

CLASSIFIED

File No. Dossier 28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION
Volume 5 From-De 83-11-01 To-À 83-11-04

CLASSIFIÉ

MGID

ATIP SCREENING

VOLS ACCESSION NO. 18815

2003

TITLE—TITRE:

DISARMEMENT
MEASURES
PLANS AND PROPOSALS
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION (INITIATIVES)

DESARMEMENT
MESURES
PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS
TRUDEAU MISSION DE PAIX (INITIATIVES)

gbc

Retention period—Période de retention:

20 Y (7A-13D) J

DUMMY ACC:98-28

NOW: _____

BOX# 15

DATE	EXAMINED BY / EXAMINÉ PAR
1994.18/06	C. 16/04

ACCESS TO INFORMATION
ACCÈS À L'INFORMATION
DEPARTMENT
OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

2002



Government
of Canada

Gouvernement
du Canada

CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET

DATED FROM
À COMPTER DU

83-11-01

TO
JUSQU'AU

83-11-04

AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - À METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER

DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS

FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTÉRIEURE VOIR

FILE NO. - DOSSIER N°

28-6-1 - Trudeau Race Mission

VOLUME

16

NOV 7 1983

003/4
ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

1/5

URR	
NOV 7 1983	
ACTION	INFO
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	

RESTRICTED

CHCGO YFGR2826 04NOV83

EXTOTT/URR

PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPF WSHDC

MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCI RCR IDD IDA IDR FPR IDNZ
GEA

OUR SFAX YFGR2825 04NOV83

—PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE ON NUCLEAR TENSION

ENCLOSED ARE TWO ARTICLES FM BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS

REFERRED TO IN REF TEL.

28-6-1-T. RUDEAU
6

PEACE MISSION

R. H. GAYNER

000004

2/5

Perspectives

The Canadian Prime Minister speaks

The following is the text of an open letter to Canadian newspaper editors from Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, dated May 9, 1983. It outlines the Canadian government's position on cruise missile testing and the disarmament issue. The United States and Canada have signed an agreement opening the way for missile tests over northern Alberta. But in April more than 80,000 Canadians publicly protested the agreement. —The Editors

by Pierre Trudeau

IN RECENT MONTHS I have received a great number of letters and petitions protesting against the possible testing of cruise missiles in Canadian territory. Because it was physically impossible to send a personal reply to all of those who had expressed their concerns to me, I gave a public response when I spoke at a dinner in honor of Vice President George Bush.

Because this whole question continues to weigh heavily upon the consciences of those in government and the general public, I have now decided to address myself directly to Canadians through this open letter. My purpose is to explain the position of the Government of Canada on the testing of the cruise missile, and on the broader issue of disarmament.

By way of preamble, let me point out that our freedom to discuss and argue issues is what gives our democracy its greatness and its strength; but that same freedom can also make us appear vulnerable in the face of Soviet totalitarianism.

In recent years, the Soviet Union has deployed hundreds of new SS-20 missiles, each equipped with three nuclear

warheads, capable of reaching all the great cities of Western Europe. However, there has not been any significant outburst of public opposition, either inside or outside the Soviet Union.

That the Soviet people have not protested against this action of their leaders surprises no one. What is surprising, however, is that those in the West who are opposed to new nuclear weapons have remained silent about the installation of the SS-20s. In contrast, they are now taking to the streets to oppose the possible deployment of U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles to protect Europe against the Soviet nuclear threat.

What is particularly surprising in Canada is to see protesters opposing the possible testing of cruise missiles in Canadian territory, but not opposing the fact that similar missiles are already being tested in the Soviet Union, as was confirmed in December by General-Secretary Andropov.

Because people in the free world feel powerless to influence the leaders of the Soviet Union, there is a great temptation to direct the whole force of their anguish and their protests against the only decision-makers who are sensitive to public opinion, namely the leaders of the democratic countries. Having convinced themselves that it is useless to denounce the SS-20s, people find it easier, I suppose, to forget about them. The strange result of this forgetfulness is that it somehow becomes possible to portray the Soviet Union not as the aggressor, but as the innocent target. This represents a curious amnesia and reversal of roles, which the Soviet leaders are quick to exploit for their own purposes.

They hope, obviously, that one-sided information, and one-sided protests, will lead to the unilateral disarmament of the West. Indeed, there is a segment of public opinion in Western Europe which has already adopted that policy.

DURING THE FIRST Special Session on Disarmament at the United Nations, I proposed, in the name of Canada, a strategy of suffocation. It was designed to smother, even in the laboratory, the development of any new nuclear weapons systems. Obviously, my proposal had to apply to both sides or to neither. There certainly was no suggestion in that proposal that the West should disarm unilaterally.

Because our strategy of suffocation was rejected by the Soviet Union, as evidenced by the continued deployment of the SS-20s, a weapon much superior to the SS-4 and 5, there was no question of urging its acceptance by the NATO countries alone. That is why we allied ourselves with the two-track strategy of our NATO partners. Those two tracks are to seek to negotiate the removal of the Soviet SS-20s and, at the same time, to prepare for the deployment of new U.S. missiles in Europe so as to pressure the Soviet Union toward serious negotiations, and so as not to leave our European allies in a vulnerable position, if the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces ended in failure.

Having declared our support for the two-track strategy, Canada should bear its fair share of the burden which that policy imposes upon the NATO alliance.

It is hardly fair to rely on the Americans to protect the West, but to refuse to lend them a hand when the going gets rough. In that sense, the anti-Americanism of some Canadians verges on hypocrisy. They're eager to take refuge under the U.S. umbrella, but don't want to help hold it.

When we seek to apply moral principles to this issue, it's easy to become trapped in positions which are either too complex or too simple. The former can paralyze us. The latter can deceive us.



Pierre Trudeau is prime minister of Canada.

3/5

Perspectives


Into the trap of over-complication fall those who insist that no moral position is valid which does not take into account every possible future breakthrough in nuclear weapons technology, every possible future difficulty in detecting the actions of the other side. Into the trap of over-simplification fall those who are content to talk about how many bowls of rice could be purchased for the price of a missile, or who condemn governments for spending anything at all on defense.

I do not deny that there is an element of truth and validity in an unconditionally pacifist position. I simply say that it is simplistic to ignore the real, complex and often immoral world to which our moral choices must apply. The Pope himself recognized this fact in a message he sent last June to the second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament. "In current conditions," he wrote, "deterrence based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself, but as a step toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable."

I believe that the Soviet peoples desire peace just as much as the peoples of the free world. But I also know that the Soviets are very heavily armed. In these circumstances, it would be almost suicidal for the West to adopt a policy of unilateral disarmament, or a policy of suffocating the development of new means of defending ourselves against the Soviet SS-20s. That is the kind of heroic moral choice which an individual could make in his personal life, but does anyone have the right to impose that choice upon a whole nation, or upon the community of free countries?

When the choice is between steadfastness or weakness in the face of totalitarianism, history should have taught us that to refuse to risk one's life in defense of liberty is to risk losing liberty, without any guarantee of saving one's life.

THAT IS WHY the Government of Canada has chosen, not without anguish or full awareness of the risk, to



Kasside, Canada

"Gee Dad... we're all out of vegetables, fruit and eggs."
"No problem. Someone's bound to throw some at us."

join our NATO partners in adopting a policy of strength in reaction to the Soviet Union.

In supporting the two-track strategy of the Atlantic alliance, however, we shall insist that progress be made simultaneously on both tracks. This combination of steadfastness of purpose and willingness to negotiate seems to be bearing fruit, as witness the latest offer of General-Secretary Andropov to take into account the numbers of warheads as well as missiles.

Indeed, are we to think that this new-found flexibility of Mr. Andropov is a straight-forward show of goodwill? Are we to believe seriously that, on two occasions since last December, the Soviets would have contemplated publicly a reduction of their nuclear forces if we had weakened in our resolve?

I hope that my explanation of our policy will have established that, were we to agree to collaborate in testing the guidance system of the cruise mis-

sile, it would be because of our solidarity with the other Western democracies, in a world which has turned a deaf ear to our suggested strategy of suffocation.

That being said, however, I would add that we should not abandon hope for the ending of the nuclear arms race. All the people of the world, whether they be friends or enemies, value their own lives, and the lives of those they love. If the discovery of the terrible secrets of the atom gives us the power to destroy the whole planet, there is a still more powerful force which can save it—our love for our children, and our love of life.

Therefore, I shall continue to believe that our strategy of suffocation is the best strategy. The great powers of the world refuse to accept it now. But that will not stop us from repeating our proposal at every opportunity, until the recognition of its truth frees us all from moral anguish and from fear. □

An American responds

by Kosta Tsipis

THE PRIME MINISTER'S open letter to the Canadians is a welcome example of the manner in which a sensitive and responsive political leader encourages public debate on a controversial topic. Yet this re-

markable document is weakened because some of the arguments it contains are technically and militarily flawed, and because its advocacy of deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing IIs in Western Europe is difficult to accommodate logically within Pierre Trudeau's broader strategy of


4/5

Perspectives

suffocation of the arms race.

To begin with, the Prime Minister's belief that the new Soviet weapons represent a new military danger for Western Europe seems unwarranted. The Soviet SS-20 missiles are essentially replacements for the older SS-4 and SS-5 intermediate-range weapons. The older missiles were inaccurate and so had large warheads: even if they would miss their targets their radius of destruction was so large that the devastation of the cities they were aimed at was assured. The SS-20s have much better accuracy and smaller warheads, and they can devastate their targets as assuredly as the older ones: operationally the two weapons systems are about the same. The only difference is that SS-20s are mobile, and can be moved on tracked vehicles from their barracks to prepared launch sites. The SS-4s and SS-5s were in fixed silos and therefore were more vulnerable to a pre-emptive NATO attack against them. So unless NATO were to be the first to initiate nuclear strikes in a war with the Eastern bloc by attacking the SS-4s and SS-5s (a pre-emption not as assuredly successful against SS-20s) the SS-20s possess no real advantage over the older missiles.

Since these new Soviet intermediate-range missiles are meant as a replacement for older weapons Trudeau should not be surprised that the Western publics have not protested their deployment. No one protested when the older Phantom F14 jets were replaced by the modern F-16 aircraft in the Western arsenals. In addition, since the SS-20s are replacements for an older system, to expect that the Soviets will totally withdraw them in exchange for the as yet non-deployed cruise missile and Pershing II may appear to them as a proposal for



unilateral reductions on their part. It is like insisting that the United States should not deploy any new ballistic missile submarines as the old Polaris boats are withdrawn.

The Prime Minister's belief that the cruise missile and Pershing II systems constitute militarily defensive systems and are politically necessary to display Western resolve is difficult to support with facts. Both are offensive weapons. They can be thought of as defensive only in as much as they contribute to the overall nuclear deterrence to a Soviet attack. But deterrence is amply provided by the spectrum of conventional, battlefield and intermediate-range nuclear systems deployed in NATO countries, the Poseidon ballistic missile submarines assigned to the NATO forces and the U.S. panoply of intercontinental strategic nuclear systems. Even the U.S. Undersecretary of

Defense Richard Perle has been reported as stating that these ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing IIs have no real military utility or significance. What is it that the Soviets can dare now that they wouldn't dare only when the cruise missiles and

Strategic Defense and Nuclear War

A two-day conference sponsored by Essex County College, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Rutgers-Newark Campus and the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey will be held at the New Jersey Institute of Technology in Newark on November 2 and 3, 1983.

The conference will bring together leaders from government, academe and the sciences who represent a cross-section of opinion and policy orientation. Experts on nuclear weapons technology, strategic policy and civil defense as well as leading advocates of arms control and nuclear disarmament are scheduled to participate.

For further information contact:
Wilma Needleman (201) 645-5541.



Kosta Tsipis is co-director of the Program in Science and Technology for International Security at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge (02139), a member of the Bulletin, board of director and special editor of the weapons tutorial series.

5/5

Perspectives



Dunlop, Canada

Pershing IIs were deployed in Europe? Thus these weapons cannot serve as the show of resolve that Trudeau correctly finds necessary.

Either the Soviet leadership is not impressed by the U.S. resolve displayed with the deployment of the MX and Trident II missiles, the B-1 bomber, the Stealth bomber and the long-range air-launched nuclear cruise missile (and then why would they be impressed by the deployment of a few hundred missiles of little, if any, military utility in Western Europe?) or they are already impressed, in which case the deployment of intermediate-range and cruise missiles in Europe is superfluous. It could be argued that this European deployment was necessary as a show of political will and U.S. solidarity with its NATO allies. Yet the opposite is happening! The alienation of substantial sections of the Western public with the military policies of their governments, which the plan to station new U.S. nuclear

The Bulletin presents a selection of Canadian political cartoons on pages 2 through 5. American readers may be surprised to find that north-of-the-border illustrators show as little mercy to their political figures as U.S. cartoonists show theirs.


The drawings are for illustration only and do not necessarily represent the editorial views of the Bulletin.

weapons in Europe has occasioned, is quite damaging to the image of Western resolve. Proceeding with the controversial deployment is not going to repair that damage.

The belief that no Soviet deployment should be left unanswered—even if it is in response to a U.S. deployment, even if it is a mere replacement of an older system—has led us to the very nuclear arms race that Trudeau has proposed to arrest with his strategy of suffocation. However, this courageous and imaginative strategy that proposes to nip new weapons in the research and development bud is incompatible with the nuclear-tit-for-nuclear-tat mentality, which constitutes the logical underpinning of the Prime Minister's advocacy for the deployment of nuclear missiles in Western Europe. To refuse Canadian participation in the further development and testing of a new nuclear weapons system would be exactly in accordance

with this strategy of suffocation of the arms race. Such refusal would have symbolic more than practical value and as such would strengthen Trudeau's hand in arguing in favor of his strategy of suffocation. It would also place Canada with Sweden and the other nuclear-capable countries that have decided not to enter the nuclear arms race at the vanguard of efforts to foster nuclear arms control agreements between the two nuclear superpowers, in order to achieve a stable nuclear peace.

Such refusal could indeed run counter to some economic and technological Canadian interests. It could also be seen as incompatible with the dictates of good neighborliness and solidarity with the United States. Yet there are higher practical and moral imperatives than being nice to one's neighbor. Arresting the nuclear arms race so as to lessen the probability of nuclear war is one of them. □



Griston, Canada



External Affairs / Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

MGTC/FILE/CIRC/CHRON/DIARY

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L CANADIAN EYES ONLY

41101 03 222 232 10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT PPR0368 04NOV83

TO/A

TO TOKYO DELIVER BY 050900

INFO

DISTR USS DMF PPD PPR IDD PGB **PCOOTT/FOWLER**

DISTR

REF

REF YOURTEL UIGR1883 04NOV83

SUBJ/SUJ

---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE:CONSULTATIONS WITH JPN

ALTHOUGH SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN TO POSSIBILITY OF PM VISIT TO JPN IN CONNECTION WITH PEACE INITIATIVE, NO/NO DECISIONS HAVE YET BEEN TAKEN IN THIS REGARD. WE WILL OF COURSE ^{INFORM} ADVISE YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OF ANY DEVELOPMENTS.

2. AT MTG WITH PGB EARLIER THIS WEEK JPNSE AMB REFERRED TO PMS PLANS TO VISIT EUROPE AND QUERIED WHETHER GOVT HAD GIVEN ANY THOUGHT TO CONSULTATION WITH JPN ON PEACE INITIATIVE. WE REPLIED THAT WE VALUED CONSULTATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH JPN AND THAT ALTHOUGH VISIT TO JPN AND CHINA BY PM IN CONTEXT OF PEACE INITIATIVE WOULD BE DESIRABLE IN PRINCIPLE, NO/NO FIRM DECISIONS HAD BEEN MADE.

~~WE~~ WE ADDED THAT ANY DECISION MIGHT HAVE TO AWAIT CONCLUSION OF PMS EUROPEAN VISIT. THERE WAS NO/NO DISCUSSION OF ANY SPECIFIC DATES AND CAN ONLY SPECULATE THAT AMB MAY HAVE SURMISED 20NOV ON BASIS OF OTHER INFO. IN FACT THERE HAS THUS FAR WITHIN GOVT BEEN ^{HYPOTHETICAL} ~~CONSIDERATION~~ CONSIDERATION OF DATES AROUND THAT TIME FOR POSSIBLE TRIP TO CHINA/JPN.

3. INCIDENTALLY, AMB MIKANAGI EXPRESSED VIEW THAT PM NAKASONE WOULD WELCOME VISIT BY PM TRUDEAU.

20-1-1-1

28-6-1

TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

Robert Grauer
SIG

ROBERT GRAUER/kh

PPR

7-7939

SIG

Philip Slyfield
PHILIP SLYFIELD 000009



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

MCTC/FILE/CIRC/CHRON/DIARY

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flècheSECURITY/
SÉCURITÉC O N F I D E N T I A L - ~~SECRET~~

CDN EYES ONLY

4 NOV 83 2021

012

10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT PPR0376 04NOV83

TO/À

TO TOKYO DELIVER BY 050900 TOKYO COMCENTRE ALERT DUTY OFFICER

INFO

DISTR

IMMEDIATELY

REF

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

SUBJ/SUJ

DISTR USS DMF PPD PGB IDD

REF OURTEL PPR0368 04NOV

20-1-1-1

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE:CONSULTATIONS WITH JPN

PM HAS DECIDED TO SEEK CONSULTATIONS WITH PM NAKASONE IN TOKYO

19NOV ON SUBJECT OF PEACE INITIATIVE.YOU SHOULD TAKE IMMED

ACTION TO SEEK JPNSE CONCURRENCE IN THIS PROPOSAL AND ADVISE BY

070900. OTT TIME.

2.PRESENT PLANS ENVISAGE PM ARRIVAL AT HANEDA/HANEDA 0930 19NOV AND

DEPARTING 1730 SAME DAY.PM WOULD LIKE TO SPEND TWO HOURS WITH

PM NAKASONE.

INFORM

PCO HOPES

3.WILL ~~ARRIVE~~ ASAP DETAILS OF ACCOMPANYING DEL. ~~WE ARE SEEKING~~ TO

HAVE MRS KONDO ACCOMPANY AS INTERPRETER.

4.OUR REQUIREMENT FOR RESPONSE BY 070900 IS DICTATED BY PMS

DEPARTURE FOR EUROPE 07NOV PM.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

ROBERT GRAUER/kh

PPR

7-7939

SIG

PHILIP SLYFIELD

000010



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

GTC/FILE/CIRC/CHRON/DIARY

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

51100 113 121 142 10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT PPR0370 04NOV83

TO/À

TO TOKYO *del by 070900*

INFO

~~INFO PC00TT/FOWLER PM00TT/AXWORTHY~~

DISTR

DISTR PGB PPD IDDZ

REF

SUBJ/SUJ

---PRIME MINISTERS INITIATIVE ON PEACE AND SECURITY

306514
~~28-6-1-TRUDEAU~~
PEACE MISSION

JPNSE EMB(ISHIGAKI,COUNSELLOR AND SUENAGA,SECOND SECTY)WAS BRIEFED BY CHAIRMAN OF TASK FORCE(DELVOIE)01NOV AFTERNOON.EMB WAS PROVIDED WITH COPY OF BACKGROUND BRIEFING NOTES ON GUELPH SPEECH (TRANSMITTED TO YOU BY TEL 26OCT).

2.FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY RECORD OF BRIEFING.

3.ISHIGAKI OPENED DISCUSSION BY INDICATING KEEN JPNSE INTEREST IN PROCESS INITIATED BY TRUDEAU AND ASKING WHEN PM DECIDED TO GO AHEAD WITH NEW INITIATIVE.IN RESPONSE DELVOIE EXPLAINED THAT CONCERN OF PM ON QUESTION OF INNATL PEACE GOES BACK CONSIDERABLE TIME.PM SPOKE OUT ON QUESTION AT UNSOD I IN 1978,AT UNSOD II IN 1982 AND LAST YEAR AT NOTRE DAME UNIVERSITY.AT WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT HE WORKED FOR DECLARATION OF SOLIDARITY ON PART OF INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES FOR COMMITMENT TO PEACE.MOST RECENTLY HIS CONCERNS WERE VOICED DURING VISIT OF PM THATCHER.IN MID SEP PM DECIDED TO SET UP TASK FORCE TO LOOK AT CURRENT SITUATION AND TO COME UP WITH OPTIONS.TASK FORCE HAS CONCLUDED ITS DELIBERATIONS ^{AND} HAS COME FORWARD WITH NUMBER OF OPTIONS FROM WHICH PM HAS SELECTED SOME.

WITH HIS GUELPH SPEECH PM HAS OPENED PROCESS OF RAISING PUBLIC

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

J.R. Lovett
SIG J.R. LOVETT/kh

PPR

4-2780

L.A. Delvoie
SIG L.A. DELVOIE(IDD)



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE TWO PPR0370 CONF D

12

10

AWARENESS AND SPARKING INCREASED DEBATE ON ISSUE. AT SAME TIME HE IS
CONSULTING WITH NUMBER OF WESTERN GOVTS TO SEE WHETHER HIS
PERCEPTIONS ARE SHARED AND ^{TO} GUAGE WHETHER HIS PROPOSAL MIGHT HAVE
~~MERIT AND~~ SUPPORT OF LEADERS IN UNBLOCKING CURRENT SITUATION. PM
WILL BE MAKING MORE SPEECHES ON QUESTION. ~~NEXT ONE IS PLANNED FOR~~
~~13 NOV AT LIBERAL PARTY MTG IN MONTREAL.~~ AS PART OF CONSULTATIVE
PROCESS PM WILL VISIT NEXT WEEK PARIS, BONN, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, ROME
AND LDN. AFTER THAT HE HOPES TO DISCUSS HIS CONCERNS AT CHOGM IN
NEW DELHI.

4. ~~ISHIGAKI QUERIED HOW LONG PMS EUROPEAN TOUR HAS BEEN PLANNED.~~
~~DELVOIE INDICATED SINCE MID-SEP AND PROVIDED DATES OF VISITS.~~
ISHIGAKI THEN QUERIED WHETHER OBJECTIVE OF VISITS IS SOLELY
CONSULTATIONS ON INITIATIVE OR COULD IT BE CONSIDERED AS GOOD WILL
AND OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE BILATERAL ISSUES. HE ASKED IF LEADERS HAVE
^{own} ~~SHOWN~~ EARLY RECEPTIVITY TO INITIATIVE. DELVOIE RESPONDED THAT
EUROVISITS ARE TO FOCUS SOLELY ON INITIATIVE - QUESTION OF E/W
RELATIONS AND INNATL/SECURITY/ARMS CONTROL - HE EMPHASIZED THAT
THESE ARE WORKING VISITS, NO/NO CEREMONIAL ASPECTS AND PM PARTY
WILL BE VERY SMALL (FOWLER, GARY SMITH AND PMO STAFF). ISHIGAKI
QUERIED WHETHER INITIATIVE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH SECTY STATE
SCHULTZ DURING RECENT MTG WITH DPM/SSEA AND IF THERE HAD BEEN
FORMAL USA REACTION. DELVOIE REPLIED THAT IT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED,
~~THAT LETTER HAD BEEN SENT TO PRES REAGAN BUT NO/NO FORMAL RESPONSE~~

...3



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE THREE PPR0370 CONF

12

10

YET.MESSAGES HAD BEEN SENT TO ALL NATO HEADS OF GOVT.ISHIGAKI
THEN QUERIED WHETHER MESSAGES HAVE BEEN SENT TO SOVIETS AND IF
VISITS TO MOSCOW AND WSHDC ARE PLANNED.DELVOIE STATED THAT MESSAGE
HAD NOT/NOT YET BEEN SENT TO MOSCOW AND THAT VISITS TO THERE AND
WSHDC ARE POSSIBILITY.IT WAS EMPHASIZED HOWEVER THAT PM WISHES TO
PURSUE HIS INITIATIVE ON EVOLUTIONARY BASIS.

5.ISHIGAKI REFERRED TO PRESS SPECULATION ABOUT INITIATIVE,VIEWS OF
SOME OF ALLIES,AND POSSIBLE DISAGREEMENT WITH^{IN} GOVT.DELVOIE RESPONDED
INDICATING HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THREE POINTS:(A)PM DOES NOT/NOT
ENVISAGE ANY SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY BETWEEN WSHDC AND MOSCOW OR ROLE AS
INTERMEDIARY.(B)PM DOES NOT/NOT INTEND TO INTERJECT HIMSELF IN
INF/SNF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SOVIETS AND AMERICANS.
(C)PM DOES NOT/NOT INTEND TO ADVOCATE THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH
POWERS BE INCLUDED IN INF TALKS.DELVOIE ADDED THAT IN HIS
INITIATIVE PM IS TAKING GLOBAL APPROACH TO QUESTION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS.HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION AND WANTS TO
DRAW MORE COUNTRIES INTO SAFEGUARD AGREEMENTS;HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT
VERTICAL PROLIFERATION - HE WANTS TO GET MORE COMPREHENSIVE
LIMITATIONS ON WEAPON BUILDUPS INVOLVING ALL FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS.
DELVOIE ADDED THAT PM WANTS TO GIVE SOME POLITICAL IMPETUS TO MBFR
TALKS IN VIENNA WHERE WE HAVE HAD TWO PROPOSALS ~~SINCE~~ ~~EASTERN~~ FROM
EASTERN EUROPE TO WHICH WEST HAS NOT/NOT RESPONDED.ANOTHER
~~OBJECTIVE-WAS-ALSO-TO-GIVE-POLITICAL-IMPETUS-AT SOON-TO-OPEN~~

...4



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE FOUR PPR0370 CONF D

12

10

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY MEASURES(CDE)CONF IN STOCKHOLM ON 17JAN.
6. ISHIGAKI SUGGESTED THAT INITIATIVE OF PM APPEARS TO BE GLOBAL
STRATEGY ENCOMPASSING NUMBER OF ARMS ISSUES. DELVOIE RESPONDED
POSITIVELY BUT STRESSED PM IS NOT/NOT CONCERNED WITH NUMBER
CRUNCHING OR WITH NUCLEAR ACCOUNTANCY. HE SEES PROBLEM AS POLITICAL
ONE.

7. ISHIGAKI ASKED ABOUT PMS VERY RECENT VISIT TO NY. DELVOIE SAID
THAT PM MET WITH HARVARD GROUP ON NUCLEAR ISSUES ~~AND~~ ^{AND} ROBERT MCNAMARA;
EARLIER HE HAD HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH ^{ROBERT MCNAMARA AND} GENERAL ROGERS, COMMANDER IN
^{IN EUROPE.} CHIEF OF NATO FORCES. IN RESPONSE TO MR ISHIGAKI'S QUESTION ABOUT
TIMEFRAME FOR PMS INITIATIVE, MR DELVOIE EXPLAINED THAT IT IS
LONG TERM. HE SUGGESTED THAT STALLED INF TALKS ^{AND UP COMING} ~~CONCERNING~~ DEPLOYMENT
OF MISSILES IN EUROPE ARE ALL SYMPTOMATIC OF PROBLEM. THE ROOTS OF
CURRENT EAST/WEST IMPASSE CAN BE TRACED BACK TO AFGHANISTAN, THROUGH
POLAND, PRES BRESHNEVS DEATH AND KOREAN AIRLINE INCIDENT. THROUGH
THESE INCIDENTS DANGER OF SUPERPOWERS MISREADING AND MISUNDERSTAND-
ING IS BECOMING GREATER AND GREATER. PM WANTS TO ^{ATTEMPT TO} ~~ARREST~~ THIS
PROCESS.

8. ~~IN RESPONSE TO DELVOIE'S COMMENTS, ISHIGAKI SUGGESTED THAT IF~~
~~INITIATIVE IS LONG TERM ENDEAVOUR, IT IS NOT/NOT ONLY GOAL FOR~~
~~PM HIMSELF BUT POLICY THAT CDA WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE. DELVOIE~~
~~RESPONDED THAT AT MOMENT IT IS PERSONAL INITIATIVE OF PM. HE FEELS~~
~~THAT TOO LITTLE IS BEING DONE (OR BEING HELD BACK) AT DIPLOMATIC~~

...5



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE FIVE PPR0370 CONFD

12

10

~~AND TECHNICAL LEVEL. WHAT IS NEEDED IS HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL~~
~~DIALOGUE.~~ ISHIGAKI THEN ASKED IF THERE HAD BEEN REACTION OF STATE
DEPT TO INITIATIVE AND IF PRES REAGAN HAD RESPONDED. DELVOIE
EXPLAINED THAT STATE DEPT HAD ^{PROVIDED SOME} ~~ISSUED~~ PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON
INITIATIVE BUT NOT/NOT SUBSTANTIVE POSITION. ~~THERE HAS BEEN SOME~~
~~CONFUSION ON THIS AND US EMB HERE ISSUED PRESS RELEASE ELABORATING~~
~~ON STATE DEPT STATEMENT.~~ REPLY FROM PRES REAGAN IS EXPECTED
SHORTLY.

9. ISHIGAKI THEN ASKED IF LETTER WOULD BE SENT TO CHINA AND USSR.
DELVOIE RESPONDED THAT FURTHER LETTERS WOULD GO OUT IN STAGES.
ISHIGAKI THEN TURNED TO QUESTION OF UN AND ROLE PM SAW FOR IT.
IN RESPONSE DELVOIE RECALLED THAT PM HAD PUT FORWARD STRATEGY
OF SUFFOCATION IN ^S UNSOD. HE CONTINUED THAT TASK FORCE HAD
IDENTIFIED ^A FEW AREAS THAT MIGHT BE PURSUED IN UN DISARMAMENT
FORUMS, FOR EXAMPLE OUTER SPACE. ~~DELVOIE STRESSED HOWEVER THAT~~
~~POINT OF DEPARTURE OF PM FOR HIS INITIATIVE IS IN NATO.~~

10. ISHIGAKI ASKED IF THERE HAVE BEEN REACTIONS FROM EUROPEAN
LEADERS ^{PRIME MINISTER} ~~WILL~~ VISIT. NOTHING FORMAL YET, DELVOIE INDICATED,
BUT PRELIMINARY REACTIONS OF SOME SENIOR OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN
POSITIVE. ISHIGAKI EXPRESSED DEEP APPRECIATION OF JPNSE FOR
BRIEFING AND WELCOMED OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT FURTHER ON
INITIATIVE. DELVOIE INDICATED THAT WE EXPECT TO CONSULT AGAIN
WITH JPNSE VERY SOON.



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

ETC/FILE/CIRC/CHRON/DIARY

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ CANADIAN EYES ONLY

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT PPR0368 04NOV83

TO/A

TO TOKYO DELIVER BY 050900

INFO

DISTR USS DMF PPD PPR IDD PGB

DISTR

REF

REF YOURTEL UIGR1883 04NOV83

SUBJ/SUJ

---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE:CONSULTATIONS WITH JPN

ALTHOUGH SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IS BEING GIVEN TO POSSIBILITY OF
PM VISIT TO JPN IN CONNECTION WITH PEACE INITIATIVE, NO/NO DECISIONS
HAVE YET BEEN TAKEN IN THIS REGARD. WE WILL OF COURSE ~~ADVISE~~ ^{INFORM} YOU
AS SOON AS POSSIBLE OF ANY DEVELOPMENTS.

2. AT MTG WITH PGB EARLIER THIS WEEK JPNSE AMB REFERRED TO PMS
PLANS TO VISIT EUROPE AND QUERIED WHETHER GOVT HAD GIVEN ANY
THOUGHT TO CONSULTATION WITH JPN ON PEACE INITIATIVE. WE REPLIED
THAT WE VALUED CONSULTATIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH JPN AND THAT ALTHOUGH
VISIT TO JPN AND CHINA BY PM IN CONTEXT OF PEACE INITIATIVE WOULD
BE DESIRABLE IN PRINCIPLE, NO/NO FIRM DECISIONS HAD BEEN MADE. ~~WE~~

~~THE S-RE-6-20~~ WE ADDED THAT ANY DECISION MIGHT HAVE TO AWAIT
CONCLUSION OF PMS EUROPEAN VISIT. THERE WAS NO/NO DISCUSSION OF ANY
SPECIFIC DATES AND CAN ONLY SPECULATE THAT AMB MAY HAVE SURMISED
20NOV ON BASIS OF OTHER INFO. IN FACT THERE HAS THUS FAR WITHIN
GOVT BEEN ^{HYPOTHETICAL} ~~BY-POSSIBLE~~ CONSIDERATION OF DATES AROUND THAT TIME
FOR POSSIBLE TRIP TO CHINA/JPN.

3. INCIDENTALLY, AMB MIKANAGI EXPRESSED VIEW THAT PM NAKASONE WOULD
WELCOME VISIT BY PM TRUDEAU.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

Robert Grauer
SIG

ROBERT GRAUER/kh

PPR

7-7939

SIG

Philip Slyfield
PHILIP SLYFIELD

000016


TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO Canadian Embassy

A

CONFIDENTIAL
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDDZ-0077 DATE Nov. 4/83

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<p>Ref Ourtel IDDZ0076 of Nov 3 - PM INITIATIVE</p> <p>Signed original letter from P.M. Trudeau to President Andropov</p> <p style="text-align: right;">28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION</p> <p style="text-align: center;">30-1-1-1</p> <div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 100px; margin: 0 auto; display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: center;"> <div style="width: 50px; height: 50px;"></div> <div style="width: 50px; height: 50px; text-align: center;">S</div> </div>	
<p>RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION</p> <p style="text-align: center;">  </p>		<p>RETURN TO / RETOURNER À</p> <p>G. Smith External Affairs (IDDZ) Ottawa</p>
DATE	SIGNATURE	



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

MGTC/FILE/CIRC/CHRON/DIARY

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flècheSECURITY/
SÉCURITÉCONFIDENTIAL - ~~SECRET~~

CDN EYES ONLY

4 NOV 83 232

012

10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT PPR0376 04NOV83

TO/À

TO TOKYO (DELIVER BY 050900 TOKYO COMCENTRE ALERT DUTY OFFICER)

INFO

DISTR

IMMEDIATELY


REF

INFO PC00TT/FOWLER

SUBJ/SUJ

DISTR USS DMF PPD PGB IDD

REF OURTEL PPR0368 04NOV



---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE:CONSULTATIONS WITH JPN

PM HAS DECIDED TO SEEK CONSULTATIONS WITH PM NAKASONE IN TOKYO

19NOV ON SUBJECT OF PEACE INITIATIVE.YOU SHOULD TAKE IMMED

ACTION TO SEEK JPNSE CONCURRENCE IN THIS PROPOSAL AND ADVISE BY

070900, OTT TIME.

2.PRESENT PLANS ENVISAGE PM ARRIVAL AT HANEDA/HANEDA 0930 19NOV AND

DEPARTING 1730 SAME DAY.PM WOULD LIKE TO SPEND TWO HOURS WITH

PM NAKASONE.

3.WILL ADVISE ASAP DETAILS OF ACCOMPANYING DEL. WE ARE SEEKING TO
HAVE MRS KONDO ACCOMPANY AS INTERPRETER.

4.OUR REQUIREMENT FOR RESPONSE BY 070900 IS DICTATED BY PMS

DEPARTURE FOR EUROPE 07NOV PM.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

ROBERT GRAUER/kh

PPR

7-7939

SIG

PHILIP SLYFIELD

External Affairs Affaires extérieures
Canada Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

GTC/FILE/CIRC/CHRON/DIARY

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ
CONFIDENTIAL

5 NOV 83 - 029 142 10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT PPR0370 04NOV83

TO/À TO TOKYO *del by 070900*

INFO ~~INFO PC00TT/FOWLER PM00TT/AXWORTHY~~

DISTR DISTR PGB PPD IDDZ

SUBJ/SUJ ---PRIME MINISTERS INITIATIVE ON PEACE AND SECURITY

*306514 28-6-1-TRUDEAU
20-1-1-1 PEACE
28-6-1 MISSION*

JPNSE EMB(ISHIGAKI,COUNSELLOR AND SUENAGA,SECOND SECTY)WAS
BRIEFED BY CHAIRMAN OF TASK FORCE(DELVOIE)01NOV AFTERNOON.EMB WAS
PROVIDED WITH COPY OF BACKGROUND BRIEFING NOTES ON GUELPH SPEECH
(TRANSMITTED TO YOU BY TEL 26OCT).

2.FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY RECORD OF BRIEFING.

3.ISHIGAKI OPENED DISCUSSION BY INDICATING KEEN JPNSE INTEREST
IN PROCESS INITIATED BY TRUDEAU AND ASKING WHEN PM DECIDED TO GO
AHEAD WITH NEW INITIATIVE.IN RESPONSE DELVOIE EXPLAINED THAT
CONCERN OF PM ON QUESTION OF INNATL PEACE GOES BACK CONSIDERABLE
TIME.PM SPOKE OUT ON QUESTION AT UNSOD I IN 1978,AT UNSOD II IN
1982 AND LAST YEAR AT NOTRE DAME UNIVERSITY.AT WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT
HE WORKED FOR DECLARATION OF ~~SOLIDARITY~~ ON PART OF INDUSTRIALIZED
COUNTRIES FOR COMMITMENT TO PEACE.MOST RECENTLY HIS CONCERNS WERE
VOICED DURING VISIT OF PM THATCHER.IN MID SEP PM DECIDED TO SET
UP TASK FORCE TO LOOK AT CURRENT SITUATION AND TO COME UP WITH
OPTIONS.TASK FORCE HAS CONCLUDED ITS DELIBERATIONS ^{AND} HAS COME
FORWARD WITH NUMBER OF OPTIONS FROM WHICH PM HAS SELECTED SOME.

WITH HIS GUELPH SPEECH PM HAS OPENED PROCESS OF RAISING PUBLIC

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG *J.R. Lovett*
J.R. LOVETT/kh

PPR

4-2780

SIG *L.A. Delvoie*
L.A.DELVOIE(IDD)

Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE TWO PPR0370 CONF

12

10

AWARENESS AND SPARKING INCREASED DEBATE ON ISSUE. AT SAME TIME HE IS
CONSULTING WITH NUMBER OF WESTERN GOVTS TO SEE WHETHER HIS
PERCEPTIONS ARE SHARED AND ^{TO} GUAGE WHETHER HIS PROPOSAL MIGHT HAVE
~~MERIT AND~~ SUPPORT OF LEADERS IN UNBLOCKING CURRENT SITUATION. PM
WILL BE MAKING MORE SPEECHES ON QUESTION. ~~NEXT ONE IS PLANNED FOR~~
~~13 NOV AT LIBERAL PARTY MTG IN MONTREAL.~~ AS PART OF CONSULTATIVE
PROCESS PM WILL VISIT NEXT WEEK PARIS, BONN, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, ROME
AND LDN. AFTER THAT HE HOPES TO DISCUSS HIS CONCERNS AT CHOGM IN
NEW DELHI.

4. ~~ISHIGAKI QUERIED HOW LONG PMS EUROPEAN TOUR HAS BEEN PLANNED.~~
~~DELVOIE INDICATED SINCE MID-SEP AND PROVIDED DATES OF VISITS.~~
ISHIGAKI THEN QUERIED WHETHER OBJECTIVE OF VISITS IS SOLELY
CONSULTATIONS ON INITIATIVE OR COULD IT BE CONSIDERED AS GOOD WILL
AND OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE BILATERAL ISSUES. HE ASKED IF LEADERS HAVE
SHOWN ^{ov} EARLY RECEPTIVITY TO INITIATIVE. DELVOIE RESPONDED THAT
EUROVISITS ARE TO FOCUS SOLELY ON INITIATIVE - QUESTION OF E/W
RELATIONS AND INNATL/SECURITY/ARMS CONTROL - HE EMPHASIZED THAT
THESE ARE WORKING VISITS, NO/NO CEREMONIAL ASPECTS AND PM PARTY
WILL BE VERY SMALL (FOWLER, GARY SMITH AND PMO STAFF). ISHIGAKI
QUERIED WHETHER INITIATIVE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH SECTY STATE
SCHULTZ DURING RECENT MTG WITH DPM/SSEA AND IF THERE HAD BEEN
FORMAL USA REACTION. DELVOIE REPLIED THAT IT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED,
~~THAT LETTER HAD BEEN SENT TO PRES REAGAN BUT NO/NO FORMAL RESPONSE~~

...3

Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE THREE PPR0370 CONF D

121

10

YET.MESSAGES HAD BEEN SENT TO ALL NATO HEADS OF GOVT.ISHIGAKI
THEN QUERIED WHETHER MESSAGES HAVE BEEN SENT TO SOVIETS AND IF
VISITS TO MOSCOW AND WSHDC ARE PLANNED.DELVOIE STATED THAT MESSAGE
HAD NOT/NOT YET BEEN SENT TO MOSCOW AND THAT VISITS TO THERE AND
WSHDC ARE POSSIBILITY.IT WAS EMPHASIZED HOWEVER THAT PM WISHES TO
PURSUE HIS INITIATIVE ON EVOLUTIONARY BASIS.

5.ISHIGAKI REFERRED TO PRESS SPECULATION ABOUT INITIATIVE,VIEWS OF
SOME OF ALLIES,AND POSSIBLE DISAGREEMENT WITH^{IN} GOVT.DELVOIE RESPONDED
INDICATING HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THREE POINTS:(A)PM DOES NOT/NOT
ENVISAGE ANY SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY BETWEEN WSHDC AND MOSCOW OR ROLE AS
INTERMEDIARY.(B)PM DOES NOT/NOT INTEND TO INTERJECT HIMSELF IN
INF/SNF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SOVIETS AND AMERICANS.
(C)PM DOES NOT/NOT INTEND TO ADVOCATE THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH
POWERS BE INCLUDED IN INF TALKS.DELVOIE ADDED THAT IN HIS
INITIATIVE PM IS TAKING GLOBAL APPROACH TO QUESTION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS.HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION AND WANTS TO
DRAW MORE COUNTRIES INTO SAFEGUARD AGREEMENTS;HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT
VERTICAL PROLIFERATION - HE WANTS TO GET MORE COMPREHENSIVE
LIMITATIONS ON WEAPON BUILDUPS INVOLVING ALL FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS.
DELVOIE ADDED THAT PM WANTS TO GIVE SOME POLITICAL IMPETUS TO MBFR
TALKS IN VIENNA WHERE WE HAVE HAD TWO PROPOSALS ~~SINCE~~ ^{SINCE} ~~EASTERN~~ FROM
EASTERN EUROPE TO WHICH WEST HAS NOT/NOT RESPONDED.ANOTHER

~~OBJECTIVE-WAS-ALSO TO GIVE POLITICAL IMPETUS-AT SOON-TO-OPEN - - -~~

...4

Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE FOUR PPR0370 CONF D

12

10

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY MEASURES(CDE)CONF IN STOCKHOLM ON 17JAN.

6. ISHIGAKI SUGGESTED THAT INITIATIVE OF PM APPEARS TO BE GLOBAL
STRATEGY ENCOMPASSING NUMBER OF ARMS ISSUES. DELVOIE RESPONDED

POSITIVELY BUT STRESSED PM IS NOT/NOT CONCERNED WITH NUMBER
CRUNCHING OR WITH NUCLEAR ACCOUNTANCY. HE SEES PROBLEM AS POLITICAL
ONE.

7. ISHIGAKI ASKED ABOUT PMS VERY RECENT VISIT TO NY. DELVOIE SAID

THAT PM MET WITH HARVARD GROUP ON NUCLEAR ISSUES. ~~AND ROBERT MCNAMARA;~~
ROBERT MCNAMARA AND
EARLIER HE HAD HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH ~~GENERAL ROGERS,~~ COMMANDER IN
IN EUROPE.
CHIEF OF NATO FORCES. IN RESPONSE TO MR ISHIGAKI'S QUESTION ABOUT

TIMEFRAME FOR PMS INITIATIVE, MR DELVOIE EXPLAINED THAT IT IS
LONG TERM. HE SUGGESTED THAT STALLED INF TALKS ~~CONCERNING~~ *AND UPCOMING* DEPLOYMENT
OF MISSILES IN EUROPE ARE ALL SYMPTOMATIC OF PROBLEM. THE ROOTS OF
CURRENT EAST/WEST IMPASSE CAN BE TRACED BACK TO AFGHANISTAN, THROUGH
POLAND, PRES BRESHNEVS DEATH AND KOREAN AIRLINE INCIDENT. THROUGH
THESE INCIDENTS DANGER OF SUPERPOWERS MISREADING AND MISUNDERSTAND-
ING IS BECOMING GREATER AND GREATER. PM WANTS TO ~~ARREST~~ *ATTEMPT TO* THIS
PROCESS.

~~8. IN RESPONSE TO DELVOIE'S COMMENTS, ISHIGAKI SUGGESTED THAT IF
INITIATIVE IS LONG TERM ENDEAVOUR, IT IS NOT/NOT ONLY GOAL FOR~~
CAN BE CONSIDERED

~~PM HIMSELF BUT POLICY THAT CDA WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE. DELVOIE
RESPONDED THAT AT MOMENT IT IS PERSONAL INITIATIVE OF PM. HE FEELS
THAT TOO LITTLE IS BEING DONE OR BEING HELD BACK AT DIPLOMATIC~~

...5

Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE FIVE PPR0370 CONFD

12

10

~~AND TECHNICAL LEVEL. WHAT IS NEEDED IS HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL~~
~~DIALOGUE.~~ ISHIGAKI THEN ASKED IF THERE HAD BEEN REACTION OF STATE
DEPT TO INITIATIVE AND IF PRES REAGAN HAD RESPONDED. DELVOIE
EXPLAINED THAT STATE DEPT HAD ^{PROVIDED SOME} ~~ISSUED~~ PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON
INITIATIVE BUT NOT/NOT SUBSTANTIVE POSITION. ~~THERE HAS BEEN SOME~~
~~CONFUSION ON THIS AND US EMB HERE ISSUED PRESS RELEASE ELABORATING~~
~~ON STATE DEPT STATEMENT.~~ REPLY FROM PRES REAGAN IS EXPECTED
SHORTLY.

9. ISHIGAKI THEN ASKED IF LETTER WOULD BE SENT TO CHINA AND USSR.
DELVOIE RESPONDED THAT FURTHER LETTERS WOULD GO OUT IN STAGES.
ISHIGAKI THEN TURNED TO QUESTION OF UN AND ROLE PM SAW FOR IT.
IN RESPONSE DELVOIE RECALLED THAT PM HAD PUT FORWARD STRATEGY
OF SUFFOCATION IN UNSOD. HE CONTINUED THAT TASK FORCE HAD
IDENTIFIED ^A FEW AREAS THAT MIGHT BE PURSUED IN UN DISARMAMENT
^A FORUMS, FOR EXAMPLE OUTER SPACE. ~~DELVOIE STRESSED HOWEVER THAT~~
~~POINT OF DEPARTURE OF PM FOR HIS INITIATIVE IS IN NATO.~~

10. ISHIGAKI ASKED IF THERE HAVE BEEN REACTIONS FROM EUROPEAN
^{PRIME MINISTER} LEADERS ~~REAGAN~~ WILL VISIT. NOTHING FORMAL YET, DELVOIE INDICATED
BUT PRELIMINARY REACTIONS OF SOME SENIOR OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN
POSITIVE. ISHIGAKI EXPRESSED DEEP APPRECIATION OF JPNSE FOR
BRIEFING AND WELCOMED OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT FURTHER ON
INITIATIVE. DELVOIE INDICATED THAT WE EXPECT TO CONSULT AGAIN
WITH JPNSE VERY SOON.



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

5 Nov 83 031242 10

SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE

EXTOTT IDDZ0080 04NOV83

TO/À

TO BONN < DELIVER BY 070900

INFO

INFO PM00TT/JOHNSON

DISTR

REF

---PM S VISIT TO BONN

SUBJ/SUJ

MANY THANKS, BUT FOR REASONS OF EASE OF TRANSPORTATION, PM WILL STAY
AT HOTEL WITH REST OF DEL.

28-6-1-^{Hudson} Peace Mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. HARLICK

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I A L	28-6-1-1 Trudeau Mission 5 NOV 83 03 12 42	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0079 04NOV83		
TO/A	TO CNBRA		
INFO			
DISTR	INFO LDN PARIS BONN ROME HAGUE <u>DELHI</u> BRU WSHDC BNATO WLGTN MOSCO PCOOTT/		
REF	FOWLER		
SUBJ/SUJ	DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RBR IDD IDA IDR RBD PPR PGB		
	---PM INITIATIVE AND CHOGM:AUSTRALIAN VIEWS		
	AUSTRALIAN HIGHCOM HAS INDICATED TO SHENSTONE(IFB) THAT AUSTRALIAN		
	PM WELCOMES PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE AND WOULD BE HAPPY TO HELP WITH-		
	OUT GETTING IN WAY OR GRANDSTANDING(AS PM FRASER MIGHT HAVE DONE,		
	ACCORDING TO HIGHCOM).THEY HAVE HEARD THAT WE SEE CHOGM AS PLAYING		
	PART IN DEVELOPMENT OF HIS INITIATIVE AND ARE ANXIOUS TO HEAR WHAT		
	WE HAVE IN MIND.THEY HAVE GAINED IMPRESSION THAT PM TRUDEAU HAD		
	SPECIFICALLY ASKED FOR OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE LEAD IN DISCUSSION OF		
	EAST-WEST RELATIONS AT CHOGM AND THAT WE ARE THINKING SERIOUSLY OF		
	PROMOTING A CHOGM QUOTE DECLARATION OF NEW DELHI UNQUOTE DIRECTED		
	TO QUOTE DISARMAMENT,PEACE AND INNATL SECURITY UNQUOTE.THEY WELCOME		
	IDEA OF SUCH A DECLARATION AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO COOPERATE IN		
	PROMOTING IT BUT ARE CAUTIOUS ABOUT TAKING LEAD ON INCORPORATING IN		
	DECLARATION IDEAS SUCH AS URGENT NEED TO RESHAPE EAST-WEST RELNS		
	AND IMPROVE BASIS OF COMMUNICATION AND DIALOGUE BETWEEN USA AND		
	SOVIET UNION IN INTERESTS OF CWLTH COUNTRIES AND WORLD COMMUNITY.		
	THEY THINK THIS SHOULD BE FOR PM TRUDEAU AS NATO LEADER TO PROVIDE		
	LEAD ON.HOWEVER,PM HAWKE HAS BEEN ASKED BY CWLTH SECRETARIAT TO		
	...2		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

IFB/M.Shenstone/jpt/sc

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG

SIG

L.A.Delyoie



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE TWO IDDZ0079 CONF D

12

10

DISCUSS DISARMAMENT AT CHOGM.

2.WE TOLD HIGHCOM THAT OUR CURRENT THINKING WAS NOT/NOT QUITE AS THEY HAD HEARD.OUR PM HAD NOT/NOT ASKED TO INTRODUCE CHOGM DISCUSSION OF WORLD POLITICAL DISCUSSION BUT HAD BEEN REQUESTED TO DO SO BY RAMPHAL AND MRS GANDHI HAD CONCURRED.IT WAS PROBABLE THAT IN HIS STATEMENT PM WOULD EMPHASIZE EAST-WEST AND ARMS CONTROL THEMES AS IN HIS GUELPH SPEECH AND HE WOULD NO/NO DOUBT BE TALKING BILATERALLY TO OTHER LEADERS AT CHOGM IN SAME SENSE AS PART OF GENERAL PROCESS OF SENSITIZING KEY MEMBERS OF WORLD COMMUNITY TO DANGERS OF CURRENT EAST-WEST SITUATION,NEED FOR POLITICAL QUOTE THIRD RAIL UNQUOTE,ETC. WHILE WE WOULD NATURALLY HOPE THAT CHOGM COMMUNIQUE WOULD REFLECT SOME OF THESE THEMES,PM HAD INDICATED PUBLICLY AT CONCLUSION OF MELBOURNE CHOGM THAT HE DID NOT/NOT ATTACH MUCH IMPORTANCE TO TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE.IN OUR VIEW PRONOUNCEMENTS IN CHOGM COMMUNIQUE AND SEPARATE DECLARATIONS,EG QUOTE MELBOURNE DECLARATION UNQUOTE ON NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES,TENDED TO BE SOON FORGOTTEN.

3.ACCORDINGLY WE HAD NOT/NOT BEEN DEVOTING ANY SERIOUS THOUGHT TO A DECLARATION OF NEW DELHI.IF AUSTRALIANS HAD SPECIFIC IDEAS FOR SUCH A DOCUMENT,WE WOULD BE GLAD TO CONSIDER THEM BUT WE HAD LITTLE INTEREST IN A QUOTE MOTHERHOOD UNQUOTE TEXT,HOWEVER GRANDILOQUENT, WHICH DID NOT/NOT SERIOUSLY TACKLE IMPORTANT AND DIFFICULT ISSUES. PM HAD INDICATED IN GUELPH STATEMENT THAT AMONG ELEMENTS OF QUOTE STRATEGY OF POLITICAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING UNQUOTE WHICH WE WOULD BE

...3



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE THREE IDZ0079 CONFD

12

10

LOOKING AT, WAS QUOTE WAYS TO ARREST PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS UNQUOTE BUT GIVEN POSITIONS OF HOST COUNTRY AND SEVERAL
OTHER KEY CWLTH MEMBERS ON NPT WE HAD NOT/NOT YET FIXED ON HOW THIS
MIGHT BE ADDRESSED.

4. WE INDICATED TO AUSTRALIANS THAT WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS
MATTER WITH THEM FURTHER AFTER PM RETURNS FROM EUROPE NOV 11, BY WHICH
TIME HIS OWN THINKING ON CHOGM WOULD HAVE ADVANCED FURTHER. IT WOULD
BE HIGHLY DESIRABLE TO COMPARE NOTES IN ADVANCE IF CDN AND AUSTRAL-
IAN PMS WERE GOING TO ADDRESS SIMILAR THEMES AT CHOGM.

5. AUSTRALIANS MAY SEND THEIR AMBASSADOR FOR DISARMAMENT (RICHARD
BUTLER) UP FROM NYORK TO TALK TO US ABOUT THIS SUBJ DURING WEEK OF
NOV 14. HE IS APPARENTLY CLOSE TO AUSTRALIAN PM AND FM.

28-6-1-1-1
4.
Bureau Peace
Mission

CONFIDENTIAL

November 4, 1983

IDDZ-0078

MEMORANDUM TO MR. FOWLER

Initiative: Next Speech

As you know, it had been our intention to begin the process of eliciting media and public interest in the next "Initiative Speech", both in Canada and abroad, very early next week. In view of the uncertainties which now exist as to whether or not the Prime Minister will give the speech in Montreal on November 13, I have taken steps to postpone all promotional activities until the situation becomes clearer.

André Burelle is producing a third draft of the speech which will reflect our most recent discussions with the PM. Gary Smith will have a couple of copies of this draft with him on the trip to Europe, and you and he may wish to work on it further, in consultation with the PM, on the return journey. Should the PM finally decide that he did not wish to give this speech to the Liberal Party gathering in Montreal, you might wish to explore with him one of the following possibilities (listed in descending order of merit from the perspective of the Task Force):

- (a) an alternate speech venue
- (b) a statement on motions in the House, as soon as feasible after his return from Europe, perhaps accompanied by short TV interviews
- (c) a full-blown statement or interview on national TV, both French and English
- (d) a televised press conference

L. A. Delvoie

L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

cc: PCO/Mr. Osbaldeston
EA/Mr. Shenstone
DND/Mr. Anderson

November 4th, 1983.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

FROM: Ivan L. Head

SUBJECT: Nuclear Arms Limitations - III

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
Mission
6-1

Herewith the draft speech material as discussed on the telephone. In length, it has grown into a full speech text and can be utilized, if it appeals to you, in its entirety without more.

Reference is made, in a guarded way, to the confidence building proposals (side-barred at pp 5-9). A brief recapitulation of the Canadian Armed Forces withdrawal from nuclear roles is joined to a summation of modern conventional equipment purchases (side-barred at pp 11-13). The verification proposal, in draft with blanks, contains a touch of technical language to meet the personal knowledge credibility issue about which we spoke (side-barred at pp 14-15).

A copy has been sent to Bob Fowler.

ILL

Less than 40 years have passed since the conclusion of World War II, yet in that relatively brief period the world has been witness to a cascade of technological events: some of extraordinary accomplishment, some of terrifying potential, all of them to be marvelled at. We have adjusted our lives to accommodate microwave ovens, colour television, and cordless telephones. We accept as routine earth-orbiting satellites, industrial lasers, and recombinant DNA. Our every-day existence is vastly different than it was even a quarter of a century ago, and much as we effect a nostalgia for the "good old" days, few of us would willingly give up the new comforts that are now part of our routine lives.

Advances on the dark side of the sciences have been equally as breath-taking. Sophisticated weapons scarcely even dreamed of a few years ago are now deployed, ready for action, some pointed at us, some pointed away. The accuracy of guidance systems permits a tiny target to be struck by a rocket launched thousands of miles distant. The explosive force of a large nuclear warhead is now 30,000 times greater than that of the atomic bomb which obliterated Nagasaki, itself the most powerful bomb ever detonated in the history of war.

- 2 -

Our adjustment to these changes has not been adequate. We continue to think that military strength is automatically equated to security. We continue to define deterrence in terms no longer logical. We fail to understand that today the utmost strength coincides with the utmost vulnerability. In these terms - military terms - the "good old" days were immeasurably better, for there was then some likelihood that military arsenals could be kept in balance; some confidence that weapons-systems would act as reliable deterrents.

That is no longer the case.

There is a considerable psychological element to a deterrent. One's adversary must take it seriously, must regard it as formidable, must believe that it is for defence. And there, of course, lies the rub. Uncounted wars have been launched by defensive units. Likely still greater numbers have been launched as pre-emptive strikes, because of apprehension that the other side's strength would be employed offensively. Luxembourg was once the strongest fortress in Western Europe. It was designed and built solely for the defence of that Duchy against outsiders. Yet times in centuries it was destroyed by outsiders who feared that it represented a security threat against them.

- 3 -

In Grecian times, elaborate rules dictated the formations employed by sailing vessels as they approached an alien coast. Certain formations were peaceful, others hostile, and shore defences were able to respond accordingly. Deceptive uses of formations were a breach of international law, and the subject of later arbitration.

Mistakes which contribute to war have always been tragic because of the suffering and destruction that has ensued. Yet in Grecian times, in medieval times, and even in recent times, those mistakes were capable of remedy. Troy was rebuilt several times. So was Luxembourg. The Coventry Cathedral has been replaced. Dresden, too. Even the introduction in this century of the hitherto unknown concepts of total war and absolute surrender did not precipitate irremedial destruction. Slowly and painfully, societies could extricate themselves from the rubble, and begin again.

The advent of nuclear weapons has changed that. The commencement of a nuclear war would set in train a sequence of irreversible consequences. It would lead to irremedial harm. For the first time in the history of mankind, there would be no recovery. Every reputable study concludes that all biological

- 4. -

life on this planet would be in peril. The brilliant accomplishments of seven millennia of poets and architects, musicians and scholars, theologians and artists, would forever be destroyed. The genius of humankind would be extinguished, quite possibly forever.

It is against this setting that concepts of security and defence and deterrence must be considered. The defenders of Troy received two years warning of the invasion preparations of the avenging Greeks. An intermediate range ballistic missile can speed across Europe, eastward or westward, from launch site to target, in ten minutes.

The accuracy and destructive force of these missiles virtually guarantees that the side which first launches them will destroy much of the other side's retaliatory capacity. The old, relatively stable concept of second - or retaliatory - strike capacity has now disappeared. Neither side can permit the other to strike first. Each side must anticipate the intentions of the other. And each has less than 10 minutes to come to a decision.

This kind of force posture is madness. If military theorists have brought us to this position, they must be instructed to edge us away. If political leaders are responsible, we must quickly begin to set a reverse course. The

- 5 -

present hair-trigger circumstances East and West, with the destruction of civilization the guaranteed result, must give way to stable, reliable defence systems. Such systems must consist of two major elements: deterrence and reassurance. Deterrence is the effective discouragement of resort to war; the knowledge that the commencement of hostilities will result in a military response which would inflict unacceptable punishment. Reassurance is the maintenance of self-confidence within each military alliance that one's own and one's adversary's military strength is adequate and is intended for defence, not for attack.

The current introduction of destabilizing weapons systems has interfered with the balance between deterrence and reassurance. It places us all now in a peril of incalculable proportions. A way out must be found and taken, step by cautious step. These steps must reflect certain shared concerns, must seek a broadened common cause, as perilous circumstances have always in the past demanded.

The markings of a great period of history are always found in the appearance of fresh understandings, in the extension of common cause. Men and women worldwide look back to the Golden Age of Athens as one such period. Another was that occasion in 1945 when representatives of half a hundred different governments

- 6. -

agreed on a number of universal values and exchanged with one another a complex of confidences that, no matter how much they disagreed on day to day issues, would remain in effect without exception and would serve to support a global structure based on order, not on war. Those understandings extended to an agreement that international peace and security was desirable and attainable; that the dignity and worth of the human person was a principle beyond controversy, to be pursued and upheld through international cooperation; that social progress and better standards of life were goals common to all; that nations should practice tolerance one to the other and live together as good neighbours. The network of trust was completed by mechanisms designed to ventilate differences, and to arbitrate disputes.

In the almost four decades since that compact was signed, half a hundred further nations joined the first 50, adhering to a community of shared goals and purposes; and then a half hundred more; and then another seven. A total of 157 countries now supports this litany of human aspirations which is the Charter of the United Nations. Yet in all too many instances there is an absence of the confidence and trust which is the essential lubricant for the effective functioning of the international system it created.

- 7 -

The shared knowledge of universal peril - from nuclear war, from environmental degradation, from economic stagnation - has not yet been sufficient to introduce into the global dialogue an element of trust or confidence adequate to permit a shared dedication to problem solving. There is not yet present in the international community a rule similar to that in Parliament where Members are not permitted to impute to one another dishonourable motives; where Members even in the most intense heat of debate are not permitted to challenge the rulings of the Chair.

It would be naive to expect, in a world with interests so diverse, that some sort of common parliamentary procedure might evolve in a single generation, or that accepted fora for international decision-taking and dispute settlement would easily be found.

Equally, however, it would be foolhardy in the extreme to assume that in this age of irreversible error, differences will somehow dissipate short of the point of no return. Yet I fear that that assumption is all too widespread. It is fostered by a belief that today's issues are of such extraordinary complexity that only a handful of experts are capable of addressing them. We are asked to believe that a few hundred high

- 8 -

priests of nuclear strategy, residing in a handful of countries, having weened their leaders and their industries from nuclear to thermo-nuclear warheads, from liquid to solid fuel propellants, from single to multiple delivery vehicles, from weapons that are deterrents to ones that challenge survival - that in these persons must we place our faith for the future of humankind. That proposal is preposterous and is increasingly under challenge by millions of persons worldwide who, like me, recognize that our security has been diminished, not enhanced, by the accomplishments of a generation of scientists and technologists encouraged to perfect instruments of human annihilation.

Tragically, the international climate at this moment discloses precious little evidence of confidence and trust between East and West. Yet there exists without question elements of common cause of immediate importance to each side. Neither side, obviously, desires annihilation. Each side, already, has declared that in its judgement a nuclear war cannot be won; that every effort must be devoted to ensuring the avoidance of nuclear hostilities. Both NATO and Warsaw Pact understand the need for the reduction of dangers now posed by mishap or miscalculation, of the need for enhanced techniques of crisis management. Each realizes the dangerous trend of destabilizing weapons systems and knows that a deterrent must

- 9 -

deter, not provoke. Each subscribes to a condemnation of the current climate of unwholesome and debilitating fear. Each supports a pluralistic international community.

This small catalogue of modest commitments bears little resemblance to the lofty expression of sense and purpose found in the U.N. Charter or in any number of great constitutional documents. Nevertheless, these commitments are as basic as life itself. And in a period when life itself is threatened on a global scale, when events anywhere are viewed increasingly as evidence of global challenge, when hostility and potential aggression are perceived with increasing frequency, perhaps it is necessary to begin again with the basics. Perhaps by so doing, the esoteric theoreticians and games players can be instructed to reverse course and to take us away from the edge of this bottomless chasm on which we now teeter, pretending that our precariousness is really security, that our imbalance is a necessary ingredient in our survival.

Canadians claim no special status in their endeavour to inject into this chilling fog the warmth of political stimulus. Quite the contrary. We claim only to be human beings, individuals who have been enriched immeasurably by the contributions of generations past, who aspire with modesty for a

- 10 -

dignified life for our children, who depend for our livelihood and our tranquility upon the natural environment that we have alternatively challenged and cherished for centuries. We are recognized by others as living in an admired way, as having succeeded in moulding a pluralistic society that embraces widespread differences springing from disparities in culture, language, geography, and ideology. We are known to be a pacific people; yet none would dare suggest we are pacifist. It is our balance between these two qualities that permits us, as members of an imperilled human race, to implore others to recognize survival as a noble and challenging quest, to accept the proposition that human dignity is a multi-faceted and highly desirable goal, to lend to discussion and negotiation at least the same urgency and the same resources that are now dedicated to armament acquisition and military planning.

This quest of Canada is no more than another step in a continuum of international activity that has marked our international posture for almost three quarters of a century. At the conclusion of World War I Canada insisted on the right to participate in the peace conference that led to the Treaty of Versailles - insisted against the resistance of major powers who had accepted with eagerness our contribution to war but were much less willing to hear our contribution to peace. Canada was a

- 11 -

member of the League of Nations; Canada earned the right in World War II to be a major actor in the negotiations at Bretton Woods and at Dumbarton Oaks and at Quebec City that led to the creation of the World Bank, and the United Nations, and the Food and Agriculture Organization; Canadians have participated in major U.N. peacemaking and peacekeeping operations in Asia, the Middle East, central Africa and the eastern Mediterranean; Canada has been elected four times to serve as a member of the Security Council; Canada has been one of the primary contributors to the creation of international legal regimes of the environment and of the oceans. Canadian foreign policy has consistently advocated universality in the international community as Prime Minister Diefenbaker demonstrated with respect to Cuba, Prime Ministers St. Laurent and Pearson argued with respect to a host of applicants for admission to the U.N, and as my government established with the recognition of the People's Republic of China and its acceptance as a permanent member of the Security Council.

Canada is a steadfast and dependable member of two regional security organizations - NATO and NORAD. In NATO, we are one of only three members (out of 15) that station armed forces permanently outside its borders; we are one of only two members that discharge responsibilities in two continents and the

- 12 -

ocean between. To NORAD, Canada contributes an element of priceless and irreplaceable value: the airspace above its vast territory. The United States is able to look northward to the Soviet Union, and to design its air defence perimeters, confident in the knowledge that for 4,000 kilometres the land mass is occupied by a politically stable ally, one that has been its sole continental defence partner for more than 43 years - since the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940.

We take seriously our defence commitments and are dedicated to the North Atlantic Treaty in its entirety, inclusive of those clauses that spell out reaffirmation of "the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations", the resolution to "the preservation of peace and security", and the promotion of "conditions of stability and well-being." In 1969, Canada indicated to its NATO allies that stability in Europe, in our opinion, would be promoted by a reduction in the numbers of nuclear warheads, and proposed that the Canadian air element withdraw from the nuclear strike role and that the Canadian artillery batteries be relieved of their Honest John munitions in favour of conventional arms. Canada argued its case strenuously against, I readily admit, strong opposition from some other members. In the result, however, NATO accepted the Canadian position, the first significant step in an alliance strategy that

- 13 -

became fully formulated by United States Secretary of Defence James Schlesinger in 1975 and given the formal title of "Raising the Nuclear Threshold". Canada stated in 1969 that it would re-arm its CF-104s with conventional weaponry, and it did. It stated that it would re-organize its artillery batteries, and it did. It stated as well that it would replace the air-to-air nuclear-tipped Genie missiles from its NORAD interceptor aircraft as soon as could be done without reducing the effectiveness of our continental commitments. The current phasing out of the CF-101s and their replacements by CF-18s will shortly be completed at which time Canada will have completed the transformation of its armed forces from nuclear to conventional weaponry.

Since 1968, Canada has transformed its Armed Forces' long range air transport fleet from propellers to jets, has replaced entirely its fleet of long range patrol aircraft dedicated to ASW to the most modern in the world, has equipped its armoured brigades with the highly acclaimed Leopard tank, has replaced its armoured personnel carriers, is now phasing in state of the art tactical and interceptor aircraft, and has commenced a new patrol frigate program for the maritime element. All of this the most modern equipment available. All of it armed with conventional munitions. All of it tasked to defensive purposes. All of it consistent with Canada's dedication to peacekeeping activities, including our standby U.N. battalion.

000042

- 14 -

I continue to believe, and I am confident that the majority of Canadians agree with me, that the best defence against war, however, is not the acquisition of weaponry but the removal of the causes of war. Among those are economic insecurity and political instability in the Third World. As its contribution to the alleviation of these factors, Canada has been a major contributor - on a per capita basis always in the upper half of all OECD contributors since 1968. It is pledged to do even better.

Suspicion and mistrust which have so often in the past been another cause of war require painstaking attention in a number of ways. Political will is one element and this I have spoken about. Another, in the space age, is the costly, highly technical development of verification techniques and procedures. An immense amount of dedicated research is necessary to permit countries to assure themselves that arms-control treaty provisions are being honoured. This research must be directed both to warhead technology and delivery systems technology. It must encourage more effective sensors of a broad variety - short range, remote and seismic. It must address itself to monitoring and analysis procedures, to on-site inspection procedures, to information exchange systems, to legal regimes embracing complaint mechanisms, review conferences and control procedures.

- 15 -

The multi-faceted verification field is every bit as complex, as challenging, and as necessary as is the development of an adequate defence posture. Yet in the long term it will unquestionably contribute more to security and to peace.

Verification is an activity to which the Government of Canada has dedicated a major effort. I am able to reveal tonight that an additional sum of \$ _____ will be made available to this activity over the next _____ years, bringing the total by 198_ to \$ _____.

Canada is a world leader in the development of remote-sensing technology. Few countries have greater experience in the application, for mining and hydrocarbon exploration purposes, of seismological techniques. With this knowledge and this experience, Canada has a contribution to make. With this fresh infusion of funds, that contribution will be, I pledge, a significant one.

Mr. Chairman, because of their dedicated and successful efforts in the cause of peace, two of the most respected figures of the 20th century were Mike Pearson and Dwight Eisenhower. I should like to refer in closing to something said by each of these men at the height of their careers.

- 16 -

President Eisenhower wrote in 1956:

"I have spent my life in the study of military strength as a deterrent to war, and in the character of military armaments necessary to win a war. The study of the first of these questions is still profitable, but we are rapidly getting to the point that no war can be won...(when) arguments as to the exact amount of available strength as compared to somebody else's are no longer the vital issues."

Prime Minister Pearson spoke in 1957 on his acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize:

"The stark and inescapable fact is that today we cannot defend our society by war since total war is total destruction, and if war is used as an instrument of policy, eventually we will have total war. Therefore, the best defence of peace is not power, but the removal of the causes of war...."

- 17. -

Sir Harold Macmillan summed it all up most succinctly in Canberra in 1958: "Jaw-jaw is better than war-war", he said. That, Mr. Chairman, undoubtedly in far less articulate language, is the message I am currently endeavouring to deliver to world statesmen.

CONFIDENTIAL

TO Canadian Embassy
A M/OW

NO. **IDDZ-0077** DATE **Nov. 4/83**

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<p>Ref Ourtel IDDZ0076 of Nov 3 - PM INITIATIVE</p> <p>Signed original letter from P.M. Trudeau to President Andropov</p> <p style="text-align: center;"><i>28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission</i></p>	
<p>RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION</p> <p>DATE _____ SIGNATURE _____</p>		<p>RETURN TO / RETOURNER À</p> <p>G. Smith External Affairs (IDDZ) Ottawa</p>



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE
O T T A W A, KIA 0A2
November 3, 1983

Dear Mr. President,

I was grateful to receive the detailed account of Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow which was transmitted to me on your behalf. I have continued to reflect on the subjects raised in that report and, along the lines of my letter to you of August 1, 1983, on the need for greater political efforts to reduce the level of East-West tension.

Since August there has been no visible improvement. This is partly due to lack of progress in the central issues of political dialogue and arms control, and partly due to troubling events such as the tragic destruction of a civilian passenger aircraft, terrorism in Lebanon, and recent developments in Grenada.

I have, in recent days, begun to articulate my deep concern at current levels of tension, and at the absence of productive political dialogue, particularly between East and West.

Given the central importance of the Soviet Union in any international effort to promote stability and security, and given the special responsibility of leaders, I have decided to communicate to you, and to other leaders, my concerns and purpose.

.... /2

His Excellency Yuri Andropov
President of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet
Moscow, USSR

I believe it essential that the most senior political levels of the East-West system begin to repair lines of communication, to work to contain unforeseen crises, and to rebuild a sense of authentic confidence in our respective intentions. The consequences of accident or miscalculation are too great for this effort not to begin. Therefore my purpose in the weeks ahead will be to develop, in cooperation with other leaders who share my concern, specific steps which might reverse the current downward path.

Your personal cooperation, Mr. President, and that of your colleagues in the Soviet leadership, are essential to the achievement of positive results. Therefore I would like to propose, as a first step, that I send to Moscow a senior personal emissary who would consult with your advisors or associates about my initiative, and who would seek your own perspective on further work. If you agree, I think it would be desirable for him to visit Moscow early in the second half of November.

My emissary will wish to review a range of proposals which I have in mind. They include an approach to political confidence-building; ways to ensure political momentum at the force reduction talks in Vienna and possibly other multilateral fora as well; and ways of taking a global approach to security questions, including both the key role of all five nuclear powers, and the vital question of non-proliferation.

I attach the utmost importance to your own personal role in the restoration of confidence and stability. Thus I look forward to your early response to my proposal of a personal emissary. If you share my general concern, I also look forward to any further consultations which we might deem useful.

I take this opportunity, Mr. President, to send my best personal wishes to you and to your colleagues.

Yours sincerely, *with kind
regards.*

A large, stylized handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'B. Lunder'.

with the
compliments of hommage de

Ted Johnson



Office of the Cabinet du
Prime Minister Premier ministre

Nov 4/83

MF
by

*Copy to you
you want to see this
last night to assist
in the presentation of letter.
The Anderson*

Canada

Thls
1.
000050



PRIME MINISTER / PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

August 1, 1983

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your very thoughtful letter which was given to me by Mikhail Gorbachev during his recent and most successful visit to Canada. Thank you also for your letter of June 17 concerning the Geneva talks on reducing and limiting intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

I share your conviction that despite our considerable differences in philosophy and attitude, we have been able to build a practical working relationship which has offered substantive and mutual benefits to both our countries. Given current East-West tensions, there is much talk about the need for dialogue and maintaining channels of communication no matter what the difficulties between us. I strongly believe in this approach but I am equally convinced that it must not be a dialogue of the deaf. Our goal must be to build a practical relationship based on mutual interests and concrete advantages to both partners.

In this regard, we are making some progress and as mutual knowledge and confidence expands, I expect, indeed anticipate, that the mistrust and suspicion which so often characterize relations between the countries of East and West will be reduced and replaced by greater efforts for international harmony, peace and cooperation.

His Excellency Yuri Andropov
President of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet
Moscow, USSR

- 4 -

In closing, may I take this opportunity to extend my personal congratulations on your election as President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.

Yours sincerely, with

personal regards.

B. J. J. J.

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
A

EXTOTT/IDDZ

UNCLASSIFIED

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO.

DATE

Nov 4/83

QUANTITY
QUANTITÉ

DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION

REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE

Copy of Guardian Article of Wednesday, November 2, 1983 -
"Cruise Line: Carry on Walking in the Woods"

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
Mission

IDD

24

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

J. R. Schram, Counsellor
Canadian High Commission, London

19-11-83
DATEIDDZ
SIGNATURE

Cruise line: carry on walking in the woods

no stopping the cruise now. That is nearly everyone. And to the MPs who on Monday's poorly- and low-spirited debate plan to the Disarmament Campaign been making reap- of its policy priori-

realisation is in Germany, al- the momentum movement re- center. The Russians have calculated by the deployment of cruise missiles, as NATO nearly four in December 1979, prevented in the Western Europe. The role of those a divisive factor Atlantic alliance matter which the will continue to they can.

policy-makers equally certain that present cannot be possibly in Hol- European susceptibility weigh heavy in nations of crisis in Washington doubtful if anyone to remember that of thousands were in Europe as of Grenada was counted. Nevertheless, the assumption of is that Alliance will hold, at least to itself.

then are mean-

ings and consequences of the coming of the cruise, and what are the possibilities for the future?

First, all is by no means lost. Full deployment will take another five years to complete. During that time, an arms control agreement could be reached in resumed negotiations in Geneva. Such an agreement would reduce the numbers of cruise missiles (and Soviet SS-20s) and might exclude the Pershing II altogether. The shape of such an agreement leaked out when the American and Soviet negotiators took their now famous "walk in the woods" last year.

There are other possibilities. There is rumour that the United States might declare an election year moratorium on further deployment. By, say, next June, Nato would have amply demonstrated its will and solidarity and President Reagan might be ready to signal to the Russians, and to American voters, his desire to reopen dialogue and make progress in arms control.

Although President Andropov has for the time being written off the United States as a partner in détente and signalled his intention to break off the intermediate-range missile negotiations, and probably the strategic weapon talks as well, there have been some hopeful developments in the Soviet posture. It has shifted towards an arithmetic of warheads, rather than missiles, and

signalled a plain readiness to envisage reductions in the number of its SS-20s, although continuing to insist on nil deployment of new American weapons.

There is also the possibility that the Americans will choose themselves a less disastrous President next year. If a Democrat looks at all like winning we can be sure that Reagan himself will start making concessions to the peace vote.

For the purpose of exploiting these more hopeful possibilities it is important not to exaggerate the destabilising effects of cruise and Pershing II missiles. Many people—perhaps as the result of a more general anxiety about nuclear weapons—have come to see them as a fatal step to Armageddon; they have become possessed by the idea that they are intended as first-strike weapons for the purpose of launching or conducting a "limited" nuclear war and fear, therefore, that they may invite pre-emptive first strikes against host countries.

There are elements of such danger, but there is a strong body of expert opinion which while seeing no military need for the cruise and Pershings, and regretting the Nato 1979 decision, does not believe that they will crucially, or even significantly, upset the nuclear balance in Europe.

Advocates and opponents alike make the points that there is nothing new about Soviet intermediate-range



Peter Jenkins

missiles targetted on Western Europe and that Nato possesses already a vast armoury of submarine-based or air-launched weapons which have been allotted theatre roles.

The argument here is not that we should learn to love the cruise. It is that we should not be mesmerised into supposing that it heralds the end of the world and thus makes hopeless the goals of arms control and disarmament. Some of the nuclear disarmers have gone the way of the nuclear strategists and reduced the subject to a technological gobbledygook which drains the politics out of it.

More dangerous than the cruise missile itself, and more urgently requiring action, is the political atmosphere in which the world has come to live. The near state

of breakdown in the relationship of the two super-powers is the most ominous aspect of the world situation today.

Arms control and disarmament are the pillars of peace which can be built on a stable relationship of peaceful co-existence; they are incapable of serving as foundations for that relationship. Unilateral disarmament is of no greater help and, indeed, could further destabilise the political relationships between the super-powers, as would be so if, say, Germany or Britain were to effectively withdraw from the Alliance.

The deterioration of political relations between the United States and the Soviet Union—the ending of détente is perhaps the chief explanation of the burgeoning of the peace movements in Europe. The European generation which has known no war is now nearly into its forties; a new generation is on its heels, one too young to remember the Cold War.

In the three years even since the Nato governments decided on the modernisation of their nuclear forces the notion of deterrence itself has been undermined by the deterioration in relations between Washington and Moscow and, although to a lesser extent, of East-West relations in Europe. The missiles then planned arrive today in circumstances which have changed dramatically.

Since that time the Soviets have invaded Afghanistan,

Congress has failed to ratify Salt II and Mr Reagan has been elected on a rearmament ticket and with a grotesquely simple view of the world. Weapons which were intended to reinforce the confidence and credibility of an alliance which depends upon the ultimate guarantee of American nuclear weapons are today having precisely the opposite effect. Europe is experiencing a crisis of confidence in the American presidency more serious than any under Nixon and Carter.

The peace movements are one reflection of that crisis. Another is the rise of nationalism more generally and the neutralism, which is a tendency within the peace movements, needs to be regarded as a form of nationalism. The growth of anti-Americanism cuts across the ideological divides of European politics. The makings of an unholy alliance of nationalists, romantic and neo-Gaullist Right, together with non-aligned and neo-Gaullist Left, is beginning to be visible in the new House of Commons.

It is predominantly rightwing governments which are having to handle this crisis of public confidence in the leadership of the United States. In Britain, Mrs Thatcher has dampened inflationary expectations but she has excited nationalist expectations. In Chancellor Kohl's Germany the consensus which has underpinned foreign policy for

more than 25 years is dissolving.

For confidence to be restored the first and overriding priority is a resumption of dialogue between the super-powers. That is the necessary condition for progress in arms control or disarmament. Without such a dialogue there will be no restoring public support for nuclear deterrence, which in any case should be minimal.

Talking with the Russians is something the European countries can do and most of them do so. No American permission is needed. Britain has been an exception in recent years but Mrs Thatcher is now in the process of abandoning her own crude and Reaganite approach to East-West relations. The Grenada experience will have given her additional incentive for developing a more independent line of contact with Moscow.

A return to détente—lowering of tension is all that the word need mean—deserves too to be the first priority of the peace campaigners. The demand for a mutual and verifiable freeze, to which the CND is giving a higher priority, requires as a first step the reopening of the super-power dialogue. In all countries, including the United States, there must be potentially huge majorities in favour of the simple first imperative of peace—"At least talk." It is the first step towards living together in a nuclear world.



TO/À MGD
FROM/DE • IDDZ

28-6-1-Troudeau Peace
Mission

REFERENCE • Your memorandum MGD-0340 of November 3
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Space for the PM's Task Force
SUJET on Peace Initiative

Security/Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
November 4, 1983
Number/Numéro

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES


DISTRIBUTION

Telephones: In paragraph 3 of your memorandum, mention is made that four telephones would be located in "the two enclosed offices, at Sheila Connick's work position and at one of the officer's work positions" with "another set of four telephones for the remaining officers" later.

This would seem to indicate that a telephone would not be located on the other secretary's desk - which would mean that she would not be in a position to answer the telephone calls.

Since answering the telephone is one of the main duties of the other secretary, it is mandatory that the other secretary's desk be provided with a telephone by which all lines can be answered.

Thank you for your assistance in this matter.


L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned 1DDZ

Person SC

Local Time 6500


C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNFC8091 04NOV83

TO EXTOTT 1DDZ DELIVER BY 041900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN

DE GOSSAGE



---PM INITIATIVE-SPEECH TWO

AWARE DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING VENUE FOR PM REPORT ON TRIP AND UNVEILING OF MORE DETAIL ON PROPOSALS. MONTREAL POLITICAL VENUE ALWAYS SEEMED PROBLEMATIC FROM POINT OF VIEW CREDIBILITY OF EXERCISE, ALTHOUGH TIMING ADVANTAGEOUS FOR MONDAY MEDIA IN CANADA AND ABROAD.

2. WOULD RECOMMEND:

A) ON TIMING AN EARLY AFTERNOON VENUE MONDAY AT LATEST. LEAKS MAY HAVE STARTED FROM CAPITALS AND WOULD LOOSE INITIATIVE IF MUCH LATER. ALSO, PM IN MONTREAL COULD ALLUDE TO MAKING FULL REPORT NEXT DAY THUS LESSENING MEDIA PRESSURE.

B) VENUE PRESS CONFERENCE WOULD BE LEAST DESIRABLE DUE TO GUARANTEE OF EXTRANEOUS QUESTIONS AND DIFFICULTY OF MAKING LENGTHY STATEMENT AT BEGINNING. HOUSE SUFFERS AGAIN PROBLEM OF OPPOSITION REACTION AND A CONFUSED OUTCOME. TV STATEMENT DIFFICULT TO ORGANIZE AND POLITICALLY SENSITIVE. SUGGEST ALTERNATE SPEAKING FORUM NOON MONDAY WITH INVITED AUDIENCE OF LEADERS OF CONCERNED GROUPS AND DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY. (PRESIDENT HAS DONE THIS TO GREAT EFFECT FOR INT'L STATEMENTS SUCH AS ANNOUNCEMENT OF CBI). THIS COULD BE DONE AT

...2


PAGE TWO UNFC8091 CONFD

LB PEARSON BLDG WITH PRESS SETUP BELOW

C)OTHER CONSIDERATIONS.WE HAVE LEARNED THE ADVANTAGE OF A PRINTED TEXT AND EFFICIENT PRE-DISTRIBUTION.A NOON MONDAY VENUE MAKES THIS POSSIBLE AND EARLY TIMING GUARANTEES NEXT DAY EUROPEAN COVERAGE AND MAKES POSSIBLE U.S.NETWORK INTEREST.A STATEMENT TO DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY IS CONTROLLABLE,COULD BE FOLLOWED BY STANDUP RECEPTION AND SSEA COULD BE FEATURED AS WELL.

CCC/241 042117Z UNFC8091

INFO



C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE PARIS WIFC6652 04NOV83

A PMOOTT LIVRAISON 040900

INFO EXTOTT/LDDZ

REF TELCON HUDON/BILODEAU 03NOV;VOTRETEL PM01236 03NOV

---VISITE PM;SCENARIO PRESSE

COMPTE TENU QUE SAVONS DEJA QUE JOURNALISTES ACCOMPAGNANT PM SFRONT

DEJA A PARIS DEPUIS LA VEILLE VOUS PROPOSONS SCENARIO SUIVANT:

1200 AUTOCAR(PRESSE) SE REND A L HOTEL POUR CUFILLIR GROUPE
(AVEC BAGAGES)

1230 LUNCH-BRIEFING AMBASSADE

1400 DEPART PAR AUTOCAR VERS L ELYSEE

APRES SORTIR DE L ELYSEE GROUPE DEVANT ACCOMPAGNER PM DANS SA
TOURNEE EST CONDUIT DIRECTEMENT A AEROPORT BOURGET.

2.CHAMBRES RESERVEES A HOTEL INTERCONTINENTAL,3,RUE CASTIGLIONE,
75001 PARIS,COMME SUIT:JACQUES HUDON:06/11 ET 07/11.FIONA CONWAY,
BOB EVANS,MIKE PARSONS,VERN FREEDLANDER,DAVID VIENNEAU: 06/11 ET
07/11.PIERRE APRIL,JOHN WALKER,JFFREY SIMPSON,PAUL KORING,MIRFILLE
MASSE,JENA-MICHEL LEPRINCE,DAVID HALTON,PATRICK BROWN,DANIELLE
CLOUTIER,BERNARD SEGUIN,PAUL LACHAPPELLE:07/11.

3.ELYSEE NOUS INFORME QUE SI PM TRUDEAU DECIDAIT DE S ENTRETENIR AVEC
PRESSE SUR PARVIS DU PALAIS PRESIDENTIEL,L OPERATION NE POURRAIT
DURER PLUS DE DIX MINUTES.


...2

PAGE DEUX WIFC6652 CONF

4. PROGRAMME DEJA MENTIONNE RISQUE TOUTEFOIS D ETRE REAMENAGE SI
PROGRAMME PM TRUDFAU SUBISSAIT LUI-MEME CHANGEMENT.

5. INFORMERONS OFFICIELLEMENT PRESSE DE LA VISITE PM TRUDEAU EN MEME
TEMPS QUE PALAIS DE L ELYSEE ANNONCERA VISITE.

CCC/272 041247Z WIFC6652



C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE PARIS WIGR5254 04NOV83

A FXTOTT XDV F L A S H

INFO BRU ROME HAGUE BONN LDN PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR LIDDZ MGT RGB RCR RSR RBD

REF VOTRETEL XDV1049 31OCT NOTRETEL WIGR5246 03NOV

---VISITE DU PM A PARIS

VOICI PROJET DE PROGRAMME POUR VISITE DU PM - MARDI 08NOV

08H00 - ARRIVEE A ORLY A BORD DU VOL 3906 (PAVILLON D HONNEUR)

ACCUEIL ASSURE PAR AMB DUPUY ET M. NIZERT(DU PROTOCOLE FRANCAIS)

08H20 - DEPART DE L AEROPORT POUR L HOTEL RITZ

(QUATRE VOITURES - ESCORTEES PAR POLICE)

NO 1 - PM - AMBASSADEUR - NIZERT

NO 2 - BFAULIFU ET POLICIERS FRANCAIS

NO 3 - FOWLER, JOHNSON, SMITH

NO 4 - COLEMAN, BROWN

09H20 - ARRIVEE A L HOTEL ET INSTALLATION

REMISE DES TELEGRAMMES - G. LANDRY

BAGAGES - B. MABLEY

12H10 - DEPART POUR L ELYSEE - PM, AMBASSADEUR, SMITH, FOWLER, BFAULIEU

12H30 - ENTRETIEN AVEC PRES MITTERRAND - IL SE PEUT BIEN QUE PRES

VEUILLE ENTRETIEN PRIVE EN TETE A TETE AVEC PM PENDANT

QUQUES MINUTES. DANS CE CAS, NS DEMANDONS PRESENCE DE L AMB.

- DEJEUNER A L ELYSEE.

PAGE DEUX WIGR5254 CONF

15H15 - DEPART DE L HOTEL AVEC DELEGATION CANADIENNE ET BAGAGES -

B. MARLEY

15H45 - DEPART DE L ELYSEE DU PM, AMBASSADEUR, FOWLER, SMITH ET BEAULIEU

16H45 - ARRIVEE A ORLY - PAVILLON D HONNEUR

17H00 - DEPART A BORD VOL 3908 (CHALLENGER) EN ROUTE POUR LAHAYE.

2. VOS COMMENTAIRES DQI, SI NECESSAIRE.

CCC/047 041624Z WIGR5254

**CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

MF
[Signature]

C O N F I D E N T I E L CDNS SEUL

DE PARIS WIGR5251 04NOV83

A EXTOTT/IDDZ LIVRAISON 041200

28-6-1- Trudeau	Division	Phoned
6	Person	Sc
	Local Time	1100
	Mission	

INFO BRU BONN LDN ROME HAGUE MOSCO WSHDC BNATO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RSR RCR RBR IDD IDA IDR

RFF NOSTELS WIGR5241 ET 5244 DU 03NOV

--- INITIATIVE DU PM TRUDEAU: REFLEXIONS SUR POSITIONS FRANCAISES
BUT DE CE TEL EST DE FAIRE ETAT, A LA VEILLE DE RENCONTRE AVEC
PRES MITTERRAND, D UN CERTAIN NOMBRE DE REFLEXIONS APPUYEES SUR
COMMENTAIRES ET REACTIONS, DEJA RECUEILLIS DE DIVERS MILITAIRES, ET
AINSI SUSCEPTIBLES DE CONTRIBUER A DRESSER PREALABLEMENT UN ETAT
DES LIEUX.

2. D ABORD, GLOBALEMENT, IL NOUS FAUT CONSTATER QUE INITIATIVE
DU PM CDN EST ACCUEILLIE AVEC INTERET/ATTENTION ET SERIEUX.
EDITORIAL DU CIT LE MONDE FINCIT EN ATTESTE ET DONNE LE TON.
FACTEURS QUI Y CONTRIBUENT TIENNENT MANIFESTEMENT DANS PRESTIGE/
CREDIBILITE DONT PM CDN BENEFICIE DANS MONDE OCCIDENTAL EN SA
QUALITE DE DOYEN DES CHEFS DE GOUVERNEMENT. AUTRE ASPECT IMPORTANT
RESIDE DANS POSITION PARTICULIERE DU CDA VIS-A-VIS DES FUA
CONSIDEREE COMME ETANT BIEN DEMARQUEE ET NON TEGLEGUIDEE, D AUTANT
QU ON SOULIGNE D AILLEURS ABSENCE D OBJECTION AMERICAINE, JUSQU A
CE JOUR, SUR INITIATIVE QUI APPARAIT DONC AUTHENTIQUEMENT CANNE.

3. SUR LE FOND, FORCE EST DE CONSTATER DES SIMILARITES D ANALYSE

...2

PAGE DEUX WIGR5251 CONF CDNS SEUL

ENTRE DISCOURS DE GUELPH ET CELUI DU PRES FRANCAIS DEVANT AGNU
SUR SITUATION INNTALE ET SES TENSIONS. PRES MITTERRAND DECLARAIT
A CETTE OCCASION QU IL FALLAIT CIT BRISER LES LOGIQUES PERVERSES
FINCIT QUI DEPUIS 1970 ENTRAINENT LE MONDE DANS UNE SUCCESSION DE
CRISES DE TOUS ORDRES ET LE POUSSENT DE DESFOUILBRE EN DESFOUILBRE
ALORS QUE COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS S ACCELERE. POUR Y PARVENIR
AJOUTAIT-IL, IL IMPORTE DE CREER UN CIT REEL EQUILIBRE FINCIT. TEL
DIAGNOSTIC FAIT APPEL A NOTION FONDAMENTALE DE CIT INTERDEPENDANCE
FINCIT DES DIVERSES COMPOSANTES DE DYNAMIQUE MONDIALE I.F. ECO/
MONETAIRE/STRATEGIQUE/CULTURELLE TOUT AUTANT QU A INTERRELATION
ENTRE EST/OUEST ET NORD/SUD.

4. CELA DIT, IL FAUT AJOUTER QUE PRES MITTERRAND EST AUSSI EUROPEEN
ET SOCIALISTE. CE SONT LA, A MON AVIS, DES DONNEES ESSENTIELLES QUI
CONDITIONNENT A LA FOIS SA LECTURE DU MONDE MAIS AUSSI LES
CONTRAINTES/IMPÉRATIFS/PRINCIPES QUI MOTIVENT L ACTION INTERNATIONA-
LE DE FRANCE.

5. VIS-A-VIS DE SES PARTENAIRES EUROPEENS, PRES MITTERRAND S EST
FAIT ILLUSTRATEUR DES TENSIONS ET DES DESEQUILIBRES AUXQUELS URSS
EST PRINCIPALE CONTRIBUTRICE PAR UNE CIT VISION EGALITAIRE A DEUX
POIDS DEUX MESURES FINCIT ET QUE CONSACRE SA RECENTE REMARQUE
CIT LES SS-20 A L EST ET LE PACIFISME A L OUEST FINCIT. CERTES DE
PAR STATUT PRIVILEGIE DE SA DEFENSE ET INDEPENDANCE DE SA

...3

PAGE TROIS WIGR5251 CONF CDNS SEUL

DISSUASION NUCLEAIRE, FRANCE S EST FAITE LE DEFENSEUR DE DOUBLE
DECISION DE 1979 EN FOI DU CONSTAT DU DESEQUILIBRE MILITAIRE QUI
S ACCENTUE. MAIS FRANCE S EST AUSSI INSCRITE COMME PARTISAN DE UN
DIALOGUE POLITIQUE ENTRE EUROPEENS POUR QUESTIONS LIEES A LEUR
SECURITE: CONCERTATION ACCRUE AU SFIN DU UEO/COOPERATION MILITAIRE
ENTRE EUROPEENS/INITIATEUR DE CDE.

6. MAIS EVALUATION DES FACTEURS DE TENSIONS EST/OUEST S ETEND
EGALEMENT AU NORD/SUD ET D OU CETTE THEMATIQUE DE DESARMEMENT/
DEVELOPPMENT DE SON DISCOURS DU 29 SEPT. POUR PRES FRANCAIS, UNE
PAIX CIT DE FAIT FINCIT PREVAUT DEPUIS TRENTE ANS ENTRE SUPER
PUISSANCES CIT FONDEE SUR DISSUASION/DISSUASION FINCIT ALORS QUE
CONFLITS SE MULTIPLIENT. AILLEURS, PAR LA FORCE DES DESEQUILIBRES
ET DE INSTABILITE.

7. SI DES SIMILARITES EVIDENTES APPARAISSENT SUR L EVALUATION DES
TENSIONS, ON NE PEUT QUE CONSTATER UNE DOUBLE TENTATION DU COTE
FRANCAIS. D ABORD CELLE, AU PLAN DES MOYENS, DE FAIRE APPEL AUX
INSTANCES EXISTANTES, ET ESSENTIELLEMENT, LA CDE DONT LE MANDAT EST
PRECISEMENT DE CONVENIR DE CIT MESURES DESTINEES A ACCROITRE LA
CONFIANCE FINCIT DANS UNE ZONE COMPRISE ENTRE L OURAL ET
L ATLANTIQUE, CELA, A LA DIFFERENCE DES MBFR. PUIS IL Y A CETTE
CONFERENCE EN DEUX TEMPS VISANT A CONSACRER AU DEVELOPPMENT LES
FRUITS DU DESARMEMENT.

...4

PAGE QUATRE WIGR5251 CONF CDNS SFUL

8. SECONDE TENTATION DE FRANCE CONSISTE EN UNE MEFFIANCE VIS-A-VIS DE URSS MALGRE QU OFFICIELLEMENT ON AFFIRME UNE POURSUITE DUN DIALOGUE QUI DEBOUCHE SUR CONSTAT DE DIVERGENCES. OR DEPUIS L AVENEMENT D UN GOUVT SOCIALISTE, FRANCE A TENU A ENDROIT DE MOSCOU UN DISCOURS FERME. MAIS LA QUESTION FONDAMENTALE EST DE SAVOIR SI DEGRÉ ACTUEL D INTOXICATION DE URSS PERMET UN QUELCONQUE CHANGEMENT D ATTITUDE DE SA PART ET S IL INCOMBE A L OUEST PAR D INEVITABLES CONCFSSIONS DE SORTIR URSS DES CONTRADICTIONS ET DE POSITION INSOUTENABLE DANS LAQUELLE ELLE S ENFERME. AU QUAI D ORSAY ON RECONNAIT QU IL FAUDRA QUE L OUEST VIVE AVEC LA REALITE SOVIETIQUE. MAIS A QUEL PRIX ET QUELS RISQUES? L URSS PEUT-ELLE DANS CONDITIONS ACTUELLES ETRE PARTIE PRENANTE D UN DIALOGUE POLITIQUE/POLITIQUE RAVIVE ET CONSTRUCTIF AU MOMENT OU L OUEST EST PERCU SELON SA PERSPECTIVE COMME MENACANT POUR SA SECURITE? UN DIALOGUE RENOVE ET PERSONNALISE EST-IL A CE MOMENT-CI LA OU UNE DES MEILLEURS FACONS D Y PARVENIR ET D EVITER QUE L ON S ENFERME DANS UN QUELCONQUE FATALISME?

9. BREF, INTERROGATION FONDAMENTALE EST SANS DOUTE RESUMEE PAR CIT LE MONDE FINCIT. LORSQU IL S INTERROGE SUR POSSIBILITE ET VOLONTE POUR MR ANDROPOV DE CONTRIBUER A UNE REDUCTION VERITABLE DES TENSIONS MEME SI L OUEST EST DISPOSE A LE FAIRE.

10. COMME AVONS DEJA EU OCCASION DE LE SIGNALER, C EST MOINS SUR LE FOND ...5

PAGE CINQ WIGR5251 CONF CDNS SEUL

QUE SUR LES MOYENS QU INTERLOCUTEURS FRANCAIS S INTERROGENT SUR
INITIATIVE CDNNE SE REFFERANT ESSENTIELLEMENT POUR INSTANT A ETAT
D ELABORATION DECRIE DANS DISCOURS DE GUELPH. EVENTUALITE D UNE
VISITE DU PM CDN A MOSCOU CONSTITUE L UN DE CES MOYENS DEMEURANT
A PRECISER, ET QUI SERA SANS DOUTE AU COEUR DU PROCHAIN ENTRETIEN

DUPUY

CCC/272 041456Z WIGR5251

28-6-1-Troudeau Peace
Mission

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BRU ZVAG5107 04NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 041200

INFO BREEC BNATO CANMILREPNATO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR IDDZ

---PM S VISIT ADMIN ARRANGEMENTS

AMBASSADOR FORTIER S SECRETARY, NICOLE ST PIERRE WILL PROVIDE
SECRETARIAL SUPPORT AT HOTEL AMIGO. WE SHALL MAKE NECESSARY
ARRANGEMENTS TO SET UP OFFICE AS REQUESTED. PHOTO-COPIER
AVAILABLE FOR OUR USE IN HOTEL IF REQUIRED.

UUU/133 041508Z ZVAG5107

28-6-1-T. Trudeau Peace
Mission

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BONN ZQFC5091 04NOV83

TO PMOOTT DELIVER BY 040900

INFO PARIS HAGUE BRU ROME LDN EXTOTT LIDDZ

REF YOURTELS 1226 02NOV 1234 03NOV TELECON/LAFLEUR/HUDON/

BROADBRIDGE 03NOV

---PM TRIP TO EUROPE:MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS BONN

AS DISCUSSED BY PHONE WE CONFIRM THAT HOTEL ARRANGEMENTS

HAVE BEEN ADE FOR MEDIA NIGHT OF 10NOV TO 11NOV AT

NOVOTEL BONN-HARDTBERG, ADDRESS:ADENAUERDAMM/ECKE PASCALSTR

5300 BONN 1,PHONE (228)5201-0.TLX 886743.

2.KINDLY ADVISE OF ANY CANCELLATIONS.

UUU/242 041331Z ZQFC5091

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Division Phoned _____

Person _____

Local Time _____

Mission _____

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR4102 04NOV83

TO FXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 041000

INFO LDN FARI SWSHDC BONN ROME HAGUE BRU BNATO PCOOTT/POWLFR

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGR RBR IDD IDA RBD RBP

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0076 03NOV

---PM INITIATIVE

DEPUTY FORMIN RYZHOV RECEIVED ME AT NOON TODAY, HAVING LEFT
MTG OF COUNCIL OF MINS FOR THAT PURPOSE. SUSLOV (DIR SECOND
EUROPEAN DIV) WAS WITH HIM. I DELIVERED LET TOGETHER WITH HASTILY
PREPARED OFFICE TRANSLATION WHICH BOTH SOV OFFICIALS READ
CAREFULLY AND WITH OBVIOUS INTEREST. RYZHOV ASKED WHAT WAS
MEANT BY QUOTE EMISSARY UNQUOTE. I SAID PERSON NOT/NOT YET NAMED
BUT I THOUGHT IT WOULD BE SOMEONE WHO UNDERSTOOD IN DETAIL
PRIME MINISTERS THINKING ON ISSUES OUTLINED IN LET AND IN
GUELPH SPEECH. AFTER READING LET SECOND TIME RYZHOV SAID HE
WOULD ENSURE THAT IT WAS DELIVERED AND THAT GROMYKO WAS INFORMED
OF IT. HE WOULD GET BACK TO ME WITH REPLY ASAP. THERE WAS CON-
SIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF PROPOSED DATES BETWEEN RYZHOV AND SUSLOV,
LEADING ME TO CONCLUSION THAT THEY WERE ALREADY THINKING OF
PRACTICALITIES OF VISIT.

2. INTERESTING COINCIDENCE THAT TODAY'S PRAVDA CARRIED SUBSTANTIAL
ACCOUNT OF GUELPH SPEECH, WHICH WAS ALSO COVERED IN SOME DETAIL,
WITH FOOTAGE, ON LAST EVENINGS (03NOV) TV NEWS. I SAW TV BROADCAST
MYSELF AND THOUGHT IT NOT/NOT BAD ACCOUNT OF SPEECH. WE ARE

...2

PAGE TWO XYGR4102 CONF

REPORTING SEPARATELY ON THIS(OURTEL XGR4099 04NOV).

3.ON OTHER SUBJECTS,RYZHOV SAID NEW SOV AMB WOULD BE LEAVING SHORTLY FOR OTTAWA.HOW WAS HE TO GET THERE?WOULD AEROFLOT BE ALLOWED TO RESUME SERVICE ON 06NOV?FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS IN YOURTEL RRR0496 02NOV,I SAID I HAD NO/NO INFO.SUSLOV SAID THEY HAD NO/NO INFO EITHER FROM SOV EMB IN OTT,AND IT WAS AWKWARD BECAUSE OF HOLIDAY.(04 DAY HOLIDAY BEGINS TOMORROW).

4.AS I LEFT,RYZHOV SAID HE HOPED I WOULD ENJOY PARADE IN RED SQUARE ON MONDAY-I SHOULD TAKE MY WIFE.I SAID I WOULD NOT/NOT BE THERE.HE INNOCENTLY ASKED WHY.I REPLIED THAT I HAD INSTRUCTIONS NOT/NOT TO ATTEND,FOR REASONS HE KNEW.MTG ENDED ON THIS SLIGHTLY SOUR NOTE.

ROBERTS.

CCC/095 041323Z XYGR4102

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Division Phoned _____
Person _____
Local Time _____

R F S T R I C T E D

FM MOSCO XYGR4099 04NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 041200

INFO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN PCOOTT/FOWLWER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/

ADMPOL/CPP LDN PARIS MDRID LSBN BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN

OSLO BRU HAGUE BNATO PRMNY CNGNY WSHDC GENEV TOKYO

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RBG RSD RSE RCD RCR IDD IDA IDR

FPR

REF OURTEL XYGR4085 01NOV

---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS:SOV MEDIA REACTION

TASS ITEM,DATELINED OTT,REPORTING ON PMS GUELPH SPEECH APPFARED
04NOV IN PRAVDA.ARTICLE PRESENTED SPEECH AND PMS CALL FOR URGENT
MEASURES TO REDUCE TENSION IN SYMPATHETIC LIGHT BUT QUOTED
SELECTIVELY AND SINGLED OUT FOR COMMENT MAINLY THOSE SECTIONS
OF PMS ADDRESS WHICH COULD BE CONSTRUED AS CRITICAL OF WEST AND
SYMPATHETIC TO CURRENT SOV POLICY PREOCCUPATIONS.PASSAGES OF
SPEECH DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CRITICAL OF USSR,AS WELL AS THEMATIC
DISCUSSION OF MILITARY VS POLITICAL POLICY DETERMINANTS WERE
NEITHER CITED NOR REMARKED UPON.PMS SUPPORT OF DETENTE AND
CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE WAS MENTIONED IN PARTICULAR
AS WAS CALL FOR EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION AND ACTIVE POLITICAL
CONTACTS BFTWEEN EAST AND WEST IN ESTABLISHING CONFIDENCE.PM WAS
DESCRIBED AS CONDEMNING QUOTE CIRCLES IN WEST UNQUOTE WHICH WERE
BASING THEIR POSITIONS ON STRENGTH AND CONFRONTATION AND AS CALLING
FOR QUOTE WESTERN POWERS UNQUOTE TO TAKE POSITIVE POLITICAL STEPS.

...2

PAGE TWO XYGR4099 RESTR

2. CONCERNING SPECIFICS OF PMS PROPOSALS FOR ACTION, FRAVDA WAS
LARGELY SILENT. ARTICLE NOTED THAT CDN PM QUOTE CALLED FOR WELL-
THOUGHT OUT AND RATIONAL COURSE OF ACTION UNQUOTE BUT OFFERED
NO/NO DETAIL. NO/NO REFERENCE WAS MADE TO PMS PERSONAL COMMITMENT
TO WORK TO REDUCE THREAT OF WAR OR TO HIS PLANS FOR CONSULTATIONS
WITH OTHER LEADERS.

3. MAIN DAILY EVENING TELECAST 03NOV HAD LONGISH ITEM ALONG SIMILAR
LINES WITH SOME FOOTAGE FROM SEMINAR.

CCC/095 041337Z XYGR4099

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR4063 04NOV83

TO FXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 040900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

NDHQOTT/DGMPO(T) TT ATOC TRENTON DE CAF

DISTR IDDZ

REF OURTEL ZQGR4059 03NOV NDHQOTT/DGMPO(T) WERP 011905Z NOV

---PMS INITIATIVE-VISIT TO BONN

WISH TO CONFIRM PM SHOULD ARRIVE 10NOV(AND LEAVE 11NOV)AT

CIVILIAN SIDE OF COLOGNE-BONN AIRPORT AT VIP GATE(SONDER

POSITION)AND NOT/NOT AT MILITARY SIDE OF AIRPORT

AS INDICATED IN PARA 2(D)OF DGMPO(T)2340.

CCC/242 041010Z ZQGR4063

28-6-1-*Thurston Peace Mission*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR4061 04NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 040900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT.JOHNSON

DISTR IDDZ

REF YOURTEL SDV1063 03NOV

---PMS VISIT-SECRETARIAL SUPPORT

REFTEL REQUIREMENTS NOTED AND IN HAND. HOTEL HAS PHOTOCOPIER
ON GROUND FLOOR. ASSUME THAT SUFFICES. FMB HAS NO/NO TABLETOP
COPIER AND WOULD HAVE TO RENT ONE.

CCC/005 040928Z ZQGR4061

28-6-1-Tyndeau Peace
Mission
6

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

28-6-1- <i>Tudor</i>	<i>Peace Mission</i>
<i>6</i>	Division Phoned.....
	Person.....
	Local Time.....

R E S T R I C T E D

FM LDN XNGR4006 04NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER 040830

INFO PONN PCOOTT/FOWLER/ARCHDEACON PMOOTT/JOHNSON/COLEMAN

HAGUF NDHQOTT/MND/CPS/ADMPOL/CPD

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RCR RCD RSR

---PMS VISIT TO EUROPE:LONDON

TO CONFIRM TELECONS YESTERDAY, DOWNING STREET SHOWED

UNWILLINGNESS TO RESCHEDULE PMS MTG WITH MRS THATCHER FROM

1200 NOON PLUS LUNCH TO TWO HOUR MTG IN AFTERNOON FLEADING

MRS THATCHER HAD PRIOR COMMITMENTS IN PM.FCO, CONSCIOUS OF OUR

PMS DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN REMEMBRANCE DAY CEREMONY, SUGGESTED

SUITABLE CEREMONY BE ORGANISED IN LDN FRIDAY MORNING.

2. THIS AM HICOMMR IS ATTEMPTING TO CONTACT PM THATCHER'S PRINCIPAL
PRIVATE SECRETARY, BUTLER, TO DETERMINE WHETHER AFTERNOON MTG MUST BE
RULED OUT, OR WHETHER LUNCH AT ONE PM FOLLOWED BY TETE-A-TETE
CAN BE ARRANGED AS COMPROMISE.

3. IF DOWNING STREET INSISTS ON NOON SCENARIO, IT WOULD BE
POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE SUITABLE CEREMONY AT WHITEHALL COMWEL
CFNOTAPH. FCO CAN ARRANGE TO HAVE TRAFFIC DETOUR OF SOME FIFTEEN
MINUTES WHICH WE THINK ADEQUATE FOR SIMPLE, DIGNIFIED CEREMONY.
SOME THIRTY UNIFORMED CDN SERVICEMEN PLUS SIMILAR NUMBER CDN
VETFRANS COULD ATTEND, PLUS HICOMM STAFF. UK SERVICEMEN, BRIT LEGION

...2

PAGE TWO INGR4006 RFSTR

REFS AND UK MINISTER COULD BE INVITED. SOME 100 PEOPLE MIGHT BE PRESENT. CEREMONY COULD INCLUDE NONDENOMINATIONAL PRAYER BY PADRE AND LAST POST BUT SHOULD NOT/NOT BE TOO ELABORATE, IF INCLUDE MILITARY BAND AS THIS MIGHT BE SEEN TO DETRACT FROM CEREMONIES AT NEIGHBOURING WESTMINSTER ABBEY (SFE BFLOW) AND FROM MAIN SUNDAY 13 NOV COMWEL CEREMONY. PARTICIPANTS COULD BE INVITED TO CDA HOUSE AFTER CEREMONY FOR REFRESHMENTS AND TO MEET FM BRIEFLY BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE TO DOWNING STREET.

4. ALTERNATIVE SCHEME WOULD BE CEREMONY AT PRINCIPAL CDN WAR CEMETERY AT BROOKWOOD, SURREY. THIS IS ABOUT 45 MINUTE DRIVE FROM HEATHROW (BUT 90 MINS FROM GATWICK) AND ONE HOUR TO DOWNING STREET. IF CEREMONY WERE HELD AT 10H30 THIS MIGHT BE FEASIBLE BUT CONSIDERABLE OBSTACLE TO SCHEME IS TRANSPORTATION OF VETFRANS AND BRITISH PARTICIPANTS. WE RECOMMEND AGAINST THIS OPTION.

5. THOUGHT WAS INITIALLY GIVEN TO LAYING WREATH AT TOMB OF UNKNOWN SOLDIER (WESTMINSTER ABBEY) WHICH WOULD BE AS CONVENIENT AS WHITEHALL CENOTAPH BUT THERE ARE ALREADY TWO SERVICES SCHEDULED THERE FOR FRIDAY AM; ONE OUTSIDE ABBEY AT 10H30-11H00 INVOLVING QUEEN MOTHER AND ANOTHER AT NOON UNDER AUSPICES OF COMWEL WAR GRAVES COMMISSION. BOTH ARE IN REMEMBRANCE OF BRITISH WAR DEAD. EVEN IF ADDITIONAL CEREMONY IN ABBEY FEASIBLE, WHICH WE DOUBT, GRAVE OF UNKNOWN SOLDIER IN ABBEY IS TREATED AS BRITISH NATIONAL.

...3

PAGE THREE XNGR4006 RESTR

SHRINF. LAYING OF WREATH THERE, FREQUENTLY DONE BY VISITING HEADS OF STATE/GOVT WOULD BE SEEN AS PAYING RESPECT TO BRITISH WAR DEAD.

6. OF OPTIONS WHITEHALL CENOTAPH SEEMS MOST SUITABLE AND PRACTICABLE IF YOU WISH TO PURSUE REMEMBRANCE CEREMONY IN UK IN PLACE OF HOLLAND.

7. SINCE DICTATING ABOVE DOWNING STREET HAS RESPONDED TO HICOMMP THAT THEY WOULD APPRECIATE CDN EFFORT TO MEET MIDDAY PROPOSAL. PREFERENCE REMAINS NOON TETE-A-TETE PLUS LUNCH. HOWEVER PM THATCHER IS AGREEABLE TO ARRANGEMENT WHEREBY OUR PM COULD ARRIVE FOR LUNCH BY 13H00. DELAY WOULD NECESSARILY EAT INTO TIME AVAILABLE BECAUSE OF HER POST-LUNCH COMMITMENTS. PRECISE TIME HAS NOT/NOT BEEN PUT ON THESE BY DOWNING STREET BUT FCO BELIEVES LUNCH WOULD BE EXPECTED TO BE OVER IN TIME TO ALLOW MRS THATCHER TO KEEP 15H00 APPT.

8. FCO HOPING FOR YOUR CONFIRMATION TODAY OF PMS PLANS. WE NEED MAXIMUM TIME TO ORGANISE LDN REMEMBRANCE DAY CEREMONY IF DUTCH CEREMONY TO BE DROPPED. IN THAT EVENT NOON APPOINTMENT WITH MRS THATCHER CAN BE CONFIRMED.

CCC/102 041313Z XNGR4006

NONCLASSIFIE

DE BRU ZVFC3601 04NOV83

A PMOTT/HUDON IMMED

INFO BREEC EXTOTT LIDDZ PARIS HAGUE ROME BONN LDN

RFF VOTTEL PM01234 03NOV

---VISITE DU PM EN EUROPE: JOURNALISTES

PROPOSONS BRIEFING A L INTENTION DES JOURNALISTES DONNE PAR LES
DEUX MISSIONS, BREEC ET AMBASSADE, SUR LES RELATIONS CDA-COMMUNAUTE
EUROPEENNE ET CDA-BELGIQUE AU CENTRE CULTUREL DU CDA (8 RUE DE
LOXUM, TEL 513.79.40 ALBERT DUMAS).

2. HEURE DU BRIEFING POURRA ETRE PRECISEE A L ARRIVEE DES
JOURNALISTES TENANT COMPTE PROGRAMME DE VISITE DU PM.

UUU/126 041112Z ZVFC3601

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
6 mission

003/4

44

1/5

RESTRICTED

CHCGO YFGR2826 04NOV83

EXTOTT/URR

PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPF WSHDC

MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCI RCR IDD IDA IDR FPR INDZ
GEA

OUR SFAX YFGR2825 04NOV83

—PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE ON NUCLEAR TENSION

ENCLOSED ARE TWO ARTICLES FM BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS

REFERRED TO IN REF TEL.

28-6-1-Turdeau Peace
b. Mission

R. H. GAYNER

000079

2/5

Perspectives

The Canadian Prime Minister speaks

The following is the text of an open letter to Canadian newspaper editors from Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, dated May 9, 1983. It outlines the Canadian government's position on cruise missile testing and the disarmament issue. The United States and Canada have signed an agreement opening the way for missile tests over northern Alberta. But in April more than 80,000 Canadians publicly protested the agreement. —The Editors

by Pierre Trudeau

IN RECENT MONTHS I have received a great number of letters and petitions protesting against the possible testing of cruise missiles in Canadian territory. Because it was physically impossible to send a personal reply to all of those who had expressed their concerns to me, I gave a public response when I spoke at a dinner in honor of Vice President George Bush.

Because this whole question continues to weigh heavily upon the consciences of those in government and the general public, I have now decided to address myself directly to Canadians through this open letter. My purpose is to explain the position of the Government of Canada on the testing of the cruise missile, and on the broader issue of disarmament.

By way of preamble, let me point out that our freedom to discuss and argue issues is what gives our democracy its greatness and its strength; but that same freedom can also make us appear vulnerable in the face of Soviet totalitarianism.

In recent years, the Soviet Union has deployed hundreds of new SS-20 missiles, each equipped with three nuclear

warheads, capable of reaching all the great cities of Western Europe. However, there has not been any significant outburst of public opposition, either inside or outside the Soviet Union.

That the Soviet people have not protested against this action of their leaders surprises no one. What is surprising, however, is that those in the West who are opposed to new nuclear weapons have remained silent about the installation of the SS-20s. In contrast, they are now taking to the streets to oppose the possible deployment of U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles to protect Europe against the Soviet nuclear threat.

What is particularly surprising in Canada is to see protesters opposing the possible testing of cruise missiles in Canadian territory, but not opposing the fact that similar missiles are already being tested in the Soviet Union, as was confirmed in December by General-Secretary Andropov.

Because people in the free world feel powerless to influence the leaders of the Soviet Union, there is a great temptation to direct the whole force of their anguish and their protests against the only decision-makers who are sensitive to public opinion, namely the leaders of the democratic countries. Having convinced themselves that it is useless to denounce the SS-20s, people find it easier, I suppose, to forget about them. The strange result of this forgetfulness is that it somehow becomes possible to portray the Soviet Union not as the aggressor, but as the innocent target. This represents a curious amnesia and reversal of roles, which the Soviet leaders are quick to exploit for their own purposes.

They hope, obviously, that one-sided information, and one-sided protests, will lead to the unilateral disarmament of the West. Indeed, there is a segment of public opinion in Western Europe which has already adopted that policy.

DURING THE FIRST Special Session on Disarmament at the United Nations, I proposed, in the name of Canada, a strategy of suffocation. It was designed to smother, even in the laboratory, the development of any new nuclear weapons systems. Obviously, my proposal had to apply to both sides or to neither. There certainly was no suggestion in that proposal that the West should disarm unilaterally.

Because our strategy of suffocation was rejected by the Soviet Union, as evidenced by the continued deployment of the SS-20s, a weapon much superior to the SS-4 and 5, there was no question of urging its acceptance by the NATO countries alone. That is why we allied ourselves with the two-track strategy of our NATO partners. Those two tracks are to seek to negotiate the removal of the Soviet SS-20s and, at the same time, to prepare for the deployment of new U.S. missiles in Europe so as to pressure the Soviet Union toward serious negotiations, and so as not to leave our European allies in a vulnerable position, if the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces ended in failure.

Having declared our support for the two-track strategy, Canada should bear its fair share of the burden which that policy imposes upon the NATO alliance.

It is hardly fair to rely on the Americans to protect the West, but to refuse to lend them a hand when the going gets rough. In that sense, the anti-Americanism of some Canadians verges on hypocrisy. They're eager to take refuge under the U.S. umbrella, but don't want to help hold it.

When we seek to apply moral principles to this issue, it's easy to become trapped in positions which are either too complex or too simple. The former can paralyze us. The latter can deceive us.



Pierre Trudeau is prime minister of Canada.

3/5

Perspectives


Into the trap of over-complication fall those who insist that no moral position is valid which does not take into account every possible future breakthrough in nuclear weapons technology, every possible future difficulty in detecting the actions of the other side. Into the trap of over-simplification fall those who are content to talk about how many bowls of rice could be purchased for the price of a missile, or who condemn governments for spending anything at all on defense.

I do not deny that there is an element of truth and validity in an unconditionally pacifist position. I simply say that it is simplistic to ignore the real, complex and often immoral world to which our moral choices must apply. The Pope himself recognized this fact in a message he sent last June to the second United Nations Special Session on Disarmament. "In current conditions," he wrote, "deterrence based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself, but as a step toward a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable."

I believe that the Soviet peoples desire peace just as much as the peoples of the free world. But I also know that the Soviets are very heavily armed. In these circumstances, it would be almost suicidal for the West to adopt a policy of unilateral disarmament, or a policy of suffocating the development of new means of defending ourselves against the Soviet SS-20s. That is the kind of heroic moral choice which an individual could make in his personal life, but does anyone have the right to impose that choice upon a whole nation, or upon the community of free countries?

When the choice is between steadfastness or weakness in the face of totalitarianism, history should have taught us that to refuse to risk one's life in defense of liberty is to risk losing liberty, without any guarantee of saving one's life.

THAT IS WHY the Government of Canada has chosen, not without anguish or full awareness of the risk, to



"Get Dad . . . we're all out of vegetables, fruit and eggs."
"No problem. Someone's bound to throw some at us."

Katze, Canada

join our NATO partners in adopting a policy of strength in reaction to the Soviet Union.

In supporting the two-track strategy of the Atlantic alliance, however, we shall insist that progress be made simultaneously on both tracks. This combination of steadfastness of purpose and willingness to negotiate seems to be bearing fruit, as witness the latest offer of General-Secretary Andropov to take into account the numbers of warheads as well as missiles.

Indeed, are we to think that this new-found flexibility of Mr. Andropov is a straight-forward show of goodwill? Are we to believe seriously that, on two occasions since last December, the Soviets would have contemplated publicly a reduction of their nuclear forces if we had weakened in our resolve?

I hope that my explanation of our policy will have established that, were we to agree to collaborate in testing the guidance system of the cruise mis-

sile, it would be because of our solidarity with the other Western democracies, in a world which has turned a deaf ear to our suggested strategy of suffocation.

That being said, however, I would add that we should not abandon hope for the ending of the nuclear arms race. All the people of the world, whether they be friends or enemies, value their own lives, and the lives of those they love. If the discovery of the terrible secrets of the atom gives us the power to destroy the whole planet, there is a still more powerful force which can save it—our love for our children, and our love of life.

Therefore, I shall continue to believe that our strategy of suffocation is the best strategy. The great powers of the world refuse to accept it now. But that will not stop us from repeating our proposal at every opportunity, until the recognition of its truth frees us all from moral anguish and from fear. □

An American responds

by Kosta Tsipis

THE PRIME MINISTER'S open letter to the Canadians is a welcome example of the manner in which a sensitive and responsive political leader encourages public debate on a controversial topic. Yet this re-

markable document is weakened because some of the arguments it contains are technically and militarily flawed, and because its advocacy of deployment of cruise missiles and Pershing IIs in Western Europe is difficult to accommodate logically within Pierre Trudeau's broader strategy of


4/5

Perspectives

suffocation of the arms race.

To begin with, the Prime Minister's belief that the new Soviet weapons represent a new military danger for Western Europe seems unwarranted. The Soviet SS-20 missiles are essentially replacements for the older SS-4 and SS-5 intermediate-range weapons. The older missiles were inaccurate and so had large warheads: even if they would miss their targets their radius of destruction was so large that the devastation of the cities they were aimed at was assured. The SS-20s have much better accuracy and smaller warheads, and they can devastate their targets as assuredly as the older ones: operationally the two weapons systems are about the same. The only difference is that SS-20s are mobile, and can be moved on tracked vehicles from their barracks to prepared launch sites. The SS-4s and SS-5s were in fixed silos and therefore were more vulnerable to a pre-emptive NATO attack against them. So unless NATO were to be the first to initiate nuclear strikes in a war with the Eastern bloc by attacking the SS-4s and SS-5s (a pre-emption not as assuredly successful against SS-20s) the SS-20s possess no real advantage over the older missiles.

Since these new Soviet intermediate-range missiles are meant as a replacement for older weapons Trudeau should not be surprised that the Western publics have not protested their deployment. No one protested when the older Phantom F14 jets were replaced by the modern F-16 aircraft in the Western arsenals. In addition, since the SS-20s are replacements for an older system, to expect that the Soviets will totally withdraw them in exchange for the as yet non-deployed cruise missile and Pershing II may appear to them as a proposal for



unilateral reductions on their part. It is like insisting that the United States should not deploy any new ballistic missile submarines as the old Polaris boats are withdrawn.

The Prime Minister's belief that the cruise missile and Pershing II systems constitute militarily defensive systems and are politically necessary to display Western resolve is difficult to support with facts. Both are offensive weapons. They can be thought of as defensive only in as much as they contribute to the overall nuclear deterrence to a Soviet attack. But deterrence is amply provided by the spectrum of conventional, battlefield and intermediate-range nuclear systems deployed in NATO countries, the Poseidon ballistic missile submarines assigned to the NATO forces and the U.S. panoply of intercontinental strategic nuclear systems. Even the U.S. Undersecretary of

Defense Richard Perle has been reported as stating that these ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing IIs have no real military utility or significance. What is it that the Soviets can dare now that they wouldn't dare only when the cruise missiles and

Strategic Defense and Nuclear War

A two-day conference sponsored by Essex County College, New Jersey Institute of Technology, Rutgers-Newark Campus and the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey will be held at the New Jersey Institute of Technology in Newark on November 2 and 3, 1983.

The conference will bring together leaders from government, academe and the sciences who represent a cross-section of opinion and policy orientation. Experts on nuclear weapons technology, strategic policy and civil defense as well as leading advocates of arms control and nuclear disarmament are scheduled to participate.

For further information contact:
Wilma Needleman (201) 645-5541.



Kosta Tsipis is co-director of the Program in Science and Technology for International Security at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge (02139), a member of the Bulletin, board of director and special editor of the weapons tutorial series.

5/5

Perspectives



Donato, Canada

Pershing IIs were deployed in Europe? Thus these weapons cannot serve as the show of resolve that Trudeau correctly finds necessary.


Either the Soviet leadership is not impressed by the U.S. resolve displayed with the deployment of the MX and Trident II missiles, the B-1 bomber, the Stealth bomber and the long-range air-launched nuclear cruise missile (and then why would they be impressed by the deployment of a few hundred missiles of little, if any, military utility in Western Europe?) or they are already impressed, in which case the deployment of intermediate-range and cruise missiles in Europe is superfluous. It could be argued that this European deployment was necessary as a show of political will and U.S. solidarity with its NATO allies. Yet the opposite is happening! The alienation of substantial sections of the Western public with the military policies of their governments, which the plan to station new U.S. nuclear

weapons in Europe has occasioned, is quite damaging to the image of Western resolve. Proceeding with the controversial deployment is not going to repair that damage.

The belief that no Soviet deployment should be left unanswered—even if it is in response to a U.S. deployment, even if it is a mere replacement of an older system—has led us to the very nuclear arms race that Trudeau has proposed to arrest with his strategy of suffocation. However, this courageous and imaginative strategy that proposes to nip new weapons in the research and development bud is incompatible with the nuclear-tit-for-nuclear-tat mentality, which constitutes the logical underpinning of the Prime Minister's advocacy for the deployment of nuclear missiles in Western Europe. To refuse Canadian participation in the further development and testing of a new nuclear weapons system would be exactly in accordance

with this strategy of suffocation of the arms race. Such refusal would have symbolic more than practical value and as such would strengthen Trudeau's hand in arguing in favor of his strategy of suffocation. It would also place Canada with Sweden and the other nuclear-capable countries that have decided not to enter the nuclear arms race at the vanguard of efforts to foster nuclear arms control agreements between the two nuclear superpowers, in order to achieve a stable nuclear peace.

Such refusal could indeed run counter to some economic and technological Canadian interests. It could also be seen as incompatible with the dictates of good neighborliness and solidarity with the United States. Yet there are higher practical and moral imperatives than being nice to one's neighbor. Arresting the nuclear arms race so as to lessen the probability of nuclear war is one of them. □



Griston, Canada

The Bulletin presents a selection of Canadian political cartoons on pages 2 through 5. American readers may be surprised to find that north-of-the-border illustrators show as little mercy to their political figures as U.S. cartoonists show theirs.

The drawings are for illustration only and do not necessarily represent the editorial views of the Bulletin.

1/2

002/4

RESTRICTED

YFGR2825

4NOV83

CHCGO

EXTOTT URR

PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CP

MINA USS DMF IFB UCB RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR IDD IDR FPR IDDZ GEA

---PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE ON NUCLEAR TENSIONS---CHICAGO

SO FAR WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DEVELOP FOLLOWING TO BRING GUELPH
SPEECH TO PUBLIC ATTENTION.

28-6-1-*Midean Peace Mission*

1. SUN OCT 30--10:30 AM RADIO NEWS AND COMMENT PROGRAM,
WBEZ, CGO PUBLIC RADIO, CONSUL GENERAL WAS INTERVIEWED FOR
FIVE MINUTE DISCUSSION OF SPEECH AND THRUST OF PM'S
INITIATIVE.
2. MON OCT. 31--DISTRIBUTION OF APPROX 100 COPIES OF SPEECH
AT U. OF CGO SEMINAR OF US/SOVIET RELATIONS. KEY NOTE
SPEAKER WAS DEP SEC OF STATE VAN DAM, PARTICIPANTS INCLUDED
DAVID ROCKEFELLER, MALCOM LOON, MACMILLAN, CHAIRMAN
CARGILL, HARRISON SALISBURY, SEN PERCY, BRENT SCOWCROFT.
EVENING SPEAKER WAS BREZINSKI. ATTENDANCE 500 PLUS,
MADE UP OF SENIOR BUSINESS AND BANKING LEADERS, DIRECTORS
OF CORPORATIONS, CORP GOVT RELATIONS OFFICERS, ACADEMICS
AND STUDENTS. SPEECH HAS SINCE BEEN WELL COMMENTED ON BY
SEVERAL PEOPLE WE ARE PLEASED TOOK TIME TO READ IT.
3. COPIES MAILED TO EDITORS OF CGO TRIBUNE, SUN-TIMES,
ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH, GLOBE DEMOCRAT, KANSAS CITY STAR, ...

.../2

(312)

427-1031

ROBERT H. GAYNER

000084

2/2


RESTRICTED

YFGR2825

PAGE 2

MILWAUKEE JOURNAL, SENTINEL. EXCELLENT COMMENTS FROM
TRIBUNE, SUN TIMES AND POST DISPATCH. NO EDITORIALS SO FAR.
4. COPY PASSED TO, READ BY AND DISCUSSED WITH MEMBER OF EDITORIAL
BOARD OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTIST, MONTHLY CIRC OF 30000 NUCLEAR
SCIENTISTS AND EXECUTIVES ACROSS U.S. SPEECH IS TO BE
PUBLISHED IN JANUARY ISSUE WITH QUOTE LAUDATORY INTRODUCTION
UNQUOTE. LAST MONTHS BULLETIN CARRIED IN EXTENSO REVIEW OF PM'S
LETTER TO CANADIAN PEOPLE AND CRITICAL RESPONSE FROM KOSTA
TSIPIS, BEING FAXED SEPARATELY OTT AND WSHDC.
END.

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS



C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM TOKYO UIGR1883 04NOV83

TO FXTOTT PGB DELIVER BY 040900

DISTR USS DMF PPD FPR IDD

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
mission

---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE:CONSULTATIONS WITH JPN

MFA CALLED TODAY TO INFORM US OF REPORT FROM AMB MIKANAGI OF
LUNCHEON DISCUSSION 02NOV WITH KILPATRICK ON PRIME MINISTER
VISITING JPN AND CHINA AFTER CHOGM. DATE MENTIONED WAS 20NOV.
VISIT WAS REPORTEDLY CONTINGENT ON RESULTS OF DISCUSSIONS WITH
W EUROPEAN LEADERS ON PMS INITIATIVE. AS YOU KNOW, DATE SUGGESTED
COINCIDES WITH BEGINNING OF STATE VISIT TO JPN OF FU YAOBANG,
CHMN OF CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY. MFA HAS ASKED FOR FURTHER
DETAILS ASAP.

CCC/195 040838Z UIGR1883

ME
48

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

UNCLASSIFIED

FM LDN XNFC1514 04NOV83

TO PMOOTT DELIVER BY 070900

INFO EXTOTT LIDDZ PARIS HAGUE BRU ROME BONN

REF YOURTEL 1234 03NOV AND TELECON 04NOV LOUISE LEFLEUR

---PMS TRIP TO EUROPE : MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS

CONFIRMING TELECON, SWB RESERVED FOR 11 AND 12 NOVEMBER FOR


FIONA CONWAY, BOB EVANS, MIKE PARSONS, VERN FREEDLANDER.

2. SWB RESERVED FOR 11 NOVEMBER FOR JACQUES HUDON, PIERRE APRIL,
JOHN WALKER, DAVID VIENNEAU, MIREILLE MASSE, JEAN-MICHEL LEPRINCE,
DAVID HALTON, DANIELLE CLOUTIER, BERNARD SEGUIN, PAUL LACHAPPELLE,
WAYNE GREENOUGH.

3. HOTEL MAYFAIR, STRATTON STREET, LDN W1, TEL 01 629 7777.

UUU/170 071102Z XNFC1514

INFO



NONCLASSIFIE

DE PMOOTT PM01247 04NOV83

A TT MR JL UCLA OU M CHEVRIER, EXECUTIVE JET AVIATION

TELEX 28153 CH IMMED DE GVA

INFO PARIS HAGUE BRU ROME BONN LDN FXTOTT LIDDZ

REF:TEL DU 04/11/83-ARRANGEMENTS MEDIA

MERCI POUR TRANSMISSION RENSEIGNEMENTS DEMANDES

2.RESERVATION DE CHAMBRES D HOTEL CONFIRMEE POUR EQUIPAGES SAUF
PARIS VEILLE DU DEPART ET RETOUR DE TOURNEE.FAIRE VOS ARRANGEMENTS
POUR PARIS.

08/11/83 LA HAYE:HOTEL KURHAUS(070-520052)

09/11/83 ROME:HOTEL DE LA VILLE(06.67.33)

10/11/83 ROTTERDAM:HILTON-ROTTERDAM(31.10.144044).

3.PRECISIONS AU PLAN DE VOL:PREVOIR UNE ENVOLEE BONN/COLOGNE-ROTTERDAM
EN FIN DE SOIREE(VERS 2300)LE 10/11 ET UNE ENVOLEE ROTTERDAM-LONDRES
(HEATHROW)(VERS 1100)LE 11/11.PAS DE CHANGEMENT POUR LE RESTE
QUANT AUX DESTINATIONS MAIS HORAIRES ENCORE SUSCEPTIBLES D ETRE
MODIFIES.

4.JACQUES HUDON PEUT ETRE REJOINT A AMBASSADE DU CANADA/PARIS
(TFL 723-0101,POSTE 233)LE 07/11/83.

UUU/204 042237Z PM01247

INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMOOTT PM01243 04NOV83

TO BONN/BROADBRIDGE IMMED

INFO HAGUE/STANFIELD EXTOTT IDDZ

CONFIRM CANCELLATION OF HOTEL ROOMS FOR MEDIA IN BONN.

2.WE CONFIRM MTG POINT AND HANDLING PLACE FOR BONN-KOLM AIRPORT:

INTAIR-BREAU-AVIATION GENERALF-NIVEAU ARRIVEE DE LA AEROPORT-

TEL 2203401(POSTE 2518)TELEX 934703.

3.EXPECTED ARRIVAL DATE AND TIME FOR MEDIA IS 10NOV83,1700.

EXPECTED DEPARTURE IS 10NOV83,2300.

4.AIRCRAFTS USED BY CDN MEDIA CONTINGENT ARE:1 FALCON 20/HB-VRM
AND LEARJET 35/HB-VFZ.

5.JACQUES HUDON CAN BE REACHED AT CDN EMBASSY IN PARIS

MON 07NOV.

UUU/204 042202Z PM01243

28-6-1-Tudon Peace
Mission

INFO

NONCLASSIFIE

DE PMOOTT PM01240 04NOV83

A ROME/GRANGER IMMED

INFO EXTOTT/IDDZ

DE HUDON

28-6-1-Hudon Peace
Mission

---ARRANGEMENTS MEDIA TELCON HUDON/GRANGER

VOICI LES RENSEIGNEMENTS DEMANDES:

1.CONFIRMONS POINT DE RENDEZ-VOUS ET D ASSISTANCE

POUR AEROPORT CIAMPINO DE ROME:AEROPORTI DE ROMA

ASSISTANCE,TEL 600119,TELEX 611 168

2.HEURE ARRIVEE PREVUE,9/11 A ROM:2005-HEURE

DEPART PREVUE,10/11:1500

3.LES AVIONS UTILISES PAR MEDIA CANADIENS SONT

FALCON 20/HB-VBM ET LEARJET 35/HB-VFZ

4.SVP RESERVER CHAMBRE POUR PERSONNES

SUIVANTES,SOIR DU 9/11:--JACQUES HUDON,SEC PRESSE
ASSOCIE DU PM,

FIONA CONWAY,BOB EVANS,MIKE PARSONS,VERN

FREEDLANDER,DAVID VIENNEAU,PIERRE APRIL,JOHN

WALKER,JEFFREY SIMPSON,PAUL KORING,MIREILLE MASSE,

JEAN-MICHEL LEPRINCE,DAVID HALTON,PATRICK BROWN,

DANIELLE CLOUTIER,BERNARD SEGUIN,PAUL LACHAPELLE,

WAYNE GREENOUGH,YVES PELLETIER,PATRICK FONTAINE,

JEAN-CLAUDE KAUFMANN,MONTZE TERRY,PIERRE BURDET,

PHILIPPE TOUXE.

5.POUR TOUT RENSEIGNEMENT SUPPLEMENTAIRE,POURRAI

ETRE REJOINT A AMBASSADE/PARIS,LUNDI 7/11.

UUU/075 041622Z PM01240

INFO

NONCLASSIFIE

DE PMOOTT PM01239 04NOV83

A BRU/DUMAS IMMED

INFO EXTOTT/IDDZ

DE HUDON

---ARRANGEMENTS MEDIA TELCON HUDON/ASSELIN

CONFIRMONS QUE VOUS POUVEZ ANNULER RESERVATIONS

HOTEL POUR JOURNALISTES A BRUXELLES.

2.CONFIRMONS POINT DE RENDEZ-VOUS ET D ASSISTANCE

AEROPORT BRUXELLES:ABELAG-CENTRE D AVIATION GENERALE

TEL 781-8075,TELEX 24833.

3.HEURE ARRIVÉE PREVUE,9/11 A BRUXELLES:1220-

HEURE DEPART PREVUE DE BRUXELLES 9/11:1800.

4.AVIONS UTILISES PAR MEDIA CANADIENS SONT FALCON

20/HB-VBM ET LEARJET 35/HB-VF2.

5.POUR TOUT RENSEIGNEMENT SUPPLEMENTAIRE,POURRAI

ETRE REJOINT A PARIS/AMBASSADE,LUNDI 7/11.

UUU/001 041622Z PM01239

28-6-1-Tudor Peace
Mission

28-6-1 = Trudeau Peace
6 | Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT XDV1074 04NOV83

TO PARIS HAGUE BRU ROME BONN LDN DELIVER BY 070800

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON/COLEMAN RCMPOTT/VIP5

NDHQOTT/DAOT3-3 HQ IMMED TT ATOC/TRENTON 412 SON

CFF/LAHR IMMED DE CAF

DISTR LIDDZ MGT RGB RCR RSR RBD

---PM INITIATIVE-ERUOPE 1983

FOLLOWING IS PM PROGRAMME AS OF 1700 HRS OTTAWA TIME NOV4/4.

OTTAWA

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 7

LOCAL TIME

1845 HOURS - MEMBERS OF THE OFFICIAL PARTY ARRIVE AT HANGAR 11.

CFB OTTAWA SOUTH AND BOARD AIRCRAFT

1910 HOURS - PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU ARRIVES AT HANGAR 11 AND BOARDS

AIRCRAFT (AMBASSADORS WILL SAY GOODBYE)

1915 HOURS - DEPARTURE FROM OTTAWA

PARIS

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 8

LOCAL TIME

0800 HOURS - ARRIVAL IN PARIS

ORLY AIRPORT

0920 HOURS - ARRIVE AT THE RITZ HOTEL

15 PLACE VENDOME

...2

PAGE TWO XDV1074 CONF

1210 HOURS - DEPART HOTEL FOR FLYSEE

1210 HOURS - LEAVE HOTEL

1230 HOURS - MEETING AND WORKING LUNCH WITH PRESIDENT MITTERRAND

(4 PLUS 4)

FLYSEE

1545 HOURS - DEPARTURE FOR AIRPORT

1700 HOURS - DEPART PARIS

ORLY AIRPORT

1800 HOURS - ARRIVAL AT THE HAGUE

VALKENBERG MILITARY AIRPORT

1820 HOURS - ARRIVAL AT DUTCH PRIME MINISTERS RESIDENCE

CATSHUIS

(PRIME MINISTER, G. SMITH, FOWLER, JOHNSON)

- (REMAINDER OF DELEGATION WILL STAY AT HOTEL DES INDES,

LANGE VOORHOUT 54-56

2000 HOURS - WORKING DINNER GIVEN BY PRIME MINISTER

LUBBERS(5 PLUS 5)

CATSHUIS

THE HAGUE

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 9

LOCAL TIME

0850 HOURS - DEPART CATSHUIS FOR THE PALACE

0900 HOURS - AUDIENCE WITH QUEEN BEATRIX (PRIME MINISTER ONLY)

1000 HOURS - DEPART THE PALACE

...3

PAGE THREE XDV1074 CONF

1020 HOURS - DEPART THE HAGUE

VALKENBERG MILITARY AIRPORT

1105 HOURS - ARRIVAL IN BRUSSELS

MELSBROEK AIRPORT

1135 HOURS - ARRIVAL AT HOTEL AMIGO

1-3 RUE DEL AMIGO

1200-1430 - WORKING LUNCH GIVEN BY PRIME MINISTER MARTENS

HOURS PRIME MINISTERS OFFICE

1435 HOURS - DEPARTURE FOR AIRPORT

1505 HOURS - DEPART BRUSSELS

MELSBROEK AIRPORT

1720 HOURS - ARRIVAL IN ROME

CIAMPINO AIRPORT

1750 HOURS - ARRIVE AT HASSLER VILLA MEDICI HOTEL

PIAZZA TRINITA D MONTI

(PRIME MINISTER, JOHNSON, BEAULIFU)

(REMAINDER OF DELEGATION WILL STAY AT GRAND

HOTEL DE LA VILLE, VIA SISTINA 69)

- EVENING FREE

ROME

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 10

LOCAL TIME

...4

PAGE FOUR XDV1074 CONF

1045 HOURS - MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER CRAXI(5 PLUS 5)

PALAZZIO CHIGI

1140 HOURS - DEPART FOR VATICAN

1200-1240 - AUDIENCE WITH POPE JOHN PAUL II

THE VATICAN

1300 HOURS - WORKING LUNCH WITH PRIME MINISTER CRAXI(5 PLUS 5)

VILLA MADAMA

1430 HOURS - DEPARTURE FOR AIRPORT

1500 HOURS - DEPART ROME

CIAMPINO AIRPORT

1745 HOURS - ARRIVE BONN

BONN/COLOGNE AIRPORT

1800 HOURS - ARRIVE STEIGENBERGER HOTEL

AM BUNDESKRANZLER PLATZ

1830 HOURS - MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL(TIME TO BE CONFIRMED)

(4 PLUS 4)

CHANCELLORS OFFICE

1930 HOURS - DINNER WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL

BONN

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 11

LOCAL TIME

0830 HOURS - DEPART HOTEL STEIGENBERGER

0855 HOURS - DEPART BONN

BONN/COLOGNE AIRPORT

...5

PAGE FIVE XDV1074 CONF

0925 HOURS - ARRIVE VOLKEL MILITARY AIRPORT

0945 HOURS - ARRIVE GROESBEEK CFMETERY BY HELICOPTER

0950 HOURS - REMEMBRANCE CEREMONY

GROESBEEK CEMETERY

1035 HOURS - DEPART GROESBEEK CEMETERY BY HELICOPTER FOR VOLKEL
MILITARY AIRPORT

1045 HOURS - DEPART NETHERLANDS

VOLKEL MILITARY AIRPORT

1045 HOURS - ARRIVE LONDON

HEATHROW AIRPORT

1200-1430 - WORKING LUNCH WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER(4 PLUS 4)

10 DOWNING STREET

1435 HOURS - DEPARTURE FOR AIRPORT


1600 HOURS - DEPART LONDON

GATWICK AIRPORT

1830 HOURS - ARRIVE OTTAWA

HANGAR 11, CFB OTTAWA(SOUTH)

CCC/273 050445Z XDV1074



C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT XDV1072 04NOV83

TO PARIS HAGUE BRU BONN ROME DELIVER BY 060900

INFO PCOTT/FOWLER PMOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR IDDZ

RFF OURTFL XDV1067 03NOV

---PM INITIATIVE-ADMIN

ADD TO PARA 1 REFTTEL:GARY JAMES SMITH,BORN 08AUG44 AT TORONTO,PPT

DD026927 ISSUED AT BRU 10DEC80.

CCC/273 042118Z XDV1072

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Division Phoned MF

Person WJ

Local Time _____

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HAGUE YWGR0751 04NOV83

TO EXTOTT UDDZ XDV DELIVER BY 041300

INFO PARIS BONN BRU ROME LDN PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

NDHOOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RCR RCD RSR

---PMS INITIATIVE:VISIT TO EUROPE:NOV83

ARRIVAL CEREMONY AT MILITARY AIRBASE OF VALKENBURG WILL BE
KEPT TO MINIMUM.AN HONOUR GUARD OF 3 WILL STAND AT THE FOOT
OF RAMP.PM WILL DISEMBARK AND WILL BE MET BY CDN AMB,
PM LUBBERS AND CHIEF OF PROTOCOL.THERE WILL BE NO/NO
NATIONAL ANTHEMS AND NO/NO REVIEW OF GUARD.PM WILL PROBABLY
TRAVEL WITH DUTCH PM TO OFFICIAL RESIDENCE AT CATSHUIS.

2.ON DEPARTURE FROM VALKENBURG MORNING OF NOV09,IT IS
EXPECTED THAT FROM DUTCH SIDE ONLY CHIEF OF PROTOCOL WILL
BE PRESENT.IT IS LOCAL CUSTOM THAT BEFORE LEAVING PM SHAKES
HANDS WITH POLICE ESCORT WHO WILL BE ACCOMPANYING HIM
THROUGHOUT VISIT.

CCC/155 041637Z YWGR0751

UNCLASSIFIED

FM HAGUE YWGR0749 04NOV83

TO PMOOTT DELIVER BY 041200

INFO PARIS BRU BONN ROME LDN EXTOTT LIDZ

REF YOURTEL PM01226 02NOV

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

---PMS VISIT:MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS

AS DISCUSSED IN HUDON/STANSFIELD TELCON, ROOMS FOR JOURNALISTS
ACCOMPANYING PM HAVE BEEN RESERVED AT KURHAUS HOTEL IN THE
HAGUE AS REQUESTED. HAVE ALSO RESERVED BUS FOR JOURNALISTS FOR
ENTIRE LENGTH OF STAY. WILL ARRANGE FOR CUSTOMS ASSISTANCE AS
REQUESTED. KURHAUS HAS TELEX FACILITIES IF NEEDED.

2. POSSIBILITIES FOR SCRUM AND PHOTO OPPORTUNITIES WILL BE
LIMITED. PM WILL LAND AT VALKENBURG NAVAL AIR BASE WHICH WILL
IN ALL PROBABILITY BE OFF-LIMITS TO PRESS. BEST OPPORTUNITY
APPEARS TO BE BEFORE DINNER WITH PM LUBBERS AT DUTCH PMS
OFFICIAL RESIDENCE. UNLIKELY THERE WILL BE OPPORTUNITIES
FOLLOWING DAY WHEN PM MEETS QUEEN. PHOTOS SESSIONS WITH QUEEN
ARE FORWORN UPON.

3. SCENARIO FOR NOV11 CEMETERY CFREMONY IN GROESBEEK STILL
SOMEWHAT UNCLEAR. WILL ADVISE.

4. MEDIA COORDINATOR IS RON STANSFIELD, SECOND SECRETARY
(PUBLIC AFFAIRS). HOME PHONE IS (01751) 79968. STANSFIELD WILL
MEET JOURNALISTS AIRCRAFT.

UUU/155 041424Z YWGR0749

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM ROME WTGR0405 04NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 041400

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR LDDZ MGT RGB RCR RSR RBD

REF OURTEL WTAG0401 03NOV YOURTELS XDV1067 03NOV 1062 03NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:ACCOMMODATION ROME

YOUR VERY USEFUL REFTEL 1067 HAS MADE PRE-REGISTRATION POSSIBLE

AND ROOMS WILL BE ALLOCATED AS FOLLOWS:

HASSLER-VILLA MEDICI:SUITE NBR 420 - PM

ROOM 417 - JOHNSON

ROOM 419 - BEAULIEU

HOTEL DE LA VILLE: ROOM 727 - OFFICE/SCY BEDROOM

ROOM 726 - FOWLER


ROOM 728 - COLEMAN

ROOM 723 - SMITH

ROOM 722 - BROWN.

2.RE REFTEL 1062,ANTICIPATE NO/NO PROBLEMS IN MEETING YOUR REQUFSTS.

CCC/050 041659Z WTGR0405



28-6-1 Trudeau Peace
mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM ROME WTGR0404 04NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DELIVER BY 041400

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR DDZ MGT RGE RCR RSR RED

---POSSIBLE MEETING BETWEEN PM AND ITALIAN LIBERAL PARTY PRESIDENT
MALAGODI

SENATOR MALAGODI'S OFFICE INFORMS US TODAY THAT LIBERAL INTERNATIONAL
CONTACTED HIM FROM LONDON TO ENQUIRE WHETHER HE MIGHT BE AVAILABLE
TO MEET WITH PM 10NOV. GRATEFUL FOR CONFIRMATION THAT PMO HAS IN FACT
TAKEN THIS INITIATIVE. IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, MOST OPPORTUNE TIME WOULD
BE IN EARLY MORNING OVER OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER BREAKFAST. GRATEFUL FOR
CLARIFICATION AND INSTRUCTIONS BY 071700 LT.

CCC/050 041650Z WTGR0404

ME
12

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
6 mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM EXTOTT PPR0370 04NOV83
TO TOKYO

DISTR PGB PPD IDDZ

---PRIME MINISTERS INITIATIVE ON PEACE AND SECURITY

JPNSE EMB(ISHIGAKI,COUNSELLOR AND SUENAGA,SECOND SECTY)WAS
BRIEFED BY CHAIRMAN OF TASK FORCE(DELVOIE)01NOV AFTERNOON.FMB WAS
PROVIDED WITH COPY OF BACKGROUND BRIEFING NOTES ON GUELPH SIEFCH
(TRANSMITTED TO YOU BY TEL 26OCT).

2.FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY RECORD OF BRIEFING.

3.ISHIGAKI OPENED DISCUSSION BY INDICATING KEEN JPNSE INTEREST
IN PROCESS INITIATED BY TRUDEAU AND ASKING WHEN PM DECIDED TO GO
AHEAD WITH NEW INITIATIVE.IN RESPONSE DELVOIE EXPLAINED THAT
CONCERN OF PM ON QUESTION OF INNATL IEACF GOES BACK CONSIDERABLE
TIME.PM SPOKE OUT ON QUESTION AT UNSOD I IN 1978,AT UNSOD II IN
1982 AND LAST YEAR AT NOTRE DAME UNIVERSITY.AT WILLIAMSBURG
SUMMIT HE WORKED FOR DECLARATION ON PART OF INDUSTRIALIZED
COUNTRIES FOR COMMITMENT TO PEACE.MOST RECENTLY HIS CONCERNS WERE
VOICED DURING VISIT OF PM THATCHER.IN MID SEP PM DECIDED TO SET
UP TASK FORCE TO LOOK AT CURRENT SITUATION AND TO COME UP WITH
OPTIONS.TASK FORCE HAS CONCLUDED ITS DELIBERATIONS AND HAS COME
FORWARD WITH NUMBER OF OPTIONS FROM WHICH PM HAS SELECTED SOME.
WITH HIS GUELPH SPEECH PM HAS OPENED PROCESS OF RAISING PUBLIC

...2

PAGE TWO FPR0370 CONF

AWARENESS AND SPARKING INCREASED DEBATE ON ISSUE. AT SAME TIME HE IS CONSULTING WITH NUMBER OF WESTERN GOVTS TO SEE WHETHER HIS PERCEPTIONS ARE SHARED AND TO GAUGE WHETHER HIS PROPOSAL MIGHT HAVE MERIT AND SUPPORT OF LEADERS IN UNBLOCKING CURRENT SITUATION. PM WILL BE MAKING MORE SPEECHES ON QUESTION. AS PART OF CONSULTATIVE PROCESS PM WILL VISIT NEXT WEEK PARIS, BONN, THE HAGUE, BRUSSELS, ROME, AND LDN. AFTER THAT HE HOPES TO DISCUSS HIS CONCERNS AT CHOGM IN NEW DELHI.

4. ISHIGAKI THEN QUERIED WHETHER OBJECTIVE OF VISITS IS SOLELY CONSULTATIONS ON INITIATIVE OR COULD IT BE CONSIDERED AS GOOD WILL AND OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE BILATERAL ISSUES. HE ASKED IF LEADERS HAVE SHOWN EARLY RECEPTIVITY TO INITIATIVE. DELVOIE RESPONDED THAT EUROVISITS ARE TO FOCUS SOLELY ON INITIATIVE - QUESTION OF E/W RELATIONS AND INTL/SECURITY/ARMS CONTROL - HE EMPHASIZED THAT THESE ARE WORKING VISITS, NO/NO CEREMONIAL ASPECTS AND PM PARTY WILL BE VERY SMALL (FOWLER, GARY SMITH AND PMO STAFF). ISHIGAKI QUERIED WHETHER INITIATIVE HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH SECY STATE SCHULTZ DURING RECENT MTG WITH DPM/SSFA AND IF THERE HAD BEEN FORMAL USA REACTION. DELVOIE REPLIED THAT IT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED, THAT LETTER HAD BEEN SENT TO PRES REAGAN BUT NO/NO FORMAL RESPONSE ...3

PAGE THREE PPR0370 CONF

YET. MESSAGES HAD BEEN SENT TO ALL NATO HEADS OF GOVT. ISHIGAKI THEN QUERIED WHETHER MESSAGES HAVE BEEN SENT TO SOVIETS AND IF VISITS TO MOSCOW AND WSHDC ARE PLANNED. DELVOIE STATED THAT MESSAGE HAD NOT/NOT YET BEEN SENT TO MOSCOW AND THAT VISITS TO THERE AND WSHDC ARE POSSIBILITY. IT WAS EMPHASIZED HOWEVER THAT PM WISHES TO PURSUE HIS INITIATIVE ON EVOLUTIONARY BASIS.

5. ISHIGAKI REFERRED TO PRESS SPECULATION ABOUT INITIATIVE. VIEWS OF SOME OF ALLIES, AND POSSIBLE DISAGREEMENT WITHIN GOVT. DELVOIE RESPONDED INDICATING HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE THREE POINTS: (A) PM DOES NOT/NOT ENVISAGE ANY SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY BETWEEN WSHDC AND MOSCOW OR ROLE AS INTERMEDIARY. (B) PM DOES NOT/NOT INTEND TO INTERJECT HIMSELF IN INF/SNF BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SOVIETS AND AMERICANS. (C) PM DOES NOT/NOT INTEND TO ADVOCATE THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH POWERS BE INCLUDED IN INF TALKS. DELVOIE ADDED THAT IN HIS INITIATIVE PM IS TAKING GLOBAL APPROACH TO QUESTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION AND WANTS TO DRAW MORE COUNTRIES INTO SAFEGUARD AGREEMENTS; HE IS CONCERNED ABOUT VERTICAL PROLIFERATION - HE WANTS TO GET MORE COMPREHENSIVE LIMITATIONS ON WEAPON BUILDUPS INVOLVING ALL FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS. DELVOIE ADDED THAT PM WANTS TO GIVE SOME POLITICAL IMPETUS TO MRFR TALKS IN VIENNA WHERE WE HAVE HAD TWO PROPOSALS FROM EASTERN EUROPE TO WHICH WEST HAS NOT/NOT RESPONDED. ANOTHER OBJECTIVE WAS ALSO TO GIVE POLITICAL IMPETUS AT SOON TO OPEN

...4

PAGE FOUR PPR0370 CONF

CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY MEASURES(CDS)CONF IN STOCKHOLM ON 17 JAN.

6. ISHIGAKI SUGGESTED THAT INITIATIVE OF PM APPEARS TO BE GLOBAL STRATEGY ENCOMPASSING NUMBER OF ARMS ISSUES. DELVOIE RESPONDED POSITIVELY BUT STRESSED PM IS NOT/NOT CONCERNED WITH NUMBER CRUNCHING OR WITH NUCLEAR ACCOUNTANCY. HE SEES PROBLEM AS POLITICAL ONE.

7. ISHIGAKI ASKED ABOUT PMS VERY RECENT VISIT TO NY. DELVOIE SAID THAT PM MET WITH HARVARD GROUP ON NUCLEAR ISSUES, EARLIER HE HAD HELD DISCUSSIONS WITH ROBERT MCNAMARA AND GENERAL ROGERS, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF NATO FORCES IN EUROPE. IN RESPONSE TO MR ISHIGAKI'S QUESTION ABOUT TIMEFRAME FOR PMS INITIATIVE, MR DELVOIE EXPLAINED THAT IT IS LONG TERM. HE SUGGESTED THAT STALLED INF TALKS AND UPCOMING DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES IN EUROPE ARE ALL SYMPTOMATIC OF PROBLEM. THE ROOTS OF CURRENT EAST/WEST IMPASSE CAN BE TRACED BACK TO AFGHANISTAN, THROUGH POLAND, PRES BREZHNEV'S DEATH AND KOREAN AIRLINE INCIDENT. THROUGH THESE INCIDENTS DANGER OF SUPERPOWERS MISREADING AND MISUNDERSTANDING IS BECOMING GREATER AND GREATER. PM WANTS TO ATTEMPT TO ARREST THIS PROCESS.

...5

PAGE FIVE PPR0370 CONF

8. ISHIGAKI THEN ASKED IF THERE HAD BEEN REACTION OF STATE DEPT TO INITIATIVE AND IF PRES REAGAN HAD RESPONDED. DELVOIE EXPLAINED THAT STATE DEPT HAD PROVIDED SOME PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON INITIATIVE BUT NOT/NOT SUBSTANTIVE POSITION. REPLY FROM PRES REAGAN IS EXPECTED SHORTLY.

9. ISHIGAKI THEN ASKED IF LETTER WOULD BE SENT TO CHINA AND USSR. DELVOIE RESPONDED THAT FURTHER LETTERS WOULD GO OUT IN STAGES. ISHIGAKI THEN TURNED TO QUESTION OF UN AND ROLE PM SAW FOR IT. IN RESPONSE DELVOIE RECALLED THAT PM HAD PUT FORWARD STRATEGY OF SUFFOCATION IN UNSSOD. HE CONTINUED THAT TASK FORCE HAD IDENTIFIED A FEW AREAS THAT MIGHT BE PURSUED IN UN DISARMAMENT FORUMS, FOR EXAMPLE OUTER SPACE.

10. ISHIGAKI ASKED IF THERE HAVE BEEN REACTIONS FROM EUROPEAN LEADERS PRIME MINISTER WILL VISIT. NOTHING FORMAL YET, DELVOIE INDICATED. BUT PRELIMINARY REACTIONS OF SOME SENIOR OFFICIALS HAVE BEEN POSITIVE. ISHIGAKI EXPRESSED DEEP APPRECIATION OF JPNSE FOR BRIFFING AND WELCOMED OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT FURTHER ON INITIATIVE. DELVOIE INDICATED THAT WE EXPECT TO CONSULT AGAIN WITH JPNSE VERY SOON.

CCC/171 050314Z PPR0370

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNAG0268 04NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV IMMED

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR IDDZ

REF YOURTEL XDV1064 03NOV

---PMS INITIATIVE NOV83-VISIT-ADMIN

MS SHIRLEY WHITESIDE WILL STILL BE SCY AT YOUR DISPOSAL. HAVE
ALSO RESERVED THIRD FLOOR BOARDROOM FOR DELS USE.

CCC/055 041527Z XNAG0268

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

1/3

-3502
(212) 246-7424

UNCLASSIFIED
NONCLASSIFIE

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Facsimile
TRANSMISSION
fac-similé

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
Mission
6

Our file/no. dossier:

NYC 07

NO. GRPA 90

DATE 4 NOVEMBER 83

PAGES 3
(incl. cover)
(y compris la page
couverture)

FROM: Canadian Consulate General
DU : Consulat général du Canada
NEW YORK

SECTION: GRPA
Mr. /~~Mad.~~
M. /Mad. AMOS DONOHUE

TO : Mr./Ms.
A : M./Mad.

Department:
Service : EXOTT/IDDZ

Phone :
Téléphone :

Subject : Article of Business Week, 14 November 83, page 66
Objet : "Trudeau tries the peace issue"

REAGAN'S JOURNEY TO THE EAST: A NEW PHASE IN THE PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP

President Ronald Reagan's Nov. 9-14 trip to Japan and South Korea will underscore a historic shift the President believes is occurring in global power and U.S. interests. By 1990 the combined gross national product of the countries on the Asian rim of the Pacific Basin and in the South Pacific will surpass that of Europe—and perhaps that of the U.S.—if relative growth rates of the 1970-83 period hold up for the rest of the decade. The Pacific Basin's importance is reinforced by the westward economic and demographic tilt within the U.S.—a phenomenon that deeply influences the thinking of Californian Reagan.

Reagan and Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone hope their meetings produce a heightened awareness, in both the U.S. and Japan, of the growing Japanese role in international affairs. For Nakasone, the visit will be important as an opportunity to convince the Japanese that their U.S. ally is led by a steady, reliable President—not the caricature of a trigger-happy gunslinger that has gained new currency in Japan as a result of the Grenada invasion.

Most of these purposes will be achieved not through formal, substantive discussions, which will take up only two hours of Reagan's stay in Japan, but through media events that will stress friendly relations between the two nations. Reagan, as he approaches the expected announcement of his candidacy for a second-term, will reap an added dividend—extensive coverage by the U.S. media of visually colorful activities, such as an exhibition of horseback archery at Tokyo's Meiji shrine.

UNREMITTING HOSTILITY. Defense will be a crucial issue both in Seoul, which is beset by North Korea's unremitting hostility, and in Tokyo. The Administration hopes the visit will give Japan an added nudge in its movement toward stepped-up military preparedness. The goal is to fulfill Japan's 1981 pledge to protect itself, its airspace, and its sea lanes to a distance of 1,000 mi. from its shores.

Although Japan will not meet that commitment until well into the 1990s, Nakasone is projecting a 6.9% increase in the defense budget in the fiscal year beginning in March. By contrast, most of the country's civilian departments are undergoing spending cuts.

Underlying the visit, however, will be the nagging strain of trade disputes between the world's two largest market economies. Japan and the U.S. disagree on a broad range of issues, from auto imports and Japanese nontariff barriers to the undervaluation of the yen. There is growing resentment in



WITH NAKASONE: A MEDIA SHOW TO SIDESTEP TOUCHY ISSUES

Tokyo of what is seen as public bashing of the Japanese on such issues by U.S. Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige, Commerce Under Secretary Lionel H. Olmer, and, to a lesser extent, by U.S. Trade Representative William E. Brock. Administration officials argue that the inconsistency between Reagan's view of Japan's importance as an ally and the litany of U.S. complaints against Japanese trading practices is not what it seems. If the Japanese do not make good-faith progress in reducing barriers to imports, the argument goes, they will face a serious protectionist backlash in the U.S. in the coming election year.

None of these issues will be the subject of detailed haggling, though, between Reagan and Nakasone. And a key dispute was cleared away beforehand: Japan agreed to limit auto exports to the U.S. to 1.85 million next year.

For 6 1002

TRUDEAU TRIES THE PEACE ISSUE

Prim Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau's self-appointed mission to close the gap between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on nuclear arms control will permit him to make a final test of Canada's domestic political waters before he decides whether to make one last try for reelection. In effect, the 64-year-old Trudeau is proposing world peace as a platform on which he and the Liberal Party could run at a time when his popularity has hit an all-time low.

In a speech on Oct. 27, Trudeau announced a series of consultations with leaders of other countries in which he would serve as "a third rail of high political energy" to complement the Atlantic alliance's two-track policy of negotiating arms cuts while modernizing NATO defenses. If the peace initiative gives new momentum to his flagging political career, Trudeau could decide to lead the Liberals once again in an election that must be held by early 1985. If the arms-control

A
3M
as
jul
Nc
rec
jul
ew
th
ho
ou
co

International Outlook

3/3

mission fizzle. Trudeau will have little choice but to carry out his previous announced intent to step down after 15 years as Prime Minister. He must make the decision no later than January to give the party time to pick a successor.

Underlying Trudeau's strategy is an attempt to focus a Canadian national election campaign on foreign policy for the first time since 1968. That was when Conservative Prime Minister John Diefenbaker lost to Liberal Lester B. Pearson after President John F. Kennedy accused Diefenbaker of backing out of an agreement to allow nuclear warheads in Canada. After years of disavowing the role that Pearson shaped for Canada as an "honest broker" among the bigger powers, Trudeau has adopted it with his own twist, warning of an "ominous rhythm of crisis" between the superpowers.

BIG PROBLEM. Although Trudeau said he had begun a process of "close discussion" with President Reagan, he launched his initiative at the height of an uproar in Canada over the U.S.

invasion of Grenada—a member, like Canada, of the Commonwealth—and of resentment among Canadians over Washington's failure to consult with Ottawa beforehand. The implicit message—that Reagan's actions and rhetoric are drawing the world closer to war—could appeal to anti-American feelings that are deeply rooted in the Canadian psyche, alongside contradictory pro-American impulses. Conceivably, Trudeau could run a campaign in parallel with the U.S. election, drawing ammunition from Democratic criticisms of Reagan.

The big problem with such a strategy is that Canadian voters' attention will not easily be diverted from domestic problems at a time when unemployment is running at more than 12%. If Trudeau fails to shift the political agenda away from domestic bread-and-butter issues, the Progressive Conservative Party under new leader Brian Mulroney (BW—July 11) will be hard for Trudeau, or any Liberal leader, to beat.

DAVID VAN PRAAGH, Special Correspondent, Ottawa

A LABOR PARTY FACEOFF DOWN UNDER

By ignoring controversial foreign-policy positions of his own Australian Labor Party, Prime Minister Bob Hawke has stayed afloat on the tide of popularity that swept him and the party into office last March. But he may soon face a showdown with Labor's left wing on whether to allow mining companies to continue developing the country's enormous uranium deposits.

Until now, Hawke has been able to convince Labor members of Parliament that pragmatism must take priority over ideology if the party is to have any chance of winning a second term. Backed by parliamentary moderates, Hawke has simply disregarded parts of the party platform—planks that call for economic aid to Vietnam, a cutoff of economic and military aid to Indonesia because of its takeover of East Timor, and a ban on visits to Australian ports by U.S. nuclear-powered ships. But uranium mining is a more divisive issue, because opposi-

tion to it is not confined to the party's left wing. A showdown is being forced by a bill introduced by the Australian Democrats—a small party that holds the balance of power in the Senate—to make the mining and export of uranium illegal, punishable offenses.

Hawke should be able to maintain party discipline and win in the Senate by arguing that abandonment of uranium mining would increase unemployment—currently 10.4% and rising—and worsen Australia's serious balance-of-payments problems. Hawke has also warned party members that a cutoff of uranium exports would hurt Australia's reputation abroad as a reliable supplier and weaken its influence in international discussions on nuclear nonproliferation.

PEACE AT A PRICE. Underlying these arguments is the potential importance of uranium in Australia's economic future. The Ranger mine in the Northern Territory is the largest in the world, and a vast new deposit has been discovered in southern Australia adding to known Australian reserves of 683,000 tons, equal to more than one-fifth of the world's total. However, Hawke may face rough treatment on uranium and other issues when his performance as Labor party leader is scrutinized by the ideologues in Labor's state branches at the July party meeting.

Much will depend on his success in managing the economy. Up to now, under a wage restraint agreement by trade unions, Hawke has enjoyed unusual industrial peace—but at a price. The unions insist on full indexation of wages to prices, and they are unwilling to allow the benefits of the incipient economic recovery to be channeled first into profits and investment to create new jobs.

To keep the agreement alive, Hawke supported a 4.3% across-the-board wage hike last month, when the "wage pause," inherited from the government of Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser, ended and the Arbitration Commission, a judicial body, resumed centralized wage fixing. The decision, employers warn, will add 150,000 to the ranks of the unemployed and will slow the recovery.

By June, with inflation expected to rise to around 11%, Hawke's accord with the unions is likely to be severely strained. And waiting in the wings is Foreign Minister Bill Hayden, whom Hawke edged out of party leadership. Hayden has kept open his lines to Labor's left and will be ready to push a more militant course if Hawke's pragmatism falters.

DENIS WARNER, Special Correspondent



PRIME MINISTER HAWKE'S CRITICS OPPOSE URANIUM MINING

Mr. Horlick

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR4058 03NOV83

TO FXTOTT ADDZ

INFO PMOOTT/JOHNSON

---PMS VISIT TO BONN

IF IT WERE CONVENIENT FOR PM AMB WOULD BE PLEASED TO
HAVE HIM STAY AT RESIDENCE. PLS ADVISE.

CCC/242 030920Z ZQGR4058

Reply Delivered by 70900

Many thanks, but
for reasons of ease of
transportation, PM will
stay at hotel with
rest of del.

F.W.
28-6-1-TRUDEAU
20-1-1-1
29 13
28-6-1-TRUDEAU
PEACE for info
MISSION
am

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM BONN 207R1025 03NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 040900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSTONE

DISTR USS DMF RGB RCB RSR RBD IFB

---PMS INITIATIVE ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS-FRG SETTING

ALTHOUGH ONLY BRIEFLY IN BONN, IT IS PERHAPS WORTH SETTING

OUT ASSIST IN YOUR BRIEFING PM FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS.

BASED BOTH ON IMMED AND EARLIER GENEV EXPERIENCE, WHICH

CONSTITUTE SETTING FOR PMS INITIATIVE. FRG CHANCELLOR AND HIS

IMMEDIATE ASSOCIATES ARE FOCUSING ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY,

AMERICAN STYLE, CONSCIOUSLY AT PRESENT LEAVING ASIDE SUBSTANCE

OF EAST/WEST PROBLEM-SOLVING. THIS MEANS THEY SHOULD GENUINELY

WELCOME PMS INTENTIONS (THEY SHARE CONCERN OVER LACK

OF WSHDC-MOSCO DIALOGUE), BUT ARE LIKELY TO FOCUS MAINLY ON

QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW TO MOVE BOTH USA AND USSR DECISION-MAKERS.

PROBLEM WILL BE TO ENGAGE CHANCELLOR IN QUICK BUT PROFOUND

ANALYSIS OF MATTER IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THOUGHT-THROUGH REACTION

REGARDING LONGER-TERM FOLLOWUP. IN SHORT, SYMPATHY MIXED

WITH HANDWRINGING CAN BE EXPECTED, AND IT WILL BE IMPORTANT

TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO GERMAN INTERLOCUTORS ON KIND OF FOLLOW-

ON INTENDED TO PMS VISIT.

2. CURRENT COMMON ASSUMPTION IS THAT FRG IS A TWO-ISSUE COUNTRY,

MISSILE DEPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC SITUATION. EVIDENCE OF THIS IS

SEEN NOT/NOT SIMPLY IN LAST ELECTION TURNAROUND BUT ALSO

IN CURRENT POLITICAL TURMOIL OF ALL GRPS. IN FACT, I SUGGEST THAT

...2

PAGE TWO Z0GR1025 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

IF IT IS A TWO-ISSUE COUNTRY, INCREASINGLY THE TWO ARE DEPLOYMENT AND FUTURE ORIENTATION OF GERMANY, IE WHOLE COMPLEX OF ISSUES INVOLVING GROWING NATIONALISTIC TENDENCIES, WHAT SOME SEE AS INCIPIENT NEUTRALIST TREND, ENDING IN RENEWED CONCERN WITH GERMAN REUNIFICATION. THE ECONOMIC ISSUE HAS DECLINING PROMINENCE FIRST BECAUSE BOTH PARTIES HAVE PROVEN UNABLE TO AFFECT EVENTS (AS CENTRAL BANK CHIEF POHL HAS PRACTICALLY SAID PUBLICLY, AND SAYS EMPHATICALLY IN PRIVATE) AND SECOND BECAUSE USA AND OTHER INTERNATIONALLY BASED TURNAROUND IS SLOWLY BEGINNING TO AFFECT FRG FAVOURABLY. THERE IS THUS NO/NO POLITICAL CHOICE ON ECONOMIC MATTERS AT MOMENT. OTHER ISSUES FG ECOLOGY HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATED BY THE MAJOR PARTIES TO THE DETRIMENT OF FRINGE ONES, AND THE PUBLIC HAS FOCUSED INCREASINGLY ON ISSUE SEPARATING MAJOR PARTIES IE DEPLOYMENT ISSUE.

3. FACT THAT PROTEST MOVEMENTS DISPLAYED SOMEWHAT LESS VIGOUR THAN FORECAST BY THEIR ORGANIZERS DOES NOT/NOT DETRACT FM STRONG GRASSROOTS CONCERN OVER DEPLOYMENT, AND CORRECTNESS THEREFORE OF GOVTS CONCERN OVER THIS PUBLIC ATTITUDE. REACTION TO USA INTERVENTION IN GRENADA WAS TESTTUBE ILLUSTRATION OF GROWING FRG PUBLIC UNEASINESS ABOUT LEAVING DECISIONS ENTIRELY TO USA ADMIN. WHAT PUBLIC SEEMS MOST CONCERNED ABOUT IN DEPLOYMENT DEBATE IS THAT KOHL HAS SUPPORTED WITHOUT RESERVATION USA ADMIN'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY APPROACH. AT HIGHEST LEVEL FRG GOVT IS NOT/NOT CONCERNED CURRENTLY ABOUT MILITARY OR TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF EAST-WEST

...3

PAGE THREE ZQGR1025 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

NEGOTIATION. WITHIN GOVT, CONTROL OF POLICY ON ISSUE SEEMS CENTRED COMPLETELY NOW IN CHANCELLORS OFFICE. GENSCHER SPEAKS OFTEN AND ABROAD, BUT DOMESTIC CONCERN IS WITH WHAT KOHL IS OR IS NOT SAYING OR DOING (AND HE IS ALSO TRAVELLING EXTENSIVELY, FACT OF WHICH GERMAN PUBLIC IS FULLY AWARE). WITHIN BUREAUCRACY (EG IN DISARMAMENT PART OF FOREIGN MINISTRY), THERE IS CONSTERNATION OVER DISAPPEARANCE OF LONGTERM CONSENSUS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH EAST. AT THE MOMENT, ONE SHOULD LOOK VERY CLOSELY TO CHANCELLORS OFFICE AND TELTSCHIK IN PARTICULAR FOR ANY SIGNS OF MOVEMENT. AND TELTSCHIK'S MOTIVATIONS ARE ENTIRELY DOMESTIC POLITICAL ONES UNRELATED TO TECHNICAL OR MILITARY ASPECTS. TO EXTENT PUBLIC CORRECTLY SENSES THIS, IT REACTS BY SAYING QUOTE DEPLOYMENT WON'T WORK UNQUOTE. IE DEPLOYMENT WILL NOT FORCE SOVIETS TO NEGOTIATE. SOMETHING MORE IS NEEDED. KOHL MUST DEAL WITH THIS. AND, AT THIS POINT, LONGSTANDING CONCERN ABOUT GERMANY'S GEO-POLITICAL SITUATION AND REUNIFICATION TAKES OVER. THAT SEEMS TO BE THE CURRENT POPULAR RATIONALIZATION.

4. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, WE SHOULD EXPECT COMPREHENSION OF, SYMPATHY WITH, AND SUPPORT FOR PMS UNDERLYING ARGUMENTATION. THE LIMIT OF FRG CONCERNS HOWEVER COMES WHEN REUNIFICATION FACTOR IS INTRODUCED. THAT IS, WHILE THERE IS A GREAT SIMILARITY IN OUR RESPECTIVE APPROACHES TO EAST/WEST PROBLEMS, INCLUDING NEED FOR DEALING WITH EAST, REUNIFICATION ISSUE HAS AGAIN BECOME

...4

PAGE FOUR ZOGRI025 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

SO SENSITIVE DOMESTICALLY THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO WARN
THAT IT SHOULD NOT/NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED. GENSCHER/GROMYKO
MTG IN VIENNA FTC FULLY REFLECTS THIS REALITY. GENSCHER'S APPROACH
WAS TO FOCUS ON NEED TO PROVIDE FRG SUPPORT FOR ALLIANCE
AND URGENCY OF EAST/WEST DIALOGUE MOSTLY IN HOPE THAT THIS WOULD
SOMEHOW LEAD TO DELAY IN DEPLOYMENT AND RESOLVE ALL ISSUES.
IT IS NOT/NOT UNFAIR TO SAY THAT FEW OPTIONS ARE OFFERED
AS TO HOW THIS CAN HAPPEN. PMS POSITION IS OF COURSE MUCH MORE
SUBSTANTIVE. IN CONTEXT OF BLUE BOOK PROPOSALS, IT SEEMS TO ME
FRG REACTION IS BOUND TO BE WITHIN MORE CAUTIOUS OR LESS
FAR THINKING PARAMETERS. IN OTHER WORDS, FRG POSITION WILL
TO SOME EXTENT APPEAR TO BE THE SAME, BUT IT WILL DIFFER THE
MORE PROFOUND PMS PROPOSITIONS ARE--NOT/NOT FOR FUNDAMENTAL
REASONS, BUT BECAUSE FRG HASN'T YET GONE INTO CURRENT STATE
OF MATTER SO THOROUGHLY.

5. FRG MORE THAN MOST OTHER ALLIANCE MEMBERS SEES NOTHING WRONG
WITH CONSULTATION AND NEGOTIATION BETWEEN EASTERN AND
WESTERN EUROPE, AND FOR THAT MATTER BETWEEN THE FRG AND DDR
(THE PACE OF THIS LATTER CONSULTATION HAS HASTENED GREATLY
IN LAST FEW WEEKS). WHERE THEY HAVE DIFFICULTY IS WITH
INTER-ALLIANCE CONSULTATION OR NEGOTIATION, IE BETWEEN
NATO AND WFO. HENCE WHILE BASED ON GENEVA EXPERIENCE I THINK
THAT THIS IS INDEED ONE OF FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS FOR
CONSIDERATION IN SEARCH FOR ANY NEW ALLIANCE POSTURE AND
AM GLAD BLUE BOOK HAS EXAMINED IT. YET IN TERMS OF BONN,
IT DOES NOT/NOT AT THIS MOMENT APPEAR TO BE PARTICULARLY

...5

000115

PAGE FIVE ZQGR1025 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

PALATABLE. IN PART, THIS FOLLOWS FACT THAT SOME EUROPEANS, BUT FOR NON-EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS TO DO SO IS QUESTIONABLE. IN ANY EVENT, JUST AS WE PRESUMABLY NEED TO THINK THROUGH BLUE BOOK TYPE PROPOSALS, EG ON MEFR, TO GET RIGHT PERSPECTIVE OF OUR OWN INTERESTS, SO FRG IS IN NEED OF CLARIFICATION OF ITS INTERESTS. IT IS LIKELY THEREFORE TO BE SOMEWHAT UNCERTAIN ABOUT SEVERAL OF PMS PROPOSALS, AS FOLLOWING IS INTENDED TO ILLUSTRATE.

6. FRG WILL CERTAINLY SUBSCRIBE TO PMS INTEREST IN THE POLITICAL, IE THEY WILL AGREE RESOLUTION OF EAST/WEST DIFFICULTY CANNOT/NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED BY TECHNICAL (IE DEFENCE) OR BUREAUCRATIC DEBATE. THEY ARE WEDDED TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND MAINTAINING WSHDC-MOSCO DIALOGUE HOWEVER AND FIRST QUESTION THEY WILL ASK, AS WE DO, IS WHAT WILL MOVE THE ALLIANCE. THEIR OWN RESPONSE WILL NOT/NOT BE CLEARCUT. HOWEVER, I SUSPECT FRANKLY THEY WOULD ARGUE THAT A GRP OF WISE ELDER STATESMEN WOULD NOT/NOT HELP MOVE MATTERS IE SUCH INDIVIDUALS WOULD, FM THEIR POINT OF VIEW, PROBABLY NOT/NOT BE BETTER THAN TECHNICIANS BECAUSE ELDER STATESMEN HAVE NO/NO CURRENT POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITIES (THEY WATCHED THE PALME COMMISSION PERFORM WITH BAHR'S FREEWHEELING). THEIR BOTTOM LINE WILL BE QUOTE WHAT DOES IT TAKE TO EFFECT CHANGE IN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S POLICIES UNQUOTE. THE ATTITUDE CONVEYED TO US IS THAT THEY REALISTICALLY KNOW THEY MUST DEAL WITH THE USA ON ITS TERMS. HENCE, THEY WOULD AGREE, LET'S FIND WAYS TO

...6

PAGE SIX ZOGRI025 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

IMPROVE THE YIELD FROM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY BUT LETS NOT/NOT
THINK WE CAN QUICKLY SUPPLANT IT.

7. SIMILARLY, SUGGESTION THAT THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS
SHOULD BE PERSUADED TO SIT AT THE SAME TABLE HOLDS GREAT
ATTRACTION FOR THEM. THEIR OWN EXPERIENCE PERMITS THEM TO
SEE UK, FRENCH AND CHINESE RELUCTANCE AS AN UNWARRANTED
COPOUT OR OPTOUT, DEPENDING UPON THE CIRCUMSTANCES. BUT
THEY KNOW THIS IS NOT/NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO FRG
PERSUASION. INDEED FRG IS GREATLY CONCERNED OVER VERTICAL
PROLIFERATION. IT ASSUMES USA AND USSR ARE NOT/NOT SIMPLY
THE KEY, BUT DOES EXPECT THOSE TWO WILL ENGAGE IN
DISCUSSION ALONE WHEN AND WHERE THEY ARE JOINTLY READY TO
DO SO. I SUSPECT HOWEVER THAT THEY DO NOT/NOT DISCERN
PRESENTLY ANY PROSPECT THAT THE UK, FRENCH AND CHINESE CAN BE
BROUGHT ALONG. IT IS THIS AS MUCH AS ALLIANCE POLICY THAT HAS
LED THEM TO MAKE AMBIGUOUS STATEMENTS LATELY ABOUT THE
COUNTING OR NON-COUNTING OF THEIR EUROPEAN ALLIES MISSILES IN
THE INF. IN SHORT, THE FRG WILL ASK SECOND QUOTE WHAT WILL MOVE
THESE THIRD PARTIES, AND IT WILL RESPOND FOR ITS PART THAT IT
SEES LITTLE PROSPECT OF THIS FOR THE MOMENT.

8. SIMILARLY, THE POSSIBILITY OF A MOVE BY OTHERS ON NON-
PROLIFERATION IN A HORIZONTAL SENSE WILL BE WELCOME. CERTAINLY
THE FRG UNDERSTANDS BETTER THAN MOST WHAT IS INVOLVED IN
NUCLEAR SELF-DENIAL COUPLED WITH THE GEOGRAPHIC FORCE
OF SUCH A DENIAL WITH WHICH WE ARE FAMILIAR. SOMEWHAT

...7

PAGE SEVEN ZOGRI025 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

BITTER, HOWEVER, THE FRG WILL LIKELY ALSO SAY THAT THE REST OF THE WORLD IS LESS COMPREHENDING, JUST AS THE PM NOTED RIGHTLY REGARDING INDIA IN HIS DISCUSSION ON THE BLUE BOOK.

GERMANS WILL EMPHASIZE THEIR BITTERNESS AT LACK OF WILLINGNESS OF THRESHOLD COUNTRIES TO TAKE NEW MEANINGFUL COMMITMENTS TO AVOID HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION AND WOULD AGREE THAT THIS IS A MAJOR AND URGENT ISSUE. BUT AGAIN THEY WILL POSE THE SUBSTANTIVE QUESTION PERHAPS RECAST AS A POLITICAL ONE QUOTE WHAT WILL MAKE THE NON-ALIGNED AND THE NON-NUCLEAR MOVE UNQUOTE. THE GERMAN ANSWER WILL BE THAT THERE MUST BE VERTICAL MOVEMENT FOR THERE TO BE HORIZONTAL BUT, LIKE CDA, THEY KNOW THAT THE SECOND WILL NOT/FOLLOW AUTOMATICALLY FROM THE FIRST, AND THEREAFTER THE CONUNDRUM IS POSED.

9. FINALLY, KOHL IS LIKELY TO ASK PM WHAT IS THE IMMEDIATE CANADIAN INTEREST IN CURRENT SITUATION IE WHAT IS OUR PUBLIC POLICY PROBLEM SINCE THIS IS THE WAY HE VIEWS THESE ISSUES. KOHL IS NOW IN JAPAN WHERE HE IS PROVIDING COMFORT REGARDING ANY INCREASE IN SOVIET SITING OF MISSILES IN FAR EAST. FOR HIS OWN REASONS HE WILL LOOK TO OUR PM FOR SOME COMMENT ON CW ISSUE WHICH IN GERMAN PARLIAMENT OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER SECURITY MATTERS IN STATISTICAL SENSE. (IE THERE ARE MORE QUESTIONS ABOUT STATIONING OF USA CHEMICALS IN FRG THAN ABOUT ANY OTHER SINGLE DEFENCE SUBJECT). THEY WILL REFLECT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

...8

PAGE EIGHT ZQGR1025 SECRET CDN FYES ONLY

APPROACH AND ASK US WHAT WE WANT, WHICH IS NOT/NOT AT ALL LACK OF DEPTH ON THEIR PART BUT RATHER REALIZATION OF PUBLICS SENSITIVITIES EVERYWHERE.

10. MY POINT HAS NOT/NOT BEEN TO TREAT WITH BLUE BOOK SUBSTANCE BUT RATHER TO ILLUSTRATE PROBABLE FRG REACTIONS IN FORM OF QUESTIONS ABOUT WESTERN AND THIRD WORLD PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. (TO GO TO HEART OF MATTER-WHAT WILL MOVE USSR-IS OF COURSE WHAT THE BLUE BOOK IS ABOUT). IN THIS SENSE, MY CONCLUSION IS THAT IN TERMS OF CURRENT FRG GOVT AND PUBLIC INTERESTS AND CONCERNS, PMS INITIATIVE IS RIGHT AND TIMELY. VARIOUS CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS ARE THOSE WHICH APPEARED FM GENEV OVER PAST FEW YEARS TO BE RIGHT ONES BUT EMPHASIS IS ON THE POLITICAL AND THAT IS WHAT IS SO CRITICAL AS KOHL WOULD ARGUE. WHAT WILL BE NEEDED WITH GERMAN INTERLOCUTORS IS CONVINCING PRESENTATION OF HOW PMS PROPOSALS BOTH ON THEIR OWN MERITS AND BY CAREFUL PRESENTATION WILL INUCE DECISION-MAKERS IN USA, USSR, WESTERN ALLIANCE AND THIRD WORLD TO MOVE. THAT IS, THE DEFINITION IN POLITICAL TERMS OF MAJOR PROBLEMS TREATED NEEDS TO BE STRESSED IN ORDER THAT POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS PROPOSED WILL BE READILY CONCEIVABLE WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY APPROACH OF CHANCELLOR KOHL, WHICH TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL ELSE DICTATES THE CURRENT APPROACH OF THE FRG GOVT TO THE ISSUES WHICH THE FM WISHES TO DISCUSS

MCPHAIL

CCC/242 041310Z ZQGR1025

SECRET

November 3, 1983

ME
42

Recent Meetings - Prime Minister/Experts

The meeting with Robert MacNamara covered the substance of his articles in Foreign Affairs. There was, therefore, little new. However, MacNamara did say, that in the Cuban Crisis of 1962, Chip Bolen, George Kennan (then Ambassador in Yugoslavia) and Llewellyn Thomas made a crucial contribution to the successful outcome of the crisis. He said that their intimate knowledge of the Russians and of how best to deal with them was absolutely vital to President Kennedy at that time, and that such expert advice is not available to the current Administration.

[General Rogers was assured that there would no notes taken at lunch.]

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission

General Rogers was asked whether he truly believed that a 4% real increase in NATO Defence Budgets would enable NATO to "catch-up" to the Warsaw Pact in conventional armaments. He said that he thought so, and went on to explain the possibilities of "Emerging Technology" and of "Interdiction of the enemy second echelon" (see his articles and speeches).

He defended the retention of NATO's first-use option, but strongly stated that he very much disliked NATO's undue reliance on a nuclear defence.

The Prime Minister mentioned his four-out-of-five record at NATO summits, mentioned that there was never any honest constructive discussion, and asked whether it was not time for NATO to have a private and honest discussion of its strategy and of how to face the future. Rogers agreed that it was high time, and mentioned that the best and most open discussions were when he invited NATO's Permanent Representatives to his Headquarters for private meetings (of which there have been two and will be more).

On Lebanon, Rogers said that the Armed Forces did not want to send in American troops, and that he personally, having lived through the Viet Nam escalation was very worried about the future extent of U.S. military involvement in Lebanon. He said that once U.S. forces were attacked and there were casualties, it was always very very difficult to avoid building-up U.S. forces and almost impossible to withdraw them. He feared that process taking place again in the Lebanon.

SECRET

- 2 -

On Grenada he said "that was not the Military Solution". He had hoped that "the President in his wisdom would overrule that decision". He saw it as a very poor decision with incalculable effects on the Europeans, and he felt, personally, that it might eventually make a second Reagan Presidency less likely. [Please protect]

The Prime Minister was called away several times to speak to Seaga among others during lunch, but had time to mention the possibility of increasing Canada's conventional forces in Europe and the alternative, much preferable in his view, of reducing all conventional forces at the MBFR talks in Vienna. Rogers thought there was hope for MBFR progress and much of the discussion revolved around this subject. During the Prime Minister's absences, Rogers commented that the Prime Minister had come a hell of a long way in ten years and now understood the East/West situation and the complexities of the Military Balance much better than most people he talked to.

On Saturday October 29 the Prime Minister lunched at the Hotel Pierre in New York. Present were George Kennan, Albert Carnesale (director of the Harvard Nuclear Study Group), Bill Hyland (professor at Georgetown and editor designate of Foreign Affairs) and Ambassadors Gotlieb and Pelletier.

Lunch lasted two hours, the discussion was consistently to the point (i.e. revolved around the Prime Minister's Initiative) and was substantive.

The three Americans seemed agreed that the Reagan Administration did not have the political will to make progress in relations with the Soviet Union.

They agreed also that if progress could be stimulated in some forum it would improve the atmosphere and so make progress more likely in other fora.

George Kennan (unopposed) said he thought the conventional imbalance in Europe was much less than generally supposed. He cited the unreliability of Non-Soviet Pact forces, and the need for Russian troops to control satellite states. He says that much of Warsaw Pact forces are not at all reliable.

SECRET

- 3 -

There was agreement that nuclear weapons are going to spread to other states and that the greatest danger of an eventual nuclear war arises from this circumstance. It was agreed that Non-Proliferation was not a sexy initiative but that it was fundamentally important. There was strong support for tying together vertical and horizontal proliferation so as to put pressure on each group.

Strong support also for putting more pressure on the United States to ratify the Nuclear Test Threshold Treaty already agreed. Ratification would put into effect a stronger verification regime and on-site inspections which would be of advantage to the West. By abiding by the Treaty's provisions though not ratifying it, we lose such advantages.

There was strong support for an eventual amalgamation of all arms talks. The West should put a complete package of how we wish to see the world to the Soviet Union. Everyone acknowledged the difficulties of such an initiative, but agreed that, ultimately, that must be the solution.

Though Bill Hyland said that our major efforts should be concentrated on INF and START, George Kennan strongly disagreed and said (without any prompting) that MBFR was now the place to concentrate. He thought there was room for progress in Vienna. Hyland agreed that progress there would be a symbol - and symbols are important - of East/West progress; he agreed that progress was possible.

Kennan went on to say that the Russians saw the large gesture (non-aggression pact) as the first step with details to follow - this was their nature. While the West saw nailing down details as the first step with grandiose gestures as the culmination of the process. He suggested that the Prime Minister use these cultural differences by asking the Soviet Union to give something in the MBFR negotiations while hinting at, or even offering to them, the equivalent of a Non-aggression Pact later in return. He said we could also offer a "Non-First Use" declaration by NATO as part of such a package.

SECRET

- 4 -

This idea was found acceptable by everyone, and the Prime Minister (in his suite after lunch) asked that this idea be thoroughly studied as it seemed very worthwhile to him. Ambassadors Gotlieb and Pelletier apparently agreed.

The Americans agreed that a proposal for a five nuclear power summit was a good one and that eventually it must happen. They suggested that it might be easier (more practical) to start with four powers, and to invite China to join later. [No-one raised the question of whether this would appear to be a way of including French and British missiles in current talks - as demanded by the Russians and refused by the West.] This idea was not raised by the Prime Minister in the Canadian meeting which took place after lunch.

There was emphatic agreement that Lord Carrington would be a breath of fresh air at NATO HQ, and everyone thought it would be most useful if he were to agree to undertake a study of NATO strategy after being designated, but before taking up his duties, as Security General. The Prime Minister later asked for arrangements to be considered whereby he could get into contact with Carrington very soon after the NAC meeting December 9.

After lunch the Prime Minister asked Ambassador Gotlieb to see if he could make arrangements for the "Third Speech" to be given before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York at lunch on December 13, or, if that were impossible, December 12.

Maurice Archdeacon



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flècheSECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

4 NOV 83 01 40 12

10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0076 03NOV83

TO/À

TO MOSCO

~~DELIVER-BY 040800~~

INFO

INFO LDN PARIS WSHDC BONN ROME HAGUE BRU BNATO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RBR IDD IDA IDR RBD

REF

SUBJ/SUJ

---PM INITIATIVE

TEXT FOLLOWS OF PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM PM TRUDEAU TO ANDROPOV. GRATEFUL

YOU DELIVER ASAP ^{NOV 4} TO MOST SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL AVAILABLE. FULLY APPRE-

CIATE DIFFICULTY OF ACCESS TO GROMYKO BUT IF IT HELPS YOU COULD

MENTION OUR SPECIAL EFFORTS HERE (A) TO INCLUDE SOVIET CHARGE

NOVIKOV AT PRIVATE DINNER WITH PM IN GUELPH JUST PRIOR TO SPEECH,

AND (B) TO ARRANGE CALL FOR NOVIKOV ON DPM/SSEA 31OCT (LATTER'S

FIRST DAY BACK FROM MIDEAST) TO DELIVER MESSAGE FROM GROMYKO.

2. PERSONAL EMISSARY MENTIONED IN MESSAGE NOT/NOT YET NAMED. YOU MIGHT

HOWEVER STRESS IMPORTANCE WE PLACE ON HIS BEING RECEIVED BY ^{GROMYKO AND} UPPER

POLICY ECHELON OF SOVIET SYSTEM, NOT/NOT JUST MFA, E.G. ALEXANDROV-

AGENTOV, ASSUMING HE IS STILL IN PLACE. QUALITY OF EMISSARY'S

RECEPTION WILL BE ONE EARLY FACTOR IN DETERMINING WHETHER PM VISIT

TO MOSCO WOULD HAVE PROSPECTS OF BEING DEALT WITH BY ANDROPOV HIM-

SELF AND OF PRODUCING CONCRETE RESULTS.

3. IN EVENT SOVIETS AGREE TO EMISSARY, BE ASSURED WE WISH YOU TO

ACCOMPANY HIM THROUGHOUT AND YOU MAY SO INDICATE. NO/NO DECISION ON

WHO WOULD ACCOMPANY FROM OTT BUT GROUP IN TOTAL PROBABLY NO/NO

MORE THAN FOUR. -----

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG P. HANCOCK

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG

L.A. Delvoite



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

4 NOV 83 01 40Z

PAGE TWO IDDZ0076 CONFIDENTIAL

12

10

4.TEXT BEGINS.

(COMCENTRE: PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)

TEXT ENDS.

5.SIGNED TEXT BY BAG.





CANADA

PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, KIA 0A2

TEXT BEGINS

Dear Mr. President,

I was grateful to receive the detailed account of Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow which was transmitted to me on your behalf. I have continued to reflect on the subjects raised in that report and, along the lines of my letter to you of August 1, 1983, on the need for greater political efforts to reduce the level of East-West tension.

Since August there has been no visible improvement. This is partly due to lack of progress in the central issues of political dialogue and arms control, and partly due to troubling events such as the tragic destruction of a civilian passenger aircraft, terrorism in Lebanon, and recent developments in Grenada.

I have, in recent days, begun to articulate my deep concern at current levels of tension, and at the absence of productive political dialogue, particularly between East and West.

Given the central importance of the Soviet Union in any international effort to promote stability and security, and given the special responsibility of leaders, I have decided to communicate to you, and to other leaders, my concerns and purpose.

.... /2

His Excellency Yuri Andropov
President of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet
Moscow, USSR

I believe it essential that the most senior political levels of the East-West system begin to repair lines of communication, to work to contain unforeseen crises, and to rebuild a sense of authentic confidence in our respective intentions. The consequences of accident/or ³ miscalculation are too great for this effort not to begin. Therefore my purpose in the weeks ahead will be to develop, in cooperation with other leaders who share my concern, specific steps which might reverse the current downward path.

Your personal cooperation, Mr. President, and that of your colleagues in the Soviet leadership, are essential to the achievement of positive results. Therefore I would like to propose, as a first step, that I send to Moscow a senior personal emissary who would consult with your advisors or associates about my initiative, and who would seek your own perspective on further work. If you agree, I think it would be desirable for him to visit Moscow early in the second half of November.

My emissary will wish to review a range of proposals which I have in mind. They include an approach to political confidence-building; ways to ensure political momentum at the force reduction talks in Vienna and possibly other multilateral fora as well; and ways of taking a global approach to security questions, including both the key role of all five nuclear powers, and the vital question of non-proliferation.

I attach the utmost importance to your own personal role in the restoration of confidence and stability. Thus I look forward to your early response to my proposal of a personal emissary. If you share my general concern, I also look forward to any further consultations which we might deem useful.

I take this opportunity, Mr. President, to send my best personal wishes to you and to your colleagues.

Yours sincerely, with kind
regards

P. E. Trudeau

TEXT ENDS



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

O T T A W A, KIA 0A2

November 3, 1983

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

Dear Mr. President,

I was grateful to receive the detailed account of Chancellor Kohl's visit to Moscow which was transmitted to me on your behalf. I have continued to reflect on the subjects raised in that report and, along the lines of my letter to you of August 1, 1983, on the need for greater political efforts to reduce the level of East-West tension.

Since August there has been no visible improvement. This is partly due to lack of progress in the central issues of political dialogue and arms control, and partly due to troubling events such as the tragic destruction of a civilian passenger aircraft, terrorism in Lebanon, and recent developments in Grenada.

I have, in recent days, begun to articulate my deep concern at current levels of tension, and at the absence of productive political dialogue, particularly between East and West.

Given the central importance of the Soviet Union in any international effort to promote stability and security, and given the special responsibility of leaders, I have decided to communicate to you, and to other leaders, my concerns and purpose.

.... /2

His Excellency Yuri Andropov
President of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet
Moscow, USSR

I believe it essential that the most senior political levels of the East-West system begin to repair lines of communication, to work to contain unforeseen crises, and to rebuild a sense of authentic confidence in our respective intentions. The consequences of accident or miscalculation are too great for this effort not to begin. Therefore my purpose in the weeks ahead will be to develop, in cooperation with other leaders who share my concern, specific steps which might reverse the current downward path.

Your personal cooperation, Mr. President, and that of your colleagues in the Soviet leadership, are essential to the achievement of positive results. Therefore I would like to propose, as a first step, that I send to Moscow a senior personal emissary who would consult with your advisors or associates about my initiative, and who would seek your own perspective on further work. If you agree, I think it would be desirable for him to visit Moscow early in the second half of November.

My emissary will wish to review a range of proposals which I have in mind. They include an approach to political confidence-building; ways to ensure political momentum at the force reduction talks in Vienna and possibly other multilateral fora as well; and ways of taking a global approach to security questions, including both the key role of all five nuclear powers, and the vital question of non-proliferation.

I attach the utmost importance to your own personal role in the restoration of confidence and stability. Thus I look forward to your early response to my proposal of a personal emissary. If you share my general concern, I also look forward to any further consultations which we might deem useful.

I take this opportunity, Mr. President, to send my best personal wishes to you and to your colleagues.

Yours sincerely, *with kind
regards.*

B. L. ...



TO/A ZSSG
FROM/DE • IDDZ

28-6-1 = Trudeau Peace
Mission

REFERENCE • Parking Privileges for C. Forgues
RÉFÉRENCE
SUBJECT • Prime Minister's Task Force on East-West
SUJET Relations and International Security (IDDZ)

Security/Sécurité	UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	November 3, 1983.
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0075

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

Mlle Christiane Forgues has been assigned to work with this Task Force for its duration (i.e. until the end of December). The Task Force requires staff who are able to work nights and weekends on a regular basis. We have been fortunate in obtaining the services of Mlle Forgues who is willing to work all of the hours required. However, to accommodate us in the work of this important Task Force, it would be greatly appreciated if parking privileges could be provided for Mlle Forgues during this time when she is required to be available for work at any time.

Any assistance you can give us in this regard to facilitate the work of this important Task Force would be very much appreciated.

L.A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ C O N F I D E N T I A L 3 NOV 83 22 07z 12 10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0074 03NOV83

TO/À TO PARIS BONN ROME HAGUE BRU LDN DELIVER BY 040900

INFO

DISTR INFO CANDELNATO WSHDC MOSCO PCOOTT/FOWLER

REF

SUBJ/SUJ DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RSR RCR RBD RBR UGB URR CPD IDR IDA

---PM INITIATIVE-VISIT TO EUROPE

FOLLOWING FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFO IS STATEMENT OF CENTRAL PURPOSES OF PM VISIT TO EUROPE AND MTGS WITH SIX HEADS OF GOVT. QUOTE.

(A) TO INFORM HIS COLLEAGUES OF HIS CURRENT CONCERNS AND PREOCCUPATIONS REGARDING EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INNATL SECURITY SITUATION.

(B) TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY SHARE HIS PERCEPTIONS, AND IN PARTICULAR HIS DIAGNOSIS THAT SITUATION REQUIRES FIRST AND FOREMOST REESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND CONFIDENCE AT HIGHEST LEVEL BETWEEN EAST AND WEST (THE QUOTE THIRD RAIL UNQUOTE).

(C) TO PROPOSE THAT THIS DIALOGUE BE REESTABLISHED BY INCREMENTAL STEPS, INCLUDING IN FIRST INSTANCE CONTACTS WITH SOVIET LEADERSHIP BY HIMSELF AND ^{SOME} OTHER WESTERN LEADERS, WHICH CONTACTS MIGHT EVENTUALLY FAVOUR RESUMPTION OF HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN WSHDC AND MOSCO UNDER MORE POSITIVE CONDITIONS THAN THOSE NOW PREVAILING.

(D) TO PROPOSE A NUMBER OF SPECIFIC MEASURES WHICH MIGHT, FURTHER CAUSE OF ARMS CONTROL AND WHICH, IF THEY PERMITTED PROGRESS IN THIS AREA, MIGHT HELP TO ARREST DETERIORATION IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THUS SERVE TO IMPROVE PROSPECTS FOR REESTABLISHMENT OF HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND CONFIDENCE.

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
L.A. Delvoie/sc SIG	IDDZ	5-2394	 SIG L.A. DELVOIE



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

12

10

~~PAGE TWO~~ IDDZ0074 CONFIDENTIAL

(E) TO CANVASS VIEWS AND REACTIONS OF HIS COLLEAGUES TO THESE PRO-
POSALS AND TO ELICIT THEIR VIEWS AS TO HOW THEY MIGHT MOST PRODUC-
TIVELY BE CARRIED FORWARD.

(F) TO ENLIST SUPPORT OF HIS COLLEAGUES FOR HIS GENERAL PLAN OF
ACTION. UNQUOTE.

2.PM DOES NOT/NOT INTEND TO RAISE BILATERAL ISSUES IN ANY OF CAPITALS
TO BE VISITED. HE HOPES THAT DISCUSSIONS WITH HEADS OF GOVT CAN FOCUS
EXCLUSIVELY ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INNATL SECURITY SITUATION.
YOU SHOULD INFORM HOST GOVT AUTHORITIES ACCORDINGLY.



TO/À • IDDZ

FROM/DE • IFB

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Prime Minister's Initiative and CHOGM:
SUJET Australian Views.

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission
MF
RD

Security/Sécurité
CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
November 3, 1983
Number/Numéro
IFB-89

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

IMC

PPR

- ...
- Attached is a record of a conversation I had today with John Bailey of the Australian High Commission, drafted in the form of a telegram which you may wish to send out with any amendments you may think necessary in the light of your knowledge of Prime Minister's thinking. The line I took was based largely on our meeting this week with the PCO to discuss CHOGM.
2. The Task Force may wish to consider the advisability of an early message from the Prime Minister to Hawke in view of the helpful noises about the initiatives that seem to be coming from Canberra.
3. I suppose that if we write to the Australian Prime Minister, we should also write to Muldoon.

Michael Shenstone

Michael Shenstone,
Assistant Deputy Minister,
Political and International
Security Affairs.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PARIS WIGR5246 03NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 031400

INFO BRU ROME HAGUE BONN LDN PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR IDDZ MGT RGB RCR RSR RBD

---PM INITIATIVE PARIS

VISIT CO-ORDINATOR GILLES LANDRY HOME PHONE 555-7116.

2.ACCOMODATION HOTEL RITZ PLACE VENDOME, PARIS.

ROOMS ALLOCATED AS FOLLOWS:

329/330 - PM SUITE (EQUIPPED AS REQUESTED)

331 - JOHNSON

332 - BEAULIEU

333 - COLFMAN

334 - VIAU

335 - OFFICE

336 - SMITH

337 - FOWLER

TOTAL COST 36,000 FF APPROX DLRS 5,600 TO BE SETTLED THROUGH EMBASSY.
BECAUSE OF EARLY ARRIVAL NOV 8, ALL ROOMS MUST BE RESERVED AS OF
NOV 7 (I.E. TWO NIGHTS). ROOMS TO BE PREREGISTERED IF WE CAN SECURE
FOR EACH PERSON THEIR DATE OF BIRTH, PASSPORT NUMBER AND PERMANENT
ADDRESS. PLS FORWARD BY RETURN TEL.

3.TRANSPORT: LIMOUSINE AND TWO SEDANS WITH CHAUFFEURS RENTED FOR
NOV 8. EMBASSY VAN AVAILABLE FOR LUGGAGE OF PASSENGERS TO BE

...2

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

PAGE TWO WIGR5246 CONF

ACCOMPANIED TO AND FROM AIRPORT BY B.MABLEY:264.7273.

4.FLIGHT 3906 TO LAND AT ORLY AND CHALLENGER FLIGHT 3908 TO DEPART ORLY AT 1700.TRAVEL TIME TO RITZ APPROX ONE HOUR WHILE FM RITZ SLIGHTLY LONGER IN AFTERNOON.

5.DEL OFFICE TO BE SET UP WITH DESK,TYPEWRITER,PHOTOCOPIER,CABINET PLUS SECRETARY F.DESILETS FM EMBASSY.

6.TEL PACKS TO BE DELIVERED TO HOTEL ON ARRIVAL OF DEL AT 0830 AND AS REQUIRED DURING DAY.

7.COMCENTER WILL BE OPENED FROM 070600Z TO 072359Z AND 080500Z TO 082359Z.MRS STRICKLAND WILL BE ON STANDBY HOME PHONE NBR 267.24.02.

8.WILL ANSWER OTHER QUESTIONS RE ARRIVAL SCENARIO AFTER MEETING WITH QUAI PROTOCOLE,AS SOON AS THEY CAN SPARE US TIME FROM THEIR PREPARING ALGERIAN PRESIDENT CHADLI'S VISIT NOV 7 TO 10.

CCC/027 031630Z WIGR5246

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned 1 3 3

Person 1712
Local Time

NONCLASSIFIE

DE PARIS WIGR5244 03NOV83

A FXTOTT IDDZ LIVRAISON 031300

INFO LDN MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUF
WSHDC MOSCO BNATO FRMNY CNGNY GENEV TOKYO PCOOTT/FOWLER
PMOOTT/COLEMAN NDHOOTT/MND/CDS/ATMPOL/CPG CHCGO LNGLS
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR IDD IDA IDR FPR
RFF NOTRETEL WIGR5243 03NOV

---INITIATIVE PM:ACTION PRESSE FRANCAISE

CI-APRES TEXTF INTITULE CIT UNE INITIATIVE DE M.TRUDEAU FINCIT.

FIDELE A L IDEE OU IL SE FAIT DU ROLF INTERNATIONAL DE SON
PAYS,M.FIEBRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU ENTREPREND LA SEMAINE PROCHAINE UNE
TOURNEE EN EUROPE AU COURS DE LAQUELLE IL VA PROPOSER SES PONS
OFFICES POUR TENTER DE RETABLIR LA CONFIANCE ENTRE L EST ET
L OUFST.LE CHEF DU GOUVERNEMENT CANADIEN SE RENDRA SUCCESSIVEMENT
A PARIS,OU IL SERA REGU MARDI 8 NOVEMBRE PAR M.MITTFRAND,LA HAYE,
BRUXELLES,ROME,BONN ET LONDRES.M.TRUDEAU EST PERSUADE QUE LA
TENSION A ATTEINT UN NIVEAU CIT ALARMANT FINCIT ET QU IL EST TEMPS
DE RETABLIR LE CONTACT AVEC MOSCOU.

CETTE DEMARCHE CONSTITUE UNE CRITIQUE IMPLICITE DE L ATTITUDE DE
L ADMINISTRATION REAGAN.SI M.TRUDEAU S ADRESSE EN PRIORITE AUX
EUROPENS,C EST QU IL N ESPERE RIEN POUR LE MOMENT,OU PAS
GRAND-CHOSE,DE M.REAGAN.CERTES,OTTAWA APPUIE LA DECISION DE L OTAN
D INSTALLER EN EUROPE LES PERSHING-2 ET LES MISSILES DE CROISIERE

...2

PAGE DEUX WIGR5244 NONCLAS

ET PERMET L'EXPERIMENTATION DE CES DERNIERS SUR SON TERRITOIRE, MALGRÉ LES PROTESTATIONS DES PACIFISTES; MAIS LE CANADA ESTIME EN MEME TEMPS QUE WASHINGTON DEVRAIT EVITER D'AVOIR RECOURS, A CHAQUE OCCASION, A LA CIT DIPLOMATIE DU MEGAPHONE FINCIT.

DANS UN RECENT DISCOURS PRONONCE A L'UNIVERSITE DE GUELPH, DANS L'ONTARIO, M. TRUDFAU A VOULU ALLER AU-DELA DU PROBLEME MILITAIRE SPECIFIQUE QUI SE POSE ACTUELLEMENT POUR EBAUCHER UNE PHILOSOPHIE DES RELATIONS GLOBALES ENTRE L'EST ET L'OUEST. LES DIVERGENCES, A CE NIVEAU, SONT FLAGRANTES AVEC L'ADMINISTRATION REAGAN. M. TRUDFAU SOUHAITE L'INSTAURATION D'UNE CIT UN CLIMAT DE COMPREHENSION STABLE ENTRE L'EST ET L'OUEST, QUI SUPPOSE LA RECONNAISSANCE RECIPROQUE DES BESOINS LEGITIMES DE SECURITE, UN DIALOGUE PERMANENT A UN HAUT NIVEAU ET UNE ATTITUDE FERME DANS LA GESTION DES CRISES FINCIT. SEUL CE DERNIER POINT RECEVRAIT L'ASSENTIMENT SANS RESTRICTION DE M. REAGAN.

LE PREMIER MINISTRE CANADIEN SE VEUT DONC UN PARTENAIRE CIT LOYAL FINCIT, MAIS NON PAS CIT SILENCIEUX FINCIT, DE L'ALLIANCE ATLANTIQUE. IL ESTIME QUE LA DETENTE, CONTRAIREMENT A UNE OPINION ASSEZ REPANDUE DANS L'ENTOURAGE DU PRESIDENT AMERICAIN, CIT A EU DES EFFETS BENEFIQUES EVIDENTS FINCIT. IL REFUSE L'IDEE D'UNE SORTIE DE BLOCUS ECONOMIQUE, POLITIQUE ET MORAL DE L'UNION SOVIETIQUE PUISSE PRODUIRE DES RESULTATS CONSTRUCTIFS. SA VISITE EN EUROPE, S'IL LA JUGE POSITIVE, SERA PEUT-ETRE SUIVIE D'UN VOYAGE

PAGE TROIS WIGR5244 NONCLAS

A MOSCOU, PRELUDE A CE SOMMET ENTRE MM. REAGAN ET ANDROPOV OUF
M. TRUDEAU APPELLE DE SES VOEUX, MAIS QUI, A L'HEURE ACTUELLE, PARAIT
PLUS ELOIGNE OUF JAMAIS.

L'ORIGINE DE LA DEMARCHE DU PREMIER MINISTRE CANADIEN REMONTE
A L'AFFAIRE DU BOEING SUD-CORéen. SEULE VOIX DISCORDANTE DANS LE
CONCERT OCCIDENTAL, M. TRUDEAU AVAIT ESTIME ALORS QU'IL NE FALLAIT
PAS TRAITER LES DIRIGEANTS SOVIETIQUES CIT COMME DES MEURTRIERS DE
SANG-FROID FINCI ET QU'EN LES CONSIDERANT AU CONTRAIRE COMME CIT
DES ETRES HUMAINS FINCI ON FAVORISAIT UNE CIT DESFSCALADE DANS LA
GUERRE FROIDE FINCI. M. TRUDEAU AVAIT ETE FRAPPE, LORS DE CE QU'IL
AVAIT QUALIFIE DE CIT TRAGIQUE ACCIDENT FINCI, PAR LA DEGRADATION
MANIFESTE DES RELATIONS ENTRE L'EST ET L'OUEST.

LE PREMIER MINISTRE CANADIEN DISPOSE DE QUELQUES ATOUTS POUR LA
MISSION DONT IL S'EST LUI-MEME INVESTI. TOUT D'ABORD, WASHINGTON N'A
PAS ELEVE D'OBJECTION. LE CANADA DISPOSE D'UNE MARGE D'AUTONOMIE PAR
RAPPORT AUX ETATS-UNIS, QUI LUI PERMET DE LANCER, SANS RISQUER DE SE
RIDICULISER, CE GENRE D'INITIATIVE. M. TRUDEAU DEVRAIT D'AUTRE PART
TROUVER QUELQUES OREILLES FAVORABLES EN EUROPE, A COMMENCER PAR
CELLE DE M. MITTERRAND. LE PRESIDENT FRANCAIS EST UN DES PARTENAIRES
OCCIDENTAUX LES PLUS FERMES A L'EGARD DE L'U.R.S.S., MAIS IL NE
PEUT QUE SOUSCRIRE AUX EFFORTS SINCERES D'UN PAYS QUI REFUSE LA
LOGIQUE DES BLOCS.

RESTE L'ESSENTIEL, C'EST-A-DIRE M. ANDROPOV. TOUTE LA CONSTRUCTION DE
M. TRUDEAU REPOSE SUR L'HYPOTHESE QUE CE DERNIER SOUHAITE, LUI AUSSI,
RETABLIR UN DIALOGUE POLITIQUE AVEC L'OUEST. RIEN, POUR L'INSTANT, NE
PERMET DE LE SUPPOSER.

UUU/047 031559Z WIGR5244

000138

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned _____

Person _____

Local Time _____

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T E

DE PARIS WIGR5243 3NOV83

A EXTOTT IDDZ LIVRAISON 031300

INFO LDN MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUF

WSHDC MOSCO BNATO PRMNY CNGNY GENEV TOKYO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/

COLEMAN NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPF

SFAX CHCGO LNGLS DE OTT

DIST MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR IDD IDA IDR FPR

REF NOTRETEL (NOTAL) WIFC6645 02NOV

--- INITIATIVE PM: ACTION PRESSE PARIS.

VOUS TRANSMETTONS PAR BELINO TEXTE DE L EDITORIAL EN PAGE 1 DU

JOURNAL LE MONDE DATE 04NOV, INTITULE CIT UNE INITIATIVE DE

M. TRUDEAU FINCIT QUI FAIT SUITE AU DEJEUNER/BRIEFING OFFERT PAR

AMBASSADEUR HIFR POUR REPS INFLUENTS DE PRESSE FRANCAISE.

CCC/027 031559Z WIGR5243

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MF
Division Phoned _____

Person _____

Local Time _____

CONFIDENTIEL

DE PARIS WIGR5241 03NOV83

A EXTOTT IDDZ FLASH

INFO BRU BONN BNATO LDN HAGUE ROME WSHDC MOSCO PCOOTT/FOWLER
NDHQOTT/PPP/ADMPPOL/DGIS/CIS

DISTR MINE USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RSR RCR RBR IDD IDA IDR FPR
RFF NOTRTEL WIGR5235 02NOV

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission
--- INITIATIVE DU PM TRUDEAU/PREMIERS COMMENTAIRES DU QUAI
SOMMAIRE: PREMIERES REACTIONS RECUEILLIES DE ANDREANI (DIR POL
AU MRE) FURENT SOBRES ET PRUDENTES MAIS GLOBALEMENT POSITIVES ET
ATTENTIFS VIS-A-VIS DE INITIATIVE DU PM CDN. CETTE RELATIVE
PRUDENCE S EXPLIQUE SANS DOUTE PAR INTERROGATIONS QUI SUBSISTENT
A CE STADE-CI, PARTICULIEREMENT SUR MOYENS ENVISAGES POUR MISE EN
OEUVRE DE INITIATIVE (NOTAMMENT EVENTUALITE D UNE VISITE A MOSCOU).
SUR LE FOND, CONSTATONS CEPENDANT UNE ANALYSE TRES SIMILAIRE DE LA
PART DE LA FRANCE DU CLIMAT INTERNATL ACTUEL ET DE SES TENSIONS.
2. RAPPORT. AMB DUPUY A RENCONTRE, 2NOV, ANDREANI, DIR POL AU QUAI
ET RECUEILLI PREMIERS COMMENTAIRES SUR INITIATIVE ET SUR DISCOURS
DU PM A GUELPH. RAPPELONS QUE TEXTE LUI EN AVAIT ETE REMIS 27OCT.
3. APRES UN EXPOSE SUR NATURE DE APPROCHE DU PM, SUR SON SFNS/SO
OBJET/SES OBJECTIFS ET SUR PREOCCUPATIONS QUI LA MOTIVENT, ANDREANI
A D ABORD, EN REPONSE, SOULIGNE QUE ANALYSE DU PM SEMBLAIT DRESSER
UN CONSTAT EN DEUX DIMENSIONS DE DEGRADATION DES RELATIONS EST/
OUEST. SELON LUI, IL IMPORTAIT DE PRECISER ENTRE DETERIORATION LIFE

...2

PAGE DEUX WIGR5241 CONF

AUX NEGOCIATIONS SUR INF ET CELLE DUF A DES FACTEURS BIEN ANTERIEURS. SELON ANDREANI, DETERIORATION REMONTE EN FAIT A 1975 (SI ON VEUT LA FIXER DANS LE TEMPS) ET AUX MALENTENDUS QUI ONT PROLIFERE CONCERNANT L APPLICATION DES ACCORDS D HELSINKI. CES MALENTENDUS SONT DIVERS, TECHNIQUES/POLITIQUES/PHILOSOPHIQUES ET N ONT CESSÉ DE S ACCENTUER DEPUIS LORS, TOUT EN CONTRIBUANT A DISSIPER ILLUSIONS DE LA DETENTE. NEGOCIATIONS SUR INF ET TENSIONS QUI LES CARACTERISENT NE CONSTITUENT QU UN PHENOMENE RECENT D UN PROCESSUS DE DEGRADATION AUX ORIGINES ANTERIEURES, MAIS QUI S INSCRIVENT DANS FOULEE D UNE MEME ACCELERATION DES TENSIONS. AVONS, SUR CE, PRECISE A ANDREANI QUE INF N ETAIENT PAS SEUL ET UNIQUE FACTEUR DETERMINANT ET QUE LECTURE DU PM PARTICIPAIT D UNE VISION GLOBALE CERTES AMPLIFIEE PAR EVENEMENTS RECENTS, DONT, AFFAIRE DU BOFING COREEN.

4. QUANT AUX CAUSES PROFONDES DE SITUATION ACTUELLE, ANDREANI TEND A LES ATTRIBUER NOTAMMENT A VISION EGALITAIRE A DEUX POIDS DEUX MESURES TELLE QUE PRECONISEE PAR URSS. SELON LUI, URSS PRECHE, POUR LES AUTRES PAYS QU'ELLE MEME, UNE NOTION D'EGALITE FAISANT APPEL A DES VALEURS ET DES PRINCIPES QUI N'ONT PAS MEME SENS OU MEME PORTEE (I.E" TRADUCTION DANS LA PRATIQUE) QUE POUR PAYS OCCIDENTAUX. CETTE VISION, LORSQU ELLE EST DENONCEE ET CRITIQUEE PAR OCCIDENT, ENTRAINE CHEZ URSS UNE REACTION IMMEDIATE D INSECURITE QUI SE TRADUIT PAR UN BESOIN DE SECURITE ACCRUE, ET CECI, SOUS PRETEXTE DE SA DIFFERENCE OU MEME DE IDEAL SOCIALISTE. EN BREF,

...3

PAGE TROIS WIGR5241 CONF

EGALITE IMPLIQUE INEVITABLEMENT POUR SOVIETIQUES UN PLUS EN LEUR FAVEUR.

5. PAR CONSÉQUENT, ANDREANI S'INTERROGE POUR SAVOIR DANS QUELLE MESURE IL INCOMBE À L'OCCIDENT, ET INEVITABLEMENT PAR DES CONCESSIONS ADDITIONNELLES, DE SORTIR URSS DU GUEPIER DANS LEQUEL ELLE S'EST ELLE-MÊME PLACÉE. À CE TITRE, SI URSS SE RETIRAIT DES NEGOCIATIONS OU LES DIFFÉRAIENT, DANS QUELLE MESURE APPARTIENNT-IL (ENCORE) À L'OUEST DE FAIRE DE NOUVELLES CONCESSIONS POUR ÉVITER À L'URSS CUL-DE-SAC DANS LEQUEL SON ATTITUDE L'ENTRAÎNE.

6. CFCI AMÈNE ANDREANI À S'INTERROGER SUR FAÇON POUVANT PERMETTRE DE ROMPRE CE CERCLE VICIEUX. EN L'ÉTAT ACTUEL DES CHOSSES, CONTACTS PERSONNELS ENTRE DIRIGEANTS (ET MÊME ÉVENTUELLEMENT RENCONTRE ULTIME ANDROPOV/REAGAN) SONT-ILS MOYENS POUR OBTENIR CHANGEMENT D'ATTITUDE DE URSS, SI CE NE SONT DES CONCESSIONS ADDITIONNELLES. CE QUE CONSTATE ANDREANI, C'EST QU'À TROP VOULOIR INTOXIUER, URSS S'EST INTOXIUÉE ELLE-MÊME.

7. ANDREANI NOTE, AVEC INTÉRÊT, LE FAIT QUE PM CDN N'IMPUTE PAS RESPONSABILITÉ DE SITUATION ACTUELLE NI À ANDROPOV NI À REAGAN. IL CONSTATE PLUTÔT, ET EN RECONNAÎT LE MÉRITE, QU'IL RENVOIE POUR AINSI DIRE CES DEUX PROTAGONISTES DOS À DOS.

8. REVENANT AUX MOYENS, ANDREANI N'A PAS MANQUÉ DE SOULIGNER MENTION FAITE DANS DISCOURS D'UNE CONFÉRENCE DES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES. SUR CE POINT, IL A TENU À RAPPELER CONDITIONS DÉJÀ ÉNONCÉES PAR PRES MITTERRAND DANS SON DISCOURS DEVANT AGNU (28 SEP)

...4

PAGE QUATRE WIGR5241 CONF

I.E.(A) CORRECTION DANS DIFFERENCE DE NATURE ET DE QUANTITE
QUI SEPARER ARSENAUX DES DEUX GRANDS DES AUTRES (B) PROGRES
SIGNIFICATIFS DANS REDUCTION DES DESEQUILIBRES/ECARTS ENTRE FORCES
CONVENTIONNELLES ET QUE DISPARAISSENT MENACES CHIMIQUES/BACTERIO-
LOGIQUES (C) ET ENFIN CESSATION DE SURENCHERE TECHNOLOGIQUE RE
ABM/ESPACE. CECI A-T-IL PRECISE EST TOUT A FAIT INDEPENDANT DES
NEGOCIATIONS FNI/START DONT RAISONS POUR NON PRISE EN COMPTE DU
DISPOSITIF FRANCAIS SONT CONNUES.IL NE FAUT PAS/PAS,
SELON ANDREANI,QUE L ON TOMBE DANS TENTATION DE CONSIDERER
PRISE EN COMPTE DU DISPOSITIF FRANCAIS (ET BRITANNIQUE)COMME
UN ELEMENT DE SOLUTION A UNE SITUATION DONT BLOCAGE ET SA
RESPONSABILITE INCOMBENT A APPROCHE ET ATTITUDE DE USSR

9. SUR IDEE DE INEFFICACITE DES FORUM ACTUELS,DU TYPE OTAN/
WILLIAMSBURG,POUR PERMETTRE AUX CHEFS D ETAT DE TRAITER EN
PROFONDEUR DES QUESTIONS DE SECURITE ET DE RAPPORTS EST/OUEST,
ANDREANI S EST FAIT L ECHO DU PRES MITTERRAND QUI A DEJA DECLARE,
APRES DERNIER SOMMET DES SEPT,SA DECEPTION QUANT A FORMULE.
ANDREANI N A PAS CACHE QUE DU COTE FRANCAIS,ON S INQUIETAIT
DU COTE SPECTACLE APORTE A CES RENCONTRES AU DETRIMENT D UNE
VERITABLE CONCERTATION.

10. RETENONS DES COMMENTAIRES D ANDREANI :

(A) D ABORD, UN CERTAIN FATALISME SANS DOUTE VOISIN DE CELUI QUE

...5

PAGE CINQ WIGR5241 CONFD

CONSTATE PM DANS SON ALLOCUTION MAIS QUI INCITE PRECISEMENT CELUI-CI
A FAIRE QUELQUE CHOSE DE PLUS;

(B) UNE INTERROGATION PROFONDE SUR C'EST LA FAÇON FINIT D'OBTENIR
DES SOVIETIQUES DES CONCESSIONS, OU MEME PLUS SIMPLEMENT UN CHAN-
GEMENT D'ATTITUDE. EN CE SENS, CONTACTS PERSONNELS ET DIALOGUE
RAVIVÉ SONT-ILS MEILLEURES AVENUES?

(C) ENFIN, UNE CERTAINE TENTATION DE S'EN REMETTRE, EN TERME DE
MOYENS, AUX INSTANCES EXISTANTES (RE CDE) ET CELA FORT DES CONDITIONS
SPECIFIQUES PROPRES A LA FRANCE ET AUX IMPERATIFS QUI SONT SIFNS
POUR SON INDEPENDANCE ET SA SECURITE.

CCC/027 031709Z WIGR5241

INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BRU ZVAG5105 03NOV83

TO FMOOTT/HUDON DELIVER BY 031200

INFO EXTOTT LDDZ PARIS HAGUE ROME BONN LDN

RFF YOURTEL PM01226 02NOV

---P.M. S VISIT ADMIN ARRANGEMENTS

WE CONFIRM 20 SWB ROOMS, RESERVED AT RAMADA HOTEL, 39 CHAUSSEE
DE CHARLFROI, BRUSSELS, TEL: 539-3000.

UNFORTUNATELY NO ROOMS AVAILABLE IN ANY SUITABLE HOTEL CLOSER
TO PM S HOTEL.

2. HIRE A BUS SUBJECT OF FURTHER TEL.

UUU/133 031602Z ZVAG5105

28-6-1 - Hudson Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BRU ZVAG5104 03NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 031100

INFO BREEC BNATO CANMILREPNATO PARIS ROME HAGUE BONN LDN

PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR IDDZ MGT RGB RCR RSR RBD

REF YOURTEL XDV1047 31OCT OURTEL ZVAG5006 02NOV

---PM S VISIT-ADMIN ARRANGEMENTS

RE PARA 5 YOUREFTEL0ARICRAFT TO ARRIVE BRUSSELS AT MELSROFK
AIRPORT. BELGIAN AUTHORITIES TO PROVIDE OFFICIAL LIMO FOR PM
AND ESCORT THROUGHOUT VISIT. AS REQUESTED ARRANGEMENTS MADE FOR
YVES BEAULIEU TO TRAVEL IN ESCORT VEHICLE WHICH WILL FOLLOW
LIMOUSINE. OTHER TRANSPORTATION FOR PARTY AND LUGGAGE TO BE
ARRANGED BY EMBASSY. TRAVEL TIME AIRPORT TO HOTEL WITH ESCORT
APPROX 20-25 MINUTES.

COORDINATOR WILL ENSURE PM S LUGGAGE PLACED IN LIMOUSINE ON
ARRIVAL AND FROM CAR TO SUITE ON ARRIVAL AT HOTEL. PROTOCOL
AUTHORITIES SEE NO/NO CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION FORMALITIES BUT
WE SUGGEST THAT ALL PASSPORTS BE READILY AVAILABLE BOTH AT
AIRPORT AND UPON ARRIVAL HOTEL.

BAGGAGE COORDINATOR IS GEORGE BEAUCHAMP. HOME TEL NBR 374-8316
WHO WILL ACCOMPANY BAGGAGE IN EMBASSY MINIVAN AIRPORT TO HOTEL.
WE SHALL ARRANGE PAYMENT OF HOTEL IN ACCORDANCE PARA 7 REFTTEL.

CCC/133 031603Z ZVAG5104

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

MF.

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

CORRECTED COPY
EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BONN ZQFC5084 03NOV83

TO EXTOTT 1DDZ DELIVER BY 030900

REF YOURTEL 02NOV

---PRESS ARRANGEMENTS-PM TRIP TO EUROPE

RE:YOUR PARA 1:WOULD BE USEFUL TO KNOW EXACT ITINERARY OF
PM FOR EUROPEAN TRIP AND WHETHER WE MAY RELEASE POSSIBLE POPE
AND QUEEN BEATRIX MTGS ETC.THIS WOULD GIVE ADDITIONA IMPETUS
TO EFFORTS HERE.PSE ADVISE.

2.RE YOUR PARA 2:SCRUMS.YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT LIKELIHOOD OF
GERMAN PRESS TO TURN OUT FOR SCRUM(ASSUMING IT WOULD BE
AFTER DINNER)PRACTICALLY NIL.COVERAGE COULD BE ASSURED IF
POSSIBILITY GIVEN TO 2 MAJOR TV CHANNELS AND WIRE SERVICE
REPORTERS TO TAPE A STATEMENT GIVEN BY PM IDEALLY SHORTLY
UPON ARRIVAL.PLS ADVISE WHETHER YOU FORESEE POSSIBILITY.WE
MUST STRESS THIS AS ONLY REAL OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE INTEREST
HERE.OTHERWISE VISIT AND MTGS TOO LATE IN DAY TO MAKE NEWS.
STATEMENT BY PM WOULD CERTAINLY GO ON TV SAME EVEINING.

3.RE YOUR PARA 3:PRE VISIT BRIEFING WILL BE GIVEN BY AMB TO GROUP
OF 10JOURNALISTS APROX ON MORNING OF 10OCT.IN EMBASSY.

UUU/242 031445Z ZQFC5084

Division Phoned.....
Person
Local Time

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
mission
6

INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BONN ZQFC5083 03NOV83

TO PMOOTT

INFO EXTOTT 11DDZ

REF YOURTEL PMOOTT 1226 02NOV

28-6-1 - *Judean Peace Mission*

---PM TRIP TO EUROPE-MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS BONN

WE HAVE SECURED 20 SWB ACCOMMODATION IN HOTEL KREUTZ
IN BONN, APROX 10 MINUTES DISTANCE FROM CITY CENTRE AND
DELEGATION HOTEL. AS IN PAST PLEASE ADVISE US IF YOU ARE EXPECTING LESS,
SO WE MAY CANCEL. OTHERWISE ROOMS WILL HAVE TO BE PAID
FOR BY PMOOTT.

2. ONE BUS AND ONE CAR WILL BE SECURED FOR PRESS USE.

3. PSE ADVISE WHAT WORK SPACE/FACILITIES REQD.

4. PRESS PASSES IF NECESSARY WILL BE PREPARED FOR ARRIVAL.

4. PLS BE ADVISED MEDIA COORDINATOR FOR VISIT IS JENNIFER
BROADBRIDGE (PHONE: (HOME) AREA CODE 228, TEL 356763).

SHOULD BE UNAVAILABLE FOR ANY REASON, CONTACT JOSEF JURKOVIC
(PHONE: (HOME) AREA CODE 228 TFL 312025).

UUU/242 031515Z ZQFC5083

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR4059 03NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 030900

INFO PARIS BRU ROME HAGUE LDN PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR (DDZ MGT RGB RCR RSR RBD

REF YOURTEL XDV1049 31OCT

---PMS INITIATIVE-VISIT TO BONN

INFO REQUESTED REFTEL AS FOLLOWS.

YOUR PARA 2.AS PER OUR 4054,VISIT COORDINATOR IS KARSGAARD,
HOME TEL 02223-4017.

YOUR PARA 4.AS PFR OUR 4049 SUITE AND SEVEN ROOMS BOOKED IN
STEIGENBERGER.THEY CANNOT/NOT BE ON SAME FLOOR.SUITE AND
TWO ROOMS ON 18TH FLOOR,FIVE OTHERS ON 17TH.DEL WILL BE
PREREGISTERED.SUITE COSTS DLRS 350,SINGLE ROOMS DLRS 100.

YOUR PARA 5.PMS CHALLENGER SHOULD ARRIVE AT COLOGNE-BONN
AIRPORT QUOTE SONDER POSITION UNQUOTE NOT/NOT AT MILITARY
AIRPORT.FRG SECURITY PROVIDING BULLET PROOF LIMO FOR PM.

. TWO EMBASSY CARS FOR DEL AND EMB VAN FOR LUGGAGE AS REQUESTED.
YOUR PARA 6.TRANSPORTATION/LUGGAGE COORDINATOR IS ROGER HACK,
HOME TEL 0228-355799.ALL CUSTOMS/IMMIG FORMALITIES WILL BE
WAIVED.

YOUR PARA 7.NOTED.

YOUR PARA 8.DESIGNATED XY IS CHRISTA GAUER.

YOUR PARA 9.AS PER OUR 4057 WILL EXTEND COMCENTRE COVERAGE
THURS 10NOV TO 2000 AND BEGIN FRI 11NOV AT 0500.CM ON
CALL WED 09NOV AFTER 1830 AND ON THURS 10NOV AFTER 2000.CM
IS KEN CAVFRLEY HOME TEL 0228-378275.

CCC/242 031110Z ZQGR4059

28.6.1 - Tyndean Peace Mission
4

R F S T R I C T E D

READDRESSED FM BONN 03NOV INFO LDN PARIS BRU HAGUE ROME MDRID
LSBON ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO WSHDC MOSCO BNATO CNGNY GENEV
TOKYO NDHQOTT/ADMPOLE/CPP EXTOTT IDDZ
FM BONN ZQGR4055 02NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 021130

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

BAG HMBERG DE BON

DISTR XDV MGT RGB RCR RSR RBD

---PMS INITIATIVE-PRESS COVERAGE

PMS GUELPH SPEECH HAS RECVD GOOD ELECTRONIC MEDIA
COVERAGE, BUT LITTLE PRINT COVERAGE THUS FAR. ON FRI, 28 OCT SPEECH
WAS FIRST OR SECOND ITEM ON ALL EARLY MORNING RADIO NEWS
PROGRAMS AND WAS LEAD ITEM ON 0800 FIFTEEN MINUTE TV NEWS
PROGRAM. IT HAS NOT/NOT, HOWEVER, CARRIED ON EVENING NEWS
PROGRAMS. NEWSPAPER COVERAGE HAS THUS FAR AMOUNTED ONLY TO
13 LINE AP REPORT CARRIED IN BONNS GENERAL ANZEIGER.

2. LACK OF NEWSPAPER COVERAGE IS IN OUR VIEW (AND ACCORDING
TO JOURNALISTS WITH WHOM WE HAVE SPOKEN) DUE TO

A) FLOOD OF OTHER MORE NEWSWORTHY MATERIAL IN SAME PERIOD
- GRENADA IN PARTICULAR. (IN FACT JOURNALISTS HERE WERE
MORE INTERESTED IN PMS COMMONWEALTH PEACE KEEPING PROPOSAL
FOR GRENADA THAN IN HIS E-W INITIATIVE).

B) PRINTING/PUBLISHING TIMETABLE HERE IN RELATION TO RELEASE
OF NEWS IN CDA.

3. EMB PREPARED SUMMARY IN GERMAN OF PMS SPEECH AND ON
FRI MORNING 28 OCT DISTRIBUTED 300 COPIES IN PRESS RELEASE
FORM TO JOURNALISTS HERE IN BONN. 50 MORE WERE MAILED
TO OTHER CITIES. WE ALSO SPOKE TO JOURNALISTS OF FIVE
MAJOR DAILIES HERE.

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission
6

PAGE TWO ZQGR4055 RESTR

4. IT IS REGRETTABLE THAT WE WERE NOT/NOT PERMITTED (AS WE PROPOSED 25 OCT AND 26 OCT) TO RELEASE MATERIAL TO HANDFUL OF TRUSTED JOURNALISTS EARLY ENOUGH ON THURS TO ENSURE FRI COVERAGE. PRINTING RUNDS FOR FRI MORNING PAPERS BEGIN THURS AT 1500 AND IF WE HAD PROVIDED MATERIAL AT 1400 (WHICH WE COULD HAVE DONE) FEEL CONFIDENT WE WOULD HAVE HAD BETTER RESULTS. HOLDING MATERIAL UNTIL 1800 HRS THUS EFFECTIVELY KILLED OUR COVERAGE. HOWEVER WE ARE ENDEAVOURING TO FOLLOW-UP AND ENCOURAGE BACKGROUND AND OTHER ANALYTICAL PIECES THAT HOPEFULLY WILL COINCIDE WITH ACTUAL VISITS HERE OF PM.

5. MUST STRESS, A TEXT IN ENGLISH (OR) FRENCH WILL NOT/NOT BE READ, LET ALONE USED BY GERMAN MEDIA. WE REQUIRE FOR FUTURE SPEECHES ON SUCH IMPORTANT ISSUES, A PRIOR SUMMARY OF HIGHLIGHTS WHICH WE CAN QUICKLY TRANSLATE INTO GERMAN AND DISTRIBUTE TO MEDIA. SUCH SUMMARY WOULD BE EQUALLY VALUABLE TO ALL POSTS SEEKING TO OBTAIN GOOD MEDIA COVERAGE.

CCC/242 021540Z ZQGR4055

INFO

NONCLASSIFIE

DE BRU ZVFC3576 03NOV83

A PMOOTT LIVRAISON 030900

INFO PARIS HAGUE ROME BONN LDN EXTOTT(IDDZ


REF YOURTEL PM01226 02NOV

---VISITE DU PREMIER MINISTRE EN EUROPE 7-11NOV;BRU-MEDIA

COORDONNATEUR AVEC MEDIA EST ALBERT DUMAS,CONSEILLER CULTUREL

ET D INFORMATION.

UUU/126 031055Z ZVFC3576



ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM TOKYO UIGR1834 03NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 230000

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN NDHQOTT/MND/CDS ADMPOL/CPP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR IDD

IDA IDR EPR

RFF YOURTEL IDDZ0070 02NOV OURTFLS UIGR1564 28OCT UIGR1736 01NOV

---PRESS GUIDANCE AND STRATEGY-PRE-PM TRIP TO EUROPE

ALTHOUGH TOKYO IS NOT/NOT ON PMS ITINERARY, YOU WILL BE AWARE THAT,

AS SUMMIT PARTNER, JPN HAS TAKEN STRONG INTEREST IN F/WEST

RELNS AND IN ONGOING ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT NEGS, WHICH

AFFECT THEIR STRATEGIC INTERESTS. JPNSE WILL THEREFORE FIND PMS

INITIATIVE VERY ATTRACTIVE. FOR REASONS OUTLINED OUR REFTELS, PMS

GUELPH SPEECH RECEIVED LITTLE ATTENTION FROM JPNSE MEDIA, WHICH

IS NORMALLY EXCEPTIONALLY RECEPTIVE TO ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES.

THIS IS SITU WE WOULD LIKE TO RECTIFY AND 13NOV SPEECH SHOULD

PROVIDE GOOD VEHICLE TO DO SO. OUR EFFORTS WILL HOWEVER ONLY BE

FRUITFUL IF WE ARE ABLE TO TRANSLATE SPEECH/MATERIAL INTO JPNSE,

OR, AT LEAST, CALL BRIEFING SESSION DAY OR SO AHEAD OF TIME. WE WOULD

THEREFORE HOPE PRE-RELEASE WILL BE POSSIBLE TO ENABLE US TO

ARRANGE BRIEFING FOR MON MORNING 14NOV (SUN 13NOV MONTREAL TIME).

IN ORDER TO DO THIS EFFECTIVELY WE WOULD NEED TEXT BY 0900 FRI

11NOV.

CCC/246 030725Z UIGR1834

R E S T R I C T E D

FM HAGUE YWGR1779 03NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 030000

INFO PARIS BRU ROME BONN LDN PCOOTT/FOWLER FMOOTT/JOHNSON

NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPF

DISTR IDDZ MGT RGB RCR RSR

REF YOURTEL XDV1049 31OCT OURTEL 0743 02NOV TRENTON TEL ATOC0702

---PMS INITIATIVE:VISIT TO EUROPE:NOV 83

PMS CHALLFNGER OUT OF PARIS ON 08NOV SHOULD LAND AT VALKENBERG
MILITARY AIRPORT NEAR WASSENAAR(SUBURB OF THE HAGUE).DISTANCE
FROM AIRPORT TO HOTEL OR DUTCH PMS RESIDENCE IS OF APPROX 20 MIN.
ARE REQUESTING TODAY DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE FROM DUTCH MFA.

2.HAS BEEN HINTED TO US THAT POSSIBILITY EXISTS FOR CREW TO STAY
AT VALKENBERG BASE,OTHERWISE ADVISE TYPE OF ACCOMMODATION NEEDED
AS WELL AS NUMBER.

CCC/155 031423Z YWGR1779

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned 1002
Person CF
Local Time 1135

R E S T R I C T E D

FM HAGUE YWGR1778 03NOV83

TO EXTOTT JDDZ XDV DELIVER BY 030900

INFO PARIS BONN PRU ROME LDN PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOTT/JOHNSON

NDHQO'T/MND/CDS/ADM POL/CPD

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RCR RCD RSR

REF OURTEL 0734 31OCT HARLICK/PILLARELLA TELECON 02NOV

---PMS INITIATIVE:VISIT TO THE NETHS:MTG WITH QUEEN BEATRIX
AS ALREADY INDICATED IN REF TELECON,IN CONFIRMING TO PALACE
PMS ACCEPTANCE OF QUEEN BEATRIX INVITATION FOR A 1/1 HR MTG
09NOV AT 10H00 WE WERE ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO
ADVANCE MTG BY ONE HOUR IE TO 09H00.CHANGE IS DUE TO
UNFORESEEN REQUIREMENTS OF HER MAJESTYS TIME THAT MORNING.
WE SAID WE WOULD PASS MSG ON TO YOU AND WOULD INFORM PALACE
ASAP.PLSF ADVISE.

CCC/155 031423Z YWGR1778

28-6-1-1 Hudson Peace
mission

INFO

28-6-11 - Trudeau Peace
mission

NONCLASSIFIE

DE PMOOTT PM01237 03NOV83

A TT EXEC JET AVIATION/UCLA/CHEVRIER GENEVE TLX 28153 CH IMMED DE GVA
INFO EXTOTT (IDDZ PARIS HAGUE BRU ROME BONN LDN

REF:LISTE DE PASSAGERS(PRESSE)PENDANT TOURNEE PM TRUDEAU EN
EUROPE, 7 AU 11NOV.

TEL QUE CONVENU, JE VOUS FAIS PARVENIR LA LISTE DES PASSAGERS QUI
VOYAGERONT SUR LE FALCON ET LE JETSTAR QUE VOUS METTEZ A NOTRE
DISPOSITION

FALCON

JETSTAR

JACQUES HUDON

MIREILLE MASSE

FIONA CONWAY

JEAN-MICHEL LEPRINCE

BOB EVANS

DAVID HALTON

MIKE PARSONS

PATRICK BROWN

VERN FREEDLANDER

DANIELLE CLOUTIER

PIERRE APRIL

BERNARD SEGUIN

JOHN WALKER

PAUL LACHAPELLE

DAVID VIENNEAU

JEFFREY SIMPSON

PAUL KORING

2. POUR CERTAINES ENVOLEES, ENCORE INDETERMINEES,

MESSIEURS WAYNE GREENOUGH, YVES PELLETIER ET STEVE HANDELMAN
POURRAIENT S'AJOUTER A CETTE LISTE. L'ORDRE DE REPARTITION DES
PASSAGERS PAR APPAREIL EST SUSCEPTIBLE D'ETRE MODIFIE.

SVP CONFIRMER RECEPTION DE CETTE LISTE.

UUU/204 032321Z PM01237

INFO

NONCLASSIFIE

DE PMOOTT PM01236 03NOV83

A PARIS/BILODEAU IMMED

INFO EXTOTT(1)DDZ

28-6-1-1-Hudon Place
Mission

---VOYAGE DU PM EN EUROPE 7-11NOV:ARRANGEMENTS MEDIA

REF TELCON HUDON/BILODEAU 03NOV

RESERVER CHAMBRE POUR JACQUES HUDON, SEC PRESSE ASSOCIE DU PM

A PARIS POUR 06/11 ET 07/11.

2.RESERVER CINQ(5)CHAMBRES POUR JOURNALISTES LE 6/11-

FIONA CONWAY, BOB EVANS, MIKE PARSONS, VERN FREEDLANDER,

DAVID VIENNEAU.

3.RESERVER ONZE(11)AUTRES CHAMBRES POUR JOURNALISTES LE 7/11:

NOMS PRECEDENTS PLUS FIERRE APRIL, JOHN WALKER, JEFFREY SIMPSON,

PAUL KORING, MIREILLE MASSE, JENA-MICHEL LEPRINCE, DAVID HALTON,

PATRICK BROWN, DANIELLE CLOUTIER, BERNARD SEGUIN, PAUL LACHAPPELLE.

4.SVP CONFIRMER AUSSITOT QUE POSSIBLE.

UUU/204 032246Z PM01236

INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMOOTT PM01235 03NOV83

TO HAGUE/STENFIELD IMMED

INFO EXTOTT LIDDZ

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

---PMS TRIP TO EUROPE-MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS AND HOTEL RESERVATIONS
PLEASE RESERVE HOTEL ROOMS FOR THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE ON 07NOV-
WAYNE GREENOUGH, YVES PELLETIER.

2. PLEASE RESERVE HOTEL ROOMS FOR THE FOLLOWING PEOPLE ON 08NOV-
JACQUES HUDON, ASST PRESS SECRETARY TO PM, FIONA CONWAY, BOB EVANS,
MIKE PARSON, VERN FREEDLANDER, DAVID VIENNEAU, PIERRE APRIL,
JOHN WALKER, JEFFREY SIMPSON, PAUL KORING, MIREILLE MASSE,
JEAN-MICHEL LEPRINCE, DAVID HALTON, PATRICK BROWN, DANIELLE CLOUTIER,
BERNARD SEGUIN, PAUL LACHAPELLE, FRED CHARTRAND, WAYNE GREENOUGH,
YVES PELLETIER.

3. WOULD IT ALSO BE POSSIBLE TO RESERVE FIVE(5) ROOMS FOR PRESS
AIRCRAFT CREWS: PATRICK FONTAINE, JEAN-CLAUDE KAUFMANN, MONTZE TERRY,
PIERRE BURDET, PHILIPPE TOUXE.

4. OTHER INFO WILL FOLLOW.

UUU/204 032245Z PM01235

INFC

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMOOTT PM01234 03NOV83

TO PARIS HAGUE BRU ROME BONN LDN IMMED

INFO EXTOTT LIDDZ

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

---PMS TRIP TO EUROPE:MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS

HERE IS THE LIST OF CDN MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES WHO WILL BE COVERING
PMS TRIP TO EUROPE 7-11NOV.PLEASE MAKE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR
BADGES,ACCREDITATION,ETC WHERE AND WHEN NECESSARY.YOU WILL RECEIVE
A SEPARATE TEL FOR HOTEL RESERVATIONS.

FIONA CONWAY (CTV)

MIREILLE MASSE (CBC)

BOB EVANS (CTV)

JEAN-MICHEL LEPRINCE (CBC)

MIKE PARSONS (CTV)

DAVID HALTON (CBC)

VERN FREEDLANDER (CTV)

PATRICK BROWN (CBC)

PIERRE APRIL (CP)

DANIELLE CLOUTIER (CBC)

JOHN WALKER (SOUTHAM)

BERNARD SEGUIN (CBC)

DAVID VIENNEAU (TRNTO STAR)

PAUL LACHAPELLE (CBC)

JEFFREY SIMPSON (GLOBE AND MAIL)

WAYNE GREENOUGH (CBC)

PAUL KORING (CP)

YVES PELLETIER (CBC)

FRED CHARTRAND (CP)

2.MEDIA CONTINGENT FROM CDA WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY JACQUES HUDON,
ASSOCIATE PRESS SECRETARY TO PM.

UUU/204 032244Z PM01234

INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMOOTT PM01232 03NOV83

TO TT MR JL UCLA OU M CHEVRIER, EXECUTIVE JET AVIATION,

TELEX 28153 CH IMMED DE GVA

INFO PARIS HAGUE BRU ROME BONN LDN EXTOTT (IPDZ

REF: PM TRIP TO EUROPE-MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS

NOUS CONFIRMONS DEFINITIVEMENT UTILISATION DE DEUX

(2) APPAREILS DU 8 NOVEMBRE 1983 AU 11 NOVEMBRE 1983

POUR LES BESOINS DES MEDIA CANADIENS QUI SUIVRONT

TOURNEE PM TRUDEAU EN EUROPE.

A) UN(1) APPAREIL FALCON 20 A 41,500 FRANCS SUISSES
POUR LA DUREE DE LA TOURNEE.

B) UN APPAREIL LEARJET 35 A 25,975 FRANCS SUISSES
POUR LA DUREE DE LA TOURNEE.

SUITE A NOTRE CONVERSATION TELEPHONIQUE DU 3/11 ET
TELEX EURALAIR DU 3/11:

1) L HORAIRE POUR CHAQUE VOL EST LE SUIVANT, POUR LE
MOMENT. CERTAINES HEURES DE DEPART OU D ARRIVEE
POURRAIENT ETRE MODIFIEES MAIS VOUS EN SEREZ AVISES
PRESTEMENT. LES HEURES INDIQUEES SONT LES HEURES
PREVUES DE DEPART.

MARDI 8 NOVEMBRE: 1630 PARIS(LE BOURGET)-LA
HAYE(ROTTERDAM)

MERCREDI 9 NOVEMBRE: 1200 LA HAYE(ROTTERDAM)-
BRUXELLES(NATIONAL)

...2

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission

PAGE TWO PM01232 UNCLAS

1800 BRUXELLES(NATIONAL)ROME(CIAMPINO)

JEUDI 10 NOVEMBRE:1500 ROME(CIAMPINO)-BONN(COLOGNE)

VENDREDI 11 NOVEMBRE: 0730 BONN(COLOGNE)-

HOLLANDE(AEROPORT A VFRIFIER)

1200 HOLLANDE-LONDRES(HEATHROW)

1800 LONDRES-PARIS(LE BOURGET)

2)CONFIRMER PAR TELEX LE PLUS TOT POSSIBLE LES NOMS
ET COMPTOIRS D ASSISTANCE POUR CHACUNE DES AEROPORTS
VISITES:

PARIS(ORLY):TRANSAIR

LA HAYE(ROTTERDAM):ROTTERDAM AIR

BRUXELLES(NATIONAL):ABELAGE

ROME(CIAMPINO):AEROPORTI DI ROMA

BONN(COLOGNE):INTEIR

HOLLANDE:A DETERMINIER SELON L AEROPORT

LONDRES(HEATHROW):BRITISH AIRWAYS EXECUTIVE

PARIS(LE BOURGET):TRANSAIR

VEUILLEZ NOUS DONNER TOUTES LEA PRECISIONS POSSIBLES
SUR CES POINTS DE RENDEZ-VOUS DE FACON A FACILITER LA
TACHE A NOS OFFICIERS D AMBASSADES QUI VIENDRONT A
NOTRE RENCONTRE AUX ARRIVEES.

3)LA LISTE DE PASSAGERS VOUS SFRA COMMUNIQUE DANS
LES PROCHAINES HEURES.

...3

PAGE THREE PM01232 UNCLAS

4) LA FACTURATION DOIT ETRE ADRESSEE DE LA FACON

SUIVANTE: GOUVERNEMENT DU CANADA

BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVE

A/S M JACQUES SICOTTE

EDIFICE P.S.B.-6E ETAGE

OTTAWA, ONTARIO, K1A 0A6, CANADA.

5) VEUILLEZ NOUS CONFIRMER LES NOMS, TITRES ET

NATIONALITES DES MEMBRES D EQUIPAGE:

FALCON 20: PATRICK FONTAINE (FRANCE)

JEAN-CLAUDE KAUFMANN (SUISSE)

MONTZE TERRY (SUISSE)

LEARJET: PIERRE BURDET (SUISSE)

PIERRE TAUXF (SUISSE)

6) VEULLIEZ NOUS CONFIRMER L IMMATRICULATION DES

DEUX (2) APPAREILS

FALCON 20: HB-VBM

LEARJET 35: HB-VFZ

7) JACQUES HUDON, SECRETAIRE DE PRESSE ASSOCIE DU

PM, ACCOMPAGNERA LES JOURNALISTES QUI UTILISERONT VOS

APPAREILS PENDANT CETTE TOURNEE.

UUU/204 032036Z PM01232

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT XDV1067 03NOV83

TO PARIS HAGUE BRU BONN ROME DELIVER BY 040900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR IDDZ

---PM INITIATIVE-ADMIN

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
Mission

FOLLOWING ARE NAME, DOB, POB, PPT NUMBER, PLACE OF ISSUE, DATE OF
ISSUE, PERM ADDRESS FOR EACH MEMBER CANDEL:

PRIME MINISTER PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU-18OCT19;MONTL;DD26383;OTT;
13MAR80;24 SUSSEX DRIVE,OTT

-ROBERT R FOWLER-18AUG44;OTT;DD028714;OTT;27AUG81;4-315 DALY AVF,OTT

-J EDWARD JOHNSON-01FEB46;LONDON,ONT;DD030864;HULL;30NOV82;2-188
GLEBE AVF,OTT

-RALPH COLEMAN-27MAY45;TRNTO;DD030568;OTT;22SEP82;2784 SPRINGLAND
DR,OTT

-GARY SMITH-WILL SUPPLY DETAILS ASAP

-ERIC S BROWN-21SEP40;ST CATHARINES,ONT;D26382;OTT;13MAR80;7
GLENMANOR DR,NEPEAN

-YVES BEAULIEU-08MAR41;MONTL;DD030856;HULL;26NOV82;6337 VISENEAU
DR,ORLEANS.

2.PLEASE ENSURE ROOMS FOR CANDEL PREREGISTERED USING ABOVE INFO AND
SEND ROOMING LIST TO XDV BY 071400.IF LIST SENT LATER,ACTION TO
PARIS/PMDEL/BROWN,INFO XDV.

CCC/264 032324Z XDV1067

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT XDV1064 03NOV83

TO LDN IMMED

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR ~~Y~~DDZ

REF YOURTEL XNAG0266 02NOV

---PMS INITIATIVE-NOV83 VISIT-ADMIN

WILL REQUIRE SCY TO BE AVAILABLE NOV11/11 FROM APPROX 1200 TO 1600
HOURS AT MACDONALD HOUSE. WILL USE CHANCERY AS DEL OFFICE.

CCC/003 031722Z XDV1064

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT XDV1063 03NOV83

TO BONN IMMED

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR IDDZ

REF OURTEL XDV1049 31OCT YOURTEL ZQGR 03NOV

---PMS INITIATIVE-VISIT TO EUROPE-SECRETARIAL SUPPORT

WILL REQUIRE MISS GAUER TO BE IN HOTEL FROM 1700 HOURS NOV10/10 TO


0830 HOURS NOV11/11 (APPROX), HER ROOM WILL ALSO BE DEL OFFICE AND

WILL REQUIRE TYPEWRITER, TYPING TABLE (NOT/NOT DESK), STATIONERY,

ETC. DOES HOTEL HAVE PHOTOCOPIER DEL COULD HAVE ACCESS TO? IF

NOT/NOT, SMALL TABLETOP MODEL IN OFFICE WILL BE FINE. ADVISE.

CCC/003 031721Z XDV1063



MF

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

(2)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HSNKI/CCSBMDE DEL YZDL1062 03NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDD

28-6-1 - Hudson Peace
Mission

INFO WSHDC BONN LDN PARIS ROME HAGUF BRU MOSCO BNATO PCOOTT/FOWLER
DISTR DMF IFB RGB IDA IDAC RGX RBD RCD

---CONFIDENCE BUILDING IN EUROPE:PMS INITIATIVE

FRG FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER WAS IN HSNKI YESTERDAY TO DELIVER
LECTURE AT FINNISH EQUIVALENT OF CIIA.ALONG WITH SOME OTHER
PREPARATORY MTG HEADS OF DEL,I SPOKE TO HIM BRIEFLY AT CONCLUSION
OF HIS TALK.HE COMMENTED ON IMPORTANCE OF PMS INITIATIVE AND SAID
THAT FRG GOVT WAS LOOKING FORWARD VERY MUCH TO WELCOMING CDN FM TO
BONN IN NEAR FUTURE.

2.I COMMEND TEXT OF GENSCHERS LECTURE TO ATTN OF OFFICIALS CONCERNED
WITH PLANNING PMS TRIP AND MORE GENERALLY WITH WORK OF CCSEMD. TEXT IS BEING FORWARDED TO IDD BY BAG WHICH IS DUE TO ARRIVE
EARLY NEXT WEEK.PM WILL NO/NO DOUBT WISH TO BE FAMILIAR,IN HIS
TALKS IN BONN,WITH OUTLINES OF THIS IMPORTANT STATEMENT OF FRG
FOREIGN POLICY IN WHICH GENSCHER EMPHASIZES INDISPENSABILITY OF
BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND
WEST AND REAFFIRMS ADVOCACY OF HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE BETWEEN USA
AND SOVIET UNION.IMMEDLY FOLLOWING TEL NBY YZDL1063 QUOTES EN
CLAIR SOME OF MORE INTERESTING PASSAGES.

CCC/274 031220Z YZDL1062

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT XDV1061 03NOV83

TO BRU IMMED

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR IDDZ

REF YOURTEL ZVAG5096 02NOV

---PMS VISIT-ADMIN ARRANGEMENTS


SECRETARIAL SUPPORT:PLEASE HAVE CB SCY AVAILABLE FOR NOV09/09.ONE ROOM AT HOTEL AMIGO TO BE USED AS OFFICE.OFFICE SHOULD BE EQUIPPED WITH TYPEWRITER,TYPING TABLE(NOT/NOT DESK)AND STATIONERY, ETC.ASCERTAIN IF AMIGO HAS PHOTOCOPIER AVAILABLE WHICH CANDEL CAN HAVE ACCESS TO.IF NOT/NOT,SMALL TABLETOP ONE SHOULD BE IN OFFICE.ADIVSE.


2.TENTATIVE ETA HOTEL 1130 HOURS; ETD 1730.

3.ADVISE NAME OF SCY.AS ONLY DAY VISIT,NO/NO REQUIREMENT FOR SCY TO OVERNIGHT AT HOTEL.

4.RE HOP VEHICLE FOR PM:RCMP HAVE INFORMED US BELGIANS PROVIDING VEHICLE FOR PM.THEREFORE,NO/NO REQUIREMENT FOR HOP VEHICLE.

CCC/003 031721Z XDV1061





C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT XDV1060 03NOV83

TO HAGUF IMMED

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR IDDZ

REF YOURTEL YWAG0895 01NOV

---PMS VISIT-ADMIN-SECRETARIAL

CB SCY WILL BE REQUIRED AT HAGUE LATE AFTERNOON APPROX 1730 HOURS
NOV08/08 TO MID-MORNING NOV09/09. AS CHANCERY TO BE USED AS DEL
OFFICE, SCY SHOULD BE ACCOMMODATED AT HOTEL NEAR CHANCERY AND WILL
BE ON CALL FOR PERIOD NOTED ABOVE. ADVISE NAME OF SCY AND NAME AND
NUMBER OF HOTEL.

2. MISS VIAU WILL NOT/NOT ACCOMPANYING DEL (SEE OURTEL XDV1058
03NOV).

CCC/003 031721Z XDV1060

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT XDV1059 03NOV83

TO PARIS/LEITH IMMED

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR IDDZ


REF LEITH/FOSTER TELCON 02NOV8

--PMS VISIT-ADMIN

WILL REQUIRE SCY AT RITZ NOV08/08 0800 TO 1630 HOURS(APPROX).ONE
OF ROOMS/ROOMS RESERVED WILL BE DEL OFFICE.ONLY EQPT REQUIRED WILL
BE TYPEWRITER AND TYPING TABLE(NOT/NOT DESK)AND STATIONERY,
ETC.DOES RITZ HAVE COPIER DEL COULD HAVE ACCESS TO?IF
NOT/NOT,SMALL TABLETOP MODEL WILL BE FINE.PMS STATIONERY WILL BE
WITH XDV OFFICER(BROWN).(SEE OURTEL XDV1058 03NOV).

2.ADVISE NAME OF SCY WITH HOME PHONE NUMBER.

CCC/003 031720Z XDV1059



MF
W

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT XDV1058 03NOV83

TO PARIS HAGUE BRU ROME LDN IMMED

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR IDDZ RGB RCR RSR RBD

REF OURTEL IDDZ0060 01NOV

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
6, mission

---PMS INITIATIVE-VISIT TO EUROPE:NOV83

REVISED CANDEL COMPOSITION IN ORDER OF PRECEDENCE AS FOLLOWS:

- RIGHT HONOURABLE PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU, PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA;
- AMBASSADOR/HIGH COMMISSIONER (AS APPROPRIATE);
- MR. R. R. FOWLER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY TO CABINET (FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICY), PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE;
- MR. J. E. JOHNSON, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE PRIME MINISTER;
- MR. G. SMITH, DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS;
- MR. R. COLEMAN, PRESS SECRETARY TO THE PRIME MINISTER;
- MR. E. S. BROWN, PROTOCOL OFFICER, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF PROTOCOL, DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS; AND
- MR. Y. BEAULIEU, SPECIAL SECURITY LIAISON TO THE PRIME MINISTER.

2. DO NOT/NOT ADJUST HOTEL RESERVATIONS UNLESS SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED TO DO SO.

CCC/003 031722Z XDV1058

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MF
28

Division Phoned
Person
Local Time 1015

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE MDRID XQGR1040 03NOV83

A EXTOTT IDDZ LIVRAISON 040900

INFO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN LDN PARIS LSEON BONN ROMF ATHNS
ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE MOSCO ENATO PRMNY CNGNY WSHDC GFNEV
TOKYO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MDN CDS/ADMPOL/CFP
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR IDD IDA IDR
FPR

REF NOTRFTL XQGR1039 31OCT

---INITIATIVE DU PM-SECURITE EST-OUEST

AVONS OBTENU DPS AFF EXT CONFIRMATION QUE PRESIDENT GONZALEZ A FORT
BIEN ACCUEILLI SENS DU MESSAGE QUE LUI A TRANSMIS PM DANS SA LETTRE
DU 25OCT ET QUIL ENTEND Y REPOUDRE DE FACON SUBSTANTIELLE DANS LES
MEILLEURS DELAIS.SELON CONSEILLER DU PRESIDENT,PREOCCUPATIONS DE
NOTRE PM SONT LARGEMENT PARTAGEES PAR PRESIDENT ET ON A FTE
AGREABLEMENT ETONNE ICI DE RETROUVER DANS LETTRE DU PM SIMILARITE
DANS FACON DEXPRIMER CES PREOCCUPATIONS.

2.EN CONTRASTE,NI PRESSE,NI RADIO,NI TELE NONT FAIT ECHO AU DISCOURS
DE GUELFH EN DEBIT DE MES CONTACTS AVEC PROPRIETAIRES ET REDACTEURS
EN CHEF DE QUATRE PRINCIPAUX JOURNAUX DE MDRID QUE JE CONNAIS
PERSONNELLEMENT JE PENSE QUIL FAUT ATTRIBUER CE SILENCE A TROIS
FACTEURS PRINCIPAUX:

A)EVENEMENTS DE LA GRENADE ET ACTIVITE TERRORISTE EN ESPAGNE MEME
QUI ONT PLUTOT MOBILISE ATTN DU PUBLIC ET DES MEDIAS;

...2

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
Mission

PAGE DEUX XQGR1049 CONFID

B) ASSEZ MAUVAIS CIT TIMING FINCIT DEJA SOULIGNE PAR DAUTRES POSTES, LE DISCOURS DE GUELPH ETANT SURVENU ICI A LA VEILLE DU TRES LONG WEEKEND DE LA TOUSSAINT SETENDANT DU 28OCT AU 02NOV;

C) ARRIVEE BEAUCOUP TROP TARDIVE DU TEXTE FRANCAIS DONT IL FAUDRA BIEN QUON SE RENDE COMPTE UN JOUR A OTT QUIL PEUT AVOIR EN CERTAINS CAS AUTANT DIMPORTANCE QUE LE TEXTE ANGLAIS;

D) EN TOUT ETAT DE CAUSE ET CELA A DEJA ETE SOULIGNE PAR DAUTRES POSTES-SI NOUS VOULIONS OBTENIR ICI UN RESULTAT QUI FUT A LA HAUTEUR DUNE INITIATIVE DE CE GENRE, IL AURAIT FALLU AVOIR LE TEMPS ET LA CAPACITE TECHNIQUE DE FOURNIR AUX JOURNALISTES LOCAUX UNE VERSION DU DISCOURS EN ESPAGNOL.

3. POUR L'AVENIR, JE PENSE QU'IL FAUT CHERCHER A CONSTRUIRE SUR CE QUI SEMBLE AVOIR ETE LA SYMPATHIQUE RECEPTION QUE LA LETTRE DU PM A RECU CHEZ LE PRESIDENT FELIPE GONZALEZ. SI FELIPE GONZALEZ REPOND AU PM COMME ON NOUS LE LAISSE PREVOIR, ON PEUT ETRE CERTAIN QUE LES ESPAGNOLS DONNERONT LA PLUS GRANDE PUBLICITE A SA LETTRE ET PAR CONSEQUENT A L'INITIATIVE DU PM. IL Y AURA REPERCUSSION FAVORABLE EN AMERIQUE HISPANIQUE. IL FAUT CONSTRUIRE LA DESSES. UNE VISITE DU PM A MDRID (VISITE DE TRAVAIL RAPIDE) DEVRAIT ETRE PREVUE DANS UNE PROCHAINE TOURNÉE. FELIPE GONZALEZ EST FAVORABLEMENT PERCU PAR LES GOUVERNEMENTS LATINO-AMERICAINS ET VISITE TRUDEAU EN AURAIT UNE PORTEE DAUTANT PLUS GRANDE

HARDY

CCC/150 041200Z XQGR1049

000172

MF
h2

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER
CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

Division Phoned _____
Person SC
Local Time 1125

S E C R E T CDN EYES ONLY

FM BONN 20GR1025 03NOV83

TO EXTOTT LDDZ DELIVER BY 040900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSTONE

DISTR USS DMF RGB RCB RSR RED IFB

28-6-1-Thudau Peace
Mission

---PMS INITIATIVE ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS-FRG SETTING

ALTHOUGH ONLY BRIEFLY IN BONN, IT IS PERHAPS WORTH SETTING

OUT ASSIST IN YOUR BRIEFING PM FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS.

BASED BOTH ON IMMED AND EARLIER GENEV EXPERIENCE, WHICH

CONSTITUTE SETTING FOR PMS INITIATIVE. FRG CHANCELLOR AND HIS

IMMEDIATE ASSOCIATES ARE FOCUSING ON PUBLIC DIPLOMACY,

AMERICAN STYLE, CONSCIOUSLY AT PRESENT LEAVING ASIDE SUBSTANCE

OF EAST/WEST PROBLEM-SOLVING. THIS MEANS THEY SHOULD GENUINELY

WELCOME PMS INTENTIONS (THEY SHARE CONCERN OVER LACK

OF WSHDC-MOSCO DIALOGUE), BUT ARE LIKELY TO FOCUS MAINLY ON

QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW TO MOVE BOTH USA AND USSR DECISION-MAKERS.

PROBLEM WILL BE TO ENGAGE CHANCELLOR IN QUICK BUT PROFOUND

ANALYSIS OF MATTER IN ORDER TO OBTAIN THOUGHT-THROUGH REACTION

REGARDING LONGER-TERM FOLLOWUP. IN SHORT, SYMPATHY MIXED

WITH HANDWRINGING CAN BE EXPECTED, AND IT WILL BE IMPORTANT

TO PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO GERMAN INTERLOCUTORS ON KIND OF FOLLOW-

ON INTENDED TO PMS VISIT.

2. CURRENT COMMON ASSUMPTION IS THAT FRG IS A TWO-ISSUE COUNTRY,

MISSILE DEPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC SITUATION. EVIDENCE OF THIS IS

SEEN NOT/NOT SIMPLY IN LAST ELECTION TURNAROUND BUT ALSO

IN CURRENT POLITICAL TURMOIL OF ALL GRPS. IN FACT, I SUGGEST THAT

...2

000173

CDN EYES ONLY
REF ID: A66328

PAGE TWO ZOGRI025 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

IF IT IS A TWO-ISSUE COUNTRY, INCREASINGLY THE TWO ARE
DEPLOYMENT AND FUTURE ORIENTATION OF GERMANY, IE WHOLE COMPLEX
OF ISSUES INVOLVING GROWING NATIONALISTIC TENDENCIES, WHAT
SOME SEE AS INCIPENT NEUTRALIST TREND, ENDING IN RENEWED
CONCERN WITH GERMAN REUNIFICATION. THE ECONOMIC ISSUE HAS DECLINING
PROMINENCE FIRST BECAUSE BOTH PARTIES HAVE PROVEN UNABLE TO
AFFECT EVENTS (AS CENTRAL BANK CHIEF POHL HAS PRACTICALLY
SAID PUBLICLY, AND SAYS EMPHATICALLY IN PRIVATE) AND SECOND
BECAUSE USA AND OTHER INTERNATIONALLY BASED TURNAROUND IS
SLOWLY BEGINNING TO AFFECT FRG FAVOURABLY. THERE IS THUS NO/NO
POLITICAL CHOICE ON ECONOMIC MATTERS AT MOMENT. OTHER ISSUES
FRG ECOLOGY HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATED BY THE MAJOR PARTIES TO THE
DETIMENT OF FRINGE ONES, AND THE PUBLIC HAS FOCUSED
INCREASINGLY ON ISSUE SEPARATING MAJOR PARTIES IE
DEPLOYMENT ISSUE.

3. FACT THAT PROTEST MOVEMENTS DISPLAYED SOMEWHAT LESS VIGOUR
THAN FORECAST BY THEIR ORGANIZERS DOES NOT/NOT DETRACT FM
STRONG GRASSROOTS CONCERN OVER DEPLOYMENT, AND CORRECTNESS
THEREFORE OF GOVTS CONCERN OVER THIS PUBLIC ATTITUDE.
REACTION TO USA INTERVENTION IN GRENADA WAS TESTTUBE
ILLUSTRATION OF GROWING FRG PUBLIC UNEASINESS ABOUT LEAVING
DECISIONS ENTIRELY TO USA ADMIN. WHAT PUBLIC SEEMS MOST
CONCERNED ABOUT IN DEPLOYMENT DEBATE IS THAT KOHL HAS
SUPPORTED WITHOUT RESERVATION USA ADMIN'S PUBLIC DIPLOMACY
APPROACH. AT HIGHEST LEVEL FRG GOVT IS NOT/NOT CONCERNED
CURRENTLY ABOUT MILITARY OR TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF EAST-WEST

PAGE THREE ZOGRI025 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

NEGOTIATION.WITHIN GOVT,CONTROL OF POLICY ON ISSUE
SEEMS CENTRED COMPLETELY NOW IN CHANCELLORS OFFICE.
GENSCHER SPEAKS OFTEN AND ABROAD,BUT DOMESTIC CONCERN IS
WITH WHAT KOHL IS OR ISNOT/NOT SAYING OR DOING(AND HE IS
ALSO TRAVELLING EXTENSIVELY,FACT OF WHICH GERMAN PUBLIC IS
FULLY AWARE).WITHIN BUREAUCRACY(EG IN DISARMAMENT PART OF
FOREIGN MINISTRY),THERE IS CONSTERNATION OVER DISAPPEARANCE
OF LONGTERM CONSENSUS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH EAST.AT THE MOMENT,
ONE SHOULD LOOK VERY CLOSELY TO CHANCELLORS OFFICE AND
TELTSCHIK IN PARTICULAR FOR ANY SIGNS OF MOVEMENT.AND
TELTSCHIKS MOTIVATIONS ARE ENTIRELY DOMESTIC POLITICAL ONES
UNRELATED TO TECHNICAL OR MILITARY ASPECTS.TO EXTENT
PUBLIC CORRECTLY SENSES THIS,IT REACTS BY SAYING QUOTE
DEPLOYMENT WONT WORK UNQUOTE.IE DEPLOYMENT WILL NOT/NOT
FORCE SOVIETS TO NEGOTIATE.SOMETHING MORE IS NEEDED.KOHL MUST
DEAL WITH THIS.AND,AT THIS POINT,LONGSTANDING CONCERN
ABOUT GERMANY'S GEO-POLITICAL SITUATION AND REUNIFICATION
TAKES OVER.THAT SEEMS TO BE THE CURRENT POPULAR
RATIONALIZATION.

4.AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND,WE SHOULD EXPECT COMPREHENSION OF,
SYMPATHY WITH,AND SUPPORT FOR PMS UNDERLYING ARGUMENTATION.
THE LIMIT OF FRG CONCERNS HOWEVER COMES WHEN REUNIFICATION
FACTOR IS INTRODUCED.THAT IS,WHILE THERE IS A GREAT SIMILARITY
IN OUR RESPECTIVE APPROACHES TO EAST/WEST PROBLEMS,INCLUDING
NEED FOR DEALING WITH EAST,REUNIFICATION ISSUE HAS AGAIN BECOME
...4

PAGE FOUR ZOGR1025 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

SO SENSITIVE DOMESTICALLY THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO WARN
THAT IT SHOULD NOT/NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED. GENSCHER/GROMYKO
MTG IN VIENNA ETC FULLY REFLECTS THIS REALITY. GENSCHER'S APPROACH
WAS TO FOCUS ON NEED TO PROVIDE FRG SUPPORT FOR ALLIANCE
AND URGENCY OF EAST/WEST DIALOGUE MOSTLY IN HOPE THAT THIS WOULD
SOMEHOW LEAD TO DELAY IN DEPLOYMENT AND RESOLVE ALL ISSUES.
IT IS NOT/NOT UNFAIR TO SAY THAT FEW OPTIONS ARE OFFERED
AS TO HOW THIS CAN HAPPEN. PMS POSITION IS OF COURSE MUCH MORE
SUBSTANTIVE. IN CONTEXT OF BLUE BOOK PROPOSALS, IT SEEMS TO ME
FRG REACTION IS BOUND TO BE WITHIN MORE CAUTIOUS OR LESS
FAR THINKING PARAMETERS. IN OTHER WORDS, FRG POSITION WILL
TO SOME EXTENT APPEAR TO BE THE SAME, BUT IT WILL DIFFER THE
MORE PROFOUND PMS PROPOSITIONS ARE--NOT/NOT FOR FUNDAMENTAL
REASONS, BUT BECAUSE FRG HASN'T YET GONE INTO CURRENT STATE
OF MATTER SO THOROUGHLY.

5. FRG MORE THAN MOST OTHER ALLIANCE MEMBERS SEES NOTHING WRONG
WITH CONSULTATION AND NEGOTIATION BETWEEN EASTERN AND
WESTERN EUROPE, AND FOR THAT MATTER BETWEEN THE FRG AND DDR
(THE PACE OF THIS LATTER CONSULTATION HAS HASTENED GREATLY
IN LAST FEW WEEKS). WHERE THEY HAVE DIFFICULTY IS WITH
INTER-ALLIANCE CONSULTATION OR NEGOTIATION, IE BETWEEN
NATO AND WFO. HENCE WHILE BASED ON GENEVA EXPERIENCE I THINK
THAT THIS IS INDEED ONE OF FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS FOR
CONSIDERATION IN SEARCH FOR ANY NEW ALLIANCE POSTURE AND
AM GLAD BLUE BOOK HAS EXAMINED IT. YET IN TERMS OF BONN,
IT DOES NOT/NOT AT THIS MOMENT APPEAR TO BE PARTICULARLY

PAGE FIVE ZQGR1025 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

PALATABLE. IN PART, THIS FOLLOWS FACT THAT SOME EUROPEANS,
BUT FOR NON-EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS TO DO SO IS QUESTIONABLE.
IN ANY EVENT, JUST AS WE PRESUMABLY NEED TO THINK THROUGH
BLUE BOOK TYPE PROPOSALS, EG ON MEFR, TO GET RIGHT PERSPECTIVE
OF OUR OWN INTERESTS, SO FRG IS IN NEED OF CLARIFICATION OF ITS
INTERESTS. IT IS LIKELY THEREFORE TO BE SOMEWHAT UNCERTAIN
ABOUT SEVERAL OF PMS PROPOSALS, AS FOLLOWING IS INTENDED TO
ILLUSTRATE.

6. FRG WILL CERTAINLY SUBSCRIBE TO PMS INTEREST IN THE
POLITICAL, IE THEY WILL AGREE RESOLUTION OF EAST/WEST
DIFFICULTY CANNOT/NOT BE ACCOMPLISHED BY TECHNICAL (IE DEFENCE)
OR BUREAUCRATIC DEBATE. THEY ARE WEDDED TO PUBLIC
DIPLOMACY AND MAINTAINING WSHDC-MOSCO DIALOGUE HOWEVER AND
FIRST QUESTION THEY WILL ASK, AS WE DO, IS WHAT WILL MOVE THE
ALLIANCE. THEIR OWN RESPONSE WILL NOT/NOT BE CLEARCUT. HOWEVER,
I SUSPECT FRANKLY THEY WOULD ARGUE THAT A GRP OF WISE ELDER
STATESMEN WOULD NOT/NOT HELP MOVE MATTERS IE SUCH
INDIVIDUALS WOULD, FM THEIR POINT OF VIEW, PROBABLY NOT/NOT BE
BETTER THAN TECHNICIANS BECAUSE ELDER STATESMEN HAVE
NO/NO CURRENT POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITIES (THEY WATCHED THE
PALME COMMISSION PERFORM WITH BAHR'S FREEWHEELING). THEIR
BOTTOM LINE WILL BE QUOTE WHAT DOES IT TAKE TO EFFECT CHANGE
IN PRESIDENT REAGAN'S POLICIES UNQUOTE. THE ATTITUDE CONVEYED
TO US IS THAT THEY REALISTICALLY KNOW THEY MUST DEAL WITH THE
USA ON ITS TERMS. HENCE, THEY WOULD AGREE, LET'S FIND WAYS TO

PAGE SIX ZOGRI025 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

IMPROVE THE YIELD FROM PUBLIC DIPLOMACY BUT LETS NOT/NOT
THINK WE CAN QUICKLY SUPPLANT IT.

7. SIMILARLY, SUGGESTION THAT THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS
SHOULD BE PERSUADED TO SIT AT THE SAME TABLE HOLDS GREAT
ATTRACTION FOR THEM. THEIR OWN EXPERIENCE PERMITS THEM TO
SEE UK, FRENCH AND CHINESE RELUCTANCE AS AN UNWARRANTED
COPOUT OR OPTOUT, DEPENDING UPON THE CIRCUMSTANCES. BUT
THEY KNOW THIS IS NOT/NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO FRG
PERSUASION. INDEED FRG IS GREATLY CONCERNED OVER VERTICAL
PROLIFERATION. IT ASSUMES USA AND USSR ARE NOT/NOT SIMPLY
THE KEY, BUT DOES EXPECT THOSE TWO WILL ENGAGE IN
DISCUSSION ALONE WHEN AND WHERE THEY ARE JOINTLY READY TO
DO SO. I SUSPECT HOWEVER THAT THEY DO NOT/NOT DISCERN
PRESENTLY ANY PROSPECT THAT THE UK, FRENCH AND CHINESE CAN BE
BROUGHT ALONG. IT IS THIS AS MUCH AS ALLIANCE POLICY THAT HAS
LED THEM TO MAKE AMBIGUOUS STATEMENTS LATELY ABOUT THE
COUNTING OR NON-COUNTING OF THEIR EUROPEAN ALLIES MISSILES IN
THE INF. IN SHORT, THE FRG WILL ASK SECOND QUOTE WHAT WILL MOVE
THESE THIRD PARTIES, AND IT WILL RESPOND FOR ITS PART THAT IT
SEES LITTLE PROSPECT OF THIS FOR THE MOMENT.

8. SIMILARLY, THE POSSIBILITY OF A MOVE BY OTHERS ON NON-
PROLIFERATION IN A HORIZONTAL SENSE WILL BE WELCOME. CERTAINLY
THE FRG UNDERSTANDS BETTER THAN MOST WHAT IS INVOLVED IN
NUCLEAR SELF-DENIAL COUPLED WITH THE GEOGRAPHIC FORCE
OF SUCH A DENIAL WITH WHICH WE ARE FAMILIAR. SOMEWHAT

...7

000178

PAGE SEVEN Z07R1025 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY

BITTER, HOWEVER, THE FRG WILL LIKELY ALSO SAY THAT THE REST OF THE WORLD IS LESS COMPREHENDING, JUST AS THE PM NOTED RIGHTLY REGARDING INDIA IN HIS DISCUSSION ON THE BLUE BOOK.

GERMANS WILL EMPHASIZE THEIR BITTERNESS AT LACK OF WILLINGNESS OF THRESHOLD COUNTRIES TO TAKE NEW MEANINGFUL COMMITMENTS TO AVOID HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION AND WOULD AGREE THAT THIS IS A MAJOR AND URGENT ISSUE. BUT AGAIN THEY WILL POSE THE SUBSTANTIVE QUESTION PERHAPS RECAST AS A POLITICAL ONE QUOTE WHAT WILL MAKE THE NON-ALIGNED AND THE NON-NUCLEAR MOVE UNQUOTE. THE GERMAN ANSWER WILL BE THAT THERE MUST BE VERTICAL MOVEMENT FOR THERE TO BE HORIZONTAL BUT, LIKE CDA, THEY KNOW THAT THE SECOND WILL NOT/FOLLOW AUTOMATICALLY FROM THE FIRST, AND THEREAFTER THE CONUNDRUM IS POSED.

9. FINALLY, KOHL IS LIKELY TO ASK PM WHAT IS THE IMMEDIATE CAN INTEREST IN CURRENT SITUATION IE WHAT IS OUR PUBLIC POLICY PROBLEM SINCE THIS IS THE WAY HE VIEWS THESE ISSUES. KOHL IS NOW IN JAPAN WHERE HE IS PROVIDING COMFORT REGARDING ANY INCREASE IN SOVIET SITING OF MISSILES IN FAR EAST. FOR HIS OWN REASONS HE WILL LOOK TO OUR PM FOR SOME COMMENT ON CW ISSUE WHICH IN GERMAN PARLIAMENT OUTWEIGHS ALL OTHER SECURITY MATTERS IN STATISTICAL SENSE. (IE THERE ARE MORE QUESTIONS ABOUT STATIONING OF USA CHEMICALS IN FRG THAN ABOUT ANY OTHER SINGLE DEFENCE SUBJECT). THEY WILL REFLECT PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

...8

PAGE EIGHT ZQGR1025 SECRET CDN FYES ONLY

APPROACH AND ASK US WHAT WE WANT, WHICH IS NOT/NOT AT ALL LACK OF DEPTH ON THEIR PART BUT RATHER REALIZATION OF PUBLICS SENSITIVITIES EVERYWHERE.

10. MY POINT HAS NOT/NOT BEEN TO TREAT WITH BLUE BOOK SUBSTANCE BUT RATHER TO ILLUSTRATE PROBABLE FRG REACTIONS IN FORM OF QUESTIONS ABOUT WESTERN AND THIRD WORLD PUBLIC DIPLOMACY. (TO GO TO HEART OF MATTER-WHAT WILL MOVE USSR-IS OF COURSE WHAT THE BLUE BOOK IS ABOUT). IN THIS SENSE, MY CONCLUSION IS THAT IN TERMS OF CURRENT FRG GOVT AND PUBLIC INTERESTS AND CONCERNS, PMS INITIATIVE IS RIGHT AND TIMELY. VARIOUS CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS ARE THOSE WHICH APPEARED FM GENEV OVER PAST FEW YEARS TO BE RIGHT ONES BUT EMPHASIS IS ON THE POLITICAL AND THAT IS WHAT IS SO CRITICAL AS KOHL WOULD ARGUE. WHAT WILL BE NEEDED WITH GERMAN INTERLOCUTORS IS CONVINCING PRESENTATION OF HOW PMS PROPOSALS BOTH ON THEIR OWN MERITS AND BY CAREFUL PRESENTATION WILL INUCE DECISION-MAKERS IN USA, USSR, WESTERN ALLIANCE AND THIRD WORL TO MOVE. THAT IS, THE DEFINITION IN POLITICAL TERMS OF MAJOR PROBLEMS TREATED NEEDS TO BE STRESSED IN ORDER THAT POTETIAL SOLUTIONS PROPOSED WILL BE READILY CONCEIVABLE WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY APPROACH OF CHANCELLOR KOHL, WHICH TO THE EXCLUSION OF ALL ELSE DICTATES THE CURRENT APPROACH OF THE FRG GOVT TO THE ISSUES WHICH THE FM WISHES TO DISCUSS

MCPHAIL

CCC/242 041310Z ZQGR1025

000180

28-6-1-Tyusian Peace
Mission

CCC/029 031156Z YWAG0898

Division Phoned _____
Person _____
Local Time _____

Mr. Smith

MF

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HAGUE YWGR0746 03NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ XDV DELIVER BY 031300

INFO PARIS BONN BRU ROME LDN PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON/COLEMAN

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RCR RCD RSR

REF OURTFL YWGR1778 03NOV HARLICK/PILLARELLA TELCON 03NOV

---PMS INITIATIVE:VISIT TO THE NETHS:MTG WITH QUEEN BEATRIX
CONFIRM THAT THERE IS NO/NO OBJECTION IN ANNOUNCING DISCREETLY
MTG BETWEEN PM TRUDEAU AND QUEEN BEATRIX.PRESS RFLASE COULD
SIMPLY INDICATE THAT DURING VISIT TO THE NETHS TO MEET WITH PM
LUBBERS FOR WORKING DINNER PM TRUDEAU WILL ALSO MEET WITH QUEEN
BEATRIX MORNING OF 09NOV.

jk

2.MUST POINT OUT THAT TRADITIONALLY CONVERSATIONS WITH QUEEN
ARE NOT/NOT DISCUSSED IN ANY SUBSTANCE PUBLICLY.RECENTLY WHEN
USA PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE REVEREND JACKSON SPOKE TO THE PRESS
REVEALING SUBSTANCE OF CONVERSATION HE HAD HAD WITH QUEEN,THIS
CAUSED QUITE AN UPROAR IN PARLIAMENT AND GOVT CIRCLES.

CCC/155 031643Z YWGR0746

Mr. Harlick
HK

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned.....

Person

Local Time

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HAGUE YWGR0745 03NOV83

TO EXTOTT UDDZ XDV DELIVER BY 031200

INFO BONN PCOOTT/FOWLER/ARCHDEACON PMOOTT/JOHSON/COLEMAN PARIS

BRU ROME LDN NDHQOTT/MND/CPS/ADMPOL/CFP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RCR RCD RSR

---PMS INITIATIVE-VISIT TO EUROPE:NOV 83

AFTER CONSULTING WITH CAF LAHR BELIEVE CEREMONY COULD BE HELD

GROESBEEK ON MORNING NOV11 PROVIDED WEATHER GOOD AND FOLLOWING

SCHEDULE STRICTLY OBSERVED.

0900-PM AND PARTY DEPART BONN ON 5 HELICOPTERS PROVIDED BY LAHR

(MAXIMUM 2 PASSENGERS PER HELICOPTER INSTEAD OF 3 AS PREVIOUSLY
INDICATED, PLUS ONE HELICOPTER AS BACKUP).

1000-(APPROX)HELICOPTERS SET DOWN AT PARKING LOT AT GROESBEEK

CEMETERY. PM GREETED BY QUEENS REP, GOVT REP, BURGOMASTER AND CDN AMB

AND IS INTRODUCED TO LOCAL DIGNITARIES, CAF SENIOR STAFF.

1015-1045- REMEMBRANCE SERVICE AT FOOT OF MONUMENT (NOTE: LAHR AND

BRUNSSUM WILL COOPERATE IN TURNING OUT HONOUR GUARD, BAND, PIPERS, ETC.)

1100-DEPARTURE IN HELICOPTERS FOR NEARBY AIRFIELD (DEELEN)

WHERE CHALLENGER AWAITS.

1120-1130-DEPARTURE IN CHALLENGER FOR LDN.

...2

28-6-1-Thudon Peace Mission

PAGE TWO YWGR0745 CONF

COMMENTS:

1. BEAR IN MIND THAT FOG OR BAD WEATHER WOULD MAKE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR PMS PARTY TO LAND AND THAT THERE IS NO/NO SHELTER AT CEMETERY SITE IN CASE OF RAIN. UMBRELLAS AND COATS IMPERATIVE. SITE IS MAGNIFICENT BUT LOCATED ON ROLLING HILLS IN COUNTRYSIDE WHERE THERE ARE NO/NO AMENITIES INCLUDING WASHROOMS.
2. FLYING TIMES BY HELICOPTER WILL NEED TO BE CONFIRMED BY CAF.
3. ASSUME CHALLENGER COULD DEPART BONN EARLY MORNING ON NOV11 TO FLY TO DEELEN. ANY MEMBERS OF PM PARTY WHO DID NOT/NOT WANT TO ATTEND CEREMONY AT GROESBEEK COULD STAY WITH CHALLENGER. THIS WOULD REDUCE REQUIREMENT FOR HELICOPTERS.
4. ARRANGEMENTS FOR CDN PRESS DIFFICULT. IF ANY PRESS FLEW WITH CHALLENGER TO DEELEN WE COULD ARRANGE MINI BUS TO TRANSPORT THEM TO GROESBEEK IN TIME FOR CEREMONY. AFTER CEREMONY THEY WOULD OBVIOUSLY NOT/NOT BE ABLE TO ACCOMPANY PM TO UK UNLESS A FEW SEATS AVAILABLE ON CHALLENGER AND HELICOPTER TRANSPORTATION AVAILABLE TO DEELEN. WF WOULD OF COURSE MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO TRANSPORT PRESS BACK TO HAGUE/AMSTERDAM FOR COMMERCIAL FLTS.
5. DUTCH SERVICES FOR WAR DEAD ARE HELD IN MAY (LIBERATION DAY) AND DUTCH AUTHORITIES WOULD THEREFORE BE MAKING UNUSUAL ARRANGEMENTS TO ORGANIZE SPECIAL CEREMONY ON NOV11.

CCC/029 031458Z YWGR0745

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned 1DDZ

Person MM

Local Time 0835

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission
6-

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE BRU 2VGR0314 03NOV83

A EXTOTT 1DDZ LIVRAISON 030900

INFO BREEC CANMILREINATO BNATO HAGUE PARIS BONN ROME PCOOTT/FOWLER
NDHOOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB R7B RSD RCR RCD RSR

RFF NOTRFTL 0505 310CT VOTRETEL 0505 290CT

---INITIATIVE DU PM:VISITE EN BELGIOUE

CONFORMEMENT A VOS INSTRUCTIONS, J AI SOULVE DE NOUVEAU
AVEC COENEN LA QUESTION DES ENTRETIENS TRUDEAU-MARTENS ET
J EN AI PROFITE,UTILISANT POUR CELA L EXCELLENTE DOCUMENTATION
QUE VOUS NOUS AVEZ ENVOYEE SUR TOUS LES ASPECTS DE LA
VISITE,POUR LE METTRE AU FAIT DES DERNIERS DEVELOPPEMENTS
ET,EN TERMES GENERAUX,DES REACTIONS DEJA SUSCITEES DANS
PLUSIEURS CAPITALES PAR L INITIATIVE CDNF.

2.AYANT PU PRECISER A COENEN LES HEURES APPAREMMENT DEFINITIVES
DE LA PRESENCE DU PM A BRU LE 2 NOV,SOIT DE 11H30 A 18H00,
CELUI-CI ME CONFIRMA,COMME PREVU,QUE LES DIFFICULTES ENVISAGEES
SUBSISTENT,MAIS IL NE LAISSA AUCUN DOUTE SUR LA VOLONTE DE
MARTENS DE TROUVER,QUOI QU IL ARRIVE,LE TEMPS NECESSAIRE
POUR CETTE RENCONTRE.COENEN FORMULA A TITRE D HYPOTHESE LA
POSSIBILITE D UN DEJEUNER DE MIDI A 14H30,PERIODE POUR
LAQUELLE MARTENS ET TINDEMANS POURRAIENT ESPERER SE FAIRE

...2

PAGE DEUX ZVGR0514 CONF

LIBERER DU DEBAT DE LA CHAMBRE PAR ACCORD PREALABLE AVEC SON PRES.
L EVOLUTION EST DONC DES PLUS FAVORABLES ET CONFIRME LES
PREVISIONS DE NOTRETEL EN REF.

3.LE PROTOCOLE DU MAE S APPRETE ENTRETEMPS A ACCUEILLIR LE
PM COMME IL CONVIENT,LUI FOURNISSANT LIMOUSINE,ET ESCORTE
DE MOTARDS.

4.VOTRETEL 0070 DU 2 NOV M A PERMIS DE REDEFINIR PLUS
SPECIFIQUEMENT L OBJECTIF DE LA VISITE AINSI QUE NOS IDEES
SUR L ORDRE DU JOUR.COFNEN ME REMERCIA DE CES PRECISIONS ET
M INDICUA QUE LES REACTIONS BELGES A LA LET ET AU DISCOURS
DE TRUDEAU SONT EN VOIE DE PREPARATION AU MAE AVEC LEQUEL NOUS
PRENONS LANGUE

FORTIER

CCC/030 031116Z ZVGR0514

INFO

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

NONCLASSIFIE

DE ROM WTFC0287 03NOV83

A PMOOTT/PMO LIVRAISON 031300

INFO EXTOTT 11DDZ

REF VOTRE TEL PM01226 02NOV TELCON GRANGER/HUDON 03NOV

---VOYAGE DU PM EU EUROPE 07-11 NOV, ARRANGEMENTS POUR LA PRESSE
AVONS RESERVE BLOC DE 20 CHAMBRES A HOTEL DE LA VILLE, VIA SISTINA
67, TEL 06 6733, TELEX 611676 CABLES: DELAVILTEL ROMA. HOTE EST
SITUE A COTE DE CELUI OU LOGERA LE PM.

2. CONFIRMONS EGALEMENT AVOIR RESERVE AUTOBUS QUI DEMEURERA
A DISPOSITION DES JOURNALISTES DURANT TOUT LEUR SEJOUR.

3. CHEF DU BUREAU DE PRESSE DE LA PRESIDENCE DU CONSEIL,
GHIRELLI, NOUS ASSURE DE TOUTE LA COLLABORATION DE SON SERVICE
POUR FACILITER TRAVAIL DES JOURNALISTES. LUI AVONS PROMIS LISTE
DES NOMS DES JOURNALISTES.

4. COORDONNATEUR POUR LA PRESSE A L'AMBASSADE EST FIFRE
GRANGER QUI PEUT ETRE REJOINT EN DEHORS DES HEURES DE TRAVAIL
A HOTEL DE LA VILLE.

5. PRIERE FAIRE PARVENIR COORDONNES D'ARRIVEE POUR AUTORISATION
DE VOL ET FACILITES D'ACCUEIL.

UUU/050 031615Z WTFC0287

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Smith

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

Division Phoned _____

Person _____

Local Time _____

FM VMBFR XTDR0195 03NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 040900

INFO TT NDC KINGSTON/TOOGOOD ONLY DE CAF

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0061 01NOV MYTEL XTDR0193 03NOV

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission

---PMS INITIATIVE---MBFR

FOR REASONS SET OUT IN MY REFTEL, I DOUBT WHETHER CONTENTS ON DRAFT COMMUNIQUE, ANODYNE AS THEY ARE, WOULD BE REGARDED BY MANY WESTERN MINISTERS AS ADEQUATE BASIS FOR MINISTERIAL MTG ON MBFR GIVEN CURRENT STATE OF NEGS. AS FOR EAST, I FIND IT HARD TO IMAGINE THAT IN ABSENCE OF POSITIVE WESTERN RESPONSE TO THEIR PROPOSALS ON DATA-VERIFICATION TRADEOFF THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT FINAL PARA WHICH, INsofar AS IT APPLIES TO EAST, EXPRESSES SATISFACTION WITH PROGRESS SO FAR AND, INsofar AS WEST IS CONCERNED, AFFIRMS DETERMINATION OF MINISTERS TO BRING NEGS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. IN ABSENCE OF WESTERN RESPONSE, EASTERN VERSION OF WHAT COMMUNIQUE SHOULD LOOK LIKE WOULD BE DRASTICALLY DIFFERENT AND WOULD SEEK TO DENOUNCE WEST FOR ITS FAILURE TO MAKE ANY MOVE OR MAKE ANY DEFINITIVE REPLY IN PRINCIPLE TO EAST'S PROPOSALS. INDEED, WITHOUT POSITIVE WESTERN REPLY, IT IS HARD TO SEE MUCH HOPE OF TWO SIDES AGREEING ON COMMON LANGUAGE. MOST THEY COULD PROBABLY DO WOULD BE TO AGREE TO DISAGREE OR TO HAVE NO/NO COMMUNIQUE AT ALL. IN ABSENCE OF WESTERN REPLY EAST MIGHT NOT/NOT EVEN BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE NEGS--THAT IS, IF THEIR CURRENT THREATS TO BREAK OFF ARE NOT/NOT MERE PLUFF.

...2

PAGE TWO XTDR0195 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

2.CHECKLIST OF POINTS OF AGREEMENT IS WORKMANLIKE AND ACCURATE.
WORD-SMITHING ASIDE,ONLY SUBSTANTIVE COMMENT I WOULD MAKE IS THAT
POINT 2 IS CORRECT BUT INCOMPLETE.ACTUALLY THERE IS AGREEMENT ON
NUMBERS FOR PARITY FORCE LEVELS(FINAL CEILINGS),LEAVING ASIDE
DISAGREEMENT ON SEPARATE ISSUE OF AIRFORCE SUBCEILING,AT 700,000
GROUND FORCES AND 900,000 COMBINED GROUND AND AIR FORCES ON EACH
SIDE

HAMMOND

CCC/076 031548Z XTDR0195

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

AF-
28-6-1-1 Nuclear Peace
Mission

INFO TT NDC KINGSTON/TOOGOOD ONLY DE CAF

REF YOURTEL IDZ0061 01NOV

---PMS INITIATIVE---MBFR

BEFORE COMMENTING IN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TEL ON DRAFT COMMUNIQUE
CONTAINED IN REFTEL VIEWED AS QUOTE INCHOATE CONTINGENCY UNQUOTE,
THERE IS ONE CRUCIAL FACTOR I MUST STRESS--NAMELY PRESENT ACUTELY
DIFFICULT AND SENSITIVE CONJUNCTURE OF MFR NEGS. THIS FACTOR HAS
DIRECT BEARING ON IMPLICATIONS OF IDEA OF INSTIGATING MEETING IN
VIENNA ON MFR OF WESTERN AND EASTERN FOREIGN MINS AND CONSEQUENTLY
ON HOW IT WOULD BE RECEIVED IN EASTERN AND WESTERN CAPITALS.

2. AS YOU KNOW, FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE POSED FOR WESTERN SIDE BY EASTS
FEB-JUNE 83 SET OF PROPOSALS IS WHETHER WEST IS PREPARED TO ACCEPT
CONCEPT OF DATA-VERIFICATION TRADEOFF. SIMPLY PUT THIS IS QUESTION:
IS WEST WILLING TO ABANDON ITS FUNDAMENTAL POSITION THAT RESOLUTION
OF EXISTING EAST-WEST DISAGREEMENT ON NUMBERS OF EASTERN FORCES
IN REDUCTIONS AREA PRIOR TO CONCLUSION OF AGREEMENT IS ESSENTIAL
FOR SOUND AGREEMENT, IN RETURN FOR EAST ACCEPTING VERIFICATION
MEASURES MORE IN LINE WITH THOSE WEST CONSIDERS NECESSARY. WEST
MAINTAINS THAT PRIOR AGREEMENT ON DATA IS NECESSARY TO KNOW, AND TO
BE ABLE TO SPECIFY AND THUS MONITOR EFFECTIVELY, REDUCTIONS EAST
MUST TAKE TO REACH AGREED EQUAL LEVELS FOR EACH SIDE OF 700,000

000190

PAGE TWO XTDR0193 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

GROUND FORCES AND 900,000 GROUND AND AIR COMBINED.ON OTHER SIDE
EAST HAS DISCLOSED THAT IT IS PREPARED TO GO SOME WAY TOWARDS
ACCEPTING MORE EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION MEASURES(AND OF COURSE IS
HINTING AT FURTHER FLEXIBILITY IF WE ACCEPT THEIR BASIC SCHEME).
3.WESTERN NEGOTIATORS HAVE BEEN CRITICISING SERIOUS SHORTCOMINGS
THAT REMAIN IN EASTERN VERIFICATION PROPOSALS AND SEEKING
ELUCIDATION OF THEM--WITH SOME SUCCESS THIS ROUND.BUT WHAT WESTERN
NEGOTIATORS HAVE NOT/NOT BEEN ABLE TO DO,DESPITE INCREASINGLY ADAMANT
INSISTENCE BY EAST THAT QUOTE TIME IS RUNNING OUT UNQUOTE,IS TO
GIVE ANSWER IN PRINCIPLE WHETHER WE ACCEPT ESSENCE OF EASTERN
PROPOSAL(IE DATA-VERIFICATION TRADEOFF).REASON WESTERN NEGOTIATORS
HAVE NOT/NOT BEEN ABLE TO RESPOND TO EASTERN DEMANDS FOR ANSWER
IN PRINCIPLE IS THAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED NO/NO GUIDANCE FROM BRU
AND CANNOT/NOT OF COURSE EXPLICITLY ADDRESS SUCH FUNDAMENTAL
QUESTION WITHOUT GUIDANCE FROM COUNCIL.REASON BRU HAS NOT/NOT
PROVIDED ANY GUIDANCE IS THAT NATO COUNTRIES HAVE NOT/NOT YET GOT
THEIR ACT TOGETHER AND COME UP WITH SOME KIND OF ANSWER.
4.RESOLVING QUESTION OF WHETHER WEST CAN COME UP WITH ANSWER BEFORE
MUCH LONGER AND WHAT IT IS TO BE IS LOGICALLY PRIOR TO QUESTION
OF INSTIGATING MEET MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL.ASSUMING IT DOES
NOT/NOT BREAK OFF NEGS,EAST MIGHT WELCOME SUCH MEETING EARLY NEXT
YEAR IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THEY CALCULATE THEY HAVE US ON THE
HIP.GROMYKO COULD BE COUNTED ON TO USE IT EFFECTIVELY AS
OPPORTUNITY TO BEAT WESTERN MINISTERS ABOUT HEAD FOR CONTINUED
WESTERN FAILURE TO RESPOND TO QUOTE BOLD,CONSTRUCTIVE ETC UNQUOTE

...3

PAGE THREE XTDR0193 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

EASTERN INITIATIVE. FOR SAME REASON IT IS DIFFICULT TO IMAGINE THAT MANY WESTERN MINISTERS WOULD RELISH THOUGHT OF GOING TO VIENNA TO FACE EASTERN FIRE -- IN DISARRAY ON FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE INVOLVED (DATA-VERIFICATION TRADEOFF), LACKING ANY WESTERN ANSWER, INITIATIVE OR COUNTER PROPOSAL AND BEARING ONLY AN ODYSSEY LIST OF AREAS OF AGREEMENT THAT HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED IN LAST TEN YEARS AND PIOUS INJUNCTION FOR FUTURE.

5. BY SAME TOKEN, IT IN NEXT FEW MONTHS WEST CAN COME UP WITH CONSTRUCTIVE ANSWER OR INITIATIVE OF ITS OWN (NOT/NOT SIMPLY NEGATIVE ANSWER AND REITERATION OF ITS ESTABLISHED POSITION ON DATA), THEN IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT SOME WESTERN MINISTERS MIGHT BE ATTRACTED TO IDEA OF MEETING AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL HERE IN ORDER TO PRESENT IT WITH MAXIMUM ECLAT. (ON OTHER HAND IF EAST SMILED WESTERN INITIATIVE IN WIND, THEY MIGHT BE WARY OF PROVIDING US WITH SUCH PLATFORM. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES IDEA OF ATTENDANCE BY WESTERN MINISTERS WITHOUT THEIR EASTERN COLLEAGUES MIGHT BE WORTH CONSIDERING.)

6. IN MY VIEW MOST VALUABLE WAY POSITIVE QUOTE POLITICAL WILL UNQUOTE CAN BE APPLIED TO MEMBER AT THIS PERHAPS CRUCIAL JUNCTURE IS TO STIMULATE WORK THAT NEEDS TO BE DONE AND DECISIONS THAT NEED TO BE TAKEN WITHIN ALLIANCE TO COME UP WITH AT LEAST PRESENTABLE WESTERN REPLY/COUNTER PROPOSAL/INITIATIVE. FORTHCOMING NAC MINISTERIAL COULD BE GOOD OPPORTUNITY FOR DPM/SSFA TO GIVE PROCESS FILLIP IT

...4

PAGE FOUR XTDR0193 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

SO URGENTLY NEEDS. IN ITS SPECIAL REPORT TO COUNCIL THIS WEEK ON
LATEST EASTERN MOVES ON VERIFICATION, AD HOC GROUP HAD REITERATED
ITS RECOMMENDATION OF LAST JUNE (WHICH WAS INSTIGATED BY CANDEL)
THAT COUNCIL REEVALUATE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION IN LIGHT OF
CURRENT SITU IN NEGS. BUT WITHOUT SOME STIMULUS FROM CAPITALS AND
MINISTERS WILL ANYTHING HAPPEN? AND IF NOTHING POSITIVE EMERGES ON
WESTERN SIDE, WOULD WE AND OUR ALLIES BE ABLE TO CONTEMPLATE LIKELY
DEBACLE OF EAST-WEST MINISTERIAL ON MBFR?

HAMMOND

CCC/076 031613Z XTDR0193



MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

12

10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT 1DDZ0073 021000G3

TO/À

TO LHM PARIS MDRID LSHON BOMM ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU

INFO

HAGUE WSHDC MOSCO ANATO PRIMEY CMONY CHCGO LUGLS GENEV TOKYO

DISTR

DELIVER BY 030800

REF

SUBJ/SUJ

INFO PCOOTT/FOULER PROOTT/COLEMAN DDHQOTT/DND/ODS/ADDPOL/CPD

DISTR MINA USS DNF IFB UGB URR RGE RSD RSR RCD RCR IDD EDA IDR FPR

---ASSESSMENT OF MEDIA REACTION TO PM S GUELPH SPEECH.

(CONCENTRE PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

P.O. ACE

1DDZ

5-2504

SIG

L.A. DELVOYE

MESSAGE PREPARATION

- 1) Use OCR element and set typewriter for 10 pitch. Observe right margin marked "10". If typewriter capable of 12 pitch only, ensure that right margin, marked "12", is observed.
- 2) Use full capitals and double line feed at all times.
- 3) Security Classification: "UNCLASSIFIED" is to be typed without spacing between letters. All other classifications are to have one space between the letters, e.g. C O N F I D E N T I A L
- 4) Use only one space between words in the address portion of the message, e.g.
TO LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Subject line is indicated by three dashes in front of the subject, e.g. --- REVISED FSIDS
- 6) First paragraph is neither numbered nor indented. All subsequent paragraphs are numbered. Do not use space between the paragraph number and the first letter of the text, e.g. 3. THE POST...
- 7) Do not use space before or after punctuation marks, e.g. WILL ARRIVE BERNE, 15 JUN. THE etc.
- 8) Use only the following punctuation: period, comma, semi-colon, colon, dash, oblique stroke, brackets and question mark.
- 9) Following signs must be spelled out: \$ (DOLLARS), % (PERCENT), # (NUMBER), " (QUOTE), and " (UNQUOTE). In English the apostrophe is omitted to form a single word, while in French the apostrophe is replaced by a space.
- 10) Always repeat negatives NO and NOT as NO/NO and NOT/NOT. DO NOT/NOT underline.
- 11) End of page of multi-page messages is identified on a separate line, at left margin with only three periods and the number of the following page, e.g.
...2
- 12) Do not use punctuation at the end of the message when there is a signature.

PRÉPARATION DES MESSAGES

- 1) Employer le LOC et régler la machine au pas "10". Placer la marge droite à "10". Si vous avez une machine de pas "12", placer la marge droite à "12".
- 2) Toujours utiliser les majuscules et le double interligne.
- 3) La cote de sécurité "NONCLASSIFIÉ" doit être dactylographiée sans espace entre les lettres. Toutes les autres doivent l'être avec un espace, par exemple: C O N F I D E N T I E L
- 4) Pour l'adresse, utiliser seulement un espace entre chaque mot, par exemple:
A LDN PARIS IMMED WSHDC
DISTR PUA APO APR MFP
- 5) Faire précéder le sujet de trois tirets, par exemple: ---DSE REVISÉES
- 6) Le premier paragraphe n'est jamais numéroté et commence à la marge. Tous les paragraphes suivants sont numérotés. Ne pas laisser d'espace entre le numéro du paragraphe et la première lettre du texte, par exemple: 3. LA MISSION...
- 7) Ne pas laisser d'espace avant ou après les signes de ponctuation, par exemple: ARRIVERAI À BERNE, 15 JUN. LE etc.
- 8) Utiliser seulement les signes de ponctuation suivants: point, virgule, point virgule, deux points, tiret, barre oblique, parenthèses et point d'interrogation.
- 9) Les signes suivants doivent être dactylographiés en toutes lettres: \$ (DOLLARS), % (POUR CENT), # (NUMÉRO), " (CITATION) et " (FIN DE CITATION). En anglais, omettre l'apostrophe et ajouter la terminaison au mot pour en faire un seul mot. En français remplacer l'apostrophe par un espace.
- 10) Répéter toujours les négatifs NO et NOT comme ceci: NO/NO NOT/NOT (en français les négatifs ne sont pas répétés).
- 11) Sur les messages comportant plus d'une page, indiquer sur une ligne séparée, à la marge à gauche, le numéro de la page suivante en le faisant précéder de trois points seulement, par exemple:
...2
- 12) Ne pas mettre de ponctuation à la fin du message quand il comporte une signature.

9007E Assessment of Media Reaction to PM's Guelph Speech

- 1) Given that the speech was a statement of intent and not a detailed plan of action, and the strength of the competing Grenada story, the PM's initiative received better than anticipated coverage and comment both in Canada and abroad.
- 2) Domestically, the strong editorial support given the initiative by Wednesday's GLOBE AND MAIL (entitled "The Third Rail") is a most welcome development -- the first time in recent years a Trudeau initiative has had this newspaper's unqualified support. The TORONTO STAR was equally positive, as was their influential columnist Richard Gwyn. LE DEVOIR was more sceptical, as was THE CITIZEN. They supported his analysis but doubted validity of effort.
- 3) Domestic coverage of the speech itself gave the PM the benefit of the doubt, but placement of stories in both print and electronic media reflected overall priority of Grenada as top story, both Friday and Saturday. Most coverage concentrated on analytic portions of speech and on the announcement of countries to be visited. This material greatly enhanced the credibility of the speech. Few (with CBC-TV a notable exception) picked up the one more detailed proposal of a five-power approach to nuclear control. The "third rail" idea as a general concept was well received as almost a slogan for the initiative.
- 4) By Monday, only the State Department's widely misread Ottawa release was receiving comment and coverage.
- 5) U.S. media: The WASHINGTON POST, NEW YORK TIMES (reprinted in International HERALD TRIBUNE) and THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR all carried straight-up coverage; placed as well as could be expected with the dominance of Grenada. The POST this week carried excerpts as well on the editorial page. We will not get essential network coverage until the developing story fits better the U.S. agenda or until the administration reacts. Regional newspapers were beginning to pick up coverage and comment early in the week.
- 6) Europe: Bonn and Brussels had greatest success in achieving next day major print and electronic coverage, including a long flattering editorial in a major daily in The Hague. Radio and TV coverage in Germany on Friday morning was virtually only notice in FRG, while French coverage was limited to short mention in LE MONDE.

...2

In general, while the PM's focus on the dangerous state of East-West relations and the necessity of renewed dialogue and political energy has been expectedly well covered and received, the five suggested areas for forward movement at the end of the PM's speech have been little analyzed or extrapolated. In terms of the validity of the PM's objectives and proposals, there is a wait-and-see attitude.

UNQUOTE

CONFIDENTIAL

November 2, 1983

IDDZ-0072

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
Mission
6

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R. R. Fowler)

Initiative - European Visit

PM Lubbers of the Netherlands has invited you and three of your officials to stay at his official residence in The Hague, Catshuis. This has the advantage of providing only one locus for your activity in The Hague since your working dinner with the Prime Minister will also be held there. (Lubbers does not live in this residence; thus you also will have privacy.) We are enquiring whether the residence has a meeting room to permit you to consult with your delegation members before the dinner. Assuming there are such facilities, we recommend you accept PM Lubbers' kind invitation to stay at the Catshuis.

Due to unexpected official engagements, Queen Beatrix has asked that your meeting with her on Wednesday morning, November 9, be moved forward to 0900 hours (from 1000 hours). The Embassy suggested 0930 hours, but the Palace wishes 0900. Since her palace is only 10 minutes by car from PM Lubbers' residence (and there will be an escort), you could leave at 0850 hours. Do you agree to this new time?

Your meeting with PM Craxi is now in two parts: a meeting from 1100-1200 hours and a working luncheon from 1300-1430 hours. We are working to improve this.

We continue to believe that your participation in a Remembrance Day ceremony in Europe would be very worthwhile. We are planning such a ceremony at Groesbeek, Netherlands for the morning of Friday, November 11. However, this event faces severe time constraints given the noon timing of your meeting with PM Thatcher. Adjustment of the latter is possible and we will keep you informed.

Attached is an itinerary for your trip, as it now stands.


L. A. Delvoile
Chairman

Task Force Working Group

cc: PCO/Mr. Osbaldeston
EA/Mr. Shenstone
DND/Mr. Anderson

CONFIDENTIAL

PM VISIT TO EUROPE - Nov 8-11, 1983

<u>Monday November 7</u>	2200	Leave Ottawa on DND 707
<u>Tuesday November 8</u>	0800	Arrive Orly Airport, Paris Go to Ritz hotel
	1230 to 1530	Meeting and working lunch with President Mitterrand at the Elysée
	1630	Depart airport for the Hague
	1730	Arrive the Hague
	1800	Arrive at Hotel des Indes (or PM Lubbers' official residence)
	2000	Dinner with PM Lubbers (5+5) Overnight in The Hague
<u>Wednesday, November 9</u>		
	0850	Leave PM Lubber's residence
	0900 to 1000	Meeting with Queen Beatrix
	1030	Depart for Belgium
	1105	Arrive in Brussels
	1130	Arrive at Amigo Hotel
	mid-afternoon	Meeting with PM Martens
	1800	Depart for Rome
	2000	Arrive Rome
	2030	Arrive at Hotel Hassler Dinner in Rome Evening free

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Thursday, November 10 0930(?) Audience with Pope

1100 - 1200	Meeting with PM Craxi
1300 - 1430	Working lunch with PM Craxi
1500	Leave airport for Bonn
1700	Arrive Bonn Proceed to Hotel Steinberger
1800	Meeting with Chancellor Kohl
1930 to 2100	Dinner with Chancellor Kohl

Friday November 11 0830 Depart Bonn for Deeland military airport (near Groesbeek Netherlands) by Challenger

SUBJECT TO
FURTHER
REFINEMENT

0930	Arrive Deeland
0930 - 1000	Helicopter to Groesbeek
1000	Participate in Remembrance Day ceremony at Groesbeek
1100 - 1130	Groesbeek to Deeland by helicopter
1130 - 1230	Deeland to London (Gatwick by Challenger)

(London Time) 1130 Arrive Gatwick

SUBJECT TO
FURTHER
REFINEMENT

1200	Arrive 10 Downing Street
	Tête à tête with notetakers Drinks with others Working lunch (4+4)
1500	Depart 10 Downing for Gatwick
1600	Depart for Gatwick for Ottawa on 707

CONFIDENTIAL

November 2, 1983


IDDZ-0071

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER


Initiative - Message to President Andropov

We attach for your consideration and comments the draft of a message to President Andropov.

If you agree, we could discuss this message at our meeting on Thursday, November 3.


L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

cc: PCO/Mr. Osbaldeston
EA/Mr. Shenstone
DND/Mr. Anderson
All members of Task Force



D R A F T

Dear Mr. President,

In my letter to you of August 1, 1983 I referred to the need for greater efforts to reduce mistrust and suspicion in East-West relations, and to the need for urgent progress in disarmament negotiations -- in all their various fora. Since that time, the level of East-West tension has risen considerably, under the pressure of negative trends both in the central issues of political dialogue and arms control, and in related events such as the tragic destruction of a civilian passenger aircraft, terrorism in Lebanon, and recent developments in Grenada.

I have in recent days begun to articulate my deep concern at current levels of tension, and at the absence of productive political dialogue which might promote a measure of mutual interest not only in achieving agreement in key negotiations, but also in establishing a common language between the superpowers and between all states with different social systems. The responsibilities you bear are heavy, and I am therefore communicating with you, as I am with other leaders, to seek your personal attention to my purposes.

I believe it essential that the most senior political levels of the East-West system begin to repair lines of

... /2

- 2 -

communication, to work to contain unforeseen crises, and to rebuild a sense of authentic confidence in our respective intentions. The consequences of accident or miscalculation are too great for this effort not to begin. Therefore my purpose in the weeks ahead is to develop, in cooperation with other leaders who share my concern, specific steps which might reverse the current downward trend.

I do not underestimate the difficulties. The erosion of trust has cut deeply into prospects for increased security, at lower levels of armament, for East and West alike. The pressure of recent events includes the death of ten Canadians caused by the destruction of the Korean airliner. My task would be facilitated if the bilateral matter of compensation could at least be relieved by a mutual agreement to initiate discussion.

I dare to hope that, if a fresh note of consultation can be struck on the broader East-West issues which face us all, we may be able to achieve concrete steps toward reducing the level of tension which now prevails.

Your personal dedication, Mr. President, and that of your colleagues in the Soviet leadership, will play an essential part in the achievement of positive results. Therefore,

... /3

- 3 -

I would like to propose, as a first step, that I send to Moscow a senior personal emissary who would consult with your associates about the progress of my initiative, and explore your own perspective on further work. If you agree, I think it would be desirable if he could visit Moscow early in the second half of November.

My emissary will wish to review a range of proposals which I have in mind. They may include an approach to political confidence-building; ways to ensure ministerial momentum at the force reduction talks in Vienna and possibly other multilateral fora as well; and ways of ensuring a global approach to security questions, including both the key role of all five nuclear powers, and the vital question of non-proliferation.

Depending on your views, to which I attach the utmost importance in the restoration of confidence and stability, I trust we shall have the opportunity to consult frankly and extensively in the course of the weeks to come. I look forward to your reply, and take this opportunity to send my best personal wishes to you and to your colleagues.

Yours sincerely,

P. E. Trudeau



MGTC FILE DIARY

FILE/DOSSIER

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I A L	12	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDDZ0070 02NOV83	<div>3 NOV 83 00 18Z</div>	
TO/À	TO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE		
INFO	WSHDC MOSCO BNATO PRMNY CNGNY CHCGO LNGLS GENEV TOKYO		
DISTR			
REF	<u>DELIVER BY 030800</u>		
SUBJ/SUJ	INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPP DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR IDD IDA IDR FPR ---PRESS GUIDANCE AND STRATEGY - PRE-PM TRIP TO EUROPE POSTS CAN CONFIRM ANNOUNCEMENT HERE LATE WEDNESDAY OF EXTENSION OF PM S CONSULTATIONS ON PEACE INITIATIVE IN EUROPE TO LONDON. PM WILL VISIT THATCHER FRIDAY ^{11 NOV.} PRESS LINE IS THAT WHILE PM DISCUSSED GENERAL LINES OF INITIATIVE WITH THATCHER DURING VISIT HERE, AND INTENDED TO HAVE BILATERAL ON SUBJECT IN MARGINS OF CHOGM, MRS. THATCHER INVITED HIM TO MEET HER IF IT COULD BE ARRANGED ON HIS RETURN FROM BONN. PM WILL ALSO BE HAVING MEETING WITH QUEEN BEATRIX OF THE NETHERLANDS DURING HIS VISIT TO THE HAGUE AT HER REQUEST (GUARD UNTIL ADVISED). THESE ADDITIONS, PLUS A POSSIBLE VISIT WITH THE POPE WHILE IN ROME (GUARD, WE WILL ADVISE SEPARATELY) CONSIDERABLY EXTEND THE EFFECTIVE- NESS OF THIS INITIAL ROUND OF CONSULTATIONS. 2. THE PM PLANS ONLY BRIEF SCRUMS WITH PRESS FOLLOWING MEETINGS AND SINCE THIS IS AT THE MOMENT A PRIVATE DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO BUILD CONSENSUS FOR A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS HE WILL NOT BE COMMENTING IN ANY DETAIL ON EITHER THE SUBSTANCE OF WHAT WAS DISCUSSED OR HOW IT WAS RECEIVED BEYOND THE MOST VAGUE GENERALITIES. MEDIA SHOULD ...2		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG P. GOSSAGE

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG *L.A. DELVOIE*

000205



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE TWO IDDZ0070 02NOV83 CONF

12

10

NOT EXPECT MORE. PMO WILL NOT ENTERTAIN INTERVIEW REQUESTS AT THIS TIME.

3. HOWEVER, IN PRE-BRIEFINGS IN EACH CAPITAL, OR IN RESPONSE TO INEVITABLE ~~QUERIES~~ ^{IS} AS TO WHATS THE TRIP ^{IS} ALL ABOUT (PARTICULARLY IN BONN AND PARIS WHERE THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE COVERAGE OF SPEECH) FOLLOWING POINTS CAN BE MADE:

-EMPHASIZE THAT PM IS NOT TRYING TO INTERPOSE HIMSELF IN CRITICAL ISSUE OF INF NEGOTIATIONS AND DEPLOYMENT. WE FULLY REALIZE THAT THIS SITUATION IS BECOMING CRITICAL WHICH IS ALL THE MORE REASON FOR EXAMINING OPTIONS IN OTHER AREAS TO GET THE TWO SIDES TALKING AGAIN.

~~-EMPHASIZE THAT TRUDEAU IS EXAMINING WITH LEADERS WAYS TO INVOLVE ALL FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS IN ESTABLISHING GLOBAL LIMITS ON STRATEGIC ARSENALS. THIS IS INDEED HIS GENERAL APPROACH TO THE SENSITIVE AND CONTROVERSIAL PROBLEM OF HOW TO DEAL WITH THE FRENCH AND BRITISH MISSILES. HE IS NOT SUGGESTING THAT SUCH A FORUM REPLACE OR INTERFERE WITH THE INF OR START TALKS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. THIS IS RATHER AN IDEA WHICH FLOWS FROM THE CONCERN EXPRESSED IN THE GUELPH SPEECH THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS MAY HAVE BECOME TOO CHARGED WITH ANIMOSITY TO BE LEFT TO THEM ALONE-AS ARE SEVERAL OTHER IDEAS HE WILL DISCUSS WITH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND STATE.~~

-THESE MEETINGS ARE THE BEGINNING OF A LENGTHIER SERIES OF CONSUL-

...3



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE THREE IDDZ0070 CONF

12

10

TATIONS WHICH WILL CONTINUE IN THE MARGINS OF CHOGM, AND THROUGH WHICH THE PM HOPES TO ACHIEVE A CONSENSUS AMONGST A REPRESENTATIVE GROUP OF LIKE MINDED COUNTRIES FOR A CONCRETE SERIES OF ACTIONS WHICH WILL REDUCE EAST-WEST TENSIONS AND PROVIDE THE IMPETUS FOR SOME POSITIVE MOVEMENT IN ARMS REDUCTIONS.

-WE WILL ADVISE NEXT WEEK AT WHAT TIME YOU CAN ALSO ANNOUNCE THAT THE PM WILL BE REVEALING THE SUBSTANCE OF SOME OF HIS PROPOSALS IN A SECOND SPEECH IN CANADA IN MID-NOVEMBER.

-HIS AGENDA FOR THE MEETINGS IN EUROPE IS IN FACT HIS ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THE FIVE POINTS AT THE END OF THE GUELPH SPEECH. WHERE THESE HAVE RECEIVED LITTLE COVERAGE POSTS MAY WANT TO RE-RELEASE THESE, OR USE THEM IN THE CONTEXT OF AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS VISIT TO THEIR CAPITAL. YOU SHOULD ATTEMPT TO WORK ON EDITORIAL WRITINGS AND ~~COMMUNISTS~~ *COLUMNISTS*.

~~-THE QUESTION OF A TRIP TO MOSCOW DEPENDS VERY MUCH ON WHAT KIND OF SUPPORT HE GETS FOR HIS IDEAS IN EUROPE AND WHETHER POSITIVE CONCRETE RESULTS CAN BE ACHIEVED WITH THE SOVIETS. HE WON'T GO IF HE HAS NOTHING TO TALK ABOUT, NOTHING TO SUGGEST WHICH MAY GET THE SIDES TALKING. USE THIS ONLY ON BACKGROUND.~~

4. FOLLOWING FOR YOUR INFO ONLY.

-INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE SPEECH HAVE BEEN POSITIVE-BOTH IN CANADIAN AND US PRESS AS DETAILED IN EARLIER TELEX, AND FROM THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UN WHO HAS EXPRESSED HIS PERSONAL SUPPORT AND OFFE-

...4



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

PAGE FOUR IDDZ0070 CONF

12

10

FM/DE
TO/À
INFO
DISTR
REF
SUBJ/SUJ

RED FULL UN ASSISTANCE, FROM DAVID STEELE, HEAD OF THE UK LIBERALS WHO USED PORTIONS OF THE SPEECH IN A DEBATE IN THE BRITISH HOUSE, FROM THE VATICAN AND IN AN AIDE-MEMOIRE FROM NORWAY. INITIAL SOUNDINGS IN THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION INDICATE THAT WE CAN EXPECT AN EARLY SUBSTANTIVE REPLY TO THE PM'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. REACTIONS FROM THE LEADERS HE IS SEEING WILL, OF COURSE, HAVE TO AWAIT HIS VISITS, ALTHOUGH LDN, ROME AND THE HAGUE ALREADY APPEAR POSITIVE.

5. PARIS INVITED SENIOR JOURNALISTS TO LUNCH WEDNESDAY FOR FULL BACKGROUND BRIEFING TO SET STAGE FOR VISIT AND OTHER POSTS TO BE VISITED WHERE MEDIA COVERAGE OF SPEECH WAS MINIMAL MIGHT CONSIDER SIMILAR ACTIVITY A COUPLE OF DAYS PRIOR TO VISIT USING SPEECH AS JUMPING OFF POINT.

6. PRESS LOGISTICS WILL BE HANDLED THROUGH COLEMAN AT PMO WHO WILL BE CONTACTING POSTS INDIVIDUALLY WITH REQUIREMENTS.

7. POSTS SHOULD BE PREPARED FOR DELIVERY AND DISTRIBUTION OF SUBSTANTIVE SPEECH PLANNED FOR LUNCH IN MONTREAL SUNDAY NOV 13 AND SUPPORTING MATERIAL. WILL ADVISE IF PRE-RELEASE POSSIBLE, AND WILL MAKE ALL EFFORTS AT THIS END TO ASSURE TIMELY DELIVERY TO CANADIAN CORRESPONDENTS OF AFP, GERMAN NEWS AGENCY, THE TIMES ETC., AS WELL AS TO NEW YORK AND WASHDC BASED REPS OF EUROPEAN MEDIA.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

SIG

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Division Phoned RCR

Person CCR

Local Time 1040

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FM VATCN XAGR0490 02NOV83

TO EXTOTT RCR

DELIVER BY 021200

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DELIVER BY 021200 ROME

DISTR IDDZ RGB RCD

REF YOURTEL RCR0346 31OCT

---VISIT OF PM TRUDEAU:DISARMAMENT AND EAST-WEST

YOUR REFTTEL REACHED VATCN EMB ONLY TODAY AS NOV FIRST(ALL SAINTS) WAS ROMAN HOLIDAY.ACCORDINGLY OUR REPLY MUST IERFORCE BE RATHER IMPRESSIONISTIC AND NOT/NOT BASED ON THOROUGH REVIEW OF POPES SPEECHFS ETC.NEVERTHELESS WHAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PREPARE BY WAY OF BRIEFING MATERIAL IS CONTAINED IN PARAS WHICH FOLLOW.

2.TEXT BEGINS SINCE INAUGURATION OF HIS PONTIFICATE ON 15OCT78. POPE JOHN PAUL II HAS BEEN UNREMITTING IN HIS EFFORTS TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE AND PEACE WITH JUSTICE AS EXEMPLIFIED BY HIS INITIATIVES IN THE FOLLOWING FOUR AREAS:HIS ANNUAL MESSAGES ON NEW YEARS DAY(WORLD DAY OF PEACE),MESSAGE ON DANGERS OF NUCLEAR WARFARE CARRIED TO LEADERS OF MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS BY MEMBERS OF PONTIFICAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,HIS CONTINUING SUPPORT BOTH FOR QUOTE SOLIDARNOSC UNQUOTE AND CONCEPT OF INTERNAL DIALOGUE WITHIN POLAND AS WELL AS HIS RECENT PERSONAL MESSAGES(ANNOUNCED ON 29OCT)TO PRESIDENTS REAGAN AND ANDROPOV NOT/NOT TO DESIST FROM CONTINUING THEIR NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL.BASED ON HIS OWN PERSONAL EXPERIENCES AS A POLE WHO STUDIED FOR PRIESTHOOD CLANDESTINELY DURING WWII AND AS CARDINAL-ARCHBISHOP OF KRAKOW WHERE HE MAINTAINED QUOTE FIRM

...2

PAGE TWO XAGR0480 CONF

BUT FLEXIBLE UNQUOTE POSITION VIS-A-VIS COMMUNIST REGIME,
PONTIFICATE OF POPE JOHN PAUL II HAS BEEN MARKED BY CON-
SERVATIVE APPROACH TO DOCTRINAL ISSUES AND BOLD CHAMPIONSHIP
OF LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, HUMAN RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT AID AND
SEARCH FOR PEACE. HIS COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS WAS SIGNALLED
IN HIS FIRST ENCYCLICAL QUOTE REDEMPTOR HOMINIS UNQUOTE, ISSUED
ON 24 MAR 79, IN WHICH HE PROCLAIMED THAT FACT THAT JESUS DIED
TO SAVE MANKIND WAS SUFFICIENT PROOF OF ESSENTIAL DIGNITY OF
MAN. IN HIS SECOND ENCYCLICAL (QUOTE LABOREM EXERCENS UNQUOTE)
ON 14 SEP 81 UPON OCCASION OF NINETIETH ANNIVERSARY OF QUOTE
RERUM NOVARUM UNQUOTE ISSUED BY LEO XIII, JOHN PAUL II PROCLAIMED
NOT/NOT ONLY MANS RIGHT TO WORK (THEME LATER ECHOED IN REPORT
ISSUED BY CTTEE OF CDN EPISCOPATE LED BY BISHOP REMI DE ROO
OF VICTORIA) BUT ALSO NEED FOR WORKER SOLIDARITY. IN THIS
CONTEXT THERE IS NO/NO DOUBT THAT ELECTION OF CARDINAL WOJTYLA
AS POPE HAS PROFOUNDLY ALTERED PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATION IN
EASTERN EUROPE (PARTICULARLY, OF COURSE, IN POLAND) IN SENSE THAT
HUMAN AND SPIRITUAL VALUES HAVE BEEN DEMONSTRATED AS
HAVING GREATER LASTING IMPORTANCE THAN MATERIALISTIC ONES.
IT IS THUS NOTEWORTHY THAT MGR SILVESTRINI (VATCN QUOTE FM
UNQUOTE), IN HIS ADDRESS TO FINAL PLENARY SESSION OF CSCE
MADRID REVIEW CONFERENCE, IN WHICH VATCN DIPLOS HAVE BEEN FULL
PARTICIPANTS AS REPS OF HOLY SEE PER SE (AND NOT/NOT OF STATE
OF VATCN CITY WHICH HAPPENS TO BE LOCATED IN EUROPE), EMPHASIZED
NOT/NOT ONLY QUESTION OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES BUT ALSO POLAND

...3

PAGE THREE XAGR0430 CONF

AND NEED FOR FORMAL AND PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF HELSINKI PRINCIPLES. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS LITTLE WONDER THAT ALLEGATIONS OF BULGARIAN/KGB INVOLVEMENT IN PAPAL ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT OF 13MAY81 CONTINUE TO ATTRACT SOME CREDENCE.

3. VIEWS OF POPE JOHN PAUL II ON EAST/WEST ISSUES WERE WELL SET OUT IN HIS 01JAN83 MSG ON SIXTEENTH WORLD DAY OF PEACE, ENTITLED QUOTE DIALOGUE FOR IFACE, A CHALLENGE FOR OUR TIME UNQUOTE, IN WHICH HE EMPHASIZED NEED FOR DIALOGUE IN ORDER TO LESSEN QUOTE GREAT PRESENT DAY ANTAGONISMS OF EAST-WEST ON ONE HAND, NORTH-SOUTH ON OTHER UNQUOTE. HE ADDED THAT INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE WOULD ALSO CONCERN ITSELF WITH QUOTE DANGEROUS ARMS RACE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO REDUCE IT PROGRESSIVELY UNQUOTE; HOLY SEE WOULD ALSO CONTINUE TO INSIST UPON NEED TO PUT STOP TO ARMS RACE QUOTE THROUGH PROGRESSIVE NEGOTIATIONS, BY AIMEALING FOR RECIPROCITY UNQUOTE. (THIS POPE IS NO/NO UNILATERALIST AS WAS DEMONSTRATED BY VATICANS RATHER RESERVED APPROACH TOWARDS LET ON NUCLEAR ARMS PUBLISHED BY USA CONFERENCE OF BISHOPS.) ON OTHER HAND, MEMBERS OF PONTIFICAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES IN SPRING ON 1982 MADE VERY EFFECTIVE PERSONAL DEMARCHES TO SUCH WORLD LEADERS AS PRESIDENTS REAGAN AND BREZHNEV AND PM THATCHER ON SCIENTIFIC DANGERS OF NUCLEAR WARFARE. SHORTLY THEREAFTER POPE MADE IT CLEAR IN ADDRESSING CERN STAFF MEMBERS IN GENEVE ON 15JUN82 THAT HE WAS AWARE BOTH OF BENEFITS OF PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND CONSEQUENT NEED TO STRENGTHEN NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFICATION SAFEGUARDS REGIME.

...4

PAGE FOUR XAGR0480 CONF

4.MOST RECENT PAPAL INITIATIVE TOOK PLACE ON THURS 27OCT WHEN
CARDINAL-SECTY OF STATE CASAROLI CALLED IN PERSONAL ENVOY
TO HOLY SEE OF USA PRESIDENT AND USSR AMBASSADOR TO ITALY TO
RECEIVE LETS FROM POPE ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENTS REAGAN AND
ANDROPOV.(THIS APPARENTLY WAS FIRST TIME THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR
HAD BEEN SUMMONED BY VATICAN QUOTE PM UNQUOTE;ALTHOUGH USSR
HAS NO/NO DIPLO RELATIONS WITH HOLY SEE, DAY-TO-DAY CONTACTS
HAD IN PAST BEEN MAINTAINED BY OFFICER OF COUNSELLOR RANK IN
USSR EMB TO ITALY).GIST OF MSG(AS PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED BY POPE
IN ADDRESSING FINAL SESSION OF TRIENNIAL SYNOB OF BISHOPS
ON 29OCT)WAS THAT SUPER POWERS QUOTE SHOULD NOT/NOT DESIST
FROM NEGOTIATIONS,WHICH WERE THE SOLE METHOD OF RECONCILING
DIFFERENCES OR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST,IN ORDER TO PUT AN END
TO THE ARMS RACE WHICH CAUSES SUCH APPREHENSION TO CONTEMPORARY
MANKIND UNQUOTE.TEXT ENDS.

CCC/052 021406Z XAGR0480



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

MGTC FILE DIARY

MESSAGE

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE
90-1-1-1 MISSION

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

12

10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0073 02NOV83

TO/À

TO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU

INFO

HAGUE WSHDC MOSCO BNATO PRMNY CNGNY CHCGO LNGLS GENEV TOKYO

DISTR

DELIVER BY 030800

REF

SUBJ/SUJ

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR IDD IDA IDR FPR

---ASSESSMENT OF MEDIA REACTION TO PM S GUELPH SPEECH.

(COMCENTRE PLEASE COPY ATTACHED)

SFAT

3 NOV 83 00 18Z

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

P. GOSSAGE

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE

Assessment of Media Reaction to PM's Guelph Speech

QUOTE
1

Given that the speech was a statement of intent and not a detailed plan of action, and the strength of the competing Grenada story, the PM's initiative received better than anticipated coverage and comment both in Canada and abroad.

- 2) Domestically, the strong editorial support given the initiative by Wednesday's GLOBE AND MAIL (entitled "The Third Rail") is a most welcome development -- the first time in recent years a Trudeau initiative has had this newspaper's unqualified support. The TORONTO STAR was equally positive, as was their influential columnist Richard Gwyn. LE DEVOIR was more sceptical, as was THE CITIZEN. They supported his analysis but doubted validity of effort.
- 3) Domestic coverage of the speech itself gave the PM the benefit of the doubt, but placement of stories in both print and electronic media reflected overall priority of Grenada as top story, both Friday and Saturday. Most coverage concentrated on analytic portions of speech and on the announcement of countries to be visited. This material greatly enhanced the credibility of the speech. Few (with CBC-TV a notable exception) picked up the one more detailed proposal of a five-power approach to nuclear control. The "third rail" idea as a general concept was well received as almost a slogan for the initiative.
- 4) By Monday, only the State Department's widely misread Ottawa release was receiving comment and coverage.
- 5) U.S. media: The WASHINGTON POST, NEW YORK TIMES (reprinted in International HERALD TRIBUNE) and THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR all carried straight-up coverage; placed as well as could be expected with the dominance of Grenada. The POST this week carried excerpts as well on the editorial page. We will not get essential network coverage until the developing story fits better the U.S. agenda or until the administration reacts. Regional newspapers were beginning to pick up coverage and comment early in the week.
- 6) Europe: Bonn and Brussels had greatest success in achieving next day major print and electronic coverage, including a long flattering editorial in a major daily in The Hague. Radio and TV coverage in Germany on Friday morning was virtually only notice in FRG, while French coverage was limited to short mention in LE MONDE.

...2

In general, while the PM's focus on the dangerous state of East-West relations and the necessity of renewed dialogue and political energy has been expectedly well covered and received, the five suggested areas for forward movement at the end of the PM's speech have been little analyzed or extrapolated. In terms of the validity of the PM's objectives and proposals, there is a wait-and-see attitude.

UNQUOTE

RBD/P.J.A. Hancock/2-5303/cb

CIRC DIARY FILE

IDDZ

RBD

CONFIDENTIAL

26-1-1-1

44

Draft Letter from Prime Minister to
Yuri Andropov

cc 28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEARCE
November 2, 1983 MISSI

RBD-020

I attach, as discussed, a proposed message
from the Prime Minister to President Andropov. Note
in particular the treatment of three elements:

- (a) A glancing reference to the KAL tragedy and
our claim for compensation;
- (b) The firm proposal that a "senior personal
emissary" visit Moscow "early in the second
half of November"; and
- (c) The general, rather than specific, outline
of the Prime Minister's programme in the
penultimate paragraph.

MINA
USS
DMF
RGB
UGB
RBR

Peter J. A. Hancock,
Director General,
USSR and Eastern Europe
Bureau

D R A F T

Dear Mr. President,

In my letter to you of August 1, 1983 I referred to the need for greater efforts to reduce mistrust and suspicion in East-West relations, and to the need for urgent progress in disarmament negotiations -- in all their various fora. Since that time, the level of East-West tension has risen considerably, under the pressure of negative trends both in the central issues of political dialogue and arms control, and in related events such as the tragic destruction of a civilian passenger aircraft, terrorism in Lebanon, and recent developments in Grenada.

I have in recent days begun to articulate my deep concern at current levels of tension, and at the absence of productive political dialogue which might promote a measure of mutual interest not only in achieving agreement in key negotiations, but also in establishing a common language between the superpowers and between all states with different social systems. The responsibilities you bear are heavy, and I am therefore communicating with you, as I am with other leaders, to seek your personal attention to my purposes.

I believe it essential that the most senior political levels of the East-West system begin to repair lines of

... /2

- 2 -

communication, to work to contain unforeseen crises, and to rebuild a sense of authentic confidence in our respective intentions. The consequences of accident or miscalculation are too great for this effort not to begin. Therefore my purpose in the weeks ahead is to develop, in cooperation with other leaders who share my concern, specific steps which might reverse the current downward trend.

I do not underestimate the difficulties. The erosion of trust has cut deeply into prospects for increased security, at lower levels of armament, for East and West alike. The pressure of recent events includes the death of ten Canadians caused by the destruction of the Korean airliner. My task would be facilitated if the bilateral matter of compensation could at least be relieved by a mutual agreement to initiate discussion.

I dare to hope that, if a fresh note of consultation can be struck on the broader East-West issues which face us all, we may be able to achieve concrete steps toward reducing the level of tension which now prevails.

Your personal dedication, Mr. President, and that of your colleagues in the Soviet leadership, will play an essential part in the achievement of positive results. Therefore,

... /3

- 3 -

I would like to propose, as a first step, that I send to Moscow a senior personal emissary who would consult with your associates about the progress of my initiative, and explore your own perspective on further work. If you agree, I think it would be desirable if he could visit Moscow early in the second half of November.

My emissary will wish to review a range of proposals which I have in mind. They may include an approach to political confidence-building; ways to ensure ministerial momentum at the force reduction talks in Vienna and possibly other multilateral fora as well; and ways of ensuring a global approach to security questions, including both the key role of all five nuclear powers, and the vital question of non-proliferation.

Depending on your views, to which I attach the utmost importance in the restoration of confidence and stability, I trust we shall have the opportunity to consult frankly and extensively in the course of the weeks to come. I look forward to your reply, and take this opportunity to send my best personal wishes to you and to your colleagues.

Yours sincerely,

P. E. Trudeau

COMCENTRE CIRC DIARYS FILE

58-6-1-TRUDEAU FENCE 11/5/83

20-1-FILE	LOSSIER
	44

A-7

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ

CONFIDENTIAL

3 Nov 83 16 03z

PLACE LIEU ORIC. DATE PRECEDENCE

Fm de FM EXTOTT RBR498 02NOV83

To To BUCST

Info INFO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU
HAGUE WSHDC MOSCO BNATO GENEV TOKYO WSAW BPEST PRGUE BGRAD STKHM

Distr CNBRA HSNKI/CDEDEL WLGTN VIENN PEKIN DELHI PCOOTT/FOWLER

Ref NDHQOTT/MND/CIS/ADMPOL/CPD/DGIS CNGNY VMBFR


Sub/suj SFAX CHCGO LNGLS

IDSTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR RBD FPR IDD
IDR IDA IDDZ RBRD IDX ZSP ZSP RBP

REF YOURTEL UYGR2842 01NOV


---PM INITIATIVE:ROM INVITATION FIRST STAGE OF PM'S INITIATIVE
WILL LAST FOUR DAYS,TAKING IN SIX COUNTRIES AND DISCUSSIONS
WITH EIGHT HIGH LEVEL INTERLOCUTORS.PRESSURES OF SCHEDULE
PRECLUDE ANY OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES EAST OR WEST.

2.IF PM UNDERTAKES SECOND STAGE OF CONSULTATIONS (WHICH HAS NOT/NOT
YET BEEN DECIDED),THEN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH CEAUSESCU WILL BE
ACTIVELY CONSIDERED.FOR YOUR INFO ONLY WE ARE CONSIDERING THREE
POSSIBLE VEHICLES(A)MESSAGE(B)VISIT TO OTT BY FM ANDREI(C)BRIEF
VISIT BY PM DURING SECOND PHASE.LAST MAY IN FACT BE LEAST LIKELY.
AT THIS POINT YOU SHOULD GIVE NO/NO INDICATION TO ROMANIANS OF
VARIANTS OTHER THAN FACT WE CONSIDER THIS INITIATIVE AS PRAGMATIC,
STEP BY STEP PROCESS.NO/NO DECISION ON FURTHER VISITS BY PM WILL
BE TAKEN UNTIL RESULTS OF FIRST SET OF CONSULTATIONS WITH NATO



RBR -

6-2633



PAGE TWO RBR498 CONFD

LEADERS HAVE BEEN EVALUATED. NONETHELESS WE WELCOME ROM INTEREST
AND WILL DO BEST TO KEEP YOU INFORMED.

TO/À MGD/D.Small

FROM/DE • IDDZ/L.A.Delvoie

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCESUBJECT •
SUJET Accommodation for PM Task Force

Security/Sécurité
CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
November 2, 1983
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0068

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

USS

DMF

CCB

IFB


The accommodation that this Task Force is occupying on the sixth floor of Tower C will no longer be available to us as of November 11, when the Inspection Teams return to Ottawa.

2. I understand from discussions you had with my colleagues earlier today that you are experiencing some considerable difficulty in locating suitable accommodation for the Task Force for the period after November 11. I also understand that you have suggested it may be necessary for the Task Force to move to some other building and that the possibility of the NCC Building on Sussex Drive or the Government Conference Centre was evoked.

3. On the basis of my experience in operating this Task Force to date, I wish to emphasize that it would be practically impossible to run this operation effectively from any building other than the Pearson Building. Experience has shown that we need to be in constant communication with members of Senior Management as well as with members of the European, USA, and International Security Branches. Furthermore, we despatch and receive an average of 30 high-priority messages every day. We also need on an ongoing basis the infrastructure offered by the Press Office, the press clipping service, and the printing service of the Department.

4. A move to another building would, from all these points of view, absolutely hobble the activities of a task force which is required to act and react very rapidly in the face of ever immediate deadlines.

5. I should therefore be grateful if every effort could be made and every alternative explored to find accommodation for this Task Force within the Pearson Building.


L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	CONFIDENTIAL	12	10
FM/DE	DE EXTOTT IDDZ 02NOV83	<div>3 NOV 83 00 1802</div>	
TO/À	A BRU <u>LIVRAISON A 030900</u>		
INFO	<u>JOHNSON</u>		
DISTR	INFO PMOOTT/ COLSON PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPH HAGUE		
REF	BREEC BNATO CANMILREP		
SUBJ/SUJ	DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RCR RCD RSR		
REF VOTRETEL ZVGR0511 DU 01NOV			
---INITIATIVE DU PM:VISITE EN BELGIQUE-ENTRETIEN			
REGRETTONS MAIS PROGRAMME CHARGE DU PM NE PERMET PAS UN ENTRETIEN			
AVEC LE ROI BAUDOUIN.MERCI VOTRE SUGGESTION.			
2.NOUS TENONS TOUJOURS LIBRE L'APRES-MIDI DU 9 NOV POUR L'ENTRETIEN			
TRUDEAU-MARTENS.LE PM QUITTE BRU A 1800 HEURES POUR ROME.AVISER			
DOP L'ETAT DE LA QUESTION.			

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. HARLICK

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE

000223

CONFIDENTIAL


November 2, 1983

IDDZ-0066

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R. R. Fowler)

Assessment of Media Reaction to PM's Guelph Speech

Attached is summary by Patrick Gossage of media reaction to your Guelph speech.



L. A. Delvoze
L. A. Delvoze
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

cc: PCO/Mr. Osbaldeston

EA/Mr. Shenstone

DND/Mr. Anderson

CONFIDENTIAL

November 2, 1983

Assessment of Media Reaction to PM's Guelph Speech

- 1) Given that the speech was a statement of intent and not a detailed plan of action, and the strength of the competing Grenada story, the PM's initiative received better than anticipated coverage and comment both in Canada and abroad.
- 2) Domestically, the strong editorial support given the initiative by Wednesday's GLOBE AND MAIL (entitled "The Third Rail") is a most welcome development -- the first time in recent years a Trudeau initiative has had this newspaper's unqualified support. The TORONTO STAR was equally positive, as was their influential columnist Richard Gwyn. LE DEVOIR was more sceptical, as was THE CITIZEN. They supported his analysis but doubted validity of effort.
- 3) Domestic coverage of the speech itself gave the PM the benefit of the doubt, but placement of stories in both print and electronic media reflected overall priority of Grenada as top story, both Friday and Saturday. Most coverage concentrated on analytic portions of speech and on the announcement of countries to be visited. This material greatly enhanced the credibility of the speech. Few (with CBC-TV a notable exception) picked up the one more detailed proposal of a five-power approach to nuclear control. The "third rail" idea as a general concept was well received as almost a slogan for the initiative.
- 4) By Monday, only the State Department's widely misread Ottawa release was receiving comment and coverage.
- 5) U.S. media: The WASHINGTON POST, NEW YORK TIMES (reprinted in International HERALD TRIBUNE) and THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR all carried straight-up coverage; placed as well as could be expected with the dominance of Grenada. The POST this week carried excerpts as well on the editorial page. We will not get essential network coverage until the developing story fits better the U.S. agenda or until the administration reacts. Regional newspapers were beginning to pick up coverage and comment early in the week.
- 6) Europe: Bonn and Brussels had greatest success in achieving next day major print and electronic coverage, including a long flattering editorial in a major daily in The Hague. Radio and TV coverage in Germany on Friday morning was virtually only notice in FRG, while French coverage was limited to short mention in LE MONDE.

...2

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL


., In general, while the PM's focus on the dangerous state of East-West relations and the necessity of renewed dialogue and political energy has been expectedly well covered and received, the five suggested areas for forward movement at the end of the PM's speech have been little analyzed or extrapolated. In terms of the validity of the PM's objectives and proposals, there is a wait-and-see attitude.

Nov. 2, 1983

MEMO TO THE TASK FORCE

CC Fowler
Axworthy
Coleman

from: Gossage



Press Arrangements and Strategy - Speech Two

1.) While the pre-release and briefing in Guelph succeeded in getting moderately favourable immediate coverage, the commentary we gained treated only the initiative per se not the substance of the proposals - probably a good thing for the moment. We also failed to give Canada based European press, particularly AFP and the German news agency, adequate time or briefing to gain any but the most rudimentary stories in those two key countries the next day (AFP filed three paras). The fact it was only pre-released in Guelph practically assured this.

2.) The fact that the second speech is substantive and detailed, and that the serious press may not travel to Montreal to hear it argues for a pre-release (say at noon) here Sunday with officials available to answer questions of substance. We are also working on background papers on MBRRFR, the five nuclear power idea, Non Proliferation etc. to supplement the speech which could be given out at the time.

3.) This would have the advantage of removing serious print journalists and commentators from the political (partisan) atmosphere of the speech and make them concentrate on substance. We could arrange for an audio feed of the speech as given to check against delivery. For the same reason suggest we set up a room here at External for this purpose.

4.) Bottom line is that if we want thoughtful coverage from serious Canadian press (nets and radio and CP etc. will go to Montreal anyway) and good wire service to Europe (they probably wouldn't go but would take a text cold here anyway) we should give them a serious chance. This is best done here with a few experts available.


5. TEXT ETC. TO POSTS)

Since we are unlikely to have a final text until Saturday, and since there is the further problem of making an all-English, all French version, the kind of distribution undertaken last time of volume printed copies, particularly to US posts may not be possible. Objective should be to have posts receive telex copies and summaries (this is badly needed for posts that have to provide translation, particularly Bonn) Sunday for processing and distribution Monday first thing. Monday backgrounders are indicated for editorial writers, columnists etc.

-2-

Besides the pre-release and briefing in Ottawa of Canada-based foreign press and Stringers, Monday coverage in Europe will be assured through NY efforts with third country press and some similar effort in Washington. CNGNY succeeded admirably in this regard with German radio and TV with first speech. Perhaps an audio feed to NY is indicated to assure this kind of first day coverage in Germany, Italy and Britain particularly.

I'd like your reactions to 1-4.

Patrick

November 2, 1983

IDDZ-0065

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER-(through R.R. Fowler)

Initiative - Purposes of your Visit to Europe

We outline below the purposes which we regard as central to your forthcoming visit to Europe and to your meetings with six heads of government. We should be grateful for your views and comments on this listing:


- (a) To inform your colleagues of your current concerns and preoccupations regarding East-West relations and the international security situation.
- (b) To determine whether they share your perceptions, and in particular your diagnosis that the situation requires first and foremost a re-establishment of political dialogue and confidence at the highest level between East and West (the "third rail").
- (c) To propose that this dialogue be re-established by incremental steps, including in the first instance contacts with the Soviet leadership by yourself and other Western leaders, which contacts might eventually favour the resumption of a high-level political dialogue between Washington and Moscow under more positive conditions than those now prevailing.
- (d) To propose a number of specific measures which might further the cause of arms control and which, if they permitted progress in this area, might help to arrest the deterioration in East-West relations and thus serve to improve prospects for the re-establishment of high-level political dialogue and confidence.
- (e) To canvass the views and reactions of your colleagues to these proposals and to elicit their views as to how they might most productively be carried forward.
- (f) To enlist the support of your colleagues for your general plan of action and for the specific proposals which would constitute its underpinning.

...2

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

If you agree, we might discuss this memorandum at our meeting on Thursday morning, November 3.



L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

cc: PCO/Mr. Osbaldeston
EA/Mr. Shenstone
DND/Mr. Anderson

TDDZ/G.J. Smith 75-239475C

Canada Affaires extérieures
Canada

TO/À RBR

FROM/DE • IDDZ/Smith

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • PM Initiative: Soviet Views
SUJET

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
mission

Security/Sécurité
CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
November 2, 1983
Number/Numéro
IDDE-0064

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

MINA

USS

DMF

IFB

IDR

IDA

ZSI

RCD

UGB

URR

MOSCO

PCOOTT/
Fowler

NDHQOTT/
ADMPOL/
CPP/
DIPOL/
CIS

WSHDC

At the University of Guelph "Peace and Security Conference" last week, one of the Soviet participants, P.T. Podlesny, Section Head at the USA and Canada Institute in Moscow, allowed himself to be interviewed by television, radio and the print media. In all cases he said his reaction to the Prime Minister's speech was "positive" and that the PM "would be welcome in Moscow".

2. Later, at a reception, Podlesny sought me out for a discussion. He reiterated what he had told the media. My response was that I was aware the PM had an outstanding invitation and would be welcome in Moscow. The question was what would be achieved. He had to be assured that the trip would result in substantive positive results. Soviet efforts to improve the climate would be important in this regard. I mentioned as an example in the bilateral field the issue of compensation for the Canadian KAL victims. Podlesny shook his head, giving the standard line that we should address ourselves to those who had provoked this incident. When I mentioned that we had received compensation from the USSR before, as a result of the damage caused when COSMOS 954 broke up over Canada, Podlesny altered his position somewhat, saying in that case "perhaps" some form of compensation should not be ruled out.

3. In response to my enquiry whether some political confidence-building gesture of a broader nature might not be possible, such as in Angola, he responded sharply that Moscow was not going to make any concessions to Washington. Any Soviet gesture in Angola would simply be pocketed by the USA who would then call on the USSR to leave Afghanistan and then other locations. Washington wasn't serious about reaching any agreement or understanding. The two recent USA proposals on INF and START fooled no one. The proposal on "build down" had no substance to it and had been put forward for domestic reasons in order to gain support for the "MX". If the USA proceeded with INF deployment, Moscow would follow through with its own new missile deployments and then the situation would become "dangerous".

...2


CONFIDENTIAL

4. Podlesny said Moscow had "given up" on the Reagan Administration. Reagan and his advisers had an anti-Soviet mind-set that could not be changed. Podlesny would have nothing to do with our argument that Moscow, through a positive demonstration of its own goodwill, could possibly influence the Reagan Administration via public opinion in the USA. The view in Moscow, he said, was that Reagan would be re-elected and the USSR simply would have to outwait him.

5. During the discussion I emphasized to him, in case there might be any doubt, that Canada supported fully the two-track decision.

6. Comment: Podlesny's comments were rather disconcerting, particularly:

- (a) the very rigid interpretation he gave about Moscow's inability to influence President Reagan in any way;
- (b) the implication he left that Moscow would respond in kind to Washington's position and attitude;
- (c) his remark that the situation could become "dangerous" following the deployment of the cruise and Pershing IIs together with Moscow's own response.


Gary J. Smith
Task Force Working Group

TO/À LCR IDDL/URR

FROM/DE C/DMF

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Visite DMF à Washington, le 10 novembre
SUJET

Security/Sécurité
RESTREINT
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
Le 2 novembre 1983
Number/Numéro
DMF-118

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

GMR
ZSI

M. Marchand se rendra à Washington le 10 novembre pour des entretiens au Département d'Etat, notamment avec le sous-secrétaire d'Etat Laurence Eagleburger. Il passera en revue la visite du VPM/SEAE au Moyen-Orient; GMR est déjà au courant des besoins en matière de documentation. Les autres sujets susceptibles d'être soulevés seront, de l'avis de M. Marchand: la Grenade, l'initiative est-ouest du Premier Ministre, et tout aspect de la réunion MacEachen-Shultz de Halifax qui pourrait nécessiter un suivi à ce niveau à ce moment-là.

2. Je vous saurais gré de me faire parvenir d'ici le mercredi 9 novembre la documentation que vous jugerez appropriée. M. Marchand sera à Londres les 4-8 novembre et n'aura que le seul 9 novembre pour se mettre au fait pour sa visite à Washington.

le Directeur de Cabinet
du Sous-ministre
(Affaires politiques)

L.I. FRIEDLAENDER

L.I. Friedlaender

C.C. 1002

4 att to ③ pls
S 17 XI

28-6-1-Tyulean Peace
mission

Speech by Herr Hans-Dietrich Genscher,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany,
to the Paasikivi Society in Helsinki
on 2 November 1983

MF

Translation of advance text

Mr President,
Ladies and gentlemen,

I gladly accepted your invitation to address you here today on the subject of my country's foreign policy.

We hold in high regard the positive role that your country plays in European affairs. It is no coincidence that the CSCE Final Act bears the name of Helsinki. Here in Helsinki the preparatory meeting was started on 26 October for the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe scheduled to commence in Stockholm on 17 January 1984.

Together with the countries of Northern Europe we share the values of freedom, democracy and rule of law. We respect the basic principles of Finnish foreign policy. Its policy of neutrality is in keeping with Finland's specific geographical situation and its historical experience. The maintenance of Finland's independence is of decisive importance for the preservation of Nordic equilibrium and for the continuation of the European process of détente. It is therefore important for all Europeans.

However, Finland's position in the community of European States is unique and cannot serve as a model for other European countries. President Koivisto emphasized this only recently when he said: "We have a unique position, and we have a unique history with Russia." We ourselves have opted for a different course in order to meet the challenge of our time: the preservation of peace in freedom; we have opted for membership of the European Community and the Atlantic Alliance. Our membership of the European Community and the Western alliance as well as our friendship with the United States are not tactical, neutral decisions; they are fundamental decisions in favour of freedom, human rights and the right to self-determination. Setting out from this basic position we are striving to develop a lasting order of peace in Europe. There are important reasons why the Germans in particular devote so much thought to such a peaceful order in Europe.

First: The German people, who have been torn asunder by the division of Europe, are gravely affected by any deterioration of the climate in Europe, by any increase in tensions. Precisely for this reason we have the greatest interest in contributing, through dialogue and co-operation, towards the steady improvement of East-West relations.

The separation of the Germans into two States has, of course, greatly heightened our awareness of the division of Europe. For us, no political decision is conceivable without bearing in mind that there are also Germans living on the other side of this line. We frame our policies without ever forgetting that Europe does not end at the rivers Elbe and Werra.

Second: Developments since 1945 have shown that the German question can only be solved in the European context. Our policy on Germany is therefore a policy for peace in Europe. Our efforts to mitigate the effects of the division of Europe and finally overcome this division are equally relevant to the division of Germany. Any progress for the whole of Europe also means progress for the Germans. This perception underscores that we link our national question to the fate of Europe. In the past our people often acted contrary to the interests of their neighbours and, owing to our situation at the heart of Europe, these conflicts had repercussions time and again for the whole of Europe. Germany's geographic situation has also always meant that the other Europeans have a particular interest in our country and that they have often also influenced German concerns.

Linking our own national destiny to that of Europe created a European dimension in German politics and contributed towards stability in Europe. Any attempt at abandoning this European dimension and going it alone at the national level, be it in the form of neutralization, would make us a cat's-paw for others and imperil stability in Europe. Out of responsibility to ourselves and our neighbours, we must not become a pawn of East-West rivalry.

By linking our national interests with the destiny of Europe we have become a driving force of the process of unification in the European Community and dedicated proponents of East-West dialogue and co-operation.

We Germans - in both parts of our country - are aware of our historical responsibility for peace: war must never again originate on German soil. Instead, initiatives for peace and co-operation must emanate from Germany. The Governments of the two German States must therefore shape their relations in such a way that tension is superseded by trusting co-operation to the benefit of people in both parts of Germany and of peace in Europe. This is the "community of shared responsibility", which encompasses more than our common history, language and culture. It determines the present and the future of the German nation. This community of shared responsibility of the Germans is also an expression of our national identity, in full awareness of which we in the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic speak of the responsibility of the German nation. The present Martin Luther Year has strengthened and deepened the Germans' awareness of their shared responsibility for the past and the future.

Ladies and gentlemen,

whoever seeks to develop an order of peace in Europe must bear in mind that peace and co-operation in Europe can only prosper and be furthered on the basis of an equilibrium of military forces at the lowest possible level. Whoever aspires to mutual trust and co-operation in Europe must also aspire to equilibrium. This is the idea underlying the Harmel strategy of the Western Alliance. The will and capacity for Western defence are linked to the quest for détente, co-operation and disarmament to form a comprehensive policy for actively safeguarding peace.

Ensuring equilibrium in Europe - this, too, must be appreciated - can, in view of the Soviet Union's military superiority over Western Europe, only be achieved by the Western European alliance with North America. The importance of the United States and Canada for security and co-operation in Europe is, as recognized by all sides, also reflected in their participation in the CSCE process.

Equilibrium is indispensable for détente and co-operation. We want to safeguard this equilibrium not by means of an arms race, but through arms control and disarmament at the lowest possible level. The will and capacity

for disarmament require a readiness to perceive and acknowledge the other side's security interests. We Germans realize that the Soviet Union's often exaggerated security needs are also the effect of the darkest chapter in our own history. Our will and determination to do what is necessary for our security is not something to bargain over at the talks, but we are ready to disarm on a balanced basis to as low a level as the Soviet Union is prepared to go along with; these are the basic elements of our security and disarmament policy.

A dialogue on disarmament must therefore play a key part in the development of an order of peace in Europe. This is something that we all appreciate particularly at the present juncture where all eyes are turned on the INF talks in Geneva. At these talks the aim is to restore equilibrium in the field of intermediate-range nuclear weapons as well - equilibrium which has been seriously disturbed by the Soviet arms build-up. There is more at stake than the correlation of nuclear forces; at stake is the central question of the relationship between nuclear powers and countries which, like ourselves, do not possess nuclear weapons. In the final analysis, the question of equal security is involved.

The Federal Republic of Germany has pledged in binding form to forego nuclear weapons of its own; it has therefore laid stake to the claim not to be threatened by the nuclear weapons of other countries - yet this is precisely what the Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles are doing. Consequently, the central Western demand for the complete renunciation of Soviet and American intermediate-range missiles is geared to the goal of asserting this fundamental claim. If this claim is not acceptable to the Soviet Union, or at least not immediately, then we require the protection of the United States. But in this case, too, we want to keep Western arms modernization as low as possible and for this reason the United States has, also on behalf of the other Allies, proposed an interim agreement for limiting the ground-launched INF of both sides to the lowest possible number. President Reagan's recent proposal and some positive elements in General Secretary Andropov's recent interview indicate that an agreement is still possible, provided the Soviet Union recognizes that a Soviet monopoly of these weapons does not do justice

to either the requirement of equilibrium or to equal security and cannot therefore be accepted by us.

The Soviet Union must now spell out its ideas at the bargaining table in Geneva so that the time left until the date for the start of deployment in November can be used for intensive talks. If no concrete agreement is achieved, deployment will commence at the envisaged date on the scale decided on in 1979. We wish to re-affirm in this context that, even after the start of deployment, we want to continue the talks, just as we carried on negotiating during the steadily increasing Soviet build-up. Deployment does not create any faits accomplis; any concrete agreement reached at a later date can be taken into account.

However, a balanced correlation of forces at the lowest possible level must also be achieved in the domain of conventional forces in Europe. In Vienna members of the two Alliances are negotiating mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe. The positions of both sides have moved closer together. Genuine progress now appears possible if the Eastern side clears the way for agreement on the two still unresolved complexes, namely force strengths and the verifiability of reductions. Success at the Vienna MBFR talks would be an important contribution to security and confidence in Europe.

However, in order to achieve a truly stable balance of conventional forces in Europe, the dialogue on disarmament must be extended so that it goes beyond the confined area of Central Europe and embraces all of Europe: the area from the Atlantic to the Urals. At the Madrid CSCE follow-up meeting it proved possible to achieve such an extension by agreeing on the convening of a Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, known as the CDE. The CDE is of the utmost importance for the security requirements of an order of peace in Europe. At this conference we intend to negotiate on the security of the whole of Europe and of all European countries. In this context, no distinction should be made between superpowers, medium-sized and small countries. The mandate ex-

pressly refers to equal rights for all participants and equal respect for their security interests.

We are grateful that Finland has organized the preparatory meeting for the CDE here in Helsinki, thus rendering a fresh contribution towards strengthening security in Europe: the CDE is also part of the CSCE process, which we call the "Helsinki process".

In the large undertaking of the CSCE it was clear from the very outset that the political, humanitarian, economic and cultural aspects of co-operation in Europe are inextricably linked with the security issues. The CSCE Final Act therefore included provisions on the military aspects of security. However, these provisions are but rudiments. With the CDE we shall now devote the necessary attention to the security aspects of the CSCE process. The importance we attach to these questions is underscored by our proposal that the Foreign Ministers should open the Conference.

The CSCE's goal of security and co-operation in Europe can be attained only progressively and on a long-term basis. This applies particularly to the goal of disarmament in Europe. The mandate for the CDE given in Madrid therefore expressly envisages a phased approach. The task of the first stage of the CDE is to create confidence. We want to agree on measures conducive to greater confidence in Europe. These can only be concrete measures that are militarily significant, politically binding and verifiable. We want to enhance calculability for both sides. We realize that, with their transparent decision-making processes, intentions and potentials, our open democratic systems by their very nature render an advance contribution towards security and calculability. The aim is to attain more confidence and security in Europe through greater openness and transparency on both sides.

If we succeed in attaining this goal of confidence-building by agreeing on effective measures, this would constitute an initial, important step towards stabilizing the military situation in Europe. We could then proceed, at the next stage, to disarmament talks in the true sense. The prime objective must then be to reduce the offensive potentials of both sides. The long-term aim

is to reduce the weapons and troops in the whole of Europe to the lowest possible level. We want to strengthen peace by ever fewer weapons. The state of "non-war" as a result of deterrence must be overcome, in a gradual, steady process, and superseded by a peaceful order in Europe founded on confidence and co-operation. We know how long and difficult this path is. But we shall strive with the utmost persistence to progress along this path.

Yet we must at all times bear in mind that the military aspects are not by themselves sufficient to create conditions in Europe meriting the title of an "order of peace". Allow me, therefore, to turn now from the military to the political principles and elements of a peaceful order in Europe:

First: The renunciation of force is the basis for peace and co-operation in Europe. This implies strict observance of the international prohibition of any use or threat of force. It applies to the use or threat of nuclear and conventional weapons alike; the renunciation of force is indivisible. The renunciation of force also implies the readiness to ban the use of force from the minds of people. It implies education for young people which serves the cause of peace and does away with ideological enemies instead of building them up. Portraying the other side as evil is not reconcilable with the spirit of the renunciation of force.

In its treaties with the East the Federal Republic of Germany made the renunciation of force the central element of its peace policy aimed at gradually surmounting the division of Europe.

The renunciation of the use or threat of force must apply not only to the conduct between Alliances. It must also be observed within Alliances. It must be reflected in a policy of moderation and restraint worldwide - this also applies to open or concealed activities, to open or subversive aggression. The East-West conflict must not be transferred to the Third World.

Chancellor Helmut Kohl stated the following in Moscow on 4 July 1983: "A new binding commitment to abstain from the use of force can help to improve the international situation if it actually prevents the threat of force and puts

an end to the use of force where it is still applied". In this spirit, the dialogue on questions relating to the renunciation of force can lead to greater stability and calculability.

Second: A steady bilateral and multilateral political dialogue between East and West is indispensable for the development of an order of peace in Europe. This dialogue must not be disrupted at times of increased tension or distrust. In fact, at precisely such junctures it is particularly necessary. This is the conviction that prompts the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany to advocate a high-level political dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union, too. The American-Soviet relationship is of key importance for world peace. The European East-West dialogue is equally crucial, but it cannot be a substitute for the American-Soviet dialogue.

As regards the German-Soviet relationship, my encounter with the Soviet Foreign Minister in Vienna - it was the fourth this year - affirmed once more that both sides are determined to continue the policy initiated by the Moscow Treaty signed over 10 years ago. We shall intensify this dialogue and expand our co-operation. This policy is of a long-term nature.

Third: Co-operation in the widest sense is an indispensable element for stable East-West relations and the development of an order of peace in Europe. Basket II of the Helsinki Final Act bears the heading: "Co-operation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment". This co-operation is not to be confined to Europe but instead, according to the Final Act, to embrace "major world economic problems such as food, energy, commodities, monetary and financial problems". It is obvious that we are but at the start in this sphere; the opportunities shown here have evidently not yet been fully perceived everywhere.

The observation that the possibilities afforded by basket II have until now been exploited only in part and the determination to proceed in exploiting the opportunities held out here do not, however, fully do justice to the importance of co-operation. Another dimension must be seen and heeded: the interdependence of the various fields of East-West relations. Progress in

arms control cannot be expected if there are no advances in the others. The same holds true of progress in the implementation of human rights and in humanitarian issues. Co-operation must be to mutual benefit; it cannot mean securing one-sided advantages. But it is obvious that, in the areas outlined in basket II, the West can, by virtue of its advanced state of development, hold out great prospects for the Soviet Union and its allies and offer far-reaching co-operation which can facilitate progress in arms control and in the questions with direct effects for people.

At all events, co-operation is an indispensable element of a long-term policy for peace. Consequently, economic relations render an important contribution towards a steady and stable political relationship between East and West. We reject any thoughts along the lines of a trade war as irreconcilable with the goal of East-West détente and co-operation. There are great prospects for economic co-operation which must be exploited in a resolute manner; in this way, too, confidence can be created, shared interests can be perceived better and new ones aroused.

The economic development of one side benefits the other as well. Environmental protection on the one side also benefits the other's environment. The interests of the Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union, and the interests of the Western democracies are mutually complementary in many ways and thus call for co-operation.

The offer of co-operation made to the East by the Federal Republic of Germany is a sincere one. We are convinced that we must unite our forces so that we can jointly ensure the prosperity of the present and future generations. This also implies that we work together in preserving our natural surroundings and draw up extensive arrangements for environmental protection. The dying forests and the polluted North and Baltic Seas dramatically show that these challenges do not stop at the dividing line between East and West.

Fourth: An order of peace in Europe cannot ignore the spiritual essence of Europe: the rule of law, especially human rights. Progress along the path towards a peaceful order therefore requires progress in respect for each individual's rights and in respect for the right to self-determination of all nations in Europe. The commitment to human rights and the right to self-determination was rightly made an integral part of the CSCE Final Act. It was reaffirmed in the joint declaration of the CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid. What we expect is no more and no less than that the pledges entered into in the CSCE process be consistently honoured. We therefore expect all countries to participate constructively in the meeting of experts on human rights and fundamental freedoms, which is to be held in Ottawa in May 1985.

Peace and co-operation in Europe - this, too, is a guiding principle of the CSCE Final Act - are not only a matter for States and governments. The people in Europe must also benefit by them in a tangible manner. The individual must himself be able to see the fruits of détente. Consequently, such great importance attaches to the pledges made in Helsinki and Madrid designed to alleviate the suffering of people resulting from the division of Europe. Only if people can experience in their everyday lives the effects of what has been agreed by their governments will the CSCE process remain credible.

Fifth: Cultural relations - this too is expressed in the Final Act - also play an essential part in the development of a peaceful order in Europe. The Eastern and Western parts of Europe are today separated by mutually opposed political systems. But this opposition must not and cannot result in the shared roots of European culture being forgotten. All European nations have made lasting contributions to this culture, and all nations in Europe continue to do so.

The great minds that all European nations have produced, the great works of art and the scientific achievements require that we respect all the nations united on this continent, who merely want to live in peace, as we Germans wish to do.

The Helsinki Final Act includes the following passage:

The 35 participating States undertake to "give their peoples a more comprehensive and complete mutual knowledge of their achievements in the various fields of culture and to promote fuller mutual access by all to these achievements". This, too, is an important fundament of an order of peace in Europe because without a knowledge of, and respect for, the great cultural achievements of others a genuine elimination of distrust, conflict and fear is hardly conceivable.

Ladies and gentlemen,

in this world which is deeply shaken by numerous conflicts, in which people are greatly alarmed at the worldwide arms build-up - a development that is increasingly extending to the Third World as well, in which the natural environment is in jeopardy, in which there is an absence of liberty in many parts, and in which many people have to live in hunger and want, it is our duty to direct all our strength to the development of an order of peace in Europe.

In the past Europe was time and again plagued by war, and it was often the source of wars that spread to other parts of the earth. This Europe must today provide an example of the will for co-operation across ideological boundaries; it must be the point of departure for global initiatives for peace and for assistance to and solidarity with the countries of the Third World. As realists, we are aware of the great obstacles that have to be overcome along the path towards an order of peace in Europe. But we also realize that we cannot place our hands in our laps and wait for democracy to come about in the Soviet Union.

Our will for co-operation is sincere and not political tactics; it is a long-term strategy for actively safeguarding peace. Our decision in favour of democracy and freedom is just as final as our determination to defend our freedom and security is beyond question. But equally beyond question is our will to participate in developing an order of peace in which all European nations can live free from fear. Particularly during the present decisive

weeks the Soviet Union should perceive the great prospects that co-operation and détente, dialogue and disarmament hold out for it, too. We must not reduce the East-West relationship to the question of missiles, but we must master this problem, too, through negotiations and the widest possible co-operation.

As a people at the heart of Europe we Germans must do our utmost to help achieve such an order of peace.

For this reason, German foreign policy is also a policy for peace in Europe.

1-



TO/À IDDZ

FROM/DE • RBD

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET • Draft Letter from Prime Minister to
Yuri Andropov

28-6-1 = Trudeau Peace Mission
MF
WD

Security/Sécurité
CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
November 2, 1983
Number/Numéro
RBD-020


ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

MINA
USS
DMF
RGB
UGB
RBR

I attach, as discussed, a proposed message from the Prime Minister to President Andropov. Note in particular the treatment of three elements:

- (a) A glancing reference to the KAL tragedy and our claim for compensation;
- (b) The firm proposal that a "senior personal emissary" visit Moscow "early in the second half of November"; and
- (c) The general, rather than specific, outline of the Prime Minister's programme in the penultimate paragraph.


Peter J. A. Hancock,
Director General,
USSR and Eastern Europe
Bureau

ACTION
SE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE PARIS WIGR5235 02NOV83

A EXTOTT IDDZ FLASH

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR XDV

REF VOTRETEL XDV1049 31OCT

---INITIATIVE PM:VISITE A PARIS

AVONS PRIS CONTACT AVEC QUAI CONCERNANT ARRANGEMENTS ADMINIS;
REPONDRE DEMAIN VOTRE REFTEL XDV.

2.COTE PROGRAMME, SOUHAITONS CONFIRMER DEMAIN SI POSSIBLE A
L ELYSEE VOS SOUHAITS CONCERNANT PERSONNES QUI ACCOMPAGNERONT
LE PM. VEUILLER NOUS INDIQUER LES MEMBRES DE LA DELEGATION
EN PROVENANCE D OTTAWA QUE LE PM SOUHAITE VOIR L ACCOMPAGNER

(A) A L ENTRETIEN AVEC PRESIDENT MITTERRAND 12H30 8NOV;

(B) AU DEJEUNER DE TRAVAIL QUI SUIVRA. COTE AMBASSADE, L AMBASSADEUR
EST EVIDEMMENT DISPONIBLE ET NOUS PROPOSERIONS QU UN AGENT SENIOR
DE L AMBASSADE (MONTPETIT, MINISTRE CONSEILLER, AFFAIRES POLITIQUES)
SOIT EGALEMENT PRESENT COMME PRENEUR DE NOTES, SI VOUS ETES D ACCORD.

3. APPRECIERIONS VOS COMMENTAIRES POUR 09H00 HEURE DE PARIS DEMAIN
MATIN.

4. VOUS FERONS RAPPORT DEMAIN SUR ENTRETIEN QU AMBASSADEUR A EU
CE SOIR A SA DEMANDE AVEC DIRECTEUR POLITIQUE DU QUAI, JACQUES
ANDREANI, CONCERNANT INITIATIVE PM.

CCC/027 021757Z WIGR5235

Division Phoned _____

Person _____

Local Time _____

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BRU ZVAG5096 02NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 021000

INFO PARIS ROME HAGUE BONN LDN PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR 1DDZ MGT RGB RCR RSR RBD

REF YOURTEL XDV1049 31OCT

---PM S VISIT-ADMIN ARRANGEMENTS

OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATION IN BRU IS A.B. ASSELIN

HOME TELEPHONE NUMBER 731-2141/731-2141.

2.CONFIRM ALL ROOMS WILL BE ON SAME FLOOR AT HOTEL AMIGO.

WILL ENSURE THAT ASSISTANT(JOHNSON)AND RCMP(BEAULIEU)WILL BE
ADJACENT TO PM S SUITE.COST OF SUITE 12,650 BF(CDN DLRS 300
APPROX)AND SINGLE ROOMS EACH 3550 BF(CDN DLRS 84.50 APPROX).

POST WILL SETTLE HOTEL BILLS,

3.RE PARA 4 REFTTEL YOUR REQUESTS C,D,E,F HAVE BEEN DEALT WITH.

4.RE PARAS 5 AND 6 FULL PARTICULARS TO FOLLOW BY SEPARATE
TELEGRAM.IN MEANTIME PLEASE CONFIRM IF HOP VEHICLE(CHEVROLET
CAPRICE)IS APPROPRIATE AS PM S LIMO.

5.RE PARA 7 YOUR COMMENTS NOTED.

6.RE PARA 8 AWAITING YOUR CONFIRMATION PENDING FINALIZATION OF
ITINERARY.

7.COMMENTS NOTED

8.GRATEFUL EARLIEST INDICATION OF REQUIREMENTS OUTLINED YOUR
PARA 8 YOUREFTTEL.

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

...2

PAGE TWO ZVAG5096 CONFD

9.COMCENTRE HOURS WILL BE EXTENDED TO MEET ALL OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS.CM ON STANDBY OUTSIDE EXTENDED HOURS IS M DARGIS TELEPHONE NBR 771-4649/771-4649.CM CAN BE CONTACTED ALSO THROUGH EMBASSY SWITCHBOARD ALL TIMES.FOR YOUR INFO EMBASSY MANNED BY 24 HOUR GUARD COVERAGE AND SWITCHBOARD COVERAGE ALSO ON 24 HOURS BASIS.REQUEST FOR COPIES OF TELEGRAMS NOTED,GRATEFUL YOU ADD BREEC BNATO AND CANMILREPNATO TO DISTRIBUTION. FOR MGT:REF YOURTEL MGT4526 31OCT.COMMUNICATIONS HOURS OF OPERATION TO BE EXTENDED NOV8 AND NOV9 AND IF REQUIRED ON NOV10 FROM 0500Z HOURS TO 2100Z HOURS.
CCC/133 021357Z ZVAG5096

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR4540 02NOV83

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

EXTOTT IDDZ


DELIVER BY 021200

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR RCR RGB RCD RCT

REF RCRTFL 0329 26OCT

---PM VISIT TO BONN-BILAT-ISSUES



Mr. Smith
Everybody who
reads a seals
brief in the PM's
book will be
enriched
pd
Division
Person
Local Time

MIN COUNS(COMM/ECON)CALLED ON GRIMM,SENIOR CHANCELLOR OFFICER
RESPONSIBLE FOR ECON POLICY BUNDESKANZLERAMT(CDN EQUIV PCO)
WITH REGARD TO WIDE NUMBER OF ECON SUBJECTS.GRIMM
INITIATED AND RTURNED SEVERAL TIMES TO QUESTION OF(CDA/EEC)
(CDA/FRG)FISHERIES AGREEMENT.HE STATED THAT AT PRESET TIME ONLY
ECONOMIC SUBJECT WHICH GERMANS WISH TO RAISE WITH PM
TRUDEAU IS QUESTION OF FISHERIES AGREEMENT.THUS IT
MIGHT BE USEFUL TO LOOK AGAIN AT DEFENSIVE BRIEFING WHICH
YOU HAD ORIGINALLY PREPARED ON FISHEREIS.

2.WE HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT TV PROGRAM ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED
FOR THIS WEEK ON LEG HOLD TRAPS(REF OURTEL 5068 28OCT TO FTE)
WILL NOW BE SCHEDULED FOR 08NOV.IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO INCLUDE
IN PM BRIEFING BOOK DEFENSIVE POINTS ON THIS AS WELL
AS SEALS ISSUE.

3.YOU MIGHT ALSO WISH TO INCLUDE BRIEFING ON BID BY CANADAIR
TO PROMOTE SALE OF THREE CHALLENGERS TO GERMAN MIN OF
DEFENCE.THIS BRIEF SHOULD ALSO INCLUDE BACKGROUND
DEFENSIVE MATERIAL ON LONG-TERM FINANCIAL PROSPECTS OF
CANADAIR.

4.FOR YOUR INFO TELTSCHIK IS ACCOMPANYING CHANCELLOR
KOHL TO JAPAN AND ASEAN THIS WEEK.

CCC/242 021600Z ZQGR4540

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

MF
Division Phoned *Me*
Person *MM*
Local Time *0828*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM OSLO WGR4262 02NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 020900

INFO COPEN MDRID LSBON ATHNS ANKRA BNATO WSHDC PCOTT/FOWLER
NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/PPP

DISTR DMF IFR RGB RSR IDD IFR IDA

---PMS INITIATIVE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS

PM WILLOCHS STATE SECTY COLDING SAYS NORWEGIAN GOVT ENDORSES PMS
INITIATIVE AND LOOKS FORWARD TO PROGRESS MADE IN COMING PHASE OF
CONSULTATIONS WITH WEST EUROPEAN GOVT LEADERS. COLDING PROVIDED AIDE
MEMOIRE (TEXT AT END OF THIS TEL) OUTLINING NORWEGIAN POSITION ON
ISSUES RAISED IN PMS SPEECH.

2. THIS AIDE MEMOIRE WILL BE BASIS FOR PMS AND MFA SPOKESMEN IN
RESPONSE TO PRESS ENQUIRIES WHICH WILL NO/NO DOUBT BE FORTHCOMING
IN CONJUNCTION WITH PM TRUDEAUS VISITS IN EUROPEAN CAPITALS. IF
NECESSARY GOVT MIGHT CONSIDER USING DEVICE OF ASKING SELECTED
JOURNALISTS TO PUT QUESTIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT I ASKED WHETHER GOVT
WOULD CONSIDER VOLUNTEERING PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT OF PMS INITIATIVE
PERHAPS EARLY NEXT WEEK. COLDING SAID THIS POSSIBILITY WAS NOT/NOT
RULED OUT.

3. COLDING MADE POINT THAT IT WAS HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE MADE CLEAR
PUBLICLY TO REINFORCE POINT IN SPEECH THAT CHANNELS OF CONSULTATION
WITH USA REMAIN OPEN IN ORDER TO GIVE NO/NO COMFORT OR PROPAGANDA
OPENING TO USSR ABOUT POSSIBLE DIFFERENCES WITHIN ALLIANCE.

...2

000252

PAGE TWO WGGR4262 CONF D

4. COLDING ADDED THAT DECISION HAD BEEN MADE TO PROVIDE AIDE MEMOIRE RATHER THAN MERELY TO ACKNOWLEDGE PMS LETTER IN ORDER TO DEVELOP NORWEGIAN POLICY STATEMENT. PM WILLOCH HAD HIMSELF HAD HAND IN DRAFTING IT AS HAD FOREIGN MIN STRAY.

5. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AIDE MEMOIRE. TEXT BEGINS:

THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT SHARES THE FEELING OF ANXIETY, EXPRESSED IN THE LETTER, REGARDING THE SERIOUS INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

THE AGGRAVATED EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP HAS DEVELOPED OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME TO REACH ITS PRESENT STATE OF TENSION, MISTRUST AND UNCERTAINTY. THE MASSIVE BUILD-UP OF SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH HAS CREATED A FEELING OF UNCERTAINTY WITH REGARD TO SOVIET INTENTIONS. THE CONTINUED OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE UNREMITTING PRESSURE AGAINST POLAND ARE LIKEWISE INCOMPATIBLE WITH A POLICY OF DETENTE.

WE MUST NOT/NOT FAIL TO POINT THIS OUT TO THE SOVIET UNION AND MAKE IT PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT THE CAUSES OF THIS UNCERTAINTY MUST BE REMOVED BEFORE ANY GENUINE POLICY OF DETENTE CAN BE REINSTATED.

BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE MUST ENDEAVOUR TO RESUME A DIALOGUE ABLE TO PRODUCE A STABILIZING EFFECT ON THE EAST-WEST SITUATION. MEANS SHOULD BE PROVIDED FOR BROADER CONTACTS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

DURING THE SUMMER WE NOTED SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT IN THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP. THE LIFTING OF AMERICAN SANCTIONS AGAINST THE SIBERIAN NATURAL-GAS PIPELINE, THE GRAIN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USA AND THE SOVIET UNION, THE CONSENSUS IN MADRID AND A CERTAIN MOVEMENT IN THE

...3

PAGE THREE WGGR4262 CONFD

MBFR AND START NEGOTIATIONS GAVE GROUND FOR CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM. IT WAS ALSO HOPED THAT THESE DEVELOPMENTS COULD HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE INF NEGOTIATIONS. THE SHOOTING DOWN OF THE SOUTH KOREAN PASSENGER-PLANE PLAYED ITS PART IN CHANGING THIS PICTURE AND LED TO RENEWED INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS.

THE SITUATION ARISING OUT OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LEBANON, CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN REGION ALSO HAS ITS EFFECTS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE DANGER THAT LOCAL CONFLICTS MAY ESCALATE INTO INTERNATIONAL CRISES, RESULTING IN THE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES, IS EVER PRESENT.

THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES HAVE COME TO DOMINATE THE EAST-WEST SITUATION. THE SOVIET UNION HAS ATTEMPTED TO MAKE PROGRESS IN OTHER FIELDS OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS DEPENDENT UPON A BREAK-THROUGH FOR SOVIET POSITIONS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THIS IS A REGRETTABLE DEVELOPMENT. PROGRESS ACHIEVED IN OTHER FORA RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL MAY BE A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN FURTHER PROMOTING EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THIS APPLIES PARTICULARLY TO THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS (START), THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA ON REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE (MBFR), AS WELL AS THE FORTHCOMING CONFERENCE IN STOCKHOLM ON CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN EUROPE (CIE). BUT WE MUST TRY TO AVOID THAT THE WHOLE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP IS BEING MADE DEPENDENT UPON

...4

PAGE FOUR WGGR4262 CONF

THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PROGRESS IN OTHER FORA WITH A MORE LIMITED SCOPE. THIS TREND IS BEING REINFORCED BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF A BROADER POLITICAL DIALOGUE.

THERE SHOULD BE NO/NO REASON FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EAST-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO MISINTERPRET OUR REAL INTENTIONS. NEVERTHELESS, WE SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR IN ALL CONTEXTS THAT THE COUNTRIES OF THE WEST RESPECT THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE EAST-EUROPEAN COUNTRIES.

MR TRUDFAU PROPOSES THAT ALL FIVE NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES SHALL ENGAGE THEMSELVES IN NEGOTIATIONS AIMED AT ESTABLISHING GLOBAL LIMITS ON THEIR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARSENALS. THIS IS AN AIM WHICH WE IN NORWAY WILL WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORT. IN THIS CONNECTION WE WOULD REFER TO THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE UNS FIRST SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD I), WHERE IT WAS UNEQUIVOCALLY LAID DOWN THAT ALL NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES BEAR A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY WITH REGARD TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. THERE IS ALSO REASON TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE A COMPREHENSIVE TEST-BAN TREATY COULD HAVE IN THIS CONTEXT. WE HAVE IN NORWAY, BOTH IN THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT IN GENEVA AND IN THE UN, ACTIVELY ADVOCATED SUCH AN AGREEMENT, WHICH WILL CONSTITUTE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS PREVENTING THE QUALITATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW WEAPONS AS WELL AS BEING A CRUCIAL ELEMENT IN THE NON-PROLIFERATION CONTEXT.

AS REGARDS THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF NON-PROLIFERATION, THE THOUGHTS

...5

PAGE FIVE WGGR4262 CONF

EXPRESSED IN PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S LETTER APPEAR TO CORRESPOND CLOSELY TO THE NORWEGIAN POINT OF VIEW. OVER THE YEARS, NORWAY HAS REGARDED IT AS A MAJOR OBJECTIVE TO STRENGTHEN THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME. WITH THIS END IN VIEW, NORWAY WILL PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN THE PREPARATION FOR THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY'S THIRD NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE IN 1985. IT IS IMPORTANT TO PREVENT THE EMERGENCE OF NEW NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES IN THE WORLD, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME IT IS VITAL THAT THE EXISTING NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES COMMENCE SUBSTANTIVE AND REAL REDUCTIONS IN THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS.

IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS MR TRUDEAU ADVOCATES BREAKING THE LONGSTANDING DEADLOCK BY PUTTING FORWARD SUBSTANTIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE WESTERN PROPOSALS. THESE ARE THOUGHTS WHICH HAVE ALSO BEEN OCCUPYING THE ATTENTION OF THE NORWEGIAN AUTHORITIES. THE SITUATION IN VIENNA SHOULD NOW BE RIPE FOR A NEW WESTERN APPROACH, DESIGNED IN PART TO EXPLOIT THE MOMENTUM CREATED BY THE EASTERN DRAFT TREATY IN JUNE THIS YEAR AND IN PART TO REGAIN THE WESTERN INITIATIVE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS.

THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT, FOR HER PART, SHAPES THE VIEW THAT THERE IS A LACK OF MUTUAL POLITICAL TRUST IN THE PRESENT DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. IT WILL THEREFORE BE IMPORTANT TO RE-ESTABLISH MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS IN BOTH NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS.

OSLO, 1, NOVEMBER 1983

TEXT ENDS

WARDROPER

CCC/061 020845Z WGGR4262

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR4057 02NOV83

TO EXTOTT MGT

INFO PARIS HAGUE BRU ROME LDN

DISTR MGTC XDV RSD RCD IDDZ

REF YOURTELS 4526 4532 31OCT

---PM VISIT-TELECOMMUNICATIONS

FOLLOWING CM COVERAGE ARRANGED FOR PERIOD PRECEEDING AND
DURING PM VISIT.


WED 09NOV-NORMAL COVERAGE(0700-1830):CM ON CALL AFTER
1830 UNTIL 0700 10NOV.(KEN CAVERELY-TEL 0228/378275).

THURS 10NOV-COVERAGE FROM 0700 UNTIL 2000.CM ON CALL
AFTER 2000(CAVERLEY).

FRI 11NOV-COVERAGE FROM 0500.NORMAL CLOSING(1830).

2.AS REQUESTED EL WILL BE AVAILABLE.

CCC/242 021515Z ZQGR4057



ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Mr. Smith
Thompson

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR3082 02NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 021400

INFO BONN PARIS ROME COPEN OSLO HAGUE BRU MDRID LSBON ATHNS ANKRA
MOSCO BNATO PRMNY GENEV CNGNY PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/
ADMPOB/CPP VMBFR

DISTR MINA USS DMF UGB URR RGB RBR RBD RCD RSD RSR IFD IFB IDR
IDA RCR

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0021 25OCT;OURTEL XNGR2056 21OCT

---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS:FCO REACTION

SUMMARY:FOREIGN OFFICE OFFICIALS POINT TO MRS THATCHERS TELEPHONE
CONVERSATION WITH PM TRUDEAU ON EAST/WEST QUESTIONS AS INDICATING
HER PERSONAL QUOTE ENTHUSIASM UNQUOTE FOR WHAT SHE REGARDS AS
QUOTE SERIOUS,APPOSITE AND TIMELY INITIATIVE UNQUOTE.REPLY TO
PM TRUDEAU'S LETTER IS NOW BEING PREPARED,AND IS EXPECTED TO
REFLECT THIS POSITIVE APPRECIATION OF INITIATIVE WHICH FITS
WELL INTO PM THATCHERS CHANGING EMPHASIS ON APPROACH TO
FAST/WEST RPLATIONS.THERE ARE,HOWEVER,DIFFERENCES OF NUANCE
WHICH REFLECT BRITISH CONCERNS OVER ANY IMPLICATIONS INITIATIVE
MIGHT HAVE FOR POSITION OF BRITISH NUCLEAR DETERRENT VIS A VIS
GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS,AS WELL AS DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH TO NEW
INITIATIVES IN MBFR,AND GENERAL TREND OF ANALYSIS OF INTERNAL
DEVELOPMFNTS IN SOVIET UNION.

...2

PAGE TWO XNGR3082 CONF

2. REPORT: FCO DEFENCE AND SOVIET DEPT OFFICIALS HAVE INDICATED THAT REACTION TO PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE IS SUBSTANTIALLY FAVOURABLE BOTH AT MINISTERIAL AND OFFICIAL LEVEL. INITIATIVE IS REGARDED AS BEING BOTH TIMELY AND IMPORTANT, AND PM THATCHER IS EXPECTED TO REPLY IN THIS VEIN PRIOR TO PM TRUDEAU'S DEPARTURE FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH OTHER HEADS OF GOVT. WE ARE TOLD PMS WILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE FURTHER TALKS WITH MRS THATCHER IN COURSE OF EUROPEAN TOUR IS GREATLY APPRECIATED BOTH AMONGST MINISTERS AND SENIOR OFFICIALS.

3. AS REPORTED OUR REFTEL2056, BRITISH GOVT HAS ALSO BEEN INCREASINGLY CONCERNED AT CURRENT NADIR IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS, AND AT IMPLICATIONS OF IMMINENT CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT. EXAMINATION OF POSSIBLE WAYS OF DEALING WITH POST-DEPLOYMENT SOVIET REACTION IS UNDERWAY HERE, AND OFFICIALS ARE KNOWN TO BE FOCUSSED ON MEANS OF ENCOURAGING SORT OF HARDHEADED, REALISTIC DIALOGUE WHICH PM THATCHER SPOKE ABOUT IN HER SPEECH 14 OCT TO CONSERVATIVE PARTY CONFERENCE. SEEN IN THIS CONTEXT, TRUDEAU INITIATIVE IS REGARDED AS PROVIDING HELPFUL, POSITIVE IMPETUS TO REVERSE OTHERWISE RATHER DISCOURAGING TREND.

4. THERE ARE HOWEVER A FEW AREAS WHERE BRITISH WOULD TAKE DIFFERENT APPROACH: FIRST INVOLVES INTERPRETATION IN THIRD PARAGRAPH OF PMS LETTER TO MRS THATCHER ON INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET UNION:

...3

PAGE THREE XNCR3082 CONF

FCO DESCRIBE THEIR ANALYSIS AS QUOTE SHADE LESS DRAMATIC:OF COURSE ANDROPOV IS SICK,BUT WE DO NOT SEE CONVINCING EVIDENCE HE IS HAVING DIFFICULTY IN MAINTAINING POLITICAL CONTROL,OR THAT PARTY IS HAVING DIFFICULTY IN MAINTAINING CONTROL OVER MILITARY UNQUOTE.SECOND AREA WHERE THERE IS SOME DISAGREEMENT,IF ONLY IN NUANCE,CONCERNS APPROACH TO MBFR.OFFICIALS HERE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN AT PAINS TO POINT OUT THAT GOVT TAKES MBFR PROCESS WITH CONSIDERABLE SERIOUSNESS(SFE OURTELS XNCR1995 14OCT, 1866 27SEP).THEY REAFFIRM THAT IT IS PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THIS SERIOUSNESS AND THEIR DESIRE FOR PRAGMATIC,MEANINGFUL PROGRESS, THAT THEY ARE SCEPTICAL OF NEW INITIATIVES(ESPECIALLY OF POSSIBLE GERMAN INITIATIVE CONSIDERED EARLY THIS FALL)WHICH MIGHT PROVIDE APPEARANCE OF PROGRESS BUT AT COST OF WESTERN SECURITY.SIMILARLY,UK CONTINUES TO BE AT FOREFRONT OF INTL PRESSURE FOR MORE EFFECTIVE APPLICATION OF NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY,SAFEGUARDS,ETC.

5.MAJOR AREA OF BRITISH CONCERN REMAINS IMPLICATIONS FOR UK NUCLEAR DETERRENT VIS A VIS GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS.OFFICIALS HAVE STRESSED TO US EXTREME POLITICAL SENSITIVITY IN DOMESTIC CONTEXT OF ANY DEVELOPMENT WHICH COULD INVITE PUBLIC PRESSURE ON GOVT AT THIS PRECARIOUS TIME OF CRUISE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT. OFFICIALS THUS EXPRESSED RELIEF THAT PM TRUDEAU HAS CONFIRMED ...4

PAGE FOUR XNGR3082 CONF

NOT ONLY CANADIAN SUPPORT FOR DUAL TRACK DECISION, BUT PARTICULAR
FOR EXCLUSION OF UK AND FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES FROM CURRENT INF
NEGOTIATIONS. HAVING SAID THIS, HOWEVER, THEY ARE WAITING WITH AT
LEAST MILD ANTICIPATION, CLARIFICATION OF CANADIAN THINKING ON
THIS POINT, BOTH AS TO SUBSTANCE OF LATER PROPOSALS, AND AS TO
THEIR TIMING.

CCC/055 021513Z XNGR3082

MF
18

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR3071 02NOV83

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ DELIVER 020900

INFO BNATO BRU HAGUE ROME PARIS PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDA/

ADMPOL/CPD

DISTR MINA DMF IFB RGB RCR RCD

REF IDB TEL 0082 27OCT

---PM EAST/WEST INITIATIVE:VISIT TO LDN

TO CONFIRM TELECONS, DOWNING STREET HAS PROPOSED PM MEET WITH
MRS THATCHER AT NUMBER TEN FOR TETE-A-TETE WITH NOTETAKERS AT
1200 NOON FRIDAY 11NOV, TO BE FOLLOWED BY WORKING LUNCH OF FOUR
PLUS FOUR (WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE HCOMMR AND SENIOR UK OFFICIAL
IN ADDITION TO AIDS OF TWO PMS). ASSUMPTION IS DISCUSSION WOULD
FOCUS ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS BUT MIGHT ALSO HAVE NEED OF
TOUCHING ON GRENADA AND DELHI CHOGM.

2.FCO INTERPRETATION OF DOWNING STREET IS THAT PM THATCHER
DOES NOT/NOT HAVE MUCH FLEXIBILITY ON TIMING AND WOULD PREFER
NOT/NOT TO SHIFT MTG AND LUNCH TO LATER.

CCC/083 021044Z XNGR3071

28-6-1-1 Judean Peace
Mission

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2395 02NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 030900

INFO MOSCO BNATO PRMNY CNGNY PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMFOIOL/
CPP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB UBD RBR IDD IDR IDA

---PMS SPEECH:USA RESPONSE TO PMS LET

DISCUSSED USA REPLY TO PMS LET WITH NSC STAFFER(COBB)WHO IS DOING
WHITE HOUSE REVISION OF STATE DEPT DRAFT.HE CONFIRMED RESPONSE
WILL BE POSITIVE AND SUBSTANTIVE.HE AGREED WE CLD SAY IN CDA
TOMORROW THAT WE EXPECT TO RECEIVE A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY FROM REAGAN
VERY SHORTLY.HE CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, AGAINST PUBLICLY CHARACTERIZING
RESPONSE IN ANY OTHER WAY.WARNING WAS NOT/NOT MOTIVATED BY FEAR
OF CDA EMBARRASSING ITSELF IF TENOR OF RESPONSE WAS DIFFERENT THAN
EXPECTED BUT RATHER BECAUSE WHITE HOUSE WLD OBJECT TO HAVING NATURE
OF REPLY MADE PUBLIC BEFORE PRES HAS SIGNED IT.

2.COBB CONFIRMED LET WILL ALSO INCLUDE INDICATION OF PRES REAGANS
WILLINGNESS TO MEET PM.MUCH AS USA WLD LIKE TO DO THIS BEFORE PM
TRAVELS TO EUROPE,PRESENT EVENTS AND REAGANS OWN TRAVEL PLANS
PROBABLY WILL PRECLUDE THAT POSSIBILITY AND MTG WILL HAVE TO TAKE
PLACE AFTER PMS VISIT TO EUROPE.

3.COBB THEN SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE A COUPLE OF QUOTE PERSONAL
UNQUOTE POINTS.FIRST WAS THAT WHITE HOUSE CONSIDERED PMS MAY LET
TO CDN EDITORS TO BE EXTREMELY GOOD AND FIRM ENUNCIATION OF PRINCIPLES

...2

28-6-1-Thudran Peace
mission

PAGE TWO UNGR2395 CONF

AND THAT REAGAN'S RESPONSE WILL PROBABLY REFER TO THIS LET. COBB SAID IT WAS USA HOPE THAT PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN MAY WILL BE MAINTAINED IN THIS EXERCISE.

4. SECOND POINT COBB MADE WAS IN REGARD TO PRESS SPECULATION IN CIA THAT PMS INITIATIVE WAS NO/NOTHING MORE THAN A VOTE-GETTING PRE-ELECTION PLOY, THAT MAY BE CARRIED SO FAR AS TO TIME AN ELECTION ANNOUNCEMENT TO COINCIDE WITH VISIT TO WSHDC. COBB SAID USA IS BASING ITS RESPONSE ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT PRESS SPECULATION IS WRONG. USA ADMIN BELIEVES THAT PM IS SINCERE AND IS TREATING INITIATIVE THAT WAY. COBB SAID HOWEVER THAT THERE WERE SOME IN ADMIN WHO ACCEPTED CYNICAL PRESS LINE. WE INTERPRETED COBB'S COMMENT TO BE AN EXPRESSION OF HOPE THAT ADMIN WLD NOT/NOT BE EMBARRASSED BY AN ATTEMPT TO USE ITS GOODWILL ON THIS ISSUE FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL PURPOSES. WE ASSURED COBB THAT PMS INITIATIVE IS SERIOUS AND SINCERE.

5. COBB ALSO COMMENTED ON REF IN PMS SPEECH TO QUOTE PROCESS OF CLOSE DISCUSSION WITH PRES REAGAN UNQUOTE SAYING THAT ONE LET DOES NOT/NOT CONSTITUTE A PROCESS. WE SAID PROCESS INVOLVED, OF COURSE FUTURE PM/REAGAN MTGS BUT ALSO CONSULTS BETWEEN DPM/SSFA, GOTLIER/DAM CONVERSATIONS, PLANNED MARCHAND/EAGLEBURGER TALKS ETC. PROCESS SHLD ALSO BE TAKEN TO INCLUDE NEW PROMINENCE ARMS CONTROL AND SECURITY ISSUES HAD GAINED IN DPM/SSFA/SHULTZ BILAT CONSULTS OVER PAST YR AND ALSO EXCELLENT CONVERSATIONS PM HAD HAD WITH VP BUSH. WE ALSO SAID PM WORDS SHLD BE REGARDED AS STATEMENT OF HIS INTENTION TO KEEP REAGAN FULLY UP TO DATE ON HIS ACTIVITIES AND THINKING.

CCC/241 022221Z UNGR2395

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MF
hd

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HAGUE YWGR1775 02NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ IMMED

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace mission

INFO LDN PARIS BRU ROME ATHNS COPEN OSLO-MDRID-ANKRA BNATO
WSHDC GENEV PMOTT/AXWORTH/COLEMAN PCOOTT/FOWLER NDQHOTT/MND/
CDS ADMPOL/CPP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR IDD IDA IDR FPR
REF OURTEL 1770 OCT28

---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS

FURTHER TO OUR REFTEL ON DUTCH MEDIA REACTION TO PM S
GUFLPH SPEECH, WE HAVE SEEN NO/NO SUBSTANTIAL COMMENT
IN PRESS OR ELECTRONIC MEDIA HERE OTHER THAN MAJOR EDITORIAL
IN 28OCT HAAGSCHE COURANT NEWSPAPER WHICH WE HAVE ALREADY
REPORTED ON. FOLLOWING EXPIRY OF EMBARGO ON TEXT OF SPEECH,
WE CIRCULATED SEVERAL OTHER COPIES TO OTHER JOURNALISTS KNOWN
TO EMBASSY, HOWEVER MOST PRESS ATTENTION OVER LAST FEW DAYS
HAS BEEN FOCUSSED ON HUGE PEACE DEMONSTRATION HELD IN THE
HAGUE OCTOBER 29.

2. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY RECEIVED SEVERAL
CALLS THIS WEEK FROM JOURNALISTS REGARDING SPEECH. WE
ASSUME RENEWED INTEREST IS RESULT OF FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT
THAT PM WILL MEET WITH PM LUBBERS.

CCC/029 031155Z YWGR1775

MF.

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMOOTT PM01226 02NOV83

TO PARIS HAGUE BRU ROME BONN LDN DELIVER BY 030900

INFO EXTOTT IDDZ

---PM TRIP TO EUROPE 07-11NOV:MEDIA ARRANGEMENTS

IN RESPONSE TO MEDIA DEMAND IN OTT, WE ARE TRYING TO ORGANIZE A CHARTER AIRCRAFT IN EUROPE FOR ABOUT 16 MEDIA. WE ARE NOT ENCOURAGING NEWS COVERAGE BECAUSE THERE WILL BE NO BRIEFINGS AND PM WILL SAY LITTLE IF ANYTHING IN DOORSTEP SCRUMS WITH MEDIA. HOWEVER, MEDIA WILL BE GOING ANYWAY.

2. GIVEN LIKELIHOOD OF CHARTER, WE WILL REQUIRE THE FOLLOWING FROM POSTS: (A) BOOK 20 ROOMS IN A HOTEL NEAR PM'S HOTEL, (B) HIRE BUS TRANSPORTATION FOR MEDIA DURING THEIR STAY, (C) DETERMINE FROM HOST HEAD OF GOVERNMENT ACCESS FOR PHOTO OPPORTUNITIES AND SCRUMS, AND, (D) POST SHOULD APPOINT A MEDIA COORDINATOR TO ASSIST CDN MEDIA DURING VISIT.

3. WE ARE PLANNING LOGISTICS BRIEFING IN OTT 03NOV AT APPROX 1100 OTT TIME. THEREFORE WOULD APPRECIATE DETAILS RE: PARA 2 BY TELEPHONE TO JACQUES HUDON, PMO(613)992-4211 BEFORE THE BRIEFING. WE WILL SEND MEDIA NAMES ASAP AFTER BRIEFING. SORRY FOR SHORT NOTICE.

UUU/075 022235Z PM01226

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT XDV1055 02NOV83

TO HAGUE IMMED

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR IDDZ

REF YOURTEL YWAG0394 01NOV

---PMS VISIT:ADMIN ARRANGEMENTS-TRANSPORTATION

CONFIRM HOP VEHICLE IS APPROPRAITF. ASSUME ONE SEDAN WILL BE
PROVIDED BY POST IN ADDITION TO RENTED SEDAN AND BAGGAGE
VAN. ADVISF

CCC/109 021713Z XDV1055

28-6-1-Tudor Place
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HAGUE YWGR0743 02NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 021100

INFO PARIS BRU ROME BONN LDN PCOTT/FOWLER PMOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR IDDZ MGT RGB RCR RSR RBD

REF YOUR TEL XDV1049 31OCT

---PMS INITIATIVE-VISIT TO EUROPE:NOV83

OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATION AT THIS POST IS

F.D. PILLARELA, COUNSELLOR, HOME PHONE (070) 540226. IN

CASE YOU SHOULD WISH TO REACH AMB, RESIDENCE PHONE (01751) 78577.

2. ACCOMMODATION; CONFIRM SUITE AND 7 SWBS RESERVED AT

HOTEL DES INDES. WILL ENSURE THAT REQUIREMENTS IN YOU

PARA 4 ARE MET.

3. TRANSPORTATION: ARE TRYING TO OBTAIN NAME OF CLOSEST

AIRPORT TO THE HAGUE FOR CHALLENGER TO LAND AT. WILL

ADVISE NAME AS SOON AS IT IS KNOWN.

4. ARRIVAL: NAME OF BAGGAGE COORDINATOR IS GEORGE RASSAM,

HOME PHONE (01751) 17573.

5. COMMUNICATIONS: ARE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS TO HAVE

EXTENDED HRS FOR SWITCHBOARD AND COMCENTRE. NAME OF HEAD

COMMUNICATOR IS MR GAMACHE. HOME PHONE (070) 251276.

CCC/029 021431Z YWGR0743

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
Mission

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Division Phoned 1025

Person RCs

Local Time 1025

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HAGUE YWGR0744 02NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ XDV DELIVER BY 021100

INFO PARIS BRU ROME BONN LDN PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR IDDZ MGT RGE RCR RSR RBD

---PMS INITIATIVE:VISIT TO EUROPE:NOV83

WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT PM LUBBERS WISHES TO INVITE

TRUDEAU AND 3 MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY TO STAY AT OFFICIAL

RESIDENCE QUOTE CATSHUIS UNQUOTE IN THE HAGUE FOR THE NIGHT OF NOV08.

PMS OFFICE WISHES TO RECEIVE ANSWER NO/NO LATER THAN NOV04.

FOR THE MOMENT PM DEL HAS BEEN BOOKED IN HOTEL DES INDES.

2.PLSF ADVISE

CCC/029 021431Z YWGR0744

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
Mission

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Mr. Harlick

MF

Division Phoned _____
Person _____
Local Time _____

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HAGUE YWGR0742 02NOV83

TO EXTOTT 1DDZ XDV DELIVER BY 021100

INFO BONN PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHSON

DISTR MGT RGB RCR RSR RBD

REF HARLICK/HILLARELLA TELCON 31OCT

*28-6-1-Thudon Peace
Mission*

---PMS INITIATIVE;VISIT TO EUROPE:POSSIBLE CEREMONY AT GROESBEEK
ACCORDING TO INFO OBTAINED FROM DUTCH MFA,MILITARY BASE
CLOSEST TO GROESBEEK IS DEELAN.PM COULD THEN BE FLOWN
FROM THERE TO CEMETERY BY HELICOPTER.FLT WOULD BE BETWEEN
20 TO 25 MIN.

2.FURTHER CONVERSATION WITH CHIEF OF PROTOCOL HE
SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS BEST SOLUTION WOULD BE TO FLY PM
BY CAF HELICOPTER FROM BONN TO NIJMEGEN AND THEN TAKE HIM
BY CAR OR DUTCH HELICOPTER TO GROESBEEK.IN MEANTIME
CHALLENGER COULD WAIT AT DEELAN OR OTHER CONVENIENT AIRPORT
READY TO FLY PM TO LDN.

3.DUTCH ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE AS MUCH AS THEY CAN
IN ORGANIZING CEREMONY AND ARE EXPLORING VARIETY OF OPTIONS
TO GET PM IN AND OUT.THEY ARE WORRIED HOWEVER THAT AT
THIS TIME OF YEAR AND EARLY IN THE MORNING HEAVY FOG COULD
INTERFERE WITH LANDING OF CHALLENGER AND FERRYING PM TO THE SITE.

...2

PAGE TWO YWGR0742 CONF

4. YOU MAY WISH TO TAKE THESE FACTORS INTO CONSIDERATION
IN REACHING FINAL DECISION. REMEMBRANCE CEREMONY CANNOT/NOT
BE SIMPLE IN AND OUT OCCASION. LOGISTICS WILL BE DIFFICULT.
PM WILL NEED TO SET ASIDE SOME TIME AT GROESBEK TO MEET
BERGOMESTER, LOCAL COUNCILLORS AND OTHER DUTCH OFFICIALS,
INCLUDING POSSIBLY MINISTER OF DEFENCE, WHO WOULD TURN
OUT FOR OCCASION. THIS WOULD NECESSARILY INVOLVE VERY
EARLY DEPARTURE FROM BONN IF PM IS TO BE IN LDN IN
TIME FOR LUNCH WITH MRS THATCHER.

5. AGAIN STRESS WE NEED MAXIMUM LEAD TIME TO SET UP SUCH
CEREMONY.

SMITH.

CCC/029 021431Z YWGR0742

28-6-1-Judeau Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT RBR0498 02NOV83

TO BUCST

INFO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPFN OSLO PRU
HAGUE WSHDC MOSCO BNATO GENEV TOKYO WSAW BPEST PRGUE BGRAD STKFM
CNBRA HSNKI/CDEDEL WLGTN VIENN PEKIN DELHI PCOOTT/FOWLER
NDHQOTT/MND/CIS/ADMPOL/CP/PGIS CNGNY VMBFR
SFAX CHCGO LNGLS

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR RBD FFR IDD

IDR IDA IDDZ RBRD IDX ZSP ZSP RBF

REF YOURTFL UYGR2842 01NOV

---PM INITIATIVE:ROM INVITATION

FIRST STAGE OF PM S INITIATIVE WILL LAST FOUR DAYS, TAKING IN SIX
COUNTRIES AND DISCUSSIONS WITH FIGHT HIGH LEVEL INTERLOCUTORS.
PRESSURES OF SCHEDULE PRECLUDE ANY OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES EAST OR
WEST.

2. IF PM UNDERTAKES SECOND STAGE OF CONSULTATIONS (WHICH HAS NOT/NOT
YET BEEN DECIDED), THEN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH CEAUSESCU WILL BE
ACTIVELY CONSIDERED. FOR YOUR INFO ONLY WE ARE CONSIDERING THREE
POSSIBLE VEHICLES (A) MESSAGE (B) VISIT TO OTT BY FM ANDREI (C) BRIEF
VISIT BY PM DURING SECOND PHASE. LAST MAY IN FACT BE LEAST LIKELY.
AT THIS POINT YOU SHOULD GIVE NO/NO INDICATION TO ROMANIANS OF
VARIANTS OTHER THAN FACT WE CONSIDER THIS INITIATIVE AS PRAGMATIC,
STEP BY STEP PROCESS. NO/NO DECISION ON FURTHER VISITS BY PM WILL
BE TAKEN UNTIL RESULTS OF FIRST SET OF CONSULTATIONS WITH NATO
LFADFRS HAVE BEEN EVALUATED. NONETHELESS WE WELCOME ROM INTEREST
AND WILL DO BEST TO KEEP YOU INFORMED.

CCC/149 031603Z RBR0498

000272

C O N F I D E N T I A L


FM VATCN XAGR0490 02NOV83

TO EXTOTT RCR DELIVER BY 021200

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER DELIVER BY 021200 ROME

DISTR IDDZ RGB RCD

REF YOURTEL RCR0346 31OCT



---VISIT OF PM TRUDEAU:DISARMAMENT AND EAST-WEST

YOUR REFTTEL REACHED VATCN EMB ONLY TODAY AS NOV FIRST(ALL SAINTS) WAS ROMAN HOLIDAY.ACCORDINGLY OUR REPLY MUST PERFORCE BE RATHER IMPRESSIONISTIC AND NOT/NOT BASED ON THOROUGH REVIEW OF POPES SPEECHES ETC.NEVERTHELESS WHAT WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PREPARE BY WAY OF BRIEFING MATERIAL IS CONTAINED IN PARAS WHICH FOLLOW.

2.TEXT BEGINS SINCE INAUGURATION OF HIS PONTIFICATE ON 15OCT78. POPE JOHN PAUL II HAS BEEN UNREMITTING IN HIS EFFORTS TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE AND PEACE WITH JUSTICE AS EXEMPLIFIED BY HIS INITIATIVES IN THE FOLLOWING FOUR AREAS:HIS ANNUAL MESSAGES ON NEW YEARS DAY(WORLD DAY OF PEACE),MESSAGE ON DANGERS OF NUCLEAR WARFARE CARRIED TO LEADERS OF MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS BY MEMBERS OF PONTIFICAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES,HIS CONTINUING SUPPORT BOTH FOR QUOTE SOLIDARNOSC UNQUOTE AND CONCEPT OF INTERNAL DIALOGUE WITHIN POLAND AS WELL AS HIS RECENT PERSONAL MESSAGES(ANNOUNCED ON 29OCT)TO PRESIDENTS REAGAN AND ANDROPOV NOT/NOT TO DESIST FROM CONTINUING THEIR NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL.BASED ON HIS OWN PERSONAL EXPERIENCES AS A POLE WHO STUDIED FOR PRIESTHOOD CLANDESTINELY DURING WWII AND AS CARDINAL-ARCHBISHOP OF KRAKOW WHERE HE MAINTAINED QUOTE FIRM

...2

PAGE TWO XAGR0480 CONF

BUT FLEXIBLE UNQUOTE POSITION VIS-A-VIS COMMUNIST REGIME,
PONTIFICATE OF POPE JOHN PAUL II HAS BEEN MARKED BY CON-
SERVATIVE APPROACH TO DOCTRINAL ISSUES AND BOLD CHAMPIONSHIP
OF LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE, HUMAN RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT AID AND
SEARCH FOR PEACE. HIS COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS WAS SIGNALLED
IN HIS FIRST ENCYCLICAL QUOTE REDEMPTOR HOMINIS UNQUOTE, ISSUED
ON 24 MAR 79, IN WHICH HE PROCLAIMED THAT FACT THAT JESUS DIED
TO SAVE MANKIND WAS SUFFICIENT PROOF OF ESSENTIAL DIGNITY OF
MAN. IN HIS SECOND ENCYCLICAL (QUOTE LABOREM EXERCENS UNQUOTE)
ON 14 SEP 81 UPON OCCASION OF NINETIETH ANNIVERSARY OF QUOTE
RERUM NOVARUM UNQUOTE ISSUED BY LEO XIII, JOHN PAUL II PROCLAIMED
NOT/NOT ONLY MANS RIGHT TO WORK (THEME LATER ECHOED IN REPORT
ISSUED BY CTTEE OF CDN EPISCOPATE LED BY BISHOP REMI DE ROO
OF VICTORIA) BUT ALSO NEED FOR WORKER SOLIDARITY. IN THIS
CONTEXT THERE IS NO/NO DOUBT THAT ELECTION OF CARDINAL WOJTYLA
AS POPE HAS PROFOUNDLY ALTERED PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATION IN
EASTERN EUROPE (PARTICULARLY, OF COURSE, IN POLAND) IN SENSE THAT
HUMAN AND SPIRITUAL VALUES HAVE BEEN DEMONSTRATED AS
HAVING GREATER LASTING IMPORTANCE THAN MATERIALISTIC ONES.
IT IS THUS NOTEWORTHY THAT MGR SILVESTRINI (VATCN QUOTE FM
UNQUOTE), IN HIS ADDRESS TO FINAL PLENARY SESSION OF CSCE
MADRID REVIEW CONFERENCE, IN WHICH VATCN DIPLOS HAVE BEEN FULL
PARTICIPANTS AS REPS OF HOLY SEE PER SE (AND NOT/NOT OF STATE
OF VATCN CITY WHICH HAPPENS TO BE LOCATED IN EUROPE), EMPHASIZED
NOT/NOT ONLY QUESTION OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTIES BUT ALSO POLAND

...3

PAGE THREE XAGR0430 CONF

AND NEED FOR FORMAL AND PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF HELSINKI PRINCIPLES. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS LITTLE WONDER THAT ALLEGATIONS OF BULGARIAN/KGB INVOLVEMENT IN PAPAL ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT OF 13MAY81 CONTINUE TO ATTRACT SOME CREDENCE.

3. VIEWS OF POPE JOHN PAUL II ON EAST/WEST ISSUES WERE WELL SET OUT IN HIS 01JAN83 MSG ON SIXTEENTH WORLD DAY OF PEACE, ENTITLED QUOTE DIALOGUE FOR IFACE, A CHALLENGE FOR OUR TIME UNQUOTE, IN WHICH HE EMPHASIZED NEED FOR DIALOGUE IN ORDER TO LESSEN QUOTE GREAT PRESENT DAY ANTAGONISMS OF EAST-WEST ON ONE HAND, NORTH-SOUTH ON OTHER UNQUOTE. HE ADDED THAT INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE WOULD ALSO CONCERN ITSELF WITH QUOTE DANGEROUS ARMS RACE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO REDUCE IT PROGRESSIVELY UNQUOTE; HOLY SEE WOULD ALSO CONTINUE TO INSIST UPON NEED TO PUT STOP TO ARMS RACE QUOTE THROUGH PROGRESSIVE NEGOTIATIONS, BY AIMEALING FOR RECIPROCITY UNQUOTE. (THIS POPE IS NO/NO UNILATERALIST AS WAS DEMONSTRATED BY VATICANS RATHER RESERVED APPROACH TOWARDS LET ON NUCLEAR ARMS PUBLISHED BY USA CONFERENCE OF BISHOPS.) ON OTHER HAND, MEMBERS OF PONTIFICAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES IN SPRING ON 1982 MADE VERY EFFECTIVE PERSONAL DEMARCHES TO SUCH WORLD LEADERS AS PRESIDENTS REAGAN AND BREZHNEV AND PM THATCHER ON SCIENTIFIC DANGERS OF NUCLEAR WARFARE. SHORTLY THEREAFTER POPE MADE IT CLEAR IN ADDRESSING CERN STAFF MEMBERS IN GENEV ON 15JUNE82 THAT HE WAS AWARE BOTH OF BENEFITS OF PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY AND CONSEQUENT NEED TO STRENGTHEN NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFICATION SAFEGUARDS REGIME.

...4

PAGE FOUR XAGR0480 CONF

4.MOST RECENT PAPAL INITIATIVE TOOK PLACE ON THURS 27OCT WHEN
CARDINAL-SECTY OF STATE CASAROLI CALLED IN PERSONAL ENVOY
TO HOLY SEE OF USA PRESIDENT AND USSR AMBASSADOR TO ITALY TO
RECEIVE LETS FROM POPE ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENTS REAGAN AND
ANDROPOV.(THIS APPARENTLY WAS FIRST TIME THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR
HAD BEEN SUMMONED BY VATICANS QUOTE PM UNQUOTE;ALTHOUGH USSR
HAS NO/NO DIPLO RELATIONS WITH HOLY SEE, DAY-TO-DAY CONTACTS
HAD IN PAST BEEN MAINTAINED BY OFFICER OF COUNSELLOR RANK IN
USSR EMB TO ITALY).GIST OF MSG(AS PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED BY POPE
IN ADDRESSING FINAL SESSION OF TRIENNIAL SYNOB OF BISHOPS
ON 22OCT)WAS THAT SUPER POWERS QUOTE SHOULD NOT/NOT DESIST
FROM NEGOTIATIONS,WHICH WERE THE SOLE METHOD OF RECONCILING
DIFFERENCES OR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST,IN ORDER TO PUT AN END
TO THE ARMS RACE WHICH CAUSES SUCH APPREHENSION TO CONTEMPORARY
MANKIND UNQUOTE.TEXT ENDS.

CCC/05Z 021406Z XAGR0480

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNAG0266 02NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 020900

INFO PARIS BRU ROME HAGUE BONN PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON

DISTR LIDDZ MGT RGB RCR RSR RBD

REF YOURTELS XDV 1048 AND XDV 1049 31OCT83

---PMS INITIATIVE-VISIT TO EUROPE-NCV83

ARRANGEMENTS DETAILED BELOW MADE AS REQUESTED WITH REF TO PARAS
IN YOURTEL 1049.

RE PARA 2/2: POST COORDINATOR-R I (RAY) HOPTON. HOME PHONE
01-866-3814.

RE PARA 4/4: ALL/ALL HOTEL ARRANGEMENTS MADE AT CLARIDGES AS
REQUESTED INCLUDING 2/2 BEDROOM SUITE FOR PM.

RE PARA 5/5: CHALLENGER SHOULD USE HEATHROW (SOUTHSIDE) IF POSSIBLE.
TRAVEL TIME TO HOTEL APPROX 1/1 HOUR 15/15 MINUTES. VEHICLE
ARRANGEMENTS IN HAND.

RE PARA 6/6: PM WILL OF COURSE HAVE AIRPORT VIP SUITE AT DISPOSAL.
ONE MEMBER OF DEL SHOULD HAVE ALL PASSPORTS AVAILABLE. CUSTOMS AND
IMMIGRATION OFFICERS WILL BE ON HAND AT AIRCRAFT. HC MINIVAN WILL
TAKE LUGGAGE DIRECTLY FROM CHALLENGER. POST BAGGAGE COORDINATOR IS
CLAUDE ETHIER, HOME PHONE 01-998-6311.

RE PARA 7/7: NO PROBLEM

RE PARA 8/8: CDA-BASED SCY (IF NEEDED) WILL BE MS SHIRLEY WHITESIDE.

...2

28-6-1-Thudon Peace
6-1-Mission

PAGE TWO XNAG0266 CONFD

PLS ADVISE ASAP IS SCY AND OFFICE EQUIPMENT IS REQUIRED.

RE PARA 9/9: COMMUNICATIONS-LDN COMCENTRE STAYS OPEN WEEKDAYS UNTIL
2300 HRS. STAND-BY CM AFTER THAT UNTIL 0800 12NOV WILL BE KEN
MCROBERTS, HOME PHONE 01-998-0778.

COMCENTRE IS STAFFED ON STAUDAYS FROM 0800-1600. AFTER WHICH
MS ELIZABETH DE BOER, HOME PHONE 01-486-1567 WILL BE STAND-BY CM.

CCC/083 021041Z XNAG0266

MF
h2

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

28-6-1-Tudor Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I E L

FM BRU ZVSV0067 02NOV83

A EXTOTT (IDDZ LIVRAISON 020800

INFO BREEC CANMILREPNATO HAGUE PARIS BONN ROME PCOOTT/FOWLER
NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/PPP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RCR RCD RSR

REF BRU ZVGR0505 31OCT83

---INITIATIVE DU PM:VISITE EN BELGIQUE

CORRECT PAGE ONE LINE 24/24 TO READ AS FOLLOWS QUOTE

SOIREE DU 9 NOV LIBRES DANS L ESPOIR QUE VOTRE DEBAT UNQUOTE

CCC/030 020944Z ZVSV0067

CONFIDENTIAL

November 1, 1983

MF

MEMORANDUM FOR OSBALDESTON

Initiative: Next Steps

28-6 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

Ted has scheduled a meeting at 10:00 Thursday
a.m. to: (PM has yet to agree)

1. get his reaction to first draft of Speech II
(for December in Montreal) which should reach
the Prime Minister tomorrow evening;
2. discuss arrangements,
 - for next weeks European trip
 - for "touching Washington base"
 - for message to Andropov (draft of same
also to the Prime Minister by tomorrow);
including note and timing of "special
emmissary" (Marchand?);
3. focus on Purpose and Objectives of European
trip; and
4. communications strategy.

Possible Problems and Concerns

- Public vs private diplomacy
 - which is more efficient
 - which is better suited to the Prime
Minister's 'political' needs (Ted has
views)

(should the Prime Minister have granted
interview to New York Times last Saturday in
New York: I said, "NO"; Gotlieb and PMO said,
"YES" - the Prime Minister did not see NYT.)

- (Does he) in light of all this: how do we
play the media in Europe and over the next
couple of months?

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

Focus of European Consultations

- We are in reasonably good stage on 'substance' (the cart); e.g. what to say to each leader on, say, MBFR or non-proliferation.
- I am concerned we do not have yet an agreed and confident "pitch" for the Prime Minister to make to the 5 leaders in the context of the requirement for more juice along the 3rd rail; that is
 - what does he want to come away with?
 - what would he wish to say ^{he} to "accomplished in Europe" on his return?
 - surely not simply that X and/or y and/or z agreed in measure a, b, or c with substantive proposal m or n!
 - surely he wants to be able to report that:
 - all the Europeans share my concern over the state of East/West relations,
 - all are agreed that something must be done and soon to change that trend line,
 - of course they recognized that the deep chill in Super Power Relations will make any change different.
 - However they encouraged me to try the harder in view of the deepening chill.
 - Clearly the level of popular concern in Europe (concern beyond the Euromissile issue) is enormous and growing.
 - All my European interlocutors assured me they would give fresh attention to a number of specific proposals we discussed and will keep me informed of their analysis of where they consider movement which could demonstrate changes in the dangerous trend might occur.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

- They encouraged me to seek to pursue discussions with both Super Powers if it seemed at all likely that something useful could be accomplished, and they pledged to lend their support to such efforts.

(Perhaps specific words on Washington and Moscow)


- We, too, will be devoting particular attention to a number of specific proposals, and to ways in which light might be introduced into the East/West relationship which sought to nourish some of these substantive proposals.
- I'll be outlining all this in greater detail at a speech in Montreal on November 13.
- In the meantime I am heartened by the degree to which my concerns are shared by our European Allies, I am grateful for the interest which they expressed in my initiative and the alacrity and generosity with which they agreed to see me and for their time and attention. I will be keeping in close touch with them in the week to come.

R.R.F.

CONFIDENTIAL

November 1, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER
c.c. Mr. Osbaldeston



Initiative - Letters to Heads of Government

Please find attached 15 letters which are dated 25 October because it was then that the telexed copies were sent.

The letters in French have been revised by André Burelle.

A stylized, cursive signature.

R.R.F.


4 days!
much too long for a Head of State
2nd us never do it again

MF.

WOS / 83

SECRET

CEO



Memorandum for the Prime Minister

c.c. Mr. Osbaldestan

Tokyo - Peking - Moscow - Delhi

INTINERARIES

If you agree, we foresee the following sequence of events over the next two weeks:

- Pearson and Smith will join us on the aircraft to Tokyo and will attend your meeting with Prime Minister Nakasone.
Saturday November 19
- They will then stay in Tokyo overnight and leave on Sunday for Peking where they will meet the Chinese (including the Foreign Minister) during November 21 and 22.
- Following these meetings they will send a full report to you at Delhi on Wednesday, November 23.
- If the Chinese response is positive, you will then be in a position to explain the situation to Indira Gandhi.

SECRET

- 2 -

CEO

Pearson and Smith then leave Peking ^{VIA TOKYO} for Moscow to arrive Thursday, November 24 for meetings on November 25 and 26. (This has not yet been confirmed by the USSR). Archdeacon will meet Pearson and Smith in Moscow, take part in the talks, and then fly with them to meet you in Delhi, Sunday November 27.

I propose that you leave Delhi at about 8:30 a.m. on Monday, November 28 to arrive in Peking at approximately 5.00 p.m. local time. You would then be free for a dinner meeting that day, a meeting next morning, and if it appears necessary, lunch that same day, Tuesday, November 29.

The return trip to Delhi could then be: take-off at 1.00 p.m. to arrive Delhi at 6.15 p.m. local or (in case of lunch in Peking) take-off at 3.30 p.m. to arrive about 9.00 p.m. in Delhi, Tuesday, November 29. You would then stay overnight and resume the previous CHOGM schedule, departing for ABU DHABI, the next morning, Wednesday, November 30.

I suggest that I accompany you to Peking, together with Pearson, Smith and Archdeacon. They would brief you on the atmosphere and results of the meetings in both Peking and Moscow, and ^{1.127} would leave Peking for Canada when you leave Peking to return to Delhi.

SECRET

- 3 -

CEO

Communications

We propose that there be no announcements whatever. However, it is possible that journalists on the flight to Tokyo will notice Pearson and Smith's absence on the subsequent flight to Bangladesh. We would respond that they were members of the Initiative Task Force who were needed in Tokyo but not at Bangladesh or CHOGM. If it become known that they had visited Peking or Moscow or both, we would confirm this, quote your Montreal speech where you said that you had initiated consultants with China and the USSR. NOTHING WOULD BE SAID IN ADVANCE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF YOUR VISITING PEKING.

ARCHDEACON

RRF

COPY TO: TASK FORCE

NO OTHER DISTRIBUTION

mF

EARLY Nov/87

000287

- 2 -

The public aspect of the initiative, then, looks fairly low profile until after Christmas. What of the non-public actions behind the scenes? Some ideas follow:

A. Letters to all NATO HOGs from PM with perhaps the following elements:

(a) DPM/SSEA (and MND at DPC?) will be putting definite proposals re MBFR on the table at the North Atlantic Council Meeting (NAC) December 8/9. PM requests flexible and positive approach from Capitals with leaders' personal attention to ensure such a response;

(b) DPM/SSEA will propose, after having sounded out Carrington himself, and after his having been elected, that he undertake a review of NATO strategy - the results of which would be presented to the NAC in May;

(c) informing leaders of the results of his China trip, and also his over all view of the elements of consensus he feels he has achieved, and which he intends to put to Washington and Moscow as soon as possible; and

- 3 -

(d) telling leaders that he feels it would be useful for him to visit Moscow personally.

- B. Visit to Washington and Moscow in late December or very early January - no particular order, though there are arguments for Washington first, and if these prevail then Washington could be before Christmas (which has merit in itself).
- C. Formal presentation of Suffocation proposals in the appropriate forum (Ambassador returns to Ottawa to receive instructions from PM).
- D. After Moscow and Washington, major speech calling upon:
 - 5 nuclear powers to meet to discuss Global security;
 - NATO and the Warsaw Pact to send Foreign Ministers to the MBFR and CDE, the former to pave the way for speedy agreement, the latter to show the political will to progress much faster than CSCE toward a militarily secure Europe.

- 4 -

- E. After return from Moscow, letters to NATO Heads of Government and others (Japan, Australia etc) suggesting that "The West" convene a conference to consider a long-term over all Political Strategy for the West vis-a-vis the Communist World. How do we see the future if it is not to be either continued confrontation and arms race, or close friendship? What are the political guidelines for our relationship with Communist states over the next several decades. What are we aiming at, and how do we proceed to that goal?
- F. Consider (no more) the practicability and the desirability of visiting other Warsaw Pact countries when he visits Moscow.
- G. Consider how to move the Angola tab. Does the PM mention this in Moscow. Does he at any time contact Fidel Castro?
- H. Ivan Head "declaration". Proceed or Drop?
- I. George Kennan (et al) suggestion of "Non aggression Pact" (Declaration of Intentions). Proceed or drop?
- J. What is to be written into SFT?

- 5 -

These are a few thoughts for the future; not exhaustive, of course. A decision in principle about what line or lines we should pursue must be taken this week if proper planning is to proceed while the PM is away.



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

2 NOV 83 00 18Z

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I A L	12	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDZ 01 NOV 83	<div>28-6-1-Tyudau Peace Mission</div>	
TO/À	TO ROME DELIVER BY 020830		
INFO	REF SMITH-HARDY TELECON NOV 01		
DISTR	---PM VISIT		
REF			
SUBJ/SUJ	FURTHER TO REFTELCON, AND BEARING IN MIND DIFFICULTIES WHICH SPLIT MTG/LUNCH WITH CRXI MIGHT CAUSE, GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD ATTEMPT TO ARRANGE LATE DINNER AND DISCUSSION WITH PM CRXI FOR EVENING OF 09 NOV. 2. IF NOT POSSIBLE WE WILL HAVE TO EXAMINE BEST WAY TO MAXIMIZE TIME AM 10 NOV. THIS MIGHT NECESSITATE EARLIER START THAN 1100 HRS.		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

G. SMITH

IDZ

5-2394

SIG

L. A. DELVOIE



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

MGTC FILE CIRC DIARY

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flècheSECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

CONFIDENTIAL

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT RBR0486 01NOV83

TO/A

TO MOSCO DELBY020900

INFO

DISTR

INFO LDN PARIS BONN WSHDC PRMNY BNATO HAGUE ROME BRU BREC PC00TT/

REF

FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD/DGIS

SUBJ/SUJ

DISTR USS DMF IFB RGB RBD RBRD RBP RBT ZSP ZSI IDD IDDZ IDA IDR

---PM'S GUELPH SPEECH-SOVEMB BRIEFING

ON FRIDAY 28OCT SOVEMB CHARGE NOVIKOV MET RBD FOR PREARRANGED DISCUSSION FOLLOWING PMS' SPEECH IN GUELPH. NOVIKOV, WHILE GENERALLY POSITIVE ON SOV ATTITUDE TOWARDS PM'S INITIATIVE, MADE CLEAR EFFORT TO KEEP OPTIONS OPEN EMPHASIZING IMPORTANCE OF SPEECH AND NEED TO STUDY ITS CONTENTS CAREFULLY BEFORE REACTING OFFICIALLY. RBD STRESSED SPEECH WAS INTRODUCTORY STEP IN PROCESS DESIGNED TO ENSURE BROAD SUPPORT AND CONCRETE RESULTS.

2. NOVIKOV, WHO HAD JUST RETURNED TO OTT FROM ATTENDING PM'S SPEECH IN GUELPH, TOOK ISSUE WITH SOME ELEMENTS OF SPEECH (PARTICULARLY THAT DETENTE HAD ENDED BECAUSE OF SOV-CUBAN ADVENTURISM) ^{BUT} CHOSE TO INTERPRET PM'S DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEMS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS ^{AS} DUE ENTIRELY TO USA INTRANSIGENCE AND HOSTILITY. BUT IN GENERAL TERMS, HE SAW SPEECH AS QUOTE REALISTIC APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, A SOBRE MINDED APPRAISAL OF WORLD WHICH MUST BE STUDIED CAREFULLY UNQUOTE.

3. NOVIKOV NOTED PM IS PLANNING VISIT TO EUROPE. HE REMINDED RBD THAT ~~INVITATION TO VISIT~~

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG M.T. MACE/lb

RBR

2-2783

SIG B.M. MAWHINNEY



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE TWO RBRO486 CONFD

121

10

INVITATION TO VISIT USSR IS OUTSTANDING AND THAT PM WOULD BE WELCOME. HE EMPHASIZED THAT, FOR SOVS, AGENDA WOULD BE OPEN TO DISCUSS ANY AND ALL MULTILATERAL OR BILATERAL TOPICS. HE HINTED HOWEVER THAT TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ORGANIZE VISIT AND THAT EARLY ADVICE WOULD BE USEFUL.

4. IN REPLY RBD STRESSED STEP BY STEP APPROACH PM IS TAKING IN HIS INITIATIVE. HEAD ON APPROACH AGAINST MOST DIFFICULT INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS WOULD NOT BE SUCCESSFUL. PM WANTS TO WORK WITHIN COMMUNITY APPROACH; TO SHARE HIS IDEAS WITH OTHER LEADERS AND TRY TO CREATE BROAD AREA OF CONSENSUS ON PRACTICAL WAYS TO REDUCE EAST-WEST TENSION. SPEECH WAS DESCRIBED AS INTRODUCTORY STEP DESIGNED TO STAKE OUT BASIC APPROACH TO EAST/WEST RELATIONS WHICH OVER TIME WILL BE DEVELOPED.

5. NOVIKOV WAS TOLD OF PM'S PLANNED TRIP TO EUROPE IN EARLY NOV TO PURSUE THOUGHTS OUTLINED IN SPEECH AND TO GAUGE EUROPEAN REACTION TO THEM. DEPENDING ON THESE DISCUSSIONS, ANOTHER SPEECH WITH GREATER SPECIFICITY COULD BE ANTICIPATED. RBD MADE CLEAR THAT PM WILL NOT/NOT PROCEED WITH INITIATIVE UNLESS HE BELIEVES THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF RESULTS.

6. NOVIKOV WAS ADVISED THAT IT IS LIKELY ANDROPOV WILL RECEIVE MESSAGE FROM PM AIMED AT DRAWING ANDROPOV'S PERSONAL ATTENTION TO PROCESS ~~USING ESTABLISHED CHANNEL OR COMMUNICATION~~ AND BEGINNING EXCHANGE

...PAGE THREE



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE THREE RBR0486 CONFD

12

10

OF VIEWS.CDN OBJECTIVE IS TO KEEP SOV GOVT FULLY INFORMED. IN THIS CONNECTION PM IS CONSIDERING INVITATION FROM ANDROPOV TO VISIT USSR BUT AS HE HAD TOLD GORBACHEV AND WRITTEN TO ANDROPOV, FIRM PROSPECT OF CLEAR AND USEFUL RESULTS WOULD BE DECISIVE FACTOR.

7.NOVIKOV HAD SEVERAL SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ON TEXT BASED LARGELY ON UNFAMILIARITY WITH VERNACULAR(IE WHAT IS CRISIS MANAGEMENT?WHAT IS MEANT BY THIRD RAIL OF ENERGY?)HE WAS UNCLEAR WHETHER PM WAS PROPOSING THAT CRUISE AND PERSHING II MISSILES SHOULD BE DEPLOYED AND THAT ONLY AFTER DEPLOYMENT SHOULD LEVELS ON BOTH SIDES BE LOWERED.ON THAT RBD QUICKLY SET RECORD STRAIGHT THAT TWO TRACK APPROACH HAS DEFINITELY NOT/NOT BEEN ABANDONED BUT THAT EMPHASIS OF SPEECH IS FOR PROGRESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE PREFERABLY BEFORE DEPLOYMENTS START.

8.NOVIKOV REHASHED USUAL DIATRIBE AGAINST USA AND ITS UNWILLINGNESS TO PROCEED WITH SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS.HE EXPRESSED FEARS THAT NEW COLD WAR IS UNDERWAY AND PRAISED PM FOR HIS EFFORTS TO TURN TIDE.
~~WHILE CAREFUL NOT TO DRAW JUDGEMENTS ON SPEECH~~ NOVIKOV AGREED WITH RBD THAT PM'S INITIATIVE ENTAILED DEFINITE RISKS.HE CITED WORDS OF ANDROPOV TO EFFECT THAT TO DEAL WITH COMPLICATED PROBLEMS! DEMANDS WISDOM AND PERSONAL COURAGE.NOVIKOV STATED TEST MUST BE WHETHER PM'S IDEAS,NOW IN GENERAL FORM,CAN BE TRANSLATED INTO PRACTICAL ACTION. USSR,HE SAID,IS READY FOR CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOTIATIONS TO EASE WORLD

...PAGE FOUR



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE FOUR RBR0486 CONFD

12

10

TENSIONS BUT USA HAS NOT RESPONDED SERIOUSLY AND DOES NOT APPEAR
INTERESTED IN REACHING AGREEMENTS WITH USSR. SOVS DO NOT UNDERSTAND
USA APPROACH BUT WILL NOT GIVE UP THEIR EFFORTS TO BUILD PEACE. IN
THIS CONTEXT, NOVIKOV ~~LET~~ PM'S INITIATIVE COULD BE USEFUL.
9. DISCUSSION ENDED ON POSITIVE NOTE BUT OFFICIAL REACTION WILL
PROBABLY BE WITHHELD UNTIL ANDROPOV RECEIVES LET FROM PM. ONCE
FORMALLY INVOLVED IN PROCESS, BELIEVE WE CAN EXPECT SOVS TO OFFER
SUPPORT TO INITIATIVE WITH NATURAL EMPHASIS ON BENEFITS FOR THEM
BUT AT LEAST SOME READINESS TO CONSIDER SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO LOWER
EAST-WEST TENSIONS.

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION
25-1-1-1
A-7

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned
Person
Local Time

44
CB
09.45

Fitz E

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYGR2842 01NOV83

TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 020900

INFO LDN PARIS MERID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE
WSHDC MOSCO BNATO GENEV TOKYO WSAW BPEST PRGUE BGRAD STKHM CNBRA
HSNKI/CDEDEL WLGTN VIENN PEKIN DELHI PCOTT/FOWLER NTHQOTT/MND/CIS/
ADMPO/ CPP/DGIS

BH CNGNY DE NYK VMBFR DE VNA

SFAX CHCGO LNLIS DE OTT

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR RBD FPR IDD IDR

IDA IDDZ RBRD IDX ZSP ZSI RBP

REF OURTEL UYGR2833 01NOV YOURTEL IDDZ0054 29OCT

---PM INITIATIVE:ROM INVITATION

AT END OF DAY, 01NOV, I RECD PHONE CALL FROM AMB FLITAN, CHIEF OF THE
DEPT OF INNATL ORGANIZATION, WHO INFORMED ME OF FOLLOWING. AFTER OUR
MTG ON 31OCT HE HAD PASSED PM TRUDEAUS GUELPH SPEECH AND INFO RELATED
TO HIS UPCOMING TRIP FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH SOME WESTERN LEADERS. PRES
CEAUSescu ALSO THOUGHT PM TRUDEAU INITIATIVE WAS MOST IMPORTANT AND
SHOULD BE ACTIVELY PURSUED. AMB FLITAN WAS TOLD TO INFORM ME QUOTE
TRES OFFICIELLEMENT UNQUOTE THAT PRES CEAUSescu WOULD BE VERY PLEASED
TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THESE QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL INTEREST WITH PM
TRUDEAU, IF PM TRUDEAU DECIDED AT A LATER STAGE TO ALSO VISIT SOME
EEUR COUNTRIES AND MOSCO. I REPEATED TO AMB FLITAN THAT I DID NOT/NOT
KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT A SECOND PHASE IN PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE, THAT I

....2

000298

PAGE TWO UYGR2842 CONF

DID NOT/NOT KNOW IF PM TRUDEAU INTENDED TO GO TO MOSCO. FLITAN STATED HE UNDERSTOOD THAT BUT STILL REITERATED THAT PM TRUDEAU WOULD BE WELCOME TO ROMANIA TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES WITH PRES CEAUSESCU.

2. IN PARA TWO MY REFTTEL, I WONDERED IF IT WOULD NOT/NOT BE POSSIBLE TO ENVISAGE SUCH A VISIT. OF COURSE I NEVER MENTIONED THAT THOUGHT TO ROMS BUT AS YOU KNOW THEIR INTEREST IN THE ISSUES AND ROLE IN WSAW PACT MTGS, IT IS EASY TO UNDERSTAND THAT THEY WOULD NOT/NOT WISH TO BE IGNORED IF PM TRUDEAU EVER DECIDED TO FOLLOW-UP HIS INITIATIVE BY VISITS TO EFUR.

3. I TOLD AMB FLITAN THAT I WOULD TRANSMIT HIS MSG TO OTT AND INFORM HIM OF ANY REACTION. THERE IS NO/NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT THIS MSG REFLECTS GENUINE INTEREST FROM PRES CEAUSESCU IN INITIATIVE. FLITANS EXCITEMENT IN TRANSMITTING MSG ALSO CONFIRMS PRESIDENTS PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN MATTER

SIMARD

CCC/181 021120Z UYGR2842

Canada

Canada

TO/À MFSA (G.S. McLeod)

FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE • McLeod/Cocker telecon November 1, 1983
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Prime Minister's Briefing Book -
SUJET printing requirements

Security/Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

Date
November 1, 1983

Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0062

28-6-1-Thudreau
b-1 Mission

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

We would appreciate your assistance in the printing of the Prime Ministerial Briefing Book for the forthcoming visit to Europe, which is somewhat at variance with the instructions laid down by O/USS.

2. The printing will be paid for out of the Prime Minister's Task Force and charged to the following coding: 014-186-186-000-2301

L.A. Delvoie /sc

L.A. Delvoie,
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

COLOURED DIVIDERS (slant cut as per sample)
printed with following

FRANCE

NETHERLANDS

QUEEN BEATRIX

BELGIUM

ITALY

THE POPE

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

BRITAIN

REMEMBRANCE DAY



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

2 NOV 83 00 18Z

SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

CONFIDENTIAL/CDN EYES ONLY

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0061 01NOV83

TO/À

TO VMBFR(FOR HAMMOND ONLY)

INFO

DISTR

---PM S INITIATIVE-MBFR

REF

SUBJ/SUJ

IN LIGHT OF POSSIBILITY THAT PM S MEETINGS WITH KOHL AND OTHERS
NEXT WEEK MAY RESULT IN APPRAISAL THAT NO WESTERN INITIATIVE IS
ATTAINABLE AT THIS TIME, TASK FORCE HAS BEEN CONSIDERING POSSIBLE
ALTERNATIVE SUBSTANCE TO INSTIGATE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS. AS
YOU ARE AWARE THIS IS SOMEWHAT LIKE TROUT FISHING IN ACIDIC LAKE AND
ONLY ITEM WE COULD IDENTIFY WAS REGISTRATION OF POINTS WHERE EAST-
WEST AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED IN COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS ACCOMPA-
NIED BY MINISTERIAL INJUNCTION TO PROCEED FURTHER. GRATEFUL YOUR
COMMENTS ASAP ON FOLLOWING DRAFT COMMUNIQUE, INFO NDC/TOOGOOD, YOU
WILL APPRECIATE THIS ALTERNATIVE IS INCHOATE CONTINGENCY ONLY, NOT
YET DISCUSSED ABOVE WORKING LEVEL AND HOPEFULLY NOT TO BE USED SO
FACT THAT IT IS UNDER CONSIDERATION AT ALL SHOULD NOT IN ANY WAY BE
DISCLOSED,

2.TEXT BEGINS QUOTE THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE STATES PARTICIPA-
TING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES
AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES IN CENTRAL EUROPE MET IN
VIENNA FROM...TO...1984.

THEY EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE CURRENT STATE OF
THE NEGOTIATIONS AND REVIEWED THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE SO

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J.D.TOOGOOD

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG

L.A.DELVOIE



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE TWO IDDZ0061 CONF/CDN EYES ONLY

12

10

FAR.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THEY AGREED THAT A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THEIR DELIBERATIONS WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE IN THIS COMMUNIQUE EXCEPT TO RECORD POINTS OF AGREEMENT THAT HAVE BEEN REACHED SO FAR IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THESE ARE:

1. THE SECURITY OF ALL PARTICIPANTS, INCLUDING THOSE WITH SPECIAL STATUS, WILL NOT BE DIMINISHED.
2. PARITY OF MILITARY MANPOWER BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AT LOWER COLLECTIVE LEVELS WILL BE ATTAINED AND MAINTAINED.
3. THE BASIC CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVITY FOR EACH SIDE WILL BE APPLIED WHEN COUNTING LEVELS OF FORCES REMAINING AFTER REDUCTIONS.
4. REDUCTIONS WILL BE UNDERTAKEN BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.
5. ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS MAINTAINING MAJOR MILITARY FORMATIONS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WILL TAKE A SIGNIFICANT SHARE OF THE TOTAL MANPOWER REDUCTIONS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE SIDES.
6. NAVAL PERSONNEL WILL BE EXCLUDED FROM REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS.
7. MANPOWER REDUCTIONS WILL BEGIN WITH THE GROUND FORCES OF THE USA AND THE USSR.
8. PERSONNEL AND UNITS WITHDRAWN FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WILL

...3



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE THREE IDDZ0061 CONF~~3~~CDN EYES ONLY

12

10

NOT BE REDEPLOYED TO GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS WHERE THEIR ADDED PRESENCE WOULD DIMINISH THE SECURITY ANY PARTICIPANT, INCLUDING THOSE WITH SPECIAL STATUS.

9. THERE WILL BE NO LIMITATIONS ON THE LOCATIONS OF MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS AND UNITS IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA.

10. NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN OF CERTAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES.

11. ON SITE INSPECTIONS TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH AN AGREEMENT WILL BE CARRIED OUT UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES TO BE AGREED.

12. POINTS OF EXIT FROM AND ENTRY TO THE AREA WILL BE ESTABLISHED. THESE POINTS WILL BE MANNED WITH OBSERVERS OF THE SIDES.

13. RELEVANT INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR ARMED FORCES WILL BE EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE SIDES FOR THE DURATION OF AN AGREEMENT.

14. THERE WILL BE NO INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION AND THOSE MEANS WILL BE USED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH GENERALLY RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.

15. A CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION WILL BE ESTABLISHED TO OPERATE FOR THE DURATION OF AN AGREEMENT.

THE MINISTERS EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THIS PROGRESS BUT RECOGNIZED THAT MORE WORK NEEDS TO BE DONE. TO THAT END THEY UNDERTOOK PERSONNALLY TO KEEP THE VIENNA TALKS UNDER CONTINUING HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL REVIEW AND REAFFIRMED THEIR

...4



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE FOUR IDDZ0061 CONF/CDN EYES ONLY

12|

10

DETERMINATION TO BRING THE NEGOTIATIONS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION

UNQUOTE.TEXT ENDS.



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ
C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDDZ0060 01NOV83

TO/À TO PARIS BRU HAGUE ROME BONN LDN

INFO
DISTR INFO PC00TT/FOWLER

REF DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RCD RSR

SUBJ/SUJ ---PM INITIATIVE-ATTENDANCE AT MTGS AND REPORTING

IT IS ENVISAGED THAT CDN PARTICIPATION IN SUBSTANTIVE MTGS BE
RESTRICTED TO FOUR: (A) PM TRUDEAU (B) CDN AMBASSADOR (C) ROBERT FOWLER
/PCO, AND (D) GARY SMITH, DEA/IDA.

2. WHILE SMITH WILL BE OFFICIAL NOTETAKER FOR ALL MTGS, VERY TIGHT
SCHEDULE WILL PRECLUDE HIS BEING ABLE TO FILE REPORTS TO OTT FROM
EACH CAPITAL. GRATEFUL THEREFORE IF IN EACH CASE AMBASSADOR WOULD
FORWARD HIGH PRECEDENCE SUMMARY TEL REPORT TO OTT/IDDZ AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE AFTER MTGS. THESE REPORTS SHOULD FOCUS ON MAIN SUBSTANTIVE
ELEMENTS OF DISCUSSION, AREAS OF AGREEMENT, AND TONE AND ATMOSPHERE
OF DISCUSSIONS.

11 Nov 83
28-6-1-Trudeau Policy Mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

L.A. Delvoie/sc

IDDZ

5-2394

SIG

SIG L.A. DELVOIE

External Affairs
Canada

External Affairs
Canada

IDDZ/S. Connick, 5-2394/SC

TO/A ZSSG
FROM/DE • IDDZ

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

REFERENCE • Prime Minister's Task Force on East-West
RÉFÉRENCE Relations and International Security
SUBJECT • Building pass for Lawrence Hagen of DND
SUJET

Security/Sécurité
Unclassified
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
November 1, 1983
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0059

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

It would be appreciated if you could please arrange to provide, at the earliest possible moment, a building pass for:

Mr. Lawrence Hagen
Senior Defence Analyst
Directorate of Strategic Analysis
Operational Research and Analysis Establishment
Department of National Defence

2. Mr. Hagen will be working, as of this morning, with us on the Prime Minister's Task Force (IDDZ) over the next two months. Particulars are:

S.I.N. 452-502-040

Date of birth: July 12, 1954

DND I.D. No.: C108327


Security clearance: Top Secret

3. Could you please advise Miss Connick at 5-2394 when Mr. Hagen's pass is available.

L. A. Delvoie

L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

Check with
Miss Mayer to
confirm TS. issue
pass. *Let*
11/1/83



000307

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIEL

Le 1^{er} novembre 1983

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
Mission

NOTE À: M. Louis Delvoie
DE: André Burelle
OBJET: Le discours de Montréal

Vous trouverez ci-joint une première ébauche du discours sur la paix et le désarmement que le Premier ministre prononcera lors du dîner-bénéfice du Parti libéral du Canada, le 13 novembre 1983, à Montréal.

J'ai rédigé ce texte en faisant les options suivantes:

1) Après le discours de Guelph, conçu davantage à l'intention des chancelleries et du milieu universitaire, j'ai choisi d'écrire un discours d'abord adressé au peuple, dans le style de la lettre ouverte sur les missiles Cruise.

2) J'ai axé toute l'allocution du P.M. sur le besoin de restaurer le règne de la rationalité et la confiance entre l'Est et l'Ouest, besoin qui inspire sa proposition d'une troisième voie. Et toutes les suggestions spécifiques, sommet des cinq grands du club nucléaire, renforcement du Traité de non-prolifération, relèvement du seuil nucléaire en Europe, etc. sont présentées comme servantes de ce grand dessein.

3) Enfin, j'ai rédigé ce deuxième discours pour qu'il demeure aussi indépendant que possible des résultats de la mission que M. Trudeau mènera entre-temps en Europe.

Du point de vue stratégie, il me semble qu'il y a pour le P.M. un avantage à se donner du champ et à laisser à ses interlocuteurs un temps de réflexion sans commentaire.

Du point de vue rédactionnel, il me semble également de bonne guerre de réserver tout compte rendu de la mission du P. M. pour un dernier discours-bilan qui déboucherait éventuellement sur l'annonce d'un voyage à Moscou.

- 2 -

Avant de remettre mon texte au Premier ministre, j'apprécierais, il va de soi, recevoir les commentaires et les suggestions du groupe de travail que vous dirigez, puisque vous êtes les accoucheurs professionnels dans toute cette opération.

Si l'approche que j'ai retenue n'est pas la bonne, il est encore temps d'en changer puisque nous sommes à treize jours de l'échéance. Mais j'apprécierais alors qu'un autre que moi, Jim Moore par exemple, prenne la relève comme maître d'oeuvre du discours.



P.-S.: J'ai intégré dans leur libellé anglais les passages que j'ai empruntés aux notes des experts de votre groupe. J'ai dû, bien sûr, faire un choix, mais j'espère que les paragraphes retenus respectent l'essentiel de leur pensée. Tous ces passages seraient, il va sans dire, adaptés en français pour faire corps avec le reste du texte.

INSTRUCTIONS:

FOR USE WHEN SIGNATURE ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF DOCUMENTS IS NEEDED. ORIGINATOR TO COMPLETE BOTH SECURITY BLOCKS.
À UTILISER LORSQU'ON EXIGE UN ACCUSÉ DE RÉCEPTION. À L'ENVOYEUR, COMPLÉTER LES DEUX ESPACES DE SÉCURITÉ.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE -- NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
A
The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
(URR, UGP, SCS)

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)
UNCLASSIFIED
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)
UNCLASSIFIED

NO.

DATE Nov. 1/83

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
One	<p>Attached is only coverage that we have found to date on Trudeau's peace initiative.</p> <div data-bbox="271 827 669 1411" data-label="Form"> <div>URR</div> <div>DEC 7 1983</div> <div> <div>1</div> <div>2</div> <div>3</div> <div>4</div> <div>5</div> <div>6</div> </div> </div> <div data-bbox="721 936 1205 1131" data-label="Form"> <div>DEC 6 1983</div> <div> <div>FILE</div> <div>DOSSIER</div> </div> </div> <div data-bbox="1013 730 1549 1037" data-label="Form"> <div>28-6-1-1</div> <div>Trudeau Peace mission</div> <div>URR</div> </div> <p>1002 to see</p>	

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Congen/Boston

DATE

SIGNATURE

EXT 34 (E.L. REV. 12/76)
7530-21-226-4107

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE

MONDAY, OCTOBER 31, 1983

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

INTERNATIONAL

Trudeau plans to 'jolt' superpowers with a peace campaign

But call for 'creative radicalism' also aims to help his Liberal Party at home

By Andrew Orkin
Special to The Christian Science Monitor



Sven Simon

Guelph, Ontario
A "deeply troubled" Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau has embarked on his greatest, and perhaps last, political venture.

Announcing a personal peace plan that will see him visit five European heads of state in a four-day visit early next month, Trudeau said it is time in his career for "creative radicalism in a very important area, disarmament and the pursuit of peace.

"There is a climate of acrimony that is dangerously confrontational. Their [the superpowers'] relationship may have become too charged for East-West relations to be entrusted to them alone."

His plan drew an immediate reaction. The United States Embassy in Ottawa issued a statement cautioning Trudeau against over-involvement in nuclear arms control talks between the superpowers. "In dialogue with the East on arms-control matters, the chances for genuine progress in these negotiations will be strengthened if Soviet leaders come to understand that the allies are united

on such common security issues as INF [intermediate-range nuclear force] negotiations," the statement said.

Trudeau's longstanding sincerity on the issue is roundly acknowledged. But his peace campaign has important political implications at home, where the percentage of public support for his Liberal Party has fallen to the mid-twenties, some 30 percentage points lower than the opposition Progressive Conservative Party. He has faced close questioning in Parliament on foreign policy matters from Brian Mulroney, newly elected Tory leader, whom Trudeau is portraying as a cold warrior.

Mr. Trudeau, who promised in 1980 to retire before the next election, is not expected to do so until he has reached a position of conspicuous achievement or political strength. The prime minister's reputation and experience in the international arena, given even a moderate appearance of success in the coming weeks, are seen by party insiders as a last Liberal hope.

The Canadian peace initiative, which will take Mr. Trudeau to France, The Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and West Germany, was only partially welcomed by representatives of Canada's increasingly strident disarmament movement. Mr. Trudeau chose an international disarmament conference at the small University of Guelph, Ontario, to deliver late last week the speech that contained initial details of his plan. His critique of the superpower impasse was carefully applied to both superpowers, but he was plainly critical of President Reagan: "I am not reassured by the posture and rhetoric of an earlier wartime age. Both Washington and Moscow seem to lack a political vision of the world wherein their nations can live in peace."

He was careful to defend his government's decision to allow the US to test air-launched cruise missiles in Canada's north this winter, a matter that has brought hundreds of thousands of Canadians onto the streets in protest. He also affirmed the commitment of NATO leaders to the "two-track" policy of negotiations and deployment that will most likely lead to the installation this winter of the first of 572 cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe.

Canadian officials are privately doubtful that Mr. Trudeau will be able to insert himself as a go-between at the superpower negotiations. Trudeau sees his efforts as a "third rail for the two-track decision — the third rail which might speed the course of agreement."

He has shown in the past that he can be consumed by single issues — North-South relations and the repatriation of Canada's constitution from the United Kingdom being prime examples — and his office says his peace effort consumes an increasing share of his attention. This devotion carries the risk of a backlash at home, where he could be seen as avoiding the domestic situation.

Trudeau's detailed strategy is being kept under wraps. He has begun "a process of close discussion" with President Reagan and sent messages to all NATO heads of government. He plans to raise the issue at a November meeting of the heads of Commonwealth governments in New Delhi, and may then accept an invitation to go to the Soviet Union that was made earlier this year.

But his general intentions were clearly stated in his announcement: "What is missing are steps, a jolt of political energy, that build an authentic confidence in man's ability to survive on the planet." It's a jolt Trudeau hopes to provide.

INSTITUTE FOR EAST-WEST SECURITY STUDIES

Update

Fall 1983

Ford Foundation to Award Institute Major Grant

The Ford Foundation has announced its intention to award the Institute a one-year grant of \$95,000 to support its European security program. According to Dr. Enid C.B. Schoettle, Program Officer in Charge of International Relations for Ford, this grant represents a major vote of confidence in the work of the Institute. The grant includes support for the Resident Fellows Program, the Arms Control Study Group, European review sessions of the Fellows' work, domestic and foreign travel of the Fellows and specialized library support.

"The Institute in its short lifetime has begun to play a very important role in supplementing government-to-government dealings between East and West. Its independence and objective approach to studying critical security problems is needed and sound. Your program seems to me to be a good idea, not only for the value of the academic work involved, but for the understanding which is fostered by direct contact between people of differing views."

*-Under Secretary of State
Lawrence Eagleburger
September 12, 1983*

News & Notes

- The U.S. Department of State has officially agreed to participate in the Institute's U.S.-Soviet Project, "U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Next Twenty Years."
- Eastern and Western governments continue to request large numbers of *Confidence-Building Measures in Europe*, the Institute's first publication in its East-West Monograph series. A majority of governments participating in the CSCE talks are using copies for their delegations to the Conference on Disarmament in Europe which convenes in Stockholm in January 1984. One Swedish government official noted that the monograph is "the only available handbook for those being sent to this negotiation." Over 30 copies have been requested from the National Security Council staff for distribution in Washington.



Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the Federal Republic of Germany (second from right) prior to his speech at the Institute with (from left), H.E. Mr. Sverre Stray, Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs; Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Adviser to President Carter; and John Edwin Mroz, President of the Institute. See page 3 for excerpts of Mr. Genscher's speech.

- The Institute continues to bring together policy-makers from East and West. At a recent intimate dinner hosted by the Institute's President, John Edwin Mroz, Dr. Peter Varkonyi, the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and senior members of Hungary's Foreign Ministry met for lengthy discussions with representatives of the National Security Council and the Department of State. Among the guests were Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Peter Jennings of ABC-News.
- Spanish Foreign Minister Fernando Moran Lopez spoke on "Spanish Security Interests in the 1980s" at an Institute luncheon in his honor on September 28 in New York.
- 90 percent of the Institute's 40 Directors from 14 countries participated in two and a half days of Board meetings September 11-13 in New York.
- The Institute's Corporate Patrons Program launched by the Bank of America continues to grow. Exxon and Gulf & Western are among the most recent corporations to join the program. As part of the Program the Bank of America will host at its San Francisco headquarters an address by the Institute's President, John Edwin Mroz, on "U.S.-Soviet Relations: Problems and Prospects" to Bay Area corporate executives.

Continued on page 2

What is the Institute?

The Institute for East-West Security Studies is an independent international research center devoted to the analysis of critical political, military and economic developments which affect international security. Its uniqueness lies in its multinational character. The research staff is composed of mid-career security specialists on loan from Foreign and Defense Ministries in both Western and Eastern Europe who spend a year in New York as Resident Fellows working together on arms control and security issues. The Board of Directors is 55 percent European and includes representatives from governments and research institutes

in more than a dozen European countries.

The Institute is more than a "think tank" however. Its strength lies in its policy orientation and close connection with key policy-makers in Europe and the United States. Its publications, such as its recent monograph, *Confidence-Building Measures in Europe*, are widely read and help shape the perceptions of the policy-making communities. As West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher noted at a recent luncheon hosted by the Institute in his honor, the Institute for East-West Security Studies has become a "significant forum" in the East-West policy debate. The Institute receives no governmental funding. Contributions in the United States are tax-deductible.

Jim Kallet

The Institute's Arms Control Program

In September 1983 the Institute began the first year of a three-year project on "Long-Term Arms Control and Disarmament Options in Europe." Research for the project is being carried out under the supervision of Dr. F. Stephen Larrabee, Vice President and Director of Studies, by a multinational team of arms control specialists from West Germany, Italy, Poland, Austria, Yugoslavia, France, Hungary and Switzerland, who will spend a year at the Institute as Resident Fellows.

The purpose of the Institute's 1983-84 East-West research program is to analyze arms control issues related to European security and explore alternatives to current approaches. The Fellows are divided into three small working groups which will examine three specific issue areas: 1) European Nuclear Issues; 2) Conventional Forces; and 3) Confidence-Building Measures.

These issue areas correspond to the three negotiations currently dealing with European security. The Institute's research will not entail an attempt to second-guess the negotiators. Rather it will examine political and military trends over the next 5 to 10 years which may affect the negotiations and the dimensions of the European security debate.

Such a project is particularly timely because the European security dialogue has entered a new phase. Many of the initial hopes at the beginning of the 1970s have failed to be borne out in practice. A decade of East-West negotiations has brought some limited results, but it has failed to eliminate many of the prime sources of tension, particularly in the

military field. Indeed, in many cases these tensions seem to be increasing. Thus there is a need to rethink many of the initial premises and concepts that governed both Western and Eastern thinking about European security.

Among the key issues to be addressed by the Fellows are the impact of new weapons technologies on European security; the changing political climate in Europe and its implications for arms control prospects in both East and West; and alternative methods for restructuring the current arms control agenda in Europe.

To supplement their research and to ensure that it addresses the major security issues in a comprehensive manner, the Fellows will make several trips to Washington and Europe to meet with key policy-makers from both East and West. They will also participate in the Institute's Arms Control Study Group, which regularly brings together top U.S. and European arms control specialists to discuss critical issues related to the Fellows' research.

The end product of this research project will be a series of collaborative papers addressing these pressing issues of international security. These papers will be published by the Institute as Occasional Papers or in its East-West Monograph series. They are designed to be substantive contributions to innovative and critical thinking about these issues, and will be circulated widely to specialists and policy-makers in the field. In addition, each Fellow will also write an individual paper on a related subject, which will appear under his own name.

The following security specialists make up the Institute's second team of Resident Fellows who began their process of research and discussion September 1983:

Austria: Dr. Heinz Vetschera

Dr. Vetschera is a senior researcher at the Austrian National Defence Academy as well as Legal Officer at the Army Command in Austria. As an expert on arms control, confidence-building measures and European security, Vetschera regularly writes for the Austrian Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs.

Federal Republic of Germany:

Dr. Hilmar Linnenkamp

Dr. Linnenkamp serves as Head of the Section on Planning Control and System Development on the Policy Planning Staff of the Federal Ministry of Defense in Bonn. Linnenkamp, who has written widely on defense planning and armaments policy, has held policy positions in the Ministry of Defense since 1969.

Hungary: Dr. Janos Jelen

Dr. Jelen is a career Foreign Service Officer who has served in Moscow and Southeast Asia. He is currently a Research Associate at the Hungarian Institute of International Relations. **Note:** Dr. Jelen will be succeeded in January by **Dr. Istvan Kormendy**, one of the leading Eastern experts on confidence-building measures and theater nuclear forces. He has served as a member of the Hungarian delegation to the CSCE Conference in Madrid for the past three years.

Italy: Marco de Andreis

Mr. de Andreis is a defense consultant for the Radical Parliamentary Group (Chamber of Deputies) and a defense specialist who has written widely on arms control, Italian defense policies, and arms production and transfers. He recently served on the editorial board of *Difesa Oggi* (Defense Today).

Poland: Dr. Marek Grela

Dr. Grela is a Research Associate at the Polish Institute of International Affairs who has served as a member of the Polish delegation to the CSCE Talks in Geneva, Helsinki and Madrid. He is an expert on East-West relations and East-West trade.

Switzerland: Dr. Paul Widmer

Dr. Widmer is currently on leave as Head of the U.S. Desk in the Political Division of the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He is a historian and political scientist who has written widely on social and political movements in Europe and the United States and their relationship to defense policies.

The following specialists participate on a part-time basis in the work of the East-West team:

France: Jean Desazars de Montgailhard

Mr. Desazars was the Deputy Head of the French Delegation to the CSCE Talks in Madrid.

Spain: Pablo Barrios

Barrios was Deputy Head of the Spanish Delegation to the CSCE Talks in Madrid. He currently serves as Counselor to the Spanish Mission to the United Nations.

Yugoslavia: Vladimir Bilandzic

Bilandzic is currently on leave from the Department of International Relations at the Institute of International Politics and Economics in Belgrade. He has also served on the Yugoslav delegations to the CSCE Talks in Geneva, Belgrade and Madrid.

News & Notes, Continued from page 1

- **Former U.S. SALT negotiator Paul Warnke addressed the Institute's Arms Control Study Group** on October 6 in New York with a discussion of European theater nuclear weapons. Joining the Institute's Resident Fellows and senior staff were members of the Institute's Arms Control Study Group, including Richard Betts of the Brookings Institution, Alton Frye and Andrew Pierre of the Council of Foreign Relations, Barry Blechman and Josef Joffe of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Colonel William Stokes of the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon. The next meeting of the Study Group will take place in Washington with an address by Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

"In the short time since its founding, the Institute has developed into a significant forum for East-West dialogue, which today is more important than ever. The Institute deserves great recognition for the substantial effort which it has devoted to this task."

*-H.E. Mr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Federal Republic of Germany
September 29, 1983*

- **In early September the Hungarian Government agreed to allow a senior government official, Ambassador Pal Racz, to join the Institute's Board of Directors.** This is the first time that a Hungarian official of his stature has been allowed to serve on the Board of a Western-based institution. Racz has formerly served as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Minister of Interior.

- **Newly-elected members of the Board of Directors include Helmut Sonnenfeldt**, Guest Scholar of the Brookings Institution and one of the foremost experts on U.S.-Soviet relations, and **Dr. Eleanor Sheldon**, former President of the Social Science Research Council. **Dr. Max Kampelman**, Head of the U.S. CSCE delegation in Madrid, has recently agreed to join the Board of Directors and will be formally elected this fall together with **Rita Hauser**, Partner of Stroeck & Stroeck & Lavan and Chairperson of the Executive Committee of the American Jewish Committee, and **Pauline Neville-Jones**, Director of Policy Planning at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London.

Excerpts From Genscher Speech

The following is an excerpt of a major foreign policy address, "An Alliance Policy for Peace in Freedom," delivered by West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher at the Institute on September 27. Genscher was the sixth European Foreign Minister in the last year to address the Institute.

... Europe is not the hub of the world. But the questions that now arise as regards security and cooperation in Europe affect not only the fate of the old continent but also the relationship between the two superpowers and hence global equilibrium and stability.

The vital interests of the European partners in the Alliance and the security interests of the United States of America are inextricably linked: on the one hand, our freedom and independence are bound up with America's status as a world power. In Europe the security of the United States, too, is being defended. On the other hand, we Europeans need the weight of the American superpower in order to preserve our freedom. In this context, we are always conscious that, whilst in the same boat, we are nearer the dangerous edge; when stability is threatened, our independence, indeed our very existence, is more directly at stake than that of the United States.

... We have no wish to see Eastern Europe in the throes of economic crisis. Not only the peoples of Eastern Europe and our own fellow countrymen in the G.D.R. would suffer; we,

too, would be adversely affected by such developments.

There is a growing awareness that one side's prosperity also promotes the other side's prosperity. Here the interests of the Soviet Union and Western Europe are not contradictory, but mutually complementary.

East-West economic relations should be compatible with our security interests. They have an important bearing on the stabilization of East-West political relations. Thinking in terms of trade war would be counterproductive. It would, moreover, be oblivious to previous experience. Trade policy must not be made a foreign policy instrument disciplining others.

Anyone wishing to stabilize East-West relations must be willing to practice economic cooperation on a wide scale.

... We must bring home to the Soviet Union our will for defense and at the same time our will for cooperation. Our policy must remain calculable through being transparent and consistent. The Soviet Union, despite all its internal difficulties, will remain a world power.

Without presenting it as a demon, we shall have to treat the Soviet Union as a powerful adversary, as a permanent rival and a constant challenge, but also as a partner in negotiations and agreements. Our relationship with the Soviet Union must therefore be determined by common sense and not by emotion.

Our task is to be constantly on our guard, determined to defend ourselves, and at all times ready for cooperation, compromise and



Jim Kallett

Foreign Minister Genscher speaking at the Institute.

understanding. Ever increasing cooperation in ever more areas must make stability, security and disarmament possible. This task demands the greatest possible conceptual cohesion, clarity and perseverance on the part of political leaders in a democracy.



Mr. Eagleburger

Excerpts From Eagleburger Speech

The following is an excerpt of a speech on "U.S.-Soviet Relations" by Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, given at the Institute's Annual Dinner September 12, chaired by Flora Lewis of *The New York Times*.

I had hoped tonight to be able to point to some small signs of progress in the [U.S.-Soviet] relationship. Before the morning of September 1, there had been small movement and we saw possibilities for some significant results. The last session of START was by far the most productive and there was some movement in MBFR. The long-standing Pentecostal problem had been resolved. We had proposed and the Soviets accepted the negotiation of a new cultural exchanges agreement and establishment of new consulates. We were discussing U.S.-proposed confidence-building measures. I would like to note the important contribution the Institute itself has just made with its monograph on this very subject. The United States has signed a new Long-Term Grain agreement and completed the Madrid concluding document. But, KAL flight No. 007, was not on our agenda.

... In consequence, we have consistently stated that we must approach U.S.-Soviet relations from a position of strength. President Reagan has undertaken as a major priority of his Administration to seek, in partnership with the Congress, to restore America's economic and military power and to reinvigorate its political self-confidence and resolve. In our


opinion, it is only on such a basis of rebuilt strength that we can hope to deter and contain Soviet adventurism and to draw the Soviets into a potentially constructive dialogue—a dialogue that could lead to equitable, political solutions to outstanding issues.

... On arms control, I mentioned that we remain seriously interested in reaching agreements that are fair. Talks are continuing on reducing strategic systems, European-based missiles, and conventional forces in Central Europe, and we hope that all of these talks will produce solid results. I am frankly not optimistic in the short term, but I am convinced of the necessity to get control over the arms race and to start some reverse momentum. I am convinced that the approach we have adopted is the most likely to produce this result.

On regional issues, we have held talks with the Soviets on Afghanistan and southern Africa, and on more general geopolitical issues. I regret to say that these talks, while generally useful and informative, have not produced the sort of actions on the Soviet part which could contribute to the near-term resolution of the problems.

On the bilateral side, we have managed to sustain a dialogue, although on a limited scale. Trade relations have improved and the recently-concluded grain agreement will ensure that American farmers get their share of the Soviet grain trade for some years to come. Unfortunately, our efforts to expand official exchanges must now be held up, but it remains in our interest to increase our access to Soviet society, and to expand the exposure of Soviet citizens to U.S. society.

... Let me conclude on a more philosophic and ultimately hopeful note. The immediate reaction of some in the West was to excuse this Soviet outrage as the result of centuries' old Soviet and Russian paranoia, and of a deep-seated insecurity. But as the historian Isaiah Berlin reminds us, it was with the triumph over Napoleon and the march to Paris that "Russia found herself a great power in the heart of Europe, conscious of her crushing strength, dominating the entire scene and accepted by



Jim Kallett

Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Richard Burt in conversation with Institute Director Ambassador Guenther van Well of the Federal Republic of Germany at the Institute's luncheon in September.

Europeans with some terror and great reluctance, as not merely equal but superior to them in brute force."

This attack on a peaceful airliner was caused more by arrogance and by power unconstrained than by any weakness. But the same school then would argue that this is inherent in the way the Russians are—implicitly that they are and will remain barbarians and slaves. This is a prescription for endless hostility between our two nations and for permanent despair. I utterly reject it.

There are new generations rising in the Soviet Union inspired by the best of their heritage. From their 19th-century literature, they read Alexander Herzen's ringing words, "One must open men's eyes, not tear them out." They read Turgenev: "I am devoted to Europe, or to be more precise to . . . civilization."

... To truly eliminate the danger of nuclear war, we must move towards a world based on democratic governments which naturally obey the rule of law.

Institute for East-West Security Studies
304 East 45th Street
New York, NY 10017
Telephone (212) 557-2570
Telex 499-0809
Cable EWSECUR



Board of Directors

IRA D. WALLACH

Chairman, Executive Committee of the Board of the Institute; Chairman, Gottesman & Company, Inc., New York

DR. LJUBIVOJE ACIMOVIC

Director, Department for International Studies, Institute for International Politics and Economics, Belgrade; Special Adviser, Yugoslav Delegation to the CSCE

ANTONIO ARMELLINI

Head of Planning and Research, Office of the Director General of Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome

H.E. MR. MUHARREM NURI BIRGI

President, Atlantic Treaty Associations, Istanbul; Former Representative of Turkey to NATO

DR. hab. RYSZARD FRELEK

Professor, Political Science, Warsaw University; Former Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Polish People's Republic to the United Nations

JEAN-LOUIS GERGORIN

Director, Center for Policy Planning, Ministry of External Relations, Paris

DAVID GOMPERT

General Manager—Marketing Planning, AT&T International, New Jersey; Former Deputy to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

DR. GYULA GYOVAI

Director, Hungarian Institute of International Relations, Budapest

RITA HAUSER*

Senior Partner, Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, New York; Chairperson, Executive Committee of the American Jewish Committee

DR. JOHAN JORGEN HOLST

Director, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo

WILLIAM G. HYLAND

Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.; Editor-designate, Foreign Affairs, New York

H.E. MR. PETER JANKOWITSCH

Member of the Austrian National Assembly, Vienna; former Austrian Ambassador to the OECD

DR. MAX KAMPELMAN*

Partner, Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Kampelman, Washington, D.C.; Head, U.S. Delegation to the CSCE Talks in Madrid (1980-1983)

JUDITH KIPPER

Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C.

H.E. MR. MILJAN KOMATINA

Federal Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Belgrade

GENERAL WILHELM KUNTNER (Ret.)

Defense Consultant; Former Commandant, Austrian National Defense Academy, Vienna

FLORA LEWIS

Columnist, The New York Times, Paris

H.E. MR. MIRCEA MALITZA

Romanian Ambassador to the United States, Washington, D.C.

MONT E. MCMILLEN, JR.

Executive Vice President, Bank of America, Los Angeles

DR. ALOIS MERTES

State Minister, Foreign Office, Bonn

DR. THIERRY DE MONTBRIAL

Director, French Institute for International Relations, Paris

ALBERT J. MOORMAN

Managing Partner, McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen, San Francisco

JOHN EDWIN MROZ

President of the Institute

CHARLES W. MULLER

President, Murden & Company, Inc., New York

PAULINE NEVILLE-JONES*

Director of Policy Planning, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London

H.E. MR. GEOFFREY PEARSON

Canadian Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., Moscow

H.E. MR. PAL RACZ

Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Hungary to the United Nations, New York

DR. OLIN C. ROBISON

President, Middlebury College, Vermont

DANIEL ROSE

President, Rose Associates, New York

HAROLD H. SAUNDERS

Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C.; Assistant Secretary of State (1978-1981)

THOMAS SAYLOR

Vice President, Garnac Grain Company, Inc., New York

DR. ELEANOR SHELDON

Business Consultant; Former President, Social Science Research Council (1972-79), New York

MITCHELL I. SONKIN, ESQ.

Partner, Garman Jaffe Sonkin, New York

HELMUT SONNENFELDT

Guest Scholar, The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.; Former Counselor of the Department of State (1974-77)

MICHAEL I. SOVERN

President, Columbia University, New York

H.E. MR. EMMANUEL SPYRIDAKIS

Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens

H.E. MR. ALEXIS STEPHANOU

Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Athens

DIETRICH STOBBE, MdB

Member of the Deutscher Bundestag, Bonn; Governing Mayor of Berlin (1977-1981)

DR. hab. JANUSZ SYMONIDES

Director, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw

DR. SEYFI TASHAN

President, Turkish Institute of Foreign Policy, Ankara

DR. CONSTANTIN VLAD

Director, Institute of Political Sciences and the Study of the National Questions, Bucharest

H.E. MR. GUENTHER van WELL

Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to the United Nations, New York

Ex-Officio

DR. KARL KAISER

Chairman, Academic Advisory Committee of the Institute; Director, Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Bonn

*Pending Formal Election, 11/15/83

The **Institute for East-West Security Studies** is a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. It receives no government funds and is financed by individuals, foundations, and corporations in the United States and Europe. All contributions to the Institute in the United States are tax-deductible.

The Institute's Board of Directors meets twice a year, once in Europe and once in the United States.

Counsel: Garman Jaffe Sonkin, New York

Auditors: Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., New York

Institute for East-West Security Studies

TELEX: 499-0809
CABLE: EWSECUR

304 East 45th Street
New York, N. Y. 10017
(212) 557-2570

1983/84 EAST-WEST RESEARCH PROGRAM

LONG-TERM ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT OPTIONS IN EUROPE

In September 1983 the Institute began the first year of a major three-year program on "Long-Term Arms Control and Disarmament Options in Europe". The research is being carried out under the supervision of Dr. F. Stephen Larrabee, Vice President and Director of Studies, by a multinational team of arms control specialists on loan from West Germany, Italy, Poland, Austria, Yugoslavia, France, Hungary and Switzerland, who are spending a year at the Institute as Resident Fellows.

The purpose of the Institute's 1983/84 East-West research program is to analyze arms control issues related to European security and explore alternatives to current approaches. The Fellows are divided into three small Working Groups which will examine three specific issue areas: 1) European Nuclear Issues; 2) Conventional Forces; and 3) Confidence-Building Measures. This is the first East-West collaborative effort on these questions.

These issue areas correspond to the three negotiations currently dealing with European security (INF, MBFR and CDE). The Institute's research will not entail an attempt to second-guess the negotiators. Rather it will examine political and military trends over the next 5 to 10 years which may affect the negotiations and the scope of the European security debate.

The end product of this research program will be a series of collaborative papers addressing these pressing issues of international security. These papers will be published by the Institute as Occasional Papers or in its East-West Monograph Series. They are designed to be substantive contributions to innovative and critical thinking about these issues, and will be circulated widely to specialists and policy-makers in the field. In addition, each Fellow will write an individual paper on a related subject, which will appear under his own name in a journal in the U.S. or Europe.

A detailed outline of the research agenda of each of the three Working Groups is attached.

European Nuclear Issues

The Working Group on European Nuclear Issues will concentrate, in its research and discussions in the coming year, on the following sets of issues which we consider to be the most deserving of attention.

1. The Political Context:

This section will provide the political framework for the analysis of European nuclear issues. It will focus on the changing domestic and international environment which has influenced and will continue to influence European nuclear issues. Among the key subjects to be addressed herein are:

- a) the role and evolution of European nuclear forces, and of the various negotiations relating to those forces;
- b) the recent changes in the European political climate as they relate to these issues;
- c) the possible impact of this changing political climate and of public opinion in Europe and the U.S. on the future evolution of these issues.
- d) the relationship between European nuclear issues and overall inter-bloc relations;

2. The European Nuclear Balance

We will address the following major issues relating to the INF balance:

- a) the significance of the European nuclear balance for the overall strategic balance;
- b) the relationship between INF and conventional forces;
- c) the functions of tactical nuclear forces;
- d) the impact of the geographic asymmetry of the two blocs on the nature of the INF (and strategic) balance;
- e) the role of the European flanks;

3. The Interests and Policies of Non-Participating Powers

This section will be devoted to a consideration of the interests and perspectives of the countries which are not parties to the INF negotiations. For the purpose of this discussion, these countries can be divided into five categories:

- a) European nuclear powers;
- b) non-nuclear members of each alliance where INF may be deployed;
- c) non-nuclear, non-deployment members of each alliance;
- d) neutral/non-aligned countries;
- e) non-European countries affected by these issues (especially China and Japan).

4) The Relationship between Short-range and Long-range TNF

Here three major issues deserve consideration:

- a) possible trade-offs between short-range and long-range forces, and the growing pressure in Europe to reduce short-range forces;
- b) the "raising of the nuclear threshold" which such trade-offs might engender, and the implications (political, military, strategic) of such trade-offs;
- c) the relative advantages of unilateral or negotiated reductions in short-range forces.

5) Improvements in Weapons Technology

This section will examine the impact of new weapons technologies on the INF negotiations and on the overall issue of INF. Are there new technologies or technological innovations looming on the horizon which might render current approaches to INF inadequate? Among the major issues considered here will be the implications of:

- a) outer-space weapons technology;
- b) the possible introduction of enhanced radiation and chemical weapons;
- c) the second generation of cruise missiles and their effect on the INF balance;
- d) improvements in conventional technology (PGMs, etc.) and their impact on war-fighting doctrine;
- e) the impact of new multi-task systems (dual-capable aircraft, etc.) on the relationship between conventional and nuclear missions.

6) Linkages between European nuclear issues and other factors affecting the balance of forces

This section will focus on the linkages between INF and the conventional defense postures of both alliances. In particular we will look at:

- a) possible "trade-offs" between INF and conventional forces;
- b) the implications of "raising the nuclear threshold" (the possibility of an increased likelihood of conventional war, etc.);
- b) a reconsideration of the conventional balance itself, and of the assumption in the West that the WTO enjoys considerable conventional superiority.

7) Relationship between INF and other negotiating fora

The key questions to be examined here are:

- a) should INF and START be merged?
- b) how should the French and British nuclear forces be treated?
- c) how do negotiations on nuclear weapons in Europe and elsewhere relate to other negotiations (especially MBFR)?
- d) should short-range TNF be included in negotiations in some form?

8) Conclusions and Recommendations

Although these are by no means the only questions worthy of discussion in any consideration of European nuclear issues, they form the core of an analysis which seeks to move beyond current debate and rethink the conceptual bases of present-day problems of security.

Confidence-Building Measures

The Working Group on Confidence-Building Measures will focus its attention during the coming year on the following sets of issues:

1) Political Context

This section will focus on the emergence and evolution of CBMs in theory and practice and the political developments which have shaped and are likely to continue to shape that evolution. It will discuss the following:

- 1) defining CBMs: what are they? what is their function?
- 2) what are and have been the expectations of the various parties to the CSCE process about CBMs? How have those hopes and expectations been affected by experience with implementing the first stage of CBMs agreed to at the Helsinki Conference?
- 3) how has the concept of CBMs changed and expanded (from CBMs to CSBMs) in the various stages of the CSCE process (Helsinki, Belgrade, Madrid)? In what ways have these changes been a result of international political developments?
- 4) how do CBMs relate to other international measures and negotiations (including those in the U.N.), and to arms control and disarmament?

2) Approaches, Interests and Goals

This section will be devoted to an analysis of the areas in which there is significant convergence or divergence in the approaches, interests and goals of the participating countries relative to CBMs. It will include an examination of:

- 1) the distinctive (and sometimes conflicting) approaches to CBMs advocated by:
 - a) NATO countries (both as a bloc and individually)
 - b) WTO countries (both as a bloc and individually)
 - c) the Neutral/Non-Aligned countries;
- 2) the areas and issues where there is significant commonality of interest among most or all of the parties to the CSCE process, especially
 - a) the political goals of CBMs (contributing to general improvement in the international climate, etc.)
 - b) the military goals of CBMs (reducing the risk of miscalculation and surprise attack, paving the way for disarmament measures, etc.)

3) The Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE)

This section will be devoted to an in-depth analysis of the CDE. Among the issues to be considered are:

- 1) the origins of and motivations behind the CDE concept (the French, Polish and other proposals);
- 2) mandate and scope of the CDE (including matters relating to the mandated criteria for CSBMs);
- 3) goals and expectations: what should a CDE do? (Stage 1 vs. Stage 2, etc.);
- 4) relationship with other negotiations (especially MBFR);
- 5) possible relationships with other proposals and ideas under discussion (nuclear-free zones and strips, restructuring of forces, etc.)

4) Types of CBMs

This section will examine the various types of CBMs that have been or might be suggested:

- 1) military CBMs ("confidence" narrowly defined);
- 2) non-military CBMs ("confidence" more broadly defined);
- 3) linkages between the two;
- 4) applicability of CBMs to other (non-European) areas (Asia, etc.);
- 5) naval and air dimensions of CBMs;
- 6) unilateral vs. negotiated CBMs.
- 7) other types (e.g. restructuring of forces, common definitions of capabilities, etc.)

5) Problems of Implementation

This section will be devoted to an examination of the contentious issues of implementation which will mark any consideration of CBMs, including:

- 1) the meaning of the requirement that CBMs be "militarily significant";
- 2) binding vs. non-binding CBMs;
- 3) verification;
- 4) geographic vs. functional approach.

6) Conclusions and Recommendations: the Future of CBMs

What are the prospects for CBMs at Stockholm and beyond? Can they make a meaningful contribution to international security? How might they be expanded, altered, or implemented differently? How should they be linked to other measures aimed at increasing international security?

Conventional Forces

The Working Group on Conventional Forces will focus its inquiry during the coming year on the following topics, which we consider most deserving of attention.

1) The Political Context

This section will provide the political framework for the analysis of conventional forces which follows. It will focus on the changing domestic and international environment which has influenced and will continue to influence issues of conventional forces. Among the key issues to be addressed here are:

- a) the role and evolution of conventional force structure, and the various negotiations relating to those forces;
- b) the recent changes in the European political climate as they relate to these issues;
- c) the possible impact of this changing political climate and of public opinion in Europe and the United States on the future evolution of these issues.

2) Assessing the Conventional Balance

This section will analyze problems related to the conventional balance. Its aim will be to develop an approach to analysing that balance which goes beyond static "bean-counting" and examines conventional forces in their dynamic relationship. In particular it will focus on:

- a) Manpower vs. Technology: how does one measure conventional force strength?
- b) Availability and Readiness of Forces:
- c) Geography and Time Factors:
- d) Force Structure: the mix of ground, air and naval forces, their operational integration, and the implications of that structure.
- e) Integration and Alliance Coherence (NATO and WTO):
 - 1) political aspects: (the maintenance of unified "political will", etc.)
 - 2) military aspects: (problems of alliance decision-making, command and control, force integration, etc., both before and during a crisis);
- f) Role of the Flanks:
 - 1) problems of defense in the northern and southern flanks;
 - 2) relationship of the flanks to the central front.

3) Doctrine and Strategy

Primary attention will be paid to the following issues:

- a) the difficulty of distinguishing between "offensive" and "defensive" doctrines and force postures;
- b) changes in doctrine and their impact on strategy: do certain changes in doctrine, for example, lead to a more offensive overall strategy?
- c) the interactive relationship between perception and doctrine: what impact does uncertainty about the other side's doctrine and strategy have upon one's own doctrine and strategy?
- d) the impact of changes in technology on doctrine;
- e) the relationship between each side's putative doctrine and its force posture;
- f) the possible significance of alternative/additional defense concepts.

1) The Question of Linkage

This section will focus upon:

- a) the relationship between conventional and nuclear forces (their role in deterrence, etc.);
- b) "first-use" and the role of tactical nuclear forces (NATO and WTO);
- c) the feasibility of conventional defense (affordability, reliability, etc.);
- d) crisis stability and the problem of surprise attack, especially:
 - 1) what force postures and operational doctrines are most conducive to crisis stability, to denial of the premium of pre-emptive strikes, to providing time for political decisions before military moves?
 - 2) in what ways can Confidence-building measures (discussed in detail by the CBM Working Group) contribute to crisis stability?
 - 3) nuclear-free zones and strips: their utility in contributing to crisis stability.

5) The Impact of Weapons Technology

Innovations in conventional and nuclear technology, and their impact on capability, doctrine and strategy. The major issues for consideration here are:

- a) the impact of new technology on the assessment of the conventional balance;
- b) the impact of new technology on doctrine;
- c) the extent to which "high-tech" conventional weapons can replace TNF in some tactical missions;
- d) new weapons systems and technologies that blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear missions (cruise missiles, dual-capable aircraft, etc.)—in particular, are these new systems stabilizing or destabilizing?
- e) perceptions and concerns of neutral/non-aligned countries relative to weapon innovations.

6) Limitations and Problems of Current Negotiating Fora

- a) MBFR:
 - 1) limitations on geographic scope, participation, and content (no linkage to nuclear issues);
 - 2) focus on manpower rather than the full range of relevant issues (armor, technology, etc.);
 - 3) quantitative (rather than qualitative) approach.
- b) CDE:
 - 1) problem of consensus of 35 nations;
 - 2) concerns about:
 - a) moving past Stage 1 to Stage 2;
 - b) cosmetic measures or real constraints?
 - c) verification.

7) Conclusions and Recommendations

Analysis of these issues will provide the context for a substantive reconsideration of the nature of conventional defense and offense, of the relationship of conventional forces to nuclear forces, and of the future role of conventional forces in assuring security and stability.

November 1, 1983

PROPOSED ITINERARY
PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT
TO BANGLADESH, CHOGM and GULF STATES

28-6-1-Trudeau Place
Mission

CITY		DAY and DATE	TIME	FLIGHT TIME
OTTAWA				
	LV.D	THURSDAY, 17 NOVEMBER	19:45	
ROME *	AR.A	FRIDAY, 18 NOVEMBER	10:00	8.15
	LV.D	SATURDAY, 19 NOVEMBER	08:30	
DHAKA	AR.A		23:00	9.30
	LV.D	TUESDAY, 22 NOVEMBER	15:10	
DELHI	AR.A		17:30	2.50
	LV.D	WEDNESDAY, 30 NOVEMBER	09:15	
ABU DHABI	AR.A	1030 30 November A.D.	10:30	2.45
	LV.D	THURSDAY, 1 DECEMBER	09:30	
MUSCAT	AR.A		10:30	1.00
	LV.D	SATURDAY, 3 DECEMBER	08:30	
BAHRAIN	AR.A		09:00	1.30
	LV.D	SATURDAY, 3 DECEMBER	12:00	
KUWAIT	AR.A		13:00	1.00
	LV.D	SUNDAY, 4 DECEMBER	12:00	
LONDON	AR.A		16:45	7.45
	LV.D	MONDAY, 5 DECEMBER	14:00	
OTTAWA	AR.A		18:30	7:30
	LV.D			

← H. 16 ??

* Subject to change (PM will see Craxi in Rome next week)

28 Nov

Dep. 0845 28 Nov

61

8.15

6.15 7.15

Arr. 1700 Peking
Evening Meeting

29 Nov.

Morning Meeting
Lunch

Dep 1700
1500

Arr Delhi 29/11/5
01 Night

7.15 7.5

30 Nov

Dep Delhi

0915.

CONFIDENTIAL
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

Memorandum for IDDZ/L. Delvoie

Re: Possible China Leg - Logistics

For air transport, I foresee two possible scenarios:

- (a) Delhi/Peking/Abu Dhabi; and
- (b) Delhi/Peking/Delhi/Abu Dhabi.

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission

All times given for these scenarios can be adjusted, and they are given in local times.

- (a) Depart Delhi 0845 hours; Arrive Peking 1700 hours (6h15m flying time)
Depart Peking ~~1145~~ ¹⁷³⁰ hours; Arrive Abu Dhabi ~~1730~~ ¹⁰³⁰ hours (9h45m flying time)

For those remaining in Delhi at the time the 707 goes to Peking, the following are the only commercial scheduled flights Delhi/Abu Dhabi:

Depart Delhi Sat 26 Nov at 2310 hours)	
Arrive Abu Dhabi Sun 27 Nov at 0115 hours)	via Japan Air Lines 465
Depart Delhi Wed 30 Nov at 0645 hours)	
Arrive Abu Dhabi Wed 30 Nov at 1030 hours)	via Gulf Air Co. 2011
Depart Delhi Thu 01 Dec at 2310 hours)	
Arrive Abu Dhabi Fri 02 Dec at 0115 hours)	via Japan Air Lines 467

NB: JAL flights are non-stop; Gulf flight stops in Muscat
I have no idea how easy/difficult it would be to get 40-odd seats on any of these flights.

- (b) Depart Delhi 0845 hours; Arrive Peking 1700 hours (6h15m flying time)
Depart Peking ~~0700~~ ¹³³⁰ hours; Arrive Delhi ~~1745~~ ¹⁴⁴⁵ hours (7h15m flying time-head winds)
(2-hours for fuel, flight planning and formalities ^{on}) overnight
Depart Delhi ~~1345~~ ⁰⁷⁴⁵ hours; Arrive Abu Dhabi ~~1730~~ ¹⁰³⁰ hours (4h15m flying time)

Each scenario has advantages. The most obvious of (a) is that the Peking/Abu Dhabi (direct) leg is shorter with less than 10 hours flying time (as compared to thirteen and a half via Delhi). The advantage of going via Delhi, although more lengthy, is that those who did not accompany the PM to Peking could be picked up and taken to the Gulf on the special flight and have the complete delegation arrive together and be present for any welcoming ceremonies.* As noted above, I have no idea how full the commercial flights are, but these are the flight routings, according to the Official Airlines Guide:

JL465: Tokyo/Bangkok/Delhi/Abu Dhabi/Rome/London (Heathrow)
JL467: " " " " " " "
GF2011: Delhi/Muscat/Abu Dhabi/Doha, Qatar

*Peace Initiative people could overnight Delhi to break up flying time.

- 2 -


CONFIDENTIAL
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

When I spoke with DND, they said they did not foresee any clearances problems; however, they did stress that they needed as much time as possible, should there be any visit into China.

As for visas, I spoke with Françoise Despard who attends to visas on official travel. She told me that the quickest time we have had in past visits for official visas to PRC has been 10 days. She suggested that perhaps the PRC Embassy in Delhi could be instructed by their MFA in Peking to issue visas on the spot, if we had worked this out in advance with the Chinese. This would involve getting all information regarding exactly who would be going (including crew) with whatever details the Chinese require well in advance of any trip. She said this was just a guess and would have to be worked out by the appropriate authorities.

For a two-day trip into Peking, there should be no problems with communications or getting a security package together.

Please don't hesitate to call me if you wish further clarification on this.



C.A. Foster
Visits and Conferences
Service
2-2971/home 745-1858

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM OSLO WGGR4256 01NOV83

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ

INFO COPEN MDRID LSBON ATHNS ANKRA BNATO WSHDC PCOOTT/FOWLER
NDHQCTT/MNL/CDS/ADMPOL/CPD

LISTR DMF IFB RGP IDD ICR IDA RSR

REF OURTEL WGGR4236 27OCT

---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS

PMS LETTER TO PM WILLOCH AND GUELPH SPEECH HAVE BEEN READ WITH CARE
AND INTEREST IN SENIOR NORWEGIAN GOVT CIRCLES AND GENERALLY WELCOMED.

2.PMS STATE SECTY COLDING SAYS HE EXPECTS TO CALL ME IN TOMORROW TO
CONVEY RESPONSE WHICH IS BEING CONSIDERED IN CONSULTATION WITH MFA.

BOTH MFA STATE SECTY BERG AND SEC GEN ELIASSEN SAID THEY WERE MUCH
IMPRESSED WITH SPEECH AS WAS FOREIGN MIN STRAY TO WHOM I GAVE COPY.

MFA ACTING DIR GEN POLITICAL AFFAIRS WHO IS CONCERTING RESPONSE WITH
COLDING SAID THAT WHILE THRUST OF INITIATIVE IS TO BE APPLAUDED

THERE WAS SOME CONCERN THAT DESPITE CLARITY OF MR TRUDEAU'S EXPRESSED
INTENTIONS THERE WAS SOME RISK THAT USSR MIGHT YET FIND MEANS TO

EXPLICIT SITUATION BY POINTING TO NATO ALLIANCE AS DIVIDED HOUSE.

3.GRENADA AFFAIR HAS UNFORTUNATELY VIRTUALLY CROWDED PMS SPEECH OFF
PRINT MEDIA.DESPITE HAVING FULL TEXT OF SPEECH LEADING DAILY

AFTENPOSTEN RAN GARBLED STORY FROM CORRESPONDENT ATTENDING

MONTEBELLO NPG MTG WHICH IMPLIED THAT PMS OBJECTIVE WAS TO GO TO

GENEVA TO MEDIATE BETWEEN THE TWO SUPER POWERS.AFTENPOSTEN NOW PLANS

...2

PAGE TWO WGGR4256 CONF

TO CORRECT THIS MISLEADING REPORT SHORTLY WITH AN ANALYTICAL
COMMENTARY IN ADVANCE OF PM TRUDEAU'S VISITS TO WEST EUROPEAN LEADERS.
5. DESPITE ITS SHORTCOMINGS AFTERNOON STORY CAUGHT EYE OF KNUD
FREDENLUND FOREIGN MIN IN FORMER LABOUR GOVT AND NOW CHAIRMAN OF
PARLIAMENTARY DEFENCE CTTEE. HE REQUESTED COPY OF SPEECH AND HAS NOW
ASKED US TO DELIVER LETTER TO PM WHICH READS IN PART QUOTE I
WHOLEHEARTEDLY SUPPORT YOUR VIEW THAT POSITIVE POLITICAL STEPS HAVE
TO BE TAKEN IN ORDER TO REVERSE... TREND LINE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS.
I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT YOUR INITIATIVES WILL BE WELCOMED BY THE
PEOPLES OF EUROPE UNQUOTE. HE ALSO ALLUDES TO FACT THAT HE PERSONALLY
TOOK PART IN 1979 TWO TRACK DECISION AND IS SURE THAT AN AGREEMENT
WITH USSR IS STILL POSSIBLE

WARDROPER

CCC/061 011102Z WGGR4256

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned _____

Person _____

Local Time _____

28-6-1

Thudreau Place
Mission

0917

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MCSCO XYGR4085 01NOV83

TO EXTOTT IIDZ DELIVER BY 010900

INFO FMOOTT/AXWORHY/COLEMAN PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/

CPF LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON ROBB ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU

HAGUE ENATO PRMNY CNGNY WSHDC GENEV TOKYO

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFF UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD PCR IDD IDA IDR FPR

REF COURTEL 4079 31CC1

---PM INITIATIVE ON EAST-WEST RESLN AND INNATL SECURITY

FIRST BRIEF MENTION OF PM GUELPH SPEECH IN SOV PRESS APPEARED

AFTERNOON 31OCT ON FRONT PAGE OF IZVESTIA. ARTICLE MENTIONED

THAT PM HAD CALLED FOR DISPLAY OF POLITICAL WILL TO PREVENT

WORLD FROM SLIDING INTO ABYSS OF NUCLEAR WAR. PM WAS REPORTED

TO HAVE EMPHASIZED IMPORTANCE OF ARRIVING AT AGMT ON CONFIDENCE

BUILDING MEASURES AND OF ESTABLISHING CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE

BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

UUU/144 011220Z XYGR4085

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYGR2842 01NOV83

TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 020900

INFO LDN PARIS MERID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE

WSHDC MOSCO BNATO GENEV TOKYO WSAW BPEST PRGUE BGRAD STKHM CNBRA

HSNKI/CDEDEL WLGTN VIENN PEKIN DELHI PCOOTT/FOWLER NTHQOTT/MND/CIS/

ADMPOI/CPP/DGIS

BH CNGNY DE NYK VMBFR DE VNA

SFAX CHCGO LNGIS DE OTT

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR RBD FPR IDE IDR

IDA IDDZ RBRD IDX ZSP ZSI RBP

REF OURTEL UYGR2833 01NOV YOURTEL IDDZ0054 29OCT

---PM INITIATIVE:ROM INVITATION

AT END OF DAY, 01NOV, I RECD PHONE CALL FROM AMB FLITAN, CHIEF OF THE
DEPT OF INNATL ORGANIZATION, WHO INFORMED ME OF FOLLOWING. AFTER OUR
MTG ON 31OCT HE HAD PASSED PM TRUDEAUS GUELPH SPEECH AND INFO RELATED
TO HIS UPCOMING TRIP FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH SOME WESTERN LEADERS. PRES
CEAUSESCU ALSO THOUGHT PM TRUDEAU INITIATIVE WAS MOST IMPORTANT AND
SHOULD BE ACTIVELY PURSUED. AMB FLITAN WAS TOLD TO INFORM ME QUOTE
TRES OFFICIELLEMENT UNQUOTE THAT PRES CEAUSESCU WOULD BE VERY PLEASED
TO EXCHANGE VIEWS ON THESE QUESTIONS OF MUTUAL INTEREST WITH PM
TRUDEAU, IF PM TRUDEAU DECIDED AT A LATER STAGE TO ALSO VISIT SOME
EEUR COUNTRIES AND MOSCO. I REPEATED TO AMB FLITAN THAT I DID NOT/NOT
KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT A SECOND PHASE IN PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE, THAT I

....2

000330

PAGE TWO UYGR2842 CONFD

DID NOT/NOT KNOW IF PM TRUDEAU INTENDED TO GO TO MOSCO. FLITAN STATED HE UNDERSTOOD THAT BUT STILL REITERATED THAT PM TRUDEAU WOULD BE WELCOME TO ROMANIA TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES WITH PRES CEAUSESCU.

2. IN PARA TWO MY REFTTEL, I WONDERED IF IT WOULD NOT/NOT BE POSSIBLE TO ENVISAGE SUCH A VISIT. OF COURSE I NEVER MENTIONED THAT THOUGHT TO ROMS BUT AS YOU KNOW THEIR INTEREST IN THE ISSUES AND ROLE IN WSAW PACT MTGS, IT IS EASY TO UNDERSTAND THAT THEY WOULD NOT/NOT WISH TO BE IGNORED IF PM TRUDEAU EVER DECIDED TO FOLLOW-UP HIS INITIATIVE BY VISITS TO FFUR.

3. I TOLD AMB FLITAN THAT I WOULD TRANSMIT HIS MSG TO OTT AND INFORM HIM OF ANY REACTION. THERE IS NO/NO DOUBT IN MY MIND THAT THIS MSG REFLECTS GENUINE INTEREST FROM PRES CEAUSESCU IN INITIATIVE. FLITANS EXCITEMENT IN TRANSMITTING MSG ALSO CONFIRMS PRESIDENTS PERSONAL INVOLVEMENT IN MATTER

SIMARD

CCC/181 021120Z UYGR2842

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MF
EJ

28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2392 01NOV83

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ DELIVER BY 020900

INFO BNATO MOSCO PRMNY CNGNY PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ACMPOL/CP
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB UBD RBR IDD IDR IDA
REF OURTEL UNGR2387 31OCT

---EAST-WEST RELS:USA REPLY TO PMS LET

GOTLIEB SPOKE TODAY TO ASST SEC BURT ABOUT USA EMB OTT PRESS RELEASE
ON PMS SPEECH AND RELATED NEGATIVE PRESS INTERPRETATION OF USA PRES
GUIDANCE. BURT WAS SUBDUED IN HIS RESPONSE SAYING IT HAD NOT CONVEYED
IMPRESSION USA WANTED AND THAT WHEN CDN JOURNALIST HAD ASKED HIM
QUESTION YESTERDAY ABOUT SPEECH HE WAS FAR MORE UPBEAT. IT IS NOT/NOT
USA DESIRE TO GIVE NEGATIVE IMPRESSION ABOUT SPEECH. BURT SAID THAT
DRAFT REPLY FROM STATE DEPT HAD INDEED GONE TO WHITE HOUSE LAST
NIGHT. REPLY WAS VERY SUBSTANTIVE. BURT WENT ON TO SAY THAT QUOTE
OUR REPLY AT STATE WAS SO SUBSTANTIVE I WAS EMBARRASSED UNQUOTE.
USA INTENTION ACCORDING TO BURT, IS CERTAINLY NOT/NOT TO BE
DISCOURAGING OR NEGATIVE.

2 SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS WE HAVE HAD WITH OTHER OFFICIALS, INCLUDING
DEPY DIR OF DIVISION WHICH DRAFTED RESPONSE, CONFIRM WHAT BURT TOLD
GOTLIEB. WE ARE TOLD RESPONSE WILL EMPHASIZE COMMON CONCERNS AND
OUTLINES USA THINKING ON VARIOUS ISSUES RAISED BY PM, ESPECIALLY IN
HIS LETTER. WE WERE WARNED HOWEVER THAT WHITE HOUSE/NSC WLD BE ADDING
THEIR OWN ELEMENTS TO LETTER. IMPRESSION WE GOT WAS THAT LETTER IS

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR2392 CONF

TRYING TO WALK A FINE LINE BETWEEN APPEARING TO GIVE PRIME MINISTER
SOME KIND OF SPECIAL MANDATE TO ACT AS AN INTERMEDIARY, WHICH USA
DOES NOT WISH AND THROWING COLD WATER ON PROCESS WHICH HE IS TRYING
TO START, WHICH USA DOES NOT WISH TO DO. USA WANTS TO BE SEEN TO BE
ENCOURAGING PM IN GENERAL WAY.

CCC/231 012322Z UNGR2392

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

UNCLASSIFIED

FM CANDELNY WKGR2356 01NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO BNATO NDHQOTT/POL/DIPOL MDRID PARIS HAGUE BRU OSLO COPEN
ANKRA ATHNS MOSCO LDN BCNN ROME VMBFR LSBON STKHM WSHDC GENEV
PCOOTT/FOWLER CANMILREPNATO

DISTR IDZ IDR

---UNGA 38:CANADIAN STATEMENT BEFORE FIRST COMMITTEE

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF CDN STATEMENT ON ACD AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY ISSUES DELIVERED BY SENATOR PITFIELD TO FIRST CTTEE,
DELIVERED TODAY.STATEMENT SHOULD BE READ IN CONTEXT OF PM S
ADDRESS TO UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH ON OCT 27,IN WHICH PM PRESENTED
A QUOTE STRATEGY OF POLITICAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING UNQUOTE.TEXT
IS AS FOLLOWS:

IN HIS REPORT,THE SECRETARY-GENERAL HAS RIGHTLY POINTED TO THE
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TODAY OF THE QUESTION OF DISARMAMENT AND ARMS
LIMITATION AND PARTICULARLY THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR.DESPITE
THE CONSIDERABLE EFFORTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE OVER THE YEARS
TOWARDS THIS CRUCIALLY IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE--AND THERE HAVE BEEN
SOME NOTABLE ACHIEVEMENTS--THERE IS A SHARED CONCERN ON THE
PART OF THE INTENATIONAL COMMUNITY ABOUT SECURITY.ANXIETY OVER
THE THREAT OF WAR HAS NOT BEEN DIMINISHED--AND FOR GOOD REASON.
THE ACCUMULATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION HAS NOT STOPPED
AND WE ARE WITNESS TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORE AND MORE SOPHIS-

...2

PAGE TWO WKGR2356 UNCLAS

TICATED NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS.

OVER THE YEARS, THE FOCUS HAS BEEN ON ARMS CONTROL AND DISARM-
AMENT--ON CONTROLLING AND ELIMINATING THE TECHNICAL MEANS OF
MAKING WAR. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT HAVE A SIMPLE BUT SEDUC-
TIVE APPEAL: REDUCE OR DESTROY THE TOOLS OF WAR AND YOU WILL
ELIMINATE WAR. THE PROBLEMS OF PRESERVING PEACE AND SECURITY, HOW-
EVER, ARE EXTREMELY COMPLEX.

WE HAVE, OF COURSE, TO CONTINUE THE PURSUIT OF WAYS AND MEANS OF
HARNESSING THE TECHNOLOGY THAT FEEDS ARMS COMPETITION AS ENER-
GETICALLY AS WE CAN. IN THIS FORUM OUR DISCUSSIONS TAKE PLACE IN
THE CONTEXT OF CERTAIN GIVEN FACTORS, PARTICULARLY THE ESTABLISHED
POLICIES OF OUR GOVERNMENTS. WE ARE, IN A SENSE, CAPTIVES OF OUR
HISTORIES. THIS IS OFTEN AN INHIBITING ELEMENT IN OUR SEARCH FOR
CONSENSUS. WHAT, IN ESSENCE, WE ARE DEALING WITH HERE AND IN OTHER
FORA RELATES TO THE CAPABILITIES OF NATIONS TO WAGE WAR IN
PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. OUR IMMEDIATE GOAL IS A LOWER LEVEL OF ARMS
AND ARMAMENTS AT AN EQUAL OR ENHANCED LEVEL OF SECURITY.

WHAT HAS BEEN LEFT LARGELY TO ONE SIDE IN OUR DISCUSSIONS IS THE
MORE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTION OF INTENTIONS WHICH GOVERN THE USE OF
ARMS THE ISSUE OF INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE.
WHICH HAS TAKEN A NEW TURN WITH THE SOVIET UNIONS ANNOUNCEMENT
OF PLANNED ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENTS OF MISSILES IN THE GERMAN
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA, ILLUSTRATES HOW IMPORTANT

...3

PAGE THREE WKGR2356 UNCLAS

THIS QUESTION IS .WHILE UNDERSTANDING INTENTIONS DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY GUARANTEE PEACE AND SECURITY,WE SHOULD BE CONCERNED THAT INTENTIONS IN THIS CRUCIAL AREA OF POLICY ARE NOT MISUNDERSTOOD

IN THE END,SUCCESSFUL ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES DEPEND ON A REAL INTENTION TO KEEP THE ARMS LID ON.THIS IS HARDLY A REVELATION,BUT IT IS A TRUTH WE SHOULD CONSTANTLY REMIND OURSELVES OF AS WE,IN FORA OF THIS KIND,DEBATE THE ISSUES OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT.AS PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU POINTED OUT IN A SPEECH IN GUELPH,ONTARIO ON OCTOBER 27,QUOTE WE MAY AT SOME POINT BE ABLE TO FREEZE THE NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN THE WORLD AT GREATLY REDUCED LEVELS.BUT HOW DO WE FREEZE THE MENACING INTENTIONS WHICH MIGHT CONTROL THOSE WEAPONS WHICH REMAIN?THEREIN LIES THE INADEQUACY OF THE NUCLEAR FREEZE ARGUMENT.UNQUOTE.

HERE WE GET TO THE CORE OF THE CURRENT DEBATE:THE UNSTEADY RELATIONS THAT HAVE DIVIDED EAST AND WEST OVER THE YEARS AND THE ABSENCE OF REAL POLITICAL DIALOGUE THAT COULD EASE TENSIONS.THERE HAD BEEN A TIME IN THE SEVENTIES WHEN DETENTE BROUGHT THE PROMISE OF SUCH DIALOGUE.REGULAR CONSULTATIONS AT THE MOST SENIOR LEVELS OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP APPEARED TO OFFER THE WAY TO DEVELOPING UNDERSTANDING .MUTUAL RESPECT AND WILLINGNESS TO SEARCH FOR WAYS OF AVOIDING CRISES AS DETENTE BECAME DIVISIBLE AND SUBJECT TO DOUBT THE PROSPECT IF OFFERED OF BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN THE

...4

PAGE FOUR WKGR2356 UNCLAS

INTENTIONS OF EACH SIDE FADED.

IN TODAY'S ATMOSPHERE OF SUSPICION AND DISTRUST, HOW CAN WE HELP IN RESTORING THE CONFIDENCE WHICH MIGHT MOVE THINGS FORWARD? AT GUELPH PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU REFERRED TO A QUOTE STRATEGY OF POLITICAL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING UNQUOTE WHICH WOULD INVOLVE QUOTE STEPS THAT REDUCE TENSIONS CAUSED BY UNCERTAINTY ABOUT OBJECTIVES, OR CAUSED BY FEAR OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE; STEPS THAT MITIGATE HOSTILITY AND PROMOTE A MODICUM OF MUTUAL RESPECT; STEPS THAT BUILD AN AUTHENTIC CONFIDENCE IN MAN'S ABILITY TO SURVIVE ON THIS PLANET. UNQUOTE. HE PARTICULARLY HAD IN MIND REGULAR HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE BASED ON OPENNESS REGARDING INTENTIONS, MUTUAL RESPECT, RECIPROCAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF LEGITIMATE SECURITY NEEDS, A DETERMINED APPROACH TO CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND INCENTIVES FOR FLEXIBILITY. THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE TO ESTABLISH A BETTER COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS AND THE EAST AND WEST GENERALLY.

THE BURDEN OF THIS STRATEGY RESTS WITH THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN EACH COUNTRY WHO ALONE, PERHAPS, CAN SHOW THE FLEXIBILITY NEEDED TO EXPLORE NEW POLICY DIRECTIONS. PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU HAS ALREADY BEGUN THE HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTATIONS HE HAS ADVOCATED AND WILL SOON BE PERSONALLY MEETING OTHER LEADERS.

IT IS OUR HOPE THAT POLITICAL LEADERS WILL TAKE UP THE CHALLENGE AND THAT THEIR EFFORTS CAN BE TRANSLATED QUICKLY INTO PRACTICAL

...5

PAGE FIVE WKGR2356 UNCLAS

TERMS IN THE VARIOUS NEGOTIATING FORA. IF THERE IS TO BE GENUINE DIALOGUE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, IT HAS TO BE BASED ON A VIABLE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY. THE FOUNDATION OF SUCH A POLICY MUST INCLUDE THE PRINCIPLES OF RECIPROCITY, TRANSPARENCY, BALANCE AND CONFIDENCE.

WE FIND THE LACK OF CONFIDENCE PARTICULARLY DISTURBING IN THE SUPERPOWER NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES IN GENEVA WHICH HAVE REACHED A CRITICAL STAGE. IN NO OTHER FORUM IS A TRUE DIALOGUE AS URGENTLY NEEDED AS IN THE INF TALKS. IF THEY ARE TO HAVE A CHANCE AT SUCCESS, THE PARTIES MUST ACCEPT AS THEIR FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE INCREASED MUTUAL SECURITY RATHER THAN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. IT IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT THE TWO SIDES PERSEVERE IN THE BARGAINING PROCESS AND COME TO GRIPS WITH CENTRAL ISSUES. WE STRONGLY SUPPORT A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION THAT WILL MAKE DEPLOYMENT OF ANY INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE UNNECESSARY. AT THE SAME TIME, IN THE ABSENCE OF CONCRETE RESULTS IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS, WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE TO DEPLOYMENT OF THE WESTS INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES. THE URGENCY LIES IN MAKING THIS ALTERNATIVE UNNECESSARY.

AS EVIDENCE OF THE WESTS DETERMINATION TO SEE A REDUCTION IN THE LEVEL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE, I WOULD DRAW THE COMMITTEES ATTENTION TO THE DECISION OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCES DEFENCE MINSTERS LAST WEEK AT MONTEBELLO, QUEBEC, TO WITHDRAW, UNILATERALLY, 1400

...6

PAGE SIX WKGR2356 UNCLAS

TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS FROM THE NUMBER IN WESTERN EUROPE DURING THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS. THIS WILL BRING TO 2400 THE TOTAL NUMBER OF WARHEADS WHICH WILL HAVE BEEN UNILATERALLY REMOVED BY THE WEST SINCE 1979.

A GREAT DEAL OF HOPE IS RIDING ON THE CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE WHICH WILL BE STARTING ITS WORK IN STOCKHOLM IN JANUARY. OUR HOPE IS THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONFIDENCE THROUGH A REGIME OF CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES COVERING EUROPE MAY RESULT IN TRANSPARENCY AND PREDICTABILITY IN MILITARY AFFAIRS WHICH IN TURN COULD INDUCE A DEGREE OF SECURITY AMONG PARTICIPATING STATES THAT WOULD MAKE A BALANCED REDUCTION OF ARMAMENT A VIABLE OPINION.

FOR OUR PART, WE HERE IN THIS COMMITTEE HAVE OUR OWN CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE TO THE CREATION OF A STABLE ENVIRONMENT OF INCREASED SECURITY.

IN THIS FORUM, OUR OBJECTIVE IS SURELY TO REINFORCE THE MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. WHAT WE DO MUST CONTRIBUTE TO MULTILATERALISM AND NOT DETRACT FROM IT. OUR EFFORTS, ESSENTIALLY, MUST BE DIRECTED TO ESTABLISHING CONSENSUS AND TO WORKING OUT PRACTICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WILL RESULT IN TANGIBLE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT MEASURES. WE MUST CONTINUE WITH THE NECESSARY PRELIMINARY WORK FOR THE TIME WHEN AN IMPROVED ATMOSPHERE PERMITS THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THESE

...7

PAGE SEVEN WKGR2356 UNCLAS

NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS OUR RESPONSIBILITY TO RESIST THE TENDENCY IN THESE TIMES OF DETERIORATING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE TO TAKE UP THE QUOTE POLITICS OF THE MEGAPHONE UNQUOTE WHERE CONFRONTATION IS VALUED OVER CONSENSUS AND WHERE DEBATE SERVES NOT THE PURPOSES OF DIALOGUE BUT RATHER TO DIVIDE AND DISUNITE. THE CHALLENGE FOR MULTILATERALISM IS TO REVERSE THESE TRENDS.

THERE IS ANOTHER CHALLENGE BEFORE US IN THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT PROCESS AND THAT IS TO RECOGNIZE THE CONTIGUITY OF INTERESTS IN MOVING TOWARD COMMON AGREEMENT AMONG DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES. NOWHERE IS THIS TRUER THAN IN THE CASE OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, THE STRENGTHENING OF WHICH POSES ONE OF THE MOST URGENT CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERALISM.

EACH OF US HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO MAINTAIN AND SUPPORT THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT PROCESS. THE DEGREE TO WHICH THAT RESPONSIBILITY IS EXERCISED IS REFLECTED IN THE VOTING PATTERNS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY UNFORTUNATELY OUR AGENDA HAS BECOME OVERCROWDED OVER THE YEARS AND THERE IS A TENDENCY TOWARDS DUPLICATION OF EFFORT IN THE RACE FOR RESOLUTIONS. PRIORITIES HAVE TO BE SET IF WE ARE NOT TO DILUTE AND DIVIDE OUR EFFORTS.

WE, OF COURSE, HAVE OUR VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT. OUR PRIORITIES ARE:
(1) TO SUPPORT STRONGLY NEGOTIATIONS TO LIMIT AND REDUCE NUCLEAR
...8

PAGE EIGHT WK3R2356 UNCLAS

ARMS;(2)TO PROMOTE EARLY PROGRESS TOWARDS THE REALIZATION OF A MULTILATERAL COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY;(3)TO ASSIST IN PREPARING A CONVENTION WHICH WOULD COMPLETELY PROHIBIT CHEMICAL WEAPONS;(4)TO PROMOTE THE EVOLUTION OF AN EFFECTIVE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME BASED ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY;(5)TO WORK TOWARDS THE OBJECTIVE OF PROHIBITING THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF ALL WEAPONS FOR USE IN OUTER SPACE;AND(6)TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN NEGOTIATIONS TO LIMIT AND REDUCE CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

ON THE URGENT NUCLEAR ISSUES,OUR OBJECTIVE IS TWOFOLD:THE INHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A STABLE BALANCE AT LOWER LEVELS.WE ARE ALSO CONSIDERING MAKING PROPOSALS FOR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS WHICH COULD HELP TO RESTRICT DESTABILIZING QUALITATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY.

WE PREFER TO SEE CONCRETE AGREEMENTS RATHER THAN DECLARATORY RESOLUTIONS WHICH PROMISE RESTRAINT BUT,IN EFFECT,DO NOT PROVIDE FOR THE MEANS TO ENSURE THAT PROMISES ARE KEPT.VERIFICATION IS A COMMONLY-AGREED NECESSITY IF WE ARE TO MAKE REAL PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.AGREEMENT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION MECHANISMS IS ONE OF THE CLEAREST INDICATIONS OF REAL INTENTIONS.WE HAVE,THEREFORE ASSIGNED A HIGH PRIORITY TO RESEARCH IN THIS AREA.

...9

PAGE NINE WKGR2356 UNCLAS

ON OCTOBER 20, THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE HONOURABLE ALLAN MACEACHEN, ANNOUNCED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT VERIFICATION RESEARCH PROGRAMME BASED IN THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL RESOURCES WILL BE FOCUSED IN THIS AREA. AN INITIAL AMOUNT OF DOLLARS 500,000 HAS BEEN ALLOCATED FOR THIS PROGRAMME. THIS AMOUNT WILL INCREASE TO DOLLARS 1 MILLION BY NEXT APRIL.

THIS INITIATIVE HAS BEEN UNDERTAKEN IN ORDER TO HELP IN THE CREATION OF AN ATMOSPHERE CONDUCTIVE TO PROGRESS IN DISARMAMENT. THE VERIFICATION PROGRAMME WILL FOCUS PRIMARILY ON TECHNICAL ASPECTS AND WILL BUILD UPON THE GREATLY INCREASED ATTENTION WE HAVE BEEN DEVOTING TO VERIFICATION RECENTLY. THE COMPENDIUM OF ARMS CONTROL VERIFICATION PROPOSALS, WHICH WE SUBMITTED TO THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT IN 1980 AND WHICH WAS UPDATED IN 1982, AND THE RESULTANT QUANTIFICATION AND CONCEPTUAL STUDIES ARE EXAMPLES OF OUR APPROACH TO THE ISSUES ON A VERY PRACTICAL AND BASIC LEVEL. CANADA HAS AS WELL TECHNICAL EXPERTISE—BOTH IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS—WHICH CAN BE APPLIED IN A NUMBER OF AREAS INCLUDING SEISMOLOGY, REMOTE SENSING, TOXICOLOGY, COMMUNICATION SATELLITES AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS DETECTION, DESTRUCTION AND DEFENCE. WE INTEND TO MARSHALL THIS EXPERTISE MORE FULLY AS OUR SPECIAL CONTRIBUTION IN SUPPORT OF THE NEGOTIATION OF AGREEMENTS ON

...10

PAGE TEN WKGR2356 UNCLAS

NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS.

WE SHALL BE SHARING THE RESULTS OF OUR WORK WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. WE HOPE IN THIS WAY TO MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO THE TECHNICAL NEEDS OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT PROCESS. BUT I WOULD STRESS THAT THE TIMES DEMAND THAT WE ALSO LOOK BEYOND TECHNICALITIES AND FOCUS ON THE NEED TO DEVELOP CONFIDENCE AND DIALOGUE; THAT THOSE WHO WOULD REALLY MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT SHOULD TALK WITH EACH OTHER AND NOT PAST EACH OTHER.

TO RETURN TO A POINT I MADE AT THE OUTSET OF MY REMARKS, THERE ARE FEW OTHER ISSUES ON WHICH SO MANY IN THE WEST-AND INDEED ELSEWHERE-HAVE BEEN SO ENGAGED AS THIS MATTER. GIVEN THE IMPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR WARFARE, THIS PREOCCUPATION IS ENTIRELY UNDERSTANDABLE AND JUSTIFIED. WE ALL WANT TO SEE PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. THE KEY LIES IN INCREASING MUTUAL SECURITY. THAT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE AS LONG AS MUTUAL SUSPICIONS ABOUT INTENTIONS REMAIN. THE CHALLENGE FACING US IN TRYING TO OVERCOME THIS HURDLE-AND THIS IS A POINT PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU MADE AT GUELPH-IS IN APPLYING A POLITICAL EFFORT TO POINTS ALONG THE EAST-WEST TREND LINE IN ORDER TO REVERSE IT FROM ITS DANGEROUS DOWNWARD PATH.

DANS SON RAPPORT, LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL A A JUSTE TITRE SOULIGNE L'IMPORTANCE CENTRALE QU'OCCUPE AUJOURD'HUI LA QUESTION DU

...11

000343

PAGE ELEVEN WKGR2356 UNCLAS

DESARMEMENT ET DE LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS, ET NOTAMMENT LES MOYENS D'ÉVITER UNE GUERRE NUCLEAIRE. MALGRÉ LES EFFORTS CONSIDÉRABLES QUI ONT ÉTÉ FAITS AU COURS DES ANNÉES EN VUE D'ATTEINDRE CET OBJECTIF CRUCIAL-ET IL Y A EFFECTIVEMENT EU DES RÉALISATIONS NOTABLES-LA SÉCURITÉ RESTE UN SUJET DE PRÉOCCUPATION POUR TOUS LES MEMBRES DE LA COMMUNAUTÉ INTERNATIONALE. L'ANXIÉTÉ DEVANT LA MENACE D'UNE GUERRE N'A PAS ÉTÉ APAISÉE-ET POUR CAUSE. L'ACCUMULATION DES ARMES DE DESTRUCTION MASSIVE SE POURSUIT. ET NOUS ASSISTONS AU DÉVELOPPEMENT D'ARMES NUCLEAIRES ET CONVENTIONNELLES PLUS EN PLUS PERFECTIONNÉES.

AU FIL DES ANS, L'INSISTANCE A ÉTÉ MISE SUR LE CONTRÔLE DES ARMEMENTS ET SUR LE DESARMEMENT-C'EST-À-DIRE SUR LE CONTRÔLE ET L'ÉLIMINATION DES MOYENS TECHNIQUES DE MENER LA GUERRE. CE PRINCIPE EXERCE UN ATTRAIT SIMPLE: RÉDUISEZ OU DÉTRUISEZ LES OUTILS DE GUERRE, ET VOUS ÉLIMINEREZ LA GUERRE. LES PROBLÈMES DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX ET DE LA SÉCURITÉ SONT, TOUTEFOIS, EXTREMEMENT COMPLEXES.

IL NOUS FAUT BIEN SUR CONTINUER À RECHERCHER LE PLUS ÉNERGIQUEMENT POSSIBLE DES MOYENS DE MAÎTRISER LA TECHNOLOGIE QUI NOURRIT LA COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS. NOS DISCUSSIONS ICI SE TIENNENT DANS LE CONTEXTE DE CERTAINS FACTEURS DONNÉS, NOTAMMENT LES POLITIQUES ÉTABLIES DE NOS GOUVERNEMENTS. NOUS SOMMES, DANS UN CERTAIN SENS, LES CAPTIFS DE NOS HISTOIRES RESPECTIVES. C'EST SOUVENT LA UN

PAGE TWELVE WKGR2356 UNCLAS

OBSTACLE A NOTRE RECHERCHE D UN CONSENSUS. LE PROBLEME QUI NOUS EST POSE ICI ET DANS D AUTRES INSTANCES, TOUCHE ESSENTIELLEMENT LA CAPACITE DES NATIONS A MENER LA GUERRE DANS LES CIRCONSTANCES PRESENTES. NOTRE OBJECTIF IMMEDIAT CONSISTE A REDUIRE LE NIVEAU DES ARMES ET DES ARMEMENTS TOUT EN MAINTENANT, ET MEME EN RELEVANT LE NIVEAU DE LA SECURITE.

MAIS NOS DISCUSSIONS ONT LARGMENT LAISSE DE COTE LA QUESTION PLUS FONDAMENTALE DES INTENTIONS QUI REGISSENT L UTILISATION DES ARMES. LA QUESTION DES FORCES NUCLEAIRES DE PORTEE INTERMEDIAIRE EN EUROPE QUI A PRIS UNE NOUVELLE TOURNURE AVEC L ANNONCE SOVIETIQUE DE NOUVEAUX DEPLOIEMENTS PREVUS DE MISSILES EN REPUBLIQUE DEMOCRATIQUE ALLEMANDE ET EN TCHECOSLOVAQUIE, ILLUSTRE TOUTE L IMPORTANCE DE CETTE QUESTION. SI LA COMPREHENSION DES INTENTIONS NE GARANTIT PAS AUTOMATIQUEMENT LA PAIX ET LA SECURITE, NOUS DEVONS PAR AILLEURS NOUS ASSURER QU IL N Y A PAS MESESTIMATION SUR LES INTENTIONS DANS CE SECTEUR DE POLITIQUE CRUCIAL.

EN DERNIERE ANALYSE, LE SUCCES DES MESURES DE CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS ET DE DESARMEMENT REPOSE SUR UNE REELLE INTENTION D ARRETER L EXPANSION DES ARSENAUX. SI CE N EST PAS LA UNE GRANDE REVELATION, CE N EN EST PAS MOINS UNE REALITE QUE NOUS DEVRIONS TOUJOURS AVOIR A L ESPRIT LORSQUE, DANS DES INSTANCES COMME CELLE-CI, NOUS DISCUTONS DE QUESTIONS DE CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS ET DE

...13

PAGE THIRTEEN WKGR2356 UNCLAS

LES ARMEMENTS. COMME LE MENTIONNAIT LE PREMIER MINISTRE TRUDEAU
DANS SON ALLOCUTION DU 27 OCTOBRE A GUELPH, EN ONTARIO, C'EST NOUS
REUSSIRONS PEUT-ÊTRE UN JOUR A BLOQUER LE POTENTIEL NUCLEAIRE
DES DEUX CAMPS A UN NIVEAU BIEN INFÉRIEUR, MAIS EXISTE-T-IL UN
MOYEN DE C'EST BLOQUER FINCI LES INTENTIONS BELLIQUEUSES DE CEUX
QUI AURONT ÉVENTUELLEMENT LE POUVOIR DE METTRE EN ŒUVRE LES
ARMES RESTANTES? C'EST SUR CE POINT QUE PÉCHE LA THÈSE DE GEL
DES ARMEMENTS NUCLEAIRES. FINCI.

VOILA QUI NOUS AMÈNE AU CŒUR DU PRÉSENT DÉBAT: LES RELATIONS
INSTABLES QUI ONT PROGRESSIVEMENT DIVISÉ L'EST ET L'OUEST ET
L'ABSENCE D'UN VÉRITABLE DIALOGUE POLITIQUE QUI POURRAIT ATTÉNUER
LES TENSIONS. IL FUT UN TEMPS. DURANT LES ANNÉES SOIXANTE-DIX,
OU LA DÉTENTE CONTENAIT LA PROMESSE D'UN TEL DIALOGUE. LES
CONSULTATIONS PÉRIODIQUEMENT MENÉES AUX NIVEAUX POLITIQUES LES
PLUS ÉLEVÉS SEMBLAIENT CONTRIBUER À RENFORCER LA COMPRÉHENSION.
LE RESPECT MUTUEL ET LE DESIR COMMUN DE RECHERCHER DES MOYENS
D'ÉVITER LES CRISES. À MESURE QUE LA DÉTENTE PERDAIT SON ASPECT
GLOBAL ET ÉTAIT REMISE EN QUESTION, ON VOYAIT DIMINUER LES
POSSIBILITÉS QU'ELLE OFFRAIT D'INSTAURER LA CONFIANCE DANS LES
INTENTIONS DE CHACUNE DES PARTIES.

DANS L'ACTUEL CLIMAT DE MÉFIANCE ET DE SUSPICION, COMMENT POUVONS-
NOUS AIDER À RESTAURER LA CONFIANCE QUI POURRAIT PERMETTRE UN
DÉBLOCAGE? A GUELPH, LE PREMIER MINISTRE TRUDEAU MENTIONNAIT UNE

PAGE FOURTEEN WKGR2356 UNCLAS

CIT STRATEGIE DE RETABLISSEMENT DE LA CONFIANCE POLITIQUE FINCIT
QUI SUPPOSERAIT CIT DES MESURES PROPRES A REDUIRE LES TENSIONS
ENGENDREES PAR L INCERTITUDE QUANT AUX BUTS POURSUIVIS,OU PAR LA
CRAITNE DES CONSEQUENCES D UN ECHEC;DES MESURES QUI ATTENUENT
L HOSTILITE ET FAVORISENT UN MINIMUM DE RESPECT MUTUEL;ENFIN,
DES MESURES CAPABLES DE SUSCITER UNE CONFIANCE VERITABLE DANS LA
CAPACITE DE L HOMME A SURVIVRE SUR CETTE PLANETE.FINCIT.IL AVAIT
TOUT PARTICULIEREMENT A L ESPRIT UN DIALOGUE REGULIER DE HAUT
NIVEAU FONDE SUR LA FANCHISE QUANT AUX INTENTIONS,LE RESPECT
MUTUEL,LA RECONNAISSANCE RECIPROQUE DES BESOINS DE SECURITE
LEGITIMES,UNE APPROCHE COHERENTE DE LA QUESTION DES SITUATIONS
DE CRISE ET DES INCITATIONS A LA SOUPLESSE.L OBJECTIF SERAIT
D ETABLIR UN MEILLEUR RESEAU DE COMMUNICATIONS ENTRE LES SUPER-
PUISSANCES,ET ENTRE L EST ET L OUEST DE FACON GENERALE.

L ONEREUX DE CETTE STRATEGIE REPOSE SUR LES DIRIGEANTS DE CHAQUE
PAYS,QUI SONT PEUT-ETRE LES SEULS A POUVOIR FAIRE MONTRE DE LA
SOUPLESSE NECESSAIRE POUR EXPLORER DE NOUVELLES ORIENTATIONS.LE
PREMIER MINISTRE TRUDEAU A DEJA ENTAME LES CONSULTATIONS DE HAUT
NIVEAU QU IL A PRECONISEES,ET IL RENCONTRERA BIENTOT D AUTRES
DIRIGEANTS.

NOUS ESPERONS QUE LES DIRIGEANTS RELEVERONT LE DEFI ET QUE
LEURS EFFORTS POURRONT SE TRADUIRE RAPIDEMENT EN GESTES CONCRETS
AU SEIN DES DIVERSES INSTANCES DE NEGOCIATIONS. S IL DOIT Y AVOIR
...15

PAGE FIFTEEN WKGR2356 UNCLAS

UN VERITABLE DIALOGUE DANS CES NEGOCIATIONS, IL FAUT QU IL SOIT FONDÉ SUR UNE POLITIQUE REALISTE DE SECURITE INTERNATIONALE. UNE TELLE POLITIQUE DOIT AVOIR NOTAMMENT POUR FONDEMENT LES PRINCIPES DE LA RECIPROCITE, DE LA TRANSPARENCE, DE L EQUILIBRE ET DE LA CONFIANCE.

NOUS TROUVONS TOUT PARTICULIEREMENT TROUBLANT LE MANQUE DE CONFIANCE REVELE LORS DES NEGOCIATIONS DE GENEVE ENTRE LES SUPERPUISSANCES SUR LES FORCES NUCLEAIRES DE PORTEE INTERMEDIAIRE, CUI EN SONT ARRIVEES A UNE ETAPE CRITIQUE. NULLE PART AILLEURS QUE DANS LE CADRE DE CES POURPARLERS FNI EST-IL AUSSI NECESSAIRE D INSTAURER D URGENCE UN CLIMAT DE DIALOGUE VERITABLE. SI L ON VEUT QU ILS AIENT UNE CHANCE DE REUSSIR, IL FAUT QUE LES PARTIES SE DONNENT COMME OBJECTIF FONDAMENTAL DE RENFORCER LA SECURITE MUTUELLE PLUTOT QUE DE S ATTACHER AUX AVANTAGES UNILATERAUX. IL EST DE LA PLUS GRANDE IMPORTANCE QUE LES DEUX PARTIES PERSEVERENT DANS LA NEGOCIATION ET S ATTAQUENT AUX QUESTIONS CENTRALES. NOUS APPUYONS FERMEMENT UNE SOLUTION NEGOCIEE QUI RENDRA INUTILE LE DEPLOIEMENT DE TOUT MISSILE NUCLEAIRE DE PORTEE INTERMEDIAIRE EN EUROPE. MAIS EN L ABSENCE DE RESULTATS CONCRETS LORS DES NEGOCIATIONS FNI. NOUS CROYONS QU IL N Y AURA D AUTRE CHOIX QUE DE DEPLOYER CES MISSILES. VOILA POURQUOI IL EST URGENT DE RENDRE INUTILE CETTE SOLUTION DE RECHANGE.

COMME PREUVE DE LA DETERMINATION DE L OCCIDENT DE VOIR UNE

...16

PAGE SIXTEEN WKGR2356 UNCLAS

REDUCTION DU NIVEAU DES ARMES NUCLEAIRES EN EUROPE, JE VOUDRAIS ATTIRER L'ATTENTION DE LA COMMISSION SUR LA DECISION PRISE PAR LES MINISTRES DE LA DEFENSE DE L'ALLIANCE OCCIDENTALE LA SEMAINE DERNIERE A MONTEBELLO, AU QUEBEC, DE RETIRER UNILATERALEMENT 1400 OGIVES NUCLEAIRES TACTIQUES DE L'EUROPE DE L'OUEST D'ICI LES PROCHAINES ANNEES. CE QUI PORTERA A 2400 LE NOMBRE TOTAL DES OGIVES QUI AURONT ETE UNILATERALEMENT RETIREES PAR L'OUEST DEPUIS 1979.

ON MET BEAUCOUP D'ESPOIR DANS LA CONFERENCE SUR LES MESURES DE CONFIANCE ET DE SECURITE ET SUR LE DESARMEMENT EN EUROPE, QUI COMMENCERA SES TRAVAUX A STOCKHOLM EN JANVIER. NOUS ESPERONS QUE LE RETABLISSEMENT DE LA CONFIANCE PAR UN REGIME DE MESURES DE CONFIANCE ET DE SECURITE COUVRANT L'EUROPE DONNERA AUX AFFAIRES MILITAIRES UNE TRANSPARENCE ET UNE PREVISIBILITE QUI POURRAIENT EN RETOUR DONNER AUX ETATS PARTICIPANTS UNE MESURE DE SECURITE SUFFISANTE POUR FAIRE DE LA REDUCTION EQUILIBREE DES ARMEMENTS UNE OPTION VIABLE.

NOUS AVONS, AU SEIN DE CETTE COMMISSION, NOTRE PROPRE CONTRIBUTION A APPORTER A LA CREATION D'UN ENVIRONNEMENT STABLE PERMETTANT UNE SECURITE ACCRUE.

ASSUREMENT NOTRE OBJECTIF ICI CONSISTE A RENFORCER L'APPROCHE MULTILATERALE DU CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS ET DU DESARMEMENT. NOS TRAVAUX DOIVENT CONTRIBUER AU MULTILATERALISME, ET NON NOUS EN ...17

PAGE SEVENTEEN WKGR2356 UNCLAS

ELOIGNER. NOS EFFORTS DOIVENT ESSENTIELLEMENT VISER A ETABLIR UN CONSENSUS ET A ELABORER DES CADRES PRATIQUES DE NEGOCIATIONS QUI PRODUIRONT DES MESURES CONCRETES DE CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS ET DE DESARMEMENT NOUS DEVONS COLLECTIVEMENT POURSUIVRE LE TRAVAIL PRELIMINAIRE NECESSAIRE PAR TOUS LES MOYENS A NOTRE DISPOSITION, NOTAMMENT MULTILATERAUX, EN ATTENDANT QU UNE AMELIORATION DU CLIMAT PERMETTE UN HEUREUX DEVOUEMENT DE CES NEGOCIATIONS. EN CETTE PERIODE DE DETERIORATION DU CLIMAT INTERNATIONAL. NOUS DEVONS RESISTER A LA TENTATION DE RECOURIR A LA CIT POLITIQUE DU MEGA-PHONE FINCIT QUI FAVORISE L AFFRONTMENT AUX DEPENS DU CONSENSUS ET QUI FAIT DE NOS DEBATS NON PAS UNE SOURCE DE DIALOGUE. MAIS PLUTOT UN MOYEN DE DIVISION ET DE DESUNION. LE MULTILATERALISME A POUR DEFI DE RENVERSER CES TENDANCES.

LE PROCESSUS DU CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS ET DU DESARMEMENT NOUS POSE UN AUTRE DEFI, CELUI DE RECONNAITRE LA CONVERGENCE DES INTERETS A AMENER LES PAYS DEVELOPPES ET EN DEVELOPPEMENT A S ENTENDRE SUR LES QUESTIONS DE SECURITE INTERNATIONALE. ET CETTE REALITE EST TOUT PARTICULIEREMENT PRESENTE EN CE QUI CONCERNE LE TRAITE DE NON-PROLIFERATION, DONT LE RENFORCEMENT EST L UN DES DEFIS LES PLUS PRESSANTS POSES AU MULTILATERALISME.

CHACUN DE NOUS A LA RESPONSABILITE DE MAINTENIR ET D APPUYER LE PROCESSUS DE CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS ET DE DESARMEMENT. LE DEGRE D EXERCICE DE CETTE RESPONSABILITE SE REFLETE DANS LES

...18

PAGE EIGHTEEN WKGR2356 UNCLAS

TENDANCES OBSERVEES AU NIVEAU DU VOTE A L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE.
MALHEUREUSEMENT NOTRE ORDRE DU JOUR S'EST ENCOMBRE AU FIL DES ANS.
ET IL Y A UNE TENDANCE AU DEDOUBLEMENT DES EFFORTS DANS CETTE
COURSE AUX RESOLUTIONS. DES PRIORITES DOIVENT ETRE ETABLIES SI
NOUS NE VOULONS PAS DILUER L'EFFET DE NOS EFFORTS.

NOUS AVONS BIEN SUR NOS PROPRES VUES SUR LA QUESTION. NOS PRIORITES
SONT: (1) D'APPUYER FERMEMENT LES NEGOCIATIONS VISANT A CONTENIR ET
A REDUIRE LA COURSE AUX ARMEMENTS NUCLEAIRES; (2) DE FAVORISER
RAPIDEMENT DES PROGRES VISANT LA CONCLUSION D'UN TRAITE MULTI-
LATERAL D'INTERDICTION COMPLETE DES ESSAIS; (3) DE PARTICIPER A LA
PREPARATION D'UNE CONVENTION QUI INTERDIRAIT TOUTE UTILISATION
D'ARMES CHIMIQUES; (4) DE PROMOUVOIR L'ELABORATION D'UN REGIME DE
NON-PROLIFERATION EFFICACE ET FONDE SUR LE TRAITE DE NON-PROLIF-
ERATION; (5) DE VEILLER A CE QUE L'ON SE RAPPROCHE D'AVANTAGE DE
L'OBJECTIF VISANT L'INTERDICTION DE LA MISE AU POINT, DE LA MISE
A L'ESSAI ET DU DEPLOIEMENT DE TOUTE ARME DESTINEE A ETRE UTILISEE
DANS L'ESPACE EXTRA-ATMOSPHERIQUE; ET (6) DE PARTICIPER ACTIVEMENT
AUX NEGOCIATIONS DESTINEES A LIMITER ET A REDUIRE LES FORCES
CONVENTIONNELLES.

DANS NOTRE EXAMEN DES QUESTIONS NUCLEAIRES URGENTES, NOUS
POURSUIVONS EN DOUBLE OBJECTIF: PREVENIR LA MISE AU POINT DE
NOUVEAUX SYSTEMES D'ARMEMENTS ET REDUIRE LES ARSENAUX NUCLEAIRES
EN VUE D'OBTENIR UNE SITUATION D'EQUILIBRE A DES NIVEAUX D'ARME-

...19

PAGE NINETEEN WKGR2356 UNCLAS

MENTS MOINDRES. NOUS SONGEONS EGALEMENT A FAIRE DES PROPOSITIONS VISANT L ELABORATION D AUTRES ACCORDS INTERNATIONAUX QUI POURRAIENT CONTRIBUER A RESTREINDRE L EFFET DESTABILISATEUR DES NOUVEAUX DEVELOPPEMENTS EN MATIERE DE TECHNOLOGIE STRATEGIQUE.

NOUS PREFERONS DES ACCORDS CONCRETS AUX GRANDES DECLARATIONS D INTENTION QUI PROMETTENT DES LIMITATIONS. MAIS SANS DONNER VERITABLEMENT LES MOYENS D ASSURER QUE LES PROMESSES SONT TENUES. IL EST COMMUNEMENT ACCEPTE QUE LA VERIFICATION EST UNE NECESSITE SI NOUS VOULONS FAIRE DES PROGRES REELS DANS LES NEGOCIATIONS SUR LE DESARMEMENT ET LE CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS. NOTRE ACCEPTATION D ETABLIR DES MECANISMES INTERNATIONAUX DE VERIFICATION SERA L UNE DES PLUS NETTES MANIFESTATIONS DE NOS INTENTIONS REELLES. C EST POURQUOI NOUS AVONS ASSIGNE UNE HAUTE PRIORITE A LA RECHERCHE DANS CE DOMAINE.

LE 20 OCTOBRE, LE VICE-PREMIER MINISTRE ET SECRETAIRE D ETAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES, L HONORABLE ALLAN MACLEACHEN, ANNONCAIT LA MISE SUR PIED D UN PROGRAMME DE RECHERCHES SUR LA VERIFICATION EN MATIERE DE CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS ET DE DESARMEMENT, DONT LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES SERA RESPONSABLE. DES RESSOURCES HUMAINES SUPPLEMENTAIRES SERONT AFFECTEES A CE SECTEUR. UN BUDGET INITIAL DE DLRS 500 000 A ETE CONSACRE AU PROGRAMME. CE MONTANT SERA PORTE A UN MILLION DE DOLLARS D ICI AVRIL PROCHAIN.

...20

PAGE TWENTY WKGR2356 UNCLAS

CETTE INITIATIVE A ETE MISE SUR PIED AFIN DE CONTRIBUER A L'INSTAURATION D'UN CLIMAT PROPICE A DES PROGRES EN MATIERE DE DESARMEMENT. LE PROGRAMME DE VERIFICATION SE CONCENTRERA PRINCIPALEMENT SUR LES ASPECTS TECHNIQUES ET S'APPUIERA SUR L'IMPORTANCE NETTEMENT PLUS GRANDE QUE NOUS AVONS RECEMMENT ACCOREDEE A LA QUESTION DE LA VERIFICATION. LE REPERTOIRE DES PROPOSITIONS CONCERNANT LA VERIFICATION DE LA LIMITATION DES ARMEMENTS, QUE NOUS AVONS PRESENTE AU COMITE DU DESARMEMENT EN 1980 ET QUI A ETE MIS A JOUR EN 1982, AINSI QUE LES ETUDES QUANTITATIVES ET CONCEPTUELLES QUI EN ONT RESULTE SONT DES EXEMPLES DE NOTRE APPROCHE TRES PRATIQUE ET CONCRETE DE CES QUESTIONS. LE CANADA A DE MEME DES COMPETENCES TECHNIQUES--TANT DES SECTEURS PRIVE QUE PUBLICS--QUI PEUVENT ETRE APPLIQUEES A UN CERTAIN NOMBRE DE DOMAINES COMME LA SISMOLOGIE, LA TELEDETECTION, LA TOXICOLOGIE, LES SATELLITES DE COMMUNICATION AINSI QUE LA DETECTION ET LA DESTRUCTION DES ARMES CHIMIQUES ET LA PROTECTION CONTRE DE TELLES ARMES. NOUS AVONS L'INTENTION DE METTRE D'AVANTAGE A CONTRIBUTION CES COMPETENCES A TITRE D'APPORT SPECIAL DU CANADA A LA NEGOCIATION D'ACCORDS SUR LES ARMES NUCLEAIRES, CHIMIQUES ET CONVENTIONNELLES.

PARTAGEANT LES RESULTATS DE NOTRE TRAVAIL LA COMMUNAUTE INTERNATIONALE, NOUS ESPERONS CONTRIBUER A REpondre AUX EXIGENCES TECHNIQUES DU PROCESSUS DE CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS ET DE DESARMEMENT. MAIS, DANS LA CONJONCTURE ACTUELLE, NOUS NOUS DEVONS DE

...21

3
PAGE TWENTY-ONE WKGR2356 UNCLAS

DEPASSER LES ASPECTS TECHNIQUES POUR NOUS CONCERTER SUR LA
NECESSITE D INSTAURER LA CCONFIANCE ET LE DIALOGUE; IL FAUT QUE
CEUX QUI POURRAIENT APPORTER UNE VERITABLE CONTRIBUTION AU
CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS ET AU DESARMEMENT ENTAMENT UN DIALOGUE
VERITABLE, ET NON UN DIALOGUE DE SOURDS.

POUR REVENIR A UN OINT QUE J AI MENTIONNEE AU DEBUT DE MES
OBSERVATIONS, IL EXISTE PEU DE QUESTIONS QUI ONT AUTANT ENGAGE
LES INTERETS DE L OUEST-ET EN FAIT D AUTRES REGIONS-QUE LA
QUESTION DONT NOUS SOMMES AUJOURD HUI SAISIS. ETANT DONNE LES
CONSEQUENCES D UNE QUERRE NUCLEAIRE, CETTE PREOCCUPATION EST
TOUT A FIAT COMPREHENSIBLE ET JUSTIFIEE. NOUS VOULONS TOUS DES
PROGRES EN MATIERE DE CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS ET DE DESARMEMENT.
LA CLE A CET EGARD EST UN RENFORCEMENT DE LA SECURITE MUTUELLE,
RENFORCEMENT QUI NE SERA PAS POSSIBLE TANT QUE CHACUN DOUTERA
DES INTENTIONS DE L AUTRE. DANS NOS EFFORTS POUR SURMONTER CET
CBSTACLE-ET C EST LA UN POINT QU A SOULIGNE LE PREMIER MINISTRE
TRUDEAU A GUELPH-IL NOUS FAUDRA POSER DES GESTES POLITIQUES
CONSTUCTIFS POUR CONTRER L EVOLUTION DANGEREUSEMENT NEGATIVE
DES RELATIONS ENTRE L EST ET L OUEST.

UUU/017 020245Z WKGR2356

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PRMNY WKGR2354 01NOV83

TO EXTOTT IDD

INFO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO

BRU HAGUE WSHDC MOSCO BNATO CNGNY GENEV TOKYO WSAW BPEST

PRGUE BGRAD BUCST STKHM CNBRA HSNKI/CDEDEL WLGTN VMBFR VIENN PEKIN

DELHI PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CP

SFAX CHCGO LNGLS DE OTT

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR RBD RBR FPR IDD

IDR IDA

REF OURTEL WKGR2339 31OCT(NOTAL)

---PM INITIATIVE-GUELPH SPEECH

DURING AMB CALL OCT31 ON SEC GEN ON ANOTHER MATTER, PEREZ DE CUELLAR
TOLD AMB HE HAD BEEN IMPRESSED AND PLEASED BY PMS INITIATIVE, AND
PRAISED HIS COURAGE. SEC GEN REQUESTED THAT HIS SUPPORT BE REPEATED
TO PM. HE ALSO ASKED SPECIFICALLY THAT HIS OFFER TO PROVIDE BACKUP
IN ANY USEFUL WAY BE REPEATED TO MR TRUDEAU. IN TURN HE ASKED TO
BE KEPT INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS.

CCC/085 012011Z WKGR2354

MF
28-6-1-Trudeau Peace
Mission

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MF
12
28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM TOKYO UIGR1736 01NOV83

TO EXTOTT IEDZ DELIVER BY 010900

INFO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CP

LDN PARIS MOSCO MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO PRU

HAGUE BNATO PRMNY CNGNY WSHDC GENEV

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD PSR RCD RCR PPD IDD PPR

IDA IDR FPR

REF OURTEL UIGR1564 28OCT NOTAL

---PMS INITIATIVE ON EAST-WEST RELNS AND INNATL SECURITY

AS REPORTED IN REFTEL, SPEECH, TOGETHER WITH BACKGROUND BRIEFING
NOTES, WAS DISTRIBUTED AND DRAWN TO ATTENTION OF USUAL PRESS CONTACTS,
BOTH JPNSE AND CDN, 28OCT. TO DATE THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO LOCAL PRESS
REACTION, EITHER JPNSE OR ENGLISH. LACK OF REACTION MAY BE EXPLAINED
BY FACT THAT WE DID NOT/HAVE TIME TO CALL PRESS CONF OR TO HAVE
SPEECH/BACKGROUND MATERIAL TRANSLATED INTO JPNSE, COUPLED WITH
OVERWHELMING PREOCCUPATION OF JPNSE PRESS WITH AFTERMATH OF TANAKA
VERDICT AND INVASION OF GRENADA. ONLY NEWS FROM CDA OVER WEEKEND.
IN FACT, WAS WIRE SERVICE REPORT OF NPG MTG AT MONTEBELLO.

2. WE ALSO DISTRIBUTED SPEECH/BACKGROUND MATERIAL EXTENSIVELY TO
MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS. SPEECH WILL BE OF MOST INTEREST TO EUROPEAN
BUREAU, MFA, WHICH HAS BROAD RESPONSIBILITY FOR E/W POLITICAL ISSUES.
BUREAU, HOWEVER, IS TOTALLY ENGAGED THIS WEEK WITH VISIT OF FRG
CHANCELLOR KOHL, AND WE DO NOT/NOT EXPECT REACTION BEFORE MON 07NOV.

...2

PAGE TWO UIGR1736 CONF

WE HAVE HOWEVER SPOKEN INFORMALLY TO CONTACTS IN OTHER BUREAUS,
EG DISARMAMENT DIVISION.

3. CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY PM WILL NO/NO DOUBT BE SHARED BY JPNSE.
UNTIL KAL INCIDENT, IN JPNSE VIEW, THERE HAD SEEMED TO BE SLIGHT
MOVEMENT TOWARDS E/W ACCOMMODATION/UNDERSTANDING, AT LEAST IN ARMS
CONTROL AREA. WHILE KAL INCIDENT DID NOT/NOT DESTROY CHANCES OF
REACHING AGREEMENT, IT CERTAINLY POLLUTED ATMOSPHERE AND SERIOUSLY
COMPLICATED ALREADY DIFFICULT SITU. WELL-INFORMED MFA OFFICIAL TO
WHOM WE SPOKE BELIEVED TIMING OF PMS INITIATIVE WAS THEREFORE
OPPORTUNE AND WOULD BE APPRECIATED BY JPNSE DECISION MAKERS.

4. JPNSE CONSIDER THAT EFFORTS MUST BE MADE TO CONTINUE TO DRAW
SOVIETS INTO ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS, PARTICULARLY IF GENEV TALKS
FAIL. CDE CONF IN JAN WILL TAKE ON EVEN MORE SIGNIFICANCE AND
BECOME FACE SAVING WAY OF ALLOWING SOVIETS TO CONTINUE ENGAGEMENT
IN ARMS CONTROL PROCESS SHOULD THEY DECIDE TO BREAK OFF GENEV
TALKS WHEN INITIAL INF DEPLOYMENT TAKES PLACE IN DEC. ONE OFFICIAL,
SPEAKING PERSONALLY, BELIEVED PMS INITIATIVE COULD BE IMPORTANT
IN KEEPING SOVIETS ENGAGED IN DIALOGUE WITH WEST, PARTICULARLY AS
IT GAVE SIGNAL TO SOVIETS THAT CURRENT HIGH LEVEL OF RHETORIC
SHOULD NOT/NOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND IN WAY OF REACHING MEANINGFUL
AND VERIFIABLE AGREEMENTS.

5. WHILE RECOGNIZING NEED FOR HIGH VISIBILITY OF PMS INITIATIVE,
OUR CONTACT IN DISARMAMENT DIV WAS PLEASED THAT WE APPEARED TO BE
GOING TO GREAT LENGTHS TO ENSURE INITIATIVE WOULD NOT/NOT BE

...3

PAGE THREE UIGR1736 CONF

MISINTERPRETED AS SIGN OF DIVISION/WEAKNESS WITHIN WESTERN CAMP.
HE ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT, IN SHORT TERM, SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
(AND HENCE EMPHASIS OF INITIATIVE) WOULD HAVE DECIDEDLY EUROPEAN
FLAVOUR/ORIENTATION. IN MEDIUM TO LONG TERM, JPNSE HOPE THAT WE
WOULD BE AS AWARE OF EQUALLY IMPORTANT ASIAN SECURITY CONCERNS.
OUR CONTACT BELIEVED PM NAKASONE WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED
IN PM TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE AND WOULD PROBABLY WELCOME OPPORTUNITY
TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AT OPPORTUNE TIME.

CCC/195 210835Z UIGR1736

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

28-6-1 - Judeau Peage
Mission MF
L

UNCLASSIFIED

FM LNGLS XOAG1577 01NOV83

TC EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADM POL/CPP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR IDD IDA IDR FPR
REFYRTEL IDDZ0037 26OCT83 AND IDDZ0021 25OCT83

---PM INIATIVE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
CIRCULATE PM'S TEXTWIDELY IN BOTH MEDIA AND AMONG INTERESTED AND
INFLUENTIAL INDIVIDUALS IN TERRITORY, INCLUDING ADVANCE NOTICE TO
FOREIGN EDITOR OF L.A. TIMES AND ASSOC. ED. OF HERALD-EXAMINER
HOPEFUL THAT IN DUE COURSE PM'S INITIATIVE WILL BE RECOGNIZED IN
EDITORIALS IN SOME OF THE MAJOR NEWSPAPERS IN TERRITORY BUT
UNFORTUNATELY AMERICAN INITIATIVE IN GRENADA AND LEBANON DISASTER ARE
DEMANDING UNDIVIDED ATTENTION OF MEDIA IN AREA. WE WILL PERSEVERE IN
STRESSING IMPORTANCE OF ANALYSIS, REFLECTIONS AND PLANNED FUTURE
ACTION CONTAINED IN PM'S SPEECH, AND WILL CONTINUE ATTEMPT TO
PERSUADE OPINION FORMERS OF WORTHINESS OF SUPPORT FOR THIS
INITIATIVE

UUU/820 011239Z XOAG1577

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HAGUE YWAG0895 01NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 011400

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON PARIS BRU ROME BONN LDN

DISTR UDDZ RGB RCR RSR RBD

REF YOURTEL XDV1049 31OCT

---PMS VISIT-ADMIN ARRANGEMENTS:SECRETARIAL ASSISTANCE

GRATEFUL ADVISE ASAP IF SECRETARIAL ASSISTANCE WILL BE REQUIRED
FROM THE HAGUE AS PER PARA 8 REFTEL. ONE OF OUR ONLY TWO SCYS HAS
BEEN HOSPITALIZED AND IS NOT/NOT EXPECTED TO BE AVAILABLE IN WHICH
CASE IT COULD BE NECESSARY TO ASK FOR TD ASSISTANCE FROM NEIGH-
BOURING POST.

2. ALSO ADVISE IF MISS VIAU WILL REQUIRE TYPEWRITER, DESK, ETC.

CCC/155 011423Z WAG0895

28-6-1-1 - Trudeau Peace
mission
b. []

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM HAGUE YWAG0894 01NOV83

TO EXTOTT XDV DELIVER BY 011400

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON PARIS BRU ROME BONN LDN

DISTR IDDZ RGB RCR RSR RBD

REF YOURTEL XDV1049 31OCT

---PMS VISIT:ADMIN ARRANGEMENTS-TRANSPORTATION

ASSUME THAT HOP VEHICLE(CHEVROLET CAPRICE) IS APPROPRIATE FOR USE
AS PMS LIMC.ADVISE.WILL BE RENTING BAGGAGE VAN AND ONE/ONE SEDAN.

CCC/155 011424Z YWAG0894

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM HAGUE YWAG0893 01NOV83

TO EXTOTT MGT IMMED

INFO LDN/RCOT

DISTR MGTC XDV RSD RCD (DDZ

REF YOURTEL MGT4526 31OCT

---PM VISIT-TELECOMMUNICATIONS

COMCENTRE WILL REMAIN OPEN FROM 1800 HRS NOV8 UNTIL REQUIRED AND
OPEN 0600 HRS NOV9. DURING NIGHT OF NOV8/9 COMCENTRE STAFF WILL BE
ON STANDBY.

CCC/155 011015Z YWAG0893

28-6-1- Trudeau
Peace
Mission
ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

UNCLASSIFIED

FM LSBN XMGR0671 01NOV83

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ

INFO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN LDN PARIS MDRID PONN ROME ANKRA COPEN
NDHQCTT/MNI CDS/ALMPOL/CPD CSLO BRU HAGUE MOSCO BNATO PRMNY CNGNY
WSHDC GENEV TOKYO CHCGO LNGLS PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR IDD IDA IER FPR
CURTEL 0664 280CT

---PM INITIATIVE-PRESS COVERAGE

ON FRI OCT28 WE UNDERTOOK DISTR OF TEXT OF SPEECH IN BOTH ENG
AND FR TO ALL MAJOR NEWSPAPERS, WEEKLIES, RADIO AND TELEVISION.
QUOTE O EXPRESSO UNQUOTE THE MOST INFLUENTIAL WEEKLY READ BY ALL
BUSINESS-LEADERS, POLITICIANS AND INTELLIGENTSIA, CARRIED AS LEAD
ARTICLE ON OCT29 IN SUMMARY OF WEEKLY EVENTS, THEME OF PMS INITIATIVE
HEADLINED QUOTE DISARMAMENT--TRUDEAU PROPOSES A THIRD RAIL UNQUOTE.
PORT TV COVERED THE STORY IN OCT29 NOON NEWS PROGRAM. WE ARE
UNAWARE OF ANY OTHER COVERAGE AT PRESENT.

2. THE REASON FOR PORT TV S CARRYING STORY IS FACT THAT ONE OF TOP
NEWSCASTERS WHO IS FRIEND OF EMB MADE SUMMARY IN PORT OF SPEECH
TEXT AND GAVE IT TO NEWSROOM. THIS CONFIRMS OUR VIEW THAT IN
ORDER TO RECEIVE EXTENSIVE COVERAGE IN PORT MEDIA, IT IS NECESSARY
FOR EMB TO ISSUE PRESS RELEASE IN PORT; ACCORDINGLY, FOR SIMILAR
EXERCISES IN FUTURE, WE WLD REQUIRE IN ADVANCE SOME FORM OF SUMMARY
OR PRESS RELEASE WHICH WE CLD TRANSLATE INTO PORT PRIOR TO DISTR

...2

PAGE TWO XMGR0671 UNCLAS

TO MEDIA.ALTERNATIVELY,AS PRESS RELEASE OR SUMMARY PRODUCED IN
PORT AND PROVIDED BY OTT WLD ENABLE US TO REACH LOCAL CONTACTS
WITH TEXT MORE LIKELY TO SEE PUBLICATION AND READY TO FIT EVEN
TIGHTEST EMBARGO DEADLINES.

UUU/015 011030Z XMGR0671

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission
SUITE A DONNER

Mr. Harlick
Pls speak to me
HD

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE ERU ZVGR0511 01NOV83

A EXIOTT ILLZ LIVRAISON 010900

INFO PMOOTT/COLSON PCOOTT/FOWLER NEHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADMPOL/CPP

HAGUE BREEC BNATO CANMILREP

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSD RCR RCD RSR

REF NOTRETEL ZVGR0505 31OCT YWGR0734 DE LAHAYE 31OCT

---INITIATIVE DU PM:VISITE EN BELGIQUE-ENTRETIEN

POSSIBLE AVEC LE ROI BAUDOUIN

CONTRAIREMENT A LA REINE BEATRIX DES PAYS-BAS, LE ROI BAUDOUIN N A PAS MANIFESTE LE DESIR D AVOIR UN ENTRETIEN AVEC PM TRUDEAU ET N EST PEUT-ETRE PAS ENCORE NECESSAIREMENT AU FAIT DE SA VISITE A BRU. LE BUT DE CE TEL EST D INDIQUER LES AVANTAGES QU UNE TELLE RENCONTRE PRESENTERAIT ET DE SOLLICITER DES INSTRUCTIONS A CET EGARD APRES CONSULTATIONS AVEC LE PM.

2. LE ROI BAUDOUIN EST COMME ON LE SAIT TRES INTERESSE AUX AFFAIRES INTERNATIONALES, EN PARTICULIER AUX RELATIONS NORD-SUD INTERET QUI SE MANIFESTE PAR L EXISTENCE ET LES ACTIVITES DE LA FONDATION DU ROI BAUDOUIN, MAIS AUSSI, NOUS DIT-ON, AUX RELATIONS EST-OUEST. IL LUI ARRIVE ASSEZ FREQUEMMENT DE RECEVOIR, A TITRE PRIVE LORSQU IL S AGIT DE VISITES DE TRAVAIL, DES HOMMES D ETAT ETRANGERS. ON SE

...2

Réponse Regrettons mais programme chargé
permet pas à un entretien avec le roi Baudouin.
Merci votre suggestion.

PAGE DEUX ZVGR0511 CONF

RAPPELLERA QUE LE ROI AVAIT RECU EN AUDIENCE PRIVEE RENE
LEVESQUE LCRS DE SON PASSAGE ICI EN DEC 1980.

3. TEIS QUE NOUS LES PERCEVONS, LES AVANTAGES D UN ENTRETIEN,
S IL ETAIT SOUHAITE PAR LES DEUX PARTIES, SERAIENT LES SUIVANTS:
AJOUTER AU PRESTIGE DE L INITIATIVE TRUDEAU EN DEMONTRANT
L INTERET DU SOUVERAIN POUR ELLE, ASSURER QUE LE PM MARTENS
LUI ACCORDE LUI-MEME LE TEMPS VOULU MALGRE LES DIFFICULTES
QUE L ON SAIT, CONTRIBUER AUX RELATIONS BELGO-CDNNES ET ENFIN,
FAIRE PROFITER PM TRUDEAU DES VUES PERSONNELLES D UN SOUVERAIN
BIEN INFORME ET AU JUGEMENT REPUTE SUR.

4. SI LE PM JUGEAIT CES ARGUMENTS CONVAINCANTS, JE ME CONTENTERAI
D INFORMER LE DIRECTEUR DU CABINET POLITIQUE DU ROI, QUI EST
UN BON AMI DE CETTE MISSION, DE L INITIATIVE TRUDEAU ET DE SA
VISITE EN LE PRIANT D EN FAIRE PART AU ROI, MAIS SANS SOLLICITER
D AUDIENCE. JE SOUHAITERAIS AUSSI ETRE AUTORISE DANS CES
CIRCCNSTANCES A INDIQUER QUE LE PM SERA RECU PAR LA REINE
EEATRIX.

5. PRIERE AVISER

FCRTIER

CCC/126 010949Z ZVGR0511

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT RBR0486 01NOV83

TO MOSCO DELIVER BY 020900

INFO LDN PARIS BONN WSHDC PRMNY BNATO HAGUE ROME BRU PREEC PCOOTT/
FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/DGIS

DISTR USS DMF IFB RGB RBD RBRE RBP RBT ZSP ZSI IDD IDDZ IDA IDR
---PMS GUELPH SPEECH-SOVEMB BRIEFING

ON FRIDAY 28OCT SOVEMB CHARGE NOVIKOV MET RBD FOR PREARRANGED
DISCUSSION FOLLOWING PMS SPEECH IN GUELPH. NOVIKOV, WHILE GENERALLY
POSITIVE ON SOV ATTITUDE TOWARDS PMS INITIATIVE, MADE CLEAR EFFORT
TO KEEP OPTIONS OPEN EMPHASIZING IMPORTANCE OF SPEECH AND NEED TO
STUDY ITS CONTENTS CAREFULLY BEFORE REACTING OFFICIALLY. RBD STRESSED
SPEECH WAS INTRODUCTORY STEP IN PROCESS DESIGNED TO ENSURE BROAD
SUPPORT AND CONCRETE RESULTS.

2. NOVIKOV, WHO HAD JUST RETURNED TO OTT FROM ATTENDING PMS SPEECH
IN GUELPH, TOOK ISSUE WITH SOME ELEMENTS OF SPEECH (PARTICULARLY THAT
DETENTE HAD ENDED BECAUSE OF SOV-CUBAN ADVENTURISM) BUT CHOSE TO
INTERPRET PMS DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEMS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS AS DUE
ENTIRELY TO USA INTRANSIGENCE AND HOSTILITY. BUT IN GENERAL TERMS,
HE SAW SPEECH AS QUOTE REALISTIC APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS,
A SOBRE MINDED APPRAISAL OF WORLD WHICH MUST BE STUDIED CAREFULLY
UNQUOTE.

3. NOVIKOV NOTED PM IS PLANNING VISIT TO EUROPE. HE REMINDED RBD THAT
...2

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace
6 mission

PAGE TWO RBR0486 CONF

INVITATION TO VISIT USSR IS OUTSTANDING AND THAT PM WOULD BE WELCOME. HE EMPHASIZED THAT FOR SOVS AGENDA WOULD BE OPEN TO DISCUSS ANY AND ALL MULTILATERAL OR BILATERAL TOPICS. HE HINTED HOWEVER THAT TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ORGANIZE VISIT AND THAT EARLY ADVICE WOULD BE USEFUL.

4. IN REPLY RBD STRESSED STEP BY STEP APPROACH PM IS TAKING IN HIS INITIATIVE. HEAD ON APPROACH AGAINST MOST DIFFICULT INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS WOULD NOT BE SUCCESSFUL. PM WANTS TO WORK WITHIN COMMUNITY APPROACH; TO SHARE HIS IDEAS WITH OTHER LEADERS AND TRY TO CREATE BROAD AREA OF CONSENSUS ON PRACTICAL WAYS TO REDUCE EAST-WEST TENSION. SPEECH WAS DESCRIBED AS INTRODUCTORY STEP DESIGNED TO STAKE OUT BASIC APPROACH TO EAST/WEST RELATIONS WHICH OVER TIME WILL BE DEVELOPED.

5. NOVIKOV WAS TOLD OF PMS PLANNED TRIP TO EUROPE IN EARLY NOV TO PURSUE THOUGHTS OUTLINED IN SPEECH AND TO GAUGE EUROPEAN REACTION TO THEM. DEPENDING ON THESE DISCUSSIONS, ANOTHER SPEECH WITH GREATER SPECIFICITY COULD BE ANTICIPATED. RBD MADE CLEAR THAT PM WILL NOT/NOT PROCEED WITH INITIATIVE UNLESS HE BELIEVES THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF RESULTS.

6 NOVIKOV WAS ADVISED THAT IT IS LIKELY ANDROPOV WILL RECEIVE MESSAGE FROM PM AIMED AT DRAWING ANDROPOVS PERSONAL ATTENTION TO PROCESS AND BEGINNING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS.

...3

PAGE THREE RBR0486 CONF

OF VIEWS.CDN OBJECTIVE IS TO KEEP SOV GOVT FULLY INFORMED.IN THIS CONNECTION PM IS CONSIDERING INVITATION FROM ANDROPOV TO VISIT USSR BUT AS HE HAD TOLD GORBACHEV AND WRITTEN TO ANDROPOV,FIRM PROSPECT OF CLEAR AND USEFUL RESULTS WOULD BE DECISIVE FACTOR.

7.NOVIKOV HAD SEVERAL SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ON TEXT BASED LARGELY ON UNFAMILIARITY WITH VERNACULAR(IE WHAT IS CRISIS MANAGEMENT?WHAT IS MEANT BY THIRD RAIL OF ENERGY?)HE WAS UNCLEAR WHETHER PM WAS PROPOSING THAT CRUISE AND PERSHING II MISSILES SHOULD BE DEPLOYED AND THAT ONLY AFTER DEPLOYMENT SHOULD LEVELS ON BOTH SIDES BE LOWERED.CN THAT RBD QUICKLY SET RECORD STRAIGHT THAT TWO TRACK APPROACH HAS DEFINITELY NOT/NOT BEEN ABANDONED BUT THAT EMPHASIS OF SPEECH IS FOR PROGRESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE PREFERABLY BEFORE DEPLOYMENTS START.

8.NOVIKOV REHASHED USUAL DIATRIBE AGAINST USA AND ITS UNWILLINGNESS TO PROCEED WITH SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS.HE EXPRESSED FEARS THAT NEW COLL WAR IS UNDERWAY AND PRAISED PM FOR HIS EFFORTS TO TURN TIDE. NOVIKOV AGREED WITH RBD THAT PMS INITIATIVE ENTAILED DEFINITE RISKS.HE CITED WORDS OF ANDROPOV TO EFFECT THAT TO DEAL WITH COMPLICATED PROBLEMS DEMANDS WISDOM AND PERSONAL COURAGE. NOVIKOV STATED TEST MUST BE WHETHER PMS IDEAS,NOW IN GENERAL FORM,CAN BE TRANSLATED INTO PRACTICAL ACTION.USSR,HE SAID. IS READY FOR CONSTRUCTIVE NEGCTIATIONS TO EASE WORLD

...4

PAGE FOUR RBR0486 CONF

TENSIONS BUT USA HAS NOT RESPONDED SERIOUSLY AND DOES NOT APPEAR INTERESTED IN REACHING AGREEMENTS WITH USSR. SOVS DO NOT UNDERSTAND USA APPROACH BUT WILL NOT GIVE UP THEIR EFFORTS TO BUILD PEACE. IN THIS CONTEXT, NOVIKOV FELT PMS INITIATIVE COULD BE USEFUL.

9. DISCUSSION ENDED ON POSITIVE NOTE BUT OFFICIAL REACTION WILL PROBABLY BE WITHHELD UNTIL ANIROPOV RECEIVES LET FROM PM. ONCE FORMALLY INVOLVED IN PROCESS, BELIEVE WE CAN EXPECT SOVS TO OFFER SUPPORT TO INITIATIVE WITH NATURAL EMPHASIS ON BENEFITS FOR THEM BUT AT LEAST SOME READINESS TO CONSIDER SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO LOWER EAST-WEST TENSIONS.

CCC/188 012335Z RBR0486

