

CLASSIFIED

CLASSIFIÉ

File No. Dossier 20-1-2-3
Volume 2 From-De 68-04-01 To-À 94 04 30

VOLS ACCESSION NO. 8163

**Semi-Active
SXIS-SA**

**CLOSED
FERME**

TITLE—TITRE:

Political Affairs -
Policy and Background -
Canadian External Policy and Relations -
AID TO AFRICA

Affaires politiques -
Politique et historique -
Politique étrangère du Canada -
AIDE A L' AFRIQUE

Retention period-Période de retention:

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DEPARTMENT
OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MINISTÈRE
DES
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

DATE	20-1-2-3
EXAMINED BY / EXAMINÉ PAR	D. J. [Signature]
ACCESS TO INFORMATION L'ACCÈS À L'INFORMATION	

AE 875

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NOTE.

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94-04-30

**FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE RICS
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CHARGE-OUT DATE – DATE D'ENVOI

CHARGE-OUT DATE – DATE D'ENVOI

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CABINET DU SECRETAIRE D'ETAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES

vol 2

ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

From/De : HON KIM CAMPBELL, PC MP
MINISTER OF JUSTICE & ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA

No.: A-09303-91

Subject/Sujet : IRAN:IRAQI REFUGEES:ASSISTANCE:LAVASSANI
Classification: POLITICS MIDDLE EAST * POLITIQUE MOYEN-ORIENT
AID & DEVELOPMENT * AIDE & DEVELOPPEMENT

Action div./Dir. resp.: GMD
Info : MINA/ARCHIBALD

Let./let. dated
Let./let. en date du

Date sent to division
Date d'envoi à la direction

Deadline date
Echéance

19 SEP 91

06 NOV 91

21 NOV 91

Comments/Commentaires

REF:A-05336-91 (GMD REPLIED 14/06)

ACC	DATE
FILE	DOSSIER
LOG	20-1-2-3
A4	(A4)

ACTION REQUIRED/SUITE A DONNER

FOR DIVISIONAL USE
RESERVE A LA DIRECTION

[] Reply for signature of SSEA
Reponse pour la signature du SEAE

Date received/Date recue

[] Reply for the signature of
Reponse pour la signature de

Action officer/Agent resp.

[] Reply by division
Reponse de la direction

Disposition and/et date

[X] For information and any necessary action
Pour examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu

G-RP/NOV 12 - NO ACTION, AS
GMD REPLIED 14/06 - AS ABOVE

[] CAMPAIGN: Reply for signature of SSEA
CAMPAGNE: Reponse pour la signature du SEAE

[] CAMPAIGN: Reply by division
CAMPAGNE: Reponse de la direction

For MINA use/
Reserve à MINA

[] CAMPAIGN: For information and any necessary action
CAMPAGNE: Pour examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu

ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA RECORDS.

996-9297 OR/OU

LES ARCHIVES DE MINA DOIVENT ETRE AVISEES DE TOUT CHANGEMENT

992-6428

White - Return to MINA registry when action completed

Blanche - Retourner aux archives de MINA lorsque suite a été donnée

Yellow - Divisional secretary Green - File with original incoming letter

Jaune - Secrétaire de direction Verte - Au dossier avec la lettre reçue

001087

Minister of Justice
and Attorney General of Canada

Ministre de la Justice
et Procureure générale du Canada

A. Kim Campbell, P.C., Q.C., M.P./c.p., c.r., députée

SEP 19 1991

A-09303-91
CC: MINA/ARCHIBALD

His Excellency M.H. Lavassani
Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran
4th Floor
411 Roosevelt Avenue
Ottawa, Ontario
K2A 3X9

Excellency:

Thank you for your letter of May 17, 1991, in which you draw my attention to recent information you have received regarding the plight of Iraqi refugees on your soil. I regret that I was unable to reply earlier.

The issue of international assistance raised in your letter is one that should be brought to the attention of my colleague, the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Hence, I have taken the liberty of passing along your letter to the Honourable Barbara McDougall. You may wish to direct further information concerning this matter to her.

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed by *
Original Signé par

A. Kim Campbell

c.c.: The Honourable Barbara McDougall, P.C., M.P.
Secretary of State for External Affairs

O/SSEA

SEP 20 1991

C/SEAE

1091-1497




Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Ottawa

In the Name of God

May 17, 1991

Honourable Kim Campbell
Minister of Justice and Attorney Gen.
Parl. Hill/Rm. 324 West Block
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0A6



Honourable,

I have the honour to draw your kind attention to the recent information received from Iranian concerned authorities regarding the plight of Iraqi refugees in our soil as follows:

Given the return of a limited number of Iraqi refugees to their homes, at the present, more than one million refugees are still settled down in North Western and Southern provinces of the Islamic Republic of Iran. So far, more than 211 foreign planes have landed in various Iranian airports, carrying more than 7068 tones of aid supplies.

But in view of the weather getting warmer in the areas, infectious diseases such as bloody diarrhea, typhoid and etc., are about to spread out.

In such circumstances need is constantly arising for items like electrical water pumps, water refiners, electrical generators, big ambulant and fixed water tanks, small and portable water storages, field bathrooms, field hospitals and labs, cold storage, disinfecting substances, ambulances, trucks, pick-ups, tents, dried food items, single use medical instruments, refrigerators, cooling equipments and so on.

Iranian Government policy is still to encourage the refugees safe return to their homes. But so far, given the extent of the disaster, the international assistance to the refugees in Iran has unfortunately been negligible and in some cases, used items have been seen among the forwarded supplies. Therefore, we expect the concerned international bodies to do their best in order to mobilize and offer more aid.



Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Ottawa

Contrary to claims by some Western media, the Islamic Republic of Iran is still willing to receive assistance from all countries (except for Israel and South Africa) and presence of the representatives of the governmental and non-governmental donating bodies in our country is an expression of such willingness.

Sincerely yours,

M. H. Lavassani

M.H. Lavassani
Ambassador



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MGTC/DIARY/CHIFFRE Under the Access to Information Act -
MGTC/JOURNAL/CHIFFRE Loi sur l'accès à l'information

Accession/Référence

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File/Dossier

20-1-2-3

MESSAGE

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SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I E L

FM/DE

FM EXTOTT GAF0909 18JUNE1984

TO/À

TO DAKAR ~~CNAKY (BAG DE OTT)~~

INFO

DISTR

INFO RABAT ALGER TUNIS ABJAN LAGOS ACCRA YUNDE

REF

WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN ROME TOKYO

SUBJ/SUJ

DISTR GGB GAD GAT GAA ZSI ZEP EEA EEF URR

CIDAHULL/BFD BFG

---GUINEA:CONSULTATIONS WITH STATE DEPARTMENT.

SUMMARY:DELEGATION REPRESENTING GAF,GAT AND ACDI/BFG MET OFFICIALS OF STATE DEPT ON 7 JUNE TO DISCUSS RESPECTIVE PGMS IN GUINEA,AND TO SHARE VIEWS AND ANALYSES ON NATURE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THAT COUNTRY SINCE 3 APRIL COUP.AMERICAN SIDE,LED BY DEPTY ASST SECTY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS PRINCETON LYMAN,STRESSED DIFFICULTIES THROUGH WHICH NEW GOVT IS PASSING,AND NEED FOR WESTERN DONORS TO WORK TOGETHER TO ASSIST GUINEA IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES.STATE ALSO CONSIDERS IT IMPORTANT TO REINFORCE STATED INTENTIONS OF NEW GOVT TO MOVE TOWARDS ECONOMIC LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL JUSTICE,AND TO REASSURE NEW LEADERS THAT THEY HAVE FRIENDS IN THE WEST. DIFFICULTIES WHICH THEY RUN,BOTH INTERNALLY (INFLATED EXPECTATIONS) AND EXTERNALLY (INADEQUATE DONOR RESPONSE)PUT GUINEAN EXPERIMENT AT RISK,BUT LYMAN IS CONVINCED THAT THERE IS OPPORTUNITY TO WORK WITH NEW GOVT WHICH MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO SLIP AWAY.

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG R. TODD/MT

GAF

6-8306

SIG W.G. LICARI



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▼ PAGE TWO GAF0909 CONFD

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2.REPORT:AT INVITATION OF STATE/WEST AFRICAN AFFAIRS OFFICE,DEL
REPRESENTING CDN GOVT OFFICIALS MOST CLOSELY RESPONSIBLE FOR
PROGRAMMES IN GUINEA HELD CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ON 7 JUNE 84
ON ~~PROGMS~~ WHICH EACH HAS UNDERWAY AND IN PLANNING FOR GUINEA,AND
TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AND ANALYSES ON RECENT AND FORESEABLE EVENTS
IN GUINEA SINCE 3 APRIL COUP D ETAT.US DEL COMPRISED PRINCETON
LYMAN,DEPTY ASSIST SECTY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS;ED PENDER,
DIRECTOR,WEST AFRICA AFFAIRS OFFICE;TED VAN GILDER,KEITH WAUCHOPE
AND NANCY MORGAN OF THAT DIVISION;COL GREGORY BRADFORD,POLITICO-
MILITARY ADVISOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS AND JULIUS COLES,DIRECTOR
OF GUINEA PROGRAMME AT USAID.

3.LYMAN RECOUNTED VISIT WHICH HE HEADED TO CONAKRY IN EARLY MAY,
WHERE HE WAS ABLE TO MEET WITH 14 MINS OF NEW GOVT.MINS TOOK NOW
FAMILIAR LINE OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
POLICY WITH EMPHASIS ON INCREASED DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE EXPECTED
FROM WESTERN DONORS TO DEAL WITH ECONOMIC CATASTROPHE WITH WHICH
GOVT WAS BECOMING EVER MORE AWARE.WORLD BANK HAD ALREADY INDICATED
ITS OPENNESS TOWARDS NEW GOVT,AND US DEL SOUGHT TO BRING HOME MSG
THAT GUINEA HAD MANY WESTERN FRIENDS READY AND WILLING TO ASSIST IT
THROUGH ITS DIFFICULTIES.WHILE NEW GOVT WAS AWARE OF PROBLEMS
WHICH ITS FINANCIAL SITUATION CREATED,IT HAD NOT REACHED ANY
DECISIONS AT TIME OF LYMAN VISIT (NOR WOULD IT APPEAR TO DATE).

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STATE CONSIDERS GUINEA AGMT WITH IMF AS PRECONDITION TO REESTABLISHING HEALTHY ECONOMY. GUINEAN ALTERNATE EXEC DIRECTOR AT IMF NFALY SANGARE, WAS ARRESTED BY ARMY AUTHORITIES AT TIME OF COUP. HE HAS BEEN NEITHER CHARGED NOR RELEASED IN INTERIM, AND DELAROSIERE OF IMF REFUSES TO COMMENCE DIALOGUE WITH GUINEA GOVT UNTIL SANGARE IS RELEASED. SINCE CMRN GOVT DOES NOT WISH TO BE SEEN CONCEDED TO IMF PRESSURE, THERE APPEARS TO BE NO/NO OBVIOUS SOLUTION. LYMAN SAID STATE WOULD BE WILLING TO URGE CONGRESS TO INCREASE AID TO GUINEA, BUT ONLY ONCE DOWNSTREAM PROBLEMS OF SUBSTANCE (DEBT, DEVALUATION) HAVE BEEN RESOLVED WITH IMF, AND DECLARATIONS OF ECONOMIC LIBERALISM HAVE BEEN TRANSLATED INTO ENVIRONMENT CONDUCIVE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENT BY BOTH GUINEAN AND FOREIGN INVESTORS. LYMAN CONCLUDED HIS PRESENTATION BY REMARKING ON SERIOUSNESS OF CMRN GOVT, ON DANGERS WHICH THEY FACE INTERNALLY FROM INFLATED EXPECTATIONS, AND ON NEED FOR DONORS TO WORK TOGETHER TO TRY TO MEET NEEDS OF GUINEA.

4. TED VAN GILDER, DEPT. DIR OF WEST AFRICA OFFICE, COMMENTED THAT CMRN GOVT IS NEOPHYTE REGIME-EXPERIENCE OF ITS MEMBERS IS ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY MILITARY, WITH LIMITED FOREIGN EXPERIENCE. PERSONS HAVE RIGHT INSTINCTS BUT ARE UNACCUSTOMED TO GOVERNING. THEY ARE OPEN TO OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE AND ARE DEMONSTRATING NEW ATTITUDES-FOR EXAMPLE, REQUEST TO FRANCE FOR ASSISTANCE IN EDUCATION SECTOR: INCIPIENT PRACTISE OF MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY.

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IN VAN GILDER'S VIEW THIS EXPERIMENT SHOULD NOT FAIL, AND WESTERN
DONORS SHD HELP CMRN TO SUCCEED.

5. COL BRADFORD EXPLAINED NATURE OF US MILITARY ASSISTANCE PGM WHICH
WAS REQUESTED BY GUINEA ONLY IN 1980. PGM PROVIDES GRANT ASSISTANCE
OF DLR ONE MILLION FOR FY 83/84 APPROVED BY CONGRESS FOR A) UP TO
FIVE MILITARY STUDENTS PER YEAR AND B) PURCHASE OF TWO NAVAL PATROL
VESSELS TO REPLACE AGING AND INOPERATIVE SOVIET VESSELS. BRADFORD
WHO WENT TO GUINEA TO EXPLAIN HOW US MIL ASSIST PGM OPERATED,
WAS VERY IMPRESSED WITH ORGANIZATIONAL ABILITY OF HIS MILITARY
HOSTS, LTD SCOPE OF THEIR DEMANDS AS WELL AS THEIR REASONABLE EXPECT-
TATIONS, AND SOPHISTICATED UNDERSTANDING OF US INTERNAL PROCESS
(STAGES, APPROVALS, DELAYS, ETC). IN ADDITION GUINEAN ARMED FORCES
WERE ABLE QUICKLY AND CLEARLY TO ESTABLISH RESPONSIBILITY, CENTRES
AND AUTHORITY FIGURES FOR DEALING WITH ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUBSTAN-
TIVE ASPECTS OF US MIL ASSIST PGM. GUINEAN INTERLOCUTORS NOTED THAT
REQUEST FOR USA ASSISTANCE WAS TO SUPPLEMENT EXISTING COOP PGMS
WITH USSR, AND SPECIFICALLY TARGETED AT NAVY WHICH HAD BEEN
ILLSERVED BY SOVIET ASSISTANCE.

6. VAN GILDER ADDRESSED FINANCIAL AND MONETARY QUESTION BY NOTING
THAT FIRST LINE INTERLOCUTOR FOR GUINEA WAS IMF, BUT ARREST AND
INCARCERATION OF SANKARE WAS NOT/NOT PERMITTING THIS DIFFICULT
SUBJ EVEN TO BEGIN TO BE CONSIDERED (SEE PARA 3 ABOVE). AT TIME

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OF LYMAN MISSION CMRN GOVT HAD NEITHER INFORMATION NOR ADVICE
PERMITTING THEM TO MAKE A DECISION ON CONVERTABILITY. NEVERTHELESS
SENIOR REPS WERE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING QUOTE A MONETARY ZONE
UNQUOTE. VAN GILDER SAID THAT IN ABSENCE OF A FUNCTIONING US DOLLAR
ZONE THIS OPTION WAS NOT/NOT TO BE DISCUSSED. MOST LIKELY PROSPECT
WAS ENTRY INTO CFA FRANC ZONE; WHICH US SUPPORTED PRIVATELY, BUT
ON WHICH THEY WOULD NOT/NOT (YET) GO PUBLIC.

7. AID PGM DESCRIBED BY JULIUS COLES WAS SMALL, HOWEVER ITS IMPORTANCE
LAY IN FACT OF US PRESENCE. IT IS PRINCIPALLY ORIENTED TOWARDS AGRI-
CULTURAL AND HEALTH SECTORS. PROJECTS INCLUDE: A) AGRICULTURAL PRODUC-
TION PROJECT: PROJECT HAS BEEN UNDER WAY FOR 8 YRS, WITHOUT BEING
ABLE TO MEET ALL ITS GOALS. B) TRANSITIONAL AGRICULTURAL PROJECT
(VALUE DLR 1.5 MIL) OBJECT TO DESIGN PROJECT WHICH WD ENCOURAGE
AGRIC SMALL HOLDINGS. C) COMMUNITY FORESTRY (500,000 DLRS) PROJECT
ENDING. D) FAMILY PLANNING (500,000 DLRS) ALSO ENDING, TO BE FOLLOWED
BY CHILDHOOD AND COMMUNICABLE DISEASE PROJECT. E) RENEWABLE ENERGY
(500,000 DLRS) SURVEY PROJECT TO EXAMINE POTENTIAL OF AND ENCOURAGE
INITIATIVES FOR MICRO INDUSTRY TO SUPPLY ENCLAVE ECONOMY. F) AGRO
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT; OVER NEXT 2 YRS THIS PGM WILL SEEK TO ESTABLISH
A JOINT VENTURE IN FISHERIES SECTOR, WITH AIM OF EXPORTING PRODUCTION.
G) PROGRAM FOOD AID. RECENT LEVEL OF DLR 2.0 MILLION RAISED TO DLR
5.0 MILLION IN CURRENT FY AS RESULT OF NEED AND REQUEST FROM NEW

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GOVT.FURTHER INCREASE IN LEVEL TO 8.0 MILLION MAXIMUM IS POSSIBLE
IN FUTURE YEARS.

8.SINE QUA NON FOR INCREASED US PARTICIPATION IN GUINEA-PRINCIPALLY
IN FAST DISBURSING BOP SUPPORT,BUT NOT EXCLUDING OTHER TYPES OF
ASS^ISTANCE,IS RESOLUTION OF IMPASSE OVER SANGARE AND AGREEMENT
WITH IMF ON QUESTION OF DEBT/DEVALUATION/CONVERTABILITY.STATE AND
USAID CONSIDER THIS PRECONDITION TO BE QUOTE S^yMBOLICALLY AND
SUBSTANTIVELY IMPORTANT UNQUOTE.SHD DEAL BE STRUCK,AID IS CONVINCED
THAT IT COULD INCREASE PGM LEVELS QUICKLY.

9.VAN GILDER WAS AWARE OF GROWING FRENCH INTEREST IN GUINEA,AND OF
DRAMATIC CHANGE IN GUINEA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS OLD COLONIAL POWER.
WHILE STATE IS PLEASED THAT IMPEDIMENTS HAVE BEEN REMOVED TO NEW
AND POTENTIALLY MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL RELATIONSHIP,FRENCH REACTION
TO NEW REGIME WAS CHARACTERIZED AS QUOTE GUARDEDLY HOPEFUL UNQUOTE.
THIS RESERVE WAS AS MUCH RESULT OF FRENCH ANALYSIS OF NEW GOVT AS
OF THEIR APPRECIATION OF MASSIVE NATURE OF TASK TO BE UNDERTAKEN.
AMERICANS ARE EXTREMELY SUPPORTIVE OF INCIPIENT AND GROWING FRENCH
ROLE IN GUINEA.THEY HAS^{VE} NO DECLARED COMMERCIAL INTEREST,RATHER CON-
TENTING THEMSELVES COMBINED EFFORTS OF FRANCE,CDA AND CERTAIN
EUROPEAN STATES MIGHT IMPROVE PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN WEST
AFRICA GENERALLY.

10.STATE PERCEPTION IS THAT CDA IS SIGNIFICANT PLAYER IN GUINEA,

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BY NATURE ^{AND} ~~OF~~ SIZE OF OUR AID PGM AND BY VIRTUE OF STRONG PERSONAL INTEREST OF MEMBERS OF CDN GOVT, INCLUDING PM TRUDEAU. CDA, THEREFORE HAS POTENTIAL ROLE IN ASSISTING PROCESS WHICH NEW GOVT HAS UNDERTAKEN.

11. IN SUMMARY, STATE ATTITUDE TO NEW GOVT IS QUOTE HOPEFUL UNQUOTE FROM READING OF MULTIPLE INDICES AS RELATED ABOVE. FOR REASONS OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY CLOSELY LINKED TO REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, MOST IMPORTANT THEME AMONGST CONCERNS OF CMRN IS THAT OF ECONOMIC LIBERALISM AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE. QUICK REESTABLISHMENT OF PRIVATE SECTOR IS SEEN AS MOTOR TO GROWTH, AND PRODUCTIVITY WILL NECESSARILY LEAD TO BETTER DISTRIBUTION THROUGH MECHANISM OF PRICE STRUCTURE. WITH THESE TWO ELEMENTS ^N ~~I~~ PLACE, US STRATEGIC CONCERN FOR STABILITY OF COUNTRY AND REGION ARE MET. BECAUSE OF VAST DEPTHS INTO WHICH GUINEAN ECONOMY HAS SUNK, US BELIEVES THAT COORDINATED EFFORT OF MANY WESTERN FRIENDS OF GUINEA IS REQUIRED TO RELAUNCH DEVELOPMENT PROCESS. LIMITS ON AVAILABILITY OF NEW FUNDS SUGGEST LOOSE OR INFORMAL COORDINATION IN EARLY STAGES, BUT AS CMRN GOVT BECOMES BETTER ABLE TO DEAL WITH ITS PROBLEMS, MORE FORMAL QUOTE CONSULTATIVE GROUP UNQUOTE POSSIBLY UNDER WORLD BANK WOULD BE DESIRABLE.



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

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Accession/Référence

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MESSAGE

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SECURITY SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I E L	12	10
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REF	CIDAHULL/BFD/BFG		
SUBJ/SUJ	DISTR GAD GAD GAT		
	REF VOTRETEL UNGR2319 17MAI		
	---GUINEE:CONSULTATIONS CDA/EUA.		
	PRIERE RETENIR APRES-MIDI DU JEUDI 7 JUIN POUR CONSULTATIONS AVEC STATE.D ACCORD AVEC ORDRE DU JOUR PROPOSE PAR COTE AMERICAIN.DEL CDNNE COMPOSEE DE ROBERT TODD, GUINEA DESK OFFICER, GAF, PIERRE DAVID, COUNTRY PROGRAMM DIRECTOR, GUINEA/SENEGAL DIVISION, CIDA FRANCOPHONE AFRICA BRANCH ET JACQUES DESJARDINS, WEST AFRICA DESK OFFICER, AFRICA TRADE DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.		

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG R. TODD/mt *mt*

GAF

6-8306

SIG W *W* LICARI

MAY 18 1984

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ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2319 17MAY84

TO EXTOTT LGAF

INFO DAKAR ABDJN CIDA HULL/BFD/BFG

BH EDCOTT/DELEHUSSE DE OTT

DISTR GGE GAD GAT

REF TODD/TEMPLE TELECON 16MAY

ACC	REL	DATE
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20-1-2-3		

---GUINEA:USA/CDA CONSULTS

AMERICANS AGREE TO POSTPONE MTG SCHEDULED FOR 23MAY AND ARE KEEPING OPEN AFTERNOONS OF 06,07,08JUN FOR THIS PURPOSE. TENTATIVE AGENDA SUGGESTED AS FOLS:

1430:MTG WITH PRINCETON LYMAN, DEP ASST SEC FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS WHO RECENTLY LED DEL TO GUINEA

1500:TED VAN GILDER, ACTING DIR, WEST AFRICAN AFFAIRS: ASSESSMENT OF POLITICAL SITU

1530:COL GREGORY BRADFORD, POLITICO-MIL ADVISOR FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS: USA MILITARY ASSISTANCE

1600:AIDE OFFICIALS: DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

1630:PRESENTATION OF CDN POLICY AND PLANS

2. GRATEFUL IF YOU WLD ADVISE ASAP LIST OF PARTICIPANTS FOR CDN SIDE AND PREFERRED DATE.

CCC/231 172201Z UNGR2319

*Julius Coles Jay Johnson
Ed Perkins*

ACTION
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APR 17 1984

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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TO EXTOTT/GAF

INFO LDN PARIS BONN ROME DAKAR RABAT ALGER TUNIS ABDJN ACCRA LAGOS

ADDIS MOSCO WSAW HAVAN CIDA HULL/BFD

BH EDCOTT/DELAHOUSSE DE OTT

BAG CNAKY DE OTT

DISTR GGB GAD GAT

CIDA BFG

REF YOURTEL GAF0613 10APR

---COUP DETAT IN GUINEA

SUMMARY: OFFICIALS IN STATE DEPT EXPRESS SATISFACTION WITH PRO-
WESTERN COUP IN GUINEA BUT ARE WARY OF STIRRING RUMOURS OF USA
COMPLICITY BY TAKING LEAD IN BACKING NEW GOVT. FRANCE SO FAR HAS
RESPONDED POSITIVELY BY BOOSTING ASSISTANCE. USA WILL SPEED UP
DELIVERIES AND POSSIBLY INCREASE AMOUNT OF FOOD AID NOW FIXED AT
DLRS US 2 MILL FOR CURRENT FY. OFFICIALS HAVE FLOATED IDEA OF JOINT
USA/CDN CONSULTATIONS, EITHER HERE OF IN OTT, CONCERNING DEVELOPMENTS
IN GUINEA.

2. REPORT: ACCORDING TO DEP DIR FOR WEST AFRICA IN STATE DEPT TED
VAN GILDER, PRINCIPAL LEADERS OF SUCCESSFUL 03APR COUP IN GUINEA,
FORMER CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF COL LANSANA CONTE, WHO HAS BEEN NAMED PRES,
AND FORMER AIR FORCE CHIEF, COL DIARRA TRAORE, WHO HAS BEEN NAMED PRIME
MINISTER, ARE VIRTUALLY UNKNOWN IN THIS COUNTRY. LATTER APPARENTLY
SPEAKS FLUENT RUSSIAN BUT HAS OMITTED ANY REFERENCE TO TRAINING

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OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL
KINSHASA 2 1710

PAGE TWO UNGR2228 CONF

IN SOV UNION FROM HIS OFFICIAL BIOGRAPHY. OTHER MEMBERS OF GOVERNING MILITARY REDEMPTION CTTEE, CONSISTING MOSTLY OF MILITARY OFFICERS, WERE AMONG FIRST WAVE OF MILITARY TRAINEES SENT TO USA WHEN SEKOU TOURE TURNED TO WEST FOR ASSISTANCE TWO YRS AGO. MIN OF MINES AND MIN OF COMMUNICATIONS IN NEW LINE-UP PARTICULARLY WERE HIGHLY REGARDED BY MILITARY INSTRUCTORS HERE.

3. IN FLURRY OF ANNOUNCEMENTS AND TELS TO WORLD BANK, FOREIGN GOVTS AND PRIVATE INVESTORS IN GUINEA IN WAKE OF TAKEOVER NEW LEADERS UPHELD SANCTITY OF CONTRACTS AND EXISTING INTE NATL AGREEMENTS, AND PROCLAIMED THEIR INTEREST IN LAYING QUOTE FOUNDATIONS OF TRUE DEMOCRACY AND AVOIDING IN THE FUTURE ANY PERSONAL DICTATORSHIP UNQUOTE. DECLARATIONS EXTOLLED FREE ENTERPRISE, ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ECONOMY HAD BEEN DEVASTATED BY SOCIALIST POLICIES OF SEKOU TOURE, AND BID FOR WESTERN ASSISTANCE AND ADVICE.

4. ACCORDING TO INFO HERE, COUP HAD BEEN GREETED FAVOURABLY OR APATHETICALLY IN COUNTRYSIDE. THERE IS NO/NO EVIDENCE OF ORGANIZED RESISTANCE. THERE WAS NO/NO BREAK OF US RELS AND THEREFORE NO/NO REQUIREMENT FOR FORMAL ACT OF RECOGNITION.

5. DESPITE GOOD REASONS FOR HAVING MISGIVINGS ABOUT PRO-SOV LEANINGS OF SEKOU TOURES LEGAL SUCCESSOR, PM BEAVOGUI, AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE FIRST OFF THE MARK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF FORMER DICTATORS DEATH, USA SO FAR HAS NOT/NOT BEEN HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR ENGINEERING TAKEOVER. VAN GILDER OBSERVED THAT SOV PRESS HAS FOCUSSED MAINLY

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR2228 CONFD

ON DISCREDITING USA MEDICAL FACILITIES FOR UNSUCCESSFUL TREATMENT OF AILING LEADER.

6.STATE DEPT WANTS TO BE RESPONSIVE TO PLEAS OF NEW GOVT FOR ASSISTANCE WHILE MAINTAINING RELATIVELY LOW PROFILE.VAN GILDER WELCOMED PROMPT LEADERSHIP EXHIBITED BY FRANCE IN BOOSTING SHIPMENTS OF FLOUR AND OFFERING OTHER GESTURES OF SUPPORT.CONSID- ERATION IS BEING GIVEN HERE TO INCREASING USA FOOD AID BEYOND LEVEL OF DLRS 2 MILL COMMITTED FOR CURRENT FY.

7STRESSING INFORMALITY OF HIS ENQUIRY,VAN GILDER SOUGHT OUR VIEWS WHETHER CDN AUTHORITIES WLD AGREE TO PARTICIPATING AT OFFICIAL LEVEL IN BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS CONCERNING RESPONSE OF TWO GOVTS TP DEVELOPMENTS IN GUINEA.HE EXPECTED THAT A MORE FORMAL APPROACH ALONG THESE LINES WLD GO FORWARD TO CDA,SUBJ TO OUR PRELIMINARY REACTION,AND OTHER MAJOR WESTERN NATIONS IN NEXT FEW DAYS,AND ASKED WHETHER THERE WLD BE PREFERENCE FOR HOLDING TALKS HERE OR IN OTT.VAN GILDER REPRESENTED PROPOSED MTGS AS FORUM FOR EXCHANGING INFO AMONG ALLIES,BUT IN LIGHT OF FOREGOING IT IS APPARENT THAT MAIN PURPOSE WLD BE TO ENCOURAGE GENERALLY FAVOURABLE WESTERN RESPONSE TO PLEAS FOR ASSISTANCE FROM NEW GOVT IN GUINEA.

8.WE SHLD BE GRATEFUL FOR GUIDANCE ASAP.DECISION TO ACQUIESCE OBVIOUSLY WLD BE COUNTERPRODUCTIVE UNLESS (A)WE SHARED GENERALLY FAVOURABLE USA VIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN GUINEA AND(B)WERE ABLE TO POINT TO TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF THIS ATTITUDE IN CDAS ALREADY

...4

GAA-0258 / McAlister / 6-3696 / SG

MESSAGE

ACTC / Diary / Circ / Div

123

PLACE	DEPARTMENT	ORIG. NO.	DATE	FILE/DOSSIER	SECURITY
LIEU	MINISTÈRE	N° D'ORIG.			SÉCURITÉ
OTT	EXT	GAA-0258	20FEB81		RESTRICTED

FM/DE

TO/A

LSAKA CPTWN DSLAM NROBI

FEB 23 16 14 '81

INFO

PRET SALBY PRMNY LAGOS COPEN CIDA HULL/BCS/ITCOTT/MEA/OPS

DISTR.

MSS UNO ZSI ECD

CIDA: BCC

DATE	8/03/16	REF
ACC	121812	DOSSIER
20-1-2-3		PAR PORTEUR
ATTN 20-1-1-10		

SUBJECT: MOZAMBIQUE AND UGANDA: CALL BY TANZ-HIGH COMMER

TANZ HIGHCOMMER CALLED ON MSS FEB 17 TO ADVISE US THAT TANZ HAD BEEN ASKED BY GOVT OF MOZAM TO CONVEY MESSAGE THAT MOZAMBIQUE HAS NO/NO DESIRE FOR WAR WITH RSA. WHILE MOZAMBIQUE IS DEDICATED TO LIBERATION OF ALL PEOPLES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, IT DOES NOT/NOT WISH CONFRONTATION WITH RSA AND HAS COMMITTED NO/NO HOSTILE ACTS AGAINST RSA. NEVERTHELESS, RECENT INCIDENTS, INCLUDING MASSING OF RSA TROOPS ON BORDER OF MOZAMBIQUE, RAID ON MAPUTO, AND WITHDRAWAL OF RSA PERSONNEL ARE MAKING MOZAMBIKANS "NERVOUS"; THEY ARE UNCERTAIN ABOUT RSA'S INTENTIONS AND WHETHER THEY WISH PEACE. HIGHCOMMER EMPHASIZED THAT ALL MOZAMBIQUE WANTS IS PEACE; WITH ALL ITS OTHER PROBLEMS, IT CANNOT/NOT AFFORD WAR.

.../2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG. A. MCALLISTER	GAA	6-3696	SIG. E. J. BERGUSCH

2

2. MSS RESPONDED THAT WE SHARED TANZ AND MOZAM CONCERN ABOUT RSA ACTIONS AND THAT ON SSEAS INSTRUCTIONS, WE HAD CALLED IN RSA AMBASSADOR TO EXPRESS THIS CONCERN. WE WOULD BEAR HIGHCOMMERS MESSAGE IN MIND IN FUTURE CONTACTS WITH RSA.

3. WE SUSPECT THIS INITIATIVE ARISES FROM MIG BETWEEN NYERERE AND MACHEL, WHICH WE UNDERSTAND TOOK PLACE RECENTLY IN DSLAM IN WAKE OF MAPUTO RAID. CPTWN MAY WISH TO USE APPROPRIATE OCCASION TO PASS ON GIST OF MESSAGE TO RSA GOVT AND WE SHALL MENTION IT TO RSA AMBASSADOR HERE. WE GATHERED FROM HIGHCOMMER THAT OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN ASKED TO CONVEY SIMILAR MESSAGE.

4. HIGH COMMER FURTHER REMARKED THAT RELATIVE INDIFFERENCE OF MAJOR WESTERN DONORS TOWARDS ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE WAS DRIVING THEM INTO ARMS OF EAST BLOC. MSS RESPONDED THAT WHILE WE HAD NO/NO POLITICAL DIFFICULTY WITH EITHER COUNTRY, THERE WAS A PROBLEM OF COMPETING PRIORITIES AND STRETCHING OURSELVES TOO THINLY. WE WERE BEGINNING NEW PROGRAMS IN UGANDA AND ZIMBABWE AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO START OTHER NEW PROGRAMS WITHOUT CUTTING BACK ELSEWHERE. NEVERTHELESS, WE HOPED THAT WE COULD GET MODESTLY INVOLVED IN MOZAMBIQUE, BEYOND OUR FOOD AID AND NGO PROGRAMS, THROUGH REGIONAL PROJECTS UNDER SADCC UMBRELLA.

.../3

001104

5. HIGH COMMER SAID FINALLY THAT HE HAD NOTED REPORTS IN CDN PRESS ALLEGING THAT TANZ HAD BACKED OBOTE IN DEC ELECTIONS AND HE WANTED TO STRESS THAT TANZ HAD BEEN COMPLETELY IMPARTIAL IN ITS CONDUCT, EVEN THOUGH PRIVATELY IT HOPED OBOTE WOULD WIN. AT ONE STAGE, NYERERE HAD EVEN PREPARED MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS TO SSEMOGERERE, WHEN IT APPEARED THAT HE MIGHT HAVE WON. WE SAID THAT REPORT OF COMWELA OBSERVERS, INCLUDING MR. DANSON, HAD NOT/NOT PROVIDED ANY INDICATION THAT TANZ HAD EXERCISED IMPROPER INFLUENCE DURING ELECTIONS. 3

6. LUKUMBUZYA SAID THAT ^AUGANDA WAS IN DESPERATE NEED OF DEVT ASSISTANCE AND WE NOTED THAT CIDA PLANNING MISSION HAD RECENTLY BEEN IN KAMPALA TO INVESTIGATE PROSPECTS FOR RECOMMENCEMENT OF ODA PROGRAMMING.

7. DANISH AMB IN SEPARATE CALL THIS WEEK ON MSS MADE SOME POINT AS IN PARA 4 RE NEED FOR MORE WESTERN INVOLVEMENT AND AID IN ANGOLA AND MOZAMBIQUE. IN AFRICA, DANES ARE CONCENTRATED THERE AND IN ANGLOPHONE EAST AFRICA. MSS REPLIED AS ABOVE.

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

DATE	810116	REF
ACC	111529	DOSSIER
FILE	20-1-2-3	
BY HAND		
ATTN		

AUG 01 1980

C O N F I D E N T I E L CDNS SEULEMENT

DE RABAT WQGR1592 30JUL80

A EXTOTT GAF

INFO WSHDC PRMNY PARIS MDRID ALGER BNATO TUNIS CAIRO MOSCO
LAGOS DAKAR JEDDA ADDIS ABDJN

PM REEHULL/VIELLARD DE OCI

SAC ACCRA KNSHA NROBI DSLAM PRET DE OTT

DISTR GAP GAM PSI UNO GAA GNG GNP

REF WSHDC TEL UNGR4115 21JUL

---CONVERSATIONS CDA/EUA SUR AFRIQUE-SAHARA OCCIDENTAL

C EST AUSSI NOTRE OPINION QAE POSITION DU ROI HASSAN II S EST
RENFORCEE DEPUIS UN AN COMME EN ONT TMOIGNE NOS TELEGRAMMES.
RECEMMENT HASSAN EST SORTI DE SA TOUR D IVOIRE POUR FAIRE DES
TOURNEES A TRAVERS LE PAYS POUR ALIMENTER SA POPULARITE.IL A
ANNONCE UNE AMNISTIE DE TOUS PRISONNIERS POLITIQUES ET LANCE
UNE GRANDE CAMPAGNE DE LUTTE CONTRE LES BIDONVILLES,EN PARTI-
CULIER DE CASABLANCA DONT IL VEUT FAIRE CIT LA PERLE DE L ATLAN-
TIQUE FINCIT.

2.S IL EST VRAI QUE LA GUERRS DU SAHARA NE SOIT PAS PRINCIPALE-
MENT RESPONSABLE DES DIFFICULTES ECONOMIQUES DU MAROC,IL NE
S ENSUIT PAS QU ELLES SONT IMPUTABLES AU REGIME COMME LES
AMERICAINS SEMBLANT QE SOUS-ENTENPRE.A NOTRE AVIS,LA CONJONC-
TURE ECONOMIQUE INTERNATIONALE DEFAVOURABLE QUI AFFECTE TOUS LES
PAYS FRAPPE PLUS DUREMENT UN PAYS COMME LE MAROC QUI NE POSSEDE NI
PETROLENI GAZ NATUREL.LE PRIX DU PHOSPHATE N A

...2

PAGE DEUX WQGR1592 CONFD CDNS SEUL

CONNU OU UN LEGERE HAUSSE RECEMMENT APRES AVOIR ETE AU
PRIX LE PLUS BAS ET LE MARCHE COMMUN CONTINUE DE FAIRE
DES DIFFICULTES A L ENTREE DES AGRUMES MAROCAINES.TOUT CECI NE
CONTRIBUE PAS A SOLUTIONNER LES PROBLEMES ECONOMICQUES DU MAROC
MAIS NOUS ECLAIRE SUR LES CAUSES D UNE SITUATION ECONOMIQUE
DEFAVORABLE OU LA GUERRE DU SAHARA N EST PEUT-ETRE PAS LE FACTEUR
DOMINANT.

3.EN CE QUI CONCERNE LES VUES AMERICAINES SUR LES RESULTATS DE LA
CONFERENCE DE FREETOWN,NOUS N AVONS RIEN A AJOUTER A NOTRE TEL
1484 11JUIL.QUANT LA COMPOSITION DU COMITE DES SAGES,LE MAROC
NE MANQUERA PAS,S IL S AVERAIT NECESSAIRE DE LE FAIRE,DE METTRE EN
QUESTION L IMPARTIALITE ET L OBJECTIVITE DE TROIS DE SES MEMBRES
QUI ONT DEJA RECONNU LA RASD.SEKOU TOURE QUI A JOUE UN ROLE
PREDOMINANT A FREETOWN ET QUI EST MEMBRE DU COMITE DES SAGES NE
RESTERA PAS COI.(VOIR JEUNE AFRIQUE DU 16JUIL).IL N Y A PAS LIEU
DE SE MONTRER TROP PESSIMISTE.

4.QUANT A LA DISSIDENCE DE MOSSE DE LA POSITION DE SON GOUVERNEMENT
CIT APPUYEE SUR SON INTUITION FINCIT;IL EST BON DE SE RAPPELER
QUE L INTUITION(OU LE SIXIEME SENS)A PEU DE VALEUR LORSQU ELLE NE
REPOSE PAS SUR UNE EXPERIENCE QUOTIDIENNE ET CONCRETE DES FAITS.
UNE INTUITION A DISTANCE ET BASEE SUR DES RAPPORTS POLITIQUES N A
PAS LIEU D ETRE

GAUVIN.

CCC/005 311115Z WQGR1592

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Claude
Cherrier
JUL 22 1980

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE WSHDC UNGR4115 21JUL80

A EXTOTT/GAF

INFO PRMNY PARIS MDRID ALGER RABAT BNATO TUNIS CAIRO MOSCO

LAGOS DAKAR JEDDA ADDIS ABDJN

SAC ACCRA KNSHA NROBI DSLAM PRET DE OTT

DISTR GAP GAM PSI UNO GAA GNG GNP

DATE	8-10-16	REF
ACC	111544	DOSSIER
BY HAND	20-1-2-3	PAR PORTEUR
ATTN:		

---CONVERSATIONS CDA/EUA SUR AFRIQUE-SAHARA OCCIDENTAL

DEPT D ETAT DANS SON ENSEMBLE CONSIDERE QUE POSITION DE HASSAN

S EST RENFORCEE DEPUIS UN AN. OPERATIONS MILITAIRES DONNENT

RESULTATS PLUS PROBANTS SANS ETRE DECISIFS. OPINION PUBLIQUE

MAROCAINE EST TOUJOURS SOLIDAIRE DE SON GOUVT BIEN QUE

BUREAUCRATES SEMBLANT CONVAINCUS, A TORT SELON AMERICAINS, QUE

CETTE GUERRE SOIT PRINCIPALEMENT RESPONSABLE DES DIFFICULTES

ECONOMIQUES DU PAYS.

2. TENDANCE SEMBLAIT CONDUIRE AUX NEGOCIATIONS, JUSQU A OUVERTURE

DE CONF DE L OUA. RUMEURS DE POURPARLERS SURGISSAIENT PARTOUT

SANS INDIQUER BIEN CLAIREMENT IDENTITE DES NEGOTIATEURS.

MAIS SUCCES RELATIF DU MAROC A CONF SEMBLE AVOIR MIS FIN A TOUT

CELA. MAROC S EST PRESENTE A FREETOWN SANS ATOUTS MAJEURS ET

WSHDC S ATTENDAIT A ENTREE DU POLISARIO A OUA. DECISION DE

RETARDER LA QUESTION A SURPRIS. MAIS COMPOSITION DU COMITE

DES SAGES EST TOUJOURS DEFAVORABLE AU MAROC.

3. DECISION DU POLISARIO DE PORTER COMBATS DANS ZONE MAROCAINE

...2

PAGE DEUX UNGR4115 CONF

WISE SANS DOUTE A IMPRESSIONNER OPINION PUBLIQUE MAROCAINE.MAIS
ELLE A AUSSI PRECIPITE DECISION AMERICAINE DE VENDRE ARMES AU
MAROC.

4.A LA FIN DE REUNION MOOSE A SURPRIS EN INDIQUANT PUBLIQUEMENT
SA DISSIDENCE DE POSITION DE SON GOUVT.TOUT EN ADMETTANT QU IL
S APPUYAIT SUR SON INTUITION PLUTOT QUE SUR DES FAITS PRECIS IL
A EXPRIME CRAINTES QUE L APPUI PARTIEL DES AMERICAINS NE
PREVIENDRAIT PAS DEFAITE EVENTUELLE DES MAROCAINS ET DESASTRE
MINEUR POUR WSHDC.NI LES AUTRES DELEGUES AMERICAINS NI LES CDNS
N ONT COMMENTE CETTE DECLARATION QUI CONFIRME EXISTENCE DE
DIVISIONS AMERICAINES JUSQU AU PLUS HAUT NIVEAU.NEANMOINS
OPINION DU GOUVT LUI-MEME N A PAS/PAS CHANGE.

5.POUR LEUR PART,DELS CDNS ONT SOULIGNE QU ILS VOULAIENT EVITER
TOUTE IMPLICATION DIRECTE TOUT EN REDOUTANT QUE CRISE
COMPROMETTE STABILITE DU MAROC ET DE TOUTE LA REGION.

CCC/241 212002Z UNGR4115

Classe
3

JUL 22 1980

ACTION SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE WSHDC UNGR4114 21JUL80

A EXTOTT/GAF

INFO PRMNY PARIS CIDA HULL/AFR ITCOTT FINOTT DAKAR ABDJN

DISTR GAP GAA UNP UNO GNG PSI

---CONVERSATIONS CDA/EUA SUR AFRIQUE-COTE D IVOIRE

DEPT D ETAT ADMET AVOIR NEGLIGE COTE D IVOIRE, SANS DOUTE PARCE
QU ELLE NE RECOIT AUCUNE AIDE ECONOMIQUE DES EUA ET BIEN QUE CE
PAYS AIT FOURNI UN RARE EXEMPLE DE SUCCES ECONOMIQUE DU LAISSEZ-
FAIRE. ATTITUDE DE WSHDC S EST MODIFIEE QUELQUE PEU DEPUIS QUE
L ON SE REND COMPTE QUE PAYS DOIT AFFRONTER DE GRAVES PROBLEMES
QUI POURRAIENT TOURNER MAL: MEVENTE DE CACAO ET DE CAFE,
ACCROISSEMENT DES DETTES EXTERIEURES.

2. CAUSE FONDAMENTALE EST HAUSSE DU COUT INTERNATIONAL DE
L ENERGIE QUI ENGLOUTIT REVENUS EXTERIEURS. IL Y A AUSSI
NATURELLEMENT PROBLEME DE SUCCESSION D HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY ET
RESSENTIMENT DES JEUNES DEVANT PRESENCE OBNUBILANTE DES FRANCAIS.
DANS CES CONDITIONS DEPT D ETAT REGRETTE MAINTENANT DE NE PAS/PAS
AVOIR ETE SUFFISAMMENT COMPREHENSIF, PAR EXEMPLE LORS DES
DERNIERES DISCUSSIONS SUR LE CACAO. CE QUI NE LES A PAS/PAS
EMPECHES DE PRESSER VIVEMENT ABIDJAN SUR DES QUESTIONS COMME
PARTICIPATION AUX JEUX OLYMPIQUES. AMERICAINS N EN SONT PAS/PAS
ENCORE A SONGER A DES CONCESSIONS ECONOMIQUES SUBSTANTIELLES; MAIS
IL POURRAIT ETRE QUESTION DE LANCER UN PROGRAMME D AIDE. ILS ONT

...2

DATE	8.10.116	REF
ACC	111558	DOSSIER
FILE	20-1-2-3	PAR PORTEUR
BY HAND		
ATTN:		

PAGE DEUX UNGR4114 CONFD

SURTOUT ESPOIR QUE DECOUVERTES PETROLIERES DONNENT EVENTUELLEMENT
A LA COTE D IVOIRE L AUTARCIE EN MATIERE D ENERGIE.DEPT D ETAT
A EGALEMENT NOTE QU UN NOMBRE CROISSANT D ENTREPRISES AMERICAINES
ETABLISSENT UN BUREAU REGIONAL A ABIDJAN.

3.AMERICAINS ET CDNS ONT CONVENU QUE LIENS AVEC LA FRANCE SONT
DEMEURES TRES ETROITS ET SURVIVRONT SANS DOUTE AU DEPART
D HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY.CEPENDANT,YACE,CANDIDAT PRO-FRANCAIS A
SUCCESSION,EST IMPOPULAIRE ET SERA PROBABLEMENT ECONDUIT SOUS
PEU.

CCC/241 212000Z UNGR4114

C O N F I D E N T I E L
DE WSHDC UNGR4018 16JUIL80
A EXTOTT/GAF

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

JUL 16 1980

DATE	8.0.16	REF
ACC	111550	DOSSIER
FILE	20-1-2-3	PAR PORTEUR
BY HAND		
ATTN:		

INFO DAKAR PARIS PRMNY ABDJN
DISTR GAP UNP UNO GNG PSI

---DISCUSSIONS CDA-EUA SUR L AFRIQUE-LE MALI

CDNS ET AMERICAINS ONT TRACE UN PORTRAIT SEMBLE DU MALI. LA
POSITION DE TRAORE S EST BEAUCOUP AFFAIBLIE DEPUIS DEUX ANS.
L ECONOMIE EST DANS LE MARASME. LA FRANCE QUI A PAYE JUSQU A
DOLLARS 200 MILLION REFUSE D AIDER DAVANTAGE. TRAORE S EST DONC
TOURNE VERS L URSS.

2. LES AMERICAINS ONT AJOUTE QUE SENGHOR PARTAGERAIT CETTE
INQUIETUDE. TRAORE A ABANDONNE SES APPUIS MILITAIRES SANS
S ASSURER EN RETOUR LE CONCOURS DES CIVILS. DEJA LES LYBIENS
DOMINENT TOUT LE TRIANGLE NORD DU PAYS (PARTIE SAHARIENNE) PAR LE
BIAIS DES TOUAREGS ET DU POLISARIO. LA SURVIE DU REGIME TRAORE
N EST SANS DOUTE QU UNE QUESTION DE TEMPS.

3. LE CDA A DECIDE DE NE PLUS ACCORDER D AIDE ALIMENTAIRE AVANT
QUE LE MALI NE SE DECIDE A AMELIORER SA POLITIQUE DES PRIX. QUANT
AUX AMERICAINS ILS ONT RECONNU QUE POUR DES RAISONS PUREMENT
HISTORIQUES LE MALI RECOIT UNE AIDE DISPROPORTIONNEE DE LEUR PART:
DOLLARS 1.4 A 16 MILLION PAR AN EN REGARD DE DOLLARS 6 MILLION
POUR LE LIBERIA (UNE PARTIE DE CETTE AIDE EST ACCORDEE SOUS COUVERT
DU PROGRAMME D AIDE AU SAHEL). LE PROGRAMME AMERICAIN NE S ETEND
PAS/PAS A L ALIMENTATION ET IL N EST PAS/PAS ASSURE QUE LE CONGRES
RATIFIERA LES FONDS PROPOSES DE DOLLARS 5 MILLION POUR L INFRA-
STRUCTURE ROUTIERE. LES FONCTIONNAIRES MALIENS DE L AIDE SONT
RAISONNABLEMENT COMPETENTS, CE QUI EXPLIQUE PARTIELLEMENT L ENGOU-
EMENT PASSE DE CERTAINS OFFICIELS AMERICAINS POUR CE PAYS.

CCC/275 162048Z UNGR4018

NOTE DE SERVICE

GAA

GAF

Votre mémo 1004 du 19 juin 1980

Consultations avec les américains sur l'Afrique
du Nord

CONFIDENTIEL

Le 3 juillet 1980

GAF-738

20-1-2-USA

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Vous trouverez ci-joint les notes relatives à l'item "F" de
l'ordre du jour en référence.

GAP

La Direction de l'Afrique
francophone et du Maghreb

Original Signed by
MARC PERRON
a signé l'original

ALGERIE

Hypothèses et points de discussion

- Une transition qu'on disait s'être faite en douceur.

Malgré la prétention du régime à présenter l'après-Boumedienne comme une "transition en douceur", les résultats des assises de juin du Congrès du FLN donnent une idée de la précarité des assises politiques qu'avaient été celles du Président Bendjedid durant un an et demi. Si son autorité en sort grandi, le temps qu'elle aura mis à s'établir exprime la virulence des luttes de faction qui prévalaient au sein du pouvoir depuis la mort de Boumedienne.

Même s'il est sans doute prématuré de tirer des conclusions définitives de ce congrès, il paraît, par contre, légitime d'y voir l'aboutissement du processus de clarification politique engagé depuis 18 mois et la confirmation des nouvelles orientations du pouvoir. Dans un sens, c'est véritablement l'après-Boumedienne qui commence.

A - Sur le plan politique:

Le Congrès confirme l'autorité du Président en réduisant de dix-sept à sept le nombre des membres du Bureau Politique et en abolissant le poste de "coordinateur du Parti" que détenait jusque là Yahiaoui. Les membres de cet exécutif seront désormais responsables individuellement devant le Président. Fait à noter, cependant, Yahiaoui demeure du groupe des sept ainsi que l'ancien MAE Bouteflika avec le résultat que l'ensemble des tendances continuera à être représenté. Il est donc prématuré de parler de victoire finale d'une faction sur une autre.

B - Sur le plan économique:

La réorientation escomptée vers les dépenses à caractère social s'est produite, confirmant ainsi la conception de Chadli d'un programme économique pragmatique. Là encore, cependant, le délai de deux ans à le mettre en oeuvre illustre l'ampleur des controverses qu'il a suscitées. De plus, l'importance des sommes qui continueront d'être affectées dans le secteur industriel de base - 38.6% du total des autorisations de dépenses par rapport à 43.5% dans le plan 1974-77 - n'autorise pas véritablement à parler de virage.

Reste à voir si la consolidation du pouvoir politique se traduira par un apaisement du climat social puisque d'aucuns attribuaient les troubles des derniers mois - autant arabisants que kabyles - à la faiblesse du leadership politique lui-même au prise avec des affrontements internes.

M A R O C

La guerre du Sahara et la situation interne

C'est sans doute pour le Maroc que les pronostics d'instabilité étaient les plus pessimistes considérant les difficultés économiques qu'impose la guerre du Sahara. La "crise de régime" évoquée à maintes occasions ne semble cependant pas en passe de se matérialiser et, paradoxalement, le climat social au Maroc est peut-être celui le mieux contrôlé à l'heure actuelle si l'on s'en fie aux troubles que connaissent les deux voisins. Sans doute l'appui populaire à cette guerre y est-elle pour quelque chose: à cet égard le consensus social sollicité dès '75 ne semble pas s'être démenti depuis lors.

Même sur le plan militaire la situation semble s'améliorer où les victoires récentes dans la région de l'Ouarkziz ont succédé à une sévère défaite dans le même secteur en mars dernier. Plus importante, cependant paraît être la signification du calme régnant dans les provinces sahariennes qui indiquent, à tout le moins, une approbation tacite des populations locales à l'endroit de la gouverne marocaine. A cet égard, la fête du Trône célébrée en grande pompe dans la capitale de la province du Sahara la plus au Sud atteste d'une forme d'acceptation de la souveraineté marocaine sur ce territoire. Par ailleurs les résultats récents du référendum national sur la constitution ont, à leur limite, valeur de plébiscite des populations sahariennes à l'endroit du Roi.

En sus du respect et de l'admiration des siens que conserve le Roi, celui-ci n'est par ailleurs, pas complètement coupé d'appui extérieur malgré la continuation de l'isolement diplomatique. Le Maroc conserve en effet le soutien financier de l'Arabie Saoudite, a réussi à susciter l'engagement militaire des américains et entretient des liens intimes et durables avec la France.

Cette thèse d'une relative stabilité du régime va un peu à l'encontre de l'analyse américaine qui estimait, il y a un bon moment déjà, que "les jours du roi Hassan sur le trône du Maroc étaient comptés". Sans doute, le traumatisme iranien y est-il pour quelque chose dans cette évaluation un peu pessimiste.

B - Nouveaux développements

Alors que nous croyions la situation stabilisée sur le plan diplomatique, voilà qu'une nouvelle offensive se dessine par le biais de l'admission éventuelle de la RASD à l'OUA. Sans vouloir préjuger des résultats du sommet de Freetown, la position du Maroc pourrait s'en trouver grandement détériorée considérant que l'OUA, par l'admission de la RASD, prendrait fait et cause pour l'une des parties après avoir pris position à Monrovia sur le principe en cause (l'auto-détermination). Il est vrai, cependant, que la menace du Maroc de se retirer de l'Organisation pèsera lourd dans la décision des Chefs d'Etat, comme le prouve l'actuel débat de procédure dans lequel s'est enlisé la question de l'admission d'un nouveau membre.

Par delà cette question du Sommet, il pourrait être utile de s'enquérir auprès des américains des détails de la médiation saoudienne du mois dernier.

T U N I S I E

Hypothèses et points de discussion

- Stabilité interne:

Partant de l'hypothèse que le coup de Gafsa n'a été possible que par l'indifférence, sinon la complicité passive de la population locale, il n'en faut pas davantage pour déduire que le précédent gouvernement ne jouissait pas d'un très fort appui populaire.

Dans cette perspective, le nouveau gouvernement Mzali semble davantage en mesure d'apaiser pour une part, le mécontentement social qui prévaut en installant:

A - Sur le plan social:

Une vision du développement moins strictement "économiste" que celle qu'avait Nouira et qui se traduit par...

- augmentation de salaires consentis;
- hausse des allocations familiales;
- généralisation de la gratuité des soins médicaux, etc.

B - Sur le plan politique:

Une certaine ouverture comme en témoigne l'élargissement des dirigeants syndicalistes et le retour au pouvoir des ministres démissionnaires de 1977.

C - Sur le plan personnel:

Une image plus compatible avec la personnalité tunisienne que celle de "technocrate occidental" qu'avait Nouira.

- Mzali, tout en étant moderniste et ouvert aux valeurs occidentales, est tout de même reconnu comme un musulman fervent, attaché à l'authenticité arabo-musulmane.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO
À EBPFROM
De GAPREFERENCE
RéférenceSUBJECT
Sujet Canadian Bilateral Aid to Africa

DATE	8003/18	
ACC	64218	REF
FILE	20-1-2-3	DOSSIER
BY HAND	PAR PORTEUR	
ATTN:		

SECURITY
Sécurité CONFIDENTIAL

DATE March 13, 1980

NUMBER
Numéro GAP-55

FILE	DOSSIER
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ENCLOSURES
Annexes

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Introduction

This paper is designed to set out our Bureau's approach to some key aspects of Canadian bilateral aid to Africa, in the hope that it will be useful to you and others in discussions with CIDA in the context of the coming year's aid allocations and the perennial issues of eligibility, concentration, etc.

2. Our point of departure is the Under-Secretary's recent draft paper on "Canadian Foreign Policy 1980-1990: a Conceptual Framework Leading to a Program of Action". The aid sections of this paper (pp.37-39) express the view that significant growth in the development programme should resume so as to overcome the damage done by recent shrinkage and the resulting inflexibility. The paper goes on to call for the establishment of better priorities among aid recipients and limitation of the number of countries of concentration, and then says:

"limiting the number of countries of concentration.....should not be accompanied by reducing the number of countries eligible for Canadian assistance. Even relatively small amounts of Canadian funds can be a significant factor in developing Canadian bilateral relationships. Canadian interests are therefore served in having a flexible program, capable of responding to political requirements and humanitarian needs, bearing always in mind the requirements that appropriate development or relief criteria be met".

We entirely agree with this formulation, and the line of policy which we suggest below accords with its substance.

Background

3. Canada's bilateral aid to Africa began on a very modest scale in the late 1950's. By FY 78/79 it had grown steadily in both volume and spread to an annual level of around \$250 million, channelled to roughly 45 countries, as well as to a reasonable number of regional institutions. The individual country allocations have varied considerably, with the bulk of the aid flowing to some 15-20 countries. This

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- 2 -

practice was ratified by the 1970 "Foreign Policy for Canadians" which set forth Canada's intention to "allocate the major portion of Canadian bilateral funds to selected countries of concentration" while reserving 20% of available funds for other countries. This was modified somewhat in favour of increased concentration by the 1975-80 "Strategy for International Development Cooperation" which proclaimed Canada's intention to concentrate "continuing bilateral assistance in a limited number of countries", but kept the door open for small amounts of funds to be provided to a "wider range of developing countries".

4. However, since 1975 CIDA officials have been under increasing pressure to deflect the growing criticism of the aid programme as ineffectual and incompetently administered. It was felt by many inside and outside CIDA that a further reduction in the number of aid recipients would result in both a greater impact and better control. This belief was sanctified by the 1978 Economic Council of Canada report, which recommended, inter alia, a reduction in the number of bilateral aid recipients to "approximately 30". Arguments in favour of flexibility and adaptability to changing circumstances, as well as the diverse nature of Canada's political and material interests in different countries, have been given little heed. In the last 18 months, cut-backs in the future growth of the aid programme (as well as continued criticism by the Auditor-General) have added even further pressure to implement the agreed concept of concentration in a manner so as to eliminate still more countries from the receipt of most, if not all, forms of bilateral aid.

5. The two African divisions of CIDA have reacted differently to these pressures. The treatment in store for Francophone countries seems a gradual withdrawal from all the smaller and poorer countries, whereas the tendency on the Anglophone side is to maintain or modestly increase the number of aid recipients, although not necessarily the number of countries of concentration.

6. On the Francophone side, CIDA is planning to refuse any requests from Mauritania, Chad and RCA for "traditional" capital and technical assistance (as opposed to MAF and perhaps food aid). At the same time, CIDA plans to disengage from Rwanda, Benin, Togo, Congo, Madagascar and Algeria (i.e. to honour existing commitments, but to refuse to consider new commitments, until eventually only MAF and perhaps food aid are the only bilateral aid transfers in force).

7. On the Anglophone side, CIDA is proposing to disengage only from Nigeria and Sierra Leone, and is open to bilateral aid relationships with Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique, which could be more comprehensive than just MAF and perhaps food aid. A programme in Egypt is also being developed.

8. In summary, it would appear that the number of aid recipients in Francophone Africa will go down, while the number in Anglophone Africa may go up!

9. In our view, it is an appropriate time to take another look at how we apply the concept of concentration, in the light of what would appear to be desirable from the point of view of our overall relations with African countries.

- 3 -

Objective

10. It should be noted at the outset that there is a fundamental difference between concentration in terms of the number of countries receiving aid and concentration in terms of the volume of aid being provided, and that the former does not preclude the latter.

11. A review of the relevant factors suggests that our objective ought to be a minimum Canadian bilateral aid presence in all poor developing African countries and a significant presence in a limited number of aid recipients. The rationale for such an objective is set out in Annex A. It should be noted that the objective conforms fairly closely to current practice; the main problem is to prevent movement away from the objective.

12. Canadian bilateral aid includes (i) traditional government-to-government aid, such as capital and technical assistance (usually in the form of specific projects), food aid, as well as Mission Administered Funds (MAF), and (ii) other government-assisted private sector aid, such as NGO's and the industrial cooperation programme.

13. The actual kind (and amount) of Canadian aid to a poor developing African country should, in our view, vary according to the relative importance of the country in terms of Canadian interests as well as its socio-economic standing. At the one end, there would be countries where the "minimum" aid presence might be only MAF and NGO's on a regular basis and a "traditional" project on an "occasional" basis, i.e. a new project every 3 to 5 years (e.g. Mauritius, Ethiopia, or Djibouti); at the other end, there would be countries receiving a "significant" level of assistance, where all forms of aid transfer might be utilized simultaneously, as they are now (e.g. Tanzania or Senegal). Other countries would fit in, as deemed appropriate, between the two ends; an illustrative table of what we think might be appropriate for each African country is set out in Annex B.

Recommendations

14. (a) We should seek interdepartmental consensus that, since the government has yet to complete its review of aid policy, which will certainly cover the key issues of eligibility and concentration, it seems desirable that current aid policies should apply, except when the Government subsequently makes a decision on eligibility applicable to a specific country (e.g. Zimbabwe).

(b) In respect of 80/81, CIDA should be urged not to drop Mauritania and Chad nor plan to disengage from Rwanda, Benin, Togo, Congo, Madagascar, Algeria, Nigeria or Sierra Leone. These and other presently ineligible countries should be told that all existing firm commitments will be honoured and all new requests for assistance (except those of an emergency character, such as food aid) will be put on "hold", until the aid review is over, at which time the countries will be informed whether or not Canada is prepared to finance any of such requests. At the same time, CIDA should be

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- 4 -

asked to set funds aside to provide MAF for all poor developing African countries.

- (c) In respect of planning for 81/86, priority should be given, first to ensuring that commitments are honoured, and second, to earmarking part of the expected funds to permit a minimum aid presence in all likely eligible countries, so that if Cabinet authorizes such a policy for the future, funds will be available to carry it out.



Michael Shenstone

ANNEX "A"

Why a minimum Canadian aid presence in all (poor developing) African countries?

(a) Introduction: Retain substantial Concentration

While the following paragraphs argue in favour of a minimum aid presence in all poor developing African countries, it emphatically does not follow that Canada's aid presence should be the same in all countries.

There are very powerful political and commercial arguments in favour of concentrating the bulk (but not the totality) of aid in a select number of recipients in Africa.

First, there is the entirely understandable desire to make a greater effort to help one's friends or to reward those who are making a genuine attempt to help themselves. Why should one make much of an effort to help those lukewarm in their support of us, or to reward the lazy and/or incompetent?

Second, the larger one's aid programme in a country, the greater the attention the donor will receive from the recipient government, which in turn can mean a more fruitful dialogue and a greater willingness on the part of the recipient to accommodate the donor's wishes and to contribute to the execution of the projects and programmes in question.

Third, the wider the range and the greater the volume of donor goods and services supplied, the better the chances of donor suppliers undertaking to provide the necessary after-sales service for repeat orders, etc. In addition, the total donor presence will be more likely to convince recipient government officials that the donor in question really is a viable alternative source of goods and services.

(b) Beyond Concentration: Background

Africa at present contains 52 nations (if defined, in accordance with OAU criteria, to include the totally off-shore nations of Cape Verde, Sao Tomé & Príncipe, Comores, Madagascar, Seychelles and Mauritius), ranging in population size from huge (Nigeria: 80-100 millions) to tiny (Seychelles: 60,000). All of these nations (except Zimbabwe-Rhodesia) are members of the United Nations, and together account for just under one-third of the UN's total membership (152).

All African countries, except South Africa, may be described as developing countries, and by western standards relatively poor (except Libya and Gabon, with annual per capita GNP's of roughly \$6,000. and \$4,000.

- 2 -

respectively). They range from more advanced countries, such as Algeria (with an annual per capita GNP of \$1,010), to the least advanced, such as Upper Volta and Mali (with annual per capita GNP's of \$100.).

At present, Canada has a bilateral aid presence of one kind or another in all poor developing countries of Africa, except Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Sao Tomé and Príncipe and, of course, Zimbabwe (Namibia is left out of account here since its prospects for internationally acceptable independence remain extremely uncertain). In Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, Djibouti, Angola, Comores and Seychelles, Canada's bilateral aid presence currently consists of MAF and NGO's only; in Uganda, Canada has recently also authorized a special, but limited, programme grant.

The first point thus to note is that Canada already has a minimum aid presence in most poor African developing countries, and that consequently to achieve a minimum aid presence in all such countries would not necessitate any major changes. To be specific, it would require only (a) upgrading four countries (of which three are rather small) to eligibility for MAF and NGO's (b) making twelve countries (of which 8 are relatively small) eligible for the "occasional" bilateral project, and (c) maintaining all other aid recipients in Africa as eligible for at least an "occasional" future bilateral project.

The question is thus: would it be desirable to extend Canada's aid programme in Africa even further, as suggested above? Or should Canada move in the opposite direction, towards a more selective number of aid recipients in Africa?

To answer these questions, it seems appropriate to consider the political, commercial, developmental, and administrative factors at issue.

(c) Political factors

Canada, being a small nation in terms of population, but large in terms of resources, and with global interests, has an interest in maintaining cordial relations with as many other nations as possible, since Canada's exclusive sovereignty over resources that by the fluke of nature lie within its boundaries will be challenged more and more in the long-term, as population and consumption pressures in less fortunate nations build up to explosive levels. While there are, and will continue to be, countries in each continent to which we will wish to pay special attention through aid or otherwise, it would be counterproductive to concentrate exclusively on them. A widely dispersed aid program will clearly help maintain cordial relations with more other countries than a narrowly focussed aid program, even though individual slices of the "cake" may be thinner. Canadian aid will not buy friends, but past experience shows that the good will it generates and the contact it develops can and does lead to more readily opened doors, when we want to pursue other Canadian interests.

- 3 -

This is particularly true in Africa. If aid is viewed as a means to maintain links established in colonial days, Canada has no obvious choices in Africa, which contains more independent countries and more cultural diversity than any other continent. If aid is seen as a reward for ideological soul-mates, Canada would appear to have some sympathies with virtually every African state, though of very differing intensity. It can be argued that a large number of Canadians are emotionally attached to the Commonwealth nations and would expect Canada to aid other members of this club (including future members such as Zimbabwe and, conceivably, Namibia). Similarly a large minority of Canadians have an attachment to the emerging Francophonie, even though some countries (e.g. Algeria) reject the categories in which Canada chooses to put them.

But the two most populous African countries (Egypt and Ethiopia) do not fit into Canada's categories at all; nor do two key Lusophone countries - Angola and Mozambique - which are highly important for the solution of Southern African problems, one of which countries, Angola, is a potentially important oil producer. There are also a number of smaller countries (Somalia, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia) whose arbitrary exclusion from almost any form of Canadian aid may be administratively convenient but lacks logic. For example, an important factor is the encouragement of regional approaches to what are essentially regional problems. The political boundaries of Africa reflect its colonial past, rather than natural phenomena. There is a growing awareness that uncoordinated national initiatives to deal with regional problems should give place to coordinated supra-national efforts (e.g. in the Sahel), if there is to be any likelihood of promoting self-sustaining development. This means that Canada should be prepared, at least occasionally, to help all countries in a region, especially in respect of regional projects. We should keep in mind that Canada has, up to now at least, managed to build over the last 20 years an enviable reputation in the Third World on account of the relative universality of our aid programme, in that we have helped countries all over the world without pronounced preferences in terms of political ideologies.

It might be claimed that the political benefits of narrowly concentrated aid in Africa in terms of increased clout for Canada in the lucky African recipients would be greater than those deriving from a more widely dispersed aid programme, preserving a degree of concentration as at present. But there is no proof. In any event, there would certainly be political costs in moving away from our present policy, since this would involve Canada having to tell a number of recipients that we no longer have enough funds (not likely to convince a Rwandan) and/or that our relations are too insignificant (likely to add insult to injury). There is also the unfortunate likelihood that in some countries which Canada might wish to

- 4 -

"drop", Canada has through the aid programme financed "white elephant" projects, in which case withdrawal might seem like welshing.

In respect of Francophone Africa, there is an additional political argument of considerable importance, namely, Canada's objectives in respect of "la Francophonie". In order to convince French-speaking Canadians that Canadian foreign policy is as responsive to their demands for a closer association with other French-speaking nations as it is to the demands of English-speaking Canadians for links with other Commonwealth nations, Canada has actively pursued the goal of setting up an institution which would indeed encourage exchanges and cooperative ventures between French-speaking nations. So far, there has not been unanimity among the French-speaking nations as to what should be the objective of such an association or indeed what might be the best means of achieving the objective. Canada sees the objective in terms of promoting the development of associated countries in the broadest terms (i.e. both cultural and economic), through initiatives involving mutual help. France, on the other hand, prefers a more culturally focussed objective. Other French-speaking nations are torn between their desires to accommodate both France and Canada. Their respect for the Canadian position, which seems closer to their real preferences, is a sign of their appreciation of what Canada has done to date to assist French-speaking Africa in its quest for economic self-reliance. It would therefore seem politically desirable that Canada not only maintain its relatively dispersed aid presence in Francophone Africa, but also make gestures towards those French-speaking countries that are at present ineligible for Canadian aid. (A separate paper, dealing with all aspects of Canada's relations with Francophone Africa, is under preparation, for submission to senior management).

(d) Commercial factors

Although one should not overstate the argument, aid, if used to finance Canadian goods and services viewed by recipients as technologically appropriate and financially attractive, can benefit the Canadian economy in terms of developing markets in recipient countries. The good will generated by recipient satisfaction may bias purchasers towards other Canadian products or make recipients more amenable to Canadian private investment. A well-executed technical assistance programme, involving stints in Canada for key recipient officials, as well as judiciously placed Canadian experts in key recipient ministries, is on balance probably a stronger instrument in this particular respect than more costly project aid (dams, etc.). It would thus seem the height of folly for Canada to continue to withdraw from, or to downgrade, this kind of technical cooperation.

While one can probably count on one's fingers the number of African countries where a significant commercial relationship with Canada seems feasible at the present time, one should not overlook, firstly, the large amount of foreign purchases being made by all African countries even

- 6 -

lead to better donor control and consequently a happier Auditor-general - though the more the donor has control, the less that of the recipient, which in turn can invite charges of neo-imperialism or neo-colonialism.

Nonetheless, as a matter of principle, administrative concerns should not dictate, but rather respond to policy objectives. The tail should not wag the dog.

It is not an insurmountable obstacle to identify aid transfer mechanisms which would not pose serious administrative problems, and in a period of declining real resources a "shopped out" technical assistance programme should be examined in this context.

- 5 -

now, and, secondly, future growth, which will inevitably lead to even more foreign purchases in the future. Already, Canadian cooperation is paying off dividends in terms of an increased propensity to buy in Canada (e.g. Algeria, Morocco and Nigeria, where 1979 exports of goods only reached \$215 million, \$68 million and \$50 million respectively; the service sector is also growing rapidly. Canada has a chance to get its foot in many more doors, if we want to - even though this should be seen as a longterm investment (i.e. the returns will not be immediate).

On the supply side, Africa seems a highly desirable source for future supplies to us of what may in the future become increasingly important raw materials, such as petroleum and certain other key metals (chromium, manganese, etc).

(e) Developmental factors

Aid experts now advocate that aid should focus on people at the bottom of the socio-economic pyramid, whose basic needs are a long way from being satisfied, as opposed to on those in the middle or even higher up in the pyramid, whose basic needs usually have already been met.

The difficulty with such an approach is that the level of technology built into the kinds of goods and services usually supplied by aid donors (including Canada) is such that only the middle classes and elites can effectively utilize it. Thus it has been argued that conventional large project aid often ends up reinforcing social inequalities in recipient countries, not to mention the gap between expectations and resources, even though at the same time it may have contributed to the economic growth of the developing country in question.

It follows that the smaller the aid programme in any given recipient, the greater the ease with which donors can resist pressures to finance large conventional projects.

In other words, "small can be beautiful". Smallness ipso facto is no guarantee of developmental purity, but the starting odds are better. At the present time, there is certainly no proof that donors with concentrated aid programmes are achieving better developmental results.

(f) Administrative factors

Advocates of exclusive aid concentration often equate increased effectiveness with decreased administrative burden. However, although there is little evidence that concentration lends to better developmental results, obviously a reduction in administrative units can


ANNEX "B"

(Assuming a 5 year budget of \$1,250. million)

	FRANCOPHONE	ANGLOPHONE	OTHERS	MECHANISMS	ALLOCATION	% 5 YR BUDGET
MINIMAL AID PROGRAMME	Burundi Comores CAR Djibouti Gabon Chad	Gambia Liberia Sierra Leone Seychelles	Somalia Angola Mozambique Cape Verde Sao Tome & Principe Guinea-Bissau Eq. Guinea	MAF : regularly NGO's : regularly Food aid : ally Industrial cooperation : occasion- Project aid : ally (capital, : technical) : ally	Expenditures (annual) up to \$1 million per country	8 % will also finance regional projects
SMALL AID PROGRAMME	Rwanda Togo Benin Madagascar Mauritania Congo	Swaziland Mauritius Namibia Zimbabwe		MAF : regularly NGO's : regularly Food aid : occ. Industrial cooperation : occ. 1 or 2 projects in 1 or 2 sectors: on continual basis	average of \$10-15 million per country over 5 years	10 %
COMMERCIAL AID PROGRAMME	Algeria Tunisia Morocco	Egypt Sudan Nigeria		MAF : regularly NGO's : regularly Industrial cooperation: Programme aid (parallel financing, lines of credit): on continual bas. Project aid (technical) : occ.	average of \$25 million per country over 5 years	12 %
MAJOR AID PROGRAMME	Senegal Cameroon Ivory Coast Guinea Zaire Sahel: Mali Niger Upper Volta	Botswana/Lesotho Zambia Malawi Ghana Uganda Kenya Tanzania		MAF : NGO's : regularly Food aid : Industrial cooperation : occ. Programme aid (parallel : occ. financing etc) : Project aid (capital and/or technical in 3 or 4 sectors: on continual basis	average of \$65-70 million per country/unit over 5 years	70 %

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GAF/J.F. SOMCYNSKY/yb



GAF-126

38-1-CIDA(1)

Le Ministère des Affaires extérieures (Direction de l'Afrique francophone et du Maghreb) présente ses compliments à l'Ambassade de la République du Sénégal et a l'honneur d'accuser réception de sa note du 31 janvier 1980, en la remerciant d'avoir porté à son attention la lettre No 04/13/sp du 31 janvier 1980 adressée à Monsieur Le Doyen du Corps diplomatique d'Ottawa.

Le Ministère des Affaires extérieures saisit cette occasion pour renouveler à l'Ambassade de la République du Sénégal les assurances de sa haute considération.

Original signed by
MARC PERRON
a signé l'original

Ottawa, le 7 février 1980.

MESSAGE

OMF 13/1/85

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DISTR.

RJO MDG JAC LHS GAP FCP

REF

SUB/SUJ

PROGRAMME D'AIDE EN AFRIQUE

A TOUTES FINS UTILES, NOUS ATTIRONS VOTRE ATTENTION SUR LA POSITION SENEGALAISE RELATIVE A UNE CONCERTATION DES AMBASSADEURS AFRICAINS A OTTAWA PREOCCUPES PAR LES CONTRAINTES BUDGETAIRES DE L'ACDI. VOICI TEXTE DE LET DE L'AMB DU SENEGAL A L'AMB DU MAROC, DOYEN DU CORPS DIPLOMATIQUE CIT JE PORTE A VOTRE CONNAISSANCE QUE LE SENEGAL NE PARTICIPE ET NE PARTICIPERA PAS A L'ETUDE ET A LA DISCUSSION DU POINT 2 QUE VOUS AVEZ FAIT INSCRIRE A L'ORDRE DU JOUR (QUI N'AVAIT D'AILLEURS PAS ETE ADOPTE) DE LA REUNION DU GROUPE D'AMBASSADEURS AFRICAINS TENUE LE 24 JANVIER 1980; POINT INTITULE: CIT COUPURES BUDGETAIRES DE L'ACDI ET LEURS REPERCUSSIONS SUR LA COOPERATION ENTRE LE CANADA ET LES PAYS AFRICAINS DANS LE DOMAINE DE L 'AIDE AU DEVELOPPEMENT FINCIT.

2. IL VOUS SOUVIENT QUE JE N'AVAIS PAS PRIS LA PAROLE SUR CE POINT.

3. EN EFFET, IL APPARTIENT A MON GOUVERNEMENT ET A MON GOUVERNEMENT SEUL D'APPRECIER L'ETAT DE SA COOPERATION AVEC LE CANADA,

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVE

SIG

J. F. Somcynsky

GAF

2-3982

SIG

M. Perron

- 2 -

DONT IL EST, A PRESENT, TRES SATISFAIT!

4. JE VOUS INFORME QUE J'ENVOIE COPIE DE CETTE LETTRE AU
MINISTERE CANADIEN DES AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES.

5. JE VOUS PRIE D'AGREER, MONSIEUR L'AMBASSADEUR, LES
ASSURANCES DE MA HAUTE CONSIDERATION. FINCIT

6. NOUS AVONS REMERCIE AMB DU SENEGAL DE CETTE INFO. NS NE
SERIONS PAS ETONNES QU'UNE FRONDE DES AMBASSADEURS AFRICAINS A OTTAWA
S'ORGANISE AUTOUR DE L'AMB HASNAOUI SUITE AUX COUPURES DE NOMBREUX PROJETS
BILATERAUX DEPUIS 18 MOIS. SUIVONS L'AFFAIRE DE PRES ET VOUS TIENDRONS
INFORMES DES DEVELOPPEMENTS. ENTRETEMPS PROCEDONS A UNE REVUE GENERALE
DE NOS RELATIONS AVEC L'AFRIQUE FRANCOPHONE Y COMPRIS CET ASPECT DES
CHoses.



*Ambassade du Sénégal
au Canada*

80020031

57, Ave. Marlborough

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38-1-CIDA(1)

To / A	GAF
From / De	BICO A-2
FEB 4 1980	
Attn:	

RJO
MDG
JAFS
GAP
FCP

L'Ambassade de la République du Sénégal présente ses compliments au Ministère des Affaires Extérieures (Direction des pays africains francophones) et a l'honneur de lui transmettre, à titre d'information , copie de la lettre No 04/IB/sp en date du 31 janvier 1980 qu'elle a adressé à Son Excellence Monsieur Nourreddine HASNAOUI, Ambassadeur du Maroc, Doyen du Corps diplomatique d'Ottawa.

L'Ambassade de la République du Sénégal saisit cette occasion pour renouveler au Ministère des Affaires Extérieures les assurances de sa très haute considération.

Q.

Ottawa, le 31 janvier 1980

Ministère des Affaires Extérieures
OTTAWA



31 JANVIER 1980

(K1N 8E8)

REF: No 04/18/sp

Son Excellence Monsieur
Nourreddine HASNAOUI
Ambassadeur du Maroc

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,


Je porte à votre connaissance que le Sénégal ne participe et ne participera pas à l'étude et à la discussion du point 2 que vous avez fait inscrire à l'ordre du jour (qui n'avait d'ailleurs pas été adopté) de la réunion du groupe d'Ambassadeurs africains tenue le 24 janvier 1980, point intitulé: "Coupures budgétaires de l'ACDI et leurs répercussions sur la coopération entre le Canada et les pays africains dans le domaine de l'aide au développement".

Il vous souvient que je n'avais pas pris la parole sur ce point.

En effet, il appartient à mon gouvernement et à mon gouvernement seul d'apprécier l'état de sa coopération avec le Canada, dont il est, à présent, très satisfait!

Je vous informe que j'envoie copie de cette lettre au Ministère canadien des Affaires Extérieures.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, les assurances de ma haute considération.



Ibrahima BOYE

001132

Diary
circ
div
File

MEMORANDUM

GAP

Bureau working group

GAP memorandum of July 25

Bilateral Aid Eligibility Review -
Political Criteria

20-1-2-3	

CONFIDENTIAL

July 31, 1978

We discussed the aid eligibility list with EBD to clarify some points and were given the following information:

GAP

GAM

GAA

- (a) EBD reviewed returns from all bureaux and concluded that overall, some bureaux had rated high, others low. EBD made an adjustment and as a result GAP's returns were cut by 10 points on average. (EBD had asked us to divide our results by 20 but later abandoned that idea. You will see our original scores on the attached bureau list.)

- (b) The co-chairmen of the main working group (Messrs. Harris and Jenkins) have decided on the following breakdown of percentages for aid eligibility:

Need	- 40% (CIDA and Finance returns)
Performance	- 20% (" " " ")
Political	- 25% (External Affairs returns)
Commercial	- 15% (ITAC returns)

Furthermore, all countries with a per capita income of \$1,200 or more are to be excluded from the list and also some countries for political reasons - Equatorial Guinea, Iraq, Uganda, Chile, Cuba and Libya.

- (c) There will be approximately 88 countries on the list (including Congo and Rwanda, which were inadvertently left off). They will be point scored in descending order from 25 to 0, in groups of three or four.
- (d) If we wish to make adjustments to the scores for any of our countries and can justify them, EBD suggests we do so now, before August 4. GAP wishes to raise the ratings of Burundi, Comores, Chad and CAE, which were severely cut by EBD. GAA wishes to increase Mozambique's score, to ensure its eligibility for aid ^{at least} on a modest scale. Generally speaking, it does not seem worthwhile to change a rating by only one or two score points, especially since most of our countries will score high in the need category.

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

2. With regard to your specific queries, here are our comments:

para 3. India and Egypt. International political importance was weighted slightly higher than importance to Canada and in this respect, it seems to us that Egypt at the present time is more important than India. In our reply to EBD, we must ensure that we have the latitude to adjust the ranking of any country as situations change.

para 4. Djibouti and Comores. Both are Francophone but Djibouti has considerable strategic importance in a very unstable area. You will note that on our Bureau list, Comores scored very low and C&P will now make changes. We in External Affairs are, of course, scoring for relative political importance rather than for a country deserving aid. We suspect Comores will score high in CIDA's need category.

para 5. Somalia and Ethiopia. We agree that Ethiopia is more important overall and can make an adjustment if you wish. The difference, however, will be minimal in scoring points.

para 6. Madagascar and Liberia. Liberia gained points for being active regionally and in international fora. Madagascar, like most islands, does not carry much international or regional clout.

Gambia, etc. Gambia scored high for its excellent human rights record and for its support of the West in international and Commonwealth fora. Seychelles has not had time to establish a record (we consider it a weakness of the criteria that newer countries are penalized in this regard - one more reason why we should be able to make adjustments over time) and Lesotho and Swaziland are too much within South Africa's orbit to pursue independent policies.

para 7. Equatorial Guinea is now off the list. We are hoping to establish relations with Sao Tome and have told EBD we intend to insert it in the list when we have the information we are seeking from U.S.A. sources. We also think now is the time to collect data on Namibia, so that we shall be prepared to consider aid when it becomes independent.

3. EBD presented us with the criteria and we prepared our returns within those limitations. On the whole, the results seem to have turned out fairly well. We do not quarrel with EBD having lowered our scores to bring them into line with other bureaux, but in a few cases the reductions were drastic (CAE reduced by 23 points and Chad by 20) and need further adjustment.

C. J. Peterson

Bureau Working Group.

20-18-9

PLACE	DEPARTMENT	ORIG. NO.	DATE	FILE/DOSSIER	SECURITY
LIEU	MINISTÈRE	N° D'ORIG.		20-1-2-3	SÉCURITÉ
OTT	EXTAFF	GAA-445	JUNE 14/78	15	RESTR

FM/DE

TO/A

LUSAKA

INFO

LDN, PRMNY, DSLAM, CPTWN, CIDA/HULL/MID/CAD/NGO

DISTR.

GAP, UNO, FCC, EBD

REF

YOURTEL XP6R 0632JUNE8

SUB/SUJ

REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE BY UANC REP

YOUR PARA 3 ACCURATELY DESCRIBES
SITUATION. WHILE WE WOULD LIKE TO MAINTAIN CORDIAL
RELATIONS WITH UANC, MECHANICS FOR OUR AID
PROGRAMME IN SOUTHERN AFRICA DO NOT ALLOW FOR
DIRECT ASSISTANCE TO SUCH GROUPS. YOU MAY HOWEVER
INFORM HOVE THAT REQUEST WILL BE REFERRED BY
CIDA TO CLEARING HOUSE WHICH CDN NGO'S THEMSELVES
MAINTAIN, IN CASE ANY NGO WISHES TO INVOLVE ITSELF.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

N.ETHERIDGE/AR

GAA

6-4606

SIG

H.H. CARTER

file chron circ diary

GEO/F.M. Filicoul/2-0871/cg

~~20-1-2-3~~
20-1-2-FR

29

N° GEO-547

Le ministère des Affaires extérieures présente ses compliments à l'ambassade de France et a l'honneur de se référer à la rencontre du 15 septembre entre l'Ambassadeur de France et le sous-secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures au cours de laquelle l'Ambassadeur avait évoqué la question des dates de la réunion entre les représentants français et canadiens au sujet de l'aide aux pays francophones d'Afrique.

Le ministère a appris que cette réunion aura lieu à Paris du 6 au 8 octobre 1975 au niveau des fonctionnaires, et que les 15 et 16 octobre Monsieur Gérin-Lajoie, Président de l'Agence canadienne de développement international, sera disponible pour rencontrer Monsieur Abelin, le Ministre de la Coopération, à Paris.

Le ministère des Affaires extérieures profite de cette occasion pour renouveler à l'ambassade de France l'assurance de sa très haute considération.

Ottawa, le 17 septembre 1975.

H. MOLGAT

To: GAA
From:

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

MAY 26 1975

~~ADREAS~~

TO
À
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,
OTTAWA/GAA

SECURITY
Sécurité

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM
De
Canadian High Commission, ACCRA

DATE
May 14, 1975

REFERENCE
Référence

NUMBER
Numéro

179 JPS

SUBJECT
Sujet
Publicity for Canadian Aid to Africa

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	
20-1-2-3	
MISSION	38-1

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

Please find attached herewith a clipping from one of
Accra's main dailies, The Ghanaian Times, which utilizes information
in a recent Canada Weekly to comment favourably on Canadian aid to
Africa.

DONE AT POST

EXTOTT/GAP

CIDAOTT/CAD

J.M. Tinsworth
High Commission

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Subject..... CANADIAN AID TO AFRICA.....

Date..... FRIDAY, MAY 2, 1975..... Publication..... GHANAIAN TIMES.....

CANADIANS AID TO NEW STATES

CANADA has allocated 195 million dollars this year towards bilateral aid programmes in independent African countries including Ghana.

About 85 million dollars out of the figure will take the form of grants and the rest as concessional loans.

The current "Canada Weekly" bulletin released in Accra, yesterday said Canada would provide a further 60 million dollars worth of food aid to Africa during the same period.

In addition, 26 million dollars

had been channelled into Africa through multilateral agencies such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, the African Development Bank and the World Council of Churches.

The "Weekly" mentioned special assistance Canada was rendering to the drought-ridden Sahelian region of West Africa and said the programme provides for disbursements over the next five years of some 230 million dollars.

It said Canada had decided to help the Sahelian states because of the "magnitude of their problems, most of which are directly

related to the severe drought suffered there since 1968".

On apartheid in South Africa, the "Weekly" stated that Canada considers the situation prevailing in the area as "totally unacceptable and an affront to the conscience of the world".

"For a quarter of a century successive Canadian governments have condemned racial injustices and colonialism as they have been practised in Southern Africa", it stressed.

About 1,500 Canadians are presently working on various aid programmes in Africa, the bulletin said—GNA.

DOSSIER JOURNAL DIRECTION

ECD

RESTREINT

Le 25 avril 1975

GAF

Mémoire de GAP du 24 mars

Petits projets d'aide en Afrique

20-1-2-3	
14	

GAP
GAA

Lors de la réunion des Chefs de Mission à Nairobi, nous avons discuté avec les Ambassadeurs ainsi qu'avec les représentants de l'ACDI des intentions de cette dernière quant à l'allocation de fonds pour des petits projets d'aide en Afrique. M. Williams nous a assurés qu'après avoir examiné les nombreux besoins de nos missions dans ce domaine, l'ACDI était prête à constituer une réserve importante qui permettrait d'allouer à chaque Ambassadeur jusqu'à \$50,000. par pays d'accréditation pour des petits projets.

Ceci est une bonne nouvelle d'autant plus que nous avons compris de votre part qu'une telle décision dépendait de la revue de la stratégie d'aide pour les années 1975-1980. Nous serions intéressés cependant à ce que suite soit donnée à ces délibérations. Nous vous saurions gré de vous informer auprès de l'ACDI des points suivants:

- 1) A partir de quand ces nouvelles allocations seront-elles faites?
- 2) Ces montants seront-ils renouvelables au cours de l'exercice financier?
- 3) Une lettre circulaire sera-t-elle émise en temps et lieu pour annoncer aux Chefs de mission cette nouvelle politique?

Nous apprécierions votre réponse dès que vous aurez eu l'occasion de soumettre ces points à l'ACDI.

Direction d'Afrique II

GAA/J.A.Licharson/6-4606/1p

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO
À

GAA Officers

SECURITY
Sécurité

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM
De

GAA(Licharson)

DATE

January 16, 1975

REFERENCE
Référence

NUMBER
Numéro

SUBJECT
Sujet

Canadian Aid, Trade &
People in Africa

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	
20-1-2-3	
MISSION	
14	

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

For your background and reference use, you may be interested

-- in the attached information on Aid, Trade and People in Africa.

GAP

J. A. Licharson

PDF

J. A. Licharson
African Affairs I Division

GAF

ECD

ECL

CSO

CSR

FCC

I Canadian Aid in Africa

A. Bilateral

	<u>1973/74 Program</u>			<u>1974/75 Allocations</u>		
	<u>Disbursements</u>					
	Loan	Grant	Total	Loan	Grant	Total
Africa total	98,210,000	70,940,400	169,151,000	110,680,000	85,100,000	195,780,000
Africa-Anglophone	57,658,000	34,531,900	92,189,900	58,100,000	34,000,000	92,100,000
Africa-Francophone	40,552,600	36,408,500	76,961,100	52,580,000	51,100,000	103,680,000
Tanzania	18,681,000	5,292,000	23,973,000	26,000,000	6,100,000	32,100,000
Zambia	1,524,000	1,317,000	2,841,000	4,850,000	5,119,000	9,969,000
Malawi	271,600	169,000	440,600	5,448,000	286,000	5,734,000
Botswana	9,600,000	9,863,000	19,463,000	5,135,000	3,007,000	8,142,000
Lesotho	N11	237,000	237,000	500,000	1,992,000	2,492,000
Swaziland	N11	365,100	365,100	350,000	1,141,000	1,491,000
UBLS	N11	587,000	587,000	N11	720,000	720,000
Special Program of Scholarships for Namibia	N11	25,000	25,000	N11	25,000	25,000
EAC	3,850,000	1,862,200	5,712,200	8,000,000	1,000,000	9,000,000
Nigeria	5,591,500	6,391,700	11,983,200	9,100,000	7,200,000	16,300,000
Ghana	1,501,000	4,136,000	5,637,000	3,500,000	4,410,000	7,910,000
Ethiopia	N11	1,510,000	1,510,000	N11	10,352,000*	10,352,000

* 9 million in emergency assistance

..... 2

- 2 -

B. Multilateral

1972-1973

\$29,107,000

1973-1974

\$24,767,000

to: World Food Program
UNDP
UNICEF
World Bank \$800,000 for River Blindness Project
African
Development Bank 73/74, carried over to 1974/75, a
\$5 million tied loan, plus \$700,000 in
technical assistance grant
UN Trust Fund for S.A. \$10,000 (74/75)
UNETPSA \$175,000 (74/75)
IUEF \$100,000 (74/75)
Commonwealth Scholar-
ship Program for
Rhodesia \$75,000 (74/75)
UNHCR
African
Development Fund \$5.5 million (73/74); \$5.5 million
(74/75); \$4.0 million (75/76)
CFTC
(Not inclusive list)

C. Food Aid

	<u>1973-74</u>	<u>1974-75</u>
Anglophone Africa	4,000,000	5,340,000
Francophone Africa	13,800,000	20,000,000

D. Non-Governmental Organizations

	<u>1973-74</u>	<u>1974-75</u>
Francophone Africa	1,605,470	1,900,000
Anglophone Africa	1,244,385	1,750,000

Plus approximately \$4 million for support of CUSO,
SUCO and CESO programs.

..... 3

001142

- 3 -

E. Expanded Humanitarian Assistance in Southern Africa

1974-75 \$302,000 added to N.G.O. Budget

Following projects approved:

1. CCC/NCC educational, medical and agricultural equipment for Frelimo and MPLA (\$100,000)
2. CCODP/SWAPO educational and health centre in Lusaka (\$12,000)
3. AMI/MPLA medical equipt (\$25,000)
4. Salvation Army Health Centre, Chiweshe Reserve, Rhodesia (\$50,000)
5. CCODP/Black Peoples Convention - Adult Literacy in South Africa (\$13,000)
6. CCODP/ZAPU Poultry Farm in Lusaka (\$3,400)

II Canadian Trade with Africa

Imports

1972-73	234,600,000
1973-74	312,200,000
1974 Jan-June	236,710,000

Exports

1972-73	176,102,000
1973-74	176,576,000
1974 Jan-Sept	244,396,000

..... 4

001143

- 4 -

III Canadians in Africa 8,780

Anglophone Africa 5,516

Botswana 80
Ethiopia 271
Gambia 4
Ghana 244
Kenya 851
Liberia 45
Malawi 227
Mauritius 18
Nigeria 1112
Rhodesia 192
Sierra Leone 80
South Africa 981
S.W. Africa 4
Swaziland 64
Tanzania 471
Uganda 148
Zambia 724

Francophone Africa 3,218

Algeria 476	Ivory Coast 195
Burundi 47	Madagascar 170
Cameroun 504	Mali 73
Cent. Afr. Rep. 31	Mauritania 13
Chad 81	Morocco 320
Congo 36	Ruanda 141
Dahomey 73	Senegal 292
Fr. Somali 7	Togo 22
Gabon 58	Tunisia 160
Guinea 216	Upper Volta 38
	Zaire 265

Portuguese Africa 46

Angola 35
Mozambique 9
Guinea Bissau 2

Ott. / Sweden



AMBASSADE DE SUISSE
AU CANADA

Réf.: 101.0 - LA/dl

classer SVP

CB

U

5, avenue Marlborough

OTTAWA, Ontario, le 3 décembre 1974

K1N 8E6

20-1-2-3	
29	52

Monsieur
Yvon BEAULNE
Directeur général
Bureau des Affaires d'Afrique
et du Moyen-Orient
Ministère des Affaires extérieures

O t t a w a , Ontario

Monsieur le Directeur général,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre lettre
du 27 novembre 1974 et de ses annexes au sujet de l'aide
que le Canada fournit à l'Afrique australe.

Je tiens à vous remercier de la documentation que
vous avez ainsi mise à ma disposition et dont j'ai pris
connaissance avec un vif intérêt. Comme convenu, j'en
adresse copie à M. l'Ambassadeur R. Keller.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Directeur général,
l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.

L'Ambassadeur de Suisse :

E. Bernath

(E. Bernath)

CONFIDENTIAL

FILE

CIRC

DIARY

OTTAWA, October 28, 1974

20-1-2-3		
37	—	

Dear Ron,

Re: Administrative Requirements for Canada's
Sahel Programme

cc 20-1-2-2-AFR
38-11-AFR

You will recall that on September 11 the Under Secretary wrote to Mr. Osbaldeston seeking his approval for a Memorandum to our Minister in which it was proposed to open three-man "embassy bureaux" in Ouagadougou and Bamako to assist in the administration of Canada's \$230 million aid program in the Sahel area.

Following Treasury Board's comments, the financial aspects of the proposal, which called for an additional 4 man-years and \$200,000 to put the program into operation during the 1974/75 fiscal year, were reassessed. It was subsequently decided that External Affairs and CIDA would divide the costs involved with each department providing 2 man-years and \$100,000 from existing resources. The two CIDA man-years will be transferred to External Affairs while External will be able to obtain its two man-years by a reallocation of resources within the Bureau of African and Middle Eastern Affairs.

The above revisions were incorporated into the Memorandum to the Minister, which is attached for your information. Mr. MacEachan agreed to the Memorandum on October 24.

While no additional resources are being requested from Treasury Board, there is still the question of "program approval." It would be appreciated if you could confirm that this is not required in this instance.

Yours sincerely,

Gary J. Smith
Central Staff

Gary J. Smith
Central Staff (PCSI)

Mr. R.S. MacLean
Director, Defence, External
and Cultural Affairs Division
Program Branch
Treasury Board Secretariat
Place Bell Canada
160 Elgin Street
Ottawa K1A 0R5

DOSSIER JOURNAL DIRECTION

GAF/G. CHARPENTIER, 2-9588/RP

PDM (M. Lyman)

RESTREINT

GAP

Le 24 mars 1975

Notre mémoire du 20 mars

Présence du Sous-ministère au Comité
sur les Affaires extérieures

20-1-2-3	
14	

Suite à votre réponse à notre mémoire du 20 mars
suggérant des additions au cahier du Sous-ministre pour
son apparition devant le Comité sur les Affaires extérieures
et la Défense nationale, vous trouverez ci-attachés les
textes dont le Sous-ministre pourrait se servir.

2. GAA vous fera parvenir directement les notes sur
l'Angola et le Mozambique qui sont leur responsabilité.

Bureau des Affaires d'Afrique
et du Moyen-Orient

Yvon Beaulac

Item g) Programme canadien au Sahel

Par décision du Cabinet au printemps 1974, l'ACDI va consacrer 230 millions de dollars au cours des cinq prochaines années pour la lutte contre la sécheresse dans les six pays du Sahel, soit le Sénégal, la Mauritanie, le Mali, la Haute-Volta, le Niger et le Tchad. Ces sommes seront réparties entre la fourniture d'aide alimentaire et des projets à court et à long termes.

Par ailleurs, avec l'appui du Ministre, l'ACDI a décidé de concentrer son aide sur trois pays du Sahel, soit le Mali, la Haute-Volta et le Niger sans pourtant exclure la possibilité de financer des projets valables dans les autres pays.

Cette somme constitue un des apports les plus importants des pays donateurs à cette région déshéritée. Afin d'activer et d'administrer ce programme d'aide, le Ministère a fait ouvrir deux bureaux d'Ambassade, un à Ouagadougou et l'autre à Bamako, et renforcer celui déjà existant à Niamey. Ces postes fonctionnent déjà depuis le mois d'octobre sous le contrôle de notre Ambassade à Abidjan. Le personnel de notre Ambassade à Abidjan a également été renforcé afin de lui permettre de s'acquitter de ce contrôle au cours des prochaines années.

DOSSIER JOURNAL DIRECTION GAF/G. CHARPENTIER, 2-9588/RF

9, item d) Exportation d'avions Buffalo au Maroc et à la Tunisie

Par décision du Cabinet de la mi-février, le Ministère a décidé d'altérer sa politique d'exportation d'armes dans les pays engagés dans le conflit au Moyen-Orient. Il a ainsi autorisé la compagnie De Havilland à négocier la vente d'avions Buffalo au Maroc à la condition expresse que ces avions ne servent pas à des fins militaires et en dehors du territoire marocain. Cette condition a été acceptée oralement par les Marocains qui doivent la confirmer au niveau gouvernemental à Rabat.

Depuis lors, la Tunisie a fait la même requête et un mémoire sera soumis au Ministre cette semaine pour lui recommander que les mêmes conditions s'appliquent à la Tunisie. Ces ventes d'avions sont destinées à encourager les ventes de l'industrie aéronautique canadienne à des pays qui n'ont pas été fortement impliqués dans le conflit au Moyen-Orient et qui de toute façon sont prêts à nous donner des garanties fermes que cet équipement ne servira pas dans un éventuel conflit dans cette région.

Le Ministre souhaiterait sans doute que cette question soit abordée devant le Comité afin d'éviter de paraître garder sous le chapeau cette modification à notre politique.

DOSSIER JOURNAL DIRECTION GAF/G. CHARPENTIER, 2-9588/RF

Item f) Maroc et Tunisie: Mission Charland

Le Sous-ministre adjoint de l'Industrie et du Commerce, M. Claude Charland, se propose de diriger une délégation d'hommes d'affaires canadiens du 16 au 23 avril au Maroc et en Tunisie pour explorer le marché qui s'offre aux exportations canadiennes. L'Algérie ne sera pas incluse dans son itinéraire car le marché là a été bien exploré et qu'une série d'hommes d'affaires a déjà été envoyée. Notre commerce avec l'Algérie excède 100 millions de dollars par année et même s'il va croissant, il suffira d'y envoyer des missions spécialisées plutôt que des missions exploratoires. Quant au Maroc et à la Tunisie, ces deux pays nous ont indiqué leur intérêt de prolonger notre programme de coopération pour stimuler les échanges commerciaux et les investissements. M. Charland et ses collaborateurs s'efforceront donc d'examiner les possibilités du Canada. Le Maroc et la Tunisie se sont dits heureux de recevoir cette mission dont la composition sera connue durant la première semaine d'avril.

DOSSIER JOURNAL DIRECTION

GAF/G. CHARPENTIER, 2-9588/RF

ECD

RESTREINT

GAP

Le 24 mars 1975

Les mémoires de GAP du 10 décembre et
de GAP du 13 mars

Petits projets d'aide en Afrique

20-1-2-3	
14	

GAA

A deux reprises, notre direction de l'Afrique francophone vous a fortement recommandé de négocier avec l'ACDI l'augmentation des allocations de nos Ambassadeurs pour les petits projets dans leur territoire. Nous n'avons pas eu de nouvelle de vous sur cette question mais nous serions prêts, si cela vous présente des difficultés, à aborder directement cette affaire avec Pierre Sicard de l'ACDI. En effet, il serait éminemment utile que nous soyons prêts, à la conférence de Nairobi, de discuter des besoins de chacun et des sommes dont disposerait l'ACDI pour le prochain exercice financier.

2. Vous avez remarqué que M. Mathieu a proposé une somme de \$54,250. pour un petit projet au Niger. Ceci dépasse les sommes que nous avons envisagées mais il semble que le projet décrit dans le télégramme 354 du 17 mars d'Abidjan mérite le soutien de l'ACDI. Pourriez-vous leur exprimer ce soutien quand vous aborderez cette question avec l'ACDI, ce qui j'espère aura lieu.

3. Il ne s'agit pas de nous communiquer les recommandations de la revue de la stratégie auxquelles, si je comprends bien, vous n'êtes pas parvenus. Il s'agit de dialoguer avec nos Ambassadeur à Nairobi pour savoir quels sont leurs besoins pour les petits projets et quelles possibilités d'administration possèdent-ils. Une dernière question, devrions-nous dépenser la plus grande partie de nos fonds dans les pays de non-concentration ou plutôt ceux de concentration. Ceci est une question qui intéresse beaucoup nos Ambassadeurs.

4. Une réponse serait appréciée d'ici le 1er avril afin de l'ajouter à nos notes pour la conférence.

Bureau des Affaires d'Afrique
et du Moyen-Orient

ECD (M. R. McKinnon)

SANS COTE

GAP

Le 2 janvier 1975

Notre mémoire du 10 décembre 1974

Petits projets pour nos pays en Afrique

38-1-CIDA/ALHOC

14

20-1-2-3

GAA
AFP
(M. Cherkasky)

Le mémoire précité propose que les chefs de mission canadiens en Afrique aient à leur disposition des fonds plus considérables à l'égard de petits projets. Nous venons de recevoir un télégramme de l'Ambassade du Canada en Côte d'Ivoire recommandant à l'ACDI de fixer une somme de \$50,000 par année pour ces petits projets dans le territoire desservi à partir d'Abidjan. Je crois comprendre que cette requête ne pose pas de difficultés. M. Cherkasky, qui a visité la région et connaît les problèmes soulevés par les petits projets, a discuté cette question avec M. O'Toole. Au point de vue de l'efficacité et de l'économie, la délégation d'une telle autorité aux Chefs de Mission dans les pays recipiendaires d'aide canadienne en Afrique paraît amplement justifiée.

2. Pour l'Afrique anglophone, le même problème se pose et GAA a encore eu récemment l'occasion de recommander dans un mémoire du 30 octobre que les fonds soient normalement augmentés à \$10,000 par année par pays de responsabilité.

3. Les deux directions africaines sont désireuses de parvenir à une décision sur ce sujet avant la prochaine réunion des chefs de mission à Nairobi au début d'avril 1975. Il se peut que dans certains cas, (par exemple des missions-clés comme celles d'Abidjan, de Lagos et d'Addis-Ababa) les chefs de mission aient besoin de sommes plus considérables. Il conviendrait peut-être d'établir un chiffre moyen, qui soit le même pour toutes les missions, quitte à verser un supplément lorsqu'il le faut. C'est à vous de juger ce qui est préférable dans les circonstances.

4. J'attacherais beaucoup de prix à ce que vous examiniez, de concert avec vos collègues de l'ACDI, l'opportunité d'une telle augmentation. Je ne crois pas qu'une décision sur les petits projets doive être retardée jusqu'à l'approbation de la nouvelle stratégie d'aide.

Yvon Beaulne

Yvon Beaulne

PROGRAMME D'AIDE CANADIENNE

Coordination avec programme français, surtout en Afrique

③ a

SUJETS DE DISCUSSION

20-1-2-3

29

Dès les premières années, la France a démontré un vif intérêt à l'égard de l'action canadienne en Afrique francophone. Déjà en 1964, lors des conversations Pearson-de-Gaulle à Paris, cette question a été discutée et traitée de la façon suivante dans le communiqué conjoint émis à la suite de la visite de M. Pearson:

"Etant donné le rôle important que joue traditionnellement la France dans ces domaines (aide à l'Afrique), et compte tenu des récents développements du programme canadien d'assistance aux pays africains d'expression française, les deux gouvernements sont convenus de l'utilité de coordonner leur politique à cet égard."

Le Premier Ministre pourrait proposer que le mécanisme actuel de consultation entre le Canada et la France soit renforcé. Les programmes canadiens en Afrique (les dépenses prévues pour 74-75 sont de \$100 millions) seront à caractère principalement bilatéral mais le Canada entend également oeuvrer sur le plan multilatéral des institutions régionales existantes. Nous sommes conscients du fait qu'une action de cette envergure dans une région qui intéresse particulièrement le gouvernement français ne peut laisser ce dernier indifférent. C'est pourquoi des consultations suivies entre la France et le Canada ont été amorcées dès le début du programme canadien d'aide au développement en Afrique francophone.

Le mécanisme de consultation qui pourrait être mis au point comprendrait les éléments suivants:

- (i) Rencontre annuelle de hauts-fonctionnaires pour discuter des politiques d'aide au développement poursuivies par les deux gouvernements dans cette région et pour échanger des vues sur certains aspects de leurs politiques économiques ayant des incidences sur le développement des pays concernés;
- (ii) Contacts fréquents entre les fonctionnaires responsables de la programmation et de la mise en oeuvre des politiques d'aide au développement des deux pays en Afrique francophone;
- (iii) Contacts fréquents, sur le terrain, entre les missions diplomatiques des deux pays;

Il devrait être clairement entendu dès le départ que le but visé par ces consultations n'est pas de subordonner le programme d'aide au développement d'un des deux pays à celui de l'autre, ni de remettre en cause l'objectif primordial de ces programmes qui est le développement économique et social des pays concernés.

-2-

Ces consultations auraient donc pour objectifs principaux:

- (i) De s'informer mutuellement des politiques d'aide des deux pays dans cette région pour en "maximiser" l'impact au point de vue du développement économique et social des pays concernés;
- (ii) De s'assurer que dans la poursuite de leur action respective dans cette région, il sera tenu le plus grand compte non seulement des intérêts particuliers de chacun mais aussi des objectifs poursuivis par le Canada et la France dans cette région, plus particulièrement en ce qui a trait à ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler l'avenir de la francophonie;
- (iii) De minimiser autant que possible les conflits d'intérêts que l'action de l'un ou de l'autre pays est susceptible de susciter, et d'éviter qu'elle ait des répercussions néfastes sur les bonnes relations entre les deux pays;
- (iv) De fournir l'occasion d'un échange de vues sur les politiques économiques des deux pays susceptibles d'avoir des incidences sur le développement des pays de la région.

Ce nouveau processus de consultations pourrait être engagé lors d'une visite au Canada de M. Abelin, le Ministre français de la Coopération, à qui le Premier Ministre voudra peut-être adresser une invitation en ce sens.

DOSSIER DIRECTION/JOURNAL

Gaf/G. Grondin/6-2932/sb

① JEANNERET (CHARLES)

② WILSON (A.W.)

③ C.I.D.A. Canadian international
development agency

③ CONFIDENTIEL

20-1-2-3

14
Ottawa, K1A 0A2

Le 28 août 1974

Cher monsieur Wilson,

Vous vous souviendrez des entretiens que nous avons eus récemment au sujet de l'étude que nous nous proposons de mettre en oeuvre, en collaboration avec l'ACDI et le CRDI, sur l'évolution de nos relations, et des relations du monde développé en général, avec le Tiers-monde. Vous trouverez, ci-joint, une version révisée de ce plan.

Monsieur Pearson m'avait demandé, il y a quelques semaines, en prévision des entretiens que nous devions avoir ultérieurement avec vous et parce que j'allais bientôt être affecté à une autre Direction du Ministère, de mettre sur papier les idées qui pourraient entrer dans le cadre du plan de travail ci-dessus mentionné. Il m'avait prié de tenter de faire de cet exercice une sorte de "Valedictory statement" résumant mon expérience du Tiers-monde et mettant en avant les actions qui pourraient être menées dans le Tiers-monde, compte tenu des revendications de celui-ci, du contexte politique actuel ou prévisible et des facteurs économiques pertinents (possibilités des économies de l'Occident, stabilité et croissance économiques, etc...). Je prends sur moi de vous faire parvenir cette sorte d'essai à titre tout-à-fait personnel. Il pourrait, peut-être, s'avérer utile, dans le cadre des études de prospective que vous avez mises en train.

Veuillez noter que je me trouve maintenant à la Direction de l'Afrique francophone, mon numéro de téléphone étant 6-2932.

.../2

M. D. W. Wilson, Directeur,
Direction de l'Analyse des Programmes,
Agence canadienne de développement
international,
122 rue Bank,
OTTAWA, Ont. K1A 0G4

-2-

Veuillez recevoir, Cher Monsieur Wilson,
l'expression de mes meilleurs sentiments.

GILLES GRONDIN

Gilles Grondin

JOURNAL/DOSSIER/DIRECTION

GAF/G. Grondin/6-2932/sb

CONFIDENTIEL

20-1-2-3

Ottawa, K1A 0A2
Le 28 août, 1974

Cher monsieur Jeanmeret,

Vous vous souviendrez des entretiens que nous avons eus récemment au sujet de l'étude que nous nous proposons de mettre en oeuvre, en collaboration avec l'ACDI et le CRDI, sur l'évolution de nos relations, et des relations du monde développé en général, avec le Tiers-monde. Notre plan de travail avait été révisé suite à nos discussions : vous trouverez, ci-joint, une version révisée de ce plan.

Monsieur Pearson m'avait demandé, il y a quelques semaines, en prévision des entretiens que nous devons avoir ultérieurement avec vous et parce que j'allais bientôt être affecté à une autre Direction du Ministère, de mettre sur papier les idées qui pourraient entrer dans le cadre du plan de travail ci-dessus mentionné. Il m'avait prié de tenter de faire de cet exercice une sorte de " Valedictory statement " résumant mon expérience du Tiers-monde et mettant en avant les actions qui pourraient être menées dans le Tiers-monde, compte tenu des revendications de celui-ci, du contexte politique actuel ou prévisible et des facteurs économiques pertinents (possibilités des économies de l'Occident, stabilité et croissance économiques, etc..). Je prends sur moi de vous faire parvenir cette sorte d'essai à titre tout-à-fait personnel. Il pourrait, peut-être, s'avérer utile, dans le cadre des études de prospective que vous avez mises en train.

.../2

M. Charles Jeanmeret,
Adjoint spécial,
Direction de l'Analyse des programmes,
Agence canadienne de développement
international,
122 rue Bank,
OTTAWA, Ont. K1A 0G4

-2-

Veuillez noter que je me trouve maintenant à la
Direction de l'Afrique francophone, mon numéro de téléphone étant
6-2932.

Veuillez recevoir, Cher Monsieur Jeanneret,
l'expression de mes sentiments les meilleurs.

GILLES GRONDIN

Gilles Grondin

DOSSIER/JOURNAL/DIRECTION

GAF/G. Grondin/6-2932/sb

CONFIDENTIEL

20-1-2-3

14

Ottawa, le 28 août 1974

Cher monsieur Gérin,

... Monsieur G. Pearson m'a demandé, suite à son entretien de la semaine dernière avec vous, de vous faire parvenir un exemplaire du plan de l'étude que nous nous proposons de mettre en oeuvre, en collaboration avec votre organisme et le CRDI, sur l'évolution de nos relations, et des relations du monde développé en général, avec le Tiers-monde. Vous trouverez ce plan en annexe.

Veillez recevoir, Cher Monsieur, Gérin, l'expression de nos sentiments les meilleurs.

GILLES GRONDIN

Gilles Grondin

Monsieur Jacques Gérin,
Vice-président,
Programmes bilatéraux,
Agence canadienne de
développement international,
122 rue Bank,
OTTAWA, K1A 0G4

GAF/L.P.Tardif/6-2932/sb

JOURNAL/DOSSIER/DIRECTION

ECD

GAF

20 - 1 - 2 - 3	

CONFIDENTIEL

le 15 juillet 1974

Relations Canada-Afrique:
Réunions périodiques de consultation.

PDE

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GAP

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FAC

Depuis quelque temps, on s'interroge dans cette Direction sur les meilleurs moyens à prendre pour intensifier nos relations avec les pays d'Afrique Francophone. On peut constater, par exemple, que ces relations ont maintenant atteint, dans certains domaines, une envergure assez importante.

- d'importants crédits ont été accordés au Zaïre pour l'achat d'avions Buffalo et d'équipements pour faisceaux hertziens;
- des lignes de crédit ont été consenties à la Tunisie, au Maroc et surtout à l'Algérie mais n'ont pu être utilisées que très lentement;
- nos programmes d'aide ont été augmentés dans plusieurs de ces pays et, malgré les faiblesses qu'on peut y découvrir, l'ACDI en est venue à mettre sur pied des mécanismes de consultation avec certains de ces pays (Algérie, Maroc, Zaïre, Côte d'Ivoire) qui auront comme résultat d'accorder une grande importance à nos programmes d'aide par rapport aux autres aspects de nos relations.

2 A notre avis, une façon d'intensifier nos relations avec ces pays serait de les envisager de façon plus globale tout en essayant de les diversifier. Dans le cas des pays que nous avons mentionnés ci-dessus, le secteur qui semble le plus prometteur pour une diversification accrue de nos relations serait le commerce. (Sauf la Tunisie et la Côte d'Ivoire, aucun de ces pays ne s'intéresse à la francophonie, mais des échanges culturels pourraient s'établir sur une base plus systématique). En effet, trois de ces pays, (Algérie, Maroc, Zaïre) ont vu récemment, leurs revenus s'accroître de façon appréciable avec l'augmentation du prix des matières premières. Pour ce faire,

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il faudrait naturellement, que nos collègues du ministère de l'Industrie et du Commerce et leurs agents du service étranger, attachent plus d'importance aux diverses possibilités de commerce qu'offrent certains pays d'Afrique francophone.

3. Une autre façon d'y arriver serait d'élargir les consultations bilatérales déjà inaugurées par l'ACDI pour les étendre aux autres champs d'intérêt réciproque. C'est ce que nous faisons déjà avec la Tunisie à l'intérieur de la Commission Mixte Canada-Tunisie. Cette formule s'est cependant avérée un peu lourde puisque dès le départ, on a pris l'habitude de les tenir au niveau ministériel (les deux dernières réunions se sont, cependant, tenues au niveau des fonctionnaires) et d'y faire participer la plupart des ministères et organismes fédéraux qui, d'une façon quelconque, s'intéressent aux relations bilatérales entre les deux pays. On pourrait toutefois envisager une formule semblable, mais plus souple, d'échanges avec les principaux pays où nous avons à la fois des programmes d'aide importants et des possibilités d'accroître les échanges commerciaux. Cette formule pourrait consister en des réunions annuelles ou périodiques auxquelles participeraient l'ACDI, le ministère de l'Industrie et du Commerce, nous mêmes et la SEE. Dès le départ, on pourrait s'assurer que ces réunions soient présidées par notre ambassadeur accrédité auprès du pays en question lorsque les réunions auraient lieu à l'étranger et par le sous-secrétaire d'Etat adjoint aux Affaires extérieures, chargé des affaires africaines ou affaires économiques, (selon la disponibilité de l'un ou de l'autre) lorsqu'elles se tiendraient à Ottawa.

4. On ne saurait évidemment mettre sur pied des formules de ce genre avec tous les pays où nous avons des programmes d'aide. Il faudrait d'abord procéder par étapes en établissant des priorités. Ce mécanisme de consultation existe déjà avec la Tunisie; nous suggérerions de l'élargir d'abord à l'Algérie et au Maroc. Si l'expérience s'avérait heureuse, on pourrait peut-être ensuite la poursuivre graduellement avec le Zaïre, la Côte d'Ivoire et le Sénégal.

5. Comme dans certains cas, l'ACDI elle-même a déjà mis sur pied ses propres mécanismes de consultation, un des problèmes majeurs auxquels nous aurions à faire face pour mettre à exécution notre proposition, serait d'amener nos

.../3

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collègues de l'ACDI à étendre le champ de consultation pour le situer dans un cadre plus vaste. A notre avis, cette opération pourrait être montée en quatre étapes:

1. il faudrait bien mettre à jour les renseignements pertinents au sujet des lignes de crédit et de leur utilisation, des programmes d'aide, du matériel fourni et des courants d'échanges entre le Canada et un pays donné afin de déterminer s'il y a avantage à mettre sur pied le forum de consultation suggéré;
 2. décider du choix des pays auxquels pourraient être étendues ces consultations;
 3. entamer, s'il y a lieu, des discussions sur ce sujet avec l'ACDI;
 4. entamer, également, des discussions avec les ambassades des pays concernés à Ottawa.
6. Nous croyons que cette suggestion a du mérite et nous proposons que ses chances de succès soient étudiées sérieusement. Il est cependant possible que pour des raisons qui nous échappent, il ne soit pas possible d'y donner suite pour l'instant ou dans un avenir prévisible. On pourrait alors peut-être suggérer d'abord qu'un représentant du ministère assiste aux réunions organisées périodiquement par l'ACDI pour faire le point sur les programmes qu'elle exécute dans certains pays. L'élargissement des réunions pourrait venir ensuite.
7. Nous aimerions connaître vos commentaires sur cette question.

GEORGES CHARPENTIER

Direction des Affaires
d'Afrique II.



CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY
AGENCE CANADIENNE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT INTERNATIONAL

OTTAWA 4

CONFIDENTIAL

June 26, 1969

Mr. Harman

Mr. Farn

Mr. Livingston

ACME Div

to note

2 file

ok.

Mr. L.A.H. Smith,
Head, Aid and Development Division,
Department of External Affairs,
334 Langevin Block,
Ottawa 4, Ontario.

Dear Mr. Smith:

Re: Commonwealth Training Programme
for Rhodesian Africans

20-1-2-3	
2	11

In reply to your letter of June 17th, we are in general agreement with your statement that the program for Rhodesian Africans should not be finalized until the results from the Commonwealth Secretariat's survey on this question have been summarized. In the meantime, however, we were obliged to advise the Secretary General of our general views by the end of May on our intentions for the coming year. Consequently, we sent a cable # TR 125 dated June 2, 1969, copy attached, stating that for 1969-70 we were prepared to offer as a maximum only five new awards and that we would confirm this later. We regret that we did not forward you a copy of this cable sooner but trust you agree with its contents in principle.

Yours sincerely,

W.A. Monaghan

W.A. Monaghan,
Acting Director,
Training Division.

Attach.

2/5/69

11-2D

CONFID.

CIDA OTT

DOMCAN LONDON

TR 125

IMMEDIATE

ARNOLD SMITH'S LETTER 24/69 APR 22/69

RHODESIAN AFRICANS - COMMONWEALTH EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE

RE-MEMORANDUM CONCERNING PROVISION OF EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING

OPPORTUNITIES FOR RHODESIAN AFRICANS:

(A) FISCAL YEAR 1968/69 -- 30 AWARDS AVAILABLE. AS OF MARCH 31/69 25 PLACES WERE ACTUALLY FILLED.

(B) FISCAL YEAR 1969/70 -- AVAILABLE FUNDS \$150,000 -- APPROXIMATELY \$97,000 COMMITTED TO CONTINUED SUPPORT OF STUDENTS PRESENTLY ON PROGRAM. 11 STUDENTS WILL TERMINATE PROGRAMS BY AUGUST 1969 OR EARLIER. 14 WILL CONTINUE THROUGH 1969/70 FISCAL YEAR. FIELDS AND LEVELS OF 14 AS FOLLOWS: ENGINEERING TECHNOLOGY - DIPLOMA; ENGINEERING MECHANICS - B.SC.; HISTORY M.A.; MEDICINE - M.D.; SOCIAL WELFARE - M.A.; 2 ARTS - B.A.; 2 POLITICAL SCIENCE - M.A.; 2 ECONOMICS - M.A.; 3 POLITICAL SCIENCE - Ph.D.

(C) NEW AWARDS AVAILABLE 1969/70 -- AS INDICATED ABOVE \$97,000 ALREADY COMMITTED TO SUPPORTING STUDENTS PRESENTLY STUDYING IN CANADA -- IN ADDITION, FUNDS MUST BE RESERVED FOR SUPPORT OF STUDENTS WHO ARE UNABLE SECURE EMPLOYMENT FOLLOWING PROGRAM TERMINATION. REMAINING FUNDS WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO OFFER 5 NEW AWARDS 1969/70. WE INTEND GIVE PRIORITY TO APPLICATIONS PRESENTLY ON

.../2

HAND FROM COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT. WILL ADVISE.

(1) SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF ENTRY --- IN ACCORDANCE WITH UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 253 (1968), CANADA NOW CONSIDERS RHODESIAN PASSPORTS INVALID. IN CASE OF SPECIAL PROGRAM STUDENTS IMMIGRATION WILL REQUEST ORDER IN COUNCIL WAIVER OF REGULATION 27(1). FOR STUDENTS PRESENTLY IN CANADA, IMMIGRATION HAS REQUESTED 2 MONTHS TIME TO OBTAIN WAIVER.

(2) CANADIAN CONTRIBUTION TO PROGRAM IN FISCAL YEARS 1970/71 1971/72 -- POLICY WILL REFLECT AFRICAN COUNTRIES' WILLINGNESS AS SHOWN IN THEIR REPLIES TO SECRETARY GENERAL'S LET BOTH TO PROVIDE EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND TO AGREE TO THIRD COUNTRY TRAINING AS OUTLINED IN SEC GEN'S LET FOR THESE RHODESIAN ^{whicous} REFUGEES.

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
W.A. MONAGHAN
ORIGINAL SIGNÉ PAR

A. MONAGHAN/C.POTTER/EM/L

TRAINING DIVISION

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY
W.A. MONAGHAN
ORIGINAL SIGNÉ PAR

6-2310

PRESIDENT.



ACTION REQUEST FICHE DE SERVICE

FILE NO. — DOSSIER N°

TO — À **Africa & M.E. Div.**

DATE **June 9, 1969**

LOCATION — ENDROIT

FROM — DE **O/SSEA/ASMcGill/fl**

☐ ACTION
DONNER SUITE

☐ APPROVAL
APPROBATION

☐ COMMENTS
COMMENTAIRES

☐ DRAFT REPLY
PROJET DE RÉPONSE

☐ MAKE
FAIRE.....COPIES

☐ NOTE AND FILE
NOTER ET CLASSER

☐ NOTE & RETURN/OR FORWARD
NOTER ET RETOURNER/OU FAIRE SUIVRE

☐ P. A. ON FILE
CLASSER

☐ REPLY
RÉPONSE

☐ SEE ME
ME VOIR

☐ SIGNATURE

☐ TRANSLATION
TRADUCTION

☐ YOUR REQUEST
À VOTRE DEMANDE

☐

001166



OFFICE OF
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Mr. Riddell
Mr. Mitchell
Mr. [unclear]
THE MINISTER
UNCLASSIFIED *file*

OTTAWA, March 25, 1969.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING PRIME MINISTER

20-1-2-3	
2	—

Question in the House - Canadian Aid to
French-speaking Africa.

...

I am attaching a proposed answer to a suppositious question which might be raised in the House in relation to an article appearing on Page 8 of today's Globe and Mail.

[Signature]
M.C.

25.3.30(U.S.)

Page 2
ED
March 25

March 25, 1969.

ANTICIPATED QUESTION
HOUSE OF COMMONS

Aid to French-speaking Africa.

QUESTION:

A statement is attributed to a Quebec official in today's Globe and Mail to the effect that in two or three years Quebec hopes to take over all programmes of foreign aid to French-speaking African countries and to finance these programmes. Is the Canadian Government aware of such intentions and have they been the subject of discussion with Quebec?

ANSWER:

Mr. Speaker, I am not aware of any intention by the Quebec Government to take over and finance the substantial programmes of assistance Canada has undertaken in the Francophone countries of Africa. The Canadian Government welcomes the growing interest in Quebec in these countries and discussions are going on about ways and means of promoting, within an appropriate constitutional framework, the close co-operation we already have with the Province of Quebec in the implementation of Canadian aid programmes.

.... /2

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SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTION:

What is the level of Canadian aid to the French-speaking countries of Africa?

ANSWER:

Mr. Speaker, in 1968-1969 an aid allocation of \$22.5 million was made to the French-speaking countries of Africa. The intention is to continue to increase the level of the Canadian aid programme for these countries.

A & ME DIV/ RnG MITCHELL/ai

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

MEMORANDUM

TO : Aid & Development Division
FROM : African & Middle Eastern Division
REFERENCE : Your Memorandum of July 23.
SUBJECT : Aid Allocation 1969-70

SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL
Sécurité *October 31.*
DATE ~~September 26~~, 1968.
NUMBER
Numéro

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA 20-1-2-3	
MISSION 34 -	

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

... Attached is a general paper on Aid to Africa,
as well as country papers dealing with our aid programmes
to Commonwealth Africa, Ethiopia and Somalia.

G. G. ROY

African & Middle Eastern Division.

A & ME DIV/RMG MITCHELL/lpz

File

CONFIDENTIAL

AID TO AFRICA--GENERAL

Background

The challenge of economic and social development will absorb most of the available energies of the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa in the foreseeable future. The colonial period bequeathed a large number of countries, many of which do not possess the human and natural resources adequate for full independence and which are oriented to supplying the raw material needs of metropolitan areas. With determination, co-operation and the right kind of external assistance these problems of economic and social development can be overcome in most instances. Nonetheless, there must be a continent-wide trend to closer co-operation and in some cases even federation if some countries are not to remain poor and very backward.

2. The current world rate of technological change increases the difficulties facing these countries: the wealth of industrialized nations is increasing disproportionately to the rate of increase in developing countries, leaving an ever widening gap. Evidence of this disparity is available to all, and causes increasing frustration. Great strains are thus placed on a developing country, faced by the needs of competing sectors of the economy and the demand for social services.
3. The atmosphere generated by this situation in Africa is not conducive to stability and peace. As it becomes more apparent that a significantly higher standard of living is eluding African peoples there will be increased chances of violent upheaval and radical change. These changes, born of frustration, could lead to a progressive alienation of Sub-Saharan from the western developed nations who by reason of their great wealth and their earlier association with Africa would be held responsible. This alienation could provide a basis for more activity in Africa by the Communist countries whose exploitation of the situation might work against the peaceful evolution of the continent. This is particularly relevant in those countries adjacent to white-ruled Southern Africa, where the Communists have shown an interest in fomenting discord.
4. A number of specific development sectors have direct relevance to peace and stability. The most important is education. Sub-Saharan Africa has realized that to grow in the 20th Century an essential pre-requisite is an educated population. As a result of determined effort, the literacy rate is climbing and the number of persons with a completed primary education and some secondary schooling is large and increasing rapidly. Unfortunately real

- 2 -

economic development has not matched the rate of increase in educated individuals at this level. Thus while there are still serious shortages at the level of middle and higher education, the supply of semi-skilled, partly educated has increased more rapidly than the employment opportunities. The attractions of urban life have drawn large numbers of persons from rural areas, swelling the ranks of the unemployed and unemployable in the cities. This situation imposes significant strains on a young country; the problem is accentuated by the concentration of administration and government in the capital city, which is generally the focal point for those seeking work or excitement. There is a tendency for the unemployed to blame their plight on the authorities or perhaps on some favoured minority or tribe, and they can become subject to political activists and demagogues.

5. The unequal distribution of even limited amounts of wealth places additional strains on the Sub-Saharan African states. Many of these countries have a relatively sophisticated industrial centre (usually the capital) and a primitive periphery. Wealth is channelled to the centre and little finds its way to the rural areas. Those individuals who have employment seek to protect and increase their gains; this process is assisted by tribal bonds which can lead to nepotism and corruption. This imbalance can lead to instability, which can manifest itself rapidly in urban areas although resentment is slow to grow among rural populations long accustomed to a simple existence. Spreading education will sharpen the edge of discontent should the urban-rural gap in income levels become too large.

6. Leaders of these countries must also struggle to restructure their economies. The almost total dependence on a narrow variety of cash crops at the mercy of world market prices together with a lack of adequate intra-state communication and transport facilities places them in a difficult position. With the current world wide glut of tropical primary products there is no likelihood of short term improvement, although over the next decade international agreements may introduce some element of stability into this situation.

7. In these circumstances, it is not surprising to see African countries seeking world wide assistance to speed their development. The needs are enormous, and help from whatever quarter is welcomed. If there is a risk of bringing larger disputes into Africa, they reluctantly accept the risk, although it is quite clear that Sub-Saharan Africa does not wish to substitute new colonialism for old.

8. It is in this area of economic and social development that Canada can play a significant role in Sub-Saharan Africa. In common with the Nordic countries and some other states, Canada is regarded as being awake to African needs and sensitivities and capable of making useful contributions to economic and social development. African nations wish to limit great power involvement if they can and therefore call on Canada more readily than they will on the United States, the Soviet Union or other big powers, particularly on sensitive requests. This is an advantage to the Western interest in general. Although the massive capital inputs which are necessary must still be sought from the major powers or international institutions, active Canadian participation in development projects can reduce the risk of great power rivalries in these African states.

- 3 -

Canadian Interests

9. While Canada has at present no important direct national interests at stake in Sub-Saharan Africa, its involvement with a number of African problems is developing and certain Canadian domestic interests have been projected to the African stage. The longer term consequences of these trends may yield a more direct Canadian national interest.

10. Canada has initiated and developed a significant aid relationship with many of the newly independent African countries, and thus has an interest in their economic and social development consonant with its commitments and contributions. Moreover, the Canadian attachment to the Commonwealth and to the United Nations, both of which are deeply affected by the problems generated by the black-white confrontation in Africa, leads an interest in assuring that these countries most directly affected receive Canadian support and encouragement. Canada's growing interest in "la francophonie" has been expressed mainly through our programmes of economic assistance to Francophone African states, which are reaching proportions equal to our aid programmes in Commonwealth Africa.

11. The most general and important Canadian interest for this area is in its peaceful development and orderly evolution; this is related to our primary interest in the maintenance of world peace. Canada itself can develop most effectively in a state of peace and stability, and conflict in Africa is not in this nation's interest. This does not imply a Canadian commitment to support the status quo, for it is recognized that rapid and broad economic and social development must be accompanied by significant change in the countries involved. It is in our interest to see that this change is accomplished, to the extent possible, in a peaceful and orderly way.

12. Canada has a modest but growing commercial interest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Our imports from this area, particularly from Commonwealth Africa, have increased rapidly and there is a slow but discernable growth in our exports. As these countries develop, and in proportion to the interest we show in their development, we can expect this market to increase. Our direct investments in black Africa are currently small but can be expected to increase.

13. Although the number of immigrants which we have received from Africa is small in absolute terms it has increased rapidly in the last few years, consisting largely of white administrators or residents who have preferred to leave Africa, and skilled minorities who believe that their future will be better assured in Canada. As these groups will probably continue to leave Africa, it is in a sense a Canadian interest to be able to profit from this situation.

14. In a wider sphere, Canadian interests in the Commonwealth and in La Francophonie have significant African components. There are twelve Commonwealth countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and the majority of independent French-speaking countries are located on that continent. The future development of both associations is likely to be strongly influenced by their African participants and this in turn will have an effect on Canada. In particular, any attempt to institutionalize francophonie and to establish its membership will have a direct bearing on Canada's aspirations as a full member of this community and may exert an important influence on our internal constitutional problems related to provincial aspirations in foreign affairs.

- 4 -

Canadian Objectives

15. From the above we can draw the conclusion that the principal Canadian objectives in Africa are as follows:

(1) to promote the peaceful and orderly evolution of independent African countries;

(2) to influence these countries to recognize Canadian interests and to encourage these governments to act with these interests to some extent in mind.

16. In terms of our programme of aid to Africa these objectives imply the following guidelines:

(a) concentration of our assistance in those countries where we will have developed or acquired interests and where it is evident that our assistance is needed and properly utilized;

(b) encouragement of inter-state and regional co-operation in order to reduce the possibilities of friction arising from the already wide disparities among some African states, and also to promote economic development on a sufficiently large scale (which many of the small countries cannot do) so that the point of self-sustaining growth can be reached;

(c) recognition of the needs of those countries which are faced by particular problems arising from political developments in which Canada has shown, through its actions, a continuing and important interest.

17. We believe that the relationship of our current programmes to Canadian objectives in Africa is generally adequate, but make the following specific suggestions set out in terms of the guidelines.

18. Concentration If, as projected, the overall Canadian aid effort increases to one percent of GNP, we would expect significantly increased allocations to be available for Africa. This will already be the case in Francophone Africa should the recommendations of the Chevrier Mission be fully implemented. If the increases are confined to countries which are already designated as countries of concentration there will be a growing imbalance between those we aid and those we do not (in significant amounts) which will not only cause some resentment among the latter, but be subject to criticism that Canada is helping only those who are already receiving the greater part of aid from all sources.

19. As the aid allocation grows, it seems to us that the concept of aid concentration must be tempered somewhat, if Canadian interests are to be served adequately. In the first instance, we think that aid should, where feasible, lead to co-operation for mutual benefit both politically and commercially. In many of the countries of concentration there is not likely to be this mutual benefit for many years. Indeed from a commercial point of view our visible trade balance is and will likely continue to be heavily weighted in favour of

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those we aid. This is undoubtedly balanced somewhat by a continuing stream of skilled immigrants from some of these countries, but we believe that it is in our interest to be more forthcoming with aid in those areas where there is a possible benefit both to Canada and to the aid recipient. In particular we believe that the aid programmes to Zambia and to the Congo (Kinshasa) should be placed on a five-year planning base and that Zambia be grouped with its East African neighbours for the purposes of external aid planning, while the Congo (Kinshasa) be formally designated as a country of concentration. Our arguments in favour of these two specific changes are outlined in the country papers below.

*(by 1970-71)

20. While concentration may serve Canadian interests in the short term, the elaboration of effective programmes in the longer term may require more flexibility. There are situations where the political and commercial objectives cited above diverge to a greater or lesser degree and in each case a judgement must be made as to the relative priority to be accorded each. This judgement will have to be made not in isolation but in relation to our entire aid programmes. To use a familiar example, some Air Canada routes are known to be uneconomic but are not eliminated because of a belief that services must be maintained in the public interest so long as some balance is maintained. In the aid field, a parallel judgement has been made in regard to our programmes to Francophone Africa. For this reason we are strongly of the view that a great deal of flexibility must be maintained within our aid programmes in order that programmes of limited size and duration can be undertaken which are in line with Canadian political interests.

21. The immediate upshot of the above reasoning is that we believe that serious consideration should be given to the institution of a modest aid programme for Somalia and a substantial increase of our programmes of assistance to Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Upper Volta. The detailed arguments are contained in the relevant attached papers.

22. Regional Orientation We believe that a new emphasis must be given to regional programmes and in a certain degree to regional institutions. As the trend towards regionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa accelerates, as for example through the formation of common market groupings, our programmes must be able to accommodate and to assist in the new situation. Moreover, as closer interstate co-operation generally means increasing stability, we should be utilizing our aid programmes to encourage such initiatives. We would, therefore, recommend that the programmes for Francophone and Commonwealth Africa contain adequate provision to allow for multistate projects within each region, and across national boundaries.

23. Among the regional organization that show signs of succeeding in establishing regional economic development is the Conseil de l'Entente, grouping Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Niger, Togo, and Dahomey. It is in the interests of African development that this experiment in regional economic and social co-operation be encouraged and limited assistance should therefore be made available to it by Canada. If it proves successful, serious consideration should be given to channelling to it substantial aid funds that would normally be given on a bilateral basis. In the meantime, aid programmes in the member countries should be maintained.

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24. The growth of regional institutions is a further element which should receive increasing Canadian support. The African Development Bank is one institution which should be encouraged and has the opportunity to play a positive role in fostering co-operation and economic development in the Continent. We believe that it is politically important to encourage the ADB and believe that a decision should be made soon on the level of Canadian support.

25. Programme emphasis In order to attain our objectives effectively our programmes of aid should in general be directed to those development projects where Canadian skills are at least the equal of those of other donors. This means, for example, concentration in temperate agriculture, technical and higher education, transportation, power generation and communications. There are undoubtedly other specializations where Canadians have competence but these are the principal ones. Within these basic areas we would fully support the concept of integrated programmes involving technical assistance, training and capital assistance. This avoids the piecemeal approach which, while having a useful stop-gap effect, often leaves no lasting impact on the recipient country. In particular we believe it desirable to reduce the number of personnel, particularly in the ordinary secondary school field, proceeding on individual assignment in Africa. While these teachers fill a useful function it is our belief that they are often under-utilized by the host government, particularly in French speaking Africa, and they place the heaviest administrative burden on our posts abroad. The need for some line personnel is real but it is possible that C.U.D.O would be a more appropriate agency to fill these gaps. Therefore, we would hope to see over the next few years a running down of this specific form of technical assistance in Africa and its replacement by integrated programmes in fields of technical and higher education.

Recommendations

26. In the light of the above, and against the background of the papers appended we wish to make the following recommendations:

(1) that the Congo (Kinshasa) receive an increased aid allocation for 1969-70 and that consideration be given to making it a country of concentration in 1970-71;

(2) that Zambia be made a country of mention, and our programme planning there placed on the same basis as in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania; Zambia's aid allocation should be increased to the level of Kenya in 1969-70;

(3) that our programme of assistance to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland be substantially increased;

(4) that a modest programme (about \$100,000) of economic assistance to the Somali Republic be established;

(5) that the Government be invited to decide on a level of contribution to the African Development Bank;

(6) that modest assistance (approximately \$100,000) be offered to the Conseil de l'Entente;

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(7) that the following other modifications in country allocations be considered:

(i) Tanzania: an increase in the annual development loan allocation to .2 million in 1969-70;

(ii) Kenya: an increase in the grant aid component for 1969-70;

(iii) Upper Volta: an increase in grant aid for technical assistance in 1969-70;

(8) That countries not specifically mentioned share in any general increase in available funds.

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AID ALLOCATIONS 1969-70

East Africa - Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda

A number of factors argue that Canada should continue to concentrate economic assistance on these three countries of East Africa. While the degree of involvement in each will vary according to our interests, we believe that at a minimum, all three should receive development loan and grant allocations at levels equivalent to or higher than in 1968-69, while food aid allocations will be unnecessary. Moreover, the regional grouping, the East African Community should receive an allocation for technical assistance on the same base of the 1968-69 allocation to EACSO.

Tanzania

Tanzania should remain the primary country of concentration of Canadian aid in East Africa. The following factors are relevant to this recommendation:

Political: (i) Tanzania was the first country in East Africa with which Canada exchanged diplomatic representatives. We have established good working relationships with the Tanzanian authorities at all levels and attained a position of trust which is perhaps unequalled by any other western country. This position, due in no small measure to our past aid programme, allows us to put forward our views candidly in the knowledge they will not be suspect.

(ii) Tanzania has been remarkably stable since independence in 1962, and this stability seems to reflect a broad consensus of the views of the population rather than being imposed from above. The programme of Canadian economic assistance encourages this stability. As Tanzania borders on Zambia and the Congo, its stability is important for the maintenance of the political stability of the entire region.

(iii) Tanzania borders on white-ruled southern Africa and is firmly committed to support the "liberation" of this area. This support involves provision of training facilities for "liberation movements", and includes allowing the supply of arms from communist sources to these groups. There are also significant economic aid programmes from communist countries, particularly China, aimed at increasing their influence in the strategic area. A significant Canadian aid programme provides the Tanzanian authorities with assistance from a country which is not suspected of any political

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designs in Tanzania or in Africa, and contributes to the stability of the area by reducing great power involvement in a politically sensitive area.

(iv) President Nyerere is one of the few African leaders whose views and programmes are widely regarded throughout Africa and beyond. In particular, the success of his domestic policies could have important implications for other developing countries, and on the whole deserve strong Canadian support.

(v) Tanzania has to a large extent freed itself of colonial ties and is seeking contacts with a wider range of countries. This should be encouraged as in the long term Canada might draw benefits in the economic sphere.

(vi) Among Canadians who have served in Africa or are familiar with African development, there is a remarkable enthusiasm for Tanzania, and our programme there should insofar as possible mirror this development.

Economic and Aid (i) Canada has a large trade deficit (\$32 million since 1962) and a Canadian aid presence could lead in the short term to increased familiarity with and desire for certain Canadian products, and over the long term a more equitable trade balance.

(ii) Tanzania, as a member of the East African Community, has signed an agreement with the C.E.A.C. giving preferential entry to certain C.E.A.C. goods. This form of special association will probably become more common with African countries, and a significant Canadian presence, particularly in the aid field, may help avoid exclusion from the markets of this populous area of Africa.

(iii) Tanzania has shown the capacity and the willingness to utilize Canadian aid effectively at current levels and we have no reason to believe they would be unable to absorb an increased amount.

(iv) The Tanzanian authorities have established development priorities which we believe can permit rapid growth in agriculture and education; they have avoided costly prestige projects.

Sector Allocation We do not see a necessity for a food aid allocation for Tanzania and we want that available funds be divided between Grant Aid and Development Loans. As the Tanzanians

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have demonstrated a capacity to utilize our loan funds, we recommend that the loan allocation be raised to \$2 million per year from the present \$1 million. On the grant aid side, our mission judges that the Tanzanians will continue to require teachers at about the same level, while training needs in Canada will decrease. In view of the probable departure of many United Kingdom experts, we suggest that more Grant Aid be made available to provide technical advisers and assistance in training Tanzanians in Africa, rather than in Canada.

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U G A N D A

Among the three countries in East Africa to which we give substantial aid Uganda should take the third place. Because of the natural connections of the economies of Kenya and Tanzania with Uganda through the East African Common Market and other common organisations Uganda should receive basically similar aid mix but the amounts should increase at a slower rate. The following specific factors are relevant to the above recommendation:

Political (i) Canada has no resident representation in Uganda but our High Commission in Nairobi has established good working relationships with the Ugandan Government.

(ii) Since attaining independence Uganda has teetered on the brink of internal up-heaval; it owes its precarious stability to the political astuteness of President Obote. He has exploited tribal differences to maintain his authority, although recently he has seemed to lean on the army for support. The internal situation is potentially explosive and is likely to remain so until it has been possible to develop a national consensus as distinct from one based on tribal divisions and political manoeuvring. We do not believe that the programme of Canadian assistance will have a significant effect in maintaining internal stability but the provision of technical assistance in certain special areas might assist in improving development planning and help to move the economy forward. Over the long term this will assist in the evolution of a stable internal situation.

(iii) Uganda currently pursues a moderate foreign policy but has relatively little influence in African or international affairs. Uganda has accepted heavy obligations towards certain communist states for the development of a jet air force which through the diversion of resources has been a brake on development. This fact in itself does not call for a reduction in our assistance to Uganda, but we should carefully examine all request for aid particularly for capital assistance; we should not relax the local cost conditions on development loans for Uganda as we might for Tanzania.

(iv) Despite Ugandan acceptance of military assistance from communist countries it remains heavily dependant on western development aid. We should attempt to complement other larger western contributions while at the same time seeking to encourage Uganda to widen the scope of its contacts with the west.

(v) President Obote, in common with his East African colleagues Kenyatta and Nyerere, has remained in power since independence. He attaches some importance to the Commonwealth connection as is witnessed by the holding of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference in Kampala in

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1967 and by providing a site for the talks sponsored by the Commonwealth Secretary-General between the Nigerian factions earlier this year. It is in our interest to encourage this continuing Commonwealth connection and account might be taken of this special interest in developing our programme in Uganda.

Economic and Aid (i) According to the IBRD, Uganda has serious weaknesses in its programme planning and decision making machinery.

(ii) Uganda has shown itself capable of absorbing the Canadian technical assistance which has been furnished but the programme is heavily oriented to the provision of secondary school teachers.

(iii) Canada's trade balance with Uganda is unfavourable and is growing more unfavourable year by year. Our exports there have stagnated since 1964 while we have increased our imports from four to nine million dollars per year. The continuing Canadian programme of assistance may help to reduce this balance in the long term particularly if assistance can be provided to the slowed down Ugandan economy.

Taken together these factors suggest that while our programme of assistance to Uganda should be maintained at its current level, an increase now is not essential and, therefore, the allocation for 1969-70 should remain at 2.3 million dollars.

Sector Allocation We do not see a need for food aid or commodity assistance to Uganda. We would envisage that the proposed allocation be divided between grant aid and development loans, and that we should take a relatively hard line on the local cost conditions governing development loans. We believe that the programme of providing secondary school teachers should be kept constant or if possible reduced with emphasis being placed instead on providing either high-level advisors or technical assistance support for a single integrated project. We suggest the provision of secondary school teachers should be turned over gradually to such organizations as CUSO.

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M A L A W I

The current programme of bilateral economic assistance to Malawi should continue to be run down, although current obligations must be met. Sufficient flexibility should be maintained (in line with Cabinet direction) to undertake small terminable projects of high priority. The following specific factors are relevant to these recommendations:

Political (i) Canada has not established diplomatic relations with Malawi.

(ii) Malawi has a keen interest in the Commonwealth connection and very close relations with Britain.

(iii) President Banda's dictatorial grip on the government has provided a degree of internal stability, although this stability might crumble if he left the scene. Moreover, the presence of a large expatriate group in positions of authority in Malawi provides a potentially explosive mixture as Dr. Banda has made no concession to local demands that he Africanize his government.

(iv) Dr. Banda's foreign policy of close association with South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia has made Malawi an outsider to the main stream of current African political thinking on southern Africa. Relations between Malawi and her African neighbours are thus strained.

Economic and Aid (i) Malawi is heavily dependent on foreign aid, being one of the few countries which still receives direct budgetary support. Assistance comes primarily from Britain although there is some from South Africa and Portugal. A small Canadian aid programme would not be significant alongside assistance from these sources and would be unlikely to have any important influence in Malawi.

(ii) While Malawi is interested in developing and encouraging foreign investments its economy is very heavily oriented towards Rhodesia and South Africa. There may be room for Canadian private investment but trade prospects are slim in view of the ready access of South African goods to Malawi.

(iii) Malawi has thusfar made effective use of the limited Canadian assistance received.

A & ME DIV/RHE MITCHELL/lps

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E T H I O P I A

The Canadian aid allocation to Ethiopia should be expanded in line with the overall expansion of our External Aid programme. We do not believe that Ethiopia should become a country of concentration now but enough flexibility should be maintained in our programme there to undertake suitable integrated projects. Ethiopia should not be considered for a development loan allocation in 1969-70. The following factors are relevant to these recommendations:

Political (i) Ethiopia and Canada have maintained close ties for many years, although we did not establish a diplomatic mission in Addis Ababa until 1966. These links, largely developed through the efforts of Canadian educators, have resulted in the establishment of cordial relations on an official level; at the same time there is a group of Canadians who follow developments in Ethiopia with interest and concern.

(ii) Ethiopia occupies a strategic location in the continent and is at the same time headquarters for the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa.

(iii) Ethiopia, as a "Christian" nation surrounded on three sides by Muslim Arab-oriented states, seeks to maintain broad contacts with the west.

Economic and Aid (i) Ethiopia has one of the most primitive economies in Africa. Development is proceeding very slowly and there are needs in virtually all sectors of the economy.

(ii) Ethiopia maintains a very large military establishment which is a drain on her finances, despite large military assistance from the United States.

(iii) The Emperor and his closest advisers follow a conservative line and believe in a gradual evolution of the country; also there is corruption among senior officials and ministers.

(iv) Canadian trade with Ethiopia is minimal and is not likely to increase soon because of the small size of the Ethiopian market for Canadian goods.

(v) Our programme of assistance to Ethiopia is still in its preliminary stages and it is difficult to judge how effectively it will be utilized.

Sector Allocation In the light of the above factors Canadian assistance to Ethiopia should be confined to projects which will be of value over the long term. The 1969-70 allocation could be increased to \$400,000 from the current level. At present we would confine our assistance to a field of education such as teacher training or the provision of faculty for institutes of higher education. We should not provide secondary school teachers to Ethiopia, but leave this to CUSO. As our experience with Ethiopia grows we would envisage the possibility of looking at larger integrated projects in the field of education or other areas where Canadian technology would coincide with Ethiopian needs.

A & M DIV/ADM: McDonald/lps

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S O M A L I A

Canada should establish a small programme of technical assistance to Somalia for the year 1969-70, in response to high-priority requests from the Somali Government. The level could be \$100,000. In future years flexibility required to undertake small integrated projects in Somalia should be available. The following specific factors are relevant:

Political (i) Canada has recently established diplomatic relations with Somalia through dual accreditation of our Ambassador in Addis Ababa. Since mid-1967 the Somalis have shown a desire for closer relations with Canada, and western countries in general.

(ii) Somali agreement to accredit our Ambassador from Addis Ababa is unique, the sole exception to the Somali refusal to accept dual accreditations from Ethiopia. This places our Ambassador in a position to observe at close hand the intricacies of the Ethiopia-Somali dispute. To exploit this, it is important for Canada to demonstrate roughly equivalent interest in both countries. A small programme of aid to Somalia would reinforce Mr. Garvin's position.

(iii) The Somali Government has been isolated from its African neighbours because of its policies toward Ethiopia and Kenya. Somalia is now making a determined effort to strengthen its relations with these countries and also with the west. Moreover, Somalia which has received massive assistance in the military field from the Soviet Union wishes to move away from the image which it has obtained as being under Communist influence. A programme of Canadian assistance would demonstrate a diversification of Somalia's foreign contacts, and would be in Canadian and western interests.

(iv) Somalia is one of the few African states which actively practices democracy, and where an orderly change in government has taken place through the electoral process.

Economic and Aid (i) Somalia is one of the poorest countries in Africa and its economy has suffered severely from the closure of the Suez Canal.

(ii) There is a pressing need for proper development planning in Somalia to utilize what resources already exist and to exploit the possibility of regional co-operation. A suitable Canadian input might encourage the regional aspects of Somali development and assist in establishing a sound basis for development planning.

(iii) Canada has virtually no trade with Somalia; this situation might be altered if there was a greater knowledge of Canada and Canadian products.

Sector Allocation We would recommend that Canadian assistance to Somalia be initially directed to providing high-level technical assistance personnel. This might be complemented by the granting of a number of scholarships for study in Canada. We would not recommend that capital or development loan assistance be made available to Somalia now, although this possibility should be left open for future years.

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BOTSWANA, LESOTHO AND SWAZILAND

It is recommended that Canadian assistance to the three black territories in Southern Africa: Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland, be increased. The reasons for doing so are largely, although not entirely, political.

Political (i) At the United Nations, Canada does not support Afro-Asian requests for sanctions against South Africa or Portugal for their policies in Southern Africa. We are, therefore, at a tactical disadvantage since we agree with the objectives of the majority but differ with the means they propose to achieve these objectives. To help convince the Africans and others of Canada's good faith we have contributed to the UN Training Programme and Trust Fund for South Africa. A more convincing demonstration would be found in increased bilateral aid to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland who have repeatedly expressed the wish to preserve their independence from South Africa, and who are in desperate need for outside assistance. Increased Canadian assistance would contribute to the strengthening of multi-racialism in Southern Africa as an answer to apartheid and demonstrate positively our desire to respond to constructive UN proposals to this end.

(ii) We anticipate closer contacts with Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland in the Commonwealth context. Leaders of all three are well-disposed to us. Contacts extend into the past with the presence over many years, especially in Lesotho, of Canadian missionary-teachers. A number of people from these countries, including the present High Commissioner for Lesotho, have studied in Canada.

Economic and Aid (i) Canada's assistance to these three countries has been successfully utilized.

(ii) Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland have a very low level of development, and even moderately increased aid would have considerable impact.

Sector Allocation There would seem to be no need to make any of these states countries of concentration. Nevertheless, there are grounds at least for doubling our existing assistance (1968-69 allocation: Lesotho--\$175,000; Botswana--\$40,000; Swaziland--\$55,000) in 1969-70. It would be desirable, for both political and economic reasons, to send at some later date an expert mission to identify larger projects which we could usefully undertake. We would expect that the increased programmes could branch out from primarily assisting the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland to bilateral programmes of assistance to the three governments. This could take the form of increased training places, the provision of experts (not necessarily teachers), and small capital assistance projects.

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Z A M B I A

Canadian economic assistance to Zambia should be placed on the same basis as Canadian assistance to Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The aid mix would differ because of the relative availability of capital for development purposes in Zambia, and its basically stronger economy. The total funds made available should eventually approximate those made available to Kenya. The following specific factors are relevant to these recommendations.

Political (i) Canada has developed a unique relationship with Zambia since the latter's independence in 1966. This rests on the belief held by President Kaunda that of all white Commonwealth countries Canada best understands and responds to the needs and aspirations of Zambia and of black Africans in general. The Zambian authorities are more open and frank with Canadians than with other western countries, despite the fact that we do not have a diplomatic representative stationed in Lusaka.

(ii) President Kaunda has espoused a non-racial philosophy based on respect for the individual and has succeeded in maintaining this policy in spite of opposition within Zambia, and the problems generated by Rhodesia's UDI. Continuing Canadian economic assistance to Zambia provides support for this policy by demonstrating that a "white" Commonwealth country with no special economic interests is willing to help Zambia overcome difficulties not of her own making.

(iii) The Canadian Government has publically condemned UDI and the racist policies of Zambia's neighbours to the south, and has supported United Nations resolutions calling for assistance to Zambia to overcome the effects of UDI. Canada has contributed through the oil airlift in 1965-66 and subsequently through two special \$500,000 allocations. Canada has counselled against the use of force to resolve the problems of southern Africa, but to make our policy of encouraging peaceful change convincing it is necessary to make extra effort to help those who face the most difficult problems in the area.

(iv) Despite the difficulties caused by UDI and potential internal problems, Zambia has retained a remarkable degree of stability since independence. It upholds the elements of democratic government and a free press. The successful programme of Canadian economic assistance by providing broad contacts with Canadian institutions and individuals may assist in maintaining this situation.

(v) While the Zambian Government has drawn its aid to date largely from non-communist sources, the acceptance of assistance from China for the building of the Tan-Zam Railway will alter this pattern and

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provide the Chinese with opportunities to develop influence. As the Chinese are already actively supporting radical elements within Zambia, and the "liberation" movements of the neighbouring white-ruled territories, a serious threat could develop to the stability of the area. It is in Canadian and western interests to minimize the influence which the Chinese may hope to gain through this planned massive aid allocation for Zambia.

Economic and Aid (i) Since UDI, Zambia has faced serious problems in reorienting its economy away from Rhodesia and in developing the economic basis which will allow it eventually to free itself from dependence on southern Africa for many vital imports.

(ii) The Zambian economy holds favourable prospects for expanding economic cooperation with Canada. In particular some of the major projects which will be undertaken over the next few years in Zambia might be suitable for Canadian financial participation. There is already a favourable balance of trade between our two countries, the only favourable trade balance which we have in East Africa. Our aid programme could assist in developing knowledge of Canadian products and services in the hope of eventually expanding our trade in Zambia.

(iii) Zambia has been building, financed either from her own resources or from international consortia, the majority of her large scale development projects. The World Bank considers Zambia credit-worthy for commercial loans.

(iv) The Zambian Government has to date utilized Canadian aid effectively.

Sector Allocation We see no present need for food aid allocations in Zambia, nor in the immediate future for development loan assistance. We recommend that in 1969-70 the available aid funds for Zambia be confined to grant aid to provide high-level technical assistance personnel for important positions in Government or to staff technical schools and schools of higher education. For this purpose we would suggest a grant aid allocation of approximately two million dollars, an increase of \$1.5 million over the 1968-69 allocation.

CONFIDENTIALNIGERIA

The future of Canada's aid programme to Nigeria must be related to the evolution of the civil war in that country. The aid allocation to that country should be very flexible and contain both grant aid, development loan and food aid allocations. It should be understood that above and beyond the figure fixed as the 1969-70 allocation, there would be sufficient flexibility to change the programmes in line with the needs as they arise. The following factors are relevant to the recommendations above:

Political (i) Canada has had close and friendly relations with Nigeria since its independence in 1960. We have been able to present our views with candour at all levels of the Nigerian government. Our programme of economic assistance has materially assisted in creating this good atmosphere.

(ii) The internal situation in Nigeria is grave. The effects of the civil war on Nigerian society and the Nigerian economy are serious, particularly in the southern half of the country. The former Eastern Region has been devastated by war and its reconstruction will be the first priority following the end of the civil war. Canadian economic assistance will make an essential contribution to the reconstruction of the Eastern Region and in helping to alleviate some of the worst effects of the war on the rest of the country.

(iii) The Canadian Government has many times expressed its willingness to provide assistance following the end of the civil war.

(iv) Soviet arms sales to NIG have significantly increased Soviet influence in that country. It is in Canadian and western interests to maintain our position and hence our programmes of assistance in order to help limit the possibility of extensive Soviet infiltration. An expanded Soviet presence would bring cold war tensions to Nigeria and could in the long term seriously affect the stability of the country.

(v) The Canadian Government is deeply committed to providing emergency relief for the hungry and destitute in the war zone. This interest can be continued following the termination of hostilities in the aid programme. The Nigerian civil war has caused a greater public outcry in Canada than any African issue since the Congo in 1960. Canadian assistance to Nigeria following the end of the civil war for the reconstruction of the Eastern Region will respond in a large measure to the wishes of a significant group of influential Canadians.

Economic and Aid (i) Nigeria has received since 1960 the largest Canadian aid allocations in Africa. Canada has a stake in Nigeria's development and our involvement should be continued and protected by a properly planned programme of economic assistance.

(ii) Nigeria, with its large and relatively sophisticated market, holds out commercial prospects for Canada in the long term. Our present trade balance is unfavourable but the programme of economic assistance should bring with it some commercial benefits.

(iii) The Nigerian economic development plan has been disrupted by the civil war and the Canadian programme will be of assistance in starting this programme forward again.

(iv) Nigeria has utilized Canadian assistance effectively, and has established priorities which accord with our thinking on the development of that country.

Sector Analysis The continuing programme should carry on providing assistance in those sectors which have already been identified as important. Uncertainties caused by the civil war and the country's needs during the period of reconstruction are such that the over-all programme will have to be developed in a pragmatic fashion.

A & ME Div/BHG Mitchell/OLF

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GHANA

The Canadian programme of economic assistance to Ghana should be continued and expanded. The basic aid mix of grants, development loans and food aid has proved satisfactory and should be continued. The following factors are relevant to the above recommendations:

Political (i) Ghana was the first independent African country with which Canada established diplomatic relations. These relations have in general been good over the period, and have become closer since the overthrow of President Nkrumah in 1966.

(ii) Since the coup, the Ghanaian authorities have been pursuing with considerable success policies of moderation which have contributed to internal stability and have laid the groundwork for a reversion to civilian rule in 1969. This transition from military to civilian rule will probably continue through 1970 and will be a critical period for Ghana. It is in the Canadian interest to help to ensure that this transition to democratic civilian government is successful. If it is, it will have significance for Africa generally. The successful programme of Canadian economic assistance has helped to provide the stable background which is essential for the success of this experiment.

(iii) The Canadian programme gives ready access to Ghanaians in critical positions on whom the National Liberation Council leans for advice.

(iv) The Ghanaian Government is attempting to promote closer co-operation with its francophone neighbours. This co-operation is initially regional economic co-operation on specific projects. A successful and expanding Canadian programme provides a basis on which Canada can participate in regional programmes involving Ghana and these francophone neighbours, and thus opens the opportunity to develop closer relations with a number of francophone African states.

(v) There is a considerable interest in Ghana among Canadians and our aid programme should reflect this.

Economic and Aid (i) Ghana has utilised Canadian assistance more effectively than any other recipient in Africa.

(ii) The Canadian aid investment in Ghana is extensive and it is in our interest to assure that the continued economic development of Ghana protects this investment.

(iii) Canadian trade with Ghana is currently limited but the effect of our continued programme of economic assistance should be to increase Ghanaian purchases in Canada and could lead in the long term to a favourable trade relationship.

(iv) Canadian economic assistance has become a major factor in Ghanaian economic development.

Sector Allocation The current sector allocations appear to correspond adequately to Ghanaian needs. We would hope to see a decrease in the number of secondary school teachers provided but a continuing emphasis on technical training and integrated capital assistance projects.

A & AL DIV/RHG MITCHELL/lpz

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K E N Y A

Kenya should, after Tanzania, be the primary recipient of Canadian economic assistance in East Africa. The aid mix should, however, differ somewhat from that accorded to Tanzania to take into account the generally stronger Kenyan economy and its eligibility for AIC credits under item 21A. The following factors are relevant to this recommendation:

Political (i) Canada has developed good bilateral relations with Kenya. We have established a resident mission in Nairobi and, while they have not reciprocated, they regard the Canadian Government as one with whom the Kenyan authorities can discuss questions frankly and openly.

(ii) Since independence Kenya has had a remarkable record of stability, in spite of the guerilla war in its north-eastern provinces, now ended, and potentially explosive racial and tribal issues. Despite predictions to the contrary a relatively harmonious relationship has developed between blacks and whites in Kenya while tribal aspirations have been muted through the authority of President Kenyatta. However, Kenya is entering a crucial period for its political stability as President Kenyatta is aging. A smooth transition of power will be assisted by a healthy economy and the realization that development is proceeding rapidly. The programme of Canadian assistance encourages this growth and hence provides an element of stability.

(iii) Kenya follows moderate policies on most questions of international concern and is a voice of moderation in African councils. It is in Canada's and the west's interests to encourage this moderation which might disappear should there be political upheaval in Kenya following on the death or incapacity of President Kenyatta. The continuing and successful programme of Canadian assistance reinforces the hands of the moderates and the technocrats in Kenya thereby reducing the likelihood of a change which would be disruptive in Kenyan foreign policies as well as in the Kenyan internal situation.

(iv) Kenya remains heavily dependent on British aid and capital and is as well a country of importance to American private and government interests. These countries will doubtless continue to bear the major aid burden and it is not in our interest to attempt to alter the situation. Our role should be a complimentary one which should encourage the Kenyans to seek to widen the scope and character of their contacts with western countries.

A & ME Div/RNG Mitchell/OLF

CONFIDENTIAL

SIERRA LEONE

The phasing-out of our program of economic assistance to Sierra Leone should be continued. Current commitments should be honoured, and the outstanding allocation of five hundred thousand dollars should be held for utilization in a suitable project. Sufficient flexibility in planning will allow high priority projects of a terminable nature to be undertaken if Canadian interests require it. The following factors are relevant to these recommendations:

Political (i) Canada established diplomatic relations with Sierra Leone in 1961. Our contacts are limited and have not been particularly close.

(ii) Sierra Leone is a member of the Commonwealth and as such participates in the programmes set up under the aegis of that association.

(iii) Sierra Leone has had over the past two years a record of instability involving three successive coups. The present government was formed in April of 1968 and is untested. It includes a number of competent persons but given the record of the past two years it is difficult to be optimistic. Corruption has been a serious factor impeding Sierra Leone's progress in the past, and we are unable to judge whether it will continue to be so.

Economic and Aid (i) Over the long term Sierra Leone's economic prospects appear good, because of ample mineral resources and a high agricultural potential. There has been bad mismanagement and a lack of development planning.

(ii) Canadian trade with Sierra Leone is small although the balance is in Canada's favour. Because of the country's size, however, there is not likely to be a significant market for Canadian products.

(iii) The economic policies of the present government are not yet formulated although there are indications that austerity measures will be imposed.

Sector Allocation Should high priority technical assistance projects arise which would coincide with Canadian interests we would favour carrying them out on a limited basis financed from the general contingency fund.

Economic and Aid (i) Canada's trade balance with Kenya has been and is unfavourable although there is a slow growth in Canadian exports while our imports have remained constant over the past four years. In view of Kenya's relatively buoyant economy the Canadian aid programme could lead to an expansion in our trade with Kenya and ultimately a more equitable trade balance. In particular our development loan and advisors programmes could have this effect and to the extent they correspond with Kenyan needs should be encouraged.

(ii) Kenya is the commercial centre of Eastern Africa and encourages the entry of private capital. It is also the major market in the new East African Common Market. The Department of Trade and Commerce has opened a commercial office in Nairobi and ECIC have indicated that Kenya would be eligible for financing under item 21A to the extent of two or three million dollars. A continuing and expanding programme of economic assistance may lead to the utilization of the ECIC credits and growing trade.

(iii) The Kenyan authorities have to date shown the ability to absorb Canadian assistance although the development loan programme has been slow to get under way. We believe that the situation will improve significantly and that Kenya will be able to absorb the assistance at the level we are willing to offer.

Sector Allocation We do not see a need for a food aid allocation for Kenya nor for commodity assistance. This situation might change in the light of recommendations from the agricultural study now under way under LAC auspices. In current circumstances we suggest that available funds be divided between grant aid and development loans. We would not recommend for 1969-70 any increase in the development loan allocation but would not exclude an increase in future fiscal years. The availability of ECIC credits also makes a development loan increase less essential. We see merit in an increase in the field of technical assistance particularly in the provision of advisors in higher education and in selected areas where high level shortages of personnel exist in Kenya. We do not favour an extension of the secondary school teachers programme except to provide teacher trainers and personnel in technical schools. The general secondary school teacher field should be gradually turned over to such organizations as UNESCO.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO
A Defence Liaison (1) Division

SECURITY
Sécurité CONFIDENTIAL

FROM
De Direction des Relations entre Pays francophones

DATE September 6, 1968

REFERENCE
Référence

NUMBER
Numéro

SUBJECT
Sujet Military Assistance to Francophone Countries

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	cc 20-1-2-3
27-20-1	
MISSION	

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

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/USSEA(M.Yalden)

A & ME

You will recall that at the June 27 meeting of the Task Force it was agreed that your Division, in consultation with African and Middle Eastern Division and this Division, would prepare a memorandum for the assistance programme to francophone countries. However, we now understand you feel that from the presentational viewpoint it would be better to include the question of military assistance to francophone countries and the related technical difficulties in the military assistance section of defence review currently being prepared for Cabinet consideration than to bring this matter to the Minister's attention in a separate memorandum.

2. We agree with your proposed method of dealing with the matter and we should be grateful if you would keep us informed of the status of the defence review and consult us with respect to that portion concerning military assistance to francophone countries.

A.K. Brant
Direction des Relations entre
Pays francophones

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO
À The Office of the High Commissioner for Canada,
LONDON

FROM
De The Under-Secretary for External Affairs,
OTTAWA

REFERENCE
Référence Commonwealth Secretary-General's letter of July 9
to the Secretary of State for External Affairs

SUBJECT
Sujet President Obote's proposal for the establishment
of a Language Institute in Kampala

SECURITY
Sécurité CONFIDENTIAL

DATE August 12, 1968

NUMBER
Numéro K-363

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA 20-1-2-3	
MISSION 4	

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

.. It would be appreciated if you would transmit the enclosed
letter to the Commonwealth Secretary-General.

.. Copies of the letter under reference and the Minister's
reply are attached for your files.

D. MC. BRANNING
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

CONFIDENTIAL


CANADA

EXTERNAL AID OFFICE
BUREAU DE L'AIDE EXTÉRIEURE

OTTAWA 4

A & ME Div.

July 1968



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*and return
with appendix
to 6th release*

* Two copies of Quarterly Report and Letter will be sent to each post designated by an asterisk.



EXTERNAL AID OFFICE
BUREAU DE L'AIDE EXTÉRIEURE
OTTAWA 4

July 1968

Quarterly Letter

The advent of summer finds the Office in the midst of a recruitment drive. I am very much aware of continuing deficiencies in our administration. Many of these are attributable to the shortage of staff and as this is gradually relieved as a result of our recruitment program we expect to be able to effect some significant improvements in our performance. Meanwhile, we are pressing forward with our existing programs and working on a number of important new initiatives. The following paragraphs should bring you up to date on the principal recent developments in the Office.

Missions will be aware of the declared intent of the re-elected Government to conduct a searching review of Canadian foreign policy. The External Aid Office is of course playing a very considerable part in this review and we anticipate that once it has been completed there may be some significant alterations in our programs. As a part of this review, the Government has already undertaken to change the name of the External Aid Office to the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) reflecting changes in program emphasis and philosophy which have already been taking place for some time within the organization and, more generally, the more sophisticated approach which most donor nations are now coming to adopt toward developmental work. (The Government has made a number of other statements relating to aid policy — see the section below relating to the International Development Centre and also the Appendix to this letter.)

1. AID ALLOCATIONS - 1968-69

We are including the allocations for our 1968-69 programme in the attached quarterly report. These have now received Cabinet approval.

2. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CENTRE

The work of the Task Force has been extended and intensified and a number of special consultants have been engaged in the various sectors with which the Centre will be concerned, e.g. agriculture, social sciences, transportation, manpower development, communication etc. These experts are preparing reports on the kinds of programs and projects the Centre

...../2

-2-

might undertake in their respective sectors. These will be incorporated with the final report which is expected to be available for consideration by the Steering Committee and Cabinet by early September.

Dr. Stuart Peters, formerly a Deputy Minister in the Newfoundland Government who recently joined the Office as a special adviser is coordinating this work. The Liberal Party as part of its election program stated its intent to give "speedy and favourable consideration" to the proposed Centre, so we are hopeful that approval will be secured fairly promptly once the necessary preparatory work has been completed.

3. PERSONNEL AND CAREER DEVELOPMENT

You will recall that in our last letter we mentioned a special course in project appraisal that was to be held for our Planning Officers at Carleton University under the direction of Dr. Grant Reuber of the University of Western Ontario, assisted by Professor A.C. Harberger, Head of the Department of Economics at the University of Chicago. This seminar took place in early June and proved to be most successful. We are looking forward to the benefits that a new approach to project analysis should bring to our planning.

As you may know, a number of positions have been provided on this year's establishment for the purpose of setting up a field staff and we are now in the process of identifying the needs at various foreign posts and allocating positions accordingly. The next step will be the selection of people to be posted to these various locations.

4. SOLE SOURCE PROCUREMENT

Sole Source Procurement or purchase without the calling of tenders is provided for in the Financial Administration Act, but as it was designed for internal government administration, it is not readily adaptable to many of the purchases made by foreign governments and financed under our development loan programme. We are therefore considering the possibility that sole source procurement might be adopted on a limited basis in order to give us additional flexibility in dealing promptly with certain projects.

5. EXTERNAL AID UMBRELLA AGREEMENTS

Work is in progress on a project to establish a formal Umbrella Treaty with some recipient governments.

At the present time Canada has concluded only 4 formal treaties with countries receiving Canadian assistance under the External Aid programme. These are the agreements concluded with India and Pakistan in 1951, with Ceylon in 1952, and with the federation of the West Indies in 1958. The first three agreements are no longer suitable and require substantial revision, while the fourth, with the West Indies has been overtaken by the dissolution of the federation and the emergence of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Barbados as three independent states. Both for

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-3-

presentational reasons, then, and to define the legal status of various "operational" agreements which Canada concludes with recipient countries in the course of administering our aid programme, we felt it would be useful to conclude formal Umbrella Agreements with at least certain of the countries receiving Canadian aid.

The final text of the External Aid Umbrella Agreements is now being re-drafted with the objective of incorporating additional clauses to cover details such as tax exemption and payment of local costs.

6. INCREASING EAO EXPERTISE

The meeting of development economists from various universities mentioned in the last quarterly letter, took place on May 30 and 31 in Ottawa. It provided an opportunity for a detailed discussion and exchange of views on our policies and programs and a number of suggestions were made for increasing the cooperation between their institutions and the EAO.

All these suggestions will be given a good deal of thought; despite the extra workload it imposes on the Office staff we feel the advantages of having some "outside" opinions brought to bear on our work are important. We want to be in a position to enlist a much greater degree of help and support from the economic profession and in particular the economics faculties of the universities and were pleased with the extent to which this objective was furthered by the meeting.

7. MISSION TO FRANCOPHONE AFRICA

The report of the Special Aid Mission to Francophone Africa was terminated and presented to the Secretary of State for External Affairs on May 15, 1968, by the Honourable Lionel Chevrier, official head of the Mission.

From the point of view of aid, the Mission resulted in both an increase and a diversification of our program.

Last year, many of us in the Office felt that in view of the bilingual and bicultural character of this country, we ought to become involved to a greater extent in some of the French speaking less developed countries. Our programs in Africa were relatively modest in both size and scope. We are therefore pleased that the Chevrier mission was able to pave the way towards a rapid and substantial increase of the programme for this region. The commitments undertaken comprise: (i) all of the funds hitherto unexpended (\$11,000,000), (ii) funds for 1968-69 (less \$10,000,000 per year for the technical assistance programme currently in operation) and (iii) funds set forth in the forward commitment authority. Thus commitments of \$30,000,000 over the next three years and an aggregate of \$40,000,000 over the next five years were made.

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Moreover, Canadian aid activities will no longer be confined to the sectors of education and food aid. Of the 49 projects approved by the Mission, 39 are capital assistance projects given high priority by the host governments and touching upon all aspects of economic and social activities including education and culture, agriculture, public health, development of natural resources and tourism among others. With regard to financing, 29 of these projects will be financed on a grant basis, 20 will be financed by way of soft loans.

Of the recommendations made in the report (which has not yet been fully considered), the following should be noted:

- (a) that the Canadian aid allocation to Francophone Africa be increased gradually to the objective of \$100 million per year as soon as possible;
- (b) that another Mission be considered to recommend on possible bilateral or multilateral aid activity to these countries;
- (c) that more aid funds be devoted to integrated capital assistance projects;
- (d) that greater priority be given to placing advisers and experts at the disposition of the host government;
- (e) with regard to education programmes, that better preparation be given to teachers, the possibility of a career with advanced training for Canadian teachers going to Francophone Africa be considered and consolidation of the education programme as a whole be undertaken;
- (f) that food aid and basic commodities become a more integral part of the Canadian aid programme;
- (g) that umbrella agreements be signed with the more developed African countries and with respect to provincial activities in aid, umbrella agreements clearly defining the nature and conditions of possible provincial action in Francophone African recipient countries;
- (h) that cultural cooperation activities be initiated in Francophone African countries with the financial responsibility to be borne by Canada.

We are giving top priority to acting on the principal recommendations, particularly those relating to specific projects, in order that the impact of the Mission on the Francophone African countries visited should not be lost and implementation of the projects decided upon can be begun without delay. In line with this, we are taking a number of extra personnel on

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under contract to this Office to work in the field under the general supervision of the Missions. These people should substantially ease the burden of extra work generated by the Chevrier Mission and will hopefully facilitate the administration of all our work in the field by virtue of their presence on site.

In the words of the report "a new dimension to Canada's relations with the African states" was added and the sending of an aid mission with such authority gave evidence of and form to Canada's interest in these countries.

8. SPECIAL EVALUATION PROJECT

Many of our posts in East Africa and Southeast Asia will be aware of the forthcoming mission of Mr. Donald Tansley to their area. Mr. Tansley, formerly Deputy Minister of Finance and Industry with the Government of New Brunswick, has been spending the last two months in the Office briefing himself on the details of our operations and policies in these two areas. He will be leaving in the near future to spend five months in East Africa and a further four months in Malaysia.

With Mr. Tansley's assistance in the field we will be undertaking an assessment of the results achieved by certain selected projects and technical assistance programs which have been underway for some time. This will require an evaluation of the developmental impact of these projects and programs and lead to an identification of those factors which bear on the effectiveness of such undertakings, both positively and negatively. Furthermore, Mr. Tansley's mission will enable us to review the overall direction and emphasis of the aid program as it relates to a particular country or region. This would include a look at the sectors and kinds of assistance which would represent the most effective use of Canadian resources. Finally, the mission should enable us to reach some conclusion as to the appropriateness of the EAO administrative machinery and procedures for supporting projects and programs and for assisting our posts in discharging their responsibilities in respect of such programs and projects.

We are looking forward to receiving Mr. Tansley's comments and suggestions over the coming months and hope that those posts which have occasion to work with him on this assignment will afford him every assistance.

9. PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S POLICY STATEMENT

Some Missions may not be aware of recent policy pronouncements by the Prime Minister on the subject of foreign aid. At a convocation ceremony at the University of Alberta on May 13, Mr. Trudeau, who was receiving an honorary degree, devoted his entire address to this field. We therefore attach for your information a brief Appendix to this quarterly letter containing extracts from the Prime Minister's speech which you will no doubt find interesting.


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10. MISSION-ADMINISTERED AID FUNDS

✓ Many Missions may already be aware of our intention to establish funds for local administration by posts in developing countries. These funds would be expended at the discretion of the Head of Mission for the support of External Aid experts, teachers, and trainees through procurement of supplies, equipment, and materials where such are required for the satisfactory completion of their assignments. The funds will also be available, subject to certain criteria, to finance small projects in developing countries consistent with Canadian policies but not necessarily directly related to other Canadian aid projects or programs. For example, they could be used to buy equipment for schools and libraries, to secure seeds or livestock for agricultural activities; to furnish equipment to support cottage industries; or to provide otherwise unobtainable medical equipment to hospitals or dispensaries.

We have written to the Department of External Affairs requesting that their Finance Division take the necessary steps to get these funds into the hands of the Missions concerned and to advise them that we are prepared to make \$80,000 available to finance this facility. We shall be writing to all posts concerned regarding this matter in more detail shortly to explain the procedures governing disbursement of these funds and to give them more information regarding the criteria for identification of suitable projects.


M.F. Strong.

Note: For your further information we attach an extra Appendix (B) to this letter, outlining the trips abroad by External Aid Office staff over the period April to June 1968.

APPENDIX A

Extract from Address by Prime Minister Trudeau.
Convocation Ceremony at University of Alberta,
May 13, 1968.

Inequities, dramatic though they may be in parts of Canada, are but pale images of the plight of many millions of persons elsewhere in the world.... Never before in history has the disparity between the rich and the poor, the comfortable and the starving, been so extreme; never before have mass communications so vividly informed the sufferers of the extent of their misery; never before have the privileged societies possessed weapons so powerful that their employment in the defence of privilege would destroy the haves and have-nots indiscriminately. We are faced with an overwhelming challenge. In meeting it, the world must be our constituency.

If the Canadian goal is to assist other States..., then we are involved with humanity. And we are involved for our mutual benefit.... How do we benefit? In several respects:

- (a) A world community of nations freely co-operating should result in a lessening of international tension. This would lead to a world less susceptible to war. Canada and Canadians would become more secure, and in this troubled world, that would be benefit beyond measure.
- (b) A multiplicity of nations possessing expanding economies would mean that standards of living would rise and world markets would multiply. Canadian products would find more purchasers, and for a trading nation such as Canada, that would be a benefit of great value.
- (c) In times of peace, men have turned their attention towards the development of their cultures, and the enrichment of life. Canadians live more meaningfully by enjoying the works of artists and scholars of whatever national source, and that is a benefit of unquestioned value....

Canadians, I think, expect a certain selectivity in (their) programmes. We all feel instinctively that our help should go to those in the direct need, to those who will make the best use of it and to those making an honest effort to promote democratic institutions and personal liberties. Beyond this, however, difficult questions arise. Should aid be given unconditionally or should it be dependent on some concept of performance?...

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-2-

More difficult, perhaps, in domestic terms at least, is the problem of "Canadian content". It is widely held that "tied aid" diminishes the real value of development assistance by increasing costs. Yet an element of tying, with the immediate benefit it implies for Canadian production, may be an important factor in assuring wide domestic support for the aid programme.....

International cooperation, particularly in the field of economic assistance...must take on a new form. From the present pattern of commodity and food assistance...we must, in response to the economic needs of the developing countries, turn more and more to preferential trade arrangements..... this kind of aid, these preferential trade arrangements, have no glamour attached to them and (it) bears little evidence of the sweet philanthropy which we have sometimes employed in the past to coat the cost of our aid "pill". Unless Canadians are aware of the vital goal our aid is seeking to achieve, they may not be sympathetic to a change of this sort....

We must recognize that, in the long run, the overwhelming threat to Canada will not come from foreign investments, or foreign ideologies, or even - with good fortune - foreign nuclear weapons. It will come instead from the two-thirds of the people of the world who are steadily falling farther and farther behind in their search for a decent standard of living. This is the meaning of the revolution of rising expectations.

APPENDIX B

External Aid Office staff travel to the field, April to June, 1968

<u>Personnel</u>	<u>Place Visited</u>	<u>Dates</u>
Mr. E. L. Fytche	Accra	April 21 - May 1
Mr. L. D. Hudon	Around the world (by way of India, Ceylon, Pakistan & Thailand)	April 4 - 28
Mr. D. M. Madden	Bogota	April 20 - 29
Mr. J. C. Lovat-Fraser	Kingston, Jamaica	April 14 - 22
Mr. J. Bene	Malaysia, Singapore Thailand, Pakistan India, Ceylon	May 16 - June 22
Mr. R. Ricard	Malaysia Thailand India Tunisia	May 31 - June 24
Mr. F. Phillips	Singapore Ceylon Thailand	June 29 - mid July
Mr. J. Taylor	Thailand, Malaysia Cambodia	June 24 - mid July
Mr. F. Dawes	Ghana, Nigeria	June 5 - 18
Mr. G. Dorval	Tunisia	June 13 - 23
Mr. W. Coombs	Nigeria	June 20 - mid July

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

MEMORANDUM

TO
A

Sous-Secrétaire interimaire
(via. MM. *Willis, Langley*)

FROM
De

Direction des Relations entre pays francophones

REFERENCE
Référence

SUBJECT
Sujet

Aide au Sénégal

SECURITY
Sécurité

CONFIDENTIEL

DATE 1e 25 juillet 1968

NUMBER
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Depuis l'envoi d'instructions à notre ambassadeur à Dakar au sujet du Secrétariat de la Conférence des Ministres de l'Education, la lettre XAO-75 du 4 juillet adressée au Bureau de l'Aide extérieure (copie en annexe) demandant notre aide pour des bourses à des étudiants sénégalais a été portée à notre attention. A la même occasion, nous avons aussi pris connaissance de la lettre XAO-74 du 28 juin (copie également en annexe) nous faisant part des inquiétudes du Président Senghor sur la mise en oeuvre du "Prytanée". (Lycée qui, entre autres, aurait pour fonction la formation universitaire des cadets sénégalais).

2. Ces lettres, qui précèdent le télégramme n° 356 de Dakar nous avisant de la visite éventuelle d'une délégation québécoise à Dakar, ne sont pas directement reliées à la question du Secrétariat de la Conférence des Ministres de l'Education. Il est bon de se rappeler cependant que, selon les renseignements fournis par le Quai d'Orsay à l'ambassade de France à Dakar (télégramme n° 372), la délégation québécoise aurait aussi pour mission de discuter une éventuelle aide technique du Québec au Sénégal (ou à certains pays d'Afrique) et, ceci, au moment précis où le Sénégal a grandement besoin de cette aide. Dans ces conditions, l'attitude du Canada au sujet de son programme d'aide au Sénégal prend une importance capitale. De fait, il est fort possible que le Président prenne sur lui de soulever cette question à l'occasion de l'audience que nous lui avons demandée d'accorder à notre ambassadeur en vue de convaincre le Sénégal d'adopter une position qui nous soit favorable à propos du Secrétariat. Il nous semble donc hautement désirable que notre ambassadeur ne se présente pas à cette audience ou à celles qu'il aura la semaine prochaine avec les autorités sénégalaises durant la visite à Dakar de la mission québécoise, sans être en mesure de discuter notre programme d'aide à ce pays ou du moins, sans être en position à faire face avec succès à la concurrence québécoise.

.../2

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3. Les retards apportés à faire démarrer le "Prytanée" nous donnent particulièrement matière à réflexion. En plus des remarques faites par le Président Senghor et portées à notre attention par notre ambassadeur dans sa lettre XAO-74, nous savons que, à l'occasion de sa récente visite à Ottawa pour la présentation de ses lettres de créance, le nouvel ambassadeur du Sénégal à Ottawa nous a aussi fait part du mécontentement de son gouvernement quant aux lenteurs apportées à donner suite à la Mission Chevrier.

4. Quant à la demande d'aide pour les étudiants, nous croyons savoir qu'elle a reçu un accueil favorable, du moins en principe, au Bureau de l'Aide extérieur mais que la question est encore à l'étude quant aux modalités d'exécution de ce programme. Il est possible, pour diverses raisons (date tardive de la demande d'aide et qualifications académiques), qu'il soit difficile d'admettre une quantité quelconque de ces étudiants au Canada et, en conséquence, il faudra peut-être que le Canada, s'il est disposé à aider le Sénégal à cette occasion, fasse porter surtout son aide sur les fonds de contrepartie provenant du don canadien de \$500,000. en farine l'an dernier, comme le suggère notre ambassadeur à Dakar.

5. Il nous semble important que notre programme d'aide au Sénégal donne à ce pays toutes les preuves possibles de sincérité et d'efficacité au moment où une confrontation fédérale-provinciale peut s'effectuer en territoire sénégalais et surtout au moment où nous demandons au Président Senghor, qui a ses propres préoccupations, de faire en notre faveur un choix qui peut lui sembler difficile. Pour cette raison, il serait peut-être opportun qu'une démarche verbale soit faite à un niveau élevé auprès des responsables du Bureau de l'Aide extérieur (MM. Hudon ou Strong) pour leur faire part des inquiétudes que suscitent les retards apportés à faire démarrer le "Prytanée" et nos autres programmes d'aide à l'Afrique et pour discuter les possibilités d'une réponse favorable à la demande d'aide pour les étudiants sénégalais. Si, comme il est à espérer, le Bureau de l'Aide extérieur était prêt à nous assurer qu'il est disposé à faire tous les efforts nécessaires pour mettre en branle la construction du "Prytanée" et qu'il accueille avec sympathie la demande d'aide pour les étudiants nous proposerions de faire parvenir à notre ambassadeur à Dakar le court message ci-joint qu'il lui communiquer plus tard les détails d'une aide possible aux étudiants.

Voulez-vous vous charger d'une démarche auprès du Bureau de l'Aide extérieur ou préférez-vous que nous en prenons l'initiative?

Etes-vous d'accord à envoyer le télégramme ci-joint à Dakar?

Ce memorandum a été rédigé en collaboration avec la Direction de l'Afrique et du Moyen-Orient, qui l'approuve.

(SIGNED) A.E. BLANCHETTE

Direction des Relations entre
pays francophones

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES

FROM REGISTRY

JUL 3 1968

EXTERIEURES
FILE CHARGED OUT

TO:

TO
A

Le Directeur Général
Bureau de l'Aide extérieure, Ottawa

FROM
De

L'Ambassade du Canada, Dakar

REFERENCE
Référence

SUBJECT
Sujet

La Mission Chevrier: présente priorité du Prytandé

SECURITY RESTREINT

DATE Le 20 juin 1968

NUMBER XAD-74
Numéro

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Annexes

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A+M.E
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return to
M. Ferguson

J'ai eu l'occasion hier soir de s'entretenir avec le Général Diallo, le Chef d'Etat Major Général des Forces Armées du Sénégal, au moment de la visite de Saint-Louis où il avait accompagné le Président Senghar qui y était allé présenter les prix de fin d'études à l'Ecole Militaire Préparatoire.

2. La seule préoccupation du Général était de me demander où en était le Prytandé. Le Président, me dit-il, lui en avait longuement causé au cours de la journée et avait manifesté quelque inquiétude devant la lenteur que met le Prytandé à démarrer. Le Général m'expliqua l'urgence nouvelle que revêt ce projet, déjà prioritaire entre tous, à la suite de l'agitation des jeunes qui conduisit ce mois-ci à la fermeture de l'Université de Dakar et de toutes les écoles du territoire. Plus que jamais il importait d'entreprendre sans retard la formation d'une élite que seul pouvait dispenser le Prytandé.

3. J'ai fait de mon mieux pour expliquer au Général Diallo tout ce qui a déjà été mis en œuvre par les autorités canadiennes à Ottawa pour permettre l'exécution des nombreux projets retenus par la Mission Chevrier en Afrique francophone et je l'assurai que les autorités canadiennes étaient conscientes de la priorité qu'accordait le Gouvernement Sénégalais au projet du Prytandé. J'ai néanmoins ajouté que je me ferais un devoir de vous faire part de ce qu'il m'avait dit.

4. A la lumière de cette conversation, il serait superflu d'ajouter que la première démarche canadienne en vue de l'exécution du projet sera accueillie par le Président Senghar avec autant de reconnaissance que de soulagement. Envisagez-vous quelque mesure concrète prochaine dans ce sens que je pourrais lui annoncer?

L'Ambassadeur,

J. M. CÔTÉ

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES 1968

FILE CHARGED OUT

TO:

Le Directeur général
Bureau de l'Aide extérieure, Ottawa

TO
A

FROM L'Ambassade du Canada, Dakar
De

REFERENCE
Référence

SUBJECT Les suites de la crise universitaire: demande d'aide
Sujet pour des bourses à l'étranger.

SECURITY CONFIDENTIAL
Sécurité

DATE Le 4 juillet 1968

NUMBER XAD-75
Numéro

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MISSION 38-1-SEN	

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Annexes

2

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Ainsi que nous l'avons rapporté, le Président Senghor, suite à la grève des étudiants de l'Université de Dakar, décide il y a quelques semaines de fermer l'Université pour une année, au cours de laquelle on doit la réorganiser en vue de la mieux adapter aux besoins du pays. C'est ainsi que le gouvernement envisage qu'au lieu de la reconnaissance de plein droit en France, dont ont joui jusqu'à date les diplômés de l'Université de Dakar, ceux-ci ne devraient dorénavant ne jouir que de l'équivalence. Comme l'Université de Dakar est financée à raison de plus de 80% par le Gouvernement français, il sera nécessaire au Sénégal de négocier un nouvel accord avec la France. A cette fin, on attend à Dakar vers la mi-juillet une délégation française qui pourrait, paraît-il, présider Monsieur Bourges lui-même, le Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires Étrangères chargé de la coopération. Malgré certaines rumeurs, il semblerait que le Gouvernement français ne fera pas obstacle aux projets de réforme présentés par le Président Senghor.

2. C'est donc face à cette perspective d'une fermeture complète de l'Université pendant un an que le nouveau Ministre de l'Éducation Nationale, Monsieur Assane Sock, a sollicité de plusieurs missions diplomatiques à Dakar, dont la nôtre, une aide en vue de permettre au Gouvernement sénégalais de placer à l'étranger pour l'année 1968-69 les quelques 1200 étudiants sénégalais qui doivent être privés de la possibilité d'étudier au Sénégal. Selon nos informations on a approché, entre le Canada, la France, la Belgique, la Suisse, les États-Unis et la Grande-Bretagne.

3. Durant l'entretien que j'ai eu avec le Ministre de l'Éducation Nationale, je lui ai d'abord demandé s'il était vraiment définitif que l'Université resterait fermée. Il me répondit "que les chances étaient qu'elle le serait" et les chiffres qu'il me présenta sur les différentes catégories d'étudiants qui seraient affectés étaient basés sur cette hypothèse. Après en avoir récapitulé la liste (que vous trouverez à l'annexe "A"), le Ministre en arriva au cœur du problème: le Gouvernement sénégalais doit trouver les ressources non seulement pour envoyer étudier à l'étranger les centaines d'étudiants sénégalais qui jouiraient normalement d'une bourse du gouvernement pour étudier au Sénégal, mais aussi pour financer les études à l'étranger de quelques

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des élèves (universitaires et v. v. bacheliers qui normalement ne seraient pas titulaires de bourses et dont 200 environ auront maintenant besoin de l'aide d'une demi-bourse pour pouvoir étudier à l'étranger. Le Ministre nous a fourni les coûts des bourses et demi-bourses à l'étranger comparés à celui d'une bourse au Sénégal et vous trouverez ces informations à l'annexe '6'.

4. Selon le Ministre, il y aurait deux formules possibles:

- (a) les gouvernements pourraient mettre à la disposition du Gouvernement sénégalais une somme d'argent représentant un certain nombre de bourses ou demi-bourses et lui laisser le soin de s'en servir pour envoyer où il le jugera à propos le nombre correspondant d'étudiants. Le Ministre a précisé que cette formule était certes celle qui convenait le mieux aux étudiants qui étaient déjà à l'université et que ce sont ceux-là mêmes qu'on chercherait d'abord à placer dans d'autres universités africaines où les systèmes et les programmes d'enseignement leur étaient plus familiers. Ce sera également vers ces universités africaines que le Sénégal dirigera les étudiants dont le financement des bourses, n'ayant pas été assuré par une aide étrangère devra être pris en charge par le Gouvernement sénégalais.
- (b) Les gouvernements pourraient, dans le cas des nouveaux bacheliers devant commencer leur université, offrir un tel nombre de bourses dans telle discipline et dans telle université de leur pays, se chargeant eux-mêmes de tous les frais nécessaires. Ces bourses seraient d'un caractère strictement exceptionnel, en ce sens qu'elles ne seraient pas soumises aux mêmes exigences que les bourses offertes sous le programme bilatéral de l'assistance technique. D'abord, parce que le "bachot" ne se passera pas cette année avant le début octobre et qu'on ne connaîtra donc pas avant le milieu de ce mois les noms des candidats. Ensuite, parce que ces étudiants seraient, comme toute, des gens que le Sénégal "confierait" au pays hôte pour une année seulement. Mais ici aussi, se poserait le sérieux problème de la réadaptation au système africain après une année à l'étranger.

5. Décrivant la situation comme "dramatique", le Ministre exprime sa gêne de nous prendre ainsi "au dépourvu" en nous présentant cette nouvelle demande, surtout dit-il, après toute l'aide que le Gouvernement canadien vient de consentir au Sénégal par l'intermédiaire de la Mission Chevrier. Le Gouvernement sénégalais, nous dit-il, apprécie cette aide à sa juste valeur et c'est pourquoi, si nous nous trouvons dans l'impossibilité d'aider son Gouvernement à résoudre ce nouveau et pressant problème celui-ci comprendrait parfaitement.

6. Avant de vous soumettre nos commentaires, il convient de vous faire part des informations que j'ai recueillies de l'Ambassadeur de France sur la question après ma conversation avec M. Seck. L'Ambassadeur s'attend à ce que malgré la fermeture officielle de l'Université l'an prochain, on y crée un certain nombre d'instituts bien encadrés, qui recevraient entre 400 et 500 élèves, à peu près tous sénégalais. Le Président Senghor ne serait pas disposé à en envisager un nombre supérieur, par crainte des risques de nouvelles agitations anti-

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...tales. De plus, les étudiants qui constituaient l'élément principal, il fallait s'attendre à ce qu'au moins les deux-tiers ne reviennent pas. Quant aux étudiants des autres pays d'Afrique, le Président ne voulait plus recevoir les gens de la forêt tels les Camerounais (dont on en comptait 400), les Camerounais ou les Congolais, mais conseiller plutôt les étudiants des régions de la "savane". Pour les autres étudiants sénégalais, le Président se proposait d'en consacrer de 200 à 300 (ceci est strictement confidentiel) c'est-à-dire les meneurs de l'agitation et les plus "durs à cuire" et il tenterait de placer le reste à l'étranger. Le Président Houphouët-Boigny aurait fermement décidé de ne pas en accepter, mais il restait une possibilité que le Sénégal puisse en placer une centaine à l'Université de Yaoundé et peut-être 200 à celle de Tananarive. L'Ambassadeur de France me disait enfin qu'il était hors question que Paris ouvre les portes des universités françaises aux étudiants de l'Université de Dakar, d'abord en raison des problèmes aigus auxquels font face celles-ci et aussi parce que de nombreux étudiants africains auraient activement participé à la récente agitation des étudiants en France. Pour le reste donc, le Sénégal espérait placer ses étudiants dans d'autres pays dont le Canada.

7. Commentaires

Etant donné l'ampleur du programme d'aide entreprise par le Canada au Sénégal, il serait plus que compréhensible, et ceci le Ministre de l'Education Nationale me l'a souligné avec beaucoup d'insistance, que nous ne puissions répondre à cet appel de la onzième heure que nous adresse le Gouvernement sénégalais. D'autant plus que la situation d'où ce dernier désire qu'on l'aide à sortir est le résultat de la décision du Président Senghor de fermer l'Université, décision, du reste, très controversée. C'est d'ailleurs pourquoi il ne serait pas impossible que, cédant aux diverses pressions, le Président puisse consentir plus tard cet été à la relaxer du moins en partie. Les entretiens franco-sénégalais prévus pour la mi-juillet pourront peut-être nous éclairer davantage sur cette possibilité, car on peut supposer que Paris ne voit pas d'un bon oeil la fermeture d'une université dans laquelle il a tant investi. Sous le bâtonnet, il apparaît cependant probable que le Gouvernement sénégalais aura besoin à l'automne et de places à l'étranger pour quelques centaines de ses étudiants et aussi de ressources pour les y envoyer.

8. Les questions qui se posent sont donc de savoir si nous devrions tenter de faire quelque chose, et le cas échéant, quoi et comment. Nous savons déjà que la France vraisemblablement ne pourra aider. D'après nos informations, la Suisse trouverait l'échéance trop brève et serait elle aussi incapable de faire quoi que ce soit. Pour la Belgique, il faut, paraît-il, exclure la possibilité d'offre de bourses au Sénégal; en effet l'échéance pour réception des candidatures aux 15 bourses offertes par ce pays au Sénégal pour 1968-69 a été dépassée sans que les Autorités sénégalaises n'aient réussi à soumettre un seul dossier complet. Mon collègue belge de qui je tiens ces renseignements croyait que Bruxelles pourrait néanmoins trouver des places dans des universités belges pour un certain nombre d'étudiants de l'Université de Dakar, mais à la condition expresse que le Gouvernement sénégalais se charge de tous les frais, ce qui semble peu probable. Quant aux Etats-Unis, nous croyons comprendre

CONFIDENTIEL

qu'un de leur programme. Il y a voit des critères permettant à des étudiants africains d'aller étudier dans un autre pays de la même région, d'où possibilité d'un secours quelconque.

9. A la lumière des informations reçues du Ministre de l'Education Nationale, on ne peut voir comment il serait possible de placer dans des universités canadiennes, après le début des cours, des candidats encore inconnus qui n'auront pas les résultats de leur "bachot" avant la mi-octobre. Par surcroît, des étudiants qui ont peut-être participé à l'agitation universitaire ici. Même si le Gouvernement de Québec désirait saisir l'occasion de la présente crise sénégalaise pour offrir des bourses à des étudiants de ce pays, il ferait face aux mêmes difficultés. Mais c'est précisément cette possibilité d'un geste de Québec qui pourrait modifier pour nous la nature du problème que soulève la requête sénégalaise, en y ajoutant une dimension de politique interne. On peut donc se demander si dans ces conditions, il y aurait ou non avantage à ce que nous répondions de façon positive à l'appel qui nous est fait. Deux possibilités nous viennent à l'esprit. D'abord il semble d'ores et déjà certain que le Sénégal, cette année encore, ne sera pas capable de se prévaloir de la totalité des 40 bourses que nous lui avons offertes au titre de l'Assistance Technique pour 1968-69. Pourrait-on examiner la possibilité d'offrir au Sénégal la somme d'argent en dollars représentant le total des bourses qui n'auront pas été octroyées, permettant ainsi aux Autorités sénégalaises de financer l'envoi d'étudiants sénégalais dans d'autres pays africains? A défaut de ceci, il y a le fonds de contrepartie provenant du don canadien de \$500,000 en farine l'an dernier et qui, selon le Ministère des Finances sénégalais, se chiffre au delà de 90 milliards de francs CFA. Pourrait-on songer à offrir au Sénégal de mettre une partie de ces fonds à sa disposition pour financer un certain nombre de boursiers en Afrique, même si ce nombre ne devait être que d'une importance symbolique?

10. Ainsi que nous le rapportons plus haut, le Ministre de l'Education Nationale nous a déjà assurés de toute la compréhension de son Gouvernement au cas où nous ne pourrions l'aider. Du point de vue, donc, de nos relations bilatérales avec le Sénégal, rien ne sera perdu si nous devons dire non. Par ailleurs le besoin apparaît actuellement si urgent, que toute offre d'un apport canadien, si modeste fut-il, ne pourrait évidemment qu'augmenter davantage le prestige que le Canada s'est déjà acquis auprès du Gouvernement sénégalais par la générosité de son aide. C'est pour cette raison et aussi à cause de la possibilité, peut-être éloignée, de l'introduction éventuelle d'un aspect "Québec" dans la question que nous avons cru devoir vous en présenter un exposé aussi détaillé.

11. Nous vous serions reconnaissants de vouloir bien nous faire connaître vos réactions à votre meilleure convenance, nous en faisant tenir un bref résumé par télégramme, afin que nous puissions en informer les Autorités sénégalaises. De notre côté, nous ne manquerons pas de vous communiquer toute nouvelle information touchant la ré-ouverture de l'Université de Dakar à l'automne.

L'Ambassadeur,

J. M. CÔTÉ

Bourses à pourvoir en cas de fermeture de l'Université de Dakar:

A) Etudiants sénégalais déjà à l'Université et jouissant d'une bourse	
1) Boursiers du Gouvernement du Sénégal déjà à l'Université	418
ii) Boursiers du Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération déjà à l'Université	149
iii) Nouveaux bacheliers devant entrer à l'Université comme boursiers du Gouvernement sénégalais	280

NOTA: Ce nombre exclut les 104 boursiers sénégalais actuellement en France.

B) Etudiants sénégalais non éligibles pour une bourse qui doivent maintenant en recevoir une pour étudier à l'étranger.

1) Non-boursiers sénégalais déjà à l'Université	445
ii) Nouveaux bacheliers non-boursiers devant entrer à l'Université	200
	<u>645</u>

NOTA: Sur ce total de 645, au moins 200 devront recevoir l'aide d'une demi-bourse pour pouvoir aller étudier à l'extérieur.

Coûts comparatifs annuels des bourses sénégalaises à Dakar et à l'étranger (\$1.00 Canadian = 226 francs CFA)

A) Bourse à l'Université de Dakar

22,500 CFA pour dix mois	=	225,000 CFA
Contribution aux oeuvres sociales	=	30,000 "
		<hr/>
		255,000 CFA

B) Bourse à l'étranger

Bourse	=	300,000 CFA
Troussseau	=	30,000 "
Indemnité de vacances (3 mois)	=	15,000 "
Oeuvres sociales	=	120,000 "
Voyage aller-retour	=	80,000 "
		<hr/>
		545,000 CFA

C) Demi-bourse à l'étranger

Bourse	=	150,000 CFA
Autres frais	=	185,000 "
		<hr/>
		335,000 CFA

Economie/M. Faguy/CB

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

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8

TO
À Direction des Pays Francophones

FROM
De Direction des Affaires Economiques

REFERENCE
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SUBJECT
Sujet

SECURITY
Sécurité CONFIDENTIEL

DATE Le 15 mai 1968

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1

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-- Vous trouverez ci-joint le texte des réponses
que nous aimerions suggérer en ce qui a trait aux questions
"H" et "M" soumises par le bureau du Sous-Secrétaire et se
rapportant aux relations fédérales-provinciales dans le
domaine de l'aide à l'étranger.

D.H. Kirkwood

Direction des Affaires Economiques

MAF a) If you create a fuss now, you will upset the constitutional negotiations

SLA b) Why is Ottawa putting forward proposals involving only a part of the whole problem concerning federal-provincial relations

Coord + Legal c) Quebec will not allow Ottawa to force Quebec (and the other provinces) into the strait jacket of the present constitution.

SLA d) How can Quebec, as head of a federal delegation, speak for the other provinces, the Federal Government, the whole of Canada.

Coord + Legal e) Within a federal or Canadian delegation will not Quebec (or the other provinces) be restricted and unable to discharge fully its responsibilities for matters over which it has full jurisdiction. Will not the arrangement suggested by Ottawa open the door to federal intervention into provincial matters.

Coord + Legal f) Would it not be possible to let provinces speak for themselves at these conferences and call in federal representatives when and if matters of federal jurisdiction arose?

NA g) Can we not distinguish between broad political issues which can and should be left to Ottawa and technical matters coming within provincial jurisdiction. We could develop arrangements whereby representation would be arranged according to the subject matter to be discussed.

h) Can the provinces exchange teachers or students (in the field of education) without becoming involved in foreign policy.

Are
+ Coord i) ~~XXX~~ the provinces to be denied all contractual relationships with other entities abroad.

SLA j) Unless you recognize the desire of Quebec for self-expression at the international level and therefore provide an outlet for the nationalist pressures, you are creating a situation wherein the alternatives may be (a) secession; (b) requests for more substantial concessions in other fields (where the freedom to manoeuvre is not very considerable either)

SLA k) Why is Ottawa taking the initiative of attacking Quebec in this field.

Coord + Legal l) What about the proposal for a court to determine when provincial matters involve foreign policy issues (a J.-M. Léger proposal)

m) Quebec does not want to develop an aid programme but just to undertake cooperative schemes with developing countries in fields of clear provincial jurisdiction.

Shirley Vellum

original + 5

QUESTION 'M':-

↓ single spaced

double
spaced

~~Question:~~ Est-ce que le Québec ne veut pas en fait entreprendre dans des domaines de juridiction strictement provinciale des programmes d'échanges avec les pays en voie de développement plutôt que des programmes d'aide proprement dit.

~~Réponse :~~ Je crois qu'il est souvent difficile de faire la distinction entre ces deux genres de programme. De toute manière, ^{le gouvernement} ~~nous~~ ^{fédéral} ~~ne considérons que~~ ~~n'avons aucune objection à ce que le Québec entreprenne l'un ou l'autre type de programmes pourvu que ces programmes ne donnent pas lieu à la signature d'accords formels entre les provinces et les gouvernements étrangers. Le gouvernement canadien croit naturellement qu'il est ^{selon le mandat parlementaire} ~~désirable et espère donc~~ que le Québec acceptera de le consulter avant d'entreprendre de tels programmes afin de s'assurer que ces échanges sont compatibles avec les buts généraux qu'il poursuit dans les pays étrangers intéressés.~~

INVENT

(X)

QUESTION "H":-

Question: Est-ce que les provinces peuvent entreprendre des échanges de professeurs ou d'étudiants dans le domaine de l'éducation sans s'immiscer dans les questions de politique étrangère?

Réponse : Il est évident, du moins en théorie, que les échanges de professeurs ou d'étudiants entre les provinces et les pays étrangers peuvent comporter des implications pour la politique extérieure du Canada. En pratique, toutefois, ^{ÉTANT DONNÉ QUE} ~~je crois que~~ les provinces peuvent garder dans ce domaine une marge de manoeuvre importante sans pour autant soulever des difficultés en ce qui a trait à la politique étrangère canadienne. Il s'agit en fait de concerter les efforts fédéraux et provinciaux dans ce domaine. Je suis convaincu qu'il est possible d'en venir à une entente à ce sujet, de telle sorte que le gouvernement fédéral soit tenu au courant des plans provinciaux en ce qui concerne ces échanges et que nous évitions ainsi les cas rares mais toujours possible de conflit. Ce qui serait par ailleurs inacceptable, ce serait naturellement que les provinces sanctionnent ces échanges par la signature d'accords formels avec les gouvernements des pays étrangers intéressés.

(2) * ETANT DONNÉ QUE L'ÉDUCATION RELÈVE DE LA JURISDICTION DES PROVINCES, UNE ÉTROITE COLLABORATION S'IMPOSE ENTRE LES GOUV. FÉD. ET PROVINCIAUX DANS CE DOMAINE. LE GOUV. FÉDÉRAL RECONNAÎT CE BESOIN ET SE FAIT UN DEVOIR DE COOPÉRER AVEC LES PROVINCES DANS LE CHOIX DE PERSONNEL ET LE PLAN DES ÉCHANGES.

De Denise Ouellette

Le 14 mai 1984

Monsieur le Directeur

Service des relations publiques

Ministère de la Santé

Ottawa

Je vous prie de bien vouloir recevoir ci-joint le rapport que j'ai rédigé à la suite de ma visite au Centre de soins de santé communautaires de la région de la capitale nationale.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Directeur, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Denise Ouellette

EXTERNAL AID OFFICE



BUREAU DE L'AIDE EXTÉRIEURE

TO
A **Canadian Embassy,
PARIS, France**

FROM
De **Director General, External Aid Office, Ottawa
Directeur Général, Bureau de l'Aide extérieure, Ottawa**

REFERENCE
Référence

SUBJECT
Sujet **Visit of Mr. Remo Desjardins Q.C. - Vice President,
Canadian Executive Service Overseas.**

SECURITY
Sécurité

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DATE

April 24, 1968.

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c.c. Mr. M.F.Strong

Mr. L.D.Hudon
Mr. Paguy, Ex.
Affairs Econ. Div.,
Mr. N. Powers
Mr. W. Liversfield,
C.E.S.O.

Mr. Desjardins is making this tour to publicise the work which C.E.S.O. is able to undertake in the French Speaking areas of Africa.

Will you please offer him your usual excellent assistance in the course of his duties.

His itinerary is attached to this letter together with French and English versions of a descriptive pamphlet and the recent C.E.S.O. President's Report.

While Mr. Desjardins is with you we would appreciate your help in arranging interviews for him with leading business men, trade associations, Chambers of Commerce and government trade officials.

Before joining the administrative staff of C.E.S.O. Mr. Desjardins was Vice President, Administration Catolli Food Products of Montreal.

RECEIVED BY
[Signature]

for Director General

J.J.Burnett/pr

TRIP TO TUNISIA, ALGERIA AND MOROCCO

May 10th : Montreal to Paris
Air France 030
LV 8:45P.M.
AR 9:20A.M. (May 11th)

May 12th : Paris to Tunis
Air France 2701
LV 1:45P.M.
AR 4:15P.M.

May 17th : Tunis to Alger
TU 906
LV Noon
AR 12:10P.M.

May 23rd : Alger to Casablanca
AH 1602
LV 7:00P.M.
AR 11:00P.M.

May 28th : Casablanca to Paris
AT 570
LV 1:00P.M.
AR 5:00P.M.

May 31st : Paris to Montreal
Air France 031
LV 10:30P.M.
AR 1:00P.M.
