

50069-C-40

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File No. 50069-C-4 Vol. One

External Affairs / Affaires extérieures  
 Canada / Canada

TO/A / CCBI

FROM/DE / BKRH

REFERENCE / RÉFÉRENCE • Korean War  
 SUBJECT / SUJET • Consultation re possible use of A-Bomb.

Security / Sécurité
PROTECTED (with file Accession/Référence attached)
File/Dossier
50069-C-40 vol.1
Date
6 April, 1989
Number/Numéro

ENCLOSURES  
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

We understand that you are at present screening the 50,000 series & would be grateful if you could look over the attached file to ascertain whether it contains any sensitive material which should be removed before making it available to a Canadian post-graduate student, at present completing his doctorate at Cambridge University.

2. Thank you very much for your assistance in this matter.

*CCBI  
 Not to be released until US material is declassified  
 10 April 1989  
 DP Cole*

*Doreen P. Cole*

Historical Section,  
 Academic Relations Division

FILE No.	<i>Screening</i>
NAME	<i>SW</i>
	<i>AB</i>

*Not really Korea  
 Senior Def rel  
 Cole + us.  
 PJBD INATO  
 US/Brit*

~~ENCLOSED~~

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: NOTE FOR FILE .....

Security .....

Date... February 21, 1956..

.....  
J.M. Teakles/  
FROM: ..Defence Liaison..(1)..Division.....

File No. 50069-6-40		
90	✓	✓

REFERENCE: .....

SUBJECT: ..Announcement of further reduction in forces in Korea.....

Mr. Campney, Minister of National Defence, made the following announcement in the House of Commons on Thursday, February 16, 1956:

Hon. R. O. Campney (Minister of National Defence): Mr. Speaker, the house may be interested to know that a further reduction in the commonwealth forces serving under the United Nations command in Korea has been decided upon.

In so far as this country is concerned the present Canadian component of some 300 officers and men will be reduced to a small detachment of about 40 personnel of the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps and the Royal Canadian Dental Corps. They will continue to provide medical and dental facilities to all commonwealth troops in Korea.

Our reduction will be phased in with that of other commonwealth countries concerned. These withdrawals are to begin next month and are to be completed as soon as practicable thereafter.

The commonwealth force then remaining in Korea will include a British infantry battalion and supporting detachments from Canada, Australia and New Zealand. This force will be known as the commonwealth contingent, Korea, and will retain its identity under the United Nations command.

Mr. G.R. Pearkes (Esquimalt-Saanich): May I ask the minister if there are any Canadian casualties in Korea at the present time?

Mr. Campney: I think not but I shall inquire.

*J.M. Teakles*

Defence Liaison (1) Division 000007

Ext. 230

Copy on 50107-A-

50061-C-40

ORIGINAL

MESSAGE FORM  
INCOMING

File No.		
50061-C-40		
16	50	

Security Classification
UNCLASSIFIED

*Ref. copy  
Am. Sec. B.  
C. C. B.  
Mr. Slaybrite  
Mr. Barton (to report his return)  
+ file AMB*

24 SEP 1952 FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

System EN CLAIR	No. WA-2303	Date: September 23, 1952.
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Priority

Departmental Circulation  
MINISTER  
UNDR/SEC  
D/UNDR/SEC  
A/UNDR/SEC'S.

Reference:

Subject: General Bradley's statement on use of atomic weapons in NATO defence.

At his press conference to-day, held on his return from Europe, General Bradley made the following statement:

Quote

It appeared to me that there was some misunderstanding about just how important a part these weapons could play at the present time in our defence and there is feeling in some of the countries that since we have atomic weapons, that there is no use in their building up any forces whatsoever, they use that as an excuse for resting on their laurels, you might say as they are at the present time, without making any further efforts. Those of us here believe that while they will play a great part in the defence of Europe, they will not completely replace all the services and the need for the other services -- that is we must have enough ground troops to make them concentrate. We must have the air to keep down their air, other-wise you can't drop any bombs. So that the point I was trying to bring out (in statements made in Europe) was that in spite of the fact that A-weapons will play a very important part in any defence of Europe, they will not replace the other troops and we must not lessen our efforts to raise those security forces to a point where they will deter war and possibly prevent it. Unquote.

References <

*ORB  
Am. Sec B  
CCOB  
Mr. Slaybrite  
Mr. Barton (on return)  
London  
Paris  
Perm. Del. to NATO*

*file AMB*

Done \_\_\_\_\_  
Date \_\_\_\_\_

CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1952 SEP 22 AM 10:40

EXT. 230

COPY

MESSAGE FORM  
 INCOMING

*Copy for*

File No.		
50069-C-10		
58	/	

Security Classification
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES  
 TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

System CYPHER-AUTO	No. WA-3737	Date: October 17, 1951.
Priority	<u>Reference:</u>	
Departmental Circulation	<u>Subject:</u>	
Phone	Following for Heeney from Wrong, Begins:	
Date	<p>1. You mentioned on the telephone this morning that the frequent talk here of the development of new atomic weapons and suggestions from some members of Congress that they should be used in Korea might revive the concern which was aroused by the President's hasty references at a press conference which led to Mr. Attlee's visit last December.</p> <p>2. Since speaking to you I have learned that Mr. Dean's speech at Los Angeles to which you referred was not discussed with others in Washington before its delivery and caused considerable concern here. Mr. Lovett spoke on October 15th to the American Legion Convention, and part of what he said was designed to counter speculation based on Mr. Dean's speech and other statements.</p> <p>3. I am repeating in my following en clair message two paragraphs from Mr. Lovett's speech, the purpose of which is to emphasize that at the present stage of development the new military applications of atomic energy have still to be proved. You will note that he includes a direct reference to their lack of availability for Korea. Ends.</p>	
References	-----	

Copy No. 1 of three copies

Defence Liaison/R.A. MacKay/elb

Ottawa, May 24, 1951

Top Secret

*Removed from  
copy No. 5  
(which is in my working  
file) 4/6/51 RAK*

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HEENEY

No. 5

Attached is a copy of Kirkwood's memorandum on the meeting on U.S. SAC projects in Canada held in the Minister's Office on May 17. Attached also is a copy which you might wish to forward to the Minister.

In view of the importance of the subject, this memorandum should probably be considered as a draft, subject to revision. If you have any comments on the memorandum you might let me have them shortly.

I have sent copies to Mr. Wrong and to Mr. Robertson with requests for their amendments if any.

*Mr. Robertson telephoned  
to say he agreed with the  
memo  
30/5/51. RAK*

*RAK*

Defence Liaison Division.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
RESULT A SECRET**

Mr. Mackay

*I think this  
is a very good  
account of our  
discussion +  
a fair basis  
on which to  
proceed*

*May 24 Mr*

*25.5.21(55)*

Copy No. 4 of six copies

Defence Liaison (1)/ D.H.W. Kirkwood / dtg  
Ottawa, May 22, 1951.

- copy # 1 = The Minister
- " # 2 = Mr. Wrong
- " # 3 = Mr. Robertson
- " # 4 = Mr. Heeney
- " # 5 = Mr. Claxton

returned to DHWK. # 1 set aside for use in  
pol. consultations.  
TOP SECRET  
# 5 kept in my working file  
DHWK  
DHWK

Discussion of USSAC Projects on May 17  
Held in the Minister's Office

1951

On May 17, a discussion was held in the Minister's office arising from the meeting with Mr. Arneson of the State Department in Mr. Heeney's office on Saturday, May 12. There were present Mr. Pearson, Mr. Wrong, Mr. Robertson, Mr. Heeney, Mr. MacKay, Mr. LeFan and Mr. Kirkwood. There were on hand a report on the discussion with Mr. Arneson which had been prepared by Mr. George for the Under-Secretary and also Mr. Ignatieff's notes on the same talk (copies of the latter attached).

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 REPUT A SECRET

New Orientation of U.S. Thinking

2. It was agreed that the most significant feature of what Mr. Arneson had said was the revelation that in Washington it was now assumed that (a) the only prospect of a major war is in the occurrence of open hostilities between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., (b) such hostilities would inevitably mean a major war, and (c) in the event of such a war the atomic bomb would be used, but only in such an event. The important question now is what circumstances would lead to open hostilities between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

3. It was agreed that the Canadian Government must accept the assumption that, in the event of such a major war under the present conditions, the atomic bomb would be used. After discussion it was also agreed that it would be very difficult to challenge this assumption at some future time unless the strategic balance should alter radically in the interim, and probably even in that case.

- 2 -

### The Problem for Canada

4. It was agreed that, in view of the foregoing, Canada might still retain a technical right to refuse permission to the U.S. to launch atomic strikes from bases in Canada, but that in fact this right was little more than academic. If a war should break out and the bomb be used, Canada would be fully involved from the outset. Thus our only effective participation in decisions governing the use of the bomb must consist in our exercising what influence we can in discussion of the circumstances leading to the outbreak of war. We can, for instance, state at any particular time that we do not consider the existing circumstances to justify the conclusion that war with the U.S.S.R. is imminent. Even if our conclusion differed from that of the U.S., it might have some deterrent effect.

### The Proposal for a "Canopy" Agreement

5. Our letter No. D-1819 of May 4 to Washington made use of the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear components of the bomb. It was suggested that this distinction is no longer of particular significance, and that in reaching any agreement with the U.S. on paper it should be played down somewhat.

6. It appeared, however, that a more fundamental issue had been brought out in the talk with Mr. Acheson. Under the McMahon Act the President had the ultimate responsibility of deciding on the use of the bomb. The Administration were therefore most unwilling to be put in the position where they would have to say to Congress, if asked, that other governments had to be consulted. On the other hand, the Canadian Government would find it most

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- 3 -

embarrassing if the U.S. Administration were to say that no other government need be consulted about use of facilities in its territory for atomic strikes. It appeared that this issue was sufficient to prevent any formal agreement about consultations prior to use of facilities in Canada in terms which would be acceptable to both parties. For this reason Mr. Arneson, if effect, had suggested that the idea of a formal "canopy" agreement be abandoned and that the informal arrangements for discussions on the developing international situation should serve in practice at least to keep the Canadian Government fully abreast of developments which might lead to a decision to use the bomb.

7. It was mentioned in passing that our proposal to grant prior authority for atomic retaliation against a direct attack on North America, intended to be helpful, served merely to point up the fact that we were not prepared to give blanket prior approval.

8. It was agreed, finally, that we should work for an agreed record of the discussion with Mr. Arneson, covering in some detail the proposals for political discussion and its relation to the question of the use of the bomb. We should attempt in addition to reach a specific agreement on the procedure to be followed in connection with the clearance of the S.A.C. activities on and over Canadian territory, to ensure in particular that arrangements should be made through diplomatic channels for movements of both nuclear and non-nuclear components of atomic bombs. Our assurance that the USSAC would in fact comply with the terms of such an agreement must rest on the fact that under United States law any deployment of nuclear components (and, in practice, of non-nuclear components as well) must be authorized by the President on the advice of the Secretaries of State and Defence and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. Hence there was little risk of any such movements occurring without the knowledge of the State Department.

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- 4 -

9. While we would not insist on consultation for overflight of Canadian territory in training exercises and non-emergency deployment, the fact that such notice must be given through the diplomatic channel would permit us, if we are really kept informed about the U.S. appreciation of the strategic and political circumstances, to answer requests for clearance in a manner which compelled consultation.

#### Routine Procedure

10. It was recognized that under the circumstances outlined we would be responsible for suggesting a procedure for obtaining rapid clearance. It was proposed that Mr. Pearson should write Mr. Claxton suggesting a direct channel for clearance between this Department and the Chief of Air Staff (to be used of course only for the technical aspects of the clearance and not the political), in order to avoid the loss of time involved in communicating through the Chiefs of Staff Organization to the Chief of Air Staff.

#### Political Discussions

11. Mr. Ignatieff, who had spoken to Mr. Arneson since the talk on Saturday, May 12, expected the State Department to take the initiative in opening talks with Mr. Wrong next week. There was some discussion of the conditions of Mr. Wrong's participation.

12. While it was considered desirable that the talks should be tripartite, rather than two separate series of bilateral discussions involving in the one case Sir Oliver Franks and in the other Mr. Wrong with representatives of the U.S. Government, it was recognized that Mr. Arneson had been given to understand that we were prepared, initially at least, to accept the United States' preference for separate

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- 5 -

bilateral discussions.

13. There was some discussion as to the probable nature of the talks. One suggestion was that they should constitute political consultation at a very senior and confidential level between close allies on any matters of major concern. On the other hand, it was pointed out that in fact our admission to these talks rested on our special position in atomic energy matters, and that if the content of the talks strayed too far from such matters then the U.S. would rapidly come to regard them as a formality as far as Canada was concerned, although the talks with the U.K. might serve a genuine and important purpose. It was agreed that Mr. Wrong should attempt to strike a note somewhere between these two extremes, so that the talks would rest rather more than indirectly on Canada's position in atomic matters but not entirely on that position. It was mentioned that Mr. Arneson's suggestions had pointed toward an arrangement that should be as flexible as possible, and on the whole this would appear to serve our purpose.

Summary of Discussion Concerning Political Talks

14. Mr. Wrong asked for explicit answers to certain questions that would serve to guide him on his return to Washington. It was agreed:

(i) that he should accept an invitation to participate in talks such as had been proposed, and

(ii) that his acceptance could precede any further exchange of paper with U.S. authorities.

The suggestion concerning the emphasis which Mr. Wrong should seek to achieve in these talks (see para. 13 above) was re-iterated, and it was added

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(iii) that we went through these talks to learn of the political and strategic circumstances which would lead (as indicated in paras. 2,3 and 4 above) to the use of the bomb. It was recognized that such information might not be the prime object of the U.K. representative in these talks.

15. Finally, it was agreed

(iv) that the question of a procedural agreement to govern deployment, training etc. was entirely separate from participation in the talks and would be followed up by separate negotiations to be initiated in Ottawa.

TOP SECRET

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

Results of the Arneson Talks in Ottawa

On Saturday, May 12th, Mr. Heeney had a meeting in his office to discuss the U.S. Strategic Air Command projects with Mr. Arneson, at which the following were also present: Mr. Norman Robertson, Mr. MacKay, Mr. George and myself.

2. Mr. Arneson outlined the procedures which governed the decisions to move and use atomic weapons and their component parts, stressing that it requires the personal decision of the President in each case as well as the advice of the Secretaries of Defence and State and the Chairman of the US AEC. He also outlined in some detail the thinking of Mr. Acheson and other senior officials of the State Department on the suggestion that there should be continuing consultations with Canada as well as the United Kingdom on the developing world situation which might give rise to the use of atomic weapons. He stressed that the main object of these consultations would be to determine what might be the conditions which would give rise to a general war as against resistance to military aggression on a limited scale, as in Korea. These consultations would consider the specific geographic areas and their political and military problems. On the State Department side they would be conducted by Mr. Paul Nitze with the assistance of General Bradley whenever necessary. Mr. Arneson said that he had personally given some thought to the idea of working out a number of contingencies which would justify the use of atomic weapons. He mentioned that in addition to the contingency involving a direct attack upon the North American Continent, the contingencies of an attack upon other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty and attacks upon United States forces stationed in the North Atlantic Treaty area as well as outside.

3. Mr. Heeney said that the idea of continuing consultation had been favourably received by the Canadian Government and that you had been advised to proceed with these consultations as soon as possible. It was desired that the consultations should be as frequent as possible and preferably on a trilateral basis. Mr. Arneson said that the State

- 2 -

Department had in mind that the meetings might take place once a week. Mr. Acheson, however, preferred that at least in the first instance they should be bilateral because of French/Government had been watching nervously for any revival of the Combined Chiefs of Staff meetings in Washington and would assuredly misunderstand any trilateral meetings of the kind now contemplated. For this reason Mr. Acheson preferred that the meetings at the State Department should be very informal indeed.

/suscepti-  
bilities.  
The French

4. Mr. Heeney did not press our preference for tripartite meetings and was inclined to leave it to your discretion, it being understood that you would be the sole representative of Canada at these meetings. Mr. Robertson also agreed with this, emphasizing that these consultations would be rather in the nature of an experiment and that the Canadian Government would be prepared to depend upon your judgment and experience in these consultations, which, if continued frequently, might prove very useful indeed.

5. The main point which Mr. Heeney stressed was that it would create very considerable political difficulties indeed if the United States Government were to press for prior consent to use Canadian bases or territory in retaliatory atomic strikes in the event of any attack upon U.S. forces stationed abroad.

6. Three main tentative decisions were reached with Mr. Arneson:

- (a) that we should go ahead with continuing and frequent consultations on a bilateral basis forthwith between yourself and Mr. Nitze;
- (b) that the diplomatic channel should continue to be used for any request relating to the deployment of both fissionable and non-fissionable components of atomic weapons over or into Canadian territory.  
(Mr. Arneson emphasized that in effect there was no difference between the deployment of fissionable and non-fissionable components and that the S.A.C. was under the strictest instruction never to carry assembled weapons over friendly territory.)

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(a) that for the time being we would suspend consideration of a "canopy" agreement. Mr. Arneson indicated that the U.S. Government had no special desire to have a written agreement of this kind, but would be prepared to consider a suggestion from the Canadian Government should we find it desirable to have an agreement in writing. It was recognized that there would be considerable difficulty in defining in writing the various contingencies in which atomic weapons might be used subject to prior consent rather than notification.

Extract of a Telegram from  
Mr. Ignatieff to Mr. Wrong

1. It may be useful for you to know that I checked my record of the Arneson talks in Ottawa last Saturday informally with Arneson, to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding on the tentative conclusions reached. He agreed that my record represents an accurate reflection of what was said. He has not yet submitted his own report to Mr. Acheson, but intends to speak along similar lines. It is his understanding that the State Department will have to take the initiative to start continuing consultations with you some time early next week. This may involve your seeing Mr. Acheson or not, as you may wish.

2. Arneson made comments on two points of detail which may be worth recording. With regard to Mr. Heeney's remarks relating to United States forces stationed abroad, Arneson responded with the comment that it was just such difficulties that led him to believe that the most useful line of approach lay in continuing consultations rather than in trying to spell out with particularity prearranged action which would follow various possible contingencies. As regards the possibility of an arrangement in writing, Arneson observed that the continuing consultations would enable both sides better to judge whether a more specific agreement would be needed. He stressed that nothing was precluded by the informal arrangements now contemplated.

3. In view of the above comments, you may wish to leave your copy of the record in Ottawa. Ends.

TOP SECRET

*File 50069-C-40  
HWK*

*U3 666*

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REQUIRE A SECRET**

Ottawa, May 24, 1951.

<i>50069-C-40</i>
Sub. <i>gk</i> <i>50</i> Filed....

Dear Mr. Robertson,

I enclose a copy of a memorandum prepared in this Division on the meeting held in the Minister's Office on May 17 on U.S. SAC projects in Canada. In view of the importance of the subject it was thought that we should have a very clear understanding as to what was said and finally agreed to at this meeting. If you have any suggestions for revision of the memorandum, will you please let us have them as soon as convenient.

Yours sincerely,

R. A. MacKAY  
R. A. MacKay.

N. A. Robertson, Esquire  
Secretary to the Cabinet  
Office of the Privy Council  
O t t a w a , Ontario

Similar letter sent to Mr. Wrong.

TELETYPE

From THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES  
To THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

CYPHER - AUTO

WASHINGTON, May 16, 1951.

WA-2070

58169-C-40

~~DOWNGRADU TO SECRET~~ Original on Pol. Consultations file.  
~~REF ID: A66666~~ JHK

Top Secret and Personal. Following for Mr. Wrong from Ignatieff, Begins:

1. It may be useful for you to know that I checked my record of the Arneson talks in Ottawa last Saturday informally with Arneson, to avoid any possibility of misunderstanding on the tentative conclusions reached. He agreed that my record represents an accurate reflection of what was said. He has not yet submitted his own report to Mr. Acheson, but intends to speak along similar lines. It is his understanding that the State Department will have to take the initiative to start continuing consultations with you some time early next week. This may involve your seeing Mr. Acheson or not, as you may wish.

2. Arneson made comments on two points of detail which may be worth recording. With regard to Mr. Heeney's remarks relating to United States forces stationed abroad, Arneson responded with the comment that it was just such difficulties that led him to believe that the most useful line of approach lay in continuing consultations rather than in trying to spell out with particularly prearranged action which would follow various possible contingencies. As regards the possibility of an arrangement in writing, Arneson observed that the

## TELETYPE

*From* THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES  
*To* THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

WASHINGTON,

- 2 -

continuing consultations would enable both sides better to judge whether a more specific agreement would be needed. He stressed that nothing was precluded by the informal arrangements now contemplated.

3. In view of the above comments, you may wish to leave your copy of the record in Ottawa. Ends.

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

FILE COPY

Copy No. 5 of 5 Copies

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, May 16, 1951.

*File 50069-C-40  
Hawk.*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

U.S. Strategic Air Command Project

Discussion with Mr. Arneson

*Copy No. 2 seen by the Minister Hawk*

1. On his return from visiting Chalk River with the members of the Canadian and United States Sections of the PJBD, Mr. Gordon Arneson visited Ottawa on May 12th in order to discuss with you the stage reached in the State Department's thinking on the proposed "canopy" agreement between the Canadian and United States Governments concerning the use of Canadian bases by the U.S. Strategic Air Command in the deployment of their forces to these bases or over Canadian territory. This memorandum is intended to serve as a record of the discussion which was attended by Mr. Robertson, Mr. MacKay, Mr. Ignatieff and Mr. George.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET**

U.S., U.K. Canadian Co-operation

2. Mr. Arneson began by reviewing the background of the co-operation between the United States, United Kingdom, and Canadian Governments on atomic matters generally. He referred to the "McMahon Act" as the "original sin" which has impeded the kind of co-operation which scientists and many government officials in all three countries know to be both necessary for the best use of scientific research and desirable in the interests of national security in all three countries. A State Department attempt to secure an amendment to the McMahon Act more than a year ago had foundered because, as we could now see by benefit of hind sight,

- (a) the U.S. were proposing too tough a bargain for the U.K. Government to accept,

- 2 -

- (b) the U.S. Joint Congressional Committee was not prepared to take as broad a view of the national interests of the United States in regard to atomic co-operation as they might have done, and,
- (c) the arrest and trial of Fuchs made it politically impossible to propose giving more atomic information to the U.K. at that time.

3. The way may now be clearing, he thought, for a resumption of the Combined Political/Committee talks in a month or so. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission was the bottle-neck at the moment, but it was expected that they would agree shortly to a proposal initiated by the Defence Department for an amendment to the McMahon Act which would permit the exchange of technical information among the three countries as barter deals made in the interests of the national security of the U.S. at the discretion of the Secretaries of State and Defence, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. 9/

#### Consultation on the World Situation

4. Apart altogether from the fairly good prospects for a successful meeting of the C.P.C., Mr. Arneson said that he hoped we would be able to give Mr. Wrong instructions fairly soon which would permit him to accept Mr. Acheson's request that he take part in consultations with Mr. Paul Nitze and General Bradley. The State Department conceives of these consultations as being held at frequent (rather than at fixed) intervals and absolutely informal in character. When pressed as to the regularity with which such consultations might be held, he said that he thought they should be held at least once a week. It was suggested that, from our point of view, it might be preferable, in order to avoid any unnecessary waste of time involved in briefing the Canadian and United Kingdom Ambassadors separately, to have the discussions on the developing world situation held on a tripartite basis. However, Mr. Arneson feared that if any formal arrangements were made for meetings between representatives of the three countries, they would lose much of their value as purely informal candid exchanges of view. He expressed the hope that the consultations would be a "two-way street"

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and that Mr. Wrong would say what was in our minds as well as hearing what was in theirs. There was a danger, he thought, that if the talks were to be on a tripartite bases, the two Ambassadors might come with advisors and fixed positions would be taken up by the three governments. What the State Department had in mind was much more informal and flexible and they were inclined to feel that this could be realized best on a bilateral basis. He agreed, however, that if the talks were to commence on a bilateral basis, the possibility of extending them to three-way discussions should not be excluded. On our side, it was agreed that we would not exclude the commencement of bilateral talks on this understanding.

5. Mr. Arneson went on to outline what kind of consultation the State Department had in mind. He said that at long last serious attention was being given in the Departments of State and Defence to an analysis of the world situation in terms of a catalogue listing the critical areas and situations all around the periphery of the Soviet bloc. Headway had already been made in discussions with the United Kingdom representatives on points of friction in Europe, and the State Department had found that the views of the United States and United Kingdom Governments on most of these points were close. No agreement had yet been reached, however, on the cataloguing of Far Eastern points of danger or on what could or should be done about them. We gathered that the United States study of this question is in a very preliminary stage at present. We pointed out that Canadian interests and knowledge were more limited in scope than those of either the United Kingdom or the United States, but we would be glad to discuss these questions with them, on the understanding that we might not, in all cases, have much to contribute.

6. Coming to the particular problem under discussion, of how to deal with the U.S. Strategic Air Command request for the use of facilities in Canada and for permission to overfly Canadian territory, Mr. Arneson said that the State Department's approach to the problem was necessarily conditioned by the constitutional inability of the President to enter into arrangements with any other government which would in effect give another government the right to veto the President's decision to use the bomb. The basic problem in broad

- 4 -

terms, as it seemed to the State Department, was of reaching agreement with the United Kingdom and Canadian Governments as to the seriousness of the overall world situation at a given time, rather than one of working out procedures for consultation or notification as to whether the bomb should be used in a given crisis.

7. If the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Canadian Governments had consulted frankly and freely on all possible circumstances which they could foresee in which the bomb might have to be used, the final decision of the United States Government could be taken on very short notice indeed. It might have to be taken while bombs were falling on Washington. Then there would be no question of delay for consultation or even for notification. From this extreme example, the spectrum of possibilities ranged all the way from a direct Soviet attack on a member of the North Atlantic Treaty to an attack by Soviet or satellite forces on United States troops outside the North Atlantic area. As we pointed out, we could not possibly agree in advance to regard any attack, even a direct Soviet attack on U.S. forces outside the North Atlantic area, as necessarily a reason for using atomic bombs. Mr. Arneson made it clear that no such automatic decisions in advance were being contemplated by the U.S. Government.

8. Recognizing frankly that in some cases the U.S. Government would automatically and immediately decide upon retaliation with atomic weapons, Mr. Arneson argued that it would be very difficult to reach an agreement in writing between the two governments as to where the line should be drawn. If we agreed that it was unrealistic to expect even prior notification in the case of an attack on the continental United States, would we be prepared to agree that notification without consultation was sufficient in the case of Soviet attack on a NAT member? -- or upon the forces of a member outside the North Atlantic area? Such questions, he realized, were almost impossible for us to answer. He wondered, therefore, if instead of trying to draw up a list of hypothetical contingencies, to which both governments would find it difficult to subscribe, it would not be preferable to proceed by means of frequent informal consultations such as he had described, rather than

...../5

- 5 -

attempting to negotiate a written agreement.

9. He also questioned the desirability of defining as sharply as our comments on the original U.S. proposals for a "canopy" agreement had indicated, the distinction between the deployment of bombs without nuclear components and the deployment of nuclear components. He explained that, although the decision to deploy nuclear components was set out in U.S. procedure as a separate step (requiring the separate authorization of the President on the recommendation of the Secretaries of State and Defence, and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission), officials in Washington concerned with such matters were coming more and more to the conclusion that the distinction between the deployment of bombs and the deployment of their nuclear components was not a very real one. He thought the military had to be trusted to respect the law that only the President could authorize the use of the bombs and he did not believe it was realistic to suspect that the military would attempt to trespass on this authority. Some people were much too fearful, he thought, about what would happen if the military were given custody of complete bombs which it was very desirable should be dispersed where they could not be knocked out at a single blow. The deployment of nuclear components meant a further state of readiness, and it was in the interests of all that the USSAC should be as ready as possible for any eventuality. Hours might be of great importance in the event of a crisis. He therefore hoped that we would not make too much of the distinction. We pointed out, however, that it nevertheless did represent the pen-ultimate stage in the President's decision to use the bomb and, as such, was of very considerable importance to us as an indication of the seriousness of the situation.

10. Mr. Arneson also asked whether it was our wish that questions of deployment of bombs and overflight of Canadian territory by the SAC should be handled through diplomatic rather than Service channels, to which we replied emphatically in the affirmative. With this he appeared to be quite in agreement.

11. After the conclusion of the meeting with you, Mr. Arneson remarked to the others that he wanted us to know that the State Department was on the same side of the fence as we were -- in favour of civil control over the military.

...../6

Comment

12. I am inclined to think that we were perhaps led into blurring the distinction between use of Canadian facilities and overflight of Canadian territory and strikes from bases in the U.S. or countries other than Canada.

R. A. MacKay.

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA

..... May 11, 1951.

No. D-1976 .....

50069-C-4  
8150

Sir,

I enclose the document (s) listed below.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

The High Commissioner for Canada,  
LONDON,  
England.

.....  
for the *Secretary of State for External Affairs.*

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

SUBJECT

Extract from the N. Y. Herald Tribune  
dated April 30, 1951.

The British and the Bomb

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA

..... May 11, ..... 1951 .....

No... D-1917 .....

50069-C-40
58   50

Sir,

I enclose the document (s) listed below.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

The Canadian Ambassador,  
WASHINGTON,  
D. C.

SECRET  
for the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT	SUBJECT
Extract from the <u>N. Y. Herald Tribune</u> dated April 30, 1951,	The British and the Bomb

UNCLASSIFIED

Ext. 140

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA

..... May 11, ..... 19 51, .....

No. D-864 .....

50069-0	-40
88	50

Sir,

I enclose the document (s) listed below.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

The Acting Permanent Representative  
of Canada to the United Nations,  
NEW YORK,  
N. Y.

*Secretary of State for External Affairs.*

for the

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT	SUBJECT
Extract from the <u>N. Y. Herald Tribune</u> dated April 30, 1951,	The British and the Bomb

*part file*  
**DUPLICATE**  
*ew*

50069-C-40	
Sub. 58	Filed...

May 10, 1951.

**DISARMAMENT AND THE *DUPLICATE***

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC ENERGY

*(This was  
note for  
Minister's  
Handbook)*

In January of 1950, in an effort to secure the admission of Communist China, Soviet delegates walked out of a number of United Nations bodies. Among these were the Commission for Conventional Armaments, and the group of six powers, (the five permanent members of the Security Council and Canada), which was carrying on talks in an effort to break the deadlock on atomic control. Since that time the Soviet boycott of these two bodies has continued, and throughout a year in which international relations have steadily deteriorated the continuing intransigence of Russian representatives has prevented any real discussion of the related problems of disarmament and atomic energy control.

On December 13, 1950, the General Assembly adopted a resolution, of which Canada was a co-sponsor, establishing a committee of twelve to examine a possible merger of the

- 2 -

Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments. While no great hope was held that this proposal would of itself afford a solution to the present deadlock in both existing Commissions, it was felt that joint consideration of the two subjects might offer a broader perspective. / The other members of the Security Council together with Canada comprise the membership of this Committee, which is called on to report to the next General Assembly.

To date the Committee has had three meetings, devoted to preliminary discussion and decisions concerning procedure. It has been decided that the chairmanship of the Committee should rotate, with continuity being maintained through the work of a Permanent Rapporteur. Prior to his sudden and untimely death in March, Mr. R. G. Riddell, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations, held this latter office.

. . . 3

- 3 -

It is too early yet to say what form the Committee's work will assume or what kind of report it is likely to submit to the General Assembly.

*Incorporated in U.N. Div  
Paper - see  
HBR*

Defence Liaison (1)/J. George/dtg

Ottawa, May 10, 1951.

*Secret*

MEMORANDUM FOR U.N. DIVISION

Disarmament and the International  
Control of Atomic Energy

*HBR*  
5.069-2-70  
58  
*Felt*

You asked us for a brief statement on this subject which you might include in Mr. Holmes' re-examination of the United Nations.

As background, the Note of May 10th which we have prepared for the Minister's Handbook will probably serve your purpose.

From the technical point of view, there is much more chance of successfully controlling atomic energy by international means than there is of effectively supervising disarmament. The process of making an atomic bomb is so complicated and difficult to conceal that it is technically feasible to achieve a higher degree of control than would be possible in limiting any other form of armament.

On the other hand, while the power of the West is predominately based on superiority in atomic weapons and the power of the Soviet Union on conventional arms and manpower, the possibility of reaching some kind of deal in striking the strategic balance naturally comes to mind. Indeed, as the Soviet stockpile of bombs grows, even though it may grow at a much slower rate than that of the United States, it will tend to neutralize the American stockpile when it reaches the point at which very grave damage could be inflicted on the U.S. should the Soviet Union decide to wage atomic warfare. If the possibility is considered that the time might come in a few years when the Americans would perhaps decide that although they could do much more damage to the Soviet Union, the enormous loss which they would suffer in retaliation would not make the game worth the candle, then it follows that the U.S. and her allies ~~must~~ *should* by that time have achieved something like a strategic balance with the

*Conceded*

*should*

- 2 -

Soviet bloc in conventional weapons alone, as atomic weapons in these circumstances might never be used.

X  
Granted this possibility, the U.S. may find that the advantages and disadvantages of using the bomb may, by say 1953 or 1954, be almost equal from a military, to say nothing of a political and moral, point of view. There are reports that this appreciation is already coming to be accepted by the U.K. and European governments who would of course suffer most immediately and directly from atomic warfare. There have been press reports that the U.K. Government is urging upon the U.S. Government a policy of not being the first to use atomic bombs against cities, though the tactical and retaliatory use of the bomb is admitted as legitimate. If such an appreciation were to become accepted in Washington, as it seems to be in London and elsewhere, it would give a new sense of urgency to breaking the deadlock in our negotiations with the Russians for the international control of atomic energy. Of course no real negotiations are possible at present, but should there be even a moderately satisfactory meeting of the Foreign Ministers and a negotiated settlement of the Korean War, a new opportunity for atomic negotiations may arise and should not be missed.

Nevertheless, it must be admitted with reluctance that there is no sign whatever that any concessions which could safely be made in the U.N. plan for the international control of atomic energy would bring the USSR to associate itself with the rest of the world in controlling atomic energy internationally. The prospects for breaking the long deadlock in the Atomic Energy Commission are very small and have not been materially improved by linking the U.N. discussion on disarmament with that of atomic energy. ~~From the point of view of the West, it is desirable that the subjects should be linked, so that if ever agreement is reached on the international control of atomic energy, it will not be reached in isolation, but as part of a bargain with the Soviet Union for general disarmament. Otherwise, the West would, by agreement on atomic energy control alone, be deprived of its greatest strategic asset with no corresponding reduction in Soviet strength.~~

X  
Agreement should

... 3  
However, it is desirable that the subjects should be linked. 000038

- 3 -

only

A great deal depends, ~~of course~~, on the timing of any possible negotiations in relation to the relative strategic strengths of the opposing blocs. But if atomic weapons are not successfully controlled internationally, there seems small likelihood of their being used for tactical purposes, ~~if at all~~, in the event of war. The analogy of gas in the last war is tempting but misleading, for a sudden use of gas by one side never offered the possibility presented by atomic weapons of knocking out the main industrial and administrative centres of a country in a few days. This is of course all the more reason for keeping constantly in mind the urgency for reaching some understanding on the international control of atomic energy. And if we are to negotiate from strength, the West should, in the atomic field, begin soon.

*[Handwritten mark]*

*[Handwritten mark]*

X

# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

FILE REF.	58	50
50067-2-40		

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Message To Be Sent	No. EX 1007	Date May 8, 1951	For Communications Office Use Only SENT -- MAY 8 - 1951
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EN CLAIR  
CODE  
CYPHER *aut.*

Degree of Priority  
**IMMEDIATE**

ORIGINATOR  
Sig. J. George

Typed: dtg

Div. Def. Liaison (1)

Local Tel. 3795

APPROVED BY  
Sig. *[Signature]*  
Typed: *[Signature]*

Is This Message Likely To Be Published  
Yes ( ) No ( )

Internal Distribution:

U.S.S.E.A.  
*copy #3*

Done *ML*

Date *May 9/51*

Copies Referred To:

Done *ML*

Date *May 9/51*

Following for Wrong from Heeney. Begins.  
Your WA-1908 of May 7, U.S. Strategic Air Command Projects.  
Unfortunately it will not be possible for Arneson to see the Minister on Saturday morning as Mr. Pearson will be out of town. However Ritchie, MacKay, George and I will be glad to have a talk. I hope Arneson will be in a position to present Mr. Acheson's views. Ends.

UNDER- SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

RECEIVED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AFFAIRS  
1951 MAY 8 PM 4:06

DATE 304 2/21  
DOME 11/8

Copies Referred To:  
DATE 304 2/21  
DOME 11/8

P.S.A.E.V. 1

SECRET - SECRETARIA OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Internal Distribution:

YES ( ) NO ( )  
Priority to be furnished  
in this message

Typed:  
Sgt. [Signature]  
APPROVED BY

Postal Tel 3382

DIA Det. Division (1)

Typed: Sgt

Sgt. J. George  
ORIGINATOR

IMMEDIATE  
Degree of Priority

CARRIER CODE  
EM CIVIL  
Message to be sent

Mr. Anderson, a telegram from  
Anderson will be to a position to present  
and I will be glad to make a talk. I hope  
of some. However, HICOTE, MCKAY, GEORGE  
SHERLOCK, MORTIMER and Mr. BENTON will be out  
today for Anderson to see the Minister on  
unofficially. It will not be con-  
sidered as a project.  
Your MV-1208 of May 2, P.S. strategic  
bottoming for along from HENRY. BEHNS.

NO. DATE MAY 8 1951  
SENT MAY 8 1951  
FOR COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE USE ONLY

WASHINGTON, D.C.  
TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR  
FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TOP SECRET  
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

OUTGOING  
MESSAGE FORM

LIFE REL. 1

Copy No. 1 of four copies

*Mr. George*

Defence Liaison (1)/J. George/elb

Ottawa, May 8, 1951

TOP SECRET

*see memo*

*File 5*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY

50069-C-40
58 [unclear] ✓ [unclear]

U.S. Strategic Air Command Projects

You may already have seen Mr. Wrong's message WA-1908, copy attached, suggesting that arrangements be made for Mr. Arneson to have a talk with the Minister on Saturday morning. If this is to be arranged, we should let Washington know immediately, so that Arneson may have a chance to get Mr. Acheson's instructions today. To save time, we have drafted a telegram for you to send to Washington on the assumption that you agree that it would be desirable for Arneson to see the Minister.

*M H [unclear]*

Defence Liaison Division (1)

*8.5.24/051*

# TELETYPE

COPY NO. 1 OF 8 COPIES

From THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

To THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TOP SECRET

CYPHER - AUTO

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1951.

*Refered*

MINISTER #3 WA - 1908

UNDR SEC #4

D UNDR SEC #5

A, UNDR SEC'S. #6

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**SECRET**

50069-e-40  
11 5-2

*In Secy.  
Will you arrange  
reply for  
meet Arneson  
Sat. for 11:15 a.m.  
a. home  
for rep to  
may 8 AM*

Top Secret. Following for Heeneey from Wrong,  
Begins:

Your letter D-1819 of May 4th. United States  
Strategic Air Command projects.

1. I have discussed the contents of your letter  
with Arneson, who hopes to be able to consult his principals  
before leaving for Chalk River on Wednesday morning. He  
was personally pleased with the proposals made in your letter.

2. He is ready to remain in Ottawa until after lunch  
on Saturday, and I think it would be useful for you to  
arrange, if possible, for him to have a talk with the  
Minister, and also to meet with perhaps you, Ritchie and  
MacKay, as well as Ignatieff who will be going to Ottawa  
with him from Chalk River on Friday evening. Will you try  
to arrange this?

3. One question which might be discussed with him  
is whether it is desirable (on the assumption that agreement  
is reached on the basis set forth in your letter) to make  
a written agreement or to rely upon an informal understanding.  
Ends.

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8 MAY 1951

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1951 MAY 11 AM 10 26

[Faint, mostly illegible text, likely the beginning of a letter or report.]

[Faint, mostly illegible text, continuing the document's content.]

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[Faint, illegible text, possibly a signature or reference code.]

[Faint, illegible text, possibly a signature or reference code.]

OUTGOING

REF. 58 50  
 50069-C-70  
 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
 TOP SECRET

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: The Canadian Ambassador, Washington, D.C.

*Don't*  
 For Communications Office Use Only  
 SENT -- MAY 4 - 1951  
 TOP SECRET

Message To Be Sent

EN CLAIR   
 CODE   
 CYPHER *auto*

Degree of Priority

ORIGINATOR

Sig. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Typed: J. George/mr.  
 Div. Def. Liaison  
 Local Tel. 3795

APPROVED BY

Sig. *[Signature]*  
 Typed: \_\_\_\_\_

Is This Message Likely To Be Published  
 Yes ( ) No ( )

Internal Distribution:  
 U.S.S.A.A. *[initials]*

Done *mk.*  
 Date *May 5/51*

Copies Referred To:

No. *EX-977* Date May 4, 1951.

Following for Wrong from Heeney,  
 Begins:

Your Message WA-1853 of May 3. United States Strategic Air Command Projects.

1. My reply will be sent to you in this afternoon's bag. It has been cleared with the Minister and the Prime Minister. Mr. Claxton has been out of town and I shall send you by teletype any comments he may have on his return this evening. Meantime take no action on my letter until you hear from me.

2. For our part, we should be glad to know what the Americans think of our counter-proposals (my letter D-1407 of April 2).

~~3. I have been thinking of suggesting to the Minister that he visit Washington to discuss this subject with Mr. Acheson (after you have acted on the reply being sent you and after you have received American views on our counter-proposals). Such a visit might bring the negotiations to a head. What is your opinion?~~

Ends.

Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Done *mk.*  
 Date *May 5/51*

Defence Liaison (1/J. George/dg/mr)

Ext. 181B

*Referred to Mr. Robertson*  
FILE COPY

OTTAWA FILE
No. 50069-e-40
58 50
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

Letter No. D-1819  
Date May 4, 1951.

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: The Canadian Ambassador, Washington, D.C.

Reference: Your letters No. 1164 of April 10 and No. 1220 of April 13.

Subject: U.S. Strategic Air Command Projects.

Copies Referred To
No. of Enclosures
Post File
No.

1. We have been considering carefully your reports of the reactions of Mr. Acheson and Mr. Arneson to our preliminary comments on the proposed "canopy" agreement.

2. Mr. Acheson's suggestion that there should be regular consultations between Sir Oliver Franks and Mr. Nitze, and his offer to make similar arrangements for you, is a most interesting one. We agree that continuing consultations, such as you describe in paragraphs 3 and 4 of your letter, could provide a valuable additional source of information on the world situation and on the circumstances which might lead to consideration of the use of atomic weapons. You may tell Mr. Acheson that you would be glad to participate. If you think it necessary or desirable, you may indicate that, in authorizing you to attend, the Canadian Government would not, of course, be accepting any implicit commitments of any kind.

3. In reply to Mr. Arneson's enquiry as to whether we think such consultations should be on a bilateral or a trilateral basis, it seems to us there might be advantages in trilateral discussions. As we assume that such consultations would be entirely private and that even the existence of such meetings would not be known to others (such as the French), we would see no reason for asking Mr. Nitze or General Bradley to go over with you separately the same ground as they were covering with Sir Oliver Franks. Furthermore three-way discussions might afford less temptation perhaps to the Americans to discriminate in any way between the information made available to us and that going to the United Kingdom.

4. We should like it to be quite clear that the general discussions Mr. Acheson is proposing would not take the place of, but would be in addition to, the specific consultations outlined in my letter No. D-1407 of April 2. We welcome the opportunity of your having continuing discussions with Mr. Nitze, but we trust that it is understood that we want nevertheless to be consulted (whatever the form of words used) through diplomatic channels at the highest political level on:

- (a) possible strikes from bases in Canada;
- (b) storage of fissionable components on Canadian territory;
- (c) overflight of Canadian territory by planes carrying fissionable components.

- 2 -

5. It may happen, of course, that specific consultations, of the kind mentioned above, would be begun through the same channels as the general consultations proposed by Mr. Acheson. We take it, however, that specific requests through diplomatic channels would normally be addressed to you by Mr. Arneson.

6. We are willing to modify the position set forth in my letter No. D-1407, in the two respects you have recommended. In paragraph 11 of your letter No. 1164, you ask whether we do not think it would be reasonable for the Canadian Government "to give prior consent in advance to strikes with atomic weapons from Goose Bay or Harmon Field in the event of a clearly-established Soviet air attack on North American territory, subject to as much prior notification as might be possible in the circumstances." The Minister has discussed this point with the Prime Minister and Mr. Claxton, and it has been agreed that we would not object to immediate retaliation by the U.S. Strategic Air Command with all available means and from all available bases, in the event of a major outright Soviet attack against continental North America. In these circumstances, we would not insist on prior consultation, but would, of course, wish to have as much prior notification as possible, provided communications between Washington and Ottawa had not been severed.

7. You may also inform Mr. Arneson that we are prepared to agree (as an exception to the P.J.B.D. Recommendation of June, 1948) that suitable Service channels should be used to clear the deployment of atomic weapons without fissionable components, to bases in Canada used by the U.S. SAC, and to bases in Alaska requiring the overflight of Canadian territory en route. However, as stated in paragraph 4 above, we still expect diplomatic channels to be used for clearing any movement of fissionable components to bases in Canada or over Canadian territory.

8. I hope that you will be able to let us have before long the State Department's comments on the substance of our proposals summarized in Paragraph 4 of this letter, as modified in Paragraphs 6 and 7.

Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

COPY NO. \_\_\_ OF TWO COPIES

Defence Liaison (1)/J. George/DG

Ottawa, May 4, 1951.

50069-240  
58 ✓

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM TO THE UNDER-SECRETARY

U.S. Strategic Air Command  
Projects

2

Attached for signature is the letter you requested to Mr. Wrong, and a telegram asking his opinion, if you wish to do so, of your suggestion to the Minister that he might visit Washington to bring the negotiations to a head.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET**

*M A Warkof*  
Defence Liaison (1).

TELETYPE

COPY NO. / of 8  
copies

From THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

To THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TOP SECRET

CYPHER - AUTO

WASHINGTON, 3 May 1951.

WA-1853

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50798-40  
41 50

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DISSEMINATION TO SECRET  
RESTRICT A SECRET

Summ.

Top Secret. Following for Heeney from Wrong,

Begins:

United States strategic air command projects.

May I expect soon to receive a reply to the questions raised in my letters Nos. 1220 of April 13th and 1164 of April 10th? Ends.

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CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

4 MAY 1951



Defence Liaison (1)/J. George / DG

Ottawa, May 3, 1951.

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY *jm*

The British and the Bomb

Attached is a memorandum which you may wish to send to the Minister drawing his attention to Stewart Alsop's recent article on the difference of opinion between Britain and America which is developing over the way in which atomic weapons should be used, if the need arises.

*M. A. Washof*  
Defence Liaison (1).

*Sent to  
Minister  
4.5.51*

*4.5.24/55)*

Ottawa, May 3, 1951.

SECRET

SEEN  
L. R. PEARSON

MAY - 5 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

The British and the Bomb

If you have not already seen it, you will be interested in the attached article by Stewart Alsop, which appeared in the N.Y. Herald Tribune of April 30th, on the rift between the British and American thinking on how to use the bomb if war should come. According to Alsop, the British believe the bomb should only be used in a tactical role or against special isolated targets and communications. Only in the unlikely event that the Soviet Union made the first atomic attack against cities, would the British consider retaliation in kind justified. To start atomic warfare against Soviet cities would, the British believe, be the surest way to unify the Soviet people, as the Germans made the mistake of doing in the last war.

Alsop regrets that the U.S. Government will almost certainly reject the British view, which he is inclined to write off as simply the natural result of the exposure of British cities to atomic attack. He points out, however, in his conclusion, that, by the time General Eisenhower has succeeded in building real strength in Europe, U.S. strategic concepts may have to be completely reexamined. This is close to the view we expressed in a memorandum to you a year ago that, when the strength of the West in conventional armaments had increased, it would be possible to hold the balance without the present almost total reliance on the U.S. Strategic Air Command. Indeed, the advantages and disadvantages of using the bomb may by then be almost equal from a military, to say nothing of a political and moral, point of view. If such an appreciation were to become accepted in Washington, as it seems to be in London and elsewhere, it would give a new sense of urgency to breaking the deadlock in our negotiations with the Russians for the international control of atomic energy. Of course no real negotiations are possible at present, but should there be even a moderately satisfactory meeting of the Foreign Ministers and a negotiated settlement of the Korean war, a new opportunity for atomic negotiations may arise and should not be missed.

*D.H.*  
A.D.P.H.

50069-C-40  
58

5-8-12(55)

4.5.24(1.1)

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

U.S. Strategic Air Command  
Projects

50069-2-40 ✓  
~~DOWNGRADED~~  
RESULT A SECRET  
SECRET

Since we last discussed the U.S. request for a "canopy" agreement which would cover the use of facilities in Canada by the U.S. Strategic Air Command Mr. Wrong has given our comments to the State Department and had their preliminary reactions. Mr. Acheson has not expressed any opinion on the substance of our proposals but has made an interesting suggestion which goes beyond them. He has proposed that Mr. Wrong should be included in arrangements which have been made for General Bradley and Mr. Nitze (the Director of the Planning Staff of the State Department) to discuss with Sir Oliver Franks from time to time the world situation which might, in the words used by President Truman to Mr. Attlee, lead to the use of the bomb. I think it would be advantageous from our point of view for Mr. Wrong to be included in these talks. We might be told more if he were to join in the discussions with Sir Oliver Franks rather than having separate talks with Mr. Nitze and General Bradley.

We have prepared a draft reply to Mr. Wrong, copy attached, and I should be grateful for your instructions and any comments you may wish to make. I believe this delicate matter is developing satisfactorily from our point of view.

Copies of the previous correspondence are attached for convenience of reference. Would you be good enough to return them to us.

I am sending a similar memorandum to Mr. Claxton asking for his comments.

*I think this  
all we can hope for  
M.H.*

*F. Pearson*

May 2, 1951.

COPY NO. \_\_\_ OF 2 COPIES

TOP SECRET

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REBUT A SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CLAXTON

U.S. Strategic Air Command  
Projects

Since we last discussed the U.S. request for a "canopy" agreement which would cover the use of facilities in Canada by the U.S. Strategic Air Command, Mr. Wrong has given his comments to the State Department and had their preliminary reactions. Mr. Acheson has not expressed any opinion on the substance of our proposals but has made an interesting suggestion which goes somewhat beyond them. He has proposed that Mr. Wrong should be included in arrangements which have been made for General Bradley and Mr. Nitze (the Director of the Planning Staff of the State Department) to discuss with Sir Oliver Franks from time to time the world situation which might, in the words used by President Truman to Mr. Attlee, lead to the use of the bomb. I think it would be advantageous from our point of view for Mr. Wrong to be included in these talks. We might be told more if he were to join in the discussions with Sir Oliver Franks rather than having separate talks with Mr. Nitze and General Bradley.

*29.5.51  
no canopy  
Wright  
LSP  
J*

We have prepared a draft reply to Mr. Wrong, copy attached, and I should be grateful for any comments you may wish to make. I believe this delicate matter is developing satisfactorily from our point of view.

Copies of the previous correspondence are attached for convenience of reference. Would you be good enough to return them to us.

I am sending a similar memorandum to the Prime Minister asking for his instructions and comments.

*F. Pearson*

May 2, 1951.

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TOP SECRET

Ottawa, April 30, 1951.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

U.S. Strategic Air Command Projects

I showed you earlier in the week copies of Mr. Wrong's most recent letters on the State Department's reactions to our preliminary comments on the proposed "canopy" agreement.

.....  
In accordance with your suggestions, we have prepared a draft reply, attached in three copies. You said that you would probably want to speak to the Prime Minister and Mr. Claxton about it.

*A.D.P.H.*

A.D.P.H.

.....  
Attached also are copies of the previous correspondence with Mr. Wrong.

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REBOOT A SECRET

*enclosures*  
*Handed to Minister*  
*Algo* *Dr*

Defence Liaison Div. (1)/J. George/DG

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, May 2, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY *n*

50069-C-4  
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U.S. Strategic Air Command  
Projects

3

Attached as requested is a memorandum for the Minister with memoranda for his signature to the Prime Minister and Mr. Claxton asking for their comments on our draft reply to Mr. Wrong.

While I think our negotiations with the Americans are going satisfactorily, if somewhat slowly, we should perhaps point out that the State Department have not so far commented on the substance of our counter-proposals.

*M. W. ...*  
Defence Liaison Division (1).

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SECRET & SENSITIVE

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SEEN

L. B. PEARSON

Ottawa, May 2, 1951.

50069-C-40

*st*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

U.S Strategic Air Command  
Projects

2

As you have requested we have prepared for your signature memoranda to the Prime Minister and Mr. Claxton asking for their comments on our draft reply to Mr. Wrong.

*perhaps you could hand these to P.M. & Mr. Claxton*

*A.D.P.H.*  
A. D. P. H.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
RÉVÉLÉ À SECRET**

3.5.43  
9-5-16(SS)

## DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Subject A-bombDate APR 30 1951 Publication N. Y. HERALD TRIBUNE**MATTER OF FACT**By **STEWART ALSOP****The British and the Bomb**

WASHINGTON.

The threatened rupture of the Anglo-American alliance, dramatized by Gen. MacArthur's recall and Aneurin Bevan's resignation, has much deeper roots than most people realize. For the fact is that the British planners and military chiefs are more and more inclined to challenge the basic concept on which American strategy rests, and thus in a sense, to challenge also the basis of the Anglo-American alliance.

The heart of the matter is that American strategy is now squarely based on atomic bombing of great population centers—and the British Isles themselves are fatally vulnerable to just this form of attack. This is certainly one reason why the British have already proposed, at least informally, that if war comes, American atomic bombs should not be used against Soviet or satellite cities, except in retaliation for Soviet attacks on American or Allied cities.

**British Thesis**

The British are urging, that, unless the Soviets first use their atomic stockpile for population bombing, the American stockpile should be used only against communication lines, special isolated targets, and tactically against enemy troops in the field. This proposal is based on the assumption that even in war the Russians probably would not use their bombs against allied cities if they knew this would cause devastating retaliation against Russian cities.

This may be wishful thinking, but in the terribly exposed position in which the British find themselves, wishful thinking is natural. The British also advance a second, and very powerful argument for their proposal. This is based on a point made by the great American expert on Russia, George Kennan, in a recent issue of "Foreign Affairs."

"We in the outside world," wrote Kennan, "... will never prevail in any struggle against the Soviet power unless the Russian people are our willing allies. That goes for peace, and it goes for war."

**Fatal Error Seen**

The British argue—and Kennan would doubtless agree—that the Russian people are not going to be "our willing allies" after 30,000,000 or so Russians have been killed by our atomic bombs. They argue that mass population bombing, except in retaliation, would be as fatal an error as Hitler's savagery in Russia, cementing the people around the regime, and thus ending all hope of quick or decisive victory.

Unfortunately, there are very cogent reasons why the British proposal will almost certainly be rejected. For one thing, there is

the nature of the bomb itself. In certain special circumstances, the atomic bomb can undoubtedly be used effectively as a tactical weapon. Yet the brutal fact is that the atomic bomb is inherently suited, not for use against isolated targets and troops in the field, but for use against the massed populations of great cities.

**Effects of the Bomb**

In Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the three primary effects of the bomb—blast, heat flash and radiation—caused only a small fraction of the casualties. The great bulk of casualties are caused by the city itself, when blast collapses buildings on top of people, and when both blast and heat flash start terrible fires. The cruel truth is that the atomic bomb is only a really revolutionary weapon when it is used in this way—to cause great cities to destroy their inhabitants.

Used in any other way, the bomb is no longer a decisive weapon. Heavy industrial machinery is not essentially damaged by the blast of a modern bomb, even under a mile from ground zero, the point above which the bomb is exploded. A soldier in a slit trench would almost certainly live to fight another day only a mile from ground zero, and a tank would remain essentially intact well under half a mile from ground zero.

Even assuming that many hundreds of bombs were available for tactical use, or against isolated targets—and each bomb represents a very heavy investment—the effects could not be decisive. A weapon with a killing radius of not much more than a mile cannot stop a numerically superior army advancing across a fluid front of many hundreds of miles.

**Would Cut Stockpile**

Thus to accept the British proposal would be the equivalent of very sharply reducing the American atomic stockpile. And the American atomic stockpile is the central military asset of the West, and the only real existing deterrent to Soviet aggression.

The fact is that the follies of past disarmament have reduced this country and its allies to total reliance on a willingness to use the atomic bomb, in the most ruthless way, for the awful purpose for which it is inherently suited. Yet it should not surprise us that the British, and our other European allies, are not precisely eager to join us in a crusade which would see their countries either occupied or devastated. And if there is no war soon, and Gen. Eisenhower succeeds in his mission of building real strength in Europe, the time may indeed come when it will be well to re-examine a strategic concept based wholly on a weapon likely by its very nature to defeat all our purposes.

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Copy No. 1 of four copies

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Defence Liaison/J. George/bw/elb

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, April 20, 1951.

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**REBUT A SECRET**

Letter to Washington

Your letters No. 1164 of April 10

and No. 1220 of April 13, U.S. Strategic Air Command  
Projects.

- 
1. We have been considering carefully your reports of the reactions of Mr. Acheson and Mr. Arneson to our preliminary comments on the proposed "canopy" agreement.
  2. Mr. Acheson's suggestion that there should be regular consultations between Sir Oliver Franks and Mr. Nitze, and his offer to make similar arrangements for you, is a most interesting one. We agree that continuing consultations, such as you describe in paragraphs 3 and 4 <sup>of</sup> your letter, would provide a valuable additional source of information on the world situation and on the circumstances which might lead to consideration of the use of atomic weapons. You may tell Mr. Acheson that you would be glad to participate at any time. If you think it desirable, you may indicate informally that, in authorizing you to attend, the Canadian Government would not, of course, be accepting any implicit commitments of any kind.
  3. In reply to Mr. Arneson's enquiry as to whether we think such consultations should be on a bilateral or a trilateral basis, it seems to us there would be distinct advantages in trilateral discussions. As we would assume that such consultations

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would be held entirely privately and that even the existence of such meetings would not be known to others (such as the French), we would see no reason for asking Mr. Nitze or General Bradley to go over with you separately the same ground as they were covering with Sir Oliver Franks when you might usefully join in ~~the~~ three-way discussions.

4. We should like, however, to be quite clear that the general discussions which Mr. Acheson is proposing would not take <sup>the</sup> place of, but would be in addition to, the specific consultations outlined in my letter No. D-1407 of April 2. While we welcome the opportunity of your having continuing discussions with Mr. Nitze, we trust that it is understood that we want nevertheless to be consulted (whatever the form of words used) <sup>through diplomatic channels</sup> in each case at the highest political level on:

- (a) possible strikes from bases in Canada;
- (b) storage of fissionable components on Canadian territory;
- (c) overflight of Canadian territory by planes carrying fissionable components.

5. It may, of course, happen that specific consultations, of the kind mentioned above, would be begun through the same channels as the general consultations proposed by Mr. Acheson, but we take it that specific requests to be handled through diplomatic channels will normally be addressed to <sup>you</sup> by Mr. Arneson.

6. We are prepared, however, to modify our position, as set forth in my letter No. D-1407, in two respects which you have recommended. In paragraph 11 of your letter No. 1164, you ask whether

- 3 -

we do not think it would be reasonable for the Canadian Government "to give prior consent in advance to strikes with atomic weapons from Goose Bay or Harmon Field in the event of a clearly-established Soviet air attack on North American territory, subject to as much prior notification as might be possible in the circumstances." The Minister has discussed this point with the Prime Minister and Mr. Claxton and has agreed that we would not object to immediate retaliation by the U.S. Strategic Air Command with all available means and from all available bases, in the event of a major outright Soviet attack against continental North America. In these circumstances, we would not insist on prior consultations, but would, of course, request as much prior notification as possible, provided communications between Washington and Ottawa had not been severed.

7. You may also inform Mr. Arneson that we are prepared to agree, <sup>as an exception to</sup> ~~despite~~ the P.J.B.D. Recommendation of June, 1948, that suitable Service channels should be used to clear the deployment of atomic weapons without fissionable components, to bases in Canada used by the U.S. SAC, <sup>and to</sup> bases in Alaska requiring the overflight of Canadian territory en route. <sup>as stated in paragraph 4 above,</sup> However, we still expect diplomatic channels to be used for clearing any movement of fissionable components to ~~these~~ <sup>in Canada</sup> bases, or over Canadian territory.

8. I hope that you will be able to let us have before long the State Department's comments on the substance of our proposals summarized in Paragraph 4 of this letter, as modified in Paragraphs 6 and 7.

~~Mr. George~~

Defence Liaison(1)/J.George/bw

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, April 17, 1951.

~~H. Heney~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

U.S. Strategic Air Command Projects

....

Attached for your consideration is a memorandum sending the Minister the two recent letters from Mr. Wrong on this subject.

Copies attached.  
DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
17.4.51

RAM

Defence Liaison Division(1).

Keenan to the Minister personally  
may I have copies tomorrow?

17.4

17.4

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17.4.20(09)

Copy No. 1 of 4 Copies

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FILED

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, April 17, 1951.

Seen by  
H. Pearson

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

U.S. Strategic Air Command Projects

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We have had two further reports from Mr. Wrong on this subject, Letters No. 1164 of April 10 and No. 1220 of April 13, attached. The first simply reports that Mr. Wrong and Mr. Ignatieff have given Mr. Arneson of the State Department our comments on the proposed U.S. "canopy" agreement and contains in paragraph 11 a suggestion from Mr. Wrong for modifying our position in the case of an outright Soviet air attack upon North America. He thinks in these circumstances it would be reasonable for the "Canadian Government to give prior consent in advance to strikes with atomic weapons from Goose Bay or Harmon Field in the event of a clearly-established Soviet air attack on North American territory, subject to as much prior notification as might be possible in the circumstances". In the original draft of our reply, we had taken more or less this line believing that, in the event of an outright Soviet attack upon North America, it would be inconceivable that a general war could be avoided.

While we were preparing a draft reply for your consideration to the first letter from Mr. Wrong, his further letter arrived reporting Mr. Acheson's reactions to our preliminary comments. This is a very interesting letter and shows that we are now getting to the heart of the matter. Consultations have already begun between

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- 2 -

Sir Oliver Franks and Mr. Nitze (who took George Kennan's place as Head of the Planning Staff of the State Department) on the developing international situation and on the conditions which might lead to a general war. Mr. Acheson has suggested that similar arrangements for consultations might be made with Mr. Wrong. Mr. Wrong would like to know as soon as possible whether you would agree that he should participate in such consultations. He would also like to be able to inform the State Department that Service channels should be used to clear the deployment to Goose Bay of atomic weapons without nuclear components, and over-flights of Canadian territory by aircraft carrying these weapons to and from Alaska. Requests for these facilities are at present made through Diplomatic channels, as provided in the P.J.B.D. Recommendation of June, 1948.

I should be grateful for your guidance as to the line you think we should take in replying to both these letters.



A.D.P.H.

Ext. 182A

*Checked*  
P17 = 4  
Mr. Howe #5  
Mr. Croxson #6  
Mr. Roberts #2

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OTTAWA FILE  
No. 50069-C40

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
TOP SECRET

Letter No. 1220.....

Date... April 13, 1951.....

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference... My Letter No. 1164 of April 10, 1951.....

Subject: United States Strategic Air Command Projects.....

Copies Referred To.....
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1. Mr. Arneson came to the Embassy on Thursday, April 12th, to tell Mr. Ignatieff and myself about Mr. Acheson's reactions to your preliminary comments on the proposed "canopy" agreement. He said that Mr. Matthews, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, and Mr. Nitze, Director of the Planning Staff in the State Department, had been present when he had reported to Mr. Acheson.

2. After informing Mr. Acheson of the points made in your Letter No. D-1407 of April 2nd, he had repeated to Mr. Acheson the comments which he had made to me on the meaning and extent of consultation envisaged in the Truman-Attlee communique as it is understood by the United States Government. Mr. Acheson had approved his interpretation as given to us last Saturday.

3. I learned from Mr. Arneson that Mr. Acheson was visited earlier this week by Sir Oliver Franks, who wished to have an informal talk with him on the same question. Sir Oliver had brought with him an appreciation by the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff of the various circumstances which might give rise to consideration of the use of atomic weapons. He had said that the United Kingdom Government fully recognized that there was a wide variation in the shades of meaning which could be ascribed to the term "consultation"; he realized that the U.S. Government could not accept a definition "at the extreme end of the spectrum" which would always involve obtaining consent from the U.K. Government before atomic weapons were used. Sir Oliver had wondered whether it would be possible to work out some clarification of the circumstances in which atomic weapons might be used. Mr. Acheson had told him that it would be difficult for the U.S. Government to adopt any rigid definition of these circumstances, and had gone on to suggest that the most useful way in which progress could be made was to continue on a regular basis the consultations which had already begun between Sir Oliver and Mr. Nitze (in which General Bradley has participated from time to time) on the developing international situation and on the conditions which might lead to a general war. Mr. Acheson had recognized that it would be difficult to arrive at a joint agreed appreciation of every situation examined, but thought that such continuing consultation, carried on through the diplomatic channel and aided with such military advice as might be appropriate, would result in a common understanding of international dangers as they arise. They would also provide a means of giving prior notification to the United Kingdom of any circumstances which might give rise to the use of atomic weapons by the United States.

Letter No. 1220, page 2.

TOP SECRET

4. Mr. Arneson said that Mr. Acheson had instructed him to offer to us informally the same arrangement as had been offered to the United Kingdom. As to the method of consultation, Mr. Arneson suggested that there might be periodic meetings between Mr. Nitze and myself, at which General Bradley or others might at times be present. These meetings could be arranged on a tripartite basis, but difficulties might be foreseen with the French Government, and possibly with other signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty, should it become known that such consultations were being carried on between the U.K., the U.S. and Canada. Mr. Arneson therefore suggested that it might be better if there were two sets of bilateral consultations of a continuing nature. Mr. Acheson would like to have our reaction to this proposal.

5. I asked Mr. Arneson how this proposal was related to the proposed "canopy" agreement; consultations on world-wide politico-strategic issues might fulfil the agreement to keep Canada as well as the United Kingdom "at all times informed of developments" which might "call for the use of the atomic bomb", but they would not cover the use of Canadian territory for specific activities in connection with the possible delivery of atomic weapons. Mr. Arneson replied that the United States authorities would still prefer to have an agreement which would permit the United States Air Force to do specific things in certain emergency situations, such as the employment by the Strategic Air Command of the facilities at Goose Bay, subject to prior notification of actual use and subject also to the continuing consultation on the developing international situation.

6. As to the different circumstances which might give rise to the use of atomic weapons, Mr. Arneson pointed out that in the event of a direct attack on any part of the North American Continent it would almost certainly be necessary for the President to order immediate retaliation. I think that we must foresee the possibility of communications being interrupted between Ottawa and Washington under the most extreme conditions of direct attack on this continent. It may therefore be necessary to agree, in advance, that in such an event immediate retaliation on the part of the United States would be justified for the purposes of self-defence under the North Atlantic Treaty or the Charter of the United Nations.

7. Mr. Arneson remarked that the British Government was interested rather in the conditions giving rise to the use of atomic weapons than in the bases from which the first atomic strikes were delivered. It was possible that the first strikes would be by carrier-borne aircraft.

8. Mr. Arneson also touched upon the question of the deployment of nuclear and non-nuclear components of atomic weapons. It could be expected that the Strategic Air Command may wish to deploy to Goose Bay non-nuclear components, i.e., the weapon without its nuclear core, as had been done last summer. He asked what procedure we would wish to be followed. I suggested that pending a more general agreement such requests should be submitted through me by the State Department, in sufficient time to enable Ministers to give the matter proper consideration. He said/

Letter No. 1220, page 3.

TOP SECRET

said that the possibility should not be overlooked that the Strategic Air Command might also have to deploy nuclear cores in advance of any decision for their use. He explained that constant attention was required to keep atomic bombs in readiness for use because of the electrical equipment powered by batteries which is an essential part of the mechanism. The fitting of the nuclear cores is a comparatively simple operation which would be done at the last moment. (It was actually done in the air after take-off in the case of the first bomb dropped at Hiroshima.) It was possible that the nuclear cores might not be distributed to bases such as those at Goose Bay and in the United Kingdom in advance of a decision to employ the weapons; on the other hand, it might be thought desirable to have enough material on the spot to enable the weapons to be completed without awaiting the arrival of cores from the United States. He proposes to have further discussions with the U.S. Air Force and others on this question.

9. In conclusion Mr. Arneson proposed that we continue an exchange of views on these issues through the same channels. He repeated his hope that the lack of a general covering agreement would not impede the execution of any arrangements that might be desired by the Strategic Air Command, with of course the approval of the President, to deploy to Goose Bay atomic weapons without the fissionable elements. I mentioned to him that I had heard that the U.S. Air Force desired to secure facilities for use in the event of war at Torbay and Gander in addition to the facilities at Goose and Harmon Field. He proposes to find out from the Air Force whether their desire to have access to these fields is related to the use of atomic weapons.

10. The main point on which I should like your views as soon as possible is whether it is agreed that I should participate in continuing consultations of the character outlined in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this letter. If these consultations were to be conducted frankly and freely, they should provide a valuable additional source of information on the world situation and the policies of the United States, and I believe that we could avoid any risk that they would give rise to a belief in Washington that the Canadian Government was accepting implicit military commitments through them. I should also like to be able to inform Mr. Arneson that we are prepared to agree that suitable Service channels should be used to clear the deployment to Goose Bay of atomic weapons without nuclear components and similar arrangements, such as the over-flight of Canadian territory by aircraft carrying these weapons from the United States to Alaska.


*W. J. Arneson*

-2-

I am writing to Arnold to-day, sending him the same papers as are attached hereto, and asking that he prepare himself to speak to Mr. Dulles on short notice.

Yours sincerely,

R. A. MacKAY

  
**Jules Léger**  
Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

cc. on 50028-BX-40 ←

cc. for Mr. Norman Robertson

*Done  
Mar. 16  
mmr.*

50028-BX-40  
616

OTTAWA, March 16, 1955

TOP SECRET

*Orig. on 50030-AB-4-40*

Dear Arnold,

Since I last wrote you on January 25 on the knotty problem of "alert" procedures there have been certain further developments that you should know of. Sir Norman Brook's committee, mentioned in my letter, produced the attached working paper, which was given to us at the Commonwealth Conference. You will get a good idea of what has happened since by reading the following telegrams, also attached, which I have exchanged with Norman Robertson since my return to Ottawa:

His No. 195 of February 14;  
My No. 290 of February 17;  
His Nos. 249, 250 and 251 of  
February 28; and  
My No. 411 of March 10.

As you will see, we hope to receive a revised version of the United Kingdom paper shortly. If we find it satisfactory, as we have every reason to expect, then we shall ask you to approach Mr. Dulles, in the manner agreed upon in these telegrams, to say that we consider the time has come for tripartite discussions in Washington. Please prepare yourself to do this on what may prove to be rather short notice. Meanwhile, it seems to me, there

Arnold D. P. Heeney, Esq., Q.C.,  
Canadian Ambassador,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Defence Liaison(1)/J.George/bw

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, April 13, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

U.S. Strategic Air Command Projects

50069-C-4  
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Attached for your consideration is a memorandum sending the Minister Mr. Wrong's letter and proposing that we agree to his suggestion that, in the event of a clearly-established Soviet air attack on North American territory, the Canadian Government would not insist on being consulted before a counter-attack were mounted from bases in Canadian territory, although it would, of course, want as much prior notification as possible.

We have, as you suggested, sent a copy of Mr. Wrong's letter to Mr. Robertson. If you agree, I propose to refer copies to the Prime Minister, Mr. Claxton, and Mr. Howe.

OK

Defence Liaison Division(1)  
*RAM*

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Copy No. 1 of 4 Copies

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Ottawa, April 12, 1951

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*NOT sent*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

U.S. Strategic Air Command Projects

Mr. Wrong and Mr. Ignatieff have given Mr. Arneson of the State Department our comments on the proposed U.S. "canopy" agreement on this subject, as you will see from Mr. Wrong's letter No. 1164 of April 10, attached. In paragraph 11, Mr. Wrong asks whether we do not think that it would be reasonable for the "Canadian Government to give prior consent in advance to strikes with atomic weapons from Goose Bay or Harmon Field in the event of a clearly-established Soviet air attack on North American territory, subject to as much prior notification as might be possible in the circumstances". In the original draft of our reply, we had more or less taken this line and I think it would be in the Canadian interest for us to agree to this concession which would make our general position more acceptable to the U.S. Government without removing whatever brakes we may be able to apply in circumstances in which the Canadian Government might still believe it possible for a general war to be avoided. In the event of an outright Soviet attack upon North America, it is inconceivable that a general war could be avoided and it would therefore seem to me to be of less concern that bases in Canadian territory might be used for a strike before Canada had technically declared war.

You may perhaps wish to have a word with the Prime Minister and Mr. Claxton on this point.

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
-2-

is no reason why you should not talk over the problem with Sir Roger Makins.

I am writing to Dana Wilgress today, sending him the same papers as are attached hereto, just to keep him fully in the picture.

Yours sincerely,

R. A. MacKAY

  
**Jules Leger**  
Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs



IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE  
NO. CSC 1313-1 (JIG)

Department of National Defence

SECRET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

15 Mar 55

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE JIG:

US National Indications Centre

16 MAR 1955

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grey  
DL21*

1. Attached is a copy of a report from the JIB liaison officer in Washington on a visit to the National Indications Centre.
2. This report will be considered under Item 4 at the meeting to be held 16 Mar.

*J.C. McGibbon*  
(J.C. McGibbon)  
Squadron Leader, RCAF,  
Secretary.

Enc.

JHT/5459/ff

c.c. CJS  
JIS

- 2 -

There is a further point which I think we  
~~might~~ make in our reply to ~~Mr.~~ Wrong's letter.  
~~Mr. Reid has suggested that we should make it crystal~~  
clear that the proposed canopy agreement would have  
nothing whatever to do with ~~action to be taken in the~~  
Far East. While this point is perhaps less urgent  
than it was a few days ago, ~~I am inclined to agree~~  
that our simple reference to the North Atlantic Treaty  
in the preamble of the agreement ~~may~~ not be enough.  
What do you think?

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perhaps take occasion to

you may

would

A.D.P.H.

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ACCESS SECTION / SECTION DE L'ACCES

DOCUMENT REMOVED FROM FILE / DOCUMENT RETIRE DU DOSSIER

RG 25 Volume 195 File 50069-C-40 pt 1  
Dossier

1990-91/008

Nature of document / Description du document Washington DC letter # 1164

No. of Pages / Nbre de pages 4

Date 10/4/51

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RM/22/4(913)

7 March, 1955.

FILE COPY

Director,  
Joint Intelligence Bureau,  
Ottawa.

National Indications Center

I visited the National Indications Center with Mr. John Clarke, Special Assistant to the AD/ORR and was briefed on the operations of the Center by Mr. J.J. Hitchcock who is in charge.

The Center occupies a small suite of offices in the basement of the Pentagon which include a conference and briefing room for the Watch Committee, a reception room, the office of the Chief and a general office housing the clerical staff and equipped with cubicle offices for the representatives of the various intelligence agencies on the NIC. The Watch Committee room is elaborately equipped with visual aids.

The staff of the Center includes about twelve officers drawn from the various IAC agencies (State, CIA, Army, Navy and Air Force). Contrary to the information I gave you earlier the Center is provided with "Rations and Quarters" by the Air Force. It is, however, under IAC control. The officers are paid by their respective services.

Since the Center has only been in operation since January 24 it is in a very early stage of development and much of my discussion with Mr. Hitchcock concerned long-term plans rather than present accomplishments. The Center receives materials from all the participating agencies and is, in addition, equipped with an AP and FBIS ticker tape and a special center. It also receives automatically copies of certain categories of incoming cables from collectors in the field. The individual officers are charged with the task of maintaining liaison with their parent agencies in order to obtain a proper evaluation of incoming material and also so that they may obtain raw intelligence which has not been passed to them in the normal way. There is an officer on duty on a 24-hour basis whose task it is to evaluate indications and if a situation becomes sufficiently tense to call the Watch Committee which meets and agrees on a joint interpretation of events to be disseminated to the proper authorities. During the Tachen evacuation the Watch Committee was called and has disseminated its joint view of a particular situation within two hours.

Mr. Hitchcock has divided his long term plans so that in the initial period he is concentrating on the current critical areas, particularly the off-shore islands and Berlin. Since it is impossible for him to get his machine working on the whole indications program at once he proposes first to get an efficient system working on these critical areas and then gradually move to the longer term indications and the problem of major war. He feels quite safe in doing this since it is a general appreciation that a major war is unlikely to occur in the near future. Eventually he hopes to develop indications lists which will be time-phased, for example there will be D-180, D-90 indicators and so on. His two major problems are first, to get the IAC agencies used to passing to him the right kind of material without swamping him with irrelevant documents and secondly, to improve the field collection system so that attaches and other collectors will be looking for the right kind of indications. This, he feels, is not being done at the moment. He said that after two years away from "raw intelligence" he found the fall-off in collection very noticeable.

- 2 -

Mr. Hitchcock did not go into detail about the mechanics of handling the documents which come into the Center and said very little about his filing procedures, etc. He gave the impression that he was much more concerned with the problems of collection, evaluation and dissemination than he was with developing any mechanical, mathematical or other alleged foolproof systems for measuring the temperature of international tension which, as you know, has been tried before. He believes that his success depends very largely on the way in which he uses his service officers to scout for him in the various IAC agencies.

Mr. Hitchcock was most emphatic in his criticism of the format and content of the Watch Committee report. He feels that it is merely a current intelligence survey and not a barometer of the imminence of war or an indications report at all. He said, however, that although he intends to change it radically eventually, he felt that because of tradition which has been established he will have to move slowly and will probably begin by writing an indications annex to the Watch Committee report which will eventually, he hopes, overwhelm and eliminate the report in its present form.

When he mentioned crash Watch Committee meetings I pointed out to him that we receive the regular Watch Committee report but that it was, in my opinion, unlikely that the outbreak of war, particularly a local war, would be forecast in the Watch Committee report in time to be of use to Canadian authorities. It was my opinion that such an outbreak would be first detected at a crash Watch Committee meeting and that the reports of such meetings are not now coming to us. Mr. Hitchcock agreed that my comment was correct and suggested that this situation could only be improved by an approach by Mr. Crean to Mr. Dulles, or at least that it could not be solved on the Uren-Hitchcock level. With this, of course, I entirely agreed. The same thing applied to the question of exchange between the National Indications Center and a parallel Canadian organization. Mr. Hitchcock felt that nothing could be done until Mr. Crean had approached Mr. Dulles and an IAC directive has been issued instructing him to release certain categories of material.

I also mentioned with reference to some specific examples that there was, in my opinion, a time lag in passing important items between Ottawa and Washington which may in the future prove serious unless something is done about it. He thought that a machinery could easily be established for the rapid transmission of individual items but there again the establishment of such machinery would depend upon the high level agreements referred to above.

For Defence Research Member.

10

ACCESS SECTION / SECTION DE L'ACCES

DOCUMENT REMOVED FROM FILE / DOCUMENT RETIRE DU DOSSIER

RG 25 Volume 195 File 50069-C-40 pt 1  
Dossier

Nature of document / DL(i) memo to Mr Mackay  
Description du document  
and Mr George

No. of Pages / 1 Date 10/4/51  
Nbre de pages

Exempt/Exception, 13(i)(a) 15(i)  
Access To Information Act /  
Reason for Removal / Loi sur l'accès à l'information  
Retrait en vertu de

Review Officer / DEA/lb.  
Agent(e) d'examen

9

ACCESS SECTION / SECTION DE L'ACCES

DOCUMENT REMOVED FROM FILE / DOCUMENT RETIRE DU DOSSIER

RG 25 1990-91/008  
Volume 195 File/Dossier 50069-C-40 pt 1

Nature of document / Description du document Washington, DC letter # 1163

No. of Pages / Nbre de pages 1 Date 9/4/51

Exempt/Exception, 15(1)  
Access To Information Act /  
Reason for Removal / Loi sur l'accès à l'information  
Retrait en vertu de

Review Officer / Agent(e) d'examen DEA/lb.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

Copy on

Extract from the minutes of the 576th meeting held File  
on 10/11/1955. 50030-AB-4-40  
Ke B

I. MEASURES TO BE TAKEN ON AND AFTER WARNING OF ATTACK

(TOP SECRET)

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1. The Committee had for consideration a draft submission to the Cabinet Defence Committee on measures to be taken on and after warning of attack. The submission outlined the three phase alert procedure which had been designed to cover the transition period from peace to war. SACEUR and SACLANT had based their alert measures on the three phase alert procedure. The submission specifically recommended:
  - (a) that the Canadian Government accept the NATO alert measures which had been proposed by SACEUR and SACLANT;
  - (b) the proposed amendments to Chapter II of the 1948 Government War Book as contained in Appendix D to the Cabinet Defence Committee submission be approved; and
  - (c) the Minister of National Defence be given the authority to call up reserve forces and units on the declaration of a reinforced alert or a general alert if the War Measures Act is not in force.

(CSC 1795-1 of 26 January, 1955 and 4 March, 1955 and CSC 1795-1, CSC 1313-1 of 9 March, 1955)
2. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff referred to the necessity for Canada accepting the alert measures which had been proposed by SACEUR and SACLANT and the desirability of tying Canadian measures to the same basic system.
3. During the discussion which followed the following points emerged:
  - A. Cabinet Defence Committee Submission
    - (1) It should be made abundantly clear that reserves would normally only be called up on the declaration of a reinforced alert. A simple alert would not involve calling out reserve force units unless the alert would continue for a prolonged period when certain ROAF reserves might be needed to man aircraft control and warning units.
  - B. Appendix A - SACLANT's Alert Measures

No comment.
  - C. Appendix B - SACEUR's Alert Measures
    - (1) In instances where recall of personnel from leave was considered necessary it should be done in a discreet manner so as not to alarm the public. It was possible that the desired affect could result by a restricting of leave during the period of the alert.
    - (2) The Meteorological aspects of SACEUR's alert measures were presently under study by the Joint Planning Committee sub-committee on Meteorological Services for Defence. It appeared that the main problem which would arise was the lack of sufficient cryptographic

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

devices to ensure security. With the lapse of time these devices were becoming more readily available. It was expected that during the period of warning the Russians would stop the exchange of meteorological information and would encrypt their meteorological broadcasts. Similarly, action should be taken by Canada to either suppress or encrypt broadcast meteorological information.

D. Appendix C - Canadian Military Alert Measures

- (1) The legal authority required to place Canadian forces under NATO commanders should be further clarified.
- (2) The imposition of censorship on military information could not be imposed by the Department of National Defence. This Department could only activate the military aspects of censorship.
- (3) During the simple alert stage it should not be necessary to call up Commodores or Vice Commodores for naval control of shipping as convoys were not planned to be operating until D plus 15 days.
- (4) In the event that a simple alert was called by any authority or country except Canada, the Chiefs of Staff in consultation with the Minister of National Defence would review the simple alert measures which would be implemented by Canada other than those required by SACEUR and SACLANT.
- (5) Control of electronic emissions during the reinforced alert stage should be done by the RCAF and RCN in consultation with the Department of Transport and the Civil Defence authorities. During the period of general alert the Air Defence Command should have complete authority to forbid electronic emissions from designated areas during certain times. The Chief of the Air Staff should discuss this problem with the Department of Transport.
- (6) Any system of security of meteorological information instituted by the RCAF in consultation with the Department of Transport should be in accordance with SHAPE's approved meteorological procedure.
- (7) The co-operation of the RCN with Customs Officials at the time of the general alert should extend to the control and/or detention of neutral ships and aircraft as well as the seizure of enemy ships and aircraft.
- (8) The RCN should have the authority to requisition or repossess former naval vessels as well as other ships as required.
- (9) The authority of the Air Defence Commander to engage and destroy apparent enemy aircraft should be further investigated. It may be necessary for this authority to be in existence before the general alert stage. It should not be required to prove beyond reasonable doubt that any aircraft destroyed had hostile intent.

TOP SECRET

ORIGINAL

COPY NO. 1 OF 11 COPIES

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

MIN. 3  
UNDR SEC 4  
D/UNDR/SEC'S 4  
A/UNDR/SEC'S 6  
Sum # 11  
WA - 1281

IMPORTANT

CYPHER - AUTO

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 4, 1951.

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET  
REVIEW A SECRET

52069-C-4

5019540  
Sub. 7.26.40. Filed... 2

Top Secret. Following for Heeney from Wrong, Begins:  
Your EM-555 of March 16th. United States Strategic  
Air Command projects.

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4 APR 1951

1. We are still awaiting a reply from Ottawa and three months have passed since the proposal was transmitted to you in my letter No. 20 of January 3rd. I am growing more concerned over the continued delay chiefly for two reasons. First, what the military call the campaigning season of 1951 will begin soon and there is a good deal that has to be done to make the project effective after it has been agreed on by the two governments. The fears here of possible Soviet air intervention in Korea, which I reported yesterday, increase my concern on this score. Secondly, the long delay in securing any response through the diplomatic channel increases the prejudices of the military here about the use of this channel and may make it more difficult to maintain the working arrangements which we and the State Department desire in order to ensure civilian control.

2. Both Mr. Claxton and General McNaughton have told me that they had thought that the reply had been agreed upon in Ottawa some time ago. If you are not yet able to inform me of the terms of the reply, can you give me some explanation of where it now stands?. Ends.

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1951 APR 4 PM 3 : 33

TOP SECRET

- 4 -

A clearly demonstrated manifestation of hostile intent should be sufficient grounds to justify the Air Defence Commander to act.

E. Appendix D - Chapter II Government War Book

- (1) On the declaration of a simple or reinforced alert by Canada each Chief of Staff as appropriate would implement in respect of forces earmarked for SACEUR and SACLANT any NATO alert declared by them.
- (2) It would be desirable that the responsibility for action by Ministers of the Crown in respect to the declaration of alerts be included in the Government War Book.

4. General Foulkes made reference to the suggested Canadian procedure for dealing with indications of major Russian aggression and explained the action which would result from the proposed operation of an indications centre.

5. The Associate Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs requested Chiefs of Staff comments on a draft telegram to the Canadian High Commissioner, London dealing with the procedural arrangements with the US and the UK for the establishment of an indications centre.

6. The Secretary to the Cabinet suggested that if there was to be an evacuation of civilian population at the time of an air raid the suggested procedure outlined as Case 2 of the document on suggested Canadian procedure for dealing with indications of major Russian aggression might require modification.

7. It was agreed:

- (a) to redraft the draft submission to the Cabinet Defence Committee in line with the observations recorded in paragraph 3 above;
- (b) that each Chief of Staff would undertake to consult with other government departments concerned where there are joint responsibilities, and obtain any required concurrences from these departments before the amended Cabinet Defence Committee submission was again considered by the Chiefs of Staff;
- (c) to approve the draft telegram to the Canadian High Commissioner, London referred to in paragraph 5 above; and
- (d) that the Canadian procedures suggested for dealing with indications of major Russian aggression be redrafted to indicate the responsibility for advising the Supreme Allied Commanders, the NATO Council and the Standing Group. It would again be considered by the Chiefs of Staff prior to submission to the Cabinet Defence Committee.

TOP SECRET

OTTAWA, March 14, 1955.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

*Done  
Mar. 14  
1955*

Director of Naval Intelligence;  
Director of Military Intelligence;  
Director of Air Intelligence;  
Director of Scientific Intelligence;  
Director, Joint Intelligence Bureau;  
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (SB); Inspector Hall.

DO 50028-BX-40  
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UNITED KINGDOM INTELLIGENCE ALERT MEASURES

Further to the memorandum which the Acting Chairman addressed to you on March 3, 1955, I enclose herewith copies of telegrams exchanged between our High Commissioner in London and the Under-Secretary on this subject. Following the JIC's consideration on February 17 of the United Kingdom Working Party's paper entitled "Possible Stages of Action When Indications of Major Russian Aggression Are Received In Good Time", and basing himself on the JIC's comments, Mr. Leger sent to Mr. Robertson the attached telegram No. 290 of February 17. Mr. Robertson gave a copy of this telegram to Mr. Patrick Dean, Chairman of the U.K. JIC.

2. Mr. Robertson's attached telegrams Nos. 249, 250 and 251 of February 28 contain the texts of Mr. Dean's two letters in reply dated February 26, the first dealing with the substantive questions we had raised about the UK paper, the second setting forth present UK thinking as to how the question should be raised with the United States. Finally, I attach Mr. Leger's telegram in reply, No. 411 of March 10. As you will see from the text, this telegram was considered by the Chiefs of Staff at their meeting on March 10, and carried their concurrence.

3. I suggest that these telegrams will provide a useful background for our discussion of this question as Item IV at our 432nd meeting on Wednesday, March 16. Accordingly, I am sending a copy of this memorandum and of its attached telegrams to the Secretary, JIC.

(G. G. Cress)  
Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee.

EXT. 97.

MESSAGE FORM

**OUTGOING**  
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FILE REF.	58	50
50069-C-40		

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET 1-

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Message To Be Sent	No. <i>Et-760</i>	Date April 4, 1951.	For Communications Office Use Only
EN CLAIR			SENT -- APR 4 1951
CODE			
CYPHER AUTO/XXXX			

Degree of Priority  
**IMPORTANT**

ORIGINATOR  
 Sig. \_\_\_\_\_  
 Typed: *J. George/bw*  
 Div. *Def. Liaison*  
 Local Tel. *3795*

APPROVED BY  
 Sig. *[Signature]*  
 Typed: \_\_\_\_\_

Is This Message Likely To Be Published  
 Yes ( ) No ( )

Internal Distribution:  
*S.S.E.A. 42*  
*U.S.S.E.A. 23*

Done *[Signature]*  
 Date *Apr. 5/51*

Copies Referred To:  
 De \_\_\_\_\_  
 De \_\_\_\_\_

Following for Wrong from Heeney, Begins.  
 Your WA-1281 of April 4. U.S. Strategic Air Command Projects.

1. I regret the long delay in commenting on the U.S. proposals transmitted in your Letter No. 20 of January 3. As Mr. Claxton and General McNaughton have told you, and as I explained in my message EX-555 of March 16, agreement was reached at a meeting with Ministers in February as to the line which we should take. The Minister has subsequently decided, however, (partly as a result of the serious risk of misunderstanding to which you drew our attention in your Letter No. 762 of March 3) that our initial comments should be tougher than in the original draft. It has also been decided that these comments should be transmitted to the U.S. Government orally and as coming from me rather than from the Canadian Government. Two Letters, D-1407 and D-1412 of April 2 and 3, went forward to you in today's bag with the Minister's approval.

2. Having worked our way through to a more or less clear-cut position, we should be able to handle future correspondence on this subject much more expeditiously.

Ends.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

*4.4.60 (US)*

11-10-71

TO: [Illegible]  
FROM: [Illegible]  
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

[Illegible text block]

1971 APR 4 6:34

DATE: 2/21

[Illegible handwritten notes]

DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES

MESSAGE BOOK

MESSAGE FORM  
 OUTGOING

File No. <u>50028-BX-40</u>	
<u>52</u>	<u>52</u>

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST,  
 LONDON

*Signal on 50030-AB-4-40*

Message To Be Sent

AIR CYPHER

EN CLAIR

CODE

CYPHER

XXXXX

No. 411

Date March 10, 1955

For Communications Section Only

Priority

REFERENCE: Your telegrams Nos. 249, 250 and 251 of February 28, 1955

SUBJECT: Alerts Procedures

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

ORIGINATOR

(Signature)

J.M. Teakles

(Name Typed)

D.L. (1) elb

Div.

Local Tel. 3402

Following for Robertson from Leger, Begins:

We are in general agreement with the comments made by Dean in his first letter. We should like to regard the first objective as a practical and speedy procedure preliminary to and in support of the NATO alert system, on the understanding that a parallel procedure for other areas of the world will be elaborated later.

APPROVED BY

(Signature)

R.A. MacKay

(Name Typed)

2. We are, however, somewhat puzzled by his reference to an overhauling of the NATO system of alerts. We wonder if he has in mind the suggestion in the second note to the working paper that an examination be made in due course to ensure that there is no conflict between the NATO systems and the tripartite procedures. While we see no objection to such an examination on a tripartite basis in connection with the study of the present proposals, we would be inclined to question whether any useful purpose would be served by re-opening the question in the North Atlantic Council. As you know, the negotiations between governments and supreme commanders on the proposed NATO alert measures (instituted by the Council's decision of July 1, 1953 on document S.C.

Internal Distribution:

S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.

D.L. (2) Div.

Done

Date

Copies Referred To:

CCOS (5)

Sec. to Cab.

129/4) have been progressing slowly, and several govern-

- 2 -

ments have already agreed to the measures which concern them. At the last meeting of the Military Committee it was announced that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff had reached agreement and would be notifying the Standing Group forthwith. Our own Chiefs of Staff are considering the measures applicable to Canada and hope to make recommendations soon to Ministers. In these circumstances, and in view of the desirability of concluding the bilateral negotiations and thus completing the NATO alerts system as soon as possible, we should be interested to know what overhauling of the system is envisaged and whether the United Kingdom has any definite proposal in mind.

3. One point which occurs to us is that the United Kingdom working paper makes no explicit reference to the agreed NATO procedure (outlined in document S.O. 166/1 for passing evaluated indications of impending Soviet attack to the Standing Group, with copies to major NATO Commands and Standing Group national staffs, by the quickest means available. We wonder whether paragraph 10 of the working paper, which states that the J.I.C. will consider how much of the intelligence received can be passed to allies other than the United States and Canada, and in what form, might not be amended to take account of the NATO procedure. One suggestion, which has already been considered by the United Kingdom J.I.C. (in draft paper JIC/256/55 of January 26, sent to us directly), is that the J.I.C., if it agrees that the indications are positive, will decide (a) whether to recommend that the Chiefs of Staff inform the Standing Group, and (b) whether to inform the major NATO commands. If this were expanded to provide for passing evaluated indications to Standing Group national staffs (in effect, the French Ministry of Defence) at the same time as to major NATO commands, this would seem to be a sensible way of implementing the NATO procedure. Indeed, the

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Defence Liaison(1)/J.George/bw

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, April 4, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

U.S. Strategic Air Command Projects in  
Canada

File 50068-64  
✓ FILE

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Attached for your consideration is a reply to Mr. Wrong's enquiry as to why our comments on this subject have not been forthcoming sooner. His message in fact crossed your letters which went to Washington in today's bag.

The second letter on this subject to which reference is made in the telegram was signed by Mr. Reid in your absence and dealt with proposed communication procedures between the Embassy and the Department.

*P.M.*

Defence Liaison Division(1).

*original  
sent to communication  
April 4/51*

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RECENT A SECRET**

*A. Y. 60 (US)*

(8)

ACCESS SECTION / SECTION DE L'ACCES

DOCUMENT REMOVED FROM FILE / DOCUMENT RETIRE DU DOSSIER

RG 25 Volume 195 File 50069-C-40 pt 1  
1990-9/008  
Dossier

Nature of document / USSEA letter D-1412.  
Description du document

No. of Pages / 2  
Nbre de pages

Date 3/4/51

Exempt/Exception, 15(1)  
Access To Information Act/

Reason for Removal / Loi sur l'accès à l'information  
Retrait en vertu de

Review Officer / DEA/ll.  
Agent(e) d'examen

- 3 -

passing of evaluated intelligence to the French in this way would seem to be a necessary preliminary to the procedure outlined in paragraph 12 of the working paper for an approach to the French Government by the United Kingdom and United States Governments, in agreement with Canada, regarding proposals for action.

4. Another point which we think should be considered is the channel to be used in approaching the other NATO countries with proposals for action. Paragraph 12 of the working paper suggests that, if the French agree, tripartite approaches should be made through diplomatic channels in the capitals concerned, keeping the NATO representative in Paris informed. We wonder whether the permanent representatives in Paris might not be a more appropriate channel, particularly since the Council is to authorize the alerts.

5. The problems of staffing and of rapid communication are under study here and we believe that satisfactory arrangements can be made.

6. As regards the procedural questions mentioned in Dean's second letter, we agree that it would be more appropriate for the United Kingdom Ambassador in Washington to make the first approach to Mr. Dulles, followed separately by the Canadian Ambassador. We agree also with the suggested line of approach. On the question of timing, while we agreed that it would be desirable to try to begin tripartite talks in the near future, we should like you to remind Dean of our desire to show the revised paper to the Ministers concerned before it is produced in Washington. This telegram was considered this morning by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, with the External Affairs representative and the Secretary to Cabinet present, and carries their concurrence.  
Ends.

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Defence Liaison (2)/G.H.Southam/mmr/mh

TOP SECRET

50028-BK-40  
52 50

OTTAWA, March 3, 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Director of Naval Intelligence;  
Director of Military Intelligence;  
Director of Air Intelligence;  
Director of Scientific Intelligence;  
Director, Joint Intelligence Bureau;  
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (SB); Inspector Hall.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

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U.K. INTELLIGENCE ALERT MEASURES

Enclosed for your information is a copy of a UK JIC paper (JIC/256/55 of January 26, 1955) concerning United Kingdom intelligence alert measures. This paper was sent by Mr. P.H. Dean to Mr. Crean under cover of a personal letter dated February 15.

2. In his letter Mr. Dean explains that this paper covers the internal arrangements made by the United Kingdom JIC. It is not at present designed to meet a situation in which a surprise attack develops in a matter of hours. As a first step they have attempted to draw up a procedure which could cope with an "orderly" and relatively orthodox outbreak of hostilities. Having established and agreed on such a procedure, they mean to go on to develop a telescoped drill to deal with "crash" warnings.

3. When Mr. Crean returns from leave he will doubtless wish to raise this matter at the JIC. I am therefore sending a copy of this letter and its enclosure to the Secretary of the JIC.

G. H. SOUTHAM

(G. H. Southam)  
Acting Chairman, Joint Intelligence Commi

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Defence Liaison Division / Division de Liaison avec la Défense  
Copy No. 3 of three copies

Ext. 187B

*Referred to*  
*4. A. Robertson*  
*FILE COPY # 5*  
*PM*  
*A. Claxton*  
*How*

OTTAWA FILE  
~~50775/0~~  
No. 50069-6-40.....  
58 50

Letter No. .... D. .... 1407  
Date ..... April 2, 1951 .....

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
TOP SECRET

**DECLASSIFIED TO  
REBUT A SECRET**

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA  
TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D. C.  
Reference.....Your letter No. 19 of January 3 and other correspondence  
Subject:.....United States Strategic Air Command Projects.....

The United States proposal for a "canopy" agreement concerning the use of facilities in Canada by the Strategic Air Command was discussed at a meeting with Mr. Pearson, Mr. Claxton, Mr. Robertson, General Foulkes, A/V/M James and myself. The subject has also been discussed with the Minister several times and the Prime Minister. The comments which follow are based on these discussions, but they should be regarded as my own, since it is felt that the matter should be kept on this more or less informal basis for the present.

Copies Referred To.....  
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2. As you have suggested, we should consider the United States request for a "canopy" agreement in the broader setting of the talks between President Truman and Mr. Attlee about the use of atomic weapons. I quite agree with your view that there is a very real risk of misunderstanding arising between the United States and the United Kingdom as to the nature of the commitment which was given by President Truman. The United Kingdom Government apparently feels that a specific commitment for consultation in advance of use of the bomb has been made by the President. On the other hand, Mr. Acheson was quite specific in his secret statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that there was no commitment to any government regarding prior consent. A close examination of the press communique issued after these talks and the memorandum of the conversation between Mr. Ignatieff and Mr. Arneson on December 11, 1950, would seem clearly to support Mr. Acheson's statement. The concluding sentence of the memorandum of the conversation with Mr. Arneson, if a correct statement of the United States Government's views, clearly indicates that the United States Government has committed itself only to consultation "on the developing international situation and the military measures which it called for, rather than upon the use, in a particular situation, of atomic or any other kind of weapons". Canada is assured of only equal treatment in this respect.

No. of Enclosures  
.....

Post File  
No.....

3. The draft canopy agreement forwarded with your letter No. 19 of January 3, if accepted by us in its present form, would constitute, in effect, advance consent to the use, subject to notification, of facilities in Canada by Strategic Air Command in preparing for carrying out operations in atomic warfare. Although the phrase

- 2 -

"consultation and notification procedure", is used in the final paragraph, it is fairly clear from the text as a whole that the "consultation" envisaged would not necessarily entitle the Canadian Government to refuse. In short, the canopy agreement as outlined would seem to leave the Canadian Government with little, if any, more control over the use for operational purposes by Strategic Air Command of facilities in Canada than it has over policy under the Truman-Attlee formula.

4. The desire of the United States authorities in view of responsibilities under NATO for strategic air operations, to have a free hand, subject to notification, for the Strategic Air Command to overfly Canada and to use Goose Bay and Harmon Field for operational purposes is fully appreciated. At the same time, if the Canadian Government agree to such an arrangement, it might well forego any opportunity it may have of influencing policy in the use of atomic weapons by reason of Canada's geographical location. In the event of an all-out war, it would perhaps be unrealistic for the Canadian Government to hope that it could really exercise an effective influence on such policy. But it would clearly seem unwise for it to "throw in its hand" in advance.

5. Such an argument, of course, can scarcely be put to the United States authorities. It might, however, be pointed out to them that although the United States has a responsibility under North Atlantic Treaty arrangements for strategic air operations, and although the Canadian Government would not wish in any way to hinder the United States in the fulfillment of these responsibilities, it is felt that it would be improper for Canada as a sovereign nation to permit unrestricted use in peacetime of facilities in Canadian territory for these operations, even on assurance of notification in advance of use.

6. The above observations apply particularly to the storage of fissionable components on Canadian territory, to the overflight of Canadian territory by planes carrying fissionable components, and to strikes from bases in Canada. These are matters on which it is felt the Canadian Government should be consulted in each case at the highest political level. The channel for such matters should be civil rather than military. The normal procedure would be for the State Department to make its request to you, and for this request, on receipt here, to be relayed at once to the Minister or the Prime Minister. (I shall write you separately suggesting a procedure for assuring security and speed).

7. Emergency situations may be envisaged when the utmost speed in dealing with a request would be required, but I do not think the procedure suggested would mean any more delay than if the request were forwarded through military channels. I cannot quite foresee the Government being prepared to authorize the military authorities here to decide on such a request. There

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OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF

(B)

OTTAWA

50028-BX-10  
52 50

2 March, 1955.

refer copy to DL(1)  
Done March 15, 1955  
mmk. file guss DL(1)

Dear Mr. Leger:

*Copy on 50030-AB-4-10*

Thank you very much for your letter of 1 March regarding the "Possible Stages of Action when Indications of Major Russian Aggression are Received in Good Time".

I have studied your comments on Telegrams 250 and 251, and I am in general agreement with your remarks and those of Mr. Patrick Dean.

In regard to sub-para. (b), we have been giving some consideration to the staffing of an Indication Centre and would like your views as to whether External Affairs would like to have a member of its department on this indication staff. We have been considering having perhaps a small staff with about two additional members added to our present Joint Intelligence Staff, who would rotate in the Indication Centre.

The other problem is one of communications, but I think our present Spectra net between Ottawa, London and Washington would be quite adequate for this purpose, although we may require to give consideration to 24-hour service.

In regard to sub-para. (c), it is my view that we should try to get this suggested arrangement to fit in with the NATO alerts agreement, and I am attaching a first draft of a suggested Canadian procedure for dealing with this subject, which would allow us to keep it in line with the NATO alerts. I have no knowledge that the NATO alerts system is to be overhauled. As I mentioned earlier, certain countries have already agreed to these alerts and at the last meeting of the Military Committee, Admiral Radford announced that the United States Chiefs of Staff had reached agreement on the alerts procedure and would be notifying the Standing Group forthwith.

In regard to the method of approach, I see no military objection to the approach being made by Sir Roger Makins in the first place, in consultation with General Whiteley. I presume Mr. Heeney would have preliminary conversations after Sir Roger had opened the subject and we would supply the necessary military advice during negotiations.

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Jules Leger, Esq.,  
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,  
East Block,  
Ottawa, Ontario.

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
- 2 -

I agree with your final paragraph and am of the opinion that the United Kingdom paper could certainly be improved upon before it is submitted to the Americans.

I understand from conversation with Mr. Bryce that he will be available in the next week or two to discuss our own alerts system and I would like to get our alerts cleared with the Chiefs of Staff and at that time we might give consideration to a suggested Canadian procedure for dealing with these indications of major Russian aggression. If there is a possibility of reaching an early agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom on this subject, it might be advisable to withhold asking for government approval of our alert system until this tri-partite procedure can be finalized. This would give us an opportunity to find out from the Standing Group whether there is any intention of revising the NATO alert system.

I am sending a copy of this letter together with the suggested Canadian procedure to Mr. Bryce.

Yours sincerely,



(Charles Foulkes)

General,  
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.

- 3 -

should be no more delay in getting a decision from the Ministers if a request were to come through diplomatic channels than if it were to come through military channels.

8. Arrangements could, I think, be made for handling other than the above matters on a Service-to-Service basis. I have in mind such matters as training programmes, the provision of storage facilities, the deployment of aircraft, and even such matters as movement and storage of bombs without fissionable components. Having agreed to facilities in Canada for the Strategic Air Command and having agreed to the division of responsibility under NATO, which leaves responsibility for strategic air operations to the United States, I do not see any objection to purely Service questions such as the above being settled directly between the RCAF and the USAF at whatever level they agree upon.

9. In conclusion, should the United States wish to proceed with negotiations for a canopy agreement, I suggest the agreement should be placed squarely upon agreed arrangements under the North Atlantic Treaty. A reference might be written into the introductory part of the United States Note to our common obligations under the Treaty, to the special responsibility of the United States for strategic air operations, and to the agreement of Treaty nations through the Council Deputies that member nations should agree to give immediate and special attention to the granting to the United States of appropriate facilities for fulfillment of its responsibilities (Document D-D/183). I am not suggesting that the text of the Note need refer to this Document or quote its language, but that it should reflect agreed North Atlantic policies under which both the Canadian and United States Government would be acting.

10. I suggest that you present these views orally to the State Department. We have tried our hands at a redraft of their proposed Note enclosed in your letter No. 19 of January 3, but with unsatisfactory results. In any case it is perhaps preferable to let them do their own redrafting in the light of our comments, should they wish to proceed with the proposed note.

A.D.P. HEENEY

Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

Ottawa, March 29, 1951

SEEN

L. B. PEARSON

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APR 2 1951  
50069-e-70  
u? | ) A.L.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

United States Strategic Air Command Project

You will recall commenting about ten days ago on a draft letter to Mr. Wrong on the above subject. You noted in your memorandum of March 20 on this draft that there was a real possibility of misunderstanding between the United States and the United Kingdom with regard to the commitments given by Mr. Truman to Mr. Attlee about consultation prior to the use of the A bomb and that it was essential that both the United States and ourselves should clearly understand what the undertaking was with regard to use of facilities in Canada for strategic air operations. You also expressed some apprehension that the letter made no distinction between the use of Canadian facilities and facilities in the United States or elsewhere. Mr. Heeney gathered that the sense of the meeting of February 9 (attended by yourself, Mr. Claxton, Mr. Robertson, General Foulkes, A/V/M James) was that there was no real distinction. However, officials of the Department were rather worried about this lack of distinction and agreed with you that there should be such a distinction.

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2. The letter to Mr. Wrong has accordingly been completed redrafted, I hope in accordance with your views. The draft states

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Letter sent April 3, dated April 2.  
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3.4.51

**SUGGESTED CANADIAN PROCEDURE FOR  
DEALING WITH INDICATIONS OF MAJOR  
RUSSIAN AGGRESSION**

---

CASE I

**FILE COPY**

Assumption

1. In this procedure it is assumed that the early information will be received from "comint" sources and may be supplemented by information from other sources, and that all information, comint and overt, will be channelled into the Indication Centre.
2. On receipt, the Indication Centre will correlate the information and pass it immediately to the Joint Intelligence Committee, automatically passing the information to the Indication Centres in Washington and London.

Intelligence Agencies (JIC, CIA, etc.)

3. On receipt of the information, the intelligence agencies will make an assessment and will seek from the United Kingdom and the United States confirmation and their assessment.

Executive Bodies

4. The Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee will report to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, and the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. These two officials may take action individually but usually after consultation.
5. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff will consult the Minister of National Defence and the Chiefs of Staff.
6. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs will consult the Secretary of State for External Affairs and appropriate officials; the Secretary to the Cabinet to be informed of the information and the possibility of a meeting of Cabinet Defence Committee.

- 2 -

7. The Ministers of National Defence and External Affairs jointly will discuss the information with the Prime Minister and decide whether it is appropriate to call a meeting of Cabinet Defence Committee.

Heads of State

8. The Prime Minister will consult the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom regarding agreement to declare an alert and a decision as to which country will take the responsibility of declaring the alert.

NOTE:

It is realized that the Chiefs of Staff are required under the NATO alert system to notify the Standing Group and the Supreme Allied Commanders of any information which may indicate that an attack is imminent. In order to avoid confusion on this issue, it is suggested that the passage of information to the Supreme Allied Commanders and the Standing Group should be as follows.

The United Kingdom and the United States should undertake to keep their representatives on the Standing Group informed, and the United States should undertake to keep the Supreme Allied Commanders informed in their roles as senior U.S. commanders.

The country responsible for declaring the alert should notify the Standing Group as such as soon as agreement has been reached that an alert should be called.

- 2 -

that the Canadian Government must be consulted at the highest level before storage of fissionable material in Canada or overflight of Canadian territory with fissionable material or strikes from Canadian bases. As you note, consultation may, in fact, imply consent, but Mr. Heeney appears to be rather doubtful that we can press the United States Government into agreeing that the Canadian Government must give express consent before such use is made of facilities in Canada, especially in the case of Harmon Field, since the Bases Agreement makes no provision for any such procedure.

3. The letter has also been altered to indicate that the views expressed are Mr. Heeney's rather than those of the Canadian Government, and instruct Mr. Wrong to give our comments orally to the State Department rather than in writing. The reason for this change is purely tactical, since it was felt that it would be preferable to "try out" these views on the United States authorities rather than for the Government as yet to take a really firm position on the matter.

4. Mr. Heeney signed the letter, but left instructions that it should have your approval before it goes.



E. R.

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, March 21, 1951.

50069-e-40 ✓

File

2<sup>nd</sup>

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INSERTS IN DRAFT LETTER OF MARCH 16 INCORPORATING THE MINISTER'S INSTRUCTIONS FOR REVISION

commencing with paragraph 3....

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3. The question of "prior consultation" and "information" was also discussed and we have, subsequently, ~~taken into consideration your further Letter No. 762 of March 3rd on this subject.~~ <sup>was subsequently taken into consideration.</sup> It is, as you say, very difficult to reach a satisfactory formulation of our views. I am sure <sup>agree</sup> ~~with your view that there is~~ you are right in drawing our attention to the very real risk of the misunderstanding arising between the United States on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and ourselves on the other as to the nature of the commitment which has been given by President Truman to Mr. Attlee -- and extended to the Canadian Prime Minister -- that the President would keep us informed of any circumstances which might lead to the use of atomic weapons. There is no doubt that the United Kingdom Government <sup>apparently</sup> feels that a specific commitment for consultation <sup>before use of the bomb</sup> has been made by the President, of the United States. There is no doubt <sup>also</sup> that the United States is satisfied that <sup>has been given</sup> there is no commitment in regard to prior consent <sup>being</sup> required from any other government before atomic weapons are used. <sup>has been given</sup> Mr. Acheson has been quite specific on this point in his secret statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. <sup>that no commitment requiring consent has been given any government.</sup> A misunderstanding which may arise, therefore, would be over the distinction between "consultation" and "<sup>information</sup> consent". In our case, that misunderstanding may be more difficult to avoid because of the fact that the United States Government have leased Canadian bases from which an attack could be mounted. As you will see from what follows in this letter, we are asking the United States Government to agree to a kind of prior consultation which, in certain circumstances, would really imply consent. We agree, however, with your assessment of the difficulties of imposing specific conditions on the United States in regard to this matter and

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- 3 -

CASE II

1. Under conditions where the information received was not from comint sources but was from sources such as Air Defence Command, it is considered that there would not be time to follow the procedures outlined above and many of the stages indicated would have to be telescoped due to lack of time. A suggested procedure is as follows.
2. A Chief of Staff receiving this information would notify the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, and the Indication Centre. The Indication Centre would attempt to confirm the information.
3. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, would pass the information, after confirmation, to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Secretary to the Cabinet; would immediately consult the Minister and the Chiefs of Staff; and would immediately ascertain from the United States Chiefs of Staff their assessment of the information. After confirmation had been received that an attack was imminent, the Minister of National Defence would be requested to call an alert.
4. Just how much consultation could be carried out would depend upon the type and assessment of the information and whether the Prime Minister and other Cabinet Ministers were available for consultation.

copy

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Under-Secretary

Security TOP SECRET

Date March 1, 1955

FROM: G.H. Southam/Defence Liaison (2)/mh

File No.

50028-BX-40

REFERENCE:

5258

SUBJECT: Intelligence Alerts

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You will have received Mr. Norman Robertson's three telegrams, Nos. 249, 250 and 251 of February 28th, on this subject. The line suggested by the Foreign Office appears to be a sensible one. However, before we inform Mr. Robertson accordingly, and prepare the necessary brief for Mr. Heeney in Washington, I suggest that General Foulkes' concurrence should be obtained. To that end, I have prepared the attached letter to the General for your signature if you concur. This letter was shown to Mr. Teakles and then Dr. MacKay in draft; neither of them had any changes to suggest, and Mr. Teakles' concurrence in this memorandum is noted in the margin.

sgd.  
J.M.T.

G. H. SOUTHAM

(G. H. Southam)

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*What U.S. is now asking of Doc is just the same as what we are asking of the U.S. in the context of the use of the bomb. The use of the bomb is a matter of life or death.*

the most we can therefore do is to make it absolutely clear that both Governments know what the other means by any implied commitments.

4. For these reasons, we have not attempted to distinguish too carefully between being consulted and being kept informed. We appreciate the President's difficulty in giving any undertaking that would be acceptable to Congress and constitutionally valid, to the effect that he would consult any Government before authorizing the use of the bomb. Equally, the Canadian Government could not ask for less than to be consulted on a matter of such importance. It is realized, however, that any advance notification the Canadian Government were given, even on the basis of being "kept informed", would open the way for a reply by the Canadian Government which would in effect mean consultations between the two Governments. No document could ensure the effectiveness of such consultations, which would in the final analysis depend on mutual confidence and good faith at the top political level.

5. We believe a clear distinction will have to be made in any general "canopy" agreement such as has been proposed between

consultation or information concerning circumstances which might lead to the imminent use of the bomb, and, consultation or information concerning any other arrangements under the proposed agreement.

The Ministers regard any information or consultation concerning operational employment of the weapon as fundamentally different and distinct from information or consultation concerning arrangements which might be made between the two Services on Government authority for such matters as deployment of aircraft,

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storage facilities, construction and training programmes. As regards the latter, what might be termed the non-operational feature of our co-operation, the Ministers see no objection to accepting a procedure whereby arrangements of this kind would be made through senior Service channels, under the general "canopy" agreement proposed.

6. It is, of course, assumed, as we must assume, that Canadian bases would not be used by the United States Government for mounting an attack except in circumstances in which Canada was already at war (or on the verge of war) for all practical purposes, even though the constitutional processes necessary for a formal declaration of war might not have been completed. This, however, must be a reservations implicit in our general reference to North Atlantic Treaty obligations, which has been dealt with in paragraph 2 of this letter.

7. As regards any communication between Governments as to a possible strike, the Ministers consider that diplomatic channels should be used. By this they mean that the State Department would communicate with the Canadian Embassy in Washington which would act as the channel to the Department of External Affairs and the Governments. Whether a proposed operation were to be mounted or staged from Canadian territory or from the continental United States, the Prime Minister would assume that he would be kept informed by the President. This was indicated in the letter of December 11 from Mr. Arneson to Mr. Ignatieff sent on Mr. Acheson's instructions, informing the Canadian Government that the assurances referred to in paragraph 3 above which President Truman had given to Mr. Attlee also applied to the Canadian Government.

8. In a separate letter, I shall explain how we would propose to establish a channel of communication which could function with the utmost speed and security in such an eventuality. Although I realize, from your letter No. 3088 of December 2, that you have already told Mr. Arneson that you

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OTTAWA, March 1, 1955

*Copy on 50030-AB-4-40*  
Dear General Foulkes,

As you are aware, my Minister's comments on the United Kingdom working paper entitled "Possible Stages of Action When Indications of Major Russian Aggression are Received in Good Time" were forwarded to Mr. Robertson in London on February 17 last. Mr. Pearson's comments took into account the J.I.C. brief on the subject, which was noted by the Chiefs of Staff on the following day.

We have now received, in telegrams Nos. 250, and 251 of February 28 from Canada House, the Foreign Office reply. This is given in the form of two letters dated February 26 from Mr. Patrick Dean to Mr. Robertson. The first deals with our comments point by point as follows:

- a) They agree that it would be wiser to remove all references to informing the Commonwealth Governments, although they point out that this would not, of course, limit their right to consult and inform such governments.
- b) They admit that their J.I.C., like ours, would be faced by problems of staffing, which may present difficulty when they come to elaborate a really fast procedure. But they consider that this problem should present itself more clearly when they start to examine a high speed drill, together with us, and they are confident that we shall be able to overcome it.

General Charles Foulkes, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., C.D.,  
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,  
Department of National Defence,  
O t t a w a.

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- 2 -

- c) Mr. Pearson asked why the United Kingdom paper was confined to the NATO area and to Russian aggression. Mr. Dean's reply on this point reads as follows:

"We do not think that the procedure outlined in our paper is incompatible with the NATO system of alerts. The whole object of our present exercise is to elaborate a practical and speedy procedure which would work independently, but in support, of the NATO alert system. The NATO alert system is in any case to be overhauled and our representatives will no doubt be able to influence the discussions in such a way as to reduce any conflict with our own private procedure to the minimum.

I agree with you that the omission of any reference in the paper to the Middle East and Far East is sufficiently explained in the text. We intend to produce a parallel procedure for these areas in due course, but we feel that, as a matter of tactics, initially it is better to secure American agreement within the context of NATO out of which the present exercise first arose. If it is presented to the Americans as something springing directly, as it in fact did, from the last Ministerial meeting in Paris, it should be possible to restrict discussion to the NATO angle. Moreover if we can work out a good procedure for NATO with the complications introduced by the existence of SACEUR, etc., we would expect to be able to make satisfactory arrangements for other theatres, which are at least no more complicated."

In his second letter, Mr. Dean sets out the Foreign Office thinking about the best method of proceeding with this matter with the Americans after agreement has been reached on the draft paper. He suggests that it would probably be unwise for our two Governments to make a joint

.... /4

thought the Prime Minister would prefer the civil to the military channel for this purpose, you can now be quite specific in saying that the Government wish the diplomatic channel only to be used for this purpose.

9. As we have said, the Government have no objection to the employment of Service channels for notification of detailed Service arrangements for non-operational activities.

10. There is a third category of communications for which we would prefer that diplomatic channels should also be used. As we understand it, nuclear components would never be carried on training flights, although bombs, less their nuclear components, might be; the only purposes for which nuclear components would have to be flown across Canadian territory would be to take them to Goose Bay or Harmon Field for storage, or, when mounted, on a strike. As the movement of nuclear components to advance bases such as Harmon and Goose might, in fact, be the earliest indication of the U.S. Government's appreciation of the seriousness of the situation, the Ministers would like it understood that any movement of nuclear components over Canadian territory, or to or from a base in Canadian territory, would require prior notification through the diplomatic channel. In such cases, we assume that the Service channel might also be employed at the same time as the diplomatic channel, so that preparations at a Service level could be made for rapid action following a Government decision.

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ACCESS SECTION / SECTION DE L'ACCES

DOCUMENT REMOVED FROM FILE / DOCUMENT RETIRE DU DOSSIER

RG 25 Volume 195 File 50069-C-40 pt 1  
1990-9/008  
Dossier

Nature of document / Description du document Memorandum for Mr Heaney

No. of Pages / Nbre de pages 2

Date 20/3/57

Exempt/Exception 30(a) 15(1)  
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Reason for Removal / Loi sur l'accès à l'information  
Retrait en vertu de

Review Officer / Agent(e) d'examen DEA/lb.

- 3 -

approach to the Americans, because we would not wish to give the impression that we have reached definite agreement on this complicated problem before consulting them. He suggests, therefore, that the United Kingdom and Canadian Ambassadors in Washington should be instructed as soon as possible to make separate approaches to Mr. Foster Dulles. They could recall the discussions which took place in Paris after the NATO Meeting in December, and say that their Governments think that the time has come to begin tripartite discussions on the problem, that Washington would be the best place in which to carry on these discussions, and that as soon as the other two Governments are ready discussions could be opened on a tripartite basis. The Ambassadors could also say that, as the problems involved are both political and military, it would probably be convenient if both political and military representatives were to take part. (Mr. Dean explains that the Foreign Office would like Sir Roger Makins to keep in close touch with General Whiteley, the head of the B.J.S.M., and he conjectures that as far as the Americans are concerned, presumably both Mr. Allen Dulles and the Pentagon would be brought in at an early stage).

Mr. Dean further suggests that Sir Roger Makins should tell Mr. Dulles of the existence of the United Kingdom draft paper, proposing that it might be used as the basis for discussion. He would emphasize, of course, that the ideas it contains cover only the stages to be completed if time allowed and that it would be very desirable, if the Americans agree, to work out a telescoped procedure among the three parties. Finally, Mr. Dean asks our views as to whether it would be better for the United Kingdom or the Canadian Ambassador to make the first approach to Mr. Dulles.

I should be grateful to receive your comments on the foregoing as soon as possible. In my view the line suggested by the Foreign Office in Mr. Dean's letters is a sensible one, and if you agree, I should like to inform Mr. Robertson accordingly. It will, also, be necessary to brief Mr. Heeney in Washington. My feeling is that it would be better to allow Sir Roger Makins to make the first approach to the Americans, and instruct Mr. Heeney to follow it up.

- 4 -

In my telegram to Mr. Robertson, I believe I should remind him of one point made by Mr. Pearson, upon which neither of Mr. Dean's letters comments directly. Mr. Pearson stated that we should like to have the opportunity of seeing the revised paper, and having it approved by the Chiefs of Staff and the Cabinet Defence Committee, before it is put to the Americans.

Yours sincerely,

JULIEN LÉGER

Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

EXT. 97.

# MESSAGE FORM

FILE REF.	
COPY NO. 1 OF 5 COPIES	

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 50115 - 40  
 5/1/51

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D.C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL TO SECRET~~

Message To Be Sent

EN CLAIR

CODE

CYPHER  AUTO / XXX

No. **Ex - 555**

Date **March 16, 1951.**

For Communications Office Use Only

**SENT -- MAR 16 1951**

Degree of Priority

ORIGINATOR

Sig. ....

Typed: **J. George/bw**

Div. **Def. Liaison**

Local Tel. **3795**

Following for Wrong from Heeney, Begins:

Your WA-944 of March 13, 1951. U.S. Strategic Air Command Projects.

1. My reply, which you saw in draft in Ottawa, was ready to be sent when we received your Letter No. 762 of March 3. After reconsideration in the light of your letter, I think my reply can be sent in more or less its original form, but I wish to discuss the matter with the Minister this afternoon. If he agrees, my reply will be in the next bag. **E.A.S.**

APPROVED BY

Sig. **[Signature]**

Typed: .....

Is This Message Likely To Be Published

Yes ( ) No ( )

Internal Distribution:

**4 SSEA #4**

Done **[Signature]**

Date **Mar 17/51**

Copies Referred To:

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

*to file  
G.H.S.*

TO: The Under-Secretary .....

Security TOP SECRET .....

Date March 1, 1955

FROM: G.H. Southam/Defence Liaison (2)/mh .....

File No. 50028-BX-4

REFERENCE: .....

5032

SUBJECT: Intelligence Alerts .....

You will have received Mr. Norman Robertson's three telegrams, Nos. 249, 250 and 251 of February 28th, on this subject. The line suggested by the Foreign Office appears to be a sensible one. However, before we inform Mr. Robertson accordingly, and prepare the necessary brief for Mr. Heeney in Washington, I suggest that General Foulkes' concurrence should be obtained. To that end, I have prepared the attached letter to the General for your signature if you concur. This letter was shown to Mr. Teakles and then Dr. MacKay in draft: neither of them had any changes to suggest, and Mr. Teakles' concurrence in this memorandum is noted in the margin.

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him  
...*

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
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*G.H. Southam*  
(G. H. Southam)

INCOMING MESSAGE

Copy No. ... of 24 Copies

ORIGINAL

FROM: THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON

*Copy on 50030 AB-4-40*

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification	
TOP SECRET	
File No.	
50028-BX-40	
52	50

Priority	System	No.	Date
IMMEDIATE	CYPHER-AUTO	251	February 28, 1955.

Departmental Circulation

MINISTER 2-3

UNDER/SEC 4-5

D/UNDER/SEC 6-7

A/UNDER/SEC'S 8-9

POL. COOR. SECT. 10

DONE - COMM'S SECTION

Date FEB 28 '55

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REBUT A SECRET**

Reference: My telegram No. 249 of February 28.

Subject:

Following for Leger from Robertson, Begins:

Following is text of second letter from Dean, referred to in paragraph 1, Begins:

"I have written to you today on the substance of the "alerts" question raised in Ottawa telegram No. 290 of February 17. We have also given thought to the best method of proceeding with this matter with the Americans after our two governments have reached agreement on the draft paper which we have been considering for the last few weeks. It may be more convenient if I set out our ideas about procedure in a separate letter.

2. It seems to us that it would probably be unwise for our two governments to make a joint approach to the Americans in Washington because we do not wish to give them the impression that you and we have reached definite agreements on this complicated problem before consulting them. Since our object is to reach eventual agreement among the three governments we think that, now we have both run over the ground together, the sooner tripartite discussions can begin the better.

3. Our suggestion therefore is that the United Kingdom and Canadian Ambassadors should make separate approaches in Washington to Mr. Foster Dulles. They could recall the discussions which took place in Paris after the NATO meeting in December and say that their governments think that the time has come to begin tripartite discussions of the problem, that Washington would be the best place in which to carry on these discussions and that as soon as the other two governments are ready talks could be opened on a tripartite basis.

4. The Ambassadors could also say that, as the problems involved are both political and military, it would probably be convenient if both political and military representatives should take part. So far as we are concerned we should certainly wish our Ambassador to keep in close touch with General Whiteley, the Head of the

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*File*

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*Dulles*

*Done, Mar 55*

*gus*

Date

Date

6.

ACCESS SECTION / SECTION DE L'ACCES

DOCUMENT REMOVED FROM FILE / DOCUMENT RETIRE DU DOSSIER

RG 25 Volume 195 File 50069-C-40 pt 1  
1990-91/008  
Dossier

Nature of document / USSEA letter "D-" (draft copy)  
Description du document

No. of Pages / 4 Date 16/3/51  
Nbre de pages

Exempt/Exception, 13(1)(a), 15(1)  
Access To Information Act /  
Reason for Removal / Loi sur l'accès à l'information  
Retrait en vertu de

Review Officer / DEA/ll.  
Agent(e) d'examen

Copy No. 1 of 5 Copies

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, March 16, 1951.

50069-200 Seen by  
u1 ✓ A. Dawson

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

U.S. Strategic Air Command Projects

I have revised our draft letter to Mr. Wrong commenting on the Pentagon draft of a communication with the Canadian Government on this subject. You saw the earlier draft before Mr. Wrong's visit and returned it without comments. In view of the importance of the subject, however, I should prefer to have your approval before sending the attached letter to Mr. Wrong.

....

My reply was prepared before we received a further letter, No. 762 of March 3, from Mr. Wrong on this subject, in the light of which I thought the reply should be reconsidered, as it goes into greater detail than he has before on the possibilities of misunderstandings arising between the United States Government on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and Canadian Governments on the other, as a result of differing interpretations of the Attlee-Truman discussions on this point. Although I think this is a real source of worry, I think my reply can stand. If you agree, I should like to send it as soon as possible, as we have, I am afraid, been rather slow in commenting on the Pentagon proposals of January.

I think, if you agree, we should send copies of Mr. Wrong's Letter No. 762 and my reply to the Prime Minister, Mr. Claxton, Mr. Howe, and Mr. Robertson.

*A.D.P.H.*  
A.D.P.H.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

-2-

B.J.S.M. We do not know which Americans are likely to be concerned, but presumably both Mr. Allen Dulles and the Pentagon would have to be brought in at an early stage.

5. We also think that it might be useful to ask Makins when he sees Mr. Dulles to say that the United Kingdom had been giving some thought to the whole problem and had prepared a draft paper for discussion which could either be tabled when the tripartite discussions began or could be circulated in advance to the Canadians and the Americans if this were thought to be more convenient. We should of course have no objection to your Ambassador mentioning the draft paper, if your government wished, but it seems to us that perhaps it would be more convenient for Makins to make the first reference to it because the paper as at present drafted is written very much from the United Kingdom point of view.

6. We also think that either Makins or your Ambassador or both should mention to Mr. Dulles that the United Kingdom and Canadian Governments took advantage of Mr. Pearson's presence in London for the Commonwealth Conference to have a preliminary talk about some of the problems involved. This would we think help to get over the difficulty mentioned in paragraph 2 above.

7. Finally we think that the point should be made to the Americans that the ideas contained in the draft paper only covered the stages to be completed if time allowed and that it would be very desirable, if the Americans agreed, to work out an urgent or "telescoped" procedure among the three parties.

8. If your government agree with some such procedure as this, it remains to decide whether it would be better for Makins or your Ambassador to make the first approach to Mr. Dulles. We have an open mind on this question and are ready to fall in with whichever course your government prefers. In any case our two Ambassadors will have to keep closely in touch until tripartite discussions get under way.

9. There may be points about this proposed procedure which you would like to discuss with me. If so I am very ready to come over and see you at any time convenient to you. If, as I expect, you will wish to refer to Ottawa, it would be helpful if you could ask for a reply soon, as we think that we should try to begin tripartite talks in the near future." Ends.

-----

INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL

Copy No. 1 of 24 copies.

FROM: THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON

*Copy on 50028-AB-4-40*

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

TOP SECRET

File No. 50028-BX-40

52 | 50

Priority	System	No. 249	Date February 28, 1955.
IMMEDIATE	CYPHER - AUTO		

Departmental Circulation

MINISTER 2-3  
 UNDER/SEC 4-5  
 D/UNDER/SEC 6-7  
 A/UNDER/SEC'S 8-9  
 POL COOR SECT. 10

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

Reference: Your telegram No. 290 of February 17.

Subject:

Following for Leger from Robertson, Begins:

My immediately following telegrams contain the texts of two letters, dated February 26, from Patrick Dean to whom I had given a copy of your telegram under reference. The first deals with the substantive questions you raised about the United Kingdom paper. The second sets forth present United Kingdom thinking as to how and when the general question could best be raised with the United States. They leave it to us to say whether we think our Ambassador or theirs should make the first approach to Mr. Dulles. In the circumstances, and having in mind the history of the paper, I expect you will feel that it would be more appropriate for the United Kingdom Ambassador in Washington to open up the subject.

2. I note that Dean's letters do not refer to your paragraph 6. The answer is that there was an error in the numbering of the paragraphs in the United Kingdom draft paper of which you have a copy. Ends.

DON... COMM'S SECTION

Date FEB 28 55

Date

References

Dh (1) 11  
*file*  
*gus/Dec*  
*Line 1 Mar 55 gus*

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28.2.33(us)

50069-2-40  
41 ✓

Defence Liaison(1)/J.George/bw

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, March 16, 1951.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REVIEW A STAGE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

U.S. Strategic Air Command Projects

... Sent 16/3/51

Attached for your consideration is a telegram to Mr. Wrong replying to his message WA-944, also attached.

....

We are also attaching a memorandum for the Minister which you asked us to prepare this morning explaining why Canadian comments on the U.S. proposals have been held up and asking the Minister's approval for the letter you are proposing to send to Mr. Wrong.

....

Also attached is a supplementary letter on communications procedures which was drafted in the expectation that it could be sent as an immediately following letter on mechanics, not policy. I hardly think it need go to the Minister.

RAM.

Defence Liaison Division(1).

ORIGINAL

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

TOP SECRET

MINISTER  
UNDR/SEC  
D/UNDR/SEC  
A/UNDR/SEC'S

CYPHER - AUTO  
WA - 944

WASHINGTON, March 13, 1951.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
R.D.J.T A SECRET

10069-C-40  
~~50195-40~~  
58 Chas. ... Filed...

Top Secret. Following for Heeney from Wrong, Begins:  
Reference your EX-295 of February 9th. United States Strategic Air Command projects.

You mentioned in your message under reference that you hoped to be in a position very shortly to comment in detail on the terms of the proposed agreed exchange of notes between the United States and the Canadian Governments. We have taken every occasion to stress here our preference for using civilian rather than military channels for communications on these matters. As the State Department is being pressed by the United States Air Force for some action, as a result of the approach made to us last January, I think that it would be very desirable to give the State Department some detailed comment on the proposals made to us last January as soon as possible. Ends.

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14 MAR 1951

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

INCOMING MESSAGE

COPY NO..... OF 24 COPIES.

ORIGINAL

FROM: THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON.

*Copy on 50030-AB-Y-4*

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification	
TOP SECRET	
File No.	
50028-DX-40	
52	50

Priority <b>IMMEDIATE</b>	System CYPHER-AUTO	No. 250	Date February 28, 1955.
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Departmental Circulation

MINISTER 2-2  
 UNDER/SEC 4-5  
 D/UNDER/SEC 6-7  
 A/UNDER/SEC'S 8-9  
 POL. COOR. SECT. 10

DONE-COMM'S SECTION

Date FEB 28 55

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

Reference: My immediately preceding telegram No. 249 of February 28.

Subject:

Following for Leger from Robertson, Begins:

Following is text of first letter from Dean, referred to in paragraph 1, Begins:

"We have considered the telegram on "alerts" (No. 290 of February 17) which you handed to me the other day and we find ourselves in general agreement with the comments contained therein.

2. We agree that it would be wiser to remove all references to informing Commonwealth Governments, and this can be done by excising the relevant words in paragraphs 10, 12 and 17 of our paper without affecting the general sense. We would not, of course, regard this as limiting our right to consult and inform Commonwealth Governments. The Americans know that this is our practice, and we agree that there is no point in making specific mention of it in the present context.

3. In our J.I.C. we have similar problems of staffing and it may be that these will present difficulty when we come to elaborate a really fast procedure. But the problems should present themselves clearly when we start examining a high speed drill together and we are confident that we can overcome them, as no doubt your J.I.C. can.

4. We do not think that the procedure outlined in our paper is incompatible with the NATO system of alerts. The whole object of our present exercise is to elaborate a practical and speedy procedure which would work independently, but in support, of the NATO alert system. The NATO alert system is in any case to be overhauled and our representatives will no doubt be able to influence the discussions in such a way as to reduce any conflict with our own private procedure to the minimum.

5. I agree with you that the omission of any reference in the paper to the Middle East and Far East is sufficiently explained in the text. We intend to produce a parallel procedure for these areas in due course, but we feel that, no a matter of tactics, initially it is better to procure American agreement within the context of NATO out of which

*DH(1) "*  
*file*  
*gms/*  
*DH*  
*Jan. Mar 55*  
*gms*

Date

Date

*28.2.46(05)*

the present exercise first arose. If it is presented to the Americans as something springing directly, as it in fact did, from the last Ministerial meeting in Paris, it should be possible to restrict discussion to the NATO angle. Moreover if we can work out a good procedure for NATO with the complications introduced by the existence of SACEUR, etc., we would expect to be able to make satisfactory arrangements for other theatres, which are at least no more complicated." Ends.

.....

CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1951 MAR 14 AM 10:18  
18

Defence Liaison/J.George/bw 726

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, March 5, 1951.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REMIT A SECRET**

50069-2-10	
41	✓

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MACKAY

.....

The attached memorandum for the Under-Secretary is ready for signature, but we should probably wait until the earlier letter to Washington has been sent. Could you conveniently find out from Mr. Heeney what is happening? Mr. Le Pan has not seen it in the Minister's Office and the mail room told me it has not been sent.

I should like to discuss this whole matter of communications with Mr. Starnes if you approve and then raise it, when we hear from Washington, with Mr. Daley.

*U*

James George.

MESSAGE FORM  
 OUTGOING

File No.	
50028-BX-4	
58	50

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: HEAD OF POST, LONDON

*Copy on 50030-AB-4-40*

*File 16*

Message To Be Sent	No. 290	Date February 17, 1955	For Communications Section Only SENT - FEB 17 1955
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AIR CYPHER  
 EN CLAIR  
 CODE  
 CYPHER *Auto* XXX

Priority  
**IMMEDIATE**

ORIGINATOR  
 (Signature)  
 G.C. Crean / elb  
 (Name Typed)  
 Div. D.L.(2)  
 Local Tel. 7051

APPROVED BY  
 (Signature)  
 (Name Typed)

Internal Distribution:  
 S.S.E.A. - U.S.S.E.A.  
 ✓ D.L. (1)  
 (Mr. Teakles)  
*Done. 18.2.55 E.B.*  
 Done. *P. W.*  
 Date. *Feb 18/55*

Copies Referred To:  
 Done.  
 Date.  
 Ext. 97 (Rev. 1/52)

REFERENCE: Your telegram No. 195 of February 14.  
**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**  
 SUBJECT:  
 Following for Robertson from Leger begins:

The Minister's comments on United Kingdom working paper are substantially on the lines set forth in your telegram. In particular, he feels it would be unwise to make any references to informing Commonwealth Governments. He also had some worry about whether the J.I.C. organization had sufficient people to undertake this sort of task. We have, however, had a word with the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, and he is of the opinion that a few extra officers might be found to undertake this work, at least in so far as really important items of intelligence are concerned. Even under present circumstances, we could by giving such items priority, take part in the procedure envisaged by the paper.

2. At the official level we believe that the consequences of failing to take part in such a procedure might leave us in the position that the Government might have to take a decision without full knowledge upon which such a decision should be based. In addition, by failing to take part we might also be left in a worse position on the exchange of intelligence than we are at the present time.

- 2 -

1. The Chiefs of Staff will consider the paper on Friday but meanwhile General Foulkes has told us that his chief worry about the paper is whether or not Part II of it cuts across the already agreed system of NATO alerts.

X  
4. We should like to have the opportunity of seeing the revised paper before it is put to the Americans. We should also like to have it approved by the Chiefs of Staff and by Cabinet Defence Committee. Although, therefore, you are free to say that we think a paper on these lines, taking into account Minister's comments, would probably be acceptable, we will not be able to accept it formally until the new draft has been approved in accordance with the procedure outlined above.

5. There is one additional point on which you might question the United Kingdom officials. As you know, the J.I.C. has been exchanging with the Americans and the British information which goes much beyond matters which directly affect Russian aggression against the NATO area. We are not very clear why the British wish to confine this paper to the NATO area on the one hand and to Russian aggression on the other. We are, as you know, equally interested in any information on possible communist aggression any where, including possible Chinese communist aggression. It occurs to us, however, that the United Kingdom may be anxious to limit this paper to the NATO area for tactical reasons with the Americans, bearing in mind United States sensitivity on Far Eastern questions. Some explanation would be useful.

6. Incidentally, there is no paragraph 16 in the document in our possession. Is this an error in numbering or has a paragraph been left out?

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Ext. 182A

*Ref*  
PM #3  
SSEA #4  
to Clerk #5  
to Robertson #6  
to Robertson #7  
*Done Mar 22 BW*

OTTAWA FILE  
No. 50067-E-40

411  
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
TOP SECRET.

Letter No. .... 762 .....  
Date..... March 3rd, 1951.....

FROM: The Canadian Ambassador, Washington, D. C.  
TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA  
Reference.... Your EX-295 of February 9th, 1951.....  
Subject:..... United States Strategic Air Command Projects.....

1. In thinking about the desire of the United States Government to secure a "canopy" agreement with Canada which would cover the use of Goose Bay and Harmon Field for the deployment of atomic weapons, it occurred to me that it would be useful to seek information about any arrangements which may have been made between the United States and United Kingdom with regard to similar projects at the United States bases in England. I therefore asked Mr. Ignatieff to raise this issue with Mr. Arneson when he next had an occasion to see him. Mr. Ignatieff saw Mr. Arneson on February 28th at the latter's request, and I enclose a note which he has given me of their discussion about the arrangements made with the United Kingdom. From this it would appear that no formal agreement has been concluded, although Mr. Attlee has given his consent to arrangements worked out between the Chiefs of Staff of the two countries.

2. You will notice that Mr. Arneson told Mr. Ignatieff that shortly after this visit Mr. Acheson, in answer to a question at a secret session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said that the United States Government did not have to obtain the consent of any other government before using atomic weapons. This revives my apprehension that the results of the conversations between Mr. Truman and Mr. Attlee last December may become the subject of misunderstanding between the United Kingdom and the United States. In my Despatch No. 3121 of December 13th, 1950, I mentioned an account of the discussions between Mr. Truman and Mr. Attlee on the use of atomic weapons which had been given to me on a personal basis by Sir Oliver Franks, and said that the British Ambassador had asked me not to report what he had told me unless I found it necessary to do so in order to be sure that the Prime Minister and Mr. Pearson understood the position. Although you have not asked me to forward this information and I have not been informed what account of these discussions was given to Mr. St. Laurent by Mr. Attlee in Ottawa, I think that it is advisable to send you at this time a copy of the record which I made on December 13th, 1950, of my talk with Sir Oliver. This is also enclosed herewith.

3. It certainly appears from this as though the British Government is satisfied that there will be prior consultation before any use of atomic weapons by the United States. Publicly, however, the United States Government is bound to do no more than to

/transmit

Copies Referred To.....
No. of Enclosures ..... 2 .....
Post File No.....

transmit information. The issue, of course, is whether the private and verbal assurances given to Mr. Attlee by Mr. Truman continue to be in effect or whether they have been superseded by the more cautious language used in the joint communique of December 8th. Is there, in short, a satisfactory meeting of minds on the interpretation of the words used in the communique in which the President undertook "to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments"? If this is accepted as equivalent to the President's assurances to Mr. Attlee that there should be prior consultation, no later difficulties should arise, unless prior consultation is taken in London to mean that the weapon will not be employed without the consent of the United Kingdom - and also of Canada, since we have been officially informed that Canada is in the same position as the United Kingdom.

4. My observations may seem to have a semantic flavour, and I do not see readily how a higher degree of precision can be secured covering every circumstance in which the use of atomic weapons might become an immediate issue. Indeed, considering the range of circumstances which might arise and the extreme rapidity with which in certain conditions a decision might have to be taken, I think that we should leave the question of the interpretation of the Truman-Attlee understanding where it is.

5. Let us assume that some atomic weapons, probably without nuclear components, will be dispersed at bases used by the Strategic Air Force at Goose Bay and Harmon Field as well as at United States bases in England, Alaska, the continental United States and possibly one or two points elsewhere. Under the proposed "canopy" agreement we would receive notice through Service channels of the transfer to the two Canadian fields of any nuclear components to complete the weapons, and once the desirability of the deployment to these fields of the weapons has been accepted there would be no solid ground for objecting to their completion. The critical stage, of course, comes later when an immediate decision might have to be taken to use the weapon. We are assured that we shall be informed of the developments respecting its use not only from Canadian fields but anywhere. (Indeed, I think that the point of departure of the carrier aircraft is a matter of small importance provided that there is a simultaneous entry into a state of war of the United States and the country having territorial sovereignty over the base employed outside the United States.)

6. Mr. Arneson outlined on December 6th last to Mr. Ignatieff the various conditions under which in his judgment questions of the use of the atomic weapon might arise, ranging between an overt Soviet attack directly against the United States and an attack by satellite forces only on a country not party to the North Atlantic Treaty. If the Russians were to employ the Pearl Harbour method to open war with the United States, the most that we could expect would be to receive information that retaliation with atomic weapons was being ordered. One can imagine the possibility that the Secretaries of Defense and State and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission might be called to the White House from their beds to advise Mr. Truman on making an instant decision which would be put into effect without delay. In other cases where the time factor was not so pressing the obligation of the United States to keep the United Kingdom and Canada informed might well in effect amount to prior consultation and possibly to the reaching of a joint decision.

*W. Arneson*

RECEIVED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
AFFAIRS  
1955 FEB 18 AM 11:46

000132

RAFT  
TELEGRAM

50028-BX-40  
5252

TOP SECRET

February 17, 1955

*Retain in file*  
*by [signature]*

TO: Office of the High Commissioner for Canada,  
London.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

*Immediate*

Following for Robertson from Leger begins:  
Reference your telegram No. 195 of February 14.

~~I have had a word with Mr. Pearson about the~~  
~~United Kingdom working paper and his comments are on United~~  
~~Kingdom working paper and~~  
substantially on the lines set forth in your telegram.

In particular, he feels it would be unwise to make any  
references to informing Commonwealth Governments. He  
also had some worry about whether the J.I.C. organization  
had sufficient people to undertake this sort of task.

We have, however, had a word with the <sup>Chairman</sup> Chief of the <sup>Staff</sup>  
General Staff and he is of the opinion that a few extra  
officers might be found to undertake this work, at least  
in so far as really important items of intelligence are  
concerned. Even under present circumstances, we could  
by giving such items priority, take part in the procedure  
envisaged by the paper.

*All the official level now believe that*  
2. The consequences of failing to take part  
in such a procedure might leave us in the position  
that the Government might have to take a decision  
without full knowledge upon which such a decision should  
be based. In addition, by failing to take part we might  
also be left in a worse <sup>pos</sup> condition on the exchange of  
intelligence than we are at the present time.

*seen by [signature]*  
*[signature]*  
*[signature]*

5

ACCESS SECTION / SECTION DE L'ACCES

DOCUMENT REMOVED FROM FILE / DOCUMENT RETIRE DU DOSSIER

RG 25 Volume 195 File/Dossier 1990-91/008  
50069-C-40 pt 1

Nature of document / Description du document  
Memorandum of Conversation  
between Ignatieff and Arneson

No. of Pages / Nbre de pages 2 Date 28/2/51

Exempt/Exception, 13(1)(a), 15(1)  
Access To Information Act/  
Reason for Removal / Loi sur l'accès à l'information  
Retrait en vertu de

Review Officer / Agent(e) d'examen DEA/lb.

4

ACCESS SECTION / SECTION DE L'ACCES

DOCUMENT REMOVED FROM FILE / DOCUMENT RETIRE DU DOSSIER

RG 25 Volume 195 File 1990-91/008  
150069-C-40 pt 1  
Dossier

Nature of document / Human-Attlee Discussion on  
Description du document  
Atomic Questions

No. of Pages / 2 Date 13/12/50  
Nbre de pages

Exempt/Exception 13(1)(a), 15(1)  
Access To Information Act/  
Reason for Removal / Loi sur l'accès à l'information  
Retrait en vertu de

Review Officer / DEA/lb.  
Agent(e) d'examen

- 2 -

3. The Chiefs of Staff will consider the paper on Friday but meanwhile General Foulkes has told us that his chief worry about the paper is whether or not Part II of it cuts across the already agreed system of NATO alerts.

4. We should like to have the opportunity of seeing the revised paper before it is put to the Americans. We should also like to have it approved by the Chiefs of Staff and by Cabinet Defence Committee. Although, therefore, you are free to say that we think a paper on these lines, taking into account <sup>Minister's</sup> Mr. Pearsen's comments, would probably be acceptable, we will not be able to accept it formally until the new draft has been approved ~~and~~ in accordance with the procedure ~~I have~~ outlined above.

5. There is one additional point on which you might question the United Kingdom officials. As you know, the J.I.C. has been exchanging with the Americans and the British information which goes much beyond matters which directly affect Russian aggression against the NATO area. We are not very clear why the British wish to confine this paper to the NATO area on the one hand and to Russian aggression on the other. We are, as you know, equally interested in any information on possible communist aggression any where, including possibly Chinese Communist aggression. It occurs to us, however, that the United Kingdom may be anxious to limit this paper to the NATO area for tactical reasons with the Americans, bearing in mind United States sensitivity on Far Eastern questions. Some explanation would be useful.

6. Incidentally, there is no Paragraph 16 in the document in our possession. Is this an error in numbering or has a paragraph been left out?<sup>7</sup>

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Defence Liaison/J.George/bw

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, February 28, 1951.

57068-e-40  
ca ✓

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY ✓

United States Strategic Air Command Projects

.....  
Attached for your consideration is a memorandum for the Minister asking for his approval before your revised reply is sent to Mr. Wrong. The memorandum for the Minister has been worded so that you may send up the letter to Mr. Wrong either signed or unsigned.

*R.A.H.*

Defence Liaison Division.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**SECRET A SECRET**

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, February 27, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HEANEY

.....

Attached is a trial run of a draft reply to Washington on Strategic Air Command Projects. As I suggested yesterday, it is in the form of a letter putting forth our desiderata rather than in the form of a draft Note which the United States would give us. Although Mr. Wrong apparently favoured a redraft of the U.S. Note, I felt that to do so we would need to have at least the Minister's approval before presenting it and then would have to go back again with the next U.S. draft. My feeling is that it would be preferable to let the United States revise their own draft in the light of our comments on their present draft.

*R.A.M.*

Defence Liaison Division.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**PROBANT A SECRET**

RECEIVED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EX-100 AFFAIRS

1955 FEB 17 PM 6:05

000140

(EXTRACT FROM MINUTES OF THE 427th MEETING OF THE  
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE, Thursday, February 17,  
1955)

*File  
ART (now file)*

50028-BX-40  
52-52

✓ I. INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE

(TOP SECRET)

1. The Committee had for consideration a paper prepared by a UK working party under the chairmanship of Sir Norman Brook, entitled "Possible Stages of Action when Indications of Major Russian Aggression are Received in Good Time". The CCOS had requested that this paper be submitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 18 Feb 55 with JIC comments. Draft comments had been circulated.

(CS 1313-1 JULI - 2 12 55)

2. It was agreed, after discussion, to approve the draft comments, subject to amendments noted by the Acting Secretary, to forward these comments to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, and to invite members of the Committee to brief their respective Chiefs of Staff on this subject.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

Defence Liaison/J.George/bw

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, February 24, 1951.

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NOT SENT

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET

PROPOSED REDRAFT OF THE SUBSTANCE OF A COMMUNICATION WITH THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT

The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff have agreed that, in the event of war, it would be highly desirable for the U.S. Strategic Air Command to have facilities for using Harmon and Goose Bay airfields for staging aircraft to overseas areas. ~~Indeed~~, The use of these two bases would be a decisively important element in a strategic air offensive initiated for the mutual defence of the North Atlantic Treaty nations, and of Canada and the United States in particular.

( ~~As~~, Under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the both the Canadian and/United States Governments have bound themselves to consider an attack against one or more members of the Treaty as an attack against all.) The North Atlantic Treaty nations have agreed, in accordance with the principle of balanced collective forces elaborated in Standing Group document SGM 267/50, that the United States should have responsibility, on behalf of all NATO countries, for strategic air bombing. In enclosure <sup>"E"</sup> ~~of~~ of document DC-26 (circulated to the Deputies as Document D-D/183), the member nations have also agreed to give immediate and special attention to granting requests which one member may make to another for appropriate military operating requirements. It is in furtherance of these <sup>agreed policies</sup> ~~common objectives~~ of North Atlantic Treaty countries that the U.S. ~~Government~~ <sup>Joint Chiefs of Staff</sup> have <sup>give consideration to</sup> ~~request the Canadian Government to agree to~~ a procedure whereby Harmon and Goose Bay would be available ~~for use~~ in an emergency <sup>for staging aircraft of</sup> ~~of~~ the U.S. Strategic Air Command ~~to overseas~~

~~also.~~

for effective use by.

*In advance of an emergency*

(In time of peace, the U.S. Strategic Air Command would require, for the above purposes, facilities for the appropriate deployment of air force units and atomic weapons, storage of weapons and construction of facilities for storage, and over-flight of Canadian territory on training mission. (In this connection, "atomic weapons" would be understood to include bombs and/or nuclear components.)

In the event of war, facilities for actual missions would, of course, be required.

Much of the above activity would be in the nature of operations outside the areas leased to the United States, and would therefore be subject to prior consultation with the Canadian Government. If the Canadian Government agrees in principle, it is suggested that a general agreement be reached as to a simple procedure for prior consultation and notification which would have to provide for maximum secrecy and minimum delay. The following procedure is suggested for the consideration of the Canadian Government:

- (a) Consultation and notification by diplomatic channels concerning any circumstances which might lead to the imminent use of atomic weapons; and,
- (b) notification by Service channels concerning other details of Service arrangements, including deployment of aircraft, storage facilities, construction, and training programmes carried out under the proposed general agreement.

If the Canadian Government so desire, an exception might be made to the procedure suggested in (b) above in the case of aircraft carrying atomic weapons over Canadian territory, whether on training flights or for purposes of bringing bombs or nuclear components to Goose Bay or Harmon for storage. In view of the possible implications of such activities, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff would be agreeable to consulting and notifying the Canadian Government in advance by diplomatic channels.

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE  
NO. CSC 1313-1 (JIC)

Department of National Defence

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

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17 Feb 55

J35

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6 | 50

G.G. Crean, Esq.,  
Dept. of External Affairs.

- DMI
- DAI
- DNI
- DSI
- RCMP
- JIB

*Cross-reference on 50030-AB-4-40*

Possible Stages of Action when Indications  
of Major Russian Aggression are Received  
in Good Time

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FEB 17 1955

1. In accordance with the decision of the Committee at its meeting today, attached are copies of the UK paper on the above subject and the final version of the JIC brief on the paper.
2. The CCOS has again emphasized the need for limited distribution of the UK paper.
3. Copies of the paper and the brief have today been passed to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff for distribution at the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to be held tomorrow.

*J. Trotman*

(J.H. Trotman)  
Acting Secretary.

Encs.

JHT/5459/ff

c.c. JIS

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17 Feb 55

JIC 132(55)

JIC BRIEF ON POSSIBLE STAGES OF ACTION WHEN INDICATIONS  
OF MAJOR RUSSIAN AGGRESSION ARE RECEIVED IN GOOD TIME

1. The JIC has examined the above UK paper in the light of its experience with the "indications project" approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee at its 551st meeting in Nov 53, and of its knowledge of recent UK discussions on this subject. We have the following preliminary views.
2. We find Part I of the document generally acceptable. In fact, we would add that unless Canada takes part in some arrangement of the kind suggested, the Canadian Government may not receive the intelligence information on which to base conclusions regarding NATO alerts, answers to urgent requests concerned with SAC action and with continental defence or other arrangements, or decisions required in other situations.
3. The procedure outlined in Part I of this paper is satisfactory insofar as it concerns the JIC, and in our opinion should be carried out in full if time allows. We are in favour of basing our procedures on the most favourable case while at the same time working out a more rapid procedure to deal with the worst case in which very little or no warning of attack is received.
4. As it is at present constituted, the JIC could now undertake to evaluate information urgently, although we consider certain improvements can be made. Our examination of the previous indications project would suggest that in order to put such procedures on a sound and permanent footing, we shall require to study and make recommendations concerning accommodation, staff and improved communications with Washington and London. We do not consider that a large accretion of staff will be required.
5. We understand that Part II of the paper - the relationship of a system of this kind to the NATO alert system - is being considered separately. We would point out, however, that:
  - (a) Regardless of any arrangements that may be made for the declaration of alerts and subsequent action, the evaluation of the information on which alerts may be based remains a major problem in many cases and is the responsibility of the JIC. In the case of a genuine bolt-from-the-blue attack, the problem is of course simple, but this is by no means the only possibility. We may well receive, for example, indications that build-ups are taking place in threatening areas, possibly together with mounting political tension, and be required to make a judgment on the information and its effects on the threat.
  - (b) The UK paper is restricted to major Russian aggression on the NATO area. In our opinion, there would seem to be a case for considering at one time the whole question of aggressive action by all possible enemies. In this connection, it will be realized that the US Strategic Air Command is not related to NATO and that to restrict the

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- 3 -

In the present unsettled world situation, the initiation of operations might, in a sudden emergency, be dictated by events, and the effectiveness of the action might be seriously jeopardized by any hard and fast procedure for prior consultation. It would, however, be the intention of the United States Government to make every effort to abide by the above undertakings and procedures, and, especially in the case of notification and consultation under (a) above, to give maximum notice to the Canadian Government.

The procedure proposed in (a) above would, of course, apply only to the initial decision of the United States Government to use atomic weapons. In the event of an atomic war, further questions of policy might arise and would require consultation between Governments, / (x)

If the general principles outlined above should be acceptable to the Canadian Government, it is suggested that this communication<sup>s</sup>, together with the Canadian Government's reply, should constitute a general agreement under which diplomatic and Service arrangements may proceed, and in accordance with which the operational commanders concerned, or other appropriate diplomatic or Service agencies, may be authorized to develop the details of the consultation and notification procedures.

/ (x) but no attempt has been made as yet to foresee either the questions <sup>or</sup> ~~on~~ the way in which such further consultation and notification might be carried on.

*Not sent*

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EXTRACTS FROM DRAFT COMMUNICATION FROM THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON

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Much of the above activity would be in the nature of operations outside the areas leased to the United States, and would therefore be subject to prior consultation with the Canadian Government. If the Canadian Government agrees in principle, it is suggested that a general agreement be reached as to a simple procedure for prior consultation and notification which would have to provide for maximum secrecy and minimum delay. The following procedure is suggested for the consideration of the Canadian Government:

- (a) Consultation and notification by diplomatic channels concerning any circumstances which might lead to the imminent use of atomic weapons; and,
- (b) notification by Service channels concerning other details of Service arrangements, including deployment of aircraft, storage facilities, construction, and training programmes carried out under the proposed general agreement.

If the Canadian Government so desire, an exception might be made to the procedure suggested in (b) above in the case of aircraft carrying atomic weapons over Canadian territory, whether on training flights or for purposes of bringing bombs or nuclear components to Goose Bay or Harmon for storage. In view of the possible implications of such activities, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff would be agreeable to consulting and notifying the Canadian Government in advance by diplomatic channels.

In the present unsettled world situation, the initiation of operations might, in a sudden emergency, be dictated by events, and the effectiveness of the action might be seriously jeopardized by any hard and fast procedure for prior consultation. It would, however, be the intention of the United States Government to make every effort to abide by the above undertakings and procedures, and, especially in the case of notification and consultation under (a) above, to give maximum notice to the Canadian Government.

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- 2 -

exchange to the NATO area may cause us to fail to receive the information on which, for example, requests related to SAC action and continental defence may have been initiated. The procedure suggested in Part I would appear to be suitable for all possible situations, but we would like to ensure that the UK would operate it in all situations, and that our agreement in principle to this paper will not restrict us to its operation only insofar as it affects NATO.

6. We also consider that this UK paper should receive some detailed amendment before it is submitted to the US authorities. The reference to "old Commonwealth Governments" in para. 10, for example, is perhaps not wise. We understand, however, that the document is a preliminary draft.

Recommendation

7. We accordingly recommend that we should take part in a tripartite scheme of this kind concerning NATO, but that final comments and recommendations should await the receipt of a revised draft of the UK paper.

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COPY NO. 25

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(COPY OF A PAPER PREPARED BY A UK WORKING PARTY UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF SIR NORMAN BROOK, AND SUBMITTED TO THE CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE CONFERENCE OF COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS)

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET

POSSIBLE STAGES OF ACTION WHEN INDICATIONS OF MAJOR RUSSIAN AGGRESSION ARE RECEIVED IN GOOD TIME

INTRODUCTION

1. This paper deals only with the situation which would arise from a major Russian aggression against the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (N.A.T.O.) area including Turkey. Major aggression by the Communist bloc is possible in other areas and suitable procedures would be required to meet these cases but it would be convenient to consider them separately.
2. This paper sets out the stages which ought to be completed if time allowed. It is recognised that time may not be available for this and that a telescoped procedure will also have to be studied.

PART I

3. Information is received at the London Indicator Centre (which would be the present Joint Intelligence Committee (J.I.C.) organisation suitably adapted) which could mean that the Soviet Union is making preparations for war.
4. The Indicator Centre finds out from the Indicator Centres in Washington and Ottawa whether the same or similar information has reached it. Thus "indicator" experts of the United Kingdom, United States and Canada are fully in touch with each other on the matter.

5. J.I.C. Action

(a) Routine Evaluation

The information is evaluated by the Directors of Intelligence on the J.I.C. in their weekly review which is submitted to the Chiefs of Staff and to Ministers.

(b) Urgent Evaluation

Special meetings are called and the report is passed to: -

- (i) Chiefs of Staff
- (ii) Secretary of the Cabinet
- (iii) Permanent Under-Secretary, Foreign Office
- (iv) The Americans and Canadians, whose own estimate is requested. Exchanges of information with the Americans and Canadians will be carried out directly between the Indicator Centres (J.I.C. in the United Kingdom).

The procedure for summoning all officers and officials concerned at short notice at any time during the day or night is being reviewed and will be tested from time to time.

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Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act  
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

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Copy #3 on  
J. George's Diary File

Defence Liaison/J. George/bw

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Ottawa, February 19, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

U.S. Strategic Air Command Projects

50062-<sup>e-100</sup>  
41...  
Fu

The memorandum for the Minister and the letter to Mr. Claxton have been delivered for their meetings with Mr. Wrong this morning. We have sent in to you our only remaining copy of the draft reply to Mr. Wrong.

There was one general point that we think might be worth making in the draft reply to Mr. Wrong; although it was apparently not discussed by the Ministers and is not reflected in our present draft reply. That is the assumption on which we take it the discussions so far have been based, that we are discussing consultation and information only up to the very early stages of a general war. Once a general war had unquestionably begun and once the bomb had been used, by either side, the sort of consultation we have been discussing would surely no longer be applicable. The Government presumably wish to be consulted only about the initial fateful decision. Further political decisions concerning the use of the bomb in war which might have to be made, such as whether to use it in Western Europe for other than tactical purposes, or whether to use it against the satellites as well as the Soviet Union itself, would have to be made during the course of the war and consultation on such matters would either have to be worked out in a separate agreement now or, perhaps more realistically, left out of account for the time being, in which case it would be necessary only to say in the proposed U.S. note, or in our reply, that we assumed the period we were talking about was from now

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- 2 -

until such time as the bomb had been used.

In connection with the Service arrangements proposed in our draft reply, it has been suggested that a reference should be made to the existing authority given to the U.S. Strategic Air Command for training flights over Canadian territory and other matters covered in a request from the State Department to the Canadian Embassy in Washington last March 9th, approved last July 10th for the year 1950, and renewed for 1951 on January 8th.

Defence Liaison Division.

6. Operational staffs of the Services are alerted.
7. The Chiefs of Staff report to the Prime Minister (as Chairman of the Defence Committee). The Minister of Defence, the Foreign Secretary and Service Ministers are informed as members of the Committee as are other Ministers concerned, e.g., the Commonwealth Secretary and the Home Secretary.
8. By direction of the Prime Minister, the Cabinet or the Defence Committee consider the report.
9. The Prime Minister or the Foreign Secretary sends a message to the United States President or Secretary of State and to the Canadian Prime Minister or Secretary of State for External Affairs, giving the United Kingdom assessment of the situation, asking for theirs and discussing possible action.
10. Meanwhile, the J.I.C. consider, after consulting their American and Canadian opposite numbers, how much of the intelligence received can be passed to our other Allies and in what form, without prejudicing security or our intelligence methods. We should wish to pass it particularly to the "old" Commonwealth Governments and also to N.A.T.O. Governments, so that the latter may be in a position to authorise the calling of a Simple Alert and other appropriate measures as required. (a Simple Alert denotes bringing N.A.T.O. forces to a state of combat readiness including bringing formation on the Continent up to strength and taking precautions against surprise attack).
11. ~~Meanwhile~~, the Cabinet will be keeping the situation under constant review and will have in mind not only the likelihood of the outbreak of war but also all possible means of averting it, for instance by diplomatic exchanges with friendly Governments, by direct representations to the potential enemy and by action in the United Nations. At the same time the Cabinet will consider how widely United Kingdom authorities should be informed of the situation.

PART II

12. If the United Kingdom/United States/Canadian Governments come to the conclusion that war probably cannot be averted or that for other reasons proposals for action should be put to friendly governments, the procedure would be as follows. The United Kingdom Government approach other Commonwealth Governments at the appropriate times. The United Kingdom and United States Governments, in agreement with Canada, approach the French Government giving them their estimate of the situation, proposing action and asking them to join in approaches to the other members of N.A.T.O. If the French agree, tripartite approaches are made accordingly through diplomatic channels in the capitals concerned. If the French disagree, or fail to make up their minds within a certain time, the United States and United Kingdom proceed nonetheless. All the N.A.T.O. countries are asked to send instructions to their N.A.T.O. representatives in Paris, and all exchanges in the various capitals are repeated to these representatives.
13. Great care will have to be taken over security of all types and especially over communications.
14. N.A.T.O. Council meet and authorise alert measures. SACEUR will no doubt receive his instructions from the Council; other Commanders should receive theirs through the Standing Group. The Commanders issue the necessary orders.

.....3

15. If it eventually becomes clear that the outbreak of hostilities is imminent, N.A.T.O. Governments will consider authorising the "Reinforced Alert" (maximum preparations to repel an attack).

17. The foregoing procedure applies to action taken with Commonwealth and N.A.T.O. Governments. Appropriate action will be required in regard to the Middle East, South East Asia and the Far East.

NOTES


1. If the above procedure is to be effective, arrangements will have to be made to ensure that the physical communications, particularly those across the Atlantic, will operate with the utmost speed and efficiency at any moment. An examination should be made by experts to ensure that this is so.

2. The N.A.T.O. systems of intelligence evaluation and Alerts should in due course be examined, and adjusted where necessary, so as to ensure that there is no conflict between them and procedures which may be adopted by the United States, United Kingdom and Canada as contemplated in this paper. If there is discussion of N.A.T.O. systems in the N.A.T.O. Council, the United Kingdom, United States and Canadian representatives should be instructed to try to avoid prejudicing any separate United Kingdom/United States/Canadian procedure.

FILE COPY

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Copy #4 on Mr. George's Diary File



Ottawa, February 17, 1951.

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Dear Mr. Claxton:

.....  
.....  
I am enclosing a self-explanatory memorandum to Mr. Pearson with a copy of a rough draft reply to Mr. Wrong's letter concerning U.S. Strategic Air Command Projects in Canada, which was discussed at a meeting of the Prime Minister, Mr. Howe, Mr. Pearson and yourself last week.

As Mr. Wrong will be in Ottawa on Monday and Tuesday of next week, I should be grateful if you would let me know whether you have any comments on the draft or whether you would like to speak to Mr. Wrong on this subject.

Yours sincerely,

A.D.P. Heeney,  
Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

The Honourable Brooke Claxton,  
Minister of National Defence,  
Ottawa, Ontario.

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Defence Liaison/J. George/bw

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Ottawa, February 17, 1951.

50069-e-10  
101

~~Urgent~~  
H. H. Mackay  
George

please see that Mr  
Claxton's letter is  
cleared first thing  
Mon. - he is base wrong almost

John

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

U.S. Strategic Air Command Project in Canada

Attached for your consideration is a memorandum for the Minister forwarding a rough draft reply to Mr. Wrong's enquiry, and a letter to Mr. Claxton sending him a copy of both the memorandum for the Minister and the draft reply. I expect Mr. Wrong will want to try to clear up this matter during his visit early next week.

Presumably, any final reply will have to be cleared by the Prime Minister and Mr. Howe?

R.A.M.

Defence Liaison Division.

Pl. also let  
me have  
copy for  
discussion  
Monday

Feb 7 Dr

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Ottawa, February 17, 1951.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

U.S. Strategic Air Command Project in Canada

....  
I am enclosing a draft letter to Mr. Wrong telling him of the discussion last week between the Prime Minister, Mr. Howe, Mr. Claxton and yourself. I expect Mr. Wrong will want to discuss this subject with you during his visit early next week. I am not enclosing copies of the incoming letter from Mr. Wrong on this subject, as a copy was circulated to you before the meeting last week.

Only three copies of this draft have been made. I am sending one of them, with a copy of this memorandum, to Mr. Claxton for any comments he may wish to make.

The draft is intended merely to serve as a basis for discussions with Mr. Wrong, after which we can prepare an early reply to a matter which, I am afraid, has been outstanding for some time.

*A.D.P.H.*

A. D. P. H.

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*A.D.P.*

MESSAGE FORM

OUTGOING

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Message To Be Sent

EN CLAIR  
CODE  
CYPHER *Ando*

No. *EX 295*

Date February 9, 1951

For Communications Office Use Only  
SENT -- FEB 9 1951

Degree of Priority

ORIGINATOR

Sig.  
Typed: J. George/aw  
Div. Defence Liaison,  
Local Tel. 3795

Following for Wrong from Heeney, begins:  
Your unnumbered letter of February 2 and your letter No. 19 of January 3. United States Strategic Air Command Projects.

APPROVED BY

Sig. *RSM*  
Typed:

We hope very shortly to be in a position to comment in detail on the terms of the proposed agreed exchange of notes between the United States and the Canadian Governments. There is, however, one point which you should make informally to the State Department immediately, if you have not already done so on the basis of my message EX-2735 of December 30, 1950: our preference for using civil rather than military channels for all consultations on policy. It is, as you know, a point to which we attach some importance.

Is This Message Likely To Be Published  
Yes ( ) No ( )

Internal Distribution:

*U.S.S.-E.A.#2*

Done *JS*  
Date *Feb 12/51*

Copies Referred To:

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Done  
Date

EXC 21

PAGE 1001

MESSAGE FORM

TO: [Illegible]

FROM: [Illegible]

ATTENTION: [Illegible]

RECEIVED [Illegible]

P

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NOTATIONS  
REMARKS

1951 FEB 9 11 1:09

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Sub. Sec. 50

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TOP SECRET

February 8, 1951

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Dear Mr. Howe,

I understand that you will be discussing this evening with the Prime Minister, Mr. Claxton and Mr. Pearson, an agreement proposed by the U.S. Government concerning the use by the U.S. Strategic Air Command of Goose Bay and Harmon, and the method and scope of consultations between the U.S. and Canadian Governments on the possibility of using the atomic bomb.

I am enclosing a copy of my memorandum for Mr. Pearson on this subject, together with a copy of Letter No. 19 from Mr. Wrong to which is appended the draft agreement.

2

Yours sincerely,

A. D. P. Heeney

The Rt. Hon. C.D. Howe,  
Minister,  
Department of Trade and Commerce,  
#1 Building, Wellington St.  
O t t a w a

50069-C-40  
41 50

TOP SECRET

February 8, 1951

Dear Mr. Claxton,

I understand that you will be discussing this evening with the Prime Minister, Mr. Howe and Mr. Pearson, an agreement proposed by the U.S. Government concerning the use by the U.S. Strategic Air Command of Goose Bay and Harmon, and the method and scope of consultations between the U.S. and Canadian Governments on the possibility of using the atomic bomb.

I am enclosing a copy of my memorandum for Mr. Pearson on this subject, together with a copy of Letter No. 19 from Mr. Wrong to which is appended the draft agreement.

Yours sincerely,

A. D. P. Heenev

The. Hon. Brooke Claxton,  
Minister,  
Department of National Defence,  
"A" Building,  
125 Elgin Street  
O t t a w a

TOP SECRET  
REPRODUCED TO SECRET

Defence Liaison/J. George/elb

Ottawa, February 8, 1951

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

*5-2069-C-4*  
*50...*

Consultation between Governments  
on the Atomic Bomb

We are attaching for your consideration a telegram to Washington giving Mr. Wrong an interim reply which he has asked for.

Also attached is an explanatory letter saying we hope in a day or two to be able to send them more definite information as to Government policy on this subject. You may think this letter should be held up pending discussion at the Ministerial level. It is, however, sent forward to give you an indication of the administrative arrangements which could be made.

*RAM*

Defence Liaison Division (1)

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Defence Liaison/J. George/elb

Ottawa, February 8, 1951

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER/SECRETARY

Consultation between Governments  
on the Atomic Bomb

For the meeting of Ministers which, we understand, is to take place this evening, we have prepared copies of the relevant documents for circulation to the Prime Minister, the Minister, Mr. Howe and Mr. Claxton. Covering notes for your signature are attached together with copies of a memorandum we have prepared for the Minister which we suggest should also be circulated to the Prime Minister, Mr. Howe and Mr. Claxton.

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*RAM*

Defence Liaison Division (1)

To be delivered at C.C.B. meeting 2-3 pm Rev 201 House

Flennors

MB for me this pm. A. Heenez attached: please return.

*U*

*copy on 5/1/75*

Copy No. 1 of 9 copies

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Ottawa, February 8, 1951 - 40

*50069-2-40*  
*File*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Consultation between United States and Canadian Governments on the Atomic Bomb, and the use of Bases in Canada.

I understand there is to be a discussion on this subject this evening between the Prime Minister, Mr. Howe, Mr. Claxton and yourself. For this purpose we have circulated the relevant papers to the Ministers concerned, and I have also sent them a copy of this memorandum. The most important document is the Pentagon draft of a note from the United States Government to the Canadian Embassy in Washington which, with the Canadian Government's reply, would constitute a "canopy" agreement under which service arrangements could proceed. The draft is attached to Mr. Wrong's letter No. 19 of January 3.

2. The policy questions for discussion resolve themselves, I think, into two categories:

- (a) Does the Canadian Government want to be consulted, or kept informed, by the U.S. Government?
- (b) Should the channel of communication between the U.S. and Canadian Governments on policy matters connected with this subject be civil or military?

3. The first question was discussed in a memorandum which I sent to the Prime Minister on January 8, in your absence, in case he wished to discuss the matter with Mr. Attlee during his visit to Ottawa. Copies of my memorandum to the Prime Minister have been circulated. Whether or not it is decided that some form of consultation is desired by the Canadian Government, I would suppose that we should at least insist on being kept fully informed as to the general plans and intentions of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, and as to any immediate plans which may be formulated for the use of Goose Bay or Harmon as launching or staging fields should an emergency situation arise.

- 2 -

4. The second question was, I believe, briefly discussed between the Prime Minister, Mr. Claxton and yourself at the end of December. We have advised Mr. Wrong of your view at that time that the Government would prefer the civil to the military channel for all consultations on policy. If this decision is confirmed this evening, we should also be in a position to indicate to the U.S. Government what the Canadian Government would regard as "matters of policy", as distinct from purely service arrangements carried forward under an agreed policy.

5. Whatever channels are used, and whether the Canadian Government is to be kept informed or consulted, it may well become necessary for our communications staffs in Ottawa and Washington to be put onto twenty-four hour watch, at least on a stand-by basis. At present, both National Defence and External Affairs Communications Sections close down entirely during the night, although someone is always available on call for "Most Immediate" messages.

Dv.

A.D.P.H.

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TOP SECRET

February 6, 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Consultation between Governments  
on the Atomic Bomb

I understand that you will be discussing this evening, with Mr. Howe, Mr. Claxton and Mr. Pearson, an agreement proposed by the U.S. Government concerning the use by the U.S. Strategic Air Command of Goose Bay and Harmon, and the method and scope of consultations between the U.S. and Canadian Governments on the possibility of using the atomic bomb.

I am enclosing a copy of my memorandum for Mr. Pearson on this subject, together with a copy of Letter No. 19 of January 3 from Mr. Wrong to which is appended the draft agreement.

While Mr. Pearson was in New York, I sent you a memorandum of January 6 to which you may also wish to refer.

J. D. P. H.

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Ottawa, February 8, 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Re: Proposed Goose Bay Lease

In case the Minister of National Defence raises this in Cabinet today, annexed is a copy of the draft lease amended as a result of discussions at the Permanent Joint Board on Defence on February 2. The only important difference between this version and the one sent to you last week is the deletion of the description of the boundaries of the leased areas. This was done for security reasons; at least 3 of the 4 main areas should not be delimited in a public document, and it was thought best to delete all boundaries. The three are the weapons storage area and the global communications areas.

Para. 3

You questioned the wording of this paragraph in relation to lands which may be added at some future time to the Leased Areas. I agree that para. 3 should be clarified, perhaps by saying:

"The term of the lease shall expire twenty years after the coming into force of this lease agreement."

Para. 5

As stated in my memorandum to you of January 26, it is legally impossible for the U.S. to give the R.C.A.F. Commanding Officer access to the special weapons storage area and the global communications areas. It is proposed to say this, on the insistence of the Americans, in a secret exchange of letters between the respective Chiefs of Staff, concurrently with the signing of the lease.

...2

- 2 -

Para. 9

You asked about the phrase "as may be appropriate" in line 5. Some R.C.A.F. regulations would not, I am advised, be appropriate for U.S. personnel, e.g., a regulation prohibiting attendance at political meetings!

Privileges and Immunities

The U.S. officials argued strongly for the inclusion in the lease of clauses setting forth privileges and immunities. When we made it clear that we did not wish to put them in the lease, they urged that these matters should be covered in a letter, concurrently with the signing of the lease, setting forth our intentions, and the Canadian Section of the P.J.B.D. agreed to recommend this course.

General Note

As you know, the lease does not give the Canadian Government any power to control or even advise upon the kind of military use to be made of the Leased Area, e.g., for special weapons. As you know, the U.S. have proposed a separate exchange of notes covering other bases as well as Goose.

A. D. P. H.

S E C R E T

DRAFT - February 5, 1951  
Amended to reflect changes made  
with U.S. Section of PJBD  
February 2, 1951.

PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES  
OF AMERICA RELATING TO GOOSE BAY, PROVINCE OF NEWFOUNDLAND

(To be made public in due course)

The Secretary of State for External Affairs for Canada  
to the United States Ambassador

Excellency,

I have the honour to refer to discussions which have recently taken place between representatives of our Governments on the Permanent Joint Board on Defence concerning a proposed lease to the United States of America of certain lands (hereinafter referred to as Leased Areas), situated within Royal Canadian Air Force Station Goose Bay in the province of Newfoundland, for military purposes, and to inform you that in view of the common defence interests of Canada and the United States of America the Government of Canada is prepared to grant such a lease subject to the terms set forth in this note.

2. The Leased Areas shall consist of such lands within Royal Canadian Air Force Station Goose Bay (hereinafter referred to as Goose Bay), in the Province of Newfoundland, as may from time to time, in a manner to be determined in each case by the Government of Canada, be made available to the United States of America upon its request.
3. The term of the lease shall be twenty years and shall be without charge.
4. The United States of America (hereinafter called the Lessee) may by notice in writing to the Government of Canada (hereinafter called the Lessor) not less than six months prior to the expiration of the term of the lease, request an extension of the term. If such request is made, the Lessor undertakes to consider it in the light of the common defence interests of Canada and the United States of America. When consulting together on a request for extension, the parties will consider what modifications if any in the provisions of the lease would be necessary or desirable in the light of experience.
5. The Lessee, without prejudice to the sovereignty of Canada, shall have quiet enjoyment of the Leased Areas, subject at all times to right of free access by the Commanding Officer, Royal Canadian Air Force Station Goose Bay, or such officer as may be designated by him, to any part of the Leased Areas.

6. The Lessee shall have the right of free access to and egress from the Leased Areas, subject to the right of the Lessor to prescribe the routes to be used, and shall have within the Leased Areas, subject to the terms of this note, such rights as are necessary to support the operation of United States military aircraft at Goose Bay, including, the right

- (a) to station personnel within the Leased Areas, to issue orders for their control and command, and to undertake such internal security measures as may be deemed necessary by the Lessee;
- (b) to construct, install, improve and maintain in the Leased Areas, personnel housing, hangars, warehouses, shops, hard stands, parking aprons, storage and distribution facilities for aviation gasoline and other petroleum supplies, and any other type of building, structure or improvement deemed necessary by the Lessee, PROVIDED that all new major construction in the Leased Areas shall have the prior approval of the Commanding Officer, Royal Canadian Air Force Station Goose Bay; and
- (c) subject to the approval of the Commanding Officer, Royal Canadian Air Force Station Goose Bay, to construct, install and operate in the Leased Areas communication facilities and navigation aids (including meteorological systems), radio and radar apparatus and electronic devices; PROVIDED that the Lessee shall not thereby cause interference with any other similar installation or operation at Goose Bay, and FURTHER PROVIDED that the Government of Canada reserves the right to allocate frequencies and to control power and type of emission.

7. All buildings, structures and improvements permanently affixed to the realty by the Lessee at Goose Bay shall remain the property of the Lessee for the duration of this lease. Any such buildings, structures, and improvements situated at Goose Bay upon the termination of this lease shall thereupon become the property of the Lessor without compensation to the Lessee. The ownership of all other property, including removable improvements, equipment, material, supplies and goods, brought into Canada by the Lessee in connection with its operations at Goose Bay shall remain in the Lessee during and after the termination of this lease, and the Lessee shall have the unrestricted right of removing or disposing of all such property, PROVIDED that removal or disposition takes place within a reasonable time.

8. The Lessee may not assign or sublet, or part with the possession of the whole or any part of the Leased Areas.

9. United States military personnel outside the Leased Areas, in relation to the performance of their military duties, shall continue to be under the control and command

of United States authorities but in all other respects so far as may be appropriate shall be subject to regulations and orders applicable to Canadian military personnel. The United States Air Force Commanding Officer at Goose Bay shall be responsible for the observance of Royal Canadian Air Force Station Standing Orders by all United States military personnel at Goose Bay outside the Leased Areas.

10. The Lessee may, jointly with the Lessor, have

- (a) the right to use the airfield at Goose Bay for the operation of United States military aircraft, subject to air traffic control by the Royal Canadian Air Force and prior notification of all expected arrivals to the Royal Canadian Air Force at Goose Bay;
- (b) free and uninterrupted use of roadways at Goose Bay outside the Leased Areas, subject to any limitations that may be imposed by the Commanding Officer, Royal Canadian Air Force Station Goose Bay, in the interests of the efficient operation of the station;
- (c) the use, for the transportation of petroleum products, of all pipes, pipelines, pumps and valves installed at Goose Bay by the Lessor and forming a part of the interconnected pipeline system; and
- (d) the use of dockage facilities installed at Goose Bay,

PROVIDED that the Lessee shall be responsible for any damage or injury suffered by others in consequence of the negligence of the members of its armed forces, employees or agents in connection with anything done or omitted under paragraph 10.

11. The Lessee may be authorized, in such manner as the Lessor determines, to use such rights of way at Goose Bay, outside the Leased Areas, as may hereafter be agreed upon, and may construct, maintain and operate thereon, such communication and transportation facilities as may be required for the support of United States military aircraft at Goose Bay.

12. The Lessee will not be required to pay any tax or fee in respect of registration or licencing of motor vehicles for use within Goose Bay.

13. The Lessee shall observe, both within and without the Leased Areas, accepted safety standards at Goose Bay for the protection of life and property.

14. The Lessee shall not install, maintain or operate at Goose Bay, whether within or without the Leased Areas, any lights or other aids to navigation of aircraft without the approval of the Commanding Officer, Royal Canadian Air Force Station Goose Bay.

15. The Lessee shall not at any time cause the waters of the Hamilton River to be polluted by disposal of sewage or otherwise.

16. The Lessee will use Canadian labour and materials as far as practicable in the construction and maintenance of facilities at Goose Bay.

17. In order to avoid doubt, I am instructed to state that my Government intends that the laws of Canada shall continue to apply throughout Goose Bay, including the Leased Areas.

18. If the foregoing is acceptable to your Government, this note and your reply shall be regarded as constituting a lease agreement in force from the date of your reply.

FILE COPY

TOP SECRET

50069-C-40	
41	✓

Ottawa, February 7, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. N. A. Robertson  
Dr. C. J. Mackenzie  
Dr. O. B. Solandt

Attlee - Churchill Exchange on  
Publishing the Quebec Agreement

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which Mr. Pearson sent to Mr. Lowe on February 5 asking him to agree that we should reply to the United Kingdom Government and that the Canadian Government would consider it unwise to publish the Quebec Agreement at this time.

Acting Secretary,  
Advisory Panel on Atomic Energy.

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET

FILE COPY

Defence Liaison/J.George/bw

50069-C-40	
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TOP SECRET

Ottawa, February 5, 1951.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**TOP SECRET**

Dear Mr. Howe:

As you will have seen from telegram No. 257 of January 31st from London and from press reports, questions have been asked in the British House of Commons about the tripartite atomic agreement and Mr. Churchill has suggested that the Quebec Agreement should be made public as it is no longer in effect. Mr. Attlee replied in the House that he would like to speak to Mr. Churchill about it, and he has since told Mr. Churchill privately that even though the Quebec Agreement is no longer in force, it was not for the United Kingdom Government to decide whether or not the Agreement could now be made public. Mr. Attlee undertook to enquire whether the other Governments concerned would have any objections.

Mr. Thomson, the Deputy United Kingdom High Commissioner, called on Mr. Reid this morning to explain the position of his Government and ask informally for the views of the Canadian Government. Sir Oliver Franks has been instructed to make a parallel approach to the State Department. Nothing is being put on paper, but the United Kingdom High Commissioner would like to be told as soon as possible what the Canadian Government's attitude would be towards publishing the Quebec Agreement.

The Right Honourable C. D. Howe, P.C.,  
Minister of Trade and Commerce,  
O t t a w a, Ontario.

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I feel quite confident that Mr. Attlee is not going to press the matter of publication and fully expects the Canadian and the United States Governments to indicate in their replies that they think it would be undesirable to publish the Agreement. Publication would be bound to lead to further questions as to the character of the Agreement, or rather modus vivendi, now in effect, and particularly as to whether the second point of the Quebec Agreement, saying that neither the United States nor the United Kingdom Governments would use the bomb against third parties without the other's consent, remains in effect. Such a discussion, I am sure you will agree, would not be conducive to good relations between the three countries concerned and might have a bad effect upon the negotiations of a new combined policy agreement which we hope will take place in Washington within the next month or two.

We therefore propose to reply to the United Kingdom High Commissioner, if you agree, that, although the Canadian Government was not a party to the Quebec Agreement, we would, as a member of the Combined Policy Committee, consider it unwise to publish the Agreement at this time.

Yours sincerely,

L. B. PEARSON

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SEEN  
L.B. PEARSON  
FEB - 6 1951

Copy No. 1 of 5 Copies

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, February 5, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Attlee-Churchill Exchange on  
Publishing the Quebec Agreement

Attached for your consideration is a self-explanatory letter to Mr. Howe on this subject, asking him to agree that we should reply to the U.K. Government that the Canadian Government would consider it unwise to publish the Agreement at this time.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REPLI A SECRET

*A.D.P.H.*  
A. D. P. H.

*Letter sent from  
Ministers Office  
6-2-51*

*5-2-25 (SS) J.  
5.2.24 (SS)*

copy No. 1 of 3 copies

50069-A-40  
201 (A)  
58 ✓

Defence Liaison/J.George/bw

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, February 3, 1951.

*File*  
**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
RESULT A SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

Attlee-Churchill Exchange on  
Publishing the Quebec Agreement

.....  
*Sent to  
minister  
5.2.51*

Attached for your signature, if you agree, is a memorandum for the Minister with a self-explanatory letter to Mr. Howe asking him to agree that we should inform the U.K. High Commissioner that the Canadian Government would consider it unwise to publish the Agreement at this time. You will recall that the Canadian Government was not, as such, a party to the Quebec Agreement, which was concluded on August 19, 1943 between Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt. The text of the Agreement refers to "co-operation between the two countries", although the Combined Policy Committee, of which Mr. Howe was to be a member, was set up under the terms of the Agreement. The Canadian position has since been regularized in a formal sense by the modus vivendi of 1948, so that we are now a full partner in tripartite atomic co-operation, but at the beginning we were in the position of being an associate rather than a partner.

.....  
*2  
Sent  
5.2.51*

I am also enclosing telegrams to Mr. Wilgress and Mr. Wrong informing them of Mr. Thomson's call and our probable reply.

*M. W. ...*  
Defence Liaison Division (1)

Ext. 192A

*Referred*  
*Robertson*  
*H.W. George*  
*620*

OTTAWA FILE 50069-e-40  
No. ~~50195-40~~

41 41  
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
TOP SECRET

Letter No.....

Date. February 2nd, 1951.....

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C.  
TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference..My letter No.. 19 of January 3rd, 1951.....

Subject:...Proposed U.S. Strategic Air Command projects.....

It would be helpful for me to know the present status of the consideration being given to the request for a general agreement to govern the deployment of units of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, mentioned in my letter under reference. Mr. Arneson has made a number of private inquiries about how matters stand, and has indicated that some consultations have taken place between the Department of State and the Department of Defence on the possible terms of a letter which might be drawn up for Mr. Acheson's signature, incorporating the substance of the paper drafted in the Pentagon which I have sent to you.

2. It occurs to me that it might be useful if we were to give Mr. Arneson, on an informal basis, the preliminary reactions of the Canadian Government to the ideas incorporated in the Pentagon paper before thinking becomes too crystallized here.

*1/17/51*

Copies Referred To.....

No. of Enclosures.....

Post File No.....

ORIGINAL

FROM: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON, ENGLAND.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA.

30069-C-148  
221

RESTRICTED

CYPHER - AUTO

NO. 257

LONDON, January 31, 1951.

UNCLASSIFIED  
D/UNDR/EEA  
A/UNDR/SEC/HA

Done  
Feb. 1/51  
T.K.

Relh  
PM  
EEA  
Mr. How  
Mr. Clayton  
Mr. [unclear]  
Mr. [unclear]  
Mr. [unclear]  
Mr. [unclear]

CS

Restricted.

In the House of Commons yesterday, in reply to a question by Blackburn as to whether the Prime Minister would give "an assurance that the relationship of equal partnership between America, Britain and Canada over the development and use of atomic energy still subsists". Mr. Attlee replied as follows: Quote: As I stated in the course of the debate in the House on December 14, there was a war-time partnership between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada for the development of the atomic weapon. By agreement between the three governments, the nature of these wartime arrangements has not been revealed on grounds of public policy. The position of the United States Administration in many of these matters is now regulated by legislation enacted in the United States since the end of the war, and the war-time arrangements have been modified accordingly. But partnership between the three countries for certain purposes in the atomic energy field continues. Unquote.

2. In subsequent questioning, Mr. Churchill raised the question whether there as any reason why the terms of the war-time agreement, which as he understood it had been "revoked", should not be made public. The Prime Minister pointed out that this could only be done by agreement with the United States Government, but indicated that he was "prepared to enquire" and would wish to have a private word with the Leader of the Opposition because of the complicated and delicate character of the whole question.

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31 JAN 1951

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3. The war-time agreement was referred to by some private members as "a treaty", which prompted Mr. Attlee to explain that no treaty was involved but that it was a question of an agreement which had been changed and altered, and new agreements subsequently made.

HIGH COMMISSIONER.

CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1951 JAN 11 PM 4:15

50069-C-40  
41

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Type of Document *ll* No. .... Date *10 Jan/51*

From:- *Chief of Staff Committee.*  
To:- *USSR*

Subject:-  
*U.S. Air operations over Canadian Territory -  
strategic air command.*

Original has been placed on File No. *50195-40*

Copies on File No. ....

Additional Information:

Date .....

FILE COPY

COPY NO. 2 OF 8 COPIES

50069-e-40  
41 ✓

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, January 8, 1951.

DECLASSIFIED  
REVIEWED TO SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Consultation Between Governments on the  
Possible Use of the Atomic Bomb

When Mr. Attlee was in Ottawa after his talks last month with President Truman, I believe you discussed with him the assurance which President Truman had given Mr. Attlee that he would keep Mr. Attlee informed of developments which might lead to the use of the bomb. There have been one or two recent exchanges between the U.S. and Canadian Governments of which you should know in case you have further private discussions on this subject with Mr. Attlee in London.

On Mr. Acheson's instructions, the State Department has told our Embassy in Washington in writing that the assurances which President Truman gave Mr. Attlee also apply to you. In other words, the President will keep you informed of any developments in the world situation which may lead to the use of the bomb. The State Department have explained to us informally that President Truman cannot undertake to consult Mr. Attlee and yourself because the U.S. Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy insist that there should be no limitation upon the President's decision and that he must not be committed, as was the case in the original Quebec Agreement of 1943, to consult any other government before deciding to use the bomb. For this reason, the State Department have explained, the President can only undertake to keep us informed -- an undertaking that could be interpreted very loosely.

.. / 2

- 2 -

.....  
.....  
As you will see from the attached copies of Mr. Wrong's Despatches of December 13th and January 3rd, the U.S. Government are also proposing to approach the Canadian Government formally at the highest political level in order to reach a general agreement to govern the use of Goose Bay and Harmon Airfield as launching bases for atomic attacks in the event of war, and as storage and training bases in peacetime. We do not know with certainty whether the U.K. Government have granted or intend to grant the U.S. Government any facilities for the use of bases in the U.K. by the U.S. Strategic Air Command. If, as we assume, the U.K. Government has granted the U.S.A.F. base facilities for strategic as well as tactical purposes, the U.K. Government face much the same problem as the Canadian Government.

In any event, you may consider it worthwhile pursuing this delicate matter personally with Mr. Attlee. In the opinion of the officials of this Department, at least, the U.S. Government have not as yet been very forthcoming in describing frankly and fully their plans and intentions, and still less in giving us any assurance that we will be adequately consulted before irrevocable decisions are taken by another government involving the use of bases in Canada.

A. D. P. H.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA

TOP SECRET

January 8, 19 51.

No. D-153

**DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET**  
**RENT A SECRET**

50069.C-40  
58 CHA. SO. FISL. ....

Sir,

I enclose the document (s) listed below.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

The High Commissioner for Canada  
in the United Kingdom,  
London, England.

**JAMES GEORGE**

*Secretary of State for External Affairs.*

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

SUBJECT

Copy No. 11 of Despatch No. 3221  
of December 13, 1950, from the  
Canadian Ambassador, Washington,  
together with enclosures.

Re: Views of Canadian Government  
on possible use of atomic  
weapons in the Far East.

**NOTE:** This document is to be  
seen only by Mr. Wilgress  
and by anyone designated  
by him.

**MEMORANDUM**

**Department of External Affairs**

Ottawa, ..... *Jan 13/50* .....

Mr. LePan

*F.L.  
D.L.P.*

I am not acquainted with the review Magasino - I think we'd have to get particulars from Rome.

I think their story undoubtedly must have come from the summaries of the Minister's speeches of Dec. 4 and Dec. 5 which were cabled to missions abroad, including Rome.

(If Rome has reported on the coverage of these speeches, as a number of missions did, there may be some mention of this review. Information Division would have the file.)

*AA.*

Ext. 182A

*Refer to the letter - Am of E - [Signature]*

OTTAWA FILE  
No. 50067-C-41

11 50  
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Letter No. 11

Date January 5, 1951

FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, BUENOS AIRES

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference: Our despatch No. 555 of December 9, 1950

Subject: Canada and the use of the atomic bomb

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1. La Prensa on the 30th of December printed a UP news item announcing that the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs had published an article in the Italian Review "Magasino". He is reported as saying that the atomic bomb could only be used in desperate cases adding that an honourable solution to the Korean conflict must be found; if this should prove impossible, the whole responsibility would rest on the Soviet and Chinese Communist Governments. It was also stated that the Occidental nations must prevent the Korean war from turning into a war against China which would immobilize the larger part of their forces. The use of the atomic bomb in Korea, it was added, might change the military situation but only at the risk of destroying the unity of action of the Atlantic Community.

9 JAN 1951

Copies Referred To

*[Signature]*

The Embassy.

No. of Enclosures

Post File

No. POL-19-11

D

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
RECORDED & INDEXED

1951 JAN 9 AM 11:15

[Faint, mostly illegible typed text, possibly a memorandum or report]

[Faint, mostly illegible typed text]

[Faint, mostly illegible typed text]

(3)

ACCESS SECTION / SECTION DE L'ACCES

DOCUMENT REMOVED FROM FILE / DOCUMENT RETIRE DU DOSSIER

RG 25 Volume 195 File 50069-C-40 pt 1  
1990-91/008  
Dossier

Nature of document / Description du document Washington D.C. letter # 19 and  
attachments.

No. of Pages / Nbre de pages 3+1 (4) Date 3/1/90

Reason for Removal / Retrait en vertu de Exempt/Exception, 13(1)(a), 15(1)  
Access To Information Act /

Review Officer / Agent(e) d'examen DEA/lb.

58069-e-40  
41 ✓

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Type of Document *Let's* No. *19+20* Date *3 Jan/50*

From:- *Washington*

To:- *USSIA*

Subject:- *Proposed U.S. Strategic Air Command projects.*

Original has been placed on File No. *50195-40*

Copies on File No .....

Additional Information:

Date .....

*[Signature]*  
Signature

Ext. 131A

D R A F T

OTTAWA FILE
No. ....

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET

Letter No. D-  
 January 2, 1957  
 Date December 20, 1950.

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FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO:

Reference..... Your letter No. 3088 of December 2, 1950.

Subject:..... Proposed U.S. Strategic Air Command projects at Goose Bay.

The Minister has considered the important questions of policies <sup>yes</sup> which you raised, and has had a word with the Prime Minister and Mr. Claxton about the future use of Goose Bay and the proposed lease now before the Government in the form of a Recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. He has instructed me to say that, before we proceed further in this matter, the U.S. Government should approach the Canadian Government at the top political level, either formally or informally, and give us full knowledge of their present plans and intentions regarding Goose Bay.

2. When you <sup>so</sup> advise the State Department, at an appropriately high level, you may add that the Canadian Government does not foresee any difficulties in agreeing to the use of the base by the U.S. Strategic Air Command for purposes of North American and North Atlantic defence. Indeed, the Canadian Government attach the highest importance to the role of the U.S. Strategic Air Command in our common defence and wish to place no obstacles in the ~~the~~ way of <sup>the</sup> fulfilment of its tasks. Insofar as the plans of the U.S. S.A.C. call for the use of bases in Canada, however, the Canadian Government considers it ~~has~~ <sup>should</sup> ~~a right to~~ be fully informed in advance of exactly what ~~they~~ are the intentions and plans of the U.S. Government

What is?

Copies Referred To.....  
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No. of Enclosures  
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Post File  
 No.....

in regard to the bases, <sup>in order</sup> so that co-operation between the two countries may proceed intelligently.

3. For your own information, we do not propose to ask the U.S. Government ~~ix~~ to undertake to consult the Canadian Government before making use of Goose Bay or any other leased base in Canada for agreed purposes in the common interest. Although the Government has not yet reached a decision on this point, ~~it~~ but we may ask for a general assurance, that only in the case of ~~an attack launched in retaliation against~~ <sup>from the US Government</sup> a direct attack on ~~this continent or on the U.S. Forces,~~ <sup>within the North Atlantic area</sup> would the United States launch an attack from a leased base in Canada without first informing the Canadian Government of its intention to do so.

We want to hedge against the contingency, no doubt remote, that we should become involved in war because of an attack launched from a base in Canada unless that attack were clearly a measure of <sup>collective</sup> self-defence and retaliation.

UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE  
FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

Copy No. 1 of 1 Copies  
*others destroyed*

Defence Liaison/J. George/bw

Ottawa, January 2, 1951.

TOP SECRET

50069-C-40  
RECORDED TO SECRET  
REPRODUCED TO SECRET

*Mr. George R. Jackson*  
*vs H. is ok?*  
*Draft*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

U.S. Undertaking to Keep the Canadian Government Informed About Possible Use of Atomic Bomb

....

While you were away in Brussels, a further despatch was received from Mr. Wrong, copy attached, explaining the U.S. Government's position in regard to consulting or keeping the Canadian Government informed about developments which might lead to the use of the bomb. The position is, as explained in Mr. Wrong's previous reports, that the U.S. Government are bound to do no more than keep the U.K. Government informed -- not to consult them in advance as specified in the Quebec Agreement. The same assurance that President Truman gave Mr. Attlee has now been extended, on Mr. Acheson's instructions, to the Canadian Government.

*Should the Dept. see 90% of this?*  
*with consultation & consent in the Quebec agreement.*  
*therefore*

Mr. Wrong also refers to further information given him by Sir Oliver Franks, which he was asked not to pass on unless he was sure it was necessary so that the Prime Minister and the Minister might understand the position. As Mr. Attlee has since seen the Prime Minister and ~~as the Minister will shortly be seeing Mr. Wrong~~, it may be unnecessary to ask Mr. Wrong to report on his conversation with Sir Oliver Franks. It does, however, leave the officials concerned in the dark, perhaps unnecessarily, on matters effecting such current negotiations as the U.S. lease and proposed use of Goose Bay.

Copies of the attached despatch have been referred to the Prime Minister, the Minister, Mr. Howe, Mr. Claxton, Mr. Robertson, Mr. Wilgress, General MacNaughton, Dr. Mackenzie and Dr. Solandt.

OK.

*Wig*  
*I think we should do a careful memo reviewing the whole situation, including Goose Bay, for consideration. Please see me.*  
*the USSIA... Mr. Acheson... perhaps... RAN*

- 2 -

Have you any instructions regarding ~~either~~ distribution or any further action to be taken on this despatch? Presumably the subject should be brought up at the next meeting of the Advisory Panel on Atomic Energy, as it will be relevant to the forthcoming meeting of the Combined Policy Committee, now expected to take place towards the end of January.

Defence Liaison Division.

# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

FILE REF.	41
5019-50069-e-4	

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
TOP SECRET

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
NOT A SECRET

Message To Be Sent	No. <u>2735</u>	Date	December 30, 1950	For Communications Office Use Only
EN CLAIR				SENT
CODE				DEC 30 1950
CYPHER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>			

Degree of Priority  
**IMMEDIATE** *RAM*

ORIGINATOR  
Sig. R.A. MacKay

Typed: aw

Div. Defence Liaison

Local Tel. 3402

APPROVED BY  
Sig. *RAM*

Typed: \_\_\_\_\_

Is This Message Likely To Be Published  
Yes ( ) No (X)

Internal Distribution:

~~None~~  
*3/5 EA  
2/5 SEA  
(communications have a copy unnumbered)*

Done \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Copies Referred To:

- Prime Minister #2
- Mr. Clayton
- Mr. Robertson
- Dr. Mackenzie
- Dr. Solandt
- Gen. McNaughton #9

Done \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Your WA-3416 of December 30. Following for Wrong from Heeney. Begins:

1. The Minister has discussed *with Mr. Clayton and the Prime Minister* questions raised in your letter No. 3088 of December 2. It is agreed that the channel should be civil rather than military and that it should be your office rather than the U.S. Embassy here. We shall probably have to work out some special security classification but for the time being please address documents to me personally and indicate thereon to be opened by me only.

~~Telegrams should be addressed to me personally and marked "no circulation".~~ *If possible please avoid telegrams until we work out special procedure and classification.*

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



ORIGINAL  
COPY NO. 1 OF 11 COPIES

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

50069 = e-40  
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101 | 50

reply was  
Sub. Sub.  
LMM

IMPORTANT

CYPHER - AUTO

WA-3416

*Referred  
to Secretary*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 30, 1950.

MINISTER - 3  
UNDR/SEC - 4  
D/UNDR/SEC - 5  
A/UNDR/SEC'S. - 5  
Sumner #11

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

Top Secret. Following for Heaney from Wrong, Begins:  
Reference my letter No. 3088 of December 2nd on Goose  
Bay projects.

*File 50195-40*

I have been informed by Arneson that the Pentagon wishes to raise sometime early next week the question of the procedure to be employed in making further approaches to us on the aspects of the question dealt with in my letter under reference. It would therefore be helpful if you would let me know, if possible by Tuesday, what channel should be employed. Ends.

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

*B.I. 14/51*

CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1951 JAN 2 AM 10:09

2

ACCESS SECTION / SECTION DE L'ACCES

DOCUMENT REMOVED FROM FILE / DOCUMENT RETIRE DU DOSSIER

RG 25 Volume 195 File 150069-C-40 pt 1  
Dossier

Nature of document / Washington DC letter #3121 +  
Description du document  
attachment

No. of Pages / 2+1(3) Date 13/12/50  
Nbre de pages

Exempt/Exception, 13(1)(a), 15(1)  
Access To Information Act/  
Reason for Removal / Loi sur l'accès à l'information  
Retrait en vertu de

Review Officer / DEA/lb  
Agent(e) d'examen

①

ACCESS SECTION / SECTION DE L'ACCES

DOCUMENT REMOVED FROM FILE / DOCUMENT RETIRE DU DOSSIER

RG 25 1990-91/008  
Volume 195 File 50069-C-40 pt 1  
Dossier

Nature of document / Memorandum - Korea and the  
Description du document Atom Bomb.

No. of Pages / 4 Date 11/12/50  
Nbre de pages

Exempt/Exception 13(1)(a), 15(1).  
Access To Information Act/  
Reason for Removal / Loi sur l'accès à l'information  
Retrait en vertu de

Review Officer / DEA/lb.  
Agent(e) d'examen

~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA

December 12, 1950.

No. D-3846

Sir,

I enclose the document (s) listed below.

File No. <u>50069-C-46</u>
Sub <u>58</u> Chron. <u>50</u> Filed...

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

The High Commissioner for Canada,  
LONDON,  
England.

R. A. Mackay

for the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

SUBJECT

Copy of Telegram No. WA - 3201 dated December 9, 1950, from the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Washington.

Attlee-Truman communique to the use of the atomic bomb.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA

SECRET

December 12, 1950

No. D. ....

Sir,

I enclose the document (s) listed below.

File No.	50069-C-40
Sub.	58 Chron. 50 Filed.....

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

(for) Secretary of State for External Affairs.

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

SUBJECT

Memorandum dated December 3 at  
Ottawa.

Korea and the Atomic Bomb

TO: New Delhi D-903 The Hague D-660  
 Karachi D-583 Rome D-1188  
 Canberra D-539 Athens D-371  
 Wellington D-442 Ankara D-286  
 Pretoria D-334 Oslo D-441  
 Tokyo D-1122 Copenhagen D-352  
 Paris D-1551 Bonn D-573  
 Brussels D-681

50069-10	
33	27

Referred by direction of The Prime Minister

To The ~~Minister of~~ Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs

**FOR INFORMATION AND ANY NECESSARY ACTION**

Mr + *[Handwritten signature]*  
 Mr *[Handwritten signature]*

Also referred to:

Mr. N. A. Robertson, Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet

Ottawa December 11 19 50

*[Handwritten signature]*  
 Pierre Asselin  
 Private Secretary.

X

(copy of a letter written by hand by the Prime Minister)

Personal

11-xii-50

My dear Ambassador,

I would like the President to know that my colleagues and I greatly appreciate his thoughtfulness in having George Perkins tell our Ambassador that the paragraph in the Attlee-Truman communique relating to the possible use of the atomic bomb, though it refers in terms only to the Prime Minister of the U.K., is intended to apply equally to the Prime Minister of Canada and that such was the understanding when the communique was drafted, the reason for there being no specific reference to the Prime Minister of Canada being the fact that the communique related to the bilateral talks between the President and Mr. Attlee.

We felt sure that would, in any event, be the President's attitude but I would like you to convey to him, when opportunity offers, our thanks for feeling we should be expressly assured about it.

With kindest personal regards,  
I remain always,

Yours very sincerely,

Louis S. St-Laurent

Hon. Stanley Woodward,  
U.S. Embassy,  
Ottawa.

*40 112  
Mr. Hoover  
Mr. Callahan  
Ret  
Circulate to  
President  
L.S. St-Laurent*

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DEC 12 1950

DEC 12 10 49 AM 1950

ORIGINAL AND FILE COPY

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FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

8-4

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 9, 1950.

IMPORTANT  
CYPHER - AUTO  
WA - 3201

MINISTER  
UNDR/SEC  
/UNDR/SEC  
A/UNDR/SEC'S

*Refer*  
*PM*  
*SSEA*  
*Mr. Howe*  
*Mr. Robertson*  
*Mr. Mackenzie*  
*Mr. Solandt (deputed)*  
*London*

*Done Dec 12/50*  
*T.K.*

Secret. Reference in the Attlee-Truman communique to the use of the atomic bomb.

1. George Perkins, who was the senior United States member of the group which drafted the Attlee-Truman communique, got in touch with us this morning to explain the penultimate paragraph of the text, which reads as follows:

"The President stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb. The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation."

2. Perkins explained that the references in the second sentence quoted above are intended to apply equally to the Prime Minister of Canada as to Mr. Attlee. This was the clear understanding when the communique was drafted, and the reason for there being no specific reference to the Prime Minister of Canada was due to the fact that the communique specifically related to the bilateral talks between the President and Mr. Attlee.

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11 DEC 1950

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1950 DEC 11 AM 9:42

8

File No.	50069-C-40
Subj.	Chron. ... File 1

TOP SECRET

December 9, 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

We have just received from Mr. Wrong a despatch, No. 3144 of December 7, enclosing a report by Mr. Ignatieff on Mr. Arneson's personal reactions to the Canadian Memorandum on "Korea and the Atomic Bomb".

The memorandum is worth reading in full, and is on the whole reassuring. We are to have more formal comments from the State Department shortly.

*Dr.*

A. D. P. H.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
RETURN A SECRET**

*Minister has copy (presumably for working paper) I have retained the attached  
Dec 9*

c.c. Mr. N. A. Robertson

50069-C-40  
Sub. Chron. .... Filed. Ottawa, December 9, 1950.

TOP SECRET

*John L. ...*  
*A. D. P. H.*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Mr. Attlee's Visit to Ottawa

I am enclosing for your information copies of two memoranda which we have sent the Prime Minister, one giving the timetable for the forthcoming North Atlantic meetings in London and the other sending him recent material on the bomb. Copies of our enclosures to the Prime Minister are also attached.

----

*A.D.P.H.*

A.D.P.H.

**UPGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REMIT A SECRET**

9.12.17(us)  
17-12-25(CS)

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, December 9, 1950.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

50069-C-1  
Ch. 12 19 19 19 19

The Bomb

-----  
For your discussions with Mr. Attlee over the weekend, we thought you might be interested in the attached telegram, WA-3182, from Mr. Wrong, from which it would appear that President Truman has assured Mr. Attlee that he would consult you both before any decision to use the bomb were taken.

-----  
I am also enclosing a copy of the memorandum on "Korea and the Bomb" prepared in the Department and revised by Mr. Wrong, copies of which were given to the State Department and the Foreign Office for their information.

-----  
You may also find of some interest the despatch from London, copy attached, reporting U.K. reactions following President Truman's statement on the bomb.

  
A.D.P.H.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REMAIN A SECRET

December 9, 1950.

50069-2-40	
27	2)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Comments surveyed in the attached report (December 4 - 7) generally approved Mr. Pearson's views on Canada's Korean policy. The London FREE PRESS (5/12) endorsed his statement against the use of the atomic bomb without careful consideration; approved his opinion that there should be no doubt of where the responsibility lay should war be forced upon us; and suggested that: "our whole influence at Lake Success should be determinedly to find a solution in this crisis." L'ACTION CATHOLIQUE (6/12) thought that Mr. Pearson had explained well Canada's policy which, it decided, meant: "pas de conflit avec la Chine et accentuation de la defense generale et nationale." LA PATRIE (6/12) said that: "le Canada prend ainsi position en faveur d'un reglement par les voies diplomatiques de preference a une solution de force." The FINANCIAL POST (Toronto, 9/12) suggested that Washington would benefit from listening to the counsels of Messrs. Attlee and Pearson.

Sharp criticism, however, was voiced by the Brantford EXPOSITOR (5/12) which thought that Mr. Pearson's remark that there was "no reason" why United Nations efforts to end or localize the war in Korea should not succeed "cannot be taken literally. There are.....many reasons why the efforts should not succeed."

The issue of appeasement was debated. There were the opinions of the Calgary ALBERTAN (4/12) which said: "Let this not be another Munich"; of the Montreal Gazette (4/12) which thought that: "any negotiations..... are likely to be written on highly inflammable material"; and of the Ottawa JOURNAL (5/12) which pointed out that: "it takes two sides to negotiate." On the other hand, the Calgary HERALD (5/12) said that "it may be necessary to buy time"; the Brantford EXPOSITOR (4/12) suggested that: "sound and far-sighted political and military strategy should be given full play"; and the Ottawa CITIZEN (5/12) stated that: "a way must be found to discuss."

- 2 -

The Sydney POST RECORD (6/12) pointed out that: "the stake is.....the whole world" and the Toronto GLOBE & MAIL (7/12) said that the West must meet the challenge of China "always keeping in mind that Europe is the vital part of the Atlantic community." LE CANADA (5/12) opposed one-nation decisions.

The Brantford EXPOSITOR (5/12); LE DROIT (4/12) and LA PATRIE (4/12) opposed the use of the atomic bomb. The Ottawa JOURNAL (6/12) decided that Canada which, after six months of fighting in Korea, had no soldiers in the field, had no right to ask to be consulted.

A.D.P.H.

## EDITORIAL OPINION ON CANADA'S KOREAN POLICY

While most of the further comment (London FREE PRESS, L'ACTION CATHOLIQUE, LA PATRIE, FINANCIAL POST) on Mr. Pearson's speeches on Canada's Korean policy expressed approval of his views, the Brantford EXPOSITOR thought that there were many reasons why the efforts to localize the Korean war should not succeed.

### London FREE PRESS (5/12):

Hon. L.B. Pearson....clearly stated the position of Canada and it is an attitude which will be endorsed by most Canadians. He took the stand that the A-bomb should not be used on China, while there is any chance at all of making peace in Korea.....Mr. Pearson is right that it is of supreme importance to the morale and survival of the free people that the responsibility for war should be placed upon Russia, China and her satellites. There should be no doubt who is forcing war. The voice of Canada has always been for peace and our whole influence at Lake Success should be determinedly to find a solution in this crisis.

### L'ACTION CATHOLIQUE (6/12):

La conduite du Canada.....a été très bien exposée par l'hon. Pearson .....Notre pays veut éviter la guerre avec la Russie ou la domination soviétique sur l'Europe, d'abord, sur l'Asie ensuite, et enfin sur les Amériques. Pour cela, pas de conflit avec la Chine et accentuation de la défense générale et nationale.

### LA PATRIE (6/12):

Notre ministre des Affaires extérieures a refait hier, à la radio, le plaidoyer qu'il avait prononcé quelques heures auparavant devant la conférence fédérale-provinciale....et ses paroles ont eu cette fois des échos aux Etats-Unis, principalement par l'interprétation qu'en donne aujourd'hui le New York Times. Le Canada prend ainsi position en faveur d'un règlement par les voies diplomatiques de préférence à une solution de force.

### FINANCIAL POST (Toronto) (9/12):

Certainly the course of events so far should make responsible Washington very willing indeed to weigh carefully the views of representatives of other countries as to what is done next.... Listening to Britain's Attlee and Canada's Pearson will do Washington a lot of good. These two men both have a deep sense of history. Compared with many of the excitable Washington characters, they are giants of experience in international affairs and in the ways of diplomacy.

However, the Brantford EXPOSITOR (5/12) considered:

If neither Peking nor Moscow is really prepared for full-scale war -- as yet -- negotiations attempted from Washington or London may serve to postpone the dire event....Mr. Pearson assumed that China was risking armed intervention on the basis of assurances of assistance from Russia. Nothing could be more logical than that.....The military situation in Korea is grave and may be expected to become even more so before any stabilization of lines can be effected. In Mr. Pearson's view, however, and, from his comments, the view also of Prime Minister Attlee.... there is no need to give way to despair.....Indeed Mr. Pearson made so bold as to affirm that there is no reason why the efforts now being made, through the United Nations, to localize and end the Korean war should not succeed. With respect for his knowledge and judgment, Mr. Pearson's remark that there is "no reason" cannot be taken literally. There are, in fact, many reasons why the efforts should not succeed. The hope is that the reasons for success will, in the patient long run, outweigh the reason for failure.

A number of editors, while not referring directly to the Minister's speeches, discussed such points as the advisability of negotiations, the importance of Europe, and the use of the atomic bomb.

In an editorial headed "Let This Not Be Another Munich" the Calgary ALBERTAN (4/12) said:

Whether or not the generals feel they can handle Chinese aggression now, let the word go out to all the world that the aggression must and will be turned back and the aggressor punished. Let there be no more Munichs, no more appeasement, no more heads in the sand.

The Montreal GAZETTE (4/12):

Concerning the desirability of such a "political settlement," there can be little question.....It may be only too true that the western nations are not now in a position to give effective resistance to Communism, either east or west. This is a perilous position that needs an abrupt awakening. But it is also a situation that should make clear that any negotiations, or paper deals, that may lull the conflict for the moment, are likely to be written on highly inflammable material.

The Ottawa JOURNAL (5/12):

- 3 -

We were told yesterday.....that Canada was going to UN's General Assembly "counselling caution on the military side against any move which would extend the conflict." If such counsel could be given to Mao, and with any chance of success, it would make sense. In the situation which exists....it makes no sense....We hear endless talk of "negotiating" with Mao: of "making a deal" with him. It takes two sides to negotiate.

The Edmonton BULLETIN (5/12):

There is no surer way to promote and precipitate (war) than by creating the notion in Russia's mind, through a series of appeasements, that we are either afraid to fight or incapable of fighting.

The Calgary HERALD (5/12):

We do not like the sound of the word "appeasement," which raises ugly memories of Munich. But we must face the fact that it may be necessary to buy time. A full-scale war against China now would be the curtain-raiser to a Third Great War.

It was the opinion of the Brantford EXPOSITOR (4/12) that: "rejecting appeasement, sound and far-sighted political and military strategy should be given full play, even though it appear cautious to the point of considerable embarrassment."  
The Ottawa CITIZEN (5/12):

A way must be found to discuss China's aspirations and security with China's new masters, even while China's armies must be resisted on the Korean battlefield. At the same time, joint efforts to build up Europe's defences, to strengthen the economies of backward areas, to see if a reconciliation with Soviet Russia is not yet possible, must be made. Then, as Mr. Pearson suggested, if there is war the world will know where the blame lies.

LA PRESSE (4/12) said that: "Le Canada réserve le plus cordial accueil au premier ministre de Grande-Bretagne.....On doit entretenir la confiance que de tant d'efforts entrepris pour écarter le danger de guerre il sera possible d'obtenir l'apaisement désiré par tous les peuples."

The Sydney POST RECORD (6/12):

One of the lessons to be learned....is that for all our preponderance in Korea, the stake is not that little peninsula but the whole world, and while we may be able to lead we must be sure not to get out so far ahead that we lose our allies.

... 4.

Toronto GLOBE & MAIL (7/12):

If....the Chinese with Russian collaboration are bent on challenging the West now, knowing that Western defense preparations have barely got started, there will be no choice but to meet the threat, always keeping in mind that Europe is a vital part of the Atlantic community and that forces sucked into the quicksands of Asia will not be available for European defense. There remains the hope that China will make negotiation possible by back-tracking in Korea.

The Peterborough EXAMINER (5/12):

The western world is not ready for a two-front war. It is better to withdraw from North Korea than to be kicked out of all Korea and involved in a major war at the same time.

LE CANADA (5/12):

Les Nations Unies peuvent se relever de cet échec, à la condition que les fautes passées ne se répètent plus. Il n'est pas admissible que le membre le plus puissant soit seul à prendre les décisions. Le maintien de la paix dans le monde ne s'obtiendra que par une collaboration réelle de tous les pays libres.

The Bramford EXPOSITOR (5/12) warned of the limitations of the A-bomb and said that the A-bomb nor the hydrogen bomb should be used "except after the most searching examination and reflection on moral, military and psychological grounds. LE DROIT (4/12) said:

Même si la bombe atomique est lancée directement contre un objectif militaire, son usage, néanmoins, demeurera condamnable lorsque l'effet mauvais l'emportera sur les avantages militaires.

LA PATRIE (4/12) referring to Mr. Atlee's visit to Washington said that he would plead against use of the atom bomb. It also recalled, for those who disdained talk of appeasement, that the U.N. was founded on the principle of seeking settlements by the rule of law. The Ottawa JOURNAL (6/12) thought that talk of not being able to risk all-out war now was late and that that risk was taken last June. It considered that Canada did not have the right to be asked for an opinion in the councils of strategy -- "with not a single soldier on the fighting front after six months of fighting."

ORIGINAL

COPY NO. 1 of 15 COPIES

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

50069-C-40  
21 | 50

*Refer*  
PM #2  
SSEA #6  
USSEA #8  
A Robertson #7

TOP SECRET

CYPHER - AUTO

WA - 3182

WASHINGTON, December 8, 1950.

#3 Mr. Keenan  
#4 Mr. Hennig  
#5 Mr. Giff  
#155 mm.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

Top Secret. Attlee-Truman talks - consultation on possible use of the atomic weapon.

1. I was informed in the strictest confidence at the British Embassy today that this question was discussed privately between President Truman and Mr. Attlee. Mr. Attlee put quite bluntly to the President the view of the United Kingdom Government that they should be consulted before any decision was reached to use the atomic weapon in circumstances in which the United Kingdom would be directly concerned.

2. Mr. Attlee intends to report on this conversation personally to the Prime Minister. I was told that the reply given to Mr. Attlee by President Truman was one which Mr. St. Laurent would find very satisfactory.

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8 DEC 1950

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

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COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1950 DEC 8 PM 4 : 28

Ext 180 A

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*for 415*  
*T.K*  
*483*  
*Mr. Robertson*  
*Mr. Mackay*  
*Mr. George*

OTTAWA FILE  
No. 52069-C-160

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

Despatch No. 483  
Date. December 8, 1950

FROM: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA IN PAKISTAN  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference. My telegram No. 127 of December 5.

Subject: Korea.

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*Mr. Robertson*

19 DEC 1950

Copies Referred To.....

Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan has now spoken publicly along the same lines as he spoke to me at our interview on December 4.

2. In an interview which he gave to Mr. James H. Berry yesterday he is reported to have said that "it would be a very great mistake to use the atom bomb in Korea because it might very well make the international situation worse."

3. Mr. Liaquat is also reported to have said in the same interview that "Pakistan's policy regarding the Korean war was to localize the fighting and whatever action the United Nations could take to achieve this object would have the support of Pakistan."

No. of Enclosures

none

*David M. Johnson*  
High Commissioner

Post File

No. 3000-K1

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JAN 18 2 55 PM 1950

RECEIVED  
JAN 18 1950

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FROM: [Illegible]

SUBJECT: [Illegible]

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Copy on 9770-B.40 14  
Subject File

CONFIDENTIAL

CIRCULAR DOCUMENT

Ottawa, December 8, 1950.

NO. B 134

I transmit herewith the document listed  
below.

*RA Mackay*  
For the Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

To the Heads of

Canadian Posts Abroad.

No. of copies 1

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SUBJECT

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Despatch No. 3121 of December 4, 1950, from the High  
Commissioner for Canada in London reporting on Korea and the  
Atom Bomb.

AIR BAG

CONFIDENTIAL

Despatch No. 3121

Date December 4, 1950

FROM: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference: My telegram No. 2348 of December 1, 1950

Subject: Korea and the Atom Bomb

In view of the possibility of misunderstanding in the United States concerning the nature of the support behind Mr. Attlee in his visit to Washington and in view of the fact that the representations made by Labour members of Parliament to Mr. Attlee against the use of the atom bomb in Korea were initiated largely by Mr. Sydney Silverman and Mr. Ian Mikardo, it seems necessary to outline the sequence of events and to give subsequent press comment on this subject.

2. The first reports of President Truman's press conference of November 30 reached the House of Commons soon after Mr. Churchill had finished his speech on November 30 in the late afternoon. Some members withheld judgment until there was time to study full reports, but others at once concluded, it seems, that the danger of the start of an atomic war was much closer than they had supposed. The reaction was very strong among some Labour members and these decided at once to let the Prime Minister know that they were strongly opposed to the use of the bomb in the prevailing circumstances. In the beginning the movement was led by such familiar figures on the Labour left wing as Mr. Mikardo and Mr. Silverman, but it would be inaccurate to represent the protest as a left-wing affair. It was supported by a very large part of the Labour Party, including other members of the National Executive and including members of the solid group of trade unionists. Estimates of their numbers agree that 100 or more members gave their support. According to one lobby correspondent, a group of Labour M.P.'s sought the advice of Mr. Eden when the idea of the letter to the Prime Minister was first suggested. Whatever the truth of this report, it would not be surprising in view of the marked sympathy towards Mr. Eden shown by the Labour rank and file during the debate. The message is said to have been typed out quickly and copies circulated around the House for signature. Its contents were made known to the Prime Minister before he made his speech on the evening of November 30.

3. The precise contents of the protest to the Prime Minister are not generally known. It would seem to be in the form of an indication to Mr. Attlee that,

Post File  
No. AR 50/1

Copies to:  
Paris  
Moscow  
New Delhi

- 2 -

in the opinion of this Labour group, the United Kingdom forces in Korea should be withdrawn if the fighting were carried across the Manchurian frontier and if the atom bomb were dropped.

4. The timing of Mr. Attlee's announcement in his speech that he expected to visit President Truman naturally made it look as if the visit was the result of this message to the Prime Minister from Labour back-benchers. The Communist press seized on this point and represented the visit in that light. The evidence available points to the fact, however, that Mr. Attlee probably would have gone in any case. Furthermore, anxiety about the use of the atom bomb has by no means been confined to those who joined in the protest.

5. As you will know, Mr. Attlee stated in his speech of November 30 that, in the opinion of the Government, a decision of such great import as the use of the atom bomb could not be taken on behalf of the United Nations without the fullest prior consultation with those member states who were at present taking part in international police action in Korea. Mr. R.A. Butler, who spoke for the Conservatives between Mr. Churchill and Mr. Attlee, had little time in which to consider the cables from Washington. He did refer, however, to "the horror that many of us would feel at the use of this weapon in circumstances which were not such that our own moral conscience was satisfied that there was no alternative". The accounts of President Truman's press conference, noted the Manchester Guardian Political Correspondent, suggested so different an emphasis from that which Mr. Churchill had just placed upon world events in his speech, that Opposition and Government supporters alike were, for a moment, unsteady. The question which posed itself on receipt of the reports from Washington was whether harmony could be maintained if a war with China should develop from new United States action. The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary had an informal meeting with Mr. Churchill later in the day.

#### 6. Press Comment

The Times on the following day, December 1, said that here was one plain proof of the need for the fullest and frankest discussion among the western leaders. "The decision to use this weapon could be made only in face of the direst threat and it could only be made on behalf of the United Nations in Korea by the common consent of the free nations". The Conservative Daily Telegraph stated that it was principles and objectives and not methods which were laid down by the United Nations. If United Kingdom opinion was overwhelmingly averse to the use of the atomic bomb at this juncture, as it surely was, it was essential to bear constantly in mind two points made by Mr. Churchill. One was that the United States contribution in Korea was by far the greatest. The other was that if the United Kingdom wished to influence the policy of the United States it should aim at the re-establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee.

7. On December 2 The Times thought that there was no reason to suppose that the people and leaders of the United States did not share the horror and repulsion expressed by all sides at Parliament at the thought of having to use the atom bomb. The Guardian concluded that

- 3 -

the Chinese Communists could capture Korea by sheer weight of numbers if they set out to do it. The United Nations countries in Korea had vital commitments in Europe and their position in Korea could become exceedingly difficult. The question was whether they should deny themselves the advantage of their best weapons which were air power and the atom bomb. There would be the greatest reluctance to bomb Manchuria or start atomic warfare and either would be a last resort, but the question was precisely that contingency - of what should be done if the Chinese Communists would not negotiate and try to destroy the United Nations armies in Korea. Whether bombing in any form would be effective had still to be decided and would have to be decided by the United Nations. On December 4 the Guardian went on to say that if the atom bomb were used it could hardly fail to be used elsewhere in the world in the fairly near future, even if its explosion prevented, rather than caused, an immediate start of the third world war. Its use against the Chinese Communists would probably alienate most of Asia from the cause of the United Nations.

8. The Sunday Times of December 3 declared that every humane and civilized person was against the atomic bomb in the same sense as he was against war. Yet like war the use of the bomb might be an enforced necessity for a society of nations menaced by aggression. If, however, the bomb was to be used in the name of society, no means should be neglected to ensure that the general will of society was behind its use. There were many reasons why the atom bomb must be treated as exceptional. On the military side its use must be related to the object in view. Soldiers might be able to indicate that atomic bombing would do great damage to particular targets but they could not say whether that would cause a withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces from Korea. On the political side the bomb had acquired a unique symbolic status. Its use would be taken as a confession that the hopes of world peace under the United Nations had been abandoned. Secondly the paralysing and dividing fears of countries in the track of possible Soviet attack would be heightened by the feeling that the moral barrier to the use of the bomb in future had gone down. There would be special danger of a split between the East and West within the non-Soviet world.

9. "Scrutator" in the Sunday Times said that the situation for using the bomb was not the present but a situation in which the United Nations forces were driven in disaster down the peninsula. It would, in certain circumstances, be suicidal for the United Nations to admit what Russian propaganda had striven to foster, namely the idea that the bomb should never be used.

(Sgd.) H.R. Horne  
(for the) High Commissioner.

Ext. 180A

*Referred enclosures only to  
SSEA  
Mr. Robertson  
D. R. [unclear]  
By [unclear]  
ATM [unclear]*

OTTAWA FILE  
No. 50069-C-100

Despatch No. 3144

Date... December 7th, 1950, .....

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
TOP SECRET

FROM: The Canadian Ambassador, Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C.  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.....

Subject: Views of the Canadian Government on possible use of atomic weapons in the Far East.

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1. As reported in my teletype to Ottawa WA 3157 (repeated to New York in Candel No. 78) of December 6th, a copy of the memorandum containing the views of the Canadian Government on the possible use of atomic weapons in the Far East (revised in accordance with your instructions contained in Candel 74 of December 6th) was given yesterday to the Department of State through R. Gordon Arneson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State on atomic matters. Two copies of the revised memorandum as given to the State Department are attached.

2. Mr. Arneson, as you know, is the senior official in the State Department who concerns himself exclusively with atomic energy matters, and it was for the purpose of obtaining considered reactions to our memorandum that our paper was given to him.

3. He said that he was glad to receive our memorandum as the issues referred in it had been discussed between Mr. Attlee and President Truman and had also been under lively discussion in the press. Mr. Arneson offered some preliminary comments which are contained in a memorandum of conversation, two copies of which are attached.

8 DEC 1950  
Copies Referred  
To Candel, ....  
..... New York.

No. of Enclosures  
... 4 .....

Post File  
No.....

*1/17/50*

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET  
REVIEW A SECRET

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FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

50069-C-40  
41 41  
SECRET

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER - AUTO

WASHINGTON, December 6, 1950.

WA-3157

MINISTER  
UNDR/SEC  
D/UNDR/SEC  
A/UNDR/SEC'S.

*Referred*  
*U.S.S.E.A.*  
*Mr. Robertson*  
*Mr. Lester*  
*Mr. Don*  
*Mr. Collins*  
*Dated Dec. 7*  
*mb.*

Secret. Addressed External as WA-3157, repeated to Candel New York as CA-78. Korea and the atomic bomb.

1. A copy of the memorandum, revised in accordance with Mr. Pearson's instructions contained in message Candel No. 74 and repeated to Ottawa in No. 585, has been given to the State Department this afternoon. It was accompanied with a verbal message that the Canadian Government attaches importance to the views contained in this memorandum and the request that comment, if possible in written form, be made on it by the U.S. Government. Some preliminary comments will be sent forward by bag tomorrow.

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17 DEC 1950

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1950 DEC 7 AM 9:08

*Mr. George*

ORIGINAL AND FILE COPY

FROM: THE CHAIRMAN, CANADIAN DELEGATION TO THE U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

50069-C-40	
U1	SJ

CYPHER - AUTO

NO. 585

SECRET

NEW YORK, December 6, 1950.

*Refer*  
*USSEA*

MINISTER  
UNDR/SEC  
D/UNDR/SEC  
A/UNDR/SEC'S

*H. Robertson Done*  
*H. Page Dewar*  
*H. Lapan*  
*H. Collins London by fax type*  
*(H)*  
*with*

Secret. Addressed Beaver Washington No. 74 repeated External Ottawa No. 585.

Following for Wrong from Pearson, Begins:

I have read your suggested revisions of the memorandum on Korea and the atomic bomb and I agree with all the changes except one, namely, the inclusion, as a final sentence to paragraph 3 (3), of the reference to the bomb being the ultimate weapon. This may not seem to be very important, but as it was stressed in my statement in Ottawa, I think it might be included in the memorandum.

2. I think it is important from the point of view of Canadian public opinion to make our position clear to the United States Government, and I would be glad if you would do this in the terms of your revised memorandum with the one change suggested above. Ends.

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6 DEC 1950

CHAIRMAN

CLEARED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

PMO DEC 6 PM 12:17

# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

EXT 7.

FILE NO.	50069C-4
SEARCHED	Chron. 50 Filed

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED KINGDOM,  
 LONDON, ENGLAND.

Message To Be Sent	No. <b>1913</b>	Date	For Communications Office Use Only
EN CLAIR		December 6, 1950.	SENT - DEC 6 1950
CODE			
CYPHER			
Degree of Priority	<p style="text-align: center;">With our despatch No. D-3719 of December 5,                  we sent you Mr. Wrong's revision of our memorandum                  on Korea and the Atomic Bomb, the original text of                  which was repeated to you in our telegram No. 1892                  of December 4.</p> <p>2. The Minister has now agreed to all suggested                  changes except the deletion of the last two sentences                  of Para. 3, which are, therefore, being retained                  in the revised memorandum to be given to the U. S.                  Government.</p> <p>3. Please give a copy of the revised memorandum                  to the U. K. Government.</p>		
ORIGINATOR			
Sig.			
Typed: G. George/tk			
Div. Def. Liaison			
Local Tel. 3795			
APPROVED BY.			
Sig.			
Typed:			
Is This Message Likely To Be Published			
Yes ( ) No ( )			
Internal Distribution:			
Done			
Date			
Copies Referred To:	Secretary of State for External Affairs.		
Done			
Date			

~~TOP SECRET~~  
Date: 6th, 1950.

~~TOP SECRET~~  
DOWNGRADED TO ~~SECRET~~  
REDUIT A SECRET

MEMORANDUM  
KOREA AND THE ATOM BOMB

File No. 50069-c-1  
Mr. G. Arneson

Memorandum of Conversation between Mr. R. G. Arneson,  
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State on Atomic Energy,  
and G. Ignatieff.

Acting upon the instructions that the views of the Canadian Government on the use of the atomic bomb in the present circumstances of war in Korea should be made clear to the U.S. Government, a copy of a Memorandum on the question, as revised and approved by Mr. Pearson in his message Candel No. 74 of December 6th, was given to Mr. Arneson at the State Department on the afternoon of December 6th. Mr. Arneson was chosen for the receipt of this Memorandum, as he is the senior official in the State Department dealing exclusively with atomic energy questions and participates in all discussions on this subject.

In giving Mr. Arneson the Memorandum, Mr. Ignatieff emphasized the importance which the Canadian Government attached to the views contained in it and asked that, if possible, comment, either in verbal or written form, should be made on it when its contents had been studied.

Mr. Arneson quickly read the Memorandum and said that he would be glad to offer certain personal comments and that he would seek authority to provide written comments later. He observed that it was particularly appropriate at this time that the Canadian Government should submit its views on this question. The remarks made by the President at his press conference the previous week had inevitably given rise to public discussion of the use of this weapon and its implications. The question had also come up in the discussions between President Truman and Mr. Attlee. A brief statement of the U.S. position had been given Mr. Attlee, which said in effect that the U.S. Government was very much alive to the implications of the use of the atomic weapon and was giving its implications urgent consideration;

/that the U.S.

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that the U.S. Government intends, if the occasion should arise to use the weapon, to consult with the United Kingdom and other countries signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty if time and circumstances permit. Mr. Arneson thought that a paper drawn in similar terms might be made available to the Canadian Government as one of the partners in tripartite co-operation.

Mr. Arneson then offered to outline the developments of thinking in the State Department on the use of the atomic weapon and its implications, as an indication of the kind of U.S. official views which might soon be formulated. Mr. Ignatieff said that this would be very helpful.

Mr. Arneson began by outlining the procedure which would govern the making of a decision by the United States to use the atomic weapon at the present time. The decision to use the weapon requires, in the first place, a recommendation from the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, which would state whether the use of the weapon was necessary or desirable from a military point of view. Mr. Arneson said that, so far as he knew, no such recommendation had been considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in connection with the Korean war and no responsible U.S. military authority had urged its use. The recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would then be considered by a special committee of the National Security Council consisting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defence, and the Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission. This committee would have to take into account the political and psychological consideration. This committee would then render its advice to the President, who would make the decision. Mr. Arneson emphasized that the armed forces do not have any atomic weapons at their disposal, unless the President authorizes the release of specific weapons from the custody of the Atomic Energy Commission to the armed forces for specific tasks.

Mr. Arneson said that about two years ago some con-

/question

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question of the conditions which might apply to the possible use of the atomic bomb, but no decisions were made at that time. The procedure outlined in the preceding paragraph, however, was agreed. In view of the deepening international crisis, this question had now been re-opened and a study was being prepared, and Mr. Arneson had been charged to prepare a preliminary paper for the consideration of the Secretary of State. What follows represents Mr. Arneson's own thinking of the way in which he proposes to analyze the problem for the consideration of the Secretary of State and the other members of the committee of the National Security Council.

It was necessary to proceed from certain assumptions. In the first place, the atomic weapon so far developed is useful only as a means of strategic, not tactical, warfare. To use the weapon tactically, it would be necessary to devise and construct an embodiment capable of delivery through one or other of the following tactical weapons; fighter bombers, guided missiles, or artillery. Although work is proceeding on the means to put the atomic weapon to tactical use, the proper devices do not exist today. It also has to be assumed that atomic weapons are available only in limited numbers and should be conserved for use against important strategic targets. Such targets exist in the industrialized areas of the Soviet Union and do not exist to any important extent in territories on the periphery of the Soviet Union. This consideration particularly applies, in the opinion of Mr. Arneson, to the areas immediately concerned in the Korean warfare.

If the preceding assumptions are accepted, Mr. Arneson said, it follows that the issue in deciding whether to use the atomic weapon is not so much the question of whether you should use this weapon or that weapon, but the question of what kind of war it is. Mr. Arneson thought that this question should be considered in relation to four possible contingencies:

/(a)

- (a) a war involving only satellite Communist forces (or what he termed a "creeping aggression"), such as has been tried in Korea;
- (b) an overt Soviet military attack against a country other than one of the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty;
- (c) an overt Soviet attack on one of the signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty other than the United States, and
- (d) an overt Soviet attack against the United States.

The question of consultation with other governments presented a different problem, Mr. Arneson suggested, in each of the contingencies noted above. Contingencies (a) and (b) presented the most difficult problems. In effect, in his opinion, it would involve decision by the United States Government, in consultation with Canada, the United Kingdom, and other NATO countries, as to whether, in the circumstances, they were prepared to go to war with the Soviet Union. That, he said, was the central question which would have to be decided first; the question of whether the atomic bomb would be used would be consequent upon a prior decision on the main issue.

In the case of contingency (c), namely, overt attack against a NATO country other than the United States, the normal consultative processes provided under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would apply and decisions would have to be related to existing strategic plans of NATO.

As regards contingency (d), namely, in the event that there was an overt Soviet attack against the United States, Mr. Arneson thought he should make it clear that it was very unlikely that the United States Government in effect would consult any other country before retaliating immediately against the Soviet union.

/Referring to

Referring to the clause in the Quebec Agreement, which provided for prior consultation between the parties before the atomic weapon was used, Mr. Arneson said that considerable thought had been given to including some provision for consultation in the modus vivendi when it was negotiated in 1947. However, in the course of the consultations which took place at that time with the Joint Congressional Committee, Senator Vandenberg had said that he could not accept under any circumstances a provision which would in effect tie the hands of the United States Government in the event that it was attacked. No such commitment, Mr. Arneson thought, would be undertaken by the United States Government in the present circumstances. He also wanted to make it clear that the question of immediate retaliation by the United States with atomic weapons would arise whatever the form of attack used by the Soviet Union upon the United States. The question would be whether the national security of the United States was directly affected by the attack by the Soviet Union, and not whether the Soviet Union used atomic weapons first against the United States.

Mr. Arneson said that the question had also been raised whether the United Nations should be consulted before the atomic weapon was used. The United Nations would certainly be called on to decide whether an aggression had occurred and to determine the aggressor. This in turn presumably would affect considerably the decision of the United States and other NATO countries, having in mind the various contingencies noted above. He did not think, however, that the United States Government would accept the idea that the United Nations should undertake to decide whether atomic weapons should be used in any particular circumstances.

/The question

The question also arose as to whether there should be a public declaration in advance of the use of the atomic weapon. If it were agreed that the use of the atomic weapon would only be applied in the event of war with the Soviet Union, then the U.S. Government would not be inclined to favour any action which would give the Soviet Union advance notice of an atomic attack and thus put the Soviet defences on the alert. However, consideration would have to be given to the kind of public statement which might be used for the purposes of psychological warfare. For instance, a public declaration might be issued to the effect that the Soviet Government by its persistent acts of aggression had brought upon the Soviet people the use of this dreadful weapon and the Soviet people would be urged to liberate themselves from their tyrants in order to avoid further attack of this kind.

In conclusion, Mr. Arneson emphasized again that these were personal views which he was developing for consideration by the committee of the National Security Council and that they went beyond, in some respects, the ground covered by the Canadian Government Memorandum. He hoped that these views, however, would give us an indication of the trend of United States official thinking on the possible use of the atomic weapon and the question of consultation with other governments. He undertook to get in touch with Mr. Ignatieff shortly and to provide formal comments on the Canadian Government Memorandum.

SECRET

December 6, 1950.

MEMORANDUM

VIEWS OF CANADIAN GOVERNMENT ON POSSIBLE  
USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE FAR EAST

The military authorities may argue that the atomic bomb is just another weapon. But, in the minds of ordinary people everywhere in the world, it is far more than that and has acquired an immensely greater intrinsic significance. The anxiety with which the possibility of the use of the bomb, by either side, is regarded has been strikingly and increasingly evident of late among our friends in Europe and in Asia. This is the main reason for the appeal, even in free countries, of the cynical Communist "peace" campaign.

The psychological and political consequences of the employment of the bomb, or the threat of its employment, in the present critical situation would be incalculably great. The risk of retaliation, to which our allies in Europe feel themselves to be exposed, would affect materially their will to resist, and even the consideration of the possibility of atomic war in Asia, when our defences are still weak, cannot fail to stimulate the tendencies toward "neutrality" which the development of strength and unity on our side is beginning to overcome.

The strategic use of the bomb against Chinese cities might conceivably change the course of military events in Asia now, but at the risk of destroying the cohesion and unity of purpose of the Atlantic community. Certainly its use, for a second time, against an Asian people would dangerously weaken the links that remain between the Western world and the peoples of the East.

The atomic bomb is the most powerful deterrent element in the arsenal of the free world. To what extent/  
extent/

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extent this is because of actual military potential, to what extent to psychological factors, it is impossible for us, and probably for anyone, to know. In any event, it is universally regarded as the ultimate weapon. It should be treated as such. The effectiveness of the bomb as a tactical weapon cannot be fully appreciated. The very uncertainty of its capabilities in the tactical role must add materially to its deterrent value. Once it has been used tactically, however, much of its force as a deterrent may disappear, unless its use for this purpose has proven overwhelmingly successful.

The Canadian people would hold their Government responsible for making the Canadian views known to the United States before the atomic bomb were to be used. This is especially true in present circumstances because of the United Nations character of the operations in Korea.

Furthermore, in atomic matters, the Canadian Government had, from the beginning, been a partner in the tripartite co-operation which stemmed from the Quebec Agreement between President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in 1943. Mr. Mackenzie King was associated with the joint declaration of November, 1945, by the heads of three governments directly concerned. Through its membership in the Combined Policy Committee, the Canadian Government has continued to assist in the development of our joint resources of raw materials and of scientific knowledge. Canada has made a direct contribution to building up the atomic stockpile. Although the modus vivendi of the Combined Policy Committee concluded in January, 1948, does not include, as did the Quebec Agreement, the clause providing for prior consultation, the Canadian Government would be inevitably involved,

and/

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and in a specially close sense, in the consequences of the use of the atomic bomb.

The mass intervention of the Chinese Communists in Korea may lead to the Third World War. In the present critical military situation, those who have their own men engaged (and this applies, of course, particularly to the United States) are obviously entitled to have full consideration given to the use of every available means of supporting the ground forces fighting under the United Nations command. This is natural and inevitable. But, before a decision of such immense and awful consequence, for all of us, is taken, there should be consultation among the governments principally concerned.

EXT. 97.

# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

FILE REF.	11	50
40069-C-40		

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
S E C R E T

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON

REPEAT TO: CANADIAN DELEGATION TO U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
 NEW YORK *No 380*

Message To Be Sent

EN CLAIR

CODE

CYPHER *aut*

No. *EX 2493*

Date December 5, 1950.

For Communications Office Use Only

**SENT -- DEC 5 1950**

Degree of Priority

**IMMEDIATE** *Dv.*

ORIGINATOR

Sig. ....

Typed: *ADPH/JH*

Div. *USSEA*

Local Tel. *4803*

APPROVED BY

Sig. *Dv.*

Typed: .....

Is This Message Likely To Be Published

Yes ( ) No ( )

Internal Distribution:

Done .....

Date .....

Copies Referred To:

Done .....

Date .....

49-P-274-100M

Following from the Under-Secretary, Begins:

Your WA 3124 and WA 3125 of December 4, Korea and the atomic bomb.

1. Thank you for your suggestions for revision of the memorandum and for the useful comments thereon which you have made. Subject to the Minister's approval, I am setting down in the immediately following paragraphs of this message my proposals for the final text.
2. The changes you suggest with respect to paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7, and for the deletion of paragraph 9 are accepted.
3. We feel you should retain the final sentence in paragraph 3. This was, in fact, used in the Minister's statement at the opening of the Dominion-Provincial Conference yesterday and is, we think, an important element in the position we have taken.
4. Putting paragraph 5 at the end as paragraph 7, is accepted.
5. We would prefer retention of at least the second sentence of paragraph 8 which we regard as of importance. The first sentence and the long third

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EXT. 97.

# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

FILE REF.		

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: .....

Message To Be Sent

EN CLAIR

CODE

CYPHER

No. .... Date .....

For Communications Office Use Only

Degree of Priority

- 2 -

ORIGINATOR

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Local Tel. ....

sentence might be omitted, perhaps, since they are repetative. If the third sentence is retained, it might read: "While there is any chance at all of preventing an extention of the present hostilities, the advantages of using the bomb, or even threatening its use, seem to us to be likely, etc." However, we do not insist on this.

APPROVED BY

Sig. ....

Typed: .....

6. All the above references are to the numbers appearing in the original memorandum contained in our EX 2475 of December 4.

Is This Message Likely To Be Published

Yes ( ) No ( )

7. This message is being repeated to the Minister in New York and I have asked him by telephone to send you an immediate teletype if he approves of the suggestions set out above and agrees that you be authorized in the light thereof to prepare a final text and present it to the State Department forthwith in terms which, in your own judgment, are best calculated to state the Canadian point of view.

Ends.

Internal Distribution:

Done .....

Date .....

Copies Referred To:

SSEA

Done .....

Date .....



FILE COPY

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OTTAWA

SECRET

BY BAG

December 5 19 50

No. D-3719

Sir,

I enclose the document (s) listed below.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

The Canadian High Commissioner,  
London, England.

A. MackAY

for the Secretary of State for External Affairs.

58 " 50069-2-40  
SD

DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT

SUBJECT

Telegram WA-3124 of December 4  
from Washington.

Korea and the atomic bomb.

Telegram WA-3125 of December 4  
from Washington.

Revised text of memorandum re atomic  
bomb.

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

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50069-4-40  
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IMMEDIATE

CYPHER - AUTO

WA-3125

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1950.

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MINISTER  
UNDR/SEC  
D/UNDR/SEC  
A/UNDR/SEC'S.

Secret. Addressed External as WA-3125, repeated Candel, New York as No. 69.

Reference my WA-3124 of December 4th.

Following is text of revised memorandum, Begins:

1. The military authorities may argue that the atomic bomb is just another weapon. But, in the minds of ordinary people everywhere in the world, it is far more than that and has acquired an immensely greater intrinsic significance. The anxiety with which the possibility of the use of the bomb, by either side, is regarded has been strikingly and increasingly evident of late among our friends in Europe and in Asia. This is the main reason for the appeal, even in free countries, of the cynical Communist "peace" campaign.

2. The psychological and political consequences of the employment of the bomb, or the threat of its employment, in the present critical situation would be incalculably great. The risk of retaliation, to which our allies in Europe feel themselves to be exposed, would affect materially their will to resist, and even the consideration of the possibility of atomic war in Asia, when our defences are still weak, cannot fail to stimulate the tendencies toward "neutralism" which the development of strength and unity on our side is beginning to overcome.

3. The strategic use of the bomb against Chinese cities might conceivably change the course of military events in Asia

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now, but at the risk of destroying the cohesion and unity of purpose of the Atlantic community. Certainly its use, for a second time, against an Asian people would dangerously weaken the links that remain between the Western world and the peoples of the East.

4. The atomic bomb is the most powerful deterrent element in the arsenal of the free world. To what extent this is because of actual military potential, to what extent to psychological factors, it is impossible for us, and probably for anyone, to know. The effectiveness of the bomb as a tactical weapon cannot be fully appreciated. The very uncertainty of its capabilities in the tactical role must add materially to its deterrent value. Once it has been used tactically, however, much of its force as a deterrent may disappear, unless its use for this purpose has proven over-whelmingly successful.

5. The Canadian people would hold their Government responsible for making the Canadian views known to the United States before the atomic bomb were to be used. This is especially true in present circumstances because of the United Nations character of the operations in Korea.

6. Furthermore, in atomic matters, the Canadian Government has, from the beginning, been a partner in the tripartite cooperation which stemmed from the Quebec Agreement between President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in 1943. Mr. MacKenzie King was associated with the joint declaration of November, 1945, by the heads of three Governments directly concerned. Through its membership in the Combined Policy Committee, the Canadian Government has continued to assist in the development of our joint resources of raw materials and of scientific knowledge. Canada has made a direct contribution to building up the atomic stockpile. Although the modus vivendi of the Combined Policy Committee concluded in January, 1948, does not include, as did the Quebec Agreement, the clause providing for prior consultation,

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the Canadian Government would be inevitably involved, and in a specially close sense, in the consequences of the use of the atomic bomb.

7. The mass intervention of the Chinese Communists in Korea may lead to the third world war. In the present critical military situation, those who have their own men engaged (and this applies, of course, particularly to the United States) are obviously entitled to have full consideration given to the use of every available means of supporting the ground forces fighting under the United Nations command. This is natural and inevitable. But, before a decision of such immense and awful consequence, for all of us, is taken, there should be consultation among the Governments principally concerned. Ends.

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

ORIGINAL AND FILE COPY

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FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

IMMEDIATE

CYPHER - AUTO

S E C R E T

WA-3124

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1950.

MINISTER  
UNDR/SEC  
D/UNDR/SEC  
A/UNDR/SEC'S

*Refer  
S.S.E.A  
USSEA  
Mr. Legg  
Mr. Bell  
Mr. Mackay  
London by Legg  
Done Dec. 5  
mk.*

*File*

S. Secret. Addressed External as WA-3124, repeated Candel, New York as No. 68.

Your EX-2474 and EX-2475 of December 4th, Korea and the atomic bomb.

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5 DEC 1950

1. Several passages in the memorandum given in EX-2475 seem to me to convey the impression that the Canadian Government believes that a unilateral decision to authorize the use of the bomb in Korea is likely to be taken and probably very soon. I am sure that this is not the case and that the statement issued by the White House after the President's press conference should be taken at its face value. It is true that the President's answers to some of the questions addressed to him were not phrased as clearly as they might have been and were misleadingly reported around the world. It would, I think, be resented if I was to present the memorandum to the State Department without emendation of such phrases as "the imminent prospect of atomic war over Korea" in paragraph 2 and "before an irreparable decision is taken" at the end of paragraph 7. Indeed, I would prefer a general toning down of the language, especially that used in paragraphs 1, 2, 8, and 9.

2. I am certain that little consideration has been given to the use of atomic weapons in Korea or Manchuria. It is doubtful whether the military results that could be achieved would be sufficiently great to warrant their use on military grounds alone. Even if Mukden, Harbin, and Dairen were destroyed, it is not likely that the dislocation would be

- 2 -

sufficient seriously to affect the Chinese operations in Korea because of the nature of their arms and equipment. The loss of even several hundred thousand lives in Manchuria would also not be likely to lead a Government of a country known for its indifference to human life to alter its purposes.

3. Although I have not myself discussed the possible employment of atomic weapons in Korea at a high level in the State Department, I have talked the matter over with the British and Netherlands Ambassadors, both of whom would, I think, agree with what is said in this paragraph.

4. My immediately following message contains a suggested revision and simplification of the memorandum.

CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

EXT. 97.

# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

FILE REF.	41	50
50069-C-410		

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON

Message To Be Sent	No. <i>EX.2476.</i>	Date December 4, 1950.	For Communications Office Use Only <b>SENT -- DEC 4 1950</b>
EN CLAIR			
CODE			
CYPHER	X		

Degree of Priority  
**IMMEDIATE**

ORIGINATOR

Sig. ....

Typed: **ADPH/Jh**  
**USSEA**

Div. ....

Local Tel. **4803**

APPROVED BY

Sig. *[Signature]*

Typed: .....

Is This Message Likely To Be Published

Yes ( ) No ( )

Internal Distribution:

Done .....

Date .....

Copies Referred To:

Done .....

Date .....

Following from the Under-Secretary, Begins:

- This morning the Minister is addressing the opening session of the Dominion-Provincial Conference and will deal with the general international situation, with particular reference to the Korean crisis. The text will be available to you through the Press Office very shortly. I think it is important that you should see it at once, particularly those passages referring to the use of the atomic bomb.
- A longer message is being sent you this morning setting forth our views at greater length.

Ends.

SSEA

4, 12, 37 (25)

# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

FILE REF.	111	50
50069-C-40		

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
<del>TOP SECRET</del>

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D.C.

REPEAT TO: LONDON

NEW YORK

Message To Be Sent

EN CLAIR

CODE

CYPHER

Degree of Priority

IMMEDIATE *Dr.*

ORIGINATOR

Sig. \_\_\_\_\_

Typed: J. George/ADPH/  
jh

Div. Def. Liaison

Local Tel. 3795

APPROVED BY

Sig. *AM*

Typed: \_\_\_\_\_

Is This Message Likely To Be Published

Yes ( ) No ( )

Internal Distribution:

*Mr. Ruis*

*Mr. Ritchie*

*Def. Liaison*

Done *[Signature]*

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Copies Referred To:

*Mr. Nat. Def.*

*M.A. Roberts*

*P.C.O.*

*[Signature]*

Done \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

No. _____	Date December 4, 1950	For Communications Office Use Only SENT -- DEC 4 1950
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WASHINGTON No. *EX-2474*

LONDON No. *1891*

NEW YORK No. *373*

**SENT -- DEC 4 1950**

1. Since President Truman's statements on November 30 about the possibility of using the atomic bomb in Korea, I have been considering our own position. You will have seen what I told the press here on November 30 on an "off-the-record" basis, as the text was sent in our telegram No. *London 1883 - Contact 364* EX-2462 of December 2.

2. In view of the rapidly deteriorating military situation in Korea, I think we should waste no time in informing the U.S. Government of some of the considerations which weigh most heavily with us, and no doubt with them, on this most delicate and vitally important problem - the use, or the threat of use, of the atomic bomb. For that reason, I am sending you in my immediately following message the text of a memorandum *which expresses our views.* ~~prepared in the Department.~~ There would of course be less risk of the Americans feeling that we were delivering an unnecessary homily on their doorstep if you were to put these points orally at an appropriate level in the State Department, but in a matter of this moment I think there should

EXT. 97.

# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

FILE REF.	

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: .....

Message To Be Sent
EN CLAIR
CODE
CYPHER
Degree of Priority
ORIGINATOR
Sig. ....
Typed: .....
Div. ....
Local Tel. ....
APPROVED BY
Sig. ....
Typed: .....
Is This Message Likely To Be Published
Yes ( ) No ( )
Internal Distribution:
Done .....
Date .....
Copies Referred To:
Done .....
Date .....

No. ....	Date	For Communications Office Use Only
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- 2 -

be some written record. I leave to your judgment, however, the method of presentation. The memorandum has been deliberately prepared without reference to President Truman's statement so that it could be taken as an independent appreciation, for the use of the Canadian Government, a copy of which we are giving to the U.S. Government for their information as an indication of our thinking on a subject of the greatest common interest to both Governments.

*2. If you have any suggestions for amendment of the memorandum before it is left with the State Department I should, of course, be glad to consider them.*

SSEA

RECEIVED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
GENERAL AFFAIRS

1950 DEC 4 AM 10:3

[Faint, mostly illegible typed text, possibly a teletype message]

- 3 -

LEONARD ROBERTSON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

RECEIVED

[Faint rectangular stamp or box]



COMMUNICATIONS  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1950 DEC 4 AM 11:5

RECEIVED  
COMMUNICATIONS  
SECTION

1950 DEC 4 AM 11:5

Faint, mostly illegible text in the left margin, possibly containing routing or administrative information.

Main body of the document containing several paragraphs of extremely faint and illegible text, likely a teletype or a heavily underexposed typed letter.



MESSAGE BOX

AIR BAG

CONFIDENTIAL

Despatch No. 3121

Date December 4, 1950

FROM: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference: My telegram No. 2348 of December 1, 1950

Subject: Korea and the Atom Bomb

In view of the possibility of misunderstanding in the United States concerning the nature of the support behind Mr. Attlee in his visit to Washington and in view of the fact that the representations made by Labour members of Parliament to Mr. Attlee against the use of the atom bomb in Korea were initiated largely by Mr. Sydney Silverman and Mr. Ian Mikardo, it seems necessary to outline the sequence of events and to give subsequent press comment on this subject.

2. The first reports of President Truman's press conference of November 30 reached the House of Commons soon after Mr. Churchill had finished his speech on November 30 in the late afternoon. Some members withheld judgment until there was time to study full reports, but others at once concluded, it seems, that the danger of the start of an atomic war was much closer than they had supposed. The reaction was very strong among some Labour members and these decided at once to let the Prime Minister know that they were strongly opposed to the use of the bomb in the prevailing circumstances. In the beginning the movement was led by such familiar figures on the Labour left wing as Mr. Mikardo and Mr. Silverman, but it would be inaccurate to represent the protest as a left-wing affair. It was supported by a very large part of the Labour Party, including other members of the National Executive and including members of the solid group of trade unionists. Estimates of their numbers agree that 100 or more members gave their support. According to one lobby correspondent, a group of Labour M.P.'s sought the advice of Mr. Eden when the idea of the letter to the Prime Minister was first suggested. Whatever the truth of this report, it would not be surprising in view of the marked sympathy towards Mr. Eden shown by the Labour rank and file during the debate. The message is said to have been typed out quickly and copies circulated around the House for signature. Its contents were made known to the Prime Minister before he made his speech on the evening of November 30.

Post File  
No. AR 50/1

Copies to:  
Paris  
Moscow  
New Delhi

3. The precise contents of the protest to the Prime Minister are not generally known. It would seem to be in the form of an indication to Mr. Attlee that,

- 2 -

in the opinion of this Labour group, the United Kingdom forces in Korea should be withdrawn if the fighting were carried across the Manchurian frontier and if the atom bomb were dropped.

4. The timing of Mr. Attlee's announcement in his speech that he expected to visit President Truman naturally made it look as if the visit was the result of this message to the Prime Minister from Labour back-benchers. The Communist press seized on this point and represented the visit in that light. The evidence available points to the fact, however, that Mr. Attlee probably would have gone in any case. Furthermore, anxiety about the use of the atom bomb has by no means been confined to those who joined in the protest.

5. As you will know, Mr. Attlee stated in his speech of November 30 that, in the opinion of the Government, a decision of such great import as the use of the atom bomb could not be taken on behalf of the United Nations without the fullest prior consultation with those member states who were at present taking part in international police action in Korea. Mr. R.A. Butler, who spoke for the Conservatives between Mr. Churchill and Mr. Attlee, had little time in which to consider the cables from Washington. He did refer, however, to "the horror that many of us would feel at the use of this weapon in circumstances which were not such that our own moral conscience was satisfied that there was no alternative". The accounts of President Truman's press conference, noted the Manchester Guardian Political Correspondent, suggested so different an emphasis from that which Mr. Churchill had just placed upon world events in his speech, that Opposition and Government supporters alike were, for a moment, unsteadied. The question which posed itself on receipt of the reports from Washington was whether harmony could be maintained if a war with China should develop from new United States action. The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary had an informal meeting with Mr. Churchill later in the day.

#### 6. Press Comment

The Times on the following day, December 1, said that here was one plain proof of the need for the fullest and frankest discussion among the western leaders. "The decision to use this weapon could be made only in face of the direst threat and it could only be made on behalf of the United Nations in Korea by the common consent of the free nations". The Conservative Daily Telegraph stated that it was principles and objectives and not methods which were laid down by the United Nations. If United Kingdom opinion was overwhelmingly averse to the use of the atomic bomb at this juncture, as it surely was, it was essential to bear constantly in mind two points made by Mr. Churchill. One was that the United States contribution in Korea was by far the greatest. The other was that if the United Kingdom wished to influence the policy of the United States it should aim at the re-establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee.

7. On December 2 The Times thought that there was no reason to suppose that the people and leaders of the United States did not share the horror and repulsion expressed by all sides at Parliament at the thought of having to use the atom bomb. The Guardian concluded that

- 3 -

the Chinese Communists could capture Korea by sheer weight of numbers if they set out to do it. The United Nations countries in Korea had vital commitments in Europe and their position in Korea could become exceedingly difficult. The question was whether they should deny themselves the advantage of their best weapons which were air power and the atom bomb. There would be the greatest reluctance to bomb Manchuria or start atomic warfare and either would be a last resort, but the question was precisely that contingency - of what should be done if the Chinese Communists would not negotiate and try to destroy the United Nations armies in Korea. Whether bombing in any form would be effective had still to be decided and would have to be decided by the United Nations. On December 4 the Guardian went on to say that if the atom bomb were used it could hardly fail to be used elsewhere in the world in the fairly near future, even if its explosion prevented, rather than caused, an immediate start of the third world war. Its use against the Chinese Communists would probably alienate most of Asia from the cause of the United Nations.

8. The Sunday Times of December 3 declared that every humane and civilized person was against the atomic bomb in the same sense as he was against war. Yet like war the use of the bomb might be an enforced necessity for a society of nations menaced by aggression. If, however, the bomb was to be used in the name of society, no means should be neglected to ensure that the general will of society was behind its use. There were many reasons why the atom bomb must be treated as exceptional. On the military side its use must be related to the object in view. Soldiers might be able to indicate that atomic bombing would do great damage to particular targets but they could not say whether that would cause a withdrawal of Chinese Communist forces from Korea. On the political side the bomb had acquired a unique symbolic status. Its use would be taken as a confession that the hopes of world peace under the United Nations had been abandoned. Secondly the paralysing and dividing fears of countries in the track of possible Soviet attack would be heightened by the feeling that the moral barrier to the use of the bomb in future had gone down. There would be special danger of a split between the East and West within the non-Soviet world.

9. "Scrutator" in the Sunday Times said that the situation for using the bomb was not the present but a situation in which the United Nations forces were driven in disaster down the peninsula. It would, in certain circumstances, be suicidal for the United Nations to admit what Russian propaganda had striven to foster, namely the idea that the bomb should never be used.

(Sgd.) H.R. Horne  
(for the) High Commissioner.



STATEMENT BY THE HONOURABLE L.B. PEARSON  
FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE  
MONDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1950

*return please*  
6

The vital question at the present time, transcending immeasurably all other questions, is how great is the risk of a major war. At this particular moment, with developments in Korea and at the United Nations in a state of flux, it is particularly difficult to discuss this question with any degree of assurance or certainty. If hostilities cannot be localized in North-Korea and if the fighting spreads over the border into Manchuria, the result may be an open war with the whole of Communist China. It is, furthermore, only safe to assume that Peking has risked armed intervention in Korea on the basis of assurances of assistance from the Soviet Union if the intervention should lead to military operations against the territory of China itself.

Therefore, a war with China might well result in Soviet assistance to the Chinese forces. The assistance might initially be indirect and "voluntary"; of a kind which the Chinese Communists claim they are giving North Korea and which could later be said not to constitute official intervention. But just as this kind of Chinese intervention in Korea has led to the danger of an open war with China, so similar Soviet intervention on behalf of China might lead to open war with the Soviet Union. It is to be hoped that the autocrats of the Kremlin understand this danger as well as we do.

At the moment, the focus of our hopes and fears is Korea. We must strive to find a solution to the grave and menacing problem that has arisen there. This will be no easy task. Before it can be done, moreover, there must be a stabilization of the military front in Korea on a line which can be firmly held. Our military advice gives us reason to hope that in spite of heavy initial losses before the counter-offensive from the North, such a line can be established and maintained.

When this has been done, we can then see where we are, in regard to the political aspects of the Korean and Far Eastern questions. The Chinese Communists have now made it abundantly clear that they regard United Nations action in Korea as something that menaces their interests so greatly that they are willing to risk a general war in challenging it. Therefore, as soon as circumstances make it possible, we must take up again the effort to reconcile on the one hand the determination of the United Nations to resist aggression, and on the other whatever legitimate interests the Chinese may have in the future of Korea and the adjacent area. I am not sure that we can reconcile these two; our interest in world peace with the purposes behind their intervention - but we must try; and we must try by some more practical and effective means than mere public statements of good intentions and pious hopes.

.. During this period, when the peace of the world will be in balance, and when we shall be walking on the edge of a volcano which is rumbling alarmingly, we must not look for easy and spectacular results. We must realize that the Chinese Communist leaders, schooled in the tactics of public abuse which have long been part of the Soviet method of diplomacy, many of them completely ignorant of the Western world, are not likely to give us visible or audible help - will, in fact, make our task harder by vilifying us with scorn and slander and misrepresentation. But we need not give way to despair or to a

-2-

fatalistic acceptance of something that is regarded as inevitable, and about which, therefore, nothing can be done, except to arm.

There is no reason, on the side of the free democracies, why the efforts which are now being made through the United Nations to localize and then end the war in Korea, should not succeed. We must, therefore, make it crystal clear - by our words and, more important, by our policies - that if they do not succeed, the responsibility will lie where it belongs; in Peking and in Moscow.

If, as we trust, these efforts do succeed, the immediate danger of a Third World War would, for the moment, be removed. That would not, however, mean that we could rule out of calculation the possibility of such a war breaking **out** later. The materials for a fire would still be there; and there would still be madmen about, with matches.

The Soviet Union already possesses the capability to wage a major war at any time. Its policies, moreover, show that it is willing to take the risk of provoking one, even though it may not deliberately desire one. At the present time, the Soviet Union possesses a great preponderance of power on land. On the sea it would be able seriously to interrupt allied lines of communication by the

- 3 -

use of its submarine fleet, and by other means. The greatest military weaknesses of the Soviet Union are in the air and in its relative deficiency in atomic bombs. The Soviet Union would probably wish to reach a higher degree of preparedness, especially for air and atomic warfare and to augment its economic potential, before becoming engaged in hostilities. The possibility that this cautious and delaying attitude is the basis of Soviet foreign policy must be weighed against the temptation to take advantage of the passing opportunity offered by relative Western weakness; against the apparent willingness of the U.S.S.R. to take chances which may lead to war, and against the bellicose and inflammatory tactics of the Cominform.

These tactics, leading to aggressive war in Korea, as well as the expansionist nature of Soviet foreign policy generally, provide an incentive, and a necessity, for western re-armament and closer cooperation. The effect of this re-armament will become increasingly important after 1951. If, therefore, the leaders of international communism have convinced themselves that war with the West must come at some time, they may consider that their best opportunity will be in the months ahead. Because of this - and because of recent events in North Korea - the danger of a major war in the immediate future has, I think, increased. Such a war could result either through deliberate armed aggressive action on the part of the Soviet Union, or its satellites, or through a willingness on their part to take increased risks in spite of the knowledge that a major war might result.

The question whether the risk of a major war will diminish after, say, the end of 1951, depends, of course, in large part on whether the Western world has been able to increase its defences and ensure the necessary unity of action; whether we can strengthen - as we are trying to do - the United Nations as an agency for preserving peace, for settling disputes and in the last analysis for organizing collective force against an aggressor. The free democracies are now taking steps to these ends at Lake Success and within the North Atlantic Organization. The crisis of the last few weeks in Korea has shown, with even greater clarity than before, the necessity for doing this and for doing it quickly and effectively.

The democratic world is - tragically but inescapably - compelled to devote an increasing proportion of its resources to the task of re-armament. This re-armament is essential and must be given priority for the time being over other objectives, but by itself, it will not be enough. We must also preserve and increase our economic and social strength. We must also take the steps necessary to rally to our side the peoples of Asia. We must give political and moral leadership of a kind which will attract and hold the support of the wavering powers, especially in Asia. Otherwise the Soviet Union may be able to extend by non-military means, by the pull of its sham but alluring offers of bread with freedom, its domination over large parts of the under-privileged, under-developed world with its masses of millions.

The forces of communist aggression in Asia have in the past successfully allied themselves with the forces of national liberation and social reform. The task of the Western democratic powers is to assist the democratic governments in those areas to break that unnatural alliance. For this purpose, it is essential that the Western countries help the Asian democratic countries in their plans for economic development, in order to relieve the distress and poverty there, on which international

- 4 -

communism feeds. Within the measure of its resources Canada should, I think, do its part to help in this great effort to promote human welfare and hence to ensure peace.

There is some discussion going on at present whether the atom bomb should or should not be used against the aggressors in Korea. One consideration in this matter - and an important one - must be the effect of such use on the relations of the Western world with Asia. The military, and others, may argue that the atomic bomb is just another weapon. But, in the minds of ordinary people everywhere in the world, it is far more than that, and its use has acquired an immensely greater significance than any other aspect of war. The anxiety with which the possibility of such use is regarded has been strikingly and increasingly evident of late among our friends in Europe and in Asia. This anxiety is, I think, the main reason for the appeal, even in free countries, of the cynical communist "peace" campaign.

It would be hard to exaggerate the psychological and political consequences of the employment of the bomb, or the threat of its employment, in the present critical situation. The strategic use of the bomb against Chinese cities might conceivably reverse the course of military events in Korea now, but at the cost, possibly, of destroying the cohesion and unity of purpose of the Atlantic community. Certainly its use for a second time against an Asian people would dangerously weaken the links that remain between the Western world and the peoples of the East.

The atomic bomb is the most powerful deterrent element in the arsenal of the free world. But it is universally regarded as the ultimate weapon. It should be treated as such.

There has, of course, been a mass intervention of the Chinese Communists in Korea. In the present critical military situation, those who have their own forces engaged (and this applies, of course, particularly to the United States whose intrepid men are bearing the brunt of this fight) are obviously entitled to have full consideration given to the use of every available means of supporting the ground forces fighting under the United Nations Command. This is natural and inevitable. But, before a decision of such immense and awful consequence, for all of us, is taken, there should surely be consultation through the U.N., particularly with the governments principally concerned. One of those would be the Canadian Government, which has from the beginning been a partner in the tri-partite development of atomic energy.

It is of supreme importance to the morale and survival of the free peoples that, if war comes, the responsibility should be clearly and inexorably fixed. While there is any chance at all of preventing an extension of the present hostilities, the advantages of using the bomb, or even threatening its use, are, I think, likely to be far outweighed by the reactions among the peoples of the world, and especially the peoples of Asia, which would follow that use.

In the confused and dangerous international situation of to-day, it is essential to try to see the world steadily, realistically, and as a whole. The obvious Soviet game is to provoke incidents and tensions at various points on the borderlands between the Western world and the Soviet Union and to try to lead us into the trap of concentrating too great a proportion of our limited resources on one or two isolated border points. It is clear that the communists are trying to lead us into this trap in Korea. In order to fight the present war in Korea a large part of the immediately available forces of the West have been committed to that country. If the war in Korea should become a war against China - and I repeat we must do everything within the power of statesmanship to prevent this - it will be difficult to avoid committing an even larger part of


- 5 -

Western resources to that war. This would mean that we would be leaving exposed our most important and, in the long run, our most dangerous front, which remains Western Europe. That is still the part of the world where we must concentrate our main effort, on building up substantial defensive strength under the collective control of the members of the North Atlantic Pact, who are slowly but surely building the structure of a North Atlantic community - on political, economic, military and social foundations.

At present, the increasing power of that community is the greatest deterrent to war. Canada must, in its own interests, and for its own security, but in a way consistent with our position, our size and our special problems as a young and developing country, make an appropriate contribution to that collective strength.

By standing firm and strong against aggression in Western Europe, and by assisting in the struggle of the Asian people to a better life, the free Western democracies can best ensure the kind of peaceful and co-operating world which is the sole objective of their foreign policies.

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SECRET

*File*

December 3, 1950.

Korea and the Atomic Bomb

1. The military authorities may argue that the atomic bomb is just another weapon. But, in the minds of ordinary people everywhere in the world, it is far more than that and has acquired an immensely greater intrinsic significance (than any other aspect of war) The anxiety with which the possibility of the use of the bomb, by either side, is regarded has been strikingly and increasingly evident of late among our friends in Europe and in Asia. This is the main reason for the appeal, even in free countries, of the cynical Communist "peace" campaign. ✓

2. The psychological and political consequences of the employment of the bomb, or the threat of its employment, in the present critical situation would be incalculably great. The risk of retaliation, to which our allies in Europe feel themselves to be exposed, would affect materially their will to resist, and the imminent prospect of atomic war over Korea, when our defences elsewhere are still weak, cannot fail to stimulate the tendencies toward "neutralism" which the development of strength and unity on our side is beginning to overcome. The strategic use of the bomb against Chinese cities might conceivably (reverse) the course of military events in Asia now, but at the (cost) of destroying the cohesion and unity of purpose of the Atlantic community. Certainly its use, for a second time, against an Asian people would dangerously weaken the links that remain between the Western world and the peoples of the East. ✓

*risk*

*change*

3. The atomic bomb is the most powerful deterrent element in the arsenal of the free world. To what extent this is because of actual military potential, to what extent to psychological factors, it is impossible for us, and probably for anyone, to know. (In any event it is universally regarded as the ultimate weapon. It should be treated as such.)

*stt*

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- 2 -

4. The effectiveness of the bomb as a tactical weapon cannot be fully appreciated. The very uncertainty of its capabilities in the tactical role must add materially to its deterrent value. Once it has been used tactically, however, much of its force as a deterrent may disappear, unless its use for this purpose has proven overwhelmingly successful. (The terrain and type of warfare in Korea do not seem to present the best conditions for the bomb's employment. to produce that result) ✓

✓ ↓ 5. The mass intervention of the Chinese Communists in Korea may lead to the third world war. In the present critical military situation, those who have their own men engaged (and this applies, of course, particularly to the United States) are obviously entitled to have full consideration given to the use of every available means of supporting the ground forces fighting under the United Nations Command. This is natural and inevitable. But, before a decision of such immense and awful consequence, for all of us, is taken, there should be consultation among the governments principally concerned.

5 6. The Canadian people would hold their Government responsible for making (our) views known to the United States before the atomic bomb were to be used. This is especially true in present circumstances because of the United Nations character of the operations in Korea. ✓  
*the Canadian*

6 7. Furthermore, in atomic matters, the Canadian Government has, from the beginning, been a partner in the tri-partite co-operation which stemmed from the Quebec Agreement between President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in 1943. Mr. Mackenzie King was associated with the Joint Declaration of November, 1945, by the heads of the three Governments directly concerned. Through its membership in the Combined Policy Committee, the Canadian Government has continued to assist in the development of our joint resources of raw materials and

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- 3 -

of scientific knowledge. Canada has made a direct contribution to building up the atomic stockpile. Although the modus vivendi of the Combined Policy Committee concluded in January, 1948, does not include, as did the Quebec Agreement, the clause providing for prior consultation, the Canadian Government would be inevitably involved, and in a specially close sense, in the consequences of the use of the atomic bomb. (We, therefore, have the responsibility to formulate our views and to make them known before an irreparable decision is taken.) ✓

8. The third world war may or may not already be upon us. It is of supreme importance to the morale and survival of the free peoples that, if war comes, the responsibility should be clearly and inexorably fixed. While there is any chance at all of preventing an extension of the present hostilities, the advantages of using the bomb, or even threatening its use, are likely to be outweighed by the reactions in the free world and, particularly, by the grave peril in which it would place Western Europe at a time when its defences could readily be overrun. ✓

It seems to us  
to be

Prof.  
relat  
ix l.  
notices

9. It appears to us that to use or threaten to use the bomb in Asia, in present circumstances, would not only be likely to have a major disruptive effect among our friends and allies, but would be committing, and perhaps for tactical purposes only, our ultimate strategic weapon in an area of secondary importance. ✓

Department of External Affairs,  
Ottawa.

EXT. 97.

# MESSAGE FORM OUTGOING

FILE REF.	41	4
50069-e-410		

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
CONFIDENTIAL

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR SENT -- *Baruch New York 304 306*  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. *DEC 3 1950* *106*  
*Immediate to Wash only* *EX-2462* *London 1883* *Paris 445*

Message To Be Sent

EN CLAIR

CODE

CYPHER

No.

Date  
 December 2, 1950

For Communications Office Use Only

SENT -- DEC 2 1950

Degree of Priority  
*IMPORTANT*

ORIGINATOR

Sig. ....

Typed: J. George/mr...

Div. Def. Liaison

Local Tel. 3795

President Truman's statements on the bomb.

1. The Minister was asked at his press conference yesterday to comment on the press statements attributed to President Truman on the possible use of the atomic bomb in Korea.

2. What follows is the text of the record of that part of the Minister's press conference:

Text Begins:

(Communications please repeat side-lined portions of the attached text).

Text Ends. Message Ends.

APPROVED BY

Sig. ....

Typed: .....

Is This Message Likely To Be Published

Yes ( ) No ( )

Internal Distribution:

*Mr. ...*  
*Mr. ...*  
*Mr. ...*  
*Mr. ...*  
*Mr. ...*  
*Mr. ...*

Done .....

Date .....

Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Copies Referred To:

Done .....

Date .....

EXT. 97

MESSAGE FORM

OUTGOING

FILE REF.	

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	
CONFIDENTIAL	

FROM: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR

WASHINGTON, D.C.

EX-2747

For Communications Office Use Only

Date

No.

Message To Be Sent

BN CLAIM

CODE

CYPHER

Degree of Priority

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Sta.

Typed: J. George/MT

Dr. Def. Liaison

Local Tel. 3795

APPROVED BY

Sig.

Typed:

Is This Message

Likely To Be Published

Yes ( ) No ( )

Internal Distribution:

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Date

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Date

000267

1. The Minister was asked at his press conference yesterday to comment on the press statements attributed to President Truman on the possible use of the atomic bomb in Korea.

2. What follows is the text of the record of that part of the Minister's press conference:

Text begins:

(Communications please repeat side-lined portions of the attached text).

Text ends.

Message ends.

Secretary of State for External Affairs



File No. 50069, C 40  
Sub. 58 Chan. ... Filed....

TOP SECRET

*File*

Ottawa, December 2, 1950.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

The Bomb

I know that you are already giving the most serious thought to possible alternative courses of action since we heard of the statement made by President Truman at his press conference yesterday, and the subsequent release from the White House regarding the possible use of the atomic bomb. As the Canadian Government has not been invited to attend the talks which are to take place next week between President Truman and Mr. Attlee, we have assumed that you will not wish to press for an invitation, but would prefer to convey our views to the United States Government on the subject of the bomb. It seems to us that it is more important to say what we think than to insist on our right to be consulted, as we would not make any strong case on legal grounds.

The original Quebec Agreement between the United States and United Kingdom in 1943 did provide for prior consultation, but in the revised form of that agreement to which Canada was a party - the Combined Policy Committee modus vivendi of January, 1948 - this particular clause was omitted. Further, in North Atlantic planning, it has been agreed that the United States would have sole responsibility for strategic bombing.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

50069-C-40  
41

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Type of Document *LA* ..... No. *3088* ..... Date *2 Dec/50*

From:- *Washington*  
To:- *USSCA*

Subject:-  
*Proposed U.S. Strategic Air Command  
projects at Howe Bay.*

Original has been placed on File No. .... *50195-40* .....

Copies on File No. ....  
.....

Additional Information:



50069-C-40  
41

FROM: THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA, LONDON, ENGLAND. **HE**  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA

*Original on 50069-A-40*

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

CYPHER - AUTO

NO. 2348

LONDON, December 1, 1950.  
(Rec'd. December 2, 1950.)

Secret. Reference Korea.

1. During a discussion this morning of arrangements for the Prime Ministers' meeting in January, Gordon-Walker told the High Commissioners of yesterday's developments leading up to the decision of the Prime Minister to go to Washington. Gordon-Walker returned to the House after having had a talk with me at the Commonwealth Relations Office at tea-time to find that the House was emptying because the news of President Truman's press conference had just come over the ticker tape. The ticker tape was giving the worst possible interpretation of what President Truman had said about the atom bomb, and there was great excitement among the members. This was only allayed to some extent when the full explanation and the subsequent White House statement became available. The Prime Minister immediately called a Cabinet meeting, which was held at 6.45 p.m. There had been suggestions before this that the Prime Minister should go to Washington and at the Cabinet meeting he put it to his colleagues that he should leave at the week-end in view of recent developments. This was unanimously agreed to, but first of all the concurrence of the United States Government had to be obtained, and this was not forthcoming until after the Prime Minister had made his speech in the House of Commons.

- 2 -

2. Later this morning at 12.30 the Prime Minister received the High Commissioners and explained to them the purpose of his visit to Washington, which was along the lines of Commonwealth Relations Office telegram Y. No. 398. After the Prime Minister had spoken, Harrison of Australia read from a telegram which he had received from Canberra, urging more frequent and better consultation between Washington, London and New York on these matters. The Prime Minister said that he would bear this in mind. I felt it necessary to point out that we should always bear in mind that the operations in Korea were being held under the auspices of the United Nations, and that while I believed there had been fairly full consultation at various stages of the operations in Korea, this did not mean that there could not be perhaps more room for consultation. I ended by pointing out that the main objective at the moment might be to get at least a virtual de facto cease fire in order to create an atmosphere in which private negotiations might have the best chance of success. Like other Governments we were concerned about localizing the conflict and in particular avoiding decisions taken in haste. Krishna Menon made a fairly lengthy statement, during the course of which he pointed out that India had all along warned that if the conflict in Korea spread towards the Manchurian border, the Chinese could not stand idly by.

3. Nearly all the High Commissioners referred to their apprehensions about MacArthur, and Mr. Attlee stated that the degree of political control over a Military Commander was always a difficult matter, but that the United States traditionally had seemed to accord more leeway to the Military Commander than had been the practice of other

- 3 -

countries. He said that he was going to Washington definitely to seek peace, but felt that the time had come for a free and frank exchange of views with the President. Ordinarily he did not favour the development of two Foreign Offices, but he felt that the circumstances in this case warranted the exchange of views between the Heads of Governments.

4. I gathered from Gordon-Walker that the intention is that Mr. Attlee should leave on Sunday, and that he will be accompanied by a number of officials, including Board of Trade officials familiar with the raw materials question, which will be one of the topics he intends to raise during his talks with President Truman.

HIGH COMMISSIONER

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, December 1, 1950.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

The Bomb

File No: 50069-C-40  
58  
Filed...

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I know that you are already giving the most serious thought to possible alternative courses of action since we heard of the statement made by President Truman at his press conference yesterday, and the subsequent release from the White House regarding the possible use of the atomic bomb.

~~The starting point in our thinking is that the bomb is Canada's problem too.~~ Canada is a member of the Combined Policy Committee; it supplies to the United States nearly all <sup>Canada's</sup> ~~its~~ production of both uranium and plutonium; Canadian research facilities at Chalk River are in constant demand by the United States Atomic Energy Commission who are giving every co-operation. Should the bomb be used at any time, whether in Korea or elsewhere, the Canadian people are likely to hold the Canadian Government, at least to some extent, responsible. This would, we think, be all the more the case in the present circumstances when Canadian forces are engaged in the United Nations efforts to defeat aggression in Korea. If the atomic bomb were to be used, the Canadian people would, we believe, regard the Canadian Government as having failed in its duty if it had not insisted on being consulted in a decision of this magnitude.

The reaction of the United Kingdom Government seems to have been along very much the same lines. Mr. Attlee's statement yesterday stressed the necessity for prior consultation. Canadian press reports said that Mr. St. Laurent may also be going to Washington to take part in the talks between President Truman and Mr. Attlee. Our information from London is that the talks will cover other subjects other than the bomb, but it is for your consideration that we should ask Mr. Wrong

- 2 -

to tell the State Department now that either you or the Prime Minister would wish to participate in the Attlee - Truman talks insofar as they concern the bomb, in view of our special position. We have therefore drafted a telegram to Washington along these lines.

We must, of course, bear in mind that we have no legal right, in accordance with any existing agreement, to participate in any way in a decision as to whether or not to use the bomb in Korea or elsewhere. The original Quebec agreement between the United States and United Kingdom in 1943 did provide for prior consultation, but in the revised form of that agreement to which Canada was a party - the CPC modus vivendi of January, 1948, - this particular clause was omitted. When the CPC agreement is re-negotiated, probably early in the New Year, it has for consideration whether some clause should be inserted covering this point.

We are perhaps on stronger ground in putting our case forward as a member of the inner circle on atomic matters and as an active U.N. partner in Korea than we would be in stressing the equally valid but more general objection that the use of the bomb in Korea would be a very severe blow to the cohesion and unity of purpose of the Atlantic community. We sent you, at the time of its publication, a copy of an article by J.J. Schrieber of the New York Herald Tribune on this subject, but in case you wish to look at it again, it is also attached.

I think that it is important that Mr. Wilgress should be kept closely informed of any decisions which you may take because of its importance to all North Atlantic countries.

CONFIDENTIAL

## PRESS CONFERENCE

INFORMATION DIVISION  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
OTTAWA - CANADA

No 14

December 1, 1950.

A press conference was held by Mr. Pearson this afternoon. It was attended by Messrs. Heeney, Reid, LePan, Anderson, Wood and Miss Carlisle of the Department, Mr. Wright of CBO and the following members of the press:

Baldwin	Globe and Mail
Barkway	Saturday Night
de Bellefeuille	Le Droit
Blakely	Montreal Gazette
Bloom	Winnipeg Free Press
Brome	British United Press
Brynmolson (Miss)	Time
Campbell (Miss)	St. John's News
Campbell	Toronto Telegram
Fox-Martin	New York Herald Tribune
Fraser	Maclean's
Gelinas	Le Droit
Green	Victoria Colonist
Greer	Toronto Star
Haviland	Montreal Star
How	Canadian Press
Hume	Ottawa Citizen
Inglis	The Times (London)
Jefferies	Windsor Star
Kitchen	Canadian Press
Langlois	La Presse
McDougall	Christian Science Monitor
McKenna	Wall Street Journal
McKeown	Montreal Standard
Munro	Southam News Services
Needham	London Free Press
Nicholson	Kemsley Newspapers
O'Leary	Vancouver Sun
Paradis	Le Soleil
Pare, D.	La Patrie
Pare, L.	L'Action Catholique
Philip	New York Times
Swanson	Ottawa Citizen
Taylor	Toronto Star
Van Dusen	Ottawa Journal
Walker	Winnipeg Free Press
Waring	Montreal Standard
Wright	The Ensign

### SITUATION IN NORTH KOREA

Mr. Pearson said that the Government had been keeping in close touch with Lake Success, Washington and London but that no one could be sure of what was going to happen in Korea nor indeed what should be done. He had hoped it would be unnecessary

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- 2 -

for him to return to Lake Success but he was now planning to be there when the question of Communist Chinese aggression came before the Political Committee.

The Minister remarked that last week he had said it was not easy to determine the nature, scope, purposes and objectives of Communist intervention in Korea. The past few days' clarification of the situation certainly did not make one feel more cheerful. There had earlier been evidence to support the thought that Chinese intervention was for limited and defensive purposes, the protection of the Manchurian border and important power plants in North Korea. It was now clear, however, that their intervention was wider in scope and more far-reaching in purpose. The Chinese Communist Government was still maintaining that it had not intervened as a Government but had merely permitted volunteers to enter the fighting. It was not clear whether the Communists had now determined to do their best to drive United Nations forces out of Korea regardless of consequences or whether they still wanted mainly to protect what they considered to be their security in Manchuria by driving these forces from the borders. In any case more than a border police and protective operation was under way. Mr. Wright asked whether the Chinese offensive might have been launched as a face-saving measure because of North Korean and Communist reverses a few weeks ago. Mr. Pearson said this might be one element but he thought that an offensive on such a scale must have necessitated long preparation and must have a much deeper purpose than merely prestige.

After pointing out that we had no direct sources of information in Korea, Mr. Pearson said that from the information available, we had been justified in thinking there was some possibility that the Communists would act prudently and that the U.N. offensive might be successful. Military intelligence had given no indication of a large concentration of Chinese forces. In view of the extent of the Chinese offensive, it was obvious that this information had been inadequate. He did not, however, wish to criticize the work of the military intelligence because, from here, all the difficulties might not be apparent. Off the record he added that our experience of the operation of military intelligence in Korea gave some cause for worry about its reliability in the future. To him it was astonishing that the Chinese had been able to collect such a force without our knowing about it. The military information we now had indicated that the situation might not be so bad as some headlines suggested and that the U.N. forces might be able to maintain a defensive line across the narrow neck of the peninsula. He thought this was probably the present U.N. military objective and there might be some reason to hope that the military position would be stabilized there within the next two or three days. This was the place where some people had thought the U.N. offensive should have stopped in the first place. What might have happened if this counsel had prevailed would doubtless be debated for years to come.

Mr. Lorenzo Paré asked for comment on the "home for Christmas" offensive. Mr. Pearson said that press reports now indicated that General MacArthur had qualified that remark which certainly seemed to have been over optimistic. On the question of the timing of the U.N. offensive, Mr. Fraser asked whether the U.N. drive had provoked Chinese counteraction or whether they had been going to attack in any case. The Minister replied that from information already made public it appeared that both sides had been getting ready to mount an attack. General Walker said that the U.N. offensive forced the Chinese into battle prematurely and that if the U.N. had not attacked, the Chinese would have struck a couple of days later. Asked about the sudden quiet that had descended, he said there had been a lull once before; he did not know

/whether

- 3 -

whether the present one had any particular significance. Mr. Bloom asked about the type of arms the Chinese were using. Mr. Pearson said that the Chinese offensive had been carried out mostly by great masses of infantry, with little heavy artillery or tank support up to the present. Off the record he said that losses of U.N. manpower had been relatively light except in the case of a few South Korean divisions.

Asked by Mr. How whether any additional help for Korea had been requested, the Minister said that any such request would come from the Unified Command and that since the current offensive started neither Canada nor any other country, so far as he knew, had received an appeal. The Unified Command was too busy with immediate military matters at the moment. Whether more help would be requested would doubtless depend on what developed on the military front in Korea and on the political front at Lake Success. He had "no idea" whether the present situation lessened or increased the probability of Canadian troops fighting there. Mr. Munro asked if there was any indication whether the Princess Patricia's now en route to Korea might be used at the front, or kept in the rear or further trained. Mr. Pearson said he did not know what the plans were for their future. Nor did he have any knowledge of plans to use the Canadian advance party in any other way than to prepare for the Canadian troops now on their way.

#### USE OF ATOMIC BOMB

// Mr. Pearson offered no comment on press reports that President Truman at his press conference this morning spoke of considering the possibility of using the atomic bomb. Off the record he pointed out that the White House had later issued a clarification of the President's remarks about the decision being up to the commander in the field stating that General MacArthur could not order the bomb to be used because, under U.S. law, all A-bombs were in the custody of the Atomic Energy Commission and only the President himself could order their use. Mr. Hume pointed out that press comments from the United Kingdom said British officials were "shocked and astounded" by the report of the President's statement and asked for Canadian Government comment. Mr. Pearson declined to give a Canadian Government reaction without knowing what was actually said. This was too important an issue for any snap statement, he said. We had asked our embassy in Washington to obtain a text of the President's statement and the White House clarification. Not for attribution to him or government sources, he said the press could say that surprise was felt in certain quarters at the statement attributed to the President and that it was assumed here that, in a matter of such importance, the President would consult other countries participating in the Korean struggle before taking any decision to use the atomic bomb. ] 2

The Minister said that the atomic bomb was legally a weapon of war just as was any other particular type of arm. The bomb was in the possession of the U.S. and if they were fighting alone they would have complete control over the use of this weapon. But the U.S. was fighting as part of a U.N. force and therefore the use of an atomic bomb by a component of the U.N. army would be of far-reaching practical political importance. Mr. Campbell suggested that it might shorten the war and save life and asked whether its use was a moral question. Mr. Pearson said off the record that if the Third World War were now being fought, there would not be the same feeling in certain quarters against using the bomb. The major crime was the starting of an aggressive war; the starter was probably entitled to whatever treatment he got. But there was still a chance that the present situation would not

/develop

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develop into a third world war and every effort must be made to prevent it from developing. If war came, then it must be because we had not been able to prevent it, and the responsibility must be made clear. It was necessary, therefore, to exercise restraint and caution at this time. He agreed that a difficult situation would arise if the military authorities said the atomic bomb would bring about the end of the war in Korea, but added that its effectiveness in such a war was open to question. It was his understanding that the bomb could best be used if there were large concentrations or important massed industrial targets. Mr. Nicholson suggested that a U.N. decision to permit use of the bomb might have the same effect as actually using it. The Minister agreed that the propaganda effect might be the same. //

#### POSSIBILITY OF EXTENDING THE CONFLICT

Mr. Fraser asked for Canadian views on strategic bombing north of the Manchurian border. Mr. Pearson said that our view had been, and still was, that it was unwise to do anything that might have the effect of extending the conflict or take any action that would bring about the formal involvement of the Communist Chinese Government in a war with the U.N. if this could possibly be avoided. So far General MacArthur had taken no such action and we had no information to suggest that he was proposing to do so. News stories had indicated that the General might be asking for some authority to strike north of the border, but his communique had contained nothing more than an implication to this effect. Asked whether, if General MacArthur wanted authority to bomb beyond the border he would go to the U.S. Government or the U.N., Mr. Pearson explained that he thought that if such a request were made it would be in the form of a request from the Unified Command to the U.S. Government which would then pass it along to the U.N., but he repeated that he had no knowledge of such a possibility.

Mr. Philip asked whether the U.S. Government or the U.N. would have the power to decide to "drop" General MacArthur. Mr. Pearson said that the General was in command of the U.N. forces by virtue of a Security Council resolution which vested the Unified Command in the U.S. and asked the U.S. to name the commander. In the opinion of some people, his authority, which extended over Korea and its surrounding waters, stemmed from this resolution and it might be argued that he had not the power to order any action outside Korea or Korean waters. On the other hand it might be argued that under the doctrine of self-defence or hot pursuit, he could follow the enemy over the border. Mr. Bloom asked whether if General MacArthur decided to drop bombs on Manchuria, this would be extending the conflict. Mr. Pearson replied that this was difficult to answer. In the event of, for example, an air battle close to the border, enemy planes might be shot down or enemy installations that were actually over the border bombed. This might be described as the extension of an actual engagement. A planned bombing attack against some position in Manchuria would, however, be a different question. It was possible that if the former occurred the Chinese Communists might wish to act with caution, as the U.N. was doing in the present circumstances. President Truman had said at his press conference that whether U.N. forces should operate outside Korea itself must be a U.N. not a U.S. decision

#### PROCEDURE IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. Pearson mentioned that a six-power resolution requesting the Chinese to withdraw their forces from Korea had been before the Security Council for 18 days and was likely to reach the vote today. The probabilities were that the U.S.S.R. would veto this resolution. (This happened later on November 30.) The Security Council could then review the problem and come up with another

/resolution

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- 5 -

resolution, perhaps a request for a cease-fire. It was more likely and generally expected, however, that the matter would be referred to the General Assembly which, under the United Action for Peace resolution passed this session, now had the power to act when the Security Council failed to reach a decision. When the question of Chinese aggression was in the Assembly, all countries would be able to participate in the discussion and all might have to take a decision on whether the Chinese Communist Government had committed an aggression or whether, as it claimed, it had simply allowed volunteers to go to Korea. Mr. Greer asked whether the Minister disagreed with Mr. Acheson that Chinese action was aggression. The Minister replied that there had been certainly aggressive Chinese action in North Korea. Whether this was the aggression of one state against another would have to be determined by the U.N.

Mr. Fraser asked whether it could be inferred that Canada would likely take a stand in the Assembly against doing anything that might extend the conflict. Mr. Pearson said Canada would do so, but added that we had certain obligations under the U.N. Charter and if others took action making it impossible to limit military action, then he did not know what our position would be. He could not elaborate on what we might say in the Assembly. Our statement was now being worked on, but it was necessary to clear our views and see what the situation actually was before the final decision on our stand could be taken.

Mr. Baldwin asked whether the pressing military situation might preclude the possibility of lengthy deliberation about what should now be done in Korea and necessitate a snap decision. Mr. Pearson said that last June, U.N. action had to be immediate if it was to come at all, and U.N. intervention had to be through the U.S. armed forces at hand. Nothing the Assembly could do next week would affect the military position; its dealing with Korea this time was political, not military.

Mr. Campbell suggested that there was a parallel to the Spanish Civil War. Mr. Pearson said that there was a surface resemblance, but in the case of Spain there was intervention on both sides. Drawing a close parallel would suggest that U.N. intervention was in the same category as Chinese Communist intervention in Korea. This was what the Chinese Communists claimed.

Asked by Mr. Greer about the possibility of reserving a strip of neutral land along the Manchurian border, Mr. Pearson said that, as he said last week, we thought this was a good idea in principle and we had not changed our opinion. But it was more difficult after the turn events had taken to put this forward as a realistic suggestion now.

#### USE OF CHINESE NATIONALISTS

Mr. Blakely brought up the subject of the Chinese Nationalists' offer to contribute 30,000 troops now on Formosa to the fighting. Mr. Pearson said there was apparently no change in U.S. opinion about the non-desirability of using Chinese Nationalists, although the Chinese Ambassador in Washington had said the offer still stood. Mr. Fraser asked what would happen if the Nationalists offered troops to General MacArthur and he accepted them. The Minister replied that if that happened no one could do anything for the Chinese Nationalists were still legally the representatives of China so far as the U.N. was concerned. He said only that this would be an "interesting development". Such a move would certainly be claimed by the Communists to be provocative and an extension of the war.

/MILITARY

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### MILITARY ACTIVITY IN EUROPE

Mr. Blakely asked if armies might be forming in Europe without our knowing it, as in the case of Communist China. The Minister replied, off the record, that he thought it was unlikely that the same sort of surprise would face us there; western military intelligence in Europe seemed to know where potential enemy divisions were located.

Asked by Mr. Wright whether there had been any change in the French attitude to western German armed forces, he said that the North Atlantic Council deputies were continuing to make progress at their meeting but the present French Government crisis imposed an additional difficulty. If M. Plevin were defeated, the deputies might find their discussions delayed. In connection with the accusations against M. Moch, he said that they were not personal but were levelled against him because he had been Minister of the Interior when the scandal in Indo-China arose. The Communists were making every effort to damage his reputation.

### POSSIBLE BIG THREE MEETING

Asked by Mr. Paré about the possibility of a meeting of the Big Three, or even Four, Mr. Pearson remarked that Mr. Bevin had suggested, but only suggested, such a meeting. While he could think of no harm arising from a meeting at this time, he thought it important to realize that a meeting by itself could achieve nothing unless those attending were disposed to come to some agreement. Consultation was always useful, in fact the U.N. had at this session passed unanimously a resolution recommending consultation among the great powers, but too much should not be expected from it.

### COLOMBO PLAN

Mr. Pearson said that Cabinet had not discussed the Colombo Plan this week but it would be considering what, if any action could be taken by Canada. He had no idea of the magnitude of possible Canadian contribution; this would depend on many factors. Mr. Hume asked whether a prior condition for financial assistance might be that India and Pakistan settle their differences over Kashmir. Off the record the Minister did not think such a condition could be laid down. He pointed out that some help had already been extended in the field of technical assistance.

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File 50069-C-40 p 01

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Canada

(C O P Y)

SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington

December 11, 1950.

Dear George:

In our discussion together on Wednesday afternoon December 6, 1950 you set forth the views of your Government on the question of the possible use of atomic weapons in the Far East. You stated that your Government was strongly of the view that before a decision was taken on the matter of use, there should be consultation among the Governments principally concerned.

The Joint Communique issued on Friday, December 8, 1950, reflecting the results of the Truman-Attlee meetings contains the following statement concerning atomic weapons:

"The President stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb. The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation."

I am authorized to inform you that the Canadian Government is in the same position with respect to the foregoing as is the United Kingdom Government.

Sincerely yours,

[ (Sgd.) Gordon *Sever*  
R. Gordon Arneson. ]

Mr. George Ignatieff,  
Canadian Embassy,  
Washington.

(C O P Y)

Two copies made,  
of which this is No. 1

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(Stamped by the Pentagon:

"RESTRICTED DATA  
Atomic Energy Act --- 1946  
Specific Restricted Data Clearance Not  
Required  
Use Military Classification Safeguards."

UPGRADED TO SECRET  
RESULT A SECRET

PROPOSED SUBSTANCE OF A COMMUNICATION WITH THE  
CANADIAN GOVERNMENT

1. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff agree on the desirability of using Harmon and Goose Bay in Canada, if war is joined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations for staging aircraft to overseas areas. Such use of these two bases would be a decisively important element in a strategic air offensive initiated for the mutual defense of our nations.
2. The use of Harmon and Goose Bay for the above purpose involves: prior deployment of Air Force units and atomic weapons, storage of weapons and construction of facilities for storage, and over-flight of Canada on training missions and, in event of war, actual missions.
3. Much of the above activity would be in the nature of operations outside the areas leased to the United States and therefore is subject to prior consultation with Canada. However, the unsettled world situation may dictate the initiation of operations in such an emergency that the present prior consultation procedure would seriously jeopardize the effectiveness of the action. Under these circumstances, it is highly desirable that a simplified prior consultation or notification procedure be developed providing for maximum secrecy and minimum delay.
4. If the Canadian Government agrees to the general principle involved, the most feasible procedure appears to be a very general agreement including prior approval for such air movements, staging and strikes. It is suggested that the general agreement authorize the development of a procedure whereby advice will be given at the proper time that these activities will be carried out. In every case, the maximum prior notice will be given and especially in the case of training or advance preparatory deployments.
5. Upon acceptance of the general principle outlined above, it is suggested that the operational commanders concerned or other appropriate Service agencies be authorized to develop the details of the consultation and notification procedure.

TOP SECRET

(C O P Y)

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5. Upon acceptance of the general principle outlined above, it is suggested that the operational commanders concerned or other appropriate Service agencies be authorized to develop the details of the consultation and notification procedure.

UPGRADED TO SECRET  
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TOP SECRET

December 11th, 1950.

MEMORANDUM

KOREA AND THE ATOM BOMB

Memorandum of conversation between Mr. R. G. Arneson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State on Atomic Energy, and Mr. G. Ignatieff, December 11, 1950.

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Mr. Ignatieff saw Mr. Arneson again on December 11th to follow up the talk which took place on December 6th, when he gave Mr. Arneson a copy of the Memorandum containing the views of the Canadian Government on the possible use of atomic weapons in the Far East.

The conversation on December 11th took place at the request of Mr. Arneson, as he said that he was in a position to give certain written comments on the questions discussed with Mr. Ignatieff on December 6th. Mr. Arneson opened the conversation by recalling that the Canadian Government Memorandum stated in particular that there should be consultation among the governments principally concerned before a decision to use the atomic bomb was made. He had now been authorized by the Secretary of State to give a written statement of the U.S. Government's position on this question in the light of understandings reached between Mr. Truman and Mr. Attlee during their meetings in Washington. The text of the written statement given to Mr. Ignatieff is contained in a letter dated December 11th, a copy of which is attached.

Mr. Arneson said that he had also been authorized by the Secretary of State to give a verbal explanation of this understanding. He also undertook to give Mr. Ignatieff an account of how the penultimate paragraph, referring/

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referring to the discussion between President Truman and Mr. Attlee on the use of the atomic bomb, came to be inserted in the joint communique on December 8th.

He explained that Mr. Attlee, had raised the question of consultation between the U.K. and U.S. Governments before atomic weapons are used, in a private meeting at which no others were present. No written statement of the U.S. position passed between President Truman and Mr. Attlee. Mr. Arneson explained that the "statement" to which he had referred in his conversation with Mr. Ignatieff on December 6th was a United States "position paper" for the use of the United States participants in the Attlee-Truman talks, and had not been given to the United Kingdom delegation. When the joint communique of the Attlee-Truman talks came to be drafted on December 8th, Sir Roger Makins, who was the U.K. representative on the drafting group, suggested a reference to the verbal exchange between President Truman and Mr. Attlee, in terms which, in the opinion of Mr. George Perkins (the U.S. representative on the group), seemed to go beyond the United States position as stated in the U.S. "position paper". A meeting was hurriedly called at the White House between U.S. officials concerned, at which Messrs. Acheson, Lovett, Harriman, Snyder, and Arneson were present. It was decided to recommend to President Truman that an agreed text should be included concerning the use of atomic weapons in the joint communique to avoid the possibility of any misunderstanding arising in the future. A text was submitted to President Truman. After approving it, the President suggested that Mr. Acheson should see Mr. Attlee and Sir Oliver Franks personally to obtain their concurrence.

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With minor alterations, the language used in the joint communique was agreed to in this manner.

Mr. Arneson went on to explain that the language so used was the only authoritative record of what had been agreed between President Truman and Mr. Attlee on this question. The decision to make this understanding public was due to the fact that there was some apprehension on the part of the President and his advisers that some misunderstanding might arise, particularly in the Congress, on what assurance President Truman had in fact given to Mr. Attlee in their private conversation. In the Blair House meetings called by President Truman a year ago last summer, for the purpose of consulting with the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy before the tripartite discussions were resumed in the fall of last year, the President had given assurance to the congressional representatives that there would be no secret commitment made to any foreign government without prior consultation with and the consent of the Joint Congressional Committee. Mr. Arneson also recalled the strong objections expressed in the Joint Congressional Committee, when it was consulted on the negotiations leading to the modus vivendi of 1947-48, when the question came up of renewing the undertaking contained in the Quebec Agreement that the United States would seek the consent of Canada and the United Kingdom before using atomic weapons. Mr. Arneson explained that it was the considered view of the United States Administration that there could be no return to the position stated in the Quebec Agreement.

He said that the State Department wished to make it quite clear that what the President had undertaken

to do/

to do in respect of Prime Minister Attlee, and would be prepared to do in respect of the Prime Minister of Canada, was to consult on the conditions or circumstances which might in the future give rise to a situation in which the atomic bomb might be used. The Administration could not undertake a commitment which would bind it to obtain the prior consent of any other government before atomic weapons are used. The language included in the joint communique had, in fact, enabled the President to inform the Joint Congressional Committee on December 11th, that it was the President's understanding that the United States Government had not relinquished in any way its power of decision to use atomic weapons.

Mr. Arneson concluded the conversation by referring again to the remarks which he had made to Mr. Ignatieff on December 6th. He thought that the position which had now been clearly established was that the consultation between the three governments would be on the developing international situation and the military measures which it called for, rather than upon the use, in a particular situation, of atomic or any other kind of weapons.

Ext. 180 A

*Refer*  
PR #12  
SSEA #3  
M. Clouston #5  
M. Howe #4  
A. Robertson #6  
M. Mackenzie #8  
S. Solandt #9  
General A. ... #10  
A. ... #11

~~Liaison plus original and one copy sent from Washington~~  
EXTRA COPIES TYPED IN OTTAWA FILE addition to above  
No. 50069-C-40  
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Despatch No. 3221

Date December 13th 1950

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION  
TOP SECRET

FROM: The Canadian Ambassador, Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference My Despatch No. 3144 of December 7th 1950

Subject Views of the Canadian Government on possible use of atomic weapons in the Far East.

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1. Since the conclusion of the talks between President Truman and Mr. Attlee, the State Department has undertaken, through Mr. R. G. Arneson, to clarify the meaning and intent of the results of the Truman-Attlee discussions in so far as they concerned the use of atomic weapons. Reference to this question is contained in the penultimate paragraph of the Joint Communique issued on Friday, December 8th, which included the following paragraph:

"The President stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb. The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation."

In a further interview between Mr. Arneson and Mr. Ignatieff, Mr. Arneson, on authority of the Secretary of State, gave Mr. Ignatieff a letter (two copies of which are attached) in which he was authorized to state that "the Canadian Government is in the same position with respect to the foregoing as is the United Kingdom Government".

2. Mr. Arneson also furnished some further light on what passed between the United States and United Kingdom delegations during the Truman-Attlee talks on the question of the possible use of atomic weapons, and this is contained in a further memorandum of conversation, two copies of which are attached.

3. The interpretation placed by Mr. Arneson on the language of the Communique does not seem to me to meet the views put to the President by Mr. Attlee and also put to the Department of State in the Canadian Memorandum of December 6th. Mr. Attlee, however, has declared himself to be "completely satisfied" with the assurances given him by Mr. Truman during his visit. I therefore thought it well to consult the British Ambassador today, and he has given me, on a personal basis, an account of the discussions last week on this subject. He asked me not to report what he had said to me unless I was sure that it was necessary so that you and the Prime Minister might understand the position. I assume that Mr. Attlee during his visit to Ottawa explained the situation to the Prime Minister, and I therefore shall not report the information given me by Sir Oliver Franks unless you request me to do so.

4. My Despatch No. 3144 of December 7th contained the notation that a copy was being referred to the Canadian Delegation in New York. This copy was in fact given personally/ 000290

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personally to Mr. Pearson in Washington on December 7th or 8th, and it will not be included in the files of the Canadian Delegation. I am therefore not referring a copy of this despatch to the Delegation.

*Mr. Pearson*

(C O P Y)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington

December 11, 1950.

Dear George:

In our discussion together on Wednesday afternoon December 6, 1950 you set forth the views of your Government on the question of the possible use of atomic weapons in the Far East. You stated that your Government was strongly of the view that before a decision was taken on the matter of use, there should be consultation among the Governments principally concerned.

The Joint Communiqué issued on Friday, December 8, 1950, reflecting the results of the Truman-Attlee meetings contains the following statement concerning atomic weapons:

"The President stated that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb. The President told the Prime Minister that it was also his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation."

I am authorized to inform you that the Canadian Government is in the same position with respect to the foregoing as is the United Kingdom Government.

Sincerely yours,

[ (Sgd.) Gordon *Sever*  
R. Gordon Arneson. ]

Mr. George Ignatieff,  
Canadian Embassy,  
Washington.

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TOP SECRET

December 13, 1950.

TRUMAN-ATTLEE DISCUSSIONS ON ATOMIC QUESTIONS

I showed Sir Oliver Franks this morning the record of the two discussions between Ignatieff and Arneson. I said that I thought that the account given by Arneson to Ignatieff on December 11th of what went on in the talks must be incomplete in some important respects. Although I imagined that Mr. Attlee, when he was in Ottawa, had filled in the gaps during his discussion with Mr. St. Laurent, I would welcome such information as he could give to guide me in reporting to Mr. Pearson.

Sir Oliver said that he would give me, on a personal basis, an account of what went on, with the understanding that I would be free to pass on what part of it I thought necessary in order to ensure that the Prime Minister and Mr. Pearson understood the situation.

Mr. Attlee had raised the matter with Mr. Truman in a private conversation before one of the meetings and had particularly requested that there should be consultation with the United Kingdom and Canada before any decision was taken to employ atomic weapons. Mr. Truman had given him verbally a full assurance in the sense desired. The advisers were then called in and Mr. Truman repeated this assurance in their presence. The assurance of prior consultation had been written into the first drafts of the Communique and had not been questioned on the U.S. side during several revisions of these drafts. On the last day of the meetings, however, while Mr. Attlee and the British party were waiting for the final approval of the Communique, Mr. Acheson called Mr. Attlee and Sir Oliver into the President's office and explained why it was undesirable that the Communique should include a

commitment/

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commitment for prior consultation, for reasons similar to those given Mr. Ignatieff by Mr. Arneson. He added that he was sure that it would prejudice the prospects of a successful resumption of the tripartite negotiations if the language of the Communique were not changed. He then produced a draft of his own, which was so reserved in language that Sir Oliver said that it sounded minatory instead of reassuring. Finally, they worked out the language employed in the Communique.

Sir Oliver said, however, that the verbal assurances given in very explicit terms by the President were not withdrawn and that therefore the phrase used, "to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation", really meant that there would be prior consultation with the Governments of the United Kingdom and Canada before a decision was taken to employ atomic weapons.

Mr. Attlee's endeavour is to stick to the line that his discussions with the President on this point were, as he said in Parliament yesterday, completely satisfactory without giving his interpretation of this passage in the Communique. Sir Oliver thinks it likely that he has informed Mr. Churchill in strict confidence of what actually transpired, and he hopes that Mr. Churchill will therefore use his influence to prevent further pressure on Mr. Attlee in the House of Commons.

Ext. 182A

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*PM*  
*see in Clouston*  
*in Howe*  
*in Robertson*  
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Letter No. 19

Date January 3, 1951

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES.

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference... My Letter No. 3088 of December 2, 1950.

Subject: Proposed U.S. Strategic Air Command projects.

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1. Mr. R. Gordon Arneson of the State Department, following up the talk which he had in my office as reported to you in my Letter No. 3088 of December 2, 1950, visited me on January 3rd in order to put forward a specific proposal for simplified procedure for prior consultation or notification between the Canadian and United States Governments in connection with the staging of aircraft of the U.S. Strategic Air Command to overseas areas. On this occasion Mr. Arneson was accompanied by Major General R. L. Walsh, the United States Air Force member of the P.J.B.D., and Mr. Joseph Chase of the State Department. Mr. Ignatieff was also present at this meeting.

2. Mr. Arneson explained that the Secretary of State had received on January 2nd a formal request from the Secretary of Defense that the Canadian Government be approached at the highest political level in order to reach a general agreement to govern the deployment of the units of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, the storage of weapons including atomic weapons, the construction of facilities for their storage, and the over-flight of Canadian territory which this deployment involves. Specifically, the proposal involves the use of Harmon Airfield as well as of Goose Bay. Before the eventuality of war, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to use Harmon and Goose Bay for training purposes, as well as to make necessary preparations for their use as staging bases for actual missions in wartime.

3. Mr. Arneson brought with him a paper drafted in the Pentagon (two copies of which are attached, numbered 1 and 2) which sets out the proposed substance of a communication to be sent by the Secretary of State to the Canadian Government on this question. He asked that this paper should be studied by the Canadian Government with a view to arriving at an agreed exchange of notes which would constitute a general agreement between the two governments.

4. General Walsh made some explanatory comment in elaboration of what Mr. Arneson had said. Two considerations accounted for the earnest desire of the Pentagon for this agreement with the Canadian Government. First, there was a need for the utmost secrecy in any communications which pass between the two governments arising out of the need for prior consultation and notification. There was also the need, however, for swift action to enable the U.S. Strategic Air Command to undertake a strategic air offensive/

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offensive for the mutual defence of Canada and the United States if, as the Pentagon paper says, "war is joined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations". What the U.S. Department of Defense is seeking, as General Walsh put it, is a "canopy" of an agreement reached at the highest political level which would enable the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, acting under the authority of the Secretary of Defense, to take prompt action, through channels of maximum security, such as from General Vandenberg to Air Marshal Curtis, to notify the Canadian authorities involved of any particular action to be taken under the terms of the general agreement.

5. The facilities desired by the U.S. Strategic Air Command for the staging of aircraft are those enumerated in paragraph 2 of the Pentagon paper. In answer to a query about what was involved in "the over-flight of Canada on training missions", General Walsh explained that this was intended to cover training flights under agreed conditions to Harmon and Goose Bay in the Northeast and also the over-flight of Canadian territory by units of the U.S. Strategic Air Command to Alaskan bases in the Northwest. The flights in the Northwest would not involve any use of Canadian airfields, but a request has been submitted by the U.S. Strategic Air Command, on which I have written to you separately, for early permission to make an over-flight of Canadian territory from Great Falls, Montana, to Ladd Field, Alaska, using the inland route rather than the coastal route to avoid dangerous icing conditions. These aircraft would be carrying atomic weapons without nuclear components, in line with the advance deployment arrangements now being planned by the U.S. Strategic Air Command.

6. I enquired from General Walsh about the reference in paragraph 3 of the Pentagon paper to the defects of the "present prior consultation procedure". General Walsh explained that if correspondence had to be undertaken in the case of every activity contemplated by the U.S. Strategic Air Command, both timing and security might be jeopardized. If a general agreement were reached between the two governments on a political level, detailed arrangements for consultation procedures directed to the economizing of time and providing for the utmost security would be worked out, presumably between the Defence headquarters of the two countries. This, he said, was the meaning of the reference to "appropriate Service agencies" in paragraph 5 of the Pentagon paper.

7. Mr. Arneson gave some explanatory comment on the reference in paragraph 2 of the Pentagon paper to the "prior deployment -- of atomic weapons". He said that under the procedure authorized by the President for the disposition of atomic weapons, Presidential approval was required at each of three stages in the process of transferring atomic weapons from the custody of the Atomic Energy Commission to the U.S. Strategic Air Command for operational use. The first stage is the delivery of the atomic weapons to the U.S.A.F. without their nuclear components. The second stage is the transfer of the nuclear components to the U.S.A.F. The third stage is the authority to employ the assembled weapons.

8. Mr. Arneson suggested that I should inform the State Department through him as soon as possible of the comments of the Canadian Government on the Pentagon paper. On the basis of these comments, a letter would then be drawn up for Mr. Acheson's signature in terms which would be satisfactory to the Canadian/  
Canadian/

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Canadian Government. The reply to Mr. Acheson's letter from the Canadian Government would then constitute the agreement.

9. I said, having in mind the comments contained in your message Ex-2735 of December 30th, that the channel which I would employ for transmitting this proposal to the Canadian Government would be civilian rather than military. I added that it would be necessary for the Prime Minister as well as some other members of the Cabinet to be consulted, and, having in mind the Prime Minister's participation in the Commonwealth meeting of Prime Ministers in London, the earliest date on which a reply could be expected from Ottawa would be after mid-January. General Walsh and Mr. Arneson said that that would be fully understood, but they hoped that an agreement satisfactory to both countries could be reached on this matter as soon as possible, and preferably before the end of this month.

10. General Walsh explained that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff considered that the P.J.B.D. should not be employed for the discussion of the projects referred to in the enclosure and any related matters concerning the use of special weapons. I think that if further information is required on the plans of the Strategic Air Command in this connection, it could easily be arranged for a qualified officer of the U.S.A.F. to proceed to Ottawa on short notice. General Walsh, however, informs me that Air Marshal Curtis, Air Vice Marshal James, and two or three other senior officers of the Air Force are familiar with these plans.

*M. H. ...*

(C O P Y)

Two copies made,  
of which this is No. 1

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(Stamped by the Pentagon:

"RESTRICTED DATA  
Atomic Energy Act --- 1946  
Specific Restricted Data Clearance Not  
Required  
Use Military Classification Safeguards."

PROPOSED SUBSTANCE OF A COMMUNICATION WITH THE  
CANADIAN GOVERNMENT

1. The United States Joint Chiefs of Staff agree on the desirability of using Harmon and Goose Bay in Canada, if war is joined by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations for staging aircraft to overseas areas. Such use of these two bases would be a decisively important element in a strategic air offensive initiated for the mutual defense of our nations.
2. The use of Harmon and Goose Bay for the above purpose involves: prior deployment of Air Force units and atomic weapons, storage of weapons and construction of facilities for storage, and over-flight of Canada on training missions and, in event of war, actual missions.
3. Much of the above activity would be in the nature of operations outside the areas leased to the United States and therefore is subject to prior consultation with Canada. However, the unsettled world situation may dictate the initiation of operations in such an emergency that the present prior consultation procedure would seriously jeopardize the effectiveness of the action. Under these circumstances, it is highly desirable that a simplified prior consultation or notification procedure be developed providing for maximum secrecy and minimum delay.
4. If the Canadian Government agrees to the general principle involved, the most feasible procedure appears to be a very general agreement including prior approval for such air movements, staging and strikes. It is suggested that the general agreement authorize the development of a procedure whereby advice will be given at the proper time that these activities will be carried out. In every case, the maximum prior notice will be given and especially in the case of training or advance preparatory deployments.
5. Upon acceptance of the general principle outlined above, it is suggested that the operational commanders concerned or other appropriate Service agencies be authorized to develop the details of the consultation and notification procedure.

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Memorandum of Conversation between Mr. Ignatieff  
and Mr. R. Gordon Arneson on February 28th, 1951

Apparently no "canopy" agreement of the sort proposed to the Canadian Government exists or is at present contemplated between the United Kingdom and United States Governments.

2. The arrangements which permit the location in United States bases in the United Kingdom of atomic weapons and the equipment and personnel required for their delivery have grown out of a series of consultations originating from inter-service contacts and have been given an informal approval by the U.K. Government through the Prime Minister.

3. As far back as 1948, Marshal of the Air Force Lord Tedder, then the U.K. Chief of the Air Staff, was approached by General Vandenberg with a request to agree to the installation of certain buildings in U.S. bases in East Anglia which were required in connection with the detonating mechanism used in atomic weapons. Lord Tedder gave his consent without seeking ministerial concurrence, as he considered it a matter within his competence. In the following year, a further approach was made to Lord Tedder by General Vandenberg, asking for permission for the transfer of equipment by the Strategic Air Command connected with atomic weapons; this was at the time of the Berlin blockade. On this occasion, Lord Tedder replied that he had to seek the consent of the Government and apparently consulted the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence. Permission was granted.

4. The next move came when Mr. Attlee visited Washington in December of last year. The Prime Minister was accompanied by Field Marshal Slim as well as the Marshal of the Air Force Slessor, and the visit of these two Chiefs of Staff of the U.K. provided an opportunity for further consultations with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. These conversations included discussions on the disposition of the Strategic Air Command in the United Kingdom for purposes connected with atomic weapons. Agreement

/was reached

was reached, and the conclusions were referred to Mr. Attlee for his approval. While Mr. Arneson was unable to give any indication of what these conclusions were, it was his understanding that there was no written "canopy" agreement of the type now under discussion between the Canadian and United States Governments.

5. Mr. Arneson added a point of interest in connection with Mr. Churchill's recent request for the publication of the Quebec Agreement. He said that this request was almost certainly connected with his concern about the lack of any formal agreement which would require the United States to seek the consent of the United Kingdom Government before using atomic weapons, even if this involved their delivery from U.S. bases in the United Kingdom. Recalling what he had told us previously of the understanding reached between Messrs. Attlee and Truman on the question of "consultation" prior to the use of atomic weapons by the United States (see our despatch 3121 of December 13th, 1950), Mr. Arneson said that after Mr. Attlee's departure from Washington Mr. Acheson had made an appearance before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in secret session. He had been closely questioned about the Attlee-Truman talks and had been asked whether any agreement had been entered into between the two governments. Apparently, Senator Hickenlooper asked the direct question: "Did the United States Government have to obtain the consent of any other government before using atomic weapons?" Mr. Acheson had made the reply: "No, certainly not." In speaking to Mr. Arneson about this matter after the meeting Mr. Acheson made the interesting observation that, had Senator Hickenlooper been brighter, he might have followed up with a more embarrassing question, such as: "Does the United States Government have any obligation to seek the consent of another government in the case where bases or facilities to be employed by the United States are located in another country?" Mr. Arneson remarked that this question would be far more difficult to answer, particularly in view of the uncertainty over the conditions which will govern the use of Goose Bay by the Strategic Air Command.

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No. 50069-G-40

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Letter No. D-.....

Date..... March 16, 1951.....

FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

TO: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Reference: Our teletype EX-225 of February 9, 1951, and your letters No. 19 of January 3 and No. 762 of March 3, 1951.

Subject: United States Strategic Air Command Projects.

1. At a meeting on February 9, Mr. Pearson and Mr. Claxton discussed the subjects raised in your letter No. 19 of January 3 and the draft enclosed with your letter of a United States Government communication with the Canadian Government, which, with the Canadian Government's reply, would constitute a "canopy" agreement under which Service arrangements concerning the deployment of units of the U.S. Strategic Air Command could proceed. Mr. Robertson, General Foulkes, A/V/M James, and I were also present.

2. It was agreed during the discussion that the Government would be prepared to make available, as part of the Canadian contribution to the common defence of the North Atlantic area, facilities in Canada for the use of the U.S. Strategic Air Command. These facilities would include the use of bases in Canada for the purposes and on the conditions to be indicated in the proposed agreement. The Canadian Government would like to see the U.S. Government's note drafted in terms that would place the exchange of notes squarely under the agreed North Atlantic Treaty arrangements whereby the United States has been given, on behalf of all NATO countries, responsibility for strategic air bombing, in accordance with the principle of balanced collective forces elaborated in NATO Document SGM 267-50. We therefore suggest that a reference might be written into the first paragraph of the U.S. note to our common obligations under the Treaty, to the special responsibility of the United States for strategic air bombing, and to the agreement of the North Atlantic Deputies that "member nations should... agree to give immediate and special attention to...granting these requirements (for base facilities) as appropriate". We are not suggesting that the text of the U.S. note need necessarily quote the above passage from Document D-D/183 concerning Military Operating

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Requirements within the North Atlantic area. Rather, we suggest that the language of the note should reflect the agreed North Atlantic policies under which both the Canadian and United States Governments would be acting.

3. It was also agreed that a sure distinction should be drawn between "consultation" and "information" concerning circumstances which might lead to the imminent use of the bomb, and consultation or information concerning any other arrangements under the proposed agreement. The Ministers regard any information or consultation concerning operational employment of the weapon as fundamentally different and distinct from information or consultation concerning arrangements which might be made between the two Services on Government authority for such matters as deployment of aircraft, storage facilities, construction and training programmes. As regards the latter, what might be termed the non-operational feature of our co-operation, the Ministers see no objection to accepting a procedure whereby arrangements of this kind would be made through senior Service channels, under the general "canopy" agreement proposed.

4. As regards any communication between Governments as to a possible strike, the Ministers consider that diplomatic channels should be used. By this they mean that the State Department would communicate with the Canadian Embassy in Washington which would act as the channel to the Department of External Affairs and the Government. The Ministers are not inclined to distinguish sharply between an operation to be mounted or staged from Canadian territory and one from the continental United States. In either event, the Prime Minister would assume that he would be kept informed by the President. This was indicated in the letter of December 11 from Mr. Arneson to Mr. Ignatieff sent on Mr. Acheson's instructions. It informed the Canadian Government that the assurances which President Truman had given to Mr. Attlee also applied to the Canadian Government.

5. In a separate letter, I shall explain how we would propose to establish a channel of communication which could function with the utmost speed and security in such an eventuality. Although I realize, from your letter No. 3088 of December 2, that you have already told Mr. Arneson that you thought the Prime Minister would prefer the civil to the military channel for this purpose, you can now be quite specific in saying that the Government wish the diplomatic channel only to be used for this purpose.

6. As we have said, the Government have no objection to the employment of Service channels for notification of detailed Service arrangements for non-operational activities.

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7. There is a third category of communications for which we would prefer that diplomatic channels should also be used. As we understand it, nuclear components would never be carried on training flights, although bombs, less their nuclear components, might be; the only purposes for which nuclear components would have to be flown across Canadian territory would be to take them to Goose Bay or Harmon Field for storage, or, when mounted, on a strike. As the movement of nuclear components to advance bases such as Harmon and Goose might, in fact, be the earliest indication of the U.S. Government's appreciation of the seriousness of the situation, the Ministers would like it understood that any movement of nuclear components over Canadian territory, or to or from a base in Canadian territory, would require prior notification through the diplomatic channel. In such cases, we assume that the Service channel might also be employed.

8. The procedures for consultation and notification discussed in paragraphs 4 and 6 above would, of course, apply only up to the time of the initial decision of the United States Government to use atomic weapons. Further questions of policy concerning the possible extension of atomic warfare might arise subsequently which would require consultation between Governments. As yet, however, we have made no attempt to study this question.

9. There is one further general observation that I think should be made, although it is one which I realize that you could not raise with the U.S. Government at this time. Throughout this letter, we have not attempted to distinguish between being consulted and being kept informed. We appreciate the President's difficulty in giving any undertaking that would be acceptable to Congress and constitutionally valid, to the effect that he would consult any Government before authorizing the use of the bomb. Equally, the Canadian Government could not ask for less than to be consulted on a matter of such importance. It is realized, however, that any advance notification the Canadian Government were given, even on the basis of being "kept informed", would open the way for a reply by the Canadian Government which would in effect mean consultations between the two Governments. No document could ensure the effectiveness of such consultations, which would in the final analysis depend on mutual confidence and good faith at the top political level.

10. While you were in Ottawa, you suggested that a draft should be prepared in the Department of the proposed communication of the United States Government to the Canadian Government, in order to enable you, quite informally, to suggest in concrete fashion exactly what we had in mind. We tried our

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hand at such a draft, but decided that it would serve no real purpose at this stage and until we have your comments on this communication when you have had another talk with the Americans.

A.D.P. Heeney,  
Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

*Mr. Healey*

*Mr. George*

TOP SECRET

*please consider further* Ottawa, March 20, 1951.

*Memorandum and report*

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HEENEY

*Mr 20*

*Ar*

U.S. STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND PROJECTS

I have read with interest the very important draft letter attached, and I think that it, generally, covers the ground.

The delicacy and difficulty of this matter has been driven home to me again by the communications received from Washington, and which are attached to your draft. There is a very real risk, I think, of a misunderstanding between the United States on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and ourselves on the other, as to the nature of the commitment already given by President Truman to Mr. Attlee - and extended to us - regarding the use of atomic bombs by the United States. There is no doubt that the United Kingdom feel that there is a specific commitment for consultation. There is no doubt also that the United States is satisfied that there is no commitment in regard to prior consent from any other government before atomic weapons are used. Mr. Acheson was quite specific on this point in his secret statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The misunderstanding which may arise will be over the relationship of "consultation" to "consent". In our case that misunderstanding may be more difficult to avoid because of the agreed occupation by the United States of Canadian bases from which an attack could be mounted. How can we agree to this without the reservation that we too must be at war! But if we are not going to permit the United States to fly atomic bombs from Canadian bases without prior agreement (except in the case of an immediate retaliation against an atomic or air assault), then, to us, prior consultation does, in certain circumstances, really imply consent. I agree, however, with Mr. Wright that it is going to be difficult to impose specific

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conditions on the United States in regard to this matter. What we must do, however, is to make it absolutely clear that each side knows what the other side means by any implied commitments.

Your draft letter touches on these difficulties in paragraphs 4 and 9. I am just wondering whether it would be wise to expand these paragraphs a little. For instance, the last sentence in paragraph 4 might refer more definitely to the assurances that President Truman gave to Mr. Attlee. You state in this paragraph that we are not inclined to distinguish sharply between an operation to be mounted or staged from Canadian territory, and one from the continental United States. I am a little worried about this, because I cannot remove from my mind the impression that there should be some such distinction. Also, I am wondering whether paragraph 9 should not be put near the beginning of our communication.

There are one or two other points of detail. In paragraph 3, you refer in lines two and three to "consultation and information", while the other references in the same paragraph are to "consultation or information". Why the distinction?

In paragraph 7, is there not an inconsistency in the last three lines where you say prior notification would be made through the diplomatic channel, and then go on to add, "We assume that the service channel might also be employed."? Or does this merely mean that there can be notification through the two channels.





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5. If you agree, I think we should put the procedure into effect on a standby basis at once. When we have concluded the proposed agreement with the U.S. Government, by an Exchange of Notes, we may have to modify our procedure, but, for the time being, I propose to instruct Messrs. Belanger, Daley, and O'Neil to arrange among themselves for one or other of them to be on call every night. This will mean that before closing down the teletype circuit to Washington, whoever is on duty for this purpose at this end will send his name and telephone number to Meagher. You will presumably have to arrange for one of your communication people to be on call every night in the same way. Then, if the State Department wished to communicate with us on this subject, they could call the Embassy where the watchman could call the duty communications man who could alert either Belanger, Daley, or O'Neil by telephone, come into the Embassy, and send the message on one of the special tapes without delay. It would then be up to our communications people to get the message immediately to one or other of half a dozen designated Officers in the Department.

6. I shall postpone taking any action on this procedure until I have your comments, particularly as to whether you think it is necessary in present circumstances.

7. Incidentally, I did not mention the point in my earlier letter telling you of the views of Ministers on the Pentagon draft because they did not raise the point, but it might be worthwhile reminding ourselves and those in the Pentagon concerned with the redraft that the "basic law" concerning channels of communications between the U.S. and Canadian Governments on defence matters is the Appendix No. 3 of the Journal of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence for June 3 and 4, 1948. The procedure agreed at that time, and subsequently approved by both Governments, laid down that the Department of External Affairs-State Department channel should be used whenever the subject matter involves the determination of Government policy, or any significant modification or extension of proposed U.S. projects or exercises in Canada, or Canadian-United States projects. You may wish to refer to this agreement in support of our general contention that diplomatic channels should be used in those cases specified in my earlier letter.

ESCOTT REEF

*Acting*

Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

*NA Robertson*  
*APR. 12/51*  
*BCW*

*see also by M. Weir*

Ext. *A*

OTTAWA FILE  
No. *50069-E-40*

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

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Letter No. 1163

Date April 9th, 1951

*file*  
*JR*

FROM: The Canadian Ambassador, Washington, D.C.

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference: Your Letter No. 1412 of April 3rd.

Subject: U.S. Strategic Air Command Projects.

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I think it unnecessary to put into effect at once the procedure suggested in your letter for specially opening a channel of communications to be employed in the event that issues arise involving the use of atomic weapons. Before we take these steps it seems to me desirable to proceed further with our discussions with the United States Government. Your suggestions relate wholly to the means whereby the Washington-Ottawa teletype may be opened for communication on this subject in the event of an emergency arising after the normal hours of operation and to the employment of special rockex tapes for this purpose. I think it may be well to make such tapes available before long and also to institute a system whereby one of two or three named operators at each end may be called upon to open the line whenever it is not in use. I believe, however, that we shall have to supplement these emergency arrangements in order to ensure in extreme circumstances greater celerity in communicating from Washington to Ottawa. It might take as much as two hours under your suggested procedure to get the line open and to begin the despatch of a message. Could we not work out a simple telephone code which would be held here perhaps by Messrs. Matthews and Ignatieff and myself and at the Ottawa end by three or four officers of the Department? Such a code could be employed at least to convey the initial warning so that the Ministers concerned in Ottawa could be alerted while the teletype line is being opened and a message transmitted.

*M. Hanning*

Ext. 182A

*Referred*

*Mr:*

*Mr. A. Robertson - Apr 12/51*

*Mr. M. H. Hove #5, A. Clayton #6*

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Letter No. 1164.....

Date.. April 10, 1951.....

FROM: THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR, WASHINGTON, D.C.

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Reference.. Your Letters Nos. D-1407. of April 2. and D-1412. of April 3.

Subject:... United States Strategic Air Command Projects.....

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1. On receipt of your two letters, I arranged for Mr. Arneson of the State Department to receive your comments orally from Mr. Ignatieff and myself.

2. I explained that it was recognized that the United States has responsibility under North Atlantic Treaty arrangements for strategic air operations and that the Canadian Government would not wish to hinder the fulfilment of these responsibilities. We could not agree, however, to permit unrestricted use in peacetime of the facilities in Canadian territory by giving approval for all such activities in advance subject to Service notification. Preparatory arrangements which the Strategic Air Command might undertake in Canada and which would not involve the use of fissionable materials, such as training programmes, provision of storage facilities and the deployment of aircraft, as well as the movement of non-nuclear components, might be handled on a Service-to-Service basis. On the other hand, for any activity which involved the movement, storage or use of fissionable components or the nuclear core of atomic weapons, it was our view that the Canadian Government should be consulted in each case at the highest political level, and that the channel should be civil rather than military. Arrangements would have to be made to permit such consultation to take place at very short notice in the event of an emergency. If the U.S. authorities wished to proceed with negotiations for a canopy agreement, it was our view that the terms of the agreement should be placed squarely within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty. I also drew Mr. Arneson's attention to the agreement concerning the channels of communication between the United States and Canadian Governments on defence matters, which is set forth in Appendix No. 3 of the Journal of the P.J.B.D. for June 3rd and 4th, 1948.

3. Mr. Arneson made notes of the points which I had made and said that he would first consult Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under-Secretary of State, who is conversant with this problem; he will also probably later consult Mr. Acheson and officials of the Defence Department. Mention was made of the possibility of a meeting between Canadian and United States representatives on a high level, including Mr. Pearson and Mr. Acheson as well as representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of both countries, as a prelude to any agreement.

4. Mr. Arneson fully recognized the risk of a misunderstanding arising between the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom as to the nature of the commitment which has been given by President Truman for consultation in advance of the 1000310

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of the use of the atomic bomb. He said that agreement on this point was the real key to the whole question. It appears, however, that since Mr. Attlee's visit further consultations with the British have reduced the risk of misunderstandings on the lines mentioned in my Letter No. 764 of March 3rd.

5. He said that whatever more extensive verbal assurance may have been given by President Truman to Mr. Attlee had been superseded by the communique issued at the conclusion of these talks. The United States Government has committed itself only to consultation (as you note in your letter) "on the developing international situation and the military measures which it called for, rather than upon the use, in a particular situation, of atomic or any other kind of weapons". Mr. Acheson's assurance to the Joint Congressional Committee was accurate, and no commitment has been undertaken by Mr. Truman which would bind the United States Government to consult with any foreign government before the President decides upon the use of the atomic bomb. Mr. Acheson, however, in his talk with the Joint Congressional Committee had not touched upon the question of consent for the use of facilities in foreign territory for the employment of atomic weapons.

6. Mr. Arneson also recalled the procedure which has been laid down before a decision is made by the President to deploy or to use both nuclear and non-nuclear components of atomic weapons. A separate decision is required in each case and this decision is made upon the advice of the Secretaries of State and of Defense, as well as the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. These three meet as a committee of the National Security Council. So far no decision has been made by the President to deploy any nuclear components of atomic weapons except for tests. The custodian of all nuclear components is, of course, the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

7. The United States Government has committed itself only to consult with Canada and the United Kingdom on the circumstances in which the atomic weapons might be used. Following the Attlee-Truman talks, further discussions took place in Washington when Air Marshal Slessor visited Washington last January. A main purpose of this visit was to find out from the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff what their strategic plan was for the use of the bases in the United Kingdom of the Strategic Air Command. The U.S. authorities gave Slessor their general ideas on strategic deployment and possible use of these bases, but apparently did not express any specific views on the possible use of atomic weapons. Informal consultations have continued through meetings in the State Department between Sir Oliver Franks, General Bradley, and Messrs. Matthews and Nitze. They again have been concerned with the strategic circumstances which might give occasion for the use of atomic weapons, especially the political and military situation in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. There has been no definition forthcoming from the U.S. side of the conditions in which the atomic bomb would probably be employed. Mr. Nitze has been under instructions to make it clear that the United States Government could not agree to any definition of the word "consultation" which would enable the United Kingdom Government to withhold consent to the employment of atomic weapons.

8. Thus the arrangements which exist between the United States/

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United States and the United Kingdom Government apparently boil down to an agreement to have continuing consultations on the circumstances which might give rise to the employment of the atomic weapon. The United States has clearly reserved the sole right to decide upon the use of the atomic bomb, particularly in the event of an attack upon the United States.

9. Some thought has been given to the possibility of defining more clearly the circumstances in which atomic weapons might be used. Mr. Arneson said that he had tried to work out some consistent criteria. Apart from coming to very general conclusions such as that atomic weapons should be used only in the event of a general war, he had found it impossible to establish any criteria which could be applicable to all cases. Indeed, considering that the value of the atomic bomb as a deterrent rests partly on the uncertainties in any potential aggressor's mind as to how, when or whether it could be used, any definition of the occasions for its employment would remove some of the deterrent value. Mr. Arneson's preliminary conclusion was that it could be said almost with certainty that any attack upon the United States or another NATO country would result in retaliatory action by the United States with atomic weapons.

10. In concluding our conversation, Mr. Arneson explained why the United States Government attaches prime importance to the use of Goose Bay by the Strategic Air Command. It was possible, in the event of an emergency, that nuclear components would not have been deployed to Strategic Air Command bases in the United Kingdom or to other strategic locations along the periphery of the probable targets. If such deployment had not taken place, the United States Government would wish to use Goose Bay as the base from which initial strikes against the enemy would take place. As the take-off of the heavy aircraft employed consumes large quantities of fuel, their fuel supply would have to be replenished in the air by tanker aircraft. A bomber laden with an atomic weapon would take off at Goose Bay and refill its tanks over Harmon Field, or possibly another field in Newfoundland, before proceeding on its mission. On completion of its mission it would seek to land in the United Kingdom or at some base in the European theatre. In the event that nuclear components had been deployed overseas in advance of the emergency, Goose Bay would be regarded as an important staging area in the movement of aircraft of the Strategic Air Command to and from more advanced bases.

11. Do you think that it would be unreasonable for the Canadian Government to give prior consent in advance to strikes with atomic weapons from Goose Bay or Harmon Field in the event of a clearly-established Soviet air attack on North American territory, subject to as much prior notification as might be possible in the circumstances? It seems to me that we could not reasonably refuse our agreement to the use in such conditions of Canadian facilities or air-space, and that we would in fact be anxious to see a counter-offensive undertaken with the minimum of delay. Furthermore, we might find in such an event that wire communication between Washington and Ottawa was severed and that it would take some time to discover alternative means of communication. If this concession were made, it might be easier for the United States Government to agree to our desire for political consultation before the use of Canadian territory for the delivery of atomic weapons in circumstances not involving  
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a direct attack on North American territory.

12. I shall be sending you a further report as soon as Mr. Arneson informs us of the preliminary reaction of the United States Government to your comments.

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Ottawa, April 10, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. MACKAY  
MR. GEORGE


Re U.S. Strategic Air Command Projects--  
Proposed "Canopy" Agreement

Mr. Escott Reid asked me yesterday whether the proposed agreement would have any bearing on the Far East, e.g., if the United States wished to overfly Canada for the purpose of dropping special weapons on China. After talking with Mr. George and examining the file, I gave it to Mr. Reid and pointed out that the United States draft communication (enclosed with letter No. 19 of January 3, 1951, from Washington) referred only to Harmon and Goose Bay, and that Paragraph 9 of our letter D-1407 of April 2 said that the agreement should be based on the North Atlantic Treaty. It seemed clear, therefore, that the proposed agreement would have nothing to do with action to be taken in the Far East.

When returning the file to me Mr. Reid said--"Our note had better make this point crystal clear. Otherwise we lose all freedom of action in the Far East as well as in Europe."

I presume that there is nothing to do about this particular point until we have received a reply to our letter D-1407. However, you will, no doubt, keep Mr. Reid's point in mind when we do receive a revised version of the proposed communication from the United States Government.

*See RRm*

  
M.H. Wershof.

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