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AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES ET
COMMERCE EXTÉRIEUR CANADA

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA


TITLE—TITRE 47-7-1 CROATIA

REFUGEE IN EUROPE - (Bico A-5)

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P R O T E C T E D

FM ZAGRB QLGR1028 14MAR94

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INFO BGRAD BNATO BRU BREEC ROME VATCN VIENN VNACE VIENN/PILLAR GENEV
ATHNS HSNKI BPEST PRGUE LSBON MOSCO WSAW BUCST BONN PARIS HAGUE
CNBRA LDN PCOOTT/IAS/FDP PMOOTT RCMPOTT/D/CA/BEAULAC
PILLAROTT/RCT/RCI/RAP EANDIHULL/OSD/ORH/OSE DOCOTT DFATCBA
SFAX MERTWGN DE OTT

TT PRMNY_WKGR WSHDC_UNGR EXTOTT_MINA EXTOTT_USS EXTOTT_IFB
EXTOTT_IDS EXTOTT_ISD EXTOTT_ISO EXTOTT_ISI EXTOTT_CPD EXTOTT_IMD
EXTOTT_IMH EXTOTT_CPP EXTOTT_JLO EXTOTT_JCD EXTOTT_JPO EXTOTT_EER
EXTOTT_URR DE COS TT NDHQOTT/DIPOL/ ADM(POL)/DPKO/DNATOPOL/DSTRATA/
DGPOLOPS/NDQC/ NDHQ INT OTTAWA/DGINT/YUGO WK GP/ CCMY ZAGREB/COMD/
CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB/COMD/ CCUNPROFOR CAMP POLOM/CCMIO/ DE CAF
DISTR MINP RGB RBD RBRD RBT RZD RZC RZP RWD RWM IMM
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---CROATIA: MEDIA FREEDOM:

DRAFT LAW ON BROADCASTING AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

SUMMARY: IN RECENT MTG WITH EMB REP, DEP MIN OF COMMUNICATIONS
FILIPOVIC OUTLINED DRAFT LAW ON BROADCASTING AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AND DISCUSSED PHILOSOPHY AND RATIONALE BEHIND PROPOSED REVAMPING OF
CROATIAN BROADCASTING SYSTEM. LAW IS BASED IN PART ON CDN MODEL,
BUT IS ALSO STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY LEGISLATION OF VARIOUS WESTERN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. INTENT IS TO TAILOR REGULATIONS TO ADDRESS

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PAGE TWO QLGR1028 P R O T E C T E D

SPECIFIC CULTURAL AND LINGUISTIC PRIORITIES, AND CDN EXPERIENCE WILL LIKELY PROVE IMPORTANT HERE AS WELL. PROSPECTS FOR MORE SIGNIFICANT LIBERALIZATION OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA IN SHORT TERM ARE NOT PROMISING AND GOVT WILL MOST LIKELY ALLOW FURTHER REFORMS GRUDGINGLY AND ONLY IN RESPONSE TO COMBINED DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN PRESSURE.

2. REPORT: THE LACK OF MEDIA FREEDOM IN CROATIA IS ONE OF MOST FREQUENTLY CITED OBSTACLES TO DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN CROATIA. IT IS A SORE POINT WITHIN CROATIAN OPPOSITION AS WELL AS AMONG INTERESTED INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS, EUROPEANS IN PARTICULAR. THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE SPONSORED A CONTROVERSIAL WORKSHOP LATE LAST YEAR ON SUBJECT, WHILE UNESCO RECENTLY SENT TEAM OF EXPERTS HEADED BY FORMER CBC HEAD PIERRE JUNEAU TO EXAMINE SITUATION AND ADVISE CROATIAN GOVT. HUMAN RIGHTS GROUPS (ESPECIALLY HELSINKI WATCH) MAINTAIN CONSTANT WATCH AGAINST MEDIA ABUSE, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS MINORITY RIGHTS AND PROVOCATION OF ETHNIC TENSIONS RELATED TO THE WAR (E.G., BOSNIAN MUSLIM REFUGEES LIVING IN CROATIA). IT IS LARGELY IN RESPONSE TO THESE PRESSURES THAT CROATIA IS IN PROCESS OF REFORMING LAWS GOVERNING ELECTRONIC MEDIA.

3. BOTH MIN AND DEP MIN OF COMMUNICATIONS ARE DUAL CDN/CROATIAN CITIZENS. THIS IS NO DOUBT PART OF REASON THAT CDN LEGISLATION WAS CHOSEN AS MODEL FOR DRAFT CROATIAN LAW (ALONG WITH THAT OF GERMANY, FRANCE, GREAT BRITAIN, ITALY AND SWITZERLAND). MAIN PRIORITIES ACCORDING TO DEP MIN DOMINIK FILIPOVIC ARE LIBERALIZATION OF MEDIA

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PAGE THREE QLGR1028 P R O T E C T E D

CONTROL WHILE AT SAME TIME PROTECTING CROATIAN CULTURE. HE LIKENED THIS TO CDN EXPERIENCE, ALTHOUGH HE LATER AGREED WITH EMB REP THAT SITUATIONS WERE QUITE DISSIMILAR IN VIEW OF FACT THAT DOMESTIC MEDIA ALREADY HAS VIRTUAL MONOPOLY ON CROATIAN-LANGUAGE BROADCASTING, AND IS THUS AUTOMATICALLY PROTECTED TO LARGE DEGREE FROM FOREIGN COMPETITION.

4. FILIPOVIC REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THAT DRAFT LAW WAS VERY LIBERAL AND COMPARED FAVOURABLY WITH THAT OF OTHER COUNTRIES. SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENT TO FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF PRIVATE BROADCASTING FOR BOTH RADIO AND TV WAS LIMITED SIZE OF DOMESTIC MARKET. HE CITED FIGURE OF 1.5 MILLION BEING REQUISITE AUDIENCE TO ENSURE STATIONS' PROFITABILITY, WHICH IF TRUE WOULD MEAN ONLY ZAGREB COULD APPROACH THIS GOAL AT URBAN/REGIONAL LEVEL (CROATIA'S ENTIRE POPULATION IS LESS THAN 5 MILLION). CONCESSIONS WOULD BE GRANTED ON BASIS OF ILL-DEFINED "BENEFITS" ACCRUING TO CROATIAN SOCIETY, ESPECIALLY AS REGARDS DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURAL INDUSTRY, PROTECTION OF LANGUAGE FROM FOREIGN INFLUENCES, AND SIGNIFICANT LOCAL PROGRAMMING. POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE STEMMING FROM VAGUENESS OF DEFINITIONS MAY HAVE BEEN LIMITED BY CREATION, AT OPPOSITION PARTIES' INSISTENCE, OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS COUNCIL. COUNCIL IS TO CONSIST OF NINE MEMBERS OF WHICH FIVE ARE TO BE NOMINATED BY PARLIAMENT AND OTHER FOUR ARE TO BE NOMINATED BY GOVT. AS GOVT HOLDS MAJORITY IN PARLIAMENT, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT THAT METHODOLOGY OF NAMING MEMBERS IS SEEN AS

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PAGE FOUR QLGR1028 P R O T E C T E D

CREDIBLE BY OPPOSITION, AND THAT THEY WIELD REAL INFLUENCE IN MAKING SUCH APPOINTMENTS.

5. NUMBER OF OTHER STEPS MUST BE TAKEN IN ORDER TO IMPLEMENT PLANS, MOST OF THESE BEING OF TECHNICAL NATURE. AGAIN, CDN MODEL IS LIKELY TO PROVE IMPORTANT, AS GOVT HAS REQUESTED COPIES OF CDN CABLE REGULATIONS FROM DEPT OF COMMUNICATIONS. IN ZAGREB ITSELF, USE OF SATELLITE DISHES IS WIDESPREAD; IT IS NOT CLEAR HOW WELL A CABLE NETWORK WILL SUCCEED AS ALTERNATIVE TO SATELLITE TECHNOLOGY.

6. COMMENT: PRIVATIZATION PROGRAMME IN CROATIA HAS BEEN RIDDLED WITH FAVOURITISM TOWARDS THOSE WITH STRONG LINKS TO GOVT, AND MUCH OF MONEY WHICH HAS FLOWED BACK FROM EMIGRE COMMUNITY IS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN REPAID WITH PRIVILEGED ACCESS TO FORMER STATE ASSETS. MASS PRINT MEDIA IS ALREADY ALMOST UNSWERVING IN ITS SUPPORT FOR GOVT AND OPPOSITION PARTIES ARE THUS AT A CONSIDERABLE DISADVANTAGE.

RELEVANCE OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA IS PARAMOUNT AS ONLY SMALL MAJORITY IN CROATIA READ PRINT MEDIA. PROSPECTS OF MARKED CHANGE THROUGH NEW LEGISLATION ARE LIMITED, ESPECIALLY AS FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IS LIMITED TO 25% PARTICIPATION AND NO SIGNIFICANT REFORM OF HRT ITSELF IS PLANNED. FILIPOVIC'S OPTIMISM FOR "IMPROVEMENT" OF HRT IS DUBIOUS AT BEST SINCE POTENTIAL CHANGES ARE ENTIRELY RELIANT ON MARKET COMPETITION, WHICH WILL LIKELY BE VERY WEAK WITH SUCH A SMALL DOMESTIC AUDIENCE. THERE ARE NO PLANS TO CEDE ANY CONTROL OF HRT TO ARMS-LENGTH BODY IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT CBC-STYLE NATIONAL

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PAGE FIVE QLGR1028 P R O T E C T E D

BROADCASTER AS OPPOSED TO STATE MEDIA ENTITY. AS CONCESSIONS ARE TO BE GRANTED BY GOVT ACCORDING TO VAGUE CRITERIA, POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT ELECTRONIC MEDIA COULD GO WAY OF PRINT MEDIA IN CROATIA - NOT/NOT SO MUCH CONTROLLED, AS BOUGHT AND SOLD. OVERT CONTROL OR INFLUENCE OF GOVT WOULD NOT BE REQUIRED IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES AS MORE SUBTLE MEANS WOULD PREVAIL TO ACHIEVE SAME ENDS: NAMELY, KEEPING POLITICAL DISCOURSE BELOW GOVT'S PAIN THRESHOLD.

PROGRAM CODE GR (POLITICAL)

APPROVALS HANSON

CCC/444 151146Z QLGR1028

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INFO BGRAD BNATO BRU BREEC ROME VATCN VIENN VNACE VIENN/PILLAR
GENEV
ATHNS HSNKI BPEST PRGUE LSBON MOSCO WSAW BUCST BONN PARIS HAGUE
CNBRA LDN PCOOTT/IAS/FDP PMOOTT RCMPOTT/D/CA/MURRAY
PILLAROTT/RCT/RCI/RAP EANDIHULL/OSD/ORH/OSE DFATCBA
SFAX MERTWGN DE OTT
TT PRMNY WKGR WSHDC UNGR EXTOTT MINA EXTOTT USS EXTOTT IFB
EXTOTT_IDD EXTOTT_IDS EXTOTT_ISD EXTOTT_ISO EXTOTT_ISI EXTOTT_CPD
EXTOTT_IMD EXTOTT_IMU EXTOTT_IMH EXTOTT_CPP EXTOTT_JLO EXTOTT_JCD
EXTOTT_JPO EXTOTT_EER EXTOTT_URR DE COS TT NDHQOTT/DIPOL/
ADM(POL)/DPKO/DNATOPOL/DTRATA/DGPOLOPS/NDOC/
NDHQ INT OTTAWA/DGINT/YUGO WK GP/ CCMY ZAGREB/COMD/
CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB/COMD/ CCUNPROFOR CAMP POLOM/CCMIO/ DE CAF
DISTR MINP RGB RBD RBRD RBT RZD RZC RZP RWD RWR IMM
DE ZAGRB QLGR/HANSON
---CROATIA-FRY RELATIONS
SUMMARY: ALTHOUGH PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE WITH AGREEMENT TO OPEN
NON-
DIPLOMATIC GOVT OFFICES IN ZAGREB AND BELGRADE, FRY CHOICE OF KNIN
SERB AS REPRESENTATIVE HAS RAISED CONTROVERSY IN CROATIA. MORE
GENERALLY, THERE IS LITTLE ENTHUSIASM IN CROATIA FOR RAPPROCHEMENT
WITH SERBIA. CROATIAN GOVT IS ADOPTING "WAIT AND SEE" APPROACH.
2.REPORT: 19JAN94 JOINT DECLARATION INITIATING NORMALIZATION OF
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PAGE TWO QLGR0024 C O N F I D E N T I A L
RELATIONS BETWEEN CROATIA AND WAS NOT/NOT RECEIVED WITH UNALLOYED
APPROVAL IN CROATIA. DECLARATION FOLLOWED WIDELY-TELEVISED IMAGES

OF
TUDJMAN AND MILOSEVIC HAGGLING OVER MAP OF BOSNIA IN GENEVA
PREVIOUS
MONTH, WHICH PROMPTED SATIRICAL WEEKLY "FERAL TRIBUNE" (PHOTO-
MONTAGE A SPECIALTY) TO FEATURE FRONT-PAGE PHOTO OF TWO NUDE MALES
IN BED TOGETHER, WITH HEADS OF TUDJMAN AND MILOSEVIC SUPER-IMPOSED,
ACCOMPANIED BY CAPTION "IS THIS WHAT WE FOUGHT FOR?".

3.FURTHER CONTROVERSY WAS ADDED 11FEB, WITH ANNOUNCEMENT THAT HEAD
OF FRY OFFICE IN ZAGREB WOULD BE VELJKO KNEZEVIC, ORIGINALLY FROM
KNIN AND FORMER DIRECTOR OF RADIO-TV ZAGREB. KNEZEVIC, LONG-TIME
FUNCTIONARY IN CROATIAN LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS, FIRST CAME TO
PROMINENCE IN 1971 FOLLOWING "ZAGREB SPRING" AS COMMITTED ANTI-
NATIONALIST, AND EVENTUALLY ROSE TO BE SECOND OR THIRD MAN IN
PARTY.

IN 1984 HE WAS APPOINTED AS DIRECTOR OF RTV ZAGREB AND IN 1986 AS
GENERAL DIRECTOR OF CROATIAN RADIO-TV (HTV). HE HELD LATTER POST
UNTIL "RETIRED" BY HDZ RULING PARTY IN JUL90.

4.WHAT RANKLES IN CROATIA, HOWEVER, IS THAT DURING SUMMER 1992,
KNEZEVIC CROSSED LINES TO REAPPEAR IN KNIN AS GENERAL DIRECTOR OF

RADIO-TV KNIN. RTV KNIN, OFFICIAL BROADCASTER OF "REPUBLIC OF
SERBIAN KRAJINA", IS EASILY RECEIVED IN ZAGREB AND ITS NEWS
PROGRAMMING MAKES ANTUN VRDOLJAK'S HTV APPEAR BY COMPARISON AS A
MODEL OF OBJECTIVITY AND RESTRAINT. FOR MOST OF PAST TWO YEARS,
ZAGREBERS HAVE BEEN ABLE, AFTER SEETHING THROUGH 30 MINUTES OF RTV

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PAGE THREE QLGR0024 C O N F I D E N T I A L
REPORTS OF "USTASI" ATTACKS ON KNIN AND BENKOVAC, TO SWITCH TO HTV
AND ABSORB SIMILAR BUT OPPOSITE REPORTS OF "CETNIK" ATTACKS ON
ZADAR
AND GOSPIC.

5.ACCORDING TO PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER MATIC CROATIAN
GOVT, HAVING AGREED TO OPENING OF OFFICES IN ZAGREB AND BELGRADE,
IS
ADOPTING "WAIT AND SEE" ATTITUDE. COMMUNICATIONS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY
BE
EASIER, BUT THAT IN ITSELF WILL NOT/NOT SOLVE PROBLEMS. IN END,
ACCORDING TO MATIC, EVERYTHING WILL DEPEND ON TRUE INTENTIONS OF
MILOSEVIC. LATTER, WITH HIS OWN POLITICAL FLANKS TO PROTECT, HAS

BEEN VERY CAGY: "HE DOESN'T SAY THAT KRAJINA IS NOT/NOT PART OF CROATIA, BUT ON OTHER HAND HE USES EXPRESSION 'REPUBLICA SRPSKA KRAJINA'". MATIC BELIEVES THAT IN END MILOSEVIC WILL HAVE TO SUPPORT

KRAJINA SERBS, BUT IS CURRENTLY TRYING TO PLAY BOTH SIDES OF GAME.

6. LARGE PART OF MILOSEVIC'S PROBLEM, ACCORDING TO MATIC, WAS LARGE NUMBER OF KRAJINA SERBS IN BELGRADE. MILOSEVIC WOULD LIKE TO BE RID OF THEM, BUT HAD TO PROCEED CAREFULLY. IN MEANTIME, HE COULD USE THEM AS A LEVER IN DEALINGS WITH CROATIA.

7. WHILE ADMITTING THAT KNEZEVIC HAD CERTAIN QUALITIES, MATIC BELIEVED THAT MILOSEVIC HAD MADE MISTAKE IN APPOINTING HIM AS FRY

REP TO CROATIA ("IN RELATIONS WITH VATICAN, YOU DON'T SEND AN AMB

WHO HAS SPOKEN AGAINST THE CHURCH"). KNEZEVIC UNDOUBTEDLY HAD INFLUENCE IN KNIN, BUT IN CROATIA HE LACKED CREDIBILITY AS HONEST

INTERLOCUTOR; IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO HAVE ANY BUT STRICTLY

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PAGE FOUR QLGR0024 C O N F I D E N T I A L
OFFICIAL CONTACTS IN ZAGREB. IT WOULD BE SOMETHING DIFFERENT, MATIC THOUGHT, IF KNEZEVIC HAD BEEN APPOINTED AS ZAGREB-KNIN GO-BETWEEN - HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO CONVEY MESSAGES BETTER THAN UNPROFOR MEDIATORS.

8. MATIC EXPECTED THAT OFFICES IN ZAGREB AND BELGRADE WOULD BOTH BE OPEN ABOUT END OF FEB. FOLLOWING THAT, WORK COULD BEGIN ON RESTORING TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSPORT LINKS. BUT EVEN ON SUCH PRACTICAL

MATTERS THERE WERE SYMBOLIC PROBLEMS: KNIN WOULD HAVE TO BE SWITCHED

FROM FRY TO CROATIAN DIALLING CODE. RE-OPENING OF ROADS MIGHT BE OBSTRUCTED BY LOCAL HARD-LINERS.

PROGRAM CODE GR (GENERAL RELATIONS)

APPROVALS HANSON

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P R O T E C T E D
FM VIENN ULIM3256 18FEB94
TO EANDIHULL/OSE
INFO EANDIHULL/OSEW/OFB/OSD/EDO/EDP/ORD/ORH/ORC/OSC/ORDX/RAB BRU
GENEV BREEC\LUNDY LDN ROME MUNIC PARIS ATHNS STKHM BGRAD
COPEN ZAGREB BUDAPEST BONN

DISTR RBD RWD RWM CPP CPD JFB RWR IMD IMM RBR
REF BONN ZQIM6788 OF 17FEB94

---FRG STARTS RETURN OF CROATIANS

1. HAVE READ RECENT MEDIA REPORTS AND BONN REFTEL ONRETURN OF CROATIANS WITH INTEREST BECAUSE OF ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON OUR YUGO SPEC MEASURES AND REFUGEE PROGRAMS. NEW GERMAN POLICY WILL BE OF CONCERN TO CROATIAN GOVT WHICH WILL BE INTERESTED IN AVOIDING SUDDEN, LARGE-SCALE RETURNS AND WHICH WILL WISH TO SEE RETURNS PHASED OVER A LONGER PERIOD. WHILE RETURNS WILL HAVE IMPLICATIONS FOR BOSNIAN REFUGEE POPULATION IN CROATIA, UNHCR PROTECTION OFFICER IN ZAGREB DID NOT, IN CONVERSATION, APPEAR TO BELIEVE THAT RETURN WOULD RESULT IN ANY SERIOUS DANGER OF REFOULEMENT. HE STATED THAT CURRENT MUSLIM/CROAT FIGHTING IN BH AND RESULTING INFLUX OF CROATIAN REFUGEES FROM BH WAS HAVING MUCH

GREATER IMPACT ON SITUATION OF BOSNIAN REFUGEES IN CROATIA.

2. WE DO NOT KNOW HOW MANY CROATIANS IN FRG HAVE AR/FC RELATIVES IN CANADA, BUT SUSPECT NEW GERMAN POLICY COULD GIVE RENEWED LIFE TO YUGO SPECIAL MEASURES. WE BELIEVE THAT GREAT MAJORITY OF
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PAGE TWO ULIM3256 P R O T E C T E D
CROATIAN CITIZENS IN GERMANY HAVE NO CLAIM TO BE CONSIDERED AS CRS. BELIEVE THIS WOULD BE VIEW OF UNHCR AS WELL.
3. THE PROTECTION OFFICER WITH WHOM WE SPOKE INDICATED THAT UNHCR HAD REQUESTED THAT FOLLOWING PERSONS SHOULD NOT BE RETURNED:
(1) CROATS FROM SERB-CONTROLLED AREAS OF CROATIA
(2) ETHNIC-SERBS TO UNPAS.
4. CROATIAN CITIZENS OF SERB ETHNIC ORIGIN OR WHO ARE MEMBERS OF MIXED MARRIAGES MAY BE PARTICULARLY RELUCTANT TO RETURN. ETHNIC SERBS AND MEMBERS OF MIXED MARRIAGES CURRENTLY FEATURE FAIRLY

PROMINENTLY AMONG OUR CROATIAN APPLICANTS, AND AMONG OUR
APPLICANTS IN CANADA WHEN WE ARE IMPRUDENT ENOUGH TO ISSUE
VISITOR VISAS TO THEM.^Z
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47-7-1-Croatia

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P R O T E C T E D
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INFO BRU BREEC LDN BONN PARIS ROME MOSCO BGRAD ZAGRB ATHNS ANKRA
VNACE VIENN BPEST BUCST PRGUE MDRID
PCOOTT/MCNEE PMOOTT PILLAROTT/RAP/RCT EANDIHULL/ORD/ORH/RAB PPD
TT EXTOTT-USS WSHDC-UNGR PRMNY-WKGR DE COS
TT NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/ASSOCADMPOL/DIPOL/DPKO/ DE CAF
DISTR MINA RGB RBD RBRD RWR RZD RZP IFB IMD IMH IMU IMM INP IDD
JFB JCD JLO JPO CPP
---EX-YUGO: CROAT VIEWS
SENIOR OFFICIALS MET WITH MILE AKMADZIC, FORMER PM OF B-H PRESENTLY
CHIEF NEGOTIATOR FOR BOSNIAN-CROATS AND MINISTER FOR INTER-REPUBLIC
AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. HE WAS ACCOMPANIED BY SENIOR
OFFICIAL OF HIS DEPT (ZUBAK) AND ANTE ROSO CHIEF OF JOINT STAFF FOR
B-CROATS. MTG TOOK PLACE JUST BEFORE START OF TODAY'S NEGS BETWEEN
PARTIES.
2. IFB DELIVERED FOLLOWING MESSAGES: (A) MILITARY SOLUTION IS
FUTILE AND RECENT GAINS ON GROUND MAY PROVE VERY TEMPORARY; RISK OF
ESCALATION IS REAL AND IT IS IN INTEREST OF B-CROATS, LIKE ALL
OTHERS, TO FIND NEGOTIATED SOLUTION; (B) ALL PARTIES MUST
COMPROMISE INCLUDING TERRITORIAL COMPROMISES; MUSLIMS MUST HAVE
ACCESS TO SEA; (C) WE HAVE SOLID EVIDENCE THAT REGULAR CROAT TROOPS
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PAGE TWO YTGR1073 P R O T E C T E D
ARE IN BOSNIA - THIS IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE; (D) GROWING
INTERNATIONAL CONSENSUS THAT CROATIA CANNOT INTERVENE IN BOSNIA
WITHOUT IMPUNITY - RISK OF SANCTIONS AGAINST CROATS IS INCREASING;

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AND (E) NEW SITUATION AFTER SARAJEVO MASSACRE IS EVOLVING WITH USA INTEREST TO BE ENGAGED AND HENCE INCREASE CHANCES FOR PEACE. IFB THEN ASKED FOR SITREP ON ONGOING NEGS WITH MUSLIMS.

3. AKMADZIC RESPONDED ON ABOVE POINTS BY STATING THAT CROATS WERE ABSOLUTELY AWARE OF DANGERS OF ESCALATION AND WERE COMMITTED TO NEGOTIATED PEACE. REFERRING TO HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH IZETBEGOVICH AND RECALLING HISTORY OF FAILED VANCE-OWEN PLAN AND MOST LIKELY OF INVINCIBLE COMPROMISE THAT CROATIAN SIDE WAS READY TO ACCEPT, HE STATED THAT ONLY SOLUTION POSSIBLE MUST BE BASED ON EFFORTS OF ICFY. YESTERDAY INTENSIVE TALKS TOOK PLACE WITH MUSLIMS IN ORDER TO AMELIORATE PRESENT PROPOSALS. IDEA WAS TO DEVELOP NEW CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE WITH 4 LEVELS: UNION, 3 REPUBLICS, AUTONOMOUS CANTONS AND COMMUNES. IDEA WAS TO ALLOW FOR CANTONS IN EACH REPUBLIC WHERE THERE COULD BE MAJORITY POPULATION OF OTHER ETHNIC GROUP THAN THE ONE CONTROLLING THE REPUBLIC (EG CROAT CANTONS IN MUSLIM PART AND MUSLIM CANTONS IN CROAT REPUBLIC). SUCH PLAN WAS DEBATED AT LENGTH YESTERDAY AND THIS MORNING MUSLIM PAPER CAME IN REWRITING UNDERSTANDING BY HAVING 3 REPUBLIC LEVEL DELETED AND GO DIRECTLY FM UNION TO CANTONS THEREBY ENSURING AGAIN UNITARY STATE CONCEPT. THIS IS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO CROATS AND TO SERBS

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PAGE THREE YTGR1073 P R O T E C T E D

FOR THAT MATTER AND MUSLIMS KNOW IT. ON ACCESS TO SEA HE REFERRED TO EXIT TO SEA CLAIMING THAT CROATS WOULD BE PREPARED TO ALLOW THE WHOLE COASTLINE TO BE AVAILABLE TO EXIT GOODS NOT ONLY ONE PORT - THIS OBVIOUSLY IS GOING BACK TO SQUARE ONE WITH NO AUTONOMY OVER PORT AND STRICT CROATIAN CONTROL - TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO MUSLIMS.

ON TROOPS, HE REFERRED TO JULY 1992 AGREEMENT FOR COORDINATION OF COMMON TROOPS IN SOUTH; THIS AGREEMENT IS NOT REJECTED YET BUT NOT IMPLEMENTED EITHER. ALL THIS AS PREMISE TO STATEMENT THAT THERE ARE NO REGULAR CROATIAN FORCES IN BOSNIA. THERE MAY BE 2000 OR 3000

BOSNIAN CROATS WHO HAVE NOW RETURNED TO BOSNIA TO ASSIST IN DEFENDING THEIR TERRITORY BUT THEY ARE NOT REGULAR HVO. GEN ROSO REITERATED POINT INSISTING THAT THERE ARE OTHER B-CROATS COMING BACK TO ASSIST FM CANADA, AUSTRALIA, USA BUT THERE IS NO B-CROAT UNIFORM AND THEY ARE THERE IN PERSONAL CAPACITY.

4. ON SANCTIONS, AKMADZIC HOPED THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE IMPOSED AND

HE REMINDED THAT B-CROATIAN OFFER TO HAVE MONITORS ON ALL ITS BORDERS WITH CROATIA AND SERBS WAS STILL ALIVE AND THERE IS NO PROBLEM FOR INTERNATIONAL SURVEILLANCE TO TAKE PLACE. ON SARAJEVO,

WHERE HE LIVED FOR 35 YEARS HIMSELF, HE AGREED THAT SIEGE MUST BE LIFTED IN WHATEVER WAY POSSIBLE; HE QUESTIONED ADVISABILITY OF NATO DMZ ZONE OF 20 KMS WITH EXCEPTION OF 2KMS FOR PALE AS UNREALISTIC.

HE CONCLUDED HIS REMARKS ON NOTE OF OPTIMISM THAT THERE NOW EXIST GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO NEGOTIATE PEACE AND THAT HE IS PREPARED TO WORK

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PAGE FOUR YTGR1073 P R O T E C T E D

FOR IT PROVIDED THAT CROATIAN DIGNITY IS FULLY RESPECTED; B-CROATS

ARE PREPARED TO SATISFY THEMSELVES WITH 17.5% OF TERRITORY.

5. IFB CONCLUDED BY REITERATING CDN POSITION AND HOPE THAT PEACE COULD BE NEGOTIATED NOW THAT NEW OPPORTUNITY IS THERE. RISK OF SPILLOVER IN BALKANS AND ELSEWHERE MUST BE AVOIDED AT ALL COSTS AND

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE MUST CONTINUE UNHINDERED. SPECIAL CONCERN

ALSO RAISED ON NEED TO RESPECT PKO FORCES. INTERESTINGLY, GEN ROSO

JUMPED IN AT END TO REITERATE THAT THERE ARE NO FOREIGN REGULAR FORCES IN BOSNIA; HE COULD VOUCH FOR THAT AND COULD PROVIDE LISTS

IF NECESSARY

6. COMMENTS: B-CROATS ARE CLEARLY NOT READY TO CAVE IN ON PRINCIPLES THAT WOULD SET STAGE FOR CROATIAN REPUBLIC TO GO ITS OWN

WAY. THEY APPEARED TO GO BACK TO BASICS AND OLD POSITIONS WHILE ONLY CONCERN THEY SEEMED TO HAVE WAS FOR RISK OF SANCTIONS BEING IMPOSED ON THEM. MTG TOOK PLACE IN CROATIAN MISSION WHERE WE MET MFA GRANIC AS WE ENTERED (GRANIC IS ACTUALLY THE ONE WHO NEGOTIATED

YESTERDAY THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES THAT ARE NOW PUT INTO QUESTION). IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THERE IS TOTAL UNITY AND COLLUSION

BETWEEN CROATS AND B-CROATS AND NO EFFORT IS MADE TO HIDE THIS. AT
SAME TIME IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT THEY REMAIN TOUGH LIKE NAILS FOR
TIME BEING.^Z
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INFO BGRAD BNATO BRU BREEC ROME VATCN VIENN VNACE VIENN/PILLAR
GENEV
ATHNS HSNKI BPEST PRGUE LSBON MOSCO WSAW BUCST BONN PARIS HAGUE
CNBRA LDN PCOOTT/IAS/FDP PMOOTT RCMPOTT/D/CA/MURRAY
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SFAX MERTWGN DE OTT
TT PRMNY WKGR WSHDC UNGR EXTOTT MINA EXTOTT USS EXTOTT_IFB
EXTOTT_IDD EXTOTT_ISD EXTOTT_ISO EXTOTT_ISI EXTOTT_CPD EXTOTT_IMD
EXTOTT_IMH EXTOTT_CPP EXTOTT_JLO EXTOTT_JCD EXTOTT_JPO EXTOTT_EER
EXTOTT_URR DE COS TT NDHQOTT/DIPOL/ASSOCIATE ADM(POL)/DPKO/
CFB LAHR/COMD/ NDHQ INT OTTAWA/DGINT/YUGO WK GP/ CCMY ZAGREB/COMD/
CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB/COMD/ CCUNPROFOR CAMP POLOM/CCMIO/ DE CAF
DISTR MINP RGB RBD RBRD RBT RZD RZC RZP RWD RWR IMM
DE ZAGRB QLGR/HANSON
---BOSNA-HERCEGOVINA: CROATIAN INVOLVEMENT
SUMMARY: CROATIANS HAVE REACTED TO ACCUSATIONS OF HV INVOLVEMENT
AND
THREATENED SANCTIONS WITH STANDARD DENIALS, IE: THAT THERE ARE ONLY
ABOUT TWO THOUSAND "VOLUNTEERS" WHO HAVE BEEN PERMITTED TO JOIN HVO
AS INDIVIDUALS, AND THERE ARE NO/NO HV UNITS EXCEPT IN BORDER AREAS
FACING SERB FORCES. PRESIDENTIAL DEFENCE AND SECURITY COUNCIL
ISSUED
STATEMENT NOT/NOT ONLY PROMISING COOPERATION WITH SECGEN IN
PRPARING
REPORT TO COUNCIL, BUT DEMANDING INVESTIGATION TO CLARIFY SITUATION

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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE TWO QLGR0010 C O N F I D E N T I A L
IN CENTRAL BOSNA. STATEMENT ALSO MAINTAINS THAT THERE ARE THREE
TIMES AS MANY FOREIGN MUSLIM VOLUNTEERS FIGHTING ON MUSLIM SIDE AS
THERE ARE CROAT VOLUNTEERS WITH HVO. THREADBARE DENIALS AND BRAVADO
DO NOT/NOT MASK GROWING REALISATION THAT CROATIA'S DUPLICITOUS
POLICY IN B-H HAS SUFFERED MASSIVE FAILURE.
2.REPORT: DURING RUN-UP TO SECURITY COUNCIL MTG 03FEB THERE WAS
INCREASING MEDIA SPECULATION OVER ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT OF HV IN B-H,
AND POSSIBILITY OF SANCTIONS BEING IMPOSED AGAINST CROATIA. GOVT
AND
GOVT-LINE PRESS REJECTED ACCUSATIONS, IN TERMS WHICH HAVE BECOME
DREARILY FAMILIAR OVER PAST YEAR OR MORE, EVEN AS EVIDENCE HAS
CONTINUED TO MOUNT. ONE BLUSTERING EDITORIAL ON FRONT PAGE OF
VJESNIK ACCUSED INTERNATL COMMUNITY OF SUBSCRIBING TO ACCUSATIONS
IN
ORDER TO SUPPORT CLAIMS THAT ALL PARTIES WERE EQUALLY GUILTY, AND
THUS CREATE PRETEXT FOR CONTINUING INACTION. IF THERE REALLY WERE
SUCH NBRS OF HV TROOPS OPERATING IN B-H, EDITORIAL MAINTAINED,
MILITARY SITUATION IN CENTRAL BOSNA WOULD BE VERY DIFFERENT.
3.ACCORDING TO STATEMENT ISSUED BY PRESIDENTIAL DEFENCE AND
SECURITY
COUNCIL 05FEB, CROATIA MUST TAKE ALL POSSIBLE STEPS TO "CLARIFY"
QUESTIONS RAISED IN SC PRESIDENTIAL STAEMENT 03FEB, SO THAT SECGEN
MAY GIVE "FACTUALLY-BASED" REPORT TO SC. SC STATEMENT, ACCORDING TO
CROATIANS, WAS GIVEN IN RESPONSE TO UNJUSTIFIED AND FACTUALLY-
BASELESS ACCUSATIONS BY B-H PM SILAJDZIC, THAT THERE WERE
30,000/30,000 HV TROOPS ENGAGED IN B-H. ON CONTRARY, ACCORDING TO
...3

PAGE THREE QLGR0010 C O N F I D E N T I A L
CROATIANS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH 12JUL92 AGREEMENT ON FRIENDSHIP AND
COOPERATION, CROATIA HAD CONTRIBUTED TO DEFENCE OF BOTH B-CROATS
AND
B-MUSLIMS, AND WAS CURRENTLY SHELTERING 282,000/282,000 REFUGEES,
MOST OF THEM MUSLIM. CROATIA, ACCORDING TO PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL,
HAD
BEEN MOST COOPERATIVE OF ALL PARTIES IN SEARCH FOR POLITICAL
SOLUTION.

4. GOAL OF CROATIAN POLICY IN B-H, ACCORDING TO PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL, STILL HAD TO BE SURVIVAL OF CROAT PEOPLE IN B-H; IT WAS THEREFORE NECESSARY FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO TAKE MORE EFFECTIVE ACTION TO PUT END TO SERB AGGRESSION AND TO MUSLIM OFFENSIVE AGAINST CROAT AREAS IN CENTRAL B-H. COUNCIL REITERATED CLAIM THAT ONLY HV TROOPS IN B-H WERE IN BORDER AREAS ABOVE DUBROVNIK, FACING SERB FORCES, AND THAT THIS WAS IN CONFORMITY WITH 12 JUL 92 AGREEMENT. IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH ACCUSATIONS, CROATIAN DEFENCE MINISTRY WOULD NOT/NOT ONLY PROPOSE STEPS TO BE TAKEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH SC PRES STATEMENT, BUT DEMANDED THAT INTERNATIONAL INVESTIGATION ESTABLISH REALITIES OF SITUATION ON GROUND.

5. MUSLIM MILITARY SUCCESSES AGAINST B-CROATS, COMBINED WITH APPARENT VIRTUAL COLLAPSE OF HVO IN CENTRAL B-H, HAVE RESULTED IN CONSIDERABLE CRITICISM AND DEBATE OVER CROATIAN POLICY IN B-H. SINCE B-H INDEPENDENCE CROATIA, WHILE RECOGNISING B-H AND PROFESSING TO RESPECT ITS SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, HAS SOUGHT TO SET CONDITIONS AS TO WHAT KIND OF COUNTRY B-H SHOULD BE. IT REJECTED ...4

PAGE FOUR QLGR0010 C O N F I D E N T I A L

IDEA THAT B-H COULD BE A UNITARY STATE, ON GROUNDS THAT THIS WOULD PLACE B-CROAT MINORITY IN SECOND-CLASS POSITION (SUCH QUALMS EVIDENTLY DO NOT/NOT APPLY TO SERB MINORITY IN UNITARY STATE THAT IS CROATIA). IDEA THAT A UNITARY B-H COULD BE MULTI-ETHNIC WAS ANATHEMA TO CROATS, WHOSE OWN INDEPENDENCE IS FLOWS FROM CREED THAT A NATION-STATE MUST BE FOUNDED ON ETHNIC NATIONALISM.

6. THUS, WHILE PAYING LIP SERVICE TO B-H INDEPENDENCE, CROATIA SUPPORTED AUTONOMY OF HERZEGOVINIAN CROATS LED BY MATE BOBAN: THEIR ASSUMPTION WAS THAT MUSLIMS (NOT/NOT A TRUE NATION ANYWAY, IN CROAT VIEW) WERE TOO WEAK AND DISORGANISED TO PREVENT IT, AND POSED NO/NO

THREAT TO APPROX 200,000 CROATS IN CENTRAL BOSNA WHO WERE OUTSIDE
BOBAN'S "CROATIAN COMMUNITY OF HERCEG-BOSNA". BOSNIAN (AS DISTINCT
FROM HERCEGOVINIAN) CROATS ARE NOW PAYING PRICE FOR CYNICAL AND
ILL-
CONSIDERED POLICY COOKED UP IN ZAGREB.
PROGRAM CODE PO (POLITICAL)
APPROVALS HANSON
CCC/560 061706Z QLGR0010

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P R O T E C T E D

FM ZAGRB QLGR0757 31DEC93

TO EXTOTT RBR TT EXTOTT_IDS EXTOTT_IMU DE COS IMMED

INFO BGRAD BNATO BRU BREEC ROME VATCN VIENN VNACE VIENN/PILLAR GENEV

ATHNS HSNKI BPEST PRGUE LSBON MOSCO WSAW BUCST BONN PARIS HAGUE

CNBRA LDN PCOOTT/IAS/FDP PMOOTT RCMPOTT/D/CA/MURRAY

PILLAROTT/RCT/RCI/RAP EANDIHULL/OSD/ORH/OSE DFATCBA

SFAX MERTWGN DE OTT

TT PRMNY_WKGR WSHDC_UNGR EXTOTT_MINA EXTOTT_USS EXTOTT_IFB

EXTOTT_IDD EXTOTT_ISD EXTOTT_ISO EXTOTT_ISI EXTOTT_CPD EXTOTT_IMD

EXTOTT_IMH EXTOTT_CPP DE COS

TT NDHQOTT/DIPOL/ASSOCIATE ADM(POL)/DPKO/ CFB LAHR/COMD/ NDHQ INT

OTTAWA/DGINT/YUGO WK GP/ CCMY ZAGREB/COMD/ CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB/COMD/

CCUNPROFOR CAMP POLOM/CCMIO/ DE CAF IMMED

DISTR MINP RGB RBD RBRD RBT RZD RZC RZP RWD RWR IMM

REF MYTEL QLGR0752 30DEC93

DE ZAGRB_QLGR/HANSON

---CROATIA: THREATENED INTERVENTION IN BOSNA-HERCEGOVINA

IN TELEVISED CONVERSATION WITH TWO ADMIRING REPORTERS 30DEC, PRES

TUDJMAN MADE STATEMENT TO EFFECT THAT CROATIA WOULD BE FORCED TO

INTERVENE IN B-H IF MUSLIM TROOPS DID NOT/NOT CEASE "GENOCIDAL"

ATTACKS ON CROAT ENCLAVES IN CENTRAL B-H. STATEMENT HAS BEEN WIDELY

REPORTED BY INTERNATL ELECTRONIC MEDIA. IN CROATIA, HOWEVER, THERE

IS NO/NO MENTION OF POSSIBLE INTERVENTION IN OTHERWISE VERY

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PAGE TWO QLGR0757 P R O T E C T E D

EXTENSIVE REPORT IN GOVT-LINE "VJESNIK" 31DEC. AS WITH SUSAK STATEMENT TWO DAYS AGO, THERE SEEMS TO BE ATTEMPT TO TELL THE WORLD WHILE KEEPING CROATIAN PEOPLE AS MUCH IN DARK AS POSSIBLE.

2.I HAD BRIEF CONVERSATION ON SUBJECT WITH PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER MATIC AT RECEPTION 30DEC. HE SAID THAT PREVIOUS STATEMENTS BY SUSAK AND GRANIC REFLECTED GOVT POLICY, AND THAT TUDJMAN WOULD SAY SAME THING DURING INTERVIEW, IN ASKED. HE INDICATED THAT CROATIAN UNITS WERE ON BORDER AND COULD MOVE IN AT ANY TIME. WHEN I POINTED OUT THAT THERE COULD BE HIGH PRICE TO BE PAID IN INTERNATL COMMUNITY IF CROATIA INTERVENED, MATIC SAID THAT THIS WAS UNDERSTOOD.

3.ELSEWHERE, CROATIAN HELSINKI CTTEE HAS ISSUED STATEMENT PROTESTING ALLEGED MOBILISATION OVER PAST WEEKS OF "SEVERAL THOUSAND CROATIAN CITIZENS OF B-H ORIGIN, WITH INTENTION OF SENDING THEM TO BATTLEFIELDS OF B-H". DRAFTEES ALLEGEDLY INCLUDE STUDENTS (WHO SHOULD BE EXEMPT), RETIREES AND EVEN INVALIDS. THEY ARE SAID TO HAVE BEEN ISSUED UNIFORMS WITHOUT INSIGNIA. ACCORDING TO STAEMENT, OFFICERS IN CHARGE OF THOSE MOBILISED ARE PREDOMINANTLY HVO.

4.IN RESPONSE, CROATIAN DEFENCE MINISTRY HEAD OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS, BGEN DRAGO KRPINA (NOT/NOT A CAREER OFFICER) STATED THAT NONE OF HELSINKI CTTEE ALLEGATIONS WAS ACCURATE. WHAT WAS INVOLVED WAS IMPLEMENTATION OF REGULAR PLAN FOR FORMATION OF RESERVE BRIGADES, WHICH WERE BEING CALLED UP AT ONLY ONE-QUARTER OF ESTABLISHED

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PAGE THREE QLGR0757 P R O T E C T E D

STRENGTH. DEPLOYMENT OF BRIGADES WOULD BE DECIDED IN NORMAL MANNER, AS FOR OTHER HV UNITS. IF ANY MEMBERS OF B-H ORIGIN WOULD CHOOSE TO VOLUNTEER TO DEFEND THEIR HEARTHS IN B-H, SAID KRPINA, THAT WAS NOT/NOT KNOWN TO HIM. IT WAS STRANGE, HE SAID, THAT IN CERTAIN CIRCLES CROATIA WAS CONSTANTLY ACCUSED OF SENDING ITS REGULAR UNITS INTO B-H, WHEN IT WAS KNOWN THAT SERBIAN REGULAR ARMY HAD BEEN WAGING WAR IN B-H FOR THREE (SIC) YRS. AS FAR AS HE KNEW, SAID KRPINA, NONE OF THOSE MOBILISED HAD COMPLAINED.


5.KRPINA CONCLUDED BY QUOTING DEFENCE MIN SUSAK AND FOREIGN MIN GRANIC TO FOLLOWING EFFECT: IT HAD BEEN MADE CLEARLY KNOWN THAT CROATIA WOULD RECONSIDER ITS POLICY AND RELATIONSHIP WITH B-H IF MUSLIM FORCES CONTINUED OFFENSIVE AGAINST CROAT AREAS IN CENTRAL BOSNA AND NERETVA VALLEY, "BECAUSE THAT WOULD THREATEN STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND SECURITY OF CROATIAN STATE."

PROGRAM CODE PO (POLITICAL)

APPROVALS HANSON

CCC/560 311636Z QLGR0757

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P R O T E C T E D

FM ZAGRB QLGR0752 30DEC93

TO EXTOTT RBR TT EXTOTT_IDS EXTOTT_IMU DE COS DELIVER BY 300900
INFO BGRAD BNATO BRU BREEC ROME VATCN VIENN VNACE VIENN/PILLAR GENEV
ATHNS HSNKI BPEST PRGUE LSBON MOSCO WSAW BUCST BONN PARIS HAGUE
CNBRA LDN PCOOTT/IAS/FDP PMOOTT RCMPOTT/D/CA/MURRAY
PILLAROTT/RCT/RCI/RAP EANDIHULL/OSD/ORH/OSE DFATCBA
SFAX MERTWGN DE OTT

TT PRMNY_WKGR WSHDC_UNGR EXTOTT_MINA EXTOTT_USS EXTOTT_IFB
EXTOTT_IDD EXTOTT_ISD EXTOTT_ISO EXTOTT_ISI EXTOTT_CPD EXTOTT_IMD
EXTOTT_IMH EXTOTT_CPP DE COS

TT NDHQOTT/DIPOL/ASSOCIATE ADM(POL)/DPKO/ CFB LAHR/COMD/ NDHQ INT
OTTAWA/DGINT/YUGO WK GP/ CCMY ZAGREB/COMD/ CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB/COMD/
CCUNPROFOR CAMP POLOM/CCMIO/ DE CAF IMMED

DISTR MINP RGB RBD RBRD RBT RZD RZC RZP RWD RWR IMM

DE ZAGRB_QLGR/HANSON

---CROATIA: THREATENED INTERVENTION IN BOSNA-HERCEGOVINA

SUMMARY: FORMIN GRANIC DOES NOT/NOT DENY REPORTED STATEMENT BY
DEFENCE MIN SUSAK, TO EFFECT THAT IF MUSLIM FORCES OVER-RUN B-CROAT
ENCLAVES IN CENTRAL B-H, CROATIA WOULD BE FORCED TO INTERVENE.
ACCORDING TO GRANIC, NEGOTIATING PROCESS WILL BE AT RISK IF ENCLAVES
FALL, BUT "CROATIA DOES NOT/NOT AT PRESENT HAVE SPECIFIC PLANS TO
INTERVENE".

2.REPORT: REPORTS OF 29DEC STATEMENT BY SUSAK HAVE BEEN CARRIED BY

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PAGE TWO QLGR0752 P R O T E C T E D

BBC AND CNN, BUT HAVE NOT/NOT BEEN GIVEN GREAT PLAY IN CROATIAN MEDIA. THERE WAS NO/NO MENTION ON MAIN TV NEWSCAST 29DEC EVENING, ALTHOUGH THERE WAS BRIEF REPORT ON RADIO NEWS. GOVT-LINE DAILY PAPERS 30DEC MADE NO/NO MENTION OF IT. APPROX NOON 29DEC, HOWEVER, DIPLO MISSIONS IN ZAGREB RECEIVED FAX FROM MFA, ASKING HOMES TO ATTEND MEETING WITH FORMIN GRANIC FOLLOWING DAY.

3.GRANIC'S OPENING STATEMENT WAS ESSENTIALLY DEBRIEF ON GENEV AND LDN MEETINGS, AND REVIEW OF HUMANITARIAN SITUATION. HE ALSO ANNOUNCED THAT SLOBODAN LANG, LEADER OF BIJELI PUT (WHITE ROAD) CONVOY TO NOVA BILA, HAD BEEN APPOINTED AMB FOR HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS. LANG GAVE AN ACCOUNT OF CONVOY OPERATION, NOT/NOT OMITTING TO CRITICIZE UNPROFOR FOR REFUSAL TO PROVIDE ARMoured TRANSPORT ON RETURN LEG (WHEN DRIVER WAS KILLED).

4.ON CURRENT MUSLIM OFFENSIVE IN CENTRAL B-H, GRANIC STATED THAT CROATIA'S GOAL WAS TO STOP CONFLICT. IT WOULD DO EVERYTHING TO PROMOTE SETTLEMENT. IMMEDIATE GOAL WAS CEASEFIRE, FOLLOWED BY RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN B-CROATS AND B-MUSLIMS. THIS WAS REASON FOR HIS LETTERS TO EU FORMINS AND SC PRES EARLIER THIS WEEK. AIM WAS NOT/NOT TO AGGRAVATE CONFLICT, BUT TO END IT.

5.WHEN QUESTIONS WERE INVITED, I ASKED WHETHER GRANIC COULD CONFIRM REPORTS OF SUSAK STATEMENT AND, IF SO, COMMENT. HE REPLIED THAT VITEZ AND BUSOVACA WERE SURROUNDED. IF B-H ARMY OFFENSIVE CONTINUED, AND IF THEY USED ALL MEANS AT THEIR DISPOSAL, THEY COULD TAKE THESE

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PAGE THREE QLGR0752 P R O T E C T E D

TWO TOWNS. IMMEDIATE RESULT WOULD BE AT LEAST ANOTHER 60/60 THOUSAND REFUGEES, WHICH WOULD PUT BOTH BOSNIAN AND CROATIAN CROATS IN VERY DIFFICULT POSITION, AND NEGOTIATING PROCESS WOULD BE AT SERIOUS RISK. CROATIA WAS THEREFORE ISSUING OPEN AND HONEST WARNING TO B-H AND ALL INTERESTED PARTIES, THAT ONLY CEASEFIRE AND CONTINUATION OF BILAT AND MULTILAT NEGOTIATIONS COULD BE MEANS TO RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT. CONCRETE ANSWER TO MY QUESTION, HE SAID, WAS THAT AT PRESENT, CROATIA HAD NO/NO SPECIFIC PLANS TO INTERVENE.

PROGRAM CODE PO (POLITICAL)

APPROVALS HANSON

CCC/560 301402Z QLGR0752



A.J.
I.R.
B.L.

P R O T E C T E D

FM ZAGRB QLGR1019 28DEC93

TO EXTOTT RBR TT EXTOTT_IDS EXTOTT_IMU DE COS

INFO BGRAD BNATO BRU BREEC ROME VATCN VIENN VNACE VIENN/PILLAR GENEV

ATHNS HSNKI BPEST PRGUE LSBON MOSCO WSAW BUCST BONN LDN PARIS HAGUE

CNBRA PCOOTT/IAS/FDP PMOOTT EANDIHULL/OSD/ORH/OSE

PILLAROTT/RCT/RCI/RAP RCMPOTT/D/CA/MURRAY DFATCBA

SFAX MERTWGN DE OTT

TT PRMNY_WKGR WSHDC_UNGR EXTOTT_MINA EXTOTT_USS EXTOTT_IFB

EXTOTT_IDD EXTOTT_CPD EXTOTT_IMD EXTOTT_IMH EXTOTT_CPP

EXTOTT_JLO EXTOTT_JCD EXTOTT_JPO EXTOTT_EER EXTOTT_URR DE COS

TT NDHQOTT/DIPOL/ASSOCIATE ADM(POL)/DPKO/ CFB LAHR/COMD/ NDHQ INT

OTTAWA/DGINT/YUGO WK GP/ CCMY ZAGREB/COMD/ CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB/COMD/

CCUNPROFOR CAMP POLOM/CCMIO/ DE CAF

DISTR MINP RGB RBD RBRD RBT RZD RZC RZP RWD RWR IMM ISO ISD ISI

REF OURTELS QLGR0724 11DEC93 QLGR1007 26NOV93

DE ZAGRB_QLGR/SHORE

---CROATIA: OPPOSITION LEADER VIEWS ON MEDIA REFORM

SUMMARY: IN RECENT MEETING WITH CHARGE AND THIRD SECRETARY, DRAZEN

BUDISA, HEAD OF OPPOSITION SOCIAL LIBERAL PARTY (HSLs), GAVE A

NEGATIVE ASSESSMENT OF PROSPECTS FOR REAL REFORM OF THE (STATE

CONTROLLED) CROATIAN MEDIA IN THE SHORT TERM. BUDISA ARGUES THAT

THE MEDIA HAVE A CENTRAL ROLE TO PLAY IN DEVELOPING DEMOCRATIC

INSTITUTIONS AND AN INFORMED ELECTORATE, BUT FEELS THAT GOVT IS

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PAGE TWO QLGR1019 P R O T E C T E D

UNLIKELY TO GIVE UP CONTROL OF SUCH A POWERFUL TOOL WITHOUT RESISTANCE. GOVT OPINION OF PURPOSE OF MEDIA, IN HIS OPINION, IS TO SPREAD MESSAGE THAT QUOTE GOVT IS PERFECT AND ALL THEY DO IS PERFECT UNQUOTE.

2. REPORT: MEDIA IN CROATIA IS SUBJECT EITHER TO DIRECT CONTROL OF GOVT THROUGH OWNERSHIP BY RULING PARTY LOYALISTS, CONTROL OVER EDITORIAL BOARDS, OR THROUGH LESS DIRECT BUT EQUALLY EFFECTIVE MEANS. JOURNALISTS WHO DO NOT TOE THE OFFICIAL LINE ARE LIABLE TO LOSE JOBS, BE DEMOTED OR AT LEAST HAVE THEIR LOYALTY TO CROATIA AND THEIR MOTIVES QUESTIONED. ALL OF THIS CREATES, IN BUDISA S VIEW, A POWERFUL TOOL FOR THE GOVT TO CONTROL THE PUBLIC DEBATE ACCORDING TO POLITICAL IMPERATIVES OF THE DAY. IT IS THEREFORE NOT A TOOL EASILY SURRENDERED AND THIS WILL POSE SIGNIFICANT DIFFICULTIES FOR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT.

3. ELECTRONIC MEDIA: ACCORDING TO SOME ESTIMATES ONLY 5-6 PERCENT OF CROATIANS READ PRINT MEDIA, AND THEREFORE RELY EXCLUSIVELY ON ELECTRONIC MEANS FOR THEIR NEWS. CONTROL OVER THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA IS BY NO MEANS ARM S LENGTH AS THE DIRECTOR OF HRT (STATE RADIO AND TV NETWORK), ANTUN VRDOLJAK, IS A GOVT MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT. THIS IS IN VIOLATION OF EXISTING MEDIA LAW WHICH STATES THAT HOLDERS OF IMMUNITY FROM PROSECUTION ARE NOT ALLOWED TO HOLD SUCH JOBS, AS IT IS A CRIME TO DISSEMINATE INFORMATION WHICH IS INJURIOUS TO QUOTE PUBLIC GOOD UNQUOTE. DEFINITION EXTENDS TO CRITICIZING OR

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PAGE THREE QLGR1019 P R O T E C T E D

RIDICULING GOVT INSTITUTIONS AND PERSONALITIES, AND HAS POWERFUL EFFECT SIMILAR TO LIBEL CHILL IN DIFFERENT CONTEXT. BUDISA STATED, HOWEVER, THAT PRESSURE WAS COMING FROM ABROAD FOR REPLACEMENT OF VRDOLJAK AS HE HAS COME TO REPRESENT AN UNACCEPTABLE SITUATION. OPPOSITION FIGURES ARE NOTABLE BY THEIR ABSENCE FROM INTERVIEWS ON NEWS PROGRAMS AND THEIR VIEWS ARE NOT SOUGHT. THEY HAVE ACCESS TO MEDIA PRIMARILY THROUGH BROADCAST PARLIAMENTARY SESSIONS AND A FEW MINUTES OF PRESCHEDULED TIME PER WEEK. DEBATES KNOWN AS TV PARLIAMENT ARE HELD AS WELL, BUT IN RESPONSE TO A COMMENT THAT A RECENT SUCH DEBATE HAD BEEN QUITE EFFECTIVE, HE VOICED HIS FEAR THAT IF THEY WERE TOO EFFECTIVE THEY WOULD BE DISCONTINUED.

4. PRINT MEDIA: BUDISA NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH THE MAJORITY OF THE PRINT MEDIA SUPPORTED GOVT, THERE WERE ALSO THOSE SYMPATHETIC TO THE OPPOSITION VIEWPOINT; THERE SEEMS TO BE LITTLE OBJECTIVITY OR BALANCE SOUGHT EITHER WAY. SOME NEWSPAPERS HAVE COME UNDER DIRECT CONTROL OF CROATIAN GOVT THROUGH PRIVATIZATION PROGRAMME, UNDER WHICH SO-CALLED SOCIALLY OWNED ASSETS ARE TRANSFERRED TO THE STATE FUND FOR PRIVATIZATION IF NO INVESTORS HAVE SHOWN INTEREST BY A CERTAIN DATE.

5. NEW MEDIA LAW: MEDIA LAW HAS PASSED FIRST READING IN PARLIAMENT AND BUDISA IS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT OPPOSITION CONCERNS WILL BE ADEQUATELY ADDRESSED. HRT WILL REMAIN STATE CONTROLLED WITH BOARD SET UP BY GOVT VIA PARLIAMENT. HE HOPES POSSIBILITIES FOR PRIVATE

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PAGE FOUR QLGR1019 P R O T E C T E D


BROADCASTERS EXIST BUT COSTS MAY BE PROHIBITIVE.

6. COMMENT: PAINS OF BEING SUBJECTED TO POLITICALLY-DRIVEN CRITICISMS BY MEDIA HAVE BEEN FELT SINCE INTL COMMUNITY (NOTABLY UNPROFOR) FIRST BECAME ACTIVE IN FY. AS WE HAVE NOTED ON PRIOR OCCASIONS, UNPROFOR HAS BECOME A PREFERRED TARGET FOR MEDIA IN CROATIA ACTING ON BEHALF OF POLITICAL MASTERS. THIS FACTOR APPLIES EQUALLY TO OVERALL PEACE PROCESS, AND BUDISA S CONCERNS OVER EXCESSIVE CENTRALIZATION OF POWER IN PRESIDENT S HANDS EXTENDS TO EASE WITH WHICH TUDJMAN CAN MANIPULATE (OR AT LEAST ATTEMPT TO MANIPULATE) PUBLIC OPINION. EFFORTS TEND TO MEET WITH SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS AND LIMITED SCEPTICISM FROM AUDIENCE, A FACT WHICH WILL CONTINUE TO COMPLICATE EFFORTS FOR INTERNAL AND REGIONAL PEACE AGREEMENTS.

PROGRAM CODE PO (POLITICAL)

APPROVALS HANSON

CCC/560 281150Z QLGR1019



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DE ZEB QLGR1007
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P R O T E C T E D
FM ZAGRB QLGR1007 26NOV93
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INFO BGRAD BNATO BRU BREEC ROME VATCN VIENN VNACE VIENN/PILLAR
GENEV
ATHNS HSNKI BPEST PRGUE LSBON MOSCO WSAW BUCST BONN LDN PARIS HAGUE
CNBRA PCOOTT/IAS PMOOTT EANDIHULL/OSD/ORH/OSE PILLAROTT/RCT/RCI/RAP
RCMPOTT/D/CA/MURRAY
TT PRMNY WKGR WSHDC UNGR EXTOTT MINA EXTOTT USS EXTOTT IFB
EXTOTT_IDD EXTOTT_IDS EXTOTT_IMU EXTOTT_CPD EXTOTT_IMD EXTOTT_IMH
EXTOTT_CPP EXTOTT_JLO EXTOTT_JCD DE COS
TT NDHQOTT/DIPOL/ASSOCIATE ADM(POL)/DPKO/ CFB LAHR/COMD/ NDHQ INT
OTTAWA/DGINT/YUGO WK GP/ CCMY ZAGREB/COMD/ CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB/COMD/
CCUNPROFOR CAMP POLOM/CCMIO/ DE CAF
DISTR MINP RGB RBD RBRD RBT RZD RZC RZP RWD RWR IMM ISO ISD ISI
DE ZAGRB QLGR/SHORE
---CROATIAN BROADCASTING REFORMS: THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE
SUMMARY: DEBATE ON PROPOSALS FOR NEW CROATIAN BROADCASTING LAW
RECENTLY BEGAN IN SABOR (PARLIAMENT), IN WAKE OF ACCUSATIONS THAT
HDZ GOVT WAS ENDEAVOURING TO PRECLUDE CONSIDERATION OF ALTERNATIVE
BILL PROPOSED BY HSLS (LIBERAL) OPPOSITION. GOVT BILL CONSISTS NOT
ONLY OF REFORMS TO ELECTRONIC MEDIA REGULATIONS BUT ALSO TO POSTAL
OPERATIONS; OPPOSITION SUGGESTS DIFFERENT APPROACH, ARGUING THAT
IMPORTANCE OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS JUSTIFIES IT HAVING ITS OWN
SPECIFIC LEGISLATION. MAJOR DIFFERENCES EXIST BETWEEN PARTIES OVER

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PAGE TWO QLGR1007 P R O T E C T E D
FINANCING, REGULATION, AND OVERALL ROLE OF MEDIA IN DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY. MORE DETAILED REPORT TO FOLLOW AFTER MEETING WITH DEP MIN

FILIPOVIC EARLY DECEMBER.

2. REPORT: DEBATE IS CURRENTLY UNDERWAY IN THE SABOR OVER REFORMS
TO
BROADCASTING REGIME, WITH BOTH GOVT AND OPPOSITION PROPOSALS BEING

CONSIDERED. THIS IS IN CONTRAST TO EARLIER GOVT POSITION THAT
OPPOSITION BILL COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED IN CURRENT PARLIAMENTARY
SESSION. THIS PROVOKED HARSH REACTION FROM LIBERALS, ALONG WITH
ACCUSATIONS OF UNDEMOCRATIC AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOUR OF
TUDJMAN GOVT THROUGH VIOLATION OF SABOR RULES OF PROCEDURE.
LIBERALS

RECENTLY BOYCOTTED PARLIAMENTARY SESSIONS, LIMITING THEIR
PARTICIPATION TO WORKINGS OF COMMITTEES, ETC, IN ORDER TO DRAW
ATTENTION TO SITUATION.

3. GOVT STRESSES NEED FOR REGULATION BASED ON CROATIAN CULTURAL AND

LINGUISTIC CHALLENGES IN FACE OF OMNIPRESENT FOREIGN PROGRAMMING.
IT

IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT BROADCAST ARTICLES OF GOVT BILL ARE
BASED ON CDN CRTC LEGISLATION (MIN MUDRINIC AND HIS DEP MIN
FILIPOVIC ARE BOTH CDN CITIZENS). IN LINE WITH MUDRINIC'S PORTFOLIO

(SHIPPING, TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS) GOVT BILL ALSO DEALS

WITH POSTAL OPERATIONS. IN KEEPING WITH MORE CONSERVATIVE
PHILOSOPHY, BILL LIMITS FOREIGN PROGRAMMING/CAPITAL INVOLVEMENT AND

MAINTAINS CONTROL OVER GOVT BROADCASTING COMPANY HRT ALONG WITH
TRANSMISSION STATIONS.

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PAGE THREE QLGR1007 P R O T E C T E D
4. OVERALL, LIBERALS PREFER A LESS REGULATED APPROACH TO THE ISSUE
THAN DOES THE GOVT, DRAWING CLEAR LINKS BETWEEN DEMOCRATIZATION,
PRIVATIZATION AND FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION. WHILE GOVT FAVOURS
ADOPTION OF CDN MODEL, LIBERALS APPARENTLY BASE THEIR PROPOSALS ON
GERMAN AND AMERICAN LEGISLATION. PARTY ARGUES SYSTEM SHOULD ALLOW
FOR GREATER PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF TELEVISION AND RADIO
STATIONS, AND DO NOT SUPPORT RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT AS

ENVISIONED IN GOVT PROPOSAL. PARTY STRESSES THAT FREEDOM OF INFORMATION, ESPECIALLY WIDESPREAD ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC MEDIA, IS

PREREQUISITE FOR DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY.

5. AFTER YESTERDAY S COMPLETION OF FIRST READING IN THE SABOR, RECOMMENDATION HAS BEEN MADE THAT GOVT INCORPORATE SOME OF HSLS RECOMMENDATIONS INTO BILL. COMPROMISE WOULD ALLOW FOR FURTHER INVOLVEMENT OF QUOTE ALL INTERESTED PARTIES UNQUOTE IN DEBATE OVER

PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF RADIO AND TV STATIONS. GOVT DOES NOT, HOWEVER, WANT TO COMPROMISE ON STATE CONTROL OVER TRANSMISSION STATIONS AND

HAS SAID IT WILL FAVOUR SOLUTIONS WHICH ENCOURAGE MORE CROATIAN PROGRAMMING.

6. COMMENT: GOVT, AND MIN MUDRINIC IN PARTICULAR, SEEM TO HAVE ADOPTED CDN MODEL DUE TO FEARS OVER DOMINANCE OF FOREIGN BROADCASTERS IN DOMESTIC MARKET. IN CROATIAN CASE, HOWEVER, THE COMPETITION COMES ENTIRELY FROM FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROGRAMMING, PRIMARILY GERMAN, ITALIAN AND ENGLISH. GOVT EMPHASIS ON PROTECTING

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PAGE FOUR QLGR1007 P R O T E C T E D
CROATIAN CULTURE AND DEVELOPING DOMESTIC INDUSTRY THEREFORE OPERATES

UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES MARKEDLY DIFFERENT FROM CDN EXPERIENCE. GOVT CONCERNS MAY BE PARTIALLY EXPLAINED BY FACT THAT CROATIA IS IN MIDST

OF A (SELF)CONSCIOUS ATTEMPT TO DEFINE AND DEFEND CROATIAN CULTURE

AND LANGUAGE, ESP IN RELATION/REACTION TO WESTERN EUROPE AND REPUBLICS OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. FOREIGN LANGUAGE INFLUENCES ARE PARTICULARLY UNWELCOME GIVEN ATTEMPTS BY ELITE TO ENCOURAGE RETURN

TO USAGE OF MORE QUOTE CLASSICAL UNQUOTE CROATIAN. (AT ONE POINT IN

DEBATE HRT DIRECTOR VRDOLJAK SOUGHT TO PERSUADE SABOR THAT GERMAN

PROGRAMMING WAS GREATER THREAT TO CROATIA THAN TO AUSTRIA, BECAUSE

GERMAN WAS ALSO LANGUAGE OF AUSTRIA AND THUS NOT/NOT THREATENED BY

IMPORTATION OF FOREIGN WORDS.) THESE FACTORS, IN CONJUNCTION WITH

CURRENT WAR MENTALITY AND LACK OF EXPERIENCE WITH FREE MEDIA, WILL

ENSURE THAT CONTROL OF ELECTRONIC AND PRINT MEDIA WILL REMAIN

ACTIVE

ISSUES. FAIRLY WIDESPREAD AVAILABILITY OF SATELLITE DISHES SERVES,

IN ANY CASE, TO PARTIALLY MITIGATE EFFECTS OF MEDIA MANIPULATION
AND

BIAS (INTENTIONAL OR OTHERWISE).

7. WILL REPORT FURTHER AFTER MEETING WITH DEP MIN FILIPOVIC EARLY

DECEMBER.


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---CLOSURE OF KARLOVAC TRANSIT CENTRE (KTC)

ONE CONSEQUENCE OF THE HEAVY SHELLING OF KARLOVAC OVER THE WEEKEND HAS BEEN THE CLOSURE OF THE KTC AND THE TRANSFER OF ITS POPULATION TO THE GASINCI REFUGEE CAMP NEAR OSIJEK APPROX 300 KM FM ZAGRB. THE TRANSFER TOOK PLACE DURING A 2 HR CEASEFIRE ARRANGED BY THE UNHCR. THE CENTRE ITSELF WAS NOT HIT BY THE SHELLING, BUT A CHURCH NEXT DOOR WAS STRUCK AS WAS THE REFUGEE CAMP RUN BY THE CROATIAN GOVT (WHERE 7 PEOPLE WERE KILLED).

2. THE REGISTERED POPULATION AT THE KTC WAS 1100. HOWEVER, ONLY 820 SHOWED UP WHEN THE TRANSFER OCCURRED. UNHCR OFFICIALS SPECULATE THAT OTHERS MAY HAVE TAKEN REFUGE WITH FRIENDS AND RELATIVES IN ZAGRB AND ITS VICINITY. THE UNHCR TRANSFERRED THE REFUGEE POP AT THE KTC BY "NUMBER" SO IT IS NOT AT THE MOMENT AWARE OF THE NAMES OF THE REFUGEES ACTUALLY TRANSFERRED. IT WILL BE SORTING THIS OUT IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

3. THE TRANSFER OF MOST OF THE CAMP POP AND THE DISPERSAL OF ABOUT 300 IS LIKELY TO HAVE SOME IMPACT ON OUR OPERATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE NUMBER OF OUR REFUGEE APPLICANTS WHO WERE RESIDING AT THE KTC WAS NOT LARGE, WE MAY HAVE SOME DIFFICULTIES IN CONTACTING AND LOCATING SOME OF OUR CLIENTS IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS

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PAGE TWO ULIM3804 P R O T E C T E D

MAY ALSO BE REQUIRED TO INTERVIEW AND MEDICALLY-EXAMINE CLIENTS NOW RESIDENT AT THE GASINJI REFUGEE CAMP. THEY WILL BE A LOT LESS HANDY THAN THEY WERE WHEN HOUSED AT KARLOVAC.

4. THE DECISION OF AIRLINE COMPANIES TO CLOSE DOWN FLYING INTO ZAGREB WILL ALSO AFFECT TRAVEL BOOKINGS FOR REFUGEES, MANY OF WHOM WILL PRESUMABLY HAVE TO DEPART FM VIENNA, GRAZ AND LJUBLJANA AS LONG AS AIR TRAVEL TO AND FM ZAGRB IS INTERRUPTED.

5. THE RENEWED FIGHTING BETWEEN SERBS AND CROATIANS IN CROATIA MAY ALSO INTERRUPT FOR THE TIME BEING THE UNHCR'S ABILITY TO ORGANIZE THE EVACUATION OF A NUMBER OF OUR CLIENTS FROM BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA E.G. DEPENDANTS OF EX-DETAINEES RESIDING IN PLACES SUCH AS VELIKA Kladusa.

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ATHNS HSNKI BPEST PRGUE LSBON MOSCO WSAW BUCST BONN LDN PARIS HAGUE
CNBRA PCOOTT/MCNEE/IAC(FOR EXEC SEC) PMOOTT EANDIHULL/OSD/ORH/OSE
PILLAROTT/RCT/RCI/RAP RCMPOTT/D/CA/MURRAY DFATCBA
SFAX MERTWGN DE OTT TT PRMNY_WKGR WSHDC_UNGR EXTOTT_MINA EXTOTT_USS
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EXTOTT_JLO EXTOTT_JCD EXTOTT_JPO EXTOTT_EER EXTOTT_URR
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PRMNY_WKGR/MALONDMC PRMNY_WKGR/MINTZLC PRMNY_WKGR/TASCHFC
WSHDC_UNGR/MEYERPMC WSHDC_UNGR/DESJAMAC WSHDC_UNGR/TULLYMRC
WSHDC_UNGR/DAWSOMC WSHDC_UNGR/VAMOSAJC EXTOTT_IMU/OUELLJC
EXTOTT_IFB/MOIRSC DE COS TT NDHQOTT/DIPOL/ASSOCIATE ADM(POL)/DPKO/
CFB LAHR/COMD/ NDHQ INT OTTAWA/DGINT/YUGO WK GP/ CCMY ZAGREB/COMD/
CCUNPROFOR ZAGREB/COMD/ CCUNPROFOR CAMP POLOM/CCMIO/ DE CAF
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---CROATIA: JOINT OPPOSITION PRESS CONFERENCE ON FOREIGN POLICY
SUMMARY: ALL PARTICIPATING PARTIES AGREED ON FOLLOWING 3/3 POINTS:

THAT TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF CROATIA WAS THE PRIMARY FP ISSUE,
REQUIRING NEW MANDATE - BUT NOT REMOVAL - OF UNPROFOR, WHICH WOULD

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PAGE TWO QLGR0567 P R O T E C T E D

BE TASKED WITH REINTEGRATING UNPA'S; THAT MINORITY RIGHTS OF B-H CROATS COULD ONLY BE ENSURED IN AN INTACT, MULTI-ETHNIC B-H STATE; THAT RULING PARTY (HDZ) PROMOTION OF FOREIGN POLICY GOALS HAD BEEN QUOTE AMATEURISH UNQUOTE AND SCATTERED, AND THAT GOVT SHOULD ADOPT A MORE QUOTE PRINCIPLED UNQUOTE APPROACH BASED ON THOROUGH CONSULTATION WITH EC AND CROATIA'S WESTERN NEIGHBOURS. OPPOSITION SUCCESS YESTERDAY IN THE PARLIAMENT IN AMENDING FOREIGN POLICY RESOLUTION WAS HAILED BY ALL LEADERS PRESENT AS SIGN OF FURTHER DEMOCRATIZATION IN CROATIA, OF A POSSIBLE END TO PARLIAMENT'S QUOTE MARGINAL UNQUOTE ROLE ON THE CROATIAN POLITICAL SCENE, AND OF A EXPRESSION OF GOOD WILL TOWARDS FUTURE INTL NEGOTIATIONS ON EX-YUGO.

2. FOLLOWING A RARE DAY IN THE SABOR (PARLIAMENT) WHERE OPPOSITION SUCCEEDED IN AMENDING MINOR ASPECTS OF GOVT FOREIGN POLICY, AND JUST A WEEK AFTER AN EVEN RARER TWO-HOUR JOINT MEETING WITH PRES TUDJMAN, FIVE OPPOSITION PARTY LEADERS APPEARED TOGETHER TO OUTLINE THEIR PARTYS' PRIORITIES IN FP MATTERS AND TO EXPRESS HOPE THAT RECENT HDZ WILLINGNESS TO LISTEN TO - AND COOPERATE WITH - OPPOSITION IN SABOR WOULD CONTINUE ON FP AND OTHER ISSUES.

3. SOCIAL DEMOCRAT LEADER RACAN CHAIRED MEETING WITH FIVE OUT OF SIX OPPOSITION PARTIES PRESENT (PARTY OF RIGHTS WAS ABSENT OSTENSIBLY DUE TO QUOTE LEGAL UNQUOTE PROBLEMS - THEIR LEADERSHIP IS BEING PROSECUTED FOR TREASON AND TERRORISM), THOUGH THE PRINCIPAL OPPOSITION LEADER, DRAZEN BUDISA OF THE SOCIAL LIBERALS, WAS ...3

PAGE THREE QLGR0567 P R O T E C T E D
REPRESENTED BY ANOTHER MEMBER, FRANJO ZENKO. CROATIAN AND SLOVENIAN TV COVERED 2HR PRESS CONFERENCE, WHICH BEGAN WITH 5 MINUTE STATEMENTS BY EACH LEADER, AND ENDED WITH QUESTIONS PRIMARILY DIRECTED TOWARDS THE LEADERS OF TWO SMALLER PARTIES: IVICA RACAN OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, AND SAVKA DABCEVIC-KUCAR OF THE PEOPLES' PARTY.

3. STATEMENTS BY PARTY LEADERS SHOWED SUBSTANTIONAL COMMONALITY OF FOREIGN POLICY POSITIONS, THOUGH EACH WAS AT PAINS TO IDENTIFY UNIQUE ELEMENTS OF THE PARTY'S FOREIGN POLICY, WHICH NOW FOLLOW. FRANJO ZENKO, REPRESENTING THE ABSENT LEADER OF THE SOCIAL LIBERALS, SOUGHT A MUCH LARGER ROLE FOR THE SABOR (PARLIAMENT) WHICH WOULD QUOTE DE-MONOPOLIZE UNQUOTE GOVT FORMATION OF FOREIGN POLICY. HE ALSO ALLOWED THAT AUTONOMOUS PROVINCES IN B-H COULD NOT BE BASED SOLELY ALONG ETHNIC LINES, AND THAT THE CENTRAL GOVT WOULD HAVE TO BE STRONG ENOUGH TO BE ABLE TO GUARANTEE THE INTEGRITY AND WELL-BEING OF ALL THREE COMPONENT ETHNIC GROUPS. DRAGO STIPAC, LEADER OF THE PEASANT PARTY, SUGGESTED THAT UNPROFOR SHOULD IMPLEMENT VOPP OR END ITS MANDATE, AS THEIR PRESENT ROLE WAS ONLY HEIGHTENING INSECURITY IN CROATIA. IVAN JAKOVIC, THE RELATIVELY YOUTHFUL LEADER OF THE ISTRIAN PARTY, INDICATED THAT BETTER RELATIONS WITH SLOVENIA, AND WITH THE ITALIAN MINORITIES IN DALMATIA, RIJEKA AND ISTRIA SHOULD BE GIVEN MORE OF A PRIORITY. SAVKA DABCEVIC-KUCAR PROPOSED THAT HV TROUPS BE COUPLED WITH UNPROFOR ON PATROLS AS A FIRST STEP

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PAGE FOUR QLGR0567 P R O T E C T E D
TO REPATRIATING THE UNPAS (A PROPOSAL WHICH IS UNLIKELY TO GET FAR WITH UN) AND CRITICIZED TUDJMAN FOR HOLDING DISCUSSIONS WITH MILOSEVIC, WHILE WAGING WAR ON MUSLIMS. SHE REJECTED HDZ ATTEMPTS TO SEEK OUT ANY COMMONALITY BETWEEN THE SITUATION OF CROATS AND THAT OF THE SERBS IN B-H. RACAN, LEADER OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS, MAINTAINED THAT CROATIA'S FIRST FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITY, REUNITING ITSELF BY GAINING BACK CONTROL OF UNPAS, SHOULD BE REALISED BEFORE THE QUESTION OF B-H SEA ACCESS WAS DISCUSSED.

4. CHAIR (RACAN) ENDED SESSION BY SUGGESTING THAT SIMILAR JOINT OPPOSITION LEADER PRESS CONFERENCES BE HELD ON OTHER TOPICS AT LEAST ONCE A MONTH.

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CNBRA PCOOTT/MCNEE/IAC(FOR EXEC SEC) PMOOTT EANDIHULL/OSD/ORH/OSE
PILLAROTT/RCT/RCI/RAP RCMPOTT/D/CA/MURRAY DFATCBA
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EXTOTT_IDS/DHAVEDC EXTOTT_IDS/KOLATHC PRMNY_WKGR/FRECHLC
PRMNY_WKGR/MALONDMC PRMNY_WKGR/MINTZLC PRMNY_WKGR/TASCHFC
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CFB LAHR/COMD/ NDHQ INT OTTAWA/DGINT/YUGO WK GP/ CCMY ZAGREB/COMD/
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---CROATIA: UNPROFOR MANDATE RENEWAL
SUMMARY: ADDRESSING FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE IN CROATIAN PARLIAMENT,
DEPTY PM/FORMIN GRANIC REVIEWED WELL-KNOWN ELEMENTS OF CROATIAN
POSITION ON RENEWAL OF UNPROFOR MANDATE. WORLD COMMUNITY HAD
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PAGE TWO QLGR0554 P R O T E C T E D
BEEN ABLE TO DEAL WITH SERB AGGRESSION, AND SOUGHT TO COMPENSATE BY
MEANS OF WARNINGS AND CALLS FOR RESTRAINT DIRECTED AT CROATIA.
CROATIA WOULD PERSIST IN SEARCH FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION, BUT WOULD
NEVER RENOUNCE ITS RIGHTS TO ITS OWN TERRITORY, NOR ACCEPT "CYPRUS
SYNDROME". CROATIAN CONDITIONS FOR RENEWAL OF MANDATE REMAINED:
CEASEFIRE, IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL UNSC RESLNS, AND DIVISION OF
MANDATE IN THREE. ONLY NEW ELEMENT WAS ASSERTION THAT DEPARTURE OF
UNPROFOR NEED NOT/NOT NECESSARILY MEAN RENEWED WARFARE. GRANIC DID
NOT/NOT ELABORATE, BUT WE CAN PROBABLY EXPECT TO HEAR MORE ON THIS
THEME AS END OF CURRENT MANDATE APPROACHES.
2.REPORT: IN OPENING STATEMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE IN CROATIAN
PARLIAMENT 03SEP, DEPTY PM/FORMIN GRANIC ACCUSED LEADERS OF
INTERNATL COMMUNITY OF INDECISIVENESS, DISUNITY AND LACK OF WILL TO
RESPOND EFFECTIVELY TO NEW THREATS TO PEACE AND SECURITY. THIS HAD
LED TO SECURITY VACUUM, AND TO NEW REGIONAL AND INTERNAL CONFLICTS
WHICH THREATENED TO HAVE EVEN WORSE CONSEQUENCES THAN THOSE NOW
BEING EXPERIENCED.
3.ACCORDING TO GRANIC, PRIMARY DUTY AND GOAL OF CROATIAN FOREIGN
POLICY HAD BEEN TO SECURE INTERNATL UNDERSTANDING AND SUPPORT FOR
PEACEFUL REINTEGRATION OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES INTO CROATIAN
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL SYSTEM. IN THIS CRITICAL PHASE OF
RECONSIDERATION OF UNPROFOR MANDATE, CROATIA HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT
IT DESIRED PEACEFUL SOLUTION, BUT HAD DETERMINEDLY DEFENDED ITS
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PAGE THREE QLGR0554 P R O T E C T E D
RIGHT TO ITS OWN TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND SOVEREIGNTY. CROATIA'S
INTERLOCUTORS HAD BEEN ASKED TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE IN INTERNATL
COMMUNITY TO ENSURE IMPLEMENTATION OF UN PEACE PLAN, AND ESPECIALLY
TO EXERT PRESSURE ON SERBIA AS PATRON OF INSURRECTIONIST SERBS,
WITH
AIM OF ARRIVING AT CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL
UNSC RESOLUTIONS.
4.REFERRING TO LATEST REPORT BY UN SECGEN, GRANIC STATED THAT

CROATIA COULD NOT/NOT ACCEPT ASSERTION THAT CROATIA AND "KNIN AUTHORITIES" WERE EQUALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR (NON)SUCCESS OF NEGOTIATIONS AND FOR SITUATION ON GROUND. NOR COULD CROATIA ACCEPT

DIMINUTION OF RELEVANT SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS IN FAVOUR OF ERDUT AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY WHEN ISSUE WAS EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY

OF KNIN SERBS FOR CARRYING OUT KEY DECISIONS OF SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERNING DISARMAMENT OF PARA-MILITARY UNITS AND PLACING HEAVY WEAPONS UNDER CONTROL OF UNPROFOR.

5.SECGEN, SAID GRANIC, HAD NOT/NOT PUT FORWARD NEW PROPOSALS REGARDING MANDATE OF UNPROFOR FOLLOWING 30SEP, AND HAD LEFT OPEN QUESTION OF CROATIAN DEMAND FOR DIVISION OF MANDATE. CROATIA, HE SAID, HAD PERSEVERED IN SEARCH FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION, BUT PERFORMANCE OF UNPROFOR TO DATE HAD BEEN INEFFECTIVE.

6.FOR HUMAN, MATERIAL AND POLITICAL REASONS, SAID GRANIC, PROLONGATION OF SUCH SITUATION WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO CROATIA. IT WOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST ON FOLLOWING CONDITIONS FOR EXTENSION OF MANDATE:

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PAGE FOUR QLGR0554 P R O T E C T E D
GLOBAL AGREEMENT ON CEASEFIRE AND CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES;
GUARANTEES FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF ALL UNSC RESLNS; AND DIVISION OF

UNPROFOR'S PRESENT MANDATE INTO THREE INDEPENDENT ONES.

7.THUS FAR, ACCORDING TO GRANIC, THERE HAD BEEN NO/NO CREATIVE ATTEMPT BY UN TO REMOVE OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF PEACE PLAN; INSTEAD, THERE HAD BEEN WARNINGS DIRECTED AT CROATIA,

CALLING FOR RESTRAINT AND EXPRESSING FEAR OF RENEWED GENERAL WARFARE. CROATIA WAS ASKED TO CONSIDER REINTEGRATION A LONG-TERM PROBLEM, TO AVOID USE OF FORCE, AND TO SEEK RESOLUTION EXCLUSIVELY

THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS. CROATIA, HE SAID WOULD ENDEAVOUR TO ROUND OUT ITS SOVEREIGNTY IN ACCORDANCE WITH SPIRIT AND LETTER OF DECISIONS OF

WORLD COMMUNITY, BUT WOULD NEVER RENOUNCE ITS RIGHTS TO ITS OWN TERRITORY.

8."CYPRUS SYNDROME" SAID GRANIC, COULD NEVER BE TOLERATED. NOR COULD

RESOLUTION OF UNPA PROBLEM BE MADE TO WAIT ON SOLUTION IN B-H.

9.FINALLY, GRANIC NOTED, DEPARTURE OF UNPROFOR WOULD NOT/NOT INESCAPABLY MEAN RENEWED WARFARE.

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ZAGREB/COMD/ CCUNPROFOR CAMP POLOM/CCMIO/ DE CAF
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---NATO-CSCE IMPLEMENTATION REPORT: CROATIA
RIGHTS OF MINORITIES
THE FATE OF SERB MINORITIES OUTSIDE SERBIA IS THE CRUCIAL ISSUE IN
CROATIA. IF IT IS NOT/NOT RESOLVED IN CROATIA, THERE CAN BE NO/NO
POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THERE, AND PROBABLY NOT/NOT IN THE REST OF THE
REGION.
2.RIGHTS OF MINORITIES ARE GUARANTEED BY THE CROATIAN CONSTITUTION,
BY A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW WHICH, INTER ALIA, ESTABLISHES TWO
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PAGE TWO QLGR0330 P R O T E C T E D
AUTONOMOUS SERB-MAJORITY AREAS (IN THE PRESENT UNPA NORTH AND

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SOUTH), AND BY AN AMNESTY (FOR ALL EXCEPT PERPETRATORS OF WAR CRIMES) FOR THOSE WHO HAVE TAKEN PART IN REBELLION AGAINST CROATIAN

GOVT AUTHORITY.

3. IN NON-OCCUPIED PARTS OF CROATIA, IT IS JUST A MATTER OF ENSURING

THAT THESE LAWS ARE OBEYED AND ENFORCED. THERE ARE SERIOUS OBSTACLES TO THIS (SEE COMMENTS UNDER "RULE OF LAW" AND "TOLERANCE"), BUT IN AREAS WHERE CROATIAN WRIT RUNS, THEY CAN AND

SHOULD BE ADDRESSED.

4. MAIN PROBLEM, HOWEVER IS OCCUPIED AREAS. UNLESS AND UNTIL THERE IS

A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT (OR IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT THAT CROATIA RECOVERS THESE TERRITORIES BY FORCE), THERE WILL BE NO/NO OPPORTUNITY FOR CROATIAN GOVT TO TRANSLATE ITS LEGISLATIVE COMMITMENTS INTO ACTION.

5. SERB AUTHORITIES IN OCCUPIED AREAS ARE COMMITTED TO REMAINING IN A

COUNTRY IN WHICH THEY WILL BE PART OF THE MAJORITY, AS THEY WERE IN

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. MEMBERS OF CROAT AND OTHER MINORITIES IN THOSE

AREAS ARE UNDER EXTREME PRESSURE, INCLUDING ETHNIC CLEANSING. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

6. CROATIA'S PRINCIPAL INTERNATL DISPUTE IS WITH FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

YUGOSLAVIA, FROM WHICH INSURRECTIONISTS IN OCCUPIED AREAS OF CROATIA

DERIVE THEIR SUPPORT. IT HAS ACCEPTED THAT DISPUTE BE SETTLED THROUGH NEGOTIATION (ICFY) AND THAT SITUATION IN OCCUPIED AREAS BE

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PAGE THREE QLGR0330 P R O T E C T E D
NORMALISED BY UNPROFOR IN ACCORDANCE WITH VANCE PLAN. PROBLEM IS LACK OF PROGRESS IN BOTH NEGOTIATIONS AND NORMALISATION, AND CROATIAN GOVT HAS REPEATEDLY WARNED THAT ITS PATIENCE IS NOT/NOT UNLIMITED AND THAT IT DOES NOT/NOT RULE OUT USE OF FORCE.

7. ON TWO OCCASIONS SINCE SEP92, CROATIA UNDERTOOK MILITARY OPERATIONS, ADVANCING ACROSS THE CEASEFIRE LINE INTO "PINK ZONES"

AND UNPAS. MOST SERIOUS OF THESE WAS 22JAN93 MASLENICA OFFENSIVE, IN

WHICH CROATIA FORCES TOOK MASLENICA BRIDGEHEAD, ZEMUNIK AIRPORT AND

PERUCA DAM. LITTLE MILITARY ADVANTAGE WAS GAINED, HOWEVER.

8. CROATIA HAS ALSO PROVIDED SUPPORT TO INDIGENOUS CROAT FORCES IN

BOSNA-HERCEGOVINA. THIS HAS CERTAINLY INCLUDED FACILITATING THE SHIPMENT OF WAR MATERIAL THROUGH CROATIA, AND FROM TIME TO TIME INDIVIDUALS WEARING CROATIAN ARMY UNIFORM HAVE BEEN SEEN IN COOPERATION WITH BOSNIAN CROAT FORCES. CROATIA HAS ATTEMPTED TO LEGITIMISE THESE ACTIVITIES BY REFERENCE TO BILATERAL COOPERATION

AGREEMENTS WITH BOSNA-HERCEGOVINA, AND TO THE THEORETICAL SUBORDINATION OF THE BOSNIAN CROAT FORCES TO THE GOVT OF B-H. CROATIA HAS ALSO PERMITTED BOSNIAN CROAT MEMBERS OF ITS OWN ARMED

FORCES TO DEPART FOR THE PURPOSE OF JOINING THE BOSNIAN CROATS.
RULE OF LAW

9.CROATIAN APPROACH TO PROBLEMS IS HIGHLY, EVEN EXCESSIVELY, LEGALISTIC. THERE IS A TENDENCY TO BELIEVE THAT ONCE LEGISLATION HAS

BEEN PASSED, PROBLEM HAS BEEN DEALT WITH. PASSAGE OF LEGISLATION, IN

...4

PAGE FOUR QLGR0330 P R O T E C T E D
FACT, IS ONLY FIRST STEP IN ADDRESSING A PROBLEM.

10.ONE MAJOR PROBLEM YET TO BE EFFECTIVELY ADDRESSED IS LAW ENFORCEMENT. PRIOR TO INDEPENDENCE, ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF POLICE FORCES WAS PREDOMINANTLY SERB; DEPARTURE OF THESE MEMBERS, BY REASON

OF DISMISSAL, RESIGNATION OR FLIGHT, HAS RESULTED IN HIGH PROPORTION

OF PRESENT POLICE FORCE BEING RELATIVELY INEXPERIENCED AND UNDERTRAINED.

11.AS WITH MILITARY, PROBLEM OF ENSURING POLITICAL AND ETHNIC NEUTRALITY IN POLICE FORCE HAS BARELY BEGUN TO BE ADDRESSED. AS POINTED OUT BY REPRESENTATIVES OF SERB NATIONAL PARTY, POLICE HAVE

BEEN UNABLE OR UNWILLING TO PROTECT MEMBERS OF SERB MINORITY FROM

ETHNICALLY-MOTIVATED VIOLENCE.

12.THIS IS PART OF A LARGER PROBLEM OF WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED POLICE

CULTURE. HISTORICALLY, PRIMARY MISSION OF POLICE IN YUGOSLAVIA (BEFORE OR AFTER WW2) HAS NOT/NOT BEEN COMMUNITY POLICING (IMPARTIALLY MAINTAINING LAW AND ORDER FOR BENEFIT OF ENTIRE COMMUNITY), BUT TO PROTECT POSITIONS OF THOSE WHO RULED AND HELD POWER. INDEPENDENCE AND DEMOCRATIC REFORMS NOTWITHSTANDING, THIS ATTITUDE PERSISTS.

TOLERANCE

13.ALTHOUGH CONSTITUTION AND LAW PROVIDE FOR PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND MINORITY RIGHTS, GREAT CHALLENGES REMAIN TO

IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE RIGHTS THROUGH RULE OF LAW.

...5

PAGE FIVE QLGR0330 P R O T E C T E D

14.ANTI-SERBISM IS PRINCIPAL FORM OF INTOLERANCE IN CROATIA, AND WILL UNDOUBTEDLY REMAIN SO AS LONG AS CONFLICT CONTINUES. IT HAS TAKEN FORM OF DISMISSAL FROM JOBS IN PUBLIC SERVICE, STATE ENTERPRISES AND SOME PRIVATE BUSINESSES. IT CONTINUES TO TAKE FORM

OF VIOLENCE, AIMED AT ENSURING DEPARTURE OF SERBS FROM CROATIA. IT

IS MOST ACUTE IN RURAL AREAS ADJACENT TO CONFLICT AREAS.

15.INFLUX OF HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF MUSLIM REFUGEES FROM BOSNA-

HERCEGOVINA HAS PLACED CROATIAN SOCIETY AND INFRASTRUCTURE UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE. DESPITE OFFICIAL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE CROAT-

MUSLIM ALLIANCE, THERE IS INCREASINGLY PREVALENT POPULAR PERCEPTION

OF MUSLIMS AS PEOPLE UNWILLING TO FIGHT FOR THEIR COUNTRY.

INCREASING CONFLICT BETWEEN B-MUSLIM AND B-CROAT FORCES IN BOSNA-

HERCEGOVINA HAS NOT/NOT YET LED TO SERIOUS BACKLASH AGAINST MUSLIMS

IN CROATIA, BUT THIS MUST BE VIEWED AS SERIOUS RISK.

16.THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO NOTABLE APPEARANCE OF NEO-NAZISM. ONE OF GNAWING ISSUES IN CROATIAN POLITICS, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN FAILURE TO

COME TO TERMS WITH QUISLING "USTASI" REGIME OF WW2. CROATIAN PARTY

OF RIGHTS HAS OPENLY CLAIMED MANTLE OF USTASI REGIME, FORMED A BLACK-UNIFORMED PARTY MILITIA, AND FLAUNTS USTASI REGALIA. OTHER EXTREME-RIGHT POLITICAL FORMATIONS ALSO GLORIFY USTASI REGIME. ONE

FACTION OF RULING HDZ PARTY HAS SIMILAR SYMPATHIES, WHICH OCCASIONALLY MANIFEST THEMSELVES IN INITIATIVES TO, EG, RE-NAME ZAGREB STREETS AFTER MEMBERS OF USTASI GOVT.

...6

PAGE SIX QLGR0330 P R O T E C T E D

17.THERE IS NO/NO SIGNIFICANT ORGANISED ANTI-SEMITISM IN CROATIA.

BOMBINGS OF JEWISH MEMORIAL AND COMMUNITY CENTRE IN 1992 WERE REVEALED AT TRIAL IN BGRAD TO HAVE BEEN INSTIGATED BY YUGO SECRET SERVICE. CROATIAN JEWS ARE PARTICULARLY OFFENDED BY ANTICS OF FAR RIGHT, BUT DO NOT/NOT BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE DIRECTLY THREATENED. IT APPEARS HOWEVER, THAT ISRAEL WILL WITHHOLD DIPLO RELATIONS UNTIL CROATIA HAS ACKNOWLEDGED AND REJECTED ITS USTASI PAST. PRES TUDJMAN, FORMERLY A PARTISAN GENERAL, ATTENDED OPENING OF HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL IN WASHINGTON, BUT HAS NOT/NOT YET "DONE A BRANDT".
PRESS FREEDOM
18. WITH EXCEPTION OF A FEW LOCAL STATIONS, BROADCAST MEDIA REMAIN A STATE MONOPOLY UNDER DIRECT CONTROL OF RULING PARTY. GENERAL DIRECTOR OF CROATIAN RADIO-TV COMPANY (POSSIBLY THE MOST GENERALLY-DESPISED PERSON IN CROATIA, AFTER SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC), IS NOT/NOT ONLY A MEMBER OF HDZ RULING PARTY, BUT A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT AND OF PRESIDENTIAL COUNCIL.
19. ON POSITIVE SIDE, THERE IS LEGISLATION IN WORKS TO OPEN BROADCASTING FIELD TO INDEPENDENT PRIVATE BROADCASTERS. CROATIAN MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS HAS REQUESTED COPIES OF CDN BROADCASTING AND SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION, AND INDICATED INTENTION OF ESTABLISHING CROATIAN EQUIVALENT OF CRTC.
20. THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO ATTEMPT TO RESTRICT USE OF SATELLITE DISHES, THROUGH WHICH CROATS HAVE ACCESS TO WIDE VARIETY OF EUROPEAN AND ...7

PAGE SEVEN QLGR0330 P R O T E C T E D
INTERNATL BROADCASTS. NOR HAS THERE BEEN ANY NOTABLE EFFORT TO JAM BROADCASTS FROM SERB-CONTROLLED AREAS OF BOSNA AND CROATIA.
21. IN PRINT MEDIA, DISTURBING TREND HAS EMERGED AS NEWSPAPERS (FORMERLY SELF-MANAGING ENTERPRISES) HAVE BEEN PRIVATISED. THROUGH USE AND MISUSE OF "MANAGERIAL CREDITS" (WHICH PROVIDE FUNDING BY WHICH MANAGERS OF THESE ENTERPRISES MAY BUY UP SHARES) RULING PARTY LOYALISTS HAVE ENDED UP IN CONTROL OF MOST MAJOR DAILIES AND WEEKLIES.
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT

22.CROATIA'S FIRST POST-INDEPENDENCE ELECTIONS (FOR PRESIDENT OF REPUBLIC AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES) WERE HELD 02AUG92, AND FOLLOWED BY ELECTIONS FOR HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND REGIONAL GOVTS 07FEB93. ELECTIONS WERE CONSIDERED FREE AND FAIR BY INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS, INCLUDING COUNCIL OF EUROPE DELEGATION. IT

WAS IN FACT CONSIDERABLE ACCOMPLISHMENT THAT ELECTIONS COULD BE ORGANISED IN CONDITIONS OF SEVERE POPULATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE DISRUPTION CAUSED BY WAR AND CONTINUING OCCUPATION OF OVER 25 PER CENT OF TERRITORY.

23.CROATIA THUS NOW HAS ELECTED INSTITUTIONS OF GOVT IN CONFORMITY WITH ITS OWN CONSTITUTION. DUE TO NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF VANCE PLAN AND LACK OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, HOWEVER, RESIDENTS OF OCCUPIED AREAS COULD NOT/NOT VOTE AND ARE NOT/NOT REPRESENTED IN CROATIAN PARLIAMENT.

...8

PAGE EIGHT QLGR0330 P R O T E C T E D

24.OPPOSITION LEADERS HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT PARLIAMENT WILL BE

MARGINALISED BY RULING HDZ PARTY, WHICH WON BOTH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS BY COMFORTABLE MAJORITIES, AS WELL AS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. PRACTICE HAS BEEN FOR PARLIAMENT TO SIT FOR ONLY A FEW DAYS EACH MONTH, AND FOR LEGISLATION TO BE PASSED UNDER "URGENT" PROCEDURES WHICH LIMIT DEBATE.

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