



# UNIFICATION OF KOREA

**File Cover No. Sp. 2895**

File No. 7-1-1-1 Vol. 2

With Tip-Back Holder Pat. No. 361978  
MacMillan Office Appliances Co., Ltd.  
309 Athlens Ave., OTTAWA, CAN.

**FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE  
SEE NEXT PART OF FILE**



7-1-1-1

FM WASHDC DEC 9/60 CONFID CDN EYES ONLY

TO EXTERNAL 3052

INFO CANDELNY PERMISNY LDN

TT DELHI FM OTT

BAG TOKYO CNBRA WLGTN FM LDN

REF CANDELNY TEL 2420 NOV20

ITEM 21-KOREA

*file  
Blatt*

ON DEC 7 WE MENTIONED TO MACDONALD OF THE STATE DEPT KOREAN DESK (WITHOUT SPECIFYING AUSTRALIANS AS SOURCE) THE GIST OF THE INFO IN PARA 1 OF CANDELNY 2336 NOV 24 AND PARA 2 OF CANDELNY REFTEL. MACDONALD WAS GRATEFUL FOR THE INFO AND INDICATED THAT THIS WAS THE FIRST HINT OF THE COMPOSITION OF THE CONCILIATION OR GOOD OFFICES COMMISSION THAT THE STATE DEPT HAD RECEIVED. HE HAD NOT RPT NOT SEEN QUOTE THE KOREAN REPUBLIC UNQUOTE REPORT OF NOV 21 ON THIS QUESTION BUT SAID THAT THE QUOTE KOREAN TIMES UNQUOTE OF NOV 17 HAD CARRIED A REPORT (COPIES BY BAG TO OTT AND PERMISNY) OF A DONG HWA NEWS AGENCY INTERVIEW WITH KRISHNA MEMON, IN WHICH MEMON REPORTEDLY URGED FREE ELECTIONS THROUGHOUT KOREA UNDER NEUTRAL (BUT NON RPT NON UN) SUPERVISION AND NORTH-SOUTH NEGOTIATIONS TOWARDS UNIFICATION, BUT DENIED REPORTS THAT HE HAD BEEN ADVOCATING NEUTRALIZATION OF A UNIFIED KOREA, THIS BEING A QUESTION ARISING ONLY AFTER UNIFICATION MEASURES.

2. MACDONALD'S PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON THE QUESTION OF NEUTRAL SUPERVISION OF FREE ELECTIONS REVOLVED AROUND TWO PROPOSITIONS, FIRST THAT THE EXCLUSION OF THE UN FROM ANY CONNECTION WITH THE UNIFICATION PROCEDURE WOULD BE A BAD PRECEDENT, AND SECOND THAT A NEUTRAL COMMISSION, WHATEVER ITS UN CONNECTIONS, WOULD HAVE TO BE COMPOSED VERY CAREFULLY IF IT WERE NOT RPT NOT TO COMPLICATE THE PROSPECTS OF REUNIFICATION.

3. AS FOR THE UN CONNECTION, MACDONALD SPOKE BRIEFLY ALONG FAMILIAR LINES ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF RECOGNIZING THE RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH THE UN HAD ASSUMED FOR THE REUNIFICATION OF KOREA. MOST OF HIS

PAGE TWO 3052

COMMENTS HOWEVER WERE CAST IN THE FORM OF QUESTIONS ABOUT HOW THE UN COULD ABDICATE FROM ITS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR REUNIFICATION, RATHER THAN DOGMATIC ASSERTIONS THAT THE UN MUST BE A PARTY TO THE SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS FOR REUNIFICATION. TO THIS EXTENT WE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE AUSTRALIAN DEL MAY BE RIGHT IN BELIEVING THAT IT HAD DETECTED SOME RELAXATION OF STATE DEPT ATTITUDES OVER THIS QUESTION (CANDELNY TEL 2275 NOV 21).

4. ON THE MERITS OF A NEUTRAL COMMISSION, MACDONALD SEEMED TO HAVE TWO MAJOR WORRIES. FIRST OF ALL, HE POINTED OUT THAT BEFORE LEARNING FROM US OF THE HINTED COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION, HE HAD BEEN WONDERING ABOUT THE PROPAGANDA POSSIBILITIES FOR THE NORTH KOREANS IF THE HYPOTHETICAL COMMISSION INCLUDED, FOR INSTANCE, NEWLY-INDEPENDENT AFRICAN STATES SUCH AS GHANA GUINEA AND MALI. HE WAS SURE THAT IF AN AFRICAN-ASIAN COMPONENT OF THIS NATURE WERE GIVEN THE USUAL CONDUCTED TOUR THROUGH NORTH KOREA, THE COMMISSION COULD ONLY BE EXPECTED TO PRODUCE EITHER ONE SIDED REPORTS ON CONDITIONS IN NORTH KOREA OR AT BEST, A STALEMATE. THE SECOND CONCERN HE EXPRESSED RELATED TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT IN THE SOMEWHAT REVOLUTIONARY ATMOSPHERE IN SOUTH KOREA SINCE THE OUSTER OF THE RHEE REGIME, ANY ACTIVITIES OF A NEUTRAL COMMISSION SITTING, FOR INSTANCE, IN SEOUL, MIGHT HAVE A DISTURBING EFFECT. HE POINTED OUT THAT ALL KOREANS, NORTH AND SOUTH, WERE FIRMLY AND EMOTIONALLY COMMITTED TO THE IDEAL OF REUNIFICATION AND THAT IN A PERIOD OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN SOUTH KOREA, IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO KEEP IN MIND THE DANGERS OF RUSHING HEADLONG INTO ILL PREPARED MEASURES FOR REUNIFICATION.

5. MACDONALD CONCLUDED HIS PRELIMINARY COMMENTS BY INDICATING THAT USA WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE BOUND TO LOOK VERY CLOSELY AT ANY PROPOSALS THAT MIGHT OFFER SOME PROSPECT OF REUNIFICATION, PRECISELY BECAUSE OF THE DESIRABILITY, AND INDEED, THE ULTIMATE INEVITABILITY OF MAKING PROGRESS TOWARDS THAT IDEAL. HE CONFIRMED THAT THE STATE DEPT HAD NO RPT NO OFFICIAL INDICATION OF THE ROK ATTITUDE TO THESE

... 3

PAGE THREE 3052

LATEST SUGGESTIONS, ALTHOUGH HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE ROK GOVT WOULD SCRUTINIZE THE CONCEPT OF A NEUTRAL COMMISSION VERY CAREFULLY, MUCH AS USA ITSELF WOULD DO, TO ENSURE, ON THE ONE HAND, THAT IT WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE ROK INTERESTS, AND ON THE OTHER, THAT ANY REAL POSSIBILITIES FOR PROGRESS WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE LOST. HE SAID THAT EDITORIAL COMMENT IN THE ROK HAD BEEN RELATIVELY LIMITED: ONE EDITORIAL HAD BEEN PERHAPS SLIGHTLY FAVOURABLE TO THE NEUTRAL COMMISSION CONCEPT, AND A SECOND HAD BEEN SLIGHTLY AGAINST IT. HE ADDED THAT SO FAR THERE WAS NO RPT NO INDICATION THAT THE SINO SOVIET BLOC WAS PROMOTING THE IDEA OF A NEUTRAL COMMISSION. THE SOVIET STATEMENT ISSUED DEC 7 HAD IN EFFECT REITERATED FAMILIAR THEMES, INCLUDING THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN, IE USA FORCES, AND CRITICISM OF UNCURK.

6. WE ASKED MACDONALD WHETHER USA EMB IN SEOUL HAD HAD ANY SUCCESS IN ELUCIDATING THE QUALIFICATIONS IN THE ROK HOUSE OF REPS RESOLUTION OF NOV 2 TO THE EFFECT THAT FREE ELECTIONS IN KOREA UNDER UN SUPERVISION SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT ONLY UNDER PROVISIONS OF THE ROK CONSTITUTION. MACDONALD SAID THAT IT APPEARED THAT THE ROK POSITION, AS INDICATED IN THIS RESOLUTION AND ITS PROVISIO, WAS PRECISELY THE UN POSITION, IE THAT THERE MUST BE FREE ELECTIONS AND THAT IN ROK POLITICAL TERMS FREE ELECTIONS WOULD ONLY BE VOUCH-SAFED IF CONDUCTED UNDER CONDITIONS SUCH AS THOSE SPECIFIED IN THE ELECTORAL LAWS OF THE ROK. HE NOTED THAT THE KOREANS WERE PROUD OF THEIR ELECTORAL LAWS AND THAT THEY WERE REASONABLY MODERN AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH ELECTORAL PRACTICES IN DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES. HENCE HE CONCLUDED THAT THE PROVISIO IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE HOUSE OF REPS DID NOT RPT NOT CREATE ANY NEW OBSTACLE TO ELECTIONS AIMED AT UNIFICATION. IN A NEGATIVE SENSE, HOWEVER, THE IMPLICATION OF THE PROVISIO WAS A REFUSAL TO CONTEMPLATE A FEDERAL PROCEDURE FOR REUNIFICATION OR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ANY SORT OF EQUIVALENCE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA IN ANY ELECTORAL MACHINERY THAT MIGHT BE SET UP.

RCD LBN 100315Z FP

000674



7-1-1-1

FM CANDELNY DEC 9/60 CONFD  
TO EXTERNAL 2557  
INFO WASHDC LDN  
BAG DELHI TOKYO CNBRA WLGTN FM LDN  
REF OURTEL 2336 NOV24  
ITEM 21 - KOREA

*file  
8/16/61*

THE CONVERSATION REFERRED TO IN PARA3 OF OUR REFTEL WAS NOT RPT NOT WITH PRESENT ROK PERM OBSERVER(CHANNING LIEM)BUT RATHER WITH FORMER PERM OBSERVER(LIMB)WHO REMAINS AS A MEMBER OF DEL AT CURRENT SESSION OF UNGA.LIMB WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A MR DOO-SUN CHOI,WHO WE GATHER IS A PROMINENT NEWSPAPERMAN IN SEOUL.

2. NOTHING EMERGED FROM CONVERSATION THAT WAS NOT RPT NOT AILDREY KNOWN TO US.LIMB STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF TWO FACETS OF CHANGE IN KOREAN POLICY UNDER NEW REGIME,VIZ RENUNCIATION OF IDEA OF UNIFICATION BY FORCE,AND AGREEMENT THAT ELECTIONS FOR UNIFICATION SHOULD BE HELD THROUGHOUT WHOLE COUNTRY AND NOT RPT NOT ONLY IN NORTHKOREA AS RHEE HAD INSISTED.IN LIGHT OF THIS,ACCORDING TO LIMB,IT WAS NECESSARY TO INSIST ON GENUINELY FREE ELECTIONS; THIS COULD BE GUARANTEED ONLY UNDER DIRECT SUPERVISION BY UN.LIMB COULD NOT RPT NOT BE DRAWN ON QUESTION OF SPECIFIC MECHANISM FOR SUPERVISION.HE MERELY REITERATED VIEW THAT IT HAD TO BE DIRECT UN SUPERVISION.

3. THIS CONVERSATION IS AT SOME VARIANCE WITH ONE WE HAD SUBSEQUENTLY WITH PRESENT PERM OBSERVER.AT LUNCH RECENTLY LIEM ASKED US IF WE WOULD BE COSPONSORING WESTERN RESOLUTION UNDER KOREAN ITEM AT THIS SESSION.WE SAID THAT WE HAD NOT RPT NOT SEEN PRECISE FORM OF CURRENT RESOLUTION AND WENT ON REMARK THAT IN RECENT YEARS,ALTHOUGH WE SUPPORTED RESOLUTIONS,WE HAD NOT RPT NOT COSPONSORED THEM.IN RESPONSE TO LIEMS QUESTION WHY THIS WAS,WE OUTLINED CDN POSITION IN GENERAL TERMS.LIEMS REACTION WAS TO SAY THAT USA POSITION IN PAST MAY HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY RHEES EXTREME POSITION AND BY NECESSITY OF NOT RPT NOT GETTING TOO FAR OUT OF LINE WITH RHEE.HOWEVER,POLICY OF NEW ROK

...2

PAGE TWO 2557

GOVT WAS THAT THERE SHOULD BE ELECTIONS IN BOTH PARTS OF COUNTRY;  
PROVIDED THAT THERE WAS ADEQUATE SUPERVISION AND GENUINELY FREE  
ELECTIONS, THAT LEGITIMACY OF UNS CONCERN WAS RECOGNIZED AND THAT  
TWO HALVES OF COUNTRY WERE NOT RPT NOT TREATED AS EQUALS IN TERMS  
OF LEGITIMACY, HE DID NOT RPT NOT SEE WHY THERE COULD NOT RPT NOT  
BE SOME FLEXIBILITY IN APPROACH TO SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS. HE  
INDICATED THAT HE WOULD RAISE THIS QUESTION WITH HIS OWN GOVT AND  
WITH USA ON HIS NEXT TRIP TO WASHDC. HOWEVER, HE SOUNDED A WARNING  
NOTE BY SAYING THAT WHILE NEW GOVTS POLICY WAS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM  
THAT OF OLD, IT WAS NEVERTHELESS TRUE THAT THERE WERE A GOOD MANY  
OF THE OLD POLITICIANS IN PARLIAMENT AND THEIR INFLUENCE HAD  
TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

RCD LDN 100340Z FP



FILE: 7-1-1-1  
REGISTRY

*Ambassador B*  
*Mr. [unclear]*  
*4 file*  
*15/12/60 avt/60*


FM CANDELNY NOV24/60 CONF  
TO EXTERNAL 2336 PRIORITY  
INFO WASHDC LDN  
TT DELHI FM OTT  
BAG TKQ CNBRA WLGTN FM LDN  
REF OURTEL 2275 NOV21  
ITEM21-KOREA

A MEMBER OF AUSTRALIAN DEL INFORMED US THAT HE HAD HEARD FROM A SOURCE CLOSE TO THE LOWER LEVELS OF THE INDIAN DEL THAT CONSIDERATION WAS BEING GIVEN (POSSIBLY BY THE INDIANS) TO A NEW APPROACH TO THE KOREAN UNIFICATION QUESTION ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES. UNCURK AS SUCH WOULD BE KEPT IN BEING AND A PARALLEL OPERATION MOUNTED INVOLVING A CONCILIATION OR GOOD OFFICES CTTEE COMPOSED OF THREE AFRICAN-ASIANS PLUS SWEDEN, SWITZERLAND AND CDA.

2. OUR AUSTRALIAN COLLEAGUE SAID THAT HIS SOURCE WAS NOT RPT NOT AUTHORITATIVE AND THAT AT MOST THE ONLY SIGNIFICANCE HE WOULD ATTACH TO THIS INFO WAS THAT IT WAS IN THE NATURE OF A TRIAL BALLOON. HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT IF ANY EXERCISE OF THIS SORT WAS CONTEMPLATED BY THE INDIANS IT COULD BE EXPECTED THAT A CONCERTED EFFORT WOULD BE MADE TO SECURE THE SEATING OF BOTH KOREAN DELS AT LEAST FOR THE DEBATE ON THE ITEM.

3. WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY ON A CONVERSATION WE HAD EARLIER THIS WEEK WITH THE KOREAN PERM OBSERVER AT HIS REQUEST. THIS CONVERSATION DID NOT RPT NOT REVEAL THAT ROK DEL HAD ANY FIRM INFO CONCERNING INITIATIVES OR TACTICS TO BE PURSUED BY THE INDIANS OR THE SOVIET BLOC DURING THE DISCUSSION OF THE KOREAN ITEM.

(RECD LDN 252215Z/RL)



7-1-1-1	
REGISTRY	

*M. McElroy with file  
B. Smith  
Nov 28/60*

FM CANDELNY NOV21/60 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY  
 TO EXTERNAL 2275 PRIORITY  
 INFO WASHDC LDN  
 BAG TXO CNBRA WLGTN FM LDN  
 REF OURTEL 2144 NOV11  
 ITEM21-KOREA

A MEMBER OF AUSTRALIAN DEL RECENTLY INFORMED US VERY CONFIDENTIALLY THAT HE HAD DETECTED IN RECENT INFORMAL CONVERSATIONS WITH STATE DEPT OFFICIALS AN INDICATION OF WILLINGNESS TO CONTEMPLATE NEGOTIATIONS CONCERNING THE MODALITIES FOR SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS FOR REUNIFICATION OF KOREA OR AT LEAST A PERSONAL DISPOSITION ON THE PART OF THE OFFICIALS CONCERNED TO HAVE ANOTHER LOOK AT THEIR BASIC POSITION. OUR AUSTRALIAN COLLEAGUE DID NOT RPT NOT KNOW HOW MUCH SIGNIFICANCE TO ATTACH TO THIS OR WHAT BEARING THE IMPENDING CHANGE OF USA ADMIN HAD ON THE QUESTION BUT THOUGHT WE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW ABOUT THIS INDICATION, HOWEVER TENTATIVE AND INDEFINITE, OF POSSIBLE FLEXIBILITY IN THE USA APPROACH.

2. HE WENT ON TO REITERATE THE AUSTRALIAN VIEW THAT FULL SUPPORT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE NEW ROK GOVT AT THIS TIME AND THAT NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE TO PUT IT IN A MORE DIFFICULT POSITION IN THE PRESENT SQUEEZE BETWEEN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON THE ONE HAND AND THE STUDENT GROUPS ON THE OTHER. HE THOUGHT THAT ANY CHANGE AT THIS STAGE IN UNGA RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE FORMULA FOR SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS WOULD CONSTITUTE AN EMBARRASSMENT TO THE ROK GOVT, AND THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO TRY TO LET MATTERS RIDE THROUGH ON THE PRESENT BASIS FOR THIS YEAR.



3. WITH REF TO YOURTEL Y211 NOV14, SINCE USA DEL HAVE NOT RPT NOT VOLUNTEERED TO SHOU US THEIR NEW TEXT WE HAVE NOT RPT NOT HAD CONVERSATIONS WITH THEM CONCERNING THE PREAMBULAR PARA ABOUT KOREAS QUALIFICATIONS FOR MEMBERSHIP. WE HAVE HOWEVER DISCUSSED THE QUESTION WITH OUR AUSTRALIAN COLLEAGUES WHO, WHILE RECOGNIZING THE

PAGE TWO 2275

DISADVANTAGES OF RETAINING THIS PARA, ARE STRONGLY OF THE OPINION THAT IT IS THE MINIMUM GESTURE REQUIRED TO WITHSTAND THE NEW ROK GOVTS PRESSURE FOR RENEWED SUBMISSION AT AN EARLY DATE OF ITS APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP.

4. REF PARA 4 OF YOUR TEL Y211, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE HEARD RUMOURS ABOUT AN INDIAN INITIATIVE INVOLVING A QUOTE NEUTRALIZATION UNQUOTE FORMULA, WE HAVE SO FAR BEEN UNABLE TO OBTAIN ANY CONFIRMATION OR CLARIFICATION.

(RECD LDN 220250Z BC)



*Mr. M. [unclear]*  
*to see + file*  
*with*  
*Nov. 14/60*

FM EXTERNAL OTT NOV14/60 CONFID

TO CANDELNY Y211

INFO WASHDC LDN WLGTN TKO

BAG CNBRA FM LDN

REF YOURTEL 2144 NOV11

KOREA - *Unification of,*

ALTHOUGH IT IS UNLIKELY THAT OUR COMMENTS WILL BE ASKED ON NEW PREAMBULAR PARAS OF AMERICAN DRAFT RESOLUTION YOU MIGHT POINT OUT TO AUSTRALIANS OR BRITISH, IF THEY APPROACH YOU, THAT WE HAVE CONTINUING DOUBTS ABOUT PREAMBULAR PARA 2.

2. WE RECOGNIZE THAT SUCH A PARA MAY BE NECESSARY FOR INTERNAL POLITICAL REASONS IN KOREA. IT SEEMS TO BE A PRIME TARGET, HOWEVER, FOR A SOVIET AMENDMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT IN ASSEMBLY VIEW BOTH KOREAS ARE QUALIFIED FOR ADMISSION. IN ANY CASE, IT DOES NOT SEEM LIKELY TO MAKE RESOLUTION MORE ATTRACTIVE.

WHEN ASSEMBLY DISCUSSED QUESTION OF KOREA'S ADMISSION IN 1957 A RESOLUTION REAFFIRMING THAT REPUBLIC OF KOREA WAS QUALIFIED FOR MEMBERSHIP WAS CARRIED IN PLENARY BY 51 VOTES TO 9 WITH 21 ABSTENTIONS. AT THE SAME SESSION, THE RESOLUTION ON REPORT OF UNCURK WAS CARRIED BY A VOTE OF 54 TO 9 WITH 16 ABSTENTIONS.

WE MAINTAIN OUR DOUBTS ABOUT THIS PARA, EVEN AS REDRAFTED, FOR FOLLOWING REASONS: (A) IT IS, STRICTLY SPEAKING, OUT OF PLACE IN A RESOLUTION ON REPORT OF UNCURK.

(B) IT COULD COMPLICATE DEBATE BY PROVIDING AN OPENING FOR A SOVIET AMENDMENT. (C) IT COULD CONCEIVABLY DRAW VOTES AWAY FROM RESOLUTION AS A WHOLE.

3. IF REDRAFT WAS PREPARED BEFORE DISCUSSIONS WITH KOREAN DEL MENTIONED IN YOUR PARA 2, DO YOU THINK IT POSSIBLE TH

T THIS

PREAMBULAR PARA MIGHT NOW BE WITHDRAWN, OR IS USA DEL LIKELY TO WISH TO RETAIN IT AS BARGAINING COUNTER WHEN 16 MEET.

4. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN WASHDC TEL 2806 NOV10 REPORTING STATE DEPT CONCERN ABOUT RUMOURS THAT INDIAN DEL WAS LOBBYING FOR A RESOLUTION THAT WOULD CALL FOR A NEUTRALIZED, UNIFIED KOREA. AT FIRST SIGHT IT WOULD SEEM THAT BEST WAY TO MEET THIS THREAT MIGHT

PAGE TWO Y211

BE TO ARGUE THAT ASSEMBLY SHOULD NOT RPT NOT PREJUDGE DECISION  
OF KOREAN PEOPLE FOLLOWING REUNIFICATION.GRATEFUL FOR ANY INFO  
REGARDING THIS INDIAN INITIATIVE.

file X Report 3-11-2  
Mr. McGeeney  
+ file  
Blatt  
Nov 21/60

FM PERMISNY NOV11/60 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

TO EXTERNAL 2153 OPIMMED

INFO WASHDC LDN PRIORITY

TT WLGTN PRIORITY FM OTT

BAG ~~TKO~~ CNBRA FM LDN

REF OURTEL 2144 NOV11

ITEM21-KOREA

PLEASE AMEND SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA2 TO READ.QUOTE:WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THE AUSTRALIANS THAT,FOLLOWING THE RATHER STRONG VIEWS EXPRESSED BY UK AND THE AUSTRALIANS AT THE MEETING ON OCT20 MENTIONED ABOVE USA AND,WE GATHER,THE AUSTRALIANS TOO,CONVINCED THE KOREAN DEL THAT IT WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE DESIRABLE TO PRESS THEIR APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP UNTIL THE KOREAN ITEM ON THE AGENDA IS DISPOSED OF.UNQUOTE.

(RECD LDN 120331Z KT)

7-1-1-1  
7-3-4-2

X Report

file JGM

~~2-2-1-2~~

Mr. McPherson:  
Although this is for "Canadian Eyes only" & under it we can obtain anything helpful from Japanese about their attitude toward Korean membership in UN and about their views on discussion of item 21 at UN. There might be enough available for a short telegram.

Keith  
Nov 21/60  
Japanese attitude to Korean membership in U.N. and Korean unification (item 21) is essentially passive. They take view that membership must await unification of recognized govt. and that unification should be brought about in accordance with existing UN resolutions. They have no original thoughts on the subject and tend to be guided by USA position which is legally "safe". Ottawa is well aware of Japan's cautious approach and does not expect much help from them in persuading USA to adopt more flexible position.

FM CANDELNY NOV11/60 CONFID CDN EYES ONLY  
TO EXTERNAL 2144 PRIORITY  
INFO WASHDC LDN  
TT WLGTN FM OTT  
BAG TOKYO CNBRA FM LDN  
REF YOURTEL Y207 NOV7  
15TH UNGA: ITEM 21-KOREA

WE ARE REPEATING BELOW THE TEXT OF FOUR OF THE PREAMBULAR PARAS under one OF USA DRAFT RESOLUTION AS REVISED PURSUANT TO AN EXCHANGE OF recognized govt. and that unification VIEWS AMONG USA, OURSELVES, UK, AUSTRALIA AND NZ AT A MEETING WHICH should be brought about TOOK PLACE ON OCT20. FOLLOWING THAT MEETING, AT WHICH WE PUT FORWARD in accordance SUGGESTIONS CONTAINED IN YOURTEL Y194 OF OCT17, WE HEARD NOTHING with existing UN MORE FROM USA DEL CONCERNING THE RESOLUTION OR THE ITEM. WE LEARNED resolutions. They ONLY ACCIDENTALLY FROM THE AUSTRALIANS THAT USA HAD GIVEN THEM A have no original thoughts REVISED TEXT WHICH WAS TO BE DISCUSSED AT A MEETING OF CO-SPONSORS on the subject and tend to IN DUE COURSE. USA DEL HAVE MADE NO RPT NO APPROACH TO US IN THIS be guided by CONNECTION AND NZERS HAVE ALSO BEEN KEPT IN THE DARK ABOUT DEVE- USA position LOPMENTS CONCERNING THE KOREAN ITEM. which is legally "safe". Ottawa is well 2. IN THE LIGHT OF THESE RATHER UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE FACT aware of Japan's THAT WE ARE NOT RPT NOT IN ANY EVENT TO CO-SPONSOR THE DRAFT cautious approach and WITHOUT A REVISION OF THE OPERATIVE PART, WE HAVE MADE NO RPT NO does not expect much APPROACH TO THE AMERICANS. WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THE AUSTRALIANS THAT help from them in FOLLOWING THE RATHER STRONG VIEWS EXPRESSED BY USA AND, WE GATHER, persuading USA to adopt more flexible position. TH AUSTRALIANS TOO, CONVICTED THE KOREAN DEL THAT IT WOULD NOT RPT JGM Nov 28/60 NT BE DESIRABLE TO PRESS THEIR APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP UNTIL THE KOREAN ITEM ON THE AGENDA IS DISPOSED OF. IT NOW SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THIS WILL TAKE PLACE BEFORE THE EXPECTED XMAS RECESS. 3. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE THINK IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF USA WERE TO LEARN THAT WE HAD ACQUIRED A COPY OF THEIR REVISED TEXT FROM ANOTHER SOURCE. FOR THE RECORD WE SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT BEFORE COMMENTING TO THE AMERICANS ON THEIR PRELIMINARY DRAFT AND BEFORE ATTENDING THE MEETING ON OCT20 WE WERE SURE THAT OUR POSITION

PAGE TWO 2144

ON SPONSORSHIP WAS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD AND WERE INVITED TO THE MEETING ON THAT BASIS. AS IT TURNED OUT BUFFUM, WHO IS USA ADVISER ON THIS ITEM FOR THE FIRST TIME, WAS NOT RPT NOT PREVIOUSLY AWARE OF THE CDN POSITION.

4. SINCE DICTATING THE ABOVE WE HAVE RECEIVED YOUR TRANSMITTAL SLIP DATED NOV8 AND NOTE THAT THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ATTACHED TO THE AIDE MEMOIRE OF OCT25 IS IDENTICAL TO THE ONE WHICH WAS THE BASIS OF DISCUSSION AT THE OCT20 MEETING, AND WHICH USA AGREED AT THAT TIME TO REVISE IN THE LIGHT OF OUR DISCUSSIONS. TEXT OF REVISED PREAMBULAR PARAS FOLLOWS. BEGINS:

NOTING THAT THE COMPETENCE AND AUTHORITY OF THE UN TO DEAL WITH THE KOREAN QUESTION HAS BEEN AFFIRMED BY REPEATED RESOLUTIONS OF UNGA,

BELIEVING THAT THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, WHICH HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY RECOGNIZED BY THE UNGA AS FULLY QUALIFIED FOR MEMBERSHIP IN THE UN, IS ENTITLED TO THE FAVORABLE VOTE OF ALL MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

NOTING WITH DEEP SATISFACTION: (A) THE CONTINUED FERVENT DESIRE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE TO DECIDE THEIR OWN FUTURE IN UNITY AND FREEDOM; (B) THE ADHERENCE TO DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AS SET FORTH IN THE REPORT OF THE UN COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA; AND (C) THE FULL SUPPORT WHICH THE GOVT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA IS GIVING FOR THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF THE KOREAN NATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES ENDORSED BY THE UNGA,

NOTING FURTHER THAT THE UN FORCES, WHICH WERE SENT TO KOREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTIONS OF THE UN, HAVE IN GREATER PART ALREADY BEEN WITHDRAWN AND THAT THE GOVTS CONCERNED ARE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW THEIR REMAINING FORCES FROM KOREA WHEN THE CONDITIONS FOR A LASTING SETTLEMENT LAID DOWN BY THE UNGA HAVE BEEN FULFILLED. ENDS.

(RCD LDN 111816Z/GAG)



Handwritten notes and signatures in the top right corner, including a signature and the date NOV 21/60.

FM WASHDC NOV10/60 CONFD  
TO EXTERNAL 2806 PRIORITY  
INFO CANDELNY PRIORITY PERMISNY LDN  
TT WLGTN FM OTT  
BAG TOKYO CNBRA FM LDN  
REF URTEL Y207 NOV7  
KOREAN UNIFICATION

WE CONFIRMED TODAY WITH OFFICERS OF THE STATE DEPTS NORTHASIA DESK THAT THERE WAS NO RPT NO MISUNDERSTANDING ON THEIR PART OF THE CDN POSITION ON THE CUSTOMARY KOREAN RESOLUTION. WE GATHERED THAT A MISUNDERSTANDING HAD EXISTED ONLY WITHIN USA EMB IN OTT AND THAT THIS HAS NOW BEEN CLEARED UP.

2. THE KOREAN DESK IN THE STATE DEPT IS, HOWEVER, CONCERNED ABOUT RUMDURS WHICH HAVE REACHED THE STATE DEPT FROM NY, ASSERTING THAT THE INDIAN DEL IS LOBBYING FOR A DRAFT RESOLUTION THAT WOULD AIM AT THE NEUTRALIZATION OF A UNIFIED KOREAN STATE. THE STATE DEPT THINKS THAT THIS INITIATIVE MAY HAVE HAD ITS ORIGIN IN A MORE OR LESS CASUAL QUOTE AFTERTHOUGHT UNQUOTE INSERTED BY USA SENATOR MANSFIELD IN HIS OCT21 REPORT TO THE SENATE CTTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON QUOTE JAPAN-USA POLICIES UNQUOTE (OURTEL 2768 NOV5 DEALS WITH THE COMMERCIAL ASPECTS OF THIS REPORT WHICH ARE, IN FACT, ITS MAJOR CONTENTS. COPIES WERE FORWARDED TO THE DEPT UNDER TRANSMITTAL SLIP OF NOV4). AT THE END OF THIS REPORT, AFTER URGING THE USE OF USA GOOD OFFICES TO THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE EXTENT IN ENCOURAGING A NEUTRALLY-ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION OF JAPANESE-KOREAN PROBLEMS, SENATOR MANSFIELD WENT ON TO STATE FURTHER QUOTE THAT WE (SHOULD) CONSIDER MOST CAREFULLY THE POSSIBILITIES OF A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF KOREAN UNIFICATION IN TERMS OF NEUTRALIZATION ON THE AUSTRIAN PATTERN UNQUOTE.

3. THIS STATEMENT HAD APPARENTLY BEEN MISINTERPRETED IN SEOUL AS REPRESENTING GOVT THINKING AND HAD LED TO CONSIDERABLE CONTROVERSIES CULMINATING IN AN EMPHATIC PUBLIC REJECTION OF THE IDEA BY SOUTH

PAGE TWO 2806

KOREAN PREMIER CHANG MYON ON NOV3.

4. WE GATHERED THAT USA REPS HAD BEEN ABLE TO SET THE SOUTHKOREAN GOVT STRAIGHT ON THE QUESTION OF NEUTRALIZATION BUT WERE FEARFUL OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE INDIAN INITIATIVE MIGHT UPSET THE RATHER PRECARIOUS SOUTHKOREAN AGREEMENT TO THE CURRENT USA DRAFT RESOLUTION. PREMIER CHANG MYON HAD STATED HIS WILLINGNESS TO ABIDE BY SUCH A RESOLUTION ONLY AFTER PATCHING OVER A FAIRLY DEEP RIFT WITHIN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY ON THIS VERY QUESTION. IN ADDITION, THE STATE DEPT WAS BY NO RPT NO MEANS SURE THAT THE SOUTHKOREAN GOVTS POSITION WAS ENTIRELY UNEQUIVOCAL. THE NOV2 RESOLUTION OF THE KOREAN HOUSE OF REPS DID INDEED AGREE THAT A FREE ELECTION SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT UNDER UN SUPERVISION BUT ADDED A RIDER TO THE EFFECT THAT SUCH AN ELECTION MUST BE QUOTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURES OF THE ROK UNQUOTE. USA EMB IN SEOUL WAS STILL TRYING TO DETERMINE EXACTLY WHAT THIS RESERVATION IMPLIED.

(RECD LDN 110307Z KT)



TRANSMITTAL SLIP

TO: The Canadian Embassy,  
TOKYO.

FROM: The Under-Secretary of State for External  
Affairs, OTTAWA.

The documents described below are for your information.

Despatching Authority... T.M. Pope/ps

7-1-1-1	
✓	/

CONFIDENTIAL

Security.....

Date..... November 8, 1960

Air or Surface..... Air Bag

No. of enclosures..... 2

*M. M. [Signature]*  
*R. Kait*  
 nov 21/60

Copies	Description	Also referred to:
1 1	Aide Memoire Draft Resolution on Korea  Reference our telegram Y-207 of November 7, 1960, re: ITEM ON KOREA	Candel NY Washington London Wellington Canberra

## INSTRUCTIONS

1. This form may be used in sending material for informational purposes from the Department to posts abroad and vice versa.
2. This form should *NOT* be used to cover documents requiring action.
3. The name of the person responsible for authorizing the despatch of the material should be shown opposite the words "Despatching Authority". This may be done by signature, name stamp or by any other suitable means.
4. The form should bear the security classification of the material it covers.
5. The column for "Copies" should indicate the number of copies of each document transmitted. The space for "No. of Enclosures" should show the total number of copies of all documents covered by the transmittal slip. This will facilitate checking on despatch and receipt of mail.



CONFIDENTIAL

AIDE MEMOIRE

The Embassy wishes to take this opportunity to inform the Government of Canada of the views of the United States Government on the Korean unification issue which appears on the agenda of the Fifteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The United States believes that this issue is of special importance because of events which have taken place in the Republic of Korea in the course of the year, particularly the July elections, which were distinguished by their fairness and freedom. In fact, the United States believes that the April revolution in Korea demonstrated before all the world the attachment of the Korean people to the principles of freedom and democracy.

It is the view of the United States that there is a need to impress upon the many new members of the United Nations the significance of Korea as a prime example of the guarantees which the United Nations can afford small powers. It was in Korea, of course, that the first collective security action under the provisions of the United Nations Charter was taken in repelling unprovoked Communist aggression against the Republic of Korea, a government which itself had been created under the auspices of the United Nations. The manner in which these new nations vote this year on the Korean unification issue may determine decisively the direction

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

of their voting in the future.

The United States is primarily concerned with promoting the national self-determination of the Korean people and allowing their nation to progress in peace and unity. The Korean people are one people, ethnically, culturally and politically, and the present division of the Korean peninsula is, in the view of the United States, unnatural and contrary to the best interests of the Koreans. Unification would benefit both halves economically by joining the predominantly agricultural south to the more industrialized and resource-endowed north and would promote the peace and stability of Northeast Asia. It is in this context that the United States Government has been constantly striving since 1945 to bring about Korean unification.

The United States believes this unity can be most effectively accomplished through free elections under the supervision of the United Nations in order to ensure that they are conducted in a genuinely free and impartial manner. The United Nations has been closely identified with the Korean question since 1947, and the new Korean Government has strongly endorsed the principle of United Nations-supervised elections. It is only the North Korean regime backed by the communist bloc which prevents the unification of Korea by its denial of the competence of the United Nations. Acceptance of the communist contention would strike at the basic foundation and moral authority of this international organization, the preservation of which is so essential to world order.

CONFIDENTIAL

-3-

The Communist north Korean regime is a totalitarian Soviet colonialist regime which maintains itself in power only by the most ruthless methods, denying its people any of the basic democratic or human rights. It enjoys no status in the international community, is a member of no international organization, and is recognized as a "government" only by members of the Soviet bloc. For the Republic of Korea to associate itself with this regime in accordance with various Communist proposed commissions or federations would give this regime de facto recognition as well as acknowledging the divided status of the Korean nation. Furthermore, such association would place the north Korean regime as a co-equal to the legitimate Republic of Korea, which has been recognized by the United Nations as the only lawful government in Korea, and provide it opportunities to subvert the progress and stability of the Republic of Korea.

Since the tragic division of the Korean peninsula in 1945, the Korean people have voted "by their feet" as to the true representative of Korea's national aspirations. The number of refugees who have fled to the Republic of Korea from north Korea and who have returned to south Korea from other areas is over three million.

The majority of the United Nations forces which were sent to Korea in accordance with United Nations resolutions have been withdrawn and the remaining forces can be withdrawn when United Nations objectives in Korea have been fulfilled. Under these conditions it is

CONFIDENTIAL

-4-

difficult to accept Communist contentions that the presence of this token force prevents the carrying out of free elections, especially since such elections would be under United Nations supervision to ensure their fairness.

Embassy of the United States of America,  
Ottawa, October 25, 1960.

C O P Y

CONFIDENTIAL  
SD/A/C.1/492

- 5 -

ANNEX I

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON KOREA

The General Assembly

Having received the report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea,

Reaffirming its resolution 112 (II) of 14 November 1947, 195 (III) of 12 December 1948, 293 (IV) of 21 October 1949, 376 (V) of 7 October 1950, 81 (IX) of 11 December 1954, 910 A (X) of 29 November 1955, 1010 (XI) of 11 January 1957, 1180 (XII) of 29 November 1957, 1264 (XIII) of 14 November 1958, and 1455 (XIV) of 12 December 1959,

Regretting that the Communist authorities continue to deny the competence and moral authority of the United Nations to deal with the Korean question, claiming that any resolution on this question adopted by the United Nations is null and void,

Regretting further that the Republic of Korea, recognized by the United Nations as the only lawful government in Korea and which the General Assembly has repeatedly recognized as fully qualified for membership, is still denied admission to the United Nations because of the negative vote of one of the permanent members of the Security Council.

Noting with deep satisfaction: (a) the adherence to democratic principles and practices in the Republic of Korea as set forth in the Report of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea; (b) the full support which the Government of the Republic of Korea is giving for the peaceful unification of the Korean nation in accordance with the principles endorsed by the General Assembly; and (c) the continued fervent desire of the Korean people for self-determination in unity and freedom,

- 6 -

Noting further that the United Nations forces, which were sent to Korea in accordance with resolutions of the United Nations, have in greater part already been withdrawn and that the governments concerned are prepared to withdraw their remaining forces from Korea when the conditions for a lasting settlement laid down by the General Assembly have been fulfilled,

1. Reaffirms that the objectives of the United Nations in Korea are to bring about by peaceful means the establishment of a unified, independent, and democratic Korea under a representative form of government with the full restoration of international peace and security in the area;

2. Calls upon the Communist authorities concerned to accept these established United Nations objectives in order to achieve a settlement in Korea based on the fundamental principles for unification set forth by the nations participating on behalf of the United Nations in the Korean Political Conference held at Geneva in 1954, and reaffirmed by the General Assembly, and to agree at an early date on the holding of genuinely free elections in accordance with the principles endorsed by the General Assembly;

3. Requests the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea to continue its work in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;

4. Requests the Secretary General to place the Korean question on the provisional agenda of the sixteenth session of the General Assembly.



FILE:  
Mr. McDevitt + file  
B Keith  
Nov 21/60

FM EXTERNAL NOV7/60 CONF  
TO CANDELNY Y207 PRIORITY  
INFO WASHDC LDN WLGTN PRIORITY  
BAG TKO CNBRA FM LDN  
ITEM 21 KOREA

WE ARE SENDING BY BAG TEXT OF AN AIDE MEMOIRE ON KOREAN UNIFI-  
CATION WHICH WAS LEFT WITH US SEVERAL DAYS AGO BY RUFUS SMITH,  
COUNSELLOR USA EMB.COMMENTING ORALLY ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT  
RESOLUTION PRESENTED BY USA DEL,SMITH SAID IT WAS HIS IMPRESSION  
THAT STATE DEPT WOULD WELCOME CDN COSPONSORSHIP AND WOULD BE  
WILLING TO CONSIDER CHANGES IN WORDING IF THESE WOULD HELP.HE  
ADDED HOWEVER THAT HE WAS NOT RPT NOT UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO  
RAISE THIS MATTER.

2.ON QUESTION OF ELECTIONS PRELIMINARY TO UNIFICATION,AIDE  
MEMOIRE RESTATES TRADITIONAL USA VIEW THAT SUPERVISION QUOTE  
OF UN UNQUOTE IS NECESSARY TO ENSURE FREEDOM AND IMPARTIALITY.  
SINCE OPERATIVE PARAS OF USA DRAFT RESOLUTION ARE IDENTICAL TO  
CORRESPONDING PARAS OF LAST YEARS RESOLUTION AND AIDE MEMOIRE  
GIVES NO RPT NO INDICATION OF GREATER USA FLEXIBILITY ON  
QUESTION OF SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS,WE SEE NO RPT NO GROUND  
FOR RECONSIDERING APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WERE TO VOTE IN  
FAVOUR OF USUAL RESOLUTION BUT NOT RPT NOT TO COSPONSOR UNLESS  
IT WERE SO REWORDED AS TO PROVIDE A POSSIBLE BASIS FOR  
NEGOTIATIONS.

3.SMITH HAS SINCE ASKED FOR OUR COMMENTS AND HAS INTIMATED THAT  
STATE DEPT MIGHT DECIDE TO RAISE OFFICIALLY THE QUESTION OF  
COSPONSORSHIP.WE REMINDED HIM THAT CDA HAS CONSISTENTLY SINCE  
1954 TAKEN POSITION THAT WHILE SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS FOR  
KOREAN UNIFICATION MUST BE EFFECTIVE,IMPARTIAL AND ACCEPTABLE  
TO THE UN,DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS WOULD NECESSARILY BE SUBJECT TPO

...2

PAGE TWO Y207

NEGOTIATION; WESTERN PROPOSALS CONCERNING ELECTORAL PROCEDURES SHOULD NOT RPT NOT THEREFORE BE SO INFLEXIBLE AS VIRTUALLY TO EXCLUDE ANY POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATION AND TO APPEAR UNREASONABLE TO MAJORITY ASIAN OPINION. WE TOLD SMITH THAT ON THIS POINT, CDN VIEW, WHICH HAD BEEN EXPRESSED MANY TIMES IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS IN NY HAD NOT RPT NOT CHANGED.

4. SMITH SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD NOT RPT NOT UNDERSTOOD THIS WAS REASON FOR OUR DECISION IN PAST NOT RPT NOT TO COSPONSOR, AND HE THOUGHT THAT SOME SECTIONS OF STATE DEPT HAD IMPRESSION OUR ATTITUDE WAS RELATED TO PREAMBULAR PARAS OF USUAL RESOLUTION. HE SAID THAT IN REPORTING HE WOULD SEEK TO CORRECT ANY MIS-APPREHENSION WHICH MIGHT EXIST ON THIS POINT IN STATE DEPT ROBERTSON

RCD LDN 081520Z FP

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER



To: **KOREAN EMBASSY**  
**WASHINGTON, D.C.**

Security: **UNCLASSIFIED**

No.: **Y. 848**

From: **THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.**

Date: **September 20, 1960**

Enclosures: .....

Reference: **Your letter No. 1364 of September 2,  
1960**

Air or Surface Mail: **BY AIR**

Subject: .....

Post File No.: **7-1-1-1**

**Note from the Korean Embassy  
regarding the Korean Item**

Ottawa File No.

References

Your reply to the Korean Ambassador's note of September 1, 1960, seems quite adequate and no further reply is necessary.

2. The copies of your letter referred to various posts were inadvertently attached to the copy for Ottawa. We have now transmitted them to their addressees.

Internal Circulation

NO.		INIT.
	AMBASSADOR COUNSELLOR	
	<del>2nd SEC. (P)</del>	
	2nd SEC. (C)	
	A.O.	
	ADMIN. CI.	
	CONSULAR CI.	
	T. & C.	
	D.N.D. (M.A.)	
	D.N.R.	

*for*  
**G. de T. GLAZEBROOK**  
**Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.**

*file*  
*[Signature]*

Distribution to Posts

- Formis N.Y.
- London
- Canberra
- Wellington
- Tokyo ✓

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Reference: .....

Subject: 15th SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY -- KOREAN QUESTION

Security: UNCLASSIFIED

No: 1364

Date: SEPTEMBER 9, 1960

Enclosures: .....

Air or Surface Mail: BY BAG

Post File No: .....

Ottawa File No.	

References

Attached are copies of the Korean  
Ambassador's note of September 1, 1960 (received  
September 9) on the Korean item, and our reply.

2. I should be grateful to know if you  
wish us to make further response to the Korean  
Embassy.

Original Signed  
A.D.P. Heaney  
The Embassy

Internal  
Circulation

Distribution  
to Posts

- PERMIS, NY
- LONDON
- CANBERRA
- WELLINGTON
- TOKYO

The Canadian Ambassador presents his compliments to His Excellency the Korean Ambassador and has the honour to acknowledge receipt of the Korean Ambassador's note of September 1, 1960 setting forth the views of the Government of the Republic of Korea on the Korean question to be discussed at the forthcoming Fifteenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations; and requesting the friendly co-operation and support of the Government of Canada, as in previous sessions, for the cause of the unification of Korea and the admission of the Republic of Korea as a member of the United Nations.

Copies of the Korean Ambassador's note have been forwarded to the Government of Canada for its consideration.

Washington, D.C.  
September 9, 1960.

Original Signed  
A. D. P. Heeney

KOREAN EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

CRR

The Korean Ambassador presents his compliments to His Excellency the Ambassador of Canada and, under the instructions from the home Government, has the honor to refer to the Korean question to be discussed at the forthcoming 15th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The question of the unification of Korea comes before the General Assembly for the fourteenth consecutive year and it has been one of the most important and urgent tasks to be accomplished by the United Nations. Unfortunately, it still remains unsettled due to the unwillingness of the communist authorities to accept the fundamental principles for the unification as set forth in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

The Government of the Republic of Korea wishes to call to the attention of the Government of Canada the fact that the Government of the Republic of Korea is "the only lawful government in Korea" based on the "valid expression of the free will of the Korean people" and so recognized by the United Nations. It has steadily developed its democratic institutions ever since the Republic of Korea came into being in 1948 and the foundation of a democratic and representative form of government in Korea has been further strengthened by the recent popular revolution in April of 1960.

The Government of the Republic of Korea also wishes to take this opportunity to reaffirm that it fully accepts and endorses the principles of the United Nations' resolutions on Korea calling for an end to the tragic division of the country and the achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and demo-

cratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of peace and security in Korea at the earliest practical date.

As a peace-loving nation dedicated to the objectives and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, Korea has long been aspiring to membership in the United Nations.

The General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly affirmed in its resolutions of 296 G (IV) of November 22, 1949, 1017 A (IX) of February 28, 1957 and 1144 (XII) of October 25, 1957, that the Republic of Korea is, in its judgment, a peace-loving State within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter and is able and willing to carry out the obligations of the Charter and, therefore, it should be admitted as a member of the United Nations.

The Government of the Republic of Korea will greatly appreciate it if the Government of Canada will render its friendly cooperation and support to the Republic of Korea, as in previous sessions, for the cause of the unification of Korea under the principles of the United Nations and for the admission of the Republic of Korea as a member in that world organization.

The Korean Ambassador avails himself of this opportunity to renew to His Excellency the Ambassador of Canada the assurances of his highest consideration.

Washington, D. C.

September 1, 1960



FM EXTERNAL OTT SEP2/60 CONFD  
TO WASHDC Y168 PRIORITY  
INFO PERMISNY LDN  
BAG CNBRA WLGTN TOKYO FM LDN  
REF YOURTEL 2210 AUG31

*Mr. Beeth*

NO.		INIT.
1	AMBASSADOR <del>1st SEC.</del>	
	2nd SEC. (P)	
	2nd SEC. (C)	
	A. J.	
	ADMIN. CL.	
	CONSULAR CL.	
	T. G. C.	
2	<del>1st SEC.</del> D.N.R.	<i>Mr</i>

KOREA

SINCE THE FIFTEENTH SESSION GIVES EVERY INDICATION OF BEING A COLD WAR SESSION, THERE IS LITTLE HOPE FOR ANY PROGRESS ON KOREAN ITEM. IN PARTICULAR, AS YOU WILL HAVE NOTED FROM LDNS TEL 2476 AUG15, STATE DEPT WOULD PREFER A STRONG RESOLUTION AND MORE ABSTENTIONS RATHER THAN A MORE FLEXIBLE RESOLUTION DESIGNED TO GET MAXIMUM SUPPORT. THE ONLY NEW ELEMENT IN THE SITUATION IS THE FORMATION OF THE NEW CABINET IN SOUTHKOREA. PREMIER CHANG HAS ABANDONED THE INFLEXIBLE POSITION OF ELECTIONS UNDER UN SUPERVISION IN SOUTHKOREA. THIS WILL MAKE THE PRESENCE OF SOUTHKOREAN DEL DURING THE DEBATE CONSIDERABLY LESS EMBARRASSING THAN IT HAS SOMETIMES BEEN IN THE PAST.

*+ file  
JOM*

2. THIS RELATIVE MODERATION OF KOREAN GOVT MIGHT LEAD SOME OF THE UNCOMMITTED COUNTRIES TO THINK THAT AN OPPORTUNITY HAS BEEN PROVIDED FOR A FRESH START IN NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THERE HAVE BEEN INDICATIONS DATING BACK TO THE CLOSE OF THE FOURTEENTH SESSION THAT USSR IS CONSIDERING A NEW APPROACH ON THE QUESTION. ONE OR MORE UNCOMMITTED COUNTRY MIGHT INTRODUCE A MODERATE RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO OPPOSE. WE DO NOT RPT NOT PROPOSE TO TAKE POSITION ON THIS POSSIBILITY HOWEVER UNTIL IT MATERIULIZES AND USA ATTITUDE IS DEFINITELY KNOWN.

3. IT IS, NEVERTHELESS, IMPORTANT THAT COMMUNIST SIDE NOT RPT NOT

PAGE TWO Y168

BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ITSELF AS BEING MORE REASONABLE THAN UN SIDE. WITH THIS END IN VIEW SOME CAPITAL MIGHT BE MADE OUT OF KIM IL SUNGS LATEST SPEECH ON RE-UNIFICATION WHICH PROVIDES FEW GROUNDS FOR THINKING THAT NORTHKOREANS ARE WILLING TO MAKE CONCESSIONS TO UN SIDE.

(RCD LDN 031300Z/EBM)

7-1-1-1



FM LDN AUG15/60 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY  
TO EXTERNAL 2476  
INFO PERMISNY WASHDC  
BAG CNBRA WLGTN TOKYO FM LDN  
REF OURTEL 2049 JUL6  
KOREAN ITEM AT UNGA

NO.	AMBASSADOR	INIT.
2	<del>CONSUL</del>	
	2nd SEC. (P)	
	2nd SEC. (C)	
	A.D.	
	ADM. CL.	
	CONSULAR CL.	
	T. & C.	
	<del>DRD (M)</del>	
	D.N.R.	

PEDLAR, FOS NEW KOREAN DESK OFFICER, SHOWED US TODAY FOS PROVISIONAL GUIDANCE FOR UKDEL IN NY CONCERNING KOREAN ITEM AT FORTHCOMING UNGA. THIS GUIDANCE IS INTENDED TO BE USED BY UKDEL AS BASIS FOR DISCUSSION WITH FRIENDLY DELS. PEDLAR KNEW OF NO RPT NO PLANS FOR ANY MEETING OF DELS IN NY BUT THOUGHT THAT UKDEL IN NY MIGHT CONCEIVABLY TAKE INITIATIVE TO CALL SUCH A MEETING. THE FOLLOWING OUTLINE OF FOS PRESENT VIEWS ON THE HANDLING OF KOREAN ITEM IS BASED ON FO GUIDANCE PAPER AND OUR DISCUSSION WITH PEDLAR.

*file  
KGM*

2. KOREAN ITEM WILL BE DEBATED THIS YEAR AGAINST BACKGROUND OF IMPORTANT EVENTS IN KOREA SINCE LAST UNGA, NOTABLY THE ELECTION OF A DEMOCRATIC GOVT REPLACING THE RHEE REGIME, THE IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH THE UNCOMMITTED AFRO-ASIAN COUNTRIES DEVELOPED BY THE INTERIM KOREAN GOVT AND THE FACT THAT THERE SHOULD NOW BE NO RPT NO POSSIBLE DANGER OF AN INVASION OF NORTHKOREA BY SOUTH. UK EMBASSY IN WASHDC HAS OBTAINED FROM STATE DEPT SAME VIEWPOINT AS EXPRESSED BY BARCO IN NY (PERMISNY TEL 805 JUN23) ABOUT THE PROBABLE EFFECTS OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS. USA CONSIDERS THAT WEST IS NOW IN A STRONGER POSITION THAN BEFORE NOW THAT THERE IS A DEMOCRATICALLY ELECTED REGIME IN SOUTHKOREA WHICH MIGHT MAKE INDIA AND OTHER UNCOMMITTED COUNTRIES MORE SYMPATHETIC TO FOURTEEN POWER RESOLUTION APPROACH. COMMUNIST CHINESE AGGRESSIVE MOVES AGAINST INDIA AND NEPAL AND STRAINED CHINESE RELATIONS WITH INDONESIA SHOULD MAKE THESE UNCOMMITTED COUNTRIES AND THEIR FRIENDS INCLUDING CEYLON LESS INCLINED TO PUT FORWARD SUCH A COMPROMISE SUGGESTION AS CEYLON REP PUT FORWARD LAST YEAR. STATE DEPT CONSIDERS THEREFORE THAT THERE

...2

PAGE TWO 2476

SHOULD BE NO RPT NO WEAKENING OF THE USUAL RESOLUTION. STATE DEPT  
WOULD TAKE A DIM VIEW OF ANY ATTEMPT THIS YEAR TO AVOID FURTHER  
ANNUAL DEBATE. ALTHOUGH THIS POINT WAS NOT RPT NOT DISCUSSED SPECI-  
FICALLY WITH STATE DEPT PEDLAR PRESUMED THAT USA WOULD STRONGLY  
OPPOSE ANY SUGGESTION FOR ALTERING PROVISION CONCERNING UN SUPER-  
VISION OF ELECTIONS. THE STATE DEPT APPARENTLY PLAN TO PUT FORWARD  
MUCH THE SAME RESOLUTION AS LAST YEAR AND USE THE OCCASION FOR  
PROPAGANDA SPEECHES. THE STATE DEPT WOULD RATHER HAVE A STRONG  
RESOLUTION AND MORE ABSTENTIONS ~~RATHER~~ THAN A MORE FLEXIBLE  
RESOLUTION DESIGNED TO GET MAXIMUM AFRO-ASIAN SUPPORT.

3. FO BELIEVES THAT KOREAN EVENTS MIGHT WORK IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION  
THAN EXPECTED BY THE STATE DEPT WITH UNCOMMITTED COUNTRIES SEEING  
IN A LESS RIGID REGIME IN KOREA GREATER POSSIBILITIES FOR SETTLEMENT  
OF KOREAN PROBLEM BY DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. COMMUNIST CHINESE  
TOUGHNESS IN THE LAST YEAR IS UNLIKELY TO AFFECT AFRO-ASIAN  
VIEWS ON KOREAN ITEM WHICH THEY WOULD APPROACH ON ITS MERITS.  
PEDLAR GAVE HIS PERSONAL VIEW THAT CORREA, CEYLON REP, MIGHT BE  
ANXIOUS TO IMPRESS NEW CEYLONESE PM BY PUTTING FORWARD THE SAME  
PROPOSAL HE DID LAST YEAR. FOUR OR FIVE OF THE NEW UN MEMBERS THIS  
YEAR HAVE RELATIONS WITH NATIONALIST CHINA, WHICH STRONGLY INDICATES  
THEY WOULD SUPPORT WESTERN RESOLUTION ON KOREA. FO HAS HAD NO RPT  
NO INDICATION OF VIEWS OF OTHER NEW MEMBERS. FO CONSIDERS THAT IT  
MIGHT PROVE TO BE DESIRABLE IN ORDER TO ATTRACT NEW AND OTHER  
AFRO-ASIAN MEMBERS SUPPORT TO DELETE FROM RESOLUTION THE EXPLICIT  
CONDEMNATION OF COMMUNIST REFUSAL TO ACCEPT UN PRINCIPLES. IN  
GENERAL FO CONSIDERS THAT NEW KOREAN GOVT SHOULD BE GIVEN TIME TO  
CONSOLIDATE ITS POSITION AND WEST SHOULD AVOID PROVIDING ANY  
POSSIBLE IMPLICATION THAT UN INTEREST IN KOREA WAS DWINDLING.  
(THESE LAST THREE POINTS WERE INCLUDED IN FOS GUIDANCE PAPER IN  
LANGUAGE SIMILAR TO AUSTRALIAN TEL QUOTED IN PERMISNY TEL 110 AUG5).

...3

PAGE THREE 2476

yes  
FO FAVOURED A QUIET APPROACH TO KOREAN DEBATE BUT THOUGHT SUITABLE OPPORTUNITIES TO EMPHASIZE FAVORABLE DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENTS IN KOREA SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE NEGLECTED. PEDLAR SAID THAT UK WOULD CERTAINLY NOT RPT NOT CONSIDER TAKING ANY INITIATIVE TO CHANGE WORDING OF PREVIOUS RESOLUTION CONCERNING UN SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS IN KOREA BUT MIGHT POSSIBLY SUPPORT SUCH A CHANGE IF CLOSER TO THE EVENT THIS APPEARED TO BE NECESSARY TO SECURE ENOUGH SUPPORT FOR WESTERN RESOLUTION.

4. UK CHARGE IN PEKING HAS REPORTED THAT THERE IS NO RPT NO SIGN OF ANY SOFTENING IN CHINESE ATTITUDE TO KOREA AND IN PARTICULAR THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS UN TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND CONDITIONS FOR ELECTIONS IN KOREA. UK EMBASSY IN MOSCOW THINKS USSR WOULD NOT RPT NOT TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE A COMPROMISE RESOLUTION THIS YEAR CAPABLE OF GAINING AFRO-ASIAN SUPPORT BUT WOULD SUPPORT ANY AFRO-ASIAN COMPROMISE INITIATIVE AND SEEK TO EXPLOIT IT FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. PEDLAR POINTED OUT THAT THIS OPINION WAS FORMED BEFORE IT WAS KNOWN THAT KHRUSHCHOV WOULD VISIT NORTHKOREA IN EARLY OCT. HE MIGHT BE PLANNING TALKS WITH NORTHKOREAN LEADERS WHICH COULD LEAD TO NEW SOVIET INITIATIVE AT UNGA.

Embassy - Ambassade du Canada  
AUG 30 1960  
- TOKYO -

NO.	AMBASSADOR	INIT.
2	<del>COL. SEC.</del>	
	2nd SEC. (P)	
	2nd S.C. (C)	
	A.O.	
	ADV. CL.	
	CONSULAR CL.	
1	T. & C.	
	D.N.D. (M.A.)	
	D.N.R.	

FM LDN AUG15/60 SECRET CDN EYES ONLY  
TO EXTERNAL 2475 PRIORITY  
INFO PERMISNY NATOPARIS WASHDC  
BAG CNBRA WLGTN TOKYO FM LDN  
KOREA

WHEN DISCUSSING KOREAN ITEM AT FORTHCOMING UNGA SESSION WITH PEDLAR OF FOS KOREA DESK, WE SOUGHT HIS VIEWS ON PRESENT KOREAN POLITICAL SITUATION. PEDLAR SAID THEY HAD HAD VERY LITTLE FROM UK EMBASSY IN SEOUL RECENTLY AND ONLY A BRIEF REPORT THAT YUN PO SON HAD BEEN ELECTED PRESIDENT QUOTE BY A SWEEPING MAJORITY UNQUOTE AT THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY JOINT SESSION ON AUG12. YUN IS LEADER OF THE OLD FACTION IN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY WHICH HAS ABOUT EQUAL STRENGTH IN SOUTHKOREAN LOWER HOUSE WITH THE DEMOCRATIC PARTYS NEW FACTION LED BY DR CHANG. THEREFORE PEDLAR PRESUMED THAT APPARENT NEW FACTION SUPPORT FOR YUNS ELECTION MEANT THERE HAD BEEN AN AGREEMENT REACHED BETWEEN THE TWO FACTIONS WHICH WOULD RESULT IN CHANG BEING APPOINTED PM.

2. PEDLAR SAID UK WAR OFFICE HAD JUST RECEIVED A RATHER WORRYING REPORT FROM UK MILITARY ATTACHE IN SEOUL DESCRIBING FRICTION AMONG SENIOR KOREAN ARMY OFFICERS FACTIONS WITH THE FACTION LED BY JAPANESE TRAINED OFFICERS MOST LIKELY TO ASSERT ITSELF OVER THE OTHER TWO FACTIONS. SENIOR KOREAN OFFICERS WERE SEEKING THE DISMISSAL OF GEN CHOY, COS OF KOREAN ARMY, WHO THEY CLAIMED WAS CORRUPT AND IMPLICATED IN PAST ELECTION RIGGING. THE MORE DISTURBING PART OF UK MILITARY ATTACHES REPORT WAS INFO FROM USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCES THAT KOREAN ARMY JUNIOR OFFICERS WERE DISCONTENTED WITH PRESENT ARMY SETUP. THEY ACCUSED THEIR SENIOR OFFICERS OF CORRUPTION AND PAST ELECTION MALPRACTICES. THEY SOUGHT THE DISMISSAL OF CORRUPT SENIOR OFFICERS AND A GENERAL SHAKEUP TO PROVIDE MORE PROMOTION OPPORTUNITIES BY COMPULSORY RETIREMENT OF MANY SENIOR OFFICERS. PEDLAR SAID THAT HIS PRELIMINARY VIEW AND THAT OF UK WAR OFFICE

Any comments re para 2.  
K.M.  
Only as we discussed with Little  
WPC  
83p

PAGE TWO 2475

WAS THAT THE JUNIOR OFFICERS DISCONTENT WAS UNLIKELY TO LEAD TO ANY ATTEMPT AT A MILITARY COUP D'ETAT SINCE A NEW GOVT WAS ABOUT TO TAKE OFFICE AFTER A FAIR DEMOCRATIC ELECTION. SOME CLEANUP AND CLEANOUT OF SENIOR KOREAN ARMY OFFICERS MIGHT WELL IMPROVE THE EFFICIENCY AND ZEAL OF SOUTHKOREAN ARMY. PEDLAR SAID THAT FO WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED TO HEAR WHETHER WE HAD HAD ANY SIMILAR REPORTS ABOUT UNREST AMONG KOREAN ARMY OFFICERS. AUSTRALIANS IN SEOUL HAD RECEIVED REPORTS SIMILAR TO THE FOREGOING.

7-1-1-1



NO.		INIT.
4	AMBASSADOR	
2	<del>GOV. SECRETARY</del>	
3	<del>2nd SEC. (A)</del>	GD
	<del>2nd SEC. (C)</del>	
	A.O.	
	ADMIN. CL.	
	CONSULAR CL.	
	T. & C.	
	<del>DATA CL.</del>	W
	T.M.R.	

*shg*

FM WASHDC AUG5/60 CONFID  
 TO EXTERNAL 2026  
 INFO LDN  
 BAG TOKYO FM LDN  
 SITUATION IN SOUTHKOREA

1 CALLED TODAY ON J GRAHAM PARSONS (ASSISTANT SECRETARY FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS) TO ASK FOR SOME GENERAL IMPRESSIONS ON KOREA.

2. HE TOLD ME THAT ALL THEIR INFO SHOWED THAT THE ELECTION WAS CONDUCTED IN AN ORDERLY WAY. THE ONLY EXCEPTIONS TO THIS WERE NOT RPT NOT BECAUSE OF IMPROPER POLICE ACTIONS BUT IN SOME CONSTITUENCIES WHERE IT BECAME KNOWN THAT THE LIBERAL CANDIDATE WAS AHEAD THERE WAS A REVIVAL OF VIOLENCE. IN THOSE CASES, THE GOVT ORGANIZED A REPEAT VOTE. PARSONS SAID THAT THE KOREANS THEMSELVES WERE VERY PLEASED ABOUT THE ORDERLINESS OF THE ELECTION AND REGARDED IT AS A HIGH-WATER MARK IN ASIA.

3. ON THE WHOLE THE STATE DEPT IS HOPEFUL ABOUT THE NEW GOVT ALTHOUGH IT IS TOO EARLY TO REACH ANY REAL CONCLUSIONS. THERE IS NO RPT NO OBVIOUS AND OUTSTANDING LEADER BUT THERE ARE GOOD MEN OF LESSER CALIBRE. IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS PARSONS WAS REASONABLY CONFIDENT THAT THE BEGINNING ALREADY MADE BY A RAPPROCHEMENT WITH JAPAN WOULD CONTINUE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE POLITICAL CHANGES IN BOTH KOREA AND JAPAN WOULD ENCOURAGE THIS PROCESS.

4. WHEN I ASKED ABOUT THE ECONOMIC SITUATION PARSONS SAID THAT THERE COULD BE NO RPT NO EXPECTATION OF KOREA DEVELOPING A VIABLE ECONOMY NOR COULD THE LARGE-SCALE AMERICAN ASSISTANCE BE MATERIALLY REDUCED WITHOUT SERIOUS EFFECT. ONE CHANGE WHICH AMERICAN AUTHORITIES HOPED TO SEE INSTITUTED LATER IS A MORE REALISTIC EXCHANGE RATE SO THAT, AS HE SAID, EACH DOLLAR SPENT BY WASHDC WOULD REPRESENT MORE THAN THIRTY CENTS. IT WAS HOPED TOO THAT THE NEW GOVT WOULD MAKE SOME MOVE TOWARD REDUCTION OF CORRUPTION IN THE USE OF ASSISTANCE FUNDS

GLAZEBROOK

(RCVD LDN 060935Z/JEJ)



NO.		INIT.
	AMBASSADOR	
	COJ SELLOR	
4	<del>SECRET (C)</del>	d
3	<del>SECRET (C)</del>	
	A.D.	
	D.M.N. CI.	
	CONSULAR CI.	
	T. & C.	
1	<del>SECRET (C)</del>	ho
	D.N.R.	

FM PERMISNY AUG5/60 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY  
 TO EXTERNAL 1110  
 INFO LDN WASHDC  
 BAG CNBRA WLGTN TOKYO FM LDN  
 REF OURTEL 805 JUNWE AND LDN TEL 1934 JUN24  
 KOREA

AUSTRALIAN MISSION HAVE PASSED ON TO US IN STRICT CONFIDENCE  
 COPY OF TEL SENT BY CNBRA TO AUSTRALIAN MISSIONS IN LDN AND  
 WASHDC CONTAINING PRELIMINARY DEPARTMENTAL VIEWS ON POSSIBLE  
 HANDLING OF KOREAN ITEM AT FIFTEENTH SESSION OF UNGA AND INSTRUCTING  
 THESE MISSIONS TO REPORT REACTION OF FO AND STATE DEPT. TEXT  
 FOLLOWS. IN LIGHT OF PARAS, PLEASE PROTECT OUR SOURCE.

WHILE WE RECOGNIZE DEPARTMENTALLY THAT DIFFICULTIES MAY ARISE  
 IF KOREAN ITEM IS TREATED AS AN ANNUAL ROUTINE, WE HAVE NO RPT NO  
 SUGGESTIONS FOR ANY SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE USUAL APPROACH AT  
 THIS STAGE. WE WOULD PREFER TO GIVE NEW R.O.K. GOVT TIME TO CONSOL-  
 IDATE ITS POSITION AND AVOID ANY POSSIBLE IMPLICATION THAT UN INTEREST  
 IN KOREA WAS DWINDLING. FOR THESE AND REASONS STATED IN WASHDC TEL  
 2100 WE AGREE THERE SHOULD BE NO RPT NO ATTEMPT THIS YEAR TO AVOID  
 FURTHER ANNUAL DEBATE.

2. ON HANDLING OF ITEM WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS.

(A) IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO BE MORE CHALLENGING IN DEBATE OVER  
 THE QUESTION OF ALL-KOREAN FREE ELECTIONS THAN WAS CONSIDERED  
 DESIRABLE PREVIOUSLY UNDER RHEE.,

(B) AN EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO OBTAIN SUPPORT OF NEW MEMBERS.,

(C) WHILE MAINTAINING A FIRM STAND ON UN PRINCIPLES, WORDING OF  
 RESOLUTION MIGHT HAVE EYE TO NEUTRALS AND NEW AFRICAN MEMBERS. FOR  
 EXAMPLE EXPLICIT CONDEMNATION OF COMMUNIST REFUSAL TO ACCEPT UN

PAGE TWO 1110

PRINCIPLES WILL HAVE TO BE WEIGHED AGAINST POSSIBLE FRIGHTENING  
OFF OF POSSIBLE NEUTRAL OR NEW NATIONS SUPPORT.

3. PLEASE REPORT STATE DEPT/FO REACTION TO THESE PRELIMINARY  
DEPARTMENTAL VIEWS WHICH ARE INTENDED FOR CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSION  
WITH THEM ALONE.

(RCVD LDN 060840Z/JEJ)



FM WLGTN JUN30/60 CCNFD CDN EYES  
TO EXTERNAL OTT 82 OPIMMED  
INFO TT LDN PERMISNY WASHDC FM OTT  
BAG TOKYO FM LDN  
BAG CNBRA FM WLGTN  
YOURTEL Y134 JUN20  
KOREA

NO.		INIT.
1	AMBASSADOR <del>SECRETARY</del> <del>...</del>	
	2.1 SEC. (P) 2.2 SEC. (C) ...	
2	CONSULAR CL. ... ... (MA) D.N.R.	

AS INSTRUCTED WE SAW LARKIN ASST SECRETARY IN NZ DEA YESTERDAY.  
NZ OFFICIALS HAD NOT RPT NOT YET CONSIDERED SPECIFICALLY TACTICS  
FOR HANDLING KOREAN ITEM THIS YEAR ALTHOUGH SOME THOUGHT HAD BEEN  
GIVEN TO TRADITIONAL UN POSITION IN RELATION TO PRESENT  
POLITICAL SITUATION IN KOREA.

+file  
JGM

2. LARKIN RECALLED THAT AT 14 SESSION NZ DEL WAS ABLE TO QUOTE  
SQUARE UNQUOTE NZ POSITION WITH CDN ONE THROUGH SHANAHANS STATEMENT  
IE NZ WOULD NOT RPT NOT OPPOSE RESOLUTION CALLING FOR NORTHKOREAN  
OBSERVERS IF SOUTHKOREAN OBSERVERS INVITED AND NZ WOULD PREFER  
RESOLUTION CALLING FOR ALL-KOREAN ELECTIONS UNDER UN QUOTE  
AUSPICES UNQUOTE RATHER THAN QUOTE SUPERVISION UNQUOTE. FOLLOWING  
THAT SESSION SHANAHAN SUGGESTED THAT IF ANY INITIATIVE WERE TO  
BE TAKEN TO INDUCE USA TO SHIFT TO MORE MODERATE POSITION  
CONSIDERATION SHOULD BEGIN WELL BEFORE OPENING OF 15 SESSION  
AFTER PRIOR CONSULTATIONS WITH CDA/AUSTRALIA/USA.

3. HOWEVER IN VIEW OF OVERTHROW OF RHEE REGIME NZ OFFICIALS ARE  
NOT RPT NOT NOW PREPARED TO QUOTE ROCK THE BOAT UNQUOTE AS THEY  
DO NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE IT SENSIBLE TO TAKE ANY INITIATIVE WHICH  
WOULD MAKE THINGS DIFFICULT FOR SOUTHKOREANS. ROK COVT SHOULD BE  
ALLOWED BREATHING PERIOD TO COMPLETE PROCESS OF CONSOLIDATION.  
NZ OFFICIALS ARE THEREFORE HOPING FOR QUIET DEBATE BUT WOULD AT  
SAME TIME WELCOME ANY ELASTICITY IN USUAL USA RESOLUTION IN  
DIRECTION OF CALLING FOR ELECTIONS UNDER UN QUOTE AUSPICES UNQUOTE.  
SOVIET BLOC DELS WOULD PROBABLY TRY TO EXPLOIT QUOTE RIGGED UNQUOTE

...2

PAGE TWO 82

ELECTIONS IN MAR/60 AS EXAMPLE OF TYPE OF QUOTE RHEE UNQUOTE  
ELECTION DESIRED BY UN BUT STING MIGHT BE TAKEN OUT OF THIS  
ARGUMENT IF FURTHER ELECTIONS WERE HELD BEFORE 15TH SESSION.

(RCVD LDN 011225Z/JEJ)

7-1-1-1

FM CNBRA JUN27/60 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

TO EXTERNAL 156 PRIORITY


INFO TT PERMISNY WASHDC LDN FM OTT

BAG TOKYO FM OTT

BAG WLGTN FM CNBRA

REF YOURTELS Y134 JUN20 AND Y133 JUN22

KOREA



NO.		INIT.
2	AMBASSADOR	
	<del>COUNSELLOR</del>	
	<del>1st SEC.</del>	
	2nd SEC. (D)	
	2nd SEC. (C)	
	A.O.	
	CONSULAR CL.	
	T. & C.	
<del>D.N.D. (M.A.)</del>		
D.N.R.		

I DISCUSSED REFTELS WITH HILL UN BRANCH TODAY WHO SAID HE HAD NO RPT NO PREVIOUS INDICATION OF DEVELOPMENTS MENTIONED IN TEL 747 FROM OUR PERMISNY. AUSTRALIA HAD HOPED AS OUTLINED OURLET 430 JUN15, THAT KOREAN ITEM WOULD BE TREATED AS QUIETLY AS POSSIBLE AGAIN THIS YEAR.

+ file  
 JOM

2. FOR YOUR CONFD INFO, FOLLOWING DEBATE ON KOREA IN UN LAST YEAR PLIMSOLL, AUSTRALIAN PERMREP TO UN AND LEADING EXPERT ON KOREA, DISCUSSED HANDLING OF KOREAN ITEM WITH USA MISSION SUGGESTING VARIOUS WAYS IN WHICH PRESENTATION WESTERN POSITION COULD BE IMPROVED AND EXPRESSING HIS PERSONAL DOUBTS ON ADVISABILITY OF ANNUAL DEBATES. USA STATE DEPT REACTED STRONGLY AGAINST SUGGESTIONS.

3. AUSTRALIANS ARE STILL CONCERNED OVER POSSIBLE FURTHER LOSS OF AFRO-ASIAN SYMPATHY AND HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR USA TO PRESENT A CASE TO UN WHICH WILL MAINTAIN AND IF POSSIBLE INCREASE SUPPORT FOR WESTERN POSITION. UNTIL REPORT CURRENTLY BEING DRAFTED BY UNCURK IS AGREED TO BY MEMBERS OF COMMISSION HOWEVER WHICH MAY BE DIFFICULT THEY DO NOT RPT NOT THINK IT WOULD BE FEASIBLE FOR AUSTRALIA TO MAKE ANY FURTHER SUGGESTIONS TO USA CONCERNING POSSIBLE REVISION OF TACTIS TO BE FOLLOWED IN UN. ALSO THEY WOULD LIKE TO OBTAIN THE VIEW OF THEIR PERMISNY.

4. HILL POINTED OUT THAT SUGGESTION LAST YEAR TO REMOVE NECESSITY FOR AN ANNUAL UNCURK REPORT WAS A PERSONAL PROPOSAL BY AUSTRALIAN PERMISNY WHICH WAS NEITHER ADOPTED NOR REPUDIATED BY AUSTRALIAN GOVT. IN VIEW RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN KOREA HE SAW LITTLE PROSPECT OF

PAGE TWO 156

ANY SUCH PROPOSAL BEING ACCEPTED NOW.

5. DEPT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS INTENDS TO CABLE PLIMSOLL CONCERNING  
POINTS RAISED IN YOURTELS AND I WILL DISCUSS MATTER FURTHER WITH  
THEM WHEN HIS VIEWS ARE KNOWN.

(RECD LDN 281731Z/RL)

FM LDN JUN24/60 CONFID CDN EYES ONLY

TO EXTERNAL 1934 PRIORITY

INFO WLGTN PERMISNY

TT CNBRA FM OTT

BAG TOKYO FM LDN

REF YOURTEL V133 JUN22

KOREA



NO.		INIT.
1	AMBASSADOR <del>COLL. SELLOR</del> <del>...</del> 2nd SEC. (D) 2nd SEC. (C) A.O. CONSULAR CI.	
2	<del>F.O.C.</del> <del>D.N.D. (M.A.)</del> D.N.R.	

AS INSTRUCTED WE SAW JONES OF KOREA DESK IN FO THIS MORNING. FO HAS HEARD NOTHING FROM ITS DEL IN NY ABOUT THE RUMOURS REPORTED BY PERMIS. NO RPT NO CONSIDERATION HAD YET BEEN GIVEN IN FO TO THE HANDLING OF KOREAN ITEM AT THE FIFTEENTH SESSION. SUCH CONSIDERATION WILL NOW BEGIN.

*file  
LOM*

2. JONES WOULD NOT RPT NOT VENTURE AN OPINION AS TO WHETHER STANDARD RESOLUTION ON KOREA MIGHT HAVE TO BE MODIFIED TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE SUPPORT. THE NEW AFRICAN MEMBERS WOULD GIVE USSR NEW FIELDS IN WHICH TO SEEK SUPPORT FOR A MODERATE RESOLUTION ON THE LINES FORESHADOWED LAST YEAR. JONES GENERAL VIEW ON KOREAN ITEM THIS YEAR WAS THAT IT SHOULD BE PLAYED IN AS MINOR A KEY AS POSSIBLE WITH THE DEBATE KEPT, IF POSSIBLE, SHORT AND SUBDUED. ON LEARNING GENERAL SUBJECT OF OUR CALL WHEN WE MADE THE APPOINTMENT YESTERDAY JONES HAD CHECKED WITH MARSHALL OF AUSTRALIA HOUSE HERE WHO HAD SAID THAT AUSTRALIANS WERE ALSO ANXIOUS FOR A QUIET DEBATE THIS YEAR. JONES HOPED USA WOULD ALSO AGREE AND NOT RPT NOT WISH TO MAKE PROPAGANDA SPEECHES.

3. IN JONES OPINION WHATEVER GOVT RESULTED FROM THE FORTHCOMING KOREAN ELECTIONS WOULD BE MORE IN FAVOUR OF A SENSIBLE APPROACH THAN THE RHEE REGIME HAD BEEN. THIS MIGHT HAVE A HELPFUL EFFECT ON USA. RECENT EVENTS IN KOREA WOULD HOWEVER PROVIDE SOVIET BLOC WITH NEW ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THE SORT OF RESOLUTION THEY WERE CANVASSING LAST YEAR. THEY WOULD POINT OUT THAT KOREAN PEOPLE WITHOUT ANY OUTSIDE HELP - IN FACT QUITE THE REVERSE - HAD FINALLY THROWN

...2

PAGE TWO 1934

OFF THE YOKE OF THE RHEE PUPPET REGIME. THEREFORE UN FORCES SHOULD  
BE WITHDRAWN FROM KOREA, UNCURK SHOULD BE ABOLISHED AND KOREANS  
SHOULD BE LEFT ALONE TO WORK OUT THEIR OWN DESTINY.

FM PERMISNY JUN23/60 CONF  
 TO EXTERNAL 805  
 INFO LDN WASHDC  
 BAG CNBRA WLGTN TOKYO FM LDN  
 REF YOURTEL Y133 JUN22 TO LDN  
 KOREA



NO.		INIT.
1	AMBASSADOR	
	<del>CONSULLOR</del>	
	<del>1st SEC.</del>	
	2nd SEC. (P)	
	2nd SEC. (C)	
	A.O.	
	CONSULAR CI.	
	T. & C.	
	<del>D.A.D. (M.A.)</del>	
	D.N.R.	

EARLIER THIS WEEK MRS ROSSEL(SWEDEN) RAISED ONCE AGAIN IN THE SAME GROUP AS THAT IN WHICH A DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE AS RECOUNTED IN OURTEL169 FEB17-BARCO(USA), PLIMSOLL(AUSTRALIA) AND STAVROPOULOS (UN LEGAL COUNSELLOR) AND MYSELF-THE QUESTION OF GIVING A HOIST THIS YEAR TO THE ANNUAL DEBATE ON KOREA. DURING THE ENSUING DISCUSSION IT BECAME QUITE CLEAR FROM BARCOS COMMENTS THAT USA WOULD NOT RPT NOT CONSIDER DISPENSING WITH THE DEBATE THIS YEAR AND THAT ON THE CONTRARY RECENT DEVELOPMENTS HAD REINFORCED THEIR DETERMINATION TO KEEP THIS ISSUE ALIVE. ALTHOUGH NO RPT NO SPECIFIC MENTION WAS MADE OF EISENHOWERS STATEMENT WHILE IN KOREA IT WAS APPARENT FROM BARCOS REMARKS THAT THIS AND THE STRONGER POSITION WHICH USA CONSIDERED THEY ENJOYED IN KOREA SINCE THE FALL OF SYNGMAN RHEE WOULD MILITATE AGAINST AMERICAN ACQUIESCENCE IN ANY MOVE TO LIMIT OR ELIMINATE THE DEBATE ON THIS ITEM.

2. WHEN MRS ROSSEL, UNWISELY PERHAPS FROM HER OWN TACTICAL POINT OF VIEW, MENTIONED THAT BURMA AND INDIA WERE MORE FAVOURABLY DISPOSED TO THE NEW REGIME IN KOREA THAN THEY HAD BEEN TO THE RHEE REGIME BARCO SEIZED UPON THIS AS FURTHER REASON FOR HAVING A DEBATE SINCE THESE COUNTRIES AND OTHERS HOLDING A SIMILAR VIEW COULD IN HIS VIEW BE EXPECTED TO BE MORE SYMPATHETIC TO THE APPROACH MANIFESTED IN THE 14-POWER RESOLUTION. MY OWN GUESS IS THAT A MORE FAVOURABLE DISPOSITION TOWARDS THE NEW KOREAN REGIME ON THE PART OF CERTAIN ASIAN COUNTRIES MIGHT WORK IN THE OPPOSITE DIRECTION FROM THAT SUGGESTED BY BARCOS ASSESSMENT. IS IT NOT RPT NOT MORE LIKELY THAT SUCH COUNTRIES WOULD SEE IN A LESS RIGID REGIME GREATER POSSIBILITIES

...2

*file*  
*EM*

Pi TWO 805

FOR SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM BY DIRECT NEGOTIATION, WHETHER UNDER UN AUSPICES OR OTHERWISE? IF THIS IS SO AND THE RUSSIANS MAKE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO GAIN SUPPORT FOR A RESOLUTION OF THE TYPE WHICH WAS CONSIDERED BY THEM AT THE LAST SESSION OF THE UNGA THEY MIGHT WELL RECEIVE A MORE SYMPATHETIC RESPONSE.

3. IN ANY EVENT IT IS PLIMSOLLS ASSESSMENT, WITH WHICH I AGREE, THAT IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO AVOID DISCUSSION OF THE KOREAN ITEM THIS YEAR

RI TCHIE

(RCVD LDN 240916Z/JF)

7-1-1-1



FM EXTERNAL OTT JUN22/60 COMED  
TO LDN Y133  
INFO CNBRA WLGTN PERMISNY WASHDC  
BAG TOKYO FM LDN  
REF PERMISNY TEL 747 JUN9  
KOREA

NO.		INIT.
1	AMBASSADOR	
	<del>CONSULTOR</del>	
	<del>1st SEC.</del>	
	2nd SEC. (P)	
	3rd SEC. (C)	
	T.O.	
	CONSULAR CL.	
	T. & C.	
2	<del>D.N.R. (M.A.)</del>	
	D.N.R.	

YOU WILL RECALL THAT AT THE LAST SESSION THE SOVIET BLOC ATTEMPTED TO FIND SPONSORS FOR A RESOLUTION URGING THE WITHDRAWAL OF UN FORCES FROM KOREA, <sup>DEMOBILISING?</sup> ABMLISING UNCURK AND CALLING ON BOTH KOREAS TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO REACH A RAPPROCHEMENT. DURING THE DEBATE THE CEYLONESE REP SUGGESTED THAT PERHAPS UN TROOPS COULD BE WITHDRAWN BEFORE ELECTIONS WITHOUT ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES AND THAT THE 14-POWER RESOLUTION MIGHT BE AMENDED BY CHANGING THE WORD QUOTE AGREE UNQUOTE TO QUOTE NEGOTIATE UNQUOTE IN OPERATIVE PARA 2. THE PARA WOULD THEN CALL ON COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES TO NEGOTIATE ON HOLDING OF GENUINELY FREE ELECTIONS. FINALLY SOBOLEV TOLD RITCHIE THAT IN HIS VIEW NEGOTIATIONS ON KOREA SHOULD TAKE PLACE PRIVATELY OUTSIDE UN. ACCEPTABLE INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE RULED OUT AND THE QUESTION OF THE PRESENCE OF UN TROOPS WOULD BE ONE OF THE ITEMS FOR NEGOTIATION BEFORE ELECTIONS WERE HELD. THESE DEVELOPMENTS AT THE LAST SESSION MAY GIVE US AN INDICATION OF THE LINE RUSSIANS WILL ADOPT AT THE FIFTEENTH SESSION.

2. OUR CONCERN HAS ALWAYS BEEN LEST THERE BE A SUBSTANTIAL FALLING AWAY OF NON-COMMITTED SUPPORT FOR THE WESTERN RESOLUTION ON KOREA. LAST YEAR WE WERE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE AUSTRALIANS IN THEIR PROPOSAL TO REMOVE THE NECESSITY FOR AN ANNUAL UNCURK REPORT AND THUS FOR AN ANNUAL DEBATE. IF THE RUSSIANS PUSH THE DEBATE ON TO NEW GROUND AT THE FIFTEENTH SESSION THIS TACTIC BECOMES A NON-STARTER BECAUSE IT WOULD MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THE UN WAS DUCKING AN EMBARRASSING PROBLEM, AND IT MAY BE DIFFICULT TO FIND ANOTHER

*& file  
JEM*

PAGE TWO Y133

QUOTE REASONABLE UNQUOTE ALTERNATIVE.

3. AT THE SAME TIME RUSSIAN EFFORTS TO GAIN ASIAN-~~AFRICAN~~ SUPPORT FOR A MODERATE RESOLUTION WOULD POSE AN EMBARRASSING PROBLEM FOR US IN VIEW OF OUR PUBLIC POSITION. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD CALL ON FO TO ASK WHETHER THEIR DEL IN NY HAS REPORTED THE SAME RUMOURS AS PERMIS AND WHETHER THEY CONSIDER IT LIKELY THAT THE STANDARD RESOLUTION ON KOREA MAY HAVE TO BE

MODIFIED IF

ADEQUATE SUPPORT IS TO BE MAINTAINED.

(RCD LDN 230730Z/EBM)



FM EXTERNAL OTT JUN20/60 CONFID  
TO CNBRA Y134  
WLGTN  
BAG TOKYO FM LDN  
REF OUR IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING TEL  
KOREA

NO.	AMBASSADOR <del>CONSULTOR</del> <del>SEC.</del> 2nd SEC. (P) 2nd SEC. (C) A.O. CONSULAR CL. T. & C. 2 <del>S.N.O. (M.A.)</del> D.N.R.	INIT.
-----	--	-------

+file  
JDM

TEL747 FROM PERMISNY WAS A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA. IT HAD THE FOLLOWING TO SAY ON THE KOREAN QUESTION: QUOTE THERE IS SOME INDICATION THAT DEBATE THIS YEAR WILL BE RATHER MORE LIVELY THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS. WE HAVE HEARD RUMOURS THAT RUSSIANS ARE SOUNDING OUT COMMITTED COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY IN THE ASIAN- AFRICAN GROUP, WITH A VIEW TO FOLLOWING UP THE LINE SUGGESTED BY SOVIET REP AND ECHOED BY CEYLONESE REP IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE LAST YEAR, AND POSSIBLY TO INCREASING THE NUMBER OF ABSTENTIONS ON THE USUAL USA-INSPIRED RESOLUTION. AMERICANS FOR THEIR PART HAVE ALREADY SUGGESTED THAT THIS IS ONE OF THE ITEMS ON WHICH THEY PLAN TO MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT TO ENLIST THE SUPPORT OF THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT COUNTRIES OF AFRICA. UNQUOTE  
2. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH THE DEPT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

(RCD LDN 230845Z/EBM)

# TELEGRAM

BY CAN COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE



Embassy - Ambassade du Canada  
FEB 23 1960  
- TOKYO -

FM PERMISNY FEB 17/60 CONF  
TO EXTERNAL 169  
INFO WASHDC LDN  
TT TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT  
REF OURTEL 1892 DEC 4  
KOREA

NO.		INIT.
1	AMBASSADOR	B
3	COUNSELLOR	
	2nd SEC. (P)	
2	1st SEC. (C)	J
	A.O.	
	CONSULAR CL.	
	T. & C.	
4	ENCL. (M.A.)	W.
	D.N.R.	

*File*

ON THE INITIATIVE OF MRS ROSSEL (SWEDISH PERMREP) A DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT TOOK PLACE THE OTHER NIGHT IN A GROUP CONSISTING OF PLIMSOLL (AUSTRALIAN PERMREP) BARCO (ACTING USA PERMREP) STAVROPOULOS (UN LEGAL COUNSELLOR) AND MYSELF. MRS ROUSSEL EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT RECURRENT DISCUSSION IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WITH THE TWO SIDES AS FAR APART AS EVER WAS A FRUITLESS EXERCISE WHICH NOT ONLY DID NOTHING TO ADVANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR KOREAN REUNIFICATION BUT TENDED TO UNDERLINE THE IMPOTENCE OF THE UN TO PROMOTE SOLUTIONS FOR THIS TYPE OF PROBLEM. IN HER VIEW THERE WAS A DANGER THAT THE POSITION OF THE UN SIDE WOULD BE UNDERMINED IF THE ANNUAL MINUET CONTINUED TO TAKE PLACE ON THE SAME BASIS. SHE HOPED THAT AT THE VERY LEAST SOME MEANS COULD BE FOUND TO OBTAIN THE NECESSITY OF HAVING THE ITEM INSCRIBED ON THE AGENDA EVERY YEAR.

2. DURING THE ENSUING DISCUSSION IT BECAME CLEAR THAT NO ONE SAW ANY REASONABLE PROSPECT OF FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE KOREAN ISSUE IN THE NEAR FUTURE, AS IT WAS GENERALLY AGREED THAT THE KOREAN PROBLEM COULD HARDLY BE SOLVED IN ISOLATION BUT ONLY AS PART OF A WIDER SETTLEMENT IN THE AREA. NONE OF THE REPS PRESENT INDICATED THAT HE HAD RECEIVED AN APPROACH FROM USSR OR THE SATELLITES WHICH WOULD SUGGEST THE POSSIBILITY OF A SOLUTION BY NEGOTIATION OUTSIDE THE UN AND I DID NOT RPT NOT VOLUNTEER THE INFO GIVEN IN OUR REFTL CONCERNING MY CONVERSATION WITH SOBOLEV ON THIS SUBJECT.

3. BARCO THEN INDICATED THAT USA WOULD FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO ENVISAGE DROPPING DISCUSSION OF THE KOREAN ITEM IN THE UN IF SUCH A DECISION WERE CONSIDERED IN ISOLATION. HE SUGGESTED <sup>ED HOWEVER</sup> ~~TE~~ ~~WER~~ THAT

PAGE TWO 169

THERE WERE SEVERAL ITEMS ON THE AGENDA EACH YEAR THE DEBATE OF WHICH SERVED NO RPT NO USEFUL PURPOSE SINCE THE PROSPECTS OF REACHING AGREEMENT WERE NEGLIGIBLE. IN SAYING THIS HE EMPHASIZED THAT HIS IDEAS ON THIS SUBJECT WERE PERSONAL AND NOT RPT NOT OFFICIAL. PERHAPS THE POSSIBILITY COULD BE EXPLORED OF REACHING AGREEMENT AMONG THE POWERS CONCERNED TO DISPENSE WITH THE DEBATE ON THESE WELL-WORN TOPICS. AS EXAMPLES HE MENTIONED HUNGARY, THE TWO SOUTH AFRICAN RACIAL ITEMS, KOREA, THE ITEMS DEALING WITH THE EXPANSION OF UN ORGANS. TO THIS LIST MRS ROSSEL ADDED UNRWA. BARCO THOUGHT THAT DIFFERENT COUNTRIES HAD DIFFERENT INTERESTS IN STAGING A DEBATE ON PARTICULAR ITEMS, WITH LITTLE CONFIDENCE THAT A SOLUTION WAS THEREBY BEING ADVANCED, AND THAT IT MIGHT THEREFORE BE POSSIBLE TO AGREE MUTUALLY TO ARRANGE ON THE BASIS OF A QUID PRO QUO NOT RPT NOT TO DISCUSS ALL OF THEM EVERY YEAR. DURING THE DISCUSSION IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT MANY OF THE SUBJECTS MENTIONED WERE NOT RPT NOT EASY TO QUOTE PAIR UNQUOTE IN THE MANNER SUGGESTED. FOR INSTANCE, WHAT SUBJECT COULD BE USED AS A COUNTERPOISE TO APARTHEID TO INDUCE THE INDIANS TO FOREGO THAT ITEM. FURTHERMORE BOTH SIDES COULD FIND ADVANTAGES IN DROPPING THE DISCUSSION OF KOREA FOR A TIME (ALTHOUGH IT WAS ARGUABLE THAT THIS WOULD BE MORE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE COMMUNIST ØGROUP THAN THE WEST) WHEREAS THE DROPPING OF HUNGARY WOULD BE LOOKED UPON BY USSR AS AN UN-MIXED BLESSING. HOW COULD AN AGREEMENT IN ADVANCE BY THE WEST TO DROP HUNGARY, FOR INSTANCE, BE MADE TO STICK IN THE FACE OF UNFORESEEN DEVELOPMENTS AS A RESULT OF WHICH SOME GOVTS MIGHT BECOME SUBJECT TO PRESSURES FROM DOMESTIC PUBLIC OPINION. EVEN IF THE QUOTE TWO SIDES UNQUOTE AGREED TO DISPENSE WITH THE ANNUAL DEBATE ON THE EXPANSION OF UN ORGANS WOULD THERE NOT RPT NOT BE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE UN WHO WOULD NEVERTHELESS WISH TO PURSUE THESE SUBJECTS? IN GENERAL, WOULD AN AGREEMENT AMONG THE BIG POWERS CONCERNED TO FOREGO DEBATE ON PARTICULAR SUBJECTS NOT RPT NOT

...3

Q

PAGE THREE 169

BE RESENTED BY THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE UN AS A WHOLE? BARCO ADDED THAT IN ANY EVENT IF SUCH A SUGGESTION FOR LIMITING DEBATE WERE ATTRIBUTED TO THE USA MISSION IT COULD BE MISREPRESENTED AS AN ATTEMPT ON THEIR PART TO DICTATE.

5. THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT SPARKED A DISCUSSION OF OTHER QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE EFFICIENCY OF THE UN AND PROPOSALS FOR SHORTENING THE PERIOD OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT IF MANY OF THE ITEMS MENTIONED WERE DISPENSED WITH IN ANY ONE YEAR THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE VIRTUALLY NOTHING LEFT ON ITS AGENDA. HOWEVER, TO DO AWAY WITH THE SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE ENTIRELY WOULD UPSET OTHER AGREEMENTS CONCERNING COMPOSITION OF THE GENERAL COMMITTEE. STAVROPOULOS SUGGESTED THAT THERE WAS NO RPT NO REAL NEED FOR THE LEGAL COMMITTEE TO MEET FOR THE FULL PERIOD OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AS LONG AS IT CONTINUED TO HAVE SO LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE TO DEAL WITH. HOWEVER, IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT ANY PROPOSAL TO SHORTEN THE SESSION OF THE SIXTH COMMITTEE WOULD RUN INTO OPPOSITION FROM SOME OF THE LEGAL REPS WHO HAD A VESTED INTEREST

~~IN THE SESSIONS OF THE COMMITTEE. THERE WAS ALSO SOME DISCUSSION OF~~

~~THE PROS AND CONS OF HAVI~~

~~EREST~~

[ IN THE SESSIONS OF THE COMMITTEE. THERE WAS ALSO SOME DISCUSSION OF THE PROS AND CONS OF HAVING THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BEGIN ITS SESSION IN THE LATTER HALF OF JAN RATHER THAN IN SEP. BARCO FELT THAT THERE MIGHT BE A LOT TO BE SAID FOR SUCH A CHANGE. FOR ONE THING, THE MONTHS PRECEDING THE SEP OPENING DATE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WERE VERY UNPROPOTIOUS FOR PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF THE AGENDA ITEMS BETWEEN DELS; MANY REPS WERE ABSENT FROM NY IN AUG; PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION COULD PLAY A VALUABLE PART IN MAKING THE WORK OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY MORE EFFECTIVE. BUT HE FELT THAT IT WOULD ALWAYS BE HARD TO ORGANIZE DURING THE SUMMER MONTHS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT WITHOUT CHRISTMAS AS A CUT-OFF DATE FOR THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DATE, THERE MIGHT BE SOME DANGER THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY WOULD CONTINUE INDEFINITELY. THERE WAS THE ADDED FACTOR THAT MANY COUNTRIES HAD

PAGE FOUR 169

PARLIAMENTARY SESSIONS IN JAN WHICH WOULD MAKE IT AN INCONVENIENT MONTH.

6. IT MAY BE THAT BARCOS OBJECTIVE IN RAISING THESE WIDER QUESTIONS WAS TO DODGE A DISCUSSION IN SUBSTANCE OF THE PARTICULAR QUESTION OF THE KOREAN ITEM. IN THIS HE WAS SUCCESSFUL. HE SAID HOWEVER THAT THE WIDER SUGGESTIONS FOR DISPENSING WITH THE DISCUSSION OF SEVERAL RECURRENT ITEMS ON THE AGENDA WERE INTERESTING AND THAT HE WOULD TAKE THEM UP WITH THE STATE DEPT AND WOULD LIKE TO RETURN TO A DISCUSSION OF THE SUBJECT IN A FEW WEEKS. IN SUGGESTING THIS HE VERY DEXTROUSLY CONVEYED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE SUGGESTIONS HAD COME FROM OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GROUP EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD, IN FACT, ORIGINATED WITH HIM

RITCHIE

7-1-1-1



FM CANDELVY DEC9/59 UNCLAS  
TO EXTERNAL 1919  
INFO WASHDC  
TT LON FM OTT  
AIRMAIL TOKYO FM NY  
REF OURTEL 1338 NOV27

NO.		INIT.
	AMBASSADOR <del>CONSULTOR</del> 2nd SEC. (P) 2nd SEC. (C) A.O. CONSULAR CI. T. & C. D.N.D. (M.A.) D.N.R.	

*M*

KOREA

THE DRAFT RESOLUTION APPROVED IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE ON NOV27 WAS ADOPTED TODAY IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY A ROLL CALL VOTE OF 54 IN FAVOUR(CDA), 9 AGAINST(SOVIET BLOC) AND 17 ABSTENTIONS(AFGH- ANISTAN BURMA CAMBODIA FINLAND GHANA GUINEA INDIA INDONESIA IRAQ LEDANON LIBYA NEPAL SAUDIARABIA SUDAN UAR YEMEN AND YUGOSLAVIA). MOROCCO AND TUNISIA WERE ABSENT.

2. THE ONLY COUNTRIES TO SPEAK WERE USA AND USSR BOTH OF WHOM SPOKE QUITE BRIEFLY ALONG THE LINES OF THEIR STATEMENTS ON THIS ITEM IN COMMITTEE.

# TELEGRAM

**DEFERRED**

## CONFIDENTIAL



FM CANDELNY DEC4/59 CONFD  
TO EXTERNAL 1892  
INFO WASHDC LDN  
TT TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT  
REF OURTEL 1848 NOV28  
KOREA

NO.		INIT.
1	AMBASSADOR	PS
2	CHIEF-SECRETARY	
	<del>1st SEC.</del>	
	2nd SEC. (P)	
	2nd SEC. (C)	
	A.O.	
	CONSULAR CL.	
	T. & C.	
3	<del>D.N.R. (M.A.)</del>	<i>MC</i>
	D.N.R.	

DURING LUNCHEON WHICH SOBOLEV(SOVIET PERMREP)AND I ATTENDED ON NOV27 HE TOOK THE INITIATIVE TO DISCUSS HIS DELS REF TO OUR 1958 STATEMENT ON KOREA TO WHICH WE REPLIED(OURTEL 1839 NOV27).

*4 file  
LGM*

2.SOBOLEV REITERATED THAT IT HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN SOVIET INTENTION TO DISTORT OR MISINTERPRET THE POSITION TAKEN BY US LAST YEAR.ON THE CONTRARY HE SAID THEY HAD BEEN MUCH IMPRESSED BY OUR STATEMENT LAST YEAR WHICH THEY HAD INTERPRETED TO MEAN THAT WE WERE IN FAVOUR OF A MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH TOWARDS NEGOTIATION THAN INDICATED BY THE USUAL UN RESOLUTION.I CONFIRMED HIS GENERAL IMPRESSION RE OUR POSITION BUT ADDED THAO WE WERE DISAPPOINTED IN THE LACK OF RESPONSE FROM THE OTHER SIDE DURING PAST YEAR.

3.SOBOLEV THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT IT WAS TIME TO CALL A HALT TO THE REPETITIOUS AND USELESS TREATMENT OF THIS SUBJECT IN THE UN.NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE PRIVATELY AND OUTSIDE THE UN.AS I UNDERSTOOD HIM HE ENVISAGED THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATIONS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO ELECTIONS IN ALL OF KOREA,AND WHICH WOULD NOT RPT NOT RULE OUT ACCEPTABLE INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION.IN ADDITION IT WOULD NOT RPT NOT INVOLVE WITHDRAWAL OF UN TROOPS BEFORE NEGOTIATION BUT THE PRESENCE OF UN TROOPS WOULD BE ONE OF THE QUESTIONS TO BE NEGOTIATED BEFORE ELECTIONS WERE HELD.

4.AT FIRST BLUSH THIS WOULD SEEM TO BE AN ADVANCE FROM THEIR PUBLIC STATEMENTS ON THIS QUESTION AND IF SOBOLEV WAS BEING SINCERE WE MIGHT EXPECT THE IDEA TO EMERGE BEFORE THE NEXT SESSION FROM SOME QUARTER OR OTHER.

*It's a pity that the initiative can't come from the Western side - but the United States could never get Pres. Rhee to accept a more flexible approach to reunification.*


DEFERRED TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL



ROUTINE

FM CANDELNY NOV28/59 CONFD  
TO EXTERNAL 1848.  
INFO LDN WASHDC  
TT TOKYO DEFERRED. FM OTT  
REF OURTEL 1839 NOV27  
KOREA



NO.		INT.
1	AMBASSADOR	13
2	COUNSELLOR	
	<del>SEC.</del>	
4	<del>1st SEC. (A)</del>	
5	<del>2nd SEC. (C)</del>	
	<del>3rd SEC.</del>	
	CONSULAR CL.	
	<del>4th SEC.</del>	
3	RND (MA)	Wrc
	<del>DNR.</del>	

WE EXERCISED RIGHT OF REPLY TO SOVIET STATEMENT OF NOV24 ON NOV27 SHORTLY AFTER CEYLON REP IN SPEAKING HAD REFERRED TO OUR 1958 STATEMENT AS HAVING GIVEN HIM COURAGE TO INTERVENE IN DEBATE LAST YEAR. HE QUOTED FOLLOWING PHRASES FROM OUR 1958 STATEMENT: QUOTE WE REGARD GENUINELY FREE ELECTIONS FOR ALL KOREA AS THE STARTING POINT OF A SOLUTION OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM, AND WE AGREE THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH ELECTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED UNQUOTE. ---- QUOTE IT STANDS TO REASON THAT THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED ONLY BY A PROCESS OF CONCILIATION AND NEGOTIATION UNQUOTE.

+ file  
EM

2. THE CEYLON REP THEN WENT ON TO EXPAND ON HIS OWN STATEMENT OF LAST YEAR AND TO EMPHASIZE THE NEGOTIATION ASPECT. IN SO DOING HE EXAMINED THE DIFFICULTIES ON BOTH SIDES BUT DID SUGGEST THAT PERHAPS UN TROOPS COULD BE WITHDRAWN BEFORE ELECTIONS WITHOUT ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT ONE SOLUTION TO THE APPARENT IMPASSE MIGHT BE TO MODIFY OPERATIVE PARA 2 OF THE 14-POWER RESOLUTION BY CHANGING THE WORD QUOTE AGREE UNQUOTE TO QUOTE NEGOTIATE UNQUOTE IN THE PHRASE QUOTE AND TO AGREE AT AN EARLY DATE ETC UNQUOTE.

3. CEYLON REP TOLD US AFTERWORDS THAT HE HAD NOT RPT NOT REALIZED THAT HE WAS QUOTING ONE PHRASE OF OUR 1958 STATEMENT THAT SOVIET REP HAD QUOTED AND THAT HIS INTENTION WAS TO USE THIS REF AS A MEANS OF INTRODUCING A REF TO HIS OWN STATEMENT IN 1958.

4. SOVIET REP FOLLOWED US AND STATED THAT IN REFERRING TO OUR 1958 STATEMENT HE HAD IN NO RPT NO WAY SOUGHT TO MISINTERPRET OR MIS-APPLY THE STATEMENT. THE WORDS QUOTED HE ADDED, HAD ALSO INSPIRED THE CEYLON REP. THE SOVIET DEL, HE CONTINUED, HAD ONLY WISHED TO EMPHASIZE

PAGE TWO 1848

THE THOUGHT THAT UNIFICATION CAN ONLY BE ACHIEVED BY A PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION AND NEGOTIATION. THIS, HE CONTINUED, SEEMED TO BE A CONSTRUCTIVE THOUGHT AND IF THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF OUR SPEECH WAS INCORRECT THIS WAS A MATTER FOR REGRET.

5. THE SOVIET REP CAME OVER PRIVATELY LATER AND REITERATED THAT HE HAD HAD NO RPT NO INTENTION OF DISTORTING WHAT WE HAD SAID BUT HAD ONLY WANTED TO UNDERLINE SOMETHING WHICH HE THOUGHT WAS IMPORTANT. HE DID NOT RPT NOT IMPLY THIS TIME, AS HE SEEMED TO PUBLICLY, THAT PERHAPS WE HAD RETREATED SOMEWHAT FROM OUR 1958 POSITION. WE ARE REPORTING SEPERATELY ON AN ADDITIONAL CONVERSATION BETWEEN SOVIET PERMREP AND RITCHIE.

6. IN CONCLUDING THE DEBATE THE USA REP REFERRED TO CEYLON REPS STATEMENT AND POINTED OUT THAT THE USA WOULD LIKE NOTHING BETTER THAN TO BEGIN MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATION BUT THAT THE DEADLOCK WAS DUE TO THE STUBBORN INSISTENCE OF THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES ON LABELLING THE UN AS AGGRESSORS AND MAINTAINING THAT UN HAD NO RPT NO COMPETENCE TO DEAL WITH THE MATTER. ON THE QUESTION OF UN TROOP WITHDRAWALS USA REP REMINDED CEYLON OF INVASION OF 1950 AND OF 1950 UN RESOLUTION WHICH CALLED ON UN TROOPS TO REMAIN IN KOREA UNTIL CERTAIN OBJECTIVES HAD BEEN REALIZED.

7. DURING COURSE OF DEBATE SOVIET BLOC REPS INDICATED NO RPT NO REAL FLEXIBILITY IN THEIR APPROACH. SOME DELS SUGGESTED THAT KOREA WOULD BE EXCELLENT PROVING GROUND FOR PUTTING QUOTE CAMP DAVID SPIRIT UNQUOTE INTO PRACTICE AND CEYLONS REPS SUGGESTION RE REWORDING OF OPERATIVE PARA2 OF THE RESOLUTION MIGHT HAVE ATTRACTED SOME INTEREST, IF IT HAD BEEN INTRODUCED EARLIER.

8. SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION REFERRED TO IN OURTEL 1812 NOV25 WAS IN FACT NOT RPT NOT INTRODUCED.



FM CANDELNY NOV27/59 UNCLAS  
TO EXTERNAL 1839 PRIORITY  
INFO WASHDC LDN  
AIRMAIL TOKYO FM NY  
REF MYTEL 1838

NO.	AMBASSADOR COUNSELLOR	INIT.
	<del>2nd SEC. (P)</del>	
	2nd SEC. (C)	
	A.O.	
	CONSULAR CL.	
	T. & C.	
	<del>D.N.D. (M.A.)</del>	
	D.N.R.	

*AL*

KOREA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF STATEMENT MADE IN FIRST COMMITTEE TODAY:

MR CHAIRMAN,

I WOULD LIKE TO EXERCISE MY RIGHT OF REPLY TO SOME REMARKS MADE BY THE REP OF USSR ON TUESDAY, BUT BEFORE DOING SO I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS MY APPRECIATION TO THE DISTINGUISHED REP OF CEYLON FOR HIS KIND REFS TO THE STATEMENT MADE IN THIS COMMITTEE LAST YEAR BY THE CDN REP.

DURING THE COURSE OF HIS STATEMENT, THE SOVIET REP ASKED QUOTE HOW CAN THE UN CONTRIBUTE TO KOREAS UNIFICATION? UNQUOTE HE ANSWERED THIS BY STATING - AND I AM QUOTING FROM THE PROVISIONAL VERBATIM RECORD - QUOTE OF COURSE THIS CANNOT BE DONE BY ADOPTING ONE-SIDED AND ULTIMATUM-LIKE DECISIONS WHICH ARE REPEATED YEAR AFTER YEAR UNQUOTE. HE THEN WENT ON TO ARGUE THAT AT THE THIRTEENTH SESSION EVEN THE DELS OF STATES WHICH CUSTOMARILY SUPPORTED UN RESOLUTIONS ON THE KOREAN QUESTION HAD - AND I QUOTE - QUOTE EXPRESSED SOME SOBER THOUGHTS ABOUT THE UNREALITY OF THIS POLICY UNQUOTE. THE SOVIET REP THEN SINGLED OUT THE FOLLOWING PHRASES FROM THE STATEMENT OF THE CDN REP IN THIS COMMITTEE LAST YEAR - AND AGAIN I QUOTE -

QUOTE... A SOLUTION TO THE KOREAN PROBLEM CANNOT BE ACHIEVED BY ATTEMPTING TO IMPOSE UNILATERAL CONDITIONS THAT IGNORE THE OPINION OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE... THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED ONLY BY A PROCESS OF CONCILIATION AND NEGOTIATION. UNQUOTE

SINCE THE SOVIET REP HAS DONE US THE HONOUR OF REFERRING TO THESE REMARKS, I SHOULD LIKE TO PUT THEM IN THEIR PROPER PERSPECTIVE. THE DIFFICULTY IS THAT, IN THE MATTER OF THIS QUOTATION, AS IN THE KOREAN

PAGE TWO 1339

PROBLEM AS A WHOLE, WORDS ARE GIVEN DIFFERENT MEANINGS BY DIFFERENT PEOPLE AND THERE IS AS YET NO RPT NO BASIC AGREEMENT ON HOW THE IDEAS THEY REPRESENT SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN PRACTICE.

IN THE FIRST PLACE, THIS QUOTATION IS COMPOSED OF PARTS OF TWO SENTENCES TAKEN FROM SEPARATE SECTIONS OF LAST YEARS STATEMENT. THE FIRST PHRASE CAME FROM THE FOLLOWING SENTENCE: QUOTE WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT A SOLUTION TO THE KOREAN PROBLEM CANNOT BE ACHIEVED BY ATTEMPTING TO IMPOSE UNILATERAL CONDITIONS THAT IGNORE THE OPINION OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE UNQUOTE. HOWEVER IT WAS FOLLOWED BY THREE OTHER SENTENCES WHICH I THINK SHOULD ALSO BE QUOTED: QUOTE THE CDN DEL, FOR ITS PART, WOULD NOT RPT NOT SUPPORT A RESOLUTION THAT MADE SUCH AN ATTEMPT. WE STAND BY THE PROPOSITION THAT THE FIRST REQUIREMENT FOR A SOLUTION MUST BE TO CONSULT THE OPINION OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE. WE REGARD GENUINELY-FREE ELECTIONS FOR ALL KOREA AS THE STARTING POINT OF A SOLUTION OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM, AND WE AGREE THAT THE <sup>RR</sup>ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH ELECTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED. UNQUOTE

THE IMPORTANT THING, AS THIS FURTHER QUOTATION MAKES CLEAR, IS HOW THE OPINION OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE IS TO BE CONSULTED.

THE SECOND PHRASE QUOTED BY THE SOVIET REP (QUOTE ... THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED ONLY BY A PROCESS OF CONCILIATION AND NEGOTIATION UNQUOTE). CAME FROM ANOTHER SECTION OF OUR STATEMENT LAST YEAR, WHICH DESERVES TO BE QUOTED IN FULL:

QUOTE THE CDN DEL REMAINS, AS WE HAVE SINCE THE UN FIRST TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE PROBLEM OF KOREAN REUNIFICATION, ANXIOUS TO ASSIST THAT PROCESS BY ALL MEANS AVAILABLE TO THE UN. IT STANDS TO REASON THAT THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED ONLY BY A PROCESS OF CONCILIATION AND NEGOTIATION. THE UN CANNOT IMPOSE REUNIFICATION UPON KOREA. WE HAVE NEVER TRIED TO DO SO BY FORCE. THE PURPOSE OF THE UN MILITARY EFFORT IN KOREA WAS NOT TO UNIFY KOREA BY FORCE BUT TO PREVENT ITS UNIFICATION BY FORCE. UNQUOTE

IN CONCLUSION, I SHOULD LIKE TO REITERATE TWO MAIN POINTS WHICH WE

PAGE THREE 1839

MADE IN OUR STATEMENT LAST YEAR. THE FIRST IS THAT THE ORIGINAL MISSION OF THE UN IN KOREA, WHICH WAS TO USE ITS GOOD OFFICES TO ASSIST THAT COUNTRY TO UNITY AND FREEDOM, REMAINS VALID. THE SECOND IS THAT, WHILE THE MODALITIES SHOULD ALWAYS BE OPEN TO DISCUSSION, THE ONE PRINCIPLE ON WHICH WE INSIST IS THAT ELECTIONS MUST BE FREE AND MUST BE CARRIED OUT UNDER EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION. ON THESE POINTS. THE STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET REP IN THIS DEBATE AND THE RECENT MEMO FROM THE NORTH KOREAN GOVT TO WHICH HE REFERRED DO NOT RPT NOT SUGGEST THAT THEY WOULD ACCEPT SUCH SUPERVISION AS WOULD IN FACT GUARANTEE THAT THESE ELECTIONS WOULD BE FREE, AND THEREFORE DO NOT RPT NOT OFFER MUCH ENCOURAGEMENT OF PROGRES TOWARD THE STAGE OF NEGOTIATION.



NO.		INIT.
2	AMBASSADOR	
	<del>CONSULTANT</del>	
1	<del>1st SEC.</del>	
	2nd SEC. (P)	
	2nd SEC. (C)	
	A.O.	
	CONSULAR CL.	
	T. & C.	
3	<del>D.N.R. (M.A.)</del>	<i>me</i>
	D.N.R.	

*Hpl*

FM CANDELNY NOV27/59 UNCLAS  
TO EXTERNAL 1838 PRIORITY  
INFO WASHDC

TT LDN FM OTT

AIRMAIL TOKYO FM NY

REF OURTEL 1812 NOV25

KOREA

14 POWER DRAFT RESOLUTION APPROVED TODAY IN FIRST COMMITTEE BY ROLL CALL VOTE OF 49 IN FAVOUR (INCLUDING CDA) 9 AGAINST (SOVIET BLOC) AND 19 ABSTENTIONS (AFGHANISTAN BURMA CAMBODIA CEYLON FINLAND GHANA GUINEA INDIA INDONESIA IRAQ LEDANON LIBYA MOROCCO NEPAL SAUDI ARABIA SUDAN UAR YEMEN AND YUGOSLAVIA). BOLIVIA COLOMBIA PANAMA PARAGUAY AND PERU WERE ABSENT.

2. TEXT OF OUR STATEMENT IN RIGHT OF REPLY TO REMARKS OF SOVIET REP ON NOV24 IS GIVEN IN OURTEL 1839.

# TELEGRAM



DEFERRED

RESTRICTED

FM CANDELNY NOV25/59 RESTD  
TO EXTERNAL 1818  
INFO WASHDC LDN  
TT TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT  
REF OURTEL 1812 NOV25  
KOREA



NO.		INIT.
1	AMBASSADOR	✓
2	CONSULOR	
	<del>SEC.</del>	
	2nd SEC. (P)	
	2nd SEC. (C)	
	A.O.	
	CONSULAR CL.	
	T. & C.	
3	<del>S.N.D. (M.A.)</del>	✓
	D.N.R.	

*file*  
*BM*

THE DEBATE ON THIS ITEM SO FAR HAS NOT RPT NOT INDICATED ANY POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS TOWARDS A SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE AND THERE SEEMS TO BE A LACK OF ENTHUSIASM IN THE COMMITTEE FOR DEBATE.

2. THE USA REP (ROBERTSON) IN OPENING STATEMENT OUTLINED THE HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM SINCE THE 1943 CAIRO CONFERENCE AND THE ROLE OF THE UN SINCE 1947. HE DESCRIBED THE NORTHKOREAN GOVT AS A SOVIET QUOTE PUPPET UNQUOTE AND RECALLED THE FACT THAT IT HAD BEEN BRANDED AS AN AGGRESSOR BY THE UN IN 1950. HE DESCRIBED VIOLATIONS OF THE 1953 ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BY THE NORTHKOREANS. HE REITERATED THE TWO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES WHICH MUST PROVIDE THE BASIS OF A KOREAN SETTLEMENT CONSISTENT WITH UN OBJECTIVES; EG THE RIGHT OF THE UN TO RESTORE PEACE AND SECURITY AND TO EXTEND ITS GOOD OFFICES AND GENUINELY FREE ELECTIONS UNDER UN SUPERVISION. HE EXAMINED THE UNWILLINGNESS OF THE COMMUNISTS TO AGREE TO QUOTE ANY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD GUARANTEE FREE ELECTIONS AND THEIR DENIAL OF UN COMPETENCE TO DEAL WITH THE MATTER. IN THIS CONNECTION HE REVIEWED THE EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN FEB 1958 AND MAR 1959 AND CONCLUDED THAT QUOTE IT IS CLEAR THAT THE COMMUNISTS HAVE NO RPT NO PRESENT DESIRE TO MOVE FORWARD TO THE SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM ON ANY TERMS SHORT OF SURRENDER BY THE UN UNQUOTE. HE STATED THAT A WITHDRAWAL OF REMAINING UN FORCES COULD ONLY LEAD TO ONE SOLUTION, COMMUNIST CONQUEST. WITH REGARD TO SUPERVISION HE POINTED OUT THAT, IF THE COMMUNISTS REALLY WANTED GENUINELY NEUTRAL SUPERVISION, THAT IMPARTIALITY COULD BE EASILY FOUND AMONG THE 82 MEMBERS OF THE UN. HOWEVER SINCE THE UN HAS BEEN

PAGE TWO 1818

ARBITRARILY RULES OUT BY THE COMMUNISTS AND SINCE OUR EXPERIENCE WITH A QUOTE NEUTRAL NATIONS COMMISSION UNQUOTE IN KOREA SHOWED CLEARLY HOW NEUTRAL ITS COMMUNIST MEMBERS WERE, MR ROBERTSON CONCLUDED THAT THE UN MUST STAND FAST ON THE PRINCIPLES WHICH IT HAD SUPPORTED FROM BEGINNING. HE ALSO APPEALED TO THOSE WHO HAVE UPHELD JUSTICE NOT RPT NOT TO GROW WEARY OF THE STRUGGLE.

3. THE UK REP MADE A SHORT STATEMENT IN WHICH HE STATED THAT THE UN MUST CALL ON THE COMMUNISTS TO RECONSIDER THEIR REFUSAL TO ACCEPT THE BASIC UN PRINCIPLES AND INDICATED THAT THE UN WOULD BE FLEXIBLE WHEN THE STAGE OF NEGOTIATION PROCEDURES WAS REACHED.

4. SOUTHAFRICAN REP STATED WITHDRAWAL OF UN TROOPS COULD NOT RPT NOT BE EQUATED TO WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE FORCES AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT CAMP DAVID SPIRIT WILL LEAD TO NEW EFFORTS AT SOLUTION; SOUTHAFRICA, WHICH HAD TENDED TO LEAVE THIS QUESTION TO THOSE MORE CLOSELY ASSOCIATED, WAS COSPONSORING DRAFT RESOLUTION IN HOPE THAT BY SO DOING THE ATTAINMENT OF UN OBJECTIVE MIGHT BE PROMOTED. AUSTRALIAN REP ALSO DEFENDED UN ROLE IN A THOUGHTFUL MANNER AND REMINDED COMMITTEE THAT AGGRESSION HAD BEEN COMMITTED BY NORTHKOREA. TO CRITICS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTHKOREA HE POINTED OUT THAT THE EVIDENCE OF FREEDOM TO CRITICIZE AND OF OPPOSITION TO PRESIDENT RHEES PARTY WERE IN THEMSELVES INDICATIONS OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTHKOREA.

5. THE LIBERIAN REP ASKED WHY THE NORTHKOREANS INSISTED ON ATTENDING UN DISCUSSION WHEN THEY DESCRIBED UN AS LACKING IN COMPETENCE AND A FRONT FOR USA IMPERIALIST AGGRESSIVE DESIGNS ON SOUTHKOREA. HE THEN PROCEEDED BY MEANS OF SATIRE WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN LOST ON THE SOVIET BLOC REPS TO USE THE MEMO SUBMITTED BY THE NORTHKOREAN GOVT TO THE SEC GEN (CIRCULATED AS DOCUMENT A/C.1/323 DATED NOV 3/59) TO DEMONSTRATE HOW CYNICAL WAS THE NORTHKOREAN ATTITUDE TO THIS PROBLEM.

6. THE MAIN THEME OF THE SOVIET BLOC SPEAKERS WAS INSISTENCE ON WITHDRAWAL OF UN FORCES, THE ABOLISHMENT OF UNCURK AND EMPHASIS ON THE

...3

PAGE THREE 1818

ILLEGALITY OF THE UN DECISIONS RE KOREA AND THE SINISTER DESIGNS OF THE USA. HOW CAN THE UN CONTRIBUTE TO UNIFICATION, THE USSR REP ASKED, AND ADDED THAT RESOLUTIONS SUCH AS SUBMITTED ONLY AGGRAVATED THE SITUATION. IN THIS CONNECTION USSR RP NOTED THAT AT THE 13TH SESSION EVEN STATES WHICH CUSTOMARILY SUPPORTED THE UN RESOLUTIONS EXPRESSED SOME SOBER THOUGHTS ABOUT THE UNREALITY OF THIS POLICY. HE QUOTED ONLY ONE-THE CDN STATEMENT AND EXTRACTED THE FOLLOWING PHRASES FROM OUR STATEMENT IN FIRST COMMITTEE ON NOV 6/58: QUOTE A SOLUTION TO THE KOREAN PROBLEM CANNOT BE ACHIEVED BY ATTEMPTING TO IMPOSE UNILATERAL CONDITIONS THAT IGNORE THE OPINION OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE... THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED ONLY BY A PROCESS OF CONCILIATION AND NEGOTIATION. UNQUOTE 7. OTHER SOVIET BLOC SPEAKERS SPOKE OF SOUTH KOREA AS A USA ATOMIC AND ROCKET BASE, OF VIOLATIONS OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BY THE UN SIDE, OF ROK GOVT MAINTAINED BY FOREIGN BAYONETS ETC. SOVIET BLOC REPS ALSO APPLAUDED THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF NORTH KOREA AS COMPARED WITH A DETERIORATING SITUATION IN THE SOUTH AND REGRETTED THAT PEACEFUL FRIENDLY OVERTURES BY THE NORTH KOREANS HAD BEEN REJECTED BY THE SOUTH. ALL THAT WAS REQUIRED, ACCORDING TO THE SOVIET BLOC REPS, WAS FOR THE UN TO WITHDRAW FROM KOREA COMPLETELY IN ORDER THAT THE TWO KOREAS COULD REACH AGREEMENT WITHOUT FOREIGN INTERFERENCE. REFS WERE MADE FROM TIME TO TIME TO THE NORTH KOREAN MEMO REFERRED TO ABOVE TO ILLUSTRATE THEIR CASE.

DEFERRED

BY CAN

TELEGRAM

Embassy - Ambassade du Canada  
DEC 1 1959



CONFIDENTIAL

FM CANDELNY NOV25/59 CONFD  
TO EXTERNAL 1812 PRIORITY  
INFO WASHDC LDN  
TT TOKYO DEFERRED, FM. OTT  
REF OURTEL 1803 NOV23  
KOREA

	1 AMBASSADOR	INIT.
	3 <del>CONSULET</del>	<i>h</i>
	2nd S.C. (R)	
	1st SEC. (C)	
	S.O.	
	CONSULAR CL.	
	T. & C.	
2	<del>2nd S.C. (M.A.)</del>	<i>ve</i>
	D.N.R.	

THE DEBATE CONTINUED YESTERDAY AFTERNOON WITH STATEMENTS BY THE REPS OF UK SOUTHAFRICA USSR THAILAND CZECHOSLOVAKIA FRANCE UKRAINE AUSTRALIA AND LIBERIA.

2. ALL BUT SOVIET BLOC REPS SPOKE IN FAVOUR OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH WAS TABLED YESTERDAY BY USA AND 13 COSPONSORS (THE SIXTEEN LESS CDA AND NZ BUT INCLUDING SOUTHAFRICA). THE TEXT IS AS GIVEN IN OURTEL 1776 NOV20 WITH ONE MINOR EXCEPTION. IN PREAMBULAR PARA 4 THE WORD QUOTE MORAL UNQUOTE HAS BEEN DELETED FROM THE PHRASE QUOTE MORAL AUTHORITY OF THE UN UNQUOTE.

3. THE THEME OF THE SOVIET BLOC INTERVENTIONS IS REFLECTED IN A DRAFT RESOLUTION FOR WHICH USSR IS TRYING TO OBTAIN SPONSORS. THE UAR DEL SHOWED US A COPY OF THE DRAFT WHICH THEY WILL NOT RPT NOT SPONSOR. IN ITS OPERATIVE PARAS THE SOVIET DRAFT WOULD URGE THE WITHDRAWAL OF UN FORCES FROM KOREA ABOLISH UNCURK AND CALL ON BOTH KOREAS TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO REACH A RAPPROACHEMENT.

4. WE WERE INFORMED BY UAR DEL THAT SOVIET REGARD THIS DRAFT AS STARTING POINT AND CHANGES MIGHT THEREFORE BE ACCEPTED. SOVIET APPARENTLY HOPE TO CONVINCED BURMA OR INDONESIA TO SPONSOR A RESOLUTION ALONG THESE LINES. THEY DO NOT EXPECT TO OBTAIN MUCH SUPPORT THIS YEAR AND THEIR INTENTION SEEMS TO BE TO PREPARE GROUND FOR SIMILAR ACTION IN SUBSEQUENT YEARS WHICH MIGHT GAIN MORE SUPPORT.

5. DEBATE WILL RECONVENE TODAY TO HEAR REP OF SOUTHKOREA AND AT LEAST FIVE OTHER SPEAKERS. SPEAKERS LIST WILL CLOSE AT 1 PM. VOTE MAY TAKE PLACE TOMORROW (THURSDAY) OR FRI.

6. WITH REGARD TO OUR VOTE ON THE QUESTION OF INVITING NORTH AND

...2

*file*  
*19M*

PAGE TWO 1812

SOUTH KOREA TO ATTEND THE DISCUSSIONS. THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF KOREA EXPRESSED HIS WARM APPRECIATION TO MR RITCHIE FOR  
OUR SUPPORT.

XEX

# TELEGRAM



DEFERRED  
BY CAN

CONFIDENTIAL



NO.		INIT.
1	AMBA <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DOR	RS
3	<del>COUNSELLOR</del>	
	<del>SEC.</del>	
	2nd Sec. (M)	
	3rd Sec. (C)	
	A.O.	
	CONSULAR CL.	
	T. & C.	
2	<del>D.N.P. (M.A.)</del>	he
	D.N.R.	

+ file  
JGM

FM CANDELNY NOV21/59 CONFID  
TO EXTERNAL 1786 OPIMMED  
INFO WASHDC LDN EMBPARIS NATOPARIS  
TT TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT  
REF OUR TEL 1775 NOV20

KOREA

DOC A/C. 1/L243, NOV20, CONTAINS TEXT OF USSR DRAFT RESOLUTION INVITING REPS OF BOTH KOREAS TO PARTICIPATE WITHOUT VOTE IN DISCUSSION OF KOREAN QUESTION.

2. DOC A/C. 1/L244, NOV20, CONTAINS TEXT OF USA DRAFT RESOLUTION INVITING REP OF SOUTH KOREA TO PARTICIPATE.

3. WE HAD ALREADY INFORMED USA DEL INFORMALLY IN ANSWER TO THEIR QUESTION THAT WE WOULD ABSTAIN ON AN INVITATION TO BOTH KOREAS AND VOTE IN FAVOUR OF INVITATION TO SOUTH KOREA AS WE DID LAST YEAR. WE ADDED THAT WE WOULD OF COURSE LEAVE OURSELVES FREE TO CHANGE OUR MINDS IF CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTED AT TIME OF VOTE (YOUR TEL 218).

# TELEGRAM

7-1-1-1



BY CAN

## CONFIDENTIAL

### DEFERRED



FM CANDELNY OCT3/59 CONFD  
TO EXTERNAL 1299 PRIORITY  
INFO WASHDC LDN EMBPARIS NATOPARI  
TT TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT  
REF OURTEL 1298 OCT3  
KOREA

NO.		INIT.
3	AMBASSADOR COUNSELLOR	RS
	<del>1st SEC.</del>	
	2nd SEC. (P)	
	2nd SEC. (C)	
	A.O.	
	CONSULAR CL.	
	T. & C.	
	<del>P.N.D. (M.A.)</del>	
	D.N.R.	bc

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF USA DRAFT RESOLUTION ON KOREA,

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

HAVING RECEIVED THE REPORT OF THE UN COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA,

REAFFIRMING ITS RESOLUTIONS 112(II) OF NOV14/47, 195(III) OF DEC12/48, 293(IV) OF OCT21/49, 376(V) OF OCT7/50, 811(IX) OF DEC11/54, 910A(X) OF NOV29/55, 1010(XI) OF JAN11/57, 1180(XII) OF NOV29/57 AND 1264(XIII) OF NOV14/58,

NOTING THAT, DESPITE THE EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES CONCERNED AND THE UK OF GREATBRITAIN AND NORTHERNIRELAND ON BEHALF OF THE GOVTS OF COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED FORCES TO THE UN COMMAND IN KOREA, IN WHICH THESE GOVTS EXPRESSED THEIR SINCERE DESIRE TO SEE A LASTING SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH UN RESOLUTION AND THEIR WILLINGNESS TO EXPLORE ANY MEASURES DESIGNED TO BRING ABOUT REUNIFICATION ON THIS BASIS, THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES HAVE PERSISTED IN THEIR INTRANSIGENCE REGARDING THE PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM.

REGRETTING THAT THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES CONTINUE TO DENY THE COMPETENCE AND MORAL AUTHORITY OF THE UN TO DEAL WITH THE KOREAN QUESTION, CLAIMING THAT ANY RESOLUTION ON THIS QUESTION ADOPTED BY THE UN IS NULL AND VOID.

NOTING FURTHER THAT THE UN FORCES, WHICH WERE SENT TO KOREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH RESOLUTIONS OF THE UN, HAVE IN GREATER PART ALREADY BEEN WITHDRAWN AND THAT THE GOVTS CONCERNED ARE PREPARED TO

PAGE TWO 1299

WITHDRAW THEIR REMAINING FORCES FROM KOREA WHEN THE CONDITIONS FOR A LASTING SETTLEMENT LAID DOWN BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAVE BEEN FULFILLED, (1) REAFFIRMS THAT THE OBJECTIVES OF THE UN IN KOREA ARE TO BRING ABOUT BY PEACEFUL MEANS ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNIFIED, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC KOREA UNDER A REP FORM OF GOVT, AND THE FULL RESTORATION OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE AREA. (2) CALLS UPON THE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES CONCERNED TO ACCEPT THESE ESTABLISHED UN OBJECTIVES IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT IN KOREA BASED ON THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES FOR UNIFICATION SET FORTH BY THE NATIONS PARTICIPATING ON BEHALF OF THE UN IN THE KOREAN POLITICAL CONFERENCE HELD AT GENEVA IN 1954, AND REAFFIRMED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND TO AGREE AT AN EARLY DATE ON THE HOLDING OF GENUINELY FREE ELECTIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES ENDORSED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. (3) REQUESTS THE UN COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND REHABILITATION OF KOREA TO CONTINUE ITS WORK IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. (4) REQUESTS THE SEC GEN TO PLACE THE KOREAN QUESTION ON THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA OF THE FIFTEENTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

7-1-1-1

BY CAN



# TELEGRAM

## CONFIDENTIAL



### DEFERRED

FM CANDELNY OCT3/59 CONF  
TO EXTERNAL 1298 PRIORITY  
INFO WASHDC LDN EMBPARIS NATOPARIS  
TT TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT  
KOREA

NO.	3	AMBASSADOR	INIT.
		<del>COUNSELLOR</del>	B
		1st SEC.	
		2nd SEC. (P)	
		2nd SEC. (C)	
		3rd SEC.	
		CONSULAR CL.	
		T. & C.	
		2nd D. (M.A.)	he
		D.N.R.	

*Spf*

THERE WAS A MEETING THE OTHER DAY OF REPS FROM THE AUSTRALIAN  
CDN NZ UK AND USA DELS, UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF MR WALTER  
ROBERTSON, TO HAVE A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF THE HANDLING OF THE  
KOREAN ITEM AND IN PARTICULAR TO LOOK AT A DRAFT USA RESOLUTION.  
TEXT OF THIS DRAFT IS OBTAINED IN OUR TEL 1299.

2. IN INTRODUCING THE DRAFT, ROBERTSON SAID THAT IT FOLLOWED LAST  
YEARS PATTERN AND THAT THE ONLY NEW ELEMENT WAS REF TO THE COMMUNIST  
CHINESE NOTE OF MAR4. ALTHOUGH THE QUOTE FIFTEEN UNQUOTE DECIDED  
NOT RPT NOT TO REPLY TO THAT NOTE, ROBERTSON EXPLAINED THAT, BECAUSE  
IT REITERATED THE CONSISTENT COMMUNIST THEME THAT THE UN HAD NO RPT  
NO COMPETENCE OR MORAL AUTHORITY TO DEAL WITH THE KOREAN QUESTION,  
IT COULD NOT RPT NOT BE IGNORED. HE WENT ON TO MAKE A RATHER  
LENGTHY DEFENCE OF THE CONTINUING USA STAND ON THE KOREAN QUESTION,  
AS REFLECTED IN THE DRAFT RESOLUTION, SUGGESTING THAT ANY DEVIATION  
FROM IT WOULD WEAKEN THE MORAL AUTHORITY OF THE UN AND WOULD UNDER-  
MINE THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE THE USA CONTINUED TO PROVIDE AT  
CONSIDERABLE EXPENSE TO THE DEFENCE OF SOUTHKOREA.

3. THE ONLY SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS WERE MADE BY PLIMSOLL (AUSTRALIA) WHO  
OFFERED THE FOLLOWING SUGGESTIONS: (A) WAS QUOTE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES  
UNQUOTE THE BEST WAY TO REFER TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND NORTHKOREA?  
(B) IN PREAMBULAR PARA 3, WOULD IT NOT RPT NOT BE BETTER TO SAY  
QUOTE CONTINUE TO REFUSE TO ~~COOPERATE~~ COOPERATE WITH THE UN IN BRINGING  
ABOUT THE PEACEFUL AND DEMOCRATIC RESOLUTION OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM  
QUOTE RATHER THAN QUOTE HAVE PERSISTED IN THEIR INTRANSIGENCE ETC  
UNQUOTE? (C) SHOULD WE NOT RPT NOT DOCUMENT *HERE* PRECISELY THE  
CORRESPONDENCE IN WHICH THE COMMUNISTS EXPRESSED THE VIEWS REFERRED

...2

PAGE TWO 1298

TO IN PREAMBULAR PARA4?(D)RE OPERATIVE PARA4, IS IT REALLY NECESSARY OR USEFUL FOR US TO PLACE THE KOREAN QUESTION ON THE AGENDA OF EVERY SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, WHEN NO RPT NO CHANGE OR PROGRESS IS EXPECTED?

4. ROBERTSON REPLIED TO THESE SUGGESTIONS AS FOLLOWS: (A) QUOTE COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES UNQUOTE WAS THE TERM USED IN PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS AND THERE WAS NO RPT NO REASON TO CHANGE IT. (B) HE HAD NO RPT NO OBJECTION TO <sup>H</sup> REWORDING SUGGESTED FOR PREAMBULAR PARA3. (C) SINCE THE LAST COMMUNIST CHINESE NOTE HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN CIRCULATED TO UN MEMBERS, IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE TO REFER TO IT DIRECTLY IN PREAMBULAR PARA4, BUT PERHAPS IT COULD BE MENTIONED IN THE STATEMENTS OF THE COSPONSORS IN INTRODUCING THE RESOLUTION IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE. (D) FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE USA, WHICH WAS CONTRIBUTING TO THE UN FORCES IN KOREA, IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO KEEP THE KOREAN QUESTION BEFORE THE UN.

5. WE SAID THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO STUDY THE USA DRAFT AND WOULD RESERVE OUR COMMENTS UNTIL A LATER MEETING. WE DO NOT RPT NOT YET KNOW WHAT THE NZ POSTION WILL BE BUT HAVE NO RPT NO REASON TO BELIEVE IT WILL BE DIFFERENT FROM LAST YEAR. TO JUDGE FROM PLIMSOLLS OBSERVATIONS, IT LOOKS AS THOUGH AUSTRALIA MAY BE MOVING IN THE SAME DIRECTION. WE GATHER THAT THE UK WILL GO ALONG AGAIN THIS YEAR AND COSPONSOR THE RESOLUTION.

6. AS YOU SEE, THE PRESENT DRAFT IS ALMOST IDENTICAL IN FORM AND PHRASEOLOGY TO LAST YEARS RESOLUTION, EXCEPT FOR THE NEW ELEMENT OF REF TO THE LAST COMMUNIST CHINESE NOTE. ON THE QUESTION OF SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS, THE FORMULA IS AGAIN QUOTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES ENDORSED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY UNQUOTE, WHICH MEANS OF COURSE QUOTE UNDER UN SUPERVISION UNQUOTE. IN VIEW OF THIS AND ALSO THE FACT THAT THE USA IS CLEARLY UNWILLING TO MOVE FROM ITS STAND THAT A KOREAN SETTLEMENT IS FOR NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE UN

...3

PAGE THREE 1298

AND THE COMMUNISTS, RATHER THAN FOR THE KOREAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES,  
IT IS OUR PRELIMINARY VIEW THAT WE SHOULD DECLINE AGAIN THIS YEAR  
TO COSPONSOR<sup>R</sup> THE USA DRAFT RESOLUTION, ALTHOUGH WE SHOULD OF COURSE  
VOTE FOR IT. WE SEE LITTLE POINT IN TRYING TO ARGUE WITH ROBERTSON  
FOR CHANGES THAT WOULD HELP US TO COSPONSOR.

7. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR VIEWS, IF POSSIBLE BY OCT 8,  
WHEN THERE WILL PROBABLY BE ANOTHER MEETING TO DISCUSS THE  
RESOLUTION.

DEFERRED

TELEGRAM  
CONFIDENTIAL

Canadian Embassy - Ambassade du Canada  
MAR 24 1959  
Tokyo - 22000

CANADIAN EMBASSY  
COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

FM WASHDC MAR 17/59 CONFID  
TO EXTERNAL 681  
INFO LDN PERMISNY EMBASSY PARIS  
TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT  
REF OURTEL 652 MAR 17

NO.		INIT.
1	AMBASSADOR COUNSELLOR	3
2	1st SEC.	
3	2nd SEC. (D)	
	2nd SEC. (C)	
	A.O.	
	CONSULAR CI.	
	T. & C.	
	D.N.D. (M.A.)	
	D.N.R.	

*Handwritten initials*

KOREA-CHINESE NOTE MAR 4

IN THE MEETING OF THE 16 TODAY PARSONS (DIRECTOR NORTHASIAN AFFAIRS) SAID THAT SINCE THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN THE CHINESE NOTE OF MAR 4 AND SINCE THE NOTE RAISED NO QUESTIONS WHICH HAD NOT BEEN ADEQUATELY ANSWERED BEFORE, THE USA SAW NO ADVANTAGE IN CONTINUING THE EXCHANGE AND THOUGHT WE WOULD BE BETTER OFF IF WE WERE TO FORGET THAT THE CHINESE NOTE HAD BEEN RECEIVED. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION THE UK REP EXPLAINED THAT SINCE THE UK CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN PEKING HAD UNDERTAKEN TO TRANSMIT THE NOTE TO THE GOVTS CONCERNED AT THE TIME OF ITS RECEIPT, THE UK DID NOT BELIEVE THAT ANY FURTHER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT WAS NECESSARY.

2. COMMONWEALTH REPS (INCLUDING OURSELVES) EXPRESSED CONCURRENCE WITH THE USA VIEW AND NO OTHER REPS DISSENTED.

3. IN RESPONSE TO OUR ENQUIRY PARSONS SAID THAT THE STATE DEPT DID NOT CONTEMPLATE ISSUING ANY PRESS STATEMENT AT THIS TIME. IF THE STATE DEPT PRESS SPOKESMAN WERE ASKED TOMORROW ABOUT TODAY'S MEETING PARSONS SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESS BE TOLD THAT REPS OF THE 16 HAD MET AND DISCUSSED THE CHINESE NOTE OF MAR 4 AND THAT THEY HAD CONCLUDED THAT SINCE THERE WAS NOTHING NEW IN IT THEY DID NOT PROPOSE TO SEND A REPLY. THERE WAS GENERAL CONCURRENCE IN THIS APPROACH AND PARSONS EMPHASIZED THAT THE STATE DEPT WOULD NOT VOLUNTEER ANY REMARKS TO THE PRESS BUT WOULD MAKE THE FOREGOING COMMENT ONLY IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS.

4. PARSONS SAID THAT THE EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH THE CHINESE WHICH OCCURRED LAST YEAR PRIOR TO THE 13TH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY HAD PROVED HELPFUL IN CLARIFYING THE UN POSITION. HE SAID THE STATE DEPT WOULD BE HAPPY TO RECEIVE ANY PROPOSALS OR SUGGESTIONS FROM THE GOVTS REPRESENTED AT THE MEETING AS TO WHAT LINE SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THE NEXT SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

# TELEGRAM CONFIDENTIAL

7-1-1-1

**DEFERRED**



NO.	2	AMBASSADOR	INIT
		COUNSELLOR	FB
		1st SEC.	BM
		2nd SEC. (P)	
		2nd SEC. (C)	
		A.D.	
		CONSULAR CL.	
		FO C.	R
		D.N.D. (M.A.)	
		D.N.R.	

FM WASHDC MAR13/59 CONFD  
 TO EXTERNAL 630  
 INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS NATOPARIS PERMISNY  
 BAG WLGTN CNBRA FM LDN  
 TT TOKYO DEFERRED FM OTT  
 REF OURTEL 608 MAR11  
 KOREA-CHINESE NOTE OF MAR

LANE(KOREA DESK OFFICER)TOLD US THIS MORNING THAT WALTER ROBERTSON HAD APPROVED THE MEMO RECOMMENDING THAT THE STATE DEPT ADOPT AN ATTITUDE SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE FO WITH RESPECT TO THE ABSENCE OF ANY NEED FOR A REPLY TO THE LATEST CHINESE NOTE.THE USA POSITION WILL NOT RPT NOT HOWEVER BECOME OFFICIAL UNTIL THE ACTING SECRETARY'S APPROVAL IS OBTAINED,PROBABLY OVER THE WEEKEND.

2.IN THE PROBABLE EVENT THAT THE STATE DEPT DOES ADOPT THE FO LINE,LANE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT NO RPT NO PRESS STATEMENT WOULD BE MADE,THOUGH THIS POINT WOULD HAVE TO BE DECIDED.HE SAID THAT THE DEPT WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF A MEETING OF THE 16(THOUGH NOT RPT NOT AT THE AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL)SO THAT QUESTION COULD BE COLLECTIVELY DECIDED.WE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT IN ORDER NOT RPT NOT TO ATTRACT ATTENTION IT MIGHT BE BETTER TO SEEK THE VIEWS OF THE GOVTS WHO HAD NOT RPT NOT YET EXPRESSED THEMSELVES INDIVIDUALLY RATHER THAN TO HOLD A MEETING.CN

7-1-1-1



FM WASHDC MAR11/59  
TO EXTERNAL 608 PRIORITY  
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS NATOPARIS PERMISNY  
BAG WLGTN CNBRA TOKYO FM LDN  
REF YOURTEL Y47 MAR10  
KOREA-CHINESE NOTE MAR4

NO.		INIT.
2	AMBASSADOR COUNSELLOR	B
3	1st SEC. 2nd SEC. (P) 2nd SEC. (C) A.O. CONSULAR CI. T & C.	
1	D.M.D. (M.A.) D.N.R.	R

*[Handwritten signature]*

WE INFORMED LANE (KOREA DESK OFFICER) TODAY OF YOUR CONCURRENCE WITH THE UK VIEWS ON THE QUESTION OF A REPLY TO THE LATEST CHINESE NOTE. LANE SAID THAT THE OFFICE OF NORTH ASIAN AFFAIRS HAVE SENT A MEMO TO WALTER ROBERTSON RECOMMENDING THAT THE STATE DEPT TAKE THE SAME VIEW OF THIS QUESTION AS THE FOREIGN OFFICE. HE UNDERTOOK TO LET US KNOW OF ROBERTSON'S REACTION EITHER TOMORROW OR FRI.

(RECD LDN 120758Z/RL)



NO.		INIT.
1	<del>AMBASSADOR</del>	
	<del>GOV. SECRETOR</del>	
2	<del>1st SEC.</del>	
	2nd SEC. (P)	
	2nd SEC. (C)	
	A.O.	
	CONSULAR CI.	
	T.C.C.	
2	R.N.D. (M.A.)	R
	P.N.R.	

*Handwritten initials*

FM EXTERNAL OTT MAR10/59 CONF

TO WASHDC Y47 PRIORITY

INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS NATOPARIS PERMISNY PRIORITY

CCOS NDC

BAG CNBRA WLGTN TOKYO FM LDN

REF LDN TELS 702 AND 706 MAR9

KOREA:CHINESE NOTE MAR4

EARNSCLIFFE HAS PROVIDED US WITH THE FOLLOWING UK VIEWS ON THE CHINESE REPLY OF MAR4 (TEXT CARRIED BY LDN TEL 702) TO THE UK NOTE OF DEC LAST CONTAINING THE MSG ON BEHALF OF THE FIFTEEN, AND WE AGREE WITH THESE VIEWS: (A) THE CHINESE NOTE, WHICH CALLS FOR NO RPT NO REPLY, CONTAINS NOTHING NEW; (B) THERE IS NO RPT NO DISCERNIBLE ADVANTAGE IN CONTINUED EXCHANGES; (C) SINCE THE UK CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN PEKING HAS ALREADY UNDERTAKEN TO TRANSMIT THE NOTE TO THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED, THERE IS NO RPT NO CALL EVEN FOR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

2. WE SHOULD WELCOME INFO CONCERNING THE REACTION OF THE STATE DEPT TO THE NOTE.

(RECD LDN 110756Z/RL)



PAGE TWO 702

IT IS EVEN MORE ABSURD THAT THE BRITISH NOTE SHOULD HAVE FORWARDED THE SO-CALLED UN RESOLUTION ADOPTED UNDER THE MANIPULATION OF THE USA.

AS EVERYBODY KNOWS, UNDER THE DOMINATION OF THE USA, THE UN HAS BEEN REDUCED TO A BELLIGERENT IN THE KOREAN WAR AND LOST ALL COMPETENCE AND MORAL AUTHORITY TO DEAL FAIRLY AND REASONABLY WITH THE KOREAN QUESTION. THEREFORE, ANY RESOLUTION ON THE KOREAN QUESTION ADOPTED BY THE UN IS UNILATERAL AND NULL AND VOID. ANY ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE THE WILL OF ONE SIDE ON THE OTHER CAN ONLY BE INTERPRETED AS DELIBERATE OBSTRUCTION OF THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA AND AN ENDEAVOUR TO CREATE A PRETEXT FOR THE PROLONGED OCCUPATION OF SOUTH KOREA BY USA ARMED FORCES.

THE KOREAN AND CHINESE GOVTS HOLD THAT ALL FOREIGN FORCES MUST BE WITHDRAWN FROM KOREA, THE KOREAN QUESTION SHOULD BE SETTLED BY THE KOREAN PEOPLE THEMSELVES THROUGH CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA WITHOUT ANY OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE, THE DESIRE OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE FOR THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF THEIR FATHERLAND MUST BE SATISFIED, AND THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED SHOULD UNDERTAKE TO ENSURE THE PEACE OF KOREA AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN KOREA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

THE KOREAN AND CHINESE GOVTS HAVE MADE UNREMITTING EFFORTS FOR THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA, AND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEERS FROM KOREA WAS ALREADY COMPLETED IN OCT 1958. THE GOVTS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE UN COMMAND SIDE SHOULD RESPECT THE WILL OF THE ENTIRE KOREAN PEOPLE TO UNIFY THEIR FATHERLAND AND MAKE EFFORTS ACCORDINGLY TO WITHDRAW ALL THEIR ARMED FORCES FROM SOUTH KOREA AT ONCE. OTHERWISE, THEY CANNOT RPT NOT ESCAPE THE GRAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR OBSTRUCTING THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA.  
ENDS,



LDN MAR9/59

TO EXTERNAL 701 P  
INFO WASHDC EMBASSYPARIS NATOPARIS PERMISNY PRIORITY  
BAG CNBRA HLGIN TOKYO FM LDN  
KOREA: CHINESE NOTE OF MAR4

NO.		INIT.
2	AMBASSADOR COUNSELLOR	
3	1st SEC. 2nd SEC. (P) 3rd SEC. (C)	
	AD. CONSULAR CI. F. & C. D.N.D. (M.A.) B.N.R.	R

WE RECEIVED TODAY IN THE FORM OF A PRESS RELEASE FROM THE COMMUNIST CHINESE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES' OFFICE HERE THE TEXT OF A NOTE WHICH WAS HANDED TO THE UK CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN PEKING ON MAR4 IN REPLY TO THE UK NOTE OF DEC4 CONTAINING THE AGREED MSG ON BEHALF OF THE FIFTEEN. WHEN WE ASKED JONES (KOREA DESK) AT THE FO ABOUT THE CHINESE NOTE THIS MORNING, HE CONFIRMED THAT IT HAD BEEN RECEIVED AND SAID THAT INSTRUCTIONS TO THE UK EMBASSY IN WASHDC TO TRANSMIT THE NOTE TO EMBASSIES OF THE FIFTEEN THERE WERE BEING PREPARED. SINCE JONES DID NOT SEEM CERTAIN WHEN THIS WOULD BE DONE, WE ARE REPEATING THE TEXT OF THE CHINESE NOTE IN OUR IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TEL.

2. THE FO'S SLOWNESS IN DEALING WITH THIS NOTE IS PROBABLY DUE TO THE FACT THAT:

(I) THE CHINESE TOOK EXACTLY THREE MONTHS TO REPLY TO THE LAST NOTE FROM THE FIFTEEN; AND

(II) THE CHINESE NOTE OF MAR4 CONTAINS NOTHING NEW BUT SIMPLY REITERATES THE OLD PROPAGANDA LINE, REPUDIATING THE ROLE OF THE UN AND DEMANDING THAT ALL FOREIGN FORCES BE WITHDRAWN FROM SOUTH KOREA AT ONCE.

JONES SAID THAT THE PRELIMINARY REACTION OF THE FO WAS THAT THE CHINESE NOTE DID NOT REQUIRE A REPLY, SINCE IT LEFT NO OPENING FOR ANY NEW SUGGESTIONS FROM THE SIDE OF THE FIFTEEN. JONES TOLD US THAT THE FO HAD ALREADY SET IN TRAIN A REVIEW OF THE UK POSITION ON KOREA, IN ANTICIPATION OF THE NEXT TIME IT CAME UP IN THE UN, BUT THAT IT WAS A LITTLE TOO EARLY TO MAKE ANY FIRM COMMENTS.

file 7-1-1-1

JGM

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Subject.....

Date..... MAR. 5 1959 ..... Publication..... Japan Times .....

## Peiping Blames Allies For Division of Korea

By United Press International

Communist China and North Korea yesterday blamed the 16 U.N. countries which participated in the Korean war, "particularly" the United States, for the lack of a settlement to the Korean question.

In a special note handed yesterday to the British charge d'affaires in Peiping, the Red Chinese Foreign Office claimed the UNC nations show "not the slightest sincerity for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question."

The note, reported last night by the New China News Agency, was in answer to a note from the 16 allied nations last December asking for clarification of Communist proposals made earlier to unify the war-torn peninsula.

The Communists claimed, yesterday, that the note from the U.N. allies "failed to give any satisfactory reply to the ques-

tion of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea raised in previous notes and statements of the (North) Korean and (Communist) Chinese Governments."

Instead, the Red Chinese note claimed, "the United States has, in repeated violation of the Korean armistice agreement, introduced large quantities of new-type weapons including atomic weapons into South Korea and conducted military maneuvers near the military demarcation line to aggravate the tension in Korea."

The Red Chinese note called out any U.N. supervised elections to unify Korea.


The note reiterated Communist demands that all foreign forces leave Korean soil and that the Korean question be settled "by the Korean people themselves through consultations between North and South Korea without any outside interference."

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

(DUPLICATE)

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.



Security: UNCLASSIFIED

862

FROM: The Office of the High Commissioner for Canada in Australia, Canberra,

Date: December 30, 1958.

Enclosures:

Reference:

Air or Surface Mail: Air

Subject: Korea - Reply to the Chinese Communist Note.

Post File No: 7-1-1-1 10-42

Ottawa File No. [ ]

References

- Washington
London
NATO Paris
Wellington
CPDUN (NY)
Tokyo
Commonwealth
U.N. Division

In the event that you have not obtained the text from the Australians you may be interested in the following statement which Mr. Casey made recently in connection with the note delivered to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Communist China by the United Kingdom Chargé d'Affaires in Peking on behalf of the countries which had contributed to the United Nations forces in Korea.

"The nations, including Australia, which contributed forces to the United Nations side in Korea, have been engaged in an exchange of correspondence during the year with the Chinese Communists on the question of a settlement of the Korean problem.

"The correspondence has been conducted through the United Kingdom Chargé d'Affaires in Peking.

"The Chinese Communists started the exchange in February with proposals for a settlement in Korea. Although we had little reason from past Communist conduct in Korea to hope to make any real progress, we gave their proposals serious consideration and asked for clarification of certain aspects. The Communists declined to give the clarifications sought and urged instead that the remaining United Nations forces be withdrawn from Korea - an impossible demand since it would expose the Republic of Korea to renewed aggression.

"The Chinese Communists in a further note on November 10 again claimed that the United Nations forces in Korea were the main obstacle to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question.

"It is quite obvious that this exchange of correspondence with the Communist side in Korea is getting us nowhere at present, and that the hopes it inspired earlier of making some progress with solving the Korean problem have not been fulfilled....

"Australia has now agreed with the other governments concerned to give simply a brief acknowledgement to the latest Chinese Communist note, pointing out at the same time that the current United Nations General Assembly recently reaffirmed by a vote of 54 to 9 that the Korean problem should be settled in accordance with stated United Nations principles."

(Sgd) J.A. Dougan (for) High Commissioner

Table with columns NO., AMBASSADOR, INIT., and rows for various office levels like AMBASSADOR, 2nd SEC. (P), 1st SEC. (C), CONSULAR CL., D.N.D. (M.A.), D.M.R.

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts



*Cartha*  
*file 7-1-1-1*

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO UNITED NATIONS  
COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND  
REHABILITATION OF KOREA

SEOUL,

KOREA.

Confidential.

11th December 1958

Memo No:  
File No: 9/2

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
Canberra.

The National Security Law and Korean Unification.

Further to our memorandum 605 of 4th December, the controversy over the proposed revised National Security Law and methods of unification has continued to fill the press for the past week. The Law is before the Judicial and Legislative Committee of the Assembly, though discussion on it has not yet gone very far, there was a fist-fight in the Assembly on 6th December, there was trouble at a public meeting held by the Democrats to discuss the Law the same day, and feeling is still running high. On the other hand, although neither the Democrats nor the Liberals have publicly changed ground, there is some evidence that efforts to secure a compromise on the bill may yet be successful; the Democrats have, in fact, said that they hoped the Liberals would withdraw the bill and work out a compromise with the Opposition. This proposal, which was made on 9th December, was rejected by the Liberals, but the rejection suggested that the Liberals might now be willing to accept ~~amendments~~ amendments in the course of the committee's consideration of the law.

2. This improved position is the result of very hard work by the United States (apart from moderate Koreans). Both the State Department and the Embassy here have taken a very serious view of the law. They have many points of criticism, but have concentrated their arguments on Article 17(5), which could gravely infringe on the freedom of the press. The line they have taken is that the American press always gives prominence to attempts to restrict press activities; such news affects public opinion in the US, and it is extremely hard for the friends of the ROK, in the State Department and elsewhere, to defend the Republic when opinion is roused. Thus possibly restrictive moves against the press can affect relations in general between the two countries. Meetings that we know have taken place on the question include one between Mr. Walter Robertson and Ambassador Yang in Washington, one between Ambassador Dowling and Foreign Minister Cho in Seoul, a discussion between the Ambassador and Jones, the head of the Embassy's political section, and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Justice, and Finance, a discussion between Gilstrap, the Deputy Chief of Mission, Jones and a Shaffer of the Embassy and the two Vice-Speakers of the Assembly and the Liberal Party floor leaders, and one between Ambassador Dowling and the Speaker of the Assembly, who is apparently ill and not playing much part at the moment. At all these meetings we are told the American concern ~~xxx xix~~ at the law was expressed in very direct and forceful terms. The meeting between the Vice-Speakers and members of the Embassy was likened to one where naughty boys were taken before the headmaster for a dressing-down.

3. The Liberals and the Government have, of course, maintained that there is not political purpose to the law, and that they are pushing it only for the reasons set out in our memo 605, para 9. However, there is good evidence to show that Article 17(5) was inserted, not by the Governme

000755

but by the Liberal Party itself, probably at the insistence of the "tough faction" led by Chang Kyun Gun and Im Chol Ho, and this has confirmed the American impression that the law is intended for political purposes. They realize that the Liberals are not likely to withdraw the bill entirely, and are thus concentrating their efforts on trying to ensure that there will be protection against abuse written into it. The Embassy is now starting to feel that they are getting somewhere with this, that there will, for example, be some clearer definition of "national secrets" in Article 4, that "libel of constitutional organs" (Article 22) will be confined to libel of the office of President, and that a qualifying "intent" clause to the effect that actions will be punishable if they are committed "solely for the purpose of assisting the enemy" will be inserted wherever necessary.

4. The Embassy has also been working on the Democrats to ensure that they are receptive to amendments. Ambassador Dowling has seen Chough Pyung Ok, and there have been several discussions between other members of the Embassy and Cho Chae Chon, the head of the Publicity Department of the Democratic Party. From our conversations with the Embassy, and as a result of our own recent discussion with Cho Chae Chon, the following summary of the Democrats viewpoint is possible:

5. The Democrats feel that the Law is definitely intended to restrict the activities of the press and opposition in the period prior to the 1960 presidential elections. They feel that existing laws - the present National Security Law, the Criminal Code, the National Defence Law, and the Coastal Defence Law - are sufficient to punish any acts of espionage that may occur. Even if these were insufficient, they point out that there is another National Security Law (and a later amendment) which was passed by the Assembly in 1949, promulgated, but never enforced, as the date of its enforcement depends on a Presidential decree which has never been forthcoming. In the present draft law, there are 9 articles which they consider objectionable; five of these ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ should by all means be deleted or severely amended, the five being Articles 4, 12, 17(5), 22 and 37. Their defence against the passage of the present law will thus be in depth - they will fall back from total opposition, to a call for enforcement of the earlier law, to a request for amendment of 9 articles and thence to the amendment of 5 articles.

6. From the Democrats' point of view the most important article is No 37, which would permit confessions made to the police or other investigating agencies (such as the CIC) to be used as evidence. They feel that the police would interpret this in the widest possible sense, and the way would be open to the ~~xxx~~ extraction of confessions from political opponents by torture. They compare present developments with those in Pusan in 1952, and recall that the Provost Marshall then planted subversive documents in the houses of those arrested and later "discovered" these documents to support the case for arrest. Even if evidence were not planted, they think article 12 could be interpreted far too widely; in Cho Chae Chon's own case, he has collected information on unemployment in the ROK for the use of the Democrats, and he feels that if he were arrested and made to confess, this material could be said to be of benefit to the enemy within the terms of Article 12. He is somewhat nervous of this, as the Liberals sometimes remark that he has the same family name as Cho Bong Am, and as he is on bad terms with Chang Taek Sang, who has said he would "pick Cho Chae Chon up" some day.

7. The American Embassy comments that the Democrats are envisaging the worst that could possibly happen. One big

Confidential.

3.

difficulty in securing any compromise is the fact that the Democrats have no confidence whatsoever in the sincerity of the Government, nor in the ability of the courts to resist pressures put upon them. And even if the courts can resist, the Democrats feel that, unless the law is drastically amended, there would be great opportunities to harrass the opposition, and to keep them out of action, involved in court proceedings, appeals etc., for long periods of time during the pre-election year.

8. That the Democrats may have some justification for their fears is shown by the recent disturbance of a public meeting and the fight in the Assembly. On 6th December, the DP got permission to hold a meeting to discuss the proposed law at their party headquarters, which is next to a public park. They first wished to hold the meeting on the roof of their Party headquarters. The police ruled that this would then be an outdoor meeting, and as such is banned at the moment (although the promised clarification of the reason for the ban has not yet been made). The Democrats also wanted to have loudspeakers on the roof of the building (so that people in the nearby park could hear) but the police would not agree to this. By a strange coincidence, the park itself was closed, "for repairs", soon after the Democrats announced their meeting. There was room for only 200 people inside the party headquarters, and when this number went in, some unidentified young men insulted the doorman, saying they should be admitted, and a scuffle developed in the course of which some damage was done to the doors. The police were called and dispersed the crowd; they detained, briefly, some reporters who took pictures of them in action, but later released them and returned cameras and films. The valiant Kim Sang Don (DP Assemblyman) sallied forth with his famous stick and joined in the doings; he was protected by a special policeman, who was detained, once again briefly, by the other policemen involved.

9. The fight in the Assembly was short, and was provoked by a bitter attack on the Democrats' unification formula by Liberal Son Do Sim, who spoke for two and a half hours. He attacked Chough Pyong Ok in particular, calling him a heavy drinker and discussing his other personal characteristics in an objectionable way. He also spoke of the Democrats as "a Communist-tolerating" party, because of their recent stress on all-Korean elections as a means to unification, and drew attention to the fact, which is made much of by the Liberals, that it was only recently that the Democrats voted for the Assembly resolution calling for elections in North Korea only. The Democrats became restive and started to shout him down, one Liberal went across the floor "to try to stop the shouting", a Democrat hit him, and the fight developed until checked by the Assembly guards.

10. The Democrats insist that their unification platform is in conformity with the 14 points put forward by Pyun Yung Tae on behalf of the ROK at Geneva in 1954. They say that it is the ROK Government which is inconsistent, having called for a "march north" (fairly regularly), "elections in North and South Korea" (at Geneva), and "elections in North Korea only" (regularly). They challenge the Government to disavow the Geneva 14 points, and the Government has avoided the challenge, though it is obviously unhappy at the position.

11. The American Embassy, and members of UNCURK in private discussion, are taking the line that it is most unfortunate that this public quarrel has developed, which seems to indicate a division not only between the two political parties concerned but also possibly between the ROK Government and the UN. This

4.

public division can only assist the Communists, and it is unwise and premature to discuss methods of unification before Communist agreement to the UN principles is obtained.

12. Mr. Busparock of Thailand still feels strongly that UNCURK is failing in its duty if it does not help to clarify the UN's position on the matter of elections. The other members of the Committee agree with us that it is pointless for us to attempt anything along these lines, not only because of the present position of the Committee and of the undesirability of buying into a domestic political squabble, but also because we ourselves could do nothing but reiterate the resolutions, which are themselves slightly ambiguous.

13. In our talk with Cho Chae Chon, he asked us some questions about unification. He asked whether, when the UN spoke of fundamental principles, this meant the ROK's 14 points. I said it meant the two principles of resistance against aggression and of free elections and proportionate representation, but added that I did not think the ROK's 14 points were in contradiction with these. He asked whether the UN considered that the ROK had sovereignty over the whole Korean peninsula or only over the areas south of the 38th parallel. I quoted the 1948 resolution about the ROK being the sole legitimate government in Korea, with its qualifying clauses about areas observed, and made no further elucidation, saying it seemed clear enough. He asked about the resettled areas north of the 38th parallel, and I said that my recollection was not exact, but that, when these areas were handed over to ROK administration, some wording to the effect that this did not prejudice their future disposition was used. He asked about all-Korean elections; I said I could give only personal views, which might not represent the position of UNCURK or my Government, but that it might be as well to keep the possibility of all-Korean elections in mind. I stressed that our conversation should be kept confidential, and repeated what I had said to the Vice-President before the May elections, that I thought it premature to go beyond an expression of support for the UN principles on this question.

14. I intend to attempt to assess the present political scene in a memorandum in the next safe-hand bag. For the moment ~~xxx~~ it should be noted that tension between the two political parties is already acute, some seventeen months before the 1960 presidential elections. The Americans are sufficiently concerned about the present developments to have taken the steps described above; these may well be successful, but it can be expected that the ~~xxx~~ period between now and 1960 will be one of frequent clashes and minor and major crises. It can also be expected, I presume, that the Communists will not waste any opportunities to provoke and exacerbate these crises; anything UNCURK and friendly nations can do to keep the political temperature down would, I am sure, be much appreciated by the United States, on whom, of course, the main burden falls.

(H.A. Dunn)  
Representative.





Canada

AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO UNITED NATIONS  
COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND  
REHABILITATION OF KOREA

SEOUL,

KOREA.

4th December 1958

Restricted.

Memo No: 605  
File No: 9/2

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
Canberra.

The National Security Law and Korean Unification.

On 18th November, a new draft of a revised National Security Law was submitted to the ROK National Assembly. This took the place of an earlier, much criticised draft which had been submitted on August 9th, concerning which we made ~~XX XX~~ a previous report. The terms of the earlier draft had been somewhat modified after consultation between the Government and the Liberal Party, but sufficient dubious clauses remain in the present draft for it to have created a great political uproar. This had, of course, been anticipated by the Liberals, and there was some doubt whether the Government or the Party would accept the responsibility of submitting it; for some time it seemed as if the Liberal Party would take it on itself to do this, but in the end the draft went to the Assembly with the countersignature of the Minister of Justice, Hong Chin Ki, on it.

2. This question of signature has been of some importance. The earlier draft had been signed by the Ministers of Justice, Home Affairs, and National Defence, all of whom appear to be concerned with its administration; this would appear to have been in accordance with the Constitution (Article 66) and the National Assembly Law (Article 39), which require that Government documents should bear the signatures of the Ministers concerned. The fact that the new draft bears only one signature and was thus referred to only one House committee - the Judicial and Legislative Committee - and not to three - Judicial and Legislative, Home Affairs, and National Defense - has added to the uproar created by the Democrats. It seems likely that the Liberals, who have expressed a wish to pass the law by the end of the year, hoped to quicken its passage by limiting the number of committees in which it would be discussed before being put to the whole Assembly.

3. Since the submission of the draft, there have been hints that some compromise between the Liberals and Democrats might be possible, but neither party has been willing to take the initiative for this. The Democrats have declared themselves absolutely opposed to the bill in toto, and have formed a "Fighting Committee to Oppose the Revision of the National Security Law in a Worse Form", into which they have attracted all but four of the Independent Assemblymen. Two of these four are Kim Jun Yon of the Unification Party, and Chang Taek Sang, the former Prime Minister. The latter of these was at first to have been one of the three leaders of the Fighting Committee (the others being Chough Pyong Ok and Paek Nam Hun), but then made a most surprising change and accepted the chairmanship of the Liberal-organized "Anti-Communist Combat Committee", one of whose ostensible aims was to promote the passage of the National Security Law. Possible reasons for this change will be discussed later in this memorandum.

4. Apart from the formation of this Anti-Communist Combat Committee, which will draw support from such Liberal-dominated organizations as the National Association and the Anti-Communist

000760

2.

Youth Corps, the most serious developments have been the move by the Seoul Municipal Police to ban public meetings indefinitely, and the vigorous dispute between the Government and the Democrats over the means of unifying Korea. The Police announced on 28th November that public meetings in the open air were not to be permitted until further notice, hinting that they had wind of a subversive Communist plot aimed at overthrowing the Government, about which more will be known soon. A reporter friend tells us that this concerns an alleged letter from the Japanese Communist Party to the North Korean Communist Party explaining the former's tactics in opposing the passage of the Police Powers Bill in Japan, and urging the latter to use similar tactics through front organizations in South Korea to prevent the passage of the National Security Law. The Seoul Shinmun has made it clear that it believes that the Democrats may have been infiltrated by pro-Communists, so this police move is of great concern to them. Practically everyone with whom we have spoken discounts all possibility of there having been such infiltration, but the smear remains, and the Democrats' ~~xxxxx~~ planned public meetings opposing the Law have been made impossible.

5. Even more serious is the public quarrel about theories of unification. As you will recall, the Democrats came out just before the elections last May with a statement favouring elections throughout Korea, and not just in North Korea, when the time for unification comes. They have now reiterated this position, saying that it is the only realistic one to take, that it is in conformity with the 14 points put forward by the ROK at Geneva in 1954, and that the unified Assembly formed after such elections should "enact" a constitution for all Korea. "Enact" was the word first used, but this was hastily changed to "amend", which is in line with the 14 points made by Pyun Yung Tai at Geneva. This change in wording was necessary to protect them against charges of denying the constitution of the ROK, but it was unfortunate that it had to be made. The Government is breathing fire - the Minister of Justice said on 3rd December that the Democrats' unification formula was no different from that of the outlawed Progressive Party, and that the prosecutors would investigate it after the Assembly debate is concluded. It is hard to believe that the Government does in fact mean to take repressive measures against the Democrats as a whole, particularly as their spokesman in the matter has been Chough Pyong Ok (than whom no one has a higher reputation as an anti-Communist), and it may well be that this particular question will die away when the Liberals have used it as fully as possible to frighten faint-hearts in Opposition. However, the Democrats have said that they might call on UN diplomats concerned with unification to support their view that all-Korean elections are what most of the friendly countries have in mind when they speak of "elections throughout Korea". If anything more comes of this we shall inform you by telegram.

6. Both the Korean Bar Association and the Korean Newspaper Editors Association have also come out in opposition to the new National Security Law, on the grounds that it is not sound in legal concepts and is likely to infringe on the people's rights. The only newspapers that do not share this view are the Seoul Shinmun (and ~~of course~~ the Korean Republic) and the Seige Ilbo, both of which are, of course, strongly controlled by the Liberals. But even the Seoul Shinmun has been rather dubious about some points in the law, and the managing editor of the Seige Ilbo, ~~xxx~~, Mr. Sull Kuk Hwan, has recently resigned finding it impossible, he told us, to agree with the policy imposed on the paper.

7. A copy of the text of the draft law is attached. The

000761

3.

main points on which it is being criticised are Articles 2, 11, 12, 17, 22, 30 and 37. Article 2 shows that the Government itself realizes how open the law is to abuse, as it warns that "special care" must be taken to protect the rights and freedom of the people. Articles 11 and 12 concern the collection and disclosure of national secrets and information about state matters. It is pointed out that some of these things are the normal concern of newspapers, that it is hard to see that social and cultural matters can be of great value to the enemy, and that the saving phrase "for the purpose of benefiting the enemy" is hard to interpret; would, for example, a journalist who knew his paper might be read in North Korea after being smuggled out of the South, be free to write critically? Article 17(5), concerning the spreading of false or exaggerated reports so as to "disturb the people's minds" has an obvious connection with the freedom of the press, as does Article 22 concerning libel of constitutional organs. Article 30 concerns the loss of qualifications by people, such as journalists or teachers, convicted under this law for a period as long as the term for which they are imprisoned. The press regards this as being equivalent to double punishment. And Article 37 allows statements made to the police to be used in court as evidence without confirmation by the accused. The Opposition thinks that this leaves the way open for the police to extract statements under duress from suspects.

7. So far the Liberals have shown little disposition to yield ground at any point. However, the accession of Chang Taek Sang to the leadership of the Anti-Communist Combat Committee, and his early statement that he is opposed to the provisions restricting the press, that he does not think the Committee should be used for political purposes such as promoting the passage of the new Law, and that he thinks that anyone who accuses his friend Chough Pyong Ok of being sympathetic to Communist aims should be heavily punished, makes it more possible that some compromise will be reached and the present tension abated.

8. It is easy to see why the Democrats oppose the Law so adamantly. It can be used to restrict their activities in the period between now and the Presidential elections in 1960 by interfering with their freedom to criticise the administration. They believe genuinely that it is a threat to human rights, and that, together with rumoured plans to extend police powers of investigation and to revert to the system of appointing, not electing, mayors of cities and towns, it is an attempt to establish something of a police state. And, of course, they are not averse to building up tension in the hope that the Government will be provoked into unwise action which will make the Democrats martyrs for human rights and win them popular sympathy.

9. The Liberals motives in presenting and pressing the Law at this time are much more complicated, for they must realize that they are risking great unpopularity, and taking the chance of damaging the ROK's international reputation by their action. They have taken steps to publicize the their ostensible reasons for the bill - a counter to the great and increasing threat of Communist subversion in many and devious ways - widely in the press and in meetings of employees of government agencies such as the broadcasting system, and the primary object of the Anti-Communist Combat Committee was to spread this publicity throughout the country.

4.

10. Some of the Liberals' motives in seeking to amend the Law appear to be: a genuine fear that Communist infiltration and subversion will be increased in the near future and spread over a wider field than the present Law can deal with; in particular, the fear that the appeal of "peaceful unification" will weaken the people's resolution in standing firm against Communist blandishments in this regard; the belief that the Progressive Party was a Communist-front whose members might even yet escape punishment under the old law; the belief that the Opposition went too far in its attacks on the Government in election campaigns in May (and, more particularly, in Yongil last September), and that this really "disturbs" and subverts the people's minds; ~~and~~ their suspicions that Communist agents might use Opposition groups to develop tactics similar to those employed against the Japanese Police Powers Bill; *and their old desire to gain the Peace Freedom but not License.*

11. Other factors that might come into their thinking are: a wish for stronger government to bolster their position in preparation for the 1960 elections; a belief that a display of vigour would please the President and reduce his evident disillusionment with the Liberal Party; a distraction from the worsening economic scene might be thought desirable; a vigorous campaign against the Opposition might help to keep the Liberals, now somewhat divided into factions, together; an early campaign to check the Democrats campaign on the plank of "unification by peaceful means" might serve some useful purpose. In this regard, the Government may even have had it in mind to try to take some ~~indefinite~~ action which might counteract the Democrats' line - the broadcast to North Korea reported in the last bag might have been an early initiative on this, and it will be remembered that the President, early this year and soon before the Assembly elections, took a mild line on unification.


12. And, of course, the present uproar may be a smokescreen hiding manoeuvres in the background. Several possibilities suggest themselves, the first being that the Liberals may in the end trade amendments in the National Security Law for a quick and non-controversial passage of the 1959 Budget. The question of the House of Councilors election, which is legally due to be held by 24th January 1959, will also require some bargaining, and the National Security Law might be a useful card to hold against this. And there are repeated suggestions that both sides are eager to adopt some form of cabinet responsibility system - possibly by reviving the post of Prime Minister; the Liberals are said to want this in order to take some of the burden off the President, Chough Pyong Ok is thought to want it, seeing himself in the role and Chang Myun kicked upstairs into a weakened position as President following the elections in 1960, and Chang Taek Sang is also believed to see himself in the part.

13. So far, the only clear move is that made by Chang Taek Sang, who has emerged from the present confusion like a rugby threequarter making a run in a match on an almost impossibly muddy and slippery field. Chang is a wily man who does not move until he is fairly sure he sees a good opening, and his recent statements that he may join the Liberal Party have attracted uncommon attention. When I last had a long talk with him, last June, there was much speculation that the Independent Assemblymen, so few in numbers that they could not even form a negotiating group in the Assembly, would soon join one or other of the parties. I asked Chang whether he would join the Democrats, and he said "No". When asked about the Liberals, he said "I have not sunk as low as that". There must therefore be good reasons for his present action in taking the chair of the Anti-Communist Com

Committee. Chang has said that the reasons for his action will become clear in a few days, and that the political situation will change within three months. It is to be hoped that this ~~xxxx~~ clarification will soon be made; at the moment there is little but speculation to go on.

14. It seems likely that Chang has realized that the day of the Independent in Korean politics is over, at least temporarily, and that he must associate with one of the parties if he is to get anywhere. He appears to have been offended by the fact that the Democrats did not give him the chairmanship of the Fighting Committee to Oppose the Revision of the National Security Law in ~~the~~ a worse form, and by a recent article in the Kyonghyang Shinmun, the Democratic newspaper, which, he said, cast aspersions on his virility (this would appear to be a weak excuse, used simply to make a break with the Democrats.) He is an authoritarian, ~~and~~ a staunch anti-Communist, ~~and~~ and has a great contempt for party politics - qualities which he shares with President Rhee. We hear that it was President Rhee himself who suggested that Chang might be won over to the Liberals' side, saying that he was "the only patriot left in Korea." There are suggestions that Lee Ki Poong's health is deteriorating again, and that he wishes to go abroad for some time to rest. Chang and Lee Ki Poong have long been friends, and Chang's decision to take the chair of the Combat Committee, which will have some authority over the Liberal Party organs, followed a talk between the two of them last weekend. There is speculation that Lee Ki Poong will soon resign from the Speakership of the National Assembly, and that Chang will be given that post, and thus be handily placed for nomination as Vice-President in 1960, or for the position of Prime Minister, if that is where the real power lies and the post is revived.

15. The President himself has not made any clear statement on the question of the National Security Law, although the Democrats claim that remarks by him on 28th November, urging cooperation between parties and the avoidance of actions to create sectarian sentiments among the people, was a directive that the Law should be passed. This was presumably in his mind, and he may ~~xxxxxx~~ believe that Chang Taek Sang can bring about greater cooperation between the political parties than has been apparent in the recent ~~xxxxxxxx~~, often pointless squabbling between parties similar in policies and outlook, and certainly both equally determinedly anti-Communist.

  
(H.A. Dunn)  
Representative.



NO.		INIT.
1	AMBASSADOR	<i>h/m</i>
2	COUNSELLOR	
	<del>1st SEC.</del>	
	2nd SEC. (D)	
	2nd SEC. (C)	
	A.O.	
	CONSULAR CI.	
	T. & C.	
	D.N.D. (M.A.)	
	D.N.R.	

*h/m*  
*h/m*

FM EXTERNAL OTT NOV28/58 CONFD

TO WASHDC Y334 OPIMMEDIATE

INFO CANDELNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS NATOPARIS

BAG CNBRA WLGTN TOKYO FM LDN

REF YOURTEL 2904 NOV26

KOREA-REPLY TO CHINESE NOTE NOV10

THE STATE DEPT DRAFT REPLY AS AMENDED IS ACCEPTABLE TO US.

(RCD LDN 290837Z/GAG)

FM WASHDC NOV26/58 CONFID  
TO EXTERNAL 2904 PRIORITY  
INFO CANDELNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS NATOPARIS  
BAG CNBRA WLGTN TOKYO FM LDN  
REF OURTEL 2880 NOV25  
KOREA-REPLY TO THE CHINESE NOTE NOV10



NO.		INIT.
1	AMBASSADOR	<i>[initials]</i>
2	COUNSELLOR	
	1st SEC.	
	2nd SEC. (P)	
	2nd SEC. (C)	
	A.O.	
	CONSULAR CL.	
	T. & C.	
	D.N.D. (M.A.)	
	D.N.R.	

IN INTRODUCING THE STATE DEPT'S PROPOSED REPLY TO THE CHINESE COMMUNIST NOTE OF NOV10 TO THE MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN THIS MORNING, WALTER ROBERTSON SAID THAT WHEN IT HAD FIRST BEEN RECEIVED THE STATE DEPT HAD WONDERED WHETHER ANY REPLY WAS NECESSARY. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE CHINESE NOTE HAD BEEN CIRCULATED IN THE UN HOWEVER AND SINCE IT WAS A WELL WRITTEN PROPAGANDA STATEMENT FROM THE CHINESE STAND POINT THE STATE DEPT HAD CONCLUDED THAT WHILE NO RPT NO SUBSTANTIVE REPLY WAS CALLED FOR SOME ANSWER SHOULD BE MADE IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE THE PROPOAGANDA ADVANTAGE THAT WOULD ACCRUE TO THE CHINESE IF NO RPT NO REPLY WERE MADE. THE STATE DEPT HAD ACCORDINGLY PREPARED A DRAFT WHICH THEY WOULD LIKE TO SEND OFF AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE.

2. THE DUTCH AMBASSADOR INDICATED THAT HIS GOVT AGREED THAT A REPLY SHOULD BE SENT AND THAT THE DRAFT PREPARED BY THE STATE DEPT WAS SATISFACTORY TO HIM. 3. THE UK REP SAID THAT HIS GOVT FELT UNDER OBLIGATION TO SEND AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND THAT THEY WOULD PROPOSE TO SEND A BRIEF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT SIMPLY STATING THAT THE CHINESE NOTE HAD BEEN RECEIVED AND COMMUNICATED TO OTHER GOVTS CONCERNED. HE SAID THAT THE UK VIEW WAS THAT THE CHINESE NOTE RAISED NO RPT NO NEW ISSUES, THAT IT HAD GENERATED LITTLE INTEREST AND THAT NOW WAS A GOOD TIME TO CLOSE THE CORRESPONDENCE. THE REVISION OF A BRIEF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT WOULD NOT RPT NOT OF COURSE PRECLUDE THE REOPENING OF THE CORRESPONDENCE BY THE SIXTEEN ON THEIR OWN TERMS AND IN THEIR OWN TIME. CONCERNING THE STATE DEPT DRAFT THE UK REP SAID THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS WERE AWARE OF THE NATURE OF THE UN RESOLUTION ON KOREA AND THAT THEY HAD ALREADY INDICATED IN THEIR NOTE OF NOV10 HOW THEY REGARD THE UN'S POSITION IN KOREA: THEREFORE THERE WAS LITTLE POINT IN PURSUING THE ARGUMENT

PA. TWO 2904

FURTHER WITH THEM.

4. THE AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR TOOK MUCH THE SAME LINE AS THE UK REP AND SUGGESTED THAT THE REPLY TO THE CHINESE DRAFTED BY THE STATE DEPT SHOULD END WITH THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE SECOND PARA (SENTENCE ENDING "ANSWERED IN DETAIL").

5. THE PHILIPPINES AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE THOUGHT A REPLY SHOULD BE MADE AND THAT THE STATE DEPT DRAFT WAS SATISFACTORY FOR THE PURPOSE. HE EMPHASIZED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE SIXTEEN TO MAKE THEIR POSITION CLEAR FOR THE BENEFIT OF PUBLIC OPINION IN ASIA.

6. THE NZ REP SAID THAT HIS GOVT FAVOURED A SIMPLE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TO THE CHINESE NOTE AND EXPRESSED THE OPINION THAT THE STATE DEPT DRAFT SAID TOO MUCH, PARTICULARLY BY MAKING SPECIFIC REF TO ONE POINT THAT HAD BEEN COVERED IN THE PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE. HE WONDERED WHETHER THE SINGLING OUT OF THIS PARTICULAR POINT WOULD NOT RPT NOT ENABLE THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS TO RETURN TO THE ARGUMENT AND RENEW THE CORRESPONDENCE.

7. WE INDICATED THAT WE WOULD FAVOUR A REPLY WHICH SIMPLY ACKNOWLEDGED RECEIPT OF THE CHINESE NOTE AND WHICH POINTED OUT THAT THE QUESTIONS RAISED IN IT HAD BEEN ANSWERED IN PREVIOUS COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE SIXTEEN. WE SAID THAT WE HAD NO RPT NO OBJECTION TO TRANSMITTING THE UN RESOLUTION IF IT WAS THOUGHT GENERALLY DESIRABLE BUT WE QUESTIONED THE WISDOM OF MAKING A SPECIAL REF TO A PARTICULAR POINT AS WAS DONE IN THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 2 OF THE STATE DEPT DRAFT.

8. IN REPLY TO THESE ARGUMENTS ROBERTSON EMPHASIZED THE DESIRABILITY OF REPLYING TO A SPECIFIC POINT WHICH HAD BEEN RAISED IN THE CHINESE

NOTE AND WHICH WAS NOT RPT NOT FULLY COVERED IN THE TEXT OF THE UN RESOLUTION. REFERRING TO THE REMARKS MADE BY THE PHILIPPINES AMBASSADOR HE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING THAT THE CASE OF THE SIXTEEN WAS ADEQUATELY DOCUMENTED FOR THE RECORD AND THAT THE SIXTEEN SHOULD NOT RPT NOT APPEAR TO BE CONCEDED ANY CHINESE CHARGES BY NOT REPLYING TO THEM ADEQUATELY. IN THE COURSE OF A DIGRESSION ON THE THEME THAT THE UN FORCES IN KOREA COULD NOT RPT NOT IN ANY WAY BE EQUATED TO THE CHINESE FORCES WHICH HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN

PAGE THREE 2904

THE NEED TO KEEP SUFFICIENT UN FORCES IN KOREA SO THAT THE STATUS OF THE UN COMMAND OVER THE ROK FORCES COULD BE MAINTAINED. IF THE NORTH AND SOUTHKOREAN FORCES WERE LEFT TO FACE ONE ANOTHER THERE WAS A POSSIBILITY THAT SOME ACTION MIGHT OCCUR WHICH WOULD PRECIPITATE HOSTILITIES AGAIN. THE UNC SIDE COULD NOT RPT NOT AFFORD TO TAKE THIS RISK.

9. IN THE COURSE OF THE DEBATE WHICH FOLLOWED THE PHILIPPINE AMBASSADOR, WHO HAD ARGUED STRONGLY IN FAVOUR OF THE STATE DEPT DRAFT, PROPOSED AS A COMPROMISE THE ELIMINATION OF THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 2 OF THE STATE DEPT DRAFT. THE AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR INDICATED THAT THIS WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO HIM AND ROBERTSON SAID THE USA WOULD ACQUIESCE IF THIS COMPROMISE WAS GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE. AFTER SOME FURTHER RATHER CONFUSED DISCUSSION AND AN INCONCLUSIVE SHOW OF HANDS THE PHILIPPINES AMBASSADOR MOVED THAT THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 2 BE ELIMINATED FROM THE STATE DEPT DRAFT AND THAT THE REMAINDER OF THE NOTE, INCLUDING THE UN RESOLUTION, BE ACCEPTED AS THE TEXT OF THE REPLY OF THE GOVTS CONCERNED. THIS MOTION WAS AGREED TO, ALTHOUGH SEVERAL REPS INDICATED THAT THEIR CONCURRENCE WAS AD REFERENDUM THEIR GOVTS. IT WAS AGREED THAT ALL GOVTS SHOULD SIGNIFY THEIR ACCEPTANCE TO THE STATE DEPT BEFORE DEC 1. SINCE A NUMBER OF REPS WERE WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, AND SINCE THERE WAS A FAIRLY EVEN DIVISION OF OPINION ON THE DELETION OF THE SECOND SENTENCE OF THE SECOND PARA, WE SHOULD NOTE THE FLEXIBILITY SHOWN BY WALTER ROBERTSON AND BY GEN ROMULO.

10. WE ASSUME THAT THE STATE DEPT DRAFT AS AMENDED (IE WITH THE SECOND SENTENCE OF PARA 2 ELIMINATED) IS ACCEPTABLE TO YOU BUT WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION SO THAT WE MAY SO INFORM THE STATE DEPT.

(RCD LND 271625Z/GAG)

000768

FM WASHDC NOV25/58 CONF  
TO LATERAL 2880 EMERGENCY  
INFO CANDELNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS NATOPARIS  
BAG CNBRA WLGTN TOKYO FM LDN  
REF YOURTEL Y328 NOV24



KOREA-REPLY TO THE CHINESE NOTE OF NOV10  
THE STATE DEPT HAS DISTRIBUTED TODAY THE TEXT OF THE FOLLOWING PROPOSED  
REPLY TO THE CHINESE COMMUNIST'S NOTE OF NOV10: BEGINS:

HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO THE MINISTER  
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HER MAJESTY'S PRINCIPAL  
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HAS THE HONOUR TO REFER TO  
THE MINISTRY'S NOTE OF 10 NOV 1958, COMMUNICATED TO THE GOVTS OF THE  
COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED FORCES FOR THE UN COMMAND IN  
KOREA, WHO, AFTER CONSULTATION, HAVE REQUESTED HER MAJESTY'S GOVT TO  
REPLY AGAIN ON THEIR BEHALF.

THE GOVTS CONCERNED HAVE NOTED THE VARIOUS QUESTIONS RAISED IN THE  
REF NOTE AND WISH TO CALL TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC  
OF CHINA AND THE NORTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES THE NOTES DELIVERED BY  
HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES ON APR9/58 AND JUL2/58 IN WHICH  
THESE QUESTIONS WERE ANSWERED IN DETAIL. IN PARTICULAR, IT WAS POINTED  
OUT THAT THE UN FORCES, WHICH WERE SENT TO KOREA IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
RESOLUTIONS OF THE UN, SHOULD REMAIN AS ONE NECESSARY GUARANTEE AGAINST  
FURTHER AGGRESSION IN KOREA PENDING A FINAL SETTLEMENT. ANSWERS TO  
ALL THE QUESTIONS RAISED IN THE MINISTRY'S NOTE AGAIN WERE GIVEN IN  
DETAIL AND WERE RESTATED AND REAFFIRMED IN THE RESOLUTION ON KOREA  
WHICH WAS ENDORSED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
DISCUSSION ON NOV14/58, BY THE OVERWHELMING VOTE OF 54 TO 9.

ENDS

THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION FOLLOWS.

(RCVD LDN 260814Z/HAP)

NO.		INIT.
1	AMBASSADOR <del>SOUS-SECR.</del>	
	<del>SECRET.</del>	
	<del>CONSUL. CL.</del>	
	<del>P. &amp; C.</del>	
3	DND (M.A.) D.N.R.	R

*JPL*

FM WASHDC NOV25/58 CONFD

INTERNAL 2879 EMERGENCY

INFO CANDELNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS NATOPARIS

BAG CNBRA WLGTN ~~TOKYO~~ FM LDN

REF YOURTEL Y328 NOV24

KOREA-REPLY TO THE CHINESE NOTE OF NOV10

THE STATE DEPT HAS CALLED A MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN FOR 11:30AM TOMORROW. WE WILL CALL COLLINS OR MCGAUGHEY AT 10/30 AM TOMORROW TO DISCUSS OUR POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE USA PROPOSED REPLY QUOTED IN TEL 2880. 2. THE UK EMBASSY HAS INFORMED US THAT WHATEVER THE DECISION OF THE SIXTEEN THE FO WISHES TO DELIVER A SIMPLE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TO THE CHINESE BEFORE THE END OF NOV. THE UK DOES NOT FAVOUR MORE THAN A SIMPLE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, THOUGH IF ANY COMMENT ON PREVIOUS COMMUNICATIONS IS TO BE INCLUDED THEY WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THE ELECTIONS THEME. THE UK ALSO DOES NOT FAVOUR TRANSMITTING TEXT OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION TO THE CHINESE.

(RCVD LDN 260813Z/HAP)



NO.		INIT.
1	AMBASSADOR CGU-SR/POR	TO
2	<del>SEC.</del> <del>SEC. (C)</del> <del>SEC. (C)</del> <del>SEC.</del>	
3	CONSULAR CI. T. & C. <del>D.N.D. (M.A.S.)</del> D.N.R.	R

*Handwritten signature*

7-1-1-1

FM EXTERNAL OTT NOV24/58 CONF  
 TO WASHDC Y328 OPIMMEDIATE  
 INFO CANDELNY PRIORITY LDN EMBASSYPARIS NATOPARIS  
 BAG CNBRA WLGTN TOKYO FM LDN  
 REF YOURTEL 2852 AND 2854 NOV21  
 KOREA-REPLY TO THE CHINESE NOTE OF NOV10



WHILE WENWOULD LIKE THE REPLY TO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS TO GO NO  
 RPT NO FURTHER THAN A FORMAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT SIMILAR TO THAT QUOTED  
 IN PARA1 YOURTEL 2852, WE WOULD NOT RPT NOT OBJECT TO THE REPLY  
 INCLUDING AN ADDITIONAL PARA DRAFTED ALONG THE LINES OF THAT  
 SUGGESTED BY PARSONS TO DE LA MARE. WE WOULD HOPE THAT THIS INCLUSION  
 WOULD RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF A MORE DETAILED REPLY LATER.  
 FURTHER CONSULTATION WITHIN THE 16 WOULD SEEM UNNECESSARY BECAUSE  
 THE CHINESE NOTE RAISES NO RPT NO NEW ISSUES. BESIDES SUCH CONSULT-  
 ATION HAS OFTEN PROVED DIFFICULT.

(RCVD LDN 250605Z/HAP)

NO.		INIT.
1	AMBASSADOR	
	<del>CONSULTOR</del>	
	<del>SECRETARY</del>	
	EC. (C)	
	CONSULAR CL.	
	<del>SECRETARY</del>	
2	D.N.B. (M.A.)	R
	D.N.R.	

*ofel*

FM WASHDC NOV21/58 CONF  
TO EXTERNAL 2854 OPIMMEDIATE  
INFO LDN CANDELNY EMBASSYPARIS NATOPARIS PRIORITY  
BAG CNBRA ULGTN TOKYO FM LDN  
REF LDN TEL 4310 NOV18  
KOREA:REPLY TO CHINESE NOTE NOV10



LANE(KOREA DESK OFFICER)TOLD US TODAY THAT A MEMO ON THIS SUBJECT  
SETTING FORTH THE STATE DEPT POSITION HAD GONE FORWARD TO THE ACTING  
SECRETARY TODAY FOR APPROVAL.

2. LANE SAID THAT THE MEMO PROPOSES THAT THE SIXTEEN SHOULD GIVE A PRO  
FORMA ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TO THE CHINESE NOTE NOV10. THE NOTE WOULD REFER  
TO PREVIOUS COMMUNICATIONS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE CHINESE AND THE  
SIXTEEN AND WOULD POINT OUT THAT THE QUESTIONS RAISED IN THE CHINESE  
NOTE OF NOV10 HAD ALREADY BEEN DEALT WITH IN PREVIOUS NOTES FROM  
THE SIXTEEN. THE NOTE WOULD END BY QUOTING THE RECENTLY APPROVED  
GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION ON KOREA.

3. LANE SAID THAT IF THE ACTING SECRETARY APPROVED THE APPROACH  
RECOMMENDED BY THE STATE DEPT A MEETING OF THE SIXTEEN WOULD BE CALLED  
PROBABLY ON MON, NOV24 WITH THE HOPE THAT EARLY AGREEMENT COULD BE  
OBTAINED AND THE REPLY TO THE CHINESE DISPATCHED LATER IN THE WEEK.

4. LANE EMPHASIZED THAT IN DRAFTING THE PROPOSED COMMUNICATION TO THE  
CHINESE THE STATE DEPT HAD ENDEAVOURED TO USE LANGUAGE WHICH WOULD  
NOT RPT NOT RAISE THE FAMILIAR DIFFICULTIES AMONGST THE SIXTEEN.

(RECD LDN 221618Z/RL)

NO.		INIT.
1	AMBASSADOR	
	<del>DEPUTY SECRETARY</del>	
2	<del>SECRETARY</del>	
	<del>ASSISTANT SECRETARY</del>	
	LEG. (C)	
	<del>CONSULAR CL.</del>	
	<del>SECRETARY</del>	
3	P.N.S. (M.A.)	K
	D.N.R.	

*Handwritten signature*

NO.	INIT.
1	AMBASSADOR
2	<del>CHIEF OF MISSION</del>
3	<del>SECRETARY</del>
	EC. (C)
	CONSULAR CL.
	T. C.
3	D.N.D. (M.A.)
	PARIS

*file*



FM WASHDC NOV21/58 CONFD  
 TO EXTERNAL 2852 PRIORITY  
 INFO CANDELNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS  
 BAG CNERA WLGTN TOKYO FM LDN  
 REF LDN TEL 4310 NOV18

KOREA:REPLY TO CHINESE NOTE NOV10

DE LA MARE OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY TODAY CIRCULATED TO REPS OF THE OLD COMMONWEALTH GOVTS THE FOLLOWING MEMO ON THIS SUBJECT. IN DOING SO HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE PROPOSED ADDITION QUOTED IN PARA3 TO A SIMPLE MSG OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT HAD BEEN DRAFTED BY HIM AND NOT RPT NOT BY THE STATE DEPT, ALTHOUGH IT WAS OF COURSE BASED ON VIEWS EXPRESSED BY THE STATE DEPT. BEGINS:

THE FO ARE INCLINED TO THINK THAT SINCE THE LATEST CHINESE NOTE CONTAINED NO NEW POINTS IT IS PROBABLY UNNECESSARY TO SEND A SUBSTANTIVE REPLY. THEY ARE ANXIOUS HOWEVER THAT A FORMAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE CHINESE NOTE, WHICH HAS NOW BEEN IN OUR HANDS TEN DAYS, SHOULD BE SENT WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY. THEY HAVE THEREFORE PROPOSED, SUBJECT TO THE VIEWS OF HM CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, PEKING, THE STATE DEPT AND YOURSELVES, A REPLY ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:

"HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES PRESENTS HIS COMPLIMENTS TO THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM HER MAJESTY'S PRINCIPAL SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAS THE HONOUR TO STATE THAT THE TEXT OF THE MINISTRY'S NOTE NO. ... OF NOV10 HAS BEEN COMMUNICATED AS REQUESTED TO THE GOVTS OF THE COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE CONTRIBUTED FORCES TO THE UN FORCE IN JOREA."

2. I HAVE PUT THIS SUGGESTION TO MR HOWARD PARSONS AT THE STATE DEPT. HE HAD PREVIOUSLY TOLD ME THAT ALTHOUGH THE CHINESE NOTE CONTAINS NO NEW POINTS THE STATE DEPT ARE DISTURBED BY THE STATEMENT IN IT THAT: "... UNDER THE DOMINATION OF THE USA, THE UN HAS BEEN REDUCED TO A BELLIGERENT IN THE KOREAN WAR AND LOST ALL COMPETENCE AND MORAL AUTHORITY TO DEAL FAIRLY AND REASONABLY WITH THE KOREAN QUESTION". MR PARSONS HAD NO DEFINITE VIEWS AS TO WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT THIS STATEMENT BUT HE THOUGHT THAT IT PROBABLY MEANT FURTHER TROUBLE FOR US. HE WAS ALSO CLEARLY RELUCTANT TO LET THE CHINESE HAVE THE LAST WORD.

PAGE TWO 2852

3. WHEN THEREFORE I PUT TO HIM THE PROPOSAL OF THE FO FOR A SIMPLE FORMAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE CHINESE NOTE HE HAD RESERVATIONS. I TOLD HIM THAT A SIMPLE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT NOW, WHICH WAS A MATTER OF ROUTINE COURTESY, WOULD NOT PRECLUDE US FROM SENDING A MORE DETAILED REPLY LATER IF WE SO WISHED, BUT HE CLEARLY HAD IT IN MIND THAT IF A SIMPLE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT WERE SENT NOW IT COULD BE DIFFICULT TO INTEREST THE "SIXTEEN" IN A DETAILED REPLY LATER. HE SAID THAT HIS OFFICE HAD NOT YET DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH MR WALTER ROBERTSON BUT THAT HIS PRELIMINARY REACTION WAS THAT IN ADDITION TO THE FORMAL PARA OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT QUOTED ABOVE OUR REPLY SHOULD GO ON TO SAY SOMETHING ON THESE LINES:

"THE POINTS MADE BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN THEIR NOTE UNDER REF HAVE ALREADY BEEN DEALT WITH IN HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES' NOTES OF THE 9TH OF APR AND THE 2ND OF JUL LAST. THE MATTER HAS SINCE BEEN FULLY DEBATED IN THE UN AND A RESOLUTION, THE TEXT OF WHICH IS ATTACHED, WAS PASSED BY THE UN IN PLENARY SESSION ON THE 14TH OF NOV BY 54 VOTES IN FAVOUR TO 9 AGAINST WITH 17 ABSTENTIONS."  
(HERE ATTACH TEXT OF RESOLUTION.)

4. I TOLD MR PARSONS THAT I THOUGHT THE FO WOULD BE OPPOSED TO EXPANDING THE REPLY IN THIS SENSE IF IT MEANT A FURTHER DELAY IN ITS DESPATCH. HM GOVT IN THE UK, AS THE RECIPIENTS OF THE CHINESE NOTE, WERE UNDER SOME OBLIGATION TO SEE THAT IT WAS PROMPTLY ACKNOWLEDGED AND WE THOUGHT IT WAS HIGH TIME TO DO SO. ENFS.

XKRCVD LDN 220849Z/HAP)



Canada

file 7-1-1-1  
AUSTRALIAN DELEGATION TO UNITED NATIONS  
COMMISSION FOR THE UNIFICATION AND  
REHABILITATION OF KOREA

SEOUL,  
KOREA.

Memo No: 583  
File No: 9/1

20th November 1958

The Secretary,  
Department of External Affairs,  
Canberra.

Periodic Report - 30th October to 19th November.

1. The President. Since his return from his state visit to Vietnam on 8th November, the President appears to have taken things quietly. He was obviously in good health as he came off the plane on his return, the newsreels of his visit show him as slightly more animated than usual while in Vietnam, and he has received his customary number of visitors each day since then. On his return, the Vice-President was on hand to greet him, and received a warm handshake and smile, which was something of a contrast to the rather offhand way in which Lee Ki Poong (who had rather pathetically waved a small ROK flag from the moment the plane touched down) was spoken to in passing.
2. The Foreign Minister, Dr. Cho, said that the visit had strengthened the political, military, economic and cultural ties between the two countries, but we believe this rather sweeping statement did not imply that anything concrete had been discussed during the visit, apart from a possible tariff agreement which could result in the ROK granting m.f.n. treatment to Vietnam, and in Vietnam halving their present tariffs on ROK goods. The Korean Republic, after saying that it was not for the ROK to tell Vietnam what to do in military matters, then proceeded to do exactly that, and say that Vietnam is not really debarred from entering into military alliances under the terms of the Geneva agreement. From the tone of this editorial, it can be inferred that the President was again told that Vietnam had no present intention of entering into any military pact.

nurtured
3. The hardy annual so tenderly/by the President - the idea of a North East Asia Treaty Organization - has been in prominence again in the past week, following a statement by Chiang Kai Shek that such an organization, to include China, the ROK, Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan, should be set up. However, the ROK's opposition to the participation of Japan, with her "dubious" attitude towards Communism, has not varied, and we believe that the Philippines Ambassador here is very chary of giving any encouragement to the idea of a closer alliance with potentially irresponsible partners such as China and the ROK.
4. A paragraph in the November 10th edition of "Newsweek", in which State Department sources were said to have stated that the President was of little help in dealing with a possible intensification of the cold war in Korea, as his health was bad and he was increasingly difficult to deal with, received some publicity in the local press. The American Embassy came out with a statement that there was "no substance" in the report, and have commented privately to us that it is obviously impossible for him to be "increasingly" difficult to deal with! A further remark in the Newsweek report, to the effect that "no successor is in sight", was condemned by the local press as a slight on Korean democracy, as the people would find his successor when the time came.

000775

2.

5. The Administration. The inspection of the Administration by the National Assembly has finished, with the exception of that of the Ministry of National Defence. The Democrats claimed that they had insufficient time to inspect thoroughly, and asked for an extension of 20 days, but this request was rejected by the Liberal majority. No major scandals emerged from the inspection - hence no doubt the Democrats' wish to probe deeper - and the present attack on the Administration is at present centred on the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Chung Jai Sul, and to a much smaller extent on the Finance Minister, Kim Hyun Chul. This attack is coming not only from the Democrats, but also from a large group of Liberal Assemblymen who wish to make Minister Chung take responsibility for allowing the price of rice to fall so low. A group of these Liberals has asked Lee Ki Poong to call on Chung to resign, and has spoken about introducing a no-confidence motion against him. A special meeting of the Cabinet considered the question on 13th November, and Chung was stoutly defended by the Finance Minister, who is now spoken of as "the strong man of the Cabinet"; Minister Kim said that even if Chung resigned the price would not rise, and clearly was of the same opinion as Chung when the latter said that some decline in the rice price was helpful to the stabilization programme and the maintenance of the 500-1 exchange rate. It seems unlikely that the President would willingly accept the resignation of any Minister who got into trouble trying to maintain the exchange rate, which is, of course, one of the President's most rigidly cherished ideas.

6. The Legislature. The National Assembly, whose standing committees are engaged in preliminary study of the 1959 budget, will soon take up discussion of a new National Security Law, introduced by the Government on 18th November. In an earlier memorandum we discussed the first draft of this law; this first draft was submitted to the Assembly on 8th November, but subsequently withdrawn for modification after differences of opinion between the Government and the Liberal Party became evident. The new text of the law was published only yesterday and we have not yet had time to study it fully in translation. Some of the more objectionable features of the early draft appear to have been dropped, but others remain, such as the use of statements to the police as evidence, penalties for libelling constitutional organizations, and so on; the independent press is very much on the defensive and the Democrats have committed themselves to blocking the passage of the Law by every possible means. The Liberals, on the other hand, say that they will give this law priority even over the budget and wish to have it passed by the end of the year, even if this means compiling a supplementary budget for January to see the Administration through until the full year's budget is passed. There is every indication that the struggle in the Assembly will be very fierce, but the possibility cannot be discounted that the Liberals are laying stress on this Law at the moment in order to effect some deal with the Democrats later in order to ensure the quick passage of the Budget; it might be remembered that they used this sort of strategy last year in connection with the Election law which was then so controversial.

7. Another legislative question which the Assembly may soon have to deal with is the establishment of a Central Bureau of Investigation (which was called for in Article 29 of the Prosecutors' Office Law but never established). This Bureau would theoretically coordinate the efforts of all intelligence agencies, both military and civilian, but there is opposition to its formation from those who feel there are already too many investigative organizations in Korea, by those who feel that the funds for it would be better applied elsewhere,

3.

and by those organizations, such as the Home Ministry, which feel that some of their authority might be reduced by this innovation.

8. The Judiciary. On 29th October, it was announced that Pyon Ok Chu, the Chief of the Seoul Appellate Court, had been elevated to the Supreme Court. This is of immediate interest mainly because Judge (New Justice) Pyon was the judge in charge of the Progressive Party's appeal. He is now eligible to take part in the hearing of the appeal against his former Court's verdict. Whether because of this fact or for other reasons, the Progressive Party defendants are now said to be despondent about their chances of securing acquittal from the Supreme Court. Certainly the present intensified anti-subversion campaign, while obviously justified in certain ways, is quite reminiscent of the "anti-peaceful unification" campaign which preceded the arrest of the progressives early this year.

9. The Taegu District Court has continued its hearing ~~xxx~~ of the case of the allegedly stolen votes at Yongil, about which we have reported earlier. The office-boy who says he stole the votes has made a full statement in court and reenacted his actions most convincingly on the spot. Two detectives have admitted that they saw him leaving the counting station but were told to ignore this by their superior. The wife of the Liberal candidate, Kim Ik No, has now been detained (when the court found that she was not pregnant as she had first said), and the press is starting to say that Kim Ik No is a very poor sort to allow this to happen to his wife while he remains free. The prosecutors are asking for permission to indict Kim Ik No, according to some reports, but the Justice Ministry appears reluctant still to allow this.

10. Another election case, this time from Kangwon-do, has now come into some prominence. The Secretary of the successful Liberal candidate in Yanggu (who won by a margin of some 650 votes, but whose victory was challenged by the runner-up, a Democrat) has given himself up to the police, confessing that, after the votes were impounded following the election, he broke into the warehouse where they were stored and inserted ~~xxx~~ 473 votes for the Liberal into the sealed boxes, and made 200 pro-Democrat votes invalid by staining them with ink. The secretary claims his conscience will not allow him to keep silence any longer, but another story is that he and the "successful" Liberal have since quarrelled over a kisaeng girl. The Supreme Court is to investigate this case towards the end of this month. P.S. It has just been reported that the Secretary has now told the prosecutors that he was lying!

11. Political Parties. The Liberal Party. The Liberals have postponed their national convention which was to be held on 9th and 10th December until some time next year. The reason given is that they do not wish to distract attention from the passage of the Budget and National Security Law. However, it would appear more probable that the Liberals still have factional problems to work out before holding their convention; just before the postponement was announced there was a further difference of opinion between the "mild faction" which wishes Lee Ki Poong to have authority to appoint party officials, and the "young faction" which wishes to have them elected. Moreover, the "Tough faction", led by Chang Kyung Gun (now in Japan at the ROK-Japan talks) is seeking ways to make up the ground it lost early this year; when Chang was back for consultations early this month, he is thought to have seen the leader of the Unification Party, Kim Jun Yon, who has been confusing the political issue somewhat (see below, "Unification Party"), and it is also thought that he has formed

4.

some sort of political alliance with Yu Tae Ha, the Head of the Korean Mission in Japan, who has, as is well known, a means of direct approach to the President. There are continued reports of Lee Ki Poong's bad health - although the Seoul Shinmun goes out of its way almost daily to say how well he is - and it would appear that the other contestants for power are jockeying for position. In this regard, there is an interesting report that the Mayor of Seoul, the able and intelligent Huh Chung, who at one time looked as if he might be heading for the Cabinet, may soon be replaced by a party man such as Lee Kun Jik, the former Home Minister. Whether this means that Huh Chung will be entirely dropped, or whether he may come into greater political prominence is not at the moment clear. In a recent conversation Mayor Huh said that he did not expect to stay in his present position for long, but that he would retire again when he left office as mayor.

12. The Democratic Party. The Democratic Party convention was held on 30th October and passed off quietly despite predictions of factional fights. Chough Pyong Ok was elected Senior Supreme Commissioner (the post he held until last year), and the other members of the Supreme Committee remained the same, viz. Chang Myun, Paik Nam Hun, Kwak Sang Hun, Pak Sun Ch'on. There was however a move to replace the last of these by Kim Do Yon, but this old faction manoeuvre did not get very far. The convention also passed resolutions calling for a revised election law, the early formation of the House of Councillors, opposition to the new National Security Law, and opposition to any reduction in local autonomy (such as the appointment and not election of mayors of cities and towns). However, after the convention was over, a clash developed between the old and new factions over appointments to other party posts, and particularly that of Floor Leader in the Assembly. The new faction has had Oh Uj Yong as floor leader since September, and there had been some criticism of his tendency to be both intriguing and ineffective. However, this did not appear serious, and it appeared to be arranged that Oh would be reelected floor leader, with Kim U. Taek (old faction) as his deputy. Yu Chin San (old faction) was to become Vice Chairman of the Central Standing Committee, and thus the factions would be equally balanced both in the House and on the Standing Committee, as far as office-holding goes. However, Yu Chin San resigned as Vice-Chairman as soon as he was elected, and was promptly elected floor leader by the old faction and some from the middle of the road; Kim U. Taek was reelected deputy floor leader, and the old faction of Chough Pyong Ok had seized both parliamentary leadership positions. This appears to have been a protest by the old faction and the middle of the road faction against the arbitrariness of the new faction, led by Chang Myun, in making party appointments. It shows that Chough Pyong Ok has gained strength within the party - he is said to have particular support from the Cholla and South Kyongsang delegates - and the new faction lost a little ground. Chough came out at the convention with a further plea for a real cabinet responsibility system; it could be that he sees himself as Prime Minister eventually, with Chang Myun and another new faction man (Cheong Il Myong is one suggestion) kicked upstairs to be President and Vice-President respectively.

13. The Democratic Party's fervent appeals for an end to corruption in government must have sounded slightly embarrassing to them last week when four members of the Seoul City Council, three of them Democrats, and one a former Democrat, were detained by the prosecutors on charges of having taken bribes from candidates for positions on the Seoul City Education Committee. The Democrats promptly disowned their erring brothers, saying that if the charges were well-founded (and they did not make any attempt to claim that this was political persecution), they would be expelled from the party. The prosecutors and the

5.

Seoul Shinmun have followed the case with rare delight.

14. The Unification Party. Mr. Kim Jun Yon, the defecting Democrat who forced the Unification Party late last year, has caused something of a stir by saying on several occasions recently that in the 1960 presidential elections his party will support President Rhee, and that he, Kim, will run for Vice-president. The Liberals, who are nervous lest they lose the President's favour and who know that the President personally likes Kim, said it was unethical to steal the head of another party in this way. We have mentioned above the reported connection between Kim, Chang Kyung Gun and Yu Tae Ha; there may be nothing in this, but a member of the Unification Party to whom we have spoken did nothing to deny it, as it obviously builds their otherwise negligible party up a little more. The Unification party members are active in two other ways that we know of at the moment - slandering the Democrats by saying that, after Shinicky's death in 1956, all but a few Democrats in high positions favoured voting for Cho Bong Am rather than Syngman Rhee, and also stating, wrongly, we believe, that the US favours the holding of elections for unification in North Korea only, and that therefore the President is perfectly right in insisting on this point.

(H.A. Dunn)  
Representative.

FM N NOV18/58 CONFD

TO EXTERNAL 4310 PRIORITY

INFO WASHDC PRIORITY CANDELNY EMBASSYPARIS NATOPARIS

BAG CNBRA WLGTN TOKYO FM LDN

REF CANDELNY TEL1867 NOV10

KOREA



THE FO DID NOT WISH TO SUGGEST ANY ACTION ON THE CHINESE NOTE OF NOV10 AS LONG AS THE KOREAN ITEM WAS STILL BEFORE THE UN WITH THE KOREAN ITEM NOW APPARENTLY DISPOSED OF IN THE UN UNTIL THE NEXT SESSION, WE ASKED GIFFARD (JAPAN AND KOREA DESK OFFICER) THIS MORNING WHAT REPLY IF ANY THE FO THOUGHT SHOULD BE MADE TO THE CHINESE NOTE.

2. GIFFARD SAID THAT THE FO HAD NO INTENTION OF TAKING ANY INITIATIVE WITH THE STATE DEPT CONCERNING A REPLY BUT WOULD SUGGEST TO THE UK EMBASSY IN WASHDC THAT THE BEST ACTION MIGHT BE TO SEND SOON AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT TO THE CHINESE, SIMPLY SAYING THAT THEIR MSG HAD BEEN PASSED ON TO THE SIXTEEN. THERE WOULD THEN BE PLENTY OF TIME FOR THE SIXTEEN TO CONSIDER WHETHER ANY FURTHER REPLY NEED BE SENT. GIFFARD REMARKED THAT HE REALLY DID NOT KNOW WHAT THERE WAS TO SAY, SINCE THE CHINESE NOTE DID NOT RAISE ANY NEW POINTS.

NO.		INIT.
1	AMBASSADOR	
	CONSULTOR	
2	<del>SECRETARY</del>	
	<del>SEC. (D)</del>	
	<del>SEC. (C)</del>	
	<del>CONSULAR CI.</del>	
	<del>SEC.</del>	
3	<del>D.N.D. (M.A.)</del>	
	<del>B.N.R.</del>	

*He*

7-1-1-1

FM NOV13/58 RESTD

TO EXTERNAL 4272 PRIORITY

INFO WASHDC CANDELNY

BAG CNBRA WLGTN TOKYO FM LDN

REF CANDELNY TEL 1867 NOV10

KOREA



THE UK CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN PEKING HAS REPORTED TO THE FO THAT THE PEOPLE'S DAILY OF NOV11 AND TAKUNG PAO OF THE SAME DATE CARRIED A COMMENTATOR'S ARTICLE AND AN EDITORIAL RESPECTIVELY ON THE LATEST CHINESE NOTE ON KOREA, WHICH WAS PRINTED IN FULL ON THE FRONT OF THE PEOPLE'S DAILY TOGETHER WITH THE TEXT OF THE NOTE OF JUL2 FROM THE "FIFTEEN".

2. THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES SUMMARIZED THE MAIN POINTES IN BOTH THESE ARTICLES AS FOLLOWS:

BEGINS: (A) THE USA WISHES TO KEEP ITS FORCES IN KOREA BY INSISTING ON THE DEMAND FOR KOREAN GENERAL ELECTIONS UNDER UN SUPERVISION BUT THE KOREAN PEOPLE COULD NOT RPT NOT FREELY EXPRESS THEIR WISHES UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS AND THE UN SUPERVISORY COMMISSION IS SO COMPROMISED THAT THEY ARE NO RPT NO LONGER IN A POSITION TO CONDUCT SUCH ELECTIONS FAIRLY. (B) THE USA WILL GET NOWHERE IN THE PRESENT DEBATES OF THE UN BY USING THIS ORGANIZATION TO FURTHER ITS AGGRESSION IN KOREA. (C) CHINA COMPLETELY WITHDREW HER TROOPS ON OCT28 THUS CREATING THE CONDITIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THE GOVTS WHO FOLLOW THE AMERICAN LEAD IN KOREA MUST RECONSIDER THEIR POSITION AND PRESS THE USA TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS TOO. (D) THE USA HAS RECENTLY EVEN IMPORTED MODERN WEAPONS INTO KOREA THUS SHOWING ITS INTENTION TO TURN THE COUNTRY INTO A "COLONIAL WAR BASE". BUT THE USA CAN NO RPT NO LONGER ESCAPE THE CONDEMNATION OF WORLD PUBLIC OPINION AND EVENTUALLY THEY WILL BE THROWN OUT BY THE KOREAN PEOPLE. ENDS

NO.	INIT.
2	RB
AMBASSADOR	
1	
SECRETAR CL.	
3	R.
END (M.A.)	
DNKR.	

*Handwritten signature/initials*

7-3-1-2  
7-1-1-1

FM WASHDC NOV13/58 CONFID

TO EXTERNAL 2793

INFO CANDELNY LDN EMBASSYPARIS NATOPARIS

BAG CNBRA WLGTN ~~TOKYO~~ FM LDN

CANDEL TEL 1867 NOV10

KOREA



WE WERE INFORMED BY LANE (KOREA DESK OFFICER) YESTERDAY THAT THE STATE DEPT HAD NOT RPT NOT YET DEVELOPED ANY VIEWS ON THE CHINESE MSG QUOTED IN THE REF TEL. LANE SAID THAT THE DEPARTMENTAL DISCUSSIONS OF THE NOTE SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY FRI. HE ADDED THAT HIS PERSONAL VIEW WAS THAT IF ANY REPLY WERE TO BE SENT (AND ONE MIGHT BE DESIRABLE IN VIEW OF THE PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE WHICH PEKING MIGHT GAIN BY THE FAILURE OF THE SIXTEEN TO REPLY) IT SHOULD BE MERELY A BRIEF RESTATEMENT OF THE POSITION OF THE SIXTEEN WITH RESPECT TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES AND THAT IT SHOULD BE SENT QUICKLY.


2. LANE SAID THAT THE STATE DEPT WAS WELL SATISFIED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE KOREAN DEBATE IN THE FIRST COMMITTEE. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY GRATIFIED BY THE MANNER IN WHICH THE KOREAN AMBASSADOR HAD CARRIED ON HIS LOBBYING AND THE MODERATE TONE OF HIS STATEMENTS.

(RECD LDN 140755Z/RL)

NO.		INIT.
2	AMBASSADOR	R
	<del>CONFIDENTIAL</del>	
1	<del>SECRET</del>	
2	<del>SECRET</del>	
	<del>SECRET</del>	
	CH. J. LAR. CL.	
	<del>SECRET</del>	
3	<del>SECRET</del> (M.A.)	R
	B.N.R.	

*Handwritten signature/initials*

FM C DELNY (NOV 12/58) CONF



TOKYO

NO.	INIT.
2	B
AMBASSADOR	
<del>CONSULTANT</del>	
1 <del>SEC.</del>	
2nd SEC. (P)	
2nd SEC. (C)	
A.O.	
CONSULAR CL.	
T. & C.	
3 <del>D.N.D. (MAY)</del>	
D.N.R.	

*file*

EXTERNAL 1879 PRIORITY

INFO LDN WASHDC EMBASSYPARIS NATOPARIS

REF OURTEL 1853 NOV8

FIRST COMMITTEE KOREA

THE DEBATE ON KOREA CONCLUDED THIS MORNING WITH THE ADOPTION OF THE 13 POWER RESOLUTION BY A VOTE OF 54 TO 9 WITH 18 ABSTENTIONS.

2. ON MON THE DEBATE CAME TO AN END WITH A SERIES OF, ON THE WHOLE, ROUTINE SPEECHES. ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET BLOC EMPHASIZED THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CHINESE FORCES THEY FAILED TO EXPLOIT THIS FACTOR TO ANYTHING LIKE THE EXTENT WE HAD EXPECTED. ZORIN'S FINAL SPEECH WAS A RELATIVELY MODERATE ONE AND IN PLACES ALMOST LIGHTHEARTED. HE FAILED TO PRODUCE ANY AMENDEMENTS OR PROCEDURAL GIMMICKS AND WENT TO THE VOTE WITHOUT PROTEST.

3. FROM THE CANADIAN POINT OF VIEW THE MOST INTERESTING ASPECT OF MON'S DEBATE WAS THE ATTENTION PAID TO OUR STATEMENT. ON FRI THE JAPANESE REP HAD IDENTIFIED HIS POSITION WITH OURS ON THE NEED FOR A FLEXIBLE APPROACH. MON MORNING THE CEYLONESE REP, SIR CLAUDE COREA, MADE A PLEA FOR REEXAMINATION OF THE UN POSITION AS PRESENTED IN PREVIOUS RESOLUTIONS. HE CITED AS "WISE WORDS" OUR STATEMENT THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR ELECTIONS COULD BE ACHIEVED ONLY BY A PROCESS OF CONSULTATION AND NEGOTIATION. SIR CLAUDE ALSO ASKED THE NORTHKOREANS TO PROCEED WITH PLANS FOR ELECTIONS REGARDLESS OF THE PRESENCE OF UN FORCES IN THE COUNTRY AND AT THE SAME TIME ASKED THOSE COUNTRIES STILL MAINTAINING FORCES WHETHER OR NOT RPT NOT THEY COULD NOT RPT NOT WITHDRAW THEM AND LEAVE THE DEFENCE OF SOUTHKOREA TO ITS OWN CONSIDERABLE ARMY. THERE WERE SUBSEQUENT MURMURS OF APPROVAL ABOUT THE ATTITUDE EXPRESSED BY CANADA AND JAPAN FROM OTHER QUARTERS. THE IRISH, IN A BRIEF EXPLANATION OF VOTE, ASSOCIATED THEMSELVES EXPLICITLY WITH US AND THE REP OF PERU, SR BELAUNDE, PRONOUNCED THE ULTIMATE ACCOLADE BY SAYING WE HAD ARGUED ELOQUENTLY.

4. THE POLES INFORMED US PRIVATELY THAT THEIR ATTITUDE HAD BEEN CONSIDERABLY AFFECTED BY THE POSITION WE HAD TAKEN AND LEWANDOWSKI EXTENDED IN HIS STATEMENT A CAUTIOUS HAND IN OUR DIRECTION. HE ARGUED THAT THE TIME HAD COME FOR THE UN TO REVISE ITS ATTITUDE. HE

A VERY GOOD REPORT  
*Ball*

PAGE TWO 1879

SAID THAT THE DELS OF CANADA JAPAN AND SEVERAL OTHERS HAD ADVISED  
"SOME FLEXIBILITY IN THE ATTITUDE OF THE MAJORITY" AND HOPED THAT  
"MORE OF US PRESENT HERE WILL BE GUIDED BY THE REALISTIC APPROACH  
IN THE FUTURE". THE POLE NOTED THAT OUR RATHER ADVANCED VIEWS HAD  
BEEN EXPRESSED PRETTY CAUTIOUSLY, AND THIS THEME WAS EMPHASIZED STILL  
MORE BY ZORIN DURING HIS SPEECH IN THE AFTERNOON. THE POLES PRIVATELY  
DREW TO OUR ATTENTION THE FACT THAT ZORIN'S COMMENTS ON OUR STATE-  
MENTS WERE QUITE DIFFERENT FROM THE ROUTINE DENUNCIATION WE HAD  
RECEIVED ON FRI FROM THE UKRANIANS AND IMPLIED THAT THEY HAD HAD A  
HAND IN THE CONVERSION.

5. ZORIN SET THE NOTE FOR HIS SPEECH AT THE BEGINNING BY SAYING THAT  
THE USA SEEMED TO BE SO ENTRANCED BY THE FLIGHT OF ITS ROCKETS THAT  
THEY IGNORED WHAT WAS HAPPENING ON OUR "SINFUL EARTH". AFTER PUNCHING  
THE AUSTRALIANS AND AMERICANS WITH CONVENTIONAL ARGUMENTS AND  
SUGGESTING THAT THE UK REP HAD NOT RPT NOT THE COURAGE OF HIS CONVIC-  
TIONS BECAUSE HE SAT BESIDE THE REP OF THE USA, ZORIN MADE AN  
EXTENDED REF TO THE CANADIAN POSITION. THE THEME OF MOST OF HIS  
ARGUMENT WAS THAT THE KOREANS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO SIT DOWN AND  
NEGOTIATE WITH EACH OTHER WITHOUT THE ASSISTANCE OF "FOREIGN NURSES,  
FOREIGN NANNIES AND FOREIGN TROOPS". HE SAID HE COULD NOT RPT NOT  
PASS OVER IN SILENCE THE SPEECH OF THE CANADIAN REP WHO, AT THE VERY  
END OF HIS SPEECH, VERY MODESTLY AND RETICENTLY EXPRESSED CERTAIN  
THOUGHTS WHICH ARE DISTINCTLY WORTHY OF ATTENTION". HE CITED OUR  
STATEMENT THAT THE UN SHOULD UNDERSTAND WHAT IT COULD DO AND COULD  
NOT RPT NOT DO AND OUR ARGUMENT THAT WE SHOULD NOT RPT NOT CLING TO  
ATTITUDES AND FORMULAE WHICH DID NOT RPT NOT FIT THE FACTS. ALTHOUGH  
HE THOUGHT THESE WERE WISE WORDS HE NOTED "THAT THE REP OF CANADA  
TRIED TO PUT ONE FOOT ON THE SOIL OF SOUND AND RELEVANT FACTS, BUT  
THEN HE SHYLY PULLED IT BACK AND STARTED AGAIN ON THE OLD AND WHAT  
HE THOUGHT, SAFE AND SOUND POSITION AS SET OUT IN THE DRAFT RESOLU-  
TION OF AUSTRALIA AND THE OTHER 12 COUNTRIES THE OLD FAMILIAR SOIL".  
THE UNFORTUNATE DR MATSUDAIRA WAS THEN DESCRIBED AS A "SHY BUT  
CONSISTENT FOLLOWER" OF THE CANADIAN POSITION. ZORIN SAID THAT THE  
FACT THAT THOUGHTS OF THIS KIND HAD BEEN EXPRESSED BY CANADA AND

PAGE THREE 1879

IN, WHO HAD BEEN A PARTY TO THE GENERAL POLICY WITH REGARD TO KOREA" HAVE GIVEN US SOME SECOND THOUGHTS". APPARENTLY THE NEW SITUATION WHICH HAD OBTAINED WITHIN THE LAST YEAR AT LEAST, HE SAID, SEEMED TO HAVE CALLED FOR OR REQUIRED THE REVIEW OF CERTAIN OLD POSITIONS (WE DREW TO THE ATTENTION OF A MEMBER OF THE SOVIET DEL AFTER THE DEBATE THAT OUR POSITION WAS NOT RPT NOT A NEW ONE AND THAT WE HAD SAID SIMILAR THINGS IN THE KOREAN DEBATE FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS).

6. THERE WAS AN EXCHANGE DURING THE DEBATE BETWEEN CEYLON AND SWEDEN WHICH WAS OF SOME INTEREST. THE REP OF CEYLON HAD BLAMED THE NEUTRAL NATIONS SUPERVISORY COMMISSION FOR NOT RPT NOT OBSERVING THE WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE TROOPS AND SAID THE COMMISSION HAD TAKEN AN IRRESPONSIBLE ATTITUDE BY INVOKING LEGALISTIC REASONS. THE SWEDISH REP REPLIED THE NEXT DAY, SAYING THAT THE TERMS OF REF OF THE NNSC WERE CLEARLY DEFINED AND WERE RESTRICTED TO CONTROL, INSPECTION AND INVESTIGATION. SHE SAID IT HAD NOT RPT NOT ALWAYS PROVED POSSIBLE TO CARRY OUT EVEN THESE LIMITED FUNCTIONS. THIS HAD LED SWEDEN TO WONDER WHETHER IT SHOULD CONTINUE SERVING ON THE COMMISSION. THE COMMISSION COULD ACT ONLY IF THERE WAS AGREEMENT BY BOTH PARTIES. FOR THIS REASON THE NNSC HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN ABLE TO INSPECT THE WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE TROOPS. THE STATEMENT WAS SO TORTUOUSLY SWEDISH THAT IT IS NOT RPT NOT VERY EASY TO FIGURE OUT EXACTLY WHAT IT MEANT. SWEDEN, IT MIGHT BE NOTED, VOTED FOR THE 13 POWER RESOLUTION.

7. ON THE WHOLE WE ARE INCLINED TO THINK THAT THE CANADIAN POINT OF VIEW ON KOREA MADE A LITTLE MORE HEADWAY THIS TIME THAN PREVIOUSLY. IT SECURED MORE OPEN SUPPORT AND SEEMED TO RALLY SUPPORT FROM MANY WHO WERE SOMEWHAT IMPATIENT OF THE CONVENTIONAL UN POSITION. WE HAD THE LOYAL SUPPORT OF NZ THROUGHOUT. WE MADE SOME CONTRIBUTION TO OUR REPUTATION AMONG THE ASIANS FOR INDEPENDENT THINKING, AND BY PUTTING A MORE REASONABLE FACE ON THE UN POSITION, MAY HAVE BEEN TO SOME EXTENT RESPONSIBLE FOR TAKING THE STING OUT OF THE COMMUNIST ATTACK. WE HAD BEEN SO WARMLY CONGRATULATED BY THE SOUTHKOREANS AND THE AMERICANS AFTER OUR STATEMENT THAT WE HAD WONDERED IF OUR POINTS HAD REGISTERED AT ALL. OUR HERESIES WERE, HOWEVER, WELL BALANCED BY VIGOROUS


... 4

000785

PAGE FOUR 1879

DENUNCIATION OF COMMUNIST SINS, AND THIS WAS ENOUGH FOR SENATOR  
HICKENLOOPER, WHO AT NO RPT NO TIME SEEMED TO COMPREHEND WHAT WE  
WERE DRIVING AT.

FM CANDELNY NOV10/58 RESTD  
TO PERMANENT 1867 PRIORITY  
INFO WASHDC LDN  
BAG CNBRA WLGTN TOKYO FM LDN  
KOREA



NO.	2	AMBASSADOR	INIT.
		CONSULOR	R
		SEC. (C)	
		CONSULAR CI.	
		T. & C.	
		D.N.R. (M.A.)	
		D.N.R.	

FOLLOWING IS TEXT, GIVEN TO US BY UK DEL, OF A NOTE WHICH WAS COMMUNICATED ON NOV10 BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN PEKING TO THE UK CHARGE D'AFFAIRES.

*file*

\*THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA PRESENTS ITS COMPLIMENTS TO THE OFFICE OF THE BRITISH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES IN CHINA AND REQUESTS IT TO COMMUNICATE THE FOLLOWING TO THE BRITISH GOVT AND, THROUGH IT, TO THE GOVTS OF THE OTHER COUNTRIES ON THE UN COMMAND SIDE. THE CHINESE GOVT, IN ITS OWN PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF KOREA, REPLIES AS FOLLOWS TO NOTE NO 64 DELIVERED TO THE CHINESE GOVT ON JUL2/58 BY THE BRITISH GOVT ON BEHALF OF THE GOVTS OF THE COUNTRIES ON THE UN COMMAND SIDE. THE CHINESE PEOPLES VOLUNTEERS HAVE ALREADY COMPLETELY WITHDRAWN FROM KOREA. THIS INITIATIVE TAKEN BY THE KOREAN AND CHINESE SIDE HAS BROKEN THE STALEMATE ON THE KOREAN QUESTION AND PROVIDED A FAVOURABLE CONDITION FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION. SHOULD THE UN COMMAND SIDE TAKE CORRESPONDING MEASURES TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES TOO FROM KOREA, THE PROSPECTS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY IMPROVE GREATLY. THE KOREAN AND CHINESE GOVTS CANNOT RPT NOT BUT POINT OUT WITH REGRET, HOWEVER, THAT THE UN COMMAND SIDE HAS UP TO NOW NOT RPT NOT ONLY FAILED TO TAKE ANY CORRESPONDING MEASURE BUT HAS, IN CONTINUOUS VIOLATION OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, UNLAWFULLY INTRODUCED NEW TYPE WEAPONS INTO KOREA AND ESTABLISHED GUIDED MISSILE BASES IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF KOREA. THESE FACTS ONCE AGAIN PROVIDE A LIVING PROOF AS TO WHO WANT PEACE AND WHO IS CARRYING OUT AGGRESSION, AS TO WHO IS WORKING FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION AND WHO IS OBSTRUCTING IT. ONE CAN NOT RPT NOT HELP ASKING: IF TH UN COMMAND SIDE BELIEVES THEIR STAND TO BE COMFORMABLE TO THE INTERESTS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE, WHY DON'T THEY WITHDRAW FROM SOUTHKOREA AND LET

PAGE TWO 1867

THE KOREAN PEOPLE SETTLE~~D~~ BY THEMSELVES THEIR OWN QUESTION FREE FROM ALL INTERFERENCE OF OUTSIDE FORCE? REGARDING THE QUESTION OF ELECTIONS RAISED IN THE NOTE OF THE UN COMMAND SIDE, THE KOREAN GOVT ALREADY SET FORTH CLEARLY ITS VIEWS IN ITS STATEMENT OF FEB 5/58, NAMELY, THAT WITHIN A DEFINITE PERIOD AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA, ALL - KOREAN FREE ELECTIONS SHOULD BE HELD AND THAT THESE ELECTIONS CAN BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A NEUTRAL NATIONS ORGANISATION. SHOULD THE GOVT OF THE COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE UN FORCES HAVE ACTUALLY THE DESIRE TO SEE "UNIFIED", INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC KOREA BROUGHT ABOUT BY PEACEFUL MEANS, IT WILL NOT BE DIFFICULT TO ATTAIN A REASONABLE SOLUTION TO SPECIFIC QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE ELECTIONS THROUGH FURTHER CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED FOLLOWING THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF THE FORCES OF THE USA AND OTHER COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING IN THE UN FORCES FROM KOREA. FROM THE TWO <sup>NOTES</sup> OTAS<sup>OF</sup> THE UN COMMAND SIDE, HOWEVER, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT FOR ONE TO BELIEVE THAT THEY HAVE SUCH A DESIRE. THE UN COMMAND SIDE HAS REPEATEDLY INSISTED ON THE SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION UNDER THE UNILATERAL TERMS OF THE UN. BUT IT IS KNOWN TO ALL THAT, UNDER THE DOMINATION OF THE USA, THE UN HAS BEEN REDUCED TO A BELLIGERENT IN THE KOREAN WAR AND LOST ALL COMPETENCE AND MORAL AUTHORITY TO DEAL FAIRLY AND REASONABLY WITH THE KOREAN QUESTION, HAVING (TRIED?) BY MEANS OF WAR TO IMPOSE ON THE KOREAN PEOPLE THE UNILATERAL TERMS OF THE UN FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION, THE UN COMMAND NOW STILL PERSISTS IN THESE TERMS, WHAT OTHER INTERPRETATION CAN THERE BE THAN THAT IT IS BENT ON OBSTRUCTING THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION AND MAINTAINING AND AGGRAVATING THE TENSION IN KOREA AND THE FAREAST? THE KOREAN AND CHINESE GOVTS ARE OF THE OPINION THAT THE CONTINUED PRESENCE IN SOUTH KOREA OF THE FORCES OF THE USA AND OTHER COUNTRIES TAKING PART IN THE UN FORCES IS AT PRESENT THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION. SO LONG AS THEY DO NOT RPT NOT WITHDRAW FROM KOREA, THEY WILL NOT RPT NOT ESCAPE THE OPPOSITION AND

...3

PAGE THREE 1867

CONDEMNATION OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE LONGING FOR PEACEFUL UNIFICATION AND THAT OF THE PEACE LOVING PEOPLES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. THE KOREAN AND CHINESE GOVTS HOPE THAT THE GOVTS OF THE COUNTRIES ON THE UN COMMAND SIDE WOULD RECONSIDER THEIR RIGID STAND AND TAKE POSITIVE MEASURES IN CONFORMITY WITH THE NATIONAL ASPIRATIONS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE AND THE DESIRE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD FOR PEACE. "

(RECD LDN 110801Z/RL)





PAGE TWO 1853

NOTED THAT WE HAD EXPRESSED OURSELVES IN FAVOUR OF CONSULTATION WITH THE KOREAN PEOPLE ON UNIFICATION, BUT HE CRITICIZED US FOR SUGGESTING THAT ELECTIONS COULD TAKE PLACE WITH THE CPV WITHDRAWN BUT WITH THE USA AND OTHER TROOPS STILL IN KOREA.

2 -

*Esther*  
*V. J. J.*



FM WASHDC NOV 6/58 CONF  
TO EXTERNAL 1837 PRIORITY  
INFO WASHDC LDN EMBASSY PARIS NATO PARIS

FIRST COMMITTEE KOREA

IN TODAY'S SESSION KOREA NZ UK NETHERLANDS CZECHOSLOVAKIA CANADA  
AND BELGIUM MADE STATEMENTS. THE TEXT OF OUR STATEMENT IS BEING  
FORWARDED BY BAG.

2. THE DEBATE WAS PRETTY STATIC. IT DEALT TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT  
WITH THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL VIRTUES OF NORTH KOREA ON THE ONE SIDE,  
AND SOUTH KOREA ON THE OTHER. THE SPEAKERS LIST CLOSES TONIGHT, AND  
THERE HAS AS YET BEEN NO RPT NO RUSH TO TAKE THE FLOOR, PARTICULARLY  
ON THE PART OF THE ASIANS. SO FAR THERE SEEMS TO BE LESS DISPOSITION  
THAN WE HAD EXPECTED ON THE COMMUNIST SIDE TO MAKE SOMETHING MAJOR  
OF THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL, AND THE DEBATE MAY CONTINUE IN A ROUTINE  
FASHION.

NO.		INIT.
2	AMBASSADOR	15
1	CONSULTOR	
	<del>SEC.</del>	
	2nd SEC. (C)	
	1st SEC. (C)	
	NO.	
	CONSULAR CL.	
	T. & C.	
3	DND (MA)	tc
	D.N.R.	

*pl*

TOKYO



FM CANDELNY NOV5/58 CONFD  
TO EXTERNAL 1831 PRIORITY  
INFO LDN WASHDC EMBASSYPARIS NATOPARIS  
REF OURTEL 1806 NOV4  
FIRST COMMITTEE KOREA


IN TODAY'S SESSION VOTING TOOK PLACE ON THE REPRESENTATION OF NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA IN THE DEBATE ON KOREA. IN THE VOTING WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE MORNING SESSION THE SOVIET RESOLUTION, WHICH PROPOSED THAT BOTH THE REPS OF SOUTH KOREA AND NORTH KOREA SHOULD BE INVITED TO ATTEND THE DEBATE, WAS REJECTED BY A VOTE OF 17 IN FAVOUR, 42 AGAINST AND 18 ABSTENTIONS (CANADA). THERE WAS ALSO A USA DRAFT RESOLUTION WHICH INVITED ONLY THE SOUTH KOREAN REP. AN INDIAN AMENDMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE NORTH KOREAN REP SHOULD BE INVITED AS WELL WAS DEFEATED BY A VOTE OF 21 IN FAVOUR, 42 AGAINST AND 14 ABSTENTIONS (CANADA). THE USA RESOLUTION WAS THEN ADOPTED BY A VOTE OF 51 IN FAVOUR (CANADA), 10 AGAINST (SOVIET BLOC) WITH 16 ABSTENTIONS.

2. THE SCANDINAVIANS AND "HONORARY" SCANDINAVIANS LIKE AUSTRIA AND ISRAEL ABSTAINED ON THE SOVIET DRAFT AND THE INDIAN AMENDMENT.

3. HICKENLOOPER (USA) MADE A STATEMENT, RATHER EMOTIONAL IN CHARACTER AND NOT RPT NOT VERY HELPFUL, WHICH DWELT OVERLY ON THE VIRTUES OF SOUTH KOREA AND THE PAST HISTORY OF THE KOREAN PROBLEM. ZORIN (USSR) WAS EVEN MORE UNCONSTRUCTIVE ON THE OTHER SIDE AND THE DISCUSSION AS A WHOLE WAS UNEDIFYING.

NO.		INIT.
2	AMBASSADOR ✓	B
	COUNSELLOR	
1	1st SEC.	
	2nd SEC. (P)	
	2nd SEC. (C)	
	I.O.	
	CONSULAR CL.	
	T. & C.	
3	D.N.D. (M.A.)	
	D.N.R.	

*Handwritten signature or initials.*



FM LDN NOV4/58 CONF  
EXTERNAL 4165 PRIORITY  
INFO CANDELNY PRIORITY

NO.	AMBASSADOR <del>SECRETOR</del> 1 REC. 2nd T. C. FOR 10 EG. (C) Q. CONSULAR CL. F. & C. <del>2nd (M.A.)</del> D.N.R.	INIT. B
-----	--	------------

*Handwritten initials*

WASHDC EMBASSYPARIS  
BAG CNBRA WLGTN ~~TOKYO~~ FM LDN  
REF OUR TEL 4140 NOV3  
CHINESE WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA

THE FO HAS NOW GIVEN US A COPY OF A FURTHER TEL ON THIS SUBJECT FROM THE UK EMBASSY IN PEKING IN WHICH WILSON REFERS TO HIS PREVIOUS MSG, QUOTED IN OUR REF TEL, AND COMMENTS AS FOLLOWS: BEGINS: THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CPV HAS BEEN GIVEN A BIG BUILD-UP IN ALL THE NATIONAL PAPERS DURING THE PAST WEEK, AND ON OCT29 TEMPORARILY DISPLACED THE STRAITS QUESTION IN THE PRESS. BUT DESPITE THE BANDS AND FIRECRACKERS, THE APPLAUSE GREETING THE DELEGATION ON THEIR ARRIVAL IN PEKING WAS BY NO MEANS TUMULTUOUS. THE COMMUNISTS HAVE USED THE OCCASION AS A "DEMONSTRATION OF CHINA'S PEACEFUL INTENTIONS" ALREADY SAID TO HAVE BEEN DISPLAYED THROUGH THEIR CEASE-FIRE PROPOSALS IN THE FORMOSA AREA IN CONTRAST TO THE AMERICANS' REFUSAL TO WITHDRAW FROM SOUTH KOREA AND TAIWAN. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THEY HAVE ADVANCED THE TIME OF THE FINAL COMPLETION OF THE WITHDRAWAL BY TWO MONTHS FROM THE SCHEDULED DATE IN ORDER TO GAIN MAXIMUM PROPAGANDA VALUE FROM IT.

2. THERE ARE AS YET NO SIGNS THAT ANY FURTHER MOVE WITH REGARD TO KOREA IS PLANNED. NONE OF THE THREE SPEAKERS AT THE MASS RALLY IN PEKING SPOKE OF THE PROSPECT OR POSSIBILITY OF ELECTIONS. THE ONLY REFS TO UNIFICATION HAVE BEEN THAT IN GENERAL YANG YUNG'S SPEECH, AND IN THE PEOPLE'S DAILY COMMENTARY OF OCT30 QUOTED IN MY REF TEL.

3. ON THE WHOLE, IT MIGHT BE JUST TO REGARD THE EVENTS OF OCT, TAKEN AS A WHOLE, AS AN EFFORT AT NORMALISATION OF SINO-NORTH KOREAN RELATIONS AND THE KOREANS ARE PROBABLY MUCH RELIEVED TO SEE THE LAST OF THEIR GUESTS. TEXT ENDS.

2. THE FO HAVE ALSO HAD A REPORT FROM THE UK EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TO THE EFFECT THAT SEVERAL DAYS AGO THE NORTH KOREAN GOVT ANNOUNCED COMPLETION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE "VOLUNTEERS" ON OCT26. THE

PAGE TWO 4165

NORTH KOREAN STATEMENT IS ALSO SUPPOSED TO HAVE (A) CALLED UPON USA FORCES TO LEAVE SOUTH KOREA SO AS TO FACILITATE REUNIFICATION ON A DEMOCRATIC BASIS; AND (B) CALLED UPON ALL MEMBERS OF THE UN TO GIVE THEIR SERIOUS ATTENTION TO CONTINUED AMERICAN OCCUPATION AND AGGRESSION IN KOREA.



FM EXTERNAL OTT NOV4/58 CONFID  
TO CANDELNY Y321 OPIMMEDIATE  
INFO LDN WASHDC  
BAG CNBRA WLGTN ~~TOKYO~~ FM LDN  
REFYOURTEL 1794 NOV1  
KOREA

NO.	13
AMBASSADOR	
<del>1st SEC. (D)</del>	
2nd SEC. (D)	
ad. EC. (C)	
A.O.	
CONSULAR CL.	
T. & C.	
<del>3</del> D.N.D. (MA)	
D.N.R.	

*file*

IF THE DEBATE SHOULD DEVELOP INTO ~~SOMETHING MORE~~ LIVELY THAN AN EXCHANGE OF STATEMENTS BETWEEN THE CO-SPONSORS OF THE DRAFT RESOLUTION AND THE SOVIET BLOC, THIS WILL PROBABLY DERIVE FROM THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE DEBATE OF UNCOMMITTED COUNTRIES OF THE AFRICAN-ASIAN GROUP. THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO SEE MUCH MERIT IN THE USA DRAFT AND, THEREFORE, THE DEL, IN ANY STATEMENT WHICH IT MAY MAKE, SHOULD PERHAPS FOLLOW THE LINE TAKEN BY OUR DEL LAST YEAR AND TRY TO PUT THE BEST COMPLEXION ON THE USA DRAFT CONSISTENT WITH THOSE ELEMENTS OF OUR POSITION WHICH ALREADY HAVE STOOD IN THE WAY OF OUR AGREEING TO CO-SPONSOR. AS YOU POINT OUT, THE ONLY REALLY NEW FACTOR IN THE SITUATION THIS YEAR IS THE WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE COMMUNIST FORCES.

2. IN THE ENVISAGED SITUATION, YOU MIGHT WISH TO CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING APPROACH TO THE SUBJECT OF THE CHINESE WITHDRAWAL IN ANY STATEMENT YOU THINK YOU SHOULD BE MADE: THE DEL MIGHT NOTE THAT THE FIFTEEN WELCOMED THIS DEVELOPMENT BECAUSE THESE TROOPS NEVER HAD ANY LEGITIMATE BUSINESS IN KOREA. INDEED, BY DESIGNATING THEM FROM THE BEGINNING AS VOLUNTEERS, THEIR PRINCIPALS ADVERTISED RATHER THAN DISGUISED THIS FACT. MOREOVER, THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF CHINESE COMMUNIST TROOPS IN KOREA COULD NOT RPT NOT BE CONDUCIVE TO THE REALIZATION OF THE UN PEACEFUL OBJECTIVE OF A UNIFIED INDEPENDENT DEMOCRATIC KOREA UNDER A REP FORM OF GOVT. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE UNC FORCES HAD AND HAVE LEGITIMATE BUSINESS IN KOREA. ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE KOREAN ARMISTICE TO DEMAND THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL OUTSIDE FORCES AS A PRE-CONDITION FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF A KOREAN SETTLEMENT AND THUS TO TRY TO EQUATE THE STATUS OF ITS FORCES WITH THOSE OF THE UNC, IS TO IGNORE THE REASONS WHY FORCES ARE IN KOREA UNDER UN AUSPICES, AND TO CONFUSE THE ISSUE. THE ISSUE IS THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA THROUGH GENUINELY FREE ELECTIONS ON A BASIS PROPORTIONATE TO POPULATION UNDER

PAGE TWO Y321

EFFECTIVE AND IMPARTIAL SUPERVISION, NOT RPT NOT ONLY OF THE PRE-LIMINARIES BUT ALSO OF THE ELECTIONS THEMSELVES. ANY ARRANGEMENT PROVIDING FOR SUCH ELECTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED. HOWEVER WHEN THE GOVTS WHICH CONTRIBUTED FORCES TO THE UNC PUT TO THE OTHER SIDE LAST SUMMER THE QUESTION OF THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH ELECTIONS SHOULD BE HELD, IT WAS BRUSHED ASIDE. FOR THEIR PART AND AS THE RESOLUTION UNDER CONSIDERATION NOTES, THESE GOVTS HAVE CLEARLY STATED THEIR READINESS TO WITHDRAW THEIR FORCES WHEN THE CONDITIONS OF A LASTING SETTLEMENT HAVE BEEN FULFILLED.

(RECD LDN 050312Z/RL)

FM LDN NOV3/58 RESTD

TO EXTERNAL 4140 PRIORITY

INFO CANDELNY PRIORITY WASHDC EMBASSY PARIS

BAG CNBRA WLGTN TOKYO FM LDN

REF CANDELNY TEL 1794 NOV1

CHINESE WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA

THIS MORNING THE FO PASSED TO US A COPY OF AN ENCLAIR TEL DATED

OCT30 FROM THE UK EMBASSY IN PEKING SUMMARIZING DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CHINESE WITHDRAWAL FROM KOREA WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE DURING OCT.

WHILE MOST OF THIS INFO WILL BE KNOWN TO YOU, IT OCCURRED TO US THAT THE STORY OF RECENT CHINESE MOVES ON THIS QUESTION IN CAPSULE FORM MIGHT BE USEFUL TO OUR DELEGATION IN NEWYORK.

2. TEXT OF FO TEL BEGINS:

"THE ORIGINAL DECISION TO WITHDRAW BY STAGES WAS ANNOUNCED ON FEB29 1958 AND THE OPERATION WAS TIMED TO BE COMPLETED BY THE END OF THIS YEAR. THE FINAL TIME-TABLE IN OCT WAS AS FOLLOWS:

(A) OCT WAS DECLARED A KOREAN-CHINESE FRIENDSHIP MONTH, AND A SINO-KOREAN-FRIENDSHIP SOCIETY WAS SET UP. AFTERWARDS, KUO MO-JO WAS SENT TO KOREA WITH A CHINESE DELEGATION TO CELEBRATE THE OCCASION.

(B) ON OCT17, A JOINT SINO-KOREAN COMMUNIQUE WAS ISSUED SAYING THAT AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL OF CHINESE TROOPS "ALL OF THEIR BARRACKS AND RELATED EQUIPMENT, FACILITIES, MATERIALS AND APPARATUS WOULD BE HANDED OVER TO THE KOREAN ARMY WITHOUT COMPENSATION".

(C) ON OCT26 THE CHINESE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS ANNOUNCED THAT THE 3RD GROUP OF THE CPV, INCLUDING GENERAL HEADQUARTERS, THREE DIVISIONS AND LOGISTICAL SERVICES, TOTALLING 70,000 PERSONS, HAD RETURNED TO CHINA BETWEEN SEP25 AND OCT26.

(D) IT WAS ANNOUNCED ON OCT27 THAT KIM IL SUNG HAD THREE WEEKS PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED CHOU EN-LAI'S INVITATION TO PAY A VISIT TO CHINA AT THE HEAD OF A GOVT DELEGATION.

(DE) ON OCT27 THE CHINESE AND NORTH KOREAN SIDE AT PANMUNJON DEMANDED WITHDRAWAL OF ALL UK AND UN TROOPS FROM SOUTH KOREA.

(F) ON OCT28, GENERAL HEADQUARTERS STAFF AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CPV ARRIVED IN PEKING TO TAKE PART IN A "HEROES WELCOME" AND RALLY.



NO.	AMBASSADOR	INT.
	<del>CONSUL</del>	
	1st SEC.	
	2nd SEC. (M)	
	2nd SEC. (C)	
	A.O.	
	CONSULAR CI.	
	T. & C.	
	<del>3rd SEC. (M.A.)</del>	
	D.N.R.	

Handwritten initials

PAGE TWO 4140

SPEECHES WERE MADE BY PENG CHEN, YANG YUNG, COMMANDER OF THE CPV AND THE NORTH KOREAN AMBASSADOR.

2. POINTS IN PENG CHEN'S SPEECH WERE:

(1) THE GREAT VICTORY OF THE SINO-KOREAN ARMY HAD SHOWN THAT THE USA WAS ONLY A PAPER TIGER AND THIS HAD ARMED THE WORLD IDEOLOGICALLY IN ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALISM. IT SHOWED THE SOLIDARITY OF THE COMMUNIST CAMP.

(2) THE WITHDRAWAL WAS ANOTHER IMPORTANT EFFORT ON CHINA'S PART TO PROMOTE THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION. IT WAS BEING CARRIED OUT WHEN THE USA IMPERIALISTS WERE AGGRAVATING TENSION IN THE FAR EAST AND HOPED, AS DID JAPAN BEFORE, TO USE KOREA AND TAIWAN AS A PINNACER MOVEMENT AGAINST CHINA. THE USA WAS NOW FULLY EXPOSED AS A CULPRIT IN OBSTRUCTING THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF KOREA AND ENDANGERING PEACE IN THE FAR EAST.

3. GENERAL YANG YUNG SAID "THE KOREAN PEOPLE WITH FIRM CONFIDENCE ARE CARRYING ON THEIR EFFORTS FOR THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF THEIR MOTHERLAND. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE KOREAN PEOPLE WILL SUCCEED IN ATTAINING THEIR ASPIRATIONS AND THAT NO ONE CAN STOP THE REUNION OF THE THIRTY MILLION PEOPLE IN THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN PARTS OF KOREA AND THE PEACEFUL UNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY".

4. A COMMENTATOR'S ARTICLE IN THE PEOPLE'S DAILY OF OCT 30 CLAIMS THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS HAS "CREATED NEW CONDITIONS FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN KOREA". THE COMMENTATOR QUOTES MR DULLES' STATEMENT OF OCT 27 AND SAYS "ALL THE WORLD RECOGNIZES THAT ONLY WHEN ALL FOREIGN TROOPS ARE WITHDRAWN FROM KOREA WILL THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS BE CREATED FOR FREE ELECTIONS AND PEACEFUL UNIFICATION". HE ADDS THAT AMERICAN TROOPS NATURALLY HAVE TO WITHDRAW 10,000 MILES BECAUSE THEY CAME FROM THAT DISTANCE AWAY. "THE AMERICANS HAVE FOR A LONG TIME SPLIT KOREA, CREATED TWO KOREAS", AND ARE "PREPARING TO LAUNCH AN AGGRESSIVE WAR".  
ENDS