

CLASSIFIED

File No. Dossier 28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION  
Volume 38 From-De 84-05-09 To-À 84-05-31

MGID CLASSIFIÉ



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28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSI  
Vol 38

VOLS ACCESSION NO. 18848

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*P-468.669*

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EXAMINED BY / EXAMINÉ PAR  
*M. Boudoin*  
DATE *2007-03-07*

SEMI ACTIVE

DEPARTMENT  
OF  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MINISTÈRE  
DES  
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TITLE—TITRE:

DISARMAMENT -  
MEASURES -  
PLANS AND PROPOSALS -  
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION (INITIATIVES)

DESARMEMENT -  
MESURES -  
PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS -  
TRUDEAU MISSION DE PAIX (INITIATIVES)

Retention period-Période de retention:

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# CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET

DATED FROM  
À COMPTER DU

84-05-09

TO  
JUSQU'AU

84-05-31

AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - À METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER

DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS

FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTÉRIEURE VOIR

FILE NO. - DOSSIER N°

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

VOLUME

39



PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE  
OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 28, 1984

*Dear Don,*

When we met in Washington in December we talked of some of the central principles, including several you put forward in your speech to the Japanese Diet, that govern your approach to the Soviet Union and to the gravest threat to humanity, the possibility of war in the nuclear age. Your most thoughtful January 16th speech was a further indication of the principles which should underlie relations with the East.

In reflecting on our meeting and on the consultations I have had with many other world leaders, I have become increasingly convinced that there is broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of statements by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring the differences between East and West, we must concentrate on identifying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following points could form a basis on which both sides could build:

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.

The Honourable Ronald Reagan  
President of the United States of America  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.

- 2 -

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that the public acceptance of these ideas by the superpowers would be an important first step in establishing the basic political framework so essential to productive negotiations. Among the critical matters that would be facilitated by the general acceptance of such a political framework are negotiations between the superpowers on nuclear arms control and disarmament, and a renewed vigour in seeking to limit horizontal nuclear proliferation, including adequate safeguards concerning the export of nuclear technology to other countries.

- 3 -

I am writing to you and to President Chernenko commending these ideas, and seeking your public agreement with them. All Canadians fervently hope that relations between East and West will soon significantly improve, so that the stage may be set for substantial movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely, with  
*kindest regards.*

*Quinn*



CANADA

PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE  
OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 28, 1984

Dear Mr. President,

May I first reiterate how very pleased I was to meet you in Moscow and to have had the opportunity for a first exchange of views on East-West issues. Your ideas on engaging in a practical and productive political dialogue are encouraging. They suggest real prospects for a constructive East-West relationship.

In reflecting on our meeting and on the consultations I have had with many other world leaders, I have become increasingly convinced that there is broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of statements by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age. I was particularly interested in the idea of "certain norms" to regulate relations between the nuclear powers which you mentioned in your speech of March second.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on identifying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following points could form a basis on which both sides could build:

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.

His Excellency Konstantin U. Chernenko  
President of the Presidium of the  
Supreme Soviet  
Moscow, USSR

- 2 -

- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
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- Both sides realize that their security' strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that the public acceptance of these ideas by the superpowers would be an important first step in establishing the basic political framework so essential to productive negotiations. Among the critical matters that would be facilitated by the general acceptance of such a political framework are negotiations between the superpowers on nuclear arms control and disarmament, and a renewed vigour in seeking to limit horizontal nuclear proliferation, including adequate safeguards concerning the export of nuclear technology to other countries.

- 3 -

I am writing to you and to President Reagan commending these ideas, and seeking your public agreement with them. All Canadians fervently hope that relations between East and West will soon significantly improve, so that the stage may be set for substantial movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely, with

*personal regards.*

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. J. Under". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed text.



CANADA

PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE  
OTTAWA K1A 0A2

le 31 mai 1984

Monsieur le Président,

Ces derniers mois, j'ai rencontré plusieurs dirigeants de pays de l'Est et de l'Ouest, dont les présidents Reagan et Tchernenko, afin d'échanger des vues avec eux sur la situation actuelle en matière de sécurité internationale et le piètre état des relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

Je me rappelle en particulier l'entretien fort utile que nous avons eu à Bucarest, en février dernier. Nous avons alors discuté plusieurs idées et propositions destinées à réduire les tensions internationales et à stabiliser et consolider la base des rapports entre l'Est et l'Ouest.

En repensant à ces diverses consultations, je suis de plus en plus convaincu qu'en dépit de difficultés persistantes et de la regrettable absence de progrès au chapitre de la réduction des armements, il subsiste un terrain d'entente étendu et discernable entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Des déclarations faites récemment par des dirigeants des deux blocs m'incitent à croire que l'on est d'accord dans une large mesure sur les principes de base devant régir les relations internationales et, plus particulièrement, notre façon d'aborder la plus grave menace planant sur l'humanité, soit la possibilité d'une guerre nucléaire.

Sans faire abstraction de nos différences, nous devons, je pense, nous appliquer à explorer les terrains d'entente et intérêts communs aux deux camps et chercher à en tirer parti. Les dix points suivants, énoncés dans un discours que j'ai prononcé à la Chambre des communes du Canada au début de cette année, pourraient fournir une base utile dans ce sens :

Son Excellence Monsieur Nicolae Ceaucescu  
Président de la République socialiste de Roumanie  
Bucarest  
ROUMANIE

- 2 -

- De part et d'autre on reconnaît l'impossibilité de sortir vainqueur d'une guerre nucléaire.
- De part et d'autre on convient qu'il faut absolument éviter la guerre nucléaire.
- De part et d'autre on souhaite être libéré du risque de guerre accidentelle ou d'attaque par surprise.
- De part et d'autre on reconnaît les dangers inhérents aux armes déstabilisatrices.
- De part et d'autre on comprend le besoin d'améliorer les techniques de gestion des crises.
- De part et d'autre on est conscient des terribles conséquences qu'entraînerait le fait d'être le premier à recourir à la force contre l'autre camp.
- De part et d'autre on a intérêt à accroître la sécurité en en réduisant le coût.
- De part et d'autre on a intérêt à éviter la propagation des armes nucléaires dans d'autres pays, communément appelée prolifération horizontale.
- De part et d'autre on en est arrivé à reconnaître prudemment les intérêts légitimes de l'autre camp en matière de sécurité.
- De part et d'autre on a conscience que les stratégies de sécurité ne sauraient être fondées sur l'hypothèse d'un effondrement politique ou économique dans l'autre camp.

Si les dirigeants de l'Est et de l'Ouest et, en particulier, les superpuissances donnaient publiquement leur adhésion à ces idées, cela aiderait largement, à mon sens, à créer l'atmosphère et le cadre politique de base si essentiels à des négociations productives touchant les armes nucléaires comme classiques. J'ai donc tenu à vous écrire, de même qu'à d'autres dirigeants, pour livrer ces idées à votre réflexion et vous inviter à y souscrire.

- 3 -

Vous espérez comme moi, je le sais, que les relations entre l'Est et l'Ouest s'amélioreront bientôt sensiblement, de manière à favoriser l'avancement du long travail destiné à libérer l'humanité de la menace de guerre nucléaire.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'assurance de ma très haute considération *et de mon*  
*un souvenir.*

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Bill Linder". The signature is written in a cursive style with a long horizontal line extending to the right.

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TO  
À

BELGRADE

NO. IDA0937      DATE June 6/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA0829 dated June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters of Heads of Government on 10 Principles</p>	<p>FILE DOSSIER 28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION</p>
1	<p>Original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to President Djuranovic, for onward transmission.</p> <p><i>Yugoslavia</i></p> <p><u>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau</u> DIV DIARY RBR - you may wish to pass copy to local embassy</p> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	

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TO  
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BUDAPEST

NO. IDA0939 DATE June 6/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA0829 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters of Heads of Government on 10 Principles</p> <p>Original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to First Secretary Kadar, for onward transmission.</p> <p><i>1st Sect. Hungarian Socialist Workers Party Hungarian People's Republic</i></p> <p>FILE 28-6-4-Trudeau</p> <p>DIV DIARY RSR - you may wish to pass copy to local embassy.</p> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	<p><i>28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION</i></p>

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TO  
À BUCHAREST

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NO. IDA0921 DATE June 6/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA0827 dated June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles</p> <p>Original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to President Ceausescu, for onward transmission.</p> <p><i>Romania</i></p> <p><u>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau</u> DIV DIARY RBR - you may wish to pass copy to local embassy</p> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	<p>28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION</p>

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TO  
À

BRUSSELS

NO. IDA0917 DATE June 6/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA0827 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles</p> <p>Original of letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to Prime Minister Martens, for onward transmission.</p> <p><i>Belgium</i></p> <p><u>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau</u> DIV DIARY RSR - you may wish to pass copy to local embassy</p> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	<p><i>28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION</i></p>

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TO  
À ROME

NO. IDA0915 DATE June 6/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA0827 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles</p> <p>Original of letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to Prime Minister Craxi, for onward transmission</p> <p><i>Haley</i></p> <p><u>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau</u> DIV DIARY RCR - you may wish to pass copy to local embassy</p> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	<p>FILE 28-6-1-TRAUDEAU PEACE MISSION</p>

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NO. IDA0935

DATE June 6/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE				
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA0829 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles</p> <p>Original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to General Jaruzelski, for onward transmission</p> <p><i>Poland</i></p> <p>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau DIV DIARY RBR - you may wish to pass copy to local embassy</p> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	<table border="1"> <tr> <td data-bbox="1049 431 1300 463">FILE</td> <td data-bbox="1300 431 1601 463">DOSSIER</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2" data-bbox="1049 463 1601 576"> <p><i>28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION</i></p> </td> </tr> </table>	FILE	DOSSIER	<p><i>28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION</i></p>	
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BELGRADE/FOR SOFIA

NO. IDA0933

DATE June 6/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE						
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA0829 dated June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles</p> <p>Original of letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to President Zhivkov, for onward transmission</p> <p><i>People's Republic of Bulgaria</i>  <u>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau</u>                      DIV                      DIARY                      RBR - you may wish to pass copy to local embassy</p> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>FILE</td> <td>DOSSIER</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2"><i>28-6-1-TRUDEAU PERLE</i></td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2"><i>MISSION</i></td> </tr> </table>	FILE	DOSSIER	<i>28-6-1-TRUDEAU PERLE</i>		<i>MISSION</i>	
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OSLO/FOR ICELAND

NO. IDA0929 DATE June 6/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE				
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA0829 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles</p> <p>Original of letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to Prime Minister Hermannsson, for onward transmission.</p> <p><i>Iceland</i></p> <p><u>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau</u> DIV DIARY RSR - you may wish to pass copy to local embassy</p> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>FILE</td> <td>DOSSIER</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION</td> </tr> </table>	FILE	DOSSIER	28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION	
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TO  
 A LISBON

NO. IDA0931 DATE June 6/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE				
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA0829 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles</p> <p>Original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to Prime Minister Soares, for onward transmission.</p> <p><i>Portugal</i></p> <p>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau</p> <p>DIV                      DIARY</p> <p>RSR - you may wish to pass copy to local embassy</p> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>FILE</td> <td>DOSSIER</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION</td> </tr> </table>	FILE	DOSSIER	28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION	
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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

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TO  
À  
ATHENS

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1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA0833 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles</p> <p>Original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to Prime Minister Papandreou, for onward transmission.</p> <p><i>Greece</i></p> <p><u>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau</u>            DIV            DIARY            RSR - you may wish to pass copy to local embassy</p> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	<p>FILE DOSSIER</p> <p><i>28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION</i></p>

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WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDA0927 DATE June 6/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE				
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA0825 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles</p> <p>Original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to Prime Minister Gonzalez, for onward transmission.</p> <p><i>Spain</i></p> <p><u>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau</u>                      DIV                      DIARY                      RSR - you may wish to pass copy to local embassy</p> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>FILE</td> <td>DOSSIER</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION</td> </tr> </table>	FILE	DOSSIER	28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION	
FILE	DOSSIER					
28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION						

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION	RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
DATE	SIGNATURE

EXT 34/BIL. (REV. 12/70) 7530-21-029-4107 FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ
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UNCLASSIFIED
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TO  
A

COPENHAGEN

NO. IDA0925 DATE June 6/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA0825 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles</p> <p>Original of letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to Prime Minister Schlüter, for onward transmission.</p> <p><i>Denmark</i></p> <p><u>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau</u> DIV DIARY RSR - you may wish to pass copy to local embassy</p> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	<p>FILE 28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION</p>

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ
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UNCLASSIFIED
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

TO  
À OSLO

NO. IDA00923 DATE June 6, 1984

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE				
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA0825 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles</p> <p>Original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to Prime Minister Willoch, for onward transmission.</p> <p><i>Norway</i></p> <p><u>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau</u>                      DIV                      DIARY                      RSR - you may wish to pass copy to local embassy</p> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>FILE</td> <td>DOSSIER</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2">28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION</td> </tr> </table>	FILE	DOSSIER	28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION	
FILE	DOSSIER					
28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION						

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

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À UTILISER LORSQU'ON EXIGE UN ACCUSÉ DE RÉCEPTION. À L'ENVOYEUR, COMPLÉTER LES DEUX ESPACES DE SÉCURITÉ.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)
<b>UNCLASSIFIED</b>
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

TO  
À PRAGUE

NO. IDA0913 DATE June 6/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE				
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA0823 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles</p> <p>Original of Letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to Prime Minister Strougal, for onward transmission.</p> <p><i>Czechoslovakia</i></p> <p><u>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau</u> DIV DIARY RBR - you may wish to pass copy to local embassy</p> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	<table border="1"> <tr><td>FILE</td><td>28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION</td></tr> <tr><td>DIARY</td><td></td></tr> </table>	FILE	28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION	DIARY	
FILE	28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION					
DIARY						

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION	RETURN TO / RETOURNER À
DATE	SIGNATURE

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE

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À UTILISER LORSQU'ON EXIGE UN ACCUSÉ DE RÉCEPTION. À L'ENVOYEUR, COMPLÉTER LES DEUX ESPACES DE SÉCURITÉ.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO  
À  
WARSAW (for GDR)

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)
UNCLASSIFIED
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. TDA0911 DATE June 6/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE				
	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA0823 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles</p> <p>Copy of Prime Minister Trudeau's letter to Chairman Honecker, dated May 31, 1984, original of which passed to Foreign Minister Fischer in Ottawa on June 1, for transmission.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">GDR</p> <p>FILE 28-6-1- Trudeau DIV DIARY RBR</p> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>FILE</td> <td>DOSSIER</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2" style="text-align: center;">28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION</td> </tr> </table>	FILE	DOSSIER	28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION	
FILE	DOSSIER					
28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION						

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

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FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE

FOR USE WHEN SIGNATURE ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF DOCUMENTS IS NEEDED. ORIGINATOR TO COMPLETE BOTH SECURITY BLOCKS.  
À UTILISER LORSQU'ON EXIGE UN ACCUSÉ DE RÉCEPTION. À L'ENVOYEUR, COMPLÉTER LES DEUX ESPACES DE SÉCURITÉ.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)
<b>UNCLASSIFIED</b>
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

TO  
À  
THE HAGUE

NO. IDA0909 DATE June 6/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE				
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA0823 of June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles.</p> <p>Original letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984, to Prime Minister Lubbers, for onward transmission.</p> <p><i>Netherlands</i></p> <p><u>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau</u> DIV DIARY RSR - you may wish to pass copy to local embassy</p> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>FILE</td> <td>DOSSIER</td> </tr> <tr> <td colspan="2"><i>28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION</i></td> </tr> </table>	FILE	DOSSIER	<i>28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION</i>	
FILE	DOSSIER					
<i>28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION</i>						

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

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RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

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WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)
UNCLASSIFIED
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDA0919 DATE June 6/84

TO  
À

BRUSSELS/FOR LUXEMBOURG

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
1	<p>Ref: Our telegram IDA0835 dated June 1, 1984</p> <p>PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles</p> <p>Original of letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to Prime Minister Werner, for onward transmission.</p> <p><i>Luxembourg</i></p> <p><u>FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau</u>                      DIV                      DIARY                      RSR</p> <p>GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec</p>	<p>FILE DOSSIER</p> <p><i>28-6-1-TRUDEAU</i></p> <p><i>PEACE MISSION</i></p>

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

DATE

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7530-21-029-4107

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CANADA

ACC	REF	DATE
335164		
FILE	DOSSIER	
28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE		
MISSION		

PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER-MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 31, 1984

Dear Mr. President,

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

Mr. Veselin Djuranovic  
President of the Presidency  
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia  
Belgrade, Yugoslavia

- 2 -

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.

Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "R. Under". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed name "Yours sincerely,".

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

78-6-1-Trade	
25	9

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**  
 FM WSHDC UNGR2357 31MAY84  
 TO EXTOTT LIDA

INFO MOSCO BNATO LDN BONN PARIS TOKYO PEKIN ROME GENEV  
 HAGUE OSLO COPEN BRU MDRID ANKRA ATHNS LSBON PRGUE WSAW  
 BUCST BPEST BGRAD PRMNY PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN  
 NDHQOTT/PPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATE STKHM/SCDEL  
 DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD IDDR IDAN IDAO UGB URR ZSI FPR RED  
 RBR RCR RCD RBG MINE MINT

REF YOURTEL 0811 30MAY

---PM INITIATIVE:PRESS GUIDANCE ON LETTERS OF TEN PRINCIPLES  
 JUST TO POINT OUT THAT KEN DAM IS NOT/NOT DEPUTY ASST SECTY  
 OF STATE BUT DEPUTY SECTY OF STATE.THERE ARE PLENTY OF DEPUTY  
 ASST SECRETARIES OF STATE BUT DAM IS NUMBER TWO OFFICIAL IN  
 THE STATE DEPT.THIS IS FOR GUIDANCE OF POSTS WHO MAY NOT/NOT  
 BE FAMILIAR WITH LOCAL TITLES.

CCC/241 311503Z UNGR2357

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

ACC	DATE
FILE	28-6-1- Trudeau
PEACE MISSION	

*John*  
*20*

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM MOSCO XYGR0708 31MAY84  
TO EXTOTT/LIDA  
INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA DMF IFB RBD RGB RBR FPR

---PM INITIATIVE:LET TO CHERNENKO ON TEN PRINCIPLES

FOLLOWING IS TASS ENGLISH VERSION OF ITEM WHICH APPEARED IN  
TODAYS PRAVDA.QUOTE

GROMYKO RECEIVES CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

MOSCO 30MAY TASS-ANDREI GROMYKO, MEMBER OF THE POLITICAL  
BUREAU OF THE CPSU CENTRAL CTTEE, FIRST DEPUTY-CHAIRMAN OF  
THE USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER OF  
THE USSR, TODAY RECEIVED CDAS AMBASSADOR TO THE USSR, PETER  
ROBERTS.

THE AMBASSADOR HANDED OVER A MESSAGE FROM THE CDN PM, PIERRE  
TRUDEAU, TO THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL CTTEE,  
PRESIDENT OF THE PRESIDUM OF THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET  
KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO.

MAIN ATTENTION WAS GIVEN DURING THE CONVERSATION TO THE NEED  
FOR URGENT MEASURES TO DEFUSE INNATL TENSION AND RESTORE  
THE CLIMATE OF TRUST IN RELATIONS BETWEEN STATES.

THE SIDES ALSO DISCUSSED SOME QUESTIONS OF THE FURTHER  
DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET-CDN RELATIONS IN THE POLITICAL AND  
OTHER SPHERES. UNQUOTE

UUU/144 311006Z XYGR0708



CANADA

PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 31, 1984

DATE	
A.C.	335502
REL	
FILE	28-6-1-TRUMAN Peace Mission
DOSSIER	
HAND	PAR PORTEUR
ATTN.	

My dear Prime Minister,

In recent months, I have had the opportunity to meet with a number of world leaders from both East and West, including Presidents Reagan and Chernenko, to exchange views at first hand about the current international security situation and the unsatisfactory state of East-West relations.

In reflecting further on these consultations, I have been increasingly convinced, in spite of continuing difficulties and the regrettable lack of progress in the arms control field, that there remains a broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of certain recent statements made by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on surveying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following ten points, which I first put forward in a speech to the Canadian House of Commons earlier this year, could form a basis on which both sides could build:

Mr. Steingrimur Hermannsson  
Prime Minister of Iceland  
Reykjavik, Iceland

- 2 -

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.
- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
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- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that public acceptance of these ideas by leaders of both East and West, and particularly by the superpowers, would be an important step in creating the basic political framework and atmosphere so essential to productive negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional weapons fields. I am writing to you, and to other leaders, commending these ideas and seeking your agreement with them.

- 3 -

I know that you share my hope that relations between East and West will soon improve significantly, so that the stage may be set for substantive movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "R. Under". The signature is written in dark ink on a light background.

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A 0G2

June 7, 1984

H.E. Hans G. Andersen  
Ambassador of Iceland  
2022 Connecticut Avenue N.W.  
Washington, D.C.  
200028

Dear Ambassador Andersen:

Prime Minister Trudeau recently wrote to Prime Minister Hermannsson regarding additional Peace Initiative proposals. I am attaching a copy of the letter, the text of which has already been delivered in Reyjavik, as I thought it would be of interest to you.

Yours sincerely,

G. Mitchell  
Director General  
Western Europe II Bureau

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À UTILISER LORSQU'ON EXIGE UN ACCUSÉ DE RÉCEPTION. À L'ENVOYEUR, COMPLÉTER LES DEUX ESPACES DE SÉCURITÉ.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO  
À

OSLO/FOR ICELAND

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)
<b>UNCLASSIFIED</b>
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NO. IDA0929

DATE June 6/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
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1

Ref: Our telegram IDA0829 of June 1, 1984

PM Initiative: Letters to Heads of Government on 10 Principles

Original of letter from Prime Minister Trudeau, dated May 31, 1984 to Prime Minister Hermannsson, for onward transmission.

FILE 28-6-1-Trudeau

DIV

DIARY

RSR - you may wish to pass copy to local embassy

GARY J. SMITH/IDA/pec

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DATE

SIGNATURE

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**ACTION**  
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18-6-1-Trudeau  
24  
dme  
T/S

IDA 0893 5/6

UNCLASSIFIED  
FM LDN XNGR1296 30MAY84  
TO EXTOTT/IDA

REF YOURTEL IDA0777 28MAY

---PM INITIATIVE

NO RECORD OF RECEIPT OF IDA0669 HERE. WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING  
SECOND SET OF PAPERS.

UUU/083 301325Z XNGR1296

\*\*\*\*\*



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

Accession/Référence
File/Dossier 28-6-84-PRUD'OMU
PEACE MISSION
12 10

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ	UNCLASSIFIED
FM/DE	FM EXTOTT IDA069D 20MAY84
TO/À	TO USHDC <u>FAX</u>
INFO	
DISTR	DISTR IDR IDAO IDAN IDAV
REF	REF YOURTEL UNGR2349 25MAY84
SUBJ/SUJ	---DPS INITIATIVE:USA VIEWS FURTHER TO REFTEL, ATTACHED IS OTTAWA CITIZEN ARTICLE OF 25 MAY.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG S. BENNETT/AC	IDA	3-5215	SIG GARY J. SMITH

# U.S. official says Trudeau peace plan helpful

By Brian Butters  
Southam News

WASHINGTON — A senior official of the U.S. State Department Thursday provided the most praiseworthy assessment to date of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's peace initiative and

said parts of it are still under active consideration by the Reagan administration.

The official said the Trudeau initiative "came up with a lot of different ideas, a number of which were good ones."

He singled out Trudeau's suggestion that the West take a new

approach to the Mutual and Balanced Forces Reduction talks with the Soviet Union in Vienna. "I think that was actually helpful in getting NATO to agree on a new proposal, which it did and which it put forward."

His remarks came during a background briefing for reporters

covering next week's meeting here of the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic alliance.

Trudeau's proposal for a ban on high-altitude testing and deployment of anti-satellite weapons was also raised. "These are the kinds of things that are under active study in the anti-satellite area."



MESSAGE

Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE
	MISSION

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ **C O N F I D E N T I A L**

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDA0811 30MAY84  
 TO/À TO MOSCO DELIVER BY 310900  
 INFO INFO WSHDC BNATO LDN BONN PARIS TOKYO PEKIN ROME GENEV HAGUE OSLO  
 DISTR  
 REF COPEN BRU MDRID ANKRA ATHNS LSBON PRGUE WSAW BUCST BPEST BGRAD PRMNY STKAM/SEDEL  
 SUBJ/SUJ PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ CPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATA PMOOTT/COLEMAN  
 DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD IDDR IDAN IDAO UGB URR ZSI FPR RBD RBR RCR  
 RCD RBG MINE MINT  
 REF YOURTEL XYGR0704 30MAY  
 ---PM INITIATIVE: PRESS GUIDANCE ON LETTERS ON TEN PRINCIPLES  
 TASS REPORT OF YOUR 30MAY MEETING WITH GROMYKO WAS PICKED UP IMMEDIATELY  
 BY REUTERS AND REACHED CDA EARLY THIS AFTERNOON. PRESS LINE WE AND  
 PMO ARE ADOPTING ON RESPONSIVE BASIS IS SIMPLE AND STRAIGHT-FORWARD  
 RECOUNTING OF BASIC FACTS. PM TRUDEAU HAS WRITTEN TO PRESIDENTS  
 REAGAN AND CHERNENKO COMMENDING TO THEM TEN PRINCIPLES HE FIRST  
 OUTLINED IN HIS HOUSE OF COMMONS SPEECH 09FEB84. HIS INTENT IS THAT  
 PRINCIPLES MIGHT FORM BASIC COMMON BOND BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AT TIME  
 WHEN EAST-WEST-RELATIONS ARE IN RATHER POOR SHAPE AND PROGRESS IN  
 ARMS CONTROL FIELD IS STALLED. GROMYKO RECEIVED OUR AMB IN MOSCO  
 WHILE LETTER WAS DELIVERED TO DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE,  
 KEN DAM IN WSHDC. (~~SECRETARY~~ <sup>SECRETARY</sup> SCHULTZ AT TIME WAS MEETING WITH DPM/  
 SSEA AND OTHER NATO LEADERS.) WE HAVE NOT/NOT YET RECEIVED OFFICIAL  
 RESPONSE FROM EITHER USA OR USSR. PM IS WRITING SIMILAR LETTERS TO

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG GARY J. SMITH/pec	IDA	5-6689	SIG GARY J. SMITH



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE TWO IDA0811 CONFD

12|

10

OTHER LEADERS HE MET DURING HIS TRAVELS IN COURSE OF HIS PEACE  
INITIATIVE AS WELL AS TO OTHER NATO AND WARSAW PACT LEADERS.

2. GRATEFUL YOU AND OTHER POSTS UTILIZE ABOVE LINE IN CONTACTS WITH  
PRESS. WITH DIP COLLEAGUES FROM NATO COUNTRIES YOU MIGHT OUTLINE  
GROMYKOS ORAL REACTION.

FILE	DOSSIER
28-6-1-TRUDEAU	PEACE
MISSION	

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

24

*file*  
*pm*  
*no*  
*- PM INITIATIVE*  
*28-6-1-TRUDEAU*  
*28*

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**  
**FM MOSCO XYGR0704 30MAY84**

**TO EXTOTT IDA DELIVER BY 301300**

**INFO WSHDC BNATO LDN BONN PARIS TOKYO PEKIN ROME GENEV HAGUE**

**OSLO COPEN BRU MDRID ANKRA ATHNS LSBON PRGUE WSAW BUCST**

**BPEST BGRAD PRMNY PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/PPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATS**

**R MINA DMF IFB IDD IDR IDAN IDAO UGB URR ZSI FPR RBD RBR**

**RCR RCD RBG MINE MINT**

**REF YOURTEL IDA0787 28MAY**

**---PM INITIATIVE:LET TO CHERNENKO ON TEN PRINCIPLES**

**GROMYKO RECEIVED ME WITH MUNDELL FOR HALF HOUR AT 5:00 PM**

**TODAY(MFA HAD EARLIER PROPOSED I MEET WITH DEPUTY FM RYZHOV**

**BUT THIS WE DECLINED.RYZHOV WAS PRESENT AT MTG WITH GROMYKO)**

**IN PRESENTING PMS LETTER I RECALLED HAVING RECENTLY DELIVERED**

**(TO FIRST DEPUTY FM KORNIENKO)LET FROM PM SETTING OUT TWO**

**SPECIFIC CDN PROPOSALS RELATING TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT.**

**PRESENT LETTER,I EMPHASIZED,DEALT WITH BROADER POLICY**

**ISSUES AND EXPRESSED PMS STRONG BELIEF THAT,DESPITE MAJOR**

**DIFFERENCES WHICH CLEARLY SEPARATE EAST AND WEST,THERE IS**

**NEVERTHELESS EXTENSIVE COMMON GROUND ON WHICH IT WLD BE USEFUL**

**FOR USA AND USSR TO REACH PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE.I INDICATED**

**PMS SPECIAL INTEREST IN PRES CHERNENKOS PROPOSALS FOR AGREED**

**NORMS OF CONDUCT FOR NUCLEAR POWERS,NOTING THAT,AS HAD**

**BEEN DISCUSSED DURING RECENT CDN-SOV POLITICAL CONSULTS IN**

**OTT,IDEAS OF PM TRUDEAU AND GEN-SEC CHERNENKO MAY HAVE**

...2

PAGE TWO XYGR0704 CONF

CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF COMMONALITY. I SOLICITED GROMYKO'S COMMENTS ON HOW USSR INTENDED TO PURSUE THESE PROPOSALS. FINALLY, I NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH CHANGES OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP WERE IMMINENT IN CDA, INTEREST OF CDN GOVT IN THESE CRITICALLY IMPORTANT INNATL ISSUES WLD BE MAINTAINED. IMPENDING CHANGES NEVERTHELESS GAVE CERTAIN IMMEDIACY AND PERSONAL DIRECTNESS TO PMS MSG.

2. GROMYKO SAID HE WLD IMMEDIATELY CONVEY PMS LET TO CHERNENKO. IF/IF AFTER CAREFUL STUDY GEN-SEC SHLD DECIDE ON WRITTEN REPLY, THIS WLD BE CONVEYED BY DIPLO CHANNELS HERE OR IN OTT. RE NORMS OF CONDUCT PROPOSAL, GROMYKO NOTED THIS HAD BEEN PUT FORWARD BY CHERNENKO IN MAR 02/02 ELECTORAL SPEECH AND WAS NOW AVAILABLE FOR CONSIDERATION BY OTHER GOVTS. IT WAS NOT/NOT PRESENT SOVIET INTENTION TO CONVERT PROPOSAL INTO A MORE FORMAL DOCUMENT TO BE CONVEYED TO SPECIFIC GOVTS. SOVS WERE SIMPLY AWAITING REACTIONS. AS YET, NOT/NOT ALL GOVTS OF MAJOR STATES HAD CLEARLY EXPRESSED THEIR VIEWS. USA HAD ALREADY BEEN REGRETTABLY NEGATIVE, BUT THIS COINCIDED WITH GENERALLY NEGATIVE APPROACH OF USA ADMIN TO ALL MAJOR INNATE QUESTIONS. GROMYKO SAID HE SENSED A CERTAIN QUOTE TONAL HARMONY UNQUOTE BETWEEN IDEAS OF TRUDEAU AND CHERNENKO AND SAID CDA, REGARDLESS OF POLITICAL CHANGES, CAN CONTINUE TO MAKE A QUOTE CERTAIN CONTRIBUTION UNQUOTE TO FUTURE INNATE DISCUSSION OF PROPOSALS. HE SAID SOVS HAVE FOR SOME TIME

PAGE THREE XYGR0704 CONF

NOTED CDAS ACTIVE INTEREST IN MOST ACUTE CURRENT INNATL PROBLEMS, IE RE ARMS RACE AND THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR. ON CAUTIONARY NOTE, HE OBSERVED THAT OF COURSE MEASURE OF RESPONSIBILITY OF DIFFERENT COUNTRIES ON THESE MATTERS VARIED ACCORDING TO THEIR SIZE AND INTERESTS. WHEN I MENTIONED ACTIVIST CDN ROLE THROUGHOUT POST-WWII PERIOD, GROMYKO WISTFULLY RECALLED MACKENZIE KINGS ROLE AT SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE, MAKING MANY SPEECHES, QUOTE NOT/NOT ALL OF WHICH WERE CONSTRUCTIVE UNQUOTE. IN PATERNALISTIC TONE, GROMYKO REFLECTED THAT SOME COUNTRIES HAD HAD TO PASS THROUGH CERTAIN QUOTE MATURING STAGE UNQUOTE. CDA, HE WAS SURE, WLD REMAIN ACTIVIST ON WORLD STAGE AND STATE ITS OWN INDIVIDUALITY.

3. IN BRIEF EXCHANGE ON CURRENT BILATL RELATIONSHIP, GROMYKO AGREED IT WAS GENERALLY GOOD AND QUOTE DEVELOPING NORMALLY UNQUOTE. HE SAID IN AREAS OF QUOTE HIGH POLITICS UNQUOTE THERE WERE SOME DIVERGENCES BUT SOVS APPRECIATED THAT CDN LEADERHIP AND PEOPLE SEEK PEACE AND OPPOSE PATH OF MILITARY PREPARATIONS. IN AREAS OF ECONOMIC AND OTHER COOPERATION, THINGS WERE DEVELOPING QUOTE NOT/NOT BADLY UNQUOTE.

4. COMMENT: ATMOSPHERE THROUGHOUT MTG WAS RELAXED. GROMYKOS COMMENT ON CHERNENKOS NORMS OF CONDUCT PROPOSAL STRUCK US AS INDICATING THAT, AT LEAST UNTIL THERE IS SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN CURRENT E/W ATMOSPHERE, SOVS WILL LEAVE IT HANGING

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PAGE FOUR XYGR0704 CONFD

IN AIR FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES AND WILL NOT/NOT PRESS FOR  
MTGS OR OTHER PROCEDURES TO GIVE IT MORE OPERATIVE POLITICAL  
SIGNIFICANCE. MFA OFFICIALS INDICATED THEIR INTENTION TO  
ISSUE BRIEF PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT ON MY CALL, INCLUDING FACT THAT  
MESSAGE HAD BEEN TRANSMITTED. GRATEFUL YOUR EARLIEST GUIDANCE  
RE PUBLIC HANDLING OF MESSAGE VIS A VIS PRESS AND DIPLO  
COLLEAGUES.

CCC/095 301509Z XYGR0704

*file*  
*[Signature]*

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE  
MISSION.  
29

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM PRMNY WKGR1107 30MAY84  
TO EXTOTT IDD DELIVER BY 010830

DISTR IDA IDR IMU IMD

REF YOURLET IDDZ240 22MAR LEE/DELVOIE TELECONS

---PM INITIATIVE-CONSULTATIONS UNDER SECGEN

LEE AND KERGIN FINALLY CAUGHT UP WITH URQUHART YESTERDAY AND DISCUSSED SUBSTANCE OF ATTACHMENTS REFLET.URQUHART SPOKE OF HIS QUILTY CONSCIENCE UNQUOTE ON THIS SUBJECT AS HE FEARED LITTLE HAD HAPPENED WITHIN SECT SINCE PM VISIT.(WE NOTED CONTINUING CHINESE INTEREST, FOR ONE.)URQUHART ASKED WHETHER WE COULD GIVE HIM NON-PAPER. WE AGREED CONSIDER POSSIBILITY.URQUHART NOTED RELEVANCE OF IDEAS TO PLANNED(BUT NOT/NOT YET ANNOUNCED)VISIT BY SECGEN TO CHERENKO IN JULY.

2.AS DISCUSSED,BELIEVE ATTACHMENTS TO REFLET ESPECIALLY ANNEX ARE TOO DETAILED AT THIS STAGE.YET CONSIDER TIMING IMPORTANT:SECGEN AND URQUHART LEAVE FOR MIDEAST TOUR THIS WEEKEND FOR TWO WEEKS AND WOULD LIKE TO GET ANY NON-PAPER TO URQUHART BEFORE DEPARTURE IF POSSIBLE.

3.PROPOSE PERSONAL NOTE DATED JUN1 FROM LEE TO URQUHART ATTACHING NON-PAPER FOR HIS REFLECTION.TEXTS FOLLOW.

LET BEGINS:DEAR BRIAN, YOU WILL RECALL THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN OUR PM AND THE SECGEN LAST JANUARY IN WHICH THE PROPOSAL FOR A FIVE POWER CONFERENCE WAS DISCUSSED,ALONG WITH OTHER IDEAS.IN OUR

PAGE TWO WKGR1107 CONF

SUBSEQUENT TALKS ON THESE MATTERS, I SKETCHED OUT FOR YOU A FEW THOUGHTS ON HOW THE PROCESS MIGHT BEGIN. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR SUGGESTION, I ATTACH A BRIEF NON-PAPER, WHICH YOU MAY FIND HELPFUL IN REFLECTING ON THE SUBJECT FURTHER WITH YOUR SENIOR COLLEAGUES IN THE SECRETARIAT. BEST PERSONAL REGARDS, DAVID. ENDS.

4. NON-PAPER BEGINS:

FIVE POWER CONSULTATIONS IN THE UN FRAMEWORK

- THE FIVE PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL SHARE SPECIAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE CHARTER;
- THEY ALSO SHARE SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITIES ARISING FROM THEIR DECLARED NUCLEAR WEAPONS POWER STATUS;
- DESPITE DIFFERENCES, THEY HAVE CERTAIN INTERESTS IN COMMON;
- THESE SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES AND INTERESTS RELATE, INTER ALIA, PARTICULARLY TO
  - THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER,
  - THE MANAGEMENT OF THEIR NUCLEAR FORCES IN SUCH A WAY AS TO AVOID ACCIDENTS AND INSTABILITY,
  - OBLIGATIONS IN RELATION TO THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.
- ACCORDINGLY, THE FIVE POWERS COULD USEFULLY HOLD INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS ON THE MANAGEMENT OF THESE RESPONSIBILITIES AND INTERESTS;
- A NEUTRAL, DISCREET AND SERIOUS SETTING COULD BE PROVIDED BY THE

PAGE THREE WKGR1107 CONF

SEC GEN WHO COULD INITIATE SUCH CONTACTS THROUGH THE PERMAMENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FIVE POWERS TO THE UN.

-CONSIDERATION WOULD BE REQUIRED OF THE ELEMENTS TO BE DISCUSSED IN SUCH TALKS. POSSIBLY IN INITIAL PHASES THE TALKS MIGHT FOCUS ON THOSE ISSUES WHERE THE GREATEST COMMONALITY OF INTERESTS MIGHT EXIST;

-ELEMENTS FOR POSSIBLE CONSIDERATION IN SUCCESSIVE PHASES MIGHT INCLUDE:NUCLEAR CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES,MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE NPT REGIME,CRISIS MANAGEMENT,ISSUES CONCERNING NEW DESTABILIZING TECHNOLOGIES,QUESTIONS RELATED TO LIMITING NUCLEAR FORCES.

ENDS.

CCC/085 010010Z WKGR1107



MESSAGE

Accession/Référence
File/Dossier 28-6-1-TRUDEAU
<i>PEACE MISSION</i>

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY  
SÉCURITÉ

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

12

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FM/DE

FM EXTOTT IDA0777 28MAY84

TO/À

TO LDN

INFO

REF YOURTEL XNGR1250 24MAY

DISTR

REF

---PM INITIATIVE

SUBJ/SUJ

FULL TEXT OF LETTERS AND ATTACHMENTS TO CHERNENKO AND REAGAN SENT TO YOU OURTELS IDA0667 AND IDA0669 09MAY (LETTERS AND ATTACHMENTS IDENTICAL). IDA0669 (PAPERS) BAGGED.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG P.E. COCKER/pec

IDA

2-3430

SIG GARY J. SMITH

AG

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

*J.L.*  
28-6-1-Trudeau  
~~20-4-7~~  
24 9

R E S T R I C T E D

FM MOSCO XYGR0693 29MAY84

TO EXTOTT IDA DELIVER BY 290900

INFO BNATO WSHDC BONN LDN STKHM ATHNS DSLAM BAIRS BGRAD

BUGST DELHI MXICO PARIS ROME PCOOTT/COWLER

DISTR MINA UGB IFB RED RGB IMD IMU RBR IDR IDD URR GAA PSR

ZSI ZSP LSR IDAO IDAN

---SIX-NATION PEACE INITIATIVE

ARTICLE IN OFFICIAL GOVT NEWSPAPER IZVESTIA 26MAY BY POLITICAL  
NEWS ANALYST V.MATVEYEV EXPLICITLY COMMENDS PM TRUDEAUS  
SUPPORT FOR SIX-NATION PEACE INITIATIVE, IN CONTRAST TO WHAT  
IS DESCRIBED AS OUT-OF-HAND AMERICAN REJECTION.

2.MATVEYEV PORTRAYS INITIATIVE IN GENERALLY FAVOURABLE TERMS  
AS REFLECTING GROWING GLOBAL CONCERN TO AVERT THREAT OF  
NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE.HE WRITES THAT OFFICIAL WSHDC WAS QUOTE  
COMPELLED UNQUOTE TO TAKE NOTICE OF DECLARATION AND REPORTS  
STATE DEPT SPOKESMAN AS VOICING SUPPORT FOR GOALS OF  
INITIATIVE WHILE REJECTING PROPOSAL FOR NUCLEAR ARMS  
PRODUCTION FREEZE.THIS MEANS,SAYS MATVEYEV,THAT USA  
OFFICIALS,WITHOUT EVEN EXAMINING DOCUMENT,ARE QUOTE REJECTING  
IT OUT OF HAND UNQUOTE.HE CONTINUES:QUOTE THE NEAR  
FUTURE WILL SHOW HOW THE GOVTS OF WEST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES  
WILL RESPOND TO THIS DOCU.IT IS CHARACTERISTIC THAT CDN  
PM PIERRE TRUDEAU CAME OUT WITH A DEFINITE SUPPORT FOR THIS

...2

PAGE TWO XYGR0693 RESTR

INITIATIVE UNQUOTE.

3.MODERATE SOV MEDIA COVERAGE OF INITIATIVE HAS SO FAR FOCUSED AS MUCH ON ALLEGED NEGATIVE USA RESPONSE AS ON SUBSTANCE OF INITIATIVE ITSELF.SWEDISH COLLEAGUE CONFIRMS THERE HAS AS YET BEEN NO/NO OFFICIAL REACTION FROM SOVIET GOVT TO INITIATIVE.

CCC/144 291200Z XYGR0693

*Mr. Burney*  
*Mr. Smith*

UGB D.H. Burney/3-7873/ps

33

TO/À ADDRESSEES LISTED IN DISTRIBUTION

FROM/DE • UGB

REFERENCE •  
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • MEETING BETWEEN PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU AND  
SUJET AMBASSADOR ROBINSON: MAY 28, 1984

*IDD*

Security/Sécurité
<b>CONFIDENTIAL</b>
Accession/Référence <b>343967</b>
File/Dossier <b>18-b-1-Trudeau</b>
Date <b>May 29, 1984</b>
Number/Numéro <b>UGB-Q77</b>

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

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WSHDC/Gotlieb  
(by FAX)

*consulte en DIU*

*file on PM INITIATIVE.*

*M June 4*

Attached is a copy of the Record of Discussion of the American Ambassador's meeting with Prime Minister Trudeau yesterday.

*B.*

D.H. Burney  
Assistant Deputy Minister  
(United States)

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF DISCUSSION

MEETING BETWEEN  
PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU AND AMBASSADOR ROBINSON  
MAY 28, 1984

Setting and Summary

The meeting with the Prime Minister was arranged as the result of a longstanding request by the Ambassador. It coincided with a lead story in the Ottawa Citizen the same day in which Ambassador Robinson was alleged to have predicted in an interview that the next Canadian Prime Minister would "tone down" or "back-pedal" on nationalism. On his arrival at the Centre Block, Ambassador Robinson was asked by the press whether he had been summoned for a reproach by the Prime Minister. He had rejected this suggestion and had tried to dissociate himself from the headline attached to his interview.

The discussion with the Prime Minister began with a reference to the story in the news by a somewhat flustered Ambassador. Otherwise, there was no specific theme for the discussion. There was a generally upbeat exchange on the state or spirit of the bilateral relationship, each offering assessments from his distinct vantage point. The Prime Minister underscored the need for balance between affirmations of political independence by Canada and other U.S. allies and a trend towards closer economic interdependence.

The meeting lasted less than twenty minutes.

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RECORD OF DISCUSSION

MEETING BETWEEN  
PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU AND AMBASSADOR ROBINSON  
MAY 28, 1984

The meeting began with a reference to the Ottawa Citizen's lead story in which the Ambassador had been reported as suggesting that the next Canadian Prime Minister would "tone down nationalism". Ambassador Robinson indicated that the headline and the interpretation in the article were not based on what he had actually said. Specifically, he said that words like "back-peddling" were not part of his vocabulary. The reporter had tried everything possible to get him to say that the U.S. would prefer to see the Conservatives in power in Canada. He had denied this, contending that the U.S. was prepared to work with either a Conservative or Liberal government. (The NDP, he added, was another matter.)

The Ambassador said that relations between Canada and the U.S. had improved dramatically in the last two years. He was personally grateful to the Prime Minister and the Canadian Ministers for their cooperation. Although he tried repeatedly to tell the Canadian press that the President and the Prime Minister got along very well, the media did not regard such judgments as news.

The Prime Minister said that he and the Ambassador had sized one another up as individuals a long time ago. The Ambassador was a right-wing Republican and represented that point of view whereas, as some would say, the Prime Minister was more of a left-leaning Liberal. It was obvious that the United States could do serious damage to Canada if it ever wanted to and that Canada would be obliged to retaliate in whatever form it could. What was important, however, was that we tend to get along even when we disagree. Ambassador Robinson's style was not that of typical Ambassadors, but it had not offended the Prime Minister. "I try to run Canada; you represent another country in Canada. I have never felt that you were ever after me personally. I recognize you disagree with some of our policies, just as we disagree with some of your policies."

The Ambassador repeated that several in the Canadian media claimed that the U.S. Embassy was secretly behind the PCs. He said his job, as he saw it, was to state the U.S. position, take the heat when the occasion merited, and "so be it". He had a life-long affection, if not

... 2

love, for Canada which, if he were to state publicly, would be regarded as patronizing or condescending. He certainly did not see his role as doing anything that would be detrimental to Canadian interests.

Less than four months after his arrival in Ottawa, Robinson had been called to Washington to meet with the President and the full Cabinet to discuss possible retaliation measures against Canada. At that time he had urged the Reagan Administration to allow more time for things to be worked out. Secretary Baldrige and Ambassador Brock had been opposed to this point of view and had wanted to take swift retaliatory action. Secretaries Regan and Haig shared the Ambassador's position which eventually carried the day. Subsequently, the Canadian Government's November 12 budget was seen as both fair and conciliatory, and the Ambassador was then able to demonstrate that he had "kept the lid on" and that his strategy had been the right one.

The Prime Minister said that balance was important for two countries as diverse in terms of power as Canada and the United States. As noted in his recent speech to U.S. editors and publishers in Montreal, the industrialized economies were becoming more integrated and more interdependent as a result of technological and structural change. In order to offset the economic reality of this trend, the United States was bound to see its friends in Canada, Germany, the U.K., etc. make affirmations of political independence. That was the necessary balance. If, said the Prime Minister, we were afraid that the United States might swallow us - as we may have been twenty years ago - it would have been more difficult to resolve issues in the manner that we have. Therefore, a certain nationalism or assertions of identity are important if we are to cooperate in areas such as sectoral trade. Any talk of sectoral trade fifteen or twenty years ago would have destroyed Canadian politicians as it did for Laurier in 1911. However, now that we have established a stronger sense of independence, we were able to take various actions, e.g. bringing a fisheries dispute to the world court, resolving problems such as the Skagit, and making progress through compromise on issues like the Garrison diversion. We will continue to disagree, but the important thing is that we continue to work to resolve differences.

The Ambassador referred to the OECD candidacy of Marc Lalonde. On that the United States and Canada had disagreed, but the difference was essentially on a national basis, not ideological.

The Ambassador stated that a spirit of fair play was central to Canada/U.S. exchanges. The quarterly meetings between Secretary Shultz and Mr. MacEachen were "great"; a lot has been accomplished through these meetings even though the press remains skeptical. At these meetings the two sides not only talk but also listen carefully to one another's point of view.

? }  
The Prime Minister noted that, on peace, he and the Ambassador were in full agreement and thought that he (the Prime Minister) had received a pretty fair hearing on this issue in Washington. The Ambassador observed that no one could gainsay the Prime Minister on the peace issue. Mr. Trudeau helped raise the Stockholm meeting to the Ministerial level and helped reduce the rhetoric on East-West relations. There had been a danger that someone might seize or take advantage of the Prime Minister's effort, but that had not happened. "We did not lose as a result of your effort; we gained."

The Prime Minister said he was not inclined to worry too much about the past. The Canada/U.S. relationship was ongoing. Issues needed to be resolved or managed as they emerged. He was confident that the present spirit would continue with his successor. He was amused when the Opposition Leader suggested that he would restore the Canada/U.S. relationship to the status it had enjoyed fifteen to twenty years ago. The Prime Minister recalled the shouting match between Prime Minister Pearson and President Johnson (over Vietnam) and the chilly atmosphere which had characterized the Diefenbaker-Kennedy years. He added that, even when Canada disagreed with the United States on interest rates or fish questions, or when the United States disagreed with Canada on energy policy, relations had not deteriorated to the point where he and the President had been shouting at one another. Therefore, the Prime Minister was not inclined to take the Opposition Leader's statement too seriously. Although there had certainly been occasions when he did not regard U.S. internal or international policies as right, it was his view that the successive U.S. Administrations that he had dealt with had been good for Canada.

The Ambassador observed that his successor (as well as the Prime Minister's) would have it much easier as a result of the good mood now prevailing. We will always have problems, but the mechanisms now in place are working.

The Ambassador said he would maintain his close interest in Canadian affairs even after he leaves Ottawa. The Prime Minister asked if the Ambassador's departure was imminent. The Ambassador said he was not likely to be here for more than a year. If the Reagan Administration is not re-elected, he would of course resign. If the Administration is elected, "as now seems likely", the Ambassador said he might stay to see through the transition, whatever form it takes. Alternatively, he might be asked to take up a position in Washington or some other post; whatever he was offered would be O.K. with him.

Ambassador Robinson concluded by expressing sincere thanks for the honest friendship he had enjoyed with the Prime Minister and Canadian Cabinet Ministers. "Our disagreements have never been mortal." He wanted to continue in that spirit with the next Prime Minister.

The Prime Minister said that the best testimony to the efforts of the Ambassador and his wife is the way we are now solving problems between our two countries. "You have made a lot of friends in Canada."

MINA (3)           IDD  
MINE               IDR  
MINT (2)           RBD  
PARL SEC           RBR  
USS                FILE  
DMF                DIV  
DMT                DIARY  
FPR                IFB  
CPD  
CMRR (2)

RETURN  
TO  
IDA

728-6-1-Trudeau  
28-COMBLOC-1-GDR  
G.J. Smith  
Arms Control and  
Disarmament Division  
995-6689

CONFIDENTIAL

May 29, 1984

IDA-0801

Memorandum for the Deputy Prime Minister and  
Secretary of State for External Affairs

c.c. Minister for External Relations  
c.c. Minister for International Trade

Subject: Prime Minister's Peace Initiative:  
Arms Control Consultations with  
German Democratic Republic (GDR)

Purpose:

To seek your agreement that Canadian and GDR arms control consultations take place in East Berlin at the end of June and that you convey this decision to GDR Foreign Minister Fischer during his meeting with you in Ottawa June 1.

Background:

During the Prime Minister's visit to East Berlin on January 30-31, he drew Chairman Honecker's attention to the fact that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact had a tendency to dismiss out of hand as pure propaganda or posturing proposals emanating from the other side. He used as an example the Prague Declaration of January 1983 and the NATO Brussels Declaration of December 1983. Both of these declarations, he said, had positive elements in them which should be explored. He accordingly proposed that arms control experts from each side should examine the positions of their respective alliances to determine where possible common elements might exist such as in the fields of chemical weapons and outer space. Mr. Honecker quickly agreed. Gary Smith, Director of Arms Control & Disarmament Division, and Ambassador Krabatsch, who is in charge of "fundamental questions" with the GDR Foreign Ministry, both of whom were present at the meeting, were specifically tasked for this purpose. It was suggested that each side exchange papers through diplomatic channels and then meet to consider them.

While public announcement of this agreement was welcomed in some quarters, including elements of the media,

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30.5.2(us)

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as representing "one of the few concrete achievements of the initiative", it also gave rise to expressions of concern from the Official Opposition about "giving NATO secrets to the GDR". Expressions of concern were also heard from some of our allies as to exactly what this agreement entailed and about Canada speaking on behalf of the NATO Alliance. FRG officials in particular expressed reservations about our dealing with the GDR in this manner (this was partially a reflection of an FRG desire that other governments not give too much status to the GDR).

Given these reactions, it was the view of officials that this aspect of the initiative should be pursued with a certain amount of caution and indeed little action has been taken on this front to date. Interestingly, the GDR itself has not pressed this point, although the GDR Ambassador, resident in Washington, during a recent visit to Ottawa did ask us how we intended to proceed.

At a recent luncheon with the Prime Minister and members of the Task Force, the above situation was explained to him in response to his question as to how the matter stood. While he understood the reasons for delay and caution, he nevertheless expressed certain disappointment and frustration that there should be difficulty with the general idea of two middle powers from different alliances pursuing common elements in the arms control field. It was stated to him that we were examining the most propitious way to proceed and that after having discussed the matter further with some of our allies, including the FRG, USA and UK, we now favoured a more typical consultative process with the GDR in which we would review the current state of arms control but not attempt to exchange any papers or reach any agreed alliance positions. Such an arrangement would not cause problems for our allies and indeed general arms control discussion on a bilateral basis between Warsaw Pact and NATO countries is a fairly common occurrence.

Recommendation:

As the GDR Foreign Minister will expect to hear from you on this subject when you receive him in Ottawa on Friday, June 1, it is recommended:

- (a) that you inform him that Canadian officials (one or two) are prepared to visit East Berlin at the end of June for one day, either June 27, 28 or 29, for general arms control consultations; and

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(b) indicate, on a responsive basis, that it is not our intention to exchange any type of agreed paper.

Do you agree?

*Michael Shenstone*

Michael Shenstone  
Assistant Deputy Minister  
Political and International  
Security Affairs

Original Signed by  
**de MONTIGNY MARCHAND**  
de Montigny Marchand

*File*  
*28-6-1-Trudeau*  
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**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2352 29MAY84

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RBD RBR RCR RCD RGB

REF YOURTEL IDA0791 28MAY

---PM INITIATIVE:LET TO REAGAN

GOTLIEB DELIVERED PMS LET TO DEP SEC OF STATE KEN DAM THIS PM.  
DAM IN ACCEPTING LET SAID THAT USA APPRECIATES THE SPIRIT IN WHICH  
THE LET WAS WRITTEN BUT THAT HE HAD NO/NO PARTICULAR REACTION TO  
THE TEN PRINCIPLES DESCRIBED IN LET AT THIS TIME. THE USA WILL  
TAKE A CAREFUL LOOK AT THE PRINCIPLES TO SEE IF THEY BELIEVE  
THEY CONSTITUTE A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH TO PROBLEM OF EAST/WEST  
RELS AT THIS TIME. DAM REITERATED THAT USA VERY MUCH APPRECIATES  
THE SPIRIT IN WHICH PM PUT FORWARD HIS IDEAS.

CCC/241 292119Z UNGR2352

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE — NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO  
À

SCOW — AMBASSADOR ROBERTS

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. IDA0793 DATE 28MAY84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION — DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE — RÉFÉRENCE
	<p>Ref: ourtel IDA0791 May 28 ✓</p> <p>Original Letter from Prime Minister Trudeau to President Chernenko</p> <p>cc: RBD RBR IDA IDA/G.G.Smith/pec</p>	<div data-bbox="1078 315 1461 517" style="border: 2px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p>PEACE. MISSION 28-6-1-TRUDEAU 9</p> </div>

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

DATE

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TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE — NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO \*  
À WASHINGTON

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANEXE(S)

NO. IDA-0789

DATE 28MAY84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION — DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE — RÉFÉRENCE
	<p>Ref: Ourtel IDA0791 28May84</p> <p>Letter from Prime Minister <u>Trudeau</u> to President Ronald Reagan dated May 28, 1984</p> <p>cc: URR UGB IDJ</p> <p>IDA/G.J.Smith/pec</p>	28-6-1-Trudeau

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

DATE

SIGNATURE



Government of Canada  
Privy Council Office

Gouvernement du Canada  
Bureau du Conseil privé

Ottawa, Canada  
K1A 0A3

CONFIDENTIAL

May 28, 1984

FILE	DOSSIER
<i>file 1</i>	
<i>28-6-84 - Trudeau</i>	
<b>PEACE MISSION</b>	

*sent to let  
my 2F  
SFF.  
IDA 787 & 791*

Dear Gary,

Attached for transmission to addressees and for appropriate distribution within the Department are letters signed by the Prime Minister on May 28, 1984:

	<u>PMO #</u>
His Excellency Konstantin U. Chernenko President of the Presidium of the Suprem Soviet Moscow, USSR	none
The Honourable Ronald Reagan President of the United States of America The White House Washington, D.C.	none

Yours sincerely,

Robert R. Fowler  
Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet  
Foreign and Defence Policy

Mr. Gary J. Smith  
Director - IDA  
Arms Control and Disarmament Division  
Department of External Affairs  
Lester B. Pearson Building  
Tower A, 6th Floor  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0G2

Canada

Unofficial translation

The Right Honourable  
Pierre E. Trudeau,  
Prime Minister of Canada,  
Ottawa, Canada

QUOTE

Dear Mr. Prime Minister!

I would like to share the concerns at the situation in the world you have expressed in your letter. The situation is indeed tense and this impels responsible statesmen and politicians to give increasingly serious attention to the problem of removing the military threat, improving the prospects of securing peace.

We are deeply convinced that this objective calls for stopping the arms race in the first place. It is quite obvious that the build-up of arsenals, particularly those of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, far from consolidating international security has the opposite effect of undermining it. Each new step along the way of escalating military preparations increases the probability of a nuclear catastrophe.

Guided by the desire to reverse this ruinous course of developments, the Soviet Union has advanced a whole range of proposals which, if implemented, would allow to freeze nuclear arms in quantity and in quality, to

prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space, to commence talks on radical reductions and ultimately on eliminating nuclear arms. I would like to stress that we are in favour of working out efficient, far-reaching agreements supplemented by measures of the most effective and strict verification and control. The stumbling block is the stand of the US Administration which has created obstacles in the way of talks on strategic and european nuclear weapons, keeps up its futile pursuit of the phantom of military superiority while giving lip service to a constructive dialogue with the Soviet Union on the issues of war and peace.

As to the considerations you have put forward seeking to facilitate verification of certain types of weapons I would like to note that these issues were among others under discussion at the Soviet-American talks in Geneva at the time when these talks broke off because of the start of the deployment of new US missiles in Western Europe. The removal of these missiles from the European soil would unblock the way to resuming the talks and the discussion of issues you have raised in your letter.

Allow me in conclusion to express the hope that you will continue your efforts aimed at eliminating the threat of war and consolidating peace.

With best regards,

June 6, 1984

K. Chernenko

UNQUOTE



MESSAGE

Accession/Référence
File/Dossier 28-6-1-Trudeau
9

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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ **C O N F I D E N T I A L** 12 10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDA0787 28MAY84

TO/À TO MOSCO DELIVER BY 290900-7

INFO INFO WSHDC BNATO LDN BONN PARIS TOKYO PEKIN ROME GENEV HAGUE OSLO

DISTR

REF COPEN BRU MDRID ANKRA ATHNS LSBON PRAGUE WSAW BUCST BPEST BGRAD

SUBJ/SUJ PRMNY PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ CPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

*mine mint*

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD IDR IDAN IDAO UGB URR ZSI FPR RBD RBR RCR RCD

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---PM INITIATIVE: LET TO CHERNENKO ON TEN PRINCIPLES

COPIED BELOW IS TEXT OF LET, DATED 28MAY, FROM PM TRUDEAU TO PRESIDENT CHERNENKO DEALING WITH 10 PRINCIPLES THAT PM BELIEVES COULD FORM ~~SOME~~ COMMON GROUND AND BASIS ON WHICH BOTH EAST AND WEST COULD BUILD IN CURRENT SITUATION. PRINCIPLES WERE FIRST OUTLINED BY PM IN HIS SPEECH TO HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 09FEB84.

(FYI: TRANSMISSION TO WORLD LEADERS ONLY TAKING PLACE AT THIS TIME DUE TO ATTEMPT TO SECURE ALL-PARTY AGREEMENT FOR RESOLUTION IN HOUSE WHICH HAS NOW BEEN ABANDONED DUE TO NDP INSISTENCE ON INCLUDING CALL FOR NUCLEAR FREEZE, ENDING OF CRUISE TESTING AND NO-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS). LETTERS TO LEADERS OTHER THAN CHERNENKO AND REAGAN THAT PM MET WITH DURING COURSE OF HIS PEACE INITIATIVE (AS WELL AS OTHER NATO AND WPO HE DID NOT SEE) ARE EXPECTED TO BE SIGNED LATER THIS WEEK AND WILL BE FORWARDED TO POSTS FOR TRANSMISSION.

2. FOR AMB ROBERTS: ORIGINAL OF LET BEING FORWARDED BY BAG 01JUN.

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR  SIG GARY J. SMITH/pec	DIVISION/DIRECTION IDA	TELEPHONE 5-6689	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ  SIG GARY J. SMITH
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PAGE TWO IDA0787 CONFD

*AS AGREED WITH RBR*

YOU SHOULD INSIST ON SEEING GROMYKO TO DELIVER THIS LETTER MAKING IT CLEAR THAT YOUR INSTRUCTIONS DO NOT/NOT PERMIT YOU TO SEE ANY SUBSTITUTE. (IN HANDLING ANY RESISTANCE YOU COULD ~~MENTION~~ *ALLUDE AS REQUIRED TO FACT* THAT SOVIET DEPUTY FM RYZHOV HAD VERY LENGTHY MTG WITH MIN PEPIN, MET WITH DPM/SSEA FOR 40 MINUTES ON WHAT WAS TO HAVE BEEN TEN-MINUTE COURTESY CALL, AND *WAS PRESENTED TO* ~~SHOOK HANDS AND HAD FEW WORDS WITH~~ PM TRUDEAU DURING RECEPTION AT ARTS CENTRE). DURING MTG YOU MIGHT SEEK TO OBTAIN CLARIFICATION FROM GROMYKO ABOUT WHAT SOVIETS HAVE IN MIND BY CHERNENKOS QUOTE NORMS OF CONDUCT UNQUOTE FOR NUCLEAR POWERS AND WHAT USE THEY INTEND TO MAKE OF THEM. SOVIET OFFICIALS AS YOU KNOW HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THERE ARE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN CHERNENKOS ~~VIEW~~ *NORMS* AND PMS 10 PRINCIPLES AND IT WAS AGREED BETWEEN DMF AND RYZHOV THAT CDN/SOVIET OFFICIALS WOULD MEET TO DISCUSS THIS FURTHER WHICH WE WOULD INTEND TO DO DURING COURSE OF SOVIET/CDN ARMS CONTROL CONSULTATIONS WHICH WERE ALSO AGREED BETWEEN DMF/RYZHOV (WE HAVE SUGGESTED THESE TAKE PLACE IN MOSCO IN AUTUMN AND WOULD BE LED ON CDN SIDE BY IDD/DELVOIE).

3. TEXT OF LET FOLLOWS: (Comcentre please copy attached)



CANADA

PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE  
OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 28, 1984

Dear Mr. President,

May I first reiterate how very pleased I was to meet you in Moscow and to have had the opportunity for a first exchange of views on East-West issues. Your ideas on engaging in a practical and productive political dialogue are encouraging. They suggest real prospects for a constructive East-West relationship.

In reflecting on our meeting and on the consultations I have had with many other world leaders, I have become increasingly convinced that there is broad and identifiable common ground between East and West. As a result of statements by leaders of both sides, I see a considerable measure of agreement on the basic principles which should govern international relations and, more particularly, our approach to the gravest threat to mankind, the possibility of war in the nuclear age. I was particularly interested in the idea of "certain norms" to regulate relations between the nuclear powers which you mentioned in your speech of March second.

Without ignoring our differences, we must concentrate on identifying and then building upon mutual interests and common ground. The following points could form a basis on which both sides could build:

- Both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won.
- Both sides agree that a nuclear war must never be fought.

His Excellency Konstantin U. Chernenko  
President of the Presidium of the  
Supreme Soviet  
Moscow, USSR

- 2 -

- Both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack.
- Both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons.
- Both sides understand the need for improved techniques of crisis management.
- Both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of being the first to use force against the other.
- Both sides have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost.
- Both sides have an interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, so-called horizontal proliferation.
- Both sides have come to a guarded recognition of each other's legitimate security interests.
- Both sides realize that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side.

I believe that the public acceptance of these ideas by the superpowers would be an important first step in establishing the basic political framework so essential to productive negotiations. Among the critical matters that would be facilitated by the general acceptance of such a political framework are negotiations between the superpowers on nuclear arms control and disarmament, and a renewed vigour in seeking to limit horizontal nuclear proliferation, including adequate safeguards concerning the export of nuclear technology to other countries.

- 3 -

I am writing to you and to President Reagan commending these ideas, and seeking your public agreement with them. All Canadians fervently hope that relations between East and West will soon significantly improve, so that the stage may be set for substantial movement in the long process of freeing all mankind from the threat of nuclear war.

Yours sincerely, with

*personal regards.*

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. J. Under". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the typed text.



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

MESSAGE

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

28-6-1-TRUDEAU

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28 MAY 84 17:51Z 10

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ  
CONFIDENTIAL

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDA0777 28MAY84

TO/À TO LDN

INFO REF YOURTEL XNGR1260 24MAY

DISTR

REF ---PM INITIATIVE

SUBJ/SUJ FULL TEXT OF LETTERS AND ATTACHMENTS TO CHERNENKO AND REAGAN SENT TO YOU OURTELS IDA0667 AND IDA0669 09MAY (LETTERS AND ATTACHMENTS IDENTICAL). IDA0669 (PAPERS) BAGGED.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION


TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG  P.E. COCKER/pec

IDA

2-3430

SIG  GARY J. SMITH



MESSAGE

Accession/Référence
File/Dossier 28-6-1-Trudeau
28 MAY 84 23 02 12 10

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SECURITY  
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

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FM EXTOTT IDA0791 28MAY84

TO WSHDC (~~DELIVER BY 290900~~)

INFO MOSCO BNATO LDN BONN PARIS TOKYO PEKIN ROME GENEV HAGUE OSLO

DISTR COPEN BRU MDRID ANKRA ATHNS LSBON PRAGUE WSAW BUCST BPEST BGRAD

REF PRMNY PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/PPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

~~MINI MINT~~

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDD IDR IDAN IDAO UGB URR ZSI FPR RBD RBR RCR RCD

RGB

REF OURTEL IDA0787 28MAY TO MOSCO

---PM INITIATIVE: LET TO ~~PRESIDENT~~ REAGAN ON 10 PRINCIPLES

COPIED BELOW IS TEXT OF LET, DATED 28MAY, FROM PM TRUDEAU TO  
PRESIDENT REAGAN ON TEN PRINCIPLES. ORIGINAL BEING CARRIED TO  
WSHDC BY DELVOIE. YOU SHOULD NOT/NOT DELIVER TEXT TO USA AUTHORI-  
TIES UNTIL WE DETERMINE WHETHER DPM/SSEA MAY WISH TO DELIVER IT  
HIMSELF WHICH WILL BE DISCUSSED WITH HIM ON BOARD AIRCRAFT. ADDI-  
TIONAL BACKGROUND INFO CONTAINED IN REFTEL TO MOSCO.

2. TEXT AS FOLLOWS: (Comcentre please copy)

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG GARY J. SMITH/pec	IDA	5-6689	SIG GARY J. SMITH

AB

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

28-6-1 - Trudeau	
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**C O N F I D E N T I A L**  
FM LDN XNGR1271 25MAY84

TO EXTOTT/IDA DELIVER BY 251200

INFO BNATO VMBFR STKHM/SCDEL GENEV PRMNY WSAW MDRID LSBON ROME  
PCOOTT/FOWLER PRGUE PARIS BPEST MOSCO BUCST BONN WSHDC COPEN  
OSLO HAGUE BRU DSLAM MXICO BAIRS STKHM NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DIPOL/  
DNACPOL DELHI  
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IDAN IDAV ZSI

REF YOURTEL0749 23MAY

---JOINT APPEAL OF SIX LEADERS FOR NUCLEAR HALT:INITIAL BRITISH  
REACTION

FOREIGN OFFICE HAS REACTED SHARPLY TO JOINT APPEAL,ISSUING  
STATEMENT WHICH BOTH SHARES CONVICTION OF SIX NATIONS THAT THERE  
MUST NEVER BE ANOTHER WORLD WAR,AND ARGUES THAT IT SERVES NO  
USEFUL PURPOSE TO INDUCE QUOTE MISPLACED SENSE OF PANIC OR FEAR  
ABOUT LIKELIHOOD OF NUCLEAR DISASTER UNQUOTE:MORE USEFUL THAN  
FREEZES OR BANS WOULD BE NEGOTIATED BALANCED REDUCTIONS IN  
LEVELS OF USA AND SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

2.BEFORE FCO CLOSED THURSDAY NIGHT FOR MAY 25/28 LONG WEEKEND  
EREAK,FCO DEFENCE DEPT TOLD US THAT STATEMENT THEY WERE ISSUING  
ON JOINT APPEAL PROVIDED GOOD INDICATION OF INITIAL BRITISH  
GOVT REACTIONS.THEY IMPLIED SOME CHAGRIN THAT GREEK PM

...2

PAGE TWO XNGR1271 CONF

WOULD NOW HAVE JOINED NON-NATO PARTNERS IN CALLING FOR WHAT AMOUNTED TO NUCLEAR FREEZE, AND EXPECTED THIS WOULD HAVE DIRECT IMPLICATIONS FOR MINISTERIAL DISCUSSIONS AT WSHDC NAC.

3. FCO STATEMENT ITSELF SAYS THAT BRITAIN SHARES SIGNATORIES CONVICTION THAT THERE MUST NEVER BE ANOTHER WORLD WAR. IT ARGUES HOWEVER THAT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE HAS PLAYED AN IMPORTANT PART IN PRESERVING PEACE IN EUROPE SINCE WORLD WAR II (AND CONTRASTS THIS WITH EXPERIENCE IN REMAINDER OF WORLD), AND SAYS THAT NUCLEAR DETERRENCE HAS PLAYED IMPORTANT PART IN THIS. QUOTE WE ARE FULLY AWARE THAT NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST WOULD BE UNPRECEDENTED DISASTER FOR MANKIND. BUT IT SERVES NO USEFUL PURPOSE TO INDUCE A MISPLACED SENSE OF PANIC OR FEAR ABOUT THE LIKELIHOOD OF THIS HAPPENING. GREATEST CONTRIBUTION TO PRESERVING STABILITY AT LOWER LEVELS OF MILITARY FORCE WOULD BE THROUGH NEGOTIATING OF BALANCED REDUCTIONS IN LEVELS OF USA AND SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS IS MORE URGENT AND WORTHWHILE TASK THAN FREEZES OR BANS.

4. STATEMENT THEN GOES ON TO POINT OUT THAT IT WAS NOT USA WHICH WALKED AWAY FROM TABLE IN GENEVA, AND THAT USA REMAINS WILLING TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS AT ANY TIME WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. IN RATHER POINTED BARB, IT SAYS BRITAIN WOULD LIKE TO SEE ALL NATIONS WHO ARE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN MAKING RESPONSIBLE CONTRIBUTION TO NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL ISSUES QUOTE INCLUDING

...3

PAGE THREE XNGR1271 CONFD

ALL OF THOSE WHO HAVE MADE OR ENDORSED THIS APPEAL, FOLLOW  
EXAMPLE OF VERY LARGE NUMBER OF STATES PARTIES TO NPT UNQUOTE.  
5. OUR US COLLEAGUE HAS DISCUSSED APPEAL WITH JOHN SILKIN, FRONT  
BENCH LABOUR MP WHO SPEAKS AUTHORITATIVELY ON DEFENCE AND ARMS  
CONTROL, AND WHO IS PROMINENT MEMBER OF PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR  
WORLD ORDER. SILKIN EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT IN USA REACTION  
(AND THAT IT HAD NOT COME FROM PRESIDENT HIMSELF), AND DESCRIBED  
APPEAL AS IN EFFECT OFFER OF GOOD OFFICES. WHILE PRESS REACTION  
HERE HAS BEEN MINIMAL, SILKIN EXPECTS THAT PWO WILL CONTINUE  
TO PRESS APPEAL, AND THAT SIX NATIONAL LEADERS ENDORSING IT WILL  
NOT BE DAUNTED BY INITIAL UNFAVOURABLE RECEPTION HERE AND IN  
WSHDC.

6. FCO OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD US THAT THEY EXPECT NO FURTHER GOVT  
REACTION AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER WSHDC NAC.

CCC/083 251419Z XNGR1271

Visit of Oscar Fischer, MFA/GDR  
June 1, 1984

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -  
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

IDA-07  
28-6-1-Trudeau  
PEACE MISSION  
9

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE

ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

ISSUE

To review the current status of the Prime Minister's initiative.

BACKGROUND

The Prime Minister's central purpose is to try to stop and reverse the worsening trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce international tensions and risks of confrontation. His chief proposal addresses the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the two superpowers.

The initiative involves a number of specific proposals - (a) a conference of the five nuclear weapon states to limit strategic nuclear arsenals (b) a concerted political effort to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime (c) a substantive Western response to the Eastern proposals on MBRF and a meeting at the Foreign Minister level in Vienna (d) the inauguration of the Stockholm CDE Meeting at senior political level.

Also related to the initiative are three specific proposals of a more technical nature related to the Prime Minister's strategy of suffocation enunciated at the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. These include: (a) a ban on the testing and deployment of high altitude anti-satellite systems (b) ensuring the verifiability of future strategic weapons systems and (c) restrictions on the mobility of terrestrially deployed ICBMs. X

RESULTS

The degree of support which the Prime Minister has garnered for the central purpose of his initiative is of itself a positive result insofar as it may have a beneficial effect on the climate of East-West relations. The decisions taken at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels in early December were particularly significant in furthering the purposes of the initiative:

- (a) an undertaking by NATO foreign ministers to attend the opening of the CDE in Stockholm (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (b) an undertaking to review the NATO negotiating position in the MBFR negotiations (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (c) the "Brussels Declaration" which places heavy emphasis on genuine détente and dialogue in East-West relations (an FRG initiative, actively supported by the Canadian delegation);
- (d) a mandate given the permanent NATO Council to review the current state of East-West relations and to report to the next NATO ministerial meeting in Washington at the end of May on what actions might be taken to improve them.

There have been additional signs of progress. In the early months of this year there was some moderation of the strident rhetoric of both superpowers; President Chernenko during his inauguration in February began to refer to returning to the period of détente, broad political contact at the Foreign Minister level between East and West, particularly between Moscow and Washington, was re-established at the beginning of the Stockholm Conference.

Western leaders, including Prime Ministers Trudeau, Thatcher and Craxi and the Italian, German and French Foreign Ministers, have gone to the East to open lines of communication; the MBFR negotiations resumed in Vienna on March 16 and on April 19 Western participants in the MBFR negotiations formally tabled new Western proposals. On April 18 the USA tabled a proposal in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for a comprehensive treaty banning chemical weapons.

In mid-May, Canada and the USSR agreed to hold bilateral arms control negotiations in Moscow next autumn.

#### CURRENT STATUS OF MAJOR ELEMENTS

The initiative continues to be pursued, bilaterally and in multilateral forums:

##### (A) East-West Relations

In recent weeks there has been a return to the use of rethoric by the superpowers and in particular by the

.../3

Soviet Union which has been stiffening its position on arms control subjects especially on INF. Prospects for an improvement in relations in the next few months are poor.

(B) Five Power Conference

To date the UN Secretary General has not yet taken up the Prime Minister's suggestion that he convene a meeting of the Permanent Representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council to discuss their responsibilities in the field of arms control. The Secretary General does not consider it "timely" to pursue this given current attitudes and circumstances. (Only the Chinese have responded favourably to the idea).

(C) NPT

While the Commonwealth Meeting in Delhi demonstrated the difficulties in making progress against the danger of horizontal proliferation, Canada remains committed to this goal and currently is examining ways to strengthen and ensure greater adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(D) Stockholm Conference

With all three groupings (Western, Warsaw Pact, Neutral and Non-Aligned) having tabled their own proposals, the major task facing the conference at its second session (May 8 - July 6) is to agree on an organizational structure (i.e. the establishment of working groups) to enable the conference to move from the general debate stage to the detailed examination of proposals and actual negotiations. Most difficult will be how to handle the Soviet declaratory proposals called, inter alia, for agreement on non-use of force and non-first use of nuclear weapons.

(E) MBFR

After considerable effort with the USA, and in the face of UK reluctance, NATO finally agreed to table its long-awaited response to Eastern proposals submitted last year. The Western proposals, which do not go as far as Canada would have liked but are nevertheless welcome, offer flexibility on the question of data, but require enhanced verification measures. This move will not in itself break the logjam in the negotiations but may be sufficient to elicit a counter move from the East in due course although the initial Eastern reaction has been harshly critical.

.../4

(F) Two Suffocation Proposals

The Prime Minister wrote to Presidents Reagan and Chernenko on May 7 to seek their views on the two specific proposals on strategic weapons systems (a) restrictions on the mobility of terrestrially deployed ICBMs; (b) verifiability of future strategic systems. No official reaction has yet been received, though we have had unofficial indications that the USA response will be favourable. (The text of the two proposals, although not the letter itself, has been provided to NATO allies.)

(G) ASAT

The proposed high altitude ASAT ban has been discussed among our allies both at NATO headquarters and bilaterally in Washington, London, Bonn, Paris and the Hague. Our first objective at this time is to achieve agreement at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to create an ad hoc working group on outer space in which the Canadian proposal might be addressed.

(H) Ten Principles

Following failure to achieve all party endorsement of the ten principles in the House of Commons the Prime Minister in the next few days will be writing to leaders of the countries he visited to suggest that the principles might form the basis of a common bond between East and West.

(I) Arms Control Consultations with the GDR

In late January, the Prime Minister agreed with GDR Chairman Honecker to have arms control experts from both countries meet to determine whether some form of common ground in arms control might not be found. Given certain sensitivity of some of our allies, particularly the West Germans, it is our intention to transform this arrangement into general arms control discussions rather than attempting to come up with common positions. This subject will be discussed further during the visit to Canada on June 1 of GDR Foreign Minister Fischer.

(J) Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security

One of the domestic outgrowths of the Prime Minister's initiative has been the Bill to establish a Canadian Institute which has now passed second reading and is currently being studied in detail by the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence. As the Bill now has all-party support, it could pass final reading by the end of June.

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

*File*  
*initiative*  
*Peace*  
18-6-1- Trudeau  
20-4-7  
25

UNCLASSIFIED

FM DSLAM YNGR1868 24MAY84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO ATHNS BNATO VMBFR STKHM SCDEL GENEV PRMNY WSAW MDRID LSBON  
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COPEN OSLO HAGUE BRU MXICO BAIRS STKHM NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CIPOLLDNACPOL  
DISTR DMF IFB IDDZ IDR IDRL RCR RSR RBD RBR RGB URR FPR IMU IDA  
ZSI CAA

REF ATHNS TEL ZFGR5320 23MAY

---JOINT APPEAL OF SIX FOR NUCLEAR HALT

STATE HOUSE RELEASED PRESS STATEMENT REPRODUCED IN MAY23 EDITION  
OF DAILY NEWS IDENTICAL TO THAT CONTAINED PARAS 3-8 ATHNS REFTL.  
PREAMBLE INDICATED THAT PRES NYERERE HAS AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO  
ATTEND SUMMIT MTG ON THIS SUBJECT WITH OTHER FIVE LEADERS. IN MEANTIME  
THE SIX WILL KEEP IN TOUCH WITH EACH OTHER TO REVIEW REACTIONS TO  
JOINT STATEMENT AND TO SEE WHAT FURTHER ACTION CAN USEFULLY BE  
TAKEN.

UUU/194 241018Z YNGR1868

cc: N249 005 / CPE / D24905 / DSTRATA

*done*  
*Juli*

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L  
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*28/84*  
*Peace initiative*

INFO BNATO BONN LDN STKHM/SCDEL PARIS ROME STKHM MOSCO ATHNS  
DSLAM BAIRS BGRAD BUCST DELHI MXICO PCOOTT/FOWLER  
DISTR MINA UGB IFB IMD IMU RBR IDR IDD URR GAA PSR ZSI ZSP RCR  
LSR IDAO IDAN

---6 NATION PEACE INITIATIVE:USA REACTION

ALTHOUGH 6 NATION PEACE APPEAL GOT SOME FRONT PAGE COVERAGE IN  
MAJOR NEWSPAPERS THE DAY IT APPEARED, IT HAS HAD NO/NO OTHER  
NOTICEABLE IMPACT IN USA.

2.ADMIN ISSUED STATEMENT SAYING THAT IT SUPPORTS GENERAL GOAL  
OF APPEAL BUT CANNOT/NOT SUPPORT THE SPECIFIC CALL FOR A NUCLEAR  
FREEZE WHICH WLD LOCK IN CURRENT IMBALANCES IN USSRS FAVOUR.

3.USA WAS NOT/NOT AWARE THAT THIS APPEAL WAS IMMINENT AND LEARNED  
OF IT ONLY A DAY OR SO BEFORE IT WAS MADE PUBLIC.OFFICIALS SAY  
THEY ARE NOT/NOT AWARE OF ANY FOLLOW-UP MEASURES SIX INTEND TO  
PROPOSE.WE CLD GAIN NO/NO SENSE THAT ADMIN WAS TAKING APPEAL  
SERIOUSLY.IT WAS DESCRIBED TO EMB AS A QUOTE PERFECT MARSHALL  
MCLUHAN EVENT UNQUOTE THAT WILL PASS QUICKLY. //

4.AT PRESIDENT PRESS CONF 22MAY ONE JOURNALIST REFERRED TO  
DECLARATION IN POSING A QUESTION ABOUT EAST/WEST RELS.PRES  
ANSWERED QUESTION WITHOUT COMMENTING ON THE DECLARATION.NO/NO  
SPECIFIC QUESTIONS WERE ASKED IN REFERENCE TO IT.

CCC/059 242119Z UNGR2341

4151 054

May 24, 1984



FILE	28-2-1
28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION	
20-4-7	

The Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau  
 Prime Minister  
 Langevin Block  
 Parliament Buildings  
 Ottawa, Ontario  
 K1A 0A2

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

With regard to the recent "Four Continent Peace Initiative" announced this past Tuesday (May 22nd), I must express my disappointment that you do not endorse this most worthy move on the part of non-nuclear governments.

I have enclosed a copy of the text of a letter which was sent by Greenpeace Canada to the Ambassadors of India, Greece, Tanzania, Sweden and Mexico, to congratulate them for their efforts.

Having been very proud of the individual effort which you yourself made over recent months, I am surprised to hear that you do not support this new peace initiative. Your reasons, as given on the radio, were vague statements that "certain particulars" of this Peace Initiative might violate the spirit of NATO agreements.

Let me ask you one question: if NATO agreements prevent one from acting upon one's conscience in the interests of peace, then is it not right to question the nature of the NATO agreements themselves? I remember a long ago election from a more militant phase of your career, in which you vowed to remove Canada from NATO entirely....

Past opinions aside, do you not agree that any effort to foster deeper understanding and communication between the superpowers is worthy of consideration? As such, it would be very desirable if the Government of Canada were to add its voice to such a plea for sanity (as, indeed, your own peace initiative seemed to indicate).

As to your argument regarding our NATO commitments, permit me to remind you that Denmark is a full partner in NATO, and their government will not accept the placement of nuclear weapons on Danish soil. Yet Canada, without even being required to do so under our NATO commitments, has permitted the testing of the destabilizing cruise missile in Canadian airspace, in a bilateral arrangement with the United States government that has nothing to do with our larger commitment to the Atlantic Alliance.

This back-and-forth fluctuation in official Canadian policy has proved to be rather confusing to Canadians. We hailed your peace initiative when it

*R. Fauler (20)*


The Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau  
May 24, 1984

- 2 -

was announced. But you are now seeming to say that a peace initiative by other governments is somehow not the same, nor as important.

Peace and disarmament are not political issues any more. They are a matter of life and death for us all. No matter what obligation the Government of Canada has to its NATO partners, its first duty is to the citizens of this country - who have already overwhelmingly indicated their desire for a true and lasting peace between the superpowers, however that peace may be accomplished.

Sincerely,

  
Beverly Pinnegar  
Executive Secretary  
Greenpeace Foundation  
Canada

Enclosures

- c.c.: His Excellency Mr. Paul Robinson Jr.  
Ambassador of the United States of America
- c.c.: His Excellency Mr. Alexey A. Rodionov  
Ambassador of the U.S.S.R.

May 24, 1984



His Excellency Mr. Paul Robinson Jr.  
Ambassador of the United States of America  
100 Wellington Street  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1P 5T1

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Greenpeace is a non-political environmental organization, with offices in twelve countries around the world. We also enjoy consultative status as a non-government organization in the United Nations.

The enclosed document is the text of a letter which was sent by Greenpeace Canada to the Embassies of Mexico, Greece, India, Tanzania and Sweden, in support of the "Four Continent Peace Initiative" announced on Tuesday, May 22nd. Enclosed also is a copy of our letter to the Soviet Ambassador in Ottawa, Mr. Alexey A. Rodionov, as well as to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau.

Greenpeace hopes that you will convey to your government our sincere wish that both parties in this insane contest will listen to the voices of the other peoples of the world, and sit down once more in meaningful dialogue to reduce the threat of nuclear holocaust.

The rest of us are justifiably worried that this current breakdown in east-west negotiations may result in destruction for us all, friend or enemy, as well as all animal and plant life on Earth. How long must we bear the pressure of this fear of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union?

Peace and disarmament are not political issues - they are a matter of life and death for everyone.

The need for national, as well as personal, security is an understandable matter. But when the superpowers' needs threaten the security of everyone else on the planet, then something is gravely wrong. It is time to put aside the usual rhetoric used by both sides and begin to solve our differences, before those differences wipe out all life on the planet.

.../2

His Excellency Mr. Paul Robinson Jr.  
May 24, 1984

- 2 -

Please urge your government to consider this new peace initiative as a serious one. Sit down with Soviet representatives again; make mutual, verifiable build-down of nuclear weapons not just a wish, but a real possibility - one that will eventually lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether and a final peace between our two cultures.

With the alternative being total destruction, what real choice do we have?

Sincerely,

  
Beverly Pinnegar  
Executive Secretary  
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Enclosures

P.S. As a final note, I have enclosed a very poignant clipping from a recent edition of the Globe & Mail. This is the legacy that we have given today's children.....on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

c.c.: His Excellency Mr. Alexey A. Rodionov  
Ambassador of the U.S.S.R.  
285 Charlotte St.  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1N 8L5

c.c.: The Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau  
Prime Minister  
Langevin Block  
Parliament Buildings  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0A2

May 24, 1984



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
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K1P 5T1

✓ c.c.: The Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau  
Prime Minister  
Langevin Block  
Parliament Buildings  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0A2

The following letter went to the Ambassadors of Sweden, Greece, India, Mexico and Tanzania:

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Greenpeace Foundation of Canada, I would like to express to you and your government our congratulations for the "Four Continent Peace Initiative" announced today in the capitals of Sweden, Tanzania, India, Mexico and Greece.

The issue of peace and disarmament can no longer be considered a political matter. Rather, it is a matter of life and death for all people and all living things on the planet.

Something must be done to convince the superpowers to get together and begin serious negotiations for a verifiable build-down of their nuclear arsenals, beginning with a halt to all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

With the complete breakdown of negotiations between the superpowers and deteriorating east-west relations, it is indeed time for the non-nuclear weapons states to intervene and promote such negotiations. We commend your government for assuming the responsibility for this vital and difficult task.

The Greenpeace Foundation fully supports your efforts and it is our sincere hope that your group of nations will show what countries can achieve when they forget their differences and act together in pursuit of the common good.

Thank you again.

GREENPEACE

# The children's eerie fear of nuclear holocaust



Survivors of a nuclear blast at a Kansas aid station in the film *The Day After*.



Cloud is feared symbol.

BY JANET KASK

Janet Kask is a freelance writer living in Montreal.

MONTREAL

**D**URING A severe winter storm earlier this year, a Montreal teacher asked her Grade 4 students to describe the bleak, icy landscape outside. When she asked the class what the darkness caused by a power failure brought to mind, one boy raised his hand.

"Nuclear war," he answered. "Just before the bomb explodes, all the power in the world goes off."

The comparison struck a collective nerve. Suddenly the entire class wanted to talk about nuclear war. Several had seen the TV drama *The Day After*, about the effects of a nuclear attack on the United States.

"They were extremely upset, and anxious to talk about their fears," the teacher recalls. "Some had been having nightmares." Some children said they had seen the film alone when their parents were out. Others were afraid to discuss the subject with their parents.

The fears of these children are echoed all too poignantly in the film in the *Nuclear Shadow*: What the Children Tell Us, currently being shown to parents and educators across Canada by a national organization called Physicians for Social Responsibility.

The documentary is based on interviews with 60 California school children aged 6 to 18. Here are some comments: "I probably think about nuclear war once or twice a day."

"Suddenly I just feel no control. Things are out of my hands."

"A lot of grown-ups aren't letting themselves believe that this can happen."

"If your parents are scared to talk about it, it's terrifying for someone young."

"We just don't feel protected by the adult population."

"We may grow up to be the most cynical generation ever. It's almost impossible to love someone when you think you might lose them."

Studies of U.S. school children during the past 10 years have shown that worry about nuclear holocaust and feelings of despair and hopelessness about the future are common. Last year, the American Psychiatric Association published a report on the psychosocial aspects of nuclear developments. One study cited in the report found that more than 70 per cent of children between 4 and 18 interviewed, "spontaneously mentioned nuclear weapons and destructive war as a likely possibility."

Dr. John Mack, co-author of the report and professor of psychiatry at the Harvard School of Medicine, interviewed 1,000 elementary and high school students during 1979-80. Summing up his results, he wrote: "There is a revelation in these responses of the experience of fear and menace. There is also a cynicism, sadness, bitterness and sense of helplessness. Some have doubts about planning families and are unable to think ahead in any long-term sense."

We may be seeing that growing up in a world dominated by the threat of imminent nuclear destruction is having an impact on the structure of the personality itself, Dr. Mack speculates. We may find that we are raising a generation of young people without a basis for making long-term commitments.

A cross-country survey of Canadian children's attitudes, co-ordinated by Dr.

Ross Parker of McMaster University, is currently under way.

"The survey is in its initial stages, with no conclusive results yet," says Dr. Susan Goldberg, a psychologist at the Toronto Hospital for Sick Children who works with groups of parents concerned about the issue. "But my own feeling from talking to children and parents is that many Canadian children share the same fears."

Dr. Richard Logan, a psychology teacher at John Abbott College in Ste. Anne de Bellevue, Que., says depression related to nuclear and other global issues is common among the young people he has observed.

"Helplessness and powerlessness is the psychological definition of depression. That's what we're seeing in a great many young people."

Researchers for the two U.S. studies found that children are surprisingly sophisticated and aware when questioned about the issue of nuclear war. Many young people are not impressed by the political rhetoric and sabre-rattling of the superpowers. All too often they see themselves as doomed victims in a catastrophic chess game.

Mental-health professionals say that adults often tend to "block out" undesirable events by simply pretending they are not there. Robert Lifton, a professor of psychology at Yale University who studied survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atom bombings, calls this phenomenon "psychic numbing". Lifton reports that for months after the two Japanese cities were bombed, many survivors refused to admit the bombings had occurred because the aftermath was too unspeakable to face.

Unlike adults, however, children tend not only to face up to the awful realities,

but to exaggerate and even dream about them, according to one study cited in the APA report.

In the film in the *Nuclear Shadow*, Dr. Lifton observes that "Children of 4, 5 or 6, just beginning to deal with the concept of death itself, are now confronted with the image of a grotesque, absurd death."

It's extremely important, those who have studied the issue say, to reassure young people that nuclear catastrophe is not a foregone conclusion, and that international public opinion is putting considerable pressure on the superpowers to engage in serious arms-control talks.

It should be pointed out that their fears of nuclear holocaust, which the experts say are shared by children all over the world, are being taken seriously. They can be told, for example, that in June, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, representing every country except mainland China, plan to meet in Helsinki to discuss the question of children and nuclear war.

"At the very least, young people need an opportunity to learn about and participate in matters that affect their lives," concludes Dr. Mack in the APA report.

Those familiar with the issue say children whose parents or other adult "role models" are actively involved in the anti-nuclear movement and who are involved themselves tend to be more optimistic about the future.

"Fears of nuclear war and the feeling of helplessness that goes along with that fear can be psychologically crippling," adds Dr. Goldberg. "Children need to understand two things: first, that they are not alone in their fears and, second, that they can do something about the situation."

Children are already organizing to deal with the issue. Last summer in London, school children organized their own peace march of 10,000 in Trafalgar Square. In Montreal, one Grade 6 class recently wrote letters to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, U.S. President Ronald Reagan, the Kremlin and the ABC television network describing their fears and appealing for disarmament. The political leaders did not write back, but ABC executive Patricia Matson wrote a sympathetic and hopeful letter to the class.

"This kind of response is good for children," says Dr. Goldberg. It makes them feel as if people are listening."

4151 054

May 30, 1984.

Beverly Pinnegar,  
Executive Secretary,  
Greenpeace Foundation,  
2623 West 4th Avenue,  
Vancouver, B.C.  
V6K 1P8

Dear Beverly Pinnegar:

On behalf of the Prime Minister, I acknowledge your letter of May 24.

Please be assured that it and the enclosed correspondence will be brought to Mr. Trudeau's attention.

Yours sincerely,

Original signed by  
Original signé par  
**Nicole Fournier,**  
**Assistant Director,**  
**Correspondence.**

Original to R. Fowler

NMF/lc

①

Date: ..31 May 1980.....

IDA-1053  
286 to PCO

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. L.A. Delvoie  
Director General, International Security  
and Arms Control Bureau (IDD)  
Department of External Affairs

file 28-2-1  
cc Greenpeace?  
cc 28.661-Indean

Letter to the Prime Minister from:

Beverly Pinnegar

PMO Ref. No: .....4151-054.....

We have arranged with the Under-Secretary's office that the Department's services can be drawn upon in preparing replies to letters which the Prime Minister has received on foreign affairs.

I would be grateful if you could arrange for ~~a reply within 30 or 40 days~~ to the attached letter for signature at the appropriate level within the Department of External Affairs and with copies to PMO/Correspondence and External Affairs/SMR/Johnston. I would also welcome your advice on alternative ways of dealing with the matter, if appropriate.

If you have any questions, please call me at 5-6073.



M.D. Archdeacon  
Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat

c.c. PMO/Correspondence (NICOLE FOURNIER)  
PCO/Judy Cameron  
EA/SMR/Ted Johnston

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

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24/5/84 - 3.30 p.m.  
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PEACE MISSION

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FM STKHM UDGR0658 24MAY84

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IDA ZSI

REF ATHNSTEL ZFGR5320 23MAY

---JOINT APPEAL OF SIX FOR NUCLEAR HALT

APPEAL HERE WAS SET OUT IN PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY PM PALME  
22MAY. IN PRESENTING IT PM DECLARED THAT IF THE GREAT POWERS  
ARMAMENTS REMAIN, THEN WE SHALL NOT/NOT EXIST MUCH LONGER. QUOTE  
OUR PROPOSAL UNQUOTE HE SAID QUOTE CAN LEAD TO IMMEDIATE ACTION.  
NO/NO LABORIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ARE REQUIRED UNQUOTE. PM WENT ON TO  
SAY THAT THE SIX WERE SEIZING UPON WHAT HAS SUPPORT IN PUBLIC  
OPINION AND WERE PUTTING THEIR OPINION-FORMING ABILITY BEHIND IT.  
HE GAVE THE FOLLOWING REASONS WHY THE SIX HAD GONE TOGETHER FOR  
THIS INITIATIVE JUST NOW: 1) THE ESCALATION OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS  
WAS MORE INTENSIVE NOW THAN EVER BEFORE; 2) THE EVIDENCE  
CONCERNING TO WHAT A NUCLEAR WAR WOULD LEAD WAS BECOMING  
INCREASINGLY MORE DISTURBING; AND 3) THE ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN THE TWO  
SUPERPOWERS WAS THE WORST SINCE THE CUBAN CRISIS IN 1962.

2. STOCKHOLMS TWO MAJOR DAILIES HAVE REMARKED IN EDITORIALS

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PAGE TWO UDGR0658 UNCLAS

(SUMMARIZED). SVENSKA DAGBLADET (CONSERVATIVE): WAR IS FAR TOO SERIOUS A MATTER TO BE LEFT TO THE MILITARY, IT IS SAID. SIX INTERNATIONAL TOP PEOPLE SEEM TO HAVE REASONED ALONG THE SAME LINES WHEN THEY SAY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF PREVENTING A NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE IS TOO SERIOUS TO BE LEFT TO THE NUCLEAR STATES. THE APPEAL SAYS NOTHING NEW, EXCEPT FOR THE FACT THAT THEY TAKE FAR TOO OPTIMISTIC A VIEW OF THE SITUATION FOR EUROPE WHEN THEY RECOMMEND A NUCLEAR FREEZE. IT IS DIFFICULT TO CRITICIZE THE APPEAL. NO/NO ONE IS AGAINST PEACE. DAGENS NYHETER (LIBERAL): THE NEW DISARMAMENT INITIATIVE IS RATHER FEATURELESS. IT IS IN FACT PRODUCED AT THE REQUEST OF A PRACTICALLY UNKNOWN ORGANIZATION, PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR WORLD ORDER WHICH HAS ITS HEADQUARTERS IN THE USA. THE IDEA SEEMS TO BE PUT FORWARD DEMANDS THAT ARE WELL-KNOWN FOR WORRIED PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. TO MANY IN THE WEST, THE SIGNATORIES CAN SEEM SOMEWHAT CRITICAL OF THE WEST. SOMEONE HAS MANAGED TO INCLUDE THE CONCEPT OF QUOTE JOINT SECURITY UNQUOTE IN THE STATEMENT-BUT BETTER HERE THAN AT THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE. IT IS GOOD TO REMIND THE NUCLEAR POWERS THAT, WHEN SIGNING THE NON-PROLIFERATION AGREEMENT THEY UNDERTOOK TO WORK TO STOP THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE.

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PAR 004/24

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

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20- -1-1 cc: 28-4	
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NONCLASSIFIE FAX

DE PARIS WIGR4178 24MAI84

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--- APPEL DES SIX AU GEL DES ARMES NUCLEAIRES

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LANDRY

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## Six chefs d'Etat ou de gouvernement lancent un appel au gel des armes nucléaires

Les chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement de six pays appartenant à quatre continents ont lancé mardi 22 mai un appel aux puissances nucléaires dénonçant « l'escalade et la course aux armements et la montée des tensions ». « Comme première mesure indispensable, déclare cet appel, nous exhortons les Etats-Unis et l'Union soviétique, aussi bien que le Royaume-Uni, la France et la Chine, à arrêter tous essais, production, déploiement d'armes nucléaires et de leurs systèmes de lancement et à réduire ensuite substantiellement leur force de frappe. »

Cet appel est signé par M<sup>r</sup> Gandhi (Inde), MM. De la Madrid (Mexique), Nyerere (Tanzanie), Papandréou (Grèce), Palme (Suède) et Alfonsín (Argentine). L'initiative, précise-t-on à New-Delhi, est le résultat de plus d'une année de consultations menées par des membres de l'organisation Parlementaires pour l'ordre mondial et qui regroupe des élus de trente et un pays. L'Argentine s'est ralliée au dernier moment à cet appel. M. Trudeau, premier ministre du Canada, qui avait été présenté comme signataire, a dit mardi qu'il « approuve infiniment » cette initiative, mais qu'il lui est difficile d'y souscrire en raison de divergences sur « certains points particuliers » tenant notamment à l'appartenance du Canada à l'alliance atlantique. En revanche,

l'appartenance de la Grèce à la même alliance n'a pas empêché M. Papandréou de signer.

A Washington, un porte-parole du département d'Etat s'est dit « d'accord avec les objectifs » des signataires, dont il respecte « la sincérité et la volonté de paix », mais dont il n'approuve pas la « tactique ». « Nous ne pensons pas qu'un gel global par les puissances nucléaires renforcerait la stabilité ou réduirait les risques de guerre », a dit ce porte-parole. - (AFP.)

NATO Ministerial, Washington  
June 1984

IDA-0735

MAY 24/84

28-6-1-Trudeau

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE

9

ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITYISSUE

To review the current status of the Prime Minister's initiative.

BACKGROUND

The Prime Minister's central purpose is to try to stop and reverse the worsening trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce international tensions and risks of confrontation. His chief proposal addresses the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the two superpowers.

The initiative involves a number of specific proposals - (a) a conference of the five nuclear weapon states to limit strategic nuclear arsenals (b) a concerted political effort to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime (c) a substantive Western response to the Eastern proposals on MBFR and a meeting at the Foreign Minister level in Vienna (d) the inauguration of the Stockholm CDE Meeting at senior political level.

Also related to the initiative are three specific proposals of a more technical nature related to the Prime Minister's strategy of suffocation enunciated at the first United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. These include: (a) a ban on the testing and deployment of high altitude anti-satellite systems (b) ensuring the verifiability of future strategic weapons systems and (c) restrictions on the mobility of terrestrially deployed ICBMs.

RESULTS

The degree of support which the Prime Minister has garnered for the central purpose of his initiative is of itself a positive result insofar as it may have a beneficial effect on the climate of East-West relations. The decisions taken at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels in early December were particularly significant in furthering the purposes of the initiative:

.../2

- (a) an undertaking by NATO foreign ministers to attend the opening of the CDE in Stockholm (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (b) an undertaking to review the NATO negotiating position in the MBFR negotiations (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (c) the "Brussels Declaration" which places heavy emphasis on genuine détente and dialogue in East-West relations (an FRG initiative, actively supported by the Canadian delegation);
- (d) a mandate given the permanent NATO Council to review the current state of East-West relations and to report to the next NATO ministerial meeting in Washington at the end of May on what actions might be taken to improve them.

There have been additional signs of progress. In the early months of this year there was some moderation of the strident rhetoric of both superpowers; President Chernenko during his inauguration in February began to refer to returning to the period of détente, broad political contact at the Foreign Minister level between East and West, particularly between Moscow and Washington, was re-established at the beginning of the Stockholm Conference.

Western leaders, including Prime Ministers Trudeau, Thatcher and Craxi and the Italian, German and French Foreign Ministers, have gone to the East to open lines of communication; the MBFR negotiations resumed in Vienna on March 16 and on April 19 Western participants in the MBFR negotiations formally tabled new Western proposals. On April 18 the USA tabled a proposal in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for a comprehensive treaty banning chemical weapons.

In mid-May, Canada and the USSR agreed to hold bilateral arms control negotiations in Moscow next autumn.

#### CURRENT STATUS OF MAJOR ELEMENTS

The initiative continues to be pursued, bilaterally and in multilateral forums:

##### (A) East-West Relations

In recent weeks there has been a return to the use of rethoric by the superpowers and in particular by the

Soviet Union which has been stiffening its position on arms control subjects especially on INF. Prospects for an improvement in relations in the next few months are poor.

(B) Five Power Conference

To date the UN Secretary General has not yet taken up the Prime Minister's suggestion that he convene a meeting of the Permanent Representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council to discuss their responsibilities in the field of arms control. The Secretary General does not consider it "timely" to pursue this given current attitudes and circumstances. (Only the Chinese have responded favourably to the idea).

(C) NPT

While the Commonwealth Meeting in Delhi demonstrated the difficulties in making progress against the danger of horizontal proliferation, Canada remains committed to this goal and currently is examining ways to strengthen and ensure greater adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(D) Stockholm Conference

With all three groupings (Western, Warsaw Pact, Neutral and Non-Aligned) having tabled their own proposals, the major task facing the conference at its second session (May 8 - July 6) is to agree on an organizational structure (i.e. the establishment of working groups) to enable the conference to move from the general debate stage to the detailed examination of proposals and actual negotiations. Most difficult will be how to handle the Soviet declaratory proposals called, inter alia, for agreement on non-use of force and non-first use of nuclear weapons.

(E) MBFR

After considerable effort with the USA, and in the face of UK reluctance, NATO finally agreed to table its long-awaited response to Eastern proposals submitted last year. The Western proposals, which do not go as far as Canada would have liked but are nevertheless welcome, offer flexibility on the question of data, but require enhanced verification measures. This move will not in itself break the logjam in the negotiations but may be sufficient to elicit a counter move from the East in due course although the initial Eastern reaction has been harshly critical.

.../4

(F) Two Suffocation Proposals

The Prime Minister wrote to Presidents Reagan and Chernenko on May 7 to seek their views on the two specific proposals on strategic weapons systems (a) restrictions on the mobility of terrestrially deployed ICBMs; (b) verifiability of future strategic systems. No official reaction has yet been received, though we have had unofficial indications that the USA response will be favourable. (The text of the two proposals, although not the letter itself, have been provided to NATO allies.)

(G) ASAT

The proposed high altitude ASAT ban has been discussed among our allies both at NATO headquarters and bilaterally in Washington, London, Bonn, Paris and the Hague. Our first objective at this time is to achieve agreement at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to create an ad hoc working group on outer space in which the Canadian proposal might be addressed.

(H) Ten Principles

Following failure to achieve all party endorsement of the ten principles in the House of Commons the Prime Minister in the next few days will be writing to leaders of the countries he visited to suggest that the principles might form the basis of a common bond between East and West.

(I) Arms Control Consultations with the GDR

In late January, the Prime Minister agreed with GDR Chairman Honecker to have arms control experts from both countries meet to determine whether some form of common ground in arms control might not be found. Given certain sensitivity of some of our allies, particularly the West Germans, it is our intention to transform this arrangement into general arms control discussions rather than attempting to come up with common positions. This subject will be discussed further during the visit to Canada on June 1 of GDR Foreign Minister Fischer.

(J) Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security

One of the domestic outgrowths of the Prime Minister's initiative has been the Bill to establish a Canadian Institute which has now passed second reading and is currently being studied in detail by the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence. As the Bill now has all-party support, it could pass final reading by the end of June.

*file*

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

R E S T R I C T E D

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INFO ENATO VMBFR STKHM/SCDEL GENEV PRMNY WSAW MDRID LSBON ROME PRGUE  
 PARIS BPEST MOSCO BONN WSHDC COPEN OSLO HAGUE BRU DSLAM MXICO  
 BAIRS PCOOTT/FOWLER STKHM LDN  
 NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CIPOL/DNACPOL  
 DISTR DMF IFB IDDZ IDR IDRL RCR RSR RBD RER RGB URR FPR IMU IDA ZSI  
 REF LDN TEL XNGR1248 23MAY

---JOINT APPEAL OF SIX FOR NUCLEAR HALT:ROMANIA

UNDERSTAND FROM AMB FLITAN,DIR,ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND INNATL ORGS,  
 THAT MAIN REASON WHY ROMANIA DID NOT/NOT JOIN APPEAL OF SIX FOR  
 NUCLEAR HALT IS DUE TO FACT THAT THIS INITIATIVE WAS PUSHED BY  
 PARLIAMENTARY ORG FOR NEW WORLD ORDER.ACCORDING TO FLITAN,INNATL  
 INTERPARLIAMENTARY UNION,WHICH HAS ITS SEAT IN GENEV,FELT QUITE  
 UPSET BY INITIATIVE TAKEN BY RIVAL ORG.SEGGEN OF INNATL  
 INTERPARLIAMENTARY UNION,PIO CARLO TERANZIO,APPARENTLY SUGGESTED  
 TO ROMANIA NOT/NOT TO JOIN THIS APPEAL.FLITAN STATED THAT IN  
 PRINCIPLE ROMANIA WAS IN AGMT FOR ACTION BY ANY FORCE WILLING  
 TO CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE EFFORT BUT THAT ACTION OF THIS KIND SHOULD  
 BE UNDERTAKEN WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF UN OR BY ANY OTHER ORG INNATLY  
 RECOGNIZED.THEREFORE,HE INSTRUCTED ROMANIAN AMB IN NYORK TO  
 EXPRESS SUPPORT FOR SUBSTANCE OF APPEAL WITHOUT,HOWEVER,LINKING  
 NAME OF PRES CEAUSESCU WITH IT.IN A MESSAGE BACK TO INDIRA GANDHI,

~~PAGE TWO~~ UYGR0965 RESTR

ROMANIA ALSO INFORMED HER OF ITS SUPPORT IN PRINCIPLE AND OF  
ROMANIAS VIEWS CONCERNING PROPER FORUM FOR SUCH INITIATIVE.

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SUITE A DONNER

28-6-1 - Trudeau	
24	9

C O N F I D E N T I A L  
FM LDN XNGR1260 24MAY84  
TO EXTOTT IDA

---PM INITIATIVE: REAGAN/CHERNENKO LETTERS

IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN OUR TALKS WITH FCO WERE WE TO HAVE COMPLETE  
TEXT OF ATTACHMENTS TO LETTERS TO CHERNENKO AND PRESIDENT REAGAN.

CCC/102 241456Z XNGR1260



MESSAGE

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Accession/Référence
File/Dossier <i>20-4-7</i> <i>18-b-1-Trudeau, P. 10</i>
<i>Peace maintenance</i>
23 MAY 84 23 05 12A
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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ: C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE: FM EXTOTT IDA0749 23MAY84

TO/À: TO LONDON DELIVER BY 240900

INFO: INFO BNATO VMBFR STKHM/SCDEL GENEV PRMNY WSAW MDRID LSBON ROME

DISTR: PCOOTT/FOWLER PRGUE PARIS BPEST MOSCO BUCST BONN WSHDC COPEN OSLO

REF: HAGUE BRU DSLAM MXICO BAIRS STKHM NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DIPOL/DNACPOL

SUBJ/SUJ: DISTR DMF IFB IDD IDR IDRL RCR RSR RBD RBR RGB URR FPR IMU IDAO  
IDAN IDAV ZSI

REF ATHNS TEL ZFGR5320 23MAY, YOURTEL XNGR1248 23MAY

---JOINT APPEAL OF SIX LEADERS FOR NUCLEAR HALT

IMMED FOLLOWING TEL CONTAINS TEXT OF EXCHANGE IN HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THIS SUBJ 22MAY BETWEEN PM TRUDEAU AND LEADER OF OFFICIAL OPPOSITION MR MULRONEY.

2. IN RESPONDING TO ANY OFFICIAL ENQUIRIES, SUCH AS ONE YOU HAVE RECEIVED FROM FCO, YOU CAN DRAW ON FOLLOWING BACKGROUND INFO. LAST SEPT PM TRUDEAU WAS APPROACHED BY MP DOUGLAS ROCHE ON BEHALF OF PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR WORLD ORDER (OF WHICH ROCHE IS LEADING MEMBER) WITH SUGGESTION THAT PM JOIN WITH GROUP OF WORLD LEADERS IN SUPPORTING JOINT PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD CALL FOR TWO-YEAR HALT IN TESTING, PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEIR DELIVERY SYSTEMS. SCENARIO AT TIME SUGGESTED THAT LEADERS MAKE THEIR APPEAL THROUGH JOINT SATELLITE HOOK-UP AND POSSIBLY TRAVEL TOGETHER WITH THEIR MESSAGE TO KEY WORLD CAPITALS. DETAILS OF PROPOSAL AND ASSO-

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
 SIG G.J. SMITH/pec	IDA	5-6689	 SIG G.J. SMITH



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PAGE TWO IDA0749 CONF D

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CIATED PROCESS WERE DEVELOPED BY OFFICE OF PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR WORLD ORDER IN NEW YORK AND IN PARTICULAR BY ITS QUOTE SECRETARY GENERAL UNQUOTE <sup>u</sup>(NICK DUNLOP, AN OFFICIAL FROM NEW ZEALAND. DUNLOP TRAVELLED TO OTT IN DEC TO EXPLAIN DEVELOPMENT OF IDEA TO CDN OFFICIALS AND TO SEEK ACTIVE SUPPORT OF PM TRUDEAU. PM SUBSEQUENTLY RECEIVED LETTER FROM MRS GANDHI ASKING HIM TO ~~SEND AN OFFICIAL TO A COORDINATING MTG~~ <sup>ATTEND</sup> OF GROUP IN NEW DELHI EARLIER THIS YEAR; REQUEST WHICH PM DECLINED.

3. ALTHOUGH PM WELCOMED ACTIVE INVOLVEMENT OF OTHER WORLD LEADERS IN DRAWING ATTENTION TO ARMS RACE AND DETERIORATING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION HE REFUSED TO SUPPORT SPECIFIC PROPOSAL PRIMARILY FOR TWO REASONS: (A) IT RAN COUNTER TO CDN DECISION TO TEST <sup>S</sup> USA AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE; (B) IT RAN COUNTER TO CDAS FIRM COMMITMENT TO NATO TWO-TRACK DECISION ON INF DEPLOYMENT. <sup>MORE GENERALLY PM</sup> ~~IT WAS ALSO PMS APPRECIATION DECIDED TO LAUNCH HIS OWN INITIATIVE FROM BASIS OF THAT COMPOSITION OF GROUP OF LEADERS WAS NOT NOT SUCH THAT IT WOULD CAAS FIRM MEMBERSHIP IN AND COMMITMENT TO NATO. HAVE OVERLY GREAT INFLUENCE WITH NUCLEAR POWERS IT WAS ADDRESSING.~~

4. ROMANIAS CEAUDESCU WAS ONE OF LEADERS THAT ORGANIZERS HAD COUNTED ON TO SUPPORT PROPOSAL <sup>BUT</sup> BOWED OUT AT RELATIVELY LATE DATE PERHAPS BECAUSE OF SOVIET PRESSURE. GONZALEZ OF SPAIN HAD ALSO BEEN APPROACHED BUT DECLINED. SPANISH EMB HERE <sup>INCIDENTALLY</sup> ~~EVIDENTLY~~ SOUGHT CDN VIEWS BEFOREHAND <sup>INCIDENTALLY</sup>

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**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

UNCLASSIFIED

FM LDN XNGR1248 23MAY84

TO EXTOTT IDD DELIVER BY 231400

INFO BNATO VMBFR STKHM/SCDEL GENEV PRMNY WSAW MDRID LSBON ROME  
PCOOTT/FOWLER PRGUE NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CIPOL/DNACPOL PARIS BPEST  
MOSCO BUCST BONN WSHDC COPEN OSLO HAGUE BRU DSLAM MXICO BAIRS  
STKHM

DISTR DMF IFB IDDZ IDR IDRL RCR RSR RBD RBR RGB URR FPR IMU IDA ZSI  
REF ATHNS TEL ZFGR5320 23MAY

---JOINT APPEAL OF SIX FOR NUCLEAR HALT

ARTICLE BY CHRISTOPHER MOSEY APPEARING IN 23MAY LONDON TIMES  
REPORTING ON SIX NATIONAL APPEAL CONTAINS STATEMENT QUOTE TWO  
COUNTRIES WHO WERE TO HAVE SIGNED-CANADA AND ROMANIA-COULD NOT  
AGREE ON FINAL TEXT UNQUOTE.IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN RESPONDING  
TO FCO AND FRG EMBASSY QUERIES HERE TO HAVE CLARIFICATION OF  
CANADIAN INVOLVEMENT ASAP.

UUU/041 231541Z XNGR1248

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

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28-6-1-TRUDEAU	
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*pepper*  
*representative*

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FM ATHNS ZFGR5320 23MAY84

TO EXTOTT(IDD) DELIVER BY 230900

INFO BNATO VMBFR STKHM/SCDEL GENEV PRMNY WSAW MDRID LSBON ROME  
PCOOTT/FOWLER PRGUE NDHQOTT/ADM POL/CIPOL/DNACPOL LDN PARIS BPEST  
MOSCO BUCST BONN WSHDC COPEN OSLO HAGUE BRU DSLAM MXICO BAIRS STKHM  
DISTR DMF IFB IDDZ IDR IDRL RCR RSR RED RBR RGB URR FPR IMU IDA ZSI  
---JOINT APPEAL OF SIX FOR NUCLEAR HALT

IN HEREUNDER PARA 3/3, SHOULD IT NOT/NOT REACH YOU FROM ANOTHER  
SOURCE, THE JOINT APPEAL ISSUED 22MAY BY PMS PAPANDEOU, INDIRA  
GANDHI AND OLOF PALME, AS WELL AS PRESIDENT DE LA MADRID,  
NYERE AND ALFONSIN. STATEMENT CALLED IN FIRST PLACE ON THE  
FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS TO QUOTE HALT ALL TESTING, PRODUCTION AND  
DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEIR DELIVERY SYSTEMS, TO BE  
FOLLOWED BY SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES UNQUOTE.  
APPEAL WAS INITIALLY ANNOUNCED AS QUOTE TO THE SUBMITTED TO THE  
UN UNQUOTE, THOUGH THIS IS NOT/NOT OBVIOUS FROM OUR READING OF  
TEXT OR COMMENTARIES HERE.

2. AMONG RELATED REMARKS AS REPORTED BY SEMI-OFFICIAL ANA  
(ATHNS NEWS AGENCY) PM PAPANDEOU RECALLED (A) THE CONSISTENT  
EFFORTS OF GREEK GOVT IN THIS FIELD AND ITS OPPOSITION TO INF  
DEPLOYMENT; (B) THE EARLIER INITIATIVE OF PWO (PARLIAMENTARIANS  
FOR WORLD ORDER) TO WHICH GREECE HAD RESPONDED FAVOURABLE.  
REPLYING TO NEWSMENS QUESTIONS, PM WOULD NOT/NOT ELABORATE

...2

PAGE TWO ZFGR5320 UNCLAS

ON WHAT FURTHER STEPS WOULD FOLLOW APPEAL BUT EXPRESSED HOPE THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WOULD JOIN IN THE EFFORT. HE DID INDICATE (A) THAT THE DISARMAMENT ISSUE WOULD BE RAISED AT THE PARIS EEC SUMMIT 25-26 JUN, WHERE GREECE WOULD PROPOSE A FOLLOW-UP DECISION ON THE INITIATIVE OF THE SIX LEADERS; AND (B) THAT HE WOULD NOT/NOT BE ABLE TO ATTEND MTG OF SOCIALIST AND SOCIALIST-DEMOCRATIC PARTIES IN PARIS 25 MAY, DUE TO OTHER COMMITMENTS. PM ALSO REITERATED THAT NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN GREECE, TERMED A QUOTE PROVOCATION AND THREAT TO PEACE UNQUOTE, WERE NOT/NOT COVERED BY ANY GREECE-USA AGREEMENT AND THAT ONLY REASON HE HAD NOT/NOT PURSUED THEIR REMOVAL WAS THAT HE WANTED THIS DONE, IF POSSIBLE, WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF QUOTE BALKAN DISARMAMENT UNQUOTE.

3. FOLLOWING TEXT OF JOINT PUBLIC STATEMENT. QUOTE

TODAY, THE SURVIVAL OF HUMAN KIND IS IN JEOPARDY. THE ESCALATING ARMS RACE, THE RISE IN INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS AND THE LACK OF CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE AMONG THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES HAS INCREASED THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR. SUCH A WAR, EVEN USING PART OF THE PRESENT STOCKPILES, WOULD BRING DEATH AND DESTRUCTION TO ALL PEOPLES.

2. AS LEADERS OF NATIONS, MEMBER STATES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, WE HAVE A COMMITMENT TO TAKE CONSTRUCTIVE ACTION TOWARDS HALTING AND REVERSING THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE. THE PEOPLE WE REPRESENT ARE NO/NO LESS THREATENED BY NUCLEAR WAR THAN THE CITIZENS OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES. IT IS PRIMARILY THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE NUCLEAR

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PAGE THREE ZFGR5320 UNCLAS

WEAPONS STATES TO PREVENT A NUCLEAR CATASTROPHE, BUT THIS PROBLEM IS TOO IMPORTANT TO BE LEFT TO THOSE STATES ALONE.

3. WE COME FROM DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE GLOBE, WITH DIFFERENCES IN RELIGION, CULTURE AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS. BUT WE ARE UNITED IN THE CONVICTION THAT THERE MUST NOT/NOT BE ANOTHER WORLD WAR. ON THIS, THE MOST CRUCIAL OF ALL ISSUES, WE HAVE RESOLVED TO MAKE A COMMON EFFORT IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE.

4. AGREEMENTS WHICH MERELY REGULATE AN ARMS BUILD-UP ARE CLEARLY INSUFFICIENT. THE PROBABILITY OF NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST INCREASES AS WARNING TIME DECREASES AND THE WEAPONS BECOME SWIFTER, MORE ACCURATE AND MORE DEADLY. THE RUSH TOWARDS GLOBAL SUICIDE MUST BE STOPPED AND THEN REVERSED. WE URGE, AS A NECESSARY FIRST STEP, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION, AS WELL AS THE UNITED KINGDOM, FRANCE AND CHINA, TO HALT ALL TESTING, PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEIR DELIVERY SYSTEMS, TO BE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWED BY SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR FORCES.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF AN ARRANGEMENT ALONG THESE LINES THAT TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE INTERESTS AND CONCERNS OF ALL, AND CONTAINS ADEQUATE MEASURES FOR VERIFICATION. THIS FIRST STEP MUST BE FOLLOWED BY A CONTINUING PROGRAMME OF ARMS REDUCTIONS LEADING TO GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT, ACCOMPANIED BY MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM AND TO ENSURE AN URGENTLY NEEDED TRANSFER OF SUBSTANTIAL

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PAGE FOUR ZFGR5320 UNCLAS

RESOURCES FROM THE ARMS RACE INTO SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. THE ESSENTIAL GOAL MUST BE TO REDUCE AND THEN ELIMINATE THE RISK OF WAR BETWEEN NATIONS.

5.WE WILL DO EVERYTHING IN OUR POWER TO FACILITATE AGREEMENT AMONG THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES.WE WILL CONTINUE TO KEEP IN TOUCH WITH ONE ANOTHER ABOUT THE BEST WAYS AND MEANS OF ACHIEVING THIS OBJECTIVE.WE WILL BE CONSULTING WITH THE LEADERS OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES AND WITH OTHER WORLD LEADERS AS WELL AS PURSUING DISCUSSIONS THROUGH UNITED NATIONS CHANNELS.

6.WE AFFIRM OUR BELIEF IN DETENTE AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING,WITH BROAD INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHT OF EACH STATE TO A PEACEFUL,SECURE AND INDEPENENT EXISTENCE AND OF THE RIGHT OF EACHPEOPLE TO ORGANISE ITS LIFE ACCORDING TO ITS OWN ASPIRATIONS.THERE CAN BE NO/NO ASSURANCE OF SAFETY FOR ONE SIDE ONLY. THAT IS WHY WE ATTACH SUCH IMPORTANCE TO A HALT IN THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE THAT ALLOWS FOR RENEWED TALKS ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT.

7.ALL PEOPLE HAVE AN OVERRIDING INTEREST IN COMMON SECURITY AND THE AVOIDANCE OF A NUCLEAR WAR WHICH THREATENS HUMAN SURVIVAL.CITIZENS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD ARE EXPRESSING,AS NEVER BEFORE THEIR CONCERN FOR THE FUTURE THIS PUBLIC DISCUSSION OF PEACE AND DISARMAMENT MUST CONTINUE AND INCREASE.THE SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT OF AN INFORMED PUBLIC WILL GREATLY STRENGTHEN GOVERNMENTAL ACTION TO REVERSE THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE.

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PAGE FIVE ZFGR5320 UNCLAS

8. WE HAVE FAITH IN THE CAPACITY OF HUMAN BEING TO RISE ABOVE THE CURRENT DIVISIONS AND CREATE A WORLD FREE FROM THE SHADOW OF NUCLEAR WAR. THE POWER AND INGENUITY OF THE HUMAN RACE MUST BE USED, NOT/NOT TO PERFECT WEAPONS OF ANNIHILATION, BUT TO HARNESS THE RESOURCES OF THE EARTH SO THAT ALL PEOPLE MAY ENJOY A LIFE OF SECURITY AND DIGNITY IN AN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FREE OF WAR AND BASED ON PEACE AND JUSTICE.

9. TODAY, THE WORLD HANGS IN THE BALANCE BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE. WE HOPE THAT OUR COMBINED EFFORTS WILL HELP TO INFLUENCE THE OUTCOME. UNQUOTE.

UUU/216 231010Z ZFGR5320

## TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE - NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

UNCLASSIFIED

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

TO  
À Canadian Embassy, WASHINGTON, D.C.

NO. IDR-1855

DATE May 22/84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
	<div data-bbox="698 154 1047 423" style="border: 2px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 10px auto; text-align: center;"> <p>IDR</p> <p>SICO A-7</p> <p>JUN 4 1984</p> <p>AWM</p> </div> <p data-bbox="276 409 1477 584">Letter from P.M. Trudeau to Mr. Alton Frye, Washington Director, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. 11 Dupont Circle, N.W., Washington, D.C.</p> <p data-bbox="276 651 552 685"><u>PLEASE FORWARD</u></p>	<div data-bbox="1096 604 1502 853" style="border: 2px solid black; padding: 5px; margin: 10px auto; text-align: center;"> <p>28-6-1-TRUDEAU</p> <p>9</p> </div>

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

May 30/84  
DATE

J. Neely  
SIGNATURE

J.R. Francis,  
Director,  
Defence Relations Division

28-WEST-1-UK  
28-6-1-Tandean  
28-7-5-1

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR1237 22MAY84

TO EXTOTT/IDA

DISTR IDAO IDAN IDAV

REF IDA TEL0729 17MAY

---BRITISH PERCEPTIONS ON CURRENT STATE OF ARMS CONTROL  
HAVE NOTED DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR IDA TELS: PARA 10 OURTEL XNGR1176  
17MAY SHOULD READ QUOTE IN RESPONSE TO BRITISH QUERY AS TO  
WHETHER SOVIET UNION MAY HAVE ENCOURAGED CANADA TO WORK UP IN  
NPT CONTEXT IDEAS INHERENT IN PMS INITIATIVE, CDNS SAID THAT  
WHILE SOVIETS HAD NOT SPOKEN OF FIVE POWER CONCEPT IN RELATION  
TO NPT, THEY HAD MADE CLEAR THEIR CONCERN RE NPT ITSELF. BOTH  
SIDES NOTED THAT SOVIETS SHOW INCLINATION TO PLAY POSITIVE ROLE  
IN NPT, AND HAVE SUGGESTED TECHNICAL CONSULTATIONS UNQUOTE.  
CCC/224 221618Z XNGR1237

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CONFIDENTIAL

May 22, 1984

IDDZ-0264

28-6-1 (Treadman)	
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R.R. Fowler)

Initiative: Update on Five Power Conference,  
Stockholm Conference and MBFR

The following brief update on these subjects is submitted pursuant to your request of last week.

Five Power Conference

Following your conversation with him in mid-January, we forwarded to the U.N. Secretary General a discussion paper on the five power conference proposal as a suggested basis for his consultations with the representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The Secretary General appears so far to have done nothing to forward this idea. Ambassador Pelletier most recently raised the matter with him on May 16, and Mr. Perez de Cuellar's reaction was that it would not be "timely" to pursue the question under present circumstances. On the basis of his just concluded consultations with the representatives of the five powers on the Cyprus issue, the Secretary General commented "with some bitterness that the Five were agreeable to maintaining their authority through use of the veto, but seemed unprepared to take on the greater responsibility of finding areas of common action."

Our mission in New York will be pursuing its discussions of this proposal with U.N. Under Secretary General Brian Urquhart.

Stockholm Conference

After an encouraging beginning with Foreign Ministers present, the Stockholm Conference settled down to a general debate on the conceptual issues, which was largely free of acrimony and recrimination. Capturing the initiative, the Western group tabled its package of concrete measures at the beginning of the second week but it was not until the first day of the second session that

the USSR formally tabled the declaratory proposals outlined in Foreign Minister Gromyko's opening statement. The Neutrals and Non-Aligned (NNA), following several weeks of negotiating among themselves, were finally able during the last week of the first session to table proposals that in many aspects were similar to the Western ones.

The major task facing the Conference at the second session (May 8 to July 6) will be to agree on an organizational structure (i.e. the establishment of working groups) in order for the Conference to move from the general debate stage to the detailed examination of proposals and actual negotiations. While on the surface this would appear to be an administrative matter, the issue has political implications as participants must agree to a structure which would permit their proposals to get full and favourable consideration and still be acceptable to the other groups of participants. For the West the problem involves developing a system which will satisfy the Soviets that their proposals will receive "equal treatment" while at the same time maintaining the Western position that the WPO declaratory proposals fall outside the mandate of the Conference.


A problem for the non-superpower participants will be to maintain the pace set during the first session of the Conference. Already, at Soviet insistence the number of plenary meetings has been reduced to four per week, and from its actions during the first week and a half of this session it would appear that the USSR will be content to continue the general debate for some time to come. Whether this is a negotiating tactic based on a Soviet perception of Western impatience or on reluctance to provide President Reagan in an election year with any evidence of movement in arms control negotiations, remains to be seen. On the other hand, the United States seems content with the slowing of the pace and is now focussing its attention on maintaining Alliance solidarity and counselling patience.

#### MBFR

On April 19, 1984, Western participants in the MBFR negotiations formally tabled the long-awaited new Western proposals offering flexibility on the question of data, but requiring enhanced verification measures. The new NATO position on data would concentrate in the first instance on clarifying figures for combat and combat support forces in Central Europe, allowing a band of discrepancy between the figures of both sides to exist at the time of

signature of an MBFR agreement and leaving for later resolution levels of forces in rear services where the bulk of the discrepancy is believed to exist. This concession gives the Warsaw Pact countries a means of resolving the data question without losing face if they are serious about concluding an MBFR agreement.

While the MBFR proposals tabled by the West last month do not go as far as we would have hoped in terms of shifting the focus of the debate from data to verification measures, they are the result of difficult compromises among NATO allies and within the Reagan Administration, and probably represent the best achievable in the circumstances. The Western move will not in itself break the log-jam in the negotiations, but may be sufficient to elicit a counter move from the East in due course. Although the initial Eastern reaction to the NATO proposals was harshly critical, it did not amount to complete rejection. Our Ambassador in Moscow has received indications that a more considered and less negative reaction may be forthcoming when the negotiations reconvene in Vienna on May 24.



L. A. Delvoie  
Chairman  
Task Force Working Group

cc: PMO/Axworthy

PCO/Osbaldeston

DND/ADMPOL/CPD/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

EA/MINA/USS/DMF/IFB/IDR/IDA/RBD/RBR

(MF)

Smyth - Some pts that do not appear in tils.

KJC.

Miscellaneous Points

- USA said that regardless of what they thought of our proposals their reaction to them would be entirely negative if they were directed to the CD.
- USA also said that if ASAT proposal had effect of reopening discussion of mandate of working group they would oppose formation of such a group.
- UK said that if this were to happen they would with regret have to support the USA.
- USA does not believe that US-USSR strategic issues should be put into CD. To do so puts us in the camp of Palme and Robles.
- UK is of view that putting ASAT proposal into CD at this point would have opposite effect to what we would seek.
- Dobbins said that putting papers in CD would be form of petty harassment normally associated with Greeks and Mexicans.
- Dobbins has said that if we go USA-USSR route USA will respond to them in positive manner.

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

mf

PM INITIATIVE: TALKING POINTS ON DISCUSSION PAPERS

We have so far recd comment on three discussion papers from UK (YBGR 8029, XNGR 0267 IFB 0179), NETHS (YBGR 6116, YWGR 0341), Norway (YBGR 6113), USA (UNGR 2006, POL 774), FRG (YBGR 6135), Italy (YBGR 6137) and Bel (YBGR 6136).

Following are our responses to specific points of substance raised in the above. It goes without saying that we do not claim to have solved all of the problems. On many of the points we would appreciate further elaboration from our allies so as to perfect our proposals.

28-6-1- Trudeau Peace Mission

1. Neths suggest that high-altitude ban could legitimize low altitude ASAT.

We hold different view. We clearly stated that we saw this only as first step and promising one in absence of deployment any such systems. In our view, this point could be made of almost any arms control proposal. Negotiation of Partial Test Ban may be instructive in this regard. Had West held out for Comprehensive Test Ban it is our judgement that nothing would have been accomplished. Thus while we would prefer, like Neths, a total ASAT ban we, like FRG, see little immediate prospect of it being negotiated. We would, of course, support any Neths suggestion for more comprehensive approach which we would not see as incompatible with our own. As with test ban negotiation it is as well to recall that best may be enemy of good.

- 2 -

Furthermore, if a high altitude ban led both sides to deploy their satellites at ever higher altitudes, the importance of low altitude ASAT would decline.

2. Neths criticized ASAT proposal for not covering development, production, possession, and destruction.

Latter two are irrelevant as no high altitude ASATs exist. We considered former two but rejected ban on them as unattainable. Ban on testing and deployment is, in our view, sufficient without adding other requirements which would then be criticized as unverifiable.

3. Neths and USA have made point that ban could be circumvented by cheating with low altitude systems by adding booster or by testing only at low altitudes.

We recognize this as legitimate concern but we wonder whether cheating would be all that easy. We would welcome further precision on this from Neths and USA.

USSR ASAT is launched by a rocket based on the SS9 which is easily observed by NTM. It has a range of perhaps less than 2000 kms. USA satellites in geostationary orbit are at an altitude of about

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- 3 -

36,000 kms. It would seem to us that adding a booster to reach that altitude be detectably by NTM if our information on USA capabilities is correct. For example, SALT II experience over differentiation to be made between SS16 and SS20 would appear to demonstrate USA ability to detect addition of third stage to what is otherwise common weapon system. More recent USA charges that Soviets are again developing SS16 as well as SSX25 would seem to reinforce this view. Furthermore, verification would be more of a Soviet than USA problem because of the size of the USA system.

The problem of circumvention could, of course, be more serious in the case of follow on Soviet systems. While it might be possible to put follow-on low altitude systems on heavy boosters for use at higher altitudes, the actual use of such systems would seem to us to be unlikely in the absence of a series of tests designed to create confidence that such a serious act would be successful. Similarly, while surrogate testing at low altitudes may be possible, would confidence in the efficacy of the systems at much higher altitudes be sufficiently high to warrant investment that deployment would entail. The recent failures in the launching of satellites from the Space shuttle would seem to underline

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- 4 -

the importance of testing. While we acknowledge that these concerns are legitimate, we do not believe that our proposal is thereby necessarily fatally flawed. We would welcome further elaboration from USA.

Cheating on arms control agreements is always possible. If the number of cases is small, such cheating may never be detected. If the cheating is only in limited cases, however, is it militarily significant.

4. There has been some suggestion that our ASAT proposal would conflict with USA planning for spaced-based BMD.

The United States has announced its intention to undertake a research programme on spaced-based BMD. It is envisaged that this programme will take at least 10 years. There would therefore appear to be no immediate conflict with our ASAT proposal which does not suggest any restriction on research and development. An ASAT treaty could be for a period of five years. It does not seem reasonable to us to eschew arms control opportunities today because of future hypothetical developments.

5. USA has said that our proposal on mobility of ICBM's is contrary to Scowcroft report.

.../5

- 5 -

Our proposal does not inhibit move towards mobile ICBM's. Indeed, PM recognized in Montreal that this would be stabilizing. Our proposal merely suggests that some limits be placed on the degree of mobility so as to facilitate verification. Degree of mobility necessary for survivability and degree of restriction useful for verification would not appear to be irreconcilable, although precise details cannot be worked out until a launcher is selected and its hardness is determined. When our experts were in WSHDC in November USA verification experts did not suggest any incompatibility with Scowcroft report. Indeed, they admitted that it was one idea they were examining although admin was not yet prepared to take position. In this respect, Scowcroft report says, "deployment of a small single-warhead ICBM in hardened mobile launchers is of particular interest because it could permit deployment in peacetime in limited areas such as military reservations. Land mobile deployments without hard launchers could be threatened by a relatively small attack - in the absence of an appropriate arms control agreement - unless our own missiles were distributed widely across the country in peacetime."

.../6

- 6 -

It is unlikely in the extreme that USA admin is going to deploy midgetman throughout length and breadth of USA, if for no other reasons than security and domestic politics. They will undoubtedly be deployed in restricted areas albeit perhaps of large size. Effect of this proposal would, therefore, be to place upon Soviets through international agreement same restriction as is imposed on USA by its political system. Finally, charge by UK in BNATO YBGR 8029 that this is contrary to current western position strikes us as rather unusual. We, at any rate, have never been consulted on how single warhead ICBM's would be deployed.

6. Neths have made point that this is not only way to ensure verifiability of mobile ICBM's.

We could welcome their alternatives. Example of SSBN's hardly applies as difference in size between it and whatever launcher is selected for midgetman will be quite considerable.

7. Neths doubt that mobility causes any verification problem is not consistent with our info but we will be interested to learn more of Neths views.

.../7

- 7 -

8. FRG has made point that real problem with single-warhead ICBM's is with reloadability and that this problem would not be solved by our proposals.

We do not entirely agree. If spares, refires etc. were kept outside of deployment areas and away from launchers, their utility would be seriously degraded. In addition, FRG point on reloadability would seem to be directly at odds with manner by which FRG has argued that refires should be handled in INF negotiations i.e., that refines should not be taken directly into account. We would welcome FRG views.

9. Why would zonal approach enhance verifiability?

By placing mobile ICBM's in restricted zones one would limit the area which satellites would have to monitor regularly. The non-deployment areas would have to be monitored but less frequently as any detection would necessarily be a violation.

10. USA and others have suggested that our proposal on verifiability undercuts Allied position on on-site inspection.

.../8

- 8 -

If this is so, it certainly was not intended as we do believe that on-site inspection remains necessary in some cases. Indeed it remains an integral part of our approach. We are not sure that we follow a logic that says that to enhance one form of verification devalues any other. Inspiration for this proposal came from example set by Carter admin in its plan for MX basing which took into account in planning stage need for verification so that ultimate basing mode would be verifiable by NTM's. Intent was to encourage both superpowers to follow that example, i.e. to think about verification before deployment. Concept may have lost something in translation from specific case to abstract formulation but we could hardly have commended example of Carter admin to present admin in WSHDC. The general principle asserted by USA that any verification régime must be tailored to specific weapons systems and specific treaty language does not in our view conflict with our proposal. Point made by number of commentators that proposal is unworkable in abstract may well be correct. But modern international relations are based on whole host of abstract concepts which we must assume they consider to be equally unworkable. We remain of view, however, that superpowers should

.../9

- 9 -

avoid, wherever possible, deploying systems which exacerbate verification or make it impossible. Furthermore, power deploying systems should have responsibility for ensuring verifiability rather than its adversary. Indeed, this has been the stance taken by General Rowny, Chief USA START negotiator, from the outset of START when it became known that Soviets had proposed that mobile ICBM's henceforth be permitted in contrast to ban on such systems agreed to in SALT II. At START consultation in Brussels, Dec. 2, 1983 Rowny said that he had reminded Soviets that if they proposed to deploy mobile ICBM's, such a proposal should be accompanied by suggested verification measures. SLCM's on general purpose boats is excellent example of contrary. If satisfactory verification proves impossible to construct in respect to such systems, ban might be preferred alternative.

11. Norwegians have, in respect to verifiability proposal, asked what would happen in case of deadlock.

That is good question and one we asked ourselves. We came to the conclusion, however, that that problem is

.../10

- 10 -

inherent in any agreement between two parties where there is no third, higher party. An SCC can be useful but it cannot ensure that problem will not arise. For example, this problem presently exists with reference to alleged cheating on SALT agreements. It can also be said to exist in respect to current data problem in MBFR.

12. Neths and Italy argue that verification cannot be pursued except in the context of specific agreements dealing with specific types of weapons and specific types of restrictions.

We accept this point. Our proposal is not, however, a verification measure. It is not designed or intended to serve as a method of verification in any particular case. It is a 'code of conduct' agreement to be applied to force planning so as to include predictably and reduce subsequent verification problems.

13. Norway suggests that measure as it stands prejudices the interests of the party deploying more new

.../11

- 11 -

systems. For that reason it would be improved if it applied to old as well as new systems.

This point is well taken. It is, however, generally assumed that existing systems are verifiable by NTM. It would also appear to us unlikely that either superpower in the future will be in a situation of deploying significantly more new systems than the other in the context of agreement which would restrict new systems to specific numbers.

14. The UK has said that placing onus of verification on deploying state would be radical shift in policy.

We would appreciate more clarification of this assertion. See reference to General Rowny above.

15. Bel has said that these proposals place USA and USSR in an equal position.

Taking a stand equidistant between the USA and the USSR poses an admittedly difficult political question. But if the proposals are to have any prospect of acceptance we believe there is a need to show even-handedness. We did, of course, take allied positions carefully into account in designing these proposals.

IDA/G.J.SMITH/5-86897/dec

FILE DIV DIARY

PM Luncheon with  
European Community Ambassadors  
May 1984

28-6-1-Trudeau

IDA-743

CONFIDENTIAL

May 22 1984

PM INITIATIVE (UPDATE)

Luncheon with European Community Ambassadors

In referring to your peace initiative, you might begin by recalling for the Ambassadors of the European Community that your prime purpose was to inject a "jolt of high-level political energy" into the international security debate. Leaders at the highest level had to engage themselves personally in the search to reduce international tensions and to improve East-West relations both for its own intrinsic value as well as to meet public expectations in Western democracies.

To the extent that a number of Western leaders are pursuing actively a policy of political dialogue with the East (Prime Ministers Thatcher and Craxi to Hungary, and visits to Moscow by the Italian, German and British Foreign Ministers and possibly, in the near future, by President Mitterrand) this is a welcome and useful development.

This contact is to be encouraged despite the increase in recent days in harsh rhetoric by Soviet leaders and a toughening in the Soviet stance on arms control, particularly in relationship to INF and START, as well as their pull back from the Olympics.

You might express some disappointment that President Chernenko does not seem to have followed through on the references he made to détente in his conversation with you in Moscow in February and that the "window of opportunity" to which you spoke has not been utilized by the USSR. Indeed, the Soviet Union has reacted negatively to: (a) the recent USA draft treaty on chemical weapons tabled in Geneva in late April; (b) the MBFR proposals tabled by the West in Vienna last month, even though they were not as ambitious as Canada might have desired; and (c) the package of confidence and security building measures tabled by the NATO countries in Stockholm.

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- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Nevertheless, you might note that the USSR last week proposed that Canada and the USSR hold bilateral arms control consultations on a number of specific subjects (chemical weapons, NPT, the Stockholm conference and outer space). Canada has agreed, provided that the agenda not be limited, and the talks are expected to take place in Moscow next autumn.

In terms of the special elements in your initiative, you might mention that their current state is as follows:

(A) Stockholm Conference

- There is general agreement that the decision to send Foreign Ministers was a good one and that the bilateral encounters held there were positive in nature. Should the discussion bog down, consideration might again be given to the idea of having Foreign Ministers return to Stockholm.

(B) Five Power Conference

- In January you had suggested to the UN Secretary General that he give consideration to convening a meeting of the Permanent Representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council to discuss their responsibilities in the field of arms control. To date he has not taken up this suggestion (only the Chinese have responded favourably to the idea) on the grounds that it would not be "timely" to pursue the question under present circumstances given current attitudes.

(C) NPT

- Your concerns about horizontal proliferation have been echoed by a number of other world leaders but your experience with Mrs. Gandhi at the Commonwealth Conference showed that it will not be an easy task to achieve progress. Canada however is examining ways in which the provisions of the NPT can be strengthened and a greater number of adherents to the agreement achieved.

(D) Two Suffocation Proposals

- Just recently you wrote to Presidents Reagan and Chernenko seeking their views on two specific

..3

proposals dealing with strategic weapons systems you have put forward gearing down the momentum of the arms race: (a) to restrict the mobility of terrestrially deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles and (b) to demonstrate the verifiability of new strategic weapons systems. To date no official reaction has been received although we have been led to believe that a favourable response will be forthcoming from Washington.

(Note: This course of action was decided upon after consultation at NATO including bilaterals with several allies including the USA.)

(E) ASAT

- Your proposal for a high altitude ASAT ban has been the subject of discussion among allies. As a first priority we would hope to achieve agreement in Geneva on the creation of a ad hoc working group on outer space in which the Canadian proposal might be addressed.
- You might add that you remain concerned about the development of a costly and possibly destabilizing new arms race in space and believe that this should be the subject of urgent consideration in the months and years ahead.

(F) 10 Principles

- As it has now become clear that all-party support for a resolution in the House on the ten principles is not possible (due to the position of the NDP) you now intend to proceed with writing to leaders of the countries you visited suggesting that the principles might form the basis of a common bond between East and West.

(G) Canadian Institute for International Peace & Security

- The Bill has now passed second reading, has been given all-party support and is now before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence for detailed consideration. Final agreement may be reached in June.

4144 042

**CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR WORLD ORDER  
PARLEMENTAIRES CANADIENS POUR UN ORDRE MONDIAL**

HOUSES OF PARLIAMENT  
LES EDIFICES DU PARLEMENT  
BOX — C.P. 950  
OTTAWA, CANADA  
K1A 0A6  
TEL. (613) 996-6111

May 22, 1984

DUSSREK
28-6-1-TRUDEAU
20-4-7

PEACE MISSION

The Right Honourable Pierre Trudeau  
Prime Minister of Canada  
House of Commons  
Ottawa, Ontario

28-2-1

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Re: The Four Continent Peace Initiative

You are probably aware of the statement made, today, by Prime Minister Gandhi, President Miguel de la Madrid, President Nyerere, Prime Minister Palme, and Prime Minister Papandreou. This statement known as The Four Continent Peace Initiative asks the nuclear powers to halt the nuclear arms race and have offered to facilitate agreement through a joint nine point proposal.

As Canadian Members of Parliament from all political parties we would ask you to support this important initiative. It seems to us that it is fully compatible with your personal peace initiatives which we likewise support.

If we can assist in any way in these matters please call on us at your convenience.

Yours very truly,

*Warren Allmand*  
Warren Allmand, M.P.  
Chairman

ORIGINAL TO *R. F. ... (20)*  
ORIGINAL ENVOYE A  
C.C. PMO FILE *C. D. Brennan*  
C.C. DOSSIERS CPM  
*& for info.*

CANADIAN PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR WORLD ORDER  
PARLEMENTAIRES CANADIENS POUR UN ORDRE MONDIAL

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TEL. (613) 996-6111

# NEWS RELEASE/COMMUNIQUÉ

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MAY 22, 1984

PARLIAMENTARIANS SUPPORT THE FOUR  
CONTINENT PEACE INITIATIVE

The Canadian Parliamentarians for World Order, through their Chairman, the Hon. Warren Allmand, M.P., have expressed their full support for The Four Continent Peace Initiative announced today in five countries.

This Initiative by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in India, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou in Greece, Prime Minister Olaf Palme in Sweden, President Julius Nyerere in Tanzania and President Miguel de la Madrid in Mexico requests the nuclear powers to halt the nuclear arms race and have offered to facilitate agreement through a joint nine point proposal. (attached)

This Initiative was first proposed in 1983 by Parliamentarians for World Order, an international network of legislators in 31 countries. The Canadian group consist of 121 members from all three parties in the Canadian Parliament.

Canadian Parliamentarians for World Order have advised Prime Minister Trudeau of their support for the Four Continent Peace Initiative and have asked him, as part of his personal peace initiative, to join the 5 other middle power leaders with this new move.

- 30 -

for information call:

Warren Allmand, M.P.	995-2251
James McGrath, M.P.	996-1783
Paul McRae, M.P.	992-6418
Walter McLean, M.P.	995-8281
Bob Ogle, M.P.	996-4585

# NEWS RELEASE

## Four Continent Peace Initiative

EMBARGOED FOR 12.01 a.m.  
May 22, 1984

FOR MORE INFO:  
Richard Pollock  
(202) 328-9001  
Nicholas Dunlop  
(212) 687-7755

### OVERVIEW

Reflecting a deepening gloom over the collapse of all nuclear arms control talks and a belief that the nuclear weapons states are beginning a drift toward war, five world leaders who are independent of both Washington and Moscow took the unusual step of advancing an arms control initiative of their own. They will personally release it in simultaneous press conferences held in their respective capitals today.

Launching this "Four Continent Peace Initiative" are Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid, Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, and Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere.

Overview/page two

The five vow to "do everything in our power to facilitate agreement among the nuclear weapons states" on an across-the-board halt to the nuclear arms race, according to the joint nine-point declaration that will explain their initiative.

They hope to break the political impasse by using their combined influence to appeal directly to the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as to the other nuclear weapons states, France, Britain and China, to put a halt to what the leaders call "the rush towards global suicide."

"We come from different parts of the globe, with differences in religion, culture and political systems," the five national leaders stated in their declaration. "But we are united in the conviction that there must not be another world war."

The effort has taken more than a year of intense consultations to prepare, and is intended to begin a new process to stem the arms race.

Overview/page three

Nuclear arms control has taken such a downward spiral, the leaders said, that non-nuclear states can no longer sit idly by. "The people we represent are no less threatened by nuclear war than the citizens of the nuclear weapons states," they stated in their declaration.

Mirroring this view, Prime Minister Gandhi explained, "What the scientists tell us is that the whole world will be affected. This is an issue on which men and women, young and old, all nationalities, should stand together. We are all neighbors on this planet."

The leaders have taken the unusual step of sending their United Nations Ambassadors to deliver the declaration to the U.N. Mission chiefs of the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Britain and China. The five Ambassadors will go as a group to each of the Missions on May 22nd.

All five leaders will be consulting with the heads of government of the nuclear weapons states.

Overview/page four

They plan to remain in close contact with each other following the declaration in order to track the political response and to review possible next steps.

"If any program is left to the technical level then it can get bogged down in details and complexities," said Mrs. Gandhi, "whereas the need is to raise it above that to a level of statesmanship which only the leaders can give."

The Four Continent Peace Initiative was born last year when a group of parliamentarians assembled in Church House in London to consider efforts they could undertake to confront the worsening tensions among the nuclear weapons states. The members belonged to a five year-old organization known as Parliamentarians for World Order. Starting in mid-1983, they dispatched delegations to meet with a select group of government leaders in order to discuss proposals for joint action.

"This is the first group of political leaders that really has the ability to play an effective

Overview/page five

third party role in negotiations to end the arms race," observed Nicholas Dunlop, Secretary-General of the organization, who has shuttled back and forth across continents for most of the past year.

Commenting on the implications of the appearance of a newly organized "third" political force between East and West, Prof. Roger Fisher, head of the Harvard Negotiation Project noted, "What is unique about this initiative is not just the content of the proposals but the process of which they are a part. It's already a success because it is changing the structure of the nuclear debate."

Among those parliamentarians who participated behind the scenes on behalf of this effort are: Ólafur Grimsson (Iceland), Douglas Roche, M.P. (Canada), John Silkin, M.P. (United Kingdom), Relus Ter Beek (Netherlands), Rep. Tom Downey (USA), Rep. Berkley Bedell (USA), and Senator Silvia Hernandez (Mexico).

The text of the joint declaration of the leaders will be available on May 22, 1984.

May 23, 1984.

The Honourable Warren Allmand, M.P.,  
Chairman,  
Canadian Parliamentarians for  
World Order,  
Room 783-CB,  
House of Commons,  
Ottawa, Ontario.  
K1A 0A6

Dear Mr. Allmand:

On behalf of the Prime Minister, I acknowledge  
your letter of May 22.

Please be assured that it and the enclosed  
news release will be brought to Mr. Trudeau's attention.

Yours sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED   
ORIGINAL SIGNÉ PAR

Marie-Andrée Bastien,  
Correspondence Director.

Original to: R. Fowler  
cc: D. Creana \*

\* for information

MAB/ls



Government of Canada  
Privy Council Office

Gouvernement du Canada  
Bureau du Conseil privé

Ottawa, Canada  
K1A 0A3

Date: 24 May 1984

*Mr. Delvoic*  
*Mr. Smith*  
*for action*

IDA-800  
Sent with  
IDA 1038  
28/6

MEMORANDUM TO:

*Mr. L. A. Delvoic*  
*Director General, International Security*  
*and Arms Control Bureau*

*file 28-61-Trade*  
*20-4-WPO*  
*28-2-1*

Letter to the Prime Minister from:

WARREN ALLMAND, M.P.

PMO Ref. No: *H144...042*

We have arranged with the Under Secretary's office that the Department's services can be drawn upon in preparing replies to letters which the Prime Minister has received on foreign affairs.

I would be grateful if you could prepare a draft reply to the attached letter and return it to me directly by 7 June, 1984 with a copy to CMR/Johnston. It should be prepared as if for the Prime Minister's signature, although I would also welcome your advice on alternative ways of dealing with the matter, if appropriate.

If you have any questions, please call me at 5-6073.

Maurice D. Archdeacon  
Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat

c.c. PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)  
PCO/Judy Cameron  
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston

*Peace initiative*

28-6-1-Trudeau	
24	9

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYGR0951 21MAY84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO PRGUE WSAW BONN MOSCO WSHDC LDN PARIS BNATO BPEST BGRAD  
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DISTR MINA MINE MINT USS DMF IFB RGB IDD IDR CPD RBD RBR UGB URR  
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---PMS INITIATIVE:FOLLOW UP

ROMANIAN AUTHORITIES CONTINUE TO MANIFEST CONSIDERABLE INTEREST IN  
 FOLLOW-UP OF PMS PEACE INITIATIVE. THEY ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED  
 IN LETS SENT TO REAGAN AND CHERNENKO AS WELL AS IN OUR VIEWS ON HOW  
PMS PRINCIPLES ON RELNS BETWEEN NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES ARE BEING  
PURSUED. ARE YOU IN POSN TO PROVIDE US WITH INFO ON LATEST  
 DEVELOPMENTS SO THAT WE COULD BRIEF HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS IN MFA?  
 CCC/181 220951Z UYGR0951

**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**

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*cc jds*

18-6-1-Trudeau  
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---PM INITIATIVE:LET TO CHERNENKO ON SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS  
WE RECOGNIZE THERE MAY HAVE BEEN REASONS TO PUBLICIZE  
AT EARLY STAGE FACT AND SUBSTANCE OF PM TRUDEAUS LETS TO REAGAN  
AND CHERNENKO.WE NEVERTHELESS THINK THAT SUCH EARLY PUBLICITY,  
COMING BEFORE LET HAD EVEN BEEN DELIVERED TO ONE OF RECIPIENTS  
SEEMS LIKELY TO UNDERMINE OUR SERIOUSNESS OF PURPOSE.WHEN I  
PRESENTED PMS LET TO KORNIENKO HE SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY READ  
ABOUT IT IN PAPERS

ROBERTS

CCC/144 181126Z XYGR0632

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

28-6-1-Trudeau

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0639 18MAY84

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INFO BNATO LDN BONN ROME PARIS HAGUE BRU PRMNY GENEV TOKYO

PEKIN WSHDC PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/PPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR MINA DMF IFB RBD RBR IDD IDR ZSI FPR

REF YOURTEL XYGR0626 16MAY

---PM INITIATIVE:LET TO CHERNENKO ON SUFFOCIATION

PROPOSALS

ORIGINAL OF PM TRUDEAUS LET TO CHERNENKO DELIVERED BY HAND

17MAY84 TO MFA OFFICIAL.

CCC/144 181313Z XYGR0639

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

*Peace initiatives*  
28-6-1-Trudeau  
2 9

**CORRECTED COPY  
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WSHDC PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/CPD/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR MINA DMF IFB RBD RBR IDD IDR ZSI FPR

REF YOURTEL IDA0667 09MAY

---PM INITIATIVE:LET TO CHERNENKO ON SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS

SUMMARY:CONVEYED PM TURDFAUS LET FOR CHERNENKO TO FIRST DEPUTY

FM KORNIENKO TODAY.LATTER INDICATED LIKELIHOOD OF CONSIDERED

SOVIET REPLY AFTER CAREFUL STUDY OF PROPOSALS.IN DISCUSSION

OF EAST-WEST/ACD ISSUES,KORNIENKO EXPATIATED AT LENGTH,AND IN

LARGELY FAMILIAR TERMS,ON PERSISTENTLY NEGATIVE USA ATTITUDES

TOWARD SOVIET ACD PROPOSALS AND ON LACK OF SERIOUSNESS OF USA

DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS.POINT OF SPECIAL INTEREST AROSE WHEN

KORNIENKO DISCUSSED QUESTION OF INF IN EUROPE:IN REASSERTING

NEED TO RETURN TO PREDEPLOYMENT SITUATION IF NUCLEAR NEGS ARE

TO BE RESUMED,KORNIENKO STATED THAT STARTING POINT SHLD BE

SITUATION AS IT EXISTED IN 1976(I.E.BEFORE DEPLOYMENT OF EITHER

SS-20S OR USA INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES HAD BEGUN)WHEN THERE

HAD BEEN NO/NO QUESTION OF ANY KIND OF SOVIET NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY

2.REPORT:I TODAY CALLED ON FIRST DEPUTY FM KORNIENKO TO CONVEY

SUBJ LET.I REHEARSED BROAD ASPECTS OF PMS INITIATIVE AS IT HAS

...2

PAGE TWO XYGR0626 CONFD

DEVELOPED, RECALLING PEARSONS NOV VISIT TO MOSCO AND PM TRUDEAUS FEB/84 MTG WITH CHERNENKO. I ALSO MENTIONED MULTI-PARTY ENDORSMENT OF INITIATIVE, LIKELY SOON TO BE EXPRESSED IN PARLIAMENTARY RESOLUTION, WHICH SHLD ENSURE ITS CONTINUITY IN SOME FORM REGARDLESS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CDA. WHEN I MENTIONED THAT SIMILAR LETTER WAS BEING SENT TO PRES REAGAN, KORNIENKO INDICATED HE WAS ALREADY AWARE FROM NORTH AMERICAN PRESS ACCOUNTS. I EXPLAINED OUR ORIGINAL INTENTIONS RE PUBLIC HANDLING AS SET OUT REPTL.

3. IN RECEIVING LET, KORNIENKO SAID PM TRUDEAUS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE INNATL SITUATION, EASE EAST-WEST TENSION AND REDUCE RISK OF WAR HAD MET WITH SOVIET UNDERSTANDING AND APPRECIATION. HE INDICATED LIKELIHOOD OF CONSIDERED SOVIET REPLY AFTER PROPOSALS HAD BEEN CAREFULLY STUDIED.

4. TO START BROADER CONVERSATION ON CURRENT E/W SITUATION, I RECALLED PM TRUDEAUS EMPHASIS, AT HIS FEB MTG WITH CHERNENKO, ON NEED TO USE QUOTE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY UNQUOTE IN FIRST HALF 84 TO TAKE STEPS WHICH WLD REDUCE EAST-WEST TENSION AND BEGIN PROCESS OF REESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS. I CITED RECENT CONCRETE WESTERN PROPOSALS-MBFR, USA DRAFT CW TREATY, STKHM PROPOSALS-AND INDICATED THAT WITH EXCEPTION OF STKHM PROPOSALS, IT SEEMED TO CDN GOVT THAT USSR HAD BRUSHED THESE INITIATIVES ASIDE WITHOUT GIVING THEM SERIOUS STUDY OR CONSIDERATION.

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PAGE THREE XYGR0626 CONF D

5. THIS LAUNCHED KORNIENKO ON EXTENDED DISQUISITION, TOUCHED MORE WITH SARCASM THAN WITH ACRIMONY, RE NEGATIVE USA ATTITUDES TOWARD MANY CONCRETE SOVIET PROPOSALS AND PERCEIVED UNSERIOUSNESS OF USA ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS. USSR, KORNIENKO SAID, HAD BEEN PEERING INTENTLY THROUGH THIS QUOTE WINDOW UNQUOTE BUT HAD UNFORTUNATELY BEEN UNABLE TO DISCERN ANY SIGN OF USA WILLINGNESS IN PRACTICE TO NEGOTIATE OR CONCLUDE MEANINGFUL AGREEMENTS WITH USSR. RE NUCLEAR ARMS NEGS AT GENEV (KORNIENKO DID NOT/NOT MAKE DISTINCTION BETWEEN START AND INF THOUGH HE SEEMED TO HAVE LATTER IN MIND) HE SAID USSR HAD MADE CLEAR ITS READINESS TO RETURN TO PREDEPLOYMENT SITUATION, RESUME NEGS AND REITERATE PROPOSALS IT HAD ALREADY MADE WHICH, IF ACCEPTED, WLD REDUCE NUCLEAR ARSENALS IN EUROPE TO LEVELS LOWER THAN THOSE OF 1976. YET USSR HAD RECEIVED NO/NO POSITIVE RESPONSE. KORNIENKO POINTEDLY SAID THAT SITUATION AS IT EXISTED IN 1976 SHOULD BE QUOTE POINT OF DEPARTURE UNQUOTE FOR NEGS SINCE, AT THAT TIME, THE QUESTION OF USSR HAVING ANY KIND OF INF SUPERIORITY IN EUROPE HAD NEVER ARISEN. WE FIND THESE KORNIENKO COMMENTS INTRIGUING. FORMULATION OF USA HAVING REJECTED SOVIET INDICATIONS OF QUOTE READINESS UNQUOTE TO RETURN TO PRE-DEPLOYMENT SITUATION AND RESUME NEGS IS REVERSAL OF USUAL FORMULA OF INVITING WESTERN SIDE TO EXPRESS SUCH READINESS. FURTHER HIS CLEAR REF TO 1976 AS MARKING BASELINE FROM WHICH NEGOTIATIONS SHLD BEGIN IS, WE THINK, DISTINCTLY NEW WAY OF SETTING OUT SOVIET POSITION.

...4

PAGE FOUR XYGR0626 CONFD

IT WAS PRESUMABLY NOT/NOT MEANT TO IMPLY LITERAL SOVIET WILLING-  
NESS TO REMOVE ALL SS-20S AND RESTORE SS-4 AND SS-5 DEPLOYMENTS  
IN EVENT OF NATO INF WITHDRAWALS. BUT IT WLD IN LOGIC IMPLY SOVIET/NOT P  
WILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE TO LIMIT SS-20 OR OTHER INF DEPLOYMENTS THE  
IN EUROPE TO SUBSTANTIVE EQUIVALENT OF ITS 1976 DEPLOYMENTS RI  
(SOVIETS MIGHT WELL TAKE POSITION THAT EXISTING SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS OV  
DO NOT/NOT EXCEED THEIR 1976 INF CAPACITY IN EUROPE). KORNIIENKO  
FORMULATION DOES CLEARLY IMPLY CONTINUED SOVIET DETERMINATION SIMPLY  
TO ELIMINATE USA INF MISSILES FROM EUROPE. IT WILL BE WORTH  
WATCHING CLOSELY FURTHER SOVIET STATEMENTS TO SEE IF CONCEPT OF JT EST  
1976 AS BASELINE FOR INF NEGS IS REPEATED AND ITS IMPLICATIONS MET D S  
FURTHER ELABORATED. SEI

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-FOR RESUMPTION OF CTB NEGOTIATIONS (USA REJECTS ON ALLEGED  
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...5

PAGE FIVE XYGR0626 CONFD

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...6

PAGE SIX XYGR0626 CONFD

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ROBERTS

CCC/144 161340Z XYGR0626

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

338723	DOSSIER
FILE	
28-6-15 TRUDEAU PEACE	
	MISSION

**SUBJECT TO CORRECTION  
SUSCEPTIBLE D'ETRE CORRIGE**

*Mr. [unclear]  
[unclear]*

*file*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0626 16MAY84

TO EXTOTT/IDA DELIVER BY 161100

INFO PNATO LDN BONN ROME PARIS HAGUE BRU PRMNY GENEV TOKYO PEKIN

WSHDC PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/CPD/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR MINA DMF IFB RBD RBR IDD IDR ZSI FPR

REF YOURTEL IDA0667 09MAY

---PM INITIATIVE:LET TO CHERNENKO ON SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS

SUMMARY:CONVEYED PM TURDEAUS LET FOR CHERNENKO TO FIRST DEPUTY

FM KORNIENKO TODAY.LATTER INDICATED LIKELIHOOD OF CONSIDERED

SOVIET REPLY AFTER CAREFUL STUDY OF PROPOSALS.IN DISCUSSION

OF EAST-WEST/ACD ISSUES,KORNIENKO EXPATIATED AT LENGTH,AND IN

LARGELY FAMILIAR TERMS,ON PERSISTENTLY NEGATIVE USA ATTITUDES

TOWARD SOVIET ACD PROPOSALS AND ON LACK OF SERIOUSNESS OF USA

DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS.POINT OF SPECIAL INTEREST AROSE WHEN

KORNIENKO DISCUSSED QUESTION OF INF IN EUROPE:IN REASSERTING

NEED TO RETURN TO PREDEPLOYMENT SITUATION IF NUCLEAR NEGS ARE

TO BE RESUMED,KORNIENKO STATED THAT STARTING POINT SHLD BE

SITUATION AS IT EXISTED IN 1976(I.E.BEFORE DEPLOYMENT OF EITHER

SS-20S OR USA INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES HAD BEGUN)WHEN THERE

HAD BEEN NO/NO QUESTION OF ANY KIND OF SOVIET NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY

2.REPORT:I TODAY CALLED ON FIRST DEPUTY FM KORNIENKO TO CONVEY

SUEJ LET.I REHEARSED BROAD ASPECTS OF PMS INITIATIVE AS IT HAS

...2

PAGE TWO XYGR0626 CONF

DEVELOPED, RECALLING PEARSONS NOV VISIT TO MOSCO AND PM TRUDEAUS  
FEB/84 MTG WITH CHERNENKO. I ALSO MENTIONED MULTI-PARTY ENDORSEMENT  
OF INITIATIVE, LIKELY SOON TO BE EXPRESSED IN PARLIAMENTARY  
RESOLUTION, WHICH SHLD ENSURE ITS CONTINUITY IN SOME FORM REGARDLESS  
OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN CDA. WHEN I MENTIONED THAT SIMILAR  
LITTEGUEHS. (MBHS T TO PRES REAGAN, KORNIENKO INDICATED HE WAS  
ALREADY AWARE FROM NORTH AMERICAN PRESS ACCOUNTS. I EXPLAINED OUR  
ORIGINAL INTENTIONS RE PUBLIC HANDLING AS SET OUT REFTTEL.

3. IN RECEIVING LET, KORNIENKO SAID PM TRUDEAUS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE  
THE INNATL SITUATION, EASE EAST-WEST TENSION AND REDUCE RISK  
OF WAR HAD MET WITH SOVIET UNDERSTANDING AND APPRECIATION. HE  
INDICATED LIKELIHOOD OF CONSIDERED SOVIET REPLY AFTER PROPOSALS  
HAD BEEN CAREFULLY STUDIED.

4. TO START EPOADER CONVERSATION ON CURRENT E/W SITUATION, I  
RECALLED PM TRUDEAUS EMPHASIS. AT HIS FEB MTG WITH CHERNENKO, ON  
NEED TO USE QUOTE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY UNQUOTE IN FIRST HALF 84  
TO TAKE STEPS WHICH WLD REDUCE EAST-WEST TENSION AND BEGIN PROCESS  
OF REESTABLISHING EFFECTIVE DIALOGUE BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS. I CITED  
RECENT CONCRETE WESTERN PROPOSALS-MBFR, USA DRAFT CW TREATY,  
STKHM PROPOSALS-AND INDICATED THAT WITH EXCEPTION OF STKHM  
PROPOSALS, IT SEEMED TO CDN GOVT THAT USSR HAD BRUSHED THESE  
INITIATIVES ASIDE WITHOUT GIVING THEM SERIOUS STUDY OR CONSIDERATION.

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PAGE THREE XYGR0626 CONF D

5. THIS LAUNCHED KORNIENKO ON EXTENDED DISQUISITION, TOUCHED MORE WITH SARCASM THAN WITH ACRIMONY, RE NEGATIVE USA ATTITUDES TOWARD MANY CONCRETE SOVIET PROPOSALS AND PERCEIVED UNSERIOUSNESS OF USA ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS. USSR, KORNIENKO SAID, HAD BEEN PEERING INTENTLY THROUGH THIS QUOTE WINDOW UNQUOTE BUT HAD UNFORTUNATELY BEEN UNABLE TO DISCERN ANY SIGN OF USA WILLINGNESS IN PRACTICE TO NEGOTIATE OR CONCLUDE MEANINGFUL AGREEMENTS WITH USSR. RE NUCLEAR ARMS NEGS AT GENEV (KORNIENKO DID NOT/NOT MAKE DISTINCTION BETWEEN START AND INF THOUGH HE SEEMED TO HAVE LATTER IN MIND) HE SAID USSR HAD MADE CLEAR ITS READINESS TO RETURN TO PREDEPLOYMENT SITUATION, RESUME NEGS AND REITERATE PROPOSALS IT HAD ALREADY MADE WHICH, IF ACCEPTED, WLD REDUCE NUCLEAR ARSENALS IN EUROPE TO LEVELS LOWER THAN THOSE OF 1976. YET USSR HAD RECEIVED NO/NO POSITIVE RESPONSE. KORNIENKO POINTEDLY SAID THAT SITUATION AS IT EXISTED IN 1976 SHOULD BE QUOTE POINT OF DEPARTURE UNQUOTE FOR NEGS SINCE, AT THAT TIME, THE QUESTION OF USSR HAVING ANY KIND OF INF SUPERIORITY IN EUROPE HAD NEVER ARISEN. WE FIND THESE KORNIENKO COMMENTS INTRIGUING. FORMULATION OF USA HAVING REJECTED SOVIET INDICATIONS OF QUOTE READINESS UNQUOTE TO RETURN TO PRE-DEPLOYMENT SITUATION AND RESUME NEGS IS REVERSAL OF USUAL FORMULA OF INVITING WESTERN SIDE TO EXPRESS SUCH READINESS. FURTHER HIS CLEAR REF TO 1976 AS MARKING BASELINE FROM WHICH NEGOTIATIONS SHLD BEGIN IS, WE THINK, DISTINCTLY NEW WAY OF SETTING OUT SOVIET POSITION.

...4

PAGE FOUR XYGR0626 CONF

IT WAS PRESUMABLY NOT/NOT MEANT TO IMPLY LITERAL SOVIET WILLING-  
NESS TO REMOVE ALL SS-20S AND RESTORE SS-4 AND SS-5 DEPLOYMENTS  
IN EVENT OF NATO INF WITHDRAWALS. BUT IT WLD IN LOGIC IMPLY SOVIET  
WILLINGNESS IN PRINCIPLE TO LIMIT SS-20 OR OTHER INF DEPLOYMENTS  
IN EUROPE TO SUBSTANTIVE EQUIVALENT OF ITS 1976 DEPLOYMENTS  
(SOVIETS MIGHT WELL TAKE POSITION THAT EXISTING SS-20 DEPLOYMENTS  
DO NOT/NOT EXCEED THEIR 1976 INF CAPACITY IN EUROPE). KORNIIENKO  
FORMULATION DOES CLEARLY IMPLY CONTINUED SOVIET DETERMINATION  
TO ELIMINATE USA INF MISSILES FROM EUROPE. IT WILL BE WORTH  
WATCHING CLOSELY FURTHER SOVIET STATEMENTS TO SEE IF CONCEPT OF  
1976 AS BASELINE FOR INF NEGS IS REPEATED AND ITS IMPLICATIONS  
FURTHER ELABORATED.

6. REMAINDER OF KORNIIENKOS COMMENT <sup>RAY</sup>, WHILE PERHAPS ACCURATE  
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ROBERTS

CCC/144 161340Z XYGR0626

cc DMF  
IFB  
IAD  
PCO/FOWLER  
NDH400/CPP  
done  
Jeli  
Am

28-6-1- Trudeau	
✓	9
INITIATIVE	

SJD  
mms 17/84

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

CONFIDENTIAL  
FM PRMNY WKGR0912 16MAY84  
TO EXTOTT IDA

DISTR IMU IDAN IDAO IDR IDRA IDRL

REF OURTEL WKGR0689 17APR

---MTG WITH SEC GEN:PM INITIATIVE:FIVE POWER CONF  
 IN MTG TODAY WITH SEC GEN PEREZ DE CUELLAR,AMB PELLETIER  
 RAISED,AMONG OTHER QUESTIONS,PMS SUGGESTION TO SEC GEN  
 LAST JAN THAT PEREZ DE CUELLAR CONSIDER INITIATING INFORMAL  
 DISCUSSIONS WITH FIVE PERM MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL ON  
 NUCLEAR QUESTIONS WITH VIEW TO BEGINNING SOME DIALOGUE ON  
 JOINT RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS AREA.AMB ASKED WHETHER SEC  
 GEN HAD FOLLOWED UP PMS SUGGESTIONS WITH ANY OF FIVE  
 PARTICULARLY SINCE CHINESE HAD INDICATED TO US DISPOSITION  
 TO DISCUSS MATTER COLLECTIVELY IN NY FORUM.  
 2.SEC GEN RESPONDED INDIRECTLY BY OUTLINING DIFFICULTY HE  
 HAD ENCOUNTERED IN HAVING FIVE COLLABORATE ON CYPRUS  
 QUESTION OVER PAST WEEKS WITH VIEW TO (A)PREVAILING ON PARTIES  
 NOT/NOT TO TAKE STEPS DESIGNED TO OBTAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE,  
 AND (B)OBTAINING EXPRESSION OF COLLECTIVE SUPPORT FOR HIS GOOD  
 OFFICES.SEC GEN INDICATED THAT USSR AND USA HAD NOT/NOT  
 RESPONDED TO HIS REQUEST AND BY LAMENTING FAILURE OF SUCH  
 SIMPLE AND OBVIOUS EXERCISE,INTIMATED THAT THAT PROSPECTS  
 FOR MORE CONTROVERSIAL AND FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE OF INITIATING

...2

PAGE TWO WKGR0912 CONFD

DIALOGUE AMONG FIVE ON NUCLEAR QUESTIONS WAS NOT/NOT TIMELY.HE  
EDITORIALIZED WITH SOME BITTERNESS(PLS PROTECT)THAT FIVE WERE  
AGREEABLE TO MAINTAINING THEIR AUTHORITY THROUGH USE OF VETO  
BUT SEEMED UNPREPARED TO TAKE ON GREATER RESPONSIBILITY OF  
FINDING AREAS OF COMMON ACTION.

3.WE SHALL FOLLOW UP WITH USG URQUHART ON HIS VIEWS FOR SEC GEN  
ACTIVITY IN THIS AREA.

CCC/119 152042Z WKGR0912

AG

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

28-6-84 - Trudeau	
24	9

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0620 15MAY84

TO EXTOTT IDA DELIVER BY 151100

~~INFO BNATO~~ LDN BONN ROME PARIS HAGUE BRU PRMNY GENEV TOKYO

PEKIN WSHDC PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/CPD/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR MINA DMF IFB RBD RBR IDD IDR ZSI FPR

REF YOURTEL IDA0667 09MAY

---PM INITIATIVE:LET TO CHERNENKO ON SUFFOCATION

PROPOSALS

FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR MTG WITH GROMYKO, INFORMED TODAY BY MFA THAT I CLD HAVE APPOINTMENT AT NOON TOMORROW WITH FIRST DEPUTY FM KORNENKO TO PRESENT LETTER. JUDGING THAT EARLY TRANSMITTAL OF LETTER IS PREFERABLE TO WAIT OF UNCERTAIN DURATION FOR FROMYKO APPOINTMENT, I ACCEPTED. I ASSUME INSTRUCTIONS REFTTEL UNCHANGED.

ROBERTS

CCC/095 151229Z XYGR0620

KORNENKO



External Affairs  
Canada

Affaires extérieures  
Canada

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow  
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

Accession/Référence
File/Dossier 28-6-3- <del>1</del> -Trudeau
15 MAY 84 232 072 10

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ  
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDAO717 15MAY84

TO/À TO MOSCO DELIVER BY 160900

INFO INFO BNATO LDN BONN ROME PARIS HAGUE BRU PRMNY GENEV TOKYO PEKIN

DISTR

REF WSHDC PCOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/CPD/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

SUBJ/SUJ DISTR MINA DMF IFB RBD RBR IDD IDR ZSI FPR IDAO IDAN IDAV

REF YOURTEL XYGR0620 15MAY OURTEL IDAO667 09MAY

---PM INITIATIVE: LETTER TO CHERNENKO ON SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS

PLEASE UTILIZE INSTRUCTIONS FOR YOUR MTG OUTLINED IN OUR REFTEL AS

APPROPRIATE WITH KORNIENKO TOMORROW. EARLY PRESENTATION IN MOSCO IS

IMPORTANT GIVEN THAT PM LET ALREADY HAS BEEN PASSED IN WSHDC TO KEN

DAM ON 11MAY (WSHDC TEL UNGR2301 14MAY NOTAL).

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
 SIG GARY J. SMITH:pec	IDA	5-6689	 SIG GARY J. SMITH

*file*

Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

PERSONAL AND  
CONFIDENTIAL

OTTAWA, K1A 0G2

May 14, 1984

IMU-1230

H.E. Mr. Alan W. Sullivan,  
Canadian Ambassador  
Canadian Embassy  
VIENNA, Austria

ACC	FILE
	27 Sep 84
FILE	DOSSIER
28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE	
MISSION	

Dear Alan,

In case you have not seen it, I enclose a fascinating article written by the Gwyns concerning the Prime Minister's initiative, which appeared in the May issue of Saturday Night. For your own information I have been told that the sections on Delhi and Peking are accurate. While many more facts and interesting tidbits exist, speculation is that one of the main sources of information for the article was Bob Fowler. I hope you find it as interesting as I did, ~~and~~ while it is understandable, I regret that this kind of information could not be made available in the Department in some manner. It would certainly help increase our understanding of why certain high level things happen the way they do. I suppose the closest we can come to it is Colin Robertson's Parliamentary dialogue/gossiplogue. While some senior people have questioned the propriety of an officer of the Department producing such material, Colin's efforts recently received the endorsement of the Operations Committee/Senior Committee.

I look forward to seeing you at the end of June for the U.N. consultations.

With warmest and best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

*J.D. Puddington*  
J.D. Puddington

①

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

*Peace initiative*  
18-6-1- Trudeau  
LA 9

**C O N F I D E N T I A L**  
**FM WSHDC UNGR2301 14MAY84**  
**TO EXTOTT IDA**

**INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR GENEV  
PARIS HAGUE OSLO COPEN ATHNS STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER/AXWORTHY  
NDHQOTT/ADM POL/DACPOL/NDACPOL/ CPP/DSTRATA/CIS  
DISTR IDD IFB MINA MINE MINT USS DMF RBR RCR RSR RBD RCD RSD  
CPD ZSI ZSP UGB URR IDDZ IDR RGB IDAO IDAN**

**---PMS INITIATIVE:LET TO PRES REAGAN**

**AMB DELIVERED ORIGINAL OF LET TO DEPTY SEC OF STATE DAM LATE  
PM 11MAY.HE ALSO CALLED ON ADMIRAL POINDEXTER,DEPTY NATIONAL  
SECURITY ADVISOR TO DELIVER A COPY OF LET(POINDEXTER WAS  
ACCOMPANIED BY MATLOCK(SPECIAL ASST TO PRES FOR EAST/WEST  
RELS)AND LEHMAN(SPECIAL ASST FOR ARMS CONTROL)).**

**2.DAM SAID USA WLD LOOK AT PROPOSALS VERY CAREFULLY.INDEED AS  
A RESULT OF OUR EARLIER CONSULTATIONS THEY WERE ALREADY STUDYING  
THEIR IMPLICATIONS.DAM SAID THAT COMMENTS HE WISHED TO OFFER  
SHLD BE TAKEN WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO WHAT USA WLD SAY IN FORMAL  
RESPONSE AND DID NOT/NOT MEAN USA WAS NEGATIVE TOWARDS THE PROPOSALS.  
IN FACT HE STARTED BY SAYING THAT USA APPRECIATED SERIOUS PROPOSALS  
SUCH AS THESE.WITH REGARD TO MOBILITY PROPOSAL PROBLEM USA SAW  
WAS NOT/NOT WITH CDN PROPOSAL ITSELF BUT RATHER WITH WHAT MIGHT  
FOLLOW FROM IT.SOVS MIGHT FOR EXAMPLE PROPOSE LIMITING AREA OF  
DEPLOYMENT OF SEA-BASED MISSILES.USA ALSO HAD TO CONSIDER THE**

...

PAGE TWO UNGR2301 CONF

...IMPLICATIONS OF THIS PROPOSAL FOR THEIR MIDGETMAN PROPOSAL.

3.DAM SAID USA CONCERN WITH VERIFIABILITY PROPOSAL WAS THAT ITS EMPHASIS ON NTM CLD CUT ACROSS USA ATTEMPTS TO GET SOVS TO ACCEPT PROCESS ON ON-SITE INSPECTION.IN GENERAL,HOWEVER,USA FAVOURS IMPROVING VERIFIABILITY.WE RESPONDED THAT SUBSEQUENT TO OUR FIRST CONSULTATIONS WITH THE USA OUR PROPOSAL HAD EVOLVED AND THAT THE PROPOSAL BEING TRANSMITTED DID NOT/NOT IN ANY WAY PRECLUDE OR LIMIT THE ROLE THAT MIGHT BE PLAYED BY ON-SITE INSPECTION.

4.AT NSC POINDEXTER AGREED THAT VERIFICATION WAS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT.AS WE ARE AWARE USA IS PUTTING MUCH EMPHASIS ON IT. PROBLEM IS VERY VERY DIFFICULT.ONE CAN EITHER DEVELOP MEANS OF VERIFICATION OR YOU MUST AGREE TO LIVE WITH CERTAIN UNKNOWNNS. WITH THE SMALL ICBMS YOU ARE MOVING TOWARDS THE LATTER PROPOSITION. ADVANTAGE IS THAT THIS ENHANCES SURVIVAEILITY AND DETERRENCE.

5.HOWEVER,LEHMAN POINTED OUT THE CDN PROPOSAL IS NOT/NOT INCONSISTENT WITH USA THINKING.JSA IN DEVELOPING MISSILE SYSTEMS CONSIDERS VERIFIABILITY AND IN START HAS ASKED SOVS HOW THEY WLD VERIFY NEW ARMS SYSTEMS.ACCORDING TO LEHMAN REAL PROBLEM IS NOT/NOT VERIFICATION PER SE.USA IS CONFIDENT IN ITS ABILITY TO FIND SOV WEAPONS.PROBLEM HOWEVER IS IN ENFORCING VERIFICATION IN AN AGREEMENT.HOW WHEN USA FINDS A VIOLATION CAN THE CASE BE MADE KNOWN CONVINCINGLY.

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR2301 CONFD

6. BOTH STATE AND NSC MADE A SPECIAL POINT OF EXPRESSING THEIR APPRECIATION THAT WE HAD DECIDED TO PROCEED IN THIS MATTER RATHER THAN THROUGH CD. THERE WAS NO/NO RESPONSE WHEN WE MENTIONED THAT WE WLD IN DUE COURSE MENTION PROPOSAL IN A SPEECH AT THE CD.

7. STATE DEPT OFFICIALS LATER ASKED ABOUT ASAT PROPOSAL SAYING THEY APPRECIATED IT HAD NOT/NOT BEEN RAISED IN CD WHILE OUTER SPACE WG MANDATE WAS STILL IN DOUBT.

8. DAM MADE A SPECIAL POINT OF SAYING THAT USA WISHED TO EXPRESS ITS APPRECIATION FOR SUPPORT CDA HAD GIVEN ON THE DRAFT CW TREATY. THIS WAS MUCH APPRECIATED ESPECIALLY OUR SUPPORT FOR THE VERIFICATION PROPOSALS.

CCC/241 141643Z UNGR2301

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


CANADA

PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE

OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 14, 1984



Dear Mr. Frye,

Thank you for your letter of January 24, 1984 and the attached Foreign Affairs article, "Strategic Build-Down: A Context for Restraint". I found the article most informative.

I appreciate your comments about my role in attempting to catalyze a dialogue between East and West and to reduce "megaphone diplomacy", as Lord Carrington so succinctly described the then prevailing international tone. While my personal contribution will necessarily become less intensive, the Canadian initiative will be continued by others and by our Ambassadors abroad.

The principle aim underlying my initiative was to restore political confidence and communication between the superpowers. I felt that arms control and other vital negotiations could not progress without a revitalized political climate. Our efforts, therefore, were directed more towards the general aim of injecting political energy into East-West relations than to the pursuit of specific ideas.

Mr. Alton Frye  
Washington Director  
Council on Foreign Relations Inc.  
11 Dupont Circle, N.W.  
Suite 900  
Washington, D.C.  
USA 20036

- 2 -

Your article contributes significantly to the current discussion on arms control, and to public understanding of the build-down proposal. I am pleased that you have had discussions recently with officials in the Departments of External Affairs and National Defence, and that they have had an opportunity to hear you personally explain the complexities and the potential of build-down proposals. You suggest in your article that the chances for strategic restraint depend upon mutual acceptance of compatible objectives. I agree that this is essential, and I dealt with the need for the development of a common purpose between East and West in a recent speech in the House of Commons, a copy of which is enclosed.

Thank you again for your letter, and for providing me with such interesting and challenging reading.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "B. Luder". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "B" and a long, sweeping underline.



MESSAGE

Accession/Référence
File/Dossier 28-6-B-Trudeau
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REF REF OURTEL IDA0667 09MAY, YOURTEL YBGR6471 10MAY  
SUBJ/SUJ ---PM INITIATIVE: LETS TO CHERNENKO/REAGAN ON SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS  
RIGHT YOU ARE. SUGGEST YOU TAKE ADVANTAGE OF PAC MTG MAY15 TO  
INFORM OTHER ALLIES THAT PM HAS WRITTEN TO REAGAN/CHERNENKO ON  
TWO OF THREE SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS DEALING WITH STRATEGIC WEAPONS  
SYSTEMS AS PER OUR REFTEL. YOU SHOULD NOTE THAT THIS COURSE OF  
ACTION WAS DECIDED UPON BY PM TRUDEAU FOLLOWING CONSULTATIONS WITH  
ALLIES (SMITH/CALDER VISIT) AND THAT USA IN PARTICULAR WAS CONSUL-  
TED CLOSELY ON PROCEDURAL ASPECT.  
2. SHOULD YOU BE ASKED ABOUT OUR ASAT PROPOSAL, ON RESPONSIVE BASIS  
YOU COULD MENTION THAT ITS ULTIMATE DISPOSITION REMAINS TO BE  
DETERMINED IN LIGHT OF FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH ALLIES AND  
EFFORTS AT CD IN GENEV TO SET UP AD HOC WORKING COMMITTEE ON  
OUTER SPACE.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
 SIG G. J. SMITH/pec	IDA	5-6689	 SIG GARY J. SMITH

cc IDA(1)⑥  
file 28-6-3-Tradean  
14/5/84

M.G. VON NOSTITZ  
U.S. GENERAL RELATIONS  
DIVISION  
2-6172

CONFIDENTIAL

5. PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE ON EAST/WEST RELATIONS  
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Issue

With the purpose of arresting the downward trend of East/West relations, the Prime Minister initiated a process aimed at re-establishing high level political dialogue between East and West and at creating a political framework for ongoing or technical negotiations between the two sides.

Background

On October 13, the Prime Minister announced that he was going to visit a number of European leaders to explore with them certain proposals which could lead to an improvement of the atmosphere surrounding East/West relations. During his European trip the Prime Minister discussed the following points:

- A) A comprehensive approach to the limitation and then the reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals by means of a conference of the five nuclear weapons states (USA, USSR, UK, France, China).
- B) A concerted endeavour at the political level to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and especially to increase the number of states adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty prior to the NPT Review Conference in 1985.
- C) A substantive Western response to the proposals put forward earlier this year by the East in the MBFR negotiations, and the injection of political momentum into these negotiations by means of a Foreign Ministers meeting in Vienna to coincide roughly with the tabling of a new Western proposal.
- D) The inauguration of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) at the Foreign Minister level in order to give this important conference political impetus at the outset.

Although not integral to his initiative as pursued personally with other governments, the Prime Minister also publicly put forward proposals related to:

- the mobility of ICBMs;
- high altitude anti-satellite systems;
- the verification of new weapons systems by national technical means.

The degree of support which the Prime Minister has garnered for the main purposes of his initiative is of itself a positive result insofar as it may have a beneficial effect on the climate of East-West relations. The decisions taken at the NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels in early December were particularly significant in furthering the purposes of the initiative:

- A) an undertaking by NATO foreign ministers to attend the opening of the CDE in Stockholm (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- B) an undertaking to review NATO negotiating position in the MBFR negotiations (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- C) the "Brussels declaration" which places heavy emphasis on genuine détente and dialogue in East-West relations (an FRG initiative, actively supported by the Canadian delegation);
- D) a mandate given the permanent NATO Council to review the current state of East-West relations and to report to the next NATO Ministerial meeting on what actions might be taken to improve them.

#### American Position

The Prime Minister, accompanied by DPM/SSEA, met with President Reagan, Vice-President Bush, Secretary of State Shultz, Defense Secretary Weinberger and other senior U.S. officials in Washington, December 15, to explain the initiative. The P.M. noted that, while the President had succeeded in signalling U.S. and western strength and confidence to the USSR, the Soviets and much of the world had not equally registered signals that U.S. and western intentions were peaceful and directed toward dialogue on and solutions to international tensions. This latter message had to be emphasized more. In this regard, the P.M. referred to the significance of the President's recent speech to the

- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL

Japanese Diet which included clear statements that the U.S. did not believe nuclear war could be won, that nuclear weapons should be banished and that the U.S. was committed to arms reductions. The P.M. also referred to the importance of the results of the NATO December Ministerial meeting in Brussels in reiterating NATO's belief in détente, balanced nuclear strength, eschewing any notion of superiority, and the need for both East and West to respect each other's legitimate security interests.

The President reaffirmed his statements in Japan, but he and his advisors appeared to take on board the P.M.'s political message that such signals of peaceful intent were not getting through and needed to be reinforced. The President and his advisors assured the P.M. of their support for the broad political objectives he is pursuing in East-West relations (and publicly wished him well in his mission), although laying most of the blame for the current state of those relations on Soviet attitudes and actions. At the same time, the Administration has maintained its reservations about the specific arms control measures put forward by the P.M. without, however, emphasizing these in public.

IDA/G.J. SMITH/56089/pec

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IDA-0681

OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
K1A 0G2  
May 11, 1984

Mr. G. Gustaaf van Beers,  
Proceedings Coordinator,  
College of Social Science,  
Department of Economics,  
University of Guelph,  
Guelph, Ontario,  
N1G 2W1

Dear Mr. van Beers,

Thank you for your letter of April 26, which only reached me on May 9. I note that the \$10,000 grant for publication of the proceedings will now be administered by the University's Office of Research. I would like to point out in this regard, as I have mentioned to Professor Murray previously, that it is our hope and expectation that the proceedings can be published by mid-June so that they may be available to the public prior to the Prime Minister's departure from office.

While I would agree with you that the document might be enhanced by an epilogue provided by the Prime Minister, this does not appear possible given his very crowded schedule at the present time. Moreover, if an epilogue of any substance were to be included, we would probably have to review the proceedings in detail beforehand so as to ensure the epilogue did not oppose or support any particular point of view.

Should you wish to prepare a short epilogue of your own, you might wish to draw upon the Prime Minister's speech in the House of Commons on February 9, --- copy attached for convenience, in which he summarized the broad thrust and effects of his initiative.

Thank you for the table of contents of the proceedings and for your efforts and those of your colleagues in undertaking this task. I look forward to receiving a copy of the booklet once it is published.

Yours sincerely,




Gary J. Smith,  
Director,  
Arms Control &  
Disarmament Division

cc: Prof.H. Wiseman  
Prof.G. Boenhart  
Prof.J. Murray

UNIVERSITY OF GUELPH

COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE  
Department of Economics


GUELPH, ONTARIO, CANADA · N1G 2W1  
Telephone (519) 824-4120



Rerum  
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April 26, 1984

Mr. Gary J. Smith  
Director  
Arms Control & Disarmament  
Department of External Affairs  
125 Sussex Drive  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0GZ



Re: University of Guelph, International Conference: Strategies  
For Peace & Security In A Nuclear Age; Summary Proceedings

Dear Gary:

Thank you for having been instrumental in us receiving a \$10,000 grant from your Department towards the Summary Proceedings of the above Conference. This grant will be administered by the University's Office of Research. The first draft is now being reviewed by the Editors, i.e. Henry Wiseman (Political Studies), Gunnar Boehnert (History) and myself and will be ready for publication in the near future.

In reviewing the entire document we thought that the value of the Summary Proceedings would be boosted if the Prime Minister would complete the document with an epilogue dealing broadly with the thrust and effects of Canada's peace initiative. Could you be of assistance please, in approaching the Prime Minister on this?

Attached I am sending you the table of contents only.  
If the Prime Minister would like to see all submissions, they will be available to you on request.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely yours,

G. Gustaaf van Beers  
Proceedings Co-ordinator

GGvB/ps

cc: Prof. H. Wiseman  
Prof. G. Boehnert  
Prof. J. Murray

Encl.

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IN STANDING COMMITTEE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENCE ~~CLAUSE~~  
(SCEAND).

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<i>[Signature]</i> SIG GARY J. SMITH/pec	IDA	5-6689	<i>[Signature]</i> SIG GARY J. SMITH

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Arms Control and  
Disarmament Division  
996-6320

Brief for DMF re  
Cda/USSR bilaterals May 14-15, 1984

COMPARISON OF CANADIAN AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON  
EAST-WEST SECURITY MATTERS

ISSUE

The purpose of this brief is to compare recent public statements on Canadian and Soviet positions as they relate to East-West security matters.

BACKGROUND

On February 9, 1984 in his speech to the House of Commons, Prime Minister Trudeau outlined ten principles of a common bond between East and West. He stated that these ten principles could be drawn upon to develop elements of a common purpose among the leaders of East and West. On March 2, 1984 in his election speech, General Secretary Chernenko proposed certain rules to govern relations among the nuclear weapons states. Mr. Chernenko further expanded his views on major East-West issues in his April 9 Pravda interview. On the same day, Soviet Ambassador Rodionov called on IDA to deliver a translation of the interview. During the course of the meeting, Ambassador Rodionov stated that there were a number of similarities between Prime Minister Trudeau's Ten Principles and the General Secretary's statements which possibly could be developed further.

A comparison of the Prime Minister's Ten Principles with the Soviet statements indicates that there is considerable apparent similarity between the Canadian and Soviet positions although many of the latter reflected long established Soviet views. Although the areas of similarity do not exactly coincide, they could form the basis of future dialogue. Because many of the positions, both Canadian and Soviet, are broad generalizations there may be a tendency for both sides to interpret each other's statements to suit their own purposes. In this regard, particular care would have to be taken in handling possible Soviet efforts to include a non-aggression pact and no-first use of nuclear weapons as reflecting areas of possible agreement. A table in point form is attached for reference as Annex A.

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SPECIFIC COMMENTS

The following is a point-by-point comparison of the Canadian and Soviet positions indicating where they are similar and where they differ.

(a) NUCLEAR WAR CANNOT BE WON/NUCLEAR WAR MUST NEVER BE FOUGHT

The Soviets consider that the prevention of nuclear war is one of their prime foreign policy objectives. Also, by renouncing propaganda on nuclear war, either global or limiting, the Soviets may be referring to the controversy in the United States on whether a nuclear war could ever be won. President Reagan is on record saying that such a war cannot be won and must never be fought. Ironically, the Soviet Union has used this same issue to score propaganda points particularly at the United Nations by condemning nuclear war and attacking NATO's policy of flexible response. The Soviet Union has never categorically stated that nuclear war cannot be won and, while condemning nuclear war, has continued to upgrade its civil defence preparations in case of war. In alluding to a limited nuclear war, it is not clear whether the Soviets are referring to the debate that nuclear war can be limited to the European theatre or to the theory that a nuclear exchange can be controlled either at the tactical level or to a limited strategic strike.

(b) FREEDOM FROM RISK OF ACCIDENTAL WAR OR SURPRISE ATTACK

Again, a Soviet-stated prime foreign policy objective is the prevention of nuclear war. They go further by suggesting that in the event of danger of nuclear conflict (possibly by accident), "consultations must be held without delay in order to prevent a nuclear conflagration". Ongoing Soviet-American negotiations to improve their hotline communications can be seen in this context. Freedom from surprise attack is harder to define and must encompass the entire spectrum of security interests, the value of deterrence, the potential of strategic first strike and their corollary theories of counterforce and countervalue. The desire for freedom from surprise attack is also deeply rooted in the Russian psyche and manifests itself in Soviet proposals for declaratory agreements on no first use of nuclear weapons, no use of force and non-aggression. Paradoxically, the Soviet Unions's xenophobia and penchant for secrecy precludes their acceptance of confidence-building measures which would contribute to freedom from surprise attack. The Soviets would view the declaratory renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries which have no such weapons on their territories as a means of

.../3

lowering the risk of accidental war or of surprise attack. This negative security assurance has lost a great deal of value for the Soviets with their deployment of SS-21s in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

(c) RECOGNITION OF THE DANGERS INHERENT IN DESTABILIZING WEAPONS

The Soviets have viewed the deployment of GLCMs and Pershing II's in Western Europe as destabilizing as in the same manner NATO has viewed the deployment of SS-20's in the same theatre. It is apparent both from Mr. Chernenko's election speech and the Pravda interview that the Soviets view the militarization of outer space as a destabilizing event. In the same vein, the Soviets would view any introduction of new weapon systems, either nuclear (cruise missiles, neutron warheads), chemical (binary chemical rounds) or convention (low-altitude ASAT) and new strategic concepts (strategic defence initiative) to be potentially to their disadvantage and hence destabilizing. This attitude would explain the Soviets' call for a qualitative and quantitative freeze on all nuclear arsenals and their interest in CW and ASAT conventions.

(d) NEED FOR IMPROVED TECHNIQUES OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The Canadian position accompanied by a detailed list of improved crisis management techniques would have to be fully explained. The Soviets have recognized this need by stating the requirement, in the event of danger of nuclear war, to hold consultations without delay in order to prevent nuclear war. In this same context and as a step beyond this minimum requirement, the Soviets went on in the Pravda interview to confirm the usefulness of dialogue with the United States. They have maintained that it is the task of the nuclear weapons states to create an atmosphere of trust in international relations. The achievement of this last goal would harken back to the heady days of détente to which Mr. Chernenko has referred several times.

(e) CONSEQUENCES OF BEING FIRST TO USE FORCE AGAINST THE OTHER

No first use of nuclear weapons has long been a central Soviet arms control theme and a direct challenge to NATO's stated policy of flexible response. A variation on the basic theme, the non-use of force has been proposed by the USSR at the CCSBMDE in Stockholm. The Soviet Union has also proposed a non-aggression pact in this same light. Such declarations win propaganda points but do little to reassure potential victims (One would have thought that the Soviets

.../4

had learned from their experience with the 1939 non-aggression treaty with Nazi Germany). The Soviets will want to discuss their own interpretation of this principle rather than accept the greater implications inherent in the Canadian position.

(f) INTEREST IN INCREASING SECURITY WHILE REDUCING THE COST

If cost reduction is looked at from strictly economic terms, the Soviets will not be particularly receptive to this principle. The Soviet Union's security interests have by far outweighed other economic considerations as indicated by the Soviet defense budget's large percentage of GNP. This notwithstanding, the Soviets have a genuine interest in increasing their own security. Thus they advocate equal security and concurrent reduction in nuclear armaments with a view of eliminating all varieties of them. The Soviets would view USA ratification of the TTBT and PNET as well as agreement to a qualitative and quantitative freeze in nuclear arsenals as measures which would increase, at least psychologically, their own security. Conversely the Soviets would view the lack of progress in restraining the arms race as a direct threat to their security.

(g) AVOIDANCE OF THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO OTHER COUNTRIES

From the Canadian viewpoint, this principle is narrowly defined within the parameters of the non-proliferation régime: The Soviet position appears more all-encompassing. They define nuclear weapon proliferation as the transfer of such weapons or control over them to a non-nuclear country (NPT Article I), the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of countries where there are no nuclear weapons and the extension of the nuclear arms race to new spheres, including outer space. By the same token, respect for the status of NWFZs and the creation of new denuclearized zones (Central Europe, the Balkans) would be viewed by the Soviets as non-proliferation measures.

(h) GUARDED RECOGNITION OF EACH OTHERS LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS

The Soviets emphasize the principle of equal security. The Pravda interview calls for normal, stable relations with the United States based upon equality, equal security and non-interference in each others' internal affairs. This last principle has been a basic Soviet goal from Yalta and Potsdam through to the Helsinki agreements.

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(i) SECURITY STRATEGIES CANNOT ASSUME POLITICAL/ECONOMIC  
COLLAPSE OF THE OTHER SIDE

A basic tenet of Marxist-Leninist ideology has been the collapse of capitalism. The Soviet Union cannot renounce this foundationstone of their beliefs. Since capitalism has not yet managed to destroy itself, Soviet rhetoric over the years has had to be modified from "we will bury you" proclamations to more businesslike statements that socialism will eventually prevail over capitalism. On the other hand, American rhetoric in the past has been equally vociferous. President Reagan has called the Soviet Union an "evil empire". In 1982 in his speech to the British House of Commons, President Reagan described communism as an aberration which would soon pass away.

CANADIAN POSITION

Despite some very basic disagreements in principle between the Canadian and Soviet positions, (e.g. non-first use of nuclear weapons) there is enough commonality to serve as a starting point for further discussions. Even in areas where Canadian and Soviet positions coincide, the methods of achieving the stated goals may still differ significantly. Nevertheless, it would be useful to continue a dialogue based on those areas of common interest in order to gauge whether Soviet interests in pursuing mutual goals in East-West security are genuine or whether the Soviets view the dialogue more as a propaganda opportunity.

PMS TEN PRINCIPLES 09 FEB. 84	CHERNENKO ELECTION SPEECH 02 MAR. 84 (RULES TO GOVERN RELATIONS AMONG NWS)	PRAVDA INTERVIEW 09 APR. 84
1 NUCLEAR WAR CANNOT BE WON	A. PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR - PRIME POLICY OBJECTIVE B. RENOUNCE PROPAGANDA ON NUCLEAR WAR EITHER GLOBAL OR LIMITED	
2 NUCLEAR WAR MUST NEVER BE FOUGHT	A. PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, IF DANGER OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT, HOLD CONSULTATIONS B. NEGATIVE SECURITY ASSURANCES	
3 FREEDOM FROM RISK OF ACCIDENTAL WAR OR SURPRISE ATTACK	A. EXTENSION OF NUCLEAR ARMS RACE TO OUTER SPACE - RENOUNCE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE, NUCLEAR FREEZE, CW BAN	A. CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARIZATION OF OUTER SPACE B. CW CONVENTION C. USA DEPLOYMENT - GLCM/PII IN EUROPE -
4 RECOGNITION OF DANGERS INHERENT IN DESTABILIZING WEAPONS	A. IF DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR, HOLD CONSULTATIONS WITHOUT DELAY	A. USEFULNESS OF DIALOGUE/TALKS B. TASK TO CREATE ATMOSPHERE OF TRUST IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
5 NEED FOR IMPROVED TECHNIQUES OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT	A. RENOUNCE FIRST USE OF <u>NUCLEAR</u> WEAPONS	A. NO FIRST USE OF <u>NUCLEAR</u> ARMS
6 CONSEQUENCES OF BEING FIRST TO USE FORCE AGAINST THE OTHER	A. EQUAL SECURITY, REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - "EQUAL SECURITY FOR ALL" (EUROPEAN CONTEXT)	A. DANGER AND LACK OF PROGRESS IN ARMS RACE, REQUIREMENT TO SHOW RESTRAINT B. U.S. RATIFICATION OF TTBT/PNET C. QUANTITATIVE/QUALITATIVE FREEZE OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS
7 INTEREST IN INCREASING SECURITY WHILE REDUCING COST	A. PREVENT ANY FORM OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION- TRANSFER/CONTROL/DEPLOYMENT. B. NWFZs/CREATION OF NEW DENUCLEARIZED ZONES C. EXTENSION OF NUCLEAR ARMS RACE TO OUTER SPACE	A. MILITARIZATION OF OUTER SPACE B. GLCM/PII
8 HORIZONTAL PROLIFERATION	A. PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS - "EQUAL SECURITY FOR ALL" (EUROPEAN CONTEXT)	A. NORMAL, STABLE RELATIONS WITH USA, BASED ON EQUALITY, EQUAL SECURITY AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHERS INTERNAL B. ATMOSPHERE OF TRUST IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
9 GUARDED RECOGNITION OF EACH OTHERS LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS	A. PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY	A. NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHERS INTERNAL AFFAIRS
10 SECURITY STRATEGIES CANNOT ASSUME POL/ECON COLLAPSE OF OTHER SIDE		

ANNEX A

**ACTION  
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**REF YOURTEL IDA0651 08MAY**

**---FIVE POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE**

WHEN CHRIS YOUNG PHONED ME FM LDN TO SEEK CLARIFICATIONS RELATING TO FIRST STORY HE HAD WRITTEN ON THIS SUBJ(BASED ON INTERVIEW WITH SOV PRESS OFFICIALS WHICH HE OBTAINED WITH OUR ASSISTANCE), I TOLD HIM ESSENTIALLY THREE THINGS:(A)TO OUR KNOWLEDGE,CHERNENKO HIMSELF HAD NEVER/NEVER GONE ON PUBLIC RECORD AS SUPPORTING PM TRUDEAUS SPECIFIC PROPOSAL FOR A FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE; (B)THAT SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE IN THEIR COMMUNICATIONS WITH US BEEN GENERALLY POSITIVE RE PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE AS A WHOLE; AND(C)THAT SOVIET OFFICIALS HAVE INDICATED THAT USSR DOES NOT/NOT IN PRINCIPLE OPPOSE IDEA OF A FIVE POWER MTG.LATTER POINT WAS BASED PRIMARILY ON A CONVERSATION I HAD SOME WEEKS AGO WITH A.BELONGOV,DEPUTY CHIEF OF FOREIGN POLICY PLANNING ADMIN OF MFA,WHO IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERY SPECIFICALLY RECALLED THAT SOVS HAD SOME YEARS BACK PROPOSED SUCH A CONF AND THEREFORE DID NOT/NOT OPPOSE IDEA IN PRINCIPLE.HE,HOWEVER,SAID NOTHING TO SUGGEST THAT SOVS WLD ACTIVELY SEEK SUCH CONFERENCE NOW.WHILE YOUNG HAS NOT/NOT REPORTED MY COMMENTS WITH COMPLETE ACCURACY,I DOUBT THIS WILL RESULT IN ANY SIGNIFICANT MISUNDERSTANDING AMONG MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED PARTIES

**ROBERTS**

**CCC/144 101057Z XYGR0595**

**ACTION**  
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CPD EER EPT FPR IDR UGB

---RM INITIATIVE-FRG VIEWS

SUMMARY:DURING REVIEW OF CURRENT STATE OF PM INITIATIVE  
REQUESTED BY MFA,BRUNMUEHL(EAST EUROPEAN DG)SAID FRG AGREED  
WITH PMS TEN POINTS(GENSCHER HAD ALUDED TO SIMILAR POINTS IN  
RECENT ARTICLE)BUT WOULD PLACE MORE EMPHISIS BOTH ON DANGERS  
OF WAR GENERALLY(AS OPPOSED TO NUCLEAR WAR ALONE)AND  
ON NEED TO PROMOTE DIALOGUE/COOPERATION WITH EAST.

BRAUNMUEHL WONDERED IF CSCE MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR  
FOLLOWING UP TEN POINTS(DIALOGUE WAS PROBABLY BETTER NOT/NOT  
LEFT ENTIRELY TO SUPERPOWERS)AND ASKED IF ANY  
THOUGHT HAD BEEN GIVEN TO THIS.

BRAUNMUEHL NOTED FRG DESIRE TO BE KEPT INFORMED AND NEED  
FOR CONSULTATIONS WITHIN ALLIANCE ON ANY NEW STEPS.

GRATEFUL ANY INFO ON THIS AND OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS  
ON INITIATIVE WE CAN GIVE GERMANS.

2.REPORT:VON BRAUNMUEHL ASKED TO SEE EDELSTEIN 08MAY TO  
REVIEW CURRENT STATE OF PM INITIATIVE.HE BEGAN BY REFERRING

...2

PAGE TWO ZQGR1193 CONF

TO PMS H OF C STATEMENT 09FEB AND SAID FRG AGREED WITH HIS  
TEN POINTS, IN PARTICULAR THAT TIME WAS RIPE FOR MAKING  
EFFORT TO IMPROVE E-W RELATIONS. THAT SMALLER POWERS SHOULD  
BE INVOLVED IN THIS PROCESS AS WELL AS SUPERPOWERS. AND THAT  
ONE SHOULD BEGIN BY IDENTIFYING COMMON INTERESTS AND  
AGREEMENT. THIS WAS GOOD APPROACH. HOWEVER FRG WOULD HAVE BEEN  
INCLINED TO EMPHASIZE DANGERS OF WAR GENERALLY RATHER THAN  
THOSE OF NUCLEAR WAR. CONVENTIONAL SOVIET STRENGTH WAS IMPORTANT  
FACTOR. USSR WAS TRYING TO DISARM WEST IN  
NUCLEAR FIELD IN ORDER TO BRING TO BEAR ITS CONVENTIONAL  
SUPERIORITY. THIS WAS WHY NON/NO-USE OF FORCE WAS OF  
INTEREST/VALUE TO FRG. FRG WOULD ALSO HAVE PUT MORE  
EMPHASIS ON MAINTAINING/PROMOTING DIALOGUE AND  
COOPERATION WITH EAST.

3. BRAUNMUEHL NOTED THAT GENSCHER HAD DRAWN UPON PMS TEN PTS  
IN MFA PUBLISHED ARTICLE-REDUCING THEM TO SIX AND  
MODIFYING THEIR EMPHASIS (COPIED TO YOU UNDER TRANSMITTAL  
SLIP). IN RESPONSE TO OUR INQUIRY. BRAUNMUEHL CONCLUDED BY  
SAYING FRG WANTED TO KEEP IN TOUCH ON PM INITIATIVE  
DEVELOPMENTS AND HOPED ANY IDEAS FOR NEW STEPS WOULD BE  
DISCUSSED IN BONN AND WITH ALLIES. HE COMMENTED  
GENSCHER WAS DISCUSSING THESE MATTERS IN WSHDC AND  
PUTTING CONSIDERABLE EMPHASIS ON FRG CONCERNS ABOUT USA  
DIRECTIONS ON SDI.

4. WE PROVIDED BRIEF RUN-DOWN ON CURRENT STATE OF PM INITIATIVE

...3

PAGE THREE ZQGR1193 CONF D

AS WE UNDERSTAND IT, NOTING INTENTION TO PM TO WRITE TO  
CHERNENKO AND REAGAN, AND OUR HOPES FOR ATTN BY UN SEC GEN  
TO FIVE POWER DISCUSSIONS, HIGHLIGHTING IN PARTICULAR  
CONTINUING CDN INTEREST IN ASAT. WITH RESPECT TO  
BRUNMUEHLS POINT ON EMPHASIS ON NUCLEAR WAR IN PMS SPEECH  
WE NOTED IMPORTANCE OF STRATEGIC CONCERNS FOR CDA (AND  
NEED TO GET CDN PUBLIC ATTN IN H OF C ADDRESS) BUT STRESSED  
THAT PMS INITIATIVE ADDRESSED ITSELF TO CONVENTIONAL WARFARE  
NO/NO LESS THAN NUCLEAR. FROM OUTSET PM HIMSELF HAD ATTACHED  
HIGH PRIORITY TO SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS WITHIN MBFR  
FORUM. INITIATIVE THUS INCLUDED MBFR PROPOSAL AND WE HAD  
TAKEN SPECIAL CARE TO ENCOURAGE INITIALLY FRG PROPOSALS  
AND SUBSEQUENTLY IMPROVEMENT OF USA PROPOSALS.

5. ON QUESTION OF FURTHER PURSUIT OF PRINCIPLES IN PMS  
SPEECH WE INDICATED WE HOPED/EXPECTED NATO MINISTERIAL AND  
LDN SUMMIT WOULD PROVIDE FORUM FOR DISCUSSION AMONG ALLIES.

6. BRAUNMUEHL ASKED IF WE HAD GIVEN ANY THOUGHT TO FORUM  
OR CHANNELS THROUGH WHICH TEN POINTS WOULD BE PURSUED WITH  
EAST. HE NOTED WHILE CERTAIN POINTS CONCERNED ONLY TWO  
SUPERPOWERS AND OTHERS WERE MULTILATERAL IN  
NATURE ALL WERE IMPORTANT FOR ALLIANCE MEMBERS. HE  
THOUGHT IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF DEBATE WERE LEFT  
ENTIRELY TO USA AND USSR. HE HYPOTHESIZED THAT CSCE (VIENNA 1986)  
MIGHT PROVIDE APPROPRIATE FORMUM FOR PURSUING DEVELOPMENT OF

...4

PAGE FOUR ZQGR1193 CONF

PRINCIPLES. WE SAID WE WERE NOT/NOT AWARE OF ANY  
CONSIDERATION YET HAVING BEING GIVEN TO CSCE FORUM AND  
BELIEVED YOU MIGHT BE IN SIMILAR PROCESS REFLECTING ON  
PROSPECTS FOR FOLLOWING UP IN VARIOUS FORUMS.

7. BRAUNMUEHL SAID HE HAD NOT/NOT YET RECVD DETAILED REPORTS  
ON GENSCHER VISIT TO WSHDC BUT DID SAY INTENTION HAD  
BEE TO EMPHASIZE E-W RELSN (HOW DID USA VIEW THEM AND ITS OWN  
BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH USSR?) AND ALLIANCE QUESTIONS,  
IN PARTICULAR SDI. FROM GENERAL SUMMARY OF GENSCHERS  
DISCUSSIONS THAT HE HAJ SEEN, USA RESPONSE ON SDI HAD BEEN  
MERELY TO SAY EUROPEANS WOULD BE KEPT INFORMED AND  
THEIR INTERESTS KEPT IN MIND IN DEVELOPMENT OF SDI.

8. CONCLUSION: BELIEVE MFA OBJECTIVES IN CONVENING MTG  
WERE TWOFOLD (A) TO ENCOURAGE CONTINUING CDN PURSUIT OF  
INITIATIVE (WE GAVE ASSURANCE OF CONTINUING STRONG INTEREST  
OF CDN GOVT AND OPPOSITION ALIKE) (B) TO REITERATE DISIRE FOR  
CLOSE CDA-FRG AND CDA-NATO CONSULTATIONS ON SUBJECT.

WE TOLD BRAUNMUEHL WE WOULD SEEK FROM YOU FURTHER  
INDICATION OF DIRECTION OF YOUR THINKING ON FUTURE  
PROSPECTS FOR INITIATIVE AND OF ANY SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENT  
ON GIVEN ELEMENTS OF INITIATIVE AND WOULD KEEP IN TOUCH  
WITH HIM. 9. YOUR TEL OF 03MAY ON DISCUSSION WITH CHINESE  
EMB ON SUBJECT PROVIDED USEFUL GUIDANCE: WE HOPE YOU MIGHT  
NOW BE IN A POSITION TO ELABORATE UPON THE INFO CONTAINED  
IN IT TO FACILITATE DISCUSSIONS WITH KEY NATO PARTNERS.

CCC/242 111200Z ZQGR1193

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28-67-TRUDEAU	
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**ACTION**  
**SUITE A DONNER**  
CONFIDENTIAL

FM BNATO YBGR6471 10MAY84

TO EXTOTT IDA

DISTR IFB IDD RBD

REF YOURTEL IDA2567 29MAY

---PM INITIATIVE: LETS TO CHERNENKO/REAGAN ON SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS  
GIVEN LIVELY INTEREST SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS ELICITED WHEN CIRCULATED  
HERE IN JANUARY. WE WOULD WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF ALLIES  
AT SOME STAGE ON DENOUMENT OF THIS UNDERTAKING. THERE IS OF COURSE  
NO/NO URGENCY BUT, IF YOU AGREE, WE HOPE THIS COULD BE DONE BEFORE  
FACT OF EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN PM TRUDEAU AND PRESIDENTS  
REAGAN AND CHERNENKO IS MADE PUBLIC.

CCC/270 101524Z YBGR6471

*(Handwritten mark)*

**ACTION  
SUITE A DONNER**

*Concurrence  
Sécurité  
Communication 11 AM 10/5  
IMMED  
pcc*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0593 10MAY84

TO EXTOTT IDA DELIVER BY 100900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/PPP/ADM POL/DSTRATA

DISTR RBR RBD

REF YOURTEL IDA0669 09MAY

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28-6-8-TRUDEAU  
24

---PM INITIATIVE:LET TO CHERNENKO ON SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS  
GRATEFUL YOU REPEAT PARA 5/5 OF PAGE 3 REFTTEL SINCE,AS RECEIVED,  
IT APPEARS MARRED BY BY DROPPED LINES.

2.ALSO PLS CONFIRM THAT PARA 1(A)UNDER SUBHEAD QUOTE DETAILS  
OF PROPOSAL UNQUOTE ON PAGE 4/4 SHLD READ QUOTE DESIGNATED  
AREAS OF DEPLOYMENT RATHER THAN QUOTE DESIGNED AREAS OF  
DEPLOYMENT UNQUOTE AS RECEIVED.

CCC/144 100624Z XYGR0593



MESSAGE

Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
28-6-3-TRUDEAU
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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ **C O N F I D E N T I A L** 12 10

FM/DE FM EXTOTT IDAO667 09MAY84

TO/À TO MOSCO DELIVER BY 100900

INFO INFO BNATO LDN BONN ROME PARIS HAGUE BRU PRMNY GENEV TOKYO PEKIN WASHDC

DISTR PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/PPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

REF

SUBJ/SUJ DISTR MINA DMF IFB RBD RBR IDD IDR ZSI FPR

---PM INITIATIVE: LET TO CHERNENKO ON SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LETTER FROM PM TRUDEAU (DATED 07MAY) TO PRESIDENT CHERNENKO WHICH YOU SHOULD BRING TO ATTENTION OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP AT HIGHEST LEVEL <sup>PREFERABLY GROMYKO.</sup> ~~YOU DEEM APPROPRIATE~~ IT DEALS WITH TWO OF THREE SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS FIRST MENTIONED BY PM IN HIS 13NOV83 SPEECH IN MTL AND IS SELF EXPLANATORY. SIMILAR LETTER IS BEING SENT TO PRESIDENT REAGAN FOR COMMENT. ATTACHMENT TO LET IS CONTAINED IN IMMED FOLLOWING TEL. ORIGINAL FOLLOWS BY BAG 10MAY. WE DO NOT/NOT INTEND TO PUBLICIZE LETTERS AT THIS TIME PENDING POSSIBLE REPLIES (USA OFFICIALS HAVE INTIMATED PRIVATELY TO US THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN IS LIKELY TO RESPOND IN POSITIVE MANNER). AT LATER DATE HOWEVER WE DO ANTICIPATE MAKING REFERENCE TO FACT ~~OF~~ LETTERS AND THEIR REPLIES IN GENEV EITHER IN REFERENCE ~~IN~~ FUTURE SPEECH BY AMB BEESLEY OR POSSIBLY IN LETTER TO CD CHAIRMAN.

2. SHOULD YOU SECURE MEETING WITH GROMYKO YOU SHOULD PUT TWO PROPOSALS IN BROADER CONTEXT OF OVERALL PM INITIATIVE AND SEEK TO ENGAGE GROMYKO IN EXCHANGE ON CURRENT EAST/WEST ARMS CONTROL SITU.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
 SIG GARY J. SMITH/pec	IDA	5-6689	 SIG GARY J. SMITH



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PAGE TWO IDA0667 CONFD

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YOU SHOULD MAKE REF TO MEETING HELD WITH GROMYKO IN NOVEMBER WITH  
PMS SPECIAL ENVOY, PEARSON, AS WELL AS GROMYKO PRESENCE AT MTG  
BETWEEN CHERNENKO/TRUDEAU IN FEBRUARY PARTICULARLY PMS REF TO QUOTE  
WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY UNQUOTE OF WHICH SO FAR USSR HAS NOT/NOT TAKEN  
ADVANTAGE. WEST HAS TABLED PACKAGE OF CONCRETE MEASURES IN STKHM,  
MBFR PROPOSAL IN VIENN AND CW DRAFT ~~REPORT~~ <sup>TREATY</sup> IN GENEV, ALL OF WHICH  
SOVIETS HAVE TENDED TO DISMISS OUT OF HAND AND REFUSE TO DISCUSS.  
OUR IMPRESSION THEREFORE IS THAT USSR, RATHER THAN RESPONDING IN  
POSITIVE WAY TO PMS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE EAST-WEST CLIMATE AND  
RELATIONSHIP BY SERIES OF SMALL BUT POSITIVE STEPS, APPEARS INTENT  
ON CLOSING AVENUES FOR DISCUSSION AND ADDING TO THE CURRENT MISTRUST  
BETWEEN TWO SUPERPOWERS.

3. FYI: AS WE HAVE REPORTED EARLIER, PROPOSED LETTERS TO CHERNENKO,  
REAGAN AND OTHER LEADERS ON TEN PRINCIPLES ENUNCIATED IN H OF C ON  
09FEB, REMAINS HUNG UP IN PARTY POLITICAL PROCESS  
AND AT THIS STAGE WE CAN GIVE YOU NO/NO DEFINITIVE DATE WHEN SIGNED  
LET FROM PM ON THIS WOULD BE FORTHCOMING. WE EXPECT HOWEVER THAT  
THERE WILL BE ~~DECISION~~ <sup>DISCUSSION</sup> EARLY NEXT WEEK DURING RYZHOV VISIT OF  
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN PMS TEN PRINCIPLES AND CHERNENKOS QUOTE RULES  
TO GOVERN RELATIONS AMONG NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES UNQUOTE.

4. TEXT OF LET. FROM PM TO CHERNENKO AS FOLLOWS:

(Comcentre please copy attached)



CANADA

PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE  
OTTAWA, K1A 0A2

May 7, 1984

Dear Mr. President,

On November 13 of last year, in a speech in Montreal, I spoke of my concerns about the international situation and put forward several specific ideas about how we might improve the prospects for peace. In particular, I made reference to two proposals dealing with strategic weapons systems, which primarily concern the United States and the Soviet Union, with the hope that these might contribute to gearing down the momentum of the arms race.


I am enclosing discussion papers which we have developed on these two proposals, one to restrict the mobility of terrestrially deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and the other to demonstrate and ensure the verifiability of new strategic weapons systems. The first proposal is based on the premise that while making missiles mobile may make them more stabilizing weapons in the sense that a first strike would not destroy them, excessive mobility of new intercontinental strategic weapons may make them virtually invisible and therefore difficult to verify in any arms control agreement. The second reflects my belief that the prospects for arms control would be considerably enhanced if the verification factors were taken into account in the development stage of any new strategic system rather than leaving it to the point where systems are put on the bargaining table.

His Excellency Konstantin U. Chernenko  
President of the Presidium of the  
Supreme Soviet  
Moscow, USSR

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I ask you to give consideration to these ideas and would welcome receiving your views on them. I am also bringing them to the attention of President Reagan.

Yours sincerely, *with*  
*personal regards.*

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Jim S." followed by a large, decorative flourish.



MESSAGE

Accession/Référence
File/Dossier 28-6-3-TRUDEAU
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**C O N F I D E N T I A L**

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FM EXTOTT IDA0669 09MAY84

TO MOSCO **DELIVER BY 100900**

BAG:  
INFO BNATO LDN BONN ROME PARIS HAGUE BRU PRMNY GENEV TOKYO PEKIN

PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ CPP/ADMPOL/DSTRATA


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REF YOURTEL IDA0667 09MAY

---PM INITIATIVE: LET TO CHERNENKO ON SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF TWO PROPOSALS ATTACHED TO SUBJ LETTER:

(Comcentre please copy attached)

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG  GARY J. SMITH/pec	IDA	5-6689	SIG  GARY J. SMITH

## Discussion Paper

### Proposal

That States Agree to Restrict the Mobility of Terrestrially Deployed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).

### Background/Rationale

1. At the centre of a stable deterrence system is the maintenance by both sides of a secure capacity for retaliation. If both sides maintain such a capability, neither will attack first, out of fear that such action could trigger a devastating response. On the other hand, a capability to engage in a disarming first strike against the nuclear forces of one's opponent would be destabilizing. Such a capability could generate fears of attack in a crisis, perhaps inducing the opponent to strike first in order to avoid being disarmed. Pressures to develop an equivalent capability could be created; the prospects for meaningful arms control would be seriously eroded. The confidence of states in their ability to retaliate, and therefore to deter, would be seriously eroded and the stability of the deterrence system as a whole would suffer.
2. In recent years concern has developed that such instabilities may be developing in the strategic balance. Trends in ICBM force characteristics (numbers, accuracy, destructive power, etc.) have led many to conclude that ICBM forces may be increasingly vulnerable to a disarming strike. Indeed, it is on the basis of such conclusions that radical reductions have been sought in ICBM assets at the START negotiations, and that planning is underway to move to less vulnerable basing modes for ICBM forces and single warhead ICBMs.
3. Of course these concerns over vulnerability apply primarily to one element of the triad of nuclear forces; bomber and submarine forces are not, at this time, considered to be vulnerable to the same degree. What is troubling is the possibility that the most reliable, capable and hitherto secure forces may be threatened. Although the logic of this concern is open to debate, given the invulnerability of other elements of strategic forces, states nevertheless attach significance to the ICBM vulnerability issue, and are modernizing their forces partly as a consequence of this concern. In addition, problems at arms control talks have resulted from demands for reductions in ICBM capability.

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4. In response to this issue, the development of mobile ICBM systems has begun. In general terms, such moves help to defuse the vulnerability question, and enhance the prospect for stable deterrence. Greater success in arms control negotiations may be expected as both sides would have reduced incentives - and capabilities - in the counterforce area.
5. It is possible, however, that a move towards mobility may be destabilizing because of the consequent difficulty this would pose in verifying by so-called National Technical Means (NTMs) (satellites, radars, etc.). If this were allowed to transpire, arms control could become difficult to negotiate, and fears of "breakout" (unauthorized sudden increases in forces) could produce pressures for larger forces and generate considerable instability in the deterrence system.
6. It will be necessary and desirable, therefore, to preclude such developments through adequate verification procedures and force deployment patterns. On-site inspection and remote sensing may provide for some assurances in this regard, but are unlikely to be in and of themselves adequate. Perhaps more promising is the possibility of prior agreement to configuring mobile ICBM forces in such a manner that verification by National Technical Means (NTMs) is possible.
7. Some possible elements of this proposal are presented below, but details should be left up to the powers to negotiate. These details relate to as yet undetermined, but critical, factors such as mobile ICBM force size, and the characteristics of the missiles themselves.

## Evaluation

### 1. Stability

As explained earlier, to the extent that mobile ICBMs are deployed, the stability of deterrence may be bolstered as there would be reduced first strike fears and incentives. If these deployments were accompanied by adequate verification procedures resulting from various agreed restrictions on ICBM mobility and deployment, arms control agreements legitimizing this shift in strategic forces in more stabilizing directions would become easier to secure. In addition, fears of unauthorized deployments would be reduced, if not eliminated.

## 2. Negotiability

As noted earlier, there is likely to be a general move in the direction of mobile ICBMs. All states are likely to be in favour of measures designed to enhance the verifiability of such deployments, particularly if such measures would reduce the requirement for intrusive verification procedures.

### Details of Proposal

1. Although the precise nature and wording of the proposal should be left up to the negotiating parties, the following represent considerations which should be taken into account in constructing this proposal:

- (a) Designated Areas of Deployment

The parties would agree to deploy mobile ICBMs only in certain fixed locales to be identified by agreement. Systems located outside these areas would be considered a violation of the agreement.

- (b) Size and Nature of Deployment Area

In order to assist in verification, the size of the deployment area at the locales identified in (a) above would have to be identified. These areas, in turn, should be distinguishable from surrounding territory, ideally by man-made barrier. In addition, designated entry and exit points for missiles being deployed or removed for repair or testing should be agreed to.

- (c) Frequency of Movement

In addition to the above measures, it may be desirable to limit the frequency of movement of the missiles in order to assist satellite verification. Movement frequency would be established to enhance verifiability without thereby increasing vulnerability.

- (d) Missile Storage

It may be desirable to establish guidelines for the storage of replacement and surplus missiles in order to enhance confidence that missile reload/refires are not being clandestinely deployed.

## Discussion Paper

### Proposal

That States Agree to Demonstrate and Ensure the Verifiability of New Strategic Weapons Systems.

### Background/Rationale

1. A central concern of arms control negotiations has always been the verifiability of provisions in the resulting agreements. Such verification is deemed necessary in order to ensure compliance, thereby enhancing mutual confidence, and preventing clandestine measures intended to circumvent treaty provisions.
2. Hitherto, verification means have resided primarily in so-called National Technical Means (NTMs). These include satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, radar facilities, etc. It has generally been felt that the types of technologies and the manner in which they have been restricted by past arms control agreements have been such as to allow for adequate verification utilizing NTMs. This is reflected in the absence of the requirement for on-site inspection provisions in past strategic arms control agreements, and the provisions contained therein which oblige the participants to refrain from measures designed to interfere with the operation of NTMs.
3. Verification, however, is likely to become increasingly difficult as new strategic technologies are developed and deployed. Weapons developed without adequate attention to verifiability may make arms control negotiations increasingly difficult, may increase distrust as to treaty adherence, and may thereby act to decrease overall deterrence stability.
4. One approach to this problem, that of on-site inspection, has consequentially become increasingly relevant to ongoing arms control negotiations and the technologies they seek to limit. Such measures, however, have been difficult to negotiate to the mutual satisfaction of the parties concerned.
5. Another approach to verification may be to strengthen the existing provisions in respect to National Technical Means by undertaking measures to ensure the verifiability of weapons to be deployed. Thus far, it has simply been

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required that there be non-interference in the operation of NTMs, together with provisions designed to preclude concealment measures which are intended to impede verification by NTMs. Enhanced verifiability by NTMs may be secured if the party deploying a given weapon system is required to demonstrate that the system is indeed verifiable by NTMs. If the deploying party is unwilling or unable to do so to the satisfaction of others, the deploying party would be required to suggest other verification provisions which would ensure verifiability. Were these acceptable to the non-deploying party, such other verification provisions as agreed to would immediately become reciprocal for both parties in terms of similar weapons systems.

6. The net effect of such provisions would be such as to ensure that strategic weapons systems are designed and deployed so as to be verifiable by NTMs, or by NTMs and a combination of other verification techniques acceptable to the parties concerned.

## Evaluation

### 1. Stability

As explained earlier, the enhancement of confidence in the adherence of the parties to arms control agreements is highly stabilizing. Verifiability is necessary for such mutual confidence. Given the potential development of new strategic weapons technologies which are difficult to verify by NTMs, the effect of this proposal would be such as to increase the incentives to design weapons systems which were verifiable by NTMs. Were systems designed which were not verifiable by NTMs, there would be a requirement to agree to additional reciprocal on-site or cooperative measures. This would enhance deterrence stability through encouraging the verifiability of weapons systems, particularly of those new systems which were allowed by an arms control agreement, but whose characteristics would be such as to hamper verification.

### 2. Negotiability

Although parties to arms control negotiations have displayed varying degrees of concern as to the question and methods of verification, all states share a general interest in maintaining adequate verification capabilities. This commonality of interest is likely to increase

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as new technologies are developed which would greatly impede the verification task. Given the reciprocal nature of this proposal, the parties to arms control negotiations should regard this measure as roughly equal in its effects.

#### Details of Proposal

The precise nature and wording of the proposal should be left up to the parties concerned. Discussions as to verifiability and verification mechanisms should take place in a verification body which would serve as an adjunct to the Standing Consultative Commission created by the SALT I and SALT II agreements.