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~~CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE~~
~~DEFENCE COUNCIL~~
CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE

The following is an extract from the minutes of the 44th Meeting of the above committee held 2nd June 48. Referred for information and necessary action.

C. J. Dillon
NAVAL SECRETARY

- ① VCNS
- ② ACNS
- DWT
- DNA
- D.N.Com
- ③ DNPO
- DNI
- DSS
- CNP
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- DGFA
- DGNO
- SA/CNS

DEVELOPMENTS IN WORLD SITUATION - REVIEW

The Minister of National Defence, at the request of the Prime Minister, explained that the purpose of the meeting was to review strategic developments with members of the Canadian Section of the Joint Defence Board so as to ensure a common point of view by all concerned. This was the third meeting of this character - the dates of the others being August 12th, 1947, and January 8th, 1948. It had been arranged to precede the meeting of the Board at Trenton scheduled for the following day.

Since the last joint meeting, important developments had taken place. On March 17th the "Western Union" had come into being, and, on the same day, President Truman had made his important announcement regarding support of the Western European democracies. This had been followed by the Prime Minister's statement that Canada would play her full part in any movement to develop an effective system of collective security through regional arrangements within the UN Charter. At the time, the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and concern about the position of Finland and Norway had led to a great sense of urgency. It had been hoped by some that these developments might lead to the United States and Canada giving formal undertakings to support Western Union. While the sense of urgency had since diminished, it was very much in the Canadian interest to seek agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom on all strategic matters.

Meanwhile, the Security Council had been faced with the most grave problems having a definite bearing on the chances of war and General McNaughton was invited to say something on these.

General McNaughton said that the Canadian delegation to the United Nations had always sought to follow the principle stated by the Minister of National Defence, of promoting good relations between the United Kingdom and the United States. When they held divergent views, Canada's difficulties increased.

On the subject of atomic energy control, the third report of the Commission would soon be submitted to the Security Council with the recommendation that it be transmitted to the Assembly at their September meeting. In that report, which dealt with the political side of control, nine countries stood together in concluding that the difficulties in achieving a basis for control arose from fundamental differences that could not be reconciled by the Commission. Soviet Russia's position in opposition had been fully described. It was hoped that the report would be accepted by the Canadian Government.

With regard to Indonesia, the Council had re-affirmed the mandate of the Truce Commission and had blocked efforts to make it a commission of arbitration. The Commission's report would be ready for early consideration.

With regard to Kashmir, the Council, after considerable deliberation, and after failure to get India and Pakistan to reach agreement, had constituted a plebiscite commission and this decision had not been specifically rejected by either party in the dispute. The Commission was now being set up and would be embarking for Kashmir shortly.

With regard to Czechoslovakia, the proposal to enquire into the circumstances in which Communists gained control of that country had led to the use of the double veto by the U.S.S.R. Possibly some good had been accomplished by revealing the reluctance of the Soviet Union to face an enquiry of this sort.

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Palestine presented the most difficult problem. Here again the guiding principle of the Canadian delegation was to secure co-operation between the United Kingdom and the United States and this had at times proved difficult. Canada had, however, acted as a mediator in arranging informal meetings and in achieving some meeting of minds, though the problem had been rendered more difficult by domestic political issues in the United States. The necessity of a full realization of the importance of strategic interests in the Middle East was apparent. It was essential to retain stability and avoid giving the U.S.S.R. any excuse for entering Palestine with troops. The issues at stake in the area were far greater than whether a Jewish state should or should not be set up. The Canadian delegation to the Security Council had never actively pushed partition except by agreement of Jews and Arabs. The delegation had resisted efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union to threaten the use of sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter and had insisted that, before sanctions were threatened, an effort should be made

made to ascertain what the five great powers were in fact prepared to do. Although there was no immediate sign of a cessation of hostilities, the Truce Commission would soon be set up and be able to take advantage of any softening of either position. It was somewhat alarming to reflect that twelve of the thirteen members of the provisional Israel government had been born within the Iron Curtain and some of these had Communist sympathies. The appointment of Mr. Malik to succeed Mr. Gromyko as U.S.S.R. delegate to the United Nations might portend a lessening of tension in Scandinavia and heightening of it in the Middle East, as the new appointee was known to be a specialist on Arab and Middle East affairs. For the time, the focus of interest and pressure seemed to be shifting from the West towards the East.

The Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs reported upon recent developments in United Kingdom and United States policies.

A significant trend was the increased continentalization of United Kingdom policy which had resulted from the Marshall offer, and an increasing realization of the threat of continued Soviet expansion in Europe. This was accompanied by a withdrawal of the United Kingdom from other parts of the world forced mainly by economic reasons, especially the necessity of transferring men from the Services to industry in order to increase production. A parallel development was that the United States were being drawn closer to western Europe and possibly some form of political guarantee would emerge. At present the western European countries felt somewhat let down since the Czechoslovakian crisis as they expected the presidential statement of March 17th to be followed by a more specific military guarantee. They were concerned about the prospects of an early war and wanted an out-and-out guarantee from the United States as a deterrent to Soviet aggression. In these circumstances patience as well as firmness was required in dealing with the U.S.S.R.

The Chief of the Air Staff reported upon his recent visit to the United Kingdom and the Continent.

In France it appeared that recent developments had strengthened their resolve to defend their country, if the necessity arose. This was in contrast to their thinking six months' ago of withdrawing forces to North Africa. It was vital, however, that they be encouraged. The French Air Force had been purged of Communist elements in the senior positions and were now working closely with the Royal Air Force, whose equipment and methods they had adopted. In this pattern military and political plans were in accord.

Sweden showed every indication of following their traditional policy of neutrality but they would probably defend their country if it were invaded. The Swedish Air Force, which was trained on United Kingdom lines, appeared efficient and should give a good account of itself if called upon to do so. They had shown some interest in procuring some electronic equipment from Canada, as supplies of this type from the United Kingdom were slow. Three air stations had been visited, at one of which a complete operations room was built underground.

Norway had been visited just at the time of the announcement that they would not sign a mutual defence pact with Soviet Russia. This had proved popular. Like the French and Swedish Air Forces, the Norwegian were re-equipping themselves with U.K. types of aircraft. However, they complained that deliveries would be slow as they ranked in priority after the Benelux countries. Morale in the Norwegian Air Force was good but they were ill-equipped and felt somewhat neglected by the United States and Canada. Favourable impressions were gained on a visit to Sola Airport.

In the United Kingdom economic difficulties imposed severe limitations on defence measures. They held to the hope that if peace could be maintained for ten years, conditions might improve and the danger diminish. They expressed interest in Canada developing heavy bombers from United States and Canadian material. In the event of war they held the belief that any attack against the North American continent would be diversionary in nature and designed to disrupt the war effort of this continent. The United Kingdom Air Ministry appeared anxious to know for planning purposes whether training facilities for Royal Air Force aircrew could again be established here. On the personnel side, the Royal Air Force were having some difficulty in filling aircrew positions and they were likely to re-establish officer positions for these.

Recently an exercise (Pandora) had been held to consider how the Royal Air Force would fight a war prior to 1955, as one problem, and after 1955, using weapons of mass destruction, as another problem. Comments on this would be given by Dr. Solandt.

The Chairman, Defence Research Board summarized the impressions gained on his recent visit to the United Kingdom, particularly in connection with the Royal Air Force exercise Pandora. There, the feeling was held by the Services that defence research had not lived up to expectations since the war. The reason for this was to be found in their economic plight which made it necessary to divert scientific effort to the industrial recovery programme.

While their original policy had been to concentrate on long-term developments, rather than the improvement of existing weapons, there were signs that this trend was being modified.

The conclusions of the Royal Air Force on exercise Pandora had appeared to him to be unduly pessimistic. Among the weapons which they considered would not be available by 1955 were supersonic aircraft, guided missiles (ground to air and air to air), and improved blind-flying bombing radar. The United States Air Force was more optimistic about the development of these by the date mentioned.

Another impression gained was that the United Kingdom were not entirely satisfied with the flow of defence research information from the United States.

Discussions had been held on the anti-submarine problem and it had been generally agreed that escort vessels plus aircraft formed the best combination for anti-submarine work, although it was conceivable that the submarine would emerge as the most effective anti-submarine weapon.

An important discussion had also been held on the best operational method for delivering atomic bombs. The Royal Air Force was inclined to the view that planes carrying atomic bombs would have to be part of a large bombing force (250 planes) using conventional bombs, as single planes would be intercepted. This technique would reduce the advantage of using atomic bombs because of the necessity of having to provide men and aircraft to constitute the conventional bombing force.

The Minister of National Defence summarized the views of the Chief of the General Staff as communicated to him by letter. These had confirmed the views already expressed that western European countries feared that they would be left in the lurch and that there was a necessity for bolstering up their morale as well as of giving specific aid and guarantees. An early statement of policy by the United States would do much to allay this fear.

The Committee, after further discussion, noted these statements pertaining to the international situation and the reports on recent visits abroad.

QUOTE No. HQS 701-0-16-1 (DMI)



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DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
ARMY

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OTTAWA, CANADA,

9 Apr 48

DNPI

Referred to...	<i>Staff</i>
APB	10 1948
File No.	11460-27
Chg' to	

Appreciation of World Strategic Situation

1. Attached for your retention please find copy No. 26 of "An Appreciation of the World Strategic Situation" prepared by DMI, dated 14 Feb 48, together with a self explanatory covering letter to BGS (Plans).
2. This is the paper which was discussed at today's meeting in Brigadier Smith's office, and while it was hastily prepared, it may be of some use in the present discussions.
3. Kindly acknowledge receipt on duplicate copy of this memorandum.

Colonel,
DMI.

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DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

- ARMY -


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HQTS 701-0-16-1 (DMI)
14 Feb 48

BGS (Plans)

Appreciation of World Strategic Situation

- 1 Attached as per your request is an Intelligence appreciation of the world strategic situation. It deals with the subject from the Soviet point of view and endeavours to meet your requirement for a paper which would set out the world situation in such a way that the Planners could determine our strategic concept and develop our strategic plans.
- 2 In forwarding this paper, it is desired to qualify it with the observation that it has been completed by DMI in nine days, as compared with the target date of 30 May 48 by which the JIC hopes to complete the same paper. It has been possible, therefore, to carry out only a minimum of research, and as a result, some very generalized statements have had to be made.
- 3 It should also be borne in mind that the Canadian Intelligence organization is being built on the premise that each service and department should equip itself to make a contribution in its own special field and that only in the JIC/JIS should there be the necessary machinery for producing coordinated studies. In the result, DMI has tackled this problem without a properly balanced collation system and staff and without the opportunity of more than passing reference to the experts in the other departments and services concerned. This deficiency is felt particularly in the case of JIB. The lack of Intelligence on communications has been a severe handicap, and it is highly likely that certain of the estimates made in this paper will require modification when adequate time is available for JIB to make its proper contribution.
- 4 In view of the extensive scope of this paper, it has been necessary to limit the amount of material presented on foreign armies. If, in the course of their studies, DMO & P require additional details, these can be produced on request.



Colonel
DMI

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Copy No. 26.

AN APPRECIATION OF THE
WORLD STRATEGIC SITUATION

Prepared at the Direction of the BGS (Plans)
by the Directorate of Military Intelligence

OTTAWA CANADA
14 Feb 48.

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THE WORLD STRATEGIC SITUATION

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APPENDIX "A"

Military Situation - USSR and Satellites
Period "A" - 1948 - 1960

APPENDIX "B"

Military Situation - Western Powers
Period "A" - 1948 - 1960

APPENDIX "C"

Military Situation - USSR and Satellites
Period "B" - After 1960

APPENDIX "D"

Military Situation - Western Powers
Period "B" - After 1960

MAP "P"

Estimated Soviet Allocation of Forces
for the invasion of Western Europe
and the Middle East - Period "A".

MAP "Q"

Estimated Soviet Garrison Forces for
the occupation of Europe and the
Middle East - Period "A".

AN APPRECIATION
of
THE WORLD STRATEGIC SITUATION

PART I - OBJECT

OBJECT

1. (a) To estimate when and under what circumstances a world war may take place.
- (b) To predict the strategy of the USSR in a world war.
- (c) To assist in the assessment of the military capabilities of the USSR in the event of hostilities.

ASSUMPTION

2. It is assumed that the USSR will be capable of constructing atomic bombs from the year 1952.

PART II - POSSIBILITIES OF WAR

INTRODUCTION

3. The Soviet Union and the United States of America are at present the only nations with sufficient war potential to wage large-scale, long-term warfare. It is likely that they will remain so in the foreseeable future.

4. While certain other nations and blocs of nations may augment considerably their economic and military potential, they will be unable to attack or resist either the USSR or the USA without the active support of the other. This paper therefore deals with the possibility of war between the USSR and the USA. Those other nations which possess significant military potential are considered in relation to this basic question.

AIMS OF THE POWERS

5. USSR

- (a) The Soviet rulers are Communists, and in accordance with their tenets, have as their objective the establishment of Communism throughout the world. They believe in the validity of their philosophy and consider it their duty to establish it by every means at their disposal regardless of its acceptability to the majority of the people in any community or country. At the same time, the men in power in the Soviet regime are Russians and are determined to ensure that their country dominates the Communist world which will result from the achievement of their aims.

- (b) They believe that the leaders of the Capitalist states will eventually attempt to precipitate a war with the USSR in order to prevent the establishment of world Communism. They therefore aim to make the USSR militarily invincible and with due regard for the lessons of Russian history are determined to eliminate the economic backwardness which is her chief weakness. The fact that this entails great hardships on the part of the people causes no more concern to the masters than do the ruthless methods employed by the security police for the suppression of the resulting disaffection.
- (c) It is believed that the Soviet rulers sincerely hope to achieve their aim of world domination by actively supporting Communist infiltration and by creating economic chaos within the Capitalist states. If her enemies undertake a preventative war they are determined to have Russia prepared. If, however, infiltration is unsuccessful and the peace is undisturbed, it is believed that as soon as the balance of military power is in her favour, the Soviet leaders will attempt to achieve their aims by force of arms.

6. USA

- (a) The USA, for the first time in its history, finds itself in the position of being the only power capable of leading the defence of its own political philosophy.
- (b) The American leaders are clearly aware of the threat contained in the aims of the Soviet Union. They also realize that the balance of power held by them is the only obstacle to Soviet aggression and their principle aim is to ensure that it does not slip into the hands of the Soviet rulers.
- (c) In order to prevent a transfer of the balance of power the US leaders have decided to oppose any further spread of communism by subversion or pressure and are prepared to do this by military and economic measures. The US Government has stated that it will "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure". This support has been provided in the form of military aid to Greece, Turkey, and China. The USA has also undertaken to provide material assistance in the form of consumer and capital goods to those countries of Europe whose economic conditions leave them suitable for Communist exploitation.
- (d) The US leaders, supported by the American public, believe that by the ensurance of free institutions and the removal of unhealthy economic conditions, the remaining countries of the world will not embrace Communism and the expansionist aims of the Soviet rulers will be defeated.

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- (c) In the event that these methods are unsuccessful and the balance of power tips in favour of the Soviet rulers, either through the further spread of Communism or the increased military might of the USSR, the policy which the USA will employ will largely depend on the mood of the American public.

CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH A WAR MAY OCCUR

7. During the next few years, while the balance of military power rests with the USA, the struggle between the expansion of and resistance to Communism will continue. It is not considered probable that either side will, without provocation, commence an aggressive war during this period.
8. There is, however, the possibility that the Soviet rulers may carry their policies of infiltration, actions by armed minorities, diplomatic pressure and violent propaganda too far and convince the US leaders and the US public that their only recourse is to use military force.
9. On the other hand, the USA, inexperienced in international power politics, may pursue her policies in such an aggressive manner, in what the USSR regards as her spheres of influence such as Greece and Turkey, that the Soviet regime becomes convinced that Russia is about to be assaulted. Measures such as the negotiation of a strong alliance against the USSR might equally well be misinterpreted as a threat of aggression and goad the Soviet Union into striking first.
10. The possibility exists that another nation may commit an act which will draw the larger powers into conflict. This is considered unlikely, particularly in the case of the Soviet Satellites whose foreign policies are under the strict control of Moscow.
11. While not considered probable, it is realized that an unpremeditated, accidental, war may start within the next few years.
12. As long as men with the ideology of the present regime in the Soviet Union are the rulers of Russia, and there is no foreseeable possibility of their displacement, they will aim at world Communism. If their efforts, short of war, are unsuccessful, it is believed that they will plan an aggressive war as soon as they have created a sufficient military preponderance to suit their purpose. On the assumption that Soviet scientists will be capable of constructing atomic bombs from the year 1952 and in view of the Soviet programme of economic expansion, it is estimated that without acquiring control of additional industry, the USSR may be able to embark on an aggressive war by approximately 1960.
13. If, in the meantime, the Soviet Union is permitted further territorial expansion this date may be slightly earlier.
14. The possibility of USA launching a premeditated war is not considered in this paper.

15. With a view to determining Soviet strategy and capabilities in the event of an accidental war a survey follows of the military situation of the world during the period 1948 to 1960 (Period "A").

PART III - MILITARY SITUATION OF THE WORLD

PERIOD "A" - 1948-1960

USSR AND SATELLITES

16. As long as they are under the state police the population of the USSR will be politically reliable. The Satellites are firmly under the control of Moscow but at present only a few of their citizens support Communism. During this period, it is anticipated that police-state methods will improve their reliability considerably. If the Satellites and the USSR are invaded it is reasonably certain that many disaffected citizens would welcome the opportunity to assist in the overthrow of Communism.

17. Soviet economy is at present incapable of supporting a large scale war but ruthless methods and tremendous efforts are being employed to develop her basic industry and resources. The Satellites are included in this program and their economies are being integrated with that of the USSR. As the period progresses Soviet economy will approach a position where a full scale war can be maintained.

18. In the scientific field, the Soviet will probably acquire the atomic bomb and will develop the capacity to employ BW and CW successfully. Although the USSR can employ long range missiles as developed by the Germans, it is unlikely that for greater ranges she will have more than a subsonic V 1 type missile of poor accuracy by 1960.

19. The Soviet Army, fairly well supplied with good equipment, is the strongest in the world. Its staff techniques are primitive and prohibit the high degree of coordination of arms and flexibility now standard in the British and US Armies. Training too is somewhat elementary by Western standards. Their doctrine of massing tanks, artillery and aircraft for the support of their infantry together with the calloused acceptance of heavy casualties has proved effective against a first class enemy. While, division for division, they cannot match the US or Britain, their mass is formidable. Satellite Armies are poorly equipped and will remain so until the Soviet rulers are convinced of their political allegiance to Moscow.

20. The Soviet Air Force at the end of World War II was equipped with a large number of aircraft of simple but rugged design mainly intended for the close support of the Army. The Soviet had neither a long-range bomber force nor the facilities to defend herself against one. Since World War II serious efforts have been made to build a strategic air arm and adequate defences for long-range air-war but it is believed that only towards the close of the period 1948 to 1960 will her industry be adequate to maintain a full scale long-range air war against targets beyond Eurasia and North Africa.

21. The surface forces of the Soviet Navy are too weak to try conclusions with the British or US Navies. It is unlikely that they will be strengthened sufficiently to alter this position by 1960. The USSR has, however, a strong submarine force and by concentrating on construction of the German Type XXI as developed by the close of World War II she will be capable of seriously threatening the sea communications of the Western Powers.

22. The military situation of the USSR and Satellites during Period "A" is treated more fully at Appendix "A" attached.

WESTERN POWERS

23. Led by the United States and Britain the remaining non-Communist countries of Europe and Asia are endeavouring to retain, or obtain, free political institutions. This battle with the Communists in the political field will probably become more intense year by year. As a counter to the unscrupulous propaganda emanating from Moscow, the US has shown signs of being prepared to adopt more aggressive methods of public enlightening of her own.

24. A war in the immediate future would find many of these countries torn with internal strife and armed Communist bands would take direct action to assist the USSR. However it is believed that as the American efforts to rehabilitate the economy of these countries begins to take effect the attraction for Communism will diminish and as free institutions are strengthened so will the Governments concerned adopt measures to curtail the activities and restrict the power of the remaining Communist fanatics.

25. During the period the economic potential and military strength of the US should increase but Britain and the remaining countries will be fully engaged in a struggle for economic rehabilitation. Very little effort will be spared for military preparedness. The USA has announced its intention of stock-piling certain raw materials not available on the North American continent.

26. The USA and Britain lead the world in scientific achievement. For the duration of the period it is expected that compared with the USSR they will maintain a higher degree of efficiency and more extensive capabilities for the employment of atomic weapons, BW, CW and long range missiles.

27. The US Armed Forces will probably remain at a strength of approximately one million men but if the planned conscription program is introduced, the period required for mobilization should be much shorter than in previous wars. The US Air Forces and Navy are the largest, the most powerful, and the best equipped in the world. They are likely to remain so throughout the period. In the event of war the Army will be mainly dependent on equipment left over from World War II.

28. The Military Situation of the Western Powers during Period "A" is treated more fully at Appendix "B" attached.

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PART IV - SOVIET STRATEGY IN A WAR DURING THE PERIOD 1948 - 1960

STRATEGY

29. The lack of Soviet military industrial potential vis-a-vis the US will force the USSR, in the event of a war within this period, to acquire such further industrial and natural resources as are militarily within her capabilities in order to accumulate as rapidly as possible sufficient potential to defeat her major foe, the USA. Her strategy will, of course, further demand that such prizes, once gained, shall be protected from enemy interference. At the same time the USSR will take all measures possible to reduce the war potential and the morale of the Western Powers.

30. The Soviet Union will rely almost entirely on the use of mass to overwhelm her foes. A very strong call will be made to the workers and, in particular, to the members of the Communist Party in foreign countries for direct action to assist in their "liberation" by Soviet forces, but there is evidence to indicate that the Soviet leaders have had ample opportunity to realize that while many foreign nationals embrace Communism as a means of improving their material welfare, there are very few indeed who are willing to become the tools of the Soviet imperialists. Nationalist Governments, provided they show determination, should have little difficulty in eliminating those few disciplined fanatics who are dangerous. It is believed that, in view of this, the Soviet planners will count mainly on superior forces for the attainment of their objectives.

OBJECTIVES

31. It is believed that Soviet capabilities will limit the USSR to the following objectives:

- (a) Western Europe, comprising Denmark, the Low Countries, France, Spain, Portugal and Italy.
- (b) Scandinavia.
- (c) The Middle East, comprising Greece, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon.

These objectives are examined further in paras 32 - 34 below. Lack of amphibious capabilities would prevent seizure of any strongly defended and overseas areas such as the UK, Iceland, the Azores and Japan. It is considered that China and South East Asia offer such meager gains in return for a considerable necessary effort, that they will be disregarded. The same is considered to apply to India and Pakistan, but the oil resources of Northern Afghanistan will be seized.

32. Western Europe is essential on account of its industrial potential, both in order to deny it to the enemy and to exploit it for Soviet use. Further, the occupation of this area would give the USSR a base for the neutralization of the UK and would deny the enemy a lodgement area for a land attack by the easiest route into the Soviet Union. Finally, the occupation of Gibraltar would close the Mediterranean to British and American vessels.

33. Scandinavia is strategically well-placed as a first step towards the delivery of air attacks on the Western Hemisphere and has, in addition, natural and industrial resources, particularly of iron and steel and possibly uranium. Moreover, the population can only support small defence forces.

34. The Middle East provides perhaps the quickest and easiest return of any of these objectives. The prize of oil in this area is needed both by the USSR and the Western Allies and its capture therefore represents a double advantage. Furthermore, domination of the Middle East interrupts British communications and denies the Western Powers a base for an attack on South Russia.

DEFENSIVE MEASURES

35. The defence of these areas may be considered under two headings:-

- (a) Defence against land and amphibious attack.
- (b) Defence against air attack.

36. Defence against land or amphibious attack entails the provision of sufficient garrisons and sufficient naval craft to destroy attacking forces. Defence against air attack necessitates the occupation of or neutralization of enemy bases, or the ability to destroy enemy aircraft carriers. From bases on Continental Europe and Asia, the Soviet Air and Naval Forces will take aggressive action to neutralize all Allied bases within striking range.

COUNTERMEASURES

37. At the same time the USSR will wish to secure bases from which to interfere with Allied war potential. Easy prizes such as Spitzbergen and South Korea will be seized with this object in view.

OPPOSITION TO BE OVERCOME

38. For the purpose of this paper the only opposition to Soviet aims taken into consideration is that provided by local national forces, i.e. forces of those countries actually invaded, plus the present occupation forces in Western Germany and Greece, and British garrisons in the Middle East. In order to provide for the possibility of further British and US forces being despatched to the assistance of local national forces, the Soviet High Command will retain a powerful reserve.

ALLOCATION OF FORCES (See Map "P" Attached)

39. Western Europe

The forces mobilisable within one month by the countries in opposition to the Soviet are estimated to be:-

	Number	Manpower Equivalent in Soviet Divisions
Germany		
US Troops	100,000	4
British Troops	120,000	5
Denmark	35,000	24
Holland	40,000	
Belgium	40,000	
France	490,000	

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43. Except for Turkey, the armies are poorly equipped and in some cases morale will be low. Apart from Turkey the country, though flat, in general has poor communications. In Turkey the natural difficulties are considerable, though communications are better. The allocation of troops might therefore be:-

	<u>Soviet Divisions</u>	<u>Satellite Divs</u>
Greece	5	10
Turkey	40	5
Remainder of Middle East	25	
	<u>70</u>	<u>15</u>

44. Apart from the campaigns mentioned above it is estimated that five divisions will be employed in seizing Northern Afghanistan and ten divisions in occupying Korea.

45. The total of troops allocated to these campaigns is 215 Soviet Divisions and 20 Satellite Divisions out of estimated total strengths as follows:-

	<u>Soviet Divisions</u>	<u>Satellite Divisions</u>
M. Day	178	40
M. plus 30	320	60

46. The Soviet Air Force will be employed mainly for the support of the Army and appropriate allotments will be made to Commanders of the ground forces for this purpose. Fighter forces will be disposed to deal with anticipated British and US air attacks while a portion of the Long Range Bomber Force will be directed to carry out raids on the UK and USA from Siberia and Scandinavia. Any available atomic bombs will probably be used in these raids rather than on Europe and Asia.

47. The operations of the surface forces of the Soviet Navy will be directed in the support of the ground forces with most activity taking place in the waters off Scandinavia and in the Eastern Mediterranean. The submarine force will have as its tasks the interception of enemy naval and amphibious forces, the isolation of the UK and the destruction of US and UK merchant shipping.

TIMING

48. It will be of great advantage to the Soviet High Command to seize these objectives before the British and US can produce field forces. It is therefore believed that all these campaigns will start simultaneously. Very tentative timings of completion are:-

Western Europe

Occupation of Germany, Low Countries, Denmark, France and Italy. D + 60 to D + 90

Occupation of Spain and Portugal D + 150 to D + 270

Scandinavia

Occupation of Norway and Sweden D + 60 to D + 180

Middle East

Occupation of Greece	D + 30 to D + 40
Occupation of Iran and Iraq	D + 30 to D + 40
Occupation of Turkey	D + 60 to D + 90
Occupation of remainder of Middle East Countries	D + 120 to D + 180
Occupation of Afghanistan and Korea	D + 10 to D + 20

GARRISONS (See Map "2" Attached)

49. The areas overrun, as described in the preceding paragraphs, will require garrisons:-

- (a) To protect them from enemy assault,
- (b) For internal security purposes,
- (c) To carry out attacks on allied territory, e.g., UK.

50. France, Denmark and the Low Countries are suitable bases for air and eventually amphibious attack on the UK and have an important industrial potential, while, as recent experience shows, their populations are adept at resistance work. Moreover, the Northern coast of France is the most likely point of allied re-entry into the continent. Italy will not provide a considerable internal security problem, although Greece will. Neither of these two countries, however, has any large industrial potential. Spain and Portugal will be a possible area of re-entry into Europe.

51. Scandinavia has some industrial potential, while the population is likely to be difficult to handle.

52. In the Middle East, oil resources in South Persia are vulnerable, but populations, except in Turkey, are not likely to establish significant resistance movements.

53. In every case the great distance of the overrun areas from the USSR, and the inadequacy of the communications, will necessitate reserves being near the scene of possible action.

54. Assuming that the USSR could finally mobilize 500 divisions and the Satellites 60, the distribution of garrisons might be as follows:-

	<u>Soviet Divisions</u>	<u>Satellite Divisions</u>
NW Europe	70	-
Italy	5	10
Spain & Portugal	40	-
Germany & Austria	50	-
Soviet Satellites	25	45
Scandinavia	25	-
Turkey	30	-
Greece	5	5
Rest of Middle East	30	-
Afghanistan	5	-
Korea	10	-
Soviet Far East	80	-
Reserve in USSR	125	-
	<u>500</u>	<u>60</u>

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It is possible that a proportion of the 125 division reserve in the USSR will not be mobilized until militarily necessary, owing to the need for maximum manpower in industry.

SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITY

55. Once the USSR has eliminated any immediate threat to her security she will endeavour to build up a striking force capable of defeating the USA. The final phase will then resemble Soviet strategy in Period "B", 1960 (Part VI).

56. The strategy which will be employed in the event that the USSR is forced to withdraw is not considered in this paper.

PART V - MILITARY SITUATION OF THE WORLD

PERIOD "B" - 1960 PLUS

USSR AND SATELLITES

57. It is believed that the rulers in Moscow will have tightened their control of Russia and the Satellites by 1960 and that they will continue to do so. Economically the Soviet will have approached the stage where a major war can be supported and she will have atomic bombs under production. Her manpower together with that of the reliable Satellites will be adequate for all military requirements and her armed forces including a long-range bomber force will be well equipped with up-to-date material. Her major weaknesses will be the unexpressed dissatisfaction of her people and the extremely centralized system of control. At Appendix "C" is a more detailed description of the military situation in the USSR and Satellites from 1960.

WESTERN POWERS

58. Politically and economically the Western Powers should be in a much stronger position than at present. Militarily their major advantage will be the possession of a larger stock of atomic bombs than the USSR. Their ability to resist or attack the Soviet Union will depend principally on whether their intelligence is able to warn them of Soviet mobilization. Further details are included at Appendix "D".

PART VI - SOVIET STRATEGY IN A WAR AFTER 1960

59. After 1960, as has been seen earlier in this paper, present indications are that the USSR may feel herself strong enough to engage successfully in war with the USA. The succession of five-year plans are designed to enable her to go into full production during the period 1955-60. She will then be in possession of significant numbers of atomic bombs and her technique in BW and CW will have been considerably advanced. In order to take full advantage of surprise, and its consequent effect on morale, it is likely that she will mobilize secretly and open the war by attacks with the above weapons carried by aircraft and rocket firing submarines on the UK and North America in order, if possible, to paralyse her chief opponents from the

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beginning. Targets are likely to be Allied strategic striking forces, morale and economy. They will be attacked continuously. At the same time she will still wish to overrun Europe and the Middle East, and possibly India and China, in order to acquire the industrial resources there located, and to deny them to her enemies. This she will carry out simultaneously with the attacks on Britain and on America.

60. The timing of any significant air or sea-borne landing in America will depend largely on the success of the mass-destruction weapons initially employed. It is likely that some months must in any case elapse before any such attack can be launched. This may or may not be after the end of the campaigns in Europe and the Middle East. In the meantime the course and scope of these operations will depend to a large extent on the success of Communism in these areas. If anti-Communist forces have prevented the spread of Communism, Soviet strategy may be approximate to that described in Part IV, although the Soviet timetable would be slower. If Communism has increased its hold then the Soviet campaign will be proportionately easier, and the military potential available for re-deployment against the American continent will be greater. The success or failure of the attacks on Britain and America will have considerable influence on the attitude adopted by the remaining non-Communist Governments.

PART VII - CONCLUSIONS

61. Unless they achieve their aims by other means, the Soviet rulers, as soon as they believe they are in a military position to do so, will attack the Western Powers. Adequate atomic bombs and industrial potential will be available by approximately 1960.

62. Through a misunderstanding on the part of the USSR or the Western Powers an accidental war may occur before 1960, although this is unlikely.

63. In the event of an accidental war, unless vigorous counter-measures are taken by the Western Powers, the USSR will harass North America, overrun Continental Europe and the Middle East, build up her offensive potential to a point where she can assault Britain and North America with weapons of mass destruction and ultimately invading forces.

64. If she launches a premeditated war from approximately 1960 on, the Soviet will mobilize secretly and strike without warning at the UK and North America with atomic bombs, BW and CW. Simultaneously land forces will attack Western Europe, the Middle East, and possibly India and China. As soon as conditions permit, air and sea-borne forces will attempt to occupy the UK and North America.

APPENDIX "A"MILITARY SITUATION - USSR AND SATELLITESPERIOD "A" - 1948-1960USSRPOLITICAL

1. The Soviet people are completely shut off from sources of news outside their own country, and are deluged with propaganda from domestic sources glorifying the Soviet State. This propaganda, together with the deterrent influence of the very powerful Secret Police, has succeeded, and will succeed, in quashing open dissatisfaction, and there is no doubt that the Soviet Government would carry the people with them in a new war. While there is undoubtedly grumbling in private, there is neither the will nor the ability to promote open opposition to the Government and it is unlikely that the opportunity for such opposition will come until the closing stages of an unsuccessful war. At the same time the very centralization which insures such close control over the people is a potential source of weakness, since capture or neutralization of the central authority would lead to disproportionate lack of control. It is believed that provided an invading army gave guarantees not to annex the Russian territory, bound itself to establish a democratic regime, and adhered to humane principles of conduct, any call by the Soviet rulers for a patriotic defence of the USSR would meet with somewhat less response than that which occurred in World War II.

2. It is unlikely that there will be any change in the above conditions in the period up to 1960.

GEOGRAPHIC

3. The accidents of geography have provided the USSR with a number of natural advantages and disadvantages. Firstly, her vast size is strategically at once an advantage and a liability. On the one hand it provides space for manoeuvre and retreat while stretching the enemy's L of C, and it allows vital industrial areas to be located far from its borders; on the other hand, the enormous length of the Soviet frontiers requires dispersal of the available defending forces and necessitates a vast transport system which today is totally inadequate.

4. From the point of view of topography, the disadvantage of lengthy frontiers is mitigated by the fact that, although they are extremely long they are largely located in regions which are all but inaccessible and their natural defences are thereby strengthened. On the other hand, Russia is a country with virtually no mountain barriers and the whole of her western and most valuable region is ideal country for an invader, as history shows.

5. Climatically, much of Russia is subject to hot summers and very severe winters, and military operations are thereby considerably hampered, especially for those not hardened to such conditions or equipped to meet them.

6. Finally, although many of the newer industrial areas are safe from attack, certain important regions are by virtue of their immovable natural or other resources in a vulnerable position. These are the Caucasus area with its oil, the Ukraine with its food and

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industrial resources, and Western European Russia with its industrial areas and communications network. These areas will therefore require special measures for defence

ECONOMIC

7. Assuming that output of basic commodities represents a realistic criterion of economic potential, Russia reached the lowest ebb in her wartime economy at the end of 1942 when at least a third of her pre-war industrial capacity and nearer a half of her total pre-war agricultural capacity was located in territory overrun by the Germans. The 1940 and 1947 production figures in respect to these basic commodities are given below and it will be seen that Soviet production figures have now, in general, reached 1940 level.

8. The present five-year plan ending in 1950 is concerned mainly with the rehabilitation of heavy industry to lay a firm foundation for the development of manufacturing industry in the subsequent five-year plan, 1950/55. To this end Russia is at present not only investing capital to the extent of a quarter of the national income, but also ploughing back into the basic industries many of its products at the expense of the manufacturing industries. Assuming that she achieves her 1950 target for heavy industries and succeeds in her plans for developing the manufacturing industries in the 1950/55 plan, her level of production of finished goods in 1955/60 will exceed quite disproportionately her present level or her level in 1950.

9. The production figures for 1940 and 1947, the planned figures for 1950, and the target figures for 1960, are given below:-

	1940	1947	1950	1960
Coal	165 mil tons	195 mil tons	250 mil tons	Approx double 1950 figures
Iron	15 mil tons	14.6 mil tons	19.5 mil tons	
Steel	18.3 mil tons	21 mil tons	25.4 mil tons	
Oil	31 mil tons	24 mil tons	35.4 mil tons	50 mil tons
Power	48 mldrds of kwhs	56 mldrds of kwhs	82 mldrds of kwhs	Approx double 1950 figures
Motor Tpt	150,000 units	208,000 units	500,000 units	

MANPOWER

10. There can be no doubt that the USSR has more than enough military manpower for any reasonable requirements. Estimated data regarding males is given in the table below:-

	1948	1955	1960
Total Numbers aged 19-50	35,600,000	42,150,000	46,300,000
Fit, trained, aged 19-50	11,600,000	16,000,000	19,000,000
Fit, trained aged 19-35	7,600,000	12,300,000	15,300,000

SCIENTIFIC

11. Atomic Bombs

The USSR may be expected to produce and test her first bomb sometime between 1950 and 1953, with mid-1952 as the most likely date. Her rate of bomb production should rise somewhat after the first year or two to a maximum of not more than 12 per year. It will be limited by her present supply of uranium ore, assuming, of course, that no other foreign ore becomes available to her and that no additional discoveries of importance are made within her borders.

12. Long-Range Guided Missiles

Development of the V-2 is taking place along lines projected by the Germans. Work is proceeding on design of the A-9 (winged V-2 with about 400-mile range) and there is also a slight indication of preliminary design work on a 900-mile supersonic missile.

The V-2 with 200-mile range could be in production by 1950 at a rate of 25 per day but England would be the only reasonable target. A much longer range - greater than 1000 miles - seems necessary to be useful to USSR against America. It is not believed that a supersonic missile with this range can be developed within ten years, but a radio-guided jet bomber with a fair accuracy could be developed within 5 years if desired.

It is likely that a V-1 type of subsonic missile can be developed within five years with at least 1,000 - mile range, but there is no evidence that the USSR is working on such a project. In any case, this weapon would have poor accuracy and be vulnerable to AA fire and fighter attack.

13. Short-Range Guided Missiles

Interest has been shown by the Soviets in the German Wasserfall, Rheintochter and other A-1 guided missiles. A version of such a weapon with radar guidance and proximity fuzing should be ready for production within five years.

14. Biological Warfare

The USSR undoubtedly has the necessary scientists and facilities for carrying out an extensive BW research and development program. There is evidence to support the belief that such work has been going on for a number of years and the Soviet Union may well be capable of effectively utilizing this mode of warfare at the present time. Certainly the country could wage open, large scale BW before 1960.

15. Chemical Warfare

Soviet scientists have at least as much knowledge of the outstanding German nerve gases as the British and US chemical warfare groups had acquired at the end of World War II.

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In addition to the above, it is probable that Soviet chemists are experimenting with other types of agents, but the likelihood that these will surpass the overall efficiency of the nerve gases by 1960 is not great.

16. Radar and Electronics Equipment

It is believed that Soviets are pushing development of early-warning and AA radar equipments, as well as VT fuzes, remote-control systems for guided missiles, infra-red devices, and microwave links for communications. VT fuzes in usable quantities should be available approximately five years hence. Militarily useful quantities of radar equipments will probably be available in five years.

ARMED FORCES17. Size

The standing armed forces are estimated in 1948 at:-

Ground forces	2,600,000
Air forces	450,000
Naval forces	600,000
MVD Security troops	400,000
Total	4,050,000

It is estimated that the ground forces could be expanded on mobilization to a total of 320 divisions of approximately 8,000,000 men within one month. The build-up of ground force divisions by types in eight months is estimated to be as follows:-

	<u>1. Day</u>	<u>After One Month</u>	<u>After 8 Months</u>
Infantry	110	235	365
Armoured	45	60	75
Airborne	3	5	10
Cavalry	20	20	50
TOTAL	178	320	500

In view of the need for additional manpower in industry it is believed that the Soviets will aim at a gradual reduction of their armed forces. Such a reduction will, of course, be entirely dependent on the international situation. Provided that no major war appears likely, it is estimated that there might be a reduction in the standing armed forces to a figure of approximately 2.75 million over the period 1948-60. Mobilized strengths will be correspondingly lower.

18. ARMY(a) Training and Morale

Owing to the lower general standard of education in the Soviet Union it is considered that the overall standard of training will be lower than in Western armies. Much effort will however be put into the establishment of an efficient intelligence service, whose peacetime activities will be aided by the operation of Foreign Communist parties.

The greatest shortcomings are likely to be in the fields of staff work, communications, and command and are likely to be exemplified by lack of speed in executing changes in plan, slowness in mounting new operations, and in lack of adequate control over subordinate units in fluid warfare. It is likely that performance in airborne and amphibious operations will be particularly low, due to the shortcomings mentioned above, as well as to lack of experience.

Morale is likely to be very high, resulting from incessant propaganda, consciousness of victory in the recent war, and the high living standard enjoyed by the Soviet Army compared with the rest of the population.

(b) Equipment

The medium tank is the T-44 which is vastly superior to the T-34(85) which in turn was more than a match for the medium tanks used by the Germans and the Western Allies during World War II. The T-44 tank is armed with either an 85-mm or 100-mm gun with excellent penetrative characteristics. The heavy tank is the "Joseph Stalin 3" which is armed with a 100-mm or a 122-mm gun both of which are excellent weapons. This tank is the best available in quantity to any country including the UK and the USA. The USSR are developing a super-heavy tank which is in reality a super-heavy AFV equipment. The main armament of this vehicle is thought to be the 152-mm gun which would be most useful in close support operations and in an anti-fortification role. Regardless of the eventual production of the super-heavy tank the T-44 medium tank and the JS-3 heavy tank will continue to be the AFV's the Soviet would use in the event of war within this period.

Soviet anti-aircraft guns are on a par with anything the Western Powers can produce. Such necessary modern AA equipment as VT fuzes and radar fire control devices should be available in quantity within five years. Nevertheless, the training of Soviet specialists is behind schedule and this may limit AA efficiency.

Soviet Army anti-tank guns are among the best in use anywhere in the world. The USSR have few new model field and medium artillery weapons but the World War II equipment on hand is available in large numbers and these are simple, mass-produced weapons capable of meeting the Soviet tactical concept of mass artillery fire plans and the low standard of technical training common to the Soviet gunners.

Field artillery type rockets have continued to play a large part in the Soviet Army since World War II and at present the Soviet equipment is as good as any in use by the US and the UK.

The USSR have undertaken the large scale production of various American type vehicles which were supplied them under Lend-Lease. By 1960 the Soviets may be expected to have large quantities of these vehicles.

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The Soviets have, it is believed, no large scale amphibious training establishments at present and it is not thought likely that they will produce equipment specifically for amphibious operations by 1960. There are indications, however, that the Soviets are reproducing a version of the US amphibious truck. It is highly probable that the Soviet will, like other powers, tend toward the idea that most if not all organic equipment must be air-transportable. To date there have been no indications of such a trend but it can be expected by 1960.

Air Force(a) At Present

The overall strength of the Soviet Air Force and Naval Air Force is estimated to be 450,000 with 14,000 aircraft in operational units as of 15 Dec 47. Approximately 45 percent of the Air Force strength is located outside the borders of the USSR. Approximately 5,100 aircraft are in Occupied Europe and 1,150 in Korea and Manchuria. The Yugoslav Air Force, which in all probability would participate in any major Soviet air effort in Europe would of all the Satellites be in the best position to supply aid to the USSR. Only the air units stationed in Germany, Austria and Roumania are considered in assessing Soviet capabilities in Europe. Soviet units in Bulgaria and Roumania are not within tactical striking distance and should hostilities develop, reinforcements from bases in the USSR rather than from the South Balkans probably would be provided.

Soviet air strength now based in Germany, Poland, Austria, and Hungary probably would prove sufficient to support the rapid over-running of Western Europe by USSR Ground Forces.

(b) By 1960

By 1960, technical, scientific, industry and training will have shown a fairly major effect on the Soviet Air Forces. It is estimated that there will be some 4,800 fighters and 3,500 ground attack aircraft as well as 3,000 bombers and transports giving a grand total of 11,300 aircraft. In addition to this war air fleet there will be some 5,000 transports in the Civil Air Fleet, available for troop transport in the event of war. It is further estimated that a likely 70 percent of this huge pool will be disposed in European Russia and Eastern Europe.

By 1960, or even as early as 1955, performance of Soviet aircraft will be almost the same as that of the Western Powers. Bombers may have somewhat a greater range than 5,000 miles while fighters with a service ceiling of 50,000 feet and speed of 630 miles per hour will be armed with a recoilless gun and radar directed rocket or rockets. Radar coverage will probably not exceed a range of 300 miles. With bombers cruising at 550 miles per hour and the limit on radar effectiveness, fighter interception will be difficult.

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20. Navy

The present strength of the Navy is 587,000 men with the following vessels:-

- 5 battleships
- 1 monitor
- 20 heavy cruisers
- 3 light cruisers
- 100 destroyers
- 49 destroyer escorts
- 308 submarines
- 28 sloops

and miscellaneous craft of varying kinds.

At present, as a naval power, the USSR lags behind the UK and US in naval technique and development. There is a wide gap between the Soviets and the US in the production of ships as well as sea power. It is extremely improbable that by 1960 the situation will be rectified by the construction of conventional ships, particularly heavy ships.

The Baltic Area has been the most important ship-building section of the country, but the Caspian and Far East have been enormously developed and their capacity is unknown.

To embark on a large building program of capital ships at this time would not only alarm the Western Powers into a naval race, but would be very expensive and wasteful for USSR. There would be little chance of overtaking the US and they could expect to find costly vessels obsolete soon after they were completed. Furthermore, the pattern of naval warfare in the future has not yet sufficiently developed to indicate the types of ships which will be most effective in the future.

The only type of ship whose place in future maritime warfare is certain is the submarine. This is largely due to the great lag of anti-submarine methods behind submarine development. It is submarine development and production that would be most profitable to the USSR in the next ten years, particularly in a war against the Western democracies whose economy is dependent on a heavy volume of merchant shipping.

It is estimated that by 1960 between 500 and 2000 "interim" ~~XX~~ submarines may be in service and also that the "true" ~~XX~~ submarine may be in general production to replace the "interim" models.

~~XX~~ "Interim" Submarine - A submersible capable of extended cruises partially submerged (schnorkel) and with a fairly high submerged speed. The German type XXI is an example of this type.

~~XX~~ "True" Submarine - A submersible capable of extended cruises, fully submerged and possessing a high under-water speed. (Does not need to snorkel and has speeds up to 30 knots submerged for considerable periods).

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APPENDIX "A"

SATELLITES OF THE USSR

The countries here considered as satellites of the USSR are Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Roumania.

POLITICAL

21. The domination exercised by the Soviet Union over these countries is due firstly to the threat derived from their geographical position, and secondly to their Communist parties, whose power varies from country to country. The four Balkan countries are completely under Communist domination, and although there must be a considerable amount of political opposition to the existing regime none of it is vocal. Hungary is only slightly removed from this class. In Poland there has up till recently been more opposition, but since the departure of Mikolajcik a ruthless tightening of control has taken place. Czechoslovakia and Finland are countries where Soviet influence is least felt of all. Both these countries have traditional economic and cultural ties with the West, and opposition to Communism has been able to flourish with comparative freedom. However, for military reasons no less than economic, neither of these countries could survive if the USSR decided to deploy all available force against them, although this might invite reactions by the Western powers which Russia does not desire.

22. In the event of war with the West it is certain that the USSR could bring in with her all the satellites except the last two mentioned, and it is most probable that these would also support her. The opposition in all these countries would, however, form a vast potential fifth column, which, if suitably organized would be valuable to an opponent.

23. The only change in the situation described above likely before 1960 is an intensification of the hold of the USSR over these countries.

GEOGRAPHIC

24. The Soviet Satellites form a defensive bastion for the USSR, protecting that flank from which past invasions of the country have come and about which she feels most apprehensive for the future. In addition Finland protects the approaches via the Baltic. This bastion is of an average depth of some 400 miles and is provided with a communications network superior to that of the Soviet Union. It includes no considerable natural barriers in the shape of mountains, rivers or deserts.

ECONOMIC

25. (a) Czechoslovakia

In Western Czechoslovakia one half the people live by industry and commerce while in the east more than two thirds of the people are peasant farmers. This makes for economic stability. The two most important industries are those producing iron and steel (including important munitions industry) and the textile industry. Economically, Czechoslovakia has the greatest war potential of any of the Satellites, with her well-developed munitions industry, agricultural self-

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sufficiency, and a source of uranium in Northern Bohemia.

(b) Poland

One of the most important factors in Polish economy is her exportable surplus of coal, while her most serious deficiencies are machinery of all kinds and rolling stock. On a long term view her surpluses will include wood, cereals, textiles, iron and steel.

(c) Roumania

The biggest economic asset is a considerable petroleum industry. Apart from this the country has no military economic importance.

(d) The remainder of the Satellites have little economic importance and are characterized by a preponderance of agricultural production, virtually complete absence of heavy industry, inadequate communications and reliance on the Soviet Union for arms and other items of military economic importance.

MANPOWER

26. It is estimated that the number of fit men of military age in the Satellite countries is approximately 15 million, of whom perhaps, in the event of war, 3 million might be armed and equipped. The number of fit might increase to 20 million by 1960.

SCIENTIFIC

27. The Satellites have no significant scientific potential. Any important scientists will be removed to the USSR.

ARMED FORCES28. Size

The standing armed forces of the Satellites are estimated at present as under:-

	<u>Ground Forces</u>	<u>Security Troops</u>	<u>Air</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Total</u>
Finland	19,000	3,000	2,000	4,000	28,000
Poland	165,000	130,000	7,000	2,000	304,000
Czechoslovakia	120,000	30,000	9,000	--	159,000
Hungary	10,000	10,000	--	--	20,000
Yugoslavia	240,000	100,000	6,000	13,000	359,000
Albania	50,000	15,000	400	400	65,800
Roumania	100,000	30,000	9,000	3,000	142,000
Bulgaria	<u>60,000</u>	<u>50,000</u>	<u>2,000</u>	<u>3,000</u>	<u>122,000</u>
Total	764,000	368,000	42,400	24,400	1,199,800

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It is estimated that these forces might on mobilization increase to about 1,500,000 (60 divisions) ~~By M plus X~~. There is no evidence to indicate that any major change in the overall total of satellite troops will take place before 1960.

29. Armies(a) Training and Morale

The standard of training of these troops will not be high, with the exception of the Czech and Polish armies. Morale will be, in general, low, and there is no doubt that any troops whose reliability was doubtful would not be used outside their own frontiers. These latter might amount to as much as 70 percent of the total.

(b) EquipmentFinland

There is little or no information available on present day Finnish armament. It is highly improbable that in line with the Soviet reparation plan for Finland that there is much more than a small store of small arms weapons in the country. Finland is capable of producing sufficient small arms weapons and mortars to arm troops which she might raise.

Poland

At present Polish first line armament is being supplied by the USSR but to date the supply of arms has fallen far short of that required to arm the standing Army adequately. Poland is known to possess the following items of first class Soviet equipment.

Tanks	- 800
Artillery pieces	-2,700
Med Mortars	-1,000

Czechoslovakia

Armament available to the Czechs early in this period is a collection of German, Soviet, British and Czech equipment of all types. Toward the end of the period the Czechs will have produced a whole series of excellent modern small arms and artillery weapons which will be used to re-equip the Army. Czech tanks which will probably follow German trends will not be comparable to those in use by the USSR, the US and the UK.

Hungary

At the end of World War II Hungary was armed with a collection of German and native Hungarian equipment. Recently, however, the Soviets are known to have been providing arms and equipment but detail as to the type and quantity of this equipment is unknown.

Yugoslavia

Yugoslav armament is a collection of German, Italian, British, American and Soviet equipment with the latter predominating. The Yugoslavs have improvised SP equipment by mounting various anti-tank and AA guns on the US light tank chassis. On the whole Yugoslavia possesses a comparatively complete collection of first class arms capable of significant performance.

Roumania

Roumanian first line armament is principally German equipment. However, the recent Roumanian negotiations have probably provided Roumania with various items of Soviet equipment as well.

Bulgaria

Bulgarian first line armament is principally German with a few items of Soviet equipment being used to expedite modern training methods.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

MILITARY SITUATION - WESTERN POWERS

PERIOD "A" - 1948 - 1960

Including

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

UNITED KINGDOM

FRANCE

LOW COUNTRIES

DENMARK

GERMANY AND AUSTRIA

ITALY

SWITZERLAND

SPAIN

PORTUGAL

SWEDEN

NORWAY

TURKEY

GREECE

MIDDLE EAST

AFGHANISTAN

INDIA AND PAKISTAN

CHINA

JAPAN

LATIN AMERICA

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

POLITICAL

1. It is not anticipated that internal political changes in the US will alter to any appreciable degree the foreign policy of her leaders. The attitude of the American public will have an important influence on the firmness with which the leaders carry out their policy. If the USSR continues with its present unscrupulous propaganda and obstructional tactics there is no reason to suppose that public opinion will withdraw its support for determined action, but it is equally possible that if Soviet propaganda adopts a less offensive tone, the enthusiasm of the American public for firm measures may dwindle. This latter contingency is not considered likely since the dictatorial rulers of the Soviet Union must continually blame some foreign scapegoat for the hardships they are inflicting on the citizens of Russia. Otherwise, the regime, itself, would be the object of criticism.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. The geographic position of the US renders it relatively invulnerable to invasion. The many natural defence lines provide for a defence in depth. Certain strategic areas are, however, extremely vulnerable to air attack, namely, Sault Ste Marie, and the communications and industrial centres of US. Sufficient Air Bases are available which added to the highly developed commercial system provide an excellent system for air operations. Communications are highly developed now and with development will meet the requirements of a future war.

ECONOMIC

3. The USA has the capacity to out produce the Soviet Union by at least 100 percent. This margin will be reduced if Western Europe and the Middle East are overrun. In the production of arms and ammunition, however, the present US preponderance is slim over that of the USSR. Government plans for economic assistance to Europe should eliminate the possibility of a serious business recession during the period. A program is under way which makes provision for the stock-piling of raw materials required in war but not available in the Western Hemisphere. In agriculture, the US is more than self-sufficient except in wool.

MANPOWER

4. Population of the US by 1950 is estimated at 143 millions and by 1960 at 150 millions. During the past war 16 million males were considered the maximum number fit for combat and available. The Armed Forces ceiling was 7,700,000 which included 1,751,000 Army Service Forces, and 2,340,000 Army Air Forces, with the remaining 3,186,000 for 90 Divisions. Peak mobilization reached 14,000,000 men.

5. It is estimated that in 1960 the US will have 48,620,000 males of a military age. Due to the tremendous number required in industry and agriculture, however, it is estimated that 18,000,000 males will be fit and available for military service in 1960. Standards of education and health are high.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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SCIENTIFIC

6. Due to American industrial capacity and the huge sums of money appropriated for research and development by various agencies, both private and civil, the US will maintain her lead in all scientific fields during this period. It is believed that an adequate supply of atomic bombs is available to wage a full-scale war. US BW/CW capabilities will also be such as to enable them to use these weapons operationally. By 1960 they will have numerous supersonic and subsonic carriers for various type warheads but the guiding systems will fall short of the accuracies required by such expensive missiles. US electronic weapons will probably be the best available.

ARMED FORCES

7. Peace time plans for the military forces contemplate a modified form of compulsory military training which is likely to be operative in the near future. At the present time the US Army has a strength of about 500,000 men. Military training will not affect this figure but will make more trained men available in emergency. The total Armed Forces strength asked for by the US Congress is 1,070,000 including Army, Navy, and Air.

8. The US is developing various new first class orthodox weapons in the small arms, artillery and AFV fields. The quantity of these weapons available in case of war in most cases will be very limited. Certain new weapons will become available to particular units but this will be the exception rather than the rule. The bulk of the actual weapons available to the US during this period in case of war will be the stockpiled weapons of World War II.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

9. The traditional strategy has been the defence of the continental US and of the Western Hemisphere. Once she has become thoroughly convinced of a threat to her existence, she has not hesitated to take aggressive action by the despatch of armed forces abroad to eliminate the danger.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR ENEMY

10. During this period, the US is and will remain capable of resisting the attack of a major power on the continental US, and of launching a combined sea, air and land attack at that power.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

UNITED KINGDOM

POLITICAL

1. It is not believed that the foreign policy of the UK will alter to any great extent during this period. The present Government has an economic policy of nationalization of the basic industries which corresponds more closely to that of the USSR than the USA and this has, in many cases, led to a desire for a closer understanding of the Soviet Union but events in the political field have clearly shown that Britain has decided to stand firm with the USA. The British people are by nature opposed to Soviet imperialism.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. The natural defences of the UK consist in its position as an island. However, under modern conditions of warfare the UK will be unable to utilize any natural defences to keep the country free of attack, but will be able to prevent invasion. A tremendous system of air bases built up during World War II are still available. A highly developed communications system is also available.

ECONOMIC

3. The UK is essentially an industrial nation, lacking many natural resources of strategic materials, but possessing a highly developed industrial machine for processing those materials into finished products. It is, however, dependent upon its trade for its economic existence. Even in agriculture the UK is dependant upon outside sources to maintain survival conditions. In the production of munitions of war the UK will be dependent upon the nations of the Commonwealth to support her production. During this period the UK will be devoting her maximum efforts to restore her economy. She will be able to spare very little manpower and resources to her defence forces.

MANPOWER

4. Out of a total working population of 20,047,000, there are 18,122,000 engaged in industry and agriculture. By 1960, the UK will have an estimated 10,972,000 males 18 - 50 of whom approximately 4,000,000 will be fit and available for military service.

SCIENTIFIC

5. If an all-out effort is made, it might be possible for her to have atomic bombs, without US assistance, by 1950 or 1951, but efforts are at present being directed toward the ultimate production of atomic power.

6. It is not likely that a long-range guided missile will be developed within the next 10 years. Most of the British effort in the guided missile field is being put on basic research toward development of an AA missile for ground and shipboard and an air-to-ground missile. It is believed that both these devices may be ready for production within five years.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

UNITED KINGDOM

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7. Biological warfare research in Great Britain, Canada, and the US is very carefully coordinated. It is intimated that progress will be made and that the capability to employ BW will be attained during this period. CW research is progressing along very restricted lines because of the current shortages of scientific manpower and money. This will result in thorough exploitation of the German nerve gases and a limited number of other agents.

ARMED FORCES

8. As of the present time, the UK has approximately 700,000 men in its Army, which in 1948 will be reduced to 590,000. The Territorial Army, the main reserve component will be 700,000 strong. It is estimated that the UK will be able to mobilize 1,750,000 by M plus 30, and 3,500,000 by M plus 180. This is a continuing capability which can not increase due to the downward trend of the UK's population and represent maximum figures. As in the case of US the UK will develop a number of weapons within the period 1948-60. The UK however will be handicapped by the present economic situation the result being that they will have designed and produced fewer new weapons than the USA. Armament available in the event of war within this period will be stockpiled World War II items.

9. The Royal Navy is the strongest in Europe and is more than a match for the USSR. The Royal Air Force is and will remain superior to the Soviet Air Forces in every respect except in the quantity of its equipment. It is believed that the air and naval forces will be able to obtain prototypes of new weapons but that production in quantity will be out of the question until a serious threat develops.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

10. British strategy is to maintain the security of the UK base, the security of sea communications (approaches to the UK, route through the Mediterranean, and routes through and exits from the Indian Ocean), and a firm hold on the Middle East.

CAPABILITIES TO RESIST ATTACK OF A MAJOR ENEMY

11. The UK cannot be considered capable of preventing, during this period, the partial neutralization of the home islands.

APPENDIX "B"

FRANCE

POLITICAL

1. Political stability in France is extremely uncertain. Communism gained considerable headway in the post-war years while the Party operated on constitutional lines but it would appear that the switch in tactics with the obvious aims of challenging the Government and sabotaging the country's economic recovery has resulted in the withdrawal of many of their previous supporters. It is believed that an improvement of the standard of living by means of US aid will further reduce Communist influence. The Communists are reliably reported to control a well-equipped underground army of about 100,000. In spite of this, it is believed that in the main the army is loyal to the Government and will deal effectively with internal opposition.

2. In the event of an aggressive war by the USSR, France can be expected to support the Western Powers, particularly if her own borders are threatened. The average Frenchman is quite consciously nationalistic and ever ready to rally somewhat sentimentally to the defence of La Belle France.

GEOGRAPHIC

3. The physical geography of France does not lend itself favourably to defence. The country is open to invasion by sea on the north, west and south. The industrial heart of the country situated in the north-east is vulnerable to cross-country attack via the historic Channel Plain route. However, as long as France is in the hands of the Western Powers, it provides admirable forward air bases for attacks on the USSR itself and on Soviet lines of communication.

4. France is provided with a good network of metalled roads and railways. In addition there is an extensive canal system which supplements road and rail transportation.

ECONOMIC

5. The economic situation in France is grave, and will continue to be for at least five years. The main obstacles to recovery are shortage of manpower, coal and food, together with a lack of new capital equipment such as machine tools, machinery, and factory space. France is not capable of equipping her own army, let alone contributing to an Allied war effort.

MANPOWER

6. Of a population of almost 42,000,000 there are approximately 8,000,000 physically fit males between the ages of 15 and 49. Since not more than 700,000 can be employed in the army, this leaves over 7,000,000 men available to industry and agriculture as a labour force. This does not include men of 50 or over, or women capable of factory work.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

FRANCE

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SCIENTIFIC

7. Not only is France considered unable to produce the atomic bomb within ten years, but there is every indication that she will not even attempt to do so. Her efforts are devoted to basic research, and ultimately to the production of power from the atom. Progress is admittedly far behind schedule and it is considered unlikely that France will have atomic power before 1958.

8. The French have attempted to overcome their inferiority to other military nations in the guided missile field by employing several hundred German experts in at least three large groups in France and are planning to establish a test range in Algeria. They have not yet caught up with the US or the British in this field, but are making rapid progress. In the meantime, they are making preliminary designs for a rocket-type missile with a range of 400 to 1200 miles that will carry a 1,300-lb warhead. It is possible that such a missile can be developed within ten years, but production in quantity, by that time is unlikely. The French have done further work, with German help, on the FX-1400 radio-controlled high-angle bomb and the Hs-293 glide bomb that the Germans used operationally, and it is believed they have also worked on the Wasserfall AA missile. The first two subsonic air-to-ground missiles could be produced at present and a variation of the Wasserfall might be ready for production in five years.

9. France is potentially one of the leading nations of the world in the field of BW. It is likely that the quantities of material needed for open, large-scale biological warfare could be manufactured in France within the next ten years. Although scientists of the French Army know a considerable amount about the German nerve gas, they have been seriously restricted in all their efforts by severe shortages of money, scientific manpower and research facilities and equipment. It seems likely, too, that this condition will persist for a number of years, with the result that few outstanding accomplishments will be achieved. The chemical industry of France is hardly capable of supplying even modest amounts of the material today. This condition can have been changed for the better, however, during the next ten years.

10. France is engaged in as many phases of electronics research as the USSR, but not on a comparable scale. There is considerable scientific and technical ability among French personnel, but sufficient funds are lacking to pursue manufacture on a militarily useful scale. It is not believed that radically new electronic equipment will be developed by the French in the next ten years, and their production at the end of that time will probably be barely sufficient for limited defensive purposes.

ARMED FORCES

11. The present strength of the army is 490,000.

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APPENDIX "B"

FRANCE

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These are disposed as follows:-

France	186,000
Germany	75,000
Austria	7,000
North Africa	102,000
Indo-China	80,000
Colonies	40,000

In addition, there are about 950,000 fully trained first line reserves under 35 years of age, although the services of these men cannot be used at present due to France's inability to equip more than 700,000.

12. Armament available to France in the event of war within this period will be the collection of French, American, British, and German equipment now on hand. Reserves of this equipment are practically non-existent.

13. Training is of a generally high standard, but is hampered by the serious lack of equipment.

14. The Air Force of 83,000 men is at present of a very low standard and serious efforts will be required to raise its standard. Equipment is poor and training is of a low quality.

15. The Navy has 62,000 men, a few battleships and cruisers, 157 destroyers and 326 submarines. It should be able to give a good account of itself in home waters. ?

NATIONAL STRATEGY

16. France's traditional National Strategy has been to defend her borders on a perimeter basis with troops raised within the country. Little assistance can be expected from the French Empire. The economic war potential will scarcely be able to supply the needs of the armed forces in action.

CAPABILITIES TO RESIST ATTACK OF A MAJOR ENEMY

17. France cannot resist a major attack for more than a few weeks without outside aid. By 1960, it is felt that the economic situation will have improved sufficiently to warrant maintaining well-equipped army and an effective air force capable of resisting a major attack long enough to permit the mobilization of a reserve of about 2,000,000 men.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

LOW COUNTRIES

POLITICAL

1. The Low Countries (Belgium and Holland) find their economies so inextricably bound up with the Western Powers that they can have no choice but to support a war against the USSR.
2. As their way of life, tradition, and ideology so closely parallel that of the Western Powers, the majority of the peoples of both countries, whose nationalism was greatly strengthened during the years of the recent German occupation, can be expected to make a willing effort to implement a decision by their Governments to assist in a war against the Soviets.
3. The Communist parties are small in both countries and depend for their strength mainly on the transportation unions. It is reported that the Communists have a plan to paralyse the transportation centres of Antwerp and Rotterdam if conditions warrant.

GEOGRAPHIC

4. As these countries comprise for the most part the great Channel Plain, natural defences to an east-west attack are not insurmountable. It has been adequately demonstrated twice during the last generation with what ease a well equipped army of a major power can overrun this area.
5. There are adequate air-fields in both countries, but these are considered to be too vulnerable for practical use, unless the Western powers were able to assure the defence of these countries by the transfer of superior ground forces to this area before it were overrun.
6. Metalled roads and railways cover both countries adequately. A weakness in both networks, however, is the countless number of bridges required in conjunction with the extensive canal systems.

ECONOMIC

7. The economic war potential of the Low Countries lies in their respective colonies. At home, they cannot hope to do more than supply their own armies with small arms and ammunition. However, both the NEI and the Belgian Congo are rich in critical strategic raw materials. The Congo supplied the Allies during the late conflict with copious quantities of copper and uranium. The NEI are one of the major world suppliers of rubber and oil.

MANPOWER

8. The combined populations of the Lowlands is about 18,000,000. Of this total, it is estimated that there are 3,700,000 physically fit males between the ages of 15 and 49.

APPENDIX "B"

LOW COUNTRIES

-2-

9. The Low Countries have no strong military tradition, and malnutrition during the occupation has left its mark. Nevertheless, when given the opportunity, their soldiers have put up a fair showing.

10. Colonial manpower cannot be utilized for the armed forces, or skilled industry.

ARMED FORCES

11. Present Armed Forces strengths amount to about 330,000. The majority of men under arms are in the ground forces. The Navies and Air Forces are efficient but are relatively insignificant in a major war. Until 1960, it is not anticipated that an effective reserve will be built up, due to lack of equipment and materiel.

12. Training has been under British supervision since the liberation, and may be considered fair.

13. Equipment

Developments in the small arms field may be expected particularly by Belgium before 1960. Such development will probably be more in the form of a commercial venture rather than for service use. The Dutch electronics firm of "Phillips" may develop equipment which has a military application but again it will be primarily a commercial venture. The Low Countries in the event of a war before 1960 will be forced to rely upon the World War II British equipment procured subsequent to VE-Day. The reserves of this equipment at present are slim.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

14. The Low Countries recognize the indefensibility of their borders, and rely for protection on: (a) the United Nations, (b) treaties of alliance with their neighbours, (c) full cooperation with the Western Powers, which at the moment entails among other things the maintenance of defence forces far above pre-war levels. In the event of an actual invasion, the Armed Forces will no doubt put up a valiant delaying action. Holland plans to flood the area south of Utrecht and withdraw west to the national redoubt under the protection of twelve divisions.

15. The raw materials production of the colonies will be made available to the Western Powers as long as physically possible.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR ENEMY

16. The Low Countries cannot hope to do more than delay a major attacking force for more than a few weeks.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

DENMARK

POLITICAL

1. In the event of a war between USSR and the Western Powers, Denmark would undoubtedly support the Western Allies although strong efforts would be made by its Government to remain neutral. Following VE-Day there was an increase in the number of Communists to the extent that they carried eighteen seats in the Government. This strength has waned during the past year and in the 1947 elections only nine seats were retained. At the present time the Communist Party is not an influential factor in Danish politics.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. Denmark is a flat undulating peninsula and a series of islands between Northern Europe and Southern Sweden. The maximum elevation is 564 feet. The west coast of Jutland is relatively straight and consists almost exclusively of dunes reaching one hundred feet in height, fronted by shallow water beaches. The east coast of Jutland and the islands to the east is generally low, without sand dunes, quite irregular, with numerous bays. These eastern beaches are favourable for landing operations.

3. The road and rail systems are well developed but each with limitations. The road net generally has not the capability of bearing heavy military traffic for any extended period while the railroads have the difficulty of providing satisfactory connections, by bridge and ferry, between the mainland and the islands. There are few good airfields while seaplane bases are good.

ECONOMIC

4. The country is lacking in any of the basic raw materials for industry. Capacity for manufacturing arms and munitions is very limited and is mainly directed to making of small arms such as the Madsen machine gun and rifles.

MANPOWER

5. Denmark has a population of about 4,000,000 with a total available manpower slightly over 2,000,000. The people are not war-like and are mainly absorbed in agriculture. Nevertheless during World War II the Danes proved themselves as excellent saboteurs against the German occupation.

ARMED FORCES

6. The peacetime strength of the Army varies between 24,000 and 35,000 because of the annual release of men and the changes in conscription laws. The main function of the regular troops is to ensure a trained reserve which is currently estimated at 150,000 men. Equipment except for the majority of small arms is a mixture of foreign weapons of which the most part are British.

7. The Danish Navy is little more than a token representation with a present strength varying between 2,500 and 3,000.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

DENMARK

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8. Danish military air power is vested in 950 men with 82 aircraft of which 68 are trainers. Future plans call for expansion and there are some 48 aircraft on order from Britain. The emphasis is to be mainly on fighters, fighter-bombers and light bombers.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

9. In the past, Denmark has followed the policy of neutrality and the present foreign policy is still based on hopes of neutrality. Because of the present low state of the Armed Forces and the lack of the necessary military equipment no workable defence plans have been adopted.

CAPABILITIES TO RESIST ATTACK OF A MAJOR ENEMY

10. Denmark's armed forces are of little account in consideration of any major aggression and it is doubtful that even a token resistance would be openly offered against a major aggressor who could offer a bloodless occupation.

APPENDIX "B"

GERMANY AND AUSTRIA

POLITICAL

1. It is anticipated that Western Germany and Austria will still be under the supervision of the Western Powers in 1960. Such being the case, they will have no choice but to support a war against the USSR.
2. Nationalism at the moment is at low ebb. There can be no doubt, however, that there will be a great revival of national consciousness when the prerequisites of a civilized economy have been reestablished.
3. Communism has made steady progress in these countries and it is believed that they would accept Soviet occupation in the event of a war rather resignedly. This would be particularly true if Von Paulus and his army reported to number 500,000 men were used to maintain order.

GEOGRAPHIC

4. Germany's only natural defences lie in the South where she is ringed by mountains. She is wide open to attack from both east and west. Germany has excellent road and rail networks. However, much of the rail system is non-effective due to unrepaired war damage. This situation will be rectified by 1960. Austria is entirely exposed to Soviet attack.

ECONOMIC

5. The economic recovery of Western Europe demands a much higher level of German industrial production than the Allies originally intended to permit. Therefore, although war plants are being scrupulously liquidated, German coal and steel production are being encouraged in spite of France's objections. By 1960, it is expected that coal and steel production will be back to pre-war level. Machinery and machine tools will also be produced at pre-war rates, so that although Germany will not have any arms or munitions industries as such, and no stock piles, she will be capable of going into production on about 18 months notice. Austria will do little more than support herself.

ARMED FORCES

6. It is unlikely that the Western Powers will allow Germany and Austria to have more than internal security forces.

TOP SECRET

ITALY

APPENDIX "B"

POLITICAL

1. Politically, Italy is a most troubled state at the present time. The country is governed by central or rightist parties that could be counted on to support the Western Powers in a war with USSR. Nevertheless the Communist element is strong and is making every effort to gain control before the full effect of the European Recovery Program can be effective. In the event of an armed conflict involving Italy and the USSR in the immediate future, the present Government would have considerable difficulty maintaining order in the initial stages. If economic stability returns, this difficulty will gradually be overcome.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. Italy is an elongated peninsula with an area of 116,000 square miles, jutting out from southern Europe into the Mediterranean. It is a mountainous country, with one extensive lowland in the north and small areas of plain along the coasts. The mainland consists essentially of two mountain ranges, the Alps and the Apennines, which are separated by the Northern Plain. Continental Italy embraces the southern slopes of the Alps, the northern slopes of the Apennines, and the plains of the Po valley and of Venetia lying between them. The Peninsular area includes the Apennines and accompanying coastal belts on either side. Italy's communications system suffered heavily during the past war, and is still in a chaotic state with no prospects of immediate major improvement.

ECONOMIC

3. Italian mining is most developed in Sicily, Sardinia, Tuscany and Piedmont. The fuel and mineral resources are wholly inadequate, to meet the needs of the nation. Mines produce coal, iron ore, sulphur, and bauxite in limited quantities. There are well developed water power resources producing cheap electricity for industry. The textile industry is the largest and most important while the chemical industry has greatly developed since 1939. Since the end of World War II there has been no arms production other than small bore ammunition in very limited quantities. Italy is in no way geared for any expansion in industry in the event of war.

MANPOWER

4. The total population at the last census (1943) was 45,681,000. Manpower, between the ages of 15 and 49, available for the armed forces is estimated to be 8,700,000 physically fit for service. There is a high percentage of illiteracy in the country, while morale and the standard of living are low.

ARMED FORCES

5. According to the terms of the peace treaty, Italy is allowed an Army of 250,000 including 65,000 Carabinieri, in addition to a Navy and an Air Force of 25,000 each. Present strength is 205,000 for ground forces, ~~41,000 for the Navy~~ and 28,000 for the Air Force. The training program is adequate although handicapped by a shortage of arms and equipment.

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APPENDIX "B"

ITALY

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6. It is not thought likely that Italy will develop or design arms within the 1948-60 period. This is due primarily to the economic situation rather than potential capabilities. The Army will, again depending upon the degree of US aid, be equipped with a mixture of British, Italian and German equipment. Reserves for such a collection will be a serious problem.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

7. Strategic defence plans for the employment of the armed forces in the event of hostilities are unknown.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR ENEMY

8. The Italian armed forces are capable of accomplishing their primary mission of maintaining internal security, but have no offensive capabilities and would be able to offer only limited defence against a well-armed aggressor.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

SWITZERLAND

POLITICAL

1. Switzerland cannot be expected to join the Western Powers in a war against the USSR, unless actually invaded by the Soviets. Her traditional policy of strict neutrality would not even permit her to extend limited assistance to the Western Powers. The Swiss, despite their diverse racial groupings, are intensely patriotic. They recognize patriotism as the keystone of their independence, and they are quite willing to make personal sacrifices for the welfare of the state. Communism has made very little progress.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. The Alps provide very strong natural defences. It would require specially trained alpine troops to successfully attack the country, and the administrative problem would be extremely difficult once the attack were launched. Switzerland could provide excellent easily defended air bases. The road and rail systems within the country are good, but due to the nature of the terrain and the number of railway tunnels they are vulnerable.

ECONOMIC

3. Economic war potential is not great. Small amounts of iron and manganese are mined and there is a small automotive industry. The watch industry can be switched to the manufacture of precision instruments if necessary. The arms firms of Solothurn, Hispano-Suiza, and Oerlikon have a significant capacity for the production of small arms and artillery.

MANPOWER

4. Of a population of little over 4,000,000, there are 964,000 physically fit males between the ages of 15 and 49. 500,000 men and 380,000 women are actively engaged in agriculture. There are 850,000 men and 428,000 women employed in industrial establishments. This total of about 2,100,000 represents the maximum labour force available in the country, from which the armed forces, the economy, and the national services must be manned. The general quality of manpower is good. The population is entirely literate, and physique is above average.

SCIENTIFIC

5. The Oerlikon Company is developing a supersonic radio-controlled liquid-fuel anti-aircraft rocket for sale, but without assistance from the Swiss Government. The chances of completing development on this missile within five years seem good. Aside from this, Switzerland can be expected to contribute little to military scientific development.

ARMED FORCES

6. The Armed Forces of Switzerland are based on the Militia system. There is a small permanent cadre of

APPENDIX "B"SWITZERLAND

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professional soldiers which is responsible for training the army under a universal call-up law. Every fit male is subject to four months compulsory service at the age of 19, and in subsequent years up to the age of 40 undergoes regular periods of refresher training.

7. The Swiss are capable of deploying a well-trained, fully-equipped army of 500,000 within a week of 1. Day. A further 300,000 can be mobilized in the course of three months. Arms and equipment are efficient by Western standards for the role they are expected to play.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

8. The Swiss defence plan embodies four phases:

- (a) The Mobilization Phase, during which the Army mans its battle stations;
- (b) The Frontier Phase, which envisages defence of the frontier by troops especially assigned to this task;
- (c) The Withdrawal Phase, in which the Army, and as much of the populace as possible, withdraw into the fastnesses of the Alps; and
- (d) The National Redoubt phase. Detailed plans for the deployment of troops and movement of supplies, carefully worked out in advance for each of these phases, are kept under constant study and are tested in periodic exercises. In the final (National Redoubt) phase, the Army will be provided with all necessary supplies by means of stockpiled materials. At present these stockpiles are estimated to last for a year under full battle conditions.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR ENEMY

9. By taking full advantage of the rugged terrain, the Swiss could maintain an organized defence against a major enemy for about a year. If supplies were flown in, guerrilla resistance could continue indefinitely.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

SPAIN

POLITICAL

1. The Government is violently anti-Communist and can be relied upon not to throw in her lot with the USSR in the event of hostilities. Her main object is a prolonged peace to enable her to recover from the Civil War of 1936-39. Individualism is the predominant characteristic of the Spaniard. The remaining hard core of the illegal Communist party of about 25,000 will have little influence unless the country is overrun by the USSR.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. The surface of the Iberian Peninsula in general is unfavourable for military operations, the greater part of the coast line is rocky and precipitous. The southern coast of Portugal and the Atlantic coast of Spain are suitable for landing operations and communications inland exist.

3. Snowblockage of passes can be expected in the northern half of the Peninsula from November to March at 5,000 feet elevation and from September to May at elevations of more than 6,000 feet.

4. Suitable Air Bases

The majority of the air bases are situated on the Central Plateau with facilities for all types of aircraft up to and including heavy bombers. Fighter plane bases are chiefly located along the south, south-eastern and north coasts of Spain and on the island of Mallorca.

5. Communications

The lines of communication of the Peninsula create a spoke-pattern, with most of the lines converging on the city of Madrid as a hub. There are only four exceptions to this generalized pattern. One is the road and railroad line along the Mediterranean Coast connecting the port cities; the second along the Portuguese Coast; a third line runs from the Galician Plateau to France; and the fourth extends from Barcelona to the Basque area, thus connecting the two important industrial areas of the Iberian Peninsula.

The four main invasion routes are down the Atlantic Coast of France through the Basque uplands and the Northern Meseta to Madrid; from Lisbon on the South Coast of Portugal and the Southern Meseta to Madrid; from Cadiz on the South Coast of Spain and the Southern Meseta to Madrid; and down the Mediterranean Coast through Barcelona to Madrid.

ECONOMIC WAR POTENTIAL

6. Raw Materials

Spain has natural resources which in the past have enabled her to maintain a very fair economy. Her coal is almost enough. Coffee, lead, zinc, sulphur, mercury and other minerals have supplied her in the past

APPENDIX "B"SPAIN

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with the needs of industry, and permitted a fair export trade. Her greatest deficiency is petroleum. Her agriculture feeds her people and supplies exportable surplusses in some items, except in times of poor harvest.

7. Arms Production

In view of the present state of army equipment and Spanish efforts to buy arms and ammunition from Switzerland, it is evident that domestic supply is inadequate to maintain an army in the field or even to train an army in modern warfare. Construction of aircraft in Spain is limited to outmoded types. There is no mass production of even these older type planes.

MANPOWER

8. Manpower engaged in industry is approximately 2 percent or about 520,000. The total population is 26,000,000. Manpower engaged in agriculture is approximately 83 percent or about 6,100,000. The available manpower between the ages of 18 and 45 is 5,780,000. Since about 35 percent of each conscription class is turned down each year for physical reasons, there is a maximum of 3,740,000 men fit for military service. Illiteracy in Spain runs from an average of 40 percent to a high of 90 percent in some districts. Living standards are low. The morale in the army is good due to the many privileges and special benefits Franco has given it. On the other hand the morale of the air force is low.

ARMED FORCES

9. The present strength of the Spanish Armed Forces is approximately 468,000. The strength of the army is 422,000, with 17,000 men (of which 1,100 are pilots) in the Air Forces and 29,000 in the Navy. In addition, there are 85,000 men in para-military forces.

10. The training of the Spanish forces at present is rather low. One quarter of the army has had less than one months service and consequently has not completed basic training. The rest of the men have had over a year's service and have had good individual training. Most of the smaller units have had fairly good unit training but there have been few exercises for units of regimental size or larger. The Army is well equipped to offer resistance against an invader but the weapons available, from small arms through artillery to AFV's, are not first class. Reserves will present a problem insofar as most raw materials for the Spanish armament industry must be imported.

11. Material shortages have limited the pilot training program and due to fuel shortages the trained pilots probably have not averaged over two hours flying per month for the past four years.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

12. In the event of hostilities Spain would be compelled to rely on defensive tactics. Once invaded the action would develop into series of delaying actions

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APPENDIX "E"

SPAIN

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to the Central Plateau.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR POWER

13. The Spanish Army has few offensive capabilities. Her defensive capabilities are sufficient to defend herself against her neighbours, but not against any of the major powers.

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APPENDIX "B"

PORTUGAL

POLITICAL

1. In a conflict involving the Soviet Union, the Portuguese Government and people, both civil and military, would be overwhelmingly anti-Soviet. Even so, Portugal would probably prefer to retain a non-belligerent status rather than declare war. She would wish, however, to give all possible aid to the anti-Soviet forces, and could be expected to grant rights for bases in any of her possessions.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. The greater part of Portugal is mountainous, and ill-suited for modern military campaigning, but admirable from a defensive or guerrilla point of view. The only feasible strategic routes of approach for invading the country are through the port of Lisbon from the Atlantic, or over the Estramadura Plateau from Spain. Unfortunately, both these routes lead directly to the strategic heart of the country. Rugged highlands adequately protect the remainder of her borders. The Azores, strategically situated off the west coast of Portugal, command the shipping lanes between Europe and the American and Europe and Africa.

3. Highways are inadequate for Portugal's normal peacetime needs. Those in existence are in disrepair. The rail coverage of the country is only fair, and there is a shortage of rolling stock.

ECONOMIC

4. Metropolitan Portugal produces three strategic raw materials in sufficient quantities for export:- cork, tungsten and tin. The larger colonies are valuable for their exports as follows:- Angola in West Africa for corn, sugar, rice, diamonds, copper and lignite; Mozambique on the east coast of Africa for sugar, corn and copra. Portugal is capable only of manufacturing small arms, explosives and ammunition up to field artillery calibre. She cannot produce armoured vehicles or armour plate.

MANPOWER

5. Of a population of about 7,250,000 only 50 percent of the adults are literate. No a.e. tables are available.

ARMED FORCES

6. Peace strengths are as follows:-

Army	57,000
Navy	7,600
Air Force	1,600

The mobilization maximum of the army is 160,000, however, equipment does not exist for more than 80,000, and a great deal of this is obsolete.

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APPENDIX "B"

PORTUGAL

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7. Training, morale, and discipline are of low quality. Weapons have been indifferent but the UK has undertaken to provide equipment for three divisions. Already 67 Centaur tanks have been provided as well as 30 Valentines.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

8. Portugal has traditionally looked to Britain for diplomatic backing and maritime protection of her overseas possessions. Their relationship will continue. In addition, the combined factors of US strength and Portuguese fear of the Soviet Union have given rise to a desire for completely friendly relations with the Americans.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR ENEMY

9. It is obvious, therefore, that Portugal depends on her two powerful friends for protection of her sovereignty, and can do little more than offer token resistance to an aggressor.

TOP SECRETAPPENDIX "B"SWEDENPOLITICAL

1. In the event of a war between East and West, Sweden would make every effort to remain neutral, to the point of making extensive economic and political concessions. She would fight if directly attacked, or if the demands on her economy or Government gravely threatened her existence. Sweden's increasing economic involvement with the USSR may weaken her potential and will to fight in the Western cause. Communists are strongest in the Home Guard, particularly in the vital industrial and defence areas, but it is unlikely that they can seriously influence events.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. The largest part of the small population of 6,600,000 is concentrated in the southernmost third of the country. The 1,500 mile coastline offers excellent defensive possibilities. There are few beaches favourable to landing operations, except for short stretches on the Skane Peninsula opposite Denmark. Beaches near Stockholm are unsuitable for landing operations. Typical coastline areas in Sweden have narrow, rocky, short beaches leading to hills or cliffs immediately beyond. Interior defence is favoured by vast mountain and lake areas, swift west-to-east streams and dense forests. The coastline hills rise to elevations of 3,000 and 6,000 feet, the rivers often flow through gorges. The south is an undulating plain traversed by hill ranges and is better suited to mobile military operations.

3. The majority of the 70 or 80 airfields are in the south.

4. The principal highways are concentrated in the south. North of the Oslo-Stockholm line, highway traffic is subject to stoppage due to snow during the winter months. The general pattern of the network in this area does not lend itself to through traffic except along the eastern seacoast. Swedish highways will not stand up under continuous heavy military traffic.

5. Railways provide the prime form of transportation for internal traffic. The two main lines running north and south are single track. A single track railway crosses the northern end of Sweden from Lulea on the Gulf of Bothnia to Narvik, in Norway. Single track capacity is 10 trains per day each way.

ECONOMIC

6. Sweden is one of the world's greatest producers of high-grade iron ore. Her domestic industry uses only a small part of the total produced, the remainder is being exported. Domestic coal production is small and unlikely to increase greatly. No petroleum is produced, but some petroleum products are obtained from shale rock. Sweden is relatively self-sufficient in food production in comparison with most Western European countries. Normally, requirements for breadgrains, sugar and meats are met from domestic production, but feedgrains and fats must be imported.

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SWEDEN

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7. A vein of shale containing .02 percent uranium underlies a large part of the south. A program of research on methods of refining this ore is currently in operation. Success in this attempt would render Swedish shale beds an important prize to uranium-poor USSR.

8. Sweden has been able to meet all the requests of her own armed forces for the production of small arms, artillery, explosives and ammunition. A considerable surplus of the country's artillery production is available for export. With the assistance of her small but important automobile industry, Sweden has produced tanks that range up to 22 tons in size. Limited numbers of heavier tanks probably could be produced. Domestic aircraft production is small and must be supplemented by imports. A small number of modern fighters and light bombers are manufactured but no heavy bombers.

MANPOWER

9. Of Sweden's population of 6,600,000 there are 2,000,000 men between the ages of 15 and 54 available for the armed forces. Their living standard, literacy, industrial skills and productivity are high.

ARMED FORCES

10. The peacetime strength of the Army is 50,000 with a trained reserve of 865,000. Besides this there is a Home Guard of 100,000 in the age range of under 17 and 48 and over. Mobilization strength including garrison troops is approximately 625,000 men. Sweden has made numerous contributions in all categories of artillery design through the commercial firm of Bofors. The greater part of these newly designed weapons are for export with the Swedish Army purchasing a comparatively small fraction of the total output. The Army has on hand sufficient quantities of good small arms, artillery of all types, and light AFV's, to render it capable of significant resistance to an invader.

11. The peacetime Naval strength is 16,300 with an estimated reserve of 30,000. It has three cruisers, twenty-nine destroyers and twenty-six submarines.

12. The Air Force at present numbers 11,200 with a peacetime goal of 12,000 backed by a trained reserve of 25,000. It is mainly composed of fighters.

13. Present training stresses defensive fighting in all three services.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

14. It is believed that the defence plan put into effect during the recent war is still workable and would be employed again in case of emergency. The plan is broken down into the main elements, taking advantage of the natural terrain features of the country:-

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- (a) An initial perimeter (chiefly coastal) defense.
- (b) The northeast defense zone, based on Boden, extending across Sweden.
- (c) The central defense zone based on Stockholm. This last is the critical zone as it contains the bulk of the defence industry.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR ENEMY

15. Well organized, better equipped than most, carefully though insufficiently trained, and efficiently led, the Swedish Forces with reserves could probably put up strong initial resistance to an attack in force by a major power.

APPENDIX "B"NORWAYPOLITICAL

1. In the event of a war between the Eastern and Western Powers, Norway would undoubtedly be more than sympathetic to the Western Allies but would again make every effort to remain a neutral state. The present government is strongly socialist. There is, however, a weak Communist Party element in this government although support to this group diminished slightly in 1947.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. The land mass area is 87,000 square miles with the most inhabitable part being in the south. The country is mountainous with rolling plateaus over 3,000 feet in height. In general these plateaus are highest in the south and are cut by deep narrow valleys. The coastline is deeply indented, precipitous, and unsuitable for landing operations. The only large beach is twenty-eight miles long and is located south of Stavanger.

3. There is a fair road net in southern Norway but in the north there is only one main trunk road and this connects with the Petsamo area in Finland. In general roads are narrow with numerous bridges and ferry crossings. Railroads have the most trackage near Oslo with a few lines electrified. There is trackage between Bergen and Oslo while central Norway is served by a main line between Trondheim and Mo.

4. Air bases are few in number and poor in condition. The main bases are for sea-planes.

ECONOMIC

5. The country is sadly lacking in raw materials with the exception of timber and iron ore. There is coal mined at Spitzbergen but this requires transportation to the mainland. Arms manufacturing capacity is limited to small arms, ammunition, and some light artillery pieces. The total of this production is limited and is insufficient for current military requirements.

MANPOWER

6. The total population is approximately 2,900,000 with available military manpower of men between 15 and 49 years of age estimated at 828,000.

ARMED FORCES

7. The peace strength of the Army is 20,700 with a trained reserve estimated at 150,000 men. Mobilization strength could reach a maximum of 50,000. Maximum future strength of the Army is estimated at three divisions while plans exist for an army of six mountain divisions. Present equipment is a collection of German, British, American, and Norwegian arms. The German coastal equipment, taken over by the Norwegians, is the heaviest equipment on hand and is likely to remain so. It is considered that there will be little change in this equipment except in small annual increases to replace wastage. Little or no reserve supplies are likely to be stock-piled.

APPENDIX "B"NORWAY

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8. The present naval strength is estimated at 9,300 which includes coast artillery. Morale is considered good. Equipment held consists of three submarines, ten motor torpedo boats, three British corvettes, nineteen mine sweepers and one destroyer with two more destroyers building.

9. The present strength of the air force is 195 aircraft and approximately 2,500 men consisting of three squadrons (fighter, coastal patrol, and light bomber), two of which are scheduled to become part of a training force. Future plans call for a maximum of six squadrons. Norway will continue to rely on the UK and USA for air equipment and technique.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

10. The foreign policy has always included the policy of neutrality. Although there are strong ties with the Western Powers, the geographic location of the country lying between the two great power blocs has again placed the country in a difficult position of decision whereby neutrality offers the best economic solution.

CAPABILITIES TO RESIST ATTACK OF A MAJOR ENEMY

11. The armed forces of Norway cannot be considered more than a token effort although given material backing from the Western Powers could be of some minor value. No workable defense plans are known to exist.

APPENDIX "B"

TURKEY

POLITICAL

1. Turkey is strongly nationalistic and the general feeling is for defence of Turkish sovereignty at all cost. The people are definitely anti-communist, pro-British and pro-American. In the event of a war with USSR, Turkey would support the Western Powers as a means of protecting her sovereignty from her long feared Northern neighbour, the USSR, who has already made official claims for bases in the Straits.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. Eastern Turkey is rugged and offers few invasion routes. The most important route passing through Kars and Erzurum is partially fortified. The long, exposed Black Sea coast is flanked by mountains ranges and there are very few ports. Communications from this area to the interior are very poor. European Turkey across the Dardanelles, would be almost impossible to reinforce. While the railway net is well suited for military needs, rolling stock is inadequate. Few roads are suitable for heavy military traffic and still fewer are open in all kinds of weather. US military aid is being directed toward the improvement of communications. This should increase Turkey's defensive strength.

3. Almost all Turkish air bases are located in western and southwestern Anatolia, and air capabilities in the eastern regions are very small due to the lack of fields and the mountainous nature of that area. The more important air fields are at Eskisehir, Kutahya, Yesilkoy, Adana, Merzifon, and Gazimur.

ECONOMIC

4. Turkey started to expand her industries with a five year plan in 1934 designed for expansion in light industries. In 1937, a second five year plan was begun, with special emphasis on heavy industry including iron steel, and chemicals. Munitions factories have been built, and the industry has had the advice, and aid of British technical experts. Little progress was made before World War II halted further construction. The Turkish factories cannot manufacture more than a small percentage of the country's needs in peace and war. This condition is chiefly the result of the lack of machine tools and replacement parts, shortages of raw and semi-finished material, and lack of skilled labour. The industrial machinery of Turkey is of a heterogeneous nature, much of which originates in countries of continental Europe, where manufacture of replacement parts has not been resumed. The deficiency of skilled labour greatly hampers the efficient manufacturing of essential goods.

5. The extent of Turkish munitions manufacturing to-day is a group of modern and efficient munition factories at Kirikkale, older factories at Ankara, a military explosives plant at Küçük Yozgat, three small privately owned plants at Istanbul, three aircraft assembly plants, a naval mine depot at Golcuk, and a gas-mask factory at Mamak. No tanks or motor vehicles are produced in Turkey, and all heavy motorized equipment must be imported. In the event of war, it is estimated that the industry could furnish only a minor part of the requirements of small arms and artillery ammunition, and a negligible part of the light artillery requirements.

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TURKEY

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MANPOWER

6. The total available manpower between ages 15 and 49 for the armed forces, totals 5,000,000, of which 3,700,000 are combat fit and 770,000 are fit for limited service. Seventy-five percent of Turkey's population is rural. Of the rural population, 79 percent are employed in agriculture.

ARMED FORCES

7. Total strength of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air) including the semi-military organization is estimated to be 576,000 men as of 1 Aug 47, constituting about 3 percent of the population.

Army (including Gendarmerie and Customs Guards)	536,000
Navy	13,925
Air Force	26,000

Infantry training in the Turkish Army is based on German lines. British missions have, of recent years, conducted training in artillery, tanks, transportation and certain specialized fields. Training in modern techniques is limited by the low educational level of the troops, the lack of modern equipment and insufficient stocks of ammunition and other supplies needed for training purposes. Training in the Turkish Army is expected to improve with the assistance of US military aid.

8. The present collection of British, German, Czech, Austrian and French equipment is being augmented from US sources but it will be several years before the army will be efficiently supplied.

9. The air force is dependent on foreign equipment and has made efforts to purchase late World War II types of fighters and trainers. Training is far from satisfactory.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

10. Turkey aims at maintaining a force large enough to defend the country against an attack. Her plans call for a defensive withdrawal to the national redoubt area surrounding Adana where a final stand will be made.

CAPABILITIES TO RESIST ATTACK OF A MAJOR ENEMY

11. It is estimated that Turkey alone could resist a major power for a period not exceeding 90 days. If sufficient aid were forthcoming, the time would be increased accordingly.

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APPENDIX "B"

GREECE

POLITICAL

1. Provided that US aid is continued to Greece it is expected that the political and economic situation will improve. The Greeks are intensely nationalistic in spirit and if invaded will support the Western Powers in a war with the USSR. With an improvement in the economic position the present dissatisfaction with constitutional Government should largely disappear.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. Strategically, the Greek mainland and islands flank the Dardanelles. Thrace, the eastward extension of the mainland serves as a land route between Europe and the Dardanelles. Salonika's port is the southern terminus of the historic military route through the mountains between the Danubian Basin and the eastern Mediterranean Sea, and the position of Greece and in particular Crete gives that area limited control over sea routes connecting the eastern and western Mediterranean.

3. The terrain is unfavourable for large-scale military operations since the country is mountainous, and, interspersed with scattered small valleys and basins connected by passes or defiles. However, the Monastir Gap, the Vardar River, and the Struma River afford major invasion routes to the strategic area of Salonika. Supplementary routes into Greek Thrace are along the Nestos and Moritsa River plains. Greece therefore possesses an abundant number of natural defence lines but as demonstrated by the German Army in 1941, a well organized modern land force can readily penetrate the country unless it is opposed by thoroughly prepared defenders.

4. The Royal Hellenic Airforce at the present time has bases at Athens, Salonika and Eleusis. In addition, commercial fields at Athens, Salonika, Ioannina, Agrinion, Kerkira, Drama and Larissa can be militarized.

5. Communications facilities which were never considered to be especially good were heavily damaged during the war. Rebuilding has progressed slowly except in the major urban areas, due to guerrilla activity. It is considered that within the next few years the system with US aid will have been considerably rebuilt.

ECONOMIC

6. The economic war potential of Greece is utterly inadequate to support even a small Greek Force. Greece is, and will continue to be, dependent upon outside sources for war materials, and supplies. There are no armament industries.

MANPOWER

7. The total available military manpower in Greece for ages 15-49 is estimated at 1,763,000, of whom 1,164,000 are fit for combat and 194,000 are fit for limited military service. Educational standards, due to the high illiteracy rate are low. Physical examinations are required for all conscripts.

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GREECE

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ARMED FORCES

8. Present strength is estimated at 157,400 as follows:-

Army	140,000
Navy	13,100
Airforce	4,300
TOTAL	157,400

In addition the National Defence Corps has 41 battalions at 500 all ranks plus three command organizations at 65 all ranks for an estimated total of 20,700. The National Defence Corps will ultimately consist of 100 battalions plus an unknown number of command organizations.

9. Training of the armed forces has been supervised by the British Military Mission and is along British lines.

10. The Greek Army should be capable of resisting invasion by other third rate powers, if the present terms of the American ERP are fulfilled. They will have on hand British and American small arms weapons and artillery and US type light AFV's. The degree of reserve available will necessarily depend upon the efficiency of US supply.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

11. Greece will employ her armed forces to the maximum extent in defence of the country. If overrun, small contingents would fight for the Western Powers as they did in World War II.

CAPABILITIES FOR DEFENCE AGAINST A MAJOR ENEMY

12. Greece could offer only token organized resistance to a major enemy. Her greatest contribution would be her capability to engage in guerrilla warfare after being overrun.

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APPENDIX "B"

MIDDLE EAST

POLITICAL

1. Arab nationalism is awakening after a very long period of somnambulance. At the present time, the Middle East countries do not have very cordial relations with the Western Powers because of the Palestine problem. However, since political policies are in good measure, dominated by the religious tenets of the people, it is considered that the Middle East countries will support the Western Powers, if those nations furnish some protective forces.
2. Throughout the Middle East, the USSR has become the symbol for class consciousness and atheism. The former has alienated the governing classes while the latter has frightened the devout and superstitious masses of peasantry. Thus Soviet propaganda has failed to penetrate, to any significant depth, the peoples of the Middle East, since it offends their two primary social values - their national cultures and their faiths. Recently the USSR has been placing more emphasis on penetration through exploitation of minorities, both religious and racial, such as: Kurds, Armenians, and followers of the Greek Orthodox faith, at the same time continuing to promote communist doctrine wherever local populations proved receptive. Outside of the Jewish community in Palestine, the Communists have little support.

GEOGRAPHIC

3. The Middle East contains the shortest routes between Europe and Asia. These are generally confined to a corridor stretching from the Levant to the Persian Gulf with the Suez Canal and the Red Sea on the southwest margin, and the coastal plain of Palestine and Syria is on its eastern edge. The natural defences consist mainly of the deserts of Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, Iraq, and the mountains of Iraq and Iran. In that sense, they are military obstacles rather than defence lines.
4. Since countries such as Yemen, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, Palestine and Saudi Arabia have no air forces, no national military air bases are in operation at the present time. Egypt has a base at Almaza and Helwan, Iran at Teleran, the British Mission maintains a field at Taif in Saudi Arabia, and Iraq has one at Baghdad. Commercial fields for international air traffic are in use at Cairo, Egypt, Bosna, Jidda, Aden, and Teheran -- all of which can be militarized. In addition numerous strips for both fighters and bombers were built extensively throughout the whole region during the war.
5. Communications throughout the area vary from fair to extremely poor. In general, each country has a fairly good rail link from its capital to other countries. Roads for the most part are confined to the coastal plains.

ECONOMICS

6. Outside of small coal and copper reserves, the economic potential of the Middle East is significant for its oil production. It has an estimated potential production of 267.3 million barrels of crude oil with a 645,000 barrel daily refining capacity. Industrially it has no potential for weapons and materials of war.

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APPENDIX "B"

MIDDLE EAST

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MANPOWER

7. Available military manpower of the Middle East countries is as follows:-

- (a) Yemen has an estimated 900,000 men between the ages of 15-49, of which only 50% are considered fit for military duty.
- (b) Lebanon has 150,000 males 15-49, fit and available for military service.
- (c) Iraq is thought to have 500,000 males from 15-49, fit and available for military service, although on a conscription basis, the laws have never been completely enforced. The usual annual levy is 12,000.
- (d) Syria has an estimated 375,000 males, 15-49, fit and available for military service.
- (e) Trans-Jordan has an estimated 45,000 males fit and available for military service.
- (f) Saudi Arabia has 1,500,000 males, aged 15-49. Most of the, due to their hardy life and being trained already in the use of a rifle and horse are fit for military service.
- (g) Iran is estimated to have about 1,900,000 males 15-49 fit and available for military service.
- (h) Egypt has an estimated 4,541,000 males 15-49 available for military service. However, due to the many exemptions, only about 560,000 can be considered fit and available. Conscripts are mainly from the poor and labour class who do not have the necessary \$80.00 with which to purchase their exemption.

ARMED FORCES

8. Presently established military forces are estimated at:

	Army	Airforce	Navy
Egypt	53,000	2,800	1,100
Iran	85,000	700	--
Saudi Arabia	41,000	160	250
Trans-Jordan	9,800	--	--
Syria	17,000	50	--
Iraq	31,000	1,300	--
Lebanon	6,300	--	--
Yemen	20,000	--	--
Total (approx)	263,000	5,000	1,300

Training in the Middle East countries is far below western standards except in Trans-Jordan, where the Arab Legion and Trans-Jordan Frontier Force are British officered and trained. The native forces in the Middle East are with few exceptions poorly equipped. As the period advances, arms left over from World War II will be accumulated by most forces.

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APPENDIX "B"

MIDDLE EAST

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NATIONAL STRATEGY

9. Although the rising tide of Arab nationalism is driving toward complete independence, the Middle East countries have given little thought to national strategy, since they realize clearly that they are and will continue to be completely dependent upon outside help for any worthwhile resistance to attack.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR ENEMY

10. The Middle East countries, in whole or in part, are capable of only token organized resistance to a major power. They are, however, capable of prolonged guerrilla warfare.

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APPENDIX "B"

AFGHANISTAN

POLITICAL

1. Afghanistan is a constitutional monarchy ruled by the Royal family who control the armed forces.
2. The people, who formerly governed themselves by a tribal system, fiercely resent any form of authority and especially do they resent having to provide conscripts for the army. Many Afghans still place tribal loyalty above loyalty to the nation. The various peoples are fanatical Moslems who traditionally hate the peoples of Russia and Communism is contrary to the doctrines of Islam. Nevertheless there is some agitation among Uzbek tribesmen of Northern Afghanistan for unity with their brethren in Soviet Uzbek.
3. It is considered that Afghanistan would side with the Western Powers in a war with the USSR, and in the event of any Soviet aggression would resist to her utmost.

GEOGRAPHIC

4. The country is open to attack from the USSR since the boundary between the two countries is marked by the Oxus River and the southern edge of the Kūin desert. If Soviet forces wished to enter Afghanistan they could cross the Oxus easily at many points. The border from the Oxus southwest to Iran is not a natural defense line. Russian railroads touch the Afghan border at Kushk Past and between Kilif and Termex. Aircraft have landed on the sand belt south of the Oxus river from Andkui east to Kaanabad and paratroops could be landed at will. The road from Kishk Past to Herat and continuing to Farah and Kandahar through the western section of Afghanistan offers no obstacles to modern mechanized forces.
5. In the eastern section of the Soviet Afghan border, the Hindu Kish Mountains would present a natural defence barrier to an attack launched toward the capital city of Kabul. The attack by land would of necessity be routed by way of the Shibar Pass which presents a bottleneck of 40 miles of one-way trafficable road, through narrow gorges with a depth of nearly 10,000 feet. This route is practically impossible during the winter months by reason of the deep snows. The only practical method of attacking Kabul area from the USSR would be by use of air power.
6. The western boundary would not present any natural defence features against an attack launched through Iran. The mountainous terrain on the southern boundary of Afghanistan and the North West Frontier Province presents a natural barrier accessible only through the Khyber Pass. Farther west on the boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan, there are no natural defence features.
7. Air bases exist at Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar. Of these only the latter two are suitable for year round operations. Flying conditions in the Kabul area are less favourable during the winter months.

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8. There are no railways in Afghanistan. A number of roads are fit for motor traffic and join up with road systems of all bordering countries. The road systems are lacking in the more mountainous districts except for strategic routes into the North West Frontier Provinces and Pakistan through the Khyber and Shibar Passes respectively. There are practically no navigable rivers in Afghanistan. The only article of commerce transported by water is timber, which is floated down the Kumar and Kabul rivers by raft.

ECONOMIC

9. Most of the mineral resources of Afghanistan are undeveloped. The northern part of the country is reported to have considerable deposits of copper. Lead and iron ore are found in many parts of the country. Iron smelting plants are located in Katagan and Parmal. Considerable coal is available, with the richest deposits located in the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush Mountains. Crude oil deposits have been discovered near Herat and in Northern Afghanistan but are at present not being exploited. Silver, mica, asbestos, chrome ore and sulphur are mined in some quantity.

10. Generally speaking it is impossible to accurately assess the economic war potential since however rich the country may be in natural resources, these have not been greatly developed.

MANPOWER

11. The total population is approximately ten millions. The total number of males between the ages of 15 and 49 is estimated at 1,800,000 (1947). The population is composed mainly of tribes with primitive standards of living. They are, however, hardy and in most cases proud of their being Afghans.

ARMED FORCES

12. The armed forces consist of the army which includes a small airforce, and the Gendarmerie, a semi-military organization. The Prime Minister exercises direct control over the armed forces in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief.

Present strengths

Army	69,500
Airforce	500
Gendarmerie	20,000
Total	90,000

The maximum total armed forces which Afghanistan is capable of producing is considered to be between 400,000 and 500,000 men.

13. The men of the Afghan tribes are taught from their youth to use the rifle. They are expert marksmen and know all the arts of guerrilla warfare.

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14. The army has a collection of World War I and II equipment but only in sufficient quantity for the purposes of maintaining internal security.

15. The Air Force training has been haphazard in the past. Foreign instructors including German, Soviet, and Italian have been employed without any standard system.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

16. The Afghan national defence policy is purely defensive, as she has no military establishment capable of waging modern offensive warfare. The chief function of the army is that of maintaining internal security rather than providing defense against invasion.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING ATTACK OF A MAJOR ENEMY

17. Afghanistan is not capable of resisting a major enemy. Any resistance to the Soviet armed forces would be token only.

APPENDIX "B"

INDIA AND PAKISTAN

POLITICAL

1. India and Pakistan will support the Western Powers in a war with USSR. The Indian sub-continent in general has been opposed to Communism, and although split into two independent Dominions since August 1947, they are still dependent on British advisers and realize they owe their present status to Western Democratic principles, which would not be possible under Soviet influence. The campaign to attain independence has raised the nationalistic feelings to fever pitch, and this feature is only marred by the communal strife which followed the setting up of the two Dominions.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. There are numerous places along India's 3,700 mile coastline where landings could be made from the sea, but the number of usable ports are few. Due to the absence of protecting islands, the shoreline is subject to storms and strong currents, while the Monsoons effectively prevent all use of landing craft during six months of the year. Her real security from sea-borne invasion lies in the protection offered by British bases which guard the entrance to Indian waters - Aden and the Cape of Good Hope to the West and Singapore and the Far Eastern Dominions to the East.

3. The North-East frontier region with its combination of broad rivers and high mountains is a military barrier of unusual effectiveness. The jungle-covered ridges of the India-Burma frontier have been described as "one of the most formidable barriers to military operations in the world".

4. The North-West frontier is probably the most vulnerable of India's boundaries. Invasions, since before the time of Alexander the Great, have used the passes on the North-West frontier. The most famous route has been via the Khyber Pass, but there are at least four other routes into India between Quetta and Chitral which could be used by a determined invader. From Quetta south to the Arabian Sea, the region is of low mountains and desert, not impassable by camel caravan, but too hot and dry to permit easy movement of an army.

5. There are many good operational air bases in India, which were developed under the aegis of the R.A.F during World War II. The communications systems have been well developed in India, in all but these regions comprising impenetrable mountain ranges. These communications systems, in particular the railways, became very disorganized during the communal rioting following the division of the sub-continent in 1947 into two separate Dominions. Reorganization of resources would be possible in the event of a crisis requiring the unified efforts of both India and Pakistan.

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INDIA AND PAKISTAN

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ECONOMIC

6. Prior to 1939, India was one of the eight leading industrial countries in the world. During World War II, Indian munition plants produced a large portion of the armaments used by her own forces, and in addition supplied substantial amounts to the British. Many new plants came into being and commenced production in 1944. The future status of the Indian ordnance factories is most uncertain. All of the plants are located in the newly created Dominion of India, and it is certain that Pakistan will demand that existing factories be divided between the two Dominions so they can support their own armies. Because of the uncertain future and the low rates of pay as compared to wartime salaries there has been a general exodus of trained technicians from the factories, so that only an estimated 5 percent remain. For this reason, many months would be required before these plants regained their wartime production level.

7. It is estimated that, owing to depleted staffs and the shut-down of over one-third of the war-built plants, return of the munitions industry in India to wartime production levels would require at least three years. Any future production capabilities will depend on the further development of India's heavy industry, which can not be undertaken for some time to come. India is rich in practically all raw materials.

MANPOWER

8. India's population of nearly 400,000,000 represents a great manpower pool. During World War II the Indian Army was the world's largest volunteer army with a peak strength of over 2,000,000. The Indians have always been noted for their high fighting qualities. Prior to World War II manpower for the army was chiefly recruited from the so-called "martial" races in northern and northwestern India. During the war several other classes were accepted, although in general, the greater part of the Armed Forces is still drawn from the North. Approximately 80 percent of recruits are illiterate, but with the inclusion of general education in their training program, they have proved adaptable and efficient in specialized and technical training.

9. The chief industry of India has always been agriculture. About 30 percent of the population are engaged in agriculture and great advances have been brought about in its scientific application. India is not agriculturally self-reliant, however, and famines are not uncommon in some districts.

ARMED FORCES

10. When the country was formed into two separate Dominions in 1947, the Armed Forces were divided,

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proportionately and primarily on a communal basis - formations of Moslem composition going to Pakistan and those of Hindu to India. This division of a hitherto well-organized, well-trained, well-equipped and well-led fighting force has resulted in the formation of two armies of lower than average fighting capabilities and communally opposed to each other. Neither army, individually, is capable of more than the maintenance of internal security for the next five years, and will not be capable of defending their separate Dominions by 1960. Any critical situation which may develop internally during this period will seriously decrease their military potential.

11. The division of the Indian Army to the two Dominions gave Pakistan a total of 135,000 personnel and India about 276,000. These figures have been seriously effected by the communal disturbances immediately following the achievement of independence. It is improbable that mobilization strength would exceed a total of 400,000 and only with the combined efforts of both Dominions could the peak figure of 2,000,000 be obtained. Both armies are well equipped with British material.

12. The Royal Indian Navy is a small force designed, for escort duty and coastal defence. Their present strength is something less than 20,000 officers and men. Most of their vessels are of the sloop and corvette class but three 6-inch gun cruisers have lately been acquired from Britain. Morale and discipline in the Navy is lower than in combat units of the Army. It is not considered possible for the Navy to defend the shores of India without outside assistance, either by 1960 or for some time thereafter.

13. The Indian Air Force was expanded during the war years under the direction and training of the R.A.F. Its present strength is approximately 15,000 all ranks and has been supplied with modern aircraft and equipment. Its present strength is not sufficient to meet internal needs, and due to the low standard of education of the average recruit, it is not considered possible to train pilots and aircrew in sufficient numbers to materially increase the present strength by 1960.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

14. It is believed that in the event of a threat from outside, they will attempt to defend their frontiers.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR ENEMY

15. India and Pakistan will be neither individually nor collectively capable of resisting unaided a major enemy by 1960.

APPENDIX "B"CHINAPOLITICAL

1. China's government in practice is by personality, as opposed to representative government practiced in the Western World. Nationalist China is governed by the virtual dictatorship of Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek and the Kuomintang. Within this party there are many personal leaders bound together by common outlook and by common allegiance to the Generalissimo. The strong points of the government are experience and control over the majority of civil servants. Despite exhaustion and strife in the country, the government policy is professed to be the achievement of political stability with a view to creating a modern state.

2. Communism has made great inroads in China. Manchuria is almost entirely in the hands of the Chinese Communists and their influence in recent months has spread rapidly through China proper.

3. China's foreign policy is directed towards building herself up as the strongest power in the Far East, foster nationalist movements in the countries of Southeast Asia, and preventing the USSR from gaining control of her border regions. China will steer a cautious course between that of the USSR and US, but in general her interests will be directed to the Western world. The factors affecting the attainment of these objectives are:

- (a) A strong Communist Party capable of resisting the National Government both politically and militarily.
- (b) Lack of material resources, capital goods, technical and administrative personnel.
- (c) Lack of force to back her commitments, resulting in diplomatic recourse as the only means of implementing her international objectives.

4. It is considered that China, even with substantial aid from the Western World, will, by 1960, be reduced in size by the Communists to such an extent that she will be in no position to help in a war with USSR. By that date she will have lost Manchuria and Sinkiang and that part of North China north of the Yellow river. The only material assistance she would represent thereafter would be a foothold in Southeast Asia for the establishment of bases.

GEOGRAPHIC

5. China can no longer rely, as was once the case, upon the isolation afforded by geographic factors. For centuries the Chinese felt secure with the sea to the south and east, the Great Wall to the north and north-east, bleak desert land to the north-west, and rugged mountain ranges to the west. For decades now the sea has been a water highway rather than an obstacle. In modern warfare the Great Wall is no longer a formidable barrier, and the difficulty of the north-west approach could be overcome by a modern army. Even the rugged mountains to the west do not preclude enemy air action from that direction. Within the country the difficulty of maneuverability for ground forces is a limiting factor in national defense. China is primarily a land of hills and mountains, with level lowlands limited to a few coastal plains, several broad river valleys and some inland basins.

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CHINA

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6. Transportation in China is slow, difficult and inadequate. While scattered highway networks and a few airlines have been established, China still depends largely upon antiquated and inefficient river traffic. Inland water transport, except for very light craft, is chiefly confined to the Yangtze and West Rivers, the large Yellow River being almost useless for such purpose, because of silt deposit. Today China, including Manchuria, has approximately 11,000 miles of operable railroads, which is entirely inadequate for her needs.

ECONOMIC

7. China does not offer much in the way of war potential. Arms manufacturing is restricted to small arms of doubtful quality and limited production facilities. What raw materials are available cannot be transported by present transportation facilities to manufacturing centres. The only important industrial concentration is located in Manchuria, and this is destined to be lost to the Communists in the very near future. Once European aid has been successfully undertaken it is believed that the US will give China considerable assistance in the form of industrial equipment.

MANPOWER

8. China has unlimited manpower resources, about 80% of the population being engaged in agriculture. The military profession has never been looked upon with favour in China, and the high morale during the war with Japan has dwindled so that the people are inclined to accept almost any substitute for the present government on the chance of obtaining a measure of economic security. The Chinese soldier does not lack the qualities of a good soldier, but poor leadership, and unstable conditions has lowered his effectiveness.

ARMED FORCES

9. Nationalist forces in China are estimated at about 2,668,000 while the Communists are currently estimated at 1,150,000 regulars and a further 2,000,000 militia or part time soldiers who join their forces when operations spread into their area. The armies are loosely organized, poorly trained and equipped, badly led, and lacking in the industrial support and system of supply found in a modern army. Depending upon the degree of aid China receives from the US she will possess a heterogeneous collection of arms representing practically every arms firm in existence. All equipment will be in such a state of disrepair as to render it capable of performing but a fraction of its normal role. The question of reserves is practically out of the question since the arms shortage requires the immediate use of virtually all armament available.

10. The Chinese Air force with training in the US and directed by US advisers in China has been built up to considerable strength. Most of the aircraft are of US type but there is a shortage of spares and a lack of trained technicians. Recent reports indicate shortage of ammunition for aircraft, which nullifies their potential as a fighting force.

11. The Chinese navy operates under Army control, and consists chiefly of small craft suitable for river patrolling and light river transport services.

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CHINA

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NATIONAL STRATEGY

12. China is considered on the whole to be a peace-loving nation. Although internal strife and attacks from without have been frequent in her history, China is a nation not characterized by conquest, and there is no foreseeable desire on her part for territorial aggrandizement. The only powerful nation contiguous to China's border today is the Soviet Union. At the price of important economic concessions, the Chinese Nationalist Government has attempted to buy a reasonable cooperation from this neighbor, at least for the near future. Her war potential in the event of outside hostilities would be effectively neutralized by her pre-occupation in dealing with the internal situation.

CAPABILITIES TO RESIST ATTACK OF A MAJOR ENEMY

13. China is not capable of resisting a major enemy, either by 1960 or in the years following. Her supply of manpower will be her greatest asset, but with the achievements of the Communists continuing as they are China will be divested of much of her economic potential before 1960.

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APPENDIX "B"

JAPAN

POLITICAL

1. The Japanese Government is elected by the people but is advised, and its actions are controlled by the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers. This elected government is very weak and could not, on its own initiative, bring Japan out of her economic slump. There is no single party in Japan, at present, which is able to command the respect of a majority of the Japanese people, and thus form a centre of stability. In the event of a war between the Western Powers and the USSR, Japan would support the Western Powers.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. Lying off the eastern shores of Asia, the Japanese archipelago is a partly submerged mountain chain which flanks the mainland. The Power dominating the islands and surrounding waters is in a position to control the movement of surface craft between the Soviet Maritime Provinces and the Pacific and probably also to render ineffective the ports of North China.

3. The Japanese railway system, which was operating efficiently prior to the war, suffered some bomb damage but remained relatively intact. The wartime disruption of coastal shipping and poor highway system, place upon the railways the major responsibility for present-day transportation. Failure of maintenance and lack of coal have limited the operation of the railroads since the termination of hostilities. Plans for electrification of many lines have been prepared by the Ministry of Transportation.

ECONOMIC

4. Japan is not able to produce food enough to feed her own population. Imported food stuffs are reported to be in excess of 20 percent of total consumption. The only exports Japan can produce without the aid of imported raw materials are, handicraft, glassware, lacquers, pottery, light machinery, and silk textiles. Arms production is nil.

MANPOWER

5. There are no military organizations in Japan at the present time and manpower is sufficient for the nations needs in all fields. Of the 6,000,000 former members of the Japanese armed forces, over 5,000,000 have been demobilized. These men plus the 10,000,000 in the military age groups, 8,000,000 of whom have had some military training, would add materially to any Power that might undertake to mobilize them. Japanese, as soldiers, are tenacious, stubborn and skilled.

ARMED FORCES

6. The Armed Forces of Japan do not exist. It is likely, however, that the Japanese peace treaty will make provision for some armed forces as in the case of other ex-enemy powers, which will be sufficient to maintain internal security.

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J.P.N

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NATIONAL STRATEGY

7. The National Strategy of Japan will be the defence of her home islands.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR ENEMY

8. Japan cannot resist an attack by a major power, nor is it likely to increase its capabilities in this respect in the foreseeable future without considerable material aid.

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APPENDIX "B"

LATIN AMERICA

POLITICAL

1. Latin America will as a whole support the Western Powers in a war with the USSR, especially if the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro is invoked. Communist infiltration is not considered to be serious.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. Strategically Latin America is comprised of four major important areas:

- (a) Caribbean Area consisting of Eastern and Southern Mexico, islands of the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico, the Central American Republics, the Panama Canal Zone, north-eastern Colombia and the northern coast of Venezuela. The importance of this area is essentially due to the Panama Canal which is important to the US.
- (b) Northwest South America, Western Mexico Area due to its importance in the security of the Panama Canal.
- (c) The Bulge of Brazil which is only 1700 miles from Africa, and which affords control of shipping from the North to South America.
- (d) Patagonia Tierra Del Fuego Area which includes all territory south of the 45 degrees south latitude assumes importance if the Panama Canal is not available for use.

3. Natural defences including mountains, jungles and the oceans materially effect Latin American defence capabilities. Communications, however, are only fair to non-existent. All countries have rail lines and roads in varying stages of disrepair except for main lines which are good military assets. Much of the trade and travel is now dependent upon river boats. Air bases, either ex-US or commercial are plentiful but chiefly on the coasts.

ECONOMIC

4. Latin America, during the past war, provided approximately 80 percent of the US imports of strategic minerals and provided practically all the supplies of antimony, white arsenic, bismuth, vanadium and quartz crystal. Latin America provided over half of the imports of beryllium, cadmium, copper, lead, manganese, molybdenum, tantalite, tin, tungsten, zinc, fluor spar, amorphous graphite and natural asphalt. Cuba for example has the fourth largest iron ore reserve in the world. Food and wool were equally important. In the event that Middle East oil is denied the Western Powers, the oil of Latin America is of prime importance, since its production capacity is 5,344 million barrels of crude oil with a daily capacity of 1,137,200 barrels, twice that of the Middle East. Production of motor vehicles, airplanes, arms and ammunition are negligible.

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LATIN AMERICA

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MANPOWER

5. Latin America has an estimated 35,000,000 males 15-49 theoretically fit for military service. The great majority of the population constitute the farm and labour classes. Skilled labour is a constant shortage in all the countries. Physical and educational standards with a few exceptions are low.

ARMED FORCES

6. Latin America's Armed Forces vary from Panama with none to Brazil with 171,000 as follows:-

Army	477,000
Navy	79,8000
Air Force	32,800
Total	

an estimated 1,660,000 trained reserves are available. Training, which in the past has been inadequate and out of date, under the United States Military Mission, is being modernized and advanced to handle large quantities of surplus and lend-lease US material. The mobilization potential is estimated at 23,929,000 of whom 21,687,000 (85 percent) may be fit for some form of military service.

7. Most armies have on hand a high percentage of World War I equipment. Along with this small amounts of modern US material is maintained. During the period, it is expected that further quantities of US equipment will be obtained with a consequent improvement in potential.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

8. Up to the present time the armies of Latin American countries have been mainly employed as a means of keeping Governments in power or of ousting them in favour of others. With the Rio de Janeiro treaty, however, the countries have embarked on a strategy of Western Hemisphere Defence. Much remains to be done in implementation of the treaty, however.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR POWER

9. Latin American countries could not resist an attack by a major power except by guerrilla warfare.

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APPENDIX "C"

MILITARY SITUATION - USSR AND SATELLITES

PERIOD "B" - After 1960

USSR

POLITICAL

1. There is no evidence to suggest a change from the conditions obtaining up to 1960. The greatest single opportunity for any such change would be the death of Stalin, which seems highly probable soon after 1960, if it has not occurred before. However, it is believed that the succession will take place smoothly, and that the MVD will ensure that would-be followers of any individual other than the candidate officially designated by the Party will be ruthlessly suppressed.

ECONOMIC

2. By the period 1955-60 Russia will have built up a considerable heavy manufacturing industry. Her target for 1960 doubles the target capacity for 1950. This might represent approximately a half of the estimated combined British Commonwealth and USA output at the time.

3. It is considered that this target is possible of attainment. From the economic point of view alone it is therefore reasonably certain that Russia could maintain armed forces, of World War II size, in a major war, of several years duration, by the period 1955-60.

MANPOWER

4. In 1960 there will be approximately 40 million fit men of military age in the USSR of whom 22 million might be available for the armed forces. The number of fit men of military age for the following decade will increase by about one million per year.

SCIENTIFIC

5. The Soviet Union should be in a strong position with regard to scientific potential. Production of atomic bombs will be well under way and in the fields of guided missiles, EW, CW, and electronics her lag behind the Western Powers will be considerably less than at present.

ARMED FORCES

6. Size

In the event of a war starting in this period it is believed that the Soviets would have already undertaken some secret mobilization, and the size of the forces on D day would therefore depend on the extent of the mobilization. The size of the standing army is estimated at 1,600,000 (105 divisions), and its build-up by divisions from M day might be on the following lines:

	<u>M day</u>	<u>After one month</u>	<u>After eight months</u>
Infantry	56	165	365
Armoured	35	60	75
Airborne	2	5	10
Cavalry	12	20	50
	<u>105</u>	<u>250</u>	<u>500</u>

APPENDIX "C"

7. Equipment

Soviet equipment in this period can be expected to be on a par in practically every field, with that used in the US and the UK. It is also probable that the USSR will develop equipment which the US and UK will be forced to adopt if they are to retain their status as well equipped armies. Soviet equipment of this era will however continue to be standardized to facilitate production and to be simple to facilitate its use by all types of educated and uneducated soldiers which the USSR would call-up in the event of war.

8. Air Force

In the brief period of slightly more than two and one half years since V-E Day, gigantic strides have been made in aircraft development and design. For example, jet planes have been developed, the sonic barrier has been reached, pilotless bombers proven feasible, mammoth load carriers flown, and navigation control improved, all of which were only ideas five years ago. Hence it is difficult to make any estimate or forecast of air power capabilities beyond a period of more than five to seven years. At present, from all indications the USSR has shown capabilities in the design, development and production of modern aircraft equalling the efforts of UK and US. The Soviet aircraft industry has made great strides in modernizing the air force as evidenced by the appearance of jet aircraft and the rapidity with which they have harnessed their industry to the production of bombers of the US B-29 model. It is expected that possibly by 1955 and certainly 1960 Soviet science and industry will be capable of producing a first class air force. It is estimated that from 1960 the USSR will be capable of engaging in large scale interhemisphere aerial warfare.

9. Navy

From 1960 onward, it is possible that the USSR could surpass the Western Powers in naval development and in the size of a fleet since twelve years is not too short a period for the developments required if forced by the totalitarian government. From 1960 on, a fleet equipped with "true" submarines and whatever types of surface vessels prove needed, will probably be possessed by the USSR. If submarines are the primary type of offensive weapon, 2,000 may be taken as a fair number. The period 1943 to 1960 makes possible the training of the required manpower.

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APPENDIX "C"

SATELLITES OF USSR

POLITICAL

10. There is no evidence that any change from the existing situation is likely after 1960, except that, if any alteration does occur, it is likely to be in the direction of intensification of Soviet control.

ECONOMIC

11. The tendency will be towards increasing industrialization, but apart from Poland and Czechoslovakia the industrial potential of the Satellites will be insignificant compared with that of the USSR. In food, these countries will have an exportable surplus.

MANPOWER

12. Starting with a possible 20 million fit men of military age in 1960, the total of this class might increase by half a million a year up till 1970. Possibly up to 4 million of these might be equipped in the event of war.

ARMED FORCES

13. Size

There is no evidence to indicate any change from the estimates for the period 1948-60 of approximately 1,200,000 men, increasing to approximately 1,500,000 men (60 divisions) by M plus 30. Ten of these divisions might be armoured.

14. Equipment

The Soviet satellite nations will be equipped with Soviet equipment to varying degrees according to the degree of Communist infiltration in that country. Fully communist nations will be completely equipped with first rate Soviet equipment, with other nations scaled according to their degree of allegiance to Moscow. Czechoslovakia would be an exception to this as she possesses an adequate arms industry of her own.

15. The countries likely to be most completely under Soviet control are Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Hungary, in that order.

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APPENDIX "D"

MILITARY SITUATION - WESTERN POWERS

PERIOD "B" - After 1960

USA

1. It is presumed that the USA will continue to expand its industrial potential as it has in the past. Its program for assisting Europe with consumer and capital goods should ensure that there is no business recession and its plans for the provision of military aid to threatened countries together with its arrangements for standardization of weapons in the Western Hemisphere should be sufficient to retain, in being, an armaments industry of considerable strength. In the technical and scientific fields the US will be unsurpassed and probably superior to the rest of the world. The armed forces will probably undergo rearmament on or near 1960.

UK

2. After Britain has overcome her economic weaknesses she will again possess a very strong war potential. Developments being planned in Africa and the rehabilitation of Europe will contribute in a great measure to this. Her extreme vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction will, however, be a serious weakness and it is doubtful whether scientific discoveries will ever immunise her from their effects.

WESTERN EUROPE

3. The economic and political condition of the countries of Western Europe will depend almost entirely on their own and American efforts in the preceding period. If these are successful, and given sufficient time to mobilize they may be able to put up more opposition to the USSR than previously.

MIDDLE EAST

4. It is estimated that from 1960 on the countries of the Middle East will be in a stronger military position than at present. The rise of nationalism has caused governments to consider the defense of their countries. If, as is possible a united or federalized Arab state is formed, it may make serious steps to provide for its defense.

INDIA and PAKISTAN
and FAR EAST

5. It is difficult to foresee any political, economic or military alterations which will be of significance to the world military situation.

LATIN AMERICA

6. By 1960 it is expected that by standardizing arms with the USA the Latin American countries will have increased their ability to resist invasion.

ESTIMATED
ALLOCATION - SOVIET & SATELLITE - DIVISIONS
FOR THE INVASION OF EUROPE AND THE
MIDDLE EAST PERIOD "A"
1948 - 60

TOP SECRET
MAP "P"

* Plus 15 used in France



TOP SECRET

MAP "C"

ESTIMATED
GARRISONS - SOVIET & SATELLITE - DIVISIONS
FOR THE OCCUPATION OF EUROPE AND THE
MIDDLE EAST PERIOD "A"
1948 - 60

Soviet Far East 80
Korea 10



ESTIMATED
GARRISONS - SOVIET & SATELLITE - DIVISIONS
FOR THE OCCUPATION OF EUROPE AND THE
MIDDLE EAST PERIOD " A "
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MLP " C "

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Soviet Far East 80
Korea 10

