

50048-AL-40

**FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE
SEE NEXT PART OF FILE**

SECRET

SECURITY REPORT - GENEVA

Physical Description

The Canadian Permanent Mission in Geneva occupies the 6th (and top) floor of one end of a new apartment building at 16 Parc Chateau Banquet. The building is new and we are the first tenants. It is of modern fire-proof construction of concrete and re-enforced concrete. Access to the top floor is gained by a self-operating lift and by a flight of fire-proof stairs.

(ii) Our accommodation is virtually self-contained on this floor as the only other tenant is Letreille, a security guard who occupies a small apartment adjoining the Chancery.

(iii) Apart from the fact that it is not an "island" property the accommodation is admirably suited to our purpose. The offices are bright and well lighted, and from a security standpoint the lay-out is satisfactory.

2. Exterior Security Features

There is a Chubb lock on the front-door which gives on to the elevator and stairwell which at the 6th floor level services the Canadian Permanent Mission only. A substantial overhang of the roof on all three sides makes surreptitious access to the windows virtually impossible.

3. Interior Security Arrangements

Chubb locks are installed on all important connecting doors. Chubb doors and grilles are on both the Communications and Registry areas. Iron grilles secured by two Chubb padlocks are on each of the windows giving on to balconies, and on the Cypher Room window.

4. Control of Visitors

Strict and well enforced. Visitors enter the Reception Hall direct from the main entrance door where they are received by the Receptionist. They remain in the Reception Hall until the officer required is notified by telephone, when they are escorted to and from the appropriate office.

5. Access Quiet Hours

Only by summoning security guard to the locked front door by bell. One key to front door is held by the security guard. (See detailed revised instructions to security guards during quiet hours.)

6. Access Restricted Area

All doors locked when office is empty, even when

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officer is absent for only a few minutes. Local staff and others allowed in this area only in the presence of Canadian personnel.

7. Access to Registry and Communication Room

Only by Canadian based members of the Permanent Mission. Instructions in this regard strict and well enforced.

8. Surreptitious Entry.

Virtually impossible due to the various physical security features. Guards alert during quiet hours and meticulous in their observance of standing orders, which are most satisfactory.

9. Security Containers

Adequate, functioning satisfactorily, and in good state of repair.

10. Key Control

Exemplary. Strict and well enforced and in accordance with Departmental instructions and practice.

11. Control and Handling of Classified Material

Most satisfactory. All sensitive material is kept in custody behind the Chubb door in the Registry and Communications Room. It is carried from there to the offices and back in envelopes by hand of Canadian member only.

(ii) Outside the Chancery it is carried in locked briefcase by hand of Canadian member. Diplomatic bag to and from the British Permanent Mission by Canadian hand only.

12. Collection and Disposal of Classified Waste

The collection of classified waste is satisfactory. It is maintained in the Registry pending its weekly destruction by a security guard in the incinerator at the British Permanent Mission.

(ii) This method of destruction is not as satisfactory as it could be, due to the waste having to be taken out of the Chancery. The problem is difficult to overcome however, as a suitable incinerator cannot be constructed and installed on the premises. The only apparent method of destroying the waste in the Chancery would be frequent burnings in a small electric incinerator, but from recent correspondence there does not seem to be too much likelihood of securing a suitable model. Another alternative mentioned to me by

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the Security Officer is the construction of an efficient incinerator in the Residence, but this also would involve taking the waste a considerable distance from the Chancery.

13. Security Guards

I was very struck by the calibre of man we have in Emmerson and Letreille. They are reliable, capable and efficient and are of pleasant and dignified bearing. Their attitude towards the officers in the Mission is all that we expect, and they have a high regard for their jobs with noticable sense of responsibility. From the administrative angle of their work Emmerson is the superior of the two men, but both are capable of assuming heavier responsibility in their particular field.

(ii) Emon is a different type of man. He is not of the same calibre as the other two and, consequently cannot produce the same results. His work has not been too satisfactory until recently and he has been spoken to about this by the Security Officer. I am informed that there are some signs of improvement lately and it is hoped that this improvement is maintained.

(iii) Each of the guards were interviewed separately by me.

(iv) The guards log book and other records are maintained properly and neatly and with the expected attention to detail.

14. Intrusion Devices

Installation of these devices should prove very difficult due to the physical security arrangements and to close supervision by the security guards and other members of the Canadian staff of local workmen and chars. The possibility that this may have been exploited by workmen however, cannot be over-looked. Present plans do not call for a full technical inspection until later this year, but arrangements are being made here with the DWS for their man at the British Permanent Mission to go over the sensitive offices and the Registry and Communications Rooms in the meantime. The Canadian officers are aware of this threat.

15. Security and Combination Settings

Combination settings held in the Taylor safe in a sealed envelope in strict conformity with Departmental regulations. They are changed regularly and reported.

16. Security Procedures and Organization

Most commendable. See standing orders, security

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instructions etc. A very high standard is imposed by the Head of Mission and the Security Officer and this high standard is maintained by all members of the Canadian staff. The enforcement of orders is strict.

17. Fire Hazards

Virtually non-existent due to the modern fire-proof construction of the building. Fire extinguishers are located at strategic points and are serviced by the security guards.

18. Surplus Material

Negative. There is nothing to report under this heading in the way of old wiring etc., and surplus records and other material are not allowed to accumulate.

19. Telephones and Telephone Security

Local Swiss P. and T. system. Switchboard has ten extensions including one to Letreille's apartment next door. There are three external lines.

(ii) There is reason to believe that the telephones are monitored by the Swiss authorities. Strict telephone security is demanded of, and complied with by, the Canadian staff.

20. Telephotography

No threat as windows of all offices are protected by nylon mesh curtains.

21. Power Supply

220 volts - 50 cycles.

SUMMARY

From a security standpoint Geneva might be termed a "model" mission. The one serious drawback is that it is not a self-contained property, but I believe that this weakness is more than compensated for by other factors. The many security features which have been installed render the Mission virtually impregnable, apart from such threats as probe microphones and so on.

(ii) I was most impressed by the real meaning which is given to the word "security" in this Mission. Security regulations and procedures are intelligent and comprehensive. A high standard of observance and performance is

SECRET

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demanded of and received from subordinate members of the Canadian staff. It is not a question of merely nominal observance of regulations; as far as security is concerned the Head of Mission and Security Officer mean business.

(iii) While the physical plant is generally speaking highly satisfactory, there are one or two weaknesses which should be corrected. In order to increase the physical security it is recommended that:

- (a) In addition to the sound-proofing of the Registry and Communication Room, which is now going forward, the walls of Rooms 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 be sound-proofed.
- (b) If the stenographers are moved to Room 11, the wall connecting this room with Room 10 be sound-proofed and a permanent sound-proofed wall erected between Room 11 and 12.



R. A. S. MacNeil
Regional Security Officer.

London, U.K.
September 30, 1957.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

Amassador and Permanent Representative,
TO ~~XX THE EXTERNAL SECRETARY OF STATE FOR GENEVA.~~

~~XX EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.~~

FROM: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR
CANADA, LONDON, U.K.

Reference:.....

Subject: Security Report - Geneva.

S E C R E T

Security:.....

No:.....

Date: September 30, 1957

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail: AIR

Post File No: UN GENEVA I

Ottawa File No.

References

Enclosed herewith is a copy of a report arising out of my recent visit to your Mission.

2. The only recommendations in connection with security that I have to make are those dealing with the sound-proofing of the walls of certain offices and some suggestions with regard to the walls of Room 11 if it is decided to use this room for the stenographers.

3. I am still in some doubt as to what might be done to provide facilities for the destruction of classified waste within the Chancery, but this will be followed up with the British authorities here.

4. As mentioned in conversation, I am arranging with the Foreign Office for their local man in Geneva to "sweep" certain parts of the Chancery.

5. If I can be of any further help at all in security matters, please do not hesitate to let me know.

(Signed) R. A. S. MacNeil

R.A.S. MacNeil
Regional Security Officer.

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

CONFIDENTIAL

August 20, 1957

STANDING ORDERS FOR SECURITY GUARDS

GENERAL

The Head of Mission is responsible for the security of his post. Mr. Jay has been designated by him as Post Security Officer and is responsible to him for the enforcement and control of all security arrangements, including the supervision and direction of the security guards in their conduct and faithful, diligent and efficient discharge of their duties.

2. Whether on or off duty, the conduct of the security guards must be irreproachable. When on duty they are to be neatly and properly dressed. They will be alert and attentive to their duties and must be polite and courteous in their dealings with callers and members of the public.

3. Guards will familiarize themselves with the Departmental regulations, the Standing Security Orders of the post, and the following.

4. Security guards, as all Canadian-based staff, must be meticulously careful about divulging information to unauthorized persons. Loose or unguarded talk can cause incalculable damage.

BASIC DUTIES OF SECURITY GUARDS

5. The primary and over-riding duty of security guards is the protection of the Chancery in the danger period of the quiet or non-working hours. Certain tasks may be assigned through the Security Officer to guards during their tours of duty, but nothing must interfere with the protection provided by the presence of the guard in the Chancery at these times. Protection of the Chancery will require the guards to:

a) carry out systematic inspections of Chancery offices and equipment with the object of

(i) detecting and reporting any physical or audible signs of surreptitious entry or physical penetration being or having been effected or attempted;

(ii) ensuring

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- (ii) ensuring that security procedures relating to the safe custody and handling of classified material have been properly observed;
- b) safeguard and control security keys;
- c) maintain and repair security containers and periodically change combination settings;
- d) install or replace security locks, bolts, bars on Chancery doors and windows;
- e) supervise the char staff and any local workmen whilst on the premises;
- f) collect from the Communications Section the white bag of classified waste, take it to the United Kingdom Permanent Mission and destroy its contents every Thursday. This task will be recorded in the Log;
- g) maintain a daily written record or log which will include
 - (i) times when guards are posted and relieved,
 - (ii) duties performed,
 - (iii) security infractions uncovered,
 - (iv) receipt of telegrams and messages during quiet hours
 - (v) admittance to Chancery during quiet hours,
 - (vi) any unusual circumstances encountered during tour of duty and action taken.

6. Within the broad framework of the above, the specific duties of the guards will be performed as described in the following paragraphs.

7. In addition to performing normal guard duties, the guards will:

- a) report as directed with the Security Guard Log Book to the Post Security Officer, who will examine all entries and initial the book. Any special instructions to guards

will be

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will be entered in the Task Book by the Post Security Officer and guards will ensure that they understand these;

- b) draw up monthly duty rosters for the approval of the Post Security Officer;
- c) be responsible for the custody, issue and return of all keys, tools, locks, security equipment and spare parts and the maintenance of an inventory of all such items on charge to the post;
- d) suggest to the Post Security Officer any action which they believe should be taken to improve the arrangements in force for the security of the Chancery.

GUARD DUTIES AND SHIFTS -

8. When one guard is absent cover is provided in accordance with the attached specimen two-guard duty schedule (Annex I). Otherwise the attached three-guard schedule will apply (Annex II).

GUARD ON EVENING SHIFT -

9. On taking over the evening shift at 5:30 p.m., the guard will

- a) enter in the log the time of his taking over the shift, and sign the log book to indicate that he has read and understands any special instructions which have been entered in the book for his guidance and attention;
- b) collect the security guard task book from the Post Security Officer and the Key Ring from Registry;
- c) ascertain from the receptionist what visitors and members of the staff are in the building;
- d) collect and return to safe any paper or other matter, which may have been in use during the day but must be kept in the safe at night;
- e) confirm that three boxes of keys are in the safe;
- f) shut and

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f) shut and lock safe.

10. As members of the staff leave the premises, the guard will take custody of their office door keys. The receipt of keys will be recorded individually on the Daily Key Control Sheet, and the keys will then be placed on a board provided for the purpose. He will also replace on his Key Ring the key to the Registry Chubb grill entrusted to the stenographers.

11. When all the staff and visitors have left the premises, except those remaining after the normal closing hour, the guard will securely lock the main entrance (ordinary lock only) and carry out his first quick round of the premises with the object of

- a) ensuring that all windows, the entrance door, the doors to the offices of the Accountant and the Officers, and the two grill doors are secured and that no fire or water hazards from burning cigarettes or running taps, etc., exist;
- b) examining possible hiding places in which an intruder may conceal himself;
- c) ensure that no classified file, document or other sensitive material has been left on desks or is otherwise unprotected.

12. He will admit, log in and supervise the char woman.

13. Having assumed responsibility for the guard of the Chancery, his most important single concern otherwise will be the close supervision of the char woman. This supervision does not imply occasionally checking her presence, but the close and uninterrupted surveillance of her activities.

14. The char woman will not clean either of the rooms in the Communications Section. Her work in the Accountant's office, the officers' offices and in the back area - including the Registry - will be especially closely watched. The guard will open the first of these offices to be cleaned, admit the char woman - checking her equipment - and keep her under the closest surveillance until that room is cleaned. He will then see her out of the room, re-lock the door, and proceed with the cleaning of the other offices and the registry in the same way until all have been cleaned. While it is desirable to clean the registry as often as possible, it may not be convenient to do so every night because of late work. It must in any case be cleaned at least as often as every Monday

morning.

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morning. Whenever the char is in the Registry, all classified material should be locked away and the key board locked in Room 1.

15. When all of her work for the evening has been completed, the guard will log out the char woman. Then, with the entrance re-locked, (Chubb lock only) he will make a thorough inspection for signs of possible tampering with the premises or equipment.

16. After all visitors, all local staff and Canadian members of the staff other than those remaining very late have left the premises, the guard will carry out his first main round of the shift in the course of which he will

- a) re-check all security containers not still in use to ensure that they are properly locked;
- b) re-check whether any classified files, documents or other sensitive material has been left on desks or otherwise unprotected;
- c) carefully re-examine all rooms, including doors, windows, walls, containers, etc., for any signs of tampering or attempted entry;
- d) unlock and leave open the doors except the entrance door and the two grill doors.

17. When the last Communications employee leaves at night, the guard will ensure that he has left the Chubb door to the Communications Section locked and has left the accordion grill in Room 5 shut and locked, with the shutters all the way down,

18. When the last person has left the premises he will lock all security containers still open, will completely lower the shutter in the Registry and will shut and lock the Chubb door on the Registry.

19. The guard may then proceed with certain incidental tasks which have been assigned to him, such as repairing locks or other equipment, examining material or furniture which has been returned to the Chancery after repair, stamping envelopes, stapling or sorting paper, etc. The completion of these tasks is to be recorded in the log and in the task book.

Guard on

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Guard on Night Shift

20. The time of takeover of keys and responsibility by the oncoming guard will be logged both by him and by the guard coming off duty, as described in paragraph 9 a).

21. Although he is permitted to sleep on duty on the late night shift, the guard should ensure by means of an alarm clock that no period of sleeping is longer than three hours duration. Between naps the guard will carry out additional inspections of the premises along the lines described above. Times for these checks will be staggered from night to night and work on incidental tasks will be adjusted to the necessity of carrying out rounds as ordered.

22. On Friday nights the guard will open each of the boxes in the safe to verify the contents against the inventories contained therein. He will also check the general contents of the safe against the inventory of the items kept in it, a copy of which is to be found on the second shelf of the safe.

23. On Monday mornings the guard will admit and supervise the char in the manner described above. On Thursday mornings he will go off for breakfast after 06:45 hours and will return to the office for the burning exercise at 10:30 hours.

24. Each morning the last regular inspection should be carried out at approximately 07:00 hours. During the hot weather the guard will use his discretion about airing out the offices and lowering blinds to provide shade from the hot morning sun. By 07:30 hours he should:

- (a) re-lock the offices of the accountant and officers;
- (b) open the Chubb door in the registry, ensuring however that the grill door is locked;
- (c) open the folding grills in all rooms other than room 5, so equipped;
- (d) remain on duty until he has issued from the key board -- against recording on the daily control sheet -- keys required by members of the Mission (he is not obliged to stay later than 08:45 for this purpose).

25. To

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25. To facilitate the issuance of keys the key board may be hung temporarily in Rooms 3, but the guard must take care to ensure that it will not be viewed by unauthorized eyes and that it is returned to the registry before he leaves the office. In the course of this operation he will also remove from the Security Guard Key Ring and entrust to the stenographers his key for the Chubb grill leading into the registry. The Security Guard Key Ring will be hung on the proper peg on the board before the guard leaves.

26. In the course of carrying out his duties, the guard on any shift will also be responsible for re-admitting members of the staff and returning to them their keys, receiving messages and telegrams, dealing with callers, etc. If members of the local staff return to work after hours or early in the morning, the guard will re-lock any sensitive offices which have been left open and keep them locked until such local members have left the premises. Particulars of all staff admitted, messages received and callers dealt with will be entered in the log.

27. On Saturday mornings during the period of two-guard cover the Canadian staff member on duty will take over from the departing Security Guard responsibility for custody of the keys. At 12:30 p.m. the Security Guard who is to be on duty on Saturday night will relieve the skeleton staff of this responsibility and will remain in the office at least until 1:00 p.m. Before leaving the offices he will make a final round and log it. On Sunday mornings it will be the responsibility of the guard who is going off duty to ensure

- (a) that the offices are secure, that all doors in the offices are locked, and
- (b) that the Security Guard Key Ring is given to the guard who will be on duty over Sunday night.

28. On Saturday mornings during three-guard cover the guard on duty should arrange to go for his lunch and to return to the office before 1:00 p.m.

Security Infractions

29. In the event of any real or suspected security infractions or security threats being discovered by the guards during the quiet hours, they will be dealt with as follows:

- (a) If the

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- (a) If the security infraction is of the sort which regrettably may occasionally occur (security containers or rooms not properly locked, classified material left about in exposed or vulnerable positions) the guard will take immediate action to protect the material involved. If a security container is discovered to be improperly locked, it should be locked and an entry made in the log for the information of the Post Security Officer. If classified material is found exposed, it should be sealed in an envelope, addressed to the Post Security Officer, and placed in his drawer in the Registry. The envelope should contain a report by the guard outlining the circumstances of the infraction and the action taken. The incident should be logged. In this connection, it should be clearly understood that the responsibility of the guard ends when he has discovered the infraction and taken the proper safeguarding action. The Post Security Officer is responsible for any subsequent investigation and corrective action.
- (b) If the circumstances are of an unusual nature and if, in the opinion of the guard, an emergency or threat exists or is imminent, he should immediately communicate by telephone with the Post Security Officer. If this officer cannot be located and he is unable to contact any other officer, and he considers such action warranted by the nature of the emergency, he should communicate directly with the Head of Post. If unable even to locate the Head of Post, he should instruct the off-duty guard to report to the Chancery, explain the situation to him, and have him acquaint the appropriate officer with the facts in person with the least possible delay. These events should be logged.

Supervision of Local Workmen

30. The recent presence of local workmen during the preparation of these new offices constitutes a security threat, the danger of which cannot be over-estimated. It is a situation which has been successfully exploited many times in the past and can be exploited whenever the utmost vigilance is even momentarily relaxed. It should always be assumed that an alien workman, however well-known and trusted, is a highly skilled technician in an offensive intelligence service.

31. Once

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31. Once the basic preparations in the office have been completed, work involving repairs and maintenance should be carried out by the guards. When this cannot be done and when the employment of local workmen is necessary, the following steps will be taken to minimize or eliminate the security threat which their presence in the Chancery involves:

- (a) Arrangements, if possible, will be made to have work carried out on Saturdays or Canadian holidays so that certain areas of the Chancery may be locked off and the defensive action concentrated on the room or rooms where the work is being done.
- (b) If more than one workman is involved, and depending on the nature of the work, the off-duty guard should be recalled and, if necessary, a member or members of the Canadian staff may be required to ensure the necessary close individual supervision of workmen.
- (c) All tools and equipment should be carefully checked on the arrival and departure of the workmen, and a most careful examination of the rooms involved will be made at the completion of the job.

Deliveries to the Chancery

32. An effective method of penetration is the installation of certain devices in furniture or equipment which has been sent off the premises for repairs. All such items will be subjected to the most minute examination on their return before being re-installed. Every delivery, even that of the most routine nature, made during the guard's tour of duty should be carefully checked and an entry to this effect made in the log. Deliveries made at other times will be brought to the attention of the guard next on duty, so that he may carry out an inspection, the results of which he will record in his log.

33. The orders promulgated for the guidance of security guards in discharging their responsibility for the protection of the Chancery are not designed to meet a security threat based on forcible entry or physical attack. This possibility is discounted.

34. The danger lies in surreptitious entry being effected, leading to the installation of intrusion devices and the gaining of access to classified material without the knowledge

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of or arousing of the suspicions of the officers of the post. The threat is a real and ever-present one, and can only successfully be combated by the most constant vigilance and scrupulous attention to detail by security guards and all other members of the Canadian staff.

M. H. WERSHOF

Max Wershof

3 Guard Scheduel.

Geneva.

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Guard A. ☐

Guard B. ☐

Guard C. ☐

Total hours worked by
Guards 527 hrs.
Hours worked per week
per Guard. 44 hrs.

Normal Mission working hours 8.30 to 12.30 1400 to 17.30

Skeleton Staff in on Sat. morning until 1230. Guard on duty allowed 1½ hrs. for lunch

Guard on duty Thurs. morning allowed 1 hr. for breakfast before destroying classified material.

Guard on duty on Sun. allowed 4 hrs. for meals, but these hours must not be regular and must be staggered.

2 Guard Scheduel.

Geneva.

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Guard A. ☐

Guard B. ☐

Total hours worked by
Guards 232 hrs.
Hours worked per week
per Guard 58 hrs.

Normal Mission working hours 8.30 to 12.30 14.00 to 17.30

Skeleton Staff in on Sat. morning until 12.30.

Guard on duty Thurs. morning allowed 1 hr. for breakfast before destroying classified material.

Guard on duty on Sun. allowed 4 hrs for meals but these hours must not be regular and must be staggered.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

Unclassified

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION
GENEVA SWITZERLAND

Reference: Our Letter No. 260 of April 3, 1957

Subject: Office accommodation - Stenographers' Room

Security:.....
No:..... 627
Date: September 18, 1957
Enclosures:.....
Air or Surface Mail: Air
Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AL-40	
43	-

References

Embassy Paris
(Mr. Monnette)
Canada House
(Mr. MacNeil)

/travel

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

As you know from earlier correspondence having to do with our move to the new offices now occupied by this Mission, we are very satisfied with our accommodation subject to one rather important reservation. This reservation concerns the room - No. 3 on the floor plan available in Ottawa - allocated to house our stenographers. Measuring only 17½ feet long by 9½ feet wide, with its walls broken by three doors (one of them a ponderous Chubb door) and one double window, room 3 is not comfortable for even two stenographers. Since we have, and require, three stenographers on our strength, one girl is now forced to share the Accountant's office - room 17. This reduces the efficiency and productivity of that busy senior clerk and seriously diminishes the usefulness of room 17 as a place in which he can transact and other personal business with visiting officials. It should also be pointed out that since room 3 has a predominantly northern exposure it receives a good deal less sunlight than other rooms on the more favoured side of the building. Moreover, a glance at the floor plan will show you that it is a crossroads on the way to the registry - room 2; and the store room (also serving now as the technician's work room) - room 1. You will note that the technician has no window of any kind.

2. With all of this unsatisfactory situation very much on our minds since our first occupancy of the new premises, we have continued to study the possibilities offered for improvement, especially as regards our stenographers, by a re-arrangement of the uses of the rooms available. One obvious possibility might be to evict Mr. Latreille who now occupies the small adjoining apartment. That accommodation might then be altered to become an integral and easily accessible part of the office as a whole. While that may be a drastic step to which we might come in the future if our foreseeable space requirements were to increase significantly, this is not something that we would now recommend. We would not recommend it because we are not sure we could put all of the rooms to good use, because the work would be difficult to accomplish, and because it would be costly. In passing, however, it may be useful to record that we understand from Mr. MacNeil, who has recently visited us from London, that there is no real need to have a guard continue to live in this small apartment

3. The second possibility - and a solution which appeals very strongly to us - is to convert rooms 11 and 12 so as to accommodate all of our stenographers in the former room. These two rooms which are at present divisible only by a folding fabric door, were originally intended as a conference room (11) and a small library (12).

4. After nearly one year of experience here we have learned that, attractive as the conference room may be and logical as its intended use may have seemed in theory, Room 11 will virtually never serve the purpose for which it was mainly intended - namely as a meeting place for visiting Canadian delegations. Delegations to ILO have traditionally used the Hotel de la Paix for this purpose, and for very good reasons, including the fact of their tripartite composition, intend to keep on doing so. Our delegations to WHO are never large enough to warrant using a room the size of Room 11, which in any case they would use only infrequently. Delegations to GATT are normally in the same position as those to WHO. When this is not the case, as during the remaining months of this year, the officials concerned with GATT prefer to have their center of activity, including their delegation meeting place, at the Palais des Nations. More as an experiment than a reflection of conviction, the delegation to the recent July session of ECOSOC used Room 11 as its principal meeting place. So far as we can tell none of the persons concerned is really anxious to repeat that test since the efficiency and the working comfort of an ECOSOC delegation would undoubtedly be enhanced by keeping its meeting place and its headquarters together at the Palais des Nations.

5. Thus we are left with the two necessary elements for a change: first the serious need for some improvement in the accommodation of our stenographers and second the presence of an eminently suitable area virtually ineffective for any other useful purpose. Accordingly we recommend that we be given authority to begin as soon as possible with the necessary small alterations, that is to say the construction of a solid wall out by one door between Rooms 11 and 12 which would follow the red line shown on the attached rough drawing (Annex 1). The approximate cost of the wall is Sw.Fr. 496.- as shown in Annex II. This estimate does not include the cost of the door, but we have been advised by the building architects that they will install the door at a cost of approximately Sw.Fr. 200.-. At the same time we would point out that reasonable sound proofing of Rooms 3 (Messrs. Clark and Bourbonnière), 9 (Mr. Wershof), 10 (Mr. Jay) and 11 and 12, is likely to be recommended by Mr. MacNeil.

6. The solution we are recommending would have the advantage of providing the stenographers with a roomy well-lighted and ventilated area convenient to the officers and to visiting delegations. The necessary work would cost relatively little and would be easy to execute. This solution would still leave the library - Room 12 - (slightly enlarged by having been squared) available as a smaller conference room for ad hoc meetings as required by visitors. The table in that room can seat ten persons comfortably. Finally, although the separation of Rooms 11 and 12 will defeat their intended combined purpose as a projection room, it is a fact that our projector is rarely used in the office and when necessary could still be employed in Room 11 alone.

7. The only residual problem that would be created by the recommended alteration would be the need to dispose of the particularly large conference table (and possibly some of its chairs) now in Room 11. If you approve our recommendation, as we very much hope you will do by telegram, you might wish to indicate what should be done with this valuable, handsome but bulky piece of furniture. Perhaps it might be sent to a larger Mission for use, perhaps, as a library table. At the same time you might wish to let us know whether it would be in order for us to allow our technician to make use of Room 3 for his work shop, should the stenographers in fact be moved to Room 11.

M. H. WERSHOF
Permanent Mission

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION,.....
..... GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.....

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Your letter 590 of Aug. 27, 1957.....
Subject: .. Despatch Case left behind by.....
..... F. L. Hammond.....
.....

Security: RESTRICTED

No: DS- 523

Date: Sept. 13, 1957.

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AL-41	
43.	50

References

Please retain despatch case No. 118
as requested. The keys are being sent to you
under separate cover by air courier. Would
you kindly acknowledge receipt of keys and
case in the customary way.

J. TIMMERMAN
for Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

RESTRICTED.

50048-AL-40
43 ✓

Ottawa, September 13, 1957

FROM: THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA
TO: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

Sept. 18

We are forwarding by (AIR COURIER ³⁸) the following:-

ONE (1) ATTACHE CASE #118 (This case is already in your possession was brought over by Mr. Hammond for the recent 24th session.)

TWO (2) KEYS SL 46 for the above case attached herewith.

Please refer to your letter No. 590, of Aug. 27, 1957 and our reply DS 523 of Sept. 13, 1957.

When the above has been received and checked, would you kindly sign and return the original form Ext. 27 R.

J. TIMMERMAN

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs


Att: C. d'Ornano, D. L. 2, Rm. 251 East Block.

This is to certify that the above mentioned items have been received in good order.

Place

Date

Signature



Original on 50048-FIM-

FM LDN SEP2/57 UNCLAS
TO EXTERNAL 2261

FOR DL(2)

MACNEIL TO BERNE AM 3RD THENCE TO GENEVA 7TH RETURNING LDN ABOUT 13TH.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

Reference:

Subject: Despatch case left behind by F.L. Hammond

Unclassified

Security:

No: 590

Date: August 27, 1957.

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.

50048-AL-40

43

✓

References

Mr. F.L. Hammond, who was attached to the Canadian Delegation to the 24th Session of the Economic and Social Council, left by mistake Despatch case No. 118 here in Geneva. He had brought this case over as a diplomatic pouch.

2. Rather than send this rather bulky case back to Ottawa we are wondering if it would not be simpler to forward the keys for it to us and we would take it into our inventory.

3. At present, we have two despatch cases on inventory and can always use a third when we have delegations here.

M. H. WERSHOF
Permanent Mission.

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

2 Keys SL 46
for # 118 att case
forwarded to Am/R
for Am
Sept 16/57
File

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

NUMBERED LETTER

File 5/11

TO: UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Security: **Confidential**
No: 577

Date: **August 22, 1957**

Enclosures: **3 in duplicate**

Air or Surface Mail: **Air**

Post File No: **Off 2-7**

FROM: **The Canadian Permanent Mission,
Geneva, Switzerland.**

Reference: **Our Letter No. 131 of February 19, 1957.**

Subject: **Security -- Security Guards**

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AL-40	
58	50

References

We have recently incorporated a number of minor amendments in our Standing Orders for Security Guards. Accordingly we are attaching a copy of the revised standing orders dated August 20, 1957.

2. You will note that attached to this revision are sample duty schedules for the period when all three guards are on duty and for the period when one guard is on leave. In the former case each guard works approximately 44 hours per week, and in the latter approximately 58 hours per week.

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SEP 5 1957

Max Wenshof
Permanent Mission

Internal Circulation

7

Distribution to Posts

Mr Marshall.
Would you reply to Res with copy to PSO (who should also be sent copies of Res Geneva letter & attachment).

H 29/10

A copy of this was received previously from the regional security officer
4/11/57

Confidential

August 22, 1957

The Canadian Permanent Mission,
Geneva, Switzerland.

5 in duplicate

Air

Our letter No. 171 of February 19, 1957.

Security -- Security Guards

We have recently incorporated a number of minor amendments in our Standing Orders for Security Guards. Accordingly we are attaching a copy of the revised standing orders dated August 20, 1957.

You will note that attached to this revision are sample duty schedules for the period when all three guards are on duty and for the period when one guard is on leave. In the former case each guard works approximately 14 hours per week, and in the latter approximately 28 hours per week.

Permanent Mission

1957 SEP 11 PM 11:07

File
CONFIDENTIAL

August 20, 1957

STANDING ORDERS FOR SECURITY GUARDS

GENERAL

The Head of Mission is responsible for the security of his post. Mr. Jay has been designated by him as Post Security Officer and is responsible to him for the enforcement and control of all security arrangements, including the supervision and direction of the security guards in their conduct and faithful, diligent and efficient discharge of their duties.

2. Whether on or off duty, the conduct of the security guards must be irreproachable. When on duty they are to be neatly and properly dressed. They will be alert and attentive to their duties and must be polite and courteous in their dealings with callers and members of the public.

3. Guards will familiarize themselves with the Departmental regulations, the Standing Security Orders of the post, and the following.

4. Security guards, as all Canadian-based staff, must be meticulously careful about divulging information to unauthorized persons. Loose or unguarded talk can cause incalculable damage.

BASIC DUTIES OF SECURITY GUARDS

5. The primary and over-riding duty of security guards is the protection of the Chancery in the danger period of the quiet or non-working hours. Certain tasks may be assigned through the Security Officer to guards during their tours of duty, but nothing must interfere with the protection provided by the presence of the guard in the Chancery at these times. Protection of the Chancery will require the guards to:

a) carry out systematic inspections of Chancery offices and equipment with the object of

(i) detecting and reporting any physical or audible signs of surreptitious entry or physical penetration being or having been effected or attempted;

(ii) ensuring

- 2 -

- (ii) ensuring that security procedures relating to the safe custody and handling of classified material have been properly observed;
- b) safeguard and control security keys;
- c) maintain and repair security containers and periodically change combination settings;
- d) install or replace security locks, bolts, bars on Chancery doors and windows;
- e) supervise the char staff and any local workmen whilst on the premises;
- f) collect from the Communications Section the white bag of classified waste, take it to the United Kingdom Permanent Mission and destroy its contents every Thursday. This task will be recorded in the Log;
- g) maintain a daily written record or log which will include
 - (i) times when guards are posted and relieved,
 - (ii) duties performed,
 - (iii) security infractions uncovered,
 - (iv) receipt of telegrams and messages during quiet hours
 - (v) admittance to Chancery during quiet hours,
 - (vi) any unusual circumstances encountered during tour of duty and action taken.

6. Within the broad framework of the above, the specific duties of the guards will be performed as described in the following paragraphs.

7. In addition to performing normal guard duties, the guards will:

- a) report as directed with the Security Guard Log Book to the Post Security Officer, who will examine all entries and initial the book. Any special instructions to guards

will be

000510

- 3 -

will be entered in the Task Book by the Post Security Officer and guards will ensure that they understand these;

- b) draw up monthly duty rosters for the approval of the Post Security Officer;
- c) be responsible for the custody, issue and return of all keys, tools, locks, security equipment and spare parts and the maintenance of an inventory of all such items on charge to the post;
- d) suggest to the Post Security Officer any action which they believe should be taken to improve the arrangements in force for the security of the Chancery.

GUARD DUTIES AND SHIFTS -

8. When one guard is absent cover is provided in accordance with the attached specimen two-guard duty schedule (Annex I). Otherwise the attached three-guard schedule will apply (Annex II).

GUARD ON EVENING SHIFT -

9. On taking over the evening shift at 5:30 p.m., the guard will

- a) enter in the log the time of his taking over the shift, and sign the log book to indicate that he has read and understands any special instructions which have been entered in the book for his guidance and attention;
- b) collect the security guard task book from the Post Security Officer and the Key Ring from Registry;
- c) ascertain from the receptionist what visitors and members of the staff are in the building;
- d) collect and return to safe any paper or other matter, which may have been in use during the day but must be kept in the safe at night;
- e) confirm that three boxes of keys are in the safe;

f) shut and

- 4 -

f) shut and lock safe.

10. As members of the staff leave the premises, the guard will take custody of their office door keys. The receipt of keys will be recorded individually on the Daily Key Control Sheet, and the keys will then be placed on a board provided for the purpose. He will also replace on his Key Ring the key to the Registry Chubb grill entrusted to the stenographers.

11. When all the staff and visitors have left the premises, except those remaining after the normal closing hour, the guard will securely lock the main entrance (ordinary lock only) and carry out his first quick round of the premises with the object of

- a) ensuring that all windows, the entrance door, the doors to the offices of the Accountant and the Officers, and the two grill doors are secured and that no fire or water hazards from burning cigarettes or running taps, etc., exist;
- b) examining possible hiding places in which an intruder may conceal himself;
- c) ensure that no classified file, document or other sensitive material has been left on desks or is otherwise unprotected.

12. He will admit, log in and supervise the char woman.

13. Having assumed responsibility for the guard of the Chancery, his most important single concern otherwise will be the close supervision of the char woman. This supervision does not imply occasionally checking her presence, but the close and uninterrupted surveillance of her activities.

14. The char woman will not clean either of the rooms in the Communications Section. Her work in the Accountant's office, the officers' offices and in the back area - including the Registry - will be especially closely watched. The guard will open the first of these offices to be cleaned, admit the char woman - checking her equipment - and keep her under the closest surveillance until that room is cleaned. He will then see her out of the room, re-lock the door, and proceed with the cleaning of the other offices and the registry in the same way until all have been cleaned. While it is desirable to clean the registry as often as possible, it may not be convenient to do so every night because of late work. It must in any case be cleaned at least as often as every Monday

morning.

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- 5 -

morning. Whenever the char is in the Registry, all classified material should be locked away and the key board locked in Room 1.

15. When all of her work for the evening has been completed, the guard will log out the char woman. Then, with the entrance re-locked, (Chubb lock only) he will make a thorough inspection for signs of possible tampering with the premises or equipment.

16. After all visitors, all local staff and Canadian members of the staff other than those remaining very late have left the premises, the guard will carry out his first main round of the shift in the course of which he will

- a) re-check all security containers not still in use to ensure that they are properly locked;
- b) re-check whether any classified files, documents or other sensitive material has been left on desks or otherwise unprotected;
- c) carefully re-examine all rooms, including doors, windows, walls, containers, etc., for any signs of tampering or attempted entry;
- d) unlock and leave open the doors except the entrance door and the two grill doors.

17. When the last Communications employee leaves at night, the guard will ensure that he has left the Chubb door to the Communications Section locked and has left the accordion grill in Room 5 shut and locked, with the shutters all the way down.

18. When the last person has left the premises he will lock all security containers still open, will completely lower the shutter in the Registry and will shut and lock the Chubb door on the Registry.

19. The guard may then proceed with certain incidental tasks which have been assigned to him, such as repairing locks or other equipment, examining material or furniture which has been returned to the Chancery after repair, stamping envelopes, stapling or sorting paper, etc. The completion of these tasks is to be recorded in the log and in the task book.

Guard on

Guard on Night Shift

20. The time of takeover of keys and responsibility by the oncoming guard will be logged both by him and by the guard coming off duty, as described in paragraph 9 a).

21. Although he is permitted to sleep on duty on the late night shift, the guard should ensure by means of an alarm clock that no period of sleeping is longer than three hours duration. Between naps the guard will carry out additional inspections of the premises along the lines described above. Times for these checks will be staggered from night to night and work on incidental tasks will be adjusted to the necessity of carrying out rounds as ordered.

22. On Friday nights the guard will open each of the boxes in the safe to verify the contents against the inventories contained therein. He will also check the general contents of the safe against the inventory of the items kept in it, a copy of which is to be found on the second shelf of the safe.

23. On Monday mornings the guard will admit and supervise the char in the manner described above. On Thursday mornings he will go off for breakfast after 08:45 hours and will return to the office for the burning exercise at 10:30 hours.

24. Each morning the last regular inspection should be carried out at approximately 07:00 hours. During the hot weather the guard will use his discretion about airing out the offices and lowering blinds to provide shade from the hot morning sun. By 07:30 hours he should:

- (a) re-lock the offices of the accountant and officers;
- (b) open the Chubb door in the registry, ensuring however that the grill door is locked;
- (c) open the folding grills in all rooms other than room 5, so equipped;
- (d) remain on duty until he has issued from the key board -- against recording on the daily control sheet -- keys required by members of the Mission (he is not obliged to stay later than 08:45 for this purpose).

25. To

- 7 -

25. To facilitate the issuance of keys the key board may be hung temporarily in Rooms 3, but the guard must take care to ensure that it will not be viewed by unauthorized eyes and that it is returned to the registry before he leaves the office. In the course of this operation he will also remove from the Security Guard Key Ring and entrust to the stenographers his key for the Chubb grill leading into the registry. The Security Guard Key Ring will be hung on the proper peg on the board before the guard leaves.

26. In the course of carrying out his duties, the guard on any shift will also be responsible for re-admitting members of the staff and returning to them their keys, receiving messages and telegrams, dealing with callers, etc. If members of the local staff return to work after hours or early in the morning, the guard will re-lock any sensitive offices which have been left open and keep them locked until such local members have left the premises. Particulars of all staff admitted, messages received and callers dealt with will be entered in the log.

27. On Saturday mornings during the period of two-guard cover the Canadian staff member on duty will take over from the departing Security Guard responsibility for custody of the keys. At 12:30 p.m. the Security Guard who is to be on duty on Saturday night will relieve the skeleton staff of this responsibility and will remain in the office at least until 1:00 p.m. Before leaving the offices he will make a final round and log it. On Sunday mornings it will be the responsibility of the guard who is going off duty to ensure

- (a) that the offices are secure, that all doors in the offices are locked, and
- (b) that the Security Guard Key Ring is given to the guard who will be on duty over Sunday night.

28. On Saturday mornings during three-guard cover the guard on duty should arrange to go for his lunch and to return to the office before 1:00 p.m.

Security Infractions

29. In the event of any real or suspected security infractions or security threats being discovered by the guards during the quiet hours, they will be dealt with as follows:

- (a) If the

- 8 -

- (a) If the security infraction is of the sort which regrettably may occasionally occur (security containers or rooms not properly locked, classified material left about in exposed or vulnerable positions) the guard will take immediate action to protect the material involved. If a security container is discovered to be improperly locked, it should be locked and an entry made in the log for the information of the Post Security Officer. If classified material is found exposed, it should be sealed in an envelope, addressed to the Post Security Officer, and placed in his drawer in the Registry. The envelope should contain a report by the guard outlining the circumstances of the infraction and the action taken. The incident should be logged. In this connection, it should be clearly understood that the responsibility of the guard ends when he has discovered the infraction and taken the proper safeguarding action. The Post Security Officer is responsible for any subsequent investigation and corrective action.
- (b) If the circumstances are of an unusual nature and if, in the opinion of the guard, an emergency or threat exists or is imminent, he should immediately communicate by telephone with the Post Security Officer. If this officer cannot be located and he is unable to contact any other officer, and he considers such action warranted by the nature of the emergency, he should communicate directly with the Head of Post. If unable even to locate the Head of Post, he should instruct the off-duty guard to report to the Chancery, explain the situation to him, and have him acquaint the appropriate officer with the facts in person with the least possible delay. These events should be logged.

Supervision of Local Workmen

30. The recent presence of local workmen during the preparation of these new offices constitutes a security threat, the danger of which cannot be over-estimated. It is a situation which has been successfully exploited many times in the past and can be exploited whenever the utmost vigilance is even momentarily relaxed. It should always be assumed that an alien workman, however well-known and trusted, is a highly skilled technician in an offensive intelligence service.

31. Once

- 9 -

31. Once the basic preparations in the office have been completed, work involving repairs and maintenance should be carried out by the guards. When this cannot be done and when the employment of local workmen is necessary, the following steps will be taken to minimize or eliminate the security threat which their presence in the Chancery involves:

- (a) Arrangements, if possible, will be made to have work carried out on Saturdays or Canadian holidays so that certain areas of the Chancery may be locked off and the defensive action concentrated on the room or rooms where the work is being done.
- (b) If more than one workman is involved, and depending on the nature of the work, the off-duty guard should be recalled and, if necessary, a member or members of the Canadian staff may be required to ensure the necessary close individual supervision of workmen.
- (c) All tools and equipment should be carefully checked on the arrival and departure of the workmen, and a most careful examination of the rooms involved will be made at the completion of the job.

Deliveries to the Chancery


32. An effective method of penetration is the installation of certain devices in furniture or equipment which has been sent off the premises for repairs. All such items will be subjected to the most minute examination on their return before being re-installed. Every delivery, even that of the most routine nature, made during the guard's tour of duty should be carefully checked and an entry to this effect made in the log. Deliveries made at other times will be brought to the attention of the guard next on duty, so that he may carry out an inspection, the results of which he will record in his log.

33. The orders promulgated for the guidance of security guards in discharging their responsibility for the protection of the Chancery are not designed to meet a security threat based on forcible entry or physical attack. This possibility is discounted.

34. The danger lies in surreptitious entry being effected, leading to the installation of intrusion devices and the gaining of access to classified material without the knowledge

- 10 -

of or arousing of the suspicions of the officers of the post. The threat is a real and ever-present one, and can only successfully be combated by the most constant vigilance and scrupulous attention to detail by security guards and all other members of the Canadian staff.


Max Wershof

CONFIDENTIAL

August 20, 1957

STANDING ORDERS FOR SECURITY GUARDS

GENERAL

The Head of Mission is responsible for the security of his post. Mr. Jay has been designated by him as Post Security Officer and is responsible to him for the enforcement and control of all security arrangements, including the supervision and direction of the security guards in their conduct and faithful, diligent and efficient discharge of their duties.

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3. Guards will familiarize themselves with the Departmental regulations, the Standing Security Orders of the post, and the following.

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BASIC DUTIES OF SECURITY GUARDS

5. The primary and over-riding duty of security guards is the protection of the Chancery in the danger period of the quiet or non-working hours. Certain tasks may be assigned through the Security Officer to guards during their tours of duty, but nothing must interfere with the protection provided by the presence of the guard in the Chancery at these times. Protection of the Chancery will require the guards to:

a) carry out systematic inspections of Chancery offices and equipment with the object of

(i) detecting and reporting any physical or audible signs of surreptitious entry or physical penetration being or having been effected or attempted;

(ii) ensuring

- 2 -

- (ii) ensuring that security procedures relating to the safe custody and handling of classified material have been properly observed;
- b) safeguard and control security keys;
- c) maintain and repair security containers and periodically change combination settings;
- d) install or replace security locks, bolts, bars on Chancery doors and windows;
- e) supervise the char staff and any local workmen whilst on the premises;
- f) collect from the Communications Section the white bag of classified waste, take it to the United Kingdom Permanent Mission and destroy its contents every Thursday. This task will be recorded in the Log;
- g) maintain a daily written record or log which will include
 - (i) times when guards are posted and relieved,
 - (ii) duties performed,
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 - (v) admittance to Chancery during quiet hours,
 - (vi) any unusual circumstances encountered during tour of duty and action taken.

6. Within the broad framework of the above, the specific duties of the guards will be performed as described in the following paragraphs.

7. In addition to performing normal guard duties, the guards will:

- a) report as directed with the Security Guard Log Book to the Post Security Officer, who will examine all entries and initial the book. Any special instructions to guards

will be

000520

- 3 -

will be entered in the Task Book by the Post Security Officer and guards will ensure that they understand these;

- b) draw up monthly duty rosters for the approval of the Post Security Officer;
- c) be responsible for the custody, issue and return of all keys, tools, locks, security equipment and spare parts and the maintenance of an inventory of all such items on charge to the post;
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GUARD DUTIES AND SHIFTS -

8. When one guard is absent cover is provided in accordance with the attached specimen two-guard duty schedule (Annex I). Otherwise the attached three-guard schedule will apply (Annex II).

GUARD ON EVENING SHIFT -

9. On taking over the evening shift at 5:30 p.m., the guard will

- a) enter in the log the time of his taking over the shift, and sign the log book to indicate that he has read and understands any special instructions which have been entered in the book for his guidance and attention;
- b) collect the security guard task book from the Post Security Officer and the Key Ring from Registry;
- c) ascertain from the receptionist what visitors and members of the staff are in the building;
- d) collect and return to safe any paper or other matter, which may have been in use during the day but must be kept in the safe at night;
- e) confirm that three boxes of keys are in the safe;

f) shut and

- 4 -

f) shut and lock safe.

10. As members of the staff leave the premises, the guard will take custody of their office door keys. The receipt of keys will be recorded individually on the Daily Key Control Sheet; and the keys will then be placed on a board provided for the purpose. He will also replace on his Key Ring the key to the Registry Chubb grill entrusted to the stenographers.

11. When all the staff and visitors have left the premises, except those remaining after the normal closing hour, the guard will securely lock the main entrance (ordinary lock only) and carry out his first quick round of the premises with the object of

- a) ensuring that all windows, the entrance door, the doors to the offices of the Accountant and the Officers, and the two grill doors are secured and that no fire or water hazards from burning cigarettes or running taps, etc., exist;
- b) examining possible hiding places in which an intruder may conceal himself;
- c) ensure that no classified file, document or other sensitive material has been left on desks or is otherwise unprotected.

12. He will admit, log in and supervise the char woman.

13. Having assumed responsibility for the guard of the Chancery, his most important single concern otherwise will be the close supervision of the char woman. This supervision does not imply occasionally checking her presence, but the close and uninterrupted surveillance of her activities.

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morning.

000522

- 5 -

morning. Whenever the char is in the Registry, all classified material should be locked away and the key board locked in Room 1.

15. When all of her work for the evening has been completed, the guard will log out the char woman. Then, with the entrance re-locked, (Chubb lock only) he will make a thorough inspection for signs of possible tampering with the premises or equipment.

16. After all visitors, all local staff and Canadian members of the staff other than those remaining very late have left the premises, the guard will carry out his first main round of the shift in the course of which he will

- a) re-check all security containers not still in use to ensure that they are properly locked;
- b) re-check whether any classified files, documents or other sensitive material has been left on desks or otherwise unprotected;
- c) carefully re-examine all rooms, including doors, windows, walls, containers, etc., for any signs of tampering or attempted entry;
- d) unlock and leave open the doors except the entrance door and the two grill doors.

17. When the last Communications employee leaves at night, the guard will ensure that he has left the Chubb door to the Communications Section locked and has left the accordion grill in Room 5 shut and locked, with the shutters all the way down.

18. When the last person has left the premises he will lock all security containers still open, will completely lower the shutter in the Registry and will shut and lock the Chubb door on the Registry.

19. The guard may then proceed with certain incidental tasks which have been assigned to him, such as repairing locks or other equipment, examining material or furniture which has been returned to the Chancery after repair, stamping envelopes, stapling or sorting paper, etc. The completion of these tasks is to be recorded in the log and in the task book.

Guard on

- 6 -

Guard on Night Shift

20. The time of takeover of keys and responsibility by the oncoming guard will be logged both by him and by the guard coming off duty, as described in paragraph 9 a).

21. Although he is permitted to sleep on duty on the late night shift, the guard should ensure by means of an alarm clock that no period of sleeping is longer than three hours duration. Between naps the guard will carry out additional inspections of the premises along the lines described above. Times for these checks will be staggered from night to night and work on incidental tasks will be adjusted to the necessity of carrying out rounds as ordered.

22. On Friday nights the guard will open each of the boxes in the safe to verify the contents against the inventories contained therein. He will also check the general contents of the safe against the inventory of the items kept in it, a copy of which is to be found on the second shelf of the safe.

23. On Monday mornings the guard will admit and supervise the char in the manner described above. On Thursday mornings he will go off for breakfast after 08:45 hours and will return to the office for the burning exercise at 10:30 hours.

24. Each morning the last regular inspection should be carried out at approximately 07:00 hours. During the hot weather the guard will use his discretion about airing out the offices and lowering blinds to provide shade from the hot morning sun. By 07:30 hours he should:

- (a) re-lock the offices of the accountant and officers;
- (b) open the Chubb door in the registry, ensuring however that the grill door is locked;
- (c) open the folding grills in all rooms other than room 5, so equipped;
- (d) remain on duty until he has issued from the key board -- against recording on the daily control sheet -- keys required by members of the Mission (he is not obliged to stay later than 08:45 for this purpose).

25. To

- 7 -

25. To facilitate the issuance of keys the key board may be hung temporarily in Rooms 3, but the guard must take care to ensure that it will not be viewed by unauthorized eyes and that it is returned to the registry before he leaves the office. In the course of this operation he will also remove from the Security Guard Key Ring and entrust to the stenographers his key for the Chubb grill leading into the registry. The Security Guard Key Ring will be hung on the proper peg on the board before the guard leaves.

26. In the course of carrying out his duties, the guard on any shift will also be responsible for re-admitting members of the staff and returning to them their keys, receiving messages and telegrams, dealing with callers, etc. If members of the local staff return to work after hours or early in the morning, the guard will re-lock any sensitive offices which have been left open and keep them locked until such local members have left the premises. Particulars of all staff admitted, messages received and callers dealt with will be entered in the log.

27. On Saturday mornings during the period of two-guard cover the Canadian staff member on duty will take over from the departing Security Guard responsibility for custody of the keys. At 12:30 p.m. the Security Guard who is to be on duty on Saturday night will relieve the skeleton staff of this responsibility and will remain in the office at least until 1:00 p.m. Before leaving the offices he will make a final round and log it. On Sunday mornings it will be the responsibility of the guard who is going off duty to ensure

- (a) that the offices are secure, that all doors in the offices are locked, and
- (b) that the Security Guard Key Ring is given to the guard who will be on duty over Sunday night.

28. On Saturday mornings during three-guard cover the guard on duty should arrange to go for his lunch and to return to the office before 1:00 p.m.

Security Infractions

29. In the event of any real or suspected security infractions or security threats being discovered by the guards during the quiet hours, they will be dealt with as follows:

- (a) If the

- 8 -

- (a) If the security infraction is of the sort which regrettably may occasionally occur (security containers or rooms not properly locked, classified material left about in exposed or vulnerable positions) the guard will take immediate action to protect the material involved. If a security container is discovered to be improperly locked, it should be locked and an entry made in the log for the information of the Post Security Officer. If classified material is found exposed, it should be sealed in an envelope, addressed to the Post Security Officer, and placed in his drawer in the Registry. The envelope should contain a report by the guard outlining the circumstances of the infraction and the action taken. The incident should be logged. In this connection, it should be clearly understood that the responsibility of the guard ends when he has discovered the infraction and taken the proper safeguarding action. The Post Security Officer is responsible for any subsequent investigation and corrective action.
- (b) If the circumstances are of an unusual nature and if, in the opinion of the guard, an emergency or threat exists or is imminent, he should immediately communicate by telephone with the Post Security Officer. If this officer cannot be located and he is unable to contact any other officer, and he considers such action warranted by the nature of the emergency, he should communicate directly with the Head of Post. If unable even to locate the Head of Post, he should instruct the off-duty guard to report to the Chancery, explain the situation to him, and have him acquaint the appropriate officer with the facts in person with the least possible delay. These events should be logged.

Supervision of Local Workmen

30. The recent presence of local workmen during the preparation of these new offices constitutes a security threat, the danger of which cannot be over-estimated. It is a situation which has been successfully exploited many times in the past and can be exploited whenever the utmost vigilance is even momentarily relaxed. It should always be assumed that an alien workman, however well-known and trusted, is a highly skilled technician in an offensive intelligence service.

31. Once

- 9 -

31. Once the basic preparations in the office have been completed, work involving repairs and maintenance should be carried out by the guards. When this cannot be done and when the employment of local workmen is necessary, the following steps will be taken to minimize or eliminate the security threat which their presence in the Chancery involves:

- (a) Arrangements, if possible, will be made to have work carried out on Saturdays or Canadian holidays so that certain areas of the Chancery may be locked off and the defensive action concentrated on the room or rooms where the work is being done.
- (b) If more than one workman is involved, and depending on the nature of the work, the off-duty guard should be recalled and, if necessary, a member or members of the Canadian staff may be required to ensure the necessary close individual supervision of workmen.
- (c) All tools and equipment should be carefully checked on the arrival and departure of the workmen, and a most careful examination of the rooms involved will be made at the completion of the job.

Deliveries to the Chancery

32. An effective method of penetration is the installation of certain devices in furniture or equipment which has been sent off the premises for repairs. All such items will be subjected to the most minute examination on their return before being re-installed. Every delivery, even that of the most routine nature, made during the guard's tour of duty should be carefully checked and an entry to this effect made in the log. Deliveries made at other times will be brought to the attention of the guard next on duty, so that he may carry out an inspection, the results of which he will record in his log.

33. The orders promulgated for the guidance of security guards in discharging their responsibility for the protection of the Chancery are not designed to meet a security threat based on forcible entry or physical attack. This possibility is discounted.

34. The danger lies in surreptitious entry being effected, leading to the installation of intrusion devices and the gaining of access to classified material without the knowledge

- 10 -

of or arousing of the suspicions of the officers of the post. The threat is a real and ever-present one, and can only successfully be combated by the most constant vigilance and scrupulous attention to detail by security guards and all other members of the Canadian staff.




M. H. WERSHOF

Max Wershof

3 Guard Schedule

Geneva

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
Mon																								
Tues																								
Wed																								
Thurs																								
Fri																								
Sat																								
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Guard A. 
Guard B. 
Guard C. 

Total Hours worked by
Guard. 527 hrs.
Average per week 44 hrs.
per Guard.

Guard coming off duty on Thurs. morning allowed 1 hour for breakfast before burning classified material.
Guard on duty on Sat. morning allowed 1½ hours for lunch.
Guard on duty on Sun. allowed 4 hours for meals but these times must not be regular.
Regular Mission hours; 0830--1230 1400--1730
Skeleton Staff plus guard in on Sat. morning.

Guard A.

Guard B.

Average per week 58 hrs
per Guard.

3 Guard Schedule.

Geneva.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
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Guard A.

Guard B.

Guard C.

Total Hours worked by
Guard 527 hrs.
Average per week 44 hrs.
per Guard.

Guard coming off duty on Thurs. morning allowed 1 hour for breakfast before burning classified material.
Guard on duty on Sat. morning allowed 1½ hours for lunch.
Guard on duty on Sun. allowed 4 hours for meals but these times must not be regular.
Regular Mission hours; 8.30 A.M. -- 12.30 1400-- 17.30
Skeleton Staff plus guard in on Sat. morning.

I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

Guard A. ☐

Guard B. ☐

000532

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Permanent Mission,
Geneva, Switzerland.

Reference: Our Letter No. 339 of May 7, 1957

Subject: Change of Combination Settings

Security: SECRET

No: 550

Date: August 15, 1957

Enclosures: One

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.

50048-AL-40

52

52

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20 AUG 1957

In accordance with the instructions contained
in Circular Document Admin. 8/56 of February 20, 1956, the
combinations of all locks in use at this Mission have been
reset.

2. The settings of the new combinations in
current use are listed in the attached sealed envelope.

Permanent Mission

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

30

50048-AL-40	
58	50

OTTAWA, July 9, 1957.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Bob:

I have just received a copy of Max Wershof's letter to you of July 2, 1957, to which I expect you will be replying shortly, if you have not already done so, with a copy to us.

This is just to say that both we and Communications Division do not object to shutters being fully raised during working hours, and agree that it would be desirable for Geneva to have on hand dust covers with which to cover machines at night and whilst foreign workmen are required to work in the Communications Room. We suggest that these dust covers be purchased locally.

Yours sincerely,


J. Zimmerman.

R.A.S. MacNeil, Esq.,
Office of the High Commissioner for Canada,
Canada House,
LONDON, S.W.1.

PERMANENT MISSION OF CANADA TO THE
PEAN OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS



MISSION PERMANENTE DU CANADA AUPRÈS
DE L'OFFICE EUROPÉEN DES NATIONS UNIES


16 Parc du Château-Banquet,

Geneva, Switzerland.

July 2, 1957.

Top Secret

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET



Dear Mr. MacNeil,

I refer to my letter of February 20, 1957, in which I enquired about the possible time at which we might expect to receive a visit from the British Foreign Service Technical Maintenance Service. I have heard indirectly that Mr. Timmerman may now be visiting the Hague and it has occurred to me that he might be there in conjunction with a technical service inspection by the BFSTMS, and that there may be a desire to have the inspection team come on to Geneva in the near future.

While we are of course anxious to have this service as soon as it can be conveniently arranged, you should know that we are now in the middle of the most hectic period of our conference season. In the circumstances we would much prefer to have a visit from the BFSTMS at some later stage, possibly after the middle of September when the heavy conference season will be over and when both Mr. Jay, the Security Officer, and myself will be present in Geneva after our respective holidays. I would very much appreciate hearing from you about the plans for inspecting our premises.

I might also take this occasion to mention another matter relating to security. As you will have noted from paragraph 4 (5) of our letter No. 131 of February 19, copy of which was sent to you, we have been relying on outside vision proof shutters to comply with the letter of the regulations which seeks to avoid the possibility that cypher equipment can be overlooked. It has been our practice in this

*MacNeil
James
James*

. . . . 2

R.A.S. MacNeil Esq.,
Regional Security Officer,
Office of the High Commissioner
for Canada,
Canada House,
London, S.W.1,
England.

000535

- 2 -

regard to insist that the shutters be raised not more than one-quarter during working hours. You will appreciate that during the hot weather considerable discomfort is occasioned to our communications personnel. Taking advantage of a recent visit on leave to Geneva of Mr. Hamilton Southam, I drew his attention to this difficulty. In his view, with which I entirely agree, there would seem no real purpose in continuing to insist that these blinds not be raised to the full extent possible, since the windows of the cypher room look out over a large park on the side of Lake Geneva. Because of this, and because we are on the sixth floor with no building opposite, it is hard to envisage how unfriendly eyes could be so placed as to look into our cypher room. In these circumstances I should welcome your concurrence that it will be permissible for us to authorize the communications personnel to raise the shutters fully during working hours.

*Wershof
Comm's
agrees.*

Another matter on which I would welcome your views concerns the occasional time when it is necessary to have workmen enter the communications area. It has come to my mind that it would be highly desirable for such occasions to have on hand duster covers similar to those used as covers for automobiles or washing machines and the like, which can be thrown over our equipment as necessary. Indeed in the interests of maintaining the maximum efficiency of our machinery there would seem to be some point in putting such duster covers over the machinery at any time that it is not in use.

Perhaps you could let me have your view as to whether you think this might be a useful suggestion for consideration in Ottawa.

Yours sincerely,

M. H. WERSHOF

Max Wershof

cc: D.L.(2) Division, ✓
Ottawa.

000536

Restricted.	
58	✓

Ottawa, June 6, 1957

FROM: THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA
TO: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

We are forwarding by (Air Courier 23) the following:-

SIX (6) SPINDLE KEYS - These have been filed to fit M6730 - MP Combination Lock.

Please refer to your Requisition No. 6, of May 1, 1957 to Supplies and Properties Division. Requests for parts for Security Equipment, locks, etc. should be addressed directly by letter to D. L. (2) Division, with copies to RSO in London. (Note: Some of these spindles may require a little additional filing but may be made to fit M Locks quite well.)

When the above has been received and checked, would you kindly sign and return the original form Ext. 27 R.

J. TIMMERMAN

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Att: C. d'Ornano, D. L. 2 Div. Rm. 251 East Block.

This is to certify that the above mentioned items have been received in good order.

Place

Date

Signature

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: Permanent Mission of Canada,
Geneva, Switzerland.

Reference: Our Letter 113 of February 12, 1957

Subject: Change of Combination Settings

Security: **SECRET**

No: 339

Date: May 7, 1957.

Enclosures: One

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: Off. 2-7

Ottawa File No.

50048-AL-40

43

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References

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MAY 14 1957

In accordance with the instructions contained in Circular Document Admin. 8/56 of February 20, 1956, the combinations of all locks in use at this Mission have been reset.

2. The settings of the new combinations in current use are listed in the attached sealed envelope.

Max Wensley
Permanent Mission

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

P

Mr d'Amours
To record & file
15/5/57
15/5

50048-AL-40	
58	52

OTTAWA, April 4, 1957.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Bob,

As requested in your letter of 19 February,
I attach some extracts from our Geneva file on the
security arrangements of our new Chancery there.
These I hope you will find useful.

Yours sincerely,

J. Timmerman.

R. A. S. MacNeil, Esq.,
Office of the High Commissioner for Canada,
Canada House,
LONDON, S.W.1.

Notes for the London File
New Offices - Geneva

Extract from Geneva File No. 50048-AL-40

October 9, 1956.

Post Book

Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Geneva.

Security

Security is a matter of special concern at posts abroad. While the maintenance of good security is a continuing process, the requirements of security must be particularly borne in mind at such times as when contemplating a move to new premises, the re-arranging of office space, the engaging of local staff, etc.

The requirements of security, therefore, will be a matter for particular attention during the forthcoming move of the Permanent Mission to new quarters, and in the months thereafter when the Mission is adapting itself to new surroundings and new office procedures. The advice and assistance of the Regional Security Officer at Canada House, London, will be available, if needed, during that period and at any time thereafter in dealing with problems of security.

Among the basic principles governing security at posts abroad are the following:

1. Locally-engaged staff are a major security hazard and therefore
 - (a) must never have access to classified information (except in rare instances involving departmental approval in each case);
 - (b) must never be permitted alone, that is, in the absence of Canadian supervision, in Chancery premises (which means, among other things, the supervision by Canadians of the work of the char staff);
 - (c) must never be issued with keys;
 - (d) must never be allowed alone in offices where classified material is unprotected;
 - (e) must be segregated from Canadian staff in an office or offices devoted to non-classified work;
 - (f) should only be engaged after a satisfactory background check has been made, through either British or American facilities.
2. The premises should be made as physically secure as possible. This includes
 - (a) the installation, wherever practicable, of departmentally-supplied locks on outside entrances, and the strict control of keys thereto;
 - (b) the provision of an adequate security room, with barred or otherwise adequately protected entrances equipped with departmentally-supplied locks;

- 2 -

- (c) the location in the security room of all security containers used for the storage of material classified Secret and above.
3. The strict observance by all Canadian staff of departmental security regulations, including, in addition to the above, ensuring that
- (a) all classified material is locked during quiet hours in security containers;
 - (b) all classified material in transit, whether outside the Chancery premises or between offices within the building, is always in the care of a Canadian staff member;
 - (c) office doors are always locked during even brief absences by the occupant, unless all classified material has previously been locked up;
 - (d) telephones are never used to discuss classified information;
 - (e) the post security officer makes frequent checks, particularly at closing time, to make certain that security regulations are being strictly observed

The basic departmental security regulations are contained in Section 200 of the Manual of Regulations and Instructions. These have been supplemented by direct correspondence with the Mission and also by the following circular documents:

No. A. 74/51 of October 19, 1951.
No. B. 116/51 of December 29, 1951.
No. B. 60/52 of June 3, 1952.
No. B. 99/52 of November 8, 1952.
No. A. 112/52 of December 31, 1952.
No. Admin. 21/53 of June 19, 1953.
No. B. 54/53 of July 8, 1953.
No. A. 39/55 of March 22, 1955.
No. B. 17/55 of April 4, 1955.
No. B. 41/55 of July 27, 1955.
No. B. 51/55 of September 27, 1955.
No. Admin. 45/55 of November 15, 1955.
No. A. 2/56 of January 16, 1956.
No. Admin. 8/56 of February 20, 1956.
No. Admin. 21/56 of May 4, 1956.
No. Admin. 34/56 of June 13, 1956.
No. Admin. 41/56 of August 16, 1956.

It is of the greatest importance that all Canadian staff members be familiar with, and strictly observe, the instructions and regulations contained in the Manual, as supplemented by the above documents. Good security is, basically, the application of care and common sense, and its price, to paraphrase a well-known expression, is eternal vigilance.

- 3 -

October 22, 1956 - Letter No. 435 from Geneva.

In your letter No. F-156 of May 10, 1956, you mentioned sixteen doors which are supposed to be fitted with Chubb 3G-74 type Security Locks. For each reference these are listed as follows:

Door between Room 1 & Room 3 (Para 3 (a) (iv) of your letter)			
"	"	" 21 & landing	(Para. 4 (vi))
"	"	" 16 "	(" " ")
"	"	" 17 " Room 16	(" " ")
"	"	" 16 " "	(" " ")
"	"	" 12 " "	(" " ")
"	"	" 11 " "	(" " ")
"	"	" 10 " "	(" " ")
"	"	" 9 " "	(" " ")
"	"	" 8 " "	(" " ")
"	"	" 7 " "	(" " ")
"	"	" 4 " "	(" " ")
Door to balcony from Room 8 (" " ")			
"	"	" " "	(" " ")
"	"	" " "	(" " ")

2. In addition to the above sixteen doors, maximum security and the logic of the exercise suggests it to be necessary to have a similar lock on the door leading from Room 10 to the small balcony adjoining. There should perhaps also be one on the door between the Guard's kitchen - Room 18 - and the outside balcony which runs outside of room forming part of the office proper.

3. If we are right, the total number of locks which may be required is 18 and we have asked the local Architect to prepare the relevant doors to receive them. To-date, however, the Chubb Company has sent only 10 locks. Accordingly before moving to our new offices on about December 1 we shall have these ten locks installed on the following important doors:

Door between Room 21 and Landing			
"	"	" 16 "	" "
"	"	" 16 "	" Room 13
"	"	" 12 "	" balcony
"	"	" 10 "	" "
"	"	" 9 "	" "
"	"	" 8 "	" "
"	"	" 4 "	" Room 5
"	"	" 13 "	" " 7
"	"	" 7 "	" " 3

4. You will note that these include both the entrance to the Guard's quarters and all other doors giving access to the outside. In addition the most important internal doors will be given priority.

5. If you feel that it is really necessary to equip the remaining doors listed in paragraphs 1 and 2 above we should be grateful for an additional 8 locks, which should reach us in good time before December 1st.

- 4 -

6. We should perhaps also draw your attention to paragraph 4(iii) in which you state that Room 5 must be fitted with a steel rolling shutter fixed to the ceiling and fastened to the floor at floor level by means of three Sargent and Greenleaf Manipulation-proof combination locks. As these locks will be on the inside of the screen it hardly seems necessary that this special type be required. If combinations are used it would mean that every morning before starting work the communications clerk would have five locks to open (besides his cabinets) - two on the door to Room 4 and the three on the shutter. It has occurred to us that a bar arrangement or at most key padlocks would be more economical and efficient.

November 7, 1956 - Defence Liaison (2) Memorandum to Supplies and Properties Division.

We agree that there appears to be no reason why any changes should now be made in the plan arrangements for the new quarters of the Delegation. The eight Chubb locks mentioned in paragraph 6 of the letter under reference should be provided and installed, and the original plan to secure the steel shutters on Room 5 with combination padlocks should not be changed in favour of key-operated padlocks.

December 7, 1956.

Tool kit and spare Sargent and Greenleaf and Taylor locks parts shipped.

December 10, 1956 - Telegram No. 281 from Geneva

Twelve combination padlocks needed for folding grills in new office. Would therefore suggest fifteen be sent immediately.

December 14, 1956

Fifteen Sargent and Greenleaf padlocks and one Sargent and Greenleaf M.P. lock for Chubb cabinet forwarded.

January 24, 1957 - Letter No. 70 from Geneva - requesting authority to stamp identifying marks on keys for Chubb locks.

January 29, 1957 - Telegram No. DS-28 to Geneva - approving marking of keys. Suggest keys for each lock be lettered A to J and keys in each series be numbered individually from one to four.

January 30, 1957 - Letter No. 86 from Geneva, requesting authority to build shelves in Room No. 1 and in the basement.

February 4, 1957 - Letter No. DS-54 to Geneva, confirming our telegram in which we approved the marking of keys and requesting Geneva to advise the R.S.O., London, to similarly mark the duplicate keys retained in Canada House.

Notes for the London File
New Offices - Geneva

Extract from Geneva File No. 50048-AL-40

October 9, 1956.

Post Book

Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Geneva.

Security

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1. Locally-engaged staff are a major security hazard and therefore
 - (a) must never have access to classified information (except in rare instances involving departmental approval in each case);
 - (b) must never be permitted alone, that is, in the absence of Canadian supervision, in Chancery premises (which means, among other things, the supervision by Canadians of the work of the char staff);
 - (c) must never be issued with keys;
 - (d) must never be allowed alone in offices where classified material is unprotected;
 - (e) must be segregated from Canadian staff in an office or offices devoted to non-classified work;
 - (f) should only be engaged after a satisfactory background check has been made, through either British or American facilities.
2. The premises should be made as physically secure as possible. This includes
 - (a) the installation, wherever practicable, of departmentally-supplied locks on outside entrances, and the strict control of keys thereto;
 - (b) the provision of an adequate security room, with barred or otherwise adequately protected entrances equipped with departmentally-supplied locks;

- 2 -

- (c) the location in the security room of all security containers used for the storage of material classified Secret and above.
3. The strict observance by all Canadian staff of departmental security regulations, including, in addition to the above, ensuring that
- (a) all classified material is locked during quiet hours in security containers;
 - (b) all classified material in transit, whether outside the Chancery premises or between offices within the building, is always in the care of a Canadian staff member;
 - (c) office doors are always locked during even brief absences by the occupant, unless all classified material has previously been locked up;
 - (d) telephones are never used to discuss classified information;
 - (e) the post security officer makes frequent checks, particularly at closing time, to make certain that security regulations are being strictly observed.

The basic departmental security regulations are contained in Section 200 of the Manual of Regulations and Instructions. These have been supplemented by direct correspondence with the Mission and also by the following circular documents:

No. A. 74/51 of October 19, 1951.
No. B. 116/51 of December 29, 1951.
No. B. 60/52 of June 3, 1952.
No. B. 99/52 of November 8, 1952.
No. A. 112/52 of December 31, 1952.
No. Admin. 21/53 of June 19, 1953.
No. B. 54/53 of July 8, 1953.
No. A. 39/55 of March 22, 1955.
No. B. 17/55 of April 4, 1955.
No. B. 41/55 of July 27, 1955.
No. B. 51/55 of September 27, 1955.
No. Admin. 45/55 of November 15, 1955.
No. A. 2/56 of January 16, 1956.
No. Admin. 8/56 of February 20, 1956.
No. Admin. 21/56 of May 4, 1956.
No. Admin. 34/56 of June 13, 1956.
No. Admin. 41/56 of August 16, 1956.

It is of the greatest importance that all Canadian staff members be familiar with, and strictly observe, the instructions and regulations contained in the Manual, as supplemented by the above documents. Good security is, basically, the application of care and common sense, and its price, to paraphrase a well-known expression, is eternal vigilance.

October 22, 1956 - Letter No. 435 from Geneva.

In your letter No. F-156 of May 10, 1956, you mentioned sixteen doors which are supposed to be fitted with Chubb 3G-74 type Security Locks. For each reference these are listed as follows:

Door between Room 1 & Room 3 (Para 3 (a) (iv) of your letter)			
"	"	" 21 & landing	(Para. 4 (vi))
"	"	" 16 " "	(" " ")
"	"	" 17 " Room 16	(" " ")
"	"	" 16 " " 13	(" " ")
"	"	" 12 " " 13	(" " ")
"	"	" 11 " " 13	(" " ")
"	"	" 10 " " 13	(" " ")
"	"	" 9 " " 13	(" " ")
"	"	" 8 " " 13	(" " ")
"	"	" 7 " " 3	(" " ")
"	"	" 4 " " 5	(" " ")
Door to balcony from Room 8 (" " ")			
"	"	" " " 9	(" " ")
"	"	" " " 12	(" " ")

2. In addition to the above sixteen doors, maximum security and the logic of the exercise suggests it to be necessary to have a similar lock on the door leading from Room 10 to the small balcony adjoining. There should perhaps also be one on the door between the Guard's kitchen - Room 18 - and the outside balcony which runs outside of room forming part of the office proper.

3. If we are right, the total number of locks which may be required is 18 and we have asked the local Architect to prepare the relevant doors to receive them. To-date, however, the Chubb Company has sent only 10 locks. Accordingly before moving to our new offices on about December 1 we shall have these ten locks installed on the following important doors:

Door between Room 21 and Landing			
"	"	" 16 " "	
"	"	" 16 " Room 13	
"	"	" 12 " balcony	
"	"	" 10 " "	
"	"	" 9 " "	
"	"	" 8 " "	
"	"	" 4 " Room 5	
"	"	" 13 " " 7	
"	"	" 7 " " 3	

4. You will note that these include both the entrance to the Guard's quarters and all other doors giving access to the outside. In addition the most important internal doors will be given priority.

5. If you feel that it is really necessary to equip the remaining doors listed in paragraphs 1 and 2 above we should be grateful for an additional 8 locks, which should reach us in good time before December 1st.

- 4 -

6. We should perhaps also draw your attention to paragraph 4(iii) in which you state that Room 5 must be fitted with a steel rolling shutter fixed to the ceiling and fastened to the floor at floor level by means of three Sargent and Greenleaf Manipulation-proof combination locks. As these locks will be on the inside of the screen it hardly seems necessary that this special type be required. If combinations are used it would mean that every morning before starting work the communications clerk would have five locks to open (besides his cabinets) - two on the door to Room 4 and the three on the shutter. It has occurred to us that a bar arrangement or at most key padlocks would be more economical and efficient.

November 7, 1956 - Defence Liaison (2) Memorandum to Supplies and Properties Division.

We agree that there appears to be no reason why any changes should now be made in the plan arrangements for the new quarters of the Delegation. The eight Chubb locks mentioned in paragraph 6 of the letter under reference should be provided and installed, and the original plan to secure the steel shutters on Room 5 with combination padlocks should not be changed in favour of key-operated padlocks.

December 7, 1956.

Tool kit and spare Sargent and Greenleaf and Taylor locks parts shipped.

December 10, 1956 - Telegram No. 281 from Geneva

Twelve combination padlocks needed for folding grills in new office. Would therefore suggest fifteen be sent immediately.

December 14, 1956

Fifteen Sargent and Greenleaf padlocks and one Sargent and Greenleaf M.P. lock for Chubb cabinet forwarded.

January 24, 1957 - Letter No. 70 from Geneva - requesting authority to stamp identifying marks on keys for Chubb locks.

January 29, 1957 - Telegram No. DS-28 to Geneva - approving marking of keys. Suggest keys for each lock be lettered A to J and keys in each series be numbered individually from one to four.

January 30, 1957 - Letter No. 86 from Geneva, requesting authority to build shelves in Room No. 1 and in the basement.

February 4, 1957 - Letter No. DS-54 to Geneva, confirming our telegram in which we approved the marking of keys and requesting Geneva to advise the R.S.O., London, to similarly mark the duplicate keys retained in Canada House.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION,
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Your Letter No. 131 of Feb. 19, 1957

Subject: Security Arrangements.

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: DS-132

Date: March 13, 1957

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.
50048-AL-40

43

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References

Thank you for your detailed report on the security measures now in effect at your post. This letter will deal with some of the points you have raised which have not been answered elsewhere.

2. Your paragraph 4 (3) - Cypher Room. We agree that it would not seem necessary that a safe be provided. You may, however, wish to consider using the Taylor security shell which we understand is now en route to you in place of the present bar-locking cabinet.

3. Your paragraph 4 (5) - Venetian Blinds. As you know, the security function of the venetian blinds is to guard against telephotography. In order to perform this function, the blinds must normally be partially closed. We doubt if this could be achieved by the external shutters to which you refer. In their normal, every day position, do these afford protection without shutting out all light?

4. Your paragraph 4 (6) - Peepholes. We agree with your suggestion that the originally planned peephole be abandoned, and agree with your alternative proposal that standard peepholes be provided in the entrance doors of both the guard's apartment and the Chancery proper.

5. Your paragraph 4 (7) - Chubb Locks. We note that you now believe that the existing installation of ten Chubb locks is adequate, and that the original plan to install an additional number might be abandoned. We have examined the present distribution of these locks and are inclined to agree, with the exception of the three balcony doors which we feel should perhaps be equipped with these locks, or, alternatively, with secure inside bolts. We suggest you discuss this point with the Regional Security Officer during his forthcoming visit.

6. Your paragraph 5. We believe that you are in a better position than are we to recommend any "relaxation" of your present security arrangements, and will be pleased to receive your suggestions at any time. You will, of course, wish to review your arrangements and problems with the Regional Security Officer during his visit.

7. Your paragraph 7. As you know, the question of overtime for security guards is a difficult one and is as yet not resolved. We see no objection, however, to

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to Posts

Regional
Security
Officer,
London.

Done
mar 18/57
T.C.

- 2 -

your recording overtime in excess of fifty hours per week, but hope that you will be able to keep such overtime to a minimum. The employment of your guards is another point which you might find it useful to discuss with the Regional Security Officer. We are pleased to be able to inform you that we expect to be able to provide you with a third guard in the near future, which should help considerably in solving the question of overtime.

for Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION,
..... GENEVA, SWITZERLAND,

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Your Letter No. 152 of Feb. 21, 1957.

Subject: Security Guard Tool Boxes.....
.....
.....

Security: UNCLASSIFIED

No: DS- 125

Date: March 7, 1957.

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No. 50048-AI-40	
58	50

References

Shortly after we despatched tool boxes to a number of our posts abroad, we were informed by the shipping section that a set of keys had been found which had apparently become detached from one of these boxes. The shipping section had no idea to which set of tools the keys belonged.

2. We are sending you this set of keys in the hope that it will fit the lock on your set of tools.

for Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

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to Posts

PERMANENT MISSION OF CANADA TO THE
EUROPEAN OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS



MISSION PERMANENTE DU CANADA AUPRÈS
DE L'OFFICE EUROPÉEN DES NATIONS UNIES

16, Parc du Château Banquet,
Geneva, March 4, 1957.

SECRET

Dear Mr. MacNeil,-

500-48-AL-40	
58	✓

Although I am relieved to be able to begin this report with the assurance that our security has in no way been compromised by the events that I shall relate below, I nevertheless feel that the nature of these events requires me to bring them to your attention.

2. You will have seen our complete description of the security arrangements we have inaugurated in our new premises. You will also no doubt be aware that we were forced, by the circumstances of our move from our exceptionally cramped quarters in the previous accommodation to the relatively large quarters we now occupy, to put these arrangements into force by stages, with the result that over the first days of our occupation of our new premises our arrangements were not, of necessity, working as smoothly and as effectively as they are expected to work now that we have settled in.

3. In addition to the normal disturbances and confusion attendant on any such move as we have had to undergo, has been the difficult and disruptive task of destroying several years' accumulation of unwanted material, a good deal of which was classified. It is because of our desire to have our offices working smoothly and securely as quickly as possible that we proceeded with the task of destroying unwanted material rather more rapidly than it would seem, in retrospect, to have been prudent to do.

Office of the High Commissioner for Canada,
Canada House,
LONDON, England.

(Attention: Mr. R.A.S. MacNeil,
Regional Security Officer.)

- 2 -

4. During the course of this operation the 15 spare keys for the ten Chubb detector locks, the spare key for the grill door leading into the Communications Section and the 8 change keys for the combinations on our two Chubb doors, were inadvertently included in one of our very many bags of classified waste for destruction. As you will have seen from our security report, our classified waste is for the present being burned once a week by our security guards at the United Kingdom Permanent Mission. During the day of February 21 they burned something like a total of twelve bags of material, using an incinerator inside the office of the United Kingdom Mission and an oil drum incinerator on the grounds of that Mission. The keys were among the papers burned in the outside incinerator.

5. The disappearance of the keys was first noted on Tuesday, February 26. A thorough search of our offices on that day and on Wednesday morning failed to turn up the missing keys. We determined that the 24 keys mentioned had been placed in a box on the morning of Sunday, February 3rd, the date on which the keys in service were first placed on our Key Board. The box had then been placed in the safe. As far as we could reconstruct the subsequent course of events in the hectic period alluded to above, it seems to us most likely that the keys were removed from the safe during the course of our intensive review of our files for the purpose of weeding out those papers we might destroy. This review took more than a week, but it seems probable that the inclusion of the keys with waste material would have occurred on Saturday, February 9, when the contents of the safe were subjected to a particularly thorough-going revision. I should perhaps explain that in "La Pelouse" it was necessary to keep in the safe a great deal of material that we are now able to have incorporated in our normal filing system; in fact, the safe was so jammed with papers that no one knew just what was in it.

6. Exactly how it came about that a box of keys could have been placed among the material for destruction, we cannot say. In extenuation of an occurrence for which we realize there is no excuse, I would emphasize that all of the staff were working at a hectic pace and in some degree of confusion that could not be avoided. Be that as it may, the keys did get swallowed up in a bag of material for destruction and were, as I have said, subsequently thrown into the incinerator at the British Mission.

. . . .

- 3 -

7. When this possibility was finally borne in upon us at noon on Wednesday, February 27th, one of the security guards went to the site of the burning and, after some time spent in raking through the mud and accumulated debris, managed to locate 21 keys. When he had returned to our offices with this collection and it was realized that some of the keys were still missing, the second security guard returned for a further search in the remaining hours of daylight available to him. His search brought forth one more key. Although this result afforded us a much-needed sense of relief, especially as the spare key for the Chubb grill leading into the Communications Section was among the first ones located, we could not feel satisfied until all the missing keys had been literally "unearthed". Accordingly, a further intensive search of the area, involving removal of some two or three inches of topsoil and its minute sifting, was carried out on February 28. In the morning one of the two remaining keys was found and, to our great relief, the last key was located in the afternoon.

8. All of the keys have been cleaned and found to be unimpaired. It goes without saying that our spare keys have now been separated into categories and placed in the safe in clearly-marked boxes containing an inventory of the contents. We have, of course, also issued instructions that the presence of these boxes in the safe is to be checked daily by the guard on duty and recorded in his log book. Once a week the actual contents of the boxes containing security spares will be checked against their inventories and this operation will be recorded. All of these safeguards will be closely controlled by the Security Officer.

9. I am sorry that this report has had to be lengthy. However, I believe that the events described deserved a full explanation. I am also hopeful that you will agree that the fact that the keys lay for some days in the mud at the burning site, while regrettable and, indeed, most disquieting especially to us, can in no way have compromised the locks providing security protection to us. Certainly we have given careful thought to this matter from every conceivable angle and we are confident that our security remains intact. Every key entrusted to us is now present and accounted for.

10. I am sending a copy of this letter to the Head of Defence Liaison (2) in the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

Yours sincerely,

M. H. WERSHOF
Max Wershof,
Permanent Representative.

000553

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA (DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

Supplies and Properties/
J. Guellette/rf

TO: The Canadian Permanent Mission,
Geneva, Switzerland.
FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.
Reference: Your letter No. 86 of January 30, 1957
Your letter No. 88 and
Subject: Telegram No. 11 of January 31, 1957.
Office Equipment - Destructor Room

Security: ~~RESTRICTED~~
No: 107
Date: March 4, 1957.
Enclosures: One
Air or Surface Mail: Air
Post File No:

Ottawa File No.

107-1-10

AL

References

Our Telegram No. P-167 of February 26, 1957, authorized the local purchase of a type of shelving which could be easily moved. In this way no problem would arise if it was decided to install a pulper in Room No. 1, and rearrangement of storage facilities became necessary.

2. Defence Liaison (2) Division has given its opinion with regard to the disadvantages of the Grant pulper and it would appear that they are not as serious as you may have been led to believe. A copy of D.L. (2)'s memorandum is enclosed and we would ask you to be good enough to let us have your reactions at an early date. We would be ready to purchase a pulper if, after reconsideration, you feel that you want it. We would consider the installation of an incinerator in an officer's house, if practicable, as an alternative to an incinerator of the type you have suggested for use in the back yard of your Residence. This incinerator could be either an addition or a substitute to the pulper in the office.

3. Since you appear to have no objection to using the Residence for this purpose, we would like to suggest that it might be the best location for the installation of a better type incinerator, as the tenure at the Residence will be assured for some forty more months to come following Treasury Board's decision which was forwarded to you last week.

4. D.L. (2) suggests that small stove, suitably modified, might be found satisfactory. We have recently written to Mr. Monette in Paris, with copy to Mr. MacNeil in London, concerning the provision of an incinerator for the recently occupied new Chancery in The Hague. We have not yet received his reply, and we are sending him a copy of this letter in order that he may advise you promptly when a satisfactory solution has been found. The decision reached for The Hague might provide a solution to your problem and avoid unnecessary search locally if Mr. Monette can send you specifications for the type of stove found satisfactory for installation in a basement.

5. This would require the agreement of your landlady as it would be necessary to connect a lead to the chimney, and you may wish to broach the subject in advance.

6. We hope that until a satisfactory installation can be arranged you will be able to continue using the facilities of the United Kingdom Embassy and that this will not inconvenience you and the U.K. Embassy too much.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
M. GRANT

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

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Mr. Monette -
Paris
Mr. MacNeil -
London

SUPPLIES AND PROPERTIES DIVISION

RESTRICTED

Feb. 26, 1957.

DEFENCE LIAISON (2) DIVISION

Geneva Letters 86 and 88 of Jan. 30 and 31 respectively, and Telegram No. 54 of Feb. 14, 1957.

Office Equipment - Destroyer Room

50048-AL-40	
58	✓

orig 10104-C-1-40

The only aspects of this correspondence which directly concern this Division are those relating to a provision of facilities for the destruction of classified waste.

2. You will note that Geneva are now questioning the desirability of being provided with a Somat 12 pulper because

- (a) it allegedly is messy and smells;
- (b) it is now desired to use the room in which the pulper was to be installed for other purposes;
- (c) the Somat 12 pulper will not destroy tapes;
- (d) arrangements may be made for the destruction for both tapes and ordinary waste by installing a drum incinerator in the grounds of the official residence.

3. We suggest that in replying to Geneva you deal with these particular points as follows:

- (a) The Somat pulper is inclined to spill over and to create a mess when overloaded either with waste, water or both. It creates a smell only when an acid solution is used in place of water for the more effective and easier destruction of certain special types of paper.

- 2 -

- (b) As the size of a Somat 12 pulper is only 28" x 19" x 39" high, and the room in which it is to be installed approximately 8' x 12', the installation of a pulper as planned should not deny use of the room for the other purposes Geneva have in mind. For example, it should comfortably house the pulper, shelves, a desk or work bench for the security guard, and, perhaps, a stationery cupboard, although insofar as the latter is concerned we would much prefer to see the space which would be taken up by this item used by the guard as additional working space.
- (c) Although the pulper will not destroy communications tapes, it will provide a convenient and ready means of destroying daily ordinary classified waste. We suggest that communications tapes could be partially destroyed and kept in the vault type communications room until completely destroyed, say once a week, by burning.
- (d) We are not much enamoured with the idea of an oil drum incinerator being installed in Mr. Wershof's garden. We would prefer to see tapes destroyed weekly by burning either in the U. K. Embassy's incinerator or in a small stove suitably modified located in the basement of an officer's house. However, if circumstances rule out both these methods, we would not take serious objection to Mr. Wershof's garden being used, provided the incinerator is properly designed and secure procedures are evolved and adopted governing the actual destruction.

H. TIMMERMAN

Defence Liaison (2) Division.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION
..... GENEVA - SWITZERLAND

Reference: Packing Slip dated December 7, 1956 from...
D.L. 2 Division
Subject: Tools for Emerson & Latreille.....
.....
.....

Security:.....Unclassified.....

No:.....152.....

Date: February 21, 1957.....

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail: Air.....

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.

50048-AK-40

43

SD

References

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We have received the tool box containing tools and equipment for work on locks but so far have not received the keys to the small Yale lock fastening it.

2. If these keys have not yet been forwarded would you please send them as soon as possible as we do not want to have to cut the lock off unless it is necessary.

MAR 6 1957

Mr d'Ornano
For immediate attn.
Please speak

Mr. Wensley
Permanent Mission.

Internal
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16/3.

Distribution
to Posts

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1957 MAR 6 AM 9:42

NO ENCLOSURES

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1957 MAR 6

WAB 0 1821

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The above being then as accurate as possible to be
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The above being then as accurate as possible to be
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Post file no.
Vat of Succession
Enclosures
Date
No.
Security
1957 MAR 6

Subject: ...
D.T. 2 Station
Re: ...

CENTRAL - ...

FROM: THE ...

EXHIBIT ...

TO: THE ...

MEMORANDUM

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

PERMANENT MISSION OF CANADA TO THE
EUROPEAN OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS



MISSION PERMANENTE DU CANADA AUPRÈS
DE L'OFFICE EUROPÉEN DES NATIONS UNIES

J33

16, Parc du Château Banquet,
Geneva, February 20, 1957.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

50048-AL-40	
43	✓

Dear Mr. MacNeil,

I am attaching a copy of our Letter No. 131 of February 19, 1957, which is a general survey in some detail of the security arrangements we have devised for our new offices, where we are at last installed. While we have devoted a considerable amount of time and careful thought to this matter, it may well be that persons more expert than we would be able to suggest desirable modifications. In view of this we are especially looking forward to your first visit to this Mission.

You will note from the comments we have made in our survey that there are some refinements - such as a peephole from the Security Guard's kitchen, a "Somat" pulper for Room 1 and a safe for Room 5 - that we think might now be unnecessary. If the Department holds a contrary view we may have to receive a further invasion of workmen.

Apart from this possibility it would seem that the period in which workmen need to be in the premises is now largely over. There are bound to be small tasks that will require relatively short visits by workmen of various kinds from time to time, but these should be no more than is normal for any office.

With this in mind, it has occurred to us that it may not now be too early to make definite plans for a technical survey inspection by the British Foreign Service Technical Maintenance Service. The purposes and methods of such an inspection were explained fully to us in the Department's

Office of the High Commissioner for Canada,
Canada House,
LONDON, England.
(Att'n: Mr. R.A.S. MacNeil,
Regional Security Officer)

.. Top Secret Letter

000559

D-2
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FEB 27 1957

Mr. Cook:
To see + file
28/2

1957 FEB 27 AM 10:13

- 2 -

Top Secret Letter No. DS-100 of April 6, 1956. At that time it was thought that we would soon be entering our new offices and it was planned to have an inspection carried out on April 28, 1956. In fact, of course, no inspection has been made of these new offices in which great numbers of workmen had been steadily employed prior to our entry at the beginning of this month.

You may already have been given a copy of Letter DS-100 for your background information. If not, you may think it desirable to obtain one from Ottawa, with whom I assume you will be in touch in respect of our need for a technical security inspection. I shall, of course, be grateful to learn in due course when we can expect our inspection to take place and whether the suggestions laid down in Letter DS-100 for our behaviour during the inspection will still apply.

Yours sincerely,

M. H. WERSHOF

Max Wershof,
Permanent Representative.

cc. Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.



OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA

PERSONAL &
CONFIDENTIAL

File
19th February, 1957

500418-AL-40
58 52

Dear John,

Thank you very much for your letter of the 11th inst;
in connection with notes extracted from the Ottawa files
to be used for reference here.

The failure to cover neither Geneva or Vienna was due
entirely to an oversight, and was only noticed when I went
to read up the background on Vienna before leaving for
there a couple of weeks ago. I will open my file on Vienna
with the material gathered during my recent inspection,
and it seems rather a waste of effort for anyone to dig
up material on the old Chancery. I should be very grateful
however if one of your staff could put together some notes
on Geneva for me and send them over here when convenient.

Yours sincerely,

Mr Keyes:

*Please extract important points
from Geneva file for Lso.* (R.A.S. MacNeil)

spec.

25/2

Done.

J. Timmerman, Esq.,
Department of External Affairs,
Defence Liaison (2) Division,
OTTAWA,
CANADA.

RASM/dcw

000562

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION,
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

Reference: Your Letter DS-422 of December 13, 1956

Subject: Security -- Security Guards.

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 131

Date: February 19, 1957.

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: SECURITY (S)

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AH-40	
43	50

References

D-2	
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FEB 27 1957

Internal Circulation

Mr. Look:
Would you look at this please - we should reply for paras 6 & 7 and write back re any other points which require looking into on his forthcoming visit

Distribution

to Posts
After you have dealt with this it should be passed to Mr. Keyser for action on chronological check.

In compliance with paragraph 3 of your Letter under reference, attached are copies of our

- a) Standing Security Orders, and
- b) Standing Orders for Security Guards, to which is appended a sample of the two-guard schedule on which we are operating.

2. Also attached are the following papers requested in paragraph 3 of the security brief prepared for the Inspection Tour - 1956 of this Mission, a copy of which was left with us by the team:

- a) Security data sheet,
- b) A plan of our new premises at 16 Parc du Château Banquet, which is, as you know, a new apartment building in which we occupy the whole of the top or sixth floor of one wing facing along the lake.

3. While the above provides you with a complete picture in some detail of our security arrangements, both your Letter under reference and the security brief already mentioned invite our additional comments. We have thought it best to accept both invitations at once, since each paper raises questions relevant to the other and security seems to us to be one package, all aspects of which should be dealt with together.

4. Specifically, you asked us to describe any changes made to the plans which have been outlined in Letter F-156 of May 10, 1955. The significant changes are as follows:

- (1) Room No. 1 - Destructor Room

As you know from our Letter No. 88 of January 31 and our telegram No. 54 of February 14, no means of destroying classified waste has yet been made available to us from Ottawa. Nor are we at all certain that

.. we can or

File
G-12
mar 14/57

- 2 -

*We have
just briefed
Sgt. on this.*

we can or would wish to receive an electric pulper, as suggested in paragraph 3 of Letter No. F-156. We are investigating the cost of providing a rough but secure incinerator to be located at a remote place on the grounds of the official residence. In the meantime, our guards are burning classified waste at the United Kingdom Permanent Mission.

(2) Room No. 3 - Stenographers

While the window grills in Rooms 2 and 4 are, in strict conformity with paragraph 4 (VII) of Letter F-156, swinging grills which will remain shut and locked with security padlocks except on exceptional occasions as may be authorized by the Security Officer for the purposes of cleaning and the like, the window on Room 3 is guarded by the same scissor-type grill as in the offices of the in the Library and Accountant and the officers (Rooms 17, 8, 9 and 10, respectively). The decision to change the order for a swinging grill to a scissor-type for Room 3 was taken by me, with the concurrence of Mr. Monette, during his last visit to the offices before our occupancy, at which time there was not time to consult you. At that time we recognized that a swinging grill of the type which had already been installed in Room 2 could only be opened at the expense of using up the already cramped area available to the three stenographers expected to use Room 3. We agreed that, even if the windows themselves could be changed to open outwards without the necessity of opening the grill itself, the grill should be opened during the day to avoid a heavy psychological burden falling on the three girls in question. Moreover, we could not see how a change to a scissor-type grill in Room 3 - which would be opened only during the day and would be locked with security padlocks at other times - could offer any less security to the office as a whole than those authorized for Rooms 8, 9, 10, and 17, some, at least, of which were only a few steps further removed from the particularly sensitive Registry and Communications areas.

(3) Room 5 - Cypher Room

*Shall
perhaps?
No safe -*

Paragraph 3(D) of Letter F-156 is, of course, out of date. In fact, more cypher equipment is installed in the room than was originally envisaged. Of more importance, no safe has yet been provided nor do we think one is necessary. At the present time a bar-locking cabinet has been placed in the room. Considering the other exceptional measures that have been taken to ensure the security of the room, this would seem to be sufficient and suitable for the storage needs of the Communications personnel. Not only would it be extremely costly to transport and instal a safe, its installation at this late date would be a difficult operation and would unnecessarily use up an already limited amount of space in this room.

(4) Room 5 - Cypher Room

Paragraph 4(III) of Letter F-156 called for a special type of rolling window shutter. In fact, a scissor grill has been installed and is locked securely with two security padlocks whenever the Communications staff are not on duty.

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- 3 -

I understand that this change had been approved by you with Mr. Monette at some time subsequent to the Letter to which we have been referring.

(5) Venetian blinds

Although paragraph 4(I) of Letter F-156 called for venetian blinds fitted internally on the windows of all offices, in fact such blinds have been installed only in Rooms 3 (Stenographers) and 5 (Cypher). However, in view of the closeness with which the grills on these windows hug the window frames, it is virtually impossible - and certainly most inconvenient - to make any use of them. *blinds.* Nevertheless, the situation from the security point of view would seem to be acceptable, since the building itself has been fitted externally with vision-proof shutters which can be raised and lowered by a mechanism installed inside. While it is true that a potential intruder can, with difficulty, raise these shutters from the outside, this would be an exceptionally perilous operation in regard to Room 5, outside the window of which there is no balcony.

I believe they are missing the point here

(6) Security Guard's Quarters - Peephole

Paragraph 3(K)(b) of Letter F-156 envisaged a glazed "peephole" to be provided in the wall between the guard's kitchen and the staircase hall. In fact, although that wall has been finished in all respects and the Security Guard is now installed in these quarters, no such peephole has been provided nor do we think one is necessary. The architects are having a great deal of difficulty obtaining even an estimate for the cost of what would be a tricky exercise in optics if a guard inside the kitchen is to have any useful field of vision into the hall. Even if they should be successful in solving this problem, there would remain the disturbing business of having to knock a hole through the wall. In view of this, and in view of the fact that we do not look upon the Security Guard living in the quarters as having anything to do with the security of the office while he is off duty, since the other guard will be on duty or the offices will be in operation, we cannot see the necessity for, nor the sense in, pursuing this notion. We shall be writing you separately with regard to the possible desirability of having the usual small and relatively inexpensive peepholes placed in the entrance door to the guard's quarters and, more importantly, in the entrance door to the office itself.

Agree.

Butter

(7) Chubb door locks

In paragraph 4(VI) of Letter F-156, mention is made of the need to place Chubb-type 3G-74 security locks on fourteen doors. In fact only ten such locks have been sent to us. Their strategic distribution throughout the offices will be clear to you from the security data sheet and the plan of the premises, attached. Having in mind their position and the other security arrangements we have built around their employment, we do not consider it necessary to send additional locks for the other doors originally mentioned, although the provision of a spare would facilitate the work of the Security Guard.

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- 4 -

5. You will appreciate that we have devoted a great deal of time and thought to the perfection of what seemed to us to be almost foolproof arrangements for the security of these offices. You will appreciate^{also} that if we are to live up to the letter of all of these arrangements, a significant call will be made on both the time and the patience of all Canadian-based members of the staff. Accordingly, in addition to suggesting any improvements which might occur to you, we would welcome any suggestions you might care to make that would relax our arrangements in the interests of the quick and untroubled performance of our normal tasks.

6. There is one aspect of our arrangements that I should like to draw to your attention at once. That is the fact that so long as we have only two guards on our establishment they are each putting in at least 104 hours on duty every two weeks. This total of approximately 52 hours weekly, which takes into account the fact that on Saturday afternoons and Sunday mornings and afternoons only spot checks are required, seems to us to be more than any Civil Service employee should be asked to work on a regular basis. It is true that part of this large total is made up of the time during the evening when your suggested two-guard schedule envisaged that the guards would be off duty, but during which our guards prefer to remain on duty in the interests of good security. Since our char woman will only work in the evening and does not complete her labours until between 8.30 and 9.00, the guards could only avail themselves of the leniency in your suggested schedule at a rather late hour when, certainly in so far as Emmerson is concerned since he lives on the other side of town, there would be little point in leaving the offices.

7. The position of the guards is, in fact, even less satisfactory than the foregoing suggests. As has been pointed out above, it is necessary for them to take our classified waste to the United Kingdom Permanent Mission for destruction by fire. For obvious reasons this can only conveniently be done during the daytime, and each guard is required to spend approximately four hours one day of every second week in the performance of this task. Their total hours on a two-weekly basis is therefore close to 108. In these circumstances, and until a third guard has been provided for our establishment, it has occurred to me that you would wish to authorize me to record overtime for the two guards in respect of any time worked in excess of, say, fifty hours a week. I should be grateful if this question could be discussed by the officers concerned both in Defence Liaison 2 and Personnel Division, and a decision transmitted to me as soon as possible. While Mr. Emmerson and Mr. Latreille have apparently been most willing to work such extra hours as are necessary for the proper performance of our responsibilities in regard to security, I am reluctant to continue to impose on their good will without some promise of their position being placed on a footing more closely equal to that of the other Canadian-based staff here.

Max W. Smith
Permanent Mission.

P.S. A copy of this Letter with its enclosures is going to London under cover of a letter to Mr. MacNeill.

February 15, 1957.

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDING ORDERS FOR SECURITY GUARDS

GENERAL

The Head of Mission is responsible for the security of his post. Mr. Jay has been designated by him as Post Security Officer and is responsible to him for the enforcement and control of all security arrangements, including the supervision and direction of the security guards in their conduct and the faithful, diligent and efficient discharge of their duties.

2. Whether on or off duty, the conduct of the security guards must be irreproachable. When on duty they are to be neatly and properly dressed. They will be alert and attentive to their duties and must be polite and courteous in their dealings with callers and members of the public.

3. Guards will familiarize themselves with the Departmental regulations, the Standing Security Orders of the post, and the following.

4. Security guards, as all Canadian-based staff, must be meticulously careful about divulging information to unauthorized persons. Loose or unguarded talk can cause incalculable damage.

DUTIES OF SECURITY GUARDS

5. The primary and over-riding duty of security guards is the protection of the Chancery in the danger period of the quiet or non-working hours. Certain tasks may be assigned through the Security Officer to guards during their tours of duty, but nothing must interfere with the protection provided by the presence of the guard in the Chancery at these times. Protection of the Chancery will require the guards to:

a) carry out systematic inspections of Chancery offices and equipment with the object of

(i) detecting and reporting any physical or audible signs of surreptitious entry or physical penetration being or having been effected or attempted;

(ii) ensuring that security procedures relating to the safe custody and handling of classified material have been properly observed;

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- b) safeguard and control security keys;
- c) maintain and repair security containers and periodically change combination settings;
- d) install or replace security locks, bolts, bars on Chancery doors and windows;
- e) supervise the char staff and any local workmen whilst on the premises;
- f) collect from the Communications Section the white bag of classified waste, take it to the United Kingdom Permanent Mission and destroy its contents every Thursday. This task will be recorded in the Log;
- g) maintain a daily written record or log which will include
 - (i) times when guards are posted and relieved,
 - (ii) duties performed,
 - (iii) security infractions uncovered,
 - (iv) receipt of telegrams and messages during quiet hours,
 - (v) admittance to Chancery during quiet hours,
 - (vi) any unusual circumstances encountered during tour of duty and action taken.

6. Within the broad framework of the above, the specific duties of the guards will be performed as described in the following paragraphs.

7. In addition to performing normal guard duties, the guards will:

- 3 -

- a) report as directed with the Security Guard Log Book to the Post Security Officer, who will examine all entries and initial the book. Any special instructions to guards will be entered in the book by the Post Security Officer and both guards will ensure that they understand these; task
- b) draw up monthly duty rosters for the approval of the Post Security Officer;
- c) be responsible for the custody, issue and return of all keys, tools, locks, security equipment and spare parts and the maintenance of an inventory of all such items on charge to the post;
- d) suggest to the Post Security Officer any action which they believe should be taken to improve the arrangements in force for the security of the Chancery.

GUARD DUTIES AND SHIFTS -

8. Guard cover is provided in accordance with the attached specimen two-guard duty schedule.

GUARD ON NIGHT SHIFT -

9. On taking over the night shift at 5.30 p.m., the guard will

- a) enter in the log the time of his taking over the shift, and sign the log book to indicate that he has read and understands any special instructions which have been entered in the book for his guidance and attention;
- b) collect the security guard task book from the Post Security Officer and the Key Ring from Registry;
- c) ascertain from the receptionist what visitors and members of the staff are in the building.

10. As members of the staff leave the premises, the guard will take custody of their office door keys. The receipt of keys will be recorded individually on the Daily Key Control

- 4 -

Sheet, and the keys will then be placed on a board provided for the purpose. He will also replace on his Key Ring the key to the Registry Chubb grill entrusted to the stenographers.

11. When all the staff and visitors have left the premises, except those remaining after the normal closing hour, the guard will securely lock the main entrance and carry out his first quick round of the premises with the object of

- a) ensuring that all windows, the entrance door, the doors to the offices of the Accountant and the officers, and the two grill doors are secured and that no fire or water hazards from burning cigarettes or running taps, etc., exist;
- b) examining possible hiding places in which an intruder may have concealed himself.

12. He will admit, log in and supervise the char woman.

13. Having assumed responsibility for the guarding of the Chancery, his most important single concern otherwise will be the close supervision of the char woman. This supervision does not imply occasionally checking her presence, but the close and uninterrupted surveillance of her activities.

14. The char woman will not clean either of the rooms in the Communications Section. Her work in the Accountant's office, the officers' offices and in the back area - including the Registry - will be especially closely watched. The guard will open the first of these offices to be cleaned, admit the char woman - checking her equipment - and keep her under the closest surveillance until that room is cleaned. He will then see her out of the room, re-lock the door, and proceed with the cleaning of the other offices and the Registry in the same way until all have been cleaned.

15. When all of her work for the evening has been completed, the guard will log out the char woman. Then, with the entrance re-locked, he will make a thorough inspection for signs of possible tampering with the premises or equipment.

16. After all visitors, all local staff and Canadian members of the staff other than those remaining very late have left the premises, the guard will carry out his first main round of

... the shift in
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the shift in the course of which he will

- a) check all security containers not still in use to ensure that they are properly locked;
- b) ascertain if any classified files, documents or other sensitive material has been left on desks or otherwise unprotected;
- c) carefully examine all rooms, including doors, windows, walls, containers, etc., for any signs of tampering or attempted entry;
- d) unlock and leave open the doors except the entrance door and the two grill doors.

Questionable Procedure. 17. When the last Communications employee leaves at night, the guard will ensure that he has left the Chubb door to the Communications Section locked and has left the accordion grill in Room 5 shut and locked, with the shutters all the way down.

18. When the last person has left the premises he will ensure that all security containers are locked and will shut and lock the Chubb door on the Registry.

19. The guard may then proceed with certain incidental tasks which have been assigned to him, such as repairing locks or other equipment, examining material or furniture which has been returned to the Chancery after repair, stamping envelopes, stapling or sorting paper, etc. The completion of these tasks is to be recorded in the log and in the task book.

20. In the course of carrying out his duties, the guard will also be responsible for re-admitting members of the staff and returning to them their keys, receiving messages and telegrams, dealing with callers, etc. If members of the local staff return to work after hours or early in the morning, the guard will re-lock any sensitive offices which have been left open and keep them locked until such local members have left the premises. Particulars of all staff admitted, messages received and callers dealt with will be entered in the log.

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21. Although he is permitted to sleep on duty, he should ensure by means of an alarm clock that no period of sleeping is longer than three hours' duration. Between naps the guard will carry out additional inspections of the premises. Times will be staggered from night to night and work on incidental tasks will be adjusted to the necessity of carrying out rounds as ordered. During the last of these rounds, at approximately 07.00 hours, he will re-lock the offices of the Accountant and the officers. He will open the Chubb door on the Registry, ensuring, however, that the grill door is locked.

22. Each morning, at the end of his final round, the guard will open the folding grills in all rooms, other than Room 5, so equipped. He will then remain on duty until he has issued from the Board - against recording on the daily control sheet - the keys required by members of the Mission. He will also remove from the Security Guard Key Ring, and entrust to the stenographers jointly, his key for the Chubb grill leading into the Registry. The Security Guard Key Ring will then be hung on the appropriate peg on the Board.

23. Saturday mornings, the Canadian staff member on duty will take over from the departing Security Guard responsibility for custody of the keys. At 12.30 p.m. the Security Guard who is to be on duty on Saturday night will relieve the skeleton staff of this responsibility and will remain in the office at least until 1 p.m. Before leaving the offices he will make a final round and log it. On Sunday mornings, it will be the responsibility of the guard who is going off duty to ensure

- a) that the offices are secure, that all doors in the offices are locked, and
- b) that the Security Guard Key Ring is given to the guard who will be on duty over Sunday night.

SECURITY INFRACTIONS

24. In the event of any real or suspected security infractions or security threats being discovered by the guards during the quiet hours, they will be dealt with as follows:

- a) If the security infraction is of the sort which regrettably may occasionally occur (security containers or rooms not properly locked, classified material left about in exposed or vulnerable positions) the guard

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will take immediate action to protect the material involved. If a security container is discovered to be improperly locked, it should be locked and an entry made in the log for the information of the Post Security Officer. If classified material is found exposed, it should be sealed in an envelope, addressed to the Post Security Officer, and placed in his drawer in the Registry. The envelope should contain a report by the guard outlining the circumstances of the infraction and the action taken. The incident should be logged. In this connection, it should be clearly understood that the responsibility of the guard ends when he has discovered the infraction and taken the proper safeguarding action. The Post Security Officer is responsible for any subsequent investigation and corrective action.

- b) If the circumstances are of an unusual nature and if, in the opinion of the guard, an emergency or threat exists or is imminent, he should immediately communicate by telephone with the Post Security Officer. If this officer cannot be located and he is unable to contact any other officer, and he considers such action warranted by the nature of the emergency, he should communicate directly with the Head of Post. If unable even to locate the Head of Post, he should instruct the off-duty guard to report to the Chancery, explain the situation to him, and have him acquaint the appropriate officer with the facts in person with the least possible delay. These events should be logged.

SUPERVISION OF LOCAL WORKMEN -

25. The recent presence of local workmen during the preparation of these new offices constitutes a security threat, the danger of which cannot be over-estimated. It is a situation which has been successfully exploited many times in the past and can be exploited whenever the utmost vigilance is even momentarily relaxed. It should always be assumed that an alien workman, however well-known and trusted, is a highly skilled technician in an offensive intelligence service.

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26. Once the basic preparations in the office have been completed, work involving repairs and maintenance should be carried out by the guards. When this cannot be done and when the employment of local workmen is necessary, the following steps will be taken to minimize or eliminate the security threat which their presence in the Chancery involves:

- a) Arrangements, if possible, will be made to have work carried out on Saturdays or Canadian holidays so that certain areas of the Chancery may be locked off and the defensive action concentrated on the room or rooms where the work is being done.
- b) If more than one workman is involved, and depending on the nature of the work, the off-duty guard should be recalled and, if necessary, a member or members of the Canadian staff may be required to ensure the necessary close individual supervision of workmen.
- c) All tools and equipment should be carefully checked on the arrival and departure of the workmen, and a most careful examination of the rooms involved will be made at the completion of the job.

DELIVERIES TO THE CHANCERY -

27. An effective method of penetration is the installation of certain devices in furniture or equipment which has been sent off the premises for repairs. All such items will be subjected to the most minute examination on their return before being re-installed. Every delivery, even that of the most routine nature, made during the guard's tour of duty should be carefully checked and an entry to this effect made in the log. Deliveries made at other times will be brought to the attention of the guard next on duty, so that he may carry out an inspection, the results of which he will record in his log.


28. The orders promulgated for the guidance of security guards in discharging their responsibility for the protection of the Chancery are not designed to meet a security threat based on forcible entry or physical attack. This possibility is discounted.

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- 9 -

29. The danger lies in surreptitious entry being effected, leading to the installation of intrusion devices and the gaining of access to classified material without the knowledge of or arousing of the suspicions of the officers of the post. The threat is a real and ever-present one, and can only successfully be combated by the most constant vigilance and scrupulous attention to detail by security guards and all other members of the Canadian staff.


Max Wershof.

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL STANDING SECURITY ORDERS

In accordance with instructions sent from Ottawa, the following Security Orders have been prepared for this Mission:

GENERAL

2. As Head of the Mission, Mr. Wershof is responsible for security. Mr. Jay has been designated by him as Post Security Officer and is responsible to him for the enforcement and control of all security arrangements. While the guards are directly responsible for the implementation of most of these arrangements, it goes without saying that all Canadian-based members of the staff have a personal stake in, and share in the responsibility for, ensuring that the instructions governing the safeguarding of Canadian Government property and documents is one hundred per cent efficient. Accordingly, in addition to the commitment to familiarize themselves each half year with the security regulations, every individual should voluntarily keep himself up-to-date with respect to the material on the security file, the standing orders for the security guards, and the following.

CLASSIFIED WASTE -

3. All personnel should ensure that classified waste is placed, as soon as possible, in the red bag provided for the purpose in the Registry. Each evening before the Registry and the Communications Room are closed, the Registry Clerk will empty the red bag into the large white bag kept for the purpose in the Communications Room. Until destructor equipment has been provided for the Mission, the guards will arrange to take the white bag of classified waste to the United Kingdom Permanent Mission each Thursday, where they will burn the contents.

This might be improved - more convenient.

KEYS -

4. Each person is individually responsible for complying with the instructions laid down for the use of keys, in so far as those may apply to her or him. Each morning the Security Guard who has been on duty during the night will remain until he has issued from the Key Board - against recording on the daily control sheet - the keys required by members of the Mission. He will also remove from the Security Guard Key Ring and entrust to the stenographers jointly, his key for the Chubb grill leading into the

.. Registry. ..

- 2 -

Registry. The Security Guard Key Ring will be hung during office hours on the appropriate peg on the Key Board.

5. Each individual will be responsible for ensuring that keys entrusted to his or her care

- a) are never seen by unauthorized persons,
- b) are returned to the Key Board - through the Registry Clerk or one of the stenographers - before the person concerned leaves the offices, even temporarily, during the day... (A record of this is to be kept on a temporary Control Sheet)... As an exception to this, the three keys used by Mr. Lebeau should be turned over to Mr. MacKinnon whenever the former leaves the offices, as, for example, during the lunch hour.
- c) are returned - against recording on the Daily Control Sheet - to the Security Guard on duty before the persons concerned leave the offices in the evening. (The Guard will replace on the Security Guard Ring the Registry grill key entrusted to the stenographers, and will hang the other keys on the Key Board.)

6. Saturday mornings, the Canadian staff member on duty will take over from the departing Security Guard responsibility for custody of the keys. At 12.30 p.m. the Security Guard who is to be on duty on Saturday night will relieve the skeleton staff of this responsibility and will remain in the office at least until 1 p.m.

Note: The only keys which may be taken from the premises are those used by the Guards (on Saturdays and Sundays) and the entrance key kept by Mr. Jay. This key will be entrusted to the Communications Operator on Friday night and returned to Mr. Jay on Monday morning. All staff should note that in the event of an emergency, e.g. the illness of the Guard on duty, Mr. Jay or the Communications Operator - as the case may be - should be contacted at once.

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- 3 -

OFFICE DOORS AND WINDOW GRILLS -

7. All doors giving access to the rooms of Canadian members of the staff must be locked when they are left unoccupied, even temporarily. Responsibility for shutting and locking the Chubb grill on the Registry will be shared by the stenographers and the Registry Clerk. They will share with Communications staff the responsibility for shutting and locking the door leading to the reception room whenever the stenographers' room and the Registry are left vacant.

8. The Chubb grill leading into the Communications Section is to be kept locked during the day. At noon the key to this Chubb grill should be placed on the Key Board and this action recorded on the temporary control sheet. The Chubb door itself will be opened in the morning by the Communications Staff and closed by them at the end of their working day. Whenever the Chubb door is locked, the grill will be left unlocked and the key will remain in a secure place in the Communications Section. The swinging grills on the windows in the Registry and the Teletype Room will normally remain locked. They can be opened for cleaning or repair of windows only with the authorization of the Security Officer.

9. The accordion grill in Room 5 may be opened by the Communications Staff while they are on duty. That staff will be responsible for shutting and locking the grill before they leave for lunch (one lock) and before they leave in the evening (both locks). In addition, they will lock their cabinet in the evening.

10. The accordion grills in the other rooms will be opened in the morning on working days and on Saturdays by the Guard on duty, and closed by the Guard on duty at night and at 1 p.m. on Saturdays. In order to avoid the burden of locking accordion grills in these rooms during the quiet hour at lunchtime, it will be necessary for all classified material to be returned to the Registry and for all office windows and doors to be shut and locked, including the Chubb grill to the Registry. The shutters in the Registry, stenographers' room and teletype room should also be lowered. It is expected that on the great majority of days Mr. MacKinnon will be in the office during the luncheon period. On those occasions when he will wish to leave the offices he will make arrangements for someone else to remain on the premises.

REGISTRY -

11. Apart from the normal responsibility of ensuring that the Chubb grill is locked whenever necessary, the Registry Clerk will also ensure that the Taylor safe is kept locked at all

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... times when

- 4 -

times when not in use. Moreover, before the luncheon break he will ensure

- a) that his window is shut and locked;
- b) that all papers and files have been placed in file drawers, all of which will be shut, though they will not have to be locked;
- c) that the keys used by him are turned over to Mr. MacKinnon.

In order to facilitate the bothersome task under (b), all members of the staff are asked to make every effort to return their papers to the Registry before 12.30. If it is not possible to return papers before the Registry Clerk leaves for lunch, latecomers are asked to obtain the key to the Chubb grill from Mr. MacKinnon and to place their papers in the drawer provided for them at the same time as they return their keys to the Key Board. The grill must then be locked again and the key for the grill should, of course, be returned to Mr. MacKinnon.

SUPERVISION OF LOCAL WORKMEN AND DELIVERIES TO THE CHANCERY -


12. The recent presence of local workmen during the preparation of these new offices constitutes a security threat, the danger of which cannot be over-estimated. It is a situation which has been successfully exploited many times in the past and can be exploited whenever the utmost vigilance is even momentarily relaxed. It should always be assumed that an alien workman, however well-known and trusted, is a highly skilled technician in an offensive intelligence service. For this reason, and because the offices - apart from the Communications Section - are not soundproof, all personnel should exercise discretion when speaking about sensitive subjects.

13. An effective method of penetration is the installation of certain devices in furniture or equipment which has been sent off the premises for repairs. All such items will be subjected to the most minute examination on their return before being re-installed. Every delivery, even that of the most routine nature, should be carefully checked by the Accountant and the delivery reported to the Security Officer, who will ask the Guards to make what further check is possible.

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14. The orders promulgated in regard to security are not designed to meet a security threat based on forcible entry or physical attack. This possibility is discounted.

15. The danger lies in surreptitious entry being effected, leading to the installation of intrusion devices and the gaining of access to classified material without the knowledge of or arousing of the suspicions of the officers of the post. The threat is a real and ever-present one, and can only successfully be combated by the most constant vigilance and scrupulous attention to detail by security guards and all other members of the Canadian staff.


Max Wershof

CANADIAN DELEGATION



DÉLÉGATION DU CANADA

GENEVA, 1957

SECURITY GUARD SCHEDULE
(FEBRUARY)

R.Latreille	Feb.1	1730hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.2	Sat
A.Emmerson	" 2	1230hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.3	Sun
R.Latreille	" 3	0830hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.4	Mon
A.Emmerson	" 4	1730hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb 5	Tues
R.Latreille	" 5	1730hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.6	Wed
A.Emmerson	" 6	1730hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.7	Thurs
R.Latreille	" 7	1730hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.8	Fri
A.Emmerson	" 8	1730hrs to	0830hrs. Feb.9	Sat
R.Latreille	" 9	1230hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.10	Sun
A.Emmerson	" 10	0830hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.11	Mon
R.Latreille	" 11	1730hrs.tto	0830hrs. Feb.12	Tues
A.Emmerson	" 12	1730hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.13	Wed
R.Latreille	" 13	1730hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.14	Thurs
A.Emmerson	" 14	1730hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.15	Fri
R.Latreille	" 15	1730hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.16	
A.Emmerson	" 16	1230hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.17	
R.Latreille	" 17	0830hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.18	
A.Emmerson	" 18	1730hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.19	
R.Latreille	" 19	1730hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.20	
A.Emmerson	" 20	1730hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.21	
R.Latreille	" 21	1730hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.22	
A.Emmerson	" 22	1730hrs. to	0830hrs. FEB.23	
R.Latreille	" 23	1230hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.24	
A.Emmerson	" 24	0830hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.25	
R.Latreille	" 25	1730hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.26	
A.Emmerson	" 26	1730hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.27	
R.Latreille	" 27	1730hrs. to	0830hrs. Feb.28	
A.Emmerson	" 28	1730hrs. to	0830hrs. Mar. 1	

50048-AL-70	
68	✓

FM GENEVA FEB14 RESTD

TO EXTERNAL OTT 54

REF OUR LETTER 88 JAN31

OFFICE EQUIPMENT-DESTRUCTOR ROOM

IN WRITING OUR LETTER WE WERE UNAWARE OF A SERIES OF ADDITIONAL SERIOUS DRAWBACKS TO THE USE OF A PULPER. EMMERSON, ONE OF OUR GUARDS, SAYS THESE MACHINES CREATE SUCH A MESS THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO USE THE DESTRUCTOR ROOM AS ADDITIONAL STORAGE SPACE WE DESPERATELY NEED AND THAT THE SMELL WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE INTOLERABLE FOR STENOGRAPHERS AND OTHER STAFF OCCUPYING BACK ROOMS.

2. IN VIEW OF THESE POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS AND OF THE OBJECTION THAT A PULPER CANNOT DESTROY CYPHER TAPES, PLEASE CORRESPOND WITH US FURTHER BEFORE MAKING ANY COMMITMENT TO SEND

COBOMAT PULPER. WE ARE INVESTIGATING POSSIBILITY OF INSTALLING AN OIL DRUM INCINERATOR ON THE GROUNDS OF MY RESIDENCE, TO WHICH WE ASSUME THERE WOULD BE NO SECURITY OBJECTION.

WERSHOF

*Mr. Reyes - Should this be marked for file?
You were dealing with this.
We should obtain a plan of the new premises
from S.R.P.*

16/2

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

231

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION,
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

Reference: Our Letter No. 513 of December 11/56

Subject: Change of combination settings

Security:..... S E C R E T

No:..... 113

Date:..... February 12, 1957

Enclosures:..... 1 encl.

Air or Surface Mail:..... Air

Post File No:..... SECURITY (S)

Ottawa File No.

50048-AL-40

43

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References

D-2
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As soon as possible after our arrival in our new offices we either changed the combinations on our locks in use or set combinations on the additional locks required.

2. The settings on all combinations now in use are listed in the attached sealed envelope.

Max Wenzel
Permanent Mission.

Internal
Circulation

Mrs d'Amato:

To record & file

*Recorded & filed
20/2/57
Pls File*

Distribution
to Posts

D

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION,
.....
..... GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.....

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Your Letter of Jan. 31, 1957 to the
Regional Security Officer, London.

Subject:

Security - Telephones

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: DS- 56

Date: ... February 5, 1957

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: ... Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AL-40	
58	50

References

In the temporary absence from London of the Regional Security Officer we are replying to your enquiry concerning the telephone in Room 4, the teletype line room. It is correct that there is no objection to the installation of a telephone in this room, and, indeed, it is desirable that one should be available to the Communications Clerk. Our Letter No. F-307 of September 12, 1955 erred on this point, since the line room houses no classified equipment.

2. No telephone should, however, be installed in the cypher room.

for Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts
London
(Regional
Security
Officer)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION,.....
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Your Letter No. 68 of Jan. 24, 1957.

Subject: Security - Keys

Security: SECRET

No: DS-54

Date: February 4, 1957.

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.

50048-AL-40 ✓

43

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References

This will confirm our Telegram No. 28 of January 29, 1957, in which we approved the marking of keys serially and individually to facilitate their identification. We would prefer this method of marking rather than the use of actual room numbers, as it may prevent anyone who might gain access to a key from ascertaining the room to which the key belongs.

2. Your attention is directed to the Specimen Standing Orders for Security Guards at Posts Abroad, paragraph 10, attached to our Letter No. DS-422 of December 13, 1956, and we suggest that you institute the procedure described therein for the safe custody of keys.

3. We assume that the duplicate keys forwarded to the Regional Security Officer, London, were suitably tagged. Would you, therefore, please advise the Regional Security Officer to mark these duplicates serially from A to J to correspond with the keys in use in the Chancery, and to stamp each key with the number 5, thus continuing the numerical sequence of all series.

Internal
Circulation

for Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

Distribution
to Posts



OFFICE OF THE
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA

50048-AL-40
129 | 50

CONFIDENTIAL

1st February, 1957.

Dear John,

*Mr. [unclear]
Please attend to
R.S. 4/2*

I have about an hour before the last bag leaves for Canada prior to my departure for Rome. I wonder therefore, if I could impose upon you to have one of your staff reply to Mr. Wershof's letter to me of the 31st January headed "Security, Geneva - Telephones".

It does seem a roundabout way of doing it but as I will not be back here and have a chance to study this before the 16th February it would give Mr. Wershof a satisfactory reply long before then. Will you please send me a copy of your reply.

Yours sincerely,

Bob.

(R.A.S. MacNeil)

J. Timmerman, Esq.,
Department of External Affairs,
Defence Liaison (2) Division,
OTTAWA,
Ontario,
CANADA.

RASM/dcw

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: E. CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION,.....
..... GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.....

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Your Letter No. 70 of Jan. 24, 1957.

Subject: Departmental Security Regulations.

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: DS- 49

Date: January 31, 1957.

Enclosures: 1

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.
50048-AL-40

43

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References

As requested, to complete your file attached is a copy of Circular Document ADMIN. No. 21/53 of June 19, 1953, although you will note that this document is not primarily concerned with security.

2. You are correct in assuming that we are aware of the desirability of an up-to-date consolidation of the various existing documents relating to security. It is intended that this consolidation take the form of a separate Security Manual, which, it is hoped, will be completed and distributed this year.

for Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

London
(Regional
Security
Officer)

C O P Y

930

"La Pelouse", Palais des Nations,
Geneva, 31st January 1957.

CONFIDENTIAL

Attention: Regional Security Officer

58048 - AL-40	
43	✓

Dear Sir:

Security, Geneva - Telephones

In its Letter No. F-307 of September 12, 1955, dealing with the subject of the installation of telephones in the new office accommodation of this Mission, the Department mentioned that "to safeguard security no telephone outlets should, as you say, be installed in Rooms 4 and 5. As an added precaution, no buzzer should be installed in either of these two rooms". As you will see from the plan of our new offices, which you have already received with a duplicate set of our keys, Room 4 will house the teletype equipment and Room 5 the sensitive cypher equipment.

Although our files show no formal decision countermanding this instruction, it is a fact that Room 4 has now been equipped with a telephone outlet. We understand that the decision to install this connection was taken here some time during September 1956 while Mr. Bélanger was making a preliminary inspection of what are to be our Communications rooms. So far as the memory of those still on our establishment goes, Mr. Bélanger told Mr. Allard at that time that the earlier worries with regard to telephones in Communications areas had largely been overcome and that, in any event, a telephone in Room 4, separated by a solid wall from Room 5, would in no way compromise the security of the cypher equipment. Moreover, we believe that he mentioned that the efficient use of the teletype equipment required that a telephone be readily available to the Communications Clerk.

Office of the High Commissioner for Canada,
Canada House,
London, England.

cc. Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

000588

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FEB 4 1957

Mr. Leck:

To see.
Do you think
we might
answer this
in Mr. McNeil
absence?

1/2 D

* There is, of course, a connecting door. 2

- 2 -

Although we have an extra telephone which we would very much like to install on the connection in Room 4, we shall not do so, at least once the cypher equipment has arrived, unless you tell us that by doing so we are not compromising security. If you think there is some danger to security by having a telephone in that situation, we should be grateful to learn whether you also think that the mere presence of a telephone outlet is also compromising.

To complete the picture, it need only be added that no buzzer has been installed in either Room 4 or Room 5.


Yours sincerely,

M. H. WERSHOF

Max Wershof,
Permanent Representative.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)



NUMBERED LETTER

UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION,
..... GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

Reference Our Letter No. 218 of June 5, 1956.

Subject: Office equipment - destructor room

Security: RESTRICTED

No: 88

Date: January 31, 1957.

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: OFF-2-1
Orig 101042-1-4

Ottawa File No. 1	
50048 AL-40	
5	

References

With our Letter under reference we included an Appendix "A" dealing inter alia with equipment for the destructor room. Simple reference was made to paragraph 3(a) of your Letter F-156 of May 10, 1955, in which you had listed the alternative suggestions of

- (a) a "Somat" 12 Electric Pulper, or
- (b) an approved incinerator, either gas or electric fired.

2. On reviewing our file we are unable to find any mention of a decision having been taken as to the kind of equipment for destroying material selected. It is a fact, however, that Room 1 on the plan of the new offices, a copy of which is available in the Department, has been equipped with a drain line, water supply and an electric power outlet. Nevertheless, we can find no reference either to the shipment of a pulper nor to any decision that a pulper would not be supplied.

3. As you know, we move into our new offices tomorrow, February 1, and will immediately be faced with the problem of destroying classified waste. Since there is no incinerator anywhere on the premises and since it will be impossible to arrange any temporary means of destroying waste, we have made an informal arrangement with the United Kingdom Permanent Mission to use their facilities for destroying. Although perfectly satisfactory from the security point of view, this arrangement has two drawbacks. In the first place, it is an imposition on the British which I am reluctant to continue indefinitely. Secondly, it necessitates the Security Guards returning to the office on one of the working days of each week in order to collect the waste and to take it the not-inconsequential distance to the British office.

4. In the circumstances I should be grateful if you would give urgent consideration to this matter and let me know what your plans are with regard to the provision of adequate destruction equipment. You

will wish to..

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

- 2 -

will wish to bear in mind our Letter No. 86 of January 30, explaining that in the absence of sufficient storage space we are hoping to build into Room 1 one wall of shelving. The room would also, we would hope, contain one of the stationery cupboards, as well as a small work table or desk for the use of the Security Guards. Obviously the size of any destruction unit must be given careful thought, since equipment that is at all bulky may require our removing some of the other furnishings which, under optimum conditions, we would like to have remain in Room 1.

5. In conclusion, I should perhaps draw your attention to one other aspect of the matter. I have been led to believe by our Security Guards that a pulping machine will not adequately destroy the waste tapes from the cypher equipment. If you should decide that, notwithstanding this possible weakness, a pulper is to be sent to this Post, I should be grateful for your instructions on how we should destroy these tapes.


6. Although the above raises a number of security questions, we have decided in this instance not to follow the procedure laid down in paragraph 7 of your Letter DS-368 of October 31, in accordance with which we should write directly to the Regional Security Officer in London. We have taken this decision because the above deals in large measure with questions of office furnishings which may not be familiar to Mr. McNeil. We have, however, sent him a copy of this Letter under a personal letter of explanation.

M. H. WENSHOF

Permanent Mission.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)



NUMBERED LETTER

UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION,
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

Reference:

Subject: Shelves in New Offices

Security: UNCLASSIFIED

No: 86

Date: January 30, 1957

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: OFF-2-1
10104-2-1-40

Ottawa File No.
5048-AL-40
58 ✓

References

DUPLICATE

As can be seen from the plan of our new offices, a copy of which you have, the only readily available fixed space for storing stationery, documents and other supplies is in the small cupboard called Room 6 on the plan. Even with the two stationery cabinets received some time ago this is not enough for our requirements. As you know, apart from the normal items we have to keep two complete sets of stationery (delegation and Mission letterhead), as well as a supply of office equipment for loan to delegations.

2. We can see no alternative to building shelves in room 1. Although this was originally intended as a destruction room, we have as yet no assurance that we are to be supplied with a pulper. If at a later date it is decided to install a pulper and the shelves are taking up too much room, they can be removed, as they will not be attached to the wall.

3. In addition to this shelving for readily available supplies, shelves will also be needed in our basement storeroom, where we will have to store not only our Entertainment Stockpile but also the balance of our supplies and the luggage of the Security Guard.

4. We have received an estimate of 413.00 S.F. (approximately \$100) for the shelving in Room 1 which will cover the whole of the back wall from floor to ceiling. For the basement the estimate is 858.00 S.F. (approximately \$200) for shelving to cover the left-hand wall and the back wall. In both cases the estimates call for shelves made of the lowest grade wood, plane unpainted. A copy of the estimate which gives the dimensions is attached. When considering this estimate it should be borne in mind that the cost of wood in is very high.

5. It would be appreciated if we could be given necessary authorization for these expenditures by the time as we shall be moving into the new offices in two days and our need for storage space will be pressing.

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

- 2 -

6. As an alternative that may be cheaper, you might wish to consider the possibility of supplying manually-assembled metal shelving. We know that this can be purchased in Canada and the United Kingdom, but we have not been able to locate it in Geneva.

M. H. WERSHOF

Permanent Mission

GENEVA JAN29/57 CONF
TO EXTERNAL 31

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

YOU WILL HAVE RECEIVED OUR LETS 68 AND 70 JAN24 IN BAG DESPATCHED
THAT DAY. WE REGRET INADVERTENTLY THESE WERE NOT ADDRESSED
TO THE SECURITY OFFICER IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA7 OF YOUR LET
DS368 OCT31. YOU MIGHT WISH TO SEND COPIES TO HIM OFFERING OUR
APOLOGIES FOR PROCEDURAL ERROR
WERSHOF

Mr. Leach

For attention

1/2

Miss Kilby, please,

+ file

*See D(2)
6 Feb 57*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

Canadian Permanent Mission.....
Geneva, Switzerland.....

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Your Letter 50 of January 18, 1957....

Subject: Office Furnishings - File cabinets.....
.....
.....

Security: Unclassified.....

No: F- 48.....

Date: January 29, 1957.....

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail:.....

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
10104-C-1-40	
50048-AL-40	
43	

References

*File this copy in 50048-AL-40
Original in 10104-C-1-40.*

We are pleased to inform you that an order is being placed through Canada House, for 4-four-drawer non-locking filing cabinets (grey) for use of the four officers of your Mission.

Non-locking cabinets are being provided on the understanding that under no circumstances will they be used to maintain classified material.

Unfortunately there has been some delay on delivery of the Taylor security shell and insert, however we are informed that shipment is being made from St John N.B. on Feb. 6, via the S.S. Beaverlodge.

Internal
Circulation

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
M. GRANT

Under Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Distribution
to Posts

FILE COPY

13 2 2 9 3 1 1 C R N
T.O.R./T.O.D.

COMMUNICATIONS
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

JAN. 29/57

FILE

50048-AL-40

SECURITY

SECRET

43

PRECEDENCE

NUMBER

DS-28

FM EXTERNAL

1957 JAN 29
OTTAWA

22 00

TO PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE GENEVA

INFO

REF

SUBJECT

APPROVE MARKING OF KEYS.

SUGGEST KEYS FOR EACH LOCK BE LETTERED FROM A TO J
AND KEYS IN EACH SERIES BE NUMBERED INDIVIDUALLY
FROM ONE TO FOUR. LETTER FOLLOWS.

LOCAL
DISTRIBUTION

ORIGINATOR

E.F. Keyes/tk

DIVISION

D. L. (2)

PHONE

2-5124

APPROVED

J. Zimmerman

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION,
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

Reference:
Subject: Security -- Keys.

Security: SECRET

No: 4/2

Date: January 24, 1957

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: SECURITY (S)

Ottawa File No.

50048-AL-40

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References

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You will have received a copy of our letter of January 17 to London, marked for the attention of the Regional Security Officer and enclosing a set of the ten keys for the Chubb locks that have recently been installed at our new offices. As you know, this leaves in our care four additional sets of these keys, or a total of forty. In addition, we have two sets of the keys for the grills installed with the Chubb doors on the Registry and the Communications Section.

2. It has occurred to us that the custody and efficient use of these keys would be greatly assisted if we were permitted to stamp on them an indication of the room served by the key and the set to which it belongs. I understand from our Security Guards that it would be a simple matter for them to identify the keys in this fashion.

3. However, before authorizing the guards to undertake this task, I should like to have confirmation from you that this procedure in no way contravenes security regulations. In this connection I should point out to you that, with the exception of the keys which the Security Guards may carry with them outside of the office during the days of Saturday and Sunday when the offices will be guarded only by spot checks, and the extra key to the entrance door which will be entrusted to Mr. Jay, I can foresee no need for our keys to be removed from the office premises. I would personally hope that you will be able to authorize us to stamp all of the keys. If you cannot do so, I would hope that you would be able to authorize us at least to stamp those keys which are not likely to be removed from the office premises.

4. In view of the fact that we should be installed in our new offices ~~not later than~~ on February 1st, I would appreciate receiving your reply by cable.

Internal Circulation

Mr. Keyes:
Prepay telegram saying we have no objection to keys being numbered serially and individually. (suggest A-1, A2, B1, B2 etc.)

Distribution

to Posts
Write letter confirming and directing attention to desirability of London's keys being similarly numbered
94. No

Mark Winstanley
Permanent Mission.

000597

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION,
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

Reference: Our Letter No. 253 of June 25, 1956.

Subject: Departmental Security Regulations.

Security: Confidential

No: 70

Date: January 24, 1957

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: SECURITY (S)

Ottawa File No.

50048-A1-40

43

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References

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JAN 28 1957

In accordance with instructions contained in Circular Document B.51/55 of September 27, 1955, all members of the Department serving at this Mission have read the Departmental security regulations.

2. I should like to add, however, that this routine responsibility is perhaps unnecessarily complicated in the absence of a concise consolidation of the basic regulations. As you know, there are, in addition to Section 201 of the Manual of Regulations and Instructions, many circular documents bearing on the subject of security which have been issued since Document No. A.74/51 of October 19, 1951. A list of seventeen of these is included at the foot of page 2 of Chapter 11 of the Post Book prepared at the time of my appointment to Geneva. A review of our files has disclosed that two of these - No. B.116/51 of December 29, 1951 and No. B.60/52 of June 3, 1952 - have been destroyed in accordance with instructions. The rest of these are on our files with the exception of No. Admin.21/53 of June 19, 1953. If you think that this document is still relevant, would you please forward a copy to us.

3. In this connection it has occurred to us that a number of these circulars seem to have been overtaken by Section 201 of the Manual, and may therefore be redundant. We presume that you have in mind the desirability of, and perhaps are now engaged on, preparing an up-to-date consolidation of the many regulations and circulars.

Max Wenshof
Permanent Mission.

Internal
Circulation

~~Mr. Brock~~
Pls. reply
with copy
to London -
J

Distribution
to Posts

D

1021 700 58 54 3 30

— 178 —

[illegible][illegible]

содержит в себе все, что есть в природе.

200-375 (2)

[illegible]

1992年12月25日 星期一

Второй вариант — это вариант с «разрывом» в развитии, когда в какой-то момент происходит сдвиг в развитии, и человек переходит на более высокий уровень. Это может быть связано с различными факторами, такими как изменение окружающей среды, получение нового опыта, общение с другими людьми и т.д.

7000000 500 5000

✓ COPY FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

SECRET

"La Pelouse", Palais des Nations
Geneva, January 17, 1957

File on Geneva file
22/1

50048-AL-40
58

Dear Sir,

In accordance with Mr. LeFevre's letter of May 24, 1956 and paragraph 8 of the Department's letter to this Mission No. DS-368 of October 31, 1956, a copy of which was sent to you, I am enclosing the following :

- 1) A complete set of ten keys for the locks installed at the new offices of this Permanent Mission, Parc du Château Banquet No 16, and
- 2) A plan of those new offices.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the Department for information.

Yours sincerely,

ATTN. DL-2

for
WJF
Max Wershof
Permanent Representative

Office of the High Commissioner for Canada,
Canada House,
LONDON, England.

Attention of the Regional Security Officer

9

000600

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE EUROPEAN
OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, GENEVA.....

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Your Telegram No. 281 of Dec. 10, 1956

Subject: Combination Padlocks.....

.....
.....

Security: CONFIDENTIAL.....

No: DS 431.....

Date: December 17, 1956.....

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail: Air.....

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.
50048-AL-40

129 50

References

We are forwarding by freight shipment fifteen Sargent and Greenleaf combination padlocks as requested in the telegram under reference.

2. Included in this shipment is one M-6730 Sargent and Greenleaf M. P. combination lock as requested in your Requisition No. 5 of October 26. The following instruction should enable you to install the lock with little difficulty. These instructions should be checked with the exploded diagram attached herewith:

- (a) Remove the lock cover and pull out the slide cam and inner spindle assembly M-6730-MP-16A which, in this lock, is in one piece.
- (b) Carefully pull out the spindle key M-6730-MP-53, hold cam MP-6730-5A with the fingers, and unscrew the dial spindle out of the cam.
- (c) Remove the hexagonal nut from the end of the tube and take off the dial ring 6916-MP.
- (d) Unscrew the bolt screw M-6730-MP-85 and remove the lever M-6730-MP-4 and spring 6730-102. Push the bolt M-6730-MP-3 back into the lock case.
- (e) Place the lock in position on the container and fasten in place with the four case screws. The heads of the two lower case screws should not touch the wheels. If they do touch them, remove the screws and reduce the diameter of the heads so that they will not rub at this point.
- (f) Place the dial ring in position and secure with the hexagonal nut and two dial screws if these are used.
- (g) Replace the cam M-6730-MP-5A and screw dial spindle into cam until spindle is snug. Unscrew spindle until the keyways in the cam and spindle coincide. Insert the spindle key with the crook of the key facing away from the centre of the dial spindle. Tap key in as far as possible.
- (h) Replace the lever M-6730-MP-4 and its spring and secure with bolt screw M-6730-MP-85. When tightening this screw make sure that a coil of the spring is not caught under the lever.

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

Regional Security Officer,
London.

Dec. 20/56
T.K

- 2 -

- (i) Replace the lock cover and dial the combination which has been set on 20-40-60 and operate the lock. As this combination was set with the lock unmounted, it is possible that when mounted as outlined above it may not open exactly on these numbers. However, by setting the numbers on the side mark, it should be possible to insert the change key whereupon the lock should be reset to new numbers.
- (j) Operate the lock several times with the door or drawer of the unit in the open position.

for Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

50048-AR-40	
43	✓

Ottawa, December 14, 1956

FROM: THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

**TO: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION TO THE EUROPEAN OFFICE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.**

We are forwarding by (FREIGHT) the following:-

FIFTEEN (15) SARGENT & GREENLEAF COMBINATION PADLOCKS #8088
Nos. E12, E13, E14, E15, E16, E23, E24, E25, E26,
E27, E28, E29, E30, E31, E32. @ \$9.00 ea. - \$135.00

Please refer to your telegram No. 281, December 10, 1956.

ONE (1) SARGENT & GREENLEAF COMBINATION LOCK FOR CHUBB CABINET
(M-6730 MP) Combination is set on 20 - 40 - 60 \$30.00

Requested in your Req. No. 5, of October 22, 1956.

Please see letter being sent to you for special instructions
concerning installation of the combination lock.

TOTAL ESTIMATED VALUE \$165.00

When the above has been received and checked, would you kindly sign and
return the original form Ext. 27 R.


Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Attention: C. d'Ornano, D. L. 2 Div. Rm. 251 E. B.

This is to certify that the above mentioned items have been received in
good order.

_____ Place _____ Date _____ Signature _____

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION TO THE
EUROPEAN OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, GENEVA.
FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Security: ..CONFIDENTIAL.....
No:DS- 420.....
Date: ..December 11, 1956.....
Enclosures:.....
Air or Surface Mail: ..AIR.....
Post File No:.....

Reference:.....
Subject: ..personal Notes of Messrs. A. Emmerson
.....and R. Latreille.....
.....

Ottawa File No.

50048-AL-40 ✓

43

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References

We are forwarding herewith the personal notes taken by Messrs. A. Emmerson and R. Latreille during the departmental course for security guards which they attended last May.

2. We are pleased to inform you that a complete tool kit and sets of spare parts as requested in your Requisition No. 5 of October 22, have been forwarded to Supplies and Properties Division, Shipping Section, for inclusion in their next shipment to your mission.

3. The only item which has not been sent is the spare Sargent and Greenleaf combination lock which is now on order but which has not yet been delivered to the Department.

Internal
Circulation

for Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

Distribution
to Posts

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

928

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION,
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

Reference: Circular Document ADMIN. 8/56 of
February 20, 1956
Subject: Change of combination settings

Security: SECRET

No: 513

Date: December 11/56

Enclosures: One

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: SECURITY (S)

Ottawa File No.

50048-AL-40

43

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References

D-2	
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Dec. 18, 1956

In accordance with the instructions contained in your Circular Document under reference, new combination settings for the safety containers in use at this office were put into effect yesterday, following the departure of Mr. Allard from this post.

2. The settings now in use are listed in the attached sealed envelope.

K. Barry Gray

The Permanent Mission.

Internal Circulation

*Mrs d'Ornano:
To record & file*

*Recorded. H
E.M.
Dec 19. 1956
Phase 7*

Distribution to Posts

10

50048-AL--40	
43.	50

FM GENEVA DEC10/56 CONFID

TO EXTERNAL 281

INFO TT EMBASSY PARIS FM OTT

REF PARIS TEL 880

NEW OFFICE

TWELVE COMBINATION PADLOCKS NEEDED FOR FOLDING GRILLS IN NEW OFFICE.

WOULD THEREFORE SUGGEST FIFTEEN BE SENT IMMEDIATELY.

Mr Keyes:

for attention

Action Taken
File please
S. Keyes
Dec 19/56

[Signature]
14/12.

Req. # 5
12/27/56

J 36
Ottawa, DECEMBER 7 1956

FROM: THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION TO THE EUROPEAN
OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

We are forwarding by (FREIGHT SHIPMENT) the following:-

50048-	AL-40
43	✓

- 1 Tube of Lubraplate No. 105
1 " " DIXON Microfyne GRAPHITE Powder.
1 Stick DIXONS Graphite 1-G-1
1 Oil Stone Carborundum No. 108
1 Set of High Speed Drills 1/16"
1 Standard 2 Cell Flashlight with batteries
1 Set of Pin Punches 1/16" to 1/8"
1 Centre Punch 1/16"
1 Ratchet Brace 10" sweep No. 1410 John Richardson
1 Expansion Bit 5/8" - 1 1/2"
1 Wood Chisel 3/8" wide.
1 " " 3/4" wide.
1 Hand Drill - chuck to accomodate up to 1/4" bit.
1 Hacksaw 12" adjustable
1 Nest of Saws No. 725
1 Oil Can 1/2 pint with flexible spout.
1 Westcott adjustable wrench 6"
1 J. B. 5/16" Wrench
1 10" Mill File Flat

When the above has been received and checked, would you kindly sign and return the original form Ext. 27 R.

[Signature]
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

ATTENTION: C. d'ORNANO, D. L. 2 Div. Rm. 251 E. B.

This is to certify that the above mentioned items have been received in good order.

[Signature]
Place

March 19-1957
Date

[Signature]
Signature

1957 MAR 26 PM 2:25

2004 01761

VINCENTINI: C. F. OLIVANO, D. F. S. DIA, KW. SSI E. B.

101 101 IMPROVED METHOD
101 101 IMPROVED METHOD

NO. 119 COLLECTOR'S PA. () RECEIVED ENTIRELY () THE FOLLOWING:-

OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS' GENERAL SECRETARIAT.

THE CIVILIAN BUREAU HAS BEEN ORDERED TO THE FOLLOWING

OFFICIAL MEMBERS 1029

Ottawa, ~~NOVEMBER~~ 1956
DECEMBER 7

FROM: THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA
TO: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION TO THE EUROPEAN
OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

We are forwarding by (FREIGHT SHIPMENT) the following:-

- ✓ 1 4" Slim Taper File
- ✓ 1 6" Half Round smooth file.
- ✓ 1 Metal Tape Ruler 0 to 72"
- ✓ 22 HACKSAW BLADES medium at 0.12 ea.
- ✓ 1 4 oz. Machinist's hammer
- ✓ 1 7½ oz. Raw Hide hammer (J. Richardson)
- ✓ 1 No. 1055D 6" Pliers
- ✓ 1 Pr. No. 84 4½ pliers.
- ✓ 1 Pr. No. 1661 x 6 " pliers.
- ✓ 1 No. 40 x 4 Screwdriver
- ✓ 1 No. 5½ Screwdriver.
- ✓ 1 12" Screwdriver
- ✓ 1 Metal Vise 4"
- ✓ 1 Set of Alphabetical Dies 1/8" letter.
- ✓ 1 " " Numerical Dies 1/8" numbers.
- ✓ 1 Metal Tool Box with tray.
- ✓ 1 Small Yale Padlock with two keys.

When the above has been received and checked, would you kindly sign and return the original form Ext. 27R.

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

ATTENTION: C. d'ORRANO, D. L. 2 Div. Rm. 251 E. B.

This is to certify that the above mentioned items have been received in good order.

Place

Date

Signature

Ottawa, DECEMBER 7 1956

FROM: THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA
TO: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION TO THE EUROPEAN
OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

We are forwarding by (FREIGHT SHIPMENT) the following:-

- #
- ✓3 SARGENT & GREENLEAF combination padlocks Nos. E1, E2, E3.
- ✓25 W-5-32 washers (for M6730 MP only)
- ✓6 W5-34 horseshoe washers (M6730)
- ✓12 W 11-33 washers (M6730)
- ✓2 tubes of "Lubraplate"
- ✓2 tubes Dixon's Microfyne Graphite powder.
- ✓6 R Spindle keys - TAYLOR 4 wheel.
- ✓3 U Horse Shoe Keepers - TAYLOR - 4 Wheel
- ✓12 W Washers - TAYLOR - 4 wheel.
- ✓6 Brass spacer washers - TAYLOR - 4 wheel.
- ✓1 S - Catch Wheels - TAYLOR - 4 wheel

Please refer to your Req. No. 5, of Oct. 22, 1956.

When the above has been received and checked, would you kindly sign and return the original form Ext. 27 R.

for Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Attention: C. d'Ornano, D.L. 2 Div. Rm. 251 E.B.

This is to certify that the above mentioned items have been received in good order.

Place

Date

Signature

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

FILE COPY

TO: INSPECTION SERVICE

Security RESTRICTED

Date Dec. 6, 1956.

..... Attention: Mr. Heilwraith

FROM: DEFENCE LIAISON (2) DIVISION

File No. 50048-AL-40		
129		129

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: Floor Plans - Canadian Embassies

Such as we have we give you.

2. Attached are the floor plans we hold for

- (a) Madrid
- (b) Dublin
- (c) Berne
- (d) Geneva.

3. You may find the report enclosed with the Dublin plan interesting in the light of your discoveries.

4. Sketches of premises for which we hold no plans would be most helpful, and we would be glad to receive, therefore, any you are in a position to provide.

CIRCULATION

Defence Liaison (2) Division.

50048-AL-40	General Jan 7/57
43	✓
File to 50048-40	

S E C R E T

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS - GENEVA

The Permanent Mission will shortly be moving to new quarters and there is therefore no point in commenting on security measures in the present offices at the "Villa la Pelouse".

2. Security arrangements for the new premises have been planned in advance and there is little more that can be done until the place is occupied and in full operation. The liaison team left with the Mission copies of the Security Data Sheet, with instructions to send the completed form to the Department as soon as the office layout and procedures are firm. The Mission was also asked to forward an architect's plan of the premises with all security data clearly marked on it, as a supplement to the data sheet.

3. It is not anticipated that any special security problems will arise in the new premises. With two security guards already at the post and a third arriving shortly, complete protection should be ensured from the first day of operations. One of the security guards (probably Latreille) will move into the apartment adjoining the Mission offices as soon as it is ready.

Inspection Service.

November, 1956.

File please 912. Jan 20/57
50048-AL-40

ACTION

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

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NOV 20 1956

50048-A L	
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27

FM LONDON NOV21/56 RESTD
TO EXTERNAL 1638 IMPORTANT
CHUBBS SECURITY EQUIPT FOR GENEVA. E A 27548-A Jan 2
CONTRACTOR HAS NOW REQUESTED FROM MONETTE ASSISTANCE OF CHUBBS
TECHNICIAN TO SUPERVISE INSTALLATION OF STRONG ROOM DOORS. EXTIMATED
COST INCLUDING PLANE FARE LONDON/GENEVA AND RETURN IS ONE HUNDRED
POUNDS. AS CONTRACTOR WILL BE READY IN TWO WEEKS TIME TO START
INSTALLATION PLEASE FORWARD TO LONDON NECESSARY AUTHORITY AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE.

S&P.

Recommended

[Signature]

DL(2)

21 NOV 56

SUPPLIES ND PROPERTIES FOR FILE ACTION TAKEN	
TUEGRAM LETTER OF REE BY	
DATE	23/11/56

SUPPLIES AND PROPERTIES DIVISION

CONFIDENTIAL

Nov. 7, 1956.

DEFENCE LIAISON (2) DIVISION

CPDUN Geneva Letter No. 435 of
October 22, 1956.

New Office Accommodation - Geneva

Oregon

10104-P-1-40 *F*
~~58042-1-40~~

50048	AL-40
127	125

We agree that there appears to be no reason why any changes should now be made in the plan arrangements for the new quarters of the Delegation. The eight Chubb locks mentioned in paragraph 6 of the letter under reference should be provided and installed, and the original plan to secure the steel shutters on Room 5 with combination padlocks should not be changed in favour of key-operate padlocks.

G.H.S.

Defence Liaison (2) Division.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION,
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

Reference: Your telegram No. F-216 of Oct. 10/56

Subject: New Office Accommodation.

Security:....CONFIDENTIAL.....

No:.....4.3.5.....

Date:....October 22, 1956.....

Enclosures:....Nil.....

Air or Surface Mail:....Air.....

Post File No:....OFF-2-1.....

Ottawa File No.

References

In your letter No. F-156 of May 10, 1956, you mentioned sixteen doors which are supposed to be fitted with Chubb 3G-74 type Security Locks. For easy reference these are listed as follows:

	no	Door between Room 1 & Room 3 (Para 3 (A) (iv) of your letter)
yes	"	" 21 & landing (Para 4 (vi))
yes	"	" 16 " " (" " ")
yes	"	" 17 " Room 16 (" " ")
yes	"	" 16 " " 13 (" " ")
yes	"	" 12 " " 13 (" " ")
yes	"	" 11 " " 13 (" " ")
yes	"	" 10 " " 13 (" " ")
yes	"	" 9 " " 13 (" " ")
yes	"	" 8 " " 13 (" " ")
yes	"	" 7 " " 3 (" " ")
yes	"	" 4 " " 5 (" " ")
no	Door to balcony from Room 8	(" " ")
no	" " " " 9	(" " ")
no	" " " " 12	(" " ")

gilles
+ SAG
Pulse

2. In addition to the above sixteen doors, maximum security and the logic of the exercise suggests it to be necessary to have a similar lock on the door leading from Room 10 to the small balcony adjoining. There should perhaps also be one on the door between the Guard's kitchen - Room 18 - and the outside balcony which runs outside of rooms forming part of the office proper.

3. If we are right, the total number of locks which may be required is 18 and we have asked the local Architect to prepare the relevant doors to receive them. To-date, however, the Chubb Company has sent only 10 locks. Accordingly before moving to our new offices on about December 1 we shall have these ten locks installed on the following important doors:

Door between Room 21 and Landing	no	door
" " " 16 " "	yes	
" " " 16 " Room 13	yes	
" " " 12 " balcony	no	gilles
" " " 10 " "	no	gilles
" " " 9 " "	no	gilles

Internal
Circulation

Original
on 10/10/56-P-1-40

Distribution
to Posts

- 2 -

Door between Room 8 and balcony - *no. 9111e*
" " " 4 " Room 5 - *yes*
" " " 13 " " 7 - *yes*
" " " 7 " " 3

4. You will note that these include both the entrance to the Guard's quarters and all other doors giving access to the outside. In addition the most important internal doors will be given priority.

5. If you feel that it is really necessary to equip the remaining doors listed in paragraphs 1 and 2 above we should be grateful for an additional 8 locks, which should reach us in good time before December 1st.

6. We should perhaps also draw your attention to paragraph 4 (iii) in which you state that Room 5 must be fitted with a steel rolling shutter fixed to the ceiling and fastened to the floor at floor level by means of three Sargent and Greenleaf Manipulation- proof combination locks. As these locks will be on the inside of the screen it hardly seems necessary that this special type be required. If combinations are used it would mean that every morning before starting work the communications clerk would have five locks to open (besides his cabinets) - two on the door to Room 4 and the three on the shutter. It has occurred to us that a bar arrangement or at most key padlocks would be more economical and efficient.

R, HARRY JAY

for Permanent Representative.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION,
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

Reference: Circular Document ADMIN. 41/56 of
August 16, 1956
Subject: Security - Local Staff

Security: SECRET

No: 407

Date: October 10, 1956

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: SECURITY(S)

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AL-40	
55	60

References

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16 OCT 1956

You will recall our Letter No. 281 of August 5, 1953, explaining in some detail the peculiar circumstances prevailing at this Mission so long as we continue to occupy our present offices in "La Pelouse". In view of the fact that it is impossible to improve the situation described until we have moved into our new office accommodation (which is expected to be on December 1st this year), you suggested in your Letter No. D-204 of August 17, 1953 that "for the time being the status quo should be maintained with regard to the security arrangements".

2. There has in fact been no change in our arrangements since that date.

Internal Circulation

Mr. Look
To note & file
16/10

K. Barry Fox
The Permanent Mission.

Distribution to Posts

D

Mr. D. Smead
Received Oct 16. 1956
Copy
Please file

D.L.(2)/G. C. Cook/11

orig on :

UNITED NATIONS DIVISION

CONFIDENTIAL

October 9, 1956.

DEFENCE LIAISON (2) DIVISION

Your memorandum of Sept. 20, 1956.

500 48-AL-40	
127	127

Post Book - Permanent Mission, Geneva.

--- As requested in your memorandum under reference, attached in duplicate is a section on security for inclusion in the Post Book now being prepared for the Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Geneva.

G. H. SOUTHAM

Defence Liaison (2) Division.

October 9, 1956.

CONFIDENTIAL

POST BOOK

Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Geneva

Security

Security is a matter of special concern at posts abroad. While the maintenance of good security is a continuing process, the requirements of security must be particularly borne in mind at such times as when contemplating a move to new premises, the re-arranging of office space, the engaging of local staff, etc.

The requirements of security, therefore, will be a matter for particular attention during the forthcoming move of the Permanent Mission to new quarters, and in the months thereafter when the Mission is adapting itself to new surroundings and new office procedures. The advice and assistance of the Regional Security Officer at Canada House, London, will be available, if needed, during that period and at any time thereafter in dealing with problems of security.

Among the basic principles governing security at posts abroad are the following:

1. Locally-engaged staff are a major security hazard and therefore
 - a) must never have access to classified information (except in rare instances involving departmental approval in each case);

- 2 -

- b) must never be permitted alone, that is, in the absence of Canadian supervision, in Chancery premises (which means, among other things, the supervision by Canadians of the work of the char staff);
 - c) must never be issued with keys;
 - d) must never be allowed alone in offices where classified material is unprotected;
 - e) must be segregated from Canadian staff in an office or offices devoted to non-classified work;
 - f) should only be engaged after a satisfactory background check has been made, through either British or American facilities.
2. The premises should be as physically secure as possible. This includes
- a) the installation, wherever practicable, of departmentally-supplied locks on outside entrances, and the strict control of keys thereto;
 - b) the provision of an adequate security room, with barred or otherwise adequately protected entrances equipped with departmentally-supplied locks;
 - c) the location in the security room of all security containers used for the storage of material classified Secret and above.
3. The strict observance by all Canadian staff of departmental security regulations, including, in addition to the above, ensuring that

. . 3

- 3 -

- a) all classified material is locked during quiet hours in security containers;
- b) all classified material in transit, whether outside the Chancery premises or between offices within the building, is always in the care of a Canadian staff member;
- c) office doors are always locked during even brief absences by the occupant, unless all classified material has previously been locked up;
- d) telephones are never used to discuss classified information;
- e) the post security officer makes frequent checks, particularly at closing time, to make certain that security regulations are being strictly observed.

The basic departmental security regulations are contained in Section 200 of the Manual of Regulations and Instructions. These have been supplemented by direct correspondence with the Mission and also by the following circular documents:

- No. A. 74/51 of October 19, 1951
- No. B. 116/51 of December 29, 1951
- No. B. 60/52 of June 3, 1952
- No. B. 99/52 of November 8, 1952
- No. A. 112/52 of December 31, 1952
- No. Admin. 21/53 of June 19, 1953
- No. B. 54/53 of July 8, 1953
- No. A. 39/55 of March 22, 1955
- No. B. 17/55 of April 4, 1955
- No. B. 41/55 of July 27, 1955
- No. B. 51/55 of September 27, 1955
- No. Admin. 45/55 of November 15, 1955

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- 4 -

No. A. 2/56 of January 16, 1956
No. Admin. 8/56 of February 20, 1956
No. Admin. 21/56 of May 4, 1956
No. Admin. 34/56 of June 13, 1956
No. Admin. 41/56 of August 16, 1956.

It is of the greatest importance that all Canadian staff members be familiar with, and strictly observe, the instructions and regulations contained in the Manual, as supplemented by the above documents. Good security is, basically, the application of care and common sense, and its price, to paraphrase a well-known expression, is eternal vigilance.

U.N. Div./D.E. Fulton/jet
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

Guar v 90256

TO: Defence Liaison Division (2)

Security

Date ..October 3, 1956.....

FROM: United Nations Division *8:24*

File No. 50048-AL-40

REFERENCE: Our Memorandum of Sept. 20, 1956

117	✓	✓
-----	---	---

SUBJECT: Preparation of Letter of Appointment for Mr. Wershof and Post Book for the Permanent Mission in Geneva.

In our Memorandum under reference we neglected to state the form we should like your contribution for the Geneva Post Book to take. We should appreciate receiving two copies of your material, double spaced, on long paper.

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W. Radu

United Nations Division

4 OCT 1956

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION,
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

Reference: Circular Document ADMIN. 8/56 of
February 20, 1956
Subject: Change of combination settings.

Security: S E C R E T
No: 397
Date: October 2, 1956
Enclosures: one ✓
Air or Surface Mail: Air
Post File No: SECURITY(S)

Ottawa File No.

50048-AL-40

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10 OCT 1956

I enclose, in the attached sealed
envelope, new combination settings for the safety
containers in use at this office.

Antoine D'Amato
Permanent Representative.

Mr d'Amato

To record & file

*Recorded
Oct 12/56
CDO
Plan File*

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

10

Security

MESSAGE FORM

OUTGOING

Original on: MARTIN, T.J. #0
"P"

File No.

50048-AL-40

117

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO:

THE CANADIAN PARLIAMENT BUILDING,
GENEVA, Switzerland.

Message To Be Sent

AIR CYPHER
EN CLAIR
CODE
CYPHER

No.

307

Date

September 21, 1956.

For Communications Section Only

Priority

REFERENCE:

YOUR TELEGRAM 215 OF SEPTEMBER 19

SUBJECT:

FELICIEL

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

ORIGINATOR

(Signature)

L.V. Brown/1

(Name Typed)

Div. Personnel

Local Tel. 6-8954

APPROVED BY

J. A. COLVIN

(Signature)

(Name Typed)

Internal Distribution:

S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.

Ext. & Org.

Finance

D.L. (S)

ORIGINAL AS IS

ORIGINAL AS IS

Copies Referred To:

Done.....

Date.....

Ext. 97 (Rev. 1/52)

000625

U.N. Div./W.E. Fulton/jet

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

Mr. Zimmerman

TO: Defence Liaison Division (2).....

Security Restricted.....

Date September 20, 1956

FROM: United Nations Division.....

File No.

500 48-AL-60

REFERENCE:

129

129

SUBJECT: Letter of Appointment for Mr. Max Wershof, Permanent Representative to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva, and Preparation of a Post Book for the Permanent Mission in Geneva.

As you know, Mr. Wershof has been appointed Canadian Permanent Representative to the European Office of the United Nations and is expected to take up his duties in December. It is the responsibility of this Division to prepare a Letter of Appointment and a Post Book for the Permanent Mission in Geneva. (The old Letter of Instructions has been discontinued and the following has been substituted:

- a) A brief Letter of Appointment (of about 3 or 4 pages in length) outlining succinctly the main interests of the Mission and mentioning the principal tasks confronting the new Head of Post;
- b) A Post Book containing the basic information on the work of the post. The Book also contains information regarding the administration of the Post and its establishment. The Post Book is reviewed periodically by the Mission and the Department, and the information in it is kept up to date in both places. This means that there is no need for a long and detailed Letter of Instructions each time a new Head of Mission is appointed).

2. I should be grateful if you would forward to this Division not later than October 23, 1956, material for inclusion in the Post Book on any of the following sections which are the responsibility of your Division:

- 1) Introduction, including the work of the European Office of the United Nations. (This will be dealt with by the United Nations Division)

- 2 -

- 2) Conference Work of the Mission (United Nations Division)
(and Finance Division)
- 3) (a) ECOSOC and the Functional Commissions (United Nations Division)
(b) The Regional Commissions and their Committees (Economic Division)
- 4) GATT (Economic Division)
- 5) Narcotic Drugs Supervisory Body and The Permanent Central Opium Board (United Nations Division)
- 6) Specialized Agencies: Introduction (United Nations Division)
 - (a) ILO (United Nations Division and Department of Labour)
 - (b) WHO (United Nations Division and Department of National Health and Welfare)
 - (c) UPU (United Nations Division)
 - (d) UNESCO (Information Division)
 - (e) FAO)
 - (f) ITU)
 - (g) WMO)
 - (h) ICAO) (Economic Division)
 - (i) IBRD)
 - (j) IMF)
- 7) Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (United Nations Division)
- 8) Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (United Nations Division)
- 9) Security Precautions (Defence Liaison Division (2))

- 3 -

10) Administration

(Establishments and
Organization Division

11) Post Report (January, 1955) - (The last report prepared by the Mission is part of the Post Book,)

3. You will note that your Division is responsible for preparing material on Security Precautions at the Permanent Mission in Geneva.



United Nations Division.

Restricted.

50048-AL-4	
52	52

Ottawa, August 30, 1956

FROM: THE DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

Aug. 31

We are forwarding by (*36* Air Courier) the following:-

TWO (2) KEYS EACH FOR BROWN ATTACHE CASES NOS. 236 and 238.

The cases are being shipped to your mission under separate cover direct from External Depot.

Forwarded upon request contained in Supplies and Properties Division, Memorandum of August 29, 1956

When the above has been received and checked, would you kindly sign and return the original form Ext. 27 R.

Geoffrey C. Loe
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Attention: C. d'Ornano, D. L. 2 Division, Room 251 East Block.

This is to certify that the above mentioned items have been received in good order.

*Received
Please find
14/12/56*



Place

Date
Geneva

Signature

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: DEFENCE LIAISON (2) DIVISION

.. Attention : Mr. D'Ornano

FROM: ... Supplies and Properties Division

REFERENCE: .. Requisition No. 4A of August 21/56.

.. Geneva

SUBJECT: ~~REQUISITION~~ Attaché cases

Security Unclassified

Date August 29, 1956.

File No.

50548-AL-40

127

129

Attaché cases 236 and 238 are being shipped
to the Canadian Permanent Mission, Geneva, Switzerland.
It would be appreciated if you would send the Keys
for same to Geneva.

[Signature]
Supplies & Properties Division

*2 Keys for each
of the above cases
forwarded to mail
room for Air Liaison
Aug 30. 1956*

*Edw
Phone file*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION,
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

Reference: Circular Doc. Admin. 8/56 of Feb. 20, 1956

Subject: Change of combination settings.

Security: S E C R E T

No: 267

Date: July 4, 1956

Enclosures: one

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: SECURITY (S)

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AL-40	
90	50

References

D-2
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10/7/56

I enclose, in the attached sealed envelope, new combination settings for the safety containers in use at this office.

Mr. d'Amato
do note, & file

[Signature]
Permanent Representative.

[Handwritten notes]
Trator Col
July 17. 1956
Change File

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

10

NO ENCLOSURES

1956 JUL 10 PM 1:37

NO ENCLOSURES

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION,
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

Circular Document No. A.74/51 of Oct.
Reference: 19, 1951 and Circular Document No. B.51/55 of September 27, 1955.
Subject: Departmental Security Regulations.

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: 253

Date: June 25, 1956

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: SECURITY (S)

Ottawa File No.

50048-AL-40

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References

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4 JUL 1956

In accordance with instructions contained in Circular Document No. B.51/55 of September 27, 1955, all members of the Department serving at this Mission have read the Departmental security regulations as outlined in Circular Document No. A.74/51 of October 19, 1951.

Robert McLean

Permanent Representative.

Internal Circulation

Mr d'Onato

To record & file

*10/7/56
Pds File*

Distribution to Posts

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DC2)

50048-AL-40	
129	129

File
25/6

DS11/173

FM PERMANENT MISSION GENEVA JUN19/56 CONF
TO EXTERNAL 144 IMPORTANT

REF YOUR TEL SX136 AND SX143 JUN11 AND JUN15
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT FOR ECOSOC

IN PLACE OF ARBUCKLE, BULLOCK HAS VISITED GENEVA AND TALKED TO
KAECH CONCESSIONAIRE FOR INSTALLATION OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIP-
MENT. WITH WRAITH OF THIS OFFICE, THEY AGREE THAT THE MOST
EFFICIENT AND ECONOMIC METHOD WILL BE TO PERFORATE TAPES
BEFOREHAND FOR TRANSMISSION BY AUTOMATIC TRANSMITTERS.

2. ACCORDINGLY THE FOLLOWING FACILITIES WILL BE INSTALLED:

(A) APPARATUS FOR CALLING DISTANT SUBSCRIBER AND CONNECTING TO
NETWORK

(B) MEANS OF PERFORATING TAPE

(C) PAGE COPY CHECK OF TAPES

(D) AUTOMATIC TRANSMISSION OF OUTGOING TAPES AT A SPEED
ABOVE AVERAGE KEYBOARD SENDING, WITH ITS CONSEQUENT SAVING
IN LINE RENTAL

(E) PAGE COPY RECEPTION OF INCOMING TRAFFIC.

3. ON THIS BASIS CONCESSIONAIRE'S QUOTATION IS

(A) INSTALLATION PRICE - 128 FRANCS

(B) SEPARATE RENTING OF EQUIPMENT - 261 FRANCS PER MONTH

(C) TRANSMISSION CHARGES 3.25 FRANCS FOR THE FIRST 3 MINUTES
GENEVA TO LONDON AND 1.25 FRANCS FOR EACH ADDITIONAL MINUTE.

4. IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR INSTRUCTIONS NO PRIVATE TELTYPE
CIRCUITS TO LONDON WILL BE TAKEN.

5. BULLOCK SAW ROOM 280 AND 282 AND IS SATISFIED THAT THEY

DS12/173

PAGE TWO 144

WILL BE SUITABLE FOR MACHINERY HAVING IN MIND THE DESIRABILITY OF KEEPING MACHINE CYPHER ROOM AND REGISTRY SEPARATE BUT CLOSELY CONNECTED. HOWEVER UNTIL WE KNOW EXACTLY WHICH ROOMS ARE TO BE OURS WE CANNOT TELL CONCESSIONAIRE TO ORDER EQUIPMENT WHICH WILL TAKE 8 DAYS TO OBTAIN AND INSTALL. WE ARE PRESSING THE SECRETARIAT FOR DEFINITE REPLY TO OUR REQUEST FOR SPACE AND WILL ENTER CONTRACT ON THE ABOVE LINES WITH THE CONCESSIONAIRE AS SOON AS WE HAVE THAT REPLY UNLESS WE SHOULD HEAR FROM YOU TO THE CONTRARY ENDS.

D.L.(2)/S. C. Cooke/11

orig. on 9118-E-40

PERSONNEL DIVISION

CONFIDENTIAL

May 25, 1956.

DEFENCE LIAISON (2) DIVISION

50048-AL-40	
55	✓

Security Guards - Geneva

As you are aware, it has been decided that C. A. Emmerson and R. Latreille are to be posted to Geneva, and that travel arrangements have been made. We understand that they will reach Geneva about June 23, approximately a week in advance of the scheduled date for the installation of machine cypher.

2. According to the latest information from Geneva, the machines will be installed, for the duration of the July - August ECOSOC Conference, in the suite of hotel rooms booked for our Delegation to the Conference. Since cypher machines require 24-hour guard, and particularly so when they are not installed in our own premises, it is essential that a third guard be provided for Geneva for the duration of the Conference, or until such time as the machines are moved from the hotel to the offices of our Permanent Delegation.

3. F. L. Hammond, a single man, whom we have had in mind for Prague or another Iron Curtain post as a fill-in until accommodation for a married guard can be located, might be sent to Geneva as a third guard for temporary duty for the duration of the Conference. At the conclusion of the Conference, which will be approximately mid August, Hammond could then proceed to his permanent posting, which it should by then have been possible to arrange without undue difficulty.

4. Hammond has been undergoing treatment for a thyroid condition and is to have an operation very shortly. He says that his doctor states that he should be fit for duty by June 30. Since it would be desirable for him to reach Geneva as soon as possible after that date, it will be necessary that he travel by air.

- 2 -

5. If for any reason Hammond cannot be sent to Geneva, J. E. McManaman, a guard who is, we understand, to report to the Department at the end of this month, might be sent in his place.

G. H. SOUTHAM

Defence Liaison (2) Division.

cc. Communications Division
United Nations Division

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

TO: Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, Canada

Security..... UNCLASSIFIED

Date..... 25th May, 1956

FROM: The Office of the High Commissioner for Canada,

Air or Surface..... Air

London, England.

No. of enclosures... ONE

The documents described below are for your information.

Despatching Authority..... (Signed) S. G. LEFEUVRE

50048-AL-40	
90	✓

Copies

Description

Also referred to:

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Copy of our letter dated 24th May to Geneva,
concerning shipment of security equipment.

29/5/56

INSTRUCTIONS

1. This form may be used in sending material for informational purposes from the Department to posts abroad and vice versa.
2. This form should **NOT** be used to cover documents requiring action.
3. The name of the person responsible for authorizing the despatch of the material should be shown opposite the words "Despatching Authority". This may be done by signature, name stamp or by any other suitable means.
4. The form should bear the security classification of the material it covers.
5. The column for "Copies" should indicate the number of copies of each document transmitted. The space for "No. of Enclosures" should show the total number of copies of all documents covered by the transmittal slip. This will facilitate checking on despatch and receipt of mail.

61-3-10 62 MAY 29 1956

000639

ASB/jw

London, 24th May, 1956

Admin 1/3/11

Dear Mr. Allard,

We are forwarding herewith a package containing 10 sets of keys, 5 keys per set, for the Chubbs Mortice deadlocks ordered for your Mission under External Affairs Authority No. E.A.27548-A,

In accordance with instructions from the Department one key of each set is to be returned to Canada House, duly labelled with the corresponding room numbers, for safe keeping pending requirements for duplicates when necessary.

Shipment of the locks together with the Strong Room doors and single peephole unit went forward on the s.s. "Lingstrom" from London on the 23rd May. Shipping bills will be forwarded to you as soon as received.

A copy of this letter has been sent to Ottawa and to Mr. Monette in Paris.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) S. G. LEFEUVRE

(S. G. Le Feuvre)
Administrative Secretary.

Hector Allard, Esq.,
Permanent Representative
Permanent Mission of Canada in Geneva,
"La Pelouse", Palais de Nations,
Geneva, Switzerland.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

FROM: Canadian Permanent Mission
TO: Geneva

TO: XXXXX
FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.
Your letter P-140 of May 9, 1956 and your
telegram P-87 of same date

Reference: Security Guards
Subject:

Security: CONFIDENTIAL
No: 197
Date: May 23, 1956
Enclosures:
Air or Surface Mail: Air
Post File No: PER-1-1

Ottawa File No.
11336-65-40 (Personnel - SI)
copy on 65
This copy for 50048-A1-40
117

References

When your telegram under reference was received I immediately wired you back to tell you that the new office accommodation would unfortunately not be ready until October 1. As you may be aware, the new office space was first of all supposed to be ready on January 1, 1956. The date was then postponed to the 1st of August 1956. However, following the meeting which was arranged on April 25 with representatives of the owners of the building, their architect and the Departmental architect Mr. Monette, the date now set for entry into the new premises is October 1. As the owners of this property are anxious to get returns for their investment as soon as possible, I can only hope that they will not be as long in completing this building as the Canton and City of Geneva have been in finishing a relatively small building (the International Centre of the Place des Nations) which had its walls completed when I arrived in Geneva at the end of November 1953 and which has been occupied only on the 1st of May, 1956.

2. During our meeting referred to in the above paragraph, the superintendent of the buildings complained that he could not get the workers which were needed to get the work done rapidly. There were 250 men of various trades working on the buildings--three in number--being put up at the Parc du Château Banquet and he could have used another one hundred men of various trades, but they were simply not to be had.

3. All of this introduction is to explain why we have suggested that the arrival of guards be delayed until further notice. From your letter P-140 of May 9, 1956, I realize that recruiting difficulties will be great and while I would not like to miss the opportunity of getting the guards assigned to Geneva, in all fairness to other posts who may require guards more urgently than we do here, I believe it would be spending money unnecessarily to send guards as early as mid-June. If the first arrival could be delayed until the middle of September, I believe this would fit more readily into the picture.

4. We have received notice that some of the equipment for communications have already arrived in Antwerp and the reinforced doors for the strong rooms in the office have also been ordered and will obviously be received before they can actually be installed. When Mr. Monette was here, he suggested that the best place to keep whatever equipment comes before we can install it would be to store it in the basement of the official residence or in the residence garage, as the superintendent of the buildings being erected has refused to accept any responsibility in the safe-keeping of any equipment which we would consider restricted, claiming that they have no facilities whatever for storing anything connected with either security or communications.

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

- 2 -

5. In the circumstances, I presume that you will understand why the suggestion of delaying the arrival of security guards was made in our telegram No. 99 of May 11.

signed Hector Allard

Permanent Representative

file on	
50048	AL-40
80	✓ 82

COPY

FM PERMANENT MISSION GENEVA MAY 17/56

CONFIDENTIAL

TO EXTERNAL 108

REF YOUR LET P 140 AND TEL P 87 MAY 9

SECURITY GUARDS

SEE MY TEL 99 MAY 11

LETTER WILL FOLLOW BY BAG NEXT WEEK

ALLARD

NUMBERED LETTER

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

TO: PERMANENT MISSION OF CANADA TO THE
EUROPEAN OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, GENEVA.

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Our telegram No. P-87 and our letter No.
P-140 of May 9, 1956.

Subject: SECURITY GUARDS

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: P-147

Date: May 15, 1956.

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.

This copy for 50048-AL-40

55

References

In our correspondence under reference, we informed you that we were arranging for the arrival of one Security Guard approximately mid-June, and that we hoped to send you a second guard a month later. However, because of the installation of additional communications equipment for the ECOSOC Conference that will be held during July, 1956, it is considered necessary that a minimum of two guards be provided by that date in order to ensure adequate security.

2. For this reason Messrs. C.A. Emmerson and R. Latreille have been selected for posting to your mission as Security Guards.

3. Mr. Emmerson is married with two children, a son aged 9 years, and a daughter aged 1½ years. Mr. Latreille, who is fully bilingual, is married without children.

4. We have been unable, as yet, to obtain firm travel accommodation for Messrs. Emmerson and Latreille, but we are endeavouring to arrange for their departure from Canada approximately mid-June, accompanied by their families. As soon as definite travel arrangements are known, we will inform you.

5. With reference to your telegram No. 99 of May 11, 1956, we are aware that the Security Guards will be arriving in advance of the expected date of completion of your new premises. However, for the reasons mentioned, we have no choice but to proceed with our plans for the arrival of Security Guards at your mission during the latter part of June.

6. It is expected that Messrs. Emmerson and Latreille will occupy accommodation outside the Chancery premises. When the third guard arrives possibly towards the end of the year, consideration should be given to having him occupy the accommodation which will be available on the new Chancery premises. We would, however, appreciate receiving your comments in this regard.

Internal Circulation

D.L. (2) Div

Distribution to Posts

E. A. COLVIN

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER DI2/PERSONNEL/GGCOOK/LVRYAN/tk/cn

TO:.....Permanent Mission of Canada to the
European Office of the United Nations,
.....GENEVA, Switzerland

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference:.....
Subject: Security Guards

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.....
.....

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No:.....P. 140

Date:.....May 9, 1956

Enclosures:.....1

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No. 50048-AL-40	
117	—

References

As you may be aware, with effect from April 1 of this year, the Department's security guard establishment has been increased to a total of fifty positions. This increase will enable us to meet, at least in part, the long-felt need for guards at many of our posts abroad. Attached for your guidance is a copy of a memorandum entitled "Provision, Employment and Duties of Security Guards in Canadian Posts Abroad".

2. Because of recruiting difficulties it will not, unfortunately, be possible completely to fill our establishment for many months. The first group of guards recruited by Civil Service Commission competition, numbering about ten, are due to report in Ottawa early this month. Others will report at later dates, and, since the past competition did not produce a sufficient number to fill our establishment, a second competition is now being arranged. These guards will be trained in Ottawa before being sent abroad. Their training will cover security principles, regulations and instructions, the installation, maintenance and repair of locks and security containers, the duties of security guards, including the manner and ways in which these duties may best be performed, report writing, etc. Each course, which we are planning to make fairly intensive, will take at least ten days to complete.

3. As you may know, a complement of three Ottawa-based security guards has been approved for Geneva, partly because of the expected installation this summer of machine cypher. Because of this latter, we are planning to send you one of the first group of guards, and hope that arrangements can be made to have him leave Ottawa towards the end of this month.

4. We have in mind a married man with two children, and have selected him for your post because the accommodation and educational facilities in Geneva are, of course, much better than at many other posts for which we must reserve our present limited number of single men. Although we understand that accommodation for a guard is available in the Chancery premises, it may be desirable that the man in question obtain outside accommodation, keeping the Chancery accommodation for an unmarried guard or guards which we may be able to provide at a later date. We hope to send you a second guard perhaps one month later, and possibly a third towards the end of the year. We will be writing to you separately providing further details concerning the men who have been selected for posting to your mission. 2 ...

Internal
Circulation

D.L.(2)

Distribution
to Posts

- 2 -

5. In the meantime, if you have any comments which would affect our present plan to post a married guard with two children towards the end of this month, would you please let us have them by telegram. Your comments, by letter, on accommodation or other problems which may arise in connection with the posting to your mission of the second and third guards would be appreciated.

A. J. PICK

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION,
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

Reference: Circular Document ADMIN.8/56 of Feb.
20, 1956

Subject: Change of combination settings.

Security: SECRET

No: 157

Date: April 16, 1956.

Enclosures: one

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No: SECURITY (S)

Ottawa File No.

50048-AL-40

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References

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24 APR 1956

I enclose, in the attached sealed envelope, new combination settings for the safety containers in use at this office.

Permanent Representative.

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

2

1986 APR 24 PM 1:54

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT MISSION,
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

Reference: Circular Document No. B.116/51 of
December 29, 1951.

Subject: Change of combination settings.

Security: S E C R E T

No: 22

Date: January 12, 1956.

Enclosures: one

Air or Surface Mail: Air bag.

Post File No: SECURITY (S)

Ottawa File No.

50048-AL-40

94

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References

I enclose, in the attached sealed
envelope, new combination settings for
the safes in use at this office. These new
settings were put into use today.

Seán Súilleabháin
Permanent Representative.

Internal
Circulation

Mr D O'Connor

*Donnelly & file
#141*

*Can
20/1/56
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Distribution
to Posts

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: Canadian Permanent Mission
Geneva

Reference: Circular Document A.74/51 of October
19, 1951

Subject: Security Regulations

Security:

No: 8

Date: January 5, 1956

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.

50048-AL-46

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JAN 12/56

In accordance with the instructions contained in paragraph 7 of the above-mentioned Circular Document, I wish to advise you that all members of the staff of this Office, with the exception of those on annual leave, have read the Departmental Security Regulations. The personnel on annual leave will familiarize themselves with the Security Regulations upon their return.

R. E. Reynoldson
Permanent Mission

M. J. Amans

do record & file

Noted Col. J. 12/1/56
Jan 13. 1956
Ph. Trib.

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

D.

NO ENCLOSURES

JAN 12 PM 1:30

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS BEING FURNISHED TO YOU FOR YOUR INFORMATION
AND IS NOT TO BE USED FOR ANY OTHER PURPOSE. IT IS THE POLICY OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA TO MAKE AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC INFORMATION
ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA. THE INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA
AND IS NOT TO BE REPRODUCED OR TRANSMITTED IN ANY FORM OR BY ANY
MEANS, ELECTRONIC OR MECHANICAL, INCLUDING PHOTOCOPYING, RECORDING,
OR BY ANY INFORMATION STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEM, WITHOUT THE
WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA.

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DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA.

•TALICH: PARIZAN:

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Your letter No. 633 of November 2, 1955.....

Subject: . . CHANGING - EVENT 500003:

Security:.....~~RESTRICTED~~.....

No: 1248

Date:.....14 November 1965.....

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail:.....

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.
500 48-1A2-40
10660-G-40
129

Original on 10660-C-46
"F"

References

1- D.L. (2)
Division

~~Mr. J. O. ...~~ ~~Arthur C. O.~~
to me
+
file ~
50048-AQ-40
per.

We are pleased to inform you that an order has been raised for the purchase and shipment as early as possible of a Dominion safe file enclosure cabinet with dial combination lock fitted with 4-drawer cap sized filing cabinet for the High Commissioner's Office.

We should appreciate being informed when this file cabinet and enclosure is received.

Internal Circulation

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
J. P. SIGVALDASON

h Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

Distribution to Posts

50048-AL-40	
94	

SUPPLIES AND PROPERTIES DIVISION

CONFIDENTIAL

Oct. 21, 1955.

DEFENCE LIAISON (2) DIVISION

orig on 50048-40
copy on cc. 50048-V-40
50048-AL-40

Security Arrangements - New Chanceries Under Construction

Mr. Monette called yesterday and we discussed various problems which he had encountered with regard to security arrangements in the new offices at The Hague and Geneva. We were able to reach agreement on all the points which he raised, but I told him that authority for altering the existing plans would have to come from you.

2. In general, this Division has no objection, from the security point of view, in the case of The Hague and Geneva and other new chanceries to be constructed, to the use of internal grilles on windows when it is not possible to install fixed internal bars. Mr. Monette suggested that such grilles should consist of a solid metal frame with the bars welded in. The frame should be secured to the casement by the use of hasps and Sargent and Greenleaf combination padlocks, one to each side. This appears reasonable.

3. In cases where it is extremely difficult or impossible to use Venetian blinds, in order to prevent telephotography, there is no objection to the use of heavy glass curtains, from the security viewpoint. Mr. Monette suggested that such curtains should be fixed at both ends.

4. With regard to the peepholes, used to see into the communications rooms and registries without the necessity of having to enter, Mr. Monette suggested that there be some sort of mirror arrangement on the walls, in order that the security guard checking the offices would be able to see all parts of the rooms. This is a very good suggestion and I think should be implemented.

- 2 -

5. With particular regard to The Hague, Mr. Monette mentioned the problem of the French doors giving access to the Ambassador's office from the balcony over the front entrance of the Chancery. Shatter-proof glass is to be used in these doors and he recommended that instead of having to use doors of metal construction, which were heavy, expensive and difficult to obtain, that we consider using doors of strong oak construction. The shatter-proof glass would be secured by the use of internal metal beading. This is acceptable to this Division.

6. In the case of Geneva, Mr. Monette raised the question of the rolling metal shutter from the large window in the Communications office in which machine cypher is to be installed. There is no balcony outside this window and access to it could only be by use of the roof immediately above or the window below. Mr. Monette suggested that instead of using heavy, almost solid, rolling shutters that we use a Grille à Rouleaux Gauger or a Grille à Ciseaux Gauger. These are illustrated on the attached sketches which Mr. Monette kindly left with me. I spoke to Communications Division concerning this and they stated that of the two they prefer the Grille à Ciseaux Gauger, which is the folding one. This would seem to provide the required protection. There should be, of course, a hasp arrangement on the grille so that they may be secured by at least two Sargent and Greenleaf combination padlocks.

7. Also, in the case of Geneva, Mr. Monette pointed out that it may be very difficult to install fixed internal bars on the other windows in the Communications offices and Registry and on the doors and windows giving access to balconies in other parts of the Chancery. There is no objection, from our point of view, to the use of folding or rolling grilles, of the type mentioned above, in such cases. If a Grille à Rouleaux Gauger is used, the metal bars should be at least $\frac{1}{2}$ inch thick.

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- 3 -

8. I am attaching an extra copy of this memorandum which, if you have no objection, you may wish to give to Mr. Monette.

Defence Liaison (2) Division.

cc. Communications Division

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: T. UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION,
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

Reference: Circular Document No. B.116/51 of
December 29, 1951
Subject: Change of combination of office safe.

Security: SECRET

No: 349

Date: September 21, 1955

Enclosures: One

Air or Surface Mail: Air bag

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.

50048-AL-40

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26 SEP 1955

I enclose, in the attached sealed envelope, the new combination setting for the office safe, which was put into use today.

Austin Beland

Permanent Representative.

Internal Circulation

2/10
pr
per. lio
Sept 30. 1955
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Distribution to Posts

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

Copy of F 10104-P-1-40

TO: Defence Liaison (2) Division.....

Security Restricted

Date May 16, 1955

FROM: Supp. & Prop. Division/P.J.Price/HR..

File No. 50048-AL-40
10104-P-1-40

REFERENCE: Canadian Permanent Delegation.....

A Engr Office of 2. N, L.

SUBJECT: New Office Space--Installations--Security Requirements.....

1. Forwarded herewith for your files in connection with the above, are copies of the following correspondence:-

(i) Letter No. F.156 to the Post dated 10/5/55.

(11) Letter No. F.522 to the Paris Embassy dated 10/5/55, for the attention of our Architect, Mr. Monette.

2. The Security details described in this correspondence are the result of discussions between Mr. Dougan, Mr. Belanger (Communications) and Mr. Price, Departmental Architect, Ottawa.

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MAY 16 1955

[Signature]
Supplies & Properties.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: The Canadian Permanent Delegation,
Geneva, Switzerland.

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Your Letters Nos. 111 of 18/3/55 and
137 of 5/4/55.

Subject: New Office Space--Layout Plan--
Equipment and Installations.

Security: Restricted

No: F 156

Date: May 10, 1955

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No:

Ottawa File No. 50048-AL-40 10104-P-1-40	
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Orig. on "F" 10104-P-1-40

References

1. With reference to previous correspondence in this matter we have now given consideration to the most efficient use of the accommodation available to us, and a layout of offices and other space - taking account as far as possible of all the varying requirements, and which has been developed from the print of the architects' floor plan, - is shown on the attached drawing (A).

2. Before going into details of planning and installation requirements it may be fitting to point out here that the architects' attention should be drawn to the possibility of problems arising in delivering heavy equipment--such as safes, safe filing cabinets and communication installations--to the space allocated to us.

3. For ease of reference offices and other spaces are numbered on the layout - Drawing (A) - from (1) to (23) inclusive and are as follows:--

(A) Room No. 1 - Destructor Room--This must be equipped either with (a) a "Somat" 12 Electric Pulper

or

(b) an approved incinerator either gas or electric fired

depending on what is allowed by the relevant District Building Authority, which should be approached for its ruling in the matter. If alternative (a)--which is our preference--is allowed the following provisions must be met:

(i) A drain line sufficient to carry off pulp of a "thick-soup" consistency--connected to the public sewer.

(ii) A good water supply

(iii) An electric power supply

(iv) A Chubb 3G-74 type Security Lock fitted to the access/exit door to Office 3.

Internal
Circulation

Defence
Liaison (2)

Distribution
to Posts

Mr. Monette
Paris

...2

-2-

If we are required to provide alternative (b) then the provision of the following must be borne in mind:--

- (a) An electric power or gas supply
 - (b) A suitable flue from the incinerator through and to the required height above the roof
 - (c) Means of disposal of the ash residue
- (B) Room No. 2--Central Registry--This room will be equipped with security containers for the safe guarding of classified material. For information in arranging for delivery of this equipment to the space allocated to us in the building the relevant unit weights--uncrated and empty--are approximately as follows:--

- (a) Cabinet--Filing--120 lbs. 55 kg.) each
- (b) Cabinet--Safe-Chubb--550 lbs. (250 kg.) each
- (c) Cabinet--Safe-Preston-310 lbs. (140 kg.) each
- (d) Safe--Taylor--2250 lbs. (1023 kg.) each

The Architect should make the necessary provisions to ensure that the flooring in Room 2 will support a superimposed load-weight of containers plus stored contents--of some 8,000 - 10,000 lbs. (pounds) ranged alongside the party wall.

- (C) Room No. 3--Canadian Stenographers--The sole access to Room No. 2--Central Registry--will be through this office.
- (D) Room No. 4, 4a (Cupboard), with Room No. 5--These spaces together comprise the Communications Section, space 4a to be fitted up as a cupboard to Room 4 and provided with five (5) rows of shelving--each shelf of some 18" in width--the bottom shelf being fixed 24" above the floor. The Architect should be informed that the weight of equipment and installations in the Communications Section will be as follows:

Room 4--2 pieces of equipment each weighing some 450 lbs, one placed alongside wall between 3 and 4 and one placed against the opposite wall.

Room 5--2 pieces of equipment each weighing some 450 lbs. one placed alongside wall between 4 & 5 and one placed against the opposite wall.

In addition, a safe, of a total weight--including stored contents--of some 2600 lbs. will be placed in this room.

- (E) Space No. 6--Will provide needed storage space.
- (F) Space No. 7--Is a passage connecting Central Registry (Canadian Stenos) and Communications Section with all other offices and rooms in the layout, via the Reception Foyer No. 13.

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-3-

- (G) Spaces No. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 17, are for office use, the suggestion being that No. 9 is for Head of Post; 8 and 10 for allocation between senior and second adviser; 11 could be used for Library/Reading Room and 12 for visiting Dignitaries. The two (2) rooms together could be used as one for conference purposes by making the dividing wall between in the form of a folding sliding partition. By this use of the space the day to day functions of the Post could be carried on even if offices 11 and 12 were in use for conference or other activity, as access between all other offices and parts of the layout via the Reception Foyer 13 would not be interrupted.
- (H) Spaces Nos. 14 and 15 are Female and Male Toilets respectively.
- (I) Space No. 16 is the main entrance lobby to the Delegation Offices.
- (J) Room No. 17 is office space for the Accountant and office messenger.
- (K) Spaces 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 comprise the Security Guard apartment and are respectively, kitchen, bed recess, living room, hall, W.C. and bathroom.
 - (a) It is suggested that to separate 19 and 20 when required either
 - (i) a curtain and track or,
 - (ii) an installation such as a "Modernfold" door or some such similar equipment, be provided for the purpose.
 - (b) A glazed "peephole" should be provided in the wall between Room 18 (kitchen) and the staircase hall so that the guard can unobtrusively observe the office entrance at any time. The glass to the peephole should be fixed on the kitchen face of the wall and the sides--on plan--of the deep aperture to the staircase hall should be splayed to give a "line of sight" to include the office entrance door.

4. For security reasons the following arrangements and provisions must be made:--

- (I) All windows of all offices must be fitted internally with Venetian Blinds, which, when in the "down, half-closed" position will be a defence against long range photography of the office interior.
- (II) The small side door opening--on to the loggia--in Office 5 must be built up solid.
- (III) The large window to office 5 must be defended by a manual-operated steel rolling window shutter fixed to the ceiling some .50 m. back from the window wall. The shutter to be similar in width to that of space 5, and when in the "down" position the shutter must extend from floor to ceiling. The shutter must run in steel channels sections--one at each side strongly fixed to each wall. Provision must be made for locking the shutter securely at floor level by means of three (3) padlocks--one (1) at each side and one (1) in the centre of the shutter--each equipped with a Sargent and Greenleaf Manipulation-proof Combination Lock. For practical

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reasons it would be preferable to ensure that the locking stubs or holdfasts, at floor level, should be fixed into the floor construction so as not to protrude above the final floor finish. Fix in the space between the shutter and the window a Venetian sunshade--which will be of the width and height of the room and should always be in the "down half-closed" position so as to conceal the shutter &/or the room interior from external view, as the rolling shutter must be rolled up out of the way during duty hours and lowered into the "down" position during off-duty periods.

- (IV) The walls between spaces 8 and 5, 5 and 6, 6 and 4a, 4a and 7, 4 and 7, 4 and 3, 3 and 2, 2 and 1, 2 and party wall, must be on the Strong Room wall principle, doubly reinforced. Spaces 4a, 4 and 5 must also be insulated at floors, walls and ceilings against sound transference to the exterior of the building and all adjacent rooms or stores of whatever nature.
- (V) To the openings between spaces 2 and 3, 4 and 7 provide and fix Chubb Standard Strong Room doors and Metal Grilles. The strong door between spaces 2 and 3 to open into Office 3 and that between 4 and 7 to open into passage 7. Each of these strong doors can be either left or right hand hung as you may decide on the spot. In addition to the emergency locking device provided with the Chubb Standard strong room door, the locking mechanism must consist of,
 - (a) To the Strong Doors--two (2) Sargent and Greenleaf Manipulation-proof Combination Locks and
 - (b) To the Metal Grille Gates--one (1) lock having a detector and monitoring device similar to the Chubb 3G-74 Security Lock.
- (VI) To the conventional doors at main entrance from Staircase Hall--to the doors to the balconies from spaces 8, 9 and 12--and to the doors between spaces 3 and 7, 4 and 5, 16 and 17, 13 and 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 16 provide and fix a Chubb type 3G-74 Security Lock.
- (VII) To cut off access from next door property to the loggia outside spaces 2, 3 and 4, a barred defence grille--which can be decorative--should be provided extending the relevant width and height and built into the wall, floor and ceiling.
- (VIII) The windows in spaces 2, 3 and 4, must be defended by bars spaced not more than 6" apart, built into the structure fabric inside the window. In the space between each window and the bars, Venetian blinds must be fixed so that when these are in the down half-closed position the bars will be concealed from view externally.
- (IX) A decorative iron grille fixed into the fabric of the building, either internally or externally--as governed by the window or door-swing (in or out), &/or the type of window-door unit and its fixed position in the wall--must be provided to the following openings:
 - (a) Space 8--door to Balcony
 - (b) Space 9--Door/Window to Balcony
 - (c) Space 12--Door/Window to Balcony
 - (d) Space 17--Window to Balcony

-5-

- (X) To enable the guard on patrol to survey--without entering--the interior of Room 5, provide--in the wall between space 5 and 6--a "peephole", double glazed for sound proofing purposes. Fit externally and adjacent thereto, an electric light switch so that the guard can operate the room lighting from that point. This "peephole" is to be concealed from view on the space 6 side, by the provision and fixing of a steel Security Access Trapdoor and Frame similar in principle to a small safe door. The Trapdoor must be hung to swing, on concealed hinges, and fitted with locking lugs--on the Taylor Safe principle--and a Sargent and Greenleaf Manipulation-proof Combination Lock (such as is found on the Remington Rand Safe Filing Cabinet).
- (XI) To satisfactorily deal with the Communication System, Electrical arrangements--ancillary to conventional requirements--must be as follows:--
- (a) Electric light and power supply - 220V 30 amp--to Rooms 4 and 5 must be separated at main building input panel.
 - (b) Provide four (4) power outlets at baseboard in each of rooms 4 and 5, i.e. two (2) to wall between 5 and 8, two (2) each side of wall between 4 and 5 and two (2) to wall between 4 and 3. One (1) ceiling electric light outlet also should be provided for each room.
 - (c) Electric light and power for rooms 4 and 5 must be controlled from room 4 by means of a fused service panel with breaker having provision for six (6) circuits.
 - (d) Circuits will be as follows:--
 - (i) Four (4) power outlets to each of rooms 4 and 5--total eight (8)--to be fused in pairs making four (4) circuits.
 - (ii) Two (2) ceiling light points, one (1) each for 4 and 5 to make one (1) circuit.
 - (iii) One (1) circuit will be spare.
 - (e) Fusing to be dealt with as follows:--
 - (i) Each pair of power outlets--fused for 5 amps.
 - (ii) Lighting points--fused as necessary--5 amps.
 - (f) Electric Light and Power Supply to rooms 4 and 5 must be grounded (earthed).
5. Generally all partitions between spaces and offices--other than as described at Para. 4 (IV)--can be constructed of the same materials as specified by the Architect for the remainder of the building. As to reasonable cross-ventilation and natural lighting of Reception Foyer 13, however, it would be well to request the Architects' advice regarding the provision--in the full-height partitions surrounding this space--of
- (a) glazing--in spaces above door-heads and
 - (b) opening portions--in such glazed areas--for ventilation.

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6. We have sent a copy of this letter to the Paris Embassy for the attention of our architect, Mr. Monette, and a copy of the covering letter to him, which is self-explanatory, is forwarded herewith for your information and retention. As regards the cost of these works--para. 4 of your letter No. 111--18/3/55 refers--it will be seen that the particular requirements shown on Plan "A"--attached hereto--and described above, are less simple and more extensive than was at first envisaged. We will therefore be glad to know as early as possible, what we must expect to pay in order to have these proposals executed and you should now arrange for the preparation of the necessary estimate of cost by the Landlord's Architect--who will no doubt find it necessary to make use of Mr. Monette's knowledge of our requirements in all these matters.
7. Finally, and as an additional precaution we think that you should obtain for our consideration--from the landlord, and other sources, if necessary--all the information possible regarding the tenants of the apartments on the same floor alongside, and on the floor immediately underneath, the space allocated to us.

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO:.....The Canadian Embassy,.....
.....Paris, France.....
.....Attention: Mr. Monette.
FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.
Reference:.....Canadian Permanent Delegation,....
.....Geneva, Switzerland.
Subject:.....New Office Space,.....
.....
.....

Security:.....Unclassified.....
No:.....F. 522.....
Date:.....May. 10, 1955.....
Enclosures:.....
Air or Surface Mail:.....
Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.
50048-AL-40
10104-P-1-40
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Orig. on "F" 10104-P-1-40

References

1. Having recently secured accommodation for the permanent delegation offices, we have now given consideration to the layout of individual office space and the consequent security requirements. These are described in detail in our letter to the Post dated 10/5/55, copy of which is forwarded herewith for your information and necessary action.

2. As the apartment block in which we have leased space is now under construction, we are hoping that we can occupy the premises on or about March 1st 1956, and we shall, accordingly, be glad if you will communicate with the post to assist as you may feel will be necessary in connection with any problems as they arise, so as to ensure that amongst other things the security installations required are dealt with in accordance with our present policy. That is to say,

(1) Security Locks

These should be ordered from Chubbs through you, and arrangements--similar to what you have planned for the new Chancery, Paris--should be made for the fixing of the locks at site. When the order is placed, the supply of 5 keys for each lock should be specified, one of each to be forwarded to us in Ottawa, the other 4 of each set of 5 being sent on to the post.

(2) Security Doors and Frames

The order to Chubbs for these should be sent through you and arrangements for the installation of the equipment required should be made with the manufacturer in accordance with the procedure which has been adopted for the new Chancery, Paris.

(3) Security Generally

You will see by reference to the contents of the copy letter to the post herewith that security arrangements generally are patterned on the requirements in connection with the new Chancery, Paris. It is expected that there

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Head/Post
Geneva

-2-

will be many queries concerning our special requirements in the sensitive area and other spaces, which will require answers, and we hope that you will be able to deal with these amongst the other calls on your time in connection with the two new building projects and other matters necessitating your attention, which have recently arisen.

3. Regarding the cost of these works, you will note our remarks in that connection in the copy letter herewith. We shall accordingly be glad if you can make it possible to visit Geneva for consultation with the Post as may be required, and to assist the local Architect as he may wish--when the Estimate of Cost of the Works is being prepared.

4. You will be aware, of course, that in connection with these proposals, no payments may be made and no work may be put in hand before full details as to the cost thereof including

(a) Construction works, installations and equipment of the conventional kind,

(b) Security Installations, and

(c) Fees--both professional and municipal--payable in connection with the scheme, have been forwarded to us in Ottawa, for consideration and approval.

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: ...THE CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION...
...G.E.N.E.V.A.....

Reference: Circ. Doc. B. 116/51 of Dec. 29, 1951.

Subject: ...Combination of Office Safe.....

Security: ...S E C R E T.....

No:153.....

Date: ...April 15, 1955.....

Enclosures: ...ONE.....

Air or Surface Mail: ...Air.....

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.

50048-AL-46

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References

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25 APR 1955

I am enclosing in the attached envelope
the combination of the office safe which was
changed on April 13.

Robert Deland
Permanent Representative

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Defence Liaison (2)/S.A. Dougan/mh

50048-AL-40
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This copy for File
50048-AL-40

Supplies and Properties Division

CONFIDENTIAL

December 28, 1954

Defence Liaison (2) Division

Your memorandum of December 23, 1954

10104-P-1-40

Office Space for Canadian Permanent Delegation, Geneva,
Switzerland.

I assume that Geneva will be one of our posts where the installation of machine cypher will be given priority. Machines should be available in late 1955 and consequently could be ready for installation in the proposed new premises in early 1956.

2. If machine cypher is installed, we should have to provide security guard protection. The establishment for security guard positions for the forthcoming fiscal year, however, is such that it is very doubtful if more than one guard could initially be posted to Geneva. Consequently, if the guard were provided with quarters within the Chancery, such as in Bonn, better around-the-clock protection could be obtained than if he were living out. The possibility exists, of course, that the establishment for security guards may be increased after the next fiscal year. If so, we may be able to make additional guards available, as we consider that a minimum of three guards is required to give complete 24-hour protection.

3. However, if you are able to obtain approval for renting the proposed premises on the basis that machine cypher is to be installed and three rooms are to be used as living accommodation for a security guard, I think that even if the number of security guards were increased, the rooms could still be put to good use. In the event that they were not occupied by a security guard, we should then require at least one room as a guard room.

(Signed) G. G. CREAM

cc: Mr. Macdonnell; Defence Liaison (2) Division.
Establishments & Organization.

000667

FILE COPY

Mr. Macdonnell
Copy to---Establishments & Organization
" "---Defence Liaison (2)

Unclassified

December 23, 1954

Supp. & Prop./J.Zoubie/HR

~~10104-P-1-40~~

50048-A2-40

Office Space for Canadian Permanent Delegation, Geneva,
Switzerland.

For some years the offices for our Delegation have been located in the Villa La Pelouse, a short distance from the Palais de Nations. The total office space consists of two rooms--one approximately 27 by 17 in size and the other approximately 17 X 14 (about 700 square feet in all). Five people work in these two rooms. The rental charged is 9490 francs or about \$2150 per month.

Because this space is obviously too small the Delegation has been engaged for some time in a search for more adequate accommodation. Very little has been found in the area in which it is necessary to have our office located. Mr. Allard now reports that a syndicate is erecting three apartment blocks on a very desirable site midway between the Hotel de la Paix and the Palais de Nations and is offering the Delegation a top floor apartment at the end of one of the buildings looking out over the lake and the Parc Mon Repos. The area of this apartment is approximately 4000 square feet. As planned by the syndicate it will comprise a very large room, about 1500 square feet in area, two large bedrooms of about 200 square feet each, four bedrooms of about 100 square feet each, a large kitchen, three bathrooms and two W.C.'s. Mr. Allard states that "Since work on this building is just commencing arrangements can be made to have this area divided in any way we wish". The syndicate has asked for a definite commitment by January 1st and claims that the apartment will be available on January 1, 1956.

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The following is a summary of the proposals in respect of this apartment made by the delegation:

- (1) That the large room be sub-divided into six smaller offices, three of which, by folding back the walls, could be converted into a film-showing room or a conference room.
- (2) That the following be the allocation of rooms:
 - one as an office for the Head of the Mission.
 - one as an office for the senior adviser.
 - one as an office for the second adviser when appointed.
 - one as a reading room and office for delegates.
 - one as a reception room and office for a receptionist-telephone operator.
 - one as an office for the two Canadian stenographers.
 - one as an office for the accountant and driver-messenger.
 - one as a registry.
 - one as a supply room.
 - one as a cypher room.
 - three rooms adjoining the cypher room to serve as a residence for a security guard.
- (3) That authority be granted to sign a lease for these premises.

It seems to me that before consideration can be given to these proposals a number of other matters must first be dealt with, viz.,

- (a) Would the Department, if we were to take this space, be prepared to install cypher equipment? I understand that for conferences we now fly in machines.
- (b) Mr. Allard mentions a "second adviser when appointed" and "receptionist-telephone operator". Is it the Department's intention to increase the staff by these two persons?
- (c) If cypher machines are installed, will the Department be appointing one guard who will live in or two or more guards who will live out and who will require only one room to serve as a guard room?

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- (d) If cypher machines are installed will this not necessitate the increase of the staff by one or more operators?
- (e) Mr. Allard appears to think that Delegations to conferences will use office space in these quarters from time to time. In support of this he points out that for the Korean conference and the G.A.T.T. conference approximately \$1140 and \$800 respectively was paid out for office accommodation in the Hotel de la Paix. The last mentioned figure is an estimate to the end of February. Perhaps someone in the Department can say whether or not this aspect of the matter warrants serious consideration.
- (f) Mr. Allard states that he "can foresee no other suitable accommodation being or becoming available". This may be quite true in connection with other building projects but it seems more than possible that other, and smaller apartments should be available in one of the three syndicate buildings. Because we are informed that the syndicate requires a commitment before January 1st, and because the Delegation's letter has only just been received, it is not possible to obtain the details we would need before the deadline.

I anticipate that we might have difficulty in convincing the Treasury Board of our need for this large space. Normally we would not ask for more than about 2000 square feet for a Mission of this size (5 Canadians and one local messenger-driver).

We might be able to prepare a reasonable case, however, if cypher equipment is to be installed, if a guard is to live in, if space must be supplied for any long period for use by Delegates to international conferences, if additional staff is to be taken on and I should be grateful for your direction.

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Copies of this memorandum are being sent to the Establishments and Organization and Defence Liaison (2) Divisions in order that they might be in a position to answer the questions above, so that a reply might be given to Geneva before January 1st.

A copy of Geneva letter No. 433 of December 13th is attached for your further information.

Supplies & Properties.

Security .CONFIDENTIAL.....

MESSAGE FORM
OUTGOING

File No. 50048-AL-40	
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FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE PERMANENT DELEGATE OF CANADA TO THE EUROPEAN OFFICE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS, GENEVA.

Message To Be Sent

AIR CYPHER
EN CLAIR
CODE
CYPHER

Priority

No.

152

Date

October 19, 1954.

For Communications Section Only

SENT - OCT 21 1954

REFERENCE: Our Telegram No. 97 of June, 17, 1954,
para. 8.

SUBJECT:

ORIGINATOR

(Signature)

J.-Y. Grenon:tk
(Name Typed)

Div. Defence Liaison
(2)

Local Tel. 5124

APPROVED BY

(Signature)

G.G. Crean
(Name Typed)

Internal Distribution:

S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.

Please arrange to make available for
use by Canadian Delegation to forthcoming GATT
meeting, Chubb filing cabinet shipped to you
last spring for use by Canadian Delegation to
Korean Conference

Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

Done.....

Date.....

Copies Referred To:

Done.....

Date.....

Ext. 182A

OTTAWA FILE

No. 50048-AL-4

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

Letter No. 258

Date July 19, 1954

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION, GENEVA

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference Circular Document B.116/51 of December 29, 1951

Subject: Combination of Office Safe

23 JUL 1954

I am enclosing in the attached envelope
the combination of the office safe which was
changed on July 19, 1954.

Copies Referred

To

No. of Enclosures

one

Post File

No.

Robert D. Brown
Permanent Delegate

Mr. J. D. Brown
10 am 26
Edo
Noted July 26 1954
File

June 23, 1954

File

50048 - AL - 40

54 | 54

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE:

Reference: Our telegram of March 23, 1954, to London.

Subject: Security Equipment.

In our telegram No. ~~1~~-115 of June 17, 1954, (on file 50117-C-40) the Canadian Delegation to the Korean Political Conference, Geneva, was instructed to turn over their Chubb filing cabinet to the Permanent Canadian Delegation at La Pelouse.



J.-Y. Grenon

Ext. 1924

OTTAWA FILE

No. 50048-AL-4

Letter No. 181

Date April 21, 1954

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

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FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO SWITZERLAND

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference None

Subject: Security Arrangements for Geneva Conference

28 APR 1954

I attach note p.B.73.Corée.O.4.(b)-AH- dated 20 April from the Swiss Political Department informing us that in the interest of maximum security for delegations to the Asiatic Conference in Geneva, the Swiss Federal Council has decided to reinforce the Geneva Police with army detachments.

I am sending a copy of this note to the Permanent Delegation in Geneva for their information.

Copies Referred

To Canadian Permanent Delegation

No. of Enclosures

1

Post File

No.

Gunnarsson
Ambassador.

Mr. [Signature] to see [Signature] [Signature]



CONFÉDÉRATION SUISSE
DEPARTEMENT
DÉPARTEMENT POLITIQUE FÉDÉRAL

FILE 8000

p.B.73.Corée.0.4.(6) - AH -

Bitte dieses Zeichen in der Antwort wiederholen
Prière de rappeler cette référence dans la réponse


Le Département Politique Fédéral a l'honneur de faire savoir aux Missions diplomatiques des pays dont les gouvernements seront représentés à la conférence asiatique que, soucieux d'assurer au maximum la sécurité des délégués, le Conseil fédéral a décidé de renforcer la police de Genève en mettant à la disposition du gouvernement genevois des détachements de l'armée.

La tâche qui sera plus particulièrement confiée à ces unités sera d'effectuer la garde des résidences occupées par des chefs de délégation ainsi que celle des villas où les délégations auront installé des bureaux.

Le Département Politique prie les dites Missions diplomatiques de bien vouloir attirer l'attention des délégations intéressées sur le fait que ces mesures sont prises exclusivement dans leur intérêt et que les autorités militaires leur seront reconnaissantes de bien vouloir en faciliter l'exécution.

Le Département saisit cette occasion pour renouveler aux Missions diplomatiques l'assurance de sa haute considération.

Berne, le 20 avril 1954.



Security .CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

File No.	
50048-AL-40	
32	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE PERMANENT DELEGATE OF CANADA TO THE EUROPEAN OFFICE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

Message To Be Sent		No. 43	Date April 15, 1954	For Communications Section Only
AIR CYPHER				SENT - APR 15 1954
EN CLAIR				
CODE				
CYPHER		X		
Priority				
ORIGINATOR		REFERENCE:		
(Signature)		SUBJECT: Security Guards for Geneva Conference.		
G. P. Kidd / mmr				
(Name Typed)				
D. L. (2)				
Tel. 6391				
APPROVED BY				
(Signature)				
G. G. Crean				
(Name Typed)				
Internal Distribution:				
S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.				
Finance				
E. & O.				
de Lotbiniere				
1/52				
es Referred To:				

The RCMP is providing three security guards for this Conference. They include:

- (1) S/Sgt. R. D. Robertson stationed at RCMP Headquarters, Ottawa, who will be in charge of the detail;
- (2) Constable J. Burke stationed in London;
- (3) Constable D. J. Vickerman stationed in Karlsruhe.

2. S/Sgt. Robertson is leaving Ottawa for the U.K. by air on April 20. Together with our communications supervisor, Mr. Richards, he will be acting as a courier for the cypher equipment from London to Geneva. He will travel with this equipment from London on April 24 by BEA flight 250 arriving in Geneva at 1:10 p.m. I should be grateful if you could arrange to meet the aircraft with a station wagon or small truck to transport the equipment to the hotel.

3. The other two guards are making their own arrangements to proceed from their posts in Europe to Geneva. They have been instructed to report to Mr. McIlwraith by noon of April 24.

EXTERNAL

000677

INCOMING MESSAGE

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

ORIGINAL

FROM: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON,
ENGLAND.

Security Classification

UNCLASSIFIED

File No.

51048-AL-40
52 50

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Priority

LETTER TELEGRAM

System

EN CLAIR

No.

388

Date

April 13, 1954.

Departmental
Circulation

MINISTER
UNDER/SEC
D/UNDER/SEC
A/UNDER/SEC'S
POL/CO-ORD'N
SECTION

Reference: Your telegram No. 464 of April 12.

Subject:

Addressed Ottawa No. 388 repeated Geneva No. 12.

Chubb safe file shipped from London April 6 due
Basle April 12. No confirmation of arrival at Basle
received but understand agents, Lamprecht and Co.,
48 Peter Merian Str., Basle, will advise Canadian
Delegation on arrival.

g-12

File
Jef

D-2

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10	APR 14 1954

DOE-COMM'S SECTION

Done

Date

14 APR 1954

References

Done

Date

000000000000

Date

Page

COMMUNICATION
EXTÉRIÈRE

155 APR 1983

ALL CORRESPONDENCE TO BE
ADDRESSED:—

THE COMMISSIONER,
R. C. POLICE,
OTTAWA

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE
HEADQUARTERS

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

FILE NO. D 1426-1-Q-10

Refer Finance
E & O
Mr de P.

OTTAWA,

CANADA

Your Ref. 50048-AL-40

April 13, 1954.

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14 APR 1954

CONFIDENTIAL

Attention: Mr. G.P. Kidd.

50048-AL-40
52 | 50

Further to previous correspondence regarding your request for security guards for the Canadian delegation to the international meeting at Geneva, Switzerland, on April 26, 1954, this is to advise that S/Sgt. R.D. Robertson from R.C.M. Police Headquarters, Ottawa, will proceed to the U.K. by air on April 20th to take charge of, and set up, the security guarding for this conference. Two members from our overseas staff have also been appointed for this duty. They are Constable J. Burke, who is at present stationed in London and Constable D.J. Vickerman, who is at present stationed at Karlsruhe. Instructions have been issued that these members should report to Mr. K.D. McIlraith, Advisor to the Canadian Permanent Delegation, European Office of the United Nations at Geneva by noon of April 24th.

2. It is understood that S/Sgt. Robertson will be required to assist Mr. Richards of your Communications Section with the custody of coding equipment from London to Geneva in the A.M. of April 24th.

3. It is understood that the Department of External Affairs will be responsible for all expenses other than salary of the members attached

The Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
OTTAWA, Ontario.

- 2 -

for this duty. Instructions have been issued to our European personnel to secure their transportation to Geneva, if possible obtaining receipts for same and they will apply for reimbursement to your Treasury Officer at Geneva.

Kenneth Hall Surf
for Commissioner.

Copy on "F" 40-BF-40

Security ..Unclassified.....

50048-AL-40

MESSAGE FORM

OUTGOING

File No. 50048-AL-40
Copy on 50048-AL-40
50048-BF-40
6 50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA,

LONDON, ENGLAND

No. 464

REPEAT TO GENEVA

No. 38

Message To Be Sent

AIR CYPHER
EN CLAIR
CODE
CYPHER

No.

Date

April 12, 1954

For Communications Section Only

SENT - APR 12 1954

Priority

REFERENCE: Our telegram No. 357 of March 23, 1954.

SUBJECT:

ORIGINATOR

(Signature)

J.-M. Déry/kr

(Name Typed)

Div...DL (2)

Local Tel...5124

APPROVED BY

(Signature)

(Name Typed)

Internal Distribution:

S.S.E.A. U.S.S.E.A.

Done

Date

Copies Referred To:

Please confirm that Chubb Safe File
has been shipped and will be in Geneva
before April 26th.

EXTERNAL

File

Done

Date



UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

WASHINGTON, D.C.

(S) 10

1000


RECEIVED
COMMUNICATIONS
AFFAIRS
1954 APR 12 PM 12:36

OTTAWA, April 1, 1954

CONFIDENTIAL

Your File No. D 1426-1-Q-10

Our File No. 50048-AL-40



The Commissioner,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
O T T A W A.

With reference to your letter of March 12, 1954 concerning the provision of three members of your Force to act as security guards for the Canadian Delegation to the forthcoming meeting on Korea to be held in Geneva, I should now be grateful if you could proceed with the arrangements for putting your proposed plan into operation. The conference is scheduled to open on April 26 but, since it is expected that the cypher machines will arrive in Geneva on April 24, it would be helpful if the security detail could reach Geneva by the latter date.

Present plans are that the Canadian Delegation will be occupying a suite of twenty rooms in the Hotel D'Angleterre. Most of these rooms will be used for the living accommodation of the members of the Delegation including the three security guards, but a small number of rooms are being set aside as offices. The cypher machines will be housed in one of the offices, together with a filing cabinet for the storage of classified material. One of the two cypher operators accompanying the Delegation will be in the "Cypher Office" during normal working hours. The security detail will therefore be required mainly during quiet hours, although it may be necessary on occasion to arrange for guard duty during the daytime. This, however, is a matter which can be worked out with the Secretary of the Delegation in Geneva. In addition it would be helpful if the Senior

-2-

Non-Commissioned Officer could exercise general supervision over the security arrangements for the whole suite of rooms.

In order that the administrative arrangements for the transportation and accommodation of the security guards may be completed, I should appreciate your letting me know as soon as possible the name of the Non-Commissioned Officer who will be in charge of the detail, as well as the names of the two members of the Force who will be temporarily detached from their posts in Europe.

I should also like to take this opportunity of thanking you for your cooperation in assisting us in providing guards for this conference.

(Signed) G. G. GREAN.

for Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

cc. Mr. de Lotbiniere
E. & O.
Finance

{ Done
Apr. 1
M. R.

Orig. in F 40 - BP-40
Copy on 50048-A-40

Security UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE FORM
OUTGOING

File No.	50048-AL-40
	40-BP-40
Copy for	50048-A-40
"	" 50048-AL-40 ✓
	6

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA

LONDON, ENGLAND

REPEAT GENEVA

No. 357

No. 24

Message To Be Sent		No.	Date	For Communications Section Only
AIR CYPHER			March 23, 1954	Sent - Mar. 23, 1954
EN CLAIR	X			
CODE				
CYPHER				
Priority		REFERENCE:		
		SUBJECT:		
ORIGINATOR		<p>Please have Chubb Safe File now ready under Authority No. E.A. 8378 A immediately shipped c/o Allard in Geneva to be put at the disposal of the Canadian Delegates attending April 26th conference.</p> <p>EXTERNAL</p>		
Original signed by				
H.A. Hunter				
(Signature)				
H.A. Hunter/MG				
(Name Typed)				
Div. Supp. & Prop.				
Local Tel. 6185				
APPROVED BY				
M. H. C.				
(Signature)				
M.H. Coleman				
(Name Typed)				
Internal Distribution:				
S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.				
Done				
Date				
Copies Referred To:				
Done				
Date				
Ext. 97 (Rev. 1/52)				

ALL CORRESPONDENCE TO BE
ADDRESSED:—

THE COMMISSIONER,
R. C. M. POLICE,
OTTAWA

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE
HEADQUARTERS

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE NO. D 1426-1-Q-10
Your File No. 50048-AS-40

OTTAWA, 12th March, 1954.

CANADA

The Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

Re: International Meeting at Geneva,
Switzerland - April 26, 1954

With reference to your letter of the 25th
ultimo, please be advised that arrangements can be made
to supply three members of this Force to act as security
guards for the Canadian Delegation to the above noted
meeting.

It is proposed to send a Senior Non-Commission-
ed Officer from this Headquarters to take charge of the de-
tail. The other two members can be obtained from among our
personnel at present on duty in Europe.

It is understood, from a telephone conversa-
tion with your Mr. D.W. Munro, that your letter under ac-
knowledgment is to be considered in the nature of a request
for information as to what arrangements can be made, if re-
quired, rather than a firm request to provide three security
guards. We will, therefore, await further advice from you
before making any definite arrangements.

G.H. Prime
(G.H. Prime) Insp.
Asst. Adjutant.

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16 MAR 1954

Ext. 1824

OTTAWA FILE

No. 50048-AL-40

Letter No. 96

Date March 2, 1954

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION, GENEVA

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

D-2 Reference Circular Document B.116/51 of December 29, 1951

Subject Combination of Office Safe

I am enclosing in the attached
envelope the combination of the office
safe which was changed on March 2, 1954.

8 MAR 1954

Copies Referred
To

No. of Enclosures
one

Post File

No.

Permanent Delegate

enclosure
f. 10 pages 25/EB

Defence Liaison (C) D. W. McGuire/hem

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, February 25, 1954.

Your File No. 01426-1-Q-10
Our File No. 50048-AS-40

50048-AL-40
54 | 50

The Commissioner,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
O t t a w a.

Attention: Special Branch

I wish to refer to my letter of July 7, 1953 and subsequent correspondence concerning the provision of security guard services for Canadian delegations to international conferences.

As you are probably aware, there is to be an international meeting in Geneva on April 26th to discuss a number of questions relating to the Far East. Temporary offices for the Canadian Delegation to this meeting are likely to be set up in one of the hotels in Geneva. In addition to the documents which it will be necessary for the Delegation to have at its disposal, it is planned to provide machine cypher facilities in order to speed up communications with Ottawa. In these circumstances it is highly desirable to have the office quarters in the hotel under constant guard.

...2.


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I would be most grateful, therefore, if you could arrange, as in the past, to assign three members of the Force who might act as a guard detail under the general direction of one of the security guards now serving in the Department.

It is not known how long this meeting will continue.

As in the past, of course, this Department will make all the necessary arrangements for transportation, accommodation and meals for members of the guard detail.

(Signed) G. G. CREAN.

 Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

File
Belanger

TO: MR. G. G. CREEAN
ccs: Mr. Lefevre, Est. & Org.
Mr. Belanger, Communications
FROM: D. W. MUNRO

held by me
until I have received your comments
Belanger

Security ..S.E.C..R.E.T.....

Date ...24. February. 1954...

File No.		
50048-AL-40		
54	54	

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: ..Cypher Machines for Geneva.....

In view of the forthcoming meeting in Geneva to discuss Far Eastern questions, it seems very likely that we will be called upon to supply cypher machine services to the Canadian Delegation. According to what Mr. Lefevre said to me yesterday, it is to be hoped that the equipment could be in Geneva at least one week before the date of the meeting which you will recall is scheduled for April 26th. This means that we have between now and April 16th to make all the necessary arrangements. In the first place, I understand that the Canadian Delegation to this Conference will be established in a hotel. From my memory of the accommodation at present occupied by the Permanent Delegation of Canada to the European Office of the United Nations at La Pelouse, there will be no space in those offices for cypher equipment. This means that the machines may have to be set up in the hotel.

2. The technical problems connected with this plan can be dealt with by Mr. Belanger of Communications Section. Two of the three machines which are now stored in London, together with their ancillary equipment, could be sent to Geneva by air without too much difficulty. Installing them in the hotel should not be too much of a problem provided the machines are wired to operate on the current available.

...2.

- 2 -

3. I understand that arrangements are being made by Personnel and Establishments & Organization to supply two qualified operators to run the machines. Servicing and maintenance is to be done, as needed, by the technician in Paris.

4. This Division will be expected to see that guard facilities are made available. It is on this particular matter I would be glad to have your advice.

5. With two operators who will be in more or less constant attendance on the machines for the greater part of the working day, the guard services will be required to cover only the quiet hours. However, if we are going to provide guard services to the Delegation we might as well try to have guards available to protect the whole suite in which the Delegation will be working in much the same way as we did for the Delegation to the United Nations in New York. We obviously do not have a sufficient number of guards in sight to provide these services but we might ask the RCMP once again to help us out as they have done in the past (3 RCMP Special Constables under the command of an NCO have provided these services to at least the last two Delegation meetings in New York). Would you agree to my asking the Commissioner if he could make available to us a similar detail for this forthcoming meeting? ✓

yes

6. Mr. Perrault, one of the guards in the East Block has indicated his readiness to go to Bonn as a guard as soon as he could be replaced here. Might it not be worthwhile considering the possibility of having Mr. Perrault named as one of the guard detail assigned to the Canadian Delegation to the Special Meeting. I have not spoken to Mr. Perrault about this yet but I feel reasonably certain that he would be prepared to accept. ✓

yes

7. With full guard facilities at the disposal of the Delegation, it will not be necessary, in my

...3.

- 3 -

notes.

opinion, to have a safe sent to Geneva to protect the tapes and inserts. I think I could make arrangements, however, to have at least one, and possibly two, Chubb cabinets sent to Geneva in time for the meeting. When the meeting is over these cabinets could be turned over to the Permanent Canadian Delegation at La Pelouse.



D. W. Munro
Defence Liaison (2) Division

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: Canadian Permanent Delegation to the United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: My letter #A-7 dated January 9, 1954

Subject: Installation of Machine Cyphers

Security: Secret

No: A-41

Date: February 19, 1954

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No. 58048-A2-40. 50117-6-40 11334-25-40	
54	54

References

The department is re-examining the problem of providing adequate security arrangements at posts where it is planned to install machine cyphers equipment. Until studies in this regard are concluded, action to proceed with the installation of machine cyphers at your post will be postponed. You will, of course, be informed in due course of developments in this matter.

Internal Circulation

S. & P. Div.
N.F.H. Berlis,
European Div.
D. L. (2) Div.
Personnel Div.

Distribution to Posts

HENRY F. DAVIS

Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

ORIGINAL AS IS
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
MEMORANDUM

Original
50117-C-40
11336-65-40

TO: Supplies & Properties Division.....

Security ..**SECRET**.....

FROM: Establishments & Organization Division.....

Date: January 5, 1954.....

REFERENCE: Your memorandum dated October 7, 1953.....

File No: 50048-AL-40		
50117-C-40		
11336-65-40		
54	54	

SUBJECT: Installation of Machine Cypher Equipment at Geneva.....

The Establishment Board, at its recent series of meetings, approved the installation of cypher equipment in Geneva, but deferred approval of the necessary staff positions until the space has been made available and the equipment is ready for installation. I should be grateful therefore if, in accordance with the undertaking given in the first paragraph of your memorandum referred to above, steps will be taken to seek suitable premises so that the installation may be proceeded with and a security guard accommodated on the premises.

2. A separate letter will be sent to Geneva informing them of the Establishment Board's decision and that they will be receiving a further letter concerning accommodation for the equipment, staff and a security guard.

ORIGINAL AS IS

HENRY F. DAVIS

Henry F. Davis
Establishments & Organization
Division

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

COPY

SECRET

Permanent Representative of Canada to
TO:.....The United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland

Security:.....
A-7

No:.....
January 5, 1954

Date:.....

Enclosures:.....
Air

Air or Surface Mail:.....

Post File No:.....

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.
Previous correspondence

Reference Installation of Machine Cypher

Subject:..Equipment

Ottawa File No
11336-65-40

References

This is to inform you that, at a recent meeting, the Establishment Board approved the installation of machine cypher equipment at you post, but while concurring in principle in the necessary staff establishment, deferred action on the establishment of the personnel positions until suitable space in which to house the equipment, staff and security guard have been located, and the equipment is ready for installation. In this regard, you may expect to receive a separate letter from the Department shortly concerning the accommodation required.

Original signed by
H.F. Davis
Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

Ext. 182

*Mr. Gagnon
for action
file
E.J.*

OTTAWA FILE No. 50048-AL-40
59 / 50
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Letter No. **423**
Date. December 1, 1953.

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION, GENEVA
TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA
Reference.....Circular Document B.116/51 of December 29, 1951.....
Subject:.....Combination of Office Safe.....

I am enclosing in the attached
envelope the combination of the office safe
which was changed on December 1, 1953.

*Envelope removed.
E.J.*

Dean Allan
Permanent Delegate

Copies Referred
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.....
No. of Enclosures
.....one.....
Post File
No.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

*File
Done*

TO: SUPPLIES AND PROPERTIES DIVISION, D.L. (2) DIVISION

Security **SECRET** 13/10/53

PERSONNEL DIVISION, COMMUNICATIONS

Date **October 5, 1953**

FROM: Establishments and Organization Division

File No. **50117-C-40**

REFERENCE:

This copy for 50048-AL-40.

SUBJECT: Installation of Machine Cypher Equipment at New Delhi, Karachi & Geneva

Attached for your information is a copy of the memorandum we are submitting to the Establishment Board on the installation of machine cypher equipment at the above posts.

2. As there will be some delay in the installation at both Karachi and New Delhi, we are proposing that we go ahead with Geneva as soon as possible. However, new offices will be needed there as a first step, and Supplies and Properties Division may wish to suggest that Geneva do some exploration in this direction in order that there will not be undue delay should the Board approve our proposal.

HENRY F. DAVIS

Henry F. Davis,
Est. & Org. Division.

October 5, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT BOARD

Subject: Installation of Machine Cypher
Equipment at New Delhi, Karachi
and Geneva.

At its meeting on June 17, 1953, the Board agreed

- "(a) To approve the installation of machine cypher equipment in New Delhi;
- (b) To approve in principle its installation in Karachi subject to the completion of satisfactory security arrangements;
- (c) That Geneva should be asked for suggestions concerning possible security arrangements and the provision of suitable space should it be decided to extend the installation programme to that post; and
- (d) That the Establishments and Organization Division (Communications Section) be authorized to proceed with the placing of orders for the required ancillary equipment, and Personnel Division be asked to study the staff problems arising from this decision with the posts concerned and the security arrangements with D.L. (2)".

The following paragraphs discuss the present situation in the light of further information available from each post, and suggest what action might be taken in each instance.

..... 2

- 2 -

New Delhi

The High Commissioner's Office, in replying to our letter about the installation of machine cypher equipment, has pointed out that the office space and staff accommodation required to implement the plan could not be provided in the present premises without great inconvenience and a good deal of expense. Apparently the only living accommodation for the security guards would be in what are described as "temporary hutments" at the back of the residence, now used for storage purposes. These, one gathers, are not very suitable; the further point is made that security guards should not be accompanied by families because of the lack of living accommodation. New Delhi does not discuss in detail the question of whether there is a room suitable for a communications office, but the impression one gets is that provision of a room would mean overcrowding in the rest of the chancery, or additional construction.

New Delhi relates the decision to install machine cypher equipment to the question of purchasing land in the diplomatic enclave and building chancery, residence and staff accommodation. They are of the opinion that a full complement of stenographers would be well able to handle the present cypher traffic. Obviously, they consider our proposal to install machines now ill-timed because of the problems of office space, staff living accommodation, and related matters which are particularly difficult in New Delhi.

In view of the points raised by the High Commissioner's Office, it would be our proposal that action on the New Delhi installation be deferred for the present, and that the visiting team be asked to examine the situation with the High Commissioner and his staff early next year.

Karachi

The High Commissioner has suggested that action be deferred until the visiting team arrives in the New Year when various complicating factors can be gone into on the spot. In brief, the chief problems are

..... 3

- 3 -

- (a) lack of space for a cypher room despite additional offices secured this summer;
- (b) No accommodation for security guards in the offices. The best they can do is a bedroom adjoining the offices but without an inter-connecting door.

While agreeing that machine cypher equipment would ultimately prove a great benefit, Mr. Kirlwood seems reluctant to push ahead with the installation immediately owing to

- (a) the additional administration involved for two security guards without any compensating increase on the stenographic or "productive" side of the mission
- (b) the prospect of one of the stenographers familiar with conditions in Karachi having to be replaced by a stenographer from elsewhere trained in Typex operation, and
- (c) the initial heavy costs involved for equipment, for alterations to the offices and personnel changes.

The cost of necessary structural alterations to provide a communications office is estimated at \$250. The electricity supply is suitable.

In the light of comments from the post, it is recommended that further consideration of the installation at Karachi be deferred until after the visiting team has examined and reported on the situation.

Geneva

The Deputy Permanent Delegate in Geneva has advised that there is no suitable space for a communications office in their present offices, and that in any event, the premises would not permit of adequate security arrangements. Installation of machines would, therefore, mean securing new office accommodation.

..... 4

- 4 -

Mr. Williams considers it would not be difficult to find larger accommodation. The Australian Delegation's Offices consisting of five rooms plus a reception hall, kitchen, and bathroom (the latter fitted out as a cypher room) may become available at a monthly rent of 500 Swiss francs including heat. Suitable offices would not likely be obtainable for less than this amount. Mr. Williams also points out that new offices would mean additional expense for furniture as what we are now using belongs to the United Nations. There is no problem regarding electricity supply in Geneva.

As the installation of machine equipment at both Karachi and New Delhi will probably be delayed, it would be our suggestion that our delegation in Geneva be asked to look into the question of securing larger offices including space suitable for a communications office and living accommodation for one security guard. The offices of the Australian Delegation would not appear to be suitable unless it would be possible to have the communications office elsewhere than in the bathroom.

The present administrative staff establishment in Geneva consists of one Steno Grade 3, one Steno Grade 2B and one clerk Grade 4. The installation of machine cypher equipment will necessitate the addition of two security guards as this is the minimum requirement at posts where machines are installed. It will also be necessary to add one teletypist Grade 2 position. The incumbent would perform communications duties and while not thus engaged, would be available to assist in other clerical tasks such as filing, typing, etc. It is recommended that the administrative staff establishment of the Delegation to the European Office of the United Nations be increased by the addition of the following:

Security Guard		2
Watchman		
Teletypist	Grade 2	1

*This amendment made
in memo to 8 to the Est Board.
Dulornett
13/10/53*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: SUPPLIES AND PROPERTIES DIVISION *Copy on 11336-65-1076*

FROM: Establishments and Organization Division

REFERENCE: .. Proposal to install Machine Cypher Equip-
..... ment at Geneva.

SUBJECT: .. Implications of Above re Office Accommodation in Geneva

Security **SECRET**

Date September 30, 1953

File No. 50117-C-40		
11336-65-40		
<i>This copy for 50048-40</i>		
54	54	↑ Geneva.

Attached are copies of our letter P-185 of July 27 to Geneva and their reply, letter No. 316 of August 24 concerning the suggestion of the Establishment Board that Geneva be considered for the installation of machine cypher equipment.

2. As we expected, the installation of machines will mean our delegation will have to secure larger office accommodation. As you may recall, our program for installing machine cypher equipment this year was originally New Delhi, Karachi and possibly Geneva. Since both Karachi and New Delhi have raised problems which will delay installation at these posts, we intend to suggest to the Board that Geneva be asked to look around for alternative offices which would be large enough to include a communications room and living accommodation for at least one Security Guard in addition to their other requirements.

3. Attached is a copy of our proposed submission to the Establishment Board. We should be grateful for your comments on this, and for any other points which you consider might appropriately be brought to the Board's attention.

D
Henry F. Davis,
Est. & Org. Division.

cc for: Personnel Division
Defence Liaison (2) Division.

To: The Permanent Delegation of Canada to the
European Office of the United Nations, Geneva,
Switzerland.

From: The Under-Secretary of State for External
Affairs, Ottawa, Canada

Reference: Nil

Subject: Installation of Machine Cypher Equip-
ment, Typex Mark 22.

Security Secret

No. P-185

Date July 27, 1953

Enclosures --

Air or Surface Mail Air

Post File No.

Ottawa File No.

The Departmental Establishment Board recently considered the question of installing machine cypher equipment (Typex Mark 22) at additional posts this year. It was agreed that you should be asked for suggestions concerning possible security arrangements and the provision of suitable space should it be decided that the volume of telecommunications traffic warranted the extension of the installation programme to your Post.

2. It was pointed out to the Establishment Board that the provision of office space would be difficult as your staff is now accommodated in two rooms of a villa which also houses the offices of other delegations. As far as was known, there was no addition space available to provide for a communications office. Consequently, if it were decided to install the equipment in Geneva, it might be necessary to seek other accommodation for the Chancery. If possible, an indication of the probable cost of alternative accommodation would be helpful.

3. The following are the requirements which would have to be met in providing a room suitable for conversion into a communications office:

(a) the room in which the typex machines are installed should be situated in a secure part of the Chancery, and the room should be fitted with a strong door as well as with a secure lock which would be sent from Canada;

(b) windows should be secured against unauthorized entry, preferably by being barred, and should be fitted with translucent glass so that the interior would not be visible from any point outside;

(c) access to the cypher office would be forbidden to unauthorized persons at all times; the office would be used for working on communications only, whether by machine or, on occasion, by one time pad;

(d) as a part of the installation programme, we would provide, for installation in the communications office, a Taylor Safe for the storage of ancillary parts and documents.

..... 2

- 2 -

4. Once machines are installed, it is essential that the premises are occupied at all times by a member of the Canadian staff and, therefore, one or two security guards would have to be added to the establishment of your Mission. It would be desirable if one or both of these guards could live or at least sleep in or immediately adjacent to your offices, including the communications office.

5. A further consideration is the electric current needed to run the equipment. The machines are built to operate on 110 or 220 Volts - 50 or 60 cycles AC and consume very little power. The maximum drain when first switched on is about 240 watts and this is reduced to 120 watts while running. Could you confirm that the current at your post would be suitable for these machines.

6. Your comments and suggestions on the points discussed above will greatly facilitate our planning, and we shall look forward to receiving a report from you in the near future.

(sgd.) J.M. Cote
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

OTTAWA FILE
NO.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Letter No. 316

Date August 24, 1953

FROM: The Canadian Permanent Delegation, Geneva

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference: Your letter No. P-185 of July 27, 1953

Subject: Installation of Machine Cypher Equipment Typex Mark 22

You will recall in your letter under reference asking for our views concerning possible security arrangements and the provision of suitable space if it were decided that the volume of telecommunications traffic warranted the installation of machine cypher equipment at this Post.

2. In this connection I should like to confirm that there is no suitable space in the Villa "La Pelouse" for the installation of cypher equipment. Moreover, the required security procedure could not be observed in the Villa, even if suitable space could be found. In view of this situation, it does, I think, follow that the installation of machine cypher equipment at this Post would necessitate our securing new office accommodation. This would not, I think, be difficult of achievement although undoubtedly it might take a little time to find suitable accommodation. I might also just add that, in our letter No. 281 of August 5, 1953, we raised the question of new accommodation in connection with the installation of new locks on the doors of this office. There is also the additional consideration, which we mentioned in our letter of August 5, 1953, that working conditions at this Post are not particularly ideal and might, under certain circumstances, be unsatisfactory.

3. Although I have not made any detailed enquiries concerning alternative accommodation, you might wish to know the current monthly rental payments by the Australian Permanent Delegation which occupies an apartment on the Quai Wilson. This accommodation consists of five rooms in addition to a reception hall, kitchen and bathroom; the latter has been fitted out as a cypher room. The monthly rental for such accommodation is 500 Swiss francs per month, which includes the cost of heat. The Delegation, however, is responsible for char staff and telephone and electricity. I would not think that one could obtain suitable office accommodation for less than 500 Swiss francs per month.

4. I might perhaps add that when I spoke to the Australian Delegation about their rental payments, they indicated that their present accommodation might become available since they are finding it somewhat inadequate, principally because of lack of space.

5. If a decision is taken to install machine cypher equipment in Geneva, and new accommodation is found, I should bring to your attention that there will be additional expenditures for furniture since most of the furnishings in our present accommodation are the property of the United Nations.

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- 2 -

6. In conclusion, I wish to confirm that it would appear that the electric current in Geneva would be suitable for our machine cypher equipment. The voltage here is 220-50 cycles (AC).

B.M. Williams
Deputy Permanent Delegate.

SECRET

Geneva

The Deputy Permanent Delegate in Geneva has advised that there is no suitable space for a communications office in their present offices, and that in any event, the premises would not permit of adequate security arrangements. Installation of machines would, therefore, mean securing new office accommodation.

Mr. Williams considers it would not be difficult to find larger accommodation. The Australian Delegation's Offices consisting of five rooms plus a reception hall, kitchen, and bathroom (the latter fitted out as a cypher room) may become available at a monthly rent of 500 Swiss francs including heat. Suitable offices would not likely be obtainable for less than this amount. Mr. Williams also points out that new offices would mean additional expense for furniture as what we are now using belongs to the United Nations. There is no problem regarding electricity supply in Geneva.

As the installation of machine equipment at both Karachi and New Delhi will probably be delayed, it would be our suggestion that our delegation in Geneva be asked to look into the question of securing larger offices including space suitable for a communications office and living accommodation for one security guard. The offices of the Australian Delegation would not appear to be suitable unless it would be possible to have the communications office elsewhere than in the bathroom.

The present administrative staff establishment in Geneva consists of one Steno Grade 3, one Steno Grade 2B and one clerk Grade 4. The installation of machine cypher equipment will necessitate the addition of two security guards as this is the minimum requirement at posts where machines are installed. It will also be necessary to add one teletypist Grade 2 position. The incumbent would perform communications duties and while not thus engaged, would be available to assist in other clerical tasks such as filing, typing, etc. It is recommended that the administrative staff establishment of the Delegation to the European Office of the United Nations be increased by the addition of the following:

<i>Security Guard</i> Watchman		2
Teletypist	Grade 2	1

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

FILE COPY

TO: Canadian Permanent Delegation to United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Four-Wheel Combination Dial Lock
Subject:

Security: RESTRICTED
No: D- 738
Date: September 21, 1953
Enclosures:
Air or Surface Mail: Air
Post File No:

Ottawa File No. 50048-A2-40 50048-1-40	
59	58

References

I herewith attach a breakdown of the four-wheel combination dial lock on your model 221C or 222 safe together with a direction sheet for operating this lock. This illustrated chart is sent to your Mission in order to facilitate the task of any of your officers or of an authorized lock expert who may have to take apart and re-assemble the lock either for repairs or cleaning purposes.

2. We believe this breakdown to be sufficiently clear to enable any officer or Ottawa-based member of your staff who has had some training in locks to clean the mechanism of the lock without having recourse to the help of a local locksmith. This cleaning could very well be done at the same time that the combination settings are changed, i.e., every three months.

3. Particular attention is drawn to the fact that no oil should be put inside the lock elsewhere than on each of the two posts inside the lock case. Under no circumstances should you use more oil on the lock. There is real danger that if the oil gets in between the tumblers they will slip and you will be unable to open the safe. If the lock has to be examined by an expert, he should take care to remove any oil which might have got into the mechanism.

Internal Circulation

for the *Ronald D. Meares*
Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

Distribution to Posts

Ext. 1824

*Mr. Goyson
for action
of file
of [unclear]*

OTTAWA FILE
No. <i>50048-AL-40</i>
<i>52 50</i>
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

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Letter No. *320*
Date *August 26, 1953*

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION, GENEVA
TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA
Reference: Circular Document B.116/51 of December 29, 1951
Subject: Combination of Office Safe

1 SEP 1953

I am enclosing in the attached envelope the combination of the office safe which was changed on August 26, 1953.

*Contents removed.
[Signature]*

[Signature]
Deputy Permanent Delegate

Copies Referred To

No. of Enclosures
one

file

OTTAWA FILE
No. 100-100000

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

*Mr. [unclear]
for [unclear]
[unclear]*

33-0

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TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA
FROM: [unclear]
SUBJECT: [unclear]

1 SEP 1963

100-100000

*Don't let [unclear]
[unclear]*

1963 AUG 31 PM 3:32

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
RECORDS DEPARTMENT

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION,
..... GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference: Your Letter No. 281 of August 5.

Subject: Security Arrangements.
.....
.....

CONFIDENTIAL
Security:

No: D - 204

Date: August 17, 1953

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No. 50048-AL-40	
59	50

References

Your letter under reference has been read with interest. Your exposé of the difficulties encountered by your office from the standpoint of security shows clearly that arrangements made with the Director of the European Office of the United Nations to install new locks on all doors leading to the two rooms occupied by this delegation in the Villa "La Pelouse" would not in itself solve the problem since some of the United Nations personnel, e.g., the door-keeper and the charwoman, would still have access to our keys. It is therefore suggested that for the time being the status quo be maintained with regard to the security arrangements.

D. W. MUNRO

for the
Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

Ext. 182A

Mr. Derry
We fully appreciate these problems, and are glad to have this account of them on file. BUT, we did not intend to call on ourselves a delay of requests for locks.

OTTAWA FILE

No. *50048-AL-18*

52 50
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

See also comment on final para. Prepare reply

Letter No. *281*
Date *281* August *8*, 1953

FROM: The Canadian Permanent Delegation, Geneva
TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA
Reference: Circular Document No. B 54/53 of July 8, 1953
Subject: Door locks for posts abroad

11 AUG 1953

We have noted in your circular document under reference that it has been decided to use standard types of door locks at all posts abroad and that it is your intention that posts should submit requests for the types of locks which they think will be most effective for their respective office premises.

by inference only.

File

Copies Referred To.....
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No. of Enclosures
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Post File
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2. As we have explained in earlier letters concerning the physical security of this office, there are certain factors which may make it difficult to comply with your wishes that Yale locks be installed on all doors leading to the two rooms occupied by this delegation in the Villa "La Pelouse". In the first place, it would of course be necessary to obtain permission from the Director of the European Office of the United Nations, since the building is United Nations property. Although the Director might not have any objections to new locks being installed, he might at the same time insist that the work be carried out by a technician on his own staff or a locksmith hired by his office for the purpose. This could conceivably be arranged, on the understanding that the locksmith would carry out the work under the "constant supervision" of a Canadian member of the staff of this office.

3. There is, however, a second problem which may be more difficult to overcome. As mentioned in paragraph 6 of our letter No. 206 of May 26, 1952, a United Nations door-keeper is on duty in the entrance hall to the Villa "La Pelouse" from 8 A.M. to 8 P.M. every day of the week, except Sundays. This door-keeper holds duplicate keys for all exterior and interior doors in the building, mainly as a precaution against the outbreak of fire in an office which may be temporarily unoccupied by Delegation staff. When he goes off duty in the evening, the door-keeper closes and bars (from inside) all shutters to exterior doors, and finally locks the main door and its protecting shutter. The key of the main door and shutter is then handed

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000713

- 2 -

in to a central control office in the Palais des Nations. In the early hours of the morning, the cleaning women assigned to the Villa "La Pelouse" (of which there are two) obtain the key to the main door of the villa from the Palais des Nations. Having entered the villa, they take the keys for the interior doors from a drawer in the door-keeper's desk. These keys are checked by the door-keeper when he comes on duty at 8 A.M. each morning. There is therefore a period between 5.30 A.M. and 8 A.M. when the building is open with only two cleaning women on the premises.

4. One of the most important points made in your circular document is that "keys (for the Yale locks) should never be given to or even seen by persons not specifically authorized to have keys". The question therefore arises whether or not you would agree to a duplicate set of keys being made available to the United Nations door-keeper in this building for his own use and for the use of the char staff in the early hours of the morning. We assume from your circular document that you would not be satisfied with such an arrangement, and if this should be the case the further question arises as to whether the Director of the European Office would agree to the installation of new locks on our office doors for which no duplicate keys would be available to employees of the United Nations whose duty it is to ensure the general security and cleanliness of the building.

5. I should mention that I have not yet raised this matter with the Director of the European Office since I would prefer to have some direction from you before doing so. Although it might be difficult to secure the Director's agreement to all the stipulations made in your circular document, it might be possible to come to some compromise arrangement which, though not ideal from our point of view, would ensure a slightly greater degree of security for this office. On the other hand, if you do not think that any compromise arrangement would be satisfactory, I can see no other alternative than to seek new office premises for this Delegation elsewhere in Geneva. In this connection I should mention that, while there are certain obvious advantages in having our Delegation office close to the Palais des Nations - and closer still to the six other Permanent Delegations which have offices in "La Pelouse" - we are constantly faced with the disadvantages of inadequate security and insufficient office space. This latter disadvantage has become more apparent during the past year or so as a result of the introduction of a larger number of filing cabinets to house the files and documents which are kept by the Delegation. There is also the fact that both Foreign Service Officers on the Delegation staff are required to work in the same room - an arrangement which is reasonably satisfactory when both officers are of similar rank and are able to adapt themselves to one another's methods of work. If, however, a more senior officer was ever sent to this post, the limitations of the two rooms at our disposal would probably be found even more unsatisfactory than is the case at present.

- 3 -

6. Although I am chiefly concerned in this letter with the security aspect of this office, I thought I should mention the question of office space in order to assist you to decide whether some attempt should be made to improve security by installing new locks or whether it would be better to think in terms of acquiring new office premises elsewhere in Geneva. If you think that the latter alternative would be desirable, I should be glad to send you in due course my views on the feasibility of obtaining suitable new office space.

*This is now
under consideration
by ESO because
of the decision
to install cypher
machines in Geneva.*

Robert W. Wainwright

Deputy Permanent Delegate.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: ~~THE~~ Permanent Delegation of Canada to the
..... European Office of the United Nations, Geneva, ...
..... Switzerland.
FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Security:..... Secret.....

No: ... *185*

Date: .. July 37, 1953

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail: *Air*

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
<i>50048-AL-46</i>	
<i>59</i>	<i>✓</i>

Reference: *Nil*

Subject: ... ~~Installation of Machine Cypher Equipment~~ ...

..... ~~Typex Mark 22~~

*Original on "P" 11336-65-40
Copy on 9118-E-40*

References

Defence Liaison (2)

The Departmental Establishment Board recently considered the question of installing machine cypher equipment (Typex Mark 22) at additional posts this year. It was agreed that you should be asked for suggestions concerning possible security arrangements and the provision of suitable space should it be decided that the volume of telecommunications traffic warranted the extension of the installation programme to your Post.

2. It was pointed out to the Establishment Board that the provision of office space would be difficult as your staff is now accommodated in two rooms of a villa which also houses the offices of other delegations. As far as was known, there was no additional space available to provide for a communications office. Consequently, if it were decided to install the equipment in Geneva, it might be necessary to seek other accommodation for the Chancery. If possible, an indication of the probable cost of alternative accommodation would be helpful.

3. The following are the requirements which would have to be met in providing a room suitable for conversion into a communications office:

(a) the room in which the typex machines are installed should be situated in a secure part of the Chancery, and the room should be fitted with a strong door as well as with a secure lock which would be sent from Canada;

(b) windows should be secured against unauthorized entry, preferably by being barred, and should be fitted with translucent glass so that the interior would not be visible from any point outside;

(c) access to the cypher office would be forbidden to unauthorized persons at all times; the office would be used for working on communications only, whether by machine or, on occasion, by one time pad;

(d) as a part of the installation programme, we would provide, for installation in the communications office, a Taylor Safe for the storage of ancillary parts and documents.

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

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- 2 -

4. Once machines are installed, it is essential that the premises are occupied at all times by a member of the Canadian staff and, therefore, one or two security guards would have to be added to the establishment of your Mission. It would be desirable if one or both of these guards could live or at least sleep in or immediately adjacent to your offices, including the communications office.

5. A further consideration is the electric current needed to run the equipment. The machines are built to operate on 110 or 220 Volts - 50 or 60 cycles AC and consume very little power. The maximum drain when first switched on is about 240 watts and this is reduced to 120 watts while running. Could you confirm that the current at your post would be suitable for these machines.

6. Your comments and suggestions on the points discussed above will greatly facilitate our planning, and we shall look forward to receiving a report from you in the near future.

I. M. Côté

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

Ext. 16

*Mr. Gougeon
for action
of file/Deum.*

OTTAWA FILE

No. *50048-AL-40*

32 58

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

Letter No. *188*

Date.... June. 3, .. 1953

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION, GENEVA

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.... Circular Document No.B.116/51 of December 29, 1951

Subject:..... Combination of Office Safe

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18 JUN 1953

I am enclosing in the attached envelope
the combination of the office safe which was changed
on May 29, 1953

removed.

Bob Williams
Deputy Permanent Delegate.

Copies Referred
To.....
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No. of Enclosures

one *BM*

Post File

No.....

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Ext. 1834

*Mr. G. J. [unclear]
for action of [unclear]*

OTTAWA FILE

No. *50048-AL-48*

52 50
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

D-2

Letter No. *63*

Date.....February..17,,1953.....
[Signature]

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION, GENEVA

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.....Circular.Document.No...B.116/51.of.December.29,,1951....

Subject:.....Combination.of.Office.Safe.....

24 FEB 1952

I am enclosing in the attached envelope
the combination of the office safe which was changed
on February 13, 1953.

Contents removed.

[Signature]

Deputy Permanent Delegate

Copies Referred
To.....
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No. of Enclosures
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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
RECORDS-CLEARED

1953 FEB 24 AM 11:02

000721

Ext. 1824

*Mr. Geyson
for action of file
H. G. M.*

OTTAWA FILE

No. *50048-AL-40*

52 50
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

D-7 Letter No. **39**

Date.....January.28.,.1952.....

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION, GENEVA

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference....Your.Letter.D.347.of.December.15.,.1952.....

Subject:....Security.Equipment.....

3 FEB 1952

In accordance with the instructions
contained in your letter under reference, I
am enclosing the Security Questionnaire and
Inventory with the appropriate amendments.

Copies Referred

To.....

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Mr. W. W. W. W.
Deputy Permanent Delegate

No. of Enclosures

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000722

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY QUESTIONNAIRE AND INVENTORY

FILE COPY

Mission

Comments

A. Chancery Premises

1. Has plan of premises, including allocation of rooms, been sent to Ottawa? <u>yes</u> (Yes or No)	With our letter No.206 of May22, 1952.
2. Is the building detached? <u> </u> Whole (or shared) floor of office building? <u>shared villa</u> If the latter, mention floor and list immediate neighbours in comment column.	<u>1st floor</u> - Permanent Delegations of France, Turkey and Norway.
3. Allocation of rooms: (a) Is there a security room in which all classified material is kept during quiet hours? <u>No</u> (b) Are the windows of this room barred? <u>N/A</u> (c) Is there a room set aside for Canadian clerical staff only? <u>No</u> (d) Is there accommodation on the premises for a resident security guard? <u>No</u> . (e) Is there at present a security guard in residence? <u>No</u> .	
4. Special Installations: (a) Telephones, <u>Four (4)</u> Locally installed? <u>Yes</u> Specially installed by U.K. engineer? <u> </u> (b) Alarm system? <u>No</u> Type <u> </u>	

B. Cypher Facilities

1. Manual yes or Machine No.
2. Is there a separate communications office? No.

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

EQUIPMENT

C. Safes

<u>Manufacturer</u>	<u>Model No.</u>	<u>Make of Lock</u>
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Taylor	221	
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History, as far as is known, including any difficulties you may have had with the locking device or any other part:

Delivered in 1949 - No difficulties with locking device.

<u>Manufacturer</u>	<u>Model No.</u>	<u>Make of Lock</u>
---------------------	------------------	---------------------

History, as far as is known, including any difficulties you may have had with the locking device:

<u>Manufacturer</u>	<u>Model No.</u>	<u>Make of Lock</u>
---------------------	------------------	---------------------

History, as far as is known, including any difficulties you may have had with the locking device:

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

EQUIPMENT

C. Safes

<u>Manufacturer</u>	<u>Model No.</u>	<u>Make of Lock</u>
---------------------	------------------	---------------------

History, as far as is known, including any difficulties you may have had with the locking device or any other part:

<u>Manufacturer</u>	<u>Model No.</u>	<u>Make of Lock</u>
---------------------	------------------	---------------------

History, as far as is known, including any difficulties you may have had with the locking device:

<u>Manufacturer</u>	<u>Model No.</u>	<u>Make of Lock</u>
---------------------	------------------	---------------------

History, as far as is known, including any difficulties you may have had with the locking device:

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

EQUIPMENT (continued)

D. Filing Cabinets

<u>Type</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Comments</u>
Remington-Rand	Nil	
Chubb	1 - on order for early delivery (Received December 3, 1952 in good order)	
Bar and Hasp	6 (5)	4 - Four drawer 1 - Two drawer 1 - One drawer

E. Door Locks

<u>Position</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Purchased locally or sent from Canada</u>	<u>No. of Keys</u>
Entrance Doors	local		
Security Room			
Cypher Room			
Elsewhere (e.g. spring locks on office doors, etc.)			

F. Padlocks used to safeguard classified material

<u>Type</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>Purchased locally or sent from Canada</u>
Key operated	2 Yale Pad- locks (Extra)	Sent from Canada.
Sargent & Greenleaf Combination (6)		(not applicable)

000727

CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

G. Miscellaneous

1. Facilities for destruction of classified waste:

- (a) Large fireplace in one of the rooms occupied by the Canadian Delegation.
- (b) Ample garden for large scale destruction with chemicals in an emergency.

2. Despatch Cases (Red type or Brown)

Number

Nil

H. Additional Comments

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: CANADIAN CONSULATE, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND...

CONFIDENTIAL
Security:

No: D- 347

Date: December 15, 1952

Enclosures: 2

Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.

50048-AL-40

96 50

References

We have recently had extracted from the files a list of the security equipment being used at your Mission. It is conceivable, however, that the resulting inventory is incomplete. I am, as a consequence, attaching a copy of the list and would be grateful if, after having checked it against the actual equipment in use, you would return it to the Department with appropriate amendments.

2. As you are, of course, aware Taylor safes are supplied to our missions abroad for the purpose of providing the best available container to safeguard the most sensitive documents. Since most missions have only one of these safes it is essential that this piece of equipment be kept in good repair. Should you have any difficulty with its operation, therefore, I would like you to report it immediately so that we may suggest a remedy.

3. In addition to the Taylor you may have another type of Canadian safe - a Dominion or an Office Speciality - and perhaps even a locally purchased one. None of these other Canadian safes, of course, should be used to protect anything more highly classified than confidential; the locally purchased ones should be used for nothing more vulnerable than petty cash.

Internal Circulation

4. As far as the lower grade Canadian safes are concerned, since they may well be used for the safe-keeping of certain documents, you will want to keep them in good repair. If we are to help you do this, it would be useful to have on record the type of lock fitted to such safes. The attached inventory is the obvious place for such details. You can see that with this information on our files, replacement parts can be ordered without delay as soon as we have been notified of a breakdown.

Distribution to Posts

5. I should perhaps make it clear that this inventory is intended to list all the security equipment in use at your post. By this I mean even such equipment as may have been provided to your Service Attaché or to your Commercial Secretary. Although the policy regarding the provision of security equipment has undergone some changes over the years, it is now an established principle that this Department will hold itself responsible for meeting the physical security needs of all government departments represented in our missions abroad. It is only logical,

-2-

therefore, that we should know the present state of that equipment if only to assess future needs. It is to this end that the attached inventory has been devised and is being circulated.

for (unflashed)

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

ROCKLAND BOND

MADE IN CANADA

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE CANADIAN CONSULATE,
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference:.....

Subject: Chubb Safe Files
.....
.....

CONFIDENTIAL

Security:.....

No: D- 341

Date: November 28, 1952

Enclosures: 1

Air
Air or Surface Mail:.....

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.

50048-AL-40

58

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References

Arrangements have been made to have sent to you from London a Chubb combination safe file fitted with a Sargent & Greenleaf combination lock. The present despatch is intended to explain to you its advantages and its limitations.

2. This filing cabinet was specifically designed to serve the needs of this Department at home and abroad. It is similar in certain respects to the Remington Rand, with which you are already familiar. However, on the basis of extensive experiments carried out on these two, and on other safe files of the same type, the Chubb has been found to offer more security. It is for that reason that we are in the process of furnishing them to all our missions.

3. We have been using the Chubb safe file in Ottawa for some time now, and are reasonably satisfied with its performance. Of the difficulties we experienced during the trial period, some we managed to iron out by insisting that the manufacturer modify certain features; at the same time rough handling can still cause difficulties.

4. Because the Chubb is not foolproof, we have arranged that all recently posted personnel receive some training in the proper handling of this piece of equipment. You may therefore find that some member of your present staff has had this training, as well as other training in security devices. For the purposes of the record, however, I propose to send you a few words of guidance which are intended to spare you the miseries (and us the expense) that follow when drawers or locks have been jammed.

5. In the first place it is well to remember that the Chubb cabinet was designed to operate smoothly and efficiently with the minimum application of force. In order to persuade users in Ottawa that such is in fact the case, we have drawn up instructions and posted them on the face of the top drawer at eye level where they cannot be overlooked. I am sending you a copy of these instructions and suggest that you have them securely fixed on the front of your Chubb.

6. So far as we know, there is only one mechanical snag left in the Chubb. It lies in the drawer release bar which sometimes sticks, particularly while the cabinet is still new. This bar runs up inside the cabinet in the front right-hand corner, about 4 inches from the front face. When the master drawer is closed this bar is forced into the "down" position, and in this way engages catches on the other three drawers, holding them firmly closed. When the master drawer is open, however, a spring should force this bar into the "up"

Internal
Circulation

Distribution
to Posts

- 2 -

position, releasing the other drawers. If, therefore, you should find that even with the master drawer open the other drawers are still firmly held in place, this bar may be stuck. To remedy this situation the bar should be prised into the "up" position. The catches will then become disengaged and the drawers should open without difficulty.

7. It is this same bar which, when forced into the "down" position by closing the master drawer first, will prevent the other drawers from being closed. The remedy in this situation is to re-open the master drawer, close all other drawers, and then close the master drawer and twirl the dial.

8. In the event, therefore, that drawers are apparently jamming, I would recommend that the position of this locking bar be investigated. Under no circumstances should you have to resort to violence to open or close any of the drawers.

9. You are already familiar with the combination lock itself. It is a Sargent & Greenleaf Manipulation Proof lock, the same as that fitted to the Remington Rand; properly handled this lock should give you no difficulty - particularly on the cabinets being sent to you, which ought to have been assembled properly following a recent protest we made to the manufacturer. The only comment I have to make on the locks, therefore, has to do with the frequency with which the settings should be changed. The settings on these locks should be changed periodically, probably when you change the settings on your Taylor safe. No record of the setting should be kept unprotected. If, at any time, you have cause to think that the combination has been compromised, you should reset it immediately.

10. I should, perhaps, add that the Chubb safe file, empty, weighs about 850 pounds. It is advisable, therefore, to decide before its arrival where you will want it placed.

G. de T. GLAZEBROOK

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

for ch

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE CANADIAN CONSULATE, GENEVA

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: D-335

Date: November 24, 1952.

Enclosures:

Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.

50048-AL-40

59

58

References

The two Yale locks referred to in your letter were sent to you as spares. They should therefore remain in the safe until you have to bring them into use, at which time you should notify me so that new spares can be sent out to replace them.

G. P. KIDD

for Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

Internal
Circulation

Supplies &
Properties to
see.

Distribution
to Posts

Ext. 185

*Mr. Goyon
for action
off file / adm.*

OTTAWA FILE

No. *50048-AL-40*

52 50

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

Letter No. *432*

Date....November.12.,.1952.....

*Call answer
E.F.*

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION, GENEVA

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.....Circular.Document.No..B.116/51.of.December.29,..1951...

Subject:.....Combination.of.Office.Safe.....

g.6

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18 NOV 1952

I am enclosing in the attached envelope
the combination of the office safe which was
changed on November 11, 1952.

*Contents removed.
E.F.*

B. J. Winman
Deputy Permanent Delegate

Copies Referred
To.....
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No. of Enclosures
one
.....

Post File

No.....

20

ACRI 3x3

1952 NOV 18 11:44 AM

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
RECORDS-CLERKED

SECRET

File No. 50048-AL-40

November 10, 1952.


96 1 ✓

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

Despatch No. H- 93 of April 15,
1952, to the Consulate-General, *Geneva*,
outlined the routine to be followed in the
event that cyphers are compromised.

ALM

Defence Liaison (2) Division.



CONFIDENTIAL

CIRCULAR DOCUMENT

Ottawa, November 8, 1952.

NO. A. 99/52

One of the points discussed during my recent meeting in Paris with the Heads of Canadian Missions in Western Europe was the burden imposed on the staffs of missions, and particularly of small missions, in preparing routine reports. I assured the Heads of Missions that on my return to Ottawa I would have this matter investigated with a view to eliminating, wherever possible, those routine report forms which could, without serious consequences, be discontinued.

2. A review of these reports was made and it was found possible to eliminate missions' annual reports (Circular Document No. A.B. 103/52 of October 16, 1952). It has now been decided to eliminate the Weekly Security Report, inaugurated in Circular Document No. 74 of October 19, 1951.

3. I am not, of course, suggesting by this move that there shall be any relaxation of security standards. The use of the forms over the past months will have served to concentrate your attention on the vulnerable parts of your organization. I am sure, therefore, that with this experience, but without the forms, you will continue to apply the Security Regulations which, you will have noted, have been recently revised.

4. In this connection I would particularly commend to your attention Despatch No. H-93 dated April 15, 1952, covering the action to be taken in the case of a compromise (suspected or confirmed) of your cypher communications. It cannot be too strongly emphasized how important it is that we should know without delay when you have reason to believe that this material might have been seen by unauthorized persons.

R. M. Broadbent
for Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

To the Heads of
Canadian Posts Abroad
excluding Consulates.

Ext. 1871

*Mr. Gouyon
Can you trace these two locks
that apparently turned up in
Geneva in error?*

OTTAWA FILE

No.

50048-PL-46

Letter No. 423

Date November 7, 1952

52 50
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

D-2

FROM: The Canadian Permanent Delegation, Geneva

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference: Your letter No. D-305 of October 20, 1952

Subject: Security Arrangements

18 NOV 1952

The two Yale locks referred to in our July inventory and your letter under reference are super pin tumbler padlocks. The key numbers are 76F.07 and 80F.96.

2. These locks were received in Geneva on July 1 and were sent in Ottawa's sea bag No. 26, dated June 18.

3. These are the only two spare padlocks we have in this office and they are being held in the safe pending your further instructions.

[Signature]

Deputy Permanent Delegate.

Copies Referred

To

No. of Enclosures

Post File

No.

1952 NOV 18 PM 11:45

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
RECEIVED-CLERK

000739

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: Canadian Permanent Delegation,
..... Geneva, Switzerland.

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference:.....

Subject:.... Security Arrangements.

Security: CONFIDENTIAL

No: D- 305

Date: October 20, 1952.

Enclosures:.....

Air or Surface Mail:.....

Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
50048-AL-XC	
10104-H-1-40	
52	58

References

In your inventory, which has recently been received, you make mention of "Two Yale locks and four keys received by sea bag from Ottawa." You admit to being somewhat mystified about these locks and request a word of explanation.

2. Unfortunately, you do not specify whether the locks in question are padlocks or door locks. If you would do so, and would, at the same time, let me know either the number of the sea bag by which they were received or, failing that, the date of their arrival, I might be able to shed some light on the problem. As things stand now, I am not sure whether these particular locks were intended for you, or whether through an error they merely got into a sea bag addressed to you. There is a possibility, therefore, that some other Mission is still waiting for two locks (padlocks or door locks), but until I have the additional information mentioned above I cannot be certain.

3. Meanwhile, the two Yale locks, and any other spare locks you have, should be kept in a safe place to prevent their being compromised.

Internal
Circulation

S. & P.

G. E. KIDD

for the

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

Distribution
to Posts

MEMORANDUM

Department of External Affairs

Ottawa,

Confidential

Mr Glazebrook

File/Don.

1. window situation appears to be generally satisfactory

2. doors most unsatisfactory (see esp. para 6.) Mr. [unclear] makes no suggestions but perhaps Berlis has some. We can, of course, get locks for some of the doors but I see no way around the cleaning situation etc.

Mr Hambley

Please consult [unclear]

Mr Berlis

Done: [unclear]

000741

56648-AK-40
96 | ✓

10104-E-40

4 June 1952

*9 file /
diom.*

MEMORANDUM FOR DEFENCE LIAISON (2) DIVISION

Re: Office Premises for Canadian Permanent
Delegation - Geneva

— I am attaching a copy of Letter No. 206
— of 22 May 1952, and attachments, from Geneva,
describing the office premises. Also attached is
a photostat of a plan sent forward with this letter.

2. You might wish to retain both attachments
and the plan for your records.

3. I should be grateful if you would return
the letter to me in due course.

*copy made
+ original
returned.
6-6-52. Just*

J. J. Hurley
J. J. Hurley,
Supplies and Properties Division.

*The situation will be somewhat better when the
Chubb arrives. diom. 12.18.52*

30048-AL-40

(COPY)

(Ottawa File No. 10104-E-40)

CONFIDENTIAL

Letter No. 206

Date: May 22, 1952

FROM: The Canadian Permanent Delegation, Geneva

TO: The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Canada

Reference : Your Letter No. F-126 of May 7, 1952

Subject : Office premises

In answer to your request, I am attaching a scaled drawing showing the lay-out of the rooms occupied by the Canadian Delegation in the villa "La Pelouse". This plan is in fact a tracing from an office floor plan produced by the United Nations Secretariat. This accounts for the fact that the scale is in centimetres and not in the more convenient foot measurement. You will see from the key to the plan how the main items of office furniture, including the safe and filing cabinets, are arranged and also the amount of space allocated to each member of the staff (the driver of the Delegation car has no particular space allotted to him).

2. I am also attaching a brief description of the office safe and each of the five filing cabinets which should provide you with all the information you require on these items.

3. As regards the locking devices on windows and doors, it is rather difficult to describe them accurately in view of their unusual pattern. As far as the glass doors facing the terrace are concerned, I am attaching a diagram which attempts to show the locking bar device which secures one side of these double doors. The other sides of the double doors are in two cases secured by key locks and in the other two cases by simple rotating catches. It should be noted that the floor plan does not show the hinged wooden shutters which cover the glass doors at night. These shutters are secured from within by heavy locking bars similar to those on the inside of the glass doors and in our view it would be difficult to force open these shutters from outside without damaging them extensively. *not very clearly*

4. I regret that it is not possible for us to give you the name of the manufacturer of the door locks of any of the office doors. As we pointed out in an earlier letter on this subject, these locks and keys were made many years ago, presumably by a Swiss firm, since the pattern of the keys is similar to that generally found in the older houses in this part of Switzerland. Short of sending you a sample key,

...2

- 2 -

it is impossible to give you a completely accurate idea of their size and "cut". I am, however, attaching a small diagram of the keys to two of the doors to our offices in the hope that these drawings will give you some idea of the various key shapes.

5. The double doors between our Delegation office and those of the French and Norwegian Delegation offices are permanently locked, the keys being held by the Palais des Nations. You will note that we have a bookcase across one set of doors and our filing cabinets blocking the other set of doors. The double doors between the two rooms occupied by our Delegation are left open, except when cypher material is in use in the room occupied by the administrative staff. On such occasions all the doors leading into the administrative staff room are locked from the inside.

2 stenos } all
+ 1 assistant } Canadian?
yfs
23.11.52
J.W.M.

6. The United Nations door-keeper, who sits in the entrance hall immediately outside our office, is in possession of duplicate keys to the entrance doors to both our office rooms. The reason for this is that it is his duty to enter our office in the evening to close the wooden shutters covering the glass doors and also to let in the cleaning women at 5 A.M. each morning (except Sundays).

7. As pointed out on previous occasions, it is difficult in this building to obtain the same degree of security as might be possible in a more modern building with fewer doors and windows, equipped with modern locking devices. However, you will no doubt wish to study the information contained in this letter, together with the floor plan, before deciding what further measures might be taken to ensure a greater degree of security than is possible in this office at the present time.

8. We understand that Mr. Berliss will be arriving in Ottawa shortly, and, in view of his detailed knowledge of our office lay-out, you may find it useful to consult him on this matter.

B.M. Williams
Secretary.

Containers for holding Classified Material

2

SAFE - J. & J. Taylor Limited; Handle No. 99936;
shipped by the Department of External Affairs,
Ottawa, in 1949.

FILING CABINETS

We are in possession of the following filing
cabinets:-

Two "Prestonia" steel four-drawer filing
cabinets, purchased on E.A. Order No. 1803 in
1948, received in Geneva in 1949. These two
filing cabinets have been fitted with steel
locking bars similar to those originally
installed on the filing cabinets in Ottawa;


One "Popham" steel four-drawer cabinet
purchased on E.A. Order No. 2644 in 1952. This
cabinet was fitted with a steel locking bar
prior to shipment.

One "Popham" two-drawer steel cabinet
purchased on E.A. Order 2155 in 1950. This
cabinet has also been fitted with a steel locking
bar similar to the bars originally installed on
the filing cabinets in Ottawa.

One four-drawer cabinet on loan from the
United Nations. This cabinet was manufactured
by "Wolf Netter & Jacobi Werke", Berlin. This
cabinet is fitted with a steel bar on hinges.
This bar has a hinge in the middle of the top
and the middle of the lower drawers (the pivot of
the hinge being concealed behind the main frame-
work of the cabinet). This bar locks in the
middle of the cabinet.

GLASS DOORS

3




CROSS SECTION
OF LOCKING
BAR LOCK

TOP + BOTTOM EXTENSION OF
SWIVEL LOCKING BAR
PIN IN FLOOR AND
HEADER


000746

KEYS

4



②



C O P Y

CONFIDENTIAL

File No. 50048-1-40.

Extract from External Affairs' Letter No. 1201 of May 28, 1952, to Canada House, London

Sub. 77 Chron. 77 Filed.....

4. Of the eight safe files now awaiting shipment, two should be consigned to Ottawa to replace those diverted. Perhaps you would also enquire from Messrs. Chubb whether the one still outstanding on Public Works order E-69404 will be available for shipment at the same time.

5. The six remaining cabinets, as suggested in my letter D-489 of February 25, should be allocated as follows:

- 1 to the Canadian Embassy, Bonn, Germany
- 1 to the Canadian Embassy, The Hague, Netherlands
- 1 to the Canadian Embassy, Rome, Italy
- 1 to the Canadian Delegation, European Office of the United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland
- 1 to the Canadian Embassy, Paris, France
- 1 to the Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C.

I should be glad if you would inform me as soon as possible when Messrs. Chubb expect to ship these safes. files abroad.

Telegram No. 1703 of September 11, 1952, from External Affairs to Canada House, London

Reference: Your Telegram No. 1912 of September 8.

Subject: Chubb Safe Files.

Chubbs should now be instructed to proceed with arrangements for the shipment of the nine safe-files in accordance with the plan outlined to you in paragraphs 4 and 5 of my Letter D-1201 of May 28.

Ext. 181B

FILE COPY

OTTAWA FILE

No... 50048-AL-40

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

Letter No... *370*.....
D-

Date... December 27, 1951.....

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO:

J.C.G. BROWN, CANADIAN LEGATION, BERNE.

Reference..... Your letter No. 500 (Geneva series) of November 24th.

Subject:..... Procedure for reporting compromise of cypher material.

I should like to thank you for the suggestion made in paragraph 4 of letter under reference.

Detailed procedure for reporting suspected or known compromise of cypher material is being prepared and will shortly be circulated to posts abroad.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Geneva.

G.deT. Glazebrook

for the
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

Copies Referred
To.....
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No. of Enclosures
None
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Post File

No.....

Ext. 181B

FILE COPY

File

OTTAWA FILE
No. 50048-AL-40

Letter No. **D-** 435

Date. December 27, 1951:

58 50
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.

Reference. Letter No. 500 (Geneva series) of November 24th from Berne.

Subject: Procedure for reporting compromise of cypher material:..

I am enclosing, for your information,
a copy of our letter No. D-370 of December 27th
to Mr. J.C. G. Brown, Canadian Legation, Berne,
concerning the suggestion made in letter under
reference for reporting compromise of cypher
material.

G.de T. Glazebrook

for the Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

Copies Referred
To.....
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No. of Enclosures
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One

Post File
No.....

Ext. 195A

50048-AL-40
49 | 50

OTTAWA FILE

No.

Letter No. 527

Date... December 27, 1951

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

FROM: The Canadian Permanent Delegation, Geneva

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference... Your Letter No. D-418 of December 4

D-2

Subject:

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25 JAN 1952

Copies Referred

To

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No. of Enclosures

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Post File

No.

Under separate cover

I am returning to you seven padlocks,
as instructed in paragraph 5 of your
letter under reference.

for Secretary.

*padlocks
received
Jan 25/52
M.C.*

*file
M.C.*

D

000752

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
RECORDS-CLEARED

1952 JAN 25 PM 1:53

5022 EIT

No. of Enclosures

SECRETARY

To
Collier Referred

Letter under reference.

as instructed by paragraph 2 of your

1 am returning to you seven packages,

under separate cover

22 JAN 1952

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Subject:

Reference:

Your letter no. D-478 of December 7

TO: THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

FROM: The Canadian Permanent Delegation, Geneva

Date: December 27, 1951

Letter No.

488

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

No.

CLASSIFICATION

Ext. 104

50048-AL-40
49 50

OTTAWA FILE

No. 50048-AL-40 50048-40

Letter No. 523

Date... December 18, 1951

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

FROM: The Canadian Permanent Delegation, Geneva

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference... Your Letter No. D.418 of December 4, 1951

Subject: Security Regulations

D-2

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27 DEC 1951

Copies Referred

To.....
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No. of Enclosures

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Post File

No.....

I should like to make the following
comments in answer to your letter under reference:

Paragraph 2 - Certificates of destruction of
one-time pads which were technically compromised
were forwarded to you by Mr. Brown under cover
of Letter No. 500 of November 24;

Paragraph 3 - It is our normal practice during
office hours to leave the safe door slightly ajar,
for the reason that you have suggested. As
pointed out in paragraph 3 of our letter No.
497 of November 22, our failure to spin the dials
after the safe door had been closed on this
particular occasion was merely due to a misunder-
standing between myself and another member of
the staff. It is most unlikely that the same
mistake will be made again;

Paragraph 4 - As pointed out in our Letter No.
481 of November 13 (paragraph 6), members of the
Delegation staff have always been responsible for
ensuring "that...all doors and windows are locked
on leaving the office at lunch time and at night."
Thus we are already taking the precautions which
you have suggested.

Detailed floor-plans of Rooms Nos.
4 and 5 occupied by the Delegation should be
available in Ottawa (possibly in the Supplies and
Properties division or one of the other adminis-
trative divisions) since copies of these plans were
forwarded at the time the Delegation first took
up its quarters in the villa "La Pelouse". Locking
devices on doors and windows are of the type that
one would expect to find in a large European house
built almost exactly one hundred years ago. Keys
are fairly large and curiously though carefully
designed, each one having a slightly different cut.
It should be remembered that the glass doors leading
on to the terrace are covered each night by heavy
shutters which are firmly bolted from within.

Although we have given the matter
considerable thought, we are unable to make any
useful suggestions regarding possible measures for
making the office more secure. I might mention
here that the United Nations security service
arranges for night patrols to include the villa "La
Pelouse", and in addition day patrols on Sundays
and holidays;

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000754

000755

Paragraph 5 - Receipt is acknowledged of the six special Sargent and Greenleaf combination padlocks forwarded by you. The old padlocks and keys will be returned to you by sea bag in due course.


Ant. Secretary.

Defence
FILE COPY

OTTAWA FILE
50048-AL-40✓ 50048-40
No.
3 2 / 10
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Letter No. D. 418
Date December 4, 1951.

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA
TO: Canadian Permanent Delegation to the United Nations,
Geneva, Switzerland
Reference: Your letter No. 497 of November 22, 1951
Subject: Breach of Security Regulations

Thank you for your explanation of the situation. I am glad that you were able to inform us immediately this breach of security occurred because it made it possible for us to take the necessary action without permitting a long interval to elapse.

2. It was apparent from your letter No. 481 of November 13 that the location of your building and the general plan of your offices would make it fairly easy for intruders to gain entrance and therefore all material which was in your safe must be considered to have been technically compromised. Accordingly, it was necessary for us to despatch new cypher equipment to you with instructions that all one-time pads should be destroyed by fire. It is necessary, however, for you to retain the cyphering book and use pads Nos. 042 and 039 for communication with Ottawa, which were delivered to you by Mr. Brown. Our mission in London was instructed to destroy the three-way Geneva pads and you will be receiving by air courier new pads. I should be grateful, if it were possible, for you to send by air courier the proper certificates of destruction of your one-time pads.

3. It might be helpful to outline a few precautions which could be taken to prevent a further occurrence of this type. When you are using the large safe you should endeavour to keep the door slightly ajar when the safe is unlocked and, when it is necessary to close the safe, you should immediately turn both dials to scramble the combination. If this suggestion is difficult to comply with, you might adopt a system of placing a red card on the door of the safe showing that although the door is closed, the safe has not been locked.

4. I am wondering whether, in view of the fact that it is necessary for the United Nations' guard to have a key to the offices, it would be possible for you and the Canadian members of your mission, posted by Ottawa, to take the responsibility of ensuring that the doors and windows are locked when the offices are not being

- 2 -

used. This, of course, would not prevent the guard from opening any of the apertures and accidentally leaving them unlocked, but it might possibly be an added precaution which could be taken. It would be helpful if you could submit a sketch of your offices, indicating the locking devices presently being used on all doors and windows. In addition, you might give me any suggestions you may have regarding possible measures which could be instituted to make the offices more secure.

5. I am sending you by air courier six special Sargent and Greenleaf combination padlocks. Each lock is set on 10 - 20 - 30. Instructions for operating the lock and changing the combinations are enclosed. The old padlocks and keys can be returned to the Department by ordinary mail provided they are placed in a sealed package.

CLAY GLAZEBROOK

For the

Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Ext. 22A

50048-AL-40
49 | 50

OTTAWA FILE

No.

Letter No. (Geneva Series) 500

Date... 24th November, 1951,...

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

S E C R E T

FROM: J.C.G. BROWN, Canadian Legation, Berne.

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference..... My telegram No. 138 of Nov. 24/51 from Geneva.....

Subject:..... Security incident at Permanent Delegation, Geneva.....

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4 DEC 1951

Your telegram No. 16 of November 22, 1951 was received in Berne on the next day. I was unfortunately absent in Basle on duty and was not able to go to Geneva until early the following morning, November 24, 1951. On my arrival at the Permanent Delegation office, I was furnished with an explanation of the incident by Mr. McIlwraith and Mr. Bryson. As stated in my telegram under reference, I am satisfied that this explanation, which is contained in Geneva Letter No. 497 of November 22, is complete.

2. In accordance with your instructions, all one-time pads at Geneva were destroyed by fire. A certificate of destruction listing the pads disposed of is attached. "In" pad number 042 and "Out" pad number 039 were brought from Berne and placed in service at Geneva.

on
FILE
11/6/51

3. In our conversation, Mr. McIlwraith raised the question of the correct procedure for reporting possible or actual compromise of cypher material. He said that, since he had not been able to find specific instructions on file concerning this point, he had some difficulty in deciding whether he should notify Ottawa about the breach of security by cypher telegram, code telegram or secret letter. In fact, he decided that the Department should be informed with least possible delay and that since the message could not be classified below SECRET, it should be sent in cypher. He assumed that the Department would automatically appreciate that there was at least some degree of risk that one-time pads held by the Geneva office had been compromised and that instructions would be sent regarding destruction and replacement of the pads. In his warning telegram he purposely avoided any reference to cypher material and placed emphasis only on the replacement of padlocks and keys. His chief concern was to warn the Department as soon as possible not to send any cypher messages to Geneva, being in a position himself to insure that no cypher messages would be dispatched from Geneva until new one-time pads had been received.

Copies Referred

To.....
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No. of Enclosures

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Post File

No.....


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000759

- 2 -

4. In discussing the method of notifying the Department in cases of this kind, we thought that it might be preferable to have a single code word which could be telegraphed to Ottawa and which would give the Department all the information necessary to show that the security of cypher material had been endangered. Possibly this method of notification has already been considered in Ottawa and abandoned for some technical reason. However, I should like to suggest that the codeword method be reconsidered in view of Mr. McIlwraith's uncertainty about sending a messageⁱⁿ cypher as opposed to the alternative method of sending a "secret" message in code.

5. No one regrets this lapse in security more than Mr. McIlwraith but I am sure that you appreciate his commendable action in drawing the matter to your attention without delay.


J.C.G. Brown.

EXT. 230

ORIGINAL

MESSAGE FORM
INCOMING

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File No.		
50048-AL-40		
49	50	

Security Classification
SECRET

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND.
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

24 NOV 1951

System CYPHER-OTP	No. 138	Date: November 24, 1951.
Priority	<u>Reference:</u> Your telegram No. 16 of 22nd November to Berne.	
Departmental Circulation	<u>Subject:</u>	
MINISTER UNDR/SEC D/UNDR/SEC A/UNDR/SEC'S.	Following from Brown, Begins: I have carried out your instructions and am satisfied that Geneva letter No. 497 of 22nd November forwarded air bag No. 49 the 22nd November, fully explains the incident. Ends.	
Done	-----	
Date		
References		

file are

EX-100-1182
COMMUNICATIONS
CLEVER

33

000761

CLEARED
COMMUNICATIONS
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1951 NOV 24 AM 10:33

Y BULK SEC
D BULK SEC
BULK SEC
MINISTER
SECRETARY
TREASURY

RECEIVED
NOVEMBER 24 1951
DEPT. OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA

RECEIVED
NOVEMBER 24 1951
DEPT. OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
NOV 24 1951

TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
GENERAL SECRETARY
HOW THE CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION CAN BE HELD RESPONSIBLE

INCOMING
MESSAGE 103W

SECTION
NOV 24 1951
103W
103W
103W

ORIGINAL

Ext. 1924

50048-AL-46
49 | 50

OTTAWA FILE

No.....

Letter No. 481.....

Date..... November 13, 1951.....

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: The Canadian Permanent Delegation, Geneva

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.... Circular Document No. A 74/51 of October 19, 1951.....

Subject:..... Weekly Security Report.....

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19 NOV 1951

I am forwarding under cover of this letter the first Weekly Security Report for this post, in accordance with the instructions contained in your circular document under reference. Owing to the fact that the Permanent Delegation office is located in a building which is the property of the United Nations, the following points should be taken into account when our security reports are examined by the Department in Ottawa.

2. There are nine Permanent Delegations, including our own, housed in the villa "La Pelouse" (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden and Turkey). The Canadian Delegation office, consisting of two rooms, is situated on the ground floor, with one of its entrance doors immediately opposite the main entrance door to the building and the other door opening on to a short corridor leading off the main entrance hall. Both rooms also have French windows which open on to the terrace at the back of the building. These windows are all equipped with full-length wooden shutters which are secured from the inside.

3. A United Nations guard is on duty in the main entrance hall of the building from 7.30 A.M. to 8 P.M. each day of the week, except Sunday. This guard is responsible for maintaining the general security of the building as a whole. This includes locking and shuttering all windows and outside doors on leaving at night and checking the identity of all persons, not already known to him, who enter the building during the day.

4. The United Nations guard holds the keys to all office doors in the building, including those of the Canadian Delegation office. Duplicates of these keys are also held by the Canadian Delegation staff. The guard opens all offices to let in the char staff in the early morning and he is responsible for general supervision during the cleaning work.

5. The locks on the office doors are not of the self-locking type and in view of the fact that the United Nations guard on duty must have keys to these doors in order to let in the cleaning staff in the morning and to close the shutters at night, there would be no point in having special locks fitted with keys held only by the Delegation staff.

Copies Referred To.....

No. of Enclosures
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Post File
No.....

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There were keys held only by the reception staff. These keys were used to open the reception room, the waiting room and the office. The keys were held by the reception staff in order to be able to open the reception room, the waiting room and the office. The keys were held by the reception staff in order to be able to open the reception room, the waiting room and the office.

The keys were held by the reception staff in order to be able to open the reception room, the waiting room and the office. The keys were held by the reception staff in order to be able to open the reception room, the waiting room and the office.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
RECORDS-CLEARED

The keys were held by the reception staff in order to be able to open the reception room, the waiting room and the office. The keys were held by the reception staff in order to be able to open the reception room, the waiting room and the office.

1951 NOV 19 AM 11:17

The keys were held by the reception staff in order to be able to open the reception room, the waiting room and the office. The keys were held by the reception staff in order to be able to open the reception room, the waiting room and the office.

The keys were held by the reception staff in order to be able to open the reception room, the waiting room and the office. The keys were held by the reception staff in order to be able to open the reception room, the waiting room and the office.

Subject: Weekly Security Report
Reference: Official document No. 1 of October 10, 1951

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA
FROM: The Canadian Permanent Representation, Geneva

Date: October 13, 1951

Letter No. 181

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

OLIVIER BIDE

6. Under present arrangements, the Delegation staff are responsible for ensuring that the safe and filing cabinets and all doors and windows are locked on leaving the office at lunch time and at night. However, as explained above, this does not prevent the United Nations guard from entering the office after the staff have left in order to make his own check on windows and shutters.


7. All classified material is kept either in the safe or in the filing cabinets located in one of the two rooms occupied by the Delegation. The safe and the filing cabinets are left unlocked during office hours since there is always at least one member of the Canadian staff on duty in that room. Keys to filing cabinet padlocks are kept permanently in the safe and are only removed for the length of time required to undo the padlocks when the office is opened at 9 A.M. and 2.30 P.M.

8. When cypher material is in use, both doors of the room housing the safe and filing cabinets are locked from the inside to ensure against unexpected entry of any unauthorized person. The doors are unlocked again when all cypher material has been replaced in the safe.

9. It will be noted from the foregoing that it is particularly important for the staff of this office to ensure that no classified material of any kind is left on desks or in drawers or in any other part of the office in view of the fact that the United Nations guard and the char staff have access to the rooms when no member of the staff is present.

10. Should you wish to make any comments on the various points which I have mentioned above, I would be very glad to hear from you in due course.

(for)



Secretary.

Ext. 34

50048-AL-46

49

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OTTAWA FILE

No.

Letter No. 497

Date. 22 November 1951

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FROM: CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION, Geneva.

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.....Our Telegram No. 136 of November 21, 1951,.....

Subject:.....Breach of Security regulations.....

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27 NOV 1951

Copies Referred

To.....
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No. of Enclosures

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Post File

No.....

Yesterday Morning it was reported to me by a member of the staff that she had found the door of the Taylor safe in this office closed, but not locked, when she went to open it at 9 a.m. I should like to give the following explanation of how this breach of security occurred.

2. On the preceding evening when Miss Boisvert and I were preparing to close the office for the night, Miss Boisvert asked me to assist her in closing the door of the safe since she had difficulty in manipulating the two handles on the door. I should say that I had demonstrated on a previous occasion to Miss Boisvert how to close the door and how to lock it by spinning the dials after the door was closed.

3. On this occasion I again showed her how to operate the handles on the door but did not myself spin the dials, assuming that she would do this. However, she in turn assumed that I had locked the door and she did not, therefore, spin the dials herself. In view of the circumstances, I accept full responsibility for the breach of security which resulted from this misunderstanding and I do not consider that Miss Boisvert is in any way to blame.

4. Although the safe door remained unlocked from 7 p.m. to 9 a.m. the next morning, I consider it most unlikely that the safe was entered during that period or that any of our cypher material has been compromised. However, in order that we may regain maximum security for our filing cabinets (the keys always being kept in the safe), I decided to send you a telegram immediately asking you to send a new set of padlocks and keys as soon as possible. Should you consider it necessary for us to destroy existing One Time Pads held by this office, I would be grateful for your instructions.

5. I very much regret my failure to carry out fully security regulations on this occasion;

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000766

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1951 NOV 27 AM 9:13

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
RECORDS SECTION

one fully security regulations on this occasion:
I will now relate my first experience

experience.
This office, I would be pleased to tell you, has to deal with extending one time security regulations. Should you consider it necessary to send a new set of regulations and keys to the new set of regulations immediately taking them to the keys always being kept in the safe. I decided to keep maximum security for our future security personnel. However, in order that we may not believe of that and of our cybernetic system to most likely that the safe was entered during from 3 p.m. to 8 a.m. the next morning, I consider that probably the safe door remained unlocked

and to prove.
and I do not consider that Miss Botsford is in any security which resulted from this misunderstanding. I accept full responsibility for the presence of the keys herself. In view of the circumstances, locked the door and she did not, therefore, admit to this. However, she in turn assumed that I had myself admit the keys, assuming that she would be outside the handles on the door and did not.

On this occasion I again showed her how the keys after the door was closed.
close the door and how to lock it by admitting on a previous occasion to Miss Botsford how to on the door. I should say that I had demonstrated her difficulty in manipulating the two handles not in closing the door of the safe since she for the night, Miss Botsford asked me to assist Botsford and I were preparing to close the office on the preceding evening when Miss

of how this process of security occurred.
I should like to give the following explanation that not locked, when she went to open it at 8 a.m. door of the Taylor safe in this office closed, by a member of the staff that she had found the yesterday morning it was reported to me

Subject: Breach of security regulations
Reference: C.M. Telegram No. 130 of November 27, 1951

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA
FROM: CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION, Geneva.

Date: 25 November 1951
Letter No.


CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

No.
ORIGINAL FILE

- 2 -

~~but~~ the occurrence has at least served to emphasize very forcibly, not only to myself but to all other members of the staff, the importance of double checking on the normal security precautions taken in this office.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "L. M. Hurath". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

(for) Secretary.

EXT. 97.

MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

FILE REF.	58	50
50048-AL-40		

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET <i>classified</i>


FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA, UNITED NATIONS, GENEVA.

Message To Be Sent		No. <u>172</u>	Date November 22, 1951	For Communications Office Use Only
EN CLAIR	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SENT - NOV 22 1951		
CODE				
CYPHER				
Degree of Priority		Reference: Your telegram No. 136 of November 21, 1951		
IMMEDIATE <i>mf.</i>		Subject: Taylor Case		
ORIGINATOR		<p style="text-align: center;">ANYWHERE</p> <p>Do not send any classified telegrams by usual means until further notice.</p>		
Sig. R.P. Cameron				
Typed: mrea				
Div. Defence Liaison (2)				
Local Tel. 7809				
APPROVED BY		Ends		
Sig. <i>(mf.)</i>		EXTERNAL		
Typed:				
Is This Message Likely To Be Published				
Yes () No (<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>)				
Internal Distribution:				
U.S.S.E.A. <i>mf.</i>				
Done <i>mf.</i>				
Date <i>Nov 22/51</i>				
Copies Referred To:				
Done				
Date				

1821 NOV 25 11:02

EXCLUDED FROM
COMMUNICATIONS
RECEIVED



EXT. 97

FILE REF.	152
152	

MESSAGE FORM
OUTGOING

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE TREATMENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA, UNITED NATIONS, GENEVA.

Message To Be Sent		No. 152	Date November 22, 1951	For Communications Office Use Only
EN CLAIR		X	NOV 23 1951	
CODE				
CYRILLIC		Degree of Priority		
IMMEDIATE		Your reference No. 136 of November 21, 1951		
ORIGINATOR		Subject: Internal Affairs		
Sig. R.P. Cameron		Do not send any classified telegrams by usual means		
Typed: Mrs.		until further notice.		
Div. Reference Liaison (2)		Inds		
Local Tel. 7809		EXTERNAL		
APPROVED BY		152		
Sig. (152)		152		
Typed: Mrs.		152		
Is This Message Likely To Be Published		152		
Yes () No (X)		152		
Internal Distribution:		152		
U.S.S.F.A.		152		
Done: Mr.		152		
Date: Nov 23/51		152		
Copies Retained To:		152		
Done:		152		
Date:		152		

1951 NOV 22 AM 11:45

RECEIVED
COMMUNICATIONS
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

000770

EXT. 97.

MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

FILE REF.	58	50
50048-AL-40		

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION, BERNE, SWITZERLAND.

<p>Message To Be Sent</p> <p>EN CLAIR</p> <p>CODE</p> <p>CYPHER <i>OTF</i> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/></p> <p>Degree of Priority</p> <p>IMPORTANT <i>YR</i></p> <p>ORIGINATOR</p> <p>Sig. _____</p> <p>Typed <i>G.deT. Glazebrook/hmp</i></p> <p>Div. <i>Def. Liaison 2</i></p> <p>Local Tel. <i>7051</i></p> <p>APPROVED BY <i>YR</i></p> <p>Sig. _____</p> <p>Typed <i>G.deT. Glazebrook.</i></p> <p>Is This Message Likely To Be Published</p> <p>Yes () No (X)</p> <p>Internal Distribution:</p> <p>U.S.S.E.A. <i>✓</i></p> <p>Done <i>mh</i></p> <p>Date <i>Nov 23/51</i></p> <p>Copies Referred To:</p> <p>Done _____</p> <p>Date _____</p> <p>50-P-427-100M</p>	<p>No. <i>16</i></p> <p>Date November 22, 1951.</p> <p>For Communications Office Use Only</p> <p>SENT -- NOV 22 1951</p> <p>Canadian delegation, Geneva, have informed us that Taylor safe in their office was left unlocked night of November 20-21. This creates a technical compromise of all cypher material held there. We have instructed Geneva by code telegram to cease telegraphing classified material, since we cannot use the compromised pads held in Geneva. We must ask you to send J.C. Brown to Geneva as quickly as possible. He should report our instructions as follows:</p> <p>We appreciate quick information on the incident. All cypher material held is technically compromised. All one-time pads should be destroyed by fire. The basic cyphering book will be retained. Brown should take with him in pad No. 042 and out pad No. 039. These could then be used for communication with Ottawa. We have instructed London to destroy 3-way Geneva pads and new pads will be sent to Geneva and London by bag. Certificates of destruction should be sent by bag.</p> <p>2. We hope this will not unduly inconvenience you, but you will appreciate the necessity for quick and effective action.</p>
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000771

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

20-B-432-100M

Date
Done

necessity for direct and effective action.
convenience you, but you will appreciate the
S. We hope this will not unduly in-
should be sent by air.
and London by air. Certificates of destruction
bags and new bags will be sent to Geneva
instructions for you to destroy 3-way Geneva
for communication with Ottawa. We have
bag 030. These could then be used
should take with you in bag no. 045 and our
cybernetic book will be retained. Brown
should be destroyed by fire. The state
technically compromised. All one-time bags
incident. All cybernetic material held to
We appreciate direct information on the
report our instructions as follows:

RECEIVED
COMMUNICATIONS
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
1951 NOV 22 PM 3:36

Copies Referred To:
Date
Done

U.S.S.E.V.

Internal Distribution:

Yes () No (X)
Likely to be Published
in This Message

Typed
Sigs
APPROVED BY

Local Tel

DIA
Del. Liaison S
brook/mb
Typed
G. Del. Liaison
Sigs

ORIGINALS

IMPORTANT

Office of Primary
CABINET
CODE
EN CIVIL
Message to be sent

Brown to Geneva as directly as possible. He should
bags held in Geneva. We must ask you to send T.C.
material; since we cannot use the compromised
by code telegram to cease telegraphing classified
material held there. We have instructed Geneva
creates a technical compromise of all cybernetic
left unlocked night of November 50-51. This
informed us that Taylor said in their office was
Canadian delegation, Geneva, have

no 10 November 55, 1951
Date
RECEIVED NOV 23 1951
For Communications Office Use Only

TO: CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION, BERNE, SWITZERLAND.
FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

SECRET
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

OUTGOING
MESSAGE FORM

DATE REC
EXL 83

EXT. 97.

MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

FILE REF.	58	40
50048-AL-70		

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA IN GREAT BRITAIN, LONDON.

Message To Be Sent		No. 2096	Date	For Communications Office Use Only	
EN CLAIR			November 22, 1951.	SENT - NOV 22 1951	
CODE					
CYPHER AUTO X					
Degree of Priority		Canadian Permanent Delegation,			
IMPORTANT. <i>WR</i>		Geneva, has informed us that safe in their office			
ORIGINATOR		was not, repeat not, locked through the night of			
Sig.		November 20-21. We have instructed them to cease			
Typed: G.deT.Glaze-		telegraphing classified material and are arranging			
brook/hmp.		for Berne to send an officer to Geneva with full			
Div. Def.Liaison 2		instructions and one-time pads. Please destroy			
Local Tel. 7051		your 3-way pads Geneva and your 50-way in pad.			
APPROVED BY		2. HAVE AN OFFICER			
Sig. <i>WR</i>		Please inform Commonwealth Relations			
Typed: G.deT.Glaze-		Office personally and immediately that because the			
brook		safe containing basic cypher and decypher was left un-			
Is This Message		locked we regard this and other material in the safe			
Likely To Be Published		as technically compromised, although the general			
Yes () No (X)		circumstances make actual compromise unlikely. You			
Internal Distribution:		should express our regret for any inconvenience that			
U.S.S.E.A. <i>✓</i>		may be caused. We can now only inform them of this			
ne <i>WR</i>		quickly.			
20023/57		3. 3-way pads will be replaced in			
Copies Referred To:		Geneva and London as soon as circumstances allow.			
Done		Ends.			
		SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.			

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

RECEIVED
COMMUNICATIONS
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1951 NOV 22 PM 3:37

London as soon as circumstances allow.
3-may bags will be replaced in

should express our regret for any inconvenience that
circumstances make some compromise necessary. You
as technically compromised. Although the General
looked me regard this and other material in the safe
safe containing basic cyber and decoder was left un-
office personally and immediately first because the
Please inform Commonwealth Relations
have an officer
Long 3-may bags General and Long 20-may to bag.

Instructions and one-time bags. Please destroy
for being to send an officer to General with full
celebrating classified material and are attempting
November 50-51. We have instructed them to cease
was not repeat not, looked through the light of
General, has informed us that safe in their office
Canadian Permanent Delegation.

ORIGINATOR

IMPOUNDING

Degree of Priority

CABLE CODE
EN CIVIL
Message to be sent

November 55, 1951

NOV 28 1951
For Communications Office Use Only

TO: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA IN GREAT BRITAIN, LONDON.
FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

SECRET

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

OUTGOING
MESSAGE FORM

DATE REC

EXT. 230

ORIGINAL

MESSAGE FORM
INCOMING


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21 NOV 1951

File No.		
58048-AL-40		
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Security Classification		
SECRET		

FROM: THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA, UNITED NATIONS,
GENEVA
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

System CYPHER - O.T.P.	No. 136	Date: November 21, 1951.
Priority IMPORTANT	<u>Reference:</u>	
Departmental Circulation	<u>Subject:</u> Taylor safe.	
MINISTER UNDR/SEC D/UNDR/SEC A/UNDR/SEC'S	<p>Regret to report that Taylor safe in this office was not (repeat not) locked though door was left closed during the night of 20th-21st November. Since keys to filing cabinet padlocks are kept in safe request send six new standard padlocks (including one with quarter-inch hasp) and keys immediately so that maximum security may be regained as soon as possible.</p> <p>2. No evidence that safe opened during the night and consider this eventuality most unlikely. Combination has been changed today.</p> <p>3. Full report follows by letter.</p> <p>-----</p> <p><i>file RMC</i></p>	
Done _____		
Date _____		
References		
Done _____		
Date _____		



CIRCULAR DOCUMENT

Ottawa, November 7, 1950.


NO. B. 121

Security Arrangements.

In order to improve the facilities for the safe custody of classified documents at your post, I should be grateful if you would have all cabinets used for this purpose fitted with hasps and iron bars. The hasps should be so fitted that the bar passes through the handles of the drawers and should be either rivetted to the frame or made fast with a bolt and locking washer. You should disconnect the push-button locking device with which the cabinet may be equipped and rely for protection solely on the bar and padlock. The push-button lock has little value and can only give a false sense of security.

In ordering additional cabinets in future I should be grateful if you would specify the use to which they are to be put. If a secure depository is required we shall supply you with steel cabinets equipped with bar and padlock; otherwise we shall send you cabinets without a locking device of any kind. If satisfactory steel cabinets can be purchased more conveniently locally, they must be fitted with bar and padlock before being used for classified material. The work on the cabinets may be done locally and posts in the United Kingdom and the United States may also purchase the padlocks locally, provided that they are as good as the Yale padlock supplied by the Department; all other posts will be supplied with padlocks from Ottawa.

I would draw your attention to the precautions to be observed in handling the keys for padlocks. A careful record of the persons to whom keys are issued should be kept. No person locally employed should be given a key. The keys should be kept in the safe when not in use and should not be taken out of the building. Should a key be lost, the padlock together with the remaining keys should be returned by bag to the Department, and such loss should be notified to the Department so that a new lock may be despatched without delay. A spare padlock should be kept in reserve so that a padlock compromised by the loss of a key can be replaced at once. In no circumstances should any keys be cut locally.


Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

To the Heads of

Canadian Posts Abroad.

File 50048-AL-40

SECRET

November 1, 1951.

GENEVA

Feb. 7, 1949 - Telegram No. 17 advises receipt of safe bearing handle 099936

Letter No. 17 of Feb. 12, 1949 from Geneva reads "We have in the office one filing cabinet which is secured with a padlock."

Desp. 235 of Nov. 30, 1950 reads "Two four-drawer filing cabinets and one two-drawer filing cabinet are being fitted with metal bars and hasps."

Our letter D.10 of Jan. 8, 1951 reports sending four padlocks and four sets of duplicate keys.

Letter F. 161 of April 26, 1951 to Geneva authorizes purchase of a one-drawer cabinet.

Letter D. 168 of April 27, 1951 advises Geneva that Miss MacCallum is taking with her one padlock and keys for the one-drawer cabinet (above mentioned).

Letter D. 259 of June 28, 1951 advises Geneva that we are sending one Yale padlock No. 774 with duplicate keys as a reserve.

X Letter D. 325 of Aug. 29, 1951 to Geneva authorizes purchase of a four-drawer steel filing cabinet, but our

Letter No. 377 of Sept. 10, 1951 from Geneva advises that this cabinet was not purchased. A requisition was enclosed for a new filing cabinet. A note at bottom of this despatch states that an order for a cabinet with bar and hasp will be placed by S. & P. (initialled J.R.M. Sept. 20, 1951).

X Letter D. 325 also advises Geneva that one padlock with four keys are enclosed (for use on the cabinet authorized but not purchased)

000777

les - 50048-40
50048-AL-40

CONFIDENTIAL

October 1, 1951

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

50048-AL-40	
Sub. 58	Chron. Filed.

The attention of all members of the delegation is drawn to the regulations for the handling and transmission of classified material as set out in the Government booklet on security prepared by the Security Panel for use by departments and agencies of the Canadian Government. Classified material includes any written, typewritten or printed material - such as documents, stenographers' note books, carbon papers, notes, drafts, and spoiled copies - which contains classified information.

Classified material used by the delegation should be sent by diplomatic bag, by cypher telegram, or in the custody of designated courier. In no circumstances should it be handled, sealed or unsealed, by any person other than a member of the delegation or member of the government service posted by Ottawa, nor should any other person have access to such material. In this regard, a distinction should be made between drivers serving as chauffeurs and as messengers. Non-Canadian drivers may serve as chauffeurs for the delegation but they should not be used for the carriage of classified material, unless in the capacity of chauffeur driving a Canadian authorized to handle such material and who retains it in his custody.

When not in use, particularly during the lunch hour and at night, classified material should be kept secure in the repositories provided in the hotel or in the office of the Canadian Embassy. While delegates may wish to work in their bedrooms, every effort should be made to ensure that classified material is not left unattended there.

With the exception of the entrance hall and rooms No's. 3, 6, 14, 15 and 16, the floor on which the offices are situated is a restricted area from which all persons other than members of the delegation or members of the government service posted by Ottawa are to be excluded. All entrances other than the main entrance to this area have been closed off, and entry will be controlled by a twenty-four hour guard consisting of F. Stevenson, C.R. Doughty, A.R. Minter and a fourth member to be named shortly. Supervision of the guards will be performed by Sgt. Vaucher of the Embassy who will report to the Secretary General of the Delegation.

Arrangements have been made for the destruction of classified waste by fire.

In case of doubt it is suggested that Mr. A.R. Grepault be consulted.

000778

CONFIDENTIAL

50048-AL-40	
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October 1, 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES SECTION

Attached for inclusion in the Handbook of Administrative Memoranda for the Canadian Delegation to the 6th session of the United Nations General Assembly, is a note on the security arrangements.

G. de T. GLAZEBROOK

Defence Liaison(2)

Defence Liaison(2) V.C. Moore:drc

File 50048-AL-40

~~50048-AL-40~~

Sub: Chron... Filed... FILE COPY ONLY

Copy to International Conferences

CONFIDENTIAL

September 12, 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR UNITED NATIONS DIVISION

Attached for inclusion in the commentary for the Canadian delegation to the 6th session of the United Nations General Assembly is a note on the security arrangements.

I should be grateful if it could be arranged for Mr. Grepault, Secretary General, to consult with this Division and pick up a copy of the Government booklet referred to in paragraph 1 of the attached note before he leaves for Paris.

Defence Liaison(2)

Files - 50048-40
50048-AL-40

CONFIDENTIAL

September 12, 1951

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

The attention of all members of the delegation is drawn to the regulations for the handling and transmission of classified material as set out in the Government booklet on security prepared by the Security Panel for use by departments and agencies of the Canadian Government. Classified material includes any written, typewritten or printed material—such as documents, stenographers' note books, carbon papers, notes, drafts and spoiled copies— which contains classified information.

Classified material used by the delegation should be sent by diplomatic bag, by cypher telegram, or in the custody of designated courier. In no circumstance should it be handled, sealed or unsealed, by any person other than a member of the delegation or member of the government service posted by Ottawa, nor should any other person have access to such material. In this regard, a distinction should be made between drivers serving as chauffeurs and as messengers. Non-Canadian drivers may serve as chauffeurs for the delegation but they should not be used for the carriage of classified material, unless in the capacity of a chauffeur driving a Canadian authorized to handle such material and who retains it in his custody.

When not in use, particularly during the lunch hour and at night, classified material should be kept secure in the repositories provided in the hotel or in the office of the Canadian representative. While delegates may wish to work in their bedrooms, every effort should be made to ensure that classified material is not left unattended there.

With the exception of the entrance hall and rooms No's 3, 6, 14, 15 and 16, the floor on which the offices are situated is a restricted area from which all

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- 2 -

persons other than members of the delegation or members of the Government service posted by Ottawa are to be excluded. All entrances other than the main entrance to this area have been closed off, and entry will be controlled by a twenty-four hour guard. *insert*

Arrangements have been made for the destruction of classified waste by fire.

In case of doubt it is suggested that Mr. A. R. Crepault be consulted.

Ext. 1024

50048-AL-40
49 | 50

OTTAWA FILE

No.

Letter No. 377

Date... 10th September, 1951...

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

FROM: THE CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION, Geneva

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.... Your letter No. D-325 of August 29, 1951,

D-2 Subject:..... Filing cabinet for GATT Delegation.

In accordance with your instructions we are making available one four-drawer filing cabinet for use by our delegation to GATT. The cabinet concerned will be one that we already hold on loan from the United Nations (as part of the office furnishings). Although we normally use this cabinet for unclassified material only, it is, in fact, fitted with a locking device similar to those now universally used by the Department at home and abroad, (i.e. a bar - in this case hinged to the cabinet itself - secured with a departmental padlock). Since locally made filing cabinets are of a different size and pattern to those used by the Department, I think it would be preferable to have another cabinet sent from Ottawa and in the meantime to use the United Nations cabinet for the GATT delegation. The majority of our cabinets would then be of the same pattern and be equipped with identical locking devices.

2. I am therefore attaching a requisition for a new filing cabinet in the hope that the arrangement I have proposed will be satisfactory from your point of view.

T.M. Brhi

Secretary.

Regn removed by S.P. JRM.

An order for a cabinet with bar and key will be placed by S.P. JRM Sept 20/51

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17 SEP 1951

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No... 1-6-Q.....

Ext. 181B

FILE COPY

Letter No... D- 325

Date..... August 29, 1951

Sub. 50048-AL-4 Chron. 4 Filed

OTTAWA FILE

50048-AL-40 and
No. 9100-AC-40

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: The Canadian Permanent Delegation, Geneva,

Reference..... Your telegram No. 74 of August 28, 1951

Subject:..... Security at the GATT Delegation meeting

From your telegram under reference it seems obvious that the Delegation will require locked accommodation for their classified material both in their offices and in the hotel. You are accordingly authorized to purchase a four drawer steel filing cabinet, which should be fitted in accordance with the terms of our Circular Document No. B121 of November 7, 1950. Please quote authority EA 7323-A. I trust that such a cabinet, or one of roughly similar size, will be available to you in Geneva and that it will be ready for the opening of the GATT conference on September 17.

I enclose one padlock with four keys, No. 4A575, for this cabinet.

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Copies Referred

To.....

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CONFIDENTIAL

August 29, 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR ECONOMIC DIVISION

50048-AL-40
Sub 32 Chron... <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Filled...

I attach a note on security

drafted for enclosure in the commentary for the delegation to the forthcoming meeting at Geneva, concerning the General Agreement Tariff and Trade. I also attach a copy, No. 504, of the Security Panel booklet for your information.

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AUG 31 1951

Refer Mr. G. W. Schlegel
Gen. Secy
Geneva.

Defence Liaison (2)

Blanca
7-9/51
CLM

Files 50048-40
50048-AL-40

CONFIDENTIAL

C
O
P
Y

July 24, 1951

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

The attention of all members of the delegation is drawn to the regulations for the handling and transmission of classified material as set out in the government booklet on security prepared by the Security Panel for use by departments and agencies of the Canadian Government. Classified material includes any written, typewritten or printed material — such as documents, stenographers' note books, carbon papers, notes, drafts and spoiled copies — which contains classified information.

Classified material used by the delegation should be sent by diplomatic bag, by cypher telegram, or in the custody of designated courier. In no circumstance should it be handled, sealed or unsealed, by any person other than a member of the delegation or member of the government service posted by Ottawa, nor should any other person have access to such material. In this regard, a distinction should be made between drivers serving as chauffeurs and as messengers. Non-Canadian drivers may serve as chauffeurs for the delegation but they should not be used for the carriage of classified material, unless in the capacity of a chauffeur driving a Canadian authorized to handle such material and who retains it in his custody.

When not in use, particularly during the lunch hour and at night, classified material should be kept secure in the repositories provided in the hotel or in the office of the Canadian representative. While delegates may wish to work in their bedrooms, every effort should be made to ensure that classified material is not left unattended there.

Arrangements should be made for the destruction of classified waste by fire in co-operation with the Canadian Permanent Delegation to the European Office of the United Nations, Geneva.

In case of doubt, it is suggested that Mr. Goldschlag be consulted.

Ext. 181B

FILE COPY

OTTAWA FILE
50048-AL-40 and
No. 9100-AG-40

Letter No...D... 319

Date... August 28, 1951

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTED

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: The Canadian Permanent Delegation, Geneva,

Reference..... Our Telegram No... 83. of August 27, 1951

Subject:..... Security problems relating to GATT delegation

As you will have gathered from our telegram under reference, the number of cabinets required to meet the needs of this Delegation will depend on whether they are obliged to use one of their hotel rooms as an office in addition to the quarters provided for them in the Palais des Nation. I am not sure whether authority will be required so that you can purchase additional filing cabinets to meet this need. However, suitable locked steel filing cabinets must be provided for this Delegation and I believe they will require at the very least one four-drawer filing cabinet.

2. It will also be necessary for you to make arrangements for any classified waste which the Delegation may have.

T.L. Carter

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

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
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50048-AL-40 ✓

CONFIDENTIAL

July 24, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS MEAGHER



As you requested, the attached note on security has been drafted for inclusion in the commentary for the delegation to the forthcoming session of ECOSOC in Geneva.

Arrangements are being made to provide you with a letter designating you as a courier and with two brief cases for the carriage of classified material.

*Copy No. 35-3
of Booklet on Security
attached.
mem.*

T. L. M. Carter
Defence Liaison (2)

Files - 50048-40
50048-AL-40

CONFIDENTIAL

July 24, 1951.

*Copy referred to
29/8/51
P.C.*

SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

The attention of all members of the delegation is drawn to the regulations for the handling and transmission of classified material as set out in the government booklet on security prepared by the Security Panel for use by departments and agencies of the Canadian Government. Classified material includes any written, typewritten or printed material -- such as documents, stenographers' note books, carbon papers, notes, drafts and spoiled copies -- which contains classified information.

Classified material used by the delegation should be sent by diplomatic bag, by cypher telegram, or in the custody of designated courier. In no circumstance should it be handled, sealed or unsealed, by any person other than a member of the delegation or member of the government service posted by Ottawa, nor should any other person have access to such material. In this regard, a distinction should be made between drivers serving as chauffeurs and as messengers. Non-Canadian drivers may serve as chauffeurs for the delegation but they should not be used for the carriage of classified material, unless in the capacity of a chauffeur driving a Canadian authorized to handle such material and who retains it in his custody.

When not in use, particularly during the lunch hour and at night, classified material should be kept secure in the repositories provided in the hotel or in the office of the Canadian representative. While delegates may wish to work in their bedrooms, every effort should be made to ensure that classified material is not left unattended there.

Arrangements have been made for the destruction of classified waste by fire.

In case of doubt, it is suggested that Miss B. Meagher be consulted.

FILE COPY

OTTAWA FILE
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTED

Letter No... D. 259

Date..... June 28, 1951

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA
TO: The Canadian Permanent Delegation, Geneva.
Reference..... Your letter No. 211 of May 11, 1951

Subject:..... Spare Padlocks

I am sending by sea bag one Yale padlock No. 774 with key in duplicate (No. 8D277) to be held in reserve as an additional replacement.

G. de T. GLAZEBROOK

for Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

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Post File
No. 4-3-0

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File
V.C. MOORE

OTTAWA FILE

~~10164-6-40~~
No. 50048-AL-40 50048-40

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTED

Letter No. 211

Date..... May. 11th, 1951

FROM: The Canadian Permanent Delegation, Geneva

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference..... Your letter No. D.168 of April 27th, 1951.

Subject..... Our requisition No. 5 - Filing Cabinet.

D-2

21 MAY 1951

Copies Referred

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No. of Enclosures

None

Post File

No. 4-3-0


I assume that the padlock delivered to us by Miss MacCallum is to be retained by this office permanently for use with the new single drawer cabinet. If my assumption is correct, it will not be necessary for you to send us an extra padlock to be held in reserve since we already hold one for this purpose.

M. J. Jones
Secretary.

D

Ext. 181B

FILE COPY



OTTAWA FILE
10104-C-10
No. 50048-AL-40V. 50048-40.

Letter No. 168

Date. April 27, 1951.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTED

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: Canadian Permanent Delegation, Geneva.

Reference.... My letter F. 161 of April 26, 1951.

Subject: Your requisition No. 5. - Filing Cabinet.

Miss MacCallum, a member of the delegation to the WHO Conference who left yesterday for Geneva, is taking with her one Yale padlock with four duplicate keys for the single drawer cabinet which you have been authorized to purchase. We shall in due course send you an extra padlock to be held in reserve.

This cabinet should not be used for classified material graded higher than "Confidential".

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G. de T. GLAZEBROOK

for Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Ext. 100C

50048-AL-16
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DUPLICATE

Geneve for
STG, C. MOORE

OTTAWA FILE
10104-C-40
No.

Letter No. F. 161

Date. April 26, 1951

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
NONE

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION, GENEVA.

Reference. Your letters No. 130 of March 27, 1951 and No. 231 of Nov. 30, 19

Subject: Your requisition No. 5 - Filing Cabinet

Authority No. EA 7071-A is being raised to cover the purchase of a cabinet as suggested in paragraph 2 of your letter No. 231.

Please proceed with purchase including bar, so that the cabinet will be available for the WHO Delegation.

A further letter will be sent to you shortly in this connection.

(Signed) H. F. Clark

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Copies Referred
To. None

No. of Enclosures
None

Post File

No.

Ext. 181 C

DUPLICATE

OTTAWA FILE
10104-C-40
No. 50048-AL-40 50048-40

Letter No. 130

Date March 27, 1951.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTED

TO: ~~FROM:~~ THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

FROM: ~~TO:~~ The Canadian Permanent Delegation, Geneva.

Reference.....Your letter No. F-82 of March 12th, 1951.....

Subject: Security Arrangements - Single-drawer filing cabinet.

It is appreciated that a single drawer cabinet affords only limited security but it is also my thought that a two-drawer cabinet is only slightly more secure. In any event, as the two-drawer cabinet previously sent to us has proved of great use for the Permanent Delegation Office, I should like to retain it here and would still appreciate receiving a single-drawer cabinet which could be used by delegations at the hotel.

Although I am not always in a position to control security arrangements at the hotel, I do try so far as possible to make sure that reasonable security arrangements are observed by delegations and this will continue to be the case whether or not a filing cabinet is received. It is not, however, only for reasons of security that a filing cabinet has been requested but it is felt that this would be of great assistance to visiting delegations for hotel rooms do not provide any space at all which is appropriate for filing even routine documents.

In the circumstances, I hope that it will prove possible to meet our request.

(Signed) N.F.H.Berlis

Secretary

OK. It should be barred (send 2 padlocks), and may be used for classified material up to confidential only.

(Sgd.) V.C.Moore
D.L. 2

(Sgd.) V.C.M.
Mr. Moore - /

See our letter F.161 authorizing purchase. As this is going ordinary air mail no mention was made of locks. I understand you will follow up with a letter re locks and security arrangements. As you are sending one padlock one extra only will be ordered.

(Sgd.) J.E.Munro

26/4/51

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No. of Enclosures

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Post File

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Ext. 181B

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FILE COPY	
50048-AL-40	
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OTTAWA FILE
10104-C-40
No. 50048-AL-40 50048-40

Letter No. F-82

Date..... March 12, 1951.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTED

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: The Canadian Permanent Delegation, Geneva.

Reference..... Your letter No. 231 dated November 30, 1950, and No. 85 of Feb. 21, 1951

Subject:..... Security Arrangements : - single-drawer filing cabinet

As a single drawer cabinet can readily be carried, it affords very little security for classified material. I should therefore be grateful if you would continue to use the two drawer cabinet in the hotel during conferences. If the management cannot provide storage for the cabinet while it is not in use, you might keep it in your offices. Should it be stored at the hotel, the padlock should be removed and kept with the keys in your safe or office cabinet.

You will appreciate the fact that even a barred cabinet of substantial weight cannot be considered a secure repository for a hotel room and that it would be desirable to keep classified papers used by convention delegations with your own classified material in the safe at your office overnight.

Copies Referred To.....

No. of Enclosures
None


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JRM
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

File 10104-C-40
50048-AL-40
50048-40

RESTRICTED

March 12, 1951.



MEMORANDUM FOR SUPPLIES AND PROPERTIES

Attached is a reply, which you might send out, to letter No. 231 of November 30, 1950 from the Permanent Delegation in Geneva concerning the purchase of single and double drawer cabinets for the storage of classified material. As Miss Munro has pointed out a single drawer cabinet has little security value. I should appreciate your consulting us in advance when requests are made to you for security equipment, particularly for repositories such as this which do not conform to normal specifications.

G. de T. GLAZEBROOK

Defence Liaison (2)

This was the reason why we referred the matter to you.

*GRU
But not before the 2-drawer cabinet was sent
GRU*

Ext. 181B

FILE COPY

OTTAWA FILE--
No. 50043-AL-40
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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Letter No...D...-24-.....

Date...January 29, 1951.....

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: The Canadian Permanent Delegation, Geneva

Reference.....Our Letter D-10 of January 8, 1951.....

Subject:.....Security Arrangements.....

My letter D. 10 of January 8 implied that
we are sending you a number of filing cabinets. This
is not the case. Four padlocks only have been despatched.

G. de I. GLAZEBROOK

for
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

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Post File
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Ext 92 A

OTTAWA FILE

No. 50048-AL-40.....

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTED

Letter No.15.....

Date.....January.19th.,.1950...

FROM: The Canadian Permanent Delegation, Geneva.

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference....Your letter No. D-10 of January 8th., 1951.....

Subject.....Security Arrangements.....

I am glad to note from your letter that four padlocks with keys are being sent to this office as requested in my despatch No. 235 of November 30th, 1950.

In your letter, however, reference is made to "the filing cabinets which are being shipped to you". You will note from my original communication on this subject that the padlocks are required for filing cabinets already installed and I assume that the reference to cabinets being shipped is an error.

N.M. BL
Secretary.

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24 JAN 1951

Copies Referred

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No. of Enclosures

none

Post File

No.....

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
RECEIVED

1951 JAN 24 AM 10:50

RECEIVED

1951 JAN 24

TO: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FROM: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

1. [REDACTED]

2. [REDACTED]

3. [REDACTED]

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1951 JAN 24
AM 10:50
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
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Ext. 181B

FILE COPY

OTTAWA FILE	
No.	50048-AL-40
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
RESTRICTED	

Letter No. D. /0

Date..... January 8, 1951.

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: The Canadian Consul, Geneva, Switzerland

Reference..... Circular Document B. 121 of November 7, 1950.

Subject:..... Security Arrangements

I am sending by diplomatic sea bag four
padlocks together with four sets of duplicate keys
(Nos. 4A684, 5A660, 6A997 and 3A736) for the
filing cabinets which are being shipped to you.

G. de T. GLAZEBROOK

for Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Copies Referred
To.....
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No. of Enclosures

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Post File

No.....

DEC 30 1950

GENEVA REPORT

Security

50048-AL-40	
Sub 3 ✓	Chron. ✓ Filed

An officer posted to Geneva must have a thorough knowledge of the security regulations of the Department of External Affairs as he will be responsible for security in this post.

Ext. 180 A

*Referred to
H.C. 48-12-43
No. 13/5012
File
over*

OTTAWA FILE

No. 48-12-43

11 50

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

SECRET

Despatch No. 2.3.5

Date..... November. 30th, ..1950..

FROM: The Canadian Permanent Delegation, Geneva

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.....Your..Circular..Document..No..B.121..of..November..7th, ..1950..

Subject:.....Security..arrangements.....

Two four-drawer filing cabinets and one two-drawer filing cabinet in this office are being fitted with metal bars and hasps in accordance with the instructions contained in the circular document. I shall be grateful, therefore, if four padlocks can be sent from Ottawa in order to lock these cabinets and to provide a spare lock to be kept in reserve.

N.F.H. Berlis

N.F.H. Berlis,
Secretary.

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5 DEC 1950

Copies Referred
To.....
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No. of Enclosures

..... none ..

Post File

No.....

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DEC 5 3 42 PM 1950

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SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

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kter the thore, thore, thore, thore, thore, thore
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one one-one, one, one, one, one, one, one
one one-one, one, one, one, one, one, one

SECRET

LOCK (SECRET) SECRETARY. SECRET OF SECRETARY (SECRET) SECRET

SECRET

ONE (SECRET) SECRETARY SECRETARY SECRETARY

SECRETARY SECRETARY

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Ext. 181 C

This copy for 50048-AL-40
DUPLICATE

OTTAWA FILE
No. 50048-AL-40
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
None

Letter No. 231.....
Date..... November 30th, 1950.

TO: ~~FROM~~ THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA
FROM: ~~TOX~~ THE CANADIAN PERMANENT DELEGATION, GENEVA.
Reference..... Your letter No. E. 191 of November 7th, 1950.....
Subject:..... Our Requisition No. 5 - Filing Cabinets.

I have noted your suggestion that the two-drawer filing cabinet sent to this office might perhaps be stored at the Hotel de la Paix and used as required by delegations. I have, however, found the two-drawer cabinet to be most useful in my own office and should be happy to continue using it. Moreover, I realize from past experience that the hotel has very little storage space available and although I am sure that the management would wish to cooperate insofar as possible with the Canadian delegation, it might cause them some embarrassment to retain a filing cabinet permanently in storage. For these reasons, I have enquired concerning the possibility of purchasing locally a single cabinet which I believe would appropriately meet the needs of delegations temporarily in Geneva.

It is possible to purchase in Geneva a single drawer steel cabinet without lock for 165 Swiss francs plus tax. The inside measurements of the cabinet are 38.6 cm. wide by 29.4 cm. high by 16 cm. long. If authority is obtained to purchase this cabinet, a metal bar could be fitted to it and a special padlock obtained from Ottawa.

There is no urgency about this request but it would be useful if such a cabinet could be purchased before the Summer months when large conferences will be in session in Geneva. I shall, therefore, be most grateful for your comments on this suggestion.

(Signed) N.F.H. Berlis
Secretary

Copies Referred To.....
No. of Enclosures none.....
Post File No. 4-3-0.....

CANADIAN DELEGATION


to the
European Office of the
United Nations



DÉLÉGATION DU CANADA

S E C R E T

No. 17



"La Pelouse", Palais des Nations,
Geneva, February 12th, 1949.

Sir,

I refer to paragraph 12 of my despatch No. 10 of February 3rd in which I stated that security arrangements had not yet been completed in the permanent office quarters in Geneva which are now located in "La Pelouse" a villa belonging to the United Nations which has been converted for the use of permanent delegations.

A. C. ...
A. H. ...
to see file

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2. I wish to refer also to my telegram No. 16 17? of February 7th and to your telegram No. 28 of February 10th concerning damage to the safe sent to this office from Canada.

3. Security arrangements have now been completed and the safe has been opened and put into operation. Although the members of the staff of this office tried several times the combinations which were set and the security officer from the U.K. Permanent Delegation also attempted to open the safe, it was apparent that either the mechanism or the handles had been jammed in transit. Yesterday, however, I arranged to have Mr. Ewing who is the Security officer at the U.S. Legation in Berne visit this office to look at the safe. Before he arrived, we tried again the combinations and on this occasion we were successful in opening the safe. Mr. Ewing was not, therefore, required to examine the mechanism but he gave as an explanation for our difficulties the fact that the handles had been jammed in transit and that possibly the combinations were not good.

FEB 21 1949

4. Since opening the safe, each member of the staff of this office has tried the combinations several times; the combinations have now been changed in accordance with instructions; and the safe appears to be working satisfactorily.

5. In addition to the safe, we have in the office one filing cabinet which is secured with a padlock.

6. Although the French doors leading from the rooms occupied by the Canadian delegation lead on to an outside terrace, the doors are locked at night and heavy outside shutters are also securely fastened to make entry from the outside impossible. Keys have now been provided for the inside doors which are also locked when the office is closed. After 8.00 p.m. when the concierge is no longer on duty in the public hall of this building, the main door is also locked and the outside storm door locked in addition so that entrance to the building can only be obtained through the use of proper keys.

The Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
Ottawa, Canada.

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7. Keys to the outside door are, of course, available to the delegations from other countries who also have office space in this building but it would be a difficult task for outsiders to gain access.

8. The grounds are supposedly patrolled at intervals during the night by U.N. guards.

9. I am satisfied that the security arrangements in effect for this office are adequate and we shall take every proper precaution to keep our files and papers secured.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,



(for) Permanent Representative.

CANADIAN DELEGATION
to the
European Office of the
United Nations



DÉLÉGATION DU CANADA

208-AL(5)
S E C C R E T Chron. 58. Filed.....

"La Pelouse", Palais des Nations,
Geneva, February 22nd, 1949.

Mr. Calverton to note & file
109.
Dear Mr. Hemsley,

In a secret despatch No. 17 dated February 12th the security arrangements for this office were described and you will note from the despatch that some difficulty was encountered in opening and putting into operation the safe sent from Canada for our use. The security arrangements are now working quite satisfactorily but I wish to refer to this subject in order to explain in advance the large number of taxi fares charged on our January and February accounts.

2. When Mr. Jean Désy arrived in Geneva on January 23rd for a meeting of the Executive Committee of the International Refugee Organization, he indicated that it would be necessary for him to send and receive cypher telegrams and that it would not be convenient to do this through the Legation at Berne, 100 miles away. The cypher books which were held for us in Berne were, therefore, brought to Geneva and deposited in a sealed package in the vault of the U.K. Permanent Delegation who had previously offered the use of their facilities. At that time, the Canadian office was located at the Hôtel de la Paix and it was necessary to use taxis to collect the books from the U.K. vault and to return them there for safekeeping.

3. About the same time, Mr. Norman Robertson arrived in Geneva with Mr. A.E. Ritchie from Canada House and Mr. C.S.A. Ritchie from the Canadian Embassy in Paris to attend meetings of the Special Berlin Currency Committee. Towards the end of Mr. Robertson's stay in Geneva, a large amount of cypher work was done by this office and although the office had moved to "La Pelouse" on February 1st, the safe had not yet been opened and keys had not been obtained to permit the use of the office in the evening or on Sunday. It was, therefore, necessary to continue working in Mr. Robertson's room at the Hôtel de la Paix after office hours and to use taxis for obtaining and returning the cypher books.

S.D. Hemsley, Esq.,
Chief Administrative Officer,
Department of External Affairs,
Ottawa, Canada.

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
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4. This situation should not re-occur as security arrangements have been completed at "La Pelouse". The cypher books are kept in the safe and keys are available to permit us to work in the office at any time.

5. If more specific information should be required concerning the large number of taxi fares shown on our accounts, I shall, of course, be glad to give further particulars.

Yours sincerely,



N.F.H. Berlis,
Secretary.

10104-1

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SECRET FILE
208-AL(5)
Sub...2.9..Chron 2.9..

J. George/KD

File
JEB

Ottawa, December 10, 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MATTHEWS

I would have no objection from the security point of view to the villa which Mr. Wilgress recommends that we should rent as office space in Geneva. It is not by any means ideal, as other delegations would have offices under the same roof and as there would be no night guard in the building, but Mr. Day tells me that the number of secret papers which will have to be kept in Geneva will be very limited and could easily be kept in a safe.

You might like to ask Mr. J.G. Smith to make immediate arrangements for shipping a safe to Geneva, if this has not already been done, as the Delegation will need a safe no matter what offices are finally obtained. Until the safe arrives in Geneva, it would be undesirable to keep secret papers in the villa.

*Doors connecting int other suites
must be securely blocked and made
sound proof.*

J.

MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
SECRET FILE
208-AI(s)
SECRET

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN MINISTER TO SWITZERLAND: BERNE

Sum. Rep to U.N.O. Geneva

MESSAGE TO BE SENT
EN CLAIR
CODE
CYPHER <i>OTR</i>
DEGREE OF PRIORITY
IMPORTANT
ORIGINATOR
SIG.
TYPED: J. George/mk
DIV. Defence Liaison
LOCAL TEL. 5253
APPROVED BY
SIG.
TYPED:
IS THIS MESSAGE LIKELY TO BE PUBLISHED
YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/>
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

No. *28* Date February 10, 1949. FOR COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE USE ONLY
SENT -- FEB 10 1949

Your telegram No. 17 of February 7.

1. If damage to your safe cannot be repaired by a U.S. or U.K. national vouched for by his Legation, try to get reliable local firm to open safe. Repairs may be carried out on your premises under Canadian supervision, but, if major repairs would necessitate removal of ~~safe~~ *lock mechanism* to local firm, please report extent of damage, and we shall try to arrange for a Foreign Office expert to be sent from London. Security of the mechanism of our safes is most important.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

DONE
DATE
COPIES REFERRED TO:

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MESSAGE FORM

or

W. H. & G. W. W.

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103

File No.	208-HL(5)
U.N. Chron.	GENEVA
Sub.	Filed

FROM: THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T

CYPHER - O.T.P.

GENEVA, February 7th, 1949.

NO. 17

No. 17. February 7th. Secret. Letter of January 5th to Wilgress. Safe bearing handle 099936 and instructions have been received in Geneva.

2. Safe was damaged in transit and cannot, repeat not, be opened. Security man from United Kingdom permanent delegation examined safe but could not help. Please advise what arrangements may be made for repairs.

3. Cypher books are being kept in sealed case in United Kingdom vault until our safe is repaired.

CANADIAN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE