

50209-40

[Pt. 2.2]

**FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE  
SEE NEXT PART OF FILE**

INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL

COPY NO. 1... OF 31 COPIES.

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES.  
 TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

*File*  
*cm*

*DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET*

Security Classification	
TOP SECRET	
File No.	
50209-40	
57	50

Priority IMPORTANT	System CRYPTER-AUTO	No. WA-2346	Date October 15, 1953.
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Departmental Circulation  
 MINISTER<sup>2</sup>  
 UNDER/SEC<sup>3</sup>  
 D/UNDER/SEC<sup>4</sup>  
 A/UNDER/SEC'S<sup>5</sup>  
 POL/CO-ORD<sup>6</sup>  
 SECTION  
 U. N. DIV. 7  
 DUN--COMM'S SECTION  
*Registry*  
*OCT 14 1953*

done \_\_\_\_\_  
 date \_\_\_\_\_

References  
*Min. of Nat Def*  
*GCOS (2 copies)*  
*Sec. Cab.*  
*Prime Minister*  
*145*  
*Amirault*  
*DL (2)*  
*WAB*

Reference: My WA-2330 of October 14, 1953.

Subject: Continental Defence - Meeting of Consultation in Washington.

We were informed today that the meeting, subject to your concurrence, has been fixed for next Thursday, October 22, at 3:00 p.m. in the State Department.

2. The Under-Secretary of State himself has now decided to be Chairman of the meeting. This, I gather, reflects the importance which the United States Government attaches to this consultation with us. The United States side will be represented by the following:

Under-Secretary Walter Bedell Smith,  
 Admiral Radford, Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff,  
 Deputy Under-Secretary Robert Murphy (Freeman Matthews will probably not attend),  
 Robert Bowie, Director of the Policy Planning Staff,  
 Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Livingston Merchant,  
 Gordon Arneson, and  
 Hayden Baynor.

3. As indicated in my message under reference; the thoughts of the United States side on the agenda of the meeting are that Robert Bowie should lead off with a presentation of the United States views on their assumptions regarding the development of Soviet policy since Stalin's death. In order that the meeting should not be unnecessarily prolonged and also because of the attendance of Admiral Radford and General Foulkes, it is thought that the detailed analysis of the risks of war, such as was presented by Messrs. Acheson and Nitze at previous meetings of consultation, will be held over for another session. It is thought that this meeting should be more directly focused on a discussion of the risks of attack upon the continental United States and the measures which the United States believes should be taken to meet this threat.

4. After Bowie's presentation it is thought that Admiral Radford might take up the discussion with an appreciation of Soviet atomic capabilities, using as the basis of his presentation document NIE 90 and its revision, (which was cleared for transmission to Ottawa on Tuesday). Admiral Radford would then give an exposition of United States views on the measures which the United States Government thinks should be taken to deal with this threat.

- 2 -

5. It is understood that the discussion should be without commitment to either government. However, we have been told that it is the hope of the United States side that we should at least be prepared to offer opinions on the underlying assumptions regarding Soviet policy since Stalin's death, and on the United States appreciation of Soviet atomic capabilities as contained in document NIE 90 of August 27 and its revision.

6. This desire on the United States side that we should express some opinions (even though they may not be strictly official) on the underlying assumptions regarding Soviet policy and offensive capabilities seems to me a reasonable request, considering the expected attendance at this meeting on the United States side. The nature of the subjects to be discussed might affect the composition of the Canadian group. For instance, if there is to be a discussion on Soviet offensive capabilities, taking into account developments in the Soviet Union in the atomic field, it might be desirable to have Dr. Solandt come down for the meeting as well as General Foulkes and Mr. MacKay.

7. There is to be, of course, no publicity at all about this meeting and the United States authorities are taking steps to do everything possible to keep the meeting secret. As precautions to this end, we shall probably be asked not to arrive in a group and some of the senior officials on both sides who are attending may be asked to use the private entrance which gives access to the Under-Secretary's Office, where the meeting probably will be held.

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CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1988 OCT 25 AM 11 : 47

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Security ... TOP SECRET .....

# MESSAGE FORM

## OUTGOING

File No.	
50209-40	
54	58

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET  
REVIEW A SECRET

Message To Be Sent	No. <i>EY</i> <i>1727</i>	Date October 15, 1953	For Communications Section Only SENT <i>JUL 15 1953</i>
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AIR CYPHER	
EN CLAIR	
CODE	
CYPHER <b>AUTO</b>	<b>XXX</b>

REFERENCE: Your WA2292 of October 9, 1953.

Priority  
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SUBJECT: Continental Defence Meeting of  
Consultation in Washington.

ORIGINATOR  
.....  
(Signature)

*W. H. Barton/BB*  
(Name Typed)

Div... *D. L. (1)* .....

Local Tel... *7509* .....

As you requested, United States document NIE-90 is being sent to you in to-day's bag.

APPROVED BY  
*[Signature]*  
(Signature)

.....  
(Name Typed)

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Internal Distribution:  
S. S. E. A.  U. S. S. E. A.

Done... *max* .....

Date... *Oct. 16/53* .....

Copies Referred To:

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Done.....

Date.....


1980  
MAY 15 11:55  
PARIS

MAY 15 11:55

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(FILE COPY)

NUMBERED LETTER



The Canadian Embassy, .....  
WASHINGTON, D. C. ....

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

50209-40  
Security: TOP SECRET  
No: 0.1165  
Date: October 15, 1953  
Enclosures: 1  
Air or Surface Mail: Surface  
Post File No: .....

Reference: .....  
Subject: Meeting of Consultation .....

Ottawa File No. 50209-40	
54	50

DOWNGRADERS TO SECRET  
REDUITS SECRET

References

I refer to your Telegram No. WA-2292 of October 9, 1953, in which you asked for the loan of United States document NIE-90, the title of which is "Soviet Bloc Capabilities Through Mid-1955". I am enclosing this report for your use. It would be appreciated if it could be returned in due course as this is the only copy available in the Department.

As yet we have not received the revision of NIE-90 to which you referred in your Telegram.

Internal Circulation

M. H. WERSHOF  
FOR THE

Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

Distribution to Posts

# INCOMING MESSAGE

UPGRADED TO SECRET  
REQUIRE A SECRET

# ORIGINAL

COPIES ... OF 31 COPIES

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

*File*  
*W7B*

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification
TOP SECRET
File No.
50209-40
29   50

Priority	System CYPHER-AUTO	No. WA-2330	Date October 14, 1953.
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Departmental Circulation

MINISTER 2  
 UNDER/SEC 3  
 D/UNDER/SEC 7  
 A/UNDER/SEC'S 5  
 POL/CO-ORD'N 6  
 SECTION 7  
 U. N. DIV. 7

*Pomroy* 31  
 L. POMROY'S SECTION

Reference: My WA-2292 of October 9.

*9.17*

Subject: Continental Defence Meeting of Consultation in Washington.

We were informed today that the State Department is trying to set up the meeting for next Wednesday afternoon, October 21.

2. The main difficulty now appears to be to pin down Admiral Radford. Plans for the meeting have advanced a little since my last report. It is thought that the meeting would last about two hours. It would begin with a statement by Robert Bowie (Director of the Policy Planning Staff and State Department representative on the NSC Planning Board) on the risks of general war, with particular reference to the State Department appreciation of Soviet policy. Admiral Radford would then discuss the United States appreciation of net Soviet offensive capabilities with particular reference to atomic weapons and United States plans for continental defence.

3. I shall let you know the moment that I am informed of a fixed time for the meeting.

OCT 16 '53

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OCT 15 1953

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CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1953 OCT 15 AM 9 3 59

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TOP SECRET

*DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REQUIR A SECRET*

*M. Mackay*  
*to See*  
**SEEN**  
*L. B. PEARSON*

October 14, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

50209-40  
54 54

The President's Visit and Continental Defence

I understand you feel that it will be difficult if not impossible to avoid a statement on continental defence when the President visits Ottawa. Attached is a draft that was prepared before the Prime Minister's visit to Washington in anticipation of a joint statement at that time. However, on re-consideration it was then decided not to pursue the matter. This draft might serve as a starter for a new statement. It is suggested that we might send it to Mr. Heeney for his comments.

*yes  
JMM*

In view of the latent hysteria in the United States on the subject of atomic attack, it might be desirable to go farther than the draft attached if before the President's visit we have made any progress on the proposed new radar screen. We have not yet received a definite request from the U.S. but I think we should anticipate one within the next couple of weeks, especially in view of the "briefing" in Washington for General Foulkes and officials of this Department tentatively scheduled for next week.

With respect to procedure in handling such a request, I think we are in a fairly good position to call the tune. State Department officials have already asked officials of this Department informally about the form of approach which would be most acceptable. My suggestion is that we should use the PJBD

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*14.10.10(05)  
15-10-20(35) E. wh.*

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channel for working out an agreement since this has the advantage of bringing political and military officials of both sides together. We might suggest to the U.S. informally that they follow the same procedure as for Operation Counterchange, when the request was put forward in a diplomatic note at the same time as it was put before the PJBD. A special meeting of the PJBD could be called quickly to deal with it. This would have the merit of permitting speed in processing since the Chiefs of Staff could consider the military aspects at the same time it was being considered in the PJBD-External network. It might be that a recommendation by the PJBD and approval of the Chiefs of Staff could be secured in time to permit approval in principle by Cabinet before the President's visit. The details of an inter-governmental agreement could be worked out later through the PJBD. If this could be done, it would permit of a reference in general terms to improvements in continental defence in any public statement on continental defence issued at the time of the visit.

Yes  
Jan

C.S.A.R.

Defence Liaison (1)/W. H. Barton/BB

S E C R E T

October 14, 1953.

Proposed Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada  
and the President of the United States of America  
regarding defence co-operation between the two  
countries

On February 12, 1947, the Governments of Canada and the United States of America made a joint statement on the extent to which the wartime co-operation between the armed forces of the two countries should be maintained in the post-war period. Since that time the expectation that the world was entering upon a prolonged period of peace has been severely shaken. Both countries, as members of the United Nations, have had to take up arms in defence of freedom and both countries have become signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty. For the first time, the North American continent has been faced with the threat of possible attack by weapons which are capable of destruction of this arsenal of the free world. As a consequence, Canada and the United States have had to institute on the North American continent a co-operative programme of defensive installations on a much larger scale and of a completely different character than ever before. This programme is constantly being modified to reflect the changing military situation and to take advantage of new technological developments.

2. Although the statement of 1947 was made under quite different circumstances than exist to-day, it has provided a highly effective basis for the development of the defensive arrangements which have since proved necessary. Nevertheless, it is considered desirable at this time to restate, in the light of the current situation, the principles upon which collaboration for the joint

defence of the two countries is founded. These are as follows:

- (1) Interchange of selected individuals so as to increase the familiarity of each country's defence establishment with that of the other country.
- (2) General co-operation and exchange of observers in connection with exercises and with the development and tests of material of common interest.
- (3) Encouragement of common designs and standards in arms, equipment, organization, methods of training and new developments.
- (4) Mutual and reciprocal availability of military, naval and air facilities in each country; this principle to be applied as may be agreed in specific instances. Reciprocally each country will continue to provide, with a minimum of formality, for the transit through its territory and its territorial waters of military aircraft and public vessels of the other country.
- (5) As an underlying principle, all co-operative arrangements will be without impairment of the control of either country over all activities in its territory.

3. As was the case when the two Governments made the statement of February 12, 1947, the decisions of each of the two Governments on joint defence matters are taken independently in continuation of the practice developed since the establishment of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in 1940. Each country will continue to determine the extent of its practical collaboration in respect of each and all of the foregoing principles. Neither country

will take any action inconsistent with the charter of the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty which remain the basis of the foreign policy of each.

4. The principles announced to-day are in continuance of the pattern of co-operation between the two countries first instituted in August, 1940, by the creation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. The object of the two Governments in restating these principles at this time is to give assurance that the close relationship between Canada and the United States in matters of common defence is being carried on in order to strengthen the effective participation of each country within the broader framework of the North Atlantic Treaty and the United Nations.

*Mr. Barton*

SEEN  
L. E. PEARSON

*File* October 13, 1953.  
*WRB*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Continental Defence - United States Press Comment

50209-160  
59/1

I believe you may be interested in the attached Letter, No. 1908, dated October 6, 1953, from our Embassy in Washington. The Letter draws attention to the alarmist statements of Congressman Cole and Mr. Arthur S. Flemming, Director of Defence Mobilization.

However, it also notes that some responsible comments are also appearing in the United States press urging that the problems of continental defence should be viewed in a more balanced perspective.

*CR*  
C. R.

14-10-25(55) E. ah.  
14.10.13(us)

# CANADIAN EMBASSY

WASHINGTON

Subject Continental Defence

Date Oct. 6, 1953

Publication Washington Post

## No Defense by Dollars

Officials Only Add to Muddle on Bombs,  
 A Technical Problem Beyond Finances

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

Two more Washington officials added confusion instead of light to the current discussions about continental defense this week and the menace of Soviet atomic and hydrogen weapons to the United States.

Arthur S. Flemming, head of the Office of Defense Mobilization, emphasized in alarming but foggy terms the Soviet Union's offensive capabilities, while Representative W. Sterling Cole said he did not "find it hard to choose between financial ruination for my country and atomic devastation."

Mr. Cole, who is chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, should know better, and Mr. Flemming either should spell out his observations in full or remain silent. For the result of such piecemeal observations is simply to compound confusion about a subject that already has been greatly oversimplified. The result could be appropriation by emotion and legislation by semantics—instead of a reasoned, balanced program for improving United States security.

For the alternatives of Russia's possession of a growing stockpile of atomic weapons and her development of a hydrogen device (which almost certainly is not yet an operational weapon) are not those Mr. Cole posed—"financial ruination" or "atomic devastation."

A reasonable continental defense, a reasonable security, which is the optimum security that man has ever enjoyed, or will ever enjoy, is possible for the United States even in the atomic age without "financial ruination."

### No Absolute Security Possible

No absolute security is possible; there never has been such a thing. And in the age of atomic and hydrogen weapons, supersonic planes and guided missiles, it is even less possible than in the past.

Most of the published discussion of the problem of security in the atomic age has centered on dollars. The implication has been that if only the Administration, Congress and the public would spend enough money, the problem would be solved. This is, of course, a gross oversimplification and it represents only one facet of the problem.

The problem of increased security in the atomic age is, first, a political problem and a technical problem and, secondarily, an economic, military and psychological problem. Dollars are no cure-all; in fact, there are authorities in Washington far more expert than Mr. Flemming or Mr. Cole who believe that the additional amount of money that could be spent usefully in the next year to improve our continental defense is measured in hundreds of millions, not billions, of dollars.

Continental defense—defense of

the continental United States—is, of course, only one aspect of the over-all defense program. No purely defensive measures ever are sufficient in any military program, least of all today when the fear of retaliation in kind must act as a primary deterrent to attack.

Therefore, continental defense must be considered in context with all defense needs; we might make the same mistake that France made prior to World War II if we wasted billions in attempting to build a Maginot Line of the air around the continental United States.

Nor is continental defense itself a simple problem of radar and interceptors.

### What Such Defense Implies

Continental defense implies, first, passive or static defense, including civilian defense; and, second, active defense, including military defense.

Common to both must be a warning system that includes a world-wide intelligence system; a ground-observer corps to watch visually for aircraft; and a radar warning system, with stations on the ground, radar picket ships and airborne radar, all knit together by a highly efficient communications network.

Passive defense includes not only the active forms of civilian defense—air raid wardens, auxiliary fire-fighting equipment, the police, etc.—but also all measures to decrease the vulnerability of our cities, industries, atomic plants and vital military installations.

These measures may include programs for partial evacuation in time of war and a long-range planned program to encourage industrial dispersion and to decrease the density of population in our cities. It also may include some underground installations.

Active defense comprises far-flung radar warning systems, fighter control systems, and a complex interlocking nexus of interceptor bases, guided missile installations and anti-aircraft guns.

Continental defense, in other words, is a problem into which many interlocking pieces must fit. Dollars are only part of this jigsaw puzzle; technical problems today are a bigger obstacle than dollars. Oversimplification and exaggeration can be almost as dangerous as overconfidence.

It is time that the whole problem of continental defense is explained in measured and balanced terms. Mr. Cole's suggestion that "more revelations" should be made to the public about hydrogen weapons should apply not only to the threat we undeniably face but to the answer needed. The whole problem of continental defense requires an over-all, not not a piecemeal, approach.

### Peaceful Solution

It is now time to ask Stewart Alsop to state and explain the premise from which he argues the necessity of investing in a military defense so vast that it would seriously threaten our economy and so distracting from the peaceful arts of civilization that we should soon have little moral or cultural energy left with which to preserve anything worth defending. For if the atomic scientists and Mr. Dulles are right and there is no defense against an enemy armed with nuclear weapons; if a hundred hydrogen bomb detonations will extinguish all life on this planet, and if the Soviets are soon to be able to devastate the entire United States, then it is time we sought other means of saving ourselves. If half the money, energy, and imagination now expended on military establishments were turned to this end—peace by negotiation, compromise, and disarmament—yes, even with the Communists—spectacular results might be won in a short time. The world awaits this. JOHN PARKE.

Gainesville, Fla.

# CANADIAN EMBASSY

WASHINGTON

GI/gmd

Subject Continental Defence

Date Oct. 6, 1953

Publication

New York Times

## Today And Tomorrow . . . By Walter Lippmann The Two Scorpions In The Bottle

WHEN DR. ROBERT Oppenheimer set off his scintillating metaphor about how the atomic race would soon be



Lippmann

like "two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of killing the other, but only at the risk of his own life," I wondered—having had the painful experience so often—how soon he would be wishing he had resisted the temptation to stray from the flat and prosaic path. The race of armaments is not a good subject for metaphorical treatment, and this was a particularly bad metaphor.

For the image of the two scorpions in a bottle is (a) a radically false picture of the atomic situation and (b) it is an unmistakable symptom of a dangerous American neurosis.

THE PICTURE is misleading because the world is not in the least like a bottle, and the United States and the Soviet Union are not now and can never be alone in it. The world does not consist of two self-contained powers, each armed with weapons of annihilation. It consists of many powers, great and small, who have a vital interest in atomic warfare and who will have an important say in the whole business.

And the notion that the United States and the Soviet Union are bottled up face to face alone with one another is a neurotic illusion. If we nurse it, promote it, sell it and beat the tom-toms about it—instead of resolving it and dissipating it—the people of this country, who are still quite sane, may get the feeling that they are like a scorpion alone with another scorpion in a bottle,—alone, in mortal danger, and trapped. If they do, the outcome is much more likely to be a panic than a policy.

THERE HAS BEEN as yet virtually no public recognition by official spokesmen of the effect on other countries and on the world balance of forces of the disclosure in September, 1949, that the Soviet Union had succeeded in breaking the American monopoly of atomic weapons. The new situation has been discussed here as if it presented the imaginary and abstract problem of the two scorpions. But in Britain, in Europe, in Japan, the new atomic situation has wrought a subtle, unadvertised but profound modification in the field of grand strategy and high policy.

As long as atomic weapons were an American monopoly, the non-Communist nations did not need to think about their own defense. But when the Soviet Union began to acquire these weapons, the problem of how to defend Great Britain, France, the Low Countries, West Germany, Japan—all of them rich targets—was posed. We must not think that the responsible military and civilian leaders in those countries have not been deeply concerned with the question simply because they do not make public statements about it.

When the problem of defense was posed abroad, it was soon plain enough that a passive defense to repel atomic attack is for them an economic and technical impossibility. The American inquiries and the American disputes about the possibilities and about the costs of what would admittedly be a poor defense, even of North America, have amounted to positive proof that there could be no sufficient passive defense of Western Europe and of Japan.

RECOGNIZING their strategic situation, they have adapted their basic policy to it: whereas they would be open to annihilating attack in case of war, their own vital interests require an active policy for the prevention of war. This active policy has meant in practice that in addition to the rearmament required to deter a Soviet aggression, they have become increasingly vigilant, increasingly determined, to take precautions against becoming entangled in a world war. They are vigilant about being entangled by accident, or by the clients of the West who think they may have a special interest in a great war.

Although there has been much worry in this country about our vulnerability to atomic attack, there has been virtually no public recognition that, if we are worried, the British, the French, the Germans and the Japanese, being far more vulnerable than we are, must be worried too. Rep. Stirling Cole (R-N. Y.), chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, said yesterday morning that the American situation is "desperate" and that we must spend 10 billion dollars more to save ourselves from "devastation." What would Mr. Cole be saying if he were a member of the House of Commons or of the French National Assembly, or the German Bundestag, or of the Japanese Diet? For if he were in any of those parliaments, he would know that they do not have 10 billions to spend on atomic defense, and that if they did have it, they

would still have less defense than we have.

MR. COLE WOULD, I believe, do what the people are doing in all the highly exposed countries. He would say that if it is possible, we must take concerted action to prevent atomic war; if nobody who has power and responsibility is preparing to take these concerted measures, then he would say that his duty to his own country called upon him to save it from destruction by avoiding entangling alliances. As long as the first and better choice is not offered, the second which is humiliating, defeatist and ugly in many of its manifestations was bound nevertheless to attract an increasing popular support.

The fact is that in the closing years of the Truman Administration and the opening of the Eisenhower Administration this country for various reasons, largely internal, has been forced to suspend its leadership of the free world. It has been unable to offer the prospect of a diplomacy to avert war and it has seemed actually to be opposed to such a diplomacy. That has been the deepest cause of the growing anti-Americanism in the outer world: our official incapacity and unwillingness to offer the outer world a policy which meets its vital need of defense from the devastation that we ourselves are afraid of.

IN MAY OF THIS YEAR, Prime Minister Churchill came forward and made himself, and Britain and the British Commonwealth, the rallying point of the first and the better choice.

No one can say now whether what the great old man has begun will save the peace. But what one can say now is that he is saving the grand alliance. Until he took his stand in May, the grand alliance was disintegrating under the growing belief that it meant entanglement in a war in which the individual countries could not be saved from destruction. The grand alliance was disintegrating because it offered no positive prospect of peace. Churchill has rallied the alliance to the hope and the effort of an active diplomacy meant to prevent a great war.

THE EFFORT, one might perhaps say, consists in breaking the neurotic bottle in which the imaginary scorpions may think they are isolated, and of reminding them that there is a third, and a fourth, and a fifth party and many others, to the issue.

# CANADIAN EMBASSY

GI/gmd

WASHINGTON

Subject Continental Defence

Date Oct. 5, 1953

Publication

New York Times

## HIGH OFFICIALS SAY NATION IS MENACED BY HYDROGEN BOMB

### Cole Asks 10 Billion More for Defense—Flemming Warns Reds Can Deliver Attack

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Sept. 4—The chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy proposed tonight that the nation spend \$10,000,000,000 more a year to increase its defenses against hydrogen bomb attacks, while the head of the Office of Defense Mobilization declared in separate statement that Russia had such weapons and the ability to use them "suddenly and without warning."

The mobilization chief, Arthur S. Flemming, made his warning in a quarterly report on the activities of his agency. He sent the summary to the White House today and discussed it at a press conference. He did not mention a thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb directly in the report, but said that "Soviet Russia is capable of delivering the most destructive weapon ever devised by man on chosen targets in the United States."

Under persistent questioning by reporters, Mr. Flemming conceded that he was talking about the thermonuclear and not the atomic bomb. His report, however, expressed confidence that "the threat can be dealt with and the national security preserved."

Meanwhile, the Congressional leader on atomic matters, Representative W. Sterling Cole of upstate New York, declared that "I don't find it hard to choose between financial ruination for my country and atomic devastation." He then called for the outlay of \$10,000,000,000 more for defense, said the situation was that "desperate" and asserted that he was willing to surrender hopes for a balanced budget and tax reductions, goals he had sought for twenty years.

#### Viewpoint Changed Recently

Mr. Cole explained on the National Broadcasting Company's "Meet the Press" television program that his viewpoint had been changed by what he had "learned in the last two or three months."

For security reasons, he said, he could not disclose whether Russia had developed a better, cheaper and easier way to make the hydrogen bomb. But he added that, from what he had learned, he was "sorely troubled."

He was disturbed not only because Russia had hydrogen weapons, but because they could be delivered by plane and Russia could do it. In this view, the New York Republican hit on the same point made by Mr. Flemming.

Representative Cole, acknowledging that a 100 percent defense against air attack was impossible, said that four out of five enemy planes could get through with the hydrogen bomb.

"We need more civil defense," he declared, "and, since we are a God-fearing people, I hope a prayer. I think the condition is that desperate."

He also said that "the time has arrived when more revelations should be made" to the public

about hydrogen weapons. He wants to get across to the public "not the number of weapons but the force of the weapons \* \* \* told and impressed by graphic illustrations and demonstrations."

The public has been "told a great deal," Mr. Cole conceded, but they must be made to realize the full implication of this new force.

#### Deplores Defense Cuts

He deplored reductions in civil defense appropriations over the past two years to a point where they now stand at 75 cents per capita. Such reductions would not have been possible if the American public knew what it was facing, he said.

"I want the public to know the kind of weapon it faces and that it must make a proper defense against it," Mr. Cole declared.

In urging greater revelations to the public—he said he did not like the phrase "Operation Candor" that had been used recently—the New Yorker took issue with Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper of Iowa, another Republican member and former chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

The midwesterner said today in an interview that there might be more danger than benefit in any move to tell the American people more than they already know about atomic and hydrogen bomb developments. He said Americans had "the fundamental facts" and that he did "not know much more that could be said without going into technical data which would benefit our enemies."

President Eisenhower told his weekly news conference Wednesday that he intended to be very frank with the public on the conclusions he had reached on the

relationship of world tensions to the growing destructiveness of weapons. He said he first had to make up his mind, though, on how to approach the matter.

Support for the approach advocated by the President and Mr. Cole came from a number of Democrats in Congress, meanwhile. Senator John O. Pastore of Rhode Island, for one, has said the Government "ought to take some calculated risks so that we may be better informed."

Also, Senator Stuart Symington of Missouri, in a speech in New York, called today for "straight talking to our own people and the free world."

Mr. Cole himself said he now was "quite ready" to support a greater exchange of information on atomic and hydrogen weapons with "the top people of our Allies," at least.

On the subject of Continental defense, the man who heads the watchdog committee of Congress on atomic energy developments said he envisaged the need for spending fifteen to twenty-five billions over a period of the next several years.

Cuts made this year in funds for the Atomic Energy Commission, totaling \$300,000, appeared "large percentage-wise," but were not crippling, Mr. Cole said. He declared, however, that the nation would have to spend "many, many more millions than we currently are spending" in view of Russia's strides in the development of hydrogen weapons.

On this score, Mr. Cole conceded that an error had been made in the post-war period of "underestimating capacity of Russia all along."

If it could be done in any way "other than pulling a Pearl Harbor ourselves," he assure one questioner, he would "favor forcing a showdown now."

While advocating a greatly expanded defense effort, the Atomic Energy Committee's chairman said, however, that he did not believe that the \$5,000,000,000 cut in funds for the Air Force, put through at the Administration's request this

year, had weakened this country's position in the air.

#### Flemming Clarifies Position

In regard to Mr. Flemming's remarks, a spokesman issued a statement tonight saying that the mobilization director had not intended to "go beyond" anything disclosed by the Atomic Energy Commission on the subject.

"I want to make it perfectly clear that I am not adding anything to statements issued by the Atomic Energy Commission," Mr. Flemming declared.

In address last week, Read Admiral Lewis I. Strauss, chairman of the commission, had reported new evidence recently of Russia's activities in nuclear explosions, and had added that recent Communist boasts from Moscow about developments in the field "do have basis in fact."

The tone of Mr. Flemming's report to the President differed from reports of previous O. D. M. administrators. Those had dealt with the rapid strides in rearming the nation, but had touched only lightly on the menace of sudden, unheralded bombing attacks on the country's production and government centers.

Mr. Flemming, however, warned of the reality of an atomic as well as other bombing attacks, and spoke of the steps that his agency was taking to develop a flexible set of mobilization plans "to enable us to meet new emergencies."

Although Mr. Flemming spoke of production gains—record military "hard goods" deliveries amounting to \$14,000,000,000 in the first six months of this year—he dwelt mostly on the defense mobilization job that confronts the nation.

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File 50209-40  
WMB

EXTRACT FROM THE NEW YORK TIMES, October 11, 1953

# SENATORS TO STUDY ATOMIC DEFENSES

NYT Oct 11/53

## Industrialist Is Named to Head Project as Kefauver Calls for 'Complete Review'

By JOHN D. MORRIS

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

WASHINGTON, Oct. 10—The Senate Armed Services subcommittee on preparedness today ordered a full study of continental defenses against hydrogen or atomic attack and named an outstanding industrialist to conduct the project.

The undertaking was announced by Senator Leverett Saltonstall, Republican of Massachusetts and chairman of both the full committee and the subcommittee. It coincided with a demand by Senator Estes Kefauver, Democrat of Tennessee, for a "complete review" of the subject. Mr. Kefauver asked for prompt hearings by the Armed Services Committee.

Robert C. Sprague, chairman of the board of the Sprague Electric Company of North Adams, Mass., will direct study for the subcommittee, Senator Saltonstall announced. He will be assisted by the unit's regular staff.

Whether this will be followed by a formal investigation and hearings, as requested by Senator Kefauver, will depend on what Mr. Sprague reports to the Saltonstall group, according to committee sources.

Other members of the subcommittee are Senator Styles Bridges, Republican of New Hampshire, and Richard B. Russell, Democrat of Georgia.

### Problem Under Study

The unit "has been considering the problem of continental defense," Senator Saltonstall reported in a prepared statement, adding:

"The subcommittee concluded that this highly technical problem must be reduced to lay terms in order that the Senate Armed Services Committee can better understand the ramified details which face the United States in preparing its defenses."

The preparedness unit was "fortunate," he said, in securing the services of Mr. Sprague "to head up this important study."

Mr. Saltonstall noted that the Massachusetts industrialist was experienced in technical subjects of this sort and called him "uniquely qualified to act as adviser to the Senate group."

"I have great confidence," he

added, "in his ability, energy and thoroughness, and I know he will do a fine job on this very responsible assignment."

Mr. Sprague, a graduate of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is a recognized authority on electronic devices and presumably will give the Senators an expert analysis of various proposals for protecting the United States against air attack by radar fences of one sort or another.

### Declined Air Post

He was President Eisenhower's choice for Under Secretary of the Air Force but declined to sell his holdings in the Sprague company in order to take the post.

The study that he will direct arises from the growing concern over Soviet Russia's capability of mounting an atomic or hydrogen attack on the United States and the controversy over methods of defense—particularly whether primary reliance should be placed on our ability to retaliate or whether radar and air defenses should be stepped up drastically.

In that connection, Charles E. Wilson, Secretary of Defense, recently indicated that an airtight build-up of continental defenses would be impossible. No more than \$500,000,000 could be spent on such a project next year, because of physical limitations, he held. Programs costing at least \$10,000,000,000 have been suggested.

Senator Kefauver's request for an investigation and hearings by the full Armed Services Committee, of which he is a member, were made in a letter to Senator Saltonstall.

"Recent statements by officials of the Federal Government in high places as to Russia's current ability to deliver these weapons over population centers of the United States have contributed greatly to public concern," he wrote.

"It has been stated by high authorities at various times that the only effective defense against delivery of these bombs in the United States is the ability to retaliate promptly. Under this philosophy, it is apparent, no genuinely effective protection would be attempted. This would mean, inevitably, a write-off, as unprotectable, of a large portion of our population and a massive portion of our industrial capacity.

### Seeks Radford Testimony

"The hearings which I hereby request should determine, as fully as problems of military secrecy will permit, the philosophy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which is now guiding our armed services in their plans for continental defenses against attack by atomic and thermonuclear weapons.

"It should also be determined whether arbitrary budget limitations for the armed services are preventing the establishment of fully effective defenses, if in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff such defenses would be effective."

Mr. Kefauver suggested that the committee seek prompt testimony on such questions by Secretary Wilson, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Lewis L. Strauss, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

"Informed persons," he added, "have suggested within recent days that very large sums would be required for protection against delivery in this country of these terrible weapons. These suggestions have been met with determined statements by other persons, many in high positions, that no such sums can be appropriated.

"The hearings which I request would go far to provide our committee and the country with the factual information which will be required in assessing the validity of these various positions.

"I do not request these hearings with any desire to create any additional fears on the part of the public.

"On the contrary, I am of the opinion that a calm attainment of the facts, whatever they may be, will be requisite to any reasonable dispassionate judgment of the effectiveness of our defense effort.

"The sooner the facts can be obtained, the sooner our committee and the Congress can take such steps, if any are required, to meet the situation which is revealed."

Meanwhile, Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Republican of Iowa and member of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, told reporters that the American atomic program "is going along very vigorously and I am not prepared to say we should pyramid it" in the face of thermonuclear developments in Russia.

Senator Ralph E. Flanders, Republican of Vermont, declared that it was possible this country had reached the point of diminishing returns in atomic preparations. He explained that if 500 bombs were enough to defeat any aggressor, the accumulation of 5,000 bombs would not make this nation ten times as safe.

# INCOMING MESSAGE

# COPY

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES.

*Original on  
50209-M-40*

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification
UNCLASSIFIED
File No.
50209-40
59

Priority	System ER CLAIR	No. WA-2299	Date October 9, 1953.
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Departmental  
Circulation

MINISTER  
UNDER/SEC  
D/UNDER/SEC  
A/UNDER/SEC'S  
POL/CO-ORD<sup>O</sup>N  
SECTION  
U. N. DIV.

Reference:

Subject: Statement by President Eisenhower on Soviet atomic capability.

Following is the text of the statement made yesterday by President Eisenhower:

Begins:

There have recently been a number of statements concerning the threat posed by Soviet progress in the development of atomic weapons. The facts as we know them are these:

You will recall that our government announced that the Soviet produced an atomic explosion in 1949 and two subsequent explosions in 1951. In August of this year we learned through intelligence channels of a Soviet test of an atomic device, in which some part of the explosive force was derived from a thermonuclear reaction, that is to say, what is popularly known as the H-bomb. The Atomic Energy Commission announced this August 12th detonation as soon as sufficient evidence was in hand, and later announced that it appeared to be part of a test series.

The development did not come as a surprise. We had always estimated that it was within the scientific and technical capabilities of the Soviets to reach this point and we have been on notice for some years that their own ingenuity has had the material assistance of what they learned of our program through espionage.

The Soviets now possess a stockpile of atomic weapons of conventional types and we must furthermore conclude that the powerful explosion of August 12th last was produced by a weapon or the forerunner of a weapon, of power far in excess of the conventional types.

We, therefore, conclude that the Soviets now have the capability of atomic attack on us, and such capability will increase with the passage of time. And now a word as to our own situation. We do not intend to disclose the details of our strength in atomic weapons of any sort, but it is large and increasing steadily. We have in our atomic arsenal a number of kinds of weapons, suited to the special needs of the army, navy and air force for the specific tasks assigned to each service.

It is my hope, my earnest prayer, that this country will never again be engaged in war. As I said in Atlantic City this week, with

Done

Date

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Date

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reference to atomic energy, "this titanic force must be reduced to the fruitful service of mankind". Real advances made by our government in developing peacetime atomic power and the other benign uses of atomic energy is evidence of the constructive goals that we have set for ourselves.

I have asked all members of this administration to refrain from comment on Soviet nuclear capabilities unless they first check their statements with the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Ends.

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**

**ORIGINAL**

COPY NO. ... OF 22 COPIES.

**FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES.**

*File  
WA-B*

**TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA**

Security Classification	
TOP SECRET	
File No.	
50209-40	
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Priority <b>IMPORTANT</b>	System CYPHER-AUTO	No. WA-2292	Date October 9, 1953.
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Departmental  
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UNDER/SEC  
D/UNDER/SEC  
A/UNDER/SEC'S  
POL/CO-ORD'N  
SECTION  
U. N. DIV.

Reference: My WA-2250 of October 5.

Subject: Continental defense meeting and consultation in Washington.

1. Arneson and Raynor informed us today that after a discussion with Freeman Matthews and Livingston Merchant at the State Department, it had been decided to ask us to defer the meeting a week, i.e., until early in the week of 18 - 24 of October. The reason this was postponed is to permit both Freeman Matthews and his successor, Murphy (at present Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affaires) to attend the meeting in the interests of continuity. We also understand that it would also permit the clearance of a revision of the United States document containing their appreciation of Soviet atomic capacity (i.e., a revise of NIE 90 of August 27).

2. Arneson tells us that the following are expected to attend the meeting on United States side: Freeman Matthews and his successor as Deputy Under-Secretary Murphy, Admiral Radford, Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Robert R. Bowie, Director of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department and department representative on NSC Planning Board, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Livingston Merchant, Haydon Raynor and Gordon Arneson. Bowie is expected to do most of the talking on the United States side.

3. It would be helpful if you would let me know whom you would wish to attend on our side. In view of the numbers to attend for the United States, I see no reason why Dewolf should not come along as well as Foulkes, Ignatieff and myself and MacKay or any other officer you may wish to send. All these would be helpful but I think we should not exceed five.

4. As it seems that United States document NIE 90 of August 27 and its revision will play an important part in the discussion, I wonder whether I could have one copy in advance. I understand that three were transmitted through the usual DRB channel and the revision will be transmitted the same way.

Done \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

References

Done \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

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Ext. 1

Refer with  
enclosure to -

OTTAWA FILE  
50209-40  
NO. 59 / 50

Letter No. 1943  
Date. October 9, 1953. *Oct 9, 1953*

*C.C.O.S*  
*DM / Finance*  
*Director of*  
*J.I.B*

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
Unclassified

*& without enclosure to*  
*Amer. & Eco. Divs. 2 files*  
*B.B.*  
*Q.16*

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, WASHINGTON, D.C.  
TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA  
Reference. Letter No. 1908 of October 6, 1953.

Subject: Quarterly Report of the Office of Defence Mobilization.

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6	<i>Statement</i>
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OCT 14 1953

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I attach for your information four copies of a quarterly report to the President by Arthur Flemming, the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, which was released on October 4. More than usual press attention has been given to this report by reason of its flat assertion that the Soviet Union "is capable of delivering suddenly and without warning the most destructive weapon ever devised by man on chosen targets in the United States". In the course of a press conference at the time of release of the report Mr. Flemming admitted he had in mind thermo-nuclear weapons. His alleged remarks at the press conference together with the statement in the report just quoted was highlighted immediately in the press as one of the "conflicting" statements made in the past week by such prominent individuals as Mr. Wilson, the Secretary of Defense, and Mr. Peterson, the Civil Defense Administrator concerning Soviet capabilities in the field of thermo-nuclear weapons. So much attention was given to Mr. Flemming's opinions that he issued a further statement that he had had no intention of going beyond anything already disclosed by the Atomic Energy Commission on the subject.

2. The attached report is not primarily concerned with the hydrogen bomb although Mr. Flemming does list the consideration quoted above as one of three which are basic to the discharge of the responsibilities of his Office. The new Office of Defense Mobilization came into existence on June 12, 1953, and it now performs functions previously allotted to three separate agencies as well as to the Department of Defense. It carries on its work, according to Mr. Flemming, in the recognition that "new threats hang over us greater than ever before faced by man". Without in any sense attempting to detract from the work of the Office we should point out that this is the time of year when all government agencies attempt to make the most of their importance since it is the time when preliminary budget estimates for the next year are under consideration.

3. The report indicates that the needs of the partial mobilization program undertaken by the United States upon the outbreak of the Korean war have in the main been met. Programs have been initiated to assure the continuity of government and industry in the event of future attack.

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Expansion of the mobilization base is being continued and about half of the original expansion goals set after the outbreak of the Korean war have been achieved. At the same time and especially in the past eight months, the Office of Defense Mobilization and the programs it administers have gone through a period of re-organization and re-assessment.

the fact

4. The report emphasizes that the heavy concentration of industrial capacity and of workers engaged in manufacturing continues to leave the United States extremely vulnerable to atomic destruction and indicates that it is essential that there be dispersion of industrial facilities. In this connection stress is laid on the importance of civil defence preparedness which, according to the report, is far from adequate at the moment.

5. As is the case with industrial capacity, continuing review is under way with respect to the materials expansion program and the report indicates that the emphasis now will be on flexible and selective management of material resources rather than on further massive expansion or accumulation. National stockpile objectives are now within reach although inventories of a few critical materials are still short of the desired goals. The Office of Defense Mobilization is also continuing an intensive survey of the manpower base for national security and expects to produce a definitive report on this aspect of national defence mobilization by December 1.

6. The report is briefer and in less detail than earlier reports of the same organization. It is concerned mainly with the principles which guide the Office of Defense Mobilization in administering an immense program designed to ensure that the "resources budget" of the United States is adequate to meet the needs of national security in the event of war, since, to quote its own words, "in war resources not dollars are the limiting factor" on a national defence effort.



for

The Embassy.

*Mr. Bator*  
*Mr. Mackay*

Ottawa, October 9, 1953

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L.B. PEARSON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Continental Defence

*File*  
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The External Affairs Observer on the Canada - United States Military Study Group returned this morning from the meeting of this body, and as the actions of the Study Group give rise to questions of some urgency, a hastily prepared report on what transpired is attached for your information.

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Despite the President's firm statement in his press conference on Thursday last, that his visit to Ottawa would be purely social and in return for the Prime Minister's visit to Washington, I am inclined to believe that in view of the spate of publicity on the need for improvement in the Continental Defence System it may be difficult to avoid some sort of statement on defence at the time of his visit. We might, in any event, go forward with preparing a joint statement on the subject which could be used if it were deemed advisable.

*Will be impossible*

Such a statement could begin by reaffirming the 1947 joint declaration of the principles of defence cooperation and then go on to say that in accordance with these principles the two Governments, through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and the other established machinery for joint study of defence matters, consulted continuously on the measures required for the protection of North America.

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If, as the report on the work of the Military Study Group suggests, the United States Government proposes in the immediate future that the two Governments should agree to proceed with the preliminary measures leading to the construction of a radar fence along the 55th parallel, there might be some advantage in attempting to reach agreement in principle prior to the President's visit. If this were done it would be possible, and, I suggest desirable to conclude the joint statement outlined in the preceding paragraph by an announcement that the two Governments had agreed on the measures which should be taken to meet the requirement for improved facilities for early warning against a possible attack.

I would suggest that, in any event, we should indicate to the State Department that any proposals on improved continental defence measures should be put forward through the mechanism of the PJBD. The use of this channel in negotiations on defence projects of this type has, as you know, many advantages which we can exploit to good effect.

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS EYES ONLY

SECOND REPORT BY THE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OBSERVER  
ON THE PROGRESS OF THE CANADA - UNITED STATES  
MILITARY STUDY GROUP

The Canada - United States Military Study Group held its third meeting at Stewart Air Force Base, Newburgh, N.Y., on October 7 and 8, 1953. At this meeting the Canada - United States Scientific Advisory Team (CUSSAT) presented an interim report on its findings to date.

CUSSAT REPORT

The Scientific Team considered that there was ample evidence that the amount of early warning time which will be provided by the currently authorized air defence system of the two countries is totally inadequate to:

- (a) permit maximum utilization of available air defence forces;
- (b) meet the needs of the strategic air forces; and
- (c) provide for the implementation of military and civil defence measures.

CUSSAT proposed that the initial step towards meeting the above deficiencies should be the installation of an early warning "fence" across North America, roughly along the 55th parallel. The principal reasons for selection of this location are as follows:

- (1) The additional early warning provided by such a line would materially increase the effective use of the military forces of both countries.

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- (2) It would be far enough south to make false alerts by enemy aircraft difficult.
- (3) It would be far enough north to be beyond existing heavy air traffic, which in turn would reduce the problem of identifying aircraft and increase said recognition capability.
- (4) Such a line is logistically feasible. It would also be economical in that considerable advantage could be obtained from existing lines of communication and transportation facilities.

CUSSAT recommended that the line should consist of CW doppler (McGill Fence) equipment, with communications provided by a microwave relay system. In the sector forward of the existing Central Canadian radar network there should be an additional tactical warning line approximately 100 miles inside the proposed 55th parallel line. The first step in building such a fence would be an engineering survey with operational analyses of the needs of each section of the fence in relation to civil air traffic. At the same time studies should be made of the required identification procedures in relation to tactical requirements.

In making its presentation CUSSAT provided detailed data which gave impressive support to its belief that the 55th parallel fence would greatly improve the effectiveness of the existing air defence system. At the same time the importance of the seaward extensions to the continental line was stressed as was the necessity for improving existing identification procedures -- CUSSAT estimated that the 55th parallel line would cost in the neighborhood of \$50 million to install. The actual figure suggested was \$39 million, but it was realized this might well prove to be low.

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CUSSAT reported that in reaching its conclusions there had been a minority view which favoured the installation of Lincoln-type equipment along the 55th parallel. This would involve a chain of manned scanning radars about 100 miles apart, backed up with McGill-type equipment spaced more thinly than the Canadian

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scientists believe desirable. CUSSAT was not in favour of the Lincoln proposal for a variety of reasons which were not fully developed in the discussion. However the most important ones appear to be that the development of the Lincoln equipment is still at too early a stage to be ready for operational use, it costs more - possibly twice as much as the McGill system, and the extra information it might be expected to yield, is not really required.

#### RECOMMENDATION OF THE STUDY GROUP

The Study Group adopted the recommendations of CUSSAT regarding the desirability of a line located generally along the 55th parallel which would have a detection capability at all altitudes and would be able to indicate whether an aircraft was inbound or outbound, but decided that it was not in a position to give any opinion on the type of equipment to be used. This question should be settled by the users of the system, who could be expected to base their decision on an examination of all the factors involved. The conclusions of the Study Group have been set down in an Interim Report which is to be submitted by the Canadian and United States Chairmen to their respective Chiefs of Staff.

#### IMPRESSIONS GAINED BY THE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OBSERVER

1. The Scientific Advisory Team had made an extremely thorough and competent study, and although its conclusions had in part to be based on incomplete data, the soundness of its recommendations can be relied upon.
2. The proponents of the Lincoln equipment have proven themselves in the past to be unscrupulous in their efforts to have their views adopted. It is highly likely that there will be further trouble from this source. Under the circumstances the Study Group was wise to beg the question of what equipment should be used.

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3. The United States Air Force and the United States Navy have still failed to reach agreement on operating responsibility for the seaward extensions to the line. It was reported on a personal basis that the Chiefs of Staff had been instructed to have this argument settled by the middle of November.
4. The United States officials at the meeting of the Study Group were of the opinion that the Interim Report of the Study Group would be considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at once and that very shortly the State Department would be requested to take up the general proposal with the Canadian Government.

Note: Because this report represents only the views of the External Affairs Observer on the Study Group, it has been marked "For External Affairs Eyes Only".

Ext. 11

*Alone*  
Oct 19, 1953  
BB

*Refer without enclosure (in New York)*  
SSEA (in New York) done WNB  
USSEA  
Min. of Nat. Def  
DM of Nat Def  
CCOS (2 copies)  
CAS  
CDAB (with enclosure)  
Sec/Cabinet  
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DM of Finance (letter)  
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OTTAWA FILE  
No. 30209-40

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
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Despatch No. 1934

Date October 8, 1953

FROM: The Canadian Ambassador, WASHINGTON, D.C. *American - London - CANAC + File*

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

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Reference.....

Subject:.....Continental Defence--Secretary of Defense press conference October 6.

OCT 14 1953

Copies Referred To.....

No. of Enclosures 1

Post File No.....

Mr. Wilson, the Secretary of Defense, who did not, in the first months of his tenure of office, have especially good relations with the press seems now to have decided to attempt to remedy that situation. His meetings with the press which in the past have been infrequent are now to take place once a week and are to be taken up not only with spot news but also with discussion of some military subject of general and continuing interest. I attach for your information five copies of the transcript of his first press conference in the new series of October 6. in which a good deal of attention was devoted to the subject of continental defence. The subject for the day was the research and development policy of the Defense Department.

2. On this latter subject, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Quarles, the Assistant Secretary for Research and Development, had a few interesting things to say on such matters as the relationship between the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense, on the alleged shift in emphasis by the Defense Department from support of basic research and on the limitations imposed by the MacMahon Act on exchange of atomic information with friendly governments. A prepared statement was distributed at the press conference containing facts and figures on the Defense Department's research and development program and will be forwarded to you under separate cover.

3. Mr. Wilson's exchanges with the press on the subject of continental defence are of more current interest to us. Mr. Wilson said he was not sufficiently alarmed at the present state of the continental defence of the United States that he would be willing to upset United States global defence policies in order to take into account continental defence schemes of the size envisaged in a report of the Lincoln Project. He thought the United States could spend a reasonable amount of money in improving existing continental defence facilities but he did not favour spending money on a "Maginot Line" which would not, in any case, prevent war. He did not suggest that the recommendations of the Lincoln Project would be rejected out-of-hand; the final plan would in fact embody the best of the recommendations of this project but it would not be the "\$20 billion kind of plan".

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4. The Secretary was asked whether new plans for increased continental defence would mean a substantial increase in the defence budget for next year. Mr. Wilson, by process of elimination of the figures put forward by his questioners, indicated that the increase would certainly not be as much as \$2 billion a year and would probably be a little more than \$500 million annually. He suggested that a good antidote for some of the hysteria which seemed to be developing with respect to United States continental defence might be provided if "we just turned around and imagined we were the Russians and started to worry about what the United States might do to us--we would be more scared than any Americans are now of the Russians". It was his judgment that the Soviet Union would not have the hydrogen bomb in a "droppable" form nor would it have the planes to deliver the bomb before at least three years. He suggested that the intelligence reports available to him "might be better" than those available to such people as Mr. Dean, former Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Val Peterson, Civil Defense Administrator, Arthur Flemming, Head of the Office of Defense Mobilization and Representative Cole, Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, all of whom have recently made public statements to the effect that <sup>the</sup> Soviet Union was now capable of delivering the hydrogen bomb on the United States. James Reston reported in the New York Times of October 8th that President Eisenhower himself has decided to intervene to avoid confusion in the statements of prominent officials on the Soviet Union's hydrogen bomb capabilities and suggests that "atomic blabber mouths in the governmental family" are to be kept in check.

5. Mr. Wilson and his Assistant Secretary made two direct references to Canada in the course of the press conference. When questioned as to whether it had been decided to integrate the McGill fence system of early warning with the more conventional radar chains under consideration in the United States, Mr. Quarles said that the whole question was "an embarrassing situation that has arisen within the last two weeks in our relations with Canada". He pointed out that the United States and Canadian authorities were working very closely in the study of the McGill fence system, but that a decision had not yet been reached as to the extent to which the McGill fence would be integrated into a continental early warning system. At another point in the press conference Mr. Wilson spoke of the need for better security with respect to what was being said and written on the subject of continental defence. He referred specifically to the article in the October 16 issue of Collier's magazine entitled "Russian Planes are Raiding Canadian Skies". He pointed out that there was a kind of information that should not be used publicly even though it might not provide the enemy with facts which he did not know. His words on this score are worth quoting in full: "In this category we are in trouble now on this continental defence business, early warning business. We are talking just as if we could move

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up in Canada and do what we damn please without the Canadians and anything else, and not getting them into it. We are talking too much here. It is getting us into trouble right now". These remarks led up to his reference to the Collier's article which presumably he meant to be taken as an example of the kind of thing which he thought should be stopped. He said that there was probably nothing in it which, to some degree at least, had not been made public before but that the article as a whole gave the wrong impression "out there" and I think we may assume that he had Canada in mind. He assured his questioners that "it was not the Canadians' fault" that the wrong impression was created by such articles.

6. You may be interested to know that our Information Office has learned from the information authorities of the Department of Defense that the Collier's article was submitted to the Pentagon before publication. The article was reviewed by the Defense authorities who gave a security clearance to it but informed Collier's that the magazine could not publicize the fact that the Pentagon had cleared the article unless there was annexed to it a disclaimer clause along the following lines, "Review of this article by the Department of Defense does not constitute verification of factual accuracy or opinion". Collier's story was not accompanied by any such statement you will remember. So far as the Pentagon is concerned this means in effect that although the article was given general clearance from the point of view of security the facts and opinions in it are not endorsed by the Department of Defense. We got the impression that the information authorities of the Department of Defense have been severely chastised for their part in arranging clearance for the article.

7. The points made by Mr. Wilson with respect to the problem of continental defence can be taken we think as representing the Administration's sober and moderate approach to a problem of great significance in the defences of the United States and should provide a useful balance to the output of the more sensational journalists on the subject. Assistant Secretary Quarles, in the course of the press conference, summed up the Administration's approach when he said, "in our plans this year and increasingly in our plans next year those projects that are of particular importance in continental defence are being emphasized and supported".

D. J. P. Murray.

(Not for general distribution)

MINUTES OF PRESS CONFERENCE

HELD BY

THE HONORABLE CHARLES E. WILSON,

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Tuesday, 6 October 1953 - 3:00 p. m. - Room 3E-869

Participant:

Honorable Donald A. Quarles, Assistant Secretary of  
Defense (Research and Development)

SECRETARY WILSON: A week ago I said that we'd have a press conference once a week for a while and if I had any particular news that was fresh that day, I'd bring it to your attention. If not, I'd discuss some policy that was of continuing interest and then have the meeting open for questions about the Defense business generally in addition to the particular subject we'd discuss.

We picked out for today our research and development policy and this is Mr. Don Quarles who is the Assistant Secretary, Research and Development.

I have a statement here which I think perhaps you have copies of but haven't had a chance to read, and perhaps I'd better read it to all of you so that we get a good start together.

THE PRESS: We read it, Mr. Secretary.

SECRETARY WILSON: Have you all read it?

THE PRESS: Yes, sir.

SECRETARY WILSON: Then we don't need it. We will both get more out of the questions and answers, perhaps, then. Mr. Quarles fixed up two charts here that show a record of the research and development expenditures, appropriations and carry-over of funds. I'd like to call your attention to this chart here (indicating) which is <sup>an</sup> easily understood one, the obligation of funds by years, obligation substantially equal to the rate of expenditures. In other words, it is the contracts put out for certain research projects. We have about 8,000 of them now, and you will note that for the four years here before Korea that we spent an average of about \$500 million a year on research and development. That is now in excess of a billion, 250 million, or two and a half times as much. The difference in the projected amount here would be the

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unobligated funds at the end of June. If we spend all the money Congress appropriated, we will obligate that much, (indicating) and we are quite sure that we will obligate at least that much (indicating), so that shows you the picture of the trend of the research and development business.

I think if any of you have questions to ask about the statement of policy on research and development or any detail of it you'd like to ask Mr. Quarles or me, we will try to answer your questions. I think it would be a good thing if we first clear up your interest in the research and development policy and then you could ask me questions about anything else.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, would you explain the liaison between the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission in this deal?

SECRETARY WILSON: There is a special relation on atomic energy between the Defense Department and the Atomic Energy Commission. Mr. LeBaron handles that for the Defense Department. However, Mr. Quarles in his Assistant Secretary responsibility for research and development does have some applications of atomic energy to take an interest in. Perhaps you'd like to make a statement about it, Don.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUARLES: I think the question is perhaps immediately directed to whether there is in this chart the Atomic Energy research and development expense or obligations and the answer to that is that the Atomic Energy Commission's research and development is excluded from this chart even though it is important to our weapons program. Such part of the atomic weapons program as is carried out by the Department of Defense in research and development is included in this chart and there is a very close working relationship between the two organizations to assure that these parts fit together.

THE PRESS: I was thinking rather of the problem on weapons development as to whether you have the authority over here to get them to work on a program that you especially want to go into or whether they are absolutely independent and can do what they like about it.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUARLES: When you say authority, you perhaps get back to Congress and the law, and I don't feel that I can answer it in that sense, but in the practical sense the Department of Defense defines the weapons that are required and the Atomic

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Energy Commission undertakes to develop its part of those weapons on its responsibility but to our requirements.

SECRETARY WILSON: There is some difference of opinion that arises at times, but in my own experience so far there is nothing that hasn't been worked out all right finally. The military can ask for any kind of development in the atomic area that they think is necessary for the military purposes. Mostly that gets charged to the Atomic Energy Commission's budget so that at times they have had a little feeling that it was like free candy in the grocery store, that we asked for a little more because it didn't cost as much. It costs them, and they usually make us describe our reasons for what we want and why and make a pretty good defense out of it, but I have no objection to that. I think it is all right to be put on the fire to justify expenditures and explain why you want what you want. So, so far the thing is working all right.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, to what degree are they free to initiate requirements themselves? Suppose they run across some novelty, something that would fit into a weapons system if you had the key part to the weapon system? What initiative are they in a position to exercise in that respect?

SECRETARY WILSON: I think they are completely free to have the initiative in the area, but I don't think they would go very far without telling us about it. I don't think --

THE PRESS: Well, they are required by law to tell you about it, I believe.

SECRETARY WILSON: And we actually have told them what we considered our military requirements to be and then they have looked into the question, could they supply those requirements and when, and sometimes how much it would cost, and it had something to do with the development of their future budget requests.

THE PRESS: Would that include the size of stockpiles of the A-bomb and H-bomb?

SECRETARY WILSON: Yes.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, could you be more specific about the shift of research on both sides, from the Bureau of Standards to Defense cognizance, and from Defense in the basic research to the National Science Foundation? You lay down

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principles but could you give any indication as to what, for instance, that would do to the Bureau of Standards' program? What will there be in money per year, or how much you are going to take over from them, how much you are going to give over to the National Science Foundation?

SECRETARY WILSON: Just before the war and as the war came on, we tried to use all the resources of our country no matter where they were or what they had been doing before, and the Bureau of Standards had some facilities and they had some personnel and they had some ideas, particularly on what we call the proximity fuze, is one of their developments, so that that went on as quite a good sized activity, and then it grew in itself to provide services for the Defense Department, and in reviewing the matter here some months ago, it looked like the Defense Department should take over a piece of that activity that was so definitely working on defense research and development and had at this time little or nothing to do with the original purpose of the Bureau of Standards. So, by mutual agreement on the part of the affected parties, that was moved over under the supervision of the Army, for whom most of the work was being done. I think something like 1600 people were involved, is that right?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUARLES: I don't know that number.

SECRETARY WILSON: I am not sure of the number but I think an appreciable number of people were transferred with the work. Could you find out about that and make sure?

MR. SCHOOLEY: Yes, sir.

THE PRESS: Who in this initiated the atomic artillery shell research?

SECRETARY WILSON: I don't know that. That was before my time.

THE PRESS: You haven't looked into that?

SECRETARY WILSON: I doubt if it was any one particular person. Those kinds of things often happen by just a discussion of interested individuals and they finally decide, Yes, that is a possibility and we should try it. I know General Collins was very much interested in it and quite approved and promoted it, but who the individual was that originally suggested it, if any one did first, I don't know.

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THE PRESS: Sir, on page 3 you say we have taken no steps to deemphasize basic research. What was all that shooting about last spring when a group of scientists accused you of doing that?

SECRETARY WILSON: Well, I have been accused of so many things that I haven't kept too close track of them. I think it was over this idea that we have down here now; it doesn't apply only to the research but it applies to all the expenditures and everything we are doing. We are taking a good look at them to see if we are getting our money's worth, and some people have the feeling if you call an activity research and it is in a class where it shouldn't be questioned, you see, and we should let the people alone. So we started to look them over, and particularly I wanted to make sure that it wasn't too big an amount of money going into overhead rather than into actual payment for research facilities and personnel, competent scientists working on it, or that we weren't subsidizing indirectly, let's say, a college where an appreciable part of the money was going to an educational subsidy the way they handled it rather than working effectively on our research and, of course, whenever people start to get hurt a little bit, you get a pretty prompt squawk, and after that little squawk I thought I hit a little pay dirt and we ought to look it over carefully.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, you said in one conference a while back that research and development had become a boondoggle. Has that been corrected now?

SECRETARY WILSON: I didn't mean to imply it was all that but a certain amount of it falls into that class if you don't look out.

THE PRESS: How much would you say of your old past research funds would go into -- would be shifted over on to the National Science Foundation? How big a segment of money is that?

SECRETARY WILSON: Perhaps you can answer that better than I can, Don. It is a relatively small amount.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUARLES: We must be careful to distinguish between basic research, which is quite a small thing in this chart, and research and development which is up in the million to a billion three range. Basic research that we are talking about is down in the few tens of millions range and the amount that was shifted from Defense over to the National Science Foundation was simply picking up two or three specific areas that the National Science Foundation, with its somewhat

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increased appropriation this year, was able to support, and those were shifted over from Defense to the National Science Foundation and we are talking about something in the order of a million or two dollars only.

THE PRESS: What are those specific areas, sir, in which there is a high probability of usable results for the Defense Department in basic research?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUARLES: What are the specific areas of research?

THE PRESS: Yes.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUARLES: Well, the physical sciences come first, of course, the precise physical sciences including advanced mathematics that would be applicable to aerodynamics and things of that kind. That would be the first area. Then in minor degree you run into quite a number of areas of science and biology and things of that -- the sciences that deal with human matters as well as with physical matters.

THE PRESS: What are the ones that are transferred to the National Science Foundation?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUARLES: The ones that they picked up were more theoretical areas of mathematics and some of the nuclear physics, and that kind of thing. Nuclear physics in this case actually was picked up by the Atomic Energy Commission rather than the National Science Foundation, but they were shifts of the more theoretical areas.

THE PRESS: Mr. Wilson, there was a reference there about shifting contracts to private industry. Specifically I understand that the germ warfare laboratory at Camp Detrick in Maryland is going to be shifted to a private contractor. Can you explain what additional benefits are derived from a private contractor?

SECRETARY WILSON: Do you know anything about that one?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUARLES: I know about it and I am not sure that we are in a position to discuss that matter here. If I may, I'll speak to your question broadly without admitting the truth or otherwise of your allegation.

THE PRESS: I didn't allege anything. It was understood or reported.

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUARLES: Sometimes these things are understood and not quite free to say whether they are correct or incorrect, but in any case if I may treat your question generally -- What are the advantages of bringing a private contractor into a situation of that kind? -- I think one can say this, that you achieve, first, industrial management which it is difficult for the government to employ and retain. Second, you buy continuity of operation against the shifting that tends to take place in the government. And third, you buy a management that all interested parties are willing to subscribe to, whereas if one department were running it, the other two might disagree. I think very broadly those are the things you are seeking.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, are the objectives of this Department hampered at all by the operations of the McMahon Act, that is to say, the preclusion in that Act of your exchanging information with the allies in the field of atomic weapons and materiel?

SECRETARY WILSON: I am not familiar with any trouble in that area, are you?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUARLES: Well, if the question is, would it be easier to operate if there were no security limitations, the answer is yes. If the question is, would it be better to operate without security limitations, the answer is no. I am not quite sure I understand the question.

THE PRESS: Well, the question as I understand it, the problem before the government was whether we would gain more by exchanging weapons information and atomic information with, say, the British, or whether that raises such a security question that it would not be wise to do so.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUARLES: I think from a Defense Department standpoint the answer is that we would not gain more; otherwise Congress would have changed the law. At the present time, the law defines what can and can't be done, and this is the wisdom of Congress from our standpoint.

THE PRESS: Would you ask Congress to change the law?

SECRETARY WILSON: We would if we thought it was important for the country.

THE PRESS: But you have no plans to do that.

SECRETARY WILSON: Not that I am familiar with.

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THE PRESS: I thought the President had indicated that he was not satisfied with the operations of the McMahon Act.

SECRETARY WILSON: I think he'd have to answer that himself. I don't happen to remember any discussions on it. The whole atomic energy business, the atomic act, is in an area now that is a little difficult, and also we have had some unfortunate cases where defectors took information to the enemy which have confused the picture a little bit, too. You sometimes hardly know who to trust.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, if there are serious limitations in the exchange of military information as a result of the act which prevents a favorable operational relationship with our allies, then it is your business, isn't it?

SECRETARY WILSON: That's right.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, what percentage of this outlay for research is in that field that everybody is calling continental defense this year, and how much next year?

SECRETARY WILSON: Do you want to try and answer that one?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUARLES: I wish I could answer it. The fact is that continental defense is an area of warfare that uses in one form or another a great part of the things that we are developing here, a great part of the objects of these developments. Now, it happens that we do not classify those projects in a way that makes it possible to break that figure out, and I simply am not in a position to answer it beyond the qualitative answer that in our plans this year and increasingly in our plans next year those projects that are of particular importance in continental defense are being emphasized and supported.

THE PRESS: Secretary, Quarles, has the question of the McGill fence, so-called, come directly before your attention, and have you made a decision whether you try to integrate it with what has been adopted with the Lincoln line and other radar?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUARLES: Well, that, as you probably know, is an embarrassing situation that has arisen within the last two weeks in our relations with Canada. We are working very closely with them in a study of the so-called McGill fence system of warning in relation to the merits of our radar, more conventional radar chains. A decision has not yet been reached as to just what

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extent the McGill fence will be integrated into an early warning system.

THE PRESS: Mr. Quarles, can you explain why at this stage of our history we are not emphasizing and giving greater support to research into continental defense, radar, and so forth; what factors promote this greater interest now than would have, say, two or three years ago?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUARLES: Well, I thought that was something you would be telling us about because there's been so much in the newspapers that I just assumed that we were all starting from the same place, that there has been a great lot of talk about Russian capability of delivering a devastating atomic or hydrogen bomb attack and this obviously increases the interest in the ability to counter such.

THE PRESS: Well, in 1949 the Russians exploded what was described as an atomic bomb in some quarters. Weren't we just as aware then as we are now of the danger of devastating attacks that you are talking about?

SECRETARY WILSON: I think the answer is that we were a little slow to wake up, perhaps, as you see from the charts there, and didn't do very much more until after the Korean thing, and when the Korean War broke out, the Congress and the people generally were willing to spend money very freely to improve the security of the country and successfully go ahead with the Korean War.

THE PRESS: Mr. Wilson, last Friday the Defense Mobilizer issued a report in which he said flatly, or implied flatly, that the Russians have the H-bomb and they can drop such a weapon on any target in the United States. In view of that statement, do you feel that there should be an increase in Defense expenditures particularly for continental defense? Would that result in your revising your own budget estimates?

SECRETARY WILSON: I think realistically the fact that the Russians have a thermonuclear atomic bomb has to be taken into account, but it was always in the picture as a possibility. I think it is perhaps stretching it a bit to say they've got that ability right now. I think they are three or four years back of where we are, so that to say that from the experimental one in August that they've got bombs ready to drop and airplanes to drop them with, I would personally doubt a little, but I wouldn't doubt that they couldn't do it in X years, whatever you want to say that might be.

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THE PRESS: What is your guess on that, sir? What is X?

SECRETARY WILSON: Oh, I would think about three years would be a fair guess with the way these developments go. It might take them more.

THE PRESS: In other words, you are saying they do not have the hydrogen bomb in a droppable form.

SECRETARY WILSON: That would be my judgment.

THE PRESS: And they do not have the planes that can deliver it.

SECRETARY WILSON: Both of them. You are talking about both of them and you also talk about can they deliver the bomb and can the airplane go back or is it a one-way trip, you see. That gets into the whole question, and I think the reason our people are so excited about it, perhaps, is that we are not used to thinking about an enemy as being able to do anything to us. We have had those oceans between our continent and a possible enemy for 150 years and we aren't like most other nations. The French and the Germans have been looking across the Rhine at each other and they have both had armies for generations, decades, and everyone knew the Russians had a big land army. I don't think we should be too panicky about it.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, how do you feel about Congressman Cole's statement yesterday which got wide publicity in the press?

SECRETARY WILSON: It just happens that I've heard about it rather than read it myself, so I don't think I am in a very good position to comment about it.

THE PRESS: Well, what he said, Mr. Secretary, if I may intervene here, was that he believes we should not plunge into expenditures of ten to fifteen or twenty billion dollars for air defense and that he himself is now willing to foresake the principle of the balanced budget. Do you agree with those views?

SECRETARY WILSON: I think it is too broad a statement for me to say yes or no to. I don't know what time interval he is talking about, and one thing about this defense business, if you could say we could spend X billions of dollars and guarantee a certain kind of a defense that is one thing, but while we know

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that we can improve our systems and equipment for detecting planes that fly over our country and with the cooperation of Canada we could detect planes that might be coming in places where they weren't supposed to be, you still have to, after you identify an unfriendly plane, have some means of destroying it and it is not a completely simple problem. The biggest deterrent to war is the probable realization on the part of the enemy that the way would be very tough and that they probably couldn't win in the long run, and, therefore, why should they precipitate a war.

THE PRESS: If you have a period of three or four years now remaining before the Russians can build and have the means of delivering a bomb, is the present research and development program adequate to make whatever preparations you feel are necessary during this interval?

SECRETARY WILSON: I think that the money will be made available to push ahead with everything that it looks like is desirable and effective to help improve our security, and the security involved is the question of early warning, largely, and along with it, the means for destroying any oncoming bombers, but the biggest thing so far as I am concerned is that I don't want those bombers to ever start. It isn't a question of detecting them after they start because the war is on then, and if the objective of our country is still peace, I think we all ought to keep talking about that rather than stirring up the war business all the time. The objective of our country is peace and we want to establish a condition in the world through the cooperation of our allies and everyone, all men of good will of all nations, so that we won't have another world war.

THE PRESS: Sir, do you subscribe to the theory of the commonly expressed belief that SAC is the single greatest deterrent?

SECRETARY WILSON: There are other deterrents. It is an important one, I'm sure of that. I wouldn't say it was necessarily the single greatest deterrent, though perhaps it might be, but it is sufficiently important that it certainly is part of our whole program. Of course, our NATO allies and our industrial strength of the free world, it all comes back to any aggressor when he actually commits the act of aggression and precipitates a war at that time thinks he can win or thinks that he will have a quick victory and maybe no opposition. I doubt if the people that came across the 38th parallel in Korea ever thought we'd oppose it. I think they thought we'd do a lot of talking but there would be no war.

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THE PRESS: Well, sir, to boil it down, do you think the continental defense problem will mean any substantial increase in the Defense budget next year?

SECRETARY WILSON: What do you call a substantial increase?

THE PRESS: Well, I would call a substantial increase anything above two billion.

SECRETARY WILSON: I don't think we could spend that much.

THE PRESS: You could ask for that much, couldn't you?

SECRETARY WILSON: Oh, yes, we could.

THE PRESS: Would it be a substantial increase in those terms in requests for new appropriations?

SECRETARY WILSON: It won't be that much. You have to remember that the continental defense involves both the interceptor planes and your method of identifying unfriendly airplanes that are in the wrong place. We have considerable continental defense now, I want you to understand, and we also have a considerable radar network. The question is how much we can improve it, how quick?

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, in line with that, you say that we have this unknown factor of X. Do you think we have sufficient time to reach what we might call a state of preparedness within that X factor years? Do we have enough time?

SECRETARY WILSON: We have quite a state of preparedness now and we have a very strong military position. I just said to some of our people yesterday if we just turned around and imagined we were the Russians and started to worry about what the United States might do to us, we'd be more scared than any Americans are now of the Russians.

THE PRESS: Well, in that connection, Mr. Secretary, Mr. Flemming said of our 233 goals to be reached since Korea, only 100 had been attained. Out of the 233 defense goals to be reached, only 100 had been reached more than three years after Korea. You said our defense was great now.

SECRETARY WILSON: Yes. I don't know what he meant by defense goals.

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THE PRESS: He meant plant expansion or industrial expansion goals.

SECRETARY WILSON: Well, of course, some of them were important and some of them weren't.

THE PRESS: Mr. Wilson, you said that we have considerable defense now. Some estimates of our ability to repel a bombing attack ranged from 10 per cent to a maximum of 30 per cent. That is, that we may be able to knock out one out of ten approaching bombers. That seems to be the current estimate. What percentage of effectiveness do you think we ought to have?

SECRETARY WILSON: I don't think anyone has made too good an estimate of what that is. You see, you have to give the Russians credit for having some bombers that I don't think they have.

THE PRESS: In other words, you think we can repel all of them?

SECRETARY WILSON: No, but you know, after all, they flew an old crate into Seoul and set a gasoline dump on fire, an old airplane here about three or four months ago, so that the big thing, of course, is that the first few planes come over, that would be war, and the big thing is do the Russians want war and do they have the ability to really fight a successful war, and could they win finally. I am sure they couldn't.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, is that all part of your reasoning in allowing three years before the Russians have a deliverable bomb and the plane? What could you expect the natural reason behind --

SECRETARY WILSON: Are you talking about one bomb? The Russians certainly aren't going to deliver one bomb with one plane, the first one they get, and start a war with nothing to back it up. In other words, we are talking about the ordinary development cycle of new products.

THE PRESS: What will be the case three years from now, sir? You gave us the three-year estimate. What will they have at that time?

SECRETARY WILSON: I don't know in absolute terms and I don't think I should tell you if I thought I did.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, let me give you a question. We

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are asked on the outside how do you rationalize your statement against Mr. Dean's statement that we only have a year? He said we have to stop the Russian's program within a year. You say three years. How do you resolve that?

SECRETARY WILSON: I don't know.

THE PRESS: Two competent people who know that subject. You say it is a very tough thing.

THE PRESS: Are you both reading the same Intelligence reports or not?

SECRETARY WILSON: I think mine might be better than his.

THE PRESS: At least right now.

THE PRESS: Val Peterson backs up Mr. Dean, Mr. Flemming backs up Dean. Somebody is kidding somebody.

SECRETARY WILSON: Well, perhaps I am a little more technical and factual about the thing. I know that you have to have the right kind of airplanes. You have to have enough bombs before you ever start anything like that. Now, maybe on the other side they could be right in this sense, that in a year they could drop one or two, but they couldn't really fight a war that quick from anything I know about this development business.

THE PRESS: Mr. Wilson, at the risk of being repetitious, do you think within this three-year period that we will be in a state of readiness as far as our continental defenses go in your own mind?

SECRETARY WILSON: I said a while ago that there was no perfect defense.--

THE PRESS: Well, as good a condition as we can get in.

SECRETARY WILSON: -- but it can be greatly improved in the three years. You never finish one of these kinds of things. You are always building up a stronger defense as against the offense, but our country will be very strong also, and the preponderance of production and military strength and scientific knowledge is certainly in the free world and it is not in the communist world.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, do you think Russia could wage

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war right now successfully?

SECRETARY WILSON: No, I do not. They might have some initial victories, and so forth, but they have their trouble, too, you know. That was very clear by their recent difficulties with the East Germans, and so forth. They have held their people down in trying to get a bigger percentage of their production in the military goods to where the people are almost revolting, and that is a great weakness to have some unfriendly satellite people in your rear. And, of course, the thing that makes us as Americans all uneasy about the communism business is that it is a combination of an economic, political and social philosophy, and to some degree they also use it in the place of religion. It takes the place of religion for some of these people. They get fanatical about the business. So that puts some unknown factors into it. However, the hope of many people is that as time goes on, their situation will improve in that they will get farther away from this untenable and final position of universal communism.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, would it be a fair statement of your position that you are not so alarmed about the present continental defense posture of this country that you are not going to go forward now into unbalancing your previous program in order to take on one of these great big new continental defense programs such as Project Lincoln?

SECRETARY WILSON: I think that is a correct statement. You can put it -- some people have used this term. While we could spend our money on a Maginot Line, that wouldn't be the thing that would prevent the war. However, personally I see where we can spend a reasonable amount of money without upsetting our other fundamental defense programs.

THE PRESS: You said you couldn't spend two billion but you say you can spend a reasonable amount. What is that, \$500 million or --

SECRETARY WILSON: Something of that order, perhaps, or a little bit more.

THE PRESS: You are just talking about the next year, are you, sir?

SECRETARY WILSON: Yes. There is no use in talking about what you are going to spend in the next two years on any technique than the whole defense.

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THE PRESS: Are you talking about spending or new money to obligate?

SECRETARY WILSON: The two things drift together over a period of time.

THE PRESS: We are talking about next year.

SECRETARY WILSON: To start out with you often ask for more authority to obligate because the lead time of these things is more than a year.

THE PRESS: And when you are talking about that are you talking about both the radar net and the interceptor fighters, too, when you are talking about these sums of five hundred million or two billion?

SECRETARY WILSON: The fighter program is in there now in part, though it may be changed or modified a little bit.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUARLES: Mr. Secretary, may I interrupt because I feel that in answer to an earlier question you may have been construed as saying, perhaps, something you didn't mean. That was you might have been construed as saying that we were not going ahead with a Lincoln-type of defense, Lincoln laboratory type of defense. That depends on what you mean by the words Lincoln laboratory, but to be construed as repudiating the Lincoln laboratory planning I am sure you didn't mean that.

SECRETARY WILSON: I understood him to mean the sort of 20 billion dollar --

ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUARLES: Talking a \$20 billion Maginot Line is one thing, but I --

SECRETARY WILSON: That is what I thought he meant.

THE PRESS: Perhaps Mr. Quarles could straighten out the points as to defining the difference between the Summer scheme and the Lincoln project. Just where are we on those things?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUARLES: Well, I can't, and I realize that I would have been better off to have kept quiet under the circumstances. The fact is that planning hasn't reached a point where your question can be answered explicitly, and I think the Secretary merely meant to say it would probably not lie in the

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direction of an all-out Maginot Line, \$20 billion kind of a plan. But I think it is very fair to say that the final plan will embody the best of Lincoln Report planning and McGill fence type of planning, and so on, and will be a substantial improvement in the early warning net and the defense along the northern border.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, you placed a sort of three-year estimate on the Russian stockpile of bombs. Did that apply to A-bombs as well as hydrogen bombs, and if not, what about the atomic bomb situation?

SECRETARY WILSON: Well, if you just took the whole atomic energy business, the bomb business, A-bombs and thermonuclear bombs, and said three years from now the Russians will have it, and then ask yourself So what, so what, that in many ways is not too different than saying that they have an army of 200 divisions. You say, so what about that, Or they have the submarines that they got from the Germans at the end of the war. In other words, they are all realities that could be used for military purposes. The final thing is, is there any reason for them to go to war and if they did, wouldn't it be clear to them that they would meet so much opposition that they would finally lose, and the difference between the victor and the vanquished in a war, the vanquished is worse off but the victor loses, too. We have been on the victorious side now in two world wars and we have lost the peace both times, and haven't settled anything. So, you can say the same thing about the third one.

Let's say we did have this big war and it was an atomic kind of war, a terribly destructive one. We finally won. What are we going to do with the Russians that are left? Are we going to turn around and try to build back their industry and resuscitate the whole world? What are we going to do about it? So, I think anyone that looks forward to a war as settling anything is just crazy on the record of history.

THE PRESS: Do you think, Mr. Secretary, that the present people in Russia are sane and do you think they would be deterred by such considerations?

SECRETARY WILSON: I would think they would because they would lose along with it. The dictators that precipitated the last war didn't fare very well in the final windup.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask you a question about the current information here. You sent a directive out from

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your office calling for a tightening up or stiffening of control of progress payments to industry for work it is doing, and I'd like to know what your ideas are on that. There has been a certain amount of criticism from industry on that.

SECRETARY WILSON: A couple of my good friends warned me that I'd get such a question asked me, so I happen to have it here. (Laughter).

THE PRESS: Do you have a copy for me?

SECRETARY WILSON: I first would like to say that this is only a normal kind of a business thing that ordinarily would do, though the tightness of our country's current money situation emphasized the importance of getting at it, and Charlie Thomas, who is the Assistant Secretary for Logistics and Supply, wrote the short memo about the matter some 20 days ago. Apparently it takes about that length of time for one to leak out of the place. (Laughter).

THE PRESS: That's not flattering, is it?

SECRETARY WILSON: One of the reporters said he isn't flattered by that. He thought he was better. I'll just read it to you.

THE PRESS: Is it classified?

SECRETARY WILSON: No. I think I said the other day that there were three kinds of information. One is the military information that you don't want your enemy to know about or your potential enemies or your competitors in this military field, and you think it is to the disadvantage of your country to have the information circulated. There is another kind of information that it just isn't smart to talk about before the issue is settled and something is done about it. In this second category we are in trouble now on this continental defense business, early warning business. We are talking just as if we could move up in Canada and do what we damn please without the Canadians and anything else, and not getting them into it. We are talking too much here. It is getting us in trouble right now. I'd like to tell you that there is an article right here in a current magazine, Collier's -- "Russian Planes are Raiding Canadian Skies".

THE PRESS: Was that your first inkling of that?

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SECRETARY WILSON: It's a cleverly written article. Possibly there is nothing in it to some degree somebody hasn't said before, but the total collection of it gets another kind of an impression out there.

THE PRESS: Is that our fault or is it the Canadians' fault?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUARLES: It is not the Canadians' fault.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, what about the progress papers? Would you mind finishing reading your memo?

SECRETARY WILSON: I'd like to.

THE PRESS: Are you going to read the memo?

SECRETARY WILSON: I am going to read the actual statement that we put out to the Army, Navy and Air Force from Assistant Secretary for Materiel, and the subject was Control of Progress Payments. Here is what we said,

"In view of the need to keep the expenditure of public funds within the statutory debt limit, the military Departments should immediately take all possible measures to maintain a tight and effective control over progress payments and to exert every possible effort consistent with established procurement policies to persuade Defense contractors to utilize private capital and financing rather than government financing to the greatest extent possible.

"This control must be exercised in such a manner as to provide for the replenishment, in accordance with existing contract clauses and regulations, of the working capital of our contractors on a minimum basis commensurate with their actual current production schedule requirements and the minimum inventory lead time for future production under present scheduled requirements."

I think it would have clarified the matter if we had said nothing about the public debt and the statutory debt limit and said it is in line with good business practice. Here is what we should do. Actually contractors, some of them, have gotten a little sloppy about their inventories and as long as it was the government's money and they could ask for it and we dished it out pretty freely, they built up bigger inventories and had slower moving inventories and more money invested because it meant nothing to

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them, and in some cases we found that we had somewhat overpaid the amount of actual work in progress that they attained or we were very close to where with any little misfortune and we overpaid, we'd have our contractor in trouble. So that in line with good business practice we said, well, now, here we've got to tighten this up a little bit and don't overpay anybody when our country is short of money. That is what that says between the lines.

THE PRESS: Does that imply there --

THE PRESS: Why should that statement that went out to the contractors not have been made public to the press at the time?

SECRETARY WILSON: Nobody thought about it. It wasn't any definite change of policy. It was just a tightening up of good business practice.

THE PRESS: Do you mean --

SECRETARY WILSON: No one thought about this being of any special interest to the press or anybody else, and I am sure that everybody is greatly exaggerating the thing now. I saw a ridiculous statement that it might make five billion dollars difference.

THE PRESS: Ten million.

SECRETARY WILSON: Ten million?

THE PRESS: In the interest.

SECRETARY WILSON: No. Five billion dollars, a five-billion dollar guess.

THE PRESS: How much difference will it make, Mr. Wilson?

SECRETARY WILSON: I'd be surprised if it would be more than two or three hundred million, and I'll just give you some weight of it. The total value of a year's aircraft procurement, aircraft and related procurement which includes the parts and everything else, is \$7 billion for this year and \$5 billion would be saving almost a whole year, and there you know that that is just absolutely foolish. All this is intended to do is just take the excess out of the thing, you see.

THE PRESS: Just cut down the over-payments.

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SECRETARY WILSON: That's right. And I don't think there are more than, as I say, two or three hundred million.

THE PRESS: In a year's time?

SECRETARY WILSON: You can only do it once, you see. It is a continuing thing. And the government expects to pay for everything it buys and all that kind of thing. The contractors have been collecting the money a little early.

THE PRESS: Will they have to borrow any money on their own now to compensate for this?

SECRETARY WILSON: Not unless they are very deficient in capital themselves. There might be some concerns that do this, you see.

THE PRESS: Do you expect the effects of this will be confined solely to airplanes?

SECRETARY WILSON: No. But then that is the only area that anybody has talked about. That is probably where most of the excess inventories are.

THE PRESS: How about electronics? Would there be much in there?

SECRETARY WILSON: I don't know of any cases. There might be one or two.

THE PRESS: Mr. Wilson, you discount the statement about the man's profit being wiped out completely?

SECRETARY WILSON: Oh, yes. That's just foolish. If it is so, he is making profits entirely on government money.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, has the Defense reorganization affected the status of your Weapons Systems Evaluation Group? Where does that stand now?

SECRETARY WILSON: The man that was in charge of that has not as yet been replaced and Mr. Newbury and Don Quarles here have been working on where it fits the best in our new organization setup. Would you like to say something about it, Don?

THE PRESS: Will it be continued?

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SECRETARY WILSON: Oh, yes, certainly, and it will be continued with about the same relation it has with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. See, it was a sort of dual setup anyhow in both the military and the civilian side of the family.

THE PRESS: How long has it been without a chairman?

SECRETARY WILSON: The first of September, wasn't it?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUARLES: That's right. Dr. Wilson returned to his university post the first of September, and I think, just adding a word to what the Secretary has said, the plan is to continue the organization and to strengthen its operations and to continue it in its present primary mission as an operations evaluations group for the Joint Chiefs of Staff as its primary function.

THE PRESS: Will it then be under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUARLES: It will not be administratively under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. It will report to the Office of the Secretary of Defense through the Assistant Secretary for Research and Development.

SECRETARY WILSON: In other words, for organization purposes and development of personnel it will report to Mr. Quarles, but the information and the work and the assignments will come from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is about as easy a way to explain it to you as anything. In other words, he will get the personnel together and organize the people to work on this weapons evaluations in line with what the Chiefs of Staff want done.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, to get back to this three-year computation again, we set off our own nuclear or thermo-nuclear reaction apparently last fall. Should we infer it will be another couple of years before we have another?

SECRETARY WILSON: That isn't when we set off the first one.

THE PRESS: It isn't?

SECRETARY WILSON: No. I would rather you did your own guessing on some of this business if you want to do it.

THE PRESS: Mr. Wilson, is there any significance to

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the fact that you and other government officials very carefully refrain from using the word "hydrogen bomb" but call it a "thermonuclear bomb"? Is it or is it not a hydrogen bomb?

SECRETARY WILSON: Well, there is a difference in them. They are a series of bombs coming from the lower end of the atomic scale rather than the high end like the uranium and fissionable ones do, and there is certainly more than hydrogen in them. So, the technicians and scientists, trying to be accurate, call them thermonuclear, which is a broad term to cover the whole business.

THE PRESS: Can we use any other word for the purpose of the newspaper reader other than hydrogen?

SECRETARY WILSON: Why can't you use thermonuclear?

THE PRESS: Can you give us any of the formula?

ASSISTANT SECRETARY QUARLES: I have no desire to change the terminology, if you want to call them hydrogen bombs.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

THE PRESS: I have one more question.

SECRETARY WILSON: One more question.

THE PRESS: I heard through the grapevine that the Defense Department received the Joint Chiefs of Staff's recommendations Saturday night. Is there anything to that?

SECRETARY WILSON: I have to back down on that 20 days, don't I?

. . . The press conference thereupon adjourned at 4:05 p. m. . .

\* \* \*

(#614 - RT)

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

*File 50209-40*

**COPY**

FROM: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON, ENGLAND  
*Original on 11912-40 X*  
 TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification	
RESTRICTED	
File No.	
50209-40	
59	✓

Priority <b>IMMEDIATE</b>	System CYPHER-AUTO	No. 1671	Date October 7, 1953.
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Departmental Circulation  
 MINISTER UNDER/SEC  
 D/UNDER/SEC  
 A/UNDER/SEC'S  
 POL/CO-ORD'N SECTION

Done \_\_\_\_\_  
 Date \_\_\_\_\_

Reference:

Subject:

1. The Daily Express this morning has a silly leader under the heading "an empty chair at Ottawa", commenting on press reports that President Eisenhower is to visit Ottawa to discuss defence problems. The editorial says there is no Canadian military concern which is not equally the concern of Great Britain, and warns President Eisenhower that this consideration "should prevent him from conducting defence talks at Ottawa when his friend Churchill is not there".

2. Unless the argument is kept alive by rebuttal from Canada, I do not think this Beaverbrook line will find much echo or provoke much comment over here. I think the United Kingdom Government's advisers are sufficiently mindful of the mess they have been in for the last two years over the United Kingdom's relationship to the ANZUS arrangements to head off any effort by Lord Beaverbrook to push ministers into an equally embarrassing attempt to interfere in Canada-United States discussions of North American defence problem.

References

Done \_\_\_\_\_  
 Date \_\_\_\_\_

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

3-4-3

710 ml

TO: The Canadian Embassy  
Washington, D. C.

Security: TOP SECRET

No: D-1133

Date: October 7, 1953

Enclosures: One

Air or Surface Mail: Surface Air

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
50209 - 40	580
DeWolfe, R. Adm.	

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference:

Subject: Continental Radar Defence

TOP SECRET

References

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET / REDUIT A SECRET

Returned from WS 4 as per letters 231 13-2-79


Mr. [Signature] Chairman OCT 25 1953

Enclosed for information is a copy of a

Departmental memorandum on this subject, dated October 3, which the Minister circulated yesterday to Cabinet Defence Committee.

[Signature] Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

OCT 22 33 PM



CENTRAL TELETYPE UNIT

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

TOP SECRET

October 3, 1953.

Continental Radar Defence

The object of this paper is to summarize our relations with the United States in this field, in order to provide a basis for discussion of likely developments in the near future.

Presently Authorized U.S. Radar Installations in Canada

2. The biggest project is usually known as PINETREE. This is a joint Canada-United States chain of 33 big radar stations in Labrador and southern Canada (from coast to coast), which was recommended by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and approved by Cabinet in February, 1951. The chain will be fully operational by July, 1954. Its original cost is about \$350 million, of which Canada is bearing one-third. Canada will man (16) of the (33 stations). The stations are big ones and the United States personnel at the 17 stations to be manned by them will total about 2700. The arrangement between the two countries is contained in an Exchange of Notes of August 1, 1951, which has been made public.

3. After the Pinetree chain of 33 stations had been authorized, the United States came up with a proposal for nine additional "gap-filling" temporary radar stations in British Columbia and Ontario. The United States has not yet formally requested permission to build these stations, but is carrying out surveys, which were authorized by Cabinet Defence Committee in February, 1953. Defence Committee said at the same time that the prospective United States request to build these stations will be granted. It is understood that these 9 stations will be paid for and manned by the United States. The United States may ask for leave to put one of the nine stations in Nova Scotia. The 9 stations will fill gaps in the Pinetree chain.

4. In January, 1953, the United States presented an urgent request for permission to build two experimental radar stations (later changed to one) in the Canadian Arctic near Herschel Island. The experiment, first known as Project COUNTERCHANGE and now as Project CORRODE, is designed to demonstrate the feasibility and value, or otherwise, of an early warning system of radar stations in the Arctic. The Canadian Government agreed to permit the United States Government to build this experimental station at United States expense, but made it a condition that the two Governments should establish a Joint Military Study Group, to study those aspects of the North American Air Defence System in general, and the early warning system in particular, which are of mutual concern to the two countries. The Canadian Government's purpose in making a condition was, in part, to ensure that the United States Government would not in future confront the Canadian Government with plans for radar construction in Canada which had not first been studied by a joint Canada-United States body. In order to emphasize this objective, the State Department was told, when it was given in February, 1953, the Note authorizing Counterchange, that the Canadian Government would not be prepared to consider proposals for an Arctic early warning chain until the Canadian Government had had time to consider

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the report of the Military Study Group. The head of the Canadian Section of the Military Study Group (MSG) is AVM Miller, Vice Chief of the Air Staff. The MSG is advised by a combined Canada-United States Scientific Team. Although the MSG has done a great deal of work, it is understood that it will be at least 3 or 4 months before its two sections make final reports to the respective governments.

#### Development of United States Thinking

5. In April, 1952, the President of the United States established a "Panel of Consultants on Armaments" to advise him and the departments concerned with the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

6. The Panel submitted its report in January, 1953, to Mr. Acheson, who made it available for the incoming administration. The report advanced the following theses:

(a) The value of the United States stockpile of atomic weapons is a wasting asset, since before long the point will be reached when the Soviet Union will have produced enough atomic weapons to use against the U.S. in a surprise attack on a scale which would cancel out the advantage the United States now enjoys because of its lead in the production of atomic weapons.

(b) If the American people are to be made aware of the dangerous situation which confronts them, they must be told frankly of the characteristics and probable effects of atomic weapons, and "roughly" the number of bombs available.

(c) The situation is rapidly developing when the *ability to* ~~art of~~ delivering atomic weapons and the ~~art~~ *of defending* the United States against them will become relatively more important than supremacy in the atomic munition field itself.

These views were subsequently given general circulation in speeches and articles.

7. Coincidentally, while the "Panel of Consultants" was at work during 1952, the U.S. Air Force set up at the Lincoln Laboratories of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a "Summer Study Group", composed mainly of university scientists, to take a "new look" at the problem of air defence. The Study Group started out with essentially the same assumptions as were subsequently to be put forward by the Panel of Consultants, and with this as a background of justification, proceeded to develop on paper an extremely ambitious air defence system which would completely cover the northern approaches to the United States.

8. The completion of these two reports in the dying days of the Truman Administration provided an ideal weapon for Civil Defence officials who succeeded in getting the Lincoln Report directly to the National Security Council (the highest defence body) by a "big end run" around the United States Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Out of this incident arose "Project Corrode" (at that time known as "Counterchange"), which the United States Government put up to Canada on the basis of the Lincoln report.

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9. In March, 1953, the fact that "the scientists" were concerned about the inadequate defences of North America, but had an answer to the problem, at a price, first reached the press in a series of five newspaper articles by the Alsop brothers, and in a feature article in the Saturday Evening Post by Stewart Alsop and a scientist named Ralph Lapp. Our Embassy in Washington discussed these articles at the time with the State Department and reported they had not been inspired from official sources but appeared to have been a private enterprise of the Alsops, undoubtedly aided by leaks of classified information.

10. Since March there has been a steady stream of articles in the United States press on the need for improved defences. Most of them have purported to describe arguments going on within the United States Government as to which is the more important, a balanced budget or increased defence forces for North America. Obviously these stories have been fed by leaks of information from official sources. The interesting question is whether they result from a sly campaign on the part of the Government to condition the public to the idea that taxes cannot be cut, or whether, as is more probable, there has been a real difference of opinion within the Government, and the protagonists have been following the good old American tradition of using the press to help quell the opposition.

11. The article of greatest general interest was that by General Bradley (retired Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff) in the August 29 issue of the Saturday Evening Post. He stressed the fact that Canadian agreement and participation in any scheme to improve the air defence system was essential, and proposed the establishment of a Continental Defence Command involving the armed forces of two countries. Finally, he suggested that the matter should be considered by the President and the Prime Minister as soon as possible.

12. During 1953 a series of important committees have worked on the problem of air defence, at the behest of the President, the National Security Council, and others. These are, of course, purely United States Committees. We learnt recently that the reports of all these committees had been brought together in some comprehensive recommendations by the Joint Planning Board of the National Security Council, had been approved by the Chiefs of Staff, and were to be considered by the National Security Council. The Canadian Embassy in Washington reported on September 21 that it had been told in strict confidence by an officer of the State Department something of the contents of this report. Following are extracts from the Embassy's telegram:

"We have been given only in general outline the nature of these recommendations. They are based apparently upon the material produced by the Kelly, Edwards and Bull Committees which had studied the various aspects of the problem, including the requirements of an early warning system, the offensive capabilities of the Soviet Union and the budgetary limitations.

"The principal conclusion of the Planning Board is that the United States does not, repeat not, now have adequate continental defence in relation to the risks of attack. The Board therefore urges that this unacceptable degree of risk

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be reduced by new and increased measures to be worked out in conjunction with Canada.

"The Board finds, in effect, that the security programme of the United States is out of balance, in that insufficient resources have been devoted to continental defence in relation to the resources deployed abroad - notably for NATO, foreign military aid and the purposes of strategic air.

"The Board's recommendation, we were told, does not say precisely what further measures of continental defence should be undertaken. It recognizes that it cannot prejudge project Corrode or the conclusions of the joint Canada - United States Military Study Group which is at present examining the feasibility and relative merits of additional radar systems in various parts of North America. The Board, however, is said to favour the approach reflected in General Bradley's article in the Saturday Evening Post of August 29, when he advocated that aerial defence should be advanced progressively northward rather than that an early warning system should be established in the far north. The Board also argues apparently in favour of increased provision of weapons of interception, including both aircraft and the most modern missiles.

"He was rather vague about the extent of the additional measures for continental defence that might be involved in the Board's recommendations. He said, however, that, if the Board's proposals were accepted, the expenditures involved would not be of the magnitude which have been mentioned in speculative articles in the press; they would, at the most he thought, require an additional expenditure of some \$1.6 billion as the peak in any one year.

"Finally, he emphasized that the recommendations of the Board had been formulated in response to instructions from the President and the N.S.C. to clarify conflicting United States views on problems of continental defence, as reflected in various studies and reports which had come before the N.S.C. He assured us that it was fully recognized that nothing could or should be done without full advance consultation with the Canadian Government. If the Board's recommendation for an increased programme of continental defence were accepted, he thought that there would be a high-level approach to the Canadian Government. He expressed the personal opinion that the President might, for instance, take the occasion of his possible visit to Ottawa to discuss this whole question with the Prime Minister.

"It cannot, of course, be taken for granted that the Board's recommendations will be approved by the National Security Council or the President. Although the National Security Council will apparently be considering recommendations which have been agreed at the staff level, the dilemma of trying to provide for increased measures of continental defence and at the same time balance the national budget will not be easily resolved and the President will be faced with difficult decisions, particularly on the magnitude and timing of further measures."

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It is necessary to stress that the fact that the Canadian Embassy has been given this information by an officer of the State Department must be kept strictly confidential.

13. The National Security Council met on September 24 and the Embassy learned, from the same sources, that no decision had been taken:

"He said that the government had not made any decisions and that, before doing so, would have to await the result of the analysis of the possible cost of alternate methods of strengthening continental defence as well as the budgetary implications of such proposals. This additional information would not be available until December 1. Thus there would be more time than had previously been anticipated for prior consultation with the Canadian Government on those aspects of continental defence that required co-operation with Canada, if they were to be implemented."

#### What will the United States Government ask of Canada?

14. It will be clear from the foregoing that we can only guess at the answer to this question. It is fairly clear that the United States will wish to have more radar defence in Canada, but the order of magnitude is still pretty uncertain.

#### Some Problems for Canada

15. If United States Government policy develops as forecast in this paper, it will, of course, create many serious problems for Canada. The Canadian Government may or may not be convinced, when United States projects are proposed, that they are reasonably necessary when weighed against global strategic factors and political obligations overseas; as well as against the possibility of air attack taking new forms in the next decade. However, it may be very difficult indeed for the Canadian Government to reject any major defence proposal which the United States Government presents with conviction as essential for the security of North America.

16. If new United States defence projects in Canada, and in particular new radar defence, should become inevitable, the Canadian Government will be faced by the question whether Canada should share in the cost and operation of the new projects or whether the United States should be allowed to develop and operate them exclusively with United States money and men. If Canada is to share in these projects, how will that affect the level of future defence expenditures and, in particular, Canada's continuing share of NATO defence in Europe?

17. It is not the purpose of this paper to try to answer, or even discuss, the questions in the preceding paragraph. It does seem, however, that the time has come to start thinking very seriously about them.

#### The Immediate Prospects

18. Despite press stories to the contrary, there is now a good chance that the National Security Council will not take any decisions for a few months. The Canadian Embassy has impressed upon the State Department the serious objection there would be from Canada if the United States Government were to settle its policy, in matters vitally involving Canada, without full prior

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consultation with the Canadian Government. In particular, it would be wrong if the United States Government were to decide on new radar projects in Canada before the Military Study Group has made its report.

19. In the meantime, it is likely that an exploratory meeting will shortly be arranged in Washington between the Canadian Ambassador, General Foulkes and an External Affairs officer from Ottawa, on the one hand, and appropriate members of the State Department and Defence Department on the other. This meeting will provide an opportunity for the Canadian representatives to obtain more information and also to caution the United States representatives against the dangers of premature unilateral United States decision and, what would be even worse, premature public announcement of United States Government desires.

Department of External Affairs,  
October 3, 1953.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: The Canadian Embassy  
Washington, D.C.

Security: TOP SECRET

No: D. 1133

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Date: October 7, 1953

Enclosures: One

Air or Surface Mail: *Surface*

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
50209-40	
59	50

Reference:

Subject: Continental Radar Defence

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUITS A SECRET**

References

Enclosed for information is a copy of a  
Departmental memorandum on this subject, dated  
October 3, which the Minister circulated yesterday to  
Cabinet Defence Committee.

M. H. WERSHOF  
FOR THE

Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

Internal  
Circulation

SIMILAR LETTER SENT TO LONDON, No. D. 1469  
CANAC, Paris. No. D. 566

Distribution  
to Posts

*(Note for file - the enclosure  
is the abridged memorandum  
actually given to Defence  
Committee)*

*Mh*

*American Dir*  
*to note and file*  
*WJB*  
*1908*  
*Refer with enclosure to Mr. Clouston without enclosure to CCOS - (2 copies)*

OTTAWA FILE No. 50209-40
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED

Letter No. 1908  
Date... October 6, 1953

FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.  
TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.....  
Subject: Continental Defence - United States Press Comment.....

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OCT 9 1953

To the all too familiar cries of alarm uttered by the Alsops and a number of other columnists in the United States press, was added this weekend the voice of the Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee Mr. W. Sterling Cole (Republican, New York). In a discussion on the National Broadcasting Company's "Meet the Press" television programme, Mr. Cole said that as a result of information which he had learned in the last two or three months he was "sorely troubled". When questioned as to his views about what should be done in the light of the information which he had received, he urged an additional outlay of as much as \$10 billion a year in defence expenditure (two clippings of a report of Mr. Cole's remarks which appeared in the New York Times of October 5 are attached).

2. At the same time, the Director of Defense Mobilization, Mr. Arthur S. Fleming, in a quarterly report on the activities of his agency, said that "Soviet Russia is capable of delivering the most destructive weapon ever devised by man on chosen targets in the United States." (copies of this report will be forwarded by bag as soon as it is available).

3. It should be noted that some responsible comments are also appearing in the press in the United States urging that the problems of continental defence should be viewed in a more balanced perspective. For instance, Hanson Baldwin, in an article appearing in the New York Times of October 5 (two copies attached), says "oversimplification and exaggeration can be almost as dangerous as overconfidence". Taking issue with comments made by Messrs. Cole and Fleming, Mr. Baldwin also points out that continental defence involves many complex questions apart from dollar expenditure, including important considerations of defence policy, availability of resources and many difficult technical problems.

4. Walter Lippmann also, in his column in today's Washington Post, urges that the problem of continental defence should not be regarded in the oversimplified terms of an armaments race between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. He draws attention to the fact that the defence of many countries, including the allies of the United States, is involved and reminds his readers that if the issue is made to appear as merely one of survival in the atomic age, many countries will be inclined to chose neutrality.

Copies Referred To.....

No. of Enclosures  
*6*

Post File No.....

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*American Dir*  
*to note and file*  
*WJB*  
*1908*  
*with enclosure to Mr. Clouston*  
*without enclosure to CCOS - (2 copies)*

OTTAWA FILE  
No. *50209-40*

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
UNCLASSIFIED

Letter No. ....  
Date.... October 6, 1953.....

FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.....

Subject: ... Continental Defence - United States Press Comment.....

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OCT 9 1953

To the all too familiar cries of alarm uttered by the Alsops and a number of other columnists in the United States press, was added this weekend the voice of the Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee Mr. W. Sterling Cole (Republican, New York). In a discussion on the National Broadcasting Company's "Meet the Press" television programme, Mr. Cole said that as a result of information which he had learned in the last two or three months he was "sorely troubled". When questioned as to his views about what should be done in the light of the information which he had received, he urged an additional outlay of as much as \$10 billion a year in defence expenditure (two clippings of a report of Mr. Cole's remarks which appeared in the New York Times of October 5 are attached).

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Copies Referred To.....

No. of Enclosures  
*6*

Post File No.....

X

- 2 -

He therefore urges that attention be paid to efforts of diplomacy to avert war in order to "offer the outer world a policy which meets its vital need of defense from the devastation that we ourselves are afraid of". A letter in the Washington Post of the same date pursues a similar line of thought (two copies of each are enclosed).

D. P. Murray

Defence Liaison(1)/W.H.Barton/mjr

CONFIDENTIAL

Refer: Washington  
American Division

50209-40

*W.H.B.*  
*7/10/53*  
Ottawa, October 6, 1953.

50209-40	
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Dear Mr. Claxton,

You suggested the other day that it would be useful to have the memorandum prepared by this Department on September 25 relating to press discussion on continental defence brought up to date periodically. Attached, for your information, is a copy of a paper entitled "Discussion in the Press on Continental Defence" which brings information on this subject up to date as of October 5, 1953.

If you find this paper is useful, we will issue further summaries from time to time.

Yours sincerely,

C. S. A. RITCHIE

C. S. A. Ritchie,  
Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

The Honourable Brooke Claxton,  
Minister of National Defence,  
Ottawa.

7.10.4 (js)

50 209-40

wmb

SEEN  
L. B. PEARSON

CONFIDENTIAL

October 6, 1953.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

50209-40	
54	54

Press Discussion - Continental Defence

Mr. Claxton suggested to me the other day that it would be useful to have the memorandum prepared by this Department on September 25 relating to press discussion on continental defence brought up to date periodically. This seemed to me to be a useful suggestion. Attached, for your information, is a paper entitled "Discussion in the Press on Continental Defence" which brings this subject up to date as of October 5, 1953. If you consider it to be useful, I will have further summaries made from time to time as long as the subject is an active one.

I have also sent a copy to Mr. Claxton for his information.

CR.  
C.S.A.R.

7-10-17 (SS) E. an L.

7.10.4 (us)

CONFIDENTIAL

CANADIAN EYES ONLY

Discussion in the Press on Continental Defence

This memorandum is intended to bring up to date the information contained in a paper entitled "Discussion in the United States Press concerning the Need for a Greatly Expanded Air Defence System" prepared by the Department of External Affairs and dated September 25, 1953.

Speculation on what programme the United States Government will decide upon to meet the threat which all writers on the subject seem to agree exists, continued unabated. The consensus of United States press opinion is summarized as follows:

- (a) Operation CANDOR, as such, will not take place, but the President will probably make a speech intended to give the American people the facts of the situation.
- (b) The only immediate measure likely to be adopted is the improvement of early warning facilities by the construction of the McGill Fence.
- (c) Imposition of a sales tax is being considered in order to replace revenues lost by expiration of other tax measures.
- (d) One of the most serious factors limiting the build-up of air defence forces is the lack of manpower.

The most serious breach of security resulted from the publication of an article by William Ulman in the October 16 issue of Collier's Magazine, entitled "Russian Planes are Raiding Canadian Skies". Although many of the statements made in this article were incorrect, it revealed a great deal of information on the existing air defence system which has hitherto been secret.

The "Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists" has devoted its September, 1953, issue to a study of Project EAST RIVER, and purports to be an analysis of the strategy of civil defence. As might be expected, the Bulletin is firmly convinced that the American people need to be awakened to the threat of imminent disaster which hangs over them, and that the continental defence system must be strengthened.

The press in Canada has, for the most part, confined itself to friendly comment on the recent official announcements of the development of the "McGill Fence". The official announcements were, of course, made necessary by the disclosures of Marquis Childs on September 11 and 12.

October 5, 1953.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

*File  
M.H.*

*M.H. Wershof/elb*

TO: ..... FILE 50209 - 40 .....

Security ..... TOP SECRET .....

Date ..... October 6, 1953 .....

FROM: ..... Defence Liaison (1) Division .....

File No.		
50209-40		
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REFERENCE: ..... **DOWNGRADED TO SECRET** .....

**REDUIT A SECRET**

SUBJECT: ..... Continental Radar Defence .....

Yesterday Mr. Pearson decided that our memorandum dated October 3 and consisting of twenty-four paragraphs should be circulated today to Cabinet Defence Committee.

2. With his permission, advance copies were sent to Mr. Claxton and were handed out at this morning's meeting of Chiefs of Staff by Mr. MacKay. Some of the Chiefs were opposed to a paper going to Defence Committee at this stage. They and Mr. Claxton were particularly doubtful of the wisdom of giving Defence Committee at this time the speculation contained in paragraphs 15 to 19. Accordingly, Mr. Pearson decided to delete these paragraphs. The revised edition was prepared, also dated October 3, omitting these paragraphs, and the revised edition was circulated at Defence Committee. Attached is a copy of the revised editions *of the volume*

*M.H.*

Defence Liaison (.) Division

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

TOP SECRET

REDUIT A SECRET

October 3, 1953.

Continental Radar Defence

The object of this paper is to summarize our relations with the United States in this field, in order to provide a basis for discussion of likely developments in the near future.

Presently Authorized U.S. Radar Installations in Canada

2. The biggest project is usually known as PINETREE. This is a joint Canada-United States chain of 33 big radar stations in Labrador and southern Canada (from coast to coast), which was recommended by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and approved by Cabinet in February, 1951. The chain will be fully operational by July, 1954. Its original cost is about \$350 million, of which Canada is bearing one-third. Canada will man 16 of the 33 stations. The stations are big ones and the United States personnel at the 17 stations to be manned by them will total about 2700. The arrangement between the two countries is contained in an Exchange of Notes of August 1, 1951, which has been made public.

3. After the Pinetree chain of 33 stations had been authorized, the United States came up with a proposal for nine additional "gap-filling" temporary radar stations in British Columbia and Ontario. The United States has not yet formally requested permission to build these stations, but is carrying out surveys, which were authorized by Cabinet Defence Committee in February, 1953. Defence Committee said at the same time that the prospective United States request to build these stations will be granted. It is understood that these 9 stations will be paid for and manned by the United States. The United States may ask for leave to put one of the nine stations in Nova Scotia. The 9 stations will fill gaps in the Pinetree chain.

4. In January, 1953, the United States presented an urgent request for permission to build two experimental radar stations (later changed to one) in the Canadian Arctic near Herschel Island. The experiment, first known as Project COUNTERCHANGE and now as Project CORRODE, is designed to demonstrate the feasibility and value, or otherwise, of an early warning system of radar stations in the Arctic. The Canadian Government agreed to permit the United States Government to build this experimental station at United States expense, but made it a condition that the two Governments should establish a Joint Military Study Group, to study those aspects of the North American Air Defence System in general, and the early warning system in particular, which are of mutual concern to the two countries. The Canadian Government's purpose in making a condition was, in part, to ensure that the United States Government would not in future confront the Canadian Government with plans for radar construction in Canada which had not first been studied by a joint Canada-United States body. In order to emphasize this objective, the State Department was told, when it was given in February, 1953, the Note authorizing Counterchange, that the Canadian Government would not be prepared to consider proposals for an Arctic early warning chain until ~~the Canadian Government~~ had had time to consider

- 2 -

the report of the Military Study Group. The head of the Canadian Section of the Military Study Group (MSG) is AVM Miller, Vice Chief of the Air Staff. The MSG is advised by a combined Canada-United States Scientific Team. Although the MSG has done a great deal of work, it is understood that it will be at least 3 or 4 months before its two sections make final reports to the respective governments.

#### Development of United States Thinking

5. In April, 1952, the President of the United States established a "Panel of Consultants on Armaments" to advise him and the departments concerned with the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

6. The Panel submitted its report in January, 1953, to Mr. Acheson, who made it available for the incoming administration. The report advanced the following theses:

(a) The value of the United States stockpile of atomic weapons is a wasting asset, since before long the point will be reached when the Soviet Union will have produced enough atomic weapons to use against the U.S. in a surprise attack on a scale which would cancel out the advantage the United States now enjoys because of its lead in the production of atomic weapons.

(b) If the American people are to be made aware of the dangerous situation which confronts them, they must be told frankly of the characteristics and probable effects of atomic weapons, and "roughly" the number of bombs available.

(c) The situation is rapidly developing when the *ability to* ~~art of~~ delivering atomic weapons and the ~~art~~ *defence* of defending the United States against them will become relatively more important than supremacy in the atomic munition field itself.

These views were subsequently given general circulation in speeches and articles.

7. Coincidentally, while the "Panel of Consultants" was at work during 1952, the U.S. Air Force set up at the Lincoln Laboratories of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a "Summer Study Group", composed mainly of university scientists, to take a "new look" at the problem of air defence. The Study Group started out with essentially the same assumptions as were subsequently to be put forward by the Panel of Consultants, and with this as a background of justification, proceeded to develop on paper an extremely ambitious air defence system which would completely cover the northern approaches to the United States.

8. The completion of these two reports in the dying days of the Truman Administration provided an ideal weapon for Civil Defence officials who succeeded in getting the Lincoln Report directly to the National Security Council (the highest defence body) by a "big end run" around the United States Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Out of this incident arose "Project Corrode" (at that time known as "Counterchange"), which the United States Government put up to Canada on the basis of the Lincoln report.

- 3 -

9. In March, 1953, the fact that "the scientists" were concerned about the inadequate defences of North America, but had an answer to the problem, at a price, first reached the press in a series of five newspaper articles by the Alsop brothers, and in a feature article in the Saturday Evening Post by Stewart Alsop and a scientist named Ralph Lapp. Our Embassy in Washington discussed these articles at the time with the State Department and reported they had not been inspired from official sources but appeared to have been a private enterprise of the Alsops, undoubtedly aided by leaks of classified information.

10. Since March there has been a steady stream of articles in the United States press on the need for improved defences. Most of them have purported to describe arguments going on within the United States Government as to which is the more important, a balanced budget or increased defence forces for North America. Obviously these stories have been fed by leaks of information from official sources. The interesting question is whether they result from a sly campaign on the part of the Government to condition the public to the idea that taxes cannot be cut, or whether, as is more probable, there has been a real difference of opinion within the Government, and the protagonists have been following the good old American tradition of using the press to help quell the opposition.

11. The article of greatest general interest was that by General Bradley (retired Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff) in the August 29 issue of the Saturday Evening Post. He stressed the fact that Canadian agreement and participation in any scheme to improve the air defence system was essential, and proposed the establishment of a Continental Defence Command involving the armed forces of two countries. Finally, he suggested that the matter should be considered by the President and the Prime Minister as soon as possible.

12. During 1953 a series of important committees have worked on the problem of air defence, at the behest of the President, the National Security Council, and others. These are, of course, purely United States Committees. We learnt recently that the reports of all these committees had been brought together in some comprehensive recommendations by the Joint Planning Board of the National Security Council, had been approved by the Chiefs of Staff, and were to be considered by the National Security Council. The Canadian Embassy in Washington reported on September 21 that it had been told in strict confidence by an officer of the State Department something of the contents of this report. Following are extracts from the Embassy's telegram:

"We have been given only in general outline the nature of these recommendations. They are based apparently upon the material produced by the Kelly, Edwards and Bull Committees which had studied the various aspects of the problem, including the requirements of an early warning system, the offensive capabilities of the Soviet Union and the budgetary limitations.

"The principal conclusion of the Planning Board is that the United States does not, repeat not, now have adequate continental defence in relation to the risks of attack. The Board therefore urges that this unacceptable degree of risk

- 4 -

be reduced by new and increased measure to be worked out in conjunction with Canada.

"The Board finds, in effect, that the security programme of the United States is out of balance, in that insufficient resources have been devoted to continental defence in relation to the resources deployed abroad - notably for NATO, foreign military aid and the purposes of strategic air.

"The Board's recommendation, we were told, does not say precisely what further measures of continental defence should be undertaken. It recognizes that it cannot prejudge project corrode or the conclusions of the joint Canada - United States Military Study Group which is at present examining the feasibility and relative merits of additional radar systems in various parts of North America. The Board, however, is said to favour the approach reflected in General Bradley's article in the Saturday Evening Post of August 29, when he advocated that aerial defence should be advanced progressively northward rather than that an early warning system should be established in the far north. The Board also argues apparently in favour of increased provision of weapons of interception, including both aircraft and the most modern missiles.

"He was rather vague about the extent of the additional measures for continental defence that might be involved in the Board's recommendations. He said, however, that, if the Board's proposals were accepted, the expenditures involved would not be of the magnitude which have been mentioned in speculative articles in the press; they would, at the most he thought, require an additional expenditure of some \$1.6 billion as the peak in any one year.

"Finally, he emphasized that the recommendations of the Board had been formulated in response to instructions from the President and the N.S.C. to clarify conflicting United States views on problems of continental defence, as reflected in various studies and reports which had come before the N.S.C. He assured us that it was fully recognized that nothing could or should be done without full advance consultation with the Canadian Government. If the Board's recommendation for an increased programme of continental defence were accepted, he thought that there would be a high-level approach to the Canadian Government. He expressed the personal opinion that the President might, for instance, take the occasion of his possible visit to Ottawa to discuss this whole question with the Prime Minister.

"It cannot, of course, be taken for granted that the Board's recommendations will be approved by the National Security Council or the President. Although the National Security Council will apparently be considering recommendations which have been agreed at the staff level, the dilemma of trying to provide for increased measures of continental defence and at the same time balance the national budget will not be easily resolved and the President will be faced with difficult decisions, particularly on the magnitude and timing of further measures."

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It is necessary to stress that the fact that the Canadian Embassy has been given this information by an officer of the State Department must be kept strictly confidential.

13. The National Security Council met on September 24 and the Embassy learned, from the same sources, that no decision had been taken:

"He said that the government had not made any decisions and that, before doing so, would have to await the result of the analysis of the possible cost of alternate methods of strengthening continental defence as well as the budgetary implications of such proposals. This additional information would not be available until December 1. Thus there would be more time than had previously been anticipated for prior consultation with the Canadian Government on those aspects of continental defence that required co-operation with Canada, if they were to be implemented."

#### What will the United States Government ask of Canada?

14. It will be clear from the foregoing that we can only guess at the answer to this question. It is fairly clear that the United States will wish to have more radar defence in Canada, but the order of magnitude is still pretty uncertain.

#### Some Problems for Canada

15. If United States Government policy develops as forecast in this paper, it will, of course, create many serious problems for Canada. The Canadian Government may or may not be convinced, when United States projects are proposed, that they are reasonably necessary when weighed against global strategic factors and political obligations overseas; as well as against the possibility of air attack taking new forms in the next decade. However, it may be very difficult indeed for the Canadian Government to reject any major defence proposal which the United States Government presents with conviction as essential for the security of North America.

16. If new United States defence projects in Canada, and in particular new radar defence, should become inevitable, the Canadian Government will be faced by the question whether Canada should share in the cost and operation of the new projects or whether the United States should be allowed to develop and operate them exclusively with United States money and men. If Canada is to share in these projects, how will that affect the level of future defence expenditures and, in particular, Canada's continuing share of NATO defence in Europe?

17. It is not the purpose of this paper to try to answer, or even discuss, the questions in the preceding paragraph. It does seem, however, that the time has come to start thinking very seriously about them.

#### The Immediate Prospects

18. Despite press stories to the contrary, there is now a good chance that the National Security Council will not take any decisions for a few months. The Canadian Embassy has impressed upon the State Department the serious objection there would be from Canada if the United States Government were to settle its policy, in matters vitally involving Canada, without full prior

-6-

consultation with the Canadian Government. In particular, it would be wrong if the United States Government were to decide on new radar projects in Canada before the Military Study Group has made its report.

19. In the meantime, it is likely that an exploratory meeting will shortly be arranged in Washington between the Canadian Ambassador, General Foulkes and an External Affairs officer from Ottawa, on the one hand, and appropriate members of the State Department and Defence Department on the other. This meeting will provide an opportunity for the Canadian representatives to obtain more information and also to caution the United States representatives against the dangers of premature unilateral United States decision and, what would be even worse, premature public announcement of United States Government desires.

Department of External Affairs,  
October 3, 1953.

# INCOMING MESSAGE

COPIES ... OF 30 COPIES.

# ORIGINAL

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification
TOP SECRET
File No.
50209-40
59   50

Priority	System CYPHER-AUTO	No. WA-2250	Date October 5, 1953.
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Departmental Circulation

MINISTER  
UNDER/SEC  
D/UNDER/SEC  
A/UNDER/SEC'S  
POL/CO-ORD'N  
SECTION

~~COMM'S SECTION~~

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Done \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

References  
DBI 6 1953

Mr Claxton  
Gen Foulkes  
CAS  
Amesbury  
DL (2)  
Dis. Sect (DRB)  
M

Done *mb*

Date 6/10/53

Reference: My WA-2217 of September 30, 1953.

*Q.12*

Subject: Continental Defence.

Arneson told us that he is hoping to arrange the meeting of consultation in Washington next week, i.e., between the 12th and the 17th. Very tentatively, he said he was hoping that it might be possible to arrange it on Tuesday, October 13. I am passing on this tentative information for use in connection with any plans you may have for sending an official or officials down from Ottawa to the meeting. We will, of course, let you know as soon as any firm date is set.

CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1953 OCT 6 AM 10 : 36

000679

TOP SECRET

Refer: Gen. Foulkes  
CAS  
A/V/M Miller

50209-40

*Done Oct 6 M*  
**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

Ottawa, October 5, 1953

50209-40	
54	50

Dear Mr. Claxton,

Mr. Pearson decided not to submit a formal memorandum to Cabinet Defence Committee for tomorrow's discussion of Continental defence.

However, we have prepared a departmental memorandum which Mr. Pearson will have available for distribution at the Defence Committee meeting if that seems desirable. A copy is enclosed.

I am referring copies to General Foulkes, the Chief of the Air Staff and A/V/M Miller.

Yours sincerely,

C. S. A. RITCHIE

C. S. A. Ritchie  
Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

The Honourable Brooke Claxton  
Minister of National Defence  
"A" Building  
O t t a w a

Defence Liaison(1)/W.H. Barton/mjr  
~~TOP SECRET~~

*Original on 50046-40*

October 5, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

50209-40

Item No. 1 of the Agenda for the Meeting of Cabinet  
Defence Committee of October 6, 1953

CONTINENTAL DEFENCE

Attached for your use is a summary of developments on the subject of continental defence. It seems to me that a most important fact which has emerged from the information obtained both by our Embassy in Washington, and by the Canadian Section of the PJBD is that the United States defence proposals which would affect Canada in the near future are relatively modest - i.e. an early warning line along the 54th parallel. Although the United States authorities still consider a more distant early warning line in the far North to be important, they intend to await the results of Project CORRODE. For the present, the only line being considered for immediate implementation is that along the 54th parallel.

It would seem that the question which requires most immediate consideration arises out of telegram No. WA-2207 of September 28 from Mr. Heeney, in which he reports that Operation CANDOR has been cancelled, although the President may make a single speech on the subject. Mr. Heeney has asked about the question of timing in regard to the proposed meeting of consultation between United States and Canadian officials. He suggests that it would be better to wait for a short time until the United States officials concerned are ready, rather than for Canada to initiate a high level approach requesting information about United States plans for continental defence. In this connection, you might wish to discuss the names of officials from Ottawa who are to attend the meeting in Washington. It is my understanding that it is to be General Foulkes and Mr. MacKay.

*File  
W.H.*

**DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET**

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One other point which the Committee might wish to consider is the desirability or otherwise of including in the 1954-55 Estimates a specific allocation, even if only a token amount, for the construction of an early warning line.

C.S.A.R.

INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL

50209-40  
 WMB

FROM:  
 THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES  
 TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification	
RESTRICTED	
File No. 50209-40	
54	50

Priority	System CYPHER-AUTO	No. WA-2244	Date October 2, 1953.
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Departmental  
 Circulation  
 MINISTER  
 UNDER/SEC  
 D/UNDER/SEC  
 A/UNDER/SEC'S  
 POL/CO-ORD'N  
 SECTION  
 DONE-COMM'S SECTION

OCT 03 '53

Reference:  
 Subject: Continental Defence - Ulman's article in Collier's.

The October 16 issue of Collier's, which went on sale today, carries an article by William A. Ulman entitled "Russian planes are raiding Canadian skies". We immediately checked with the State Department and were told that they had been given advance notice of this publication through the United States Embassy in Ottawa. We also gathered that our own department had been in touch with the United States Embassy about this article.

2. The State Department agrees with us that the publication of this article is deplorable and assures us that none of their people has been in touch with Ulman or knows anything about him. We were again assured that this kind of article, like the ALSOP's, cannot be ascribed to any official inspiration.

Done \_\_\_\_\_  
 Date \_\_\_\_\_

- References
- MND
  - DMND
  - CCOS (2)
  - Sec/Gen
  - American Div
  - Economic
  - DL (2)
  - DRB
  - PTBD - (4)
  - Finance

Done *ml*  
 Date 5/10/53

RECEIVED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1953 OCT 3 AM 9 : 49

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*Full Copy*

TO: Mr. Barton

CONFIDENTIAL

October 2, 1953

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division

50209 - 40
59   ✓

SUBJECT: Continental Defence -- Press Discussion

Mr. Ritchie told me yesterday that Mr. Claxton had told him that he wanted your memorandum of September 25 relating to press discussion "Brought Up To Date." Neither Mr. Ritchie nor I knows just what Mr. Claxton has in mind.

My guess would be that, so long as the subject is being actively debated in the press, Mr. Claxton would like to have about once a week a short memorandum reviewing the principal stories in the press during the preceding week.

I should be grateful if you would take this on and if you would produce your next memorandum on Monday, October 5.

*W*

Defence Liaison (1) Division

cc to Mr. Mackay

Refer Mr. Pearson } Done with B  
Gen Foulkes }  
USSEA

TOP SECRET

File extra copy on 50209-B-40

Washington  
DL(2)  
American  
Sec/Cabinet  
DM Finance  
Maj Gen Spaulding  
R. A. Creech  
A. M. Miller  
Mr. Solandt + file with B

copy on 50209-B-40  
October 1, 1953.

50209-40  
54 | 50

Dear Mr. Claxton,

I believe you will wish to hear of some of the more important developments at the meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence which has just concluded. In accordance with your instructions, I made the statement on joint planning which you had approved. It was received by the United States Section not only with complete understanding of the Canadian position, but also with satisfaction that there was now a mutual understanding of the limited significance to be attached to the planners' reports. The importance placed by the United States Services on the joint preparation of these studies was very evident and further confirmed in my mind the wisdom of your decision

Stemming from the discussions at the meeting of the Board on this item, and from the discussions on the progress of the Military Study Group, General Webster, the Acting Chairman of the United States Section and Mr. Horsey, the new State Department Member, asked Mr. MacKay, Air Vice Marshal Miller and me to join them in an off-the-record discussion of current developments in the United States.

General Webster stated that for over a year the United States Government had been concerned about the fact that in the light of Soviet progress in the development of atomic weapons, United States home defences appeared to be inadequate and out of balance with the United States strategic offensive capabilities. A series of studies on the overall problem of continental defence dealing with such specific aspects as air defence, early warning, and

Honourable Brooke Claxton,  
Minister of National Defence,  
O t t a w a.

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- 2 -

internal preparedness had been made and these in turn had been collated into a report which put forward specific recommendations for action. This report had already been considered by the National Security Council, but had not yet been approved by the President because some of the fiscal and internal political problems involved had not yet been balanced up. He added that the recommendations in the report which dealt with defence questions which affected Canada were modest. He referred to the work of the Military Study Group and stated that so far as the United States was concerned, he hoped that the Joint Conclusion of the Group would be to recommend to the two Governments a southern early warning line in the region of the 54th parallel. He said that in the opinion of the United States authorities, a more distant early warning line in the far north was still considered important but before reaching any conclusion they were awaiting the results of Project CORRODE in accordance with the exchange of Notes on that project. If the tests proved such a distant early warning line to be feasible, and if there were no important new developments to change the situation, some proposals might be made in the future for such a far northern line. However for the present the only line being considered for immediate implementation was that along the 54th parallel.

Mr. Horsey, the State Department Member, then made what seemed to me to be a very significant statement to the effect that the recommendations of the National Security Council report supported the balanced concept as between offensive power and the build-up of home defences. So far as he understood the whole subject he could see no reduction planned for other world-wide commitments. He then commented briefly on Operation CANDOUR. He expressed regret that this scheme had had so much premature and irresponsible discussion in the press, particularly since it involved another Government. He explained that the purpose of Operation CANDOUR was to increase public awareness of the threat and to develop support for the United States Government's actions in putting its defences in order without creating in the process unmanageable political difficulties. He stated that very

- 3 -

much off the record he thought the President was going to make a speech along this line within a week, but he added that he did not think the final decision had been made yet. He was certain that when a decision had been made the Canadian Government would be told. So far as he knew the tenor of this speech was not such that it would unduly alarm the Canadian public.

I expressed appreciation for the information which the United States Section of the Board had just given us on this subject of joint concern to the two countries. I said that we in Canada were satisfied that the decision to set up the Military Study Group and to have it examine objectively and dispassionately the problem of air defence was a sound one. I remarked that it seemed to me that the emergence of the idea of using the relatively simple McGill Fence type equipment in the neighbourhood of the 54th parallel was an important forward step over some of the other more grandiose schemes which had at one time or another been suggested. I then referred briefly to Operation CANDOUR and mentioned the concern of the Canadian authorities that the attempt to awaken the American people to the threat of air attack might have unfortunate consequences by inducing hysteria which would adversely affect the defence programme in Europe and elsewhere, and perhaps make it even more difficult to adopt sensible arrangements of more modest character. Mr. Horsey stated that the United States Government was aware of the danger and expressed confidence that any public statements by the President or Members of the Cabinet would be moderate in tone.

Mr. Horsey also informed us that the President's visit to Ottawa would probably now be proposed for November 12. It seemed to me that in view of the current press speculation on the subject of air defence, the public might expect a statement on this subject at the time of the visit. If so, the Government will no doubt wish to have authoritative information at its disposal at an early date. I therefore discussed with those members of both the Canadian and American Sections of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence who are also on the Military Study

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- 4 -

Group, the desirability of having the latter body prepare an interim report giving its considered opinion on the 54th parallel line so that the Chiefs of Staff in both countries might have it for consideration by October 15. If such action were not taken, the work of the Study Group might well be overtaken by the march of events.

As with previous correspondence on these matters, I am sending copies of this letter to Mr. Pearson and General Foulkes for their information.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) A.G.L. McNaughton

A.G.L. McNaughton.

M.H. Wershop/eib

*Mr. Santor WMB  
a file  
D.L(1)*

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
MEMORANDUM

TO: ~~the Acting Under-Secretary~~  
.....  
.....  
FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division.....  
REFERENCE: .....  
.....  
SUBJECT: Continental Defence.....

Security <b>TOP SECRET</b>		
Date <b>October 1, 1953</b>		
File No. <b>50209 - 40</b>		
<i>54</i>	<i>54</i>	

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REQUIR A SECRET**

Mr. Ignatieff told me today that there is a U.S. document in Ottawa which should be seen by those dealing with this problem. It is identified as NIE 90 of August 27 and was sent by a U.S. authority to Dr. Solandt.

I gather that the Embassy has not seen it, but thinks it is the latest appreciation of the atomic threat to North America.

Should someone talk to Dr. Solandt?

*Yes D.L(1)  
Mr. Mackay*

*M. H. Wershop*  
Defence Liaison (1) Division

*Mr. [unclear]  
I didn't ask Dr. Solandt for the paper, but discussed the situation with him. He didn't seem to think I might see the matter about [unclear].*

M. Wershol/PW

*Please refer to*  
**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

*file copy*

TO: ACTING UNDER-SECRETARY

TOP SECRET

October 1, 1953.

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division

50209-40	
54	54

Continental Defence - Meeting on October 6 of Cabinet Defence Committee.

As there is some thought of this Department submitting a paper to Defence Committee, I have tried my hand at a draft, borrowing liberally from Mr. Barton's past efforts. My draft is annexed, and I will give a copy to Messrs. MacKay and Barton on their return later to-day.

2. It is a long memo and could be shortened. However, in view of the complexity and importance of the subject, I respectfully hope that Ministers might be willing to read a long memo.

3. Paragraphs 20-24 contain opinions which may have to be deleted.

*M*  
Defence Liaison (1)

*Note Mr. C. Ditchie, after consulting K. ...  
said annexed paper should not be put  
in as a Memorandum to CDC, but  
should be reproduced, as a Departmental  
memorandum, & copies made available  
to CDC members at the meeting  
Oct 5 AM*

D R A F T

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TOP SECRET

October 1, 1953.

MEMORANDUM FOR CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE

50209-40  
57

Continental Radar Defence

The object of this paper is to summarize our relations with the United States in this field, in order to provide a basis for discussion of likely developments in the near future.

Presently Authorized U.S. Radar Installations in Canada

2. The biggest project is usually known as PINETREE. This is a joint Canada-United States chain of 33 big radar stations in Labrador and southern Canada (from coast to coast), which was recommended by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and approved by Cabinet in February, 1951. The chain will be fully operational by July, 1954. Its original cost is about \$350 million, of which Canada is bearing one-third. Canada will man 16 of the 33 stations. The stations are big ones and the United States personnel at the 17 stations to be manned by them will total about 2700. The arrangement between the two countries is contained in an Exchange of Notes of August 1, 1951, which has been made public.
3. After the Pinetree chain of 33 stations had been authorized, the United States came up with a proposal for nine additional "gap-filling" temporary radar stations in British Columbia and Ontario. The United States has not yet formally requested permission to build these stations, but is carrying out surveys, which were authorized by Cabinet Defence Committee in February, 1953. Defence Committee said at the same time that the prospective United States request to build these stations will be granted. It is understood that these 9 stations will be paid for and manned by the United States. The United States may ask for leave to put one of the nine stations

- 2 -

in Nova Scotia. The 9 stations will fill gaps in the Pinetree chain.

4. In January, 1953, the United States presented an urgent request for permission to build two experimental radar stations (later change to one) in the Canadian Arctic near *Henshel Island*. The experiment, first known as Project COUNTERCHANGE and now as Project CORRODE, is designed to demonstrate the feasibility and value, or otherwise, of an early warning system of radar stations in the Arctic. The Canadian Government agreed to permit the United States Government to build this experimental station, at United States expense, but made it a condition that the two Governments should establish a Joint Military Study Group, to study those aspects of the North American Air Defence System in general, and the early warning system in particular, which are of mutual concern to the two countries. The Canadian Government's purpose in making a condition was, in part, to ensure that the United States Government would not in future confront the Canadian Government with plans for radar construction in Canada which had not first been studied by a joint Canada-United States body. In order to emphasize this objective, the State Department was told, when it was given in February, 1953, the Note authorizing Counterchange, that the Canadian Government would not be prepared to consider proposals for an Arctic early warning chain until the Canadian Government had had time to consider the report of the Military Study Group. The head of the Canadian Section of the Military Study Group (MSG) is AVM Miller, Vice Chief of the Air Staff. The MSG is advised by a combined Canada-United States Scientific Team. Although the MSG has done a great deal of work, it is understood that it will be at least 3 or 4 months before its two sections make final reports to the respective governments.

Development of United States Thinking

5. In April, 1952 the President of the United States established a "Panel of Consultants on Armaments" to advise him and the departments concerned with the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

6. The Panel submitted its report in January, 1953, to Mr. Acheson, who made it available for the incoming administration. The report advanced the following theses:

- (a) The value of the United States stockpile of atomic weapons is a wasting asset, since before long the point will be reached when the Soviet Union will have produced enough atomic weapons to use against the U.S. in a surprise attack on a scale which would cancel out the advantage the United States now enjoys because of its lead in the production of atomic weapons.
- (b) If the American people are to be made aware of the dangerous situation which confronts them, they must be told frankly of the characteristics and probable effects of atomic weapons, and "roughly" the number of bombs available.
- (c) The situation is rapidly developing when the art of delivering atomic weapons and the art of defending the United States against them will become relatively more important than supremacy in the atomic munition field itself.

These views were subsequently given general circulation in speeches and articles.

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7. Coincidentally, while the "Panel of Consultants" was at work during 1952, the U.S. Air Force set up at the Lincoln Laboratories of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a "Summer Study Group", composed mainly of university scientists, to take a "new look" at the problem of air defence. The Study Group started out with essentially the same assumptions as were subsequently to be put forward by the Panel of Consultants, and with this as a background of justification, proceeded to develop on paper an extremely ambitious air defence system which would completely cover the northern approaches to the United States.

8. The completion of these two reports in the dying days of the Truman Administration provided an ideal weapon for Civil Defence officials who succeeded in getting the Lincoln Report directly to the National Security Council (the highest defence body) by a "big end run" around the United States Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Out of this incident arose "Project Corrode" (at that time known as "Counterchange"), which the United States Government put up to Canada on the basis of the Lincoln report.

9. In March, 1953, the fact that "the scientists" were concerned about the inadequate defences of North America, but had an answer to the problem, at a price, first reached the press in a series of five newspaper articles by the Alsop brothers, and in a feature article in the Saturday Evening Post by Stewart Alsop and a scientist named Ralph Lapp. Our Embassy in Washington discussed these articles at the time with the State Department and reported they had not been inspired from official sources, but appeared to have been a private enterprise of the Alsops, undoubtedly aided by leaks of classified information.

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10. Since March there has been a steady stream of articles in the United States press on the need for improved defences. Most of them have purported to describe arguments going on within the United States Government as to which is the more important, a balanced budget or increased defence forces for North America. Obviously these stories have been fed by leaks of information from official sources. The interesting question is whether they result from a sly campaign on the part of the Government to condition the public to the idea that taxes cannot be cut, or whether, as is more probable, there has been a real difference of opinion within the Government, and the protagonists have been following the good old American tradition of using the press to help quell the opposition.

11. The article of greatest general interest was that by General Bradley (retired Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff) in the August <sup>29</sup>~~18~~ issue of the Saturday Evening Post. He stressed the fact that Canadian agreement and participation in any scheme to improve the air defence system was essential, and proposed the establishment of a Continental Defence Command involving the armed forces of two countries. Finally, he suggested that the matter should be considered by the President and the Prime Minister as soon as possible.

12. During 1953 a series of important committees have worked on the problem of air defence, at the behest of the President, the National Security Council, and others. These are, of course, purely United States committees. We learnt recently that the reports of all these committees had been brought together in some comprehensive recommendations by the Joint Planning Board of the National Security Council, had been approved by the Chiefs of Staff, and were to be considered by the National

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Security Council. The Canadian Embassy in Washington reported on September 21 that it had been told in strict confidence by an officer of the State Department something of the contents of this report. Following are extracts from the Embassy's telegram:

[Quote paragraphs 2 to 8 of WA-2150.] *amended*

It is necessary to stress that the fact that the Canadian Embassy has been given this information by an officer of the State Department must be kept strictly confidential.

13. The National Security Council met on September 24 and the Embassy learned, from the same sources, that no decision had been taken:

"He said that the government had not made any decisions and that, before doing so, would have to wait the result of the analysis of the possible cost of alternate methods of strengthening continental defence as well as the budgetary implications of such proposals. This additional information would not be available until December 1. Thus there would be more time than had previously been anticipated for prior consultation with the Canadian Government on those aspects of continental defence that required cooperation with Canada, if they were to be implemented."

What Will the United States Government Ask of Canada?

14. It will be clear from the foregoing that we can only guess at the answer to this question. It is fairly clear that the United States will wish to have more radar defence in Canada, but the order of magnitude is still pretty uncertain.

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15. As for the kind of new radar that the United States will want as a first priority, the Department of External Affairs can only make a layman's estimate, which is subject to correction by the R.C.A.F. It seems that the United States Air Force (USAF) regards the development of early warning facilities to be <sup>the</sup> most important single requirement, and one which must be met on the highest priority. To meet this requirement the USAF proposes, as a first step, the installation of a warning "fence" along the general line Prince Rupert-Edmonton-The Pas-Churchill-Goose Bay (commonly referred to as the "54th parallel line"), using the Canadian-developed "McGill Fence" equipment. It would be supplemented by a fence running south from Alaska to Edmonton which would link the main warning line with the Alaskan radar system. These fences would be supported on the flanks by picket ships and airborne radar stretching from Hawaii to Alaska and from Newfoundland to the Azores. Taken as a whole, this system, in the opinion of the USAF, would give three hours early warning of the approach of piston engine bombers. In addition, operational research analysis indicates that it would improve the effectiveness of the main radar system by about 30%. Since, by using the McGill equipment it is estimated that the whole of the land portion of the fence can be installed for about \$30-\$50 million (approximately the same cost as one or two standard heavy radars), and the number of personnel required would be very small (the stations operate unattended), the immediate installation of the system is, in the opinion of the USAF, of vital importance.

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16. Of second priority, but equally important in the opinion of the USAF, is the provision of an additional early warning line along the Canadian arctic coastline from Alaska to Greenland. The purpose of this line would

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be to provide a minimum of 3 hours' early warning against the approach of jet bombers. The USAF has reserved judgment on the type of equipment required for this far northern line until the results to be obtained from the "Corrode" experiment are available. If manned radar were to be used, the cost would be very high - possibly \$200-\$300 million, or even more. If, on the other hand, the McGill equipment proved satisfactory, the cost would be much lower.

17. The case for the far northern warning line is much less clear-cut than that for the 54th parallel line, because it would probably make little difference to the efficiency of the active air defence forces and its principal purpose would be to meet the needs of organizations other than Air Defence Command, e.g. Civil Defence, Navy, Strategic Air Command, etc.

18. The Military Study Group is, of course, expected to report on all these matters and it is to be hoped that the United States Government will not reach any decision, and will not ask the Canadian Government to reach any, until the MSG has completed its work.

19. It would not be surprising if United States requests for more radar defence were accompanied or followed by requests for the posting of additional USAF fighter squadrons in Canada and the location in Canadian border cities of United States anti-aircraft guided missile battalions. These possibilities are mentioned here only because they will be logical developments of a United States Government decision (if such a decision is made) to spend more money and effort on air defence pointed north.

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Some Problems for Canada

20. If United States Government policy develops as forecast on this paper, it will, of course, create many grave problems for Canada. The Canadian Government may or may not be convinced, when United States projects are proposed, that they are reasonably necessary when weighed in the balance of world prospects and obligations. ~~However, it is very difficult for the Canadian Government to reject any major defence proposal which the United States Government presents with conviction as essential for the security of North America.~~ <sup>and</sup> the possibility of air attack taking new forms in the next decade. However, it may be very difficult indeed for the Canadian Government to reject any major defence proposal which the United States Government presents with conviction as essential for the security of North America.

21. If new United States defence projects in Canada, and in particular new radar defence, should become inevitable, the Canadian Government will be faced by the question whether Canada should share in the cost and operation of the new projects or whether the United States should be allowed to develop and operate them exclusively with United States money and men. If Canada is to share in these projects, how will that affect the ~~tax~~ level of future defence expenditures and, in particular, Canada's continuing share of NATO defence in Europe?

22. It is not the purpose of this paper to try to answer, or even discuss, the questions in the preceding paragraph. It does seem, however, that the time has come to start thinking about them.

The Immediate Prospects

23. Despite press stories to the contrary, there is now a good chance that the National Security Council will not take any decisions for a few months. The Canadian Embassy has impressed upon the State Department the serious objection there would be from Canada if the

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United States Government were to settle its policy, in matters vitally involving Canada, without full prior consultation with the Canadian Government. In particular, it would be wrong of the United States Government to decide on new radar projects in Canada before the Military Study Group has made its report.

24. In the meantime, it is likely that an exploratory meeting will shortly be arranged in Washington between the Canadian Ambassador and General Foulkes, on the one hand, and appropriate members of the State Department and Defence Department on the other. This meeting will provide an opportunity for the Canadian representatives to obtain more information and also to caution the United States representatives against the dangers of premature unilateral United States decisions and, what would be even worse, premature public announcement of United States Government desires.

Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Department of External Affairs,

October , 1953.

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

*file 50209-40*

*Original on 50219D40*

**COPY**

**FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES**

**TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA**

Security Classification	
UNCLASSIFIED	
File No.	
50209-40	
54	✓

Priority <b>IMPORTANT</b>	System <b>EN CLAIR</b>	No. <b>WA-2223</b>	Date <b>September 30, 1953.</b>
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Departmental Circulation  
MINISTER UNDER/SEC D/UNDER/SEC A/UNDER/SEC'S POL/CO-ORD 'N SECTION

Reference:

Subject:

Following is a transcript of the President's remarks on the subject of the H-Bomb at his press conference to-day. This transcript was made available to us on the understanding that it has not (repeat not) been cleared by the President's office and that we will not (repeat not) use it to quote the President direct:

Text begins:

Question:-- (Will) this country's awareness of the Russians' ability to manufacture the H-Bomb have any effect on his plans for the nation's defenses?

Answer: We are, quite naturally. This is a material and physical fact of the utmost importance to the world. Particularly, it makes us more interested than ever in determining just what are the intentions of the USSR and their associated countries honestly attempting to reach some kind of negotiated situation with the United States in which all of us can have confidence. Now the knowledge that they have this bomb is, of course, an acute one for the Defence Department. I should say that it is a fact that is probably causing each of us more earnest study, you might say almost prayerful study, than any other thing that has occurred lately; and I might say in connection with that, that I do hope when I can get straightened out in my own mind and with my advisers exactly how we should approach this whole subject in the inter-related subject of the international situation, the relief of tensions in the world and this growing destructiveness of the world's armaments. When I can get that all straightened, I expect to go before the United States and tell them (to be very frank in telling) the facts on which my studies have been based and the conclusions that the administration and I have reached. Just when this can be done I am not prepared to say because it is very, very intricate and any attempt to do this is very apt to react in a number of ways. But we have friends abroad. We must be very careful that they understand always. We have one intention in the world-peace. We

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References  
*to all who got telegrams or contacted defence. Done M*

Done \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Done \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

- 2 -

don't want any harm and anyone who has had certainly the kind of experience with war that I have can say this with such passion, almost, as to put war at the very last of any possible solutions to the world's difficulties. I believe we have gone far enough in this. You could say that the only possible tragedy greater than winning a war would be losing it. Just war is-should be-out from the calculations of all of us and we should proceed from there.

Now, we want all of our friends to understand this thoroughly but we have to talk from positions of strength because we have to take rudimentary precautions for our own security. We will not quail from any sacrifice necessary to provide that security. If you don't look out these intentions are misunderstood, and badly misunderstood. They say we are- we are pugnacious or we are impulsive or we have lost our faith in the conference table. Now those things are far from the truth. They are the contrary to the truth and so we must be very careful. Another thing is, you don't want to frighten anyone to death in this world. As I have said to you before, frightened people cannot make good decisions. So you have to understand our own strength, a strong free world, a strong America, at the very same time that you are weighing also our dangers and our risks. So, after this very round-about way of answering your question, the fact is that anyone would be foolish to try to shut our eyes to the significance of the event of which you speak.

Text ends.

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INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL

COPY 1 OF 21 COPIES

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

TOP SECRET

File No.

50209-40

59 50

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Priority

System

No. WA-2217

Date September 30, 1953.

CYPHER-AUTO

Departmental Circulation

MINISTER  
UNDER/SEC  
D/UNDER/SEC  
A/UNDER/SEC'S  
POL/CO-ORD'N  
SECTION

Reference:

Subject: Continental Defence - United States Arrangements

To help understand the reports I have been sending on the consideration currently being given by the United States Government to the possibility of increased measures of continental defence, and in particular the arrangements proposed by Arneson for consultation with the Canadian Government before decisions are taken on the United States side, I thought it might be useful to summarize my understanding of arrangements for handling continental defence questions in Washington.

2. Any such new defence measures would, of course, require the authority of the President, and ultimately of Congress through the granting of appropriations. The President, before making decisions on important questions affecting national security, obtains the advice of the National Security Council, established under the National Security Act of 1947 (amended in 1949) to "advise the President with respect to integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security". The present members of the Council are the following:

- Secretary of State (Dulles)
- Secretary of Defence (Wilson)
- Secretary of the Treasury (Humphrey)
- Director of Foreign Operations' Administration (Stassen)
- Director of Defense Mobilization (Flemming)

3. In addition to the above Council members, the following attend as advisors:

- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford)
- Director of Central Intelligence (Allen Dulles)
- Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Planning (C.D. Jackson).

4. For staff functions at the Council meetings Robert Cutler, Administrative Assistant to the President, always attends together with some assistants.

5. To help prepare recommendations for the consideration of the Council, the President established

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Done

Date

References

- PM
- Min D
- En D
- cccs(2)
- Sec Cab
- DR France
- DR Def. Prod.
- Chanc DR B
- PJBD (4)
- Amer Div
- Econ Div
- DL (2)
- Chanc. Paris
- Can House

Done

Date

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the National Security Council Planning Board. Its chairman and principal executive officer is Robert Cutler; its other members are: State, Robert Bowie; Treasury, Andrew Overby; Defense, Frank Nash; Foreign Operations Administration, Frank Roberts; ODM, William Elliott; Joint Chiefs of Staff, Major General Gerhart; Central Intelligence, Robert Amory, Jr.; Psychological Strategy Board Adviser, George Morgan.

6. Departmentally, the principal departments concerned with day-to-day handling of continental defence questions are State and Defense Departments with the Treasury and the Bureau of the Budget being continually consulted on budgetary implications. The relations of myself and members of my staff lie primarily with the Secretary of State (Dulles), the Under-Secretary of State (Bedell Smith), and the Deputy Under-Secretary (Freeman Mathews) on high-level matters; at the middle level we deal with Assistant Secretary Livingston Merchant and with Raynor, the Director of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs; and at the lower level with Horsey and Wight, who handle day-to-day affairs, including those conducted through the PJBD.

7. As continental defence involves defence measures against atomic weapons and the possibility of retaliatory use by the United States of atomic weapons, we have kept in constant touch with R. Gordon Arneson whose title is Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. He is the senior officer in the State Department handling all aspects of atomic energy matters. In this capacity he is the United States Secretary of the Combined Policy Committee, the principal liaison officer with the Defense Department and the U.S.A.E.C. on atomic energy matters - civil as well as military - and has been used in a staff or advisory capacity by the Planning Board of the National Security Council.

8. The specific arrangements for consultation which he has proposed arise from the agreed minute initialled by Mr. Acheson and yourself at the State Department on June 14, 1951. This minute, as you know, provides for frequent consultations between Canadian and United States representatives at the top level in Washington (without commitment to either government) on developments which might give rise to the use of atomic weapons. What, in effect, is now proposed is that these consultations should be revived, taking as a point of departure the appraisal by the military and civil officials of the new administration of the threat of war generally and to North America in particular, in the light of what they have learnt about Soviet atomic capabilities.

9. The composition of these meetings of consultation has been rather flexible. At least two have been attended by the Secretary of State himself; most have been attended by the Deputy Under-Secretary of State (Mathews), the Director of Policy Planning (now Bowie, formerly Nitze), Arneson and one or two other State Department officials on the United States side. On the Canadian side, you went to the meeting at which the minute was signed, otherwise the Canadian Ambassador and one or two Embassy officials attended. Since these arrangements have been so flexible, there is no reason why the attendance should not be arranged in a manner which may be acceptable to both sides, including appropriate military as well as civil representation.

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10. This background also explains why Arneson wishes to consult Freeman Mathews before seeking the authority of the Secretary or the Under-Secretary to revive the meetings of consultations with us, as neither Dulles nor Bedell Smith are familiar with the arrangements made under the preceding administration. I think it is in our interest to have Arneson follow the procedure he suggests. It would not only meet our immediate need for information on the plans for additional measures of continental defence now under consideration, it would also have the additional advantage of reviving the procedures for continuing consultation which have so far not been employed since the new administration took over.

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CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1953 SEP 13 PM 3 : 11

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INCOMING MESSAGE

50209-40 fls

NO. 1 OF 27 COPIES

ORIGINAL

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**

**REDUIT A SECRET**

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

**TOP SECRET**

File No.

50209-40

54 (2)

Priority <b>IMPORTANT</b>	System <b>CYPHER-AUTO</b>	No. WA-2207	Date September 29, 1953.
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Reference: Your EX-1613 of September 28, 1953.

Subject: Continental Defence.

Following for the Minister, Begins:

Thank you for your very helpful message. I was also anxious about the possible impact upon Canada of the President's speech projected under "Operation Candor" for October 4 and asked Ignatieff to discuss the possibility of advancing the timing of the proposed senior officials meeting with Arneson. Arneson showed Ignatieff in confidence a memorandum from the White House dated September 28 cancelling "Operation Candor", as a "series of connected and integrated weekly talks". The memorandum said that the President "may" deliver a single speech on the subject, but that no final decision had been taken on such a speech or the "what, when or whether" of it. Arneson explained that, while the idea of the President himself speaking had not been dropped, the main purpose of any address would be to give the public a sober appraisal of the threat resulting from recent developments in Soviet atomic capabilities so as to allay exaggerated anxieties that the Alsops and other columnists have been playing on in recent articles.

2. In fact, the White House memorandum sarcastically apologized for using the old-fashioned and regular channel of an inter-departmental memorandum instead of the Alsop column. Arneson said that government officials had been annoyed by the assumption by the Alsops and a few others of the self-appointed role of Jeremiah on the subject of the nation's defence against air attack. He was unaware of any official support for this press campaign. He thought that some encouragement might have been given to the Alsops from private individuals and organizations interested in developing support for voluntary civil defence and from some scientists connected with the East River project and similar studies.

3. As to the timing of the projected meeting of consultation, Arneson recognized the desirability of arranging this as soon as possible. The delay in arranging the meeting is apparently not only connected with Mathews' return, but also with the preparation of the information which would be passed to the Canadian

Departmental Circulation

MINISTER 2

UNDER/SEC 3

D/UNDER/SEC 4

A/UNDER/SEC'S 5

POL/CO-ORD'N 6

SECTION

*Parsons 2?*

*Copy # 7*

*Justy.*

Done

Date

References

PA

AMND

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ccos(2)

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London

DR Finance

DR Def

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P5BD(4)

Done

Date

.....2

- 2 -

representatives at this meeting. It is also necessary to obtain authorization at the highest level for the passing of certain information connected with Soviet atomic capability. He hoped, however, to be able to tell us some time this week when arrangements could be made for the meeting.

4. The information contained in the White House memorandum about "Operation Candor", I suppose, makes some difference to our own views on timing. I agree that we should try to have the meeting as soon as possible. The question of procedure seems to boil down to this: should we wait until the officials here feel that they are ready for consultations with us, or should we make a high-level approach requesting information about United States plans on continental defence? I believe that the former procedure would yield better results, provided, as you say, that, meantime, we keep in close and continuous touch with the United States Government at every possible level.

5. Arneson also threw a little more light on the results of the discussion on continental defence at last week's Security Council meeting. He said that the government had not made any decisions and that, before doing so, would have to await the result of the analysis of the possible cost of alternative methods of strengthening continental defence as well as the budgetary implications of such proposals. This additional information would not be available until December 1. Thus there would be more time than had previously been anticipated for prior consultation with the Canadian Government on those aspects of continental defence that required cooperation with Canada, if they were to be implemented.

6. Incidentally, the columnists, including the Alsops, are now describing the new plans for continental defence which are supposed to be under consideration in Washington in much more moderate terms. Reston, in his article in the New York Times of September 25, said that "continental defence expenditures against the possibility of airborne and submarineborne atomic attack will be increased - probably by considerably less than \$1 billion of new money - but all dramatic continental defence plans -- will be postponed or rejected". Alsop, in his column on September 28, said that "since the final decisions have not been taken, it is too early to say what manner of animal all this laboring of mountains may produce. But it begins to seem that the end result may be a mouse - a rather large mouse, but a mouse all the same". He added, "at least for the first year, the cost of the radar installations alone should be no more than a fraction of a billion dollars". Ends.

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Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*  
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1983 SEP 12 3 PM 2 " 000710

copy in 50286-40 file on 50209-40

Statement by Dr. O.M. Solandt,  
Chairman, Defence Research Board.

WAB

50209-40  
54154

What has been referred to in the press as "The McGill Fence" is an early warning device that has been under intensive development during the last eighteen months. Details of the device are naturally secret. However, it can be said that it is not a substitute for a chain of radar stations but is intended to supplement such a chain.

Development of the device has been directed by the Defence Research Board. Professor G. A. Woonton, Chairman of D.R.B. Electronic Advisory Committee, Dr. J. S. Foster, former Chairman of D.R.B. Electronic Research Panel, Dr. W. B. Lewis of Chalk River, Dr. G. S. Field, Chief of Division A, and Mr. L. G. Eon, a senior scientific officer of D.R.B., are those that have been principally concerned with the work. The first stages of the search for a cheaper and more effective early warning device involved three laboratories: the Radio Physics Laboratory of the Defence Research Board under Mr. J. W. Scott, the Radio and Electrical Engineering Division of the National Research Council under Mr. B. G. Ballard, assisted by Dr. D. W. McKinley, and the Eaton Electronics Research Laboratory at McGill University which is under the direction of Professor G. A. Woonton. Later the work was centralized at the Eaton Electronics Laboratory with financial support from the Defence Research Board and under the direction of Professor Woonton and Mr. Whitehead. The actual experimental equipment that is now being tested was manufactured by RCA Victor Company of Montreal under the direction of the Eaton Laboratory. The unusual speed with which the development has been carried through has been largely due to the initiative of Mr. Eon and a remarkable cooperation of all the agencies concerned.

A number of these stations have been installed experimentally to determine their operational capabilities. Trials have been going along all summer and have shown that this equipment can be used to provide a warning system that can be installed at comparatively low expense in terms of money, materials and manpower. All the equipment can be manufactured in Canada.

more.....

- 2 -

United States authorities have been in on this from the beginning and have shown great interest in the results achieved.

Both development work and further trials are still proceeding.

It should be emphasized again that even if this equipment proves to be as effective as would appear likely, it is not a substitute for a radar chain but would provide an additional device for obtaining early warning of the approach of aircraft. The indications are that this is likely to constitute a considerable advance in our capacity for protection against air attack.

(30)

Security **TOP SECRET**

50209-40

MESSAGE FORM

~~DOWNGRADED TO SECRET~~  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

File No.	
50209-40	
32	58

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST, CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Message To Be Sent	No.	Date	For Communications Section Only
PLAIN CYPHER	EX-1613	September 28, 1953.	<b>SENT</b> SEP 28 1953
PLAIN			
CODE			
CIPHER			

REFERENCE: Your telegrams 2172 and 2179 of September 24, and 2195 of September 25, 1953.

SUBJECT: Continental Defence.

**AUTO**  
 Priority X

**IMPORTANT**

ORIGINATOR  
 (Signature)  
 L. B. Pearson  
 (Name Typed)

APPROVED BY  
 (Signature)  
 L. B. PEARSON  
 (Name Typed)

Internal Distribution:  
 S.S.E.A. U.S.S.E.A.

Done: *MAL*  
 Date: *Sept. 29/53*

Copies Referred To:  
 Prime Minister  
 Mr. Claxton  
 D/M, Nat. Def.  
 Chm., Chiefs of Staff  
 Sec. Cabinet

*See page 3*

Done: *Sept 29*  
 Date: *MN*

Following for Heeney from the Minister, BEGINS:  
 I have been very much interested in your messages, about which I commented with you on Saturday morning on the telephone. I am also glad that you have been able to take advantage of your meeting with the Secretary of Defence to make known our apprehensions over certain possible developments in regard to continental defence. The United States Government should be as aware as we are of the importance of this question to Canada and of the inadvisability of making any plans or general statements about it which would embarrass us and, indeed, complicate any ultimate arrangements which may have to be made.

2. Mr. Claxton has done a memorandum on the subject for the Prime Minister, expressing his worries, a copy of which has been forwarded to you. He has also had a number of talks with General McNaughton, officials of this Department, and the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, as well as with myself. We are all very much aware here of the difficulties, and even the dangers ahead if wrong impressions are created by articles along the lines of those emanating from the Alsops.

28.9.34(05)

- 2 -

3. While we should keep in close and continuous touch with the United States Government on these developments at every possible level, Mr. Claxton and I both agree with you that a visit at this time to Washington by either of us, or a visit by Mr. Wilson here, would excite too much interest and arouse unnecessary speculations. I think, however, that a meeting along the lines suggested in paragraphs 4 and 5 of your telegram 2195, reporting on your talks with Arneson, would be most helpful, though we might wish to send someone from Ottawa from External Affairs on the 2 official level to attend such a meeting along with General Foulkes. Such a meeting should, I think, be held as soon as possible. We would like it to take place far enough in advance of the President's address to permit the possibility of the meeting influencing the address; this may mean having the meeting this week before Freeman Mathews returns (which you expect at the end of the week).

4. The line we should take with them would, of course, be to assert that since they did not know what they wanted or might want and we did not know yet what we wanted or might want, we should wait until the work of the Military Study Group is more advanced (which might be mid-October) and such other consideration as the subject warranted, and arrive at an agreed policy before making public statements which would create a public opinion which would circumscribe and even terminate all possibility of freedom of action in working out the best programme to meet our need. Although the Military Study Group may still have a few months' work to do, we hope to have a tentative report from the Canadian section by October 15.

5. I hope that Arneson or someone else will be able to let us have an advance copy of the President's address on defence problems, now proposed for October 4, on the assumption that this address will deal with matters of direct and essential interest to Canada. If, however, the address is general in character and could not be related to Canada, directly or indirectly, then

... 3

while welcoming knowledge of its contents, we would have no particular claim to such knowledge in advance. However, for the President to refer to matters in this address which could only be implemented with the co-operation of Canada, and without our advance knowledge, and without the prior consultation which would be rendered necessary in these circumstances, might cause very considerable embarrassment and add to the difficulties on both sides of the border in subsequent discussions of this vitally important matter. ENDS. MESSAGE ENDS.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Also referred to  
DM Refund  
DM Finance

D R B

P J B D

London

Deleg to NATO Paris

Amn Div

Econ Div

DL2

MW Sept 29

Security ..... TOP SECRET .....

*Comments  
please  
return to  
Wershof*


# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

File No. 50209 - 40	
30	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST, WASHINGTON, D.C.

~~DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET~~  
~~REDUIT A SECRET~~

Message To Be Sent AIR CYPHER EN CLAIR CODE CYPHER <b>AUTO</b>	No. <i>EX-1609</i> Date <i>25</i> September 25, 1953	For Communications Section Only <b>SENT SEP 28 1953</b>
Priority ..... ORIGINATOR ..... (Signature) M.H. Wershof/elb (Name Typed) Div. D.L.(1) Local Tel. 3402	REFERENCE: Your WA-2172 of September 24  SUBJECT: Continental Defence  Following from Acting Under-Secretary, begins;  Following is text of memorandum sent by Mr. Claxton to the Prime Minister dated September 23, begins:  (Communications: Please insert attached text)  2. Your telegrams are being sent to Mr. Claxton and of course will be shown to Mr. Pearson on his return. Ends.	
APPROVED BY  (Signature) ..... (Name Typed)	SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.	
Internal Distribution: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.	Done. <i>W</i> Date. <i>Sept 28</i>	
Copies Referred To: ..... ..... .....	Done. .... te. .... xt. 97 (Rev. 1/52)	

RECEIVED  
EXTRADITION  
AFFAIRS

1953 SEP 26 AM 11:20

000717

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER  
FOR CANADA, LONDON

Security: TOP SECRET

No: 1432

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Date: September 28, 1953

Enclosures: 6

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Post File No:

Reference:  
Subject: United States-Canada Discussions  
on Continental Air Defence

Ottawa File No.	
50209-40	
SY	SD

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

FILE COPY

References

This subject has become very active recently and is likely to remain so. Enclosed are copies of some recent telegrams and one memorandum, as follows:

- WA-2150 of September 21 from Washington;
- WA-2172 and WA-2179 of September 24 from Washington;
- WA-2195 of September 25 from Washington;
- Departmental Memorandum, dated September 25, entitled "Atomic Warfare and United States Defence Policy";
- EX-1613 of September 28 to Washington.

2. We shall endeavour to keep you informed of future developments in this subject.

M. H. WERSHOF

FOR THE

Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Internal Circulation

(Note for file -  
Acting US State  
authorized this  
for London  
& Canada)  
HW

Distribution to Posts

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER Defence Liaison(1)/M.H.Wershof/  
mjr

TO: DELEGATION OF CANADA TO THE  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, PARIS

Security: TOP SECRET

No: 554

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Date: September 28, 1953

Enclosures: 6

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Reference:  
Subject: United States-Canada Discussions  
on Continental Air Defence

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.	
50209-40	
54	50

References

FILE COPY

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- EX-1613 of September 28 to Washington.

2. We shall endeavour to keep you informed of future developments in this subject.

M. H. WERSHOF

FOR THE

Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

Internal  
Circulation

Distribution  
to Posts

Defence Liaison(1)/M.H.Wershof/mjr  
TOP SECRET

Refer: Chairman, Chiefs of Staff  
Washington  
American Division  
D.L.(2) & Pol.Coord.Sec.

50209-40

*L. Ritchie*  
29.9.53

Ottawa, September 28, 1953.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

50209-40  
3 2 50

Dear Mr. Claxton,

Continental Air Defence

Enclosed are two memoranda, dated September 25, which I gave to Mr. Pearson on Saturday. The titles are "Discussion in the United States Press concerning the need for a greatly expanded Air Defence System" and "Atomic Warfare and United States Defence Policy".

I am sending copies to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, and to Mr. Heeney in Washington.

Yours sincerely,

*C.S.A. Ritchie*

C.S.A. Ritchie.

The Hon. Brooke Claxton, M.P., Q.C.,  
Minister of National Defence,  
Ottawa.

28.9.53 (us)

# INCOMING MESSAGE

50209-40

# ORIGINAL

COPY NO. 1 OF 21 COPIES.

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS CANADA

**SECRET**

Security Classification

**TOP SECRET**

File No.

50209-40

58 50

Priority <b>IMPORTANT</b>	System CYPHER-AUTO	No. WA-2195	Date September 25, 1953.
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Departmental Circulation

MINISTER 2

UNDER/SEC 3

D/UNDER/SEC 4

A/UNDER/SEC'S 5

POL/CO-ORD'N 6

SECTION

Reference: My WA-2172 of September 24.

Subject: Continental defence.

The lunch which Ignatieff and I had with Arneson today gave me an opportunity of impressing upon him (as I had on Secretary Wilson yesterday) the vital importance to Canada of decisions on continental defence, and to discuss informally procedures which might be followed in enabling Canadian authorities to be informed of United States thinking and plans before any new proposals are put forward.

2. I told Arneson of my talk with Secretary Wilson, as reported in my WA-2179 of September 24. I repeated to him in some detail what I had said to the Secretary of Defense about the way in which any decisions which the United States Government might ultimately take would affect most important national considerations in Canada. I told him that I would assume that the State Department as well as the Defense Department would now be fully alive to the necessity of giving full information to the Canadian Government and consulting us before any new proposals were put forward officially.

3. Arneson readily agreed that I could proceed on this assumption. He said that, rather than have the initiative come from the Canadian side requesting such information and co-operation, it would be preferable if the initiative should come from the United States side. In the light of the history of Canada-United States co-operation in continental defence, he thought that there might be three phases in joint action on this matter:

(a) a joint analysis of the general considerations affecting the risks of war, renewing the earlier series of meetings of consultation;

(b) a United States appreciation of Soviet atomic net capabilities in the light of the most recently acquired information resulting from this year's Soviet atomic tests; and

...2

*Summ. 21*

References

P.M.

~~MURND~~

~~BRUND~~

~~ccos - 2 conf.~~

~~DR of Ref Prod.~~

~~DR Rince~~

~~atty in Byge~~

~~clerk DRB~~

~~PJBD (4)~~

~~Amica~~

~~Economic~~

~~DLG~~

~~Sec Cabinet~~

*M*

Done *JWR*

Date *26/9/53*

(c) an exposition of the measures of continental defence which the United States authorities were considering in the light of (a) and (b).

4. As to procedure, the three phases might be compressed into one meeting attended by a few senior officials of the Departments of State and Defense which had joint responsibility in the matter. For instance, a meeting might be arranged, at which attendance for the United States, would include the Under-Secretary or his deputy, the Director of Policy Planning Staff, and Arneson for the State Department, and representatives of the Secretary of Defense and United States Chiefs of Staff. Arneson agreed that if such a meeting were arranged, it would certainly be desirable to have the Chairman of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff in addition to myself. This would seem to me to be a sensible procedure at this stage and one that would suit our purposes.

5. As the next step towards arranging such a meeting, Arneson said that he would like to consult the Deputy Under-Secretary, Mr. Freeman Mathews, who is thoroughly familiar with the meetings of consultation which had been held under the preceding administration. Since Mathews was the connecting link in the senior echelon of the State Department between the two administrations, he thought he would like to have him present in discussing the matter with the Under-Secretary and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff who had not participated in these arrangements. Mathews is away at the moment but is expected back at the end of next week. Arneson thought that, if matters would be handled in this way, there would be little difficulty in making arrangements which would be acceptable to us.

6. As to the timing factor, it was Arneson's impression that no decision had been taken by the National Security Council at its meeting yesterday and that no definitive conclusions were likely to be reached on the magnitude and timing of any additional measures of continental defence until further information is available on its effects on the budget and on the deployment of resources for defence purposes, which is now being studied by the new United States Chiefs of Staff. However, Arneson thought that it was almost certain that the question of continental defence would arise in some form in the event of the President visiting Ottawa. He realized therefore that, on the assumption that this visit was now probable, it was necessary to make arrangements for preparatory joint talks along the lines he had suggested early in October.

7. Referring to the newspaper reports about plans for the President to make a nation-wide address on defence problems (some times referred to as "Operation Candour"), Arneson said that he had had it in mind to give us and the British advance information on the substance of the President's address. No firm decision had yet been taken at the White House about the speech but the date proposed was October 4. Arneson said he would get in touch with us as soon as he had any information for us on this subject.

TOP SECRET

*Not Sent*

*file M*

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA  
TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

IMMEDIATE

SEPTEMBER 25, 1953

Reference your 2172 and 2179 of September 24

Subject: Continental Defence

*(See at night)*  
**50209-10**

~~Following for Heeneey from Claxton Begins: 32~~

1. I am very much interested by your two messages. It ~~is more than interesting~~ <sup>is</sup> that you should have seen the Secretary of Defense ~~and that he should have raised this matter~~ <sup>and that</sup> ~~you discussed it with him~~ <sup>along the lines reported</sup>.
2. I am asking that you be sent a copy of a memorandum on this I sent the Prime Minister. I have also had a number of talks about this with General McNaughton, Mr. Ritchie and the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff. ~~Altogether I think it is fair to say that they take just as serious a view of the possible results of action along the lines suggested by the Alsops as I do.~~ <sup>a</sup> <sup>is taken here</sup>
3. Since Mr. Wilson has raised the question we should ~~certainly not leave the suggestion of a meeting for consultation in the air.~~ <sup>keep in close touch with the US Govt</sup> <sup>on these developments</sup> <sup>how</sup> <sup>at this time</sup> I am inclined to agree with you that a visit to Washington by Mr. Pearson or myself or a visit by Mr. Wilson here would excite too much interest in the light of current attention.
4. As you know, General Foulkes had exceedingly close personal relationships with General Bradley and if the latter were still Chairman I would be all for General Foulkes dropping in to see him. In view of there being a new appointment, it would seem to be more desirable if General Foulkes only saw Admiral Radford at the latter's invitation.
5. In any event you will be following this up yourself and no doubt there will be other developments ~~within days, if not hours.~~ One course that might be followed would be for you and General Foulkes to see Bedell Smith and then go from him to Mr. Wilson and Admiral Radford. Certainly we should not let

- 2 -

the matter drag as it is certain that the American attitude will be in process of formation and we must move before the day comes when they initiate formal consultation, as they would be only likely to do this after they knew what they wanted to do and then consultation would be largely a matter of letting us know in advance with very little possibility of altering their view or intended course of action. Consequently, if they suggest that they have not made any decision and that the matter can stand for a week or so, I would feel that we should move in anticipation. I should be glad to hear your view on this.

6. The line we should take with them would, of course, be to assert that since they did not know what they wanted or might want and we did not know what we wanted or might want, we should wait until we got the results of the Air Force and Scientific Study Group, which should be available about the middle of October and such other consideration as the subject warranted and arrive at an agreed policy before making public statements which would create a public opinion which would circumscribe and even terminate all possibility of freedom of action in working out the best programme to meet our need.

7. To sum up, my view on the two telegrams you have shown me is that we should not let the matter lay beyond Monday or Tuesday, but should take the initiative in seeking an interview to learn the probable course of action and to lay the foundation for our having an adequate opportunity of effectively presenting our views before their course of action was decided upon.

8. Meanwhile, the Permanent Joint Board is meeting and as you will see from my memorandum to the Prime Minister, I have informed General McNaughton of our views and he may learn something there, though that is not very likely.

- 3 -

9. In my memorandum I referred to the reference in the Marquis Childs' article to the McGill Fence. This appears in an article bearing an Ottawa dateline and this and the reference to McGill University's participation in scientific developments in the Second World War, of course tend to indicate that the source of the leak is Canadian.

10. We are naturally looking into this very thoroughly. So far as I can find, however, Childs saw Mr. Pearson, General McNaughton and General Foulkes. So far as we know, he did not see the C.A.S. or Air Vice Marshal Miller, who heads our team on these matters and as far as I know, did not see any other Air Force representative. McNaughton and Foulkes tell me that Childs arrived with full and detailed knowledge of the whole background on continental defence, including knowledge of the McGill Fence, and not only that they did not give him any new material, but they were careful not to say things which would confirm the information he already had.

11. I asked General McNaughton, if he had a chance, to bring this up with General Henry at the meeting of the P.J.B.D. He should, I thought, state that we were extremely shocked by the article; that as far as we knew Childs had only seen three Canadians, naming them; and as far as we knew, he had not obtained this story from any Canadian source. If General Henry knew or could find out anything to the contrary, we would be glad if he would let us know so that we could follow up the matter here.

12. I would be glad if you would keep this aspect of the matter in mind and let me know if you hear anything bearing on it. I suppose that it would be a good thing if we could find out through some trustworthy and independent third party what Childs own account of this was, possibly Reston or someone like that might know, though there would be great danger in your showing even any interest in it. Ends.

*(Note for file - this was drafted by Mr. Clouston but was not sent. It was used however in drafting a telegram sent by Mr. Pearson on Sept 28) B.H.*

000725

*See Pearson  
in Pearson*

Ottawa, September 25, 1953

50209-40

*file  
M*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

50209-40  
32 ✓

Continental Air Defence

Annexed is a set of the following papers:

- 1) Marquis Childs' article in the Washington Post of September 12 containing the first public reference to the "McGill Fence";
- 2) Alsop's article in the Montreal Gazette of September 17 regarding "Operation Candour";
- 3) WA-2150 of September 21, which was repeated to you in New York;
- 4) Mr. Claxton's memorandum to me of September 23 covering his memorandum to the Prime Minister dated September 23;
- 5) and 6) WA-2172 and WA-2179 of September 24;
- 7) A memorandum entitled "Discussion in the United States Press concerning the need for a greatly expanded Air Defence System"; dated September 25, prepared in this Department at Mr. Claxton's request but not yet sent to him;
- 8) A memorandum entitled "Atomic Warfare and U.S. Defence Policy", dated September 25, prepared in this Department -- not yet sent to Mr. Claxton.

C. R.

1

Extract from The Washington Post  
Saturday, September 12th, 1953

## ARCTIC DEFENSE IS JOINT UNDERTAKING

By Marquis Childs

OTTAWA, Canada--The Canadian government has recently completed its pledge to supply 12 squadrons equipped with jet all-weather fighter planes to the North Atlantic Treaty military force in western Europe. With the delivery of the last of the 300 jets, Canada becomes the only NATO power, with the possible exception of the United States, where schedules are still to be filled, to live up to its pledged contribution.

This is a matter of considerable pride in the solid, stable government that has just been reelected to power by a large majority. It indicates, too, the weight that top policy-makers give to the NATO concept of building a bastion in the heart of the European workshop that is next door to the Communist peril.

The deep conviction of the importance of NATO played a part in the behind scenes controversy that has taken place over how and where a continental defense system should be established to protect the great industrial complex of the United States and Canada.

That controversy began last spring when the National Security Council in Washington determined that Canada should be asked to cooperate in the immediate construction of a radar warning system built on the very edge of the Arctic waste. This was in line with the recommendation of Project Lincoln, the Air Force research program into protection from an atomic Pearl Harbor being carried out at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

IT ALSO was in response to the urging of those concerned with civil defense. They argued that such a line would give a five-to-six-hour warning of a bombing attack and with that warning American cities could be effectively evacuated. The Lincoln Line, as it has become known, was designed to link up with the radar system being built around Alaska and with a warning system on the big Air Force base at Thule on the Island of Greenland. One advantage was that the radar stations could be supplied by ships along the Arctic coast. The estimated cost is reported to have been from 600 million to a billion dollars.

But Canadian as well as some American military and scientific experts began to find flaws in the idea of an Arctic line. They pointed out that planes passing over it could be detected and their numbers estimated with fair accuracy, but the direction in which they were going could not be determined. Thus, a raid might be aimed at Chicago or Seattle, while on the first warning all of the big cities on the Eastern Seaboard would be evacuated. After this happened two or three times, disrupting normal life to an extraordinary degree, the system would be abandoned. In a continuing cold war with a growing fear of atomic disaster, the Russians would quickly exploit such a situation, sending planes into the Arctic wild for the sole purpose of causing havoc.

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The Canadian opposition put a damper on eager, one might also say frantic, determination of the Americans to get on with building the Lincoln Line. It is now virtually certain that regardless of the appraisal of the tests in the Arctic as to the effectiveness of such a line, it will not be built. Opinion here is all on the side of pushing up from the farthest north railway so that the warning time is constantly increased with a series of lines to check and recheck on direction and numbers. This was likewise the final view of General Omar Bradley just before he retired as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

IN THE midst of the argument over the Lincoln Line, Canada came up with a new idea for an intermediary line based on a more advanced technology. This was the brainchild of a group of brilliant scientists at McGill University in Montreal, among them those who contributed the pioneering development of radar and the proximity fuse at the beginning of World War II.

The McGill fence, as it is now known, could be far less costly and could be built much more quickly. But even more important, the skilled manpower required to operate it would be a fraction of that required for the Lincoln Line. What is more, the radar network now being completed to protect a part of Canada and the United States would serve as a backstop.

All these factors are likely to prove decisive when the joint Canadian-United States defense board meets at the end of this month. Canadian cabinet members are fearful that if billions are spent for continental defense at the same time the United States is curtailing its aid to western Europe, the NATO powers will fear a retreat within fortress America and NATO will be weakened or destroyed. This is still another argument--the clincher from the Canadian viewpoint--for the compromise plan put forward by Canada's military and scientific planners.

...oOo...

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Subject *Spec. I. Orvasal*

MONTREAL GAZETTE

Date **SEP 17 1953**

Publication

Stewart Alsop

## Matter of Fact

### Experiment In Truth

Washington. — President Eisenhower has now approved plans for one of the most remarkable experiments in government ever undertaken in this country. These plans call for seven reports to the American people, all related to one aspect or another of the threat to national survival inherent in the growing Soviet air-atomic capability. The series of reports is tentatively scheduled to start Sunday evening, Oct. 4, and to continue every Sunday evening until Nov. 15.

This project — known as "Operation Candor" in the inner circles of the Government — will start, as presently planned, with a vitally important speech by the President. In this speech President Eisenhower expects to tell the people in broad strokes, but frankly and factually, the hard truth about the national situation. This Presidential report to the people is to be followed by six further nation-wide radio and television reports by Administration leaders, all dealing with the problem of national survival in the nuclear age.

Precise schedules have not been worked out, nor has it finally been decided who will participate in the series. But according to present plans the Presidential report will be followed by a discussion of American foreign policy by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Sen. Alexander Wiley, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Dulles and Wiley are expected to stress the need for Allies — and the foreign bases which only Allies can supply — in the nuclear age.

Secretary of Defence Charles Wilson, Deputy Secretary Roger Kyes, and Adm. Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are scheduled to follow with a three-cornered report on defence. Wilson, Kyes and Radford will emphasize what can be accomplished by an effective air defence against atomic attack, the need for which has now been officially recognized by the National Security Council.

In a sense, indeed, "Operation Candor" is an outgrowth of the Lincoln Project study of air defence, first described by the present reporters, and the various studies of the air defence problem that have followed it. For the purpose of "Operation Candor" is to explain to the nation the basic facts that make a great, continuing, national defence effort necessary.

After the defence report, Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Lewis Strauss may make the most significant report of all. The present intention is for Strauss and Dulles to give rough estimates, based on

the best intelligence data available, of Soviet nuclear production.

If this bold step is finally approved by the President, Dulles and Strauss will give three estimates of Soviet stockpiling — a minimum, a median, and a maximum estimate. They will also give a sufficient indication of American atomic and hydrogen bomb production to provide the necessary standard of comparison.

There is still strong opposition to this course, in the Atomic Energy Commission (where Commissioner Eugene Zuckert is reportedly one who opposes it) and elsewhere. But the essential facts on stockpiling are likely to be made public in the end, for two reasons.

First, the American people would learn much, but the Soviets nothing, from revealing these facts. Second, unless they are revealed, "Operation Candor" becomes largely meaningless, like a production of "Hamlet" without the Prince of Denmark. For these reasons, it is believed in some quarters that the stockpiling estimates should be given at the very beginning, by the President, leaving Strauss and Dulles to fill in the details.

There will be a civil defence report by Civil Defence Director Val Peterson and his deputy, Mrs. Katherine Howard. And there will be a report on the balance between national solvency and national survival, by Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey, and probably with his Budget Director, Joseph Dodge.

This will be a key report, since it should give a very clear indication of how much real national effort and sacrifice the Administration intends to ask, as insurance against national devastation in air-atomic attacks. It is possible that Humphrey will propose a national tax, as one painful but necessary means of paying the bill for this insurance. Finally, the President is scheduled to sum up on the evening of Sunday, Nov. 15, putting what has gone before into proper perspective.

This program is, of course, subject to change. The President might even conceivably change his mind, and cancel the whole project. Short of this, it might in the end be so watered down as to serve no useful purpose, or even turned into a political stunt. Certain absolutely vital high-policy decisions, moreover, must be made if the program is to be really effective — and these have not yet been made. Yet as of now, this program for trusting the American people with the truth looks like a remarkably courageous and wholly admirable experiment in government.

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CONFIDENTIAL

CANADIAN EYES ONLY

September 25, 1953.

Discussion in the United States Press  
concerning the need for a greatly  
expanded Air Defence System

1. In April, 1952 the President of the United States established a "Panel of Consultants on Armaments" to advise him and the departments concerned with the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The Chairman of the Panel was Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, and the members were Vannevar Bush, Allen W. Dulles, John Dickey (President of Dartmouth College), and Joseph Johnson (President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
2. The Panel submitted its report in January, 1953, to Mr. Acheson, who made it available for the incoming administration. The report advanced the following theses:
  - (a) The value of the United States stockpile of atomic weapons is a wasting asset, since before long the point will be reached when the Soviet Union will have produced enough atomic weapons to use against the U.S. in a surprise attack on a scale which would cancel out the advantage the U.S. now enjoys because of its lead in the production of atomic weapons.
  - (b) If the American people are to be made aware of the dangerous situation which confronts them, they must be told frankly of the characteristics and probable effects of atomic weapons, and "roughly" the number of bombs available.

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(c) The situation is rapidly developing when the art of delivering atomic weapons and the art of defending the United States against them will become relatively more important than supremacy in the atomic munitions field itself.

3. These views were subsequently given general circulation by Dr. Oppenheimer in speeches and articles.

4. Coincidentally, while the "Panel of Consultants" was at work during 1952, the U.S. Air Force set up at the Lincoln Laboratories of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a "Summer Study Group", composed mainly of university scientists, to take a "new look" at the problem of air defence. The Study Group started out with essentially the same assumptions as were subsequently to be put forward by the Panel of Consultants, and with this as a background of justification, proceeded to develop on paper an extremely ambitious air defence system which would completely cover the northern approaches to the United States.

5. The completion of these two reports in the dying days of the Truman Administration provided an ideal weapon for Civil Defence officials who succeeded in getting the Lincoln report directly to the National Security Council by a "big end run" around the U.S. Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Out of this incident arose "Project Corrode" (at that time known as "Counterchange").

6. In March, 1953, the fact that "the scientists" were concerned about the inadequate defences of North America, but had an answer to the problem, at a price,

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first reached the press in a series of five newspaper articles by the Alsop brothers, and in a feature article in the Saturday Evening Post by Stewart Alsop and a scientist named Ralph Lapp. Our Embassy in Washington discussed these articles at the time with the State Department and reported they had not been inspired from official sources, but appeared to have been a private enterprise of the Alsops, undoubtedly aided by leaks of classified information.

7. Since March there has been a steady stream of articles in the U.S. press on the need for improved defences. Most of them have purported to describe arguments going on within the U.S. Government as to which is the more important, a balanced budget or increased defence forces for North America. Obviously these stories have been fed by leaks of information from official sources. The interesting question is whether they result from a sly campaign on the part of the Government to condition the public to the idea that taxes cannot be cut, or whether, as is more probable, there has been a real difference of opinion within the Government, and the protagonists have been following the good old American tradition of using the press to help quell the opposition.

8. The article of greatest general interest was that by General Bradley in the August 18 issue of the Saturday Evening Post. He stressed the fact that Canadian agreement and participation in any scheme to improve the air defence system was essential, and proposed the establishment of a Continental Defence Command involving the armed forces of two countries. Finally, he suggested that the matter should be considered by the President and the Prime Minister as soon as possible.

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9. Also of particular interest to Canada were two articles by Marquis Childs, dated September 11 and 12. These articles were datelined from Ottawa and contained the first public reference to the "McGill Fence" and to Canadian views on the air defence problem. So far as can be ascertained, no one in Ottawa told Mr. Childs about the McGill Fence, and presumably he must have learned about it from United States sources.

10. The most recent press speculation has been concerned with a scheme called "Operation Candor" which is supposed to consist of a series of seven weekly television broadcasts in which the President and his senior officials break the bad news to the American people. However, in a story dated September 23 in the New York Times, James Reston (head of the Times Washington bureau) reports that Jack Benny can relax because this "whing-ding of a television series probably will not come off". It is possible, however, according to Reston, that a single speech will be made by the President on the characteristics and dangers of the atom and the need for more defence in the United States against atomic attack.

11. An interesting sidelight on the concern of the United States press with this subject is that, although the articles written by some U.S. columnists, particularly the Alsops, have been reprinted in Canadian newspapers, to date there has been almost no Canadian journalistic comment on it, except for mild interest when the article by General Bradley was published in the Saturday Evening Post. Even then, attention was given for the most part to his proposal that a continental defence command be formed, and to his references to Canada, rather than to the need for improved North American defences.

D R A F T

T O P S E C R E T

September 25, 1953.

Atomic Warfare and United States Defence Policy

Although, so far as is known, the U.S. Government has never defined its defence policy in the same terms as the Minister of National Defence has stated the Canadian policy, the Secretary of Defence would probably agree that the objectives are similar. As applied to the United States, these would be:

- (1) The immediate defence of the United States and its possessions from attack;
- (2) Implementation of any undertakings made by the United States under the charter of the United Nations, or under NATO, or other agreements for collective security;
- (3) The organization to build up strength in a total war.

During the period from 1949 to 1952, the United States, as did Canada, considered that the most immediate threat from communist aggression lay in Korea and Europe, and assigned a considerable proportion of its defence effort to those theatres. At the same time, of course, the United States, then as now, considered that the chief deterrent to war lay in its store of atomic weapons and the existence of a strong Strategic Air Command.

In undertaking the defence of the United States, the Defence Department has never pretended that it could provide complete protection against the possibility of enemy bombers hitting American targets. But it does consider it essential to be able to provide sufficient protection to safeguard the warmaking capability of the United States to the degree necessary to assure successful conclusion of a general war.

- 2 -

Differences of opinion of the way in which this objective should be fulfilled has led to bitter warfare between the three Services and between different branches of the USAF. Effective establishment of the U.S. Air Defence Command was delayed for at least two years by the inability of the Services to reach agreement on its role, and was further hamstrung by the success of Strategic Air Command in convincing the Secretary of the Air Force that priority should be given to its requirements on the theory that the best defence was to obliterate the enemy before he could strike. The viciousness with which these conflicts were pursued within the armed services is difficult to believe unless one has come in contact with it.

The confidence which the U.S. Government, and for that matter, the American people, placed in their presumed atomic monopoly as a principal measure of defence, meant that once they were convinced the Russians were in a position to wage an effective atomic war, the reverse of the coin held true, and the retaliatory power of SAC began to look like a very ineffective shield.

These doubts were given expression in a report prepared by a panel set up by Mr. Acheson, with Dr. Oppenheimer as chairman, which produced a report in the closing days of the Truman Administration. This report drew three major conclusions.

- (a) The value of the United States stockpile of atomic weapons is a wasting asset, since before long the point will be reached when the Soviet Union will have produced enough atomic weapons to use against the U.S. in a surprise attack on a scale which would cancel

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out the advantage the U.S. now enjoys because of its lead in the production of atomic weapons.

- (b) If the American people are to be made aware of the dangerous situation which confronts them, they must be told frankly of the characteristics and probable effects of atomic weapons, and "roughly" the number of bombs available.
- (c) The situation is rapidly developing when the art of delivering atomic weapons and the art of defending the United States against them will become relatively more important than supremacy in the atomic munitions field itself.

Coincidentally, while the Oppenheimer report was being prepared, both the U.S. Air Force and the Civil Defence Administration were giving increased attention to the technical problems of, and the requirements for, air defence. Both agencies accepted as a fundamental assumption that, if war broke out, a likely first move on the part of the Russians would be a surprise atomic attack on the United States. Civil Defence officials were concerned primarily with the need for as much advance warning as possible. The Navy and Strategic Air Command wanted as much advance warning as possible in order to disperse their forces and to launch retaliatory measures. Air Defence Command, on the other hand, placed greater emphasis on the necessity for reliable information which could be used as a guide to the effective distribution of interceptor forces, and therefore was concerned with improving the quality of early warning in the vicinity of the existing system before setting up facilities for distant early warning.

- 4 -

During the summer of 1952 the U.S. Air Force set up, at the Lincoln Laboratories of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a "Summer Study Group", composed mainly of university scientists, to take a "new look" at the problem of air defence. The Study Group started out with essentially the same assumptions as were subsequently to be put forward by the Oppenheimer panel, and with this as a background of justification, proceeded to develop on paper an extremely ambitious air defence system which would completely cover the northern approaches to the United States. The scheme, as originally conceived, was intended to ensure that from the moment a hostile aircraft entered the furthest northern reaches of the Arctic, it would be under surveillance. Interception would commence at a point many hundreds of miles north of the existing system and thus would provide "defence in depth". Needless to say, the cost was astronomical - sufficient even to alarm the scientists. At this point, they started to cut elements of the system out and ended up with the conclusion that a distant early warning line, by itself, could be constructed and operated at a cost commensurate with the benefits which could be expected to be obtained from it. This distant early warning line was to be situated along the Canadian Arctic coast with sea and air flanks extending from Hawaii to Alaska and from North Eastern Canada and Greenland to some undetermined point in the direction of the Azores.

The completion of both the Lincoln and Oppenheimer reports toward the end of 1952 provided heavy ammunition for the proponents of an improved air defence system, and particularly for the Civil Defence officials who desired much more early warning of a raid than the existing system provided. These officials were successful in getting the Lincoln report directly to the National Security Council by a "big end ru000737

- 15 -

around the U.S.A.F. and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and out of this incident arose Project Corrode.

Since the beginning of the year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council have given much thought to various aspects of the overall problem, including such questions as the following:

- (a) Are additional air defence measures necessary and, if so, on what scale and in what form?
- (b) Is the defence programme as a whole in balance? Should additional resources for continental defence be provided at the expense of other defence commitments, including NATO, foreign military aid, and strategic air?
- (c) Is the risk of attack against North America sufficiently great to necessitate abandoning the avowed intention of the Government to cut expenditures if the threat is to be met.

These are grave decisions to make, and as the rest of the world has learned, the United States seems incapable of making such decisions without much public debate, which presumably acts as a mass psychological conditioner. The air defence enthusiasts, no doubt with sincere and patriotic motives have used every resource at their disposal, including certain widely-read newspaper columnists, to campaign for a bigger and better air defence system. At the same time the officials who foresee the problem of paying for the system are trying to devise ways of convincing the public that tax cuts are not in their best interest. In the United States one can always be sure that these ways will be dramatic. In the face of this, the Bureau of the Budget and the Secretary of the Treasury would appear to be fighting a losing battle, although Mr. Humphrey is still talking of a new defence concept which will meet U.S. needs more effectively than ever before, but cost less.

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The latest word from our Embassy indicates that the likely ultimate conclusion of the United States Government will be that the United States does not now have an adequate continental defence system in relation to the risks of attacks, and that this unacceptable degree of risk must be reduced by new and increased measures to be worked out in conjunction with Canada. The suggested rate of expenditure would be a peak of \$1.6 billion in any one year. It should be realized that a large proportion of this money would probably be spent on defence activities in the United States and in the maintenance of the seaward early warning lines.

What effect these expenditures will have on U.S. defence expenditures as a whole, and how the Government will reconcile the defence programme with its promises of tax reductions cannot be predicted. The only sure fact is that it will all be thoroughly aired in the public press.

**INCOMING MESSAGE**

**ORIGINAL**

Copy No. 1 of 21 copies.

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

**TOP SECRET**

File No.

3-0209-40

54 | 50

Priority

System

CYPHER - AUTO

No. WA-2179

Date September 24, 1953.

Departmental Circulation

MINISTER <sup>2</sup>

UNDER/SEC <sup>3</sup>

D/UNDER/SEC <sup>4</sup>

A/UNDER/SEC'S <sup>5</sup>

POL/CO-ORD<sup>n</sup> <sup>6</sup>

SECTION <sup>7</sup>

Reference: My WA-2172 of September 24th.

Subject: Continental defence.

*J.P.D.*

1. It so happened that this afternoon I was making my "courtesy" call on the Secretary of Defence. After the usual exchange of platitudes about our two countries, Mr. Wilson mentioned this subject, which was clearly on his mind (as it was on my own, although I had decided not to be the first to mention it on this occasion). He said that the National Security Council had been considering this difficult problem this morning - a subject which was of importance to my country as well.

2. The Secretary went on to say that it was difficult to arrive at a correct balance between United States requirements abroad and on this continent, particularly now that the new element of Soviet possession of the hydrogen bomb had been added. United States military authorities had been giving anxious consideration to what should be done. It was to be remembered that the strongest final deterrent to Soviet aggression lay in the capacity of the United States to retaliate. As he put it, the best deterrent was the Soviet realization that they could not win a war, ;no matter how much destruction and harm they might do to our side. For this reason we must not deploy too much of our strength on "fixed" defences.

3. With respect to Northern defence, he did not seem to be very fully informed on the various schemes. At any rate, he did not say much to me other than that consideration was being given now to a chain of radar stations on the 54th Parallel. He also knew of the (joint) experimental work being done in the Far North.

4. This is all pretty familiar, but it gave me the opportunity of putting to the Secretary the vital importance to Canada of decisions in this matter. I told him that I very much hoped that, before the United States Government's own opinions as to the requirements of the situation had "jelled", there would be full opportunity for Canadian authorities to have the United States appreciation and to express their own. Whatever decisions were ultimately taken would involve most important national considerations in Canada. The position would be very much more difficult to deal with if the United States were to come to us with something cut-and-dried.

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DONE - COMM'S SECTION

Done 25 SEP 1953

References

- Refer*
- Prime Minister
- Minister of N. D.
- DM of N. D.
- CCOS - Scopia
- PSBD
- DM of Def Prod.
- DM of Finance (attn. Mr. Byge)
- C DAB
- American Economic
- DL (2)
- Sec/Tal*

Done *J.P.D.*

Date 25/9/53

- 2 -

5. Mr. Wilson agreed that we were entitled to be consulted at an early stage. He even said that he would be prepared himself to go to Canada for a couple of days, or, alternatively, to have the Minister of National Defence come down here. I said that this would certainly be very helpful at some stage but that perhaps before either visit (which would be bound to attract public attention - already pretty stirred up on this topic, at least in this country) it might be wise to have informal and very private discussions at a high official level. It might be, for example, that the Chairman of our Chiefs of Staff and I could be put in direct touch with the United States Under-Secretary of State and the Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

6. It was left that Mr. Wilson would turn over in his mind the best procedure for consultation. He will I hope let me know shortly what course the United States authorities decide to suggest. Incidentally, I gather the impression (although this may prove wrong) that no decision had been taken this morning by the National Security Council on the form and extent of the program which should be undertaken.

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Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*  
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1958 SEP 11 AM 8:58

000742

# INCOMING MESSAGE

# ORIGINAL

Copy No. 1... of 21 copies.

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**

**REDUIT A SECRET**

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

**TOP SECRET**

File No.

50209-40

54 | 50

Priority	System CYPHER - AUTO	No. WA-2172	Date September 24, 1953.
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Departmental Circulation

MINISTER 3

UNDER/SEC 3

D/UNDER/SEC 4

A/UNDER/SEC'S 5

POL/CO-ORD'N 6

SECTION

Reference: Your EX-1584 of September 23, and our WA-2150 of September 21, 1953.

Subject: Continental Defence.

Mr. Claxton telephoned me on Tuesday afternoon (September 21) to draw my attention to the serious implications for Canada of the issues raised on this subject in recent pieces by various United States columnists, notably Alsop and Childs. I drew the Minister's attention to our telegram under reference which no doubt he has now seen.

2. I told Mr. Claxton that we fully appreciated the gravity and delicacy of this problem and that, in consultation with Admiral DeWolfe, we were doing everything possible to keep in touch with developments in the United States Government. At the moment there was nothing substantial to add to our telegram of September 21st; my impression was that much that had appeared in the newspapers was inaccurate and premature.

3. We have already ensured that at the working levels of the State Department there is a realization of the important considerations of national policy, which from the Canadian standpoint, should be taken into account in any new proposals for continental defence. We have also emphasized the importance which the Canadian Government attaches to being consulted at a sufficiently early stage; it was essential that we should not be confronted with large decisions on which we had had no adequate chance to express our views; further, it was particularly important to avoid any leakage of any United States proposals until joint solutions could be worked out.

4. The best procedure for consultation is a question which is not easy and requires some thought. Clearly, it should be kept very secret at the early stages particularly, and should involve very few. What would the Ministers think of Foulkes coming down and meeting say Bedell Smith and one or two others very privately, if that could be arranged? Ignatieff and I are to have Arneson to lunch tomorrow and we may have further news for you thereafter.

5. Incidentally, you have no doubt seen Reston's article in yesterday's New York Times (September 23). This puts the background to the discussion of continental defence in the United States into better perspective than the Alsop articles.

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COMM'S SECTION

Date 25 SEP 1953

References

Refer

Prime Minister

Min. of N.D.

DM of N.D.

CCOS super

PSBD

DM of Def Prod

DM of Finance (with Mr. Bryce)

CDRB

American Economic

DL (2)

Sec 7/20

Done

Date 25/9/53

- 2 -

6. Will you let Mr. Claxton see this message and also make sure that Mr. Pearson sees it and my telegram under reference when he is in Ottawa this coming week-end.

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CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1953 SEP 11 AM 07

000745

Security TOP SECRET

# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

File No. 50209 - 40	
54	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST, Washington, D.C.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

Message To Be Sent

AIR CYPHER  
EN CLAIR  
CODE  
CYPHER

AUTO  XXXX

No. *EX-1584*

Date *23*  
September 22, 1953

For Communications Section Only

SENT SEP 23 1953

REFERENCE: Your WA-2150 of September 21

Priority

SUBJECT: Continental Defence

ORIGINATOR

(Signature)

M.H. Wershof/elb  
(Name Typed)

Div. D.L. (1)

Local Tel. 3402

Thank you for this very helpful telegram.

We are passing it to the Prime Minister, the Minister in New York, Mr. Claxton, General Foulkes, <sup>Dr. Solandt,</sup> the Departments of Finance and Defence Production, and are directing their attention to the caution in paragraph 9.

APPROVED BY

(Signature)

(Name Typed)

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Internal Distribution:

S.S.E.A.  U.S.S.E.A.

Done *MAL*

Date *Sept. 24/53*

Copies Referred To:

Done

Date

Ext. 97 (Rev. 1/52)

23.9.9(05)

SEP 23 1988

SEP 23 10:51

50209-40

*RLN*



CANADA

MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

Ottawa, September 23, 1953.

**UPGRADED TO SECRET  
REQUI A SECRET**

TOP SECRET

50209-40  
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MEMORANDUM TO:  
ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Attached is a copy of a memorandum I am sending the Prime Minister on developments in the United States regarding continental defence. From our telephone conversation yesterday I understand that you share, to some extent at least, my own apprehensions.

Perhaps at a convenient time you might show this to Mr. Pearson.

*RLN*

"Brooke Claxton"

Att.

*(Copy sent to Washington Sept 25  
Copy referred to Amr Des  
+ DL 2 Sept 28  
RLN  
~~Sept 25~~*

24:9.13(us)

Ottawa, September 23, 1953.

TOP SECRET

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRIME MINISTER

- Begins
1. You will recall the various discussions we have had at the Cabinet and elsewhere on the effect on Canada of probable developments in the United States, particularly those relating to defence of the territory of North America against air attack.
  2. Since "Operation Lincoln" at M.I.T. a year ago, there has been increasing attention paid to this in official speeches and in articles in the press. Lately the statements have taken on an even more positive and detailed character.
  3. I mention, for example, General Bradley's articles in the Saturday Evening Post for August 22 and 29, the articles by Marquis Childs in the Washington Post on September 11, 12 and 13, a syndicated article by Joseph and Stewart Alsop called "Truth Experiment", which appeared in the Toronto Telegram of September 17, the publication of the list of 163 possible targets for H- or A-bombs and numerous other statements.
  4. Meanwhile, service personnel and scientists of the two countries are working on an assessment of the risks and possibilities of defence through various types of additional defences.
  5. Perhaps the most significant of all these is the Alsop article to which I have referred and of which I attach a copy.
  6. Obviously, this <sup>all</sup> forms a pattern, the design of which must be inspired by the administration.
  7. It is not too much to suggest that the reason for this flood of propaganda is not so much the increased fear of attack by Russia as growing fear of the hostility of the electors when it becomes apparent that the Republican Party's promises to balance the budget and cut taxes while strength-

- 2 -

ening their defences has not got the slightest chance in the world of being carried out.

8. Indeed, the only substantial reduction so far made was effected through arbitrarily slicing five billion dollars off the appropriations for the U.S.A.F., effected not through economies but through a sharp decrease in the planned effective strength of the U.S. Air Force. A good part of the saving has been made through the cancellation of aircraft building programmes, e.g. Canadair Limited where a good many millions of dollars already spent on tooling up and beginning to make parts will be completely lost without any remaining benefit. (In this case it is possible that the cost of cancellation will represent something approaching fifty per cent of the cost of completing the contract and obtaining the aircraft.) Apparently the administration had it in mind that the anger of the electorate may be flooded out in a wave of fear of atomic attack.

9. We have heard from a good many sources that consideration is given to something like "Operation Candor", mentioned by the Alsops. In a telephone conversation yesterday Mr. Heeney said that nothing has yet been decided by the White House but that this is receiving active consideration.

10. Anything like "Operation Candor" would almost certainly have serious consequences.

- (a) Emphasis on home defence would lead to a disproportionate amount being put into purely defensive measures.
- (b) It would be accompanied or followed by releases or leaks on the location and effectiveness of existing defence works giving Russia the information it most keenly desires. } 3
- (c) Since attack can only come over Canadian territory, it would place responsibility for the alleged defencelessness of New York and Chicago on our failure to make adequate provision. C
- (d) It would increase enormously the pressure on us to add to our own defence measures, which we could only do by increasing the defence

- 3 -

appropriation or reducing our contribution to NATO.

- (e) What has just been said would be equally true in the United States, so that greater insistence on local defence would further reduce U.S. participation in NATO abroad and mutual aid.
- (f) Any reduction in the U.S. contribution would be used by the European countries as an excuse for their further letting up in their efforts, defeating the purpose of NATO and adding to liability to attack.
- (g) An operation of this kind would lead to a spate of speculative articles, breaches of security and the like, which would upset public opinion and further reduce the power of the administrations in the States and here and abroad to plan effectively so as to make the most economic and efficient use of their combined resources to build up collective security through joint action.
- (h) Finally, the whole operation would greatly bolster up the strength and morale of the forces behind the Iron Curtain, just at a time when the continued steady development of our strength can probably be combined with a<sup>4</sup> willingness to sit around a table and discuss measures that may be taken to eliminate the threat and danger of war.

11. What has been said above about the effect of breaches of security is no exaggeration. The articles of Marquis Childs in the Washington Post describe in great detail the problems of air defence and the measures being taken to meet them. That of September 12 contains this passage on the McGill Fence, the first public reference ever made to it so far as I know:

"In the midst of the argument over the Lincoln Line, Canada came up with a new idea for an intermediary line based on a more advanced technology. This was the brainchild of a group of brilliant

- 4 -

scientists at McGill University in Montreal, among them those who contributed the pioneering development of radar and the proximity fuse at the beginning of World War II.

"The McGill fence, as it is now known, could be far less costly and could be built much more quickly. But even more important, the skilled manpower required to operate it would be a fraction of that required for the Lincoln line. What is more, the radar network now being completed to protect a part of Canada and the United States would serve as a backstop."

12. This article carries an Ottawa dateline and it was published following a visit by Childs to Ottawa. I was away at the time. I understand he saw Mr. Pearson and others who talked to him quite frankly in the belief that what they said would be treated with discretion. I am assured, however, that no one here mentioned the "McGill Fence". On the basis of this assurance I am asking General McNaughton to take advantage of any favourable opportunity to mention this breach to General Henry, U.S. Chairman of the P.J.B.D. during the course of its meeting next week. What I suggested to General McNaughton was that if he had a chance of doing this informally he should draw General Henry's attention to the article and say that he himself had been assured that this had not come from any Canadian source and to ask General Henry if he could let him know if in fact it had come from any Canadian source so that effective measures could be taken to stop this.

13. I spoke to Mr. Heeney about this whole subject yesterday. He is gravely concerned about it. Mr. Ritchie is having a note prepared reviewing the various developments and statements that have been made. We expect to have reports on the survey being made by the Air Forces and scientists of the two countries early in October.

14. In the meantime, I have had Canadian answers to the suggestions made by SHAPE as part of NATO's annual review operation given in such a form as to emphasize the possibility of further developments in North American defence and to say nothing which might indicate the possibility of our providing further forces or assistance in Europe.

- 5 -

15. Without full information as to what the U.S. administration intends it is, of course, easy to take too serious a view of what this might portend for us and for the continued build-up of the security of the free nations. If, however, further inquiries confirm my own grave misgivings, it may not be too much to say that the line of action that may be taken may prove to constitute the most serious setback to our work together for joint security since the end of the Second World War, and bring about a situation which might, to some extent at least, endanger the extraordinarily harmonious relations which have existed between Canada and the United States. If there appears to be any serious justification for this extreme view, then it would appear to be desirable that we should take steps to make our apprehensions known to the administration at Washington.

16. One approach to this might be that just as the United States administration would readily recognize that no steps could be taken to carry out a programme of additional continental defence without the co-operation of Canada, so it would be advisable to discuss the matter fully with Canada before starting currents of opinion in the United States which would virtually force our taking additional steps.

*Ends*

INCOMING MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET  
REFUGAL SECRET

NO. ... OF 21 COPIES

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

Security Classification

TOP SECRET

File No.

50209-40

52 50

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

File copy on 50210-40  
Copy on 50286-40

Priority

System

No. WA-2150

Date September 21, 1953.

CYPHER-AUTO

Departmental Circulation

MINISTER  
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A/UNDER/SEC'S  
POL/CO-ORD 'N

SECTION

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22 SEP 1953

SEP 22 '53

Reference: Your EX-1471 of August 27 and our WA-2012 of August 28, 1953.

Subject: Continental Defence.

We have been told informally and in strict confidence by Gordon Arneson of the State Department that the various studies of the problems of continental defence in Washington have now been brought together in some comprehensive recommendations of the Joint Planning Board of the National Security Council. These recommendations, we understand, have been approved by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. They are to be considered by the National Security Council shortly.

2. We have been given only in general outline the nature of these recommendations. They are based apparently upon the material produced by the Kelly, Edwards and Bull Committees which had studied the various aspects of the problem, including the requirements of an early warning system, the offensive capabilities of the Soviet Union and the budgetary limitations.

3. The principal conclusion of the Planning Board is that the United States does not, repeat not, now have adequate continental defence in relation to the risks of attack. The Board therefore urges that this unacceptable degree of risk be reduced by new and increased measure to be worked out in conjunction with Canada.

4. The Board finds, in effect, that the security programme of the United States is out of balance, in that insufficient resources have been devoted to continental defence in relation to the resources deployed abroad - notably for NATO, foreign military aid and the purposes of strategic air.

5. The Board's recommendation, we were told, does not say precisely what further measures of continental defence should be undertaken. It recognizes that it cannot pre-judge project corrode or the conclusions of the joint Canada - United States study group which is at present examining the feasibility and relative merits of additional radar systems in various parts of North America.

References

Refer  
Prime Minister  
Mr. Claxton  
CCOS (2 copies)  
DM of ND  
DM of DDP  
Gen McNaughton  
Mbr. members of PTBD  
CD RB  
Sec Cabinet  
DM of Finance  
American Div  
Economic Div  
DL (2)  
Report to Mr. Pearson in NY.

Done  
Date

.....2

- 2 -

The Board, however, is said to favour the approach reflected in General Bradley's article in the Saturday Evening Post of August 29, when he advocated that aerial defence should be advanced progressively northward rather than that an early warning system should be established in the far north. The Board also argues apparently in favour of increased provision of weapons of interception, including both aircraft and the most modern missiles.

6. Arneson was rather vague about the extent of the additional measures for continental defence that might be involved in the Board's recommendations. He said, however, that, if the Board's proposals were accepted, the expenditures involved would not be of the magnitude which have been mentioned in speculative articles in the press; they would, at the most he thought, require an additional expenditure of some \$1.6 billion as the peak in any one year.

7. Finally, Arneson emphasized that the recommendations of the Board had been formulated in response to instructions from the President and the N.S.C. to clarify conflicting United States views on problems of continental defence, as reflected in various studies and reports which had come before the N.S.C. He assured us that it was fully recognized that nothing could or should be done without full advance consultation with the Canadian Government. If the Board's recommendation for an increased programme of continental defence were accepted, he thought that there would be a high-level approach to the Canadian Government. He expressed the personal opinion that the President might, for instance, take the occasion of his possible visit to Ottawa to discuss this whole question with the Prime Minister.

8. It cannot, of course, be taken for granted that the Board's recommendations will be approved by the National Security Council or the President. Although the National Security Council will apparently be considering recommendations which have been agreed at the staff level, the dilemma of trying to provide for increased measures of continental defence and at the same time balance the national budget will not be easily resolved and the President will be faced with difficult decisions, particularly on the magnitude and timing of further measures.

9. This report is based on an informal conversation on various aspects of atomic energy. As you know, we have from time to time obtained information on a personal and informal basis from Arneson on developments in the atomic energy field as well as on questions relating to continental defence. As it was made clear to us that Arneson did not have any specific authority to pass this information on to us, I would appreciate it if, in any enquiries which may be made on this subject in other quarters, special care be taken to protect the source.

10. I know that General Foulkes has had valuable personal contacts on this subject in Washington and that he has been following developments very closely. He will therefore be interested in this message which we have discussed with the Chairman of the Joint Staff here.

11. We will endeavour to keep you informed of developments after the National Security Council has considered this problem and we would like to be kept abreast of any information you receive through Foulkes and indeed from any other source.

Defence Liaison(1)/W.H.Barton/mjr

TOP SECRET

*W.H.B.*

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET**

September 18, 1953.

50209-140
52   50

Dear Norman,

It has become apparent in recent weeks that the U.S. is likely, in the near future, to approach us with some ambitious early warning radar projects which would be part of a larger programme to strengthen the air defence of North America. On September 4, the Minister informed us that a group of Ministers planned to have an informal discussion on September 8 regarding Canadian defence policy generally, with particular reference to the possibility of increased North American defence activity. Although it was not possible, in the time available, to furnish the Minister with a paper containing the considered views of all concerned in this Department, Defence Liaison (1) Division submitted a memorandum summarizing some of the more obvious problems and putting forward some possible measures which might be adopted by the Canadian Government to meet the situation.

The Minister has now directed that a more thorough paper be prepared. We should welcome any suggestions or comments which you might wish to make.

Yours sincerely,

R. A. MacKAY

/S/ R. A. MacKay

Norman A. Robertson, Esq.,  
High Commissioner for Canada  
in the United Kingdom,  
Canada House,  
London, S.W.1.

18.9.43(25)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

Defence Liaison(1)/W.H.Barton/mjr

TO: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.....

Security:..... TOP SECRET

No:..... 2-1041

Date:..... September 17, 1953.

Enclosures:..... 1

Air or Surface Mail:.....

Post File No:.....

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

Reference:.....

Subject:.. Canada-United States Defence.....

..... Relations.....

Ottawa File No.	
50209-40	
59	50

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REQUIR A SECRET**

References

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2. The Minister has now directed that a more thorough paper be prepared. We should welcome any suggestions or comments which you might wish to make.

R. A. MacKAY

*for*

Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

R. A. MacKAY

Internal  
Circulation

*X memorandum of  
Sept 5/53*

Distribution  
to Posts

(COPY)

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF

O T T A W A

CSC 1663-5 (JPC)

*File on 50209-40* 15 September 1953.

Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs,  
Ottawa, Canada.

*(original in 703-AS-40)*  
*Copies on*  
*703-R-40*  
*703-AZ-40*

*JNB*  

50209-40
59

Exercise NORAMEX - 54

1. Reference your letter of 25 August, 1953, in which you requested views on certain suggestions of the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development relative to future U.S. exercises such as NORAMEX.
2. It is agreed that it would be undesirable for a provincial government to be consulted before the Canadian Government had approved an exercise and thus, in effect, give a province a veto in advance on a military exercise to be conducted in Canada.
3. It is also agreed that, whenever possible, Canadian observers should be present, not only when U.S. military activities are carried out in Canada, but also when surveys for such activities are made. This has, of course, been normal practice in the past.
4. It is desirable that notification to Canadian citizens of exercises to take place in Canada should be made by Canadian authorities. In the case of Canadian exercises, notification is normally given by notices in local newspapers and by messages from appropriate government departments such as the Department of Transport. While it would not be feasible in Labrador to use local newspapers, notification could be made by appropriate local authorities such as D.O.T., R.C.M. Police, the Department of Resources and Development, etc.
5. It is suggested that the question of amending Section 205 of the National Defence Act be left in abeyance as no known difficulties have arisen which would indicate the necessity for an amendment at this time.

/S/ Charles Foulkes

(Charles Foulkes)  
Lieutenant-General  
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.

Stewart Alsop

Copy on 5028640

MONTREAL GAZETTE

50209-40  
54 | 54

MATTER OF FACT

Experiment In Truth

Washington. - President Eisenhower has now approved plans for one of the most remarkable experiments in government ever undertaken in this country. These plans call for seven reports to the American people, all related to one aspect or another of the threat to national survival inherent in the growing Soviet air-atomic capability. The series of reports is tentatively scheduled to start Sunday evening, Oct. 4, and to continue every Sunday evening until Nov. 15.

This project - known as "Operation Candor" in the inner circles of the Government - will start, as presently planned, with a vitally important speech by the President. In this speech President Eisenhower expects to tell the people in broad strokes but frankly and factually, the hard truth about the national situation. This Presidential report to the people is to be followed by six further nation-wide radio and television reports by Administration leaders, all dealing with the problem of national survival in the nuclear age.

Precise schedules have not been worked out, nor has it finally been decided who will participate in the series. But according to present plans the Presidential report will be followed by a discussion of American foreign policy by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Sen. Alexander Wiley, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Dulles and Wiley are expected to stress the need for Allies - and the foreign bases which only Allies can supply - in the nuclear age.

Secretary of Defence Charles Wilson, Deputy Secretary Roger Kyes, and Adm. Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are scheduled to follow with a three-cornered report on defence. Wilson, Kyes and Radford will emphasize what can be accomplished by an effective air defence against atomic attack, the need for which has now been officially recognized by the National Security Council.

In a sense, indeed, "Operation Candor" is an outgrowth of the Lincoln Project study of air defence, first described by the present reporters, and the various studies of the air defence problem that have followed it. For the purpose of "Operation Candor" is to explain to the nation the basic facts that make a great, continuing, national defence effort necessary.

After the defence report, Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Lewis Strauss may make the most significant report of all. The present intention is for Strauss and Dulles to give rough estimates, based on the best intelligence data available, of Soviet nuclear production.

If this bold step is finally approved by the President, Dulles and Strauss will give three estimates of Soviet stockpiling - a minimum, a median, and a maximum estimate. They will also give a sufficient indication of American atomic and hydrogen bomb production to provide the necessary standard of comparison.

There is still strong opposition to this course, in the Atomic Energy Commission (where Commissioner Eugene Zuckert is reportedly one who opposes it) and elsewhere. But the essential facts on stockpiling are likely to be made public in the end, for two reasons.

- 2 -

First, the American people would learn much, but the Soviets nothing, from revealing these facts. Second, unless they are revealed, "Operation Candor" becomes largely meaningless, like a production of "Hamlet" without the Prince of Denmark. For these reasons, it is believed in some quarters that the stockpiling estimates should be given at the very beginning, by the President, leaving Strauss and Dulles to fill in the details.

There will be a civil defence report by Civil Defence Director Val Peterson and his deputy, Mrs. Katherine Howard. And there will be a report on the balance between national solvency and national survival, by Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey and probably with his Budget Director, Joseph Dodge.

This will be a key report, since it should give a very clear indication of how much real national effort and sacrifice the Administration intends to ask, as insurance against national devastation in air-atomic attacks. It is possible that Humphrey will propose a national tax, as one painful but necessary means of paying the bill for this insurance. Finally, the President is scheduled to sum up on the evening of Sunday, Nov. 15, putting what has gone before into proper perspective.

This program is, of course, subject to change. The President might even conceivably change his mind, and cancel the whole project. Short of this, it might in the end be so watered down as to serve no useful purpose, or even turned into a political stunt. Certain absolutely vital high-policy decisions, moreover, must be made if the program is to be really effective - and these have not yet been made. Yet as of now, this program for trusting the American people with the truth looks like a remarkably courageous and wholly admirable experiment in government.

- 30 -

Refer: Economic Division

AMERICAN DIVISION

*Original and  
4900-B-7-40  
"X"*  
*419153*

TOP SECRET

September 14, 1953

DEFENCE LIAISON (1) DIVISION

Your memorandum of August 24, 1953

50209-40	
59	✓

Letter of Instruction for Mr. A.D.P. Heeney

I refer to your memorandum of August 24, 1953, in which you requested a section on recent and current defence problems in the relations between Canada and the United States.

Attached, as requested, is the survey on the defence aspects of Canada-U.S. relations. For your information, the section on Military Procurement was supplied by Economic Division.

↓  
50213-40  
"F" M. H. WERSHOF

Defence Liaison (1)

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

TOP SECRET  
(except where otherwise indicated)

RECENT AND CURRENT PROBLEMS IN THE RELATIONS  
BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

PART I - DEFENCE

CONTINENTAL DEFENCE

U.S. Radar Installations in Canada

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Secret

1. The main U.S. radar installations in Canada are those belonging to the "Radar Extension Plan" (commonly referred to as "Pinetree"), authorized by an Exchange of Notes dated August 1, 1951. Construction of these radar stations is well advanced and the estimated operational date for the whole chain is July 31, 1954. A number of the stations are already operating. Of the total of 33 stations in the chain, 11 are financed and manned by the RCAF, 5 are manned by the RCAF and financed by the USAF, and 17 are financed and manned by the USAF.
2. The USAF is now carrying out surveys with a view to setting up 9 "gap-filling" temporary radar stations. 3 of these will be in the British Columbia, 5 in Ontario, and 1 in Nova Scotia. The U.S. Government has not yet requested permission for the erection of these stations. Cabinet Defence Committee has indicated that it will be prepared to approve the proposal on condition that responsibility for financing and manning shall be borne by the USAF.
3. Construction of an experimental link of a possible distant early warning radar chain across the Arctic from Alaska to Greenland is now underway (Project "Corrode"). This experimental link consists of 3 main stations, 2 of which are in Alaska and 1 in Yukon Territory. There are also a number of intermediate unattended stations.

Secret

Proposals for Anti-Aircraft Installations in Canada

4. The U.S. Section of the Military Cooperation Committee has stated a requirement for the completion of anti-aircraft defences around certain U.S. cities adjacent to the Canadian border, e.g. Niagara Falls, Buffalo, Detroit, etc. This would involve either the Canadian Army manning sites in Canada, or the stationing of U.S. troops in Canada. This matter has not yet been raised in the FJBD or through diplomatic channels.

Secret

Interceptor Aircraft Operations

5. Existing arrangements permit USAF aircraft to intercept unidentified aircraft over Canada which are heading toward the border, but they do not permit engagement of the aircraft while over Canadian territory. The USAF has expressed objection to these arrangements on a number of grounds, and discussions are now being carried on in FJBD with a view to modifying them to meet USAF requirements.

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Top Secret

General Problems Related to Continental Defence

6. It would appear that the U.S. Government is likely to propose, in the near future, a general strengthening of North American defence arrangements. Because of the possibility that as a consequence of Project "Corrode" (see paragraph 3 above), the United States might propose the construction of early warning installations in the far north, the Canadian Government required, as a condition of its approval of the project, that a Canada-U.S. Military Study Group should be set up to study those aspects of the North American air defence system which are of mutual concern to the two countries. The Study Group held its first meeting in August, 1953, and will probably complete its task toward the end of 1953 or early in 1954.

Top Secret

7. One of the difficulties experienced in the development of arrangements between the armed forces of the two countries for the defence of North America has been the restriction imposed on Canadian military planners against joining in the discussion with U.S. planners, of future defence requirements over and above those currently authorized. This matter has been raised by the U.S. in the FJBD and is currently under consideration by the Canadian Government.

Confidential

8. Although in NATO the precedent for unified commands which ignore national boundaries is now well established, no consideration appears to have been given, in Canadian official circles, to the wisdom or otherwise of modifying the existing policy that command in Canadian territory should be Canadian. Likewise, so far as is known, the United States Government has never suggested to Canada that the Canada-U.S. Region of NATO should be placed under a Supreme Commander. However, in view of General Bradley's recent suggestion that impending developments in the field of North American defence would make such a step desirable, it may well be studied.

STRATEGIC AIR OPERATIONS

Secret

9. Under NATO, the United States is responsible for strategic air operations. For the fulfilment of these responsibilities in the event of hostilities, overflight of Canadian territory, as well as the use of bases in Newfoundland and North Eastern Canada will be essential for effective operations.

Secret

Command Arrangements in North Eastern Canada

10. The installations which the United States has built up in the northeastern area for the support of strategic air operations extend from the 99-year leased bases in Southern Newfoundland to Thule, in Northern Greenland. This complex of bases is directed by the United States North East Command, with headquarters at Fort Pepperell, near St. John's, Newfoundland.

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- 3 -

11. The Canadian Government, in consenting to the establishment of North East Command, specified that the United States command function did not extend beyond the bases and their activities, and that the Canadian Government was still responsible for the protection of that part of Canada embraced by the U.S. North East Command. Nevertheless, responsibility for defence of scattered installations easily shades into assumption of responsibility for the whole area. This is all the more likely to occur because of the absence of Canadian forces in the region. An example of the way this situation results in practice is that the USAF has an interceptor squadron stationed in Goose Bay. In theory this squadron comes under command of the Canadian air defence commander in Montreal. In actual fact the absence of adequate communications makes impossible the exercise of command in this way. As a consequence, the Canadian air defence commander has had to delegate his authority in this case to the Commanding General of North East Command at Fort Peppereil.

U.S. BASES IN NORTH EASTERN CANADA

Confidential

Ninety-nine Year Leased Bases

12. On the accession of Newfoundland to Canada, we were faced with the existence of bases leased to the United States for 99 years. These included very extensive rights exempting personnel in the Newfoundland area from the application of Canadian law. The exemptions have since been pared down by agreement so as to bring them substantially into line with those enjoyed by the U.S. forces elsewhere in Canada under the Visiting Forces (U.S.A.) Act, but no reduction of the period of tenure has been effected. By a further agreement (Exchange of Notes of April 28-30, 1952), it has been arranged that, when the NATO Status of Forces Agreement comes into effect in respect of both Canada and the United States (which will be in September 1953), it will be applicable to all United States forces in Canada, including those at the leased bases and at Goose Bay, it being understood that the provisions of the Leased Bases Agreement which deal with matters covered by the NATO Status of Forces Agreement will be held in abeyance until the latter is terminated through expiration or denunciation. Provisions of the Leased Bases Agreement dealing with matters not covered in the NATO Status of Forces Agreement are not affected.

Confidential

Goose Bay

13. Goose Bay is an RCAF base, but an area within the base has been leased to the United States for twenty years under conditions set forth in an Exchange of Notes dated December 5, 1952. It is used by the USAF as a principal staging base for strategic air operations.

... 4

Confidential

Global Communications Stations

14. A site is to be made available to the USAF at Northwest River, near Goose Bay, and another has been made available near Harmon Air Force Base for the erection of global communications stations. The site at Northwest River is to be included in the area leased to the USAF at Goose Bay. In the case of the site near Harmon Air Force Base, the period of tenure has been left indefinite, but has been related to the period of operation of the station at Goose Bay.

Secret

Frobisher Bay

15. In 1951 the USAF was granted permission to station approximately 150 men for an indefinite period at RCAF Station, Frobisher Bay, and to use the airfield there as a refueling base for aircraft flying to Thule.

UNITED STATES ACTIVITIES IN WESTERN CANADA

Exchange of Notes classified Confidential until it can be tabled in Parliament. Otherwise this item is unclassified.

Haines-Fairbanks Pipeline

16. By an Exchange of Notes dated June 30, 1953, the United States Army was authorized to construct through Canada a petroleum products pipeline from Haines, Alaska, to Fairbanks, Alaska. Construction is scheduled to start during the autumn of 1953. A Special Commissioner has been appointed by the Canadian Government to serve, during the period of construction of the pipeline, as a channel between the Corps of Engineers and the various Canadian agencies involved.

Secret

Alaska Communications

17. Preliminary discussions are underway between Canadian and U.S. authorities regarding the installation of a co-axial underwater cable from Prince Rupert to Haines, Alaska. From that point communications facilities would be constructed along the route of the Haines-Fairbanks pipeline to Haines Junction, where they would be tied in with the Northwest Communications System on the Alaska Highway. It is probable that the Canadian sections of these communications facilities would be operated by Canadian National Telegraphs.

Unclassified MILITARY PROCUREMENT

18. Difficulties which were experienced in the past in procuring military equipment in the United States for Canadian defence forces have been largely overcome by amendments of the Mutual-Defence Assistance Act, the U.S. legislation under which such procurement is carried out. Present U.S. legislation presents no major problems to such procurement.

- 5 -

19. United States purchasing in Canada at the outset of the current defence build-up fell far behind Canadian purchases in the United States. At the present time, however, U.S. expenditures for defence purchases in Canada now exceed Canadian expenditures in the United States.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Security *Secret* .....

50209-40		
✓	✓	

Type of Document *Letter* ..... No. *-* ..... Date *Sept. 14/53*

From: *U.S.S.R.* .....

To: *R. B. Bryce, Asst. Sec. Minster of Finance*  
*Ottawa*

Subject: *"Comments on the Recent  
Soviet Hydrogen Bomb  
Explosion"*

Original on File No. *50219-40* .....

Copies on File No. ....

Other Cross Reference Sheets on ....

Prepared by *[Signature]* .....

50209-40

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TOP SECRET

Ottawa, September 5, 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

50209-40  
59 | ✓

Canada - U.S. Defence Relations

In view of your meeting with other Ministers on Tuesday next to discuss this subject, I enclose a memorandum which has been hastily prepared by Defence Liaison (1) Division.

I hope that it will be helpful to you, but would ask that it should not be taken as the considered views of all concerned in this Department. A more thorough paper will be prepared, in consultation with other Divisions, if it is decided to have a discussion in Cabinet Defence Committee.

C. S. A. R.

*Copies referred to  
Exec Dir  
Exec  
Anon  
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Ottawa, September 5, 1953

A Review of Canadian Defence Policy as it  
affects Canada - United States Defence  
Relationships

The White Paper on Canada's defence programme by the Minister of National Defence defines the Canadian defence policy in terms of three objectives

- (a) the immediate defence of Canada and North America from direct attack;
- (b) implementation of any undertakings made by Canada under the Charter of the United Nations, or under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or other agreement for collective security;
- (c) the organization to build up strength in a total war.

20 While the defence of Canada and North America against direct attack has been listed as the first objective of Canadian defence policy, circumstances which existed when the current expanded defence programme was launched made it clear that the areas of activity which merited most immediate attention were those covered by the second objective. Thus most of Canada's peacetime defence forces have been assigned to tasks connected with Canadian commitments to the United Nations and to NATO. It should be noted that during the past two years the United States in general has followed a similar course. However, there has been an important difference in the position of the two countries. NATO and UN commitments, together with the back-up forces to maintain them, have absorbed and apparently will continue to absorb most of the Canadian military manpower and financial resources available in peacetime under existing Government policy. On the other hand, the United States, while it was disposed during

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the past two years to give priority to Europe and Korea in the deployment of effective forces and equipment, is now paying much more attention to North American defence requirements and is in a position to provide the resources it considers necessary for this task.

3. There is general agreement in the United States that North American defences, particularly against air attack, are inadequate and that immediate measures must be taken to correct this situation. Unavoidably Canada will become deeply involved in any resulting programme of construction of new defence installations.

4. There are at present approximately 15,000 U.S. servicemen stationed in Canada and, unless the world situation changes markedly, they are likely to continue to be stationed here for many years to come. Presumably, if the United States puts forward proposals for additional defence installations in Canada and they are approved by the Canadian Government, the number of U.S. servicemen stationed in Canada will show a further increase. The long-term political implications of, and objections to, such a situation are obvious. In the following paragraphs of this paper are listed certain ideas and principles which it is suggested the Canadian Government might follow to assist in counteracting the undesirable aspects of increased U.S. defence activities in Canada. These ideas are put forward in the light of two basic assumptions:

- (a) It is politically unrealistic to reject any major defence proposals which the U.S. Government presents with conviction as essential for the security of North America;
- (b) short of war, it will not be possible substantially to increase the number of

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Canadian forces assigned to the direct defence of Canada, since the current Canadian manpower policy is unlikely to change and since it would be politically undesirable to withdraw forces assigned to meet NATO commitments.

5. With these assumptions in mind, the following ideas and principles are put forward for consideration:

(a) Participation in Planning

Any Canadian agreement to the construction of additional U.S. defence installations in Canada should be based on joint Canada - U.S. military planning of the requirements which the installations are intended to satisfy. This would give the Canadian military authorities and the Canadian Government the opportunity to insist on exacting criteria of necessity and soundness of concept and upon the provision of adequate information at an early stage in the development of defence projects while they are still malleable. At present, however, this situation does not hold because the Canadian military planners are not permitted to participate in joint planning which involves possible future defence requirements over and above those currently authorized by the Government.

(b) Participation in Implementation of Defence Projects

It is submitted that the more Canada contributes, whether it be personnel, construction facilities, supply of equipment, or otherwise, the stronger will be its bargaining position in negotiations with the United States, not only with regard to the character of joint defence projects but also with respect to the measure of de facto control exercisable over U.S.- occupied installations on Canadian territory. During the past six years, many schemes to accomplish this purpose have

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been considered but have foundered on the rock of an already fully committed defence budget. At this time, however, perhaps it would be wise to include in the budget an item earmarked for this particular purpose. The funds might be obtained by a reduction in some other area of the defence programme. One further device which has been rejected in the past but might be given greater consideration would be for Canada to construct installations and supply equipment for rental to the United States during the period of occupation of the installations by members of the U.S. armed forces. This procedure would be particularly appropriate in the case of the provision of aids to navigation in the Far North.

(c) Assertion of Canadian Sovereignty

Sovereignty will almost certainly be adversely affected by the presence of numbers of American troops and large, or numerous small, U.S. military installations in Canada unless the Canadian people are thoroughly imbued with the idea that their presence in Canada is part of a jointly agreed plan in which both countries are participating on an equitable basis. It is suggested that in order to accomplish this purpose, the Canadian Government should, as a matter of policy, follow two main courses of action:

(1) Make some material contribution to every U.S. Project in Canada.

In some cases it will be possible to do this by arranging that a project be treated as an addition of an existing scheme in which Canada is already a partner.

(11) Take every opportunity to stress in public statements that U.S. forces are in Canada as a part of a joint defence scheme to which both countries are contributing and which is to their mutual benefit.

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It has been suggested that this process might be facilitated if Canada - U.S. defence arrangements, either as a whole or at least in the Northeastern region were ostensibly dealt within a NATO framework or command structure rather than bilaterally as at present and possibly this idea merits consideration as a matter of policy.

Regardless of the manner of presentation, it would seem desirable that a much more vigorous effort than heretofore should be made to develop the sentiment among the Canadian people that our joint defence arrangements are a real contribution to the strength of the free world and therefore something to be proud of.

(d) Frequent Emphasis when engaged in Joint Defence Discussions with U.S. Authorities on the Difficulties raised by ambitious U.S. Defence Projects in Canadian Territory.

All Canadian agencies which, as a part of their regular functions, will be the recipient of U.S. proposals for defence projects in Canada might be instructed to make use of every opportunity to give informal expression to Canadian policy along the following lines:

- (1) The Canadian Government is always fully prepared to collaborate on measures for the joint defence of the two countries which are mutually agreed to be necessary, and which are without impairment of the control of either country over all activities in its territory.
- (11) The Canadian Government, in developing its defence policy and programme, considers that for the present its armed forces can

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most effectively be employed in the defence of Canada and the free world by utilizing the bulk of its combatant formations in an active role in Northwest Europe and in Korea until they can honourably be withdrawn. It also considers that under the circumstances which now exist, it is not possible for Canada substantially to increase either the forces or resources it has allocated for the defence of North America.

- (iii) The Canadian Government recognizes that the United States Government may deem it necessary for the defence of North America, and in particular for the defence of possible targets in the United States, that defence forces and installations be placed in Canada additional to those already mutually agreed upon. However, it desires to impress upon the United States Government that the basing in Canada of U.S. forces and installations gives rise to serious problems for the Canadian Government, both political and administrative.
- (iv) The Canadian Government considers that because of these problems, and because of its responsibility to ensure that any arrangements are without impairment of its control over all activities in Canada, it must require that:
- (1) the United States Government should keep the Canadian Government fully informed of the scope and general nature of continental defence plans, and of the factors which form the basis of the conclusion of the U.S.

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Government that implementation of the plans is necessary.

- (2) all proposals for establishing U.S. forces or defence installations in Canada shall, before consideration by the Canadian Government, be referred to a joint military planning group (e.g., the Military Cooperation Committee), the Canadian and U.S. Sections of which shall report to their Governments through their respective Chiefs of Staff. In its deliberations, the joint military planning group shall be guided by agreed intelligence estimates;
- (3) arrangements for the control of forces shall continue as at present agreed;
- (4) the Canadian Government shall have the right at any time to have its forces take over from U.S. forces the responsibility for manning defence installations in Canada;
- (5) the arrangements for tenure by the United States of any new defence installations in Canada shall provide for termination when required by the Canadian Government, after review by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

Defence Liaison (1) Division  
Department of External Affairs

502-9-40  
Defence Liaison (1)/W.H. Barton/mjr

RESTRICTED

September 3, 1953.

MEMORANDUM FOR MINISTER'S PRESS CONFERENCE

General Bradley's Article in Saturday Evening Post

It is quite likely that the Minister may be asked to comment on the views expressed by General Bradley in an article which dealt with some of the problems of North American defence.

If the Minister is asked about General Bradley's suggestion that an overall continental defence command be formed, it is suggested that he might reply that, if such a command were considered militarily necessary or desirable, he was sure that the Government would give it very careful consideration. So far as is known, this question has never been raised by the authorities of either country for consideration by the other.

General Bradley suggested that discussions should be carried out between the President and the Prime Minister and then stated, "The issues are too large, the time too pressing, for us to let this drift along in routine negotiation." This remark may lead to a question about the efficacy of existing arrangements for dealing with joint defence problems. The Minister may wish to refer to the fact that joint consultation is carried on between the two countries, both within the NATO framework and by means of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. He might also wish to emphasize the long tradition of effective cooperation which has been developed in the PJBD and express confidence that any problem referred to it would not be handled as "routine negotiation".

M. H. WERNHOF

Defence Liaison(1)/W.H.Barton/mjr

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Ottawa, August 31, 1953.

Chairman,  
Chiefs of Staff,  
Ottawa.

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Article by General Bradley in the Saturday Evening Post

In view of the general interest in the recent article by General Bradley published in the Saturday Evening Post and containing references to Canada-U.S. defence problems, we asked our Ambassador in Washington for his comments. Attached, for your information, are five copies of his reply which was sent as telegram No. WA-2012 dated August 28, 1953. Also attached are five copies of telegram No. WA-2017, dated August 28, 1953, which would indicate that the Ambassador has asked for comments from the Canadian Joint Staff in Washington. If any such comments are received by this Department, they will, of course, be referred to you for information.

M. H. WERSHOF

FOR THE

Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

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August 31, 1953.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

SEEN  
L. B. PEARSON

Canada-U.S. Defence Problems

You may have seen the article entitled "A Soldier's Farewell" by General Bradley, which was published in the Saturday Evening Post of August 29. From the Canadian point of view, the principal item of interest was the suggestion that the urgent need for improved continental defences merited the President and the Prime Minister conferring with a view to the establishment of an over-all continental defence command. In General Bradley's words, "The issues are too large, the time too pressing, for us to let this drift along in routine negotiation."

In addition to this reference to Canada-United States defence relationships, General Bradley dealt in some detail with the problem of continental defence. While he took issue with the concept of the arctic early warning line advocated by the Lincoln Summer Study Group, he made it plain that, in his view, it was necessary to take immediate steps to "push our aerial defences northward in Canada as fast as we can without leaving gaps or holes for the enemy to play tricks in".

It seems to me that General Bradley's remarks serve to illustrate a situation that deserves increased attention in Canada. The plain fact of the matter is that, rightly or wrongly, there is general agreement in the United States that North American defences are inadequate and that immediate measures must be taken to improve the existing situation. The current economy drive in the U.S., coupled with the confusion of ideas about what should be done, has delayed the adoption of a firm policy, but there are many indications that a combination of political and military pressures will force a decision in Washington in the immediate future, if, indeed, it has not already been reached.

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Willy-nilly, Canada will become deeply involved in the U.S. program for improving continental defences. In Bradley's words, "... we can do almost nothing without the friendly cooperation and the teamwork of the Canadians." By cooperation and teamwork, much more is meant than the mere provision of land for bases:

"Hitherto there has been a most cordial working relationship between the military leaders of the two countries. But now, as we plan to move our mutual air defences northward toward the Hudson Bay country, something more is required. ... In my opinion a more effective over-all continental defence command must be worked out between Canada and ourselves. This command would include not only the air forces, but elements of the armies and navies of both countries."

You may consider that, in view of the U.S. pressure for more elaborate defences, and the suggestion in General Bradley's article that existing command arrangements between Canada and the United States should be modified to meet the needs of the newly developing situation, it might be useful, within the Department of External Affairs, to make a study of the various aspects of the current Canadian defence policy with particular reference to Canada-U.S. relationships. This study would deal with such facets of the over-all problem as the work of the Canada-U.S. Military Study Group, which was set up as a condition of Canadian approval of Project CORRODE (formerly known as Project COUNTERCHANGE) to study North American air defence requirements; the current restriction on Canadian participation in joint Canada-U.S. planning of future defence requirements; the difficulties raised by current U.S. defence projects which involve Canada; etc.

If you think that such a study would be helpful at this stage, I will have a paper prepared for your consideration.

We asked our Embassy in Washington for comments on General Bradley's article. These were given in telegram No. WA-2012 of August 28, 1953, a copy of which is attached to this memorandum.

*LD*  
C.S.A.R.

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

*File 6* ORIGINAL

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

*58*

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification	
S E C R E T	
File No.	
<i>50209-40</i>	
<i>57</i>	<i>50</i>

Priority	System	No.	Date
	CYPHER-AUTO	WA-2017	August 28, 1953.

Departmental  
Circulation

MINISTER  
UNDER/SEC  
D/UNDER/SEC  
A/UNDER/SEC'S  
POL/CO-ORD 'N  
SECTION

Reference: Our telegram No. WA-2012 of today's date.

Subject: Article by General Bradley in the Saturday Evening Post.

It may be that the Canadian Joint Staff here will have further comments to offer on General Bradley's article in addition to those contained in our earlier message today. If so, they will be forwarded to you early next week.

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References	

31 AUG 1953

Done \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act*  
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1953 AUG 29 PM 1 : 26

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**INCOMING MESSAGE**

*File W48*  
**ORIGINAL**

**FROM:** *Copy out 50210-40*  
**THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES.**

*57*

**TO:** THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification	
<b>S E C R E T</b>	
File No.	
<i>50209-40</i>	
<i>57</i>	<i>50</i>

Priority <b>IMPORTANT</b>	System <b>CYPHER-AUTO</b>	No. <b>WA-2012</b>	Date <b>August 28, 1953.</b>
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Departmental Circulation  
 MINISTER UNDER/SEC  
 D/UNDER/SEC  
 A/UNDER/SEC'S  
 POL/CO-ORD'N SECTION

Reference: Your telegram EX-1471 of the 27th August.

Subject: Article by General Bradley in the Saturday Evening Post.

We think you should assume that you will be faced before long with requests from the United States Government for co-operation in the field of continental defence on a scale considerably larger than any which have been made previously. On the other hand, we think it would be premature to assume that such requests will be as towering as General Bradley suggested, or even of the nature indicated in his article.

2. In estimating the likelihood of such an approach as General Bradley recommended, from President Eisenhower to the Prime Minister, you will no doubt want to keep in mind the background provided by the following facts, which we think are relevant:

(a) As one symptom of the nagging anxiety here about the vulnerability of the United States to air attack, there has been for at least six months widespread agitation both inside the United States Government and in the press for a more hermetic system of continental defence; and this agitation has grown with the news that the Soviet Union carried out, on the 12th of August, an atomic explosion involving a thermo-nuclear reaction.

(b) A new slate of Chiefs of Staff was installed this month, and they have been instructed by the President to conduct a thoroughgoing review of United States strategy and military planning.

(c) There has been a long-standing difference of opinion of a technical kind between the armed services, on the one hand, and scientists and civil defence authorities, on the other, over how to make the best use of whatever resources could be allocated for continental defence. This dispute has never been completely resolved, but, in so far as a decision has been reached, it has gone in favour of the scientists and the civil defence authorities and against the armed services, whose views of the best way to defend North America are presented by General Bradley.

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Done *AUG 29 53*  
 Date **31 AUG 1953**

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(d) Repeated efforts to obtain more money for continental defence have foundered on the administration's determination to balance the budget and restore the soundness of the dollar.

3. In retrospect, the skepticism with which many administration spokesmen received Malenkov's announcement on the 8th of August that the United States did not enjoy a monopoly on the production of the hydrogen bomb now appears to have been singularly ill-advised. The tone of much newspaper comment on the hydrogen explosion in the Soviet Union reveals a strong disinclination to be fobbed off much longer with paternal reassurances from the government; and many responsible editors and columnists are calling for improved continental defence. In the same way as the news in 1949 that the Soviet Union had an atomic bomb was followed by a thorough re-examination in the National Security Council of United States foreign and defence policy and military dispositions, so the knowledge that the Soviet Union either now has, or shortly will have, a hydrogen bomb may be expected to lead to another searching re-examination which will almost certainly come to the conclusion that the defences against a Soviet air attack across the Arctic should be strengthened.

4. Such a re-examination had been begun even before there was knowledge of this new factor. Indeed, one of the reasons for the complete change in the United States Chiefs of Staff was to make possible a fresh look at the United States military planning and strategy. It is impossible to forecast what will be the conclusions of the new Chiefs of Staff. Almost certainly they will ask for more money for continental defence. But it should not be assumed that they will want to concentrate United States resources on the defence of North America at the cost of reducing United States capabilities in other parts of the world. Admiral Radford's personal opinions are by no means completely known; but he has made no secret in the past either of his support for an energetic policy to resist Communism in Asia, or of his belief in the important world-wide role the United States Navy has to play as a platform for air-attack in time of war. The new Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff may be expected to agree with General Bradley that more attention should be paid to continental defence, but he will have to balance its claims against the need to meet many continuing commitments around the globe.

5. In any case, the views of the new Chiefs of Staff may not be decisive. In arguing that an early warning system in the far north would be of little value unless "backed up with bases and radar installations to provide continuous tracking and converging interception", and in advocating instead that aerial defences should be advanced progressively northward in Canada without any gaps being left, General Bradley is putting forward the views that for many months have been held by the military services. However, the scientists at Brookhaven and MIT and their allies in the Civil Defence Organization and in the press who have proposed an early warning system in the far north have won the only engagement on this technical issue that

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has been fought within the United States Government since the new administration took office; and the experimental start that is now being made on "operation corrode" is the sign of their victory. It may be that the new Chiefs of Staff will share the opinions of their predecessors on how best to provide defence against a Soviet attack across the Arctic; and, if so, they may succeed better than General Bradley and his colleagues in having their views accepted by the President. But this cannot be taken for granted.

6. It must also be borne in mind that budgetary considerations have hitherto defeated most of the efforts to extend and tighten the network of continental defence. The Kelly Report, the East River Project, and the Bull Report have not yet produced many tangible results; and the chief reason is that, prompted by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, the President has been unwilling to unbalance the budget further by authorizing large expenditures for continental defence. In a television interview on Wednesday night, Mr. Humphrey said that his chief concern was to balance the budget, but he suggested that, whether this was done at a high or low level, was of secondary importance. No doubt that is truth. But it is hardly conceivable that an administration which came to power on a promise to reduce taxation once the budget had been balanced, could afford to raise taxes unless there were a marked deterioration in the international situation. Since that method of raising money for improved northern defences would seem to be virtually precluded, it can be anticipated, we think, that the administration will continue to show reluctance to finance costly and elaborate schemes of continental defence. They sincerely believe that the fundamental strength of the United States cannot be maintained unless the soundness of the dollar is restored. They may be forced to sacrifice their budgetary and fiscal principles, but they will not abandon them lightly.

7. You will appreciate that it is particularly difficult to make any reliable predictions in this field. Many different plans are still being mooted by various United States authorities; and the President and the National Security Council will have to take into account many conflicting considerations before coming to firm decisions. It is therefore impossible to say whether General Bradley's article is to be taken as an accurate forecast of the kind of approach that is to be expected. In any case, you would do well, in our opinion, to assume that before very long Canada will probably be faced with new, and even larger requests, for co-operation in the defence of North America.

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# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

File No. <b>50209-40</b> <b>50209-45</b>	
<b>57</b>	<b>50</b>

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST, CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

## FILE COPY

Message To Be Sent

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CODE	
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Priority

No. **EX 1471**

Date **August 27, 1953.**

For Communications Section Only

**AUG 27 1953**

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: Article by General Bradley in August 29 Edition of Saturday Evening Post

ORIGINATOR

(Signature) *W.H. Barton*

(Name Typed) **W.H. Barton/mjr**

Div... **D.L.(1)**

Local Tel..... **7509**

General Bradley's remarks on North American defence and Canada-United States defence relationships were most interesting. We are preparing a memorandum for the Minister on his return from New York reviewing the current situation regarding Canada-United States defence problems in the light of the views expressed in the article.

APPROVED BY

(Signature) *[Signature]*

(Name Typed)

2. Your estimate of Washington opinion on this general subject, including the current lively issue of the need for increased air defence, General Bradley's proposals, and Canada-United States defence relationships, would be appreciated. We assume that you can prepare an estimate without, at this stage, making any enquiry at the State Department or Pentagon.

Internal Distribution:

S. S. E. A.  U. S. S. E. A.

*Amer. Div*

*3/18/53*

Done.....

Date.....

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Copies Referred To:

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1953 AUG 27 AM 10:42


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This Command would include not only the Air Forces but elements of the Armies and Navies of both countries. He then suggests that President Eisenhower should confer personally with the Prime Minister on these questions.

While I think the Minister will be greatly interested in General Bradley's comments, I assume that you will not wish to take up his time on this subject while he is in New York. However, I propose to have prepared a memorandum summarizing the current situation concerning Canada-United States defence relationship and recent developments in this area of activity in the light of General Bradley's remarks.



Defence Liaison(1) Division