

Department of National Defence

Canadian Forces

BUSINESS CONTINUITY PLAN

Annex A

Sub-Appendix 6-1

DND/CF BCP Exercise Scenarios

DND/CF BCP Exercise Scenarios

- References: A. Government Security Policy (Business Continuity Planning) 1 Feb 02
B. 3120-1 (SJS CANUS Plans) DM/CDS Initiating Directive – DND/CF Continuity of Critical Operations and Services (Business Continuity Plan) 5 January 2007
C. TBS Public Service Readiness Plan 2008
D. DAOD 1003-0 Business Continuity Planning
E. DAOD 1003-BCPP Business Continuity Planning Program
PS BCPP Compliance Report Reference 4.4: A Strategy to Exercise Business Continuity Plans for Government Institutions

BCP SCENARIO 1 – LOSS OR DISRUPTION OF SERVICES

SCENARIO 1.1 – EAST END OTTAWA LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER

Significant construction has been underway on the roadways surrounding the Startup Building (Innes and Startup). During the morning rush hour the driver of a heavily loaded transport truck lost control of his vehicle and collided at high speed with a backhoe that was performing delicate road excavation near a major underground power transmission cable. The result was catastrophic devastation of the power cable, resulting in a total blackout of electrical power being supplied to a large portion of the eastern end of the city of Ottawa. Hydro Ottawa has promised to put all available resources to work on reconstructing and repairing the power supply and foresees restoration of the power at the earliest in 24 hours but has informally confirmed it will likely take 72 hours or more for full restoral of services.

THE ACCIDENT SITE

The collision of the two vehicles occurred near the northeast corner of Innes and Cyrville. The westbound lanes of Innes Road were entirely blocked with the wreckage, causing a back up down the off ramp and very soon afterward in the entire right-hand lane of the 417 heading eastbound from downtown Ottawa toward Montreal. Due to the presence of live high voltage electrical wires at the accident site, first responders had to proceed extremely cautiously first in attending to the victims of the accident and then later in the clearing of the wreckage. As a result, it was approximately 4 ½ hours before the wreckage was cleared and Hydro Ottawa was able to work unimpeded at the power restoral activity.

Travel in and out of the entrance to the Startup Building was only possible by travelling southbound on Startup Road, which is accessible off Cyrville Road.

Travel eastbound on Innes Road was possible, however the Startop exit off Innes Road was entirely closed down. As a result of the accident on the westbound side of Innes Road, significant traffic back-ups occurred on the eastbound side also, affecting traffic back to and on the southbound side of St Laurent Blvd, all the way to the Queensway. Personnel caught in traffic enroute to the Startop Building became enmeshed in the traffic back-ups for hours.

IMPACTS ON DND BUILDINGS

The blackout has affected not only the Startop building housing the CF's operational command but also the DND occupied buildings at the Coventry and Labelle locations. The RCMP HQ building at the Vanier Parkway has been similarly affected.

Staff already at work within the Startop building experienced a sudden shutdown of all electrical power and information systems not connected to the building's UPS (uninterrupted power source). Overhead lights were extinguished in all areas except the Command Centres, although the emergency lighting system switched on and was available until the battery systems within the lights were drained after 45 minutes. In an unhappy coincidence, Commander CEFCOM and Commander CANOSCOM had planned an early morning meeting and were travelling together in one of the building's elevators at the time of the power outage and became trapped in the elevator between the second and third floors of the building.

CF COMMAND AND CONTROL

The MGen George R. Pearkes NDHQ building is unaffected by the power outage and the CDS is in place and has been made aware of the situation at Startop. The NDCC is monitoring the situation and prepared to accept an influx of some command post personnel from the operational command HQs although surplus workspace is extremely limited.

SCENARIO 1.2 – CENTRAL AND WEST END OTTAWA LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER

In the early morning hours all the Ottawa fire stations have been called out to battle a major blaze in the Ottawa Hydro sub-station building located downtown at Gloucester and Lyon streets. The cause of the fire is unknown at this point as the building is still ablaze, but the resulting power outage is affecting an area from the Ottawa River in the north to the Queensway in the south and from the Vanier Parkway in the east all the way to Island Park Drive on the western side of the city. The downtown core is a traffic disaster, with all the emergency vehicles

that have been called to the scene, combined with the lack of power to the intersections providing no traffic signals. OC Transpo has diverted its buses off the downtown transitway routes westward on Albert and eastward on Slater, to Wellington St in both directions between Elgin and Bronson streets. This diversion has caused major congestion on Wellington Street in front of the Parliament buildings. With no idea as yet of the extent of the damage in the sub-station building, Hydro Ottawa has promised to put all available resources to work on redirecting power through other sub-stations at the earliest in 24 hours but has informally confirmed it will likely take 72 hours or more for full restoration of services. Ottawa Police are making public pleas for the city's citizens to avoid coming to the downtown core area and exacerbating the situation.

IMPACTS ON DND BUILDINGS

DND buildings within the affected area are without power. Major buildings affected include the MGen George R Pearkes building, Constitution building, Cumberland building, Lorne building, and Tunney's Pasture as well as assorted other office space buildings located throughout the downtown core.

A back-up electric generator powers the NDCC within the MGen George R. Pearkes building.

CF COMMAND AND CONTROL

The CDS is maintaining situational awareness by working out of one of the office spaces within the NDCC facility. The Level One organizations have been advised to activate BCPs and, if located within one of the facilities currently without power, to move mission essential staffs to other local area buildings identified as secondary sites in the BCPs and to continue with essential activities.

Cmdt CFSU(O) has directed activation of the alternate CFSU(O) operations site located at Uplands. CFSU(O) Military Police have been called out to ensure physical protection of DND facilities that may be at risk due to a loss of power to physical security systems.

SCENARIO 1.3 –GATINEAU LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER

A broken water main has flooded a main Gatineau power sub-station resulting in a power shut-down affecting the entire central area of the city (Aylmer and other outlying parts of the community remain unaffected). In order for crews to gain safe access inside the station to make a damage assessment and repairs, the flooding must be first cleared. While it's unclear how long it will be before Hydro crews are capable of restoring the electrical system, best estimates suggest 24 to 72 hours is a reasonable assumption, particularly given the age of the equipment and the potential difficulties in quickly sourcing replacement parts for

portions of the electrical generating system that may have been damaged by the flooding.

IMPACTS ON DND BUILDINGS

DND buildings located within Gatineau have been affected by the widespread power outage. Place du Portage is without electricity, as are the buildings at 45 Sacre Coeur and the Asticou Centre. The Louis St Laurent building has emergency generators providing power to some limited floors.

CF COMMAND AND CONTROL

The MGen George R. Pearkes NDHQ building is unaffected by the power outage and the CDS is in place and has been made aware of the situation within Gatineau. The NDCC is monitoring the situation. ADM(Mat) is the primary Level One organization affected by the Gatineau outage and has activated the BCP for that organization.

BCP SCENARIO 2– LOSS OF STAFF

SCENARIO 2.1 – INFLUENZA OUTBREAK (SERIOUS BUT NOT PANDEMIC)

Hospitals in Canadian major urban centres have been reporting higher percentages than normal in the cases of influenza being diagnosed through the month of November. Alarming, it's not only the 'typical' patients who are brought to emergency rooms suffering from influenza, the elderly and the very young. In fact, a large number of cases of influenza being diagnosed are among the group aged 35-55 years old. There have been some reports of similar findings around the world, but as of yet the World Health Organization had not found it necessary to increase the pandemic alert level as the flu virus appears to simply be a particularly virulent mutation of a common strain of the disease.

Canadian Public Health Officials have made public statements reminding the population of the importance of hygiene, washing hands regularly, and imploring those hit with the virus to self-quarantine at home to prevent unchecked spread of the disease. Parents are asked to remain home with sick children, both to prevent children from spreading the flu at school or daycare but also to ensure the parents are not spreading the virus before becoming aware they have contracted it.

CF/DND WORKFORCE

The CDS and DM have agreed that an influenza virus outbreak affecting a large proportion of working-age people will undoubtedly impact on the DND/CF's ability to maintain normal levels of activities, particularly in the larger urban centres

such as Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Edmonton, Winnipeg and Vancouver where many of the larger headquarters are located. They have, therefore, activated the Business Continuity Plan and directed all Level One organizations to assess their workforce and limit on-site manning to a minimum. Telework is to be strongly encouraged to prevent spread of the virus and any individuals who know they have been in contact with the virus are directed to self-quarantine at home as a preventive measure.

ADM(IM) has been directed to ensure maximum capacity is available for remote connection to the DWAN. If necessary, augmentation measures are to be taken ASAP to both increase the number of remote (DVPNI) terminals available for use and also for the central capacity to accommodate remote access of the network.

For those personnel continuing work on-site, videoconferencing is the preferred means of meeting both to limit potential face-to-face transmission of the influenza virus and also to limit potential exposure to the virus from the general public while travelling to various DND/CF locales.

CF/DND MEDICAL SUPPORT

Thus far the civilian medical facilities are barely adequate to manage the numbers of people requiring care from severe influenza symptoms. The CF has been put on warning by the Public Health Agency of Canada that a request for aid may be forthcoming if the situation deteriorates any further. CMP has the lead to assess CF health services capabilities that may be available to assist should it be required.

SCENARIO 2.2 – PANDEMIC INFLUENZA OUTBREAK OUTSIDE CANADA

The World Health Organization has just confirmed that a pandemic influenza event has commenced based on reports from certain hard-hit areas within Asia. Thus far there have been some relatively isolated outbreaks in Europe, where authorities are doing their best to quarantine victims and limit the spread of the influenza. Based on preliminary test results, 3 or 4 cases of the same strain of influenza have been detected within Canada, although they have appeared randomly and the point of origin or commonality for them is not evident. The Federal government has alerted Provincial and Territorial governments to be prepared for the coming pandemic and have promised all available federal resources to augment shortfalls in local abilities to respond to the crisis wherever possible.

CF/DND WORKFORCE

It is clear that the once the pandemic influenza virus outbreak reaches Canada it can be expected to affect a large proportion of working-age people and thus will

undoubtedly impact on the DND/CF's ability to maintain normal levels of activities, particularly in the larger urban centres such as Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto, Edmonton, Winnipeg and Vancouver where many of the larger headquarters are located.

The CDS and DM have directed all Level One organizations to be prepared to activate BCPs once the pandemic reaches Canada. Telework is to be strongly encouraged to prevent spread of the virus and any individuals who know they have been in contact with the virus are to be directed to self-quarantine at home as a preventive measure.

ADM(IM) has been directed to take steps to increase the capacity available for remote connection to the DWAN. Augmentation measures are to be taken ASAP to both increase the number of remote (DVPNI) terminals available for use and also for the central capacity to accommodate remote access of the network.

CF/DND MEDICAL SUPPORT

The CF has been put on warning by the Public Health Agency of Canada that a request for aid may be forthcoming once the pandemic wave reaches Canada. CMP has the lead to assess CF health services capabilities that may be available to assist should it be required. CMP has been tasked to track any and all cases of influenza (and to test for indications of pandemic influenza) occurring within CF members and to take steps to report those cases and ensure the individuals' affected are isolated from the larger CF community in an attempt to limit spread of the disease. Stockpiles of antivirals located at CF medical depots are to be afforded additional physical protection and contingency plans put in place to move those stockpiles to affected areas of the country if required.

SCENARIO 2.3 – PANDEMIC INFLUENZA OUTBREAK IN CANADA

The World Health Organization has confirmed that a worldwide pandemic influenza event is in progress. Having started in Asia, the first wave of the pandemic has swept the continent, and is having a catastrophic effect on the population, particularly in rural areas where there are limited medical facilities.

The first wave of influenza is now making its way across Europe, and is particularly heavy in the Eastern European nations. Russia and those nations remaining under its influence are refusing to provide detailed reporting on the impacts of the disease, although anecdotally it is clear that the casualty percentages are significant.

Hospitals in Canadian major urban centres are beginning to struggle with the increased patient load, although the pandemic remains in early stages across

North America. Vaccine companies worldwide have received the influenza virus and are working feverishly to develop a vaccine, but while some foreign companies are close to full production status, governments are refusing to allow exports of the vaccines until their own populations are fully protected. The Canadian pharmaceutical companies are estimating another two to three weeks before an effective vaccine can be expected to be available in sufficient quantities to protect the domestic population, and that will only be with targeted vaccination programs aimed at keeping ahead of the influenza wave.

Cabinet is holding regular meetings to deal with the health crisis and the MND has asked the CDS to assess what medical support the CF may be able to provide to the hardest-hit areas of the country where medical resources are likely to be rapidly overwhelmed as the first wave of the pandemic crests in those areas.

A particularly worrisome aspect to the pandemic is an indication that it may be resistant to Tamiflu. Initial research has indicated that Tamiflu has been used widely as a preventive measure in certain Asian countries, and scientists have already noted a spike of resistance to the oseltamivir class of drugs to which Tamiflu belongs in strains of seasonal influenza experienced in recent years primarily in Northern Europe and Canada.

The Canadian government has stockpiled millions of doses of Tamiflu antivirus to be used to limit complications and reduce morbidity among victims who present for early treatment of the disease (within 48 hours). The antivirus may also be used as a prophylaxis for health care workers, key decision makers and public health and societal responders with the intent of supporting Canadian pandemic goals of minimizing serious illness and death, and societal disruption. The problem with the preventive strategy is that antiviral prophylaxis requires considerably more drug than early treatment. Four to five individuals could be treated with the amount of drug required to provide prophylaxis for one individual for a 6 week period. Therefore, given the limited stocks of the drug, the Canadian government's approach is currently to use the National Antiviral stockpile for treatment only.

CF/DND WORKFORCE

Upon declaration of the pandemic having reached Canada, the CDS and DM activated the organization's Business Continuity Plan as well as the CF/DND Pandemic Contingency Plan and directed all Level One organizations to assess their workforce and limit on-site manning to a bare minimum. Telework is to be strongly encouraged to prevent spread of the virus and any individuals who know they have been in contact with the virus are directed to self-quarantine at home as a preventive measure.

ADM(IM) has been directed to ensure maximum capacity is available for remote connection to the DWAN. If necessary, augmentation measures are to be taken ASAP to both increase the number of remote (DVPNI) terminals available for use and also for the central capacity to accommodate remote access of the network.

For those personnel continuing work on-site, videoconferencing is the preferred means of meeting both to limit potential face-to-face transmission of the influenza virus and also to limit potential exposure to the virus from the general public while travelling to various DND/CF locales.

CF/DND MEDICAL SUPPORT

Thus far the civilian medical facilities are easily managing the limited numbers of victims presenting with pandemic influenza symptoms. The civilian health care system has been put on alert to

The CF has been warned by the Public Health Agency of Canada that a request for aid may be forthcoming if the civilian health care system should become overwhelmed. CMP has the lead to assess CF health services capabilities that may be available to assist should it be required. Immediate Readiness Units across the country are being placed on alert to respond should more generic support to maintain public order be required (for example providing a security presence at distribution sites for antivirals).

BCP SCENARIO 3 – LOSS OR DISRUPTION TO FACILITIES

SCENARIO 3.1 – BOMB THREAT DOWNTOWN OTTAWA

A credible bomb threat has been called in to the City of Ottawa Police. Initial analysis indicates that the threat most likely originated from a previously low profile terrorist organization identifying itself as a group of second-generation Canadians sympathetic to the jihadist movement in Afghanistan. The terrorist group has indicated that it has in its possession, and potentially situated in location somewhere in the downtown Ottawa core, a bomb that it is prepared to detonate should its demands not be met. There is no indication that the bomb is other than a purely explosive device, nor is there any information provided on the expected yield of the device.

The RCMP has been engaged and the Government of Canada operations centre is coordinating very closely with potentially implicated government departments such as Public Safety and DND.

Discussion is underway among senior leadership as to whether or not all government employees should be alerted to be on the lookout for and to immediately report any suspicious packages or unclaimed items. While not

wanting to cause widespread panic or an uncontrolled exodus of government employees from the area, employee safety is a key consideration. Therefore it is felt that until more detail is received, the downtown area will not be evacuated. DND/CF leadership have been told to take steps to be prepared to evacuate if necessary.

CF/DND RESPONSE

The Government of Canada Operations Centre (GOC) has notified NDCC of the threat.

SCENARIO 3.2 – DIRTY BOMB THREAT DOWNTOWN OTTAWA

A credible bomb threat has been called in to the RCMP indicating that a dirty bomb is set to go off in the Parliamentary precinct downtown Ottawa. ITAC (the integrated threat assessment centre) indicates that the group claiming to be responsible for the dirty bomb is a homegrown terrorist organization with strong links to organized crime in Montreal. The organization has members who work the port in Montreal and the Senate Committee on Defence and Security (SCONSAD) has been warning for years of the government's inability to properly survey and control shipments entering the country through that location. It's entirely feasible that the terrorist group has in its possession, and potentially situated in location somewhere in the downtown Ottawa core, a dirty bomb that it is prepared to detonate. It's unclear as yet what the motivation would be for detonating such a device, aside from engendering terror in the Canadian population.

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission has been called in to assist with locating and assessing the device, and scientists from DRDC are also engaged. However, all involved indicate that the likelihood of being able to either locate or definitively rule out the presence of a dirty bomb in such a large area is highly improbable. Parliament is in recess so there are currently no parliamentarians on site. Evacuation of parliamentary staff from the various parliamentary buildings is underway and so far there has been no public acknowledgement of the threat however it's clear that the media will soon become aware of the crisis and will quickly descend upon the area to cover the story.

SCENARIO 3.3 – CHEMICAL SPILL/CONTAMINATION AND EVACUATION OF DOWNTOWN OTTAWA

The winter road conditions are treacherous – snow falling on top of ice pellets mixed with freezing rain. As a result, frequent collisions are occurring throughout the city and traffic is extremely congested. Outside the MGen Pearkes Bldg located at 101 Colonel By Drive, at the intersection of Nicholas and Laurier Streets, a rather messy collision has just occurred. A car on Laurier collided in

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To: Annex A

DND/CF BCP

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the middle of the intersection with a large truck that was proceeding down Nicholas St, and a pile-up of trucks following immediately behind the first has resulted in a multi-car pileup involving at least one other large truck that was following closely behind the first. Both are carrying large liquid cargos, and the damage has caused leaks of those cargos. Police have been called to the scene and some of the first responders have already reported feeling skin and eye irritation and have noted a large yellowish pool of liquid beginning to form in the area of the liquid cargo spill.