







### FILE USERS

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### INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE OF FILE COVER

#### CROSS REFERENCE

- 5189-1 Terrorism - General
- 5189-2 Terrorism - Activity Report
- 5189-3 Terrorism - Lookouts
- 5189-4-1 Terrorism - Hijacking & Airport Incidents - General
- 5189-4-2 Terrorism - Hijacking & Airport Incidents - Conventions
- 5410-3 U.S. Hijackers from Cuba in Transit Through - Canada
- 5400-16-4 Training of Airlines Personnel re: Hijackers etc.

NATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY COMMITTEE - GENERAL FILE  
KEPT WITH A. BUTROID

SECTION DES DOSSIERS existe pour vous servir et elle s'acquitte bien de cette fonction dans la mesure où vous renvoyez promptement le dossier. Ce dossier vous est confié et il vous appartient de le renvoyer à l'expéditeur, à moins que vous ne donniez instruction à votre SECTION DES DOSSIERS de le transmettre à une autre Direction ou une autre personne; sans cela, le dossier demeure sous votre responsabilité jusqu'à son retour à l'expéditeur.

#### EXPLICATIONS RELATIVES AUX INDICATIONS À PORTER SUR LA CHEMISE

- Colonne 1 - nom du destinataire
- Colonne 2 - nom de l'expéditeur
- Colonne 3 - date de l'envoi
- Colonne 4 - indication de classer le dossier ou de le transmettre à une autre personne
- Colonne 5 - initiales de l'usager du dossier ou indication que les mesures voulues ont été prises
- Colonne 6 - date de renvoi du dossier
- Colonne 7 - demande de renvoi du dossier à l'usager à une date indiquée
- Colonne 8 - date où le dossier doit être renvoyé

#### RAPPELS

- NE PAS - retenir le dossier plus longtemps que nécessaire;
- NE PAS - mettre les dossiers hors de vue dans votre bureau ou dans vos classeurs s'il y a ris que qu'on ne puisse les trouver en votre absence;
- NE PAS - mettre la correspondance sur plus d'un sujet dans un seul dossier à moins d'avoir fait faire des copies supplémentaires pour les dossiers en question;
- NE PAS - laisser les dossiers sur le parquet, les appuis de fenêtre, ou les corbeilles à papiers; une telle pratique entraîne souvent la perte ou l'endommagement des dossiers;
- NE PAS - changer l'intulé du dossier ni mutiler la chemise de quelque façon;
- NE PAS - surcharger les "dossier généraux"; il est difficile de trouver la correspondance antérieure dans un dossier général;
- NE PAS - enlever de correspondance du dossier sans consulter la Section des dossiers.

*Handwritten initials/signature*



**CLOSED**  
**VOLUME**



**VOLUME**  
**COMPLET**

DATED FROM  
À COMPTER DU

TO  
JUSQU' AU

**AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE — À METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER**

**DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS — NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS**

**FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE — POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTÉRIEURE VOIR**

FILE NO. — DOSSIER N<sup>o</sup>

VOLUME

Transport Canada Transports Canada

Air Air

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence 670-7

April 1, 1974.


CONFIDENTIAL

TO: THE SECURITY OFFICER - AIR CANADA  
C.P. AIR  
EASTERN PROVINCIAL AIRWAYS  
NORDAIR LTD.  
PACIFIC WESTERN AIRLINES  
QUEBECAIR LTD.  
TRANSAIR  
WARDAIR CANADA LTD.

Confidential information has been received advising that earlier this year 6 Palestinians, believed to be members of the Black September Organization, arrived in Bogota, Colombia from Rome. Entries on their tourists cards which were issued in Rome by the Colombian Consul indicated they intended to stay at a well known downtown hotel. Subsequent investigation revealed they did not register at the hotel. To date, the authorities have not been able to trace the movements of the suspected terrorists and their present whereabouts are unknown.

Following are their names and related data as given in the Airport entry records. There may be minor discrepancies due to faulty copying by the Airport Immigration Officials. The numbers quoted refer to either Syrian or Lebanese passports.

- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.



... 2

*JPH*  
*For file & any action you consider necessary, please.*  
*3/14/74*

- 2 -

In view of the possibility that these suspects may attempt to secure passage on a Canadian aircraft in the future, it is suggested that consideration be given to incorporating their names into your airline reservations network. Advance notice of their intention to travel would be most desirable in order to obtain proper law enforcement action and support in the development of plans for surveillance and a thorough security screening.

You will be kept informed of any further intelligence received regarding the whereabouts and activities of these Palestinians. In the meantime, we would appreciate advice as to whether or not arrangements can be made to use the reservations network for alerts of this nature.

Yours truly,

Original Signed by  
J. COOK

W. M. McLeish,  
National Civil Aviation  
Security Co-ordinator.

# MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION  
CONFIDENTIAL



To File

YOUR FILE No.  
Votre dossier

OUR FILE No. 22/611-USS  
Notre dossier

Chief, Eastern Europe Division

DATE

September 19, 1973

FROM  
De

Meeting between Mr. T.M. Burns, Senior Assistant  
Deputy Minister, International Trade and  
Mr. V. Myshkov, Head, USSR Trade Representation  
in Canada, Thursday, September 13, 1973

FOLD

SUBJECT  
Sujet

Mr. Myshkov, who was returning to Moscow on Saturday, September 15th for consultations until after the Mixed Commission meeting in October, was accompanied by Mr. I. Shalashov, Deputy Head, and Mr. L. Stogov from the Trade Representation. Mr. Gayner, Director, European Bureau and the writer also attended. During the course of the discussion the following points were raised:

- 1) Mr. Myshkov asked Mr. Burns what subjects Mr. Gillespie was likely to raise with Trade Minister Patolichev. The Senior ADM responded that as Mr. Myshkov knew, the Department had tended to regard the industrial exchange agreement with its working groups and Mixed Commission meetings from two standpoints: a) the exchange of scientific and technological information which had proven valuable and b) the agreement and attendant working group activities as a vehicle through which Canadian trade efforts in the USSR could be supported and trade opportunities identified -- particularly in the capital goods field. He felt that the contacts made under the agreement had been beneficial, however there was some disappointment over the lack of commercial spin-off. Mr. Burns suggested that there seemed to be a "gap" in communication which resulted in Canadian companies seeming to have identified sales opportunities only to find that a decision to import could not be obtained. He assumed our Minister would wish to speak to Patolichev about this problem.
- 2) Mr. Burns then referred to the present composition of trade between Canada and the USSR. He welcomed the success of Soviet trade efforts in Canada but pointed out that we had not yet enjoyed comparable export successes in the Soviet Union. The Senior ADM and Mr. Myshkov agreed that our trade promotional activities vis-à-vis the USSR had a two-barrel thrust, i.e. a) identification of areas where Soviet requirements and Canadian capabilities match and normal trade should be taking place, and b) our desire to sell capital goods to the USSR should in no way be taken as precluding involvement by Canadian companies in joint ventures and long term industrial cooperation in the Soviet Union. Mr. Burns thought this latter concept a highly exciting one and remarked the Minister would wish to discuss with Patolichev areas where our chances seemed most promising for cooperation in projects of this nature. He also reiterated a

- 2 -

point made in earlier meetings with Mr. Myshkov, i.e. this is a relatively new concept for the Canadian business community and this fact, coupled with the smaller number of large corporations in Canada compared to some other countries, made it difficult to identify firms quickly who could take on projects of the huge dimensions that the Soviets are putting forward.

- 3) Mr. Burns' last point concerned the second meeting of the Joint Consultative Commission on trade. He explained it was difficult to envisage what timing would result in the most productive meeting for both sides. It was accepted by Myshkov that to a large degree the timing of the second meeting of the JCC would depend on how the mixed Commission went and the success (or lack of same) enjoyed by the large group of businessmen accompanying the Minister to Moscow. At any rate this was something the Minister and Patolichev could discuss.
- 4) Myshkov thanked Mr. Burns for this information and was given an updated copy of the list of Canadian businessmen who were being invited to accompany Mr. Gillespie to the Mixed Commission meeting. Myshkov's reaction to the list was favourable, however, as some of the companies were not familiar to him he requested a short description of each firm's area of competence and previous activity (if any) in the USSR in order that he might alert the appropriate FTO's on his return to Moscow. He felt that the more information the FTO's had before the arrival of the Canadian businessmen the more productive their meetings would be, and he made particular reference to what he expected to be most interesting meetings between Mitton of Hawker Siddeley and Promashimport. We agreed to provide this information to Myshkov by end of day Friday, September 14 (done). He also agreed to get in touch with Pybus shortly after his return to Moscow and discuss the list of businessmen with him to ensure that the Soviet side had the most current position on each company's activities.
- 5) In a final reference to the Mixed Commission it was suggested that for the general briefing scheduled for Wednesday, October 17, that the Soviet authorities might bring together the same type of government representation as they provided during the businessmen's round table held in Moscow some two years ago sponsored by Business International. This meeting had given a very clear indication of how the Soviet economy operated and on the experience of other western countries in trade and joint ventures with the USSR. In addition it was suggested that it would be useful to have senior representatives of the appropriate FTO's in attendance at all working group meetings, e.g. Promashimport at the Forest Based Industries Working Group meeting. Myshkov agreed to see what he could do on both these points.

. . . 3


CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

6) Myshkov then raised two final points:

a) Toronto Office and b) the status of V. Kokonin (Raznoexport).

On the first point it was agreed that he would provide us with a detailed written justification for a USSR trade office in Toronto and we would undertake to make this material available to other interested departments. As regards Kokonin, Myshkov made an impassioned plea to have his visa extended for a further six months (it is due to expire Sept. 23) as he was "essential" to the Soviet Trade Representation's activities in Canada. Again we said further information was needed in order that as good a case as possible could be made under the demonstrable need criterion. As a result it was arranged to have Mr. Kokonin visit the Department to supplement orally the information already sent to us in writing by Myshkov. When we have all the facts of the matter in our hands we will pass them on to the other interested departments in order that a final decision can be taken in respect of Mr. Kokonin.



C. L. Bland

CLB/fc

cc: DM's Office  
Mr. T.M. Burns  
Mr. R.E. Latimer  
Mr. C. Charland  
Mr. L. Drahotsky  
Dr. S. Wagner OST  
Mr. M. Dale OST  
Mr. A.W.A. Lane  
Mr. R.H. Gayner  
Mr. J.D. Welsh  
Moscow (by bag)

External Affairs - (ECL) - Mr. P. Douglas  
- (GEA) - Mr. G. Hardy  
- (CRO) - Miss Munro

Dept. of Finance - Mr. G.F. Mintenko

Dept. of Manpower  
& Immigration - Mr. J. Hamilton ✓

000293

ROUTE SLIP  
PAPILLON DE L'ITINÉRAIRE

PASS TO: - TRANSMIS À:

1. ~~F~~ DC .....

2. 8<sup>d</sup> .....

3. ....

4. ....

Date .....

Initials .....

Initiales .....

000294

cc: Director General, Foreign Service,  
Att: IFAM

# MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION  
**CONFIDENTIAL**



TO Dept. of Manpower & Immigration,  
A Attention: Chief, Admissions Division

YOUR FILE No.  
Votre dossier

OUR FILE No. 5430  
Notre dossier

DATE April 5, 1974.

FROM C.H. Hill, Canadian Embassy,  
De M & I, Beirut

SUBJECT Arab Non-Immigrant Control  
Sujet

FOLD

This is merely a preliminary report to inform you of my arrival in Beirut on March 29 and to comment on my stop-overs in London and Paris.

Monday, March 25, I had a short discussion with Mr. Bissett and Mr. Sinclair and spent some time in discussions with them and with some of the officers who have dealt with Arab non-immigrant applications in London. I outlined in very broad terms the proposal as outlined in the draft revision of 7.63 in the Manual. There was general agreement with the proposal although with some reservation as to the delay of ten days and the possible increase in workload which would be caused by the new procedures.

Regarding the delay, it would be helpful if this could be reduced but it was agreed that, if it could not, it would not be too long before it became known that it takes a few days longer for Arabs to obtain their visas and that this would be accepted. In actual fact it would merely mean scheduling the interview for 11 days in advance rather than 2 or 3 as is the case at present.

Since I did not have any figures on Arab non-immigrant applications from London and it would have been difficult to obtain them from London records on short notice we could not discuss the question of work-load in specific terms. When I pointed out that it was my understanding that the Visa information telex would be sent by Stage "B", it was generally agreed that there should not be a very substantial increase in the work-load for the Immigration staff.

Tuesday morning I spent with Sgt. Ian Huchinson, the C.V.C.O. in London. When I outlined the proposal to him, he was quite pleased to learn of the steps that are being taken. I gained the impression that he would not be overly concerned over the additional work load in sending out the Visa information telexes but no doubt if he does have reservations, he will take them up with his Headquarters.

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- 2 -

In Paris I had discussions with Mr. Durocher and his staff regarding the situation at that office. They maintain a monthly file of all non-immigrant applications and they are retained for one year. Although we did not make a check of all the applications over the past year, the volume is much higher during the summer months. The figures for the months checked were:

1973	February	-	9
	March	-	6
	April	-	19
	July	-	68
1974	February	-	11

and it was estimated the annual figure would be approximately 325. Of the 11 applications dealt with in February 1974, 7 of the applicants had been in France 5 months or less, 2 of them for only a few days.

While in Paris I met the V.C.O. and had a short discussion with him. We did not go very deeply into the proposed procedures but he did not anticipate any real difficulty from the brief explanation I gave.


Since arriving in Beirut I have discussed the draft control procedures with Mr. Button and his staff and with Sgt. Coulpier and Dent. They have seen a copy of the draft amendment, although not the draft submitted to the A.D.M. Their main reservation stems from the problem of communication within the area covered by Beirut. Many of the areas are covered for us by British officers who are very conscientious and efficient in carrying out this work. In any case where they have doubts they query this office. If it becomes necessary for them to refer all cases to Beirut there will be a considerable increase in the load on the British telex facilities and a system will have to be set up for having these telexes picked up at the British Embassy. They do not re-transmit them to the Canadian Embassy.

I understand Sgt. Coulpier has already made his comments in a memorandum sent to his Headquarters last week, so it is quite possible there will be some discussion in Ottawa on the points he has raised.

.../3...

- 3 -

In all the discussions I have had to this point, while there have been some reservations regarding the system as drafted at present, there is agreement with the proposal and a readiness to give it a try and, if necessary, amend it on the basis of the experience gained over the first few months. Since the procedures as outlined do not apply to cases in Beirut area and as Mr. Button has a trip planned in two weeks during which he will be meeting with British Visa Officers in a number of centers, he will be discussing alternatives with them and we will discuss the matter further on his return.



C.H. Hill  
Second Secretary  
M & I

CHH/eg

c.c. IMMIG (Hamilton), CRO, CRR, FPO

CONFIDENTIAL

PSI- 762

OTTAWA, April 18, 1974.

Director General,  
Security Service,  
Royal Canadian Mounted Police,  
O T T A W A.

ATTENTION: "D" OPERATIONS

Further to the recent meeting between S/Sgt. Holloway and officers of External Affairs we wish to record the agreement reached on the dissemination to Canadian posts abroad of information dealing with terrorism. There are two types of information, one, dealing with or involving foreigners and two dealing with or involving Canadians.

- 1) For information dealing with foreigners the information is to be sent to Manpower and Immigration and this Department marked for the attention of the Security and Intelligence Liaison Division. Immigration will send it to posts abroad where its officers are responsible for visa matters. We will forward it to posts where External officers are responsible for the issuance of visas and any additional posts deemed appropriate.
- 2) (a) Information dealing with the possible use of lost or stolen Canadian passports by terrorists should be forwarded to the Passport Division of this Department. The information will be coordinated with any available with the Passport Division and sent to all relevant posts abroad.  
  
(b) Information dealing with the possible involvement of Canadians apart from that in 2(a) above should also be sent to this Department marked for the attention of the Security and Intelligence Liaison Division.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

It would be appreciated if the above procedures could be used in future. In the event there is any doubt about what distribution should be given to any particular piece of information please contact Mr. Fardy at 995-7982.

A. F. HART

A.F.Hart  
Director-General  
Bureau of Security and Intelligence Liaison

S E C R E T

Mrs. Jean W. Edmonds,  
Assistant Deputy Minister  
(Immigration).

Acting Director General,  
Home Branch.

April 2, 1974.

International Terrorism

1. The information in this paper is for your use at the meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Committee tomorrow.
2. The recent activities of the Department on international terrorism had been directed primarily towards Arab terrorists, which group has been most active on the international front.
3. A memorandum has been sent to visa issuing offices overseas advising them that all applications from persons of Arab nationality are to be referred to Ottawa (the R.C.M.P.) and to Beirut for a check against information that might be available on the applicant at either place.
4. Instructions are now being prepared for the Immigration Manual advising all our offices in Canada and overseas of the procedures in effect for Arabs. There is provision in these instructions for doing checks in the field in Canada on companies or persons to whom an applicant might be destined. These checks will be done where the visa issuing office is suspicious about the proposed visitor, even though there might not be any information available of an adverse nature.
5. The R.C.M.P. are providing us with lists of persons who might belong to one of these terrorist groups and might attempt to enter Canada and also lists of stolen passports and travel documents which might be in use by terrorists. These lists are provided on a continuing basis and are distributed to all Immigration offices in Canada and visa issuing offices overseas. Procedures have been put into effect whereby we are in very close liaison with the R.C.M.P. and any intelligence information on terrorist activities is provided to us very quickly.
6. There are a large number of terrorist groups throughout the world and fortunately up until now, none of their activities have been directed towards Canada or its institutions, or against any foreign missions in this country. There is some activity which takes place here, mostly meetings, among a Yugoslav group, the Croatian Liberation Movement. This Movement directs its acts of violence against the Yugoslav Government, is politically oriented and its aims and objectives are the creation of a Croatian country.

...2

**SECRET**

- 2 -

7. In discussions we have had concerning terrorist groups who might undertake some sort of activity during the 1976 Olympics, the following are some of the possible groups:

- (a) Croatians (against the Yugoslav representation);
- (b) The Black Panthers from the United States;
- (c) The Weathermen from the United States;
- (d) Cuban groups permanently residing in the United States (against the present Cuban Government); and,
- (e) IRA (against the British Government).

These are only a small number of the terrorist groups throughout the world which might take advantage of the Olympics to draw attention to their particular cause.

8. In order to prevent terrorist activities taking place in Canada, the ideal solution would be to prevent the entry of their members at Canadian ports of entry. For the small group that require visas, provided we have sufficient information, preventing them from travelling to this country is not difficult, all we have to do is refuse to issue a visa. However, many of the groups come from countries where visas are not required. Preventing the entry of these people is much more difficult and almost impossible without some advance information on which we could base a lookout.

9. While it is now possible to order the deportation of persons arriving without visas, without going through the cumbersome appeal procedures, we do have to have enough information to place a person in one of the prohibited classes of the Immigration Act. Getting such information and getting it in time to act is often extremely difficult.

10. We often find ourselves obtaining information from our sources a day or two prior to the event and sometimes after the person we are trying to apprehend has already arrived in Canada.

BY HAND

PLEASE ADDRESS  
CORRESPONDENCE TO:  
THE COMMISSIONER  
ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE  
OTTAWA, CANADA  
K1A 0R2




PRIÈRE D'ADRESSER LES  
LETTRES COMME SUIT:  
LE COMMISSAIRE  
GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CANADA  
OTTAWA, CANADA  
K1A 0R2

HEADQUARTERS  
DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE

YOUR NO.  
VOTRE NO

OUR NO.  
NOTRE NO



April 16, 1974

S E C R E T

*Handwritten signature and date: JPH 7/1/74*

Mr. A. Butroid,  
Director, Intelligence & Security,  
Immigration Division,  
Dept. of Manpower & Immigration.

Dear Sir:

This is further to our correspondence of  
April 8, 1974.

2. New information has been received indicating  
there is a possibility of simultaneous and multiple  
attacks on Israeli targets between 9/25 April 1974.  
A group of Arab Terrorists are reportedly prepared to  
attack anywhere in the world and could either attack  
at an airport and open fire on crowds or leave a  
suitcase bomb.

3. The foregoing has been supplied to  
Immigration Officers at major control points in  
Canada. It would be appreciated if similar action  
could be taken with your personnel overseas.

4. This information has also been provided  
to the Department of External Affairs.

Yours truly,

*JPH*  
*for info.*  
*if necessary*  
*dissemination please.*

*H.C. Draper*  
H.C. Draper  
Deputy Director General (Ops)  
Security Service

*Handwritten signature and date: JPH 7/1/74*

S E C R E T

BY HAND



PLEASE ADDRESS  
CORRESPONDENCE TO:  
  
THE COMMISSIONER  
ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE  
OTTAWA, CANADA  
K1A 0R2

PRIÈRE D'ADRESSER LES  
LETTRES COMME SUIT:

LE COMMISSAIRE  
GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CANADA  
OTTAWA, CANADA  
K1A 0R2

HEADQUARTERS  
DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE

YOUR NO. s.15(1)  
VOTRE N°  
  
OUR NO. [REDACTED]  
NOTRE N°

April 16, 1974

S E C R E T

*JP 4/14/74*  
Mr. A. Butroid,  
Director, Intelligence & Security,  
Immigration Division,  
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to the Department of External Affairs.

Yours truly,

*JPH*  
*for info.*  
*v. necessary*  
*disconnection please.*

*H.C. Draper*  
H.C. Draper  
Deputy Director General (Ops)  
Security Service

*JP 7/4/74*

SECRET

c.c. Chief, Admissions Division  
Atten: Head, Special Categories Unit.

IMM-HOME  
MACKAY/sm

CONFIDENTIAL

Our File:

The Commissioner,  
Royal Canadian Mounted Police,  
Headquarters,  
OTTAWA, Ontario. K1A 0R2.

305 Rideau Street,  
OTTAWA, Ontario. K1A 0J9.

February 7, 1974.

Attention: Immigration & Passport Section

RE: Jordanians Seeking Pilot's Training

Attached for your information is a memorandum from the District Intelligence Officer, Toronto District to Chief, Intelligence Section, Ottawa. This memorandum deals with Jordanian nationals who have been receiving pilot's training in the Toronto area.

Director, Intelligence & Security Division,  
Immigration Division.

enc.

c.c. R.C.M.P. Security Service.  
For your information.



Government of Canada

Gouvernement du Canada

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

s.19(1)

TO  
A Chief, Intelligence Section,  
Ottawa

FROM  
DE District Intelligence Officer,  
Toronto

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE 30 January, 1974

RECEIVED  
FEB 4 1974  
1 UNIT  
CITIZENSHIP

SUBJECT  
OBJET ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION PATTERNS — JORDAN

Information:

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]


[Redacted]

Page two

To: Chief Intelligence Section/Ottawa

30 January, 1974

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**Page 307**

**is withheld pursuant to sections  
est retenue en vertu des articles**

**15(1), 19(1)**

**of the Access to Information Act  
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**


Page four

To: Chief, Intelligence Section/Ottawa

s.15(1)

s.19(1)

30 January, 1974



*J. P. Bush*

Copy to:

- Regional Intelligence Officer, Toronto
- Regional Intelligence Officer, Montreal
- District Intelligence Officer, Mississauga

SIXTH COMMITTEE  
PROVISIONAL AGENDA  
ITEM 94

UNGA - TWENTY-EIGHTH SESSION

International Terrorism

A. Background References

- General Assembly Resolution 3034 (XXVII), December 18, 1972  
Study Prepared by the Secretariat A/C 6/418, November 2, 1972  
Observations of States A/AC.160/1, May 16, 1973  
Observations of States A/AC.160/1 Add. 2, July 9, 1973  
Observations of States A/AC.160/1 Add. 3, July 18, 1973  
Observations of States A/AC.160/1 Add. 4, July 27, 1973  
Analytical Study by Secretary-General of Observations of States  
A/AC.160/2, June 22, 1973  
Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism A/AC.160/  
1.3, Add. 1, 2 and 3  
Text of Canadian Statement on International Terrorism to Ad Hoc  
Committee, July 24, 1973.

B. Background

The General Assembly, by resolution 3034 (XXVII) of 18 December, 1972, voted to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on measures to prevent international terrorism and to study its underlying causes. Canada voted against the resolution on the grounds that it represented insufficient action on the part of the United Nations to what we considered a serious and urgent problem. Despite our misgivings we agreed to participate as one of the 35 members of the Committee which met in New York from July 16 to August 10, 1973.

The four-week session of the Committee ended without agreement on any specific recommendations to the General Assembly for future action. The Committee was plagued throughout by weaknesses and ambiguity in its mandate which gave Arab and some African members ample opportunity to divert the Committee from consideration of measures against acts of international terrorism by individuals and groups to a wide-ranging debate about "state" terrorism. (e.g. colonial and racist oppression by Portuguese, Rhodesian and South African régimes, U.S.A. bombardment of Cambodia and acts of Israeli aggressors and occupiers). Debate also covered the inevitability and legitimacy of the counter-struggle by national liberation movements and oppressed and/or occupied peoples.

Informal efforts were made during the final week of the session to reach agreement for a package of specific recommendations to the General Assembly including:

- a) condemnation of acts of international terrorism;
- b) strengthening of national measures to prevent acts of international terrorism;
- c) wider adherence to existing international conventions (especially three ICAO conventions) dealing with aspects of international terrorism; and
- d) elaboration of an additional international convention for prevention of specific acts of terrorism not covered by existing conventions.

- 2 -

These efforts, however, floundered on Arab intransigence. In particular, the Arabs were able to maintain sufficient non-aligned support for their insistence that measures could only be elaborated on the basis of a generally acceptable definition of international terrorism, along with the identification of causes and that measures should in no way apply to "the struggle of peoples against colonialism, foreign occupation, racial discrimination and apartheid".

Several members of the non-aligned group, especially Nigeria, Tanzania and India, expressed interest in Western proposals for specific measures including the elaboration of an additional convention to be pursued in parallel with any further action on definition and causes. However, attempts to achieve a compromise text on recommendations were ultimately blocked by Algerian tactics over the exemption clause including a threat of embarrassing the wavering non-aligned countries by raising the question of group loyalties at the forthcoming Algiers non-aligned summit meeting.

The report of the Committee to the General Assembly thus consists of a summary of the main trends in the debate along with numerous annexes setting out various draft proposals for a definition, the study of causes and measures for prevention, including the text of the American Draft Convention first presented at the General Assembly last fall.

C. Issues facing the Session

- (1) The General Assembly will receive the report of the Ad Hoc Committee and will have to decide what action to take.

D. Likely Course of Events

The report of the Ad Hoc Committee will likely be referred to the Sixth Committee for consideration. The Sixth Committee would then be asked to make recommendations to the General Assembly as to possible future action.

E. Instructions

If, as expected, the Report of the Ad Hoc Committee is referred to the Sixth Committee, our main concern should be to ensure that its consideration will not have any detrimental effect on consideration of the ILC Draft Articles on the Protection of Diplomats. To this end it may be prudent to work together with other like-minded delegations to see that the Ad Hoc Committee's report is not discussed until after the Sixth Committee has considered the ILC Draft Articles.

The report of the Ad Hoc Committee is, in itself, an innocuous document. Without taking the lead in the debate, the delegation should state our deep disappointment that the Committee was unable to agree on recommendations that could be considered by the General Assembly and the Sixth Committee.

. . . /

- 3 -

If, as expected, there is no new hope on the horizon for a meaningful breakthrough, the delegation should support any move to terminate the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. The Ad Hoc Committee approach should be regarded as not viable given the divisions that became evident during its discussions last summer.

While we can see the need for a new general convention along the lines of the U.S.A. draft convention, it would appear that we will have to bide our time until such time as there is more general support. For such a proposal the discussions last summer in the Ad Hoc Committee did indicate that it may be possible to create support for and reach a broad consensus on new legal instruments directed at specific acts of international terrorism. By doing so, it may be possible to avoid some of the problems that the development of an all-inclusive instrument approach (as exemplified by the American Draft Convention) has demonstrated. As an example of the specific approach, it may be possible to reach a consensus on the taking of innocent hostages or the use of the mails for terroristic purposes. If it becomes apparent that such an approach may have some chance of success, the delegation may wish to associate itself with efforts to reach agreement.

For further information please contact:

D.M. Miller (FLO) : 2-2104  
R.J. Buchan (FLO) : 6-3488  
H.C. Pardy (PSI) : 2-9596

Telegraphic addressees:

Bag : WshDC, Ldn, CandelNATO, Paris, Bonn, Taviv,  
Cairo, Beirut, Alger

Dist: PDF FLP PSP UNO FLO FLA ECT PSI

Ottawa File Number: 20-22-UN



Deputy Minister  
Manpower and Immigration

Sous-ministre  
Main-d'œuvre et Immigration

Our file: OP 5189-4-1

November 28, 1973.



MEMORANDUM TO THE MINISTER

Re: Bomb Threat - Toronto International  
Airport - Terminal II.

Late yesterday afternoon, November 27, an anonymous telephone call was received at Terminal II, Toronto International Airport, advising that no passengers or deportees were to be placed on Air Canada Flight 960 destined to leave Toronto for Trinidad at 11 a.m., November 28. It was claimed that there was a bomb aboard the aircraft.

Our Immigration officials in Toronto immediately alerted the R.C.M.P., Air Canada and the Mississauga Police. We were advised that Flight 960 left as scheduled this morning after having been carefully checked.

We were advised that five citizens of Trinidad arrived on an Air Canada flight late Sunday evening and after examination, all five were reported under Section 22 for Special Inquiries. Four were ordered deported and one was admitted to Canada. There was no return flight by Air Canada to Trinidad until Flight 960 today. Immigration Intelligence in Toronto suspect that the sole Trinidadian who was admitted may have been instrumental in this bomb threat. We understand that the R.C.M.P. and Immigration Intelligence are still investigating this matter and they have both indicated that there may be a tie-in with this one Trinidadian and others from Trinidad already in Canada.

Should I receive further information or details warranting your attention, I shall inform you immediately.

*A. E. Gotlieb*

A. E. Gotlieb

305 Rideau Street  
Ottawa  
K1A 0J9

305, rue Rideau  
Ottawa  
K1A 0J9

c.c.: Minister's Office  
c.c.: Minister's Circulation File  
c.c.: Special File of Deputy Minister  
c.c.: J.R.Robillard  
c.c.: L.E.Gafenco  
c.c.: A.J.Arlett

5-3

Our file: OP 5189-4-1

November 28, 1973.

MEMORANDUM TO THE MINISTER

Re: Bomb Threat - Toronto International  
Airport - Terminal II.

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Should I receive further information or details warranting your attention, I shall inform you immediately.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
A. E. GOTLIEB  
A SIGNÉ L'ORIGINAL

A. E. Gotlieb

## BOMB THREAT

Jack Fleming - Toronto call.

T-1. Airport - Term # 2 late yesterday afternoon rec'd an anonymous phone call stating not to depart or place any passengers on flight # 960 AIR CANADA, destined to leave Toronto for Trinidad at 11 AM to day. (NOV 28/73) as there was a bomb aboard aircraft.

Toronto Term. immediately alerted R.C.M.P., Air Canada & Trinidadian Police & flight # 960 left as scheduled this A.M. after being carefully checked.

### BACKGROUND

Fleming states that 5 Trinidadians arrived on Air Cde flight late Sunday evening. All were reported for under Sec 22; four were ordered deported & 1 was admitted. There was no return flight by Air Cde to Trinidad since the arrival of these 5 until Air Cde # 960 this A.M. Toronto Intelligence suspects the 1 Trinidadian who was admitted may have been instrumental in the threat. R.C.M.P. & Intelligence still checking out & indicate there may be a tie-in with this 1 Trinidadian & others from Trinidad, already in Cde.

JGw

28/11/73.

12 noon

It's nice to hear  
an effort we appreciate

*[Handwritten signature]*

13/6

000315

AERIAL SERVICES  
SERVICES DE L'AIR



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT  
MINISTÈRE DES TRANSPORTS

YOUR FILE 155-27  
VOTRE RÉF:

IN REPLY QUOTE 602-10 (ICAO)  
RÉF. À RAPPELER: SECRET

Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0N8

April 5, 1973.

  
Mr. A. Butroid,  
Special Assistant to the  
Assistant Deputy Minister, Immigration,  
Department of Manpower and Immigration,  
E.A. Bourque Memorial Building,  
Room 1002, 305 Rideau Street,  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0J9

Dear Mr. Butroid:

Further reference is made to my letter to you of January 15, 1973 concerning "Specifications for security measures to prevent acts of unlawful interference".

I wish to thank you for your assistance in providing comments and observations on this very important matter. Your proposals have been very helpful in assisting with the development of a reply to the International Civil Aviation Organization and your efforts in this regard are much appreciated.

Yours truly,

for W.M. McLeish,  
Director General,  
Civil Aeronautics.

c.c. Mr. A. Butroid. Ref. file 155-27

Room 1002

SECRET

OTTAWA, KIA OJ9  
February 2, 1973

Mr. J.E. Ledbetter,  
Secretary,  
National FAL Committee,  
Canadian Transport Commission,  
Congill Bldg., Room 804,  
175 Slater Street,  
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear Mr. Ledbetter:

Re: State Letter AS 8/2 - 72/260 (Restricted)  
dated 27 December 1972. (Your File 38-4-3)  
Specifications for Security Measures to  
prevent Acts of Unlawful Interference.

You will recall that it was agreed at the National FAL Committee meeting on January 25, 1973, that we would provide you with a written reply to your letter of January 19, 1973.

We are in agreement with the view of the Air Navigation Commission that it would be preferable to incorporate all aviation security standards and recommended practices in a single new comprehensive Annex. The difficulties in searching for information on security measures would negate any advantage of including the material in the existing Annexes and PANS. The material simply does not lend itself to inclusion in the present system.

The major advantages of placing the security measures in a single new Annex are its comprehensiveness and reference facility. The format suggested in Appendix "J" meets this criteria.

With regards to Appendix "H", the proposed items are acceptable to this Department insofar as they affect our procedures.

Yours sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
J. C. BEST  
À SIGNÉ L'ORIGINAL

J.C. Best

SECRET

**SECRET**

Our file: 155-27  
your file: 602-10(DGGA)

Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0J9  
9 February 1973

Mr. W.M. McLeish  
Director General  
Civil Aeronautics  
Department of Transport  
Ottawa, Ontario

Dear Mr. McLeish:

It would seem that the enclosures to your letter of 15 January 1973 (ICAO State Letter AS 8/2 - 72/2760 dated 27 December 1972 concerning "Specifications for security measures to prevent acts of unlawful interference") are the same as those to which our Assistant Deputy Minister (Operations) Mr. J.C. Best has commented on in a reply to the Secretary, National FAL Committee.

I attach a copy of his letter for your information, which reflects the views of this department.

Yours truly,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
A. BUTROID

A. Butroid  
Special Assistant

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

Our file: 155-27  
your file: 602-10(DGGA)

Ottawa, Ontario  
KIA OJ9  
9 February 1973

Mr. W.M. McLeish  
Director General  
Civil Aeronautics  
Department of Transport  
Ottawa, Ontario

Dear Mr. McLeish:

It would seem that the enclosures to your letter of 15 January 1973 (ICAO State Letter AS 8/2 - 72/2760 dated 27 December 1972 concerning "Specifications for security measures to prevent acts of unlawful interference") are the same as those to which our Assistant Deputy Minister (Operations) Mr. J.C. Best has commented on in a reply to the Secretary, National PAL Committee.

I attach a copy of his letter for your information, which reflects the views of this department.

Yours truly,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
A. BUTROID  
A. Butroid  
Special Assistant

**SECRET**

D R A F T

OTTAWA, K1A 0J9  
February 1, 1973.

Mr. J.E. Ledbetter,  
Secretary,  
National FAL Committee,  
Canadian Transport Commission,  
Congill Bldg., Room 804,  
175 Slater Street,  
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear Mr. Ledbetter:

Re: State Letter AS 8/2 - 72/260 (Restricted)  
dated 27 December 1972. (Your File 38-4-3)  
Specifications for Security Measures to  
prevent Acts of Unlawful Interference.

You will recall that it was agreed at the National FAL Committee meeting on January 25, 1973, that we would provide you with a written reply to your letter of January 19, 1973.

We are in agreement with the view of the Air Navigation Commission that it would be preferable to incorporate all aviation security standards and recommended practices in a single new comprehensive Annex. The difficulties in searching for information on security measures would negate any advantage of including the material in the existing Annexes and PANS. The material simply does not lend itself to inclusion in the present system.

The major advantages of placing the security measures in a single new Annex are its comprehensiveness and reference facility. The format suggested in Appendix "J" meets this criteria.

In regards to Appendix "H", the proposed items are acceptable to this Department insofar as they affect our procedures.

Yours sincerely,

J.C. Best.

*② This covers the points discussed and agreed to.  
J.C. Best  
1/21/73.*

DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION  
MINISTÈRE DE LA MAIN-D'OEUVRE ET DE L'IMMIGRATION

MEMORANDUM - MÉMOIRE

26 Jan 73

TO - À:

Director of Operations -  
Immigration  
Special Assistant to the  
ADM (Immigration)

FROM - DE:

Chief, Procedures Division.

---

Re: State Letter AS 8/2 - 72/260 (Restricted)  
dated 27 December 1972.  
Specifications for Security Measures to  
prevent Acts of Unlawful Interference.

---

Attached is a suggested draft of a letter  
to Mr. Ledbetter.

I don't know if we are in agreement with the  
policy suggested in this letter. For this reason I  
would suggest that we review it prior to referring it  
to Mr. Best.

② It would be better to handle this type  
of security in a new branch.

P. 10/1/73 C. J. [Signature]

000321

DRAFT

OTTAWA, K1A 0J9  
January 26, 1973.

Mr. J.E. Ledbetter,  
Secretary,  
National FAL Committee,  
Canadian Transport Commission,  
Congill Bldg. - Room 804,  
275 Slater Street,  
Ottawa, Ontario.

Dear Mr. Ledbetter:

Re: State Letter AS 8/2 - 72/260 (Restricted)  
dated 27 December 1972.  
Specifications for Security Measures to  
prevent Acts of Unlawful Interference.

You will recall that it was agreed at the National FAL Committee meeting on January 25, 1973, that we would provide you with a written reply to your letter of January 19, 1973.

There are advantages in placing all security measures in a separate manual. The information would be restricted, its dissemination would be more readily controlled and the danger of key procedures becoming public knowledge would be diminished. On the other hand, there is a very real danger that under <sup>EMERGENCY</sup> crisis conditions these very restrictions could negate the advantages of the security measures in preventing the unlawful interference of the aircraft. For instance, emergency measures that are misinterpreted by either the aircraft or air traffic personnel could precipitate rather than avoid a disaster.

The overriding principle should be that when an annex or a PANS is consulted it must contain all the procedures applicable to a given situation. Referring the reader to a security manual which is not readily available could mean the difference between a successful measure and a tragedy. The effect of spreading the security procedures throughout the annex and PANS is in itself a measure of security as it is a subject that cannot be readily located or understood by the uninitiated.

For these reasons, we believe it would be preferable to place the material in the existing annexes and PANS.

In regards to Appendix H, the proposed items <sup>in so far as</sup> are acceptable <sup>affected our procedures</sup> to this Department.

Yours sincerely,

J.C. Best.

SERVICES  
SERVICES DE L'AIR



DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT  
MINISTÈRE DES TRANSPORTS

YOUR FILE  
VOTRE RÉF:  
  
IN REPLY QUOTE  
RÉF. À RAPPELER:

602-10 (DGCA)  
SECRET

Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0N8  
January 15, 1973

Mr. A. Butroid,  
Special Assistant to the  
Assistant Deputy Minister, Immigration,  
Department of Manpower and Immigration,  
E. A. Bourque Memorial Building,  
Room 1002, 305 Rideau Street,  
Ottawa, Ontario.  
K1A 0J9

Dear Mr. Butroid:

Enclosed is a copy of ICAO State Letter AS 8/2 - 72/260  
(Restricted) dated 27 December 1972, concerning "Specifications  
for security measures to prevent acts of unlawful interference".

You will note that a reply is requested by 15 April  
1973, therefore it would be appreciated if your reply could be  
sent to me by March 30, 1973.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read 'W. M. McLeish'.

W. M. McLeish,  
Director General,  
Civil Aeronautics.

Encl.

TEL.: 866-2551

CABLES: ICAO MONTREAL

ORGANISATION DE L'AVIATION  
CIVILE INTERNATIONALE



ORGANIZACIÓN DE AVIACIÓN  
CIVIL INTERNACIONAL

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION

(CS)

INTERNATIONAL AVIATION BUILDING  
1080 UNIVERSITY STREET  
MONTREAL 101, P.Q. CANADA

WHEN REPLYING, PLEASE QUOTE:  
RÉFÉRENCE À RAPPELER DANS LA RÉPONSE:  
INDÍQUESE EN LA RESPUESTA ESTA REFERENCIA:

AS 8/2 - 72/260 (Restricted)

27 December 1972

Subject: Specifications for security measures  
to prevent acts of unlawful interference  
Action Required: Reply by 15 April 1973

Sir,

1. I have the honour to inform you that the Council, at the 12th to 16th meetings of its 77th Session (29 November to 7 December 1972), considered the question of developing specifications concerning security measures to prevent acts of unlawful interference with international civil aviation and its facilities, and requested that I obtain Contracting States' views as indicated below.

... 2. In Appendices A to H to this letter, the Council presents for States' comments draft amendments to several Annexes and PANS. The texts in Appendix H (concerning Annex 9) were initially prepared by the Air Transport Committee and those in Appendices A to G (concerning Annexes 2, 6, 10, 11 and 14, PANS/RAC and PANS/OPS), by the Air Navigation Commission. The material now appearing in the Appendices results from a preliminary review by the Council. This action by the Council does not imply its acceptance of any of the material or of the status with which it is presented at this time.

... 3. At Appendix I appears material, initially developed by the Air Navigation Commission, which deals with organization and administrative matters. In presenting it to Council, the Commission expressed the view that that material did not lend itself to inclusion in the existing Annexes and PANS and that, therefore, it appeared necessary to adopt a new Annex. After a preliminary review that resulted in a number of changes, the Council decided that the texts in Appendix I should be circulated to States with a request that

*agree*

- 2 -

they comment as to their suitability for inclusion in Annexes, existing or new, or in some other document (such as the Security Manual). It should be noted that although the material is presented in the form of draft SARPS, this does not prejudge the ultimate decision by the Council, in the light of States' comments, regarding the disposition and status of any of this material.

4. Finally, Appendix J presents a sample table of contents of the material that could be included if it were decided not to introduce the material in several Annexes and PANS but to incorporate all aviation security standards and recommended practices in a single new Annex. Transmission of Appendix J with the present letter should not be interpreted as an endorsement by Council of the idea of a single Annex; its sole purpose is to illustrate what such an Annex might contain and to obtain States' comments as to whether it is desirable or not to establish such an Annex.

5. During the Council's discussions of the material which should be presented to States for comment, as described above, some Council Members expressed doubts as to whether the provisions of Article 37 of the Convention permit the establishment, as standards and recommended practices, of specifications concerning security measures to prevent acts of unlawful interference, particularly those of the type included in Appendix I. Some other Council Members, who did not share these doubts, recalled the terms of Clause (3) of Assembly Resolution A17-10. The Council did not express an opinion on the question.

6. May I request that any comments your Government may wish to make on the draft amendments appearing in Appendices A to H and on the material contained in Appendix I, as well as its views on the questions raised in paragraphs 3 and 4 above, be dispatched to reach me not later than 15 April 1973.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

  
Assad Kotaite  
Secretary General

Enclosures:

Appendices A to J

APPENDIX A

PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF ANNEX 2

Chapter 3. - General Rules

Add new Section 3.6 as follows:

\*"3.6 Unlawful Interference

3.6.1 An aircraft which is being subjected to unlawful interference shall endeavour to notify the appropriate ATS unit of this fact and of any deviation from the current flight plan necessitated by the circumstances, in order to enable the ATS unit to give priority to the aircraft and to minimize conflict with other aircraft.

Note 1. - ATS units will endeavour to recognize such unlawful interference and will attend promptly to requests by the aircraft. Information pertinent to the safe conduct of the flight will continue to be transmitted and necessary action will be taken to expedite the conduct of all phases of the flight.

Note 2. - Action to be taken by SSR equipped aircraft which are being subjected to unlawful interference is prescribed in Annex 11, (see proposed para 2.13.1) PANS/RAC and PANS/OPS."

---

\*Note for the information of States:

This provision is complementary to proposed amendments of Annex 11, Chapter 2, new section 2.13 (Appendix D) and PANS/RAC (Appendix F).

- - - - -

Letters AS 8/2 - 72/260 (Restricted)  
72/261

APPENDIX B

PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF ANNEX 6, PART I

Chapter 13. - Security

Add the following new paragraphs:

"13.2 Navigation Information for Aerodromes to which Flights may be Diverted

Recommendation. - Aeroplanes which, in the opinion of the operator, are likely to be subject to unlawful seizure should be equipped with current useful navigation information for aerodromes to which they may be diverted.

13.3 Aeroplane Search Procedure Checklist

An operator shall ensure that there is available on board a bomb-threat search procedure checklist for use in case of threatened sabotage.

13.4 Crew Member Training Programmes

An operator shall establish and maintain a ground and flight training programme which enables crew members to act in the most appropriate manner to minimize the consequences of acts of unlawful interference.

13.5 Reporting Incidents of Unlawful Interference

Following an incident of unlawful interference the pilot-in-command shall submit, without delay, a report of such incident to the designated local authority."

State letters AS 8/2 - 72/260 (Restricted)  
72/261

APPENDIX C

PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF ANNEX 10, VOL. I

Part I, Chapter 2. - Radio Navigation Aids

Add new paragraph 2.5.4.4 as follows:

\*"2.5.4.4 Code 3100 shall be used on Modes A and B to provide recognition of an aircraft which is being subjected to unlawful interference."

Renumber existing paragraphs "2.5.4.4, 2.5.4.5 and 2.5.4.6" to read, "2.5.4.5, 2.5.4.6 and 2.5.4.7" respectively.

Amend original paragraph 2.5.4.4 by adding "3100" in the last line so that it will now read, ". . . recognition of Codes 3100, 7600 and 7700."

---

\*Note for the information of States:

This provision is complementary to proposed amendment of PANS/RAC, Part III, new paragraph 16.2.1, Note (b) (Appendix F) and PANS/OPS (Appendix G).

State letters AS 8/2 - 72/260  
72/261 (Restricted)

APPENDIX D

PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF ANNEX 11

Chapter 2. - General

Add new Section 2.13 as follows:

\*"2.13 Priority in the Event of an Aircraft Emergency

2.13.1 An aircraft known or believed to be in a state of emergency, including being subjected to unlawful interference, shall be given priority over other aircraft.

Note. - An aircraft equipped with an SSR transponder might operate the equipment as follows:

(a) on Mode A, Code 7700, to indicate that it is in a state of emergency; or

\*\* (b) on Mode A, Code 3100, to indicate specifically that it is being subjected to unlawful interference."

Chapter 3. - Air Traffic Control Service

Delete paragraph 3.1.2.

Chapter 5. - Alerting Service

In paragraph 5.1.1:

Add new subparagraph 2) as follows:

"2) to any aircraft known or believed to be the subject of unlawful interference; and"

Renumber existing subparagraph 2) to read "3)".

---

Notes for the information of States:

\* This provision is complementary to proposed amendments of Annex 2, Chapter 3, new section 3.6 (Appendix A) and PANS/RAC (Appendix F).

\*\* This note is complementary to proposed amendments of Annex 10 (Appendix C) and PANS/OPS (Appendix G).

APPENDIX D

- D-2 -

In paragraph 5.2.1 2):

Add, at the end of subparagraph c), the words "or when".

Add new subparagraph d) as follows:

"d) an aircraft is known or believed to be the subject of unlawful interference,"

Replace 5.6 with the following:

"5.6 Information to aircraft operating in the vicinity of an aircraft in a state of emergency"

5.6.1 When it has been decided by an air traffic services unit that an aircraft is in a state of emergency, other aircraft known to be in the vicinity of the aircraft involved shall, except as provided in 5.6.2, be informed of the nature of the emergency as soon as practicable.

5.6.2 When an air traffic services unit knows or believes that an aircraft is being subjected to unlawful interference, no reference shall be made in ATS air-ground communications to the nature of the emergency unless it has first been referred to in communications from the aircraft involved and it is certain that such reference will not aggravate the situation."

See letters AS 8/2 - 72/260  
72/261 (Restricted)

APPENDIX E

PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF ANNEX 14

Part III - Physical Characteristics of Aerodromes

Delete the last sentence of existing paragraph 1.32.

Add the following new paragraphs, after 1.32:

\*"1.32 a) An isolated aeroplane parking position shall be designated or the aerodrome control tower advised of an area or areas suitable for the parking of an aeroplane which is known or believed to be the subject of unlawful interference, or which for other reasons needs isolation from normal aerodrome activities.

"1.32 b) Recommendation. - The isolated aeroplane parking position should be located at the maximum distance practicable and in any case never less than 100m (330 ft) from other parking positions, buildings or public areas etc. Care should be taken to ensure that the position is not located over underground utilities such as gas and aviation fuel and, to the extent feasible, electrical or communication cables."

Part VI - Aerodrome Equipment

Add a new sub-paragraph to paragraph 1.1.1 concerning secondary power:

"e) security lighting, if provided in accordance with 5.1."

Add the following new paragraph after 4.2:

"++4.2 a) Recommendation. - Fences or other suitable barriers should be provided to deter the inadvertent or premeditated access of unauthorized persons into aviation ground installations and facilities located off the aerodrome.

++See Annex 14, Part I, 2.4."

---

\*Note for the information of States:

This provision is complemented by proposed amendment of PANS/RAC, Part V, new paragraph 10.4 (Appendix F).

APPENDIX E

- E-2 -

Add the following new chapter after Chapter 4:

"Chapter 5 - Security Lighting

5.1 Recommendation. - At an aerodrome where it is deemed desirable for security reasons, fences and other barriers provided for the protection of international civil aviation and its facilities should be illuminated.

5.2 Recommendation. - The light units should be within the protected area and located so that the ground area on both sides of the fence or barrier is illuminated."

State letters AS 8/2 - 72/260  
72/261 (Restricted)

APPENDIX F

PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF PANS/RAC

Part III. - Area Control Service

Add, immediately after paragraph 1.3, the following Note:

**"Note. - Unlawful interference with an aircraft constitutes a case of exceptional circumstances which may require the application of separations larger than the specified minima, between the aircraft being subjected to unlawful interference and other aircraft."**

Add new Section 16.2 as follows:

"16.2 Priority

16.2.1 An aircraft known or believed to be in a state of emergency, including being subjected to unlawful interference, shall be given priority over other aircraft.

Note. - An aircraft equipped with an SSR transponder might operate the equipment as follows:

- (a) on Mode A, Code 7700, to indicate that it is in a state of emergency; or
- \* (b) on Mode A, Code 3100, to indicate specifically that it is being subjected to unlawful interference."

Add new Section 16.3 as follows:

"16.3 Unlawful Interference

16.3.1 Air traffic services personnel shall be prepared to recognize any indication of the occurrence of unlawful interference with an aircraft.

\*16.3.2 Whenever unlawful interference with an aircraft is suspected, and where automatic distinct display of SSR Mode A Code 3100 and Code 7700 is not provided, the radar controller shall attempt to verify his suspicion by setting the SSR decoder to Mode A Code 3100 and thereafter to Code 7700.

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\*Note for the information of States:

The note and provision are complementary to proposed amendment of Annex 10, Vol. 1, Part I, Chapter 2, new paragraph 2.5.4.4, (Appendix C) and PANS/OES (Appendix G).

APPENDIX F

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\*Note. - Aircraft equipped with SSR transponder are expected to operate the transponder on Mode A Code 3100 to indicate specifically that it is the subject of unlawful interference. The aircraft may operate the transponder on Mode A, Code 7700, to indicate that it is threatened by grave and imminent danger, and requires immediate assistance.

16.3.3 Whenever unlawful interference with an aircraft is known or suspected, ATS units shall promptly attend to requests, if any, from the aircraft and shall take such action as is necessary to expedite the conduct of all phases of the flight. ATS units shall also:

- (a) transmit, and continue to transmit, information pertinent to the safe conduct of the flight, without expecting a reply from the aircraft;
- (b) monitor and plot the progress of the flight with the means available, and co-ordinate transfer of control with adjacent ATS units without requiring transmissions or other responses from the aircraft, unless communication with the aircraft remains normal;
- (c) inform other ATS units concerned with the flight, including the known or assumed destination;
- (d) notify
  - (i) the operator or his designated representative;
  - (ii) the appropriate rescue co-ordination centre in accordance with appropriate alerting procedures;
  - (iii) the designated security authority.

Note. - It is assumed that the designated security authority and/or the operator will in turn notify other parties concerned in accordance with pre-established procedures.

- (e) relay appropriate messages, relating to the circumstances associated with the unlawful interference, between the aircraft and designated authorities.

16.3.4 If aircraft are despatched to intercept and escort an aircraft which is being subjected to unlawful interference, ATS units shall provide all possible assistance to the intercepting aircraft to assist them in positioning themselves in relation to the aircraft which is being subjected to unlawful interference."

Renumber existing paragraphs 16.2, 16.3 and 16.4 as 16.4, 16.5 and 16.6, respectively.

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\*Note for the information of States:

This note is complementary to proposed amendment of Annex 10, Vol. 1, Part I, Chapter 2, new paragraph 2.5.4.4, (Appendix C) and FANS/OPS (Appendix G).

APPENDIX F

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Part V - Aerodrome Control Service

Add new paragraph 10.4 as follows:

"10.4 An aircraft known or believed to be the subject of unlawful interference shall be cleared to the designated isolated parking position. Where such an isolated parking position has not been designated, or if the designated position is not available, the aircraft shall be cleared to a position within the area or areas selected by prior agreement with the aerodrome authority. The taxi clearance shall specify the taxi route to be followed to the parking position. This route shall be selected with a view to minimizing any security risks to the public, other aircraft and installations at the aerodrome.

Note. - See Annex 14, Part III,"

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APPENDIX G

PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF PANS/OPS

Part V. - Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR)  
Transponder Operating Procedures

Add a new Section 1.4 as follows:

"1.4 Unlawful Interference with Aircraft in Flight

\*1.4.1 Should an aircraft be subjected to unlawful interference in flight, the transponder shall be set to Mode A Code 3100 to give indication of the situation unless circumstances warrant the use of Code 7700."

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\*Note for the information of States:

This provision is complementary to proposed amendments of Annex 10 (Appendix C), Annex 11, Chapter 2, new paragraph 2.13.1, note (b) (Appendix D) and PANS/RAC (Appendix F).

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## APPENDIX H

### PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF ANNEX 9

#### CHAPTER 1. - DEFINITIONS AND APPLICABILITY

Add the following definition in the appropriate place:

Security Equipment. Devices of a specialized nature for use, individually or as part of a system, in the prevention or detection of acts of unlawful interference with civil aviation and its facilities.

#### CHAPTER 3. - ENTRY AND DEPARTURE OF PERSONS

Add the following new Recommended Practice, following existing paragraph 3.22 and renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly:

3.23 Recommended Practice. In order to facilitate aircraft departure, Contracting States which examine passengers as a security measure should, to the extent feasible, utilize security equipment in conducting such examinations so as to reduce materially the numbers of persons to be personally searched.

Note. - The use of radiological techniques for screening passengers should be avoided.

- Privacy should be assured when a thorough physical search is to be carried out. If special rooms are not available, portable screens may be used for this purpose.

Add the following new Recommended Practice, following existing paragraph 3.24 and renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly:

3.26 Recommended Practice. In order to facilitate aircraft departure, Contracting States which examine baggage of passengers departing from their territory as a security measure should, to the extent feasible, utilize security equipment in conducting such examinations so as to reduce materially the amount of baggage to be actually searched.

APPENDIX H

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CHAPTER 4. - ENTRY AND DEPARTURE OF CARGO AND OTHER ARTICLES

Amend existing paragraph 4.6 by inserting the underlined words as follows:

4.6 Contracting States shall make arrangements consistent with security requirements which permit operators to select and load cargo, stores and unaccompanied baggage on outbound aircraft up to the time of departure.

Add the following phrase to the Note following 4.8:

... nor is it intended to preclude examinations considered essential in particular cases for security purposes.

Add the following phrase at the end of the last sentence of paragraph 4.10:

... making due allowance for essential security precautions in particular cases.

Add the following Recommended Practice after existing paragraph 4.10 and renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly:

4.11 Recommended Practice. Air cargo acceptance procedures should be established in which either the shipper is known to the airline operator or identification and/or package inspection is required. This latter requirement should be especially observed when accepting small packages for transport by air.

Amend paragraph 4.28 (renumbered as 4.29) by adding the underlined words in the first portion of the paragraph:

4.29 Contracting States shall allow the loan of aircraft equipment and spare parts and security equipment and spare parts between airlines.....etc.

Amend paragraph 4.30 (renumbered as 4.31) by adding the underlined words in the first portion of the paragraph:

4.31 Recommended Practice. Ground equipment and security equipment imported into the... etc.

Add the words "and security equipment" at the end of this same paragraph.

Add the following additional paragraphs to the Note following existing paragraph 4.30 (renumbered as 4.31):

5) Security equipment:

- weapon detecting devices;
- explosives detecting devices;
- intrusion detection devices.

6) Component parts for incorporation into security equipment.

Amend existing paragraph 4.31 (renumbered as 4.32) by adding the words "and security equipment" after the words "ground equipment" in the first sentence.

CHAPTER 6. - INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS - FACILITIES AND SERVICES FOR TRAFFIC

Add the following new sub-paragraph at the end of existing paragraph 6.7:

- e) to take precautions to prevent unauthorized access to unattended aircraft, including locking aircraft doors, locking doorways to airbridges and removing loading stairs.

Add the following new Recommended Practice after existing paragraph 6.11 and renumber existing paragraph 6.12 as 6.13:

6.12 Recommended Practice. Checked baggage should be accepted only on presentation of the traveller's ticket and only by an authorized representative or accredited agent of the air carrier.

Add the following new Recommended Practice after existing paragraph 6.12 (renumbered as 6.13) and renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly:

6.14 Recommended Practice. Contracting States, in order to ensure that only authorized crew and passengers and other authorized personnel are permitted access to an aircraft, should make appropriate arrangements for adequate supervision over their movement between the terminal building and the aircraft.

Add the following new Recommended Practice after existing paragraph 6.20 (renumbered as 6.22) and renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly:

6.23 Recommended Practice. A secure storage area should be provided at each international airport where misrouted baggage may be held until reforwarded.

Add the following new Standard after existing paragraph 6.31 (renumbered as 6.34) and renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly:

6.35 Contracting States shall adopt measures designed to prevent unauthorized access to cargo, baggage, mail and stores in the course of conveyance between terminal buildings and aircraft. Cargo, baggage, and mail, the means of transport used in each case for such conveyance and loading areas on the apron shall be safeguarded with a view to preventing, as far as possible, acts of sabotage.

APPENDIX H

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Amend existing paragraph 6.32 (renumbered as 6.36) by adding the underlined words as follows:

6.36 Recommended Practice. Adequate space should be available in cargo terminals for storage and handling of air cargo, including building up and breaking down of pallet and container loads, located next to the customs area and easily accessible to authorized persons and vehicles from both the apron and the land side road.

Amend existing paragraph 6.33 (renumbered as 6.37) by adding the underlined words as follows:

6.37 Recommended Practice. Cargo terminals should be equipped with storage facilities for special cargo (e.g. valuable goods, perishable shipments, and live animals). Those areas of cargo terminals in which cargo and mail is stored overnight or for extended periods prior to shipment by air should be protected against access by unauthorized persons.

CHAPTER 8. - OTHER FACILITATION PROVISIONS

Amend the first portion of existing paragraph 8.2 by adding the underlined words as follows:

8.2 Recommended Practice. The aircraft, ground equipment, security equipment, spare parts...etc.

CHAPTER 9. - SECURITY PROVISIONS

Add the following new Recommended Practice as the first paragraph in this Chapter and renumber subsequent paragraphs accordingly:

9.1 Recommended Practice. Contracting States should ensure that law enforcement officers are readily available at its international airports with authority to assist in cases of suspected and actual unlawful activity at such airports and in the questioning of suspected persons.

Add a new Recommended Practice after existing paragraph 9.3 (renumbered as 9.4) as follows:

9.5 Recommended Practice. When security measures, additional to those mentioned in 6.12, are required on special occasions, steps should be taken to ensure that all baggage loaded on the aircraft either belongs to passengers actually travelling on the aircraft or is unaccompanied baggage which has been given security clearance.

Amend the footnote in Chapter 9. - Security Provisions\* to read as follows:

\* Provisions related to this subject are also contained in other Chapters and Annexes.

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## APPENDIX I

(See paragraph 3 of the State letter)

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### Chapter 1. - Introduction

Introductory Note. - The security of international civil aviation requires that each State prepares plans and procedures and makes appropriate arrangements which together provide a basic level of security for normal operating conditions and which are capable of rapid expansion to meet any increased security threats.

Effective security under normal operating conditions requires co-operation between States, departments and agencies of government, aerodrome administrations, operators and others. In conditions of increased security threats, particularly close co-operation between States may be required.

Other provisions governing the action to be taken to prevent unlawful interference, or when such interference has occurred, are presented in Annexes 2; 6, Part I; 9; 10, Vol. 1; 11 and 14 and associated detailed procedures are provided in the PANS/RAC and the PANS/OPS. A detailed listing of these provisions are shown hereunder in Chapter 8. Guidance on all matters of aviation security organization and its functioning are found in Doc 8973 (Restricted), Security Manual for the Prevention of Unlawful Acts against Civil Aviation and its Facilities.

\*Application. - The provisions in the material that follows are expected to be applied by States in proportion to the prevailing threat of unlawful interference to which each of its aerodromes or its services is exposed.

### Chapter 2.- Definitions

\*\*Aerodrome. A defined area on land or water (including any buildings, installations and equipment) intended to be used either wholly or in part for the arrival, departure and movement of aircraft.

\*\*Aeroplane. A power-driven heavier-than-air aircraft, deriving its lift in flight chiefly from aerodynamic reactions on surfaces which remain fixed under given conditions of flight.

\*\*Aircraft. Any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other than the reactions of the air against the earth's surface.

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### Notes for the information of States:

\*If the material in Appendix I is eventually put into a new Annex, or existing Annexes, the substance of this paragraph would be included in the Applicability chapter.

\*\*These definitions are the same as in Annex 6, Part I.

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Air side. The movement area of an aerodrome, adjacent terrain and buildings or portions thereof, access to which is controlled.

\*Operator. A person, organization or enterprise engaged in or offering to engage in an aircraft operation.

Chapter 3. - General

3.1 Policy

3.1.1 Safety of passengers, crew and the general public shall be the primary consideration in all matters related to acts of unlawful interference with international civil aviation and its facilities.

3.1.2 The objective of the civil aviation security programme shall be to protect the safety, regularity and efficiency of international civil aviation by providing for the prevention of acts of unlawful interference through regulations, practices and procedures.

3.1.3 Recommendation. - States should co-operate, particularly with adjacent States and those with which they have major air transport relationships, in developing complementary civil aviation security programmes.

3.2 The Appropriate Authority

3.2.1 The State shall designate an appropriate authority within its administration which will be responsible for the civil aviation security programme.

Chapter 4. - The Civil Aviation Security Programme

4.1 Co-ordination and Liaison

4.1.1 Recommendation. - The appropriate authority should establish means of co-ordinating activities between the departments, agencies and other organizations of the State concerned with or responsible for various aspects of the national civil aviation security programme.

Note. - The setting up of a Civil Aviation Security Committee, as described in Doc 8973 (Restricted) - Security Manual for the Prevention of Unlawful Acts against Civil Aviation, would meet the intent of this provision.

\*Note for the Information of States:

This definition is the same as in Annex 6, Part I.

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4.1.2 Recommendation. - The appropriate authority should allocate responsibility for implementation of the security programme as between the State, aerodrome administrations, operators and others concerned.

4.1.3 Recommendation. - The appropriate authority should establish and maintain liaison through ICAO, or directly with other States where desirable, for the exchange of information related to plans, designs, equipment, methods and procedures for the prevention of acts of unlawful interference.

Chapter 5. - Aerodromes

5.1 General

5.1.1 An aerodrome security programme shall be established for each international aerodrome adequate to meet the needs of international civil aviation.

Note. - Compliance with this provision will require the development of a security plan for each aerodrome.

5.1.2 The appropriate authority shall establish or arrange for the establishment of aerodrome security committees, composed of all parties concerned, to develop and implement the required security measures and procedures at each aerodrome.

5.1.3 The appropriate authority shall provide or arrange for the provision of essential supporting security services at each aerodrome.

Note. - Essential supporting security services include, but are not necessarily limited to, law enforcement assistance.

5.1.4 Recommendation. - Security measures and procedures should be applied at aerodromes in such a manner as to cause a minimum of interference with, or delay to, international civil aviation.

5.1.5 Recommendation. - States should ensure that aerodrome administrations comply, as far as may be practicable, with requests from other States for the application of special security measures to specific flights.

5.2 Aerodrome Security Services

5.2.1 An aerodrome security service shall be provided at each international aerodrome and an officer assigned responsibility for this service.

5.2.2 The aerodrome security service shall have overall responsibility for protection on the aerodrome against acts of unlawful interference with international civil aviation and its facilities and for co-ordinating action in the event of an incident.

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5.2.3 Recommendation. - The aerodrome security service should make periodic security surveys of the aerodrome.

5.2.4 Recommendation. - The aerodrome security service should make provision for the examination of suspected incendiary and explosive devices and also for the disposal of such devices.

Note. - The intent of this recommendation may be met by arrangements with other authorities.

5.2.5 Recommendation. - The aerodrome security service should take all necessary steps to ensure that measures and procedures designed to prevent persons and vehicles from unauthorized access to the air side of aerodromes are adopted and put into use.

Note. - The above Recommended Practice aims at putting into practice such measures as the following:

- designate air side areas;
- post signs or notices which read "Authorized Persons Only" or similar language;
- provide identification for authorized persons and vehicles;
- challenge all persons and vehicles in air side areas who appear to have gained unauthorized access;
- provide escorts for visitors to air side areas; and
- lock or control all doors and entrances to air side areas.

## Chapter 6. - Aircraft Operators

### 6.1 Operators' Security Programme

6.1.1 The State shall require operators of aircraft of its registry to adopt and put into use a security programme which is in proportion to the threat to international civil aviation and its facilities as known to the State.

6.1.2 The appropriate authority shall ensure that operators' security programmes are compatible with the prescribed aerodrome security programmes.

6.1.3 The State shall require the operators of aircraft of its registry to ensure that their security programmes conform with the requirements of those States into which they operate.

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Chapter 7. - Reports

7.1.1 States concerned in incidents of unlawful interference shall (should?) provide the International Civil Aviation Organization with all relevant information concerning the aeronautical aspects of such incidents.

7.1.2 The State shall immediately notify the State of Registry of an unlawfully seized aircraft when such an aircraft has landed in its territory.

Chapter 8. - Security Measures in Annexes and associated documents

Note. - Specialized security measures are an integral part of many provisions for international air transport operations. For this reason detailed specifications and practices have been incorporated in a number of other documents. (See Introductory Note, Chapter 1).

This Chapter lists, by subject, the location of these specialized security measures.

8.1 Notification by aircraft

Annex 2, Chapter 3, paragraph 3.6; Annex 10, Volume 1, Chapter 2, paragraph 2.5.4.4; PANS/OPS, Part V, paragraph 1.4.

8.2 Responsibilities and training of crew members

Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 13.

8.3 Aircraft equipment and essential documentation

Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 13.

8.4 Passengers, baggage, cargo, mail and stores

Annex 9, Chapter 3, paragraphs 3.23 and 3.26; Chapter 4, paragraphs 4.6, 4.8 and 4.11; Chapter 6, paragraphs 6.12, 6.14, 6.23, 6.35, 6.36 and 6.37; Chapter 9, paragraphs 9.2 (new number), 9.3 (new number) and 9.5 (new).

8.5 Security equipment - customs provisions

Annex 9, Chapter 4, paragraphs 4.29, 4.31 and 4.32.

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8.6 Action by air traffic services units

Annex 11, Chapter 2, Section 2.13, Chapter 5, paragraphs 5.1.1 (2), 5.2.1 (2) (d) and 5.6; PANS/RAC, Part III, paragraph 1.3, Note and Sections 16.2, 16.3 and Part V, paragraph 10.4.

8.7 Aerodromes

Annex 14, Part III, paragraphs 1.32 (a) and (b); Part VI, paragraphs 1.1.1 (e), 4.2, 4.2 (a) and (b), 4.3 and 4.4; proposed Chapter 5.

8.8 Protection of air side areas and aircraft on aerodromes

\*Annex 9, Chapter 6, paragraphs 6.7 (e) and 6.14; Chapter 9, paragraph 9.3 (new number); Annex 14, Part III, paragraph 1.32 (a).

*Note for the information of States: If the material in Appendix I is put into a new Annex or existing Annexes, as an alternative to Chapter 8 the text of relevant extracts from the documents listed above could be reproduced as an Attachment. Such a comprehensive presentation of related provisions in one document, similar to that contained in Annex 12, might simplify administration of the security programme by States.*

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APPENDIX J

SAMPLE TABLE OF CONTENTS OF A SINGLE COMPREHENSIVE AVIATION SECURITY ANNEX

(See paragraph 4 of the State letter)

Note for the information of States:

In this table of contents general provisions dealing with the organization, methods and procedures for preventing acts of unlawful interference are listed first, followed by specific provisions relating to the various progressive stages of a flight potentially or effectively subject to unlawful interference. This sequence is intended to emphasize the need to concentrate on efforts, in the pre-flight phase, to prevent acts of unlawful interference rather than on efforts to alleviate them in flight or on post-flight investigative measures.

The development of a single comprehensive Annex on aviation security would require the rewording of some of the provisions dealing with security now contained in Annexes 6, 9 and 14 and of the provisions proposed in Appendices A to I, including those in which a security item has been incorporated in material which is primarily concerned with other aviation matters.

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Chapter 1. - Introduction

Introductory Note. - (Repeat the Introductory Note of Appendix I, deleting the third paragraph.)

Chapter 2. - Definitions - (Continue as in Appendix I, Chapter 2, through to the end of Chapter.)

Chapter 3. - General (Continue as in Appendix I, Chapter 3, through to the end of Chapter.)

Chapter 4. - The Civil Aviation Security Programme (Continue as in Appendix I, Chapter 4, through to the end of Chapter.)

Chapter 5. - Aerodromes

5.1 General (Continue as in Appendix I, Chapter 5, paragraph 5.1, through to the end of paragraph.)

5.2 Aerodrome Security Services (Continue as in Appendix I, Chapter 5, paragraph 5.2, through to the end of paragraph.)

5.3 Fencing and Security Barriers

Reflect the provisions contained in Annex 14, Chapter 4, paragraphs 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.

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5.4 Search and Protection of Aircraft

Reflect the provisions contained in Annex 9, Chapter 9, paragraph 9.3 and Annex 14, Part III, paragraph 1.32, provisions proposed for Annex 9, paragraphs 6.7 (e) and 6.14 (Appendix H) and Annex 14 (Appendix E), Part III, paragraphs 1.32 (a) and (b).

5.5 Security Lighting

Reflect the provision contained in Annex 14, Part V, paragraph 2.14.1 and provisions proposed for Annex 14 (Appendix E) new Chapter 5.

Chapter 6. - Aircraft Operators (Continue as in Appendix I, Chapter 6, through to the end of Chapter.)

Chapter 7. - Processing of Passengers, Baggage, Cargo, Mail and Stores

7.1 Restrictions on Carriage of Firearms

Reflect the provisions contained in Annex 9, Chapter 9, paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2.

7.2 Processing of Passengers and Baggage

Reflect the provisions proposed for Annex 9, Chapter 3, paragraphs 3.23, 3.26; Chapter 4, paragraphs 4.6, 4.8, 4.11; Chapter 6, paragraphs 6.12, 6.23 and Chapter 9, paragraph 9.5 (Appendix H).

7.3 Cargo, Mail and Stores

Reflect the provisions proposed for Annex 9, Chapter 4, paragraph 4.11; Chapter 6, paragraphs 6.35, 6.36 and 6.37 (Appendix H).

Chapter 8. - Security Equipment (Customs, Loan of Equipment, etc.)

8.1 Reflect the provisions proposed for Annex 9, Chapter 4, paragraphs 4.29, 4.31 and 4.32 (Appendix H).

Chapter 9. - Aircraft Modification and Documentation

9.1 Aircraft Modification

15 Reflect the provisions contained in Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 13, paragraph 13.1.

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9.2 Essential Documentation

Reflect the provisions proposed for Annex 6 (Appendix B), new paragraphs 13.2 and 13.3.

Chapter 10. - Action by Pilots .

10.1 Notification by Aircraft

Reflect the provisions proposed for Annex 2 (Appendix A) and PANS/OPS (Appendix G).

10.2 Radio Navigation Aids

Reflect the provisions proposed for Annex 10, Volume I (Appendix C).

10.3 Reports by Pilot-in-Command

Reflect the provisions proposed for Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 13 (Appendix B), paragraph 13.5.

Chapter 11. - Action by Air Traffic Services Units

11.1 Reflect the provisions proposed for Annex 11 (Appendix D) and PANS/RAC (Appendix F).

Chapter 12. - Reports (Continue as in Appendix I, Chapter 7, through to the end of Chapter.)

Chapter 13. - Training of Crew Members

13.1 Reflect the provisions proposed for Annex 6, Part I, Chapter 13 (Appendix B), paragraph 13.4.

Note for the information of States:

Several of the provisions in existing Annexes and PANS which may be considered for transfer to a new single Annex on security deal with security in a composite context. Care would have to be exercised in order to ensure that the original intent of those provisions is not overlooked and it might therefore be necessary to reflect some of these provisions in two Annexes.

- END -

**A r t i c l e 9 — Facilitation**

3.8.5 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE.—  
*Numerals 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 0 and the Gregorian calendar (with months being spelled out in full) should be used in furnishing the information listed in 3.8.4.*

3.8.6 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE.—  
*When the text of the visa is in a national language other than English, French or Spanish, one of these three languages should also be used.*

**III. — ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTATION**

3.9 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE.—  
*Contracting States should not require either from temporary visitors travelling by air, or from operators on their behalf, any information in writing supplementary to or repeating that already presented in their identity documents.*

3.10 A Contracting State which continues to require written supplementary information from temporary visitors travelling by air, shall limit its requirements to the items and shall follow the format set forth in Appendix 4—Embarkation/Disembarkation Card. Contracting States shall accept the Embarkation/Disembarkation Card when completed by temporary visitors and shall not require it to be completed or checked by the operator. Legible hand-written script shall be accepted on the card, except where the form specifies block lettering.

**IV. — PUBLIC HEALTH REQUIREMENTS**

3.11 In cases where evidence of protection against cholera, yellow fever or smallpox is required from persons travelling by air, Contracting States shall accept the International Certificates of Vaccination or Revaccination in the forms set out by the World Health Organization in Appendices 2-4 of the International Sanitary Regulations.

3.12 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE.—  
*Medical examination of persons arriving by air should normally be limited to those disembarking and coming within the incubation period of the disease concerned, as stated in the International Sanitary Regulations, from an area infected with one of the six quarantinable diseases (plague, cholera, yellow fever, smallpox, typhus and relapsing fever).*

**V. — CLEARANCE PROCEDURE**

3.13 Except in special circumstances, Contracting States shall not require that identity documents be collected from passengers or crew before they arrive at the passport control points.

3.13.1 After individual presentation by passengers and crew of the identity documents, the public officials concerned shall, except in special individual cases, hand back such documents immediately after examination, rather than withholding them for purposes of obtaining additional control.

3.14 Each Contracting State shall make arrangements whereby the identity document of a temporary visitor need be inspected by only one official at times of entry and departure.

*Note.—This provision is intended to ensure inspection of the identity document of a temporary visitor by only one official on behalf of both the Immigration and Police authorities. It is not intended to discourage Health and Customs officials from examining the identity document whenever this may facilitate health and customs clearance of the temporary visitor.*

3.15 Contracting States shall accept an oral declaration of baggage from passengers and crew.

3.16 Contracting States shall normally accomplish inbound passenger baggage inspection on a sampling or selective basis.

**VI. — CREW AND OTHER OPERATORS' PERSONNEL**

3.17 Contracting States shall provide facilities which will enable unlicensed crew members of their airlines to obtain without delay and without charge crew members' certificates containing the material set forth in Appendix 5 and valid for the crew member's term of employment.

3.18 In the case of an airline flight crew member who retains his licence in his possession when embarking and disembarking, remains at the airport where the aircraft has stopped or within the confines of cities adjacent thereto, and departs on the same aircraft or on his next regularly scheduled flight, each Contracting State shall accept such licence

**3. — Entry and Departure of Persons**

for temporary admission to the State and shall not require a passport or visa provided the licence contains the specifications set forth in 5.1.1 of Annex 1, plus: a) a certification that the holder may at all times re-enter the State of issuance of the licence upon production of the licence; b) a photograph of the holder; and c) place and date of birth of the holder.

*Note.—It is the intent of this Standard that a licence shall be recognized as a satisfactory identity document under the specific circumstances when it contains the above certification and the other items specified, even if the holder is not a national of the State of Registry of the aircraft on which he serves. It is not desired to discourage Contracting States from issuing such licences to resident alien flight crew members if they are willing to do so.*

*Specifications for licences are set forth in Chapter 5 of Annex 1—Personnel Licensing.*

3.18.1 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE.—  
*Each Contracting State should extend privileges of temporary admission similar to those provided under 3.18, and on the same conditions, to a flight crew member of an aircraft operated for remuneration or hire but not engaged in scheduled international air services, subject to the requirement that such flight crew member must depart on the aircraft on its first flight out of the territory of the State.*


3.19 In the case of either an airline flight crew member whose licence does not meet the specifications of 3.18 or an unlicensed crew member of an airline, each Contracting State shall extend privileges of temporary admission similar to those provided under 3.18 and on the same conditions, provided the crew member concerned is in possession of a valid Crew Member Certificate (Appendix 5).

*Note.—The implementation of 3.18 and 3.19 permits rapid and efficient disposition of flight personnel by airlines. The full benefit cannot be derived from these provisions while some States withhold acceptance of them.*

3.19.1 RECOMMENDED PRACTICE.—  
*Each Contracting State should extend privileges of temporary admission similar to those provided under 3.19 and on the same conditions, to a flight crew member of an aircraft operated for remuneration or hire but not engaged in scheduled international air services, when such flight*

*Specific follow-up*

TRANSPORT



DEPUTY MINISTER OF TRANSPORT  
SOUS-MINISTRE DES TRANSPORTS

670-2  
SECRET

Ottawa, Ontario,  
K1A 0N5,  
December 20, 1972.

Dear Mr. Adams:

I refer to your letter dated 17 October, 1972, in which you request our assistance in developing a means to supply passenger lists in advance of flight arrivals at Canadian International Airports.

The question has been discussed with the carriers, and the Interdepartmental Inspection Services Committee, and its resolution will be most difficult from a methodology aspect rather than one of inconvenience to passengers.


We have arranged for a small group under the guidance of Mr. W. M. McLeish the National Civil Aviation Security Coordinator to examine this question in detail and to recommend possible solutions and the estimated costs.

It is proposed by Mr. McLeish to contact Mr. A. Butroid for representation from your Department.

Yours sincerely,



O. G. Stoner.



Mr. R. M. Adams,  
Assistant Deputy Minister  
Immigration,  
Department of Manpower and Immigration,  
E.A. Bourque Memorial Building,  
305 Rideau Street,  
Ottawa, Ontario.  
K1A 0J9

MTL STAR  
29-11-72

Yes - provided the new  
officer will be available to  
respond to. I'm sure will  
for immediate help. PE  
4.12.72

RCMP  
I understand from the  
last bulletin that the  
RCMP will be recruiting  
up to 500 special  
constables for airports  
necessity. I guess they  
have seen the flight  
log.



Commissioner W. L. Higgitt

# RCMP steps up airport security

Canadian Press

OTTAWA — The RCMP is stepping up a program of hiring special constables to increase security at airports.

Commissioner W. L. Higgitt said last night that the special constables don't get the same intense training given a normal RCMP recruit.

The rapid growth of airports has created a need for more special constables, he said, and the force is looking for 50 more recruits.

The ideal special recruit would be one with some army training, or perhaps an ex-policeman.

The special constables, who receive some training with the force, don't have to meet all the age and physical requirements set out for regular recruits.


Mr. Higgitt said that increased police presence might help deter would-be air pirates.

"The security requirements at airports are growing fast, and we are just trying to meet the need," he said.

S. 170-5

# MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION



TO : WAO - Edmonton

YOUR FILE No.  
Votre dossier

NOV 13 3 44 AM '72

OUR FILE No.  
Notre dossier 5172-2

DATE November 14, 1972

FROM : AGM  
Edmonton International Airport

FOLD

1972

SUBJECT : Passport Screening - International Airport

1. This is further to our memorandum of October 31, 1972, and your teletype message WAOS - 946 of November 7, 1972, each dealing with the subject matter.
2. As pointed out in the above mentioned memorandum, the meeting of October 19th was oriented towards action required when a known or suspected terrorist arrived for Immigration clearance at an International Airport. As a result of opposite points of view being taken by the R.C.M. Police representatives, and the MOT representatives a separate meeting of these officials took place on Monday November 6, 1972. Attending were Staff Sergeant Roth, R.C.M.P., Corporal Jessiman, R.C.M.P., Mr. Morley - Ministry of Transport and Mr. Giles - Ministry of Transport.
3. The Immigration area was examined in an effort to determine the best possible course of action. It was agreed that all Non - Residents would simply turn left at the top of the escalator and enter a holding room. Desks now provided for Immigration Officials just outside the door of the above mentioned holding room would be set up inside the room and the terrorist would be detained until R.C.M.P. arrived on the scene. A warning buzzer would be installed from the Immigration desk to the Building Control Room. When the buzzer sounded the operator would advise police in an appropriate manner. In no case would the terrorist be allowed access to his baggage. This would be taken care of by police.
4. We are providing copies of this report to Police and Immigration Officials and we assume Mr. Empson will arrange another meeting, at which time it is hoped a solution will be reached which is satisfactory to all concerned.

*John*  
*so will I*  
*FAC*

*W. A. Morley*  
W. A. Morley  
Airport General Manager

CC: Cpl. Jessiman  
Mr. S. Empson

*HRCorbe #*  
*will be there*  
*mid Dec. 1972*

# MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION



TO  
A

Director of Operations - Immigration  
ATTENTION: R.J. Curry

YOUR FILE No.  
Votre dossier

OUR FILE No. OP 5170-9-1  
Notre dossier

FROM  
De

P.G. Lambert

DATE

November 10, 1972

SUBJECT  
Sujet

Security Measures at Airports

The purpose of this memorandum is to apprise you of the manner in which security measures are taken against suspected terrorists at certain airports abroad and the extent to which officers carry out the immigration inspection are involved.

## Rome - Italy

Officers on the Passport Control Inspection Desks are part of the National Police Force under the Ministry of the Interior. However, although armed their only role, should a security risk come to their attention is to sound an alert button with their foot which registers in the office of the Chief of Security Police at the airport. Trained security police then take over and they will attempt to apprehend and disarm the suspect. These security officers are encouraged to apprehend and disarm suspects away from the airport and crowds if possible. There are no metal detection inspections carried out on incoming passengers. The immigration examination is cursory and during the short time the Passport Control Officers were observed, it can be said that no reference was made to the lookout index.

Security departure checks are carried out by certain airlines such as El Al - Pan Am - TWA - CPR - Lufthansa. These checks include a metal detector test and hand baggage search at the departure gate. This is usually done by the airline employees with help if requested from the Security Police.

Airport security in Rome is the responsibility of the Chief of the Security Police. They have armed officers at strategic locations on the airport and the area is patrolled with armed vehicles. The public are no longer allowed in the public galleries overlooking the tarmac. These galleries are enclosed with barbed wire to improve security arrangements.

*Noted  
gen  
20/11/72*

Zurich - Switzerland

The Immigration Passport Control Stations at the International Airport are manned by members of the National Police Force. These officers rotate between the inbound inspection desk and the outbound security examination stations. They spend one to two hours at each work station.

As members of the National Police Force the officers on the Passport Control Desks have been given some training on the use of arms as well as methods of disarming persons or defusing explosives. However, should these officers come upon a suspected terrorist, they have been instructed to take delaying action and call upon fellow officers stationed in the secondary immigration area who are specialists in the handling of terrorists. Each passport control desk has an alarm button for the use of the examiner should he require help from a specialist. Such assistance is available within 60 seconds and a test was made for our benefit while at Zurich.

Departure checks including search of the person and baggage is carried out by male and female members of the National Police Force. It was the most thorough departure inspection witnessed in Europe.

Security at this airport is the responsibility of the Chief of the National Police at the airport. Alerts from any area of the airport register in his office and he directs any emergency security operation with the full cooperation of the airport authority and other departmental heads involved. Armed guards and vehicles patrol the airport under the direction of the Chief of Police.

Copenhagen - Denmark

The Passport Control examination desks for the inspection of passengers arriving from other countries are manned by National Police Officers. They are trained policemen but when on immigration passport control work at the airport they are expected to seek assistance of trained security specialists in their service should they come into contact with a suspected terrorist. Other than being on the lookout for suspected terrorists and to try to implement delaying action the officers on passport control duty are not expected to take any direct action with a person suspected of being armed or dangerous.

Departure checks are carried out by Transportation Company employees with the help of security guards.

The overall security of the airport is the responsibility of the Chief of the Copenhagen City Police Force at the airport and he is assured of complete cooperation from the National Police and the security guards in the employ of the Airport Authority. The security guards in the employ of the Airport Authority patrol the terminal and are responsible for the security of aircraft on the ground.

Frankfurt - Germany

The immigration inspection is carried out at this airport by "Frontier Service Officers" of the Ministry of the Interior. As they are trained in the use of arms as well as methods of disarming persons and defusing explosives the officers engaged in the passport control operation are expected to take direct action should a terrorist or security risk come to their attention. They can also call upon fellow officers for help. Incidentally, they are in the process of finalizing the installation of a computerized lookout system which will provide answers in 5 seconds.

The Airport Authority has its own security force to patrol the airport and guard planes on the ground as well as carry out departure checks and hand baggage inspection.

In the case of a security emergency the Chief Police Officer of the Frontier Service (Ministry of the Interior) at the airport, coordinates the emergency operations.

Amsterdam - Holland (Schiphol)

The Government Military Police, staff the Passport Control (Immigration) Desks at this airport. These officers are on the staff of the Department of National Defence but the administration of the immigration laws is the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice. The officers on passport control duty have an alert button at their work station to call a plain clothes senior officer if assistance is required. They must call special trained police if a suspected terrorist appears. Passport control officers even though armed are not expected to take any direct action in such a case other than to alert the senior officer and delay the passenger.

The Airport Authority has contracted a private security force to carry out departure examination of passengers and their baggage. Only selected flights are examined.

The Chief of the Military Police at the airport is responsible for all security arrangements in an emergency. This force looks after the security of aircraft on the ground and they man two tanks on the tarmac for use in case of emergency.

Paris - France (Orly)

Immigration examinations at this airport are carried out by members of the Police Force (Service Frontalier) of the Ministry of the Interior. These passport control officers can alert and have the assistance of a secondary examiner should they come across an inadmissible person. They also hope to have an automatic lookout system in operation shortly.

*2/11/77*  
*[Signature]*

This system will give a reading on selected suspects within 30 seconds. The officers on Passport Control duty at this airport are under instructions to allow a suspected terrorist to proceed away from the airport but to ensure that he is followed.

Departure checks by the Police Force are carried out on all passengers and their baggage leaving the country.

There is a Security Committee established by the Airport Authority at Orly Airport. In the case of emergency the Chief of Police at the airport is in charge of all security operations. Armed members of the Police Force patrol the premises and guard the airport from roof top positions as well as selected positions on the airfield. They guard aircraft on the ground and in armed vehicles escort flights of certain airlines to and from the runways. Certain areas in the airport are under tight security control and only employees in possession of the proper identification have access to these locations.

#### London - England (Heathrow)

Immigration officers man the 40 passport control stations in terminal one, 12 in terminal two and 18 in terminal three. There is no rotation of staff between terminals. These officers have lookout books and "watch for" lists but only the small "watch for" lists get much attention. Immigration officers do not have an alert alarm button in their work stations but if technical or other assistance is required they can call on their fellow officers or supervisor for help. The Immigration Officer-in-Charge at the airport is a member of the security panel at the airport but the security role played by immigration officers is minimal. If a suspected terrorist appeared before them they would be expected to try to delay his progress and notify the police at the airport who are trained to handle such emergencies.

Departure checks are carried out by the airline employees. Passengers and their hand baggage are examined in the departure lounge.

In the event of a security emergency at the airport the National Police Force would take over the coordination of the emergency operations. The British Airport Authorities have a force of about 370 persons both male and female who carry out a security patrol of the airport on a continuing basis. In addition B.O.A.C. and other large airlines operating at Heathrow have their own security forces to look after their particular interests.

Conclusion

With the exception of Immigration Officers at Heathrow the officers at all other airports visited are in fact police officers armed and trained in the use of arms and explosives. Yet, only in Frankfurt are the Passport Control Officers expected to take direct action to apprehend and disarm should they come into contact with a suspected terrorist.

Male and female Immigration Officers stationed at airports in Canada are not on the front line and are not trained in the handling of arms or explosives. Therefore, in my opinion, they should not be expected to take any direct action in the event it becomes known a suspected terrorist is attempting to gain entry to this country. Arrangements should be made to have the R.C.M.P. take the required security measures in such circumstances and we should not under any circumstances agree to having our examiners particularly the females trained in the use of or recognition of arms and explosives.

Agreed!

B.S.H.

noted  
18.11.77

c.c. J.R. Robillard  
c.c. P.G. Lambert

Director of Operations - Immigration  
ATTENTION: R.J. Curry

OP 5170-9-1

P.G. Lambert

November 10, 1972

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.... 2

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1

5170-9-1



Government of Canada / Gouvernement du Canada

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO / À

Director of Operations - Immigration  
Director  
Home Services Branch  
OTTAWA

FROM / DE

Regional Enforcement Consultant  
PRAIRIE REGION

SECURITY - CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
CONFIDENTIAL
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE
5170-8
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE
November 8, 1972

SUBJECT / OBJET: Examination of Terrorists

*Copy on!*  
*OP 5170-9-1*

This is further to our memorandum of October 24, 1972 concerning the examination of terrorists.

As indicated in our previous memorandum, meetings were held at both Edmonton and Calgary to discuss a plan to be used at the Edmonton and Calgary airports should a terrorist come to their attention. You will note from the attached memos from both Edmonton and Calgary that MOT Officials, RCMP and Airline Officials disagreed with the suggestion of both Immigration and Customs that terrorists should be permitted to flow through the examination areas at both Immigration and Customs without being referred to secondary.

Until such time as a definite plan can be reached by all concerned at Edmonton and Calgary, it is the intention of both Immigration and Customs to refrain from referring terrorists for secondary examination. We will, however, alert the Police as quickly as possible.

Immediately further correspondence is received from Edmonton and Calgary in this regard, it will be passed on to you.

*J. McLeod*  
J. McLeod

Att.


THIS ATTACHMENT  
PUT ON FILE  
NOV. 15 1972  
C.R.

000364

# MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION  
CONFIDENTIAL

3



YOUR FILE No. 5170-8  
Votre dossier

OUR FILE No. 5550-1  
Notre dossier

DATE Oct. 24, 1972

TO A Director of Immigration Operations  
Prairie Region

FROM De District Administrator, CIC  
Edmonton, Alberta

SUBJECT Sujet Security Procedures -Edmonton International  
Airport - Terrorists

FOLD

1. As requested, a meeting of Airline Representatives, R.C.M.P., Customs and MOT Officials was held at the Edmonton International Airport on October 19th, 1972.

2. As suggested, we put forward our opinion, supported by Customs, that should a person be identified as, or suspected of being a terrorist, the primary line officer would issue a card of pre-designated colour to signify that no secondary examination by Customs would be required and the person would be allowed to proceed outside the examination area. Once subject had been given such card, the primary line officer would either leave his work station to alert the appropriate agencies, probably by telephone to a designated number, or the alternative would be to install some form of warning system at the primary line work station enabling the officer to notify the appropriate agencies without arousing suspicion. The primary line officer could leave his work station and maintain surveillance of the suspect until such time as the appropriate enforcement authorities had taken over or, this task could be carried out by any available officer or the Customs point man, depending on final arrangements agreed to. Once the enforcement agent had taken over surveillance he would take whatever action was deemed appropriate.

3. MOT Officials, the R.C.M.P. and the Airline Officials disagreed with the above suggested procedure for the following reasons:

- (A) Suspect would have access to his baggage which they felt should be avoided if possible.
- (B) Suspect might not be leaving confines of the airport (e.g. on-going connection, etc.) and, in such event would have to be apprehended inside the building giving rise to the same risks if the person was apprehended in the examination area. Airline Officials emphatically stated that such persons should not be permitted to board an onward flight.
- (C) Present physical layout of examination area at the Edmonton International Airport is such that suspect could be apprehended or seized, with reasonable safety, and quickly isolated in a room separate from the public without incurring too great a risk to persons in the examination area.

++2++

++2++

- (D) The R.C.M.P. have staff on duty at the International Airport during time both domestic and international flights are arriving and/or departing. They indicate that they could have an officer (in plain clothes) in the examining area within a very short space of time. Presently, an R.C.M.P. Officer is always in attendance on arrival of international flights.
- (E) The R.C.M.P. are of the opinion that allowing the suspect to proceed to the general waiting area and onwards creates the risk that they may lose him. One other reason is that once the suspect is in possession of his baggage, he poses a greater risk when and if apprehension is made either in confines of the terminal or elsewhere.
- (F) Suggestion was made that, if necessary, suspect could be delayed at the primary line point and referred to the present Immigration and closed office for further questioning. At this point, R.C.M.P. Officers would take over.
- (G) R.C.M.P. indicated that MOT should consider having available a special room easily accessible to the examination area where suspects could be quickly, effectively and safely isolated.

4. It is quite apparent that the differences of opinion Re procedures to be implemented could not be resolved at the meeting. The MOT Airport Manager indicated that he wished to consult with his Departmental Authorities for policy guidance before committing himself. The R.C.M.P. have indicated that considerable correspondence has already taken place Re this subject and they are expecting that a policy decision affecting action to be taken, should any occurrences of this nature take place, will soon be made.

5. Of course we could have steadfastly maintained our position and insisted that suspects be allowed to leave the examination area without hindrance, however, you will agree that unless we obtain the cooperation of all concerned, any measures adopted would likely fail in achieving the ends desired.

6. I also attended the Calgary meeting where we encountered the same opposition, however, I expect that the Officer-in-Charge, Calgary, will be reporting to you in the very near future.



W. R. Clark  
for District Administrator

5170-8

Government of Canada / Gouvernement du Canada

3

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO  
À

Director, Immigration Operations,  
Canada Immigration Centre,  
WINNIPEG.

FROM  
DE

Officer-in-Charge,  
Canada Immigration Centre,  
~~EDMONTON~~ CALGARY

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ
<u>CONFIDENTIAL</u>
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE
5550 - AP
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE
20 October 1972

SUBJECT  
OBJET

Security Procedures - Calgary International Airport

1. This is further to my letter of 5th October 1972 which refers to the Director of Operations, Home Services Branch, Telex of the 29th of September 1972. A further meeting was held at the Calgary International Airport today, and was attended by representatives from:

- Airport Manager's office
- Ministry of Transport
- Air Canada
- CP Air
- Wardair
- Hughes Air West
- Canada Customs
- Calgary City Police
- R.C.M.P.
- Canada Immigration  
(Messrs. McLeod, Empson and Post)



2. It was evident from the outset of the meeting that the R.C.M.P. do not agree that suspected terrorists should be permitted to flow through the entry process, without secondary or delay, as has been suggested by Immigration and Customs. They seem to feel that if a person is to be isolated or apprehended that action should be commenced, if possible, at the primary line or in our secondary area. Calgary City Police do not seem to be so concerned with the person being allowed through, but feel that if they are to have time to respond to an alarm, the person should be delayed as long as possible to enable them to set up surveillance, or be prepared to apprehend. Inspector Evans of the Calgary City Police thought possibly the Medical Secondary might be of some assistance here. Immigration Secondary, Customs Secondary, and Baggage Delivery were suggested as means of delaying the terrorists so that law enforcement agencies could be in a better position to respond.

3. Transportation companies seem to feel that this is similar to the problems they have been facing for a number of years, and one representative expressed the hope that improved screening procedures at all airports might prevent persons with weapons from arriving by aircraft. Enforcement agencies seem to feel that it would be to their disadvantage if the terrorists were not allowed to claim their baggage, on the assumption that his destructive power might be contained in same.

MEMORANDUM

NOTE DE SERVICE

TO  
A

Director, Immigration Operations,  
Canada Immigration Centre,  
WINNIPEG.

FROM  
DE

Officer-in-Charge,  
Canada Immigration Centre,  
CALGARY.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION - DE SÉCURITÉ <b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>
OUR FILE - N/RÉFÉRENCE <b>5550 - AP</b>
YOUR FILE - V/RÉFÉRENCE
DATE <b>20 October 1972</b>

SUBJECT  
OBJET

Security Procedures - Calgary International Airport

Page 2.

4. We did not arrive at any agreement with the other agencies. The Airport Manager's office agreed to look into the possibility of an alarm system on a 24-hour basis, whereby we could alert airport security authorities without arising suspicion. I think the R.C.M.P. have instructions not to enter into any form of commitment on this matter at this time.

c.c. District Administrator,  
Edmonton.

OP 5789-4-1

November 01, 1972

File: 2535-4

Mr. T. M. McGrath  
Chief, Airport Services and Properties  
Ministry of Transport  
Tower "C"  
Place de Ville  
Ottawa KIA 0N8

Dear Mr. McGrath:

I am in receipt of Mr. W. M. McLeish's invitation and attached agenda for the 4th meeting of the National Civil Aviation Security Committee to be held in Ottawa on November 08, and I will attend this meeting on behalf of IDISC.

I understand you have requested IDISC to prepare position papers with respect to Item 3 and 4 of the agenda. Mr. Lukazewicz will have already advised you that as Item 4 covers outbound flight procedures the item is outside the IDISC Terms of Reference, however we do wish to comment on Item 3, which reads as follows:

3. "Inbound flight procedures to identify terrorists (need for passenger manifest on International flights by Canadian carriers to other than US destinations)"

We should at first point out that IDISC would oppose any move to re-introduce the passenger manifest in Canada. We seriously doubt if any such move would achieve the stated goal, and the end result would be the introduction of procedures that could best be described as anti-facilitation.

However to illustrate the problem, there are two methods of arranging passenger manifests for presentation to authorities on arrival.

- Onboard Passenger Manifests.
- Name lists transmitted via Telex or Satellite.

RECEIVED IN  
IDISC  
NOV 3 1972

### Onboard Passenger Manifest

A document(s) carried in the aircraft pouch. While a relatively simple procedure in the days of transborder DC3 operations (24 passengers), this method is simply unacceptable with the much larger volume of traffic carried onboard today's aircraft. We could go into great detail to outline the administrative process which leads up to a typed passenger manifest being placed in the aircraft pouch minutes before departure. Needless to say this document really serves no useful purpose, as it is presented to the authorities at the same time as the passengers. Any suggestion that the passengers could be held until the manifest was checked against a look-out-book must be discounted. Consider an airport such as Dorval. With simultaneous arrivals of several international carriers, all required to hold their passengers until the manifests were cleared, chaos would result. Our terminal buildings were not designed to be operated in such a manner.

### Name Lists Transmitted by Telex or Satellite

This method provides the passenger list in advance of the flight arrival, however, it is a very expensive way of transmitting information. In this case the first question to be expected from the carrier is "who pays?".

It is difficult on short notice to estimate the cost of transmitting this information via telex or teletype. However we do know that several years ago the US Immigration Service and TWA participated in an experiment to transmit passenger manifests via satellite from Frankfurt, Germany to Dulles Airport at Washington, D.C. The test, conducted over a period of several weeks, proved successful in providing the information prior to arrival, but the cost was estimated at between \$5,000 to \$7,000 per flight!

Teletype circuits would not be as expensive, however to ensure the manifest was available on arrival the messages would have to be transmitted on a priority basis. Generally speaking all priority messages are of an operational nature and introducing long teletype name lists to already overburdened operational teletype networks could cause problems.

In this respect there are several questions that should be asked. Who would provide, install and maintain the additional equipment that might be required? Where is the information to be directed; to a central point, or to the airport of arrival? What happens when the flight is diverted because of the weather conditions at the destination airport or if the flight makes an unscheduled landing enroute?

- 3 -

As an additional point of interest very few overseas airports have check-in procedures that call for the name on a passenger ticket to be compared against the name on a passport. Therefore, there is no real assurance that the passenger information collected overseas actually covers the same passenger as arrived in Canada.

In closing we can only add that it would be most unfortunate if Canada, as a Contracting State of ICAO and who subscribes to the recommended practice set out in Annex 9 as follows:

"2.6 Contracting States should not require  
the presentations of a passenger manifest"

should now insist on re-introduction of a document so successfully eliminated several years ago. There must be a better way.



E. H. Weir  
CP Air Representative  
to IDISC

bcc: Mr. J. T. Lukaszewicz ←  
IDISC Secretariat

All IDISC Members

MEMORANDUM

GOVERNMENT OF CANADA



NOTE DE SERVICE

GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA

FROM  
DE Officer-in-Charge,  
Canada Immigration Centre,  
Vancouver International Airport, B. C.

TO  
À Director of Immigration,  
Home Services Branch,  
Ottawa.

SUBJECT  
SUJET Procedures for Dealing with Suspected Terrorists  
Attempting Entry.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION / DE SÉCURITÉ
<del>SECRET</del>
YOUR FILE - VIRÉFÉRENCE
5170-1-(DIO)
DATE
06 October 1972

*copy of  
OP 5189-1  
OP 5189-4-1*

As requested by the Acting Director of Immigration Operations, Pacific Region, attached is a plan for this Airport concerning the above matter.

A meeting took place yesterday with all inspectional agencies here together with R.C.M.P. and a Security Officer from M.O.T. It was tentatively agreed that this plan would be suffice for the present, however, if any one of us felt modifications or changes were needed, another meeting would be convened immediately.

WRS: jm

cc: Director of Immigration Operations  
Pacific Region

District Administrator  
Vancouver, B. C.

*Committee for  
1972 - 1973 - 1974*

Vancouver International Airport file:

5170-1-5135


4 October 1972

PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH SUSPECTED TERRORISTS ATTEMPTING ENTRY AT THE  
VANCOUVER INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

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PART I

Any government agency at the airport receiving information of a terrorist in the building or on board an arriving aircraft will contact immediately other agencies within the airport as follows:



Part II

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---

Plan A

If information is received that a terrorist or terrorists are on board an arriving aircraft, R.C.M.P. in plain clothes will apprehend subject as he steps off aircraft. Arrangements will be made by some means to have a stewardess or purser identify subject. If required an Immigration officer will accompany R.C.M.P. to the aircraft.

Plan B

If the Customs Officer at the Primary Inspection line feels he is dealing with a terrorist, do not refer to Secondary Immigration Examination, but let subject flow through line. The Customs officer should then contact his Supervisor who will press a Silent Alarm buzzer located at the Customs Cashier Cage. This will be seen on an Enunciator Panel in the R.C.M.P. office which is located approximately 150-200 yards from the inspectional area. He will then advise all responsible agencies named in Part I of this operation.

Plan C

If passenger is sent in to Secondary Immigration Examination and the Immigration officer is suspicious he is dealing with a terrorist or locates subjects name on our list of known terrorists, he will immediately contact his Supervisor who will press a Silent Alarm buzzer located under the Shift Supervisor's desk. This will be seen on an Enunciator Panel in the R. C. M. P. office. He will then advise all responsible agencies named in Part I of this operation.

NOTE

M. O. T. have been requested by the Co-ordinator of the Inspectional Services here to install this Alarm System at once. We have also requested that more R.C.M.P. officers, preferably in plain clothes, are in the Inspectional area when we are having peak periods of passengers arriving especially from overseas.

In each plan if examination on behalf of any of the four inspectional services was not completed, this could be done after the R.C.M.P. have carried out their respective duties and responsibilities.

Part III

---

---

Suggested guidelines to be used in cases of terrorists attempting entry at Vancouver International Airport:

1. Prime objective of system is to avoid triggering violent incidents.
2. Safety of examining officers, passengers, bystanders, etc. must be of prime concern.
3. Procedure to be aimed at safe apprehension of dangerous individuals.
4. Police, Customs, Immigration and other involved agencies must be alerted immediately suspect terrorist identified.
5. Individual should not be made aware of fact he is under suspicion until police available to control situation.
6. If need be, suspect could be permitted to flow through entry process without reference to Secondary Examination and if possible kept under discreet surveillance until police available and able to take over.

ORIGINAL on  
OP 5789-1  
CURRY/rs

~~Mr. P. Lambert~~

cc: R.J. Curry  
cc: P.G. Lambert  
cc: Director, Home Services Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

Director of Operations - Immigration

R.J. Curry

October 2, 1972

TERRORISTS

THIS ATTACHMENT  
PUT ON FILE  
OCT 10 1972  
C. R. [initials] OP 5789-41

An emergency meeting was convened in the afternoon of September 27, 1972 to deal with the threat imposed by the possibility of Terrorists entering Canada. In attendance were:

- Mr. Gus Begulki, Security Service, R.C.M.P.
- Mr. John Hamilton, Home Services, Immigration
- Mr. J. Ouimet, A/Director, Criminal Investigation, R.C.M.P.
- Mr. P.G. Lambert, Operations - Immigration
- Mr. C. Dagg, A/Chief, Enforcement Division
- Mr. Tom Hierlihy, A/Manager, Enforcement Control Section,
- Mr. S.T. Lukasiewicz, IDISC
- Mr. G.L. Rosette, Customs
- Mr. J.W. Shurie, MOT Airport Services
- Mr. J. Cook, MOT Airport Policing and Security
- Mr. R.J. Curry, Operations - Immigration

The R.C.M.P. representatives expressed the opinion that the intelligence they had been receiving was very reliable and that indeed a real threat existed. Operating on this premise, the meeting examined our present system of dealing with undesirable elements and found it lacking in several respects.

First, I went on record stating that neither immigration officers nor customs officers were trained or equipped to deal with "Terrorists" in the light of the two catastrophic incidents that have occurred at Lod Airport in Tel Aviv and at the Olympic Games in Munich.

Sometime was spent on various ways and means of setting up an unobtrusive alarm system that would be responded to quickly by someone trained and equipped to deal with the dangers imposed by the presence of a terrorist at one of our ports of entry. The installation of an alarm system does not seem to pose any great difficulty, but we were unable to resolve just who would respond to it.

..2/

The Assistant Commissioner J. Ouimet of the R.C.M.P. stated that his force could not enter into a formal arrangement with Inspection Services because a question of jurisdiction was involved. They would, however, be agreeable to making contact with the local municipal police force upon receipt of a request for assistance, but it became quite obvious that the time involved precluded this type of arrangement as one that was operationally effective.

As a consequence, the meeting broke off inconclusively and Mr. Cook who was representing Security for the Ministry of Transport, was to undertake an immediate review between his department, and the security and police agencies to see if the matter could be resolved or other alternatives explored.

Pending further discussions, the attached telex was directed to the field staff under confidential cover on the following afternoon, September 28, and this is acknowledged at best as a stop-gap measure only.

I expect that MOT will be convening a meeting this afternoon to inform us of what developments have occurred since last Wednesday. I will take along a representative from the Home Services Branch.

R.J. Curry

PG 10/10

**CONFIDENTIAL**

5189-4-1

Director - Operations  
(Immigration)  
Attention: Mr. R. J. Curry

PP  
CHS  
5/10/72

~~5170-9-1~~ SE

September  
29, 1972.

for Director,  
Home Services Branch.  
Terrorists - Hijacking and  
Airport Incidents.

1. Attached are copies of a telex which was forwarded to all Directors of Immigration Operations as the result of discussions relating to the above matter. I understand that you wish to provide IDISC Committee members with a copy of this.

2. Copies are also being provided to the Director, Programs and Procedures Branch, the Director General, Foreign Service and the Chief, Admissions Division.

*[Handwritten signature]*

THIS ATTACHMENT  
PUT ON FILE  
OCT 10 1972  
C.R.

Distribution

- ✓ Director,  
Programs & Procedures Branch.  
Director General, Foreign Service.  
Chief, Admissions Division.

Atté-

AJF  
to rat  
PP  
4/10/72

notes  
ajf  
5/10/72  
Naled  
CHS  
6/10/72

Main-d'œuvre et Immigration  
Manpower and Immigration

TELECOMMUNICATION MESSAGE

MESSAGE PAR TÉLÉCOMMUNICATION

**CONFIDENTIAL**

IMPORTANT: Messages must be typewritten or printed in block letters.

IMPORTANT: Le message doit être dactylographié ou écrit en majuscule.

Originator's Name (in full) Nom de l'employeur (au complet)	Room Pièce	Telephone Téléphone	Date	Page Page	Operator's Use À l'usage de l'opérateur
C. DAGG	855	2-1921	28/9/72	1 2	
Message Priority - Ordre de priorité du message			Message Classification - Classification du message		
Routine Routine	Urgent Urgent	Stand by En attente	Flash Immédiat	Unclassified Non classifié	Restricted Diffusion restreinte
			Confidential Confidentiel		

Priority - Priorité	Classification - Classification	Our File - Notre référence	Your File - Votre référence
URGENT		5170-9-1	

FROM - DE: DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS - IMMIGRATION ALL DIRECTORS OF  
DIRECTOR, HOME SERVICES BRANCH IMMIGRATION OPERATIONS

*RELIVER 115  
MONTREAL  
COMMUNIQUE  
JANUARY 1972*

Start Message Here Commencer ici	Typewriter Characters to Inch Nombre de frappes au pouce
	Stop here for 12 Si 12, terminer ici
	Stop here for 10 Si 10, terminer ici

FURTHER TO OUR TELEX MESSAGES OF JULY 6th AND JULY 21st LAST THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES ARE TO BE USED BY OFFICERS IN CHARGE ALL PORTS OF ENTRY AS BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH LOCAL CUSTOMS, POLICE AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES INVOLVED, TO WORK OUT PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH SUSPECTED TERRORISTS ATTEMPTING ENTRY.

- (1) PRIME OBJECTIVE OF SYSTEM IS TO AVOID TRIGGERING VIOLENT INCIDENTS
- (2) SAFETY OF EXAMINING OFFICERS, PASSENGERS, BYSTANDERS, ETC. MUST BE OF PRIME CONCERN
- (3) PROCEDURE TO BE AIMED AT SAFE APPREHENSION OF DANGEROUS INDIVIDUALS
- (4) POLICE, CUSTOMS, IMMIGRATION AND OTHER INVOLVED AGENCIES MUST BE ALERTED IMMEDIATELY SUSPECT TERRORIST IDENTIFIED
- (5) INDIVIDUAL SHOULD NOT BE MADE AWARE OF FACT HE IS UNDER SUSPICION UNTIL POLICE AVAILABLE TO CONTROL SITUATION
- (6) IF NEED BE, SUSPECT COULD BE PERMITTED TO FLOW THROUGH ENTRY PROCESS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO SECONDARY EXAMINATION AND IF POSSIBLE KEPT UNDER DISCREET SURVEILLANCE UNTIL

AUTHORIZING SIGNATURE  
SIGNATURE DE L'AUTORISATEUR

Manpower and Immigration / Main-d'œuvre et Immigration

TELECOMMUNICATION MESSAGE

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Originator's Name (in full) Nom de l'employeur (au complet)	Room Pièce	Telephone Téléphone	Date	Page Page	of de	Operator's Use À l'usage de l'opérateur
				2	2	<b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>
Message Priority — Ordre de priorité du message			Message Classification — Classification du message			
Routine • Urgent • Stand by • Flash Routine • Urgent • En attente • Immédiat			Unclassified • Restricted • Confidential Non classifié • Diffusion restreinte • Confidentiel			

**MESSAGE**

Priority — Priorité	Classification — Classification	Our File — Notre référence	Your File — Votre référence

FROM — DE: TO — À:

Start Message Here / Commencer ici

Typewritten Characters to Inch / Nombre de frappes au pouce

Stop here for 12 / Si 12, terminer ici

Stop here for 10 / Si 10, terminer ici

POLICE AVAILABLE AND ABLE TO TAKE OVER.

PROCEDURES WILL VARY FROM PORT TO PORT DEPENDING UPON RESOURCES, FACILITIES AND AVAILABILITY OF POLICE. IMPERATIVE HOWEVER THAT PLANS AND SYSTEMS BE DEvised TO DEAL WITH SITUATION FOR USE SHOULD NEED ARISE. SUGGEST REGIONAL ENFORCEMENT ADVISER BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PROJECT EACH REGION.

PLEASE ADVISE THIS HEADQUARTERS OF PLANS FOR EACH PORT OF ENTRY. PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO DEVELOPMENT PLANS FOR INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS. IMMEDIATE REPORT AIRPORT PLANS REQUESTED.

THESE GUIDELINES ARE FOR IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION AS A PREPAREDNESS MEASURE. STAFF SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO REMAIN CALM IN PERFORMANCE OF DUTIES.

TMM Home  
HIERLIHY Jdh

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*E. vernet*

Director - Operations  
(Immigration)  
Attention: Mr. R. J. Curry

5170-9-1 ✓

September  
29, 1972.

*for* Director,  
Home Services Branch.

Terrorists - Hijacking and  
Airport Incidents.

1. Attached are copies of a telex which was forwarded to all Directors of Immigration Operations as the result of discussions relating to the above matter. I understand that you wish to provide IDISC Committee members with a copy of this.

2. Copies are also being provided to the Director, Programs and Procedures Branch, the Director General, Foreign Service and the Chief, Admissions Division.

*29/9/72  
MCK  
Joh  
BB*

*JD*

Distribution

Director,  
Programs & Procedures Branch.  
Director General, Foreign Service.  
Chief, Admissions Division.

Atté-

Main-d'œuvre  
et Immigration Manpower  
and Immigration

TELECOMMUNICATION  
MESSAGE

MESSAGE PAR  
TÉLÉCOMMUNICATION

**CONFIDENTIAL**

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Routine Routine	Urgent Urgent	Stand by En attente	Flash Immédiat	Unclassified Non classifié	Restricted Diffusion restreinte	Confidential Confidentiel

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Priority - Priorité	Classification - Classification	Our File - Notre référence	Your File - Votre référence
URGENT		5170-9-1	

FROM - DE: DIRECTOR OF OPERATIONS - IMMIGRATION ALL DIRECTORS OF  
DIRECTOR, HOME SERVICES BRANCH IMMIGRATION OPERATIONS

*Handwritten notes:*  
HRLIFER, J.J.  
MONTREAL, PQ  
10/21/72  
JANUSOOPER, J.B.

Start Message Here Commencer ici	Typewriter Characters to Inch Nombre de frappes au pouce
	Stop here for 12 Si 12, terminer ici
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AUTHORIZING SIGNATURE  
SIGNATURE DE L'AUTORISATEUR

Main-d'œuvre et Immigration  
 Manpower and Immigration

TELECOMMUNICATION  
 MESSAGE

MESSAGE PAR  
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c.c. J.R. Robillard  
c.c. A.J. Arlett

CONFIDENTIAL

Directors of Immigration Operations

OP 5189-4-1

~~OP 5170-9-1~~

Director of Operations - Immigration

July 24, 1972

Unlawful Interference with Civil Aviation

copy on  
5170-9-1

1. Unlawful interference with civil aviation in recent months has placed considerable pressure on authorities to implement and co-ordinate programs designed to deter and prevent criminal acts against the air transportation industry.

2. One such program has been instituted by the Law Enforcement Intelligence Unit (L.E.I.U.) in the U.S.A. of which our Intelligence Section is a member. In October 1971 the L.E.I.U. was asked to advise the Federal Aviation Administration, (F.A.A.) of any information or criminal activity which may be injurious to the security of civil aviation. The information gathering process began immediately and the L.E.I.U. has now assembled data concerning:

- (a) Actual or suspected criminal activity directed against an airport, aircraft or FAA facility.
- (b) Arrests or convictions of FAA employees or individuals who hold FAA pilot certification.
- (c) Any movement or activities of dissident groups or individual leaders which may pose a threat to some portion of the air transportation industry.
- (d) Illegal use of aircraft.
- (e) Identification and activities of groups or individuals who may be suspected of planning to:
  - (1) Hijack an aircraft. (Air piracy)
  - (2) Interfere with the duty performance of any of the flight crew or attendants aboard aircraft.

- (3) Attempt to board an aircraft with an unauthorized concealed deadly or dangerous weapon.
- (4) Place a bomb or explosive device aboard an aircraft, at an air terminal, of FAA facility.
- (5) Impart or convey false information concerning attempts to do any of the above acts.

3. The F.A.A. has extensive information on aircraft type, registration and ownership, along with a register of all individuals who hold pilot certificates. The names and addresses of F.A.A. Regional Intelligence Officers or local F.A.A. Security Offices, are recorded with the Intelligence Section.

4. My reason for drawing your attention to this information is to make you aware of the facility that is available to us should we need to use it at some future date. It is true that this kind of information is available to us through the R.C.M.P., but there will be instances where urgency is a prime consideration, in which case we can go directly to our own sources, who having primary jurisdiction, will obtain the particulars we need, more expeditiously.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
R. J. Curry  
A SIGNÉ L'ORIGINAL

Director of Immigration Operations - Halifax  
Director of Immigration Operations - Montreal  
Director of Immigration Operations - Toronto  
Director of Immigration Operations - Winnipeg  
Director of Immigration Operations - Vancouver

AXA

For your information. You may wish to advise the Regions.

OP 5170-9-1

CONFIDENTIAL

A/Chief, Enforcement Division  
Chief, Admissions Division

*Attn: please do.*  
*J.R. 2/17/72*

IH700-5-12 Vol. 3

June 28, 1972.

*d/* Director, Home Services Branch.

Unlawful interference with Civil Aviation

*COPY ON:*  
*5170-9-1*

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

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ORIGINAL ON:  
HQ3-27589  
IMFOR/BEAUPRE/HL Diary

CONFIDENTIAL

ALL MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION POSTS ABROAD.

COPY ON:

5855-13-1

5170-9-1

June 19, 1972.

for Director General,  
Foreign Service.

Palestinian Extremist Organizations

OP ~~5170-9-1~~  
5189-4-1

607

1. This is further to telex message of September 11, 1970 to all posts abroad on the subject of "Air Hijacking - Mid East".

2. Our Beirut office was recently approached by someone subsequently identified as a member of a Palestinian guerrilla organization called Black September. Photocopy of Beirut's memorandum of May 22, 1972 which is self-explanatory, is hereto attached for your information together with photocopy of a false non-immigrant visa issued by an unknown person using a counterfeit visa stamp reproduced from stamp IM-91, now taken out of circulation.

3. Some of the discrepancies noted in the false non-immigrant stamp are as follows:

- i) Crown appears as poor replica;
- ii) Fonctionnaire Canadien à d'immigration instead of "à l'immigration";
- iii) identifying visa stamp number obliterated;
- iv) characters for English wording somewhat larger;
- v) use of circled numeral although only one number shown in passport and only one visa issued;
- vi) the missing "y" in word "Entry" is a result of the worn edges of visa stamp IM-91.

4. In view of recent events that took place in Israel denoting that certain Palestinian groups are still very much active, all posts are being reminded once again to exercise the utmost caution when dealing with requests

...2

- 2 -

from Arab applicants for non-immigrant visas or extensions of validity of visas issued at other visa offices. Applications and requests for extension of validity should be dealt by the more experienced officers and in the case of Palestinians or other persons suspected of being connected with any Palestinian extremist group, their particulars should be referred to Headquarters in accordance with the instructions of September 11, 1970.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY  
ORIGINAL SIGNÉ PAR  
G. M. Mitchell

G.M. Mitchell,  
A/Director of Operations,  
Foreign Service.

Enc.

LAMBERT/CL

c.c. For File DG 5855-1

c.c. Diary Copy

c.c. Mr. J.R. Robillard's Diary (1128)

c.c. Mr. P.G. Lambert's Diary (224F)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**Directors General.**

*of 5189-4-1*

DG 5855-1

September 16/70

**Assistant Deputy Minister (Operations)**

*copy on:  
5189-1*

**Selection & Processing - Applications.**

1. Quoted hereunder for your information is a confidential message sent to all Immigration Posts abroad by the office of the Director General, Foreign Branch, Immigration Division at this headquarters.

" In view recent hijacking episodes following instructions to be followed until further notice. Quote all apparent or presumed arabs regardless of nationality who come to your office attention asking for information for visas for Canada are to be interviewed by a visa officer and screened carefully. All those who turn out to be palestinians or who are suspected of being connected with any Palestinian Nationalist Group will be required to apply in writing and will be informed that their application will be considered in Ottawa. Visa telegram as per 7.51 will be sent together with other relevant information obtained at time of interview. Visa authorization will take about three weeks.

The above is not intended as a form of sanction against arabs but as a precautionary measure against individuals who may be potential hi-jackers or saboteurs. "

2. Will you please arrange to pass along this information to all CICs in your regions.

*J.C. Best*  
J.C. Best

Distribution

- Mr. W.C. Stewart - Halifax
- Mr. T.R. Watt - Toronto
- Mr. G. Beaudry - Montreal
- Mrs. Jean Edmonds - Winnipeg
- Mr. L.S. McGill - Vancouver

*pg 2*

*of 5189-4-1*  
*5855-1*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BERUT SEP15/70 NO/NO STANDARD

TO TT EXTER 497 DE PARIS

INFO CAIRO TAVIV TT IMMIGOTT DE OTT ATHNS DE PARIS

REF IMMIGOTT TEL UNN SEP11

PROCEDURE GOVERNING ARAB AND PALESTINIAN VISA APPLICANTS

DUE(A) LIKELIHOOD REVISED PROCEDURE WOULD BE INTERPRETED HERE AS FORM OF SANCTION IF IT BECAME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE AND (B) SIMILARITY OF REVISED PROCEDURE WITH CURRENT PRACTICES OF IMMIG BERUT INTEND TO ADOPT POSITION ENTRY REGULATIONS HAVE NOT/NOT BEEN CHANGED IF QUERIED BY LOCAL MEDIA REPS. CONTINGENCY MAY NOT/NOT ARISE HERE AS WE ALREADY HAVE REPUTATION FOR TOUGH ENTRY REGULATIONS BUT GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ADOPT SIMILAR STANCE IN EVENT OF ENQUIRIES BY CDN PRESS OR PUBLIC.

*Noted Cde 16/9/70  
over to JF*

*Noted JF. and agreed.  
It was External who removed our  
original instruction not to make the  
new procedure public. It is true our  
entry Regulation have not changed - the change  
is purely procedural.  
17.9.70*

SEP 16 3 07 PM '70  
MANPOWER & IMMIGRATION  
OTTAWA

284952

11-9-70 OP 5189-4-1

*file*

DEPARTMENT OF MANPOWER AND IMMIGRATION

MINISTÈRE DE LA MAIN-D'OEUVRE ET DE L'IMMIGRATION

TELECOMMUNICATION MESSAGE



CANADA

MESSAGE PAR TÉLÉCOMMUNICATION

IMPORTANT - MESSAGE MUST BE PRINTED IN BLOCK LETTERS OR TYPEWRITTEN

IMPORTANT - TOUT MESSAGE DOIT ÊTRE ÉCRIT À LA MACHINE OU EN LETTRES MOULÉES

TO: TELEX OPERATOR - A: L'OPÉRATEUR DE TÉLEX ROOM - SALLE 910 BOURQUE		DATE 11 SEP 70	FILE NO. - N° DU DOSSIER	CHARGE TO - AU COMPTE DE				
ORIGINATOR'S NAME (in full) - NOM DE L'ENVOYEUR (au complet) G. DUROCHER/CA		ROOM-SALLE 235	BUILDING - L'ÉDIFICE BOURQUE	TEL. NO. - N° DE TÉL. 2-1890				
TRANSMISSION MEDIA - TRANSMIS PAR			MESSAGE CLASSIFICATION - CLASSIFICATION					
TELEX TÉLEX	TELTEX TÉLTEX	TELEGRAM TÉLÉGRAMME	CABLE CÂBLOGRAMME	TELEX VIA EXT. AFF. TÉLEX VIA AFF. EXT.	RUSH URGENT	NORMAL NORMAL	MAY BE SENT NEXT A.M. PEUT ATTENDRE AU LENDEMAIN MATIN	CLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIEL
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
IF BY TELEGRAM SI PAR TÉLÉGRAMME		<input type="checkbox"/> FULL RATE PLEIN TARIF	<input type="checkbox"/> DAY LETTER LETTRE DE JOUR	<input type="checkbox"/> NIGHT LETTER LETTRE DE NUIT				

MESSAGE IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL

FROM/DE: INFOR TO/A: ALL IMMIG POSTS ABROAD

*gpl*  
*Please pass this information to the 10/15/70*

IN VIEW RECENT HIJACKING EPISODES FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS TO BE FOLLOWED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE. QUOTE ALL APPARENT OR PRESUMED ARABS REGARDLESS OF NATIONALITY WHO COME TO YOUR OFFICE ATTENTION ASKING FOR INFORMATION FOR VISAS FOR CANADA ARE TO BE INTERVIEWED BY A VISA OFFICER AND SCREENED CAREFULLY. ALL THOSE WHO TURN OUT TO BE PALESTINIANS OR WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING CONNECTED WITH ANY PALESTINIAN NATIONALIST GROUP WILL BE REQUIRED TO APPLY IN WRITING AND WILL BE INFORMED THAT THEIR APPLICATION WILL BE CONSIDERED IN OTTAWA. VISA TELEGRAM AS PER 7.51 WILL BE SENT TOGETHER WITH OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION OBTAINED AT TIME OF INTERVIEW. VISA AUTHORIZATION WILL TAKE ABOUT THREE WEEKS. UNQUOTE

*See p 15/10/70*

THE ABOVE IS NOT INTENDED AS A FORM OF SANCTION AGAINST ARABS BUT AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE AGAINST INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY BE POTENTIAL HIJACKERS OR SABOTEURS.

PLEASE NOTE THE ABOVE YOU MAY WISH TO INFORM CICs IN CANADA.

- c.c. Director, Home Services Branch.
- c.c. Director General of Operations.
- Director General, Foreign Branch.

THIS ATTACHMENT  
PUT ON FILE  
SEP 15 1970  
C. R.

11-9/70 of 5189-4-1  
 FCN-302

FM/EXT	EXT	DATE	FILE/DOSSIER	SECURITY
		SEP 11 1970		SECURITE
			NO	PRECEDENCE
TO/A	ALL POSTS INCLUDING LDN EXCEPTING SAIGON, THE		FCN 3874	IMMEDIATE
INFO	CONSULAR POSTS IN THE U.S. AND THOSE POSTS TO WHICH M&I ARE SENDING THE ATTACHED SIMILAR MESSAGE.			

PA FILE

REF  
 SUB/SUJ AIR HIGHJACKING - MIDEAST

IN VIEW RECENT HIGHJACKING EPISODES FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS TO BE FOLLOWED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE:

2. ALL APPARENT OR PRESUMED ARABS REGARDLESS OF NATIONALITY WHO COME TO YOUR OFFICE ATTENTION ASKING FOR INFORMATION FOR VISAS FOR CDA ARE TO BE INTERVIEWED BY A VISA OFFICER/OFFICER AND SCREENED CAREFULLY. ALL THOSE WHO TURN OUT TO BE PALESTINIANS OR WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING CONNECTED WITH ANY PALESTINIAN NATIONALISTIC GROUP WILL BE REQUIRED TO APPLY IN WRITING AND WILL BE INFORMED THAT THEIR APPLICATION WILL BE CONSIDERED IN OTTAWA. VISA TELEGRAM AS PER 7.51 OF IMMIG MANUAL WILL BE SENT TOGETHER WITH OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION OBTAINED AT TIME OF INTERVIEW. VISA AUTHORIZATION LIKELY TO TAKE ABOUT THREE WEEKS.

3. FOR YOUR INFO ONLY THE ABOVE IS NOT/NOT INTENDED AS A FORM OF SANCTION AGAINST ARABS BUT AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE AGAINST INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY BE POTENTIAL HIGHJACKERS OR SABOTEURS.

DISTRIBUTION NO STD PMA; PDG; PDF; MIN (Mr. Vincent); POP; PSI (Mr. Rowe); .. 2  
 LOCAL/LOCALE FLE (Mr. Clark); OUN (Mr. Sharp); GAF (Mr. Delvois); M&I (Mrs. Faulkner done)

ORIGINATOR/REDACTEUR	DIVISION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/AUTORISE
SIG..... FRIELIQUET/WHF.....	ATTACHMENT	2-6470	SIG..... E. H. GILMOUR.....

EXT 18/BIL (REV 5/64)  
 (COMMUNICATIONS DIV)

SEP 16 1970

Noted  
 JF

- 2 -

FOR LONDON ONLY - IMMEDIATE

INFORM FOREIGN OFFICE OF ABOVE, SEEK THEIR CO-OPERATION IN SENDING INSTRUCTIONS TO SAME EFFECT TO BRITISH OFFICES ABROAD AUTHORIZED TO GRANT CDN VISAS AND ENQUIRE WHETHER THEY ARE CONTEMPLATING TAKING SIMILAR ACTION.

FOR WASH ONLY - IMMEDIATE

INFORM STATE DEPARTMENT OF ABOVE AND ADVISE WHETHER THEY ARE CONTEMPLATING TAKING SIMILAR ACTION.

EXT 18A (5/84)  
COMM'S DIV.