



National **Défense**
Defence **nationale**

IR 82/86+ CHINA/TAIWAN:
Competing in Canada.

— 15366 —

FILE No.
DOSSIER

SECRET

SCHEDULE AUTHORITY YEAR(S)	PÉRIODE DE CONSERVATION
1	1970-1979
2	1980-1989
3	1990-1999
4	2000-2009
5	2010-2019
6	2020-2029
7	2030-2039
8	2040-2049
9	2050-2059
10	2060-2069
11	2070-2079
12	2080-2089
13	2090-2099
14	2100-2109
15	2110-2119
16	2120-2129
17	2130-2139
18	2140-2149
19	2150-2159
20	2160-2169
21	2170-2179
22	2180-2189
23	2190-2199
24	2200-2209
25	2210-2219
26	2220-2229
27	2230-2239
28	2240-2249
29	2250-2259
30	2260-2269
31	2270-2279
32	2280-2289
33	2290-2299
34	2300-2309
35	2310-2319
36	2320-2329
37	2330-2339
38	2340-2349
39	2350-2359
40	2360-2369
41	2370-2379
42	2380-2389
43	2390-2399
44	2400-2409
45	2410-2419
46	2420-2429
47	2430-2439
48	2440-2449
49	2450-2459
50	2460-2469
51	2470-2479
52	2480-2489
53	2490-2499
54	2500-2509
55	2510-2519
56	2520-2529
57	2530-2539
58	2540-2549
59	2550-2559
60	2560-2569
61	2570-2579
62	2580-2589
63	2590-2599
64	2600-2609
65	2610-2619
66	2620-2629
67	2630-2639
68	2640-2649
69	2650-2659
70	2660-2669
71	2670-2679
72	2680-2689
73	2690-2699
74	2700-2709
75	2710-2719
76	2720-2729
77	2730-2739
78	2740-2749
79	2750-2759
80	2760-2769
81	2770-2779
82	2780-2789
83	2790-2799
84	2800-2809
85	2810-2819
86	2820-2829
87	2830-2839
88	2840-2849
89	2850-2859
90	2860-2869
91	2870-2879
92	2880-2889
93	2890-2899
94	2900-2909
95	2910-2919
96	2920-2929
97	2930-2939
98	2940-2949
99	2950-2959
100	2960-2969
101	2970-2979
102	2980-2989
103	2990-2999
104	3000-3009
105	3010-3019
106	3020-3029
107	3030-3039
108	3040-3049
109	3050-3059
110	3060-3069
111	3070-3079
112	3080-3089
113	3090-3099
114	3100-3109
115	3110-3119
116	3120-3129
117	3130-3139
118	3140-3149
119	3150-3159
120	3160-3169
121	3170-3179
122	3180-3189
123	3190-3199
124	3200-3209
125	3210-3219
126	3220-3229
127	3230-3239
128	3240-3249
129	3250-3259
130	3260-3269
131	3270-3279
132	3280-3289
133	3290-3299
134	3300-3309

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Government of Canada Gouvernement du Canada
Intelligence Comité
Advisory Consultatif de
Committee Renseignements

INTELLIGENCE REPORT

BULLETIN DE RENSEIGNEMENTS

NO.: 82/86	DATE: 24/04/86
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CHINA/TAIWAN: Competing in Canada

CHINE/TAIWAN: La rivalité au Canada

MAY 6 1986

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- 1 -

CHINE/TAÏWAN: La rivalité au Canada

Résumé

La RPC et Taïwan veulent toutes deux gagner l'appui des Chinois d'outre-mer, c'est-à-dire ceux qui vivent à l'extérieur de la Chine. Ils jugent cet appui essentiel au succès des efforts qu'elles déploient pour étendre leur influence politique sur la scène internationale et atteindre leurs objectifs en matière de politique étrangère. La RPC et Taïwan se disputent l'allégeance des quelque 300 000 Chinois d'outre-mer qui se trouvent au Canada. La RPC a, par des moyens à la fois visibles et cachés, progressé sur la voie de la réalisation de son objectif en matière de politique étrangère qui est la réunification de la Chine et de Taïwan, et obtenu de l'information scientifique et technologique utile à son programme de modernisation.

Elle a renforcé sa position en révisant ses politiques vis-à-vis les Chinois d'outre-mer, [redacted] représente vraiment la majorité des Chinois et jouit du prestige d'un pays reconnu officiellement. Les modérés vont probablement garder le haut du pavé au sein de la communauté chinoise au Canada, mais les partisans de Taïwan pourraient se livrer à la longue à des actes de violence en guise de protestation contre la présence de la RPC au Canada.

(SECRET)

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CHINA/TAIWAN: Competing in CanadaSummary

1. Both the PRC and Taiwan wish to gain the support of overseas Chinese, i.e. Chinese residing outside of China. They see such support as important in their efforts to extend their political influence internationally and to fulfill their foreign policy objectives. Both the PRC and Taiwan are competing for the allegiance of the estimated 300,000 overseas Chinese in Canada. The PRC has used both overt and covert means to further its foreign policy objective of reunifying China and Taiwan and to obtain scientific and technological information for its modernization program.

The PRC has enhanced its position because the PRC has improved its policies toward overseas Chinese,

truly represents the majority of the Chinese population and has the prestige of being recognized officially. While moderate members of the Chinese Canadian community will probably continue to prevail, violence directed by Taiwanese supporters against the PRC presence in Canada could occur in the longer term.

(SECRET)

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Report

2. Both the PRC and Taiwan wish to win the support of overseas Chinese, i.e. Chinese living outside of China. They see such support as important in their efforts to extend their political influence internationally and to fulfill foreign policy objectives. The PRC and Taiwan are competing for allegiance of the estimated 300,000 overseas Chinese in Canada. The PRC has steadily gained predominance in this rivalry and is much more influential than Taiwan within the Chinese communities in Canada. (SECRET)

3. During the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, the PRC's effort to court overseas Chinese received a major setback as a result of the harassment in China of returned overseas Chinese by the Red Guard. Many overseas Chinese, whose relatives were abused and discriminated against, rejected the PRC and turned to Hong Kong and Taiwan to fulfill their cultural needs. Consequently, the recognition of the PRC by Canada in 1970 was looked upon by many Chinese Canadians with some apprehension. (SECRET)

4. The ascent to power of Deng Xiaoping led to changes in both China's foreign and domestic policies. China's modernization effort was coupled with the tenet that the overseas Chinese represented a valuable asset in obtaining Western technology. By 1978, China increased its efforts to court overseas Chinese and steps were taken to commence restitution for injustices caused to returned overseas Chinese. Improved PRC/Canada relations have also served to enhance the image and prestige of the PRC in the eyes of many Chinese Canadians. As a result, Chinese Canadians, the vast majority of whom trace their origins to southern China, have re-evaluated their cultural and economic ties with their homeland. Businessmen are finding opportunities in the previously untapped markets in the PRC. Chinese Canadians are now again permitted to visit their ancestral homes. (SECRET)

5. Conversely, Taiwan's international image, in the eyes of the Chinese communities in Canada, has gradually been tarnished by allegations of criminal secret society ties with the Taiwanese regime and by the use of strong-arm tactics. In Canada, while the PRC has adopted a "peaceful unification"

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policy towards Taiwan, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The result has been that many Chinese Canadians who were formerly aligned with Taiwan are either turning toward the PRC or simply opting out of "China" politics. (SECRET)

Competition in the Chinese Canadian Community

6. The PRC conducts overseas Chinese programs which are designed to encourage patriotic support on the part of Chinese living abroad through contact with relations living in China. Overseas Chinese programs also include the resettlement and re-education of returned overseas Chinese. Primary, secondary, and university training is also available to overseas Chinese living abroad. The education of overseas Chinese in the PRC is designed to instill an appreciation for Chinese culture and language with a strong emphasis on patriotic support for the PRC. (SECRET)

7. Taiwan's Overseas Affairs program, while similar to that of the PRC's, is not as elaborate. [REDACTED]

(SECRET)

PRC Intelligence Activities

8. While the PRC has been quite successful in recent years with its overt programs, it has been equally successful in the covert intelligence activities directed at the infiltration and manipulation of overseas Chinese communities. [REDACTED]

According to PRC scientific and technology officers

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posted abroad, overseas Chinese are heavily relied upon to meet the technology requirement of the PRC.
(SECRET)

Taiwan Intelligence Activities

9. Intelligence efforts by Taiwan's Kuomintang Intelligence Service (KMTIS) are primarily directed at gathering intelligence regarding the PRC and its activities [REDACTED] countering such activities where possible, and promoting the image and policies of Taiwan over those of the PRC.

[REDACTED] Additionally, the KMTIS mandate includes [REDACTED] the official recognition of Taiwan.

violent political activity internationally has been absent from Chinese Nationalist League (CNL) activities in Canada as a result of the stabilizing influence of the elder members.

[REDACTED] While the moderate faction is expected to prevail in the short term, attrition may allow the radicals to gain eventual control of the CNL with a resulting shift toward more aggressive anti-PRC policies and activities. While moderate influences will probably continue to prevail, the possibility of violence cannot be ruled out.
(SECRET)

Outlook

10. The rivalry between the PRC and Taiwan over gaining the confidence of the overseas Chinese in Canada will continue. It is expected that the PRC will continue [REDACTED] to influence overseas Chinese to assist in its foreign policy objective of reunifying Taiwan with China and to obtain scientific and technological information for its modernization program. Taiwan will be inclined to [REDACTED] discrediting and neutralizing the PRC programs. While moderate members of the Chinese Canadian community will probably continue to prevail, violence directed by Taiwanese supporters against the PRC presence in Canada could occur in the longer term.
(SECRET)

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