


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
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Volume 15 From-De 83-12-09 To-À 83-12-12

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*E. Kelly
Apr 4 1989*

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TITLE—TITRE:

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DISARMEMENT
MEASURES
PLANS AND PROPOSALS
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION (INITIATIVES)

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PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS
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
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
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DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS

FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTÉRIEURE VOIR

FILE NO. - DOSSIER N°

28-6-1-T Mudeau Peace Mission

VOLUME

16

A/NZ file

R E S T R I C T E D

FM PEKIN WJGR0958 12DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO BNATO WSHDC MOSCO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CP

DISTR IDR IDA RBR PER PED RCR RGB RBR RBD ZSI

---ARMS CONTROL:CHINESE POSN

DAY AFTER PMS VISIT TO PEKIN PEOPLES DAILY CARRIED LENGTHY COMMENT ABOUT ISSUE DISARMAMENT.ARTICLE GOES OVER MUCH SAME GROUND COVERED BY CHINESE LEADERS DURING PMS VISIT FOCUSING CRITICAL ATTN ON TWO SUPERPOWERS.THERE ARE, HOWEVER, NUMBER OF NUANCES THAT CHINESE LEADERS DID NOT/NOT MENTION IN CONVERSATIONS WITH PM.

2.ARSENALS OF TWO SUPERPOWERS HAVE INCREASED IN BOTH QUANTITY AND QUALITY WHILE NEGNS HAVE BEEN IN PROGRESS.ARTICLE SAYS TWO MATCH EACH OTHER IN STRENGTH.HOWEVER WHILE EACH ACCUSES OTHER OF ATTEMPTING TO GAIN UNILATERAL SUPERIORITY,EACH IS TRYING TO GAIN SUPERIORITY FOR ITSELF.TWO SUPERPOWERS HAVE OBTAINED LARGE STOCK OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND POST GRAVE THREAT TO WORLD PEACE.ARTICLE THEN REPEATS PERSISTENT CHINESE THEME--SUPERPOWERS MUST TAKE LEAD IN CEASING TESTING,IMPROVING AND MANUFACTURING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IN DRASTICALLY REDUCING NBRS OF THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEIR MEANS OF DELIVERY.

3.ARTICLE OFFERS CLARIFICATION OF CHINESE PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD BY FM WU AT UNGA FOR INTERNATL CONFERENCE.ARTICLE EMPHASIZES THAT

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PAGE TWO WJGR0958 RESTR

CONFERENCE SHOULD BE CONVENED WHEN SUPERPOWERS HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON REDUCING THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS BY HALF (NOT/NOT NECESSARILY AFTER THEY HAVE CARRIED OUT SUCH REDUCTIONS). ARTICLE GOES ON THAT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN TWO SUPERPOWERS IN THIS RESPECT WOULD NOT/NOT ONLY CREATE ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL TRUST BUT ALSO COULD RAISE CONFIDENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES SO THAT NUCLEAR REDUCTION CAN BECOME NON/NON-STOP PROCESS. ARTICLE, HOWEVER, OFFERS NO/NO LIGHT ON WHO SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN QUOTE WIDELY REPRESENTATIVE UNQUOTE CONFERENCE FM WU HAD PROPOSED. WE PRESSED SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL ON SAME POINT, BUT HE ADMITTED THAT CHINESE HAD DEVELOPED NO/NO VIEWS ON HOW MANY OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD BE REPRESENTED AT CONFERENCE OR WHO THEY MIGHT BE. SUGGESTION, HE SAID, WAS RECOGNITION OF INTEREST OF MANY NON/NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ISSUES.

4. ARTICLE ALSO REITERATES CHINESE VIEW THAT CHINA IS READY TO ASSUME ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IN ARMS CONTROL AT APPROPRIATE TIME. HOWEVER, IF SUPERPOWERS WILL NOT/NOT TAKE LEAD IN REDUCING THEIR ARSENALS, BUT TRY TO WORK OUT SIMULTANEOUS FREEZE OF WEAPONS OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES CHINA WILL NOT/NOT PARTICIPATE. WITHOUT NAMING USSR AS ORIGINATOR OF IDEA ARTICLE CRITICIZES PROPOSED WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. QUOTE ONE SUPERPOWER HAS REPEATEDLY CALLED FOR SUCH A CONFERENCE BUT HAS REMAINED SILENT ON SPECIAL DUTIES OF SUPERPOWERS ON NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION AND NEED FOR THEM TO TAKE ACTION FIRST UNQUOTE.

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PAGE THREE WJGR0958 RESTR

5.SAME DAY FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN COMMENTED ON INF TALKS, CRITICIZING TWO PARTICIPANTS ACCUSING EACH OF TRYING TO SURPASS OTHER.SPOKESMAN ALSO REFERRED TO PEACE MOVEMENT IN EUR SAYING QUOTE WE UNDERSTAND AND SUPPORT IT UNQUOTE.SPOKESMAN SAID THAT CHINA OPPOSED USSR-USA NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN ASIA.QUOTE WE HOLD THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALREADY DEPLOYED IN ASIA SHOULD BE DRASTICALLY REDUCED OR DESTROYED UNQUOTE.

6.WHILE ARTICLES DO NOT/NOT REPRESENT ANY DRAMATIC CHANGES IN CHINESE THINKING THEY ARE OF INTEREST IN THAT THEY UNDERLINE MANY OF COMMENTS CHINESE LEADERS MADE TO PM AS WELL AS ADDING SOME ADDL DETAILS TO CHINESE PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD AT UNGA.HOWEVER,FACT THAT OFFICIALS ARE SO VAGUE ON NBR OF IMPORTANT ELEMENTS SUGGESTS THAT FROM CHINESE VIEWPOINT PROPOSALS MERIT LIES MORE IN ITS UTILITY AS PROPAGANDA STICK TO USE AGAINST TWO SUPERPOWERS THAN AS CREDIBLE WAY TO SECURE REDUCTIONS IN NUMBERS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN WORLD.

CCC/002 130300Z WJGR0958

WM. GORDON RIVERS
P.O. Box 813
Fonthill, Ontario
Canada
L0S 1E0

27 November, 1983

Chairman Y. Andropov: President R. Reagan
Kremlin, Moscow, White House, Washington,
U. S. S. R. U. S. A.

Gentlemen:

Re: Peace Initiative, Rt. Hon. P. E. Trudeau

Reference: my letter of 22 Aug 83
: several enclosures.

When I wrote my previous letter on my grand-daughter's birthday, I was not aware of Mr. Trudeau's plans. However, it was obvious he was being encouraged by some of Canada's religious leaders. As noted in the GLOBE+MAIL editorial of 2 Nov 83, this is the culmination of Mr. Trudeau's consistent intellectual, lifetime and personal concern for the well-being of others. It comes at a most critical time in mankind's history. The urgency of the day and his stature as an elder statesman should entitle him to and ensure a respectful hearing. It is even hoped by this writer that his initiative could be used as the justification for you to draw back from the brink, and also enhance your integrity as reasonable and responsible leaders.

Mr. Trudeau and I belong to different political parties. Indeed, some of my most forceful arguments have been directed towards him and members of his party. They have always responded courteously, thus indicating that my comments have been considered respectfully. We are fellow Canadians, fathers, world citizens, both interested in peace in freedom. I continue to urge you to discuss the reduction of nuclear arms. Whatever Mr. Trudeau's specific proposals are, I hope you will consider them seriously. To ignore them is to invite disaster for us, for you, for everyone.

Respectfully and sincerely,

W.G. Rivers

A Past President,
Niagara Military Institute

Trudeau's counsel of hope

Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau is trying to strike a spark of hope in a season of despair, by rallying international political support for a summit of the world's five nuclear powers. Whatever the success of his mission, Trudeau has certainly caught the mood, and the fears, of our times. The need for new beginnings has seldom been greater.

Getting the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, France and China to sit down at one table to discuss nuclear arms curbs will not be easy. For one thing, there's no precedent. For another, there is much wariness. But Trudeau is not building entirely upon sand; in one way or another each of the five powers has agreed that some sort of forum is desirable.

Even when the Soviet and American leaders were trading their worst Cold War jibes earlier this year (calling each other evil empire-builders and bellicose lunatics), both repeatedly held out the prospect of a summit.

In his very first interview with a foreign journalist, last New Year, Yuri Andropov said that a bilateral summit could be a "very effective way" to improve East-West relations. In March, news reports from Washington and Moscow suggested both leaders wanted such a meeting. In May, Ronald Reagan went so far as to predict a summit will be held in 1984, and he reiterated his desire for one as recently as last month.

The British, French and Chinese governments, too, should be anxious for the chance to make their concerns known at a wider summit. The British saw "great significance" in Andropov's offer earlier this year of a formal non-aggression pact. The French have long sought better ties with

the Soviets and a wider European conference on detente and disarmament. And the Chinese are seeking to both preserve their growing ties with the U.S., and to defuse border conflicts with the Soviets.

Prime Minister Trudeau has done nothing more than to take the five parties at their word, and is trying to marshal political support for a summit. And the agenda Trudeau proposes is deliberately modest, deliberately confined to issues on which already there is wide international agreement. If the five nuclear parties can't agree to meet to discuss even this much, they will risk seriously eroding their credibility with the non-nuclear nations.

The nuclear powers already have debated, in such forums as the United Nations, the need to curb the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear countries. The same holds true for the rest of Trudeau's agenda, including proposals to reduce the risk of war in Europe, to limit anti-satellite weapons, to restrict the spread of hard-to-detect long-range missiles, and to foster greater openness in arms control verification. None of these are matters which the Soviets and Americans could decide by meeting just among themselves.


Such discussions would carry far more weight at the sort of multilateral meeting Trudeau proposes. And the chances of consensus on at least some points would be far greater.

Most important, the world's great allies and adversaries would be sitting down — for the first time — to collectively try to ease the mistrust that poisons their relations, and jeopardizes their security.

TORONTO STAR

Tuesday, November 15, 1983

WHEEL. TORONTO STAR



WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1983

The Globe and Mail

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The third rail

Canadians are understandably skeptical about Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's crusade to curb the nuclear arms race. The odds are long that he can succeed where so many others have failed. His initiative could even backfire, and be exploited by the Kremlin to undermine Western unity.

But if this mission invites skepticism, it defies cynicism. Too much of the Canadian reaction thus far has centred on the political motivations behind the Trudeau initiative. Mr. Trudeau is presumed to have embarked on his crusade in order to extend his lease on 24 Sussex Drive, or in order to terminate his lease there in a blaze of personal glory.

Such assumptions ignore the fact that this is no sudden interest in world affairs on the Prime Minister's part. He has been a consistent advocate of reducing international tensions, and has previously been personally involved in defusing confrontation within the Commonwealth and in efforts to lessen North-South friction.

His inability to bridge the North-South gap was due both to the international recession and to his failure to go beyond a vague espousal of "global negotiations." The lesson of that earlier crusade is that his arms control initiative will have to include precise proposals rather than mere exhortations to reasonableness.

But, pending the specifics, Mr. Trudeau is entitled to vigorous, non-partisan support for his efforts to break the super-power impasse and develop a momentum favorable to the cause of arms reduction. Without such support at home, he will stand no chance of making Canada's limited influence count abroad.

Mr. Trudeau is addressing the super-powers as the senior statesman of the West, and he rates a respectful hearing in world capitals on that basis

alone. But, on this issue at least, he is also the authentic voice of the Canadian people. He articulates the hope for a peaceful world which all Canadians share.

When he calls on the super-powers to approach their arms talks in a spirit of compromise, he is urging them to resolve this, the most dangerous confrontation threatening humanity, in the spirit in which Canadians have traditionally defused their own internal confrontations.

When he tells the Kremlin and the White House that the survival of humanity requires that they make a supreme act of political will to defy the blind forces of determinism, he speaks from the experience of a nation whose own endurance as an independent entity has required such an assertion of human purpose over manifest destiny.

Mr. Trudeau is thus attempting to summon the lessons of Canada's past as sign-posts for the super-power leaders whose decisions will affect Canada's future. Even his sternest critics, while not absolving him of his domestic failures, should urge the Prime Minister onward to success in this international mission.

Instead, some Canadians insist that if Mr. Trudeau wants to play the "helpful fixer," he should start with the Canadian economy and leave the nuclear arms negotiations to foreign leaders. But if Canadians cede to others all responsibility for solving the nuclear stand-off, we become an audience instead of an actor in the determination of our fate.

There are times in the history of every nation when self-interest requires that its leaders look beyond the pocket-book concerns of day-to-day politics and tackle an issue of transcendental importance. This is one of those times; this is one of those issues.

I do not recall the oil companies ever being ^{seriously} concerned with our welfare as human beings or as

SN: D 26Nov83. The special bird called CANADIANS.

Insular Trudeau hurt economy

By TIM NAUMETZ

OTTAWA (CP) — One of the largest Canadian subsidiaries of foreign oil companies has blamed Prime Minister Trudeau's "insular" style of government for economic problems facing the country.

Gulf Canada Ltd. said Friday in a submission to the royal commission into the economy that under Trudeau, the government returned to an interventionist approach abandoned after the Second World War.

The government, with a "cloistered" system of cabinet committees established by Trudeau, shifted its emphasis to such specific issues as control of key industrial sectors, regional disparity and Canadian ownership, Gulf said.

"The decision-making process has become so insular and isolated that it is often perceived by the public as being manipulative and devoted more to its own ends than

to . . . the public interest," the oil giant said in a statement announcing its commission submission.

Gulf, 60-per-cent owned by Gulf Oil Corp. of Pittsburgh, Pa., said the failure of Trudeau's system was most evident in the introduction of the national energy program of 1980.

"Despite the important input that could have been provided, business played no role in its development and, consequently, has had no commitment to many of its significant features."

Gulf argued that Canada faces increased international competition and must decentralize policies to allow speedy decisions and responses by government and industry to changing market and social conditions.

With exports accounting for 26 per cent of the gross national product, Canada is more heavily dependent on international trade than any other industrialized nation, Gulf said.


"Yet with a productivity performance among the worst, we face increasing competition not only from other industrialized nations but also from developing countries," the company said.

It repeated a proposal to establish an advisory group representing governments, labor and business to consult with the federal government on policy issues.

Gulf also called for an end to regulated oil pricing, less government regulation, an end to direct taxes on oil and gas production and a reduction in the government share of petroleum revenues to spur investment.

It also urged that the government drop a provision in the national energy program that gives state-owned Petro-Canada an option on 25 per cent of any producing oil and gas wells in the North and offshore.

Gulf says that because some of the oil was discovered before the program's announcement, the measure is unfairly retroactive.



SN STD 26Nov83

Dissidents' treatment protested

Toronto STAR 6 Nov 83.

So much for Communist state.

Psychiatrists fight Soviet abuse

By MITCH MOLDOFSKY

In the Soviet Union, when you apply for an exit visa, they think you must be crazy.

By 1978, Vladimir Tsurikov had been applying for exit visas for four years, and was committed by the authorities to a psychiatric hospital for "émigrational delusions." There he was given unnecessary nerve-related drugs which induced fainting fits, high fevers, and loss of co-ordination. On his release in 1980, he went to the unofficial Working Commission to Investigate the Use of Psychiatry for Political Purposes in Moscow, which examined him and concluded that he had never needed psychiatric care.

His is one of the 110 such cases discovered by Amnesty International since 1977, and which a group of Toronto psychiatrists are trying to do something about.

Psychiatrists Against Psychiatric Abuse, or PAPA, is a Toronto-based group led by Dr. Joel Jeffries and Dr. Frank Cashman of the Clarke Institute. Members across Canada write letters to foreign governments, Ottawa, dissidents and their families in an effort to gain the release of wrongly diagnosed psychiatric patients who have been committed for political reasons.

They also try to put pressure on the offending governments to suspend their practices entirely, though this has been less successful. Last week at the Canadian Psychiatric Association meeting in Montreal, the doctors tried to get their colleagues to express regret at the Soviet resignation from the World Psychiatric Association. However, the suggestion was referred to committee, and Dr. Jeffries expects that's where it will stay.

Because of their home, the group is sometimes confused with the various patients' rights groups protesting problems with mental health care practice in Ontario. A more literal description might be "psychiatrists against the misuse of psychiatry," says Dr.

Jeffries. "We're talking about people who are being treated as mentally ill when they're not."

PAPA also supports colleagues within the Communist bloc who risk punishment by trying to draw attention to such abuses. One of these is Dr. Anatoloy Koryagin, a former consultant to the unofficial Working Commission in Moscow, which examines political dissidents after, between, and sometimes even before their stays in mental institutions, to see if their diagnoses tally with the government's. Often, they do not.

Applied for visa, Soviet man committed for 'émigrational delusions'

In 1981 Dr. Koryagin, who is serving 12 years in prison and internal exile, published an article in the British medical periodical *The Lancet* entitled "Unwilling Patients." In the article, which reached England through an underground Soviet printing network, he refers to the term "socially dangerous," which is used universally as justification for involuntary committal to mental institutions. In the accepted sense, the term refers to people who are physically dangerous to themselves or to others because of their mental state.

In Russia, reports Dr. Koryagin, "the clinical meaning . . . was replaced by its judicial meaning, i.e. that the patient was capable of harming the social system as a whole." Accordingly, many dissidents have been committed solely for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," with no medical reasons at all being cited.

Another dissident doctor is Seymon Gluzman, who was arrested in 1972 for challenging the official diagnosis of a former army officer whom the government wanted to suppress. After serving a 10-year prison term, he is working again in Kiev, and continuing to agitate.

At its September meeting, PAPA decided to offer honorary memberships to both doctors, to express their moral support and solidarity with their activities. They also resolved to try and get the larger world health organizations to adopt similar gestures.

"There's a whole spirit within the USSR of not going along with the authorities," says Dr. Jeffries. "There are many people prepared to stand up and say 'I don't like what's going on,' even though they know the consequences are very often that they will be arbitrarily imprisoned."

Although there are probably isolated cases of abuse in North America, he says, there is nothing like the organized, state-run/psychiatric abuse found in the Communist countries, Dr. Jeffries says. However, he said if something came to their attention, the group would certainly take an interest in it.

The group meets every few months to update information (and write letters to foreign governments, the dissidents, their families, and Ottawa in an effort to gain their release). It is a member of the International Association on the Political Use of Psychiatry, an umbrella group linking similar groups in other Western and Scandinavian countries. Although invited to join the physician's section of Amnesty International, the group decided to keep its focus exclusively on psychiatry. "Things have much more weight if you complain about the abuse of colleagues," explains Dr. Jeffries. "Also, within Canada, maybe we can prick the consciences of our colleagues better if we deal with somebody who's 'like them'."

St. Catharines, Ontario, Canada

The Standard Business

Friday, October 21, 1983

So much for depending on pure capitalism! GM had repeated warnings

WASHINGTON (AP) — General Motors Corp. test drivers and internal company documents repeatedly warned of brake locking problems on 1980 X-body cars before they went into general production, say GM files made public Thursday.

Documents in the files also said key GM executives were warned of the seriousness of the braking problem just before production.

The documents showed that the automaker went ahead with production of the front-wheel-drive car in early 1979 without correcting the problems.

The documents were ordered unsealed by U.S. District Judge Thomas Jackson, who is hearing a suit brought by the U.S. Justice Department in August, seeking a recall of 1.1 million X-body cars.

The department is also asking that GM be ordered to pay \$4 million in damages, alleging the company failed to act on the braking problem and later withheld information from federal officials.

GM has denied the allegations, saying it did not know about the X-body brake problem before production. GM has said it will vigorously defend itself against the suit.

The documents say warnings to key GM executives about the braking problem came Dec. 10, 1978, in Phoenix, Ariz., at a meeting attended by former GM president E.

M. Estes. The meeting included discussion of the months of testing on the X-body cars. One document said a testing official, W. F. Peake, briefed GM executives at the meeting on the braking problem.

In a summary of the proceedings in Phoenix, Peake said that Estes at the conclusion of the session said he "believed that the brake item seemed to be the number one problem at this time and that we could not afford to go into production with major problems on this vehicle."

Peake also said Estes believed "it was far too difficult and expensive to do a major retro-fit program after the cars had been built and stockpiled."

Among the documents released were test-driver logs from 1978 that show drivers in at least 35 cases complained of brakes locking and causing control problems.

"The brakes are getting really bad. They are sometimes locking up and they are grabbing constantly," one test driver said May 25, 1978.

Another reported in October, 1978, that the left rear brake "locks up without too much pressure being applied."

The documents released Thursday show that GM officials in apparently all cases responded to the test driver complaints. But usually,

they attributed the problem to a faulty brake-lining and responded by replacing the faulty part.

GM touted the cars, which were being introduced with much fanfare, as a new generation of fuel-efficient autos. They went into production in January, 1979. But the documents showed that the braking problem continued to be a topic of internal GM memos for months after that.

"Every time I ask, I am told the X-car brakes are fixed. These tests do not indicate they are. What do we have that does?" Frank Winchell, a vice-president in GM's engineering division, complained in May, 1979, said one document.

The U.S. Justice Department had sought release of the documents, but GM had argued they contained sensitive company information and should be kept under wraps.

But Jackson ordered all the documents except five made public. He acknowledged those five involved information potentially damaging to GM.

Transportation Secretary Elizabeth Dole hailed the decision and said she hoped it would "hasten the recall" of the 1980-model cars.

The issue involves the 1980 Chevrolet Citation, Pontiac Phoenix, Oldsmobile Omega and Buick Skylark. Although they are 1980 models, many were produced in early 1979.

People ETC.

Survival of fittest: Plan now for 1984

Now! At last! The last fitness program you'll ever need. Shape up for 1984 with **The George Orwell Exercise Book**.

By following this simple program you should be all right when the end comes. Of course, it might not be the end that comes. It might be something much worse. In that case you might still be all right. Who knows? It won't matter anyway.

1. TREMBLE. Stand there and tremble. Think about Reagan. Think about Andropov. Think about the cruise missile. Think about the Gulf of Hormuz. Trembling gets all your extremities and their environs worked up. Gets things flowing. Gets things pumping. Trembling is a good general warm-up. If you can't think of anything in particular that scares you, think of something in general. A nameless fear is ideal to get you started trembling.

2. TAKE TO YOUR BED. At the first sign of trouble, take to your bed. Don't wait for a harsh word. Don't wait for bad news. They will come along sooner or later. You want to be prepared when they arrive. Take to your bed five, maybe six times a day. The first few times will be difficult. But after awhile you'll get the hang of it. Soon you'll be able to take to your bed without so much as a glance at the front page of the paper.

Ignore nuclear reactors

2. (b) (Advanced) PULL THE COVERS OVER YOUR HEAD. Be careful not to do this in response to anything that happens in South America. Or in Southeast Asia. Or after hearing an announcement from Ontario Hydro that while absolutely nothing is wrong with their nuclear reactors, repairs will be completed in a week. You want something really extraordinary to happen before you pull the covers over your head, on account of once you pull them over your head you're not going to want to pull them down again.

3. ROLLING THE EYES HEAVENWARD. Three sets of five repetitions. If an average business were run the way the country is run. One-two-three-four-five. The business would be out of business. One-two-three-four-five. A penny saved is .82 of a penny earned. One-two-three-four-five.

4. DUCK! You never know when something might be flying at your head. You never know what it might be that might be flying at your head. Why is something flying at your



head? What have you done to deserve this? Why you? If you're going to stand there asking a bunch of dumb questions, you're a goner. Shut up. Duck!

5. SMACKING YOURSELF ON THE FOREHEAD. (Caution: The shock of the blow when you smack yourself on the forehead should never exceed the shock that caused you to smack yourself on the forehead.) Anything Robert Kaplan ever says. Smack. Easy, there.

Little mew-mew sounds

6. WHIMPERING. Properly executed, whimpering is one of the most profitable exercises you can perform. When you whimper you make little mew-mew sounds in the back of your throat. These set up high-frequency vibrations that penetrate into all recesses of the body and make them tingle. Try it. Think how many people in this country are unemployed. Think how they can't afford to buy anything. When they don't buy anything, think how the firm you work for will have to start cutting back. Think how you'll feel when you're cut back. Whimper, whimper. And there aren't any jobs. *Whimper, whimper.* You'll have to live on your savings. What savings? **WHIMPER, WHIMPER.** Feel the tingle? It's just like ultrasound. Maybe better. It adds verve to your vitals.

7. CLOSING YOUR EYES SO IT WILL ALL GO AWAY. Okay, close your eyes. Are they closed? Okay, everything's all right. It's all gone away. Honest. You can open your eyes now. Surprise! I was lying. Nothing has changed. Sure had you fooled, eh? Smack! Whimper. Tremble. Roll the eyeballs. This is a marvellous all-purpose exercise, if you happen to be in a hurry and can't complete the entire program.

8. BLINK. Blink rapidly. This will help keep back the tears. If anyone sees you and asks what you're doing, tell them you've got something in your eye. A speck of dirt. Something like that.

SPECIAL OFFER: Act now! By sending in immediately you will receive, free, a recording of teeth gnashing — the perfect accompaniment for these exercises. This is a limited-time offer. Obviously.

A/NZ *file*

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28-6-1 - TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

DAY AFTER PMS VISIT TO PEKIN PEOPLES DAILY CARRIED LENGTHY COMMENT ABOUT ISSUE DISARMAMENT.ARTICLE GOES OVER MUCH SAME GROUND COVERED BY CHINESE LEADERS DURING PMS VISIT FOCUSING CRITICAL ATTN ON TWO SUPERPOWERS.THERE ARE, HOWEVER, NUMBER OF NUANCES THAT CHINESE LEADERS DID NOT/NOT MENTION IN CONVERSATIONS WITH PM.

2.ARSENALS OF TWO SUPERPOWERS HAVE INCREASED IN BOTH QUANTITY AND QUALITY WHILE NEGNS HAVE BEEN IN PROGRESS.ARTICLE SAYS TWO MATCH EACH OTHER IN STRENGTH.HOWEVER WHILE EACH ACCUSES OTHER OF ATTEMPTING TO GAIN UNILATERAL SUPERIORITY,EACH IS TRYING TO GAIN SUPERIORITY FOR ITSELF.TWO SUPERPOWERS HAVE OBTAINED LARGE STOCK OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND POST GRAVE THREAT TO WORLD PEACE.ARTICLE THEN REPEATS PERSISTENT CHINESE THEME--SUPERPOWERS MUST TAKE LEAD IN CEASING TESTING,IMPROVING AND MANUFACTURING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IN DRASTICALLY REDUCING NBRS OF THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEIR MEANS OF DELIVERY.

3.ARTICLE OFFERS CLARIFICATION OF CHINESE PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD BY FM WU AT UNGA FOR INTERNATL CONFERENCE.ARTICLE EMPHASIZES THAT

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PAGE TWO WJGR0958 RESTR

CONFERENCE SHOULD BE CONVENED WHEN SUPERPOWERS HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON REDUCING THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS BY HALF (NOT/NOT NECESSARILY AFTER THEY HAVE CARRIED OUT SUCH REDUCTIONS). ARTICLE GOES ON THAT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN TWO SUPERPOWERS IN THIS RESPECT WOULD NOT/NOT ONLY CREATE ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL TRUST BUT ALSO COULD RAISE CONFIDENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES SO THAT NUCLEAR REDUCTION CAN BECOME NON/NON-STOP PROCESS. ARTICLE, HOWEVER, OFFERS NO/NO LIGHT ON WHO SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN QUOTE WIDELY REPRESENTATIVE UNQUOTE CONFERENCE FM WU HAD PROPOSED. WE PRESSED SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL ON SAME POINT, BUT HE ADMITTED THAT CHINESE HAD DEVELOPED NO/NO VIEWS ON HOW MANY OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD BE REPRESENTED AT CONFERENCE OR WHO THEY MIGHT BE. SUGGESTION, HE SAID, WAS RECOGNITION OF INTEREST OF MANY NON/NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ISSUES.

4. ARTICLE ALSO REITERATES CHINESE VIEW THAT CHINA IS READY TO ASSUME ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IN ARMS CONTROL AT APPROPRIATE TIME. HOWEVER, IF SUPERPOWERS WILL NOT/NOT TAKE LEAD IN REDUCING THEIR ARSENALS, BUT TRY TO WORK OUT SIMULTANEOUS FREEZE OF WEAPONS OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES CHINA WILL NOT/NOT PARTICIPATE. WITHOUT NAMING USSR AS ORIGINATOR OF IDEA ARTICLE CRITICIZES PROPOSED WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. QUOTE ONE SUPERPOWER HAS REPEATEDLY CALLED FOR SUCH A CONFERENCE BUT HAS REMAINED SILENT ON SPECIAL DUTIES OF SUPERPOWERS ON NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION AND NEED FOR THEM TO TAKE ACTION FIRST UNQUOTE.

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PAGE THREE WJGR0958 RESTR

5.SAME DAY FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN COMMENTED ON INF TALKS, CRITICIZING TWO PARTICIPANTS ACCUSING EACH OF TRYING TO SURPASS OTHER.SPOKESMAN ALSO REFERRED TO PEACE MOVEMENT IN EUR SAYING QUOTE WE UNDERSTAND AND SUPPORT IT UNQUOTE.SPOKESMAN SAID THAT CHINA OPPOSED USSR-USA NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN ASIA.QUOTE WE HOLD THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALREADY DEPLOYED IN ASIA SHOULD BE DRASTICALLY REDUCED OR DESTROYED UNQUOTE.

6.WHILE ARTICLES DO NOT/NOT REPRESENT ANY DRAMATIC CHANGES IN CHINESE THINKING THEY ARE OF INTEREST IN THAT THEY UNDERLINE MANY OF COMMENTS CHINESE LEADERS MADE TO PM AS WELL AS ADDING SOME ADDL DETAILS TO CHINESE PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD AT UNGA.HOWEVER,FACT THAT OFFICIALS ARE SO VAGUE ON NBR OF IMPORTANT ELEMENTS SUGGESTS THAT FROM CHINESE VIEWPOINT PROPOSALS MERIT LIES MORE IN ITS UTILITY AS PROPAGANDA STICK TO USE AGAINST TWO SUPERPOWERS THAN AS CREDIBLE WAY TO SECURE REDUCTIONS IN NUMBERRS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN WORLD.

CCC/002 130300Z WJGR0958



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ

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---TRUDEAU PEACE INITIATIVE

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38-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

BY ALL MEANS INVITATION SHOULD BE ACCEPTED. OCCASION APPEARS EXCELLENT FOR EXPLANATION OF ELEMENTS OF CDN FOREIGN POLICY, PARTICULARLY CDAS VIEW THAT SEARCH FOR PEACE REQUIRES PROCESS OF DISCUSSION, DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION.

2. WE WOULD LEAVE PREPARATION OF TEXT TO YOURSELVES WHO ARE MORE FAMILIAR WITH WHAT WILL APPEAL TO THIS SPECIFIC LOCAL AUDIENCE. WE WILL PROVIDE BY BAG TEXTS OF PMS SPEECHES IN GUELPH AND MTL FROM WHICH YOU MAY WISH TO QUOTE.

3. WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT REFERENCE BE MADE TO CDAS ROLE IN SEARCH FOR PEACE IN CENTAM, PARTICULARLY CDAS CONTINUING SUPPORT OF CONTADORA PROCESS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

D. Bickford
D. Bickford

LCR

3-5526

SIG

E. Martel
E. Martel

Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures
28-6-1 TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION


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RSR-0462

The Department of External Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of Greece and has the honour to acknowledge receipt of its Note no. 3250/2883/AS1213 of November 30, 1983.

The Department wishes to assure the Embassy that the text of the letter from the Prime Minister of Greece, Mr. Andreas Papandreou to the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada has been duly transmitted.

The Department of External Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of Greece the assurances of its highest consideration.


Ottawa, December 12, 1983

EMBASSY OF GREECE
OTTAWA

Note No 3250/2883/AS1213

The Embassy of Greece presents its compliments to the Department of External Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith the text of a letter dated 28 November, 1983, by the Prime Minister of Greece Mr. Andreas Papandreou addressed to the Right Honourable Prime Minister of Canada Pierre Elliott Trudeau. This Embassy would be grateful to the Department of External Affairs if the latter would be kind enough to forward the said letter accordingly.

The Embassy of Greece avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of External Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.



November 30, 1983

His Excellency Pierre Elliott Trudeau
Prime Minister of Canada
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada

Athens, November 28, 1983

Dear Pierre,

Thank you for your letters dated October 25th and November 18th, 1983, which I have read thoroughly and with great interest. I have also considered with equal interest and care the notes of your speech in Montreal, on November 13th, which your Ambassador in Athens kindly forwarded to me.

I am very pleased to note that I share to a great extent your thoughts and concerns and I agree with you that confluence of circumstances demands urgent corrective action.

It is my appreciation too, that East-West relations have seriously deteriorated and are currently encountering a critical juncture of heightening tension and uncertainty. Events of political or military nature, such as Afghanistan, Poland, the Middle East, South and Central America, as well as the South Korean aircraft incident, are some recent examples of the deterioration of East-West relations.

What, however, is currently being considered as the most crucial issue and which threatens with total disaster the whole humanity is the frantic arms race between the two superpowers.

Day after day the arsenals of the two superpowers are considerably enlarged by modern more sophisticated and destructive nuclear weapons. More than ever the

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world situation today is fraught with danger. The spectre of nuclear holocaust becomes more and more haunting. The escalation of armaments has reached a point where each of the major nuclear powers has a capacity of destroying the world many times. At the same time, the international crises drag on and on, while new hotbeds of tension are added to the international scene. An all this at the detriment of the weak, who feel increasingly helpless before the might of the powerful.

The reduction of armaments and the abolishment of the causes of conflict are imperative for world peace. Our primary objective must be to urge both superpowers to abide by the voice of logic.

I would agree with you that the trends you referred to in your speech in Montreal of November 13th 1983, to which the East-West confrontation is attributed, are: an increasing resort to the use of force to settle international disputes, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the worsening state of East-West relations and the absence of high politics and understanding between the superpowers. I, therefore, regard as positive the four elements of your program of political management that you have stated in your speech. I should also like to assure that, during the N A C Ministerial Meeting of December 8th, I will fully support your proposals regarding high political representation at the inaugural meeting of the Stockholm Conference, as well as the N A T O response to the latest eastern proposals on MBFR early in the new year and to a meeting in Vienna at the Foreign Ministers' level as a follow-up to its response.

I cannot, however, share your views concerning N A T O's commitment for the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe, as you have stated in your letter dated October 16th 1983.

For my Government and the Greek people, that commitment has a totally different dimension and is linked with the obligation all of us have to protect by all means the most

valuable possession of the earth, that is human life.

Allow me to point out that, in my view, the euro-missiles issue is not a simple case of unbalance, inequity or lack of parity. It is something much more than that. It is a radical change in strategy, since strategic warning is limited to an unacceptable degree and imposes application of new methods based exclusively on automation. In more simple words, we should accept that we are approaching the time where human mind will be set aside by the computers so that the latter will be those who will decide for the future of humanity. I believe I don't need to underline to you the dangers of such an option. However, bearing in mind those dangers, we must all undertake our responsibilities for the benefit of our peoples.

I hope we would have the opportunity to see each other soon and to discuss again our various efforts aiming at promoting understanding, detente and peace. I think that no possibility should be missed in this direction, when our world is increasingly facing a visible threat against its very existence.

Yours sincerely,

Andreas Papandreou

MR. SAIT

We spoke about compiling the replies to the M's
lets see's what Joseph Ceron prepared. Do you want something more?
CONFIDENTIAL

MF
MASONR FILE

December 12, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (via Mr. Osbaldeston)

Letters from various NATO Heads of Government on the Initiative

Attached, in a variety of forms, are seven messages from NATO leaders (Reagan, Lubbers, Papandreou, Gonzalez, Werner, Schlüter and Willoch - you have already received Kohl's) responding variously to your correspondences of October 25 and mid-November on the Initiative.

The letters are unanimous in support of your undertaking special efforts to enhance the East/West dialogue, although some are more explicit than others. Werner, Gonzalez and Schlüter in particular put forth assessments of the present parlous state of our relations with the USSR and the Warsaw Pact in terms strikingly similar to your own.

Inevitably, divergences emerge among the leaders when they address some of those specific proposals which make up the initiative.

Schlüter of Denmark is perhaps the most supportive. He flags in particular his view that progress can be made on the NPT and MBFR. To the extent that Denmark would have a role to play in the matter, he also supports the idea of a five power meeting (as does Lubbers).

Lubbers also agrees with the proposal that the CDE be attended at the level of foreign ministers. He reserves judgement on high level attendance at an appropriate meeting of the MBFR negotiations in Vienna pending the formulation of a Western response to the WPO proposal of last spring.

Werner of Luxembourg, after a particularly articulate assessment of the current situation, reiterates his country's support for the NATO two track policy. He then emphasizes that the most important objective facing all governments is the achievement of equitable and verifiable disarmament. While sympathetic to the proposal in favor of movement in the MBFR negotiations, he advises that he is awaiting Canada's specific ideas in this regard. In this, he is supported by Willoch of Norway who states that he is in favor of a thorough evaluation of the West's negotiating position at Vienna.

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
Papandreou is also in favor of giving a high political profile to MBFR and the CDE. He takes this opportunity to explain Greece's opposition to the two track approach, which he suggests has been a major contributor to destabilization because of the nature of the weapons being deployed.

Gonzalez' letter is simply one of support in general.

President Reagan's letter is by far the most enigmatic. While ostensibly supporting the need for dialogue, he squarely places the blame for the absence of such dialogue with the Soviet Union and its allies. He does not respond to the proposal that the CDE be opened at the Foreign Minister level (his letter of course ante-dating your telephone conversation with the U.S. President as well as the decision on the matter taken at the NAC) but suggests that the Stockholm Conference will be a forum to test Soviet willingness to pursue a meaningful dialogue. Furthermore, while stating that the United States is not against the convening of the 5 power meeting in principle, he comments that there are so many barriers to this that its realization in any foreseeable future is problematic. His view that the Soviets alone are responsible for the current impasse emerges again on MBFR, which he states is blocked because of WPO intransigence on the question of estimating troop levels.

Only on the NPT does he firmly support your initiative although his emphasis is on "horizontal nuclear proliferation" and not vertical proliferation which is of concern to many of the NPT signatories and non-signatories.

In the end, it is possible to conclude that, at least as far as these 7 leaders are concerned, you have hit a nerve: there is a real sense of frustration with the lamentable state of our relations with the socialist block. Actual movement on specifics will require additional communication, coordination and persuasion to achieve a common commitment to specific measures designed to improve the situation.



R.R.F.

Caron

ROYAL DANISH EMBASSY

File No. 105. I. 1.

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NO. 39.

The Embassy of Denmark presents its compliments to the Department of External Affairs and has the honour to convey to the Department the following message, which the Prime Minister of Denmark has sent to The Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada:

"My dear Prime Minister,

Thank you so much for your message concerning the present state of east-west relations which I have read with the utmost attention and interest. Having considered it in detail, allow me, Mr. Prime Minister, to advance a few comments in the following.

First of all, I would like to stress the fact that I fully share your assessment of the disturbing difficulties to which east-west relations have been exposed over the past few years. Indeed, since the late 1970'es a growing atmosphere of distrust and lack of confidence has gradually replaced the climate of detente. You name but a few of the most essential reasons for this unfortunate development, inter alia the receding high-level political dialogue between east and west, the implications of the leadership change in the Soviet Union and the tragic shooting-down of a South Korean civilian airliner. I could add the continued Soviet military presence in Afghanistan and the attitude of the Soviet Union towards events in Poland. And the list probably continues even further.

These developments have had an adverse effect on east-west-relations in general leading to the present deep trough you refer to. They have also caused sincere and deep concern in the populations of our two countries.

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Department of External Affairs,
O t t a w a .

- 2 -

We as politicians therefore carry a heavy responsibility which, in my view, impels us to work actively towards the restoration of a stable east-west-relationship. As a European country, history has told us that security in Europe is indivisible. That is why we strongly believe that east and west share a fundamental interest in the avoidance of war. Thus, Danish governments have been consistent proponents for the necessity of continuing and expanding the dialogue as the only way to alleviate misconceptions and misunderstandings between east and west and to achieve tangible and balanced results. The visit to Moscow two weeks ago by our foreign minister, Mr. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, should be seen in this context.

Against this background the Danish government warmly welcomes your initiative to reinstitute the high-level political dialogue between east and west. We share your view that it is of paramount importance that such an approach gains momentum. We would further be prepared to consider favourably your concrete proposals to initiate negotiations among all five nuclear weapon states on the establishment of global limits on their strategic nuclear arms, to contain horizontal proliferation as well as to inject new impetus to the MBFR-negotiations in Vienna which have now lasted for 10 years. It is beyond any doubt that progress in one or all of these fields could constitute an important step along the road towards lasting peace.

I am looking forward to learn more about your considerations on these matters.

Yours sincerely

(signed) Poul Schlueter"


The Embassy has been advised by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Copenhagen that the letter signed by Prime Minister Poul Schlueter on November 16, 1983, has been sent by special courier to this Embassy. As soon as it is received in Ottawa, the message will be brought to the Department of External Affairs for delivery to the Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada.

The Embassy of Denmark avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of External Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

Ottawa, November 18, 1983.



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MINISTER-PRESIDENT

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Nr. 338158

The Hague, November 29, 1983

Dear Pierre,

Thank you very much for your letter of November 16. I was glad to have the opportunity to receive you at the Catshuis on November 8 and I share your view that our discussions were most fruitful.

We should indeed improve and sustain the dialogue between East and West and I value your efforts to find ways to bring this about.

In your letter you specifically mention the two main fora for arms control in the conventional field i.e. the CDE and MBFR. Indeed, public attention these days focuses rather exclusively on nuclear issues, thereby often overlooking the conventional problem we face in Europe. An active and creative Western approach to the talks in both Stockholm and Vienna would contribute to balancing public attention more evenly between nuclear and conventional issues.

I fully agree with you that we should attach great importance to the CDE. My colleague, Hans van den Broek, Minister for Foreign Affairs, will in principle attend the opening of the Conference in Stockholm in January, even though he has a rather busy travelling schedule in that period.

The importance of MBFR is no less than that of the CDE. In my opinion as well, the West should come up with a response in Vienna to the latest Eastern proposals. Some ideas have been developed in Bonn which could provide the basis for a new Western initiative. You suggested in your letter a meeting of Foreign Ministers as a possible follow-up to a new Western move. I believe this would indeed be

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His Excellency Mr. P.E. Trudeau
Prime Minister of Canada
Ottawa


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the better order of priorities: first of all we will have to come up with new proposals and after that or in conjunction with it we could consider whether a ministerial meeting could be useful to follow through these proposals. A ministerial meeting where the West would still have to operate on the basis of its 1982 proposals is, I am afraid, bound to be not only unproductive but probably even counterproductive. A ministerial meeting on the basis of new Western proposals, however, would certainly seem to offer better prospects and could possibly help to give the MBFR process the political impetus it is indeed in need of.

Your suggestion to create a new forum where the five nuclear weapons states would negotiate global limitations on their nuclear forces certainly deserves further thought, and I will be following with interest the reactions you receive from the countries directly concerned. I do not know whether the idea could be realized in any near future, but placed in a broader time frame it could have the advantage of offering a more concrete perspective than the British and French systems, which presently are at the centre of such an intense public debate, would at a certain point in time be made the subject of arms control talks.

with personal regards



Carson

SECRET

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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TO EXTOTT RSR

INFO BNATO MOSCO PMDELKWAIT PRMNY PEKIN PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN
ROME HAGUE BONN PARIS LDN BRU NDHQOTT/MND/CDS/ADM POL/ CPP

DISTR IDDZ URR RBR IDA UGB MINA USS DMF IFB RGB IDD IDR URR

---PMS INITIATIVE:LET FROM LUXEMBOURG PM

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF LET RECEIVED AT EMB FROM LUXEMBOURG PM WERNER TO
PM TRUDEAU IN RESPONSE TO PMS LET OF 24OCT.ORIGINAL TO YOU BY BAG.
LET AS YOU WILL NOTE IS VERY SUPPORTIVE OF THE INITIATIVE BUT DOES
NOT/NOT GO INTO SPECIFICS.

TEXT BEGINS

QUOTE

MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE,

J AI L HONNEUR D ACCUSER RECEPTION DE VOTRE LETTRE DU 24OCT PAR
LAQUELLE VOUS AVEZ BIEN VOULU ME FAIRE PART DE VOS PREOCCUPATIONS
CONCERNANT LES RELATIONS EST-OUEST AINSI QUE DE VOS SUGGESTIONS POUR
REMEDIER A CETTE SITUATION.

JE PARTAGE ENTIEREMENT VOS SOUCIS SUR L ETAT INSATISFAISANT DES
RELATIONS ENTRE LES DEUX BLOCS AINSI QUE VOS DESIRS DE CHANGER CE
CLIMAT MALSAIN.EVIDEMENT,COMME VOUS L AVEZ REMARQUE VOUS-MEME,L ETAT
DE SANTE DE MONSIEUR ANDROPOV ET,PAR CONSEQUENT,SON EVENTUELLE INA-
BILITE DE CONTROLER COMPLETEMENT LES DECISIONS POLITIQUES NE NOUS
FACILITERONT PAS/PAS LA TACHE DE RETABLIR UN DIALOGUE POLITIQUE DE
HAUT NIVEAU.CE DIALOGUE DEVIENDRAIT,CEPENDANT,D AUTANT PLUS PRESSANT
SI LES NEGOCIATIONS DE GENEVE DEVAIENT ECHOUER.POUR LE MOMENT,TOUTE-

PAGE TWO UNGR2485 CONF

FOIS, L'ESPOIR RESTE QUE DE NOUVELLES PROPOSITIONS AMERICAINES POUR-
RAIENT QUELQUES PEU DEBLOQUER LA SITUATION A LA DERNIERE MINUTE.

DANS CE CONTEXTE, J'AIMERAIS SOULIGNER L'APPUI INCONDITIONNEL QUE LE
LUXEMBOURG DONNE A LA DOUBLE DECISION DE L'OTAN AU SUJET DES FNI. JE
SUIS CONVAINCU DE LA NECESSITE DU DEPLOIEMENT CONFORMEMENT AU CALEN-
DRIER PREVU, CAR TOUT REPORT DES PREMIERS DEPLOIEMENTS RISQUERAIT DE
FAIRE CROIRE A L'UNION SOVIETIQUE QU'UN NON-DEPLOIEMENT SERAIT POS-
SIBLE A OBTENIR SANS CONTRE-PARTIE DE SON COTE.

CETTE DERNIERE REFLEXION ME SEMBLE AVOIR AUSSI UNE PORTEE SUR LE
TROISIEME ELEMENT DE VOS REFLEXIONS, C'EST-A-DIRE LE FAIT QUE LA
CONFIANCE DES UNS VIS-A-VIS DES AUTRES A SUBI UN NET REcul. IL EST
DONC D'UNE IMPORTANCE PRIMORDIALE QUE L'UNION SOVIETIQUE SE RENDE
BIEN COMPTE QUE LES DECISIONS DE L'OTAN NE SONT PAS/PAS DES PAROLES
EN L'AIR, INFLUENCABLES-VOIR MEME REVERSIBLES-PAR UNE HABILE MANIPU-
LATION D'UNE PARTIE DE L'OPINION PUBLIQUE DANS NOS PAYS, QUI SE SOUCIE
A TRES JUSTE TITRE DU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX ENTRE LES DEUX BLOCS. CETTE
FERMETE DOIT DONC, ELLE AUSSI, CONTRIBUER A CE QUE L'EST NE SE MEPRENNE
PAS/PAS SUR NOS VERITABLES INTENTIONS.

TOUTEFOIS, NOTRE OBJECTIF PRIMORDIAL EST, ET RESTERA, LE DESARMEMENT, A
CONDITION QU'IL ABOUTISSE A UNE REDUCTION EQUILIBREE ET VERIFIABLE
DES ARMES, QU'ELLES SOIENT NUCLEAIRES-STRATEGIQUES OU A PORTEE INTER-
MEDIAIRE-OU CONVENTIONNELLES. CONVAINCRE L'URSS ET SES ALLIES DE LA
SINCERITE DE CET OBJECTIF DOIT ALLER DE PAIR AVEC NOTRE RESOLUTION DE
RESTER FERMES-ET PARTANT CREDIBLES.

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PAGE THREE UNGR2485 CONF

CECI M AMENE A UNE REFLEXION QUANT AU TON QUI CARACTERISE RECEMMENT LES PRISES DE POSITION DE PART ET D AUTRE DANS LA CONFRONTATION DES DEUX SUPERGRANDS ET J AIMERAIS CITER UNE PHRASE DU DISCOURS PRONONCE LE 20OCT PAR NOTRE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES, MADAME COLETTE FLESCH DEVANT LA CHAMBRE DES DEPUTES: CIT SANS ILLUSIONS QUANT A L INTENTION AVOUEE DE L UNION SOVIETIQUE DE FAIRE TRIOMPHER LE MARXISME-LENINISME DANS TOUS LES PAYS DU MONDE, NOUS DEVONS CEPENDANT DE NOTRE COTE AUSSI, EVITER CE QUI POURRAIT RESSEMBLER A L ESPRIT DE CROISSADE FINCIT. EN EFFET, IL ME PARAIT ABSOLUMENT IMPERATIF DE VEILLER A CE QUE, DE PART ET D AUTRE, LE NIVEAU DES COMMUNICATIONS SOIT RAMENE D UN TON DE PROPAGANDE EXCESSIF A UN MODE PLUS SOBRE DE FORMULATION AFIN QUE LE DIALOGUE POLITIQUE PUISSE ETRE REPRIS.

JE VOUS FELICITE DONC, MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE, DE L INITIATIVE QUE VOUS VENEZ DE PRENDRE ET JE VOUS SOUHAITE QUE VOS PROPOSITIONS PUISSENT RENCONTRER L APPUI LE PLUS LARGE POSSIBLE.

JE NE PEUX QUE SOUSCRIRE ENTIEREMENT A VOTRE DESIR DE VOIR, A UNE ECHELLE GLOBALE, UNE LIMITE AUX ARMES NUCLEAIRES STRATEGIQUES ET MEME, DE PREFERENCE, LEUR REDUCTION. DE MEME, LE LUXEMBOURG A TOUJOURS APPUYE TOUT EFFORT VISANT A CONTENIR LA PROLIFERATION LATERALE DES ARMES NUCLEAIRES.

EN CE QUI CONCERNE LES NEGOCIATIONS MBFR, NOTRE PAYS Y PREND UNE PART ACTIVE EN DEPIT DE L IMPORTANCE REDUITE DE SES FORCES MILITAIRES. LES QUELQUES PROGRES, POUR LIMITES QU ILS SOIENT, QUI ONT PU ETRE ENREGISTRES RECEMMENT A VIENNE M INCITENT A NE PAS/PAS PERDRE TOUT ESPOIR

PAGE FOUR UNGR2485 CONFD

POUR UN ABOUTISSEMENT DE CES NEGOCIATIONS. EN TOUT CAS, JE NE MANQUERAI PAS/PAS D INFORMER NOTRE DELEGATION A VIENNE DE VOS IDEES DANS CE DOMAINE.

FINALEMENT, IL RESTE A TROUVER UN MOYEN POUR SORTIR D UNE SITUATION QUI POURRAIT S AVERER ETRE UNE IMPASSE, QUE POURRAIT CONSTITUER LA REDOUTEE MAINMISE PLUS MARQUEE DES MILITAIRES SUR L APPAREIL SOVIETIQUE. JE SUIS D AVIS QUE LA PERIODE ACTUELLE DEVRAIT ETRE CELLE OU LES BASES POUR UN RENOUVELLEMENT DU DIALOGUE A HAUT NIVEAU DOIVENT ETRE CREEES, AFIN QUE CE DIALOGUE PUISSE SE POURSUIVRE DANS UN CLIMAT PLUS DETENDU, UNE FOIS QUE LA DIRECTION SOVIETIQUE PRESENTERA DE NOUVEAU UN VISAGE PLUS CLAIR ET DEFINI AU MONDE.

DANS CETTE OPTIQUE, JE PENSE QU IL EST NECESSAIRE DE PRESENTER AUX PAYS DE L EST UNE POSITION DE FERMETE ET DE RESOLUTION, MAIS AUSSI D EVITER TOUT EXCES DE FORMULATION QUI POURRAIT METTRE EN DOUTE NOS INTENTIONS ET ASPIRATIONS LES PLUS PROFONDES QUE SONT LE MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX DANS LA LIBERTE ET LE DESARMEMENT LE PLUS COMPLET POSSIBLE.

TOUT EN VOUS REMERCIANT DE M AVOIR PROCURE CETTE OPPORTUNITE D EVOQUER QUELQUES CONSIDERATIONS SUR CES IMPORTANTS SUJETS, JE VOUS PRIE DE BIEN VOULOIR AGREER, MONSIEUR LE PREMIER MINISTRE, L ASSURANCE DE MA TRES HAUTE CONSIDERATION ET DE MES SENTIEMENTS CORDIAUX.

PIERRE WERNER

PRESIDENT DU GOUVERNEMENT UNQUOTE

TEXT ENDS

CCC/086 712316Z UNGR2485

ROYAL NORWEGIAN EMBASSY

ROYAL BANK CENTRE
90 SPARKS STREET, SUITE 932
OTTAWA, ONTARIO, CANADA K1P 5B4


Mr. Cohen 3343 037
Texte envoyé par télà
PM del Delhi. Pour les
archives du PM
RD

XV-55/83

The Royal Norwegian Embassy presents its compliments to the Department of External Affairs and has the honour to forward the text of a letter, dated November 22, 1983 to the Prime Minister of Canada, the Right Honourable Pierre E. Trudeau, from the Prime Minister of Norway, Mr. Kåre Willoch. The letter is response to Mr. Trudeau's letter to Mr. Willoch of November 18, 1983.

The Royal Norwegian Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of External Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.

Ottawa, November 22, 1983



The Prime Minister's Office, Oslo

Oslo, November 22, 1983

My Dear Prime Minister,

With reference to your letter dated 17 November 1983 I would like to offer the following comments concerning the inaugural meeting of the CDE and the MBFR negotiations:

The Norwegian Government attaches great importance to the forthcoming Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. It is our opinion that this Conference must be used to continue and intensify the East/West dialogue on security and disarmament. The successful preparatory meeting in Helsinki has paved the way for an orderly opening of the Conference. Consequently, Norway will support the proposal that all NATO members should be represented at a high political level, preferably at the level of Foreign Ministers, at the opening of the Stockholm Conference.

In the view of the Norwegian Government, the latest Eastern proposals in Vienna have underscored the need for a thorough evaluation of our own negotiating position in the MBFR. A strategy should be developed for making some real movement in the negotiations.

The Norwegian Government would like to associate itself with your proposal for a decision on a new Western initiative to be taken at the forthcoming NATO Foreign Minister meeting. But before we decide on a

The Right Honourable Pierre E. Trudeau
Prime Minister of Canada
Ottawa

- 2 -

follow-up meeting in Vienna at the Foreign Minister level, we ought to have a clear picture of the Western response. In principle we are positive to holding such a meeting, provided the conditions are favourable.

I look forward to remaining in close contact on the subject in the coming months.

Kåre Willoch /S/

EMBASSY OF GREECE

OTTAWA

Note No 3250/2883/AS1213

The Embassy of Greece presents its compliments to the Department of External Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith the text of a letter dated 28 November, 1983, by the Prime Minister of Greece Mr. Andreas Papandreou addressed to the Right Honourable Prime Minister of Canada Pierre Elliott Trudeau. This Embassy would be grateful to the Department of External Affairs if the latter would be kind enough to forward the said letter accordingly.

The Embassy of Greece avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of External Affairs the assurances of its highest consideration.



November 30, 1983

His Excellency Pierre Elliott Trudeau
Prime Minister of Canada
Ottawa, Ontario
Canada

Athens, November 28, 1983

Dear Pierre,

Thank you for your letters dated October 25th and November 18th, 1983, which I have read thoroughly and with great interest. I have also considered with equal interest and care the notes of your speech in Montreal, on November 13th, which your Ambassador in Athens kindly forwarded to me.

I am very pleased to note that I share to a great extent your thoughts and concerns and I agree with you that confluence of circumstances demands urgent corrective action.

It is my appreciation too, that East-West relations have seriously deteriorated and are currently encountering a critical juncture of heightening tension and uncertainty. Events of political or military nature, such as Afghanistan, Poland, the Middle East, South and Central America, as well as the South Korean aircraft incident, are some recent examples of the deterioration of East-West relations.

What, however, is currently being considered as the most crucial issue and which threatens with total disaster the whole humanity is the frantic arms race between the two superpowers.

Day after day the arsenals of the two superpowers are considerably enlarged by modern more sophisticated and destructive nuclear weapons. More than ever the

-2-

world situation today is fraught with danger. The spectre of nuclear holocaust becomes more and more haunting. The escalation of armaments has reached a point where each of the major nuclear powers has a capacity of destroying the world many times. At the same time, the international crises drag on and on, while new hotbeds of tension are added to the international scene. An all this at the detriment of the weak, who feel increasingly helpless before the might of the powerful.

The reduction of armaments and the abolishment of the causes of conflict are imperative for world peace. Our primary objective must be to urge both superpowers to abide by the voice of logic.

I would agree with you that the trends you referred to in your speech in Montreal of November 13th 1983, to which the East-West confrontation is attributed, are: an increasing resort to the use of force to settle international disputes, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the worsening state of East-West relations and the absence of high politics and understanding between the superpowers. I, therefore, regard as positive the four elements of your program of political management that you have stated in your speech. I should also like to assure that, during the N A C Ministerial Meeting of December 8th, I will fully support your proposals regarding high political representation at the inaugural meeting of the Stockholm Conference, as well as the N A T O response to the latest eastern proposals on MBFR early in the new year and to a meeting in Vienna at the Foreign Ministers' level as a follow-up to its response.

I cannot, however, share your views concerning N A T O's commitment for the deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe, as you have stated in your letter dated October 16th 1983.

For my Government and the Greek people, that commitment has a totally different dimension and is linked with the obligation all of us have to protect by all means the most

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valuable possession of the earth, that is human life.

Allow me to point out that, in my view, the euro-missiles issue is not a simple case of unbalance, inequity or lack of parity. It is something much more than that. It is a radical change in strategy, since strategic warning is limited to an unacceptable degree and imposes application of new methods based exclusively on automation. In more simple words, we should accept that we are approaching the time where human mind will be set aside by the computers so that the latter will be those who will decide for the future of humanity. I believe I don't need to underline to you the dangers of such an option. However, bearing in mind those dangers, we must all undertake our responsibilities for the benefit of our peoples.

I hope we would have the opportunity to see each other soon and to discuss again our various efforts aiming at promoting understanding, detente and peace. I think that no possibility should be missed in this direction, when our world is increasingly facing a visible threat against its very existence.

Yours sincerely,

Andreas Papandreou

3322 046



Embajada de España


UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

TEXT OF LETTER ADDRESSED TO PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SPAIN

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have read with great interest your letter of 25 October as well as the important lecture you gave at Guelph University.

I share, in its broad outlines, the concern you express about the alarming present situation of international tension. Unfortunately, the symptoms of deterioration have multiplied lately. Because of the possible general consequences of such deterioration, it affects not only the superpowers, but all the peace-loving peoples and their leaders. I feel, as you do, that it is imperative to surmount this climate of mistrust and confrontation, and that to this effect, it is necessary to exert imagination, courage and political decisions.



ORIGINAL TO R. Fowler
ORIGINAL ENVOYÉ À
C.C. P.M.O. FILE
C.C. DOSSIERS C.P.M.



Embajada de España

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The steps you propose seem to me to be in principle appropriate, although, needless to say, their implementation will encounter, at least initially, considerable difficulties and serious resistance.

Certainly, political dialogue at the highest level must be promoted as a means of breaking the vicious circle of a militarism which breeds on mutual suspicion. This is essentially the scope of your bold and generous initiative, to urge a collective act of political will. I assure you that I personally sympathize with this initiative and I wish you the greatest success in the contacts you have initiated with several western leaders. You can count on the goodwill of the Government of Spain and our willingness to cooperate.

Our peoples must not surrender to discouragement and inertia, particularly in such difficult times. We, in Government, cannot evade the responsibilities incumbent on us. The possibility for future generations to have a more propitious, free and peaceful outlook depends ultimately on us, on our ability to collectively overcome the greatest

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Embajada de España

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of threats, the obliteration of any future.

I hope, Mr. Prime Minister, to keep
in contact with you and look forward to encouraging
news about the initiatives you have had the valor
to undertake.

I send you my most cordial greetings,

Felipe González Marquez

EL PRESIDENTE DEL GOBIERNO

Madrid, 16 de noviembre de 1.983

Excmo. Sr. Pierre Elliot Trudeau
Primer Ministro del Canadá
OTTAWA

Estimado Primer Ministro:

He leído con gran interés su carta de 25 de octubre, así como el importante discurso que pronunció en la Universidad de Guelph.

Comparto, en sus grandes líneas, las preocupaciones que expresa por la alarmante situación de tensión internacional. En los últimos tiempos se han multiplicado, lamentablemente, los síntomas de este deterioro que, por las consecuencias generales que puede tener, afecta no sólo a las superpotencias, sino también a todos los pueblos amantes de la paz y a sus gobernantes.

Pienso, como Vd., que es imperativo desbloquear este clima de suspicacias y enfrentamiento, y que para ello se necesita imaginación, valentía y decisiones políticas.

Los pasos que Vd. propone me parecen en principio acertados, si bien no necesito decirle que su puesta en práctica tendrá, al menos inicialmente, considerables dificultades y encontrará serias resistencias.

Ciertamente, se debe impulsar el diálogo político al más alto nivel, como forma de romper el círculo vicioso de un militarismo que se alimenta de desconfianzas mutuas.

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
EL PRESIDENTE DEL GOBIERNO

En esto se resume en el fondo su iniciativa, generosa y audaz, en un acto colectivo de voluntad política. Le puedo asegurar que personalmente simpatizo con la misma, y que le deseo los mayores éxitos en los contactos que ha emprendido con varios líderes occidentales. Puede contar con la voluntad del Gobierno español y con nuestro deseo de cooperar.

Nuestros pueblos no pueden entregarse al desánimo y a la inercia, particularmente en los momentos difíciles. Sus gobernantes tampoco podemos sustraernos a las responsabilidades que nos incumben, cuando de nosotros depende en último extremo que las generaciones venideras conozcan un mañana más próspero, más pacífico y más libre, si es que entre todos conseguimos vencer la mayor de las amenazas, que ni siquiera exista para ellas un mañana.

Espero, Sr. Primer Ministro, seguir en contacto con Vd. y poder tener noticias alentadoras sobre las iniciativas que ha tenido el coraje de emprender.

Le envío mis más cordiales saludos,



Felipe González Márquez.

3343 035

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 14, 1983

Dear Pierre:

I appreciate your thoughtful letter regarding the state of East-West relations and the level of tension in international politics. Recent developments in the Soviet Union indeed merit our attention, and the question whether Yuri Andropov has succeeded in establishing political control in the USSR bears our careful consideration. Much attention has also been drawn to the militarization of that society, a development that may be a factor in the deterioration of East-West relations.

I share your view that Western governments must sustain their efforts to place international politics on a more stable footing. As you suggested, I think it would be useful for us to meet to examine the long-term strategy we in the West ought to pursue to bring the Soviet Union and its Allies into a more stable and predictable pattern of international behavior.

There are three broad aspects of world security which deserve our concerted attention: first, the steady growth in Soviet military power -- far beyond legitimate defensive needs -- and the growing propensity of the Soviets to use it, both directly and indirectly, in destabilizing fashion; second, the high levels of armaments in general, which make the world more dangerous than ever; and third, the virtual absence of trust in the East-West relationship, which undermines our ability to achieve progress in the first two areas. We certainly will not be able to put all these problems to rest at once, but I believe that we must pursue a strategy which addresses all of them simultaneously, since they are linked in important ways.

REC'D. / REÇU

DEC 9 1983

Coordination

Progress in arms reduction, for example, will be very difficult if the Soviet Union continues to use its military power irresponsibly, and if Soviet authorities continue to evade full compliance with past agreements. Such actions undermine the minimal foundation of confidence on which any agreement must rest and underscore the necessity of proceeding with our program of nuclear and conventional force modernization.

With respect to the specific aspects of your East-West agenda, let me say that I fully share your desire to see more progress in all of these areas. In the MBFR talks, we continue to be frustrated by the Soviet refusal to provide essential data on their troop levels. But we are beginning to make limited progress on verification.

At the Stockholm CDE, we will begin to negotiate confidence and security building measures aimed at reducing the risk of war in Europe. While we in the West approach this forum with sincere interest in achieving meaningful progress, the real question is whether or not the USSR will engage in substantive discussions or continue to promote hollow, but superficially attractive, proposals.

Your emphasis on combatting horizontal nuclear proliferation is fully shared here in Washington and is a concern about which we have communicated recently. Progress on this front could serve as the first step in securing agreement in other arms control fora. Given the convergence of Western and Soviet interests in nuclear nonproliferation, there is reason for optimism here.

As for the convening of a five-power conference on reducing nuclear armaments, we have no fundamental objections to such a development at some point. I am concerned, however, that the real focus of our attention should be on achieving verifiable and

substantial reductions at the negotiations currently in progress, particularly at the INF and START talks. It does not seem likely that opening up yet another forum at this time would improve the prospects for successful arms control agreements or the political climate between East and West. I would also note that both our British and French Allies, as well as the Chinese, have indicated a willingness to reconsider their current attitude toward arms control limitations on their nuclear forces only under conditions which do not seem likely to be met in the near future. We respect the reasons which have led these governments to take this position, and feel it would be counterproductive if the impression were to be created that there were differences within the Alliance on this issue.

These are all matters which we can discuss further when we meet. It is most important for us to find a way to persuade Moscow that we are resolute in defending the values of our societies. At the same time, we and our Allies are prepared to engage in a meaningful dialogue and serious negotiations aimed at reducing tensions and threats to peace. As we go forward in this effort, I am sure you will agree that we must not allow the open and frank discussion, which is essential to the Alliance, to mislead the Kremlin regarding our total commitment to preserving our way of life. The strength and unity of the North Atlantic Alliance are essential if we are to convince our adversaries that a reduction of arms and of international tensions is in their interest.

Pierre, I found both your letter and your speech in Guelph insightful and thought-provoking. I look forward to seeing you for a detailed discussion.

Sincerely,

Ron

The Right Honorable
Pierre Elliott Trudeau, P.C., M.P.
Prime Minister of Canada
Canada

file

CONFIDENTIAL

December 12, 1983

IDDZ-0279

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R.R.Fowler)

Initiative: Results of the NATO Ministerial Meeting

Further to our memorandum IDDZ-0271 of today's date, we attach for your information a copy of the "Declaration of Brussels" issued by the NATO Foreign Ministers on December 9, 1983. This text reflects the extent to which a certain number of Foreign Ministers (FRG, Canada, France, Belgium, Netherlands) were able to rally an Alliance consensus for a forward-looking NATO posture on East-West relations, as opposed to merely expressing satisfaction with Alliance solidarity and the need to stand fast in the face of Soviet intransigence (a line clearly favoured at the outset by the USA and UK). We would draw your attention in particular to the references to the legitimate security interests of the USSR, and to constructive relationships and genuine détente between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries; this type of terminology has invariably been strongly resisted in the past by the Reagan Administration.

L. A. Delvoie

L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

c.c. PMO/Axworthy
PCO/Osbaldeston
DND/Anderson
DEA/MINA DMF IFB IDR

Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

December 9, 1983

DECLARATION OF BRUSSELS

We, the representatives of the sixteen member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, reaffirm the dedication of the Allies to the maintenance of peace in freedom.

Our Alliance threatens no one. None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack. We do not aspire to superiority, neither will we accept that others should be superior to us. Our legitimate security interests can only be guaranteed through the firm linkage between Europe and North America. We call upon the Soviet Union to respect our legitimate security interests as we respect theirs.

We are determined to ensure security on the basis of a balance of forces at the lowest possible level. Faced with the threat posed by the Soviet SS-20 missiles, the Allies concerned are going forward with the implementation of the double-track decision of 1979. The ultimate goal remains that there should be neither Soviet nor United States land based long-range INF missiles. The deployment of USA missiles can be halted or reversed by concrete results at the negotiating table. In this spirit we wish to see an early resumption of the INF negotiations which the Soviet Union has discontinued. (1)

We urge the countries of the Warsaw Pact to seize the opportunities we offer for a balanced and constructive relationship and for genuine detente. In all arms control negotiations progress must be made among the states participating, in particular in:

- the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START);
- the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks (INF);
- the Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR);
- the endeavours for a complete ban on chemical weapons in the Committee on Disarmament.

(1) Denmark and Greece reserve their positions on this paragraph; Spain, not having been a party to the double-track decision of 1979, reserves its position on this paragraph.

- 2 -

We are also resolved to use the forthcoming Stockholm Conference as a new opportunity to broaden the dialogue with the East, to negotiate confidence building measures and enhance stability and security in the whole of Europe.

We shall continue to do our utmost to sustain a safe and peaceful future. We extend to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries the offer to work together with us to bring about a long-term constructive and realistic relationship based on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity. For the benefit of mankind, we advocate an open comprehensive political dialogue, as well as co-operation based on mutual advantage.

P. E. Barton
Defence Relations Division
2-9263

SECRET

IDR-4769

December 13, 1983

Memorandum for the Deputy Prime Minister
and Secretary of State for External Affairs

cc: Minister for International Trade
cc: Minister for External Relations

Subject: US Air Force Strategic Air Command (SAC)
Overflights of Canada on Airborne Alert

PURPOSE

To seek your signature of the attached joint Memorandum to Cabinet, prepared in consultation with the Department of National Defence and to ask you to sign the attached letter to Mr. Blais requesting his co-signature of the Memorandum.

BACKGROUND

The Memorandum recommends that Cabinet agree to the renewal of an arrangement which would permit nuclear-armed (SAC) bombers to overfly Canada in times of crisis, subject to consultations between the Governments of Canada and the United States. This arrangement is in implementation of a public commitment in the Defence White Paper of 1971 and entails no new policy considerations. The Memorandum conforms to Cabinet's decision of December 14, 1978, that subsequent renewals of this arrangement be authorized by Cabinet on the advice of the Secretary of State for External Affairs in consultation with the Minister of National Defence. Mr. Blais will sign an identical Memorandum for purposes of your joint submission to Cabinet.

The current arrangement expires on December 31, 1983. The submission is scheduled to be considered by Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy and Defence on December 19. We envisage that the renewed arrangement would be brought into force by Exchange of Notes between you and the Ambassador of the United States.

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SECRET

I recommend that you sign the Memorandum to Cabinet.

Original Signed by
Original signé par
M. SHENSTONE

M. Shenstone
Assistant Deputy Minister
(Political and International
Security Affairs)

de Montigny Marchand

Deputy Prime Minister
Secretary of State for External Affairs



Vice-premier ministre
Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, K1A 0G2

SECRET

The Honourable Jean-Jacques Blais, P.C., M.P.
Minister of National Defence
Room 312 West Block
House of Commons
Ottawa


My dear Colleague,

I attach, for your signature if you agree, a Memorandum to the Cabinet on the subject of U.S. Air Force Strategic Air Command (SAC) Overflights of Canada on Airborne Alert. The Memorandum recommends the renewal of an arrangement which would permit nuclear-armed SAC aircraft to overfly Canada in times of crisis, subject to consultations between Governments.

The current Exchange of Notes expires on December 31, 1983. This Memorandum is scheduled to be discussed at the December 19 meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy and Defence.

I should be grateful if you would append your signature to the Memorandum to Cabinet and arrange for it to be forwarded to the Privy Council Office by December 22.

Yours sincerely,


for Allan J. MacEachen

- 7 -

SECRET

- b) subsequent renewals of this arrangement be authorized by Cabinet on the advice of the Secretary of State for External Affairs in consultation with the Minister of National Defence.

Hon. Jean-Jacques Blais
Minister of National Defence

Serald A. Regan
Acting Sec of State for
External Affairs

for Hon. Allan J. MacEachen
Deputy Prime Minister and
Secretary of State for
External Affairs

J. L. ...
fdca

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

December 12, 1983.

IDDZ-0277

Mr. Gregg B. Perry
Manager
Camp Columbia
Thetis Island
British Columbia
VOR 2Y0

Dear Mr. Perry:

On behalf of the Prime Minister, permit me to reply to your letter of November 4 which proposes that Camp Columbia receive a group of Soviet youths during 1984, in an effort to encourage youth exchanges between Canada and the Soviet Union.

As you suggested, Canada and the Soviet Union, indeed all countries of East and West, would benefit from expanded contacts. This is true whether one is speaking of national leaders or ordinary citizens, a view shared by the Prime Minister who is endeavoring to encourage dialogue at the highest levels.

Your own efforts at developing contracts between Canadian and Soviet youths should be seen in the same vein. While such exchanges are not government sponsored at present, there have been, we understand, private initiatives which have resulted in visits by Canadians to the Soviet Union, and Soviet citizens to Canada. The Peace Making Task Force, for example, might wish to launch such a program itself. Your Soviet contacts, in such a case, would be the Soviet Intourist Agency (2020 University Avenue, Montreal, Quebec).

I wish you the best of luck in your endeavours.

Yours sincerely,

L.A. Delvoje

L.A. Delvoje
Chairman
Task Force Working Group



file

TO/À • UGB
FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • PM Visit to Washington
SUJET

Security/Sécurité
CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
December 12, 1983
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0275

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

DMF

IFB

As the Prime Minister's visit to Washington this week will relate almost exclusively to his initiative on peace and security, I would suggest that the Task Force assume lead responsibility for all aspects of the visit. I would also suggest that Mr. von Nostitz be attached to the Task Force for the next four days to participate in preparations for the visit and to ensure the necessary liaison with the USA Embassy in Ottawa. Do you agree?

L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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TO BNATO/TAYLOR

TAYLOR DE DELVOIE
FROM

---NAC MINISTERIAL

CDN PERMANENT DELEGATION ONCE AGAIN CAME THROUGH WITH FLYING
COLOURS ON BOTH SUBSTANCE AND LOGISTICS. JOHN ANDERSON JOINS ME IN
THANKING YOU AND ALL YOUR STAFF FOR YOUR HOSPITALITY, KINDNESS AND
SUPPORT. REGARDS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG L.A. DELVOIE

IDDZ

5-5912

L.A. Delvoie
SIG L.A. Delvoie



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SUBJ/SUJ

---PM INITIATIVE

RE MFA REQUEST FOR BRIEFING ON PM S TOKYO, PEKIN VISITS ETC, ASSUME

YOU HAVE DRAWN ON POINTS CONVEYED IN OUR REFTEL.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

SIG J. McNEE

DIVISION/DIRECTION

IDDZ

TELEPHONE

5-5912

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE

MR SMITH

action

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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RCR

---PMS INITIATIVE-FRG VIEWS

SUMMARY:FRG SUPPORTS AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF PMS INTITIAE
INT IS GENERAL LINES AND IS FOLLOWING CLOSELY ITS DEVELOPMENT
AND RECEPTION ELSEWHERE.OFFICIALS HAVE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE
INDIVIDUAL PROPOSALS,NOTING EG THAT SOME ARE ESSENTIALLY FOR OTHER
COUNTRIES TO TAKE UP(FIVE NUCLEAR POWER CONF)OR THAT
SUBSTANCE NEEDS TO BE AGREED BEFORE DECISION ON POLITICAL
INPUT IS MADE(MBFR).THEY THUS SEE DIFFICULTIES IN ACHIEVING LINKAGE
BETWEEN PMS CALL FOR POLTIICAL DIALOGUE AND ELEMENTS TO GIVE
SUBSTANCE TO ANY SUCH DIALOGUE.

2.REPORT:WE MET WITH SCHAUER,MFA DIR GEN FOR WESTERN HEMISPHERE,
TO OBTAIN A READING OF CURRECT FRG VISIES ON PMS INITIATIVE.
DISCUSSION CONFIRMED THAT GERMAN REMAIN POSITIVELY DISPOSED TOWARDS
PMS INITIATIVE.HIS GENERAL ANALYSIS OF SITUAITON IS SIMILAR TO THEIRS.
AND HIS CALL FOR HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL ENAGEEMENT ISD ONE THEY CAN

...2

PAGE TWO ZQGR4119 CONF D

READILY ENDORSE, AS IT IS ONE THEY MAKE REGULARLY THEMSELVES. THEY ARE FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENT OF INITIATIVE CLOSELY AND REQUESTED INFO ON RECEPTION PM RECEIVED IN TOKYO, PEKIN ETC. GRATEFUL RECEIVE LINES OF BRIEFING WE CAN PASS ONE.

3. ON SPECIFIC PROPOSALS GERMAN HAVE QUESTIONS AND BECOME SOMEWHAT MORE CAUTIOUS. EXCEPTION IS LEVEL OF REPRESENTATION IN STKHM. THEY HAVE FROM OUTSET BELIEVED CDE SHOULD OPEN AT FM LEVEL. GENSCHER WILL DEFINITELY BE IN ATTENDANCE.

4. ON MBFR SCHAUER SAID THAT SUBSTANCE SHOULD DETERMINE MIN INVOLVEMENT, NOT/NOT VICE VERSA. IN OTHER WORDS WEST SHOULD FIRST DECIDE CONTENT OF ITS RESPONSE TO EASTERN PROPOSALS, DECIDE FURTHER HOW THIS RESPONSE SHOULD BE MADE AND ONLY THEN DECIDE WHO SHOULD MAKE IT. FRG AGREED TIMELY RESPONSE SHOULD BE MADE TO EASTERN PROPOSALS BUT NEITHER USA NOR UK APPEARED READY AT THIS POINT TO MAKE IT. FRG WOULD BE READY FOR DISCUSSION OF CDN IDEAS ON MBFT AT NATO MIN DEC 8-9 IF MINA WERE TO RAISE THEM. SCHAUER SAID MBFR HAD NOT/NOT BEEN RAISED DURING UK/FRG SUMMIT (OURTEL ZQGR4083 10 NOV) AND WAS TOUCHED ON ONLY BRIEFLY DURING FR/FRG SUMMIT (OURTEL ZQGR4107 29 NOV)/

5. ON IDEA OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWER CONF SCHAUER SAID FRG WAS OF COURSE IN PRINCIPLE IN FAVOUR OF SUCH CONF TAKING PLACE. HOWEVER FRG WAS NOT/NOT NUCLEAR POWER, HAVING RENOUNCED NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR ITSELF, AND IT WAS ULTIMATELY QUESTION THAT NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD DECIDE. HE WANTED TO KNOW WHAT UK/FRG/CHINESE REACTION HAD BEEN HE ASSUMED FR

...3

PAGE THREE ZQGR4119 CONF

REACTION WAS SIMILAR TO MITTERANDS UN SPEECH IE POSITIVELY
DISPOSED IN PRINCIPLE BUT SETTING OUT THREE TOUGH CONDITIONS
BEFORE FR COULD PARTICIPATE IN ANY SUCH CONF. UK POSITION, JUDGING
FROM HOW SPEEC TO UN, SEEMEND TO BE SIMILAR.

6. SCHAUERS REACTION TO SUFFOCATION OF ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS
WAS SIMILAR, IE FRG HAD NO/NO INTENTION OF PRODUCING SUCH SYSTEMS
AND IT WAS ESSENTIALLY QUESTION TWO SUPERPOWERS HAD TO DECIDE
BETWEEN THEMSELVES (ON THESE SPFCIFIC SUFFOCATION IDEAS, AS WELL AS
MBFR, WE WILL BE TOUCHING BASE WITH FRED RUTH AND HIS PEOPLE FOR
MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS).

7. SCHAUER ALSO TOOK OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE FRG VIEWS ON USSR WALKOUT
IN GENEV. HE SIAD SOVIETS WOULD COME BACK TO INF NEGS QUOTE SOMEWHERE,
SOMEHOW UNQUOTE. PERHAPS NOT/NOT IN GENEV, PERHAPS IN CONJUNCTION WITH
START. USSR HAD STRONG INTEREST IN AGREEMENT ON INF AND WOULD BE BACK.
DEPLOYMENT WAS DEFEAT FOR USSR, BUT POLITICALLY THERE WAS LITTLE THEY
COULD DO. THEY CONTINUED TO SHOW GREAT INTEREST IN CDA. GDR REACTION
TO DEPLOYMENT HAD BEEN MEASURED AND CAUTIOUS. FOR ALL THESE REASONS,
FRG THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT NAC MAKE FIRM BUT POSITIVE STATEMENT
AT NEXT WFEKS MTG, PERHPAS IN FORM OF SEPARATE STATEMENT. (ENATO HAS
REPORTED FRG NATO DEL HAS RAISED THIS POSSIBILITY).

CCC/005 051104Z ZQGR4119



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

12 Dec 83 23 12 52 10

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM/DE
TO/À
INFO
DISTR
REF
SUBJ/SUJ

FM EXTOTT IDDZ0272 12DEC83

TO HAVAN

DISTR LCD IDD IDA

REF YOURTEL YYGR3027 ~~OF~~ 08DEC

---PM INITIATIVE

WE AGREE WITH LCR THAT PRESENTATION OF CUBAN RADIO ON PM INITIATIVE
WOULD BE DESIRABLE, BUT HAVE NO/NO TIME TO WRITE SPEECH.

2. SUGGEST YOU TAKE TEXTS OF PM S GUELPH AND MTL SPEECHS AND EDIT
THEM TO GIVE TEXT YOU NEED. SHOULD YOU REQUIRE ADDITIONAL POINTS,
PLS CONSULT US.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. McNEE

IDDZ

995-5912

SIG

L.A. DELVOIE

Handwritten notes:
1002 02 72 of 1002
send to 1002
9/12/83

Handwritten notes:
You might check
with HQ
about this

Handwritten notes:
1002
9/12/83

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM HAVAN YYGR3027 08DEC83
TO EXTOTT LCR
DISTR LCD (IDD IDA

---TRUDEAU PEACE INITIATIVE

SENIOR OFFICIAL OF CUBAN NATL RADIO HAS INVITED US TO MAKE
3 TO 5 MINUTE PRESENTATION ON CUBAN RADIO PUBLIC AFFAIRS
PROGRAM. SHE SUGGESTED PRESENTATION DEAL WITH TRUDEAU PEACE
INITIATIVE. FORMAT WOULD BE SET SPEECH, NOT/NOT DISCUSSION.
PROGRAM IS BROADCAST NATIONWIDE. WE CONSIDER INVITATION SHOULD
BE ACCEPTED. IF YOU AGREE, GRATEFUL YOU PROVIDE APPROPRIATE TEXT.
GRATEFUL REPLY ASAP AS OFFICIAL PREFERRED THAT WE SPEAK THIS
MONTH.

CCC/233 082020Z YYGR3027

sent to IDDZ
all
9/12/82

R E S T R I C T E D

FM NROBI WAGR1263 08DEC83

TO EXTOTT GAA

INFO LSAKA DSLAM HRARE PRET PRMNY LDN PARIS BONN LAGOS ACCRA
KNSHA YUNDF ABDJN DAKAR ADDIS PCOOTT/CARON DELHI
DISTR MINA MINE MINT USS DMF IFB GGB GAD IMD IMU IMC IDD IDR
UGB FPR

REF OURTEL WAGR1241 06DEC

---KENYA:NUCLIAAR WAR

KENYA HAS NEVER IN PAST BEEN VERY VOCAL ON ISSUE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. CONSEQUENTLY WE WERE VERY PLEASED TO HEAR MOIS REMARKS ON THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR UPON HIS RETURN FROM CHOGM (SEE REFTTEL). MOREOVER, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TOLD USSR AMBASSADOR WHEN SIGNING CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC PLAN ON 07DEC THAT KENYA IS CONCERNED WITH PRESENT GROWING TENSION BETWEEN SUPER POWERS AND APPEALED TO THEM TO COME TO ROUNDTABLE DIALOGUE AS QUOTE WE DONT WANT TO BE CAUGHT IN A HOLOCAUST BECAUSE OF THE TENSION UNQUOTE. MINISTER ADDED QUOTE TWO SUPERPOWERS SEEM TO BE IGNORING OTHER COUNTRIES IN THEIR NEGOTIATIONS UNQUOTE. MINISTERS REMARKS WERE CARRIED BY LOCAL MEDIA. SUBSEQUENT TO CHOGM THERE HAVE BEEN TWO MAJOR ARTICLES ON NUCLEAR WAR IN LOCAL PRINT MEDIA. IT WILL BE INTERESTING TO SEE IF OTHER AFRICAN LEADERS BEGIN TO PUBLICLY RAISE THIS ISSUE AS MOST HAVE BEEN GENERALLY QUIET IN PAST.

CCC/257 090530Z WAGR1263

CONFIDENTIAL

December 12, 1983

IDDZ-0271

p2 9 que

Memorandum for the Prime Minister (through R.R. *R*)

Initiative: Results of the NATO Ministerial Meeting

In terms of your initiative on peace and security, the just concluded NATO Ministerial meeting produced four highly positive results:

- (a) an undertaking by NATO foreign ministers to attend the opening of the CDE in Stockholm (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (b) an undertaking to review the NATO negotiating position in the MBFR negotiations (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (c) the "Brussels declaration" which places heavy emphasis on genuine détente and dialogue in East-West relations (an FRG initiative, actively supported by the Canadian delegation);
- (d) a mandate given the permanent NATO Council to review the current state of East-West relations and to report to the next NATO ministerial meeting on what actions might be taken to improve them (on the basis of a proposal by FM Tindemans for an update of the political aspects of the 1967 Harmel Report entitled "Future Tasks of the Alliance", an idea you had mentioned to Tindemans on November 9, 1983)

While Mr. MacEachen was unable to rally a consensus in favour of holding a ministerial meeting at the MBFR negotiations (in the face of firm USA and UK opposition), the Secretary General, in his summing up, did record the existence of a "préjugé favorable" for (1) ministerial involvement in the process of reviewing the NATO position on MBFR, and (2) the possibility of a ministerial meeting in Vienna if the results of the NATO review appeared to warrant this.

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
- 2 -

Next Steps:

In the aftermath of the NATO ministerial meeting we believe that we should:

- (a) instruct our missions in Warsaw Pact countries and in the neutral and non-aligned countries of Europe to make démarches to their host governments in favour of ministerial participation at the opening session of the CDE in Stockholm;
- (b) maintain close diplomatic contacts with the NATO countries concerned, and especially the Federal Republic of Germany, to ensure that the review of the NATO position in MBFR moves ahead as rapidly as possible.

Do you agree?



L.A. Delvoix,
Chairman,
Task Force Working Group

c.c.: PMO/Axwerthy
PCO/Osbaldesten
DND/Anderson
DEA/MINA, DMF, IFB, IDR.

MF

Brief
for SRA/Howe
for Pilot
12 Dec.

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PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE

ISSUE

The purpose of this brief is to discuss the current status of the Prime Minister's initiative.

BACKGROUND

The Prime Minister's central purpose is to try to stop and reverse the worsening trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce international tensions and risks of confrontation. His chief proposal addresses the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the two superpowers. The PM is interested in seeing if by opening lines of communication to Moscow more propitious conditions can be created for political dialogue between Moscow and Washington.

The initiative involves a number of specific proposals - (a) a conference of the five nuclear weapon states to limit strategic nuclear arsenals (b) a concerted political effort to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime (c) MBFR - a substantive Western response to the Eastern proposals and a meeting at the Foreign Minister level (d) the inauguration of the Stockholm CDE Meeting at senior political level.

Also related to the initiative, but not pursued personally by the PM with other governments, are proposals for (a) a ban on the testing and deployment of high altitude anti-satellite systems (b) a requirement that future strategic systems be verifiable by National Technical Means and (c) restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs.

- 2 -

Results of the PM's consultations with other governments to-date may be roughly summarized:

European allies have given encouraging support. The Europeans share his analysis of the dangerous state of East-West relations and the need for the re-establishment of political dialogue.

The French were generally supportive, with reservations as to timing. Their statements on the five power conference have been contradictory. The Germans were positive and generally supportive (and have subsequently endorsed the five power conference idea). The British were generally supportive of the broad purpose, but have reservations about specific proposals (especially the five power conference). The Dutch and Belgians reacted very positively, with some reservations as to timing (they think such an initiative may be most needed in the spring of 1984 once INF deployment has taken place). The Italians were generally supportive and have publicly endorsed the idea of a five power conference. (Also, we have had very positive and fully supportive written responses from the Danes and Norwegians and a very positive reaction from the Spaniards.)

Our High Commission in London will have briefed the FCO on the visits to Japan, CHOGM, China and the Soviet Union.

PM Nakasone of Japan was very receptive and fully supportive when the PM visited Tokyo on November 19.

Commonwealth Heads of Government specifically endorsed PM Trudeau's initiative in the Goa Declaration on International Security.

The Chinese are mildly supportive of the broad political purpose, but do not support the call for a five power conference or the NPT. They argue that the first priority is concentrating pressure on the superpowers to reduce their arms.

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The Soviets are interested, but cautious and non-committal. They claim to have had sad experiences with high-level contact with the US, hence they were "reserved" about the idea of the higher level of contact the better. While they appreciated the PM's view on the importance of discussions of intentions and goals, they claimed that Washington, in deploying new missiles was acting on a different basis. They are non-committal on a five power conference and reserved judgement on high-level presence at CDE and MBFR. The Soviets said what was lacking in the superpower relationship was "the will to work for mutually-acceptable solutions".

Next Steps being considered, beyond the DPM/SSEA's proposals to NAC on MBFR and CDE, are a visit by the PM to Washington, likely before Christmas, and a possible subsequent visit to Moscow.

BRITISH POSITION

Mrs. Thatcher agrees generally with the PM's analysis of the need for high-level political initiative and she has recently publicly called for "sensible and pragmatic dialogue" between East and West. But they have serious reservations on specific proposals, especially on a five power nuclear conference.

Foreign Secretary Howe at the U.N. General Assembly said "if Soviet and US strategic arsenals were to be very substantially reduced and if no significant changes had occurred in Soviet defensive capabilities, Britain would want to review her position and consider how best she could contribute to arms control in light of reduced threat". Mrs. Thatcher stressed to the PM the need for modernization of the British strategic force.

TALKING POINTS

- The PM's starting point is that the initiative in no way cuts across Canada's commitment to Alliance, NATO's "two-track" decision of 1979 and our decision to permit testing of the cruise.
- It is not intended in any way to interfere in the START negotiations or the INF problem.
- We are glad that the British largely share our analysis of the prevailing dangerous state of East-West relations and the need for high-level political initiative and genuine dialogue with the East.
- The PM wants to see, with certain Western European allies such as the UK, if by opening lines of communication with Moscow more propitious conditions can be created for political dialogue between Moscow and Washington.
- He will most likely visit Washington before Christmas and is considering a possible subsequent visit to Moscow.
- We believe that the specific measures proposed by the PM have merit and progress on any of them would contribute to improving East-West dialogue. But the initiative is primarily a political enterprise; it does not stand or fall on the acceptability of any one specific proposal.
- The Prime Minister's proposal on a five-power conference envisages setting limits only after a START agreement and after British and French modernization. First phase, following model of SALT I, would have as its objective setting limits; question of reductions would only arise at subsequent and much later stage.

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- Proposal envisages state-to-state rather than bloc-to-bloc negotiations. Aggregation of British and French forces with those of United States is not implied. Indeed, proposal if accepted would erase any prospect of aggregation.

- While the Prime Minister has suggested that these negotiations begin as soon as possible during course of next year, it is not intended that such talks occur without adequate preparation at lower levels, or that such talks should take place precipitously.

- Our impressions of the "neutral" Soviet response were:
 - (a) The visit of Mr. Trudeau's emissary occurred the day after Andropov's statement of November 24 on INF. Although Gromyko and Kornienko said they had read the PMS statements and followed his actions closely their "neutral" response to his proposals may be due to a "policy review" which they hinted may be underway on INF, the results of which are not yet clear. It may be they will harden their response if they draw the conclusion that their message has not "registered" in the West.

 - (b) Uncertainty over Andropov's health overshadows all their decisions; one Soviet interlocutor told us Andropov's illness was "painful", but not serious and that he was only able to do business by telephone. It was suggested that he might be able to return to work in a minimum role sometime after December 20.

 - (c) They would welcome a Trudeau visit, but timing is a problem (due to Andropov's health). Gromyko appeared to be almost pleading that we not press them immediately to set a date; sometime early in January may be possible.

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- (d) They will not want to do anything to improve the chances of President Reagan's re-election;
- (e) They do not think it possible to have a rational relationship with the US when the US views them as the concentration of evil. The Soviets will view the PM's initiative through the "prism" of this American attitude to them.
- (f) They did not threaten to pull out of any other negotiations although on START Kornienko said INF deployment has changed the strategic situation because the missiles in Europe which reach the USSR are the same missiles based in the USA, from the Soviet point of view.

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information
It would be supported that the
statement would come from the
superpowers (e.g. at a Helsinki
type meeting), or alternatively
serve as a basis for the
5 power meeting of Security
Council members.

Discuss possibility of a letter
to the two superpowers where
I would say that I will accept
their reaction to such an initiative
(including other objections in Head's
depending on the reasons of purpose.

CONFIDENTIAL
December 12, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER
c.c. Mr. Osbaldeston

MF
pd

Ivan Head's Proposal for "Statements of Concern"
by the US and the USSR

You will recall from my memorandum of
October 14 (copy attached) that Ivan Head proposed
that, in the context of the initiative, you act as a
catalyst and prompt the Soviet and American governments
to produce "unilateral yet identical" statements of
mutual concern on major issues.

Mr. Head also suggested that your success in
persuading the Americans and the Soviets to issue, even
independently, such a statement could lead to an
improvement in atmospherics and subsequently generate
pressure in favour of reciprocal confidence-building
measures, undertaken either jointly or unilaterally.
The essence of his proposal is for statements of
principle to lead to positive and unilateral action,
without the necessity of face-to-face negotiations
which, Mr. Head states, neither side is willing to
engage.

From Ivan's own list of "concerns", we can
conclude that he is not recommending a statement of
abstract foreign policy principles such as those
already enshrined in, for example, the UN Charter, the
Helsinki Final Act, and other international
agreements. Nor is it likely that what is needed is a
new code of conduct for US and USSR relations. The
"Declaration of Basic Principles of Relations"
concluded between the US and the USSR in 1972 in the
context of the SALT I is still technically in force.
(We have attached a copy of that text for your
information.)

Rather, what is proposed is to promote
~~agreement on one, two or three fundamental, even basic,~~
overriding policy positions to which both the United
States and the Soviet Union can subscribe either
privately, to lessen suspicion between them, or
publicly, in an effort to reassure citizens of both
East and West. While you have disavowed any intention

Mr. [Signature]

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December 12, 1983

ME
[Signature]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (via Mr. Osbaldeston)

Ivan Head's Proposal for "Statements of Concern"
by the US and the USSR

You will recall from my memorandum of October 14 (copy attached) that Ivan Head proposed that, in the context of the initiative, you act as a catalyst and prompt the Soviet and American governments to produce "unilateral yet identical" statements of mutual concern on major issues.

Mr. Head also suggested that your success in persuading the Americans and the Soviets to issue, even independently, such a statement could lead to an improvement in atmospheric and subsequently generate pressure in favour of reciprocal confidence-building measures, undertaken either jointly or unilaterally. The essence of his proposal is for statements of principle to lead to positive and unilateral action, without the necessity of face-to-face negotiations which, Mr. Head states, neither side is willing to engage.

From Ivan's own list of "concerns", we can conclude that he is not recommending a statement of abstract foreign policy principles such as those already enshrined in, for example, the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and other international agreements. Nor is it likely that what is needed is a new code of conduct for governing US and USSR relations. The "Declaration of Basic Principles of Relations" concluded between the US and the USSR in 1972 in the context of the SALT I is still technically in force. (We have attached a copy of that text for your information.)

Rather, what is proposed is to promote agreement on one, two or three overriding policy positions to which both the United States and the Soviet Union can subscribe either privately, to lessen suspicion between them, or publicly, in an effort to reassure citizens of both East and West. While you have disavowed any intention of acting as intermediary

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between US and Soviet leaders, the sequence of visits (USA followed by USSR) works in favour of your obtaining agreement or commitment by Reagan on policy positions such as those noted below and conveying them to (but not negotiating them with) Andropov. Whether these policy positions (or indeed the fact that such were discussed) should be made public would depend entirely on the desires of the principals and your own view of the situation.

Suggested Principles

1. "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought".

President Reagan made this point in his speech to the United Nations last September. He repeated it almost verbatim in his speech in the Japanese Diet on November 11 while on an official visit. The Soviet Union has made comments similar to this. The reiteration of this policy position, particularly if it could be made public, perhaps by you at some subsequent date, could achieve some degree of public reassurance about the intentions of the two nuclear powers.

It may also be possible to propose, as a corollary, the following point as well: talk of winning a limited nuclear conflict leads to confusion regarding intentions, and thus is dangerous.

Most, if not all, scenarios played out in NATO war games indicate that the use of tactical nuclear weapons on the European battlefield leads inexorably to strategic exchanges involving US and USSR ballistic missiles and other strategic weapons. Nevertheless, there are those in the Reagan Administration who have been quoted as saying they believe in the feasibility of limiting a nuclear exchange in a fashion which would permit the US to "win" a nuclear war. This view, however, is not the official policy of the Reagan Administration.

For both parties to declare privately (to each other) or publicly a rejection of "limited nuclear war" would help quiet the more sabre-rattling extremists on both sides.

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2. In an age when both super powers hold in their arsenals thousands of nuclear warheads, nuclear "superiority" has become meaningless.

In a recent telex from Peter Roberts (conveyed to you in the Task Force memorandum of December 5), he states that "I think that the Soviets do not believe the present USA Administration is interested in capping the arms race on the basis of equality, however defined. If the Prime Minister were convinced otherwise, it would be useful indeed for him to come here and to say so to Andropov. Such an assertion from the Canadian Prime Minister would be taken seriously here and might lead to examination of Soviet assumptions, and even to further examination with the USA itself."

The Soviet Union has striven, particularly since the Cuban missile crisis, to achieve parity with the United States in military terms. It has, by and large, succeeded. The Soviets have also reiterated that they do not wish to achieve superiority (in order to save themselves the trouble of an evermore frantic arms race).

The Reagan Administration has a more mixed record on the question of superiority. It came into office talking about a "window of vulnerability" (reminiscent of the Kennedy "missile gap" in 1960). It believes that the United States once had superiority (as it clearly did) but that it was sacrificed on the altar of détente. While not stating explicitly that it is out to regain superiority, it is not likely to want to enrage the right wing of the Republican Party by disclaiming it as its intention. Nevertheless, President Reagan might, in confidence, state the view that, in the current context, superiority is a meaningless phrase. If you were to be successful in conveying this message to Andropov, it might lead to a Soviet reappraisal of the Reagan Administration's military intentions, as Roberts suggests.

3. Nuclear weapons must be banished from the face of the earth.

In his speech to the Japanese Diet, Mr. Reagan said "I know I speak for people everywhere when I say, our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the earth".

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During his meeting with Mr. MacEachen last week, Secretary of State Shultz drew attention to this statement and indicated US disappointment that the US could not get anyone interested in the idea. The President, apparently, is seriously committed to its pursuit.

It is not clear from this whether the banishment of nuclear weapons is to be achieved through Star Wars technology (a budget for which has recently been approved) or through arms control and the strengthening of the NPT. You could congratulate President Reagan for making this statement and attempt to draw him out on the thinking behind it. Its credibility would be significantly enhanced if the corollary statement along the lines of the following could be agreed to by Reagan and confirmed, for their part, by the Soviets:

Nuclear proliferation must be halted through arms control and through the strengthening of the NPT.

In light of comments made by senior Administration officials to their Canadian counterparts over the last few weeks, it would seem essential that you mention to the President that this is the first occasion you have to raise this approach and therefore you do not expect a reply from the President until some later date.

R.R.F.

Caron

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CANADIAN EYES ONLY

December 12, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R.R.Fowler)

Peace Initiative - Visits to Peking and Moscow
and Recommendations re Follow-up

You are aware of the results of my visits to Peking and Moscow. My principal conclusions are the following.

China

The Chinese made a special effort to receive you at a convenient time. They clearly respect your intentions and are willing to give support to the idea of high-level political discussion of arms control. However, they tend to be pessimistic about the chances of success, partly, I believe, because they themselves are not yet ready to consider favourably real reductions in their military strength, particularly their modest nuclear weapons programme. They may be ready to reconsider their major condition for a conference of The Five plus other "representative" states (a commitment to reduce by 50% superpower strategic weapons), however, if the START talks show early signs of progress. We should continue to press them on this subject. In regard to our other proposals, the Chinese are unlikely to show more than polite interest. They were inflexible on the subject of signing the NPT or urging others to do so. This is a matter of principle for them, although they said they would not encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The remarks of Deng about the prospects of nuclear war (two billion dead is a tolerable prospect) were alarming. I think we should go back to them with our own analysis of the effects of full-scale nuclear war and ask them to think again. You might do this in a letter to Deng.

The USSR

In Moscow there was a less negative response to the Five Power proposal, although Gromyko was clearly sceptical. The Soviets are themselves on record some years ago with a similar proposal, designed no doubt to stop China and the others from modernizing their own weapons. I did not give Gromyko a detailed account of the rationale for this proposal, fearing that the opposition of the UK and France to it would open the way for Soviet exploitation of the issue. We must now decide how to follow up on Moscow (see below). On other subjects, the Russians made clear that their attitude is

...2

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CANADIAN EYES ONLY

governed by their assessment of USA intentions. This is negative, to say the least. However, I don't think they had yet decided how far to go in reacting to INF deployment.

Gromyko would not commit himself on his attendance at Stockholm and Vienna, implying that substance was more important than process. Nor would the Russians comment on the proposals for an ASAT treaty and for verification of new strategic weapons. They will probably await USA reactions to them.

The question of a visit to Moscow is blocked by the uncertainty over Andropov. I could get no clarification of dates, but was led to believe that an answer may not be forthcoming until mid-December at the earliest. My strong impression is that they want you to come if Andropov is able to receive you, but would be reluctant to issue the invitation if he could not do so. They are aware that a visit after mid-January might be difficult, if not impossible. They are also aware that a visit ought to have "results"; if not agreement on our proposals, then at least some indication of flexibility and a "payoff" for the bilateral relationship (I hinted broadly that we wanted progress on family reunification and an answer on "compensation" for the KAL incident).

What Next?

There is unlikely to be agreement soon on our specific proposals, except for political attendance at Stockholm. We shall know more about the prospects for a Western initiative at the MBFR talks after the NATO meeting; without such an initiative it is unlikely that Western Ministers would be willing to attend the next meeting in January. As for our ASAT proposal, the USA has told us at the official level that it is premature. The USSR may give support in principle, but it has a more comprehensive proposal already on the table which has received wide support at the UN. Finally, the Five-Power Conference idea has at best been received with scepticism. A revision of the rationale for such a conference which emphasizes crisis management might improve its chances of acceptance, but it seems clear that in any event the timing of such a conference will be related to progress in START. Neither the USSR nor China appear to relate such a conference to strengthening the NPT. The Chinese reaffirmed their opposition to the NPT, whether or not the superpowers agree on reductions of nuclear weapons.

...3

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CANADIAN EYES ONLY

We have not so far initiated formal consultations with our NATO allies about possible revisions to NATO doctrine along the lines described in the October 1 briefing book. Informal USA reactions are negative. McNamara has made a number of specific proposals on the subject (see attachment) which would be worth exploring. The timing of such an initiative is delicate, however, and might best await the outcome of Soviet reactions to INF deployment, i.e. early in 1984.

Whatever the fate of our specific ideas, however, I believe that visits to Washington and Moscow would in themselves be substantive actions reflecting your main concern that East/West tensions be addressed at the political level. The Soviet leadership in particular is passing through a difficult period, whether or not Andropov recovers, and would benefit from a direct exposure to Western views, especially if these reflected your understanding of President Reagan's objectives. If Soviet leaders are looking for ways to ease tension, your visit would give them an opportunity to indicate this. If not, your visit would provide an occasion for urging them to reconsider the matter. In any event, Canada/Soviet relations could only be enhanced by such a visit, especially perhaps in the area of family reunification.

Measuring Success

My visits to Peking and Moscow demonstrated a high degree of interest in your initiative, agreement that new efforts must be made to reduce levels of tension and armaments, but no consensus on how to achieve these reductions. I found that our specific proposals attracted little outright support, in part because they are not formulated in sufficient detail, but also because they tend to assign responsibility for the arms race to all the nuclear weapons states and to challenge deeply held dogmas. In particular, they do not address the issue of central interest to the two powers - USA/Soviet relations.

Your visits to Moscow and Washington will be regarded as the "test" of the initiative. Given that each will blame the other for the present impasse, we might try to draw up a short catalogue of objectives which do appear to be agreed and urge that these be "adopted" in some fashion as a basis for further talks, e.g. observe SALT II in practice, continue to negotiate radical reductions of strategic weapons, preserve outer space for peaceful purposes,

...4

- 4 -

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strengthen NPT, improve crisis communications, etc. At the least, you could say that you urged explicit agreement to such objectives in addition to commending our specific ideas.

In the end, assessments of the initiative will turn on this theme of its effect on USA/USSR relations. As these are unlikely to improve soon, it will be said that the initiative "failed". There are three basic responses to this charge: 1) mediation was never intended, 2) you are satisfied that the threshold of political attention to these issues has been raised and some new ground turned, and 3) the impulse to find new ways of easing superpower tensions will find other forms, perhaps amongst a like-minded group of countries, and Canada will continue to encourage such momentum.

I have sent a copy of this memorandum to the DPM/SSEA.

Geoffrey Pearson
Special Representative

cc: DPM/SSEA

PCO/Osbaldeston

External/Shenstone/Delvoie

DND/Anderson

IDR/S.B.Hanson/2-9368/rl

TO/A Canadian Embassy, STOCKHOLM
FROM/DE • Under-Secretary of State for External
Affairs, OTTAWA.
REFERENCE • Stockholm telegram UDGR0940 Oct. 4, 1983
RÉFÉRENCE
SUBJECT • Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ):
SUJET Swedish Proposal

Security/Sécurité
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Accession/Référence
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December 12, 1983
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The Swedish Ambassador called on IFB on December 8 on instructions to follow up the Swedish proposal of a year earlier for an NWFZ in Central Europe. He presented two aides-memoire (attached): one a synthesis of reactions to the proposal; the other, described as Swedish views on the proposal, seems to clarify ambiguities and answer objections raised by other governments.

2. The proposed zone is now described as a corridor, the institution of which would be a confidence-building measure rather than a fully fledged disarmament measure. Sweden, according to the Ambassador, has no intention of putting the proposal forward at the Stockholm CCSBMDE under present circumstances. They might, however, hold the idea in reserve for "later".

3. The Ambassador explained that these two aides-memoire were being presented in fulfilment of Sweden's earlier promise to advise other governments of the reactions to the proposal. No further follow-up was now envisaged: not least because, as the Ambassador noted, reactions had divided along bloc lines and had been very lopsided. It would be up to other countries to pursue the matter if they so wished.

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

AIDE-MEMOIRE

Reactions to the inquiry by the Swedish government on the proposal by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues regarding battlefield nuclear weapons in Central Europe

1. The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (ICDSI) proposed in its report, "Common Security - a Programme for Disarmament" the establishment of a zone in Europe free from battlefield nuclear weapons. The report was published in July 1982.

On 8 December 1982 the Swedish government approached 28 governments in Europe and North America asking them to express their views on the ICDSI proposal. The Swedish government mentioned in its verbal notes that it would inform each government about the reactions received.

The term "zone" seems to have given rise to some uncertainty about the substance of the arrangement. The term "corridor" would therefore seem to be more adequate. For the sake of clarity, this term has been used in this summary of the replies and in the account of the Swedish government's attitude to the ICDSI proposal.

All the governments approached have given official replies in writing. Some states have objected to the full texts of their replies being circulated. For

that reason a summary of the replies is set out below.

2. The majority of the states approached express their appreciation of Sweden's initiative to focus attention on the ICDSI corridor proposal.

Several states declare that they take a favourable view of nuclear-weapon-free zones and refer to the work on the establishment of such zones which has been in progress in the UN and elsewhere for several years.

With respect to the substance of the proposal the main views are:

3. A number of states - mainly neutral and non-aligned - have stated that, generally they take a favourable view of the proposal. They express their willingness to participate in future discussions on the proposal.

Those states concur in the assessments on which the corridor proposal is based and express one or more of the following standpoints:

- The battlefield nuclear weapons deployed at the dividing-line between the two alliances increase the risk that nuclear weapons would be used in the event of an armed conflict. When recourse is taken to nuclear weapons, at whatever level, this can lead to a disaster for mankind.
- A withdrawal of battlefield nuclear weapons in accordance with the ICDSI proposal would raise the nuclear weapon threshold, thereby reducing the danger of a nuclear war.

- A corridor arrangement in accordance with the ICDSI proposal would help to increase confidence as well as promote stability and détente in the area and serve to promote more comprehensive disarmament measures.
- The proposal has a direct bearing on European security policy matters. It would facilitate the attainment of security in Europe at the lowest possible armaments level.
- The consideration of the proposal in the global forum of the United Nations is ascribed great importance.
- The possibility of obtaining, through diplomatic contacts, agreement between the states approached by Sweden regarding both basic substantial features of the proposal and a suitable forum for its consideration would be welcomed.

4. A number of states - mainly NATO-members - put forward - with various nuances and emphases one or several of the following reservations and objections :

- Nuclear weapons, including battlefield nuclear weapons, are kept in a state of preparedness exclusively for the purpose of deterrence in order to ensure that war - of whatever kind - no longer be considered as a conceivable alternative. The establishment of a corridor free from battlefield nuclear weapons would make it possible to appraise the aggressor's risk and entice him to believe that a conventional surprise attack based on superiority might have a chance of success at least in that zone. Thus, the attempt to raise the nuclear threshold in this way risks lowering the threshold of aggression.
- The corridor arrangement involves such changes in the credibility of deterrence that confidence in current security system, and its stability, could be undermined.
- The military advantages for a potential aggressor who has superior conventional forces at his disposal would be further enhanced if he could count on a lower risk of being attacked by battlefield nuclear weapons.
- Since a number of battlefield nuclear weapons are so called dual-capable weapons, the corridor arrangement would lead to a reduction in conventional capacity.

- The withdrawal of battlefield nuclear weapons could lead to a lowering of the nuclear threshold. The reasoning behind this point of view is that the battlefield nuclear weapons, after being withdrawn, would be concentrated in a narrow area outside the corridor and be a target of a first strike.

- The corridor proposal disregards the geographical diversity and differences between the two alliances in the depth of their defence arrangements.

- The corridor arrangement would contravene the principle of collective security, as defined by the Western alliance, since it could lead to a special status for certain states within the alliance.

- The discussion on a corridor free from battlefield nuclear weapons could divert attention from current negotiations on the European medium-range nuclear weapon systems.

- With reference to the desire to reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons, it is pointed out that the corridor arrangement does not mean any decrease in the number of operative nuclear weapons in Europe. The proposal does not take into account the fact that nuclear weapons stationed in the vicinity of the corridor could reach targets within the corridor itself.

- The verification of the corridor arrangement gives rise to considerable difficulties. It would not prevent battlefield nuclear weapons from being reintroduced into the corridor in a crisis.

- Emphasis is given to the attainment of a better balance of conventional forces between East and West as a prerequisite for the establishment of the corridor arrangement. The corridor can therefore not be viewed in isolation from current negotiations in Geneva and Vienna as well as the current confidence building efforts in the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

- The requirements for nuclear weapons in Europe should be kept under close and regular review. Such a review is currently taking place within the NATO alliance to ensure that the number and type of these weapons are no greater than the minimum necessary for deterrence.

5. The Warsaw Pact members express in principle a favourable view of the idea of a corridor. They declare themselves prepared to take part in future talks on this issue. They put forward one or more of the following opinions :

- The proposed corridor arrangement would raise the nuclear weapon threshold, promote stability and an atmosphere of confidence in Europe; it would also facilitate a reduction in armed forces and weapons.

The corridor should be made considerably wider than the figure of 150 km on each side of the dividing-line between East and West, which is mentioned in the ICDSI proposal. However, the width of the corridor, like other aspects of the arrangement, including verification of the parties' compliance with their undertakings, can be made subjects of negotiation.

The corridor proposal is regarded as an important step towards a reduction and elimination of all nuclear weapons from the European continent.

Negotiations about a corridor arrangement would have a very constructive effect on the political climate in Europe and would further the negotiations in Vienna on a reduction of armed forces and armaments.

The establishment of a corridor should begin in Central Europe within the framework of the efforts made at the Vienna talks.

AIDE-MEMOIRE

Swedish views on the proposal for a corridor free from battlefield nuclear weapons in Central Europe

General background

The Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues (ICDSI) has proposed that a corridor free from battlefield nuclear weapons be established in Europe. The Swedish government, which supports this proposal, on 8 December 1982, sent verbal notes to the NATO and Warsaw Pact member states, and to a number of neutral and non-aligned states, asking them to set forth their views. No separate Swedish proposal was introduced. The government forwarded the ICDSI proposal in order to learn about the views of other governments. Accordingly, the Swedish inquiry related to the ICDSI proposal in the form it was set out in the Commission report, without additions and changes.

The Swedish government notes with great satisfaction that the ICDSI proposal has been carefully considered. This is apparent i.a. from the substantial and detailed replies, which have been received.

The Swedish government's main views are as follows:

An essential starting-point is our conviction that no country could come out of a nuclear war as the victor. A total nuclear war would mean appalling destruction and its outcome might threaten the very existence of mankind. This destruction would

inevitably affect countries which do not base their security on nuclear weapons. What is called a limited nuclear war would in all probability develop into a total nuclear war. The primary aim is therefore to prevent a situation where nuclear weapons would be used.

The Swedish government bases its assessment of the corridor idea on the view that nuclear deterrence is in the long run a fragile foundation for peace. The result of the constant quantitative and qualitative arms race is an increasing risk of confrontation and war. It also entails economic sacrifices. It is therefore of utmost importance to strive for the establishment of international security built on co-operation for common survival instead of threat of reciprocal annihilation.

For several years Sweden has expressed its concern about the prevailing deployment patterns regarding tactical, short-range nuclear weapons - known also as battlefield nuclear weapons - as well as their role in military planning and political strategy. There is a risk that battlefield nuclear weapons would be used at an early stage of a conflict. Sweden has pointed out in various international fora over the years that short-range nuclear weapons as such are not the subject of any disarmament measures and has called for this category of weapons to be included in the disarmament efforts. The objective should be to carry through substantial reductions and ultimately to eliminate all battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe. Our aspirations are thus, in a longer perspective, more far-reaching than the limited measure of a corridor arrangement. A corridor of

this type should be regarded mainly as a measure that aims at reducing the risk of immediate recourse to battlefield nuclear weapons were a conflict to break out.

In the international debate during recent years increasing interest has been attached to possible measures for reducing and, in the long run, eliminating battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe. The NATO decision of 28 October 1983 to cut down the number of battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe in the next few years is a welcome step in this direction. The desire to reduce the role of battlefield nuclear weapons in the military postures of both alliances has given further impetus to this discussion.

By taking up the ICDSI's proposal, the Swedish Government has wished to encourage a more concrete debate on the role of nuclear weapons in Europe. Sweden's initiative has been inspired by a desire to throw light not only on the special problems associated with battlefield nuclear weapons but also on the issue of nuclear weapons in general.

We wish to underline that the corridor should be regarded mainly as a confidence-building measure. In itself, a corridor arrangement does not lead to any decrease in existing nuclear weapons arsenals, nor would it alter the basic military relations which have prevailed for a long time between the two blocs in Europe. The establishment of a corridor free from battlefield nuclear weapons could, on the other hand, constitute a step towards reducing the risk for nuclear confrontation in Europe.

1. The effect of the corridor on the nuclear threshold

The Swedish government is of the view that the withdrawal of battlefield nuclear weapons would counteract the risk of early recourse to nuclear weapons in a conflict situation. In addition, both sides would be aware that the other side cannot use battlefield nuclear weapons from its part of the corridor. The nuclear threshold would thus be raised which is one of the most important effects of the envisaged corridor arrangement.

Battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe have become so numerous that in the present situation neither party can have an advantage over the other in respect to these weapons. Furthermore, it is not probable that these weapons would be used as a result of rational calculation. The prevailing deployment pattern rather involves the risk that military developments could evoke political decisions to use nuclear weapons.

2. The linkage between nuclear deterrence and the risk of conflict

We wish to underline that the possibility of having recourse to nuclear weapons against the corridor area would still exist even if battlefield nuclear weapons were withdrawn. No party can therefore count on being able to carry out military aggression with conventional weapons without incurring the risk of reprisal by nuclear weapons placed outside the corridor area.

An agreement on a corridor free from battlefield nuclear weapons - with, for instance, verification measures comprising on-site inspection - would by its very existence increase confidence and transparency and, in this way, reduce the risk of a conflict as such breaking out. A corridor arrangement can consequently be said to raise the conflict threshold.

3. The corridor and existing security systems

As to the effect of the corridor on the security of both alliances, the limited nature of the proposed arrangement should be stressed. It is our conviction that the establishment of the corridor would not have political implications of the kind envisaged in connection with nuclear-weapon-free zones in the traditional sense.

The use of the term "zone" in some cases seems to have evoked more far-reaching perceptions than intended about the substance of the arrangement. The term "corridor" therefore seems to be more adequate. This is the designation used by Sweden.

From the ICDSI's description of the corridor, it is apparent that the Commission has adopted a functional approach and that it has not intended to achieve a geographical arrangement. According to this approach, the corridor would only affect a certain category of nuclear weapons. The arrangement would not comprise the territory of any state as a whole and the area in question is not intended to be the object of absolute freedom from nuclear weapons in the form of so called negative security assurances.

Initially the corridor should comprise an area along the border between the alliances in Central Europe and ultimately extend from the northern to the southern parts of Europe.

The corridor would thus not give rise to any differentiation in the status of the countries concerned in relation to their respective allies. According to what is known about the parties' military doctrines, there does not seem to exist any contradiction between them and the idea of a corridor.

The corridor would not involve changes that would have a destabilizing effect.

4. Linkage with the conventional forces

In the ICDSI report, the corridor proposal is placed in a broader arms-control context which comprises measures also relating to conventional and chemical weapons. Regarding the establishment of the corridor, the report also states that "this scheme would be implemented in the context of an agreement on parity and mutual force reductions in Central Europe".

What is meant by

parity can only be determined by negotiations.

In our view, it is essential that such negotiations should also result in substantial reductions of the conventional forces in Europe.

5. The linkage between the corridor and the INF and the MBFR negotiations

As is apparent from the ICDSI report, the corridor proposal only affects battlefield nuclear weapons, which are at present not the subject of any disarmament negotiations. There is hardly reason to believe that the discussion

and deliberations on the corridor would complicate the disarmament negotiations on other weapons systems.

The Swedish government is of the view that progress on the corridor issue could have a positive impact on other Europe-related negotiations.

6. The width of the corridor

In the ICDSI report it is recommended that the geographical definition of the corridor should be determined through negotiation. For illustrative purposes a width of 150 km on both sides is mentioned. In the ensuing discussion it has been suggested that the width of the corridor should be extended to 250 - 300 km on each side of the border line between the military blocs. If the width of the corridor were increased in this way, the corridor would cover practically the whole of the territories of the two German states, a strip in north-western Poland and about half of Czechoslovakia. An extension of this kind would call for such a far reaching re-organization of existing nuclear forces that the measure would completely change the substance and aim of the ICDSI proposal. In the opinion of the Swedish government, such a substantial widening of the corridor would impair the prospects of reaching a consensus on a corridor arrangement.

It can however be noted that the states which have suggested an extension have indicated that they consider the width of the corridor to be a matter for negotiation.

7. Battlefield nuclear weapons and the conventional military forces

In the ICDSI report it is stated explicitly that the corridor arrangement relates to munitions within the category of battlefield nuclear weapons. This means that nuclear warheads for shortrange missiles as well as nuclear ammunition for artillery, and atomic mines would be withdrawn from the corridor, while the delivery systems, including certain dual-capable weapons - which can also carry conventional munitions - could remain in the area.

The corridor arrangement would therefore not lead to an automatic reduction in the conventional military capacity. At the same time it is clear that more elaborate rules must be worked out on how to deal with these dual-capable weapons.

8. Verification

Several of the replies take up problems associated with the verification of an agreement on a corridor free from battlefield nuclear weapons.

It is obvious that adequate control mechanisms are an important element in a corridor arrangement.

This applies to the prohibition against nuclear munitions within the corridor as well as the provisions concerning launchers within the same area which could also be used for battlefield nuclear weapons.

It is assumed that these control mechanisms will be the subject of negotiations. It seems obvious that verification mechanisms should be construed in such a way that they correspond to the special needs involved in a corridor arrangement. In addition, as in other disarmament contexts, a measure of reciprocal trust is a pre-condition for an agreement.

III. General comments

The inquiry initiated by Sweden has resulted in closer attention to the ICDSI proposal. A widespread exchange of international opinion has taken place. This was one of our main aims. Sweden, for its part, is greatly interested in a continued dialogue in various fora with a view to obtaining increased clarity on how a corridor arrangement could be worked out and on the prospects for its establishment. The Swedish Government will continue to take an active part in the efforts to implement the corridor proposal.

The ultimate aim of bringing the ISDCI corridor proposal into the dialogue between governments as well as into the public debate is to promote the endeavours to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in Europe, to bring about reductions and, in the long term, to remove tactical nuclear weapons from our part of the world.

This can be brought about through unilateral measures as well as by negotiations between the states concerned.



TO/A DOSSIER

FROM/DE • FPR

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SUBJECT • Radio-Canada Présent 09 décembre .
SUJET Entrevue avec John Noble à l'OTAN

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Date	12 décembre 1983
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Du côté de Genève et des négociations START...
De Bruxelles, nous arrivait une note optimiste pour le
Canada et le but qu'il s'était fixé à la réunion de
l'OTAN.

Maurice Godin: Pendant que les tables de négociations entre
les deux superpuissances se vident durant le temps des
fêtes, les ministres des Affaires étrangères des pays de
l'OTAN réunis en Belgique décident qu'il faut absolument
rétablir sinon la confiance au moins les communications
entre les parties. Pour ce faire, ils ont décidé de
participer eux-mêmes à la conférence sur le désarmement
en Europe qui s'ouvrira à Stockholm en janvier prochain
et qui réunira en plus des pays de l'OTAN les pays du
Pacte de Varsovie, les deux supergrands. Pour le
Canada, cette décision de même que celle de relancer les
négociations de Vienne sur la réduction mutuelle des
forces constitue une première victoire pour le plan
de M. Trudeau comme l'explique de Bruxelles M. John
Noble, porte-parole du ministère canadien des Affaires
extérieures.

John Noble: Sur les deux questions précises, c'est-à-
dire la participation ministérielle à la
conférence sur le désarmement européen à Stockholm
tous les ministres ont confirmé qu'ils y assisteront.
Deuxièmement, ils ont réussi à accepter la proposition
canadienne qu'il devrait y avoir une réexamination de
la position de l'OTAN sur la MBFR et dans les questions nous
avons aussi lancé l'idée il se peut, plus tôt que prévu,
qu'il y ait à Vienne une réunion ministérielle. Certaines
gens disent qu'il est un peu trop tôt pour décider ça mais
M. MacEachen a aussi lancé l'idée qu'une fois que la
réunion terminée, il faudrait avoir une réunion spéciale
de l'OTAN qui pourrait avoir lieu au Canada au printemps
prochain.

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M.G. M. Noble, est-ce qu'on peut dire que ce sont là les premiers gestes concrets qu'on voit dans la mission de M. Trudeau?

J.N. Certainement. Ils sont beaucoup plus concrets dans la mesure où nous avons tous les pays de l'OTAN c'est-à-dire toute l'alliance, quinze pays qui ont accepté deux des cinq propositions précises de l'initiative de M. Trudeau.

M.G. On sait que là il y a 35 pays qui iront à Stockholm mais il n'y a que les pays de l'OTAN maintenant qui ont dit oui, est-ce que ça ne tient pas aussi cette initiative-là à la décision du Pacte de Varsovie d'envoyer aussi les ministres des Affaires extérieures.

J.N. Evidemment, il y aura un dialogue. C'est important, mais je ne crois pas que tous les ministres de l'OTAN vont se rendre sans engagement de l'autre côté mais je vois difficilement que les pays du Pacte de Varsovie n'y assistent pas parce qu'ils ont tous intérêt puisque la Convention de Bruxelles va dans le même sens que l'initiative de M. Trudeau. Une déclaration de deux pages invite tous les pays du Pacte de Varsovie de saisir toutes les occasions pour avoir des relations équilibrées et constructives et une détente véritable. Je pense que c'est un appel au dialogue que lance l'OTAN aux pays de l'Est et je crois que les pays de l'Est vont certainement répondre de façon positive.

M.G. On sait que M. Trudeau va aller à Washington la semaine prochaine, est-ce qu'il est possible, si jamais les pays du Pacte de Varsovie tardent un peu trop pour se prononcer pour envoyer leurs ministres des Affaires étrangères à Stockholm, est-ce qu'il est possible que M. Trudeau essaie d'aller à Moscou avant le début de la conférence pour essayer de convaincre les partenaires du Pacte de Varsovie de Moscou d'aller à cette conférence.

J.N. Ça, c'est une question qu'il faut poser à M. Trudeau mais M. MacEachen a dit avant-hier qu'il ne croit pas que la mission de M. Trudeau ne soit terminée avant que M. Trudeau se rende à Washington et à Moscou.

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M.G. Le Canada met beaucoup d'emphase sur la conférence de Stockholm. Dans le passé, même s'il n'y avait pas les ministres, ça n'a pas vraiment beaucoup fonctionné ce genre de conférence. Pourquoi croyez-vous que même s'il y a des ministres, cette fois là, ça ira mieux?

J.N. C'est plutôt un geste politique à donner une poussée politique à une conférence qui normalement aura lieu au niveau des ambassadeurs, au niveau des fonctionnaires. Alors, il y a surtout la question symbolique dans ça et suite aux négociations sur les euromissiles ici on peut maintenant redonner un côté qu'il continue d'y avoir des négociations entre les pays de l'Est et les pays de l'Ouest. C'est dans ce contexte qu'il faut voir une réunion au niveau ministériel ou le lancement de la conférence de Stockholm au niveau politique.

M.G. M. Noble, vous parlez d'une victoire du Canada mais il y a aussi eu au cours de cette conférence de l'OTAN une discussion à propos de la nécessité d'augmenter les armements conventionnels en Europe. Est-ce que cela ne va pas un peu à l'encontre des propositions de M. Trudeau?

J.N. Pas nécessairement. Je crois que dans le contexte où il y aura réduction des armements nucléaires, évidemment, à moins qu'il ait réduction conjointe des deux côtés dans les armements conventionnels, il faut que l'OTAN soit capable de se défendre. Et, c'est certainement une chose qui est très importante.

M.G. Est-ce que ce n'est pas contraire aux propositions de M. Trudeau qui disait qu'il faut plutôt parler de réduction des forces conventionnelles.

J.N. Mais, évidemment, nous parlons de ça aussi parce que la poussée que nous avons donnée aux négociations sur les réductions mutuelles et équilibrées des forces, c'est-à-dire MBFR qui se tiennent à Vienne, ça concerne les armements conventionnels. Nous poursuivons les négociations sur les deux voies, à la fois nucléaire et conventionnelle.

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M.G. Dernière question, M. Noble. Pour revenir à la conférence de Stockholm de janvier, les ministres^{se} rencontreront, vous avez dit, pour une ouverture de dialogue, est-ce qu'il y a des points précis que vous pensez qui seraient prioritaires pour cette conférence?

J.N. La question sera plutôt de devoir rétablir le dialogue politique plutôt que des actions précises pour l'ordre d'ouverture. Une autre question aussi c'est que les pays de l'OTAN sont tombés d'accord pour se réunir à la veille de la conférence de Stockholm pour avoir un autre dialogue entre eux alors ça dépasse déjà ce que le Canada souhaitait avoir à Stockholm.

Merci beaucoup, Maurice Godin à Ottawa.

Le directeur adjoint des
relations avec les media,


Dilys Buckley-Jones



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Radio-Canada Téléjournal 09 décembre

OTAN- Plan de paix de Trudeau

Security/Sécurité
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La mission de paix du Premier ministre Trudeau n'a pu reprendre son envol à la réunion de l'Otan à Bruxelles même que le Secrétaire d'Etat américain, Georges Shultz, l'a pratiquement clouée au sol, c'est-à-dire M. Shultz est d'avis qu'un intermédiaire n'est pas nécessaire pour approcher les deux super-puissances. Donc, il semble que les Américains ne croient pas vraiment à cette mission de paix même si M. Trudeau sera à Washington jeudi pour en parler. Cela dit, du côté de l'OTAN, les ministres des Affaires extérieures ont adopté une déclaration solennelle qui demande la reprise du dialogue Est-Ouest sur le désarmement. Paul-André Comeau est à Bruxelles.

Paul-André Comeau: Les ministres des Affaires étrangères de l'Alliance atlantique ont véritablement voulu faire un geste de bonne volonté envers Moscou en préconisant une véritable reprise du dialogue entre l'Est et l'Ouest. Cette bonne volonté, selon le Secrétaire général de l'Alliance atlantique, Josef Luns, se concrétisera dès le mois prochain par la participation à la conférence de Stockholm sur le désarmement et par la relance des négociations de Vienne sur la réduction des forces en Europe, en accord, d'ailleurs, avec l'un des aspects de la mission de paix de M. Trudeau. C'est avec le Secrétaire d'Etat américain que le chef de la diplomatie canadienne s'est entretenu ce matin des objectifs généraux de cette mission. Mais, devait préciser G. Shultz, le problème des relations avec Moscou en est un avant tout de substance et ne nécessite pas de nouveaux canaux de communications. Visiblement stupéfait, Allan MacEachen s'est, au contraire, employé à démontrer que toutes les décisions prises par l'OTAN au cours de cette session allaient dans le sens de l'initiative de paix du Premier ministre du Canada. A la lumière des propos de M. Shultz, on peut maintenant qualifier de sceptique,

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à tout le moins tiède, l'attitude de Washington envers la mission. Renverser ce préjugé, c'est le défi que devra relever le Premier ministre du Canada lorsqu'il se présentera à la Maison blanche la semaine prochaine.

Paul-André Comeau, à Bruxelles.

le Directeur adjoint des
relations avec les media,


Dilys Buckley-Jones

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Meeting with Yugoslav Counsellor
Lasovic, December 9, 1983

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RBD

The Counsellor of the Yugoslav Embassy, Mr. Lasovic, called on RBR December 9 to present a Diplomatic Note requesting our support for the Yugoslav candidate to the Commission of the United Nations for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Mr. Cicanovic. Mr. Lasovic was also interested in hearing our assessment of the present state of East-West relations, especially the current status of the Prime Minister's initiative.

RBR briefly assessed the reception the Prime Minister's initiative had received to date. It had received a positive reception at the meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government, which had been reflected in the GOA communiqué. Mr. Trudeau's upcoming visit to Washington would be the next stage of the Prime Minister's initiative. If the Prime Minister undertook a visit to Moscow, this could occur sometime in January, although the state of Yuri Andropov's health remained a question mark. Most recently, the NATO Atlantic Council's decisions that: a) NATO foreign ministers attend the opening of the CDE in Stockholm; b) the West review its position on MBFR, were welcome developments which would inject a jolt of "political energy" into East-West relations, much in line with the Prime Minister's thinking. Mr. Lasovic noted that the Yugoslav Foreign Minister would most likely attend the opening of the CDE in Stockholm.


Mr. Lasovic informed us of Yugoslav views on a number of continuing bilateral issues:

- A Canadian proposal for commencement of negotiations for a civil air agreement early next year will likely receive a positive reply from the Yugoslav authorities.
- The Yugoslav Embassy has been continuing its discussions over the resumption of an EDC line of credit. Mr. Lasovic felt confident agreement could soon be reached.

- 2 -

RESTRICTED

- Ongoing discussions between Stopanska Banka Skopje and the Royal Bank of Canada aimed at resolving the disbursement problems associated with Canada's 1983 Berne pledge could possibly result in an agreement between the two banks on December 12, 1983.
- The CCC has received a proposal from Tri-Com to conduct a feasibility study on possible means to complete the aborted Goodwood Data contract with FATCA. Mr. Lasovic saw this as a "good sign".
- Mr. Lasovic requested RBR's support in encouraging an agreement between the Canadian and Yugoslav film industries.
- Yugoslavia hoped that more concrete results would soon result from the Canada/Yugoslavia MOU on Agriculture, signed by Minister Whelan in August of this year.
- The Yugoslav authorities have agreed to a proposal by Health and Welfare Canada that negotiations for a social insurance agreement between Canada and Yugoslavia commence in May.
- There was a possibility the Fifth Assembly of the Croatian National Congress which had, according to Lasovic, been refused venues in France, FRG and U.K., would hold its annual meeting this year in Toronto. The Yugoslav Government would not look favourably on such a meeting.



Barry M. Mawhinney,
Director,
USSR and Eastern Europe
Relations Division.

We'll gamble ~~Mr. McNe~~

Mr. Alex ~~Wright~~ Mc Smith

12-12-83.

(MF)

I checked with ~~Mr. A~~ / Robertson

① no
we can either prepare something +
have it in reserve, or take our chances
on this one not being called +
② ^{yes} scramble if it is.

Robertson has no way of knowing,
but his hunch is that this item
will not come up right away.

JM

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CABINET DU
SECRETARE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

MEMORANDUM

To
A IDDZ

From
De MINA

Reference
Référence

Security UNCLASSIFIED
Sécurité

Date December 12, 1983


Subject
Sujet "Late Show" - Proceedings
 on Adjournment Motion

Attached is the text of an exchange in the House
between Ms. Pauline Jewett, M.P. and the Honourable
P.E. Trudeau on December 8, 1983 (House of
Commons Debates, page _____).

2. We have been advised that the subject of this
exchange may be raised in the "Late Show" on a date not yet
fixed. (Late Show -- the Proceedings on Adjournment Motion --
takes place on Monday, Tuesday and Thursday from 6:00-6:30 p.m.)
When this matter comes up in the Late Show we are advised only
on the morning of the day when it will be discussed. The
response to the Late Show exchange will be required in MINA by
1:00 p.m. that day. Given this short notification time it is
necessary to have a text prepared in advance.

3. We would be grateful if you could prepare, as soon
as possible, a text for the use of the Parliamentary Secretary.
The statement should be double-spaced and should take no longer
than three minutes to deliver; one to one-and-a-half pages is
sufficient. Please indicate on the statement that it is a
"Suggested response to Mr. _____, M.P. on the subject of..."

*John - you know to make
would be 1 page if you like
but often I am not told
the name for 6:00 pm*


D. Colin Robertson
Parliamentary Returns Officer

Oral Questions

TENDERING OF CONTRACTS—GOVERNMENT POLICY

Hon. Allan Lawrence (Durham-Northumberland): Mr. Speaker, does the Minister not see any conflict of interest in having one of the Minister's personal friends positioned in the Minister's own office at the same time as that friend is running a private company that is doing business with the Minister's own Department and other Departments of the Government? Were any of these contracts, including the contracts with the Minister's Department, ever tendered?

Hon. Mark MacGuigan (Minister of Justice): Mr. Speaker, if the Hon. gentleman wants information about contracts, he could get it in the usual way. The fact is that this matter is proceeding in the way in which matters are normally conducted by the Government. There are no hidden facts, and my hon. friend can discuss all of them with me any time he wishes.

USE OF GOVERNMENT FACILITIES

Hon. Ray Hnatyshyn (Saskatoon West): Mr. Speaker, the point here is that a former communications officer in the Prime Minister's Office is now using taxpayers' money for his own contracting and business purposes. I would ask the Minister of Justice if Mr. McDonald is now paying a reasonable rate for the use of the Minister's facilities and stenographic help, or is he in fact getting a freebie and indulging in the worst kind of patronage?

Hon. Mark MacGuigan (Minister of Justice): Mr. Speaker, to the best of my knowledge he is not using such facilities. He is a consultant, and he is available in various offices from time to time. He has been present in my office from time to time for that purpose, and that purpose only.

* * * 1002

DISARMAMENT

REQUEST THAT PRIME MINISTER SEEK NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREEZE

Ms. Pauline Jewett (New Westminster-Coquitlam): Mr. Speaker, my question is directed to the Prime Minister. In yesterday's Throne Speech the Government said in part that it would "continue to advance proposals to slow the steady spiral of the arms race". We welcome that, for we in this Party have already advanced proposals to slow the steady spiral of the arms race, one of our key proposals being a nuclear weapons freeze starting with the superpowers. Therefore, will the Prime Minister, in his forthcoming visits to Washington and, I hope, to Moscow, urge the two superpowers to declare their support for an immediate nuclear weapons freeze, balanced and verifiable, followed by massive reductions in nuclear arms? This is a peace initiative that people everywhere would like to see.

Right Hon. P. E. Trudeau (Prime Minister): Mr. Speaker, I believe I can at least agree with the intention of the suggestion of the Hon. Member that there should be a massive reduction. I would just remind her that the NATO countries announced,

about a month and a half ago, that they would reduce their nuclear arsenal in Europe over a period of years by some 2,400 nuclear warheads. I certainly think that that should be the ultimate objective of the two superpowers in the negotiations both in START and in INF.

• (1500)

On the question of whether a freeze should be proposed first, I do not think that that is something that the superpowers would agree on, since they disagree on the different kind of deployment that the other has. On the objective of reduction, I agree with the Hon. Member and I certainly will discuss it in Washington when I go there in a short time and eventually I will in Moscow, if I go there too.

Ms. Jewett: Mr. Speaker, I hope the Prime Minister will address himself to the freeze. You have to stop the car before you can put it in reverse.

DEFENCE AND ARMS CONTROL RESEARCH

Ms. Pauline Jewett (New Westminster-Coquitlam): Mr. Speaker, in connection with yesterday's Speech from the Throne, may I also ask the Prime Minister whether it was his intention, in the one proposal that was made, namely, the funding of research in defence and arms control, to restrict the research and information gathering to defence and arms control or, as I hoped, was it his intention to have a much larger focus to include peace research, disarmament, and conflict resolution?

Right Hon. P. E. Trudeau (Prime Minister): Mr. Speaker, on the comment that the Hon. Member made at the beginning of her question, that you have to freeze in order to go into reverse, I think the hon. lady forgets that in order to have a verifiable freeze you must have as intricate a set of negotiations as you need for reduction. That is why, rather than start with a freeze, with all the difficult paraphernalia of verification to see what would be frozen, when, and in what stages, it is better to go for reduction than a freeze.

In so far as her question on the matter raised in the Speech from the Throne is concerned, it would be a wider mandate rather than a narrower one.

THE ECONOMY

INTEREST RATE LEVELS—REQUEST FOR GOVERNMENT ACTION

Mr. Don Blenkarn (Mississauga South): Mr. Speaker, my question is also directed to the Prime Minister. He will know that today interest rates are just a coupy less than 10 per cent on the bank rate. That is the seventh straight increase in rates. The Prime Minister will know that if rates continue to go up all hope of recovery will be squished. Will the Prime Minister give the country an undertaking today that he will not allow the commercial prime rate to exceed 11 per cent, and that he

R E S T R I C T E D

FM TOKYO UIGR3095 12DEC83

TO EXTOTT PPR DELIVFR BY 120900

INFO PCOOTT/DURRAND

DISTR PPD IDDZ

REF YOURTEL PPR0574 09DEC

---PMS VISIT TO JPN:THANK YOU LETS

IN VIEW OF PURPOSE AND DURATION OF VISIT, WE SEE ONLY REQUIREMENT AS BEING LET TO PM NAKASONE. IN DRAFTING SUCH LET, IT SEEMS TO US THERE ARE TWO RELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS: (A) ONE-DAY VISIT WAS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF MEETING PM NAKASONE FOR BRIEFING AND DISCUSSION OF PM TRUDEAU'S PEACE INITIATIVE. LETTER SHLD THUS FOCUS LARGELY ON THEME OF INITIATIVE, THANKING NAKASONE FOR HIS POSITIVE SUPPORT AND REPORTING ON SUBSEQUENT EVENTS, EG, CHOGM, MTGS WITH CHINESE AND WITH PRES REAGAN. IN PARTICULAR, MENTION MIGHT BE MADE OF ANY COMMENTS PM TRUDEAU MADE AT CHOGM ON JPNS POSITION ON NPT ETC, AS SUGGESTED BY NAKASONE DURING 19 NOV MTG. (B) ON ASSUMPTION LDP WINS GENERAL ELECTION 13 DEC, PM TRUDEAU WILL PRESUMABLY WISH TO SEND MSG OF CONGRATULATIONS AT EARLIEST OPPORTUNE MOMENT.

2. GIVEN THESE CONSIDERATIONS, CONSIDER DRAFT LET ALONG FOLLOWING LINES SHLD BE CONSIDERED, IN CONSULTATION WITH IDDZ AND PMO. TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM EFFECT, WE SHLD RECEIVE APPROVED TEXT BY TEL EARLY IN WEEK OF 18 DEC, NOT/NOTWITHSTANDING FACT THAT NAKASONE WILL NOT/NOT BE FORMALLY RE-ELECTED AS PM UNTIL DIET MEETS AFTER GENERAL ELECTION.

...2

PAGE TWO UIGR3095 RESTR

BEGINS:MY DEAR PRIME MINISTER,

MAY I FIRST CONVEY TO YOU MY WARMEST CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR PARTS SUCCESS AT THE POLLS AND,OF COURSE,YOUR REELECTION IN YOUR OWN CONSTITUENCY.I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING TO WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU,BOTH AS SUMMIT PARTNERS AND IN OUR FRIENDLY AND FLOURISHING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

I WAS DELIGHTED TO HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO VISIT TOKYO,ALL TOO BRIEFLY,LAST MONTH.I KNOW THAT IT WAS AN EXCEPTIONALLY BUSY TIME FOR YOU POLITICALLY,AND I AM MOST GRATEFUL FOR THE TIME YOU TOOK TO SEE ME.YOUR POSITIVE SUPPORT FOR MY PROPOSALS TO TRY AND IMPROVE EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND TO REVERSE THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE WAS VERY HEARTENING,AND I THANK YOU FOR IT.I WAS ALSO PLEASED TO LEARN THAT YOU HAD REPORTED EXTENSIVELY AND SUPPORTIVELY IN THE DIET ON OUR CONVERSATION.SINCE WE MET,I HAVE TRAVELLED TO THE COMMONWEALTH HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING IN NEW DELHI,AND HAVE SEEN THE CHINESE LEADERS IN PEKING.LAST WEEK,I HAD A MTG IN WSHDC WITH PRES REAGAN.(IDDZ SHLD,AT THIS POINT,PROVIDE PROGRESS REPORT)....

IN CONCLUSION,PRIME MINISTER,MAY I WISH YOU AND YOUR FAMILY MY BEST PERSONAL WISHES FOR A RESTFUL HOLIDAY SEASON AND A HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR.

YOUR SINCERELY (ETC.)

ENDS.

CCC/246 120710Z UIGR3095

*PARTS ON
FWR PG. TO
BE INSERTED*

MR DEVOIE

19.12.83

IDDZ/J.McNee/5-5912/cf

RAFT

We have been asked to provide a para or 2 on the progress of the initiative for a thank you let from

At the Commonwealth meeting in New Delhi I spoke of our shared concerns over the current state of East-West relations and the dangers of ^{the} vertical and horizontal proliferation ^{of nuclear weapons}. I was heartened by the response I received from my fellow Commonwealth leaders who specifically endorsed my initiative in the Goa Declaration on International Security. The Chinese leaders supported the general political purpose of my initiative, although they argued that the first priority is bringing pressure to bear on the superpowers to reduce their arsenals.

Last week I received encouraging support from President Reagan who endorsed my efforts to reduce tensions and to improve relations between East and West. At this stage I detect hopeful signs, including the results of the NATO ministerial meeting in early December, that progress is being made in reversing the dangerous trend in East-West relations.

TR PM to Nakasone.

The Asian division want to get this out to PCO tomorrow now that the results of the Japanese elections are in.

This draft is for approval.

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MF
RD

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR3018 12DEC83

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ UGB PCOOTT/FOWLER DELIVER BY 130830

INFO MOSCO BNATO ROME LDN BONN PARIS NDHQOTT/DM/ADM POL/CPP

PMOOTT/AXWORTHY

DISTR MINA USS DMF IDR IDA RGB IFB RBD RBR RCR URR

---PM VISIT 15DEC:DIFFICULT POINTS

WE ARE RUNNING INTO VERY STIFF FRONT ON EXIT MODE FROM WHITE HOUSE WITH NSC STAFF SAYING IT WOULD BE QUITE INHABITUAL FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN TO APPEAR FOR VISIT OF THIS SPECIFIC SCALE AND CHARACTER. WE HAVE MADE THE POINT THAT PRACTICE ON THIS OCCASION WILL BE COMPARED TO PREVIOUS VISITS WHEN PRESIDENT DID APPEAR JOINTLY WITH PM TRUDEAU AND COULD BE INVOKED BY PRESS TO SIGNIFY UNENTHUSIASTIC STANCE TOWARD PM INITIATIVE AS A WHOLE. SOME WE HAVE SPOKEN TO ARE QUITE SYMPATHETIC TO IMPORTANCE OF QUOTE VISUALS UNQUOTE OF THIS KIND BUT THEY ARE UP AGAINST RIGID PROTOCOL BARONS WHO ARE VERY PROTECTIVE OF PRACTICE ON THIS SCORE SO AS TO PREVENT EROSION OF PRESIDENTIAL PEROGATIVES. FOR REAGAN TO APPEAR OUTSIDE WHITE HOUSE AFTER VISIT, THIS EVENT WOULD HAVE TO BE CALLED AN OFFICIAL WORKING VISIT AND FOR HIM TO AWARD TWO SUCH VISITS IN ONE YEAR WOULD BE APPARENTLY PRECEDENT WHICH COULD BE CITED TO HIS DISADVANTAGE BY OTHER ALLIES WHO HAVE SOUGHT SUCH TREATMENT WITH SUCH FREQUENCY. GOTLIEB WILL RAISE MATTER WITH NSC ADVISER MCFARLANE.

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR3018 CONF D

2. YOU ARE AWARE THAT HELICOPTORS WILL NOT/NOT BE MADE AVAILABLE ON ARRIVAL. THIS IS NOT/NOT THAT IMPORTANT AN ISSUE AND WE SUGGEST WE JUST LEAVE IT AS IS.

3. ON SHULTZS LUNCH, CDN SIDE IS ENTITLED TO 9 PLACES.

4. ON BUSHS DINNER, IT NOW APPEARS THAT BUSH WILL INVITE DPM/SSEA AND GOTLIEBS. IT IS GOING TO BE VERY TOUGH TO GET ADDITIONAL PLACES AT THIS EVENT WHICH IS SEEN BY BUSH AS BEING BOTH VERY PERSONAL AND ENTIRELY SOCIAL.

5. TURNING TO SUBSTANTIVE MTG WITH PRESIDENT, WE ARE NOW ADVISED THAT ANY MORE THAN 4 FROM OUR SIDE WOULD MOVE MTG INTO CABINET ROOM. THIS IS DEFINITELY TO BE AVOIDED SINCE IT WOULD CHANGE PERSONAL CHARACTER OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN PM TRUDEAU AND REAGAN AND WOULD ADMIT TO MTG LARGE NUMBER OF OFFICIALS ON USA SIDE SOME OF WHOM ARE QUITE NEGATIVE AND TO WHOM REAGAN WOULD DEFER IF THEY ARE PRESENT. WE REALIZE THAT THIS SMALL A NUMBER POSES PROBLEMS BUT WE STRONGLY SUGGEST WE ACCEPT THIS REALITY AS BEING IN INTEREST OF PM TRUDEAUS MISSION.

6. LASTLY, ON A POINT OF SUBSTANCE. PM TRUDEAU SHOULD REALLY NOT/NOT MAKE ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO REAGAN AT THIS MTG UNLESS WE ARE ABLE TO WARN ADMIN OF THIS BEFOREHAND. HE COULD NOTIONALLY TALK TO REAGAN ABOUT THE PRINCIPLE OF WORKING OUT PRINCIPLES TO GOVERN EAST-WEST RELATIONS BUT SHOULD NOT/NOT SOLICIT REAGANS AGREEMENT ON ANY SPECIFIC PRINCIPLE OR PROPOSAL AT THIS MTG WITHOUT THIS HAVING BEEN RAISED ELSEWHERE BEFOREHAND. PM CLD OF COURSE TABLE FOR STUDY (ANY?) PROPOSAL: ISSUE IS ONLY ABOUT EXPECTING REACTION FROM REAGAN.

CCC/059 122331Z UNGR3018

MF

send to IDDZ
All
13/12/83

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT LCR2307 12DEC83

TO HAVAN

DISTR LCD IDD IDA LCP

REF YOURTEL YYGR3027 08DEC

---TRUDEAU PEACE INITIATIVE

BY ALL MEANS INVITATION SHOULD BE ACCEPTED. OCCASION APPEARS EXCELLENT FOR EXPLANATION OF ELEMENTS OF CDN FOREIGN POLICY, PARTICULARLY CDAS VIEW THAT SEARCH FOR PEACE REQUIRES PROCESS OF DISCUSSION, DIALOGUE AND RECONCILIATION.

2. WE WOULD LEAVE PREPARATION OF TEXT TO YOURSELVES WHO ARE MORE FAMILIAR WITH WHAT WILL APPEAL TO THIS SPECIFIC LOCAL AUDIENCE. WE WILL PROVIDE BY BAG TEXTS OF PMS SPEECHES IN GUELPH AND MTL FROM WHICH YOU MAY WISH TO QUOTE.

3. WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT THAT REFERENCE BE MADE TO CDAS ROLE IN SEARCH FOR PEACE IN CENTAM, PARTICULARLY CDAS CONTINUING SUPPORT OF CONTADORA PROCESS.

CCC/252 122234Z LCR2307

File

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

R E S T R I C T E D

FM PEKIN WJGR0958 12DEC83

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ

INFO BNATO WSHDC MOSCO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CP

DISTR IDR IDA RBR PER PED RCR RGB RBR RBD ZSI

---ARMS CONTROL:CHINESE POSN

DAY AFTER PMS VISIT TO PEKIN PEOPLES DAILY CARRIED LENGTHY COMMENT ABOUT ISSUE DISARMAMENT.ARTICLE GOES OVER MUCH SAME GROUND COVERED BY CHINESE LEADERS DURING PMS VISIT FOCUSING CRITICAL ATTN ON TWO SUPERPOWERS.THERE ARE,HOWEVER,NUMBER OF NUANCES THAT CHINESE LEADERS DID NOT/NOT MENTION IN CONVERSATIONS WITH PM.

2.ARSENALS OF TWO SUPERPOWERS HAVE INCREASED IN BOTH QUANTITY AND QUALITY WHILE NEGNS HAVE BEEN IN PROGRESS.ARTICLE SAYS TWO MATCH EACH OTHER IN STRENGTH.HOWEVER WHILE EACH ACCUSES OTHER OF ATTEMPTING TO GAIN UNILATRAL SUPERIORITY,EACH IS TRYING TO GAIN SUPERIORITY FOR ITSELF.TWO SUPERPOWERS HAVE OBTAINED LARGE STOCK OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS AND POST GRAVE THREAT TO WORLD PEACE.ARTICLE THEN REPEATS PERSISTENT CHINESE THEME--SUPERPOWERS MUST TAKE LEAD IN CEASING TESTING,IMPROVING AND MANUFACTURING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IN DRASTICALLY REDUCING NBR OF THEIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEIR MEANS OF DELIVERY.

3.ARTICLE OFFERS CLARIFICATION OF CHINESE PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD BY FM WU AT UNGA FOR INTERNATL CONFERENCE.ARTICLE EMPHASIZES THAT

...2

PAGE TWO WJGR0958 RESTR

CONFERENCE SHOULD BE CONVENED WHEN SUPERPOWERS HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON REDUCING THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS BY HALF (NOT/NOT NECESSARILY AFTER THEY HAVE CARRIED OUT SUCH REDUCTIONS). ARTICLE GOES ON THAT AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN TWO SUPERPOWERS IN THIS RESPECT WOULD NOT/NOT ONLY CREATE ATMOSPHERE OF MUTUAL TRUST BUT ALSO COULD RAISE CONFIDENCE OF OTHER COUNTRIES SO THAT NUCLEAR REDUCTION CAN BECOME NON/NO-STOP PROCESS. ARTICLE, HOWEVER, OFFERS NO/NO LIGHT ON WHO SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN QUOTE WIDELY REPRESENTATIVE UNQUOTE CONFERENCE FM WU HAD PROPOSED. WE PRESSED SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL ON SAME POINT, BUT HE ADMITTED THAT CHINESE HAD DEVELOPED NO/NO VIEWS ON HOW MANY OTHER COUNTRIES SHOULD BE REPRESENTED AT CONFERENCE OR WHO THEY MIGHT BE. SUGGESTION, HE SAID, WAS RECOGNITION OF INTEREST OF MANY NON/NO-NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES IN NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ISSUES.

4. ARTICLE ALSO REITERATES CHINESE VIEW THAT CHINA IS READY TO ASSUME ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IN ARMS CONTROL AT APPROPRIATE TIME. HOWEVER, IF SUPERPOWERS WILL NOT/NOT TAKE LEAD IN REDUCING THEIR ARSENALS, BUT TRY TO WORK OUT SIMULTANEOUS FREEZE OF WEAPONS OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES CHINA WILL NOT/NOT PARTICIPATE. WITHOUT NAMING USSR AS ORIGINATOR OF IDEA ARTICLE CRITICIZES PROPOSED WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. QUOTE ONE SUPERPOWER HAS REPEATEDLY CALLED FOR SUCH A CONFERENCE BUT HAS REMAINED SILENT ON SPECIAL DUTIES OF SUPERPOWERS ON NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION AND NEED FOR THEM TO TAKE ACTION FIRST UNQUOTE.

...3

PAGE THREE WJGR0958 RESTR

5.SAME DAY FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN COMMENTED ON INF TALKS, CRITICIZING TWO PARTICIPANTS ACCUSING EACH OF TRYING TO SURPASS OTHER.SPOKESMAN ALSO REFERRED TO PEACE MOVEMENT IN EUR SAYING QUOTE WE UNDERSTAND AND SUPPORT IT UNQUOTE.SPOKESMAN SAID THAT CHINA OPPOSED USSR-USA NUCLEAR ARMS RACE IN ASIA.QUOTE WE HOLD THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS ALREADY DEPLOYED IN ASIA SHOULD BE DRASTICALLY REDUCED OR DESTROYED UNQUOTE.

6.WHILE ARTICLES DO NOT/NOT REPRESENT ANY DRAMATIC CHANGES IN CHINESE THINKING THEY ARE OF INTEREST IN THAT THEY UNDERLINE MANY OF COMMENTS CHINESE LEADERS MADE TO PM AS WELL AS ADDING SOME ADDL DETAILS TO CHINESE PROPOSAL PUT FORWARD AT UNGA.HOWEVER,FACT THAT OFFICIALS ARE SO VAGUE ON NBR OF IMPORTANT ELEMENTS SUGGESTS THAT FROM CHINESE VIEWPOINT PROPOSALS MERIT LIES MORE IN ITS UTILITY AS PROPAGANDA STICK TO USE AGAINST TWO SUPERPOWERS THAN AS CREDIBLE WAY TO SECURE REDUCTIONS IN NUMBERS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN WORLD.

CCC/002 130300Z WJGR0958

TELEGRAM RETRANSMIT FORM

CONCENTRE:

Please repeat telegram number ZYGR0823

FROM BAIRS DATED 12DEC83

Classification CONFIDENTIAL (copy attached)

Action TO _____

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER - IMMEDIATE

DISTR _____

L.A.Delvoie IDDZ 5-5912 Dec. 13/83
Authorizing Officer Division Phone Date

NOTE: It is the responsibility of the authorizing officer to
attach a copy of telegram to be repeated to this form.

→ **IDDZ** for necessary action

MF

cc. IDA IDR
RGB USS +

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

*PCOTT/
FOWLER*

Division Phoned 3-4911
Person BJJ
Local Time 1200

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BAIRS ZYGR0823 12DEC83

TO EXTOTT USS DELIVER BY 121100

INFO WSHDC PARIS ROME MDRID BNATO

DISTR DMF IFB LGB RSD ZSP LSR URD

---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE: DISCUSSIONS WITH FRENCH, ITALIAN, SPANISH
AND USA LEADERS

DURING MINISTER BUSSIERES VISIT TO BAIRS TO ATTEND ARGENTINE
PRESIDENTIAL INAUGURATION, WE WERE ABLE TO ARRANGE BRIEF PRIVATE
DISCUSSIONS WITH PM MAUROY OF FRANCE, PM CRAXI OF ITALY, PRESIDENT
OF COUNCIL FELIPE GONZALES OF SPAIN AND USA VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH.
2. MAUROY COMMENTED ON MR TRUDEAU'S RECENT VISIT TO FRANCE, INDICATING
IN A MOST CAUTIOUS WAY THAT INITIATIVE HAD SOME MERIT BUT WOULD BE
DIFFICULT TO PURSUE. NEVERTHELESS GOVT OF FRANCE WOULD FOLLOW
DEVELOPMENTS CLOSELY AND, HE SAID, PRES MITTERRAND WAS TAKING A
PERSONAL INTEREST.

3. CRAXI WAS MUCH MORE FORTHCOMING. HE APPLAUDED PMS EFFORTS, NOTING
THAT IT WAS AN EXTREMELY IMPORTANT STEP IN THE FACE OF HIGH TENSION
BETWEEN USA AND USSR. HE SAID HE HAD WRITTEN LET TO MR TRUDEAU IN
SUPPORT OF CDN IDEAS AND WANTED TO KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH HIM IN
THIS REGARD.

4. FELIPE GONZALES MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT HE FULLY BACKED MR
TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE. HE PRAISED PMS COURAGE AND PERSEVERANCE IN
LIGHT OF MAJOR DIFFICULTIES QUOTE SOME LEADERS UNQUOTE WERE PLACING

...2

PAGE TWO ZYGR0823 CONFD

IN HIS WAY. HE SAID HE HAD WRITTEN SUPPORTIVE LET TO PM QUOTE BUT I WANT YOU TO TELL MR TRUDEAU THAT MY SUPPORT GOES WELL BEYOND WHAT I INDICATED IN MY LETTER; THIS INITIATIVE DESERVES ALL OUR HELP AND TO EXTENT POSSIBLE I AM WILLING TO HELP UNQUOTE. BUSSIERES THANKED SPANISH PRESIDENT ON BEHALF OF PM AND ASSURED HIM HIS POSITIVE MESSAGE WOULD BE COMMUNICATED TO PM ON FORMERS RETURN TO OTT 13DEC83.

5. VP BUSH ADVISED THAT MR TRUDEAU WOULD BE COMING TO WSHDC THIS WEEK AND THAT DINNER WITH PRES REAGAN WAS PLANNED. HE WAS CAREFULLY NON-COMMITTAL ABOUT USA REACTION TO PMS INITIATIVE AND AMERICAN POLICY. NEVERTHELESS HE GAVE IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS WELL AWARE OF IF NOT/NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN INTERNAL USA GOVT DISCUSSIONS ON THE MATTER. HE ALSO NOTED THAT QUOTE USA HAVE BEEN FOLLOWING CLOSELY DEVELOPMENTS RELATED TO YOUR PRIME MINISTERS EFFORTS UNQUOTE.

6. SINCE WE ARE UNAWARE OF STANDARD DISTRIBUTION FOR TELS ON THIS SUBJECT, GRATEFUL IF OTHER APPROPRIATE ADDRESSEES COULD RECEIVE COPIES.

CCC/145 121449Z ZYGR0823

MF

CTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LAGOS XKGR0343 12DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDA/DDZ

INFO WSHDC LDN BONN BNATO PARIS

DISTR ZSS ZSP ZEP ZSI GAA RBD RBR IDR GAAD IMC IMU

REF OURTEL XKGR0341 12DEC

---NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY: PRES SHAGARI ON GLOBAL PEACE AND
SECURITY

ALONG WITH CONTINUING QUOTE ECONOMIC DISCOMFORT UNQUOTE, QUOTE A
GROWING THREAT TO WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY UNQUOTE WAS FLAGGED AS
PREVAILING INTERNATIONAL CURRENT IN SHAGARIS ANNUAL FOREIGN
POLICY ADDRESS DEC09. JUST RETURNED FROM THE DELHI CHOGM AT WHICH
PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE HAD BEEN MOOTED, SHAGARI DECLARED QUOTE
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE, ESPECIALLY ON
EAST-WEST RELATIONS, NOW CAST A LOT OF DOUBT ON FUTURE SURVIVAL
OF THE ENTIRE HUMAN RACE. IN THE WAKE OF THE NUCLEAR MISSILES
DEPLOYMENT CRISIS IN EUROPE AND THE ATTENDANT DFRAILMENT OF THE
DISARMAMENT TALKS, OUR WORLD IS NOW ON THE VERGE OF A PRECIPICE
THE STARK CONSEQUENCES OF WHICH SHOULD STIR IN US ALL, IRRESPECTIVE
OF IDEOLOGICAL BELIEFS, THE GRAVEST CONCERN. WE ARE ALARMED THAT
THESE DEVELOPMENTS WOULD FURTHER ACCELERATE THE PRESENT ARMS RACE
BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS AT A TIME WHEN THE WORLDS SCARCE RESOURCES
SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE SENSIBLY DIRECTED TOWARDS RELIEVING THE
PREVAILING SQUALOR AND POVERTY OF THE GREATER PART OF OUR WORLD.

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PAGE TWO XKGR0343 CONFD

IT IS OUR FERVENT HOPE THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD NOT/NOT THROW AWAY THE MAJOR GAINS THAT THEY HAVE MADE FOR PEACE AND UNDERSTANDING IN THE PAST DECADES. WE THEREFORE CALL ON THEM TO HALT THE CURRENT ARMS RACE, AND IN THE SPIRIT OF INTER-DEPENDENCE DEFINE THEIR SECURITY NOT/NOT IN TERMS OF THE QUANTUM OF ARMS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE ARSENALS BUT IN THE QUALITY OF LIVES OF THE PEOPLE OF OUR GLOBE. UNQUOTE. SHAGARI DID NOT/NOT MENTION PM TRUDEAU'S PEACE INITIATIVE OR ANY OF ITS ELEMENTS.

2. FURTHER ON GLOBAL STABILITY, SHAGARI LAMENTED: QUOTE IN CONTEMPORARY INTER-STATE RELATIONS, THE SUPERPOWERS APPEAR TO BE TOO READY TO ADOPT THE MILITARY OPTION IN DEFENDING THEIR IDEOLOGY EVEN IN AREAS THAT ARE NOT/NOT OF DIRECT THREAT TO THEIR NATIONAL INTERESTS. SUCH PERCEIVED THREATS INEVITABLY INFRINGE ON THE INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM OF ACTION OF OTHER STATES. INDEED, THIS ATTITUDE POSES A GRIEVOUS THREAT TO WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY UNQUOTE. THIS REMARK WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE MORE POINTED CURRENT SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE USA THAN FOR THE OTHER SUPERPOWER, AND WAS CLEARLY INTERPRETED AS SUCH BY THE AUDIENCE.

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NEW YORK TIMES

2/11

IN THE NATION

A
Grim
Agreement

By Tom Wicker

Soviet-American relations are at the lowest level since 1962, with a major channel of communications — nuclear arms control talks — probably closed at least until after the 1984 elections. But important Soviet-American agreement was recently reached in Washington, as scientists from both nations concurred on the most vital matter of all: *A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.*

Those italicized words are President Reagan's, from his recent U.N. address, but his Administration seems to give little more than lip service to his point — note, for example, the Pentagon's current interest in expanding the nuclear arms race into outer space rather than seeking a treaty banning such a move; or Secretary Weinberger's famous "guidance" that the armed forces must be able to "prevail" over the Russians in a "protracted" nuclear war.

The four Soviet and four American scientists who spoke at a forum on Capitol Hill made short work of that kind of thinking. New scientific studies of the consequences of nuclear war demonstrated that there would be "no sanctuaries," declared Carl Sagan, the Cornell University astrophysicist: "The ashes of communism and capitalism will be indistinguishable."

Lewis Thomas of the Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Institute said these new studies "change everything" about man's understanding of nuclear war. So catastrophic would be the climatic, biological and environmental damage now expected, he and the other scientists agreed, that a nation launching such a war probably would be committing suicide even if no other nation made a nuclear response.

The Russians said their work confirmed American scientific predictions that the explosion of only a part of the existing warheads would cause a long "nuclear winter" of darkness and freezing cold, in which no crops and few humans could survive; and

they added their own grisly forecasts of a worldwide "toxic smog" and the fatal disruption of the intricately linked ecosystems that sustain life.

The forum was sponsored by proponents of the nuclear freeze movement, and the eight scientists offered the view that it was imperative for the superpowers to freeze the building and deployment of nuclear weapons, then to begin rapidly reducing their stocks of warheads to a level far below any yet suggested.

Sergei P. Kapitsa of the Moscow Physico-Technical Institute dismissed as "gadgets" such proposals as Mr. Reagan's space-based "star wars" defense system, and added: "Gadgets won't solve the problem. It is time for ideas — not gadgets like civil defense and star wars." His studies demonstrated, he said, that "the growth of arsenals" was the real danger.

Paul Ehrlich of Stanford University testified that after a nuclear war "the only survival" would be in "extraordinarily deep shelters with independent air supplies" — independent, that is, of the contaminated outside atmosphere, a condition hard to imagine. Even that might only delay death, he said, until those sheltered finally emerged; therefore, "we cannot preclude the extermination of human life."

Mr. Ehrlich defended such scientific conclusions as having been subject to exhaustive peer review. The findings were so extensive and so obvious, he said, that they constituted a sort of "biological overkill"; and to ask a biologist what would be the results of a nuclear war was like asking "a physician if everybody in this room put a double-barreled shotgun in his mouth and shot it, what would be the medical consequences?"

With such testimony echoing in a crowded Senate Caucus Room, the notion of a workable civil defense against nuclear war — even the supposedly extensive Soviet civil defense program — took a considerable beating. Mr. Kapitsa said the acronym for "civil defense" in Russian (the first two letters of each word) formed the word "coffin."

"I'm sorry," he said. "There's just no way out of it."

And Mr. Ehrlich said that some Russians had a "better idea" than civil defense. "They suggest that you wrap yourself in a sheet and crawl calmly to the cemetery, so as not to cause panic."

Much testimony suggested that the civil defense plans of the Federal Emergency Management Agency were not more practical — for example, its ludicrous recent report on agriculture after the holocaust, in which it predicted no shortage of farm labor because there would be so many "urban migrants" to pick the crops, about half of which F.E.M.A. expects to survive.

Such flights of F.E.M.A. fancy — which, of course, tend to support the dangerous illusion that nuclear war can be survived, hence can be fought — are blown out of the water by prominent scientists and other authorities in "The Counterfeit Ark," a new publication of Physicians for Social Responsibility. Stay tuned for another article about this devastating analysis of civil defense possibilities.

NEW YORK TIMES

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THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, DECEMBER

Needed: Summit Talks

By Arlen Specter

WASHINGTON — As a result of my discussions with Russian and American arms negotiators, I found the Soviet Union's decision last week to suspend the strategic arms reduction talks unfortunate but not surprising. The fact is, as both sides concede, the Start talks had already stopped. They may resume, but they cannot succeed unless President Reagan and the Soviet leader, Yuri V. Andropov, meet face-to-face.

Late last month in Geneva, I spent two hours with the Soviet representatives to the strategic arms reduction talks. They were tough and unyielding, as they always are, even in informal meetings such as this one. But I also sensed a new ingredient: despair. Earlier, I had detected a trace of the same feeling among American negotiators.

I had asked for the meeting to find out how seriously the Russians viewed the American deployment of land-based cruise and Pershing 2 missiles in Western Europe. With me was Senator Carl Levin, Democrat of Michigan.

Social warmth quickly gave way to an atmosphere that matched the bone-chilling cold of the Geneva night. Each question we asked was met with political barangues. When I brought up the Soviet Union's failure to agree to on-site inspection, for ex-

Arlen Specter, a Republican, is a Senator from Pennsylvania.

ample, Viktor Karpov said I was trying to sabotage the evening's discussion with what he called "a complicated, irrelevant matter."

Throughout the meeting, the Russians kept coming back to the deployment of the cruise and Pershing 2 missiles. It was clear, as the meeting ended, that they were much more worried about the Pershings. They have reason to be. The Pershings are lethal weapons that, with minor modifications, could hit military and civilian targets — including Moscow — with deadly accuracy in a matter of minutes. I would not like a Soviet version of the same weapon installed in Cuba.

I left convinced that the only way out of this mess would be a summit meeting between President Reagan and Mr. Andropov. You see, while our negotiators are more polite and engage in a rhetoric of a different tone, they too are trapped by control from


Washington, just as their Soviet counterparts are chained by Moscow.

There is reason to believe that our negotiators in Geneva and Mr. Karpov felt the same way. So does the Senate, which twice passed resolutions calling for a nuclear summit conference.

A summit meeting would require a major shift in the thinking of diplomats in both countries. Ever since the disastrous meeting between President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev in 1961 in Vienna, summit meetings have become simple, colorful ceremonies to ratify prior agreements. But there will be no agreement this time without a summit conference to break the deadlock.

The time is right for both sides. The allies of each are becoming restive. Certainly in the West, it is problematic whether the United States can count much longer on Western Euro-

CONT—



Maria Roberts

pean governments' approval of our present negotiating stance on intermediate-range missiles, even though the British and West German parliaments recently reaffirmed their support for the new deployment.

The outlines for a more fruitful set of negotiations are there. We can use the threat of the Pershing 2's, which I believe are truly terrifying to the Russians, to induce Moscow to reduce its advantage in land-based intermediate-range missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The 360 Soviet SS-20's carrying more than 1,000 accurate warheads, and the 610 SS-18's and SS-19's carrying some 5,000 warheads, are what most concern American leaders as destabilizing the nuclear balance. Reducing these missiles' numbers would lessen both the risk of nuclear war and the costs of the arms race.

If Mr. Reagan and Mr. Andropov could agree to reciprocal reductions whereby, for example, America might forswear deployment of the Pershing 2's, and deploy only one-half of the 464 ground-launched cruise missiles and perhaps fewer MX missiles, in return for the Kremlin's dismantling most of its SS-18's, 19's and 20's, they will have constructed the framework of a treaty of historic importance.

They must move rapidly, however. Soviet military leaders, whose political strength reportedly is in ascendancy, may press for missile increases rather than missile reductions once the United States has deployed significant numbers of Pershing 2 and cruise missiles, and perhaps even some MX's, by the end of 1984.

The suspension of negotiations on both long- and intermediate-range missiles should not deflect us from our quest for arms control. But it clearly heightens the need for President Reagan and Mr. Andropov to meet in 1984.

DECEMBER 10, 1983

FIRST US ASAT TEST: NOTIFYING ALLIES

S) BEGIN Q'S AND A'S:

Q1 WHY IS THE US TESTING AN ASAT AT THIS TIME?

A1. THE UNITED STATES HAS HAD A LONG-STANDING COMMITMENT TO DEVELOP AN ANTI-SATELLITE CAPABILITY. THIS COMMITMENT WAS FIRST MADE IN THE PREVIOUS ADMINISTRATION. THE U.S. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY ANNOUNCED BY THE PRESIDENT JULY 4, 1982 STATES THE FOLLOWING

THE UNITED STATES WILL PROCEED WITH DEVELOPMENT OF AN ANTI SATELLITE CAPABILITY, WITH OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT AS A GOAL. THE PRIMARY PURPOSES OF A UNITED STATES ASAT CAPABILITY ARE TO DETER THREATS TO SPACE SYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES AND, WITHIN SUCH LIMITS IMPOSED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW, TO DENY ANY ADVERSARY THE USE OF SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS THAT PROVIDE SUPPORT TO HOSTILE MILITARY FORCES.

THE UNITED STATES WILL DEVELOP AND MAINTAIN AN INTEGRATED ATTACK WARNING, NOTIFICATION, VERIFICATION, AND CONTINGENCY REACTION CAPABILITY WHICH CAN EFFECTIVELY DETECT AND REACT TO THREATS TO UNITED STATES SPACE SYSTEMS.

OUR COMMITMENT TO DEVELOPMENT OF AN ASAT CAPABILITY OF OUR OWN HAS LONG BEEN PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE. THE FACT THAT WE CONDUCTED AN INITIAL TEST OF THE ASAT LAUNCH VEHICLE RECENTLY SIMPLY REFLECTS THAT OUR RESEARCH HAS REACHED THE POINT WHERE INITIAL FLIGHT TESTING CAN BEGIN.

Q2. WHY IS THE US BUILDING AN ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEM?

A2. THE PURPOSE OF A US ASAT CAPABILITY, WHICH HAS BEEN IN DEVELOPMENT FOR SEVERAL YEARS, IS TWO-FOLD: FIRST, TO DETER THREATS TO OUR OWN SPACE SYSTEMS; AND SECOND, WITHIN SUCH LIMITS AS ARE IMPOSED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW TO BE ABLE TO COUNTER CERTAIN SATELLITES WHICH PROVIDE SUPPORT FOR HOSTILE MILITARY FORCES. WE CONSIDER THIS A PRUDENT RESPONSE TO THE EXISTING SOVIET ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPON, AND TO SOVIET DEPLOYMENT IN RECENT YEARS OF A NUMBER OF MILITARY SATELLITES WHICH, WHILE NOT WEAPONS THEMSELVES, ARE DESIGNED TO SUPPORT DIRECTLY THE USSR'S TERRESTRIAL FORCES IN THE EVENT OF A CONFLICT. IN THE ABSENCE OF A COMPARABLE US SYSTEM, OR SOME FORM OF VERIFIABLE NEGOTIATED MUTUAL LIMITS ON ASAT SYSTEMS, THE SOVIET

ASAT SYSTEM PROVIDES THEM WITH A UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE

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Q3 IS THE U.S. HEADING FOR A SPACE ARMS RACE WITH THE SOVIET UNION?

A3: NO THE U.S. HAS NO DESIRE TO ENGAGE IN ARMS RACE WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN ANY AREA. THE U.S. USE OF SPACE HAS ALWAYS BEEN NON-AGGRESSIVE. IF PRESSED: IN THE SPECIFIC CASE OF ASAT. THE PRESIDENT HAS DETERMINED THAT U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIRES WE MAKE A COMMITMENT TO DEVELOP AN ASAT CAPABILITY..

Q4 WON'T DEVELOPING AN ASAT ONLY HEIGHTEN TENSIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION FOLLOWING THEIR SUSPENSION OF THE INF TALKS AND FAILURE TO SET A DATE FOR RESUMPTION OF THE START TALKS?

A4: THE ASAT TEST HAS NO BEARING ON THE GENEVA TALKS ON EITHER IF OR START, OR VICE VERSA.

OUR ASAT PROGRAM HAS BEEN PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE FOR QUITE SOME TIME IT IS PART OF A CONTINUING RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AIMED AT ENSURING THAT THE SECURITY OF THE U.S. IS NOT ENDANGERED BY THE SOVIET MILITARY USE OF SPACE AS YOU KNOW. THE SOVIETS HAVE THE WORLD'S ONLY OPERATIONAL ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEM AND HAVE CONTINUED TO TEST IT. SINCE IT BECAME OPERATIONAL IN THE EARLY 1970'S.

Q5 WHAT STEPS IS THE ADMINISTRATION TAKING WITH REGARD TO SPACE ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS?

A5: THE ADMINISTRATION IS CONTINUING TO STUDY BOTH THE SPECIFIC AND GENERAL DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED IN SPACE ARMS CONTROL. IT IS IN THE PROCESS OF ASSESSING THE MERITS OF A NUMBER OF ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS.

IN ADDITION, THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN ACTIVELY INVOLVED IN ESTABLISHING A WORKING GROUP TO DISCUSS OUTER SPACE ISSUES AT THE 40-NATION CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT CD IN GENEVA. IN LAST YEAR'S CD, THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS ALLIES BLOCKED FORMATION OF A CD WORKING GROUP WITH A MANDATE TO DISCUSS WHAT IF ANY NEW ARRANGEMENT MIGHT BE NEEDED OR DESIRABLE TO FURTHER THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE. A WORKING GROUP WITH THIS MANDATE WOULD PROVIDE THE NECESSARY FOUNDATION FOR UNDERSTANDING WHAT PROBLEMS MUST BE RESOLVED IN ANY PROSPECTIVE ASAT TREATY. AND WE HOPE CONSENSUS ON SUCH A GROUP CAN BE REACHED IN THE COMING CD SESSION.

Q6 WHAT WAS THE OBJECT OF THIS TEST?

A6 THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE TEST WAS TO EXAMINE BOOSTER ROCKET CAPABILITIES. THE TEST INVOLVED LAUNCHING THE ASAT LAUNCH VEHICLE FROM AN AIRBORNE F-15 INTO A VERTICAL TRAJECTORY.

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SECRET

Q7: SOME MEMBERS OF CONGRESS HAVE URGED THE PRESIDENT TO DELAY TESTING OF THE US ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEM AND TO RESUME NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON BANNING SUCH DEVICES. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT?

A3. AS WE HAVE SAID IN THE PAST, THE US SUPPORTS RESPONSIBLE EFFORTS TO CONTROL ARMS IN OUTER SPACE, IN THE OUTER SPACE TREATY, THE ABM TREATY, THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY, AND SO ON. OUR NATIONAL SPACE POLICY STATES THAT THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO STUDY SPACE ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS AND THAT "THE UNITED STATES WILL CONSIDER VERIFIABLE AND EQUITABLE ARMS CONTROL MEASURES THAT WOULD BAN OR OTHERWISE LIMIT SPECIFIC WEAPONS

SYSTEMS SHOULD THOSE MEASURES BE COMPATIBLE WITH UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY. WHILE WE HAVE BEEN INTENSIVELY STUDYING THIS AREA, WE HAVE NOT IDENTIFIED MEASURES THAT SATISFY THE CRITERIA OF THE SPACE POLICY.

Q8: SENATOR TSONGAS' AMENDMENT TO THE FY 85 DEFENSE DEPARTMENT APPROPRIATION BILL RESTRICTS FUNDING FOR ASAT TESTING. DOES THIS TEST VIOLATE THE AMENDMENT?

A8. O THE TEST FULLY COMPLIES WITH EXISTING STATUTES (FYI THE TSONGAS AMENDMENT PLACES RESTRICTIONS ON FUNDING FOR TESTS WHICH USE THE ASAT WARHEAD AGAINST OBJECTS IN SPA-E. THIS TEST DID NOT INVOLVE AN OBJECT IN SPACE. THE TEST INVOLVED LAUNCHING ONLY THE ASAT LAUNCH VEHICLE FROM AN AIRBORNE F 15 INTO A VERTICAL TRAJECTORY.).

Q9: HAS THE US IN THE PAST ENGAGED IN OUTER SPACE ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS OF ANY SORT WITH THE USSR? WHAT

WAS THE RESULT OF THOSE NEGOTIATIONS?

A9: IN 1978-79 THE US CONDUCTED BITATERAL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION SPECIFICALLY ON ANTI-SATELLITE ARMS CONTROL. THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AS WELL AS ONGOING STUDIES HAVE MADE IT CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS FOR WHICH SOLUTIONS

MUST BE FOUND BEFORE WE ARE IN A POSITION TO REACH AN AGREEMENT. WE ARE CURRENTLY WORKING ON THESE PROBLEMS. AMONG THEM ARE POTENTIALLY SEVERE VERIFICATION DIFFICULTIES ARISING FROM SOVIET POSSESSION OF ITS EXISTING OPERATIONAL ASAT SYSTEM.

SECRET

Q10 YOU HAVE MENTIONED PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH MEASURES TO CONTROL ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS. CAN YOU GIVE AN EXAMPLE?

A10 ONE EXAMPLE IS THE DIFFICULTY OF VERIFYING AN AGREEMENT TO DATE NO WAY HAS BEEN FOUND TO VERIFY EFFECTIVELY THE ELIMINATION OF THE SOVIET ASAT INTERCEPTOR WHICH IS RELATIVELY SMALL AND FITTED TO A SOVIET SPACE BOOSTER USED FOR OTHER SPACE LAUNCH MISSIONS WE DO NOT KNOW HOW MANY SUCH INTERCEPTORS HAVE BEEN MANUFACTURED, AND IT WOULD BE RELATIVELY EASY TO MAINTAIN A COVERT SUPPLY FOR USE IN A CRISIS. SINCE SATELLITES WHICH SERVE US AND ALLIED SECURITY ARE FEW IN NUMBER ANY SOVIET CHEATING ON AN ASAT AGREEMENT, EVEN ON A SMALL SCALE, COULD POSE A PROHIBITIVE RISK.

Q11 WHEN WILL THE NEXT TEST BE HELD, AND WHAT WILL IT INVOLVE?

A11 THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WILL STUDY THE RESULTS OF THE RECENT TEST BEFORE CHOOSING A SPECIFIC DATE.

Q12 IS CONGRESS AWARE OF THIS TEST?

A12 CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS, INCLUDING SENATOR TSONGAS, HAVE BEEN INFORMED.

Q13 WHAT IS THE ADMINISTRATION'S REACTION TO THE TSONGAS AMENDMENT?

A13 THE U.S. IS COMPLYING WITH EXISTING STATUTES.

Q14 ISN'T THE TEST OF THE ASAT JUST A FIRST STEP IN U.S. PLANS TO DEVELOP AND DEPLOY SPACE-BASED DEFENSES?

A14: NO THE ASAT PROGRAM IS BEING PURSUED QUITE APART FROM THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE TO DEFINE AN R&D PROGRAM WHOSE LONG-TERM GOAL IS TO ELIMINATE THE THREAT OF BALLISTIC MISSILES. AS NOTED ABOVE, THE PURPOSE OF THE U.S. ASAT CAPABILITY IS TO DETER THREATS TO U.S. SPACE SYSTEMS AND WITHIN THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW TO BE ABLE TO COUNTER SPACE-BASED SYSTEMS THAT PROVIDE SUPPORT TO HOSTILE MILITARY FORCES

IN HIS 23 MARCH SPEECH, THE PRESIDENT CALLED FOR INVESTIGATION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF DEFENSE AGAINST

BALLISTIC MISSILES. SINCE THEN, THE USG CONDUCTED SEVERAL STUDIES OVER THE COURSE OF THE SUMMER. THE RESULTS OF THE INITIAL STUDIES HAVE NOW BEEN PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT. WE EXPECT HIM TO MAKE A DECISION ABOUT NEAR-TERM BUDGETARY REQUIREMENTS AND RESEARCH PLANS IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. BEFORE HE DOES, WE WANT TO SHARE WITH YOU SOME OF THE RESULTS OF THE STUDIES.

4. THE STUDIES HAVE BEEN PROMPTED IN PART BY SOVIET RESEARCH ON BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE. DURING THE COURSE OF THE REVIEW, THE U.S. CLOSELY EXAMINED THE SIZE OF SOVIET EFFORTS IN BOTH TRADITIONAL ABM RESEARCH AND IN FBAM WEAPONS. THE SOVIETS HAVE VERY LARGE SCALE PROGRAMS

UNDERWAY IN BOTH AREAS. WE PLAN TO SHARE INTELLIGENCE ON THOSE PROGRAMS WITH YOU.

5. THE STUDIES SUGGEST THAT NEW TECHNOLOGIES WHICH COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE IN THE YEARS JUST PRIOR TO AND AFTER THE TURN OF THE CENTURY MIGHT PERMIT MULTI-LAYERED DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES AS AN INTEGRATED EFFECTIVE SYSTEM.

6. THERE ARE, HOWEVER, MANY UNKNOWNNS ABOUT THOSE TECHNOLOGIES, SUCH AS THE COST AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THESE VARIOUS DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE POSSIBLE EFFECT OF COUNTERMEASURES. CURRENT U.S. RESEARCH INTO THESE AREAS AND THE TRADITIONAL ABM TECHNOLOGY TOTALLED BETWEEN 1.0 AND 1.50 BILLION DOLLARS ANNUALLY IN FY 84.

7. THE OPTIONS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT WOULD INCREASE THAT FUNDING FOR RESEARCH IN THE FY 85 BUDGET REQUEST NOW UNDER PREPARATION 25-50 PERCENT ABOVE THE PREVIOUSLY PLANNED FY 85 LEVEL, WHICH WAS BETWEEN ONE AND A HALF BILLION AND TWO BILLION DOLLARS.

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INCREASES COULD FOLLOW ANNUALLY AS THE RESEARCH PROGRESSES. THE OPTIONS UNDER CONSIDERATION WOULD REDIRECT CURRENT FUNDING, AWAY FROM TRADITIONAL ABM RESEARCH INTO NEWER TECHNOLOGIES THAT RELY HEAVILY UPON BEAM WEAPONS AND NEW SENSOR TECHNOLOGIES.

8. THE STUDIES CONCLUDE THAT WE CANNOT MAKE DECISIONS ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF A SYSTEM FOR DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES UNTIL RESEARCH ANSWERS MANY OF THE UNKNOWN. WE EXPECT THAT RESEARCH WILL TAKE AT LEAST A DECADE.

9. THE U.S. RESEARCH PROGRAM WILL NOT BE IN CONFLICT WITH THE ABM TREATY AND OTHER OBLIGATIONS THAT THE U.S. HAS ENTERED INTO. OF COURSE, WE ALSO WILL CONTINUE TO ADHERE

TO A STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE AND TO NATO'S STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. WE DO NOT INTEND TO ALTER OUR STRATEGIES UNLESS WE FULLY UNDERSTAND AN ALTERNATIVE AND CONCLUDE THAT IT IS SUPERIOR.

10. WE WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO ASSURE DETERRENCE THROUGH WEAPON MODERNIZATION AND VIGOROUS PURSUIT OF ARMS CONTROL START/STRATEGIC AREAS. IN BOTH THE INF AND

11. THE SECURITY OF OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES IS UPPERMOST AS WE ANALYZE THE POTENTIAL OF SYSTEMS TO PROTECT AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES. WE INTEND TO CONSULT FULLY AS OUR OWN RESEARCH CONTINUES. AS THE PRESIDENT SAID IN HIS MARCH 2, SPEECH, "WE RECOGNIZE THAT OUR ALLIES RELY UPON OUR

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE POWER TO DETER ATTACKS AGAINST THEM. THEIR VITAL INTERESTS AND OURS ARE INEXTRICABLY LINKED--THEIR SAFETY AND OURS ARE ONE. AND NO CHANGE IN TECHNOLOGY CAN OR WILL ALTER THAT REALITY." THEREFORE, WE HAVE INCORPORATED INTO OUR STUDY EFFORTS THE CRITERION THAT GREATER RELIANCE ON DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS SHOULD AFFORD SECURITY TO OUR ALLIES AND MUST NOT REDUCE OUR CAPABILITIES TO MAINTAIN OUR COMMITMENTS AROUND THE WORLD.

12. THE VIEWS OF YOUR GOVERNMENT WOULD BE APPRECIATED. WE ANTICIPATE THE PRESIDENT WILL MAKE A DECISION ON THE SIZE AND SHAPE OF THE FY 85 BUDGET REQUEST IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. WE WOULD BE WILLING, IF REQUESTED, TO PROVIDE A SMALL BRIEFING TEAM IN JANUARY TO PROVIDE FURTHER INFORMATION.

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SOVIET INTENTIONS QUERIED IN VIENNA

Diplomats Say Moscow Raises Doubts on Future of Talks on Nonnuclear Forces

By JAMES M. MARHAM

Special to The New York Times

BONN, Dec. 9 — According to Western diplomats in Vienna, the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies have started giving signals that raise doubts about whether they intend to continue the decade-old talks on reduction of conventional arms in Central Europe.

In light of the Soviet Union's decision last month to abandon the Geneva negotiations on medium-range weapons and its refusal Thursday to set a date for resuming the Geneva talks on strategic nuclear weapons, Western delegates to the so-called Mutual and Balanced Forces Reductions talks in Vienna said they found it noteworthy that the Warsaw Pact side had not yet accepted a date for resuming those discussions after Christmas.

The last pre-Christmas session at the Hofburg Palace in Vienna is scheduled for Dec. 15, and veteran negotiators say it is highly unusual at this point not to have a mutually accepted resumption date fixed for late January or early February.

At the same time, Warsaw Pact delegates have been suggesting that the deployment of American medium-range nuclear weapons in West Germany, Britain and Italy will have a negative effect on the Vienna discussions. The deployment began last month.

Merely 'Playing Poker'?

Such signals are variously interpreted by Western diplomats in Vienna. Some say they suspect that the Russians and their allies are merely, as one diplomat put it, "playing poker" and will agree next week to a resumption date.

To buttress their case, these diplomats note that the state-run Soviet press and radio have had little to say about the talks here, whereas there was an intense propaganda campaign before the walkout from the medium-range talks. The decision Thursday to not schedule a resumption of the strategic arms talks was similarly telegraphed by Marshal Nikolai V. Ogarkov, chief of the Soviet general staff, at a news conference Monday in Moscow.

But others offered a more gloomy analysis of the Vienna talks. "They are again resorting to their implied threats at their press briefings," an envoy in Vienna said of the Warsaw Pact members. "There's little doubt in my mind that they will do something here."

Proponents of this view argue that the Kremlin may have been irritated by the relatively tranquil response of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the interruptions at Geneva and by the tendency to dismiss the announced Soviet "countermeasures" to Western deployment as long-planned military moves.

The Russians appear to be particularly incensed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl's disclosure of the details of a letter from the Soviet leader, Yuri V. Andropov, which the West German leader construed as meaning that Moscow might eventually return to the medium-range talks in Geneva. A standard, upbeat West German reading of the international situation has typically included a litany of other forums where East-West negotiations are continuing, including the Vienna talks.

"It will be interesting to see how far Moscow feels it has to go to show that they really are angry," a senior Bonn official said. He described the Soviet reaction to deployment as "relatively mild" so far.

This official speculated that the Russians might be interested in "a new approach" to the talks here, possibly including short-range nuclear weapons in what has been a fairly unfruitful discussion of purely conventional forces in West Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg on the NATO side and Poland, Czechoslovakia and East Germany in the Warsaw Pact.

The Stockholm Conference

A final advantage of suspending or scuttling the Vienna talks, diplomats say, would be to put a sharper focus on the East-West conference on military confidence-building measures that is to open in Stockholm on Jan. 17. Foreign ministers from NATO countries have said they will attend the beginning of the Stockholm gathering, but the Warsaw Pact has not yet indicated whether it will be represented at a similar level.

An offshoot of the recent Madrid conference on security and cooperation in Europe, the Stockholm forum could be attractive to Moscow since its 35 participants include neutral nations and some that profess nonalignment.

This highly fluid format can be counted on to come up with compromise proposals to break deadlocks. Some diplomats argue that it could afford the Russians a chance to try, as they did at Madrid, to split the United States from its European allies.

The conference's initial mandate is to agree upon measures that would deter surprise attacks in Europe. A remote second phase would consider disarmament.

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned 20
Person 101530
Local Time 101530

**CDN EYES ONLY
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*MF
RD*

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM BRU ZVGR0063 10DEC83

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ DELIVER BY 110900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADM POL/ CPP WSHDC BNATO

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RSR RSD RCR RCD IDR IDA

*28-6-1-Trudeau
Peace
Mission*

---PM INITIATIVE:EUROPEAN HOP MTG

FOLLOWING ARE MAJOR POINTS OF DMFS SUMMING UP OF DISCUSSION

AT HOP MTG ON QUESTION OF PEACE AND SECURITY AND PMS

INITIATIVE.YOU MAY WISH TO KEEP THESE VIEWS IN MIND WHEN

PREPARING BRIEFINGS FOR PMS VISIT TO WSHDC DEC 15.

2.QUOTE THERE WAS AN INSISTENCE ON IMPORTANCE OF MAKING THE
APPROPRIATE DISTINCTION,WITH RESPECT TO PMS INITIATIVE,
BETWEEN THE PURELY POLITICAL ELEMENTS(IMPROVEMENT OF EAST-WEST
DIALOGUE,DETENTE),AND DISARMAMENT ELEMENTS THAT ACCOMPANY IT.

3.THERE WAS GENERAL SUPPORT FOR CDN ROLE AND INTEREST IN
PURSUIT OF THOSE POLITICAL ELEMENTS,SUCH AS DIALOGUE,NEGS
AND QUOTE GENUINE DETENTE UNQUOTE.THERE WAS HOWEVER
CONSIDERTABLE UNEASE ABOUT POSSIBILITY THAT CDA MIGHT TRY TO
ACTIVATE A BASIC REVIEW OF NATO STRATEGIC AND MILITARY
DOCTRINE.IT WAS FELT THAT SUCH A COURSE MIGHT NOT/NOT GAIN SUPPORT
FROM EUROPEAN CAPITALS BOTH FOR REASONS OF SUBSTANCE AND TIMING.
WITH THE PRESENT ECONOMIC SITU IN EUROPE,AND THE POLITICAL
TENSIONS CAUSED BY INSTALLATION OF INF THE TIME MIGHT NOT/NOT BE
RIGHT TO HAVE ANY FUNDAMENTAL REVIEW OF NATOS STRATEGY.EUROPEAN

...2

PAGE TWO ZVGR0063 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

GOVTS HAD GREAT DEAL AT STAKE IN NOT/NOT ROCKING THE BOAT AND WOULD NOT/NOT SUPPORT AT THIS TIME A REOPENING OF DOCTRINES WHICH UNDERPINNED THEIR SECURITY--ESPECIALLY IF THEY SUSPECTED THAT ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES WOULD INEVITABLY REQUIRE INCREASED RESOURCES FOR DEFENCE. THERE WERE HOWEVER SOME INDICATIONS THAT NORWAY, NETHERLANDS, AND TURKEY, OUT OF DISQUIET FOR DIFFERENT REASONS WITH EXISTING CONCEPTS, MIGHT BE LESS NEGATIVE. IF CDA WAS TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE IN THIS AREA, IT WOULD BE LOGICAL TO BUILD ON BASIS OF SUPPORT FROM THESE COUNTRIES, TO THE EXTENT SOURCES OF THEIR DISSATISFACTION APPEARED ON EXAMINATION TO BE ONES WE SHARED.

4. IT IS CLEAR THAT COMMON DENOMINATOR OF SUPPORT IN EUROPE FOR PMS INITIATIVE LIES ESSENTIALLY WITH ITS POLITICAL DIMENSION, NOT/NOT WITH ARMS CONTROL OR STRATEGY REVIEW ELEMENTS. UNQUOTE

5. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, DMF THEN OUTLINED POSSIBLE SCENARIO FOR PM MTG WITH PRES REAGAN ON DEC 15. DOES PM STICK SOLELY TO POLITICAL ELEMENTS AND EMPHASIZE MUTUAL USA-USSR INTERESTS IN DIALOGUE, RATHER THAN GOING INTO SPECIFIC ARMS CONTROL MEASURES KNOWING US ADMINS LACK OF ENTHUSIASM FOR THESE MEASURES? OR DOES PM, IN SPITE OF KNOWN AMERICAN ATTITUDE, RAISE SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS SUCH AS FIVE-POWER CONF AND AGENDA ITEMS FOR SUCH CONF? TO LOWER RISK OF USA OPPOSITION TO FIVE POWER CONFERENCE COULD PM SUGGEST AGENDA BEGIN WITH CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND CODES OF CONDUCT LEAVING DISCUSSION OF CEILINGS AND RATIOS FOR LATER, PRESUMABLY WHEN START NEGS WOULD BE MORE ADVANCED?

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PAGE THREE ZVGR0063 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

THESE QUESTIONS REMAIN LARGELY UNANSWERED BY HOPS BUT
THERE DOES SEEM TO BE A SENTIMENT THAT RAISING NON-PROLIFERATION
AREA WITH USA MIGHT REPRESENT A PROMISING AVENUE THAT WOULD
COMBINE POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND ARMS CONTROL MEASURE.

6. TWO IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF CONTEXT TO BE CONSIDERED IN
PREPARATION FOR PMS MTG WITH PRES REAGAN WERE (A) THE SOVIETS
APPEAR TO HAVE DECIDED TO DO NOTHING WHICH MIGHT HELP REAGAN'S
RE-ELECTION (THAT IS NOTHING THAT WOULD PERMIT HIM TO CLAIM
CREDIT FOR SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS IN THE AREA OF PEACE AND
DISARMAMENT) (B) FINAL ACCEPTANCE BY USA OF LANGUAGE SUCH AS
QUOTE GENUINE DETENTE UNQUOTE AND QUOTE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP
UNQUOTE WITHIN NATO, AS SET OUT IN COMMUNIQUE AND DECLARATION
ISSUED AFTER NATO MINISTERIAL MTG (DESPITE SEC SHULTZ'S EVIDENT
RELUCTANCE AT OUTSET OF DISCUSSION TO SEE SUCH PHRASES USED.)
IF PM SUCCEEDED IN GETTING PRESIDENT OPENLY TO ENDORSE
OVERTURE ELEMENTS IN NATO COMMUNIQUE AND DECLARATION THEREBY
OBTAINING U.S. MAKE VIRTUE OUT OF THIS NECESSITY THIS MIGHT
CONSTITUTE IMPORTANT ACHIEVEMENT OF HIS VISIT TO WASH.

CCC/030 101833Z ZVGR0063

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM BRU ZVGR0061 10DEC83
TO LDN/MINDEL DELIVER BY 101400
INFO EXTOTT MINA PCOOTT/FOWLER
DISTR DMF IFB (UDDZ)
NOBLE DE DELVOIE
REF WSHDC TEL UNGR3015 09DEC
---PM VISIT TO WSHDC

28-6-1 - The Jean Paul
Mission

GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ASCERTAIN FROM DPM/SSEA WHETHER HE
WISHES TO BE ACOMPANIED TO WASHDC BY SENIOR DEPTL OFFICIAL
(E.G.MARCHAND OR SHENSTONE).PLS ADVISE OTT ADDRESSEES
CONCERNED BY TEL AND MARCHAND IN BRU BY PHONE(EMBASSY
513-7940).

CCC/030 101019Z ZVGR0061



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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FM EXTOTT IDDZ0270 09DEC83

TO LDN DELIVER BY 120900

INFO BRU/MINDEL/DELVOIE DELIVER BY 100900

DISTR IFB RCR RGB
REF: YOURTEL XNCR 4324 DEC 8/83
---PM INITIATIVE: BRIEFING OF HC MORAN

28-6-1 - Trudeau's Mission

DURING MTG 06DEC BETWEEN RGB AND RCD WITH UK HIGH COMMISSIONER MORAN TO REVIEW PREPARATIONS FOR DPM/SSEA MTG WITH HOWE NEXT WEEK, IDDZ (SMITH) INFO PROVIDED BRIEFING ON PM VISITS TO JPN, DELHI AND PEKIN, AS WELL AS PEARSONS MISSION TO MOSCO. LORD MORAN ALSO HAD NUMBER OF QUESTIONS ABOUT INITIATIVE IN GENERAL, WHICH WERE ANSWERED.

2. HIGH COMMISSIONER HAD NOT/NOT BEEN INFORMED BY FCO THAT: (A) COPY OF PAPER ON FIVE-POWER PROPOSAL HAD BEEN HANDED TO FCO; AND (B) THAT PM HAD WRITTEN SECOND LET TO MRS THATCHER IN MID-NOV CONCERNING PROPOSALS HE WISHED TO SEE ADVANCED AT NATO MIN MTG. WE SUBSEQUENTLY PROVIDED HC WITH COPIES OF BOTH.

3. LORD MORAN MENTIONED THAT WE WOULD BE AWARE THAT, UNLIKE SOME RESPONSES PM HAD RECEIVED DURING HIS TRIP, MRS THATCHER AND UK GOVT HAD BEEN RATHER RESERVED ABOUT INITIATIVE. WE NOTED (A) THAT ON GENERAL ANALYSIS AND CENTRAL THEME OF INITIATIVE PM AND MRS THATCHER APPEARED RATHER CLOSE. MRS THATCHER WAS MENTIONING NEED FOR DIALOGUE, AVOIDANCE OF MISCALCULATION AND MISUNDERSTANDING, AND WAS FOR FIRST TIME PLANNING VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE; (B) THAT MRS THATCHER HAD BEEN VISIBLY INTERESTED AND EVEN SLIGHTLY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT PM S

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DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG <i>G. Smith/sc</i>	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG <i>G. Smith</i>



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PAGE TWO IDDZ0270 CONFD

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SUGGESTION THAT POSSIBLE HEAD OF GOVT ATTENDANCE AT STKHM AT SOME
POINT IN TIME MIGHT PROVIDE VEHICLE FOR EASILY ARRANGED REAGAN-
ANDROPOV ENCOUNTER(LORD MORAN SAID THIS INFO HAD NOT/NOT BEEN
REPORTED TO HIM);(C)ON MBFR WE WERE RECEIVING ENCOURAGING SIGNS
FROM OTHER ALLIES AND HOPED ALL WOULD AGREE IN BRU ON NEED TO DEVEL-
OP WESTERN RESPONSE;AND(D)THAT ON FIVE-POWER PROPOSAL PM TRUDEAU
DID NOT/NOT REALLY HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN HIS PROPOSAL TO
MRS THATCHER DURING LUNCH AND THAT PERHAPS BRIEFING SHE HAD BEEN
PROVIDED BEFOREHAND MAY NOT/NOT HAVE TOTALLY REFLECTED CDN PROPOSAL
WHICH DID NOT/NOT CALL ON UK TO HALT OR LIMIT ITS NUCLEAR MODERNIZA-
TION PROGRAM BUT RATHER TO COME TO TABLE WITHOUT PRECONDITION WHERE
SUPERPOWER REDUCTIONS ^S WOULD BE CALLED FOR AND INITIAL DISCUSSION
COULD FOCUS ON MATTERS SUCH AS CRISIS MANAGEMENT.

4.WE NOTED THAT CDN OFFICIALS WITH DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF PROPOSALS
(CALDER AND HAGEN) HAD RECENTLY BEEN IN WSHDC TO GOOD EFFECT AND
THERE MIGHT BE BENEFIT IN THEM VISITING LDN FOLLOWING DPM/SSEA-HOWE
MTG IF BOTH MINS THOUGHT THIS USEFUL.LORD MORAN EXPRESSED FAVOURABLE
REACTION.

CORRECTED COPY
EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE

CDN EYES ONLY
~~RESERVE AUX CDNS~~

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

CONFIDENTIAL CDN EYES ONLY

CORRECTED COPY

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FM EXTOTT ~~IDDZ0269~~ 09DEC83

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TO BONN PARIS DELIVER BY 120900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/CP BNATO LDN BRU WSHDC

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDR IDA (RCR)

REF BONN 4119 02DEC PARIS 5487 07DEC

---PM INITIATIVE: FRENCH AND GERMAN VIEWS.

WE ARE STRUCK BY THE VERY CAUTIOUS REACTIONS TO THE PMINITIATIVE YOU HAVE HAD FROM QUAI AND WEST GERMANY MFA IN THE WAKE OF THE PM S VISITS TO PARIS AND BONN.OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT OFFICIALS ARE MUCH MORE CAUTIOUS THAN WERE MITTERAND AND KOHL IN THEIR MTGS WITH PM AND IN KOHL S REPLY TO PM S 17NOV LET (OURTEL IDDZ0257 07DEC)

2.FOR EXAMPLE,PARIS TEL 5487 07DEC REPORTS THAT THE FRENCH SHARE OUR ANALYSIS OF THE PREVAILING STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS,BUT THE FRENCH DO NOT/NOT WANT TO SUCCUMB TO A DRAMATIZATION OF THE ACTUAL SITUATION.HOW DOES THIS SQUARE WITH MITTERAND S MID-NOV TELEVISED ADDRESS IN WHICH HE ARGUED THAT CURRENT SITUATION WAS THE WORST CRISIS SINCE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND BERLIN BLOCKADE?WE UNDERSTAND ALSO THAT AT NATO NAC MTG THIS WEEK CHEYSSON DESCRIBED CURRENT EAST-WEST SITUATION AS A STATE OF CRISIS.

3.ON PROPOSAL FOR A 5 NUCLEAR POWER CONFERENCE,NEW YORK TIMES 26 NOV AND,WE UNDERSTAND,LE MONDE SUGGEST THAT MITTERAND AND KOHL MAY HAVE DISCUSSED THE PM S PROPOSAL AT THEIR SUMMIT 25 NOV (IT CERTAINLY SEEMS TO HAVE SURFACED AT THEIR PRESS CONFERENCE).GRATEFUL PARIS

...2

PAGE TWO IDDZ0269 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

AND BONN SEEK CLARIFICATION OF FRENCH AND GERMAIN THINKING ON THIS QUESTION AND, SPECIFICALLY WHETHER IT SURFACED IN MITTERAND/KOHL MTG AND HOW. WE UNDERSTAND FROM BELGIAN AMB HERE THAT MITTERAND MAY HAVE FLOATED AN EXPANDED FIVE POWER IDEA AND THAT FRENCH PRESIDENT MAY HAVE CERTAIN ARMS CONTROLS PROPOSALS UP HIS SLEEVE TO DESEALATE CURRENT SITUATION THAT HE MAY DEPLOY EARLY IN NEW YEAR.

4. FLWG IS TEXT OF RELEVANT PORTION OF NYT ARTICLE:

QUOTE: THE CANADIAN PROPOSAL

MR KOHLS SECURITY ADVISERS HAVE BEEN STUDYING A PROPOSAL BY PRIME MINISTER PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU OF CANADA FOR A CONFERENCE OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS—THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, CHINA, FRANCE AND BRITAIN—TO MOVE FORWARD ON DISARMAMENT, AND THE ADVISERS REACTION HAS BEEN FAVORABLE IN A TOAST THURSDAY, MR KOHL SPOKE OF RESUMING THE SUSPENDED TALKS QUOTE IN GENEVA OR IN ANOTHER PLACE UNQUOTE.

AT THEIR NEWS CONFERENCE TODAY HOWEVER, BOTH MR KOHL AND MR MITTERAND DECLINED TO BE DRAWN INTO A DISCUSSION OF THIS IDEA, AND THE FRENCH PRESIDENT CAUTIONED THAT BONN AND PARIS DID NOT NECESSARILY HAVE IDENTICAL VIEWS. HE SAID THE POSITIONS OF FRANCE AND WEST GERMANY WOULD ULTIMATELY BE QUOTE CONCORDANT AND I HOPE, CONVERGENT UNQUOTE.

SOME OF MR KOHLS AIDES SEE A FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE AS A WAY TO

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PAGE THREE IDDZ0269 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

DEAL WITH THE LONGSTANDING SOVIET DEMAND TO COUNT THE INDEPENDENT
FRENCH AND BRITISH NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER BALANCE.
BUT MR MITTERAND, ACCORDING TO THE FRENCH, IS RELUCTANT TO BE DRAWN
INTO A FIVE-POWER CONFERENCE UNLESS ITS MANDATE IS PRECISELY
DEFINED. UNQUOTE.

CCC/291 100126Z IDDZ0269



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

FILE CIRC DIARY

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TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION	
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SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ CONFIDENTIAL

FM/DE FM EXTOTT RBR0777 09DEC83

TO/À TO MOSCO

INFO INFO LDN PARIS BONN WSHDC ROME HAGUE BRU BNATO PRMNY PEKIN TOKYO

DISTR NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DPP/DGIS PCOOTT/FOWLER

REF DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBD RBRD RBP RBT ZSP ZSI IDD IDDZ IDA IDR

SUBJ/SUJ REF YOURTELS XYGR9907 25NOV XYGR4174 4176 26NOV

---PM INITIATIVE-SOVEMB BRIEFING

SOV MIN-COUNSELLOR NOVIKOV ACCOMPANIED BY FIRST SEC GOUSSAREV CALLED ON RBD AND GARY SMITH OF TASK FORCE ON 7DEC FOR UPDATE ON PM'S INITIATIVE. BRIEFING FOCUSED MAINLY ON VISIT BY PEARSON TO MOSCO.

2. SMITH OPENED DISCUSSION WITH REVIEW OF MOSCO VISIT LARGELY AS PER REFTELS. HE NOTED THAT SOV SIDE HAD BEEN WELL INFORMED ON INITIATIVE, HAD CLEARLY STUDIED PM'S SPEECHES BUT DESPITE APPARENT INTEREST HAD REMAINED NON-COMMITTAL ON BOTH PM'S PROPOSALS AND POSSIBILITY OF TRUDEAU VISIT. CLEAR IMPRESSION GAINED BY EMISSARY WAS THAT SOVS WERE UNABLE TO PROVIDE CLEAR RESPONSE BECAUSE OF (A) HEALTH OF ANDROPOV AND (B) MAJOR REVIEW UNDERWAY ON RELATIONS WITH USA.

3. RBD MADE CLEAR THAT CDN SIDE WAS STILL INTERESTED IN VISIT AND THAT PROBABLE QUOTE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY UNQUOTE WAS OPEN TO MID-JAN AT WHICH TIME HOUSE WILL RESUME SITTING. (NO MENTION WAS MADE OF POSSIBLE VISIT IN LATE JAN. THIS CAN BE RAISED WITH SOVS LATER IF NECESSARY). SOVS WERE TOLD VISIT TO WSHDC WAS IMMINENT AND THAT WE

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RBR 0777 PAGE TWO CONFD

REMAINED HIGHLY OPTIMISTIC EARLY VISIT TO USSR COULD SERVE USEFUL
PURPOSE.

4. IN RESPONSE TO EMB QUESTION WHETHER SOV SIDE HAD DISCUSSED PM'S
FIVE PROPOSALS IN DETAIL, RBD EXPLAINED THAT, IN OUR VIEW THERE HAD
BEEN PERHAPS TOO NARROW ATTENTION FOCUSED ON PROPOSALS PER SE. PM'S
OBJECTIVE IS TO FIND WAYS TO IMPROVE DIALOGUE AND REDUCE TENSIONS. OF
COURSE SPECIFIC IDEAS HAD TO COME FORWARD BUT CDN PROPOSALS WERE NOT
MEANT TO BE COMPREHENSIVE NOR EXCLUSIVE. WHAT WE HAD HOPED TO GAIN
FROM SOV SIDE WAS SOME SENSE OF HOW THEY WOULD RE-ESTABLISH DIALOGUE
WITH USA. IN OUR VIEW, THIS IS MATTER OF GENERAL POLICY WHICH DOES NOT
DEPEND EXCLUSIVELY ON AVAILABILITY OF LEADERSHIP. IN THAT CONTEXT WE
HAD HOPED SOVS COULD HAVE BEEN MORE FORTHCOMING IN DISCUSSIONS WITH
PEARSON.

5. AT THIS POINT GOUSSAREV STEPPED IN WITH COMMENT THAT IF DIALOGUE
WERE TO FOCUS ON BILATERAL QUESTIONS, THERE WOULD BE NO DIFFICULTY.
SOVS HAD BEEN CLEAR IN EXPRESSING DESIRE TO IMPROVE BILATERAL LINKS
BUT EAST-WEST RELATIONS ARE BROADER MATTER AND ARE EXPERIENCING
MUCH DIFFICULTY. IF VISIT WERE BILATERAL ONLY THERE WOULD BE NO PROBLEM
BUT BROAD REASSESSMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS IS NECESSARY DUE TO
CHANGE IN STRATEGIC SITUATION. HE EMPHASIZED SOVS ARE NOT SAYING NO TO
VISIT BY PM BUT TIME IS REQUIRED TO WORK OUT MATTERS GOING BEYOND
BILATERAL INTERESTS. RBD POINTED OUT PM WOULD NOT WISH TO GO TO MOSCO

...PAGE THREE



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PAGE THREE RBR0777 CONFD

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ON BASIS OF BILATERAL AGENDA ONLY; AIM IS FIND WAYS TO IMPROVE EAST-
WEST DIALOGUE. AT SAME TIME, WE ARE NOT TRYING TO TELL SOVS WHAT THEY
SHOULD BE DOING TO IMPROVE DIALOGUE. WHAT WE ARE LOOKING FOR IS SOME
SIGNAL THAT SOVS WOULD WELCOME VISIT BY PM AS PART OF PROCESS TO FIND
WAYS TO REDUCE CRISIS ATMOSPHERE WE ARE NOW FACING. IN OUR VIEW BALL
NOW RESTS IN SOV COURT AND WE AWAIT THEIR RESPONSE.
6. NOT CERTAIN WHAT TO MAKE OF GOSSAREV'S ALLUSION TO BILATERAL VISIT
BEING EASIER TO ORGANIZE THAN ONE COVERING QUOTE BROADER ISSUES
UNQUOTE. IF HE WAS FISHING WE QUICKLY SET RECORD STRAIGHT; THAT PM
WOULD ONLY TRAVEL TO MOSCO IF HE WAS CERTAIN IT WOULD BE IN CONTEXT
OF INITIATIVE AND NOT OTHER MATTERS.



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ: C O N F I D E N T I A L / CDN EYES ONLY - 10 DEC 83 01 26Z 12 10

FM/DE: FM EXTOTT IDDZ0269 09DEC83
TO/À: TO BONN PARIS (BNATO LDN BRU WSHDC)
INFO: INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/PPP
DISTR: DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDR IDA RCR
REF: REF BONN 4119 02DEC PARIS 5487 07DEC
SUBJ/SUJ: ---PM INITIATIVE: FRENCH AND GERMAN VIEWS.

DELIVER BY 120900

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

WE ARE STRUCK BY THE VERY CAUTIOUS REACTIONS TO THE PMS INITIATIVE YOU HAVE HAD FROM QUAI AND WEST GERMANY MFA IN THE WAKE OF THE PM S VISITS TO PARIS AND BONN. OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT OFFICIALS ARE MUCH MORE CAUTIOUS THAN WERE MITTERAND AND KOHL IN THEIR MTGS WITH PM AND IN KOHL S REPLY TO PM S 17NOV LET (OURTEL IDDZ0257 07DEC) 2. FOR EXAMPLE, PARIS TEL 5487 07DEC REPORTS THAT THE FRENCH SHARE OUR ANALYSIS OF THE PREVAILING STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, BUT THE FRENCH DO NOT/NOT WANT TO SUCCUMB TO A DRAMATIZATION OF THE ACTUAL SITUATION. HOW DOES THIS SQUARE WITH MITTERAND S MID-NOV TELEVISED ADDRESS IN WHICH ^H HE ARGUED THAT CURRENT SITUATION WAS THE WORST CRISIS SINCE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND BERLIN BLOCKADE? WE UNDERSTAND ALSO THAT AT NATO NAC MTG THIS WEEK CHEYSSON DESCRIBED CURRENT EAST-WEST SITUATION AS A STATE OF CRISIS. 3. ON PROPOSAL FOR A 5 NUCLEAR POWER CONFERENCE, NEW YORK TIMES 26 NOV AND, WE UNDERSTAND, LE MONDE SUGGEST THAT MITTERAND AND KOHL MAY HAVE DISCUSSED THE PM S PROPOSAL AT THEIR SUMMIT 25 NOV (IT CERTAINLY SEEMS TO HAVE SURFACED AT THEIR PRESS CONFERENCE). GRATEFUL PARIS ...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG  J. McNEE	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG  G. SMITH



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AND BONN SEEK CLARIFICATION OF FRENCH AND GERMAIN THINKING ON THIS
QUESTION AND, SPECIFICALLY WHETHER IT ^{WAS RAISED} ~~SURFACED~~ IN MITTERAND/KOHL
MTG AND HOW. WE UNDERSTAND FROM BELGIAN AMB HERE THAT MITTERAND MAY
HAVE FLOATED AN EXPANDED FIVE POWER IDEA AND THAT FRENCH PRESIDENT
MAY HAVE CERTAIN ARMS CONTROLS PROPOSALS UP HIS SLEEVE TO DESESCA-
LATE CURRENT SITUATION THAT HE MAY DEPLOY EARLY IN NEW YEAR.

4. FLWG IS TEXT OF RELEVANT PORTION OF NYT ARTICLE:

(COMCENTRE PLSE COPY ATTACHED TEXT: QUOTE TO UNQUOTE)

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Last First

CPD 1DDZ RWP 66S SUBJECT/SUJET

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NEW YORK TIMES

PUBLIC JN 1DD JLO ZSI
IDR RBR TIR

DATE NOV 26 1983

Kohl and Mitterrand Respond Calmly

Special to The New York Times

BONN, Nov. 25 — Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President Francois Mitterrand reacted in tones of studied calmness today to the Soviet Union's decision to break off the Geneva talks on medium-range missiles. Both expressed hope that the negotiations would eventually be resumed.

"We call upon the Soviet Union to return to the negotiating table as soon as possible and to make its contribution to a concrete disarmament, to the balance of forces and to stable East-West relations," Mr. Kohl said in a statement made public at a news conference here with the French President.

The statement said the retaliatory measures announced Thursday by the Soviet leader, Yuri V. Andropov, "are not in the interest of the peoples of Europe, neither in the East nor the West."

The Soviet leader's statement included the announcement of plans for new seaborne nuclear missiles aimed at the United States, the possibility of deploying more medium-range SS-20 missiles aimed at Western Europe and accelerated deployment of shorter-range tactical nuclear weapons in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

Asked about Mr. Andropov's steps, Mr. Mitterrand said simply that the Soviet leader's "declaration is new."

He added, "Let us take time so that we can consider it."

East German's Speech Noted

The dispassionate reaction of Mr. Kohl and Mr. Mitterrand, who held two days of talks in the framework of their mutual friendship treaty, reflected a widespread analysis in Paris and Bonn that the Andropov measures were neither unexpected nor harsher than earlier Soviet signals had presaged. Moreover, according to officials in Bonn, neither Mr. Kohl nor Mr. Mitterrand is eager to rush forward now with new negotiating formulas.

Officials here remarked on a strikingly conciliatory speech today by Erich Honecker, the East German Communist Party chief, to a Central Committee gathering in East Berlin. Mr. Honecker said he did not exclude the possibility that "sooner or later there will be positive results in the ne-

gotiations over disarmament, and détente will be pursued."

Mr. Honecker, who faces outspoken opposition from Protestant church groups to the deployment of new Soviet missiles, said the Warsaw Pact deployment "produces no rejoicing." He insisted that East Germany wanted to "limit as much as possible" any damage the missile confrontation would do to relations with West Germany.

The declaration by Mr. Honecker, normally one of Moscow's most faithful allies, was taken here as another indication that the Soviet retaliatory measures were essentially tactical and limited in scope. Putting short-range missiles in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, Atlantic alliance specialists say, has been planned for years and is only now being unveiled, supposedly in retaliation for the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Western Europe.

QUOTE The Canadian Proposal

Mr. Kohl's security advisers have been studying a proposal by Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau of Canada for a conference of five nuclear powers — the United States, the Soviet Union, China, France and Britain — to move forward on disarmament, and the advisers' reaction has been favorable. In a toast Thursday, Mr. Kohl spoke of resuming the suspended talks "in Geneva or in another place."

At their news conference today, however, both Mr. Kohl and Mr. Mitterrand declined to be drawn into a discussion of this idea, and the French President cautioned that Bonn and Paris did not necessarily have identical views. He said the positions of France and West Germany would ultimately be "concordant and, I hope, convergent."

Some of Mr. Kohl's aides see a five-power conference as a way to deal with the longstanding Soviet demand to count the independent French and British nuclear forces in the European theater balance. But Mr. Mitterrand, according to the French, is reluctant to be drawn into a five-power conference unless its mandate is precisely defined.

As a demonstration of continuing French-German military cooperation, Defense Ministers Charles Hernu and

Manfred Wörner signed a protocol today for the joint development of a new antitank helicopter. Some 400 helicopters will be built under joint license.

In his toast Thursday night, Mr. Kohl confronted widespread concern in France about the growth of neutralist sentiment in West Germany, particularly in the opposition Social Democratic Party. The Chancellor said he was aware there was talk in France of "the spirit of Munich" — the appeasement strategy that fed Hitler's ambitions in the 1930's — but he insisted:

"Let me say in all clarity: The Federal Republic stands firmly in the Western alliance. The Germans will not endanger this adherence with unrealistic neutralist dreams."

Responding, Mr. Mitterrand said: "I believe in your loyalty, because all of you Germans, here and elsewhere, have rebuilt your country in affliction, with effort and, above all, with visceral attachment to fundamental values."

The two leaders also discussed preparations for a meeting of European heads of government in Athens Dec. 4-6, but Mr. Kohl acknowledged that only partial moves had been agreed upon for changing the European Community's agricultural subsidy policies and keeping the organization from going bankrupt. In veiled language, Mr. Mitterrand voiced France's continuing worries about how the eventual inclusion of Spain and Portugal would affect the Common Market.

UNQUOTE



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

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FM/DE
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TO BONN

INFO WSHDC PARIS LDN MOSCO BNATO PEKIN TOKYO ROME HAGUE BRU PRMNY

VMBFR OSLO COPEN MDRID BUCST WSAW PRGUE BPEST PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR DMF IFB RCR RSR IDR IDA

---PM INITIATIVE

HELMUT SCHMIDT IS REPORTED BY GLOBE AND MAIL TO HAVE ENDORSED PM
INITIATIVE, AND FIVE NUCLEAR POWER CONFERENCE IN PARTICULAR, IN PU-
BLIC SPEECH AND NEWS CONFERENCE 08DEC IN TORONTO

(COMCENTRE PLS COPY ATTACHED TEXT: QUOTE TO UNQUOTE)

*28-6-1-1 Hudson
Mission*

121

10

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. McNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

G. SMITH

Schmidt backs PM in plan for peace

By MICHAEL McDOWELL
Globe and Mail Reporter

QUOTE

TORONTO — Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's proposal for a conference of the world's five nuclear powers has been given a ringing endorsement by former West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt.

"Not only do I agree to that proposal of your Prime Minister, but also I have assisted it in speaking to my own Parliament at home," Mr. Schmidt told a news conference in Toronto yesterday. "I think that this is a good initiative and should be followed up by others."

Earlier yesterday, Mr. Schmidt made a plea for renewed detente between the Soviet Union and the United States. If the two superpowers cannot or will not communicate with each other, he said, smaller countries such as Canada have a duty to promote a dialogue to ensure peace in the world.

"It's a wrong idea that the leadership can only come from the Americans . . . (although) most of the leadership, in the end, will have to come from them," he told more than 800 people who paid up to \$100 a plate for the luncheon address at the Sheraton Centre.

Turning to Mr. Trudeau's conference proposal, Mr. Schmidt empha-

sized that although two of the five nuclear powers (France and China) did not sign the non-proliferation treaty, it was "not necessary to be a member of any club in order to get together for limitation of nuclear arms and (for) diminishing nuclear arms."

Neither Moscow nor Washington had made an "utmost effort" to negotiate seriously in the current weapons negotiations, he added.

Mr. Schmidt said that during the past few years detente has become a dirty word for some people, but that it was still absolutely vital for global security.

The United States has a woeful ignorance of Russian history which is essential to understanding the Soviet attitude to peace and defence, he said, because they ignore Russia's centuries-old preoccupation with defending its borders.

Soviet foreign policy, he noted, is 75 per cent the product of Russian historical experience and only 25 per cent attributable to Communist thinking. Therefore, the Soviets should not be treated as "once and forever our foe and enemy."

Mr. Schmidt, 64, the chancellor of West Germany from 1974-82, ridiculed the idea of using "economic warfare" against the Soviets, because they would never allow themselves to be defeated economically, but would "just suffer ore."

But the Soviets are afraid of the United States, China and West Germany, he added. "We have to get back to the 15-year-old idea of stretching out our hand to them . . . (because) the Russians are full of suspicion and fear" and have a complex about their own security.

Mr. Schmidt said the Soviets must be treated as a "partner" if a stable peace is to be achieved. Equally important is "the necessity for silent, confidential talks and diplomacy with the other side — with as little television as possible," he added.

Under President Yuri Andropov, the military influence on the Soviet leadership has never been greater, Mr. Schmidt said. "That does not necessarily mean they have become aggressive, but it does mean that they will not let down their defences. They think it's necessary for their security."

VNOV

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file

TO/À RCR RSR
FROM/DE IDDZ

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE
SUBJECT •
SUJET

PM Initiative:
Letters to NATO Heads of Government

*28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission*

Security/Sécurité
RESTRICTED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
December 9, 1983
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0266

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

Attached are copies of the PM's November 17 letters to NATO Heads of Government for countries in your geographical area.

2. These are provided so that you might inform embassies in Ottawa, if you wish.
3. We have already sent you most of these letters; this is to ensure that you have a complete set.

J. McNee
Task Force Working Group

IDDZ/J.McNee/996-5912/cf

TO/À FILE

FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Washington Visit - Meeting December 8.
SUJET

28.6.1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	December 9, 1983.
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0265

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

1. Timing and Programme

A one hour (11-12) meeting is satisfactory provided that both Reagan and the PM emerge to meet the press briefly together, as was the case the last time the PM visited the White House for a pre-Williamsburg working visit. The Canadian press will expect this.

If Shultz were to offer lunch the PM would be agreeable. (Smith to advise Washington).

Bush has invited the PM to a private dinner on the 14 or 15, preferably the 15th. (Fowler to follow-up).

2. Announcement - to have been simultaneously at 11:00, December 8.

3. Fowler reported that the PM:

- (a) wants DPM/SSEA to raise with Shultz the possibility that he (PM) might mention the possibility of a review of NATO strategy to Reagan
- (b) agrees to a personal letter to Carrington proposing that he consider a review of NATO in the 1980's
- (c) does not want DPM/SSEA to tell Shultz that what we are being offered is inadequate.

4. Objectives and Scenario

Broadly, the approach will be:

- (1) to establish common ground
- (2) to explain the initiative and why the PM has undertaken it
- (3) what are the Americans' plans? (e.g. for START and INF) and to outline the PM's future direction.

On (g) Carrington, in addition to a letter from the PM to Carrington, the (a) DPM/SSEA to tell Shultz that he will be mentioning this to Carrington next week in London

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

(b) DPM/SSEA to try the idea on Carrington
13 December in London

(c) PM may raise this with Reagan.

The proposal would be for Carrington to look at NATO in general; he might bring such a report to the next NATO meeting in the spring.

On (h) principles, the PM might mention a couple of principles in Washington e.g. neither side is aiming for superiority or no one can win a nuclear war.

5. Briefing Book

To include the following briefs:

- (a) objectives - IDDZ
- (b) scenario - IDDZ
- (c) Shultz role and influence - URR
- (d) McFarlane biography - URR
- (e) overview of bilateral issues - URR

6. Media

The aim is US network coverage; the statements by Reagan and P.M. are the way to achieve this. "Good Morning America" is confirmed for Monday 16th from NYC. Mr. Gotlieb would give the press briefing after the P.M. departs.

7. UN Visit

Postponed until January.

8. Delegation

The meeting is to be 4 to 4 (and Bush). That is, PM, Gotlieb, Fowler, plus one from External or Task Force.

There is space for 3 on the Challenger going down, but only 2 coming back.

9. PM's Speech, December 13

Axworthy advises that 1/3 to 1/2 (5 pgs) will deal with peace. PMO/Jim Moore is drafting this. (Archdeacon to follow-up).

10. Speech III Outline - 19-20 January in NYC? Embassy to be asked to think of venue. RGD (Hancock) and CPD (Heinbecker) to work on outline.

000157



A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "F. L. G.", is written over the right side of the coat of arms.

WITH THE COMPLIMENTS
OF THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

AVEC LES HOMMAGES
DU
MINISTÈRE
DES
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

December 12, 1983

IDDZ/Mr. Delyoie

Louis,

We had this typed-up on Friday for circulation and in order to have "hand out" copies ready for public use.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Brian H.", is written above the name Brian Herman.

Brian Herman

000158

Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada December 9, 1983

DECLARATION OF BRUSSELS

28-6-1 = Trudeau
Peace
Mission

We, the representatives of the sixteen member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, reaffirm the dedication of the Allies to the maintenance of peace in freedom.

Our Alliance threatens no one. None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack. We do not aspire to superiority, neither will we accept that others should be superior to us. Our legitimate security interests can only be guaranteed through the firm linkage between Europe and North America. We call upon the Soviet Union to respect our legitimate security interests as we respect theirs.

We are determined to ensure security on the basis of a balance of forces at the lowest possible level. Faced with the threat posed by the Soviet SS-20 missiles, the Allies concerned are going forward with the implementation of the double-track decision of 1979. The ultimate goal remains that there should be neither Soviet nor United States land based long-range INF missiles. The deployment of USA missiles can be halted or reversed by concrete results at the negotiating table. In this spirit we wish to see an early resumption of the INF negotiations which the Soviet Union has discontinued. (1)

We urge the countries of the Warsaw Pact to seize the opportunities we offer for a balanced and constructive relationship and for genuine detente. In all arms control negotiations progress must be made among the states participating, in particular in:

- the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START);
- the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks (INF);
- the Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR);
- the endeavours for a complete ban on chemical weapons in the Committee on Disarmament.

(1) Denmark and Greece reserve their positions on this paragraph; Spain, not having been a party to the double-track decision of 1979, reserves its position on this paragraph.

- 2 -

We are also resolved to use the forthcoming Stockholm Conference as a new opportunity to broaden the dialogue with the East, to negotiate confidence building measures and enhance stability and security in the whole of Europe.

We shall continue to do our utmost to sustain a safe and peaceful future. We extend to the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact countries the offer to work together with us to bring about a long-term constructive and realistic relationship based on equilibrium, moderation and reciprocity. For the benefit of mankind, we advocate an open comprehensive political dialogue, as well as co-operation based on mutual advantage.

Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada le 9 décembre 1983

Déclaration de Bruxelles

Nous, représentants des seize pays membres de l'Alliance atlantique réaffirmons l'attachement des Alliés au maintien de la paix dans la liberté.

Notre Alliance ne menace personne. Aucune des nos armes ne sera jamais utilisée autrement que pour répondre à une agression. Nous n'aspérons pas nous-mêmes à la supériorité mais ne tolérons pas non plus la supériorité des autres. Nos intérêts légitimes en matière de sécurité ne peuvent être garantis que par le ferme lien qui unit l'Europe et l'Amérique du nord. Nous appelons l'Union soviétique à respecter nos intérêts légitimes en matière de sécurité comme nous respectons les siens.

Nous sommes déterminés à assurer la sécurité sur la base d'un équilibre des forces au niveau le plus bas possible. Confrontés à la menace des missiles soviétiques SS-20, les Alliés concernés mettent actuellement en oeuvre la double décision de 1979. L'objectif ultime demeure qu'il n'y ait aucun missile des FNI à longue portée basé à terre. Ni soviétique ni américain. Le processus de déploiement de missiles américains peut être arrêté ou inversé selon les résultats concrets obtenus à la table de négociation. Dans cet esprit, nous souhaitons voir reprendre rapidement les négociations sur les FNI que l'Union soviétique a interrompues. (1)

Nous invitons instamment les pays du Pacte de Varsovie à saisir les occasions que nous leur offrons d'établir des relations équilibrées et constructives et une détente véritable. Des progrès doivent être réalisés, entre les participants, dans toutes les négociations sur la maîtrise des armements, en particulier:

- aux Conversations sur la Réduction des Armements stratégiques (START);
- aux Conversations sur les Forces nucléaires à portée intermédiaire (FNI);
- aux Négociations sur les Réductions mutuelles et équilibrées de Forces (MBFR);
- dans la recherche d'une interdiction complète des armes chimiques au Comité du Désarmement.

(1) Le Danemark et la Grèce réservent l'un et l'autre leur position sur ce paragraphe; l'Espagne, qui n'a pas été partie à la double décision de 1979; réserve sa position sur ce paragraphe.

- 2 -

Nous sommes également résolus à mettre à profit les possibilités nouvelles qu'offre la conférence qui doit s'ouvrir prochainement à Stockholm pour élargir le dialogue avec l'Est, négocier des mesures de confiance et renforcer la sécurité et la stabilité dans l'ensemble de l'Europe.

Nous continuerons à faire tout ce qui est en notre pouvoir pour poser les bases d'un avenir sûr et pacifique. Nous offrons à l'Union soviétique et aux autres pays du Pacte de Varsovie d'oeuvrer avec nous à l'établissement de relations réalistes et constructives à long terme qui reposent sur l'équilibre, la modération et la réciprocité. Pour le bien de l'humanité toute entière, nous sommes partisans d'un dialogue politique large et ouvert, ainsi que d'une coopération fondée sur l'intérêt mutuel.

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

de Calder
I -> there anything
we can send to Tokyo
re Nakasone's reserve
in power?
9/12/83
Smith

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FM TOKYO UIGR3064 09DEC83

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ DELIVER BY 090900

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---PM INITIATIVE:JPNSE REACTION

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28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission	

DURING VISIT OF PGB,JPNSE OFFICIALS DREW TO OUR ATTN COMMENTS BY PM NAKASONE IN DIET ON PM TRUDEAUS PEACE INITIATIVE.COMING IMMED BEFORE DISSOLUTION FOR LOWER HOUSE ELECTION,COMMENTS WERE NOT/NOT PICKED UP BY JPNSE PRESS.UNLIKE HANSARD,DIET PROCEEDINGS ESPECIALLY OF UPPER HOUSE CTTEES,ARE NOT/NOT CIRCULATED PUBLICLY FOR SEVERAL DAYS,SO WE DID NOT/NOT RECEIVE FULL TEXT OF NAKASONES REMARKS UNTIL MID-WEEK.FOLLOWING IS OFFICE TRANSLATION OF RELEVANT PASSAGES FROM RECORD OF AD HOC CTTEE ON ADMIN REFORM,HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS: QUOTE EXCERPTS FROM MINUTES OF HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS AD HOC CTTEE ON ADMIN REFORM;100TH DIET;

1.MONDAY,NOVEMBER 21,1983:PRIME MINISTER YASUHIRO NAKASONE(IN RFLY TO OSAMU YATABE,JPN SOCIALIST PARTY)...ON SAT(20NOV)I WAS PAID A VISIT BY CDN PM PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU.HE SAID HE WAS ON HIS WAY TO INDIA,WHERE HE WAS SCHEDULED TO DISCUSS DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES WITH THE HEADS OF THE COMMONWEALTH NATIONS. IN OUR MTGS,I ASKED HIM ABOUT HIS VIEWS(ON DISARMAMENT AND WAYS TO PROMOTE WORLD PEACE).THE CDN PM IS VERY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT PROMOTING

...2

PAGE TWO UIGR3064 UNCLAS

TALKS ON NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION. PM TRUDEAU AND I ARE IN AGMT THAT IN LIGHT OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, THE NUCLEAR SUPER-POWER AND OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS SHOULD EXERCISE GREATER MODERATION, THAT THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND OTHER THIRD POWERS SHOULD BE GIVEN ASSISTANCE IN THE PEACEFUL APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, AND THAT WE SHOULD PRESS MORE VIGOROUSLY FOR FULFILLMENT OF THAT COMMITMENT. PM TRUDEAU WAS GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY THE OUTCOME OF OUR MTG.

2. TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1983: PM YASUHIRO NAKASONE (IN REPLY TO KOICHIRO UEDA, JPN COMMUNIST PARTY): ... ON SAT, I WAS VISITED BY CDN PM PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU. WE TALKED FOR AN HOUR AND 40 MINUTES ON WAYS TO DO AWAY WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PREVENT WAR FROM OCCURRING. PM TRUDEAU AND I SHARED THE VIEW THAT, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF BANISHING NUCLEAR ARMS AND PREVENTING WAR WOULD BE UNATTAINABLE UNLESS THE 5 NUCLEAR POWERS—THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, BRITAIN, FRANCE AND CHINA—COULD BE BROUGHT TOGETHER TO SIT DOWN AT THE SAME TABLE AND TALK SENSIBLY ABOUT COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO TOTALLY BANNING OR REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ON THIS POINT, WE AGREED THAT A FORUM SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED WHERE THE 5 NUCLEAR POWERS CAN DISCUSS THIS QUESTION. HOWEVER, AS TO WHETHER THIS CAN ACTUALLY BE DONE AT ONCE, IT WILL BE NO/NO EASY MATTER TO CARRY OUT. UNLESS THE ISSUE BEING NEGOTIATED BETWEEN AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION INVOLVING THE PERSHING II AND SS-20

...3

PAGE THREE UIGR3064 UNCLAS

MISSILES IS SETTLED TO SOME EXTENT, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO MOVE FORWARD.

PARA THEREFORE, IN ORDER TO GET THE 5 NUCLEAR POWERS TO SIT DOWN AT THE SAME TABLE, IT IS NECESSARY FOR US, AS CALLED FOR IN THE TOKYO STATEMENT, WHICH WAS ISSUED BY WEST GERMAN CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL AND MYSELF, TO WORK HARD FROM THE SIDELINES TO BRING THE INF (INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCES) TALKS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. THE TOKYO STATEMENT CALLED FOR PERSISTENCE IN OUR EFFORTS TO THAT END. WHEN I ASKED PM TRUDEAU FOR HIS SUPPORT FOR THE TOKYO STATEMENT, HE SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO TAKE PART AND GIVE HIS SUPPORT. SO, PLEASE UNDERSTAND THAT CAN AND JPN ARE MAKING TANGIBLE AND REALISTIC EFFORTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS TO RID THE WORLD OF NUCLEAR WAR, DO AWAY WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND CARRY OUT DISARMAMENT.

3. SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1983:

NORITAKE WADA (KOMEITO): I UNDERSTAND THAT CAN PM TRUDEAU CAME TO JPN FOR THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF MTG YOU LAST SAT AND THAT AT THAT MTG HE EXPLAINED HIS 4-POINT DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL INCLUDING A CALL FOR CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION BY THE 5 MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS. I THINK THAT THE LINE OF THINKING THAT A POLITICAL DIALOGUE NEEDS TO BE STEPPED UP IN THE INTEREST OF EASING INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS IS VERY TIMELY. I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER, IN ADDITION TO TALKING FRANKLY TO US PRES RONALD REAGAN ON VARIOUS ISSUES, YOU INTEND AT THIS JUNCTURE.

...4

PAGE FOUR UIGR3064 UNCLAS

GIVEN THE PREVAILING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, TO ISSUE SOME SORT OF CALL FOR SAY, ARMS REDUCTION SIMILAR TO THE ONE PM TRUDEAU IS WORKING.

PARA PM YASUHIRO NAKASONE: I TOLD PM TRUDEAU THAT INTERNATIONAL RELNS HAVE BECOME GREATLY STRAINED, AS REVEALED IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS LIKE, FOR INSTANCE, THE SHOOTING DOWN OF THE KAL AIRLINER, THE BOMB ATTACK IN RANGOON AGAINST SOUTH KOREAN LEADING FIGURES, OR THE RECENT FIGHTING BETWEEN RIVAL FACTIONS OF THE PLO IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I TOLD PM TRUDEAU THAT I ADMIRER HIM FOR ACTING, OUT OF CONCERN FOR THE DEADLOCK IN INTERNATIONAL RELNS, TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN CREATING A MOOD WHICH WOULD HELP TO BREAK THIS STALEMATE IN INTERNATIONAL RELNS AND THAT WE ALSO FEEL THE NECESSITY OF RESOLVING THE STALEMATE. I ALSO SAID THAT I HAD A VERY HIGH REGARD FOR THE INITIATIVE HE DISPLAYED IN VISITING COUNTRIES IN W EUROPE TO PRESENT SPECIFIC PROPOSALS (TO HALT THE ARMS RACE) AND IN COMING ALL THE WAY TO JPN WITH HIS MESSAGE.

PARA AMONG THE NUMBER OF PROPOSALS HE PRESENTED, HE STRONGLY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING THE 5 NUCLEAR POWERS TO SIT DOWN TOGETHER AT THE SAME TABLE TO DISCUSS THIS QUESTION (OF REDUCING NUCLEAR ARMS) AND ASKED ME TO ALIGN MYSELF WITH HIM, TO WHICH I TOLD HIM I WAS, IN PRINCIPLE, IN FAVOUR OF HIS PROPOSALS. HOWEVER I EXPLAINED THAT BOTH CHINA AND FRANCE ARE STILL NOT/NOT

...5

PAGE FIVE UIGR3064 UNCLAS

YET PARTIES TO THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND THE NUCLEAR POWERS ALL DIFFER IN THE POSITIONS THEY ARE TAKING TOWARD THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE. I SAID THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WOULD BE EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT TO BRING THE 5 NUCLEAR POWERS TO THE SAME NEGOTIATING TABLE WHILE THE INF TALKS STILL REMAINED UNSETTLED. I POINTED OUT THAT, FOR MY PART, I ALSO BELIEVE IT WILL BE NECESSARY IN THE END TO GET THE 5 NUCLEAR POWERS TO SIT DOWN TOGETHER TO SERIOUSLY DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DRAW UP A SPECIFIC PLAN FOR NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION AND I ADDED THAT ULTIMATELY THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION COULD NOT/NOT BE EXPECTED TO BE COMPLETELY RESOLVED IF THIS STEP WAS NOT/NOT SUCCESSFULLY TAKEN. I SAID THAT IN ORDER TO MOVE FORWARD IN THAT DIRECTION, IT IS FIRST IMPERATIVELY NECESSARY TO CLEAR AWAY THE INF ISSUE, OTHERWISE THE OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHING A FORUM FOR DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION BY THE 5 MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS CAN NEVER BE ATTAINED. IN THAT CONTEXT, I PLEDGED TO DO ALL I CAN TO HELP RESOLVE THE INF AND START ISSUES. BUT, FOR ALL THIS, I TOLD PM TRUDEAU THAT I UNDERSTOOD VERY WELL WHAT HE WAS SAYING.

PARA ANOTHER IMPORTANT POINT WHICH WE DISCUSSED AND WHICH WAS RAISED BY ME CONCERNS THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY UNDER WHICH JPN HAS RATIFIED, THE NUCLEAR POWERS ARE REQUIRED TO REFRAIN FROM PROVIDING NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TO
...6

PAGE SIX UIGR3064 UNCLAS

EXTEND POSITIVE ASSISTANCE TO NON-NUCLEAR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN CONJUNCTION WITH PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY. JPN SIGNED AND HAS SINCE RATIFIED THE TREATY IN THE EXPECTATION THAT THE NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD FAITHFULLY OBSERVE THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY, BUT THE NUCLEAR POWERS HAVE NOT/NOT DONE ENOUGH TO RESTRAIN THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. I THINK THE NUCLEAR POWERS SHOULD TAKE BOLDER STEPS TO EXTEND ASSISTANCE ASSISTANCE TO THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND OTHER COUNTRIES (IN THE THIRD WORLD). IT IS INADMISSIBLE FOR COUNTRIES PURSUING PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY TO BE OVER-SUBJECTED TO RESTRAINTS (IN PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY). JPN IS ONE OF THE AFFECTED COUNTRIES. IN THAT SENSE, I PROPOSED TO PM TRUDEAU THAT WE SHOULD ADDRESS THIS ISSUE TOGETHER IN RELATION TO THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

PARA IN RESPONSE, PM TRUDEAU SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD VERY WELL WHY I SHOULD WANT TO SPEAK OUT IN SPECIFIC TERMS ON THE BASIS OF SUCH GROUNDS AND THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS A VERY GOOD IDEA.

PARA I THEN SAID THAT IF SO, I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF HE WOULD TELL THE LEADERS OF THE 30 COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS, WHO WERE GOING TO MEET IN A SUMMIT CONFERENCE TO BE HELD IN NEW DELHI WHICH HE WAS TO ATTEND, THAT QUOTE THIS IS WHAT NAKASONE IS SAYING IN TOKYO UNQUOTE SO THAT THIS COULD STRIKE A RESPONSIVE CHORD WITH THE PEOPLE OF THE COMMONWEALTH. I ALSO ASKED HIM TO TELL THEM THAT HE SUPPORTS IN PRINCIPLE PM TRUDEAU'S IDEAS.

UUU/195 090846Z UIGR3064

External Affairs / Affaires extérieures
Canada / Canada

ACTION
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MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

W 02009/09

1/11

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

TOP/TOD
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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ
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CANADIAN EMBASSY

WASHINGTON

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28-6-1-Tudreau

Peace Mission

M/DE FM WSHDC POL547 091283 (FACSIMILE)

O/A TO EXTOTT IDDE URR

NFO

HSTR

ICF REF BRU TEL ZVGR0580 09DEC83

SUBJ/SUJ ---MACEACHEN/SHULTZ BILATERAL: PMS VISIT TO WSHDC

ATTACHED IS TEXT OF REAGANS JPN SPEECH AS REQUESTED

PARA 9 REFTL.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

J.K.B. Kinsman/dt

SIG

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

J.K.B. Kinsman

SIG *[Signature]* 14

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2/11

THE WHITE HOUSE

**Office of the Press Secretary
(Tokyo, Japan)**

For Immediate Release

**ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE NATIONAL DIET**

**The National Diet Building
The Assembly Hall of the House of Representatives
Tokyo, Japan**

November 11, 1953	
RETURN TO REMOVED AU	POUR - ETRE PORTE AU DOSSIER
ACC 329428	REF DATE
DOSSIER	
70-TPN-1-3-080	

9:35 A.M. JST

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, distinguished members of the Diet, it is with great honor and respect that I come before you today, the first American President ever to address the Japanese Diet.

I have been in your country only two days. But speaking for my wife, Nancy, and myself, may I say you have more than made us feel at home. The warmth of your welcome has touched our hearts. In welcoming us, you pay tribute to the more than 230 million Americans whom I have the privilege to represent. From all of us -- all of them to you we reach out to say: The bonds of friendship which unite us are even greater than the ocean which divides us. (Applause.)

It was a dozen years ago on an autumn day like this one that I first visited Japan and today, as then, I feel energy, initiative and industry surging through your country in a mighty current for progress. And just as before, I am struck by a unique gift of the Japanese people: You do not build your future at the expense of the grace and beauty of your past.

Harmony is a treasured hallmark of Japanese civilization and this has always been pleasing to Americans. Harmony requires differences to be joined in pursuit of higher ideals, many of which we share. When former President Ulysses S. Grant visited here in 1878, he discovered Japan is a land of enchantment.

During his stay, he met with the Emperor and their discussion turned to democracy, the pressing issue of the day. President Grant observed that governments are always more stable and nations more prosperous when they truly represent their people.

I am proud to help carry forward the century-old tradition, meeting first with your Emperor on my arrival and now meeting with you a great milestone in your history: The 100th session of the Diet under the modern Japanese Constitution.

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In six years you will celebrate your 100th anniversary of representative government in Japan, just as we will celebrate the birth of our own Congress. I bring you best wishes and heartfelt greetings from your American counterparts, the Congress of the United States. (Applause.)

One cannot stand in this chamber without feeling a part of your proud history of nationhood and democracy, the spirit of hope carrying the dreams of your free people. Of all the strengths we possess, of all the ties that bind us, I believe the greatest is our dedication to freedom. Japan and America stand at the forefront of the free nations and free economies in the world.

Yes, we are 5,000 miles apart; yes, we are distinctly different in customs, language and tradition; and yes, we are often competitors in the world markets. But I believe the people represented by this proud Parliament and by my own United States Congress are of one heart in their devotion to the principles of our free societies.

I am talking about principles that begin with the sacred worth of human life; the cherished place of the family; the responsibility of parents and schools to be teachers of truth, tolerance, hard work, cooperation and love; and the role of our major institutions -- government, industry and labor -- to provide the opportunities and security -- opportunities and security free people need to build and leave behind a better world for their children and their children's children.

America and Japan are situated far apart, but we are united in our belief that freedom means dedication to the dignity, rights and equality of man. Yukichi Fukuzawa, the great Meiji-era educator, said it for you: "Heaven has made no man higher or no man lower than any other man."

Our great American hero Abraham Lincoln put it in political perspective for us: "No man is good enough to govern another man without that other's consent."

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We both value the right to have a government of our own choosing. We expect government to serve the people. We do not expect the people to serve government.

America and Japan speak with different tongues, but both converse, worship, and work with the language of freedom. We defend the right to voice our views, to speak words of dissent without being afraid, and to seek inner peace through communion with our God.

We believe in rewarding initiative, savings and risk-taking. And we encourage those who set their sights on the farthest stars, and chart new paths to progress through the winds and waters of commerce. Others censor and stifle their citizens. We trust in freedom to nurture the diversity and creativity that enriches us all. I like what your poet Basho said: "Many kinds of plants and each one triumphant in its special blossoms." (Applause.)

Finally, our freedom inspires no fear because it poses no threat. We intimidate no one. And we will not be intimidated by anyone. The United States and Japan do not build walls to keep our people in; we do not have armies of secret police to keep them quiet; we do not throw dissidents into so-called mental hospitals; and we would never cold-bloodedly shoot a defenseless airliner out of the sky. (Applause.) We share your grief for that tragic and needless loss of innocent lives.

Our two countries are far from perfect. But in this imperfect and dangerous world, the United States and Japan represent the deepest aspirations of men and women everywhere -- to be free, to live in peace, and to create and renew the wealth of abundance and spiritual fulfillment. I have come to Japan because we have an historic opportunity, indeed, an historic responsibility. We can become a powerful partnership for good, not just in our own countries, not just in the Pacific region, but throughout the world. (Applause.) Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, my question is: Do we have the determination

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to meet the challenge of partnership and make it happen. My answer is without hesitation. yes we do and yes we will.

For much of our histories our countries looked inward. Well, those times have passed. With our combined economies accounting for half the output of the free world, we cannot escape our global responsibilities. Our industries depend on the importation of energy and minerals from distant lands. Our prosperity requires a sound international financial system and free and open trading markets. And our security is inseparable from the security of our friends and neighbors.

The simple hope for world peace and prosperity will not be enough. Our two great nations, working with others, must preserve the values and freedoms our societies have struggled so hard to achieve. Nor should our partnership for peace, prosperity and freedom be considered a quest for competing goals. We cannot prosper unless we are secure and we cannot be secure unless we are free. And we will not succeed in any of these endeavors unless Japan and America work in harmony.

I have come to your country carrying the heartfelt desires of America for peace. I know our desires are shared by Prime Minister Nakasone and all of Japan. We are people of peace. We understand the terrible trauma of human suffering. I have lived through four wars in my lifetime. So I speak not just as President of the United States, but also as a husband, a father, and a grand father. (Applause.) I believe there can be only one policy for preserving our precious civilization in this modern age. A nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought. (Applause.)

The only value in possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they can't be used ever. I know I speak for people everywhere when I say, our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the earth. (Applause.)

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Arms control must mean arms reductions. America is doing its part. As I pledged to the United Nations less than two months ago, the United States will accept any equitable, verifiable agreement that stabilizes forces at lower levels than currently exist. We want significant reductions. And we're willing to compromise.

In the strategic arms reduction talks, American negotiators continue to press the Soviet Union for any formula that will achieve these objectives. In the longer-range INF talks, we are pursuing the same course, even offering to eliminate an entire category of weapons. I'm very conscious of our negotiating responsibility on issues that concern the safety and well-being of the Japanese people. And let me make one thing very plain. We must not and we will not accept any agreement that transfers the threat of longer-range nuclear missiles from Europe to Asia. (Applause.)

Our great frustration has been the other side's unwillingness to negotiate in good faith. We wanted to cut deep into nuclear arsenals, and still do. But they're blocking the dramatic reductions the world wants. In our good faith effort to move the negotiations forward, we have offered new initiatives, provided for substantial reductions to equal levels, and the lower the level the better. But we shall wait. We still wait for the first positive response.

Despite this bleak picture, I will not be deterred in my search for a breakthrough. The United States will never walk away from the negotiating table. Peace is too important. Common sense demands that we persevere. And we will persevere. We live in uncertain times. (Applause.) There are trials and tests for freedom wherever freedom stands. It is as stark as the tragedy over the Sea of Japan where 269 innocent people were killed for the so-called cause of "sacred airspace." It is as real as the terrorist attacks last month -- the Republic of Korea's leadership in Rangoon -- and against American and French members of the international peacekeeping force in Beirut.

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And yes, it is as telling as the stonewalling of our adversaries at the negotiating table, and as their crude attempts to intimidate freedom-loving people everywhere.

These threats to peace and freedom underscore the importance of closer cooperation among all nations. You have an old proverb that says, "A single arrow is easily broken, but not three in a bunch." (Applause.) The stronger the dedication of Japan, the United States and our allies to peace through strength, the greater our contributions to building a more secure future will be. The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security must continue to serve us as the bedrock of our security relationship. Japan will not have to bear the burden of defending freedom alone. America is your partner. We will bear that burden together. (Applause.)

The defense of freedom should be a shared burden. We can afford to defend freedom; we cannot afford to lose it. The blessings of your economic miracle, created with the genius of a talented, determined and dynamic people, can only be protected in the safe harbor of freedom.

In his book, In Quest of Peace and Freedom, former Prime Minister Sato wrote: "In the hundred years since the Meiji Restoration, Japan has constantly endeavored to catch up and eventually overtake the more advanced countries of the world." I don't think I'll be making headlines when I say, you've not only caught up, in some cases, you've pulled ahead. Here again, our partnership is crucial. But this time, you can be teachers. To all those who lack faith in the human spirit, I have just three words of advice: Come to Japan. (Applause.)

Come to a country whose economic production will soon surpass the Soviet Union's, making Japan's economy the second largest in the entire world. Come to learn from a culture that instills in its people a strong spirit of cooperation, discipline, and striving for excellence; and yes, learn from government policies which helped ~~create this economic miracle -- not so much by central planning, as~~ by stimulating competition, encouraging initiative, and rewarding savings and risktaking.

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Our country has made great strides in this direction during the last 3 years. We are correcting past mistakes. Hope is being reborn. Confidence is returning. America's future looks bright again. We have turned the corner from overtaxing--(applause) -- turned the corner from overtaxing, overspending, record interest rates, high inflation and low growth. The United States is beginning the first stage of a new industrial renaissance, and we're helping pull other nations forward to worldwide recovery.

But some in my country still flinch from the need to restrain spending. Under the guise of lowering deficits, they would turn back to policies of higher taxes. They would ignore the lesson of Japan. A look at Japan's postwar history yields two stunning conclusions: Among the major industrialized countries, your tax burden has remained the lowest and your growth and savings rates the highest. (Applause.) Savers in Japan can exempt very large amounts of interest income from taxation; your taxes on so-called unearned income -- (laughter) -- are low; you have no capital gains tax on securities for investors; and the overwhelming majority of your working people face tax rates dramatically lower than in the other industrial countries, including my own. (Applause.) And incentives for everyone -- that's the secret of strong growth for a shining future filled with hope and opportunities and incentives for growth, not tax increases, is our policy for America. Sometimes I wonder if we shouldn't further our friendship by my sending our Congress here and you coming over and occupying our Capitol building for a while. (Applause.)

Partnership must be a two-way street grounded in mutual trust. Let us always be willing to learn from each other and cooperate together. We have every reason to do so. Our combined economies account for almost 35 percent of the world's entire economic output. We are the world's two largest overseas trading partners. Last year, Japan took about 10 percent of our total exports and we bought some 25 percent of yours. Our two-way trade will exceed \$60 billion in 1983, more than double the level of just 7 years ago.

The Williamsburg Summit last May, the leaders of our industrial democracies pledged

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cooperate in rolling back protectionism. My personal commitment to that goal is based on economic principles, old-fashioned common sense and experience. I am old enough to remember what eventually happened the last time countries protected their markets from competition: It was a nightmare called "the Great Depression." And it was world wide. World trade fell at that time by 60 per cent. And everyone, workers, farmers and manufacturers were hurt.

Let us have the wisdom never to repeat that policy. (Applause.) We're in the same boat with our trading partners around the globe. And if one partner in the boat shoots a hole in the boat, it doesn't make much sense for the other partner to shoot another hole in the boat. Some say, yes, and call that getting tough. Well, forgive me, but I call it getting wet all over. (Applause.) Rather than shoot holes, let us work together to plug them up so our boat of free markets and free trade and fair trade can lead us all to greater economic growth and international stability. (Applause.)

I have vigorously opposed quick fixes of protectionism in America. Anti-competitive legislation like the local content rule, which would force our domestic manufacturers of cars to use a rising share of U.S. labor and parts. Now, this would be a cruel hoax -- (applause) -- raising -- It would be raising prices without protecting jobs. We would buy less from you. You would buy less from us. The world's economic pie would shrink. Retaliation and recrimination would increase.

It is not easy for elected officials to balance the concerns of constituents with the greater interests of the nation. But that's what our jobs are all about. And we need your help in demonstrating free trade to address concerns of my own people. Americans believe your markets are less open than ours. We need your support to lower further the barriers that still make it difficult for some American products to enter your markets easily. Your government's recent series of actions to reduce trade barriers are positive steps in this direction. We very much hope this process will continue and accelerate. In turn, I pledge my support to combat protectionist measures in my own country.

If we each give a little we can all gain a lot. (Applause.) As two great and mature democracies, let us have the faith to believe in each other, to draw on our long and good friendship and to make our partnership grow. We are leaders in the world economy. We and the other industrialized countries share a responsibility to

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open up capital and trading markets, promote greater investment in each other's country, assist developing nations, and stop the leakage of military technology to an adversary bent on aggression and domination.

We believe that the currency of the world's second largest free market economy should reflect the economic strength and political stability that you enjoy. We look forward to the yen playing a greater role in international financial and economic affairs. We welcome the recent trend toward a stronger yen. And we would welcome Japan's increasingly active role in global affairs. Your leadership in aid to refugees and in economic assistance to various countries has been most important in helping to promote greater stability in key regions of the world. Your counsel on arms reduction initiatives is highly valued by us.

We may have periodic disputes, but the real quarrel is not between us. (Applause.) It is with those who would impose regimentation over freedom, drudgery over dynamic initiative, a future of despair over the certainty of betterment, and the forced feeding of a military goliath over a personal stake in the products and progress of tomorrow.

You and your neighbors are shining examples for all who seek rapid development. The Pacific Basin represents the most exciting region of economic growth in the world today. Your people stretch your abilities to the limit, and when an entire nation does this, miracles occur. Being a Californian, I have seen many miracles hardworking Japanese have brought to our shores.

In 1965, a young samurai student, Kanaye Nagasawa, left Japan to learn what made the West economically strong and technologically advanced. Ten years later, he founded a small winery at Santa Rosa, California, called the Fountaingrove Round Barn and Winery. Soon he became known as the great king of California. Nagasawa came to California to learn, and stayed to enrich our lives. Both our countries owe much to this Japanese warrior-turned-businessman.

As the years pass, our contacts continue to increase at an astounding rate. Today some 13,000 of your best college and graduate students are studying in America. And increasing numbers of U.S. citizens are coming here to learn everything they can about Japan. Companies like Nissan, Kyocera, Sony and Toshiba have brought thousands of jobs to America's shores. The State of California is planning to build a rapid speed train that is adapted from your highly successful bullet train. In 1985 the United States will join Japan in a major exhibition of science and technology at Tsukuba, another symbol of our cooperation. (Applause.)

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For my part, I welcome this new Pacific tide. Let it roll peacefully on, carrying a two-way flow of people and ideas that can break from barriers of suspicion and mistrust, and build up bonds of cooperation and shared optimism. (Applause.)

Our two nations may spring from separate pasts; we may live at opposite sides of the earth; but we have been brought together by our indomitable spirit of determination, our love of liberty, and devotion to progress. We are like climbers who begin their ascent from opposite ends of the mountain. The harder we try, the higher we climb and the closer we come together -- until that moment we reach the peak and we are as one. (Applause.)

It happened just last month. One American and two Japanese groups began climbing Mt. Everest -- the Japanese from the side of Nepal and the Americans from the side of Tibet. The conditions were so difficult and dangerous that before it ended two Japanese climbers tragically lost their lives. But before that tragedy, those brave climbers all met and shook hands just under the summit. And then, together, they climbed to the top to share that magnificent moment of triumph. (Applause.)

Good and dear friends of Japan, if those mountaineers could join hands at the top of the world, imagine how high our combined 350 million citizens can climb, if all of us work together as powerful partners for the cause of good. (Applause.) Together there is nothing that Japan and America cannot do.

Thank you very much. God bless you. (Applause.)

END

10:05 A.M. JST

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	FOR MTG) <u>Mission</u>	

---MACEACHEN/SHULTZ BILATERAL:PMS VISIT TO WSHDC

DPM/SSEA OPENED DISCUSSION ON SUBJ BY APPRISING SHULTZ THAT HE WISHED TO MAKE TWO GENERAL POINTS GOVERNING PMS APPROACH TO MTG NEXT WEEK:

2.(A)HE WANTED SHULTZ TO KNOW THAT WHEN PM TALKS ABOUT NEED TO RE-ESTABLISH HIGH LEVEL DIALOGUE BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS,HE HOPED IT WAS UNDERSTOOD IN WSHDC THAT HE WAS NOT/NOT PUTTING USA AND USSR IN SAME BAG. IN THIS CONNECTION SSEA READ OUT TO SHULTZ SECTION IN HIS NOV29 CHICAGO SPEECH THAT CDA DID NOT/NOT VIEW USA ON SAME LEVEL OR MORAL EQUIVALENCY AS SOVIET UNION. SHULTZ SOMEWHAT JOCULARLY ASKED WHETHER HE WAS SPEAKING FOR PRIME MINISTER OR HIMSELF.SSEA REPLIED HE WAS SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF GOVT OF CDA. SHULTZ THEN OBSERVED THAT PRIME MINISTER HAD MADE NUMBER OF POSITIVE STATEMENTS ON CDA/USA RELNS AND THAT THERE WERE NO/NO CONCERNS IN THIS RESPECT IN WSHDC.

3.(B)SSEA WANTED TO REGISTER THAT PRIME MINISTER WAS NOT/NOT TRYING TO INSERT CDA INTO SUPERPOWER DIALOGUE BUT THAT HE WAS ENDEAVOURING TO PLAY A SUPPORTIVE ROLE TO ASSIST PRESIDENT IN

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PAGE TWO ZVGR0580 CONED CEO

7 HIS PEACE EFFORTS. PURPOSE WAS THAT PM COULD PERHAPS MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS PRESIDENTS EVENTUAL ACTIONS IN THE PEACE PROCESS.

4. SSEA THEN GAVE SHULTZ SOME BACKGROUND ON ORIGIN OF INITIATIVE. HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN CONCERN IN LIBERAL CAUCUS IN PARLIAMENT AND AMONG CDN PUBLIC THAT WHEREAS CDA WAS SUPPORTING DEPLOYMENT IN INF MISSILES IN EUROPE AND TESTING THE CRUISE IN CDA, CDN GOVT WAS NOT/NOT DOING MUCH ON POLITICAL PEACE FRONT. AS A CONSEQUENCE, PRIME MINISTER HAD LAUNCHED SOME PROPOSALS, HOWEVER THESE PROPOSALS WERE NOT/NOT DESIGNED TO SHAKE UP IN ANY WAY NATOS TWO-TRACK DECISION ON INTERMEDIATE RANGE MISSILES.

✓ 5. SSEA RECALLED WHEN HE MET DEPUTY SECTY DAM LAST MONTH, HE TOLD HIM THAT PM WOULD CALL PRESIDENT AND THAT HE MIGHT RAISE ISSUE OF HEAD OF GOVT REPRESENTATION AT CDE. SSEA NOTED THAT CDN GOVT STILL DEEMED THIS HIGH LEVEL REPRESENTATION WORTHY OF CONSIDERATION.

7 6. ON ISSUE OF REVIEW OF NATO STRATEGY, SSEA APPROACHED SHULTZ IN FOLLOWING FASHION. HE REFERRED TO IDEAS GENERATED BY GENERAL ROGERS ON RELATIONSHIP OF NUCLEAR THRESHOLD AND SIZE OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES. SSEA SAID THAT CDN GOVT HAD BEEN THINKING FOR SOME TIME THAT IF WOULD BE GOOD IDEA TO REVISIT 1967 HARMEL REPORT. HE NOTED THAT FOREIGN MIN TINDEMANS HAD CONCENTRATED ON DIALOGUE DIMENSION OF THIS REPORT YESTERDAY AND THAT IT WOULD ALSO BE ONE OF THE DIMENSIONS OF EAST/WEST SITU THAT PM MIGHT VERY WILL RAISE WITH PRES DEC15.

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7. SHULTZ EMPHASIZED THAT WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND THAT THIS STRATEGY COST LESS THAN CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE. ACCORDINGLY COST/BENEFIT FACTORS HAD TO BE CAREFULLY WEIGHED. HE SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE A RESPONSIBLE QUESTION TO PUT TO PM WHETHER HE WAS WILLING TO SHARPLY INCREASE CDN DEFENCE BUDGET IN ORDER TO REDUCE EXCESSIVE RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR DETERRENT.

8. ASST SECTY BURT NOTED THAT ROGERS HAD ACTUALLY NOT/NOT BEEN SUGGESTING THAT AN EXPANSION OF CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT AUTOMATICALLY MEANT THAT THE WEST COULD REDUCE ITS NUCLEAR DETERRENT. HE AVERRED THAT BOTH WERE VERY MUCH NEEDED AND HE POINTED OUT THAT SOVIETS HAD BEEN VERY MUCH PROCEEDING ALONG BOTH TRACKS. SHULTZ AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE TO DO TOO MUCH IN CONVENTIONAL DIRECTION AND BURT ADDED THAT IT WAS NOT/NOT OBJECTIVE TO MAKE WORLD SAFE FOR CONVENTIONAL WARFARE.

*question is
just
use.*

9. SSEA HAD TOLD US PRIOR TO MTG THAT SHULTZ AT DINNER LAST NIGHT HAD EXPRESSED SOME DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO/NO REACTION TO PRESIDENTS CALL FOR COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE REFERRED TO PRESIDENTS SPEECH IN JPNSE DIET IN THIS REGARD. IN MTG TODAY WITH DPM/SSEA HE MENTIONED AGAIN THAT PRES REAGAN COULD NOT/NOT GET ANYBODY INTERESTED IN ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THAT THIS IDEA SIMPLY STUMPED THE DOCTRINE THEORISTS BUT THAT PRES REMAINED SERIOUSLY COMMITTED TO PURSIT

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PAGE FOUR ZVGR0580 CONF D CEO

OF THIS IDEA (FOR WSHDC: PLS GET IDDZ/URR TEXT OF REAGAN'S JPN
SPEECH). SSEA NOTED AFTER MTG THAT THIS MIGHT BE AN OPENING PM
COULD PURSUE WITH PRES NEXT WEEK, MAKING REFERENCE TO THE JPN
SPEECH AND SHULTZ'S COMMENTS HERE IN BRU.

10. SPECIFIC PM INITIATIVE PROPOSALS WERE NOT/NOT DISCUSSED. ON
WAY OUT FROM MTG HOWEVER SHULTZ MENTIONED TO SSEA AS FAR AS FIVE-
POWER CONF WAS CONCERNED QUOTE WE CAN TALK ABOUT IT BUT IT IS
NOT/NOT GOING TO HAPPEN UNQUOTE.

11. QUESTION OF SSEA'S PARTICIPATION IN WSHDC VISIT WAS RAISED BY
SHULTZ WHO ENQUIRED WHETHER SSEA WOULD BE ACCOMPANYING PM. IT
WAS ALSO BROUGHT UP BY ASST SECTY BURT AT DINNER LAST NIGHT WHO
SAID THAT SINCE SHULTZ WAS PRESENT AMERICAN SIDE WOULD LIKE TO
HAVE SSEA ATTEND AS WELL. SSEA REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT/NOT KNOW
AT THIS STAGE SINCE IT WOULD MEAN SHORTENING HIS VISIT TO UK.
SHULTZ SHOT BACK IN LIGHTHEARTED FASHION QUOTE WELL, WE LL SEE
WHERE YOUR PRIORITIES ARE UNQUOTE.

12. AFTER MTG SSEA TOLD US THAT ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT/NOT HIS USUAL
PRACTICE TO ACCOMPANY PM HE FEELS IT WLD BE DESIREABLE TO DO SO.
AND THIS HAS BEEN CONFIRMED AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH PM.

CCC/133 091659Z ZVGR0580

TO/À FILE
FROM/DE FPR
REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE
SUBJECT •
SUJET CBC National, December 9:
NATO Meeting: PMS Peace Initiative

28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

Security / Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
Accession / Référence
File / Dossier
Date
December 9, 1983
Number / Numéro
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CBC: NATO Foreign Ministers have ended a two-day meeting in Brussels and they agreed on a lot of things: to continue stationing Cruise and Pershing missiles in Western Europe and to talk to the Soviet Union about arms control, at any time. But they couldn't agree on the importance of Canada's Peace Initiative. Don Murray reports.

D.M.: Initiatives for peace and dialogue with the Soviets sprouted all over this NATO Foreign Ministers Conference. The Ministers agreed on a special declaration reaffirming their willingness to negotiate at any time. They announced they'd go 'en bloc' to Stockholm in January to a European Security Conference even if Soviet-bloc foreign ministers didn't show up. They ordered a special NATO review of East-West relations and a review of NATO's offers at talks to reduce Warsaw Pact and NATO troops in Europe. But when it came time for NATO Secretary General Josef Luns to hand out the credit for these Initiatives, the Trudeau peace effort ranked last with its call for new offers on troop reductions. France, according to Luns, was responsible for the decision of all Foreign Ministers to travel to Stockholm next month.

SecGen: The decision that Ministers would attend the Conference was a proposal by Monsieur Cheysson.

D.M.: That didn't please External Affairs Minister Allan MacEachen, who again insisted Canada had launched the idea. But he said he wouldn't quibble.

DPM/SSEA: I'm not concerned about the apportioning of credit, as Mr. Luns did, because on every item the outcome was quite welcome to Canada.

FPR-1188

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
D.M.: The Trudeau Peace Initiative received more buffetting from American Secretary of State, George Shultz, who referred slightly sardonically to the Prime Minister's recent diplomatic travelling.

G.Shultz: He has a programme of visitations which I assume he will carry on ...

D.M.: Then talking of Trudeaus trip to see President Reagan next week and his wish to see the Soviets, Shultz suggested outside help to bring the super-powers together really wasn't necessary.

G.Shultz: There's lots of communication between Washington and Moscow. The state of our relationship is not because it is impossible to communicate. It's the substance that is giving the problem.

D.M.: MacEachen was taken aback by Shultz's remarks and he insisted that at a private meeting this morning the U.S. Secretary of State wasn't nearly so cool about Trudeau's trip. Shultz's public remarks suggested that if the Americans are now resigned to Trudeau completing his round of world capitals, they clearly don't believe that very much will come of it. Don Murray, CBC News, Brussels.



D. Buckley-Jones
Deputy Director
Media Relations Division



TO/A FILE

FROM/DE • FPR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE CBC 0800 December 9, 1983

SUBJECT •
SUJET NATO Foreign Ministers endorse two of
PM's peace proposals

28-6-1-Trudeau
Peace
Mission

Security/Sécurité UNCLASSIFIED
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File/Dossier
Date 09 December 1983
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The Foreign Ministers of NATO wound up their meeting in Brussels with a declaration calling for a renewed effort to achieve genuine détente with the Warsaw pact nations. Their final statement endorsed two proposals which Canadian officials say stem from Prime Minister Trudeau's peace plan.

Patrick Brown: The Minister for External Affairs, Allan MacEachen, came here with two firm suggestions that next month's European Security Conference be upgraded, with Foreign Ministers attending instead of lower ranking officials, and that efforts be made to breathe life into the stagnant talks on balanced and mutual force reduction in Vienna. The Canadian delegation is claiming credit for initiating the NATO endorsement of these proposals and no doubt Prime Minister Trudeau will claim this development is proof that his peace initiative is beginning to bear fruit. Nevertheless, as the outgoing NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns points out, all NATO countries have been seeking ways to revive the dialogue with the East.

The next step then comes in January in Stockholm, when western delegations will be headed by Foreign ministers. The usefulness of that will be judged in the first instance by whether the Eastern bloc decides to follow suit.

Patrick Brown, CBC News.

D. Buckley-Jones

D. Buckley-Jones
Deputy-Director
Media Relations

BNATO FAX

28.6.1 - Trudeau
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December 9, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R.R.Fowler)

Peace Initiative - Visits to Peking and Moscow
and Recommendations re Follow-up

You are aware of the results of my visits to Peking and Moscow. My principal conclusions are the following.

China

The Chinese made a special effort to receive you at a convenient time. They clearly respect your intentions and are willing to give support to the idea of high-level political discussion of arms control. However, they tend to be pessimistic about the chances of success, partly, I believe, because they themselves are not yet ready to consider favourably real reductions in their military strength, particularly their modest nuclear weapons programme. They may be ready to reconsider their major condition for a conference of The Five plus other "representative" states (a commitment to reduce by 50% superpower strategic weapons), however, if the START talks show early signs of progress. We should continue to press them on this subject. In regard to our other proposals, the Chinese are unlikely to show more than polite interest. They were inflexible on the subject of signing the NPT or urging others to do so. This is a matter of principle for them, although they said they would not encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The remarks of Deng about the prospects of nuclear war (two billion dead is a tolerable prospect) were alarming. I think we should go back to them with our own analysis of the effects of full-scale nuclear war and ask them to think again. You might do this in a letter to Deng.

The USSR

In Moscow there was a less negative response to the Five Power proposal, although Gromyko was clearly sceptical. The Soviets are themselves on record some years ago with a similar proposal, designed no doubt to stop China and the others from modernizing their own weapons. I did not give Gromyko a detailed account of the rationale for this proposal, fearing that the opposition of the UK and France to it would open the way for Soviet exploitation of the issue. We must now decide how to follow up on Moscow (see below). On other subjects, the Russians made clear that their attitude is

...2

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

governed by their assessment of USA intentions. This is negative, to say the least. However, I don't think they had yet decided how far to go in reacting to INF deployment.

Gromyko would not commit himself on his attendance at Stockholm and Vienna, implying that substance was more important than process. Nor would the Russians comment on the proposals for an ASAT treaty and for verification of new strategic weapons. They will probably await USA reactions to them.

The question of a visit to Moscow is blocked by the uncertainty over Andropov. I could get no clarification of dates, but was led to believe that an answer may not be forthcoming until mid-December at the earliest. My strong impression is that they want you to come if Andropov is able to receive you, but would be reluctant to issue the invitation if he could not do so. They are aware that a visit after mid-January might be difficult, if not impossible. They are also aware that a visit ought to have "results"; if not agreement on our proposals, then at least some indication of flexibility and a "payoff" for the bilateral relationship (I hinted broadly that we wanted progress on family reunification and an answer on "compensation" for the KAL incident).

What Next?

There is unlikely to be agreement soon on our specific proposals, except for political attendance at Stockholm. We shall know more about the prospects for a Western initiative at the MBFR talks after the NATO meeting; without such an initiative it is unlikely that Western Ministers would be willing to attend the next meeting in January. As for our ASAT proposal, the USA has told us at the official level that it is premature. The USSR may give support in principle, but it has a more comprehensive proposal already on the table which has received wide support at the UN. Finally, the Five-Power Conference idea has at best been received with scepticism. A revision of the rationale for such a conference which emphasizes crisis management might improve its chances of acceptance, but it seems clear that in any event the timing of such a conference will be related to progress in START. Neither the USSR nor China appear to relate such a conference to strengthening the NPT. The Chinese reaffirmed their opposition to the NPT, whether or not the superpowers agree on reductions of nuclear weapons.

...3

- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

We have not so far initiated formal consultations with our NATO allies about possible revisions to NATO doctrine along the lines described in the October 1 briefing book. Informal USA reactions are negative. McNamara has made a number of specific proposals on the subject (see attachment) which would be worth exploring. The timing of such an initiative is delicate, however, and might best await the outcome of Soviet reactions to INF deployment, i.e. early in 1984.

Whatever the fate of our specific ideas, however, I believe that visits to Washington and Moscow would in themselves be substantive actions reflecting your main concern that East/West tensions be addressed at the political level. The Soviet leadership in particular is passing through a difficult period, whether or not Andropov recovers, and would benefit from a direct exposure to Western views, especially if these reflected your understanding of President Reagan's objectives. If Soviet leaders are looking for ways to ease tension, your visit would give them an opportunity to indicate this. If not, your visit would provide an occasion for urging them to reconsider the matter. In any event, Canada/Soviet relations could only be enhanced by such a visit, especially perhaps in the area of family reunification.

Measuring Success

My visits to Peking and Moscow demonstrated a high degree of interest in your initiative, agreement that new efforts must be made to reduce levels of tension and armaments, but no consensus on how to achieve these reductions. I found that our specific proposals attracted little outright support, in part because they are not formulated in sufficient detail, but also because they tend to assign responsibility for the arms race to all the nuclear weapons states and to challenge deeply held dogmas. In particular, they do not address the issue of central interest to the two powers - USA/Soviet relations.

Your visits to Moscow and Washington will be regarded as the "test" of the initiative. Given that each will blame the other for the present impasse, we might try to draw up a short catalogue of objectives which do appear to be agreed and urge that these be "adopted" in some fashion as a basis for further talks, e.g. observe SALT II in practice, continue to negotiate radical reductions of strategic weapons, preserve outer space for peaceful purposes,

...4

- 4 -

CONFIDENTIAL
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

strengthen NPT, improve crisis communications, etc. At the least, you could say that you urged explicit agreement to such objectives in addition to commending our specific ideas.

In the end, assessments of the initiative will turn on this theme of its effect on USA/USSR relations. As these are unlikely to improve soon, it will be said that the initiative "failed". There are three basic responses to this charge: 1) mediation was never intended, 2) you are satisfied that the threshold of political attention to these issues has been raised and some new ground turned, and 3) the impulse to find new ways of easing superpower tensions will find other forms, perhaps amongst a like-minded group of countries, and Canada will continue to encourage such momentum.

I have sent a copy of this memorandum to the DPM/SSEA.

*(original signed
by*

Geoffrey Pearson
Special Representative

cc: DPM/SSEA

PCO/Osbaldeston

External/Shenstone/Delvoie }

DND/Anderson

RESTRICTED

28-6-1- Bureau
Peace
Mission

Memorandum for the Deputy Prime Minister and
Secretary of State for External Affairs

PM Initiative: Your interview with "The Journal"

We attach, as requested, a chronology of events directly related to the Prime Minister's initiative on East-West relations and international security.

In background briefings for the press, we have usually taken the line that while specific actions relating to the Prime Minister's initiative were started in September of this year, the evolution of the Prime Minister's thinking and concerns can be traced on the public record through: (a) his speech to UNSSOD II in 1982; (b) his speech at Notre Dame University in 1982; (c) his statements and role at the Williamsburg Summit; and, (d) his statements following the KAL airliner incident.


L.A. Delvoie

Chairman

TASK FORCE WORKING GROUP

cc: DMF/Mr. Marchand
FPR/Mr. Noble

PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

A Chronology of Events

- (1) DPM/SSEA luncheon with PM (Sept 8)
- (2) DPM/SSEA meeting on arms control with Departmental officials (Sept 12)
- (3) DPM/SSEA meeting with PM (Sept 20)
- (4) PM meeting in Ottawa with DPM/SSEA, MND and senior officials; creation of Task Force (Sept 21)
- (5) PM meeting at Meach Lake with DPM/SESEA, MND, senior officials and ambassadors; review and selection of options; extension of existence of reconfigured Task Force (Oct 7)
- (6) DPM/SSEA meeting in Halifax with Secretary Shultz (Oct 16)
- (7) PM letters to all NATO heads of government (Oct 22-25)
- (8) PM speech at Guelph University (Oct 27)
- (9) PM letters to Soviet and Chinese leaders (early November)
- (10) PM meetings with President Mitterrand, PM Lubbers, Queen Beatrix, PM Martens, HH the Pope, PM Craxi, PM Thatcher (Nov 8-11)
- (11) PM speech in Montreal (Nov 13)

- 2 -

- (12) PM letters to all NATO heads of government (Nov 17-18)
- (13) PM telephone conversation with President Reagan (Nov 17)
- (14) PM letters to PM Hawke and PM Muldoon (Nov 18)
- (15) PM meeting with PM Nakasone (Nov 19)
- (16) PM personal emissary (Geoffrey Pearson) visits to Peking (Nov 21-22) and to Moscow (Nov 25-26).
- (17) PM participation CHOGM in New Delhi (Nov 22-27)
- (18) PM visit to Peking (Nov 28-29)
- (19) DPM/SSEA speech in Chicago (Nov 29)
- (20) DPM/SSEA participation in NATO ministerial meeting (Dec 8-9)
- (21) PM meetings over six weeks period with Robert McNamara, General Rogers, General Brent Scowcroft, George Kennan, members of Harvard Nuclear Study Group, Georgi Arbatov (Oct-Nov)

External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

FPR-D BUCKLEY-JONES/5-1874-AH

TO/À FILE

FROM/DE FPR

REFERENCE
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT
SUJET CBC National, December 9
NATO: MacEachen pushes peace proposals

28-6-1-Trudeau
Peace
Mission

Security/Sécurité	UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	December 9, 1983
Number/Numéro	FPR-1183

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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CBC: In Brussels, NATO Foreign Ministers discussed several ways to keep some kind of discussions with the Soviets going. They all agreed tonight, to go to a disarmament conference in Stockholm next month. That's what Canada has been pushing as part of Prime Minister Trudeau's Peace Initiative. Don Murray reports from the NATO Meeting.

D.M.: The stop of the START talks found NATO's foreign ministers just beginning a so-called super-restricted meeting to review the status of East-West relations. Despite European pressure, the Americans continue to insist inside and outside the meeting that it was up to the Soviets and not them to make the next move.

Because right now we've got a good proposal on the table, and we want the Soviet Union to come back and negotiate.

D.M.: Meanwhile, External Affairs Minister Allan MacEachen was pursuing his mission to sell Prime Minister Trudeau's peace initiative. His first stop for breakfast was with West German Foreign Minister Hans Deitrich Gentscher. Significantly, neither then nor later did the selling job include the five nation nuclear power conference originally suggested by Trudeau. Canadian officials have now concluded there's just too much opposition to that proposal. Rather, at the NATO Council Meeting MacEachen pushed just two points. He urged all fellow ministers to go next month to Stockholm to a European Security Conference to meet their East Bloc counterparts. He also argued that NATO should try to revive efforts to reduce conventional armies in East and West Europe. Canada says NATO should make new proposals at Vienna on troop reduction as a sign of goodwill to the Soviets. But at the end of the day MacEachen was guarded about whether his proposals would be endorsed in the final communique.

FPR-1183
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SSEA: Our general view of East-West relations as it will appear, I hope, will be very consistent with what the Prime Minister has been doing but we will have to wait and see.

D.M.: Canada isn't alone in urging new initiatives to reduce East-West tensions. West Germany is trying to persuade other NATO members to adopt a special political declaration indicating more NATO flexibility and a willingness to look at different options to reopen negotiations. Behind the façade of harmony the tug-of-war between Europeans and Americans about how best to deal with the Soviets continues here. Don Murray, CBC News, Brussels.


D. Buckley-Jones
Deputy Director
Media Relations Division

*Mr. [unclear]
Can you pls confirm that
Copen got the 2 letters from
Trudeau?
09/12/83*

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned _____
Person _____
Local Time _____

MR BMTM

*WE CAN CONFIRM THAT COPEN REC'D THE
OCT 25^{LET} BY TEL, BUT ~~THERE~~ NO TRANSMITTAL
SLIP COVERED THOSE LETTERS SO WE'VE NO
PROOF FOR THE NOV 16 LET WE DO
HAVE A
RENEWED TRANSMITTAL SLIP →*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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---PRIME MINISTERS INITIATIVE: DANISH VIEW

WE FINALLY HAD OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS PMS INITIATIVE WITH HENNING
GOTTLIEB, SPECIAL SECURITY ADVISER TO DANISH PRIME MINISTER POUL
SCHLUTER. GOTTLIEB STATED THAT SCHLUTER WAS IMPRESSED BY PMS REASONING
AND QUOTE THAT IT WAS RIGHT UNQUOTE. THERE WAS GROWING FEELING IN
EUROPE THAT WEST WAS SLIPPING AND THAT SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE.
QUESTION OF COURSE WAS WHAT AND IN WHAT CONTEXT IE, GLOBAL CONTEXT
SUCH AS PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE OR IN WESTERN CONTEXT -- THAT THE
WEST GET ITS ACT TOGETHER CONCEPTUALLY. GOTTLIEB CITED EX CHANCELLOR
SCHMIDTS RECENT ARTICLE IN DIE ZEIT WHICH ALSO UNDERLINED SPREADING
MALAISE FELT AMONG WEST AT SLIPPING SECURITY POLICY. GOTTLIEB THANKED
US FOR INFORMING DANISH GOV OF PMS INITIATIVE AND ASKED TO BE KEPT
INFORMED.

CCC/237 091542Z YJGR1397

0288

~~DO YOU WANT ME TO SEND A MSG TO~~
REST

OPEN? _____

JUST: RSK

Grateful you confirm that you rec'd.

original ^{8/25 OCT} let signed by PM to Danish PM

SCHLUTER ~~was rec'd and delivered to passed on.~~
~~rec'd by you.~~

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace
Mission

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT MGTC9532 09DEC83

TO BRU

INFO BNATO VMBFR PEKIN MOSCO LDN PARIS HAGUE OSLO COPEN BONN LSBON
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28-6-1 - Thursday
Peace
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TO ATNTA BOSTN BFALO CHCGO CLVND DALAS DTROT LNGLS MNPLS

NRLNS PHILA SFRAN SEATL CNGNY DELIVER BY 091700

INFO EXTOTT (IDDZ UGP

AS YOU WILL BE AWARE, PRIME MINISTER HAS ACCEPTED INVITATION FROM PRESIDENT FOR MTG ON HIS PEACE INITIATIVE THURS 15DEC AT 11:00AM. THIS IS THE ONLY ELEMENT OF PROGRAMME THAT HAS BEEN ANNOUNCED UP TO PRESENT, BUT THERE ARE MTGS WITH OTHER SR ADMIN OFFICIALS IN THE WORKS WHICH WILL FILL OUT A FULL DAYS PROGRAMME IN WASH. IN ADDITION, THE PRIME MINISTER HAS AGREED TO APPEAR ON QUOTE GOOD MORNING AMERICA UNQUOTE ON ABC IN THE FIRST HALF HOUR OF THE PROGRAMME LIVE ON FRIDAY MORNING TO DISCUSS THE INITIATIVE. THIS IS CLEARLY ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT STEPS HE HAS TAKEN IN HIS INITIATIVE, AND WE WILL ENDEAVOUR TO GET TRANSCRIPTS AND OTHER INFORMATION OUT TO YOU NEXT WEEK TO HELP YOU IN ANSWERING QUESTIONS THAT MAY ARISE FROM THE MTG.

2. PLEASE NOTE ALSO THE SUCCESS THAT THE PMS IDEAS HAVE HAD AT THE NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MTG CONCLUDING TODAY IN BRUSSELS. IT NOW APPEARS THAT ALL NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS HAVE AGREED TO ATTEND THE CDE MTG IN STKHM AND NATO HAS ALSO AGREED TO REVIEW THE WEST POSITION IN REGARD TO THE CONVENTIONAL ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (MBFR) IN VIENNA.

3. IN ADDITION, THERE IS AGREEMENT TO REVIEW EAST/WEST RELATIONS

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OFMS

PAGE TWO UNFC8124 UNCLAS

FROM A POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW. THIS MOVEMENT CERTAINLY REPRESENTS
THE KIND OF INJECTION OF POLITICAL WILL THAT TRUDEAU HAS BEEN
TALKING ABOUT. WE, OF COURSE, HOPE FOR ANOTHER FLURRY OF POSITIVE
EDITORIALS FOLLOWING NEXT WEEKS MTGS. IN THE MEANTIME WE HOPE YOU
WILL DO EVERYTHING TO PREPARE THE WAY.

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
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TO BNATO/MINDEL

INFO PMOOTT/FOWLER EXTOTT IDDZ

DISTR UGB UGP



---MINISTERS PROGRAMME WASHINGTON:PRESS

PLS ADVISE ASAP WHETHER MINISTER WOULD BE WILLING TO ACCEPT INVITATIONS FOR INTERVIEWS ON INITIATIVE DURING WASHINGTON VISIT. WE HAVE ALREADY HAD A FIRM REQUEST FROM NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO FOR THEIR MORNING PROGRAMME FRIDAY AND WILL DOUBTLESS RECEIVE OTHERS FOR WHICH WE COULD OFFER MINISTER IF THIS ACCEPTABLE. FOR INSTANCE, NIGHT LINE INTERESTED IN HIM FOLLOWING HIS CHICAGO SPEECH AND MIGHT BE A GOOD PROSPECT; DITTO MACNEIL/LEHRER.

2. CLEARLY WILL MAKE NO/NO INDIVIDUAL COMMITMENTS WITHOUT CHECKING WITH NOBLE, BUT WOULD LIKE TO KNOW IF WE CAN BE ENCOURAGING.

3. OTHER OPTION MIGHT BE QUOTE ON THE RECORD UNQUOTE PRESS CONFERENCE WITH MCEACHEN FOLLOWING MTG WITH PRESIDENT. AT MOMENT WE ARE ONLY PLANNING BRIEFING FOR CDN PRESS, BUT AVAILABILITY OF MINISTER FOR POST MTG PRESS ACCESS WOULD DOUBTLESS ATTRACT LARGER NUMBER OF AMERICAN MEDIA.

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28-6-1-Tuesday
Peace
Mission

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TO EXTOTT IDR

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NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DIPOL/DNACPOL/DSTRATA PMOOTT/FOWLER
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URR URD UGB IDDZ

---NAC MINISTERIAL MTG-PRES D HONNEUR OPENING SPEECH

FOLLOWING IS FRENCH TEXT OF SUBJ SPEECH

2.TEXT BEGINS QUOTE INTERVENTION DE M CLAUDE CHEYSSON,MINISTRE
DES RELATIONS EXTERIEURES DE LA FRANCE EN SA QUALITE
DE PRESIDENT D HONNEUR DU CONSEIL ATLANTIQUE
(SESSION MINISTERIELLE,8-9DEC 1983)

C EST AVEC UNE VIVE SATISFACTION QUE JE PRENDS LA PAROLE EN
TANT QUE PRESIDENT D HONNEUR DE NOTRE CONSEIL.

CECI ME DONNE D ABORD L OCCASION DE VOUS SALUER MONSIEUR
LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL,ET DE VOUS RENDRE L HOMMAGE QUI VOUS EST
DU,EN VOUS DISANT COMBIEN LA FRANCE SE FELICITE DE L AMITIE QUE
VOUS LUI TEMOIGNEZ,EN VOUS EXPRIMANT AUSSI NOTRE ADMIRATION POUR
L ACHARNEMENT ET L EFFICACITE QUI EST LA VOTRE LA OU IL FAUT
DONNER A NOTRE ALLIANCE SA PLEINE SIGNIFICATION.SANS DOUTE,CES
ELOGES SONT-ILS PREMATURES.MAIS JU TENAIS A MARQUER DES MAINTENANT
UN MOMENT QUE CHACUN VIVRA AVEC UNE EMOTION PARTICULIERE DU FAIT

...2

PAGE TWO YBGR7192 UNCLAS

DE VOTRE GRANDE PERSONNALITE ET DU POIDS QUE VOUS AVEZ ACQUIS DANS
L HISTOIRE DE VOTRE PAYS, PUIS DANS CELLE DE
L EUROPE AVANT DE L AFFIRMER DANS LE MONDE ATLANTIQUE.

CETTE INTERVENTION ME PERMET ENSUITE DE RAPPELER LA PRESENCE
ACTIVE ET LA SOLIDARITE DE LA FRANCE AU SEIN DE L ALLIANCE. DEPUIS
QUE MON PAYS A EU L HONNEUR, EN JUIN DERNIER, D ACCUEILLIR LE CONSEIL
A PARIS, LE GOUVT FRANCAIS A POURSUIVI ET CONCRETISE LES EFFORTS
ANNONCES A L EPOQUE POUR QUE LA SOLIDARITE DE LA FRANCE PUISSE
JOUER LE CAS ECHEANT AVEC TOUTE L EFFICACITE ET LA RAPIDITE
NECESSAIRES.

VOICI ENFIN ET SURTOUT L OCCASION POUR MOI DE RAPPELER LES
EVENEMENTS VECUS AU COURS DES DERNIERS MOIS, AU TERME DE L EVOLUTION
DE QUELQUES ANNEES. IL EST CLAIR QUE NOUS TRAVERSONS UNE CRISE DES
RELATIONS EST-OUEST. ELLE N EST PAS NOUVELLE; ELLE NE NOUS EST PAS
DUE; MAIS SON EXISTENCE ET SA GRAVITE SONT INDENIABLES. NIER
L EVIDENCE NE DISSIPERAIT PAS LES NUAGES. AU CONTRAIRE, EN CETTE
PERIODE DE TENSION, IL FAUT ENVISAGER L AVENIR AVEC CALME, LUCIDITE,
COURAGE ET JE N HESITERAI PAS A L AFFIRMER, AVEC LA CONFIANCE QUI
DOIT RESULTER DE NOTRE DETERMINATION.

OR, EN CETTE FIN D ANNEE 1983, NOUS POUVONS A MON SENS
TIRER UN CERTAIN RECONFORT DE LA FACON DONT ONT ETE MAITRISEES
LES DIFFICULTES. CECI NOUS PERMET, ME SEMBLE-T-IL, DE CONSIDERER
L AVENIR AVEC UN ESPOIR RENOUVELE.

AU COURS DES DERNIERS MOIS, UNE FOIS ENCORE, LA QUESTION

PAGE THREE YBGR7192 UNCLAS

CRUCIALE A ETE CELLE DE L EQUILIBRE DES FORCES,CONDITION DE LA SECURITE,CONDITION DE LA PAIX.CERTES,LE PROBLEME NE SE POSE PAS DANS LES MEMES TERMES POUR LA FRANCE ET POUR SES ALLIES,MAIS VOUS RECONNAITREZ QUE NOUS NOUS SOMMES CLAIREMENT EXPRIMES AU NOM DE LA SOLIDARITE QUI EST L ESSENCE MEME DE NOTRE ALLIANCE.NOUS L AVONS FAIT SANS ARRIER PENSEE,INDIFFERENTS AUX PRESSIONS DE CEUX QUI AURAIENT PREFERE QUE NOUS NOUS TAISIONS,ET EN PLEINE INDEPONDANCE.

NOUS L AVONS FAIT AUSSI AVEC RESPECT.LES PAYS QUI ONT EU A PRENDRE ET A APPLIQUER LA DOUBLE DECISION DE DEC 1979 ONT EU LE COURAGE AUQUEL JE RENDS HOMMAGE DE REPONDRE A LA MENACE TOUT EN GARDANT L ESPOIR DE LA NEGOCIATION ET EN Y FAISANT SANS CESSE APPEL. ILS ONT AINSI APPORTE UN NOUVEAU TEMOIGNAGE DE LEUR FIDELITE A L ESPRIT ET A LA LETTRE DE L ALLIANCE,A SAVOIR LA VOLONTE DE PROTEGER LES INTERETS VITAUX TOUT EN EVITANT LA POLEMIQUE ET LA CONFRONTATION.

PENDANT CE TEMPS,MALHEUREUSEMENT,L AUTRE PARTIE A TROP SOUVENT PRESENTE DE MANIERE TENDANCIEUSE LE DONNEES DU DEBAT AVEC L INTENTION D IMPRESSIONNER ET D ALARMER NOS PROPRES OPINIONS PUBLIQUES.ET CEPENDANT LA GRANDE MASSE DE NOS COMPATRIOTES A VITE COMPRIS LA TROMPEUSE DENONCIATION D UNE PRETENDUE CONTRADICTION ENTRE LE REFUS LEGITIME DE LA GUERRE ET LA NECESSITE ABSOLUE DES MESURES DE SECURITE.LES DEBATS DE CES DERNIERS MOIS,LES MANIFESTATIONS DEMOCRATIQUES QUI LES ONT PARFOIS PROLONGES ONT AINSI TOUT NATURELLEMENT CONDUIT A LA REAFFIRMATION TRANQUILLE ET CONVAINCUE DES DECISIONS DEJA PRISES.

PAGE FOUR YBGR7192 UNCLAS

C EST UNE BELLE DETERMINATION DE SAND FROID, DE DETERMINATION ET DE DEMOCRATIE. LA PRESENTE SESSION DU CONSEIL EN SERA MARQUEE, J EN SUIS CONVAINCU.

LES EVIDENCES SONT D AILLEURS LA: LA PREMIERE EST QUE, DURANT LES ANNEES OU NOTRE PRINCIPAL ALLIE NEGOCIAIT, MULTIPLIAIT LES OFFRES, NEGOCIAIT ENCORE EN VUE D OBTENIR L ACCORD AVEC L URSS QUE NOUS SOUHAITONS TOUS, CETTE DERNIERE A MULTIPLIE PAR QUATRE LE NOMBRE DE SES SS-20, TOUT EN PRETENDANT PERIODIQUEMENT, SANS CRAINTE DE REPETITION ET DE CONTRADICTION ENTRE LES AFFIRMATIONS SUCCESSIVES, QUE L EQUILIBRE DES FORCES N EN DEMEURAIT PAS MOINS, A CHAQUE ETAPE, UNE REALITE.

ET MAINTENANT, LA DELEGATION SOVIETIQUE A QUITTE LA TABLE. ELLE TROUVAIT LOGIQUE ET NORMAL QUE NOUS NEGOCIIONS TANDIS QU ELLE MULTIPLIAIT LES BASES DE SS-20. DES QUE LA PREMIERE IMPLANTATION REPOUNDANT A CE DEPLOIEMENT A ETE EBAUCHEE, ELLE A ROMPU LA NEGOCIATION. ET ELLE ANNONCE DE NOUVEAUX PROGRAMMES D ARMEMENT, CE QUI PROVOQUERA INEVITABLEMENT LA RELANCE DE LA COURSE.

LE PLUS FRAPPANT DANS L ATTITUDE DE L URSS AU COURS DE CES DEUX ANNEES, C EST QU ELLE A REFUSE JUSQU AU BOUT ET AVEC UNE EXTRA-ORDINAIRE OBSTINATION DE TENIR COMPTE D UNE NOTION AUSSI ELEMENTAIRE QU ESSENTIELLE: L INDISPENSABLE EQUILIBRE DES FORCES. CE PRINCIPE EST ESSENTIEL AVANT TOUTE NEGOCIATION DE DESARMENT ET L URSS L A IGNORE JUSQUE DANS SES DERNIERES DEMARCHES A GENEVE. ELLE A NIE L EVIDENCE D UN DESEQUILIBRE POURTANT FLAGRANT, PUISQUE LES SEULS MISSILES DE PORTE INTERMEDIAIRE SONT SOVIETIQUES.

...5

PAGE FIVE YBGR7192 UNCLAS

EST-IL NECESSAIRE, D AUTRE PART, DE SOULIGNER ICI QUE LA DEMANDE SOVIETIQUE DE COMPENSATION DES FORCES TIERCES N A AUCUNE JUSTIFICATION, NI SUR LE PLAN MILITAIRE, NI SUR LE PLAN POLITIQUE. IL EST CLAIR QUE LES FORCES TIERCES NE SONT PAS CONCUES POUR FAIRE PIECE AUX SEULS SS-20 MAIS POUR REpondre A L ENSEMBLE DE LA MENACE, ET, A CET EGARD, FAUT-IL RAPPELER QUE LE RAPPORT DES FORCES EST DE 1 A 100 ENTRE LA FRANCE ET L UNION SOVIETIQUE.

EN FAIT, LA VOLONTE DE L URSS EST DE JOUIR D UN DROIT PERMANENT ET RECONNU A LA SUPERIORITE PAR RAPPORT AUX ETATS-UNIS ET A LA CAPACITE PERMANENTE D INTIMIDATION DE L EUROPE.

NOUS NE POUVONS PAS ACCEPTER CE DESEQUILIBRE, ELEMENT GENERATEUR DE TENSIONS, DE MENACES; ELEMENT QUI PEUT TROUBLER LA PAIX, EN DONNANT A CERTAINS L ILLUSION DE POUVOIR GAGNER LA GUERRE.

LA FERMETE DONT L ALLIANCE A FAIT PREUVE DOIT AVOIR VALEUR DE SIGNAL. NOTRE REUNION DOIT MARQUER AVEC FORCE ET SOLENNITE NOTRE DESIR COMMUN DE VOIR REPREDRE LES NEGOCIATIONS SUR LES ARMES A PORTEE INTERMEDIAIRE, DE VOIR PROGREDER LES NEGOCIATIONS QUI PEUVENT PERMETTRE D ABAISSER LE NIVEAU OU DOIT SE PLACER L EQUILIBRE NUCLEAIRE ENTRE ETATS-UNIS ET UNION SOVIETIQUE.

CEPENDANT, L ALLIANCE N ENTRERA PAS DANS LA SURENCHERE DES CONTRE-MESURES. ELLE GARDE LA MAIN TENDUE, CAR ELLE SAIT QUE SEUL LE DIALOGUE PEUT OUVRIR DES PERSPECTIVES CONSTRUCTIVES. LES RESULTATS OBTENUS DANS LE PASSE ET AU COURS DE CETTE ANNEE 1983

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PAGE SIX YBGR7192 UNCLAS

MEME, NOUS ENCOURAGENT A PERSEVERER. JE NE PRENDRAI QU UN SFUL
EXEMPLE, MAIS IL EST IMPORTANT: IL NOUS A FALLU DES MOIS, DES ANNFES
A MDRID POUR CONVENIR D UNE CONFERENCE SUR LE DESARMEMENT EN
EUROPE REUNISSANT LES 35 SIGNATAIRES DES ACCORDS D HELSINKI. MAIS
NOUS Y SOMMES PARVENUS, LA TENACITE A PAYE. DANS SIX SEMAINES,
A STKHM, TOUS LES ETATS D EUROPE, DE L ATLANTIQUE A L OURAL ET LES
ETATS AMERICAINS POURRONT DEMONTRER LEUR VOLONTE DE PAIX, EN
CHERCHANT LES MOYENS D ASSURER UNE PLUS GRANDE CONFIANCE, ET
DEMAIN UNE PLUS GRANDE SECURITE POUR L EUROPE DANS SONT ENSEMBLE.

QUE CE CI AIT LIEU, LA ET A CE MOMENT, MERITE L ATTENTION.

D AUTRES FORMES DE DIALOGUE DOIVENT ETRE TROUVEES, ENTRE
LES ETATS, LEURS ENTRPRISES, LEURS INSTITUTIONS CULTURELLES; LES
HOMMES DOIVENT DIALOGUER AU-DESSUS DE LA BARRIERE
PSYCHOLOGIQUE ET MILITAIRE QUI LES SPARE. L EFFORT TETU DE DIALOGUE
NE DOIT PAS ETRE REMIS EN CAUSE PAR LES HUMEURS DU MOMENT. IL DOIT
PERMETTRE A NOS VALEURS PROFONDES DE SE MANIFESTER.

A L URSS D Y REPONDRE, POUR UN DIALOGUE QUE NOUS
SOUHAITONS REALISTE ET CONSTRUCTIF TOUT AUTANT QUE SANS
COMPLAISANCE.

UUU/298 091613Z YBGR7192

MF

28-6-1 - Trudeau Peace Mission

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FM BNATO YBGR7191 09DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDR

INFO CANMILREP NATO WSHDC LDN BONN OSLO COPEN ROME HAGUE ANKRA
PARIS ATHNS MDRID VMBFR BRU MOSCO STKHM PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/
ADMPOL/DNACPOL/PPP/CORAE/CIS/DSTRATA

DISTR MINA DMF IFB IDDZ FPR MINE MINT UGB RGE URR RCR RBR RBD ZSP
ZSI IDA IDRL

REF OURTEL YBGR7190 09DEC

---USA SECTY OF STATE SHULTZ PRESS CONF RE PM TRUDEAUS

VISIT TO WSHDC

AT POST-NAC MINISTERIAL PRESS CONF USA SECTY OF STATE SHULTZ
WAS ASKED RE IMPENDING VISIT TO WSHDC BY PM TRUDEAU WHAT WOULD
BE OUTCOME OF DISCUSSION, WOULD USA ENCOURAGE PM TRUDEAU TO GO
TO MOSCO AND WOULD THIS LEAD TO PROGRESS IN GETTING WSHDC AND
MOSCO TOGETHER. SHULTZ SAID HE ASSUMED PM TRUDEAU WILL CARRY
ON HIS PROGRAMME OF VISTATIONS. USA ALWAYS IS GLAD TO TALK TO
PM TRUDEAU. NO/NO DOUBT DISCUSSION WILL COVER PM TRUDEAUS
INITIATIVE AND MANY OTHER THINGS IN USA/CDA RELNS. OVER LAST
2-3 YEARS THERE WAS VERY SUCCESSFUL EFFORT TO DEAL WITH BILAT
RPROBLEMS, THERE HAD BEEN INNUMERABLE MTGS BETWEEN SHULTZ AND MR
MACEACHEN, AND 6-7 BETWEEN MESSRS REAGAN AND TRUDEAU. SHULTZ
SAID THERE WAS LOTS OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN MOSCO AND WSHDC.
THE STATE OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN USA-USSR WAS NOT/NOT BECAUSE
IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO COMMUNICATE BUT BECAUSE OF PROBLEMS WITH
SUBSTANCE.

UUU/298 091614Z YBGR7191

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR7189 09DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDR DELIVER BY 091500

INFO WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN ROME OSLO COPEN MDRID LSBON ATHNS ANKRA
MOSCO WSAW PRGUE BPEST BUCST BGRAD VMBFR GENEV STKHM PCOOTT/FOWLER
NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DIPOL/DACPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR IDA IDD IFB DMF USS RBR RBD RCR RCD CPD CCB CGE CGS ZSP ZSI
URR URD UGB IDDZ

---NAC MINISTERIAL MTG-OVERVIEW

SUMMARY:NAC MINISTERIAL MTG,08-09DEC WAS DOMINATED BY GENERAL THEME
OF EAST-WEST DIALOGUE IN WAKE OF INF DEPLOYMENTS.THAT ALLIES WERE
CARRYING THROUGH SECOND TRACK OF DEC79 INF MODERNIZATION DECISION WAS
SEEN BY MINS BOTH AS DEMONSTRATION OF ALLIANCE UNITY AND RESOLVE AND
AS SERIOUS SET-BACK FOR USSR.AT SAME TIME,IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT
THERE WAS NO/NO CAUSE FOR QUOTE TRIOMPHALISM UNQUOTE OR COMPLACENCY
SINCE WESTERN SOLIDARITY HAD NOT/NOT BEEN ACHIEVED WITHOUT COST.IN
SOME COUNTRIES, LONGSTANDING CONSENSUS ON ANTL SECURITY POLICY HAD
BEEN FRACTURED BY GROWING PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND
GENERAL ALIENATION OF LARGE SECTION OF MODERATE OPINION.THIS WAS
NOT/NO DOUBT DUE TO FACT THAT ARMS BUILD-UP CONTINUES UNCHECKED.
SOVIET ACTION IN WITHDRAWING FROM INF NEGOTIATIONS AND QUOTE
SUSPENDING UNQUOTE START TALKS WAS CLEARLY INTENDED TO EXACERBATE
WESTERN PUBLIC ANXIETY CONCERNING OSTENSIBLE EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION.
FRG PROPOSED DECLARATION(OURTEL YBGR7188)AND BELGIAN PROPOSAL FOR

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PAGE TWO YBGR7189 CONF

UPDATE OF 1967 HARMEL REPORT ON NATOS FUTURE TASKS WERE INTENDED TO HIGHLIGHT WESTS WILLINGNESS TO PURSUE CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE WITH USSR. SUBJ OF ALLIANCE POLICY TOWARDS POLAND WAS NOT/NOT RAISED.

2. CONSIDERED FROM PERSPECTIVE OF PMS INITIATIVE, MINISTERIAL MTG WAS SUCCESS. BELGIAN FMS PROPOSAL FOR COUNCIL TO UNDERTAKE QUOTE THOROUGH APPRAISAL OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS WITH VIEW TO ACHIEVING MORE CONSTRUCTIVE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE UNQUOTE (PARA 3 OURTEL YBGR7185) WAS IN LINE WITH SUGGESTION PM PUT TO BOTH PM MARTENS AND FM TINDEMANS 09NOV. DPM/SSEAS LINE OF ARGUMENT THAT TIME WAS RIPE FOR POLITICAL CHARGE TO BE INJECTED INTO EAST-WEST EQUATION WAS WELCOMED BY COLLEAGUES AS WAS SPECIFIC PROPOSAL RE MINISTERIAL PRESENCE AT INAUGURAL MTG OF STKHM CONFERENCE 17JAN. FRENCH FM CHEYSSON ADDED ICING TO THAT PARTICULAR GATEAUX WITH SUGGESTION THAT NATO MINS ALSO MEET TOGETHER IN STKHM ON EVE OF CDE. THERE WAS ALSO UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR ENHANCED MINISTERIAL INVOLVEMENT IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND AGREEMENT THAT WESTS POSITION BE SUBJ TO EARLY REVIEW. WHILE MOST MINS WERE FAVOURABLY DISPOSED TO IDEA OF CONVENING MBFR PLENARY AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL IN VIENN, IT WAS GENERALLY THOUGHT THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THIS NOTION SHOULD AWAIT OUTCOME OF REVIEW. DEBATE, HOWEVER, PROVIDED OBVIOUS FORESHADOWING OF DIFFERENCE OF OPINION AS TO WHAT COURSE FUTURE ALLIED POLICY SHOULD TAKE.

3. REPORT: IT WAS EVIDENT FROM OUTSET OF MTG THAT PRINCIPAL PREOCCUPATION OF MINS WAS STATE OF EAST WEST RELATIONS, AND IN

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PAGE THREE YBGR7189 CONF D

PARTICULAR EAST-WEST DIALOGUE IN WAKE OF INF DEPLOYMENTS. ONE NOTED AN ALMOST AUDIBLE COLLECTIVE SIGN OF RELIEF THAT ALLIANCE HAD MET AND SURMOUNTED CHALLENGE POSED BY INF DEPLOYMENTS AND INDEED NOW FOUND ITSELF IN A STRONGER POSITION NOT/NOT ONLY MILITARILY BUT ALSO POLITICALLY AS RESULT OF EXPERIENCE. AS FRG FM GENSHCER PUT IT, POLITICS IS MATTER OF MAKING IMPRESSION AND NOTHING IMPRESSES RUSSIANS MORE THAN NATO UNITY. MANY MINS EXPRESSED VIEW THIS YEAR HAS WITNESSED SERIOUS SETBACK FOR SOVIET POLICY AND COMMENSURATE NATO VICTORY. BUT THEY THOUGHT IT WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT NOW TO STRESS ALLIES WILLINGNESS TO BROADEN DIALOGUE WITH EAST WITH VIEW TO DEVELOPING LONG-TERM, CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP BASED ON EQUILIBRIUM, MODERATION AND RECIPROCITY. THIS WAS MESSAGE OF FRG INSPIRED QUOTE DECLARATION OF BRUSSELS UNQUOTE.

4. DPM/SSEA AND UK FM HOWE BOTH MENTIONED THAT NATOS QUOTE VICTORY UNQUOTE HAD NOT/NOT BEEN ACHIEVED WITHOUT COST. MODERATE OPINION IN NUMBER OF ALLIED COUNTRIES HAD BEEN ALIENATED, THERE WAS LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF NATO STRATEGY, PUBLIC OPPOSITION TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAD INCREASED, THERE WAS PERCEIVED DECLINE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, AND WITH INF AND START NEGOTIATIONS IN SUSPENSE, THERE WAS GENERAL FEELING AMONG PUBLICS THAT SITU WAS GETTING OUT OF CONTROL. IT WAS TRUE THAT MOST ALLIED GOVTS HAD SUCCEEDED IN CARRYING THEIR PUBLICS WITH THEM BUT IN SOME CASES ONLY JUST. ISSUE HAD TO BE VIEWED IN LONG-TERM WHICH, GIVEN NEED OF WESTERN GOVERNMENTS TO FACE ELECTORATE

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PAGE FOUR YBGR7189 CONF D

EVERY FEW YEARS, MEANT THERE WAS NO/NO CAUSE FOR COMPLACENCY. ALLIANCE UNITY WAS OF VITAL IMPORTANCE IN MAINTAINING CONSISTENT POLICY AND NEW NOTIONS WHICH TENDED TO WEAKEN ITS COHERENCE WERE UNWELCOME. THIS INTERPRETATION OF INF EXPERIENCE WAS PARAPHRASED BY NETHS FM VAN DEN BROECH AND NORWEGIAN FM STRAY, WITH LATTER SUGGESTING THAT, IN FUTURE, NATO TAKE MEASURES NECESSARY FOR ITS DEFENCE AND AVOID LINKING THEM TO COURSE OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

5. ASIDE FROM INITIAL HESITATIONS ON PART OF USA SECY OF STATE SHULTZ, THERE WAS UNANIMOUS SUPPORT FOR DECLARATION AND NOTION WHICH IT CONTAINED OF LOOKING TO FUTURE ENHANCEMENT OF EAST/WEST DIALOGUE PARTICULARLY THROUGH ACTIVE PURSUIT OF PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. (SHULTZ, AT FIRST, TENDED TO SEE STATEMENT AS UNSEEMLY PLEA TO USSR. HE WAS ALSO UNAHPPY WITH REF TO QUOTE GENUINE DETENTE UNQUOTE). THIS PROVIDED CONVENIENT ENTREE FOR DPM/SSEA TO INTRODUCE CONCEPT OF INJECTING POLITICAL CHARGE INTO ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND TO ELABORATE ON TWO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS (ON CDE AND MBFR) CONTAINED IN PMS 18NOV LET TO NATO HEADS OF GOVT.

6. SUGGESTION THAT ALL NATO MEMBERS BE REPRESENTED AT INAUGURAL MTG OF STKHM CONFERENCE ON 17JAN WAS WELCOMED BY ALL AS REFLECTED IN PARA 12 OF THE COMMUNIQUE. FRENCH FM CHEYSSON ADDED TO THIS PROPOSAL THAT NATO FMS MEET TOGETHER IN STKHM ON EVE OF CONFERENCE TO REAFFIRM THEIR SUPPORT. THIS TOO WAS AGREED TO IN PRINCIPLE.

7. SECOND PROPOSAL, THAT NATO RESPOND TO RECENT EASTERN MBFR PROPOSALS
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THE FIVE YBGR7189 CONF

EARLY IN NEW YEAR AND BE PREPARED TO FOLLOW THIS UP WITH FMS MTG
IN VIENN, GOT SOMEWHAT ROUGHER RIDE. OPPOSITION CAME LARGELY FROM UK
ALTHOUGH ITALY AND USA ALSO VOICED RESERVATIONS. PRINCIPAL COUNTER
ARGUMENT WAS THAT DECISION NOW ON MINISTERIAL ATTENDANCE WOULD
PREJUDICE OUTCOME OF NATOS REVIEW OF ITS NEGOTIATING POSITION.
NOR/NOR WAS IT THOUGH APPROPRIATE THAT MINS SHOULD SIGNAL IN
COMMUNIQUE THAT REVIEW WAS UNDERWAY SINCE THIS CARRIED WITH IT
IMPLICATION THAT WESTERN POSITION WAS GOING TO CHANGE. DURING COURSE
OF MTG, HOWEVER, IDEA TOOK HOLD THAT MBFR NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD NOT/NOT
BE ALLOWED TO LANGUISH IN OBSCURITY AND THAT MINS HAS RESPONSIBILITY
TO INJECT SOME POLITICAL ADRENALIN IN ORDER TO GET THEM MOVING
AGAIN. AS RESULT, BY SECOND DAY REVIEW HAD BEEN AGREED TO AND SEC GEN,
WHO IS NOTED FOR HIS SCEPTICISM RE MBFR, WAS REFERRING TO A QUOTE
PREJUGE FAVORABLE UNQUOTE ON PART OF MINS TO CDN PROPOSAL FOR
MINISTERIAL ATTENDANCE AT VIENN AND TO AGREEMENT THAT PROPOSAL
SHOULD BE LOOKED AT AGAIN ONCE REVIEW IS COMPLETED. DPM/SSEA OFFERED
TO HOST INFORMAL LASPAINIERE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS TO CONSIDER
RESULTS OF REVIEW. WHILE IT WAS NOT/NOT POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN IN
COMMUNIQUE MORE THAN REF TO QUOTE ALLIES REVIEWING STATE OF
NEGOTIATIONS IN LIGHT OF (EASTERN) STATEMENTS UNQUOTE, (SEE PARA 13) SEC
GEN UNDERTOOK AT SUBSEQUENT PRESS CONFERENCE TO POINT OUT THAT NATO
WAS ALSO REVIEWING ITS NEGOTIATING POSITION (OURTEL YBGR7190 09DEC).
THIS POINT WAS ALSO MADE BY DPM/SSEA AT HIS PRESS CONFERENCE.
8. MORE DETAILED REPORTS COVERING MIN EXCHANGES ON EAST/WEST
RELATIONS, INF, CDE AND MBFR TO FOLLOW.

CCC/054 091720Z YBGR7189

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M.F.

28-6-1 - Hudson
Peace
Mission

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FM BNATO YBGR7188 09DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDR DELIVER BY 091200

INFO WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN ROME OSLO COPEN MDRID LSBON ATHNS ANKRA
MOSCO WSAW PRGUE BPEST BUCST BGRAD VIENN GENEV STKHM VMBFR NDHQOTT/
ADMPO/DIPOL/DNACPOL/DSTRATA PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR IDA IDD IFB USS DMF RBR RBD RCR RCD CPD CCB CGE CGS ZSP ZSI
URR URD UGB IDDZ

---NAC MINISTERIAL MTG-DECLARATION

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DECLARATION OF BRUSSELS, IN BOTH ENGLISH
AND FRENCH

2.TEXT BEGINS QUOTE

DECLARATION OF BRUSSELS

WE, THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SIXTEEN MEMBER
COUNTRIES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, REAFFIRM THE
DEDICATION OF THE ALLIES TO THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IN
FREEDOM.

OUR ALLIANCE THREATENS NO/NO ONE. NONE OF OUR
WEAPONS WILL EVER BE USED EXCEPT IN RESPONSE TO ATTACK. WE
DO NOT/NOT ASPIRE TO SUPERIORITY, NEITHER WILL WE ACCEPT THAT
OTHERS SHOULD BE SUPERIOR TO US. OUR LEGITIMATE SECURITY
INTERESTS CAN ONLY BE GUARANTEED THROUGH THE FIRM LINKAGE
BETWEEN EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA. WE CALL UPON THE SOVIET
UNION TO RESPECT OUR LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS AS WE
RESEPECT THEIRS.

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PAGE TWO YBGR7188 UNCLAS

WE ARE DETERMINED TO ENSURE SECURITY ON THE BASIS OF A BALANCE OF FORCES AT THE LOWEST POSSIBLE LEVEL. FACED WITH THE THREAT POSED BY THE SOVIET SS-20 MISSILES, THE ALLIES CONCERNED ARE GOING FORWARD WITH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DOUBLE-TRACK DECISION OF 1979. THE ULTIMATE GOAL REMAINS THAT THERE SHOULD BE NEITHER SOVIET NOR UNITED STATES LAND BASED LONG-RANGE INF MISSILES. THE DEPLOYMENT OF USA MISSILES CAN BE HALTED OR REVERSED BY CONCRETE RESULTS AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. IN THIS SPIRIT WE WISH TO SEE AN EARLY RESUMPTION OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS WHICH THE SOVIET UNION HAS DISCONTINUED(1) FOOTNOTE: (1) DENMARK AND GREECE RESERVE THEIR POSITIONS ON THIS PARA; SPAIN, NOT HAVING BEEN A PARTY TO THE DOUBLE-TRACK DECISION OF 1979, RESERVES ITS POSITION ON THIS PARA.

WE URGE THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT TO SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITIES WE OFFER FOR A BALANCED AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP AND FOR GENUINE DETENTE. IN ALL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS PROGRESS MUST BE MADE AMONG THE STATES PARTICIPATING, IN PARTICULAR IN:

- THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS (START);
- THE INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TALKS (INF);
- THE NEGOTIATIONS ON MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS (MBFR);

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PAGE THREE YBGR7188 UNCLAS

-THE ENDEAVOURS FOR A COMPLETE BAN ON CHEMICAL
WEAPONS IN THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT.

WE ARE ALSO RESOLVED TO USE THE FORTHCOMING
STKHM CONFERENCE AS A NEW OPPORTUNITY TO BROADEN THE
DIALOGUE WITH THE EAST, TO NEGOTIATE CONFIDENCE BUILDING
MEASURES AND ENHANCE STABILITY AND SECURITY IN THE WHOLE OF
EUROPE.

WE SHALL CONTINUE TO DO OUR UTMOST TO SUSTAIN A
SAFE AND PEACEFUL FUTURE. WE EXTEND TO THE SOVIET UNION AND
THE OTHER WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES THE OFFER TO WORK TOGETHER
WITH US TO BRING ABOUT A LONG-TERM CONSTRUCTIVE AND REALISTIC
RELATIONSHIP BASED ON EQUILIBRIUM, MODERATION AND RECIPROCITY.
FOR THE BENEFIT OF MANKIND WE ADVOCATE AN OPEN COMPREHENSIVE
POLITICAL DIALOGUE, AS WELL AS CO-OPERATION BASED ON MUTUAL
ADVANTAGE. UNQUOTE.

DECLARATION DE BRUXELLES

NOUS, REPRESENTANTS DES SEIZE PAYS MEMBRES DE
L ALLIANCE ATLANTIQUE, REAFFIRMONS L ATTACHEMENT DES ALLIES
AU MAINTIEN DE LA PAIX DANS LA LIBERTE.

NOTRE ALLIANCE NE MENACE PERSONNE. AUCUNE DE NOS
ARMES NE SERA JAMAIS UTILISEE AUTREMENT QUE POUR REPENDRE A
UNE AGRESSION. NOUS N ASPIRONS PAS NOUS-MEMES A LA SUPERIORITE

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PAGE FOUR YBGR7188 UNCLAS

MAIS NE TOLERONS PAS NON PLUS LA SUPERIORITE DES AUTRES.
NOS INTERETS LEGITIMES EN MATIERE DE SECURITE NE PEUVENT ETRE
GARANTIS QUE PAR LE FERME LIEN QUI UNIT L EUROPE ET
L AMERIQUE DU NORD.NOUS APPELONS L UNION SOVIETIQUE A
RESPECTER NOS INTERETS LEGITIMES EN MATIERE DE SECURITE
COMME NOUS RESPECTONS LES SIENS.

NOUS SOMMES DETERMINES A ASSURER LA SECURITE SUR
LA BASE D UN EQUILIBRE DES FORCES AU NIVEAU LE PLUS BAS
POSSIBLE.CONFRONTES A LA MENACE DES MISSILES SOVIETIQUES
SS-20,LES ALLIES CONCERNES METTENT ACTUELLEMENT EN OEUVRE LA
DOUBLE DECISION DE 1979.L OBJECTIF ULTIME DEMEURE QU IL N Y
AIT AUCUN MISSILE DES FNI A LONGUE PORTEE BASE A TERRE.NI
SOVIETIQUE NI AMERICAIN.LE PROCESSUS DE DEPLOIEMENT DE
MISSILES AMERICAINS PEUT ETRE ARRETE OU INVERSE SELON
LES RESULTATS CONCRETS OBTENUS A LA TABLE DE NEGOCIATION.
DANS CET ESPRIT,NOUS SOUBHAITONS VOIR REPRENDRE RAPIDEMENT
LES NEGOCIATIONS SUR LES FNI QUE L UNION SOVIETIQUE A
INTERROMPUES.(1)LE DANEMARK ET LA GRECE RESERVENT L UN ET L AUTRE
LEUR POSITION SUR CE PARA;L ESPAGNE,QUI NA PAS ETE PARTIE A LA
DOUBLE DECISION DE 1979,RESERVE SA POSITION SUR CE PARA.

NOUS INVITONS INSTAMMENT LES PAYS DU PACTE DE

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PAGE FIVE YBGR7188 UNCLAS

VARSOVIE A SAISIR LES OCCASIONS QUE NOUS LEUR OFFRONS D ETABLIR
DES RELATIONS EQUILIBREES ET CONSTRUCTIVES ET UNE DETENTE
VERITABLE. DES PROGRES DOIVENT ETRE REALISES, ENTRE LES
PARTICIPANTS, DANS TOUTES LES NEGOCIATIONS SUR LA MAITRISE
DES ARMEMENTS, EN PARTICULIER:

-AUX CONVERSATIONS SUR LA REDUCTION DES ARMEMENTS
STRATEGIQUES (START);

-AUX CONVERSATIONS SUR LES FORCES NUCLEAIRES A
PORTEE INTERMEDIAIRE (FNI);

-AUX NEGOCIATIONS SUR LES REDUCTIONS MUTUELLES ET
EQUILIBREES DE FORCES (MBFR);

-DANS LA RECHERCHE D UNE INTERDICTION COMPLETE DES
ARMES CHIMIQUES AU COMITE DU DESARMEMENT.

NOUS SOMMES EGALEMENT RESOLUS A METTRE A PROFIT
LES POSSIBILITES NOUVELLES QU OFFRE LA CONFERENCE QUI DOIT
S OUVRIR PROCHAINEMENT A STKHM POUR ELARGIR LE DIALOGUE
AVEC L EST, NEGOCIER DES MESURES DE CONFIANCE ET RENFORCER LA
SECURITY ET LA STABILITE DANS L ENSEMBLE DE L EUROPE.

NOUS CONTINUERONS A FAIRE TOUT CE QUI EST EN NOTRE
POUVOIR POUR POSER LES BASES D UN AVENIR SUR ET PACIFIQUE.
NOUS AFFRONS A L UNION SOVIETIQUE ET AUX AUTRES PAYS DU PACTE
DE VARSOVIE D OEUVRER AVEC NOUS A L ETABLISSEMENT DE RELATIONS

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PAGE SIX YBGR7188 UNCLAS

REALISTES ET CONSTRUCTIVES A LONG TERME QUI REPOSENT
SUR L EQUILIBRE, LA MODERATION ET LA RECIPROCITE. POUR
LE BIEN DE L HUMANITE TOUT ENTIERE, NOUS SOMMES PARTISANS
D UN DIALOGUE POLITIQUE LARGE ET OUVERT, AINSI QUE D UNE
COOPERATION FONDEE SUR L INTERET MUTUEL.

UNQUOTE.

UUU/298 091441Z YBGR7188

NNNN

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR7184 09DEC83

TO EXTOTT RCR

INFO BONN BREEC

BH FANDOOTT DE OTZ

DISTR RCM IDDZ RCD RGB

REF BNATO TEL YBGR7180 08DEC

28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

---DPM/SSEA MTG WITH FM GENSCHER - BILATERAL QUESTIONS

AS INDICATED RFFTEL, ONLY VERY FEW MINUTES WERE DEVOTED TO
BILAT MATTERS DURING MTG BETWEEN DPM/SSEA AND FM GENSCHER ON
08DEC.

2. AFTER MAKING A FEW COMMENTS ABOUT COMMUNITY AGRICULTURAL
PROBLEMS WHICH HAD BEEN AT CENTRE OF DEBATES AT JUST CONCLUDED
EEC SUMMIT IN ATHNS, GENSCHER SAID THAT MIN MACEACHEN WOULD
SEE THAT FISH DID NOT/NOT REPRESENT THE ONLY ISSUE CONFRONTING
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. DPM/SSEA REPLIED THAT FROM CDN POINT OF
VIEW WE APPREARD TO BE MAKING GOOD PROGRESS ON NEGS RE FISH.
ONLY OUTSTANDING PROBLEM SEEMED TO RELATE TO SIZE OF PACKAGES
TO BE USED FOR CDN FISH EXPORTED. GENSCHER AGREED THAT THERE
HAD INDEED BEEN REAL PROGRESS IN NEGS.

3. DPM/SSEA MENTIONED THAT HE HAD RAISED QUESTION OF NEWSPRINT
EXPORTS WITH EEC COMMISSION REPS IN COURSE OF MTG HELD PREVIOUS
DAY. GENSCHER DID NOT/NOT REACT.

4. DPM/SSEA ALSO MENTIONED QUESTION OF SEALS FN PASSANT, BUT
SAID HE DID NOT/NOT WISH TO PURSUE IT IN COURSE OF THIS
CONVERSATION. DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO MULTILATERAL MATTERS.

CCC/070 091408Z YBGR7184

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28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM BNATO YBGR7183 09DEC83
TO EXTOTT IDR

INFO WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN ROME OSLO COPEN MDRID LSBON ATHNS ANKRA
MOSCO WSAW PRGUE BPEST BUCST BGRAD VMBFR GENEV STKHM PCOOTT/FOWLER
NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DIPOL/DACPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR IDA IDD IFB DMF USS RBR RBD RCR RCD CPD CCB CGE CGS ZSP ZSI
URR URD UGB (IDDZ)

---NAC MININTERIAL MTG--INTERVENTION OF DPM/SSEA

FOLLOWING IS ACCT OF MAIN CDN INTERVENTION DURING COURSE OF NATO
FMS MTG DEC8-9.

2.DPM/SSEA INTRODUCED HIS REMARKS WITH OBSERVATION THAT HE SHARED
GENSCHERS DESCRIPTION OF INF DEPLOYMENT AS QUOTE VICTORY UNQUOTE
FOR ALLIANCE.USSR HAD SUFFERED POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFEAT.
HAD NATO FAILED IN ITS DETERMINATION,OR LOST PARLIAMENTARY VOTES,
OR NOT/NOT DEPLOYED,ALLIANCE WOULD BE SUFFERING SAME REVERSE AS
USSR NOW WAS.

3.QUESTION AROSE WHAT APPROACH WEST SHOULD TAKE IN LIGHT OF
THAT EVENT.DPM/SSEA SAID THAT,IN HIS VIEW,APPROACH SHOULD STEM
FROM CONFIDENCE IN WESTS ECONOMIC,POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRENGTH.
NOR SHOULD IT BE STATIC OR ASSUME UNCHANGING POLICY OR APPLY
POLICY IN EXACTLY SAME WAY.IT HAD TO BE REMEMBERED THAT LARGE
PROPORTIONS OF PUBLIC IN WEST HAD NOT/NOT AGREED WITH NATO POSITION
ON INF.THIS HAD BEEN CASE BOTH IN CDA AND ELSEWHERE.DEMOCRACY

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PAGE TWO YBVGR7183 CONF D

INSISTED THAT THIS FACT BE TAKEN INTO ACCT. WESTERN GOVTS ALSO HAD TO TAKE ACCT OF LEGITIMATE RIGHTS AND ASPIRATIONS OF USSR. THERE WAS NEED TO DEVELOP NOTION OF MUTUAL TRUST. IN CDN VIEW THERE WAS/WAS STILL SOMEONE AT END OF LINE IN USSR. ANDROPOV WAS STILL VERY MUCH IN CHARGE AT LEAST IN NEAR TERM, THOUGH IN LONG TERM SITU WAS LESS CLEAR. FOR NOW WEST HAD TO WORRY OVER INFLUENCE OF SOVIET MILITARY. THIS WAS ALL MORE REASON TO MAINTAIN DIALOGUE WITH MOSCO.

4. DPM/SSEA SAID HE AGREED WITH EARLIER SPEAKERS ABOUT CRISIS IN E/W RELATIONS, SEVERITY OF WHICH OUGHT NOT/NOT TO BE DENIED. IF THIS WAS SO, WEST SHOULD BE SEEKING TO REVERSE DOWNWARD TREND AND RISK OF CONFRONTATION. PUBLIC CONTINUED TO BELIEVE IN THREAT FROM SOVIET UNION, BUT SAW MORE IMMEDIATE THREAT, OF WAR. GOVTS HAD TO DEMONSTRATE THEY WERE AS KEEN TO AVOID WAR AS PUBLIC. THIS WAS PRINCIPAL PUBLIC ANXIETY IN CDA. SO HE AGREED WITH GENSCHER ON NEED TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

5. MR MACEACHEN SAID HE WISHED TO MENTION TWO STEPS AS MEANS OF PROMOTING GREATER CONFIDENCE AND INJECTING POLITICAL INFLUENCE INTO NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID GENSCHER'S COMMENTS ON IMPORTANCE OF FORTHCOMING STKHM CSBMS CONFERENCE HAD BEEN NOTED BY EVERYONE. CONFIDENCE BLDG WAS IMPORTANT MEANS OF PAVING WAY FOR ARMS CONTROL, BUT IT WAS NOT/NOT ONLY ONE. CDE ADDRESSED INTENTIONS, WHILE MBFR GRAPPLED WITH PROBLEM OF CAPABILITIES. CDE, HE SAID, PROVIDED

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PAGE THREE YBGR7183 CONFD

CONCEPTUAL LINK BETWEEN POLITICAL AND MILITARY DIMENSIONS OF E/W RELATIONS. WEST SHOULD HAVE NO/NO ILLUSIONS; STKHM WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT CONFERENCE. BUT MINS COULD INJECT POSITIVE ELEMENT BY WATCHING OVER CONF CLOSELY. MINS, HE SUGGESTED, SHOULD AGREE TO RECONVENE IN STKHM AT START OF CONFERENCE. THIS WOULD PUT ONUS ON EAST, AND SHOW THAT NATO FMS MEANT BUSINESS. IT WOULD ALSO APPEAL TO NNA. ABOVE ALL, IT WOULD SIGNAL TO WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION THAT ALLIANCE APPROACHED DIALOGUE FROM POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE POINT OF VIEW. DPM/SSEA SAID HE WAS PLEASED THERE WAS ALREADY GOOD DEAL OF SUPPORT FOR SUCH IDEA.

6. AS FOR VIENN TALKS ON MBFR, MR MACEACHEN SAID IT WAS CLEAR TO CDA THAT WESTERN NEGOTIATORS NEEDED NEW GUIDANCE ON HOW TO RESPOND TO EASTERN PROPOSALS, WHICH WERE UNACCEPTABLE IN THEIR PRESENT FORM. WEST MUST BE SEEN TO BE MAKING CONSTRUCTIVE COUNTER-PROPOSAL SOON. IT COULD NOT/NOT CONTINUE TO RELY ON ITS JUL82 POSITION. SO CDA BELIEVED THERE WAS NEED FOR URGENT REVIEW OF WESTERN POSITION. IT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN AT ONCE AND PURSUED WITH VIGOUR. THERE SHOULD BE CONTRIBUTIONS FROM CAPITALS TO DEVELOP NEW IDEAS FOR VIENN, WHICH SHOULD BE PRESENTED EARLY IN NEW YEAR. ONCE NEW POSITON HAD BEEN WORKED OUT, WHETHER IN FORM OF COUNTERPROPOSALS OF NEW INITIATIVES, CDA BELIEVED WESTERN PARTICIPANTS SHOULD INDICATE WILLINGNESS TO MEET WITH EASTERN PARTICIPANTS AT MINISTERIAL LEVEL IN VIENN.

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PAGE FOUR YBGR7183 CONFD

7. BOTH STEPS WERE IMPORTANT, MR MACEACHEN CONCLUDED. STKHM
CONF WAS WELL ON ITS WAY TO BEING LAUNCHED. IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT
TO USE VIENN CONF IN SAME WAY TO DEMONSTRATE WESTS WILLINGNESS
TO DIALOGUE.

CCC/070 091418Z YBGR7183

28-6-1 - Hudson
Peace
Mission

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT IDR4737 09DEC83

TO BGRAD

DISTR APG RBR IDDZ

---SB HANSON-TD IN OTT

HANSON, WHOM YOU MAY REMEMBER, RETURNING TO BGRAD ON FLT JU211 1
1800. PLEASE HOLD ALL MAIL.

UUU/088 091722Z IDR4737

28-6-1-1 / Trudeau
Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR4336 09DEC83

TO EXTOTT/IDR

INFO BNATO BUCST PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN
OSLO BRU HAGUE WSHDC MOSCO GENEV WSAW BPEST PRGUE BGRAD STKHM
VMBFR PRMNY PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/CIS/ADMPOL/CPD.DNACPOL/CIS
DISTR MINA MINE USS DMF IFB UGB URR RGB RSD RSR RCD RCR RBD FPR
IDD IDRA IDDZ RBRD ZSP RBP ZSI

REF IDR4719 07DEC

---INF:ROMANIAN INITIATIVE:BRITISH VIEWS

SUMMARY:ROMANIAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICIALS BRAD AND NEAGU CALLED
ON FCO ASST UNDER SECY RESPONSIBLE FOR DEFENCE 02DEC TO PUT
FORWARD ROMANIAN INITIATIVE ON INF.THEY TOLD OFFICIALS HERE THAT
INITIATIVE WAS PROMPTED BY BREAKDOWN OF GENEVA TALKS AND BY
PRESIDENT CEAUSESCUS BELIEF THAT IT WAS NOW ESSENTIAL TO REOPEN
EAST/WEST DIALOGUE AND PARTICULARLY FOR USA TO HALT DEPLOYMENT
OF NEW MEDIUM RANGE WEAPONS IN EUROPE,AND FOR SOVIETS TO
WITHDRAW AND DESTROY THEIR EXISTING WEAPONS.AIM SHOULD BE TO
ACHIEVE BALANCE OF FORCES IN EUROPE.BRITISH REPLIED THAT WHILE
THEY SHARED ROMANIAN DESIRE FOR FURTHER DIALOGUE,THIS COULD ONLY
BE EFFECTIVE IF IT FOLLOWED CREATION OF PROPER POLITICAL CLIMATE.
WHILE UK WAS GLAD THAT ROMANIA RECOGNIZED PRINCIPLE OF PARITY,
AND UNDERSTOOD THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH STRATEGIC NUCLEAR SYSTEMS

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PAGE TWO XNGR4336 CONF

HAD NO PLACE IN INF NEGOTIATIONS, BRITISH POSITION REMAINED FIRM THAT ONLY SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR INVENTORIES OF SUPER POWERS COULD OPEN WAY FOR BRITISH DETERRENT TO BECOME RELEVANT TO ARMS REDUCTION TALKS.

2.REPORT:BRAD AND NEAGUS LONDON VISIT 02DEC TO PRESS ROMANIAN INF INITIATIVE FOCUSED ON MEETING WITH FCO ASST UNDER SECY FOR DEFENCE MATTERS,CARTLEDGE.(WE HAVE DELAYED REPORTING ON MEETING BECAUSE FCO HAD UNDERTAKEN TO PASS ON FULL TRANSCRIPT.THIS HAS NOW BEEN DONE,AND COPIES ARE BAGGED TODAY TO IDR,BNATO,BUCST,WSHDC AND GENEV)FOLLOWING ARE MAIN HIGHLIGHTS OF TALKS:

3.ROMANIANS TOLD BRITISH THERE WERE TWO POSSIBLE FORMULA WHICH COULD BE ADOPTED UNDER THEIR PROPOSALS:A)USA WOULD NOT ASSEMBLE OR DEPLOY ANY INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN EUROPE,AND THOSE PARTS ALREADY HERE WOULD BE STOCKPILED.IN RETURN,SOVIETS WOULD WITHDRAW AND DESTROY ALL INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES DEPLOYED IN EUROPEAN PART OF SOVIET TERRITORY.MEANWHILE USA WOULD REDUCE CORRESPONDINGLY ITS FORWARD BASED NUCLEAR WEAPONS;B)USA WOULD NOT DEPLOY ANY MISSILES IN EUROPE:SOVIET UNION WOULD KEEP FOR A TIME BEING ON EUROPEAN PART OF ITS TERRITORY A NUMBER OF WARHEADS EQUAL TO NUMBER OF THOSE HELD BY UK AND FRANCE,WITH REST BEING SCRAPPED.THOSE KEPT BY SOVIET UNION SHOULD BE MOVED TO SAME DISTANCE FROM ITS FRONTIERS AS DISTANCE

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PAGE THREE XNGR4336 CONF D

FRENCH MISSILES WERE FROM TERRITORY OF SOVIET UNION. NEGOTIATIONS WOULD THEN CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARDS ELIMINATION AND DESTRUCTION OF ALL US AND SOVIET INTERMEDIATE RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES.

4. NEAGU ALSO PROPOSED NUMBER OF MEETINGS: 1) BETWEEN USA AND SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTERS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE; 2) BETWEEN PRESIDENTS ANDROPOV AND REAGAN AT BEGINNING OF 1984; 3) BETWEEN NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS AND WARSAW PACT FOREIGN MINISTERS; 4) A PARALLEL CONFERENCE TO GENEVA TALKS IN WHICH ALL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES SHOULD PARTICIPATE; 5) SPEEDED UP MBFR AND 6) MEETING BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF NATO AND WARSAW PACT TO DISCUSS CONVENTIONAL ARMS REDUCTIONS AND REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS.

5. ROMANIANS TOLD BRITISH THAT WHILE IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO IGNORE EXISTENCE OF BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR MISSILES, THEY RECOGNIZED IT WAS DIFFICULT TO INCLUDE THESE IN CURRENT GENEVA TALKS; THEY THEREFORE SUGGESTED THAT UK SHOULD BE PREPARED TO MAKE STATEMENT AGREEING THAT AT APPROPRIATE STAGE IN DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS, UK NUCLEAR FORCES WOULD BE CONSIDERED IN GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF BALANCE OF FORCES BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. TO EMPHASIZE ROMANIAN INITIATIVE, PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU WOULD BE MAKING PERSONAL APPEAL TO PRESIDENTS ANDROPOV AND REAGAN.

6. IN RETURN, CARTLEDGE WELCOMED ROMANIAN RECOGNITION OF PRINCIPLE OF PARITY, AND THAT BRITISH AND FRENCH NUCLEAR SYSTEMS

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PAGE FOUR XNGR4336 CONFD

SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN CURRENT GENEVA INF NEGOTIATIONS. HE REAFFIRMED BRITISH VIEW THAT UK DETERRENT COULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN ARMS CONTROL TALKS UNTIL SUCH TIME AS SUPERPOWERS HAD COMPLETED SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTIONS. HE DESCRIBED FIRST ROMANIAN PROPOSAL AS CLOSE TO PROPOSALS US HAD PUT TO SOVIETS AT START OF GENEVA TALKS, AND NOTED THAT BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED THAT CALCULATION OF MISSILE WARHEADS SHOULD BE IN GLOBAL TERMS AND SHOULD INCLUDE ALL LRINF INCLUDING THOSE IN ASIA; SOVIETS HAD REJECTED ZERO OPTION AND HAD INSISTED ON RETAINING SUBSTANTIAL MONOPOLY ON SS20S IN EUROPEAN RUSSIA. HE SAID BRITISH ALSO SAW DIFFICULTIES WITH SECOND ROMANIAN PROPOSAL: RETENTION BY SOVIET UNION OF NUMBER OF SS20S WOULD ALLOW SOVIET UNION TO RETAIN MONOPOLY. FURTHERMORE BRITISH AND FRENCH SYSTEMS COULD NOT BE LINKED IN ANY WAY TO NEGOTIATIONS TO WHICH THEY WERE NOT RELEVANT.

7. IN CONSIDERING ROMANIAN SUGGESTION THAT WEST MIGHT MAKE CONCESSIONS TO PERSUADE SOVIETS TO REENTER GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, CARTLEDGE TOLD NEAGU THAT THERE WAS NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT WOULD IN FACT ENCOURAGE SOVIETS TO RESUME TALKS; WEST HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT WERE SOVIETS TO RETURN TO NEGOTIATIONS, DEPLOYMENT PROGRAMME COULD BE HALTED, MODIFIED OR REVERSED AT ANY STAGE IF AN AGREEMENT WERE TO RESULT WHICH JUSTIFIED THIS.

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PAGE FIVE XNGR4336 CONFD

8. BRITISH TOLD ROMANIANS THAT THEY SHARED DESIRE FOR FURTHER EAST/WEST DIALOGUE, BUT SUGGESTED THAT THIS COULD ONLY BE EFFECTIVE WERE IT TO TAKE PLACE IN QUOTE RIGHT POLITICAL CLIMATE UNQUOTE. THIS COULD ONLY BE ACHIEVED WERE SOVIETS TO RETURN TO TALKS. IN MEANTIME, GRADUAL PROCESS OF DEPLOYMENT WOULD CONTINUE OVER NEXT FIVE YEARS.

9. ROMANIANS TOLD BRITISH THAT THEY WERE NOT AWARE OF HOW THEIR PROPOSALS HAD BEEN RECEIVED IN MOSCO.

CCC/224 091627Z XNGR4336

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

28.6.1 - Theodor
Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM LDN XNGR4332 09DEC83

TO EXTOTT RSR DELIVER BY 090900

INFO ANKRA ATHNS TAVIV PRMNY GENEV VIENN BNATO BREEC PESCO BERUT

CAIRO COPEN STKHM CNBRA HSNKI DUBLN WSHDC PARIS HAGUE BRU OSLO

BONN LSBON MDRID ROME MOSCO DELHI TOKYO PEKIN PCOOTT/FOWLER

NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DIPOL/DGIS/DMPC

DISTR MINA MINE MINT FPR USS DMF DMFX RGB IFB CPD RSD RCR SID

SIDG IDD IDDZ IDR IMD IMU IMC JLA JLO GMD GMR GMRD ZSP ZSI URR

RCM

REF OURTEL XNGR4320 07DEC

---TURKISH-CYPRIOT UDI, AND UNFICYP

SUMMARY: FURTHER BRIEFING FROM FCO SOUTHERN EUROPEAN DEPT ADDED LITTLE OF SUBSTANCE TO OUR REFTEL. THATCHER/PAPANDREOU MEETING AT ATHNS SUMMIT WAS NECESSARILY BRIEF AND ELICITED AMBIVALENT GREEK RESPONSE: PAPANDEOU TOLD PM THATCHER THAT HE WAS NOT CHANGING HIS MIND ABOUT TRIPARTITE TALKS: QUOTE I WILL NOT SIT DOWN WITH TURKS BUT I WILL HAVE ANOTHER WORD WITH KYPRIANOU ON MATTER AND LET YOU KNOW UNQUOTE. BRITISH OFFICIALS ARE PRIVATELY SCEPTICAL THAT AN EFFECTIVE FORMULA FOR GUARANTOR PARTY TALKS WILL BE FOUND. ON UNFICYP, BRITISH GOVT HAS NOT YET GIVEN FORMAL APPROVAL TO EXTENSION OF BRITISH CONTINGENT, THOUGH FCO EXPECTS THIS TO BE DONE IN NEAR FUTURE. IN MEANTIME, BRITISH DEL AT UNGA

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PAGE TWO XNGR4332 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CONTINUE WORK ON RESOLUTION WITH AIM OF ACHIEVING ACCEPTABLE TRADE-OFF. OFFICIALS HERE EXPECT THAT COMPROMISE WILL BE DIFFICULT, BUT ARE PREPARED TO QUOTE RIDE STORM OUT UNQUOTE. THEY AGREE WITH CDN DESIRE TO SEE MANDATE RENEWED WITH AS LITTLE FANFARE AS POSSIBLE.

2. REPORT: TRIPARTITE TALKS: PAPANDEOU/THATCHER MEETING AT ATHNS SUMMIT HAS STILL LEFT BRITISH UNCERTAIN AS TO WHETHER PAPANDEOU REJECTION OF TRIPARTITE TALKS IS FINAL, OR WHETHER HIS REFERENCE TO FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH KYPRIANOU LEAVES POSSIBILITY OF SOME SORT OF ACCEPTABLE DISCUSSIONS STILL OPEN. STRONG IMPRESSION HERE IS THAT GREEKS WILL IN END MAINTAIN REFUSAL TO MEET WITH TURKS, AND THAT TRIPARTITE TALKS DO NOT THEREFORE OFFER VIABLE AVENUE FOR SOLUTION. UK IS IN NO HURRY TO MAKE GREEK REJECTION (MUCH LESS THEIR OWN PESSIMISTIC OUTLOOK) PUBLIC. THEY RECOGNIZE PITFALLS IN PAPANDEOU/KYPRIANOU EFFORTS TO SHIFT RESPONSIBILITY TO UK, AND ULTIMATELY, TO HAVE UK TAKE BLAME WHEN PROCESS FAILS. BRITISH ON OTHER HAND ARE LOOKING TO UN SEC GEN TO LAUNCH INITIATIVE WHICH UK COULD SUPPORT; FCO ARGUE THAT THEY THEMSELVES HAVE ONLY LIMITED LEVERAGE WITH TURKEY AND NOT MUCH MORE WITH PAPANDEOU, AND THAT ANY EFFECTIVE INITIATIVE MUST THUS COME FROM UN, AND MUST BE STRONGLY SUPPORTED BY USA. BRITISH AMBASSADOR IN ANKRA HAS ON INSTRUCTIONS SUGGESTED RATHER BLUNTLY TO TURKISH POLITICAL DIRECTOR ...3

PAGE THREE XNGR4332 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

THAT FOR ANY PROGRESS TO BE MADE, TURKEY WILL NEED TO COME UP WITH PACKAGE OF CONCESSIONS ITSELF, EG TURKISH TROOP WITHDRAWALS, AND TO INSPIRE DENKTASH TO IMPROVE HIS OFFER, ESPECIALLY ON AIRPORT. TURKISH RESPONSE WAS AS NONCOMMITTAL AS ONE MIGHT EXPECT IN DAYS JUST PRIOR TO NEW FOREIGN MINISTER BEING SWORN IN; BRITISH AMBASSADOR WILL RETURN TO CHARGE (SOMEWHAT MORE SOFTLY) ONCE FOREIGN MINISTER TAKES OFFICE. OFFICIALS HERE ARE PRIVATELY PESSIMISTIC THAT TURKS WILL AGREE TO COME UP WITH SUFFICIENTLY ATTRACTIVE CONCESSIONS TO BRING GREEK/GREEK CYPRIOTS AROUND.

3. BESIDES BEING SCEPTICAL OF POSSIBILITIES FOR TRIPARTITE TALKS, OR MEANINGFUL TURKISH CONCESSIONS, BRITISH OFFICIALS HAVE TWO OTHER LONGER TERM CONCERNS; THEY ARE WORRIED THAT KYPRIANOU WILL PAINT HIMSELF INTO A CORNER BY CONTINUING TO INSIST ON PRIOR REVERSAL OF UDI; THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT GREEK PREMIER WILL PLAY QUOTE SPOILING ROLE UNQUOTE SEEING UDI AS OPPORTUNITY TO SCORE POINTS IN TURKISH/GREEK RELATIONS. QUOTE THERE ARE FEW THINGS THAT GREEK GOVT CAN DO TO HELP SITUATION, BUT MANY WHICH THEY CAN DO TO TRY TO SPOIL IT UNQUOTE.

4. ON UNFICYP, CDN AND BRITISH THINKING LARGELY COINCIDES; WHILE BRITISH HAVE NOT RECEIVED NECESSARY FORMAL GOVT APPROVAL FOR EXTENSION OF CONTINGENT, FCO EXPECT PROCESS TO BE COMPLETED SHORTLY. UNGA DEL HAS BEEN IN TOUCH OTHER SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS

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PAGE FOUR XNGR4332 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

(AND WE UNDERSTAND WITH CANDEL)WORKING ON RESOLUTION WHICH MIGHT EVENTUALLY ACHIEVE COMPROMISE ON REFERENCES TO GOVT OF CYPRUS AND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 541.BRITISH UNDERSTAND THAT GREEKS AND GREEK CYPRIOTS HAVE APPROACHED ALL SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS,AND OFFICIALS HERE DO NOT MINIMIZE DIFFICULTIES THEY SEE IN PUTTING TOGETHER ACCEPTABLE FORMULA.BRITISH DEL EVIDENTLY HAS INSTRUCTIONS TO QUOTE RIDE STORM OVER UNQUOTE AND TO LOOK FOR ALL HELP THAT THEY AND OTHER CONTRIBUTORS CAN GIVE AND GET. THEY HAVE SPOKEN DIRECTLY TO GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS IN NEW YORK,AND AT OFFICIAL LEVEL TO CYPRIOT GOVT IN NICOSIA.AIM HERE, AS IN OTT,IS TO HAVE MANDATE RENEWED WITH AS LITTLE FUSS AS POSSIBLE.FINANCIAL AND RELATED QUESTIONS SHOULD BE LEFT ASIDE, TO BE TAKEN UP IN EARNEST IN THE NEW YEAR,AND WELL BEFORE MANDATE ONCE AGAIN COMES UP FOR RENEWAL.

5.FCO SOUTHERN EUROPEAN DEPT ARE RELUCTANT TO ADDRESS QUESTION AS TO WHAT WOULD HAPPEN SHOULD DENKTASH INSIST ON MORE THAN RENEWAL OF MANDATE,EG IF TURKISH CYPRIOT OBJECTION TO REFERENCE TO GOVT OF CYPRUS IS FIRST SHOT IN LONGER EFFORT TO PUT UNFICYP RELATIONS WITH TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY ON SAME FOOTING AS WITH CYPRIOT GOVT.WHILE THEY SUGGEST PRIVATELY THAT UNFICYP COULD STILL BE EFFECTIVE WITHOUT FULL COOPERATION FROM TURKISH CYPRIOTS(SUPPORT OF GREEK CYPRIOTS IS ESSENTIAL)OFFICIALS WILL DO NO MORE THAN SUGGEST THAT THEY WILL CROSS THIS BRIDGE IF AND WHEN THEY MUST COME TO IT.

CCC/253 091116Z XNGR4332

28-6-1 = Trudeau
Peace
Mission
action

mf

UNCLASSIFIED

FM TOKYO UIGR3064 09DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 090900

INFO MOSCO WSHDC BNATO PRMNY ROME LDN PARIS ERU HAGUE BONN

NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/ CPP PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA DMF PGB RGB UGB IFB RBR UCB URR RCR ZSP ZSI PPR IDD

IDA IDR

---PM INITIATIVE:JPNSE REACTION

DURING VISIT OF PGB,JPNSE OFFICIALS DREW TO OUR AITN COMMENTS BY
PM NAKASONE IN DIET ON PM TRUDEAUS PEACE INITIATIVE.COMING IMMED
BEFORE DISSOLUTION FOR LOWER HOUSE ELECTION,COMMENTS WERE NOT/NOT
PICKED UP BY JPNSE PRESS.UNLIKE HANSARD,DIET PROCEEDINGS ESPECIALLY
OF UPPER HOUSE CTTEES,ARE NOT/NOT CIRCULATED PUBLICLY FOR SEVERAL
DAYS,SO WE DID NOT/NOT RECEIVE FULL TEXT OF NAKASONES REMARKS
UNTIL MID-WEEK.FOLLOWING IS OFFICE TRANSLATION OF RELEVANT PASSAGES
FROM RECORD OF AD HOC CTTEE ON ADMIN REFORM,HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS:
QUOTE EXCERPTS FROM MINUTES OF HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS AD HOC CTTEE
ON ADMIN REFORM;100TH DIET;

1.MONDAY,NOVEMBER 21,1983:PRIME MINISTER YASUHIRO NAKASONE(IN RFLY
TO OSAMU YATABE,JPN SOCIALIST PARTY)...ON SAT(20NOV)I WAS PAID
A VISIT BY CDN PM PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU.HE SAID HE WAS ON HIS
WAY TO INDIA,WHERE HE WAS SCHEDULED TO DISCUSS DEFENCE AND
DISARMAMENT ISSUES WITH THE HEADS OF THE COMMONWEALTH NATIONS.
IN OUR MTGS,I ASKED HIM ABOUT HIS VIEWS(ON DISARMAMENT AND WAYS TO
PROMOTE WORLD PEACE).THE CDN PM IS VERY ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT PROMOTING

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PAGE TWO UIGR3064 UNCLAS

TALKS ON NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION. PM TRUDEAU AND I ARE IN AGMT THAT IN LIGHT OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, THE NUCLEAR SUPER-POWER AND OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS SHOULD EXERCISE GREATER MODERATION, THAT THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND OTHER THIRD POWERS SHOULD BE GIVEN ASSISTANCE IN THE PEACEFUL APPLICATION OF NUCLEAR ENERGY, AND THAT WE SHOULD PRESS MORE VIGOROUSLY FOR FULFILLMENT OF THAT COMMITMENT. PM TRUDEAU WAS GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY THE OUTCOME OF OUR MTG.

2. TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1983: PM YASUHIRO NAKASONE (IN REPLY TO KOICHIRO UEDA, JPN COMMUNIST PARTY): ... ON SAT, I WAS VISITED BY CDN PM PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU. WE TALKED FOR AN HOUR AND 40 MINUTES ON WAYS TO DO AWAY WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PREVENT WAR FROM OCCURRING. PM TRUDEAU AND I SHARED THE VIEW THAT, IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF BANISHING NUCLEAR ARMS AND PREVENTING WAR WOULD BE UNATTAINABLE UNLESS THE 5 NUCLEAR POWERS—THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, BRITAIN, FRANCE AND CHINA—COULD BE BROUGHT TOGETHER TO SIT DOWN AT THE SAME TABLE AND TALK SENSIBLY ABOUT COMMITTING THEMSELVES TO TOTALLY BANNING OR REDUCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ON THIS POINT, WE AGREED THAT A FORUM SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED WHERE THE 5 NUCLEAR POWERS CAN DISCUSS THIS QUESTION. HOWEVER, AS TO WHETHER THIS CAN ACTUALLY BE DONE AT ONCE, IT WILL BE NO/NO EASY MATTER TO CARRY OUT. UNLESS THE ISSUE BEING NEGOTIATED BETWEEN AMERICA AND THE SOVIET UNION INVOLVING THE PERSHING II AND SS-20

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PAGE THREE UIGR3064 UNCLAS

MISSILES IS SETTLED TO SOME EXTENT, IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO MOVE FORWARD.

PARA THEREFORE, IN ORDER TO GET THE 5 NUCLEAR POWERS TO SIT DOWN AT THE SAME TABLE, IT IS NECESSARY FOR US, AS CALLED FOR IN THE TOKYO STATEMENT, WHICH WAS ISSUED BY WEST GERMAN CHANCELLOR HELMUT KOHL AND MYSELF, TO WORK HARD FROM THE SIDELINES TO BRING THE INF (INTERMEDIATE NUCLEAR FORCES) TALKS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. THE TOKYO STATEMENT CALLED FOR PERSISTENCE IN OUR EFFORTS TO THAT END. WHEN I ASKED PM TRUDEAU FOR HIS SUPPORT FOR THE TOKYO STATEMENT, HE SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO TAKE PART AND GIVE HIS SUPPORT. SO, PLEASE UNDERSTAND THAT CDA AND JPN ARE MAKING TANGIBLE AND REALISTIC EFFORTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS TO RID THE WORLD OF NUCLEAR WAR, DO AWAY WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND CARRY OUT DISARMAMENT.

3. SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1983:

NORITAKE WADA (KOMEITO): I UNDERSTAND THAT CDN PM TRUDEAU CAME TO JPN FOR THE EXPRESS PURPOSE OF MTG YOU LAST SAT AND THAT AT THAT MTG HE EXPLAINED HIS 4-POINT DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL INCLUDING A CALL FOR CREATION OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION BY THE 5 MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS. I THINK THAT THE LINE OF THINKING THAT A POLITICAL DIALOGUE NEEDS TO BE STEPPED UP IN THE INTEREST OF EASING INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS IS VERY TIMELY. I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER, IN ADDITION TO TALKING FRANKLY TO US PRES RONALD REAGAN ON VARIOUS ISSUES, YOU INTEND AT THIS JUNCTURE,

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PAGE FOUR UIGR3064 UNCLAS

GIVEN THE PREVAILING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, TO ISSUE SOME SORT OF CALL FOR SAY, ARMS REDUCTION SIMILAR TO THE ONE PM TRUDEAU IS WORKING.

PARA PM YASUHIRO NAKASONE: I TOLD PM TRUDEAU THAT INTERNATIONAL RELNS HAVE BECOME GREATLY STRAINED, AS REVEALED IN THE INF NEGOTIATIONS AND OTHER DEVELOPMENTS LIKE, FOR INSTANCE, THE SHOOTING DOWN OF THE KAL AIRLINER, THE BOMB ATTACK IN RANGOON AGAINST SOUTH KOREAN LEADING FIGURES, OR THE RECENT FIGHTING BETWEEN RIVAL FACTIONS OF THE PLO IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I TOLD PM TRUDEAU THAT I ADMIRER HIM FOR ACTING, OUT OF CONCERN FOR THE DEADLOCK IN INTERNATIONAL RELNS, TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN CREATING A MOOD WHICH WOULD HELP TO BREAK THIS STALEMATE IN INTERNATIONAL RELNS AND THAT WE ALSO FEEL THE NECESSITY OF RESOLVING THE STALEMATE. I ALSO SAID THAT I HAD A VERY HIGH REGARD FOR THE INITIATIVE HE DISPLAYED IN VISITING COUNTRIES IN W EUROPE TO PRESENT SPECIFIC PROPOSALS (TO HALT THE ARMS RACE) AND IN COMING ALL THE WAY TO JPN WITH HIS MESSAGE.

PARA AMONG THE NUMBER OF PROPOSALS HE PRESENTED, HE STRONGLY STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF GETTING THE 5 NUCLEAR POWERS TO SIT DOWN TOGETHER AT THE SAME TABLE TO DISCUSS THIS QUESTION (OF REDUCING NUCLEAR ARMS) AND ASKED ME TO ALIGN MYSELF WITH HIM, TO WHICH I TOLD HIM I WAS, IN PRINCIPLE, IN FAVOUR OF HIS PROPOSALS. HOWEVER I EXPLAINED THAT BOTH CHINA AND FRANCE ARE STILL NOT/NOT

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PAGE FIVE UIGR3064 UNCLAS

YET PARTIES TO THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND THE NUCLEAR POWERS ALL DIFFER IN THE POSITIONS THEY ARE TAKING TOWARD THE UNITED NATIONS DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE. I SAID THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT WOULD BE EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT TO BRING THE 5 NUCLEAR POWERS TO THE SAME NEGOTIATING TABLE WHILE THE INF TALKS STILL REMAINED UNSETTLED. I POINTED OUT THAT, FOR MY PART, I ALSO BELIEVE IT WILL BE NECESSARY IN THE END TO GET THE 5 NUCLEAR POWERS TO SIT DOWN TOGETHER TO SERIOUSLY DISCUSS THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DRAW UP A SPECIFIC PLAN FOR NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION AND I ADDED THAT ULTIMATELY THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION COULD NOT/NOT BE EXPECTED TO BE COMPLETELY RESOLVED IF THIS STEP WAS NOT/NOT SUCCESSFULLY TAKEN. I SAID THAT IN ORDER TO MOVE FORWARD IN THAT DIRECTION, IT IS FIRST IMPERATIVELY NECESSARY TO CLEAR AWAY THE INF ISSUE, OTHERWISE THE OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHING A FORUM FOR DISCUSSION OF NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION BY THE 5 MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS CAN NEVER BE ATTAINED. IN THAT CONTEXT, I PLEDGED TO DO ALL I CAN TO HELP RESOLVE THE INF AND START ISSUES. BUT, FOR ALL THIS, I TOLD PM TRUDEAU THAT I UNDERSTOOD VERY WELL WHAT HE WAS SAYING.

PARA ANOTHER IMPORTANT POINT WHICH WE DISCUSSED AND WHICH WAS RAISED BY ME CONCERNS THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY UNDER WHICH JPN HAS RATIFIED, THE NUCLEAR POWERS ARE REQUIRED TO REFRAIN FROM PROVIDING NON-NUCLEAR COUNTRIES WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TO

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PAGE SIX UIGR3064 UNCLAS

EXTEND POSITIVE ASSISTANCE TO NON-NUCLEAR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN CONJUNCTION WITH PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY. JPN SIGNED AND HAS SINCE RATIFIED THE TREATY IN THE EXPECTATION THAT THE NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD FAITHFULLY OBSERVE THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY, BUT THE NUCLEAR POWERS HAVE NOT/NOT DONE ENOUGH TO RESTRAIN THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. I THINK THE NUCLEAR POWERS SHOULD TAKE BOLDER STEPS TO EXTEND ASSISTANCE TO THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND OTHER COUNTRIES (IN THE THIRD WORLD). IT IS INADMISSIBLE FOR COUNTRIES PURSUING PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY TO BE OVER-SUBJECTED TO RESTRAINTS (IN PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY). JPN IS ONE OF THE AFFECTED COUNTRIES. IN THAT SENSE, I PROPOSED TO PM TRUDEAU THAT WE SHOULD ADDRESS THIS ISSUE TOGETHER IN RELATION TO THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY.

PARA IN RESPONSE, PM TRUDEAU SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD VERY WELL WHY I SHOULD WANT TO SPEAK OUT IN SPECIFIC TERMS ON THE BASIS OF SUCH GROUNDS AND THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS A VERY GOOD IDEA.

PARA I THEN SAID THAT IF SO, I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF HE WOULD TELL THE LEADERS OF THE 30 COMMONWEALTH MEMBERS, WHO WERE GOING TO MEET IN A SUMMIT CONFERENCE TO BE HELD IN NEW DELHI WHICH HE WAS TO ATTEND, THAT QUOTE THIS IS WHAT NAKASONE IS SAYING IN TOKYO UNQUOTE SO THAT THIS COULD STRIKE A RESPONSIVE CHORD WITH THE PEOPLE OF THE COMMONWEALTH. I ALSO ASKED HIM TO TELL THEM THAT HE SUPPORTS IN PRINCIPLE PM TRUDEAU'S IDEAS.

UUU/195 090846Z UIGR3064

28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR3015 09DEC83

TO EXTOTT XDV

INFO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY PCOOTT/FOWLER LDN/MINDEL BRU/MINDEL

DISTR URR UGB IDDZ DMF IDD FPR

---PMS VISIT

PMS VISIT IS DESIGNATED BY USA AS QUOTE PRIVATE UNQUOTE VISIT. THIS MEANS MINIMAL SUPPORT FROM USA PROTOCOL SIDE. THIS IN TURN HAS SEVERAL LOGISTICAL IMPLICATIONS. ARRIVAL: NORMALLY FOR PRIVATE VISIT HELICOPTER FROM ANDREWS IS NOT/NOT AVAILABLE. IF THIS IS THE CASE ARRIVAL AT ANDREWS SHLD BE NO/NO LATER THAN 1015. HOWEVER USA HAS AGREED TO LOOK AT HELICOPTER QUESTION AGAIN AND WILL INFORM US. IF HELICOPTER IS PROVIDED IT WILL TRANSPORT ONLY THOSE FOUR GOING TO WHITE HOUSE MTG. OTHERS WILL GO BY CAR TO MADISON HOTEL (CONTACT THERE IS MARTHA BATEMAN 862-1778). MEDAS WILL PROBABLY BE AT AIRPORT TO MEET DEL. IF PM IS HELICOPTERED TO CITY SHULTZ MAY/MAY MEET HELICOPTER ON MALL. OTHERWISE PM WILL BE GREETED ON ARRIVAL AT WHITE HOUSE. PM WILL ENTER WHITE HOUSE GROUNDS BY NORTH WEST GATE, STOPPING IN FRONT OF WEST WING WHERE HE WILL BE MET BY PROTOCOL ESCORT AND PROCEED TO ROOSEVELT ROOM TO SIGN GUEST BOOK AND THEN TO OVAL OFFICE. FORMAT AFTER MTG FOR SUCH VISIT IS OUT BY CHIEF OF PROTOCOL. (THE EXIT SCENARIO IS SUBJ OF SEPARATE DISCUSSION. WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED).

2. LUNCH WITH SHULTZ, IS NOW CONFIRMED FOR ACROSS STREET AT BLAIR

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR3015 CONF

HOUSE, LUNCH WILL LAST ONE AND ONE-HALF HRS ENDING AT 1345 AND WE EXPECT CDN DEL OF 6 OR 7 PLUS COUPLE FROM HERE WLD BE MATCHED BY 9 OR 10 AMERICANS. THOSE ATTENDING LUNCH BUT NOT/NOT OVAL OFFICE MTG WILL BE BROUGHT BY CAR FROM MADISON. (AFTER LUNCH PM CLD GO NEXT DOOR VIRTUALLY TO CORCORAN MUSEUM FOR LANDMARK EXHIBITION QUOTE MASTERPIECES OF AMERICAN ART UNQUOTE).

3. WE ARE WORKING ON 1500 HRS MTG ON HILL. THERE ARE FEW SENATORS IN TOWN BUT WE THINK WE CAN ARRANGE GOOD MTG WITH SOME KEY FIGURES. WILL DPM/SSEA WISH TO GO TO HILL MTG? BELIEVE TO ENSURE FRANKFESS OF EXCHANGE HILL MTG SHLD BE LIMITED IN SIZE. PM, DPM/SSEA, GOTLIEB AND ONE OR TWO OTHERS.

4. AFTER HILL WE ARE PROPOSING PM GO TO OFFICIAL RESIDENCE FOR MTG WITH MAJOR COLUMNISTS. ARE ARRANGING SEP PROG FOR DPM/SSEA (SEE OURTEL UNFC8123 DEC9).

5. AFTER THIS MTG PM WILL RETURN TO HOTEL UNTIL VERY SMALL DINNER WITH BUSH. DINNER IS 1930 AT ALIBI CLUB, 1803 I (EYE) STREET. BUSH OFFICE WILL INFORM MONDAY OF DETAILS. HE IS IN ARGENTINA. HIS OFFICE PLEASED TO LEARN DPM/SSEA COMING AS WELL.

6. FRI, 16 DEC PM WILL LEAVE HOTEL AT 710 FOR ABC STUDIOS AT 1770 DESELLES STREET (A BLOCK AND A HALF FROM HOTEL). BALANCE OF DEPARTING GROUP WILL BE TAKEN DIRECT TO AIRPORT. AFTER TV APPEARANCE (OR APPEARANCES) PM WILL GO DIRECT TO ANDREWS AIRPORT BY CAR. TRAVEL TIME ABOUT 35 MINS. AMB AND GOSSAGE WILL ACCOMPANY FROM EMB.

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR3015 CONF D

7. REQUIRE (A) CODING FOR ACCOMMODATION, CAR RENTALS, ETC, (B) FOLLOWING
INFO RE PLANE: TYPE, CAPTAINS NAME, TAIL NUMBER, CALL NUMBER, (C) ORDER
OF PRECEDENCE FOR DEL, (D) LIST OF ALL WHO ARE ARRIVING ON PMS
PLANE, (E) LIST OF ALL ARRIVING SEPARATELY, WITH ARRIVAL TIMES.

CCC/241 092344Z UNGR3015

28-6-1 - Judeau
Peace
mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM WSHDC UNGR3013 09DEC83
TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO LDN PARIS BONN BNATO CANMILREPNATO BRU OSLO COPEN ROME MDRID
LSBON HAGUE ATHNS ANKRA VIENN BERN VMBFR PMOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DNACPOL
DISTR MINA IFB DMF DMFX IDDZ IDD IDR RSR RGB RBX IDAO IDAN
REF YOURTEL IDA1391 08DEC

---CDE:PRESENCE OF PARLIAMENTARIANS

STATE DEPT INFORMS US THAT NO/NO DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE ON
PARTICIPATION OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AT STOCKHOLM.THEY DO NOT/NOT
EXPECT ONE FOR AT LEAST A WEEK.IN CSCE CONTEXT CONGRESSMEN ALWAYS
WENT AS PART OF USA DEL AND NOT/NOT AS OBSERVERS.HOWEVER THEY DID
NOT/NOTSPEAK.U.S.A PREFERENCE,IF DECISION IS MADE TO INCLUDE
CONGRESSMEN WILL BE TO FOLLOW THIS PATTERN,AND INCLUDE THEM ON
DEL BUT THIS DOES NOT/NOT RULE OUT GOING ALONG WITH NATO CONSENSUS
THAT THEY GO ONLY AS OBSERVERS IF THAT IS THE STRONG WISH OF
ALLIANCE PARTNERS AND IF CONGRESSMEN CAN BE CONVINCED TO ACCEPT
THE LOWER STATUS.

2.TO DATE ONLY ONE MEMBER OF CONGRESS HAS CONTACTED STATE RE GOING
TO STKHM,BUT IT IS ANTICIPATED MORE WILL EXPRESS INTEREST NOW THAT
SHULTZ WILL GO.THERE IS NO/NO DESIRE IN ADMIN TO ACCOMMODATE THE
ONE CONGRESSMAN WHO HAS SO FAR EXPRESSED INTEREST BECAUSE HE IS
STRONG ADVOCATE OF THE FREEZE.

3.LIFE FOR USA IS COMPLICATED BY EXISTENCE OF HOUSE OF REPS CSCE

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PAGE TWO UNGR3013 CONFD

COMMISSION(FASCELL COMMISSION).ONE HOUSE STAFFER WILL BE A MEMBER
OF THE USA DEL.IT IS POSSIBLE THAT BY JAN THERE WILL ALSO BE A
SENATE CSCE COMMISSION WHICH WILL ALSO INSIST ON(AND BE GIVEN)
A PLACE ON THE USA DEL.

4.USA VERY INTERESTED IN DEVELOPMENTS IN OUR THINKING.

CCC/241 092138Z UNGR3013

28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM CANDELNY WKGR2895 09DEC83

TO EXTOTT IDR

INFO NDHQOTT/DIPOL/DMPC/D LAW I WSHDC LDN PARIS GENEV

CAIRO TAVIV STKHM TOKYO MOSCO MXICO LAGOS BPEST BNATO

ANKRA ATHNS

DISTR IDRA IDRL IDD IDDZ IMU IMD RCM GMR JLO JLOA JLOB

RCR RSR GMRD

---UNGA 38:SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE(SPC)-AGENDA ITEM 71-

COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE WHOLE QUESTION OF PEACE-

KEEPING OPERATIONS IN ALL THEIR ASPECTS

SPC TODAY ADOPTED RESLN L48/REV.1 BY VOTE OF 96(CDA)-14-4.RESLN

IS SUBSTANTIVE IN NATURE(FAX NO 1926 TO ALL OTTAWA ADDRESSEES

9 DEC 83)AND AIMS AT RE-VITALIZATION OF COMMITTEE OF 33.

2.WEEK-LONG INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS/CONSULTATIONS BY COSPONSORS

(INCL CDA)CLOSELY COORDINATED WITH SHEHATA OF EGYPT(RAPPOREUR

OF COMMITTEE OF 33)CULIMINATED IN AGREEMENT BY G77 TO SUPPORT

RESLN AND THUS ASSURED LARGE POSITIVE VOTE.INTENSIVE USSR

LOBBYING AGAINST RESLN HAD VERY LITTLE RESULT.

3.PRE-AMB PARA SEVEN(STRESSING COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY TO SHARE

FINANCIAL BURDEN)WAS SUBJECT OF SEPARATE VOTE 76(CDA)-14-21)

4.WE EXPECT POSITIVE PLENARY VOTE SHLD BE HIGHER THAN 106

RECEIVED IN 1978 AT TIME OF PASSAGE OF LAST PEACE-KEEPING

SUBSTANTIVE RESLN.

CCC/017 100044Z WKGR2895

D I F F U S I O N R E S T R E I N T E

DE CANDELNY WKGR2894 09DEC83

A EXTOTT IMU

INFO GENEV

DISTR IDA IDAN IDAO IDR IDRL IDRA IDD IDDZ

---VOTES A LA PREMIERE COMMISSION, 9 DEC

LA PREMIERE COMMISSION A TERMINE SES TRAVAUX EN VOTANT SUR LES PROJETS DE RESLNS RELATIFS AUX QUESTIONS DE SECURITE INTERNATIONALE. L.83/REF.3 (MIS EN OEUVRES DES DISPOSITIONS DE LA CHARTE CONCERNANT LA PAIX ET LA SECURITE, ITEM 67) INTRODUIT PAR SIERRA LEONE:75 (GRECE)-19 (E.R. R.U. TURQUIE, PORTUGAL, LUXEMBOURG, FRANCE, RFA, BELGIQUE, ITALIE, URSS ET AL)-18 (CDA ET AUTRES MEMBRES DU BARTON GROUP (BG)). CDA A EXPLIQUE SON VOTE SUR CETTE DERNIERE RSLN EN SOULIGNANT QUE CE N EST PAS PAR LA CREATION DE MECANISMES ADDITIONNELS QUE L EFFICACITE DU PROCESSUS DE SECURITE COLLECTIVE POURRAIT ETRE AUGMENTER (FAC A IMU).

2. L.86/REV.1 (PAIX ET SECURITE INTERNATIONALE, ITEM 67) A ETE RETIRE PAR CHYPRE. L.87/REV.1 (MISE EN OEUVRE DE LA DECLARATION SUR LE RENFORCEMENT DE LA SECURITE INTERNATIONALE, ITEM 66) INTRODUIT PAR LA YOUGOSLAVIE: 108 (AUSTRALIE, DANEMARK, FRANCE, GRECE, ISLANDE, IRLANDE, PAYS BAS, ESPAGNE, NORVEGE)-0-12 (CDA ET AUTRES MEMBRES DU BG). L.88/REV.3 (RENFORCEMENT SECURITE ET COOP REGION DE LA MEDITERRANEE, ITEM 65), INTRODUIT PAR MALTE, A ETE ADOPTEE PAR CONSENSUS.

CCC/017 100044Z WKGR2894

28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

gpb

Division Phoned *2007*
Person
Local Time *1720*

*28-6-1-Tyndal
Peace
Mission*

UNCLASSIFIED

FM BNATO YBGR2519 09DEC83

TO EXTOTT FPR/IDDZ DELIVER BY 091600

INFO PMOOTT PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/MND/ADMPOL/ CPP/DSTRATA/DIPOL/
DSSP/DGINFO BRU BREEC POECD COPEN BONN PARIS WSHDC ATHNS ANKRA
ROME HAGUE OSLO LSBON MDRID LDN MOSCO BPEST BUCST TOKYO WLGTN
CNBRA PRGUE WSAW BGRAD PRMNY GENEV

DISTR MINA MINE MINT USS DMF UGB EFB RGB IFB DMFX FED EER RGX RBD
RBR TDD CPD ZEP ZSP ZSI IDD IDA IDR SCI UGB URR URD

---DPM/SSEAS PRESS CONFERENCE 9/9DEC AT 2 P.M.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DPM/SSEAS PRESS CONFERENCE AT END OF NAC:

Q.DO YOU HAVE A STATEMENT BEFORE WE PESTER YOU WITH QUESTIONS?

A.WELL I DONT HAVE A CAREFULLY WRITTEN STATEMENT BUT MAYBE
AN IMPRESSION OR TWO OF THE MEETING WILL BE USEFUL.I

THOUGHT IT WAS A GOOD MEETING,MUCH DISCUSSION AND MUCH
COHERENCE IN TERMS OF VIEWS AND SENTIMENTS AND THE MINISTERS
WERE CERTAINLY MORE RELAXED THAN THEY WERE A YEAR AGO BECAUSE
A YEAR AGO THEY WERE FACING THE CRITICAL YEAR OF DEPLOYMENT
AND NOT FULLY SURE OF WHAT WOULD HAPPEN,WHETHER THE DECISION
WOULD BE MAINTAINED,WHAT PARLIAMENTS WOULD DO.AT THIS MEETING
THE DECISIONS HAS BEEN TAKEN AND NOT ONLY TAKEN BUT CONFIRMED
BY PARLIAMENTARY VOTES;DEPLOYMENT IS GOING TO TAKE PLACE AND
TO THAT EXTENT I THINK THERE WAS A BELIEF THAT THE ALLIANCE

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PAGE TWO YBGR2519 UNCLAS

HAD AN ADVANTAGE, A VERY DEFINITE ADVANTAGE FROM THAT POINT OF VIEW. IT COULD LOOK TO THE FUTURE WITH A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONFIDENCE AND SENSE OF STRENGTH. YOU MAY BE INTERESTED IN HOW I ASSESS THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE OUTCOME ON WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS BEEN PUSHING. I THINK THAT, WELL, FIRST OF ALL ON THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE, THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN URGING THAT THERE BE A MAJOR POLITICAL IMPULSE GIVEN TO THAT CONFERENCE. YOU WILL SEE WHEN THE COMMUNIQUE COMES OUT THAT MINISTERS HAVE EXPRESSED AN INTENTION TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE AND EVEN MORE IN THE WAY OF AN ADDITIONAL IMPULSE THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT TO A SUGGESTION MADE BY MR CHESSON THAT WESTERN FOREIGN MINISTERS MEET TOGETHER PRIOR TO THE OPENING OF THE CDE CONFERENCE IN STKHM SO THAT WE REALLY HAVE GIVEN THAT EVENT A MAJOR POLITICAL IMPULSE NOT ONLY THROUGH OUR WILLINGNESS TO ATTEND THE CONFERENCE ITSELF BUT ALSO OUR INTENTION TO MEET TOGETHER PRIOR TO THE CONFERENCE IN STKHM TO PREPARE FOR IT. SO I THINK THATS A MAJOR STEP AHEAD, OR A MAJOR STEP IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHAT THE PRIME MINISTERS HAS BEEN SAYING. ON THE MBFR, ON THE MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS, A DECISION HAS BEEN TAKEN TO REVIEW THE NEGOTIATING POSITION OF THE WESTERN NATIONS IN ORDER TO GIVE SOME MOMENTUM TO THAT NEGOTIATION; THAT CERTAINLY IS A MAJOR STEP FORWARD. AS YOU KNOW THE EASTERN

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PAGE THREE YBGR2519 UNCLAS

COUNTRIES HAVE MADE PROPOSALS TO WHICH RESPONSE HAS NOT BEEN GIVEN BY THE NATO COUNTRIES OR BY THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND NOW WE VE DECIDED TO INSTITUTE A MAJOR REVIEW OF OUR NEGOTIATING STANCE WITH A VIEW TO COMING UP WITH COUNTER-PROPOSALS OR A NEW INITIATIVE OR SOMETHING ELSE. SO THATS THE NEXT POINT.THE FURTHER POINT IS THAT MINISTERS STILL HOLD OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF A MINISTERIAL INVOLVEMENT IN THAT VIENNA CONVERSATION THOUGH UNTIL THE REVIEW IS COMPLETED IT WAS FELT PREMATURE TO PREJUDGE THAT SITUATION.BUT QUITE APART FROM THAT PARTICULAR MEETING,THE MINISTERS DID UNDERTAKE TO MAINTAIN THEIR OWN INVOLVEMENT IN THE FUTURE OF THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND THAT CERTAINLY WAS OUR PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE, TO ENSURE THAT THE MBFR ALSO RECEIVED IN POLITICAL IMPULSE, THAT MINISTERS PAID ATTENTION TO IT AND THAT THEY KEEP IT VERY MUCH UNDER THEIR PURVIEW.I MAY ADD FURTHER THAT IN ADDITION I SUGGESTED TO MINISTERS THAT FOLLOWING THE COMPLETION OF THE REVIEW IT MIGHT BE DESIRABLE FOR WESTERN MINISTERS TO COME TOGETHER AND CERTAINLY THAT HAS NOT BEEN PRECLUDED.SO THATS IT,I THINK INSOFAR AS THE PRIME MINISTERS INITIATIVE IS CONCERNED AS IT RELATES TO NATO.GOOD AND SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE.THERE WERE OTHER ASPECTS TO THE CONCLUSION THAT WERE QUITE IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS BFEN URGING.FOR EXAMPLE,THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF BELGIUM

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PAGE FOUR YBGR2519 UNCLAS

MR TENDEMANS, WITH WHOM THE PRIME MINISTER DID HAVE CONVERSATIONS WHEN HE WAS IN EUROPE, BROUGHT FORWARD A PROPOSAL THAT WOULD CONDUCT AN EXAMINATION OF THE EAST/WEST RELATIONS WITH A VIEW TO ESTABLISHING A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE. I DONT HAVE THE COMMUNIQUE WITH THE EXACT WORDS, BUT I THINK THAT TOO WAS A VERY FAVOURABLE THRUST. I TOLD YOU, I THINK, EARLIER THAT I MET WITH MR SHULTZ AND DISCUSSED THE VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER TO WSHDC SO THAT IS ABOUT IT.

Q. I AM INTERESTED IN WHY WSHDC IS COMING BEFORE MOSCO ON THE PRIME MINISTERS ITINERARY. I BELIEVE THAT IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE TORONTO STAR, HE SAID THAT IF THERE WAS A PREFERENCE HE WOULD HAVE PREFERRED TO GO TO MOSCO BEFORE GOING TO SEE PRESIDENT REAGAN. WHY HAS THIS BEEN CHANGED?

A. WELL, QUITE APART FROM THE PREFERENCE THAT THE PRIME MINISTER MAY HAVE EXPRESSED, THERE IS ALWAYS THE CONVINIENCE OF THE HOSTS AND IT WAS POSSIBLE FOR THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT TO MEET THE PRIME MINISTER NEXT WEEK AND IT HAS NOT YET BEEN POSSIBLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION TO PROVIDE A DATE.

THAT WOULD BE MY ANSWER TO THE QUESTION: APART FROM PREFERNCES THERE IS A REQUIREMENT TO ADJUST TO WHAT IS POSSIBLE FOR YOUR HOSTS.

Q. AND DO YOU NOT THINK THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT SEE MR TRUDEAUS TRIP TO WSHDC AS PREJUDICING TO SOME EXTENT, THE

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PAGE FIVE YBGR2519 UNCLAS

TENOR OF HIS TALKS WITH THE KREMLIN?

A.NO/NO I DONT SEE HOW THEY COULD REACH THAT CONCLUSION.MR JOEFFREY PEARSON HAS BEEN IN MOSCO,HE HAS EXPLAINED WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS UP TO.HES MET WITH MR GROMYKO AND WITH MR KORNIENKO AND EXPRESSED THE PRIME MINISTER WILLINGNESS TO REACT TO ANY DATE WHICH THEY MIGHT PROPOSE.THEY WERE UNABLE TO PROPOSE A DATE AT THAT TIME SO I DONT SEE THERE WOULD BE THE SLIGHTEST JUSTIFICATION TO BELIEVE THAT HE WAS CARRYING A MESSAGE, THAT HE WAS A MESSENGER BOY.IF THERE WAS SOMETHING INTERESTING THAT WERE SAID IN WSHDC IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR HIM TO CONVEY THAT TO MOSCO BUT THATS CERTAINLY NOT IN OUR PLANNING OF THE VISIT.

Q.MINISTER,AM I TO UNDERSTAND THEN,THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS FORMALLY TOLD THE SOVIET UNION THAT HE WANTS TO GO TO MOSCO AND VISIT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND THE SOVIETS RESPONSE THUS FAR HAS BEEN WE CANT GIVE YOU A DATE?

A.I THINK THE SITUATION IS A BIT THE OTHER WAY:THE PRIME MINISTER HAS AN INVITATION FROM MR ANDROPOV TO GO TO MOSCO AS I HAVE AN INVITATION FRO MR GROMYKO TO GO AND THE PURPOSE OF MR PEARSONS VISIT TO MOSCO WAS TO EXPLAIN THE PRIME MINISTERS OVERALL INITIATIVE SO THAT

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PAGE SIX YBGR2519 UNCLAS

THEY WOULD KNOW AND TO OBVIOUSLY EXPLORE TOGETHER THE POSSIBILITIES OF A VISIT SO I DONT THIN THERE IS ANY TENSION ON THAT QUESTION OF WHO IS ASKING WHOM.

Q.NO/NO,BUT GIVEN THE LINGERING HEALTH OF MR ANDROPOV AND THE BACKLOG PEOPLE TO SEE WHEN HE COMES BACK TO WORK,HAS THERE BEEN THOUGHT GIVEN OF THE INITIATIVE IN THE SOVIET UNION BEING HANDLED AT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS LEVEL SO IT CAN BE DONE SOON?

A.WELL THAT IS POSSIBILITY.MR GROMYKO IS QUITE AN IMPORTANT SPOKESMAN BUT THAT HAS NOT/NOT BEEN CONCLUDED TO MY KNOWLEDGE. IVE BEEN AWAY I HAVENT TALKED TO THE PRIME MINISTER RECENTLY, I DONT THINK IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED THAT CIRCUMSTANCES WERE SUCH THAT IT BE NECESSARY TO HAVE A MEETING SOLELY WITH MR ROMYKO

Q.AND IF THAT HAPPENDED, YOU WILL BE YOURSELF GOING TO MOSCO?

A,NO/NO I DONT HAVE PRESENT PLANS TO GO.I THINK I WILL GO AT SOME POINT,HOPEFULLY NEXT YEAR,BUT I WOULD EXPECT THAT THE FIRST VISIT OF ANY CDN MINISTER WOULD BE THE PRIME MINISTER.

Q.MINISTER,THE USA SECRETARY SHULTZ RECENTLY TALKED ABOUT MR TRUDEAUS VISIT AND SAID WE HAVE LOTS OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN WSHDC AND MOSCO,THE PROBLEM IS SUBSTANCE.IF THAT IS THE CASE THAN WHAT JUST CAN MR TRUDEAU ADD BY VISITING WSHDC?

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PAGE SEVEN YBGR2519 UNCLAS

A. I WOULD WANT TO KNOW REALLY WHAT MR SHULTZ MEANT BY SUBSTANCE. YESTERDAY, MR CHEYSSON IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE CONFERENCE DESCRIBED THE SITUATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST PRESENTLY AS A STATE OF CRISIS, WHICH HE SAID COULD NOT BE DENIED. NOW THAT WAS HIS ANALYSIS WHICH I UNDERSTOOD WAS FULLY ENDORSED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE UNITED STATES. IF THERE IS LACK, MY OWN APPRECIATION OF THE SITUATION IS THAT THERE HAS TO BE CREATED SOME RELAXATION IN THE PRESENT ATMOSPHERE AND IF POSSIBLE SOME REBUILDING OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN EACH OTHER BEFORE SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS CAN TAKE PLACE. THERE MAY BE LOTS OF TALKS, IF FOR EXAMPLE HE MEANS THERE IS LOTS OF TALK IN VIENNA OR AT THE INF TALKS AND THERE HAS BEEN, WELL WHY HAVEN'T WE HAD AN AGREEMENT? WHY HAVEN'T WE MADE PROGRESS? WHY HAVE THEY BROKEN OFF? WE VE HAD TALK AT THE START AND NOW THEY ARE SUSPENDED, OR IF NOT/NOT SUSPENDED, THE NEW DATE IS NOT/NOT SETTLED. IF BY SUBSTANCE, IT IS MEANT A SITUATION THAT PREVENTS AGREEMENT BECAUSE THERE IS A BAD ATMOSPHERE OR A LACK OF TRUST OR TOO GREAT TENSION, IF THATS WHAT HE MEANS THATS FINE; BUT I DONT THINK THAT I WOULD AGREE THATS IS JUST BECAUSE PEOPLE DISAGREE INTELLECTUALLY THAT WE RE NOT/NOT GETTING ANYWHERE. WE GO THROUGH A MEETING LIKE NATO WHERE THERE ARE OBVIOUSLY DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON VARIOUS POINTS BUT NEVERTHELESS WE CONCLUDE A SUCCESSFUL

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PAGE EIGHT YBGR2519 UNCLAS

MEETING BECAUSE WE HAVE A COMMON PARTNERSHIP, A COMMON APPRECIATION OF THE WORLD. I WOULD THINK THAT BETWEEN THE EAST AND THE WEST AT THE MOMENT THERE MAY BE A VERY DEEP DIFFERENCE IN HOW THEY LOOK AT EACH OTHER AND HOW THEY SEE THE WORLD. THAT IS ABOUT ALL I CAN SAY BY WAY OF COMMENT.

Q. IF I CAN PURSUE THE SHULTZ ISSUE JUST A LITTLE FURTHER, THIS MORNING YOU SUGGESTED THAT WE ASK HIM HOW HE FELT ABOUT THE TRUDEAU INITIATIVE. HAVING DONE SO AND FOUND HIS RESPONSE QUITE COOL TO SAY THE LEAST, HE STRESSED THAT IT WAS JUST A PART OF AN ONGOING DIALOGUE, BILATERAL MATTERS. WHILE WSHDC WAS INTERESTED IN THE TRUDEAU INITIATIVE, BASICALLY COMMUNICATIONS WERE FINE BETWEEN WSHDC AND MOSCO. WE VE GOT HIS RESPONSE. NOW PERHAPS YOU COULD GIVE US YOUR EVALUATION OF SHULTZ RESPONSE TO YOU WHEN YOU PROMOTED THE TRUDEAU INITIATIVE THIS MORNING?

A. WELL I THINK THAT IVE PROMOTED THE TWO ASPECTS OF THE TRUDEAU INITIATIVE AT THE NATO MEETING WITH I THINK REASONABLY GOOD RESULTS. IN MY MEETING WITH MR SHULTZ, MY PURPOSE WAS TO MAKE SOME COMMENTS BY WAY OF EXPLAINING WHAT MR TRUDEAU WAS UP TO AND WHAT HE WASNT UP TO. WHAT HE ISNT UP TO, FOR EXAMPLE, IS IN ANYWAY CUTTING ACROSS THE BOW OF THE INF TALKS OR THE TWO TRACK DECISION OR OUR MEMBERSHIP IN NATO, THAT WE

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PAGE NINE YBGR2519 UNCLAS

HAVE THAT SOLID COMMITMENT THAT IS NOT AFFECTED BY WHAT MR TRUDEAU IS DOING. MR TRUDEAU IS TAKING THAT AS AN ACCEPTED ASPECT OF CDN FOREIGN POLICY AND LOOKING TO THE FUTURE. AND I WANTED TO ALSO TELL MR SHULTZ A NUMBER OF THINGS THAT THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT OR MIGHT NOT RAISE, SO THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE AT LEAST INFORMED AND THAT HE WOULDN'T BE TAKEN BY SURPRISE, BUT I WASN'T GOING TO MR SHULTZ SAYING QUOTE LOOK GEORGE I HAVE THIS, THIS, THIS, AND WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT IT. UNQUOTE. I DIDN'T FIND HIM COOL, HE'S A VERY COOL MAN IN ANY EVENT. WE HAD A GOOD MEETING, QUITE A GOOD MEETING.

Q. DID SECRETARY SHULTZ INDICATE TO YOU THAT HE FELT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD A ROLE TO PLAY IN DIALOGUING BETWEEN WSHDC AND MOSCO?

A. NO/NO HE DIDN'T COMMENT ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, AND I DIDN'T, BECAUSE I DIDN'T SAY THE PURPOSE OF MR TRUDEAU WAS TO BE A BROKER OR A MEDIATOR BETWEEN MOSCO AND WSHDC, FAR FROM IT. ON THE CONTRARY, I SAID THAT MR TRUDEAU WASN'T OUT TO DISPLACE THE PRESIDENT, WHO MUST BE THE MAIN INTERLOCUTOR WITH THE SOVIET UNION. NOBODY CAN PLAY THE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT BECAUSE HE IS THE HEAD OF THE SUPERPOWER.

Q. WHAT WILL MR TRUDEAU WILL BE LOOKING FOR NEXT WEEK. ARE THE AMERICANS TREATING THIS AS ANY OF THOSE MEETINGS

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WHERE WE RUN BACK AND FORTH?

A. I THINK THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS TAKEN ON THIS JOB OF TRYING TO MAKE SOME MOVEMENT HOWEVER LITTLE THAT MIGHT TURN OUT TO BE. AND THE NUMBER OF MOVEMENTS HERE AND THERE MAY TOGETHER HAVE AN IMPACT. AND HERE WE HAVE TAKEN, IN THE NATO MEETING, A NUMBER OF STEPS THAT ADD UP.

I WOULD HOPE THAT IN WSHDC THEY WOULD GET AN UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT THE PRIME MINISTER IS UP TO AND IF THERE IS ANY NEGATIVE FEELINGS ABOUT HIS EFFORTS, THAT THEY OUGHT TO BE CLEARED UP. I CANT UNDERSTAND WHAT THEY WOULD BE BUT IF THERE ARE, I HOPE THEY WILL BE PUT ON THE TABLE. I MADE A SPEECH IN CHICAGO LAST WEEK AND I MADE THE POINT THAT CANADA DIDNT REGARD THE SOVIET UNION AND THE USA HAS MORAL EQUIVALENTS. THE UNITED STATES STOOD APART BECAUSE OF ITS VALUES AND BECAUSE OF ITS DEMOCRACY AND ITS LIBERTY. NO/NO CDN CAN EQUATE ONE WITH THE OTHER. YOU TALK ABOUT TWO SUPERPOWERS AS YOU MUST, BUT FOR A CDN TO SAY THAT THEY ARE IN THE SAME BAG WOULD BE QUITE UNACCEPTABLE. THAT DOES NOT/NOT REPRESENT CDN POLICY; WE ARE NOT/NOT MEMBERS OF THE WARSAW PACT. WE ARE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE. I WANTED TO MAKE SOME OF THOSE POINTS WHICH MAY SEEM UNNECESSARY TO MAKE BUT THEY ARE PRETTY FUNDAMENTAL.

Q. YOU TALKED A LOT ABOUT THE CDN PEACE INITIATIVE BUT

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LISTENING TO MR LUNS, IT SEEMS THAT THE CDN ASPECT IS
PRETTY OVERSHADOWED. THE WEST GERMANS WAS GIVEN CREDIT FOR
THE BRUSSELS DECLARATION, MR CHEYSSON FOR STKHM,
(I AM ONLY QUOTING MR LUNS) MR TINDEMANS FOR THE BELGIUM INITIATIVE
AND THEN THE MBER FOR US. WHERE DO WE FIT IN?

A. I THINK WHAT WE OUGHT TO BE CLEAR ABOUT THE STKHM THING
AND HERE I THINK MR LUNS HAS NOT TOLD YOU
THE FULL STORY. THE CDN LANGUAGE, THE LANGUAGE IN THE COMMUNIQUE,
REFERS TO THE STKHM CONFERENCE AND THE PRESENCE OF MINISTERS.
THATS WHAT WE VE BEEN LOOKING FOR. I THINK, AND THAT IS WHERE
MR CHEYSSON COMES IN, HE EVEN PUTS SOME FROSTING ON THE CAKE,
ON THE CDN CAKE, BY SUGGESTING THAT PRIOR TO THE CDE
NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS MEET TOGETHER AND I THINK THAT
WAS A VERY GOOD IDEA, WHICH I ENDORSED IMMEDIATELY. SO I AM NOT
CONCERNED ABOUT THE APPORTIONING OF CREDIT AS MR LUNS DID
BECAUSE ON EVERY ITEM THE OUTCOME WAS QUITE WELCOME TO CDA.
AS TO THE DECLARATION, WHERE DID THE DECLARATION COME FROM? THE
NOTION OF THE DECLARATION CAME FROM WILLIAMSBURG, AND WHERE
DID THE WILLIAMSBURG DECLARATION COME FROM—FROM CDA.

Q. IF YOU ARE NOT CONCERNED ABOUT THE APPORTIONING OF THE CREDIT,
WHY ARE YOU CLAIMING IT?

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A. WELL, I AM CLAIMING VERY CLEARLY THOSE PARTS THAT ARE RELATED TO THE PRIME MINISTERS INITIATIVE. THATS ALL. AND I D CLAIM ANYTHING ELSE I COULD TOO, BUT I AM PUTTING SOME PERSPECTIVE INTO THESE EVENTS BECAUSE I WAS AT WILLIAMSBURG AND IVE ATTENDED THESE MEETINGS AND I THINK I AM TRUTHFULLY REPORTING WHAT THE FACTS ARE. BUT I FIND IT COINCIDENTAL THAT MR TRUDEAU HAD BEEN IN BRUSSELS AND TALKED TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF BELGIUM AND TO MR TINDEMANS ABOUT HARMEL AND WE NOW HAVE A PROPOSAL FROM MR TINDEMANDS WHICH HE HAS BUILT UP AROUND THE HARMEL REPORT. THERE HAS CERTAINLY BEEN SOME OSMOSIS IN THIS DIALOGUE THAT HAS PRODUCED RESULTS. THAT IS ALL WE RE SEEKING.

Q. IF I MAY PURSUE THE CDN PERSPECTIVE ONE STEP FURTHER, GIVEN THE FACT THAT ANY SOVIET/WSHDC DIALOGUE WILL BE DECIDED ON BY THE TWO PRESIDENTS, WHAT CAN WE REALLY EXPECT PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU, TO SAY TO EITHER REAGAN OR ANDROPOV BEYOND QUOTE ID LIKE YOU TO TALK, I THINK ITS A GOOD IDEA? UNQUOTE.

A. YOU ASK WHAT CAN THE PRIME MINISTER SAY. IF THERE WAS A THEME THAT WAS COMING OUT OF THIS MEETING FROM A NUMBER OF SPEAKERS THAT WAS THE NECESSITY OF TALKING TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THEIR LEADERSHIP AND EXPLAINING TO THEM WHAT THE WEST WAS LIKE, HOW IT WOULD BEHAVE, AND NOT TO MISUNDERSTAND WHAT WAS HAPPNEING IN THE WEST. FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WAS A VIEW

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PAGE THIRTEEN YBGR2519 UNCLAS

EXPRESSED THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD MISUNDERSTOOD
THE DEMONSTRATIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE AND IN NORTH AMERICA AND
THAT THEY MISUNDERSTOOD THEM AS EVIDENCE THAT THE WESTERN
ALLIANCE WOULD COLLASPE IN THE FACE OF THE REQUIREMENT TO
DEPLOY, AND THAT WE OUGHT TO DO MORE TO GET OUR VIEWS ACROSS
SO THAT THEY WOULD UNDERSTAND HOW WE OPERATE, WHAT OUR VALUES ARE,
AND THEY WOULD GET A CHANCE TO TALK TO US. THEY ARE NOT TALKING
VERY MUCH. THERE ARENT VERY MANY CONTACTS AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL.

Q. THERES GOING TO BE, OR THERE IS THE POTENTIAL FOR A POLITICAL
CONTACT AT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS LEVEL IN STKHM DEPENDING
ON WHAT GROMYKO DOES. WILL PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU URGE A
SUMMIT BETWEEN REAGAN AND ANDROPOV

A. I THINK THATS A QUESTION THAT IN PRINCIPLE, I CERTAINLY
WOULD FIND A GOOD THING. BUT I THINK BOTH SIDES
ARE SAYING THE SAME THINGS WE DONT WANT A SUMMIT UNLESS
ITS WELL PREPARED, UNLESS WE GET SOME RESULTS. THE MOMENT
DOESNT SEEM RIGHT FOR THAT.

Q. DOES THE PRIME MINISTER SHARE THE FEELING THAT ITS NOT
THE RIGHT TIME FOR A SUMMIT?

A. WELL LOOK, I AM EXPRESSING MY OWN VIEWS AND YOU'LL HAVE A CHANCE
TO TALK TO HIM ABOUT THAT. I MEAN THE TWO PARTIES WILL HAVE
TO DECIDE THAT ITS RIGHT. I DONT THINK

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THAT EVEN THE PRIME MINISTER CAN SAY TO MR REAGAN AND
MR ANDROPOV NOW IS THE TIME FOR YOU TO HAVE A
SUMMIT-THAT WOULD BE A BIT PRESUMPTUOUS-ONE MIGHT UPHOLD
THE VALUE OF A SUMMIT BUT THE TIMING WOULD DEPEND ON
THEIR ASSESSMENT OF WHETHER IT WOULD GET THEM ANYWHERE OR
WHETHER IT MIGHT NOT/NOT WORSEN THE SITUATION.BUT I AM SURE THE
PRIME MINISTER WOULD BE GLAD TO GIVE YOU HIS VIEWS ON THAT.
I JUST DONT THINK AT THE MOMENT THAT THERE IS A CHANCE FOR
A SUMMIT-RIGHT NOW.

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DRIFOTT PMOOTT/COLEMAN PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/EAMND/ADMPOL/DIPOL/CPP
DISTR MINA MINT MINE USS DMT DMF UGB IFB RGB RCR URT URR LIDDZ IDR IDA
---DPM/SSEA SCRUM FOLLOWING BILATERAL WITH SECTY SHULTZ

FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF DPM/SSEA SCRUM IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING HIS MTG
WITH SECTY SHULTZ(0745 TO 0905 HRS) IN BRU 09DEC. DPM/SSEA WILL TALK
TO PRESS LATER RE RESULTS OF NATO FOR MIN MTG. QUOTE:

Q: HOW DID YOUR TALKS WITH MR SHULTZ GO?

SSEA: THEY ALWAYS GO WELL, VERY WELL. THIS IS PART OF OUR REGULAR
CONSULTATIVE PROCESS. WE LAST MET FOR COUPLE DAYS IN HALIFAX AND THIS
WAS A CONTINUATION OF THAT BASICALLY BILATERAL DIALOGUE.

Q: WHAT DID HE HAVE TO SAY ABOUT THE TRUDEAU INITIATIVE?

SSEA: WE DID NOT/NOT SPEND ALL OUR TIME WITH THE TRUDEAU INITIATIVE.
THE PRIME MINISTER WILL BE GOING TO WASHINGTON AND THAT WILL BE THE
OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS IT IN MORE DETAIL. WE DID TOUCH UPON IT AND I
MADE SOME COMMENTS ABOUT IT BUT OUR PRINCIPAL CONCERN AT THIS POINT
WAS BILATERAL QUESTIONS AND SOME OTHER ISSUES IN THE WORLD, INCLUDING
GRENADA AND THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE PEACE PROPOSALS OF THE PRIME
MINISTER ABOUT WHICH I MADE COMMENTS BUT BEARING IN MIND THAT THE

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PRIME MINISTER WILL BE IN WASHINGTON AND THAT WILL BE THE OCCASION FOR A FULL DISCUSSION.

Q: WHEN WILL HE BE IN WASHINGTON?

SSEA: WELL I THINK THAT THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR ANNOUNCED IN OTTAWA THAT IT WOULD BE NEXT WEEK, SOMETIME NEXT WEEK. I AM NOT/NOT PRECISELY SURE OF THE DATE YET BUT IT WILL BE NEXT WEEK.

Q: WELL WHAT IMPORTANT BILATERAL ISSUES DID YOU DISCUSS?

SSEA: WELL WE DISCUSSED ENVIRONMENTAL QUESTION; WE DISCUSSED DEFENCE QUESTION; WE DISCUSSED TRADE QUESTION; WE DISCUSSED THE GENERAL QUESTION OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY OR CONFLICT OF JURISDICTION. THESE ARE ONGOING PROBLEMS THAT WE HAVE BEEN DEALING WITH. UNDER THE ENVIRONMENT WE TALKED ABOUT ACID RAIN, TOXICS WASTES AND THE GARRISON DIVERSION. UNDER TRADE WE TALKED ABOUT SECTORAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR FREE TRADE. WE TALKED ABOUT OUR OLD FAVOURITES--FISH AND POTATOES. DO YOU WANT ANYMORE? (JUMBLE OF JARGON) OH YES--ASBESTOS.

Q: WHEN YOU TALKED BEFORE YOU MENTIONED THE PEACE INITIATIVE, WERE WE TO UNDERSTAND THAT MR. SHULTZ HAD LISTENED AND THEN YOU MOVED ON.

SSEA: WE AH---MR SHULTZ IS AN EXTREMELY GOOD LISTENER AND I MADE MY COMMENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK AND I WANTED TO PUT HIS EFFORT IN A CONTEXT AND TO ALERT THE AMERICAN AUTHORITIES AS TO WHAT POSSIBLE PARTICULAR ITEMS THE PRIME MINISTER MIGHT RAISE, SO IN A SENSE IT WAS MY PITCH IN PREPARATION FOR THE VISIT OF THE PRIME MINISTER.

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Q:WELL HE MADE NO/NO COMMENTS IN OTHER WORDS?

SSEA:WELL THERE WERE SOME COMMENTS,SURE,BUT THE RULE OF THE GAME IS TO FIND OUT FROM HIM HIS COMMENTS.

Q:CAN YOU CONFIRM SIR WHETHER YOU WILL BE GOING TO STOCKHOLM IN JANUARY?

SSEA:YES,I THINK I WILL BE GOING.ALL THE OTHERS I BELIEVE WILL BE GOING BUT THAT IS SUBJECT TO FINAL RATIFICATION LATER TODAY.

Q:OUR BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY,SIR GEOFFREY HOWE SAID LAST NIGHT THAT YOU WILL ALL BE GOING.

SSEA:WELL THEN HE IS CONFIDENT ABOUT THE OUTCOME.I WAS A BIT MORE GUARDED.I WILL HAVE TO ACQUIRE SOME OF THAT BRITISH BOLDNESS IN MY STATEMENTS.

Q:WHEN WE SAY ALL DOES THAT INCLUDE THE EASTERN BLOC--HOW CAN YOU SPEAK FOR THEM?

SSEA:WHEN WE SAY ALL WE TALK ABOUT OUR OWN WESTERN GROUP OF MINISTERS.WE CAN NOT/NOT TALK ABOUT THE EASTERN MINISTERS.THEY WILL HAVE TO MAKE UP THEIR OWN MIND AS TO WHAT THEY WISH TO DO.

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REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: UNGA 38: SPC: AGENDA ITEM 71

A/SPC/38/L.48/Rev.1 dated 8 Dec 83

28-6-1 - *Yudani*
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LCol W.A. Morrison

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General Assembly

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8 December 1983

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Thirty-eighth session
SPECIAL POLITICAL COMMITTEE
Agenda item 71.

COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE WHOLE QUESTION OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS IN ALL THEIR ASPECTS

Australia, Canada, Egypt, Fiji, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Philippines and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland: revised draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 1874 (S-IV), of 27 June 1963, 2006 (XIX) of 18 February 1965, 2053 A (XX) of 15 December 1965, 2249 (S-V) of 23 May 1967, 2308 (XXII) of 13 December 1967, 2451 (XXIII) of 19 December 1968, 2607 (XXV) of 8 December 1970, 2835 (XXVI) of 17 December 1971, 2965 (XXVII) of 13 December 1972, 3091 (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973, 3239 (XXIX) of 29 November 1974, 3457 (XXX) of 10 December 1975, 31/105 of 15 December 1976, 32/106 of 15 December 1977, 33/114 of 18 December 1978, 34/53 of 23 November 1979, 35/121 of 11 December 1980, 36/37 of 18 November 1981, 37/93 of 10 December 1982,

Taking account of the views expressed and issues raised on the question of peace-keeping during the debate on the item,

Reaffirming the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Conscious of the vital role played by United Nations peace-keeping forces in support of decisions of the Security Council in discharging its primary responsibility in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Recognizing that the presence of United Nations peace-keeping forces authorized by the Security Council in conflict areas demonstrates the common concern of United Nations Members in the preservation of stability and easing of tension in those areas,

Aware of the extremely difficult financial situation of the United Nations peace-keeping forces in the light of the heavy burden incurred by troop contributors, especially those from developing countries,

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English

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Stressing the collective responsibility of Member States, in accordance with the Charter, to share equitably the financial burdens of such operations established by the Security Council, which should continue to be conducted with maximum efficiency and economy,

Urging, at the same time, that other areas of co-operation with and support for United Nations peace-keeping forces should be encouraged,

Recognizing the need to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of United Nations peace-keeping forces,

Commending the Secretary-General for the way he is carrying out peace-keeping operations of the United Nations decided upon by the Security Council,

Convinced that the importance of the issues of United Nations peace-keeping is such that the United Nations should continue to work for a comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects,

Taking note of the report of the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations,

1. Expresses its conviction that peace-keeping operations of the United Nations, conducted with the consent of the host country and respect for its sovereignty and territorial integrity, consistent with the Charter, are an essential function of the United Nations, though not a substitute for the peaceful settlement of disputes and therefore of a temporary nature;
2. Urges all concerned to co-operate fully in the implementation of United Nations peace-keeping operations;
3. Reaffirms and renews the mandate given to the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations by relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;
4. Expresses concern about the difficult financial situation of United Nations peace-keeping operations;
5. Urges again the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations, in accordance with its mandate, to renew its efforts to work towards the completion of agreed guidelines which will govern the conduct of peace-keeping operations of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and to devote further attention to specific questions related to the practical implementation of peace-keeping operations;
6. Requests the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations to submit a status report on its present situation, to determine the areas of possible progress and other areas where progress would be difficult to achieve or still pending, and to consider proposals to reactivate and rationalize its work;
7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of the thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in all their aspects".

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REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: UNGA 38: FIRST CTTEE: AGENDA ITEM 65

A/C.1/38/L.88/Rev.3 dated 8 Dec 83

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8 December 1983

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Thirty-eighth session
FIRST COMMITTEE
Agenda item 65

STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malta, Romania,
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Tunisia and Yugoslavia: revised
draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 36/102 and 37/118, on the item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security",

Mindful of the importance of strengthening peace and security in the Mediterranean and of the resultant impact on international peace and security,

Noting the provisions relating to the Mediterranean in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, signed at Helsinki on 1 August 1975, and those of the Concluding Documents of the Belgrade and Madrid Meetings,

Noting the declarations of the successive meetings of the Non-Aligned Countries concerning the Mediterranean, as well as official declarations on, and contributions to, peace and security in the Mediterranean made by individual countries,

Taking note of the analytical report of the Secretary-General, 1/

1. Recognizes:

(a) That the security of the Mediterranean is closely linked with international peace and security;

1/ A/38/395 of 30 September 1983.

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English
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(b) That further efforts are necessary for the reduction of tension and of armaments and for the creation of conditions of security and fruitful co-operation in all fields for all countries and peoples of the Mediterranean, on the basis of the principles of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, security, non-intervention and non-interference, non-violation of international borders, non-use or threat of use of force, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, peaceful settlement of disputes, and respect for sovereignty over natural resources;

(c) The need for just and viable solutions of existing problems and crisis in the area on the basis of the provisions of the Charter and of relevant resolutions of the United Nations, the withdrawal of foreign forces of occupation, and the right of peoples under colonial or foreign domination to self-determination and independence;

2. Encourages efforts for intensifying existing and promoting new forms of co-operation in various fields, particularly those aimed at reducing tension and strengthening confidence and security in the region;

3. Urges Mediterranean States to inform the Secretary-General of any concerted efforts aimed at promoting and strengthening security and co-operation in the Mediterranean;

4. Urges all States to co-operate with Mediterranean States in efforts to enhance security and co-operation in the Mediterranean;

5. Invites the Secretary-General to give due attention to the question of peace, security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region and, if requested to do so, to render advice and assistance to concerted efforts by Mediterranean countries in promoting peace, security and co-operation in the region;

6. Further requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-ninth session, on the basis of all replies received and notifications submitted in the implementation of this resolution and taking into account the debate on this question during its thirty-eighth session, a comprehensive report on strengthening security and co-operation in the Mediterranean;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Strengthening of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region".

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
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SUBJECT: UNGA 38: FIRST CTTEE: AGENDA ITEM 65
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7 December 1983

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Thirty-eighth session
FIRST COMMITTEE
Agenda item 65

STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malta, Romania,
Tunisia and Yugoslavia: revised draft resolution

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 36/102 and 37/118 on the item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security",

Mindful of the importance of strengthening peace and security in the Mediterranean and of the resultant impact on international peace and security,

Recalling the provisions relating to the Mediterranean in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, signed at Helsinki on 1 August 1975, and those of the Concluding Documents of the Belgrade and Madrid Meetings,

Noting with appreciation the declarations of the successive meetings of the non-aligned countries concerning the Mediterranean, as well as official declarations on, and contributions to, peace and security in the Mediterranean made by individual countries,

Taking note with appreciation of the analytical report of the Secretary-General, 1/

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1. Recognizes:

(a) That the security of the Mediterranean and the security of the adjacent regions are interdependent and significant for peace and security throughout the world;

(b) That further efforts are necessary for the reduction of tension and of armaments and for the creation of conditions of security and fruitful co-operation in all fields for all countries and peoples of the Mediterranean, on the basis of the principles of sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, security, non-intervention and non-interference, non-violation of international borders, non-use or threat of use of force, the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for human rights and respect for sovereignty over natural resources;

(c) The need for just and viable solutions of existing problems and crises in the area on the basis of the provisions of the Charter and of relevant resolutions of the United Nations, the withdrawal of foreign forces of occupation, and the right of peoples under colonial or foreign domination to self-determination and independence;

2. Encourages Mediterranean States, taking due account of the specific characteristics and security aspects of the region, to consider holding ad hoc meetings and consultations in order to concert views and devise initiatives among themselves and, as appropriate, with States in the adjacent regions and other concerned States, for intensifying existing and promoting new forms of co-operation in various fields, particularly those aimed at reducing tension and strengthening confidence and security in the region;

3. Urges Mediterranean States to inform the Secretary-General of any concerted efforts aimed at promoting and strengthening security and co-operation in the Mediterranean;

4. Urges all States to co-operate with Mediterranean States in efforts to enhance security and co-operation in the Mediterranean;

5. Invites the Secretary-General to give more attention to the question of peace, security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region and, if requested to do so, to render advice and assistance to concerted efforts by Mediterranean countries in promoting peace, security and co-operation in the region;

6. Further requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly, at its thirty-ninth session, on the basis of all replies received and notifications submitted in the implementation of this resolution and taking into account the debate on this question during its thirty-eighth session, a comprehensive report on strengthening security and co-operation in the Mediterranean;

7. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-ninth session the item entitled "Strengthening of security and co-operation in the Mediterranean region".

action

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---PRIME MINISTERS INITIATIVE: DANISH VIEW

WE FINALLY HAD OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS PMS INITIATIVE WITH HENNING
GOTTLIEB, SPECIAL SECURITY ADVISER TO DANISH PRIME MINISTER POUL
SCHLUTER. GOTTLIEB STATED THAT SCHLUTER WAS IMPRESSED BY PMS REASONING
AND QUOTE THAT IT WAS RIGHT UNQUOTE. THERE WAS GROWING FEELING IN
EUROPE THAT WEST WAS SLIPPING AND THAT SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE.
QUESTION OF COURSE WAS WHAT AND IN WHAT CONTEXT IE, GLOBAL CONTEXT
SUCH AS PM TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE OR IN WESTERN CONTEXT -- THAT THE
WEST GET ITS ACT TOGETHER CONCEPTUALLY. GOTTLIEB CITED EX CHANCELLOR
SCHMIDTS RECENT ARTICLE IN DIE ZEIT WHICH ALSO UNDERLINED SPREADING
MALAISE FELT AMONG WEST AT SLIPPING SECURITY POLICY. GOTTLIEB THANKED
US FOR INFORMING DANISH GOV OF PMS INITIATIVE AND ASKED TO BE KEPT
INFORMED.

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WOULD COMPLICATE THIS OBJECTIVE WE WOULD NOT/NOT PUSH NOTION OF
CDN JOURNALISTS BEING INVITED IN RETURN, HOWEVER WE THINK IDEA
SHOULD BE FLOATED, AT LEAST INITIALLY. IN EVENT SOVS ASK FOR
SUGGESTIONS AS TO WHO SHOULD BE INVITED, WE PROPOSE RICHARD GWYN
OF TRNTO STAR. GWYN HAS DEMONSTRATED INTEREST IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS
IN PAST, HAS WRITTEN ON PMS INITIATIVE AND IS A WELL-KNOWN
JOURNALIST WHO IS NATIONALLY SYNDICATED.

4. WITH REF TO PARA 3 YOUR REFTTEL, WE ARE INCLINED TO LET BEST AND
WATSON PROPOSALS STAND OR FALL ON THEIR OWN MERITS. WATSON PROPOSAL
WHILE INTERESTING MAY POSE SPECIAL COMPLICATIONS FOR SOVS. WE WOULD
NOT/NOT WANT VISIT HERE TO REST ON SUCCESS OF THAT INITIATIVE.
INVITATION COULD BE EXTENDED FROM HERE OR THROUGH EMB. ADVANTAGE
TO EXTENDING INVITATION THIS END IS THAT IT COULD BE CLEARLY LINKED
TO PMS INITIATIVE. WE ARE OF TWO MINDS, HOWEVER AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL
YOUR VIEWS ON MOST APPROPRIATE CHANNEL.

5. REQUEST AMB ROBERTS NOT/NOT MENTION PROPOSED VISIT TO TOLKUNOV
AT UPCOMING MTG. WE WOULD BE MOST INTERESTED IN AMBS PERSONAL
IMPRESSIONS OF TOLKUNOV ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO HIS SUITABILITY
AS POTENTIAL INVITEE. WE STILL FAVOUR EXTENSION OF INVITATION TO
BOVIN. BOVINS CONNECTIONS TO POLITBURO AND KNOWN INTEREST IN EAST-
WEST RELATIONS MAKE HIM STRONGEST CONTENDER IN OUR EYES BUT WE
ARE OPEN TO OTHER SUGGESTIONS.

6. GRATEFUL YOUR VIEWS ON ABOVE AND ANY ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS YOU
MAY WISH TO MAKE.

CCC/072 092154Z RBP1393

AB-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PRGUE WOCR1371 09DEC83

TO EXTOTT RBR MGT

INFO PRCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DMPOL/DGIS BNATO WSHDC LDN PARIS
PRMNY CNGNY WSAW MOSCO BGRAD BPEST BUCST BRU GENEV VIENN
BAG TOKYO PEKIN DE OTT BERN COPEN HSNKI OSLO LSBON STKHM HAGUE
DISTR MINA MINE MINT USS DMF RBD RCD TSD RERD IDD IDR ETT ZSP FPR
PER PPR PED SIO SIOA SID IDDZ IFB SIC JLO JLA JCD LGB ZSI IDA
LCD LCR

REF OURTEL WOCR1371

---REACTION TO SOVIET MISSILE DEPLOYMENT IN CSSR
AT ORIGINATORS REQUEST PLEASE MAKE DISTR LINE READ SAME AS THIS TEL.
2.MGTC PLEASE PROTECT OUR REFTEL TO LCD LCR.

CCC/175 091030Z WOCR1371

MF

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

**CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS**

FM PEKIN WJGR0954 09DEC83

TO EXTOTT (IDDZ)

INFO WSHDC PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/CPD

DISTR MINA DMF IDR IDA RGB RBR URR RCP ZSI UGB

REF WSHDC TEL UNGR2500 06DEC

---PMS INITIATIVE-VISIT TO WSHDC

28-6-1 - *Musden
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Mission*

CONSCIOUS THAT PMS INITIATIVE HAS BEEN UNWELCOME-~~IN CERTAIN~~ QUARTERS,
AND THAT MY INTERLOCUTORS MIGHT HAVE ONLY SUPERFICIAL KNOWLEDGE
OF PMS INITIATIVE; IN BRIEFING MY USA, AUSTRALIAN, AND NEW ZEALAND
COLLEAGUES AFTER PMS VISIT HERE I REMINDED THEM AT VERY BEGINNING
THAT PM HAD STATED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THAT HIS INITIATIVE SHOULD
NOT/NOT BE CONSTRUED AS REPRESENTING ANY CHANGE IN OUR FIRM
COMMITMENT TO ALLIANCE. ALSO THAT PM WAS NOT/NOT SUGGESTING POSSIBLE
POSTPONEMENT OF ESTABLISHMENT OF PERSHING II AND CRUISE MISSILES
IN WESTERN EUR OR A WEAKENING OF OUR DECISION TO ALLOW THE TESTING
OF CRUISE MISSILES OVER NORTHERN CDA. BEARING IN MIND PMS POSSIBLE
VISIT TO PRES REAGAN AND EVIDENT LACK OF UNANIMITY IN WSHDC ON
POSITIVITY OF PMS INITIATIVE I ADDED THAT WHILE TWO SUPERPOWERS
SHARED MAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTENANCE OF PEACE, PM DID NOT/NOT
IMPLY THAT THEY SHARED EQUAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRESENT TENSE SITU
IN WORLD ALTHOUGH HE EVIDENTLY COULD NOT/NOT SAY SO IN PUBLIC
WITHOUT RISKING LOSS OF CREDIBILITY WITH SOVIETS. I ALSO REFERRED
TO THE PMS CONSTRUCTIVE EXPLANATION TO DENG XIAOPING OF USA

...2

PAGE TWO WJGR0954 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

LEGISLATIVE PROCESS WHEN LATTER RAISED WITH HIM WHAT HE DESCRIBED
AS INCONSISTENCY IN USA POLICY TOWARDS CHINA. USA AMB HUMMEL, WHO
TOOK NOTES HAS NO/NO DOUBT REPORTED THIS TO WSHDC.

GAUVIN

CCC/002 090555Z WJGR0954

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM EXTOTT RBR0777 09DEC83
TO MOSCO

28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
Mission

INFO LDN PARIS BONN WSHDC ROME HAGUE BRU BNATO PRMNY PEKIN TOKYO
NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DPP/DGIS PCOOTT/FOWLER
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RGB RBD RBRD RBP RBT ZSP ZSI IDD IDDZ IDA IDR
REF YOURTELS XYGR9907 25NOV XYGR4174 XYGR4175 26NOV

---PM INITIATIVE-SOVEMB BRIEFING

SOV MIN-COUNSELLOR NOVIKOV ACCOMPANIED BY FIRST SEC GOUSSARFV CALLED
ON RBD AND GARY SMITH OF TASK FORCE ON 7DEC FOR UPDATE ON PMS
INITIATIVE. BRIEFING FOCUSSED MAINLY ON VISIT BY PEARSON TO MOSCO.

2. SMITH OPENED DISCUSSION WITH REVIEW OF MOSCO VISIT LARGELY AS PER
REFTELS. HE NOTED THAT SOV SIDE HAD BEEN WELL INFORMED ON INITIATIVE,
HAD CLEARLY STUDIED PM'S SPEECHES BUT DESPITE APPARENT INTEREST HAD
REMAINED NON-COMMITTAL ON BOTH PMS PROPOSALS AND POSSIBILITY OF
TRUDEAU VISIT. IMPRESSION GAINED BY EMISSARY WAS THAT SOVS WERE
UNABLE TO PROVIDE RESPONSE BECAUSE OF (A) HEALTH OF ANDROPOV AND
(B) MAJOR REVIEW UNDERWAY ON RELATIONS WITH USA.

3. RBD MADE CLEAR THAT CDN SIDE WAS STILL INTERESTED IN VISIT AND
THAT PROBABLE QUOTE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY UNQUOTE WAS OPEN TO MID-
JAN AT WHICH TIME HOUSE WILL RESUME SITTING. (NO/NO MENTION WAS MADE
OF POSSIBLE VISIT IN LATE JAN. THIS CAN BE RAISED WITH SOVS LATER IF
NECESSARY). SOVS WERE TOLD VISIT TO WSHDC WAS IMMINENT AND THAT WE

...2

PAGE TWO RBR0777 CONF D

REMAINED HIGHLY OPTIMISTIC EARLY VISIT TO USSR COULD SERVE USEFUL PURPOSE.

4. IN RESPONSE TO EMB QUESTION WHETHER SOV SIDE HAD DISCUSSED PMS FIVE PROPOSALS IN DETAIL, RBD EXPLAINED THAT, IN OUR VIEW THERE HAD BEEN PERHAPS TOO NARROW ATTENTION FOCUSED ON PROPOSALS PER SE. PMS OBJECTIVE IS TO FIND WAYS TO IMPROVE DIALOGUE AND REDUCE TENSIONS. OF COURSE SPECIFIC IDEAS HAD TO COME FORWARD BUT CDN PROPOSALS WERE NOT/NOT MEANT TO BE COMPREHENSIVE NOR EXCLUSIVE. WHAT WE HAD HOPED TO GAIN FROM SOV SIDE WAS SOME SENSE OF HOW THEY WOULD RE-ESTABLISH DIALOGUE WITH USA. IN OUR VIEW, THIS IS MATTER OF GENERAL POLICY WHICH DOES NOT/NOT DEPEND EXCLUSIVELY ON AVAILABILITY OF LEADERSHIP. IN THAT CONTEXT WE HAD HOPED SOVS COULD HAVE BEEN MORE FORTHCOMING IN DISCUSSIONS WITH PEARSON.

5. AT THIS POINT GOUSSAREV STEPPED IN WITH COMMENT THAT IF DIALOGUE WERE TO FOCUS ON BILATERAL QUESTIONS, THERE WOULD BE NO/NO DIFFICULTY. SOVS HAD BEEN CLEAR IN EXPRESSING DESIRE TO IMPROVE BILATERAL LINKS BUT EAST-WEST RELATIONS ARE BROADER MATTER AND ARE EXPERIENCING MUCH DIFFICULTY. IF VISIT WERE BILATERAL ONLY THERE WOULD BE NO/NO PROBLEM BUT BROAD REASSESSMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS IS NECESSARY DUE TO CHANGE IN STRATEGIC SITUATION. HE EMPHASIZED SOVS ARE NOT/NOT SAYING NO/NO TO VISIT BY PM BUT TIME IS REQUIRED TO WORK OUT MATTERS GOING BEYOND BILATERAL INTERESTS. RBD POINTED OUT PM WOULD NOT/NOT WISH TO GO TO MOSCO ON BASIS OF BILATERAL AGENDA ONLY;

...3

PAGE THREE RBR0777 CONF

AIM IS FIND WAYS TO IMPROVE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE.

AT SAME TIME, WE ARE NOT/NOT TRYING TO TELL SOVS WHAT THEY SHOULD BE DOING TO IMPROVE DIALOGUE. WHAT WE ARE LOOKING FOR IS SOME SIGNAL THAT SOVS WOULD WELCOME VISIT BY PM AS PART OF PROCESS TO FIND WAYS TO REDUCE CRISIS ATMOSPHERE WE ARE NOW FACING. IN OUR VIEW BALL NOW RESTS IN SOV COURT AND WE AWAIT THEIR RESPONSE.

6. NOT/NOT CERTAIN WHAT TO MAKE OF GOUSSAREV'S ALLUSION TO BILATERAL VISIT BEING EASIER TO ORGANIZE THAN ONE COVERING QUOTE BROADER ISSUES UNQUOTE. IF HE WAS FISHING WE QUICKLY SET RECORD STRAIGHT THAT PM WOULD ONLY TRAVEL TO MOSCO IF HE WAS CERTAIN IT WOULD BE IN CONTEXT OF INITIATIVE AND NOT/NOT OTHER MATTERS.

CCC/032 092328Z RBR0777

R E S T R I C T E D

FM EXTOTT PPR0574 09DEC83

TO TOKYO

INFO PCOOTT/DURRAND

DISTR PPD (DDZ

28-6-1 - Trudeau
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---PMS VISIT TO JPN:THANK YOU LETS

GRATEFUL YOU PROVIDE FOR OUR CONSIDERATION DRAFT THANK YOU
LETTER FROM PM TRUDEAU TO PM NAKASONE,ALONG WITH YOUR SUGGESTION
OF ANY OTHERS TO WHOM THANK YOU LET SHOULD BE SENT.

CCC/032 092326Z PPR0574

External Affairs / Affaires extérieures
Canada / Canada

MF

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W 0009/09

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

TOP/TOD
COMMUNICATIONS

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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ
UNCLASSIFIED

CANADIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

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ICF REF BRU TEL ZVGR0580 09DEC83

SUBJ/SUJ ---MACEACHEN/SHULTZ BILATERAL: PMS VISIT TO WSHDC

ATTACHED IS TEXT OF REAGANS JPN SPEECH AS REQUESTED
PARA 9 REFTTEL.

28-6-1 - Hudson
Peace
Mission

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

J.K.B. Kinsman/dt

SIG

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

J.K.B. Kinsman
SIG
14
000286

2/11

THE WHITE HOUSE

**Office of the Press Secretary
(Tokyo, Japan)**

For Immediate Release

November 11, 1953

**ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE NATIONAL DIET**

**The National Diet Building
The Assembly Hall of the House of Representatives
Tokyo, Japan**

9:35 A.M. JST

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, distinguished members of the Diet, it is with great honor and respect that I come before you today, the first American President ever to address the Japanese Diet.

I have been in your country only two days. But speaking for my wife, Nancy, and myself, may I say you have more than made us feel at home. The warmth of your welcome has touched our hearts. In welcoming us, you pay tribute to the more than 230 million Americans whom I have the privilege to represent. From all of us -- all of them to you we reach out to say: The bonds of friendship which unite us are even greater than the ocean which divides us. (Applause.)

It was a dozen years ago on an autumn day like this one that I first visited Japan and today, as then, I feel energy, initiative and industry surging through your country in a mighty current for progress. And just as before, I am struck by a unique gift of the Japanese people: You do not build your future at the expense of the grace and beauty of your past.

Harmony is a treasured hallmark of Japanese civilization and this has always been pleasing to Americans. Harmony requires differences to be joined in pursuit of higher ideals, many of which we share. When former President Ulysses S. Grant visited here in 1878, he discovered Japan is a land of enchantment.

During his stay, he met with the Emperor and their discussion turned to democracy, the pressing issue of the day. President Grant observed that governments are always more stable and nations more prosperous when they truly represent their people.

I am proud to help carry forward the century-old tradition, meeting first with your Emperor on my arrival and now meeting with you a great milestone in your history: The 100th session of the Diet under the modern Japanese Constitution.

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In six years you will celebrate your 100th anniversary of representative government in Japan, just as we will celebrate the birth of our own Congress. I bring you best wishes and heartfelt greetings from your American counterparts, the Congress of the United States.
(Applause.)

One cannot stand in this chamber without feeling a part of your proud history of nationhood and democracy, the spirit of hope carrying the dreams of your free people. Of all the strengths we possess, of all the ties that bind us, I believe the greatest is our dedication to freedom. Japan and America stand at the forefront of the free nations and free economies in the world.

Yes, we are 5,000 miles apart; yes, we are distinctly different in customs, language and tradition; and yes, we are often competitors in the world markets. But I believe the people represented by this proud Parliament and by my own United States Congress are of one heart in their devotion to the principles of our free societies.

I am talking about principles that begin with the sacred worth of human life; the cherished place of the family; the responsibility of parents and schools to be teachers of truth, tolerance, hard work, cooperation and love; and the role of our major institutions -- government, industry and labor -- to provide the opportunities and security -- opportunities and security free people need to build and leave behind a better world for their children and their children's children.

America and Japan are situated far apart, but we are united in our belief that freedom means dedication to the dignity, rights and equality of man. Yukichi Fukuzawa, the great Meiji-era educator, said it for you: "Heaven has made no man higher or no man lower than any other man."

Our great American hero Abraham Lincoln put it in political perspective for us: "No man is good enough to govern another man without that other's consent."

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We both value the right to have a government of our own choosing. We expect government to serve the people. We do not expect the people to serve government.

America and Japan speak with different tongues, but both converse, worship, and work with the language of freedom. We defend the right to voice our views, to speak words of dissent without being afraid, and to seek inner peace through communion with our God.

We believe in rewarding initiative, savings and risk-taking. And we encourage those who set their sights on the farthest stars, and chart new paths to progress through the winds and waters of commerce. Others censor and stifle their citizens. We trust in freedom to nurture the diversity and creativity that enriches us all. I like what your poet Basho said: "Many kinds of plants and each one triumphant in its special blossoms." (Applause.)

Finally, our freedom inspires no fear because it poses no threat. We intimidate no one. And we will not be intimidated by anyone. The United States and Japan do not build walls to keep our people in; we do not have armies of secret police to keep them quiet; we do not throw dissidents into so-called mental hospitals; and we would never cold-bloodedly shoot a defenseless airliner out of the sky. (Applause.) We share your grief for that tragic and needless loss of innocent lives.

Our two countries are far from perfect. But in this imperfect and dangerous world, the United States and Japan represent the deepest aspirations of men and women everywhere -- to be free, to live in peace, and to create and renew the wealth of abundance and spiritual fulfillment. I have come to Japan because we have an historic opportunity, indeed, an historic responsibility. We can become a powerful partnership for good, not just in our own countries, not just in the Pacific region, but throughout the world. (Applause.) Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, my question is: Do we have the determination

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to meet the challenge of partnership and make it happen. My answer is without hesitation. yes we do and yes we will.

For much of our histories our countries looked inward. Well, those times have passed. With our combined economies accounting for half the output of the free world, we cannot escape our global responsibilities. Our industries depend on the importation of energy and minerals from distant lands. Our prosperity requires a sound international financial system and free and open trading markets. And our security is inseparable from the security of our friends and neighbors.

The simple hope for world peace and prosperity will not be enough. Our two great nations, working with others, must preserve the values and freedoms our societies have struggled so hard to achieve. Nor should our partnership for peace, prosperity and freedom be considered a quest for competing goals. We cannot prosper unless we are secure and we cannot be secure unless we are free. And we will not succeed in any of these endeavors unless Japan and America work in harmony.

I have come to your country carrying the heartfelt desires of America for peace. I know our desires are shared by Prime Minister Nakasone and all of Japan. We are people of peace. We understand the terrible trauma of human suffering. I have lived through four wars in my lifetime. So I speak not just as President of the United States, but also as a husband, a father, and a grand father. (Applause.) I believe there can be only one policy for preserving our precious civilization in this modern age. A nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought. (Applause.)

The only value in possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they can't be used ever. I know I speak for people everywhere when I say, our dream is to see the day when nuclear weapons will be banished from the face of the earth. (Applause.)

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Arms control must mean arms reductions. America is doing its part. As I pledged to the United Nations less than two months ago, the United States will accept any equitable, verifiable agreement that stabilizes forces at lower levels than currently exist. We want significant reductions. And we're willing to compromise.

In the strategic arms reduction talks, American negotiators continue to press the Soviet Union for any formula that will achieve these objectives. In the longer-range INF talks, we are pursuing the same course, even offering to eliminate an entire category of weapons. I'm very conscious of our negotiating responsibility on issues that concern the safety and well-being of the Japanese people. And let me make one thing very plain. We must not and we will not accept any agreement that transfers the threat of longer-range nuclear missiles from Europe to Asia. (Applause.)

Our great frustration has been the other side's unwillingness to negotiate in good faith. We wanted to cut deep into nuclear arsenals, and still do. But they're blocking the dramatic reductions the world wants. In our good faith effort to move the negotiations forward, we have offered new initiatives, provided for substantial reductions to equal levels, and the lower the level the better. But we shall wait. We still wait for the first positive response.

Despite this bleak picture, I will not be deterred in my search for a breakthrough. The United States will never walk away from the negotiating table. Peace is too important. Common sense demands that we persevere. And we will persevere. We live in uncertain times. (Applause.) There are trials and tests for freedom wherever freedom stands. It is as stark as the tragedy over the Sea of Japan where 269 innocent people were killed for the so-called cause of "sacred airspace." It is as real as the terrorist attacks last month -- the Republic of Korea's leadership in Rangoon -- and against American and French members of the international peacekeeping force in Beirut.

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And yes, it is as telling as the stonewalling of our adversaries at the negotiating table, and as their crude attempts to intimidate freedom-loving people everywhere.

These threats to peace and freedom underscore the importance of closer cooperation among all nations. You have an old proverb that says, "A single arrow is easily broken, but not three in a bunch." (Applause.) The stronger the dedication of Japan, the United States and our allies to peace through strength, the greater our contributions to building a more secure future will be. The U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security must continue to serve us as the bedrock of our security relationship. Japan will not have to bear the burden of defending freedom alone. America is your partner. We will bear that burden together. (Applause.)

The defense of freedom should be a shared burden. We can afford to defend freedom; we cannot afford to lose it. The blessings of your economic miracle, created with the genius of a talented, determined and dynamic people, can only be protected in the safe harbor of freedom.

In his book, In Quest of Peace and Freedom, former Prime Minister Sato wrote: "In the hundred years since the Meiji Restoration, Japan has constantly endeavored to catch up and eventually overtake the more advanced countries of the world." I don't think I'll be making headlines when I say, you've not only caught up, in some cases, you've pulled ahead. Here again, our partnership is crucial. But this time, you can be teachers. To all those who lack faith in the human spirit, I have just three words of advice: Come to Japan. (Applause.)

Come to a country whose economic production will soon surpass the Soviet Union's, making Japan's economy the second largest in the entire world. Come to learn from a culture that instills in its people a strong spirit of cooperation, discipline, and striving for excellence; and yes, learn from government policies which helped ~~create this economic miracle -- not so much by central planning, as~~ by stimulating competition, encouraging initiative, and rewarding savings and risktaking.

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Our country has made great strides in this direction during the last 3 years. We are correcting past mistakes. Hope is being reborn. Confidence is returning. America's future looks bright again. We have turned the corner from overtaxing--(applause) -- turned the corner from overtaxing, overspending, record interest rates, high inflation and low growth. The United States is beginning the first stage of a new industrial renaissance, and we're helping pull other nations forward to worldwide recovery.

But some in my country still flinch from the need to restrain spending. Under the guise of lowering deficits, they would turn back to policies of higher taxes. They would ignore the lesson of Japan. A look at Japan's postwar history yields two stunning conclusions: Among the major industrialized countries, your tax burden has remained the lowest and your growth and savings rates the highest. (Applause.) Savers in Japan can exempt very large amounts of interest income from taxation; your taxes on so-called unearned income -- (laughter) -- are low; you have no capital gains tax on securities for investors; and the overwhelming majority of your working people face tax rates dramatically lower than in the other industrial countries, including my own. (Applause.) And incentives for everyone -- that's the secret of strong growth for a shining future filled with hope and opportunities and incentives for growth, not tax increases, is our policy for America. Sometimes I wonder if we shouldn't further our friendship by my sending our Congress here and you coming over and occupying our Capitol building for a while. (Applause.)

Partnership must be a two-way street grounded in mutual trust. Let us always be willing to learn from each other and cooperate together. We have every reason to do so. Our combined economies account for almost 35 percent of the world's entire economic output. We are the world's two largest overseas trading partners. Last year, Japan took about 10 percent of our total exports and we bought some 25 percent of yours. Our two-way trade will exceed \$60 billion in 1983, more than double the level of just 7 years ago.

The Williamsburg Summit last May, the leaders of our industrial democracies pledged

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cooperate in rolling back protectionism. My personal commitment to that goal is based on economic principles, old-fashioned common sense and experience. I am old enough to remember what eventually happened the last time countries protected their markets from competition: It was a nightmare called "the Great Depression." And it was world wide. World trade fell at that time by 60 percent. And everyone, workers, farmers and manufacturers were hurt.

Let us have the wisdom never to repeat that policy. (Applause.) We're in the same boat with our trading partners around the globe. And if one partner in the boat shoots a hole in the boat, it doesn't make much sense for the other partner to shoot another hole in the boat. Some say, yes, and call that getting tough. Well, forgive me, but I call it getting wet all over. (Applause.) Rather than shoot holes, let us work together to plug them up so our boat of free markets and free trade and fair trade can lead us all to greater economic growth and international stability. (Applause.)

I have vigorously opposed quick fixes of protectionism in America. Anti-competitive legislation like the local content rule, which would force our domestic manufacturers of cars to use a rising share of U.S. labor and parts. Now, this would be a cruel hoax -- (applause) -- raising -- It would be raising prices without protecting jobs. We would buy less from you. You would buy less from us. The world's economic pie would shrink. Retaliation and recrimination would increase.

It is not easy for elected officials to balance the concerns of constituents with the greater interests of the nation. But that's what our jobs are all about. And we need your help in demonstrating free trade to address concerns of my own people. Americans believe your markets are less open than ours. We need your support to lower further the barriers that still make it difficult for some American products to enter your markets easily. Your government's recent series of actions to reduce trade barriers are positive steps in this direction. We very much hope this process will continue and accelerate. In turn, I pledge my support to combat protectionist measures in my own country.

If we each give a little we can all gain a lot. (Applause.) As two great and mature democracies, let us have the faith to believe in each other, to draw on our long and good friendship and to make our partnership grow. We are leaders in the world economy. We and the other industrialized countries share a responsibility to

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open up capital and trading markets, promote greater investment in each other's country, assist developing nations, and stop the leakage of military technology to an adversary bent on aggression and domination.

We believe that the currency of the world's second largest free market economy should reflect the economic strength and political stability that you enjoy. We look forward to the yen playing a greater role in international financial and economic affairs. We welcome the recent trend toward a stronger yen. And we would welcome Japan's increasingly active role in global affairs. Your leadership in aid to refugees and in economic assistance to various countries has been most important in helping to promote greater stability in key regions of the world. Your counsel on arms reduction initiatives is highly valued by us.

We may have periodic disputes, but the real quarrel is not between us. (Applause.) It is with those who would impose regimentation over freedom, drudgery over dynamic initiative, a future of despair over the certainty of betterment, and the forced feeding of a military goliath over a personal stake in the products and progress of tomorrow.

You and your neighbors are shining examples for all who seek rapid development. The Pacific Basin represents the most exciting region of economic growth in the world today. Your people stretch your abilities to the limit, and when an entire nation does this, miracles occur. Being a Californian, I have seen many miracles hardworking Japanese have brought to our shores.

In 1965, a young samurai student, Kanaye Nagasawa, left Japan to learn what made the West economically strong and technologically advanced. Ten years later, he founded a small winery at Santa Rosa, California, called the Fountaingrove Round Barn and Winery. Soon he became known as the great king of California. Nagasawa came to California to learn, and stayed to enrich our lives. Both our countries owe much to this Japanese warrior-turned-businessman.

As the years pass, our contacts continue to increase at an astounding rate. Today some 13,000 of your best college and graduate students are studying in America. And increasing numbers of U.S. citizens are coming here to learn everything they can about Japan. Companies like Nissan, Kyocera, Sony and Toshiba have brought thousands of jobs to America's shores. The State of California is planning to build a rapid speed train that is adapted from your highly successful bullet train. In 1985 the United States will join Japan in a major exhibition of science and technology at Tsukuba, another symbol of our cooperation. (Applause.)

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For my part, I welcome this new Pacific tide. Let it roll peacefully on, carrying a two-way flow of people and ideas that can break from barriers of suspicion and mistrust, and build up bonds of cooperation and shared optimism. (Applause.)

Our two nations may spring from separate pasts; we may live at opposite sides of the earth; but we have been brought together by our indomitable spirit of determination, our love of liberty, and devotion to progress. We are like climbers who begin their ascent from opposite ends of the mountain. The harder we try, the higher we climb and the closer we come together -- until that moment we reach the peak and we are as one. (Applause.)

It happened just last month. One American and two Japanese groups began climbing Mt. Everest -- the Japanese from the side of Nepal and the Americans from the side of Tibet. The conditions were so difficult and dangerous that before it ended two Japanese climbers tragically lost their lives. But before that tragedy, those brave climbers all met and shook hands just under the summit. And then, together, they climbed to the top to share that magnificent moment of triumph. (Applause.)

Good and dear friends of Japan, if those mountaineers could join hands at the top of the world, imagine how high our combined 350 million citizens can climb, if all of us work together as powerful partners for the cause of good. (Applause.) Together there is nothing that Japan and America cannot do.

Thank you very much. God bless you. (Applause.)

END

10:05 A.M. JST

28-6-1 - Trudeau
Peace
mission

C O N F I D E N T I E L

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TO EXTOTT RGB MGTC IMMED

INFO PARIS LDN BONN ROME BRU BREEC BNATO VIENN VMBFR COPEN HSNKI
ATHNS VATCN DUBLN HAGUE OSLO LSBON STKHM BERN GENEV ANKRA PESCO
POECD/HOP ITCOTT/OLIVER/LACHAPELLE FINCOTT/SHANNON PCOOTT/BLACKBURN
DISTR MINA USS DMF DMT IFB RCD RSD RSR RST RCM RCT ACP CCB TFB
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A : M./Mad.

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Subject : JOURNAL OF COMMERCE "CANADIANS DISAPPOINTED
Objet : POLICY STATEMENT"

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Canadians Disappointed By Policy Statement

By LEO RYAN

Journal of Commerce Staff

MONTREAL — Business spokesmen in Canada have expressed strong disappointment and criticism over the contents of the Throne speech which on Wednesday opened a new session of the Canadian federal Parliament in Ottawa.

The speech, read by Governor General Edward Schreyer from a text approved by Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, outlined government priorities for a session that is expected by observers to be the last before the next general elections.

Members of the political opposition and businessmen said the Liberal government will have great difficulty in converting most of its promises into a reality with the session lasting one year at the most. It is widely speculated that Prime Minister Trudeau will announce his retirement this winter after leading the Liberal Party since 1968.

The Liberal Party is presently nearly 30 points behind the Progressive Conservative Party in opinion polls and political commentators said the speech sounded more like a campaign platform than a policy statement. Few details were given on the 80 or so items contained in the speech.

As expected, the speech placed considerable emphasis on Prime Minister Trudeau's recent initiatives on behalf of world peace — initiatives

that thus far have met with limited success.

Among other things, the speech called for \$400 million in new spending on job creation, increased guaranteed income supplements to single old-age pensioners, and pledged changes in bankruptcy laws to protect farmers and workers as well as amended competition laws. It also indicated a mortgage rate insurance scheme was close to cabinet approval.

While opposition politicians described the package as "a grab bag of generalities" designed to appeal to everyone, John Bulloch, president of the Canadian Federation of Independent Business, said he was "extremely disappointed."

"It has sullied Mr. Trudeau's commendable peace and restraint initiatives with 1960s style politicking," Mr. Bulloch said in a telephone interview.

In Mr. Bulloch's view, it amounted to "a public relations overkill."

"If goldfish had a right to vote," he added, "they would have included a program for goldfish."

Officials at the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, though they approved Mr. Trudeau's efforts for peace abroad and prosperity at home, said it was not possible to assess where the priorities lay in economic matters or to see how the retraining programs were well geared to the country's actual manpower needs.