

5002-100  
Vol. 1-3



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PRELIMINARY REPORT OF BOARD OF INQUIRY INTO THE  
ACCIDENT OF LOCKHEED AIRCRAFT CF-CPD.

(COPY)

In pursuance of the powers vested in me under the Air Regulations, 1938, I, the Honourable Clarence Decatur Howe, Minister, do hereby appoint T.M. Shields, District Inspector of Air Regulations, Winnipeg, President; J.R.K. Main, Inspector of Airways, Ottawa, Member; and K.F. Saunders, Acting District Inspector, Air Regulations, Edmonton, Member, of a Board of Enquiry for the purpose of investigating the circumstances under which aircraft CF-CPD failed to arrive at its destination - Vancouver - on the night of December 20th, 1942.

Dated at Ottawa this 22nd day of December,  
1942.

MINISTER

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3.	William Andrew Boyd, 1326 East 24th Ave., Vancouver,--employed as Radio Operator, in Vancouver, by the Department of Transport.	7
4.	J. H. McKenzie, 2033 W. 58th Avenue, Vancouver employed by the Department of Transport as Sr. Traffic Control Officer, Vancouver Airport.	9
5.	T. S. Finnie, 8362 E. Boulevard, Vancouver,--employed by C. P. A., and in charge of Vancouver maintenance base at the seaplane hangar.	10
6.	George C. Wilson, 2599 W. 34th Ave., Vancouver, --employed as Chief Engineer with C. P. A.	14
7.	Walter E. Gilbert, 7866 Hudson St., Vancouver, --Senior Officer of the Company in Vancouver district.	16
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17.	H. D. Cameron, 1356 W. 12th Avenue, Vancouver,--employed with Department of Transport Meteorological Division.	44
18.	A. R. McCauley, 7837 Angus Ave., Vancouver,--Meteorologist in charge Vancouver Station.	45
19.	Gus Armstrong, Chief Operator, Canadian Pacific Air Lines Limited, Fort St. John, B. C.	47
20.	Thomas McLaughlin, 12123-122nd Street, Edmonton, --employed as Crew Chief for C. P. A., at Edmonton.	49
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3. EXHIBITS

Flight Plan - Trip 4-17, Aircraft Lockheed 14 H2 CF-CPD, Dec. 20/42  
Exhibit A Message Reports as received by Canadian Pacific Air Lines, Vancouver, B.C., pertaining to trip 4-17  
Exhibit B Actual Radio Messages received by Canadian Pacific Air Lines radio operator, Vancouver, B.C., pertaining to Trip 4-17, Dec. 20 1942

### 3. EXHIBITS

Exhibit C Statement of weather reports from 12:30 hrs. to 18:30 hrs. December 20th, 1942, received by Canadian Pacific Air Lines Vancouver from weather office, Vancouver.

Exhibit D Report of message as received by Witness R. Raine, at Vancouver, B. C. Pertaining to Trip 4-17, December 20th, 1942.

Exhibit E Extracts from Vancouver Radio Range Station Log, pertaining to Canadian Pacific Air Lines Trips 4-16 and 4-17, December 20th, 1942.

Exhibit F Aircraft and Engine and Radio Inspection Report Carried out at Vancouver, December 19th and 20th, 1942.

Exhibit G C. G. Ballentine's Report of Trip 4-16 of December 20th, Prince George to Vancouver, Via Princeton.

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Exhibit I Department of Transport Meteorological Division, Vancouver, B. C. Weather Map. Dec. 20, 1942.

Exhibit J Special Weather, Vancouver - Princeton, from 12:30 hrs to 18:30 hrs. Dec. 20, 1942.

Exhibit K Weather Reports received at Fort St. John from Vancouver and Quesnell, 13:30 hrs - 19:30 hrs.

Exhibit L Aircraft and Engine Inspection Reports, December 9th and December 12th, covering Nos. 1, 3 and 5 checks.

### 4. APPENDICES

A. Discussion.

B. Map.

C. Statement filed on behalf of Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd. in re aircraft Lockheed 14 H2 CF-CPD.

PRELIMINARY REPORT OF BOARD OF  
ENQUIRY

Appointed to investigate the circumstances attending the accident (non-appearance) of Lockheed aircraft CF-CPD, missing on December 20th, 1942. This aircraft having now (January 4th, 1943) been missing for a period of over two weeks, lost in a mountainous country in the dead of winter, the Board has assumed that the aircraft is wholly or partly destroyed and that the entire company of ten passengers and three crew are dead.

CONDUCT OF INVESTIGATION

Aircraft CF-CPD was officially reported overdue at about 7 P.M. on the evening of December 20th to an official of the Department by an official of C.P.A. On the morning of December 21st, the Minister appointed a Board consisting of Inspector T.M. Shields of Winnipeg, Assistant Inspector K.F. Saunders of Edmonton, and Inspector K. R. Main, with instructions to investigate and report upon the accident, (non-appearance of the aircraft constitutes an accident). Two members of the Board immediately proceeded to Vancouver, arriving there on the afternoon of December 22nd. On December 23rd the Board participated in the search for the missing aircraft. On December 24th inhabitants of the Chilliwack, B.C. area were questioned with indecisive results regarding the reported appearance or hearing of an aircraft on the afternoon of December 20th. The search from the air continued on December 25th with a member of the Board participating. On December 26th, 27th and 28th, an open hearing was conducted in which evidence was taken relating to the reported movements and general conduct of the flight of Lockheed CF-CPD. One member of the Board then proceeded to Fort St. John where a number of witnesses were questioned and documents examined. The Board then resumed its sitting in Edmonton on

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January 2nd, 1943, where further evidence was taken. At this time also a general discussion was conducted with officials of C.P.A., the Senior officer of the Meteos Branch in Edmonton, and representatives of the Airline Pilots Association, regarding ways and means of assuring safe flying operations on the Fort St. John-Vancouver route.

The Board has every reason to believe that a diligent search has been made for the missing aircraft during the two weeks that it has been missing; since no sign of it has been found, it is assumed that the aircraft may not be located for a very long time or that it may never be found. All the available documentary evidence having been obtained, and all known material and expert witnesses having been heard and questioned, the Board then adjourned sine die to prepare this preliminary report.

NARRATIVE-DESCRIPTION OF FLIGHT COVERING  
KNOWN FACTS

Lockheed 14H aircraft CF-CPD was dispatched as Trip No. 4-17 out of Fort St. John bound for Vancouver at 14:40 hours, on December 20th, 1942. The flight plan called for intermittent instrument flying between Fort St. John and Prince George and contact operation between Prince George and Vancouver. Six passengers and 241 lbs. of baggage were enplaned at Fort St. John. At Prince George the plane landed at 15:05 hours. Four passengers and 115 lbs. of baggage and 3 lbs. express were enplaned at this point. The records show that the aircraft left Prince George with 355 gallons of gas. It took-off from Prince George at 15:21 hours. The distance between Prince George and Vancouver on the direct route is approximately 320 miles; and the pilot gave an E.T.A. at Vancouver of 2 hrs. 25 mins. The pilot reported at Quesnel at 15:50 hrs; Stum Lake at 16:20 hrs; Bridge River at 16:50 hrs; Gunn Lake at 16:50 hrs; and reported being on the North leg of the Sidney range at 17:27 hrs. There appears to have been interference

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at that time and the full text of this message was not received. At 1734 hours he reported on the North leg of the Vancouver range, the text of the message being: "Trip 4-17 North Leg VR (Vancouver) Range 12000 ETA VR 1745 letting down on east and west leg". The evidence shows that approval was given for a let-down on the E-W leg of Vancouver Range and that the pilot acknowledged receipt of the message. No further message was received from the aircraft until 1805 hours at which time the following message was received: "4 Vancouver Range what is Vancouver ceiling and visibility". C.P.A. radio was the only station hearing this message. The signal at this time is reported to have been decidedly faint and the pilot was advised to try to get through on 3105 K.C. Previous to this the aircraft had been transmitting on C.P.A. company frequency of 5390 Kc.

In view of the fact that the aircraft was already twenty minutes overdue, steps were taken to broadcast on both Company and range frequencies in hopes of obtaining contact. This was continued for the next hour and a half without success. The message at 1805 hrs. was the last received.

The records show that the emergency procedure prepared by C.P.A. to meet a contingency of this sort was put into effect at 1940 hours, 1 hour and 55 minutes beyond the E.T.A. at Vancouver.

#### GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF ROUTE AND OPERATIONS

The Vancouver-Fort St. John stage of the *Y.S.A.T.* Ltd. operations is conducted under authority of Licence C-57 issued by the Department. The licence as originally issued authorizes daylight contact operations only; but an endorsement, dated July 28th, 1941, states:

"This letter will be your authority to permit your aircraft to fly from Williams Lake to Vancouver, B.C., following the north leg of the Princeton Range to Princeton, providing that

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Princeton is reached not later than 30 minutes after sunset, and providing further that:-- the weather at Princeton shows scattered clouds or better; that the ceiling at both Vancouver and Seattle is not less than 5000 feet, with a visibility of not less than six miles; that no icing conditions are reported; and that the weather is stable along this entire section of the route.

It must be understood that night flying is not to be carried out as a regular practice, and that a night flight must not be undertaken if it can be avoided."

Limited night flying is also permitted in and out of Fort St. John; and this implies, although it is nowhere stated, approval to operate under instrument flying conditions on those portions of the route that are properly lighted, and adequately equipped with airports and ranges.

This licence as stated therein provides for the operation of a "reasonably regular" schedule. This, to distinguish it from first-class airlines operations that are expected to maintain a percentage of schedules of 95% or better. In order to maintain a high percentage of schedules it is necessary to have:

- (a) Adequate flying equipment.
- (b) Highly skilled and trained personnel.
- (c) A reliable and smooth working communication system.
- (d) Adequate aids to navigation, i.e. radio ranges, et cetera.
- (e) Airports of a type suited to the flying equipment and the nature of the service, i.e. lighted for night flying and provided with winter treatment of runways for all year flying on wheels and,
- (f) A closely integrated Company organization.

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"This letter will be your authority to permit your aircraft to fly from Williams Lake to Vancouver, B.C., following the north leg of the Princeton Range to Princeton, providing that

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The Y.S.A.T. Ltd. has been responsible for pioneering this route and has necessarily had to conduct its operations with considerably less than the requirements given above. It is now in the process of transition from what is commonly known as a "Bush service" to a first class airline service. Its flying equipment, i.e. Lockheed 14's and Lodestars, is adequate for first class operation. Its flying personnel appears to be good; and a determined and apparently reasonably successful effort is being made to train them in instrument operations and airline procedure.

The airports at Fort St. John and Vancouver are adequate; and it is anticipated that a new first class airport will be in use at Prince George in the near future. Between Prince George and the Trans-Continental Airways System from Lethbridge and Vancouver, there are fields at Williams Lake and Kamloops that can be used in emergency; and in addition a first class airport is being constructed at Dog Creek. When this latter airport is completed this route can be regarded as being provided with the necessary minimum of airports.

There are no radio ranges between Prince George and Princeton, a distance of approximately 315 miles. This is considerably below the minimum standard set for a first class airline operation which in Canada requires the installation of a range at approximately over normal terrain and at closer intervals as may be found necessary in mountain terrain approximately 100 mile intervals. The terrain between Prince George and Princeton can best be described as a rolling plateau with a mean elevation of 3000' to 5000'. It is on the whole dry; and is only lightly timbered, with occasional patches of prairie interspersed. The weather conditions in this area are reported to be quite favourable to flying.

On the so-called "direct route" which departs from this plateau in the neighborhood of Dog Creek, the country is exceedingly rough and mountainous between that point and the head of Howe Sound and there are no landing fields in this area.

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The communications between Vancouver and Fort St. John, or Prince George, are not good. The following systems are in use:

- (a) Teletype from Vancouver to Edmonton and long wave by Department of Transport equipment from Edmonton to Fort St. John or Prince George.
- (b) Commercial telegraph or telephone to Prince George; these systems being somewhat slow for the transmission of flight or weather reports.
- (c) Alberta Government Telephone between Edmonton and Fort St. John. The traffic is very heavy on this line and rapid communication cannot be depended upon.
- (d) Short wave, i.e. C.P.A. 5390 Kc between Fort St. John or Prince George and Vancouver. C.P.A. has stations at Williams Lake and Kamloops. From these, messages from the two northern points may be relayed to or from Vancouver where necessary. Because of the military situation, weather reports transmitted by radio must be in code, which entails considerable loss of time in coding and decoding messages, and restricts the form of message to a few simple observations.

From the above it will be seen that the company is considerably hampered in its attempt to operate a first class airline service through lack of airports, aids to navigation and adequate communication system. The evidence also shows that Company organization is not integrated to a degree necessary for successful operation of a first class airline service.

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SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

The evidence shows that:

- (a) Aircraft CF-CPD was properly licensed and certificated for operation over this route. It carried an adequate amount of fuel. Its load was well within the limit set by the C of A and it was safely distributed. It carried a full complement of navigation and other instruments and carried duplicate radio equipment and a third emergency receiving set operated on dry cell batteries.
- (b) The pilot, Captain E. Kubicek had 5439 hours of flying experience including 677 hours on Lockheed 14-H2 and 517 hours on this particular route. He held Public Transport Pilot's Certificate No. 162 in good standing. He had received some training under the hood flying the Vancouver range. There appears to be no reason to doubt that he was familiar with correct range procedure at that point and that he was competent in handling an aircraft on an instrument let-down onto the Vancouver airport. He was last checked out by Herbert Hollick-Kenyon, Operations Supervisor, Western Division, C.P.A.L., on December 14th, 1942, and rated as "good" which is the highest rating given by the Company. He had been medically examined on August 8, 1942, and found to be medically fit.
- The Co-pilot, First Officer, W. Holland, had 5648 hours solo flying experience. He had flown 49 hours over this route as co-pilot

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or First Officer. He was the holder of Public Transport Licence No. 81 in good standing, authorizing him to fly this type of aircraft. He had been medically examined on October 20th, 1942 and found medically fit.

The stewardess, Miss Edna Young was medically examined and was found physically fit.

(c) This flight was planned entirely as a daylight operation flown contact between Prince George and Vancouver. The evidence shows that the airports along the entire route and at the terminals, were fit for this type of operation. The radio equipment, i.e. the ranges, were functioning normally and in an entirely satisfactory manner. The weather between Prince George and the vicinity of Princeton was clear and fit for contact flying. The evidence shows however, that an occluded front had moved in from the Pacific and was at that time, i.e. between 2 P.M. and 5 P.M., somewhere between the Coast and Eastern slope of the Cascades. There is strong evidence to show that on the West side of the Cascade Mountains on the route which the pilot was following between Bridge River and Squamish at the head of Howe Sound, the area was heavily, if not entirely overcast, with clouds rising to a height of 18,000' or more, and with indications of considerable turbulence and the probability of ice. There is nothing to show that the pilot received a report telling him that a front had moved into this area nor does it appear that the

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pilot asked for a weather report, although the evidence of one witness shows that he invariably requested such information, when approaching Vancouver, although the cloud condition ahead of him must have been apparent since it was observed by two other pilots in the area at approximately the same time. The records also show that wind velocities between 8000' and 12000' were from 50 to 60 miles an hour from the West to South-West, but it is reasonable to suppose that the pilot was aware of this fact.

- (d) At 1735 hours the pilot gave an E.T.A. presumably on the range of 1745 hours, i.e. he assumed that he was ten minutes out at that time. He had reported his altitude as 12000'. Had he been correct in his assumption, and had the flight proceeded normally he should have been at the block in approximately thirty minutes or less. The fact that he called for a weather report half an hour later, i.e. at 1805 hours, indicates either that he had not fixed his position correctly at 1745 or that he had become lost in the interval. It is possible that he depended for a fix on the intersection of the Vancouver and Sidney Island Range. He knew the country around Vancouver very well and it is not reasonable to suppose that he would have been lost had he been flying contact. It must therefore be assumed that he was not flying contact and that he miscalculated his position while flying on instruments either in clouds or over an under-cast. It hardly needs to be stated that a miscalculation of this nature in an aircraft flying

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at between 150 and 200 miles an hour in the vicinity of Vancouver has a high probability of ending in disaster.

#### FINDINGS

The Board finds that Lockheed aircraft CF-CPD, carrying ten passengers and a crew of three, said aircraft being the property of Yukon Southern Air Transport Limited (Canadian Pacific Air Lines Limited), failed to reach its destination at Vancouver on December 20th, 1942, and has not been seen or heard of since that time. The aircraft, having been lost for a period of over two weeks in a mountainous country in the middle of winter, the Board assumes that the aircraft is partly or wholly destroyed and that the occupants are dead.

The Board finds evidence which indicates that the pilot lost contact with the ground and miscalculated his position when in the vicinity of the Vancouver airport. There is, of course, no evidence to show conclusively that the accident was caused by an error in navigation. The evidence does show, however, that a high percentage of schedules cannot be maintained on this route with a reasonable degree of safety, with the facilities available.

The Board further finds that the transmission of weather reports is not as quick or thorough as could be desired, due to limited land-line systems of communication, which makes it necessary to resort to the use of radio messages, which must be sent in code.

There is also evidence that company organization is not functioning smoothly, due, in part at least, to limited communication facilities. It also finds that the training of pilots in instrument work and airline procedure is being done

largely in spare time and is therefore not as systematic as it should be.

The Board finds that there is a rather disturbing tendency on the part of the company's pilots, senior and junior alike, to disregard or belittle official weather reports.

The evidence shows that, due apparently to laxity, no emergency rations or equipment were carried in the aircraft.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Board therefore recommends that:

- (a) Immediate steps be taken to install a radio range at, or in the vicinity, of Dog Creek. *Seek on air by 15<sup>th</sup> Dec 43*
- (b) That the attention of the Company be directed to the faulty system of communication and that the Company and the Department of Transport, and where necessary, the British Columbia Provincial Government, co-operate in improving same. *RCA are at present installing teletype circuit throughout this area*
- (c) That the weather code be examined with a view to extending it to cover additional information. *Seems to have been satisfactory for other operations*
- (d) That steps be taken to authorize pilots to call for weather reports in the clear when an emergency may be reasonably anticipated. *This is already in effect. 3/17/43 W.A.S.*
- (e) That pilots be encouraged to report weather conditions observed on route while flying, with the Meteos staff on the ground after the termination of the flight.
- (f) That the Company be encouraged to conduct a systematic course in instrument training and air-line procedure for its pilots. It now appears that this is merely done in spare time. It is

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felt that the flight personnel should be trained in instrument flying to the point where contact operations would be undertaken only under unusual circumstances. The company should discourage its pilots from flying the direct route between Prince George and Vancouver, since there are no aids to navigation and no landing fields on this route. At present, these men fly contact, by preference, and only take to the use of instruments in emergency. The highest degree of efficiency cannot be obtained while this outlook prevails.

- (g) That the company be encouraged to proceed toward that type of organization that is necessary in a first class airline company. The Board has reference to those numerous instances of lack of coordination by the officials that appeared during the course of the investigation. Thorough coordination presupposes, of course, an adequate communication system between different points.
- (h) That weather be given in the clear from the Control Tower, on request, on 278 Kc.



(T. M. Shields)  
District Inspector,  
Air Regulations. Chairman.



(K. E. Main)  
Inspector of Airways Member.



(K. F. Saunders)  
Assistant Inspector,  
Air Regulations Member.

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22.	H. G. Hardham, 12142-122nd Street, Edmonton, Alberta	52

E.C.F. WILLIAMS, [REDACTED]  
having been duly sworn, states:

I am employed as radio operator by Canadian Pacific Air Lines, holding Amateur Licence No. 5603.

Q.#1 - How long have you held that licence?

A. - Since 1940.

Q.#2 - How long have you been employed by Canadian Pacific Air Lines?

A. - About a year and a half at Edmonton and Calgary, and about a month at Vancouver.

Q.#3 - Were you on duty the evening of Dec. 20th?

A. - Yes.

Q.#4 - Have you a record of messages sent and received by C.P.A. Trip 17-4?

A. - Yes.

Q.#5 - What replies were sent to these messages?

A. - We check each PX, put our initials down, then put it on paper.

Q.#6 - What frequencies were you regarding?

A. - 5390 and 5345. Kubicek was on 5390 Kcs.

Q.#7 - What were Kubicek's messages so far as you recall?

A. - The record here covers it pretty well. (see exhibit "A").

Q.#8 - Did you get any previous message saying he was on Sidney Range?

A. - I don't know. I was in the room not paying particular attention to PX's, but R. Raine ought to be able to give more information.

Q.#9 - To the best of your knowledge, how much fuel, gas and oil did Trip 4-17 take on at Prince George on the 20th.

A. - I couldn't say. He had 355 gals. when he left Prince George and the capacity was 536 gals.

Q.#10 - Do you keep a complete log of messages sent and received?

A. - Yes.

Q.#11 - Have you any reason to believe that Kubicek actually was sent a record of weather?

A. - I haven't any definite proof that other operators gave him the weather.

Q.#12 - Is this <sup>exhibits</sup> simply a statement of weather over the route or is it something the pilot had?

A. - As far as I know, it is just the weather. They were made

First Witness

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E.C.F. Williams

up in our office, taken from Department of Transport meteorological reports for Vancouver and Prince George. Others are received direct from Ft. St. John. The Department of Transport observer there makes up weather reports. At Kamloops and Williams Lake we have our own observers.

Vancouver, B.C.  
Dec. 26th, 1942

Mr. Williams, on being recalled, states:

- Q. #13 - Some time between 1200 and 1300 hrs. on the afternoon of the 20th December, did you have a conversation with some one in the Meteorology Building, presumably the forecaster?
- A. - I don't know who he was. I telephoned that office as Ballentine was asking whether he should go by Princeton. The person I talked to said there was a high overcast, about 15,000 ft., with icing conditions. Of course I transmitted that back to Ballentine. I didn't give it to him in code. He checked O.K. he would come in that way.
- Q. #14 - Would you have a copy?
- A. - It was oral. I have no written record but Ballentine will back me up.
- Q. #15 - Having transmitted that information to Mr. Ballentine at his request, did you take any steps to transmit the same information to Trip 4-17?
- A. - At the time I was rather busy and it slipped my mind. The flight plan of Kubicek called for contact.
- Q. #16 - You say in transmitting the message you advised Ballentine to come in by Princeton. You were then acting in the capacity of despatcher?
- A. - Yes.
- Q. #17 - Did it occur to you that that same message might be of interest to Kubicek?
- A. - No, it didn't. At the time I was busy.
- Q. #18 - It didn't occur to you that it might be wise to telephone Mr. Gilbert, as there were no other despatchers, and get his opinion?
- A. - No.
- Q. #19 - Was there any one else here to whom you might have broached the question?
- A. - Raine was here. He took over at 1630. He is the technician. There is no senior operator here just two of us, no special rank.

First Witness

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E.C.F. Williams

- Q.#20 - Did you discuss it with Raine or any one else.
- A. - No, I didn't.
- Q.#21 - Do you remember the time?
- A. - It was 1 hr. 10 mins. flying time from Prince George, south of Quesnel.
- Q.#22 - I gather the reason you felt Kubicek would not be interested was that Capt. Ballentine was on intermittent instrument and Kubicek on contact?
- A. - Yes.
- Q.#23 - What was the time?
- A. - 1355 hrs.
- Q.#24 - What form of message would you expect from a pilot flying under difficulties?
- A. - If there was an emergency and he wanted us to know he was in danger of crashing, he would say "May-Day".
- Q.#25 - If he was icing up and losing height and wanted weather badly and didn't want to bother about the code, what would you expect?
- A. - He would ask for the weather in English. (in clear).
- Q.#26 - If a request for weather was received without reference to whether it should be in code or clear, would you assume the pilot was not experiencing difficulties, or not flying under emergency conditions?
- A. - I think a lot depends on the pilot. In my experience in the McKenzie River district, some of the pilots didn't believe in advertising conditions that they were flying in, on account of the public. Other pilots believe in letting you know.
- Q.#27 - Would you consider the message received from Kubicek at 1805 indicated he was experiencing a condition of emergency?
- A. - I couldn't say, not having been on duty at this time. Judging from the wording of the message, I couldn't say.
- Q.#28 - Have you any written instructions or special procedure you should follow should anything unusual develop when despatching a trip or when it is en route?
- A. - If we know an aircraft is in difficulty, if one station gets a report he is supposed to broadcast to all stations to stand by. There are supposed to stand by and leave the channel open for any emergency calls.

First Witness

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E.C.F. Williams

Q.#29 - Was that done here?

A. - No, We were all in contact with aircraft up to within half an hour of the time it was reported missing. They were all calling and Mr. Raine did not deem it necessary to elaborate on it.

Q.#30 - Do you know if any request was made for the proper emergency procedure to be put into effect?

A. - Yes. Mr. Raine did this. A message was also sent out on the teletype, as an emergency. Teletype phoned it at 1940.

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Vancouver, B.C.  
Dec. 27th, 1942.

Mr. Williams, on being recalled, states as follows:

Q.#31 - At the time you sent the message to Capt. Ballentine regarding Vancouver weather, what would be the location of Trip 4-17?

A. - I don't know definitely, but believe he would be a little distance out of Prince George on his way in to Prince George from Fort St. John, and if he was listening on 5390 kcs. he would have received that message.

Q.#32 - During the short time you have been a radio operator at Vancouver Station do you know if Capt. Kubicek made requests for weather information while flying between Fort St. John and Vancouver?

A. - He would not hesitate to ask for information regarding the weather and to my knowledge this is the only occasion when he did not request information concerning weather.

Dec. 29th, 1942.

RONALD NOEL RAINE, 8233 Hudson St., Vancouver, B.C.,  
having been duly sworn, states:

I am employed as radio technician with Canadian Pacific  
Air Lines, Vancouver. Have been with them for four and a  
half years. I hold Second-Class Radio Licence No.

Q.#1 - You were on duty the night of December 20th?

A. - I wasn't on duty, but was there.

Q.#2 - Edmonton apparently cleared Kubicek at 1436, someone  
received message - Williams says he didn't receive it?

A. - I didn't receive that. I didn't receive any until  
near the end.

Q.#3 - You transmitted message regarding ceiling, weather  
and visibility to Kubicek. Did he check that?

A. - Yes.

Q.#4 - Did you get message in which Kubicek said he was on the  
north leg of Sidney Range at 1727 hrs.?

A. - That report was very indefinite. We checked with  
Williams Lake to get the operator's report on it.

The range got a message from Kubicek at 1805. I coded  
it up and sent it back at 1807. The C.P.A. operator  
had heard Kubicek asking for ceiling and visibility.  
Reception was poor and Range did not get it.

Vancouver, B.C.  
December 26th, 1942

R.N. Raine, on being recalled, states:

Q.#5 - What is the procedure with regard to inspection of  
radio equipment on aircraft?

A. - Every time the aircraft comes in I give the radio  
our No. 1 Check. I go over receivers and run up on all  
bands. Fuses and spare antennae are checked. On  
receiving I listen to the ranges and I also check the  
radio compass. I check the auxiliary of all frequencies  
and also on the nose loops. The dry cell is checked  
on No. 3 check every fifty hours I do that. I checked  
the radio on December 19th and found it correct.

December 27th, 1942

Second Witness

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R.N. Raine

R.N. Raine, on being recalled, states:

- Q.#6 - You were on duty and received a message from Kubicek at 1805. We have the wording and are trying to ascertain if possible what was his state of mind- -whether he considered himself an emergency?
- A. - I am afraid not. I knew he was overdue at the time and I wouldn't guarantee who it was, but I think it was Kubicek. I couldn't say whether he seemed excited or not. They talk quite loudly into the mikes and his voice always seemed sort of excited. I wouldn't like to give any opinion at all.
- Q.#7 - You don't use the radio often, do you?
- A. - I used to be sole operator, now I just relieve occasionally.
- Q.#8 - Just how did he speak?
- A. - I am afraid I cannot help you at all.

December 27th, 1942.

WILLIAM ANDREW BOYD, 1326 East 24th Ave., Vancouver, B.C., having been duly sworn, states:

I am employed as Radio Operator, Department of Transport, Vancouver, since the 1st of August, 1942, previously having been employed in this capacity at Princeton for three and a half years--a total of four years.

Q.#1-Will you give the Board an account of messages passed to and from C.P.A. 4-17 on the 20th of December, not appearing on this record.

A. - At 1727 I called C.P.A. 4-17 and he answered me back and said he was on the north leg of Sidney Island Range. I couldn't make out the rest of his conversation very well--he said something about the east leg and I called C.P.A. office and spoke to the operator on duty, asking if he had received the message. C.B.X. said "No", he hadn't--couldn't read it.

Q.#2-Who was the operator.

A. -I believe it was Operator Raine. The time was between 1732 and 1734. I called C.P.A. 4-17 again and this time he said he was on the north leg of the Vancouver Range at 12,000 ft. - E.T.A. Vancouver 1745. He asked if it was O.K. to use the east and west leg for let-down.

Q.#3-Then what did you do?

A. -I had kept a memorandum of our conversation on a piece of paper, so I immediately called back and repeated what he gave me word for word. He checked that and I said "Stand by, I will contact the operator." I called McKenzie, the operator, by inter-phone and told him C.P.A. 17 said it was on the north leg of Vancouver range and wanted to use the east and west leg for a let-down. McKenzie said it was O.K., there was no local traffic, so I again called the trip and gave him just what the operator gave me--that it was O.K. to make a let-down on the east and west leg, no other traffic, except C.P.A. 4. The pilot on C.P.A. 4-17 came back and said O.K.

Q.#4-Did he repeat your message?

A. -He simply said O.K. and said it was Trip 4.

-Signals at this time were very good, little interference; the interference I had had five minutes before had disappeared. He was transmitting on 5390 Kcs. I was talking to him on the range. The time was 1732 to 1734.

Q.#5-What were the signals like during the next hour?

A. -There seemed to be quite a lot of telephone interference-- Vancouver was calling Bella Bella lady operator and the B.C. Telephone was breaking in intermittently on 5390 Kcs.

Q.#6-Did you experience any trouble with static?

A. -There was a little static on radio but it was not interfering with reception when it was coming through.

Q.#7-The interference was not so serious as to prevent messages coming through?

A. -Not when I was working. I was on for the rest of the evening. You couldn't hope for any better transmission except for a little

Third Witness

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William Andrew Boyd

static and B.C. Telephone interference. We didn't have to ask for any repeats.

Q.#8- Have you experienced previous difficulty in receiving messages from C.P.A. on 5390 Kcs. due to telephone broadcast interference from the B.C. Radio Telephone System?

A. - I have noticed Vancouver calling Bella Bella occasionally and when I have been standing by on 5390 Kcs. the C.P. operator was calling and I was listening in to see what was going on and sometimes there were two or three things interfering.

Q.#9- Is this the first time you have had really definite interference?

A. - Yes, this is the first time it has broken up transmission.

Q.#10- Have you had complaints from pilots regarding this particular interference?

A. -No.

I submit to the Board a record of messages for the Vancouver Station on December 20th. (Exhibit E)

Vancouver, B.C.  
December 27th, 1942.

J.H. McKENZIE, 2033 W. 58th Avenue, Vancouver, B.C.,  
having been duly sworn, states:

I, J.H. McKenzie, am employed by the Department of  
Transport as Sr. Traffic Control Officer, Vancouver Airport,  
and am the holder of A.T.C.O. Certificate No. 53.

On the evening of the 20th I was on duty in the  
Vancouver Control Tower, listening on 5390 and 3105 kcs.  
At 1735 hrs. I heard a call from Capt. Kubicek, Trip 4-17,  
giving his altitude as 12,000--estimated Vancouver 1745,  
starting descent 1735, asking if he could do his let-down  
on the east-west leg.

Q.#1 - Do you recall any reply to that?

A. - Range replied, repeated message.

Q.#2 - After that you heard nothing?

A. - No.

Q.#3 - Had you any conversation with anyone else?

A. - The range phoned me and asked me what traffic there  
was before he would give permission for the let-down  
on east-west leg and I told him there was nothing  
reported. He came back and gave Kubicek permission.

Q.#4 - When is it usual for traffic to get in touch with  
tower?

A. - C.P.A. come down north leg - we specify over Bowen  
Island or Pt. Grey. The less we can work an aircraft  
the better; that gives them plenty of time to go into  
their procedure.

Q.#5 - You say C.P.A. frequently comes in over the north  
leg and makes a fix over the station on that leg?

A. - In fairly good weather you can generally spot them  
and then they do a let-down from there; in bad  
weather give position.

Q.#6 - From your experience do they occasionally use the  
north leg even if weather conditions are such they  
cannot be seen, or do they only use it in other  
contact conditions?

A. - I can't remember. I have known them to come in the  
east leg.

Q.#7 - What was radio reception like during the period from  
1700 to 1900 hrs.?

A. - Reception was good.

Q.#8 - You don't recollect any unusual static conditions?

A. - He came over fairly well. One time I got him he was  
quite clear. Where he was I couldn't say--he didn't  
make any mention of it.

Vancouver, B.C.  
Dec. 27th, 1942

T.S. FINNIE, 8362 E. Boulevard, Vancouver, B.C.,  
having been duly sworn, states:

I am the holder of Air Engineer's (a) and (c) Licence No. A-1805, and am employed by Canadian Pacific Air Lines in charge of Vancouver maintenance base at the seaplane hangar. On the night in question (Dec. 19th) we did the maintenance on Lockheed CF-CPD, it being the regular engineer's night off.

The mechanic, two helpers and myself gave the regular routine run-up on Lockheed CF-CPD, from 1600 to 2400 hrs. On the morning of the 20th at 0600 hrs. I had engines run up and checked ship out for operations. Everything was in order.

Q.#1 - What did your check consist of?

A. - Our forms are Nos. 1 to 5. We did No. 2 check. Check on airframe is for appearance of aircraft in general, detailed inspection landing gear, complete inspection floats, operation of float controls, check-out on battery. We always change batteries every night. We give engines routine inspection of engine mount, inspect for nicks in propeller, cracks, general inspection of propeller control cables. Everything called for on routine inspection of this engine was carried out. We check for loose oil lines, etc. Landing, navigation, wheel and position lights for landing gear are checked; we checked propeller de-icing system--that was correct. We changed fuses the previous night after checking everything else. Electric system was checked, fire extinguishers, emergency exit, heating system, wing de-icers, inspected for cracks on surfaces of rudders, inspected rear stabilizers, oxygen supply and looked for wrinkles, cracks, etc. (History of No. 2 Check handed over to Board)

Q.#2 - Were de-icers functioning to their maximum when engine was run up the following morning.

A. - Yes, de-icers were functioning satisfactorily.

Q.#3 - The following morning during the run-up we hand ship over to cleaning crew. They clean the cowlings around engine, after that we instal all the cowlings on the aircraft. It is cleaned ready to go in the morning as soon as we instal newly charged battery.

Q.#4 - Can you identify that battery?

A. - We get new batteries as required from Edmonton. Mr. Wilson will tell you more about that.

Q.#5 - Lockheeds require heavier batteries than Rapides?

A. - Our batteries are numbered R.1, R.2, R.3, L.1, L.2, L.3 in red paint on the sides of the batteries.

Q.#6 - Do you check the propeller?

A. - Propellers were checked under my supervision and found correct.

Fifth Witness

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T.S. FINNIE.

Q.#7 - As a result of your inspection did you find anything of a suspicious nature in aircraft, propeller or equipment?

A. - No--the only thing was that a blue color appeared on right dump valve outlet for right gas tanks - appearing to be leaking dump valve. Also servo oil leak was observed in #3 compartment. Tail shock leg was leaking. Lockheeds quite commonly have a blue colour around the gas lines all around wing root and must be inspected for blue colour, also inspected where the gas tank intakes extend into the tank. We always look around the rheostat, right rear dump well.

Q.#8 - Are you satisfied aircraft was airworthy, also engines and propeller?

A. - Yes.

Q.#9 - Have you any log books?

A. - Log books at all times are carried with machines, as at times schedules cannot be adhered to and there are stop-overs owing to weather or other reasons. Journey and Aircraft, Engine, Propeller and Flight Report Books are carried on the aircraft?

Q.#10- Those log books are actually on the aircraft then?

A. - Yes.

Q.#11 - You signed them that morning?

A. - Yes.

Q.#12- What time in the morning did you sign aircraft out as being airworthy?

A. - 0730 hrs.

Q.#13 - You didn't mention anything about parachute flares - are these aircraft provided with parachute flares?

A. - Parachute flares are in a part of the ship that cannot readily be inspected except on a No. 4 check. They are operated electrically.

Q.#14 - When did machine last have No. 4 check?

A. - After 200 hrs.

Q.#15 - Had this machine been recently overhauled?

A. - I don't know.

Q.#16 - As a result of your inspection you were satisfied was thoroughly airworthy?

A. - Yes, one doesn't sign out a ship unless it is satisfactory. There was only the spot where I noticed sweating on the dump valve. I told Mr. Wilson about it and he made a note of it to be rectified at Edmonton on the next No. 4 check.

Fifth Witness

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T.S. Finnie

- Q.#17 - You inspected all the controls, flying controls, propeller controls but did not inspect floor boards and panels. Did you inspect them for operation only?
- A. - I sat up in the cockpit and operated all the switches.
- Q.#18 - After that did you check the battery or did you check battery first?
- A. - We had changed the battery. The reason we do that is that when a ship comes in at 1830, by the time we are through work it is 2400 hrs. The cabin lights take a lot of power, operating landing lights takes a lot of power; by that time the battery would be drained. We change battery after we get through and the next morning another one is put in.
- Q.#19 - Who inspects batteries?
- A. - The mechanic on duty with me checks hydraulic rating and operation of battery.
- Q.#20 - The radio technician doesn't change batteries?
- A. - No, the mechanic does that.
- Q.#21 - When do you check for gas and oil?
- A. - When we bring it over to the field, there is a dip stick and we fill the tanks up.
- Q.#22 - Did you fill CF-CPD up on the 20th?
- A. - I can't remember.
- Q.#23 - Did you check all electrical equipment after you put the battery in?
- A. - Navigation lights, cabin cockpit lights and instrument lights are checked after we put in the new battery.
- Q.#24 - Do you know whether radio equipment was checked after you put in new battery?
- A. - I don't know.
- Q.#25 - Can you tell us when you check emergency exits?
- A. - I don't know whether it was myself or someone else who checked them that night. Whoever checks an item out initials the check sheet beside that item.
- Q.#26 - What special equipment by way of emergency rations, blankets, axe, matches and so on were carried?

Fifth Witness

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T.S. FINNIE.

- A. - Blankets were carried but there were no rations, axe or other emergency equipment. On my previous report I had noted that no equipment was on board. I understand it was a company rule that such be carried.
- Q.#27 - Was there a first-aid kit?
- A. - I believe the stewardess had that.
- Q.#28 - Did you check the compartments to be sure there were no emergency rations?
- A. - Yes, all four compartments were checked that night.
- Q.#29 - Were there any rations on the 20th?
- A. - No, it was reported previously and I understood the aircraft was going to Edmonton where they would supply rations and the necessary equipment.

At the request of the Board the witness produced his Air Engineer's Certificate No. A-1805, which was found to be in good standing.

Vancouver, B.C.  
Dec. 29th, 1942.

GEORGE C. WILSON, 2599 W. 34th Ave., Vancouver, B.C.  
having been duly sworn, states:

I am employed as Chief Engineer with Canadian Pacific Air Lines, and am the holder of (a) and (c) Air Engineer's Certificate No. A-1130.

Q.#1 - Were you here on the 20th?

A. - Yes.

Q.#2 - Did you do any checking on Lockheed CF-CPD?

A. - No, that was all done on the night shift.

Q.#3 - There was a question that arose re emergency rations-- the Air Engineer expressed the opinion there was no emergency equipment?

A. - No, such equipment had been on that machine but after it came back from Edmonton it was reported there were no rations on board, and it was reported to Edmonton. We do not know definitely whether there was any on or not on the day of December 20th.

Q.#4 - Have you any of the log books either on the aircraft or any of the equipment?

A. - None other than the daily sheets.

Q.#5 - Are the engineering staff here kept conversant with the time of an aircraft in relation to overhaul; would you know whether or not this aircraft was due for a check?

A. - This aircraft should have gone to Edmonton around the first part of last week--it had been flown slightly over 201 hrs. since last overhaul. We wired Edmonton advising them the time was up, but in this case the wire had not been sent.

Q.#6 - What latitude do you allow?

A. - The No. 4 check should be made every 200 hrs.--if more time is required we request permission.

Q.#7 - Have you any written instructions regarding repair and maintenance of aircraft?

A. - No, not issued by the company.

Q.#8 - You say that instructions regarding the No. 4 check at 200 hrs. are a matter of hearsay, as far as you are concerned?

A. - Yes.

Q.#9 - What about other types of aircraft?

A. - The No. 2 check is given for anything over 7 hrs.--the No. 3 every 50 hrs. 000035

Sixth Witness

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George C. Wilson

Q.#10 - Have you instructions covering that?

A. - Not written. It is understood verbally.

Q.#11 - What do you recollect regarding the time this aircraft was last overhauled--do you remember its past history at all?

A. - Not particularly--nothing definite. I know the last No. 4 was on the 14th of October, 1942, carried out at Edmonton.

Q.#12 - Have you any information on this machine having been completely overhauled in November?

A. - I believe it was up for renewal of the Certificate of Airworthiness.

Q.#13 - Were the wings taken off?

A. - I don't know.

Q.#14 - Were log books with aircraft whenever you had occasion to check same?

A. - Such records would be in aircraft. Original maintenance sheet is sent to Edmonton each day and a copy kept in log book.

I herewith submit to the Board the airplane and engine inspection report for CF-TCD for December 19th and 20th, and aircraft route inspection sheet.

Q.#15 - What special equipment was carried on the aircraft in the way of blankets, etc.?

A. - There was a blanket for each passenger. Matches would be with ration kit if there was one on. I couldn't say if such was on board or not, I was never on at night.

Q.#16 - What does ration kit consist of?

A. - For Yukon Southern Air Transport I couldn't say. I know what we have of our own.

Vancouver, B.C.  
December 27th, 1942.

WALTER E. GILBERT, 7866 Hudson St., Vancouver, B.C., having been duly sworn, states:

I, W.E. Gilbert, am Senior Officer of the company in Vancouver district, with jurisdiction over operations despatch.

On December 20th the operations were proceeding normally and I had no knowledge of anything untoward until notified by telephone somewhere around 1830 - 1900 hrs. in the evening. I was not in my own home but was contacted at another home and came immediately to the Airport. When I arrived I checked the station and immediately took charge of preliminary efforts to contact Trip. Our first efforts incidentally were to use the long distance telephone to all points where some information might possibly be obtained. We maintain a chart with names and long distance numbers all across the area, so that we may contact ground observers who might have noticed the Trip. We telephoned these numbers according to our best judgment; at the same time we contacted the R.C.A.F. who put an aircraft into the air to see if they could secure any indications on the ground of lights, etc. We had our other Lockheed in Vancouver at that time but it was not serviceable then.

The R.C.A.F. despatched up the valley. Contact was also made with the B.C. Police and they broadcast through their own stations and appealed for any information that might be available. From that time on reports began to roll in and it was simply a matter of co-ordinating them and building up a search programme on the results of this co-ordination. We maintain an active operation despatch office until 12:30 or 1 A.M. then discontinue it until the following morning, and operators co-ordinated any reports that came in. Part was done by radio range and the other by Vancouver operator.

Q.#1 - During your absence, who is responsible for the safe conduct of operations?

A. - I nominate somebody to take my place in my absence from the city, otherwise I am always on call by telephone. The person named may be one of the pilots or not, depending on who is available.

Q.#2 - Who was on duty the night of the 20th?

A. - I was. I have no Assistant Superintendent and if I had one there would be no use for one most of the time. The total operational staff is only four persons including myself. There is a normal despatch staff of two in Vancouver district and when there is a despatcher on duty there is usually an operator on duty. On the night in question the situation was bad, due to the sudden illness of a despatcher, who came down with a high fever and had to go home. He turned his duties over to an operator, who advised Fort St. John of the situation, that being the point where the two trips left from. This meant the trips knew they would have to co-ordinate weather information and get clearances at that end. Fort St. John is not under the jurisdiction of Vancouver district, but is considered part of the main line from Edmonton. It is the other terminal of Route 60 - Vancouver to Fort St. John. The despatch system is really basically

W.E. Gilbert

controlled in Edmonton, the final decisions being obtained in Edmonton on any problems coming up.

The second despatcher in Vancouver district was at the time of the accident in Edmonton on a familiarization trip. When the first despatcher had to go home ill we had no immediate relief, but I do not think this had any bearing on the situation as the operator on duty understood his next move in a case like that, he might have telephoned me and put me on the job. Under the circumstances I think the procedure he followed was O.K.

- Q.#3 - Records show the aircraft was despatched from Fort St. John by Edmonton intermittent instrument between Fort St. John and Prince George, contact from Prince George to Vancouver. So far as you are aware, that decision was made without reference to any official in Vancouver.
- A. - Both trips 4-16 and 4-17 were aware they would have to co-relate their own information and get clearances in the north - they were definitely made aware of that by Vancouver.
- Q.#4 - Vancouver is a terminal point the same as Edmonton, is it not?
- A. - Edmonton is our Divisional Headquarters and the heart of our despatch system. Final decision is rendered by Edmonton upon any matters that come up. Vancouver is better aware of weather conditions than Edmonton could be, but for the purposes of company routine, final decision rests at Edmonton.
- Q.#5 - Weather conditions being what they were on the afternoon of Dec. 20th, would you have approved of the contact flight on a direct route between Prince George and Vancouver, had the matter been referred to you?
- A. - I cannot answer Yes or No. The difficulty of clearing any of these trips is that the procedure would conflict. We have three sets of flight rules in our Manual--Contact, On Top and Instruments. Weather conditions as set forth in this Manual look so complicated it is difficult to know whether you will clear on instruments or contact. To the best of my knowledge I have always preferred to clear on instruments, because then you are completely covered. Contact is difficult to make a decision on in such a wide strip of country. When we have had a trip over in the immediate past and have a definite knowledge of what conditions are like, I feel free to clear a trip contact.
- Q.#6 - Do you consider the step taken at Edmonton to clear this flight through on contact without reference to you or one of the despatchers here was justified?
- A. - I think it was a normal procedure. The Operator on duty

W.E. Gilbert

in Vancouver who is in fact acting as despatcher in the absence of the other despatcher understands he may object to clearance of any flight into Vancouver if in his judgment the operation would not be safe.

Q.#7 - Do you know at what hour the flight plan in question was received at Vancouver?

A. - I couldn't tell you right now.

Q.#8 - Just for the record, give the Board a brief statement of the qualifications of your despatchers here?

A. - Our two despatchers in Vancouver are our two most senior radio operators. A.M. Craig's experience is in excess of three years with the company and E. Smith's also in excess of three years. Previous to the inauguration of our present despatch system on Route 60 they have been occupied in clearing trips on our local coastal routes such as Vancouver to Zeballos and Port Alice, and it was on such duties they received their basic training in despatch and correlation of weather reports. In other words, since the start of our Victoria run in March, 1939, we have tried to maintain a despatch system to the best of our ability. In addition, both despatchers have been over the route in order to familiarize themselves with the actual terrain and give them a better picture of what the weather reports mean when received. Mr. Craig was in Edmonton on a familiarization trip and Mr. Smith was to have gone at the earliest moment he could be spared. Apart from that, neither has had a special course in despatch and a company course is still being built up. The despatch operation is based on the old Yukon Southern manual, which is rather complicated, but we try to interpret it to the best of our ability.

Q.#9 - What would be your interpretation of the question - "Intermittent Instrument Flight?"

A. - "Intermittent Instrument" operation I would take to mean one in which the aircraft might be called upon to pass through local broken cloud conditions, as opposed to flying into a heavy frontal build-up, or over an unbroken overcast, for a protracted period of time. There are three classifications in our manual-- "Over-Top Flight," "Contact Flight" and Instrument Flight!

Q.#10 - What time is allowed to elapse before an emergency is declared?

A. - Ordinarily if a trip is overdue 30 minutes after a call. We try to call the trip and then check with long distance operators. Emergency procedure would start from that moment and our operators would check with range operator

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W.E. Gilbert

Q.#11 - In this particular instance what time was emergency declared?

A. - The procedure was already under way when I reached the Airport about 1900 hrs., 1 hr. 15 mins. after the trip's E.T.A.

Vancouver, B.C.  
Dec. 27th, 1942.

C.G. BALLENTINE, 1760 W. 60th Ave., Vancouver, B.C., having been duly sworn, states:

I, C.G. Ballentine, am employed as Captain by Canadian Pacific Air Lines, holding Public Transport Pilot's Certificate No. 250, which entitles me to act as pilot of several types of aircraft, including Lockheeds 14H and 1850. My total flying experience on these types is approximately 630 hrs. as Captain and 125 hrs. as First Officer. My total flying experience amounts to 3000 hrs. or more solo and 150 hrs. dual and dual check time.

I left Prince George in charge of Lockheed CF-CPC at 1355 hrs. on Dec. 20th, on a scheduled flight direct to Vancouver. I had flight planned to go via Hope, intercepting the east leg of Vancouver Range at Hope. Some thirty miles south of Prince George I asked Vancouver if they recommended changing my flight plan to direct rather than via Hope. They would not recommend this, so I carried on with my original flight plan.

We had been flying at 8,000 ft. and at Clinton had a cruising altitude of 12,000 ft. to get on top of a layer of broken clouds. Because of sudden winds we changed our flight plan to read via Princeton. Approximately half way between Clinton and Princeton we C.C.A.'d to 14,000 ft. to remain on top of this lower deck. We arrived over Princeton Range at 14,000 ft. at the same time that T.C.A.'s trip, also westbound, arrived there. Returned west on west leg Princeton Range and our despatcher at Vancouver advised that T.C.A. might go to 14,000. As soon as we heard that T.C.A. had commenced ascending, we started our descent. By the time we checked over the marker the T.C.A. trip was still ahead of us so we slowed down and commenced a routine descent on the east leg of Vancouver Range. We broke contact approximately over New Westminster at about 6,000 ft. from there on was contact close to the airport.

Q.#1 - What was total elapsed time?

A. - 3 hrs. 44 mins.

Q.#2 - Were you despatched from Edmonton?

A. - From Ft. St. John. I was given a clearance with a rider at my own discretion.

Q.#3 - How were you despatched --how much on contact and how much on instruments?

A. - A copy of my flight plan will have been sent to Edmonton.

Herewith a report asked for by our District Superintendent, outlining my trip from Prince George to Vancouver on December 20th, officially known as Trip 4-16.

Q.#4 - What significance would you attach to the fact you were despatched via Hope rather than on the direct route?

A. - The weather over the Cascades. The fact it was via Hope rather than via Princeton would indicate it wasn't very bad.

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Q.#5 - Your report shows you saw some heavy stuff piling up on your right and that led you to ask for weather at Vancouver and further advice as to how trip should be completed?

A. - I would normally ask for Vancouver weather every so often, and their weather had shown fairly consistent improvement since I left Ft. St. John. I simply asked for weather in a routine manner.

Q.#6 - What advice did you receive?

A. - Simply a weather report. At one point I asked for weather direct and they refused to give it.

Q.#7 - Why did they refuse to give it?

A. - They said they didn't like it--better come in direct.

Q.#8 - Is there anything you can add to your report as to the appearance of the weather over the Cascades to your right front, as you came in?

A. - I don't think so. I said the top looked high in my report. I guess without going into it it was probably icing.

Q.#9 - About how often do you follow this route?

A. - Fifty or sixty times altogether.

Q.#10- What route do you usually follow from the southern end?

A. - In summer the direct route is not only shorter, but quite safe by contact method. Hope is our next alternative and Princeton I have used a number of times, but only when I am solid on instruments.

Q.#11- "Intermittent instrument" - what interpretation do you put on that expression?

A. - When going through over broken clouds--instruments three or four minutes, contact three or four minutes. It is rather a vague term.

Q.#12 - What would you call it if you were flying over a solid overcast for half to three-quarters of an hour?

A. - I would call it on top so far as visual navigation was concerned.

Q.#13 - Taking all factors into account, possibility of engine failure, landing fields, etc., what in your opinion is the safest way to fly the southern part of the route--first, when the weather is good contact weather, and secondly when doubtful?

A. - Princeton, Hope and Vancouver are all practically the same distance from Prince George and what we call the direct route down the Squamish Valley, with the exception of perhaps five minutes you can come down almost to sea

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level at contact. I have always considered this route as safe as any of the others, providing I can get down at 3,000, 4,000 or 5,000 ft, assuming it wasn't clouding over.

Q.#14 - Do you ever fly the direct route when conditions are such that it is necessary to make contact over the Vancouver Range in order to get a fix?

A. - Never deliberately. Once or twice I have come over when it was clear; right near Vancouver it was smoky.

Q.#15 - If you were coming in on the north leg do you cut across the quadrant to the east leg?

A. - No. I have come down on two or three occasions when it was overcast here. I didn't know this condition existed.

Q.#16 - How did you get a fix then?

A. - At Garibaldi A.D.F. on Vancouver Station and intercepted the west leg other range receiver on top.

Q.#17 - How would you come down and get a fix over the Range?

A. - I would strike the west leg and turn to the station and from there it again becomes routine let-down as soon as you get a fix over the station.

Q.#18 - You have never flown that route when whole of valley covered with cloud undercast?

A. - I have at times when I started out, got half-way and then found the other half was undercast.

Q.#19 - What would you get a fix on in that case?

A. - I don't think it has ever happened coming this way. When northbound, the southern part of the valley was such that it was good business to go up there.

Q.#20 - Is it assumed when you fly contact into Squamish that it will never be necessary to use north leg as a fix?

A. - I think so.

Q.#21 - Is it correct to say there is no procedure let-down for getting a fix on the range, getting a let-down and using the north leg?

A. - Not as far as I know. Our company procedure makes no allowance for that.

Q.#22 - It has been assumed rightly or wrongly that Kubicek swung east on December 20th to intercept the east leg. Have you ever followed that procedure?

A. - No.

Q.#23 - Would you consider it good practice?

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- A. For myself, No. Your track strikes the west leg at right angles whereas by turning out you intercept east leg and not only have much farther to go but intercept it at an angle.
- Q.#24 - Reports from Kubicek show that he did fixes over Bridge River then Gun Lake, then apparently somewhere in the vicinity of Squamish. Is it customary to fly that direct route in that way?
- A. - Gun Lake and Squamish are both on the normal route.
- Q.#25 - Have you ever encountered icing conditions with your aircraft?
- A. - Daily.
- Q.#26 - How do you find the ice affects it?
- A. - It affects the aircraft. I have never landed with a very heavy load on. My assumption that slots are seriously affected comes mostly from Trans Canada Air Lines.
- Q.#27 - Have you ever flown that type with slots sealed up?
- A. - No.
- Q.#28 - You have no reason to believe then that the fact that CF-CPD had the slots open might, in conjunction with icing conditions, have been a contributory factor in the loss of the aircraft?
- A. - No, I haven't enough knowledge of flying with slots closed to answer.
- Q.#29 - Would you go so far as to say that in your opinion the pilot did not use good judgment in flying west of the Cascades on the direct route on December 20th.
- A. - Witness refuses to answer.
- Q.#30 - You asked for advice regarding route you should follow coming into Vancouver and were advised not to use the direct route. Should not this advice also have been given to Kubicek?
- A. - My request was informal and reply was informal and didn't go out as a particular message to me. I was simply advised to adhere to my original flight plan. The reason I asked Vancouver was that the weather from Prince George for some distance south was excellent. I could see clouds over the Cascades but perhaps due to the time of day, there seemed to be a light strip somewhere about mountain top level. I wanted to know what was at the lower end and if I could safely fly contact. That was the reason for my request to Vancouver. Vancouver of course could only answer a question like that by looking out towards the hills and if there were obvious clouds there, or such an overcast they cannot see through it, they are unable to answer my question.

C.G. Ballentine.

- Q.#31 - Is it not possible that Vancouver, instead of looking towards the hills, had a look at the weather map and consulted the meteorologist?
- A. - Their answer would incorporate additional knowledge which would be available and which the trip is not in possession of.
- Q.#32 - Is it customary to ask for weather and advice as to method of flying a route, informally and get an informal answer?
- A. - No.
- Q.#33 - Why was your request informal on this day.
- A. - I had already made a flight plan, satisfactory both to myself and to Vancouver, and I asked the question without much hope of a determinate answer.
- Q.#34 - Nevertheless, the nature of their answer carried no doubt in your mind that it was not safe to fly that route contact?
- A. - Yes.
- Q.#35 - Under the circumstances, should not that same information have been passed to another aircraft in the air at the same time, flying the same route. If you had been the other fellow and had flown into difficulties without getting this information, when it was available, how would you have felt?
- A. - The only reason I would ask Vancouver that question is if it looks like contact from my side--does it also look like contact from their side.
- Q.#36 - What would you have done had you been flying the direct route contact, on finding there was a heavy undercast and clouds piled up in front of you when you passed the Cascades?
- A. - I would have returned to the other route via Hope.
- Q.#37 - In your opinion what additional facilities; i.e.: airports and aids to navigation, will be necessary in order to make it possible to operate this route on schedule with a reasonably high degree of safety?
- A. - I think we should have at least two airports with range facilities like Princeton and Hope. Dog Creek Airport if it had a range is about midway, and gives us an alternate where we could make a let-down. Another range could be installed at a place to be decided upon. The two above mentioned ranges, and markers on both east and north legs of Prince George range and markers on the north leg of Princeton, would be helpful. This last marker could be somewhere near Kamloops.

C.G. Ballentine

- Q.#38 - What route did you follow from Williams Lake to Princeton in your flight of December 20th?
- A. - I think I was probably about 20 miles west of Williams Lake when I passed that point and from thence I went by Dog Creek, from Dog Creek I started to turn one mile towards the east of my original course; from there I followed approximately a straight line to the point where I intercepted the north leg of Princeton Range somewhere near Merritt. From Merritt to Vancouver via Princeton I was on the regular range route.
- Q.#39 - In your evidence you state you observed a large build-up of clouds over the Cascades. Approximately where were you when you observed this?
- A. - This build-up was evident from the time we left Prince George and from Dog Creek to a point between Hope and Princeton this was immediately to our right the whole way. Between Princeton and Hope we cleared this cloud and carried on on instruments.
- Q.#40 - Could you name approximately the location of that build-up?
- A. - It seemed to run the length of the Cascades and come just to their eastern edge. It extended northwest and southeast. The river was visible to us underneath the whole time.
- Q.#41 - Would it be possible for such a build-up to be so localised that the route over Squamish would be free from the build-up?
- A. It is possible.
- Q.#42 - Have you ever encountered a condition where the build-up was fairly liberalised?
- A. - Yes.
- Q.#43 - You said in your evidence that you encountered some ice between Princeton and Vancouver. Approximately how much ice was picked up?
- A. - As we were going down, I thought so little of it I didn't pay much attention to it, but somewhere between 13,000 and 10,000 or 11,000 ft. on our way down we got from 1/4" to 1/2".
- Q.#44 - Where would you think that would be?
- A. - About Chilliwack, I would say. At Hope I was still very high.

Vancouver, B.C.  
December 28th, 1942

H. Hollick-Kenyon, 10016 - 146th St., Edmonton, Alta. having been duly sworn, states as follows:

I am the holder of Public Transport Pilot's Licence No. 31, and am employed as Operations Supervisor, Western District, Canadian Pacific Air Lines, Ltd. I am responsible for the conduct of main line scheduled operations between Regina, Vancouver and Whitehorse, also for the proper conduct of flight operations, supervision and development of flight techniques, recommendations concerning navigational or airway aids and supervision of pilot training.

I am only interested in the functioning of communications over these lines; should they not be satisfactory each specific instance will be taken up with the Division Superintendent or alternatively with an Officer of the Department of Transport.

Q.#1- The Board at the present time is holding a preliminary investigation into the non-appearance of Lockheed CF-CPD which you reported missing to Inspector Saunders while it was on a scheduled trip known as No. 4-17, from Ft. St. John to Vancouver on December 20th. Can you tell us by whom that trip was despatched?

A. - Not without referring to records. I had no information on that point before I left Edmonton and have not since had opportunity to check any records.

Q.#2- The evidence we have on file shows this trip was despatched on intermittent instrument between Fort St. John and Prince George and contact from Prince George to Vancouver. The evidence also indicates it was despatched from Edmonton. Is it customary to despatch an aircraft from Prince George to Vancouver contact without reference to a despatcher or senior officer of the company in Vancouver.

A. - No.

Q.#3- Have you any reason to believe that Edmonton received the approval of a despatcher or senior official of the company in Vancouver before approval for that despatch was given?

A. - I don't know.

Q.#4- Whose responsibility would it be to ensure that the approval of some official in Vancouver was given before flight was despatched?

A. - It is not necessary that such an approval must be received. The Despatch Office in Edmonton, acting for Operations Supervisor, myself, may give authority. They have authority to clear trips over any part of the route without reference to me. He would be doing it on my responsibility, pursuant to authority given him by me.

Q.#5- Our records show there was no despatcher on duty in Vancouver the afternoon of December 20th. In that case would the Edmonton despatcher make contact with some other official before clearing the trip?

A. - That would depend on circumstances. If weather conditions appeared reasonably normal he would clear the trip, assuming he was asked for clearance and there was no one available here to exercise that authority.

Ninth Witness

H. Hollick-Kenyon

Q. #6 - Do you consider the Communications System between here and Fort St. John adequate?

A. - Yes, within the limitations of any radio circuit.

Q. #7 - What short-wave radio stations have you in this area?

A. - There are company radio stations at Vancouver, Kamloops and Williams Lake--none at Prince George or Fort St. John, these points depending on Department of Transport facilities.

Q. #8 - Do you feel the weather reporting system is reasonably adequate?

A. - Yes, I believe it is an adequate weather reporting system.

Q. #9 - As in the present instance, a flight is despatched from Fort St. John contact between Prince George and Vancouver, what in a general way are instructions given to a pilot for the completion of his flight should he find it advisable to go on instruments--is the fact that you have approved a flight plan as far as you can go in relation to instructions.

A. - In general practice a flight plan must be adhered to unless a change arises which would necessitate a change, which should be sent to nearest office.

Q. #10 - What route would you expect a pilot to fly contact between Prince George and Vancouver?

A. - Any one of three routes - usually the shortest between Prince George and Vancouver direct via Howe Sound--second, via Williams Lake and Hope--third, via Princeton.

Q. #10 - In the present instance it appears the pilot flew by Williams Lake and Howe Sound?

A. Yes.

Q. #11 - What are his instructions if he finds he is flying overcast when he reaches Vancouver?

A. - No specific instructions--he is expected to go on instruments.

Q. #12 - Have instructions been issued as to just how he must proceed in this matter?

A. - Yes, they have been filed with your Department -- "Let-Down Procedure for Vancouver!"

Q. #13 - Then it is the same procedure as used by Trans-Canada Air Lines?

A. - Yes, issued under date of November 21st, 1941.

H. Hollick-Kenyon

Q. #14 - If it was found there was a continuous overcast between the upper end of Howe Sound, extending south and east, it would be necessary for him to leave the range and fly in a quadrant until he picked up the east leg again?

A. - The procedure would be to follow the north leg until he reached the radio range, then proceed to make his let-down--the only variation from that would be should there be an undercast, then he might let down from his cruising altitude, remaining above the undercast.

Q. #15 - Is it correct to say that company procedure would require the pilot coming in on the north leg to get a fix over the Vancouver range before proceeding to make a let-down?

A. - Yes.

Q. #16 - In the present instance there is no evidence to show that the pilot did obtain a fix over the Vancouver range?

A. - There is also, on the contrary, no evidence to show he didn't.

Q. #17 - Is it not customary for a pilot to report over the range when he makes a fix on it?

A. - Only when in a control area.

Q. #18 - Is<sup>n</sup> this a control area?

A. - Yes.

Q. #19 - The pilot reported on the north leg of the Vancouver range at 1734 with an E.T.A. of 1745. He was at 12,000 ft. Would it have been possible for him to have got a fix over the Vancouver range and go through the established procedure and arrive Vancouver at 1745.

A. - No, the expression "E.T.A." means the time he would get a fix on the Vancouver range.

Q. #20 - The evidence before the Board shows that a message was received from the pilot at 1805 hrs.-- 20 mins. overdue?

A. - He may have reached Vancouver range, as there is nothing to indicate he didn't.

Q. #21 - The company would take what procedure when an aircraft is overdue, and when is it considered overdue?

A. - It is considered overdue within thirty minutes.

Q. #22 - What is the procedure then?

A. - The local Superintendent should be called in at once and if he considers the circumstances warrant it he should call on all available agencies.

H. Hollick-Kenyon

Q.#23 - Have you an arrangement with the railways and telephone and telegraph systems in cases of emergency?

A. - We have a working arrangement with all agencies including the R.C.A.F., railways, telephone and telegraph companies, whereby they can make a search if necessary.

Q.#24 - Have you any idea what steps were taken in the present instance?

A. - No, you can get that information from the Division Superintendent.

Q.#25 - Is it not probable that an aircraft despatched on contact, using the direct route, would frequently run into conditions under which the pilot would be flying over an overcast covering the whole Vancouver area?

A. - No, not frequently. Even if it is closed in, very often weather conditions to the west of Vancouver are very much better than to the east of Vancouver.

Q.#26 - You are no doubt aware that the north leg of Vancouver range is floating--that we have reason to believe there are a number of multiples on it, and at least one bend. Do you consider that leg satisfactory for obtaining a position for an aircraft flying contact from Williams Lake intending to land at Vancouver?

A. - The use of the north leg of Vancouver range in conjunction with the north leg of Sidney range renders it perfectly safe for operation from Williams Lake to Vancouver; although there are multiples and bends present the north leg of the range is not used until close to the station, when it becomes stabilized.

Q.#27 - Assuming that a pilot comes in on the north leg of Vancouver range and finds turbulent clouds piling up in front of him to a considerable height--say 18,000 to 20,000 ft., what would you expect that pilot to do?

A. - Revise his flight plan and proceed on another route.

Q.#28 - What steps would he take to get into Vancouver.

A. - He should revise his flight plan via Hope or Princeton.

Q.#29 - That would mean he would fly contact until he got to the north Princeton leg?

A. - If he was proceeding via Princeton he would have the alternative of remaining contact and proceeding down the Fraser Valley until he intercepted the east leg of the Vancouver range at Hope.

Q.#30 - To your knowledge, what training did pilots Kubicek and Holland have in instrument flying under the hood?

A. - Capt. Holland has had no training in instrument flying with this company, as it was intended this should follow the preliminary stages of his training as a Captain. Capt. Kubicek has had an extensive training in instrument flight, both in actual practice and under the hood, including let-down practices

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at Vancouver, Prince George and Fort St. John, and continuation of flight along the airways while hooded. He was last checked on or about December 15th, 1942, when an approach on the north leg was made and an instrument let-down was continued from an altitude of about 9,000 ft. down to about 1,000 ft. His grading on that occasion was good, the highest rating we use.

Q.#31 - Was he competent in working out orientation problems?

A. - Yes, he has familiarized himself with orientation problems of Vancouver range.

Q.#32 - What are the minimum conditions of ceiling and visibility set for your pilots?

A. - Days - ceiling 1,000 ft., visibility 2 miles.

Q.#33 - Has the company issued instructions to pilots when they find they are overdue E.T.A.?

A. - No. It is customary when the E.T.A. is more than five minutes out to have it revised.

Q.#34 - In allocating these two pilots to this operation was consideration given to the temperamental characteristics of both?

A. - Yes, consideration was given to these points and it was discussed individually with each officer before the assignment was made. They had known each other for some time and it was felt the assignment should be completely satisfactory in view of their past friendship.

Q.#35 - What steps do you take to ensure that the load is evenly distributed about the c.g. in loading an aircraft?

A. - Cargo in aircraft is loaded from front to rear, up to the rated cargo capacity of each compartment. This has the effect of placing the c.g. in the proper place. At Vancouver load is distributed with reference to the libroscope.

Q.#36 - Do you weigh the cargo at all stations at all times?

A. - Yes, all cargo placed on aircraft is weighed.

Q.#37 - Is it correct that you assume a weight of 170 lbs. per passenger?

A. - Yes.

Q.#38 - What are the instructions with regard to filling of tanks and use of tanks in regard to load distribution?

A. - We fill the right rear first, then the left front, the then left rear, then right front, using them in reverse order. We use the same methods as T.C.A.

Q.#39 - What radio equipment is carried on aircraft?

A. - Bendix 100 W. transmitter, radio compass and range receiver, Bendix communication receiver, Bendix auxiliary all-wave receiver, and Marconi

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receiver. Auxiliary receiver may be used in conjunction with manually operated unit.

Q.#40 - What steps are taken to ensure the safe operation of radio.

A. - Receivers and transmitters are checked for operation before take-off from terminal by pilot. In Vancouver they are checked by radio technicians before aircraft is passed for despatch and re-checked by pilot before departure.

Q.#41 - Is any record kept of that check?

A. - Yes, log books are kept for radio equipment.

Q.#42 - You are probably aware that as the outcome of a meeting with a considerable number of operators, certain general specifications were drawn up for certain types of routes. Specifications given in the Radio Licence of Route C-57 are based on the outcome of these discussions with operators. A certain minimum is given there--among other things it is specified that with twin engined aircraft emergency fields should be available every 100 miles. In the light of this would it not seem that the direct contact operation between Prince George and Vancouver departs from that factor of safety?

A. - I cannot answer that Yes or No. If weather conditions over the Hope route are satisfactory - Yes; if unsatisfactory then direct route may be severe. There are no intermediate fields between Vancouver and Kamloops except Princeton.

Q.#43 - In those contact conditions you would not contemplate over top flying?

A. - Not for more than 15 mins.

Q.#44 - Are there any improvements you can suggest to make this route safer.

A. - There is no question the route would be more satisfactory with more radio aids, high frequency marker at Hope or a radio range, and another at Dog Creek.

Q.#45 - Would a marker at Dog Creek help?

A. - No, you really want some navigational aid, and a marker is hardly in that class.

Q.#46 - With improved radio aids to navigation and additional airports on the Princeton, Kamloops, Williams Lake, Prince George route, would you not consider that it would be wise to use this route entirely?

A. - Yes, unless exceptional conditions rendered a deviation from the airway necessary in the interests of safety.

Vancouver, B.C.  
Dec. 26th, 1942

H. Hollick-Kenyon, recalled.

At the request of the Board, the witness presented his Public Transport Licence #31, which was found to be in order.

Q. #1 - You have stated in your previous evidence that you are responsible for the conduct of main line scheduled operations between Regina, Vancouver, and Whitehorse; also for the proper conduct of flight operations, supervision and development of flight techniques, recommendations concerning navigational or airway aids and supervision of pilot training?

A. That is correct.

Q. - #2 - What is your total flying experience?

A. Approximately 8000 hours.

Q. #3 - On Lockheed 14 aircraft?

A. Approximately 1000 hours altogether, probably 3 to 4 hundred hours as pilot in charge.

Q. #4 - Could you give an estimate as to the hours you have flown on the Vancouver-Whitehorse run as Captain?

A. Very few, as Captain. You will appreciate the fact that I fly in the capacity of checking or instruction purposes. Therefore my logged time shows very little as Captain, which is true for a number of years past.

Mr. Kenyon submitted the following information:

Total flying hours Captain Kubicek - approximately 5439 hours.

Total flying hours W. Holland - approximately 5648 hours. According to records available at the present time Kubicek during November flew 56 hours 34 minutes. During the same period Holland flew 13 hours. In December Kubicek flew 56 hrs. 16 minutes.

We have at present no information available as to the total time on Lockheed 14's.

With regard to weather forecasting, Mr. Kenyon stated as follows:

There are cases where forecasts are delayed in transmission due to reasons unknown to me, as this comes under the Department, and they do not reach Fort St. John in time to be of any use and there are certain instances where forecasts for specific terminals are in variance with the actual conditions.

Q. #5 - Would you say that the observations were not accurate?

A. In some cases.

Q. #6 - Is this particularly noticeable in Vancouver?

A. No, their weather reports are generally accurate.

Q. #7 - Have any steps been taken to remedy this situation?

A. On or about December 15th last, I communicated with Mr. D. C. Archibald asking him to come to Edmonton in order to discuss the subject of weather reporting on the North West staging route, and at Prince George, particularly in connection with the desired improvement in spot weather reporting. He intimated that he will see me shortly.

Edmonton, Alberta,  
January 2nd, 1943.

H. Hollick Kenyon again recalled.

Mr. Kenyon produced herewith the originals of flight tests made by Captain Kubicek at Vancouver on October 18, October 23, September 3rd, October 12, December 14, and En Route Check Report between Vancouver and Fort St. John on October 13, and Night En Route Check Report between St. John and Whitehorse, December 13th. This tending merely, of course, to establish his general competency at night.

Edmonton, Alberta,  
January 2nd, 1943.

W.J. BRADY, 6992 Angus Drive, Vancouver, B.C.,  
having been duly sworn, states:

I was Captain on T.C.A. Trip No. 3 on December 19th. The weather encountered from Princeton to Vancouver was frontal type overcast condition; clouds built up solid from 3,000 to 17,000 ft. Just after we left Princeton we were on instruments at 12,000 ft., with intermittent light to moderate static; light to moderate ice from 12,000 ft. down to 7,000 ft. The overcast held broken as far as flying was concerned between here and Westminster, there was an overcast.

Weather observations from Princeton looking towards the northwest there was a marked increase in height of clouds in the form of a high build-up.

Q.#1 - From your experience, what would that indicate in that area?

A. - It would indicate very definitely that is where the most active section of the weather was. I would expect considerable turbulence in that area.

Q.#2 - Would you expect to encounter serious icing conditions in a cloud formation of that type?

A. - Definitely.

Vancouver, B.C.  
Dec. 26th, 1942.

Ben McGrath, Rosedale, British Columbia, having been sworn, states as follows:

I, Ben McGrath, am a resident of Rosedale, British Columbia, which is  $7\frac{1}{2}$  miles east of Chilliwack.

At two minutes to six, on December 20th, 1942, my brother and I were out in the open at home where I heard a plane coming over from the direction of Harrison Lake, flying south. After it passed our place, it turned and flew west. I could see the base of the clouds on the mountains at about 5,000 feet. I could not see the plane. It was out of sight in the clouds. At seven minutes past six, it came back flying approximately S.S.E. on the right hand side, about one mile south of Cheam peak at about the same level and really kicking up a roar. It seemed to be making more noise than the Trans-Canada planes. I could hear it still going in the same direction at ten minutes past six, then the sound died away. There was a solid overcast. The visibility was good below the overcast. It was not raining at that time. The motors sounded normal.

I am the District Agent of the Home Oil Distributor. I have thirty hours solo flying experience. I have been flying off and on for about four years.

Chilliwack, B.C.  
December 24, 1942.

M103270 Spr. W. D. Cole, R.C.E., having been duly sworn states:

I, Spr. Cole, am a Sapper in the R.C.E., in Vedder Crossing, B.C., was in my hut after supper, on the evening of December 20th, just on the point of darkness, say at about 5:30 p.m. approximately. I heard a plane come over and went out of the hut. I only heard it once. The sound gave me the impression that it was flying low. It came from the North of us, flying toward the south or southwest. I only heard it for a few seconds. It wasn't a single engine plane.

The weather was bad -- clouds over top of the knoll (small hill about 100 to 200 feet high). It was raining.

Vedder Crossing, B.C.  
December 24, 1942.

Frederick William Whitwick, Chilliwack, British Columbia, having been duly sworn, states as follows:

I, Frederick William Whitwick, am a resident of 60 Hazle Street, Chilliwack, B.C. At 6:10 p.m. on December 20, 1942, I was on the street. I heard an aeroplane flying East. I could not see it. From the sound, he appeared to be flying at the height Trans-Canada Air Lines planes usually come over. At about 6:50 p.m. I heard a plane flying west. He made two circles. He was below the level of the peak of Cheam. After this, he opened up his motors and flew in the direction of Chilliwack Lake. I am satisfied that it was a twin motor aircraft. The motors appeared to be normal. There was no sputtering or anything. After he made the two circles, he gave her the gun and the engines sounded a lot louder. The visibility was poor on the ground when I first heard the plane. There was a kind of a scotch mist. The second time it had cleared up quite a bit. Clouds were a whitish grey. There was no break or hole in the clouds. I would estimate the aircraft at being about 4,000 to 4,500 feet.

I have been living here for twenty-two years. I often go out and listen to Trans-Canada Air Lines planes coming over.

Chilliwack, B.C.  
December 24, 1942.

H82348 Spr. H. O. Beck, R.C.E., having been duly sworn states:

I was in camp on the evening of December 20th, 1942. After supper at about 5:15 p.m. I heard a plane fly over. By the sound I thought it was a twin engine Job. I came out of the hut to look for it. I think the plane was flying at a height of from 1,000 to 2,000 feet. It appeared to be flying toward the N.E. in the general direction of Chilliwack Lake. The engines sounded perfectly normal. I could see the lower hills around the camp.

I worked in Canada Car for two years. I am interested in aircraft.

Vedder Crossing, B.C.  
December 24, 1942.

CAPT. A. RANKIN, 6155 McKenzie St., Vancouver, B.C.,  
having been duly sworn, states:

I am employed by Trans Canada Air Lines and hold  
Public Transport Pilot's Licence No. 122.

Q.#1 - The evidence shows there was more than one machine  
flying from Vancouver on Dec. 20th. We understand  
you had left Vancouver and were in the vicinity of  
Chilliwack?

A. - I was Captain of T.C.A. Trip No. 4 on the 20th of  
December departed from Vancouver at 1708 hrs. - take-  
off time 1715 hrs. At 1718 we were at 1500 ft. on  
east leg of Vancouver Range, climb was continued on  
east leg, marker was crossed at approximately 9000 ft.  
Previous to this ice was being encountered above  
the 7000 ft. level. After passing the marker at  
9000 ft., moderate ice began to accumulate. We then  
increased power and turned south of the east leg of  
Vancouver and made a 360° turn to attempt to climb  
above ice conditions. One complete turn and one half  
turn were made before turning back again. We  
eventually got the engine up to 2500.

At the time we knew we had a westerly wind, but were  
not aware of strength until we had a check over Prince-  
ton, after making two turns I believe our groundspeed  
was around 230 m.p.h., airspeed down due to ice, not  
much over 170. Wind about 50 m.p.h. S.W.

Q.#2 - About how long after you passed marker before you  
started turns?

A. - It would probably be two or three minutes past the  
sharp position.

Q.#3 - How long did turns continue?

A. - Very shallow, I would say about three minutes - I  
would say the time taken to complete turns and arrive  
back on range would be five minutes - about six to  
eight minutes past marker when we completed turns.

Q.#4 - How was radio reception from Vancouver Range?

A. - Range was good, we heard Range talking to other  
aircraft. Our reception of the Range was good and  
I think this message they were broadcasting was repeated  
twice at least. We could read them all right.

Q.#5 - What time did you hit Princeton?

A. - About 1752.

Vancouver, B.C.  
Dec. 26th, 1942.

H.W. EDWARDS, 8408 Hudson St., Vancouver, B.C.,  
having been duly sworn, states as follows:

I am employed as Department of Transport Meteorologist  
on duty during the day of December 20th, from 8:30 in the  
morning until 16.30 in the afternoon.

Q.#1 - Were you responsible for forecasts?

A. - Yes. I was not responsible for forecasts covering  
the period from 9:00 hrs. to 17:00 hrs. issued by  
forecaster going off duty. After I am on duty any  
forecasts required are issued by me.

Q.#2 - Would you give the Board your opinion regarding the  
weather characteristics in the area around the north  
end of Howe Sound during the afternoon of Dec. 20th?

A. - I submit herewith weather map at 1730 Pacific  
Daylight time Dec. 20th. I would expect around  
Howe Sound at that time clouds would probably be  
built up, several layers, very ragged, some shower  
clouds up to - say, 16,000 ft. or in some cases  
probably higher; with light to moderate rain showers,  
snow on higher levels. I do not know the exact  
height at which you could expect snow; it would  
probably be fairly close to the surface--5,000 to  
6,000 ft. As far as icing conditions are concerned,  
the area was quite moist, temperature almost saturated.  
I would expect with the showers light to moderate  
icing conditions. As far as turbulence was concerned  
there might be moderate turbulence in the higher  
poles; cumulus clouds not extremely severe; conditions  
just moderate.

Q.#3 - Would conditions be appreciably more severe north of  
Vancouver than in Vancouver itself?

A. - Ordinarily north of Vancouver there is not as much  
lift due to the higher maintenance as the air strikes.  
On the north they get more severe showers than at the  
Airport. Even when it is clear here, on the north  
shore they have quite heavy rain due to the lift of  
air over the mountains.

Q.#4 - What is the relative stability of weather conditions  
in that area as compared to weather over here or  
farther east?

A. - The front moving from west to east and weather  
conditions changing all during the afternoon, farther  
west would clear up sooner as far as the front itself  
is concerned. I really don't think the weather over  
the north route and eastern route would be greatly  
different--it was squally right along the valley.  
It had just begun to clear up at Vancouver.

Q.#5 - Do you recall a conversation with the C.P.A. operator  
on the afternoon of the 20th?

A. - Yes. He asked me if I thought it would be advisable  
to clear a trip on the direct route. I didn't know  
what trip it was and I don't recollect the exact  
time--I think it was probably between 1400 and 1430  
hrs. I was speaking to C.P.A. radio operator on duty  
at that date--I told him it would not be advisable

H.W. Edwards

to clear on the direct route at that time. To go straight south from Hope there are no emergency fields and the weather wasn't good, so I told him the other route was advisable, not because I thought weather conditions so much worse but that facilities the other way were less.

Q.#6 - During the winter pilots frequently encounter quite heavy winds of quite high velocity?

A. - The highest winds certainly are usually in a westerly direction. They have winds from all directions but westerly prevails, and the highest are usually westerly, after a front they will veer around to the west.

Q.#7 - That is the time at which you experience most difficulty in making observations of upper air movements?

A. - Yes.

Q.#8 - There is therefore always the possibility of a factor of uncertainty in flying over the mountains during the winter time in unstable weather conditions--a wind of 20 to 30 miles at lower levels may upstairs be 150?

A. Yes. We generally have some idea, because wind velocity itself depends on change of pressure at any level. Twice daily, morning and evening, northern Canadian stations make upper air observations. We draw them 5,000 to 10,000 ft., although observations north of here are very scant and it is difficult to get an accurate estimate, yet it gives you an idea just what they are likely to be. At this time in the afternoon when the forecast map from the morning is not available, we have to depend on the wind taken at 2230 the previous day. That is when direct observations are lacking.

Q.#9 - From your reports do you have any records of weather observations on the afternoon of Dec. 20th? Have you any records to show what upper wind velocities were on the afternoon of Dec. 20th?

A. - Reports are on back of map submitted.

Q.#10- Will you give your opinion on whether it is safer to run down from Williams Lake to Kamloops down the leg of the range into Princeton and then west into Vancouver, or whether, even taking into account the very rough terrain between Bridge River and Squamish, weather conditions are such as to make it possible to go that way. It would be purely a matter of weather but if weather were better there than on the southern end of the route, it might be justified. We want to get all information we can on the weather in those two areas.

A. - I do not think it would be better over the direct route. 000062

H.W. Edwards

Q.#11 - In your opinion, from the weather standpoint, there would be no advantage in going over the direct route?

A. No.

Q.#12 - Was it a fact that on this particular occasion the front had passed Vancouver to Prince George?

A. - From the 1730 map it was almost through Prince George at that time. At the time the trip left Prince George it would be somewhat to the west. The trip left there at 1521--at that time the front would be to the west of Prince George and to the west of Vancouver.

Q.#13 - At about 1700 hrs. of the day in question the front had passed Vancouver and presumably was a little west of there?

A. - I believe again it had passed Vancouver although right at Vancouver the front itself was almost sure to leave.

Q.#14 - Would you expect a clearing action behind the front on the day in question?

A. - Yes, not immediately behind it. About two hours after the front passed I would expect it to improve.

Q.#15 - Would there be any difference in the clearing action as between the Mt. Garibaldi area and the valley?

A. - It depends to a certain extent on the type of area that follows the front. It would be likely to be more squally than the Garibaldi area.

Q.#16 - Is it usually a characteristic of such conditions-- that it is likely to clear more rapidly in the valley than in the higher levels?

A. - Clearing takes place more rapidly usually on the lee side of mountain range than to windward, where the clouds are likely to persist for longer time and there is likely to be rain or snow squalls.

Q.#17 - In your opinion, would that indicate a tendency to lessen cloud formation over Squamish? We know it was lessening at Patricia Bay, could that be expected to be the case at Squamish?

Q.#18 - I think in that area there would probably be more clouds than at Patricia Bay--at the same time I think conditions would be improving in that area and that a build-up would be tight at the top of the clouds, becoming less. Clouds after that time would be subsiding--conditions would be improving--in that respect, would not expect any rapid clearing in that area, lower clouds would hang around.

H.W. Edwards

Q.#19 - Do you consider the weather at the time trip 4-17 was despatched on Dec. 20th justified a contact clearance between Prince George and Vancouver on the direct route?

A. - No, at least I do not think you could fly contact. The ceiling was too low. I don't know if the clouds would have broken up at that time, although the tops might probably be subsiding. At lower levels the general forecast was solid clouds.

Vancouver, B.C.  
Dec. 27th, 1942.

H.D. CAMERON, 1356 W. 12th Avenue, Vancouver, B.C., <sup>having been sworn,</sup> ~~employed~~ with Department of Transport Meteorological Division, states:

I came on duty the afternoon of December 20th at 16:30 hrs., remaining until 24:00 hrs.

Q.#1 - Did anything happen during your period of duty?

A. - Capt. Ballentine, of the flight coming in, and his co-pilot, Mr. Beckett, came in to give a report of weather they encountered over the mountains--he usually does, he gives this verbally. I believe it was approximately 1850 hrs.

Mr. Boyd of the Radio Range had mentioned previously there was a delayed C.P. trip, but about 1850 he said it was overdue, a C.P. trip from Prince George, so he wanted weather observations coded up for broadcasting, so I immediately went up to the roof and took an observation myself and coded it for him before broadcasting. That was the first I knew of a land-plane overdue, if it had been a seaplane we would not be much concerned because sometimes a seaplane may find it necessary to land somewhere for a time.

It wasn't until 1850 I was informed. I coded up the weather for Mr. Boyd, from then on we kept a specially close watch on the weather and also to see if we could hear any aircraft.

About 1935 I hadn't received any official notice from Canadian Pacific Air Lines and I didn't want to do anything without consulting them, so I telephoned them to see if they wanted to officially declare the trip overdue and I would put a message on the teletype if they so desired. They asked me to do so, so I had the teletypist send an emergency notice to all stations on our circuit and to Vancouver Island also put on a message to American stations on circuits 10, 11 and 13, asking them to be on the lookout for an aircraft that was two hours overdue.

A little later I telephoned Mr. Gilbert. I had a suggestion that they broadcast a notice on the commercial radio broadcast, as possibly some farmers might have seen or heard something. Mr. Gilbert agreed to this suggestion. I believe that is about all.

Q.#1 - To whom were you speaking at Canadian Pacific Air Lines re emergency message.

A. - I don't know. It was on the interphone.

Vancouver, B.C.  
Dec. 27th, 1942.

A.R. McCauley, 7837 Angus Ave., Vancouver, B.C., states:

I am employed as Meteorologist in charge Vancouver Station and have been there approximately five years.

- Q.#1 - In your opinion, is it possible to make any general assumptions regarding the weather behind either a warm or a cold front moving east from the coast, north of Vancouver?
- A. - Each front has its own characteristics. The weather following the front will depend upon the season of the year and the previous history of the air mass. In general, clearing will be more rapid over the valleys than along the mountain slopes. Clearing behind cold fronts on the coast over the Cascade Mountains is slower than a similar front over the ocean or on the prairies.
- Q.#2 - If you pass behind a cold front would you expect a warm front normally?
- A. - We very infrequently have warm fronts on the Pacific-- they are usually cold fronts. The warm mass is prevented in its eastward motion by the mountains, with the result the cold front catches up to the warm front, lifting the entire mass of warm air aloft, and frontal system is then shown as an occluded front.
- Q.#3 - Is such a condition accompanied by more than usual turbulence?
- A. - That depends on whether the occlusion is a warm front type or a cold front type. In general the turbulence associated with a warm type occlusion will develop very similarly to that of a warm front, and sometimes with the cold type occlusion there will be turbulence similar to that of the other cold front?
- Q.#4 - It is not possible, then, to come to any general conclusions?
- A. - In the majority of cases you can predict the type of weather that will follow any particular type of front.
- Q.#5 - I gather from what you say that a trained meteorologist having studied the characteristics of a particular air mass would probably be in a position to predict the characteristics of the air behind the front, whereas a layman not having studied the characteristics of that air mass would not be in a position to take up a chart and draw any accurate conclusions from it?
- A. - This is substantiated. Experience has a lot to do with it. You can always forecast better for your own district than for another district.
- Q.#6 - What time are these maps drawn up?
- A. - Every six hours beginning 0530 hrs. In addition we draw a smaller map every three hours, when there is the most flying. We cannot tell how fast the fronts coming in off the coast are travelling until they have passed two stations. We are hampered by lack of information from the west--most weather moves from west to east.

A.R. McCauley

Q.#7 - What is your opinion on conditions prevailing at 1430 hrs. on December 20th?

A. - As I recall it, the best way would have been contact or intermittently contact from Prince George until approaching the Cascades, then instrument over the Cascades to Vancouver.

Q.#8 - There is no weather man at Prince George?

A. - No forecaster; just an observer.

Vancouver, B.C.  
Dec. 27th, 1942.

Witness recalled for further questioning.

Q. #9 - Will you please submit to the Board any records you have covering weather conditions existing in your district from noon until 18:30 hrs on the 20th of December?

A. Yes. I Herewith submit to the Board the following records:

- (a) Reported weather, Vancouver, B.C. and Princeton, from 12:30 hrs. to 18:30 hrs., December 20th, 1942.
- (b) Pilot balloon observation for areas in B.C. and Seattle, Washington, December 20th, 1942.
- (c) Airways Weather Record for December 20th, 1942, covering the following points:

Prince George,  
Williams Lake,  
Vanderhoof,  
Kamloops,  
Lillooet,  
Kleena Kleene,  
Boston Bar,  
Princeton,  
Hope,  
Chilliwack,  
Rock Bay,  
Vancouver,  
Quesnel,  
Merry Island,  
Patricia Bay

Vancouver, B.C.,  
December 28, 1942.

Gus Armstrong, Chief Operator, Canadian Pacific Air Lines Limited, Fort St. John, B.C., having been duly sworn, states as follows:

I, Gus Armstrong, am employed as dispatcher for Canadian Pacific Air Lines at Fort St. John, B.C. On December 20th, 1942, I dispatched Trip 4-17 from Fort St. John to Vancouver, after receiving a loading clearance from Edmonton, Alberta.

Q. #1 - Did you clear Trip 4-17 from Fort St. John to Prince George intermittent instrument?

A. Yes.

Q. #2 - What do you mean by intermittent instrument?

A. Partly contact and partly instrument.

Q. #3 - Were you familiar with the dispatch of Trip 4-16?

A. Yes.

Q. #4 - Why was trip 4-16 dispatched intermittent instrument from Prince George to Vancouver, while Trip 4-17 was dispatched contact.

A. I cannot say. Trip 4-16 was dispatched from Vancouver.

Q. #5 - Did you refer your dispatch to Vancouver for confirmation?

A. No. I expected Vancouver to cancel this if it wasn't approved.

Q. #6 - What made you think it was OK for Trip 4-17 to clear contact?

A. The weather report at the time. At 1400 hrs. it showed at Vancouver (See report)

Q. #7 - Were you aware that there was a front moving in from the west at that time?

A. Not officially, but I had a pilot's report that a front was moving in towards Vancouver, that I believe had been relayed from the Vancouver office, but this was told to me on Pilot Ballentyne's return to Fort St. John on the 22nd.

Q. #8 - Is it customary to dispatch a trip from Fort St. John to Vancouver without reference to Vancouver?

A. No. I usually get a clearance from Vancouver.

Q. #9 - Were you aware that there was no dispatcher on duty at Vancouver at that time?

A. No.

Q. #10 - How long have you been stationed at Fort St. John in the employ of Canadian Pacific Air Lines.

A. Since September 1st, 1942. I have been dispatching since May 1942.

Q. #11 - Did the fact that Vancouver gave no objection

constitute local approval of the plan to your mind?

A. Yes. The plan for Trip 4-17 was sent at 1400 hrs.

Fort St. John, B.C.,  
January 1st, 1943.

Thomas McLaughlin, 12123-122nd Street, Edmonton, Alberta, having been duly sworn, states as follows:

I am employed as Crew Chief for Canadian Pacific Air Lines, stationed at Edmonton.

Q. #1 - Was it in October this machine was given #4 check and overhaul?

A. It was a #4 check and right engine change.

Q. #2 - Was this in November or October?

A. CF-CPD arrived in Edmonton for #3 check and right engine change on December 9th. This work was completed December 12th.

Q. #3 - As a result of your inspection you certified the aircraft and engine as being airworthy?

A. The day the machine left Edmonton, it was the Sunday morning, December 13th, Mr. Kubicek came up and appealed to take the machine and due to adjustments we had to make to the mixture control on the carburettor and the propeller governor controls, we did a local test flight for about half an hour, and made one or two final adjustments on the ground again, and gassed him up and he left for Fort St. John.

Q. #4 - You certified the log books?

A. Yes.

Q. #5 - Who certified them with you?

A. The machine had been flown the previous day, December 12th, and there were other adjustments to be made which were made overnight and other minor adjustments.

Q. #6 - You did not have another engineer check over the controls?

A. That part was all done in the installation checks. The people in charge of the engine installations and engineers on the other ships had their names where it was proper on the work sheets. I did the final signing out on that particular day.

Q. #7 - What class of Air Engineer's Certificate do you hold?

A. A and C.

Q. #8 - There was no major repairs carried out at all?

A. Just routine Lockheed #3 check and engine change.

Q. #9 - Have you Lockheed instructions telling you when these various checks must be carried out and what points must be covered by each check?

A. We have a check system, I believe which is copied from Trans-Canada Air Lines, and based on the Lockheed data on Checks #s 1, 2, 3 and 4, which are carried out pretty closely.

At the request of the Board the witness presented his A and C Air Engineer's Certificate #A-1058, which was found to be in order and good standing.

Edmonton, Alberta,  
January 2nd, 1943.

Norman Edmund Dennison, 9928-107th Street, Edmonton, Alberta, having been duly sworn, states as follows:

I am Superintendent of Maintenance, Canadian Pacific Air Lines, stationed at Edmonton.

Q. #1 Are you a holder of an Air Engineer's Licence?

A. Yes. Air Engineer's Licence #A-539 Types A, B, C, and D, endorsed in Categories A and C for Lockheed.

Q. #2 Will you please give the Board copies of instructions for maintenance and overhaul, governing all your inspections for maintenance and overhaul of aircraft.

Mr. Dennison handed these to the Board for their retention.

Q. #3 - Have you any specific instructions covering the conditions or the time limits under which the engines, propellers and the aircraft shall be completely overhauled?

A. Engines: We are more or less following TCA procedure which either overhaul the engine at 550 to 600 hours or as an alternative, remove the cylinders for inspection at approximately 400 hours and 800 hours for the crankcase. We have been overhauling our engines at 550 to 600 hours, as we have no spare cylinders.

Q. #4 - Where has this overhaul work been done?

A. By TCA in their Winnipeg shops. We send a complete unit from the firewall forward, and they return it to us and it is a case then of exchanging the units.

Airframes: We have not set down an actual time limit for removing wings for inspection. We remove the elevator tabs, leading edge of elevator, stabilizers and remove the floor and seats and the leading edge of the centre section at each #4 check, which is 200 hours, and the same applies to engine change time. In this particular case on this aircraft it was due for a No. 3 check at the time of the engine change, but while the work was going on we went further than that and carried out a complete #4 check. That is in addition to the work called for on a #3 check, we removed the floor for inspection of controls and the wheels, for an inspection and servicing of brakes and tires.

I herewith submit to the Board the complete engine change and inspection report as carried out in our shops between the period of December 9th and December 12th, to Lockheed CF-CPD. These are initialled by W. J. Busby at the time the job was completed and each item as it was carried out by the mechanic is initialled. In addition we have a complete report of the servicing carried out in Vancouver between the dates of December 14th and including the morning of December 20th, #1 and #2 checks.

Q. #5 - Was there a gyro pilot installed in CPD?

A. No. The automatic pilot was removed from the aircraft prior to delivery to Yukon Southern last August.

Q. #6 - What flight navigation instruments are on that aircraft?

A. Directional gyro, gyro horizon, turn and bank, rate of climb, 2 altimeters, 2 airspeeds - all the standard instruments.

Q. #7- What system had you for checking and calibrating these instruments, when and how is that work done?

A. Our Sperry instruments are now sent to TCA shops, Winnipeg. Our other instruments are inspected and calibrated in our own instrument shop here.

Q. #8 - What about the propellers? What system of maintenance and overhaul have you for them?

A. We return our airscrews to TCA every 2nd engine change, at approximately 1100 hours. They are checked at every other engine change here. They are actually sent to TCA shops every 1000 or 1100 hours.

Q. #9 - Do you keep propeller log books?

A. Yes.

Q. #10 - Do you know the maximum service life of the propellers being used?

A. 7000 hours for the blades.

Q. #11 - Is there anything laid down for the maintenance of the de-icer equipment?

A. That is covered in # 2, 3 and 4 inspections.

Q. #12 - The original service life of these propellers as recommended by the Manufacturers was 4000 hours. Was your company granted extension beyond that limit by the Manufacturers?

A. No. But TCA were and we naturally concluded that the same concession would apply to our company.

Q. #13 - Did your company ever submit a specimen propeller to the Manufacturers for inspection and investigation, and a report covering the type of operation under which these propellers were being used?

A. No.

Edmonton, Alberta,  
January 2nd, 1943.

H. G. Hardham, 12142-122nd Street, Edmonton, Alberta, having been duly sworn, states as follows:

I am a dispatcher with Canadian Pacific Air Lines Limited, stated in Edmonton.

Q. #1 -- Were you on duty on the afternoon of December 20th?

A. Yes.

Q. #2 -- Would you kindly tell your story in your own words please?

A. To the best of my knowledge Trip 4-17 left Fort St. John and operated routine. The last I heard he was almost at the point of letting down in Vancouver and from that time on I heard no more about it until I heard that he was missing and not reported in Vancouver. I actually had nothing to do with the dispatch of the trip from St. John, outside of a discussion with the St. John dispatcher regarding the advisability of holding Trip 4-17 in connection with our Trip 2 from Whitehorse. The first wire from St. John indicated that Trip 4-17 should hold in connection with Trip 2. Mr. McNamee was on duty in Edmonton at the time and he sent a wire saying hold Trip 4-17.

The following are copies of messages in this connection:

1300 20-12-42 Fort St. John  
Operator, Edmonton.  
Advise if Kubicek to hold at St. John for north trip or clear to Vancouver stop Present indication of two planes bringing loads from Vancouver to St. John unfavorable if unable to clear north as at present rush please reply

Signed Dispatcher, Fort St. John  
Received 1318 Radio Range office Edmonton.

-----

1403 Edmonton 20-12-42  
Dispatcher Fort St. John  
Have Kubicek hold St. John for south bound load

Signed Dispatcher McNamee, Edmonton

-----

Ft. St. John 20-12-42  
Dispatcher Edmonton.  
Have 6 passengers here 3 at Prince George and trip loaded and ready to go south stop advise rush

Signed Dispatcher St. John,  
Received Edmonton 1422.

-----

I came on duty again at 1400 and sent the following reply at 1437:

Dispatcher St. John.  
OK Kubicek proceed south

Signed Dispatcher Edmonton.

Q. #3 - Are you chief dispatcher?

A. There is no such appointment. Each dispatcher is in an individual capacity.

Q. #4 - How long have you been acting in the capacity as dispatcher with Canadian Pacific Air Lines?

A. Since July this year.

Q. #5 - In terms of actual seniority you haven't been doing this as long as Armstrong?

A. No.

Q. #6 - I gather from what you say that your duties as you understand them cover two phases of operation. One to ensure the traffic situation and the other the loading of the aircraft. Is that right?

A. Yes, but not for the actual traffic, but to see there is no overload of traffic on aircraft.

Q. #7 - Is it your duty to see that movement of trips is co-ordinated?

A. Yes, Mr. Kenyon is Operations Supervisor, and we refer matters to him, but if he or Mr. McConachie are not available, we look after it.

Q. #8 - What other duties have you as dispatcher?

A. We consider the trend of the weather and discuss it with the Meteorological office and try to form an opinion as to whether the proposed operation is safe or otherwise. If we consider it favourable for safe operation we issue a clearance.

Q. #9 - It is your duty then to assess the weather and discuss it with the pilot?

A. Yes.

Q. #10 - Do you ever dispatch aircraft from Fort St. John to Vancouver from this office?

A. No. Sometimes Vancouver will ask our opinion, or possibly advice, as to whether it should be cleared or not. Sometimes they have even telephoned to discuss the operation, and if we can help them out in any way with our suggestions or advice we do so. Possibly the main reason they telephone us is that Mr. Kenyon is close at hand and we can get his advice on the operation as well, and we can help them out from this end.

Q. #11 - Were you aware there was no dispatcher on duty in Vancouver on the afternoon of December 20th when flight 4-17 was en route?

A. No.

Q. #12 - Is it your understanding that a Flight Plan filed at Fort St. John and approved for dispatch from that point should also receive the approval of the Vancouver office?

A. Yes. The Flight Plan is transmitted to Vancouver for their consideration, and they signify approval by filing.

Q. #13 - Is this procedure followed in order to ensure that the flight as planned is safe, taking into account the Vancouver weather?

A. Yes, that is my understanding.

Edmonton, Alberta,  
January 2nd, 1943.

Exhibit A-A.

FLIGHT PLAN

Trip 4-17, Aircraft Lockheed 14 H2 CF-CPD,  
December 20, 1942, From Fort St. John to Vancouver.

EXHIBIT A.

Message Reports as received by Canadian Pacific  
Air Lines, Vancouver, B. C., pertaining to trip 4-17. 1st witness

Message Reports as received by Canadian  
Pacific Air Lines, Vancouver, B.C., per-  
taining to Trip 4-17 -

Fort St. John - Prince George,  
Prince George - Vancouver,  
December 20th, 1942.

*Exhibit "A"*

*True*

*First witness*

000078

REPORTS ON TRIP 4-17 RUN DEC. 20TH.

~~XXXXXX~~

*26-1-202*

FORT ST. JOHN MESSAGE NUMBER FOUR TO VANCOUVER? FILED FOURTEEN HUNDRED ADDRESSEE OPERATIONS VANCOUVER.

FLIGHT PLAN TRIP FOUR OF SEVENTEENTH CREW KUBICEK, HOLLAND, AND YOUNG CAPTAIN FIRST OFFICER, AND STEWARDESS RESPECTIVELY, AIRCRAFT CF-CPD ESTIMATED TIME DEPARTURE FROM FORT ST. JOHN FOURTEEN FORTY FIVE TO BRINCE GEORGE INTERMITANT INSTRUMENTS CRUISE AT TWELVE THOUSAND FEET TIME OF FLIGHT ONE HOUR AND FIFTEEN MINUTES. PRINCE GEORGE TO VANCOUVER TWELVE THOUSAND TWO HOURS AND TWENTY FIVE MINUTES ALTERNATES CHANGE CRUISING ALTITUDE RETURN FT. ST. JOHN? MINIMUM FUEL TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY GALLONS RADIO FREQUENCY 5390. SIGNED DISPATCH FORT ST. JOHN, RECEIVED BY E. WILLIAMS AT THIRTEEN FIFTY THREE.

FT. ST. JOHN 2 PRINCE GEORGE FILED FOURTEEN FORTY FIVE ADDRESSED TO OPERATIONS CANADIAN PACIFIC AIR LINES. DISPATCH ~~XXXX~~ TRIP FOUR OF THE SEVENTEENTH OUT ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ST. JOHN FOURTEEN FORTY LOAD PASSENGERS VANCOUVER SIX BAGGAGE TEN BIECES AT TWO HUNDRED AND FORTY ONE POUNDS MAIL NONE ON BOARD EXPRESS NONE ON BOARD DELAY DUE CLEARANCE. SIGNED DISPATCH FT. ST. JOHN, RECEIVED BY E. WILLIAMS AT 1357.

EDMONTONS MESSAGE NUMBER THREE TO FT. ST. JOHN FILED AT FOURTEEN THIRTY SIX. ADDRESSEE DISPATCH FT. ST. JOHN. OK KUBICEK PROCEED SOUTH. SIGNED DISPATCH EDMONTON RECEIVED BY A. SCHUBERG AT FOURTEEN THIRTY SEVEN DECEMBER TWENTY SECOND.

POSITION REPORT FROM TRIP FOUR OF DECEMBER SEVENTEENTH ESTIMATE SENTINEL MOUNTAIN TWELVE THOUSAND FEET COMPASS READING ONE SEVEN FIVE RECEIVED BY E. WILLIAMS AT FIFTEEN NINETEEN MOUNTAIN STANDARD TIME.

PRINCE GEORGE THREE VANCOUVER FILED FIFTEEN TWENTY ONE TO DISPATCH VANCOUVER COPY ALL STATIONS DISPATCH TRIP FOUR OF SEVENTEENTH IN PRINCE GEORGE FIFTEEN ZERO FIVE OUT PRINCE GEORGE FIFTEEN TWENTY ONE PASSENGERS FOUR BAGGAGE SEVEN PEICES AT ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTEEN POUNDS EXPRESS ONE PIECE AT THREE POUNDS MAIL NONE ~~CABS~~ CABS FOR PASSENGERS TEN SIGNED MACDONALD CANADIAN PACIFIC AGENT AT PRINCE GEORGE RECEIVED BY E. WILLIAMS AT FIFTEEN TWENTY FOUR.

POSITION REPORT AT FIFTEEN FIFTY TEN MILES WEST QUESNELL RECEIVED BY E. WILLIAMS.

POSITION REPORT AT SIXTEEN TWENTY ON TRIP FOUR OF SEVENTEENTH TWENTY SOUTH OF STUM LAKE RECEIVED BY E. WILLIAMS.

POSITION REPORT RECEIVED FROM TRIP FOUR OF SEVENTEENTH AT SIXTEEN FIFTY OVER BRIDGE RIVER RECEIVED BY R. RAINE

#2

POSITION REPORT ON TRIP FOUR OF SEVENTEENTH AT SIXTEEN FIFTY BY GUNN LAKE  
RECEIVED BY ~~KXXWXXXXXAMS~~.R. RAINE.

*Handwritten:*  
W. R. Raine  
26-12-4

LANDING CODE IN ~~KXKX~~ AMERICAN ALACO CODE NR. ~~KXKX~~ 93779 CEILING  
QUEEN VISIBILITY T FOR TARE WIND DIRECTION P FOR PREP WIND VELOCITY  
P FOR PREP KOLSMAN D FOR DOG, SENT TO TRIP FOUR OF SEVENTEENTH AT  
SIXTEEN FIFTY BY R. RAINE.

TRIP FOUR OF SEVENTEENTH AT SEVENTEENTH ~~TXXKXX~~ TWENTY SEVEN NORTH  
LEG OF ~~XX~~ SYDNEY RANGE. RECEIVED BY R. RAINE.

AT SEVENTEEN THIRTY FOUR TRIP FOUR OF SEVENTEENTH ON NORTH LEG VANCOUVER  
RANGE TWELVE THOUSAND ESTIMATED TIME OF ARRIVAL VANCOUVER 1745  
LETTING DOWN ON EAST AND WEST LEG RECEIVED BY R. RAINE.

NOTE:

TRIP FOUR OF SEVENTEENTH REPLIED ASKING FOR CEILING AND VISIBILITY  
RANGE GAVE SAME BUT DID NOT RECEIVE ANY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AT EIGHTEEN  
ZERO FIVE ~~XX~~. R. RAINE.

Actual Radio Messages received by Canadian  
Pacific Air Lines radio operator, Vancouver,  
B.C., pertaining to Trip 4-17, December 20th,  
1942.

Exhibit "B"

*und*

*Joint Witness*

000081

EXHIBIT B

Actual Radio Messages received by Canadian Pacific  
Air Lines radio operator, Vancouver, B. C., pertain-  
ing to Trip 4-17, Dec. 20, 1942.

*1st witness*

REPORTS ON T 4-I7 RUN ON DEC. 20TH.

XJ 4 VR I400  
OPS VR  
F P 4-I7 K/H Y CPD ETD XJ I445 XS INTER INSTRU I20 I-I5 VR C I20  
2/25 ALT CCA RET XJ MIN FUEL 260 RAD 5390  
DX XJ I353EW

XJ 2 XS I445  
OPS CPA  
DX 4-I7 OUT I440 LOAD PASS VR 6 BG IO-24I MAIL NIL EX NIL DELAY DUE  
CLEARANCE  
DX XJ I357EW

XD 3 XJ I436  
DX XJ  
OK KUBICEK PROCEED SOUTH  
DX XD XJ I437EW

4-I7 EST SENTINEL MT. I2000 I75 I519m EW

XS 3 VR I52I  
DX VR CPI ALL  
DX 4-I7 IN I505 OUT I52I PASS 4 BG 7-II5 EX I-3 MAIL NIL CAB PASS IO  
MCDONALD I524EW

4-I7 IO W QUESNELL -----I550EW

4-I7 20 S STUMM LAKE I620 EW

T4-I7 VR OVER BRIDGE RIVER I650RR

4-I7 MY GUNN LAKE I650EW

LANDING CODE TRIP 4-I7 93779 CEILING QUEEN VISIBILITY TARE  
WIND DIRECTION PREP WIND VELOCITY PREP KOLSMAN DOG MINUS ONE  
T 4 I650RR

4-I7 N LEG YJ 172/I727EW

4-I7 N LEG VR RANGE ~~I~~I2000 ETA VR I745 LETTING DOWN ON E AND W LEG  
I734EW

VR 4-I7 TRIP REPLIED ASKING FOR CEILING AND VISIBILITY RANGE GAVE  
SAME BUT DID NOT RECEIVE ANY ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  
I805RR

*Final 26-12-42*

EXHIBIT C.

Statement of weather reports from 12:30 hrs. to 18:30  
hrs. December 20th, 1942, received by Canadian Pacific  
Air Lines Vancouver from weather office, Vancouver.

*1st witness*

Statement of weather reports  
from 12:30 hrs. to 18:30 hrs.  
December 20th, 1942, received  
by Canadian Pacific Air Lines  
Vancouver from weather office,  
Vancouver.

Exhibit "C"

*True*

*First Witness*

000085

FOLLOWING IS THE WEATHER OBTAINING AT VARIOUS POINTS AND TERMINALS  
 RELATIVE TO ERIPS 4/16 AND 4/17.

PORT ST JOHN

1230	45	overcast	8 miles	altimeter setting	29.66
1330	45	"	8 "	" "	29.58
1430	40	"	8 "	" "	29.56
1530	20	"	8 "	" "	29.54

PRINCE GEORGE

1230	80	"	8 "	" "	29.41
1330	70	"	8 "	" "	29.37
1430	80	"	8 "	" "	29.34
1530	65	"	8 "	" "	29.34
1630	60	"	8 "	" "	29.31
1730	60	OBSURED	" "	" "	undecipherable
1830	50	"	8 "	" "	29.34

GRANDE PRAIRIE

1330	25	overcast	lower broken	8 miles	altimeter setting	29.61
1430	25	"	" "	8 "	" "	29.61
1530	24	"	" "	8 "	" "	29.56
1630	25	"	" "	8 "	" "	29.55

WILLIAMS LAKE

1330	70	OVERCAST	LOWER BROKEN	8 "	" "	29.46
1530		UNLIMITED HIGH	BROKEN LOWER SCATTERED	8 MILES	ALT SET	29.38
1630		"	" " " BROKEN	8 "	" "	29.43
1830		"	OVERCAST	8 "	" "	29.47

KAMLOOPS

1300		UNLIMITED	SCATTERED	8 MILES		
1500	60	OVERCAST	LOWER BROKEN	8 MILES	TEMPERATURE	44
1600	70	BROKEN		8 MILES		

LILLOET

1330	50	OVERCAST	LOWER BROKEN	8 miles	ALT SET	29.61
1530	70	BROKEN	LOWER BROKEN	8 "	" "	29.66
1630		HIGH	BROKEN LOWER SCATTERED	8 "	" "	29.66
1830	70	BROKEN		8 MILES		

CHILLIWACK

1430	40	OVERCAST	LOWER SCATTERED	8 MILES	LIGHT RAIN	SHOWER
1530	30	"	8 MILES	LIGHT RAIN	WIND	SOUTHWEST 15
1630	20	"	8 "	" "	" "	15
1730	10	"	8 "	" "	" "	20
1830		NO REPORT				

PRINCETON

1330	50	SCATTERED	15 MILES	ALT	29.74	
1430	50	"	15 "	"	29.72	
1530	50	"	15 "	"	29.68	
1630	HI	BROKEN	SCATTERED 50	15 miles	ALT SET	
1730	HI	OVERCAST	SCATTERED 50	15 "	" "	29.67
1830	HI	BROKEN	SCATTERED 45	15 "	" "	29.72

VANCOUVER

1330	25	OVERCAST	15 MILES	LIGHT RAIN	SHOWER	29.61
1430	60	"	LOWERBROKEN	15 MILES	LIGHT RAIN	29.66
1530	60	"	15 SCATTERED	15 MILES		29.81
1630	60	"	20 MILES			29.84
1730	50	"	15 SCATTERED	25 MILES		29.81
1830	60	BROKEN	20 MILES			29.83

EXHIBIT D.

Report of message as received by Witness R. Raine,  
at Vancouver, B. C. Pertaining to Trip 4-17, Decem-  
ber 20th, 1942.

2nd witness

Witness R. Raine, Radio Technician,  
Canadian Pacific Air Lines Limited,  
Vancouver, B.C.

Report of message as received by him at  
Vancouver, B.C. pertaining to Trip 4-17,  
December 20th, 1942.

Exhibit "D"

*True*

*Second to 000088*

*Handwritten:* 26-12-63

MY REPORT OF TRIP 4-17 BY R. RAINE.

Trip 4-17 was due to report at 1717. I called this trip several times, receiving no answer. The Northern stations also called the trip. At 1727, the trip gave a position report, "North leg of Sidney range....." Signals were hard to read, being weak and covered with heavy static. As this report was indefinite, Vancouver range was contacted to check 4-17's position.

At 1734 the trip replied to Vancouver range "North leg Vancouver range 12000, estimate over the range 1745. Is it okay to use East-West leg of Vancouver range for letdown?"

The range replied advising it was okay to use East-West leg for letdown.

At 1747 trip 4-17 was again due to report and was called by myself and our Northern stations. No reply was received, so the range was again phoned and asked to call the trip. They called but received no reply. In the meantime, I continued calling the trip every 2 or 3 minutes. Our Northern stations were also calling the trip.

The range was again requested to call 4-17 at 1805. The trip replied to the range by saying "4 Vancouver range what is Vancouver ceiling and visibility?"

This was not heard by the range; in fact I was the only station to hear this report. I called the range by phone, and repeated 4-17's request. At 1807 the range broadcasted Vancouver ceiling and visibility. Trip 4-17 did not reply to this.

The range continued calling trip 4-17 every 2 or 3 minutes, asking for a reply 5390Kc, 3105Kc, or 4355Kc. I monitored 5390Kc, and 4355Kc. The range monitored 5390Kc and 3105Kc.

OPA stations and Vancouver range continued calling trip 4-17 till approximately 2000 P.D.T.

At 2330, I closed down our station, advising Vancouver range to this effect. The range continued monitoring 5390Kc and 3105Kc till our station came on the air at 0730 next morning.

*Handwritten signature:* R. Raine

EXHIBIT E.

Extracts from Vancouver Radio Range Station Log,  
pertaining to Canadian Pacific Air Lines Trips  
4-16 and 4-17, December 20th, 1942.

Extracts from Vancouver Radio Range Station  
Log, pertaining to Canadian Pacific Air Lines  
Trips 4-16 and 4-17, December 20th, 1942.

*Exhibit "E"*

*True*

000091

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORT

26-11-43  
Typed by J.W.A. Robertson

VFW. RADIO DIVISION

Extracts from log only on aircraft worked or heard, routine monitoring adjacent Ranges and Markers omitted  
DATE December 20th. 1942 Vancouver BC

Opr. W.A. Boyd  
on duty VFW

RADIO STATION

TIME	STATION TO	STATION FROM	COMMUNICATION	OPERATOR'S INITIALS
			Flight Plans re CPA-4-16 & 4-17	
			CPA 4-16 CF-CPC Ballantine out XS 1355 on intmt instmts 12T 1-45 Hope intmt 12T Hope VR	
			CPA 4-17 CF-CPD Kubicek 2.25 XS Dret 12T VR Out XS 1521	
			Both above phoned from CPA Radio VR 1435P/20	H. WAB.
1627	TCA-3	CYJ	Re CPA 4 at 16,000 (CJR VR notifying his trip of	
48	CYJ	TCA-3	Begn TCA-3 descg from 12T whereabouts Ballentine)	
57	"	"	Marker 10T dsdg	
	"	"	5200' dsdg New Westminster	
	VXV	"	" " " "	
15	"	"	Ask landing clearance- OK to land	
18	*	"	TCA-3 on ground at VR	
re TCA-4 15			TCA-4 airborne to QL (means TCA-4 going East)	
Going out 18			" 1500' climbing Eastbound	
BALLANTINE-1726-27	VXV	CPA4-16	5000' Fraser Ave Bridge dsdg & crclg to coming	
27	CPA4-17	VFW	On N leg YJ Range (something about E leg - QRM) advise CPA interphone but he unread all N leg VR Range 12T ETA VR 45 - is it OK to use E & W leg for letdown (advise CPA office but unread all) Advise Tower-says OK no local traffic	
32-34	"	"		
1735	CYJ	TCA-4	Reach Cruising Alt. 13,000 at 35	
55	CPA4-17	VFW	Ask PX twice no answer	
1805	"	"	Called on request CPA - no answer	
07	"	"	Sent VR code weather blind	
10-11	"	"	Ask answer 3105 - no reply	
14	"	"	Called-no answer- advise answer 3105	
VFDJ is Sidney I. 17	VFDJ	VFDM	Ask standby 5399k - willco	
19	CPA4-17	VFW	No answer 3105	
22	"	"	" " 5390	
26	"	"	" "	
30	"	"	Ask trip call 4755 kc (moderate QRM on 5390 BC telephone and carrier noises all evening. 4495 is bad for same QRM (Marwell of Fort Rupert QRM) QRM 5390K is Vancr calling Bellabella.	
40	"	"	No answer	
45	"	"	" "	
			several more calls were made up to 1950 - no answers	

Entries re CPA trips <sup>15</sup> in red. Those in black mainly refer to TCA trips which were flying VR Range at the same time and are included to show range operation was normal. This has been further verified by evidence of TCA pilots concerned. There was no PRECOT issued but VFW advised Sidney Isld. Princeton was advised by SSS teletype later. UNDERLINES ARE EXPLANATORY - ADDED IN THIS EXTRACT - NOT SHOWN IN 1000092 ORIGINAL

EXHIBIT F.

Aircraft and Engine and Radio Inspection Report  
Carried out at Vancouver, December 19th and 20th,  
1942.

*6th witness*

EXHIBIT G.

C. G. Ballentine's Report of Trip 4-16 of December 20th,  
Prince George to Vancouver, via Princeton.

*8th witness*

C. G. Ballentine's Report of  
Trip 4-16 of December 20th,  
Prince George to Vancouver, via  
Princeton.

Exhibit G

True

E. G. M. witness

000095

*Washville 28/1/43*

## CANADIAN PACIFIC AIR LINES, LIMITED

FROM C.G. Ballentine  
 AT Vancouver  
 SUBJECT Trip #4-16  
 FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

TO Superintendent  
 AT Vancouver  
 COPY TO cc  
 DATE Dec. 20/42

*(Princeton)*  
 Left XS at 1355, with 350 gals fuel. As far south as we could see after take-off, conditions looked very good, as were reports. Having been away from a forecaster for four days, I had only my guesses as to the mountain weather.

About Quesnell, we could see a build-up over the Cascades, but thinking ~~there might be~~ this might be high enough to go under contact, I asked VR if they could change my flight plan to "direct", if it looked good from their side of the mountains. They replied that it did not, and that ice was forecast. We therefore carried on with our original flight plan.

As we approached the mountains west of LWL, the build up over the Cascades became more apparent to us. No distinct layer was visible, and it went up far beyond our ceiling. It did not appear to be "boiling", but looked like bad static at least and possible ice; whereas ahead towards QP it sloped down and seemed to stop.

We had cruised at 8,000 to about Clinton, contact, and then climbed to 12,000 to stay on top of this lower broken stuff. The big build up was always just to our right. We then changed our flight plan to "via QP", wishing to maintain a flight path we could check against the range if we had to go on instruments, as there was a wind we figured at 50 to 60 from the SW. We also had one rough engine and wanted LKA as a positive "out" in case of a load of ice or engine trouble.

We had some trouble in staying on top without using excess power due to numerous downdrafts. These were not violent but kept letting us down, so eventually we went to 14,000, arriving over QP at this height within 5 minutes of our ETA, which was based --I think-- on a ground speed of 137 MPH.

*(Princeton)*  
 The build up as we turned west was then across our path toward VR, extending south too far to make it worth while trying to dodge it. Besides we were then on the home stretch

## CANADIAN PACIFIC AIR LINES, LIMITED

FROM \_\_\_\_\_ TO \_\_\_\_\_  
 AT \_\_\_\_\_ AT \_\_\_\_\_  
 SUBJECT \_\_\_\_\_ COPY TO \_\_\_\_\_  
 FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

-2-


and ice was no longer so important as we could go down. TCA checked over QP at 12,000 within a minute of us, and we said we would stay at 14,000 until they started down. We were then advised they were climbing to 14,000. To keep safe separation we went to 16,000, knowing that once in the build up we would probably lose all communication.

This caused us some inconvenience, as we had been away from VR for several days and ~~that~~ last of our oxygen was gone, an item we discovered too late. Very tiring to both of us.

We went on instruments about LHO. <sup>(Hype)</sup> As soon as TCA started down, so did we. At some point during the let down, I think from 14,000 down to 11,000, we collected ice pretty rapidly, although this was not bad under the circumstances; Little or no turbulence. Static was terrific, and I was using alternately the nose loop and the compass loop, both on "anti-static" position, to read VR range. The ADF was almost useless, and so I left it alone. *(Radio Compass) (due to static)*

The wind at one point was so strong I had a heading of 150 to get back on the leg -- heading 237 -- after allowing myself to drift off what I thought was just a little. I had to hold this for ten minutes. In fact it took will power to remind myself that I was really ~~in~~ on this leg and not lost, and because, due the wind, our arrival over the fan marker was so delayed, I actually went to work and proved the leg by crossing it several times to make sure we had not passed either the marker or perhaps VR itself. Once I had re-convinced myself that all was as it should be, the rest was routine, ~~in spite of the~~ We hit the marker and started down, breaking out over Westminster.

The only "hazards" encountered were static and high winds, although at the one level, the ice was heavy. The wind combined with the static would certainly have been very confusing if we had not been sure of our position within a few miles at all times.


 000097

September 1942

CANADIAN PACIFIC AIR LINES LIMITED  
WESTERN LINES  
FLIGHT PLAN

Trip # **4-17** Aircraft # **CP-CPD** Date **DEC 20/42** From **XJ** To **VR**

With intermediate stops for Fuel, Mail, Passengers, Express at **XS**  
Weather Summary

**HEAVY CLOUD OVER MOUNTAINS BROKEN ON EITHER SIDE OF RANGE  
UNLIMITED TO CASCADES SCATTERED OVER THE PEAKS**

From	To	Procedure	Altitude	Power	Wind	Air Condition	Time
<b>XJ</b>	<b>XS</b>	<b>1/2 C 1/2 INST</b>	<b>12000</b>	<b>45%</b>	<b>SW</b>	<b>STABLE</b>	<b>1-15</b>
<b>XS</b>	<b>VR</b>	<b>C AND LET DOWN ON EAST LEG</b>	<b>12000</b>	<b>45%</b>		<b>Stable</b>	<b>2-25</b>

Station Kollsman Altimeter barometer reading at **13:30** **29:66** in. hg. Total Time **3-40**

ALTERNATES From	To	Procedure	Altitude	Power	Wind	Air Condition	Time
<b>RET</b>	<b>CCA XJ LKA</b>	<b>CONTACT</b>	<b>7000</b>	<b>45%</b>		<b>ROUGH</b>	

AIRWAYS TRAFFIC

**NO REPORT** departed or will depart from \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ for \_\_\_\_\_ altitude  
departed or will depart from \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ for \_\_\_\_\_ Altitude  
departed or will depart from \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ for \_\_\_\_\_ Altitude  
departed or will depart from \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_ for \_\_\_\_\_ Altitude

**XS** radio range was ~~not~~ functioning properly at **1330** Checked by **DOT**  
**XJ** radio range was ~~not~~ functioning properly at **1330** Checked by **DOT**

REMARKS:

**RADIO 5390**

CLEARANCE

You are hereby cleared:  
From **XJ** To **VR** Minimum Fuel **260** gals Time **1400** Dispatcher **J R Armstrong (Signed)**  
From \_\_\_\_\_ To \_\_\_\_\_ Minimum Fuel \_\_\_\_\_ gals Time \_\_\_\_\_ Dispatcher \_\_\_\_\_  
From \_\_\_\_\_ To \_\_\_\_\_ Minimum Fuel \_\_\_\_\_ gals Time \_\_\_\_\_ Dispatcher \_\_\_\_\_  
From \_\_\_\_\_ To \_\_\_\_\_ Minimum Fuel \_\_\_\_\_ gals Time \_\_\_\_\_ Dispatcher \_\_\_\_\_

I have analyzed and discussed weather reports and consider conditions suitable for the flight with the gas provided and will conduct it in accordance with existing company and Department of Transport Regulations.

CAPTAIN **E W Kubick**  
(Signed)

FIRST OFFICER

**W G Holland**  
(Signed)

*Circular hole copy  
Mailed by  
Ops on 12/20/42  
Jan 5th 1943.*

# MACKENZIE AIR SERVICE LIMITED

98TH STREET DIVISION

## AIRPLANE AND ENGINE INSPECTION REPORT

Station XD  
Date { IN 12/12/42  
OUT 13.12.42

Plane No. CPD  
Trip { IN \_\_\_\_\_  
OUT \_\_\_\_\_

Time Since Engine Overhaul: Left 173:10 Right \_\_\_\_\_ hours. Engine No.: Left \_\_\_\_\_ Right \_\_\_\_\_  
Time Since Last No. \_\_\_\_\_ Check \_\_\_\_\_ Hrs. at Station \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

CHECK TO BE DONE (Circle One) 1 3 4 5

### FUEL AND OIL

Fuel	Left	By	Right	By	Oil	Left	By	Right	By
Front Fuel Tanks—gals.					Quarts In				
Rear Fuel Tanks—gals.					Quarts Drained				
<b>TOTAL GALS.</b>									

### INSPECTION

	Left By	Right By		By		By
Propellers	<u>ASB</u>		Emergency Exit	<u>ASB</u>	Oxygen	
Engine Nacelles	<u>ASB</u>		Fire Extinguishers	<u>ASB</u>	Seals	
Engines	<u>ASB</u>		Electrical System	<u>ASB</u>	Propeller Deicer System	<u>ASB</u>
Engine Accessories	<u>ASB</u>		Fuel System	<u>ASB</u>	Fuselage	<u>ASB</u>
Oil Systems	<u>ASB</u>		Hydraulic System	<u>ASB</u>	Wings	<u>ASB</u>
Battery Changed by			Heating System	<u>ASB</u>	Empennage	<u>ASB</u>
Number Removed			Flight Controls (including flaps)	<u>ASB</u>	Miscellaneous Equipment	
Number Installed			Landing Gear (incl. Tail Wheel)	<u>ASB</u>	Plane Cleaned, Interior	
			Surface Deicer System	<u>ASB</u>	Plane Cleaned, Exterior	

Instruments Inspected By \_\_\_\_\_ Radio Inspected By \_\_\_\_\_  
Instruments Ground Tested By \_\_\_\_\_ Radio Ground Tested By \_\_\_\_\_

### ENGINE GROUND TEST

	Left	Right		Left	Right	
Max. Ground R.P.M.			Idling Oil Pressure			Propeller Deicer Oper'n
Idling Ground R.P.M.			Cylinder Temperature			Generator Operation
Max. Manifold Pressure			Auto Carb. Operation			Gyro Instrument Oper'n
Max. Fuel Pressure			Propeller Operation			Hyd. System Pressure
Max. Oil Temperature			Dual Vac. Pump Operation			Outside Air Temperature
Max. Oil Pressure			Surface Deicer Operation			Engines Gr'nd Tested by

### WORK TO BE DONE AND ADDITIONAL WORK COMPLETED

<u>R - adjust right mixture control rod.</u>	<u>ASB</u>	<u>ASB</u>
<u>Right prop emergency power stop adjusted</u>	<u>ASB</u>	<u>ASB</u>
<u>Left prop full power + emergency power settings adjusted.</u>	<u>ASB</u>	<u>ASB</u>
<u>Left oil pressure adjusted up one turn.</u>	<u>ASB</u>	<u>ASB</u>
<u>Left prop governor turnbuckle (lower cable) to be tightened &amp; locked.</u>	<u>ASB</u>	<u>R.M.</u>
<u>Oil pressure adjusting screw cap to be replaced &amp; locked.</u>	<u>ASB</u>	<u>7/97</u>
<u>Check up retracting lever - reported jamming in up &amp; down position</u>		
<u>Warning horn reported not blowing</u>		
<u>Prop governor wheel to be safetied.</u>	<u>ASB</u>	<u>R.M.</u>

M. A. S. Ltd. Log Book Posted By \_\_\_\_\_ Certified Airworthy By \_\_\_\_\_  
Countersigned \_\_\_\_\_





**CANADIAN PACIFIC AIR LINES**  
**AIRCRAFT RADIO INSPECTION**

AIRCRAFT *CPD* TRIP *H* DATE *12/12/42* STATION *VR* SINCE No. 4

PILOT *Hutch* REPORTS *no report*

CAUSE

CORRECTION

EQUIPMENT OUT EQUIPMENT IN

No. 4 EQUIPMENT AND AIRCRAFT INSPECTION HOURS AT LAST No. 4 BY

T8P1	247D	OUT	IN	BY	14	OUT	IN	BY	T8P1 AND 14	BY
ARC6					MN6				27A Sensitivity	H L
GARC6					MP10				RA6 Batteries	H L
RCBB					TA2				RA6 on Batteries	
RA4					27A				TA2 on 3105	
AVR7					RA2				MN4 Calibration	
14B					RA6				MN6 Tracking	
R3AB					MN26				Antenna Condition	RR
T30AB					MN31				Lightning Arrestor	
G30AB					MN36				Trimmers	
UT6					MS6F				Seals	RR
									Spares	RR
					NJB Relays, Wiring				Fuses	RR
					MN31 Setting					
					Anti Static System				Completed	

AIRCRAFT OVERHAUL INSPECTION TOTAL HOURS

T8P1	247D	OUT	IN	BY	14	OUT	IN	BY	BOTH	BY
ARC6					MN36				Shock Mountings	
GARC6					MN37				Tach. Control Cables	
RCBB					MR13				Marker Light Box	
RA4					MN22				Antenna Systems	
AVR7					MR15				Fuse Replace	
14B					MS26B				Wiring Condition	
R3AB					RA2				Conduit Condition	
T30AB					RA6					
G30AB					TA2					
UT6					Loop Dehydrator				Completed	

ADDITIONAL WORK COMPLETED *1 Check*

A AND E SIGNED AT *1710* DATE *12/12/42* RADIO SYSTEM SERVICEABLE

000102

# CANADIAN PACIFIC AIRLINES AIRPLANE and ENGINE INSPECTION REPORT

Station \_\_\_\_\_  
 Date { In Dec 19<sup>th</sup> / 42  
 Out \_\_\_\_\_

Plane No. TC-C.P. 10.  
 Trip { In \_\_\_\_\_  
 Out \_\_\_\_\_

CHECK TO BE DONE (Circle One)      1      2      3      4      5

## WORK TO BE DONE and ADDITIONAL WORK COMPLETED

	Mechanic	Inspector
<u>TK and TCS</u>		
Check if Done by Each Line		
Remove all soiled seat covers ✓		
Remove soiled linen from lavatory ✓		
Vacuum rugs and seats ✓		
Clean with pyrene spots on rugs and seats ✓		
Wash trays with soap and water ✓		
Wash all food compartments ✓		
Wash front and rear bulk heads and leatherette along side walls ✓		
Polish sink and lavatory seat ✓		
Empty and clean lavatory all ash trays. ✓		
Polish overhead rail on blanket rack. ✓		
Empty and clean lavatory and put in deodorant. ✓		
Wash and polish windows inside and out and window sills. ✓		
Clean cock-pit. ✓		
Clean and rewrap oxygen masks. ✓		
Replace cards. ✓		
Clean out pockets ✓		
Check no. of		
Blankets - <u>10</u>		
Pillows - <u>10</u>		
Oxygen masks - <u>12</u>		
Cover floor with canvass ✓		
Done by		
<u>Marguerite &amp; Jeanne</u>		

*TC*



**ACKENZIE AIR SERVICE LIMITED**  
98TH STREET DIVISION

**AIRPLANE AND ENGINE INSPECTION REPORT**

Station EDMONTON  
Date { IN 9/12/42  
OUT \_\_\_\_\_

Plane No. CPD  
Trip { IN \_\_\_\_\_  
OUT \_\_\_\_\_

Time Since Engine Overhaul: Left 3175 Right 3088 hours. Engine No.: Left 165.20 Right 750.20  
Time Since Last No. 3 Check 43.10 Hrs. at Station VR Date 27/11/42

CHECK TO BE DONE (Circle One)      1      2      **3**      4      **5**

**FUEL AND OIL**

Fuel	Left	By	Right	By	Oil	Left	By	Right	By
Front Fuel Tanks—gals.					Quarts In	<u>60</u>	<u>H.D.</u>		
Rear Fuel Tanks—gals.					Quarts Drained	<u>60</u>	<u>J.S.</u>		
<b>TOTAL GALS.</b>					<u>SUM P+SCREEN</u>		<u>H.D.</u>		

**INSPECTION**

	Left By	Right By		By		By
<u>CARB. SCREEN</u>	<u>H.W.</u>		Emergency Exit	<u>J.W.B.</u>		
Propellers			Fire Extinguishers	<u>J.W.B.</u>	Oxygen	<u>✓</u>
Engine Nacelles			Electrical System	<u>J.W.B.</u>	Seals	<u>✓</u>
Engines			Fuel System	<u>J.W.B.</u>	Propeller Deicer System	
Engine Accessories			Hydraulic System	<u>J.W.B.</u>	Fuselage	<u>J.W.B.</u>
Oil Systems			Heating System	<u>J.W.B.</u>	Wings	<u>J.W.B.</u>
Battery Changed by	<u>on charge</u>		Flight Controls (including flaps)	<u>J.W.B.</u>	Empennage	<u>J.W.B.</u>
Number Removed			Landing Gear (incl. Tail Wheel)	<u>J.W.B.</u>	Miscellaneous Equipment	<u>J.W.B.</u>
Number Installed			Surface Deicer System	<u>J.W.B.</u>	Plane Cleaned, Interior	<u>J.W.B.</u>
					Plane Cleaned, Exterior	<u>J.W.B.</u>

Instruments Inspected By \_\_\_\_\_

Radio Inspected By \_\_\_\_\_

Instruments Ground Tested By \_\_\_\_\_

Radio Ground Tested By \_\_\_\_\_

**ENGINE GROUND TEST**

	Left	Right		Left	Right	
Max. Ground R.P.M.	<u>2300</u>	<u>2300</u>	Idling Oil Pressure	<u>15+</u>	<u>20-</u>	Propeller Deicer Oper'n
Idling Ground R.P.M.	<u>550</u>	<u>550</u>	Cylinder Temperature	<u>375</u>	<u>365</u>	Generator Operation
Max. Manifold Pressure	<u>34.5</u>	<u>34.5</u>	Auto Carb. Operation	<u>OK</u>	<u>OK</u>	Gyro Instrument Oper'n
Max. Fuel Pressure	<u>4.5</u>	<u>4.5</u>	Propeller Operation	<u>OK</u>	<u>OK</u>	Hyd. System Pressure
Max. Oil Temperature	<u>150</u>	<u>150</u>	Dual Vac. Pump Operation	<u>OK</u>	<u>OK</u>	Outside Air Temperature
Max. Oil Pressure	<u>90</u>	<u>85</u>	Surface Deicer Operation	<u>OK</u>	<u>OK</u>	Engines Gr'nd Tested by <u>J.W.B.</u>

**WORK TO BE DONE AND ADDITIONAL WORK COMPLETED**

	Inspector	Mechanic
SHEET #1 MAINTENANCE +		
" #2 ENGINE ROOM ✓		
" #3 METAL SHOP ✓		
" #4 RADIO ✓		
" #5 ELECTRICAL ✓		
" #6 INSTRUMENTS ✓		
" #7 UPHOLSTERY ✓		
" #8 UNDERCARRIAGE + BATTERY ✓		

PLEASE COMPLETE ENGINE GRD. TEST DATA.

M. A. S. Ltd. Log Book Posted By \_\_\_\_\_

Certified Airworthy By \_\_\_\_\_

Countersigned \_\_\_\_\_

Form 32 1M2-42

MACKENZIE AIR SERVICE LIMITED  
 98th STREET DIVISION

Cont. Sheet No.

W. H. H. (Copy)  
 27/1/63

AIRPLANE AND ENGINE INSPECTION REPORT

Station T.D Plane No. T.C.S  
 TRIP (In Dec 9-42)  
 (Out)

CHECK TO BE DONE (circle one) 1 2 3 4 5

Mechanic Inspector

Remove Centre Hisle Cabin ✓  
 Replace ✓ ✓ ✓  
 Remove All Inspection Panels ✓  
 Replace ✓ ✓ ✓  
 Check All Control Cables ✓  
 Remove Panels No 2 Compt's ✓ gwh  
 Replace ✓ ✓ ✓  
 Check All Plumbing ✓  
 Remove Main Wheels - Check Brakes & Grease ✓  
 Remove Tail Wheel - Grease Bearings ✓  
 Clean Main Gas Screen ✓ L.H.  
 Drain Sumps Prior Ax. ✓  
 Check fluids ✓ L.H.  
 Grease Undercarriage ✓  
 Repair Straps on Sliding Windows ✓  
 No 3 Instrument Check ✓  
 Repair Bendix Loop Housing ✓  
 Repair Right fire wall cowling  
 Fire Extinguisher OK gwh.  
 Put red glass on left nav light.

M.A.S. Ltd. Log Book Posted by

# CANADIAN PACIFIC AIRLINES AIRPLANE AND ENGINE INSPECTION REPORT

Station VR Plane No. CPD  
 Date { IN Dec 19/42 Trip { IN 4  
 { OUT Dec 20/42 { OUT 3

Time Since Engine Overhaul: Left 208.77 Right 42.17 hours. Engine No.: Left 3175 Right 3092  
 Time Since Last No. 4 Check 201.21 Hrs. at Station ED Date 14/10/42

WEEK TO BE DONE (Circle One)      1      **2**      3      4      5

### FUEL AND OIL

Fuel	Left	By	Right	By	Oil	Left	By	Right	By
Front Fuel Tanks—gals.	55	Beva	58	Beva	Quarts In	16	Beva	16	Beva
Rear Fuel Tanks—gals.	95	Beva	143	Beva	Quarts Drained	1	T.S.F.	1	T.S.F.
<b>TOTAL GALS.</b>	<b>150</b>		<b>201</b>		Screens		T.S.F.		T.S.F.

### INSPECTION

	Left By	Right By		By		By
			Emergency Exit	T.S.F.	Barograph	—
			Fire Extinguishers	T.S.F.	Oxygen 1600 @ 35°F	T.S.F.
Propellers	T.S.F.	T.S.F.	Electrical System	T.S.F.	Seals	—
Engine Nacelles	T.S.F.	T.S.F.	Fuel System	T.S.F.	Propeller Deicer System	T.S.F.
Engines	T.S.F.	T.S.F.	Hydraulic System	T.S.F.	Fuselage	T.S.F.
Engine Accessories	T.S.F.	T.S.F.	Heating System	T.S.F.	Wings	T.S.F.
Oil Systems	T.S.F.	T.S.F.	Flight Controls (including flaps)	T.S.F.	Empennage	T.S.F.
Battery Changed by			Auto Pilot	—	Miscellaneous Equip.	—
Number Removed	R9	T.S.F.	Landing Gear (incl. Tail Wheel)	T.S.F.	Plane Cleaned, Interior	MSTJB
Number Installed	L15	T.S.F.	Surface Deicer System	T.S.F.	Plane Cleaned, Exterior	MJ-VIM

Instruments Inspected by \_\_\_\_\_ Radio Inspected by \_\_\_\_\_  
 Instruments Ground Tested by T.S.F. Radio Ground Tested by \_\_\_\_\_

### ENGINE GROUND TEST

	Left	Right		Left	Right		
Max. Ground R.P.M.	2000	2000	Idling Oil Pressure	15	15	Propeller Deicer Oper'n	OK
Idling Ground R.P.M.	500	500	Cylinder Temperature	375	375	Generator Operation	OK
Manx. Manifold Pressure	29"	29"	Auto Carb. Operation	OK	OK	Gyro Instrument Oper'n	OK
Max. Fuel Pressure	4 1/2	4 3/4	Propeller Operation	OK	OK	Hyd. System Pressure	450
Max. Oil Temperature	160	160	Dual Vac. Pump Operation	OK	OK	Outside Air Temperature	45°F
Max. Oil Pressure	80	70	Surface Deicer Operation	OK	OK	Engine Grnd Tested by	T.S.F.

### WORK TO BE DONE AND ADDITIONAL WORK COMPLETED

2 pints servo added large tank	T.S.F.	Mechanic	Inspector
Refill small fire extinguisher	T.S.F.		
Replace entrance light at door	T.S.F.		
2 qts de-icer fluid added	T.S.F.		
Repair broken bonding wire on carburetor air intake left engine	T.S.F.		
Tighten oil pressure line connect opposite left mag. right tank	T.S.F.		
Pump up tail wheel oleo. Put new air valve in	T.S.F.		
Paint backs of props	J.E.S.		

**NOTE**  
 Blue color appearing on right dump valve outlet for right gas tanks, appears to be leaking dump valve also serve oil leaks observed in #3 compartment.  
 Tail shock leg leading.

Certified Airworthy by J.D. Finnie  
 C.P.A. Log Book Posted by J.D. Finnie Countersigned \_\_\_\_\_

C.P.A.

# CANADIAN PACIFIC AIRLINES AIRPLANE AND ENGINE INSPECTION REPORT

Station VN Plane No. CF-CPD  
 Date { IN Dec. 17/42 Trip { IN 4  
 { OUT Dec. 18/42 { OUT 3

Time Since Engine Overhaul: Left 201.26 Right 36.06 hours. Engine No.: Left 3125 Right 3892  
 Time Since Last No. 4 Check 115.11 Hrs. at Station X12 Date 17/14/42

CHECK TO BE DONE (Circle One)      1      **2**      3      4      5

### FUEL AND OIL

Fuel	Left	By	Right	By	Oil	Left	By	Right	By
Front Fuel Tanks—gals.	<u>75</u>	<u>JNA</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>JNA</u>	Quarts In	<u>8</u>	<u>JNA</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>JNA</u>
Rear Fuel Tanks—gals.	<u>100</u>	<u>JNA</u>	<u>143</u>	<u>JNA</u>	Quarts Drained	<u>1</u>	<u>TSF</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>JNA</u>
TOTAL GALS.	<u>175</u>		<u>175</u>	<u>350</u>	Screens		<u>TSF</u>		<u>JNA</u>

### INSPECTION

	Left By	Right By		By		By
			Emergency Exit	<u>JNA</u>	Barograph	<u>JNA</u>
			Fire Extinguishers	<u>JNA</u>	Oxygen <u>1650 at 55°F</u>	<u>JNA</u>
Propellers	<u>TSF</u>	<u>JNA</u>	Electrical System	<u>JNA</u>	Seals	<u>JNA</u>
Engine Nacelles	<u>DB</u>	<u>JNA</u>	Fuel System	<u>JNA</u>	Propeller Deicer System	<u>JNA</u>
Engines	<u>TSF</u>	<u>JNA</u>	Hydraulic System	<u>JNA</u>	Fuselage	<u>JNA</u>
Engine Accessories	<u>TSF</u>	<u>JNA</u>	Heating System	<u>JNA</u>	Wings	<u>JNA</u>
Oil Systems	<u>TSF</u>	<u>JNA</u>	Flight Controls (including flaps)	<u>JNA</u>	Empennage	<u>JNA</u>
Battery Changed by			Auto Pilot	<u>JNA</u>	Miscellaneous Equip.	<u>JNA</u>
Number Removed	<u>115</u>	<u>JNA</u>	Landing Gear (incl. Tail Wheel)	<u>JNA</u>	Plane Cleaned, Interior	<u>TB</u>
Number Installed			Surface Deicer System	<u>JNA</u>	Plane Cleaned, Exterior	<u>RT</u>

Instruments Inspected by \_\_\_\_\_ Radio Inspected by \_\_\_\_\_  
 Instruments Ground Tested by JNA Radio Ground Tested by \_\_\_\_\_

### ENGINE GROUND TEST

	Left	Right		Left	Right		
Max. Ground R.P.M.	<u>2000</u>	<u>2000</u>	Idling Oil Pressure	<u>20</u>	<u>15</u>	Propeller Deicer Oper'n	<u>OK</u>
Idling Ground R.P.M.	<u>500</u>	<u>500</u>	Cylinder Temperature	<u>375</u>	<u>375</u>	Generator Operation	<u>OK</u>
Manx. Manifold Pressure	<u>29"</u>	<u>29"</u>	Auto Carb. Operation	<u>OK</u>	<u>OK</u>	Gyro Instrument Oper'n	<u>OK</u>
Max. Fuel Pressure	<u>4 1/2</u>	<u>4 3/4</u>	Propeller Operation	<u>OK</u>	<u>OK</u>	Hyd. System Pressure	<u>OK</u>
Max. Oil Temperature	<u>150</u>	<u>150</u>	Dual Vac. Pump Operation	<u>OK</u>	<u>OK</u>	Outside Air Temperature	<u>45°</u>
Max. Oil Pressure	<u>80</u>	<u>78</u>	Surface Deicer Operation	<u>OK</u>	<u>OK</u>	Engine Grnd Tested by	<u>JNA</u>

### WORK TO BE DONE AND ADDITIONAL WORK COMPLETED

<u>1 pint servo added to main tank</u>	<u>JNA</u>	Mechanic	Inspector.
<u>2 qts deicer fluid added</u>	<u>JNA</u>		
<u>Repair centre cupboard door.</u>	<u>JNA</u>		
<u>Dump valve right side has excess blue stains</u>	<u>JNA</u>		
<u>cleaned out dirt from deicer pump valves but</u>	<u>JNA</u>		
<u>flow still very sluggish, no pressure from pumps.</u>	<u>JNA</u>		
<u>Pumps up tail wheel strut to 6"</u>	<u>JNA</u>		
<u>frozen up &amp; oil up &amp; down landing gear switches both well</u>	<u>JNA</u>		
<u>Removed repaired, &amp; replaced port rear</u>	<u>JNA</u>		
<u>seat.</u>	<u>JNA</u>		
<u>Tightened loose bolts on #4 and #5 cylinder exhaust collar</u>	<u>JNA</u>		
<u>Replaced #9 cylinder load mount bracket. Tightened loose bolt #1 load</u>	<u>JNA</u>		
<u>Removed and replaced port exhaust stack after welding on patch over</u>	<u>JNA</u>		
<u>hole on exhaust cluster tubes</u>	<u>JNA</u>		
			<u>left engine TSF</u>
			<u>TSF</u>

Certified Airworthy by J. H. Smith

C.P.A. Log Book Posted by JNA Countersigned \_\_\_\_\_  
Late departure due reservations.



Form 32 LM2-42

MACKENZIE AIR SERVICE LIMITED  
98th STREET DIVISION

Cont. Sheet No.

AIRPLANE AND ENGINE INSPECTION REPORT

*W. J. G. (Copy)*  
*7/11/43*

Station EDMONTON Plane No. CPD  
TRIP (In 9/12/42 DATE (In  
(Out) (Out)

CHECK TO BE DONE (circle one) 1 2 3 4 5

Mechanic Inspector

# 6 SHEET INSTRUMENTS

# 3 CHECK ALL INSTRUMENTS.

G.M.

*[Signature]*  
*J. G.*

# 3 CHECK COMPLETED

*EM*

M.A.S. Ltd. Log Book Posted by \_\_\_\_\_

Form 32 1M2-42

MACKENZIE AIR SERVICE LIMITED  
98th STREET DIVISION

Cont. Sheet No.

AIRPLANE AND ENGINE INSPECTION REPORT

*W. H. ...*  
*7/11/63*  
(Copy)

Station EDMONTON Plane No. CPD  
TRIP (In 9/12/42 DATE (In \_\_\_\_\_ Out \_\_\_\_\_)  
(Out \_\_\_\_\_)

CHECK TO BE DONE (circle one) 1 2 3 4 5

Mechanic Inspector

#7 UPHOLSTERY

REPAIR STRAPS SLIDING WINDOWS

*can't find any thing wrong with this part*  
CHECK WORKING OF RECLINERS ALL SEATS

MAKE UP COAT HANGERS

*SR* *W. H. ...*  
*SR* *W. H. ...*  
*SR* *W. H. ...*

*102*



# CANADIAN PACIFIC AIRLINES AIRPLANE and ENGINE INSPECTION REPORT

Station \_\_\_\_\_  
Date { In \_\_\_\_\_  
Out \_\_\_\_\_

Plane No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Trip { In \_\_\_\_\_  
Out \_\_\_\_\_

CHECK TO BE DONE (Circle One)      1      2      3      4      5

### WORK TO BE DONE and ADDITIONAL WORK COMPLETED

*Dec 17/42*

~~TGR~~ and TCS

*C.P.D.*

Mechanic      Inspector

Check if Done by Each Line

Remove all soiled seat covers ✓

Remove soiled linen from lavatory ✓

Vacuum rugs and seats ✓

Clean with pyrene spots on rugs and seats ✓

Wash trays with soap and water ✓

Wash all food compartments ✓

Wash front and rear bulk heads and leatherette along side walls

Polish sink and lavatory seat ✓

Empty and clean all ash trays ✓

Empty and clean lavatory and put in deodorant ✓

Polish overhead rail on blanket rack ✓

Wash and polish windows inside and out and window sills

Clean cock-pit ✓

Clean and rewrap oxygen masks *OK*

Replace cards ✓

Clean out pockets ✓

Check no. of  
Blankets 9  
Pillows 10  
Oxygen masks OK

Cover floor with canvass ✓

Done by *Jeanne*

# YUKON SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT LIMITED

## AIRPLANE AND ENGINE INSPECTION REPORT

Station Et. Ft. John  
 Date { IN Dec 20  
 { OUT Dec 20

Plane No. CPD.  
 Trip { IN 3 AC. 13:25  
 { OUT 4 LV. 14:05

Time Since Engine Overhaul: Left \_\_\_\_\_ Right \_\_\_\_\_ hours Engine No.: Left \_\_\_\_\_ Right \_\_\_\_\_  
 Time Since Last No. \_\_\_\_\_ Check No. Hrs. at Station \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

CHECK TO BE DONE (Circle One)      1      2      3      4      5

### FUEL AND OIL

Fuel	Left	By	Right	By	Oil	Left	By	Right	By
Front Fuel Tanks—gals.	50	<i>[initials]</i>	55	<i>[initials]</i>	Quarts In				
Rear Fuel Tanks—gals.	95	<i>[initials]</i>	120.	<i>[initials]</i>	Quarts Drained	<i>OK</i>	<i>[initials]</i>	<i>[initials]</i>	<i>[initials]</i>
<b>TOTAL GALS.</b>	<i>None added X.</i>								

### INSPECTION

	Left By	Right By	By	By
<i>W. H. [unclear] 7/11/63</i>				
Propellers				
Engine Nacelles				
Engines				
Engine Accessories				
Oil Systems				
Battery Changed by				
Number Removed				
Number Installed				
			Emergency Exit	
			Fire Extinguishers	<i>[initials]</i>
			Electrical System & FUSES	<i>[initials]</i>
			Fuel System	
			Hydraulic System	
			Heating System	
			Flight Controls (including flaps)	
			Surface Deicer System	
			Oxygen	
			Seals	
			Propeller Deicer System	
			Fuselage	
			Wings	
			Empennage	
			Miscellaneous Equipment	
			Plane Cleaned, Interior	
			Plane Cleaned, Exterior	

Instruments Inspected By \_\_\_\_\_ Radio Inspected By \_\_\_\_\_  
 Instruments Ground Tested By \_\_\_\_\_ Radio Ground Tested By \_\_\_\_\_

### ENGINE GROUND TEST

	Left	Right		Left	Right	
Max. Ground R.P.M.			Idling Oil Pressure			Propeller Deicer Oper'n
Idling Ground R.P.M.			Cylinder Temperature			Generator Operation
Max. Manifold Pressure			Auto Carb. Operation			Gyro Instrument Oper'n
Max. Fuel Pressure			Propeller Operation			Hyd. System Pressure
Max. Oil Temperature			Dual Vac. Pump Operation			Outside Air Temperature
Max. Oil Pressure			Surface Deicer Operation			Engines Gr'nd Tested by <i>[initials]</i>

### WORK TO BE DONE AND ADDITIONAL WORK COMPLETED

	Mechanic	Inspector
<i>ANTI-ICE fluid checked OK.</i>		
<i>According to Black Book engine performance was normal - engines were not run-up at this base as he left the tarmac at 14:05 5 min. after arrival, and off the field at 14:40.</i>		
<i>[Signature]</i>		



Y. S. A. T. Log Book Posted By At. VR Certified Airworthy By At. Ve

Countersigned \_\_\_\_\_ 000114

Form 32 1M2-42  
(Copy)

MACKENZIE AIR SERVICE LIMITED  
98th STREET DIVISION

Cont. Sheet, No.

AIRPLANE AND ENGINE INSPECTION REPORT

Station	EDMONTON	Plane No.	CPD
TRIP (In / Out)	9/12/42	DATE (In / Out)	

CHECK TO BE DONE (circle one)      1    2    ③    4    5

Mechanic Inspector

MAINTENANCE SHEET #1 - PART ②

CHECK LUX EXTINGUISHER

JWB m/p

PORT NAV. LIGHT - REPLACE RED GLASS

JWB m/p

CHECK ALL DEICER BOOTS FOR CONDITION

JWB m/p

CLEAN CABIN

CLEAN COCKPIT

DRAIN SUMPS BEFORE DX

Remove Battery box floor clean out

JWB m/p

Drain servo tank

JWB m/p

Remove both 4 way valves

JWB m/p

Repack " " " " (accessory shop)

JWB m/p

Replace " " " valves

JWB m/p

Refill servo tank

JWB m/p

Paint both box

JWB m/p

Fasten Lux Fire Extinguisher holder in rear of cabin

Hydraulic Fluid on floor came from four way valve - 2 lines had not been tightened on installation - found after pressure had been built up, job.

Form 32 1M2-42  
(Copy)

MACKENZIE AIR SERVICE LIMITED  
98th STREET DIVISION

Cont. Sheet No.

AIRPLANE AND ENGINE INSPECTION REPORT

*W. J. Fowle*  
*2/1/43*

Station EDMONTON Plane No. CPD  
TRIP (In 9/12/42 DATE (In \_\_\_\_\_ Out \_\_\_\_\_)  
(Out \_\_\_\_\_)

CHECK TO BE DONE (circle one) 1 2 3 4 5

Mechanic Inspector

SHEET # 4 RADIO

# 3 CHECK - RADIO EQUIP.

REPAIR BENDIX LOOP HOUSING.

<u>Radio Compass installed after check</u>	<u>RD</u>
<u>Aut. Loop Amplifier</u>	<u>RD</u>
<u>Loop for Compass</u>	<u>RD</u>

M.A.S. Ltd. Log Book Posted by

*W. J. Fowle*

Form 32 1M2-42  
(Copy)

MACKENZIE AIR SERVICE LIMITED  
98th STREET DIVISION

Cont. Sheet No.

AIRPLANE AND ENGINE INSPECTION REPORT

*W. M. M. S.*  
*7/11/43*

Station	<u>EDMONTON</u>	Plane No.	<u>CPD</u>
TRIP (In/Out)	<u>9/12/42</u>	DATE (In/Out)	

CHECK TO BE DONE (circle one)      1      2      3      4      5

ENG. SHOP SHEET # 2

Mechanic Inspector

REMOVE ENG. # 3088 - R. SIDE.

INSTALL " # 3092 - " "

FIRE WALL WASHED DOWN  
TAIL PIPE & INTENSIFIER TUBE  
CHECKED & REPAIRED  
GENERATOR, SERVICED  
STARTER SERVICED  
VACUUM PUMP SERVICED  
SWITCH JUNCTION BOX REMOVED  
FROM OLD MOUNT & INSTALLED  
ON NEW.

HYDRAULIC PUMP ~~REMOVED~~ OFF  
OLD ENG. WAS PUT ON  
NEW (NOT SERVICED)

ALL CONTROLS WERE  
ADJUSTED & LOCKED.  
PROPS. WERE ADJUSTED &  
LOCKED

OIL SUMP PLUG CHECKED  
FOR LOCKING, ALSO OIL  
RAD.

15 GALS OF 120 OIL PUT  
IN RIGHT OIL TANK.

*F.M.S.*

RUN UP. TOM M<sup>c</sup>L.

CANADIAN PACIFIC AIR LINES, LIMITED

PILOT'S PLANE REPORT AND WORK ORDER

Line CPD Trip IV Date Dec 15 Pilot Kulich 2nd Pilot Holland Stewardess Young

MOTOR DATA

TRIP DATA

	L. MOTOR	R. MOTOR	FROM	TO	LEFT	ARR.	TIME
OIL TEMP.	150	150	X5	X5	09:05	10:30	1:45
OIL PRES.	78	78	X5	X5	11:30	12:45	1:10
GAS PRES.	4 1/2	4 3/4					
CYL. HEAD TEMP.	360	360					
CARB. AIR TEMP.	90	90					
MANIFOLD PRES.	25 3/4	25 3/4					
R.P.M.	1790	1790					
IND. AIR SPEED	160						
AIR TEMP.	+25'						
			TOTAL				2:58'

INST. VACUUM 1 3/4 - 4 - 4

DEICER PRES. 8

MOTORS OK

PLANE

INSTRUMENTS

RADIO Auxiliary Radio light not working.

CONDITIONS: Good—Poor—Variable  
(Circle One)

STATIC: Light—Moderate—Heavy  
(Circle One)

MISC. Close right cockpit window before it breaks.

CANADIAN PACIFIC AIR LINES, LIMITED

PILOT'S PLANE REPORT AND WORK ORDER

Plane CPD Trip III Date Dec 14 Pilot Kubish 2nd Pilot Holland Stewardess Young

MOTOR DATA

TRIP DATA

	L. MOTOR	R. MOTOR	FROM	TO	LEFT	ARR.	TIME
OIL TEMP.	150	150	N.R.	X5	1500	17:20	2:20
OIL PRES.	30	98					
GAS PRES.	5	5					
CYL. HEAD TEMP.	360	350					
CARB. AIR TEMP.	90	90					
MANIFOLD PRES.	25 3/4	25 3/4					
R.P.M.	1790	1790					
IND. AIR SPEED	160						
AIR TEMP.	425						
			TOTAL				2:20

INST. VACUUM

1 3/4 - 4 - 4

DEICER PRES.

8

MOTORS

PLANE

INSTRUMENTS

RADIO

CONDITIONS: Good—Poor—Variable  
(Circle One)

STATIC: Light—Moderate—Heavy  
(Circle One)

MISC.

wing flap lever not getting into neutral position.  
Undercarriage levers not blowing till 12 inches manifold -  
Undercarriage let down lever sticking when releasing undercart.

# MAINTENANCE TRANSCRIPT

Check Made at <b>XS</b>	Station	Date <b>19-12-42</b>
Check Completed (Circle One)		<input checked="" type="radio"/> 1    2    3    4    5
Time Since Last No. 3 Check		<b>40-30</b>
Time Since Last No. 4 Check		<b>199-35</b>
Time Since Last Oil Change		<b>40-30</b>
	L	R
Time Since Last Overhaul (Engines)	<b>205-50</b>	<b>40-30</b>
Quarts of Oil Drained		

## WORK DONE, REPAIRS MADE AND PARTS REPLACED

Mech. Station

*gas sumps drained  
via DX.*

## WORK NECESSARY AT NEXT STATION

C.P.A.L. Log Book Posted by *[Signature]*

Certified Airworthy By *[Signature]*

CANADIAN PACIFIC AIR LINES, LIMITED

PILOT'S PLANE REPORT AND WORK ORDER

Plane *CPD* Trip *TH-15<sup>th</sup>* Date *Dec 17/42* Pilot *Kubrick* 2nd Pilot *Holland* Stewardess *Young*

MOTOR DATA

TRIP DATA

	L. MOTOR	R. MOTOR	FROM	TO	LEFT	ARR.	TIME
OIL TEMP.	130	150	VR	X5	08:35	11:10	2:15
OIL PRES.	78	80	X5	X5	11:45	13:10	1.25
AS PRES.	4 1/2	5	X5	X5	14:53	15:00	1.08
CYL. HEAD TEMP.	365	360	X5	V.R	16:20	18:10	1.50
CARB. AIR TEMP.	90	90					
MANIFOLD PRES.	25 3/4	25 1/2					
R.P.M.	1730	1730					
IND. AIR SPEED	160						
AIR TEMP.							
			TOTAL				

INST. VACUUM *1 3/4 -4 -4* DEICER PRES. *8*

MOTORS *O.K. — set up props 100 revs. for emergency operation*

PLANE *Please fix centre cupboard door in rear* *df*

INSTRUMENTS

RADIO *10<sup>m</sup>*

CONDITIONS: Good—Poor—Variable  
(Circle One)

STATIC: Light—Moderate—Heavy  
(Circle One)

MISC. *penic mark across the beam bracket for 15" manifold pressure*  
*How about some one signing the journey log book?*

CANADIAN PACIFIC AIR LINES, LIMITED

PILOT'S PLANE REPORT AND WORK ORDER

Plane CPD Trip 4 Date Dec 19 Pilot Hubert 2nd Pilot Howard Stewardess Young

MOTOR DATA

TRIP DATA

	L. MOTOR	R. MOTOR	FROM	TO	LEFT	ARR.	TIME
OIL TEMP.	150	150	XS	VR	1300	16:47	2:47
OIL PRES.	78	78					
GAS PRES.	4 3/4	5					
HEAD TEMP.	360	365					
CARB. AIR TEMP.	90	90					
MANIFOLD PRES.	25 1/2	25 1/2					
R.P.M.	1800	1800					
IND. AIR SPEED	160						
AIR TEMP.	+29						
			TOTAL				

INST. VACUUM 1 3/4 - 4 - 4 DEICER PRES. 8

MOTORS

PLANE

*Handwritten mark*

INSTRUMENTS

RADIO

CONDITIONS: Good—Poor—Variable  
(Circle One)

STATIC: Light—Moderate—Heavy  
(Circle One)

MISC.

# PILOT'S PLANE REPORT AND WORK ORDER

Plane <sup>C.P.D.</sup> TV-12 Trip → Date Dec 16 Pilot Kubrick 2nd Pilot Hall Stewardess Young

### MOTOR DATA

### TRIP DATA

	L. MOTOR	R. MOTOR	FROM	TO	LEFT	ARR.	TIME
OIL TEMP.	150	150	X.S	V.R	10:32	12:35	2:03
OIL PRES.	80	78					
FAS PRES.	4 3/4	5'					
CYL. HEAD TEMP.	375'	375'					
CARB. AIR TEMP.	90	90					
MANIFOLD PRES.	25'	25'					
R.P.M.	1800	1800					
IND. AIR SPEED	150						
AIR TEMP.	+12						
			TOTAL				2:03

INST. VACUUM 1 3/4-4-4

DEICER PRES. ✓

MOTORS OK.

PLANE

INSTRUMENTS

RADIO Am Radio light suit.

CONDITIONS: Good—Poor—Variable  
(Circle One)

STATIC: Light—Moderate—Heavy  
(Circle One)

MISC.

# PILOT'S PLANE REPORT AND WORK ORDER

Plane CPD Trip III+IV Date Dec 18 Pilot Kutner 2nd Pilot Holland Stewardess Young

MOTOR DATA

TRIP DATA

	L. MOTOR	R. MOTOR	FROM	TO	LEFT	ARR.	TIME
OIL TEMP.	150	150	V.R.	X5	09:00	11:00	2:00
OIL PRES.	80	78	X5	X5	11:40	12:45	1:05
GAS PRES.	4 1/2	5	X5	X5	13:10	14:50	1:20
L. HEAD TEMP.	355	360					
CARB. AIR TEMP.	90	90					
MANIFOLD PRES.	25	25					
R.P.M.	1800	1800					
IND. AIR SPEED	155						
AIR TEMP.	+6						
			TOTAL				

INST. VACUUM 1 3/4 - 4 - 4

DEICER PRES. 81

4:25

MOTORS

PLANE

INSTRUMENTS

RADIO

CONDITIONS: Good—Poor—Variable  
(Circle One)

STATIC: Light—Moderate—Heavy  
(Circle One)

MISC.

*How about the combings that were loose on our arrival at Pt George?*

# MAINTENANCE TRANSCRIPT

Check Made at <b>VR</b>	Station	Date <b>Dec 19/42</b>
Check Completed (Circle One)		1    2 <input checked="" type="radio"/> 3    4    5
Time Since Last No. 3 Check		43.17
Time Since Last No. 4 Check		201.21
Time Since Last Oil Change		43.17
	L	R
Time Since Last Overhaul (Engines)		208.37                      43.17
Quarts of Oil Drained		

WORK DONE, REPAIRS MADE AND PARTS REPLACED	Mech.	Station
2 pints servo fluid added		WGH
Refill small fire extinguisher		WGH
Replace entrance light at door		TSE
2 qts deicer fluid added		WGH
Repair broken bonding wire on Carb <sup>air</sup> intake & engine		TSE
Tighten oil pressure line connection opposite left mag - right engine		WGH
Pump up tail wheel also - put in new air valve		TSE
Paint backs of props		J.E.G.
<b>WORK NECESSARY AT NEXT STATION</b>		
Investigate blue color on right dump valve outlet		
Dump valve on right tank probably leaking		
Investigate servo oil leaks in #3 compartment		

# MAINTENANCE TRANSCRIPT

Check Made at <b>W/R</b>	Station	Date <b>Dec 17 1955</b>
Check Completed (Circle One)	1	2 <b>(2)</b> 3 4 5
Time Since Last No. 3 Check	36.06	
Time Since Last No. 4 Check	195.11	
Time Since Last Oil Change	36.06	
	L	R
Time Since Last Overhaul (Engines)	201.26	36.06
Quarts of Oil Drained		

WORK DONE, REPAIRS MADE AND PARTS REPLACED	Mech.	Station
1 pint servo added to main tank	W.G.H.	
2 qts de-icer fluid added	W.G.H.	
Repair center cupboard door	M.D.	
Cleared out dirt from de-icer pump valves but flow still very sluggish no pressure from pump	W.G.H.	
Pump up tail oleo strut to 6"	W.G.H.	
Loosen & set up & down landing gear & switch both wheels	W.G.H.	
Removed & repaired & replaced foot rear seat	J.A.S.	
Tightened loose bolts on #4 & 3 cylinder exhaust collar		
Replaced #9 cylinder Ford mount & bracket. Tightened loose bolt in mount & bracket.	T.S.F.	
<b>WORK NECESSARY AT NEXT STATION</b>		
Removed & replaced foot exhaust stack after welding on patch over hole in exhaust & clean tubes	T.S.F.	

C.P.A.L. Log Book Posted by J. V. Munn Certified Airworthy By J. V. Munn



# MAINTENANCE TRANSCRIPT

Check Made at	Station	Date
Check Completed (Circle One)		1    2    3    4    5
Time Since Last No. 3 Check		24.30
Time Since Last No. 4 Check		183.35
Time Since Last Oil Change		24.30
	L	R
Time Since Last Overhaul (Engines)		189.50                      24.30
Quarts of Oil Drained		

## WORK DONE, REPAIRS MADE AND PARTS REPLACED

Mech.                      Station

## WORK NECESSARY AT NEXT STATION

C.P.A.L. Log Book Posted by.....

Certified Airworthy By.....

000128



# CANADIAN PACIFIC AIRLINES AIRPLANE and ENGINE INSPECTION REPORT

Station \_\_\_\_\_  
Date { In December 16<sup>d</sup>  
Out \_\_\_\_\_

Plane No. C.P.A.  
Trip { In Wednesday  
Out \_\_\_\_\_

CHECK TO BE DONE (Circle One)                      1                      2                      3                      4                      5

### WORK TO BE DONE and ADDITIONAL WORK COMPLETED

	Mechanic	Inspector
<u>TCRand TCS ← C.P.A.</u>		
Check if Done by Each Line		
Remove all soiled seat covers ✓		
Remove soiled linen from lavatory ✓		
Vacuum rugs and seats ✓		
Clan with pyrene spots on rugs and seats ✓		
Wash trays with soap and water ✓		
Wash all food compartments ✓		
Wash front and rear bulk heads and leatherette along side walls ✓		
Polish sink and lavatory seat ✓		
Empty and clean <del>lavatory</del> all ash trays. ✓		
Polish overhead rail on blanket rack. ✓		
Empty and clean lavatory and put in deodrant. ✓		
Wash and polish windows inside and out and window sills. ✓		
Clean cock-pit. ✓		
Clean and rewrap oxygen masks. ✓		
Replace cards. ✓		
Clean out pockets ✓		
Check no. of Blankets <u>8, 8</u> Pillows <u>10</u> Oxygen masks <u>OK.</u>		
Cover floor with canvass ✓		
Done by <u>Margueritte &amp; Jeanne</u>		
<p>Please note that there were 2 blankets missing when the aircraft arrived Vancouver. <u>S.M.K.</u></p>		

29

X

DATE

CANADIAN PACIFIC AIRLINES

PILOT, Kubrick ..... FLIGHT TEST UNDER HOOD .....  
 AIRCRAFT, 4411 ..... STATION, VR ..... DATE, Aug 18 1942 .....

TIME UNDER HOOD, Variable ..... GRADE EACH ITEM "A", "B", "C", "D",

1. Take-off.....
2. Take-off (cut one engine).....
3. Steep right and left 180° turns (Bank of 45° or over).....
4. Steep right and left 180° turns (cut one engine).....
5. Recovery from stalls, skids, slips, steep spirals, unusual manoeuvres.....
6. Glide (at minimum airspeed).....
7. Glide (at maximum rate).....
8. Ability to locate and identify beacon course from unknown position (indicate method used).....
9. Ability to locate cone of silence at minimum altitude and simulate descent over field on both engines.....On one engine.....  
 (Grade determined by net result ratings of items 12.)
10. Cut one engine when over field on final approach...
11. Instrument Approach

	Altitudes		GRADE
	TOLERANCE ALLOWED	PREScribed	
a. Initial Approach	50 feet	VR to MR @ 8000 then to 11000	B
b. Altitude Prior to turn	50 "		
c. Procedure Turn	50 "	let down at VR, procedure turn to old field	B
d. Return to Station	nil		
e. Over Station	nil		
f. Over Field	nil	let down XT, crosswind, turn to field	B+
g. Initial Approach	10°		
h. Procedure Turn(out)	5°		
i. Procedure Turn (in)	0°		
j. Return to Station	5°		
k. Airspeed	5 mph		
l. Rate of Descent	100 feet		
m. Course from Station to Field	5°		
n. Timing (Station to Pull Out)	sec		
o. Pull Out			
p. Technique in locating Station (Initial)			A
q. Technique in locating Station (Final)			B
Signal Reaction			C
Signal Volume			D
t. Knowledge of Procedure			B

12 Weather and conditions prevailing at time. Variable .....

13. Instruments used. All .....

14. Remarks (attitude, etc.) Is not confident, or familiar enough with procedure. .....

Kuyon  
 Check Pilot.

DATE

CANADIAN PACIFIC AIRLINES

PILOT Kubrick FLIGHT TEST UNDER HOOD VR DATE Aug 23 1942  
AIRCRAFT 114 H STATION VR

TIME UNDER HOOD 1/5 mins GRADE EACH ITEM "A", "B", "C", "D",

1. Take-off.....
2. Take-off (cut one engine).....
3. Steep right and left 180° turns (Bank of 45° or over).....
4. Steep right and left 180° turns (cut one engine).....
5. Recovery from stalls, skids, slips, steep spirals, unusual manoeuvres.....
6. Glide (at minimum airspeed).....
7. Glide (at maximum rate).....
8. Ability to locate and identify beacon course from unknown position (indicate method used).....
9. Ability to locate cone of silence at minimum altitude and simulate descent over field on both engines.....On one engine.....  
(Grade determined by net result ratings of items 12.)
10. Cut one engine when over field on final approach.....
11. Instrument Approach

	Altitudes			GRADE
	TOLERANCE ALLOWED	PRESCRIBED	TLOWN	
a. Initial Approach	50 feet			C
b. Altitude Prior to turn	50 "			C
c. Procedure Turn	50 "			B
d. Return to Station	nil			B
e. Over Station	nil			B
f. Over Field	nil			B
GYRO HEADINGS				
g. Initial Approach	10°			
h. Procedure Turn(out)	5°			
i. Procedure Turn (in)	0°			
j. Return to Station	5°			
k. Airspeed	5 mph			
l. Rate of Descent	100 feet			
m. Course from Station to Field	5°			
n. Timing (Station to Pull Out)	sec			
o. Pull Out				
p. Technique in locating Station (Initial)				B
q. Technique in locating Station (Final)				B
r. Signal Reaction				A
s. Signal Volume				A
t. Knowledge of Procedure				B

12. Weather and conditions prevailing at time..... fine, slightly rough lower levels

13. Instruments used..... All

14. Remarks (attitude, etc.)..... Wants to improve - lacks practice and instruction  
- instructed to take 2 hours weekly practice -

Reynolds  
Check Pilot.

11 X

DATE \_\_\_\_\_ CANADIAN PACIFIC AIRLINES

PILOT *Kubiczek* FLIGHT TEST UNDER HOOD  
 AIRCRAFT *TCS* STATION *VR* DATE *Sept 13 1948*

- TIME UNDER HOOD *50* GRADE EACH ITEM "A", "B", "C", "D",
1. Take-off.....
  2. Take-off (cut one engine).....
  3. Steep right and left 180° turns (Bank of 45° or over).....
  4. Steep right and left 180° turns (cut one engine).....
  5. Recovery from stalls, skids, slips, steep spirals, unusual manoeuvres.....
  6. Glide (at minimum airspeed).....
  7. Glide (at maximum rate).....
  8. Ability to locate and identify beacon course from unknown position (indicate method used).....
  9. Ability to locate cone of silence at minimum altitude and simulate descent over field on both engines.....On one engine.....  
 (Grade determined by net result ratings of items 1, 2.)
  10. Cut one engine when over field on final approach.....
  11. Instrument Approach

	Altitudes			GRADE
	TOLERANCE ALLOWED	PRESCRIBED	FLOWN	
a. Initial Approach	50 feet			A
b. Altitude Prior to turn	50 "			A
c. Procedure Turn	50 "			
d. Return to Station	nil			
e. Over Station	nil			B
f. Over Field	nil			
		GYRO HEADING		
g. Initial Approach	10°			A
h. Procedure Turn(out)	5°			B
i. Procedure Turn (in)	0°			A
j. Return to Station	5°			A
k. Airspeed	5 mph			B
l. Rate of Descent	100 feet			B
m. Course from Station to Field	5°			C
n. Timing (Station to Pull Out)	sec			B
o. Pull Out				
p. Technique in locating Station (Initial)				A
q. Technique in locating Station (Final)				B
r. Signal Reaction				B
s. Signal Volume				B
t. Knowledge of Procedure				A

- 12 Weather and conditions prevailing at time. *CAVU*
- 13 Instruments used. *PCC*
- 14 Remarks (attitude, etc.) *Good. Pilot is keen. Needs practice, smoothing out, and close to cone work.*

Check Pilot. *Kenny*

*lit down off north leg of Sydney, spoiled by misalignment N course, transferred to east leg of VR.*

20 X

DATE

CANADIAN PACIFIC AIRLINES

PILOT... Kubick ..... FLIGHT TEST UNDER HOOD .....  
 AIRCRAFT... TCS ..... STATION... VR ..... DATE... Oct 12 1944

TIME UNDER HOOD... 1.45 ..... GRADE EACH ITEM "A", "B", "C", "D",

1. Take-off.....
2. Take-off (cut one engine)..... B
3. Steep right and left 180° turns (Bank of 45° or over)..... B+
4. Steep right and left 180° turns (cut one engine).....
5. Recovery from stalls, skids, slips, steep spirals, unusual manoeuvres..... A
6. Glide (at minimum airspeed).....
7. Glide (at maximum rate).....
8. Ability to locate and identify beacon course from unknown position (indicate method used)..... Combination A
9. Ability to locate cone of silence at minimum altitude and simulate descent over field on both engines..... B+ ..... On one engine.....  
 (Grade determined by net result ratings of items 12.)
10. Cut one engine when over field on final approach... .. B+
11. Instrument Approach

	Altitudes			GRADE
	TOLERANCE ALLOWED	PRESCRIBED	FLOWN	
a. Initial Approach	50 feet			<u>A-</u>
b. Altitude Prior to turn	50 "			<u>A-</u>
c. Procedure Turn	50 "			<u>A-</u>
d. Return to Station	nil			<u>A-</u>
e. Over Station	nil			<u>A</u>
f. Over Field	nil			<u>A</u>
		GYRO HEADINGS		
g. Initial Approach	10°			<u>A</u>
h. Procedure Turn(out)	5°			<u>A</u>
i. Procedure Turn (in)	0°			<u>A</u>
j. Return to Station	5°			<u>A</u>
k. Airspeed	5 mph			<u>A</u>
l. Rate of Descent	100 feet			<u>A-</u>
m. Course from Station to Field	5°			
n. Timing (Station to Pull Out)	sec			
o. Pull Out			<u>too much power</u>	<u>B</u>
p. Technique in locating Station (Initial)				<u>A</u>
q. Technique in locating Station (Final)				<u>A</u>
r. Signal Reaction				<u>A</u>
s. Signal Volume				<u>A</u>
t. Knowledge of Procedure				<u>A</u>

12 Weather and conditions prevailing at time..... CAVW - Sm

13 Instruments used..... All

14 Remarks (attitude, etc.)..... Very good - marked improvement since last check.

E.W.K. Check Pilot. Kubick

73 X

DATE

CANADIAN PACIFIC AIRLINES

*info.*

FLIGHT TEST UNDER HOOD

PILOT *Kulinski* ..... AIRCRAFT ..... STATION ..... DATE *Dec 14/48*

TIME UNDER HOOD *170* ..... GRADE EACH ITEM "A", "B", "C", "D",

1. Take-off.....
2. Take-off (cut one engine).....
3. Steep right and left 180° turns (Bank of 45° or over).....
4. Steep right and left 180° turns (cut one engine).....
5. Recovery from stalls, skids, slips, steep spirals, unusual manoeuvres.....
6. Glide (at minimum airspeed).....
7. Glide (at maximum rate).....
8. Ability to locate and identify beacon course from unknown position (indicate method used).....
9. Ability to locate cone of silence at minimum altitude and simulate descent over field on both engines.....On one engine.....  
 (Grade determined by net result ratings of item 12.)
10. Cut one engine when over field on final approach...
11. Instrument Approach

Altitudes

	TOLERANCE ALLOWED	PRESCRIBED	FLOWN	GRADE
a. Initial Approach	50 feet			A
b. Altitude Prior to turn	50 "			A
c. Procedure Turn	50 "			A
d. Return to Station	nil			A
e. Over Station	nil			A
f. Over Field	nil			A
GYRO HEADINGS				
g. Initial Approach	10°			A
h. Procedure Turn(out)	5°			A
i. Procedure Turn (in)	0°			A
j. Return to Station	5°			A
k. Airspeed	5 mph			A
l. Rate of Descent	100 feet			A
m. Course from Station to Field	5°			A
n. Timing (Station to Pull Out)	sec			A
o. Pull Out				A
p. Technique in locating Station (Initial)				A
q. Technique in locating Station (Final)				A
r. Signal Reaction				A
s. Signal Volume				A
t. Knowledge of Procedure				A

12. Weather and conditions prevailing at time.....
13. Instruments used.....
14. Remarks (attitude, etc.).....

*E. W. Kulinski*

Check Pilot.

23

K.

DATE

CANADIAN PACIFIC AIR LINES.  
 WESTERN LINES

Pilot Kubicek PILOT ENROUTE CHECK REPORT  
 Date Dec 13 1942 Grade (A)  
 Plane TCS Trip 3-13 From VR To XJ

Poor  
 Satisfactory  
 Good  
 Excellent

1. Appearance  Excellent
2. Pilots Equipment  Excellent
3. Preparation of Flight  Excellent
4. Taxiing  Excellent
5. Runup  Excellent
6. Takeoff  Excellent
7. Climb  Excellent
8. Cruising  Excellent
9. Approach  Excellent
10. Landing  Excellent
11. Radio  Excellent
12. Cockpit Procedure  Excellent
13. Leaving Cockpit  Excellent
14. Weather conditions etc. prevailing AD/50  
 during flight. high fly wind light clouds
15. Steps to be taken to correct any weak point

CAPTAIN E.W. Kubicek

CHECK PILOT [Signature]

NIGHT

DATE Dec 13 1942

CANADIAN PACIFIC AIR LINES.  
 WESTERN LINES

		Poor	Satisfactory	Good	Excellent
Pilot	<u>KUBICKI</u>				
PILOT ENROUTE CHECK REPORT					
Date	<u>Dec 13 1942</u>				
Grade					
Plane	<u>CPT</u>				
Trip	<u>2nd-12</u>				
From	<u>XJ</u>				
To	<u>XY</u>				
1. Appearance					
2. Pilots Equipment					
3. Preparation of Flight					
4. Taxiing	<u>Night qualification flight, including XJ YE QH XY - this officer fully competent.</u>				
5. Runup	<u>No passengers XJ-XY.</u>				
6. Takeoff					
7. Climb					
8. Cruising					
9. Approach					
10. Landing					
11. Radio					
12. Cockpit Procedure					
13. Leaving Cockpit					
14. Weather conditions etc. prevailing during flight.					
15. Steps to be taken to correct any weak point					
CAPTAIN					
CHECK PILOT	<u>Kuzgo</u>				

12m

Wednesday  
15  
April

Exhibit H. (7 pages).  
sent to be photographed.

27-2.43,  
Km.

000138

# APRIL

## MARCH

S M T W T F S

## MAY

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30	31	..	..	..	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
..	..	..	1	2	3	4
5	6	7	8	9	10	11
12	13	14	15	16	17	18
19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	..	..
..	..	..	..	..	..	..

S	M	T	W	T	F	S
..	..	..	..	..	1	2
3	4	5	6	7	8	9
10	11	12	13	14	15	16
17	18	19	20	21	22	23
24	25	26	27	28	29	30
31	..	..	..	..	..	..

1942

EXHIBIT H.

WILL BE INSERTED LATER.

7. Items

EXHIBIT I.

Department of Transport Meteorological Division,  
Vancouver B. C. Weather Map. Dec. 20, 1942.

*16th witness*

