WITH SOME SATISFACTION. ON THE OTHER HAND, IN SPEAKING TO CHERNENKO AS IN SPEAKING TO HONNEKER AND STROUGAL, THE PM LEFT NO/NO DOUBT OF WHERE WE STOOD ON INF DEPLOYMENT OR ON OUR NATO MEMBERSHIP, AND SOVS CAN BE UNDER NO/NO ILLUSION THAT THEY ARE PRYING US LOOSE FROM THE ALLIANCE. IN FACT THEY UNDERSTAND THE ALLIANCE ONLY SLIGHTLY BETTER THAN THEY UNDERSTAND OUR DOMESTIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS, WHICH IS HARDLY AT ALL, AND SUPPOSE (AS THEY SUPPOSE WITH THE EEC) THAT EVERY EXPRESSION OF OPINION REPRESENTS ANOTHER RIP IN THE COMMUNAL FABRIC.

7. BUT TO TAKE IT A LITTLE FARTHER, DOES AN ATTEMPT LIKE THE PMS HAVE ANY EFFECT AT ALL ON THE LIKES OF GROMYKO AND CHERNENKO? AND IF NOT/NOT, HAS IT ANY ON THE LIKES OF GORBACHEV? I THINK IT HAS. THE SOVS BELIEVE THEY ARE DEALING WITH WILD MEN IN

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PAGE FIVE XYGR0257 CONFD

WASHINGTON, AND THAT THEY HAVE MORE OF IT AHEAD OF THEM. THE LOWERING OF DECIBELS IN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S RECENT PRONOUNCEMENTS HAS CONVINCED THEM OF NOTHING, AND I BELIEVE MYSELF THEY ARE AS MUCH OFFENDED BY THE CONDESCENSION IN THE RECENT QUOTE SOFT UNQUOTE SPEECHES AS THEY WERE IN THE OLD QUOTE CRUSADE UNQUOTE ONES. THEY ARE MOREOVER ON THE DEFENSIVE. THEIR FOREIGN POLICY IS GOING BADLY EVERYWHERE EXCEPT PERHAPS IN LEBANON, WHERE THE ISRAELIS ARE HELPING THEM. IT DOES NOT/NOT IMPROVE THEIR TEMPER. I THINK THAT REITERATED AMERICAN ASSURANCES TO THE WORLD THAT ALL IS WELL, THAT CHANNELS ARE OPEN, MAKE THEM EVEN ANGRIER AND LESS WILLING TO OFFER A GESTURE. THEY LEFT INF AND START AS A WAY OF DECLARING THAT THE WORLD WAS IN A BAD WAY. THE RESPONSE FROM WASHINGTON, THAT EVERYTHING WAS UNDER CONTROL, WAS NOT/NOT WHAT THEY WANTED.

8. THE PM WALKED WITH HIS MESSAGE INTO THAT SITUATION. HIS MSG WAS NOT/NOT THAT EVERYTHING WAS UNDER CONTROL OR THAT CHANNELS WERE OPEN, BUT THAT THINGS WERE VERY NEARLY OUT OF CONTROL AND THAT THE DIALOGUE, IF ANY, WAS OF THE DEAF. THAT WAS A MESSAGE SOVS WANTED TO HEAR FROM OUR SIDE, BECAUSE THEY REGARD IT AS A REALISTIC MESSAGE. THEY CONSIDER THEMSELVES, I THINK, PROVOKED, HUMILIATED AND CHALLENGED, AND THEY ARE THEMSELVES AWARE OF THE DANGERS OF THEIR OWN STATE OF MIND. A SENIOR WESTERN STATESMAN ARRIVING ON THEIR DOORSTEP WITH A POLITICAL ASSESSMENT NOT/NOT SO DIFFERENT FROM THEIR OWN IS A WELCOME SIGHT, AND NOT/NOT SUCH

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A COMMON SIGHT.FROM WHAT I HAVE SO FAR LEARNED HERE,NEITHER  
THATCHER NOR KOHL TALKED IN THE PMS VEIN.NOBODY ELSE OF COMPARABLE  
STATURE FROM THE WEST RECEIVED BY CHERNENKO.

ROBERTS

CCC/095 271355Z XYGR0257

*We have a  
printed copy  
on file.  
action*

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FM PMOOTT PM00176 25FEB84  
TO EXTOTT IDZZ NDHQOTT/PPP

INFO MOSCO LDN PARIS PEKIN CNGNY BON LSBON MADRID BRU HAGUE  
COPEN OSLO STKHM ROME ATHNS ANKRA BNATO VMBFR GENEV WSAW PRAGUE  
BGRAD BUCST

TRANSCRIPT OF A SCRUM WITH THE PRIME MINISTER FOLLOWING A MEETING  
WITH KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY  
OF THE USSR, MOSCOW, FEBRUARY 15, 1984.

TRANSCRIPTION D UNE ENTREVUE SUR LE VIF ACCORDEE PAR LE PREMIER  
MINISTRE A LA SUITE D UNE REUNION AVEC M CONSTANTIN TSCHERNENKO,  
SECRETAIRE GENERAL DU PARTI COMMUNISTE DE L URSS, A MOSCOU, LE 15  
FEVRIER 1984.

Q. CHRISTOPHER YOUNG, SOUTHAM NEWS: PRIME MINISTER, DOES  
THIS TRIP COMPLETE OR END THE PHASE OF YOUR PEACE INITIATIVE AS FAR  
AS THE TRAVEL PART OF IT GOES?

A. I CANT PREDICT WHETHER THERE WILL BE ANY NEED FOR  
FURTHER TRAVEL. CERTAINLY IT COMPLETES ONE CYCLE. AS WE LEFT EACH  
OTHER, THE GENERAL SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT WE COULD MEET AGAIN AND  
WE COULD CONTINUE THE DIALOGUE--CERTAINLY CANADA AND THE SOVIET  
UNION. THERE ARE NO/NO PLANS FOR ANY MEETING AT THIS TIME.

Q. I DONT MEAN JUST THE SOVIET UNION. I MEAN OTHER WORLD  
LEADERS.

A. WELL, THATS ALL I CAN THINK OF FOR NOW.

Q. JAN LASOWSKI, CBC: PRIME MINISTER, WHAT IS THE STATUS

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NOW OF YOUR PLAN TO HAVE LEADERS OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS COME TOGETHER FOR A SUMMIT CONFERENCE? IS THAT STILL A PRACTICAL IDEA AS FAR AS YOU ARE CONCERNED? DID MR. CHERNENKO HAVE ANYTHING TO SAY ABOUT IT, ONE WAY OR ANOTHER?

A. WELL I WAS ENCOURAGED THAT MR GROMYKO YESTERDAY IN THE STATEMENT REFERRED TO THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS AND I DID RETURN TO THAT TODAY IN MY DISCUSSIONS, URGING THEM THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL, ON SOME OCCASION, SHOULD GET THE FIVE TOGETHER SEEING AS THEY ARE, COLLECTIVELY, THAT THEY WOULD BE SUPPORTIVE OF IT. I HAVE NO/NO ANSWER TO THAT. WE WILL HAVE TO SEE HOW EVENTS DEVELOP.

I DID POINT OUT TO THEM THAT THERE WAS A POLITICAL WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS--THAT IS, BETWEEN NOW AND JUNE--WITH THE MBFR MEETING SCHEDULED FOR VIENNA IN MARCH, WITH THE NATO REVIEW OF EAST-WEST POLITICAL RELATIONS TO BE PRESENTED TO NATO IN MAY, WITH ANOTHER MONTH OR SO TO GO IN THIS STAGE OF THE MEETING IN STOCKHOLM, WITH AN ECONOMIC SUMMIT IN JUNE WHERE WE ALWAYS DO RETURN TO POLITICAL QUESTIONS AND EAST-WEST AND, PERHAPS, WITH THE FACT THAT, AFTER JUNE, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WILL BE IN FULL SWING. SO, I DID TRY TO IMPRESS ON THEM THAT THERE WAS A WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY WHERE THE POLITICIANS COULD SEND SIGNALS AND MAKE POSITIVE GESTURES AND TAKE SMALL STEPS.

I THINK THAT ONE THAT WE MUST TAKE IS ON THE MBFR: WE MUST

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ANSWER THE SOVIET PROPOSAL OF LAST JUNE. MR GROMYKO, IN THE EXCHANGE THIS AFTERNOON, ALSO RETURNED TO THAT. I THINK THEY FIND IT VERY SIGNIFICANT. IT WILL BE SIGNIFICANT TO US, TOO, WHAT WE SAY THERE AND HE INSISTED ON REDUCTION OF ARMS--NOT/NOT INCREASE OF CONVENTIONAL STRENGTH, REDUCTION. THE WORDS BALANCE AND EQUILIBRIUM CAME BACK CONSTANTLY IN HIS OPENING, WELCOMING NOTES. THE GENERAL SECRETARY BEGAN, PRACTICALLY, BY SAYING THAT POLITICAL DIALOGUE WAS IMPORTANT, THAT HE VALUED THE CANADIAN INITIATIVE IN ITS USEFULNESS AND PRACTICALITY AND, AS I SUGGESTED EARLIER, SAID THAT WE COULD CONTINUE DIALOGUING ON THIS MATTER.

Q. JE CROIS QUE M MAUROY A PRESENTE (INAUDIBLE) IL EST UN HOMME OUVERT (INAUDIBLE). QUELLE EST VOTRE IMPRESSION DE LA PERSONNALITE DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL?

R. UN HOMME SOLIDE, REALISTE, QUI NE SE PERD PAS DANS LES MOTS. IL EST ARRIVE CERTAINEMENT DANS MON CAS DROIT AU BUT. IL A VOULU PARLER DE L INITIATIVE CANADIENNE DE RECHERCHE DE LA PAIX. IL EN A PARLE ABANDAMMENT. NOUS AVONS EU TRES PEU DE TEMPS POUR LES QUESTIONS BILATERALES. SIMPLEMENT, IL A EXPRIME LE VOEU QUE NOUS PUISSIONS LES POURSUIVRE A D AUTRES OCCASIONS, MAIS IL PARAISSAIT CERTAINEMENT SAVOIR LA OU IL VOULAIT ALLER, PAS DE FLOTTEMENT DANS LES PRINCIPES ET JE PENSE QU IL ETAIT REMARQUABLE EN CE SENS QU IL NE RECHIGNAIT PAS A PROPOS DU PASSE. IL N EST PAS REVENU SUR DES CONDITIONS ANTERIEURES,

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IL N A PAS PARLE DES INF, DU DEPLOIEMENT. IL N A PAS PARLE DU PRESIDENT AMERICAIN. IL EST VENU DROIT AU BUT. C EST UN HOMME PARFAITEMENT PRATIQUE ET JE SUIS CONVAINCU QUE (INAUDIBLE).

Q. MARK PHILLIPS, CBC: PRIME MINISTER, LET ME ASK A

TWO-PART QUESTION. THE FIRST IS, DO YOU STILL CONSIDER YOUR PEACE INITIATIVE TO BE ALIVE AND, IF SO, WHAT IS THE NEXT STEP IN IT? AND, FOLLOWING UP ON YOUR PREVIOUS ANSWER HERE, IN THE GENERAL SECRETARY'S LACK OF REFERENCE TO SOME OF THE PROBLEMS IN NEGOTIATIONS UNTIL NOW, DID YOU CONCLUDE THAT HE WAS, THEREFORE, OPEN TO MOVING FORWARD IN THOSE AREAS OR OTHER TYPES OF TALKS?

A. AS FOR THE FIRST PART OF YOUR QUESTION, OBVIOUSLY THE WHOLE THRUST OF THE INITIATIVE WAS TO INJECT POLITICAL ENERGY, TO LOWER THE MEGAPHONES, AND THESE THINGS ARE HAPPENING. IN THAT SENSE, THE INITIATIVE IS NOT/NOT ONLY ALIVE, I GUESS ITS BECOMING PRACTICAL REALITY—NOW THAT WE ARE NOT/NOT SHOUTING, NOW THAT WE ARE TALKING, NOW THAT WE HAVE RETURNED TO THE POLITICAL CONTACT IN STOCKHOLM AND THAT WE WILL ALSO BE RESUMING IN VIENNA.

OBVIOUSLY, THE INITIATIVE BEGINS TO LIVE. HOWEVER, IT WILL DEPEND ON WHAT WE CAN DELIVER. GROMYKO TOOK ME UP ON MY WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY AND SAID QUOTE YES, THERE IS THAT WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY AND WE WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT YOU PUT SOMETHING INTO IT, TOO UNQUOTE. AND I SAID THAT I DID FEEL THAT WE HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO ANSWER THE SOVIET PROPOSAL OF LAST JUNE ON MBFR, BUT THAT IF THEY JUST LET US SEND  
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SIGNALS, AND NO/NO POSITIVE SIGNALS COME IN RETURN, THEN THAT WINDOW WOULD BE CLOSED.

SO I FEEL THAT THERE IS A DOUBLE RESPONSIBILITY. WE UNDERTOOK FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW WITHIN NATO, WITHIN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE, TO MAKE SURE THAT THE THRUST OF THE CANADIAN INITIATIVE TO ASSUME POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY WOULD VERY MUCH REMAIN ALIVE.

Q. ON THE SECOND PART OF THAT QUESTION, THOUGH, THE FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE LACK OF REFERENCE TO THE TROUBLES OF THE PAST..?

A. I FOUND THAT A POSITIVE STEP, THAT THERE WAS NOT/NOT A RETURN TO THE RECRIMINATIONS AND THE STRIDENCY AND CERTAINLY NO/NO PRECONDITIONS. THEY STARTED, AS I SAY, TO TALK ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND HE MADE TWO CONDITIONS--BUT THERE WERENT PRECONDITIONS--THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED AS BETWEEN EQUALS, AND THE SECOND THAT THEY WOULD NOT/NOT DIALOGUE ONLY FOR THE SAKE OF DIALOGUE, THEY WOULD HAVE TO LEAD SOMEWHERE. THEY WOULD HAVE TO SHOW PROGRESS. AND AS I POINTED OUT, THATS A TWO-WAY STREET, WE TOO FEEL THAT WE HAVE SOME ANSWERS TO GIVE IN RETURN FOR THE SAME THING, BUT THE NATO REVIEW WHICH IS IN PROGRESS NOW AND WHICH WILL BE REPORTED IN MAY, WILL BE VERY MUCH INFLUENCED BY WHAT THEY ALSO DO.

I GUESS YOU ALL NOTED THAT IN YESTERDAYS SPEECHES THERE WAS AN APPARENT EFFORT--I THOUGHT IT WAS SIGNIFICANT--IN WHAT THEY DIDNT SAY, AS WELL AS WHAT THEY SAID. THEY DIDNT RETURN ONCE AGAIN TO INF, TO FORMER OPINIONS THEY HAVE EXPRESSED ABOUT PRESIDENT

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REAGAN, AND SO ON. SO I BELIEVE THERE IS AN OPENNESS ON BOTH SIDES, A READINESS, AND IT WOULD BE FOR POLITICIANS EVERYWHERE TO RESPOND TO THE DESIRE--THE GOALS--TO USE THIS IMPROVED CIRCUMSTANCES. THE SAFETY NET THAT WE WERE LAYING OUT FOR POST-JANUARY 1 HAS PRODUCED ONE IN THAT SENSE.

Q. STUART GORDON, CNN: DID YOU TALK SPECIFICALLY ABOUT INF AND (INAUDIBLE) OF THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS TALKS, AND IF SO, DID HE GIVE YOU ANY IDEA THAT THEY MAY BE WILLING TO COMPROMISE THEIR POSITION?

A. I DON'T THINK THEY KNOW. WE DIDN'T TALK SPECIFICALLY ON THAT--CERTAINLY NOT/NOT THE INF--BUT THE GENERAL SECRETARY TALKED SPECIFICALLY OF THE NEED TO REDUCE THE NUCLEAR THREAT AND REDUCE THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR ARMS SIGNIFICANTLY IN A MAJOR WAY, HOPING FOR REAL PROGRESS.

Q. JEAN-PIERRE QUITTARD, RADIO-CANADA: IL Y A, EN CE MOMENT, DEUX ATTITUDES A MOSCOU. IL Y A DES OPTIMISTES QUI PENSENT QU'AVEC M. CHERNENKO IL VA Y AVOIR UN DIALOGUE, ET LES REALISTES QUI PENSENT (INAUDIBLE) QU'IL N'Y A RIEN A ESPERER. DANS QUELLE CATEGORIE VOUS SITUEZ-VOUS, LES REALISTES OU LES OPTIMISTES, ET QUELLE EST, POUR VOUS, L'IMPORTANCE DE CETTE NOUVELLE ELECTION POUR VOTRE CROISADE POUR LA PAIX?

R. JE VOUDRAIS ME CATEGORISER DANS LE GROUPE DES REALISTES. JE NE CROIS PAS A L'OPTIMISME. JE CROIS AU DESESPOIR

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SURMONTE, COMME DISAIT BERNANOS. JE CROIS QUE CE N EST PAS UN RETOUR EN ARIERE. C EST UN REGARDEN AVANT MAIS CA NEVEUT PAS DIRE QU IL Y AURA UN VIRAGE BRUSQUE. LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL A EMPLOYE A PLUSIEURS REPRISES LE MOT CIT DETENTE FINCIT, ET JE PENSE QU IL Y AURA UNE CONTINUITE AVEC (INAUDIBLE). EFFECTIVEMENT LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL M A ACCUEILLI EN SE REFERANT A LA RENCONTRE QUE NOUS AVIONS EUE A HELSINKI IN 1975 ET DANS CE SENS-LA IL Y AURA UNE CONTINUITE, MAIS UNE CONTINUITE DANS LE DIALOGUE. C EST LE MOT QU IL A LUI-MEME EMPLOYE AU DEBUT. IL N Y AVAIT PAS DE SENTIMENT DE RUPTURE, NI D IMMOBILISME. IL FAUT ATTENDRE QUE NOUS AYONS FORME NOTRE OPINION. IL FAUT LAISSER PASSER LE TEMPS, LAISSER PASSER LES ELECTIONS. IL N Y AVAIT RIEN DE CA. C ETAIT MAINTENANT, C EST (INAUDIBLE). ALORS IL FAUT REGARDER L AVENIR AVEC L ESPOIR.

Q. ET POUR VOTRE MISSION POUR LA PAIX, C EST IMPORTANT?

R. MA MISSION, CE N EST PAS IMPORTANT. CE QUI EST

IMPORTANT, C EST QUE LE MONDE, LES LEADERS POLITIQUES MARCHENT VERS LA PAIX. COMME IL ETAIT INDIQUE, ILS SEMBLANT, EUX, DISPOSES A MARCHER VERS LA PAIX SANS RECRIMINATION, SANS RESSASSER LES VIEILLES HISTOIRES. JE CROIS QUE C EST AUSSI L ATTITUDE DE L ALLIANCE ATLANTIQUE. NOUS L AVONS INDIQUE ASSEZ CLAIREMENT A BRUXELLES, EN DECEMBRE, LORSQUE NOUS AVONS PARLE DU BESOIN DE RENOUE LE DIALOGUE SUR UN PIED D EGALITE, NON SUR UNE BASE DE SUPERIORITE, DE SUPERIEUR A INFERIEUR. NOUS AVONS INDIQUE CLAIREMENT QUE NOUS ENTENDIONS

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RESPECTER LES INTERETS DE L AUTRE, COMME NOUS VOULIONS QU IL RESPECTE  
LES NOTRES. CA, C EST UNE BASE POLITIQUE. DE NOTRE COTE, A CAUSE DE  
L HIATUS DES DERNIERS MOIS, NOUS NE SAVIONS PAS COMMENT EUX ALLAIENT  
(INAUDIBLE), MAIS MA CONCLUSION, C EST QU ILS SONT TOUT A FAIT SUR LA  
MEME LONGUEUR D ONDES QUE NOUS. JE DOIS DIRE QU EFFECTIVEMENT CELA  
PRENDRA UN PEU DE TEMPS.

Q. JOHN BURNS, NEW YORK TIMES: PRIME MINISTER, AS THE  
HEAD OF A NATO GOVERNMENT THAT HAS SUPPORTED THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE  
MISSILES IN EUROPE, DID YOU FIND IT NECESSARY TO SPEAK THE NATO  
POSITION ON THIS OR TO ARGUE FROM A NATO POSITION FOR A SOVIET  
RETURN TO THE INF NEGOTIATIONS, IN PARTICULAR. AND THE SECOND PART  
OF THE QUESTION, ON A DIFFERENT MATTER, DID MR CHERNENKO, AT ANY  
POINT, CITE SPECIFICALLY THE PRONOUNCEMENTS OF HIS PREDECESSOR,  
MR ANDROPOV, ON THIS OR OTHER ARMS ISSUES? THE MOST RECENT MAJOR  
SOVIET STATEMENT ON ARMS WAS ON JANUARY 25 BY MR ANDROPOV, AND IT  
WOULD BE INTERESTING TO KNOW IF HE IS CITING THAT IN REFERENCE TO  
INF OR (INAUDIBLE)

A. THERE WAS NO/NO SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO INF. THERE WAS NO/NO  
SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO ANY PARTICULAR FORUM, GENEVA OR STOCKHOLM--  
WITH THE EXCEPTION AS I SAID, OF VIENNA. YOU COULD INTERPRET MANY  
OF THE THINGS HE SAID AS BEING CONDUCTED AT ONE OR OTHER OF THOSE  
FORUMS. HE DID TALK OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES--THAT MIGHT BE  
STOCKHOLM; HE DID TALK OF THE NEED TO REDUCE THE NUCLEAR ARMS

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DRASTICALLY--AND THAT COULD BE GENEVA. BUT THERE WAS NO/NO INDICATION ON HIS PART THAT HE HAD CHOSEN A FORUM OR THE MESSAGE.

THERE WAS A GREAT OPENNESS AND EFFORT TO INDICATE THAT THEY WANTED THE DIALOGUE TO RESUME IN WHATEVER FORUM, IN WHATEVER WAY THAT BOTH SIDES COULD AGREE ON.

ON THE FIRST PART OF YOUR QUESTION, THE ANSWER IS NO/NO. I MADE NO/NO EFFORT TO JUSTIFY OUR PAST POSITION NOR/NOR TO ATTACK THEIRS. ON THE CONTRARY, I INDICATED THAT THE CDN INITIATIVE SPRUNG FROM THE ALMOST INEVITABILITY OF A DEADLOCK ARISING TOWARDS THE END OF 1983. AND IT IS BECAUSE IT WAS MORE AND MORE OBVIOUS, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE KOREAN AIRLINE DISASTER, THAT THERE WAS NOT/NOT A PERIOD OF FRUITFUL EXCHANGE, THAT THERE WOULD BE A KIND OF A BUILDUP TOWARDS THE DEADLINE THAT HAD BEEN SET IN DECEMBER 1979--THE DEADLINE OF DECEMBER 1983--THAT THE WHOLE CANADIAN INITIATIVE WAS BEING CONCERNED WITH WHAT WOULD HAPPEN AFTER, TO FILL THAT VACUUM. WOULD BOTH SIDES SLAM THE DOOR AND TURN THEIR BACKS ON EACH OTHER FOREVER? WOULD THEY KEEP SHOUTING DURING THE WHOLE YEAR OF 1984 AND BEYOND? OR WOULD OUR SIDE SUGGEST THAT WE SET THE MEGAPHONES ASIDE AND BEGIN SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS, AND WOULD THEIR SIDE RESPOND IN THE SAME WAY? WE WERE LOOKING BEYOND 1983 AND, IN MY TALKS WITH THE GENERAL SECRETARY, I WAS LOOKING BEYOND 1983 BECAUSE WE ARE HERE AND NOW. ITS A SHORT WINDOW, AS I SAY, BETWEEN NOW AND THE END OF JUNE.

Q. ANY REFERENCE TO MR ANDROPOVS STATEMENT?

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R. NO/NO REFERENCE, NO/NO QUOTED REFERENCE TO HIS STATEMENTS.

CERTAINLY NOTHING, AS I SAID EARLIER, RETURNING TO INF SPECIFICALLY. THE ONLY CONDITIONS THAT WE HAD HEARD. NO/NO PRECONDITIONS. THE ONE RETURN TO THE PAST, THE LINK TO THE PAST, AS I SAID EARLIER IN FRENCH, WAS TO DETENTE: AT THE 1975 MEETING WE HAD IN HELSINKI AND TO THE NEED TO RETURN TO THAT PERIOD.

Q. YOU SAID THAT IT WAS WHAT WAS LEFT UNSAID YESTERDAY.

WHICH YOU CONSIDERED IMPORTANT. I AM WONDERING IF YOU COULD DEFINE WHATEVER SIGNAL YOU MAY HAVE SEEN YESTERDAY OR MAY HAVE RECEIVED IN YOUR MEETING TODAY THAT WOULD SUGGEST A DEPARTURE FROM THE ANDROPOV PERIOD, AND WHAT FRESH OPPORTUNITIES YOU SEE NOW.

A. MR ANDROPOV HAD PRETTY WELL TO LIVE UP TO THE THREAT THAT HE HAD DELIVERED: THAT IF THE WEST DEPLOYED, THEY WOULD BREAK OFF NEGOTIATIONS. AND THE WHOLE QUESTION--PRACTICALLY THE SOLE QUESTION--IN OUR MINDS IS HOW CAN HE COME BACK TO THE TABLE AT SOME POINT HAVING SAID THAT HE WOULD LEAVE. AS CHURCHILL ALWAYS USED TO SAY, ITS EASIER TO LEAVE THAN TO COME BACK. YOU SAY, WELL THATS THE OPPOSITION THAT HES TALKING ABOUT. YOU KNOW, THEYVE LEFT THE TABLE, HOW DO THEY COME BACK? EVERYONE WAS CONJECTURING ON THE TIME IT WOULD TAKE AND WHAT WAY IT WOULD HAPPEN AND SO ON. WELL, THERES A NEW MAN THERE, A MAN WHO WAS NOT PARTICULARLY AN ANDROPOV MAN--HE GOES BACK TO BREZHNEV AND THE DAYS OF DETENTE--THEREFORE HE DOESNT HAVE TO BE SADDLED WITH SPECIFIC POSITIONS. I AM NOT SUGGESTING THAT

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THERE WILL BE A TURN-AROUND OR AN INTERRUPTION OF CONTINUITY, BUT THERE IS AN OCCASION TO RETURN TO THE TABLE, OR TO RETURN TO THE DIALOGUE IN (INAUDIBLE) AND I CANT BLAME THEM FOR SAYING QUOTE WELL OKAY, YOU'RE USING THE RIGHT WORDS NOW, BUT WHAT ARE GOING TO BE YOUR ACTIONS? UNQUOTE. WE USE THE SAME LANGUAGE WITH THEM, YOU KNOW. THEY'RE TRYING TO TALK TO YOU, BUT WHAT WILL YOU DO IN ACTIONS. BOTH SIDES ARE SAYING THE SAME THING: TALK, LOWER THE DECIBELS, (INAUDIBLE) SOMETHING TO TAKE A SMALL STEP. WE ARE TELLING THEM QUOTE WELL, YOU TAKE ONE, TOO UNQUOTE AND I THINK THAT IS OPEN OF US. ITS A NEW BALL-GAME, A NEW PITCHER.

1. NEWSWEEK: COULD YOU TELL US A LITTLE BIT ABOUT THE WORKING STYLE BETWEEN MR CHERNENKO AND MR GROMYKO. DID CHERNENKO USE NOTES, HOW MUCH OF A LOAD DID HE CARRY AS OPPOSED TO MR GROMYKO AND WHAT WAS YOUR IMPRESSION OF CHERNENKOS ABILITY TO DEAL IN SPECIFIC TERMS WITH THE ISSUES INVOLVED.

A. WELL THATS A MORE DIFFICULT QUESTION. WE HAD THIRTY MINUTES TOGETHER, MORE OR LESS, AND AS YOU KNOW HALF OF IT IS TAKEN BY TRANSLATION, SO ITS PRETTY HARD TO FORM A DEFINITIVE JUDGEMENT. BUT CERTAINLY MR CHERNENKO HAD A PROGRAM. HE DID HAVE NOTES. HE HAD A CERTAIN NUMBER OF THINGS HE WANTED TO SAY. HE SAID THEM AND HE REPEATED SOME OF THEM, PARTICULARLY ENCOURAGING ME TO PURSUE THE INITIATIVE. THEY FOUND THAT IT HAD VALUE, THAT IT WAS USEFUL AND PRACTICAL. PRACTICAL IS A WORD THAT CAME BACK SEVERAL TIMES. SO, I IMAGINE THAT HE KNEW WHAT HE WANTED TO SAY IN HIS SHORT PERIOD OF  
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TIME, AND I IMAGINE IT WAS THE SAME WITH THE OTHER LEADERS. HE WAS  
CARRYING THE MAIN THRUST OF THE POLICY--THE MESSAGE THAT THEY  
WANTED TO GET THROUGH; GROMYKO WAS MORE AD LIBBING AND REFERING A BIT  
MORE TO THE ISSUES THAT I HAD RAISED.

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RUDE PRAVO, February 25, 1984 ( page 6 )

Our reader's inquiry

ON PREMIER TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE

A reader L.J. from Prague 2 asked our editorial office about details on Canadian Premier Pierre Trudeau's standpoints presented in the course of his visit to Czechoslovakia.

As known, Pierre Trudeau, Canada's Prime Minister came with initiative to hold " the so called " meeting of the Five i.e. meeting of the five countries possessing nuclear arms. ( USSR, USA, G.B., France and China/, a year ago. The meeting was supposed to make commitments about non-proliferation and subsequent reduction of nuclear arsenal of the parties concerned. It was not a new proposal at all. Political declaration of the Warsaw Pact member countries had already appealed for making such commitments, at the beginning of the last year.

Before coming to Czechoslovakia, Canadian Premier paid visits to six Western European capitals, Peking, Tokio, etc. After a stay in Czechoslovakia, he left for G.D.R. and Romania.

Pierre Trudeau is a leader of the country - a signatory of the so called dual decision by NATO Pact of December 1979-the decision that cleared the way for bringing new US nuclear, medium-range missiles to Europe. So far, Trudeau has never dissociated himself, in public, from that decision. However, through his statements, he expressed concern over consequences that might arise from deploying the missiles on European Continent. He also recommended, inter alia, the US - Soviet talks to be resumed without regard to the installation of the US first-strike missiles.

However, he does not take into account that a dialogue from the position of force as conceived by the U.S. and some of her allies is not acceptable for the socialist countries. And its just the position of force, the U.S.

and other NATO member-countries are trying to build up by means of deploying new US nuclear missiles in Europe.

On the one hand, Pierre Trudeau expresses real concern over peace by declaring nuclear war inadmissible and calling for a return to the policy of relaxation and improving international relations, but on the other hand, he is not able to free himself from "the logic" of the NATO Pact thinking refusing to acknowledge the principle of equality and equal security of the two sides, as to the issue of nuclear weapons in Europe. As far as his proposal for the meeting of "the Five" is concerned, it is worth recalling, the Soviet Union and his allies have several times called for holding similar even summit meetings, at which, agreements of fundamental character concerning the next development of international relations would be concluded.

Two-side freeze and reduction of nuclear arsenal of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. might constitute a first step to be followed by all nuclear powers. However, a conclusion of such agreements is stubbornly opposed by the U.S.

So, the Canadian Premier should address himself, first, to the leaders of the Western countries, in particular, to those of the U.S.A. In the course of the talk with Konstantin Tchernenko in Moscow, on February 15, on the occasion of Pierre Trudeau's attending Andropov's funeral, the Soviet side re-emphasized its will for conducting just and equal political dialogue with all countries aimed at reaching concrete agreements.

by Miroslav Fládr

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## NA DOTAZ ČTENÁŘE

### K iniciativě premiéra Trudeaua

Na podrobnosti k postojům kanadského premiéra Pierra Trudeaua při jeho návštěvě v ČSSR krátce se uskutečnila ve dnech 25. a 26. ledna se ptá čtenář L. J. z Prahy 2

Předseda vlády Kanady Pierre Trudeau přišel, jak známo, už loni s iniciativou uspořádat tzv. schůzku pěti, tedy konferenci pěti jaderných států (Sovětského svazu, USA, Velké Británie, Francie a Číny), která by měla přijmout závazky o nerozšířování a následném snížení jaderných arzenálů zúčastněných stran. Nejde o návrh nikterak nových. Takové závazky navrhl přijmout mj. pražská Politická deklarace členských států Varšavské smlouvy na počátku loňského roku.

Kanadský premiér už před návštěvou Československa účesťoval šest západoevropských hlavních měst, Peking, Tokio atd. Z ČSSR pak odejel na návštěvu NDR a Rumunska.

Pierre Trudeau je představitelem země, která připojila svůj podpis pod tzv. dvojitý rozhodnutí paktu NATO z prosince 1979, jež otevřelo cestu novým americkým jaderným raketám středního doletu do Evropy. Od tohoto rozhodnutí se zatím nikdy veřejně nedistancoval. Jeho prohlášení ukazují, že současně s tím má však obavy z následků rozmísťování těchto raket na evropském kontinentě. Doporučuje také mj. aby se obnovily sovětsko-americké rozhovory bez ohledu na instalaci amerických raket prvního úderu.

Něbere ale ohled na skutečnost, že dialog z pozice síly, jak si ho představují Spojené státy a někteří jejich spojenci, není pro socialistické země přijatelný. A právě takovou pozici síly se USA a další státy NATO pokoušejí vybudovat rozmísťováním nových amerických jaderných raket v Evropě.

Na jedné straně má tedy Pierre Trudeau reálné obavy o mír, prohlašuje jadernou válku za nepřijatelnou a vyslovuje se pro návrat k politice uvolnění, k zlepšení mezinárodní situace, ale na straně druhé se není schopen vymenit z »logiky« myšlení Severoatlantického paktu,

kteří v otázce jaderných zbraň v Evropě odmítá uznat zásadu rovnosti a stejné bezpečnosti obou stran. Pokud jde o jeho návrh tzv. schůzky pěti, je třeba připomenout, že Sovětský svaz a jeho spojenci už nejednou vyzvali k podobným setkáním i na nejvyšší úrovni, na nichž by byly uzavřeny dohody zásadního charakteru pro další vývoj mezinárodních vztahů.

Prvním krokem by mohlo být dvoustranné jednání a snížení jaderných arzenálů SSSR a USA, které by pak bylo rozšířeno na všechny jaderné mocnosti. Dosažení těchto dohod však tvrdostně blokuje americká strana.

Kanadský premiér by se tedy měl v první řadě obrátit na vedoucí představitele západních zemí, svých spojenců, a především na Spojené státy. Při setkání s Konstantinem Černěnkem 15. února v Moskvě, kam Pierre Trudeau přijel na pobyt Jurije Andropova, bylo sovětskou stranou znovu zdůrazněno, že »SSSR se zasazuje o politický dialog se všemi zeměmi, který musí být veden na spravedlivém a rovnoprávním základě a musí být zaměřen na dosažení konkrétních dohod.«

MIROSLAV FLÁDR



TOUS LES DIR-GEN, DIRECTEURS,  
CHEFS DE SECTIONS

ALL DIR-GEN, DIRECTORS, HEADS OF SECTIONS

ADD

ESPACES DISPONIBLES

VACANT OFFICES

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Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date 24 février 1984 February 24, 1984
Number/Numéro

TO/À

FROM/DE

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •  
SUJET

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

Afin de pouvoir répondre aux demandes des employés permutants qui requièrent des cours de langues étrangères avant leur affectation, le Centre de préparation aux affectations est présentement à la recherche de locaux à l'intérieur de l'édifice Lester B. Pearson. Comme les cours de langues sont normalement dispensés sur une base individuelle, des bureaux fermés seraient suffisants.

2. Si vous possédez des bureaux disponibles à l'heure actuelle ou prévoyez en avoir entre la mi-février et la fin juillet, veuillez téléphoner au numéro 2-2221.

3. Merci de votre collaboration.

In order to meet rotational employees' pre-posting linguistic needs, the Posting Briefing Centre has a need for additional office space in the Lester B. Pearson building. Language courses are usually given on an individual basis and private offices are required.

2. Should you be able to offer vacant office space now or some time between mid-February and the end of July please call 2-2221.

3. Your cooperation is appreciated.

R. W. Burchill  
Director General  
Personnel Planning and  
Development Bureau

Le Directeur général  
Direction générale de la  
planification et du  
perfectionnement

Canada

Canada

IDR (Brian Herma) (2-5457)

TO/A : CCB  
FROM/DE : IFB

*Mr. Smith  
to see file*

REFERENCE • Minutes of December 15, 1983 Meeting  
RÉFÉRENCE • of the Defence Evaluation Group  
Steering Committee  
SUBJECT • Future Work of the Defence Evaluation  
SUJET • Group: Defence Long-Term Funding

Security/Sécurité
CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
February 24, 1984
Number/Numéro
IFB-0051

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

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I recently reviewed the minutes of the December 15th meeting of the Steering Committee, just to see where we stand and what projects lie ahead. Re-reading paragraph seven of the minutes has prompted me to write this note.

2. In our discussion of future funding for the Defence envelope, our Treasury Board colleague reminded us that it would be important to ensure adequate Ministerial understanding of defence expenditure priorities "to ensure that Defence received a fair share in future years". As I recall, we agreed that the Defence Evaluation Group would undertake a study of future funding and optional funding procedures. Could I ask if this study is now underway and, if so, could you let me know how it is progressing?

3. My purpose in enquiring is to underline the view that such a study would be incomplete were it not to contain a detailed analysis of the current and future trends with respect to the overall NATO defence effort and, in particular, the reactions of our Alliance partners to Canadian plans with respect to defence expenditures. In other words, an analysis of procedures for setting the Defence envelope or proposals with respect to funding levels or options cannot, in my view, be seen in a strictly domestic perspective. The foreign policy implications must be taken into account.

4. In addition, I believe it would be useful for the Group to have a clear understanding of relevant NATO studies and recommendations in the area of conventional force improvements. One example is the work underway, in a concerted fashion, on exploiting new technologies within NATO. These efforts are

.../2

CONFIDENTIAL

directed at using new or emerging technologies to reinforce the strategy of deterrence, compensate for the conventional imbalance in Europe, and raise the nuclear threshold.

The proposition is an expensive one and it would have implications for the defence budgets of NATO member countries. But its pursuit has to be seen in relationship to reducing NATO's potential reliance on nuclear weapons.

5. Conversely, progress in the MBFR talks in Vienna could result in an agreement on stationing fewer forces on both sides in Central Europe. This could have a potential effect on our contribution - although we would not necessarily either be required or wish to reduce the number of Canadians stationed in Europe in view of their comparatively small numbers.

6. The Bureau of International Security and Arms Control, in collaboration with National Defence, is closely involved in this study of these and related subjects. I have asked the Bureau to cooperate with the Group in preparation of the study on future defence funding.



Michael Shenstone  
Assistant Deputy Minister  
Political and International  
Security Affairs

*date*

## PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE

### ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

#### BACKGROUND

The Prime Minister's central purpose is to try to stop and reverse the worsening trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce international tensions and risks of confrontation. His chief proposal addresses the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the two superpowers. In the wake of the KAL downing, East-West relations appeared to have touched a low point. There has been little genuine political dialogue between the two sides and no real political framework for arms control and other negotiations. The Prime Minister is interested in seeing if more propitious conditions can be created for building a constructive, working relationship between East and West.

The initiative involves a number of specific proposals - (a) a conference of the five nuclear weapon states to limit strategic nuclear arsenals (b) a concerted political effort to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime (c) a political impetus by the West to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks in Vienna to try to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe by achieving a stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels (d) the inauguration of the Stockholm Conference at senior political level.

Also related to the initiative are proposals for (a) a ban on the testing and deployment of high altitude anti-satellite systems (b) a requirement that future strategic systems be verifiable by National Technical Means and (c) restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs.

- 2 -

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

1. Prime Minister's meeting with Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence and senior officials; creation of Task Force (September 21)
2. Prime Minister meets at Meach Lake with Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of National Defence, senior officials and ambassadors (October 7)
3. Prime Minister's letters to all NATO Heads of Government (October 22-25)
4. Prime Minister's speech at Guelph University (October 27)
5. Prime Minister's letters to Soviet and Chinese leaders (early November)
6. Prime Minister's meetings with President Mitterrand of France, Prime Minister Lubbers and Queen Beatrix of the Netherlands, Prime Minister Martens of Belgium, His Holiness the Pope, Prime Minister Craxi of Italy, Chancellor Kohl of West Germany, Prime Minister Thatcher of Great Britain (November 8-11)
7. Prime Minister's speech in Montreal (November 13)
8. Prime Minister's meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone (November 19)
9. Prime Minister's personal emissary (Geoffrey Pearson) visits Peking (November 21-22) and Moscow (November 25-26)
10. Prime Minister participates in Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in New Delhi (November 22-27)

- 11 Prime Minister's visit to Peking (November 28-29)
12. Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs participation in NATO ministerial meetings (December 8-9)
13. Prime Minister's meetings over six week period with leading experts on nuclear matters and East-West relations - Robert McNamara, General Rogers, General Brent Scowcroft, George Kennan, Members of the Harvard Nuclear Study Group, Georgi Arbatov. (October-November)
14. Prime Minister's visit to President Reagan in Washington (December 15)
15. Prime Minister's meeting with U.N. Secretary General (January 11)
16. Visit of Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang (January 16-20)
17. Prime Minister's visit to Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Romania (January 24 - February 2).
18. Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons (February 9).
19. Prime Minister's meeting with Soviet Secretary General Chernenko in Moscow (February 15).

#### REACTIONS

The Prime Minister has received encouraging support for the broad political purposes of the initiative in his consultations with European allies, the Chinese leadership, President Nakasone of Japan and President Reagan. The Prime Minister has found general agreement with his analysis of the dangerous state of East-West relations and the need for the re-establishment of political dialogue.

- 4 -

Also, Commonwealth Heads of Government specifically endorsed Prime Minister Trudeau's initiative in the Goa Declaration on International Security which reflected the Prime Minister's analysis of the gravity of the current situation and the importance of applying political will to the quest for international security. U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has commended and encouraged the Prime Minister's efforts.

The Prime Minister has engaged in dialogue with Eastern European leaders in Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Romania and has discussed East-West relations with Soviet Secretary General Chernenko, who described the initiative as useful and practical.

#### RESULTS

The degree of support which the Prime Minister has garnered for the main purposes of his initiative is of itself a positive result insofar as it may have a beneficial effect on the climate of East-West relations. The decisions taken at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels in early December were particularly significant in furthering the purposes of the initiative:

- (a) an undertaking by NATO foreign ministers to attend the opening of the Stockholm Conference, followed by a decision by the Warsaw Pact to have its ministers attend.
- (b) an undertaking to review the NATO position on the MBFR negotiations;
- (c) the "Brussels declaration" which pledges NATO to work for "genuine détente" and constructive dialogue with the East in recognition of their mutual security interests and eschews any attempt to seek superiority.
- (d) a decision to review the state of East-West relations to search for ways in which they might be improved.

① How to measure success

② Question of NATO commitment

---

|| Every other govt had its own peace initiative going  
What distinctive Ldr role - agenda





MESSAGE

Accession/Référence
File/Dossier

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY  
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*FROM* ←

REF OURTEL IDDZ0192 24FEB

---PM INITIATIVE:NATO CONSULTATIONS

ON REVIEWING ALL RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS, WE CONSIDER THAT SKINNERS  
PRESENCE IN BRU WOULD BE EMINENTLY DESIRABLE. GRATEFUL THEREFORE IF  
YOU WOULD REVIEW YOUR DECISION AND AUTHORIZE SKINNER TO PROCEED  
BRU TO MEET WITH SMITH AND CALDER IN THE COURSE OF MONDAY 27FEB.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG L.A.Delvoie/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

*L.A. Delvoie*  
SIG L.A.Delvoie

000633

*file*

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

IDDZ-0202

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A 0G2

February 24, 1984

Ms. Katherine Mackenzie  
Secretary Township Peace Group  
Georgeville, Quebec  
JOB 1T0

Dear Ms. Mackenzie:

Thank you for your letter of February 7 and for your generous offer of assistance to the Prime Minister's Task Force.

The Task Force is a small working group of officials from the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence and the Privy Council Office who have been brought together to assist and advise the Prime Minister in his current initiative on international security and East-West relations. As such, we have not been in direct contact with the Canadian public and at this stage, do not have any plans to broaden the scope of our work.

Perhaps the best contribution individual Canadians can make is to show that the Government's efforts to restore a constructive climate to East-West relations and thereby improve the chances of genuine arms control have wide public support in Canada.

Thank you again for your offer of assistance.

Yours truly,

*L. A. Delvoie*

L. A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

Georgeville, Quebec, J0R 1T0

Feb 7/84.

M. Louis Deloie  
Peace Task Force  
Ottawa

Dear Sir, we are a group in the Eastern Townships called The Township Peace Group. At the moment we are trying to mass all the Township groups together, first to join the Peace Caravan project & then to use our numbers as considerable force in whatever project seems possible. I was wondering if there was anyway we could contribute to your group.

Yours Truly  
Katherine Mackenzie  
Sec. Township Peace Group.

Katherine Mackenzie  
Georgetown  
P.O. JOB 1T0

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10DZ



M. Louis Delvoie,  
Peace Task Force  
Office of the Prime Minister  
Ottawa  
Ontario.

000636

c.c. PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)  
PCO/Judy Cameron  
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston

Ref. PMO No. 3357 005

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A 0G2

February 24, 1984

IDDZ-0201

Mr. Roman Fin  
72 Elise Terrace  
Willowdale, Ontario  
M2R 2X1

Dear Mr. Fin:

Your letter to the Prime Minister of 17 December has been referred to the Prime Minister's Task Force. Please accept my apologies for the delay in reply.

I have drawn your letter to the attention of my colleagues on the Task Force and to the USSR and Eastern Europe Relations Division of the Department of External Affairs.

As you know, the Prime Minister had a first meeting with the new Soviet General Secretary Mr. Chernenko in Moscow after Mr. Andropov's funeral in which he outlined the fundamental thrust of his initiative which aims to restore a climate of confidence and high-level political dialogue to East-West relations. We have no illusions about the character of the Soviet government, but we think it essential to seek common ground between East and West as a necessary step to progress on arms control.

A genuine concern for the promotion of respect for human rights in the Soviet Union informs Canadian policy. In earnest of its commitment to human rights as part of the CSCE process, Canada will host a Human Rights Experts Meeting next year and will be seeking ways of influencing the USSR to recognize the rights of its citizens as confirmed by the CSCE process.

Thank you for your views on how to approach the Soviet Union.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "L. A. Delpie".

L. A. Delpie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group



Government of Canada

Gouvernement du Canada

**ACTION FICHE DE REQUEST SERVICE**

To - A <b>RBK / HARPIN</b>	File No. — Dossier N°
	Date <b>14/2/84</b>

From — De  
**1002 / MONEE**

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<input type="checkbox"/> Returned your call Vous a rappelé	<input type="checkbox"/> Will call again Vous rappellera	<input type="checkbox"/> Wants to see you Désire vous voir
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Date	Time — Heure	Message received by Message reçu par
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<input type="checkbox"/> Action Donner suite	<input type="checkbox"/> Approval Approbation	<input type="checkbox"/> Note & return Noter et retourner
<input type="checkbox"/> Comments Commentaires	<input type="checkbox"/> Draft reply Projet de réponse	<input type="checkbox"/> Note & forward Noter et faire suivre
<input type="checkbox"/> As requested Comme demandé	<input type="checkbox"/> Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> Note & file Noter et classer

**RON - ANY THOUGHTS ON HOW WE SHOULD REPLY? DO YOU KNOW THIS GROUP?**

**John,  
as promised [Signature]**

cc: PMO/Gorecki  
MINA

RBR/D. Goulet/2-8743/1b  
FILE CIRC DIARY

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A 0G2

November 30, 1983

RBR-0691

Mr. Clifford Elliott,  
Christian Initiative for Peace,  
80 Sackville Street,  
Toronto, Ontario  
M5A 3E5

Dear Mr. Elliott,

On behalf of the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Honourable Allan J. MacEachen, thank you for your telegram of October 27 concerning Oleg Radzinski and other members of the "Committee to Establish Trust between U.S. and U.S.S.R." in the Soviet Union which was forwarded to him by the Prime Minister.

Mr. Radzinsky's situation and the harassment of the members of the independent peace group in the Soviet Union are indeed unfortunate. Through information received from our Embassy in Moscow, which has been monitoring the situation of the peace group, we understand that Mr. Radzinsky was brought to trial on October 13 on charges of anti-Soviet slander after nearly one year in investigatory custody. He was sentenced to one year in custody and five years of internal exile. Given his year in pre-trial detention, he is expected to undergo immediate banishment to a place of internal exile. Western diplomats and journalists were denied entry to the court on the day of the trial.

The harassment of peace activists in the Soviet Union and of other individuals who wish to express their political and religious belief is a matter of deep concern to the Canadian Government. At the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act relating to the freedom of

.../2

- 2 -

thought, conscience, religion or belief, was reaffirmed. The right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in this field, was also confirmed.

It is our intention to continue to play an active role in fostering the implementation of the CSCE process in the period following the Madrid Meeting. As host to the Human Rights Experts Meeting scheduled to take place in October 1985, Canada will be initiating a series of consultations with its allies with a view to preserving the impetus developed in Madrid and encouraging continued attention to the human rights situation in the USSR.

While progress will undoubtedly be slow, I can assure you that we will continue to seek opportunities to promote greater respect for human rights while participating fully in the peace effort on the international plane.

Yours sincerely,

Barry M. Mawhinney,  
Director,  
USSR and Eastern Europe  
Relations Division



Government of Canada    Gouvernement du Canada  
Privy Council Office    Bureau du Conseil privé

Ottawa, Canada  
K1A 0A3

Date: *February 1, 1984*

*M. [Signature]*

MEMORANDUM TO: *Mr. R. Francis*  
*Director General International*  
*Security and Arms Control Bureau.*

Letter to the Prime Minister from:

*ROMAN FIN*

PMO Ref. No: *3357 005*

We have arranged with the Under Secretary's office that the Department's services can be drawn upon in preparing replies to letters which the Prime Minister has received on foreign affairs.

I would be grateful if you could arrange for a reply (within seven working days) to the attached letter for signature at the appropriate level within the Department of External Affairs and with copies to PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier) and External Affairs/CMR/Johnston. I would also welcome your advice on alternative ways of dealing with the matter, if appropriate.

If you have any questions, please call me at 5-6073.

*[Signature]*

Maurice D. Archdeacon  
Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat

c.c. PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)  
PCO/Judy Cameron  
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston

RECEIVED - REÇU  
FEB 3 1984  
IN IDD

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**CONTROL FORM - PRIME MINISTER'S CORRESPONDENCE**

**FORMULAIRE DE CONTRÔLE - CORRESPONDANCE DU PREMIER MINISTRE**

TO/A:

Mr. Fowler,

CC:

Messrs. Osbaldeston, Darling, Clark (our file)

RE: LETTER FROM/LETTRE DE:

Roman Fin

DATE:

December 17, 1983

SUBJECT/SUJET:

Peace mission

CORRESPONDENCE NO/NO DE LA CORRESPONDANCE:

3357 005

Judy Cameron

DATE: January 3, 1984

REPLY PREPARED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SIGNATURE.  
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DU PREMIER MINISTRE.

REPLY PREPARED FOR MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN'S SIGNATURE AND FORWARDED THROUGH JUDY CAMERON.  
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DE MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN, TRANSMISE PAR JUDY CAMERON.

REFERRED TO ANOTHER MINISTER THROUGH JUDY CAMERON TO MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.  
RÉFÉRÉ À UN MINISTRE PAR JUDY CAMERON À MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.

NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. COPY RETAINED IN PCO FOR INFORMATION AND ORIGINAL RETURNED TO JUDY CAMERON.  
AUCUNE RÉPONSE NÉCESSAIRE. UNE COPIE EST CONSERVÉE AU BCP À TITRE D'INFORMATION. L'ORIGINAL RETOURNE À JUDY CAMERON.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS/OBSERVATIONS ADDITIONNELLES:

17 December 1983.

The Right Honourable  
Pierre Elliot Trudeau  
Parliament Building  
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada.

REC'D. / REÇU  
DEC 28 1983  
Coordination

3357 005

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am writing to you before your trip on your peace-mission to Moscow. Enclosed is a letter to Mr. Andropov, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and relevant materials about the independent Soviet peace group.

I appeal to you, when you are in Moscow, to raise at the highest level of the Soviet government the question of the fate of the independent Soviet peace movement, namely, the Group to Establish Trust between the USSR and the USA. The existence of this group in the Soviet Union is absolutely essential to the world peace process. Its members support all positive peace initiatives, especially their own government's peace-building programme. They support your efforts for peace and will welcome your visit in Moscow. Moreover, they do not limit themselves to existing programmes. They have developed their own proposals which have already spawned immediate fruitful results. Their goal is to establish trust between Soviet and Western people. In the short period of 18 months members of the Moscow Group to Establish Trust have been visited by many people from the West, especially by leaders of the Western peace movement. As a result, these leaders took back with them new hope and a better understanding. They are able now to work for peace more effectively: not abstractly but practically.

To help the Moscow Group to Establish Trust survive is not only a humanitarian action of caring about a few courageous people. This is, of course, important. More importantly, it is a matter of survival for the whole of mankind. If, in one country, peace activists are arrested, prosecuted, and oppressed for their activities towards peace, trust between countries is not possible, international tension increases, and peace becomes unattainable. I ask you, when you are in Moscow, to visit members of the Group to Establish Trust to exchange views on the peace-building process in the world.

Please, be firm and courageous at the Kremlin. Show moral strength. Do not allow Soviet leaders to deceive you by assurance of their peaceful intentions. They have been talking about peace throughout their history - for the last 66 years. It is time to ask them for good deeds towards peace, not only for good words. Such actions on their part could be not only a termination of the oppression of the independent peace movement in the Soviet Union, but a wide support of any individuals or groups who want to contribute to peace. If it is a people's state, as they claim in their Constitution, the state must support the people's peace initiatives. Authorities should not limit their people to state-organized activities. They say, that official Soviet Peace Committee consists of 50-60 million members. But it works only in one direction: to only blame the USA and to do nothing constructive for peace itself. Its activities are fruitless. Western visitors who have contacted the Soviet Peace Committee have experienced afterwards disappointment and hopelessness concerning the struggle for

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C.C. BLAGOJEVIC  
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
- 2 -

peace. The one sided approach of this Committee's activity actually works against peace, giving rise to hatred and destroying trust between people.

I ask you to say to Soviet leaders that Canada firmly stands on its peace positions and will not allow anybody to deceive the Canadian people; that Canadians can not accept such Soviet actions like, for example, the breaking the Helsinki agreement, the invasion in Afganistan, the walk-out from arms talks in Geneva, or the prosecution of dissidents and peace activists and so on.

Please remember that in Moscow you are a messenger for peace not only from Canada, but from all of humanity. This may be your best chance (perhaps your final opportunity) to tell the Soviets what you think about establishing world-wide peace and what type of participation in this peace-building process the Canadian people can expect from the Soviet government. I hope that it is not too late already

Sincerely yours,



Roman Fin,  
Institute for the Soviet Union Studies,  
Director,  
Group for Trust in Canada, Chairman.

72 Elise Terrace, Willowdale,  
Ontario, M2R 2X1.  
Phone: (416)-226-6420.

15 December 1983

His Excellency  
Yuri Andropov  
Kremlin, Moscow, USSR.

Copy: The Right Honourable  
Pierre Elliot Trudeau  
Parliament Building  
Ottawa, Ont., Canada

The President  
Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, DC, USA

Editor  
Glob and Mail  
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Mr. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:

I am deeply concerned about the fate of members of the 'Group to Establish Trust between the USSR and the USA' in the Soviet Union. I believe that it is a tragic mistake to harass these people and not to recognize them as real peace activists. I appeal to you to support, not to inhibit, their activities.


Members of the Group to Establish Trust are known in the West as people who have dedicated their efforts to achieve peace through establishment of trust between people and governments that is such a necessary moral foundation for world peace process. Their peace proposals are perceived here as a practical programme to improve the international climate and to reduce the mutual fear and the international tension. If this programme were carried out it would work for peace more effectively than any sophisticated system of deterrence. The world needs trust not deterrence. No single group in the West has done more for peace than they have, bringing hope to the world.

And yet they have been suppressed. Vladimir Mishchenko, Alexander Shatravka, and Oleg Radzinsky have been sentenced to prison, labor camp or exile for terms ranging from 1 to 6 years. The fate of Vladimir Kornev is not known. Recently Olga Medvedkova, Olga Luznikova, and Valerii Godyak were arrested. Ms. Medvedkova is facing trial charged with beating three police officers. Many cases of other persecutions including incarceration in psychiatric hospital, beatings, administrative arrest for 15 days, home arrests, disconnection of telephones, surveillance and so on have been reported.

It is impossible to comprehend the suppression of those initiatives which have been declared by the Soviet government as a means of peacebuilding. In no instance have members of the Group to Establish Trust broken any Soviet law nor discredited any government's peace initiative. On the contrary they have sought to develop your government's peace activities, proposing to extend them from official contacts to human contacts on a person-to-person basis, that is immediate and the most fruitful and hopeful way to establish trust between people.

I appeal to you to extend every consideration to members of the Group to Establish trust; to release those of them who have been convicted or been in jail under investigation; to close Ms. Medvedkova's case; to stop the harassment of any form of members of Group; and to provide normal human conditions for positive activity for everyone in your country who wishes to contribute to peace.

Yours truly,

  
Roman Fin,  
Chairman, Group for Trust in Canada.  
72 Elise Terrace, Willowdale, Ont.,  
M2R 2X1, Canada.

## INDEPENDENT SOVIET PEACE GROUP:

1. On June 4, 1982, in Moscow, a group to establish Mutual trust between the USSR and the USA was formed and the following appeal was issued:

### APPEAL TO THE GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLIC OF THE USSR AND THE USA.

The USSR and the USA possess the means to kill on a scale capable of ending human society.

The balance of fear cannot be a reliable guarantee of security. Only trust between nations can create confidence in the future.

Today, elementary trust between our two countries has vanished. It is no longer simply a problem of bilateral relations. Now the question is whether mankind will be crushed by its own destructive capabilities.

This problem demands immediate action. But it is evident that politicians on both sides are incapable of coming to an early agreement about substantive arms limitations, much less about disarmament. Their political interests and obligations prevent them from being objective on disarmament issues.

Realizing this, we do not want to accuse either side of lacking interest in the peace process, much less of harboring aggressive intentions. We are convinced that they are sincerely struggling for peace and the prevention of nuclear war. However, the search for disarmament has faltered.

We all share responsibility for the future. The energetic public peace movement in many countries proves that millions of people understand this. But our common will for peace should not be blind. It should be conscious and expressed concretely, taking into account the real situation. The world is concerned for its future. Everyone understands that dialogue is needed in order to prevent the threat of war. The existing two-sided dialogue must be expanded.

We are convinced that the time has come for the general public not only to raise the issue of disarmament with decision-makers, but also to participate with politicians in the search for solutions. We propose a four-sided dialogue, with the Soviet and American publics included and enjoying equal rights.

We are for the progressive reduction and eventual abolition of nuclear weapon stockpiles and other means of mass destruction, and for the limitation of conventional weapons.

We suggest the following program:

1. As an initial step towards eliminating the nuclear threat, we call for individual, concrete proposals for the establishment of trust and for mutual limitation and reduction of arms. We urge that every proposal be simultaneously sent to the governments of both countries and to the representatives of independent public peace groups.

We hope that the Soviet and American peoples will pay particular attention to our appeal. Their governments bear the chief responsibility for international security.

2. We appeal to the public in both countries to organize integrated, international and independent public groups to analyze specific proposals for disarmament and the establishment of trust between countries. Such groups would select the most interesting and realistic proposals, inform the public about them and recommend them for review to the governments of both countries. They would also inform the public of the possible consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, and of all issues relevant to disarmament.

3. We appeal to scientists, particularly to independent international organizations of scientists fighting for peace, to work on scientific problems directly

connected with the preservation of peace. For example, it is important to work out a mathematical model for evaluating the weapons of opposing sides. We call on scientists to create independent research groups to analyze suggestions made by the public.

4. We urge all political figures and representatives of the press of both countries to refrain from accusations concerning the intended use of nuclear weapons for aggressive purposes. Such accusations only inflame mistrust and thus make constructive dialogue impossible.

5. We believe that an essential prerequisite for establishing trust is agreement by the USSR and the US to encourage an open exchange of opinions and to inform the public of both countries on the process of disarmament.

We call on the Soviet and American governments to create a special international bulletin (with government guarantees for distribution in both countries) in which the parties would conduct a dialogue and openly deal with issues including the following:

- a. an analysis of disarmament negotiations
- b. an exchange of opinions on arms control and disarmament
- c. suggestions for establishing trust
- d. an exchange of information on the possible consequences of using nuclear weapons.

Such a bulletin should allow the independent public peace movements to enter into the discussion and publish uncensored materials, in particular suggestions for disarmament and confidence-building measures, and information about the peace movements and their activities.

We appeal to the governments and publics of the USSR and the USA, since we are convinced that everyone who understands that the future is in jeopardy should have a real opportunity to defend it!

### Members of the group:

Sergei Batovrin, 25, artist.  
Vladimir Fleishgakker, 28, engineer.  
Maria Fleishgakker, 28, engineer.  
Viktor Blok, 37, physicist.  
Mikhail Ostrovsky, 26, dental technician.  
Ludmilla Ostrovsky, 26, linguist.  
Igor Sobkov, 37, psychiatrist.  
Gennady Krochik, 33, physicist.  
Boris Kolyuzhny, 39, mathematician.  
Sergei Rozenoer, 29, mathematician.  
Yury Khronopulo, 47, physicist.  
Yury Medvedkov, geographer, Ph.D.  
Olga Medvedkov, geographer, Ph.D.  
Valery Godyak, 41, physicist and mathematician, Ph.D.  
Oleg Radzinsky, 23, philologist.  
Mark Reitman, physicist and mathematician.  
Vladimir Opekin, 47, biologist, Ph.D.

## 2. Response of the Soviet Government to peace group activity and group member's destiny.

*On June 14 the committee asked that it be formally registered and requested permission to mount a peace demonstration in Moscow on June 27. However, because no answer was received, the demonstration had to be called off. In the meantime, group members are still being called in for interrogation and their apartments continue to be blocked by the police.*

Members of the Group were reportedly threatened with prosecution under Article 200 of the RSFSR Criminal Code which prohibits "the unwarranted exercise, in violation of the legally established order, of one's actual or supposed rights..." after they requested permission for a public demonstration for disarmament on June 27.

*Harassment has also taken other forms: Yury Khronopulo, a research worker, was warned that he would be dismissed from his institute if he did not cease his activities and the home of Igor Sobkov was searched, and his books confiscated, including those on yoga.*

*Group spokesman ~~Sergei~~ Batovnin and Vladimir and Maria Fleishgakker have been under continuous house arrest. On July 16 Khronopulo and Yury Medvedkov were both arrested for "petty hooliganism" and given 15 days of jail. The purpose of these actions was probably to keep them from making contact with the Scandinavian peace marchers who were on their way to the USSR. Remaining committee members were either held under police surveillance or were ordered to be out of town by July 21, the day when the marchers were scheduled to arrive in Moscow.*

*On August 6 Batovnin was arrested at Medvedkov's home and taken to Moscow Hospital No. 14, where he was forcibly administered neuroleptic drugs. On August 8 his wife, Natasha, reported that her husband was given pills four times a day and that he was threatened with electric shock treatments if he refused to take the medication. She said that after swallowing the tablets, he seemed tired and subdued. He was released from the hospital on September 7th.*

*Of the nine refuseniks in the seventeen-member Group for the Establishment of Mutual Trust, two members, Mikhail and Ludmilla Ostrovsky, were allowed to emigrate and have since arrived in New York. Vladimir and Maria Fleishgakker were at first also told that they could leave, but later, permission was withdrawn. Another refusenik, Sergei Rozenoer, issued a statement that he had changed his mind about emigrating; he decided that he would rather remain in the Soviet Union and continue his peace activities.*

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Oleg Radzinsky, on July 20th was searched in his apartment. On October 26th 1982 he was arrested and on October 13th 1983 he was sentenced to 1 year in a labor camp plus 5 years of exile.

Alexander Shatravka was arrested in October 1982 and sentenced to 3 years.

Vladimir Kornev was arrested in Odessa in April 1983 and his fate is not known.

Victor Block and Gennady Krochik were sent to Novosibirsk from the 21st to the 28th in order to keep them from contact with Scandinavian peace marchers in Moscow.

On October 13<sup>th</sup> 1983, Olga Medvedkova, Olga Lusnikova, and Valerii Godyak were arrested for attempt to attend Oleg Radzinsky's trial. They were interrogated during several hours, beaten and then released. Olga Medvedkova was charged with beating of three police officers. She is faced trial in December 1983 and punishment to term of from 1 to 6 years.

Sergey Rozonoer was under house arrest for 2 weeks.

Telephones of all members of the Group have been disconnected.

Vladimir Mishchenko was sentenced to 1 year.

On September 29th Vladimir Fleishgaker was sentenced to 15 days of administrative arrest.

### 3. Facts and impressions of Western peace movement leaders.

The British disarmament organization END (European Nuclear Disarmament) has published a special report, *Moscow Independent Peace Group* (available from The Merlin Press, 3 Manchester Road, London E14). Jean Stead, an editor of *The Guardian*, who had accompanied the Peace marchers on their trip through the Soviet Union, published the following comments in an article "The Peace March and the Moscow Independent Group" included in that report.

Most of the marchers—about 250—were liberal professional women, mostly Labor-voting with a few Communists from Finland. With them were about 20 men, mostly academics and students. Many of them were abysmally ignorant about the Soviet Union, but they were well boned-up on nuclear defence strategy and were able to argue forcefully the case for unilateral disarmament. Scandinavians have no nuclear weapons...

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The march, though it sometimes resembled a cultural delegation or a discussion group, can be considered a success—if for no other reason than it held out a hand of friendship with no strings attached. Its main failure lay in not securing a meeting with the 16 leaders of the unofficial peace movement in Moscow. This included two distinguished professors who were sent to a detention centre for "alcoholics and hooligans" for 15 days while the marchers were in town, and two others who had been under intermittent house arrest.

Eva Nordland—an initiator of the march and a sociology lecturer at Oslo University—suggested a meeting and was told by members of the Soviet Peace Committee that it might be possible. These, after all, were a group people would be wanting to know about when they got home. Were they genuine or were they 'plants' to bring discord to the march? Grigory Lokshyn, the secretary of the Peace Committee, told them that they were drunks, 'anti-socials', provocateurs working for the CIA. At a stormy meeting just before leaving Moscow, two members of the Soviet Peace Committee gave different explanations for the arrests, one of them being that one of the professors had hit a conductor on a bus. The odds are that probably no one knew the exact details.

In the end, and time being short, the women decided not to seek a meeting with the unofficial group. They were under pressure, they were tired—but it seemed like a mistake then, and it still does.

In the end, only one member of the march went to see the dissidents—Danielle Grunberg, half Danish, living in Britain and sponsored on the march by END and CND.

\* \* \*

### Danielle Grunberg describes her meeting with the Moscow Peace Group in the END report.

In Moscow the spontaneity seemed to vanish and the marching was shorter and much subdued. Western correspondents, who initially claimed the march would never reach Moscow, now stated that Moscovites had not been informed of the marchers' arrival. There were certainly fewer people in evidence and more plain-clothes police. But whatever the immediate shortcomings, the march was a breakthrough. It was the first time Soviet people had the chance to see an independent Peace March in their country.

The main failure lay in the marchers' unwillingness to make contact with the unofficial peace group. In Leningrad we had heard of the arrest of two members of the group and since no one else seemed willing to go, I decided to meet them in Moscow, and went to their flat accompanied by Jean Stead of the *Guardian* and Coes van der Vel, a Dutch journalist.

The flat, in a high rise block on the outskirts of Moscow, was heavily guarded by KGB. We were greeted eagerly by five members of the group (mostly scientists and intellectuals).

Olga Medvedkov, doctor of Geographical Science, is the wife of Professor Yuri Medvedkov. ... She said they had received scores of proposals from Soviet people, some of which were: the creation of marriage agencies between citizens of the US and the USSR; the creation of joint cultural and medical centers; the organizing of joint TV programs; the establishing of a nongovernmental Soviet-American commission to research public opinion in the sphere of disarmament; and the declaration of Moscow as a nuclear-free zone. These proposals and their Appeal had been sent to the Soviet Peace Committee but remained unanswered. They had collected hundreds of signatures on a petition, mostly from students, but all their documents and papers had been confiscated by the KGB as anti-Soviet publication. This was followed by illegal house arrests, disconnection of telephones, searches were made and members constantly followed.

Here are the notes which I took of our conversation:

two well-known members of the group, both professors are in prison now as hooligans. When I (Olga Medvedkov) went down to buy some food I was followed by 8 men down to the shop. One week after the group was created three members were under house arrest, Vladimir Heisigakker was under house arrest for three weeks and his telephone

was disconnected. Sergei Rosenoer was under house arrest for two weeks. Under Soviet law house arrest is illegal but privately it is done. They don't tell you anything but just come outside your door and stop you from going anywhere. When I told a solicitor about this he said he knew nothing about it....

On June 27 the group was going to organize a peace demonstration near the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow under the slogans "No More Hiroshima's" and "Peace through Trust not Fear" and they were kept in their flats.

On July 16 two members of the group, Yury Medvedkov and Yury Khronopulo were arrested as hooligans in the street at midnight. They had left the flat at 10 o'clock and disappeared. As they didn't come back the others understood that they had been arrested. They had wanted to join Peace March '82, in Leningrad. Olga Medvedkov phoned the main police station but they did not know where they were. She then went to the KGB but got nowhere. He had left the flat in his shirt-sleeves and had no jacket with him. She wanted to make sure he had a jacket as he had just had pneumonia. She then took a car with some of the others and they found them approximately two kilometers outside Moscow in an alcoholic prison....

Two other members, Victor Block and Gennady Krochik were sent to Novosibirsk for the period July 21-28. They are both physicists and were told they had to go there. No reason was given.

The group did not join the Soviet Peace Committee as it was organized by the government and is not independent. They had asked for their help but were ignored from the beginning. Peace and trust cannot only be on a political and government level. It must be discussed amongst ordinary people. The Peace Committees are all controlled. It is not possible in the USSR for all people to come and meet Peace March '82. People don't want war but they can't discuss specific conditions of trust. The peace groups are fiction. All their work is support for the Soviet government, they don't work. At the Academy of Sciences in Moscow we have no meetings about peace. We did have a meeting to express support for the Argentine Junta during the Falkland war and to judge the UK as aggressors. There was no discussion, just an official point of view. There is a Soviet Peace Fund, but what they do is not open in the press.

The group was asked how long they had been preparing their program and they said that they had been discussing it through the winter.

They do not regard themselves as dissidents or against their government. Peace is a matter for everybody. They were surprised at the government's reaction and thought it fantastic. At first they thought they had been misunderstood. They had sent their proposals to groups in the US and to the Scandinavian Women. Nothing reaches them through the post. Through the Voice of America they had heard of support for their group at the Special Session for Disarmament in a short mention by Senator Edward Kennedy....

The following letter protesting harassment of Moscow peace workers was signed by Dorothy Thompson, E.P. Thompson and Nicholas Humphrey, British peace movement leaders, and published in the *London Times* on July 19. The immediate cause for the letter was the detention and sentencing to 15 days administrative arrest (for "hooliganism") of *Yury Khronopulo*, a physicist, and *Yury Medvedkov*, a geographer, reportedly to frustrate their hopes of meeting with Scandinavian peace marchers during their visit to Moscow on July 21. (See this issue: The Moscow Peace Group.)

In the past four weeks reports in the Western press have noted the establishment of an independent group of peace workers in Moscow: The Group for Establishing Trust between the USSR and United States of America.

There appear to have been 10 or 11 founder-members of the group. Their spokesman is a young artist, Mr. Sergei Batovrin. A larger number of citizens have subsequently signed their appeals. These include a call on the Moscow City Council to declare itself a nuclear-free zone; an appeal to the government of both the USSR and United States to halt all nuclear tests; and a program for improving trust between Soviet and American people—including exchanges between schools, open TV discussions, and so on.

The group disclaims any desire to pose as "dissidents." "We do not want to be a counterweight to the authorities, but to work alongside them," Mr. Batovrin is quoted as saying.

Today's report of the sentencing of two members of the group indicates that the initiators and signatories of these appeals are being harassed by the Soviet authorities. Soviet sources in the past have excused such behaviour with counter-accusations that members of the group are advertising themselves to the Western press in the hope of getting permits to emigrate.

The behaviour of the Soviet security services is outrageous. Peace workers in Britain and in Western Europe want to open up as many channels of discourse with friends on "the other side" as possible, whether official or unofficial.

The demands of this independent group are admirable and are more radical than the programs of official Soviet peace committees, which denounce Western militarism but which refrain from any criticism of the policies of their own state. They are also very close to the demands which we are making upon our own governments, in the West.

What is the Soviet state afraid of? Why does it lunge around with a 50-year-old ideological bag on its head, suspecting enemies on every side? How can the fact that some young Moscovites want to put forward their own independent ideas and talk about peace with Western peace workers be seen as threatening to a powerful state? The Soviet people are as anxious about war as peoples in the West. Why do the Soviet security services have so little confidence in them that they fear direct exchanges except through limited and licensed channels?

If the Soviet authorities genuinely seek disarmament and detente—and we accept that many of them do—then they must learn to lower their security guard and to permit their citizenry to talk directly with peaceful opinion in the West.

#### 4. Response of the official Soviet Peace Committee.

On March 4, 1983, Deborah Sanders, a young American pacifist, wrote to Yury Zhukov, chairman of the official Soviet Peace Committee, asking: "Please, Mr. Zhukov, do everything you can to allow the Group to Establish Trust Between the USSR and the US, founded by Yury and Olga Medvedkov, to flourish."

On May 3, Yury Zhukov answered:

... I regret to state that the mass media controlled by the monopolies hostile both to the Soviet Union and to all progressive forces, try their hardest to misrepresent the activity of all peace-loving forces and to bring discord into their ranks. The press either passes in silence over the peace campaigns or depicts them as subversive actions instigated by the Soviet agents . . . .

As for the so-called "Group to Establish Trust between the USSR and US," which gets much publicity in the monopoly-controlled Western press, I can supply you with the following information. This group of 15 persons whose name list appeared in the Western newspapers hasn't done and doesn't do anything valuable for the cause of peace. Neither are they subjected to any kind of harassment. Yury and Olga Medvedkov, whom you mention in your letter, had applied for the emigration visa to Israel under the excuse of rejoining the sister of Olga's father who lives in that country. Their application was refused, since the regulations for rejoining the disrupted families, existing in our country, make provisions for direct relatives, such as husbands and wives, children and parents, brothers and sisters. Yury and Olga Medvedkov have no direct relatives in Israel.

After that the Medvedkovs and a number of their friends, most of whom had applied for visas to Israel and had been refused, their applications not complying with the administrative rules, made a "group" with the purpose of emigrating by gaining publicity abroad and external support.

I am keen on repeating that these persons have never taken and aren't taking part in the struggle for peace. Instead, they constantly allege to foreign journalists that they are ill-treated. What do they mean by saying that? As it turned out, when in the party organization of the Geography Institute of the Academy of Science of the USSR, where this couple is working, it became known that Communist Party member Yury Medvedkov wanted to emigrate to Israel, though he has no direct relatives there, and being ethnically Russian, has never professed Judaism, his fellow-communists were indignant: how can a party member aspire to emigrate to the country which is committing the awful atrocities in Lebanon? That is why he was excluded from the ranks of the Party. Nevertheless, Yury and Olga Medvedkov continue to work, and nobody persecutes them. This detailed account was necessary because Yury Medvedkov went so far as writing in an open letter to the "Journal of European Nuclear Disarmament" (JEND) the following: "We risk our liberty and even our lives every day. But to be outside the peace movement is impossible for us. It's a point of honor, the point of being humans." Now, I guess you can have a clear idea of these people.

I wish you great success in your struggle for peace. Our movement and yours are fighting for the common cause. We both do our best to preserve peace on our planet.

The following interview with Sergei Batovrin, a founding member of the Trust Group, appeared in the February 11, 1983 issue of *New Statesman*. (Batovrin emigrated from the Soviet Union on May 19 with his mother, wife and child.)

*Does your peace movement really exist today?*

... We do exist. Regularly, twice a week, the group meets for discussion. Scientific seminars are also held on a regular basis. We are carrying on with our peace research. We are continuing to produce posters and badges. New peace proposals are being brought forward, our documents are being distributed. And fresh actions are being planned. The number of our supporters is growing, although this doesn't take into account the number of those who would like (if they dared) to declare openly their support.

The range of the group's actions may appear modest. But what actions can be carried out under our circumstances, when a request to hold a demonstration brings about house-arrest, when the call for peace proposals to be phoned in to us leads to the cutting-off of our telephones, and when an anti-war art exhibition ends in the confiscation of all the pictures? All the same, we have no intention of limiting ourselves in our anti-nuclear protests and our actions against war....

*What suggestions do you have?*

We think it's pointless to look for culprits in the state of relations between the superpowers - what's necessary is to change these relations. However, the normalisation of Soviet-American relations can be brought about only by tackling the totality. The interdependent character of the problem in the relations between the two countries simply doesn't permit anything less than a comprehensive resolution. Attempts to solve some problems without solving others is like trying to sit on a chair with only one leg.

We propose that the USA and the USSR enter immediately into negotiations to achieve a bilateral freeze in nuclear weapons. At the same time, work around this issue must be inseparably linked with concentrated measures to humanize relations between the peoples - to overcome distrust and to relax and open up mutual relations, by means of establishing links between citizens, cooperation and the exchange of information and of people, discussion and dialogue. We are confident that this could secure, without long-drawn negotiations, the chance to go on from a freeze to the real reduction of armaments. Thus, *A freeze founded on mutual openness!*

We are proposing the setting-up of a joint Soviet-American Commission to research and coordinate possible joint US-Soviet projects for the improvement of world conditions to be funded out of reciprocal cuts in military budgets. For example: the cutting of military budgets by only \$450 million (as calculated by the World Health Organizations) could fund a joint program to eradicate malaria, from which about one billion people suffer.

Here are some more of our positions:

We are in favour of the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

We are against the MX missile and the deployment of any new intercontinental ballistic missiles in the West and in the East.

We are for the complete abolition of nuclear tests.

We propose that the US and USSR work together to establish international norms for the prevention of radioactive pollution of the environment - these norms to replace the existing national norms.

We propose a ban on the development, testing, and production of all kinds of delivery systems for nuclear weapons in the East and West.

We are opposed to the development of any new types of weapon of mass destruction.

We are for the limitation and reduction of conventional weapons.

In short, we support all proposals which can lead to the limitation, reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weaponry. But at the same time it's clear to us that these practical measures of disarmament will be impossible unless we change the whole character of East-West relations, unless we can overcome distrust through massive measures to humanize these relations.

We've proposed more than 80 such measures - among these, a Soviet-American book-trading program, whereby citizens could receive by mail books and periodicals not widely available in their country; an exchange of children from Soviet and American families during school vacations; permanent cultural centers; exchanges of workers on a temporary basis; Soviet-American youth festivals (for example, a rock-festival), televised discussions between politicians from both countries, with questions from the audience; joint medical clinics; a tourist program with inexpensive holidays in the USA and USSR by means of living-in exchanges between families... and dozens of other proposals.

When the politicians of both countries are incapable of coming to any agree-

ment on disarmament - when disarmament depends on trust - when trust is lacking and progress in building it depends on the issue of disarmament - then the first step required to break out of this circle is to create a common community. Neighbouring citizens of the East and West must themselves initiate measures to understand each other better, and to overcome distrust.

*What are the future prospects of the group?*

... The fate of the independent peace movement today depends in large part upon whether our colleagues in the Western peace movement wait for us to be arrested before they intervene on our behalf, or whether they respond at once, now, to a threat which has already been perfectly evident - for half a year - in the ceaseless repression and persecution of their Moscow colleagues.

In the last analysis, we are not just talking about the persecution of a small group of people. We are dealing with a problem of fundamental significance - the fate of the world depends upon whether each person understands that a peaceful future requires a peaceful defense of the right to struggle for peace.

Compiled by Roman Fin,  
Group for Trust in Canada,  
Chairman.  
December 19, 1983.

# **GROUP OF TRUST IN CANADA**

72 ELISE TERRACE, WILLOWDALE, ONTARIO M2R 2X1

The fear and terror that the future holds in store for us can be eradicated from our life only by positive constructive activity in favour of life, liberty and security. Peace would come into the world through the identification and disarmament of those forces which threaten our existence, regardless of whether they arise from the Soviet Union, the United States, our own government or society, the governments or societies of other countries, or from all sides simultaneously. However, peace and disarmament will remain only abstract concepts and beautiful words which will not bear fruit as long as we do not gain accurate knowledge of those forces which control the weapons and act accordingly. On the other hand, ignorance and the application of mistaken ideas can lead us into catastrophe.

Because the present world situation is so difficult and complicated, because our existence seems to lack all security, and because we cannot simply remain inactive and place our sole trust in help from the other world, we must develop trust and hope in our hearts through positive human activity, if our courage is not to fail us. But we must not make the mistake of not recognizing a "wolf in sheep's clothing". Our will to trust should not be blind, but conscious and informed.

The establishment of mutual trust between the peoples and governments of the free world on the one hand, and the peoples and governments of the communist world on the other, as well as between the peoples of the free world and the government of the U.S.A., is the real foundation on which positive decisions can be made concerning world problems such as peace and war, freedom and slavery, energy and environmental crises, spiritual and cultural crises, aid to poor countries and starving peoples etc.

The Group of Trust considers freedom and human rights as the supreme values in the life of mankind. It dedicates its activities to secure and protect the freedom of all peoples and the human rights of all individuals on our planet by working in the following directions:

1. Study of the Soviet Union as a partner with whom mutual trust is to be established.
2. Study of the political, economic and moral strength of the U.S.A. and other countries of the free world in order to further the understanding of the nature of our own society, our own potential to establish trust between peoples and governments in the Western world as a whole, between the different governments in the West, and especially between the U.S. governments and peoples of the free world.
3. Establishment of direct contacts with Soviet people and/or with independent Soviet groups such as the independent Moscow Peace Group, known officially as the Group for the Establishment of Mutual Trust Between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., with a view to the exchange of opinions on a wide range of world problems, including those of arms control and peace. Organization of peace, and other kinds of conferences, cultural and scientific exchanges, exchange of lecturers and speakers etc. on a people-to-people level, this form of intercourse being the best way to establish mutual trust.

Continued...

4. **Establishment of contacts with the Soviet, American, and Canadian Governments in order to express our will to freedom, protection of human rights and peace, and to set up dialogue between Canadian people and the governments of the three countries.**
5. **Investigation of the potentials for peace and war in the world. Study of all the different peace movements today and their programmes and methods with a view to selection of the most realistic proposals. Bringing the latter to the attention of the public and the governments of the West and The Soviet Union.**
6. **Investigation of all aspects of the arms control issue in order to further the understanding and the use of possibilities of effective and constructive multilateral, bilateral, or unilateral actions to freeze, reduce, or abolish any kind of existing weapons: nuclear, conventional, bacteriological, electromagnetic etc.**
7. **Delivery of lectures and organization of discussions with different peace groups. Provision of speakers for community groups, professional associations, trade unions, and educational institutions. Conducting of public opinion polls on all issues relating to mutual trust and world problems.**
8. **Support for the programme of the Moscow Group for the Establishment of Mutual Trust Between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.:**
  - i) **The Creation of an exchange programme for school children of the two countries.**
  - ii) **Arrangement of televised discussions between representatives of the two governments to be shown in full in both countries, with the possibility for viewers to phone in questions.**
  - iii) **The creation of a common programme with the use of similar peace teach-ins and text-books, to be obligatory in Soviet and American schools.**
  - iv) **The opening of a Soviet Cultural Center in Washington and an American Cultural Center in Moscow.**
  - v) **The creation of a Soviet-American mediation Bureau for those seeking to reunite with their families or to help those persons who wish to marry.**
  - vi) **The creation of a Soviet-American Medical Center for conducting joint research.**
  - vii) **The creation of a Soviet-American Institute of Public Opinion with the authority to conduct independent public opinion polls in both countries on questions relating to mutual trust and peace.**
  - viii) **The creation of an organization for those wishing to correspond. (A Pen Pal Bureau)**

*I wish to participate in or support the following activities:*

- To be a member of Group of Trust in Canada. ....
- To make a contribution to support Group of Trust in Canada. ....
- To invite the speakers of Group of Trust in Canada for talks, discussions, lectures, in my church, community, student's club, school, group or association etc.....
- To be on your mailing list. ....

Name.....

Address.....

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# The Soviet Union (Sovietism)

Origin, Nature, Philosophy, Morality, Structure, Realities of Existence.

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Class Structure, Health Protection, Trade, Social Security, Education, Science, Literature  
and Arts, Sport.

### 9. Nations and nationalities in the U.S.S.R.

Friendship and Contradictions.

### 10-11. The State and the Individual.

Rights and Obligations

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### 12. Foreign Policy.

Fulfillment of historical task

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Fees: \$115.00

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Please send forms to: R. FIN, 72 Elise Terrace, Willowdale, Ont., M2R 2X1.

For information please call 226-6420

I wish to attend course of lectures "The Soviet Union" ("Sovietism")

Name.....

Address.....

Telephone.....

Convenient day, time and place (North, East, West, Downtown...), to attend the lecture..

.....

# The Soviet Union Myth & Reality

Public lectures by Roman Fin

I. November, 28, 7:00 P.M.

II. December, 1, 8:00 P.M.

Medical Science Auditorium, University of Toronto

*For information, please call: 226-6420*

Roman Fin is an author of seven books including:

Nature of Communist Party of the U.S.S.R.  
Moral Structures of the Modern Socialistic Society,  
Sovietism. The Constitution of the U.S.S.R.. Myth and Reality  
Reflections on Morality

*Roman Fin is a brilliant interpreter of the Soviet Union, its Origin, Nature, Philosophy, Morality, History and all aspects and realities of its existence. His life experience consists of about 40 years of life in the Soviet Union where he was a worker, student, scientist, philosopher and writer and where he for his first two books merited the highest reward - confinement in Psychiatric Prison.*

*Roman Fin is a founder of Group of Trust and Independent Institute for the Soviet Union Studies in Canada.*

December 23, 1983.

Dr. Roman Fin,  
72 Elise Terrace,  
Willowdale, Ontario.  
M2R 2X1

Dear Dr. Fin:

On behalf of the Prime Minister, I acknowledge  
your letter of December 17.

Please be assured that it and the enclosed  
documentation will be brought to Mr. Trudeau's  
attention.

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed by  
Original signé par

Marie-Andrée Bastien,  
Correspondence Director.

Original to: R. Fowler

cc: FILE 3357 005

MAB/jgb

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*File*

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 ---EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND PMS PEACE INITIATIVE:HUNG VIEWS  
 SUMMARY

BOTH FM VARKONYI AND DEPUTY FM ESZTERGALYOS HAVE EXPRESSED  
 CONTINUING INTEREST IN PMS PEACE INITIATIVE, AND HAVE REPEATED HUNG  
 VIEW THAT PMS EFFORTS WERE PARTICULARLY WORTHWHILE AND SHOWED SENSE  
 OF COMMITMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY. BUT WHILE THERE HAD BEEN CERTAIN  
 IMPROVEMENT IN ATMOSPHERE AS RESULT OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ATTENDANCE  
 AT STOCKHOLM, INTERNATL LIFE REMAINED TENSE. HUNGS ARE SCEPTICAL  
 THAT RECENT STATEMENTS BY REAGAN INDICATE BASIC CHANGE IN WSHDC  
 ATTITUDES, AND REPEAT SOVIET LINE THAT EUROMISSILES MUST RETURN TO  
 SITUATION PRIOR TO NATO DEPLOYMENT FOR NEGOTIATIONS TO RECOMMENCE.  
 ALTHOUGH CHERNENKOS ACCESSION TO USSR POWER MEANT CONTINUITY IN  
 BASIC WPO POLICIES, HUNGS THINK THERE COULD BE A REVIEW OF SOVIET  
 ATTITUDES; IN PARTICULAR INDIRECT ADMISSION OF FAILURE BY WPO  
 SUCCESSFULLY TO EXPLOIT WESTERN QUOTE PEACE GROUPS UNQUOTE SUGGESTS  
 THAT MOSCO AND EAST EUROPE ARE LOOKING FOR NEW POLICY LINE ON INF.  
 REPORT:

PAGE TWO ZWGR0271 CONF D

2. LATE LAST WEEK I PASSED A COPY OF THE PMS STATEMENT TO THE HOUSE ON HIS TRIP TO EASTERN EUROPE AND HIS PEACE INITIATIVE TO FERENC ESZTERGALYOS, HUNGARIAN DEPUTY FM. ESZTERGALYOS WAS GRATEFUL TO BE INFORMED OF PMS VISIT AND LINKED IT TO RECENT VISIT PAID TO BPEST BY BRITISH PM THATCHER (OURTEL ZWGR0239 17FEB). HE ALSO REFERRED TO JAN26 TV INTERVIEW GIVEN BY HUNG FM VARKONYI IN WHICH LATTER SAID THAT IN ESTABLISHING THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO ALLIANCES IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THEM TO GO BACK TO FUNDAMENTALS AND TO TAKE ARMS CONTROL OUT OF THE HANDS OF THE NUCLEAR ACCOUNTANTS. DRAWING ON HIS MINISTERS INTERVIEW TO COMMENT ON PMS VISITS ESZTERGALYOS SAID THAT VARKONYI HAD ALSO NOTED POSITIVE SIGNS EMERGING. PRESENCE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS AT STOCKHOLM INDICATED CERTAIN IMPROVEMENT IN ATMOSPHERE BUT SHOULD NOT/NOT BE CONSIDERED A BREAKTHROUGH IN INTERNATIONAL TENSION. MTG OF GROMYKO AND SHULTZ WAS PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT. BUT EVEN HERE SAID VARKONYI, ONE SHOULD NOT/NOT MAKE FAR REACHING CONCLUSIONS FROM ONE MTG. INTERNATIONAL LIFE WAS EXTREMELY TENSE AND THIS HAD NOT/NOT DIMINISHED SIGNIFICANTLY.

3. AS REGARDS THE PMS CONTENTION THAT IN CONTRAST TO EARLIER STATEMENTS, PRES REAGAN HAD TWICE IN JAN SIGNALLED A CONSTRUCTIVE TONE, ESZTERGALYOS EXPRESSED SOME RESERVATIONS (EVEN TWO SWALLOWS DID NOT/NOT MAKE A SUMMER) AND ECHOED HIS FMS SCEPTICISM. THERE WAS A CHANGE IN THE TONE COMING FROM WSHDC BUT AS VARKONYI HAD SUGGESTED IN HIS INTERVIEW THERE HAD BEEN NO/NO BASIC CHANGE IN ATTITUDES.

...3

PAGE THREE ZWGR0271 CONF

IF ANYTHING SAID ESZTERGALYOS, A FORMER AMBASSADOR TO WSHDC AND WHO KNOWS THE AMERICAN SCENE WELL, THE NEW TONE WAS TIED DIRECTLY TO THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS ELECTORAL AMBITIONS. REAGAN'S POLICIES REMAINED THE SAME. IN SPEAKING OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF EURO MISSILES ESZTERGALYOS NOTED, VARKONYI HAD COMMENTED THAT THE SITUATION WAS NOT/NOT IRREVERSIBLE BUT IT WAS UP TO THOSE PREACHING DIALOGUE TO DEMONSTRATE SERIOUS INTENTIONS. THIS SAID VARKONYI MEANT RETURNING TO THE SITUATION BEFORE DEPLOYMENT. THIS MEANT THAT THE AMERICANS MUST SOLEMNLY PLEDGE NOT/NOT TO BE THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SUBSCRIBE TO AN AGMT ON COOPERATION AND RENOUNCING USE OF FORCE BY WAY OF FULLER COMMENT ON THE PMS VISITS IN EASTERN EUROPE, ESZTERGALYOS TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO ECHO HIS MINISTERS VIEWS ABOUT WESTERN ALLEGATIONS THAT THE WPO COUNTRIES HAD TRIED TO SEPARATE WESTERN EUROPE FROM THE USA. VARKONYI DENIED THAT SUCH A POLICY HAD EVER BEEN PURSUED.

4. FROM THIS VANTAGE POINT FM VARKONYI'S LAST MENTIONED COMMENT APPEARS TO BE AN INDIRECT ADMISSION OF FAILURE ON THE PART OF THE WPO IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO EXPLOIT THE QUOTE PEACE GROUPS UNQUOTE IN WESTERN EUROPE AND SUGGESTS THAT MOSCO AND ITS SATELLITES ARE LOOKING FOR A POLICY THAT CAN REPLACE A LINE WHICH HAS PROVED UNSUCCESSFUL AND HAS CAUSED CONCERN AMONG THE POPULATIONS OF MOSCOW'S CLIENT STATES IN EASTERN EUROPE. ESZTERGALYOS REINFORCED THIS BY STATING THAT ALTHOUGH CHERNENKO MEANT CONTINUITY IN WPO POLICIES, HIS ACCESSION TO POWER WLD

...

PAGE FOUR ZWGR0271 CONF

ALSO MEAN A BASIC REVIEW OF SOVIET ATTITUDES AND PERHAPS OPENING UP NEW POSSIBILITIES, A POSITION THAT DOES NOT/NOT EXACTLY SQUARE WITH VARKONYIS EARLIER BUT RATHER MORE PESSIMISTIC VIEWS. IN THIS CONNECTION, ESZTERGALYOS EXPRESSED GREAT INTEREST IN THE GDR AGMT WHEREBY CDN AND GDR OFFICIALS SHOULD MEET TO EXCHANGE PROPOSALS ON DISARMAMENT AND IDENTIFY AREAS OF PRAGUE DECLARATION THAT MERITED EXAMINATION. BUT WHY NOT/NOT EXTEND THIS TO DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE TWO ALLIANCES AS A WHOLE HE ASKED?

5. ESZTERGALYOS EXPRESSED THANKS ON BEING GIVEN BACKGROUND ON PMS VISITS AND SAID THAT ALTHOUGH A BREAKTHROUGH AND IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WERE STILL A LONG WAY OFF, HUNG VIEW WAS THAT PMS EFFORTS WERE PARTICULARLY WORTHWHILE AND SHOWED DEEP SENSE OF COMMITMENT, RESPONSIBILITY AND PERSISTENCE. THEY WLD WATCH FURTHER STEPS AND RESULTS WITH INTEREST. HUNGARY WAS A SMALL COUNTRY AND DID NOT/NOT HAVE PRETENSIONS SO FAR AS ITS INFLUENCE WAS CONCERNED. THE USA AND THE USSR WERE THE DECISIVE ELEMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION BUT EVEN SMALL COUNTRIES CARRIED SOME WEIGHT AND HUNG WOULD USE ITS INFLUENCE TO ENCOURAGE RESUMPTION OF TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER POWERS.

ARCAND

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---PM INITIATIVE: THREE SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS  
PLEASED TO MEET WITH NACHENIUS AND AMB WIJNAENDTS. UNDERSTAND MEERBURG,  
HEAD OF ARMS CONTROL DIV, MIGHT ALSO BE USEFUL CONTACT.  
2. APPRECIATE YOUR OFFER TO HOST SMALL LUNCH FEB 29.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG  G. J. SMITH	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG  L. A. DELVOIE



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---PM INITIATIVE:TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS.

THANKS INFO YOUR REFTE<sup>L</sup> WILL MAKE APPROPRIATE TRAIN ARRANGEMENTS UPON  
ARRIVAL.

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*G. J. Smith*  
G. J. SMITH

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

*L. A. Delvoie*  
L. A. DELVOIE

000666



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---USA ASAT PROGRAM

FOR RECORD FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PIECE OF PAPER GIVEN TO SMITH/CALDER  
/LYSYCHYN IN WSHDC 23FEB BY ACDA REPS OUTLINING PRINCIPAL QUESTIONS  
THEY MUST ANSWER ON ASAT IN REPORT WHICH MUST BE SUBMITTED TO  
CONGRESS BY END OF MARCH.

2.TEXT BEGINS.

QUOTE

(COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)

UNQUOTE.

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SIG *G.J. Smith* G.J. Smith/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG *L.A. Delvigne* L.A. Delvigne

000667

The House Appropriations Committee refused to authorize \$19 million for advance procurement of an ASAT system and called for an arms control report. This report according to Congressman Dicks is to answer the following question, "Is there an arms control answer before we start off on a very expensive escalation?" The floor debate in the House makes clear that deletion of the advance acquisition funds was not to affect development and testing. The principle proponent of requiring a report, Congressman McHugh, set forth a detailed listing of what the report should contain:

First, an assessment of the current threat posed by the Soviet ASAT system to existing and future American satellites, including which satellites are threatened, to what degree, and how changes in U.S. satellite systems will change that degree of threat.

Second, an indication of the defensive measures, both contemplated and potential, which could increase the survivability of U.S. space assets.

Third, a full explanation of the military utility of the U.S. ASAT, including a description of which Soviet satellites it would be capable of attacking and the threat those satellites pose to U.S. military operations.

Fourth, an indication of the military and technological alternatives to ASAT weapons which the United

States could utilize, or has utilized, in order to offset the threat to military operations posed by Soviet satellites.

Fifth, an indication of the likely Soviet response to deployment of the U.S. ASAT system.

Sixth, an assessment of possible U.S. and Soviet follow-on ASAT systems, and the potential implications of these technologies for the 1972 United States-Soviet ABM Treaty.

Seventh, an assessment of the willingness of the Soviet Union to resume bilateral negotiations to limit ASAT weapons.

Eighth, a detailed analysis of the latest Soviet proposed draft treaty on ASAT systems, and of any other available draft treaties, as to the suitability of such draft treaties as the basis for United States-Soviet negotiations.

93  
Ninth, an assessment of the effects of a 6-month to 1-year moratorium on the testing of both American and Soviet ASAT systems on potential United States ASAT negotiations, and upon the projected initial operating capability date for the U.S. ASAT weapon.

Tenth, an assessment of the verification problems which would be posed by deployment of the U.S. ASAT weapon.

Eleventh, an assessment of the verification problems which would be posed by a joint United States-Soviet moratorium on flight testing of all ASAT systems.



*file*

TO/À  RSR  
FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE • Your memo RSR-0167 of February 16, 1984.  
RÉFÉRENCE •  
SUBJECT • Brief for DPM/SSEA's Meeting with  
SUJET • The Spanish Foreign Minister.

Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
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File/Dossier	
Date	February 24, 1984
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0196

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES  
-1-  
DISTRIBUTION

... As requested attached is a brief on the Prime Minister's initiative in preparation for the visit of the Spanish Foreign Minister.

*L.A. Delvoie*  
L.A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE

ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

ISSUE

The purpose of this brief is to discuss the current status of the Prime Minister's initiative.

BACKGROUND

The Prime Minister's central purpose is to try to stop and reverse the worsening trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce international tensions and risks of confrontation. His chief proposal addresses the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the two superpowers. The PM is interested in seeing if by opening lines of communication to Moscow more propitious conditions can be created for political dialogue between Moscow and Washington.

The initiative involves a number of specific proposals - (a) a conference of the five nuclear weapon states to limit strategic nuclear arsenals (b) a concerted political effort to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime (c) a substantive Western response to the Eastern proposals on MBFR and a meeting at the Foreign Minister level in Vienna (d) the inauguration of the Stockholm CDE Meeting at senior political level.

Also related to the initiative, but not pursued personally by the PM with other governments, are proposals for (a) a ban on the testing and deployment of high altitude anti-satellite systems (b) a requirement that future strategic systems be verifiable by National Technical Means and (c) restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs.

RESULTS

The degree of support which the Prime Minister has garnered for the main purposes of his initiative is of itself a positive result insofar as it may have a beneficial effect on the climate of East-West relations. The decisions taken at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels in early December were particularly significant in furthering the purposes of the initiative:

.../2

- (a) an undertaking by NATO foreign ministers to attend the opening of the CDE in Stockholm (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (b) an undertaking to review the NATO negotiating position in the MBFR negotiations (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (c) the "Brussels Declaration" which places heavy emphasis on genuine détente and dialogue in East-West relations (an FRG initiative, actively supported by the Canadian delegation);
- (d) a mandate given the permanent NATO Council to review the current state of East-West relations and to report to the next NATO ministerial meeting on what actions might be taken to improve them.

There have been additional signs of progress. There has been some moderation of the strident rhetoric of both superpowers, which have recently indicated the importance they attach to political dialogue, President Reagan in his speech of January 15 and General Secretary Chernenko in his meeting with the Prime Minister.

Broad political contact between East and West was re-established at the beginning of the Stockholm Conference for the first time since the acrimonious conclusion of the Madrid Conference last September.

Western political leaders, including the Prime Minister and Prime Minister Thatcher, have gone to the East to open lines of communication.

It has been agreed that the MBFR negotiations will resume in Vienna on March 16.

These are all indications of a change in the deteriorating trend in East-West relations that was apparent in the autumn of 1983.

#### SPANISH POSITION

The Spanish have been very positive in their response to the initiative. They shared our analysis of the alarming situation in the autumn of 1983 and support the Prime Minister's efforts, in their words, "to unblock international dialogue and secure effective disarmament measures". They attach particular importance to the Stockholm Conference.

President Gonzalez has invited the PM to visit him in Madrid to discuss the initiative, should another trip to Europe be planned.



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
PLEASED TO HAVE CHANCE TO SPEAK WITH ALSTON APART FROM CONSULTATIONS,  
PARTICULARLY GIVEN UK POSITION ON THESE ISSUES.  
2.SUGGEST THAT WE MIGHT HAVE DRINK TOGETHER LATE MONDAY AFTERNOON,  
PERHAPS AT HOTEL ROYAL WINDSOR.PERHAPS ALSTON COULD CALL HOTEL TO  
CONFIRM.

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SIG  G.J.Smith/sc

IDDZ

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SIG  L.A.Délyoie

000672 -

Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A 0G2

February 24, 1984

IDDZ-0195

Mr. Alfred Kearns  
2179 Elmira Dr., No. 458  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K2C 1H3

Dear Mr. Kearns:

Thank you for your letter of February 9. The Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. MacEachen, has asked me to express his gratitude for your support for the Prime Minister's and his efforts to work for a reduction in international tensions and to contribute to a better and more constructive relationship between East and West.

It is clear that the Prime Minister has been voicing the deep concerns of a great many Canadians when he has argued the urgent necessity of political leaders devoting themselves to the over-riding issues of peace and security.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "L.A. Delvoze".

L.A. Delvoze  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group



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
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LETTRES

5-2723

To/À  
AU

*IDDZ*



- FOR INFORMATION AND ANY NECESSARY ACTION  
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- THIS LETTER HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED  
ON A ACCUSÉ RÉCEPTION DE CETTE LETTRE
- BY TELEPHONE/PAR TÉLÉPHONE
- BY LETTER (Copy attached)/PAR LETTRE (Copie-jointe)

REMARKS/REMARQUES

*RP*

Signature

*84.2-17*

D: 000674

Mr. Alfred Kearns  
2179 Elmira Dr., No. 458  
Ottawa, Canada  
K2C 1H3

OTTAWA WEST END VILLA

Feb. 9<sup>th</sup> 1984

To the Honourable  
Allan J. MacEaen  
Deputy Prime Minister

Regging your forgiveness Sir:

But I must ~~impose~~ <sup>impose</sup>

on your good nature to use some of your very valuable time  
that I may express my feelings of the House of Commons  
proceedings today. First of all having read and "followed" a  
lot of Parliament proceedings I feel that this ~~is~~ has been  
"a day to be remembered" When if ever did a Prime Minister  
or a President of any country ever receive such a standing ovation  
or showing of total agreement by all members, including opposition  
etc. etc. As did our Honourable Prime Minister this morning  
all of us showing our appreciation at total agreement for the  
accomplishments you and he secured on your recent trips.

But very disappointed I have just secret information from  
our C. BC. that there will not be a repeat showing this evening except  
a few portions only on the News spots

Hopefully some good writer is making "something"  
of these proceedings such as Lawrence Martin did in his book  
I am just finishing enjoying: "PRESIDENTS and PRIME MINISTERS"

In closing may I act perhaps ignorantly and ~~voice~~ <sup>voice</sup>  
my disapproval as usual of "Mr" Broadbent's out of place? remarks  
and rarely also but respect for some of Mr. Mulroney's remarks.

Yours truly

and very sincerely

how about the Le CANADA "carry on" gentlemen

Alfred Kearns

I'm sure you have total  
agreement and respect for  
me as well as the  
rest of all my friends  
and I am proud to show my personal  
membership association with  
card # 000675  
over  
G.P.



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

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---PM INITIATIVE: NATO CONSULTATIONS

AS DISCUSSED REFTTELECON, GRATEFUL IF SKINNER COULD ARRIVE IN BRU LATE AFTERNOON MON 27FEB FOR (A) CONSULTATIONS WITH SMITH/CALDER, AND (B) TO PARTICIPATE IN CONSULTATIONS AT BNATO ON THREE SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS.

2. WE LOOK FORWARD TO DRAWING ON SKINNERS EXPERTISE, PARTICULARLY ON QUESTION AS TO WHETHER CD IS OR IS NOT/NOT APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG  G.J. Smith/sc	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG  L.A. Delvoie



TO/À RCR  
FROM/DE • IDDZ  
REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE  
SUBJECT •  
SUJET • Message from H.H. Pope John Paul II

Security/Sécurité	RESTRICTED
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	February 24, 1984
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0191

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

CMR/Johnston/  
Brunton

You may wish to draw on the following in drafting a reply to the Pope's New Year's message: "Your Holiness' call for a rededication of our efforts to the cause of peace in the message for the celebration of the World Day of Peace is very welcome indeed and largely parallels the thinking which has informed my own political initiative of the past months.

I, too, am persuaded that heads of government and political leaders of all countries bear primary responsibility to their citizens to work for peace among nations. At the Williamsburg Summit of the seven industrial countries last May we pledged "to devote our full political resources to reducing the threat of war". I have been attempting to make good that commitment and to signal to my fellow heads of government the urgency of improving the atmosphere between East and West and thereby reducing international tensions and the risks of ~~accident~~ *conflict*

We must also squarely confront the predicament of the nuclear arms race. I submit that we cannot leave these matters to the superpowers alone. All nations have a responsibility to do what they can to work for disarmament. Other nations can help create conditions which will be more propitious for a constructive dialogue between East and West and above all between the superpowers. We must work together to find the common interests of our own humanity, for, as you have said, true peace can only be built on mutual trust.

I salute your efforts to bring peace and to remind us of the heavy responsibilities political leaders bear to strive to develop peaceful relations between nations!"

*L.A. Delvoje*  
L.A. Delvoje  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group



Government of Canada  
Privy Council Office

Gouvernement du Canada  
Bureau du Conseil privé

Ottawa, Canada  
K1A 0A3

Date: ..... 27 janvier 1984

NOTE POUR: *Mme Louise Fréchette*  
.....  
..... *E.A.-R.C.R*

Lettre adressée au Premier ministre de:

*Jean-Paul II*

CPM numéro de dossier: *40 03 027*.....

Nous avons convenu avec le bureau du  
Sous-secrétaire que les services du Ministère soient mis  
à contribution pour préparer les réponses aux lettres  
sur les affaires étrangères adressées au Premier  
ministre.

Je vous serais reconnaissant de vouloir  
rédiger un projet de réponse à la lettre ci-jointe et de  
me l'envoyer avant le 15 février 84, et d'en faire  
parvenir une copie à CMR/Johnston. Vous devez la  
rédiger comme si le Premier ministre allait la signer;  
toutefois, j'accueillerai avec plaisir toute suggestion  
pertinente sur d'autres façons de procéder.

Si vous avez des questions, n'hésitez pas à  
m'appeler au 593-6068.

*Pierre S. Pettigrew*

Pierre S. Pettigrew  
Secrétariat de la politique étrangère  
et de la défense

c.c. CPM/Correspondance (Nicole Fournier)  
BCP/Judy Cameron  
AE/CMR/Ted Johnston *Janis*

P.S. L'agent du Vatican s'occupe sans  
doute impliquer l'équipe de Delvoie (1002)  
dans cette rédaction.

*Janis*

Canada

• TO ECONOMIZE — HANDWRITE.

• POUR FIN D'ÉCONOMIE — ÉCRIRE À LA MAIN



Government of Canada / Gouvernement du Canada

ROUND TRIP MEMORANDUM

NOTE ALLER RETOUR

FROM DE CMR/Brunton

File No. (originator) — Dossier n° (source)

TO À IDDZ

File No. (addressee) — Dossier n° (destinataire)

Subject - Objet Privy Council Office Correspondence

Were substantive comments on the Pope's message (see attached) done, and if so could you please forward a copy to CMR (B-3).

Signature  
Reply - Réponse

*C. Brunton*

Date February 23, 1984 Telephone 3-6487

See copy attached of our memo IDDZ-0191 addressed to RCR, February 24, 1984.

7540-21-029-0717

GC 59a

Signature

Date

Telephone

1 ADDRESSEE DESTINATAIRE

Please add reply — Keep this copy and return copy 2 to originator.  
Inscrire la réponse — Garder cette copie et expédier la copie 2 à l'initiateur

000679

ROUND TRIP MEMORANDUM

NOTE ALLER RETOUR

Government of Canada / Gouvernement du Canada

TO / A  
CMR/Brunton

File No. (originator) — Dossier n° (source)

FROM / DE  
RCR/Frechette

File No. (addressee) — Dossier n° (destinataire)

Subject - Objet: Privy Council Office Correspondence

Would you please check your records to see if you acknowledged receipt of the note from the Pope's representative in Canada concerning copies of His Holiness's message on World Peace day, which was referred to you January 27, 1984 from the Privy Council Office (PCO#4023 027). Could you please send a copy of the acknowledgement to CMR (B-3).

Signature

*C. Brunton*

Date

February 22, 1984

Telephone

3-6487

Reply - Réponse

Receipt of the note from the Pro-Nuncio was acknowledged by Protocol (copy of their note attached). PCO subsequently requested substantive comments on the Pope's message as input to a possible PM's reply. The request was passed on to IDD 2 for action.

7540-21-028-0717

GC 598

Signature

*L. Fréchette*

Date

22/2/84

Telephone

2-0871

2 REPLY / RÉPONSE

Please return this copy to originator. / Veuillez retourner cette copie à l'initiateur.

000680

Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

c.c. RCR RCD  
GOVGEN PM MINA  
(W/ATTACHMENTS)

Canada

NOTE NO. XDC-0143

Le Ministère des Affaires extérieures présente ses compliments à la Nonciature Apostolique et a l'honneur d'accuser réception de sa Note no 13102 du 20 janvier 1984, par laquelle la Nonciature Apostolique lui fait parvenir trois exemplaires du Message de Sa Sainteté le Pape Jean-Paul II de la part du Souverain Pontife, adressé respectivement au Gouverneur général, au Très Honorable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Premier ministre du Canada, et à l'Honorable Allan J. MacEachern Vice-Premier ministre et Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures.

Le Ministère tient à informer la Nonciature Apostolique que les trois exemplaires ont été transmis à leurs destinataires.

Le Ministère des Affaires extérieures saisit cette occasion pour renouveler à la Nonciature Apostolique les assurances de sa très haute considération.

OTTAWA, le 12 janvier 1984.



NONCIATURE APOSTOLIQUE

APOSTOLIC NUNCIATURE

N. 18102

La Nonciature Apostolique présente ses compliments au Ministère des Affaires extérieures et a l'honneur de lui faire parvenir ci-joints trois exemplaires - deux en anglais et un en français - du Message de Sa Sainteté le Pape Jean-Paul II à l'occasion de la célébration de la Journée Mondiale de la Paix, le 1er janvier 1984.

Un exemplaire est destiné à Son Excellence le Gouverneur Général, un autre au Très honorable Premier Ministre et le troisième à l'honorable Ministre des Affaires extérieures.

La Nonciature Apostolique se permet de demander au Ministère de bien vouloir les faire parvenir à leurs Hauts Destinataires de la part du Souverain Pontife.

En remerciant vivement pour ce service, la Nonciature serait en même temps reconnaissante au Ministère de lui faire connaître, dès que possible, la réponse ou les réponses qui seront envoyées au Saint-Père.

La Nonciature Apostolique saisit cette occasion pour renouveler au Ministère des Affaires extérieures les assurances de sa plus haute considération.

Ottawa, le 20 décembre 1983.

AP.  
Ministère des Affaires extérieures  
Edifice Lester B. Pearson  
125 prom. Sussex  
OTTAWA, Ontario  
K1A 0G2

*ERS*

Government of Canada / Gouvernement du Canada  
Privy Council Office / Bureau du Conseil privé

Ottawa, Canada  
K1A 0A3

Date: ... 27 January ...

CMR

NOTE POUR: *Mme Louise Frechette*  
.....  
.....  
..... RCR

Lettre adressée au Premier ministre de:

*Jean Paul II*

CPM numéro de dossier: *.4023...027.....*

Nous avons convenu avec le bureau du Sous-secrétaire que les services du Ministère soient mis à contribution pour préparer les réponses aux lettres sur les affaires étrangères adressées au Premier ministre.

Je vous serais reconnaissant de vouloir rédiger un projet de réponse à la lettre ci-jointe et de me l'envoyer avant le 15 février 82, et d'en faire parvenir une copie à CMR/Johnston. Vous devez la rédiger comme si le Premier ministre allait la signer; toutefois, j'accueillerai avec plaisir toute suggestion pertinente sur d'autres façons de procéder.

Si vous avez des questions, n'hésitez pas à m'appeler au 593-6068.

*P. S. Pettigrew*  
Pierre S. Pettigrew  
Secrétariat de la politique étrangère  
et de la défense

- c.c. CPM/Correspondance (Nicole Fournier)
- BCP/Judy Cameron
- AE/CMR/Ted Johnston

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T E

DE EXTOTT MGT2227 24FEV84

A FCOLDN NDHQOTT RCMPOTT HAGUE COPEN OSLO STKHM HSNKI

PRGUE VIENN BGRAD MOSCO WSAW BUCST BPEST RABAT DAKAR ABDJN LAGOS

YUNDE KNSHA GENEV ATHNS BGHDD AMMAN BERUT CAIRO TUNIS BERNE DELHI

PEKIN TOKYO MANIL HKONG BRU BNATO ALGER MDRID LSBON ROME BONN

TT DFACNBRA DE CBA IMMED

SAC CNKRY BMAKO OUAGA NIAMY DE OTT BRDUX STBRG MRSLL DE PAR

LBRVE DE KSA

DISTR GENERALE

---GREVE DES CAMIONNEURS-PARIS

LA SECTION DES MESSAGERIES DE PARIS NOUS INFORME DE LA POSSIBILITE  
D UNE GRAVE PERTURBATION DU TRANSPORT TERRESTRE A DESTINATION ET  
EN PROVENANCE DES AEROPORTS. CETTE SITUATION POURRAIT FAIRE  
MANQUER DES VOLS ET RETARDER DE CE FAIT LE TRANSFERT OU LA  
MANIPULATION DES SACS DE COURRIER. CELA S EST D AILLEURS DEJA  
PRODUIT.

2. AFIN DE PERMETTRE AUX MESSAGERS DE CHANGER A BREF DELAI DE MODE  
DE TRANSPORT DANS LA REGION PARISIENNE TOUT EN CONTINUANT A  
ASSURER DES SERVICES, NOUS DEMANDONS A NOS CLIENTS DE BIEN VOULOIR  
POUR L INSTANT REDUIRE AU MINIMUM LA QUANTITE ET LE POIDS DES SACS  
ENVOYES ET INDIQUER LES ARTICLES URGENTS AFIN QUE LE MESSAGER  
PUISSE S EN OCCUPER LE PLUS RAPIDEMENT POSSIBLE.

3. LA SECTION DES MESSAGERIES DE PARIS A ELABORE EN COLLABORATION  
AVEC MGT DES PLANS D URGENCE APPLICABLES A BREVE ECHEANCE SI LA

...2

PAGE DEUX MGT2227 RESTR

SITUATION DEVAIT S AGGRAVER.NOUS FAISONS DONC APPEL A VOTRE  
PATIENCE ET TOLERANCE JUSQU A CE QUE LES CHOSES REVIENNENT A LA  
NORMALE.

4.BRU/BOTAN-VOUS SEREZ PEUT-ETRE APPELE A FOURNIR UNE AIDE PLUS  
IMPORTANTE QU A L ORDINAIRE.NOUS NOUS RENDONS BIEN COMPTE DES  
PRESSIONS INDUES QUE CELA POURRA CREER SUR VOS RESSOURCES.NOUS  
NOUS EFFORCERONS TOUTEFOIS DE GARDER AU MINIMUM LES DEMANDES  
SUPPLEMENTAIRES.

5.POUR EMPIRER LA SITUATION,NOUS APPRENONS QUE LE PERSONNEL  
NAVIGANT DE BRITISH AIRWAYS EST EN GREVE.LA PORTEE DE CETTE GREVE  
N EST PAS ENCORE CLAIRE,MAIS CELLE-CI POURRAIT ENTRAINER L ARRET  
DES VOLS.

CCC/189 062247Z MGT2227

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

*MF*  
*TD*

Division Phoned \_\_\_\_\_  
Person \_\_\_\_\_  
Local Time \_\_\_\_\_

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2072 24FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 241330

INFO ENATO CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR GENEV

PARIS HAGUE OSLO COPEN ATHNS STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER/AXWORTHY

NDHQOTT/ADM POL/DACPOL/DNACPOL/ CPP/DSTRATA/CIS

DISTR IDD IFB MINA MINE MINT USS DMF IDA RBR RCR RSR RBD RCD

RSD CPD ZSI ZSP UGB URR IDR RGB

---PMS INITIATIVE:CONSULTATIONS WITH USA

SUMMARY:IN SERIES OF MTGS WITH STATE,DOD AND ACDA,PMS TASK FORCE REPS WERE TOLD BY AMERICAN INTERLOCUTORS THAT USA IN GENERAL AGREED WITH CONCEPTS OF NEED TO MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS VERIFIABLE AND TO LIMIT ICBM MOBILITY BUT THAT THEY DISAGREED STRENUOUSLY WITH OUR CIRCULATING THESE IDEAS AT THE CD.IN THE USA VIEW THE CD IS IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATING FORUM AND CIRCULATING THESE PAPERS TO THE CD MEMBERS WILL INEVITABLY BE SEEN AS AN INDICATION OF A DESIRE TO HAVE THESE ISSUES DISCUSSED THERE.THIS WLD CAUSE USA SERIOUS PROBLEMS.OUR DECISION TO PRESENT THESE PAPERS IN THE CD IS SEEN AS A MAJOR DEPARTURE FROM WHAT USA UNDERSTOOD TO BE PURPOSES AND TACTICS OF PMS INITIATIVE.DIFFERENCES ON ASAT WERE MORE BASIC. USA HAS SERIOUS RESERVATIONS ABOUT DESIRABILITY,DEFINABILITY AND VERIFIABILITY OF AN ASAT AGREEMENT.CD WAS ALSO CONSIDERED AN INAPPROPRIATE FORUM FOR RAISING ASAT ISSUE BUT MORE FOR TACTICAL REASONS.PRIME CONCERN SEEMED TO BE TIMING.IF PAPER IS TO BE

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR2072 CONF

CIRCULATED IN CD IT SHLD NOT/NOT BE BEFORE OUTER SPACE WG IS  
CONSTITUTED AND ITS MANDATE AGREED.

2.REPORT:IDDZ BRIEFING TEAM MET SEPARATELY 23FEB WITH TEAMS FROM  
DOD,STATE AND ACDA.HOST TEAMS WERE HEADED BY REED HAMNER.SENIOR  
DEP ASST SEC(INNATL SECURITY POLICY)AT DOD,JAMES DOBBINS,DEP ASST  
SEC AND JAMES MEDAS DEPT ASST SEC AT STATE AND MARY LIB HOINKES  
DEPT ASST DIR(MULTILATERAL)AND LOU NOSCENZO DEPT ASST DIR  
(STRATEGIC)AT ACDA.

3.IN ALL THREE MTGS WE HEARD GENERALLY CONSISTENT VIEWS ON ALL  
POINTS OF DISCUSSION ALTHOUGH THERE WERE SOME DIFFERENCES IN  
EMPHASIS AND TONE.WHILE THESE DIFFERENCES PROVIDED SIGNIFICANT  
INSIGHTS INTO ATTITUDE IN VARIOUS PARTS OF USA ADMIN(SOME DOD  
INTERLOCUTORS REFERRED TO CD AS QUOTE CIRCUS UNQUOTE AND QUOTE  
BURLESQUE UNQUOTE)THEY DID NOT/NOT ADD UP TO SUGGESTION OF SERIOUS  
DIFFERENCES IN POLICY OR ATTITUDE TOWARD OUR THREE SUFFOCATION  
PROPOSALS AND OUR INTENT TO CIRCULATE THEM AT CD.

4.OUR INTERLOCUTORS CHARACTERIZED ALL THREE SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS  
AS THOUGHTFUL AND SAID THEY HAD BEEN WELL PREPARED TO THE EXTENT  
THEY SET OUT THE KINDS OF FACTORS THAT NEED TO BE THOUGHT ABOUT  
IN DEALING WITH THE ISSUES.IN ALL CASES OUR PROPOSALS REFLECT ISSUES  
THAT ARE UNDER SERIOUS STUDY IN THE USA.WHILE THEY MIGHT FORMULATE  
THEM DIFFERENTLY THE USA IS IN BASIC AGREEMENT WITH OUR PROPOSALS  
ON VERIFIABILITY AND MOBILITY.OUR INTERLOCUTORS POINTED OUT SOME  
...3

PAGE THREE UNGR2072 CONF D

OF THE PROBLEMS THEY SAW WITH THESE PROPOSALS BUT SAID THEY NEVERTHELESS HAD COME TO AGREE WITH THEM. NO/NO ONE ARGUED OUR PROPOSAL TO LIMIT MOBILITY WAS INCONSISTENT WITH SCOWCROFT REPORT. ONE INTERLOCUTOR WENT SO FAR AS TO SAY EARLIER STATE DEPT REF TO IT IN DEMARCHES TO US WAS QUOTE STUPID UNQUOTE. MORE GENEROUS EXPLANATIONS WERE THAT COMMENT REFLECTED ONLY SUPERFICIAL READING OF OUR PROPOSAL OR THAT USA DESIRE WAS TO AVOID SIT IN WHICH TALK ABOUT LIMITING MOBILITY UNDERMINED SUPPORT FOR MOBILE MISSILES BEFORE CONCEPT WAS FULLY UNDERSTOOD AND ESTABLISHED.

5. ON ASAT THERE WAS LITTLE AGREEMENT WITH CDA. USA SAID THEY ARE STUDYING POSSIBILITY OF ASAT BAN BUT THAT FOR PRESENT THEY DID NOT/NOT BELIEVE THEY CLD AGREE TO ENTER INTO SUCH NEGS. PROBLEMS THEY SAW, AND TO WHICH THEY HAD NO/NO SOLUTIONS INCLUDE: (A) DEFINITION: WHAT IS AN ASAT?; (B) VERIFICATION: ACCORDING TO USA THEY DO NOT/NOT KNOW HOW TO VERIFY ASATS. ONE INTERLOCUTOR ASKED IF IT WERE NOT/NOT INCUMBENT ON ANYONE PUTTING FORWARD A SUGGESTION TO BAN ASATS TO PUT FORWARD A VERIFICATION REGIME; (C) DESIRABILITY: DO YOU WANT TO BAN ASATS? SUCH A BAN CLD INTERFERE WITH BMD RESEARCH OR SET THE STAGE FOR BREAKOUT BY THE SOVS (FOLLOWING TEL WILL DEAL IN GREATER DETAIL WITH COMMENTS ON OUR VARIOUS PROPOSALS).

6. MAIN FOCUS OF WHAT USA HAD TO SAY TO US HOWEVER RELATED NOT/NOT TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE PROPOSALS BUT TO THE USE OF THE CD AS A FORUM FOR CIRCULATING OUR PAPERS. THE USA WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED.

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR2072 CONFD

IN THEIR VIEW CIRCULATING PAPERS AT CD IMPLIED THAT WE BELIEVED THAT THIS WAS THE APPROPRIATE FORUM TO DEAL WITH THESE ISSUES. THE USA DOES NOT/NOT.TWO OF THE PROPOSALS RELATE SPECIFICALLY TO BILATERAL USA/USSR NEGS AND THE CD AS A MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATING FORUM.IT HAS NOT/NOT DEALT WITH STRATEGIC ISSUES AND SHLD NOT/NOT BE ENCOURAGED TO DO SO.SOME NATIONS ARE LIKELY TO TAKE OUR CIRCULATION OF PAPERS ON THESE SUBJS IN CD AS AN INVITATION TO DO SO.WHILE OUR INTERLOCUTORS WERE REASSURED BY OUR ASSURANCES THAT WE DID NOT/NOT BELIEVE CD WAS APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR DISCUSSION OF VERIFICATION AND MOBILITY PROPOSALS,THEY REMAINED CONCERNED OTHERS WLD INTERPRET OUR ACTION DIFFERENTLY.CONTRIBUTION OF QUOTE BOTSWANNAS OF THIS WORLD UNQUOTE TO STRATEGIC DEBATE WAS NOT/NOT CONSIDERED TO BE HELPFUL.

7.QUESTION THAT THEN CAME TO THEIR MINDS WAS THAT IF WE DID NOT/NOT THINK CD WAS APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR NEGOTIATING THESE ISSUES WHY RAISE THEM THERE.

8.OUR INTERLOCUTORS REFUTED THE ARGUMENT THAT CIRCULATING DOCUMENTS IN CD WAS BASICALLY A NEUTRAL ACT.THEY SAID IT DID NOT/NOT FOR EXAMPLE COMPARE WITH DISCUSSING IDEAS IN GENERAL DEBATE IN UN. CD IS NOT/NOT A FORUM FOR DISCUSSION,IT IS A NEGOTIATING FORUM.

9.ONE INTERLOCUTOR SAID THAT IF OUR INTENTION WAS TO INFLUENCE THE USA,CIRCULATING THE DOCUMENTS IN THE CD WLD WORK DIRECTLY AGAINST OUR INTENTIONS.SHLD PROPOSALS GO TO CD USA WLD FEEL COMPELLED TO

...5

PAGE FIVE UNGR2072 CONFD

SPEAK OUT AGAINST THEM.

9. STRENGTH OF USA VIEWS WAS INDICATED BY DOBBINS WHO SAID THAT BETRAYAL WAS TOO STRONG A WORD BUT THAT IT CAME CLOSE TO REFLECTING USA REACTION TO INFO THAT WE INTENDED TO CIRCULATE PAPERS AT CD. HE SAID USA HAD NOT/NOT REACTED FORMALLY TO EARLIER MENTION OF THESE PROPOSALS AND HAD BEEN GENERALLY SUPPORTIVE OF THEM. BUT IT HAD NEVER OCCURRED TO THEM THAT CDA WAS THINKING ABOUT THE CD WHEN WE HAD SPOKEN OF RAISING PROPOSALS IN THE APPROPRIATE FORUM. IF WE HAD MADE THAT CLEAR USA WLD HAVE REACTED DIFFERENTLY. DOBBINS AND MEDAS CHARACTERIZED DECISION TO CIRCULATE PAPERS IN CD AS A CHANGE IN TACTICS FOR PMS INITIATIVE WHICH THEY TOOK TO BE GEARED TO BUILDING CONSENSUS AROUND PMS PROPOSALS. USA WAS THEREFORE SURPRISED BY DECISION TO GO TO CD AND SHORT NOTICE WHICH WE GAVE OF THIS INTENTION. IT APPEARED TO USA WE WERE SEEKING A CONFRONTATIONAL ROUTE. IN USA VIEW IF WE HAD GONE TO NATO TO ASK WHAT OTHERS CONSIDERED TO BE THE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR OUR PROPOSALS, THIS WLD HAVE BEEN MORE CONSISTENT WITH THE EARLIER PART OF THE INITIATIVE.

10. IN THE USA VIEW NATO IS THE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR THE DISCUSSION OF THESE PROPOSALS. ANOTHER ROUTE THEY SUGGESTED IS BILATERAL APPROACHES TO THE USA AND USSR. A VARIATION DOBBINS SUGGESTED WLD BE TO RAISE THE ISSUE IN NATO MULTILATERALLY AND WITH USSR ON BILATERAL BASIS. DOBBINS SAID HE WAS NOT/NOT SPEAKING WITH FULL AUTHORITY BUT HE EXPECTED THAT IF WE WERE TO WRITE TO USA FORMALLY ASKING FOR REACTION

...6

PAGE SIX UNGR2072 CONFD

TO THESE TWO SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS WE WLD GET A BASICALLY POSITIVE RESPONSE WHICH WE CLD THEN ANNOUNCE PUBLICLY.

11. USA OBJECTION TO RAISING ASAT ISSUE AT CD WAS TACTICAL RATHER THAN ONE OF PRINCIPAL AS FOR THE OTHER SUFFOCATION ISSUES. HERE THE MOST TELLING POINT SEEMED TO BE TIMING. IF PAPER IS CIRCULATED NOW IT WILL INTERFERE WITH SETTING UP OF OUTER SPACE WORKING GROUP AND MAKE NEGS OF ITS MANDATE MUCH MORE DIFFICULT. USA ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IF ASAT NEGS WERE TO TAKE PLACE (A BIG IF GIVEN CURRENT USA CONCERNS ON THE SUBSTANTIVE SIDE OF QUESTION) THEY WLD PROBABLY BE MORE SUCCESSFUL IF CARRIED OUT BILATERALLY BY USA AND USSR. HOWEVER USA OBJECTIN TO OUR ASAT PROPOSAL HAS FAR LESS TO DO WITH FORUM THAN WITH SUBSTANCE OF ACTUAL PROPOSAL.

CCC/241 241741Z UNGR2072

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

MF  
ED

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2071 24FEB84

TO EXTOTT (IDDZ)

INFO VMBFR BNATO CANMILREPNATO BONN LDN MOSCO GENEV PRMNY STKHM  
NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/CID/CORAE/ADMPOL/DIPOL/CPD/DSTRATA

DISTR IFB IDR IDA IDRA IDRL RGX RBD RCD RCR RSR RSRD CPD IDD

---MBFR:REVIEW OF WESTERN POSITION

IN CONSULTATIONS ON OUR THREE SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS YESTERDAY WE  
RAISED MBFR AND OUR CONCERN WITH IT WITH INTERLOCUTORS. IN THESE  
MTGS BEST RESPONSE WE WERE ABLE TO ELICIT WAS FROM DOBBINS WHO SAID  
THAT USA SHLD BE COMING TO ALLIES BY MID-MAR WITH RESULT OF ITS  
REVIEW. HE SAID USA POSITION WLD BE POSITIVE AND CONTAIN NEW  
THINKING ON DATA/VERIFICATION ISSUES.

2. ON MARGINS OF MTG WITH ACDA WE WERE TOLD THAT USA NOW HAS A  
DECISION FROM THE PRES AND ALLIES SHLD BE HEARING QUOTE VERY  
SHORTLY UNQUOTE.

3. WE ANTICIPATE THAT REST OF ALLIES WILL NOT/NOT HEAR UNTIL AFTER  
USA HAS DISCUSSED ITS NEW POSITION WITH FRG. FRG HAS AFTER ALL BEEN  
IN THE LEAD IN PUTTING PRESSURE ON USA TO CHANGE ITS POSITION. WE  
NOTE THAT KOHL WILL BE HERE IN EARLY MAR AND WLD EXPECT THAT USA  
WILL MAKE ITS POSITION KNOWN TO THE REST OF THE ALLIES VERY  
SHORTLY AFTER.

CCC/230 242101Z UNGR2071

*MF*  
*B*

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L NO/NO DISTR

**NO / NO DISTR  
DISTR INTERDITE**

FM GENEV YTGR1385 24FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDA/SMITH

REF SMITH/SKINNER TELECON

---ACD;BNATO CONSULTATIONS

THIS WILL CONFIRM THAT SINCE SKINNER WILL BE ON LEAVE NEXT WEEK AND BECAUSE PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES HAVE ARISEN IN CD,IT WILL NOT/NOT BE POSSIBLE TO RELEASE ANYONE FOR THE BRU CONSULTATIONS.

2.FOR YOUR INFO I PREFER THAT REQUESTS FOR TEMPORARY ASSIGNMENT OF OFFICERS FROM THIS MISSION BE RAISED WITH ME PERSONALLY(AS IS THE PRACTICE IN THE CASE OF IMU AND OTHERS)

BEESLEY

CCC/198 241645Z YTGR1385

MF

UNCLASSIFIED

**CORRECTED COPY  
EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE**

CORRECTED COPY

FM GENEV YTGR1352 24FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDA

DISTR LIDDZ

REF OURTEL YTGR1323 23FEB

---CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

FURTHER TO REPTTEL, YOU MAY WISH TO NOTE FOLLOWING VARIATIONS IN PATTERNS OF AMBASSADORIAL DISARMAMENT FUNCTIONS OF FULL-TIME AMBS TO CD, AND OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR THOSE COUNTRIES WITH AMBASSADORS WHO PERFORM FUNCTIONS SIMILAR TO THOSE ENVISAGED IN SPEECH FROM THRONE, (EG LIASON WITH CDN PUBLIC) AS FULFILLED BY PEARSON, MENZIES AND BEESLEY.

2. FRG AMB FRED RUTH FOR EXAMPLE, WHO HAS TITLE OF QUOTE AMBASSADOR FOR DISARMAMENT UNQUOTE RESIDES IN BONN AND IS CHARGED WITH PUBLIC LIAISON ON ACD/INNATL SECURITY ISSUES IN FRG. (HIS COLLEAGUE, FRG AMB HENNING WEGENER, IS STATIONED IN GENEVA ACCREDITED FULL-TIME TO CD). SWEDISH VARIATION IS THAT EX OFFICIO HEAD OF SWEDISH DEL, AMB MAJ BRITT THEORIN, IS CHAIRMAN OF SWEDISH DISARMAMENT COMMISSION AND IS BASED IN STOCKHOLM, (AND DELIVERED POLICY STATEMENT TO CD THIS SESSION). ON DAY-TO-DAY BASIS, CD FUNCTIONS ARE EXERCISED BY HEAD OF SWEDISH CD DEL, FULL-TIME AMB ROLF EKEUS, WHO IS RESIDENT IN GENEVA.

3. USA AND USSR FULL-TIME AMBS TO THE CD ARE NOT/NOT STATIONED IN GENEVA ON POSTING, BUT ARE BASED IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS,

...2

PAGE TWO YTGR1352 UNCLAS

AND ARE CONSIDERED TO BE ON TD IN GENEVA WHEN CD IS IN SESSION.  
(THEIR DOMESTIC RESPONSIBILITIES ARE NOT/NOT IDENTICAL).

4. PRACTICE IS THAT ALL FULL-TIME AMBS TO THE CD ATTEND FALL SESSIONS  
OF UNGA FOR THREE MONTHS TO HEAD THEIR FIRST CTTEE DELS, INCLUDING  
USA AND USSR AMBS. MOST OF THEM ALSO ATTEND MEETINGS OF DISARMAMENT  
COMMISSION IN NYK IN SPRING (HANDLED BY MENZIES AND BEESLEY IN PAST).

UUU/221 241049Z YTGR1352

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

M F

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR1061 24FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO HAGUE BNATO LDN GENEV CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO ROME VMBFR PARIS

OSLO COPEN ATHNS NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DNACPOL/DIPOL/PPP/DSTRATA/CIS

PRMNY STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER WSHDC

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDAO IDAN IDR SCS

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0177 17FEB

---PM INITIATIVE-SUFFOCATION BRIEFING

HAVE TENTATIVELY ARRANGED FOLLOWING PROGRAM FOR SMITH/CALDER

VISIT 01MAR.

9:30 MTG IN EMB

10:30-11:00 MTG IN MFA WITH AMB RUTH.AMB MCPHAIL WILL PARTICIPATE

11:00-12:30 CONTINUATION WITH MFA/DEF MIN EXPERTS

12:30 LUNCH HOSTED BY KARSGAARD

2.SWB S FOR SMITH AND CALDER AT TULPENFELD HOTEL, HEUSSALLEE

2-10 TEL 21 90 81.FOR FEB29.

CCC/007 241430Z ZQGR1061

1002 - Delv...

Goby sent me  
this by  
channel

Mr. Snydler  
for info  
FRS 29

IFB / SHRE...  
NOT JUST  
PEREZ BUT  
RAMPHAL  
TOO!  
BABY.

~~...~~  
air.  
(IFB)

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT IMU0468 24FEB84

TO BGOTA WSHDC

INFO PRMNY LDN

DISTR ~~...~~ LSR URR IMC IDA EEA

REF BGOTA TEL ZPGR0267 06FEB

---UN ASSOCIATION NATL CONF (WPEG JUNE84)

APPRECIATE EFFORTS OF BOTH POSTS TO ENCOURAGE BOTERO (FORMER FINANCE  
MIN OF COLOMBIA) AND ADELMAN (DIRECTOR OF USA ARMS CONTROL AND DIS-  
ARMAMENT AGENCY) TO ATTEND AND ADDRESS SUBJ CONF. UN ASSOCIATION IS  
KEEN TO HAVE BOTH PARTICIPATE.

2. IT MAY BE OF ASSISTANCE IN THIS REGARD TO KNOW THAT CONFIRMED  
PARTICIPANTS NOW INCLUDE PEREZ DE CUELLAR (UN SECGEN), RAMPHAL  
(COMWEL SECGEN), SILKIN (FORMER UK DEFENCE MIN) AND HOPPER (VICE  
PRES WORLD BANK. MACNAMARA (FORMER PRES OF WORLD BANK) HAS DECLINED.  
UN ASSOCIATION WORKS CLOSELY WITH THIS DEPT WHICH DECIDED LAST YEAR  
TO DOUBLE ITS SUSTAINING GRANT TO ASSOCIATION OVER NEXT FOUR YEARS.

3. FOR BGOTA: PRESENCE OF BOTERO IN WESTERN USA IN JUNE MAY MAKE IT  
EASIER FOR HIM (AND CHEAPER FOR UN ASSOCIATION) TO ATTEND WPEG CONF  
UNLESS THERE IS CONFLICT WITH 15-17 JUN DATES. ASSOCIATION HAS BEEN  
ADVISED THAT SURNAME IS BOTERO NOT/NOT MONTOYA.

UUU/088 272242Z IMU0468

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned 1202  
Person \_\_\_\_\_  
Local Time 1522

**CORRECTED COPY  
EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE**

PREVIOUSLY DISTRIBUTED WITHOUT PAGE FOUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CONS**

FM BONN ZQGR0060 24FEB84

TO EXTOTT)IDDZ DELIVER BY 241200

INFO BNATO/AMB ONLY WSHDC/AMB ONLY VMBFR/AMB ONLY

DISTR IFB IDR DMM

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0190 23FEB

---MBFR:REVIEW OF WESTERN POSITION

PMS CONCERN IS UNDOUBTEDLY SHARED BY FRG.PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY,  
GOVT HERE HAS MADE CLEAR THAT PRINCIPAL TWO AGENDA ITEMS FROM  
KOHLS POINT OF VIEW WHEN HE VISITS WSHDC IN SEVEN DAYS WILL BE  
POSSIBILITY OF USA/USSR SUMMIT AND REVISED WESTERN POSITION FOR  
MBFR RESUMPTION 16MAR.

2.WE HAVE INDEED LATELY PRESSED CDN POSITION ON MBFR AT SENIOR  
FRG LEVELS,IE JUST SHORT OF KOHL AND GENSCHER.LAST WEEK AND THIS  
WE DID SO WITH CHANCELLORS FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER

(OURTEL ZQGR1015 21FEB WITH GENSCHERS PRINCIPAL SECURITY  
ADVISOR,STATE MIN MERTES(TEL TO FOLLOW).AND WITH STATE SECTY  
MEYER LANDRUT(OURTEL ZQGR1055 22FEB)PRINCIPAL PUBLIC SERVANT  
ADVISER ON EAST/WEST MATTERS.IN ALL THREE CASES IT WAS EVIDENT  
GERMANS ARE BAFFLED OVER DIVISIONS OF OPINION IN WSHDC.FM  
SPD OPPOSITION WE ALSO HAD SIMILAR REPORT FOLLOWING VOGELS  
VISIT TO WSHDC LAST WEEK:EAGLEBURGER AND EDDLEMAN ARE ALLEGED  
TO FAVOUR REVISED STANCE,IE MOVE FORWARD FM DEBATE OVER DATA

...2

PAGE TWO ZQGR0060 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

TO EMPHASIS ON VERIFICATION OF CUST, WHILE PEARL REMAINS ADAMANTLY  
OPPOSED (VOTEL WAS TOLD BY EAGLEBURGER QUOTE YOU CAN TAKE  
PEARL WITH YOU UNQUOTE).

3. PRECISE TERMS IN WHICH CHANCELLOR KOHL WILL RAISE ISSUE  
WITH PRES REAGAN IS STILL UNDER DISCUSSION. WE HAVE APPOINTMENT  
WITH FRED RUTH, MFA DISARMAMENT AMBASSADOR, EARLY NEXT WEEK TO  
OBTAIN STATE OF PLAY. CHANCELLOR HAS MET ITALIAN PREMIER  
HERE AND WILL MEET BOTH THATCHER AND MITTERAND IN NEXT  
FEW DAYS BEFORE DEPARTING FOR WSHDC. EUROPEAN MATTERS  
LOOM LARGE IN SUCH DISCUSSIONS, BUT SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT  
ISSUES IN RELATION TO WSHDC VISIT ARE APPARENTLY ALSO ON AGENDA.

4. YOU WILL RECALL (OURTEL ZQGR0027 23JAN) WE BELIEVE THERE TO BE  
GREAT UTILITY IN MSG FM PM TO CHANCELLOR. GIVEN PMS LATEST CONCERN,  
WE THINK IT NOW VERY IMPORTANT THAT SUCH MSG SHOULD BE  
APPROVED AND TRANSMITTED BEFORE KOHL GOES TO WSHDC LATE NEXT  
WEEK (PRESUMABLY 03MAR). OUR ORIGINAL PURPOSE, WHICH IS EVEN MORE  
VALID TODAY, WAS TO HAVE COMMUNICATION WHICH COULD BE MADE  
PUBLIC THEREBY GIVING SOME FRG ENDORSEMENT TO PMS INITIATIVE.  
THIS IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER BECAUSE WITH OTHER DEVELOPMENTS,  
PUBLICLY INITIATIVE HAS BEEN LOST SIGHT OF HERE. AND, MORE  
SIGNIFICANTLY, HAS GRADUALLY BECOME WITHIN ADMINISTRATION  
REMOVED FROM CHANCELLORS POWER LOCUS, SUBJECT OF SOME CRITICISM  
WHOLLY UNWARRANTED BY CHANCELLORS OWN ATTITUDE.

...3

PAGE THREE ZQGR0060 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

5. IN SUBSTANTIVE TERMS ALSO, SUCH A MSG IS NOW WARRANTED, WE SUGGEST, BECAUSE FRG OWES CDA SOMETHING ALBEIT LIMITED, IN RETURN FOR MSGS CARRIED TO EASTERN EUROPE AT FRG REQUEST, AS BRIEFING BOOK FOR PMS VISIT CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED. PMS CONCERN ABOUT MBFR WHICH GERMANS SHARE IS THIS FACTOR WHICH THEY SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. KOHL IN LAST TWO WEEKS HAS RESPONDED TO MITTERANDS CALL FOR GREATER EUROPEAN ROLE IN SECURITY MATTERS BY FAVOURING SUCH A DEVELOPMENT PROVIDED THIS DOES NOT/NOT MEAN IDEPENDENTLY OF, NOR INCONSISTENLY WITH, USA PILLAR IN ALLIANCE. HE HAS NOT/NOT HOWEVER (MUCH LESS HAVE VARIOUS CIVILIAN AND MILITARY OFFICIALS) REACHED POINT OF GOING BEYOND GENERALITIES TO PRESS PUBLICLY FOR USA MOVEMENT ON SPECIFIC SECURITY ISSUES EG ON MBFR OR FIVE POWER CONF.

6. IF WE ARE TO BE HEARD BY CHANCELLORS OFFICE (AND, AS FREQUENTLY STATED, NEITHER GENSCHER NOR FOREIGN MINISTRY BEAR MUCH WEIGHT IN THIS MATTER) JSG FM PM TO CHANCELLOR IS VITAL AT THIS TIME AS KOHL PREPARES FOR HIS WSHDC VISIT. POSSIBLE TEXT MODIFIED FM EARLIER VERISONS SHOULD BE PRETTY EXPLICIT, IE GOING BEYOND REAFFIRMATION OF NEED FOR NEW WESTERN MBFR POSITION AT LEAST TO POINT OF SIGNALLING KIND OF SOLUTION PM THINKS KOHL SHOULD TRY OUT ON REAGAN. WE CANNOT/NOT DEPEND UPON COMMUNICATION AND TRANSLATION OF POSITIONS FM EG NATOBURU TO HAVE BEEN PUT TO CHANCELLOR.

...4

PAGE FOUR ZQGR0060 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

7. IF YOU AGREE WITH SUCH COURSE OF ACTION, I WOULD ATTEMPT TO  
DELIVER MSG TO CHANCELLOR IN PERSON THOUGH THAT MAY  
INDEED BE DIFFICULT GIVEN HIS TRIPS NEXT WEEK. AT MINIMUM, WE  
WOULD PROCESS IT THROUGH CHANCELLORS ADVISER KEEPING FOREIGN MIN  
IN PICTURE AFTERWARDS

MCPHAIL

CC/242 241700Z ZQGR0060

CCC/248 241950Z OTSW2053



MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

Accession/Référence
File/Dossier

123 FEB 84 22 10 522

SECURITY  
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM/DE  
TO/À  
INFO  
DISTR  
REF  
SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0190 23FEB84  
TO BONN/AMB ONLY WSHDC/AMB ONLY  
INFO BNATO/AMB ONLY VMBFR/AMB ONLY  
DISTR IFB IDR  
SUBJ/SUJ ---MBFR:REVIEW OF WESTERN POSITION  
AT MTG WITH TASK FORCE YESTERDAY MORNING, PM TRUDEAU EXPRESSED CON-  
SIDERABLE IMPATIENCE AND IRRITATION WITH SLOW PROGRESS BEING MADE  
ON ALLIANCE REVIEW OF WESTERN POSITION IN MBFR NEGS. UNDER THESE  
CIRCUMSTANCES, WE THINK IT IMPORTANT THAT YOU (A) SEIZE SUITABLE  
OPPORTUNITIES TO REGISTER OUR INTEREST IN SEEING THIS DOSSIER MOVE  
FORWARD, AND (B) ATTACH PRIORITY TO REPORTING ON EVOLUTION OF  
FRG/USA THINKING AND DECISION-MAKING.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG L.A. Delvoie/sc	IDDZ	5-5912	<i>L.A. Delvoie</i> SIG L.A. Delvoie

000702



*file*

TO/A • MGD/Mr. Small  
FROM/DE • IDDZ/L. A. Delvoie

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • PM Task Force on Peace and Security  
SUJET

Security/Sécurité
<b>UNCLASSIFIED</b>
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
February 23, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0189

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

IFB

MGT

Following a conversation with the Minister yesterday morning, I wish to inform you that the Task Force will continue to exist in its present configuration for at least another two weeks.

2. I hope that it will be possible for you to leave us in our present accommodation for at least that period of time. Many thanks for your cooperation in a "fluid" situation.

  
L. A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

Chintore  
J'ai dit au ché mais je  
n'ai pas trouvé  
le tel?

Mr. Mc Mec  
Did you consult w  
USA Division to see  
whether anything has been  
done about this. It  
strikes me as a very  
long shot

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

Demandez-vous  
regarder un peu?  
J 24/2

Lisa Jrobata East Europe  
(59)34835

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM WSHDC UNFC8958 23FEB84  
TO EXTOTT (IDDZ UGP URR)  
REF OURTEL UNFC8910 (16JAN)

---INTERVIEW REQUEST WITH PRIME MINISTER  
GRATEFUL EARLY REPLY TO OUR REPTTEL. VAJDA HAS CALLED REPEATEDLY  
FOR ANSWER TO INTERVIEW REQUEST. HIS NEWSPAPER EDITOR IS ALLEGEDLY  
EVEN MORE INTERESTED NOW IN LIGHT OF PMS MTG WITH CHERNENKO.  
HE CLAIMS THAT REQUEST FOR INTERVIEW HAS BEEN PRESSED IN OTT BY  
HUNGARIAN EMBASSY PRESS ATTACHE AND BY MFA THROUGH CDN EMBASSY  
BUDAPEST.

UUU/241 231855Z UNFC8958

~~MR BELVIE / MR SMITH~~

RBR HAS CONSULTED PRO/PETTIGREW  
ON THIS + AWAIT A RESPONSE FROM THE P.M.

ERAM 7.3.84

~~E. A. DELVOIE~~


G. MITH

K. CALDER

J. MCNEE

000705

RBR / M. Smith?  
62633



R E S T R I C T E D

FMPPEST ZWGR0275 24FEB84

TO EXTOTT RBR

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR /RBP RBD FPR RGB

① Noted for  
② L.S.

---REQUEST FOR INTERVIEW WITH PM:HUNG CORRESPONDANT:PETER VAJDA  
MFA APPROACHED US VERBALLY ON 22FEB CONCERNING REQUEST FOR INTERVIEW  
WITH PM BY WASHINGTON-BASED CORRESPONDANT FOR MAIN PARTY NEWSPAPER  
QUOTE NEPSZABADSAG UNQUOTE.PETER VAJDA,WHO IS ACCREDITED TO OTT,  
APPARENTLY MADE REQUEST FOR PRIVATE INTERVIEW WITH PM IN EARLY  
JAN84 THROUGH HUNG EMBASSY IN OTT.MFA EXPRESSED HOPE THAT INTERVIEW  
REQUEST WOULD RECEIVE POSITIVE REPLY IN OTT,AND WERE ANXIOUS FOR  
UPDATE.

2.MFA POINTED OUT THAT INTERVIEW REQUEST IS REFLECTION OF DEEP  
HUNG INTEREST IN PMS PEACE INITIATIVE.INTERVIEW WOULD BE GIVEN  
PROMINENCE IN QUOTE NEPSZABADSAG UNQUOTE SATURDAY EDITION,WITH  
WIDEST CIRCULATION POSSIBLE IN HUNGARY.

3.VAJDA WANTS TO CONCENTRATE INTERVIEW ON THREE MAIN AREAS:  
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SITUATION,PMS PEACE INITIATIVE AND(LESS  
IMPORTANTLY)BILATERAL CDA/HUNG RELATIONS.VAJDA WOULD SUBMIT  
QUESTIONS IN ADVANCE,AND WOULD OF COURSE WANT TO MEET PM PERSONALLY.

4.WE BELIEVE MFA INTEREST IN INTERVIEW IS MORE THAN CASUAL,GIVEN  
SUPPORT EXPRESSED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS AND AT HIGHEST LEVELS FOR PMS  
EFFORTS(SEE FOR EXAMPLE OURTEL ZWGR0271 24FEB).INTERVIEW COULD BE

...2

PAGE TWO ZWGR0275 RFSTD

SEEN HERE AS SUBSTITUTE AT LEAST IN SHORT TERM FOR PM VISIT TO  
BPEST.

CCC/108 241120Z ZWGR0275

**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

*MF*  
**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

**C O N F I D E N T I A L CANADIAN EYES ONLY**

**FM TOKYO UIGR1927 23FEB84**

**TO EXTOTT IDDZ IMMED**

**INFO WSHDC BNATO PARIS DELHI LDN PEKIN MOSCO BONN ROME CNBRA  
STKHM PRMNY GENEV VMBFR PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN  
NDHQOTT/CIS/CPD**

**DISTR MINA MINE MINT USS DMF DMT CPD IFB RGB PGB RBD PPD RBR PPR  
PER ZSP ZSI IDD IDA IDR FPR**

**---PMS INITIATIVE ON PEACE AND SECURITY--JPNSE VIEWS**

**DRAWING ON GUIDANCE IN VARIOUS TELS AND, MORE SPECIFICALLY, ON PMS  
LET TO NAKASONE, WE DISCUSSED INITIATIVE WITH GROUP OF JPNESE  
OFFICIALS HEADED BY MAKITA, DIR, DISARMAMENT DIV, MFA. IN PRINCIPLE,  
JPNSE REMAIN SUPPORTIVE OF PMS INITIATIVE, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE YET TO  
FORMULATE CONSIDERED RESPONSE TO PMS LET. IT IS IN FACT DOUBTFUL  
THERE WILL BE PROMPT REPLY.**

**2. MAKITA STRESSED THAT HIS COMMENTS, ALTHOUGH CLEARED WITH OTHER  
MFA OFFICIALS CONCERNED, MUST BE CONSIDERED INFORMAL AND UNOFFICIAL.  
HE SAW JPN AND CDA AS BEING IN SIMILAR POSITIONS AS NON-NUCLEAR  
MEMBERS OF WESTERN ALLIANCE, UNDER PROTECTION OF USA NUCLEAR UMBRELLA.  
IN UNDERTAKING INITIATIVE, HOWEVER, MR TRUDEAU HAD GIVEN CDA FAR  
HIGHER PROFILE ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES THAN JPN HAD EVER BEEN WILLING  
TO ASSUME. INITIATIVE WAS UNIQUE; NO/NO ONE ELSE IN WEST HAD MOUNTED  
SUCH AN UNDERTAKING, EVEN THOUGH MOST SHARED SAME GOALS.**

**...2**

PAGE TWO UIGR1927 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO AVOID GIVING IMPRESSION TO SOVIETS THAT WESTERN ALLIANCE WAS IN ANY WAY DIVIDED ON BASIC ISSUES. MAKITA EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS NOT/NOT SAYING TRUDEAU INITIATIVE WAS HAVING THIS EFFECT, BUT THERE SEEMED TO BE UNDERLYING APPREHENSION ON PART OF JPNSE OFFICIALS IN SPITE OF OUR REASSURANCES.

3. WHILE PMS INITIATIVE HAS NOT/NOT, EXCEPT AT TIME OF PMS VISIT, RECEIVED EXTENSIVE PUBLICITY IN JPN, IT HAS EVIDENTLY INSPIRED OPPOSITION POLITICIANS AGAIN TO URGE PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE TO TAKE HIGHER PROFILE ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES, ALTHOUGH QUESTIONS POSED IN DIET HAVE NOT/NOT DIRECTLY LINKED PMS INITIATIVE TO THESE SUGGESTIONS. PRESSURE HAS BEEN RESISTED BY RULING LDP, WHICH IS ALWAYS WARY OF RISK OF ANTAGONIZING USA BY FLOATING PROPOSALS WHICH, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS BEING CRITICAL OF USA NUCLEAR WPNS POLICIES. AS RESULT, OFFICIALS HAVE NOT/NOT CONSIDERED RECOMMENDING THAT PM NAKASONE RAISE PMS INITIATIVE DURING HIS TRIP TO CHINA.

4. CONCERNING ISSUES RAISED IN PM TRUDEAU'S MONTREAL SPEECH AND IN LETTER TO NAKASONE, MAKITA HAD FOLLOWING COMMENTS:

(1) NPT--IT HAS BEEN FUNDAMENTAL JPNSE OBJECTIVE TO DISCOURAGE HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION; PREPARATIONS FOR FORTHCOMING NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE ARE BEING PURSUED CONSCIENTIOUSLY WITH THIS IN MIND.

(2) ENCOURAGING DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION--THIS HAS BEEN CONSISTENT POLICY, WHICH JPNSE CONSIDER OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE IN

PAGE THREE UIGR1927 CONF D CDN EYES ONLY

TIMES OF COOL RELATIONS. MAKITA NOTED THAT, WITH EACH CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATION IN SOVIET UNION, WEST SEEMS ALWAYS TO HAVE HAD HIGH EXPECTATIONS OF NEW LEADERSHIP, AND HAS ALWAYS BEEN DISAPPOINTED. WHILE CHERNENKO MIGHT BE OPEN TO DIALOGUE WITH WEST, JPNSE CONSIDER HIS LEADERSHIP TRANSITIONAL AND BELIEVE HE WILL NOT/NOT DEVIATE SUBSTANTIALLY FROM POLICY LINES ESTABLISHED BY ANDROPOV. NAKASONE HAS NONETHELESS SAID IN DIET THAT HE WOULD WELCOME POSSIBILITY OF EXCHANGING VIEWS, EG, WITH SOVIET PARLIAMENTARIANS. JPNSE HAVE ALSO REITERATED LONG-STANDING INVITATION TO FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO TO VISIT JPN, BUT THIS IS UNLIKELY IN NEAR FUTURE. SENIOR-LEVEL POLICY CONSULTATIONS WITH SOVIETS WILL TAKE PLACE 12-13 MAR IN MOSCO (SEE OURTEL UIGR1812 21FEB);

(3) FIVE POWER CONFERENCE--THIS PROPOSAL CAUSES PARTICULAR PROBLEMS FOR JPNSE AND OFFICIALS ARE SKEPTICAL AS TO ITS REALISM. OFFICIALS CONSIDER CHINESE SPEECH IN CD IN GENEV 16FEB AS EVIDENCE THAT CHINA HAS NOT/NOT, IN FACT, SOFTENED ITS POSITION. DURING PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE'S VISIT TO PEKIN, DISARMAMENT IS LIKELY TO COME UP, BUT IT IS DOUBTFUL PM WILL RAISE IDEA OF FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE. MAKITA NOTED THAT GENEV, WHERE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS ARE ALREADY ENGAGED, IS ALWAYS AVAILABLE AS FORUM FOR DISCUSSION. JPNSE WOULD PREFER TO TAKE QUOTE STEP-BY-STEP UNQUOTE APPROACH WITHIN EXISTING FORA RATHER THAN TO SUGGEST SOME OTHER MECHANISM WHICH WOULD BE LIMITED TO FIVE POWERS. THEY CONSIDER FIVE POWER MTG WOULD BE INCREDIBLY COMPLICATED AND SERIES OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE MORE PRODUCTIVE.

PAGE FOUR UIGR1927 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

(4) ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE--JPNSE SEE THIS AS A QUOTE BIG POWER GAME UNQUOTE AND ARE RELUCTANT TO TAKE STRONG POSITION, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF USA INTERESTS AT STAKE. WESTERN SECURITY MUST BE PARAMOUNT CONSIDERATION, BOTH IN THIS AND IN PROPOSAL ON LIMITING MOBILITY OF ICBMS, WHICH WAS DESCRIBED BY JPNSE AS ESSENTIALLY TECHNICAL MILITARY PROBLEM.

(5) MBFR--IN PRINCIPLE, JPNSE ARE SUPPORTIVE OF EFFORTS TO REDUCE CONVENTIONAL FORCES, CONDUCTED IN MANNER WHICH WILL NOT/NOT AFFECT WESTERN SECURITY, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF CURRENT IMBALANCE OF FORCES.

5. AFTER STUDYING TEN PRINCIPLES ANNOUNCED IN PRIME MINISTERS SPEECH TO HOF, JPNSE OFFICIALS FOUND TWO WHICH THEY THOUGHT COULD BE SUBJECT TO MISINTERPRETATION, IE, :

NUMBER SIX: THIS COULD BE READ AS CONTRADICTION OF NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE; IS CDA SUGGESTING STRATEGY BE MODIFIED? AND NUMBER EIGHT: THIS MIGHT ALSO BE MISCONSTRUED: FOR EXAMPLE, USA IS CURRENTLY DEPLOYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN WEST EUROPEAN STATES WHICH DID NOT/NOT ALREADY HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THEIR TERRITORY. WE COMMENTED THAT THIS DEPLOYMENT DID NOT/NOT CONSTITUTE HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION IN NPT TERMS.

6. IN CLOSING, OUR INTERLOCUTORS NOTED THAT NO/NO ONE COULD DISAGREE WITH MOTIVATION BEHIND MR TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE. HOW TO REALIZE GOALS WAS, HOWEVER, DIFFERENT MATTER AND JPNSE FORESAW PITFALLS. WE PUT TO THEM CDN VIEW THAT, IF THERE WAS NECESSARY POLITICAL WILL BY PARTIES CONCERNED, AT LEAST SOME OF PMS GOALS COULD BE ACHIEVED;

...5

PAGE FIVE UIGR1927 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

INDEED THERE SEEMED ALREADY TO HAVE BEEN PROGRESS IN THAT DIRECTION. JPNSE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS, BUT WERE HESITANT TO PUT FORWARD ANY NEW SUGGESTIONS WHICH MIGHT CARRY INITIATIVE FORWARD.

7. CONTRAST BETWEEN VERY POSITIVE RESPONSE OF NAKASONE DURING NOV83 MTG WITH PM TRUDEAU AND RESERVED COMMENTS OF OFFICIALS NOW IS NOTEWORTHY. THERE IS, HOWEVER, COMMON DENOMINATOR: NO/NO MATTER HOW SUPPORTIVE JPNSE HAVE BEEN IN TERMS OF RHETORIC, THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO OFFER OF SUBSTANTIVE SUPPORT. RELUCTANCE OF JPNSE OFFICIALS TO COUNSEL PM NAKASONE TO RAISE PMS INITIATIVE WITH CHINESE, FOR EXAMPLE, CONFLICTS WITH OBSERVATION MADE BY AMB MIKANAGI IN HIS DISCUSSION ON 14FEB WITH USS (YOURTEL PPR0325 14FEB NOTAL). YOU MIGHT THEREFORE WISH TO CONSIDER REPRESENTATION TO NAKASONE TO AT LEAST FLAG WITH CHINESE HIS INTEREST IN AND GENERAL SUPPORT FOR INITIATIVE.

8. PARAS ONE TO SIX ABOVE CONTAIN INFORMATION RECEIVED IN CONFIDENCE FROM JPNSE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

CCC/246 230910Z UIGR1927

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BGRAD ZLGR3357 23FEB84

TO EXTOTT RBP

INFO STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DGIS/CPM MOSCO

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDDZ IDA IDR FPR RBRD RBD RGE UGD UGR RCR

REF YOURTEL RBR0324 16FEB

---CHERNENKO SUCCESSION-YUGO VIEWS

YUGO MFA CONTACTS HAVE BEEN BOTH VERY SYMPATHETIC TO PMS INITIATIVE AND VERY INFORMATIVE IN PAST ABOUT KREMLIN DEVELOPMENTS(OURTELS ZLGR5027 26NOV82,ZLGR3217 01FEB83 AND ZLGR3777 12APR83).NOW THAT DUST HAS SETTLED A LITTLE,PROPOSE TO CALL ON MFA TO OBTAIN ACCOUNT OF YUGO LEADERS INTERVIEWS WITH CHERNENKO AND THEIR GENERAL VIEWS ON EFFECT OF HIS SUCCEEDING ANDROPOV.SINCE YUGOS WILL OBVIOUSLY BE EVEN MORE FORTHCOMING IF WE HAVE SOME INFO/VIEWS TO OFFER,SUGGEST WE DERIVE THESE SELECTIVELY FROM MOSCOW TELS XYGR0218 14FEB AND XYGR0226 15FEB.IF WE DO NOT/NOT HEAR FROM YOU TO CONTRARY BY 29FEB PROPOSE TO SEEK EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AS INDICATED WITH BEST YUGO CONTACT.

CCC/096 241215Z ZLGR3357

**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

*action*  
*See para 7 - do we want to  
try to enlist Nakasone?*  
*[Signature]*

**C O N F I D E N T I A L CANADIAN EYES ONLY**

**FM TOKYO UIGR1927 23FEB84**

**TO EXTOTT IDDZ IMMED**

**INFO WSHDC BNATO PARIS DELHI LDN PEKIN MOSCO BONN ROME CNBRA  
STKHM PRMNY GENEV VMBFR PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN  
NDHQOTT/CIS/CP**

**DISTR MINA MINE MINT USS DMF DMT CPD IFB RGB PGB RBD PPD RBR PPR  
PER ZSP ZSI IDD IDA IDR FPR**

**---PMS INITIATIVE ON PEACE AND SECURITY--JPNSE VIEWS**

**DRAWING ON GUIDANCE IN VARIOUS TELS AND, MORE SPECIFICALLY, ON PMS  
LET TO NAKASONE, WE DISCUSSED INITIATIVE WITH GROUP OF JPNESE  
OFFICIALS HEADED BY MAKITA, DIR, DISARMAMENT DIV, MFA. IN PRINCIPLE,  
JPNSE REMAIN SUPPORTIVE OF PMS INITIATIVE, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE YET TO  
FORMULATE CONSIDERED RESPONSE TO PMS LET. IT IS IN FACT DOUBTFUL  
THERE WILL BE PROMPT REPLY.**

**2. MAKITA STRESSED THAT HIS COMMENTS, ALTHOUGH CLEARED WITH OTHER  
MFA OFFICIALS CONCERNED, MUST BE CONSIDERED INFORMAL AND UNOFFICIAL.  
HE SAW JPN AND CDA AS BEING IN SIMILAR POSITIONS AS NON-NUCLEAR  
MEMBERS OF WESTERN ALLIANCE, UNDER PROTECTION OF USA NUCLEAR UMBRELLA.  
IN UNDERTAKING INITIATIVE, HOWEVER, MR TRUDEAU HAD GIVEN CDA FAR  
HIGHER PROFILE ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES THAN JPN HAD EVER BEEN WILLING  
TO ASSUME. INITIATIVE WAS UNIQUE; NO/NO ONE ELSE IN WEST HAD MOUNTED  
SUCH AN UNDERTAKING, EVEN THOUGH MOST SHARED SAME GOALS.**

**...2**

PAGE TWO UIGR1927 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

IT WAS THEREFORE IMPORTANT TO AVOID GIVING IMPRESSION TO SOVIETS THAT WESTERN ALLIANCE WAS IN ANY WAY DIVIDED ON BASIC ISSUES. MAKITA EMPHASIZED THAT HE WAS NOT/NOT SAYING TRUDEAU INITIATIVE WAS HAVING THIS EFFECT, BUT THERE SEEMED TO BE UNDERLYING APPREHENSION ON PART OF JPNSE OFFICIALS IN SPITE OF OUR REASSURANCES.

3. WHILE PMS INITIATIVE HAS NOT/NOT, EXCEPT AT TIME OF PMS VISIT, RECEIVED EXTENSIVE PUBLICITY IN JPN, IT HAS EVIDENTLY INSPIRED OPPOSITION POLITICIANS AGAIN TO URGE PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE TO TAKE HIGHER PROFILE ON DISARMAMENT ISSUES, ALTHOUGH QUESTIONS POSED IN DIET HAVE NOT/NOT DIRECTLY LINKED PMS INITIATIVE TO THESE SUGGESTIONS. PRESSURE HAS BEEN RESISTED BY RULING LDP, WHICH IS ALWAYS WARY OF RISK OF ANTAGONIZING USA BY FLOATING PROPOSALS WHICH, RIGHTLY OR WRONGLY, MIGHT BE INTERPRETED AS BEING CRITICAL OF USA NUCLEAR WPNS POLICIES. AS RESULT, OFFICIALS HAVE NOT/NOT CONSIDERED RECOMMENDING THAT PM NAKASONE RAISE PMS INITIATIVE DURING HIS TRIP TO CHINA.

4. CONCERNING ISSUES RAISED IN PM TRUDEAUS MONTREAL SPEECH AND IN LETTER TO NAKASONE, MAKITA HAD FOLLOWING COMMENTS:

(1) NPT--IT HAS BEEN FUNDAMENTAL JPNSE OBJECTIVE TO DISCOURAGE HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION; PREPARATIONS FOR FORTHCOMING NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE ARE BEING PURSUED CONSCIENTIOUSLY WITH THIS IN MIND.

(2) ENCOURAGING DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIET UNION--THIS HAS BEEN CONSISTENT POLICY, WHICH JPNSE CONSIDER OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE IN

...3

PAGE THREE UIGR1927 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

TIMES OF COOL RELATIONS. MAKITA NOTED THAT, WITH EACH CHANGE OF ADMINISTRATION IN SOVIET UNION, WEST SEEMS ALWAYS TO HAVE HAD HIGH EXPECTATIONS OF NEW LEADERSHIP, AND HAS ALWAYS BEEN DISAPPOINTED. WHILE CHERNENKO MIGHT BE OPEN TO DIALOGUE WITH WEST, JPNSE CONSIDER HIS LEADERSHIP TRANSITIONAL AND BELIEVE HE WILL NOT/NOT DEVIATE SUBSTANTIALLY FROM POLICY LINES ESTABLISHED BY ANDROPOV. NAKASONE HAS NONETHELESS SAID IN DIET THAT HE WOULD WELCOME POSSIBILITY OF EXCHANGING VIEWS, EG, WITH SOVIET PARLIAMENTARIANS. JPNSE HAVE ALSO REITERATED LONG-STANDING INVITATION TO FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO TO VISIT JPN, BUT THIS IS UNLIKELY IN NEAR FUTURE. SENIOR-LEVEL POLICY CONSULTATIONS WITH SOVIETS WILL TAKE PLACE 12-13 MAR IN MOSCO (SEE OURTEL UIGR1812 21FEB);

(3) FIVE POWER CONFERENCE--THIS PROPOSAL CAUSES PARTICULAR PROBLEMS FOR JPNSE AND OFFICIALS ARE SKEPTICAL AS TO ITS REALISM. OFFICIALS CONSIDER CHINESE SPEECH IN CD IN GENEV 16FEB AS EVIDENCE THAT CHINA HAS NOT/NOT, IN FACT, SOFTENED ITS POSITION. DURING PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE'S VISIT TO PEKIN, DISARMAMENT IS LIKELY TO COME UP, BUT IT IS DOUBTFUL PM WILL RAISE IDEA OF FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE. MAKITA NOTED THAT GENEV, WHERE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS ARE ALREADY ENGAGED, IS ALWAYS AVAILABLE AS FORUM FOR DISCUSSION. JPNSE WOULD PREFER TO TAKE QUOTE STEP-BY-STEP UNQUOTE APPROACH WITHIN EXISTING FORA RATHER THAN TO SUGGEST SOME OTHER MECHANISM WHICH WOULD BE LIMITED TO FIVE POWERS. THEY CONSIDER FIVE POWER MTG WOULD BE INCREDIBLY COMPLICATED AND SERIES OF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE MORE PRODUCTIVE.

PAGE FOUR UIGR1927 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

(4) ARMS CONTROL IN SPACE--JPNSE SEE THIS AS A QUOTE BIG POWER GAME UNQUOTE AND ARE RELUCTANT TO TAKE STRONG POSITION, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF USA INTERESTS AT STAKE. WESTERN SECURITY MUST BE PARAMOUNT CONSIDERATION, BOTH IN THIS AND IN PROPOSAL ON LIMITING MOBILITY OF ICBMS, WHICH WAS DESCRIBED BY JPNSE AS ESSENTIALLY TECHNICAL MILITARY PROBLEM.

(5) MBFR--IN PRINCIPLE, JPNSE ARE SUPPORTIVE OF EFFORTS TO REDUCE CONVENTIONAL FORCES, CONDUCTED IN MANNER WHICH WILL NOT/NOT AFFECT WESTERN SECURITY, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF CURRENT IMBALANCE OF FORCES.

5. AFTER STUDYING TEN PRINCIPLES ANNOUNCED IN PRIME MINISTERS SPEECH TO HOF, JPNSE OFFICIALS FOUND TWO WHICH THEY THOUGHT COULD BE SUBJECT TO MISINTERPRETATION, I.E.:

NUMBER SIX: THIS COULD BE READ AS CONTRADICTION OF NATO STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE; IS CDA SUGGESTING STRATEGY BE MODIFIED? AND NUMBER EIGHT: THIS MIGHT ALSO BE MISCONSTRUED: FOR EXAMPLE, USA IS CURRENTLY DEPLOYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN WEST EUROPEAN STATES WHICH DID NOT/NOT ALREADY HAVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THEIR TERRITORY. WE COMMENTED THAT THIS DEPLOYMENT DID NOT/NOT CONSTITUTE HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION IN NPT TERMS.

6. IN CLOSING, OUR INTERLOCUTORS NOTED THAT NO/NO ONE COULD DISAGREE WITH MOTIVATION BEHIND MR TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE. HOW TO REALIZE GOALS WAS, HOWEVER, DIFFERENT MATTER AND JPNSE FORESAW PITFALLS. WE PUT TO THEM CDN VIEW THAT, IF THERE WAS NECESSARY POLITICAL WILL BY PARTIES CONCERNED, AT LEAST SOME OF PMS GOALS COULD BE ACHIEVED;

...5

PAGE FIVE UIGR1927 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

INDEED THERE SEEMED ALREADY TO HAVE BEEN PROGRESS IN THAT DIRECTION. JPNSE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS, BUT WERE HESITANT TO PUT FORWARD ANY NEW SUGGESTIONS WHICH MIGHT CARRY INITIATIVE FORWARD.

7. CONTRAST BETWEEN VERY POSITIVE RESPONSE OF NAKASONE DURING NOV83 MTG WITH PM TRUDEAU AND RESERVED COMMENTS OF OFFICIALS NOW IS NOTEWORTHY. THERE IS, HOWEVER, COMMON DENOMINATOR: NO/NO MATTER HOW SUPPORTIVE JPNSE HAVE BEEN IN TERMS OF RHETORIC, THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO OFFER OF SUBSTANTIVE SUPPORT. RELUCTANCE OF JPNSE OFFICIALS TO COUNSEL PM NAKASONE TO RAISE PMS INITIATIVE WITH CHINESE, FOR EXAMPLE, CONFLICTS WITH OBSERVATION MADE BY AMB MIKANAGI IN HIS DISCUSSION ON 14 FEB WITH USS (YOURTEL PPR0325 14 FEB NOTAL). YOU MIGHT THEREFORE WISH TO CONSIDER REPRESENTATION TO NAKASONE TO AT LEAST FLAG WITH CHINESE HIS INTEREST IN AND GENERAL SUPPORT FOR INITIATIVE.

8. PARAS ONE TO SIX ABOVE CONTAIN INFORMATION RECEIVED IN CONFIDENCE FROM JPNSE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

CCC/246 230910Z UIGR1927

*- didn't Nakasone offer to help?*  
*Jay*

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned \_\_\_\_\_  
Person \_\_\_\_\_  
Local Time \_\_\_\_\_

**PERS INFO / RENS PERS-**

C O N F I D E N T I A L PERS INFO

FM GENEV YTGR1313 23FEB84

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ/DELVOIE DELIVER BY 230900

FROM BEESLEY

REF MYTEL YTGR1286 22FEB

---REPLACEMENT FOR SKINNER

GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD TELEPHONE ME TODAY IF POSSIBLE

BETWEEN 9:00 AM AND 12:00 NOON YOUR TIME AT (022)33.90.00.

CCC/221 231236Z YTGR1313

FILE CIRC DIARY

CLASS NO. ORIG. NO. N° D'ORIG. SECURITY SECURITY

FAX 7/23

U N C L A S S I F I E D

FM LDN XNGR 0427 23FEB84

TO EXTOTT/IDR

DE OTS

INFO NDHQOTT/DIPOL/DNACPOL/DSTRATA ~~UNCLASSIFIED~~

DISTR (IDDZ RCR IDA FPR SCI RBR URR

REF OURTEL XNGR0397 20FEB;OURTEL XNGR0353 16FEB

---TIMES SERIES ON NATO

ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO FORTH ARTICLE IN SERIES ON NATO  
APPEARING IN TIMES OF 23FEB, THIS ONE BY ITALIAN PM CRAXI.

COPY BY OTTAWA BY FACS.

2.COMCENTRE PLS SEND TO OTT BY FACSIMILE.

1/2  
MF  
JD

J R SCHRAM/mg

POL & ECON

370

J R SCHRAM

# Towards a w der peace

1/23 2/2



If we think of the Atlantic alliance in human terms, we see a man of full awareness, with full physical and intellectual powers. As a baby he was rather weak, and many doctors shook their heads in doubt and scepticism. But he grew from strength to strength, until every anxiety was silenced. His degree thesis, the challenge of liberty, was respected even by his declared opponents.

He has developed his social relationships, widened the circle of his knowledge and, most important, has preserved the security of the western world. Today he faces his most difficult task, the challenge of peace.

The alliance has no precedent. In this, the most ideological century in history, it guarantees the safety of all its members while allowing them to develop freely without restriction of any kind. Under its protection, the great ideological challenge between East and West has been able to develop in peaceful terms.

In the 35 years since its inception, the protagonists and the setting - notably the boundaries of the East-West confrontation - have changed. As early as 1956, an alarm bell was rung at the outbreak of the Suez crisis, which resulted not only in a dispute between allies - the United States on one side and France and Britain on the other - but also an abrupt break between the West and the Arab world. The subsequent Arab-Israeli wars accentuated the awareness of the dangerous consequences which an open confrontation with the Arab world would have on the political and economic security of the West. This awareness became a dramatic realization of impotence in the 1973 conflict.



**Continuing our series on 35 years of Nato, Bettino Craxi, Italian Prime Minister, sees a relaxation of East-West tension as a prerequisite for limiting local wars in Africa and Asia and making Third World aid more effective**

Not much good was done by the sudden, over-effusive love for the Arab world (a love which to many smelt of oil) which the major European countries began to show after 1967, forgetting their earlier attitudes in favour of Israel. This alienated Israel, thus losing the European nation the opportunity to play a moderating part and leaving this task to the USA.

To find a show of more specific intentions by the European countries, we must go to the EEC summit of December 1973 at Copenhagen, with its declaration of readiness "to give our own assistance in the search for peace and for guaranteeing a solution" to this conflict. This declaration was repeated at various times, always in the same tone, up to the Venice declaration of June 13, 1980, when the Nine went further by proclaiming their readiness "to participate, in the context of a global settlement, in a system of specific, obligatory international guarantees, including action on the spot".

None of these declarations stopped the course of events. Destabilization processes continue to assail many countries in Asia and

Africa, spheres of influence have continued to change and to extend, and the dividing line of the East-West confrontation remains as changing and unstable as ever.

What shall we do? Clearly we cannot give up. Equally clearly, if the whole weight of the alliance is periodically moved over these changing boundaries, the result can only be an intensification of international conflict, condemning local disputes to perpetuity.

This leads us to ask: Is a global vision more useful than a regional view of individual conflicts? Does European and American policy coincide towards the individual countries of Asia and Africa? What relation is there between a stable western policy and the instability and unpredictability of some governments of these countries?

In seeking an answer to these questions, we see an obvious need for improved East-West relations, which would greatly assist in limiting local conflicts and taking most of the danger out of them.

We are living through a critical stage in our relations with the Soviet bloc. Detente should not become a

simple memory. One general consideration must be kept in mind: is it possible to think that world peace can be maintained by an increasingly intense and sophisticated balance of terror? Can the world live by inventing increasingly complicated and terrible instruments of offence and by inventing equally complicated devices for defence?

I want to assert my conviction of the need to change course, of the impossibility of continuing on our present road indefinitely. I am not thinking about a situation in which one of the two contestants will put up his hands in surrender (the solidarity shown by the West with regard to the Soviet SS20 speaks for itself). I am thinking of an agreed, controlled change of direction; a reduction in armament that cannot be achieved if we argue over who was initially responsible for the arms race.

When *The Times* invited me to take part in the debate on the future of Nato, it asked me to "think aloud, even the unimaginable". Well, is it impossible to imagine an East-West agreement to renounce strategic and military advantages outside the area of the Atlantic Pact or the Warsaw Pact? Is it impossible to imagine an East-West understanding on the quantity, quality and nature of aid to the developing countries of the Third World? Is it impossible to imagine consistent activity aimed at preventing a war economy taking the place of a peace economy in all these countries, or death and degradation being the price which these people must pay for their yearning to survive?

Previous articles in this series appeared on January 13, January 25, and February 16. A full collection is to be published in book form in cooperation with the Georgetown Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington.

MF

**CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM EXTOTT PSR0400 23FEB84

TO DELHI DELIVER BY 240900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER/CARON

DISTR LIDDZ PST MINT PFG PED PGB

REF YOURTEL WBGR 1070 21FEB

---GANDHI-TRUDEAU MESSAGE

PM HAS INDICATED HE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO VISIT DELHI IN  
RESPONSE TO MRS. GANDHI'S INVITATION FOR DISCUSSIONS ON PEACE  
ISSUE. DRAFT REPLY HAS BEEN PREPARED FOR HIS SIGNATURE BUT  
NATURE OF RESPONSE CANNOT YET BE CONFIRMED. FOR YOUR  
BACKGROUND INFO ONLY IT WELCOMES PARLIAMENTARIANS INITIATIVE  
AND THANKS MRS. GANDHI FOR INVITATION BUT NEVERTHELESS  
DECLINES ATTENDANCE.

2. LETTER TO PM GANDHI WILL BE SIGNED IN NEXT FEW DAYS.  
DURING REGAN VISIT CDN SIDE IS NOT ASKED TO RAISE SUBJECT.  
HOWEVER, SHOULD MATTER COME UP, WE SUGGEST THAT MINT SHOW  
AWARENESS OF INVITATION, COMMEND INITIATIVE IN GENERAL TERMS,  
AND COMMENT THAT HE UNDERSTANDS REPLY IS STILL BEING  
PREPARED. IT WOULD ALSO BE IN ORDER FOR MINT TO MAKE  
GENERAL REFERENCE TO HEAVINESS OF PM SCHEDULE AND  
AMOUNT OF TIME HE HAS DEVOTED DURING PAST FEW MONTHS TO  
HIS PEACE INITIATIVE. IT COULD ALSO BE NOTED THAT PM

.../2

PAGE TWO PSR0400 S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

ATTENDED QUOTE SUMMIT UNQUOTE ORGANIZED BY MRS. GANDHI  
AT UNGA THIS AUTUMN. THIS SHOULD PREPARE INDIANS FOR  
POSSIBILITY THAT PM MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO ATTEND. HOWEVER  
MINT SHOULD STRESS THAT HE IS NOT AWARE OF NATURE OF CDN  
RESPONSE, WHICH STILL AWAITS FINAL DECISION OF PM.

3. FOR YOUR INFO WHEN INDIAN ACTING HICOMMER CALLED ON PSR  
23FEB ON ANOTHER MATTER HE ENQUIRED AGAIN ABOUT PM'S  
INTENTIONS RE GANDHI MTG. HE UNOFFICIALLY CORROBORATED  
INFO CONTAINED PARA 2 REFTTEL TO EFFECT THAT MTG MIGHT BE  
POSTPONED. WE INDICATED THAT MATTER WAS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION.  
CCC/146 240311Z PSR0400

MINE (2)

FILE

MR

FPR

PLEASE RETURN TO IDDZ AFTER SIGNATURE

IDDZ-0188

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A 0G2

*February 24, 1984*

Stan and Dorothy Sauder  
19 Belmont Avenue West  
Kitchener, Ontario  
N2M 1L2

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Sauder:

Thank you for your two letters of January 31, addressed to me and to my colleague the Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, Allan MacEachen, and for your support for the Prime Minister's initiative.

It is clear that the Prime Minister is voicing the grave concerns of many Canadians when he has spoken of the urgent necessity of re-establishing East-West relations on a constructive basis and of squarely facing the need for disarmament.

As you observe, the monies spent on nuclear and conventional armaments represent a misallocation of resources on a global scale. Both the developed and developing worlds are guilty of putting limited national resources into military budgets instead of into development.

While it would be unrealistic to think that complete disarmament can be achieved, the Canadian Government has argued vigorously that the path to increased security is a balance at lower levels of both conventional and nuclear armaments. If greater security can be achieved we would hope that funds previously allocated by all nations to defence could be channelled to economic development and social needs.

.../2

- 2 -

With his proposal for a conference of the five nuclear weapons states, his stress on the need for reductions in conventional forces and the other arms control proposals of his initiative, the Prime Minister has taken several concrete steps towards alleviating the current crisis. I think that we can be proud of Canada's efforts, over a number of years, to counter the nuclear arms race and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond those nations which already have them.

Yours sincerely,  
Original Signed by  
Originale signée par  
JEAN - LUC - PEPIN  
Minister for External Relations  
Ministre des Relations extérieures  
Jean-Luc Pepin

000725



From / De	No. / N°	Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINE by / L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINE avant	
STAN AND DOROTHY SAUDER	01572	Date	22-02-84
Letter dated / Lettre en date du	Date received in MINE / Date de réception à MINE	Date sent to Division / Date d'envoi à la direction	
31-01-84	07-02-84	08-02-84	
Action Division / Direction responsable	Information Division(s) / Direction(s) informée(s)	Referred by / Référé(e)	
IDDZ			
Subject / Sujet	Comments / Commentaires		
PEACE INITIATIVE			

**ACTION REQUIRED / ACTION REQUISE**

- Reply for minister's signature / Réponse pour la signature du ministre
- Reply for the signature of / Réponse pour la signature de
- Reply by division / Réponse de la direction
- Note and file / Noter et mettre au dossier
- Draft reply to be incorporated in letter by Minister's staff / **Projet de réponse requis pour inclusion dans lettre rédigée par les assistants du Ministre**

ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINE REGISTRY (5-7221)

LE REGISTRE DE MINE DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT (5-7221)

**FOR DIVISIONAL USE  
POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIRECTION**

Date received in Division / Date reçu à la direction


Action officer / Agent responsable

Disposition and date / Disposition et date

For MINE use / Pour utilisation de MINE

000726

19 Belmont Avenue West, Kitchener, Ontario  
N2M 1L2  
January 31, 1984



The Honourable Mr. Jean-Luc Pepin  
External Affairs Minister  
The House of Commons  
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0A6

Dear Mr. Pepin:

As a Canadian citizen, world citizen and follower of Christ in whom I believe, I wish to add my voice to the many which are speaking today for peace and for justice for our voiceless brothers and sisters around the world.

We support Mr. Trudeau's current Peace Initiative, particularly his statement that "there must be a direct linkage between disarmament and development" made in his November 13, 1983 outline of the Initiative in Montreal.

Every minute thirty children die for want of food and inexpensive vaccines and every minute the world's military budget absorbs \$1.3 million of the public treasure. It seems that the goal of protecting security through maximizing national military power can be pursued only at the expense of other social goals such as insuring satisfactory living standards, education, and accessible health care for all. The fulfillment of these goals, it seems to us, is most essential to the progress and security of all peoples of the world.

We appreciate the material, social and political privileges which we enjoy as a Canadian, but we can no longer justify the preservation of this privilege by complicity in the nuclear arms race. The moral and ethical costs are simply too high.

As a Christian, concerned about the colossal investment required for armaments and nuclear power, I would urge the investment of our tax dollars and our limited natural resources towards total human development, the meeting of basic human needs and alternative, safe and renewable sources of energy which will not pollute the earth. I am willing to lower my standard of living so that others may have a just share.

We want to see our country take the initiative in actions of peace and justice. To that end, we pray for you that you may be given wisdom and courage in these most difficult days.

Sincerely yours,

*Stan & Dorothy Sauder*  
Stan and Dorothy Sauder

External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

From/De <i>Dorothy Sauder Ont.</i>		No. No <b>A 05556</b>
Subject/Sujet <i>Supports Canada's peace initiatives.</i>		Action div./Dir. responsable <i>IDA IDDZ</i>
Letter dated/Lettre en date du <i>84-01-31</i>	Date rec'd in MINA Date de réception à MINA <i>84-02-10</i>	Date sent to div. Date d'envoi à la dir. <i>84-02-10</i>
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par		Info. division(s)/Direction(s) informée(s) <i>84-02-17</i>
Comments/Commentaires		

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE  <input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de  <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction  <input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date received/Date reçu <i>Feb 13 84</i>  Action officer/Agent responsable <i>[Signature]</i>  Disposition <i>AS THE IDENTICAL LET. WAS SENT TO MR REPIN, WE HAVE PREPARED ONE REPLY FOR MR REPIN'S SIGNATURE TO BOTH.</i> <i>IDDZ 0185 (copy attached)</i>  Date <i>IDDZ 0185</i>  For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA
ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA REGISTRY LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT	<b>5-1047</b>

AR-98 5356  
IDA

19 Belmont Avenue West, Kitchener, Ontario  
N2M 1L2  
January 31, 1984

The Honourable Mr. Allan MacEachen  
Secretary of State for External Affairs  
Ottawa, Canada

Dear Mr. MacEachen:

As a Canadian citizen, world citizen and follower of Christ in whom I believe, I wish to add my voice to the many which are speaking today for peace and for justice for our voiceless brothers and sisters around the world.

I support Mr. Trudeau's current Peace Initiative, particularly his statement that "there must be a direct linkage between disarmament and development" made in his November 13, 1983 outline of the Initiative in Montreal.

Every minute thirty children die for want of food and inexpensive vaccines and every minute the world's military budget absorbs \$1.3 million of the public treasure. It seems that the goal of protecting security through maximizing national military power can be pursued only at the expense of other social goals such as insuring satisfactory living standards, education, and accessible health care for all. The fulfillment of these goals, it seems to me, is most essential to the progress and security of all peoples of the world.

I appreciate the material, social and political privileges which I enjoy as a Canadian, but I can no longer justify the preservation of my privilege by complicity in the nuclear arms race. The moral and ethical costs are simply too high.

As a Christian, concerned about the colossal investment required for armaments and nuclear power, I would urge the investment of my tax dollars and our limited natural resources towards total human development, the meeting of basic human needs and alternative, safe and renewable sources of energy which will not pollute the earth. I am willing to lower my standard of living so that others may have a just share.

I want to see my country take the initiative in actions of peace and justice. To that end, we pray for you that you may be given wisdom and courage in these most difficult days.

Sincerely yours,

*Dorothy Sauder*  
Dorothy Sauder

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY  
PRIME MINISTER  
FEB 7 1984  
CABINET DU VICE-  
PREMIER MINISTRE

237-0173



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

Assistant Deputy Minister    Sous-ministre adjoint

MF 1/3/84  
[Signature]

IDDZ Delvois

New Meadows tells me that our huge deficit on Travel is going to be covered, either by a credit transfer or by a "no-fault" recognition of overspending at the end of March (Dept has money in other pockets that will lapse) so the expense of this trip really won't make any difference.

In the light of this, I think the simplest thing to do is to pay for his whole trip on the grounds that it is relevant to the general thrust of the peace initiative and to the

specific topic of the  
Centre.

Unless you see  
any strong objections,  
please let him know.  
I can sign his travel  
warrant.

M.S.

(IFB)

15  
CAF  
m...  
MF

Disarmement

IDA 1DDZ 251 RBP  
1DD 1MU.2 RCR URR  
PUBLICATION JLO RSR RBR  
IDR SCI CBS

SUBJECT/SUJET

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

DATE  
FEB 22 1984

# Finding détente in unlikely places

## US diplomat pays a visit to East Germany

By Elizabeth Pond  
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Bonn

Don't look now, but that Soviet client nagging Moscow to resume détente is none other than rigid, hard-line, orthodox East Germany.

The Feb. 21 all-day visit to East Berlin by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt is recognition of this curious fact. Mr. Burt is the highest-ranking American foreign-policy official ever to visit East Berlin.

It is also tacit American recognition that the West Germans were right to preserve as much détente as possible in Central Europe even during the revived cold war that followed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

As an informed source describes it, Burt was to sound out "the possibility of continuing East-West dialogue." In particular, the aim was to undercut Soviet claims that the new NATO Euromissile deployments have created a crisis situation and to press US proposals for arms control by taking advantage of East European misgivings about new Soviet missiles in East Europe.

East Berlin's new role in promoting détente is so contrary to the conventional wisdom of the past quarter century that some explanation of the background, evidence, motivation, and trade-offs of the East German shift is necessary.



Burt: sounding out possibilities

Roughly ever since Stalin's death in 1953 the practice has been that the more an Eastern European country strained at the Soviet leash, the more eager it was for better East-West relations. Détente created a less tense atmosphere in which Romania could get away with defying Soviet foreign policy — or Hungary could experiment with market-type economic reform.

The hard-line East Germans were the conspicuous holdouts to such trends. Once the Soviets themselves opted for détente, in fact, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev had to dump East German leader Walter Ulbricht. Ulbricht's replacement, Erich Honecker, went along with the German-German version of détente, called "Ostpolitik" in Bonn.

But he was wary lest the resultant liberalizing of East European societies get out of hand and destabilize their governments. In 1980/81 Honecker criticized the rise of Solidarity in Poland more sharply than did any other East European leader (except Czechoslovakia's Gustav Husak).

During the freeze in East-West relations after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, East Berlin did seek to maintain the special German-German relationship. Many Americans interpreted this as a bald attempt to woo West Germany away from the American alliance, however, rather than any East German devotion to overall East-West détente.

When West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt alluded to East German restraint on the Soviet Union (as well as West German restraint on the US) during his ill-timed summit with Honecker on the weekend martial law was imposed in Poland in 1981, this was treated as a bad joke in Washington.

East Germany's willingness to contradict the Soviet line became apparent as NATO began deploying its new missiles at the end of 1983. The Soviets walked out of the Euromissile arms control talks in Geneva, saying they would not return until NATO removed its new missiles.

And Moscow did its best to stimulate a mood of East-West crisis, both verbally and in new "counterdeployments" of short-range nuclear missiles in Czechoslovakia and East Germany.

Initially Honecker echoed the Soviet forecast that NATO deployments would usher in a new "ice age" in inter-German relations. But even before the Pershing IIs and cruises touched European soil, he was stressing the need for "limiting the damage" in East-West relations.

And he increased by 40 percent the number of working-age East Germans allowed to go West for "urgent family reunification" in 1983.

The two German states, Honecker and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl agreed, were joined in an "association of responsibility" to help prevent war (and, by implication, tensions that could lead to war).

Even as Moscow was declaring it would not resume nuclear arms control talks until the NATO missiles were withdrawn, Honecker asserted the Soviets would eventually return to the negotiating table.

Even more remarkably, Honecker expressed public misgivings about the new Soviet missiles in East Europe. And there already were more missiles (in Eastern Europe) than the West realized, he added — leaving some listeners to infer that no more were needed.

East German Defense Minister Karl-Heinz Hoffmann and Bulgarian President Todor Zhivkov have also publicly drawn attention to the financial burden the East Europeans have to assume in paying for the Soviet missiles.

And in an unprecedented move well before the NATO deployments, the East German party newspaper Neues

Deutschland printed a letter from Lutheran pastors expressing horror at the new Soviet as well as the new TO missiles. More discreetly, hard-line Czechoslovakians aired reservations about the new Soviet missiles.

These developments occurred in the last months of Soviet President Yuri Andropov's life. The West saw them primarily as East European maneuvering for more elbow room in a time of leadership uncertainty in the Kremlin.

But Honecker's lobbying for relaxation of East-West tensions continued even after the new Soviet party general secretary, Konstantin Chernenko, took office.

Immediately after the announcement on Feb. 10 of Andropov's death, Honecker told an East Berlin party conference that everything must be done "to use every possibility to let common sense and realism prevail, to replace confrontation with cooperation, to make progress in disarmament, and to revive détente in accord with the principle of equality and equal security."

When Honecker and Kohl held their first summit — in Moscow on the eve of Mr. Andropov's funeral — Honecker came with a prepared statement for the two leaders to issue after their talk. It emphasized their mutual interest in further East-West dialogue. It spoke of the "existential importance" of avoiding nuclear war and of using "common sense" to search for "practical solutions" to prevent "the course of international affairs from getting out of control."

As examples of this search it praised the Stockholm conference on confidence-building measures in Europe and the conventional forces reduction talks that will resume in Vienna in another month.

The statement did not mention the suspended nuclear arms control talks, but the West Germans came away from the meeting convinced Honecker wants these talks, too, to be resumed — and thinks there is a real possibility Chernenko will resume them.

Honecker's motivation in all this seems to be largely economic. Even more than most other East European countries, the East German government depends on raising the living standard of its citizens for its legitimization (since any nationalist alternative would risk enhancing the attraction West Germany holds for the East German man in the street).

East Germans already live better than any other East Europeans. The East German economy had the second-highest growth in the Soviet bloc last year.

But there are growing bottlenecks, including fuel shortfalls. And after a decade of subsidizing East European energy, the Soviet Union has too many economic problems of its own to continue bailing out its clients.

So West Germany is East Germany's only economic savior. And the understood condition for gestures like Bonn's 1 billion mark (\$370 million) credits to East Berlin last year is relaxation in East-West German relations.

But in the long run, Moscow can permit relaxed East-West German relations only within a broader relaxation of overall East-West relations. Hence the East German interest in a return to something approaching détente.

Soviet tolerance of this East German lobbying seems to derive from the special importance to Moscow of East Berlin, and from a balancing of risks.

Thus, East Germany is an ideological stalwart in the Soviet bloc, backing and even urging Soviet disciplining of liberal heresies, aiding Soviet promotion of revolution abroad by sending a few thousand East German military and police advisers to ripe third-world countries. East German industry also supplies much of the modern technology needed by the Soviet Union. And East Germany is the greatest prize in Moscow's postwar buffer zone in East Europe — one the Soviets deem worth securing with 19 of their 30 divisions in Eastern Europe.

If Honecker says he needs a robust economy to ensure political stabilization then — and if the Soviets can't provide the necessary economic help — Moscow is inclined to let East Berlin go ahead and get help from Bonn, even if it must accept the price of inter-German détente.

For the Soviets the risks of Eastern European contamination in such a course are not too high, since the East German leadership itself is so orthodox.

Since détente began, the East German leadership has shown remarkable skill in allowing its citizens unlimited access to alien West German radio and television and in welcoming 6 million West German visitors a year — all without destabilizing party rule or ideological control.


For a few years the West Germans have been watching this evolution of East German policy. The slow, stable opening of a country like East Germany to Western contacts has always seemed much more durable to them than the headlong rush of a Poland in spurts that alarm the hegemonial Soviet Union and set off a backlash.

The latter-day American appreciation of East Germany's position, by contrast, reflects an altogether new sophistication in Washington. In the past, high US officials would visit Romania or Hungary or Poland (during liberal phases), but never hard-line East Germany. Usually the aim was to dramatize how far the country being visited was diverging from Soviet practices.

This week, however, Richard Burt is visiting the model conformist states of East Germany and Bulgaria in addition to economically experimenting Hungary.

At this point the US sees an advantage in dealing with the orthodox states of East Europe — and in reinforcing their novel moderating influence on Moscow.

JOAN FORBES — STAFF



**WHERE MISSILES GO IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY**

Missile	Location	Range
<b>WEST GERMANY</b>		
108 Pershing IIs	Mutlangen (9 already deployed)	1,085 miles
	Neu Ulm (no deployments yet)	
	Heilbronn (no deployments yet)	
96 cruises	Undisclosed	1,550-1,860 miles
<b>EAST GERMANY</b>		
SS-22	One reported sighted in Bernsdorf	335-620 miles
SS-21	Undisclosed	40-75 miles

The NATO missiles are being deployed to counter the approximately 260 triple-warhead SS-20s in the Soviet Union aimed at Western Europe. The SS-20 has a range of about 3,410 miles.

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Fila/Dossier: 28-4-CDE

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1/21  
1/23  
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Head of Delegation

\*Mr. Teodor Malescuz

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Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic  
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Geneva  
Deputy Head of Delegation

\*Mr. Mihai Bichir

First Secretary  
Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic  
of Romania to the United Nations Office at  
Geneva

Mr. Aurelian Gretu

Second Secretary  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Romania

Lt. Col. Ing. Annel Popescu

Expert  
Ministry of National Defence, Romania

\* Spouse present

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16/28

Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala

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Mr. H.M.G.S. Palihakkara

Third Secretary  
Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to the  
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Mr. P. Kariyawasam

Third Secretary  
Permanent Mission of Sri Lanka to the  
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Chairman of the Swedish Disarmament  
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ex officio when in attendance

\*Mr. Rolf Ekus

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Head of Delegation

\*Mr. Lars-Erik Wingren

Counsellor  
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\*Mrs. Elisabet Bonnier

First Secretary

\*Mr. Hans Berglund

Colonel  
Military Adviser

\*Mr. Johan Lundin

Director of Research  
National Defence Research Institute

Mrs. Ann Mari Leu

Scientific Adviser  
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Dr. Jan Przewitz

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Mr. Lars Eric De Geer

Scientific Adviser  
National Defence Research Institute

Mr. Stig Alemyr

Member of Parliament

Mrs. Anita Brakenhielm

Member of Parliament

Mr. Sture Ericson

Member of Parliament

Mrs. Gunnel Jonäng

Member of Parliament

Mr. Rune Angström

Member of Parliament

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17/20

Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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- \*Mr. Victor L. Israelyan                   Head of Delegation  
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USSR to the Conference on Disarmament
- \*Mr. Boris P. Prokofiev                   Deputy Head of Delegation  
Envoy  
Deputy Director, Department of  
International Organizations  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Mr. Roland M. Timarbaev                 Deputy Head of Delegation  
Envoy  
Deputy Director, Department of  
International Organizations  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- \*Mr. Lev. A. Eganov                     Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- \*Mr. Timur F. Dmitrichov               Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Mr. Fyry V. Kostenko                   Expert, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- \*Mr. Grigory V. Bordenzhikov           First Secretary  
Permanent Representation of the USSR  
to the Office of the United Nations  
and other International Organizations  
in Geneva
- Mr. Igor E. Scherbak                   Expert, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Mr. Pavel Y. Skomorokhin               Expert, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Mr. Sergey V. Kobych                   Expert, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Mr. Vladimir A. Krocha                 Expert, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- \*Mr. Gennady V. Antaifarov             Third Secretary  
Permanent Representation of the USSR  
to the Office of the United Nations and  
other International Organizations  
in Geneva
- Mr. Alexander P. Kortejev              Expert
- Mr. Vladimir N. Tcherednichenko       Expert

\* Spouse present

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18/27

- \*Dr. R. Ian. T. Cromartie CBE Ambassador  
Leader of the United Kingdom Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament
- \*Mr. Lawrence J. Middleton Counsellor
- \*Mr. Barry B. Noble Counsellor  
Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations Office at Geneva
- \*Mr. James Richards First Secretary  
Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations Office at Geneva
- \*Mr. Jean François Gordon First Secretary
- Dr. Graham H. Cooper Ministry of Defence
- Dr. Frank H. Grover Seismological Research Centre
- \*Mr. David A. Slinn Third Secretary

Delegation of the United States of America  
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- \*The Honorable Louis G. Fields Ambassador  
United States Representative to the Conference on Disarmament
- \*Mr. Norman G. Clyne Deputy United States Representative to the Conference on Disarmament
- Mr. Herbert Galhorn (February 6 - March 12) Adviser  
Multilateral Affairs Bureau  
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- Mr. Nicholas Carrara Adviser  
Multilateral Affairs Bureau  
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- Mr. Pierce S. Gordon Adviser  
Multilateral Affairs Bureau  
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- Ms. Katharine Grittenburger Adviser  
Multilateral Affairs Bureau  
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- Mr. Daniel Callington Colonel, USAF  
Adviser  
Office of the Under-Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense
- Mr. Richard L. Horne United States Mission to the United Nations Office at Geneva

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Delegation of the United States of America (continued)

19/21  
28

Mr. Arnold Horowitz  
(March 12 - April 27)

Adviser  
Multilateral Affairs Bureau  
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Mr. Robert Mikulak

Adviser  
Multilateral Affairs Bureau  
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Ms. Blair Murray  
(February 6 - 25)

Adviser  
Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs  
Department of State

Mr. Robert Norman

Adviser  
Office of United Nations Political and  
Multilateral Affairs  
Bureau of International Organization  
Affairs, Department of State

Mr. John M. Pickett

Adviser  
Assistant to the Associate Director  
for National Security Programs  
Department of Energy

Mr. James J. Hogan

Colonel, USAF  
Adviser  
Office of Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Department of Defense

Mr. Lawrence Madson

Adviser  
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Mr. Raymond O. Waters

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Mr. Enrique ter Horst

Minister Counsellor  
Chargé d'Affaires, a.i.

Delegation of the Republic of Venezuela (continued)

20/21

Mr. Teófilo Labrador Rubio

Counsellor  
Permanent Mission of Venezuela  
to the United Nations Office at  
Geneva

Mr. Oscar García García

Second Secretary  
Permanent Mission of Venezuela  
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Head of Delegation

\*Mr. Miodrag Mihajlović

Minister Counsellor  
Permanent Mission of the Socialist  
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia  
to the United Nations Office at Geneva  
Deputy Head of Delegation

Mr. Dragomir Djokić

Special Counsellor at the Federal  
Secretariat for Foreign Affairs  
Member of Delegation

Mrs. Mira Stjepanović

Counsellor at the Federal Secretariat  
for Foreign Affairs  
Member of Delegation

Mr. Dušan Minić

Expert (Chemical Weapons)

Professor Dr. Milorad Radotić

Expert (Radiological Weapons)

\* Spouse present

FEB. 22 '89 22:21 PERMANENT MISSION OF CON GENEVA

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21/21  
~~21~~

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Permanent Representative of the Republic  
of Zaïre to the United Nations Office  
at Geneva  
Head of Delegation

Mr. Longo Bekpas Kénga

First Counsellor  
Permanent Mission of the Republic  
of Zaïre to the United Nations Office  
at Geneva  
Member

Ms. Esaki Ezunga Kabaya

First Secretary  
Permanent Mission of the Republic  
of Zaïre to the United Nations Office  
at Geneva  
Member

Mr. Oziil Gholi

Second Secretary  
Permanent Mission of the Republic  
of Zaïre to the United Nations Office  
at Geneva  
Member

BURROUGHS DEX 3500

P. 2

1/2

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Our file/no. dossier:

NYC 72

NO. GRPA-183

DATE 22 FEBRUARY 1984

PAGES T W O  
(incl. cover)  
(y compris la page  
couverture)

FROM: Canadian Consulate General  
DU : Consulat général du Canada  
NEW YORK

SECTION: General Relations & Public Affairs/GRPA  
Mr./Ms. McKechnie/  
M./Mad. Weatherup

TO : Mr./Ms.  
A : M./Mad.

Department: EXTOTT: (IDDZ)  
Service :

Phone : BY OTT: PCO/FOWLER  
Téléphone :

Subject : NEW YORK TIMES 22 February 1984 (A-23)  
Objet :

"THROUGH THE WINDOW" - Tom Wicker

2/2

NYT 22/2/84 p. A23 A23

IN THE NATION

# Through the Window

By Tom Wicker

Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada reports that when he suggested to Konstantin U. Chernenko, the new Soviet leader, and Andrei Gromyko, the Foreign Minister, that a "window of opportunity" now exists for better East-West relations, Mr. Gromyko replied:

"Yes, there is that window of opportunity and we want to make sure that you [the West] put something into it, too."

This puts in useful perspective the optimistic reports that Western officials, including Vice President Bush, brought back from Moscow and the funeral of Yuri V. Andropov. Mr. Chernenko, they said, showed a conciliatory attitude, leading them to believe that the long slide of Soviet-American relations to the lowest level since 1962 might possibly be ended under the new leadership.

To the extent that this slide had been the product of the bitter exchanges between Mr. Andropov and President Reagan, as well as their opposed arms control policies, this optimism seems plausible. Mr. Gromyko, however, was making it clear to Mr. Trudeau that the Russians saw no one-way street ahead. They want evidence — more than that provided in Mr. Reagan's conciliatory speech of Jan. 16 — that Washington, too, is ready to seek better relations.

Both sides having given rhetorical assurances of their interest in a warmer climate of understanding, Mr. Reagan is in good position to take the first concrete step. That would not only put Moscow in the position of having to follow his initiative or confess the hollowness of Mr. Chernenko's words; undoubtedly, too, such a move by the President would work to his credit in the Presidential election, and among European allies uneasy over his anti-Soviet remarks.

Mr. Reagan could, for example, agree to take up the longstanding Soviet offer to explore a treaty banning anti-satellite weapons. Moscow has actually put a proposed treaty on the table at the United Nations; but Mr. Reagan so far has refused to enter negotiations, and his Administration went ahead recently with a crucial test of the U.S. "ASAT," as these weapons are called.

Satellites are vital instruments for the verification of other arms control agreements; so a treaty banning ASAT's would be an important supplement to any future arms treaty, as well as a good way to "put something" into that "window of opportunity." Mr. Reagan might even offer to suspend ASAT testing while exploring treaty possibilities.

The U.S. is already ahead of Moscow

in ASAT technology; moreover, it depends more heavily than Moscow does on satellite observations, since that is one of the few ways to penetrate the closed Soviet society. On the face of it, therefore, Mr. Reagan seems to have more to gain from an ASAT treaty than the Russians do; and even if treaty talks came to naught, that would be known soon enough so that ASAT development could be resumed before any substantial harm was done.

Another possibility, if Mr. Reagan truly wants better relations, or even if he only wants to test Soviet sincerity, would be to declare a six-month unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons testing. If Moscow followed suit, the way would be open for a succeeding six-month moratorium, or perhaps a year next time, or perhaps even for the resumption of negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban treaty.

If the Russians did not participate in the moratorium, or refused to continue it after a certain point, little would be lost. U.S. verification abilities — in this case seismographic, since both nations have conducted all nuclear testing underground since the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 — are more than adequate to detect Soviet tests; and if they continued or were resumed, the U.S. could immediately begin testing again too.

A moratorium observed by both sides would achieve a major part of the widely supported "freeze" on production, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons. A Reagan initiative for such a test moratorium would have moral force too, since both the U.S. and the Russians are twice pledged (in the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) to seek a Comprehensive Test Ban treaty; but Mr. Reagan has so far been unwilling to enter such negotiations.

Finally, as noted here before, there's a precedent: in the late 50's and early 60's, a moratorium on nuclear testing was observed by both nations for about three years. The Russians broke it, following atmospheric tests by the French, and the U.S. immediately resumed its own tests — having scored at least an important propaganda victory.

Mr. Reagan, unfortunately, has so far been committed to a nuclear arms buildup, not to a Comprehensive Test Ban — a goal pursued by all his predecessors back to Dwight Eisenhower. Declaring a moratorium now would be concrete evidence to the Russians of good U.S. intentions; it would challenge them to prove their own; and it would put Ronald Reagan in the mainstream of modern Presidential history, just in time for the elections.

*file*

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~~---PMS VISIT-THANK YOU LETTERS~~

THERE REMAINS ONE MORE FORMALITY TO COMPLETE ADMIN FILE ON ANDROPOV FUNERAL AND PMS VISIT:THANK YOU LETTERS.

FOLLOWING ARE OUR SUGGESTIONS FOR RECIPIENTS, WITH SUGGESTED SIGNATORIES IN BRACKETS:

- (A) K U CHERNENKO, GENERAL SECRETARY OF CC (PM TRUDEAU)
- (B) D S NIKIFOROV, HEAD OF PROTOCOL DEPT/MFA (FOWLER)
- (C) V P SUSLOV, HEAD OF SECOND EUROPEAN DEPT/MFA (FOWLER AND/OR HANCOCK)
- (D) V F FOMICHEV, SECOND EUROPEAN DEPT OFFICER/MFA (FOWLER).

2. IN CASE OF CHERNENKO, EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION COULD BE TUCKED INTO MORE SUBSTANTIVE LET (EG RE DECALOGUE) WHICH WE UNDERSTAND PM TRUDEAU INTENDS TO WRITE. RE OTHERS, BRIEF DRAFTS SUGGESTED OURTEL XYGR6705 26NOV32, WITH APPROPRIATE UPDATE AND PERSONAL TOUCHES, COULD SERVE AS MODELS.

3. AWAIT YOUR FURTHER GUIDANCE.

CCC/144 221356Z XYGR0250

External Affairs Affaires extérieures  
Canada Canada

MEMORANDUM

*I FB / Mr. Sharstone*

*We spoke. Should  
welcome your views.  
hp*

*MF*

TO/A

IDDZ

FROM/DE

G.A.H. Pearson

Security/Sécurité
<b>RESTRICTED</b>
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File/Dossier
28-WEST-1-CDA
Date
February 22, 1984
Number/Numéro

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CONFERENCE ON ARMS CONTROL AND  
SECURITY IN EUROPE

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

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I am a member of the Board of Directors of the Institute for East-West Security Studies, ... based in New York. Information is attached. The Institute's annual conference will be held in Austria at the end of March. The agenda and list of participants ... is also attached. I have recommended that Tom Delworth be invited, but if he is not, I will be the only Canadian. The Institute will in principle pay my travel expenses but in view of the above I would hope the Government might agree to do so, especially as I would intend to travel also to Stockholm and London (and possibly Oslo) to consult SIPRI and the IISS about the plans for our own Institute for International Peace and Security. Please let me have your views.

*G. Pearson*  
G.A.H. Pearson

# INSTITUTE FOR EAST-WEST SECURITY STUDIES

## Update

Fall 1983

### Ford Foundation to Award Institute Major Grant

The Ford Foundation has announced its intention to award the Institute a one-year grant of \$95,000 to support its European security program. According to Dr. Enid C.B. Schoettle, Program Officer in Charge of International Relations for Ford, this grant represents a major vote of confidence in the work of the Institute. The grant includes support for the Resident Fellows Program, the Arms Control Study Group, European review sessions of the Fellows' work, domestic and foreign travel of the Fellows and specialized library support.

*"The Institute in its short lifetime has begun to play a very important role in supplementing government-to-government dealings between East and West. Its independence and objective approach to studying critical security problems is needed and sound. Your program seems to me to be a good idea, not only for the value of the academic work involved, but for the understanding which is fostered by direct contact between people of differing views."*

*—Under Secretary of State  
Lawrence Eagleburger  
September 12, 1983*

### News & Notes

- The U.S. Department of State has officially agreed to participate in the Institute's U.S.-Soviet Project, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Next Twenty Years."
- Eastern and Western governments continue to request large numbers of *Confidence-Building Measures in Europe*, the Institute's first publication in its East-West Monograph series. A majority of governments participating in the CSCE talks are using copies for their delegations to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe which convenes in Stockholm in January 1984. One Swedish government official noted that the monograph is "the only available handbook for those being sent to this negotiation." Over 30 copies have been requested from the National Security Council staff for distribution in Washington.



*Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany (second from right) prior to his speech at the Institute with (from left), H.E. Mr. Svann Stray, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs; Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Adviser to President Carter; and John Edwin Mroz, President of the Institute. See page 3 for excerpts of Mr. Genscher's speech.*

- The Institute continues to bring together policy-makers from East and West. At a recent intimate dinner hosted by the Institute's President, John Edwin Mroz, Dr. Peter Varkonyi, the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and senior members of Hungary's Foreign Ministry met for lengthy discussions with representatives of the National Security Council and the Department of State. Among the guests were Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Peter Jennings of ABC-News.
- Spanish Foreign Minister Fernando Moran Lopez spoke on "Spanish Security Interests in the 1980s" at an Institute luncheon in his honor on September 28 in New York.
- 90 percent of the Institute's 40 Directors from 14 countries participated in two and a half days of Board meetings September 11-13 in New York.
- The Institute's Corporate Patrons Program launched by the Bank of America continues to grow. Exxon and Gulf & Western are among the most recent corporations to join the program. As part of the Program the Bank of America will host at its San Francisco headquarters an address by the Institute's President, John Edwin Mroz, on "U.S.-Soviet Relations: Problems and Prospects" to Bay Area corporate executives.

*Continued on page 2.*

### What is the Institute?

The Institute for East-West Security Studies is an independent international research center devoted to the analysis of critical political, military and economic developments which affect international security. Its uniqueness lies in its multinational character. The research staff is composed of mid-career security specialists on loan from Foreign and Defense Ministries in both Western and Eastern Europe who spend a year in New York as Resident Fellows working together on arms control and security issues. The Board of Directors is 55 percent European and includes representatives from governments and research institutes

in more than a dozen European countries.

The Institute is more than a "think tank" however. Its strength lies in its policy orientation and close connection with key policy-makers in Europe and the United States. Its publications, such as its recent monograph, *Confidence-Building Measures in Europe*, are widely read and help shape the perceptions of the policy-making communities. As West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher noted at a recent luncheon hosted by the Institute in his honor, the Institute for East-West Security Studies has become a "significant forum" in the East-West policy debate. The Institute receives no governmental funding. Contributions in the United States are tax-deductible.

*Jim Kauter*

## The Institute's Arms Control Program

In September 1983 the Institute began the first year of a three-year project on "Long-Term Arms Control and Disarmament Options in Europe." Research for the project is being carried out under the supervision of Dr. F. Stephen Larrabee, Vice President and Director of Studies, by a multinational team of arms control specialists from West Germany, Italy, Poland, Austria, Yugoslavia, France, Hungary and Switzerland, who will spend a year at the Institute as Resident Fellows.

The purpose of the Institute's 1983-84 East-West research program is to analyze arms control issues related to European security and explore alternatives to current approaches. The Fellows are divided into three small working groups which will examine three specific issue areas: 1) European Nuclear Issues; 2) Conventional Forces; and 3) Confidence-Building Measures.

These issue areas correspond to the three negotiations currently dealing with European security. The Institute's research will not entail an attempt to second-guess the negotiators. Rather it will examine political and military trends over the next 5 to 10 years which may affect the negotiations and the dimensions of the European security debate.

Such a project is particularly timely because the European security dialogue has entered a new phase. Many of the initial hopes at the beginning of the 1970s have failed to be borne out in practice. A decade of East-West negotiations has brought some limited results, but it has failed to eliminate many of the prime sources of tension, particularly in the

military field. Indeed, in many cases these tensions seem to be increasing. Thus there is a need to rethink many of the initial premises and concepts that governed both Western and Eastern thinking about European security.

Among the key issues to be addressed by the Fellows are the impact of new weapons technologies on European security; the changing political climate in Europe and its implications for arms control prospects in both East and West; and alternative methods for restructuring the current arms control agenda in Europe.

To supplement their research and to ensure that it addresses the major security issues in a comprehensive manner, the Fellows will make several trips to Washington and Europe to meet with key policy-makers from both East and West. They will also participate in the Institute's Arms Control Study Group, which regularly brings together top U.S. and European arms control specialists to discuss critical issues related to the Fellows' research.

The end product of this research project will be a series of collaborative papers addressing these pressing issues of international security. These papers will be published by the Institute as Occasional Papers or in its East-West Monograph series. They are designed to be substantive contributions to innovative and critical thinking about these issues, and will be circulated widely to specialists and policy-makers in the field. In addition, each Fellow will also write an individual paper on a related subject, which will appear under his own name.

The following security specialists make up the Institute's second team of Resident Fellows who began their process of research and discussion in September 1983:

### Austria: Dr. Heinz Vetschera

Dr. Vetschera is a senior researcher at the Austrian National Defence Academy as well as Legal Officer at the Army Command in Austria. As an expert on arms control, confidence-building measures and European security, Vetschera regularly writes for the Austrian Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs.

### Federal Republic of Germany:

#### Dr. Hilmar Linnenkamp

Dr. Linnenkamp serves as Head of the Section on Planning Control and System Development on the Policy Planning Staff of the Federal Ministry of Defense in Bonn. Linnenkamp, who has written widely on defense planning and armaments policy, has held policy positions in the Ministry of Defense since 1969.

### Hungary: Dr. Janos Jelen

Dr. Jelen is a career Foreign Service Officer who has served in Moscow and Southeast Asia. He is currently a Research Associate at the Hungarian Institute of International Relations. **Note:** Dr. Jelen will be succeeded in January by **Dr. Istvan Kormendy**, one of the leading Eastern experts on confidence-building measures and theater nuclear forces. He has served as a member of the Hungarian delegation to the CSCE Conference in Madrid for the past three years.

### Italy: Marco de Andreis

Mr. de Andreis is a defense consultant for the Radical Parliamentary Group (Chamber of Deputies) and a defense specialist who has written widely on arms control, Italian defense policies, and arms production and transfers. He recently served on the editorial board of *Difesa Oggi* (Defense Today).

### Poland: Dr. Marek Grela

Dr. Grela is a Research Associate at the Polish Institute of International Affairs who has served as a member of the Polish delegation to the CSCE Talks in Geneva, Helsinki and Madrid. He is an expert on East-West relations and East-West trade.

### Switzerland: Dr. Paul Widmer

Dr. Widmer is currently on leave as Head of the U.S. Desk in the Political Division of the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is a historian and political scientist who has written widely on social and political movements in Europe and the United States and their relationship to defense policies.

The following specialists participate on a part-time basis in the work of the East-West team:

### France: Jean Desazars de Montgailhard

Mr. Desazars was the Deputy Head of the French Delegation to the CSCE Talks in Madrid.

### Spain: Pablo Barrios

Barrios was Deputy Head of the Spanish Delegation to the CSCE Talks in Madrid. He currently serves as Counselor to the Spanish Mission to the United Nations.

### Yugoslavia: Vladimir Bilandzic

Bilandzic is currently on leave from the Department of International Relations at the Institute of International Politics and Economics in Belgrade. He has also served on the Yugoslav delegations to the CSCE Talks in Geneva, Belgrade and Madrid.

## News & Notes, *Continued from page 1*

- **Former U.S. SALT negotiator Paul Warnke addressed the Institute's Arms Control Study Group** on October 6 in New York with a discussion of European theater nuclear weapons. Joining the Institute's Resident Fellows and senior staff were members of the Institute's Arms Control Study Group, including Richard Betts of the Brookings Institution, Alton Frye and Andrew Pierre of the Council of Foreign Relations, Barry Blechman and Josef Joffe of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Colonel William Stokes of the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon. The next meeting of the Study Group will take place in Washington with an address by Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

*"In the short time since its founding, the Institute has developed into a significant forum for East-West dialogue, which today is more important than ever. The Institute deserves great recognition for the substantial effort which it has devoted to this task."*

*-H.E. Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Federal Republic of Germany  
September 29, 1983*

- **In early September the Hungarian Government agreed to allow a senior government official, Ambassador Pal Racz, to join the Institute's Board of Directors.** This is the first time that a Hungarian official of his stature has been allowed to serve on the Board of a Western-based institution. Racz has formerly served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Minister of Interior.

- **Newly-elected members of the Board of Directors include Helmut Sonnenfeldt**, Guest Scholar of the Brookings Institution and one of the foremost experts on U.S.-Soviet relations, and **Dr. Eleanor Sheldon**, former President of the Social Science Research Council. **Dr. Max Kampelman**, Head of the U.S. CSCE delegation in Madrid, has recently agreed to join the Board of Directors and will be formally elected this fall together with **Rita Hauser**, Partner of Strock & Strock & Lavan and Chairperson of the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Committee, and **Pauline Neville-Jones**, Director of Policy Planning at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London.

## Excerpts From Genscher Speech

The following is an excerpt of a major foreign policy address, "An Alliance Policy for Peace in Freedom," delivered by West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher at the Institute on September 27. Genscher was the sixth European Foreign Minister in the last year to address the Institute.

... Europe is not the hub of the world. But the questions that now arise as regards security and cooperation in Europe affect not only the fate of the old continent but also the relationship between the two superpowers and hence global equilibrium and stability.

The vital interests of the European partners in the Alliance and the security interests of the United States of America are inextricably linked: on the one hand, our freedom and independence are bound up with America's status as a world power. In Europe the security of the United States, too, is being defended. On the other hand, we Europeans need the weight of the American superpower in order to preserve our freedom. In this context, we are always conscious that, whilst in the same boat, we are nearer the dangerous edge; when stability is threatened, our independence, indeed our very existence, is more directly at stake than that of the United States.

... We have no wish to see Eastern Europe in the throes of economic crisis. Not only the peoples of Eastern Europe and our own fellow countrymen in the G.D.R. would suffer; we,

too, would be adversely affected by such developments.

There is a growing awareness that one side's prosperity also promotes the other side's prosperity. Here the interests of the Soviet Union and Western Europe are not contradictory, but mutually complementary.

East-West economic relations should be compatible with our security interests. They have an important bearing on the stabilization of East-West political relations. Thinking in terms of trade war would be counterproductive. It would, moreover, be oblivious to previous experience. Trade policy must not be made a foreign policy instrument disciplining others.

Anyone wishing to stabilize East-West relations must be willing to practice economic cooperation on a wide scale.

... We must bring home to the Soviet Union our will for defense and at the same time our will for cooperation. Our policy must remain calculable through being transparent and consistent. The Soviet Union, despite all its internal difficulties, will remain a world power.

Without presenting it as a demon, we shall have to treat the Soviet Union as a powerful adversary, as a permanent rival and a constant challenge, but also as a partner in negotiations and agreements. Our relationship with the Soviet Union must therefore be determined by common sense and not by emotion.

Our task is to be constantly on our guard, determined to defend ourselves, and at all times ready for cooperation, compromise and



Jim Kallert

Foreign Minister Genscher speaking at the Institute.

understanding. Ever increasing cooperation in ever more areas must make stability, security and disarmament possible. This task demands the greatest possible conceptual cohesion, clarity and perseverance on the part of political leaders in a democracy.



Mr. Eagleburger

## Excerpts From Eagleburger Speech

The following is an excerpt of a speech on "U.S.-Soviet Relations" by Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, given at the Institute's Annual Dinner September 12, chaired by Flora Lewis of *The New York Times*.

I had hoped tonight to be able to point to some small signs of progress in the [U.S.-Soviet] relationship. Before the morning of September 1, there had been small movement and we saw possibilities for some significant results. The last session of START was by far the most productive and there was some movement in MBFR. The long-standing Pentecostal problem had been resolved. We had proposed and the Soviets accepted the negotiation of a new cultural exchanges agreement and establishment of new consulates. We were discussing U.S.-proposed confidence-building measures. I would like to note the important contribution the Institute itself has just made with its monograph on this very subject. The United States has signed a new Long-Term Grain agreement and completed the Madrid concluding document. But, KAL flight No. 007, was not on our agenda.

... In consequence, we have consistently stated that we must approach U.S.-Soviet relations from a position of strength. President Reagan has undertaken as a major priority of his Administration to seek, in partnership with the Congress, to restore America's economic and military power and to reinvigorate its political self-confidence and resolve. In our

opinion, it is only on such a basis of rebuilt strength that we can hope to deter and contain Soviet adventurism and to draw the Soviets into a potentially constructive dialogue—a dialogue that could lead to equitable, political solutions to outstanding issues.

... On arms control, I mentioned that we remain seriously interested in reaching agreements that are fair. Talks are continuing on reducing strategic systems, European-based missiles, and conventional forces in Central Europe, and we hope that all of these talks will produce solid results. I am frankly not optimistic in the short term, but I am convinced of the necessity to get control over the arms race and to start some reverse momentum. I am convinced that the approach we have adopted is the most likely to produce this result.

On regional issues, we have held talks with the Soviets on Afghanistan and southern Africa, and on more general geopolitical issues. I regret to say that these talks, while generally useful and informative, have not produced the sort of actions on the Soviet part which could contribute to the near-term resolution of the problems.

On the bilateral side, we have managed to sustain a dialogue, although on a limited scale. Trade relations have improved and the recently-concluded grain agreement will ensure that American farmers get their share of the Soviet grain trade for some years to come. Unfortunately, our efforts to expand official exchanges must now be held up, but it remains in our interest to increase our access to Soviet society, and to expand the exposure of Soviet citizens to U.S. society.

... Let me conclude on a more philosophic and ultimately hopeful note. The immediate reaction of some in the West was to excuse this Soviet outrage as the result of centuries' old Soviet and Russian paranoia, and of a deep-seated insecurity. But as the historian Isaiah Berlin reminds us, it was with the triumph over Napoleon and the march to Paris that "Russia found herself a great power in the heart of Europe, conscious of her crushing strength, dominating the entire scene and accepted by



Jim Kallert

Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard Burt in conversation with Institute Director Ambassador Guenther von Well of the Federal Republic of Germany at the Institute's luncheon in September.

Europeans with some terror and great reluctance, as not merely equal but superior to them in brute force."

This attack on a peaceful airliner was caused more by arrogance and by power unconstrained than by any weakness. But the same school then would argue that this is inherent in the way the Russians are—implicitly that they are and will remain barbarians and slaves. This is a prescription for endless hostility between our two nations and for permanent despair. I utterly reject it.

There are new generations rising in the Soviet Union inspired by the best of their heritage. From their 19th-century literature, they read Alexander Herzen's ringing words, "One must open men's eyes, not tear them out." They read Turgenyev: "I am devoted to Europe, or to be more precise to . . . civilization."

... To truly eliminate the danger of nuclear war, we must move towards a world based on democratic governments which naturally obey the rule of law.

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# Institute for East-West Security Studies

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List of Invitees to Annual Conference  
"Approaches to Arms Control in Europe"  
Igls, Austria  
March 23-25, 1984

Chairman

H.E. Mr. Erwin Lanc

Minister of Foreign Affairs, Austria

List of Invitees

10 specialists and officials from the Soviet Union  
(including a guest speaker to be determined)

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Director, Department for International Studies, Institute for International Politics and Economics, Belgrade; Special Adviser, Yugoslav Delegation to the CSCE

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Dr. Seweryn Bialer

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Edouard Brunner

Secretary of State Designate, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Bern

Richard Burt

Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

Ambassador Franz Ceska

Austrian Ambassador to Belgium

Ambassador Klaus Citron

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Benoit D'Aboville	Deputy Director, Division of Strategic Affairs, French Ministry of External Relations
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Dr. Lawrence Freedman	Professor of War Studies, King's College, London
Brigadier Franz Freistetler	Head, Institute for Strategic Studies, Austrian Defense Academy
Dr. hab. Ryszard Frelek	Professor, University of Warsaw; Former Polish Ambassador to the U.N.
Alton Frye	Washington Director, Council on Foreign Relations
Professor Curt Gasteyger	Director, Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies, Graduate Institute on International Studies, Geneva
Leslie Gelb	<u>The New York Times</u>
Jean-Louis Gergorin	Director of Policy Planning, French Ministry of External Relations
Heinrich Gleissner	Head, Department for Disarmament Affairs, Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
David Gompert	General Manager - Market Planning, AT & T International; Former Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Dr. Marek Grela	Resident Fellow (Poland), Institute for East-West Security Studies
Dr. William E. Griffith	Ford Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Dr. Gyula Gyovai	Director, Hungarian Institute for International Relations
Nils Haagerup	<u>Berlingerske Tiden</u>
Rita Hauser	Partner, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, New York
James L. Hickman	Director, Soviet-American Exchange Program, Esalen Institute, San Francisco
Jim Hoagland	Assistant Managing Editor, <u>The Washington Post</u>
Dr. Johan Holst	Director, Norwegian Institute for International Relations
Professor Michael Howard	Regius Professor of Modern History, Oriel College, Oxford University
Brig. Gen. Kenneth Hunt	Visiting Professor, University of Surrey
Jacques Huntzinger	National Secretary for International Affairs, French Socialist Party
William G. Hyland	Editor-Designate, <u>Foreign Affairs</u>
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H.E. Mr. Peter Jankowitsch	Member of Austrian National Assembly

Pe Jennings Dr. Josef Joffe	ABC-TV News Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Dr. Karl Kaiser	Director, Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft fur Auswärtige Politik, Bonn
Dr. Max Kampelman	Partner, Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Kampelman; Former Head, U.S. Delegation to the CSCE, Madrid
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Helmut Sonnenfeldt	Guest Scholar, The Brookings Institution; Former Counselor, Department of State
H.E. Mr. Emmanuel Spyridakis	Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens
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Michel Tatu	<u>Le Monde</u>
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# Institute for East-West Security Studies

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## ANNUAL CONFERENCE

### APPROACHES TO ARMS CONTROL IN EUROPE

23 - 25 March 1984

Das Kongresszentrum Igls

Igls, Austria

Chairman:

H.E. Mr. Erwin Lanc

Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Austria

## PRELIMINARY AGENDA

### NOTES

- 1) All conference events will take place at the Kongresszentrum Igls with the exception of breakfast, which will be taken in the participant's hotel, and dinners, which will be hosted by the Austrian government in Innsbruck.
- 2) The three hotels which will house the participants are each within a 10-minute walk of the Kongresszentrum Igls. Buses will be provided to transport the participants from the hotels to the Kongresszentrum in case of inclement weather.
- 3) All plenary sessions will be held in the Kongresssaal of the Kongresszentrum Igls.
- 4) Each participant will be assigned to one of four small working groups which will meet in the Kongresszentrum.

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Friday, March 23

9:00 A.M. - 2:00 P.M.

Arrival in Igls - Check in to Hotel

(Hotel assignments will be sent ahead to all participants)

Note: Luncheon will not be provided as part of the conference package. All participants who arrive early should eat lunch at their hotel at their own expense.

2:00 p.m. - 3:00 p.m.

Conference Registration - Kongressaal

3:00 p.m. - 3:45 P.M.

PLENARY

- Welcoming Remarks: Ira D. Wallach, Chairman,  
Executive Committee, Institute for East-West  
Security Studies
- Opening Remarks: John Edwin Mroz, President,  
Institute for East-West Security Studies.
- Opening Address - H.E. Mr. Erwin Lanc  
"Approaches to Arms Control in Europe"

3:45 - 5:45 P.M.

PLENARY

Panel Discussion: "Approaches to Arms Control in Europe"

- Dr. Johan J. Holst, Director of the Norwegian Institute  
of International Affairs; Conference Deputy Chairman.
- Dr. Gyula Gyovai, Director of the Hungarian Institute  
of International Relations; Conference Deputy  
Chairman.
- H.E. Mr. Peter Jankowitsch, Member of the Austrian  
National Assembly; Conference Deputy Chairman.

Plenary Discussion

5:45 - 6:00 P.M.

Refreshments

6:00 - 7:30 P.M.

PLENARY

Presentation and Discussion of Conference Papers on  
Topics #1 and #2

Introduction of Topic #1: Intermediate Range Nuclear  
Forces

Summary presentation of a paper prepared by the  
Institute's team of East-West Fellows.

NATO's INF deployment and the Soviet decision to  
break off the Geneva talks has cast a new pall over the  
prospects for arms control in Europe. What are the  
political and military conditions for breaking the  
deadlock? What are the alternatives to the present  
negotiating framework? How will technological  
developments in the near future affect these issues?

Introduction of Topic # 2: Conventional Defense and  
Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Summary presentation of a paper prepared by the  
Institute's team of East-West Fellows.

Rising anti-nuclear sentiment in Europe and the  
development of new conventional technologies have given  
rise to a debate over the validity of nuclear defense.  
What are the current alternatives to "flexible response"  
and what are their political/military implications? What  
role can and should short-range nuclear systems play in  
Western and Eastern defense? What are the prospects  
and implications for trying to constrain short-range  
nuclear systems?

Plenary Discussion

7:30 - 8:30 P.M.

Free time

8:30 P.M.

Buses depart from Hotels to Innsbruck.

9:00 - 11:00 P.M.

Dinner (at restaurant in Innsbruck to be determined).

11:00 P.M.

Buses depart from Innsbruck to Hotels in Igl.

Saturday, March 24

7:00 - 8:45 A.M.

Breakfast (to be taken by participants in their hotel)

8:45 - 9:00 A.M.

Walk or bus to the Kongresszentrum

9:00 - 10:30 A.M.

WORKING GROUP (A,B,C,D) DISCUSSIONS

- Working Groups A and B will discuss Topic #1,  
"Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces"
- Working Groups C and D will discuss Topic #2,  
"Conventional Defense and Tactical Nuclear Weapons"

Note: Participants will be given the opportunity to select  
in late February which of the two sets of working groups  
they would like to join. Meeting rooms for each of the  
four working groups will be noted on the Final Agenda  
mailed to participants prior to the conference.

30 - 8:30 P.M. Free Time

8:30 P.M. Buses depart from hotel for Innsbruck

9:00 - 11:00 P.M. Dinner and Tirolean Entertainment in Innsbruck

11:00 P.M. Buses depart from Innsbruck to Igls hotels

Sunday, March 25

7:00 - 8:45 A.M. Breakfast (to be taken by participants in their hotel)

8:45 - 9:00 A.M. Walk or bus to the Kongresszentrum

9:00 - 10:45 A.M. WORKING GROUP (A,B,C,D) DISCUSSIONS  
Discussion of Topic #3

10:45 - 11:00 A.M. Coffee and tea

11:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M. PLENARY  
Working Group Chairmen (A,B,C,D) Report on Topic #3  
Plenary Discussion  
Concluding Session  
Chairman's Remarks: H.E. Mr. Erwin Lanc

1:00 - 2:15 P.M. Concluding Luncheon (Served in the Restaurant of the Kongresszentrum)

2:15 P.M. Departure of Participants

NOTE: The Spring 1984 Meeting of the Board of Directors of the Institute for East-West Security Studies will convene at 3:00 P.M. in the Kongresssaal of the Kongresszentrum.

- 9:30 - 10:45 A.M.      Coffee and tea
- 10:45 A.M. - 12:15 P.M.      Working Group Discussions Continue
- 12:15 - 2:00 P.M.      Luncheon (Served in the Restaurant at the  
Kongresszentrum)
- Speech by Soviet official (to be announced)
- Speech by U.S. official (to be announced)
- 2:00 - 4:30 P.M.      Free Time
- Note: Members of the Institute's Academic Advisory  
Committee will convene in the Saal Wilten for their annual  
meeting at 2:00 P.M..
- 4:30 - 6:15 P.M.      PLENARY
- Working Group Chairmen (A,B) Report on Topic #1
- Working Group Chairmen (C,D) Report on Topic #2
- Plenary Discussion
- 6:15 - 6:30 P.M.      Refreshments
- 6:30 - 7:30 P.M.      PLENARY
- Introduction of Topic #3: Confidence-Building Measures
- Summary presentation of a paper prepared by the  
                                 Institute's team of East-West Fellows.
- With the approach of the Conference on Disarmament  
                                 in Europe (CDE), due to open in Stockholm in January,  
                                 increasing attention has been devoted to the issue of  
                                 confidence-building measures (CBMs). The role and  
                                 function of CBMs, however, remain unclear. What  
                                 precisely is the relationship of CBMs to arms control?  
                                 What are the areas of common interest between East  
                                 and West? In what way can CBMs contribute to  
                                 enhancing security in Europe?

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## Board of Directors Spring Meeting

March 25 and 26, 1984

Igls, Austria

### Preliminary Schedule

#### Notes

- 1) All sessions of the Board Meeting will be held in the Kongresssaal of the Kongresszentrum Igls.

#### Sunday, March 25

1:00 - 2:15 P.M.	<u>Concluding Luncheon for Institute's Annual Conference (all Board members are invited to attend)</u>
3:15 - 5:15 P.M.	<u>First Session of the Board Meeting convenes under the Chairmanship of Ira D. Wallach, Chairman of the Executive Committee</u>
5:15 - 5:45 P.M.	<u>Refreshments</u>
5:45 - 7:30 P.M.	<u>Second Session of the Board Meeting</u>
7:30 - 8:30 P.M.	<u>Free Time</u>
8:30 - 9:15 P.M.	<u>Cocktails (at one of the three hotels in Igls - to be announced)</u>
9:15 - 10:30 P.M.	<u>Dinner (at one of the three hotels in Igls - to be announced)</u>
10:30 P.M. -	<u>Informal Discussions</u>

Monday, March 26

8:00 - 9:30 A.M.

Working Breakfast Meeting

This meeting is hosted by the Finance Committee to enable all Directors to participate in a discussion of the Institute's long-term fundraising strategy.

9:30 - 9:45 A.M.

Walk or bus to the Kongresszentrum

9:45 A.M. - 12:30 P.M.

Third Session of the Board Meeting (Coffee and tea will be available)

12:30 - 2:00 P.M.

Concluding Luncheon (served in the Restaurant of the Kongresszentrum)

2:00 P.M.

Departure of Board Members

RESTRICTED


February 22, 1984

IDDZ-0187

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ARCHDEACON

Initiative - Parliamentary Resolution

Further to our meeting with the Prime Minister this morning, I attach, as agreed, a revised and abridged draft resolution.

  
L. A. Delvoze  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

cc: PMO/Fowler/Axworthy  
PCO/Osbaldeston  
DND/Anderson  
DEA/MINA USS DMF IFB

DRAFT RESOLUTION

That this House,  
mindful of Canada's place in the community of Western nations  
and of its enduring commitment to the principles, purposes  
and policies of the North Atlantic Alliance;

recalling the efforts made by successive Canadian governments  
over the last forty years in the cause of international peace  
and security;

troubled by the state of East-West relations, by serious  
instability in the international security situation, by the  
continuing arms race and, above all, by the risk of nuclear  
war which threatens the survival of humanity;

- (i) endorses the efforts and initiatives of the Government of  
Canada to restore a climate of confidence in East-West  
relations, to re-establish high-level political dialogue  
between East and West, and to contribute to the vital  
goal of arms control and disarmament;
- (ii) draws to the attention of all countries of East and West  
the following ten principles on which they can build in  
developing their relations on the basis of mutual  
interest:
  - 1. Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.

.../2

2. Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
3. Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or of surprise attack.
4. Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
5. Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
6. Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
7. Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
8. Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
9. Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
10. Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

Feb. 21/84

Refer to ~~CTM/Matthews~~  
& diary file

Done  
23/2/84  
AC

MF

Deputy Prime Minister  
Secretary of State for External Affairs



Canada

Le premier ministre  
Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A 0G2

The Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau,  
P.C., Q.C., M.P.  
Prime Minister of Canada  
OTTAWA, Ontario  
K1A 0A2

My dear Prime Minister:

Shortly after it was announced in the Speech from the Throne last December that it was the Government's intention to create a publicly-funded centre to deal with defence and arms control issues, I asked Geoffrey Pearson to study this question in all its aspects and to submit a report and recommendations to me.

A short time ago, I received Pearson's report, in which he suggested that further consideration needed to be given to the matter before any final decisions were reached on creating a defence and arms control centre. On reading his report and the tentative conclusions to which he has come, I can only agree that more time is required to study the matter in the depth which it deserves.

I think it may be useful, however, for me to give you my own preliminary thoughts on the question while making it clear that they do not in all instances reflect the views of Geoffrey Pearson.

Let me first say that I do not think the Government should endeavour to create a research centre per se. To do so would merely risk duplicating the work already being done in the fields of defence and arms control by a number of non-governmental institutions



- 2 -

across the country, many of which have been long established (partial list attached), and one of which - the Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, based in Ottawa - was established just last November with some Government financial assistance. Furthermore, the number of people in Canada with expertise and experience in these fields is limited. To establish a research centre of any size in Ottawa would require raiding existing institutions and government departments for scarce human resources. In other words, it would mean "robbing Peter to pay Paul".

I believe that it would be preferable that any government centre be mandated to stimulate, fund and, to the extent possible, coordinate research work being done in existing institutions. Most of these already receive government grants or work under contract to government departments but are still generally inhibited in their work by a lack of funds. More generous government funding would permit them to realize their potential more fully.

The Government's centre could also have among its objectives bringing to the attention of the public the results of research conducted both in Canada and abroad through an active publication and information program. It could pursue this educational and information function by organizing conferences and seminars to which both specialists and members of the general public would be invited. It could also constitute a data bank and dissemination centre available to scholars, specialists and laymen alike.

Finally, I see the Government's centre as having a significant role to play in the development of expertise in Canada in defence and arms control studies. The centre should have the funds required to operate an ambitious program of fellowships and scholarships for university students and others interested in pursuing their studies in these fields. This would not only help Canada to build up a fund of expertise but would also help to develop and expand programs which already exist in universities across the country.

While the centre should enjoy a substantial measure of operational autonomy in order to ensure its credibility with the Canadian public, I believe it is important that it assist the work of the Government and

- 3 -

not act at cross-purposes with it in policy terms. What we need is an institution that will deepen our own and the public's knowledge of the complex issues involved in the defence and arms control field and augment the Government's capacity to respond to and/or initiate forward-looking proposals of its own in this domain. I furthermore think the Director of the centre should be appointed by and report annually to the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

I hope that you will find these preliminary thoughts of interest. This whole matter is one which merits further considered study and I can assure you that I shall write to you again as soon as our ongoing examination permits me to give to you some more definitive views on the shape the centre should take.

Yours sincerely,

*signed  
AJM*

Allan J. MacEachen

Some Institutions Dealing with Defence and Arms Control Affairs

- 1) Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University
- 2) Centre for Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick
- 3) Centre Québécois des Relations Internationales, Laval  
University
- 4) Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton  
University
- 5) Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Ottawa
- 6) Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, Toronto
- 7) Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto
- 8) Research Program for Strategic Studies, York University
- 9) Centre for International Relations, Queens University
- 10) Strategic Studies Program, University of Calgary
- 11) Institute of International Relations, University of British  
Columbia

*file*

Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A 0G2

February 22, 1984

IDDZ-0203

Mr. C.R. Davidson  
Box 2412  
Station 177  
Halifax, N.S.  
B3J - 3E4

Dear Mr. Davidson:

The Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. MacEachen, has asked me to thank you for your letter and support of the Canadian Government's initiative on East-West relations and international security.

It is clear that the Prime Minister is voicing the deep concerns of a great many Canadians when he has argued the urgent necessity of reducing international tensions and building a constructive, long-term relationship between East and West.

The Prime Minister believes, as you do, that peace is broader than simple arms reduction. Arms control and disarmament negotiations can only succeed if they proceed within a framework of political understanding between the two sides. The Prime Minister's initiative has aimed, in part, at recalling the superpowers to their heavy responsibilities to each other and to the world community.

In his speech in the House of Commons on February 9, the Prime Minister proposed a set of ten principles that countries of both East and West could draw on in developing their relations, based on common interests. This is one area in which, we hope, both sides can agree.

We, too, are worried by the dangers of horizontal nuclear proliferation; as a key part of the initiative, the Prime Minister has drawn attention to this danger and to the necessity of buttressing the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is our best hope of containing the spread of nuclear weapons. While Canada does sell Candu reactors abroad, it

.../2


- 2 -

does so only to countries which have made binding international commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Hence Canada does not aid horizontal proliferation.

A central part of the covenant of the Non-Proliferation Treaty between the nuclear powers and non-nuclear states is that the nuclear powers will provide nuclear technology to other states for peaceful purposes. Only on this basis will other nations continue to support the NPT.

Thank you again for your support for the Government's efforts.

Yours truly,



L. A. Delvoie  
Chairman

Task Force Working Group



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

REFERRED BY THE OFFICE  
OF THE SECRETARY OF  
STATE FOR EXTERNAL  
AFFAIRS, MINISTER'S  
REGISTRY - LETTERS

TRANSMIS PAR LE CABINET  
DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT  
AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES  
DOSSIERS DU MINISTÈRE -  
LETTRES

5-2723

To/À  
AU

*JDA*



FOR INFORMATION AND ANY NECESSARY ACTION  
POUR EXAMEN ET SUITE À DONNER, S'IL Y A LIEU



THIS LETTER HAS BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED  
ON A ACCUSÉ RÉCEPTION DE CETTE LETTRE



BY TELEPHONE/PAR TÉLÉPHONE



BY LETTER (Copy attached)/PAR LETTRE (Copie-jointe)

REMARKS/REMARQUES

*PP*

Signature

*84-2-17*

000785

Da

10

Dear Sir,

1DDZ

I applaud your government's peace initiative, but hope you will apply its goals to all aspects of policy.

Horizontal proliferation is a real and deadly danger. There is no excuse for Canada's continuing to contribute by selling Candu reactors. Please do what you can to get rid of the Candu program.

Also, the U.S. seems to be developing chemical weapons and officially sanctioning the role of outer space in the arms race. Peace is more than a decrease in the numbers of nuclear weapons. That will help, but we also need qualitative disarmament.

Please work towards a general de-escalation.

of world tensions.  
Perhaps Canada could  
play a role in initiating  
some east-west joint  
projects.

In any event, please  
continue to work for  
peace.

Sincerely

Charles R. Davidson

P.S. Any response  
will be appreciated.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY  
PRIME MINISTER

FEB 17 1984

C. R. Davidson  
Box 2412  
Station 177  
Halifax, N.S.  
B3J-3E4




HELP CHILDREN WITH  
UNICEF  
POUR LES ENFANTS

Hon MacEachen  
Sect. of State External Affairs  
House of Commons  
Ottawa, Ont.



8



000789

29 Feb

MINA (2)  
FILE  
CMR  
FPR

PLEASE RETURN TO IDDZ AFTER SIGNATURE

IDDZ-0186

*Currier*

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A 0G2

FEB 29 1984

Ms. Sheila Young  
Secretary  
Women's International League  
for Peace and Freedom  
1176 W. 11th Avenue  
Vancouver, B.C.  
Canada  
V6J 2C3

Dear Ms. Young:

Thank you for your letter of January 9 which reached Stockholm after my departure and has been returned to me in Ottawa.

We are grateful for your support for the Canadian government's efforts to reverse the trend in East-West relations and to contribute to a more propitious climate for dealings between the superpowers. We have maintained that the vital arms control negotiations cannot be pursued successfully unless they take place within an agreed political framework. A recognition of their over-arching political responsibilities appears to have been absent from the superpowers' approach to each other in recent years.

We will give a high priority to the Stockholm Conference, as it can, by building confidence between both sides, reduce the risk of war in Europe.

Thank you for your support for our efforts. You can be assured that the government will continue to argue the urgent necessity of political leaders squarely facing the central problems of international security and the nuclear arms race.

FEB 24 1984  
A65500  
1 DD

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed by  
Original signé par  
ALLAN J. MacEACHEN

Allan J. MacEachen



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

**ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE**

pm Sheila Young, Secy. Womens Innatl. League for Peace & Freedom, BC		No. No	A 05500
Subject Sujet Urges Cdn. Govt. to continue Confidence & Security Building Measures between East & West.		Action div./Dir. responsable IDA ID DZ	
Letter dated/Lettre en date du 84-01-9	Date rec'd in MINA Date de réception à MINA 84-02-08	Date sent to div. Date d'envoi à la dir. 84-02-08	Info. division(s)/Direction(s) informée(s)
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par			84-02-15
Comments/Commentaires			

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE  <input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de  <input type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction  <input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date received/Date reçu February 9 1984 <hr/> Action officer/Agent responsable J. McNEE <hr/> Disposition Letter ID DZ-0186 <hr/> Date February 22 1984 <hr/> For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA FEB 29 1984
ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA REGISTRY LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT	5-1047



CANADA

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS  
OF THE  
CANADIAN  
~~EMBASSY~~  
Delegation

AVEC LES HOMMAGES  
DE la  
~~L'AMBASSADE DU~~  
~~CANADA~~  
délégation du  
Canada  
January 24, 1984

Office of the  
Hon. Allan J. MacEachen  
(MINA)

Received at the Delegation Office  
after the departure of the Minister  
and party. Forwarded to you for  
appropriate action.

*fr* *T Newton*

Canadian Delegation to the  
Conference on Confidence and  
Security-Building Measures and  
Disarmament in Europe

000792

# Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

INTERNATIONAL HEADQUARTERS: 1, Rue de Varembe, 1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland.  
CONSULTATIVE STATUS B WITH UNITED NATIONS, ECOSOC, UNCTAD, UNESCO,  
SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE RELATIONS WITH FAO, ILO, UNICEF.

## VANCOUVER BRANCH

1768 W. 11th Avenue,  
Vancouver, B.C. Canada,  
V6J 2C3.

January 9, 1984.

Hon. Alan MacEachen,  
Minister for Foreign Affairs,  
Conference on "Confidence and Security Building Measures etc,  
Stockholm, Sweden.

Dear Mr. MacEachen:

Members of the above organization view your presence as our representative at this important conference as part of the initiative of the Prime Minister to do all possible to make a breakthrough in the perilous situation existing between East & West.

Although its terms of reference appear not to have any direct relation, in that we understand that matters on the proposed agenda are only indirectly related to the issues which could create agreements to take immediate steps to not only ensure the security of Europe, but also to ease global tensions, it is our fervent hope that delegates will insist on priorities at this session.

The efforts of Mr. Trudeau undoubtedly have awakened many governmental leaders to the imperative need of taking far stronger measures against the prolonged, and apparently insincere approach to negotiations on the subject of nuclear weapons, which has created the appalling fear and danger overshadowing humanity. We call upon you to extend that spirit of urgency, and voice strongly at every opportunity, that no longer must the two superpowers delay in arriving at decisions which will be implemented to halt the mad arms race.

Yours is a very challenging assignment. But we have confidence that you will keep in mind the dire results of a global nature should Governments fail the people.

Yours sincerely,

  
Sheila Young,  
Secretary.

C O P Y

# Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

INTERNATIONAL HEADQUARTERS: 1, Rue de Varembe, 1211 Genève 20, Switzerland.  
CONSULTATIVE STATUS B WITH UNITED NATIONS, ECOSOC, UNCTAD, UNESCO,  
SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE RELATIONS WITH FAO, ILO, UNICEF.

**VANCOUVER BRANCH**  
1768 W. 11th Avenue,  
Vancouver, B.C.,  
V6J 2C3.

January 9, 1984.

Rt. Hon. Pierre E. Trudeau,  
Prime Minister of Canada,  
House of Commons,  
Ottawa, Ont. K1A 0A2.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

At this crucial period of unprecedented danger aggravated by mounting tension between the two super-Powers, it is our deep concern that the Conference on "Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament" in Europe give preference to discussion and formulation of proposals vital to the early security of Europe by the elimination of all nuclear weapons—intermediate range, tactical and strategic on land and surrounding seas.

It should be noted that irrespective of agreements on Detente, the time between the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975 and today has proved conclusively that it is useless to strive for confidence and trust while the United States and the Soviet Union struggle to achieve and maintain military superiority in the best methods of mass slaughter.

In our view, the Conference in Stockholm offers what could be the last opportunity for other nations of the world to insist that both East and West discard animosities, fear and distrust, and address themselves directly to the weighty task that surpasses all other considerations: action to ensure that the threat of a nuclear war be removed from Europe, and thus, the beginning of a reversal of the global arms race.

We agree with the recent statement of the Secretary General of the United Nations: "Who has given these two super-Powers the right to decide our fate?"

Your courageous initiative to seek to lessen tension, and bring together the two antagonists in high-level negotiations has gained the respect of many Governments and world public opinion. We, of the WILPF, operating in thirty countries, give full support, and beg you to pursue your commendable endeavours confident that the peoples of the world are with you.

Aware that deliberations and decisions at the coming Conference will reverberate and affect the world military situation, we urge that Canada press, through every available channel, for concentration on key issues relating to European security which could break the present deadlock on concrete action and lead to steps of progressive world disarmament.

Yours sincerely,

Sheila Young,  
Secretary.

c.c. Hon. A. MacEachen, Hon. G. Pelletier.

000794

W.I.L.P.F.  
1768 W.11th Avenue,  
Vancouver, B.C. Canada,  
V6J 2C3.



Hon. Alan MacEachen,  
Canada's Representative,  
Conference on "Confidence and Security Measures etc"  
STOCKHOLM,  
SWEDEN.

URGENT

**Air mail Par avion**

*forward to Ottawa.*

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

mf

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BNATO YBGR6195 22FEB84

TØ EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO HAGUE BONN NDHQOTT/DSTRATA

REF YOURTEL IDDZØ181 2ØFEB

---PM INITIATIVE:THREE SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS

RESERVATIONS FOR FIRST-CLASS TRAVEL NOT/NOT NECESSARY AT  
THIS TIME OF YEAR,AND IN ANY CASE RESERVATIONS CAN ONLY  
BE MADE ON TRAIN DEPARTING 1329.TRAINS DEPART BRU FOR  
HAGUE EVERY HOUR.

2.MOST DIRECT TRAIN HAGUE TO BONN DEPS HAGUE AT 1644,  
CONNECTING AT COLOGNE, FOR 21Ø9 ARRIVAL BONN.ALTERNATIVES  
ARE FREQUENT DEPARTURES, WITH TWO CONNECTIONS, AT AMSTERDAM  
OR BRU, AND COLOGNE.

3.ADVISE.

UUU/Ø7Ø 22163ØZ YBGR6195

*Mr. Smith*

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

*mf*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HAGUE YWGR0371 22FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ IMMED

INFO CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR GENEV PARIS OSLO  
COPEN ATHNS STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER WSHDC PRMNY  
NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DNACPOL/DIPOL/PPP/CSTRATA/CIS  
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDAO IDAN IDR SCS  
REF YOURTELS IDDZ0158 15FEB 0177 17FEB

---PM INITIATIVE:THREE SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS

WE ARE GLAD YOU COULD INCLUDE HAGUE IN YOUR TOUR OF BILATERAL  
CONSULTATIONS IN EUROPE ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF RESERVATIONS  
EXPRESSED BY DUTCH WITH REGARD TO PMS THREE SUFFOCATION  
PROPOSALS(REF OURTEL 0341 FEB3/84).VOS,DIR OF ATLANTIC  
COOPERATION AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AT MFA,SAID HE APPRECIATED  
GESTURE.UNFORTUNATELY,JACBOVITS,DIR GEN OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS,  
VOS HIMSELF AND VAN WALSUM,DIR OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE,WILL ALL BE  
IN WSHDC THAT WEEK WITH FOR MIN VAN DEN BROEK FOR BILATERALS WITH  
AMERICANS.

2.MTG IN HAGUE ON FEB29 COULD TAKE PLACE WITH MRS DE BIJLL  
NACHENIUS,HEAD OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS DESK UNDER VOS.DE BIJLL  
NACHENIUS IS WELL KNOWN TO SMITH SINCE THEY WERE BOTH MEMBERS  
OF THEIR RESPECTIVE NATO DELS IN BRU DURING SAME PERIOD.IN OUR  
EXPERIENCE SHE IS KNOWLEDGEABLE AND INTELLIGENT INTERLOCUTOR.  
VOS SAID THAT ROVING AMB WIJNAENDTS,WHO DEPUTIZES FOR DIR GEN

...2

*MEROURC - HEAD  
OF DIV. FOR MANS  
000797*

PAGE TWO YWGR0371 CONFD

FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS WHEN LATTER ABSENT, IS CURRENTLY OUT OF COUNTRY BUT SHOULD BE BACK BY TIME OF MTG. VOS REJECTED IDEA OF INCLUDING REPS FROM DEFENCE MINISTRY OR PRIME MINISTERS OFFICE IN BRIEFING SESSION. THIS IS BEST WE CAN ARRANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES AND WOULD THEREFORE STRONGLY RECOMMEND YOU ACCEPT.

3. BOTH AMB AND COUNSELLOR HAVE PREVIOUS COMMITMENTS FOR EVENING OF FEB28 BUT WOULD BE GLAD TO HOST SMALL LUNCH FEB29.

4. HAVE BOOKED TWO SWB AT HOTEL DES INDES FOR EVENIN OF FEB28.

CCC/155 221458Z YWGR0371

ACTAON

MF  
MIDDZ

R E S T R I C T E D

FM ANKRA ZEGR0260 22FEB84

TO EXTOTT IID

INFO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN PCOOTT/FOWLER ATHNS BONN LDN PARIS MOSCO

ROME BNATO WSHDC STKHM/SCEL NDHQOTT

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR UGB URR IDD IDA IDR FPP RWP

---PM TRUDEAUS PEACE INITIATIVE-TURKISH PRESS AND MEDIA COVERAGE

AS RESULT OF CONTINUING EMBASSY CONTACTS WITH TURKISH PRESS AND MEDIA

RE PMS PEACE INTITIAIVE, INCLUDING LET FROM AMB TO ALL FOREIGN EDITORS

OF NEWSPAPERS HIGHLIGHTING PMS RECENT H OF C SPEECH, THREE NATL

NEWSPAPERS REPORTED ON INITIATIVE OVER PAS WEEK. ONE OF THEM, MILLIYET

IS CONSIDERED AMONGST MOST INFLUENTIAL OF ALL NATL DAILIES AND HAS

EXCELLENT, WELL-INFORMED READERSHIP. IT GAVE PROMINENCE TO PMS TEN

CONSENSUS POINTS. ENGLISH-LANGUAGE NEWSPAPER, THE DAILY NEWS ALSO GAGE

HOUSE SPEECH PROMINENT COVERAGE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS NEWS PAGE AND

CARRIED SEVERAL OTHER REPORTS ON PMS INITIATIVE. EARLIER IN MONTH, ONE

OF EMBASSYS CLOSE CONTACTS WROTE POSITIVE COLUMN ON PMS INITIATIVE IN

PRESTIGIOUS TERCUMAN NEWSPAPER ENTITLED QUOTE THE LONELY MAN UNQUOTE.

(IN IFC MILLIYET ALSO REPORT ON INITIATIVE VIA LET ON OPS PAGE FROM

AMB OUTLINING HIGHPOINTS OF PMS INITIATIVE). TURKISH TV HAS ALSO

CARRIED SEVERAL NEWS SPOTS ON PM OVER PAST 3-4 WEEKS ON PRIME TIME

EVENING NEWS. MOST RECENT WAS BASED ON PMS MTG WITH SOVIET SEC GEN. ON

BALANCE, COVERAGE HERE OVER PAST SEVERAL WEEKS HAS BEEN ENCOURAGING

CONSIDERING HEAVY ATTENTION GIVEN TO DOMESTIC AND CYPRUS UDI

DEVELOPMENTS.

CCC/244 231141Z ZEGR0260

BURROUGHS DEX 3500

P. 2

*action*

1/2

FEX-3502  
(212) 246-7424

UNCLASSIFIED  
NONCLASSIFIE

Facsimile  
TRANSMISSION  
fac-similé

Our file/no. dossier:

NYC 72

NO. GRPA-183 DATE 22 FEBRUARY 1984

PAGES TWO  
(incl. cover)  
(y compris la page  
couverture)

FROM: Canadian Consulate General SECTION: General Relations & Public Affairs/GRPA  
DU : Consulat général du Canada Mr./Ms. McKechnie/  
NEW YORK M./Mad. Weatherup

TO : Mr./Ms.  
A : M./Mad.

Department: EXTOTT: IDDZ  
Service :

Phone : BY OTT: PCO/FOWLER  
Téléphone :

Subject : NEW YORK TIMES 22 February 1984 (A#23)  
Objet :

"THROUGH THE WINDOW" - Tom Wicker

2/2  
15

NYT 22/2/84 p. A23 A23

IN THE NATION

# Through the Window

By Tom Wicker

Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada reports that when he suggested to Konstantin U. Chernenko, the new Soviet leader, and Andrei Gromyko, the Foreign Minister, that a "window of opportunity" now exists for better East-West relations, Mr. Gromyko replied:

"Yes, there is that window of opportunity and we want to make sure that you [the West] put something into it, too."

This puts in useful perspective the optimistic reports that Western officials, including Vice President Bush, brought back from Moscow and the funeral of Yuri V. Andropov. Mr. Chernenko, they said, showed a conciliatory attitude, leading them to believe that the long slide of Soviet-American relations to the lowest level since 1962 might possibly be ended under the new leadership.

To the extent that this slide had been the product of the bitter exchanges between Mr. Andropov and President Reagan, as well as their opposed arms control policies, this optimism seems plausible. Mr. Gromyko, however, was making it clear to Mr. Trudeau that the Russians saw no one-way street ahead. They want evidence — more than that provided in Mr. Reagan's conciliatory speech of Jan. 16 — that Washington, too, is ready to seek better relations.

Both sides having given rhetorical assurances of their interest in a warmer climate of understanding, Mr. Reagan is in good position to take the first concrete step. That would not only put Moscow in the position of having to follow his initiative or confess the hollowness of Mr. Chernenko's words; undoubtedly, too, such a move by the President would work to his credit in the Presidential election, and among European allies uneasy over his anti-Soviet remarks.

Mr. Reagan could, for example, agree to take up the longstanding Soviet offer to explore a treaty banning anti-satellite weapons. Moscow has actually put a proposed treaty on the table at the United Nations; but Mr. Reagan so far has refused to enter negotiations, and his Administration went ahead recently with a crucial test of the U.S. "ASAT," as these weapons are called.

Satellites are vital instruments for the verification of other arms control agreements; so a treaty banning ASAT's would be an important supplement to any future arms treaty, as well as a good way to "put something" into that "window of opportunity." Mr. Reagan might even offer to suspend ASAT testing while exploring treaty possibilities.

The U.S. is already ahead of Moscow

in ASAT technology; moreover, it depends more heavily than Moscow does on satellite observations, since that is one of the few ways to penetrate the closed Soviet society. On the face of it, therefore, Mr. Reagan seems to have more to gain from an ASAT treaty than the Russians do; and even if treaty talks came to naught, that would be known soon enough so that ASAT development could be resumed before any substantial harm was done.

Another possibility, if Mr. Reagan truly wants better relations, or even if he only wants to test Soviet sincerity, would be to declare a six-month unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons testing. If Moscow followed suit, the way would be open for a succeeding six-month moratorium, or perhaps a year next time, or perhaps even for the resumption of negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban treaty.

If the Russians did not participate in the moratorium, or refused to continue it after a certain point, little would be lost. U.S. verification abilities — in this case seismographic, since both nations have conducted all nuclear testing underground since the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 — are more than adequate to detect Soviet tests; and if they continued or were resumed, the U.S. could immediately begin testing again too.

A moratorium observed by both sides would achieve a major part of the widely supported "freeze" on production, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons. A Reagan initiative for such a test moratorium would have moral force too, since both the U.S. and the Russians are twice pledged (in the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty) to seek a Comprehensive Test Ban treaty, but Mr. Reagan has so far been unwilling to enter such negotiations.

Finally, as noted here before, there's a precedent: in the late 50's and early 60's, a moratorium on nuclear testing was observed by both nations for about three years. The Russians broke it, following atmospheric tests by the French, and the U.S. immediately resumed its own tests — having scored at least an important propaganda victory.

Mr. Reagan, unfortunately, has so far been committed to a nuclear arms buildup, not to a Comprehensive Test Ban — a goal pursued by all his predecessors back to Dwight Eisenhower. Declaring a moratorium now would be concrete evidence to the Russians of good U.S. intentions; it would challenge them to prove their own; and it would put Ronald Reagan in the mainstream of modern Presidential history, just in time for the elections.

*file*

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12 Purpose of Travel/Objet du voyage  
**Consultations with NATO allies re PM's Initiative**  
**(All accommodation being arranged by posts involved)**

13 City and Country/Ville et pays <b>#306</b> <b>Depart Ottawa for Mirabel</b>		14 Dates <b>1830 hrs.</b> <b>Feb. 26</b>	15 Additional Information/Renseignements supplémentaires (circle ONE in each Category) (Dans i, ii) et iii), encercler la réponse appropriée.)		
<b>Arrive Mirabel</b>		<b>1905 hrs.</b>	<b>(i) Type of Travel: Insp (RIP only)</b> <b>ii) But du voyage: Insp. (RIP seulement)</b>		
<b>Depart Mirabel-Sabena #570</b>		<b>2005 hrs.</b>	<b>Liaison/Liaison</b>		
<b>Arrive Brussels</b>		<b>Feb. 27 - 0935 hrs.</b>	<b>Conf/Conf.</b>		
<b>(Travel Brussels-Hague-Bonn being arranged privately)</b>		<b>Training/Formation</b>			
<b>Depart Bonn/Cologne-BA#745</b>		<b>1740 hrs.</b> <b>March 1</b>	<b>Other/Autre</b>		
<b>Arrive London (Heathrow)</b>		<b>1755 hrs.</b>	<b>(ii) ADMship</b>	<b>PFZ</b>	<b>PTD</b>
<b>Depart London- Air Cda #865</b>		<b>1515 hrs.</b> <b>March 3</b>	<b>ii) SMA</b>	<b>PFC</b>	<b>PUA</b>
<b>Arrive Ottawa</b>		<b>March 3</b>	<b>PTT</b>	<b>PUM</b>	<b>PUR</b>
			<b>(iii) Overtime/Leave Implications</b>		<b>YES NO</b>
			<b>iii) Répercussions en termes d'heures suppl./de congés</b>		<b>OUI NON</b>
			<b>(iv) Estimated Total Cost</b>		<b>\$</b>
			<b>iv) Coût total prévu</b>		

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Date		Recommended by/Recommandée par

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Name of Bank/Nom de la banque		Address/Adresse	
12 Purpose of Travel/Objet du voyage			

Consultations with USA officials re PM's Initiative

13 City and Country/Ville et pays <b>Depart Ottawa - Eastern Airlines afternoon flight</b>	14 Dates <b>February 22</b>	15 Additional Information/Renseignements supplémentaires (circle ONE in each Category) (Dans i, ii et iii), encerclez la réponse appropriée.) <b>Liaison/Liaison</b>
<b>Arrive Washington, D.C.</b>	<b>February 22</b>	<b>Conf/Conf.</b>
<b>(NO ACCOMMODATION REQUIRED)</b>		<b>Training/Formation</b>
<b>Depart Washington, D.C.</b>	<b>February 23</b>	<b>Other/Autre</b>
<b>Eastern Airlines evening flight</b>		(ii) ADMship <b>PfZ</b> PTD PFG <b>(FB)</b> ii) SMA PFC PUA PTE
<b>Arrive Ottawa</b>	<b>February 23</b>	PTT PUM PUR
		(iii) Overtime/Leave Implications YES NO iii) Répercussions en termes d'heures suppl./de congés OUI NON
		(iv) Estimated Total Cost \$ iv) Coût total prévu

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7 Passport / Passeport Diplomatic <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Special <input type="checkbox"/>			
10 Inoculations / Inoculations Yes <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown <input type="checkbox"/> Non déterminé <input type="checkbox"/>			

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12 Purpose of Travel / Objet du voyage

Consultations with NATO allies re PM's Initiative  
(All accommodation being arranged by posts involved)

13 City and Country / Ville et pays Depart Ottawa for Mirabel	14 Dates 1830 hrs Feb. 26	15 Additional Information / Renseignements supplémentaires (circle ONE in each Category) (Dans i, ii et iii, encercler la réponse appropriée.) i) Type of Travel: Insp. (RIP only) i) But du voyage: Insp. (RIP seulement)
Arrive Mirabel	1905 hrs.	
Depart Mirabel-Sabena #570	2005 hrs.	<b>Liaison / Liaison</b>
Arrive Brussels	Feb. 27-0935 hrs.	Conf / Conf.
(Travel Brussels-Hague-Bonn being arranged privately)		Training / Formation
Depart Bonn/Cologne-BA#745	1740 hrs. March 1	Other / Autre
Arrive London (Heathrow)	1755 hrs.	(ii) ADMship PFZ PTD PFG ii) SMA
Depart London -Air Canada #865	1515 hrs. March 3	PFC PUA PTE
Arrive Ottawa	March 3	PTT PUM PUR
		(iii) Overtime/Leave Implications YES NO iii) Répercussions en termes d'heures suppl./de congés OUI NON
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HOUSE OF COMMONS BOOK - BRIEFING NOTE  
 RE DE LA CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES - NOTES D'INFORMATION

Section

Subject/Highlights / Sujet/Points saillants CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEVA:

Soviet acceptance of on-site inspection for destruction of chemical weapons stocks.

Ambassador Issraelyan announced on 21 February that the Soviet Union would accept on-site inspection as a primary method of verification of destruction of chemical weapons stocks.

Source  
 Globe and Mail February 22, 1984

Assessment / Evaluation Classification  
RESTRICTED

If correct as stated in the Soviet statement, this decision constitutes a major breakthrough in the search for a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. In 1982 at UNSSOD II and again on January 10 of this year, the Soviet Union had expressed a willingness to tackle the issue but with restrictions. For example, in June 1982 at UNSSOD II, in a proposal later tabled with the Committee on Disarmament (CD) in August 1982, the Soviet Union spoke of the "possibility" of systematic international on-site inspection which each nation could consider "favourably" or otherwise" (right to refuse). In November 1983, the United States invited CD members to a chemical weapons destruction facility in Utah to witness the destruction of live weapons with effective verification requiring a relatively small number of inspectors. Although no socialist country attended the demonstration, the results as witnessed by 28 of the 40 CD members may have influenced the Soviet Union. There is reason to believe that the Soviet military will not be pleased with this decision, particularly since it could well have implications beyond CW negotiations. The West should, therefore, be particularly sensitive to the issue. The suggested reply includes the reaction which has been agreed to by the Western Group in Geneva and was used in a Canadian intervention in plenary.

Suggested Reply / Réponse suggérée

- Canada is delighted that the Soviet Union has accepted on-site inspection as a method of verification of the destruction of chemical weapons since it is considered an essential and basic step in the process. The decision could constitute a breakthrough in the verification process which could have implication well beyond the CW issue itself.
- It is our impression that this latest Soviet decision is one which has developed progressively from proposals made by the Soviet Union at UNSSOD II in June 1982 and more recently on January 10, 1984. Both presented useful concepts concerning the problem of destruction of CW stocks.
- Canada hopes that this new policy on on-site verification presages an across-the-board engagement on verification by the Soviet Union in all areas of arms control.
- Canada, having provided the Chairmanship for the CW Working Group in Geneva in 1983, is particularly pleased in that the decision appears to clear away a number of the most difficult issues identified last year and upon which agreement had not been reached.
- Canada is prepared to react positively to the Soviet decision and will comment definitively to the Soviet position later after study.

Prepared by / Préparé par F.R. Cleminson	Division / Direction IDA	Date Feb. 21, 1984	Tel. no. / N° de té 992-1892	000805
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12 Purpose of Travel/Objet du voyage: Consultations with USA officials re PM's Initiative

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Airlines afternoon flight		(i) Type of Travel: Insp (RIP only) i) But du voyage: Insp. (RIP seulement)
Arrive Washington, D.C.	February 22	Liaison/Liaison
(NO ACCOMMODATION REQUIRED)		Conf/Conf.
		Training/Formation
		Other/Autre
Depart Washington, D.C.	February 23	(ii) ADMship ii) SMA
Eastern Airlines evening flight		PFZ PTD PFC
Arrive Ottawa	February 23	PFC PUA PTE
		PTT PUM PUR
		(iii) Overtime/Leave Implications iii) Répercussions en termes d'heures suppl./de congés
		YES NO OU NON
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SUBJ/SUJ

---CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

GRATEFUL YOU PROVIDE US ASAP WITH NAMES OF COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE  
AMBASSADOR ACCREDITED SPECIFICALLY TO CD IN GENEV AND SIZE OF THEIR  
DELS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG Gary J. Smith/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG Gary J. Smith

000807

RESTRICTED

February 21, 1984

IDDZ-0184

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R.R. Fowler)

Initiative - Parliamentary Resolution

Following your speech on peace and security in the House of Commons on February 9, the Leader of the Opposition suggested that you "bring forward an appropriate resolution so that Members of all corners of this House may consider it and give him [the Prime Minister] the kind of overwhelming endorsement which will help him along his way". We understand that you may wish to do this, and we therefore attach a draft resolution for your consideration.

  
L. A. Delvoie

Chairman

Task Working Group

cc: PMO/Axworthy

PCO/Osbaldeston

DND/Anderson

DEA/MINA USS DMF IFB

DRAFT - PARLIAMENTARY RESOLUTION

That this House,  
troubled by the high level of international tension, by  
serious instability in the international security situation,  
by the continuing arms race and, above all, by the risk of  
nuclear war which threatens the survival of humanity;

convinced that the international community must work to  
achieve greater international security at significantly lower  
levels of nuclear and conventional armament;

recognizing that a concerted effort is required to restore  
and sustain a constructive dialogue in the conduct of  
East-West relations;

underlining the important contribution to international  
understanding of increased contacts at all levels between the  
governments and peoples of East and West;

recognizing the supreme importance of the application of  
political will to ameliorate the current international  
security situation;

- (1) endorses, on behalf of the Canadian people, the Govern-  
ment of Canada's efforts and initiatives to restore a  
climate of confidence and re-establish high-level

- 2 -

political dialogue between East and West and to contribute to the vital goal of disarmament;

calls on the participating states to give high priority to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe which aims to reduce the risks of war in Europe;

calls on all participants in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks in Vienna to work for increased security in Europe by achieving a military balance at lower levels of conventional forces and armaments, and thereby raising the nuclear threshold in Europe;

urges the five nuclear weapons states to accept their responsibilities and to come together to address the question of the control of nuclear weapons;

urges all other states to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

urges the United States and the Soviet Union to establish a genuine political dialogue, in the interests of world peace;

.../3

- 3 -

ii) draws to the attention of all countries of East and West the following ten principles on which they can build in developing their their relations on the basis of mutual interest:

1. Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
2. Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
3. Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or of surprise attack.
4. Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
5. Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
6. Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
7. Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.

.../4

- 4 -

8. Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
9. Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
10. Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

TO/À MINA  
FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE • Action request A-05616  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Letter to the DPM/SSEA from Josephine  
SUJET Monkman

Security/Sécurité	UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	February 21, 1984
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0183

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

-1-

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We suggest that the reply to this letter might best be made by one of the DPM/SSEA's exempt staff. The following paragraphs might be of use in responding to the points concerning the Prime Minister's initiative:

"Thank you for your support for the Prime Minister's initiative. It is clear that he is voicing the deep concerns of a great many Canadians when he has spoken of the critical necessity of re-establishing political dialogue and a constructive working relationship between East and West. The Canadian Government will continue to give high priority to working to reduce international tensions and to make progress on arms control and disarmament.

Regretably, we must also maintain our civil defences in an adequate state to be prepared should a nuclear war break out."

Louis Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

External Affairs  
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES  
ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

From De <i>Josephine Monkman NS</i>		No. No <b>A 05616</b>
Subject Sujet <i>PM's peace initiative?</i>		Action div./Dir. responsable <i>IDDZ</i>
Letter dated/Lettre en date du <i>84-01-23</i>	Date rec'd in MINA Date de réception à MINA <i>84-02-14</i>	Date sent to div. Date d'envoi à la dir. <i>84-02-14</i>
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par		<i>84-02-21</i>
Comments/Commentaires		

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE  <input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de  <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction  <input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date received/Date reçu <i>Feb 15 1984</i> Action officer/Agent responsable <i>J. McNEE</i> Disposition <i>transmitted to MINA 1002 0183</i> Date <i>February 21, 1984</i> For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA
ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA REGISTRY LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT	<b>5-1047</b>

EXT:439 (83/3)

RETURN TO MINA REGISTRY WHEN ACTION COMPLETED  
RETOURNER AU REGISTRE DE MINA LORSQUE L'ACTION EST COMPLÉTÉE

48 Victoria Street  
Antigonish, Nova Scotia  
B2G 1X3  
January 23, 1984

Dear Mr. MacEachen:

It was with a deep sense of disheartment that I heard on CBC newscast that officials in Ottawa had allotted \$3,000,000 to the province of New Brunswick for the construction of a nuclear fallout shelter. Surely, Sir, this is diametrically opposed to the effort Mr. Trudeau is currently undertaking in the struggle to retain and obtain a meaningful peace situation on this planet. It is without doubt that one wishes Mr. Trudeau Godspeed and success as well as yourself in these efforts.

I do wonder though at the validity of political goals of our government and those of the opposition when so many facetious remarks are bandied about in parliament. One hopes this is only a superficial stance for TV cameras and not the real thing otherwise we don't have a prayer.

Many thanks  
Josephine Monkman



MF

TO/À • L.A. Delvoire

FROM/DE • J.A. McNeel

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Parliamentary Resolution On The Initiative:  
SUJET • Some Considerations

Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	February 21, 1984
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0182

*Many thanks for this very good piece of work*

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

Task Force

I have done a draft resolution based on the Goa Declaration, the draft declaration the PM submitted to CHOGM in Goa and the ten principles set out by the PM in his 9 February speech.

After consulting Yanover, the Government House Leader's procedural expert, and John B. Stewart's The Canadian House of Commons - Procedure and Reform, I conclude that parliamentary resolutions bind no one, but they are often sought by governments as evidence of support for government action. Stewart explains "The House expresses its opinions by resolutions. It expresses its will by orders." A recent important resolution was on French language rights in Manitoba, introduced by the PM on 6 October (attached). Other examples are a resolution to approve the ratification of the Columbia River Treaty and one to concur in the report of the Special Committee on the National Flag, both in 1964.

There is no set form for a parliamentary resolution. They can be long or short and may be hortatory. Yanover stressed that our resolution should be as non-partisan as possible if it is to win unanimous consent.

The introduction of a resolution means that it must be debated (by prior agreement, the debate on the Manitoba language resolution was limited to the three party leaders, but as we have just had a leaders' debate on the initiative, such a limited debate seems unlikely). If the PM moves the resolution, that implies Speech Four. An alternative would be for the DPM/SSEA to move the resolution. That way the resolution could refer explicitly to the PM; in my draft the House "endorses, on behalf of the Canadian people, the Government of Canada's efforts and initiatives..." (this could be moved by the PM). Whether the PM or DPM/SSEA moves the resolution, a speech would have to be prepared.

As for the Opposition, in his 9 February speech in the House Mr. Mulroney said the "missing dimension" of the initiative had been "a formal endorsement of his proposals and the inclusion of, perhaps, yet others equally valuable by

WITH UNANIMOUS  
CONSENT, PRESUMABLY  
A DEBATE COULD  
BE DONE AWAY  
WITH.

23.2.84

*JAM*

all Members". He added "our endorsement of his proposals and initiatives would be no less enthusiastic" (than had the PM introduced a resolution earlier) and "I call on the PM again to bring forward an appropriate resolution so that Members from all corners of this House may consider it and give him the kind of overwhelming endorsement which will help him along his way." On his 4 December speech Mulroney outlined specific proposals on disarmament which he said he would have put to Parliament.

The NDP leader Mr. Broadbent in the House 9 February said they "share completely in the stated goals that he established last fall before he (PM) embarked on his travels".

To bridge these two positions, the resolution should be more general than specific. In sum, I think the core of the resolution must be the House's endorsement of the initiative and of the ten principles. It should in no way seem to be an instruction or mandate, but should be an expression of opinion and support.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'J. Mulroney', is centered on the page. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a prominent 'J' and 'M'.

*Official Languages*

[Translation]

**Madam Speaker:** It being 3 o'clock, the House will now proceed with the order made on October 5, 1983.

\* \* \*

[English]

**OFFICIAL LANGUAGES****RESOLUTION ON FRENCH LANGUAGE RIGHTS IN MANITOBA****Right Hon. P. E. Trudeau (Prime Minister)** moved:

Whereas a fundamental purpose of the Constitution of Canada is to protect the basic rights of all Canadians, including Aboriginal peoples, English-speaking and French-speaking minorities, religious, ethnic and other minority groups;

Whereas the Constitution contains provisions respecting the status and use of the English and French languages in Canada;

Whereas the *Manitoba Act, 1870* was enacted by the Parliament of Canada to establish the province of Manitoba and is part of the Constitution;

Whereas in 1870 Parliament provided special protection for the use of the English and French languages in Manitoba under section 23 of that Act;

Whereas the Supreme Court of Canada, on December 13, 1979, reaffirmed this constitutional protection under section 23 of the *Manitoba Act, 1870*;

Whereas the Constitution is the supreme law of Canada and is binding upon Parliament and the Legislatures of all provinces;

Whereas it is in the national interest that the language rights of the English-speaking and French-speaking minorities in Canada be respected and protected in a spirit of tolerance and civility, amity and generosity;

Whereas an agreement was reached on May 16, 1983 by the Government of Canada and the Government of Manitoba, with the participation of the Société Franco-Manitobaine, to modify the *Manitoba Act, 1870*, so that the Government and Legislative Assembly of Manitoba can fulfill effectively their constitutional obligations under section 23 of that Act;

Whereas it is in the national interest to support continued efforts by the Government and Legislative Assembly of Manitoba to fulfill effectively their constitutional obligations and protect the rights of the French-speaking minority of the province;

(1) the House endorses, on behalf of all Canadians, the essence of the agreement reached by the Government of Canada and the Government of Manitoba, with the participation of the Société Franco-Manitobaine, on May 16, 1983, to modify the *Manitoba Act, 1870*;

(2) the House invites the Government and Legislative Assembly of Manitoba to take action as expeditiously as possible in order to fulfill their constitutional obligations and protect effectively the rights of the French-speaking minority of the province.

He said: Madam Speaker, I feel truly privileged to participate in this debate. I should like to say, not without emotion, that it is perhaps the most important day of my life as a Parliamentarian. For by the resolution which is before the House, we in this Chamber are called upon to do two things: first, to ensure that the Constitution will be obeyed; second, to right a wrong.

It is fundamental to our life as a free society, indeed to our existence as Parliamentarians, that the Constitution be obeyed. The Constitution is the source of all authority in this land: it permits us to sit in this place and to make laws; it gives authority to the officers of the Crown to collect taxes or to ensure obedience to the criminal law; it is the source of the very authority by which the Queen reigns and holds office. If the Constitution is not obeyed, then indeed the human contract

on which this free society exists is imperilled. As Hobbes said, life indeed would then be solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.

This resolution is of fundamental importance because, first, it is giving our support to that principle of obeying the Constitution. Second, I have said that by this resolution we will be attempting to right a historic wrong. I think that is not only a very noble privilege and duty which falls on us but it also is an encouragement to all those in this country, no matter how weak or small or poor they be, to know that the men and women sitting in this place are dedicated to that principle of setting wrongs right.

[Translation]

What is this resolution about, Madam Speaker? It is about a law enacted by the Parliament of Canada in 1870, a law that created the province of Manitoba. This law was introduced before the Parliament of Canada by the then Prime Minister, John A. Macdonald. It gave provincial rights to a territory that was part of our Canadian territories at the time, but above all, it gave legal status to the desire of the people of Manitoba, the majority of whom were French speaking at the time, that both languages, French and English, would be entrenched in the Constitution and given equal status in the legislature, the statutes and the courts.

Madam Speaker, as we all know, twenty years later, in 1890, the Manitoba legislature passed a law making English the only official language, the result being that subsequently, unilingualism became official in Manitoba, a situation that was 20 last for many decades.

Although experts on constitutional law maintained that the 1890 law was probably *ultra vires* in terms of the Constitution, it was not until the seventies that a Franco-Manitoban, Mr. Georges Forest, challenged the law of 1890 before the courts, and the Supreme Court of Canada, a tribunal established by the Parliament of Canada under the powers vested in Parliament by the Canadian Constitution, declared that the 1890 law establishing unilingualism was *ultra vires* and null and void, and consequently, that the 1870 guarantee for two official languages still stood.

I admire the Supreme Court for saddling politicians with this problem, since it is its role. The Supreme Court must tell us what the Constitution says, without worrying about the political, social or economic problems that may arise as a result of a Supreme Court judgment on a legal matter arising from the Constitution. In fact, after the judgment in December 1979, governments in this country were faced with a dilemma. Because the 1890 law was unconstitutional, this might mean that all statutes passed by Manitoba, all its policies and practices, had no legal authority, and that is the question now before the Supreme Court of Canada, and it is there because Mr. Bilodeau asked the Court for a ruling on the consequences of its 1979 judgment.

- Largely positive

Who intended <sup>in House</sup> to SCOT ?

textual point of order: OK.

= 1st year

- # para

(a) doubt:

recommenced to SCOT etc  
to name of Tomlin  
etc to date etc for  
Lem.

1/ negotiable with opposition

Period on tactics & timing

= for the name to by 1/30 AM-

*Mr. Smith*

ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER

*mi*

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BNATO YBGR6193 21FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ/SMITH

INFO NDHQOTT/DSTRATA

---TD BRUSSELS

ROBERT ALSTON HAS ASKED IF HE MIGHT HAVE HALF HOUR WITH YOU APART FROM BRIEFING, 28FEB. HE HAS SUGGESTED, AS FIRST OPTION, LUNCH THAT DAY. WE NOTED THAT GIVEN YOUR SCHEDULE, ONLY LIKELY ALTERNATIVE WAS MON MORNING OR AFTERNOON. ADVISE.

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rd

S E C R E T

FM BNATO YBGR6190 21FEB84

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NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP/CORAE/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/CIS DELIVER BY 211400

INFO CANMILREPNATO BRU LDN BONN BRU WSHDC MOSCO VMBFR GENEV PRMNY

PARIS HAGUE OSLO COPEN ATHNS MDRID LSBON ROME ANKRA STKHM/SCDEL

PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA DMF IDA RCR RBR ZSI ZSP CPD R3X IDRL IDRA IDDZ IFB

REF OURTEL YBGR6134 21FEB

---INF:SCG MTG 20FEB:HEADS OF DEL LUNCH

SUMMARY:WITH INITIAL DEPLOYMENT BEHIND ALLIANCE,MAIN  
CONCERN OF HEADS OF DELS WAS WITH HOW WESTERN GOVTS MIGHT  
BEST APPROACH BROADENING OF ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE WHICH ALL  
SAW AS CERTAIN TO OCCUR DURING YEAR AHEAD.APART FROM NETHS  
REP,ALL OTHER BASING COUNTRIES REPORTED THAT PUBLIC OPINION  
WITH REGARD TO INF ISSUE HAD EASED.CONSEQUENCE,HOWEVER,  
WAS THAT WEST COULD LOOK FORWARD TO SHIFT IN FOCUS BY PEACE  
MOVEMENT TO NUCLEAR ISSUES IN GENERAL,INCLUDING NATURE OF  
DETERRENCE AND CONTINUING VALIDITY OF NATO STRATEGY.WITH  
PEACE MOVEMENT CASTING ABOUT FOR NEW ISSUES,EUROPEAN REPS  
IN PARTICULAR SAW URGENT NEED FOR GOVTS TO EXPLAIN AND  
DEFEND NATO CONCEPTS AND STRATEGY IN FACE OF EXPECTED SHIFT  
IN PUBLIC PRIORITIES.AS REGARDS INF NEGS,THERE WAS CON-  
SENSUS THAT WEST HAD BOTH GOOD PROPOSAL AND GOOD POSN VIS-A-VIS

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PAGE TWO YBGR6190 SECRET

BOTH WESTERN PUBLICS AND SOVIETS, AND THAT ALLIANCE SHOULD NEITHER CONVEY IMPRESSION OF ANXIETY NOR UNDUE URGENCY.

2. REPORT: BURT OPENED DISCUSSION BY SUGGESTING THAT EAST/WEST RELATIONS HAD QUOTE BOTTOMED OUT UNQUOTE AND WERE ENTERING NEW PHASE. USA SAW POSSIBILITY OF IMPROVEMENT BOTH AS TO ATMOSPHERE AND CONTENT. WITH MBER ABOUT TO RECONVENE (ALLUSION TO CURRENT STUDIES IN WSHDC WAS NOT/TAKEN UP), CDE, AND CD WHERE CW WOULD PROVIDE MAJOR ISSUE FOR CURRENT SESSION, ARMS CONTROL AGENDA LOOK PROMISING. IN NUCLEAR AREA, USA PREFERRED CURRENT FRAMEWORK BUT WAS PREPARED TO EXPLORE ANY NEW IDEAS USSR MIGHT HAVE. IN MEANTIME, ALLIANCE WAS WELL PLACED AND WEST SHOULD NOT/NOT GIVE IMPRESSION THAT NEGOTIATING POSN WAS UNDER REVIEW. BURT ALLOWED THAT IMPROVEMENT IN USA/USSR RELATIONS WOULD PROBABLY HELP REAGAN IN CAMPAIGN BUT STRESSED THAT PRES WOULD NEITHER SOFTEN HIS PRINCIPLES NOR SUBMIT TO SOVIET BLANDISHMENTS.

3. FRG REP STATED THAT GERMAN PEACE MOVEMENT WAS NOW LOOKING FOR NEW OUTLETS (INCL IN ONE INSTANCE 35 HOUR WEEK) AND CAUTIONED THAT WESTERN GOVTS MUST NOW PREPARE THEMSELVES FOR BROADER DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR ISSUES, ESPECIALLY CONCEPT OF DETERRENCE AND NATO STRATEGY, WHICH WERE BEGINNING TO SURFACE IN FRG. RUTH AVERRED THAT SOVIET PURSUIT OF NFU AGMT AT STKHM CONF REPRESENTED POLITICAL ATTEMPT TO NEUTRALIZE WESTERN

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PAGE THREE YBGR6190 SECRET

NUCLEAR POSN FOLLOWING ARMS CONTROL/MILITARY FAILURE TO PREVENT INF DEPLOYMENT. TURNING TO CD, RUTH DREW ATTN TO POSITIVE PUBLIC REACTION IN FRG TO RECENT CW INITIATIVE BY UK, AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT USA CW PAPER WOULD NOT/NOT BE MUCH LONGER DELAYED.

4. UK REP CARTLEDGE ECHOED FRG ASSESSMENT AS TO LIKELY THRUST OF PUBLIC CONCERN IN COMING YEAR. CARTLEDGE WARNED, HOWEVER, AGAINST HEIGHTENED PUBLIC EXPECTATIONS. WHILE, LIKE USA AND FRG, UK SAW LIKELIHOOD OF SOME CHANGE IN EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIP, LDN ALSO BELIEVED GREAT DEAL MORE WOULD REMAIN SAME.

5. ITALIAN REP SAW NO/NO MAJOR PROBLEMS LOOMING IN ITALY OVER IMPENDING DEPLOYMENT, BUT REMINDED COLLEAGUES THAT AS HIS COUNTRYMEN WERE NOT/NOT RENOWNED FOR THEIR RATIONALITY, FORECAST COULD PROVE WRONG. BELGIAN REP DE LA BARRE STRESSED NEED FOR SCG TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF INF NEGS QUOTE DOWNTIME UNQUOTE TO CONSIDER WESTERN REACTIONS TO ALL POSSIBLE SOVIET MOVES. DE LA BARRE ALSO DREW ATTN TO NEED TO BROADEN BOTH ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE BEYOND INF, AND DIALOGUE AT LARGE WITH EAST BEYOND ARMS CONTROL. CDN REP INTIMATED THAT BROADENING OF DIALOGUE CALLED FOR BY OTHERS, TOGETHER WITH INJECTION OF POLITICAL IMPETUS AT HIGHEST LEVEL, WAS ESSENTIAL PURPOSE UNDERLYING MR TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE.

6. OUR INTERVENTION CAUSED ASG (POL AFFAIRS) TO STRESS

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PAGE FOUR YBGR6190 SECRET

IMPORTANCE OF EAST/WEST STUDY. DANNENBRING USED HANCOCKS PRESENTATION EARLIER TO SPC, ON WHICH HE OBSERVED FAOURABLY, TO STRESS THAT ALLIANCE COULD NOT/NOT JUST RECONFIRM HARMEL, BUT MUST GO BEYOND 1967 STUDY AND INDEED DEC83, BRU DECLARATION, AND LOOK TO FUTURE. PUBLIC DEMANDED NO/NO LESS.

7. ONLY UNCOMFORTABLE NOTE WAS SOUNDED BY NETH REP VOS. VOS ENVIED BELG. HE NOTED THAT CD LEADERSHIP OF PRESENT COALITION IN HAGUE WAS NOT/NOT FIRM AND SEEMED UNCERTAIN AS TO HOW TO MANAGE DEBATE. NETH REP CAUTIONED THAT ELECTION, WERE ONE TO BE CALLED, WOULD RESULT IN GOVT WITH SOCIALIST PARTICIPATION AND CERTAINTY OF NO/NO DEPLOYMENT. VOS SAW COMING TWO TO THREE MONTHS AS CRITICAL AND IMPLIED THAT OUTCOME REMAINED VERY UNCERTAIN.

8. IN PRIVATE ASIDES, RUTH EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT CDA WOULD CONTINUE TO TAKE BONN INTO CONFIDENCE REGARDING IMPENDING ARMS CONTROL TALKS WITH GDR; WHILE BOTH USA AND UK REPS INDICATED THAT WHILE THEY LOOKED FORWARD TO VISIT BY OTT REPS, THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO OPPOSE TABLING OR CIRCULATING BY CDA IN CD OF THREE SUFFOCATION PAPERS. ON DIFFERENT NOTE CARTLEDGE ALSO INDICATED THAT HE WOULD BE MOVING BY SUMMER AND EXPECTED HE WOULD BE REPLACED AS AUS(DEFENCE AND ACD) BY JOHNS WESTON.

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S E C R E T

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INFO CANMILREP NATO BRU LDN BONN WSHDC MOSCO VMBFR GENEV PRMNY PARIS

HAGUE OSLO COPEN ATHNS MDRID LSBON ROME ANKRA STKHM/SCDEL

PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA DMF IDA RCR RBR ZSI CPD RGX IDRL IDRA IDDZ IFB ZSP

---INF:SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP(SCG)MTG 20FEB

SUMMARY:SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP(SCG)MTG CHAIRED Y RICHARD

BURT 20FEB FOCUSED ON EASTERN BLOC REACTIONS TO SOVIET

COUNTERMEASURES,POSSIBLE SOVIET OPTIONS AND PUBLIC HANDLING.USA

ALSO PROVIDED INTELLIGENCE UPDATE.SEVERAL DELS MENTIONED POSSIBILITY

RUSSIANS WOULD LINK PROGRESS ON INF TO WIDER SOVIET POLITICAL

APPROACHES.THERE WAS FULL DISCUSSION ON ISSUE OF MORATORIUM/PAUSE

IN LRINF MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS.CHAIRMAN OUTLINED REASONS WHY

MORATORIUM/PAUSE WOULD BE MAJOR MISTAKE AND WAS SUPPORTED BY OTHERS.

USA WILL REFINE AND CIRCULATE PAPER ON POSSIBLE SOVIET OPTIONS AND

PITFALLS,AND ITALY WILL PREPARE PAPER ON POLITICAL APPROACHES

RUSSIANS MIGHT PURSUE FOR DISCUSSION AT NEXT MTG IN LATE MAR,DATE

TO BE PROPOSED LATER.REPORT ON HEADS OF DEL LUNCHEON BY SEPARATE TEL.

2.REPORT:GENERAL REMARKS:BURT SAID THERE WAS LITTLE INDICATION FROM

BUSH/CHERNENKO MTG OR SHULTZ/GROMYKO BILAT STKHM ON SOVIET THINKING

RE WHETHER OR HOW THEY MIGHT RETURN TO INF NEGS.WHILE IT WAS AGREED

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PAGE TWO YB3R6194 SECRET

THAW ON NUCLEAR TALKS WAS INEVITABLE, IT WAS TOO EARLY TO PREDICT WHEN IT WOULD HAPPEN. IN RECENT WEEKS RUSSIANS SHOWED SOME SIGNS OF DISCOMFORT RE THEIR POSITION ON INF NEGS, EG THEY HAD TONED DOWN SOME OF THEIR MORE STRIDENT COMMENTS AND WERE RELATIVELY TOLERANT OF NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACK(NSWP)EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN TIES WITH WEST. BURT ALSO CITED RELATIVELY MILD SPEECH BY CHERNENKO ON ACCEPTING LEADERSHIP. HENCE, WHILE IT WAS PERIOD OF SOME AMBIGUITY AND SOME ENCOURAGING SIGNS, WEST SHOULD AVOID PUBLIC PESSIMISM OR DESPAIR; CONFIDENCE AND PATIENCE WERE NECESSARY. FRG REP RUTH SAID CHANCES FOR SOVIET RETURN TO INF NEGS WERE MINIMAL IF EXPECTATIONS WERE CREATED THAT THEY COULD USE POSSIBILITY TO RE-OPEN USA DEPLOYMENT ISSUE, IE FREEZE OR PAUSE IN USA DEPLOYMENTS. THIS EXPECTATION WOULD RUIN CHANCES FOR SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL NEGS. ITALY SAID ALLIANCE SHOULD DO NOTHING TO PUT ONUS ON WEST FOR LACK OF PROGRESS IN NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL.

3. SOVIET OPTIONS: SC3 CONTINUED DISCUSSION BEGUN AT LAST MTG ON SOVIET OPTIONS. BURT SAID THAT SOVIET INF WALK OUT HAD TAKEN SPECIFIC ISSUE OUT OF SPOTLIGHT BY RAISING WIDER CONCERNS ABOUT EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP. SOVIET PROPAGANDA AIMED AT WESTERN PUBLICS HAD SPILLED OVER TO NSWP AND STIRRED CONCERNS THERE.

IT WAS CONSIDERED TOO EARLY TO MAKE JUDGEMENTS ON HOW NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP WOULD HANDLE ISSUE. AMONG OPTIONS MENTIONED BY BURT INCLUDED POSSIBILITY (A) RUSSIANS WOULD NOT/NOT

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PAGE THREE YBGR6194 SECRET

NEGOTIATE UNTIL AFTER USA ELECTIONS(B)SOVIETS COULD  
ACCENTUATE MOVES OUTSIDE NEGS TO SHIFT BURDEN ON WEST,EG  
BY FANNING INTEREST IN LRINF DEPLOYMENT MORATORIUM/PAUSE.  
ALTERNATIVELY BURT SUGGESTED RUSSIANS COULD COME UP WITH SOME  
FORMULA FOR RESUMPTION OF INF AND/OR START TALKS,EG,  
RESUMPTION OF START WITH SOME ELEMENTS OF INF INCLUDED.  
GROMYKO COMMENTS TO SHULTZ RE USA FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS  
COULD BE TAKEN TO INDICATE INTEREST IN INCLUDING INF IN START.  
HOWEVER,SOVIET MERGER PROPOSAL MIGHT NOT/NOT BE INEVITABLE.FACE-  
SAVING SOLUTION BY RUSSIANS MIGHT BE TO PROPOSE COMPARTMENT-  
ALIZED MERGER WITH PARALLEL INF AND START TALKS UNDER SINGLE  
UMBRELLA.USA WILL REFINE EARLIER CIRCULATED PAPER ON SOVIET  
OPTIONS FOR NEXT SC3 MT3,TO INCLUDE KINDS OF PROPOSALS  
RUSIANS MIGHT MAKE AND PITFALLS TO BE AVOIDED.ITALIANS  
OFFERED TO PREPARE PAPER ON POLITICAL APPROACHES SOVIETS  
MIGHT MAKE IN CONNECTION WITH INF EG,LINKAGE WITH  
SOVIET PROPOSALS RE DRASTIC REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS,  
NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES,NO/NO FIRST USE.

4.OUR QUESTION WHETHER USA PAPER MIGHT CONSIDER WHAT MORE WEST  
COULD DO TO ENCOURAE MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE FROM MOSCO,  
PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY NEW SOVIET  
LEADERSHIP,PROMPTED SEVERAL REACTIONS.BURT SAID IT WOULD BE  
MISTAKE TO MAKE DECISIONS OR EVEN LEAN TO APPROACHES OTHER THAN

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PAGE FOUR YBGR6184 SECRET

CURRENT ONES WHICH MIGHT SUGGEST ALLIANCE WAS UNCOMFORTABLE WITH ITS CURRENT POSTURE. HE CAUTIONED THAT ANY SUGGESTION OF POSSIBLE CHANGE IN NATO POSN COULD HAVE UNINTENDED EFFECT ON RUSSIANS AND SUGGEST TO THEM THAT ALLIANCE WAS GETTING NERVOUS. THIS COULD PROMPT RUSSIANS TO WAIT FOR EVEN MORE SLIPPAGE IN WESTERN POSN. HAVING DEMONSTRATED TO PUBLICS THAT CURRENT LACK OF INF NEGS WAS SOVIET RESONSIBILITY, BURT SAID THAT WE MUST APPEAR OPEN-MINDED BUT SHOULD NOT/NOT FORMULATE NEW PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE INITIATIVES. FRG AGREED AND URGED THAT ALL ALLIANCE MEMBERS MAKE CLEAR THAT WESTERN NEGOTIATING CRITERIA REMAINED VALID. BELGIUM CAUTIONED THAT R USSIANS COULD TIE RETURN TO INF NEGS TO BROAD POLITICAL CONDITIONS SUCH AS FREEZE ON DEPLOYMENTS OR AGMT ON RENUNCIATION OF FORCE. THIS COULD BE ONE WAY FOR RUSSIANS TO REACTIVATE CURRENTLY DIMINISHED PUBLIC DEBATE ON INF WITHOUT COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO ANY NEW NEGOTIATING FORMULAE. UK SAID WEST SHOULD NOT/NOT PAY PRICE FOR USSR RETURN TO NEGOTIATING TABLE; INITIATIVE FOR RESUMPTION RESTED WITH USSR. IF RUSSIANS ACTED, WESTERN GOVTS WOULD BE EXPECTED TO REACT QUICKLY; HENCE WE SHOULD USE PRESENT INTERVAL TO CLEAR MINDS RE WHAT FORMS OF RESUMPTION OR PRECONDITIONS WE COULD, OR COULD NOT/NOT, ACCEPT. ALLIANCE MUST NOT/NOT, HOWEVER, APPEAR TO BE NEGOTIATING WITH ITSELF. UK ALSO MENTIONED THAT ONE SOVIET

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PAGE FIVE YBGR6184 SECRET

PRE-CONDITION COULD BE CALL FOR MUTUAL PAUSE IN DEPLOYMENTS. CONTINUING SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS COULD MAKE SUCH A CALL APPEAR MORE ATTRACTIVE TO PUBLICS. HENCE ALLIANCE COUNTRIES MUST STRESS NEED FOR NATO PROGRAM OF DEPLOYMENTS TO CONTINUE BY MAKING CLEAR THAT OUR DEPLOYMENTS ARE IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET THREAT AND THEIR CONTINUATION AFFORDS REAL ONLY CHANCE OF BRINGING RUSSIANS BACK TO NEG. ALLIANCE MUST SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE ON THIS ISSUE TO AVOID MISUNDERSTANDING OR MISAPPREHENSION IN EAST.

5. NSWP REACTIONS TO COUNTERMEASURES: BURT SAID SOME EASTERN BLOC COUNTRIES WERE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH COUNTERMEASURES AND WERE AT PAINS TO SHOW CONTINUED CONTACTS WITH WEST. BURT WOULD BEGIN VISIT TO EAST BERLIN/BPEST/SOFIA 21 FEB AND WOULD REPORT TO SCG REPS RE ANY INF PORTIONS OF DISCUSSIONS ALTHOUGH VISIT WAS NOT/NOT SOLELY IN CONTEXT OF COUNTERMEASURES. BELGIUM, UK, FRG REPS AGREED THAT EAST EUROPEANS WERE UNEASY WITH SOVIET COUNTERMEASURES. BELGIUM CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT WEST MUST BE CAREFUL NOT/NOT TO APPEAR TOO OBVIOUSLY TO BE TRYING TO DRIVE WEDGES WITHIN WPO. FRG CAUTIONED AGAINST BEING OVERLY OPTIMISTIC ABOUT BENEFIT TO BE DERIVED FROM EAST EUROPEAN ANXIETIES.

6. PUBLIC HANDLING: BURT FOCUSED ON POSSIBLE SOVIET CAMPAIGN FOR MORATORIUM IN LRINF MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS. HE SAID THAT RUSSIANS MAY NOT/NOT GIVE UP THEIR EFFORT OUTSIDE NEGOTIATION FORUM.

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PAGE SIX YBGR6184 SECRET

TO STOP DEPLOYMENTS BY CALLING FOR MORATORIUM. SINCE IT WAS CLEAR MORATORIUM/PAUSE WOULD BE MAJOR MISTAKE, BURT URGED THAT FOLLOWING ARGUMENTS BE MADE IN PUBLIC:

(A) REMIND PUBLICS THAT USA DEPLOYMENTS WERE GRADUAL, CONTINUING PROCESS MANDATED BY DEC79 DECISION AND WERE AGREED BASIS FOR INF POLICY. WE HAD TO GET AWAY FROM ANY SENSE OF MILESTONES IN PROCESS.

(B) WE SHOULD POINT OUT THAT USA DEPLOYMENTS HAD ONLY BEGUN AND WOULD EXTEND OVER SEVERAL YEARS, PROVIDING AMPLE TIME TO REACH AGMT ON REDUCTIONS IF RUSSIANS WERE INTERESTED; DEPLOYED SYSTEMS COULD BE WITHDRAWN.

(C) MORATORIUM WOULD NOT/NOT HELP TO GET AGMT. RATHER, IT WOULD EXPEND ALLIANCES MAIN NEGOTIATING CAPITAL SIMPLY TO GET RUSSIANS BACK TO TABLE. IF IN FACT MORATORIUM DID BRING RUSSIANS BACK TO TABLE, RUSSIANS COULD BE EXPECTED THEN TO TAILOR THEIR NEGOTIATING APPROACH TO PERPETUATE MORATORIUM. SOVIETS HAD GIVEN NO/NO INDICATION THEY WOULD ALTER THEIR NEGOTIATING APPROACH IN ANY EVENT.

(D) MORATORIUM/PAUSE WOULD REWARD RUSSIANS FOR DEPLOYING FIRST AND THEN WALKING OUT OF NEGS.

(E) USA NEGOTIATED FOR TWO YEARS IN FACE OF SOVIET DEPLOYMENTS; THERE WAS NO/NO GROUNDS FOR SOVIETS TO MAKE NEGOTIATIONS DEPENDENT ON USA NON-DEPLOYMENT.

...7

PAGE SEVEN YBGR6184 SECRET

(F)MORATORIUM/PAUSE WOULD GIVE RUSSIANS NEW INCENTIVES IN OTHER SITUS TO FREEZE ARMS CONTROL NEGS TO ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS. BELGIUM UNDERLINED IMPORTANCE OF ALLIED UNITY; LINE AS OUTLINED BY BURT WAS NOT/NOT EUROPEAN OR AMERICAN VIEW BUT RATHER WAS ALLIANCE POSN.

7. INTELLIGENCE UPDATE: USA REPORTED DISCOVERY OF ONE NEW SS20 BASE UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN WESTERN USSR (KROLEVETS) AND ONE NEW BASE IN EAST (BARNAUL 4) AS WELL AS ONE OTHER BASE ALREADY KNOWN UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN EAST (KANSK 2). HENCE THERE CURRENTLY ARE 42 SS20 BASES OPERATIONAL (27 IN WESTERN USSR, 15 IN EAST) AND 3 UNDER CONSTRUCTION (ONE IN WESTERN USSR AND 2 IN EAST). BY 1987 THERE COULD BE 350 SS20 IN WEST AND 270 IN EAST IF CURRENT BASES ARE ROUNDED OUT. USA STILL COULD NOT/NOT CONFIRM SOVIET CLAIMS THAT SS5 HAD BEEN PHASED OUT. CURRENT UNCLASS COUNT WAS 224 SS4, 16 SS5, 378 SS20. WHILE SS22 HAD NOT/NOT BEEN IDENTIFIED CONCLUSIVELY IN GDR OR CSSR, GROUND SUPPORT EQPT HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED IN BOTH COUNTRIES. 4 SOVIET DELTA-CLASS SJBS HAD BEEN IDENTIFIED IN QUOTE Y UNQUOTE CLASS OPERATING AREA OFF EAST COAST NORTH AMERICA. ALSO ONE E2 SUB WAS IDENTIFIED OFF USA BUT HAD SINCE RETURNED TO USSR.

8. SOVIET GROUND LAUNCH CRUISE MISSILE (GLDM), WITH RANGE APPROX 3000 KMS, COULD BE OPERATIONAL LATE THIS YEAR OR

...8

PAGE EIGHT YBGR6184 SECRET

1985. SOVIET SEA LAUNCH VERSION COULD BECOME OPERATIONAL AT ANY TIME; SOVIET AIR LAUNCH VERSION, ON BEAR AIRCRAFT, COULD BE OPERATIONAL THIS YEAR, INTENDED PARTICULARLY TO THREATEN USA RATHER THAN EUROPE. IN ANSWER TO OUR QUERY USA SAID IT WAS TOO EARLY TO TELL HOW BIG SOVIET CRUISE PROGRAM WAS BUT IT WAS ASSUMED TO BE FAIRLY SUBSTANTIAL. BURT SAID USA WAS PLANNING AT SOME STAGE TO INDICATE PUBLICLY NEW SOVIET SS20 BASE IN WESTERN USSR WAS UNDER CONSTRUCTION SINCE INFO WOULD BECOME PUBLIC SOON IN ANY EVENT AND HENCE, IT OUGHT TO BE PUT INTO PROPER CONTEXT, IE PART OF PROGRAM UNDERWAY FOR SOME TIME AND NOT/NOT COUNTERMEASURE. SINCE RUSSIANS HAVE SAID THEY WOULD END QUOTE MORATORIUM UNQUOTE FACT THAT THEY ARE CONTINUING WITH NEW SITES DID NOT/NOT COME AS MAJOR SURPRISE. SINCE RUSSIANS HAD TOO MANY WARHEADS ALREADY, STILL FURTHER DEPLOYMENTS DID NOT/NOT CREATE QUALITATIVELY NEW THREAT.

CCC/070 211545Z YBGR6184

NO / NO DISTR  
DISTR INTERDITE

*Ms. Smith  
to see & file  
ED*

C O N F I D E N T I A L NO/NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION

FM GENEV YTGR1230 21FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

DISTR IDD

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0169 16FEB

---PM INITIATIVE

AS YOU WILL APPRECIATE AMBS TO CD ARE EXTREMELY INTERESTED  
IN PMS INITIATIVE (AS IS SECRETARIAT). ENQUIRIES HAVE RANGED  
FROM CHINESE AMB TO OUR BNATO ALLIES.

2. PURPOSE OF SUGGESTING OUR PARTICIPATION IN BNAOT DISCUSSION  
WAS (A) TO BECOME MORE CLOSELY INFORMED AND (B) TO PROVIDE BACK-UP  
ON BASIS OF CD PERSPECTIVE.

3. IT WAS FOR SIMILAR REASONS THAT WE SUGGESTED VISIT OF SMITH  
TO CD.

4. SEPARATE TEL BEING SENT ON SUBSTANCE

BEESLEY

CCC/221 211012Z YTGR1230

ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER

*Mr. Smith*  
*Feb*  
*Sm*

UNCLASSIFIED

FM LDN XNAP1098 21FEB84

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0179 20FEB

---HOTEL ACCOM;SMITH AND CALDER

TWO/TWO SWB CONFIRMED DURRANTS HOTEL. MAR01-03 INCL.COST POUNDS 42.00

INCL.

UUU/253 211517Z XNAP1093

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM DELHI WBGR1070 21FEB34

TO EXTOTT PSR

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLDER

DISTR LDDZ

REF OURTEL WBGR1051 06FEB

---GANDHI-TRUDEAU MESSAGE

DO YOU ANTICIPATE REPLY TO MRS GANDHIS MESSAGE PRIOR TO MINT  
VISIT TO DELHI?

2.GHAREKHAN TOLD US 21FEB THAT WHILE THERE WAS STILL NO/NO  
FIRM DATE FOR DELHI MEETING, INDIANS WERE NOW LOOKIN AT LATE  
APRIL. HE CONFIRMED THAT MEETING OF SENIOR OFFICIALS HAD TAKEN  
PLACE IN LDN.

CCC/282 211013Z WBGR1070

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR1050 21FEB84

TO EXTOTT RBR

INFO HAGUE BRU OSLO ATHNS MDRID LSBON ANKRA WSHDC BNATO LDN  
PARIS ROME PRMNY VMBFR GENEV WSAW PRGUE BPEST BGRAD STKHM/SCDEL  
PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR FPR IDDZ RBG UGB UGR RGB RCD  
RCR URD URR

REF YOURTEL RBR0324 16FEB

---KOHL MTGS WITH CHERNENKO/HONECKER

SUMMARY:

TELSCHIK, KOHL'S FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR SAID KOHL'S MTG  
WITH CHERNENKO WAS SIMILAR IN NATURE AND SUBSTANCE TO PMS MTG  
LARGELY BECAUSE KOHL AND PM HAD PREVIOUSLY AGREED ON LINE THEY  
WOULD USE WITH CHERNENKO. SOVIET GEN SECTY MADE NO/NO  
ACCUSATIONS OR AGGRESSIVE PTS. GERMANS BELIEVE THERE IS MORE  
CHANCE FOR POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT OF E-W RELATIONS THAN UNDER  
ANDROPOV. ON INF GERMANS THINK SOVIETS WILL NOT/NOT RETURN  
TO NEG TABLE IF THEY JUDGE THIS WOULD HELP REELECT REAGAN.  
DURING KOHL WSHDC VISIT 24-26MAR, HE WILL CONCENTRATE ON  
CONVINCING REAGAN OF NEED FOR USA-USSR SUMMIT AND FOR  
WESTERN MOVE IN MBFR. RE HONECKER-KOHL MTG, TELTSCHIK SAID  
HONECKER WAS STRONGEST EVER GDR SECTY GEN, WHO HAD MORE FREEDOM  
TO MOVE THAN HAD PREDECESSORS AND WOULD USE THAT FREEDOM.

...2

PAGE TWO ZQGR1050 CONF

2.REPORT:AMB MET WITH TELSCHIK TO FOLLOW UP ON PM-KOHL MTG IN MOSCO BY BRIEFING HIM ON PM-CHERNENKO MTG AND RECEIVING FRG ASSESSMENT OF KOHL-CHERNENKO MTG.IN RESPONSE TO AMBS OUTLINE OF PM MTG(MOSCO TEL 0026 15FEB),TELSCHIK(WHO WAS WITH KOHL)OBSERVED THAT KOHL'S MTG HAD FOLLOWED SIMILAR PATTERN IN BOTH FORM AND SUBSTANCE,AND THAT THIS WAS NOT/NOT SURPRISING GIVEN FACT PM AND KOHL HAD AGREED ON LINE THEY WOULD TAKE BEFORE MTG CHERNENKO.KOHL THUS CONCENTRATED ON IMPORTANCE OF CHERNENKO MTG WITH REAGAN IN NEAR FUTURE.GEN SECTY LEVELLED NO/NO ACCUSATIONS AGAINST FRG,USA AND WEST.HE DID SAY IT WAS INADEQUATE FOR WEST SIMPLY TO SAY USSR HAD TO RETURN TO NEG TABLE,AND UNACCEPTABLE TO CREATE PUBLIC IMPRESSION THAT NOTHING HAD HAPPENED SINCE NEGOTIATIONS CEASED-IE DEPLOYMENT HAD BEGUN.SOVIET PROPOSALS REMAINED ON TABLE,WERE STILL VALID AND IT WAS UP TO WEST TO RESPOND.(TELSCHIK NOTED OBVIOUS RESPONSE WAS THAT THESE WERE ONLY VALID IF THEY COULD BE NEGOTIATED).FRG JUDGEMENT WAS THAT WHEN SOVIETS RETURN TO INF NEGS WOULD DEPEND ON THEIR ASSESSMENT OF REAGAN'S REELECTION CHANCES.IF RETURNING BEFORE NOV WOULD HELP REAGAN'S CHANCES,THEY WOULD WAIT UNTIL ELECTIONS WERE OVER.(TELSCHIK OBSERVED THAT HONECKER HAD TOLD KOHL SOVIETS WERE IN FACT CONVINCED REAGAN WOULD BE REELECTED).

3.ONLY BILATERAL TOPIC RAISED WAS BY KOHL CONCERNING VISITS TO FRG OF GERMANS OF RUSSIAN ORIGIN.NUMBERS HAD DROPPED FROM THOUSANDS TO HUNDREDS PER MONTH AND KOHL ASKED FOR MORE LIBERAL TREATMENT AS GOODWILL GESTURE.HE HAD ALSO INVITED

...3

PAGE THREE ZQGR1050 CONF

CHERNENKO TO BONN(AS HE HAD ANDROPOV).CHERNENKO MERELY NODDED WHICH GERMANS INTERPRET AS NONCOMMITAL.

4.GENERAL GERMAN IMPRESSION(REINFORCED BY SUBSEQUENT KOHL-HONECKER MTG)WAS THAT DEVELOPMENTS IN E-W RELSN WOULD BE MORE POSITIVE THAN THEY HAD BEEN UNDER ANDROPOV.CHERNENKO WAS NOT/NOT FORCED TO KEEP FACE AS ANDROPOV WOULD HAVE BEEN.

5.TELTSCHIK SAID GERMANS THUS PLACED GREAT STRESS ON USA-USSR SUMMIT,AND ENCOURAGING REAGAN TO EARLY MTG WITH CHERNENKO WOULD BE FIRST PRIORITY OF KOHLS MARCH VISIT TO WSHDC.

AUTHUR BURNS,US AMB IN BONN,HAD RECENTLY SAID SUMMIT RESULTING IN PUBLIC STATEMENT BY BOTH SIDES THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE INF NEGS WOULD BE SUFFICIENT JUSTIFICATION TO HOLD SUMMIT.TELTSCHIK CLEARLY BELIEVED THIS WAS POTENTIALLY FRUITFUL AVENUE TO PURSUE.SECOND AREA KOHL WOULD STRESS IN WSHDC WAS MBFR,AND NEED FOR EARLY WESTERN MOVE IN VIENN.TELTSCHIK SAID THEIR CURRENT INFO WAS THAT REAGAN HAD MADE UP HIS MIND ON MBFR BUT THEY DID NOT/NOT KNOW WHAT HE HAD DECIDED.

6.TELTSCHIK ALSO MADE NUMBER OF COMMENTS ON LENGTHY KOHL-HONECKER MTG IN MOSCO.THIS WAS THEIR FIRST MTG AND AS REPORTED IN PRESS KOHL AND HONECKER HIT IT OFF WELL.TELTSCHIK SAID MOST IMPORTANT IMPRESSION HE HAD GAINED FROM MOSCO VISIT WAS INDEPENDENCE SHOWN BY HONECKER.

...4

PAGE FOUR ZQGR1050 CONF

LATTER HAD SAID E-W DIALOGUE WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER BECAUSE SITUATION HAD DETERIORATED AND HE BELIEVED SOVIETS WOULD RETURN TO INF NEGS(WITHOUT SPECIFYING WHEN).GERMANS WERE IMPRESSED THAT HONECKER WOULD MAKE SUCH STATEMENTS BEFORE HE HAD MET WITH CHERNENKO AND THAT HE WOULD MAKE THEM PUBLICLY.

7.TELTSCHIK IDENTIFIED THREE HIGHLIGHTS OF HONECKERS MTG WITH KOHL.FIRST WAS HONECKERS CLEAR INTEREST IN GOING AH AD WITH E-W DIALOGUE AND ARMS CONTROL NEGS.SECOND WAS HONECKERS OBSERVATION THAT IF REAGAN WERE TO GIVE POSITIVE SIGNAL IT WOULD RECEIVE POSITIVE ECHO FROM MOSCO.THIRDLY,HONECKER NOTED THAT HE WAS ABLE TO ACCOMPLISH MORE THAN HE HAD IN PAST,ESPECIALLY IF NEGOTIATIONS WERE CONDUCTED IN SECRET.TELTSCHIK BELIEVED HONECKER WAS TELLING FRG HE COULD PERSONALLY DECIDE ON ISSUES WITHOUT GOING TO HIS POLITBURO.GERMAN ASSESSMENT WAS THAT HONECKER WAS STRONGEST SEC GEN GDR HAD HAD,BOTH WITHIN PARTY AND VIS A VIS USSR.HE THUS HAD MORE FREEDOM TO MOVE TOWARDS WEST(WHICH WAS ONLY PLACE HE COULD GET HELP TO SOLVE HIS PROBLEMS),AND GERMANS WERE CONVINCED HE WOULD USE THIS FREEDOM.

CCC/242 230750Z ZQGR1050

ACTION  
SITE A DONNER

CDN EYES ONLY  
RESERVE AUX CDNS

MF  
D

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM LDN XNCR0402 21FEB84

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ PRIORITY

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/PPP/DNACPOL BNATO WSHDC BONN GENEV PARIS

VMBFR

DISTR RCR IDD IDR IFB IDA DMF

---PMS INITIATIVE/MBFR,USA STRATEGIC DEFENCE,ASAT:UK VIEWS

WHEN CALLING 17FEB ON CARTLEDGE,FCO UNDERSECTY FOR DEFENCE,TO  
REVIEW DEVELOPMENTS IN ARMS CONTROL(AND TO MEASURE FCO DISCONTENT  
WITH CDN INITIATIVES)WE WERE REMINDED IN LOW KEY BUT CLEAR WAY OF  
CDA/UK DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH TO MBFR AN#OC'NVMF[+

G TACTICS IN TREATMENT  
OF SPACE WEAPONS.

2.CARTLEDGE MADE NO/NO DIRECT REFERENCE TO CDN POSITION ON MBFR.  
HE SAID UK WAS TROUBLED BY POLITICAL PRESSURES IN FRG FOR MOVEMENT  
ON MBFR(THERE WAS LITTLE SUCH PRESSURE IN UK)WHICH UK FEARED COULD  
BE IN DIRECTION INIMICAL TO LONG TERM NATO SECURITY INTERESTS.EVEN  
IF THERE WERE POLITICAL BENEFITS TO BE GAINED IN EAST/WEST TERMS  
BY QUOTE MOVEMENT UNQUOTE,THESE HAD TO BE MEASURED AGAINST ANY LONG  
TERM SECURITY RISKS INVOLVED.ARGUMENTS TO ABANDON REQUIREMENTS FOR  
FIRM MBFR DATA BASE AND TO RELY UPON VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS  
SEEMED AT THIS JUNCTURE TO BE BASED MORE ON POLITICAL OPTIMISM  
THAN OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS.UK COULD NOT/NOT SEE USSR ACCEPTING  
NECESSARY DEGREE OF INTRUSIVENESS TO MAKE VERIFICATION RELIABLE.

...2

PAGE TWO XNGR0402 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

LIKELY VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS OF AGREEMENT WOULD BE OPEN TO SQUABBLING BUT POLITICAL PRESSURES IN NATO COUNTRIES WOULD FORCE NATO GOVTS TO CONTINUE UNSATISFACTORY AGREEMENT.UK SAW NO/NO LIKELIHOOD OF USSR LATER MOVING TO CONVENTIONAL PARITY IN MBFR AREA. USSR HAD SHOWN NO/NO INCLINATION TO REDUCE ITS FORCE LEVELS TO PROMOTE BETTER POLITICAL CLIMATE AND LITTLE OTHER INDUCEMENT WAS AVAILABLE.OUTCOME OF INITIAL AGREEMENT THEREFORE WOULD BE FREEZE APPLYING TO NATO BUT UNCERTAINLY TO USSR.WE SUGGESTED THAT SACEUR ASSESSMENT MIGHT PROVIDE CAUTIOUS COMPROMISE PATH BUT CARTLEDGE SAW IT AS WRITTEN TO SATISFY POLITICAL EXPECTATIONS RATHER THAN AS RELIABLE MILITARY ASSESSMENT.UK STOOD BY ITS PROPOSAL FOR NATO REVIEW OF POSSIBILITY OF RESPONDING TO WPO WITH READINESS TO STUDY VERIFICATION BUT WITHOUT ABANDONMENT OF REQUIREMENT FOR AGREED DATA BASE.HIS HOPE WAS USA AND GERMANS WOULD AGREE TO CAUTIOUS LINE.

3.TURNING TO DEVELOPMENTS IN SPACE,CARTLEDGE SAID VISITING USA TEAM ON QUOTE STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE(SDI)UNQUOTE HAD LEFT UNEASE IN LDN.WHILE RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR DEFENCE RATHER THAN RETALIATION HAD MORAL ATTRACTIONS,ITS DEVELOPMENT WOULD OPEN HIGHLY DESTABILIZING PERIOD.USA R&D EFFORTS WOULD PROVIDE INCENTIVE TO RENEWED SOVIET EFFORT.AMERICANS HAD TENDENCY TO DOWNGRADE SOVIET TECHNOLOGY.ARGUMENTS FOR ARMS CONTROL INHIBITIONS ON ABM DEVELOPMENT REMAINED COMMANDING IN UK VIEW(CARTLEDGE SAID NOTHING

...3

PAGE THREE XNGR0402 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

OF UK INTEREST IN PROTECTING EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS MINIMUM  
DETERRENT). ASAT ISSUE WAS RELATED. USA SEEMED TO BE RELUCTANT TO  
CONSIDER ARMS CONTROL ASAT MEASURES LEST THEY BE OBSTACLE TO ABM  
DEVELOPMENT. IN UK VIEW USA/SOVIET ASAT PROGRESS WAS STILL MINOR  
AND ABOUT EQUAL AND ARMS CONTROL MEASURE WAS STILL FEASIBLE AND  
DESIRABLE. CARTLEDGE WAS NOT/NOT PERSUADED BY USA ARGUMENT ASAT  
AGREEMENT WAS UNVERIFIABLE.

4. CARTLEDGE AGREED CDA AND UK SHARED CONCERNS ABOUT DIRECTION OF  
USA THINKING BUT SAID UK WAS TROUBLED BY CDN TACTICS ON ASAT  
ISSUE. IN UK VIEW CDN INTENTION TO PUT VIEWS ON ASAT BEFORE CD AND  
PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO THIS STEP BEFORE CONSULTATION WITH  
ALLIES WAS TACTICALLY UNWISE. DEALING WITH USA ON SUCH SENSITIVE  
SUBJECT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR ALLIES AND THEIR INFLUENCE IN WSHDC  
WOULD NOT/NOT BE ENHANCED BY CDN MOVE. THIS WOULD ONLY IRRITATE USA  
BY ENGAGING NNA AND SOVIET BLOC IN CD DEBATE TO POSSIBLE BENEFIT  
OF SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR SPACE TREATY. HE HOPED THAT IF CDA FELT IT  
NOW HAD TO PUT FORWARD IDEAS IN GENEV THEY WOULD NOT/NOT BE  
ACTIVELY PURSUED THERE AT THIS JUNCTURE. WHEN WE SAID WE WOULD BE  
CIRCULATING AND NOT/NOT TABLING PROPOSALS, CARTLEDGE SAID HE WAS  
QUOTE HALF REASSURED UNQUOTE.

CCC/083 211004Z XNGR0402

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0247 21FEB84

TO EXTOTT RBR

INFO WSHDC LDN PARIS ROME BONN HA3UE OSLO ATHNS MDRID LSBON ANKRA

BNATO PRMNY VMBFR GENEV WSAW PRGUE BPEST BUCST BGRAD STKHM/

SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DGIS/CPP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB LIDDZ IDA IDR FPR RBRD RBD RGB UGB URR

RCR ZSP

---CHERNENKO-BUSH MTG

WE ARE IMPRESSED WITH THOROUGHNESS AS WELL AS RAPIDITY OF  
ACCT OF MTG IN WSHDC TEL UNGR2052(NOTAL)AND WILL LIMIT OUR  
CONTRIBUTION ONLY TO ELEMENTS WHICH WERE NOT/NOT COVERED IN  
WSHDC TEL AND TO LOCAL USA EMB JUDGMENTS.

2.WE HAVE CONFIRMATION THAT BUSH MADE HUMAN RIGHTS REPRESENTATIONS  
ON BEHALF OF SCHARANSKY, SAKHAROV AND ORLOV(RECENTLY RELEASED  
FROM PRISON AND SENT INTO INTERNAL EXILE).AMERICAN SIDE FELT  
CHERNENKO TRIED HARD TO CREATE GOOD ATMOSPHERE AND USA EMB  
COLLEAGUE CONTRASTED RELATIVELY RELAXED SETTING IN FEB84 WITH  
MUCH MORE FORMAL ATMOSPHERE OF NOV82.CHERNENKO WAS DESCRIBED  
AS CORDIAL MAN WITH QUOTE POLITICAL INSTINCTS UNQUOTE WHO  
SEEMED TO ENJOY IRONY OF HIS POSITION.AMB HARTMAN SAID HE FELT  
HIMSELF BACK IN BREZHNEV ERA.AMERICANS NOTED THAT CHERNENKO  
WAS EXTREMELY WELL AND EXPENSIVELY DRESSED.

3.RE LOCAL AMERICAN IMPRESSION OF ROLE OF GROMYKO, IN CONTRAST  
TO BUSH-ANDROPOV MTG WHEN GROMYKO NEVER SPOKE ONCE, THEY  
SEE GROMYKO AS FEELING COMPELLED TO INTERJECT AT LEAST  
ONCE DURING BUSH-CHERNENKO MTG (AND VIRTUALLY EVERY OTHER MTG

...2

PAGE TWO XYGR0247 CONF

BETWEEN CHERNENKO AND VISITORS).PURPOSE GENERALLY SEEMED  
TO BE NEGATIVE OR LESS FORTHCOMING THAN CHERNENKOS TONE AS IF  
TO MAKE A POLITICAL POINT OF MAINTAINING A HARDER LINE.GROMYKOS  
CONTRIBUTION,ACCORDING TO AMERICAN COLLEAGUE,CAME WHEN VP  
BUSH PRESENTED PRES REAGANS LET.GROMYKO STATED IT WOULD BE  
LOOKED AT CAREFULLY AND SOVIET SIDE WOULD REPLY IF NECESSARY.

CCC/095 211510Z XYGR0247

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0245 21FEB34

TO EXTOTT RBR

INFO BNATO ANKRA BRU ROME COPEN OSLO ATHNS MDRID HSNKI LSBON  
HAGUE WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN PR3UE WSAW BPEST BUCST BGRAD STKHM  
GENEV. VIENN NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CIS PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA MINE DMF IFB RGB ZSP ZSI LIDDZ CPD RBD FPR

REF OURTEL XYGR0235 17FEB

---SOVIET LEADERSHIP

REFTEL REPORTED AND COMMENTED ON A HITHERTO PUBLICLY UNKNOWN ASPECT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY PARTY PLENUM WHICH SUGGESTS SOME BEHIND-SCENES MANOEUVRING AND REALLOCATIN OF POWER AND RESPONSIBILITIES WITHIN POLITBURO DURING PRESENT SUCCESSION PHASE. ANOTHER STRAW IN WIND REGARDING POTENTIAL FURTHER LEADERSHIP CHANGES COMES FROM TURK CHARGE. DURING CALL BY TURK PM AND FORMIN ON TIKHONOV AND KORNIENKO AFTER FUNERAL CEREMONIES, TURKS RENEWED OUTSTANDING INVITATION FOR TIKHONOV TO VISIT TURKEY. HEAD OF SOVIET GOVT COULD NOT/NOT COMMIT HIMSELF, REFERRING EXPLICITLY TO SUPREME SOVIET ELECTIONS IN MAR TO BE FOLLOWED BY POSSIBLE CHANGE OF GOVT IN APR.

2. THERE WAS NO/NO FURTHER PRECISION BUT ALL LOCAL CONTACTS AGREE THAT TIMING IS RIGHT FROM POINT OF VIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS (SUPREME SOVIET CONFIRMATION OF SOVIET GOVT WITHIN TWO MONTHS OF ITS ELECTION, SCHEDULED FOR 04MAR). ITALIAN PCI DEL ATTENDING FUNERAL REPORTEDLY WAS TOLD AUTHORITATIVELY

...2

PAGE TWO XYGR0245 CONF

THAT SUPREME SOVIET WOULD BE CONVOKED WITHIN TWO WEEKS OF  
ELECTION. THIS WOULD NORMALLY IMPLY HOLDING OF CENTRAL CTTEE  
PLENUM JUST BEFORE, AT WHICH ANY GOVT CHANGES WOULD BE DECIDED/  
CONFIRMED. SPECULATION IS ALREADY RIFE ON WHO MIGHT RETIRE  
(TIKHONOV IS FAVOURITE CANDIDATE), BECOME NEW CHAIRMAN OF  
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS (GORBACHEV OFTEN MENTIONED) AND/OR BE  
ELECTED CHAIRMAN PRESIDUM OF SUPREME SOVIET-PRESIDENT-  
(CHERNENKO, TIKHONOV, GROMYKO, ETC).

CCC/095 211455Z XYGR0245

IDA CHISTOFF  
T. Joseph 24, 84  
SSEA: press release last  
week of Jan/83 was much  
more positive. You  
shd send it to  
STKHM.

C O N F I D E N T I A L  
FM EXTOTT IDA0241 21FEB84  
TO STKHM/SCDEL

INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO VMBFR WSHDC BONN PARIS GENEV LDN MOSCO  
NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/DSTRATA  
DISTR IDAO IDAN IDDZ IDR RGX RBD RBR  
REF YOURTEL SCDL0159 17FEB

J. Schmidt  
24/2/84

---STKHM CONF: PRAGUE DECLARATION - CDN POLICY  
SOVDEL MAY HAVE HAD IN MIND SPEECH MADE BY DPM/SSEA AT CD ON  
01FEB83. RELEVANT PASSAGE STATES: QUOTE THE RECENT PRAGUE  
DECLARATION REFERRED TO THE WORK OF THIS CITEE IN AN  
EXTENDED WAY. AS I SAID IN OTTAWA LAST WEEK, ANY ASPECTS OF  
THESE PROPOSALS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO PROGRESS TOWARDS CONCRETE  
AND VERIFIABLE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS WILL  
RECEIVE OUR SUPPORT, ---UNQUOTE.

2. IN APRIL 83 DMF TOLD CZECHO AMB THAT WE HAD MADE CAREFUL  
STUDY OF DECLARATION AND HAD CONCLUDED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE  
WHICH WAS FUNDAMENTALLY NEW OR LIKELY TO LEAD TO PROGRESS  
TOWARD CONCRETE AND VERIFIABLE AGMTS IN ACD.

CCC/131 220002Z IDA0241

1/6

M.F.

UNCLASSIFIED  
FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

NYK 004/21

NUMBER 0114

DATE 21 Feb 84

PAGES 6

FROM: PERMANENT MISSION NEW YORK

TO: EXTOTT / IDA (UYEYAMA)

DELIVER BY 1530

INFO:

DISTR:

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: CD Rules of Procedure

W. M. Quinn  
RELEASING OFFICER

ORIGINAL

- Registry
- Diary
- Destroy
- Doc Centre
- Circulation File

FEB 21 7 43 PM '83

2/4

APPENDIX I

(From: UN DISARMAMENT YEARBOOK  
Vol 4: 1979).

**Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Disarmament**

*(Adopted at the 15th plenary meeting, on 28 February 1979)\**

**Introduction**

These rules of procedure have been adopted taking into account the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, including the agreement reached following appropriate consultations among the Member States during that session which the General Assembly welcomed in the Final Document.

**I. Functions and membership**

1. The Committee on Disarmament (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) is a disarmament negotiating forum open to the nuclear-weapon States and 35 other States (see annex).
2. The membership of the Committee will be reviewed at regular intervals.
3. All member States of the Committee shall take part in its work in conditions of full equality as independent States, in accordance with the principle of sovereign equality enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

**II. Representation and accreditation**

4. The delegation of a member State of the Committee shall consist of a head of delegation and other representatives, advisers, and experts, as may be required.
5. Each delegation shall be accredited by a letter on the authority of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the member State addressed to the Chairman of the Committee.
6. The delegations shall be seated following the English alphabetical list of membership.

**III. Sessions**

7. The Committee shall have an annual session divided into two parts. The first part shall begin on the first Tuesday in February. The Committee shall decide, as soon as practically possible, the opening date of the second part and the closing dates of both parts of its annual session, taking into account the requirements of its work.
8. The Chairman of the Committee, in full consultation with and with the agreement of all its members, may convene the Committee in special session.

\* See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 27 (A/34/27)*, vol. I, appendix I.

3/6

#### IV. Chairmanship

9. When the Committee is in session, the Chairmanship of the Committee shall rotate among all its members on the first day of the calendar month, a rotation which began in January 1979 following the English alphabetical list of membership.

10. If the head of the delegation which performs the function of Chairman cannot be present, he may be replaced by a member of his delegation. If no member of the delegation holding the Chair is able to perform the function of Chairman the delegation next in order of rotation shall temporarily assume this function.

11. Apart from exercising the normal functions of a presiding officer and in addition to the powers conferred upon him elsewhere by these rules, the Chairman shall, in full consultation with the Committee and under its authority, represent it in its relations with States, with the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations and with other international organizations.

12. During the period when the Committee is not in session the functions of the Chairman shall be carried out by the representative of the member State which chaired the last plenary meeting of the Committee.

#### V. Secretarial

13. At the request of the Committee, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following consultations with the Committee, will appoint the Secretary of the Committee, who shall also act as his personal representative, to assist the Committee and its Chairman in organizing the business and time-tables of the Committee.

14. Under the authority of the Committee and its Chairman, the Secretary shall, *inter alia*, assist in the preparation of both the provisional agenda of the Committee and the first draft of the reports of the Committee to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

15. At the request of the Committee the Secretary shall provide professional assistance to the Committee by preparing background papers and bibliographies on issues which are the subject of negotiations in the Committee as well as by compiling data and information relevant to the conduct of negotiations.

16. The Secretary shall also perform such other functions as are entrusted to him by these rules or by the Committee.

17. The Secretary-General of the United Nations will be requested to provide the staff as well as the necessary assistance and services needed by the Committee and any subsidiary bodies which it may establish.

#### VI. Conduct of work and adoption of decisions

18. The Committee shall conduct its work and adopt its decisions by consensus.

#### VII. Organization of work

19. The work of the Committee shall be conducted in plenary meetings as well as under any additional arrangements agreed by the Committee, such as informal meetings with or without experts.

20. The Committee shall convene in plenary meetings in accordance with a schedule to be agreed upon. These meetings shall be held in public unless the Committee decides otherwise. In the event that it is decided to hold a private meeting, the Committee shall also decide whether to issue a communiqué of the meeting. The communiqué shall adequately reflect the substance of the proceedings and decisions taken by the Committee.

21. If the Committee is unable to take a decision on the substance of an item under negotiation, it will consider the subsequent examination of that item.

22. The Committee may hold informal meetings, with or without experts, to consider as appropriate substantive matters as well as questions concerning its organization of work. When

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requested by the Committee, the Secretariat shall provide unofficial summaries of those meetings in the working languages.

23. Whenever the Committee deems it advisable for the effective performance of its functions, including when it appears that there is a basis to negotiate a draft treaty or other draft texts, the Committee may establish subsidiary bodies, such as *ad hoc* sub-committees, working groups, technical groups or groups of governmental experts, open to all member States of the Committee unless the Committee decides otherwise. The Committee shall define the mandate for each of such subsidiary bodies and provide appropriate support for their work.

24. The Committee shall decide if its own rules of procedure may be adapted to the specific requirements of its subsidiary bodies. The meetings of the subsidiary bodies shall be informal unless the Committee decides otherwise. The Secretariat shall provide assistance to the subsidiary bodies, as requested, including the preparation of unofficial summaries of the subsidiary bodies' proceedings in the working languages of the Committee.

25. The approval by consensus of reports shall not be interpreted as affecting in any manner the essential requirement that such reports must reflect faithfully the positions of all the members of the respective organs.

26. The Committee and its subsidiary bodies shall normally meet at the Office of the United Nations at Geneva.

#### VIII. Agenda and programme of work

27. At the beginning of each annual session the Committee shall adopt its agenda for the year. In doing so, the Committee shall take into account the recommendations made to it by the General Assembly, the proposals presented by member States of the Committee and the decisions of the Committee.

28. On the basis of its agenda the Committee, at the beginning of each part of its annual session, shall establish its programme of work, which will include a schedule of its activities for that part of the session, taking also into account the recommendations, proposals and decisions referred to in rule 27.

29. The provisional agenda and the programme of work shall be drawn up by the Chairman of the Committee with the assistance of the Secretary and presented to the Committee for consideration and adoption.

30. The subject of statements made in plenary meetings will normally correspond to the topic then under discussion in accordance with the agreed programme of work. However, it is the right of any member State of the Committee to raise any subject relevant to the work of the Committee at a plenary meeting and to have full opportunity of presenting its views on any subject which it may consider to merit attention.

31. While the work of the Committee is in progress member States may request the inclusion of an urgent item in the agenda. The Committee shall decide whether and when it should be considered.

#### IX. Participation by States not members of the Committee

32. Representatives of non-member States shall have reserved seats in the conference room during plenary meetings and, if the Committee so decides, at other meetings.

33. Interested States not members of the Committee may submit to the Committee written proposals or working documents on measures of disarmament that are the subject of negotiation in the Committee and may participate in the discussion of the subject-matter of such proposals or working documents.

34. The Committee will invite States not members of the Committee, upon their request, to express views in the Committee when the particular concerns of those States are under discussion. Having considered such a request, the Committee will, through its Chairman, transmit an invitation to that effect to the State or States concerned.

35. The Committee may also decide to invite the States referred to in rules 33 and 34 to

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participate in informal meetings and in meetings of its subsidiary bodies, in which case the procedure of rule 34 is applicable.

36. The provisions of rules 4 and 5 shall also apply to delegations of non-member States participating in the work of the Committee.

**X. Languages, records and documents**

37. Simultaneous interpretation, verbatim records of public plenary meetings and documents shall be provided in the languages used within the United Nations system by member States of the Committee who are participating in its work. Any representative may speak in his own language provided he makes available simultaneous interpretation into a working language.

38. Numbers shall be given in the order in which documents are received by the Secretariat. Check lists of all documents reproduced by the Secretariat shall be available from time to time.

39. Documents of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD) and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) series may be referred to without their re-submission.

40. Verbatim records and formal and other relevant documents of the Committee shall be distributed to States Members of the United Nations normally within two weeks. Official documents of the Committee will be made available for public use.

**XI. Invitations to organs of the United Nations system**

41. The Committee may decide to invite specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and other organs of the United Nations system to provide information as appropriate if the Committee decides that doing so would advance its work.

**XII. Non-governmental organizations**

42. All communications from non-governmental organizations to the Committee, to the Chairman or to the Secretariat shall be retained by the Secretariat and be made available to delegations upon request. A list of all such communications shall be circulated to the Committee.

**XIII. Reports to the United Nations General Assembly**

43. The Committee shall submit, through the Chairman, reports to the United Nations General Assembly annually, or more frequently as appropriate.

44. The drafts of such reports shall be prepared by the Chairman of the Committee with the assistance of the Secretary and shall be made available to all member States of the Committee for consideration at least two weeks before the scheduled date for their adoption.

45. The reports of the Committee shall be factual and reflect the negotiations and work of the Committee. Unless the Committee decides otherwise, the drafts shall contain:

- (a) The agenda;
- (b) A summary of specific requests addressed to the Committee by the United Nations General Assembly at its preceding regular session;
- (c) Sectional headings in accordance with items comprised in (a) and (b) above and other matters raised in the Committee during the year;
- (d) Conclusions and decisions;
- (e) A table of contents and an index of verbatim records, by country and subject, of the period covered by the reports;

\* In accordance with this provision the Committee reached an understanding to use, for the time being, Arabic, English, French, Russian and Spanish.

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- (f) Working papers and proposals submitted during the year;
- (g) Verbatim records of the meetings held during the year, distributed as a separate annex;
- (h) Other relevant documents.

46. The Committee shall adopt the annual report at the end of its session. This report shall be made available to all Member States of the United Nations before the opening of the regular session of the United Nations General Assembly. All other reports shall be circulated without delay.

#### XIV. Amendments

47. These rules of procedure may be amended by decision of the Committee.

The following is the text of the Chairman's interpretative statement referred to in paragraph 15 of the report:

"It is the understanding of the Chairman, following consultations with members of the Committee, that the rules set forth in paragraph 18, chapter VI, entitled 'Conduct of work and adoption of decisions', will also apply to any subsidiary organs the Committee may establish."

#### ANNEX

*(Adopted at the 26th plenary meeting, held on 10 April 1979)*

- |                              |   |
|------------------------------|---|
| Algeria                      | Japan   |
| Argentina                    | Kenya   |
| Australia                    | Mexico  |
| Belgium                      | Mongolia  |
| Brazil                       | Morocco   |
| Bulgaria                     | Netherlands   |
| Burma                        | Nigeria   |
| Canada                       | Pakistan  |
| China*                       | Peru  |
| Cuba                         | Poland  |
| Czechoslovakia               | Romania   |
| Egypt                        | Sri Lanka   |
| Ethiopia                     | Sweden  |
| France                       | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics                     |
| German Democratic Republic   | United Kingdom of Great Britain<br>and Northern Ireland |
| Germany, Federal Republic of | United States of America                                |
| Hungary                      | Venezuela   |
| India                        | Yugoslavia  |
| Indonesia                    | Zaire   |
| Iran                         |   |
| Italy                        |   |

\* At the time of the adoption of the rules of procedure China had not participated in the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

*action*

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---MBFR:REVIEW OF WESTERN POSITION

AMEND PAGE TWO PARA3 TO READ IN PART QUOTE USSR KEPT  
SAYING IN VIENN THAT THESE HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN. IN OTHER  
WORDS, AGMT ON CEILING...UNQUOTE.

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