

CLASSIFIED

File No. Dossier 28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION
Volume 39 From-De 84-06-01 To-À 84-06-08



18849

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION
Vol 39

MGID VOLS ACCESSION NO. 64

CLOSED
FERMÉE

ACCESS TO INFORMATION
ACCÈS À L'INFORMATION
EXAMINED BY / EXAMINÉ PAR
M. Boudoin
DATE 2007-03-07

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
VOLS ACCESSION NO. 18849
MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TITLE—TITRE:

DISARMAMENT -
MEASURES -
PLANS AND PROPOSALS -
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION (INITIATIVES)

DESARMEMENT -
MESURES -
PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS -
TRUDEAU MISSION DE PAIX (INITIATIVES)

Retention period-Période de retention:

20Y(7A-13D)J



Government
of Canada

Gouvernement
du Canada

CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET

DATED FROM
À COMPTER DU 84-06-01 TO
JUSQU'AU 84-06-08

AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - À METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER

DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS

FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTÉRIEURE VOIR

FILE NO. - DOSSIER N°

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION.

VOLUME

40

28-6-1-Trudeau

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

ACC	280786
FILE	DOSSIER
28-6-1-TRUDEAU	
Peace Mission	

file

R E S T R I C T E D

FM WSAW UMGR1164 08JUN84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO BGRAD BPEST MOSCO PRGUE LDN WSHDC PARIS BONN BNATO ROME

PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RGB RBD RBR RSD IDR

REF YOURTEL IDA0829 01JUN OURTEL UMGR1134 05JUN

---PMS INITIATIVE:LETTERS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES
AT SOCIAL OCCASION 27JUN VICE FORMIN WIEJACZ TOOK INITIAITVE IN
ADVISING ME THAT PMS LET WAS FORWARDED TO JARUZELSKI ON SAME DAY IT
WAS RECEIVED (VIZ 05JUN).WIEJACZ EMPHASIZED THAT CONTENTS WERE BEING
CLOSELY EXAMINED AND IT WAS QUOTE LIKELY UNQUOTE THAT REPLY WOULD
BE FORTHCOMING.IN RESPONSE WE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT SUCH WOULD BE THE
CASE.ON DEPARTING WIEJACZ SAID WE MIGHT BE HEARING FROM HIM SOONER
RATHER THAN LATER.

2.MFA KNOWS THAT I SHALL BE IN BRLIN NEXT WEEK AND THAT ARMOUR IS
IN CHARGE.A REPLY THAT SOON COULD BE PREMATURE BUT IN ANY EVENT WE
WILL REPORT DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY OCCUR

MCLAINE

CCC/127 081520Z UMGR1164

Ab

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

AC 336163	REF	DATE
FILE	28-6-1- Trudeau	DOSSIER
PEACE MISSION		

R E S T R I C T E D

FM COPEN YJGR0730 08JUN84

TO EXTOTT IDA DELIVER BY 081630

INFO OSLO MDRID PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RSD RSR IDR IDAO

REF YOURTEL IDA0825 01JUN

---PM INITIATIVE:LETTERS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES

IN ABSENCE OF PM SCHLUTER, AMBASSADOR DELIVERED TEXT OF LET 08JUN
TO HENNING GOTTLIEB, DEPUTY UNDER-SECTY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND
SECURITY POLICY, OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER.

2. HE SAID THAT PM AND GOVT HAD FOLLOWED PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE
WITH GREAT INTEREST AND APPRECIATION. HE WELCOMED THIS FURTHER
EXPRESSION OF MR. TRUDEAUS VIEWS. HE WOULD DRAW LET TO SCHLUTERS
ATTN IMMEDIATELY ON HIS RETURN. HE THOUGHT SCHLUTER WOULD WISH TO
SUPPORT MAIN THRUST OF INITIATIVE IN ANY WAY POSSIBLE AND ENQUIRED
WHETHER WE WERE SEEKING DANISH PUBLIC DECLARATION OF SUPPORT FOR
TEN PRINCIPLES, ALONG WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN SOME CO-ORDINATED OR
JOINT MANNER. IF SO, GOTTLIEB THOUGHT DANISH STATEMENT WOULD BE
READILY FORTHCOMING.

3. WE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE FOR MR. TRUDEAUS SUCCESSOR TO DECIDE ON
ANY SPECIFIC FOLLOW-UP ACTION IN RELATION TO THESE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE
EAST/WEST RELATIONS BUT CLEARLY ANY PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR
PRINCIPLES WOULD BE HELPFUL IN TERMS OF INFLUENCING MOSCO AND WSHDC.
I STRESSED THAT ANY FURTHER DANISH VIEWS ON HOW EFFORTS MIGHT BE

...2



PAGE TWO YJGR0730 CONF

SUSTAINED OR DIRECTED WOULD BE WELCOME BY CDN AUTHORITIES IN WHAT
SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS A CONTINUING CDN PRE-OCCUPATION.

CCC/237 081534Z YJGR0730

ACC	RE	DATE
FILE	28-6-1-Trudeau DOSSIER	
PEACE MISSION		

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

R E S T R I C T E D

FM SPORE UCGR1590 08JUN84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD PSR IDR

REF YOURTEL IDA0823 07JUN

---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE

TEXT OF PMS LET WAS DELIVERED 05JUN TO PM LEE THROUGH PERM SEC,
MFA, AS AGREED IN TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH LATTER.

CCC/094 080744Z UCGR1590

FILE	2861-Trademan	PEACE
MISSION		

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

R E S T R I C T E D

FM BUCST UYGR1076 08JUN84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/NDACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RSD RSR IDR IDAO

REF YOURTEL IDA0827 01JUN

---PM INITIATIVE:LET TO CEAUS~~ESCU~~SCU

COPY OF TEXT OF LET WAS DELIVERED 07JUN TO MME GROZA, VICE MIN, MFA,
IN VIEW OF CONTINUED ABSENCE OF MIN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, STEFAN ANDREI,
WHO WENT TO WSAW AFTER VISIT TO MOSCO. MME GROZA PROMISED THAT
PRES CEAUSESCU WOULD RECEIVE LET AS SOON AS HE RETURNED FROM WSAW.
HER PRELIMINARY REACTION WAS THAT ROMANIAN AUTHORITIES ARE IN AGMT
WITH ALL TEN PRINCIPLES.

CCC/181 081125Z UYGR1076

336164	
FILE	86-1-Trudeau
DOSSIER	
PEACE MISSION	

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BPEST ZWGR0919 08JUN84

TO EXTOTT/IDA

INFO OSLO/FOR ICELAND LSBON ANKRA BGRAD/FOR SOFIA WSAW PCOOTT/FOWLER
BGRAD NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RGB RHD RBR RSD RSR IDAO IDR
REF YOURTEL 0829 01JUN

---PM INITIATIVE:LETTERS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES
ON JUN 5 I CALLED ON DEPT FOREIGN MIN ESTERGALYOS(NOTES WERE TAKEN
BY LAJOS NAGY AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE TO CDA AND HEAD OF NA DIVISION
OF MFA),AND HANDED HIM COPY OF PMS LET ADDRESSED TO FIRST SECTY
JANOS KADAR.EXPLAINING GENESIS OF LET AND MENTIONING LEADERS WHO
HAVE RECD SIMILAR MISSIVE I INDICATED TO ESTERGALYOS,THAT IN VIEW
GYULA HORNS RECENT TV INTERVIEW(OURTEL 0889 06JUN)IN WHICH HE HAD
UNDERLINED NEED TO GET BACK TO BASICS,PMS INITIATIVE AND COMMUNICATION
TO KADAR SEEMED PARTICULARLY TIMELY.WE WERE INTERESTED IN HUNGARYS
VIEWS AND ANXIOUS TO COOPERATE IN BREAKING LOG JAM IN WHICH E/W
RELATIONS FOUND THEMSELVES.

2.ESTERGALYOS THANKED ME FOR LETTER,READ IT AND SAID IT WOULD BE
TRANSLATED IMMEDIATELY AND TRANSMITTED TO KADAR.STATING THAT HIS
COMMENTS WERE PURELY PERSONAL AND REFERRING TO PMS TEN PTS AS THE
QUOTE TEN COMMANDMENTS UNQUOTE,ESTERGALYOS SAID HE WAS SURE HUNGS
WERE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT WITH VIEWS EXPRESSED IN PMS LET.IF BOTH
SIDES CONTINUED TO CONCENTRATE ON ROCKET ISSUE ALONE,WE WOULD GET

...2

PAGE-TWO-ZWGR0919-CONF

NOWHERE.THERE OBVIOUSLY WAS A NEED TO CONCENTRATE ON POINTS WHERE
COMMON GROUND EXISTS.BUT SAID ESTERGALYOS REPEATING A FAMILIAR
THEME,IN PAST MONTHS HUNGARY AND ITS ALLIES HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED.
WEST,PARTICULARLY AMERICANS,HAD TOLD THEM NOT/NOT TO HEED RHETORIC
COMING OUT OF WSHDC BUT TO BASE JUDGEMENT ON ACTIONS.A CERTAIN
LEVEL OF OPTIMISM HAD EMERGED OUT OF ANDREOTTI/CRAXI VISIT BUT
THESE HOPES HAD BEEN DEFLATED BY THE MIXED AND CONFUSING MESSAGE
COMING OUT OF WSHDC.BPEST REALLY DID NOT/NOT KNOW HOW TO INTERPRET
THE MIXED SIGNALS FROM WSHDC.OBVIOUSLY MANY OF THE HARSH NOTES
REFLECTED THE REALITIES OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL CAMPAIGN BUT WAS
THISALL?WITH NIXON,WPO HAD BEEN ABLE TO TALK;WITH REAGAN REPUBLICANS
IT WAS NOT/NOT,AS THEY SEEMED TO BE MORE AGRESSIVE AND NATIONALISTIC
AND DETERMINED TO ASSERT THEIR POSITION AS TOP DOG,TO BE THE WORLDS
STRONGEST NATION.

3.WHEN I RESPONDED THAT SOVIET STONEWALLING IN CONNECTION WITH
EVERY OFFER PUT FORWARD BY THE WEST WAS ALSO DISAPPOINTING,
ESTERGALYOS SAID THAT UNFORTUNATELY AT PRESENT APPROACHES BY BOTH
GREAT POWERS WERE RATHER STERILE.BUT ADDED DEP MIN,MOSCO WAS NOT/NOT
AS ADAMANT AS WE MIGHT THINK AND THAT PEOPLE WHO EXPECTED LACK OF
MOMENTUM ON PART OF SOVIETS AS LONG AS REAGAN WAS IN POWER WERE
WRONG.IN ANY EVENT WITH VOLATILITY OF AMERICAN ELECTORATE RE-
ELECTION OF REAGAN WHILE QUITE PROBABLE WAS NOT/NOT A FOREGONE
CONCLUSION.

...3

PAGE THREE ZWGR0919 CONF

4.I FOUND ESTERGALYOS COMMENTS ON POLITICAL SITUATION IN USA INTERESTING AS IT SUGGESTS HUNGS AND PERHAPS SOVIETS HAVE NOT/NOT ENTIRELY WRITTEN OFF POSSIBILITY OF VICTORY BY DEMOCRATS AND THUS A RETURN TO EASIER RELATIONSHIP THAT EXISTED UNDER CARTER/MONDALE. IT ALSO SUGGESTS THAT IF THIS EXPECTATION IS NOT/NOT REALIZED THEN AFTER THE ELECTIONS SOVIETS MAY BE PREPARED TO TAKE A FRESH LOOK AT THEIR UNEASY RELATIONSHIP WITH REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. ESTERGALYOS COMMENTS ABOUT STERILITY OF POLICIES OF BOTH GREAT POWERS IS ALSO REVEALING COMMENTARY ABOUT HOW HUNGS SEE BIG BROTHERS. IT IS CERTAIN THAT KADAR AND THE LEADERSHIP HERE WILL THUS WELCOME PMS LETTER AS ANOTHER LEVER THEY CAN USE TO PROD RUSSIANS INTO A MORE REASONABLE LINE.

ARCAND

CCC/108 081120Z ZWGR0919

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

ACC	RL	
FILE	N8-61-Imdean DOSSIER	
PEACE MISSION		

R E S T R I C T E D

FM TOKYO UIGR6283 08JUN84

TO EXTOTT L IDA

INFO LDN/PM DEL/FOWLER MOSCO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA MINT MINE DMF IFB RGB RED RBR ZSI IDD IDR IDAO IDAN IDAV

REF YOURTEL IDA0945 07JUN

---LET TO PM FROM SOVIET PRESIDENT CHERNENKO

IF APPROVAL GIVEN TO PROVIDE TEXT OF CHERNENKO LET TO NATO ALLIES,
WILL THERE BE ANY OBJECTION TO OUR GIVING IT AS WELL TO JPNSE?

CCC/232 080336Z UIGR6283

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

336226	
FILE	28-61-Trudeau DOSSIER
PEACE MISSION	

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BGRAD ZLGR4063 08JUN84

TO EXTOTT (IDA

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL WSHDC BNATO LDN BONN PARIS

TOKYO PEKIN ROME GENEV WSAW PRGUE BPEST BUCST

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RGB RBD RBR RSD RSR IDAO IDR

REF YOURTEL IDA0829 01JUN(NOTAL)

---PM INITIATIVE:LETS TO HEAD OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES

SUMMARY:

FORTUITOUSLY,MTG WITH MFA ASSISTANT SECTY ZDENKO SVETE HAD
ALREADY BEEN ARRANGED FOR 06JUN IN CONTEXT OF VISIT TO BGRAD BY
JAY AND FAIRWEATHER.NOTE CONVEYING TEXT OF PMS LET(MEANWHILE
TRANSMITTED DIRECTLY TO PRESIDENCY)WAS THEREFORE PASSED TO HIM
IN ORDER TO OBTAIN SEMI-OFFICIAL REACTION FROM THIS INFLUENTIAL
AND ARTICULATE SOURCE.WHILE SVETE DESCRIBED CURRENT EAST-WEST
SITUATION AS CATASTROPHIC,AND EXPRESSED DEEP PESSIMISM ABOUT
PROSPECTS FOR SHORT-TERM IMPROVEMENT,HE AGREED THAT
INITIATIVES SUCH AS PMS WERE BEST TACTICS UNDER PRESENT
CIRCUMSTANCES;ATMOSPHERE,AT LEAST,MUST AND CAN BE IMPROVED.

REPORT:

SVETE BEGAN HIS COMMENTS BY DESCRIBING
INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AS CATASTROPHIC IN ALMOST ALL RESPECTS,
WITH PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVEMENT FOUND ALMOST NOWHERE:GENERAL EAST-WEST
RELATIONS,DISARMAMENT,IRAN-IRAQ WAR,GLOBAL ECONOMIC/FINANCIAL
SITUATION,NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONSHIP.HE HAD CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS

...2

PAGE TWO ZLGR4063 CONF

DIFFICULT TO SEE A WAY OUT OF THIS OMINOUS STATE OF AFFAIRS. HOWEVER HE NOTED THAT THE YUGO FOREIGN MINISTRY AND HE HIMSELF HAD BEEN FOLLOWING VERY CLOSELY CDN POLICIES, INCLUDING PMS INITIATIVE, AND HAD CONCLUDED THAT CDA AND YUGO HAVE A COMMON APPROACH TO TACKLING THE SITUATION.

2. MORE SPECIFICALLY, SVETE DESCRIBED THE PMS 10 POINTS AS VERY REALISTIC UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES: IT WAS A GOOD TACTIC TO TRY AND IDENTIFY AT LEAST THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OVER WHICH BOTH EAST AND WEST CAN AGREE. HE NOTED THAT SOME OF THESE 10 POINTS HAD BEEN ORIGINALLY PROPOSED BY ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER, FOR INSTANCE NON FIRST USE OF FORCE. HOWEVER, HE SAID, THE MAIN SIGNIFICANCE OF IDENTIFYING PRINCIPLES IS THAT THEY CONSTITUTE AN ATTEMPT TO IMPROVE THE GLOBAL ATMOSPHERE BY TELLING THE SUPERPOWERS THAT THEY MUST START TO MOVE; IF BY THE PRESSURE OF PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE AND OTHER SIMILAR INITIATIVES, THE OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD CAN QUOTE START THE SNOWBALL ROLLING UNQUOTE, WE CAN GET THE SUPERPOWERS TO REALIZE THAT THE SITUATION THEY ARE IMPOSING ON THE REST OF THE WORLD - A GLOBAL IDEOLOGICAL DIVISION - IS UNACCEPTABLE AND ULTIMATELY THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS WAR. TO THIS END, HE COMMENTED, THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT MUST ALSO BECOME MORE ACTIVE. THE REST OF THE WORLD IS IN A POSITION TO TRY TO DO SOMETHING; EVEN IF WE CAN NOT/NOT CHANGE REALITIES WE CAN AT LEAST TRY TO CHANGE THE ATMOSPHERE, AS MR TRUDEAU IS DOING.

3. SVETS SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF WORLD AFFAIRS AND OF ...3

PAGE THREE ZLGR4263 CONF

LIKELY DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN AND BETWEEN USA AND USSR SIMILARLY REFLECT YUGOS CONSTANT AND DEEP-SEATED CONCERN THAT THE SUPERPOWERS RIVALRY IS NOT/NOT ONLY THREATENING GLOBAL PEACE AND PROSPERITY BUT ALSO DRAWING ALL OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD WITH THEM INTO CONFRONTATION. HE DESCRIBED THIS CURRENT CONFRONTATION AS BEING SO SERIOUS THAT ALL CHANNELS ARE CLOSED, ONLY UNILATERAL STATEMENTS ARE BEING MADE, AND THESE ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY IDEOLOGICAL. HE COULD NOT/NOT SEE EVEN THE REMNANTS OF A NORMAL PUBLIC POLITICAL DIALOGUE: THE SUPERPOWERS EXCHANGES ARE INCREASINGLY DETACHED FROM REALITY. IN RESPONSE TO THE SUGGESTION THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S RECENT STATEMENTS HAVE SOFTENED, SVETE ADMITTED THAT HIS PHRASES HAVE BECOME MORE PALATABLE, BUT CLAIMED THAT EVERY SO OFTEN ONE QUOTE JUMPS OUT UNQUOTE WHICH NEGATES THE GENERAL EFFECT OF THE SOFTER TONE. ON ITS SIDE, THE SOVIET UNION SIMPLY SAYS NYET; IT INSISTS QUOTE ON EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY UNQUOTE, WHICH BEING TRANSLATED INTO PRACTICAL TERMS MEANS THAT, FIRST THEY WILL HAVE DISCUSSIONS BUT MAKE NO/NO CONCESSIONS ON ANY ISSUES, AND SECOND, THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL MATCH EVERY MILITARY DEVELOPMENT IN THE USA AND IF POSSIBLE WILL EXCEED THEM.

4. AS REGARDS THE MEDIUM-TERM USA POSITION, SVETE SAID THAT THERE WAS NO/NO QUESTION THAT REAGAN WOULD BE RE-ELECTED. HOWEVER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF ELECTION CAMPAIGNS ARE SUCH THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE AT THIS STAGE TO ANTICIPATE THE TONE OF THE SECOND REAGAN ADMINISTRATION. YUGO WOULD CERTAINLY HOPE THAT HE WOULD PAY MORE SERIOUS ATTENTION

...4

PAGE FOUR ZLGR4063 CONF

TO FOREIGN POLICY IN HIS SECOND TERM, BUT ONE PROBLEM IS HIS CONSTANT CONCERN WITH NATIONAL SECURITY. NUCLEAR ARMS, MX, STAR WARS TECHNOLOGY, FORCE MODERNIZATION: IS ALL THIS REALLY NECESSARY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY? DOES IT OPEN THE WAY TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE OTHER SIDE IF THE LATTER FEELS ITS RELATIVE POSITION DETERIORATING?

5. AS REGARDS THE MEDIUM-TERM PROSPECTS IN THE SOVIET UNION, SVETE HELD OUT LITTLE HOPE FOR ANY FUNDAMENTAL IMPROVEMENT RESULTING FROM A CHANGE IN THE LEADERSHIP SINCE THE USSR TODAY IS A VICTIM OF HISTORICAL REALITIES. THE YUGO LEADERSHIP HAS MET THE YOUNGER MEN IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP SUCH AS GORBACHEV AND THE LATTERS PROBLEM, IF HE DOES REPLACE CHERNENKO, WILL BE TO FIND NEW OR DIFFERENT POLICIES TO ADOPT. HE WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH THE SAME SET OF INTERNAL PROBLEMS AND INSTITUTIONS, AND WHILE HE MIGHT INSTITUTE A DIFFERENT PERSONAL APPROACH, EVEN THIS WOULD REQUIRE AT LEAST 3-4 YEARS TO PUT ACROSS. THE SOVIET POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ESTABLISHMENT WILL NOT/NOT CHANGE OVERNIGHT, AND IT WAS SVETES PERSONAL VIEW THAT GORBACHEV COULD NOT/NOT CHANGE ANYTHING IN HIS FIRST 3 YEARS. HIS ANTICIPATION THEREFORE WAS THAT A CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN THE KREMLIN WOULD NOT/NOT RESULT IN MUCH THAT WAS DIFFERENT, SO AT LEAST IT WAS BETTER TO TRY TO DEAL WITH THE DEVIL YOU KNOW.

6. AS REGARDS EASTERN EUROPE, SVETE REMARKED THAT HE OFTER ASKS HIS USA COLLEAGUES WHETHER THEY THINK ANY CHANGE THERE COULD RESULT FROM EXTERNAL PRESSURE; IF BASIC CHANGES WERE ANTICIPATED THE RESPONSE ...5

PAGE FIVE ZLGR4063 CONFD

FROM MOSCOW WOULD BE SIMPLY TO IMPOSE UNANIMITY OF VIEWS AND
ELIMINATE THE ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE THAT IS ALLOWED NOW, PARTICULARLY
TO CEAUSESCU. IN THIS AREA AS IN THE GENERAL EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP,
PROGRESS IS POSSIBLE ONLY UNDER CONDITIONS OF DETENTE.

7. ALL THE ABOVE COMMENTS WERE PROVIDED BY SVETE IN CONFIDENCE.

CCC/148 110600Z ZLGR4063

RCR-0964

Ottawa, Ontario,
K1A 0G2

Le 8 juin 1984

Son Excellence M. Wolfgang Behrends,
Ambassadeur
Ambassade de la République
fédérale d'Allemagne,
1, rue Waverley,
Ottawa.

ACC	REF	DATE
FILE		
28-6-1-Trudeau		
(A-6)	Peace Mission	

Excellence,

Il me fait plaisir de vous faire tenir,
--- ci-joint, copie de la lettre que le Premier ministre
Trudeau adressait le 31 mai au chancelier Kohl et
contenant dix points d'entente qui, s'ils étaient
acceptés à l'Est, comme à l'Ouest, constitueraient une
étape importante dans la reprise d'un dialogue Est-Ouest
fructueux.

Veillez agréer, Excellence, l'assurance de
mes sentiments les meilleurs.

Directrice des Relations
politiques et économiques,
Europe de l'Ouest I

L. Fréchette
Louise Fréchette

ACC —	REF	DATE
FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission	DOSSIER	

R E S T R I C T E D

FM SPORE UCGR1590 08JUN84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD PSR IDR

REF YOURTEL IDA0823 07JUN

---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE

TEXT OF PMS LET WAS DELIVERED 05JUN TO PM LEE THROUGH PERM SEC,
MFA, AS AGREED IN TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH LATTER.

CCC/094 080744Z UCGR1590

file 28-6-1-Trudeau	
2/1	9

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

R E S T R I C T E D

FM PRGUE WOGR2019 07JUN84


TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO WSAW MOSCO BONN LDN BNATO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACOPOL
DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RGB RBD RBR RSD RSR PPD PPR PER
PED PSD PSR PGB IDAO IDR
REF YOURTEL IDA0823 01JUN

---PM INITIATIVE:LETS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES
TEXT OF PMS LET WAS DELIVERED LATE YESTERDAY TO VICE MIN JOHANES
AT MFA.HE HAD BEEN TRYING FOR TWO DAYS TO ARRANGE FOR ME TO SEE
MIN CHNOUPEK(I HAD BEEN PUT ON STANDBY FOR TWO HOURS IN MORNING)
BUT MIN HAS BEEN TIED UP WITH VISIT OF KIM IL SUNG.HE PROMISED TO
TRANSMIT LET TO PM STROUGAL AT ONCE.I EXPLAINED ITS ORIGINS,
MENTIONED LETS TO REAGAN AND CHERNENKO AND WHEN JOHANES REFERRED
TO LATTERS PROPOSALS FOR AGREED NORMS OF CONDUCT I TOUCHED
LIGHTLY ON GROMYKOS REACTION(MOSCO TEL XYGR0704 30MAY).JOHANES
INDULGED BRIEFLY IN USUAL POLEMICS ABOUT REMOVAL OF USA MISSILES
FROM WESTERN EUROPE AND REAGANS BELLIGERENT TALK BUT HAD
NOTHING/NOTHING TO SAY ON SUBSTANCE OF TRUDEAU LET

PEEL

CCC/117 070911Z WOGR2019



**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

R E S T R I C T E D

FM DELHI WBGR1319 07JUN84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO MOSCO

DISTR IDAO IDAN

REF MOSCO TEL XYGR0744 06JUN

---SIX NATION PEACE INITIATIVE

AS POSTSCRIPT TO REFTEL, FULL TEXT OF SOVIET STATEMENT WAS

CARRIED IN LARGE CIRCULATION DAILY INDIAN EXPRESS 03JUN

ALMOST AS AN ADVERTISEMENT. TEXT WAS DATED MOSCO 01JUN (TASS).

AT BOTTOM WAS STATE QUOTE ISSUED BY INFORMATION DEPARTMENT OF

USSR IN INDIA, NEW DELHI UNQUOTE.

CCC/282 080520Z WBGR1319

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

ACC	336165	REF	DATE
FILE	28-6-1- Trudeau		
DOSSIER			
PEACE MISSION			

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PEKIN WJGR0568 07JUN84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO BAG HAGUE BONN TOKYO WSAW/FOR GRD PRAGUE LAND CNBRA WLGTH SPORE
LSAKA PCOOTT/FOWLER NDQHOTT/DNACPOL DE PEK

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RGB RBD RBR RSD RSR PPD

PPR PER PED PSD PSR PGB IDAO IDR

REF YOURTEL IDA0823 01JUN

---PM INITIATIVE:LETS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES

IN ABSENCE OF PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANG AND FOREIGN MINISTER

WU XUEQIAN IN WESTERN EUROPE,AMB CALLED ON ASST MIN

ZHU QIZHEN ON 05JUN TO DELIVER COPY OF PMS LET EXPLAINING

THAT ORIGINAL WOULD BE FORTHCOMING.ZHU PROMISED TO BRING

LET TO ATTENTION OF HIS FOREIGN MIN AND PREMIER ZHAO

ZIYANG SOON AFTER THEIR RETURN ON 20JUN.

2.AMB MENTIONED PRES REAGANS SPEECH IN DUBLIN AS INDICATION

OF USA DESIRE TO RENEW DIALOGUE WITH SOVIET UNION.ZHU REMARKED

THAT THERE WAS LITTLE NEW IN PRES REAGANS STATEMENT AND ATTRIBUTED

IT TO COMING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AS WELL AS RELUCTANCE OF SOME

EUROPEANS TO ACCEPT CRUISE MISSILES(IE POSITION OF DUTCH GOVT).AMB


REFERRED TO PREMIER ZHAO ZIYANGS STATEMENT IN FRANCE ON DISARMAMENT

AS SHOWING CHINA SHARED PM TRUDEAUS CONCERN ABOUT PRESENT

TENSION BETWEEN TO SUPERPOWERS.ZHU SAID THAT THERE WAS

NO/NO DOUBT CHINA SHARED PM TRUDEAUS CONCERNS BUT THOUGHT

...2



CONFIDENTIAL
770000 8 11117

PAGE TWO WJGR0568 CONF D

THAT UNTIL TWO SUPERPOWERS SHOWED GENUINE DESIRE TO REDUCE
ARMAMENTS, ESPECIALLY NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, NOTHING COULD
BE DONE BY OTHERS EXCEPT PERHAPS TO CONTINUE TO EXERT
PRESSURE ON THEM.

3. AMB GAINED IMPRESSION THAT CHINESE MAINTAINED VIEW THAT
SOVIET UNION WAS NOT/NOT THE ONLY ONE RESPONSIBLE FOR LACK
OF PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

CCC/299 070801Z WJGR0568

File	DOSSIER
88-6-1- Trudeau	
PEACE MISSION	

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

R E S T R I C T E D

FM HAGUE YWGR0598 07JUN84

TO EXTOTT (IDA IMMED

INFO ECNN TOKYO WSAW/FOR GDR PRGUE LDN PEKIN CNBRA WLGTN SPORE
LSAKA PCOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RGP RBD RBR RSD RSR PPD PPR
PER FED PSD PSR RGB IDAO IDR

REF YOURTEL IDA0823 01JUN

---PM INITIATIVE:LETTERS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES

WE CHOSE TO TRANSMIT LETTER TO DUTCH PM VIA VOS, DIR OF ATLANTIC
COOPERATION AND INTL SECURITY DIV AT MFA, AS VOS WILL MEET WITH
PM LUBBERS FRI MORNING 9JUN84. WE WERE ASSURED THIS WOULD BE
QUICKEST WAY FOR PM TO RECEIVE LETTER. VOS HAS ASSURED US HE WILL
REMIT LETTERS IN PM LUBBERS HANDS AND WILL GET BACK TO US SHOULD
THERE BE ANY IMMED REACTION.

CCC/155 071351Z YWGR0598

DOSSIER
CHRON
CIRC
JOURNAL

RSR/R. Brazeau/2-8216/CI

28-6-1	
OTTAWA, ONTARIO	16
KIA 0G2	

Le 7 juin 1984

Son Excellence Paul Peters
Ambassadeur du Luxembourg
2200 Avenue Massachusetts
Washington D.C. 20008
Etats-Unis d'Amérique

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Je vous fais parvenir, pour votre information,
une copie de la lettre transmise le 31 mai dernier par
le Premier Ministre Trudeau au Premier Ministre Werner
se rapportant à l'initiative de paix de Monsieur Trudeau.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, l'assurance
de mes salutations distinguées.

R. Brazeau
Direction Europe de l'Ouest II

DOSSIER
CHRON
CIRC
JOURNAL

RSR/R. Brazeau/2-8216/CI

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
KLA OG2

28-6-1	
RB	

7 juin 1984

Monsieur Felipe Cabral
Premier Secrétaire
Ambassade du Portugal
645 Promenade Island Park
Ottawa, Ontario
K1Y 0B8

Cher Monsieur Cabral,

Je vous fais parvenir, pour votre information,
une copie de la lettre transmise le 31 mai dernier, par
le Premier Ministre Trudeau au Premier Ministre Soares
se rapportant à l'initiative de paix de Monsieur Trudeau.

Veuillez agréer, cher Monsieur Cabral, l'assurance
de mes salutations distinguées.

R. Brazeau
Direction Europe de l'Ouest II

DOSSIER
CIRC
CHRON
JOURNAL

RSR/R. Brazeau/2-8216/c1

28-6-7	
OTTAWA, ONTARIO K1A 0G2.	76

7 juin 1984

Monsieur Cesar Gonzalez
Ministre Conseiller
Ambassade d'Espagne
350 rue Sparks, suite 802
Ottawa, Ontario
K1R 7S8

Cher Monsieur Gonzalez,

Je vous fais parvenir, pour votre information, une copie de la lettre transmise le 31 mai dernier par le Premier Ministre Trudeau au Premier Ministre Gonzalez se rapportant à l'initiative de paix de Monsieur Trudeau.

Veillez agréer, cher Monsieur Gonzalez, l'assurance de mes salutations distinguées.

R. Brazeau
Direction Europe de l'Ouest II

DOSSIER
CHRON
CIRC
JOURNAL

RSR/R. Brazeau/2-8210/CI Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

28-6-1	
AB	

7 juin 1984

Monsieur Vincent van der Mersch
Conseiller
Ambassade de Belgique
85 Chemin Range, suites 601 à 604
Ottawa, Ontario
K1N 8J6

Cher Monsieur van der Mersch,

Je vous fais parvenir, pour votre information,
une copie de la lettre transmise le 31 mai dernier par
le Premier Ministre Trudeau au Premier Ministre Martens
se rapportant à l'initiative de paix de Monsieur Trudeau.

Veillez agréer, cher Monsieur van der Mersch,
l'assurance de mes salutations distinguées.

R. Brazeau
Direction Europe de l'Ouest II

FILE
CIRC
CHRON
DIARY

BICO A6

DATE	28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE INITIATIVE
FILE	
BY	
DATE	

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

June 7, 1984

H.E. Per M. Ølberg
Ambassador of Norway
90 Sparks Street
Suite 932
Royal Bank Centre
Ottawa, Ontario

Dear Ambassador Ølberg:

I am attaching a copy of a letter from Prime Minister Trudeau to Prime Minister Willoch, the text of which has already been delivered in Oslo. The letter contains the latest information regarding Prime Minister Trudeau's Peace Initiative, a subject in which I know you are interested.

Yours sincerely,

G. Mitchell
Director General
Western Europe II Bureau

WHEN SIGNATURE ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF DOCUMENTS IS NEEDED, ORIGINATOR TO COMPLETE BOTH SECURITY BLOCKS.
LORSQU'ON EXIGE UN ACCUSÉ DE RÉCEPTION, À L'ENVOYEUR, COMPLÉTER LES DEUX ESPACES DE SÉCURITÉ.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)
UNCLASSIFIED
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

TO
À

OSLO

NO. IDA00923 DATE June 6, 1984

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA0825 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles</p> <p>Original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to Prime Minister Willoch, for onward transmission.</p> <p>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau DIV DIARY RSR: you may wish to pass copy to local embassy</p> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
DATE	SIGNATURE	

EXT 34/BIL. (REV. 12/70)
7530-21-020-4107

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE

RSR/D. McCue/6-1892/61

FILE
CIRC
CHRON
1 RY

BICO A6-28-6-1-TRUDEAU PERCE-MISSON

TO	FROM
BY HAND	PAR PORTEUR
ATTN.	
OTTAWA, ONTARIO	
K1A 0G2	

June 7, 1984

H.E. Vagn Aage Korsbaek
Ambassador of Denmark
Suite 702
85 Range Road
Ottawa, Ontario

Dear Ambassador Korsbaek:

I am attaching a copy of a recent letter from Prime Minister Trudeau to Prime Minister Schluter, the text of which has already been delivered in Copenhagen. The letter contains further proposals in relation to Prime Minister Trudeau's Peace Initiative which I thought might be of interest to you.

Yours sincerely,

G. Mitchell
Director General
Western Europe II Bureau

FOR USE WHEN SIGNATURE ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF DOCUMENTS IS NEEDED. ORIGINATOR TO COMPLETE BOTH SECURITY BLOCKS.
À UTILISER LORSQU'ON EXIGE UN ACCUSÉ DE RÉCEPTION. À L'ENVOYEUR, COMPLÉTER LES DEUX ESPACES DE SÉCURITÉ.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
À

COPENHAGEN

NO. IDA0925

DATE June 6/84

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)
UNCLASSIFIED
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA0825 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles</p> <p>Original of letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to Prime Minister Schlüter, for onward transmission.</p> <p>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau DIV DIARY RSR - you may wish to pass copy to local embassy</p> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

DATE

SIGNATURE

EXT 34/BIL. (REV. 12/70)
7530-21-029-4107

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE

FILE
CIRC
CHRON
DIARY

RSR/D. McCue/6-1892/cl

BICOA6

DATE	
ACCT	
28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION	
OTTAWA, ONTARIO	
K1A 0G2	
IT HAND	FOR FORIE R
ATTN:	

June 7, 1984

H.E. Naboth van Dijk
Ambassador of The Netherlands
275 Slater Street
3rd Floor
Ottawa, Ontario

Dear Ambassador van Dijk;

I am attaching a copy of a letter from Prime Minister Trudeau to Prime Minister Lubbers, the text of which has already been delivered in The Hague. The letter contains the latest information regarding Prime Minister Trudeau's Peace Initiative, a subject in which I know you are interested.

Yours sincerely,

G. Mitchell
Director General
Western Europe II Bureau

FOR USE WHEN SIGNATURE ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF DOCUMENTS IS NEEDED. ORIGINATOR TO COMPLETE BOTH SECURITY BLOCKS.
À UTILISER LORSQU'ON EXIGE UN ACCUSÉ DE RÉCEPTION. À L'ENVOYEUR, COMPLÉTER LES DEUX ESPACES DE SÉCURITÉ.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
À
THE HAGUE

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S) UNCLASSIFIED
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDA0909 DATE June 6/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA0823 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles.</p> <p>Original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984, to Prime Minister Lubbers, for onward transmission.</p> <p>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau DIV DIARY <u>RSR</u> - you may wish to pass copy to local embassy</p> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
DATE		SIGNATURE

EXT 34/BIL. (REV. 12/70)
7530-21-029-4107

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

ACC 335426 REF DATE 840607
FILE 28-6-1-1- Trudeau Peace Mission DOSSIER
(A6)

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE PARIS WIGR4263 07JUN84

A EXTOTT/RCR LIVRAISON 071400

INFO PCOOTT/PETTIGREW/SMYTHE/FOWLER PMOOTT/JOHNSON/COLEMAN/COPELAND
LDNPMDEL/FOWLER/DMF WSHDC BONN ROME TOKYO BREEC POECD GENEV PRMNY
BNATO MOSCO NDHQOTT/DNACPOL SCDEL/STKM MDRID ATHNS

DISTR MINA MINE MINT USS DMF DMT EFB RGB UGB PGB EED ETD EPD EEA
EEF ETE ETS EPT EPG RCD RCT RCR RCM RBD RBR RSD CPD IDD IDR IMD IMU
URD URR URT URE JLE TID ZEP XDV FPR IFB IAM IDA RSR RST RWP CMR CAQ
JCX JLO JCD GAF GAA LCD LCR ZSI SFD SFP

REF NOTRETEL WIGR4258 06JUN

---ENTRETIEN PMS TRUDEAU/MAUROY A PARIS 05JUN:DISSUASION NUCLEAIRE
RESUME:

CE TEL VOUS DONNE UN COMPTE RENDU PLUS DETAILLE QUE DANS REFTTEL
DE DISCUSSION SUR DISSUASION NUCLEAIRE LORS DE ENTRETIEN AVEC PM
MAUROY QUI RECEVAIT A MATIGNON 05JUN PM TRUDEAU POUR UN ENTRETIEN
INFORMEL ET AMICAL DE CINQUANTE MINUTES.

PM TRUDEAU QUESTIONNA PM MAUROY SUR RAISONS DE ABSENCE D UN
MOUVEMENT ANTI-NUCLEAIRE SIGNIFICATIF EN FRANCE ET LUI FIT PART
DE SES INTERROGATIONS SUR CONSEQUENCES D UNE PROLIFERATION
NUCLEAIRE HORIZONTALE ET SUR RESPONSABILITE DES DETENTEURS DE ARME
ET DU SAVOIR-FAIRE NUCLEAIRE POUR L EMPECHER.IL RAPPELLE QUE SEUL,
DES CHEFS D ETAT QU IL A VISITES EN NOV DERNIER,PRES MITTERRAND

...2

1011321
A 57182

3140	139	224
PAGE DEUX WIGR4263 CONF		
111	120	131

AVAIT SU ABORDER QUESTION AVEC INTELLIGENCE SOUS CET ANGLE,
MEME SI DEPUIS LA FRANCE A EXPRIME DES RESERVES.

RAPPORT:

2. EN REPONSE A QUESTION DU PM TRUDEAU QUI S INTERROGEAIT SUR
RAISONS DE ABSENCE D UN MOUVEMENT ANTI-NUCLEAIRE SIGNIFICATIF
EN FRANCE, PM MAUROY REPONDIT QUE JUSQUE DANS ANNEES 60, C-A-D
JUSQU AU DEVELOPPEMENT PAR LA FRANCE DE SA PROPRE ARME ATOMIQUE,
IL N Y AVAIT JAMAIS EU EN FRANCE DE TRADITION INTELLECTUELLE
DE ETUDE DES PROBLEMES DE DEFENSE ALORS QU EN ALLEMAGNE, DES
MILIEU DU 19E SIECLE, ON ELABORAIT UN KRIEGSPIEL APRES L AUTRE
QUI DEVINRENT DES SUJETS DE DISCUSSION QUASI PERMANENTS. RIEN
DE TEL NE S EST PRODUIT EN FRANCE JUSQU A DEUXIEME GUERRE
MONDIALE, HORMIS QUELQUES PROPHETES ISOLEES, COMME DE GAULLE,
MAIS QUE PERSONNE OU PRESQUE N ECOUTAIT. SITUATION A CEPENDANT
RADICALEMENT CHANGE DEPUIS LORS CAR, DEPUIS DEVELOPPEMENT PAR LA
FRANCE DE SA PROPRE ARME ATOMIQUE, ON ASSISTE AU CONTRAIRE A UNE
DISCUSSION PERMANENTE SUR DEFENSE. PM MAUROY DIT SON ETONNEMENT
DE CONSTATER, PAR EXEMPLE, NOMBRE DE CADRES SUPERIEURS DEGAGES
PAR MOYENNES ET GRANDES ENTREPRISES FRANCAISES POUR SUIVRE
PENDANT UN OU DEUX ANS COURS DE INSTITUT DES HAUTES ETUDES DE
DEFENSE NATIONALE ET DE ECOLE SUPERIEURE DE GUERRE, MAINTENANT
OUVERTES AUX CIVILS. ALORS QUE INTELLECTUELS DE AVANT-GUERRE
...3

PAGE TROIS WIGR4263 CONF

ETAIENT TOUT A FAIT REFRACTAIRES A IDEE DE SUIVRE UN COURS
D OFFICIER, GENERATION ACTUELLE AU CONTRAIRE S INTERESSE DE
PRES AUX COURS DISPENSES PAR CES DEUX GRANDES ECOLES.

3. FINALEMENT, CONCLUT MAUROY, ON SE REND COMPTE QUE IDEE DE
DISSUASION CIT A LA FRANCAISE FINCIT COLLE BIEN AVEC ESPRIT
FRANCAIS, TOUT COMME NOTION D ETRE A LA FOIS MEMBRE DE ALLIANCE
ATLANTIQUE MAIS D Y AVOIR UNE POSITION MILITAIRE PARTICULIERE.
MAUROY RAPPELLE QUE OPPOSITION AU DEVELOPPEMENT D UNE FORCE
DE FRAPPE INDEPENDANTE FRANCAISE PROVENAIT AU DEBUT DE LA GAUCHE
EN FRANCE. ELLE S Y EST RALLIE DEPUIS, A TELLE ENSEIGNE QUE ABSENCE
DE OPPOSITION DANS COUCHES POPULAIRES FRANCAISES A FORCE DE
DISSUASION NATIONALE FAIT QU ON NE RENCONTRE PAS NON PLUS EN
FRANCE D OPPOSITION SIGNIFICATIVE AU DEVELOPPEMENT DES CENTRALES
NUCLEAIRES NON PLUS QU A IMPORTANTE USINE DE TRAITEMENT DES DECHETS
NUCLEAIRES SITUEE DANS NORD PAS DE CALAIS ET A LAQUELLE FONT
APPEL PLUSIEURS PAYS ETRANGERS DONT LE JAPON.

4. MAUROY INTERROGE ALORS PM TRUDEAU SUR ATTITUDE DE POPULATION CDNNE.
PM TRUDEAU REpond QUE SITUATION AU CDA N EST PAS TROP DIFFICILE MAIS
QUE POPULATION CDNNE EST SANS DOUTE PLUS EVEILLEE, NOTAMMENT EN
CE QUI CONCERNE DANGERS DE PROLIFERATION NUCLEAIRE, PROBLEME QUI
NE SEMBLE PAS PREOCCUPER INTELLECTUELLEMENT LES FRANCAIS.

S INTERROGE-T-ON, PAR EXEMPLE, EN FRANCE SUR CE QUI SE PASSERAIT

...4

PAGE QUATRE WIGR4263 CONFD

SI DES PAYS COMME BRESIL, ALLEMAGNE, ARGENTINE, COREE, INDE, ETC., SE DOTAIENT AUSSI D UN ARMEMENT NUCLEAIRE DE DISSUASION? S INTERROGE-T-ON EN FRANCE SUR DES THEORIES COMME CELLE DE ASTRONOME SAGAN QUI PREVOIT UNE NUIT NUCLEAIRE QUI DETRUIRAIT TOUTE VEGETATION PENDANT DES ANNEES DANS HEMISPHERE NORD SI UN CONFLIT NUCLEAIRE VENAIT A ECLATER? PM TRUDEAU RAPPELLE QUE SEUL DES CHEFS D ETAT QU IL A VISITES EN NOV DERNIER, PRES. MITTERRAND AVAIT SU ABORDER AVEC INTELLIGENCE PROBLEME DE PROLIFERATION NUCLEAIRE HORIZONTALE, MEME SI DEPUIS LA FRANCE A EXPRIME DES RESERVES SUR PROPOSITION CDNNE D UNE CONFERENCE DES CINQ PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES POUR EXAMINER A FOND CETTE QUESTION. 5. PM MAUROY REpond QUE PRES MITTERRAND A CONSTAMMENT CE SOUCI A L ESPRIT ET QUE MEME SI LA FRANCE N EST PAS SIGNATAIRE DU TRAITE DE NON-PROLIFERATION, POUR DES RAISONS PARTICULIERES, PRESIDENT EST DESIREUX DE RESPECTER CERTAINES REGLES DANS MARCHES D EQUIPEMENT NUCLEAIRE QUE FRANCE NEGOCIE AVEC DES PAYS ETRANGERS. PM MAUROY AJOUTE QU EN FRANCE ON A SENTIMENT QUE PAIX MONDIALE A JUSQU A MAINTENANT ETE PROTEGEE EFFICACEMENT PAR TERREUR NUCLEAIRE. PM TRUDEAU REPLIQUE QUE C EST SANS DOUTE VRAI TANT QUE DEUX GRANDS ET LES TROIS AUTRES PAYS QUI POSSEDENT ARME NUCLEAIRE DEMEURENT RATIONNELS DANS LEUR CONDUITE, MAIS IL FAUT DES MAINTENANT SE POSER QUESTION QUE CETTE PRESOMPTION NE SERA PLUS VALABLE A PARTIR DU MOMENT OU CLUB DES PAYS DOTES DE ARMEMENT NUCLEAIRE S ELARGIRA A DOUZE PAYS OU DAVANTAGE.

CCC/165 071501Z WIGR4263



Accession/Référence

335948

File/Dossier

23-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE

MISSION

7 JUN 84 21 17Z

12

10

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

R E S T R I C T E D

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDA0945 07JUN84

TO/À

TO PMDEL/LDN/FOWLER/SHENSTONE **FLASH**

INFO

INFO MOSCO **DELIVER BY 080900** PARIS WSHDC ROME BONN TOKYO PEKIN

DISTR

WJAN, PRAGUE, BREST, BERLIN, BRIST

REF

PRMNY HAGUE BRU OSLO GENEV BNATO VMBFR COPEN PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/

SUBJ/SUJ

ADMPOL/CPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATA STKHM/SCDEL

DISTR MINA MINT MINE DMF IFB RGB RBD RBR ZSI IDD IDR IDAO IDAN IDAV

---LETTER TO PM FROM SOVIET PRESIDENT CHERNENKO

SOVIET CHARGE NOVIKOV CALLED ON ACTING PM PEPIN FOR TEN MINUTES THIS AFTERNOON TO HAND OVER LETTER FROM PRESIDENT CHERNENKO TO PM TRUDEAU. NOVIKOV INDICATED IT WAS IN RESPONSE TO PMS LET OF 07MAY TO CHERNENKO WHICH DEALT WITH TWO SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS DESIGNED TO (A) RESTRICT MOBILITY OF TERRESTRIALLY DEPLOYED INTERCONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILES AND (B) ENSURE THE VERIFIABILITY OF NEW STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS. IT DOES NOT/NOT DEAL WITH TEN PRINCIPLES CONTAINED IN PMS LET OF 28MAY.

2. CHERNENKOS REPLY DEALS WITH GENERAL EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND DOES NOT/NOT COMMENT SPECIFICALLY ON SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS EXCEPT TO SAY THAT THOSE SORT OF ISSUES WERE UNDER DISCUSSION IN GENEV AT TIME WHEN SOVIET-AMERICAN TALKS BROKE OFF. IMPLICATION IS THAT USA IS TO BE BLAMED FOR LACK OF PROGRESS ON CDN PROPOSALS. MORE EXPLICITLY, CHERNENKO SAYS IT IS USA STAND THAT HAS CREATED QUOTE STUMBLING BLOCK UNQUOTE IN WAY OF INF AND START TALKS. ANTI-USA RHETORIC IS

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

GARY J. SMITH/pec

IDA

5-6689

SIG

GARY J. SMITH



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE TWO IDA0945 RESTD

12

10

NOT/NOT OVERDONE HOWEVER AND CHERNENKO HAS POSITIVE WORDS TO SAY
ABOUT PM TRUDEAUS OWN EFFORTS.

3. SOVIET EMB FIRST SECRETARY GOUSSAROV, WHO ACCOMPANIED NOVIKOV ON
CALL, TOLD US AFTER MEETING THAT WE SHOULD PAY ATTENTION TO TONE AND
CONTENT OF LETTER PARTICULARLY WHEN COMPARING IT, AS HE WAS SURE WE
WOULD, WITH RECENT COMMUNICATIONS FROM SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO OTHER
WESTERN LEADERS.

4. GRATEFUL PMS APPROVAL TO PASS MAIN ELEMENTS OF LET TO OUR NATO
ALLIES. ADVISE.

5. TEXT OF LET AS FOLLOWS: (Comcentre please copy attached)



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	28-6-1-Trudeau 28-COMBLOC-1-GDR
	PEACE MISSION

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

CONFIDENTIAL

6 JUN 84 21 132 12 10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDA0901 06JUN84

TO/À

TO WSAW DELIVER BY 070900

INFO

DISTR

INFO BONN WSHDC BNATO LDN PARIS PRMNY ROME HAGUE BRU MOSCO BGRAD

REF

BPEST BUCST PRGUE GENEV STKHM/SCDEL VMBFR PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/CP/

SUBJ/SUJ

DNACPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR MINA DMF RGB RBD RBR IDD IDR IFB IDAO IDAN IDAV RCR ZSI

REF OURTELS IDA0855 AND 0857 04JUN, YOURTEL UMGR 1140 06JUN

---PM INITIATIVE: CDA/GDR ARMS CONTROL CONSULTATIONS

GIVEN UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING PROGRAMME FOR POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS

IN WSAW, WE CONCUR WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATION THAT ARMS CONTROL CON-
SULTATIONS IN EAST BERLIN WOULD BEST TAKE PLACE ON FRIDAY 29JUN WITH
TRAVEL FROM WSAW ON 28JUN. GRATEFUL YOU NAIL DOWN THIS DATE WITH
KRABATSCH DURING YOUR VISIT TO EAST BERLIN NEXT WEEK.

2. VERY PLEASED WITH SUGGESTION THAT AMB MCLAINÉ JOIN CANDEL FOR
DISCUSSIONS WITH KRABATSCH ET AL. PLEASE PROCEED WITH APPROPRIATE
HOTEL RESERVATIONS FOR EVENINGS OF 28-29JUN ONCE GDR AGREE TO DATES.

3. CDN APPROACH TO CONSULTATIONS¹ AS OUTLINED OUR REFTELS AND PARA 4
YOUR REFTEL, SHOULD BE STRESSED TO GDR, AS YOU PROPOSE TO DO, SO
THERE WILL BE NO/NO DOUBT ABOUT OBJECTIVES OF TALKS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

GARY J. SMITH/pec

IDA

5-6689

SIG

GARY J. SMITH

TO/À FILE (through IDD)

FROM/DE • IDA

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Six-Nation Proposal on Arms Control: Call
SUJET by Swedish Ambassador

Security/Sécurité	RESTRICTED
Accession/Référence	336150
File/Dossier	28-6-1-Trudeau PEACE MISSION 20-4-7
Date	6 June 1984
Number/Numéro	IDA-0891

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

IDD
IDR
RSD
RSR
IDAO
IDAN
STKHM

Swedish Ambassador Bjork called on Louis Delvoie, Director-General of the International Security Bureau 4 June to introduce Swedish Ambassador-at-large, Bernt Carlsson. Mr. Carlsson described himself as a political appointee to the Swedish Foreign Ministry involved with Arms Control and Disarmament issues and he indicated that he was visiting North America to determine, inter alia, official reaction to the Six-Nation Proposal. Specifically, he wished to learn how Canadian officials viewed the current state of East-West relations; our evaluation of the Six-Nation proposal; and plans that Canada had for future endeavours in the arms control field.

2. Mr. Delvoie prefaced his remarks by drawing attention to the imminent change in the leadership of the Liberal party and his assumption that the new Prime Minister would have his own views on what his personal role in Arms Control endeavours should be. Mr. Delvoie then reviewed with his visitors how the Prime Minister's initiative had been received in Canada (goals and substance had received non-partisan support) and recent developments (letters to Reagan and Chernenko conveying the two suffocation proposals and letters to Reagan, Chernenko, NATO Heads of Government and the other Heads of Government of countries that he had visited, conveying the ten principles contained in his 9 February speech). Turning to the Six-Nation proposal, Mr. Delvoie indicated that the Prime Minister was sympathetic with it but that it contained some points which, by virtue of our adherence to agreed NATO policy, Canada could not accept. It would probably be accurate to say that Prime Minister Trudeau was "one in spirit" with the Proposal.

.../2

- 2 -

RESTRICTED

3. Questioned about the NATO Ministerial Meeting which took place last week in Washington, Mr. Delvoie stated that the atmosphere of the meeting had been influenced by the bleak picture of Soviet attitudes toward the West as painted by the Foreign Ministers of Spain, Italy and the Federal Republic, all of whom had made recent trips to Moscow. Mr. MacEachen had tried to convince his colleagues to adopt a more balanced approach in the Washington Statement in order to send a positive signal to the Soviets but while a number of Europeans agreed with us in private, none did so in the meetings.

4. The meeting wound up with Mr. Delvoie indicating arms control issues on which Canada intends, for the immediate future, to focus attention: early resumption of INF/START talks; MBFR (we hoped that the recent Western proposal will elicit an Eastern response); CW; and outer space (we must soon find a way to halt the development of weapons for use in outer space before the whole process becomes too destabilizing). Mr. Delvoie also expressed concern over lack of reaction in the US Administration to the doubts and criticism of the Space Defence Initiative which are emanating from numerous concerned knowledgeable and responsible sources.

5. Neither Ambassador Bjork nor Ambassador Carlsson made any substantive comments about Swedish arms control policy with the exception of a few preambular comments when raising the subject of the Six-Nation Proposal. Both appeared content to restrict themselves to querying Canadian policy.



D.A. Snider
Arms Control and
Disarmament Division

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

ACC	336156	DATE
FILE	18-6-1-Trade	PEACE W.S.C./R
	20-4-7	

R E S T R I C T E D

FM MOSCO XYGR0744 06JUN84

TO EXTOTT LIDA

INFO BNATO WSHDC BONN LDN STKHM ATHNS DSLAM BAIRS BGRAD BUCST

DELHI MXICO PARIS ROME PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA UGB IFB RBD RGB IMD IMU RBR IDR IDD URR GAA PSR ZSI

ZSP LSR IDAO IDAN

REF OURTEL XYGR0693 29MAY

---SIX-NATION PEACE INITIATIVE

SUMMARY:SOV GOVT STATEMENT PUBLISHED JUNE01 RESPONDS TO SIX-NATION INITIATIVE WITH LITANY OF WELL-KNOWN SOVIET PROPOSALS. SOVS SEEM NOT/NOT TO TAKE INITIATIVE VERY SERIOUSLY,EXCEPT AS PROPAGANDA EXERCISE.

REPORT:ON JAN01/001 OFFICIAL GOVT STATEMENT WAS ISSUED RESPONDING TO SUBJ INITIATIVE.JOINT DECLARATION WAS DESCRIBED AS CENTERING ON NEED TO STOP FURTHER BUILDUP OF NUCLEAR ARMS, FREEZE NUCLEAR ARSENALS AND IMMEDIATELY BEGIN SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS OF THOSE ARSENALS.STATEMENT THEN SELF-SERVINGLY REVIEWS RANGE OF MEASURES ADVOCATED BY USSR:QUOTE THE POINT IS TO REACH AGREEMENT WITHOUT DELAY ON PUTTING AN END TO THE QUANTITATIVE BUILDING UP OF ALL COMPONENTS OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS,INCLUDING ALSO ALL DELIVERY VEHICLES FOR NUCLEAR ARMS AND MUNITIONS FOR THEM, ON RENOUNCING THE DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR ARMS OF NEW KINDS AND TYPES,ON ESTABLISHING A MORATORIUM ON ALL TESTS OF NUCLEAR MUNITIONS,ON STOPPING THE PRODUCTION OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS FOR

...2

NOV 1984
SECRET

PAGE TWO XYGR0744 RESTR

AIMS OF CREATING NUCLEAR MUNITIONS.UNQUOTE.STATEMENT ASSERTS THAT
ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE MUST BE TOTAL LIQUIDATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS.
STATEMENT RECALLS SOV PROPOSALS FOR QUOTE RADICALLY LOWERING
UNQUOTE NUCLEAR CONFRONTATION GLOBALLY AND IN EUROPE.QUOTE THESE
PROPOSALS CAN BE IMMEDIATELY TRANSLATED INTO THE LANGUAGE OF
CONCRETE ACCORDS AS SOON AS THE OBSTACLES FOR THEIR DISCUSSION
ARE REMOVED,THE OBSTACLES DELIBERATELY CREATED BY WASHINGTON
WHICH IS DEPLOYING ITS FIRST STRIKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN WESTERN
EUROPE IN THE HOPE OF ATTAINING MILITARY SUPERIORITY.UNQUOTE.
PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR IS SAID TO BE FIRST OBJECTIVE OF SOV
FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE AND THIS SHLD BECOME QUOTE
OBLIGATORY NORM OF BEHAVIOUR OF ALL NUCLEAR POWERS IRRESPECTIVE
OF THE SIZE OF THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS.UNQUOTE STATEMENT CALLS
ON ALL NUCLEAR POWERS TO RENOUNCE FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
AS USSR HAS ALREADY DONEE,AND TO GUARANTEE NON-USE OF NUCLEAR ARMS
AGAINST STATES ON WHOSE TERRITORY THERE ARE NO/NO SUCH ARMS,
AS USSR HAS PLEDGED.RE LATTER,USSR IS QUOTE PREPARED TO IMPART
TREATY FORM TO IT BY WAY OF CONCLUDING MULTILATERAL AND BILATERAL
AGREEMENTS UNQUOTE STATEMENT FURTHER ASSERTS NEED TO PREVENT
NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION QUOTE TO THOSE AREAS OF THE WORLD
WHERE THERE ARE NO/NO SUCH WEAPONS AND TO INITIATE A PROCESS OF
FREEING FROM SUCH WEAPONS THOSE AREAS WHERE THEY ARE NOW DEPLOYED.
AS FOR USSR,IT IS RESOLUTELY FOR THE CREATION AND EXPANSION OF
NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES.UNQUOTE.FINALLY,WEAPONS OF ANY KIND SHLD NOT/

...3

PAGE THREE XYGR0744 RESTR

NOT BE ALLOWED IN OUTER SPACE, A MATTER ON WHICH USSR HAS ALSO
MADE CONCRETE PROPOSALS.

2. IN SUM, STATEMENT IS A REHASH OF KNOWN POSITIONS WHICH INTRODUCES
NOTHING NEW BY WAY OF EITHER SUBSTANCE OR PROCEDURE. STATEMENT
WAS NOT/NOT CONVEYED OFFICIALLY TO CONCERNED GOVTS VIA MOSCO
EMES AND NONE OF INTERESTED DIPLO COLLEAGUES WITH WHOM WE HAVE
SPOKEN (SWEDISH, INDIAN, GREEK) IS AWARE OF ITS HAVING BEEN OFFICIALLY
CONVEYED IN THEIR RESPECTIVE CAPITALS. OUR IMPRESSION THAT SOVS
DO NOT/NOT TAKE SIX-NATION INITIATIVE TOO SERIOUSLY, EXCEPT AS
PROPAGANDA EXERCISE.

CCC/095 060958Z XYGR0744



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	28-6-1-TRUDEAU <i>PEACE</i>
<i>MISSION</i>	

7 Jun 84 0 h 24 62 10
3-1-3-IDA

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

FM/DE
TO/À
INFO
DISTR
REF
SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDA0738 06JUNE84

TO PRGUE

DISTR MFFP MFFV IDD

REF YOURTEL 3034 25JUNE84

---PAYE

HAPPY TO PRESENT MYSELF-MARGOT EDWARDS, NEW FINANCIAL OFFICER FOR IDD. WILL BE HAPPY TO ADVISE ON FINANCIAL MATTERS RELATED BUREAU ACTIVITIES YOU HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN, IE TASK FORCE.

2. TELEPHONE INSTALLATION COST CANNOT BE CHARGED AS PAYE, LAST DATE TO DO SO WAS APR 17. EXPENSE SHOULD BE CODED TO 014-760-760-016-1501. VERY IMPORTANT RELATED DOCUMENTATION STATE IT IS TASK FORCE BUDGET ITEM. THIS INFO HAS TO SHOW ON FINANCIAL PRINTOUTS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

M. Edwards


SIG M. EDWARDS/AC

IDA

3-5214

Gary J. Smith

SIG GARY J. SMITH



**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T E

DE BRU ZVGR0382 06JUN84

A EXTOTT/IDA LIVRAISON 060900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL PARIS ROME BUCST

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RSD RSR IDR IDAO

REF VOTRETEL 0827 01JUN

**---INITIATIVE DU PM: LETTRES AUX CHEFS DE GOUV SUR LES DIX
PRINCIPES: BELGIQUE**

**AMBASSADEUR A PRESENTE 5 JUIN, DES SON RETOUR DE LUXEMBOURG
(NOTRETEL ZVGR0381 DU 5 JUIN), LET DE TRUDEAU A MARTENS AVEC
COMMENTAIRES APPROPRIES, PAR L'ENTREMISE DE SON CHEF DE
CABINET COENEN (AMB DEVAIT VOIR MARTENS FORTUITEMENT, QUELQUES
MINUTES PLUS TARD). COENEN LUI A PROMIS UNE REPONSE DES QUE
MARTENS AURA PU CONSULTER TINDEMANS AUQUEL AMB A EGALEMENT
ENVOYE TEXTE SUGGERANT ECHANGE DE VUES PROCHAIN A CE SUJET
ET SIGNALANT QUE PM CDN INVITE SES INTERLOCUTEURS A APPUYER
PUBLIQUEMENT LES IDEES PRESENTEES.**

CCC/030 060907Z ZVGR0382

FILE	18-61-Indean
PEACE MISSION	

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

R E S T R I C T E D

FM DELHI WBGR1313 06JUN84

TO EXTOTT LIDA

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR PSR

REF YOURTEL IDA0831 01JUN

---PM INITIATIVE::LETTER TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES
TEXT DELIVERED BY HAND 04JUN TO GHAREKHAN, JOINT SECRETARY,
PRIME MINISTERS OFFICE WHO LOOKS AFTER INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY ISSUES.

CCC/282 060922Z WBGR1313

ACC	REL	FILE
28-6-1-Trudeau		
DOSSIER		
PEACE MISSION		

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

R E S T R I C T E D

FM WSAW UMSV0011 06JUN84

TO EXTOTT LIDA IMMED

INFO OSLO LSBON ANKRA BGRAD BPEST MOSCO PRGUE LDN WSHDC PARIS BONN
BNATO ROME PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RGB RBD RBR RSD RSR IDR

REF YOURTEL MGTC8389 05JUN OURTEL UMGR1134 05JUN

---PMS INITIATIVE:LETTERS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON THEN PRINCIPLES

PLEASE CORRECT SYMBOL RGV TO READ RGB/RGB.

2.MGTC:PLEASE PROTECT TO RGB.

CCC/235 060810Z UMSV0011

A6

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

335289
28-6-1- Imdeawick PEACE MISSION
28-COMBROC-1 GDR

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSAW UMGR1140 06JUN84

TO EXTOTT LIDA DELIVER BY 060900

INFO BONN WSHDC BNATO LDN PARIS PRMNY ROME HAGUE BRU MOSCO BGRAD
BPEST BUCST PRGUE GENEV STKHM/SC DEL VMBFR PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/PPP/
DNACPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR MINA DMF RGB RBD RBR IDD IDR IFB IDAO IDAN IDAV RCR ZSI

REF YOURTELS IDA0855 IDA0857 04JUN OURTEL UMGR1134 05JUN

---PMS INITIATIVE:CDN/GDR ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

YOUR REFTELS ARE GREATLY APPRECIATED AND IMPECCABLY TIMED AS I SHALL
BE IN BRLIN 11-14JUN AND IN USEFUL POSITION TO DISCUSS PROPOSED ARMS
CONTROL NEGS WITH GDR AUTHORITIES AS FOLLOW-UP TO 01JUN FISCHER
VISIT TO OTT.

2.EVER SINCE PMS VISIT TO PRLIN THERE CAN BE NO/NO DOUBT THAT GDR
AUTHORITIES HAVE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO CDN INITIATIVE ON NEED
FOR BILATERAL COOPERATION IN SEEKING COMMON GROUND BETWEEN NATO AND
WPO POSITIONS WHICH MIGHT BE EXPLORED AND EXPLOITED FOR COMMON GOOD.
AS CORRECTLY NOTED YOUR REFTEL 0855,GDR HAD INITIALLY BEEN SOMEWHAT
DISAPPOINTED AT ABSENCE OF CONCRETE STEPS RE FOLLOW-UP BUT WERE
CIRCUMSPECO IN THEIR COMMENTS IN THIS REGARD.

3.CURRENT SUGGESTION WILL DO MUCH TO DISSUADE THEM OF OUR RETICENCE
AND WE CANNOT/NOT BUT LEND OUR FULL SUPPORT TO RENEWED INITIATIVE.
GIVEN SOME UNCERTAINTIES SURROUNDING PROGRAM FOR POLITICAL
CONSULTATIONS IN WSAW(AS OUTLINED OUR REFTEL)IT WOULD BE OUR STRONG

...2

PAGE TWO UMGR1140 CONF

RECOMMENDATION THAT WE ^SWEEK CONSULTATIONS WITH ERNST KRABATSCH IN
NRLIN ON FRI 29JUN. THIS WOULD ALLOW TIME FOR FULL PROGRAM IN POLAND
AND TRAVEL FROM WSAW 28JUN. WITH YOUR CONCURRENCE I WOULD ALSO
PROPOSE TO JOIN SMITH/IDA AND ARSENE DESPRES/IDR FOR DISCUSSIONS
WHICH I CONSIDER OF SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE IN OUR POLITICAL RELNS
WITH GDR. IF YOU AGREE, APPROPRIATE RESERVATIONS VIS-A-VIS ACCOMMODATION
WILL BE MADE IN EAST BRLIN FOR NIGHTS 28-29JUN.

4. PENDING YOUR CONCURRENCE AS TO ARRANGEMENTS, I WILL CERTAINLY STRESS
POINT DURING MY CONVERSATION WITH GDR AUTHORITIES NEXT WEEK THAT CDN
INTENTION IS TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT RANGE OF CURRENT ARMS CONTROL
ISSUES AS WELL AS REVIEW OF INNATL SECURITY SITU. AT SAME TIME WE
SHALL UNDERLINE IT IS NOT/NOT OUR INTENTION TO EXCHANGE PAPERS NOR
ATTEMPT TO ARGUE IN WRITING ON COMMON POINTS THAT MIGHT BE IDENTIFIED
IN RESPECTIVE ALLIANCE POSITIONS (ALTHOUGH AT MINIMUM WE CAN EXPECT
SUBSTANTIAL DISAPPOINTMENT IN OUR POSITION).

5. AS I LEAVE WSAW 09JUN FOR POZNAN FAIR AND THEN TO BRLIN IT IS MOST
IMPORTANT THAT I HAVE YOUR VIEWS/CONCURRENCE REGARDING DISCUSSIONS
WITH GDR AUTHORITIES BY 080900 WSAW TIME

MCLAINE

CCC/235 061010Z UMGR1140

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
À

ROME

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)
UNCLASSIFIED
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDA0915 DATE June 6/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA0827 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles</p> <p>Original of letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to Prime Minister Craxi, for onward transmission</p> <p>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau DIV DIARY RCR - you may wish to pass copy to local embassy</p> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION	RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
DATE	SIGNATURE

EXT 34/BIL (REV. 12/70)
7530-21-029-4107

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE

ACC	REF	DATE
FILE	DOSSIER	
28-6-1-Trudeau		

Kenzie Musier



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA K1A 0A2

le 31 mai 1984

Monsieur le Premier ministre

Ces derniers mois, j'ai rencontré plusieurs dirigeants de pays de l'Est et de l'Ouest, dont les présidents Reagan et Tchernenko, afin d'échanger des vues avec eux sur la situation actuelle en matière de sécurité internationale et le piètre état des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

Je me rappelle en particulier l'entretien fort utile que nous avons eu à Rome, en novembre dernier. Nous avons alors discuté plusieurs idées et propositions destinées à réduire les tensions internationales et à stabiliser et consolider la base des rapports entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

En repensant à ces diverses consultations, je suis de plus en plus convaincu qu'en dépit de difficultés persistantes et de la regrettable absence de progrès au chapitre de la réduction des armements, il subsiste un terrain d'entente étendu et discernable entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Des déclarations faites récemment par des dirigeants des deux blocs m'incitent à croire que l'on est d'accord dans une large mesure sur les principes de base devant régir les relations internationales et, plus particulièrement, notre façon d'aborder la plus grave menace planant sur l'humanité, soit la possibilité d'une guerre nucléaire.

Sans faire abstraction de nos différences, nous devons, je pense, nous appliquer à explorer les terrains d'entente et intérêts communs aux deux camps et chercher à en tirer parti. Les dix points suivants, énoncés dans un discours que j'ai prononcé à la Chambre des communes du Canada au début de cette année, pourraient fournir une base utile dans ce sens :

Son Excellence Monsieur Bettino Craxi
Premier ministre de la République italienne
Rome
ITALIE

- 2 -

- De part et d'autre on reconnaît l'impossibilité de sortir vainqueur d'une guerre nucléaire.
- De part et d'autre on convient qu'il faut absolument éviter la guerre nucléaire.
- De part et d'autre on souhaite être libéré du risque de guerre accidentelle ou d'attaque par surprise.
- De part et d'autre on reconnaît les dangers inhérents aux armes déstabilisatrices.
- De part et d'autre on comprend le besoin d'améliorer les techniques de gestion des crises.
- De part et d'autre on est conscient des terribles conséquences qu'entraînerait le fait d'être le premier à recourir à la force contre l'autre camp.
- De part et d'autre on a intérêt à accroître la sécurité en en réduisant le coût.
- De part et d'autre on a intérêt à éviter la propagation des armes nucléaires dans d'autres pays, communément appelée prolifération horizontale.
- De part et d'autre on en est arrivé à reconnaître prudemment les intérêts légitimes de l'autre camp en matière de sécurité.
- De part et d'autre on a conscience que les stratégies de sécurité ne sauraient être fondées sur l'hypothèse d'un effondrement politique ou économique dans l'autre camp.

Si les dirigeants de l'Est et de l'Ouest et, en particulier, les superpuissances donnaient publiquement leur adhésion à ces idées, cela aiderait largement, à mon sens, à créer l'atmosphère et le cadre politique de base si essentiels à des négociations productives touchant les armes nucléaires comme classiques. J'ai donc tenu à vous écrire, de même qu'à d'autres dirigeants, pour livrer ces idées à votre réflexion et vous inviter à y souscrire.

- 3 -

Vous espérez comme moi, je le sais, que les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest s'amélioreront bientôt sensiblement, de manière à favoriser l'avancement du long travail destiné à libérer l'humanité de la menace de guerre nucléaire.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Premier ministre, l'assurance de ma très haute considération *et de mon*

très sincère.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "B. Linder". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, stylized initial "B" and a long, sweeping horizontal stroke at the end.

TO/λ • PSR

FROM/DE • IDA

REFERENCE • Your memorandum PSR-1191 of June 4, 1984
 RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Canada/India Informal Meeting
SUJET

Security/Sécurité

CONFIDENTIAL

Accession/Référence

335490

File/Dossier

28-6-1-Trudeau; 4-UNGA
PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT 28-~~3-5~~ 3-5
SUB-ASIA-1-INDIA SPECIAL

20-4-7

Date

June 6, 1984

20-INDIA-9

Number/Numéro

IDA-909

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

ETN
IDD
IDR
IMU

We are attaching briefs for use during the visit of Indian Foreign Secretary Rasgotra on June 15 on the following subjects:

PM Initiative
6-nation appeal for nuclear halt
Nuclear issues in the UN

Gary J. Smith,
Director,
Arms Control &
Disarmament Division

FILE 28-4-UNGA
DIV
DIARY

Canada/India Informal Mtg, Ottawa
June 15, 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

M.R. Grinius
Arms Control and
Disarmament Division

996-6320

UNGA: ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES

ISSUE

At the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), India continues to be a major influence among the neutral and non-aligned (NNA) countries on arms control and disarmament (ACD) issues.

BACKGROUND

India has long played a leading role among the NNA on arms control and disarmament issues, particularly in the nuclear field. It was Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's father, Nehru, who first proposed a nuclear test ban in 1954. India's explosion of a "peaceful nuclear device" in 1974 has not perceptively diminished India's role as one of the Third World's major spokesmen on ACD issues.

A comparison of India's voting pattern, in contrast to Canada's, on the 46 ACD resolutions which came to a vote at UNGA 38 is revealing. India cast 27 positive votes (Canada: 16) and only 2 negatives votes (Canada: 12). Indian-Canadian votes were identical only on 8 resolutions and were diametrically opposite on 13 resolutions. India and Canada agreed to disagree on 25 resolutions through one or the other country's abstention. In contrast, India voted with the Soviet bloc 32 times and against it only once.

That India would cast a majority of positive votes supporting various ACD resolutions is not surprising. India voted for various resolutions calling for a nuclear freeze (one such resolution was submitted by India), the prevention or condemnation of nuclear war and non-use of nuclear weapons. India co-sponsored the only draft convention on any ACD matter to be passed by the General Assembly in 1983. The convention called for the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons stating that any use of nuclear weapons was against the UN Charter and a crime against humanity. Canada and the rest of NATO (except Greece) voted against this resolution as it directly challenged NATO's doctrine of flexible response.

India cast one of only three negative votes against the Pakistani resolution calling for the establishment of a

.../2

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) in South Asia. The message to Pakistan was clear. India would keep its nuclear option open during any future hostilities with Pakistan. This message was reinforced by Indian abstentions on resolutions (one of which was submitted by Pakistan) calling for nuclear weapons states (NWS) not to resort to the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states (so-called negative security assurances). In the same context, it should be recalled that India has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has often castigated the NWS for their vertical proliferation while maintaining a very ambiguous position on the possible possession of its own nuclear arsenal. India joined the Warsaw Pact countries in voting against the Western resolution calling for continued investigations into the alleged use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and South East Asia.

CANADIAN POSITION

Canada's solidarity with her NATO allies and the Western Group in general has led to substantially different views from India's on the majority of ACD issues. This situation has been further exacerbated by the general coincidence of views between India and the Soviet bloc. Canada could not support any resolution calling for a nuclear freeze (the cessation of the continued development, deployment and testing of nuclear weapons and delivery systems) since a freeze would leave a serious imbalance of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe. Calls for the non-use of nuclear weapons are totally against NATO's doctrine of flexible response. Finally, the large number of ACD issues where both countries have agreed to disagree reflects basic differences between Western and NNA approaches to ACD matters. Where India and Canada did agree fully, the issues tended to be non-controversial ones such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco (the establishment of a NWFZ in South America), the denuclearization of Africa, the preventing of an arms race in outer space and the declaration of a Disarmament Week.

TALKING POINTS

- Although Canada, as a member of the NATO alliance, and India, as a leader in the non-aligned movement, have adopted rather differing approaches to arms control and disarmament matters at the UN General Assembly, we hope to be able to consult more closely with you in order to expand the number of areas in which we are in agreement.
- Canada could not support India's co-sponsored draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons as the resolution ran counter to NATO's doctrine of flexible response. In a similar vein, Canada could not support India's resolution calling for a nuclear freeze because such a freeze would perpetuate the current serious imbalance of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) in Europe.
- As you are aware, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will be reviewed in September 1985. As India is such a strong supporter of measures to curb the arms race both in the vertical and horizontal sense, it is hoped that India will review its attitude towards the NPT and consider signing the treaty.

FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau
DIARY
DIV

IDA-909

Canada/India Informal Mtg, Ottawa
June 15, 1984

CONFIDENTIAL

28-6-1-Trudeau
PEACE MISSION

G.J. Smith
Director
Arms Control and
Disarmament Division
995-6689

PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE

ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

ISSUE

To review the current status of the Prime Minister's initiative.

BACKGROUND

The Prime Minister's central purpose is to try to stop and reverse the worsening trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce international tensions and risks of confrontation. His chief proposal addresses the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the two superpowers.

The initiative involves a number of specific proposals - (a) a conference of the five nuclear weapon states to limit strategic nuclear arsenals (b) a concerted political effort to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime (c) a substantive Western response to the Eastern proposals on MBFR and a meeting at the Foreign Minister level in Vienna (d) the inauguration of the Stockholm CDE Meeting at senior political level.

Also related to the initiative are three specific proposals of a more technical nature related to the Prime Minister's strategy of suffocation enunciated at the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. These include: (a) a ban on the testing and deployment of high altitude anti-satellite systems (b) ensuring the verifiability of future strategic weapons systems and (c) restrictions on the mobility of terrestrially deployed ICBMs.

RESULTS

The degree of support which the Prime Minister has garnered for the central purpose of his initiative is of itself a positive result insofar as it may have a beneficial effect on the climate of East-West relations. The decisions taken at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels in early

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

early December were particularly significant in furthering the purposes of the initiative:

- (a) an undertaking by NATO foreign ministers to attend the opening of the CDE in Stockholm (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (b) an undertaking to review the NATO negotiating position in the MBFR negotiations (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (c) the "Brussels Declaration" which places heavy emphasis on genuine détente and dialogue in East-West relations (an FRG initiative, actively supported by the Canadian delegation);
- (d) a mandate given the permanent NATO Council to review the current state of East-West relations and to report to the next NATO ministerial meeting in Washington at the end of May on what actions might be taken to improve them.

There have been additional signs of progress. In the early months of this year there was some moderation of the strident rhetoric of both superpowers; President Chernenko during his inauguration in February began to refer to returning to the period of détente; and broad political contact at the Foreign Minister level between East and West, particularly between Moscow and Washington, was re-established at the beginning of the Stockholm Conference.

Western leaders, including Prime Ministers Trudeau, Thatcher and Craxi and the Italian, German and French Foreign Ministers, have gone to the East to open lines of communication; the MBFR negotiations resumed in Vienna on March 16 and on April 19 Western participants in the MBFR negotiations formally tabled new Western proposals. On April 18 the USA tabled a proposal in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for a comprehensive treaty banning chemical weapons.

In mid-May, Canada, on the initiative of the USSR, agreed to hold bilateral arms control negotiations.

CURRENT STATUS OF MAJOR ELEMENTS

The initiative continues to be pursued, bilaterally and in multilateral forums:

(A) East-West Relations

In recent weeks there has been a return to the use of rethoric by the superpowers and in particular by the

.../3

- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Soviet Union which has been stiffening its position on arms control subjects especially on INF. Prospects for an improvement in relations in the next few months are poor.

(B) Five Power Conference

To date the UN Secretary General has not yet taken up the Prime Minister's suggestion that he convene a meeting of the Permanent Representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council to discuss their responsibilities in the field of arms control. The Secretary General does not consider it "timely" to pursue this given current attitudes and circumstances. (Only the Chinese have responded favourably to the idea).

(C) NPT

While the Commonwealth Meeting in Delhi demonstrated the difficulties in making progress against the danger of horizontal proliferation, Canada remains committed to this goal and currently is examining ways to strengthen and ensure greater adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(D) Stockholm Conference

With all three groupings (Western, Warsaw Pact, Neutral and Non-Aligned) having tabled their own proposals, the major task facing the conference at its second session (May 8 - July 6) is to agree on an organizational structure (i.e. the establishment of working groups) to enable the conference to move from the general debate stage to the detailed examination of proposals and actual negotiations. Most difficult will be how to handle the Soviet declaratory proposals calling, inter alia, for agreement on non-use of force and non-first use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Washington statement on East-West relations issued by NATO Foreign Ministers on May 31 advanced this issue somewhat by the following sentence: "In order to give further effect and expression to the existing duty of all participating states to refrain from the threat or use of force in their mutual relations, agreement would be necessary on the above concrete measures in accordance with the Madrid mandate."

(E) MBFR

After considerable effort with the USA, and in the face of UK reluctance, NATO finally agreed to table its long-awaited response to Eastern proposals submitted last year. The Western proposals, which do not go as far as Canada would have liked but are nevertheless welcome, offer flexibility on

.../4

- 4 -

CONFIDENTIAL

the question of data, but require enhanced verification measures. This move will not in itself break the logjam in the negotiations but may be sufficient to elicit a counter move from the East in due course although the initial Eastern reaction has been harshly critical.

(F) Two Suffocation Proposals

The Prime Minister wrote to Presidents Reagan and Chernenko on May 7 to seek their views on the two specific proposals on strategic weapons systems (a) restrictions on the mobility of terrestrially deployed ICBMs; (b) verifiability of future strategic systems. No official reaction has yet been received, though we have had unofficial indications that the USA response will be favourable. (The text of the two proposals, although not the letter itself, has been provided to NATO allies.)

(G) ASAT

The proposed high altitude ASAT ban has been discussed among our allies both at NATO headquarters and bilaterally in Washington, London, Bonn, Paris and the Hague. Our first objective at this time is to achieve agreement at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to create an ad hoc working group on outer space in which the Canadian proposal might be addressed.

(H) Ten Principles

Following failure to achieve all party endorsement of the ten principles in the House of Commons the Prime Minister on May 31 wrote to leaders of the countries he visited (USA, USSR, FRG, UK, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Japan, China, GDR, Czechoslovakia, Romania, including Commonwealth countries present at CHOGM in New Delhi last November), as well as to all other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, to suggest that the principles might form the basis of a common bond between East and West. A copy of his letter to Mrs. Gandhi is attached.

(I) Arms Control Consultations with the GDR

In late January, the Prime Minister agreed with GDR Chairman Honecker to have arms control experts from both countries meet to determine whether some form of common ground in arms control might not be found. Given certain sensitivity of some of our allies, particularly the West Germans, it is our intention to transform this arrangement into general arms control discussions rather than attempting to come up with common positions. It is proposed that these consultations take place in East Berlin at the end of June.

.../5

(J) Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security

One of the domestic outgrowths of the Prime Minister's initiative has been the Bill to establish a Canadian Institute which has now passed second reading and is currently being studied in detail by the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence. As the Bill now has all-party support, it could pass final reading by the end of June provided agreement can be reached on the composition of the Board of Directors.



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE
OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 31, 1984

Dear Indira,

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations. I recall, in particular, the most valuable conversations we had in New Delhi and Goa at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting during which we discussed several ideas and proposals aimed at reducing international tension and restoring the vital East-West relationship to a more stable and constructive basis.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

Her Excellency Shrimati Indira Gandhi
Prime Minister of India
New Delhi

- 2 -

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

Your recent statement in concert with five other world leaders is witness to your personal interest and your willingness to act in this most important matter. I fully support your aims in this regard, and I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely, *personal regards*

A handwritten signature, likely of a high-ranking official, written in dark ink. The signature is stylized and appears to be a single word or a very short phrase.

FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau, 20-4-7
DIV
DIARY

Canada/India Informal Mtg, Ottawa
June 15, 1984

RESTRICTED

M.R. Grinius
Arms Control and
Disarmament Division

996-6320

SIX NATION JOINT APPEAL

ISSUE

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was one of the six national leaders who signed a joint appeal to the nuclear weapons states to curb the nuclear arms race.

BACKGROUND

Mrs. Gandhi joined the leaders of Argentina, Greece, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania in signing a joint appeal on May 22, 1984 calling upon the nuclear weapons states (NWS) to halt all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, as well as to follow this with a substantial reduction in their nuclear forces. This first step would then be followed by a continuing programme of arms reductions leading to general and complete disarmament. Measures would also have to be taken to strengthen the United Nations system and to ensure the transfer of resources from the arms race into social and economic development. The essential goal of the appeal was to reduce and then eliminate the risk of war between nations. There was fleeting reference to "adequate verification measures". The thrust of the appeal is totally compatible with India's traditional position on nuclear arms control and disarmament matters.

The idea of a joint appeal was first initiated by the Parliamentarians for World Order (PWO) who persuaded Mrs. Gandhi in the summer of 1983 to lead the initiative. In September 1983, Prime Minister Trudeau was approached by Douglas Roche, M.P., current president of PWO, with the suggestion that the Prime Minister join with other world leaders in supporting a joint proposal which would call for a two-year halt in testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. The Secretary General of PWO - Nick Dunlop, an official from New Zealand - travelled to Ottawa in December to explain the development of the idea to Canadian officials and to seek the active support of Prime Minister Trudeau. The Prime Minister subsequently received a letter from Mrs. Gandhi asking him to come to a coordinating meeting in New Delhi in early 1984, but the Prime Minister declined.

- 2 -

RESTRICTED

Of the NWS, three have officially replied to the Six Nation Joint Appeal. The United States, while supporting the general goal of the appeal, could not support the specific call for a nuclear freeze since that would lock-in current imbalances in favour of the Soviet Union. The United Kingdom, while sharing the conviction of the six leaders that there must never be another world war, stated that it served no useful purpose to induce a misplaced sense of panic or fear about the likelihood of a nuclear war. The Soviet Union in a recent TASS article voiced unconditional support for a nuclear freeze as proposed in the appeal. The call for a nuclear freeze has long been a Soviet cry. However, the TASS article did not mention the other aspects of the appeal. The relationship between disarmament and development continues to be anathema to the Soviets.

CANADIAN POSITION

The Prime Minister in the House of Commons welcomed the active involvement of other world leaders in drawing attention to the arms race and to the deteriorating international situation. However, Canada could not support the appeal primarily for two reasons:

- a. the appeal ran counter to Canada's firm commitment to the 1979 NATO two-track decision on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF); and,
- b. it ran counter to the Canadian decision to test the USA air-launched cruise missile.

In the House of Commons when asked about Greece as a NATO country supporting the appeal, Prime Minister Trudeau recalled that Greece's proposal for a six month freeze on INF deployment was rejected by all other NATO members. He went on to say that Canada, having adhered to the 1979 NATO decision could "not have the latitude of the Prime Minister of Greece and still be faithful allies of NATO."

TALKING POINTS

- Canada welcomes the active involvement of other world leaders in drawing attention to the arms race and to the deteriorating international situation. Prime Minister Trudeau recently wrote to Mrs. Gandhi supporting her aims in this regard (copy of letter attached).
- Canada could not support the appeal because it ran counter to NATO's two-track decision on INF and it ran counter to the Canadian decision to test the USA air-launched cruise missile.
- We noted that the appeal gives only fleeting reference to the question of adequate verification which remains one major stumbling block in discussions on most arms control and disarmament measures. Does India have any concrete proposals on verification?
- We note that the Soviet Union reacted favourably towards the call for a nuclear freeze but has ignored the appeal for the transfer of resources from the arms race to social and economic development. Have China or France reacted to the appeal?

FILE 28-6-1-TRUDEAU
PCO/Archdeacon
RBD

Unofficial translation

The Right Honourable
Pierre E. Trudeau,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa, Canada

335417	
FILE	DOSSIER
28-6-1-TRUDEAU	PEACE
	MISSION

Dear Mr. Prime Minister!

I would like to share the concerns at the situation in the world you have expressed in your letter. The situation is indeed tense and this impels responsible statesmen and politicians to give increasingly serious attention to the problem of removing the military threat, improving the prospects of securing peace.

We are deeply convinced that this objective calls for stopping the arms race in the first place. It is quite obvious that the build-up of arsenals, particularly those of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, far from consolidating international security has the opposite effect of undermining it. Each new step along the way of escalating military preparations increases the probability of a nuclear catastrophe.

Guided by the desire to reverse this ruinous course of developments, the Soviet Union has advanced a whole range of proposals which, if implemented, would allow to freeze nuclear arms in quantity and in quality, to

2.

prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space, to commence talks on radical reductions and ultimately on eliminating nuclear arms. I would like to stress that we are in favour of working out efficient, far-reaching agreements supplemented by measures of the most effective and strict verification and control. The stumbling block is the stand of the US Administration which has created obstacles in the way of talks on strategic and european nuclear weapons, keeps up its futile pursuit of the phantom of military superiority while giving lip service to a constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union on the issues of war and peace.

As to the considerations you have put forward seeking to facilitate verification of certain types of weapons I would like to note that these issues were among others under discussion at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva at the time when these talks broke off because of the start of the deployment of new US missiles in Western Europe. The removal of these missiles from the European soil would unblock the way to resuming the talks and the discussion of issues you have raised in your letter.

Allow me in conclusion to express the hope that you will continue your efforts aimed at eliminating the threat of war and consolidating peace.

With best regards,

June 6, 1984

K. Chernenko

Его Превосходительству
Господину Пьеру Э.Трюдо,
Премьер-министру Канады,
Оттава, Канада

Уважаемый г-н Премьер-министр!

Разделяю выраженную в Вашем письме обеспокоенность обстановкой в мире. Она действительно напряженная, и это побуждает ответственных государственных и политических деятелей все более серьезно задумываться над тем, как устранить военную угрозу, как улучшить перспективы обеспечения мира.

По нашему глубокому убеждению, для этого нужно прежде всего остановить гонку вооружений. Совершенно очевидно, что наращивание арсеналов оружия, прежде всего ядерного и других видов оружия массового уничтожения, не укрепляет, а, наоборот, подрывает международную безопасность. С каждым новым шагом по пути эскалации военных приготовлений увеличивается вероятность ядерной катастрофы.

Руководствуясь целью повернуть вспять этот пагубный ход событий, Советский Союз выдвинул целый комплекс предложений, осуществление которых позволило бы заморозить ядерные вооружения в качественном и количественном отношениях, предотвратить распространение гонки вооружений на космос, приступить к переговорам о радикальном сокращении

2.

и в конечном итоге - ликвидации ядерных средств. Подчеркиваю: мы за выработку действенных, далеко идущих договоренностей, подкрепляемых самыми эффективными и строгими мерами контроля и проверки. Дело упирается в позицию администрации США, которая воздвигла препятствия для переговоров по стратегическим и европейским ядерным вооружениям, упорно продолжает погоню за химерой военного превосходства, лишь для вида рассуждая о желании вести с Советским Союзом конструктивный диалог по вопросам войны и мира.

Что касается соображений, высказываемых Вами относительно облегчения контроля за некоторыми видами вооружений, то могу сказать, что подобные вопросы в числе других были предметом рассмотрения на советско-американских переговорах в Женеве в тот момент, когда эти переговоры прекратились в результате начала размещения новых американских ракет в Западной Европе. Устранение этих ракет с европейской земли открыло бы путь к возобновлению переговоров, в том числе и к обсуждению затрагиваемых в Вашем письме вопросов.

Хочу в заключение выразить надежду, что Вы и далее будете прилагать усилия, направленные на устранение военной угрозы и упрочение мира.

С наилучшими пожеланиями,

К. Черненко

6 июня 1984 года

MEMORANDUM

TO/A • IDA/Smith
FROM/DE • IDA/Cleminson

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET

Comments on PRMNY Tel WKGR1095 31May84:
USA/USSR Positions on ACD

Security/Sécurité	
<u>CONFIDENTIAL</u>	
Accession/Référence	
ACC. 335400	
28-6-1-TRUDEAU cc 28-6-3,	
<u>PEACE MISSION</u> DOSSIER	
28-6-13, 28-6-6-CW, 28-7-1,	
Date 28-COMBLOC-1-USSR, 28-4-UNDC	
June 6, 1984	
Number/Numéro	
IDA-0732	

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

In reference to Ambassador Ekeus's proposal to table PM's ten principles in UNDC, you will remember that Ambassador Beesley has already included them in his February 21 plenary speech in the CD.

2. Ambassador Ekeus proposed that studies be made of present USSR position on verification and Ambassador Beesley supported this proposal. UNIDIR has now agreed to supply office space for the project for Ellis Morris (YTGR3685 4 June 1984) in response to our request (IDA0664 28 May 1984). If you agree this task could be undertaken by Morris during his period in Geneva.

3. In reference to RW and Swedish language, Ambassador Beesley in his April 26 speech opted for the simple 1979 text. The Swedish proposal included the banning of a type of warfare and the banning of a weapons system. We would have to determine the Western Group's view and whether we are willing to sacrifice principles. Perhaps we should.

4. On CW there is no problem. Ambassador Beesley will have Dr. Hamblin for the period 18 June - 6 July and Dr. Sutherland 16 July - 31 August. Both will be devoted exclusively to CW issues.

5. Concerning Arms Control and Outer Space, our brief for SSEA/DPM indicated that all participants except Mexico (in the person of Garcia Robles) appeared ready to agree in the creation of a committee to deal with the issue. Info garnered by Ambassador Beesley from the Australians and from our favourable Swedish Ambassador seems to confirm the likelihood of establishing the group.

F.R. Cleminson
F.R. Cleminson
Arms Control and
Disarmament Division

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM PRMNY WKGR1095 31MAY84

TO EXTOTT IDA DELIVER BY 311400

INFO GENEV VIENN VMBFR BUCST WSHDC LDN PARIS HAGUE BRU BONN MOSCO TOKYO

CNBRA MDRID ATHNS ANKRA ROME COPEN OSLO HSNKI STKHM/SCDEL BNATO

CANMILREPNATO NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/DIPOL

BH AECBOTT/FRASER EMROTT/MORRISON DE OTT

BAG DUBLN DE OTT

DISTR IFB IDD IDAN IDAO IDR IDRL IMU RBR ETN JLE RSD RSR URR RBR

URD RBD

REF IDA TEL 0787 29MAY IDA0652 28MAY

---USA-USSR POSITIONS ON AC/D

DURING LENGTHY DISCUSSION YESTERDAY BETWEEN SWEDISH CD AMB EKEUS AND
AMBASSADOR BEESLEY, EKEUS REPORTED ON PERSONAL BASIS (HENCE CEO
CLASSIFICATION) ON SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS HE HAD HAD RECENTLY WITH USA
AND USSR OFFICIALS ON CTB/NPT, ON OUTER SPACE, ON CW, ON RW, AND ON BW.
RESULTS OF HIS BILATERALS WERE IN ALL CASES ENCOURAGING TO VARIOUS
DEGREES. EKEUS ALSO SUGGESTED THAT PMS TEN PRINCIPLES BE TABLED IN UNDC.
2. EKEUS WILL BE IN WSHDC ALL DAY TODAY TO ATTEND A WORKING LUNCH ON A
RANGE OF AC/D ISSUES, AND PARTICIPATE AFTERWARDS IN A QUOTE SEMINAR
UNQUOTE ON RW AND CTB. HE HAD HEARD SAME INFO AS OURSELVES ON CTB,
NAMELY THAT INTER AGENCY POSITION HAD NOW BEEN DETERMINED WHICH WAS
NEGATIVE ON ANY MOVEMENT ON CTB AND ON AUSTRALIAN LANGUAGE FOR WG IN
GENEV CD. HOWEVER EKEUS HAD JUST RECEIVED MORE RECENT INFO TO EFFECT

...2

PAGE TWO WKGR1095 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

THAT ACDA AND SPECIFICALLY ITS DIRECTOR ADELMAN HAD NOW REACHED FAVOURABLE DECISION ON NEED TO MOVE ON CTB BECAUSE OF POTENTIAL THREAT WHICH INACTION WOULD POSE TO NPT. (HE SAID ALSO THAT HF HAD PRESENTED ARGUMENTATION IN SUPPORT OF THE NPT MTGS WE HAD HOSTED, AND CONSIDERED THAT HIS POINTS HAD REGISTERED. IN ANY EVENT, IN HIS VIEW OUR MTGS HAD CONTRIBUTED TO THE PROCESS OF MOVEMENT, OR WILLINGNESS TO MOVE ON CTB). HOW FAR USA ACDA CAN MOVE INTER AGENCY PROCESS IS NOT/NOT CLEAR, BUT THEY ARE NOW COMMITTED TO TRYING. USA CD AMB FIELDS MAY BE ABLE TO ASSSIT IN INFLUENCING WHITE HOUSE (WHICH HAS JUST GIVEN HIM STRONG SUPPORT IN FACE OF ATTEMPT BY ADELMAN TO REPLACE HIM, ACCORDING TO INFO FIELDS HAS GIVEN US ON PRIVATE BASIS.) EKEUS IS HOPEFUL THAT USA WILL NOW BE WILLING TO AGREE TO SET UP AN ADHOC SUBCTTEE ON CTB IN THE CD IN GENEVA AND WORK ALSO IN THE CTTEE OF EXPERTS. HE WILL REPORT TO ME RESULTS OF HIS DISCUSSIONS IN WSHDC.

3. EKEUS HAS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT USSR IS ALSO WILLING TO MOVE ON CTB BECAUSE OF CONCERN FOR NPT. IN HIS PERSONAL DISCUSSIONS WITH USSR CD AMB ISSRAELIAN, IT IS EVIDENT THAT LATTER WISHES TO CONTINUE TO ADOPT A CONSTRUCTIVE AND COOPERATIVE APPROACH TO NPT; (ISSRAELIAN HAS TOLD BEESLEY THAT HE QUOTE HAS SOME IDEAS UNQUOTE.) HE WOULD FEEL MORE COMFORTABLE IF MORE NON-ALIGNED STATES WERE TO PARTICIPATE IN FURTHER MTGS (IF ANY). HE HAS TOLD EKEUS THAT IN ORDER TO PUSH THE WORK OF THE CD ON CTB, USSR WOULD SEND TEAM OF EXPERTS TO WORK IN SEISMIC EXPERTS GROUP FOR PERIOD OF TWO OR EVEN THREE WEEKS. (THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH

...3

PAGE THREE WKGR1095 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE DISPLAYED AT LAST SESSION BY USSR EXPERTS, THE USSR HAVING EARLIER INDICATED THAT THEY MIGHT NO/NO LONGER PARTICIPATE.) EKEUS IS CONVINCED THAT THE USSR HAS MADE A POSITIVE DECISION ON VERIFICATION PER SE, IN LIGHT OF THEIR POSITION ON CTB (ON WHICH HE THINKS THEY MAY BE WILLING TO HAVE SEISMIC MONITORING DEVICES INSTALLED ON USSR TERRITORY) AND ON CW (WHERE THEY ARE QUOTE ACTUALLY WILLING TO HAVE FOREIGNERS ADMITTED TO THEIR TERRITORY ON SEMI-PERMANENT BASIS) AND IN IAEA (IN WHICH THEY HAVE ADVANCED MONITORING PROPOSALS). HE CONSIDERS IT IMPORTANT THAT STUDIES BE MADE OF PRESENT USSR POSITION ON VERIFICATION (VIEW SHARED BY BEESLEY).

4. ON RW USA HAS REACTED FAVOURABLY TO SWEDISH RW PROPOSAL (ON WHICH WE HAVE REPORTED TO YOU). USA OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD EKEUS THAT THEY HAVE ALREADY BEGUN CONTINGENCY PREPARATIONS FOR PARTICIPATION IN CD DISCUSSIONS ON SWEDISH PROPOSAL WHEN IT IS INTRODUCED IN SUMMER CD SESSION. MATTER WILL BE DISCUSSED IN DEPTH IN WSHDC TODAY.

5. EKEUS IS NOT/NOT YET AWARE OF USSR POSITION ON SWEDISH RW PROPOSAL, BUT HE WILL BE FOLLOWING UP WITH ISSRAELIAN BEFORE LATTER LEAVES NYORK, SINCE ISSRAELIAN WILL NOT/NOT RETURN TO GENEVA UNTIL LATE JUNE, ALTHOUGH USSR WILL BE WELL REPRESENTED FROM JUN12 OPENING DAY ONWARDS. (AS YOU KNOW JAPANESE FM WILL SPEAK ON OPENING DAY.)

6. IN LIGHT OF PREVAILING BAD RELATIONS BETWEEN USA AND USSR, IT IS INTERESTING THAT USA OFFICIALS HAD TOLD EKEUS THAT BEFORE THEY COULD GIVE SUPPORT TO THE SWEDISH RW PROPOSAL THEY WOULD HAVE TO CONSULT

...4

PAGE FOUR WKGR1095 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

WITH THE USSR BECAUSE OF THEIR BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON A PROPOSED TREATY.

7. IN RESPONSE TO INQUIRY FROM EKEUS BEESLEY SAID HE WAS UNABLE AS YET TO GIVE CDN REACTION TO SWEDISH RW PROPOSAL, BUT INDICATED ON PERSONAL BASIS THAT IT APPEARED TO ADDRESS BOTH RW AND SANCTUARY ISSUE IN INGENIOUS WAY.

8. EKEUS HAS ALSO BEEN HAVING REGULAR DISCUSSIONS WITH USA AND USSR OFFICIALS ON CW, AND HAS WORKED OUT WITH THEM A QUOTE PLAN OF ACTION UNQUOTE WHICH HE WOULD LIKE TO IMPLEMENT ALMOST IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE RECONVENING OF THE CD. HE ENVISAGES SUBMITTING CHAIRMANS PROPOSALS BASED ON DRAFT TREATY LANGUAGE HE HAS BEEN DISCUSSING WITH SWEDISH AUTHORITIES IN STKHM. WHERE THERE IS NO/NO AGREEMENT ON CHAIRMANS PROPOSALS, DISCUSSIONS WILL PROCEED ON BASIS OF LAST YEARS CW WG REPORT, SUPPLEMENTED BY RECENT USA AND USSR PROPOSALS.

9. USA HAD A CW TEAM IN NYORK YESTERDAY (PRESUMABLY SAME ONE JUST IN OTTAWA) TO CONSULT WITH EKEUS, AND HE SAID THE TALKS WENT WELL; THEY EVEN DISCUSSED QUESTION OF USE. WHILE USA HAD NO/NO LEGAL EXPERTS PRESENT, HE SAID THEY INDICATED THAT QUOTE THEY WISHED TO RETAIN RIGHT TO RETALIATE UNQUOTE. HE AGREED THAT THIS MAY BE ANOTHER VERSION OF NON FIRST USE COMMITMENT RESULTING FROM ACCESSION TO 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL COUPLED WITH SUCH RESERVATIONS BY MANY STATES TO THE PROTOCOL. EKEUS ASKED BEESLEY TO BEGIN CONSULTATIONS ON QUESTION OF USE IN HIS CAPACITY AS QUOTE FRIEND OF THE CHAIR UNQUOTE, AND SUGGESTED

...5

PAGE FIVE WKGR1095 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

STARTING WITH IRAN.

10.ON OUTER SPACE BEESLEY PASSED ON INFO JUST RECEIVED FROM AUSTRALIANS TO EFFECT THAT STATE DEPT OFFICIALS HAD INDICATED IN LAST WEEKS BILATERALS WITH THE AUSTRALIANS THAT THEY WERE CONSIDERING AGREEING TO DISCUSSIONS OF QUOTE RULES OF THE ROAD UNQUOTE IN CD. THEY HAD NOT/NOT SPELLED OUT WHAT IT MEANT,BUT IT COULD CONCEIVABLY HAVE APPLICATION NOT/NOT LIMITED TO HIGH ALTITUDES AND PRESUMABLY WOULD REQUIRE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A WG.EKEUS POINTED OUT THAT SUCH A PROPOSAL SEEMS CONSISTENT WITH STATEMENT IN CD BY FIELDS THAT USA CONSIDERS THAT DISCUSSIONS SHOULD OCCUR ON QUESTION OF WHICH AREAS REQUIRE CLARIFICATION AND HE HAS BEEN PRESSING USA TO AGREE TO A WG IN CD WITH SUCH A MANDATE.HE WILL RAISE THIS WITH USA OFFICIALS AT LUNCHEON TODAY.(HE SAID THAT ACDA HAD STRESSED THAT OFFICIALS FROM DEFENSE DEPT WOULD BE PRESENT TO HEAR HIS VIEWS.)

11.EKEUS DID NOT/NOT HAVE MUCH NEWS TO ADD ON BW,BEYOND COMMENT THAT USSR SEEMED TO HAVE CHANGED ITS EARLIER POSITION,PERHAPS BECAUSE OF FEARS OF TREATY-AMENDING PRECEDENT WHICH WOULD BE SET FOR NPT,AND THAT SWEDES WOULD BE TALKING WITH USSR IN ENDEAVOUR TO PERSUADE THEM.

12.IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT DISCUSSION BEGAN WITH EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON SORRY STATE OF USA-USSR RELATIONS,AND RELEVANCE OF PMS 10 PRINCIPLES. EKEUS(AND UNDC CHAIRMAN)WOULD LIKE TO SEE THEM TABLED IN UNDC.EKEUS SAID ALSO THAT SWEDEN WOULD PROBABLY MAKE AN APPROACH IN OTTAWA AND/OR STKHM TO ASK IF CDA WOULD RECONSIDER DECISION NOT/NOT TO

...6

PAGE SIX WKGR1095 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

PARTICIPATE IN UN EXPERTS GROUP ON CONCEPTS OF SECURITY IN LIGHT OF
PMS PRINCIPLES WHICH HAD BEEN TABLED IN HOFD AFTER SWEDES LAST
APPROACH IN OTTAWA. HE SAID HE HAD SENT THE 10 PRINCIPLES TO STKHM
AFTER BEESLEY PLENARY SPEECH IN CD AND STKHM HAD REACTED TO THEM
QUOTE EXTREMELY FAVOURABLY UNQUOTE, INDEPENDENTLY OF THEIR POSSIBLE
RELATIONSHIP TO THE UN STUDY.

13. AT CLOSE OF DISCUSSION IT WAS AGREED THAT EKEUS AND BEESLEY
WOULD MEET AGAIN TOMORROW, POSSIBLY AT BREAKFAST. IN MEANTIME, BEESLEY
OFFERED FULL SUPPORT OF CDA IN GENEVA ON CW.

CCC/066 311715Z WKGR1095

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

28-6-1- Trudeau	
24	9

UNCLASSIFIED

FM DSLAM YNGR2033 05JUN84

TO ~~EXTOTT~~ LIDA

REF YOURTEL IDA0831 01JUN

---PM INITIATIVE: LETS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES
LET FROM PM TO NYERERE DELIVERED PERSONALLY TO RUPIA, PS, MFA,
ON JUN05/84 IN ABSENCE OF MINISTER WHO IS IN WSHDC. RUPIA
UNDERTOOK TO FORWARD TI TO PRES SAME AFTERNOON

JOHANSEN

UUU/194 060958Z YNGR2033

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER
R E S T R I C T E D

FM WSAW UMGR1134 05JUN84

TO EXTOTT LIDA IMMED

INFO OSLO LISBON ANKRA BGRAD BPEST MOSCO PRGUE LDN WSHDC PARIS

BONN BNATO ROME PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RGV RBD RBR RSD RSR IDR

REF YOURTEL IDA0829 01JUN(NOTAL)

---PMS INITIATIVE:LETTERS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES
IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REFTEL I CALLED ON WIEJACZ,SENIOR VICEMIN
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,ON 05JUN TO DELIVER PMS LET FOR ONWARD XMISSION
TO GENERALJARUZELSKI.IN INTRODUCING TOPIC I RECALLED EARLIER
DISCUSSIONS WE HAD ON PMS PEACE INITIATIVE AND UNDERLINED LATTERS
CONTINUING DETERMINATION TO IDENTIFY COMMON GROUND ON WHICH EAST
AND WEST MIGHT BUILD DESPITE VERY CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCES WHICH
DIVIDE US AND CURRENT STALEMATE ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS.IN THIS
REGARD PM HAD OUTLINED TEN PRINCIPLES WHICH WERE INCORPORATED IN LET
AND ON WHICH WE WERE MOST HOPEFUL MUTUAL AGREEMENT COULD BE
ESTABLISHED.

2.IT WAS IN PURSUIT OF THIS OBJECTIVE THAT PM HAD ADDRESSED LETS
TO REAGAN AND CHERNENKO,TO HEADS OF GOVT WITH WHOM HE HAD
DISCUSSED PEACE INITIATIVE DURING HIS TRAVELS AND NOW TO REMAINING
HEADS OF GOVT OF WSAW PACT AND NATO.WE ASKED THAT LET TO JARUZELSKI
BE PASSED TO GENERAL AS MATTER OF SOME PRIORITY AND ADDED THAT WE
WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN ANY COMMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE FORTHCOMING.

...2

Mr. [unclear]
Do we have [unclear] 4.2
on [unclear]
5/14
24
file
28-6-1-Trudeau
PEACE MISSION

PAGE TWO UMGR1134 RESTR

3. IN ACCEPTING LET WIEJACZ SAID IT WOULD BE PASSED TO JARUZELSKIS OFFICE IMMEDIATELY, THAT IT WOULD BE STUDIED MOST CAREFULLY AND THAT ANY COMMENTS OR REPLY WOULD BE RAISED WITH ME ASAP. WIEJACZ ALSO ASKED WHETHER WE WERE IN POSITION TO ELUCIDATE ON RESPONSES TO DATE TO WHICH WE REPLIED THAT DELIVERY OF LETS ONLY NOW WAS UNDERWAY AND THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO EXPECT RESPONSES. WITH REF TO LET TO USA AND USSR, HOWEVER, WE REPLIED ALONG LINES OF PRESS GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN YOURTEL IDA0811 30MAY.

4. AS PERSONAL COMMENT WIEJACZ INDICATED HE WELCOMED LET AND INITIATIVE WHICH WAS SORELY NEEDED GIVEN DEPRESSED AND DEPRESSING STATE OF EAST/WEST RELNS AND ABSENCE OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS. RELATIONS, HE ADDED, HAD TAKEN FURTHER DOWNTURN AS CONSEQUENCE OF NATO COMMUNIQUE FROM FOREIGN MINISTERS MTG IN WSHDC. ACCORDING TO WIEJACZ PARTICULAR POLISH CONCERNS HAD CENTERED ON REF IN COMMUNIQUE TO POLAND AS ONGOING POLITICAL CONCERN AND OBJECT OF SPECIAL ATTN. EQUALLY DISTURBING WAS COMMUNIQUE'S ENDORSEMENT OF PURSUIT OF INTER-GERMAN RELATIONS WHICH IN REALITY MEANS QUOTE ALLIANCE SUPPORT FOR FRG REVANCHISM UNQUOTE. FINALLY HE DEPLORED ABSENCE IN COMMUNIQUE QUOTE OF ANY RESPONSE TO WFO INITIATIVES OF ANY SORT INCL THOSE EMERGING FROM RECENT WFO FOREIGN MINS MTG IN BPEST. UNQUOTE.

5. RATHER THAN EMBARKING ON FULL SCALE DEBATE AND IN EFFORT TO MAINTAIN FOCUS ON PMS LET WE COMMENTED BRIEFLY ON WIEJACZ'S OBSERVATIONS WHICH WE ACKNOWLEDGED WOULD BE GRIST FOR FORTHCOMING

...3

PAGE THREE UMGR1134 RESTR

BILATERAL POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS AT WHICH HE SHALL CHAIR POLDEL.
IN CLOSING WIEJACZ ASKED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE ANY OBJECTION
SHOULD THE PRESS REPORT FACT OF OUR MTG AND THAT A LET TO GEN
JARUZELSKI FROM PM HAD BEEN HANDED OVER.GIVEN FACTUAL PUBLICITY
WHICH SURROUNDED SIMILAR MTG IN MOSCO WE INDICATED THERE WOULD BE
NO/NO OBJECTIONS.

6.MTG WAS RELAXED AND FRIENDLY.FROM TENOR OF WIEJACZS COMMENTS
IT WAS DIFFICULT TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER A RESPONSE IS LIKELY TO BE
FORTHCOMING.HOWEVER IT WOULD NOT/NOT BE SURPRISING FOR JARUZELSKI
TO SEIZE OPPORTUNITY OF WRITING TO PM(AND ANY PUBLICITY ATTACHED
THERETO)IF IT DOES NOT/NOT SET CAT AMONG THE PIGEONS IN HIS OWN
BACKYARD

MCLAINE

CCC/127 051500Z UMGR1134



LUTHER COLLEGE

University of Regina

Regina, Saskatchewan, Canada S4S 0A2

(306) 584-0255

June 5, 1984.

(rec'd June 12/84)

FILE	18-6-1-Indian
20	PEACE MISSION

IDA 9842.
Mr. Smith

for reply pls
[Signature]

Dear Mr. Delvoie:

I am delighted that initiatives for Peace are being taken by more and more people, especially by our Prime Minister.

My approach to Peace is in line with the long tradition of persons who believe the expression passed on by the United Nation's General Secretary -- that we will not be at peace with each other till we are at peace inside our individual selves.

As a Psychologist with a graduate degree in Theology and experience in both clerical and clinical counselling, I have observed the effect on people's relationships as they came to peace with themselves.

I enclose a copy of my approach to helping people work towards an inner peace that has changed homes, spouse and generation problems -- Peace -- with honor and humility and strength.

I would be very grateful to learn more about your work and be of any assistance if that seems appropriate.

Sincerely

Paul M. Antrobus

Paul M. Antrobus, Ph.D.,
Associate Professor/
Registered Psychologist.

PMA/lp

Wachan has paper

*P.S. I will be in C.H.
June 21 (Ac 74.122) to 2.
Would it be possible to
get 5 minutes feedback.*

Peace,

Paul

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

28.6.1 - Trudeau	
24	9

R E S T R I C T E D

FM OSLO WGGR3673 05JUN84

TO EXTOTT/IDA

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RGB RBD RBR RSD RSR IDAO IDR

REF YOURTEL IDA0829 01JUN

---PM INITIATIVE:LETTERS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES

TEXT OF LETTER WITH EXPLANATORY NOTE WAS SENT BY SPECIAL DELIVERY
REGISTERED MAIL TO PM HERMANSSON OF ICELAND ON 05JUN.TEXT WAS
SENT BY COUNSELLOR IN TEMPORARY ABSENCE OF HOP OUTSIDE OF OSLO ON
OFFICIAL BUSINESS.

CCC/061 050938Z WGGR3673

file

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I E L
DE ROME WTGR0185 05JUN84
A EXTOTT IDA

8-61- Trudeau	
24	9


INFO WSHDC BNATO LDN BONN PARIS TOKYO PEKIN GENEV HAGUE BRU
PRMNY PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/CPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATA
SAC OSLO COPEN MDRID ANKRA ATHNS LSBON PRGUE WSAW BUCST BPEST
BGRAD DE OTT
DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD IDR IDAN IDAO UGB URR ZSI FPR RED RBR
RCR RCD RGB MINE MINT

REF VOTRETEL IDA0827 01JUN

---INITIATIVE DU PM: LETTRE AUX CHEFS DE GOUVT SUR LES DIX PRINCIPES
J AI LIVRE CE MATIN A GIULIANO AMATO, CHEF DE CABINET DU PM ET
SOUS-SECRETAIRE D ETAT A LA PRESIDENCE DU CONSEIL, COPIE DE LA LETTRE
EN FRANCAIS DE M TRUDEAU A M CRAXI, L INFORMANT QUE LE MESSAGE EN
ETAIT EGALEMENT COMMUNIQUE AUX PRESIDENTS REAGAN ET TCHERNENKO
AINSI QU AUX CHEFS DE GOUVT DES PAYS AVEC QUI IL S ETAIT ENTRETENU
DE SON INITIATIVE DE PAIX L AUTOMNE DERNIER.

2. AMATO ME REMERCIA CHALEUREUSEMENT, ME RAPPELANT QUE LA PHILOSOPHIE
DE NOS DEUX PREMIERS MINISTRES EN LA MATIERE COINCIDAIT LARGEMENT.
IL M ASSURA QUE LA LETTRE DE TRUDEAU SERAIT REMISE A CRAXI AVANT
SON DEPART POUR LA CONFERENCE AU SOMMET DE LDN OU ILS SE REVERRAIENT
POUR LA PREMIERE FOIS DEPUIS LEUR ENTREVUE DU 10 NOV DERNIER A ROME.
JE REPONDIS AUX QUESTIONS D AMATO QUE JE NE SAVAIS PAS SI TRUDEAU
POSERAIT A LDN LA QUESTION DES DIX PRINCIPES EN SOI. CEUX-CI

...2



PAGE DEUX WTGR0185 CONF

REPRESENTAIENT LE FRUIT D UNE LONGUE REFLEXION ET D UN EFFORT
DE CONCEPTUALISATION QUI REFLETAIT LES PERCEPTIONS ET LES
OBSERVATIONS DES NOMBREUX CHEFS DE GOUVT AVEC LESQUELS LE PM CDN
S ETAIT MIS EN CONTACT ET DONT IL AVAIT RECUEILLI LES CONFIDENCES
ET LES PREOCCUPATIONS CES DERNIERS MOIS. IL ETAIT DONC INEVITABLE
QUE TRUDEAU EN SOIT INSPIRE AU COURS DES DISCUSSIONS, QUEL QUE SOIT
LE CARACTERE QU ELLES PRENDRAIENT A LDN, AVEC SES COLLEGUES SUR LES
QUESTIONS DE SECURITE INTERNATIONALE ET DE RELATIONS EST-OUEST.
3. COMME LES RELATIONS EST-OUEST FERONT EGALEMENT L OBJET D ECHANGES
DE VUES ENTRE MINISTRES DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES A LDN, J AI CRU
OPPORTUN DE FAIRE PARVENIR A ANDREOTTI UNE COPIE DE LA LETTRE DE
TRUDEAU A CRAXI

HARDY

CCC/191 052000Z WTGR0185

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

*file
m*

28-6-1-Trudeau	
24	9

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T E

DE PARIS WIGR4250 05JUN84

A EXTOTT LIDA LIVRAISON 050900

INFO ROME BRU BUCST PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RSD RSR IDR IDAO

REVOTRETEL IDA0827 01JUN

--- INITIATIVE DU PM - LETTRE AU PRES

CONFIRMONS TRANSMISSION 04JUN DE LETTRE CONTENUE DANS VOTRETEL
EN REF AU PRES MITTERRAND PAR ENTREMISE DE VEDRINE A ELYSEE.

2. PHRASE RELATIVE A CIT ENTRETIEN FORT UTILE QUE NOUS AVONS
EU FINCIT A ETE COMPLETEE PAR MENTION CIT A PARIS, LE 8 NOVEMBRE
DERNIER FINCIT I.E. DATE DE LEUR DERNIERE RENCONTRE.

3. COMME POUR CORRESPONDANCES ANTERIEURES SUR INITIATIVE DU PM,
COPIE DU TEXTE A EGALEMENT ETE TRANSMISE AUX INTERLOCUTEURS
CONCERNES AU QUAI APPELANT LEURS COMMENTAIRES. VOUS AVISERONS
DE LEURS REACTIONS DES QUE CONNUES.

CCC/190 050950Z WIGR4250

AG

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

R E S T R I C T E D

FM ANKRA ZEGR0777 05JUN84

TO EXTOTT IDA DELIVER BY 050900

DISTR RSR

REF YOURTEL IDA0851 04JUN

---PM INITIATIVE

WE CHECKED OUR OWN RECORDS. PLEASE REFER TO OURTEL ZEGR1649 OF 18NOV83 WHICH RAISED THE PROBLEM OF CONFUSION THAT OCCURRED WITH LETTER OF 25OCT83. TEXT OF THIS LETTER INTENDED FOR HEAD OF GOVT WAS SENT HERE TO PM. ORIGINAL COULD NOT/NOT BE TRANSMITTED BECAUSE ADDRESSED TO PRES EVREN.

2. MESSAGE OF 16NOV83, WHICH REFERRED TO THAT 25OCT83, HAD ALSO TO BE SENT TO PM.

3. PM WAS THEN AND STILL IS PROPER RECIPIENT. IT IS NOT/NOT APPROPRIATE HERE TO BE SENDING SUCH A COMMUNICATION TO THE PRESIDENT.

4. IN CIRCUMSTANCES, I SUGGEST THAT MESSAGE BE HANDLED AS SUCH RATHER THAN A LETTER. DELIVERY OF ORIGINAL CAN LATER BE WITHHELD. ADVISE.

MATHIEU

CCC/025 050838Z ZEGR0777

18-6-1-Trudeau	
Copy	letter sent- 9

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

R E S T R I C T E D

FM OSLO WGGR3674 05JUN84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RSD RSR IDR IDAO

REF YOURTEL IDA0825 01JUN

---PM INITIATIVE:LETTERS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES
IN TEMPORARY ABSENCE OF HOP OUTSIDE OF OSLO ON OFFICIAL BUSINESS
COUNSELLOR PROVIDED TEXT OF LETTER REFTEL COVERED BY EXPLANATORY
NOTE TO PM WILLOCHS STATE SEC 05JUN.PM WILLOCH CONTINUES
CONVALESCING FROM INTERNAL AILMENT BUT IS CONDUCTING BUSINESS
PART-TIME FROM HIS HOME AND IS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO OFFICE 12JUN.
QUICK SCAN OF MATERIAL PROVIDED LEAD STATE SEC COLDING TO COMMENT
THAT MATERIAL APPEARED ENTIRELY COMPATIBLE WITH NORWEGIAN VIEWS.
HE INDICATED HOWEVER THAT MFA WOULD STUDY MATTER AND WE COULD
EXPECT A WRITTEN REPLY PROBABLY FROM PM WILLOCH SOMETIME NEXT WEEK.
2.GIVEN THAT FM STRAY IS ACTING PM WE ALSO CALLED ON HIS PERSONAL
SECRETARY AT MFA WHO HAD BEEN APPRISED OF THE CALL ON COLDING.IN
FACT BOTH OFFICIALS WERE DISCUSSING MATTER BY TELEPHONE WHEN WE
CAME INTO MFA.PERSONAL SECRETARY WHO IS REPUTED TO HAVE PARTICULARLY
EFFECTIVE INFLUENCE ON FM INDICATED MFA WOULD PROBABLY ASK FOR
CLARIFICATION OF POINT SIX RELATING TO USE OF FORCE.HE REVIEWED AT
SOME LENGTH NORWEGIAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS NON-USE OF FORCE PRINCIPLE
VIS-A-VIS USSR ALONG LINES QUITE FAMILIAR TO US AS THEY APPEAR TO

...2

RECEIVED
JAN 11 1974
RECEIVED

PAGE TWO WGGR3674 RESTR

PARALLEL YOUR OWN.WHILE NOTING LATTER WE NEVERTHELESS THOUGHT THAT
IF THERE WAS ANY QUESTION WHATSOEVER ABOUT POINTS MADE MFA SHOULD
INCLUDE THAT IN ANY WRITTEN REPLY THAT MAY BE MADE TO YOUR LETTER.
ANY REPLY WILL OF COURSE BE SENT TO YOU ON RECEIPT.

CCC/061 050938Z WGGR3674

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T E
DE BRU ZVGR0381 05JUN84

A EXTOTT/IDA

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RSD RSR IDR IDAO

REF VOTRETEL IDA0835 01JUN

---INITIATIVE DU PM:LETTRES AUX CHEFS DE GOUV SUR LES DIX PRINCIPES
LUXEMBOURG

VOTRETEL ENREF ETANT FORT OPPORTUNEMENT ARRIVE JUSTE AVANT
DEPART DE L AMBASSADEUR POUR LUXEMBOURG OU SE TENAIT JOURNEE
ECONOMIQUE CDNE.LET DE TRUDEAU A WERNER A PU LUI ETRE TRANSMISE
AVEC COMMENTAIRES APPROPRIES DES LE 4 JUIN PAR L ENTREMISE
DE SON CONSEILLER SPECIAL JEAN DE RODENBOURG.WERNER ETANT
SUR LE POINT DE PRENDRE SA RETRAITE ET NE SE REPRESENTANT
PAS AUX PROCHAINES ELECTIONS LEGISLATIVES QUI AURONT LIEU A
LA MI-JUIN,AMB TRANSMET EGALEMENT LA LET SOUS COUVERT D UN
MOT PERSONNEL AU MAE FLESCH EN ATTIRANT SON ATTENTION SUR
LE FAIT QUE PM CDN INVITE SES INTERLOCUTEURS A APPUYER
PUBLIQUEMENT LES IDEES PRESENTEES.

CCC/030 051329Z ZVGR0381

*File
M
June 5/84*

28-6-1- Trudeau	
24	9



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

28-6-1-Trudeau *Peace*

MISSION

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ	<u>R E S T R I C T E D</u> <i>8513</i>	5 JUN 84 22 4512	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDA0961 05JUN84		
TO/À	TO ANKRA <u>DELIVER BY 060900</u>		
INFO			
DISTR	DISTR RSR		
REF	REF YOURTEL ZEGR0777 05JUN		
SUBJ/SUJ	--- PM INITIATIVE		
<p>GIVEN SITUATION DESCRIBED YOUR REFTEL, AND AFTER CONSUL- TATION WITH RSR, WE AGREE WITH COURSE OF ACTION DETAILED PARA 4 YOUR REFTEL, OF DELIVERING TELEGRAPHIC MESSAGE TO TURKISH PM AND WITHHOLDING OF ORIGINAL LETTER ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT EVREN.</p>			

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

GARY J. SMITH/pec

IDA

5-6689

SIG

GARY J. SMITH

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
À

ANKARA

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)
UNCLASSIFIED
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDA-889 DATE JUNE 5/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE							
1	<p>Ref: Ourtel IDA0829 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles.</p> <p>Original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to President Evren.</p> <div data-bbox="303 783 696 997"><table border="1"><tr><td colspan="2">FILE 28-6-1-TRUDEAU</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">DIV</td></tr><tr><td>DIARY</td><td rowspan="2">9</td></tr><tr><td>RSR</td></tr></table></div> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	FILE 28-6-1-TRUDEAU		DIV		DIARY	9	RSR	
FILE 28-6-1-TRUDEAU									
DIV									
DIARY	9								
RSR									
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À							
DATE		SIGNATURE							

EXT 34/BIL. (REV. 12/70)
7530-21-029-4107

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 31, 1984

Your Excellency,

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

His Excellency General Kenan Evren
President of the Republic of Turkey
Ankara, Turkey

- 2 -


- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "R. Linder", followed by a long horizontal flourish.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
À CANBERRA

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)
UNCLASSIFIED
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDA-869 DATE June 5/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA-0823 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 principles.</p> <p>Original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to Prime Minister Hawke - for onward transmission.</p> <div data-bbox="279 915 685 1163"><p>FILE 28-6-1-TRUDEAU DIV DIARY PPR - you may wish to send copy to local embassy. Gary J. Smith/IDA/pec</p></div>	

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

DATE

SIGNATURE

EXT 34/BIL. (REV. 12/70)
7530-21-029-4107

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE
OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 31, 1984

Dear Robert,

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations. I recall, in particular, the most valuable conversations we had in New Delhi and Goa at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting during which we discussed several ideas and proposals aimed at reducing international tension and restoring the vital East-West relationship to a more stable and constructive basis.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

The Right Honourable Robert J. Hawke
Prime Minister of Australia
Canberra

- 2 -


- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely, *personal regards.*

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be a stylized 'D' followed by a series of loops and a horizontal stroke.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
À

LUSAKA

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ

WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)

UNCLASSIFIED

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDA-871

DATE June 5/8

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA-0823 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles.</p> <p>Original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 President Kaunda, for onward transmission.</p> <div data-bbox="276 924 682 1176" style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-top: 20px;"><p>GAA - you may wish to send copy to local embassy. <u>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau</u> DIV 9 DIARY Gary J. Smith/IDA/pec</p></div>	
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
DATE		SIGNATURE

EXT 34/BIL. (REV. 12/70)
7530-21-029-4107

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 31, 1984

Dear Kenneth,

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations. I recall, in particular, the most valuable conversations we had in New Delhi and Goa at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting during which we discussed several ideas and proposals aimed at reducing international tension and restoring the vital East-West relationship to a more stable and constructive basis.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

His Excellency Kenneth David Kaunda
President of the Republic of Zambia
Lusaka

- 2 -

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely, *personal regards.*

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Pierre".

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
A BONN

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)
UNCLASSIFIED
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDA0861

DATE JUNE 5/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA-0823 dated June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles.</p> <p>Original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to Chancellor Kohl, for onward transmission.</p> <div data-bbox="285 774 695 1020" style="border: 2px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 10px 0;"><p>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau</p><p>DIV</p><p>DIARY</p><p>RCR - you may wish to send copy to local embassy.</p></div> <p>Gary J. Smith/IDA/pec</p>	
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
DATE	SIGNATURE	

EXT 34/BIL. (REV. 12/70)
7530-21-029-4107

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 31, 1984

Dear Helmut,

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations. I recall, in particular, the most valuable conversation we had in Bonn last November during which we discussed several ideas and proposals aimed at reducing international tension and restoring the vital East-West relationship to a more stable and constructive basis.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

Herr Helmut Kohl
Chancellor
Federal Republic of Germany
Bonn, Germany

- 2 -

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely, *personal regards.*

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Zim".

FOR USE WHEN SIGNATURE ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF DOCUMENTS IS NEEDED. ORIGINATOR TO COMPLETE BOTH SECURITY BLOCKS.
À UTILISER LORSQU'ON EXIGE UN ACCUSÉ DE RÉCEPTION. À L'ENVOYEUR, COMPLÉTER LES DEUX ESPACES DE SÉCURITÉ.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
À

NEW DELHI

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ	
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)	
UNCLASSIFIED	
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)	

NO. IDA0883 DATE June 5/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<p>Ref: Ourtel IDA0831 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles.</p>	
1	<p>Original of Prime Minister Trudeau's letter of May 31, 1984 to Prime Minister Gandhi, for onward transmission.</p> <div><div>FILE 28-6-1-TRUDEAU</div><div>DIV</div><div>DIARY</div><div>PSR-you may wish to send copy to local embassy.</div></div>	
	GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec	

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

DATE

SIGNATURE

EXT 34/BIL. (REV. 12/70)
7530-21-029-4107

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE
OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 31, 1984

Dear Indira,

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations. I recall, in particular, the most valuable conversations we had in New Delhi and Goa at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting during which we discussed several ideas and proposals aimed at reducing international tension and restoring the vital East-West relationship to a more stable and constructive basis.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

Her Excellency Shrimati Indira Gandhi
Prime Minister of India
New Delhi

- 2 -

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

Your recent statement in concert with five other world leaders is witness to your personal interest and your willingness to act in this most important matter. I fully support your aims in this regard, and I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely, *personal regards*

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Jim".

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)
UNCLASSIFIED
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

TO
À

LONDON

NO. IDA0865

DATE JUNE 5/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
1	<p>Ref: Ourtel IDA-0823 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letter to Heads of Government on 10 Principles</p> <p>Original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau dated May 31, 1984 to Prime Minister Thatcher, for onward transmission.</p> <div data-bbox="289 764 699 1016" style="border: 2px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 10px 0;"><p>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau</p><p>DIV</p><p>DIARY</p><p>RCR - you may wish to send copy to local embassy.</p></div> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
DATE		SIGNATURE

EXT 34/BIL. (REV. 12/70)
7530 - 21 - 029 - 4107

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE
OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 31, 1984

Dear Margaret,

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations. I recall, in particular, the most valuable conversations we had in London last November and again in New Delhi during the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting during which we discussed several ideas and proposals aimed at reducing international tension and restoring the vital East-West relationship to a more stable and constructive basis.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

The Right Honourable Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
10 Downing Street
London, England

- 2 -

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely, *personal regards.*

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Ziaur Rahman', with a large, stylized initial 'Z'.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
À

WELLINGTON

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)
UNCLASSIFIED
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDA-867 DATE June 5/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE							
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA-0823 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 principles.</p> <p>Original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to Prime Minister Muldoon - for onward transmission.</p> <div data-bbox="341 882 730 1092"><table border="1"><tr><td colspan="2">FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau</td></tr><tr><td>DIV</td><td rowspan="2">9</td></tr><tr><td>DIARY</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">PPR - you may wish to send copy to local embassy.</td></tr></table></div> <p>Gary J. Smith/IDA/pec</p>	FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau		DIV	9	DIARY	PPR - you may wish to send copy to local embassy.		
FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau									
DIV	9								
DIARY									
PPR - you may wish to send copy to local embassy.									

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

DATE

SIGNATURE

EXT 34/BIL. (REV. 12/70)
7530-21-029-4107

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE
OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 31, 1984

Dear Robert,

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations. I recall, in particular, the most valuable conversations we had in New Delhi and Goa at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting during which we discussed several ideas and proposals aimed at reducing international tension and restoring the vital East-West relationship to a more stable and constructive basis.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

The Right Honourable Robert Muldoon, C.H.
Prime Minister of New Zealand
Wellington

- 2 -

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely, *personal regards*.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Dum' or similar, written in a cursive style.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
A

DAR ES SALAAM

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)
UNCLASSIFIED
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDA-873

DATE June 5/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE							
	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA-0823 dated June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles.</p> <p>Copy of original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to Prime Minister Nyerere. Original handed to Tanzanian Foreign Minister in Ottawa on June 5, for his transmission to the Prime Minister.</p> <div data-bbox="256 793 657 1031" data-label="Form"><table border="1"><tr><td colspan="2">FILE 28-6-1-TRUDEAU</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">DIV</td></tr><tr><td>DIARY</td><td rowspan="2">G</td></tr><tr><td>GAA - you may wish to send copy to local embassy.</td></tr></table></div> <p>Gary J. Smith/IDA/pec</p>	FILE 28-6-1-TRUDEAU		DIV		DIARY	G	GAA - you may wish to send copy to local embassy.	
FILE 28-6-1-TRUDEAU									
DIV									
DIARY	G								
GAA - you may wish to send copy to local embassy.									

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

DATE

SIGNATURE

EXT 34/BIL. (REV. 12/70)
7530-21-029-4107

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE
OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 31, 1984

Dear Julius,

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations. I recall, in particular, the most valuable conversations we had in New Delhi and Goa at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting during which we discussed several ideas and proposals aimed at reducing international tension and restoring the vital East-West relationship to a more stable and constructive basis.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

His Excellency Julius K. Nyerere
Prime Minister of the Republic of Tanzania
Dar-es-Salaam

- 2 -

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

Your recent statement in concert with five other world leaders is witness to your personal interest and your willingness to act in this most important matter. I fully support your aims in this regard, and I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely,

Personal regards,

De Gaulle

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
À

PARIS

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ

WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)

UNCLASSIFIED

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDA-881

DATE June 5/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
1	<p>Ref: Ourtel IDA0827 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles.</p> <p>Original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to President Mitterand for onward transmission.</p> <div data-bbox="292 804 693 1035"><p>FILE 28-6-1-TRUDEAU DIV DIARY RCR - you may wish to send copy to local embassy. 9 GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p></div>	

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

DATE

SIGNATURE

EXT 34/BIL (REV. 12/70)
7530-21-029-4107

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA K1A 0A2

le 31 mai 1984

Cher ami,
Monsieur le Président,

Ces derniers mois, j'ai rencontré plusieurs dirigeants de pays de l'Est et de l'Ouest, dont les présidents Reagan et Tchernenko, afin d'échanger des vues avec eux sur la situation actuelle en matière de sécurité internationale et le piètre état des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

Je me rappelle en particulier l'entretien fort utile que nous avons eu à Paris, en novembre dernier. Nous avons alors discuté plusieurs idées et propositions destinées à réduire les tensions internationales et à stabiliser et consolider la base des rapports entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

En repensant à ces diverses consultations, je suis de plus en plus convaincu qu'en dépit de difficultés persistantes et de la regrettable absence de progrès au chapitre de la réduction des armements, il subsiste un terrain d'entente étendu et discernable entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Des déclarations faites récemment par des dirigeants des deux blocs m'incitent à croire que l'on est d'accord dans une large mesure sur les principes de base devant régir les relations internationales et, plus particulièrement, notre façon d'aborder la plus grave menace planant sur l'humanité, soit la possibilité d'une guerre nucléaire.

Sans faire abstraction de nos différences, nous devons, je pense, nous appliquer à explorer les terrains d'entente et intérêts communs aux deux camps et chercher à en tirer parti. Les dix points suivants, énoncés dans un discours que j'ai prononcé à la Chambre des communes du Canada au début de cette année, pourraient fournir une base utile dans ce sens :

Son Excellence Monsieur François Mitterrand
Président de la République française
Palais de l'Elysée
Paris
FRANCE

- 2 -


- De part et d'autre on reconnaît l'impossibilité de sortir vainqueur d'une guerre nucléaire.
- De part et d'autre on convient qu'il faut absolument éviter la guerre nucléaire.
- De part et d'autre on souhaite être libéré du risque de guerre accidentelle ou d'attaque par surprise.
- De part et d'autre on reconnaît les dangers inhérents aux armes déstabilisatrices.
- De part et d'autre on comprend le besoin d'améliorer les techniques de gestion des crises.
- De part et d'autre on est conscient des terribles conséquences qu'entraînerait le fait d'être le premier à recourir à la force contre l'autre camp.
- De part et d'autre on a intérêt à accroître la sécurité en en réduisant le coût.
- De part et d'autre on a intérêt à éviter la propagation des armes nucléaires dans d'autres pays, communément appelée prolifération horizontale.
- De part et d'autre on en est arrivé à reconnaître prudemment les intérêts légitimes de l'autre camp en matière de sécurité.
- De part et d'autre on a conscience que les stratégies de sécurité ne sauraient être fondées sur l'hypothèse d'un effondrement politique ou économique dans l'autre camp.

Si les dirigeants de l'Est et de l'Ouest et, en particulier, les superpuissances donnaient publiquement leur adhésion à ces idées, cela aiderait largement, à mon sens, à créer l'atmosphère et le cadre politique de base si essentiels à des négociations productives touchant les armes nucléaires comme classiques. J'ai donc tenu à vous écrire, de même qu'à d'autres dirigeants, pour livrer ces idées à votre réflexion et vous inviter à y souscrire.

- 3 -

Vous espérez comme moi, je le sais, que les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest s'amélioreront bientôt sensiblement, de manière à favoriser l'avancement du long travail destiné à libérer l'humanité de la menace de guerre nucléaire.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'assurance de ma très haute considération *et de mon*
amical souvenir.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "John F. Kennedy", with a large, stylized "J" and "K".

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
A

TOKYO

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ

WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)

UNCLASSIFIED

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDA0863

DATE JUNE 5/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA-0823 dated June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles.</p> <p>Original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984, for onward transmission.</p> <div data-bbox="297 787 690 1010" style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 10px 0;"><p>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau DIV DIARY PPR - you may wish to send copy to local embassy.</p></div> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
DATE	SIGNATURE	

EXT 34/BIL. (REV. 12/70)
7530-21-029-4107

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 31, 1984

Dear Yasu,

~~Your Excellency,~~

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations. I recall, in particular, the most valuable conversation we had in Tokyo last November during which we discussed several ideas and proposals aimed at reducing international tension and restoring the vital East-West relationship to a more stable and constructive basis.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

His Excellency Yasuhiro Nakasone
Prime Minister of Japan
Tokyo

- 2 -

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely, *personal regards.*

Quint

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
À

PEKIN

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ

WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)

UNCLASSIFIED

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDA0877

DATE June 5/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE						
1	<p>Ref: Ourtel IDA0823 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles.</p> <p>Original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to Premier Zhao, for onward transmission.</p> <div data-bbox="337 762 727 972" data-label="Form"><table border="1"><tr><td colspan="2">FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau</td></tr><tr><td>DEV</td><td rowspan="3">9</td></tr><tr><td>DARY</td></tr><tr><td>PER - you may wish to send copy to local embassy.</td></tr></table></div> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau		DEV	9	DARY	PER - you may wish to send copy to local embassy.	
FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau								
DEV	9							
DARY								
PER - you may wish to send copy to local embassy.								

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

DATE

SIGNATURE

EXT 34/BIL (REV. 12/70)
7530-21-029-4107

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE
OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 31, 1984

My dear Premier,

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations. I recall, in particular, the most valuable conversations we had in Peking and in Canada during which we discussed several ideas and proposals aimed at reducing international tension and restoring the vital East-West relationship to a more stable and constructive basis.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

His Excellency Zhao Ziyang
Premier, State Council
People's Republic of China
Beijing

- 2 -


- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely, *personal regards.*

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "B. J. Linder". The signature is fluid and extends across the width of the page.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
À

SINGAPORE

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ

WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)

UNCLASSIFIED

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO.

IDA-879

DATE

June 5/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
1	<p>Ref: OURTEL IDA-0823 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles</p> <p>Original Letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to Prime Minister Lee for onward transmission.</p> <div data-bbox="305 819 695 1032" style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"><p>FILE 28-6-1-TRUDEAU DIV DIARY PSR - you may wish to send copy to local embassy.</p></div> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	
RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION		RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
DATE		SIGNATURE

EXT 34/BIL. (REV. 12/70)
7530-21-029-4107

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE
OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 31, 1984

Dear Harry,

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations. I recall, in particular, the most valuable conversations we had in New Delhi and Goa at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting during which we discussed several ideas and proposals aimed at reducing international tension and restoring the vital East-West relationship to a more stable and constructive basis.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

His Excellency Lee Kuan Yew
Prime Minister of Singapore
Singapore

- 2 -


- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely, *personal regards.*

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to be 'Jim', written in dark ink.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
A

DAR ES SALAAM

Correcha

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)
UNCLASSIFIED
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO.

IDA-873

DATE

JUNE 5/8

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
----------------------	---------------------------	-----------------------

REF: OUR TELEGRAM IDA-0831 DATED JUNE 1, 1984

PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles.

Copy of original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to President Nyerere. Original handed to Tanzanian Foreign Minister in Ottawa on June 5, for his transmission to the President.

FILE 28-6-1-TRUDEAU	
DIV	
DIARY	
CAA	G
GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec	

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

DATE

SIGNATURE

EXT 34/BIL. (REV. 12/70)
7530-21-029-4107

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE
OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 31, 1984

Dear Julius,

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations. I recall, in particular, the most valuable conversations we had in New Delhi and Goa at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting during which we discussed several ideas and proposals aimed at reducing international tension and restoring the vital East-West relationship to a more stable and constructive basis.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

His Excellency Julius K. Nyerere
President of the United Republic of Tanzania
Dar-es-Salaam

- 2 -

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

Your recent statement in concert with five other world leaders is witness to your personal interest and your willingness to act in this most important matter. I fully support your aims in this regard, and I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely,

Personal regards,

D. A. A.



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

28-6-1-TRUDEAU

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

R E S T R I C T E D

5 JUN 84 22 4422

10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDA0887 05JUN84

TO/À

TO BPEST **DELIVER BY 060900**

INFO

DISTR

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RGB RBD RBR RSD RSR IDAO IDR

REF

REF YOURTEL ZWGR0866 05JUN

SUBJ/SUJ

---PM INITIATIVE: LETTERS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES

PLEASE DELIVER TEXT OF LETTER TO KADAR. ORIGINAL ADDRESSED TO KADAR

AND BEING FORWARDED BY BAG 08JUN.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG GARY J. SMITH/pec

IDA

5-6689

SIG GARY J. SMITH

28-6-1-Trudeau	
26	9

R E S T R I C T E D

FM BPEST ZWGR0866 05JUN84

TO EXTOTT LIDA DELIVER BY 050900

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RGB RBD RBR RSD RSR IDAO IDR
REF YOURTEL IDA0829 01JUN

---PM INITIATIVE:LETTERS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES
WE NOTE THAT TEXT OF PMS LETTER IS ADDRESSED TO KADAR NOT/NOT
HEAD OF GOVT WHO IS PM LAZAR.PLSE ADVISE IF IT IS INDEED TO KADAR
YOU WISH LETTER ADDRESSED.KADAR WOULD APPEAR TO BE LOGICAL
ADDRESSEE.

CCC/108 050450Z ZWGR0866

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

28-6-1-Trudeau	
25	9

R E S T R I C T E D

FM WSAW UMGR1134 05JUN84

TO EXTOTT LIDA IMMED

INFO OSLO LISBON ANKRA BGRAD BPEST MOSCO PRGUE LDN WSHDC PARIS

BONN BNATO ROME PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RGV RED RBR RSD RSR IDR

REF YOURTEL IDA0829 01JUN(NOTAL)

---PMS INITIATIVE:LETTERS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES
IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REFTEL I CALLED ON WIEJACZ,SENIOR VICEMIN
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,ON 05JUN TO DELIVER PMS LET FOR ONWARD XMISSION
TO GENERALJARUZELSKI.IN INTRODUCING TOPIC I RECALLED EARLIER
DISCUSSIONS WE HAD ON PMS PEACE INITIATIVE AND UNDERLINED LATTERS
CONTINUING DETERMINATION TO IDENTIFY COMMON GROUND ON WHICH EAST
AND WEST MIGHT BUILD DESPITE VERY CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCES WHICH
DIVIDE US AND CURRENT STALEMATE ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS.IN THIS
REGARD PM HAD OUTLINED TEN PRINCIPLES WHICH WERE INCORPORATED IN LET
AND ON WHICH WE WERE MOST HOPEFUL MUTUAL AGREEMENT COULD BE
ESTABLISHED.

2.IT WAS IN PURSUIT OF THIS OBJECTIVE THAT PM HAD ADDRESSED LETS
TO REAGAN AND CHERNENKO,TO HEADS OF GOVT WITH WHOM HE HAD
DISCUSSED PEACE INITIATIVE DURING HIS TRAVELS AND NOW TO REMAINING
HEADS OF GOVT OF WSAW PACT AND NATO.WE ASKED THAT LFT TO JARUZELSKI
BE PASSED TO GENERAL AS MATTER OF SOME PRIORITY AND ADDED THAT WE
WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN ANY COMMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE FORTHCOMING.

...2

PAGE TWO UMGR1134 RESTR

3. IN ACCEPTING LET WIEJACZ SAID IT WOULD BE PASSED TO JARUZELSKIS OFFICE IMMEDIATELY, THAT IT WOULD BE STUDIED MOST CAREFULLY AND THAT ANY COMMENTS OR REPLY WOULD BE RAISED WITH ME ASAP. WIEJACZ ALSO ASKED WHETHER WE WERE IN POSITION TO ELUCIDATE ON RESPONSES TO DATE TO WHICH WE REPLIED THAT DELIVERY OF LETS ONLY NOW WAS UNDERWAY AND THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO EXPECT RESPONSES. WITH REF TO LET TO USA AND USSR, HOWEVER, WE REPLIED ALONG LINES OF PRESS GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN YOURTEL IDA0811 30MAY.

4. AS PERSONAL COMMENT WIEJACZ INDICATED HE WELCOMED LET AND INITIATIVE WHICH WAS SORELY NEEDED GIVEN DEPRESSED AND DEPRESSING STATE OF EAST/WEST RELNS AND ABSENCE OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS. RELATIONS, HE ADDED, HAD TAKEN FURTHER DOWNTURN AS CONSEQUENCE OF NATO COMMUNIQUE FROM FOREIGN MINISTERS MTG IN WSHDC. ACCORDING TO WIEJACZ PARTICULAR POLISH CONCERNS HAD CENTERED ON REF IN COMMUNIQUE TO POLAND AS ONGOING POLITICAL CONCERN AND OBJECT OF SPECIAL ATTN. EQUALLY DISTURBING WAS COMMUNIQUE'S ENDORSEMENT OF PURSUIT OF INTER-GERMAN RELATIONS WHICH IN REALITY MEANS QUOTE ALLIANCE SUPPORT FOR FRG REVANCHISM UNQUOTE. FINALLY HE DEPLORED ABSENCE IN COMMUNIQUE QUOTE OF ANY RESPONSE TO WPO INITIATIVES OF ANY SORT INCL THOSE EMERGING FROM RECENT WPO FOREIGN MINS MTG IN BPEST. UNQUOTE.

5. RATHER THAN EMBARKING ON FULL SCALE DEBATE AND IN EFFORT TO MAINTAIN FOCUS ON PMS LET WE COMMENTED BRIEFLY ON WIEJACZ'S OBSERVATIONS WHICH WE ACKNOWLEDGED WOULD BE GRIST FOR FORTHCOMING

...8

PAGE THREE UMGR1134 RESTR

BILATERAL POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS AT WHICH HE SHALL CHAIR POLDEL.
IN CLOSING WIEJACZ ASKED WHETHER THERE WOULD BE ANY OBJECTION
SHOULD THE PRESS REPORT FACT OF OUR MTG AND THAT A LET TO GEN
JARUZELSKI FROM PM HAD BEEN HANDED OVER.GIVEN FACTUAL PUBLICITY
WHICH SURROUNDED SIMILAR MTG IN MOSCO WE INDICATED THERE WOULD BE
NO/NO OBJECTIONS.

6.MTG WAS RELAXED AND FRIENDLY.FROM TENOR OF WIEJACZS COMMENTS
IT WAS DIFFICULT TO ASCERTAIN WHETHER A RESPONSE IS LIKELY TO BE
FORTHCOMING.HOWEVER IT WOULD NOT/NOT BE SURPRISING FOR JARUZELSKI
TO SEIZE OPPORTUNITY OF WRITING TO PM(AND ANY PUPLICITY ATTACHED
THERE TO)IF IT DOES NOT/NOT SET CAT AMONG THE PIGEONS IN HIS OWN
BACKYARD

MCLAINE

CCC/127 051500Z UMGR1134

ACTION
SUITE A-DONNER

R E S T R I C T E D

FM BONN ZQGR1261 04JUN84

TO EXTOTT LIDA

FW

28-6-1 - Trudeau	
2A	9

INFO HAGUE TOKYO WSAW PRGUE LDN PEKIN CNBRA SPORE LSACA

PCOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL MOSCO WSHDC HAGUE PARIS

DISTR FGB IDAO IDR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RGB RBD

RER RSD RSR PPD PPR PER PED PSD PSR

REF YOURTEL IDA0823 01JUN

---PM INITIATIVE: LETS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES
AME TODAY(04JUN) DELIVERED COPY OF PMS LET TO PHILIPP
JENNINGER, MIN OF STATE IN KOHLS OFFICE WHO IS PRIMARILY
CONCERNED WITH E-W QUESTIONS. IN ADDITION TO NOTING
SIMILAR LET HAD OR WAS BEING SENT TO NUMBER OF OTHER
HEADS OF GOVT, AMB PROVIDED SOMETHING OF GROMYKOS REACTION
FROM MOSCOTEL 0704 30MAY. AMB ALSO NOTED THAT AT THEIR NOV
BONN MTG, PM AND CHANCELLOR HAD NOT/NOT FULLY AGREED ON
PERHAPS ONLY ONE PT. KOHL HAD THOUGHT USSR WOULD RETURN
TO GENEV NEGS JFTER SOME TIME, PM HAD BEEN LESS CERTAIN
THEY WOULD DO SO. SITU NOW WAS THAT THEY HAD NOT/NOT DONE
SO, AND PMS PRINCIPLES WAS EFFORT TO CREATE NEW
ATMOSPHERE THAT WOULD I.A. HELP BREAK THIS LOGJAM.
2. JENNINGER UNDERLINED SIMILARITY OF CDN AND FRG VIEWS AND
OBJECTIVES. HE REFERRED TO BONNS DESIRE TO SEE WSHDC-MOSCO
SUMMIT TAKE PLACE, AND MUSINGLY OBSERVED THAT PMS
PRINCIPLES COULD FORM BASIS FOR SUCH A SUMMIT.
PROBLEM WAS THAT USSR WOULD DO NOTHING UNTIL AFTER USA

...2

201120
850000 A 3102

PAGE TWO ZQGR1261 RESTR

PRE ELECTION IN BELIEF THAT TO DO SO WOULD HELP REAGAN.
JENNINGER THOUGHT THIS BELIEF TO BE MISTAKEN-SOVIET
HARD LINE WAS IN FACT ASSISTING REAGAN.NY TIMES EDITOR
HAD MADE SAME PT TO JENNINGER THAT MORNING.GROMYKO WAS
CURRENTLY CONTROLLING MANAGEMENT OF USSR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND HE WAS FIRM IN HOLDING TO HARDLINE.USSR
NEEDED TO BE HELPED TO FIND A WAY TO RETURN TO GENEV
NEGS-THERE WAS NO/NO INCLINATION ON THEIR PART TO
FIND ONE.SIMPLY SAYING,AS CHERNENKO HAD TO GENSCHER,THAT
USA MUST REMOVE INF ALREADY STATIONED,SIGNALLED
COMPLETE LACK OF INTEREST IN FINDING SOLUTION TO IMPASSE.
3.IN REPLY TO AMB QUESTION JSNNINGER SAID BONN WAS QUOTE
NOT/NOT OVERJOYED UNQUOTE AT DUTRH PARL INF DECISION BUT
VIEWED IT AS ISOLATED INSTANCE.DIFFICULT SITUATION OF DUTCH
COALITION GOVT WAS WELL KNOWN.DECISION WOULD STRENGTHEN
HAND OF HARD-LINERS IN MOSCO BUT COULD NOT/NOT AT SAME
TIME BE DESCRIBED AS USSR SUCCESS.JENNINGER DID NOT/NOT
THINK DUTCH DECISION WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT USSR
POLICY.SOVIETS KNEW THAT ULTIMATELY THEY HAD TO
NEGOTIATE WITH USA,NOT/NOT WEST EUROPEANS.

4.AMB ALSO TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO ASK HOW BONN VIEWED PROGRESS
TOWARD EURUOPEAN UNITY(VIDE FONTAINBLEAU SUMMIT,WEU MTG ETC).
JENNINGER SIMPLY SAID THIS QUESTION SHOULD NOT/NOT BE

...3

PAGE THREE ZQGR1261 RESTR

GIVEN HIGHER PRIORITY THAN IT DESERVED WHICH HE
ATTRIBUTED TO FORTHCOMING EUROPEAN ELECTIONS. MITTERRAND
WAS STRONG BELIEVER IN NEED TO BUILD EUROPE BUT PROCESS WOULD
BE LONG AND DIFFICULT. CLEARLY JENINGER WAS NOT/NOT
ABOUT TO GIVE ANYTHING AWAY, ALTHOUGH HIS VERY LOW-KEY
RESPONSE MIGHT BETRAY DESIRE TO RESTORE MORE BALANCED
PERSPECTIVE TO ISSUE IN LIGHT OF HIGH DEGREE OF INTEREST
MITTERRANDS INITIATIVE, ESPECIALLY ON WEU, HAS RAISED.

CCC/242 050850Z ZQGR1261



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

28-6-1-Trudeau

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SECURITÉ

~~R E S T R I C T E D~~

5 JUN 84 00 25Z 12 10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDA0851 04JUN84

TO/À

TO ANKRA DELIVER BY 050900Z

INFO

REF YOURTEL ZEGRO774 04JUN

DISTR

REF

DISTR RSR

SUBJ/SUJ

---PM INITIATIVE:

OUR RECORDS INDICATE THAT PREVIOUS TWO LETTERS SENT BY PM TRUDEAU
VIA YOUR EMB TO TURKISH GOVT ON PEACE INITIATIVE OCT25 AND NOV16/83
WERE ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT EVREN ALTHOUGH NO/NO RESPONSE RECEIVED
FROM TURKS.

2. ON ABOVE BASIS AND AS ORIGINAL OF MAY31 LET TO EVREN HAS ALREADY
BEEN SIGNED BY PM TRUDEAU, SUGGEST YOU STICK WITH PRESIDENT AS
RECIPIENT IN SPITE OF FACT PM OZAL MIGHT BE MORE ACTIVE IN FOREIGN
POLICY FIELD.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG GARY J. SMITH/pec

IDA

5-6689

SIG GARY J. SMITH



MESSAGE

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

28-6-1-Trudeau

28-6-1-TRUDEAU-1-CDR

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I A L	12	10
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDAO855 04JUN84		
TO/À	TO WSAW DELIVER-BY-050900		
INFO	INFO BONN WSHDC BNATO LDN PARIS PRMNY ROME HAGUE BRU MOSCO BGRAD		
DISTR	BPEST BUCST PRAGUE GENEV STKHM/SCDEL VMBFR PCOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/		
REF			
SUBJ/SUJ	CPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATA		
	DISTR MINA DMF RGB RBD RBR IDD IDR IFB IDAO IDAN IDAV RCR ZSI		
	---PM INITIATIVE: CDA/GDR ARMS CONTROL CONSULTATIONS		
	DPM/SSEA USED OCCASION OF VISIT OF GDR FOREIGN MINISTER OSKAR FISCHER		
	TO OTT 01JUN TO PROPOSE FOLLOW UP TO PM TRUDEAU/CHAIRMAN HONECKER		
	UNDERTAKING FOR CDN/GDR ARMS CONTROL CONSULTATIONS AT OFFICIALS		
	LEVEL. DPM/SSEA EXPRESSED HOPE THIS COULD OCCUR BEFORE END OF JUNE.		
	2. FISCHER REPLIED THAT HE WAS PLEASED TO HEAR THIS AS HE HAD HAD		
	QUOTE IMPRESSION IN MARCH AND APRIL THAT CDN SIDE HAD LESS OF AN		
	INTEREST IN IT UNQUOTE. FISCHER FAVOURED PROPOSAL AS CONTRIBUTING		
	TO BILATERAL RELATIONS QUOTE WITHOUT DOING DAMAGE TO INTERESTS OF		
	OUR ALLIANCES UNQUOTE, TALKS AND IMPROVED BILATERAL RELATIONS MIGHT		
	NOT CHANGE INNATL SITUATION BUT THEY ^{CLD} GIVE QUOTE GOOD SIGNAL UN-		
	QUOTE. HE PROPOSED THAT CDN OFFICIALS TRAVEL TO EAST BERLIN FOR		
	CONSULTATIONS.		
	3. WE SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD ACCOMPANYING GDR OFFICIALS THAT BEST DATE		
	FOR US WOULD BE FOR ONE DAY ON EITHER JUNE 27, 28 OR 29, FOLLOWING		
	CONSULTATIONS IN WSAW JUNE 25-26. GDR AMB HERDER SAID HE WOULD		
	...2		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

GARY J. SMITH/pec

IDA

5-6689

SIG

GARY J. SMITH



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE TWO IDA0855 CONFD

12

10

INFORM ERNST KRABATSCH OF GDR FOREIGN MINISTRY WHO WOULD LEAD
GDR SIDE.

4. GRATEFUL YOU CONFIRM ABOVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH GDR OFFICIALS (WE
WOULD PREFER JUNE 28 OR 29 AS OPPOSED TO 27) AND INFORM THEM CDN SIDE
WILL BE MADE UP OF SMITH/IDA AND ARSENE DESPRES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
IDR. WE WOULD ALSO WELCOME PARTICIPATION OF SENIOR REP FROM EMB.
ALSO WILL REQUIRE ACCOMMODATION IN EAST BERLIN FOR ONE NIGHT ONCE
DATE SET.

5. IN YOUR CONTACTS WITH GDR OFFICIALS, GRATEFUL YOU STRESS POINT THAT
OUR INTENTION IS TO HAVE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT RANGE OF CURRENT ARMS
CONTROL ISSUES AS WELL AS REVIEW OF CURRENT INNATL SECURITY SITUATION.
YOU WILL NOTE FROM MEMO TO DPM/SSEA WE HAVE PREPARED PREVIOUSLY ~~TELE~~
(GOING FORWARD IN SEPARATE TEL) THAT IT IS NOT/NOT OUR INTENTION TO
EXCHANGE PAPERS NOR ATTEMPT TO AGREE IN WRITING ON ANY COMMON POINTS
THAT MIGHT BE IDENTIFIED IN ^{RESPECTIVE} ALLIANCE POSITIONS.

6. RBR SENDING SEPARATE REPORT ON HIGHLIGHTS OF FULL MEETING WITH
FISCHER.

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

*File
m*

28-6-1- Trudeau	
4	9

R E S T R I C T E D

FM LDN XNGR1338 04JUN84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RGB RED RBR RSD RSR PPD PPR

PER PED PSD PSR PGB IDAO IDR

REF YOURTEL IDA0823 01JUN

---PM INITIATIVE:LETTERS TO HEAD OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES

LETTER DELIVERED TO JOHN COLES,PRIVATE SECRETARY,PMS OFFICE AND
TO NIGEL BROOMFIELD,HEAD SOVIET DEPT,FCO A.M. 04JUN.

CCC/102 041502Z XNGR1338

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BUCST UYGR1046 04JUN84

TO EXTOTT LIDA

DISTR RBR

28-6-1-Trudeau
20 9

REF YOURTEL IDA0827 01JUN

---PM INITIATIVE: LETS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES

AM SEEKING APPT WITH MIN STEFAN ANDREI FOR TRANSMISSION OF LET.

(ANDREI NOW IN MOSCO TILL 7JUN)

2. ASSUME THAT IN ORIGINAL LET SIXTH LINE READS QUOTE

LES ENTRETIENS FORTS UTILES QUE NOUS AVONS EUS UNQUOTE SINCE PM

TRUDEAU AND PRES CEAUSESCU HAD TWO LENGTHY MTGS. ALSO ASSUME AT

END THAT SALUTATION READS MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT UNQUOTE AND

NOT/NOT AS IN REFTEL QUOTE MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE UNQUOTE.

UUU/181 041005Z UYGR1046

20 V27/185

0847

176

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Fli

<i>28-6-1-Trudeau</i>	
<i>24</i>	<i>9</i>

NONCLASSIFIE

DE MDRID XQGR0368 04JUN84

A EXTOTT IDA

LIVRAISON 040900

REF VOTRETEL IDA825 01JUN

---INITIATIVE DU PM: LETTRE AUX CHEFS DE GOUV
ETANT DONNE QUE PRESIDENT FELIPE GONZALEZ NE PARLE PAS ANGLAIS A
NOTRE CONNAISSANCE, PRIERE NOUS ENVOYER TEXTE FRANCAIS DE LA LETTRE
DU PM TRUDEAU SANS DELAI

HARDY

UUU/150 041230Z XQGR0368


ASS: RSR

INFO: PEO/ARCHIVED

OK 26 m'eng
not 16 m'eng

Spurberg
- for you

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER



R E S T R I C T E D

FM ANKRA ZEGR0774 04JUN84

TO EXTOTT LIDA DELIVER BY 040900

DISTR RSR

---PM INITIATIVE

PM OZAL AND NOT/NOT PRESIDENT EVREN SHOULD BE RECIPIENT OF
PM LETTER.EVREN IS NOT/NOT INVOLVED IN REGULAR MANAGEMENT
OF FOREIGN POLICY.RECENT CORRESPONDENCE ON PM INITIATIVE
HAS BEEN WITH OZAL ALTHOUGH TO OUR KNOWLEDGE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
NEVER RECEIVED.

2.NEED AUTHORITY BY RETURN TO SUBSTITUTE OZAL AS RECIPIENT.

MATHIEU

CCC/025 040918Z ZEGR0774

EVREN
on 21

EVREN
NOV 16



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

28-6-1-Trudeau

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

UNCLASSIFIED

5 JUN 84 00 15Z

12

10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDA0847 04JUN84

TO/À

TO BUCST (DELIVER BY 050900)

INFO

REF YOURTEL UYGR1046 01JUN

DISTR

REF

---PM INITIATIVE: LETTER TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES

SUBJ/SUJ

ASSUMPTION PARA TWO YOUR REFTEL CORRECT.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG GARY J. SMITH/pec

IDA

5-6689

SIG GARY J. SMITH

FILE DIV DIARY

cc:PER,IDD,IDR,RCR

UVA/Gary J. Smith/56689/dec
Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -
Document divulgué en vertu de la loi sur l'accès à l'information

28-6-1-Trudeau

28-COMBLOC-1-CHINA

RESTRICTED

June 4, 1984

IDA-0843

NOTE FOR DMF

Reference: Your enquiry of June 4, 1984

Subject: Chinese Proposal for International
Nuclear Conference

Both the International Herald Tribune of
--- May 31 and the New York Times of June 3 (both attached)
make reference to Chinese Premier Zhao's call, during
a speech before the French National Assembly on Wednes-
day, May 30, for a "broadly representative international
conference" to discuss arms control.


2. While we have not seen the text of his remarks,
nor received a report from our Embassy in Paris, Zhao
appears to be reiterating a proposal first put forward
at the UN General Assembly last fall by Foreign Minister
Wu Xueqian (copy of the relevant portion of his speech
--- is attached). You will note it calls for a "widely
representative international conference with the
participation of all nuclear weapon states, to negotiate
the general reduction of nuclear weapons by all nuclear
weapon states".

3. There are two points to note about this
proposal:

(a) that a pre-condition for it is that the Soviet
Union and USA take practical action "to stop
--- testing, improving and manufacturing nuclear
weapons, and agree on reducing by half their
nuclear weapons and means of delivery of all
types";

(b) the Chinese are calling for a conference of
about 15 countries that would include represen-
tative groups from the NNA as well as East and
West.

In both these respects the Chinese proposal differs
from Prime Minister Trudeau's call for a 5-power nuclear
conference. We will have to check the actual text of
Zhao's proposal to see whether these two points remain
part of the Chinese position.



Gary J. Smith,
Director,
Arms Control &
Disarmament Division

May 31, 1984

Zhao, in Paris, Urges International Talks on Cuts in Nuclear Arms

The Associated Press

PARIS — Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang of China proposed Wednesday the calling of a broadly representative international conference to discuss the problem of the reduction of nuclear arms by all nuclear nations.

Speaking on the first day of his visit to France before an audience of French senators and National Assembly deputies, with Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy present, Mr. Zhao said his suggestion was the practical, just and rational position of the Chinese government.

He said it reflected the hopes of the peoples of the world, adding: "We hope that it may find a favorable echo among the nations concerned."

Mr Zhao also said that China, on the basis of peaceful coexistence, is intent on achieving normal relations with all countries, including the United States and the Soviet Union. He noted China's hope that relations with the Kremlin would improve to the point where the two nations could achieve a rapport of good neighbors.

China, he said, backs disarmament, including the destruction of all nuclear arms. He said China's nuclear stockpile is for defense only.

Mr. Zhao arrived in Paris Wednesday morning, the first stop on his six-nation European tour. He will leave for Brussels on Sunday.

He said his country understands the French position of maintaining a nuclear force independent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The French force, because it is not attached to that of other nations in the alliance, is not included in the count of NATO's nuclear strength and is a subject of disagreement during nuclear arms talks.

Mr. Zhao, who has helped steer China's economy toward modernization, assured Europeans that his country intended to open its doors to European technology and capital under "preferential conditions."

Open-Door Trade Policy

Christopher S. Wren of The New York Times reported from Beijing:

Mr. Zhao's trip, which also will take him to Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Italy, is the first by a Chinese leader involved in the new open-door policy of trade. Hua Guofeng, Mao's successor, visited Western Europe in 1979 before being squeezed out by China's current paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping.

Britain is not on Mr. Zhao's itinerary, apparently because of delicate negotiations on the future of Hong Kong.

Mr. Zhao told a group of West European correspondents in Beijing last week that China welcomes West European investment in construction projects, including nuclear power plants, and in oil exploration.

A West European diplomat said the trip also is part of a strategy to balance China's contacts with countries around the Pacific rim, including the United States. Mr. Zhao visited the United States and Canada in January and President Ronald Reagan came to Beijing a month ago.

Chinese officials have made clear that they would like more West European technology to lessen their dependence on U.S. supplies.

A French company reportedly has an edge in bids to provide components for a proposed 1,800-megawatt nuclear power station in the province of Guangdong, and British, Italian, Dutch and French oil companies are among those bidding for drilling rights on the continental shelf.

Mr. Zhao's 18-day trip will also include a visit to the headquarters of the European Community in Brussels. China's trade with the countries of Western Europe totaled \$6.8 billion last year.


Mr. Zhao told the West European reporters last week that he would also discuss the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Europe. Publicly, China is opposed to the deployment, calling it part of the superpower struggle for hegemony, but privately some Chinese officials have hinted that they think it is necessary to balance Soviet deployment.

Arthur H. Motley Dies; Publisher of Parade

International Herald Tribune

NEW YORK — Arthur H. (Red) Motley, 83, former president, publisher and chairman of the board of Parade magazine, died Wednesday in Palm Springs, California.

Mr. Motley retired from Parade, the Sunday newspaper magazine, in 1978 after a 32-year association during which its circulation rose from two million to 19 million. He was also a former director of Whitely Communications Corp.



TALL SHIP — Crew members stand on the yards of the Simón Bolívar, a Venezuelan square-rigger, in the harbor at Hamilton, Bermuda. The ship has been entered in a tall ships race from Bermuda to Halifax, Nova Scotia.

Russian Tells West's Scientists Of Dangers of Biological War

Washington Post Service

WASHINGTON — The chief of a Soviet laboratory has written to half a dozen scientists in the West expressing alarm about biological warfare and the use to which his and other work on epidemics might eventually be put.

Leonid A. Rvachev, chief of an epidemiology laboratory at the Gamaleya Institute in Moscow, has devised a mathematical model intended to predict how a flu epidemic would spread around the world, how fast it would reach each city, what toll it would take and how fast it would move on, according to U.S. scientists who have seen a manuscript describing the model.

Mr. Rvachev recently sent the manuscript by ordinary mail to scientists in the United States, Britain, and other countries. Accompanying the manuscript were letters expressing alarm that work such as his could be used for biological warfare.

Mr. Rvachev proposed putting the work to good use by establishing a new international health organization to develop accurate ways of predicting the spread of natural epidemics and to monitor the possible military misuse of that technology.

Ira M. Longini of the University of Michigan, who specializes in mathematical models on the spread of disease and received one of the Rvachev letters, said, "If his model works, and we don't know that yet, then it would predict the spread of biological agents from city to city on a global scale."

Other scientists are not convinced that the Rvachev model could work or would be useful in predicting the spread of disease. Michael Gregg, deputy director of the Epidemiology Program Office of the federal Centers for Disease Control, who has met Mr. Rvachev and received his material, said the model suffers from at least two possible defects — it requires knowledge of a people's relative susceptibility to a given disease, and it calls for information about how much people travel back and forth between cities.

Other scientists are not convinced that the Rvachev model could work or would be useful in predicting the spread of disease.

Michael Gregg, deputy director of the Epidemiology Program Office of the federal Centers for Disease Control, who has met Mr. Rvachev and received his material, said the model suffers from at least two possible defects — it requires knowledge of a people's relative susceptibility to a given disease, and it calls for information about how much people travel back and forth between cities.

Niger To Fight Military Against S

By W. Joseph

The Assoc

LAGOS — W buttons and telements, Nigeria's ment has gone to derliness, ineffic disregard for har

The government tion the "war agai Its first objectives Nigerians to line buses, to stop driv side of roads, to p to their childrer hoarding scarce c

The campaign achieved an initia lar acceptance.

"An instant suc was one," Olatun communications i Univerity of Lago in a column in 1 Lagos. "The 'war pline' has transfo stops from human vens of brotherly survival of the fitt planted by the sur kest."

State-run televi ported the story c returned the equi \$4,000 she had recce bank transaction. spent three days ir piction of fraud, u reported the mistal report said. It attri an's honesty to the raising impact of t indiscipline."

The campaign's also noticeable changeover of Nig Nigerians endured banks to excha amounts of old ba bills — a manu characterized by a ness.

"It was amazing for Nigerians," s Macebuh, executiv Guardian. "Ay would have bee banks."

In declaring th Tunde Idiagbon, 1 second-ranking o indiscipline could disregard for lawf of traditional nor lawlessness."

The governmer ond front in early the benefits of the vision commercial hard at work at a



JUN - 3 1984

China and France Near Nuclear Accord

By E. J. DIONNE Jr.

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, June 2 — Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang of China said today that France and China were close to agreement on a contract for the construction of a nuclear power plant in Canton and announced that the two countries had concluded accords designed to ease French investment in China.

Mr. Zhao also declared that China would give Hong Kong "wide autonomy" when it takes control of the city from Britain in 1997, in order to insure its "prosperity and stability."

The announcement came at a news conference as Mr. Zhao neared the end of a visit to France, a visit characterized by warm words between Mr. Zhao and French leaders, and an emphasis by the Chinese Prime Minister on Chinese economic development.

During his visit, Mr. Zhao talked of world peace and praised Paris as a city of "revolutionaries." But he spent most of his visit finding out such things as how much fast trains, airbuses and nuclear reactors cost.

Confidence 'in Marx and Lenin'

So intent was Mr. Zhao on technological and financial matters that a French reporter asked him today what would be left of Communist ideology in China if it kept moving toward modernization and opened itself more and more to the West.

"I have complete confidence in the ideas of Marx and Lenin," replied Mr. Zhao. "But I deal with the concrete situation in which China finds itself."

He said China would seek to take what was good from the West, keep out the bad and try "to build a spiritual civilization."

Mr. Zhao, who is on a monthlong tour of Europe, indicated during his stop in France that he was more interested in buying and selling that ideological matters.

Mr. Zhao leaves Sunday for Brussels, the next stop on his tour, and is scheduled to visit Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Italy.

The Chinese Communist Party newspaper, People's Daily, called the trip a "significant diplomatic move" designed to improve relations with Western Europe.

Urges Nuclear Talks

On Wednesday, during a speech before the French National Assembly, Mr. Zhao urged the United States and the Soviet Union to resume negotiations on limiting intermediate-range nuclear weapons and called for a "broadly representative international conference" to discuss arms control.

Mr. Zhao also praised efforts toward European unity, a statement seen as favorable to President François Mitterrand's proposals to that effect last month.

The speech before the National Assembly was Mr. Zhao's major foreign policy address here. But he did not lose the opportunity to once again play the role of development agent.

China, he said, offered an immense market to Western countries and businesses.

"We are disposed to give facilities and preferential conditions to promote the introduction of Western European technologies and capital," Mr. Zhao said.

For the most part, Mr. Zhao's trip was about technology. The Chinese Prime Minister rode the French fast train, the T.G.V., and France's airbus and visited a nuclear power plant in St. Alban-St. Maurice. He impressed his French hosts by repeatedly asking the most technical of questions, and also the most capitalist of questions: "How much does it cost?"

French officials have been hoping to win the contract to build a nuclear plant in Canton. Mr. Zhao said today that an agreement on the plant had been reached in principle, but that some details still had to be worked out.

There were apparently still differences between France and China on the

financing of the Canton plant.

Most of the contracts for China's plans to construct 12 nuclear plants are expected to go to United States companies.

The two treaties announced by Mr.

Zhao today include one guaranteeing French investments and another aimed at keeping French businessmen from being taxed by both the French and Chinese Governments when they work in China.

29 Sep 83 UNGA

DS/11

A/38/PV.8
39-40

(Mr. Wu Zueqian, China)

∫ As matters now stand, it is only natural that people should ask the two nuclear super-Powers which possess the largest arsenals to be the first to reduce their arms, drastically cut their nuclear and conventional armaments and destroy the reduced armaments before there can be any reduction of arms by other countries.

AW/int/man

A/38/PV.8

41

(Mr. Wu Xueqian, China)

China desires peace and favours disarmament. We are for genuine disarmament and against sham disarmament; that is, arms expansion under the camouflage of disarmament talks. The Chinese Government has, together with other third world countries, made unremitting efforts to promote real progress in disarmament.

China has always stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

China declared explicitly, in 1964, on the occasion of the successful test of its first atomic bomb, that China was developing nuclear weapons for defence purposes and that at no time and in no circumstances would China be the first to use nuclear weapons.

China was the first country to propose that nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to use nuclear weapons against each other, and the first country to undertake the commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-free zones.

China respects and supports the proposals of non-nuclear-weapon countries for the establishment of nuclear-free zones or zones of peace.

China is in favour of reducing conventional armaments as well as nuclear arms.

China stands for the early conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons.

At the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, China put forward a proposal on the question of the nuclear-weapon States ceasing to develop, and reducing, nuclear weapons, calling on the two super-Powers to take the lead in adopting practical measures to cut their nuclear weapons and means of delivery by a wide margin. With a view to promoting progress in disarmament, we are prepared to make a further effort by proposing that, after the Soviet Union and the United States have taken practical action to stop testing, improving and manufacturing nuclear weapons, and agreed on reducing by half their nuclear weapons and means of delivery of all types, a widely representative international conference should be convened, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, to negotiate the general reduction of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States. We hope that this proposal will receive a positive response. 7



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

28-6-1-TRUDEAU

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ	N O N C L A S S I F I E	5 JUN 84 00	252	12	10
FM/DE	DE EXTOTT IDA-0853 04JUN84				
TO/À	A MADRID LIVRER A 050900				
INFO					
DISTR	INFO PC00TT/ARCHDEACON				
REF	DISTR:RSR				
SUBJ/SUJ	REF MDRID XQGR0368 4JUN84				
	--- <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>				
	MALHEUREUSEMENT PM A DEJA SIGNE LA LETTRE EN ANGLAIS ET C'EST TROP				
	TARD POUR OBTENIR UNE AUTRE VERSION EN FRANCAIS CAR M. TRUDEAU				
	PART POUR L'EUROPE CE SOIR.				
	2.ON A AVERTI LE CONSEIL PRIVE QU'A L'AVENIR TOUTES LES LETTRES				
	DOIVENT ETRE EN FRANCAIS.				
	3.DANS CES CIRCONSTANCES PRIERE DE LIVRER TEXTE EN ANGLAIS AUSSITOT				
	QUE POSSIBLE.				

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

GARY J. SMITH

IDA

5-6689

SIG

GARY J. SMITH



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

28-6-1-Trudeau

28-COMBLOC - 1 - GDR

752

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

5 JUN 84 07

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

12

10

~~CONFIDENTIAL-CE-O~~

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDA0857 04JUN84

TO/À

TO WSAW DELIVER BY 050900

INFO

DISTR

INFO BONN WSHDC BNATO LDN PARIS PRMNY ROME HAGUE BRU MOSCO BGRAD

REF

BPEST BUCST PRAGUE GENEV STKHM/SCDEL VMBFR PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/

SUBJ/SUJ

CPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR MINA DMF RGB RBD RBR IDD IDR IFB IDAO IDAN IDAV RCR ZSI

REF OURTEL IDA0855 04JUN

---PM INITIATIVE: CDA/GDR ARMS CONTROL CONSULTATIONS

AS PER REFTTEL, FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF OUR MEMO IDA0801 TO DPM/SSEA:

(Comcentre please copy attached)

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG GARY J. SMITH/pec

IDA

5-6689

SIG GARY J. SMITH

MINA (3)	IDD
MINE	IDR
MINT (2)	RBD
PARL SEC	RBR
USS	FILE
DMF	DIV
DMT	DIARY
FPR	IFB
CPD	
CMRR (2)	

G.J. Smith
Arms Control and
Disarmament Division,
995-6689

CONFIDENTIAL

May 29, 1984

IDA-0801

Memorandum for the Deputy Prime Minister and
Secretary of State for External Affairs

c.c. Minister for External Relations
c.c. Minister for International Trade

Subject: Prime Minister's Peace Initiative:
Arms Control Consultations with
German Democratic Republic (GDR)

quire:

Purpose:

To seek your agreement that Canadian and GDR
arms control consultations take place in East Berlin at
the end of June and that you convey this decision to
GDR Foreign Minister Fischer during his meeting with you
in Ottawa June 1.

Background:

During the Prime Minister's visit to East Berlin
on January 30-31, he drew Chairman Honecker's attention to
the fact that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact had a tendency
to dismiss out of hand as pure propaganda or posturing
proposals emanating from the other side. He used as an
example the Prague Declaration of January 1983 and the
NATO Brussels Declaration of December 1983. Both of these
declarations, he said, had positive elements in them which
should be explored. He accordingly proposed that arms
control experts from each side should examine the positions
of their respective alliances to determine where possible
common elements might exist such as in the fields of
chemical weapons and outer space. Mr. Honecker quickly
agreed. Gary Smith, Director of Arms Control & Disarmament
Division, and Ambassador Krabatsch, who is in charge of
"fundamental questions" with the GDR Foreign Ministry,
both of whom were present at the meeting, were specifically
tasked for this purpose. It was suggested that each side
exchange papers through diplomatic channels and then meet
to consider them.

While public announcement of this agreement was
welcomed in some quarters, including elements of the media,

.....2

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

as representing "one of the few concrete achievements of the initiative", it also gave rise to expressions of concern from the Official Opposition about "giving NATO secrets to the GDR". Expressions of concern were also heard from some of our allies as to exactly what this agreement entailed and about Canada speaking on behalf of the NATO Alliance. FRG officials in particular expressed reservations about our dealing with the GDR in this manner (this was partially a reflection of an FRG desire that other governments not give too much status to the GDR).

Given these reactions, it was the view of officials that this aspect of the initiative should be pursued with a certain amount of caution and indeed little action has been taken on this front to date. Interestingly, the GDR itself has not pressed this point, although the GDR Ambassador, resident in Washington, during a recent visit to Ottawa did ask us how we intended to proceed.

At a recent luncheon with the Prime Minister and members of the Task Force, the above situation was explained to him in response to his question as to how the matter stood. While he understood the reasons for delay and caution, he nevertheless expressed certain disappointment and frustration that there should be difficulty with the general idea of two middle powers from different alliances pursuing common elements in the arms control field. It was stated to him that we were examining the most propitious way to proceed and that after having discussed the matter further with some of our allies, including the FRG, USA and UK, we now favoured a more typical consultative process with the GDR in which we would review the current state of arms control but not attempt to exchange any papers or reach any agreed alliance positions. Such an arrangement would not cause problems for our allies and indeed general arms control discussions on a bilateral basis between Warsaw Pact and NATO countries is a fairly common occurrence.

Recommendation:

As the GDR Foreign Minister will expect to hear from you on this subject when you receive him in Ottawa on Friday, June 1, it is recommended:

- (a) that you inform him that Canadian officials (one or two) are prepared to visit East Berlin at the end of June for one day, either June 27, 28 or 29, for general arms control consultations; and


.....3

- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) indicate, on a responsive basis, that it is not our intention to exchange any type of agreed paper.

unfused

Do you agree? 

~~Michael Shenstone
Assistant Deputy Minister
Political and International
Security Affairs~~

~~de Montigny Marchand~~

LDN

SUMMIT MSG

ACT	Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act - Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
file	28-6-1-True
28-4	SECRET PEACE MISSION
	June 4/84

SUMMIT MESSAGE TO THE SOVIET PRESIDENT

The objective is to break out of the impasse in East/West relations. A message to the Soviet President (Annex A) could be helpful in two ways:

- (a) by reflecting a Western attitude which goes beyond mere firmness (as per the NATO Washington Statement) to include a real interest in cooperation, and
- (b) by encouraging the Soviet leadership to be less isolationist and consider some of the benefits of better relations.

There is likely to be a good deal of opposition to the proposal. To introduce it, you might wish to make the following points:

1. We do not object to issuing a statement on Common Democratic Values. It is useful to remind ourselves periodically of the values we share. But it is not enough.
2. None of us disputes the fact East-West relations are in terrible shape, and we recognize the associated dangers. But our analysis tends to end there. We don't draw the conclusion that corrective action is required. Or if we do, that it is up to us to take such action.
3. We have an obligation, to ourselves and others, to find a way out of the current impasse. It is in the interest of Western countries to act. The initiative must come from us. The Russians do

- 2 -

SECRET

not have the political culture or intellectual virtuosity that we do. In any case, why should we leave our fate in their hands?

4. We need to do two things: ensure they understand us properly, and draw them out of the shell into which they are retreating. To do this, I suggest we send them a message.

To assuage the British, the message should appear to flow from the "London Charter" rather than assume the character of a separate East/West declaration. Others will want assurance that the message conveys an appropriate degree of Western firmness and resolve and is consistent with previous statements of Western policy. It might therefore be useful to stress that the message is fully consistent with President Reagan's address to the Japanese Diet, his speech of January 16, 1984 on East-West relations, and the statement issued in Washington last week by NATO foreign ministers. Its central theme should be that there are common interests to be pursued.

5. The message should present an image of the West which is coherent, firm and reasonable. It should refer to the London Charter, and to our determination to uphold and defend the basic values we share. It should make the point that the Soviet Union cannot count on our demise, but also that it has nothing to fear from us.
6. The point would be to draw Soviet attention to the futility of a policy of waiting for Western concessions.

- 3 -

SECRET

Most messages, declarations and communiques go no further than this. They express good intentions, but make no practical proposals. The Russians have dismissed such efforts in the past as "words, not action". The Summit message needs to clear this hurdle.

7. The message should then accentuate the positive.

There is not much, but there is some and we should build on it. I have in mind interests which East and West have in common, some of which are reflected in the NATO Washington Statement (para 5). Above all, there is recognition that, in the final analysis, each side holds the key to the other's security.

8. Finally, the message could flag the benefits which would accrue to the Soviet Union from improved relations, particularly the economic benefits. And it could invite Soviet leaders, especially those unfamiliar with the West, to visit the West and see for themselves that cold war is not the only alternative. It should challenge them to break out of their self-imposed isolation, to act in response to our invitation.

Should it not prove possible for you to secure the agreement of your colleagues to the dispatch of a message to the Soviet President, you may wish to propose that the London

- 4 -

SECRET

Declaration be amended to include some general language on East-West relations (Annex B). This language would have the advantage of sending a signal of openness and goodwill to the East, while at the same time not altering the nature or basic purpose of the London Declaration.

ANNEX A

June 4, 1984

LANCASTER HOUSE MESSAGE TO THE SOVIET PRESIDENT

Dear Mr. President,

We have been meeting at Lancaster House to consider certain international questions, and we wish to share with you some of the results of our deliberations.

Two generations have reached maturity since the end of the last great war. Not for a century have the major powers sustained such a period of peace. The peace has been fragile, but through our common efforts it has held. And it has offered hope of a more stable and cooperative future for both East and West. It is the clear determination of the Heads of State and Government gathered in London that such hope be realized.

We wish to assure you of our peaceful and cooperative intentions. As the London Charter issued today so firmly demonstrates, we represent societies founded on democratic values, the rule of law, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. We have armed to defend ourselves, and we shall defend ourselves if attacked; but we do not seek military superiority, nor do we harbour hostile intentions towards others. We understand and respect the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union; in return we require equal understanding and respect for our own legitimate security interests.

- 2 -

Our governments and peoples are as one on this. Debate among us should not be mistaken for division, nor should the vitality of the democratic process be misconstrued as dissension over essential purposes. The disintegration of our societies or of our collective security system is not in prospect. To arrest cooperation in anticipation of such a development is futile and dangerous. To retreat into a posture of menace and belligerence can only be irresponsible and self-defeating.

The goals we pursue in common are more important than those which divide us: to avoid war, to contain crises, to balance and reduce forces, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to achieve mutual security, and to provide prosperous and rewarding futures for our children.

Should we not together recognize that each side holds the key to the other's security, that there is no reasonable alternative to pursuing together the goals we share, and that both sides bear a responsibility to negotiate agreements on issues which divide us?

We believe you should carefully consider the prospects for peace of mind and economic benefit to be achieved from a stable entente between our respective systems. We invite you and your colleagues to test our sincerity and our flexibility, to visit our countries and determine for yourselves both the vigour of our societies and our capacity for cooperation.



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

28-6-1-TRUDEAU

9

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ **R E S T R I C T E D**

2 JUN 84 00¹² 30z 10

FM/DE
TO/À
INFO
DISTR
REF
SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDAO 825 ~~28MAY84~~ 01JUN84

TO OSLO COPEN MDRID **(DELIVER BY 040900)**

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RGB RCM RSD RSR IDAO IDR

REF OURTEL IDAO787 28MAY **to moscow**

---PM INITIATIVE: LETTERS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES

COPIED BELOW IS TEXT OF A LETTER DATED 31MAY84 FROM PM TRUDEAU TO
YOUR RESPECTIVE HEADS OF GOVT. PM WILLOCH, PM SCHLUTER AND PM
GONZALEZ

DEALING WITH 10 PRINCIPLES THAT PM BELIEVES COULD FORM COMMON GROUND
AND BASIS ON WHICH BOTH EAST AND WEST COULD BUILD IN CURRENT SITUA-
TION. PRINCIPLES WERE FIRST OUTLINED BY PM IN HIS SPEECH TO HOUSE
OF COMMONS 09FEB84.

2. PLEASE ENSURE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TRANSMISSION OF LET AT HIGHEST
POSSIBLE LEVEL.

3. SIMILAR LETS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SENT TO USSR AND USA, OTHER NATO
AND WPO COUNTRIES, JAPAN, CHINA AND YUGOSLAVIA, AS WELL AS HOGSPM
MET AT CHOGM IN DELHI LAST NOVEMBER.

4. ORIGINAL OF LETTERS TO FOLLOW BY BAG.

5. TEXT OF LETTER FOLLOWS: (Comcentre please copy attached letter) ~~and then~~

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG GARY J. SMITH/pec

IDA

5-6689

SIG GARY J. SMITH

~~My dear Prime Minister,~~

TEXT BEGINS

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations. I recall, in particular, the most valuable exchange of correspondence we had related to several ideas and proposals I had put forward aimed at reducing international tension and restoring the vital East-West relationship to a more stable and constructive basis.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

- 2 -

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely,

----- ~~TEXT~~ ENDS



MESSAGE

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

28-6-1-TRUDEAU

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

R E S T R I C T E D

2 JUN 84

00

12

29

2

10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDA0835 01JUN84

TO/À TO BRU/FOR LUXEMBOURG) DELIVER BY 040900

INFO INFO PC00TT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

REF DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RSD RSR **12R 1210**

SUBJ/SUJ REF OURTEL IDA0787 28MAY TO MOSCOW

---PM INITIATIVE: LETTERS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES

COPIED BELOW IS TEXT OF LETTER DATED 31MAY84 FROM PM TRUDEAU TO PM

WERNER DEALING WITH TEN PRINCIPLES THAT PM BELIEVES COULD FORM COMMON
GROUND AND BASIS ON WHICH BOTH EAST AND WEST COULD BUILD IN CURRENT
SITUATION. PRINCIPLES WERE FIRST OUTLINED BY PM IN ~~HOUSE OF COMMONS~~
HIS SPEECH TO HOUSE OF COMMONS 09FEB84.

2. ~~PLEASE~~ PLEASE ENSURE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TRANSMISSION OF LET AT
HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL.

3. SIMILAR LETS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SENT TO USSR AND USA, OTHER NATO
AND WPO COUNTRIES, JAPAN, CHINA, YUGOSLAVIA AS WELL AS HOGS PM MET
AT CHOGM IN DELHI LAST NOVEMBER.

4. ORIGINAL LETTER TO FOLLOW BY BAG.

5. TEXT OF LETTER FOLLOWS: (Comcentre please copy attached).

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG GARY J. SMITH/pec

IDA

5-6689

SIG GARY J. SMITH

TEXT BEGINS

Ces derniers mois, j'ai rencontré plusieurs dirigeants de pays de l'Est et de l'Ouest, dont les présidents Reagan et Tchernenko, afin d'échanger des vues avec eux sur la situation actuelle en matière de sécurité internationale et le piètre état des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

En repensant à ces diverses consultations, je suis de plus en plus convaincu qu'en dépit de difficultés persistantes et de la regrettable absence de progrès au chapitre de la réduction des armements, il subsiste un terrain d'entente étendu et discernable entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Des déclarations faites récemment par des dirigeants des deux blocs m'incitent à croire que l'on est d'accord dans une large mesure sur les principes de base devant régir les relations internationales et, plus particulièrement, notre façon d'aborder la plus grave menace planant sur l'humanité, soit la possibilité d'une guerre nucléaire.

Sans faire abstraction de nos différences, nous devons, je pense, nous appliquer à explorer les terrains d'entente et intérêts communs aux deux camps et chercher à en tirer parti. Les dix points suivants, énoncés dans un discours que j'ai prononcé à la Chambre des communes du Canada au début de cette année, pourraient fournir une base utile dans ce sens :

- 2 -

- De part et d'autre on reconnaît l'impossibilité de sortir vainqueur d'une guerre nucléaire.
- De part et d'autre on convient qu'il faut absolument éviter la guerre nucléaire.
- De part et d'autre on souhaite être libéré du risque de guerre accidentelle ou d'attaque par surprise.
- De part et d'autre on reconnaît les dangers inhérents aux armes déstabilisatrices.
- De part et d'autre on comprend le besoin d'améliorer les techniques de gestion des crises.
- De part et d'autre on est conscient des terribles conséquences qu'entraînerait le fait d'être le premier à recourir à la force contre l'autre camp.
- De part et d'autre on a intérêt à accroître la sécurité en en réduisant le coût.
- De part et d'autre on a intérêt à éviter la propagation des armes nucléaires dans d'autres pays, communément appelée prolifération horizontale.
- De part et d'autre on en est arrivé à reconnaître prudemment les intérêts légitimes de l'autre camp en matière de sécurité.
- De part et d'autre on a conscience que les stratégies de sécurité ne sauraient être fondées sur l'hypothèse d'un effondrement politique ou économique dans l'autre camp.

Si les dirigeants de l'Est et de l'Ouest et, en particulier, les superpuissances donnaient publiquement leur adhésion à ces idées, cela aiderait largement, à mon sens, à créer l'atmosphère et le cadre politique de base si essentiels à des négociations productives touchant les armes nucléaires comme classiques. J'ai donc tenu à vous écrire, de même qu'à d'autres dirigeants, pour livrer ces idées à votre réflexion et vous inviter à y souscrire.

- 3 -

Vous espérez comme moi, je le sais, que les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest s'amélioreront bientôt sensiblement, de manière à favoriser l'avancement du long travail destiné à libérer l'humanité de la menace de guerre nucléaire.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Premier ministre, l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

TEXT ENDS



MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

File/Dossier 28-6-1-TRUDEAU	
2 JUN 84 00 12 31 7	

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

R E S T R I C T E D

10

FM/DE
TO/À
INFO
DISTR
REF
SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDA0831 ~~31MAY84~~ 01JUN84

TO DELHI DSLAM **(DELIVER BY 040900)**

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD PSD PSR PGB GGB GAA GAD IDAO IDR

REF OURTEL IDA0787 28MAY TO MOSCOW

--- PM INITIATIVE: LETTERS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES

COPIED BELOW IS TEXT OF A LETTER DATED 31MAY84 FROM PM TRUDEAU TO
YOUR RESPECTIVE HEADS OF GOVT;

DEALING WITH 10 PRINCIPLES THAT PM BELIEVES COULD FORM ~~THE~~ COMMON
GROUND AND BASIS ON WHICH BOTH EAST AND WEST COULD BUILD IN CURRENT
SITUATION. PRINCIPLES WERE FIRST OUTLINED BY PM IN HIS SPEECH TO

HOUSE OF COMMONS 09FEB84. **LET ALSO INCLUDES REF TO SIX NATION
PEACE INITIATIVE IN WHICH GANDHI/NYERERE WERE INVOLVED.**

2. PLEASE ENSURE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TRANSMISSION OF LET AT HIGHEST
POSSIBLE LEVEL.

3. SIMILAR LETS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SENT TO USSR AND USA, OTHER NATO
AND WPO COUNTRIES, JAPAN, CHINA AND YUGOSLAVIA, AS WELL AS ^{OTHER} HOGS PM
MET AT CHOGM IN DELHI LAST NOVEMBER.

4. ORIGINAL OF LETTERS TO FOLLOW BY BAG.

5. TEXT OF LETTER FOLLOWS: (Comcentre please copy attached)

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

GARY J. SMITH

IDA

5-6689

SIG

GARY J. SMITH

TEXT BEGINS

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations. I recall, in particular, the most valuable conversations we had in New Delhi and Goa at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting during which we discussed several ideas and proposals aimed at reducing international tension and restoring the vital East-West relationship to a more stable and constructive basis.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

- 2 -

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

Your recent statement in concert with five other world leaders is witness to your personal interest and your willingness to act in this most important matter. I fully support your aims in this regard, and I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely,

TEXT ENDS

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO
À

USSEA OTTAWA (ID)

JUN 8 1984

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

NO.

DATE _____

1 June 1984

QUANTITY
QUANTITÉ

[illegible]

REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE

PM INITIATIVE - CONSULTATIONS

UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL:

2

Letter from PD Lee to Brian Urquhart,
Under-Secretary-General for Special
and Political Affairs, and copy of
non-paper

Our Telegram WKGR 1107
of 30 May 1984 and
Smith/Lee Telecon 1 June 84

DISTRIBUTION: BY POST (With Attachments)

IDA/IDR/IMU/IMD

perze mission

28-6-1-TRUDEH

5

/CJS

PRMNY

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER

DATE _____

SIGNATURE

cc: Ambassador Pelletier/
Ambassador Beesley/Mike Kergin/
C. Chistoff
The Permanent Mission of Canada
to the United Nations



P.D. LEE/035 File 0110121
Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

La Mission Permanente du Canada
auprès des Nations Unies

cc: IDD/IDA/IDR/IMU/IMD

1 June 1984

Dear Brian,

You will recall the conversation between our Prime Minister and the Secretary General last January in which the proposal for a five power conference was discussed, along with other ideas. In our subsequent talks on these matters, I sketched out for you a few thoughts on how the process might begin. In response to your suggestion, I attach a brief non-paper, which you may find helpful in reflecting on the subject further with your senior colleagues in the Secretariat.

In addition, you will recall that in his speech of February 9 to the House of Commons reporting on his peace and security discussions, Prime Minister Trudeau inter alia suggested "ten principles of a common bond between East and West". For ease of reference, I attach a copy of Mr. Trudeau's speech (the principles can be found listed on page 6).

In order to pursue consideration of these principles, Mr. Trudeau has recently written to President Reagan and Chairman Chernenko, along with the other leaders of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries, as well as of Japan and the PRC. You may be interested to know that, in discussing the letter with our ambassador in Moscow, Foreign Minister Gromyko expressed the view that there was a "tonal harmony" between Mr. Trudeau's ten principles and the "norms of conduct" for nuclear powers of which Mr. Chernenko spoke in his March 2 election speech.

I would of course be happy to pick up the threads with you on your return from the Middle East.

Yours sincerely,

P.D. Lee, Minister and
Deputy Permanent Representative.

Mr. Brian E. Urquhart,
Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs,
Offices of the Secretary-General,
Room S-3853A,
UNITED NATIONS.

FIVE POWER CONSULTATIONS IN THE UN FRAMEWORK

- The Five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council share special rights and responsibilities under the Charter;
- They also share special responsibilities arising from their declared nuclear weapons power status;
- Despite differences, they have certain interests in common;
- These responsibilities and interests can be said to relate, inter alia, particularly to:
 - the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter,
 - the management of their nuclear forces in such a way as to avoid accidents and instability;
 - nuclear non-proliferation;
- Accordingly, the five powers could usefully hold informal discussions on the management of these responsibilities and interests;

... 2

- A neutral, discreet and serious setting could be provided by the Secretary General who could initiate such contacts through the Permanent Representatives of the five powers to the United Nations,
- Consideration would be required of the elements to be discussed in such talks. Possibly in initial phases the talks might focus on those issues where the greatest commonality of interests might exist;
- Elements for possible consideration in successive phases might include: nuclear confidence building measures, measures to strengthen the NPT regime, crisis management, issues concerning new destabilizing technologies, questions related to limiting nuclear forces.



MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

28-6-1-TRUDEAU

2 JUN 84 00 12 302 9

10

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

R E S T R I C T E D

FM/DE
TO/À
INFO
DISTR
REF
SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDA0827 ~~21 MAY 84~~ 01JUN84

TO PARIS ROME BRU BUCST **(DELIVER BY 040900)**

INFO PC00TT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RGB RBD RBR RSD RSR IDAO IDR

REF OURTEL IDA0787 28MAY TO MOSCOW

---PM INITIATIVE: LETTERS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES

COPIED BELOW IS TEXT OF A LETTER DATED **MAY 31** FROM PM TRUDEAU TO
YOUR RESPECTIVE HEADS OF GOVT,

DEALING WITH 10 PRINCIPLES THAT PM BELIEVES COULD FORM COMMON GROUND
AND BASIS ON WHICH BOTH EAST AND WEST COULD BUILD IN CURRENT SITUA-
TION. PRINCIPLES WERE FIRST OUTLINED BY PM IN HIS SPEECH TO HOUSE
OF COMMONS 09FEB84.

2. PLEASE ENSURE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TRANSMISSION OF LET AT HIGHEST
POSSIBLE LEVEL.

3. SIMILAR LETS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SENT TO USSR AND USA, OTHER NATO
AND WPO COUNTRIES, JAPAN, CHINA AND YUGOSLAVIA, AS WELL AS HOGS
PM MET AT CHOGM IN DELHI LAST NOVEMBER.

4. ORIGINAL OF LETTERS TO FOLLOW BY BAG.

5. TEXT OF LETTER FOLLOWS: (Comcentre please copy attached letter and list)

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG GARY J. SMITH/pec

IDA

5-6689

SIG GARY J. SMITH

TEXT BEGINS

Ces derniers mois, j'ai rencontré plusieurs dirigeants de pays de l'Est et de l'Ouest, dont les présidents Reagan et Tchernenko, afin d'échanger des vues avec eux sur la situation actuelle en matière de sécurité internationale et le piètre état des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

Je me rappelle en particulier l'entretien fort utile que nous avons eu (voir la liste ci-jointe pour site/date). Nous avons alors discuté plusieurs idées et propositions destinées à réduire les tensions internationales et à stabiliser et consolider la base des rapports entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

En repensant à ces diverses consultations, je suis de plus en plus convaincu qu'en dépit de difficultés persistantes et de la regrettable absence de progrès au chapitre de la réduction des armements, il subsiste un terrain d'entente étendu et discernable entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Des déclarations faites récemment par des dirigeants des deux blocs m'incitent à croire que l'on est d'accord dans une large mesure sur les principes de base devant régir les relations internationales et, plus particulièrement, notre façon d'aborder la plus grave menace planant sur l'humanité, soit la possibilité d'une guerre nucléaire.

Sans faire abstraction de nos différences, nous devons, je pense, nous appliquer à explorer les terrains d'entente et intérêts communs aux deux camps et chercher à en tirer parti. Les dix points suivants, énoncés dans un discours que j'ai prononcé à la Chambre des communes du Canada au début de cette année, pourraient fournir une base utile dans ce sens :

- 2 -

- De part et d'autre on reconnaît l'impossibilité de sortir vainqueur d'une guerre nucléaire.
- De part et d'autre on convient qu'il faut absolument éviter la guerre nucléaire.
- De part et d'autre on souhaite être libéré du risque de guerre accidentelle ou d'attaque par surprise.
- De part et d'autre on reconnaît les dangers inhérents aux armes déstabilisatrices.
- De part et d'autre on comprend le besoin d'améliorer les techniques de gestion des crises.
- De part et d'autre on est conscient des terribles conséquences qu'entraînerait le fait d'être le premier à recourir à la force contre l'autre camp.
- De part et d'autre on a intérêt à accroître la sécurité en en réduisant le coût.
- De part et d'autre on a intérêt à éviter la propagation des armes nucléaires dans d'autres pays, communément appelée prolifération horizontale.
- De part et d'autre on en est arrivé à reconnaître prudemment les intérêts légitimes de l'autre camp en matière de sécurité.
- De part et d'autre on a conscience que les stratégies de sécurité ne sauraient être fondées sur l'hypothèse d'un effondrement politique ou économique dans l'autre camp.


Si les dirigeants de l'Est et de l'Ouest et, en particulier, les superpuissances donnaient publiquement leur adhésion à ces idées, cela aiderait largement, à mon sens, à créer l'atmosphère et le cadre politique de base si essentiels à des négociations productives touchant les armes nucléaires comme classiques. J'ai donc tenu à vous écrire, de même qu'à d'autres dirigeants, pour livrer ces idées à votre réflexion et vous inviter à y souscrire.

- 3 -

Vous espérez comme moi, je le sais, que les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest s'amélioreront bientôt sensiblement, de manière à favoriser l'avancement du long travail destiné à libérer l'humanité de la menace de guerre nucléaire.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Premier ministre, l'assurance de ma très haute considération *et*

de mon très cordialement.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Daniel S. F.", is written over a horizontal line.

PARAGRAPH ONE - VENUE/DATE

Président Mitterand - a Paris, en novembre dernier

PM Craxi - a Rome, en novembre dernier

PM Martens - a Bruxelles, en novembre dernier

President Ceaucescu - a Bucarest, en fevrier dernier

TEXT ENDS



MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

R E S T R I C T E D

File/Dossier

28-6-1-TRUDEAU

2 Jun 84 00 12 29 4

10

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDA0829 ~~31MAY84~~ 01JUN84

TO/À

TO OSLO (FOR ICELAND) LSBON ANKRA BGRAD (FOR SOFIA) WSAW BPEST ~~BRUXELLES LUXEMBOURG BGRAD~~

INFO

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

DISTR

REF

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RGB RBD RBR RSD RSR IDAO IDR

SUBJ/SUJ

REF OURTEL IDA0787 28MAY TO MOSCOW

---PM INITIATIVE: LETTERS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES

COPIED BELOW IS TEXT OF A LETTER DATED 31MAY FROM PM TRUDEAU TO

YOUR RESPECTIVE HEADS OF GOVT: HERMANSSON/ICELAND, SOARES, EVREN, ZHIVKOV/SOFIA,
JARUZELSKI, KADAR, WERNER/LUXEMBOURG AND DJURANOVIC,

DEALING WITH 10 PRINCIPLES THAT PM BELIEVES COULD FORM COMMON GROUND
AND BASIS ON WHICH BOTH EAST AND WEST COULD BUILD IN CURRENT SITUA-
TION. PRINCIPLES WERE FIRST OUTLINED BY PM IN HIS SPEECH TO HOUSE
OF COMMONS 09FEB84.

2. PLEASE ENSURE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TRANSMISSION OF LET AT HIGHEST
POSSIBLE LEVEL.

3. SIMILAR LETS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SENT TO USSR AND USA, OTHER NATO
AND WPO COUNTRIES, JAPAN, CHINA AND YUGOSLAVIA, AS WELL AS HOGS PM
MET AT CHOGM IN DELHI LAST NOVEMBER.

4. ORIGINAL OF LETTERS TO FOLLOW BY BAG.

5. TEXT OF LETTER FOLLOWS: (Comcentre please copy attached letter)

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG GARY J. SMITH/pec

IDA

5-6689

SIG GARY J. SMITH

TEXT BEGINS

~~My dear Prime Minister,~~

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

— Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

- 2 -

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely,

TEXT ENDS

U N C L A S S I F I E D

F A C S I M I L E T R A N S M I S S I O N

01-2000 1/12

NYK

003/01

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

NUMBER

501

DATE- 1 JUNE 1984

PAGES 12

FROM: PERMANENT MISSION NEW YORK

TO: ~~EXTOTT/IDD~~ ~~IMD~~ ~~IMU~~ ~~EDD~~ ~~EEA~~ PCOOTT/FOWLER

INFO:

DISTR:

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: INTER ACTION COUNCIL: MAY 24-26

NOTE: MR. BRAD MORSE HAS ASKED THAT THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT
BE FORWARDED TO THOSE OFFICIALS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PRIME
MINISTER AND HIS PEACE INITIATIVE. A TWO PAGE SUMMARY WILL
FOLLOW ON JUNE 4.

M. Kneubühler
RELEASING OFFICER

S. CARLSON

ORIGINAL

☐ Registry
☒ Diary RETURN TO SC
☐ Destroy
☐ Doc Centre
☐ Circulation File



**INTERACTION
COUNCIL**

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

2.
4/12

FINAL STATEMENT

adopted at the second session

BRIONI

24-26 May 1984

1. The InterAction Council held its second session on the island of Brioni in Yugoslavia from 24-26 May 1984. The Council, chaired by Dr. Kurt Waldheim, former Secretary-General of the United Nations, is comprised of 26 highly respected members who have held the highest offices as Heads of Government in their respective countries. They have agreed to pool their experience, in their individual capacities to promote action on priority issues affecting world peace and development. The participants at the Brioni meeting were as follows:

Kurt Waldheim, Secretary-General of the United Nations
1971-1981, Chairman

Takeo Fukuda, Prime Minister of Japan, 1976-1978,
Honorary Chairman

Ahmadou Ahidjo, President of the United Republic of
Cameroon, 1960-1982

Kirti Nidhi Bista, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Nepal,
1969-1970, 1971-1973 and 1977-1979

Kriangsak Chomanan, Prime Minister of Thailand, 1977-1980

Mathias Mainza Chona, Prime Minister of the Republic of Zambia,
1973-1975 and 1977-1978

Jenoe Fock, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Hungarian People's Republic, 1967-1975

Malcolm Fraser, Prime Minister of Australia, 1975-1983

Arturo Frondizi, President of Argentina, 1958-1962

Kurt Furgler, President of the Swiss Confederation, 1977 and 1981

Manea Manescu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Socialist
Republic of Romania, 1974-1979

Olusegun Obasanjo, Head of the Federal Military
Government of Nigeria, 1976-1979

Ahmed Osman, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Morocco,
1972-1979

Misael Pastrana Borrero, President of Colombia,
1970-1974

Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, Prime Minister of
Portugal, 1979-1980

Mitja Ribičič, President, Federal Executive Council of
the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, 1969-1971

Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of
Germany, 1974-1982

Ola Ullsten, Prime Minister of Sweden, 1978-1979

Bradford Morse, Secretary-General of the InterAction
Council

2. Some members of the Council who could not be present at the session addressed messages to the participants in Brioni. Such messages were received from Mr. Giulio Andreotti, former Prime Minister of Italy, Mr. Jacques Chaban-Delmas, former Prime Minister of France, Mr. Selim Hoss, former Prime Minister of Lebanon, Hedi Nouira, former Prime Minister of Tunisia, and Mr. Carlos Andres Perez, former President of Venezuela.

3. Two members of the Policy Board of InterAction participated in the session: Sardar Swaran Singh of India and Mamoudou Toure of Senegal. Further, the session was attended by several special guests: Arthur Dunkel, Director-General of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Diego Arria representing former President Carlos Andres Perez, Harald Malmgren and Henri Arphang Senghor representing former President Leopold Sedar Senghor.

4. Mr. Veselin Djuranović, President of the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia honoured the InterAction Council by his presence at the opening meeting at which he delivered an important statement. The participants in the session were also received by Mr. Raif Dizdarević, Foreign Minister of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

5. At its session the InterAction Council reiterated its concern, expressed at its first session in Vienna in November 1983, that world peace was being threatened on two fronts, the politico-military and the economic. The Council reaffirmed to continue to attach high priority to three central issues:

4/12

- (a) the promotion of peace and disarmament;
- (b) the revitalization of the world economy, in particular by way of lower interest rates and dealing with the problems of external debt;
- (c) the strengthening of cooperation for development.

6. Mr. Helmut Schmidt, former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, presented to the Council a report of a group of financial experts (*) which had met under his chairmanship in Wolfsberg, Switzerland on 5th and 6th May 1984 to explore possibilities for realistic action in the critical areas of money, finance and debt which could be promoted by the InterAction Council within the framework of the Council's Final Statement of Vienna.

7. In addition, the Council had before it concrete proposals for action relating to trade and protectionism and to new approaches to intensify assistance to developing and especially least developed countries, together with a report by the Chairman on consultations carried out by him with high-level representatives of the major Powers in regard to the issues of peace, security and disarmament.

8. At the conclusion of the session, the InterAction Council adopted the following

FINAL STATEMENT

9. The InterAction Council is gravely concerned about a number of world issues affecting world peace and development. This concern, already expressed at its first session in Vienna in November 1983 has been deepened by the events and trends of the past six months.

10. A vacuum has emerged at the international level with a virtual absence of meaningful contacts between two superpowers, increasing the danger of nuclear confrontation with unimaginable destructive consequences. An escalating arms race and conflicts among developing countries drain large amounts of resources urgently required for development. A vacuum has also developed in relations between developing and developed countries, endangering the prospects for prosperity and development.

11. The stability of worldwide monetary and financial arrangements is now in question, particularly in view of the heavy debt burden of developing countries which is exacerbated by high deficits in industrial countries, leading to high interest rates. At the same time trade arrangements are increasingly afflicted by protectionism. This situation is, in the Council's view, unsustainable. Decisive and imaginative leadership is required from the Governments of all countries, from international groups and organizations, from the private sector and from individuals. All must recognise that they must accept some measure of sacrifice to achieve constructive solutions which are indeed feasible and which will be in the vital interests of all.

(*) In addition to Mr. Schmidt, the following experts participated: Aldo Ferrer (Argentina), Milton W. Hudson (USA), Fritz Leutwiler (Switzerland), Michiya Matsukawa (Japan), Axiul Aziz al-Quraishi (Saudi Arabia), I.G. Patel (India), Mamoudou Toure (Senegal) and John Williamson (United Kingdom).

5/12

-4-

12. A special effort is required, based on international solidarity and common human interest, to increase the assistance provided to the least developed countries. These countries, already underdeveloped, have suffered acutely from the turmoil of the international economic system, and now are facing natural disasters as well.

13. The Council reaffirmed its conviction that the United Nations Organization should play an intricately important role in the examination and solution of the major issues confronting humanity - peace, disarmament and world development.

14. Current problems of peace and development cannot be solved simply by ad hoc measures in response to crises as they emerge. Restoration of world prosperity on a sustainable basis will require responsible and concerted action by all: North and South, market and socialist economies, oil-exporting and oil-importing countries, debtor and creditor countries, least-developed and other developing countries, governments, international organizations and private sectors, banks in particular.

15. A number of important principles must be respected:

- economic policies should be guided not just by short-term concerns but also by their long-term consequences;
- the institutions of international economic, financial and monetary co-operation should be reinforced and sustained, and adapted to present and future needs of the world economy and development;
- the economic waste involved in current global levels of military expenditure which is a significant causal factor in the economic difficulties confronted by the world community must be diminished;
- human resource development - improving the skills and management abilities of developing countries - is a prerequisite for economic and social progress and should be accelerated;
- the ominous long-term economic implications posed by the depletion of natural resources and by ecological deterioration should be given serious attention; and
- the ultimate aims of economic activity should be an enhancement of welfare and the respect of human rights and of cultural values, in order to benefit the individual.

II.

Debt crisis and debt management

16. The debt problem was jointly created by the actions of all parties. It is therefore the joint responsibility of all to seek solutions. The world must not repeat the disasters that flowed from the demands for unrealistic resource transfers in connection with reparations and interallied war debt during the

501

6/12

- 5 -

interwar years. Co-operation among central banks and the skillful responses of the Bank for International Settlements and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have succeeded in containing thus far the debt crisis. Given the gravity of the economic situation of developing countries and of a number of commercial banks in the developed countries, it is clear that special emphasis needs to be given to proposals for practical action to manage development and debt problems rather than to react to them. There is now an urgent need for a comprehensive solution to the debt-creditor problem. This statement spells out some of the principles that should apply in working for such a solution. This task is of paramount importance if a major international crisis is to be averted.

17. Debtor countries should pursue realistic adjustment programmes agreed in good time with the IMF, as they pursue development programmes with the World Bank. Such programmes need to combine a sustained improvement in the balance of payments with a resumption of economic growth and development. At present, the essential, even if unpopular, role of the IMF is that of negotiating adjustment programmes with countries confronting balance of payment or debt-servicing problems. There must be conditionality, otherwise fresh credits will not flow. This conditionality must take into account the interests of debtors and creditors alike and the social and political situations of the countries concerned. The conditions applied in the future should not so seriously affect the economic, social and political fabric of the country, the living conditions of its people, or the availability of critical development inputs, that they call in question the possibility of a resumption of growth and continuing economic and social progress.

18. Countries should create favourable conditions for the return of flight capital, which has reached substantial dimensions in a number of countries in recent years and which contributes significantly to the debt problem. Likewise they should try to attract more direct private investment. This above all, entails realistic exchange rate policies, the avoidance of artificialities in domestic pricing and the removal of bureaucratic restrictions on foreign investment, which must, however, reflect the concerns and interests of both the investors and the recipient countries.

19. Given the economic situation faced by debtor countries, an element of austerity is inevitable in effective adjustment programmes but austerity should not be pushed beyond the level essential for successful medium-term adjustment. Adjustment programmes should encourage the transformation of productive structures, stabilisation and increased capital formation, so that countries can adapt to the changing conditions of the world economy.

20. On the other hand it is politically intolerable that as a result of fluctuations in interest and exchange rates, debtor countries can not predict the maximum debt service payments that they will have to make in dollars for the year ahead. This uncertainty has a devastating effect on national planning and development. Measures to increase predictability are needed to provide some degree of protection against such fluctuating rates.

21. The contribution of the commercial banks should be to provide fresh money and interest relief in instances where a debtor country is making a good-faith

commitment to adhere to an IMF programme, and to devise mechanisms that will cap the debt service payments that countries have to transfer. Measures will need to be tailored to meet the situation of individual debtor countries while taking into account the concerns of the creditors. To contain annual debt repayments where they become excessive such measures may include:

- the restriction of annual debt service payments of a debtor country to an agreed maximum,
- the consolidation of short-term debts to medium-term fixed interest bonds,
- multi-year rescheduling instead of the current shortest term practice,
- capitalization of interest, and
- additional special measures, as may be required, for developing countries on a case by case basis.

22. The least developed countries, in comparison with other groups of countries, have been forced into excessively harsh adjustment measures, partly in response to change in their terms of trade, as a result of declining prices for their primary products coupled with dramatic increase in oil prices. The scale of indebtedness of these countries in world terms is not substantial and particular measures should therefore be taken to bring the terms of debt repayment for these countries into line with their longer term capacity to pay, while upholding the basic principle that obligations should be honoured.

23. The governments of creditor countries should support the establishment of the mechanisms indicated in paragraph 21 and apply their principles. They should also provide comparable fresh financial resources and interest relief through various mechanisms such as the Paris Club. They should take account of the vital interests of debtor countries in particular, in a lowering of world interest rates and in trade expansion when they formulate their macro-economic policies. Stability and confidence would be greatly enhanced if OPEC and other governments and central banks would agree to consolidate a larger part of their deposits into medium term bonds.

24. The international financial institutions must be furnished with a level of financial resources commensurate to their tasks. Banking legislation should be harmonized, particularly with regard to reserve requirements among the major creditor countries. Governments of creditor countries must also anticipate lower tax revenues due to the losses of commercial banks.

25. It is important to work towards international understanding on a coherent set of measures along the lines set out above, constituting in effect, a General Agreement to Lend.

III.

Development

26. Policies to promote the development of developing countries should take into account the economic situations and objectives of individual countries and strive for appropriate conditions for intensive international co-operation for development. There are no easy, general solutions: progress can only be made step by step.

8/12

- 7 -

27. While the debt crisis is the main cause of the recent setback to development in the middle income countries, the deterioration of the terms of trade has also been critical, particularly to many low income countries. Natural disasters and catastrophic climatological conditions have further aggravated the desperate situation of many developing countries. The continuing excessive population growth in many areas implies that per capita income has been falling in many places. A resumption of development will again demand contributions from all the parties involved: from the developing countries themselves, whose own efforts contribute most, from the western developed countries, and from the centrally planned economies.

28. Developed countries, of both East and West, have a singular responsibility to increase trade and aid and to encourage the transfer of technology which is essential to modernisation and adjustment, and thus to exports and the servicing of debt. Recent measures that have curtailed the magnitude of contributions by multilateral organizations to the cause of development are misguided and run counter to the very interests of developed countries. The IDA replenishment should be concluded rapidly and at the level proposed by the World Bank management. This should be done, whether or not all countries are prepared to contribute their previously agreed shares.

29. Initiatives by the management of the World Bank Group to strengthen and enlarge its operations should be strongly supported. In particular, there should be a substantial increase in World Bank capital. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), as the central agency for multilateral technical assistance, must have significantly increased support in view of its critical role in assisting developing countries in heightening human skills which is the foundation of effective and sustainable economic development.

30. The developing countries at all levels of development have the principal responsibility for their own development. The experience of a number of East Asian countries has demonstrated the beneficial effects of policies emphasizing human resource development, population planning, exploitation of the possibilities offered by international trade, and encouraging direct private investment, which is the most efficient way of transferring technology, compatible with the objectives, values and conditions of each country. In addition, developing countries stand to gain substantial dividends from helping each other in a more systematic way, through regional co-operation, and economic and technical co-operation among themselves.

31. The particular problems of the least developed countries require urgent and sustained attention through intensified assistance from the wider world community. There is an urgent need for a rapid increase in concessional assistance to these countries, together with measures in the field of trade and technical co-operation to increase their earnings and strengthen their domestic capabilities.

32. In order to promote a dramatic increase in resources for the deprived peoples of these countries, the InterAction Council intends to mobilise a major publicity campaign, with the support of the advertising industry and the media so as to mobilise public opinion throughout the world, together with private sector organizations, in particular, corporations and banks.

IV.

Trade and Protectionism

33. The resolution of the debt crisis, and restoration of sustained global economic growth depend directly upon the trade policies of governments. A large and growing share of world trade, already more than half of all trade, is restricted by protectionist measures or distorted by subsidies. The trend towards protectionism and deterioration of trade relations among nations must be arrested and reversed.

34. Towards this end, determined efforts must be made to restore the effectiveness of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and to bring governments back under the multilateral discipline of mutual rights and obligations embodied in the GATT.

35. As a first step, efforts should be intensified to implement already agreed obligations to pursue the work programme of GATT. A new round of trade negotiations could be initiated with the aim of liberalizing world markets, arresting the spread of economic nationalism and protectionism. Such a new round could contribute to restoring confidence in the multilateral approach to the management of trade relations. Until the time, however, that its results can come into effect, other actions with greater immediacy are also needed.

36. As an additional step, the major trading nations should commit themselves to bring all of their import restrictive actions, both formal and informal, into the GATT framework for multilateral scrutiny. They should refrain from any new safeguards or restrictive actions outside the rules of GATT, arresting the present erosion in international discipline and the rule of law, and opening the way for a mutually agreed process of rolling back present restrictions.

37. Developed countries should reduce tariff and non-tariff trade-restrictions, particularly on exports from developing countries, and should do so on a non-discriminatory basis. In addition, they should reduce overproduction in certain sectors, such as agriculture, textiles and steel, and refrain from engaging in barter trade. To counter the disruptions in export earnings that periodically occur for those countries dependent on one or few commodity exports, international schemes such as a widened STABEX type arrangement should be developed.

38. If there is significant resistance by some governments to such liberalisation, then an effort could be made, among those countries willing to do so, to explore the outlines of a more co-operative and liberal trading relationship based on agreement among them on a code of liberalisation. Such a code would include commitments that members would not increase protection against other members, that they would eliminate illegal forms of protection, and that they would seek to liberalise all existing restrictions. Such a code would be open to the accession of other states in due course.

10/12

39. Consideration could also be given to the negotiation of regional or more broadly based free trade arrangements to reduce gradually the inhibiting effects of protectionism to open the way for trade expansion among them.

V.

Co-ordination of Policy and Institutions

40. The beneficial effects, especially to developed countries, of the recent US economic recovery, are fully recognized, particularly in terms of increased exports to the US by other countries and the resulting export-led growth. Such recovery has, however, severe disadvantages and is in any event unsustainable in the longer run. Extremely high real interest rates magnify the debt problem and restrain productive investment and thereby employment around the world. They induce a large net capital inflow to the largest national economy in the world, which is not tolerable on the present scale over extended periods.

41. There is an ever present danger that a loss of confidence in the dollar will precipitate a depreciation that would oblige the Federal Reserve Board to raise interest rates further, risking renewed deep depression. Prompt action to reduce the US budget deficit substantially is therefore imperative for sustainable revitalization of the world economy.

42. Present mechanisms for effective coordination of the economic policies of the major industrialized countries, including summit meetings have recently proved ineffective. Clearly, there is an urgent need to achieve more reliable and responsive inter-governmental co-ordination of economic policies. To help accomplish this goal, the InterAction Council will seek to convey to present government leaders the merits and urgency of such systematic coordination and especially the prompt adoption of responsible fiscal policies by all major powers.

43. International cooperation is also frustrated by institutional rigidities. For example, while there is an intimate interaction between the world trade and financial problems, there is little serious effort to deal with the totality of the present crisis in a comprehensive manner.

44. The fundamental split in economic powers and responsibilities in capitals is reflected in the differences among the multilateral economic institutions. The IMF is focused almost entirely on short-term financial and macro-economic difficulties; the multilateral development banks are primarily concerned with supporting new projects for agriculture, industry, or social and economic infrastructure; the GATT has concentrated its energies on sector-by-sector trade disputes, and on periodic renewal of world-scale efforts to liberalize movements of goods, without regard to capital flows and exchange rates.

45. It is essential to improve cooperation among the major multilateral economic institutions and within the Development Committee of the World Bank. Also, co-operation between GATT and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) should be intensified. The InterAction Council intends to promote support for such co-operation.

- 10 -

VI.

International monetary reform

46. Present monetary arrangements, embodying as they do volatile relationships, have not proved generally satisfactory. Discussions of reform are in progress in many fora and no one at present has an overview of the thrust of all these discussions. There is as yet, no sign of the emergence of a new consensus among the major economic powers. The InterAction Council will continue to work for a consensus on monetary reform.

47. The InterAction Council, while continuing to review these issues further, at this stage stresses the following particular issues in the field of monetary reform:

- The need for greater stability between the dollar, ECU and yen, without a freezing of their exchange rates. This must, however, not be achieved at the cost of unsatisfactory domestic performance in the countries involved;
- The need for an annual allocation of a limited quantity of SDRs for several years;
- The need to provide for a future increase in IMF resources which might be achieved by arrangements for increased borrowing from governments, so as to allow the financing of medium-term adjustment programmes.

48. Finally, the InterAction Council is fully aware of the importance attached by many concerned parties to the convening of an international conference of monetary, financial and debt issues. It recognizes, as stated above, the need for both immediate measures in response to the present crisis, and for fundamental measures to re-establish the world systems of money and finance on a sound basis, sustainable over the long term. Short-term and long-term measures must, of course, be mutually reinforcing.

49. The Council stresses the clear need for continuing study of all the issues so as to clarify the possibilities for constructive changes and for international agreement on interim and longer term measures. The Council intends to review this matter thoroughly at its third session. In the long run, a greater degree of stability of exchange rates and much greater discipline of governments in orienting their monetary and fiscal policies in relation to their balance of payment situation is clearly indispensable.

- 11 -

VII

Peace, Security and Disarmament

50. The complete breakdown of contacts at the top level between the United States and the Soviet Union has led to a dangerous deterioration in the relationship between the two superpowers, aggravating global instability and diminishing the capacity of either country to play a constructive role in regional conflicts.

51. The Council urges the leaders of both countries to re-establish a personal dialogue at the earliest possible date and invites the leaders of other concerned countries to lend their weight to achieve this goal. Even if no other result is achieved other than that the leaders of the two superpowers will be getting to know each other, a summit of this kind would serve an important purpose. Communications must be maintained among all governments, regardless of political ideology. The Council believes that proposals to reduce tensions should not be made public before they have been presented to a negotiating partner as this will very likely result in a negative response.

52. An increasing number of developing countries are now diverted by conflict from the essential task of advancing their development. Every effort must therefore be made to avoid an extension of the East-West confrontation to the developing world. Regional efforts towards peace should be encouraged and strengthened, such as those by the Contadora Group in Central America and ASEAN in South-East Asia. The Council expresses its strong support for such efforts, which will not only promote peace and development, but also enhance democratic structures in the countries concerned.

External Affairs Canada Affaires extérieures Canada

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
28-6-1-TRUDEAU	
28-6-1-TRUDEAU	
2 JUN 84	00 33 12 9
12	10

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ **R E S T R I C T E D**

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDA0833 01JUN84

TO/À TO ATHNS **DELIVER BY 040900 T**

INFO INFO PC00TT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

REF DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RSD RSR **IDR IDAO**

SUBJ/SUJ REF OURTEL IDA08787 28 MAY TO MOSCOW

---PM INITIATIVE: LETTERS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES

COPIED BELOW IS TEXT OF LETTER DATED 31MAY84 FROM PM TRUDEAU TO

PM PAPANDREOU DEALING WITH 10 PRINCIPLES THAT PM BELIEVES COULD FORM
COMMON GROUND AND BASIS ON WHICH BOTH EAST AND WEST COULD BUILD IN
CURRENT SITUATION. PRINCIPLES WERE FIRST OUTLINED BY PM IN HIS SPEECH

TO HOUSE OF COMMONS 09FEB84. **LET ALSO INCLUDES REF TO SIX NATION
PEACE INITIATIVE IN WHICH PAPANDREOU WAS INVOLVED.**

2. PLEASE ENSURE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TRANSMISSION OF LET AT HIGHEST
POSSIBLE LEVEL.

3. SIMILAR LETS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SENT TO USSR AND USA, OTHER NATO
AND WPO COUNTRIES, JAPAN, CHINA, YUGOSLAVIA, AS WELL AS HOGS PM MET
AT CHOGM IN DELHI LAST NOVEMBER.

4. ORIGINAL OF LETTER. TO FOLLOW BY BAG.

5. TEXT OF LETTER FOLLOWS: (Comcentre please copy attached).

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG GARY J. SMITH/pec

IDA

5-6689

SIG GARY J. SMITH

TEXT BEGINS

~~... FACILITY,~~
DEAR ANDREAS

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

- 2 -

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

Your recent statement in concert with five other world leaders is witness to your personal interest and your willingness to act in this most important matter. I fully support your aims in this regard, and I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely,

TEXT ENDS



MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

28-6-1-TRUDEAU

2 JUN 84 00 9282

12

10

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ **[R E S T R I C T E D]**

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDA0823 01JUN84

TO/À

TO HAGUE BONN TOKYO WSAW/ (FOR GDR) PRAGUE LDN PEKIN CNBRA WLGTN

INFO

DISTR

SPORE LUSAKA **(DELIVER BY 040900)**

REF

INFO PC00TT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL

SUBJ/SUJ

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD RCD RCR RCM RGB RBD RBR RSD RSR PPD PPR

PER PED PSD PSR **RGB** IDAO IDR

REF OURTEL IDA0787 28MAY TO MOSCOW ~~SECRET~~

---PM INITIATIVE: LETTERS TO HEADS OF GOVT ON TEN PRINCIPLES

COPIED BELOW IS TEXT OF LETTER DATED 31MAY84 FROM PM TRUDEAU TO

YOUR RESPECTIVE HEADS OF GOVT, DEALING WITH 10 PRINCIPLES THAT PM

BELIEVES COULD FORM COMMON GROUND AND BASIS ON WHICH BOTH EAST AND

WEST COULD BUILD IN CURRENT SITUATION. PRINCIPLES WERE FIRST OUT-

LINED BY PM IN HIS SPEECH TO HOUSE OF COMMONS 09FEB84.

2. PLEASE ENSURE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TRANSMISSION OF LET AT HIGHEST

POSSIBLE **LEVEL.**

3. SIMILAR LETS HAVE ALREADY BEEN SENT TO USSR AND USA, OTHER NATO

AND WPO COUNTRIES, JAPAN, CHINA, YUGOSLAVIA, **AS WELL AS** HOGS PM MET AT CHOGM

IN DELHI LAST NOVEMBER .

4. ORIGINAL OF LETTERS TO FOLLOW BY BAG.

5. FOR WSAW: PLEASE NOTE **ORIGINAL** LETTER TO HONECKER WAS PASSED BY DPM/SSEA

TO FM FISCHER IN OTT TODAY.

6. TEXT OF LETTER FOLLOWS: (Comcentre please copy attached letter and list)

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG GARY J. SMITH/pec

IDA

5-6689

SIG GARY J. SMITH

TEXT BEGINS

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations. I recall, in particular, the most valuable conversation(s) we had in (see following list for venue/date) during which we discussed several ideas and proposals aimed at reducing international tension and restoring the vital East-West relationship to a more stable and constructive basis.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

- 2 -

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely, /

PARAGRAPH ONE - VENUE/DATE

PM Lubbers - The Hague last November
Chancellor Kohl - Bonn last November
PM Nakasone - Tokyo last November
Chairman Honecker - last January (no venue)
PM Strougal - Prague last January
PM Thatcher - London last November and again in Delhi
during the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting
Premier Ziyang - Peking and in Canada
PM Hawke - New Delhi and Goa at the Commonwealth Heads of
Government meeting
PM Muldoon - New Delhi and Goa at the Commonwealth Heads of
Government meeting
PM Yew - New Delhi and Goa at the Commonwealth Heads of
Government meeting
President Kuanda - New Delhi and Goa at the Commonwealth Heads of
Government meeting

TEXT ENDS



MESSAGE

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

28-6-1-TRUDEAU

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUN 84 22 12 51Z

10

FM/DE
TO/À
INFO
DISTR
REF
SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDA0819 01JUN84

TO PRMNY ~~DELIVER BY 011600~~ **IMMED**

~~DISTR~~ DISTR IDA IDR IMU IMD DMF IFB RBR

REF YOURTEL WKGR1107 31MAY, SMITH/LEE TELECON 01JUN

---PM INITIATIVE: CONSULTATION WITH UNDER SECGEN

TO CONFIRM REF TELECON, YOU SHOULD PASS TO URQUHART ASAP COPY OF
EXCELLENT NON-PAPER YOU HAVE PREPARED (PARA 4 REFTEL) TO WHICH WE
HAVE NO/NO ADDITIONS TO MAKE.

2. BEARING IN MIND SECGEN WILL BE VISITING CHERNENKO IN JULY YOU
SHOULD ADD FOLLOWING ~~POINT~~ TO YOUR PERSONAL NOTE TO URQUHART:

~~NOTE~~ (A) COPY OF PM TRUDEAU TEN PRINCIPLES; (B) REF TO FACT THAT
PM IN PAST FEW DAYS HAS WRITTEN TO CHERNENKO AND REAGAN AS WELL AS
ALL NATO AND WPO COUNTRIES, CHINA AND JAPAN, DRAWING TEN PRINCIPLES
TO THEIR ATTENTION AND (C) NOTING SOVIET INTEREST IN TEN PRINCIPLES
AND FACT ~~THEY~~ ^Y HAVE MENTIONED THAT CERTAIN SIMILARITY EXISTS BETWEEN
PRINCIPLES AND QUOTE NORMS OF CONDUCT OF NUCLEAR STATES UNQUOTE
THAT CHERNENKO REFERRED TO IN HIS 02MAR QUOTE ELECTION UNQUOTE
SPEECH.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

GARY J. SMITH/pec

IDA

5-6689

SIG

GARY J. SMITH



CANADA

PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 31, 1984

ACC	REF	DATE
335502		84061
FILE	BOSSIER	
28-6-1- Trudeau		
Peace Mission		

Dear Helmut,

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations. I recall, in particular, the most valuable conversation we had in Bonn last November during which we discussed several ideas and proposals aimed at reducing international tension and restoring the vital East-West relationship to a more stable and constructive basis.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

Herr Helmut Kohl
Chancellor
Federal Republic of Germany
Bonn, Germany

- 2 -

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely, *personal regards.*

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Zim' or similar, written in a cursive style.