

NATO RESTRICTED

~~2248-4 CMBG 33001~~
(DMPC)

PA

01 01 041350 Z NOV 88 RR RRRR

DMPC 2492

NDHQ OTTAWA

HQCFE LAHR//SSO OPS/SO2 PLANS//

INFO FMCHQ ST HUBERT//SSO OPS & PLANS//

N A T O R E S T R I C T E D DMPC 2492

SUBJ: NUMBER 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001 (NR)

REFS: A. 4 CMBG 3120-21 (G2) 2900-6 31 AUG 88

B. 1220.5/SHOOP/S136/88 1 JUL 88 SACEUR'S SEMI-ANNUAL LIST OF PLANS

FRI

1.(NR) THE USE OF THE FIRST TWO DIGITS QUOTE 33 UNQUOTE CAUSES
CONFUSION WITH SIMILAR USAGE IAW REF B AS A METHOD OF IDENTIFYING
PLAN ORIGINATORS. FIRST TWO DIGITS 33 HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO
COMCENTAG BY NATO

2.(NU) ADVISE IF THIS PLAN COULD BE RENUMBERED. REVIEW OF OTHER
PLANS WITH NUMBERS THAT MIGHT CAUSE CONFUSION SHOULD ALSO BE
CONSIDERED.

DLOTR NDOC

MAJ FR THOMAS, DMPC 2-6, 996-7496/SD (439 D)

for COL LWF CUPPENS, DMPC, 992-3400
for Thomas Mai

NATO RESTRICTED

~~NATO SECRET~~



4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group
Le 4e Groupement de Brigade Mécanisé Canadien
CFPO 5000



①

Office of the Commander
Cabinet du Général Commandant

THIS IS AN ACCOUNTABLE DOCUMENT WHICH MUST BE RETURNED TO DDA 3-3-2-2 FOR DISPOSAL.

Copy No 32 of 40

3120-1 (G3 Plans)

19 June 1986

Distribution List

4 CMBG GDP OPLAN 33001
AMENDMENT NO 1/86

DDA 3-3-2-2 / D Adm M 3-3-2-2
Referred to
Transmis à C.L.D.O.

Reference: 3120-1 (Comd) 21 February 1986

File No. 33001-1704
Copy No. 32
Code No. 3120-1
ACTION INFORMATION

1. (NS) Following amendments are to be made to reference:
 - a. delete Annex G complete and insert new Annex G
 - b. delete Annex A complete and insert new Annex A.
2. New table of contents will be issued later to reflect changes.

④ DDA 3-3-2-2
As per min 2 - yours
for disposal
2. HUESTIS
30 July 86

S.K. Newman
S.K. Newman
Captain
for Commander 4 CMBG

Distribution List

- List B (4 CMBG)
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- VII (US) Corps for 1 (US) AD
- II (GE) Korps (2 Copies)
- 4 PzGrenDiv
- 4 PzGrenDiv (CLO)
- 10 PzDiv
- GTSC
- GTSC for VKK 632
- USAREUR
- NDHQ (CLDO)/DGMPPO
- FMCHQ
- HQ CFE
- CFB Lahr
- FMSU
- II (GE) Korps

② DLOTR 2
your necessary
action
by
50/cad

③
Super BOR

1. The amendments 29/7 have been entered into the DLOTR copy of the 4CMBG Oplan.
2. The material in the envelope NATO Sp's they old (prior to amendment) copy for destruction.

~~NATO SECRET~~
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MCD
hco1
30 June 86

3/29/7/86 (BB)

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NRMS 3-3 / SGDDN 3-3
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4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade
La 4e Brigade mécanisée du Canada
CFPO/BPFC 5000

33001-4
APR 21 1992
2048-7704
File No. 3121-100
à *1002*

3120-1 (SSO Ops)
| April 1992

3120-1 (OSEM Op)
| avril 1992

Distribution List

4 CANADIAN MECHANIZED BRIGADE GROUP
GENERAL DEFENCE PLAN TERMINATION

Reference: 4 CMBG GDP OPLAN 33001 Part one and two 1 January 1986

- As a result of the announced withdrawal of Canadian Forces in Europe, the resultant preparations for the disbandment of 1 Canadian Division Forward units and the eventual closeout of 4 CMBG HQ, a review of all publications accountable to 4 CMBG HQ has commenced. The first step regarding destruction of classified documents will consist of:
 - destruction of the 4 CMBG HQ General Defence Plan (GDP) (ref); and
 - the destruction of 1 Canadian Division Forward Units GDPs.
- As of 11 April 1992 the referenced GDP is non-effective. Addressees are to destroy all copies of the 4 CMBG GDP and forward Certificate of Destruction to this HQ attention G3 Operations no later than 28 April 1992. The original copy of the 4 CMB GDP will be retained by this Headquarters until final close-out.
- Units of 1 Canadian Division Forward which have produced similar GDPs are to issue orders for destruction of their GDPs. The original copy of each unit GDP is to be transferred to this Headquarters utilizing a Transfer Voucher (DND 1503).
- This Headquarters will retain the units original GDP until close-out in 1993 when final disposition of these plans will be determined. All queries regarding this direction are to be directed to Capt S. Gibson, Brigade G3 Operations, Lahr military 6519.

Liste de distribution

CESSATION DU PLAN GÉNÉRAL DE DÉFENCE
DU 4° GROUPE BRIGADE MÉCANISÉ DU CANADA

Référence: 4° Bde MC GDP OPLAN 33001 partie un et deux 1 janvier 1986

- À la suite de l'annonce du retrait des Forces Canadiennes en Europe, des préparatifs pour la dissolution des unités de la 1ère Division Canadienne Avancé et de la fermeture éventuelle du QG 4° Bde MC, une révision de toutes les publications dont le QG du 4° GBMC est responsable a été initiée. La première étape pour la destruction des documents classifiés comportera:
 - la destruction du Plan Général de Défence (PGD) du QG 4° GBMC en réf; et
 - la destruction des PGD des unités de la 1ère Division Canadienne Avancé.
- Le document en référence ne sera plus en vigueur à partir du 11 avril 1992. Tous les détenteurs sont priés de détruire toutes copies et faire suivre un certificat de destruction à ce QG, compétence G3 Opérations, au plus tard le 28 avril 1992. La copie originale du PGD de la 4° GBMC sera retenu par ce Quartier Général jusqu'à la fermeture finale.
- Les unités de la 1ère Division Canadienne Avancé, qui ont produit des PGD similaires doivent émettre un ordre de destruction de leur PGD. La copie originale de chaque unité PGD devra être transférée à ce Quartier-général en utilisant un Bordereau de Transfert (DND 1503).
- Ce Quartier-général tiendra les copies originales des unités jusqu'à la fermeture en 1993. La disposition finale de ces plans sera déterminée à cette date. Toute question concernant cette directive peut être soumise au Capitaine S. Gibson, Brigade G3 Opérations, local 6519.

Pour le commandant de la 4e Brigade mécanisée du Canada
Officier supérieur d'état-major Opérations
Lieutenant-colonel J.G.D. Bastien

J.G.D. Bastien

J.G.D. Bastien
Lieutenant-Colonel
Senior Staff Officer Operations
for Commander 4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade

*destroyed
3120-21 (G3)
2900-6
dt 31 Aug 1988
copy # 33 (on pink card)
32 (on pink card) dt 14 Sep 92
certificate sent to HQ
NRMS 3-3-4
9 Jun 92*

DISTRIBUTION LIST (page 2)

LISTE DE DISTRIBUTION (page 2)

*3121-1 (Comd)
w/enclosure Book 1 and 2
dt 21 Feb 86
certificate sent 14 Sep 92*

*3120-1 (G3 Plans) dt 26-6-87
w/enclosure Annex A - Book
Intelligence Estimate
certificate sent 14 Sep 92*

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II (GE) Korps - OPZ (GFSTD Haupt)
II (GE) Korps - OPZ Res (GFSTD Haupt Res)
II (GE) Korps (SCLO)
HQ 1 Cdn Div Fwd (G1 Fwd)
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4 PZGRENDIV, CLO Regensburg
10 PZDIV
GTSC Mannheim
VKK 632 Nurnberg
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4 PZGRENDIV, CLO Regensburg
10 PZDIV
GTSC Mannheim
VKK 632 Nurnberg
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FMSU 313
4 Régnt AD

2248-33001-4

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE
MINUTE SHEET - NOTE DE SERVICE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION - COTE DE SÉCURITÉ	-
FILE NO. - NO DE DOSSIER	2248-1101
DATED - DATÉE	20 OCTOBER 1988

SUBJECT - SUJET
INCORRECT USE OF FILE NUMBER

REFERRED TO
TRANSMISE A

REMARKS - REMARQUES
(TO BE SIGNED IN FULL SHOWING APPOINTMENT, TELEPHONE NUMBER AND DATE)
(ATTACHÉ DE SIGNATURE, FONCTION, NUMÉRO DE TÉLÉPHONE ET DATE)

NOTE TO FILE

Please note that 4 CMBG were incorrectly using Oplan's 33001 # in regards to their plan. Confirmation done by DMPC Major Thomas.

Major Thomas has sent a message to 4 CMBG on 19 Oct '88 to inform 4 CMBG that they are incorrectly using Oplan's 33001 number, in order to rectify this problem. Were told a reply will take at least 2 months.

Meanwhile have opened a file using 4 CMBG's (U.I.C) code as we were using 2248-33001's number.

Norms 3-2-2
C. Sadarot
20 Oct. 88

2-3309-000383

MEMORANDUM

File No.: _____
No. de dossier: 2248-33001 -11
Main file
NAID SECRET.

Date: AUG 15 1988
ADUT

TO: CLDO-DLOTR-Maj. Slinivski

A: _____

REMOVAL OF CORRESPONDENCE FROM FILE

EXTRACTION DE CORRESPONDENCE DU DOSSIER

Reference: A-AD-D30-001/JS-001, Art. 515

Référence: A-AD-D30-001/JS-001, Art. 515

1. Our records reveal that the following correspondence has been removed from this file/temporary docket:

1. Notre registre indique que la correspondance ci-mentionnée a été enlevée du dossier/dossier temporaire:

Originator: _____
Origine: _____

Reference: _____
Référence: _____

Date: _____
Date: 14 December 1987

2. It is requested that the above original missing papers be returned or this section informed of the reasons for removal.

2. Nous vous prions de retourner la pièce originale manquante ou nous informer des raisons de l'extraction.

③ NDRMS

1. AS advised previously, documents consisted of amendments to Operational Plans & have been incorporated in copies held by CLDO. They are of no use to anyone on file. Miss C. Godard.

NOTE: All "signals" of "incoming correspondence" are to be returned for file. If you wish you may make yourself photocopies and retain for your references.

Thank you!

NDRMS 3-2-2 / GDDN

Tel: 2-3309

→ M. Slinivski
DLOTR-3
31 Aug 000384



Government of Canada

Gouvernement du Canada

FILE RECALL

RAPPEL DE DOSSIER

TO - A CLDO - DLOT R Maj. Slivinski		Date 16 May 88
File No. - Dossier n° 2248 - 33001	Vol/TD - Vol/DT M.F. (Secret)	Date charged out / Date de sortie 7 Dec 87
Subject - Objet NATO Defence Measures & Plans - Plans Dplan 4 CMBG.		

● PLEASE COMPLETE THE LOWER PART OF THIS FORM AND RETURN TO RECORDS OFFICE AT
 ● PRIÈRE DE REMPLIR LA PARTIE CI-DESSOUS ET DE LA RENVOYER AU SERVICE DE DOSSIERS

Signature ▶ Tel. ▶

TRACED

File attached for updating. B.F. for / Dossier ci-joint pour mise à jour A.R. pour le:

File attached - R. / Dossier ci-joint - R. File retained* / Dossier conservé*

No record of file / Aucune trace de ce dossier File has been returned / Dossier déjà renvoyé

File was passed to / Dossier confié à on le

Other - Autre
 ? **3 documents retained:**
 - 4CMBG Int Estimate dated 1 May 87
 - 4CMBG OPLAN 33001 Amndt #3
 - 4CMBG OPLAN 33001 Amndt 3/87

*Reason - Motif
All above docs are CDO copies and are required for ready reference. PAd on file in error
Slivinski **998-0147** **18 May 88**
 Signature Tel. - Tél. Date **000385**

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4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group

Le 4^e Groupe-brigade mécanisé du Canada

CFPO 5000

CLDO Copy 32 of 40
 (3) BRANCH 3120-1 (G3 Plans)
 OCT 1 03 September 1986
 REGISTRY
 No. 4073/86

CDA 3-3-2-2 / D Adm M 3-3-2-2
 Referred to
 Transmis à CLDO
 2248-33001-4
 SEP 30 1986

Distribution List

4 CMBG GDP OPLAN 33001
AMENDMENT 2/86

Reference: 3120-1 (Comd) 21 February 1986

1. Following amendment is to be made to referen
 - a. delete Annex G complete and insert new Annex G.
2. The revised Annex G is effective upon receipt. The old Annex G shall be destroyed immediately. Certificates of destruction are not required by this Headquarters.

RA
 ACTION INFORMATION
 RETAINED RETURN

S.K. Newman
 S.K. Newman
 Captain
 for Commander 4 CMBG

DISTRIBUTION LIST

- List B (4 CMBG)
- D Sqn, RCD
- HQ CENTAG (6 Copies)
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- VII (US) Corps (SCLO) (2 Copies)
- 1st (US) AD
- II (GE) Korps (2 Copies)
- 4 PzGrenDiv
- 4 PzGrenDiv (CLO)
- 10 PzDiv
- GTSC
- VKK 632
- USAREUR
- NDHQ (CLDO/DGMPO)
- FMCHQ
- HQ CFE
- CFB Lahr
- FMSU
- II (GE) Korps (SCLO)

(2) DLOTR-2-2
 Ref was passed to you.

(3)

NTF
 Actioned -
 Release May
 DLOTR 2-2
 20 Oct 86
 NATO SECRET
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cc
 16 Oct 86

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~~2900-1~~ (SO/DGMP0)
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~~2245-1704~~
DGMP0 977

2248-33001-4

01 01 061331 Z AUG 86 RR RR UUUU

NDHQ OTTAWA

4 (CA) FMBG HQ LAHR

UNCLAS DGMP0 977

SUBJ: 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001 AMENDMENT 1/86 19 JUN 86

REF: YOUR WR 985 301205Z JUL 86

SUBJ DOCU RECD BY DGMP0 AND HELD NDOC LIBRARY

B. GIBB, P01/DGMP0/OR/SUPR/992-2301/BC

V.M. DOUGLAS CAPT SO/DGMP0



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01-01 *01/426z* AUG 86 RR RRRR

S0/CLDO 0228

1248-33001-4

NDHQ OTTAWA//S0/CLDO//

4(CA)CMBG HQ LAHR

R E S T R I C T E D S0/CLDO 0228

SUBJ: 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001 AMENDMENT 1/86 19 JUN 86

REF: YOUR WR 985 301205Z JUL 86

SUBJ DOCS FOR CLDO RECEIVED 29 JUL 86. DND 728 RETURNED SAME
DATE.

CA HARDIE/MAJ/S0/CLDO/992-8858/0424

CA HARDIE/MAJ

3120-1 (S0/CLDO)

RESTRICTED

SECRET

01 1311640 Z JUL 86 RR SSSS

DLOTR 18652

NDHQ OTTAWA//DLOTR//

4(CA) CMBG HQ LAHR//G3 PLANS//

S E C R E T DLOTR 18652

SUBJ: 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001 - AMENDMENT NO 1

REF: YOUR 3120-1 (G3 PLANS) DATED 19 JUN 86

1. (S) WISH TO COMMEND YOU ON NEW ANNEX A WHICH IS A MOST COMPREHENSIVE DOCUMENT
2. (S) HOWEVER, I NOTE THAT APPX 4 TO ANNEX A IN OLD MATERIAL, IE, YOUR LIST OF MAPS IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE NEW AMENDMENT
3. (S) REQUEST YOU ADVISE IF LIST OF MAPS TO BE RETAINED OR IF A NEW APPX WILL BE ISSUED

LCOL A.D. MCQUARRIE DLOTR 2 998-0145 5314F

AD McQuarrie LCol
for LCOL J.G. RENY DLOTR

2245-1704 (DLOTR)

SECRET

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ANNEX A
TO 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001
DATED 1 JANUARY 1986

4 CANADIAN MECHANIZED BRIGADE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE

- References:
- A. COMCENTAG's General Defence Plan, Annex C 31 Aug 83
 - B. HQ CENTAG Terrain Analysis of the Corps Area of Operations 14 Apr 78
 - C. VII (US) Corps Intelligence Estimate 1-82 7 Dec 82
 - D. OPLAN II (GE) Korps 33001, Annex C (Military Intelligence 1 Apr 82)
 - E. 1 (US) Armoured Division Intelligence Estimate 1-84 30 Jan 84
 - F. 4 Pz Gren Div, The Military Significance of the Topography of Northeastern Bavaria, May 82
 - G. HQ CENTAG Geographic Policy (NU) (1978)

THREAT

1. (NS) Given its role, as CENTAG reserve, the threat to 4 CMBG is the threat to CENTAG. This threat is outlined in reference A, a summary of which is attached as Appendix 2. Commanding Officers, using this estimate as a basis are to ensure that unit officers are briefed annually on the Warsaw Pact (WP) Threat. Detailed intelligence estimates on the 4 CMBG priority areas of commitment (references C, D and E) are also available through the G2 HQ, 4 CMBG.

TERRAIN

2. (NS) A terrain analysis of the CENTAG area of operations is found at reference B. A more detailed analysis of the terrain in Northeastern Bavaria is found at reference F. A summary of these documents is attached as Appendix 3.

MAPS

3. (NC) The details of 4 CMBG holdings of operational maps and charts for war are outlined at Appendix 4.

AREA OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST

4. (NS) Unlike a front line formatin which has a well defined area of operations 4 CMBG can be tasked to go anywhere in the CENTAG area. However, 4 CMBG requires intelligence data to facilitate operational planning the moment a tasking is received from COMCENTAG. The Brigade must therefore maintain data on all enemy forces likely to operate in the CENTAG area. While it cannot be determined with certainty when the Brigade will be committed, it is apparent in examining COMCENTAG's General Defence Plan that this could occur as late as the enemy commitment of its Second Operational Echelon (i.e. Second Echelon Armies). It is therefore possible

A-1

.../A-2

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ANNEX A
TO 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001
DATED 1 JANUARY 1986

that 4 CMBG could face either First or Second Echelon Armies anywhere within the CENTAG sector. In addition, the possibility of rear area operations cannot be discounted. 4 CMBG could face SPETSNAZ, Air Assault or Airborne forces operating in the CENTAG area.

5. (NS) The peace-time deployment of these enemy forces covers a very large area which also contains forces of no interest to 4 CMBG. Realistically then, the Brigade must be considered to have less of a geographic area of interest than an operationally oriented area of interest. The 4 CMBG area of interest, then, can be defined as: the first and second echelon armies opposing CENTAG, and their combat support (to include air support and airborne forces likely to operate in the CENTAG rear area).

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

6. (NS) While the Brigade area of interest has been defined, it is beyond the capability of the intelligence staff to maintain a detailed data base on all formations within this area. It is therefore necessary to place the requirements in priority and to state what detail of data is required:

- a. Category A. The first priority must go to the threat in the most probable area of employment along the VII (US) Corps/II (GE) Korps boundary. Here the enemy consists of the formations of the Southwestern Front. These formations may vary as WP dispositions change, however based on the current CENTAG Intelligence Estimate they include; the first and fourth Czechoslovakian Peoples Army (8 Divs), the Soviet Central Group of Forces (5 Divs) and the Czechoslovakian Eastern Military District (2 Divs). The maximum possible intelligence data must be maintained on these forces.
- b. Category B. The second priority goes to those formations of the Western Front likely to oppose CENTAG, and those forces likely to be employed in the CENTAG rear area. The intelligence data maintained on these forces would include only current orbats and equipment capabilities. The formations currently in this category include: First Guards Tank Army (3 Divs), Eight Guards Army (4 Divs), The Polish Silesian Military District (5 Divs), 103 Guards Airborne Division and 44 Guards Airborne Division; and
- c. Category C. The third priority consists of intelligence on the enemy air forces likely to be encountered. It is possible aircraft from any WP country could be employed in support of the armies the Brigade will encounter. There is little value, then, in maintaining organizational data. This category would therefore consist of intelligence on all WP aircraft and air delivered weapons.

NATO SECRET

ANNEX A
TO 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001
DATED 1 JANUARY 1986

CLASSIFICATION OF INTELLIGENCE

7. (NS) In examining this intelligence support requirement, it is apparent that there are different requirements at three different security classification levels. To facilitate training, it is essential that 4 CMBG maintain intelligence on orbats, equipment and tactics at the RESTRICTED level. SECRET level intelligence is necessary for regular planning and assessment purposes on the same subject areas. Finally proper coverage of all categories is required at levels above SECRET.

SUMMARY

8. (NS) Due to 4 CMBG's role it must maintain currency on the threat to CENTAG and be prepared to operate anywhere within the CENTAG sector. The Brigade's area of interest cannot be related to a geographic area but must be tied to the first and second echelon armies, as assessed by CENTAG. To ensure the best possible intelligence data is maintained in keeping with the Brigade's capabilities, the intelligence requirements must be placed in priority, with the Threat along the VII (US), II (GE) inter Corps boundary taking precedence. A detailed breakdown of 4 CMBG's intelligence requirements is found at Appendix 1.

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APPENDIX 1
 TO ANNEX A
 TO 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001
 DATED 1 JANUARY 1986

4 CMBG INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

CATEGORY	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		
	RESTRICTED	SECRET	ABOVE SECRET
<p>A</p> <p>1 CPA</p>	<p>1. Type Orbats Czech & Soviet</p> <p>2. Equipment capabilities</p> <p>3. Doctrine & tactics</p>	<p>1. Detailed Orbats</p> <p>2. Equipment capabilities</p> <p>3. Doctrine & tactics</p> <p>4. Level and type of training conduct</p> <p>5. Biographical information</p> <p>6. CZ capabilities</p>	<p>1. Detailed Orbats</p> <p>2. Equipment capabilities</p> <p>3. Doctrine & tactics</p> <p>4. Level and type training conduct</p> <p>5. Biographical info</p> <p>6. Probable operational missions</p>
<p>B</p> <p>1 GTA 8 GA PSMD 103 GABNDIV 44 GABNDIV</p>	<p>1. Type Orbats Polish & Soviet</p> <p>2. Equipment capabilities</p>	<p>1. Detailed Orbats</p> <p>2. Equipment capabilities</p>	<p>1. Detailed Orbats</p> <p>2. Equipment capabilities</p>
<p>C</p> <p>WP Air Forces</p>	<p>1. Aircraft & weapons capabilities</p>	<p>1. Aircraft & weapons capabilities</p>	<p>1. Aircraft & weapons capabilities</p>

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APPENDIX 2
TO ANNEX A
TO 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001
DATED 1 JANUARY 1986

4 CANADIAN MECHANIZED BRIGADE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Reference: COMCENTAG's General Defence Plan, Annex C, 31 Aug 83

GENERAL

1. (NS) The 4 CMBG Intelligence Estimate is a summary of the CENTAG Intelligence Estimate (reference A).

AIM

2. (NS) To outline the Warsaw Pact Threat against CENTAG with particular emphasis on those areas of greatest concern to 4 CMBG.

WP GROUND FORCES OPPOSING CENTAG

3. (NS) First Echelon Fronts. It is to be expected that the FIRST ECHELON FRONTS will be composed of those forces which in peace-time are stationed outside the USSR.

4. (NS) CENTAG therefore would be opposed by the following forces:

a. The Southern Wing of WESTERN FRONT comprising:

(1) FIRST OPERATIONAL ECHELON: 1 GUARDS TANK ARMY/GSFG (1GTA) and 8 GUARDS ARMY/GSFG (8 GA)

(2) SECOND OPERATIONAL ECHELON: POLISH SILESIA MILITARY DISTRICT (PSMD)

b. SOUTHWESTERN FRONT comprising:

(1) FIRST OPERATIONAL ECHELON: 1 and 4 CPA; and

(2) SECOND OPERATIONAL ECHELON: CENTRAL GROUP OF FORCES (CGF) and CZECHOSLOVAKIAN EASTERN MILITARY DISTRICT (CEMD)

5. (NS) Second Echelon Fronts. SECOND ECHELON FRONTS committed within the CENTAG sector in exploitation of FIRST ECHELON FORNTS objectives may consist of forces of the CARPATHIAN MILITARY DISTRICT (CPMD). Additionally, elements of the BELORUSSIAN MILITARY DISTRICT (BEMD), which AFCENT estimates to oppose NORTHAG, may be directed alternatively against CENTAG.

NATO SECRET

APPENDIX 2
TO ANNEX A
TO 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001
DATED 1 JANUARY 1986

6. (NS) Theatre Reserves. If SECOND ECHELON FRONTS are not established, the forces given in para five above could be used as a THEATRE RESERVE to reinforce the FIRST ECHELON FRONTS within the CENTAG area. Additionally the 44 GUARDS AIRBORNE DIVISION/BAMD (44 GABND) and the 103 GUARDS AIRBORNE DIVISION/BEMD (103 GABND) are estimated to be available as THEATRE RESERVE for commitment in the CENTAG sector.

7. (NS) Strategic Reserves. Elements of 12 divisions of the MOSCOW, URAL and VOLGA MILITARY DISTRICTS and approximately five Soviet and six non-Soviet MOBILIZATION DIVISIONS might be committed as STRATEGIC RESERVE within the CENTAG sector after a long term buildup.

STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

8. (NS) The immediate strategic objective of the WESTERN FRONT are considered to be the establishment of bridgeheads over the Rhein River as follows:

- a. Vicinity WESEL in order to seize the key area WESEL - AACHEN NEUSS; and
- b. North and South of MANNHEIM in order to seize the key area of PALATINATE and parts of the SAARGEBIET.

9. (NS) The immediate strategic objective of the SOUTHWESTERN FRONT are considered to be the establishment of a bridgehead over the RHEIN River between MANNHEIM and KARLSRUHE to seize the key area inside LORRAINE.

APPROACHES

10. (NS) The following analysis applies to the CENTAG area of Operations:

- a. CENTAG's area of operations within the FRG is characterized by:
 - (1) a limited depth;
 - (2) a very dense road and railway net;
 - (3) terrain which in many instances is suitable for cross-country movement and manoeuvres; and
 - (4) terrain that tends to direct WP offensive operations towards a few major avenues of approach which present themselves as principle axis of advance.
- b. Although the following four major groupings of approaches into the Centag sector are assessed to be of particular importance, it is emphasized that much of the terrain between allows for

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manoeuvre mainly by smaller units. Even the lightly-forested areas have a dense road net which allows all-weather movement.

(1) The NORDHAUSEN, the Hessian CORRIDOR and the EISENACH-FULDA Approach

- (a) The NORDHAUSEN (PE 2408) approach bypasses the forested HARZ mountains in the south, astride and south of the Inter-Army-Group boundary, and leads further to the west into the PADERBORNER BECKEN, well in NORTHAG's defense sector. However, its southern portion enables penetration to the HESSISCHER CORRIDOR and the EISENACH-FULDA approaches thus allowing the enemy to choose different combinations of possible axes of advance. The NORDHAUSEN approach could initially accommodate up to two divisions abreast;
- (b) The HESSISCHER CORRIDOR leads towards GIESSEN (MB 7804). Its entrance is blocked by the REINHARDSWALD, KAUFUNGERWALD, HOHE MEISSNER and KNUELLGEBIRGE. A penetration into the HESSISCHER CORRIDOR from the north seems to be as difficult (enemy forces would have to pass through the built-up area of KASSEL) as passing the mountain chain of the KAUFUNGERWALD and the MEISSNER in the south. Along the HESSISCHER CORRIDOR approach a south-westward thrust of initially up to two divisions could be launched;
- (c) The EISENACH-FULDA approach leads from the northern edge of the THUERINGERWALD (NB 4801) to the FRANKFURT-DARMSTADT-MAINZ triangle with crossing sites over the RHEIN River. This approach provided the most direct route of approximately 150 km to the RHEIN River west of FRANKFURT. However, the built up areas and the necessity to seize the TAUNUS mountains before the crossing sites could be used, reduces this advantage. Although wooded hills close to the border as well as the hilly area of BAD HERSFELD initially canalize the movement of armed and mechanized forces, more favorable terrain widens towards the west/southwest. The FULDA approach initially can accommodate up to three divisions abreast, widening in the vicinity of the FULDA River to five divisions and at the lower end, joining the HESSISCHER CORRIDOR, from five to six leading divisions.

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(2) The MEININGEN, COBURG and HOF Approaches

- (a) The MEININGEN approach leads from MEININGEN (PB 0040) via WUERZBURG (NA 6717) south of the ODENWALD towards the RHEIN valley between MANNHEIM and KARLSRUHE. The MAIN River, with an average width of about 90 meters, is the major obstacle cutting across the approach. However, it offers numerous bridging and crossing sites. Other rivers, such as the TAUBER, JAGST and KOCHER, will not cause considerable delay for advancing enemy forces. Due to its good highway net and the generally flat and open terrain, the MEININGEN approach is considered as a high speed approach with a high deployment capacity. It can carry at least three attacking divisions initially, and provides the shortest route east of the RHOEN-SPESSART into the RHEIN valley. Once the Main River is crossed, this approach joins the COBURG approach with an approximate width of 100 km.
- (b) The COBURG approach leads from the area SONNEBERG (PA 5580) via the COBURG (PA 4070) area to BAMBERG (PA 3630). As it crosses the border area it can be considered a complementary axis to the MEININGEN approach. Initially the HASSBERGE and STEIGERWALD would canalize attacking forces. Once the area southwest of BAMBERG is reached and the MAIN and REGNITZ Rivers are crossed it widens and joins the MEININGEN approach after bypassing the STEIGERWALD. It permits, alternatively, a southward thrust to the STUTTGART (NV 1303) area. The coburg approach can accommodate up to two divisions crossing the border.
- (c) The HOF approach extends from PLAUEN (TR 9838) via HOF (QA 0778) in a southwesternly direction astride the autobahn to the area of BAYREUTH (PA 8533). Movement will be impeded by the FRANKENWALD in the north, FICHELGEBIRGE in the east and the broken terrain of the FRAENKISCHE SCHWETZ and FRAENKISCHE ALB. The HOF approach seems to be better suited as a follow-up or supply route rather than as a high speed avenue of attack. It could also support a major effort out of the COBURG/MEININGEN or CHEB area. It can accommodate the attack of one division.

(3) The CHEB, PLZEN-HWY 14 and FURTH Approaches
(of principle interest to 4 CMBG)

- (a) The CHEB approach leads from KARLOVY VARY (UR 4968) south of the ERZGEBIRGE to CHEB (UR 1251) where it splits into a one division northern route via

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MARKTREDWITZ (TR 9143), BAYREUTH towards BAMBERG or NUERNBERG and into a one or two division southern route via MITTERTEICH (UR 0238) and WEIDEN (TR 9507). On both routes, hilly and forested terrain as well as patches of bog and swamp reduce off-road movement,

- (b) The PLZEN-HWY 14 approach leads through the OBERPFAELZER WALD following the axis of the FRAENKISCHE ALB where off road movement is difficult. Further to the west this approach eventually joins the COBURG/MEININGEN approaches or, in a southwesterly direction, leads via STUTTGART to the RHEIN valley in the vicinity of KARLSRUHE-STRASSBOURG. The approach can initially accommodate two divisions abreast, and
- (c) The FURTH approach leads from PLZEN via FURTH (UQ 4265) between the OBERPFAELZER WALD and BOEHMER WALD/BAYRISCHER WALD into the rolling terrain between AMBERG (QV 0581) and STRAUBING (UQ 2217). An attack can be aimed either at penetrating the NUERNBERG area from the southeast thus supporting an attack along the PLZEN-HWY 14 approach; or, at entering the DONAU valley between REGENSBURG and STRAUBING thus enabling or supporting operations in NIEDERBAYERN. Movements are hampered by the REGEN and CHAM valleys. This approach can accommodate up to two divisions abreast,
- (4) The BOEHMERWALD - BAYRISCHER WALD. The Bohmerwald provides an initial barrier to large scale movements. Enemy forces are principally bound to two highways (11 and 12) leading from KLATOVY (UQ 7773) and STRACONICE (VQ 2057) southwest through mountainous and forested area of the BOEHMERWALD and BAYRISCHER WALD which generally prevents cross-country movement of large mechanized formations. Only secondary attacks, possible involving elements of one division along each of the two highways, could be expected, and
- (5) The DONAU Approach. The DONAU approach covers the area along the GERMAN/AUSTRIAN border between the DONAU River and the edge of the ALPEN. After crossing the INN/SALZACH Rivers which constitute an initial barrier, the wide and mostly open area is suited for armoured operations. The main thrust can be expected north to the line BRAUNAU (UP 5447) MUENCHEN. After having crossed the DONAU in the west, further advance to the RHEIN is impeded between SCHWAEBISCHE ALB and FRAENKISCHE ALB and the built-up area of STUTTGART and the SCHWARZWALD. The length of this approach to the RHEIN Valley between MANNHEIM and KARLSRUHE is approximately 400 km. The DONAU approach also forms the widest avenue of approach into the CENTAG area. It offers the possibility of rapid movement through NIEDERBAYERN with four to six divisions abreast.

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11. (NS) Summary

- a. Except the BOEHMERWALD, all other groups of approaches into the CENTAG sector could support a Front main effort;
- b. All approaches, except the MEININGEN and the DONAU approach, encompass initially difficult terrain in the border-near area thus hampering enemy movement; and
- c. Further to the west, all four groups of approaches (except BOEHMERWALD) favour armoured operations with the three southern avenues of approach converging to the RHEIN Valley.

WP PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST CENTAG

12. (NS) WESTERN FRONT Operations

- a. 1 GUARDS TANK ARMY, 8 GUARDS ARMY and MD III are deployed in peacetime in overlapping areas between the HARZ and the ERZGEBIRGE. AFCENT assesses that MD III will oppose NORTHAG;
- b. On CENTAG's left flank a WP army (probably MD III with three divisions) could attack astride the inter-army-group boundary between CENTAG and NORTHAG. Using the NORDHAUSEN/MUELHAUSEN approach this army would most likely be directed northwest into the NORTHAG sector;
- c. Directly opposite CENTAG, army offensives would probably develop north and south of the SPESSART/RHOEN. 1 GUARDS TANK ARMY and 8 GUARDS ARMY with a total of eight divisions could be committed as FIRST OPERATIONAL ECHELON in either area:
 - (1) The army attacking north of the SPESSART/RHOEN would most likely take advantage of the more favourable terrain along the axis EISENACH-FULDA-FRANKFURT for its main effort. Secondary attacks along the HESSIAN CORRIDOR could provide flank protection and would be conducted in coordination with the thrust from the NORDHAUSEN area. Its objectives are as follows:
 - (a) Its likely immediate operational objective is the area VOGELSBERG-GIESSEN, and
 - (b) Its likely final operational objective: the establishment of a bridgehead across the RHEIN south of FRANKFURT, and
 - (2) The army offensive south of the SPESSART/RHOEN would most likely exploit the favourable terrain along the MEININGEN approach and concentrate its main effort in this area. Supporting attacks would be conducted along the COBURG and

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HOF approaches. Again, the FIRST TACTICAL ECHELON could comprise two divisions for secondary attacks, and one division probably would be retained to form the SECOND TACTICAL ECHELON. Its objectives are assessed as follows:

- (a) The immediate operational objectives would be the establishment of bridgeheads over the MAIN in the vicinity of WUERZBURG, and
 - (b) The final operational objective would be the establishment of a bridgehead across the RHEIN south of MANNHEIM; and
- d. WESTERN FRONT's main effort against CENTAG will depend upon the area of commitment of the PSMD comprising the SECOND OPERATIONAL ECHELON. The WP can commit the PSMD either entirely north or south, or elements of PSMD to reinforce FIRST OPERATIONAL ECHELON Forces on both sides of SPESSART/RHOEN.

13. SOUTHWESTERN FRONT Operations (Of primary concern to 4 CMBG)

- a. SOUTHWESTERN FRONT is expected to employ 1st CZ army and 4th ARMY as FIRST OPERATIONAL ECHELON with a total of eight divisions:
 - (1) The main thrust is assessed as occurring either along the CHEB or PLZEN/HWY 14 approaches, or simultaneously along both approaches. Secondary attacks will probably be made along the FURTH approach and in the BOEHMERWALD/BAYERISHER WALD area in order to provide flank protection and/or to contain defending CENTAG forces,
 - (2) Within the FIRST TACTICAL ECHELON up to four divisions could be committed along the CHEB and HWY 14 approaches and 1-2 divisions might be committed for the secondary attacks,
 - (3) The SECOND TACTICAL ECHELON will comprise some 2-3 divisions. The possibility exists that either echelon could be reinforced by CEMD forces, and
 - (4) Objectives include the following:
 - (a) Immediate operational objectives are assessed as the areas north and south of NUERNBERG including the important Autobahn-junctions and crossing sites over the LUDWIG/EUROPA-KANAL. Operations to the north of NUERNBERG are likely to be controlled by 1 (CZ) ARMY and to the south of NUERNBERG by 4 (CZ) Army, and

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- (b) The final operational objective of the FIRST OPERATIONAL ECHELON is the establishment of bridge-heads over the RHEIN in the vicinity of KARLSRUHE; and
 - b. The commitment of SOUTHWESTERN FRONT's SECOND OPERATIONAL ECHELON, the CGF and possibly CEMD will depend upon the coordination with Western Front's offensive toward the MANNHEIM area and the success of the SOUTHWESTERN FRONT's FIRST OPERATIONAL ECHELON. The options include:
 - (1) to continue the offensive from the KARLSRUHE area into FRANCE, or
 - (2) to reinforce the FIRST OPERATIONAL ECHELON of SOUTHWESTERN FRONT; and
 - c. The allocation of forces given above is mainly based on their peacetime locations. It cannot be excluded that mixed Czech/Soviet formations will be employed in either OPERATIONAL ECHELON.
14. (NS) Operations through AUSTRIA
- a. If the WP intends to include AUSTRIA in its operations against CENTAG its principal options include:
 - (1) the use of airspace over AUSTRIAN territory,
 - (2) the use of AUSTRIAN territory for a deployment of forces opposite CENTAG without hostilities against AUSTRIA, and
 - (3) attacks into and through AUSTRIA;
 - b. Advantages to the WP of any military action against CENTAG through AUSTRIA would be:
 - (1) CENTAG will be forced to include the FRG/AUSTRIAN border in its defence,
 - (2) CENTAG reserves would have to be committed at an early time,
 - (3) The extension of WP's attack sector would allow the employment of more forces thus increasing its favourable force ratio,
 - (4) WP could contain II (GE) Korps forces in order to provide flank-protection for its attacks towards NUERNBERG-RHEIN, or the WP could conduct a large scale pincer operation towards the RHEIN with main thrusts being developed simultaneously along the axes WUERZBERG and/or NUERNBERG and the DONAU approach, and

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- (5) NATO's air defence systems could be outflanked; and
- c. Some options for that offensive include:
- (1) SOUTHWESTERN FRONT could develop a secondary thrust with up to four CZ divisions along the DONAU approach to support its main effort towards NUERNBERG-RHEIN,
 - (2) SOUTHWESTERN FRONT could develop its main thrust along the DONAU approach with 6-8 CGF/CZ divisions with an immediate operational objective in the vicinity of INGOLSTADT and the final operational objective in the KARLSRUHE area. Only secondary attacks would then be conducted in the sector north of the DONAU to contain CENTAG forces and provide flank protection, and
 - (3) The WP could, in addition to SOUTHWESTERN FRONT, form an individual "DONAU FRONT" with forces from HUNGARY AND CPMD. This option seems initially less likely as it not only requires a considerable build-up, but would also effect the availability of forces against LANDSOUTH.

NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

15. (NS) The Soviets consider that any conflict with NATO will quickly expand into nuclear warfare, at least at the threat level. If not initiated by NATO, the Soviets themselves may initiate nuclear exchange if they deem it necessary to achieve their stated objectives or if their intelligence indicates that NATO is preparing to employ such weapons. In any event, the initial strike is expected to be Theatre wide and may involve the employment of hundreds of weapons per front.
16. (NS) The initial strike will be conducted under national authority and direction. Subsequent strikes will be conducted on the authority of the Front Commander. The Front Commander may delegate this authority to Army and Division commanders, although he will remain ultimately responsible for the further employment within his operational area.
17. (NS) Targets of the initial and subsequent nuclear strikes will include CENTAG nuclear delivery means, communications facilities troop concentrations, key supply installations, airfields and targets of opportunity.
18. (NS) In a nuclear environment, Soviet doctrine envisions a rate of advance of 40-50 km per day along the main axes of advance. Sizeable heliborne and/or airborne formations may be committed to exploit the effects of nuclear fires and to support advancing tank/motorized formations which will be committed immediately after the nuclear fires are delivered.

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CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

19. (NS) Chemical Warfare

- a. Once the political decision to use weapons of mass destruction has been made, chemical weapons may be used separately from or in conjunction with nuclear weapons when and where considered expedient. Early use of chemicals in a conventional battle to gain maximum effect from surprise cannot be discounted;
- b. The initial chemical used would probably be as wide-spread as possible in order to benefit from surprise. Thereafter, persistent agents would be used to deny areas to CENTAG forces, while non-persistent agents would be used against targets suitable for later WP use, such as airfields and communication centers, or battlefield sectors across which ground forces are to advance;
- c. The Soviet Union has a wide variety of chemical agents available which comprise blister, nerve, blood and mustard agents. Potential delivery means are mortars, artillery including MRLs, missiles, mines, aerial bombs spray tanks for aircraft. Soviet nerve agents are considered to be the primary fill in chemical warheads of FROG and SCUD missiles; and
- d. There is no indication that any NSWP country is in possession of highly toxic chemical ammunition, but the Soviets will undoubtedly release sufficient agents to support operations conducted by NSWP forces.

20. (NS) Biological Warfare

- a. The Soviets have a very competent microbiological research program, affording an essential knowledge of developments in the area of offensive and defensive biological warfare; and
- b. Although there is no firm evidence that Soviet forces are equipped with biological munitions, some systems already in service, particularly missiles and aerial spray devices could be used for delivery, essentially against rear area population centers. It should be noted that the Soviet Union has ratified the Biological Weapon Convention which prohibits the development, production and stockpiling of such weapons.

AIR OPERATIONS

21. (NS) The WP tactical and strategic air threat is posed by:

- a. Frontal Aviation Forces comprising:
 - (1) air superiority fighters,

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- (2) fighter bombers and light bombers,
- (3) multi-role fighters,
- (4) reconnaissance aircraft,
- (5) dedicated electronic counter-measures escort or stand-off jamming aircraft,
- (6) attack/assault helicopters,
- (7) helicopters and short range transporters for liaison and logistical support, and
- (8) Frontal aviation forces are organized into Tactical Air Armies (TAAs) and the respective elements of the national Air Armies of NSWP countries. TAAs will be subordinate to Fronts in wartime; and

b. Strategic Forces as follows:

- (1) more than 450 MRBM may be targeted against Central Region. They include the SS-4 (range approximately 2000 km) and SS-5 (range approximately 4000 km) types. The mobile SS-20 (range approximately 5000 km) missile which has three MIRV warheads is replacing the SS-4 and SS-5 models. Furthermore, the positioning of several GOLF II submarines in the BALTIC adds another threat to the Central Region, and

- (2) Long Range Aviation comprised of medium and heavy bombers.

22. (NS) At the outset of any attack the WP is likely to mount a heavy air offensive in order to attain air superiority, thereby:

- a. denying NATO air forces influence on the land-battle;
- b. achieving freedom of action for WP air operations; and
- c. protecting WP controlled territory.

23. (NS) The extent and respective targets of air interdiction type operations will depend on the CENTAG ground forces posture at the start of the attack:

- a. If CENTAG ground forces are still on their march towards their positions the interdiction effort will then try to destroy or neutralize as much of these as possible and to delay or prevent their arrival on the battlefield;

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- b. Later or when CENTAG has established its defence in time, command and control and logistic installations as well destination airfields and marshalling areas of external reinforcements may be possible targets; and
- c. The destruction of vital points with the lines of communications (eg, bridges across the RHEIN/MAIN, etc) will depend on the WP assessments of the effects on its own operations in the respective situation.

24. (NS) Close Air Support type operations would be simultaneously concentrated on those areas of the battlefield where a decisive turn of the battle is about to be achieved such as a breakthrough or its exploitation with second echelon formations, or where artillery fire is unavailable or insufficient to support hardpressed units.

25. (NS) Besides fixed wing aircraft, attack helicopters will conduct close air support, battlefield assault-support and possibly ant-helicopter and anti-radar operations. The majority of missions in the CAS role would most likely be of anti-tank warfare and neutralization of ground targets such as hard points not readily approachable by ground troops. Loiter time of the HIND helicopter is estimated to be more than one hour in the target area whilst performing a low level attack mission with a radius of 50 km.

AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

26. (NS) Out of the three Soviet Airborne Divisions which will likely be committed against AFCENT the employment of 44 GABND and 103 GABND could occur against CENTAG. Additionally there are available:

- a. 1 ABN Div in POLAND;
- b. 1 ABN Bde in CSSR; and
- c. 1 ABN Bn in GDR.

Elements of these forces are trained to conduct subversive operations.

27. (NS) For an airdrop operation of a reinforced regiment (three days supply included) approximately 164 CUB or 92 CANDID are required. An optimum mix of both types would require 111 CUB plus 27 CANDID. The number of available transport does not allow the simultaneous commitment of all available airborne forces but only four regiments.

28. (NS) If the WP employs airborne forces in support of its operations against CENTAG, likely options would be:

- a. To seize and secure terrain where NATO forces have not yet reached their defensive positions;

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- b. To support the ground forces along their main axes of advance in maintaining or renewing the momentum of attack (only where there is a chance of an early link-up), including the seizure of key points;
- c. Possible objectives may include the area VOGELSBERG (NB10), river crossings across the MAIN between WUERZBURG (NA61) and SCHWEINFURT (NA84), the areas TAUBERGRUND (NV67), FRANKENHOEHE (NV85), and north and south of NUERNBERG (PV48). If the WP attacks through AUSTRIA the employment of such forces can assist the seizure of river crossing across the SALZACH, INN, ISAR and DONAU;
- d. To provide flank protection following a major penetration. Possible objectives for such an operation could be the slopes of KNUELLGEBIRGE, TAUNUS, both sides of SPESSARP/RHON and STEIGERWALD; and
- e. To exploit nuclear and/or chemical strikes.

HELIBORNE OPERATIONS

29. (NS) The WP demonstrates its appreciation for the value of tactical heliborne operations by continuously increasing the number of attack/assault helicopters. The most likely force to be encountered is a battalion size formation in order to gain tactical objectives.

30 (NS) Using only those attack/assault helicopter regiments from the Forward Area which are estimated as opposing CENTAG the WP could commit:

- a. Five lightly equipped MRBn in support of WESTERN FRONT; and
- b. Three and one-half lightly equipped MRBn in support of SOUTHWESTERN FRONT (4 CMBG sector).

31. (NS) These capacities could be further increased by the use of HINDS, general purpose helicopters and helicopter regiments from the Western MDs. The depth of such operations would probably not exceed a range of approximately 50 km beyond the FEBA. Operations would more likely be restricted to an area of some 20 km beyond the FEBA, as suppressive fire support from artillery attack helicopters and/or aircraft will be necessary. The light equipment of the lifted formations will also require a rapid link-up with attacking ground forces.

32. (NS) Heliborne forces could be employed anywhere:

- a. to capture and retain key tactical positions such as defiles, river crossing sites and blocking positions;
- b. to tactically assist the ground forces attack;

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- c. to assist in exploiting nuclear/chemical strikes;
- d. to prevent or delay the approach of immediate reserves;
- e. to destroy nuclear deliver means; and
- f. to destroy communications installations in the Forward Combat Zone.

RADIO ELECTRONIC COMBAT (ELECTRONIC WARFARE)

33. (NS) Under Soviet doctrine, EW is referred to as Radio Electronic Combat (REC). REC is the total intergration of electronic warfare and physical destruction means designed to deny NATO the use of its electronic control systems and to protect friendly electronic control systems from the enemy.

34. (NS) The large WP communications intercept equipment inventory provides coverage of all NATO tactical communications frequencies, except the upper portions of the multi-channel band. The WP has the capability of intercepting and monitoring most NATO radar operations, although WP capabilities in the J-band may be somewhat limited. The WP ECM equipment inventory also allows coverage of a major portion of NATO's tactical communication and radar frequency spectrums. The inventory includes communication jammers of use against e.g. UHF, VHF, HF and radio-relay equipment plus a large array of ground based and airborne radar jammers.

35. (NS) Front assets will be directed mainly against Army Group-Corps-Division communications, their interruption and deception. Army assets will be concentrated along the army's main effort and be directed against Corps-Division-Brigade communications, for intercept/DF and jamming. Division assets will conduct intercept/DF operations against tactical (Division-Brigade-Battalion) radio communications and reconnaissance radars.

36. (NS) Airborne electronic counter measures are used primarily to support air operations will be targeted against NATO air defense resources. Soviet airborne REC assets may also be used against non-air defense ground force manoeuvre assets. Such targeting would utilize the increased range and mobility of airborne REC assets to its greatest advantage.

SUBVERSIVE ACTIONS

37. (NS) WP Hostile Intelligence Services' (HIS) activities will increase considerably during the transition period from peace to war. They will play an important role in WP planning and conducting offensive operations. Although the position and attitude of certain German Leftist organizations cannot be predicted, it is expected that HIS will maintain close cooperation with orthodox communists and extremist groups to coordinate subversive activities with WP operation plans.

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38. (NS) In the Field of espionage. HIS will exploit all means in order to gain utmost intelligence on NATO alert and mobilization measures, movements, allocation of forces, their disposition and effects by the withdrawal of legal residents, HIS will additionally rely on illegal agent nets, the exploitation of sympathizers, refugees, evaders and evacuees.

39. (NS) In the field of subversion. HIS will use disinformation, rumours and the whole spectrum of psychological warfare to create dissension within the armed forces and the civilian population, to destroy their will to resist and to disrupt relations between the allied nations.

40. (NS) Sabotage will constitute the most serious threat immediately prior to and with the outbreak of hostilities. It will be conducted both by individual agents or groups and by WP Diversionary Brigades.

41. (NS) Diversionary Brigades. There are 11 Diversionary Brigades within the Soviet MDs and one in GSFG. GDR, Poland and CSSR have additional diversionary units. In peacetime a Diversionary Brigade comprises 250 men. They are highly trained in western languages, sabotage, assassination and subversion. They will be committed in teams of 5 - 12 men each. Missions will include:

- a. Destruction or neutralization of CENTAG nuclear delivery means;
- b. Destruction and neutralization of communications traffic and logistic installations;
- c. Capture of high level VIPs; and
- d. Capture or destruction of sensitive equipment and documents.

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TERRAIN

- References:
- A. HQ CENTAG Terrain Analysis of the CENTAG Area of Operations 14 Apr 78
 - B. 4 Pz Gren Div The Military Significance of the Topography of Northeastern Bavaria May 82

GENERAL

1. (NS) A detailed knowledge of the terrain is essential for the conduct of operations. A detailed analysis of all areas 4 CMBG may deploy is not feasible however a general analysis of the CENTAG area of operations can be found at reference A.

AIM

2. (NS) The aim of this document is to summarize the major aspects of terrain in 4 CMBG's priority deployment area, Northeastern Bavaria.

TOPOGRAPHS REGIONS

3. (NS) The major topographic regions (see figure 1) are as follows:

- a. THUERINGER WALD, FRANKENWALD, FICHELGEBIRGE. The THUERINGER WALD, FRANKENWALD and FICHELGEBIRGE are one range with similar characteristics. The terrain is rolling to rugged ranges and summits do not follow a consistent orientation, the ranges are cut by many narrow, steep valleys mainly extending in a NE-SW direction. Local variations range from 50 - 250 meters; elevations reach 400 - 800 meters. Highest elevations are in the THUERINGER WALD 982 meters, FRANKENWALD 795 meters and FICHELGEBIRGE 1023 meters;
 - (1) THUERINGER WALD, extends southeast from the lower reaches of the WERRA River to the FRANKENWALD for a distance of approximately 110 kilometers, with a width varying from 10 to 30 kilometers. Elevations decrease to the southeast. The heavily forested mountain ranges rise to some 400 - 500 meters above the surrounding plateau. The entire area has a ridge-like character with deep, pine-forested valleys forming relatively deep passes. The steepest slopes are in the northwest towards the THUERINGER BECKEN, in the lowlands between the HARZ and THUERINGER WALD, where as the slopes towards the southwest (WERRA Valley) are more gentle forming a zone with scrapland like characteristics and interspersed lowlands between the THUERINGER WALD and Inner-GERMAN Border. The road net is dense and sufficient to support movement of major units; it is, however, poorly maintained in the densely forested higher-altitude hills,

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- (2) FRANKENWLAD (FRANKONIAN FOREST). Elevations of the FRANKENWALD are generally lower, ranging from 600 to 800 meters, the terrain is less rugged. Towards the southeast, the FRANKENWALD slopes to the MUENCHBERGER HOCHFLAECHE (MUENCHBERG UPLANDS) which separate the FRANKENWALD from the FICHELGESBIRGE. Approximately 55% of the hilly area and 25% of the uplands are forested. The BERLIN (VU 9520) - MUENCHEN (PU 9132) Autobahn, one major and several secondary roads traverse the area. The northern portion of the FRANKENWALD is drained by the KRONACH and RODACH rivers, and the southwestern portion by the WEISSER MAIN River. The SAALE River, receiving waters from the MUENCHBERGER HOCHFLAECHE, and running to the north is dammed to form three lakes. The river itself is difficult to ford. Streams in this region are generally narrow and swift. Water levels vary greatly depending on seasonal rainfalls. Banks and bottoms consist of silt, sand and gravel,
- (3) FICHELGESBIRGE. The FICHELGESBIRGE is the hub of four mountain chains: The FRANKENWALD, the ERZGEBIRGE, the OBERPFAELZER WALD and the FRAENKISCHE ALB. The ridges of the FICHELGESBIRGE encompass horseshoe-like uplands of SELB (TR 1592) and WUNSIEDEL (TR 8747). The average elevations is 800 meters, maximum elevation is 1094 meters. Only about one half of the FICHELGESBIRGE is forested today, since large areas have been cleared in recent years. Several streams drain the area into the ELBE, DONAU and MAIN rivers. Valleys in the central plateau area are deeply incised and widen in their western portions. The road net consists of two main roads leading from east to west and a few secondary roads. While movement through the FICHELGESBIRGE is difficult it can be bypassed easily on the north or south. To the unit in possession its deep compartmented valleys would form an excellent staging area for further operations;
- b. The OBERPFAELZER WALD (UPPER PALATINATE FOREST). The OBERPFAELZER WALD extends in a NW-SE direction from the NAAB Valley in the north to the FURTH Cap in the south. Elevations increase from 600 to 1000 meters. The relief varies from rolling to rugged. The NAAB Depression is an extension of the EGERLAENDER BECKEN beyond the ridge on the BOHEMIAN side. The other major depression is the FURTHER SENKE with elevations dropping to 400 meters. This gap is dominated on the north and south by hills rising up to 1000 meters. Nearly half of the area is forested, mainly in the dominating ranges. Several roads traverse the OBERPFAELZER WALD in an E-W direction. The trail network is of sufficient quality to support heavy vehicular movement in all but the most severe weather. The WALDNAAB, PFREIMD and SCHWARZACH rivers drain the area into the NAAB River. These streams flow in wide, often drench valleys. The NAAB Depression is sprinkled with dammed up lakes and ponds;

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- c. The BAYERISCHER WALD (BAVARIAN FOREST). The BAYERISCHER WALD extends in a NW-SE direction and slopes steeply to rugged hill masses grouped in ranges. Its eastern range comprises all parts of the BOEHMERWALD (BOHEMIAN FOREST) which are located on the GERMAN side of the border. Maximum elevation in the western range is 1100 meters and in the eastern range 1456 meters. The central region of the area is densely forested (90%); evergreen are predominant. HWY 12 (PHILLIPSREUTH VQ 0513) provide for east-west movement. Otherwise one road net is poor except in the extreme southern part. Available roads have steep gradients and sharp curves and often follow incised valleys. Its northeastern part, the HINTERER BAYERISCHER WALD, is the watershed between the ELBE and the DONAU rivers. Many small streams drain into the REGEN, ILZ and OHE rivers;
- d. MAIN-NAAB HILLS (OBERPFAELZER HEUGELLAND). This area is bordered on the NE and east by a chain mountains stretching along the Inner-GERMAN Border and the FRG/CSSR border and on the west by the FRAENKISCHE ALB. It is a narrow belt about 120 km long and 10-40 km wide, extending from the KULMBACH (PA 7552) area in the north to the DONAU River in the south. The relief varies from undulating to rolling with interspersed basins (ie, SONNEBERG-NEUSTADT, KULMBACH, WEIDEN and BODENWOEHRER BECKEN). This area is best compared to a patchwork of villages, towns and farmland with extensive areas of low forestation alternating with mini-ranges and forest-crowned or even sem-barren hilltops. This landscape might be described as "typical German". The hills immediately to the southeast of Pegnitz have an unusual abundance of high natural springs, which make trafficability worse at times on the high terrain extremes than in the mid or even low ranges. These mountain springs create special problems in the March through May period. The impact area of Grafenwöhr Training Area presents a serious though not impassable obstacle. Low areas near river valleys are subject to inundation in severe weather. The MAIN-NAAB Hills taper down to the WALDNAAB River, with its natural river-crossing-operation sites in the vicinity of WEIDEN. On the eastern side of the WALDNAAB, the terrain rises through a 10 km belt of rolling hills and farmland into the OBERPFAELZER WALD; and
- e. FRAENKISCHE ALB. (FRAENKISCHE HILLS). The FRAENKISCHE ALB rises on the west with a discontinuous scrap edge of about 100-200 meters above the FRAENKISCHES STUFENLAND and encompasses its east and southeast flank. The region consists of an open plateau with deep, steep-sided river valleys. (WIESENT, PEGNITZ, VILS, LABER, ALTMUEHL and WOERNITZ). Maximum elevations reach up to 650 meters. The plateau, more massive, higher and barren in the northern portion (FRAENKISCHE SCHWEIZ), is not easily accessible from this side. It slopes, however, gently towards the NAAB River in the east and the DONAU River in the south. The highlands are covered with forests, mostly coniferous, that alternate with pasture, wetland, and farmland. This region has

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a branched out drainage pattern. Almost vertical slopes along river valleys and local relief up to 200 meters do channelize movement to some extent, but the area is ultimately passable to major military formations via the well developed road and trail network. Although forests cover up to 60% of the FRANCONIAN UPLAND, their effect would be to slow--not to deny--the transit and swift. Water is abundant throughout the year. Bank and bottom materials range from silty clay to firm and sandy gravel. The ALTMUEHL and WOERNITZ rivers as well as the VILS river south of AMBERG (QV 0581) are generally difficult to ford and become unfordable during periods of high water.

DRAINAGE (See Figure 2)

4. (NC) DONAU. The majority of the river systems within the area run off into the DONAU River. To control water levels a number of dams have been built along the rivers course. The DONAU enters Northeastern Bavaria from the southwest, running through ULM and Ingelstadt to Regensburg before turning south to the Austrian border. The river width is approximately 150 meters near Regensburg and due to the dams reaches 800 meters in places. It is considered to be a minor obstacle.

5. (NC) REGEN. The main river in the Bayerischer Wald is the REGEN. It flows from Cham up to west of Roding in a deeply cut valley with wooded mountain slopes on either side. This valley, which starts off as a wide level valley, expands in the area around Nittenau and then narrows again near Steflig, changes its course abruptly to the south and then runs from Regenstauf in a valley up to 4 kilometers wide to Regensburg, where it flows into the Donau. The width of the river ranges from 40 - 100 meters and its depth from 0.80 to 2.50 meters. In the basins of the river valley, banks are mostly soft and carry few trees.

6. (NC) NAAB. The Naab river with its sources the Nordliche Waldnaab and Fuhtelnaab meet at Windischeschenbeck to form the Waldnaab. The river bears the name Naab, without any additions only after it has received the Haidenaab near Oberwildnau, 10km south of Weideu. After approximately 100 km it flows into the Donau west of Regensburg. The River Naab does not pose a difficult obstacle. The northern portion is narrow and shallow and can be easily forded. Although the southern portion is generally wider there are numerous areas where crossings could be affected. Along the entire length there are numerous small creeks and ditches that debouch into the Nab. The sheer numbers of these small water courses could make movement difficult. There are also several routes and railway lines that run parallel to the river thereby lending good access for crossing operations. Once again the valley through which the river flows has slopes up to 50% and is heavily forested restricting movement to the routes and a few cleared areas. There are also several swampy areas in the valley whose width varies from 1 - 6 km along the length. The principal characteristics of the river are:

- a. Bottom composition gravel with fine soils;

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- b. Width - Mean Water 5 - 20 meters;
- c. Depth - Mean Water .5 - 1.5 meters;
- d. Speed of Flow - Mean Water 1 - 1.5 meter/second.

Overall the river is not too difficult an obstacle since it can be readily forded or bridged with AVLB. There are numerous access routes along its entire length.

7. (NC) VILS. The VILS river flows in a North-South direction through the towns of Sulzbach-Regensburg and Amberg and into the Naab river at Kallmunz. The Vils does not present a major obstacle to Warsaw Pact movement. However due to the surrounding terrain it is difficult to cross south of Amberg. The river is approximately 6 to 8 meters wide and ranges from 1 to 3 meters deep.

8. (NC) PEGNITZ. The River Pegnitz, between the towns of Pegnitz and Hersbruck, is a narrow slow moving river that forms a limited obstacle mainly because of the narrow, heavily forested valley through which it meanders. Access to it is restricted to reentrants and routes that are already existent. In the northern portion just South of Pegnitz (PA 8315), the creek is very narrow and does not constitute an obstacle. However with development to the existing railway embankment it could constitute more of an obstacle. From Neuhaus (PA 8400) South, the obstacle becomes more difficult primarily because of the steep walled valley through which it flows. The principal characteristics are:

- a. Bottom - sandy (some gravel);
- b. Width - Mean Water - northern portion (Pegnitz to Neuhaus)
5 - 10 km;
southern portion (Neuhaus to Hersbruck)
15 - 20 km;
- c. Depth - Mean Water 0.5 - 1.5 meters;
- High Water 1.5 meters; and
- d. Speed of Flow - Mean Water 0.5 - 1 metersec,
- High Water 1.5 meter/sec.

9. (NC) PUTLACH. Generally the PUTLACH is a small narrow river that provides very little of a physical obstacle in itself. The ground through which it flows is difficult and forested thus providing some measure of an obstacle. From Moritz (PA 7924) to Oberhauenstein (PA7716) the Putlach meanders along as a ditch. However the soil surrounding it is poorly drained clay with a tendency to be swampy and hence has poor trafficability. The valley varies in width up to 1 km wide and has forested slopes. The gradient of these slopes is again from 50 to 90 percent and the valley width varies from 50 to 100 meters. The creek here has fairly steep embankments with an average height of 1 to 1.5 meters and a slope

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that varies from 50 to 80 percent. A road parallels the Putlach from Pottenstein to Behringemuhle. The river bottom is comprised of fine soils (clay) and some gravel. The principal characteristics are:

- a. Width - Mean Water 2 to 10 km;
- b. Depth - Mean Water 0.5 to 1.5 meters; and
- c. Speed of Flow - Mean Water 1.5 meters/second.

10. WIESENT. The Wiesent is the principal river in the Frankische-Schweiz. Its source is at Steinfeld PA 545 385 but it doesn't attain any real importance until Behringsmuhle PA 681 167. Its direction of flow is from Plankenfels to Streitberg. The principal characteristics are:

- a. Width - Mean Water 8 to 20 meters (in spots 20 meters);
- b. Depth - Mean Water 0.5 to 2.5 meters;
- High Water 2 meters; and
- c. Speed - Mean Water 1 meter/second,
- High Water 1.5 meter/second.

11. (NC) ROTER-MAIN. An extension of the line of the PEGNITZ River to the NORTH is the roter-MAIN. The ROTER-MAIN runs in the opposite direction of the Pegnitz River from CREUSSEN (PA 8824) toward BAYREUTH (PA 8535) in the NORTH. The ROTER-MAIN is not an obstacle to WARSAW PACT movement. Wheeled vehicles may have difficulty crossing due to the trees which border it.

CLIMATE

12. (NR) Bavaria lies in the moderate zone and belongs to the "Atlantic Continental" climatic region. That is, it has a transition zone climate which is characterized primarily by the effects of alternating moist ocean and dry continental air masses - and to a minor extent also by polar and tropical air masses.

13. (NR) However, the climate is also largely dependent on the topography; lowlands and mountains show significant differences in "regional climates". The location of valleys, slopes and mountain peaks further influences the climate of each region and produces "local" climates. Even large "enclosed" populated areas have their own special urban climate.

14. (NR) The influence of the ocean climate prevents wide fluctuations of average temperatures, that is, the difference between the coldest and the warmest months is smaller, whereas under the continental influence it becomes greater.

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15. (NR) The large basins and lowlands, i.e. the Central Franconian basin, the Upper Palatinate hills, the DANUBE valley and the Lower Bavarian Hills, are characterized by the continental climate; however, the Danube valley to the south means little precipitation (most of that in the summer), only brief snow cover, and earlier spring, warmer summers, higher annual average temperatures and greater temperature differences.

16. (NR) These regions lie in the rain-forest shadow of the plateaus of the Franconian Heights, the Sterger Forest, the Franconian hills and the Fichtel Mountains to the west.

17. (NR) The Franconian hills and the Upper Palatinate and Bavarian Forests come under the influence of the oceanic climate. The predominant westwinds bring moisture and release it primarily over the western mountains. This reduces the precipitation to the east. However, in the Rear Upper Palatinate Forest the amount of precipitation increases again further eastward to 1000 mm, whereas the western part of the Upper Palatinate Forest is still protected by the Franconian hills which catch most of the precipitation. Precipitation in the Bavarian Forest also increases towards the east reaching a maximum in the Rear Bavarian Forest at 1850 mm.

18. (NR) Although the hills act as a rain catcher, they are not high enough to create a significant climatic difference between the foreland and the plateau. Thus, the Franconian hills belong to the dry central mountain regions.

19. (NR) The Upper Palatinate and Bavarian Forests, on the other hand, are cool and damp. Summers are short, average temperatures lower and total precipitation considerably higher, although with fewer fluctuations. Summer and winter bring roughly the same amount of precipitation; dry periods and hail are rare. During winter the "Bohemian wind" a dry katabatic wind, intensifies the cold considerably, especially in the low areas that are exposed to the northeast and the eastwest oriented portion of the border mountains. High snowdrifts in the winter and dehydration of the young seedlings in the spring are further results of the "Bohemian wind".

LIGHT

20. (NR) Light tables for Northeastern Bavaria are contained in Tables 1 and 2.

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
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FIGURE 1



A-3-8

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
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FIGURE 1



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TABLE 1
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34		SUNRISE AND SUNSET AT GREENWICH MERIDIAN, LATITUDE 48° NORTH																				NAUTICAL ALMANAC OFFICE U.S. NAVAL OBSERVATORY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20390			
LATITUDE 48° 00' N		UNIVERSAL TIME																							
LONGITUDE 0 00 W																									
DAY	JAN.	FEB.	MAR.	APR.	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG.	SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.													
	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM	
1	750	417	728	459	642	544	540	629	443	712	402	751	404	803	435	736	517	642	558	540	644	443	728	409	
2	750	418	727	501	640	545	538	631	441	714	404	752	405	803	437	735	518	640	600	538	646	441	729	409	
3	750	419	726	503	638	547	536	632	440	715	404	753	405	803	438	734	520	638	601	536	647	439	731	409	
4	750	420	724	504	636	548	533	634	438	717	403	754	406	802	439	732	521	636	603	534	649	438	732	408	
5	750	421	723	506	634	550	531	635	436	718	403	754	407	802	440	731	523	634	604	532	650	436	733	408	
6	749	422	722	507	632	551	529	637	435	719	402	755	407	801	442	729	524	632	605	530	652	435	734	408	
7	749	424	720	509	630	553	527	638	433	721	402	756	408	801	443	727	525	630	607	528	653	433	735	407	
8	749	425	719	511	628	554	525	639	432	722	401	757	409	800	444	726	527	628	608	526	655	432	736	407	
9	749	426	717	512	626	556	523	641	430	723	401	757	410	800	446	724	528	626	610	524	656	431	737	407	
10	748	427	716	514	624	557	521	642	429	725	401	758	411	759	447	723	529	624	611	522	658	429	738	407	
11	748	428	714	515	622	559	520	644	427	726	400	759	412	759	448	721	531	622	613	520	700	428	739	407	
12	747	430	712	517	620	600	518	645	426	727	400	759	412	758	450	719	532	620	614	518	701	427	740	407	
13	747	431	711	519	618	602	516	647	425	729	400	800	413	757	451	718	533	618	616	516	703	425	741	407	
14	746	432	709	520	616	603	514	648	423	730	400	801	414	756	453	716	535	616	617	514	704	424	742	407	
15	745	434	707	522	614	605	512	649	422	731	400	801	415	756	454	714	536	614	618	513	706	423	743	407	
16	745	435	706	523	612	606	510	651	421	733	400	801	416	755	455	712	538	611	620	511	707	422	744	407	
17	744	437	704	525	610	608	508	652	419	734	400	802	417	754	457	711	539	609	621	509	709	421	744	408	
18	743	438	702	526	608	609	506	654	418	735	400	802	419	753	458	709	540	607	623	507	710	420	745	408	
19	742	439	701	528	606	611	504	655	417	736	400	803	420	752	459	707	542	605	624	505	712	419	746	408	
20	742	441	699	530	604	612	502	657	416	738	400	803	421	751	501	705	543	603	626	503	713	418	746	409	
21	741	442	697	531	602	613	500	658	415	739	400	803	422	750	502	703	544	601	627	501	714	417	747	409	
22	740	444	695	533	600	615	499	700	414	740	400	803	423	749	503	702	546	599	629	500	716	416	747	410	
23	739	445	693	534	598	616	497	701	413	741	401	803	424	748	505	700	547	597	630	498	717	415	748	410	
24	738	447	692	536	596	618	495	702	412	742	401	804	425	747	506	698	549	595	632	496	719	414	748	411	
25	737	448	690	537	594	619	493	704	411	744	401	804	427	746	508	696	550	593	633	494	720	413	749	411	
26	736	450	688	539	592	621	491	705	410	745	402	804	428	744	509	694	551	591	635	492	722	413	749	412	
27	735	451	686	541	590	622	489	707	409	746	402	804	429	743	510	692	553	589	636	491	723	412	749	413	
28	733	453	684	542	588	624	487	708	408	747	402	804	430	742	512	690	554	587	638	489	724	411	750	413	
29	732	455	683	543	586	625	485	710	407	748	403	803	431	741	513	688	556	585	639	487	726	411	750	414	
30	731	456		544	584	626	483	711	406	749	403	803	433	739	514	686	557	583	641	485	727	410	750	415	
31	730	458		542	628		481	750	406	750		804	434	738	516	684		585	643	484			750	416	

THIS TABLE MAY BE USED IN ANY YEAR OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND WITHIN THE GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARY OF THE STATED PLACE WITH AN ERROR NOT EXCEEDING TWO MINUTES AND GENERALLY LESS THAN ONE MINUTE. ADD ONE HOUR FOR DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME IF AND WHEN IN USE.

37		SUNRISE AND SUNSET AT GREENWICH MERIDIAN, LATITUDE 50° NORTH																		NAUTICAL ALMANAC OFFICE U.S. NAVAL OBSERVATORY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20390				
LATITUDE 50° 00' N		UNIVERSAL TIME																						
LONGITUDE 0 00 W																								
DAY	JAN.	FEB.	MAR.	APR.	MAY	JUNE	JULY	AUG.	SEPT.	OCT.	NOV.	DEC.												
	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM	RISE AM	SET PM
1	759	408	734	453	644	541	538	631	437	718	356	800	356	813	428	743	514	645	559	540	649	438	736	401
2	759	409	733	455	642	543	536	633	436	719	355	801	355	812	430	742	516	643	601	537	650	436	737	401
3	759	411	731	457	640	545	534	634	434	721	355	802	356	812	431	740	517	641	602	535	652	434	739	400
4	758	412	730	459	638	546	531	636	432	722	354	803	357	812	433	739	519	639	604	533	654	433	740	400
5	758	413	728	500	636	548	529	637	430	724	353	804	357	811	434	737	520	637	605	531	655	431	741	359
6	758	414	727	502	634	550	527	639	429	725	353	805	358	811	435	735	521	634	607	529	657	430	742	359
7	758	415	725	504	632	551	525	640	427	727	352	805	359	810	437	734	523	632	608	527	659	428	744	359
8	757	416	724	506	630	553	523	642	425	728	352	806	400	810	438	732	524	630	610	525	700	426	745	359
9	757	418	722	507	628	554	521	644	424	730	352	807	401	809	440	730	526	628	611	522	702	425	746	358
10	756	419	720	509	626	556	519	645	422	731	351	808	402	808	441	728	527	626	613	520	704	423	747	358
11	756	420	719	511	624	558	517	647	421	733	351	808	403	808	443	727	529	624	615	518	705	422	748	358
12	755	422	717	512	621	559	514	648	419	734	351	809	404	807	444	725	530	621	616	516	707	421	749	358
13	755	423	715	514	619	601	512	650	418	736	350	810	405	806	446	723	532	619	618	514	709	419	750	358
14	754	425	713	516	617	603	510	651	416	737	350	810	406	805	447	721	533	617	619	512	710	418	751	358
15	753	426	712	518	615	604	508	653	415	739	350	811	407	804	449	719	535	615	621	510	712	417	752	358
16	752	428	710	519	613	606	506	655	413	740	350	811	408	803	450	717	536	613	623	508	714	415	752	358
17	752	429	708	521	611	607	504	656	412	741	350	812	409	802	452	715	538	610	624	506	715	414	753	359
18	751	431	706	523	608	609	502	658	411	743	350	812	410	801	453	714	539	608	626	504	717	413	754	359
19	750	432	704	524	606	611	500	659	409	744	350	812	411	800	455	712	541	606	627	502	718	412	755	359
20	749	434	702	526	604	612	498	701	408	745	350	813	413	799	456	710	542	604	629	500	720	411	755	400
21	748	435	700	528	602	614	496	702	407	747	350	813	414	798	458	708	544	602	631	498	722	410	756	400
22	747	437	698	530	600	615	494	704	406	748	351	813	415	797	459	706	545	599	632	496	723	409	756	401
23	746	438	696	531	598	617	492	706	405	749	351	813	416	796	461	704	547	597	634	494	725	408	757	401
24	745	440	695	533	596	618	490	707	404	751	351	813	418	794	463	702	548	595	636	492	726	407	757	402
25	743	442	693	535	594	620	488	709	402	752	351	813	419	793	465	700	550	593	637	490	728	406	758	402
26	742	443	691	536	592	622	487	710	401	753	352	813	420	792	467	698	551	591	639	488	729	405	758	403
27	741	445	689	538	590	623	485	712	400	754	352	813	422	790	469	696	553	589	641	486	731	404	758	404
28	740	447	687	540	588	625	483	713	400	755	353	813	423	789	471	694	555	587	642	484	732	403	758	405
29	738	448	686	541	586	626	481	715	399	757	353	813	424	788	473	692	557	585	644	482	733	403	759	405
30	737	450		542	584	628	479	716	398	758	354	813	426	786	475	690	559	583	645	480	735	402	759	406
31	736	452		540	630			718	397	759			427	785	477	688	561	581	647	478	737	401	759	407

THIS TABLE MAY BE USED IN ANY YEAR OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND WITHIN THE GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARY OF THE STATED PLACE WITH AN ERROR NOT EXCEEDING TWO MINUTES AND GENERALLY LESS THAN ONE MINUTE. ADD ONE HOUR FOR DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME IF AND WHEN IN USE.

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ANNEX G
TO 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001
DATED 1 JANUARY 1986

GDP RECCE POLICY

GENERAL

1. There is a need for units to become familiar with the various GDP Contingency Operations Plan.

AIM

2. The aim will be to provide the 4 CMBG policy for GDP related recces.

AREAS

3. Reconnaissance will be conducted of the following GDP areas:

- a. unit PSAs and the routes to them;
- b. unit RSAs;
- c. brigade move staging area near CRAILSHEIM;
- d. Assembly Area SETTER; and
- e. each of the possible Contingency Operations Plan (COP) areas.

GUIDELINES

4. Only the unit or supporting arm commanders specified in Appendix 1 may participate in GDP recces.
5. Units may conduct TEWTs, CPXs or FTXs involving additional unit personnel over a GDP area if the exercise is done as a normal part of unit training and the exercise is not presented as being GDP related.
6. Dress and means of transportation will be as specified in Appendix 1.
7. Where Appendix 1 indicates HQ 4 CMBG authority is required to conduct a recce, units will submit a request, attention G3, with information specified in Appendix 2.
8. Initial recces, by all authorized personnel, must be conducted within the time periods given. Recces should normally be conducted during the annual FALLEX Hohenfels/Grafenwöhr concentrations.

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ANNEX G
TO 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001
DATED 1 JANUARY 1986

FUNDING

9. Units should request funds for GDP recces in their annual budget submissions.

APPENDICES:

Appendix 1 - GDP Recce Guidelines
Appendix 2 - Format for GDP Recce Requests

G-2

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APPENDIX I
 TO ANNEX G
 TO 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001
 DATED 1 JANUARY 1986

GDP RECCE GUIDELINES

AREA	PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED TO CONDUCT RECCE	DRESS	MEANS OF TPT	TIME PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE RECCE MUST BE DONE	CLEARANCE BY HQ 4 CMBG REQUIRED	REMARKS
PSA and routes to it	All unit Comds down to and including veh dvrs and crew comds	uniform	mil veh	within 30 days of arrival in a unit	No	
RSA	CO, DCO, Coy/Sqn/Bty/Flt Comds, Ops 0, i/c unit har recce party, 1 RCHA AD Tp Comd	civilian	civilian	within 6 months of arrival in a unit	No	Should be conducted in groups of max 2 or 3 pers.
Staging Area	Same as RSA	uniform	mil veh	within 12 months of arrival in a unit	Yes, except as part of a trg rd mov staging camp	
Assembly Area SETTER	Same as RSA	uniform	mil veh	within 12 months of arrival in a unit	Yes, except during FALLEX	
Deployment	CO, DCO, Coy/Sqn/Bty Flt Comds, Ops 0 Engr Tp Comds, Armd Def Pl Comds, Recce Pl Comds, D Sqn RCD Battle Capt, 1 RCHA AD Tp Comd, OC Fwd Repair Gp, 4 Svc Bn	uniform	mil veh	all options which have been planned in detail must be done within 12 months of arrival in unit	Yes, except if within FALLEX Hohenfels RMA	

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APPENDIX 2
TO ANNEX G
TO 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001
DATED 1 JANUARY 1986

FORMAT FOR GDP RECCE REQUESTS

LETTERGRAM

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FM

TO HQ 4 CMBG LAHR//G3 OPS//

SUBJ: GDP RECCE

1. Requests for GDP recces will be submitted in the following format:
 - a. area of recce;
 - b. date of recce;
 - c. pers participating including appointment; and
 - d. sp required beyond unit resources.

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PA



National Defence / Défense nationale

2000-1 (G2)

NDP/DC 222 / SGRDN 3-2-2
Re: PA
Transmis a

4 Canadian Mechanized
Brigade Group Headquarters
CFPO 5000

DEC 4 1987

7 May 1986

National Defence Headquarters
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0K2

File No. 2248-33001-4
Dossier No. RETAINED
Copy No. RETENUE
ACTION / INFORMATION

CRS / CIS DDI REGISTRY

Referred to
Transmis a 2584

MAY 26 1986

Control No. 3924
Controle No. 3924
File No. _____
Dossier No. _____

Attention: DDI 3-4

4 CMBG INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 1-86

1. Enclosed is 4 CMBG Intelligence Estimate 1-86. This is the first product of its kind in 4 CMBG and fills a critical intelligence requirement. It is intended to reassess or update the estimate at least once a year.
2. A copy is forwarded for your perusal. The estimate is Annex A to our GDP and is considered to be a dynamic document. Any comments which your office wishes to make would be received most positively. A careful reading of the appendices will show 4 CMBG's intelligence requirements.
3. The estimate is written at the NATO SECRET level so that it can be forwarded to our German allies. 4 CMBG has a special access facility and invites comments or information at all levels of security.

[Signature]
D.S. Moreside
Major
for Commander 4 CMBG

Enclosure: 1

2000-7-2-6

DISTRIBUTION ??

We have 3 copies of copy No 62. (spare according to Dist List).

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DDI 3-4

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
4 CANADIAN MECHANIZED BRIGADE GROUP



INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE



1-86



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Copy 62 of 65

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ANNEX A (INTELLIGENCE) TO 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001

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SUMMARY

1. 4 CMBG is likely to be employed on or near the VII (US) Corps/II (GE) Korps boundary. The orientation is EAST-WEST roughly parallel to Highway 14. The main effort of the South Western Front (SWF) is expected to be down Highway 14.
2. Military operations are possible at any time of the year. The most temperate weather occurs from May through September, but clear cold periods in mid winter are also conducive to rapid mounted attack. Average temperatures range from -7 to 19 degrees centigrade. Annual precipitation averages between 51 to 89 centimeters. Trafficability is usually worst during mid spring and mid autumn. Fog is most likely to occur on autumn mornings, although winter has periods of poor visibility interspersed with windows of clear weather. Winds are generally from west to southwest thus favouring NATO use of smoke and chemical weapons.
3. The terrain in the Brigade's area of operations (AO) is complex. It is characterized by densely forested areas particularly on the border and west of the NAAB River, by hills and escarpments, and by numerous water obstacles, none major, but which have to be dealt with and which do canalize movement. There are few open areas which facilitate manoeuvre. The terrain is defensible. The enemy will have to modify and adapt his tactics in order to achieve the objectives and the rates of advance stated in his doctrine.
4. Within the CHEB - Highway 14 corridor, Warsaw Pact forces can cross the border on three divisional axes: CHEB - BAYREUTH - BAMBERG (North), MARIANSKE LAZNE - PEGNITZ - FORCHHEIM (Centre), and PLZEN - HIGHWAY 14 - SCHWBACH (South). The first echelon army must fight its way across 100 kilometers of difficult terrain before attempting a crossing of the RMD canal. West of the canal the terrain supports high speed operations. Within the sector, the southern divisional axis is the most likely main effort. As the battle develops, the enemy will shift his effort to the sector where he has met with the most success.
5. Enemy forces immediately available to form the first operation echelon are the five divisions of the Central Group of Forces (CGF) and the four divisions of the 1st Czech Peoples' Army. The second operational echelon will be drawn from one of the three armies of the Carpathian Military District (CPMD), probably 38 Army. Current indications are that the Soviet's will use a limited build-up period of about one week. To ensure the tempo of operations is maintained the second operational echelon will have commenced its move forward before D-Day.
6. It would appear that the Soviets regard the Border to Canal operation as a single army, 1½ to 3 day operation. A follow-on army would likely be employed after the Canal. The second echelon army could, of course, be committed earlier. An army can be expected to handle operations for three to five days.
7. The enemy can be expected to mount tactical air assault operations to seize crossings on the NAAB River and important defiles. Operational level air assault or airborne operations may be conducted on the RMD Canal. Special purpose forces (SPF) can be expected to conduct reconnaissance and

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targetting in the area. This sector will receive ground attack priority (fixed wing and helicopter) within the SWF.

8. The enemy has two attack options:

- a. Option 1. The CGF, as the lead army of the SWF, conducts the main attack with three divisions on line in the CHEB - Highway 14 corridor. A tank division (TD) will be positioned to exploit success with priority to the SOUTH; or
- b. Option 2. 1 CPA, as part of the SWF, attacks in first echelon with three divisions leading and its TD following-up. CGF divisions would attack in second echelon in this option.

9. Option 2 is the most likely course of action as it would allow the Czechs to open the way for Soviet exploitation deep into West Germany.

COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE (APPENDIX 1)

10. 4 CMBG is faced by WP SIGINT, IMINT and HUMINT threats. They are well coordinated and complementary.

11. The Brigade has been identified as a priority EW/SIGINT collection target especially when deployed in the forward area or training in Grafenwöhr or Hohenfels. The HUMINT threat stems from SMLM, WP TIR trucks, diplomatic personnel, agents, subversive, terrorist and eventually SPF and sleeper agents. The full scope of the WP IMINT collection effort ranges from hand-held cameras to tactical reconnaissance aircraft to drones and strategic satellite systems. The WP uses Intelligence Collector Flights (ICF) to target exercises held within 100 kilometers of the border. Awareness of the threat and appropriate counter-measures will make the WP collection effort much more difficult.

ORDER OF BATTLE (APPENDIX 2)

12. The ORBAT of the CGF, CPA and CPMD are included.

AIR THREAT TO 4 CMBG (APPENDIX 3)

13. Aircraft available to the Southwestern Front for immediate operations against 4 CMBG include 450 ground attack fighters (FITTERs, FISHBED, FLOGGERS and FROGFOOT); 165 assault helicopters (HIP) and 180 attack helicopters (HIND and HIP). Interdiction by ground attack fighters could jeopardize our movement to forward assembly areas. Once battle is joined the attack helicopter poses the major threat.

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE (APPENDIX 4)

14. This threat stems from a battalion of the Czech 22 Airborne Regiment; an Air Assault Brigade in the CPMD and one in GSFG; an Air Assault Battalion in CGF and one in the CPMD; and a SPF Brigade in GSFG and the CPMD. Because of 4 CMBG's reserve role there is increased likelihood that the Brigade might encounter some of these forces whose action would be designed to disrupt or delay the movement of reserves or to attack facilities in the rear unbalancing or "unlocking" the defence from the rear.

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NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL THREAT (APPENDIX 5)

15. Despite Soviet assurances against first use of NBC weapons, their mere existence is cause for concern. It is assessed that they would use CW munitions without nuclear from the outset.

THREAT TO 4 CMBG WHILE ON THE AIRFIELD (APPENDIX 6)

16. Massive air strikes are considered the primary threat to the Lahr and Baden airfields. Surface-to-surface missiles, NBC and airborne attacks are assessed as minimal. Should the Brigade not be deployed forward prior to hostilities we risk collateral damage from attacks on the airfield.

THREAT TO 4 CMBG DURING DEPLOYMENT (APPENDIX 7)

17. Should the Brigade deploy forward prior to actual hostilities, the physical threat to the Brigade is minimal. However, once war is initiated, movement to SETTER and beyond would be subjected to air strikes, movement through chemically contaminated areas and eventually missile strikes. Such actions could seriously disrupt or delay our forward deployment.

SOVIET ARMY DOCTRINE FOR COMBAT IN HILLY AND MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN (APPENDIX 8)

18. The Soviet's characterize the terrain in our GDP as hilly and mountainous. As such they emphasize outflanking manoeuvres and air assaults in their tactics. Historically, rates of advance have been one third the norm and frontages have been two to three times the norm in this type of terrain.

FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION (APPENDIX 9)

19. Soviet and Czech force development and modernization have been characterized by changes in force structures, equipment upgrades and improved C³ systems. In particular, the CPA have deployed an array of new equipment such as the BMP-2, T-72, SA-13, DANA, 2S7, and 2S4. In conjunction there are major upgrades including a fire control system for T-55s.

WEAKNESSES AND VULNERABILITIES (APPENDIX 10)

20. The WP is assessed as having some major problems, many of which have the potential to detract from operational efficiency. These include demographic and ethnic disparities, social ills, WP reliability, and poor leadership. Exploitable vulnerabilities by 4 CMBG include the lack of initiative by low level commanders, inflexibility in the command structure, rigid tactics as well as some of their equipment.

4 CMBG INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (APPENDIX 11)

21. The requirement for intelligence and information on our potential enemy cannot be confined solely to war or times of increasing tension. The Brigade's IR's are as follows:

- a. Priority 1 - CPA and CGF;
- b. Priority 2 - CPMD;

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- c. Priority 3 - Air Forces likely to support Priorities 1 and 2;
and
- d. Priority 4 - 1 GTA and 8 GA.

METEOROLOGICAL DATA (APPENDIX 12)

22. A table outlining meteorological data for the GDP area is included.

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DISTRIBUTION LIST (As per 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001)

In addition, the following distribution, to working Intelligence staffs, is controlled by G2, 4 CMBG.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>COPY NUMBER</u>
<u>External</u>	
1 RCHA (IO)	41
RCD (IO)	42
D Sqn, RCD (Int)	43
4 CER (IO)	44
4 CMBG HQ & Sig Sqn (Ops 0)	45
2 PPCLI (IO)	46
1 R22 ^{er} (IO)	47
4 Svc Bn (IO)	48
4 Fd Amb (IO)	49
4 CMBG MP P1 (Int)	50
444 THS (IO)	51
HQ CFE (SO2 Int)	52
NDHQ (CIS/DDI 3-3)	53
NDHQ (CIS/DDI 6-3)	54
FMC (SSO Int)	55
2 (EW) Sqn, 1 CSR	56
<u>Internal</u>	
G2	57
G2 Ops	58
Int Sect	59
CI Sect	60
SAIF	61
Spares	62-65

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4 CANADIAN MECHANIZED BRIGADE GROUP

INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

- References:
- A. COMCENTAG's General Defence Plan, Annex C 14 March 1985
 - B. CENTAG Intelligence Estimate, 19 November 1985
 - C. HQ CENTAG Terrain Analysis of the Corps Area of Operations 14 April 1978
 - D. VII (US) Corps Intelligence Estimate 1-82 7 December 1982
 - E. OPLAN II (GE) Korps 33001, Annex C (Military Intelligence 1 April 1982)
 - F. 1 (US) Armoured Division Intelligence Estimate 1 August 1985
 - G. 4 PzGrenDiv, The Military Significance of the Topography of Northeastern Bavaria, May 1982

PART 1

GENERAL

EXTRACT OF 4 CMBG'S MISSION

MISSION

1. 4 CMBG will:
 - a. initially occupy, as Army Group reserve, assembly area SETTER;
 - b. with first priority, be prepared to be released under OPCON VII (US) Corps for employment in the CHEB approach; and
 - c. as second priority, be prepared to be released under OPCON II (GE) Korps for employment in the PLZEN Hwy 14 approach.
2. As COMCENTAG's only in-theatre reserve, 4 CMBG is a brigade group with an Army Group perspective. It can be said that the THREAT to CENTAG is the THREAT to 4 CMBG. Unlike a front line formation, 4 CMBG can be theoretically tasked to go anywhere in the CENTAG area. While it cannot be determined with certainty where and when the Brigade will be committed, COMCENTAG, in his General Defence Plan, has narrowed our planning focus to the two areas and formations stated in our mission.

AREA OF INTELLIGENCE INTEREST

3. The Brigade's area of intelligence interest is defined by operations against first and second echelon armies (as assessed by CENTAG) likely to be employed in the so-called Nurnberg group of approaches, ie, CHEB-PLZEN/Hwy 14-FURTH approaches. The Brigade must also maintain basic intelligence on other enemy forces likely to operate in the CENTAG sector; however, operations outside our primary area of concern are considered, for the most part, unlikely.

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PART 2

THE CENTAG PERSPECTIVE

STRATEGIC AIM

4. The strategic aim of the WP in an attack against the Central Region would probably be the seizure of NORTH SEA, CHANNEL, ATLANTIC, and perhaps even MEDITERRANEAN coasts and ports in order to control the maximum amount of NATO territory and the economic potential within this area.

5. To pursue this strategic aim, the WP is expected to activate a Theatre of Military Operations (TVD). Within the Central Region this TVD may comprise three First Echelon Fronts with 14-15 armies and approximately 24 divisions as Second Echelon Fronts and/or Theatre Reserve, depending on WP preparation time. Additionally, up to 17 divisions and some mobilization divisions might be committed as Strategic Reserve after a long build-up.

6. The three WP First Echelon Fronts facing the Central Region are assumed initially to have the following boundaries: (See Graphics)

- a. NORTHERN FRONT - from DENMARK to an east-west line about 30 km north of Berlin;
- b. WESTERN FRONT - from the southern boundary of NORTHERN FRONT to the ERZGEBIRGE; and
- c. SOUTHWESTERN FRONT - from the ERZGEBIRGE to the CSSR/AUSTRIAN border. If the WP intends to include AUSTRIA in its operations, SOUTHWESTERN FRONT's southern boundary would be shifted further south or the WP could establish a separate DONAU FRONT.

7. The objectives of these Fronts committed against the Central Region are assessed to be:

- a. NORTHERN FRONT - to seize GERMAN/DUTCH NORTH SEA coasts and/or ports including the SCHELDE estuary;
- b. WESTERN FRONT
 - (1) to establish bridgeheads over the RHEIN in the vicinity of WESEL in order to seize the key area WESEL-AACHEN-NEUSS, and
 - (2) to establish bridgeheads over the RHEIN between MANNHEIM and MAINZ in order to seize the PFALZ and parts of the SAAR; and
- c. SOUTHWESTERN FRONT - to establish a bridgehead over the RHEIN in the vicinity of KARLSRUHE.

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HYPOTHESIS FOR ATTACK

8. With the exception of a surprise strategic nuclear attack, the WP cannot launch a strategic offensive against NATO without detectable changes in its force posture in the forward area. Indications resulting from increased political and military readiness of the WP will provide NATO with at least 48 hours of warning time.

9. In the event of an attack with short warning, the WP would attack without prior build-up of the Second Echelon Fronts and would, therefore, have to limit the attacking ground forces to those immediately available in the GDR, CSSR and POLAND (Unreinforced Attack - approximately 27 divisions opposite CENTAG). These forces might not be strong enough for a decisive breakthrough. If the WP wished to avoid such a disadvantage, it would have to complete the build-up of its Second Echelon Fronts (Reinforced Attack - about 44 divisions facing CENTAG). This would provide NATO 10 to 14 days of warning time.

10. Although the possibility of either a limited strategic offensive (Unreinforced Attack) or a Reinforced Attack cannot be excluded, CENTAG estimates that the WP will balance the advantage of surprise and the disadvantages of less than fully developed combat power and logistic support. Therefore, an attack is most likely after commencement of mobilization but before completion of forward deployment of Second Echelon Front forces. The balance of surprise and readiness is likely to occur six to eight days after commencement of WP mobilization (Partially Reinforced Attack).


TERRAIN

11. There are five groups of approaches into the CENTAG sector - (See Diagram 1):

- a. the NORDHAUSEN, HESSIAN CORRIDOR and EISENACH-FULDA approaches;
- b. the MEININGEN, COBURG and HOF approaches;
- c. the CHEB/HWY 14 and FÜRTH approaches;
- d. the BOEHMERWALD-BAYERISCHERWALD approaches; and
- e. the DONAU approach.

A comparison of the EISENACH-FULDA, MEININGEN and CHEB/HWY 14 approaches (all of which are capable of supporting a Front's main attack) shows that the EISENACH-FULDA is the most suitable.

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12. CENTAG's area of operations within the FRG is characterized by:
- a limited depth;
 - a very dense road and railway net;
 - terrain which in many instances is suitable for cross-country movement and manoeuvres; and
 - terrain that tends to direct WP offensive operations towards a few major avenues of approach which present themselves as principle axes of advance.

Although the following five major groupings of approaches into the CENTAG sector are assessed to be of particular importance, it is emphasized that much of the terrain between allows for manoeuvre mainly by smaller units. Even the lightly-forested areas have a dense road net which allows all-weather movement.

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13. The NORDHAUSEN, the HESSIAN CORRIDOR and the EISENACH-FULDA approach

- a. The NORDHAUSEN (PE 2408) approach bypasses the forested HARZ mountains in the south, astride and south of the Inter-Army-Group boundary, and leads into NORTHAG's defence sector. However, its southern portion enables penetration to the HESSISCHER CORRIDOR and the EISENACH-FULDA approaches thus allowing the enemy to choose different combinations of possible axes of advance. The NORDHAUSEN approach could initially accommodate up to two divisions abreast;
- b. The HESSISCHER CORRIDOR leads towards GIESSEN (MB 7804). A penetration into the HESSISCHER CORRIDOR from the north seems to be possible but would be difficult. Along the HESSISCHER CORRIDOR approach a southwestward thrust of initially up to two divisions could be launched; and
- c. The EISENACH-FULDA approach leads from the northern edge of the THUERINGERWALD (NB 4801) to the FRANKFURT-DARMSTADT-MAINZ triangle. This approach provides the most direct route (approximately 150 km) to the RHEIN River west of FRANKFURT. However, the built-up areas and the necessity to seize the TAUNUS mountains before the crossing sites could be used, reduces this advantage. Although wooded hills close to the border as well as the hilly area of BAD HERSFELD initially canalize the movement of armed and mechanized forces, more favourable terrain widens towards the west/southwest. The FULDA approach initially can accommodate up to three divisions abreast, widening in the vicinity of the FULDA River to five divisions and at the lower end, joining the HESSISCHER CORRIDOR, from five to six leading divisions.

14. The MEININGEN, COBURG and HOF approaches

- a. The MEININGEN approach leads from MEININGEN (PB 0040) via WUERZBURG (NA 6717) towards the RHEIN valley between MANNHEIM and KARLSRUHE. The MAIN River, with an average width of about 90 meters, is the major obstacle cutting across the approach. However, it offers numerous bridging and crossing sites. Due to its good highway net and the generally flat and open terrain, the MEININGEN approach is considered as a high speed approach with a high deployment capacity. It can carry at least two attacking divisions initially, and provides the shortest route into the RHEIN valley;
- b. The COBURG approach leads from the area SONNEBERG (PA 5580) via the COBURG (PA 4070) area to BAMBERG (PA 3630). Once the area southwest of BAMBERG is reached and the MAIN and PEGNITZ Rivers are crossed, it widens and joins the MEININGEN approach. The COBURG approach can accommodate up to two divisions crossing the border; and
- c. The HOF approach extends from PLAUEN (TR 9838) via HOF (QA 0778) in a southwesternly direction astride the autobahn to the area of BAYREUTH (PA 8533). It can accommodate the attack of one division.

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15. The CHEB, PLZEN-HWY 14 and FÜRTH approaches (the so-called Nürnberg group of approaches - of principle interest to 4 CMBG):

- a. The CHEB approach leads from KARLOVY VARY (UR 4968) south of the ERZGEBIRGE to CHEB (UR 1251) where it splits into a one division northern route via MARKTREDWITZ (TR 9143), BAYREUTH towards BAMBERG and into a one division southern route via MITTERTEICH (UR 0238) and WEIDEN (TR 9507). On both routes, hilly and forested terrain as well as patches of bog and swamp reduce off-road movement;
- b. The PLZEN-HWY 14 approach leads through the OBERPFAELZER WALD following the axis of the FRAENKISCHE ALB where off-road movement is difficult. Further to the west this approach joins the COBURG/MEININGEN approaches leading via STUTTGART to the RHEIN valley in the vicinity of KARLSRUHE-STRASBOURG. The approach can initially accommodate two divisions abreast; and
- c. The FÜRTH approach leads from PLZEN via FÜRTH (UQ 4265) between the OBERPFAELZER WALD and BOEHMERWALD/BAYRISCHER WALD into the rolling terrain between AMBERG (QV 0581) and STRAUBING (UQ 2217). An attack can be aimed either at penetrating the NÜRNBERG area from the southeast thus supporting an attack along the PLZEN-HWY 14 approach; or, at entering the DONAU valley between REGENSBURG and STRAUBING. Movements are hampered by the REGEN and CHAM valleys. This approach can accommodate up to two divisions abreast.

16. The BOEHMERWALD - BAYRISCHER WALD. The BOEHMERWALD provides an initial barrier to large scale movements. Enemy forces are principally bound to two highways (11 and 12) leading southwest through mountainous and forested area of the BOEHMERWALD and BAYRISCHER WALD which generally prevents cross-country movement of large mechanized formations. Only secondary attacks, possible involving elements of one division along each of the two highways, could be expected.

17. The DONAU approach. The DONAU approach covers the area along the GERMAN/AUSTRIAN border between the DONAU River and the edge of the ALPEN. After crossing the INN/SALZACH Rivers which constitute an initial barrier, the wide and mostly open area is suited for armoured operations. The main thrust can be expected north to the line BRAUNAU (UP 5447) MUNCHEN. After having crossed the DONAU in the west, further advance to the RHEIN is impeded between SCHWABISCHE ALB and FRÄNKISCHE ALB and the built-up area of STUTTGART and the SCHWARZWALD. The length of this approach to the RHEIN valley between MANNHEIM and KARLSRUHE is approximately 400 km. The DONAU approach also forms the widest avenue of approach into the CENTAG area. It offers the possibility of rapid movement with four to six divisions abreast.

18. Except for the BOEHMERWALD, all other groups of approaches into the CENTAG sector could support a Front main effort. All approaches, except the MEININGEN and the DONAU approach, encompass initially difficult terrain in the near-border area thus hampering enemy movement. Further to the west, the approaches (except DONAU - BOEHMERWALD) favour armoured operations with the southern avenues of approach converging to the RHEIN valley.

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PROBABLE COURSES OF ACTION AGAINST CENTAG

19. Directly opposite CENTAG, army offensives would probably develop north and south of the RHOEN/SPESSART. 1 GTA and 8 GA with a total of seven divisions could be committed with 1 GTA north of RHOEN/SPESSART and 8 GA south or vice versa. However, 8 GA is expected to conduct the main attack.
- a. the army attacking north of the RHOEN/SPESSART would most likely take advantage of the favourable terrain along the axis EISENACH-FULDA-FRANKFURT for its main effort. Secondary attacks through the HESSIAN CORRIDOR could provide flank protection and would be conducted in coordination with a thrust from the NORDHAUSEN area. A likely intermediate operational objective is the area VOGELSBURG-GIESSEN, where the EISENACH-FULDA approach and HESSIAN CORRIDOR merge into each other. After seizure of that objective, the attack could be continued towards the likely final operational objective: the establishment of a bridgehead across the RHEIN southwest of FRANKFURT;
 - b. an army offensive south of the RHOEN/SPESSART would most likely exploit along the MEININGEN approach and concentrate its main effort in this area. Supporting attacks would be conducted along the COBURG and HOF approaches; and
 - c. WESTERN FRONT's main effort against CENTAG will depend upon the success of the First Operational Echelon and, therefore, the area of commitment of the Second Operational Echelon. The WP can employ elements of the Polish Silesian Military District (PSMD) to reinforce First Operational Echelon forces on both sides of the RHOEN/SPESSART or commit it either entirely north or south.

20. SOUTHWESTERN FRONT Operations

- a. SOUTHWESTERN FRONT's (SWF) objective would probably be the seizure of bridgeheads over the RHEIN River between MANNHEIM and KARLSRUHE as a precursor to Second Echelon Front Forces attacks into FRANCE. SWF is assessed to include Czech Western Military District (CWMD), with 1(CZ) Army and 4(CZ) Army, Czech Eastern Military District (CEMD) and Central Group of Forces (CGF) stationed in CZECHOSLOVAKIA.
 - (1) The main thrust could be established either along the CHEB or HWY 14 approaches or simultaneously along both. Secondary attacks are probable along the FURTH approach and in the BOEHMERWALD/BAYERISCHERWALD area in order to provide flank protection and/or to fix defending CENTAG forces. Within the First Tactical Echelon up to four divisions could be committed along the CHEB and HWY 14 approaches and one or two divisions might be committed for the secondary attacks. The Second Tactical Echelon would then comprise two or three divisions,

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- (2) Intermediate operational objectives for the First Operational Echelon could be the areas north and south of NURNBERG including the important Autobahn junctions and crossing sites over the LUDWIG/EUROPA-KANAL. Therefore, operations to the north of NURNBERG are likely to be controlled by one army and to the south of NURNBERG by the other army; and
 - b. Timing for the commitment of SOUTHWESTERN FRONT's Second Operational Echelon (probably CGF or CGMD) will depend upon the progress of WESTERN FRONT's offensive towards the MANNHEIM area and the success of SOUTHWESTERN FRONT's First Operational Echelon.
21. Operations through AUSTRIA
- a. A general WP attack on NATO would probably include an attack through AUSTRIA. Should AUSTRIA be included the principal considerations would be:
 - (1) violation and use of AUSTRIAN airspace,
 - (2) attack into and through AUSTRIA by both air and ground forces, and
 - (3) use of AUSTRIAN territory for deployment of forces opposite CENTAG without hostilities against AUSTRIA;
 - b. Advantages to the WP of any military action against CENTAG through AUSTRIA would be;
 - (1) CENTAG would be forced to modify initial deployment to include the GERMAN-AUSTRIAN border in its defence,
 - (2) The extension of the WP's attack sector would allow the employment of more forces, thus increasing its favourable force ratio.
 - (3) The WP could contain II (GE) Korps forces in order to provide flank protection to its attack towards NUERNBERG-RHEIN or it could conduct a large scale pincer operation towards the RHEIN with main thrusts being developed simultaneously along the axes WUERZBERG and/or NUERNBERG and the DONAU approach, and
 - (4) NATO's air defence systems could be outflanked; and
 - c. Options for using the DONAU approach are:
 - (1) SOUTHWESTERN FRONT could develop a secondary thrust with up to four Czech divisions from the area CESKE-BUDEJOVICE along the DONAU approach to support its main effort towards NUERNBERG-KARLSRUHE,


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- (2) SOUTHWESTERN FRONT could develop its main thrust from the area CESKE-BUDEJOVICE along the DONAU approach with 6-8 CGF/CZ divisions with an immediate operational objective in the vicinity of INGOLSTADT and the final operational objectives in the KARLSRUHE area. Initially, only secondary attacks would then be conducted in the sector north of the DONAU to contain CENTAG forces and provide flank protection, and
- (3) The WP could, in addition to the SOUTHWESTERN FRONT, form an individual "DONAU FRONT" with forces from HUNGARY and/or the Carpathian Military District (CPMD). Initially, this option seems less likely as it not only requires a considerable build-up and time consuming operations through AUSTRIA on its east-west axis, but it would also affect the availability of forces against LANDSOUTH.

EFFECT ON 4 CMBG

22. Initially, the Brigade will occupy a tactical assembly area (TAA) - SETTER, near the VII(US) Corps - II (GE) Korps boundary. This positioning facilitates the commitment of the Brigade in either the CHEB or PILZEN/HWY 14 approach. These approaches are in the areas of responsibility of 1 (US) AD. or 4 (GE) PzGrenDiv, respectively. For the most part the remainder of this estimate will deal with operations in both of these areas.



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PART 3

AREA OF OPERATIONS

WEATHER

23. General. Massive all-arms military operations are possible at any time of year in Central Europe. The most temperate weather occurs from May through September, but clear cold periods in mid-winter may be most conducive to rapid mounted attack. For climatology data see Appendix 2.

- a. Spring. Wet ground tends to restrict movement to existing road nets. Rain and fog tend to slow movement but also offer some concealment and sound muffling. Cloudy conditions tend to restrict low altitude air activity such as ground support, airborne and helicopter operations;
- b. Summer. Cross-country manoeuvrability is basically limited only in periods immediately after rain storms. Ground cover improves as foliage and summer crops grow. Extended daylight and clear skies tend to favor air operations of all kinds. Visibility by ground forces also increases both day and night;
- c. Fall. Cross-country manoeuvrability becomes increasingly restricted and concealment is increasingly denied as foliage drops and fields are harvested. Fog severely limits visibility and when combined with cloud cover and freezing temperatures tend to limit aircraft support of all types; and
- d. Winter. Freezing temperatures tend to enhance cross-country trafficability except during periods of warming trends. Manoeuvre tends to be limited in snow storms, which can occasionally be heavy throughout the sector. Snow limits trafficability particularly in higher elevations, where some accumulations up to 2 meters are not uncommon. Occasionally heavy fog can severely restrict movement and operations. Air support activity tends to be highly unpredictable.

24. FACTORS

- a. Temperature. Although the climate is not severe in West Germany, the seasons are pronounced. Summer temperatures (April to November) average 5° to 19°C - 7° to 2°C. In exceptional years, mid-summer temperatures may range into the 30's, while winter cold spells can bring temperatures well below freezing. In the last decade, there has been a repeated warming trend in late Jan, with the coldest temperatures usually in early Jan and in Feb;
- b. Precipitation. Annual precipitation averages from 8 to 14 cms, with the heaviest accumulation occurring between June and September. Slow autumn rains trail into winter snows occurring primarily between late November and March. While snow can remain on the ground throughout the winter, warming periods and mid-winter thaws often create trafficability problems. Conducting winter operations involves a high element of risk;

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however, the possibilities for achieving surprise, great speed and demoralization of the defender may outweigh that risk;

- c. Fog and Cloudiness. Although fog is most likely to occur on autumn mornings, and least likely in July and August, central European weather is characterized by rapidly changing conditions. In winter for instance, 24 to 72 hour windows of relatively clear weather may be suddenly interrupted by thick fog that drastically curtails combined arms interoperability and limits target acquisition capabilities of even the most sophisticated systems; and
- d. Winds. Winds are generally from the west and southwest at 5-10 knots, although patterns shift in early spring and late autumn to winds from the northwest.


25. EFFECT ON MILITARY OPERATIONS

- a. Visibility. Air-ground operations relying on good visibility can almost always be mounted in the summer months, and blocks of clear weather can occur at any time of year. Autumn and early winter normally have the harshest fog and cloud cover, with the weather becoming increasingly clear as the winter progresses;
- b. Trafficability. Although severe weather will limit the cross-country mobility of wheeled transport vehicles, the all-weather road network in the forward area diminishes the significance of this problem. Tracked combat vehicles can manoeuvre and fight under virtually all local weather conditions, although temporary attrition rates (mired vehicles, etc.) of 5-10% may characterize rapid all-weather operations. The worst conditions for movement are ice storms, however, they primarily restrict on-road travel. Winter weather can alternate from year to year or even month to month, with periods of thaw softening the fields, or a long freeze hardening the topsoil to create ideal conditions for combat vehicles;
- c. Winds. Prevailing winds do not favour enemy use of nuclear or chemical weapons; and
- d. Personnel and Equipment. Temperate weather (May through October) simplifies maintenance and favors the defender who must fight dismounted. Extremely cold weather reduces the stamina of dismounted defenders, strips away natural camouflage and negatively affects high-technology defensive systems.

TERRAIN

26. General. Terrain considerations are the basis for all operational planning. In our area of operations (AO), terrain will be the decisive factor. It is characterized by densely forested areas particularly on the border and west of the NAAB RIVER, by hills and escarpments and by numerous water obstacles, none major, but nonetheless which have to be dealt with and which do canalize movement. There are few open areas which facilitate manoeuvre.

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27. Topographic Regions. Our AO can be divided into five major topographic regions (See Diagram 3):

- a. The OBERPFÄLZER WALD is a complex of rugged hills rising in close proximity to the border and continuing into CZECHOSLOVAKIA. In general this terrain is passable. There are terrain sectors which have obstacle value, e.g. the precipitous terrain from EAST of WEIDEN (TR9707) to EAST of LUHE (TQ9496), as well as the steep slopes southeast of SCHWARZENFELD (TQ9274) towards BODENWÖHR (UQ0461). In the centre of the area the OBERPFÄLZER WALD protrudes across the NAAB to the WEST in the direction of HIRSCHAU (QV1392) - AMBERG (QV0780), obstructing highspeed movement. The NAAB has year round obstacle value for EAST-WEST movement because of it's width, depth, banks and tendency to flood. The heavy coniferous forestation of the region is broken up by an excellent network of improved surface and dirt-top forestry roads. Fields of fire are generally very restricted, severely limiting the opportunities for employment of antitank Guided Missiles (ATGMs). The ridges run NE to SW, with local relief between 50 and 300 meters. This area is particularly well suited to enemy dismounted infiltration.

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After emplaced obstacles have been cleared, the trail network is of sufficient quality to support heavy vehicular movement in all but the most severe weather;

- b. The MAIN-NAAB HILLS are best compared to a patchwork of villages, farms, and farmland with extensive areas of low forestation alternating with mini-ranges of forest-crowned or even semi-barren hilltops. This landscape might be described as "typically German". The sector is generally suitable for the movement of mechanized formations. The hills immediately to the southeast of PEGNITZ have an unusual abundance of high natural springs, which make trafficability worse at times on the high terrain extremes than in the mid or even low ranges. These mountain springs create special problems in the March through May period. The impact area of Grafenwöhr Training Area presents a serious though not impassible obstacle. Low areas near river valleys are subject to inundation in severe weather. The Main-Naab Hills taper down to the Waldnaab River, with its natural river-crossing-operation sites in the vicinity of Weiden. On the eastern side of the Waldnaab, the terrain rises through a ten kilometer belt of rolling hills and farmland into the Oberpfälzer Forest. Deployment of enemy formations will be restricted by sectors covered with woods and by the multitude of small lakes. The terrain triangle of SCHWARZENFELD - BODENWOHR - SCHWANDORF (TQ9068) with its extensive lakes and adjoining woods as well as the mining area of WACKERSDORF (TQ9566) (despite the B85) represent a major obstruction to movement. The B14 will be of special importance to movement EAST-WEST. Between SCHNAITTENBACH (TQ8392) and SULZBACH-ROSENBERG (PV9986) (along B14) there are some obstacles such as lakes, narrow passages and the mining area around HIRSCHAU and SCHNAITTENBACH;
- c. The FICHELGEbirge, a rugged, oval-shaped, heavily-forested independent mountain range, can be easily bypassed to the north or south. Forces conducting a high speed attack would be unlikely to initially commit major formations in this area. However, if a sturdy defense of the Main-Naab Hills to the south blunts the enemy effort, attacking forces will be likely to probe for routes through these mountains. Simply put, the longer the CREUSSEN-KENMATH area is successfully defended, the more likelihood there is of the enemy at attempting to force a passage of the Fichtelgebirge. For defensive purposes, the area can be divided down the middle into an eastern and western sector. The eastern half of the range has excellent redundant roads and trails, and an attacker would almost certainly find eventual bypass routes around defensive positions. The western sector, however, is extremely constricted, with hard surface east-west roads reduced to two two-lane blacktop routes, and with service trails more restricted by the steepness of the terrain. Essentially, an attacker approaching from the east would likely find the FICHELGEbirge easier to ingress than to egress. The range does have military advantages that could be exploited by a Warsaw Pact force in its possession. However, its deep, compartmented valleys would form an excellent forward staging area for further operations;

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- d. The FRÄNKISCHE ALB is characterized by rough, compartmentalized terrain - although local relief and forestation are not so severe as in the FICHTELGEBIRGE or OBERPFALZER WALD. Nearly vertical slopes along river valleys and stream traces, and local relief up to 200 meters, do channelize movement to some extent, but this area is ultimately passable to major military formations via the well-developed road and trail network. Although forests cover up to 60% of the FRANKISCHE ALB, their effect would be to slow--not to deny--the transit of major military formations. In the most rugged sectors of the Fränkische Alb, fields of fire are often less than 500 meters. Although the highest elevations generally occur north of the Wiesent River Valley and the Püttlach River Trench (rivers that effectively divide this sector in two), the northern area is largely high plateau (although with deeply-incised north-south stream beds), between Bayreuth and Bamberg. In the sector bounded approximately by Pegnitz, Forchheim and the Hertzsles Ridge northeast of Erlangen, forestation is heavy and the terrain rugged, with exposed rock outcroppings along steep valley walls. While secondary roads are of good quality, they are often narrow enough to be subject to successful interdiction. Although major formations may be thus delayed or further channelized, the infiltration of platoon to company sized enemy formations will be a constant danger. The terrain SOUTH of Highway 14 is also generally unsuitable for the deployment of large formations. The HIRSCHWALD (SOUTH of AMBERG) and the Hohenfels training area are also unsuitable for the high speed movement of large mechanized formations due to the dense forests, steep slopes and the deep narrow valleys of the LAUTERACH, HAUSNERBACH and FORELLENBACH. The area offers many potential obstacles. The VILS and ALTMAEHL rivers also hamper movement;
- e. The MIDDLE FRANCONIAN BASIN, for the purpose of this estimate, includes the Canal (which is not considered a significant obstacle in itself), the low mountains of the STEIGERWALD, the Main River flood plain--actually a plateau cut by the Main between the STEIGERWALD, Würzburg and Rothenburg, and the rolling hills of the FRANKENHOHE, bounded approximately by Crailsheim, Neustadt a.d. Aisch and the city of Fürth. Nürnberg, Erlangen and Bamberg mark the eastern boundary of the MIDDLE FRANCONIAN BASIN. The terrain within this sector is extremely varied, from areas of dense urbanization, through sub-compartments of clustered ponds and marshes, through densely forested hills and low mountains, to the classic tank country (interrupted only by the trace of the Main River) that stretches from Schweinfurt to Rothenburg. In the STEIGERWALD, the attacking force will be channelized, but the cross-compartmentalization hinders the establishment of a coherent defensive line. Only the trace of Autobahn E5 offers an integral valley line with a substantial number of medium to long range fields of fire. Mobility is best south of the STEIGERWALD, once the greater Nürnberg metropolitan complex has been left behind. NORTH of Nürnberg, crossings of the RMD are most likely to be attempted between FORCHHEIM (RA4909) and ERLANGEN (PA4595). SOUTH of NURNBERG, crossings would probably be attempted on either side of ROTH (PV5257);

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- f. The autobahns in sector are E-6/A-9 (NÜRNBERG-BAYREUTH-HOF) and E-5/A-3 (NÜRNBERG-REGENSBERG) and E-12 (NURNBERG-AMBERG);
- g. Critical federal highways are 14 (ANSBACH-NÜRNBERG-OBERPFÄLZ-CHECHOSLOVAKIA), 22 (BAMBERG-BAYREUTH-ERBENDORF-WEIDEN), 299 (AMBERG-GRAFENWOHR-PRESSATH-ERBENDORF), 2 (NÜRNBERG-PEGNITZ-BAYREUTH) 47 (WEIDEN-NORTH of GRAFENWOHR-PEGNITZ, FORCHHEIM) and 85 (KULMBACH-AUERBACH-AMBERG-SCHWANDORF-CHAM); and
- h. West Germany probably has the finest, best maintained network of secondary roads in the world. Although the terrain in areas such as the FRANKISCHE ALB is relatively difficult, the road network has been designed to overcome terrain restrictions and to a remarkable extent the attempt has succeeded. Additionally, forestry and farm trails are constantly undergoing improvement and bind all hard surface arteries. With persistence, enemy forces can almost always discover a way around obstacles. Destruction of critical autobahn bridges, for instance, will serve to delay, but not to stop enemy movement.

28. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE TERRAIN

- a. Obstacles. There are no true barriers in sector, but there are several potential obstacles. The NAAB River will be the first significant tactical obstacle encountered by the enemy in the forward area. In depth, the most readily identifiable obstacle is the line of the RMD Canal, although this is largely compromised by the high-quality bridges, and by highway underpasses that can be flooded to reduce canal water levels. Nonetheless, the RMD Canal remains a likely target for enemy air assault operations intent upon capturing bridges intact. The area between NÜRNBERG and FORCHHEIM is particularly well-suited to the establishment of a tactical bridgehead as is the area SOUTH of NURNBERG between SCHWARZACH and ROTH. The terrain triangle of SCHWARZENFELD - BODENWÖHR - SCHWANDORF (in the SE of sector) is a true natural obstacle. The large number of forest, roads and trails deprive the forested areas of much of their natural obstacle value;
- b. Key Terrain. Because of the nature of the terrain and the extensive network of highways/roads (in all directions) the defence will be a battle for the LOCs. The decisive terrain in sector for the enemy and therefore a key objective will be crossings of the canal NORTH and SOUTH of NURNBERG. The canal is certainly not a major obstacle by Soviet standards but it is the last significant terrain problem the enemy commander must overcome before breaking out. Several other areas could affect operations significantly:
 - (1) WEIDEN and the dominant ground to the EAST,
 - (2) NAAB River (and tributaries) as it impedes local actions,
 - (3) CREUSSEN bluffs (ridge line SOUTH of BAYREUTH and EAST of CREUSSEN) because it dominates the approaches from the EAST and blocks movement to the NW,


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- (4) Line POTTENSTEIN - PEGNITZ - AUERBACH as it is the only manoeuvre passage between the PUTTLACH trench (highway 470 river valley - POTTENSTEIN and WEST) and the GRAFENWOHR training area,
 - (5) AMBERG - SULZBACH/ROSENBERG - HIRSHAU road network, and
 - (6) Road network surrounding NEUMARKT, ie, i.d. OBERPFALZ;
- c. Observation and Fields of Fire. Central European terrain is not neatly divided into restrictive sectors nor sectors where there are uninterrupted fields of fire. Rather, the terrain is complex and normally there is a mosaic effect, where, within the field of vision, there are various potential fields of fire some excellent and long-range, others of medium quality, and some poor, with excessive dead space. There are generally good opportunities for concealment from ground observation. Even within less restricted sectors, such as the MAIN-NAAB Hills, optimum fields of fire are the exception rather than the rule. The table below (West German Ministry of Defence) breaks out the entire West German landscape by percentage against a direct fire engagement table. Only particularly obstructed areas, the RUHR, BLACK FOREST and the HARZ Mountains, were excluded from the study (also ALPINE areas, since they constitute a radically different problem). Their inclusion would further lessen the maximum range shots available in percentage terms:

<u>RANGE</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE OF TERRAIN ENGAGEMENT POSSIBLE</u>
(1) over 2,500 meters	6%
(2) over 2,000 meters	10%
(3) over 1,500 meters	17%
(4) over 500 meters	45%
(5) under 500 meters	55%

- d. Camouflage, Cover and Concealment. Best camouflage and concealment is provided by the terrain extremes, such as dense forest and urbanized terrain, with varying degrees of concealment possible between these two poles. Best opportunities for camouflage and concealment from visual observation are during the summer months, when foliage is thickest. The defending forces, especially static support sites, will have to work hardest at camouflage and concealment in the winter months, when deciduous forests and groves are bare.

ENEMY AVENUES OF APPROACH AND OBJECTIVES



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29. AVENUES OF APPROACH (See Diagram 4)

a. CHEB - HWY 14 CORRIDOR. From an operational point of view, ie, Front/Army, the CHEB - HWY 14 Corridor provides the optimum avenue of approach from Czechoslovakia. The sector sits astride an excellent direct operational corridor that can be drawn from the Carpathian Military District (CPMD) west across the RHINE. The area between CHEB and the SCHWANDORF terrain triangle (para 32a) contains four primary axes of approach, encompassing the most exploitable terrain along the border. In discussing each tactical avenue, it must be remembered that identification of each as a probable division avenue is based upon current Soviet doctrine. Each avenue discussed could accommodate up to a division size attack. The current assumption is that tactical formations are more likely to be committed in echelon than on line, with the stress on sustaining the effort and maintaining the tempo of combat operations. Within each avenue of approach there will be open zones where few if any enemy forces appear. Initial attacks along Regimental axes will be narrow and deep:

(1) Northern Sector

(a) MARKTREDWITZ-MITTERTEICH-BAYREUTH-BAMBERG approach
Due to its initial difficulty, this approach will probably support the main attack farther south. Local success could lead to commitment of exploitation forces in this approach. A division in the approach would lead with two Regiments up initially - one toward MARKTREDWITZ and one toward MITTERTEICH, and

(b) TIRSCHREUTH-ERBENDORF-KEMNATH-PEGNITZ-FORCHHEIM approach. Operational planners will not regard the Waldnaab River as a significant obstacle. This approach offers the best initial breakout possibilities. It contains two clearly defined axes in the vicinity of the border. Regiments would likely advance initially towards TIRSCHENREUTH and BARNAU. Tactical reconnaissance would likely be especially strong in this sector in an attempt to locate the best routes past the GRAFENWOHR-KEMNATH line,

(2) Southern Sector. This avenue has long been regarded the primary invasion route into WEST GERMANY. This might well be the Army's initial main effort, although initial and subsequent terrain is a difficult or worse than in other sectors. The avenue leads directly to NURNBERG - a disadvantage. Although this avenue contains several possible regimental axes, none is of the initial quality as the TIRSCHENREUTH axis. In this avenue the attacker must fight through the OBERPFALZER WALD, cross the NAAB, with the first truly good chance of a breakout coming NORTH of AMBERG. After the capture of the NAAB river sector (which is only a true obstacle SOUTH of SCHWARZENFELD) and the MAIN-NAAB hills, the advance will be channelized along the line HIRSCHAU-SCHNAITTENBACH in the NORTH, THE FREIHOLSER Forst in the centre and the Hohenfels training area in the SOUTH.

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- (a) VOHENSTRAUSS-SULZBACH/ROSENBERG-ALTDORF-SCHWABACH approach. This avenue within the southern avenue can support a division size attack force. The extensive improved primary and secondary road net in the area, mitigates the difficult terrain between Sulzbach-Rosenberg and Altdorf. Regiments would likely advance initially down Highway 14 and from the ESLARN basin. This approach offers an excellent NE to SE road net, uniform terrain constraints, avoids the heart of the restrictive FRAENKISCHE ALB ((HERSBRUCK feature (PV7888)) and affords better seasonal trafficability in the vicinity of the likely bridgehead SCHWABACH-ROTH,
- (b) OBERVIECHTACH-SCHWARZENFELD-HIRSHWALD-NEUMARKT approach. This approach is less attractive for a division size attack than the axis immediately NORTH. Manoeuvre space for Regimental size units is constricted SOUTH of AMBERG and NORTH of HOHENFELS by the HIRSHWALD Taubenbacher Forst. Conditions for manoeuvre improve in the vicinity of NEUMARKT i.d. Opf; and
- b. FÜRTH. An attack launched with one division from the CHAM (UQ3055) - FÜRTH (UQ4464) depression both along HWY B85 and in the direction of NEUNBURG V.W. (UQ1070) - SCHWARZACH (TQ9977) is possible. However, it would be strongly channelized by the terrain of the SCHWANDORF triangle in the direction of NABBURG (TQ9682) or SCHWANDORF. Success on these axes would eventually threaten our flanks.

EFFECT ON ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

OPERATIONAL LEVEL

30. It must be stressed that there is virtually no terrain within our potential AO which is readily passable. However, it is certainly not conducive to a massive combined arms blitzkrieg type of attack. Notwithstanding, it is doubtful whether, initially at least, operational level planners will take this into account. Their plan will call for normal doctrinal deployment and timetable and be tied to terrain objectives.

31. The terrain in the CHEB - HWY 14 corridor presents the best opportunity for the SWF to develop the attack into Southern Germany. That is not to say that it is good, but it is relatively better than the rest. South of HWY 14 the SCHWANDORF terrain triangle represents a true natural barrier. Doctrinally speaking the area between CHEB and the triangle is an Army frontage (70 kms). Thus, it seems logical to place an Army boundary in this area (parallel to the SWF boundary). This is advantageous from an enemy standpoint as it places the best terrain for developing the attack under one command and it encompasses the inter-corps boundary.

32. The enemy will take full advantage of western Czechoslovakia's good quality road and rail nets and concealed assembly areas in close proximity to the international border prior to the initial outbreak of hostilities. First echelon armies will be deployed within 50-60 kilometers of the border along with their support bases. Second echelon armies will be forward

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deployed at the earliest possible time, almost certainly prior to the outbreak of hostilities, to close the gap between echelons. For example, as CGF moves into western assembly areas, a lead army from the Carpathian Military District (CPMD) could already be in the vicinity and west of CGF's peacetime garrison locations. Artillery groups will be deployed within 2-8 kilometers of the border, dependent on level of organization and terrain. Regimental train equivalents and DAG trains will be established between 7 and 15 kilometers from the border. Division and Army Mobile Supply Bases will be located well forward, usually in an expansion of pre-existing sites served with road and rail communications. All combat support and combat service support elements will be deployed in order to best support a rapid attack and timely commitment of exploitation forces. Second echelon regiments and independent combat battalions such as Independent Tank Battalions (ITB's) will be positioned to best perform the alternative missions of exploitation or repelling NATO counter-attacks.

33. Based upon weather-terrain considerations alone, the optimum time for an attack in sector would be either late summer or mid-winter during a freeze. The enemy will ultimately commit his exploitation forces and reserves where he meets with the most success, abandoning stalemated sectors to low priority fixing actions while the bulk of his assets are rapidly moved to the apparent breakthrough sector. Even heavily-forested areas generally are passable, their primary disadvantage being that they restrict deployment into combat formations. There is no sub-sector where it can be categorically stated that the enemy will definitely not appear. This problem is compounded by advanced Soviet doctrine, which implies that the enemy will make no attempt to be everywhere, but will carefully choose relatively narrow areas of concentration even within divisional avenues of approach, bypassing other areas completely. As long as the enemy can maintain a rapid rate of advance, he will not worry excessively about open flanks.

34. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- a. The enemy's initial goal will be to achieve a significant penetration. In sector, the Army's final objective would be crossing sites over the RMD Canal, north and south of NURNBERG. If this objective were achieved the first echelon army would likely hand over to a follow on army with the intention of maintaining the tempo with fresh forces. Attacks on intermediate objectives and crossing sites would be supported by tactical air assault operations. Doctrinally the Soviets would plan this entire operation to take 1- $\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 days, as unlikely as this may seem to us. If the lead army is heavily attritted it is unlikely that the Front Commander will immediately commit a follow on army. Instead he will look for a sector which is having more success;
- b. After having taken some 50-60 km and arriving at the edge of the FRANKISCHE ALB, the Front/Army commander may decide to change the direction of attack rather than proceed directly into some exceeding difficult terrain, including the built up area of NURNBERG. There are three possibilities:

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- (1) In the NORTH, push SOUTH of BAYREUTH then north west in the direction of BAMBERG,
 - (2) In the centre, drive between the Puttlach Trench and PEGNITZ to crossing sites between FORCHHEIM and ERLANGEN, and
 - (3) In the SOUTH, push a division between SULZBACH/ROSENBERG and AMBERG toward ALTDORF and NEUMARKT, eventually leading to crossing sites SOUTH of NÜRNBERG possibly in the SCHWABACH-ROTH area;
- c. The intent of the front commander will be to achieve an early breakout into the heart of West Germany. In support of this, he will bypass minor force concentrations, most urban areas, and the Nürnberg metropolitan complex (except for specific facilities, such as the airport). Cities in general will be enveloped, then allowed to "fall" of themselves;
 - d. If an OMG were used, it would be committed in a lightly held sector and not at fixed defenses. Its goal would be to disrupt rear area operations, destroying C³, nuclear storage sites and weapons and ultimately to destroy the cohesion of the defense - to unlock the defense. It would advance along the line of least resistance to the greatest possible depth; and
 - e. In summary, the enemy in sector will have to fight his way in the CHEB - HWY 14 Corridor through one hundred difficult kilometers, to the NÜRNBERG/Canal area. Although much of this terrain favours the defender, lines of communications to the east of the border ease staging and support requirements for the attacker, while operational rewards for success are very high - a clear breakout into the West German heartland.

TACTICAL LEVEL

35. NORTHERN AVENUE

- a. In the northernmost avenue, the enemy will initially seek to secure the shoulders of the MARKTREDWITZ and possibly Mitterteich approach as well. This operation will receive high priority so that tank and motorized rifle units, as committed, do not become pinned against the Cheb/Cheb-lakes obstacle complex. Simultaneously, divisional and regimental reconnaissance elements will probe for undefended or lightly defended routes into and through the defense. Combat activities in this avenue, and possibly in the southern (Hwy 14) avenue as well, may be initiated prior to launching the main attack in an attempt to draw attention and reserve forces to the north and possibly off to the south;
- b. Initial enemy activities within the center avenue will probably be an attempt to secure the high ground in the triangle between Mähding, Tirschenreuth and Barnau, with a possible rapid clearing action along the southern flank of the Barnau valley complex as well. Reconnaissance forces would seek lightly

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defended roadways or mobility corridors over which armoured forces could move swiftly to and across the Waldnaab. If an early passage of the Waldnaab could be effected in force, the lead division's least attritted regiments would be ordered to continue the advance while the follow-on division closed for early commitment as an exploitation force.

36. SOUTHERN AVENUE

- a. In the southern sector, it should quickly become clear that West German combat forces are defending the majority of the avenue. At this time, reconnaissance forces will be committed or diverted, if necessary, to define the boundary between US and West German forces. The army commander might then re-weight the attack to split the perceived boundary- although the pattern of movement will still be to the west. Only the most obvious opportunity would cause the army commander to actually divert a leading division into another division's sector. The commander in the southern sector will doctrinally concentrate his efforts on river crossing sites, vicinity WEIDEN, LUHE and NABBURG. If, for instance, gains were made quickly along the HWY 14 approach; follow-on forces could be diverted to open the center. But all such diversions would become justified, for instance, if several divisions were positioned and awaiting commitment in the northern avenue. Also, it remains perhaps unlikely that the enemy would first meet with success in the southern avenue, since here the terrain is initially the most difficult;
- b. Initial objectives of first echelon regiments would be in the VOHENSTRAUSS (UQ0800) area and OBERVIECHTACH (UQ1382) area as a precondition for the assault on the NAAB river. Crossings of the NAAB would be attempted between WEIDEN (TR9507) and WERNBERG (TQ9591) possibly at ROTHENSTADT (TQ9402), OBERWILDENAU (TQ9298), LUHE (TQ9496), OBERKOBELITZ (TQ9492) and WERNBERG (TQ9491). Further to the SOUTH assaults on the NAAB would occur between PFREIMD (TQ9686) and SCHWAZRZACH (TQ9977) in an attempt to seize crossings astride NABBURG (TQ9682). Air assault on any of these objectives is highly likely;
- c. Once across the NAAB there are possibly three axes of attack through the MAIN-NAAB hills region into the Frankische Alb:
 - (1) Along B14 towards HIRSCHAU (QV11392) - AMBERG (QV0881) with a main attack in the general area of SULZBACH-ROSENBERG (PV9787),
 - (2) NORTH and SOUTH of the ridge line JOHANNISBERG (QV1684) - FRIEDRICHBERG (TQ8582) with a main attack in the general area AMBERG (QV8582), and
 - (3) Possibly on an axis SCHWANDORF (TQ9068) - B85 - BAD URSENSOLLEN (QV0076) with the main thrust passing AMBERG to the SOUTH. The attacks would bypass the major built up areas.

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ENEMY OBJECTIVES

37. Likely enemy objectives (Diagram 4) should become clear from a careful reading of the previous section. This section should be read in conjunction with the map. The battle will be a fight for the control of LOCs. Each objective supports the subsequent advance. The Front/Army plan will be driven by terrain objectives while at the tactical level the objective will be to destroy forces in contact. Doctrinally the Soviets would want to achieve crossing on the RMD canal within 1-½ - 3 days. Considering the difficult terrain and Soviet historical success therein, 5-10 days would seem more likely.

EFFECT ON 4 CMBG OPERATIONS

38. The OBERPFÄLZER WALD in the EAST and the FRANKISCHE ALB in the WEST of our area of operations impede rapid movement and favour the defense. The Frankische Alb is the most significant land feature likely to affect Brigade operations. The flow of the roads and highways in the AO does support the possibility of successful EAST-WEST movement especially in the AMBERG/NURNBERG area. Also the structure of the LOCs does permit units to leave the area in any direction. The large number of forest roads and trails deprives the Alb (and other forested areas) of much of their natural obstacle value but makes the defence extremely manpower intensive. Notwithstanding, the defence must take advantage of the natural aspects of the terrain to control LOCs and to facilitate the use of killing zones.

39. The rugged terrain of the Alb does not permit rapid lateral shifting of armoured and artillery support. Approaches to the area must be covered by minefields. Most roads through the Alb are narrow and do not provide sufficient passage in case of obstruction. Convoys are very vulnerable to ambush and to interdiction by aircraft.

40. The constant changes from open to close terrain do not permit fully deployed major formations from the Czech border. This will result in constantly changing organizations; the necessity for infantry to frequently change from mounted to dismounted operations and vice versa; and difficulties in maintaining contact while advancing through forests and defiles. Tanks will most likely be parcelled out to direct support of the infantry.

41. Enemy recce elements will constantly be seeking covered and concealed alternate routes through forested areas. If a regimental avenue is perceived as only lightly held, an advance guard or even main body is likely to be swiftly committed to that sector. This results in an even present threat to our flanks.

42. The undulating nature of the terrain, coupled with heavy forestation will restrict engagement range to between 500 and 700 meters in most of the area. Three thousand meter fields of fire are rare.

43. Although the terrain favours the defence, it is often far more favourable for the movement of mechanized formations than the map would suggest. Enemy formations can take advantage of the close country alternately mounting and dismounting, effectively combining tank/infantry action. The dense road network is quite passable and often provides options in defended sectors. Concealed movement will often be passable. The mountains and hills offer good observation in all directions.


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44. The effect of the difficult terrain in our area of operations on Soviet tactics can be better appreciated by studying Appendix 8.

PART 4


ENEMY FORCES

45. Units of immediate interest to 4 CMBG include the 5 divisions of the Soviet Central Group of Forces and the 28th Army Corps and the 10 divisions of the Czech Peoples' Army (CPA).



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
46. Central Group of Forces. The CGF was organized from units participating in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. During peacetime, CGF is directly subordinate to the Combined Supreme Command (Headquarters General Staff, Moscow). During wartime the actual subordination of Headquarters CGF is difficult to determine. It is believed that HQ CGF would command the Southwest Front supported by the Czech WMD HQ. As a pure Soviet Command, CGF would undoubtedly report to the Soviet Theatre of Military Operations (TVD). Its organization is depicted below:



47. Czechoslovakian Peoples' Army. The CPA is a ten division ground force, split into two field armies - 1 and 4 CPA. Each has four divisions. There are two tank divisions in the East Military District (EMD) of Czechoslovakia.

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48. Detailed Order of Battle. See Appendix 2.

49. STRENGTH


- a. CGF. All CGF combat units are category A and as such have approximately 95 percent personnel strength and 100 percent of authorized equipment. A high state of combat readiness is maintained at all times. Personnel combat readiness is maintained through a standardized training cycle. This has traditionally been based on six-month cycles, although there are indications that the new system, that of replacing one line company out of a battalion each six-month period, may be inaugurated. Materiel readiness is achieved through a daily regime of maintenance and through strict peacetime conservation of assets. Normally, 90-95% of the combat vehicles are held in temporary storage and only 5-10% of a unit's equipment is used for daily training. During regiment and division level field training exercises all equipment sets are employed;

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- b. 1 CPA. All of the divisions in the 1st CPA are category A. As such, they are equipped with a full complement of combat equipment and up to 75 percent of authorized personnel. Additionally, the 1st CPA has been the recipient of major items of new equipment such as the T-72 tank and self propelled artillery;
- c. 4 CPA. On balance 4 CPA is a category B formation. It has one cat A division, two cat B divisions and one at cat C. 4 CPA would require a minimum of 72 hours to mobilize; and
- d. EMD. Both tank divisions of the EMD are category C. Again, at least 72 hours would be required to mobilize.

50. REINFORCEMENTS

- a. The armies committed against the SWF in the first operational echelon will probably be followed by a second operational echelon formed from one of the armies of the Carpathian Military District. Although it is impossible to state with certainty at this time which army from CPMD will be committed in sector, this should become evident during the pre-hostilities phase, as the follow-on CPMD army moves through the CGF peacetime garrison area and deploys forward elements to establish contact with the lead army's rear elements.



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- b. Since the mid-1970s, the Soviet ground forces in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Districts of the western USSR have implemented a significant force development program. This program includes both a force expansion and force modernization. Most of the 35 active motorized rifle and tank divisions have re-equipped with T-64 or T-72 tanks, modern artillery, and APCs/IFVs; and several now have SAM systems. These forces have developed into a more significant and powerful component of Warsaw Pact forces. See Appendix 2. As a result, the majority of these divisions are now essentially equal in organization and equipment capabilities to divisions in the Soviet Groups of Forces in East Europe. However, the majority continue to be manned at cadre levels, necessitating extensive mobilization, movement, and, in most situations, training prior to commitment to combat. It is assessed that the growth of the combat capabilities of forces from the western military districts (WMD) is the result of changing Soviet strategy to attain theater objectives in a short, fast-moving campaign; and
- c. Czech Reinforcements. The only Czech reinforcement would be available from the two tank divisions (Cat C) of the EMD. It is possible that one of these divisions will reinforce each forward army.

NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL (NBC)

51. Nuclear. Although the Warsaw Pact armies, especially the Soviets, are presently developing an excellent capacity for tactical employment of nuclear weapons, it is generally believed that they will initiate the battle using conventional means and will only resort to nuclear exchange if conventional means prove inadequate, or in response to NATO's first use.

52. Chemical. Doctrinally, chemical weapons could be employed during initial preparatory fire and during continuing operations. In Warsaw Pact forces, up to 30% of artillery units of fire can be chemical rounds or warheads. Most likely employment of chemical munitions would be for flank protection/terrain control, to disorganize defences/demoralize defenders, for the neutralization of areas and units to be bypassed, and to close main logistical depots and supply routes to NATO forces. Soviet forces will normally employ non-persistent agents in areas where their own efforts and forces will concentrate. Employment of persistent agents in a general area is an indicator that the Soviets probably do not intend to pass major formations through that same area. The overall likelihood of chemical weapons employment increases when an offensive operation runs into difficulties and bogs down. The Soviets probably have the world's best overall NBC defence equipment, with the Czechs a close second within the Warsaw Pact. The outfitting of the individual soldier does severely limit his capability to conduct strenuous dismounted operations. Given the opportunity, Soviet forces will normally remain mounted and on the move in an NBC environment.

53. Biological. It is extremely unlikely that the enemy will employ biological weapons to achieve tactical or operational goals.

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AIRBORNE/AIR ASSAULT/UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

54. Airborne/Air Assault

- a. CGF now has an organic battalion consisting of two BMD-equipped companies and two parachute companies, as well as technical and support service troops. This battalion is subordinate to the Army/Corps commander for conducting either operational or tactical operations. Most probable missions would be to seize the far bank and bridges at crossing sites, to strike identified headquarters, communications complexes and fixed field logistic sites, or to try to seize critical codes on major LOCs;
- b. The Czech 22d Airborne Regiment has at least two battalions (one active, one mobilization) of conventionally trained airborne soldiers. Organic Czech air force assets could deliver these forces. As a wartime subordinate of the SWF, these two battalions could be employed anywhere in the Front's area of operations; and
- c. Within the sector, the most likely tactical airmobile targets would be crossing sites over the Naab. Operational targets could include the Pegnitz and Amberg area LOC turntables and crossing sites on the RMD Canal. Any of these operational targets could be struck with either airborne or air assault forces, or a combination of the two. Identification of these most likely target areas is not intended to exclude other possibilities, including targets of opportunity created by the dynamics of battle. PEGNITZ-AMBERG target areas would probably become active after the passage of the NAAB line had been effected. RMD Canal area targets would become likely once enemy formations neared the BAYREUTH-PEGNITZ-VELDEN line and the SULZBACH/ROSENBERG-AMBERG line.

55. Unconventional Warfare. Although the CGF has no identified Special Purpose Forces (SPF) units, the Carpathian Military District could deploy several SPF units to the CGF. The Czech 22d Airborne Regiment has one active duty battalion and one reserve battalion trained as SPF. Priority of SPF action will be against nuclear storage sites, nuclear capable weapons systems (Lance and Pershing), and, for the first 24 to 72 hours, air defence weapons, air defence warning systems, and air defence command and control points, as well as ammunition and POL storage sites. SPF teams doctrinally conduct reconnaissance, direct action, and deep targeting missions. The priority SPF mission is expected to be reconnaissance against and targetting for subsequent destruction by other means (air and artillery). SPF would also assist the insertion of airmobile/air assault forces. SPF teams can mark helicopter landing zones, assist in securing same, and provide guides and reconnaissance forces to the air assault unit.

56. AIR FORCES. See Appendix 3.

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PART 5

CONCLUSION

SOUTHWESTERN FRONT ATTACK OPTIONS

57. Assumption. The WP executes the partially reinforced attack option, ie, the forward deployment of Second Echelon Front forces (from WMD of the Soviet Union) has begun but is not complete. A balance of surprise and readiness would be achieved after six to eight days of WP mobilization.

OPTION ONE

58. The Soviet CGF conducts the attack with 4-5 divisions in the CHEB-HWY 14 corridor. 1CPA would attack SOUTH of the SCHWANDORF triangle entirely against II(GE) Korps. Second echelon armies would be available from the CPMD, 4CPA or the Czech EMD. The commitment of the second echelon would depend on the success achieved by the first echelon forces:


a. Advantages

- (1) strongest army of the SWF is used in the best approach, and
- (2) facilities coordination between Fronts;

b. Disadvantages

- (1) surprise would be lost as the CGF moved to concentrate for the attack,
- (2) Czech forces would have to shift SOUTH, again giving away surprise and exposing their flank, and
- (3) Soviet forces vulnerable to possible Czech fifth columnist activity.

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OPTION TWO

59. The Czechs would provide both first echelon armies with 1CPA attacking in the CHEB-HWY 14 Corridor and 4 CPA attacking SOUTH. The second echelon armies would come from the CGF, the divisions of the EMD and the CPMD.

a. Advantages

- (1) the Czechs would achieve surprise by attacking out of their garrisons or training areas,
- (2) the WP would have a strong army, the CGF, available to exploit weakened NATO defences,
- (3) a first echelon Czech attack would show solidarity, and


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(4) Soviets would be behind the Czechs to "push" them along;

b. Disadvantages

- (1) questionable quality of the Czech armies might allow NATO to steal the initiative early in the battle, and
- (2) SWF success would likely fall behind the WESTERN Front thus providing a flank security problem from GSG.



60. Probable Course of Action. Option two supported by airborne/air assault attacks on crossing sites and rear areas. As the enemy perceives he has made a tactical breakthrough, he will redirect priority of effort. Operational reserves will be directed toward the breakthrough sector. The enemy may choose to support his advance with chemical fire. He will attempt to achieve the canal crossings within 5-10 days.

61. Effect on 4 CMBG

- a. The Brigade must be prepared to face either Czech or Soviet divisions, with the latter being more capable;

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- b. If the objectives on the RMD canal are indeed planned for 1-½ - 3 days (by doctrine) the Brigade is likely to be committed very early and therefore must be prepared, in all respects, from commitment upon arrival in SETTER; and
- c. The Brigade expects to be faced by one full division in a defensive situation. It is possible to foresee our commitment in the CREUSSEN, PEGNITZ and AMBERG areas. In each case, the terrain will allow a division in echelon. The importance of the objective area warrants commitment of a full division. It might be a division which has penetrated the initial defences; a tank division committed to exploit initial success; a specifically task organized formation such as an OMG; or a fresh division from the second echelon army, eg, the CGF.

62. Supporting assessments and basic intelligence data are attached as appendices to this estimate.

Appendices:

- Appendix 1 - Counter-Intelligence
- Appendix 2 - ORBAT
- Appendix 3 - Air Threat
- Appendix 4 - Soviet Unconventional Forces
- Appendix 5 - NBC
- Appendix 6 - Threat While on Airfield
- Appendix 7 - Threat During Deployment
- Appendix 8 - Soviet Tactics In Mountainous and Hilly Terrain
- Appendix 9 - Force Development and Modernization
- Appendix 10 - WP Vulnerabilities and Weaknesses
- Appendix 11 - 4 CMBG Intelligence Requirements
- Appendix 12 - Climatological Data

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APPENDIX 1
TO ANNEX A
TO 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001
DATED 1 JANUARY 1986

COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE

THE MULTI-DISCIPLINE HOSTILE

INTELLIGENCE THREAT TO 4 CMBG

INTRODUCTION

1. The greatest intelligence collection threat facing 4 CMBG arises from the services of the USSR and its WP allies. By far the largest is posed by the Soviet Union. However, all NSWP countries possess highly capable intelligence organizations such as the Czech Intelligence Service (CIS) and East German Intelligence Service (EGIS).
2. This intelligence threat takes the form of a comprehensive and well co-ordinated employment of human intelligence (HUMINT), signal intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT) assets.
3. The significance of the multi-discipline threat is that a single collection target can be exploited by several sources to more completely define it's functions and critical importance to military operations. This "all-source" approach creates a situation in which one asset can be used to discover the existence of a likely intelligence target; then another source can be tasked to exploit fully the discovery.

AIM

4. The aim of this Appendix is to describe the multi-discipline threat posed against 4 CMBG by WP intelligence services.

SCOPE.

5. This Appendix consists of three attachments outlining the three threat disciplines: SIGINT, HUMINT and IMINT.
6. The intelligence collection threat is omnipresent. Each attachment will address the threat across the spectrum of peace to war.

HUMINT

7. The HUMINT threat against 4 CMBG can manifest itself in many ways including illegal agents, SMLM (See note 1) TIR trucking, WP visitors, diplomatic personnel, commercial trade representatives and classic traitor type agents as well as Soviet Special Purpose Forces. During peacetime all of these avenues of approach may be used but as the tension increases there probably will be a transition to a more military oriented intelligence threat, ie, SPF, sleeper agents, etc. and a drying up of such sources as TIR trucks, WP visitors and eventually SMLM and diplomatic pers.

SIGINT

8. SIGINT is defined as the category of intelligence comprising communications (COMINT) intelligence, electronic (ELINT) and telemetry intelligence (TELINT) as well as tactical SIGINT and EW during hostilities.

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As the Brigade has no telemetry signals, TELINT is not a threat to the Brigade. The SIGINT threat is omnipresent yet extremely difficult to detect for much of it is passive and is conducted from inside the borders of the WP.

9. Fixed SIGINT sites, space and airborne platforms pose the greatest threat to 4 CMBG in peacetime. During any period of rising tension we would expect continued operation of present assets as well as the activation of more strategic and tactical air and ground assets specifically targetted against 4 CMBG. This includes all Soviet and Czech Divisional systems.

IMINT

10. Imagery Intelligence is that category of intelligence derived from black and white, colour, infrared and side looking airborne radar (SLAR). The Soviet Union has deployed an array of sophisticated imagery collection means. 4 CMBG faces a considerable IMINT threat in both peacetime and during the transition to war.

11. Peacetime assets include satellites, hand-held cameras used by human sources, WP civil airlines and some military aircraft. The transition to war would probably see the expansion of space IMINT platforms and the activation of more tactical surveillance resources.

EFFECT ON 4 CMBG OPERATIONS

12. It must be remembered that the more secretive, undetected and "unknown" hostile intelligence collection is, the more effective it likely will be. HIS probably wants to foster an attitude within 4 CMBG that we view ourselves as insignificant and unimportant. The ability to collect information and thus to damage our ability to carry out our tasks is far greater in such an attitudinal environment.

13. Combatting the HIS threat is a combination of awareness of the specific threats combined with physical measures to counter SIGINT, IMINT and HUMINT attacks.

14. Countering the SIGINT threat is knowing what collection systems are deployed against the Brigade, how they are used and what they are targetting. This in turn must lead to a thorough understanding of our exploitable vulnerabilities and weaknesses, both human and technical. Combined with good ECCM hopefully we will reduce the WP ability to collect signals information and intelligence on 4 CMBG.

15. Similar to SIGINT, Brigade personnel must be aware of the photographic or IMINT collection capabilities of the WP for nothing will reveal an accurate location better than an aerial photograph. The threat from these platforms should clearly indicate the requirement for not just good but excellent camouflage and concealment. The old adage "you can't hit what you can't see" still is very much applicable.

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16. Countering the HUMINT threat once again requires a good understanding of who the enemy is and how he operates. This knowledge, combined with sound physical, information and material security will limit the hostile human intelligence effectiveness.

17. The three threats - signals, human and imagery, are very much inter-related. To neglect or deemphasize any of these three areas could be just as harmful as emphasizing none at all. As an example, excellent camouflage that would deny WP aerial photographic systems to locate accurately our positions would be negated completely if the signals threat was ignored and ECCM was not employed. Extensive use of our electronic communications while completely camouflaged would allow the enemy to locate our positions. The consequence is that we would probably be targeted for physical attack very quickly.

NOTE 1: SMLM - Soviet Military Liaison Mission was created in 1947 to monitor the denazification of Germany. However, their principal mission now is to gain information on NATO forces in West Germany. To do this the Soviets have three missions, one in the French area located in Baden-Baden (17 members); one in the US area operating out of Frankfurt (14 members); and one in the British sector working from Buende (12 members). France, Britain and the US have similar missions located in East Germany. SMLM's basic method of operation is through touring and observing NATO exercises, garrisons, etc. They are restricted as to where they can travel through the imposition of both permanent and temporary restricted areas (PRA and TRA). There are definitive rules established concerning what SMLM pers are permitted to do. SMLM vehicles may travel freely in Germany outside restricted areas (TRA or PRA) but can only transit restricted areas on the autobahn. However, they may not stop at any point in a PRA or TRA, to include parksplatzs or reststops. In addition SMLM persons are not permitted to monitor, sketch, photo, record or follow any NATO military activities, carry weapons or conceal their military uniform. However, they regularly violate the restricted areas in their attempt to electronically monitor, photograph, observe, note, etc, NATO activity. SMLM personnel appear to be interested in the whole spectrum of NATO military ranging from deployment of nuclear weapons, aircraft and new equipment to monitoring road moves, noting licence plates, tactical signs on vehicles as well as physically "sweeping" areas vacated by exercising units, HQ, etc. Very simply, nothing seems too trivial for SMLM collection. SMLM is allowed unrestricted radio communications with GSFG. 4 CMBGI 3-1 Annex A outlines the policy for SMLM detention by CF personnel. Listed below are the members of SMLM(B) along with their official vehicles:

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SMLM (B) - PERSONNEL

<u>RANK</u>	<u>LAST NAME</u>	<u>FIRST NAME</u>
COL	SEMIKHXINE	PIOTR (Head of Mission)
COL	FOMINE	ALEXANDRE IVANOVITCH
LCOL	TCHOUPARINE	VICTOR
MAJ	KOUCHKINE	VLADIMIR
MAJ	KOUCHTCHEV	VASSILI
MAJ	ZERIANOV	IGOR
ENSIGN	KALETCHENKOV	VITALI
ENSIGN	BOUTAIEV	EVGUENI
ENSIGN	TCHOUGOUIEV	VALERI
ENSIGN	BOUZINE	ALEXANDRE
ENSIGN	TSAGELNIK	VASSILI
ENSIGN	IAKOVLEV	VALERI
ENSIGN	BORICHENKO	VITALI
PTE	BIENIETSKI	SERGUEI
PTE	TARABROV	ALEXANDRE
PTE	ASTAKHOV	VALERI
PTE	ARKOUCHENKO	OLEG

SMLM (B) - VEHICLES

<u>MAKE</u>	<u>YEAR</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>COLOUR</u>	<u>PLATE NO.</u>
OPEL SENATOR	1984	BERLINE	ANTHRACITE	60
OPEL REKORD 2.0	1985	BERLINE	MAROON	61
OPEL REKORD	1984	BERLINE	DARK GREEN	62
OPEL CARAVANE	1984	BREAK	BLUE	66

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<u>MAKE</u>	<u>YEAR</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>COLOUR</u>	<u>PLATE NO.</u>
FORD TRANSIT	1983	MINIBUS	LIGHT GREEN	68
SCHOAL KG 8871	1983	TRAILOR	BROWN	69
ISUZU TROOPER	1986	4 X 4	OLIVE GREEN	64

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TAB B - HUMINT
TAB C - IMINT

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WARSAW PACT SIGINT/ELECTRONIC

WARFARE THREAT TO 4 CMBG

INTRODUCTION

1. Warsaw Pact electronic warfare assets are a constant threat to 4 CMBG during peacetime and hostilities. The closer we approach the Brigade wartime locations the greater this threat becomes. The peacetime threat is focussed primarily on intercept in the passive mode. Intelligence collection SIGINT assets of all WP armies are capable of monitoring 4 CMBG communications, however the Czech and Soviet CGF present the greatest threat particularly during our annual training periods in Grafenwöhr and Hohenfels. East German Intelligence collection is also active against the Munster and Bergen-Hohne training areas and poses a threat to 4 CMBG when deployed in those areas. The Czechs in particular are thought to have one of the finest signals collection establishments of all WP countries.

AIM

2. The aim of this Tab is to outline the Warsaw Pact SIGINT/EW Threat to 4 CMBG in peace and war.

GENERAL

3. The WP prepares for EW under its doctrine of Radio Electronic Combat (REC). This doctrine emphasizes that each level of command above the division have the capability to perform REC against like opposing forces (WP army vs NATO corps and WP division vs NATO division). WP organization for REC includes both ground and air assets. The Warsaw Pact assume that their REC assets are capable of destroying or neutralizing a minimum of 30% of NATO combat capabilities and they regularly train to that end. Both Czech and CGF armies utilize airborne radio relay, airborne jammers, airborne collection systems in support of the ground forces.

4. WP doctrine for employing EW assets is based on three principles. One principle is derived from WP appreciation that NATO weapon systems are heavily dependent upon electronics for command and control. Selective, timely disruption of command and control links equates to neutralization of weapons system during the disrupted period. A second principle of WP REC is the use of EW as a means of combat. During preparations for a breakthrough operation, jammers will be massed on the flanks of the WP attacking force to effect maximum disruption of the NATO defender's communications and radar systems during the critical initial stages of the battle. This WP application requires intricate timing of ECM employment and detailed knowledge of opposing NATO signal practices. The final principle underlying WP REC doctrine is the use of EW resources in conjunction with other means of combat. The use of EW is timed for maximum effectiveness. At a designated time, EW resources are allocated, concentrated

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or dispersed in the same manner as combat and combat support forces are manipulated. Timing of employment and battlefield allocation of EW resources are conceived by the WP commander as a prerequisite to practical application of EW as a tactic.

PEACETIME

5. 4 CMBG, garrisoned over 400 km from the CSSR/FRG border is within collection ranges for some fixed and airborne SIGINT assets. As we move closer to the border, Czech National assets target us from fixed sites subordinate to the Czech 7 SIGINT Regiment located at LITEROMICE (VR 3994). The mission of the 7th Regiment includes the monitoring of: military telephone radio relays of Frankfurt, Munich, Kaiserlautern, and possibly Augsburg, Grafenwohr and Stuttgart; communications of all military units east of the Rhine river including the Hohenfels and Grafenwohr training areas.

6. The Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies are known to use their diplomatically immune facilities such as embassies and residences as bases for the conduct of COMINT intercept. Soviet buildings in Baden-Baden are likely to support such collection efforts as roof top antennae are designed to include the HF/VHF communications coverage of neighbouring military units. Personnel employed at such facilities are well trained and reliable. 2 PPCLI communications are within range of this facility and are therefore vulnerable.

DEPLOYMENT

7. 4 CMBG deployment under electronic silence minimizes the threat during the initial stages of the deployment, however as we near the assembly area the Brigade becomes the target for specialized airborne collectors, namely the COOT-A and the high flying MIG 25 FOXBAT-D.

8. The COOT-A will probably fly ICF (Intelligence Collection Flight) missions parallel to the FLOT and at least 50 km behind it. It carries photo-reconnaissance cameras, a SLAR (sideways looking airborne radar) pod and SIGINT receivers.

9. The COOT-A has a direction finding capability with a line of bearing accuracy of plus or minus 1-2 degrees. With this accuracy an emitter 300 km away could be located to within 6-10 km, depending on the frequency, number of bearings taken and length of baseline. The COOT-A probably has a secure voice downlink and intelligence gathered may be transmitted to elements of divisional reconnaissance battalions. Although the accuracy of the COOT-A is 6-10 km, detection of 4 CMBG by this platform would probably activate other more accurate collectors.

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ASSEMBLY AREA

10. The 4 CMBG assembly area is approximately 80 km from the CSSR/FRG border. This is well within the range of the COOT-A and FOXBAT-D and it is this capability which will assist in providing the WP with their first warning of a Brigade size unit assembly, if it is not already known. However the SIGINT sites deployed along the border should not influence our initial assembly so long as we remain on radio silence. Once 4 CMBG broadcasts we become a target for multi-channel equipment out to a range of 150 km.

11. Once 4 CMBG is committed to battle and deploys east of the assembly area, the entire WP EW inventory, both air and ground will impact on our operations. The degree to which these assets will influence us is entirely scenario dependent.

ONCE COMMITTED

12. The Soviet division commander can, through his reconnaissance battalion and target acquisition battery, effectively intercept and DF all tactically significant signal activity out to at least 30 kms beyond the FEBA. Czech assets are comparable. CGF at Army level are capable of launching DR-3 drones which may have an ELINT capability, an asset not available to any Czech unit at present.

13. The radio-radar reconnaissance company, subordinate to the reconnaissance battalion, can perform both radio and radar intercept and DF of NATO transmissions in the division sector. The company is principally equipped to intercept and DF VHF voice communications and tactical radars, although it can intercept VHF/UHF aircraft frequencies out to several hundred kilometers. The radar intercept platoon of the TAB (Target Acquisition Battery) has one NRS-1 radar DF system, one tactical FM communications DF network and an estimated five communications intercept posts. When opposing a NATO division, the company could monitor tactical communications between division and brigade, and brigades and battalions. At the same time, it could monitor the fire control nets of the supporting artillery unit(s).

14. WP forces employ a large variety of communications DF systems. The R-300 general purpose intercept series of radio receivers are of extreme importance while the R-363/SPIKE SQUARE antenna array is the principle Soviet FM tactical communications DF system. It is held by the division reconnaissance battalion and can theoretically locate 20 to 30 radios per hour, operating within the 20 to 100 MHz low VHF bank (tactical FM radios such as the PRC-25, PRC-70, GRC-125, GRC-160, and VRC-64 radios). SPIKE SQUARE will fix numerous NATO tactical radio sets operating in units below divisional level, ie, 4 CMBG. The TURN series has replaced SPIKE SQUARE in CGF divisions while the Czech Army remains equipped with the older system. A gradual replacement of SPIKE SQUARE with TURN series is expected in 1 CPA in 1986. A three station network along a 15 km baseline can achieve sufficient accuracy for artillery fire. The frequency spectrum of 1 to 440 MHz is covered by Soviet general purpose radio

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receivers which pose an additional intercept threat to almost all NATO tactical FM communications systems.

15. The WP have five radio jammers all of which are believed found in the ECM battalion at front level. These Front level jammers have the capability to cover 4 CMBG's communications. In addition a Soviet division is capable of jamming at least 90 VHF channels at NATO brigade level and below.

16. Central Group of Forces COMINT and ELINT assets are concentrated in two battalions: a radio intercept battalion and a radio technical battalion.

17. The CGF has deployed a heliborne relay jamming squadron, a relatively new concept in Soviet doctrine. The squadron consists of 18 HIP helicopters capable of jamming both air defence radars as well as radio relay systems (up to 27 links in it's area of operations). The standoff jamming distance is 15 km behind the Soviet FLOT. This technique gives the HIP a minimum effective jamming range of 100 km on our side of the FEBA.

EFFECT ON 4 CMBG OPERATIONS

18. Communication equipment and its use can provide a vast amount of information and intelligence to a hostile SIGINT organization. Not only are insecure nets and telephones highly vulnerable to both ESM and secure nets when operating, can also provide the enemy with valuable information such as HQ locations.

19. It must be stressed that passive SIGINT operations are being conducted against the Brigade in peacetime. Although WP intelligence services have the capability to monitor 4 CMBG garrison communications it is during field deployments, particularly as we get closer to the IGB/Czech border, that we become highly susceptible. The effect of this SIGINT collection is that the WP intelligence agencies can gain a much better understanding and appreciation of our ORBAT, roles, procedures including strengths and weaknesses, all of which will be used against us in war.

20. Under war conditions the "passive" collection will be augmented by the offensive ECM resources of the WP. Under Soviet doctrine EW and physical attack of the target are closely integrated. Detection and subsequent jamming, deception and attack have the potential to impair Brigade operations.

21. The bottom line is that SIGINT and EW operations can be powerful "weapons" for the enemy. However, we must remember that all the sophisticated electronic gadgetry is rendered impotent if we don't emit an electronic signature. Although voice procedure and other ECCM activities are important, our best bet is to constantly minimize, in other words to eliminate all unnecessary traffic. While conducting training in forward areas, particularly early in the training cycle, communications training must enjoy the same priority as tactics and gunnery.

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HUMAN INTELLIGENCE THREAT (HUMINT)

INTRODUCTION

1. In order to plan a wartime operation or adopt a peacetime course of action the Soviets require extensive civilian and military intelligence. To achieve this they have deployed the world's largest intelligence collection apparatus. Of the three components of this organization, SIGINT, IMINT and HUMINT, the latter is the most prolific. The HUMINT threat posed by the Soviets and its NSWP partners is nothing short of immense.
2. A key element of this HUMINT threat is that it is designed to transcend the peace to war spectrum. As war moves closer the peacetime threats probably will be replaced by a different set of wartime actors.

AIM

3. The aim of this Tab is to outline the real and potential human intelligence threat to 4 CMBG in both peace and during the transition to war.

PEACETIME THREAT

4. As the only in-theatre CENTAG reserve 4 CMBG may be the target for a variety of threats including low level agents, SMLM, WP TIR truck drivers and covert agents including traitors.
5. Probable items of primary interest for HUMINT collectors would be ORBATS, equipment and facilities, war plans, deployment patterns, states of readiness, as well as biographic data on key members of the Brigade.
6. Analysis of the potential WP HUMINT activity conducted during the Brigades FALLEX 85 clearly shows that we are being monitored. In addition to SMLM, WP TIR trucks and Czech diplomatic personnel being in a position to target the Brigade, there were numerous reports of suspicious people following, observing, photographing and otherwise noting Brigade activity.
7. It is known that more than 500 WP trucks cross the Czech/FRG border daily. Of these, it has been estimated that up to 20% could be dedicated intelligence collectors. Even if the other 80% are not in the direct employ of WP intelligence, questioning of returning drivers probably would reveal a substantial amount of information. On a recent Brigade FTX a survey revealed that WP TIR trucks transitted the Brigades's exercise area on a major route at the rate of 13 per hour.
8. Transport International Routier (TIR) are commercial trucks which bear the symbol TIR on their bumpers. In 1959, numerous eastern and western European nations signed a trade agreement allowing commercial trucks to be sealed by a customs agent at their point of origin, Transit

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International Borders, and not be opened for inspection again until arrival at the final destination.

9. Since the agreement was signed, speculation that Warsaw Pact nations were using the agreement to assist them in their intelligence gathering operations has increased. Eastern European trucks often follow long circuitous routes throughout West Germany, which have no apparent intermediate stops. Recent reports indicate that the drivers of East German vehicles are often approached by East German intelligence services to work for them. These drivers are not usually given a specific mission, just told to tour through West Germany and report what they see. This makes it extremely difficult for German security agencies to establish a pattern of suspicious activities, or keep accurate data on increased interest during NATO exercises or increased travel through areas restricted to SMLM. Most drivers are not professional intelligence personnel, use no aids, and are not paid for these activities. The assistant drivers, however, are often reserve officers recruited from the National Peoples' Army. Because nearly 50,000 East German trucks annually enter the FRG, it is impossible for German security to monitor all TIR trucks. Some examples of detected activities include trucks which have been found parked near military installations without drivers anywhere in sight. Further investigation revealed that the drivers were engaged in suspicious activities, such as measuring bridge supports, girth of trees, and monitoring road intersections. Some trucks have been found to contain extremely sophisticated communications equipment, capable of intercepting military traffic. There is further speculation that some trucks are used to provide accurate locations for satellite photography. The way this might be achieved is through some form of marker on the top of the truck.

10. The SMLM threat is ever present as they are often seen shadowing military convoys, monitoring exercises and observing military installations such as airfields. SMLM activity incorporates the use of photography, physical sweeping of vacated exercise areas, sketching, note-taking and probably some SIGINT. It is known that SMLM take considerable interest in the deployment of both AWACS and F-15 squadrons to the Lahr and Baden airfields. Although Permanent and Temporary Restricted Areas are designed to prevent SMLM activity it is known that SMLM regularly violate Restricted Areas in search of information.

11. Agents, both low and high level pose a constant threat to the Brigade. The advantage that these people have is their anonymity (until detected and neutralized). Having a well placed source could be most damaging to 4 CMBG in terms of revealing operational plans etc. Even low grade agents could provide information on movement, vehicle and personnel status, sketches, photographs and a wealth of other data.

12. In addition there are various communist, peace, left and right wing organizations that are anti-military and/or pro WP. Such groups may conduct harassment, propaganda displays, demonstrations, sabotage, espionage and other subversive activity towards NATO personnel, installations and activity.

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13. The following is a list of some of the major organizations that could adversely affect 4 CMBG operations:

- a. The DKP with allied groups SADJ and DFG/K are Communist organizations that are very active in anti-military operations. They are known to attempt espionage and support peace groups to achieve their goals. Local offices of these organizations exist in HOF, SCHWEINFURT, BAMBERG, KULMBACH, BAYREUTH, ERLANGEN, NURNBERG, SCHWABACH, INGOLSTADT, KEHLHEIM, REGENSBURG, CHAM, FURTH, WALD, WEIDEN, AMBERG and SCHWANDORF;
- b. Peace groups including "Reichswald" and the "Franconian Educational Organization for Peace Work" are also active in the NURNBERG - FEUCHT areas;
- c. The "New Left Wing" is also active in anti-military work. Representing this broad group of activists are the BWK, KPD, AB/KPD, MLPD, Soldiers Committee Regensburg, and the Regensburg Citizens' Committee. REGENSBURG, NURNBERG, ZIRNDORF and BAMBERG are major centres for the "New Left Wing" activity; and
- d. The Extremist-Right organizations of the NPD and JN consider the allied NATO military to be members of the occupation forces and as such agitate for the withdrawal of NATO troops from Germany. Offices are located in BAYREUTH, SCHWEINFURT, FURTH, ERLANGEN, NEUMARKT and AMBERG.

14. Red Army Faction (RAF). The Terrorist threat in the West European theatre is very real and requires all soldiers to be aware of the potential danger. The Red Army Faction (RAF) remains the most dangerous indigenous terrorist group in the FRG. The RAF are not averse to killing military personnel to obtain ID cards, money or other documents.

15. Revolutionary Cell (RZ). This terrorist group first surfaced in West Berlin in 1973 and has been active in the FRG since that time. This group is dedicated to the destruction of the West German system and is opposed to the US military presence in Europe. It operates independently from the RAF, concentrating primarily on nocturnal arson and bombing attacks against soft targets such as defence-related or multi-national companies and host nation agencies. In order to gain public support and sympathy for their causes, the RZ has attempted not to injure people in its attacks. RZ activities have been concentrated in the FRANKFURT/WIESBADEN, BERLIN, and RHINE/RUHR (DUESSELDORF) areas. The RZ lacks a hard core. It has a cellular structure which makes it difficult to determine total RZ strength; although it is estimated to be between 50 and 100.

16. Mid-East Terrorists. On occasion, mid-East terrorist groups have been active in West Germany. Extremists associated with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) have carried out shootings and bombings.

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PLO related groups, including Abu Nidal and Force-17 have been responsible for several attacks in Western Europe and the Middle East.

17. Armenian terrorists have been active world-wide primarily against Turkish targets. However a number of incidents involving Canada and Armenian terrorists has created concern that these terrorists may attack Canadian targets.

18. Although the terrorist threat to CF personnel and installations is considerably lower than the US, our association with NATO certainly establishes CFE as a potential target, albeit moderate. Static establishments and personnel while in garrison present the best target for a terrorist attack as they provide an opportunity to conduct proper surveillance, prepare and execute their plan. Conversely, the threat to exercising forces is considered much more minimal as troops in the field are not an easy or inviting target. Security in the field, combined with the transitory nature of the target make it difficult for the terrorist.

DEPLOYMENT THREAT

19. During a period of increasing tension the Soviets would probably start to insert more military oriented intelligence collection means such as Special Purpose Forces (SPF) as well as activating "sleeper" agents. If the Brigade was ordered to move to its forward assembly area SETTER, we might face this additional HUMINT threat. Although it is very difficult to determine when the activists of SMLM and diplomatic personnel would be curtailed and the borders closed to TIR trucks etc, a worst case scenario would see these activities in whole or in part operating for some time. This would probably be the case during the initial stages of increased tension when we would be targetted by a combination of SMLM, diplomatic personnel, WP TIR truck drivers, as well as SPF, sleeper agents, sympathizers and other informants. Much of the intelligence and information collection on the Brigade could be carried out with relative impunity. A few well placed collectors could observe the Brigades deployment, noting number and type of vehicles and personnel. Deployment at night and in bad weather will reduce the HUMINT threat.

20. The threat of sabotage from these human intelligence resources during a Brigade deployment is unlikely as their primary aim would be to provide useful information. The threat of sabotage would probably come immediately prior to and at the outbreak of hostilities and would be carried out by non-intelligence collectors (ie: non-HUMINT).

ASSEMBLY AREA THREAT

21. As 4 CMBG arrives in its assembly area, security, camouflage and restricted movement would reduce the threat from SMLM, TIR trucks and diplomatic people. However, local agents, sympathizers and SPF collectors would continue to pose a threat. A major task of the SPF is providing

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detailed information on unit locations for targetting purposes. This would be particularly important if hostilities already had broken out. Although the majority of the collection would likely occur from a "stand-off" distance, SPF collectors could attempt infiltration into the Brigade area dressed in Allied combat clothing and speaking French and/or English.

EFFECT ON 4 CMBG OPERATIONS

22. The impact on present Brigade activity by WP HUMINT is at best an educated guess. We know that SMLM, WP personnel in TIR trucks and cars periodically monitor the Brigade. We know that WP diplomatic personnel have observed the Brigade. What we don't know is how many, if any, local agents including ones internal to CFE exist, and what sort of information has and is being gleaned. It would be prudent to assume that there are agents, if not in, or working for CFE, then certainly local civilians who monitor and report the Brigade's movement, status, etc. We probably are monitored by a variety of HUMINT sources and should assume that the WP intelligence agencies have collected and will continue to collect a variety of basic information concerning vehicle and personnel status, new equipment, PSA's, routes, railheads, alert and movement procedures, CFR numbers, tactical signs, callsigns, bridge classification of vehicles, types of camouflage, nominal rolls and a myriad of other detail.

23. Although the impact on the Brigade's peacetime status and activity from this passive HUMINT collection is minimal, the real results in part would surface prior to or at the outbreak of hostilities. In addition, accurate knowledge of our peacetime status can allow the WP to adjust its weapons, plans, organizations, etc, to be prepared to counter us more effectively.

24. As HUMINT activity would continue during any forward deployment and into actual battle, the SPF, along with other informants, probably would play an instrumental role. SPF teams would most likely have missions to act as forward observers, providing accurate targetting information for air, missile, artillery or any other attack on the Brigade.

25. Although certain HUMINT activities are difficult to prevent, ie: a local agent monitoring a road move, defensive positions, etc, any weaknesses we have can be partly compensated through education and awareness of the HUMINT threat facing the Brigade. Combined with reporting and the use of appropriate counter-measures this should make the task of the WP HUMINT collector somewhat more difficult.

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IMAGERY INTELLIGENCE (IMINT)

INTRODUCTION

1. The Soviets have always placed a great deal of importance on reconnaissance. The scope of their collection is extremely wide-ranging, extending from hand-held cameras (military attaché and low/high level agents), tactical reconnaissance by aircraft or drones to strategic reconnaissance gathered by specialist signal intelligence collectors and earth satellites. Although IMINT platforms operate against us in peacetime, in war we will see an increase in imagery collection against NATO and consequently 4 CMBG.

AIM

2. The aim of this Tab is to outline the imagery threat to 4 CMBG covering the peace to war spectrum.

PEACE TIME THREAT

3. On any given day there are about 100 to 150 satellites in orbit of which four to five are used for military photo reconnaissance. In addition, most others have a military application be it recce, communications or photographic. Two types of photo recce satellites are currently used:

- a. the medium resolution system (Med-Res) used normally for general search and mapping of large areas; and
- b. the high resolution system (Hi-Res) used to obtain more detailed information on selected targets.

4. The areas targetted by the high resolution system are usually very small, therefore these satellites are designed to perform a few limited manoeuvres to focus on a number of targets. For example, a photographic satellite is usually programmed to orbit the earth once every 90 to 120 minutes providing good area coverage over a 24 hour period. On a 12 to 13 day mission this permits at least one opportunity (weather permitting) to photograph any part of the earth's surface within the north and south latitudes established by the inclination of the satellite. Films usually are recovered after 12 to 13 days in orbit.

5. The photo recce satellites could be launched at intervals of three to five days and recovered after only six to eight days in orbit, however the Soviets have demonstrated the ability to eject and recover film capsules while the satellite remains in orbit in a continuous targetting mode. The geographical relationship between the Soviets launch areas combined with the eastward rotation of the earth, allows the Soviets to photograph Central Region areas shortly after the satellites launch and recover information derived from the sensors a few hours later. Based on Soviet satellite photographic capability it must be assumed that all 4 CMBG vehicles and major weapons have been counted and otherwise

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investigated "from the sky". It is interesting to note that some WP TIR trucks may have markings on the top of the truck to assist Soviet satellites in accurately locating positions.

6. During any NATO deployment an increase of recce satellites is possible in order to monitor CENTAG movement, thus 4 CMBG is very susceptible. We also must expect activity from military attachés, agents, sympathizers and other WP personnel. As the Brigade moves closer to the Nurnberg area, 4 CMBG probably will become the target for specialized airborne IMINT collectors, namely the COOT-A and the high flying MIG-25 FOXBAT-D variant, both fitted with multi-sensor equipment. The COOT-A is a modified transport aircraft dedicated to ICF (Intelligence Collector Flights). It carries a first generation SLAR POD (side looking airborne radar) and is used primarily for mapping, but when used in conjunction with on board radio DF facilities it can pinpoint fixed targets and track mobile emitters.

7. The BREWER-D and the FOXBAT-D have a SLAR capability that could be used to locate vehicles on the road. Soviet SLAR signals are scattered by foliage and trees so vehicles in hide positions would not normally be located. Soviet SLAR has no real time downlink, therefore, they can detect vehicles in motion but cannot target them. The resolution is sufficient to detect vehicles but not identify them. The FOXBAT-D can standoff 50 km from the FLOT and search an area up to 50 km deep in enemy territory. The FOXBAT is a high-altitude aircraft capable of flying above much of NATO's air defence umbrella on penetration missions. The BREWER-D will have to penetrate lower level air defence space in order to use it's SLAR effectively, and should not pose a threat until border crossing takes place.

THREAT IN ASSEMBLY AREA AND ONCE COMMITTED

8. Once we are deployed forward for battle the Soviets could use all reconnaissance platforms available to monitor the Brigade, especially satellite imagery and intelligence collector flights. Another reconnaissance asset that would be used by the Soviets is the DR-3 Drone which would be particularly valuable immediately after a border crossing to confirm NATO strong/weak points. The DR-3 is a low-altitude, subsonic reconnaissance Drone with a primary mission to acquire timely intelligence data on enemy forces on the tactical battlefield. Reconnaissance equipment fitted to the DR-3 includes several photographic cameras and TV cameras with an onboard recorder or data link. It is assessed that the system has the capability to deliver near real-time reconnaissance data to Soviet army level commanders. This is accomplished by ejecting a canister containing the data over or near the command post requesting the information. The current inventory of Warsaw Pact Drones remains limited to a programmed flight which reduces it's operational usage as all flights must be thoroughly planned to optimize results. Other battlefield missions may include ELINT collection, electronic counter-measures, target acquisition and delivery of biological or chemical agents.

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TAB C
TO APPENDIX 1
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TO 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001
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WEAKNESSES

9. Satellites have a few deficiencies, the greatest of which is the inability to photograph targets where extensive clouds exist. In addition, first generation satellite imagery is not available for interpretation until deorbiting of the satellite. Second generation systems are a significant improvement over earlier systems in that they have the capability to deorbit at least two auxiliary film capsules prior to the re-entry of the satellite. In addition to this capsule deorbit capability there is an increased mission life of at least 30 days. Thus, if processing and analysis of film from a capsule reveals something unusual or an obscure target, manoeuvres can be made to cover the target again before satellite deorbit.

10. At present Soviet SLAR (side looking airborne radar) has no real time downlink therefore the process of targetting from SLAR propagation demands much greater time! In addition it's ability to differentiate vehicles is questionable. SLAR is based on line of sight and will have difficulty in detecting vehicles on the opposite side of the hill because of radar shadows.

EFFECT ON 4 CMBG OPERATIONS

11. The Soviets have numerous imagery assets that could be used against 4 CMBG and deployment of the latest generation of sensors will make it increasingly more difficult to go undetected. However, by adhering to good overhead camouflage and concealment, Soviet capability to determine our locations through visual recce, overflight photography, infra-red, SLAR, drones and satellite recce will be reduced sharply. Conversely, if our positions are not effectively concealed there is a high probability that WP imagery sensors will detect us with sufficient resolution for accurate targetting.

12. Every effort should be attempted to reduce our vulnerability to the imagery threat including the use of towns to help counter the infra-red or thermal imaging devices. Heavily canopied forests, while not reducing the heat signature, will reduce, and in many instances eliminate the effectiveness of straight photographic cameras. Conversely, trenches and vehicles in the open provide no challenge to an enemy intelligence analyst.

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APPENDIX 2
TO ANNEX A
TO 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001
DATED 1 JANUARY 1986

ORDER OF BATTLE

INTRODUCTION

1. An Order of Battle (ORBAT) provides the means by which the basic structure and equipment of military forces are portrayed. Thus, from an intelligence point of view the ORBAT is an important "baseline" reference to monitor and confirm the identification, equipment and organization of WP forces.

AIM

2. The aim of this Appendix is to provide the most current ORBAT on the two armies likely to oppose 4 CMBG in war; the Czechoslovakian Peoples' Army (CPA), the Soviet Central Group of Forces (CGF), and the Carpathian Military District (CPMD).

IDENTIFICATION

3. The form in which westerners refer to Soviet and NSWP units, formations, etc, is called True Unit Designators (TUD). An example of a TUD is 1 Tank Regiment of the 1 Tank Division. All the TUDs for 1 and 4 CPA and CGF are listed on pages A-2-9 to A-2-14.

4. Unit, formation, etc, TUDs are classified in the Soviet system and generally are not known by the soldiers of those units and are infrequently used in radio communications. Regiments, divisions, etc, are referred to by their honourific title or Field Post Number (FPN) which are five digit numbers. For example, HQ 15 GTD/CGF is listed as unit 43115 while HQ 30 GMRD/CGF is known as 61381. Most soldiers will know their FPN, few will know their TUD.

5. An example of an honourific title is the Czech 22 Airborne Regiment which is known as the "First Unit of the Slovak Revolution". It should be noted that the collection of these wartime designators is not complete and may change when a particular unit is reorganized or resubordinated.

READINESS CATEGORIES

6. The Soviets categorize their divisions into two broad categories: Ready and Not Ready. Ready divisions are those that are at or near full wartime strength. NATO has subdivided these Ready divisions into categories A and B. Not Ready divisions include cadre and training divisions which correspond to the NATO category C. The categories that Canada uses are:

- a. Category A - full complement of combat and support equipment manned at 80% or more of war personnel strength;
- b. Category B - full complement of combat and support equipment but manned at any 50-80% of wartime strength;

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APPENDIX 2
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- c. Category C - most combat equipment but they lack some support equipment and are manned at only 10-50% of war personnel strength. Training divisions are included in this category;
- d. Category D - these divisions have most of their combat and combat support equipment but lack significant amounts of general support equipment. Combat equipment is of older, sometimes obsolete types. They are manned at less than 10% of their war strength;
- e. Mobilization Division. Mobilization divisions, which the Soviets refer to as "divisions of the second formation" or "second generation divisions", represent an intermediate level between active divisions and those that could be formed from depot stocks. They have been located in the vicinity of CAT B and C divisions and consist of prepositioned equipment sets that are maintained by a small caretaking element which may be drawn from an active co-located division. Although the quantity and quality of equipment varies and service support assets may be lacking, most MOB DIVs hold the major items of combat equipment particularly tanks and artillery. Upon mobilization the bulk of divisional personnel will normally be drawn from the reserves; however, most key staff positions will be filled by predesignated personnel from the nearby active division. In the past two years a large number of these divisions have been moved away from the active divisions and some have subsequently become active CAT D or CAT C divisions. Isolated MOB DIVs would presumably be manned entirely by reservists.

EQUIPMENT

7. Some equipment listed in the ORBAT is quite old and may not be familiar to some of the readers, therefore a short description of these equipments is included:
- a. OT-810. A Czech modification of a WW II German halftrack with overhead protection. It is normally seen fitted with the M59A recoilless gun;
 - b. MT-34. A tank based on the WW II Russian T-34. It mounts an 85mm main gun;
 - c. T-10. A Russian built heavy tank with a 122mm main gun, crew of four and maximum range of 250 km; and
 - d. M53/59. An old towed, twin barrel 30mm anti-aircraft gun.
8. One of the major tanks listed in the ORBAT is the T-72 M1981/3 which equates to the latest variant of the T-72. The T-72 M1981/3 should not be confused or associated with the new T-80 which has had the designator M1983/1.

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.../A-2-3

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ORBAT UPDATE

9. In order for an ORBAT to be fully functional it must be current, thus this ORBAT will be updated annually.


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.../A-2-4

NATO SECRET

CZECHOSLOVAKIA - WESTERN MILITARY

DISTRICT (WMD)




A-2-4


.../A-2-5

NATO SECRET


CZ MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION (MRD)



CZ TANK DIVISION (TD)



SOVIET CENTRAL GROUP OF FORCES (CGF)




A-2-7


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SOVIET MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION (MRD)



SOVIET TANK DIVISION (TD)



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APPENDIX 2
 TO ANNEX A
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 DATED 1 JANUARY 1986

DIVISION TRUE UNIT DESIGNATORS

SOVIET CENTRAL GROUP OF FORCES

CATEGORY "A"

<u>18 GMRD</u>	<u>48 MRD</u>	<u>30 GMRD</u>
18 GMRD HQ VR 9484	48 MRD HQ WR 8333	30 GMRD HQ CU 6182
CRTA - VR 9484	CRTA - WR 8333	CRTA CU 6182
275 GMRR VR 9484	333 MRR XR 0426	168 GMRR DU 4486
78 GMRR VS 7516	268 MRR XR 0457	164 MRR BT 8593
80 MRR VS 2015	328 MRR WR 8233	166 MRR CV 7637
360 TR VS 8816	U/I TR XR 4137	30G TR CU 7260
U/I IND TK BN VS 8816	U/I IND TK BN XR 4137	U/I IND TK BN CU 7260
U/I RECCE BN VS 2015	U/I RECCE BN WR 8233	U/I RECCE BN CV 7637
44 ARTY REGT VS 8409	U/I ARTY REGT XR 1052	U/I ARTY REGT DU 6588
U/I AT BN WS 1005	U/I AT BN XR 1052	U/I AT BN CT 2897
U/I FROG BN VS 8310	U/I FROG BN XR 0426	U/I FROG BN BT 8593
U/I SA-6 VS 8511	U/I SA-8 REGT UNLOC	U/I SA-8 REGT CU 7260
U/I HEL SQN VS 8107	U/I HEL SQN XQ 5995	U/I HEL DET CU 6288
U/I ENGR BN VR 8604	U/I ENGR BN WR 8333	U/I ENGR BN CT 2797
U/I SIG BN VR 9385	U/I SIG BN WR 8333	U/I SIG BN CU 6182
U/I CHEM BN VS 3626	U/I CHEM BN WR 8333	U/I CHEM BU 8817
U/I MAINT BN VS 3626	U/I MAINT BN WR 8333	U/I MAINT BN DU 2658
U/I MAT SP BN VR 8604	U/I MAT SP BN WR 8333	U/I MAT SP DU 2658

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APPENDIX 2
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DATED 1 JANUARY 1986

DIVISION TRUE UNIT DESIGNATORS

SOVIET CENTRAL GROUP OF FORCES

(Continued)

CATEGORY "A"

<u>15 GTD</u>	<u>31 TK DIV</u>
15 GTD HQ VR 9064	31 TD HQ XR 7540
U/I CRTA VR 9064	CRTA XR 7540
U/I TR VR 9064	100 TR BV 9791
U/I TR VR 9064	237 TR XR 8210
U/I TR VR 9064	77 TR XR 9252
295 MRR VR 9064	322 MRR XQ 6495
U/I RECCE BN VR 9064	U/I RECCE BN XR 7540
U/I ARTY REGT VS 6301	617 ARTY REGT BV 9791
U/I FROG BN VR 3340	U/I FROG BN XR 7540
U/I SA-6 REGT VR 4946	U/I SA-6 REGT XR 7540
U/I HEL SQN VR 9465	U/I HEL SQN XQ 5995
U/I ENGR BN WR 3340	U/I ENGR BN XR 8210
U/I SIG BN VR 9064	U/I SIG BN XR 7540
U/I CHEM BN VR 9064	U/I CHEM BN XR 7540
U/I MAINT BN VR 9064	152 MAINT BN XQ 6495
U/I MAT SP BN VR 9064	U/I MAT SP BN XR 7540

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APPENDIX 2
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DIVISION TRUE UNIT DESIGNATORS

1ST CZECH PEOPLES' ARMY

CATEGORY "A"

<u>1 TK DIV</u>	<u>2 MRD</u>
1 TD HQ VR 3365	2 MRD HQ UQ 9254
1 TK REGT VR 1009	10 MRR UQ 6966
2 TK REGT VR 0751	11 MRR UQ 7773
21 TK REG UR 9776	12 MRR UQ 4878
3 MRR VR 1678	23 TR UQ 6197
1 RECCE BN UR 8564	10 RECCE BN UQ 6966
1 ARTY REGT VR 3995	8 ARTY REGT UQ 7572
1 FROG BN VR 3995	U/I FROG BN UQ 6197
* 16 FROG BN VR 3995	U/I MRL BN UQ 7572
1 MRL BN VR 3995	2 SA-6 REGT UQ 6966
5 SA-8 REGT UR 9776	4 SIG BN UQ 9353
91 ENGR BN VR 3995	4 ENGR BN VQ 0862
U/I SIG BN VR 3365	2 CHEM DEF BN UQ 7467
5 CHEM DEF BN VR 3365	2 MAINT BN UQ 7672
1 MAINT BN UR 9775	U/I MAT SP BN VQ 0664
U/I MAT SP BN VR 0780	

*NOTE: MAINTAINED FOR MOBILIZATION BY 1 TD

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APPENDIX 2
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DIVISION TRUE UNIT DESIGNATORS

1ST CZECH PEOPLES' ARMY

(Continued)

CATEGORY "A"

<u>19 MRD</u>	<u>20 MRD</u>
19 MRD HQ UR 8311	20 MRD HQ VR 4867
57 MRR UR 5513	49 MRR UR 3237
67 MRR UR 3608	65 MRR UR 1149
104 MRR UR 3019	74 MRR UR 4465
11 TR UR 8209	12 TR UR 8564
19 RECCE BN UR 3020	20 RECCE BN UR 1151
47 ARTY REGT UR 8508	38 ARTY REGT UR 2554
19 FROG BN UR 3608	20 FROG BN UR 5761
U/I MRL BN UR 8508	20 MRL BN UR 2554
11 SA-6 REGT UR 5513	12 SA-6 REGT UR 3237
11 ENGR BN UR 8508	12 ENGR BN UR 7881
11 SIG BN UR 7909	12 SIG BN UR 4666
11 CHEM BN UR 3607	12 CHEM BN UR 4666
19 MAINT BN UR 8508	20 MAINT BN UR 8564
U/I MAT SP BN UQ 8091	U/I MAT SP BN UR 5374

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APPENDIX 2
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DIVISION TRUE UNIT DESIGNATORS

4TH CZECH PEOPLES' ARMY

CATEGORY "B"

<u>4TH TK DIV</u>	<u>9TH TK DIV</u>	<u>15 MRD</u>
4 TD HQ WQ 4194	9 TD HQ VQ 7574	15 MRD HQ VQ 6624
13 TR WR 2828	17 TR VQ 5851	62 MRR VQ 2630
7 TR WQ 0043	14 TR VQ 3762	51 MRR VQ 4908
8 TR WQ 4271	18 TR VQ 7574	68 MRR VQ 0735
9 MRR WQ 7812	79 MRR VR 7713	20 TR VQ 6026
4 RECCE BN WQ 0043	9 RECCE BN VQ 0735	15 RECCE BN VQ 0735
6 ARTY REGT WQ 4329	362 ARTY REGT VR 6622	36 ARTY REGT VQ 6126
4 FROG BN VQ 8838	U/I FROG BN VQ 6681	15 FROG BN VQ 0735
U/I MRL BN WQ 4129	U/I MRL BN VR 7713	U/I MRL BN VQ 6126
* 13 FROG BN VR 8565	9 AAR REGT VR 6622	1 AAA REGT VQ 6126
4 AAA REGT WQ 4094	8 ENGR BN VQ 5851	15 ENGR BN VQ 6023
6 ENGR BN WQ 0044	9 SIG BN VQ 7574	1 SIG BN VQ 6224
5 SIG BN WQ 4094	U/I CHEM BN VQ 3673	15 CHEM BN VQ 6224
U/I CHEM BN WQ 4094	9 MAINT BN VQ 7574	15 MAINT BN VQ 6126
4 MAINT BN WQ 4271	U/I MAT SP BN VQ 3763	U/I MAT SP VP 6198
U/I MAT SP BN WQ 4094		

*NOTE: MAINTAINED FOR MOBILIZATION

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DIVISION TRUE UNIT DESIGNATORS

4TH CZECH PEOPLES' ARMY

CATEGORY "C"

3 MRD

3 MRD HQ XQ 0700

4 MRR XQ 5514

5 MRR XQ 2108

6 MRR XQ 8038

33 TR XQ 7596

3 RECCE BN XQ 7363

361 ARTY REGT XQ 8038

U/I FROG BN XQ 7596

13 AAA REGT XQ 6727

U/I MRL BN XQ 8038

U/I ENGR BN XQ 3903

3 SIG BN XQ 7362

U/I CHEM BN XQ 6727

3 MAINT BN XQ 7362

U/I MAT SP BN XQ 7363

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APPENDIX 2
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 TO 4 CMBG OPLAN 3300
 DATED 1 JANUARY 1986

CZ WMD

	M-46 (130mm FD Gun)	D-20 (152mm Towed)	D-30 (122mm Towed)	2S1 (122mm SP How)	DANA (152mm SP How)	M-30 (122mm How)	M-18/10 (152mm How)	M-31/37 (122mm Gun)	RM-70 (122mm MRL)	M-51 (130mm MRL)	ML-20 (152mm How)	ERDM (SAGGER)	AT-3 (GROUND)	AT-4 (GROUND)	FROG-7	M-53/59 (30mm AA Gun)	S-60 (57mm AA)	SA-6	M-10	M-53 (100mm)	SCUD-B	SA-4	2S7 (203mm SP How)	2S4 (240mm SP MCRS)	M53 100mm Gun														
71 Bde, 7th Arty Div, (WMD)	36							36	18		36												**	**															
162 Bde. 7th Arty DIV, (WMD)									72																														
(MRL) U/I Bde, 7th Arty Div, (WMD)	72																																						
U/I Bde, 7th Arty Div, (WMD)											*72																												
322d Arty Bde, 1st CPA	18				12			36			18										36																		
U/I Arty Bde, 4th CPA	18							54			18										18																		
321st SCUD Bde, 1st CPA																						12																	
331st SCUD Bde, 4th CPA																						12																	
216th AT Arty Regt, 1st CPA																						12																	
217th AT Arty Regt, 4th CPA													6/9								54																		
													6/9								54																		

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APPENDIX 2
 TO ANNEX A
 TO 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001
 DATED 1 JANUARY 1986

CZ WMD

	M-46 (130mm FD Gun)	D-20 (152mm Towed)	D-30 (122mm Towed)	2S1 (122mm SP How)	DANA (152mm SP How)	M-30 (122mm How)	M-18/10 (152mm How)	M-31/37 (122mm Gun)	FM-70 (122mm MRL)	M-51 (130mm MRL)	ML-20 (152mm How)	ERDM (SAGGER)	AT-3 (GROUND)	AT-4 (GROUND)	FROG-7	M-53/59 (30mm AA Gun)	S-60 (57mm AA)	SA-6	M-10	M-53 (100mm)	SCUD-B	SA-4	2S7 (203mm SP How)	2S4 (240mm SP MORS)	M53 100mm Gun
U/I SA-6 Regt, 1st CPA																		20							
311th Arty Bde (SCUD), (WMD)																					12				
SA-6 Regt, 4th CPA																		20							
SA-4 Bde, (WMD)																						27			
201st AAA Regt, (WMD)																	24								
16 FROG Bn (WMD)															4										
13 FROG Bn (WMD)															4										
U/I Arty Bde (MOB) (WMD)																									72

* Will be replaced by DANA Howitzer
 ** 71 Bde has unknown number of Hy Mors & How

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APPENDIX 2
 ANNEX A
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 DATED 1 JANUARY 1986

WMD 1 CPA

	T-72	T-54/55	BMP	BTR-60	OT-62 (AFC Tracked)	OT-64 (AFC Wheeled)	OT-65 (Rece Veh)	D-20 (152mm Towed)	D-30 (122mm Towed)	2S1 (122mm Towed)	DANA (152mm SP How)	M-30 (122mm How)	M-31/37 (122mm Gun)	RM-70 (122mm Gun)	M-51 (130mm MRL)	M-18/46/10 (152mm How)	ML-20 (152mm How)	BRDM-2 (SACGER)	AT-3 (GROUND)	AT-4 (GROUND)	FROG-7	M-53/59 (30mm AA)	S-60 (57mm AA)	SA-9	SA-6	SA-13	SA-8
1st TK Regt, 1st TD	95		13#		3		11															9-12					**
2nd TK Regt, 1st TD	95		13		3		11															9-12					4
21st TK Regt, 1st TD	95		13		3		11															9-12					4
3rd MRR, TD	31		95		12		15					18			6			9	12			9-12					
1st Arty Regt, 1st TD							10		12		18	24				6											
MRL Bn, 1st TD														18													
1st FROG Bn, 1st TD																					t4						
5th SA-8 Regt, 1st TD																											
1st Recon Bn, 1st TD			12			6	19																				
10th MRR, 2nd MRD		40	96#			12	15					18			6			9	12			9-12					

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APPENDIX 2
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WMD 1 CPA

	T-72	T-54/55	BMP	BTR-60	OT-62 (APC Tracked)	OT-64 (APC Wheeled)	OT-65 (Reece Veh)	D-20 (152mm Towed)	D-30 (122mm Towed)	2S1 (122mm Towed)	DANA (152mm SP How)	M-30 (122mm How)	M-31/37 (122mm Gun)	RM-70 (122mm Gun)	M-51 (130mm MRL)	M-18/46/10(152mm How)	ML-20 (152mm How)	BRDM-2 (SAGGER)	AT-3 (GROUND)	AT-4 (GROUND)	FROG-7	M-53/59 (30mm AA)	S-60 (57mm AA)	SA-9	SA-6	SA-13	SA-8	
11th MRR, 2nd MRD		40	3			108	15					18			6				9	12			9-12					
12th MRR, 2nd MRD		40	3			108	15					18			6				9	12			9-12					
23rd TK Regt, 2d MRD		95	3		3		11																9-12					
8th Arty Regt, 2d MRD							10				18	36				18												
MRL Bn, 2nd MRD														18														
FROG Bn, 2nd MRD																					4							
2nd SA-6 Regt, 2d MRD																										20		
10th Recon Bn 2d MRD			12			6	19																					

* Being replaced by BMP-2. Expect remaining 1TD regts to follow suit.

10 MRR has 1 Bn BMP-2.

** Expect 1st TK regt to acquire SA 13's.

† Probably replaced with SS-21/SCARAB.

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APPENDIX 2
 TO ANNEX A
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 DATED 1 JANUARY 1986

1 CPA

	T-72	T-54/55	BMP	BTR-60	OT-62 (APC Tracked)	OT-64 (APC Wheeled)	OT-65 (Rece Veh)	M46 (130mm Gun)	D-20 (152mm Towed)	D-30 (122mm Towed)	2S1 (122mm SP How)	DANA (152mm SP How)	M-30 (122mm Gun)	M-31/37 (122mm Gun)	BM-70 (122mm MRL)	M-51 (130mm MRL)	M-18/46/10 (152mm How)	ML-20 (152mm How)	BRDM - 2 (SAGGER)	AT-3 (GROUND)	AT-4 (GROUND)	FROG-7	M-53/59 (30mm AA Gun)	S60 (57mm AA)	SA-9	SA-6	
49 MRR/20 MRD		40	96			12	15				18					6				9	12			9-12			
74 MRR/20 MRD		40	3			108	15						18			6				9	12			9-12			
65 MRR/20 MRD		40	3			108	15						18			6				9	12			9-12			
12 TR/20 MRD		95	3		3		11																	9-12			
38 Arty Regt/20 MRD							10					18	36					18									
20 MRL Bn/20 MRD															18												
20 FROG Bn/20 MRD																						4					
12 SA-6 Regt/20 MRD							5																			20	
20 Recon Bn/20 MRD			12			6	19																				
57 MRR/19 MRD		40	96			12	5				18					6				9	12			6			

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1 CPA

	T-72	T-54/55	BMP	BTR-60	OT-62 (APC Tracked)	OT-64 (APC Wheeled)	OT-65 (Receve Veh)	M46 (130mm Gun)	D-20 (152mm Towed)	D-30 (122mm Towed)	2S1 (122mm SP How)	DANA (152mm SP How)	M-30 (122mm Gun)	M-31/37 (122mm Gun)	BM-70 (122mm MRL)	M-51 (130mm MRL)	M-18/46/10 (152mm How)	ML-20 (152mm How)	BRDM - 2 (SAGGER)	AT-3 (GROUND)	AT-4 (GROUND)	FROG-7	M-53/59 (30mm AA Gun)	S60 (57mm AA)	SA-9	SA-6
67 MRR/19 MRD		40	3			108	15						18			6			9	12			6			
104 MRR/19 MRD		40	3			108	15						18			6			9	12			6			
11 TR/19 MRD		95	3		3		11																6			
47 Arty Regt/19 MRD							10			18		18	18					6								
MRL Bn/19 MRD															18											
19 FROG Bn/19 MRD																						4				
11 SA-6 Regt/19 MRD							5																			20
19 Recon Bn/19 MRD			12		6	19																				

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4 CPA

	T-72	T-54/55	BMP	OT-62 (APC Tracked)	OT-64 (APC Wheeled)	OT-65 (Reece Veh)	M46 (130mm FD Gun)	D-20 (152MM Towed)	D-30 (122mm Towed)	2S1 (122 SP How)	DANA (152mm SP How)	M-30 (122mm How)	M-18/M-10 (152mm How)	M-31/37 (122mm Gun)	BM-70 (122mm MRL)	M-51 (130mm MRL)	ML-20 (152mm How)	BRDM (SAGGER)	AT-3 (GROUND)	AT-4 (GROUND)	FROG - 7	M-53/59 (50mm AA Gun)	S60 (57mm AA)	SA-6						
4th AAA Regt/4th TK Div																							6	18						
4th RECON Bn/4th TK Div			12		6	19																								
17th TK Regt/9th TK Div		95	13	3		11																	6							
14th TK Regt/9th TK Div		95	13	3		11																	6							
18th TK Regt/9th TK Div	*	95	13	3		11																	6							
79th MRR/9th TK Div		31	96	12		15						18				6							6							
362nd ARTY Regt/9th Div						10					18	36																		
U/I MRL Bn/9th TK Div															18															
U/I FROG Bn/9th TK Div																						4								
9th AAA Regt/9th TK Div																							6	18						

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4 CPA

	T-72	T-54/55	BMP	OT-62 (APC Tracked)	OT-64 (APC Wheeled)	OT-65 (Recoe Veh)	M46 (130mm FD Gun)	D-20 (152MM Towed)	D-30 (122mm Towed)	2S1 (122 SP How)	DANA (152mm SP How)	M-30 (122mm How)	M-18/M-10 (152mm How)	M-31/37 (122mm Gun)	RM-70 (122mm MRL)	M-51 (130mm MRL)	ML-20 (152mm How)	ERDM (SAGGER)	AT-3 (GROUND)	AT-4 (GROUND)	FROG - 7	M-53/59 (30mm AA Gun)	S60 (57mm AA)	SA-6								
U/I Recon Bn/9th TK Div			12	6	15																											
62nd MRR/15th MRD		40	96	12	15							18				6			9	12			6									
51st MRR/15th MRD		40	3	108	15							18				6			9	12			6									
68th MRR/15th MRD		40	3	108	15							18				6			9	12			6									
4th MRR, 3rd MRD		40	3	108	15							18				6			9	12			6									
5th MRR/3rd MRD		40	96	12	15							18				6			9	12			6									
6th MRR/3rd MRD		40	3	108	15							18				6			9	12			6									
33rd TK Regt/3rd MRD	31	64	3	3		11																	6									
361st Arty Regt/3rd Div											18	36			18																	
FROG Bn 3rd MRD																						4										

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4 CPA

	T-72	T-54/55	FMP	OT-62 (APC Tracked)	OT-64 (APC Wheeled)	OT-65 (Reece Veh)	M46 (130mm FD Gun)	D-20 (152mm Towed)	D-30 (122mm Towed)	2S1 (122 SP How)	DANA (152mm SP How)	M-30 (122mm How)	M-18/M-10 (152mm How)	M-31/37 (122mm Gun)	RM-70 (122mm MRL)	M-51 (130mm MRL)	ML-20 (152mm How)	BRDM (SAGGER)	AT-3 (GROUND)	AT-4 (GROUND)	FROG - 7	M-53/59 (30mm AA Gun)	SGO (57mm AA)	SA-6						
263D AAA Bn/3rd MRD																						6	18							
3rd Recon Bn/3rd MRD			12		6	19																								
13th TK Regt/4th TK Div		95	13	3		11																6								
7th TK Regt/4th TK Div		95	13	3		11																6								
8th Tk Regt/4th TK Div		95	13	3		11																6								
9th MRR/4th TK Div		31	96	12		15						18				6		9	12			6								
6th Arty Regt/4th TK Div						10					18	36			18															
4th FROG Bn/4th TK Div																						4								

* In process of converting to T-72

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4 CPA EMD

	T-72	T-54/55	EMP	OT-62 (AFC Tracked)	OT-64 (AFC Wheeled)	OT-65 (Recce Veh)	M46 (130mm FLD Gun)	D-20 (152MM Towed)	D-30 (122mm Towed)	2S1 (122 SP How)	ML978 (152mm SP How)	M-30 (122mm How)	M-18/M-10 (152mm How)	M-31/37 (122mm Gun)	FM-70 (122mm MRL)	M-51 (130mm MEL)	ML-20 (152mm How)	BROM (SAGGER)	AT-3 (GROUND)	AT-4 (GROUND)	PROG - 7	M-53/59 (30mm AA Gun)	S60 (57mm AA)	SA-6							
20th TK Regt/15th MRD		95	3	3		11																	6								
36th Arty Regt/15th MRD						10					18	36	6																		
U/I MRL Bn/15th MRD															18																
15th FROG Bn/15th MRD																						4									
1st AAA Regt/15th MRD																							6		18						
15 Recce Bn/15 MRD			12		6	19																									

Eastern MD

10th Tk Regt/13th TK Div	95	13	3		11																		6								
15th Tk Regt/13th TK Div	95	13	3		11																		6								
54th TK Regt/13th TK Div	95	13	3		11																		6								

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4 CPA EMD

	T-72	T-54/55	BMP	OT-62 (AFC Tracked)	OT-64 (AFC Wheeled)	OT-65 (Recece Veh)	M46 (130mm FLD Gun)	D-20 (152MM Towed)	D-30 (122mm Towed)	2S1 (122 SP How)	ML978 (152mm SP How)	M-30 (122mm How)	M-18/M-10 (152mm How)	M-31/37 (122mm Gun)	RM-70 (122mm MRL)	M-51 (130mm MRL)	MI-20 (152mm How)	BRDM (SAGGER)	AT-3 (GROUND)	AT-4 (GROUND)	FROG - 7	M-53/59 (30mm AA Gun)	S60 (57mm AA)	SA-6										
8th MRR/13th TK Div		31	31	77		15						18				6		9	12			6												
3rd Arty Regt/13th Div						10					18	36	18		18																			
U/I AAA Regt/13 TK Div																							6	18										
13th Recon Bn/13th Divh			12		6	19																												
60th Tk Regt/14th TK Div		95	13	3		11						11				6		9	12			6												
103rd TK Regt/14 Tk Div		95	13		3		11															6												
63rd MRR/14th TK Div		31	96		12		15					18				6		9	12			6												
55 MRR/14 TD		31	3	108			15					18				6		9	12			6												
49th Arty Regt/14th TK Div							10					18	36		18																			

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CGF

	T-72 M1981/3	T-62	BMP	BTR-60	M-46	D-20	D-30	2S1	2S3	ZSU-23-4	SA-9	SA-13	SA-8	SA-6	S60	AT-3 (BRDM)	AT-5 (BRDM)	BM-21	FROG-7	SCUD-B	SS-12/22	SS-21/SCARAB	SA-4	2S5													
77 TR/31 TD	31	63					18			4	4																										
100 TR/31 TD	31	63	10				18			4	4																										
237 TR/31 TD		94	10				18			4	4																										
322 MRR/31 TD	40		94					18		4	4					9																					
U/I AR/31 TD									36									18	4																		
U/I SAM REGT/31 TD														20																							
328 MRR/48 MRD	40			117			18			4	4					9																					
268 MRR/28 MRD	40		94				18			4	4					9																					
333 MRR/48 MRD	40			117				18		4	4					9																					
U/I TR/48 MRD	31	63								4	4																										

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CGF

	T-72 M1981/3	T-62	BMP	BTR-60	M-46	D-20	D-30	2S1	2S3	ZSU-23-4	SA-9	SA-13	SA-8	SA-6	S60	AT-3 (BRDM)	AT-5 (BRDM)	BM-21	FROG-7	SCUD-B	SS-12/22	SS-21/SCARAB	SA-4	2S5						
ITB/48 MRD	20	30																												
U/I AR/48 MRD							36		18									18					4							
U/I SAM Regt/48 MRD													20																	
SA-4 Bde/CGF																							20							
AAA Regt/28 AC															24															
TK TNG Bn/CGF	16																													
SCUD Bde/CGF																					12									
SS-12/22 Bde/CGF																						18								
UI Arty Bde/CGF						36																								
75 GMRR/18 GMRD	40			117			18			4	4					9														

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CGF

	T-72 M1981/3	T-62	BMP	BTR-60	M-46	D-20	D-30	2S1	2S3	ZSU-23-4	SA-9	SA-13	SA-8	SA-6	S60	AT-3 (BRDM)	AT-5 (BRDM)	BM-21	FROG-7	SCUD-B	SS-12/22	SS-21/SCARAB	SA-4	2S5
78 GMRR/18 GMRD	40		94					18		4	4					9								
80 MRR/18 GMRD		40		117			18			4	4					9								
360 TR/18 GMRD	94						18			4	4													
U/I AR/18 GMRD							18		36									18				4		
U/I SA Regt/18 GMRD														20										
ITB/18		50																						
U/I TR/15 GTD	31	63	31				18			4	4													
U/I TR/15 GTD		94	31				18			4	4													
U/I TR/15 GTD		94	31				18			4	4													
295 MRR/15 GTD		40	94					18		4	4						9							

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CGF

	T-72 M1981/3	T-62	BMP	BTR-60	M-46	D-20	D-30	2S1	2S3	ZSU-23-4	SA-9	SA-13	SA-8	SA-6	S60	AT-3 (BRDM)	AT-5 (BRDM)	BM-21	FROG-7	SCUD-B	SS-12/22	SS-21/SCARAB	SA-4	2S5	
U/I AR/15 GTD									36									18	4						
U/I SAM Regt/15 GTD														20											
168 GMRR/30 GMRD	40			117		18				4	4					9									
164 GMRR/30 GMRD	40			117		18				4	4					9									
166 GMRR/30 GMRD	40		94					18		4	4					9									
30 GTR/30 GMRD		94				18				4	4														
ITB/30 GMRD		50																							
U/I AR/30 GMRD						36			18									18	4						
U/I SA Regt/30 GMRD													20												

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CPMD

	T-72	T-64	T-55	T-62	PT-76	BMP	BMD	BTR-60	BTR-152/BTR-60	TRUCKS	D-30	2S1	2S3	2S5	ML-20	D-20/D-1	M-46	2S4, 240mm Mortar	2S7, 203mm How	BM-21	BM-27	FROG-7	SS-21	S60	SA-8	SA-6	SA-11	SA-4	SA-2	SA-3	SCUD-B	SCALEBOARD	SA-9	ZSU-23-4	
8 TA																																			
23 TD	X					X					X	X	X			X				X			X		X							X	X		
30 GTD	X					X					X					X				X			X	X	X							X	X		
50 TD		X				X					X									X		X			X										
SCUD																															X				
13A																																			
51 GMRD			X			X		X			X					X				X		X						X							
97 GMRD			X		X	X		X			X					X				X		X		X											
161 MRD	X	X				X		X			X					X				X		X		X											
U/I Arty Bde															X		X																		

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CPMD

	T-72	T-64	T-55	T-62	PT-76	BMP	BMD	BTR-60	BTR-152/BTR-60	TRUCKS	D-30	2S1	2S3	2S5	ML-20	D-20/D-1	M-46	2S4, 240mm Mortar	2S7, 203mm How	BM-21	BM-27	FROG-7	SS-21	S60	SA-8	SA-6	SA-11	SA-4	SA-2	SA-3	SCUD-B	SCALEBOARD	SA-9	ZSU-23-4				
SA-4 Bde																																						
SCUD Bde																																						
38A																																						
17 GMRD			X			X		X			X					X				X		X		X														
70 GMRD	X		X			X		X			X					X				X		X		X														
128 GMRD		X				X		X			X	X	X							X		X				X	X							X	X			
146 MRD			X					X	X		X				X																							
Arty Bde														X		X																						

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AIR THREAT TO 4 CMBG

INTRODUCTION

1. At the outset of any attack on NATO, the WP is likely to launch a massive air offensive in order to attain air superiority, deny NATO air forces influence on the land battle, and achieve freedom of action for further WP air operations. This offensive would be independent of the land battle and probably would be controlled by the Soviet General Staff. The most likely objectives in such an attack would be:

- a. to open corridors in NATO'S SAM belt;
- b. to destroy nuclear delivery means and stock piles;
- c. to destroy air defence assets;
- d. to destroy C³ facilities; and
- e. prevent reinforcement and re-supply to NATO'S front line units.

Close air support of the ground forces would have a relatively low priority, at least initially, except in those areas of the battlefield considered vital to the success of the ground offensive.

AIM

2. The aim of this Appendix is to describe the air threat to 4 CMBG in the execution of our GDP.

GENERAL

3. The initial WP offensive would probably be launched in three waves. The first wave would be targetted against NATO's early warning radars, SAMs and AAA systems in the forward area. The second wave would concentrate against additional SAMs, AD control sites, fighter airfields as well as nuclear sites. The third wave would strike further airfields, nuclear sites and C³ installations and would probably be composed of Soviet Strategic Theatre Forces. The attacks would come in at low level, within minutes of one another, and would be accompanied by extensive RECS.

*BKF
Bosger
Zundbrink
AA*

*2nd wave
Force
of
Lynx
AA*

4. In order to expedite the attack and minimize airspace coordination management problems, three or more corridors would be established. In the Southwestern Front area, a likely corridor would run along the line PLZEN/NURNBERG.

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (CAS)

5. Since 1980, the Soviets have undertaken a major reorganization of their air and air defence forces. Frontal Aviation air armies have been abolished and their assets reformed into an entity known as the Air Forces

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of the Military Districts/Groups of Forces. Tactical helicopter formations have been established as a part of another new organization known as Army Aviation. Currently the CGF has a single assault helicopter regiment and each Soviet division in CGF has a helicopter fire support squadron.

6. It should be noted that most Soviet air defence aircraft have a capability in the CAS role. It is assessed, however, that their use in this role would be unlikely and would only occur in a critical stage of the land battle or if complete air superiority had been achieved.

7. Command and control of CAS is critical to the support of ground forces. For fixed-wing aircraft, the Front Commander controls his dedicated assets through the Combat Control Centre (CCC), a unit similar to the NATO ATOC. At the Army level, this function is performed by the Vectoring and Target Designation Point or the VTDP which is the combat air traffic control authority. The VTDP controls the lowest link between air and ground units - the Combat Control Group or CCG. The CCG directly controls the attacking aircraft in the tactical operational area of a ground force division similar to a NATO FAC. Helicopter operations differ in that they are usually planned and executed at the CCC level and passed directly to the CCG.

8. During hostilities, it is assessed that only those aircraft currently stationed in Czechoslovakia, (both Soviet and Czech) and in the Carpathian Military District will support the Southwestern Front. These will be covered in detail.

CZECHOSLOVAKIAN AIR FORCE (CAF)

9. The CAF is the third largest in the WP after the USSR and Poland with a total of about 1,100 aircraft and 58,000 personnel. It is organized into air defence forces (7 Air Defence Army), tactical air forces (10 Air Army) and independent units. The 10AA commands the 1st Fighter Division with three fighter regiments and 34th Fighter Bomber Division with four fighter bomber squadrons. There are a total of 151 dedicated ground attack fighters and 25 attack helicopters in the 10AA. Although a Czech Air Force organization, 10AA probably would be subordinated to the Commander of the Southwestern Front in war. Czechoslovakia is the only non-Soviet WP country to operate the SU-25 FROGFOOT. Aircraft holdings and locations are given in Tab A and B.

AIR FORCES OF THE CENTAL GROUP OF FORCES (AF OF CGF)

10. The Air Force of CGF operates a total of 304 aircraft organized into a division with two fighter regiments and a single fighter bomber regiment, a single attack helicopter regiment and independent units. This force includes 45 fighter bombers and 58 attack helicopters.

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AIR FORCES OF THE CARPATHIAN MILITARY DISTRICT (AF OF CPMD)

11. The AF of CPMD has a total of 744 aircraft organized into a fighter division of three regiments, and a fighter bomber division with four regiments. In addition, there are two attack helicopter regiments and an assault helicopter regiment with 98 attack helicopters, plus 36 ground attack FROGFOOT.

AIRCRAFT TYPES

12. The most numerous ground attack aircraft in the region is the swept-wing, single engine, supersonic SU-7 FITTER-A. This ageing aircraft is a reliable and stable platform for bombing and rocket firing, but has a limited pay-load and range plus minimal avionics. Armament consists of two wing-mounted 30mm guns and a full complement of conventional bombs and unguided rockets mounted on four wing pylons. The CAF holds 55 FITTER-A in its inventory and the AF of CPMD has 80 in storage.

13. The FITTER-D and FITTER-H are variable geometry wing variants of the FITTER-A with improved performance and avionic fits. Armament consists of two 30mm guns plus conventional bombs and rockets mounted on eight pylons on the fuselage. The FITTER-H is also utilized in the reconnaissance role with the addition of photo-elint pods. The AF of CPMD and AF of CGF hold a total of 104 FITTER-D and FITTER-H in their inventories.

14. The MIG-23 FLOGGER-H and the MIG-27 FLOGGER-D and J are far more formidable aircraft. These variable geometry-wing ground attack fighters are armed with an internal 23mm gun and can carry two 23mm gun pods under-wing. A variety of bombs up to 500 Kg and rockets can be carried in addition to laser guided Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile (TASM). The FLOGGER probably has an internal ECM fit, enhanced avionics plus a laser range finder and a limited night attack capability. The CAF operates 39 FLOGGER-H and the AF of CGF has a total of 45 FLOGGER-D and FLOGGER-Js.

15. The CAF operates 40 MIG-21 FISHBED JEX (an export J model) in the CAS role. This dual purpose aircraft has an internal twin-barrel 23mm cannon and a mixture of bombs and rockets in four wing pylons.

16. The CAF also operates 33 L-39 ALBATROS aircraft in the CAS role. Originally designed as a trainer, the Czech produced ALBATROS can carry a 23mm gun under the fuselage and has four under-wing pylons for rockets and bombs.

17. The most recent addition to the CAF inventory is the SU-25 FROGFOOT. This twin-engine, subsonic fighter was specifically designed for the CAS mission similar to the US A-10 THUNDERBOLT II. The FROGFOOT is a versatile aircraft capable of operating from unprepared airstrips, is heavily armoured, has a good reaction capability and boasts a short turn-around time. Armament consists of an internal twin barrel 30mm gun and the usual bomb/rocket fit mounted on ten pylons. The fire control system includes a laser range finder/target designator, a heads up display (HUD), and a weapons release computer. The FROGFOOT has a limited night attack capabi-

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lity. The CAF holds about 12 FROGFOOT and the AF of CPMD has about 30-36 in its inventory.

HELICOPTERS

18. Probably the most immediate and serious threat to 4 CMBG operations is the MI-24 HIND attack helicopter. The HIND is a versatile, heavily armed and armour plated helicopter capable of being fitted with a variety of bombs, rockets and ATGM. The HIND-D has a four-barrel 12.7mm machine gun in the nose turret and four AT-2 SWATTER ATGWs mounted on the wing tip pylons. Weapon control is through an on-board computer via target acquisition and sighting devices. An advanced avionics fit enables the HIND to operate in poor weather and night conditions. It is assessed that it can operate 80% of the time the Central Region versus 50% of the time for fixed-wing fighters. The CAF operates 25 HIND-Ds and the AF of CGF and the AF of CPMD hold a total of 156 HIND-Ds. Although the HIND E is not deployed to Czechoslovakia the introduction of this attack helicopter plus the HAVOC and/or HOKUM should not be ruled out. Such operational deployments would make a substantial leap in the threat posed by attack helicopters. This is particularly true of the air-to-air threat.

19. The MI-8 HIP-C is the standard assault helicopter in the WP. It can carry up to 24 combat equipped troops to a maximum range of 500 Kms. The unarmoured HIP-C is equipped with a twin rack for rockets and/or bombs up to 500 kg. A light machine gun may be mounted in the side door and each window in the cabin has a support bracket which allows troops to fire at ground targets from the air. The CAF operates 29 HIP-Cs and the AF of CGF and AF of CPMD have a total of 137 HIP-Cs.

SORTIE RATES

20. Combining the above assets, the Southwestern Front Commander would have at his disposal some 450 fixed-wing ground attack aircraft and about 180 attack helicopters (HIND only). Using an availability factor of 85% and a sortie rate of three for fixed-wing and seven for helicopters, this gives a theoretical daily sortie rate of about 990 and 1070 respectively. These numbers represent a "worst-case scenario". Combat attrition, poor weather conditions, accumulated pilot and ground crew fatigue, plus the inevitable disruptions of wartime operations would reduce these numbers considerably.

ORDNANCE

21. The WP utilizes a large variety of conventional bombs for CAS from 50 to 500 Kg. These range from general purpose fragmentation to armour and concrete piercing to cluster containers. Although there are five types of incendiary/napalm bombs in the inventory, their use during range training is seldom if ever observed. In addition to the conventional bombs capability, there are also systems for dispensing both anti-tank and anti-personnel mines. The HIP-C is the usual platform for aerial mine delivery. The Soviets will probably continue to up-date their conventional bombs making use of newly acquired or developed technology. In this area, fuel

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air explosive (FAE) weapons have great potential against soft targets and dug in troops. Soviet interest in FAE remains high and it is anticipated they will develop FAE related weapons in the future.

22. A variety of air-to-surface rockets exist in 57, 80, 240 and 330mm; of these, the 57mm S-5 is the most commonly used. It's different versions have a HE/HEAT warhead and it is carried and launched from either a 16 or 32 shot rocket pod.

ATTACK HELICOPTER TACTICS

23. The HIND normally operates in pairs or multiples of two aircraft. Attack profiles usually consist of an approach to the initial point (IP) in close formation at heights between 50-150 ft; terrain-following techniques are used with speeds from 80 to 170 kts, sufficient for the initiation of a pull-up of 150-300 ft to target acquisition and weapon launch. The firing distances from target are assessed to be from 3.5 to 5.0 km for ATGM, 1.2 km for free flight rockets (FFR) and 1.0 km for machine gun attacks. The exposure time for the launch of ATGM can be as little as 15 seconds including the "pop-up".

24. A variation employed for saturating the target is the butterfly manoeuvre. HINDS ingress in four or six aircraft formations and then break up into pairs once in the target area. The lead pair will turn on to the attack run in echelon formation 20-30 seconds before the trailers. As they approach the target, they initiate a pop-up, fire rockets or machine guns and break off around in a race track pattern. It is noteworthy that the formation will invariably turn left while in echelon right and vice-versa, thus making the flight path predictable to ground defences. These are followed by the second pair which in turn is followed by the last pair. In many cases, a second group of six follow and establish an opposing race-track pattern; thus, there are two helicopters firing at the target every 10-15 seconds. Operating in a low level attack mission over a radius of 50 km, HIND can loiter for more than one hour in the target area.

FIGHTER-BOMBER TACTICS

25. Soviet doctrine stresses the value of overwhelming numerical superiority and the shock effect of large formations on enemy morale. Squadron strength formations are commonly seen in Soviet training. Also, the large formations simplify command and control problems and lower the requirement for flight-lead qualified pilots. For conventional rockets, bombs, and cannon runs, however, two aircraft attack is very common. In large scale exercises in which a squadron goes to the range, they will almost invariably break up into two aircraft formation for attack runs. The pair will occasionally make multiple passes following a familiarization pass.

26. WP ground attack range training tends to be tightly controlled with extreme emphasis on safety. It is usually conducted in two modes: normal range practice and free search. Free search is designed to simulate attacking a target whose exact location is not known. Aircraft are given

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a defined area to search and are usually monitored or controlled from a fixed range tower. While this training is important, it is somewhat sporadic and the pilots are not experts in independently finding and destroying the target. In addition to being under strict control, pilots almost invariably make a familiarization pass before attacking a target. This, combined with other factors such as shallow dive angles, further inhibits realistic training. The majority of weapons delivered are rockets and guns - most suitable for CAS.

27. The Soviets' most recent improvement is emphasis on the use of a tactical delivery method known as the combat turn. Aircraft ingress at fairly low altitude, most commonly 300m, and as low as 100-200m above ground level. When abeam the target, they pop-up in a 2G climbing turn, enter a 10-20° dive and release ordnance. When compared to the NATO pop-up tactic, it tends to be less aggressive, but it is an effort to use more tactically survivable manoeuvres. One of the most notable changes in Soviet training has been the dramatic increase in the use of TASM. These may not effect CAS, but have a direct impact on precision attacks against high value point targets in battlefield air interdiction.

28. Helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft are often used simultaneously on exercises to support deliberate ground attacks or assault river crossings. Typically fighter bombers make multiple attack passes from various directions, normally above 200m. HINDs, staying below 80-100m, normally make pop-up rocket attacks in between fixed-wing attacks. Simultaneous attacks by HIND and FLOGGER have been observed, however, using altitude separation and attack direction for spacing. The fighters and helicopters will have separate targets; the helicopters attacking immediate defences and the fighters attacking about 500m deeper.

29. Recently there has been increased evidence of night operational training by a mixed force of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters supporting a heliborne assault landing. To date these developments have only been noted in East Germany but it must be assumed that these tactics will be practiced and improved upon to meet stated Soviet doctrine of operating on a 24/7 basis. The HIND remains the only Soviet weapons platform with any real credibility in night operations. The use of fixed-wing aircraft for CAS at night remains suspect, especially when considering the highly centralized and inflexible command and control system.

EFFECT ON 4 CMBG OPERATIONS

30. The recent Soviet resurrection of Army Aviation guarantees air support to the Southwestern Front Commander irrespective of the air battle. Due to its availability, ability to operate at night and in poor weather conditions, plus its heavy armament, the HIND attack helicopter remains the principle threat to 4 CMBG operations. The deployment of the Brigade along Highway 14 would place it squarely along a probable air corridor as well as a major ground approach, thus, increasing the probability of air attack.

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31. The WP train heavily in supporting their ground forces, but their training is restrictive and tactics are not very survivable. Finally, they have developed an extensive command and control system for integrating their air support into the ground battle. This communication and procedure-dependent system may be very susceptible to attacks and jamming.

List of Tabs:

Tab A - Ground Attack Aircraft Supporting Southwestern Front
Tab B - Location Map - Czechoslovakia

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GROUND ATTACK AIRCRAFT SUPPORTING

SOUTHWESTERN FRONT

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>CZECH</u>	<u>AF OF CGF</u>	<u>AF OF CPMD</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
HIND-D	25	58	98	181
HIP-C	29	42	95	166
FITTER-A	55	0	45	100
FITTER-H	0	0	45	45
FITTER-C	0	0	45	45
FISHBED JEX	40	0	0	40
FISHBED L/N	0	0	45	45
FROGFOOT	12	0	30-36	42-48
FLOGGER D/J	0	45	0	45
FLOGGER-H	39	0	0	39
ALBATROSS	33	0	8	41
TOTAL	233	145	411-417	789-795

NOTE: The above includes dedicated ground attack only. Similar aircraft utilized as trainers, recce or in the air defence role are not listed.


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SOVIET UNCONVENTIONAL FORCES

INTRODUCTION

1. Soviet emphasis on all forms of special purpose or unconventional forces has increased drastically in recent years. The damage potential for a small highly trained force out-weighs the effort of training and insertion, thus, such a force is extremely cost effective. Recent trends in Soviet reorganization, specifically the reanimation of the OMG, has established the necessity for small vertically delivered or prepositioned forces to take advantage of both tactical and strategic errors by NATO commanders. Such forces can, even if unsuccessful in initial tasking, provide sufficient dislocation of NATO forces to justify their employment. Soviet organization, equipment and planned deployment of SPF, Airborne and Airmobile/Air Assault units make these forces a potential threat which is vastly out of proportion to their numbers.

AIM

2. The aim of this Appendix is to examine Soviet WP Special Purpose Forces, Airborne Forces and Air Mobile/Air Assault Forces and assess their potential effect on 4 CMBG operations.

SPECIAL PURPOSE FORCES (SPF)

3. The Soviet Union maintains SPF Brigades, subordinate to the GRU (Chief Intelligence Directorate), in 12 of the 16 Military Districts (MDs) of the USSR, and in the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG)(See Tabs A and B). Smaller units are also present with the Soviet Naval Fleets. An SPF Brigade with the ground forces has a strength of 700-1000 men in war. Each Brigade could form up to 100 teams consisting of 3-15 men each, depending on its mission. The headquarters company of the Brigade would consist of specially selected, highly trained soldiers identified for specific tasks, such as linking up with agents behind the lines, or locating and killing political/military leaders.

4. Based on mission assignment and location, the Central Region could face the following forces:

- a. The Soviet SPF Brigade of the GSFG, the GDR's 40th Paratroop Battalion, and one battalion of the Czechoslovak 22nd Airborne Regiment. The Warsaw Pact could employ forces in the Federal Republic of Germany and in the BENELUX countries. As many as 145 teams could form from these forces;
- b. The Soviet SPF Brigades from the BELORUSSIAN MD would probably deploy to West Germany or France while those from the CARPATHIAN MD would most likely be used in Germany (but optionally also in Austria and Switzerland). With these forces, the Soviets could

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form another 200 teams for use in the Central Region, bringing the total to 345;

- c. Teams from the Special Forces Brigades of the Northern and Baltic Fleets which the Soviets could employ along the Belgian and Dutch coasts (as well as the French and British); and
- d. The Soviet SPF Brigades in the MOSCOW and KIEV MDs, which are regarded as reserves. These additional forces could comprise 180 teams.

5. Manning. SPF units consist of 30% officers and 70% NCOs/enlisted men (including conscripts). SPF members are carefully selected to ensure absolute political reliability, physical perseverance and mental ability. The attractive elite image and the large number of privileges guarantee that the quota for highly qualified volunteers is met. Despite this, reservists are needed to get SPF Brigades to full strength. However, these augmentees would probably not have full qualifications.

6. Equipment

- a. The SPF are specifically equipped for unconventional warfare operations. Apart from the standard weaponry for close combat in special commands, SPF teams may hand-carry anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles (like RPG-7 and SA-7), a light grenade launcher, and diverse explosives and directional mines. They could also carry chemical and biological agents--the so-called "diversionary poison". Indications suggest that the Soviets have developed "container bombs" which are dropped by parachute and guided by the SPF teams on the ground via direction finders. The SPF teams may also use radio beacons to guide aircraft to targets; and
- b. For communications, the SPF teams use a ground-to-air and long-range ground-to-ground communications set (with a maximum range of 1000 km). The radio sets operate with encryption and burst transmission.

7. Training

- a. SPF training is demanding and comprehensive. Basic training for special commands include:
 - (1) various modes of parachuting,
 - (2) close combat and survival training,
 - (3) intensive shooting with weapons (including those used by NATO),
 - (4) training in the use of different explosives, incendiaries and mines, and

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- (5) specific radio operating and tactical ambush actions;
- b. Additional skills include:
 - (1) silent killing,
 - (2) interrogation of prisoners (including use of torture),
 - (3) NBC training (especially in the chemical and biological field),
 - (4) driver training for using Western cars and armoured vehicles, and
 - (5) language training; and
- c. Training on models of PERSHING, PLUTON, LANCE and NIKE - HERCULES indicate likely selected targets for SPF missions in the Central Region.

8. Deployment

- a. Prior to deploying a large number of SPF teams into NATO's rear areas, a number of events would occur. Obviously target selection would determine team composition and support requirements. The Soviets have a planned target list for covert operations which is continuously updated. This ensures that data on each target is current. Prior to the operation, the SPF would position necessary materials in concealed locations near the target(s). The SPF would tailor its training/materials specifically to the target country and the mission. As previously noted, the Soviets could insert into the target area key personnel and selected leaders, possibly as early as three weeks before the mission. Selected teams could arrive up to 48 hours before the mission. The mass of SPF might not deploy until just before, during, or after the outbreak of hostilities;
- b. After deployment, teams may move within the rear area using rented/stolen civilian cars, wearing civilian clothes or hiding in prepared hiding places. When the time comes to conduct their assigned mission(s), the teams might switch to NATO uniforms or civilian attire. They would probably acquire any additional necessary equipment, material, and ammunition/explosives by force. (Note: SPF teams will not necessarily comply with Geneva Conventions on warfare); and
- c. The size of SPF teams depends on their mission. For reconnaissance, the team might consist of four men; for sabotage, it might expand to fourteen men. Some missions might require the coordinated deployment of several teams. The teams will operate either against preplanned targets or in an allocated area.

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9. Effects on 4 CMBG Operations. It is estimated that a maximum of 200 teams could be used in the CENTAG area, thus it is expected that 4 CMBG might encounter some of these teams. The SPF threat is two phased. The most serious threat is likely to occur prior to deployment and cannot be considered to be aimed solely at the Brigade. The Lahr airfields' wartime operational status raises the likelihood that it may be an SPF target, with an early neutralization strike affecting 4 CMBG as a bonus. It is unlikely that 4 CMBG would be targetted with any priority of it's own, however, the Brigade's movement to deployment areas may bring it into contact with the second phase threat. As lines of communications and movement do have a priority with SPF forces the possibility exists that the Brigade may have to move through or be moving over a target before or during an SPF attack. This threat is not unique to SPF forces as any number of enemy operatives may be tasked with LOC disruption.

AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

10. The Warsaw Pact has other units which could also operate in the rear area of the Central Region. For example, airborne operations are a distinct probability. The Soviet Union was one of the pioneers in airborne development, and today maintains the world's largest airborne force. The approximately 47,000 Soviet airborne soldiers are defined by the Soviets as being "intended for combat operations in the enemy rear". Each airborne division, and the Soviets have six Category A divisions and one training division (See Tabs C and D), is a 7100 man organization equipped with 331 BMD air-droppable armoured combat vehicles. Each division also has its own artillery, anti-tank, and air defence units. The structure of an airborne division gives it limited sustainability, for it must link up with attacking ground forces within 72 hours, or receive extensive air resupply.

11. Military airlift is available in the Western USSR to drop up to one airborne division with three days supplies in a single operation, but an airborne assault of this scale in the Central Region would involve considerable risks. At minimum, the Warsaw Pact would have to suppress NATO air defences on the flight path to the drop zone. In addition, it would have to maintain at least limited control of the air space in the objective area until link up with ground forces was made. Certainly planning such a large-scale airborne operation is complex and susceptible to change in order to avoid interference by major NATO ground formations (at least until after the drop). These considerations reduce the likelihood that the Soviets would launch a division size assault against the Central Region. Regimental or battalion size drops are more likely.

12. Airborne operations would probably take place between 100 to 600 km distance from the FEBA. Specific high value objectives would include airfields, key bridges or river crossing sites, nuclear storage sites, nuclear delivery systems, major command and control facilities, and key terrain features along the planned thrust lines of main ground forces. For smaller size drops (ie, battalion and company size), objectives might include key communication, radar, and air defence sites. For all airborne operations, the planners would select the drop zones in advance.

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Desirable drop zones are usually a few kilometers from the objective, although the mobility afforded by the BMD allows Soviet planners to select more distant drop zones, if necessary. An airborne force, once on the ground, will organize quickly, and then move swiftly to its target area to maximize surprise. Probably airborne forces would attempt to secure and hold a major objective deep in NATO's rear until link up with attacking ground forces. However, they could also attempt to destroy a lesser target closer to the FEBA, and then withdraw to better defensive positions or exfiltrate back to the front lines.

13. Airborne forces are heavily armed with BMD, ASU-85 and artillery, but are still vulnerable to armoured or mechanized forces, attack helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft. They will, therefore, attempt to move as quickly as possible to prevent effective NATO or national (defence forces) reaction, and will rely on their own air support and shock action to accomplish the assigned mission.

AIR ASSAULT/AIR MOBILE FORCES

14. Soviet military theorists have given great attention to the potential value of helicopter-delivered forces for attacks into enemy rear areas. Until recently, however, actual training for and execution of such operations was restricted generally to a depth of no more than 15 kilometers. Troops used for this training were drawn from motor rifle units. In recent years, the Soviets have formed specialized air assault units.

15. Air Mobile Brigades. The first Soviet front level air-transportable units were formed at locations in the Transcaucasus (TC MD), Transbaykal (TBMD), and Far East Military Districts (FE MD) in the early 1970's (See Tab E). These three units are similarly organized. Each has an organic aviation transport helicopter regiment (32 MI-7/HIPs and up to 24 MI-6-HOOKs); 122mm howitzer, 120mm mortar, 85mm anti-tank gun, and SA-9 batteries; and engineer, reconnaissance, signal, medical, and chemical units. The rifle battalions lack armoured personnel carriers (APCs) or other combat vehicles, making them entirely dependent on trucks or airlift for movement. The absence of parachute training further restricts air assault to helicopters only and has led to their description as "Airmobile" brigades. Airmobile units are assessed to have missions of siezing bridges; mountain passes, river-crossing sites, road junctions, or other key terrain features against unsophisticated opposition, in advance of attacking combined armed forces, so as to remove potential movement obstacles. Airmobile operations could be conducted up to 100 km ahead of the main attack, although distances of 50 km are more likely.

16. Air Assault. In the late 1970's, a series of air assault units began appearing in selected MDs and Groups of Forces (GOFs). In contrast to the earlier "Airmobile" brigades, these units are described as "Air Assault" brigades, since their association with parachute training and

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rigging facilities revealed a capability to be inserted by airdrop as well as by helicopter (See Tab E). Additionally, air assault brigades possess greater organic mobility, fire, and staying power against a well-equipped opponent. With two exceptions, the currently identified air assault brigades are located in MDs and GOFs opposite NATO. Their expanded capabilities include air-transportable BMD APCs for some of the three to four rifle battalions in the brigade; eventually all may be so equipped. Additionally, the 122 mm howitzer battery has been expanded into a battalion, and a multiple rocket launcher battery has been added. While considerably more artillery is required, parachute capabilities and BMDs allow fixed-wing aircraft to be utilized in conjunction with helicopters. Air assault brigades have no organic helicopter assets and require airlift to be furnished by the transport helicopter regiment. Air assault brigade missions and depths of employment are similar to their airmobile counterparts, although their greater fire and staying power would allow their commitment against more heavily defender targets as well as an extended linkup schedule.

17. A front may have an air assault brigade of two airmobile and two parachute battalions and an army may have an air assault battalion (See Tab E). These specialized units are well trained and equipped with the BMD, the M1975 MBRL, and other air transportable equipment. Presently, a lack of sufficient heavy lift helicopters limits the range and flexibility of some operations, but newer aircraft, like the HALO, will offset that limitation in the future. In fact, when HALOs join units in the Forward Area (probably in the next two years), airmobile operations could extend into the rear area. These airmobile assaults would go against the same sort of targets as airborne assaults, but generally at a lesser range.

18. Some air assault units may participate in an OMG operation, preceding or accompanying an OMG. Artillery/fixed wing air attacks would precede an airmobile/heliborne assault to prepare the landing zone, and attack helicopters (HIND at the moment, possibly HAVOC or HOKUM in the future) would accompany the assault force. As with an airborne assault, the unit would quickly move from the landing zone to the objective. Because airmobile forces can land in set formation with combat vehicles and crews together, movement from the landing zone is quicker than an airborne assault. Like an airborne assault, the sustainability of an airmobile operation is about 72 hours.

19. In addition to the specialized Front and Army resources the Soviets have the potential to lift a line motor rifle battalion out of an MRD and employ it in an airmobile role.

20. While capabilities are limited at the moment, the presence of specialized airmobile units in the Forward Area and the continual improvement of helicopter lift assets will increase the threat to NATO's rear area in the future.

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EFFECT ON 4 CMBG OPERATIONS

21. Because of 4 CMBG's role as CENTAG reserve the Soviets might consider employing an airmobile/air assault force to prevent or at least delay our movement. This would be particularly true from SETTER to either VII or II Corps areas. The potential gains in delaying 4 CMBG may outweigh the potential loss and effort to conduct such an operation.

22. In addition 4 CMBG's role as reserve increases the possibility that the Brigade could be used to counter an airborne or heliborne force inserted in VII or II Corps rear.

TABS:

TAB A - SPF Brigade List
TAB B - SPF Brigade Location Map
TAB C - Airborne Division HQ List
TAB D - WP Special Airborne Forces
TAB E - Airmobile/Air Assault Lists
TAB F - Load Factors for a Typical Air Mobile Brigade
TAB G - Air Assault Brigade Organization
TAB H - Air Assault Battalion Organization

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SPECIAL PURPOSE BRIGADE LIST

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
(2) Special Purpose Bde	Pskov	LE MD
(10) Special Purpose Bde	Feodosiya	OD MD
(160) Special Purpose Bde	Viljandi	BA MD
U/I Special Purpose Bde	Berdk	SI MD
U/I Special Purpose Bde	Chirchik	TU MD
U/I Special Purpose Bde	Chuchkovo	MO MD
U/I Special Purpose Bde	Furstenburg	GSFG
U/I Special Purpose Bde	Ili/Kapchagay	CE MD
U/I Special Purpose Bde	Iziaslav	CA MD
U/I Special Purpose Bde	Kabul	40 A/AF/TU MD
U/I Special Purpose Bde	Kazly Ruda	BA MD
U/I Special Purpose Bde	Kirovograd	KI MD
U/I Special Purpose Bde	Lagodekhi	TC MD
U/I Special Purpose Bde	Marina Gorka	BE MD
U/I Special Purpose Bde	Olovyannaya	TB MD
U/I Special Purpose Bde	Ussuriysk	FE MD

TOTAL: 16 Special Purpose Bdes (Previously referred to as "SPETSNAZ" or "Diversionary Bdes")

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SPECIAL PURPOSE BRIGADE LIST



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AIRBORNE DIVISION HQ LIST

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>MILITARY DISTRICT</u>
7 GDS AB DIV	KAUNAS	A	BA MD
44 GDS AB DIV	JONAVA	C	BA MD
76 GDS AB DIV	PSKOV	A	LE MD
98 GDS AB DIV	BOLGRAD	A	OD MD
103 GDS AB DIV	KABUL	A	40 A/AF/TU MD
104 GDS AB DIV	KIROVABAD (HQ AB DIV)	A	TC MD
105 GDS AB DIV	FERGANA	*	TU MD
106 GDS AB DIV	TULA	A	MO MD

NOTE: ALL AB DIVS SUBORDINATE TO VDV MOSCOW

SUMMARY: 6 CAT A DIVS
1 CAT C DIV

TOTAL: 7 AB DIVS*

* 105 GDS AB DIV component sub-units were re-subordinated to various units and formations in Afghanistan. The DIV HQ elements, a housekeeping force, and probably a training cadre remain. This DIV is not included in the AB DIV total.

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WARSAW PACT SPECIAL AB FORCES

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TO&E</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	
GDR	2 PARA BN	34/450	Lehnin	May have special forces role.	
	U/I SPF BDE	100/300	Furstenberg	GSFG	
	U/I Air Assault Bde	200/2000	Cottbus	GSFG	
POLAND	6 A Div	395/3475	Krakov	Accepted as a "Classic AB Unit", however parts of it might be employed on "Special Forces tasks".	
	1 Special AB Bn	100/350	Dziwnow) GHQ))	
	16 Special AB Coy	30/120	Bydgoszcz) PMD These units are trained in "long range recce" role and are believed to have "special forces tasks".)))	
	62 Special AB Coy	30/120	Bleslawiec) SMD))	
	U/I Special AB Coy	30/120	Modlin)))	
	CSSR	22 AB Regt	160/1840	Prostejov	Its 4th Bn trains as a "Special Force" unit.
		U/I Air Assault Unit	100/300	Oromov Lazne	CGF Unit
HUNGARY	34 AB Recce Bn	50/390	Szolnok	Sometimes this Hungarian special force unit trains with Czechoslovak forces.	
	U/I AB Bn	100/300	Kesckemet	SGF Unit.	

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<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>T&E</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
ROMANIA	161 Para Regt	85/760	Buzau	Romanian AB units are in state of reorg which may result in one Bn possibly Regt, each for its four Armies. Special role not yet determined.
BULGARIA	U/I AB Regt	50/500	Plovdiv	We accept it as airborne, southern NATO Allies credit it with a Special Forces role. Probably partially right.

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AIRMOBILE/AIR ASSAULT LISTS

AIRMOBILE BRIGADE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
13 AIRMOBILE BDE	MAGDAGACHI	35 A/FE MD
21 INDEP AIRMOBILE	KUTAISI	TC MD
U/I INDEP AIRMOBILE BDE	MOGOCHA	TB MD

AIR ASSAULT BRIGADE

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
56 AIR ASLT	KUNDUZ/GARDEZ	A	40 A/AF/TU MD
U/I AIR ASLT	AKTOGAY	A	CE MD
U/I GDS AIR ASLT BDE	BREST	A	BE MD
U/I AIR ASLT BDE	CHERNYAKHOVSK	A	BA MD
U/I (GSD) AIR ASLT BDE	COTTBUS	A	GSFG
U/I AIR ASLT BDE	KHYROV	A	CA MD
U/I AIR ASLT BDE	KUYVOZI	A	LE MD
U/I AIR ASLT BDE	KYAKHTA	(B)	TB MD
U/I AIR ASLT BDE	NIKOLAYEV	A	OD MD
<u>TOTAL: 9 AIR ASSAULT BDES</u>			

AIR ASSAULT BATTALION

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
U/I AIR ASLT BN	BENDERY	14 A/OD MD
U/I AIR ASLT BN	BIROBIDZMAN	U/I CORPS/FE MD
U/I AIR ASLT BN	BREST	(28) TA/BE MD
U/I AIR ASLT BN	BURG	3 SA/GSFG

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<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SUBORDINATION</u>
U/I AIR ASLT BN	KECSKEMET	SGF
U/I AIR ASLT BN	KONIGSBRUCK	1 GTA/GSFG
U/I AIR ASLT BN	KONOTOP	1 GA/KI MD
U/I AIR ASLT BN	LEIPZIG	8 GA/GSFG
U/I AIR ASLT BN	OREMOV LAZ	CGF
U/I AIR ASLT BN	PETROZAVODSK	6 A/LE MD
U/I AIR ASLT BN	RAVENSBRUCK	2 GTA/GSFG
U/I AIR ASLT BN	VLADIMIR VOLYNSKIY	13 A/CA MD
<u>TOTAL:</u> 12 AIR ASSAULT BNS		

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LOAD FACTORS FOR A TYPICAL AIRMOBILE BRIGADE

<u>SUB-UNIT</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>HELICOPTER LIFT REQUIREMENTS</u>
a. Rifle Battalion 1	no vehicles	16 HIP (or sorties)
b. Rifle Battalion 2	no vehicles	16 HIP
c. Rifle Battalion 3	no vehicles	16 HIP
d. Howitzer Battery	6 x 122mm D-30 howitzers, prime movers and crews	6 HOOK
e. Mortar Battery	6 x 120mm mortars, prime movers and crews	6 HOOK
f. Anti-tank Artillery Battery	6 x 85mm Apat guns prime movers and crews	6 HOOK
g. Anti-tank Missile Battery	9 BRDM ATGM vehicles	9 HOOK
h. Anti-aircraft Artillery Battery	6 x 23mm ZU-23 guns, prime movers and crews	6 HOOK
j. Brigade HQ	no vehicles	3 HIP
k. Engineer Company	no vehicles	3 HIP
m. Reconnaissance Platoon	3 BRDMs	3 HOOK
n. Signal Company	no vehicles	2 HIP
p. Medical Company	no vehicles	2 HIP
q. Chemical Defence Platoon	no vehicles	2 HIP

Assets left behind include 71 GAZ-66 trucks and 28 UAZ-69 jeeps of the Headquarters, Engineer, Signal and Medical Companies and the Chemical Defence Platoon as well as the Maintenance Company. The prime movers in the Howitzer, Mortar, ATGM, Anti-tank Artillery, and Anti-aircraft units carry ammunition.


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AIR ASSAULT BRIGADE



LOAD FACTORS FOR A TYPICAL AIR ASSAULT UNIT

<u>SUB-UNIT</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>HELICOPTER LIFT REQUIREMENTS</u>
a. Rifle Battalion 1	infantry only	17 HIP (or sorties)
	or	
	infantry with 6 x 120mm mortars, UAZ-69 prime movers and crews	17 HIP
b. Rifle Battalion 2	infantry only	17 HIP
	or	
(not confirmed in all brigades; may be added at a later date)	infantry with 6 x 120mm mortars, UAZ-69 prime movers and crews	17 HIP 6 HOOK
c. BMD Battalion 1	infantry only	16 HIP
	or	

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	infantry with 31 BMDs and 6 x 120mm mortars with UAZ-69 prime movers and crews	37 HOOK
d. BMD Battalion 2	infantry only	16 HIP
	or	
	infantry with 31 BMDs and 6 x 120mm mortars with UAZ-69 prime movers and crews	37 HOOK
e. Howitzer Battalion	18 x 122mm howitzers with prime movers and crews; 6 multiple rocket launchers and crews	24 HOOK
f. Anti-aircraft Batterie	8 ZU-23s with prime movers and crews	8 HOOK
g. Brigade HQ	personnel only	3 HIP
h. Engineer Company	3 UAZ-69/GAZ-66	3 HOOK
j. Signal Company	personnel only	2 HIP
k. Reconnaissance Company	personnel only	
	or	
	4 BMDs drivers, and personnel	4 HOOK
m. Chemical Defence Platoon	personnel only	1 HIP
n. Medical Platoon	personnel only	1 HIP

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
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AIR ASSAULT BATTALION



LOAD FACTORS FOR A TYPICAL INDEPENDENT AIR ASSAULT BATTALION

<u>SUB-UNIT</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>HELICOPTER LIFT REQUIREMENTS</u>
a. Assault Company (BMD)	infantry only or infantry 12 BMDs and drivers	4 HIP (or sorties) 2 HOOK
b. Air Assault Company 1	no vehicles	4 HIP
c. Air Assault Company 2	no vehicles	4 HIP
d. Howitzer Battery (if present)	6 x 122mm howitzers, prime movers and crews	6 HOOK 4 HIP
e. Mortar Battery	6 x 120mm mortars, prime movers and crews	6 HOOK
f. Battalion HQ	no vehicles	1 HIP

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<u>SUB-UNIT</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>HELICOPTER LIFT REQUIREMENTS</u>
g. Reconnaissance Platoon	personnel only or personnel, 2 BMDs and drivers	1 HIP 2 HOOK
h. Signal Platoon	no vehicles	1 HIP
j. Medical Aid station	no vehicles	
k. Forward Air Control	no vehicles	1 HIP
m. Team and Observation Team	no vehicles	

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APPENDIX 5
TO ANNEX A
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NUCLEAR BIOLOGICAL CHEMICAL THREAT TO 4 CMBG

INTRODUCTION

1. The Warsaw Pact armed forces, especially the Soviets, have a well developed NBC warfare capability. The Soviets maintain large stocks of chemical, nuclear and some biological munitions, as well as the means to deliver them. Despite Soviet assurances against first use of these weapons the mere existence of the munitions is sufficient cause for concern.

AIM

2. The aim of this Appendix is to outline the NBC threat to 4 CMBG.

NUCLEAR

3. The Warsaw Pact armies, especially the Soviets, have developed an excellent capacity for the tactical employment of nuclear weapons, to include first use. Most indicators tend to substantiate the belief that the Warsaw Pact will initiate any future war using conventional means. It is not easy to determine the circumstances under which the Soviets might initiate tactical nuclear warfare. The following seem the most likely:

- a. to pre-empt a NATO nuclear strike;
- b. if faced with defeat, especially if that might lead to entry into WP territory ; and
- c. if faced with an unacceptable delay to an advance, especially if the strategic aim was close to being achieved.

4. The initial use of tactical nuclear weapons is likely to be a massive strike, because the Soviets consider that the war will be won by the side that strikes first. Approval would need to be given at the highest political level, and it is probable that tactical strikes would be supported by the use of theatre nuclear weapons on targets in greater depth. The initial strikes would be planned at front level; follow-up strikes would probably be planned and executed at army level.

5. Nuclear Targets. Soviet doctrine considers the following to be suitable for nuclear strikes:

- a. enemy nuclear delivery means (the priority target);
- b. HQs;
- c. reserves (eg, 4 CMBG);
- d. known defensive positions;

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- e. rear area installations;
- f. communication centres; and
- g. SAM sites.

6. Strikes are normally airburst and are likely to be made 20-30 minutes before an attack, but they will probably be further from the FEBA than NATO strikes because the Soviets do not normally withdraw forward troops before a strike.

7. The Soviets have approximately 1300 tactical nuclear missiles. The Southwestern Front which 4 CMBG will deploy against has approximately 650 operational missiles. NSWP countries are not thought to hold nuclear warheads under national control during peacetime but it is assessed that they may receive them in war. Figure 1 outlines the various nuclear capable tactical ballistic missiles.

MISSILE	FIRST DEPLOYMENT	MAXIMUM RANGE (KMS)	WARHEAD	DEPLOYMENT
FROG-7	1965	90	KT Range	4 per division
SCUD-A	1957	300	KT Range	12 per army, 5 per front, (CAT B and C units)
SCUD-D	1961	300	KT Range	12 per army, 5 per front
SCALEBOARD (SS-12)	1965	930	MT Range	12 per front
SS-21	1976	100	KT Range	Replacing FROG-7
SS-12 (MOD)	1983/84	1000	MT Range	Replacing SCALEBOARD (SS-12)
SS-23	1978	500	KT Range	Replacing SCUD

FIGURE 1 - TACTICAL NUCLEAR MISSILES

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8. The Soviet guns currently assessed as capable of firing nuclear warheads are the 2S7 (203mm SP howitzer), 2S4 (240mm SP mortar) and all 152mm howitzers. This includes the 2S3, D-20 and ML-20. The warheads are probably in the very low KT range. Nuclear ammunition for artillery weapons probably will be held only at the front level.

BIOLOGICAL

9. The Soviet Union and many of the Warsaw Pact countries are believed to possess a highly competent micro-biological program. Although the use of biological (BW) agents is similar to that of chemical agents, BW agents require much more time to become effective thus limiting their immediate battlefield effectiveness. In spite of a considerable BW capability, it is highly unlikely that biological agents would be used against front line troops. Static installations that the Soviets would not want to use (and deny NATO use) such as reinforcement airfields, naval and shipping ports, probably would be targets for BW attacks, if such agents were employed.

10. In April 1972, 100 countries, including the Soviet Union signed a convention to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons. The Soviet Union did not destroy their stockpiles and research is still ongoing. Certain incidents during the last decade such as an outbreak of anthrax near a biological industrial plant help indicate that the Soviet Union is continuing its research into pathogenic agents which have a direct military application.

CHEMICAL

11. The Soviets have traditionally considered chemical agents to be weapons of mass destruction like nuclear weapons. Although they have now renounced the "first use" of such weapons they have retained the option to use them in retaliation, and they have not undertaken to destroy existing stocks. The initial use of chemical weapons would almost certainly be subject to a high level political decision, probably by the Politburo, because of the potential escalation to nuclear weapons.

12. The current interpretation of Soviet chemical warfare doctrine suggests that the Soviets would retaliate in kind to an enemy attack, but since the US has also renounced the "first use" of chemical weapons this may be a somewhat academic consideration. The offensive use of chemical weapons by the Soviets is considered possible, but is thought to be less likely against an enemy with good chemical protection and a retaliatory capability. Furthermore, the Soviets might fear that NATO would regard the use of chemical weapons as an escalation of the conflict, leading not only to chemical, but perhaps also nuclear retaliation. It is possible that they regard chemical weapons as conventional.

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13. Once political approval has been given for the use of nuclear or chemical weapons, authority for subsequent chemical attacks would probably be delegated quickly to divisional commanders.

14. The following targets are considered to be suitable for chemical strikes:

a. Non-Persistent Agents

- (1) defiles and communication centres on main axes of attack,
- (2) dropping and landing zones for airborne assaults, and
- (3) enemy positions close to their own troops;

b. Persistent Agents

- (1) ground to be denied to the enemy, and
- (2) ports, bases and rear area installations; and

c. Non-Persistent or Persistent Agents

- (1) enemy nuclear delivery means,
- (2) well prepared enemy defensive positions,
- (3) HQs, reserves and assembly areas, and
- (4) the flight path for a helicopter-landed assault.

15. Surprise is the key factor in the use of chemical weapons, and the Soviets would aim to deliver as great a volume of fire as possible over a period of up to one minute. For this the BM-21, BM-27, and the Czech RM-70 rocket launchers would be of great value. For example, a battalion of BM-21's would be able to fire 720 rockets in less than 30 seconds. In Soviet Artillery Regiments up to 30% of their units of fire may be chemical rounds or warheads.

16. Although rocket launchers probably would be the "weapon of first choice", all mortars and artillery weapons 85mm and larger are chemical capable. This includes all tactical surface-to-surface missiles.

17. The Soviets have the best overall NBC defence equipment, with the Czechs a close second within the Warsaw Pact. The outfitting of the individual soldier, however, does severely limit his capability to conduct strenuous dismounted operations. Should the Soviets conduct chemical operations they will normally remain mounted and on the move until clear of any contaminated areas.

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EFFECTS ON 4 CMBG OPERATIONS

18. As mentioned, the Lahr and Baden airfields probably would be higher priority targets for NBC attack than the Brigade itself. Thus, should the Brigade still be located on or near these airfields after the outbreak of war, the threat of NBC attack would increase correspondingly. Of the three forms of attack persistent chemical probably would pose the most likely threat, followed by non-persistent, nuclear and biological.

19. Any delay in our forward movement will result in a higher threat level from chemical and nuclear weapons as one of the target priorities for Soviet chemical or nuclear attack is reserve forces. Although a chemical attack might not be launched specifically against 4 CMBG, the Soviets may choose to interdict chemically major arteries, in an attempt to block, disrupt or slow NATO deployment and reinforcement. Thus, 4 CMBG must be prepared, as a minimum, to deploy through contaminated areas from either persistent or non-persistent chemicals.

20. The combination of late 4 CMBG deployment and a stalled Soviet offensive might combine to enhance significantly the tactical nuclear threat to the Brigade.

21. Once NATO and in particular 4 CMBG are deployed forward and battle has been initiated, the Soviets face an interesting dilemma regarding the use of NBC weapons on forward troops. The prevailing winds are in a south easterly direction, therefore, any NBC attack could turn against the Soviets. Use of such weapons is very weather dependent and thus somewhat more unpredictable. For this reason the weapon of choice might be non-persistent chemicals, used for "surgical" type strikes, versus the broad front or massive attack.

22. In addition to the wind element as a determining factor for "surgical" strikes the Soviets probably would use chemical selectively in a number of other circumstances. Such use might not initiate a massive retaliatory NATO strike. Some of those selective situations where chemicals might be used against 4 CMBG are:

- a. the Brigade is deployed against a major WP axis and has contributed in stopping the advance;
- b. the Brigade is in the path of an OMG or breakthrough force;
- c. moving from SETTER to either VII (US) Corps or II (GE) Korps;
and
- d. moving forward from Lahr and Baden after war has broken out, particularly at major choke points, defiles, etc.

23. With 4 CMBG being deployed on the Highway 14 corridor the probability of encountering a major Soviet force and thus a chemical attack is considerably greater than other potential Brigade deployment areas.

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24. Soviet NBC capabilities are excellent and are very real, but given the escalatory nature of these weapons as well as the prevailing winds the use of the NBC arsenal will be one of the most important political decisions the Soviet Politburo will have to make. The threat of use will always be present:

TABS:

TAB A - Soviet Chemical Agents and Persistency of Selected Liquid CW Agents

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TAB A
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SOVIET CHEMICAL AGENTS

AGENT	CLASSIFICATION	METHOD OF ABSORPTION	PERSISTANCE	LIKELY DELIVERY MEANS
Hydrogen-Cyanide	Blood	inhalation only	non-persistent (minutes)	MRLs Aerial bombs
Mustard and Lewisite	Blister	skin and inhalation	persistent (hours)	Mortars Field guns Chemical mines Aerial bombs and sprays
Sarin	Nerve	inhalation	non-persistent (hours)	Field guns Aerial bombs
Thickened Soman (VR-55)	Nerve	skin and inhalation	persistent (days-weeks)	Missiles Aerial bombs Aerial spray (possible)

PERSISTENCY OF SELECTED LIQUID CW AGENTS

AGENT	SLIGHT BREEZE, SUNNY, 15°C	WINDY AND RAINY 10°C	CALM, SUNNY LYING SNOW -10°C
Mustard	2 - 7 Days	½ - 2 days	2 - 8 weeks
Sarin	¼ - 4 hours	¼ - 1 hour	1 - 2 weeks
Soman	2½ - 5 days	3 - 36 hours	1 - 6 weeks
VR-55	3 - 21 days	1 - 12 hours	1 - 16 weeks

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APPENDIX 6
TO ANNEX A
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THREAT TO 4 CMBG WHILE ON THE AIRFIELDS

INTRODUCTION

1. As the airfields at Baden and Lahr would serve as major fighter interceptor bases, as well as key arrival points for reinforcements from North America, the airfields are considered high value targets for early attack.

AIM

2. The aim of this Appendix is to outline the threat to 4 CMBG while located on the airfield at CFB's Lahr and Baden.

INCREASING TENSION

3. In time of tension or impending crisis and while 4 CMBG is still in garrison we should expect increased activity from both covert and overt sympathizers. These elements could be deployed as students, truck drivers, businessmen and locally employed personnel. Special Purpose Forces could also infiltrate before "D" Day via TIR trucks, commercial airlines as well as posing as tourists, businessmen and athletes, etc.

4. During this period of tension the WP would be most interested in our state of readiness. They would monitor radio and telephone circuits to collect this type of information.

5. Sabotage can be expected and would probably consist of attempts at the destruction of equipments and supplies by use of explosives, fire and contaminants. Priority targets would include POL stocks, depots and rail lines. Unattended military vehicles would provide targets of opportunity.

6. As tension continues psychological operations and subversive activities are probable. Propaganda and agitation would probably increase throughout the Central Region with the aim of creating a fear of war within the population. This action would be intended to cause unrest, undermine the morale of both civilians and soldiers, influence political decisions and hamper NATO's preparations for defence.

AIR THREAT

7. Upon the outbreak of war both Canadian bases would face a direct threat. Attacks will be launched against NATO rear areas, in concert with and supporting the aims of the Front Commander in the forward combat zone. Since CFE airfields support the newest generation of CF-18's and are slated to host squadrons of F-15's, it is considered that our bases would be high priority targets. The first overt military threat likely to be faced by our bases in war is that of a massive air attack launched by FENCERS, FLOGGERS and possibly long range assets such as BACKFIRE and BLINDERS. These attacks would probably concentrate on airfield defences, maintenance facilities, and runways.

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8. Air attacks on our bases would take advantage of three probable approaches: Karlsruhe, Offenburg and/or the Freiburg corridor. All of these are well suited to low level flight. Gaps in NATO's air defence from such activity as terrain masking might restrict the electronic and visual detection capabilities at both CFE airfields.

9. Most of the air attacks on the Lahr airfield probably would come in a north-south direction. As survival areas for the Brigade are close to the airfield there is a high risk of Brigade units suffering collateral damage. Departing from an attack on the airfield enemy aircraft probably would continue in the direction of the attack for 30-45 seconds, regroup then execute a sharp turn eastward and follow a reciprocal heading to a recovery base.

10. Approach corridors outlined in paragraph 8 should not lead to a rigid expectation that these would be the only approaches used for an attack on the airfields. As Soviet planning places strong emphasis on surprise, CFE airfields should expect an air attack from any direction and at tree top level until final approach to the target.

UNCONVENTIONAL/SPECIAL PURPOSE FORCES (SPF)

11. It is estimated that SPF will be in place prior to the outbreak of hostilities. If the Brigade is still in the Lahr/Baden area SPF pose a threat, primarily from reconnaissance but possibly some minor sabotage/attacks. SPF units operate in teams of 3-15 men depending on their mission. They could be disguised in Canadian or Allied uniforms and undoubtedly would possess at least limited knowledge of English or French. These teams are assessed as having the capability to know road, rail and air movements. By using homing beacons, SPF could direct air strikes into the Brigade area either on the airfield or in the surrounding areas.

12. A Brigade rail move is particularly vulnerable as sabotage of rail lines would be relatively easy and at the same time difficult to prevent or defend. Although such activity may not be destructive to the Brigade the delay and disruption factors could be significant.

SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILES (SSM)

13. It is estimated that there is very little threat to the Brigade while on or near the airfields from SSM's.

CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR

14. Given the mission of the airfields, the Soviets might wish to neutralize these bases using persistent chemical agents. However, as use of chemical weapons, especially in the initial stages of war would be a high escalatory step, the actual threat to 4 CMBG in the Lahr and Baden areas is considered minimal. The proximity of France would also cause Soviet planners to think twice as they will no doubt attempt to keep the French out of the war.

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AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

15. Front level airborne operations can be directed at targets up to 1,000 kilometers from the FEBA, which places 4 CMBG under a constant threat from garrison to assembly area. Doctrinally, an airborne operation would be conducted shortly after an air attack, however the threat from airborne forces to the Brigade while still on the airfields is probably minimal.

EFFECT ON 4 CMBG OPERATIONS

16. The effect on Brigade operations is of course dependent on the level of crisis. If CENTAG Headquarters has not ordered us to our forward assembly area and we are still in the vicinity of the Lahr and Baden airfields, the Brigade will become increasingly at risk to the whole spectrum of enemy activities. These range from simple intelligence collection by low-level agents to disruptive sabotage, to massive air attack and eventually chemical and nuclear strikes.

17. Conversely, if the Brigade is deployed prior to hostilities commencing then the physical threat to the Brigade is almost nil. We would however be subject to intelligence collection both overt and covert.

18. In any event, but particularly if tension rises rapidly there is a significant threat to the CFE airfields. Therefore, it is incumbent on the Brigade to move away from the airfields as quickly as possible and on as many routes as possible. In addition, operational stocks of equipment deployed on or near the airfield are also at risk. To alleviate any potential problems associated with the Brigade's move, operational stocks and attacks on the airfield, all operational stocks should be moved from the airfield. This would free the Brigade to move quickly, would increase the security of operational stocks and would allow those stocks to be moved with a lesser degree of urgency.

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APPENDIX 7
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THREAT TO 4 CMBG DURING DEPLOYMENT

INTRODUCTION

1. During time of increasing tension and eventually war, 4 CMBG could find itself deploying forward under a variety of threat conditions. Should COMCENTAG deploy us prior to actual hostilities the physical threat to the Brigade should be minimal. However, should we move to SETTER at the outbreak of hostilities or shortly thereafter we could be subjected to substantial threats.

AIM

2. The aim of this Appendix is to outline the threat to 4 CMBG during deployment to our forward assembly area.

THE AIR THREAT

3. Aside from the HUMINT, IMINT and SIGINT threats described in other appendices, a major concern to 4 CMBG will be the air threat. During the first three days of a war, the Soviet/WP would probably launch an air operation with the following objectives:

- a. to open corridors in NATO'S SAM belt;
- b. to destroy nuclear delivery means and stock piles;
- c. to destroy air defence assets;
- d. to destroy C³ facilities; and
- e. prevent reinforcement and re-supply to NATO'S front line units.

4. The WP aircraft most likely to be used to attack those targets would be the FENCER, FLOGGER, BLINDER and the BACKFIRE as they have extensive range and most have all-weather fighting capabilities.

5. Although WP pilots are not known for their flexibility in selecting targets, a brigade-size unit moving on an autobahn would be a very attractive target of opportunity, if not a primary one. Attacking aircraft would probably use rockets and tactical ASMs for maximum effect.

6. The closer the Brigade gets to the assembly area the greater the threat becomes, as range is no longer a major limitation for enemy aircraft. The immediate vicinity of Nürnberg is considered a likely target for air attacks as the road/rail network in that area makes it an ideal choke point. An air attack on the area would likely be coupled with SPF recce and direct action for maximum effect, especially during the early stages of an operation.

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THE MISSILE THREAT

7. Although possible, a missile attack on 4 CMBG deploying to the assembly area is not considered likely. Soviet/WP missiles do not have the pin-point accuracy required for a linear moving target, thus making it an unreliable and non-cost effective system. Aircraft would be a more appropriate delivery means because of their accuracy and the possibility to readily evaluate the post-strike effect on the target. However, the missile threat will increase steadily with the development of new and more accurate missiles.

8. As the Brigade deploys in the assembly area, the missile threat becomes realistic because the targets become more concentrated, accuracy is less of a factor and range is reduced. The missiles likely to be used are the SCUD-B and the SCALEBOARD/SS-12/22 with ranges of 300 and 1000 km, respectively. Both are found as Front/Army-level support weapons and can deliver nuclear, chemical, HE and possibly ICM warheads.

THE CHEMICAL THREAT

9. As with the missile threat, a direct chemical attack on 4 CMBG while on the move is not likely. Even though subject to retaliation in kind by NATO, the WP may elect to use chemical weapons in limited quantities and on selective targets to deprive NATO of critical facilities, ie: airfields, ports, roads and rails. Once such target is probably the Nürnberg complex, therefore, 4 CMBG must be prepared to deploy through contaminated areas and we must be prepared to encounter areas contaminated with either persistent or non-persistent agents.

10. The Soviets have large quantities of chemical weapons that could be delivered by aircraft, bombs, missiles, rockets, mines and even drones. Although it is estimated that the "direct" chemical threat to the Brigade while deploying is low, the Soviets certainly have the chemical resources, capability and probably the political will power to unleash these weapons.

THE SPECIAL PURPOSE FORCE (SPF) THREAT

11. SPF constitute an ever present threat to the Brigade as they are trained to accomplish a variety of tasks such as reconnaissance, sabotage, assassination and forward air controlling. The weapons and equipment they use range from sniper rifles to nuclear demolition devices. It is assessed that 100-200 SPF teams could be deployed in the CENTAG rear area, a team being composed of 3-15 men depending on the mission.

12. The threats from the SPF revolve primarily around reconnaissance and assisting in directing indirect or direct attacks on the Brigade by other resources. Direct physical attack by SPF on the Brigade is considered unlikely although selective assassination and sabotage are real possibilities. Both are unpredictable and inexpensive and can have a profound

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negative impact on morale. A good example of easy and cheap sabotage would be the placing of metal devices on rail tracks thereby causing a train derailment or the destruction of power generating stations by use of simple explosives.

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13. If the Brigade deployed forward prior to hostilities the physical threat to it would certainly be negligible, although the threat of intelligence collection must be considered high. However, should the Brigade be moved forward at the outbreak of war or shortly thereafter then the Brigade faces physical attack primarily from aircraft and sabotage. The chemical threat must always be considered as a possibility although not probable.

14. Massive air strikes on linear targets, particularly a train load of tanks or howitzers would seriously jeopardize the Brigade's deployment and subsequent ability to fight. Even the derailment of a train load of F echelon vehicles might cause sufficient damage to those vehicles to prevent them from further forward deployment. At the very least considerable delay and confusion would be achieved.

15. To minimize the impact of enemy attacks, including sabotage on the Brigade, a sound and workable communications system should be employed. In this way timely intelligence and information could be passed. Forewarning of an impending air strike, for example, would allow time for evasive and/or defensive preparations to be conducted. Air defence systems accompanying convoys and trains would help provide the close in, local protection in addition to NATO's air defence umbrella.

16. Manning of fighting vehicles such as tanks and howitzers throughout a rail move would increase survivability firstly because the personnel would no longer be located in one or two coaches but spread throughout the length of the train. Second, the AFVs, etc, would provide a high degree of protection themselves. Third, the vehicles could be off-loaded much quicker.

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SOVIET ARMY DOCTRINE FOR COMBAT IN HILLY AND MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN

INTRODUCTION

1. The European part of the USSR is a flat plain where the only major natural obstacles are wide, slow rivers. It was over this terrain that most of the crucial battles of WWII were fought. Its geographical features have formed the command, control and operational doctrine of the Soviet Army:

- a. mechanized mass attacks on a wide front;
- b. massive fire support; also as a substitute for unavailable cover;
- c. high rate of advance and deep objectives;
- d. capability to cross wide rivers quickly; and
- e. open terrain permitting tight centralization of command.

It is the general flatness and lack of relief in the western USSR that is considered the "norm". For this reason, Soviet military doctrine considers warfare which takes place under environmental or in geographic conditions differing from the above "norm" as being combat "in special conditions". Even minor elevations thus become operationally significant.

AIM

2. The aim of this Appendix is to outline Soviet Army doctrine for combat in hilly and mountainous terrain.

A MOUNTAIN IN SOVIET TACTICAL THINKING

3. In accordance with topographical terrain definitions of the Soviet Army, any relief feature over 500m above sea level or rising 200m above the surrounding plain is a "mountain". Accordingly, the terrain in the OBERPFÄLZ is to be classified between "spur of a high mountain range" and "medium-height mountains" (hereinafter referred to as medium mountains). The small-sized, hilly and mountainous terrain in Central Europe, especially its medium-height mountains: the HARZ, RHÖN, FRANKISCHE ALB, OBERPFÄLZER and BAYERISCHER WALD, force the Soviet Army to modify its tactical doctrine.

4. In the wake of AFGHANISTAN, military publications in the east and west increasingly deal with warfare in mountains. The descriptions given and the statements made in these publications are governed by the special conditions prevalent in high mountains. The Soviet Union has no "mountain troops", but it has motor rifle divisions and airborne troops which have undergone special training especially in the southern military district of

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TRANSCAUCASUS and in the FAR EAST. The general principles for combat in mountains also apply to European wooded medium mountains.

DEFILES

5. Any terrain sector that narrows the attack of armoured units and formations is considered a "defile". Such defiles slow down the rate of advance, render the attacker vulnerable and thus favour, at first, the defender. Defiles can be formed by:

- a. terrain features;
- b. woods;
- c. rivers; and
- d. built-up areas.

6. The concept of a "defile" is particularly appropriate to mechanized mobile warfare. It does not mean that the terrain on either side of a defile constitutes an obstacle or that it is impassable for armoured vehicles. Defiles merely prevent a rapid advance on a wide front, giving the defender an advantage in time, the amount of which is proportionally reduced by the speed with which the terrain on either side of the defile can be penetrated. "Genuine" defiles, in the opinion of the Soviets, are to be found almost exclusively in high mountains. Mechanized units defending such defiles against a Soviet attacker must be aware of this. For the attacker, fighting in medium mountains is fighting for defiles, with the aim to regain, as quickly as possible, open terrain and thus the option for mobile operations. Fighting for heights gains its significance mostly from the defiles which are commanded by them.

7. In the opinion of the Soviets, the return to fast moving operations out of defiles can be achieved by the following:

- a. frontal break-through by superior use of arms;
- b. outflanking and opening the defile by attacking the flank and rear of the defender; and
- c. by combining both manoeuvres.

8. Surprise as a principle plays a central role in the above. In this context, we distinguish between TIME, SPACE and FORCES.

a. In TIME, surprise can be attained by:

- (1) speed, e.g. the seizure of key points in depth by an advance detachment moving either by road or air; or by

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- (2) the sequence of action, ensuring that encirclement and outflanking manoeuvres are conducted prior to the first frontal contact with the enemy in the defile;
- b. in SPACE, surprise can be attained by:
- (1) an outflanking manoeuvre in seemingly unsuitable terrain,
 - (2) an outflanking manoeuvre, using airborne troops; or by
 - (3) diversionary attacks on the flank and rear of the defender;
- c. FORCES will attain surprise by:
- (1) massing, or
 - (2) use of support arms in unexpected places (eg, tanks in woods or artillery in direct fire), or
 - (3) special quality of troops deployed.

9. For the attacker, an attack in the OBERPFÄLZ or FRANKISCHE ALB will consist of a continuous series of battles for defiles. Even when successful the rate of advance will be greatly reduced. In the area of the OBERPFÄLZ, the Soviets cannot expect that their ideal "norm", eg, to advance with a motor rifle division between 60-150m in 1-3 days, will be met. The experience gained in the CARPATHIANS in 1944 with a favourable proportion of forces shows that the rate of attack was reduced by approximately 1/3 compared to the flat. In the OBERPFÄLZ this could mean approximately 20 km per day. The attack, as the decisive phase of war in the Soviet mind, aims at the destruction of the enemy and seizure of terrain. Only by destroying a defender can the attacker regain his freedom of operation, irrespective of the terrain. The first objective in by-passing forces of a defender is, therefore, to prevent him from evading and eventually to destroy him.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

10. Command must be decentralized for such terrain and battalion and company commanders must be afforded a great amount of freeplay. Due to the space between possible movement axes, the attack frontages may increase from regiment and up. This does not affect the width of break-through sectors and fire concentrations along valleys and roads.

11. As a general rule, main attacks are centered on areas such as roads and valleys, so as to forestall any loss of time in difficult terrain. To this end, several formations (below divisional and regimental level) must be formed for the purpose of advancing along the main axes, i.e. echeloned. Ridges in between do not permit speedy shifting of troops, and they make centralize command and control difficult. Contrary to the usual desire of

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the Soviets in open terrain, mutually supporting assault troops must be formed, consisting of:

- a. mixture of tanks and motor riflemen up to platoon level; and
- b. reinforcement by engineer, anti-aircraft and artillery, occasionally to company level.

12. Given the large number of battle tanks and doctrine, it is to be expected that Soviet tanks will emerge even in difficult terrain; perhaps not in mass along forest trails and roads, but in single, "assault gun-style" in support of infantry and combat patrols. German experience gained in the Russian campaign underlines this statement. In this context, NATO planners must not too quickly exclude difficult ground for attacks.

13. Soviet doctrine emphasizes that an attack is to be conducted at high speed and on axes using by-passing and outflanking manoeuvres wherever possible. As well, an attack shall be conducted incessantly day and night. The most effective and most typical offensive employed is a main attack along a readily accessible axis, coupled with a coordination assault by one or several separate detachments on a difficult and unexpected axis. This appears to be the "DS solution" for virtually any attack halted by an enemy strong point on commanding ground. Before an attack, tactical leaders are taught to look for gaps between enemy positions, so as to exploit them subsequently in covert attacks on the enemy flank and rear. The aim of such attacks will always be the seizure of commanding heights over looking valleys and defiles. Wooded medium mountains are well suited for the use of diversionary forces and raiding parties against enemy HQs and rear areas. In order to increase the effect of surprise of the enemy, all forces will assault simultaneously.

14. The use of forward detachments, a favorite Soviet tactic, will rarely be made in mountainous terrain except to prevent enemy deployment to his defensive positions. When attacking a prepared enemy, the Soviet commander in the mountains will resort to the OUTFLANKING DETACHMENT. In size, the outflanking detachment can comprise up to 1/3 of the attack formation. Usually, it consists of motor rifle troops, reinforced by engineers, who will advance undercover of darkness and on foot, sometimes in vehicles, to capture key points in the enemy rear. There, they can:

- a. eliminate enemy command posts;
- b. prevent the enemy from moving up reserves (through ambush);
- c. open positions from the rear; and
- d. prevent the enemy from escaping, so as to destroy him in a combined operation with the frontal assault force.

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15. A company acting as an OUTFLANKING DETACHMENT will normally operate up to ranges of 10 km; a battalion will operate up to 15 km. An outflanking detachment can move on foot or in vehicles, or use a combination of means, but it is essential that it penetrates UNSEEN into the enemy rear and achieve its success by surprise. When moving on foot, it will be necessary to move up the combat vehicles quickly on reconnoitred routes as the attack is launched.

THE THIRD DIMENSION

16. The use of transport and assault helicopters further increase the capabilities of outflanking detachments. When no special air assault troops are earmarked for air assault operations, a motor rifle battalion may be used leaving behind their APCs, they can be flown up to 50 km for 24-hour missions, using 16 HIPs. In support of army ground operations, both HIND and HIP assault helicopters are used to provide fire support, especially long-range anti-tank defence. When approaching targets over forest areas, the engagement by enemy weapons on helicopters is more difficult. Mechanized forces available to a defender will be able to destroy such forces quickly as long as the latter are not yet deployed. It will require much time and effort to drive the enemy forces out of built-up areas or woods.

17. From large airheads, enemy helicopters can operate in the depth of the area of operations. For mechanized reserves, the odds of successfully fighting outflanking detachments and, air assault operations are governed by their speed of reaction.

THE AMBUSH

18. Ambushes and so-called "fire sacks", or killing zones, play an important role in Soviet tactics, with mountain ledges and flanking mountain edges being specially suitable for them. Since flank protection in most cases cannot keep pace with rapid thrusts through valleys, there is an increased hazard for an attacker in getting caught in possible killing zones. As a general rule, "fire sacks" favour the defender. However, in case of insufficient reconnaissance they can also endanger counter-attack forces, as was shown by an example from the CARPATHIANS in 1944 that has been given wide coverage in the Soviet military press.

CONSIDERATIONS FOR FIGHTING IN MOUNTAINS

19. Command and Control. The command and control of combined arms is delegated from regimental level to battalion and, sometimes, company level. Emphasis is placed on independent decision-making by all leaders. Commanders direct operations from locations far ahead where they can see both the terrain and the enemy. Regimental and divisional commanders control their forces from the so-called "operational group", a mobile command group consisting of various HQ elements, based on command and observation posts. These mobile command groups are capable of redeploying

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every 2-3 hours, moving for 20-30 minutes and setting up again. Divisional command posts are moved up 3-4 km behind the forward line of their main forces in battle.

20. Communications. The effect of heights favours the defender in that it enables him to reconnoitre and use the most suitable locations for radio and radio relay stations. Conspicuous heights, however, are dangerous because they attract the attention of diversionary forces and outflanking detachments. For an attacker, helicopters can assume the tasks of radio relay. In accordance with Soviet electronic warfare doctrine, complete jamming of friendly radio operations must occur before launching the attack.

21. Artillery. The artillery of a motor rifle regiment will accompany attacking battalions, behind the lead company, so as to be able to fight, from perimeter positions and in direct fire on antitank weapons of the defender. The remaining artillery will occupy positions, enabling them to shift fire from one attack axis to another without delay.

22. Air Defence. Missile air defence systems should be sited on heights, if possible while antiaircraft artillery may be sited in valleys to prevent enemy aircraft from underflying radar surveillance.

23. Engineers. As a general rule, engineers are attached not only to the main forces but also to the outflanking detachments; firstly, to remove barriers and, secondly, to retard enemy counter-attacks through barriers and ambushes. In special cases, the task of engineers added to outflanking detachments may be to prevent the enemy from withdrawing.

24. Immediate Air Support. Besides the use of helicopters as transport and command and control means, tactical air assault operations, combat helicopters are now available for close air support. They are not only used for antitank defence but also for air attacks with aircraft cannons, bombs and rockets. Their odds of survival in medium mountains is substantially higher than on flat ground, especially when skillfully exploiting wooded valleys. Attack helicopters and fighter aircraft also replace the otherwise available heavy weapons of infantry holding key terrain in rear area after having landed.

CONCLUSION

25. The Soviets recognize that the terrain in our area of operations will not support a rapid, fast moving tank battle. They learned the following lessons from the Carpathian campaign of 1944/45 (similar terrain):

- a. loose coordination (or even no coord) of offensive operations. Offensives often develop into a series of separate and isolated pitched battles for control of key roads, ridge lines, passes etc;
- b. major axes were invariably along valley floors, on main roads, or across mountain plateaus;

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- c. main attacks were often put in across difficult terrain because such areas were often less heavily defended;
 - d. advance frontages were often 2 - 3 times the norm;
 - e. multiple small scale attacks instead of one or two attacks in selected areas because of the inability to concentrate heavily on any one axes;
 - f. slower rates of advance (38 Army in 1944 planned 20 km/day and achieved 1.2 km/day). On average 1/3 the norm; and
 - g. diversionary attacks were often successful.
26. Modern Soviet teaching seems to stress the following points:
- a. main attacks along accessible axes with a coord attack by one or more detachments along difficult or unexpected axes;
 - b. tactical air assaults behind the defender;
 - c. wider frontages with multiple attack zones of smaller size;
 - d. more recce, looking for gaps and breeches, dead ground and concealed approaches;
 - e. attacks from line of march may be infrequent, and deliberate attacks from assembly areas will be the norm;
 - f. regiments may attack in single echelon;
 - g. tanks dispersed and dismounted attacks the norm; and
 - h. night operations rare, ie, the launching of a major attack.
27. Soviets have the following options for an attack over hilly-mountains/forested terrain:
- a. Option 1. Employ standard Operational and Tactical methods evolved over flat terrain conditions but which take account of modern weapons systems, up-to-date battlefield technology and equipments, the resulting changes in combat groupings and battlefield drills;
 - b. Option 2. Conduct normal Operational and Tactical Break-through missions against the enemy tactical defence zone, using up-to-date methods and procedures in accordance with their Field Service Regulations adapting them for combat tasks conducted through rugged hilly and/or mountainous terrain. (Seeking to

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force a passage through the valleys or along the roads or other accessible going);

- c. Option 3. Conduct Operational and Tactical tasks against the enemy in accordance with accepted doctrine but using the terrain and conditions where the enemy would least expect such measures to be used thereby gaining the maximum element of SURPRISE. (Crossing rugged terrain where the enemy would not expect such options to be used).
- d. Option 4. Employ normal Operational and Tactical methods, over hilly, rugged or mountainous terrain, enhanced by modern ideas and techniques designed to put the enemy under maximum pressure to his FRONT, the FLANKS and REAR areas. Such methods would include the use of Airborne Troops dropped well ahead of the main body; Motor-rifle troops ferried into the enemy defences by helicopter in the desant (air assault) role, and, the employment of OUTFLANKING DETACHMENTS assigned the role of penetrating deep into the enemy position to disrupt and dislodge him using simultaneous attacks to front and rear. The Outflanking Detachment is particularly suited, in the Soviet view, to mounting tasks through rugged terrain and mountainous regions; and
- e. Option 5. Develop an old idea into a new approach in Soviet conventional doctrine, at the Operational level, which will enable the maximum shock effect to be maintained on the enemy throughout the assault, break-in and pursuit stages of an Offensive coupled with dramatic measures taken to crumble his defences from within. Such a technique under the broad concept of the "Operational Manoeuvre Group" is currently being studied by the Soviets. This approach, the Soviets hope, will prove to be a timely innovation and a viable option to achieve a quick defeat of NATO.

28. A combination of options 4 and 5 appears to be most beneficial from a Soviet point of view. Recent exercises and doctrinal innovations support this thesis.

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FORCE DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION

INTRODUCTION

1. As a result of changing Soviet perceptions of strategic requirements in the Western TVD and rapid advances in weapon technology, the Soviets and to a lesser degree their WP allies, have embarked on a significant program of Force development and modernization. Since the mid-1970s, this program has included extensive improvement in Force structure, upgrading of key equipment and C³ systems, plus the creation of new units and formations.

AIM

2. The aim of this Appendix is to outline force development, and modernization in the CPA, CGF and CPMD.

GENERAL

3. Soviet military planners are placing greater emphasis on high speed exploitation by large ground manoeuver formations deep into an enemy's operational rear, and they are making changes in the force structure of divisions and armies that will greatly facilitate such operations. At the same time, they have always emphasized massing fire support of all means (artillery, air, and missiles) that would be capable of destroying NATO nuclear, air, and command and control assets. Considerably more helicopters are being allocated to provide responsive, continuous close support to attacking divisions and armies. The Soviets are also deploying a new family of theatre and tactical nuclear missiles that are more accurate and much more survivable than previous systems. These include the medium range SS-20, the improved SS-12 MOD 2, and the new tactical SS-21 missile. Major changes usually appear in GSFSG, before the other Groups of Forces, Western Military Districts (WMD) and other WP nations.

TANK DIVISION

4. Restructuring of Soviet divisions in the Groups of Forces which began in 1980 is now nearing completion. The major thrust of this restructuring is the tank division. The crux of the change is the conversion of the tank regiment from a very tank-heavy force to one that has a true combined arms mix of armour, infantry, and artillery.

5. The tank regiment restructuring consists of two major organizational modifications. The first is the expansion of organic motor rifle assets from company to battalion strength. This upgrade has provided tank regiments with a BMP-equipped motorized rifle battalion organized identically to the upgraded battalions in the BMP-equipped motorized rifle regiments. BMP-equipped motorized rifle battalions are now assessed as having expanded from 31 to 43 BMP. This increase is due to the addition of a machine-gun platoon to each of the three motorized rifle companies and the inclusion of a grenade launcher platoon and an anti-aircraft platoon at the battalion level.

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6. The second aspect of the upgrade in tank regiments has been the addition of an organic artillery battalion. Initially, tank regiments received up to 18 D-30 howitzers, however, the D-30s are gradually being replaced by 18 self-propelled 2S1 122mm howitzers. All tank regiments are expected to convert to self-propelled artillery as the systems become available. A possible further upgrade could be the expansion to 24 weapons per battalion.

7. The motorized rifle regiment of the tank division was improved in the mid-1970s by the upgrade of the organic 122mm howitzer battery (D-30) to a 122mm self-propelled howitzer battalion of 18 2S1. As part of the 1980 reorganization, the motorized rifle regiment was again reorganized. The number of motorized rifle battalions was reduced from three to two when the organic motorized rifle assets of the tank regiments were expanded from company to battalion.

8. The tank division's artillery regiment likewise is undergoing significant change in the restructuring process. In the past this regiment consisted of three battalions of tube artillery: one equipped with the self-propelled 152mm howitzer 2S3, and two with the towed 122mm D-30. The regiment now consists of two self-propelled 152mm battalions. Additionally, the previously independent multiple rocket launcher battalion is now subordinate to the regiment. As the regiment had three tube-artillery battalions prior to the 1980 reorganization, it is possible that a third artillery battalion will be added to this organization as the tubes become available.

9. The divisional reconnaissance battalion is also actively involved in the reorganization process. This unit has been strengthened by the addition of six medium tanks. Although it was originally believed that these tanks were formed into a separate company within the battalion, recent observations indicate that the tanks are integrated into two BMP-equipped reconnaissance companies. Each company has one platoon of three tanks. In addition to receiving tanks, reconnaissance battalions have also been augmented with up to six BTR-60s and, in some cases, the newer BTR-70. Although the role these APCs fulfill within the battalion is currently in question, the inclusion of the BTR-60PA tactical command post, which possesses a ground-to-air communication capability, probably indicates that the unit now has an organic air liaison element. The BRM-1 (formerly called the BMP M-1976(2)) is found in the battalion headquarters and the reconnaissance companies.

MOTOR RIFLE DIVISION

10. Although the major emphasis of the restructuring process is placed on tank divisions, motorized rifle divisions have also benefited from these organizational changes. The reconnaissance battalion, helicopter squadron, and SS-21 battalion are reorganized to be identical to those of the restructured tank division. The tank regiment of a motorized rifle division is identical to that of a tank division except that it has no organic motorized rifle unit. The motorized rifle regiments of the

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division presently exist in two types. The BMP-equipped motorized rifle regiment is organized identically to that of a tank division except that it has three motorized rifle battalions. The other two rifle regiments of the motorized rifle divisions are still equipped with BTRs and have an artillery battalion of 122mm towed D-30. The TO & E of motorized rifle battalions has been upgraded from 39 BTRs to 50 BTRs, giving the restructured BTR regiment 150 APCs. Finally, it should be remembered, the motorized rifle division also has an independent tank battalion with 51 tanks. There is recent evidence that one BMP-equipped motorized rifle regiment of a motorized rifle division in GSFG may have upgunned its organic artillery battalion from 18 to 24 tubes of 122mm 2S1 howitzers. Additionally the 120mm mortar batteries of motorized rifle battalions have been upgraded from six to eight tubes.

11. The artillery regiment in the motorized rifle division has also been restructured. The regiment had two battalions of 122mm towed D-30 and one battalion of 152mm self-propelled 2S3 battalions and one D-30 battalion. The formerly independent 122mm multiple rocket launcher battalion is now resubordinated to the regiment, as was done in the restructured tank division. There are limited indications that the present organization of the artillery regiment in motorized rifle divisions is only a temporary measure. Eventually, these regiments may consist entirely of 152mm 2S3 self-propelled artillery organized into 24 gun battalions.

12. Although it would appear that a dramatic increase has occurred in the amount of firepower in the Soviet Groups of Forces, it must be stressed that the organizations reflected in this analysis are the goals of an ongoing Soviet restructuring process. These goals, at present, are not all reality. For instance, motorized rifle battalions of some Soviet divisions still have 31 BMP's while most have 43. Some tank regiments have been completely restructured with a battalion of 2S1s while others have only one, two, or three batteries of D-30s. Much of the restructuring that was initially accomplished relied heavily on assets available within Soviet divisions. For instance, tank division artillery regiments were stripped of D-30s for transfer to tank regiments. As equipment becomes available, the D-30s are being replaced by self-propelled systems. As assets were being reshuffled, the Soviets were willing to experience some temporary reduction in combat power in order to create a force with significantly greater firepower, mobility, and flexibility.

CZECHOSLOVAKIAN PEOPLES' ARMY (CPA)

13. In spite of persistent economic difficulties, the Czechoslovakian force modernization is proceeding rapidly and has resulted in noteworthy upgrades in ground force equipment capabilities. Concurrent with equipment upgrades have been increased efforts toward improving the quality and type of training such as improvement of training areas, better instruction and efforts to retain quality career soldiers. Underlying all this have been the first steps towards the introduction of tactical doctrine which

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reflects Soviet concepts of high mobility and the employment of artillery tank and infantry formations.

14. Since May 1980, the CPA has been replacing its T-55s with the T-72M. About 340 of the Czech produced tank have been fielded to date, but the T-55 remains the principle battle tank with about 2900 in service.

15. BMP's continue to be introduced in large numbers in Czech divisions according to the Soviet model of one BMP equipped regiment per motorized rifle division and BMPs in the rifle regiment of the tank division. To date, BMP's have been reported in all of the 10 divisions. They are normally also found in the Divisional Reconnaissance Battalion, as well as in the reconnaissance elements of the OT equipped motor rifle regiments and tank regiments. In October 1985, the presence of BMP-2's was confirmed in 1 TD, 1 CPA. The standard APCs remain the OT-64 and BMP-1.

16. In conjunction with equipment upgrades, it is believed that Czech divisions will undergo a significant reorganization to conform to the pattern seen in Soviet units. This reorganization involves the expansion and/or addition of motorized rifle and artillery assets and the addition of helicopter assets. In tank regiments the motorized rifle company will be expanded to a battalion and a battalion of 122mm SP artillery will be added. In BMP equipped motorized rifle regiments the towed 122mm artillery battalion will be replaced by the 2S1. In the divisional artillery regiments, the addition of a 152mm SP howitzer battalion is taking place using the Czech produced 152mm SP howitzer DANA. The DANA is also being deployed in the artillery brigades of 1 CPA and 4 CPA. In addition, 7 Artillery Division has received the 203mm SP gun 2S7 and the 240mm SP mortar 2S4. Czechoslovakia is the only non-Soviet WP country to hold these weapons in its inventory.

17. The Czechs have begun to field in limited numbers the Soviet AT-4/SPIGOT anti-tank guided missile and have probably completed fielding their own man portable anti-tank weapons, the RPG-75. Although the AT-4/SPIGOT has not yet been fully fielded, it has been issued on a limited basis to various units for familiarization. Eventually the AT-4 will either complement or completely replace the AT-3/SAGGER in Czech manoeuvre units. The RPG-75 is the Czech version of the Soviet RPG-7 anti-tank weapon, and is believed to have been fully fielded with Czech units.

18. The most significant development in air defence weapons upgrades is the deployment of the Soviet ZSU-23-4 AAA system and the SA-9/13 SAM system at the regimental level. It is probable that these two systems make up a new "Soviet Model" air defence company in divisional AAA Regiments. The SA-9 SAM system has been observed with Czech forces in limited numbers since 1980, and HUMINT reports have provided indications of ZSU-23-4 systems within Czech training areas. The ZSU-23-4 system, as the obvious replacement for the M-53/59 30mm AAA gun, can probably be integrated into the Czech inventory without the higher preponderance of SA-9 sightings than of ZSU-23-4's. Another upgrade in divisional area defence capabilities involves the introduction of the SA-6 SAM system into the AAA regiments. The upgrade is now complete in all 1st Army Divisions and in the Army level

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AAA Regiment, where the SA-6 replaced the S-60 57mm AAA gun. It is expected that the SA-6 system will now begin to be phased into the 4th CPA.

19. The SS-21 SCARAB SSM was confirmed with the CPA in the May 1985 Prague Military Parade and is now deployed with 1TD/CPA. The SCARAB is replacing the FROG-7 in GSFG on a one-for-one basis and is also deployed in two divisions of the CGF.

CENTRAL GROUP OF FORCES (CGF)

20. The force modernization and re-equipment program for CGF is progressing much more slowly than that of GSFG and other Soviet divisions. The main battle tank is the T-72 with 900 being held, but there are still 600 of the older T-62s on inventory. The standard APCs remain the BTR-60 and BMP. Increasing numbers of BTR-70s have been identified but not as yet on a one-for-one basis for the older BTR-60. Surprisingly, the BMP-2 has not yet been seen in CGF, but it is expected to be deployed in the near future.

21. There has been no evidence of the divisional structural changes described in paragraphs 3-13 occurring in CGF. It is assessed, however, that the process should start shortly and be complete by 1990.

22. Most of the changes in CGF have occurred in the artillery. In terms of organization, the CGF army level artillery brigade is expected to be organized with a 72 or 96 gun Brigade. The D-20 152mm towed howitzers of the brigade may be replaced by the M1976 152mm towed howitzer and expanded to 24 gun battalions vice the current 18 gun battalion. Divisional artillery regiments have achieved interim reorganization consisting of one or two battalions of 18 x 2S3 152mm self-propelled howitzers, one or two battalions of 18 x D-30 122mm towed howitzers, and one battalion of 18 x BM-21 122mm MRLs. The howitzer battalions are expected to upgrade to 24 weapons per battalion. In addition, the D-30 battalions will be replaced with 2S3 152mm self-propelled howitzers. Upgrades should be accomplished by 1987. The BM-21 MRLs probably will be replaced with a new MRL system in the 1990's. The new MRL will feature greater mobility, increased crew protection, and automatic reloading features. Integration of the airborne MRL system, M1976 is also expected in the air assault battalion. The SS-21 SCARAB has replaced the FROG-7 in the 18th GMRD and the 48 MRD. The remaining three divisions are expected to convert in the near future.

CARPATHIAN MILITARY DISTRICT (CPMD)

23. The CPMD consists of three operational armies: one tank and two combined arms armies (CAA) with a total of four tank divisions and nine motor rifle divisions. A detailed ORBAT is included in Appendix 2. The CPMD is in the process of implementing the changes outlined in paragraphs 3-12 but the exact status is unknown at this time.

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24. Although the CPMD is not yet completely equipped with the latest models, the older equipment still in service is combat effective. The standard battle tank is a mixture of the T-64 and T-72 with 550 and 975 being held respectively. There are still 273 T-62s and 975 T-54/55s in the inventory. The standard APCs are the BMP-1 and BTR-60, however a large number of BTR-50/152 and even trucks still remain in the motorized rifle regiments. Artillery weapons include the modern D-30 and D-20 towed howitzers, the 2S1 and 2S3 self-propelled howitzers, the nuclear capable 2S5 and M1976 152mm towed howitzers, and the 2S7 203mm howitzer and the 2S4 240mm mortar. The BM-27 220mm MRL has begun to replace the BM-21 MRL in the artillery division. Air defence assets range from the most modern combined SA-6/SA-11 regiment to S-60 57mm towed AAA guns. ATGM systems range from the old BRDM equipped AT-2 to the modern BRDM AT-5.

25. One and possibly two independent air assault brigades are subordinate to CPMD, although one of the brigades may only be an air assault battalion subordinate to one of the armies of the CPMD. These brigades have great mobility because of their BMD combat vehicles which can be parachuted or air-landed into an area. They will eventually include much more artillery and rocket launcher support than the standard airborne regiment. This mobility, coupled with the improved firepower and anti-aircraft capability of the brigade's BMDs, artillery, and rocket launcher systems, gives the front commander a highly flexible, rapid, and mobile assault force.

OPERATIONAL MANOEUVRE GROUP (OMG)

26. Since the late 1970's, important changes in the operational employment and organization of Soviet ground manoeuvre formations have been observed. The most significant operational change has been the concept of employing a tailored, high speed exploitation force at Army and Front level. This force, called the Operational Manoeuvre Group (OMG), is structured to fight independently and is designed to move deep into the enemy rear area and seize critical objectives - normally before second echelon forces are committed to combat.

27. OMG's are generally found under Army (reinforced division-OMG-A) or Front (Tank Army-OMG-F) control. The OMG should not be confused with the second echelon. It is not closely controlled by its parent organization, nor is it a "mop-up" force. It can be likened to a large raiding force, assigned an ultimate objective.

28. The primary role of the OMG is to speed the advance of the attacking unit's main force. Associated tasks for the OMG would be to seize objectives behind the main defensive belt; prevent reinforcement or retreat; to act as raiding groups in the depth of defences, destroying HQs, nuclear weapons storage sites, logistics centers, etc; or to penetrate vulnerable boundaries.

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29. An OMG is most likely to be used when the enemy defence system is seen to be at a low state of readiness, or when enemy defences are relatively shallow and not supported by large reserves. Heavily supported with aviation and artillery assets, penetrations of 150-200 km would not be uncommon. An OMG may also be employed along one or more axes to execute encirclement operations in conjunction with airborne forces.

30. Restructuring of divisional and non-divisional units within the Belorussian Military District (BEMD) and the Transbaykal MD (TMD) indicates an organization is being evaluated for use as an operational manoeuvre group formation in a wide variety of combat formations. These two corps - level units are assessed as being well suited to function as an operational manoeuvre group (OMG). The two units restructuring are the 120th GMRD/BEMD and the 5th GTD/TBMD. Parallel restructuring in both divisions includes:

- a. Reorganization of the motorized rifle regiment and tank regiments into brigades that consist of composite battalions. Composite battalions contain a mix of BMP and T-72/80 tank companies;
- b. New equipment has also been added to these brigades. Two SA-8/GECKO SAM batteries, wheeled amphibious bridging system ABS(W), MCV-M-1979 mine-clearing vehicles, and GMZ minelayers were reported in at least one of the brigades;
- c. Changes in the artillery regiment included the addition of one battalion of BM-27, 220mm multiple rocket launchers; and
- d. In addition to restructuring changes, the divisions will be augmented with non-divisional units such as an independent security and service battalion, a communications relay battalion, and an air-assault brigade. In addition to new units and new structures, significant doctrinal changes are also coming about. Fire support is now integrated into the OMG concept. The new fire support concept involves the integration of tubed artillery, rockets and missiles, aviation systems, and air defence to neutralize NATO's long range weapons attempting to conduct deep strikes against the OMG.

31. Should the necessary tactical situation be present and adequate manoeuvre forces available, the Army and/or Front Commander may well elect to employ an OMG in the CHEB/HWY 14 axis of advance. Actual employment of an OMG is situation oriented and will rest upon the Army/Front Commander's estimate of the situation and probability for success at that time rather than on potential contingency plans already in existence.

RECCE STRIKE COMPLEX

32. A related development has been the evolving concept of integrating reconnaissance, artillery, air and ADP under the term Reconnaissance Strike Complex (RSC). This concept is designed to minimize reaction time against

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important and mobile targets. The increased attack capability of the RSC should significantly enhance WP capabilities.

EFFECTS OF 4 CMBG OPERATIONS

33. The extensive force modernization program has increased substantially the combat effectiveness of both Soviet and Czech forces available to the Commander of the Southwestern Front. In particular, the streamlining of the previously rather cumbersome tank divisions has made them much more flexible and effective in the restrictive and difficult terrain of 4 CMBG area of operations.

34. The most significant equipment upgrading has occurred in the field of artillery and armour. The already potent WP artillery has been enhanced by the fielding of various modern SP weapons along with associated target acquisition and fire control systems and the expansion of units and formations. Finally, the deployment of some 550 T-64s and 2,200 T-72s from CGF, CPA and CPMD poses a major threat to 4 CMBG operations.

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WARSAW PACT

WEAKNESSES AND VULNERABILITIES

INTRODUCTION

1. All too often western writers portray the WP and in particular the Soviet soldier as 10 feet tall using machines that never breakdown and never run out of fuel plus firing weapons with an endless and efficient supply of ammunition. In essence the WP military generally is viewed as a well oiled, highly efficient war machine that will slice through NATO with its leading tanks dipping their barrels in the Atlantic Ocean in just a few weeks.
2. In providing assessments on the WP forces, their capabilities and intentions, western analysts tend to move along the spectrum rather quickly to the "worst case scenario". Although we must be prepared for such a scenario it has to be tempered with a hard look at reality. That reality being that there appears to be some significant weaknesses and exploitable vulnerabilities in the WP's so-called "war machine".

AIM

3. The aim of this Appendix is to highlight some of the potential weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the WARSAW PACT FORCES.

SCOPE

4. In order to keep the scope sufficiently narrow this appendix focuses on operational and tactical level problems that may be evident in the CGF and CPA. As some of the weaknesses and vulnerabilities are a direct reflection on the larger Soviet system a very brief overview of that system is provided. Finally, the section on exploitable vulnerabilities relates directly to 4 CMBG.
5. This Appendix consists of:
 - a. Section 1 - Strategic Overview;
 - b. Section 2 - Operational Problems; and
 - c. Section 3 - Exploitable Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities.

SECTION 1 - STRATEGIC OVERVIEW

THE SYSTEM

6. The individual in the military is a product of the Soviet system reflecting both its strengths and weaknesses. Social problems such as

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delinquency, chronic alcoholism, absenteeism and crime will remain features of Soviet life for the foreseeable future, despite the leadership's efforts to introduce a degree of social discipline. Over sixty years of Communist Party rule have not eradicated these deeply-rooted characteristics. These social problems continue to be extremely prevalent and in some cases rampant within the Armed Forces. Although discipline is severe in the military, certain social ills are very wide spread. While it is difficult to assess accurately the impact on military effectiveness from these problems it is hard to conceive of them being very positive.

DEMOGRAPHY

7. The Soviet forces face two main problems related to demography:
 - a. The declining numbers of available manpower; and
 - b. Second, a dramatic change in the ethnic balance.
8. The first problem can be related to the Soviets ability, over the long term, to sustain its large force structure as required by their doctrine. A corollary to this is the increasing inability to be more selective about recruitment. Thus as technology increases the Soviets may have to rely more and more on unsophisticated conscripts with the potential degradation in overall military effectiveness.
9. Regarding the second problem, a recent census has showed a continuation of the trend of below average rates of population growth among the Slavic peoples compared to the above average rates for eastern minorities. By the year 2000 it is estimated that the Russians will comprise less than 50% of the population of the USSR. The increasing proportion of non-Russians will hinder the regimes long term plan to re-establish a Soviet culture based on the Russian language and Marxist-Leninist ideology. Present racial tensions, language barriers, and political reliability will be magnified. According to defectors this ethnic and language problem already has been brought into sharp focus in the military. Many soldiers don't understand basic Russian which is the language of instruction in the Soviet armed forces. In addition nearly all officers are of slavic origin, even those in units with a majority of non-slavs. Resentment and strife are very evident thus the overall effect on combat effectiveness and cohesiveness is probably detrimental. A recent example is the use of Muslim troops in Afghanistan and the major problems encountered. It is possible that similar problems could develop in any conflict with NATO.

WP RELIABILITY

10. The degree of cohesion of the WP members is a potential source of weakness since their national interests and policies do not always accord with those of the USSR or of each other. Historical animosity has always existed amongst the WP nations.

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11. Can we expect the Czechs to fight if ordered by Moscow? We must expect that they would if provided with a valid reason such as a perceived threat to the Czech homeland. Conversely Czech reliability and combat effectiveness would be suspect if ordered to fight by the Soviets for perceived Soviet goals. If the Czechs see themselves as aggressors rather than defenders of their homeland severe morale problems may develop. A difficulty facing Soviet planners is that if the Czechs were coerced into fighting, stiff resistance by NATO forces could drastically lower the Czech will to fight.

SECTION 2 - OPERATIONAL WEAKNESSES & VULNERABILITIES

GENERAL

12. This section focuses on those "larger" weaknesses that undoubtedly detract from the overall effectiveness of WP operations. An understanding of potential "operational" weaknesses may assist Brigade officers and soldiers in better developing the spirit required to win the battle.

13. Although the thrust of this section is not towards exploitable vulnerabilities certain issues may in fact be deemed to be vulnerable by the reader. So much the better.

LEADERSHIP

14. Leadership weaknesses reflect the problems in Soviet society at large such as - corruption, lack of responsibility, etc.

15. Centralized control and strict obedience to orders probably add to the restriction of initiative, certainly at lower levels. Soviet commanders carry full responsibility for every aspect of the operation and thus they tend not to delegate. They are over-burdened and over-worked with irrelevant demands on their time, thus impairing their ability to make their influence felt.

16. Conscript system provides for "instant NCOs" with little or no leadership experience. Many conscript NCOs are reportedly immature, error prone and poor leaders.

TRAINING

17. Cyclical Training. Due to the six month rotations and thus the replacement of a quarter of their troops during these times, training, both individual and collective, probably suffers significantly.

18. Rigid Training. Training is very rigid, repetitive and lacks the necessary freeplay to allow commanders and soldiers to learn to adapt to changing and unforeseen situations. Unit training is often characterized by repetitive and monotonous drills.

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19. Ammunition Deficiency. A known training problem is the allocation of only small amounts of full calibre ammunition.
20. Offensive Operations. There is a lack of training in anything but offensive armoured operations. The absence of large scale exercises makes it difficult to thoroughly train staffs at all levels.
21. Lack of FTX Training. There is an apparent lack of FTX staff training above division level. Czech divisional and army staffs in particular exercise infrequently. Training is primarily conducted up to regimental level. This lack of Czech command and control experience potentially reduces the effectiveness of Czech divisions.
22. Inadequate Logistical Staff Training. The Soviet logistical support system is possibly inadequately trained as Army and Front level rear service units do not participate in FTXs frequently. Large scale exercises rarely feature extensive logistics activity. In addition, many rear service units have to be mobilized from the civilian economy.

DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

23. Rigidity. Soviet doctrine and tactics appear to be rigidly goal oriented with little or no room for initiative. Any disruption of their plans may have a major effect because of the Soviet's apparent inability to adjust rapidly to new missions and force restructuring.
24. Stereotyped Battle Drills. Their tactics are largely geared for regiment and above with battalions employing stereotyped battle drills. Thus, Soviet tactics are somewhat predictable allowing for the necessary counter action. This problem will be compounded by the fact that tactical adjustments will have to be made because of the terrain in central and south Germany.
25. Artillery Support. There appears to be a heavy reliance on artillery support. Effective counter-bombardment would reduce their capability to fight, both from a physical and psychological point of view.
26. Bottlenecks. Attacking on dispersed regimental axes will not allow the Soviets and Czechs to avoid critical traffic bottlenecks. Vehicle concentrations will be especially heavy as follow-on units move toward commitment.
27. Emerging Doctrine. Soviet doctrine is changing and now calls for more initiative by commanders at all levels but initiative is neither inherent in the system nor is it reflected in training or tactics. There appears to be a distinct gap between the emerging new doctrine and the human capability to see it through.

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28. Secrecy. Secrecy may preclude operational flexibility and small unit coordination. Important decisions are routinely kept at the highest level and disseminated at the last minute, thus denying thorough planning at lower levels.

DISCIPLINE AND MORALE

29. Morale problems in the Soviet and Czech forces are prevalent as the conscript receives low pay, suffers poor accommodation and is often faced with harassment and abuse from NCOs and officers. Soldiers are expected to obey orders rigidly and not to use initiative. Leadership based on harsh discipline, mistrust and fear may cause small unit cohesion to collapse or at least encounter difficulties under the stress of battle. Killing commanders and striking hard probably would have an adverse affect on small unit cohesion and thus combat effectiveness. (Assuming there was any cohesiveness in the first place.)

LOGISTICS

30. Soviet doctrine and goals force large logistical requirements which lend themselves to interdiction and thus disruption. The control system might be too inflexible to meet operational goals and sudden changes as a result of objectives not being taken and time tables not being met. Although there is a restructuring of the logistics services as well as a large transportation capacity they still suffer from an apparent inability to get large quantities of supplies to the right place at the right time. In addition a large proportion of roads in Czech and the western military districts are liable to rapid deterioration after heavy use. This would probably cause bottlenecks, confusion and delays in getting supplies and reinforcements forward.

SOVIET-CZECH SUSTAINABILITY

31. The major vehicle differences between a Czech and Soviet motor rifle division are:

<u>VEHS</u>	<u>CZECH MRD</u>	<u>SOVIET MRD</u>
Tracked	423	612
Wheeled	2234	2909
Trailers	755	1389

32. The Czech division is weaker than its CGF counterpart purely in terms of resources. The net effect is that the Czech divisions probably are not as capable of sustained exploitive operations. Assuming the CGF and CPA attacked simultaneously and if the CPA advance faltered, a gap or open flank between the CGF and the CPA, might be created which could then be exploited.

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SECTION 3

EXPLOITABLE VULNERABILITIES BY 4 CMBG

GENERAL

33. This section deals with some of the perceived vulnerabilities of the WP forces at the tactical level, including equipment. This section is by no means complete but is meant to highlight some of the major items of interest and relevance. Hopefully the perceived vulnerabilities outlined will aid the reader in placing our potential battlefield opponents in a more appropriate perspective.

TRAINING

34. No Cross Training. There is no cross training of WP soldiers thus in an infantry company probably only the platoon and company commanders and the signallers know how to operate a radio; only machine gunners probably know how to operate their machine gun etc. Therefore identifying and killing signallers, commanders and support type specialists would probably lower the companies battle effectiveness.

35. De-emphasis of Some Training. The Soviets de-emphasize training which they believe will be of little use in a future war such as patrolling, dismounted operations, fighting in woods and ambushes. Thus we might expect very little aggressive activity particularly at night should the Soviet attack be halted. Aggressive patrolling on our part could keep the Soviets off balance. The lack of dismounted training leads to the conclusion that we must force the enemy to dismount by combining obstacles with maximum long range engagements from anti-tank weapons, artillery and mortar. Their de-emphasis of fighting in woods might be exploitable by such stubborn defense on the major routes or open manoeuvre areas that they are forced to try to penetrate through the large number of wooded areas in southern Germany.

INITIATIVE

36. Lack of Initiative. Although platoon commanders are well drilled they lack initiative, doing only as ordered by the company commander who in turn is rigidly controlled by the battalion commander. Therefore, in a rapidly changing situation timely decisions may not be forthcoming due to the highly centralized command system and aversion to accepting responsibility. Thus, any immediate chance for exploitation may not occur. A sturdy defence would no doubt cause confusion, delay and provide an opportunity to strike hard. Identification and neutralization of commanders would cause disruption. The fear of failure is great and any strong action to immobilize Soviet commanders such as extensive obstacles should be conducted.

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COMMAND AND CONTROL

37. Rigidity. As the Soviet and Czech command and control is very rigid, destruction of Regiment and Division Headquarters would probably have serious consequences. Thus early identification of the Headquarters will lead to their early neutralization. Recce forces well forward could help achieve this aim.

38. Lack of Radios. Section commanders don't carry radios and nor do dismounted platoon commanders, thus they must rely on hand and voice signals. Using smoke to block the view of the section and platoon commander may cause considerable confusion. In addition, vehicles with antennae should be our first target priorities.

39. Maps. Maps are classified in the Soviet Forces and probably are not issued below company commander. In addition maps sometimes are issued only at orders, thus restricting any planning by subordinate commanders. Also, Cyrillic maps will not aid in reading the Roman alphabet on West German road signs! Without maps, navigation will be a problem. Cross country movement requires maps for accurate navigation. Therefore, by forcing the Soviets to move cross country navigation could become a problem resulting in poor command and control, uncoordinated movements, attacks and confusion, etc.

40. Radio Nets. A Soviet battalion normally only has two standard radio nets, the battalion command net and in the case of the motor rifle battalions, a support weapons net. ECM against these nets probably would have serious negative effects on the battalion's ability to fight.

TACTICS

41. Lack of Adaptability. Soviet tactics have been developed to a large extent on the open plains of the USSR. Faced with the central and southern German terrain it is doubtful whether those tactics could be utilized without major adjustments. This, combined with the inherent inflexibility and lack of initiative could severely limit WP attacks to smaller platoon and company sized engagements vice large coordinated division and army attacks. Therefore if we take best advantage of the terrain including extensive obstacles, we should severely restrict his ability to operate effectively. (See Appendix 8).

42. Recce and Intelligence. Soviet and Czech operations rely on detailed planning (more so than us) based on accurate intelligence of the enemy. Any error in this assessment could render the planning of an attack useless. As a consequence an unexpected development in a combat situation leaves little room for alterations. Contradicting this intelligence requirement and compounding the recce problem are training deficiencies in recce units due to the lack of initiative of battalion commanders and below. As well, there is an apparent lack of understanding of the requirement for recce to support battalion operations. A low level enemy commander may not have any idea of what size of force he is up against. This might be especially true if ECM is being conducted against

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higher level reconnaissance and command nets. Also killing the enemies reconnaissance would aid in causing the battalion commander to fight "blind".

43. Poor Night Fighting. Although doctrine states that combat operations will continue on a 24/7 basis very little night training is conducted by either the Soviets or Czechs. We can take advantage of that weakness by patrolling extensively at night. Any offensive action by us at night would possibly be very demoralizing to the Soviets.

EQUIPMENT

44. Tanks

- a. T-55. It has an obsolete fire control system, poor gun depression, low accuracy and cannot fire very effectively on the move, although the Czechs and Soviets are trying to rectify some of these problems with updated fire control systems. The T-55 is vulnerable on the right front and side where internal fuel tanks and ammunition are loaded;
- b. T-62. It has similar problems to that of the T-55 and only has an effective range to about 1200 metres. Firing is normally conducted from a short halt which makes the tank quite vulnerable. All our anti-tank weapons are effective especially on the right hand side where fuel and ammunition are located;
- c. T64A
 - (1) This tank is most vulnerable at the belly, the suspension system, the turret (except the front), the fuel tanks on both sides of the driver and between the turret and the engine compartment, hull area and by hits on the hull side armour,
 - (2) Night vision devices are not very effective at longer ranges,
 - (3) Poor gun depression therefore skylining results when firing,
 - (4) The autoloader is unreliable and thus may be sensitive to the effects of non-penetrating hits, and
 - (5) Not very successful with new engine - not powerful enough and is prone to breakdown especially over extended operations.

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d. T-72

- (1) Ammunition storage is very vulnerable. The significant point is that there are semi-combustible cartridge cases in the turret which are relatively unprotected. A perforation of the sides or rear of the turret could lead to catastrophic destruction of the tank, and
 - (2) The T-72 is most vulnerable at the belly, suspension systems, turret (except the front) the fuel tanks on both sides of the driver and between the turret and engine compartment;
- e. All Soviet tanks are estimated to have a gradeability of about 30-35%. The terrain in central and southern Germany has many areas where there are 50-60% slopes. The tanks will encounter problems in negotiating these areas. Siting of defensive positions is important in order to catch Soviet tanks possibly having trouble negotiating what looks like good tank terrain. In addition heavily forested areas will restrict tank movement. Thus, as the tank is the cornerstone of Soviet tactics restricting tank movement through poor gradeability and vegetation may seriously disrupt any WP advance; and
- f. Regarding protection, the 60° frontal arc (essentially between the headlights) should be avoided as a primary point of aim. The tracks, hull and turret sides as well the rear will provide better results.

45. APCS/AIFVS

a. BMPS (most variants)

- (1) Vulnerable to all 4 CMBG anti-tank weapons and .50 cal,
- (2) The gunners sight has poor retention characteristics and there is a dead spot in the traverse of the main gun and coaxial machine gun over the searchlight (ie 293-350°),
- (3) It has poor main gun depression,
- (4) Effective range of the AT 3 is limited by the poor guidance system,
- (5) The glacis plate is aluminum, therefore, very vulnerable to top attack,
- (7) The interior is cramped and restricts the ability of the section to fight from the vehicle as their doctrine and tactics state;

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- (8) The gunner, is exposed while reloading the Sagger; and
 - (9) Ammunition is exposed in an open carousel and very vulnerable.
- b. OT-62 and OT-64. Vulnerable to all 4 CMBG anti-tank weapons and heavy machine gun fire;
 - c. OT-65. Very vulneravble to HMG fire and artillery fragments due to the thin armour; and
 - d. BTR-60PB
 - (1) Has a very limited capability as an infantry fighting vehicle,
 - (2) Vulnerable to fragmentation rounds as well as .50 calibre machine gun fire using C44 ammunition,
 - (3) Vulnerable to all anti-tank weapons,
 - (4) Greatest vulnerability is that troops must dismount over the top of the vehicle thus exposing themselves, therefore we should try to force them to dismount at long range, and
 - (5) It lacks good mobility and is prone to engine problems.

46. Summary. Despite the quantity of tanks, AFVS and other weapons and equipment the Soviets have some significant limiting weaknesses in their equipment. Mechanical failure is relatively high amongst combat vehicles. Sighting systems are old and in many cases rudimentary. Well placed hits may cause lethal consequences. Gradeability and overall sustainability of Soviet tanks is poor. The Soviets do not train on most of their equipment as it is kept in storage for long periods. This will probably aggravate the breakdown problem thereby straining their repair services and thus their battle effectiveness.

EFFECT ON 4 CMBG OPERATIONS

47. Historically we have tended to focus almost exclusively on the Soviet strengths and capabilities and relegated his limitations, weaknesses and vulnerabilities to a cursory glance.

48. Although not exhaustive this Appendix is intended simply to expose some of the major problems, constraints, weaknesses and exploitable vulnerabilities of Soviet and Czech ground forces, particularly in those areas that may be exploitable.

49. The bottom line for the Brigade is that understanding the limitations of the Soviets and their allies should allow opportunities to seize the initiative.

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4 CMBG INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

INTRODUCTION

1. Hostility intelligence requirements are driven by a commanders' mission(s). However, the requirement for intelligence and information on our potential enemies cannot be confined solely to war or even to times of increasing tension. We must strive to have a reasonably good understanding of our potential adversaries prior to war, so that hopefully we will be better prepared to engage him on the battlefield.
2. The 4 CMBG area of primary intelligence interest is defined as the first and second echelon armies likely to be employed in the NURNBERG group of approaches. Other forces likely to oppose CENTAG are of interest but have a lower priority.
3. Combined with this operational area of interest we must maintain an ongoing peacetime general awareness of the Soviet and NSWP military ranging from doctrine and tactics to weapons and personnel.

AIM

4. The aim of this Appendix is to outline 4 CMBG Intelligence Requirements.

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS - PRIORITIES

5. The Brigade's peacetime Intelligence Requirements (IR's) are much broader than those required during increasing tension and eventually war. The transition to war and the clearer definition of our mission will result in the Brigade's IR's becoming narrower and well defined.
6. In order to meet present requirements the Brigade's IR's have been placed in the following priority:
 - a. PRIORITY 1. The threat in the most probable area of employment along VII (US) Corps and II (GE) Korps boundary which is:
 - (1) Czech Peoples' Army (CPA), and
 - (2) Soviet Central Group of Forces (CGF);
 - b. PRIORITY 2. Those forces available to support or act in concert with those formations in PRIORITY 1 which are from the Carpathian Military District (CPMD);
 - c. PRIORITY 3. Those enemy air forces likely to support those organizations in PRIORITIES 1 and 2; and

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- d. PRIORITY 4. Those formations likely to oppose CENTAG in areas outside of the Brigade's likely mission areas. These include: the First Guards Tank Army (1 GTA) and 8 Guards Army (8 GA). Both formations are located in the southern part of East Germany.

7. 4 CMBG's Intelligence Requirements have been divided into three major areas: Peacetime (including Priorities 1 to 4 listed in paragraph 6); IR's during deployment and occupation of SETTER; and Hostility IR's

LIST OF TABS:

- Tab A - Peacetime Intelligence Requirements
Tab B - Intelligence Requirements During Deployment and Occupation of SETTER
Tab C - Hostilities Intelligence Requirements

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PEACETIME INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

A. SPECIFIC

1. PRIORITY 1 - CPA and CGF

SER	REQUIREMENT	REMARKS	AGENCY/SOURCE
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	Est of the threat to CENTAG	SECRET level	CENTAG CFE/DDI
2	Est of the threat to VII (US) Corps, 3 ID and 1 AD	SECRET level	VII (US) Corps 1 AD 3 ID
3	Est of the threat to II (GE) Korps and 4 PzGrenDiv	SECRET/CTS level	II (GE) Korps
4	ORBATs and TOE	(1) SECRET level. In addition to Corps and Div produced ORBATs also reqr USAREUR, <u>DIA</u> , <u>DDI</u> and <u>NSA</u> ORBATs and TOE, and (2) Req'r overhead imagery to sp presentations. Should be down to Regt level.	CENTAG VII (US) Corps II (GE) Korps 1 AD CFE/DDI CFE/DDI
5	Wpns and Eqpt	(1) Used by CGF and CPA (2) Incl assessments of their capabilities, limitations and weaknesses (3) UNCLAS to SECRET levels	CFE/DDI VII (US) Corps

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
		(4) Overhead imagery reqr on eqpt/wpons systems especially latest developments (5) Attaché photos reqr	CFE/DDI CFE/DDI
6	Training Analysis	(1) UNCLAS to SECRET (2) Focus on both individual and collective trg, especially FTxs (3) To emphasize assessments of CPA and CGF to conduct tac ops (4) Area of weaknesses and strengths. Stress analysis not just raw info/ mat (5) Reqr overhead imagery showing deployments. Emphasize adv, attack and aslt river crossing ops/trg	CFE/DDI HQ VII Corps BAOR CFE/DDI
7	Offrs and soldiers of CPA and CGF	(1) UNCLAS to SECRET (2) Stress capability to do the job in war. Reqr analysis not just raw info (3) Reqr NATO mil attaché reports from Czech	VII Corps CENTAG CFE/DDI II Korps CFE/DDI

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
8	Interoperability of CPA and CGF	(1) SECRET level (2) Assessment of the capability and intention to conduct inter-operability msns (3) Should incl trg assessments	CENTAG VII Corps II Korps CFE/DDI
9	Special Purpose Forces	(1) UNCLAS to SECRET (2) Assessment of capabilities and limitations on SPF immediately aval to sp CGF and CPA (3) To incl trg, eqpt, likely tgts and method of op	CENTAG VII Corps II Korps 1 AD CFE/DDI
10	Assessment of Czech doctrine and tacs vice CGF	(1) UNCLAS to SECRET (2) Incl analysis of Czech capability to conduct ops IAW their doctrine, trg and tacs. Is it exploitable?	CENTAG VII Corps II Korps CFE/DDI
11	Assessment of Czech reliability	(1) SECRET level (2) Relate to ability to conduct and sustain ops	CENTAG VII Corps II Korps 1 AD CFE/DDI

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
12	Assessment of each CGF and CPA Div	(1) SECRET level (2) Incl capability, str, weaknesses, vulnerabilities (3) Outline significant known or potential differences between the Divs particularly with respect to those that are exploitable	VII Corps II Korps CFE/DDI
13	Biographic Data	(1) SECRET (2) Assessments on all Div and Regt Comds	CFE/DDI VII Corps II Korps
14	Vulnerabilities of Canadian eqpt to wpns used by CGF and CPA	UNCLAS to SECRET	CFE/DDI
15	Estb of maj weaknesses, limitations and exploitable vulnerabilities of CGF and CPA	(1) UNCLAS to SECRET (2) Incl an assessment as to how best we can exploit weaknesses and vulnerabilities.	CENTAG VII Corps II Korps CFE/DDI
16	Terrain Analysis	UNCLAS to SECRET	CENTAG 1 AD VII Corps 4 PzGrenDiv II Korps

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2. PRIORITY 2 - Carpathian Military District (CPMD)

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	Threat Estimate	(1) SECRET (2) Incl capabilities and intentions as to how, where and when these forces will be used	VII Corps CFE/DDI
2	ORBAT and TOE	(1) SECRET (2) Reqr VII Corps, 1 AD, USAREUR, <u>DDI, DIA and NSA ORBAT's and TOE</u>	VII Corps 1 AD CFE/DDI
3	Wpns and Eqpt	(1) UNCLAS to SECRET (2) Incl any wpns/eqpt not found in CGF or CPA incl vulnerability of Canadian eqpt	VII Corps 1 AD CFE/DDI
4	Training Analysis	(1) UNCLAS to SECRET (2) Indiv and collective (3) Incl weaknesses, str, vulnerabilities	VII Corps CFE/DDI
5	Assessment of overall combat readiness, mobility, officers and men	(1) SECRET (2) To incl assessment of capability to fight off (ie, as a sec or third ech army) (3) Also incl wng times	VII Corps CFE/DDI

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
6	Comparison of CGF and CPA Divs	(1) SECRET (2) Incl wpns and eqpt assessment, pers, org, capabilities, limitations and weaknesses	VII Corps CFE/DDI CENTAG

3. PRIORITY 3 - Air Forces likely to sp orgs listed in Priority 1 and 2

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	ORBATs and TOE	(1) SECRET (2) Incl overhead imagery of WP air bases and aircraft	CFE/DDI VII Corps
2	Threat Estimate	(1) UNCLAS to SECRET (2) Incl capabilities and intentions to sp grd forces (3) Incl prob tgts and radius of action	VII Corps CENTAG II Korps 1 AD CFE/DDI
3	Training	(1) UNCLAS to SECRET (2) Assessment of their tacs, wpns and trg (3) Incl how air forces will prob be used in role against 4 CMBG	VII Corps CENTAG CFE/DDI

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4. PRIORITY 4 - 1 GTA and 8 GA

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	Threat Estimate	(1) SECRET (2) Incl capabilities and intentions	CENTAG BAOR VII Corps CFE/DDI
2	ORBATs and TOE	(1) SECRET (2) Reqr USAREUR, DDI DIA and NSA	VII Corps CFE/DDI BAOR
3	Wpns and Eqpt	(1) UNCLAS to SECRET (2) Capabilities, limitations, etc, that are different than those in PRIORITYES 1 and 2	VII Corps CFE/DDI BAOR
4	Force Structuring	(1) SECRET (2) Incl assessment of what new developments are occurring	VII Corps CFE/DDI BAOR
5	Training Analysis	(1) UNCLAS to SECRET (2) Focus on both individual and collective indicating major weaknesses and strengths (3) Incl assessment of officers and men	VII Corps CFE/DDI BAOR

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
6	Vulnerabilities of Canadian Eqpt	(1) UNCLAS to SECRET (2) In addition to those wpn systems avail to CGF/CPA and CAMD	VII Corps CFE/DDI BAOR
7	Maj Weaknesses and Vulnerabilities	(1) UNCLAS to SECRET (2) Incl assessments of how best we can exploit	VII Corps CFE/DDI BAOR

B. GENERAL

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1	Current info/int on a wide variety of subjs incl: a. Soviet Soldiers b. Doctrine c. Tacs d. Trg e. Logistics f. C3 g. EW h. Special orgs - Airmobile, Air Aslt, Airborne j. Latest dev on eqpt, wpns and ac k. OMGs and other "new" orgs	(1) UNCLAS to SECRET (2) Incl assessment on str, capabilities and exploitable vulnerabilities	

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
2	Academic and Strategic Assessment Studies	(1) UNCLAS to SECRET (2) To provide a gen overview of the Soviet and WP (3) To incl academic type papers or those produced by such orgs as the RAND Corp	CFE/DDI CENTAG USAREUR VII Corps BAOR
3	Overhead Imagery	(1) Outlined in Sect A (2) Primary use for briefing and dev of Div binders	CFE/DDI
4	Attaché Photography	(1) Good quality photos depicting WP eqpt (2) Should be "fd" oriented as much as possible (3) Incl BRIXMIS, and NATO attaches in Moscow, Czech, DDR and Poland	CFE/DDI
5	<u>Pubs</u> a. FAGS b. CFA Reports c. Complete MC Series d. UK & US Int Pubs e. Annual CIE & CANUS Assessments		

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
6	Afghanistan	Current devs & tacs	CFE/DDI

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INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS
DURING THE DEPLOYMENT & OCCUPATION
OF SETTER

GENERAL

1. The Bde must deploy forward to SETTER over a long distance, therefore we have a requirement for Primary Int Reqs (PIR) and Int Reqs (IR) to maintain an accurate threat est to the Bde move.

INT PROBLEM

2. Will en forces attack, interdict, disrupt or delay our move to and occupation of SETTER? If so how, where & when?

SERIAL	REQR	AGENCY/SOURCE
(a)	(b)	(c)
1	<u>PIR</u> Have there been any disturbances, physical disruptions, ambushes or sabotage along the Bde's routes? If so where, when and what?	Polizei SIU GTSC CENTAG
2	What is the status of known SPF tms? Has any SPF activity occurred along our road and/or rail routes? Where and when?	CFE CENTAG GTSC VII Corps
3.	Have any air strikes occurred? Where, when and what? What is the status of Soviet long rge interdiction ac?	CENTAG CFE
4	Will the en employ nuc or chem wps? If so where & when?	CENTAG VII Corps II Korps CFE
	<u>IR</u>	
5	Have airborne forces been marshalled? Where and what str? Are destinations known?	CENTAG CFE

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(a)	(b)	(c)
6	What is the status of SSM firing units capable of striking 4 CMBG? Has any SSM firing occurred? Is so where and when?	CENTAG VII Corps II Korps CFE
7	What is the status of known agents and how could they affect 4 CMBG?	GTSC CENTAG SIU Polizei
8	Has any subversive activity been conducted? Where, what, when?	Polizei SIU CENTAG GTSC
9	What is status of en tpt hel's? Have any hel crossed the border? Where and when?	CENTAG CFE
10	What is the status of Soviet photo satellites? How many? Timings?	CFE

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HOSTILITIES INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

GENERAL

1. This Tab outlines the PIRs & IRs reqr to prep and execute a mov from SETTER to sp either VII (US) Corps or II (GE) Korps.

INT PROBLEM

2. Will the en attack, disrupt or prevent 4 CMBGs mov to sp either VII (US) Corps or II (GE) Korps? If so how, when, where and what str?

SERIAL	REQR	AGENCY/SOURCE
(a)	(b)	(c)
	<u>PIR</u>	
1	What are the en's objs in the CENTAG area and where is his main effort? Who is leading?	CENTAG CFE VII CORPS II KORPS
2	What is the en activity in the NURNBERG gp of aproaches?	CENTAG CFE VII CORPS II Korps
3	Will the en emp nuc and/or chem wpns to prevent our mov? If so where and when?	CENTAG CFE VII Corps II Korps
4	What are the locs and activity of all CGF and CPA divs?	CENTAG CFE VII Corps II Korps
5	What are the locs and status of SSM and MRL firing units?	CENTAG CFE VII Corps II Korps

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(a)	(b)	(c)
	<p><u>IR</u></p>	
6	Where is the CGF and CPA recce/surv conc of effort?	CENTAG VII Corps II Korps CFE
7	What is the status of CGF and/or CPA ab/air aslt forces?	CENTAG VII Corps II Korps CFE
8	Have any SPF been deployed? Where, when and what str?	CENTAG VII Corps II Korps CFE GTSC
9	Where are the en's uncommitted Regts & Divs? What are their present activity and future intentions?	CENTAG VII Corps II Korps CFE
10	Where are the ens arty assets that could affect 4 CMBG deployment?	CENTAG VII Corps II Korps CFE
11	What is the status of en FGA assets and can they hit 4 Bde? Where, when & in what str?	CENTAG VII Corps II Korps CFE
12	What are the current locs & activity of CPMD Divs?	CENTAG VII Corps II Korps CFE
13	What is the status of Soviet recce satellites? Have they overflown & photo'd our locs? If so when?	CFE

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CLIMATOLOGY DATA

1.

MONTH	TEMPERATURE (°C)				PRECIPITATION (cm)				WIND (KT)			MEAN			PRESSURE ALT 99.95% (m)	MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS										
	EXTREME MAXIMUM	MEAN DAILY MAXIMUM	MEAN DAILY MINIMUM	EXTREME MINIMUM	MEAN TOTAL	MAXIMUM IN 24 HOURS	MEAN SNOWFALL	MAX SNOWFALL IN 24 HRS	PREVAILING DIRECTION	MEAN SPEED	EXTREME SPEED (PEAK/GUST)	RELATIVE HUMIDITY (%)		DEW POINT (°C)		PRECIP > .0254 cm	PRECIP > 1.27 cm	SNOWFALL > .254 cm	SNOWFALL > 3.8 cm	THUNDERSTORMS	FOG (< 7 MILES)	TEMPERATURE (°C)				MEAN CLDNS (TENTHS)
												0400	1300									> 32.2	> 26.7	< 0	< -17.8	
JAN	10	-5	-7	-27	5	2	28	18	W	4	46	89	83	-5	670	14	1	10	2	#	24	0	0	28	3	8
FEB	15	2	-5	-27	5	3	23	10	W	5	67	89	80	-3	716	14	1	10	2	#	20	0	0	21	2	8
MAR	23	6	-3	-2	6	2	20	15	W	6	58	89	72	-1	670	14	1	7	2	#	22	0	0	21	1	7
APR	29	12	2	-6	6	2	5	10	W	5	40	90	62	3	640	14	1	3	#	2	21	0	#	10	0	7
MAY	31	17	6	-2	5	2	#	3	W	5	50	91	59	7	564	14	1	#	0	3	22	0	1	2	0	7
JUN	32	21	9	.5	9	4	0	0	W	5	43	91	56	10	518	15	2	0	0	7	20	#	5	0	0	7
JUL	33	23	10.5	1	8	5	0	0	W	4	58	92	56	11	533	13	2	0	0	6	24	1	8	0	0	6
AUG	39	21	10	1	6	2	0	0	W	4	37	92	62	11	533	14	1	0	0	4	24	1	4	0	0	7
SEP	29	18	7	-3	6	3	0	0	W	4	41	94	63	9	549	13	1	0	0	2	25	0	1	2	0	6

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MONTH	TEMPERATURE (°C)				PRECIPITATION (cm)			WIND (KT)			MEAN			MEAN NUMBER OF DAYS													
	EXTREME MAXIMUM	MEAN DAILY MAXIMUM	MEAN DAILY MINIMUM	EXTREME MINIMUM	MEAN TOTAL	MAXIMUM IN 24 HOURS	MEAN SNOWFALL	MAX SNOWFALL IN 24 HRS	PREVAILING DIRECTION	MEAN SPEED	EXTREME SPEED (PEAK/GUST)	RELATIVE HUMIDITY (%)		DEW POINT (°C)	PRESSURE ALT 99.95% (m)	PRECIP ≥ .0254 cm	PRECIP ≥ 1.27 cm	SNOWFALL ≥ .254 cm	SNOWFALL ≥ 3.8 cm	THUNDERSTORMS	FOG (< 7 MILES)	TEMPERATURE (°C)				MEAN CLDNS (TENTHS)	
												0400	1300									> 32.2	MAXIMUM		< 0		< -17.8
																							> 26.7	< 0			
OCT	26	14	3	-6	4	2	#	3	W	4	39	94	70	6	594	10	#	#	0	#	27	0	0	8	0	7	
NOV	18	6	.5	-13	5	2	8	18	W	4	46	91	80	1	670	15	1	4	#	#	25	0	0	16	0	8	
DEC	12	0	-5	-27	6	3	23	15	W	4	56	90	85	-4	732	14	1	10	2	0	24	0	0	26	2	8	
ANN	33	12	2	-27	69	5	23	15	W	5	67	91	69	4	625	164	13	44	8	24	278	2	19	134	8	7	

- REMARKS: 1. Based on: Grafenwöhr AAF, FRG.
 2. † East, Sep through Jun is significant as a secondary prevailing direction for its frequent occurrence.
 3. * Data not available.
 4. # Less than 0.5 day, .125 or .0125cm, or .5 percent as applicable.

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2. FLYING WEATHER - PART 1

FLYING WEATHER (% FREQ)	HOURS (LST)	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	ANN	EYR
CEILING less than 3000 feet and/or VISIBILITY less than 3 miles	00-02	79	66	50	33	26	17	15	22	38	57	62	72	45	9
	03-05	79	70	60	48	41	35	40	41	57	66	66	72	56	11
	06-08	79	74	72	54	46	36	43	50	64	74	73	75	62	12
	09-11	78	72	64	46	35	28	29	37	45	61	68	78	53	12
	12-14	69	63	53	37	29	23	23	30	26	41	57	73	44	12
	15-17	64	53	46	27	19	18	14	18	16	31	52	69	36	12
	18-20	71	60	44	21	15	14	9	12	15	33	55	72	35	12
	21-23	77	65	45	22	18	11	9	14	19	43	57	72	38	9
	ALL HOURS	74	65	55	37	29	23	23	29	35	51	62	73	46	

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FLYING WEATHER - PART 2

FLYING WEATHER (% FREQ)	HOURS (LST)	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	ANN	EYR
CEILING less than 1500 feet and/or VISIBILITY less than 3 miles	00-02	71	54	40	23	18	13	12	17	34	48	49	59	37	9
	03-05	71	58	48	38	35	30	33	36	51	58	55	60	48	11
	06-08	69	62	61	46	36	28	35	43	59	66	62	64	53	12
	09-11	69	61	49	25	17	11	12	22	34	50	55	69	40	12
	12-14	55	43	28	12	7	6	4	9	11	26	41	60	25	12
	15-17	52	36	22	9	5	5	3	7	7	18	38	57	22	12
	18-20	62	47	27	11	7	5	3	5	9	23	41	59	25	12
	21-23	67	53	34	14	10	8	5	9	15	34	44	60	29	9
	ALL HOURS	64	52	39	22	17	13	13	19	28	40	48	61	34	

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FLYING WEATHER - PART 3

FLYING WEATHER (% FREQ)	HOURS (LST)	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	ANN	EYR
CEILING less than 1000 feet and/or VISIBILITY less than 2 miles	00-02	46	28	22	12	11	7	6	8	21	33	32	36	22	9
	03-05	43	33	27	23	22	20	20	23	38	42	38	36	30	11
	06-08	46	43	39	28	22	17	17	28	46	50	40	40	35	12
	09-11	47	42	27	12	7	4	4	10	17	35	38	46	24	12
	12-14	36	28	13	4	3	3	2	3	5	13	25	37	14	12
	15-17	33	22	11	2	2	2	2	2	4	8	24	36	12	12
	18-20	40	23	13	3	3	4	1	2	4	13	25	37	14	12
	21-23	45	26	15	5	4	4	2	3	7	20	28	38	16	9
	ALL HOURS	42	31	21	11	9	7	7	10	18	27	31	38	21	

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FLYING WEATHER - PART 4

FLYING WEATHER (% FREQ)	HOURS (LST)	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	ANN	EYR
CEILING less than 200 feet and/or VISIBILITY less than 1/2 mile	00-02	4	5	4	3	4	2	2	3	12	16	8	6	6	9
	03-05	6	6	5	7	10	8	7	9	22	21	9	7	10	11
	06-08	6	12	10	7	7	6	4	10	23	24	9	6	10	12
	09-11	6	9	4	1	#	#	#	#	5	10	7	5	4	12
	12-14	3	3	#	0	0	#	0	0	0	1	2	2	1	12
	15-17	2	2	#	0	0	0	0	0	#	#	2	2	1	12
	18-20	4	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	5	3	2	12
	21-23	7	5	3	1	1	1	#	#	3	8	6	5	3	9
	ALL HOURS	5	6	3	2	3	2	2	3	8	10	6	5	4	

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

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4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group



COPY NO 32 OF 40

3120-1 (G3 Plans)

4 Canadian Mechanized
Brigade Group Headquarters
CFPO 5000
7630 Lahr/Schwarzwald

6 November 1984 **NRMS/SGDDM D.O.D.**

Referred to
Transmis à *PA*

2248-33001-4
DEC 13 1984

Distribution List

4 CMBG GDP OPLAN 33001
AMENDMENT NO 1/84

(3121-1)

Reference: 3120-1 (Comd) 1 July 1984

File No. *2245-1704*
Origin No. **SETANCO**
Copy No. **CITECQ**
Origin No.

1. (NS) Following ink amendments are to be made to Annex H of reference:

- a. page H-11-1 Serial 7 (B) delete "ALLA 15188" and insert "ALLA 151260" and
- b. page H-11-1 Serial 8 (B) delete "ALLA 600138" and insert "ALLA 600200".

2. (NS) Change reflects CCT Numbers for TAA SETTER.

S.K. Newman

S.K. Newman
Captain
for Commander 4 CMBG

DISTRIBUTION LIST

<u>SERIAL</u>	<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>COPY NUMBER</u>
1	HQ 4 CMBG	1
2	1 RCHA	2
3	RCD	3
4	D Sqn RCD	4
5	4 CER	5
6	4 CMBG HQ & Sig Sqn	6
7	2 PPCLI	7
8	1 R22 ^e R	8
9	4 Svc Bn	9
10	4 Fd Amb	10

② *Go/CLDO*
pls destroy
with classified w/aster
cc
19/11

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-2-

DISTRIBUTION LIST (cont'd)

<u>SERIAL</u>	<u>DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>COPY NUMBER</u>
11	4 MP PL	11
12	444 Tac Hel Sqn	12
13	HQ CENTAG	13 - 18
14	HQ CENTAG (SCLO)	14
15	VII (US) CORPS	20
16	VII (US) CORPS (SCLO)	21 - 22
17	VII (US) CORPS for 1 (US) AD	23
	SCLO, II (GE) KORPS	24 - 28
18	(II (GE) KORPS	24)
19	(II (GE) KORPS	25)
20	(4 PzGrdnDiv	26)
21	(4 PzDiv, CLO	27)
22	(10 PzDiv	28)
23	GTSC	29
24	GTSC for VKK 632	30
25	USAREUR	31
26	NDHQ (CLDO)	32
27	NDHQ (DGMPD)	33
28	HQ FMC	34
29	HQ CFE	35
30	CFB Lahr	36
31	CFB Lahr	37
32	Spares	38 - 40

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CMBG



4 Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group

Le 4^e Groupe-brigade mécanisé du Canada

CFPO 5000

NDRMS/SGDN 3.2.2
Referred to
Transmis à

C.I.D.O.

C.I.D.O.
BRANCH
29 FEB 84
REGISTRY
No. 023 14 FEB 84

Copy No 32 of 40
FEB 28 1984

3121-1 (SSO Ops) 2245-1704
14 February 1984
ACTION INFORMATION
RETAINED
RETEINÉ

2248-33001-4

Distribution List

4 CMBG OPLAN 33001 (GDP)
AMMENDMENT 01/84

- References:
- A. 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001 4 March 1983
 - B. 4 CMBG 3121-1 (SSO Ops) 15 July 1983
 - C. 4 CMBG 3121-1 (SSO Ops) 5 August 1983

1. (NS) The following are to be removed from Reference A immediately:
 - a. Annex A (pages A-1 to A4-A-2) in its entirety; and
 - b. Appendix 1 to Annex D (pages D1-1 to D1-L-1) in its entirety.
2. (NS) Holders of 4 CMBG OPLAN 33001 (Reference A) will destroy the superceded pages in accordance with current security regulations and provide a certificate of destruction.
3. (NS) Appendix 1 to Annex D will be replaced in the near future by a revised 4 CMBG Alert Instruction which will not be included as part of the GDP.
4. (NS) It should be noted that References B and C were the only amendments issued in 1983.

③
DL01 2
Action
[Signature]
29/2/84

②
DL 01
Yours for
action
[Signature]
29/2

[Signature]
L.T.B. Mintz
Lieutenant-Colonel
for Commander 4 CMBG

DISTRIBUTION LIST (.../2)

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.../2

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DISTRIBUTION LIST

(Copy Number)

Internal

HQ 4 CMBG

1

External

1 RCHA

2

RCD

3

D Sqn RCD

4

4 CER

5

4 CMBG HQ & Sig Sqn

6

3 RCR

7

1 R22^{er}

8

4 Svc Bn

9

4 Fd Amb

10

4 MP Pl

11

444 Tac Hel Sqn

12

HQ CENTAG

13 - 18

HQ CENTAG (SCLO)

19

VII (US) Corps

20

VII (US) Corps (SCLO)

21 - 22

VII (US) Corps for 1 (US) AD

23

SCLO, II (GE) Korps

24 - 28

(II (GE) Korps -

24)

(II (GE) Korps -

25)

(4 PzGrenDiv -

26)

(4 PzDiv, CLO

27)

(10 PzDiv -

28)

GTSC

29

GTSC for VKK 632

30

USAREUR

31

NDHQ (CLDO)

32

NDHQ (DGMPD)

33

HQ FMC

34

HQ CFE

35

CFB Lahr

36

CFB Lahr EMSU

37

Spares

38 - 40

NATO SECRET



MEMORANDUM

3 Aug 83

To: NDRMS 3-2-2

From: DL07 2-2

Subj: AMENDMENT 01/83 TO 4CMBG GDP

Ref: 3121-1 (SSO OPS) 15 July 1983

Ref removed from file and
used to amend 4CMBG OP Plan
as directed by instructions in
Ref.

SR Coffey
May
DL07 2-2
64102