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SECURITY - Policy and Procedures - Cabinet
Committee on Security and Intelligence -
Meetings -

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1963-64-66

**PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
CANADA**

SUBJECT

SECURITY

Policy and Procedures

Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence

Meetings

MEETINGS

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ

MORANDUM

Confidential

For file -

Minutes of meeting of
Cabinet Committee on Security and
Intelligence held on June 27th, 1966,
sent by hand today to -

The Prime Minister
Mr. Martin
Mr. Hellyer
Mr. Cardin
Mr. Drury
Mr. Benson
Mr. Pennell
Mr. Marchand

Mr. Robertson
Mr. Wall
P.C.O. Files (2)

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11 July 66

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July 8th, 1966.

A meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence was held on Monday, June 27th, 1966, at 4:30 p.m. in Room 340-S, Centre Block.

PRESENT:

The Rt. Hon. L. B. Pearson
Prime Minister, (Chairman)
The Hon. E. J. Benson
Minister of National Revenue,
The Hon. P. T. Hellyer
Minister of National Defence,
The Hon. L.T. Pennell
Solicitor General.

ALSO PRESENT:

Mr. R. G. Robertson
Secretary to the Cabinet,
Mr. Marcel Cadieux
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
Mr. E. B. Armstrong
Deputy Minister of National Defence,
Mr. G. W. Hunter
Deputy Minister of Defence Production,
Asst. Commissioner W. H. Kelly
Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
Mr. T. D. MacDonald
Department of Justice,
Mr. J. J. McCardle
Department of External Affairs,
Mr. D. F. Wall
Privy Council Office, (Secretary)
Mr. P. M. Pitfield
Privy Council Office. (A/Asst. Secretary)

I. General Inquiry into Security Methods and Procedures

1. The Committee had before it a draft Memorandum for the Cabinet entitled "General Inquiry into Security Methods and Procedures" dated June 17, 1966.
2. At the request of the Prime Minister, the Chairman of the Security Panel (Mr. R. G. Robertson) reviewed the main points contained in the Memorandum before the Committee for discussion.
3. Mr. Robertson said that in drafting the proposed Terms of Reference for the inquiry the Security Panel had been very much aware of the danger of converting the inquiry into a Court of Appeal. He said that for this reason the Memorandum emphasized that the inquiry should

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look backward principally in order to enable it to recommend improvements in security methods and procedures in the future. Another point which the Security Panel had considered to be of prime importance was that the proceedings of the inquiry should be held in camera. Bearing in mind the experience of the Spencer Inquiry and the Munsinger Inquiry, the Security Panel was convinced that the Terms of Reference for the general inquiry into security methods and procedures should permit the Commissioners no discretion in this regard. If hearings were held in public there would be legitimate demands for representation by counsel which in turn would change the whole nature of the inquiry. Public hearings would adversely affect the lives and reputations of many individuals and would prejudice the atmosphere of trust and confidence which is essential to the operation of security procedures in the personnel relations of government departments and agencies. In speaking of the nature of the Commission and the number of Commissioners, Mr. Robertson stressed the view of the Security Panel that the inquiry should be conducted in the greatest degree on a basis of informality consistent with the fact that security evaluations are not a matter of legal proof but a matter of judgement. He said that the inquiry would have to be on its guard against demands to look into particular cases made by outside parties with a view to stirring up trouble. The whole question of representations by public organizations would have to be considered, the view of the Security Panel being that submissions should be made first in writing and that any subsequent hearings should be in camera in order to discourage sensationalism. Mr. Robertson said that a third point of great importance in setting up the inquiry would be to safeguard information obtained from other countries and preserve Canada's relations with security agencies abroad. Given that the inquiry would go on for at least 18 months to 2 years, there would be a continuing source of strain on Canada's international security relationships.

4. The Committee then passed to a consideration of the recommendations set out at the conclusion of the Memorandum:

"(a) that the Commission should be given a broad mandate to examine security methods and procedures in the application, subject only to the protection of national, international and individual security and rights as set out in detail in this memorandum and in the draft terms of reference, attached."

Under this heading the Committee examined the proposed Terms of Reference for the Commission.

5. The Solicitor General was of the view that paragraph (1) of the Terms of Reference should be broader and more general than proposed. The Prime Minister agreed that "the security of the State" and "the rights of the individual" should be mentioned. The Solicitor General proposed the following wording:

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"To review the security procedures and practices that have been followed, having regard to the security of the State and the rights of the individual."

Mr. Cadieux suggested that they should be recast in terms as follows:

"to make a full and confidential inquiry into the past and present operation of Canadian security methods and procedures, to advise what security methods and procedures are most effective and how they can best be implemented, to make such reports and recommendations for this purpose as they deem necessary and desirable in the national interest, and in the conduct of the foregoing to have regard to the necessity of (a) maintaining the security of Canada as a nation; (b) respecting the rights and responsibilities of individual persons; and (c) preserving Canadian relations with the governments of other countries."

The Prime Minister suggested, and the Committee agreed, that the words "past and present" ought to be omitted in order to reduce the risk of leading the Commission into a detailed examination of past cases. The Prime Minister further suggested, and the Committee agreed, that the Terms of Reference as proposed in the memorandum should be adjusted in the light of the forms of words proposed by the Solicitor General and by Mr. Cadieux.

6. Paragraph 2 of the Terms of Reference proposed in the memorandum were found to be acceptable by the Committee.

"(b) the Commission be composed of not less than three members, the Chairman to be a Judge of the Superior Court or an outstanding lawyer."

In view of recent controversy concerning the appointment of Judges to Royal Commissions, the Prime Minister suggested, and the Committee agreed, that the specific reference to a Judge should be replaced by reference to "a person learned in the law".

"(c) if possible one of the Commissioners should have had experience in the security field, but, failing this, should be experienced in the workings of the public service."

The Committee agreed to this item, noting that it would be taken into account in the selection of Commissioners but would not be specifically mentioned in the Terms of Reference. Mr. Robertson stated that it was the Security Panel's view that the third Commissioner should be someone associated with liberal views, and the Committee agreed.

"(d) as outlined in the draft Terms of Reference at Annex, the proceedings of the Commission should be held wholly in camera and under the umbrella of all normal security precautions."

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The Prime Minister expressed the view that this requirement should not be specifically stated in the Terms of Reference, although it should be made clear to the Commissioners prior to their appointment. Mr. Robertson stated the purpose of the requirement was to avoid a campaign in the press that would ultimately lead to all the Commission's hearings being held in public. The Prime Minister agreed but pointed out that there were other campaigns, particularly in Parliament, that would be waged against all hearings being held in camera. Mr. Robertson suggested that the Government was in the best position to answer such campaigns, and that by requiring in the Terms of Reference that all hearings be held in camera the whole question would be brought to a head. The Minister of National Defence pointed out that the issue could be avoided by the agreement of party leaders. Mr. Cadieux pointed out that so long as the Commission conducted its inquiry under "the umbrella of all normal security precautions" there would be little that could be said in public. After some discussion, the Prime Minister suggested that some form of words should be found so that all the hearings except those at the beginning and at the end of the inquiry would be held in camera. The Solicitor General said that in addition there could be an undertaking that the substance of the findings would be made public along with certain specific recommendations relating to the public service. The Prime Minister observed that it would be the Solicitor General who would have to consult with party leaders concerning the Terms of Reference, and if they were not willing to accept them as regards in camera hearings the Government would have to fall back on a device such as that suggested by the Minister of National Revenue, namely: that in discussions with Commissioners prior to their appointment undertakings be obtained that all hearings would be held in camera.

"(e) the inquiry should be conducted informally, the research being done by the Commissioners themselves, rather than by a research staff, with formal testimony under oath and with advice of Counsel only when deemed essential by the Commissioners or when requested by persons appearing before the Commission for the protection of their rights and interests."

The Prime Minister observed that it would be an unusual Royal Commission that did not rely upon research done by its staff. Mr. Robertson explained the opinion of the Security Panel that the sensitivity of the subject matter of the inquiry made it desirable that wherever possible it should be handled only by Commissioners. The Prime Minister suggested, and the Committee agreed, that the wording of this item should be changed to read that

"the inquiry should be conducted informally, the research being done by the Commissioners to the greatest possible extent, rather than by research staff, etc."

In this connection, the Solicitor General pointed out that in the United Kingdom the practice had been adopted of naming additional persons to Commissions primarily for the purpose of conducting the research.

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"(f) the Commission must not be, or be thought to be, a tribunal to review decisions made in individual cases in the past either in the public service or in the defence industry."

Mr. Hunter explained the importance of the allusion to the defence industry where there are some 65,000 persons employed many of whom require security clearances.

"(g) the Commission should not be finally established until Mr. Justice Wells and Mr. Justice Spence have made their reports on the inquiries they are presently conducting into the Spencer and Munsinger cases."

The Prime Minister suggested that, while he was in agreement with this item, it should not be contained in the memorandum as circulated to Cabinet. The Minister of National Revenue expressed the view that in fact all the items (a) through (g) could be removed, the memorandum concluding simply with the recommendation of the Terms of Reference. The Prime Minister was of the view that a little bit more was required than that in the way of recommendations and suggested, with the agreement of the Committee, to omit item (g) and edit items (a) through (f) in the light of the views that had been expressed.

7. The Committee endorsed the recommendations of the Security Panel that a general inquiry into Canadian security methods and procedures be established with terms of reference as revised in light of the Committee's discussion, and agreed that an appropriate recommendation be placed before the Cabinet in the following week, although there should be no public announcement of the terms of reference or the establishment of the Commission until after the departure of the Soviet delegation presently in Canada.

D. F. Wall,
Secretary.

Privy Council Office,
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CABINET COMMITTEES ON MANPOWER,
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND LABOUR
and SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE

The Cabinet Committees on Manpower, Social Development and Labour and Security and Intelligence held a joint meeting on July 5, 1966 at 9:30 a.m., in Room 340-S, Centre Block.

PRESENT

The Honourable Paul Martin (Acting Chairman)
(Secretary of State for External Affairs)

The Honourable Paul Hellyer
(Minister of National Defence)

The Honourable H. Robichaud
(Minister of Fisheries)

The Honourable C. M. Drury
(Minister of Industry and
Minister of Defence Production)

The Honourable M. Sauvé
(Minister of Forestry)

The Honourable E. J. Benson
(Minister of National Revenue)

The Honourable L. T. Pennell
(Solicitor General)

The Honourable J. Marchand
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration)

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. T. Kent
Mr. R. B. Curry
Mr. J. Morrison
Mr. E. P. Beasley
(Department of Citizenship and Immigration)

Mr. M. Cadieux
Mr. E. R. Rettie
(Department of External Affairs)

Mr. D. F. Wall (Acting Secretary)
Mr. A. R. Winship (Assistant Secretary)

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ADMISSIBLE CLASSES AND SECURITY SCREENING OF IMMIGRANTS

1. The Committees considered proposals by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration concerning revision of the admissible classes of immigrants and procedural changes in the security screening of

immigrants, as outlined in the Minister's memorandum of 22nd June, 1966. (Ref. Cab. Doc. 371/66).

2. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, in referring to his recommendations for revising the admissible classes of immigrants, said that it was proposed to redefine the privilege of sponsorship and to make it non-discriminatory. Apart from the immediate family unit, sponsored immigrants would only be brought into Canada by Canadian citizens, and male immigrants in this group who would be entering the labour force would be required to have the equivalent of a primary education or a skill that was in demand in Canada. At the same time, classes of relatives eligible for sponsorship would be somewhat broadened, and Canadian citizens would be able to sponsor relatives from the African and Asian countries to the same extent they were permitted to do so at present from Europe and the Americas. It was anticipated that these measures would remove the potentially explosive feature of the present system and would stabilize the movement of sponsored immigrants for the future.

3. Mr. Marchand said that in order to make the changes in the sponsorship system meaningful, it would also be necessary to eliminate discrimination in security screening procedures for immigrants from certain countries. Due to a lack of facilities at present, it was impossible to make proper enquiries and hence to deal with potential immigrants from communist bloc countries. On the other hand, immigrants from Britain and the United States were accepted without security screening. The exemptions that had developed over the years were illogical and called for a number of relatively simple procedural modifications. It was proposed that immigration forms require more detailed information, particularly as to organizations in which the applicant had held office from 18 years of age. All applicants would be interviewed by an immigration officer or a diplomatic official and screening facilities would continue to be used wherever available. The new procedure would apply only to sponsored immigrants who would be admissible if there was no indication of criminal activities or active political attitudes of a potentially subversive character.

4. Mr. Marchand observed that the proposed changes in admissible classes of immigrants would require only an order-in-council to amend the immigration regulations; changes in security procedures would require a small increase in the number of immigration officers stationed abroad. It was proposed to wait until Parliament had had an opportunity to consider the White Paper on Immigration, and to announce the proposed changes in conjunction with the introduction of legislation on immigration appeals and the announcement of the new policy on landing and control of non-immigrants.

5. During the discussion that followed, these points emerged:

(a) Concern was expressed about the ability of the diplomatic missions abroad to cope with applications that might flow from proposed changes in sponsorship privileges and security procedures. Canada did not yet have missions in every country and difficulties had already been experienced in applying immigration procedures because of restrictions imposed by the governments of certain communist countries.

(b) It was anticipated that almost the only sources of sponsored immigration from communist countries in Europe would be Poland, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, which suggested that the administrative burden of dealing with added applications for sponsorship

would be far outweighed by the advantages of removing discrimination in sponsorship privileges.

(c) The privilege of sponsorship at present belonged to landed immigrants and Canadian citizens alike. The new policy would restrict the privilege to those who had acquired the status of citizenship.

(d) The additional waiting period before naturalized Canadians could sponsor their relatives was based on the assumption that immigrants who had acquired citizenship would be in a better position economically and socially to assist their relatives to become established in Canada. The Canadian requirement was for skilled immigrants and the proposed changes in sponsorship were an attempt to offset a potentially explosive imbalance in favour of unskilled labour under present sponsorship procedures.

(e) It was not expected that the educational requirement imposed on sponsored male immigrants would create undue difficulties with ethnic groups in Canada, particularly in view of the removal of discrimination that was a much greater source of difficulty at present for sponsored immigration from Europe.

6. During further discussion with reference to the new security procedures proposed, the following points emerged:

(a) Mr. Pennell said that the R.C.M.P. were generally in agreement with the proposed revision of procedures as it affected communist bloc countries in Europe. However, there was concern as to whether security screening should not exclude inactive communist sympathizers from countries like the United Kingdom. The R.C.M.P. were also concerned about whether the proposed procedure would encourage communist Chinese immigration and about the effect it would have on those of Chinese origin already in Canada illegally.

(b) It was noted that for the first time the security screening procedure would extend to United Kingdom immigrants. The added difficulty of excluding inactive communist sympathizers would be considerable.

(c) As far as Chinese immigration was concerned, none was expected except through Hong Kong and the anticipated increase was minimal. Present procedures had made it extremely difficult to establish identity for those of Chinese extraction who were in Canada, because of the discriminatory feature in the security screening procedures. With the removal of discrimination, the Immigration Department would be much more insistent on the establishment of identity for Chinese immigrants.

(d) Mr. Hellyer recalled the special circumstances under which European countries had acquired communist governments following World War II. He suggested that a date should be selected before which membership in a Communist party should not be grounds for excluding the prospective immigrant. No applicant should be accepted who had been a Communist Party member after 1950. However, those from countries that were not in the communist bloc who had been Party members prior to 1950 should only have their applications deferred for a period of time.

(e) It was important also to ensure that those involved in criminal activities would be detected by the security screening procedure. The present system had not been effective and the new procedures proposed were much more likely to prevent even those involved in crime, but without a record, from entering Canada.

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(f) Members agreed that the administrative definitions of non-admissible classes of immigrants for security purposes should be worked out in detail with the Security Panel, having regard to the points raised during discussion.

(g) While there was some disadvantage in an announcement of the proposed changes in policy before the White Paper on Immigration was issued, there was an urgent need for action to control non-immigrants and for a public indication of government policy on sponsored immigration.

7. The Committee agreed to recommend that the Cabinet approve:

(a) the new admissible classes of immigrants indicated in paragraph 29 and Appendix "B" of the Minister's memorandum;

(b) the security screening system for sponsored immigrants outlined in paragraph 32 of the memorandum, on the understanding that the administrative definitions of non-admissible classes of immigrants for security purposes would be worked out in detail in consultation with the Security Panel;

(c) plans to bring into effect the newly admissible classes by Order-in-Council later this year;

(d) announcement by the Minister of the proposed changes in admissible classes in the House of Commons when the immigration appeals legislation has been introduced and the new policy on landing and control of non-immigrants made public; the announcement also to refer in general terms to the intention to develop facilities for dealing with applications for sponsored immigration from Iron Curtain countries; and

(e) that arrangements be made at the time of the announcement for the inclusion in the various ethnic newspapers of informative advertisements explaining the changes and the reasoning behind them.

D. F. Wall,
Acting Secretary.

Privy Council Office,
O t t a w a.

1964

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May 5th, 1964.

R.C.M. Police Establishment Increase considered at a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence on Tuesday, April 28th, 1964, at 4:00 p.m. in Room 340-S.

PRESENT:

- The Prime Minister
(Rt. Hon. L. B. Pearson), (Chairman)
- The Secretary of State for External Affairs
(Mr. Martin),
- The Minister of National Defence,
(Mr. Hellyer),
- The President of the Queen's Privy
Council for Canada
(Mr. McIlraith),
- The Minister of Public Works
(Mr. Cardin),
- The Minister of Industry
(Mr. Drury),
- The Minister of Justice
(Mr. Favreau).

ALSO PRESENT:

- Mr. Marcel Cadieux
- Mr. A. J. McCardle
Department of External Affairs,
Commissioner G. B. McClellan
Chief Superintendent W. H. Kelly
Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
- Mr. G.G.E. Steele
Secretary of State Department,
- Mr. R. G. Robertson
- Mr. D. F. Wall (Secretary)
- Mr. D. Beavis (Asst. Secretary)
- Privy Council Office.

1. The Committee had for consideration a memorandum (S&I-4, April 28/64), proposing an increase of 73 positions to be allocated in the 1964-65 establishment of the Directorate of Security and Intelligence, a determination which the Treasury Board had felt unable to assess and on which the advice of the Cabinet Committee had been sought by the Board. The proposed increase in the establishment was as follows:

- a) Counter-espionage - 48 positions
- b) Counter-subversion - 10 positions
- c) Security Screening - 13 positions
- d) General Administration - 2 positions

2. At the request of the Prime Minister, Commissioner McClellan gave a detailed report on the background of the operations of the Directorate, elaborating on the information contained in the document. He pointed out that, in addition to that of the Izvestia representative arrested the previous evening after some months of physical surveillance, which was consumptive both of time and personnel, there were 40 other known active cases of espionage in the country; of these 6 were very active. While

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Ottawa was a particular problem, there also was considerable activity in other large cities such as Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver. He stressed the reference in the paper to the increase in espionage activity during periods of détente and characterized the rate of increase as 'tremendous', noting that the 48 additional counter-espionage positions could be materially reduced if travel regulations for Russian diplomats in Canada were to be reduced to a 25 mile "free travel" radius from the 75 mile zone now in effect.

3. The Commissioner said that, while 'illegal residents' operating under cover of false documents had been the biggest problem in the last five of six years, the Committee should be aware of the high proportion of embassy staff known to be, or suspected of being, career intelligence officers. Thirty-three out of fifty had been suspected of being members of the Russian Intelligence Service; of these, 13 had been identified by allied security services but had not so far been caught in action in Canada. Eighteen of twenty-eight had been identified as intelligence officers in the Polish Intelligence Service; ten of twenty-nine in the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service; five of nineteen in the Yugoslavian Service (the most poorly organized); and five of twenty-three in the Cuban Intelligence Service. While such proportions seemed high, they were borne out by information from a defector responsible for the solution of several important cases abroad who also estimated that about 100 'illegals' were active either in Canada or close to the border. Of these some ten or twelve were known as were some tasks: collecting data from cemeteries for use in illegal documentation, surveying for high land on the coast for a transmitter of some sort, surveying targets such as pipelines for future sabotage, and one agent known to be working, without success, to subvert female employees of the Department of External Affairs.

4. In response to questions from Ministers, the Commissioner also noted:

- a) Most agents operative were of European background, although nearly 50% were of Canadian origin.
- b) Not only were the top flight agents better trained, such as the nine Canadians recently returned from Moscow, but the mechanics of covering an agent "meet" were increasingly difficult and more absorptive of man-power for surveillance. Additionally, the Russian Intelligence Service showed increased capacity to watch for possible weaknesses in Canadian staff abroad; the ratio being one to one in Moscow, covering every level of the Canadian staff. Great patience on the part of the Russian Intelligence Service was common knowledge. For example, a Canadian compromised abroad might not be 'activated' for more than ten years, by which time the Canadian undoubtedly would have been transferred and likely would occupy a more senior position. All weaknesses were used for exploitation, professional prostitutes and homosexuals not excepted. An estimated 5,000 Russian Intelligence Service staff were considered to be employed solely on such penetration of Western Embassies in the U.S.S.R.
- c) All missions from the U.S.S.R. carried at least one intelligence officer. All allied security services were agreed on this and it had recently been confirmed in Canada by the defector, Professor Klotchko. Two known officers were in Canada at present with the wheat mission; during a recent visit of the Red Army chorus an agent in Canada was known to have been 're-activated', and the same sort of activity could be expected of the Red China News Agency as from any Soviet-bloc embassy.

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- d) A public statement concerning the reasons for the expulsion of the Soviet press correspondent, Tarasov, would be helpful, as the Russian Intelligence Service were known to shake up their organization each time they were publicly embarrassed.

5. During the Ministerial discussion which followed, the following points arose -

- a) If a public statement were made concerning Tarasov, questions would be raised as to the lack of criminal charges. Such questions could, however, be answered on the grounds that
- (i) charges would result in the production of classified documents, which would not be in the public interest;
 - (ii) reciprocal Soviet action, probably on false bases, could be anticipated;
 - (iii) an agreement had been reached with the Canadian informant that he would not become involved in any publicity and the laying of charges would result in a breach of this agreement; and
 - (iv) such action could well tend to discourage other informants from cooperating with the R.C.M. Police in future;
 - (v) reticence in matters such as this was the only course consistent with the public interest.

6. After further brief discussion, the Committee agreed

- a) that an increase of 73 positions in the establishment of the Directorate of Security and Intelligence in the R.C.M. Police was necessary and should be recommended to the Cabinet; and
- b) that a public statement concerning the expulsion of Tarasov, along the lines of that read by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, should be made in the House of Commons at 6:00 p.m. and subsequently be released to the Press.

D. F. Wall,
Secretary.

Privy Council Office,
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Minutes of the First meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence, held on Wednesday, October 16th, 1963, in Room 340-S of the House of Commons at 5:00 p.m.

PRESENT

The Prime Minister
(Mr. Pearson) (in the Chair)

The Minister of Justice
(Mr. Chevrier)

The Secretary of State for External Affairs
(Mr. Martin)

The Minister of Citizenship & Immigration
(Mr. Favreau)

The Associate Minister of National Defence
(Mr. Cardin)

The Secretary of the Security Panel
(Mr. Wall) (Secretary)

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. R. G. Robertson
(Secretary to the Cabinet)

Mr. R. B. Bryce
(Deputy Minister of Finance)

Mr. N. A. Robertson
(Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs)

Mr. J. J. McCardle
(Department of External Affairs)

Commissioner C. W. Harvison
(Royal Canadian Mounted Police)

Mr. T. D. MacDonald
(Department of Justice)

Mr. J. S. Cross
(Department of Citizenship & Immigration)

Mr. D. Beavis
(Privy Council Office) (Asst. Secretary)

I. Revised Cabinet Directive on Security

1. The Committee had for consideration a revised draft Cabinet Directive on Security together with a covering memorandum describing proposed changes of policy and procedure.

(Cabinet Committee Document S&I-2 entitled "Revised Cabinet Directive on Security", dated October 4th, 1963, refers.)

2. The Prime Minister said that in his view the revised Directive would provide a satisfactory solution to the difficult problem of security screening, and expressed the hope that it would help to meet the worries and criticisms which had been expressed. While the Directive did not provide for a system of appeal as such, it did embody the reality of an adequate system of review.

3. The Minister of Justice said that the draft Directive was much better than that in effect at present, but still fell short of what he had hoped it would be possible to achieve in the way of an outside system of review such as that in effect in the United Kingdom. Mr. Chevrier felt that the revised policy, even though improved, would still be subject to severe criticism, and did not consider that the Directive should be made public.

4. The Secretary to the Cabinet pointed out that neither the United Kingdom nor the United States provided an appeal system as such, but rather a formal system of review to assist the responsible Minister in arriving at a decision. The Security Panel considered that the procedures in the proposed Directive were more in accordance with the realities of the matter than any system which provided the "trappings" of an appeal without its substance.

5. During further discussion the following points arose:

- (a) While there might be immediate advantage in showing the Directive to leaders of the opposition parties on a confidential basis, such action would inevitably lead to the tabling of the document;
- (b) therefore it seemed most appropriate that the Prime Minister make an explanatory statement in the House of Commons embodying the substance of the Directive without referring to it directly;
- (c) that some difficulty must be anticipated concerning the requirement to consider associations and family relationships in connection with an individual's security status; and
- (d) on the whole, the new Directive would ensure fair treatment of individuals as a result of its requirement for at least three stages of review.

6. The Committee therefore recommended:

- (a) that the Cabinet approve the policies and procedures set out in the draft Cabinet Directive on Security for implementation by all departments and agencies;
- (b) that a statement be made by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons, setting out the substance of the changes in security policy and procedure; and
- (c) that, if necessary, the Minister of Justice would make a further, more detailed statement concerning security during the consideration of the estimates of his department for 1963-64.

II. Questions on Security Raised by Mr. Orlikow

7. The Committee had for consideration a series of questions concerning security which had been asked in the House of Commons by Mr. Orlikow, New Democratic Member for Winnipeg North on September 30th, 1963, together with draft replies prepared by the Security Panel.

(Cabinet Committee Document S&I-3 dated October 11th, 1963, refers.)

8. After discussion, the Cabinet Committee recommended:

- (a) that the replies as drafted be made in the House of Commons, after a general statement had been made about security policy; and
- (b) that the member of the government making the replies be informed, in relation to part 1 of question 1,162, that while a number of security officers were for various reasons listed in the Government of Canada telephone directory, their being so listed did not vitiate the arguments against listing all departmental security officers as a general practice.

III. Security Screenings: Revised Personal History Form

9. The Committee had for consideration a revised Personal History Form used as a basis for security investigation, together with a covering memorandum explaining how it differed from the form presently in use.

(Cabinet Committee Document S&I-1 entitled "Security Screening: Personal History Form", dated September 17, 1963, refers.)

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10. After discussion, the Committee recommended that the revised Personal History Form be approved for use in all departments and agencies, subject to a minor modification of wording in one of the questions on the form.

D. F. Wall,
Secretary.

Privy Council Office,
October 22nd, 1963.

AGENDA

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June 30, 1966.

CABINET COMMITTEES ON
MANPOWER, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT & LABOUR
and SECURITY & INTELLIGENCE

The meeting of the members of these Committees, formerly scheduled for Monday, July 4, will now be held on Tuesday, July 5, at 9:30 a.m., in Room 340-S, Centre Block.

A G E N D A

1. Admissible Classes and Security Screening of Immigrants. (Cab. Doc. 371/66, June 22, 1966 circulated).

F. A. Milligan, and
D. F. Wall,
Secretaries.

Privy Council Office
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LIST OF PEOPLE WHO RECEIVED COPIES OF: (a) AGENDA or
~~(b) // MINUTES // OF // MEETING~~

REGARDING: Cabinet Committee on
Manpower, Social Development & Labour, and
Security and Intelligence

DATE OF MEETING: ~~Tuesday~~ Monday, July 4, 1966

TIME OF MEETING: 9:30 a.m.

PLACE OF MEETING: Room 340-S, Centre Block

DISPATCHED: June 28, 1966 AT: 3:00 p.m.

SUBJECTS ON AGENDA:

1. Admissible Classes and Security
Screening of Immigrants

Mr. Pearson
Mr. Martin
Mr. Hellyer
Mr. Cardin
Mr. Benson
Mr. MacEachen
Mr. Sharp
Mr. Robichaud
Mr. Teillet
Miss LaMarsh
Mr. Drury
Mr. Favreau
Mr. Nicholson
Mr. Sauvé
Mr. Pennell
Mr. Marchand

Mr. Robertson (2)
Mr. Milligan
Mr. Wall
Mr. Leach (no document)

P.C.O. File (2) (no document)

Mr. Bryce
Mr. Kent

S-1-1 (6)-17
(Agenda)

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CONFIDENTIAL

June 28, 1966.

CABINET COMMITTEES ON
MANPOWER, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT & LABOUR
and SECURITY & INTELLIGENCE

A meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Manpower, Social Development and Labour will be held with members of the Committee on Security and Intelligence on Monday, July 4, at 9:30 a.m., in Room 340-S, Centre Block.

A G E N D A

1. Admissible Classes and Security Screening of Immigrants. (Cab. Doc. 371/66, June 22, 1966 attached). S-1-7

F. A. Milligan, and
D. F. Wall,
Secretaries.

Privy Council Office
O t t a w a.

Attch.

**PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ**

MORANDUM

Confidential

For file -

Agenda for meeting of
Cab. Cttee. on Security and Intelligence
to be held on Monday, June 27th, 1966,
sent to -

The Prime Minister
Mr. Martin
Mr. Hellyer
Mr. Caddin
Mr. Drury
Mr. Benson
Mr. Pennell
Mr. Marchand

Mr. Robertson
Mr. Wall

P.C.O. Files (2)

MAK

23 Jun 66

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S-1-1(b)-M
(Agenda)

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June 23rd, 1966.

A meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence will be held on Monday, June 27th, 1966, at 4 p.m. in Room 340-S, Centre Block.

A G E N D A

- I. General Inquiry into Security Methods and Procedures
(Document S&I-6 dated June 17, 1966, distributed June 22, 1966.)

D. F. Wall,
Secretary.

Privy Council Office,
O t t a w a.

1963

S-1-1 (S) M
(Agenda.)

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A G E N D A

The first meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security and Intelligence to be held Wednesday, October 16th, 1963, at 5:00 p.m. in Room 340-S, Centre Block.

- I. Revised Cabinet Directive
(Document S&I-2)

- II. Questions Raised by Mr. Orlikow
(Document S&I-3)

- III. Security Screening: Personal History Form
(Document S&I-1)

D. F. Wall,
Secretary.

Privy Council Office,
October 14th, 1963.