


[illegible]

"B.F." - DO NOT HOLD THIS FILE WHEN LAPSE  
IN ACTION MAY EXCEED 48 WORKING HOURS

SECRET - FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY



-13931-

Canadian Defence Intelligence



# A GUIDE FOR ACTION

INTELLIGENCE

NOT FOR PUBLICATION  
CLASSIFIED LIBRARY  
OCT 20 1976

Published by Director General Intelligence and Security

NDHQ—OTTAWA

SECRET - FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY

000118

SECRET  
FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE



MINISTÈRE DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE

2000-35 (DGIS)

National Defence Headquarters  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A OK2

15 October, 1976

Distribution List

DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE

1. Enclosed for your retention is a copy of a paper on Canadian defence intelligence. I hope you will find it useful. Please note that its distribution is for CANADIAN EYES ONLY.

*R.J.G. Weeks*

R.J.G. Weeks  
Major-General

Director General Intelligence and Security

DISTRIBUTION (Overleaf)

SECRET

FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY

000119

SECRET

FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 2 -

DISTRIBUTION

External

Commander, Mobile Command (through SSO(Int))  
Commander, Maritime Command (through SSO(Int))  
Commander, Air Command (through SSO(Int))  
→ National Defence College  
Canadian Forces Command and Staff College  
Canadian Forces School of Intelligence and Security  
CFAs  
CFILO (London)  
CFILO (Washington)  
Sec IAC (for members)

Internal

DM  
CDS  
VCDS  
DCDS  
CMDO  
CLDO  
CADO  
DGMPO  
ADM(Pol)  
A/ADM(Pol)  
CPP  
D Strat A  
DIPC  
DSTI  
D Secur  
DDI  
DISPS

SECRET

FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY


000120

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

FOREWORD

I believe that there is a fundamental need for a document which states the Canadian requirement for defence intelligence. The subjects about which intelligence is needed and the scope of the intelligence required change with the passage of time and the unfolding of events. But you have to start somewhere. This paper is intended to discuss the requirement for defence intelligence as it appears to me now, to define the areas and subjects of intelligence interest both geographically and functionally, prescribe the scope of the intelligence we need, consider the sources from which it is obtained and to establish priorities.

Intelligence is information relevant to a particular subject obtained from both open and special sources which, after analysis and assessment, can be used as a guide to action. Intelligence is not an end in itself, it is a means to an end. This paper is intended therefore not only as a guide to help all those who are involved in producing defence intelligence for Canada, but also to give users of defence intelligence a better idea of what is involved.



R.J.G. Weeks  
Major-General

Director General Intelligence and Security

July, 1976

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

## DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE

### TABLE OF CONTENTS

#### FOREWORD

	PAGE
PART I THE REQUIREMENT FOR DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE	1
PART II AREAS AND SUBJECTS OF DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE INTEREST AND THE SCOPE OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED	15
PART III SOURCES AND PRIORITIES	27
PART IV THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE	33
ANNEX A DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE INTERESTS BY SUBJECT AND BY COUNTRY	

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

PART I

THE REQUIREMENT FOR DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE

INTRODUCTION

1. Our national and international objectives are subject to challenges and open to opportunities. These challenges and opportunities develop from both internal and external sources, include the threat of violence and subversion and may be expressed in political, economic, or military terms. The function of intelligence, in a broad sense, is to assess these challenges and opportunities objectively, and report the conclusions and implications to those responsible for the formulation and execution of national policy. It is only in this way that informed decisions can be made with a full awareness of the risks and benefits involved.

DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE

2. Individual nations can no longer defend themselves alone from all possible threats. Therefore, groups of nations with common interests seek to defend themselves collectively. Purely national security interests and alliance security interests overlap. Both, however, are proper objectives of national policy and in defence terms the same national military forces serve national interests and alliance interests at one and the same time. This is also true of intelligence, and it is necessary to obtain a nice balance of resources between those required to meet purely national needs in the narrow sense and those required to meet the broader, but still national, objective of collective defence.

ROLES OF THE CANADIAN FORCES

3. The roles of the Canadian Forces have been defined, in order of priority, as follows:

- a. assistance in maintenance of internal security including the surveillance of our territory and coastlines, i.e., the protection of our sovereignty;

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 2 -

- b. the defence of North America in cooperation with the USA;
- c. the fulfilment of such NATO commitments as may be agreed upon; and,
- d. the performance of such international peacekeeping roles as we may from time to time assume.

INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

- 4. Present objectives of defence intelligence, as related to these roles, are to recognize and assess:
  - a. threats to the security of the Defence establishment and to the internal security of Canada, which may require the Canadian Forces to be deployed within Canada in aid of the civil power;
  - b. the threat to the sovereignty of our national territory, airspace or surrounding waters;
  - c. the threat to North America in the context of general war;
  - d. the risk that a limited war may escalate to involve Canada as a consequence of NATO or other alliance commitments;
  - e. any threat to peace or stability outside Canada especially in areas where Canadian interests are directly or indirectly involved and in circumstances which may require the use of Canadian troops already *in situ* or the deployment of the Canadian Forces either in a combat, peacekeeping or civil support role.
- 5. In addition to providing estimates of risk related to the roles of the Canadian Forces, it is also important for Defence Intelligence to identify and make known opportunities for action to support defence and national objectives in a positive sense. This is an aspect of intelligence which tends to be forgotten.

.../3

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

000124

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 3 -

6. Defence intelligence related to the security of the military establishment and threats to internal security are national matters, as are external threats to the sovereignty of our national territory, airspace or surrounding waters. Threats to peace and stability outside Canada may involve both national and alliance interests. Limited and general war are largely alliance matters. It is clear that as the scale of the military threat increases, national interests and alliance interests tend to merge. This accounts in part for the complexities involved in determining intelligence priorities and allocating resources for intelligence purposes. An additional factor is that our alliance partners often have vested national interests in areas of alliance intelligence thus making it necessary for Canada to have a national capability for independent assessment.

7. In military terms, defence intelligence is required so that realistic military policies can be devised which make the best use of available resources. A correct assessment of the threat from a Canadian point of view is essential before judgements can be made with respect to:

- a. strategy and operational concepts;
- b. force structure and manpower allocation;
- c. procurement of weapons systems and equipment;
- d. logistic support requirements;
- e. operational readiness standards;
- f. operational deployment capabilities; and,
- g. research and development requirements.

8. It is axiomatic that the Canadian Forces must not be deployed or committed without the best available information about the strengths, dispositions, organization, tactics, techniques and weapons systems of their opponents.

.../4

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

000125

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 4 -

This is as applicable to internal security operations as it is to operations outside Canada. At the upper end of the spectrum of conflict, this is mainly a question of collective defence and thus the intelligence required is the same for Canada as it is for our major allies. The Canadian defence intelligence requirement at this level, therefore, is essentially to ensure that our contribution to the collective effort is sufficient to obtain access to the information we need from the data banks of our major allies. In this way Canadian requirements at the lower levels of conflict can be met and at the same time we can maintain the capability of making an independent judgement of the military threat to NATO Europe and of the threat to North America at the *strategic* level.

9. The problem which this poses, however, is that while we can be reasonably sure that information will be shared where there is a clear collective defence involvement, there is no such certainty when vested national interests are involved, either ours or those of other nations. The need for purely Canadian intelligence thus increases in inverse ratio to the scale of the threat.

INTERNAL SECURITY

10. It is a military principle that every commander is responsible for the security of his command. Thus DND is responsible in peace-time for ensuring that defence establishments are protected internally against physical loss or theft, against the disclosure of information which it is not in the national interest to make public or which has been entrusted to us by other nations, and against subversion from within.

11. The internal security of Canada, outside DND establishments, is primarily a civil responsibility. There are occasions, however, when it is necessary to deploy Canadian Forces in Aid of the Civil Power or simply to assist civilian authorities in other internal security operations such as crowd control or prison riots. In such situations, it is essential that, once ordered, the military intervention be swift and efficient. This means

.../5

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 5 -

that military commanders must have the latest intelligence pertaining to their area of operation. While most of this intelligence can be provided by civilian police forces and other agencies, it is not acceptable to wait until troops are requested to start gathering such information. The CF must receive and analyze such intelligence, *from a military point of view*, as far in advance of CF involvement as possible.

12. With respect to the internal security of the military establishment, therefore, the Canadian Forces must have the information necessary to protect themselves. With respect to the internal security of Canada, the information required is that which will permit the Canadian Forces to intervene effectively if ordered to do so.

#### SOVEREIGNTY

13. The role of surveillance of Canadian territory and coastlines is not, at present, primarily a function of preventing hostile intrusion by foreign military forces. In fact, intelligence estimates in recent years have been unable to envisage circumstances in which the deployment of military forces by an unfriendly foreign power in deliberate violation of Canadian sovereignty could occur, except in the context of a general war. However, the surveillance of territories that are largely unoccupied, of uncontrolled waters, and of airspace is essential to determine whether unauthorized foreign intrusions do occur and, if so, to permit an assessment to be made of implications with respect to Canadian sovereignty.

#### DEFENCE OF NORTH AMERICA

14. a. General War

- (1) General war is the least likely contingency. This is so because a state of mutual military deterrence exists between the USA and the USSR at the strategic level. The forces of military deterrence are delicately balanced, however, and the whole spectrum of capabilities from ICBMs to men with rifles must be covered.

.../6

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 6 -

- (2) At present only two countries, the USA and the USSR, possess the full range of military deterrent power on a global scale. Although this power is exercised on both sides with the support of allies, the primary roles rest at present with the principals. The threat and implications of the emergence of the People's Republic of China as a nuclear power are fully recognized and dealt with later in the paper.
- (3) Canadian defence intelligence requirements with respect to global war are:
  - (a) to obtain and analyze information which relates to any direct threat to North America;
  - (b) to obtain and analyze information which will permit an independent Canadian assessment, technical or strategic, to be made of developments which may shift the balance significantly to one side or the other;
  - (c) to identify changes of emphasis within the spectrum of capabilities; and,
  - (d) to obtain information which may affect Canadian Forces deployed outside North America in support of the deterrent or because of other major alliance commitments.
- (4) At the strategic level, the intelligence requirements for the defence of North America are the same as those for general war. At present only the Soviet Union has the capability of posing such a threat in strategic military terms, but

.../7

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 7 -

it is possible that China may develop such a capability within the next decade. Deterrence of this type of threat is collective, however, and the intelligence requirement must be viewed in alliance terms insofar as strategic weapons are concerned.

- (5) In order to retain the capability of an independent Canadian assessment, intelligence is required to measure the threat presented by:

- (a) ICBMs;
- (b) submarines; and,
- (c) manned bombers.

This capability includes systems which are now deployed and those which are under development.

b. Limited War

- (1) The likelihood that Canada would be directly involved in a limited war *ab initio* is minimal. Moreover, there is little chance that a limited war could occur, in which both the USA and USSR were direct participants, which could not lead very quickly to general war. Our interests, therefore, should be aimed at assessing the risk that a limited conflict, particularly one in which either the USA or the USSR is indirectly involved, might result in a direct confrontation.
- (2) A similar assessment of risk, that is to say the risk of expansion leading to great power participation, is required with respect to local conflicts - such as the India-Pakistan war of 1972 and the continuing Arab-Israeli confrontation.

.../8

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

000129

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 8 -

- (3) However, this relatively limited requirement is postulated upon the assumption that specific Canadian interests other than a generalized interest in preserving the peace are not involved. If there are specifically Canadian interests at stake, our requirement for information must be expanded to include a capability to assess the factors which might bear upon the possible deployment of Canadian Forces.

NATO AND NORAD

15. Certain defence intelligence requirements are fixed by commitments which Canada has undertaken through alliances:

- a. NATO
- b. NORAD

16. The information required is on two levels. First, intelligence to permit a judgement to be made with respect to the continued deployment of the forces involved and to consider policy aspects relative to the commitment itself and, second, information required by the forces involved in their deployment areas which will assist them in carrying out the tasks which they have been given.

17. In NATO and NORAD, the intelligence required is supplied by the field headquarters under which the Canadian elements serve. However, it is not always completely adequate for their needs by Canadian standards and may have to be supplemented from national sources. The SHAPE intelligence organization, for example, is entirely dependent upon the intelligence supplied by member countries of NATO, but the conclusions drawn often represent a compromise between as many national views as there are members. This is less true of NORAD because of geographic proximity and because participation is bilateral rather than multilateral.

.../9

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 9 -

18. There is thus a continuing requirement for Canada to be capable of making an independent judgement of the military threat to NATO Europe (and to the Canadian Forces there) and of the threat to North America at the strategic level and to contribute towards the intelligence upon which the threat estimates are based.

THREATS TO PEACE AND STABILITY IN AREAS WHERE CANADIAN INTERESTS ARE INVOLVED

19. Canadian interests may be *direct* - involving areas in which we have substantial investments in human, economic, or political terms (national interests), or *indirect* - involving areas in which we have an interest in terms of collective defence (alliance interests).

20. In areas where we have been committed to peace-keeping roles, such as the Middle East and Cyprus, for example, the provision of objective national intelligence is a Canadian responsibility. We must be able to assess continually those military factors which relate to political judgements about our continued participation.

21. Although the tactical information required by our forces or personnel deployed under UN or other similar international auspices is normally available locally on a day-to-day basis, there is a requirement to make sure that additional intelligence sometimes available at NDHQ is transmitted to the Canadian Commander concerned. Moreover, there is a requirement to monitor the degree to which risk is involved in national terms (in Cyprus, for example, the deployment of Turkish forces from the mainland) and to give military advice, based on intelligence, with respect to the policy of continued commitment or possible withdrawal.

22. Obviously, our intelligence resources are insufficient to permit us to maintain a world-wide data base collected in advance as an insurance against every contingency. It is, therefore, necessary to assign priorities. We must accept the risks of having no coverage at all on some parts of the world without a time-lag during which we can hope to obtain it from our allies as a by-product of our contribution to intelligence for collective defence or from other sources.

.../10

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

000131

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 10 -

THE EMERGENCE OF NEW POWER RELATIONSHIPS

23. So far this paper has considered the intelligence requirement in terms of the realities of global power as they have evolved in the last twenty-five years. That is to say an era during which strategic military power became bipolar in nature centred upon Washington on the one hand and Moscow on the other.

24. It was also an era, however, during which the validity of nuclear military power as an instrument of global policy has decreased in credibility except in a deterrent sense. The Cuban crisis of 1962 made it clear that both the Soviet Union and the United States will seek to avoid the actual use of nuclear military power. It is also clear that this limitation again focuses attention on the use of conventional military power, but in circumstances which are strictly proscribed in terms of duration, geographic scope, scale of intensity and participation. The first indication of this came at Suez in 1956 and was confirmed by the American decision to withdraw from Vietnam. It is apparent, moreover, that so far as the major nuclear powers are concerned, the phenomenon of national commitment to the use of total military power as a conclusive means of achieving external national objectives on a global scale has been substantially modified since 1945. The advance of military technology has played a major part in these changing power relationships. These and other factors have substantially reduced the credibility of superpower protection and have brought about a tendency toward the fragmentation of alliances which were wrought under the imperatives of bipolarity. This tendency is as observable in the East as it is in the West.

25. As a consequence, new power relationships are emerging which are infinitely more complex, are multipolar rather than bipolar, rest more upon economic and political power than military power and are played out in a variety of international forums where the currency of influence and voting support have become the "cash in hand" of the statesman. The power to apply or withhold military power will still be important where vital security interests are concerned, but this power by itself has serious limitations and has less utility in coercive terms than has been the case up to now. The ability to make valid judgements about what is perceived as vital, by others in particular, is absolutely essential.

.../11

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

000132

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 11 -

26. The existence of nuclear military power can therefore be perceived as an umbrella under which a wide variety of orchestrated power options including conventional military power can be exercised. The development of Soviet conventional strength, especially at sea, to permit the pursuit of foreign policy and economic objectives on a global scale attests to their clear understanding of the use of power in this way.

27. The multipolar centres of power about which future coalitions will form and reform are emerging as follows:

- a. the United States
- b. the Soviet Union
- c. China
- d. Japan
- e. the EEC.

28. The need to retain a balance of bipolar military power continues to be perceived by the Soviet Union and the United States as an essential element of global strategy. Thus the need to appraise that balance remains a fundamental intelligence requirement. Nevertheless, the economic drain which the retention of military power imposes and the decreasing validity of nuclear military power exercised unilaterally as a form of sanctions or a source of client state protection tends to weaken the ability of these two powers to attract the compliance of the third world. It is because of this that new power relationships are emerging.

29. The triangular relationship between China, the Soviet Union and the United States, coupled with the emergence of China onto the world stage as a member of the United Nations Security Council and as the self-styled champion of the third world, has had an impact which needs no elaboration. There appears little reason to doubt that she will eventually acquire military power, to match the capability of those whom she perceives as adversaries, despite certain limitations upon its use for coercive purposes.

.../12

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

000133

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 12 -

30. The centres of attraction for new coalitions may pull in different directions at the same time and must be examined both separately and in relation to each other. Romania, for example, may desire better economic arrangements with the West, but can move in that direction only to the extent that political circumstances permit. Japan, with a tremendous potential for economic growth may desire links with China for economic purposes while at the same time developing a deterrent capability to counter-balance a perceived military threat from that quarter.

31. The economic and political power of Japan has not been matched so far by comparable military power. This in fact has been unnecessary because of the protection afforded by the United States. It is now becoming clear, however, that United States economic policy and Japanese economic expansion are not necessarily compatible. At the same time the credibility of the US as a protective power in the Far East has been adversely affected by the events in Vietnam and by the diminishing validity of nuclear military power as an instrument of policy. Thus the thrust of Japanese policy is likely to be in the direction of greater self-reliance in political and military terms. Her economic power is already a major factor in a global sense and her influence as a world power is increasing rapidly. She is capable now of implementing an independent nuclear weapons program if a decision to do so were taken.

32. The EEC has, as yet, no articulated military power in a collective external sense except in the application of a highly developed technological capability to the joint production of arms and equipment which enhances the external influence of the community. It appears that for some time to come the EEC will remain embroiled in the bipolar military relationship even though this relationship is being eroded by economic and political pressures. Two countries within the EEC, the United Kingdom and France, have a national nuclear capability. Britain is within the constraints of NATO and bilateral arrangements with the US, whereas France has a fully independent force.

33. In addition to considering the *circumstances* under which Canadian Forces might be deployed, therefore, such as global war and limited war, it is necessary to define Canada's external defence intelligence requirements in terms of:

.../13

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 13 -

- a. the bipolar balance of military power which is still present, but which has diminishing utility;
- b. the emerging multipolar power relationships centred on the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and the EEC;
- c. the shifting pattern of third world country relationships to existing and emergent centres of power; and,
- d. explicit national interests.

34. An additional potential factor which will affect the requirement for defence intelligence is the prospect of detailed negotiations on MBFR. There is a substantial difference between the intelligence required for strategic purposes - that is to say to assess the strategic balance - and that which is required for the purposes of MBFR. The difference is in terms of detail.

35. Before reductions are made at all, the starting position, in which there can be a substantial degree of confidence, must be known. It is not enough to use the existing analytical criteria based upon a relatively limited data base and designed for a broad assessment of strategic balance. The problems involved and the facts which will have to be produced come much closer to the requirements of wartime tactical intelligence, but on a much wider scale. The negotiator must have criteria against which he can measure the validity of the figures for manpower and weapons strengths presented by the other side.

36. Intelligence will be obliged to quantify as well as identify and evaluate the part of the Warsaw Pact force offered for reduction, as well as the forces available for reinforcement, and to aid in judgements as to whether comparable tactical and technological capability and not merely comparable numbers are being proposed.

37. The magnitude of the task from a Canadian point of view, however, is eased by the fact that we are part of an alliance team. This gives us the basic intelligence data from which we can draw our own conclusions. Regardless of the source there is still a basic requirement for information which will enable us to make a purely Canadian assessment of the facts.

.../14

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

000135

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 14 -

38. Apart from the continuous requirement for information concerning actual force capabilities and deployments, there is also a requirement to assess future capabilities on the basis of something more precise than an intuitive guess. Such an assessment can be made as a consequence of the study of foreign military oriented scientific and technical capabilities coupled with a knowledge of what is being done in the fields of research and development. It is in this area that the best guide can be found to anticipating the thrust of future strategy and thus to determine what tomorrow's policies should be.

39. A new scientific concept takes about 10 years to reach the development stage. From this point to production is 3 to 15 years depending upon the political or industrial backing. Consequently, the options available to a nation from a scientific point of view can be known well in advance, as most of the information is openly available. Progress during the development stage is more difficult to follow as the military advantages become recognized and non-scientific factors enter into the planning and decision making. To be able to assess the future military capability of a nation it is necessary to fill in the fragmentary intelligence available by analogy with our own scientific and technical progress.

40. In the shorter term, indicators of future trouble can be provided by studying the technical development of arms, their procurement, military aid patterns, and the movement and availability of militarily significant strategic commodities such as enriched uranium, oil, other minerals, metals and chemicals on a world-wide basis.

.../15

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 15 -

PART II

AREAS AND SUBJECTS OF DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE INTEREST  
AND THE SCOPE OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED

41. Canadian defence intelligence areas of interest are divided for convenience into the following categories *which are not in order of priority*:

CATEGORY I

- a. CATEGORY I - *Potentially hostile countries with an actual or developing capability to mount a military attack on Canada or, below the threshold of general war, pose a military threat to Canadian sovereignty.*
- (1) The Soviet Union
  - (2) The People's Republic of China

SCOPE OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED

Because an attack on Canada by hostile ground forces is highly unlikely our defence intelligence effort in this category should be directed only to the study of weapons systems which a potential enemy could use against North America. These are:

- (1) ICBMs
- (2) SLBMs
- (3) Manned aircraft

In general, sufficient information is required with respect to numbers, quality, current deployment and activities, systems capabilities, state of training, communications, research and development to make a valid assessment of the gross strategic balance in a North American context both currently and in the future. In assessing this balance ABMs and warning systems must also be taken into account. Enough detail will be necessary to understand the military implications of, for example, SALT and to set out the military threat factors which bear upon our participation in NORAD. Insofar as the threat to Canadian sovereignty is concerned, the principal elements to be informed about are satellites above our airspace, surface ships

000137

.../16

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 16 -

and submarines including Arctic drift stations which are active in areas adjacent to our national airspace or surrounding waters or within range of our coasts. Information is required concerning the activities, locations and capabilities of such vehicles as well as the state of research and development in these fields.

CATEGORY II

- b. CATEGORY II - *Countries with whose forces Canadian troops deployed outside Canada may become involved in conflict as a consequence of existing treaty or other obligations.*

- |     |   |                                     |
|-----|---|-------------------------------------|
| (1) | The Soviet Union and<br>Warsaw Pact countries | NATO (area<br>covered by<br>MC/161) |
| (2) | China/N. Korea                                | UN<br>(residual)                    |

SCOPE OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED

a. NATO

Detailed assessment is required of those elements of the forces of the countries listed with whom formed units of the Canadian Forces may be in conflict. At present this means primarily those elements of the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact Forces deployed against Canadian Forces committed to NATO. Thus the areas of Defence Intelligence interest to Canada under this category derive specifically from the operational roles under NATO which we have accepted. These areas of interest are:

.../17

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

000138

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 17 -

- (1) Warsaw Pact Forces facing CENTAG  
(Czech and CGF)
- (2) The CANLANT area
- (3) The Northern flank (Norway)

Additional information is required on the Warsaw Pact Forces as a whole in order to understand the framework within which the parts in our areas of interest operate, to participate adequately in alliance intelligence terms, and to support our MBFR negotiators.

b. North Korea/China

Although the prospect of renewed conflict in Korea on the scale of the early 1950s appears slight there is a continuing residual commitment by Canada in this area. The intelligence required must be to determine the risk of Canada being placed in a position politically to become involved if the fighting were to start again. The military intelligence requirement, which is low on the scale of priorities, is to monitor military activities which could indicate a renewal of hostilities.

CATEGORY III

c. CATEGORY III - *Peacekeeping (existing obligations).*

- |     |  |         |
|-----|--|---------|
| (1) | Cyprus, Turkey and Greece                | UNFICYP |
| (2) | India and Pakistan                       | UNMOGIP |
| (3) | Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Israel | UNTSO   |
| (4) | Egypt and Israel                         | UNEF    |
| (5) | Syria and Israel                         | UNDOF   |

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 18 -

SCOPE OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED

With respect to Cyprus, Turkey and Greece the intelligence required under this category is that which is relevant to our commitment under UNFICYP. It should enable us to assess the military factors affecting continued participation, give timely warning of renewed conflict between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, to be aware of the military capabilities of each, and to have at hand details of the deployment and capabilities of potential intervention forces especially those in Greece and Turkey, but not excluding the forces of the Soviet Union and other major powers. Similar requirements would exist, with modifications, with respect to any other peacekeeping task to which the CF might be committed. The same approach, but substantially adjusted as to scope and detail, applies to other areas where individual Canadian UN observers are deployed. At present these areas are India, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and South Korea.

CATEGORY IV

- d. CATEGORY IV - *Actual or emergent centres of global power (includes areas, both land and sea, in which they seek to develop or establish a military presence).*

- (1) USA
- (2) USSR
- (3) China
- (4) Japan
- (5) EEC

.../19

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

000140

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 19 -

SCOPE OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED

At this level the only useful intelligence is that which includes the whole spectrum of Political, Economic, Scientific, Technical and Military factors. Military factors are only an element in the whole picture. The kind of military intelligence required is essentially at the strategic level and postulates an ability to make a broad assessment of the role and capabilities of the armed forces as instruments of policy. Details of Order of Battle, weapons systems and so on are not required except in so far as they have relevance in strategic terms. In the case of the EEC this kind of information is required with respect to individual member countries in the context of NATO relationships as well as progress (or lack of it) towards an articulated common military policy. Technological breakthroughs which would be strategically relevant are also important.

CATEGORY V

- e. CATEGORY V - *Additional strategically important areas in which there is a potential for conflict with an inherent danger of expansion or escalation.*
- (1) Middle East (area covered by M/C 255)
  - (2) Indian sub-continent
  - (3) Southern Africa
  - (4) Southeast Asia
  - (5) The Balkan Peninsula
  - (6) Latin America and the Caribbean

.../20

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 20 -

SCOPE OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED

It is not always possible to designate areas of potential conflict by countries and consequently these have to be considered regionally. In any event the potential problems are usually too broad to confine to national boundaries. It is possible, however, to identify the principal current problems which might lead to conflict. These are:

Middle East: NATO flank, Israel vs the Arab World. Oil. Soviet and Chinese penetration and influence.

Indian Sub-continent: India vs Pakistan. Interplay of Soviet Union, China, Japan and USA.

Southern Africa: Basically Black vs White emerging nationalism, OAU anti-colonialism. Chinese and Soviet penetration and influence.

S.E. Asia: Communist expansionism. Post colonial nationalism.

The Balkan Peninsula (Yugoslavia). Soviet Communist hegemony. Internal instability.

Latin America & The Caribbean: Communist expansion. Chronic instability.

The Defence Intelligence requirement under this category, therefore, is:

- a. To recognize and assess developments which might indicate that armed conflict is probable.
- b. To assess the broad military and technological capabilities of the principal protagonists in the context of their political and economic alignment.

.../21

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

000142

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 21 -

- c. To assess the probability of direct or indirect military involvement by other countries principally the major centres of global power.
- d. To follow the course of the conflict if forces are engaged in battle.

CATEGORY VI

- f. CATEGORY VI - *Countries in which there is a high degree of direct national interest and a strong element of unpredictability.*

- (1) The factors which are important in judging, from a defence intelligence point of view, where our direct national interests lie are as follows:

(a) CANADIAN RESIDENTS

The Government has a responsibility for the safety of Canadian citizens wherever they may be and their evacuation or protection by the armed forces may become a commitment which we might have to be prepared to undertake if the circumstances were such that they could not get out by commercial means. Obviously the degree of risk is in proportion to the degree of stability in the country concerned and its attitude towards Canada and Canadians. Based on advice from the Consular Division, External Affairs, the figure of 150 or over has been taken as the criterion.

.../22

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

000143

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 22 -

(b) CANADIAN COMPANIES

Canadian companies with substantial operations overseas are a potential source of pressure on the Government to render assistance in case of trouble. The basis for selecting a country for inclusion in this context should be that the company or companies have operations based overseas of such a magnitude that a threat to continued operations would adversely affect the Canadian economy.

(c) TRADE

Any country with which we trade currently at a level of \$100 million or more annually should be included.

(d) CANADIAN DEFENCE EQUIPMENT

Countries which are actual or potential purchasers of Canadian defence equipment at a level of \$1 million a year or more.

(e) CIDA

Countries which have received \$10 million or more (accumulative) in Canadian aid.

(f) STRATEGIC COMMODITIES

Countries which have been identified as primary sources of commodities strategically essential to Canada.

(g) MILITARY TRAINING ASSISTANCE

Countries to whom military training assistance is given either in Canada or in the country concerned.

(h) EMIGRE POPULATION

Countries with a significant cohesive emigré population in Canada.

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 23 -

- (2) These factors, considered above, however, are insufficient to permit a decision to be made on where our interests lie from a defence intelligence point of view. There is a common factor which must also be taken into account and that is the factor of unpredictability. The application of this consideration explains why there is little defence intelligence interest in Switzerland, or Sweden for example, but a great deal of interest in Spain or Nigeria. An exception, however, is Iran because it is an emerging centre of stability in a highly unpredictable area.
- (3) A study has been made, based on the criteria given, to determine the countries in which there is a high degree of national interest. This is attached at Annex A, which also incorporates Canadian defence intelligence interests with respect to the other categories of intelligence which have been identified. Annex A is designed primarily to show the application of a methodology and is not necessarily definitive or up to date.

SCOPE OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED

In countries where there is a high degree of specific national interest the Defence Intelligence requirement relates to the possible use of the Canadian Forces to support our foreign policy objectives. These supporting tasks are more likely to be related to such matters as aid, both economic and military, disaster relief, the evacuation of Canadian citizens and the pursuit of trade interests (including sales of military equipment) than involvement in conflict and our Defence. Intelligence requirements must be governed accordingly. These will vary from country to country but could include:

.../24

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

000145

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 24 -

- a. Stability, especially where there are military regimes or governments which depend upon the armed forces for their power.
- b. Airfield and port information.
- c. Military equipment requirements.
- d. Military capability in relation to neighbouring states.
- e. Presence and influence of foreign military powers.
- f. The threat to supplies of strategic commodities.
- g. Internal security problems in Canada arising from emigré - nation of origin relationships.
- h. Military training assistance.
- j. Military factors bearing upon CIDA operations.

CATEGORY VII

- g. CATEGORY VII - *The Canadian Continental Area - actual or developing groups and organizations whose activities could lead to Canadian Forces deployment in an internal security operation.*
  - (1) Organizations which advocate revolutionary or violent changes in our government or life style.

.../25

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 25 -

- (2) Organizations or groups who may encourage people to defy legal authority in order to advance their particular cause such as trade unions, American Indian Movement and the Black Power Movement.
- (3) Large ethnic groups (émigré population) who may react violently in Canada to events affecting their countries of origin.

SCOPE OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIRED

In Canada the political aim is, of course, to avoid a situation requiring the use of military force. However, evidence of a readiness to deploy troops in support of a civil power can be effectively used as a deterrent during a period of tension. If military participation is required in order to have the desired sobering effect on would-be terrorists or subversives, commanders and troops must know what they are doing and must appear to know what they are doing. This means that intelligence well in advance of, and during an internal security operation will be vital. Hence the requirement for the CF to receive information on a regular basis to meet military planning requirements, maintain an intimate knowledge of domestic trends, and gain expertise in providing intelligence during an internal security operation. The information required in this category is:

- a. Names, locations and activities of subversive or potentially subversive organizations.
- b. Names, activities and movements of key members of such organizations.

.../26

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 26 -

- c. Methods and tactics used by subversive organizations or groups.
- d. Resources - size of membership, financial support, and equipment including arms and ammunition.
- e. The location, purpose, and mood of large crowds which have the potential of rioting.
- f. The trend and direction of any political or labour unrest which may lead to civil disorder.

.../27

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

000148

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 27 -

PART III

SOURCES AND PRIORITIES

42. Intelligence is only as good as the sources from which the information is derived. Information obtained from the best possible sources is no good unless there is somebody at the head office to recognize its significance and make it known to decision makers. There must therefore be a proper balance between collection and analysis. Information collected at random without direction is of limited value. The source must have access to the information required and it is necessary to distinguish between functional sources which are technical in nature, but require human interpretation, and human sources which are subject to human error. *Direct* sources are those controlled by the agency responsible for collection and analysis and *indirect* sources which are those which another agency or country controls. Direct sources under Canadian control include SIGINT, Canadian missions abroad [REDACTED], Merchant Shipping Liaison Officers, defectors, travellers, members of the Canadian Forces, News Services and open publications (including translations). These sources are under direct Canadian control, and they give only limited access to the information required. They must, therefore, be augmented by information available indirectly. The main indirect sources available to Canada are those under the control of [REDACTED]. We are able to draw on these banks of intelligence in proportion to the extent to which we can establish a credit balance with them. Our ability to open an account is established by common alliance membership. Our credit balance derives from what we are able to contribute to the common cause as a consequence of:

- a. SIGINT collection;
- b. information collected by members of the Canadian Forces - particularly [REDACTED]
- c. translations and perusal of foreign publications;

.../28

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 28 -

- d. information collected by Canadian Merchant Shipping Liaison Officers;
- e. the processing and analysis of raw information [REDACTED]
- f. maritime surveillance including HF/DF and HF/DF research; and,
- g. mapping and charting activities.

43. As a by-product of these contributions, Canada receives finished intelligence and other information of value to intelligence [REDACTED]

44. It is necessary to devote a substantial proportion of our collection and analytical effort to maintaining these credit balances but this, in turn, complicates the relationship between resources and priorities. The amount that has to be paid in to guarantee a credit balance is a matter of judgement which cannot be quantified in any precise way. It is essential, however, to be absolutely clear about the reasons for allocating resources for this purpose so that the effort expended is seen as a means to an end and not as an end in itself.

45. Generally speaking, the criteria against which allocation of resources for this purpose must be measured are:

- a. some proportion of the effort should meet direct Canadian needs;
- b. the project should have a yardstick capability - a means of measuring the accuracy and completeness of finished intelligence provided by our partners and to facilitate an independent Canadian assessment;
- c. the resources committed should be such that a capability remains to meet purely Canadian requirements; and,
- d. the project must be and be seen to be a meaningful contribution to the allied intelligence effort.

.../29

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

000150

s.15(1)

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 29 -

To give an example: Canada has undertaken a study of a particular Military District of the USSR [REDACTED] [REDACTED] This continuing study gives us access to the ground forces order of battle of the USSR; the Military District in question contains at least one Soviet division of each type which gives us a yardstick against which to measure the accuracy of the military information we receive on other parts of the Soviet Union; it enables us to participate effectively in the production of NATO threat papers; the resources committed leave us with a capability to meet Canadian needs; it is highly visible in terms of a meaningful contribution to the total data bank.

PRIORITIES

46. In order to establish priorities for defence intelligence, four key factors have to be put in the balance. These are:

- a. degree of damage;
- b. time;
- c. probability; and,
- d. responsibility for response.

47. Theoretically, then, the number one priority for defence intelligence should be derived by determining the most likely event that will cause the greatest degree of unacceptable damage in the immediate future for the prevention of which the Canadian Forces are solely responsible. To give an example, a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union on North America could occur at any time and would cause a catastrophic degree of damage; but it is unlikely, and the primary responsibility for nuclear response rests with the United States.

48. The commitment of elements of the Canadian Forces to a peacekeeping task, on the other hand, is empirically probable, could also happen at any time on relatively short notice, but the decision to undertake

.../30

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

000151

s.15(1)

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 30 -

or not to undertake the task would be a matter for unilateral Canadian decision. A decision not to respond would not necessarily result in an unacceptable degree of physical damage to Canada unless external areas of direct national interest were involved. Here again we see the interplay of national and alliance interests. *The most likely challenges to purely Canadian interests appear to be below the threshold of war. And the challenge of war is met by alliances in which we participate. Consequently, the main factor which bears upon Canadian defence intelligence is responsibility for response. Our intelligence priorities therefore are:*

- I situations in which Canada must act unilaterally, depending primarily upon her own resources;  
  
e.g. Internal Security - Sovereignty
- II situations in which Canada must act, but with respect to which we cannot rely entirely upon intelligence obtained from our friends;  
  
e.g. Peacekeeping
- III situations requiring an alliance response in which Canada participates.  
  
e.g. A challenge to NORAD or NATO

This puts in another way a proposition which was made earlier - namely, that the need for purely Canadian intelligence increases in inverse ratio to the scale of the threat.

49. These theoretical Defence Intelligence priorities must be adjusted to take into account the necessity for allocating a sufficient proportion of our total resources to ensure the flow of both raw information and finished intelligence [REDACTED]. The proportion of resources required for this purpose will vary. A high proportion is required where clear alliance interests are involved but this proportion must be scaled down as the requirement becomes more uniquely national.

.../31

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

000152

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 31 -

Obviously there will be some overlapping, but a judgement of the relative importance of alliance and national interests provides a useful guide. A further refinement which is applicable in terms of Canadian defence intelligence interests is to give greater priority to areas which affect elements of the Canadian Forces which are actually deployed. The following table reflects these considerations and indicates the relative priorities to be assigned to the various categories of intelligence described in Part II. It also provides a guide to the relative allocation of resources between alliance and national needs.

.../32

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 32 -

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>RESOURCE ALLOCATION GUIDE</u>		<u>PRIORITY (Para 48)</u>	<u>SUB PRIORITY (Based on CF Deployment)</u>
	<u>National</u>	<u>Alliance</u>		
I Direct Threat to Canada -				
a. Global War	20%	80%	III	b
b. Sovereignty	80%	20%	I	a
II Treaty Obligations	20%	80%	III	a
III Peacekeeping	80%	20%	II	a
IV Power Centres	50%	50%	III	d
V Strategic Areas	20%	80%	III	c
VI Direct National Interests Outside Canada	90%	10%	II	b
VII Internal Security	100%	-	I	b

It is apparent, therefore, that Canadian Defence Intelligence priorities are as follows:

- Priority I
  - (a) Sovereignty
  - (b) Internal Security
- Priority II
  - (a) Peacekeeping
  - (b) Direct National Interests
- Priority III
  - (a) Treaty Obligations
    - (i) NORAD
    - (ii) NATO
  - (b) Global War
  - (c) Strategic Areas
  - (d) Power Centres

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 33 -

PART IV

THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

50. A professional examination of the intelligence available on the military aspects of the threats or challenges facing Canada and the alliances to which it belongs will reveal considerations that are of major significance for decision-makers. In peacetime circumstances, most of the conclusions that derive from these considerations (based on intelligence) have a direct impact upon defence policy and planning at national, departmental, and alliance levels; to a lesser extent they affect day to day operations. In times of tension and war, of course, the focus shifts more to operations that are foreseeable in the short term. In either case, however, the role of defence intelligence in every country is to provide information on those foreign military forces and their doctrine and activities which affect the objectives of the nation.

51. Intelligence cannot perform this function effectively if it is not automatically consulted early and regularly in the decision-making process. There would, in fact, be no purpose to intelligence if it were to produce estimates that are used only in the event that the analysis happens to support preconceptions of policy and planning goals and sometimes long-implanted biases. To be effective, intelligence should be close to policy, plans and operations for guidance as to their concerns and the decisions they must make but not so close that it loses objectivity and integrity. This is a delicate balance to strike. Nevertheless, intelligence must lay before the decision-makers the best knowledge available and the latest intelligence judgements which bear importantly upon national defence policy.

52. It is inevitable that intelligence assessments, which include capabilities - options and judgements of likelihood, will overlap into areas of operational and policy responsibilities and be viewed by some as an unwarranted infringement, particularly if the judgements are unpalatable.

.../34

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

000155

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 34 -

53. The recipients of intelligence must, of course, place it in the perspective of other considerations (operational, political, practical, financial and so on) which may be overriding. Obviously, Intelligence is an essential consideration, but not the only consideration for decision-makers. But if the intelligence officer fails to carry his argument to the ultimate conclusion, he is derelict in his duty. Moreover, he simply cannot permit *the formulation* of his judgements to be restrained by the imperatives of operational needs no matter how compelling these may be. These imperatives must be applied to completed intelligence analysis and must not become part of the process.

54. Consequently, an intelligence officer's task is far from completed when the capabilities have been established. This must be followed by an analysis of options and conclude with an informed judgement (speculative, perhaps, but informed) of what options are most likely and what this means for the authorities to whom the intelligence officer reports.

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

000156

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

ANNEX A

DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE INTERESTS BY SUBJECT AND BY COUNTRY

INTRODUCTION

This table is illustrative rather than definitive. It is simply a compilation of the factors (identified in PART II) which bear upon Canadian defence intelligence interests as they apply now to countries throughout the world. Obviously, it is time-sensitive.

SECRET  
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

**SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY**

	CANADIAN RESIDENTS (150 or More - Unstable Environment)	CANADIAN COMPANIES (Or Substantial Investment)	TRADE (In Excess of \$100 Million)	DEFENCE SALES (Actual or Potential In Excess of \$1M)	CIDA (In Excess of \$10 Million)	STRATEGIC COMMODITIES	MILITARY TRAINING ASSISTANCE	EMIGRE POPULATION	PEACEKEEPING AND OTHER CDN FORCES COMMITMENTS	NORAD	NATO	WARSAW PACT	SOVIET MILITARY PENETRATION	CHINESE MILITARY PENETRATION	POWER CENTRE
AFGHANISTAN													X		
ALBANIA														X	
ALGERIA	X		X		X	X							X		
ANDORRA															
ARGENTINA	X			X											
AUSTRALIA		X	X	X		X									
AUSTRIA				X											
BAHAMA ISLANDS		X													
BAHRAIN						X									
BANGLADESH					X								X		
BARBADOS					X		X								
BELGIUM		X	X	X						X					EEC
BERMUDA		X													
BHUTAN															
BOLIVIA				X											
BOTSWANA	X				X										
BRAZIL	X		X	X	X	X									
BRUNEI															
BULGARIA												X	X		
BURMA					X		X								
BURUNDI														X	
CAMEROON				X	X		X								
CEN AFRICAN REP															
CHAD															
CHILE	X			X	X			X							
CHINA, PEOPLE'S REP OF			X					X							X

**SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY**

ANNEX A

000158

**SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY**

	CANADIAN RESIDENTS (150 or More - Unstable Environment)	CANADIAN COMPANIES (Or Substantial Investment)	TRADE (In Excess of \$100 Million)	DEFENCE SALES (Actual or Potential in Excess of \$1M)	CIDA (In Excess of \$10 Million)	STRATEGIC COMMODITIES	MILITARY TRAINING ASSISTANCE	EMIGRE POPULATION	PEACEKEEPING AND OTHER CDN FORCES COMMITMENTS	NORAD	NATO	WARSAW PACT	SOVIET MILITARY PENETRATION	CHINESE MILITARY PENETRATION	POWER CENTRE
COLOMBIA				X	X	X									
CONGO, PEOPLE'S REP OF												X	X		
COSTA RICA	X														
CUBA	X											X			
CYPRUS	X							X							
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	X						X				X	X			
DAHOMY					X										
DENMARK			X							X				EEC	
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC		X		X											
ECUADOR			X	X	X										
EGYPT, ARAB REP OF	X							X				X			
EL SALVADOR				X											
ETHIOPIA	X			X		X									
FIJI ISLANDS															
FINLAND												X			
FRANCE		X	X	X						X				EEC	
GABON					X										
GAMBIA															
GERMANY, DEM REP OF											X	X			
GERMANY, FED REP OF		X	X	X		X		X		X				EEC	
GHANA	X			X	X	X	X								
GREECE	X			X			X			X					
GUATEMALA		X													
GUINEA												X	X		

**SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY**

ANNEX A

000159

**SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY**

	CANADIAN RESIDENTS (150 or More - Unstable Environment)	CANADIAN COMPANIES (Or Substantial Investment)	TRADE (In Excess of \$100 Million)	DEFENCE SALES (Actual or Potential in Excess of \$1M)	CIDA (In Excess of \$10 Million)	STRATEGIC COMMODITIES	MILITARY TRAINING ASSISTANCE	EMIGRE POPULATION	PEACEKEEPING AND OTHER CDN FORCES COMMITMENTS	NORAD	NATO	WARSAW PACT	SOVIET MILITARY PENETRATION	CHINESE MILITARY PENETRATION	POWER CENTRE
GUYANA	X	X			X	X	X	X							
HAITI	X				X		X								
HONDURAS					X										
HUNGARY	X						X					X	X		
HONG KONG	X	X	X												
ICELAND											X				
INDIA		X	X	X	X		X						X		
INDONESIA	X			X	X										
IRAN				X		X									
IRAQ	X					X							X		
IRELAND, REPUBLIC OF	X	X					X								EEC
ISRAEL	X	X						X							
ITALY		X	X	X							X				EEC
IVORY COAST	X				X										
JAMAICA	X	X			X	X	X	X							
JAPAN		X	X	X		X									X
JORDAN															
KENYA	X			X	X		X								
KHMER REP (CAMBODIA)															
KOREA, NORTH												X	X		
KOREA, SOUTH				X											
KUWAIT				X		X									
LAOS					X							X	X		

**SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY**

ANNEX A

000160

**SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY**

	CANADIAN RESIDENTS (150 or More - Unstable Environment)	CANADIAN COMPANIES (Or Substantial Investment)	TRADE (In Excess of \$100 Million)	DEFENCE SALES (Actual or Potential in Excess of \$1M)	CIDA (In Excess of \$10 Million)	STRATEGIC COMMODITIES	MILITARY TRAINING ASSISTANCE	EMIGRE POPULATION	PEACEKEEPING AND OTHER CDN FORCES COMMITMENTS	NORAD	NATO	WARSAW PACT	SOVIET MILITARY PENETRATION	CHINESE MILITARY PENETRATION	POWER CENTRE
LEBANON	X				X		X								
LESOTHO	X			X											
LIBERIA	X			X											
LIBYA	X				X							X			
LIECHTENSTEIN															
LUXEMBOURG		X								X				EEC	
MALAGASY REPUBLIC															
MALAWI															
MALAYSIA	X		X	X	X	X									
MALI												X			
MALTA				X											
MAURITANIA															
MEXICO	X	X	X		X										
MONACO															
MONGOLIAN REPUBLIC												X			
MOROCCO			X	X								X			
MUSCAT AND OMAN															
NETHERLANDS		X	X	X		X				X				EEC	
NEPAL															
NEW ZEALAND			X												
NICARAGUA				X											
NIGER	X			X	X										
NIGERIA	X		X	X	X	X									
NORWAY		X	X			X				X					
PAKISTAN	X		X	X			X	X					X		

ANNEX A

000161

**SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY**

**SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY**

	CANADIAN RESIDENTS (150 or More - Unstable Environment)	CANADIAN COMPANIES (Or Substantial Investment)	TRADE (In Excess of \$100 Million)	DEFENCE SALES (Actual or Potential In Excess of \$1M)	CIDA (In Excess of \$10 Million)	STRATEGIC COMMODITIES	MILITARY TRAINING ASSISTANCE	EMIGRE POPULATION	PEACEKEEPING AND OTHER CDN FORCES COMMITMENTS	NORAD	NATO	WARSAW PACT	SOVIET MILITARY PENETRATION	CHINESE MILITARY PENETRATION	POWER CENTRE
PANAMA															
PARAGUAY															
PERU	X			X	X										
PHILIPPINES	X				X		X								
POLAND							X					X	X		
PORTUGAL	X			X			X			X					
PUERTO RICO															
QATAR						X									
RHODESIA															
ROMANIA	X											X	X		
RWANDA	X				X										
SAN MARINO															
SAUDI ARABIA				X		X									
SENEGAL					X										
SIERRA LEONE															
SINGAPORE	X	X		X			X								
SOMALI REPUBLIC													X		
SOUTH AFRICA	X	X	X			X		X							
SPAIN	X	X	X	X				X							
SRI LANKA (CEYLON)					X										
SUDAN	X												X	X	
SURINAM						X									
SWAZILAND															
SWEDEN			X	X											
SWITZERLAND		X	X	X											

**SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY**

ANNEX A

000162

**SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY**

	CANADIAN RESIDENTS (150 or More - Unstable Environment)	CANADIAN COMPANIES (Or Substantial Investment)	TRADE (In Excess of \$100 Million)	DEFENCE SALES (Actual or Potential in Excess of \$1M)	CIDA (In Excess of \$10 Million)	STRATEGIC COMMODITIES	MILITARY TRAINING ASSISTANCE	EMIGRE POPULATION	PEACEKEEPING AND OTHER CDN FORCES COMMITMENTS	NORAD	NATO	WARSAW PACT	SOVIET MILITARY PENETRATION	CHINESE MILITARY PENETRATION	POWER CENTRE
SYRIA								X				X			
TAIWAN	X	X	X												
TANZANIA	X			X	X	X								X	
THAILAND					X										
TOGO					X										
TONGA															
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO	X				X	X	X	X							
TRUCIAL STATES						X									
TUNISIA					X										
TURKEY	X	X		X	X	X	X				X				
UGANDA								X					X	X	
USSR			X			X					X				X
UNITED KINGDOM		X	X	X		X	X				X				EEC
UNITED STATES		X	X	X		X			X	X					X
UPPER VOLTA	X				X										
URUGUAY															
VENEZUELA	X		X	X		X									
VIET NAM, NORTH												X	X		
VIET NAM, SOUTH															
WEST INDIES ASSOC STATES					X										
YEMEN												X			
YEMEN, SOUTH												X			
YUGOSLAVIA	X	X			X		X					X			

ANNEX A

000163

**SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY**

**SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY**

[illegible]

## ANNEX A

000164

**SECRET CANADIAN EYES ONLY**

**SECRET - FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY**

**SECRET - FOR CANADIAN EYES ONLY**

000165