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File No. Dossier 28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION
Volume 29 From-De 84-02-03 To-À 84-02-07

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18839

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION
Vol 29

VOLS ACCESSION NO. 18839

TITLE—TITRE:

DISARMEMENT
MEASURES
PLANS AND PROPOSALS
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION (INITIATIVES)

DESARMEMENT
MESURES
PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS
TRUDEAU MISSION DE PAIX (INITIATIVES)

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M. Boudoin
DATE 2007-03-05

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OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MINISTÈRE
DES
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

Retention period-Période de retention:

20Yrs (7A-13D) J



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DATED FROM / À COMPTER DU 84-02-03 TO / JUSQU'AU 84-02-07

AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - À METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER

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FILE NO. - DOSSIER N° 28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission	VOLUME 30
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AM-INTERP: 1ST ADD BGT: 0233
LONDON-1ST ADD 471 . . . PROPOSALS.

INITIATIVE IGNORED

THE RESULT IS THAT TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE HAS BEEN LARGELY IGNORED BY THE AMERICAN AND WESTERN EUROPEAN MEDIA.

HIS EASTERN EUROPEAN TRIP GOT VIRTUALLY NO MENTION IN BRITISH, FRENCH OR AMERICAN NEWSPAPERS. EVEN THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE INTERNATIONAL HERALD-TRIBUNE, PUBLISHED IN PARIS, IGNORED THE TRIP.

TRUDEAU'S COMMENTS ABOUT NATO IN DAVOS PRODUCED A STORY IN THE NEW YORK TIMES BUT IT WAS ABOUT THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL FLAP IN OTTAWA RATHER THAN THE PEACE INITIATIVE ITSELF.

SIMILARLY, NEWSWEEK'S INTERNATIONAL EDITION MADE REFERENCE LAST WEEK TO THE LETTER TO TRUDEAU FROM AILING SOVIET LEADER YURI ANDROPOV. BUT THE NEWSMAGAZINE REPORTED THE LETTER ONLY IN LIGHT OF ANDROPOV'S HEALTH AND DIDN'T REFER TO THE REASON FOR TRUDEAU'S REQUEST TO VISIT MOSCOW.

TRUDEAU MAY PREFER TO CONDUCT HIS INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY WITHOUT THE ATTENTIONS OF THE NEWS MEDIA.

HOWEVER, AS THE FOCUS OF THE INITIATIVE SHIFTS FROM A PERSONAL CRUSADE BY THE PRIME MINISTER TO A BROADER CANADIAN INITIATIVE, THE LACK OF INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION MAY BE MORE DETRIMENTAL.

TRUDEAU HAS PLAYED ON HIS OWN INTERNATIONAL STATURE AND HIS ACCESS TO OTHER LEADERS TO UNDERTAKE HIS INITIATIVES SO FAR. BUT THE BROADER NETWORK OF DIALOGUE TOUTED BY OFFICIALS AS THE NEXT STAGE WILL BE LESS ABLE TO REGARD THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA AS A NUISANCE BEST AVOIDED AND STILL MAINTAIN CREDIBILITY.

AM-INTERP: BGT: 0465

INTERPRETING THE NEWS - BUDGET P PAUL KORING

LUSK (CP) - AT THE END OF HIS EASTERN EUROPEAN SWING; PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU SUGGESTED THE DEBATE ON EAST-WEST ISSUES MIGHT BE MORE PRODUCTIVE IF THE MEDIA WERE EXCLUDED.

REFERRING TO AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM IN DAVOS; SWITZERLAND; WHERE HE PARTICIPATED ON A PANEL DISCUSSION WITH OTHER LEADERS; THE PRIME MINISTER SAID SUCH EXCHANGES WOULD BE MORE FRUITFUL IF THEY WERE PRIVATE.

HIS MUSINGS DURING THAT DISCUSSION ABOUT THE CREDIBILITY OF NATO'S FUNDAMENTAL MILITARY STRATEGY PRODUCED A POLITICAL BROUHAHA BACK IN OTTAWA.

THE PRIME MINISTER WAS APPARENTLY ANNOYED BY MEDIA COVERAGE OF HIS EXPRESSIONS OF DOUBT THAT A U.S. PRESIDENT WOULD RISK NUCLEAR WAR TO SAVE EUROPE FROM AN INVASION BY WARSAW PACT FORCES.

YET IT WAS TRUDEAU; WHO ALSO ATTENDED CLOSED SESSIONS AT THE SYMPOSIUM; WHO CHOSE THE ONE SESSION ATTENDED BY THE MEDIA TO MAKE HIS COMMENTS.

HE ALSO ALLUDED TO HIS DOUBTS ABOUT THE CREDIBILITY OF NATO'S FIRST-USE OPTION IN HIS PUBLICLY DELIVERED OPENING STATEMENT.

AND IT WAS TRUDEAU WHO TRIED TO BOLSTER HIS ARGUMENT BY CITING THE RIGHT TO ASK QUESTIONS IN A DEMOCRACY.

DURING THE SESSION HE CHIDED FORMER FRENCH PREMIER RAYMOND BARRE FOR REFUSING TO SAY WHETHER HE BELIEVED WASHINGTON WOULD ORDER THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO SAVE EUROPE.

AFTER BARRE SAID THE QUESTION SHOULD NOT EVEN BE CONSIDERED; TRUDEAU REPLIED: "DEMOCRACIES DON'T WORK THAT WAY.

"PEOPLE ARE ENTITLED TO ASK QUESTIONS OTHERWISE THEY WILL NOT SUPPORT THEIR GOVERNMENTS."

APPARENT CONTRADICTION

THE APPARENT CONTRADICTION BETWEEN TRUDEAU'S DEFENCE OF THE DEMOCRATIC RIGHT TO ASK QUESTIONS AND HIS QUITE CONSIDERABLE EFFORTS TO EXCLUDE THE MEDIA UNDERSCORES ONE OF HIS PERCE INITIATIVES MOST SIGNIFICANT FAILURES.

SINCE HE LAUNCHED HIS PERSONAL CRUSADE LAST OCTOBER; THE PRIME MINISTER HAS VISITED SIX WESTERN EUROPEAN CAPITALS; THE COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE IN NEW DELHI; JAPAN; CHINA; WASHINGTON AND THREE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES.

YET THAT QUITE REMARKABLE EFFORT; ACCOMPANIED BY SOME SPECIFIC SUCCESSES FOR HIS INITIATIVES; HAS RECEIVED SCANT ATTENTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS.

IT IS AS IF TRUDEAU WANTS IT THAT WAY.

DURING HIS FIRST TOUR OF WESTERN EUROPE; TRUDEAU MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE WOULD JUST AS SOON NOT HAVE ANY REPORTERS ALONG.

EVEN ON LAST WEEK'S SWING TO THREE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES; TRUDEAU MET ONLY THREE TIMES WITH REPORTERS AND THEN FOR WHAT WERE DESCRIBED AS ORGANIZED SCRUMS; RATHER THAN FORMAL NEWS CONFERENCES.

IT IS NO SURPRISE THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF OTHER THAN CANADIAN NEWS ORGANIZATIONS ARE MYSTIFIED BY THE TRUDEAU INITIATIVES.

MOST HAVE ONLY THE VAGUEST OF NOTIONS ABOUT WHAT TRUDEAU IS TRYING TO DO.

NOR IT IS SOLELY A FUNCTION OF CANADA'S RELATIVE UNIMPORTANCE AS FAR AS INTERNATIONAL NEWS ORGANIZATIONS ARE CONCERNED.

THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE MAKES NO OBVIOUS EFFORT TO BRIEF FOREIGN JOURNALISTS ABOUT TRUDEAU'S PROPOSALS.

MORE

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TO
À
IDDZ

FROM
De
UGB

REFERENCE
Référence

SUBJECT
Sujet

P.M.'s Initiative: Implications for
Canada/U.S. Relations
20-1-2-USA
20-1-1-1

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APR 27 1984
28-6-1-TRUDEAU
PEACE MISSION

SECURITY
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DATE
February 7, 1984
NUMBER
Number
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ENCLOSURES
Annexes

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Although the views of the Embassy in Washington need no repetition from me, I would like to endorse the conclusion (WSHDC telegram UNGR2010 of February 3) and, at the same time, offer some additional comments regarding the peace initiative. I have said, from the beginning, that, if our objective was to change mind sets or trend lines and inject political energy into the East-West dialogue, we should mobilize virtually all our influence on the one super-power on whom we can exercise influence. We have not done so consistently nor, I submit, have we chosen to acknowledge appropriately the degree to which there has been a change in tone emanating from Washington. Domestic political considerations in the U.S. have obviously been a significant but not an exclusive factor. Equally we have failed regularly to consult with (or even inform) the U.S. and other major allies as new steps are undertaken.

2. Public statements in Davos, followed by more pungent remarks in East Berlin and Bucharest, have raised more than eyebrows in Washington. They have generated concern about the impact on basic tenets of NATO strategy and on the credibility of the U.S. commitment. They play directly, but one-sidedly, into concerns about security in Europe and into intensive domestic debates within allied countries of Europe. The issue is not whether questions of this kind are permissible. The issue is whether those with questions have answers or, more particularly, commitments to offer as alternatives to those now in place. Arms control proposals represent one answer, but are they being played for show or for effect? If the latter, are we prepared to stop and consult further or are we determined to press on regardless of the views of our major allies?


3. I cannot help but be concerned about the extent to which the initiative is now beginning to jeopardize our bilateral relations. The potential for fallout is genuine; it is certain to increase as elections draw closer and will be conditioned by the manner in which we respond to (or ignore) what I would characterize as a measured message of concern from Washington. I think

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it is time to take stock of the various elements involved with the initiative, bring a clearer focus on the procedural or substantive proposals which merit priority and are attainable and choose our tactics accordingly. I would suggest that an important first step immediately thereafter would be to meet with appropriate U.S. (and European officials) and consult in the spirit we often demand of them. This means systematic debriefing and advance notice. I am concerned that we seem to want to break new ground before we replace at least some divots.

4. Most of all I object to a continuing effort being cast as the P.M.'s "personal" initiative, for which responsibility, as well as basic analyses, become blurred and the follow-up is of the damage-control or 'least objectionable next-step' variety - a posture which, I submit, is as reckless as it is irresponsible.


D.H. Burney
Assistant Deputy Minister
(United States)

C O N F I D E N T I A L FACSIMILE
FM EXTOTT UGB0014 07FEB84
TO WSHDC

ACC	REF	DATE APR 27 1984
FILE 28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION		

---PM INITIATIVE:IMPLICATIONS FOR CDA/USA RELATIONS

(COMCENTRE: PLEASE TRANSMIT ATTACHED BY FACSIMILE)

D.H.BURNEY

UGB

3-7873

D.H. Burney
D.H.BURNEY

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TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE — NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO The Canadian Embassy/SCDEL
 A STOKHOLM/Sweden

NO. IDDZ-0127 DATE 07 Feb. 84

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION — DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE — RÉFÉRENCE
	<p>As requested please find attached copy of PRMNY Tel WKGR0059 11JAN concerning PM's meeting with UN Secretary General.</p>	<p>Ref: Yourtel SCDL 0102 03FEB</p> <p><i>MA</i></p> <p>John McNee Task Force Working Group on East/West Relations and International Security</p>

14 FEB. 1984

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February 7, 1984

IDDZ-0125

Memorandum for the Prime Minister (through R.R. Fowler)

Initiative: A Review

"
The purpose of this memorandum is to review very briefly the impact which your peace initiative has had. It is an updated version of the memorandum we forwarded to you on December 19, 1983.

On the broad front of East-West relations, the following balance sheet roughly weighs events since you launched your initiative in early October.

Plus

- Generally positive reactions of foreign governments and media to the political aspects of your speeches, messages and visits abroad.
- The Goa Declaration issued by the Commonwealth Heads of Government.
- President Reagan's speech to the Japanese Diet.
- The Brussels Declaration issued by NATO Foreign Ministers.
- The NATO decision to undertake a review of East-West relations and to devise means to improve them.
- Forward movement within NATO on MBFR.
- The opening of the Stockholm Conference at Foreign Minister level and the numerous high level East-West contacts to which this gave rise (including the Shultz-Gromyko meeting).
- The undertaking of the UN Secretary General to envisage discussions with the representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council on nuclear arms limitations.

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- The tone of President Reagan's speech on USA - Soviet relations, and of his State of the Union message.
- The contribution to East-West dialogue of your talks with the leaders of three Eastern European countries.

Minus

- The USA invasion of Grenada.
- USSR withdrawal from the INF and START negotiations.
- Increasing uncertainty regarding the USSR leadership.
- The Reagan Administration's proposals for a 17% increase in the USA defence budget (including the start of research on a Ballistic Missile Defence system).
- Increased direct USA involvement in the Lebanon/Syria/Israel conflict.
- The start of a new round in the public debate between the USA and USSR on non-compliance with the provisions of arms control agreements.

On balance, therefore, it would seem that while a number of factors have contributed to the further deterioration of East-West relations, some positive steps have been taken to try to improve the climate surrounding those relations, especially in the realm of direct contacts and declaratory policy, i.e. there has been some shift away from "megaphone diplomacy" in favour of dialogue.


On the specific proposals which you advanced as part of your initiative, the results are mixed. The proposal to launch the Stockholm Conference at senior political level has been successfully implemented. Some progress has been made within the alliance on the MBFR front. The idea of a five power conference has been endorsed by a number of important countries, including the FRG and Italy, and may be pursued by Secretary General de Cuellar; it has, however, been greeted with reservations or pre-conditions by the five governments most directly concerned. Virtually no headway has been made on the question of horizontal nuclear proliferation. Reactions received so far to the three suffocation measures have been either negative or guarded, but it will not be possible to assess the prospects of these proposals until discussion papers on them are circulated at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva within the next few

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weeks. These measures, as well as some of your other specific proposals, will continue to be pursued by Canada through diplomatic channels and within the international institutions most directly concerned.

In short, if the objective was to make a breach in the climate of distrust and to take a first step or two in the long process required to reverse the ongoing deterioration in East-West relations, your initiative has already contributed, directly and indirectly, to the achievement of some highly positive results."



L.A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

cc: PMO/Axworthy
PCO/Osbaldeston
DND/Anderson
DEA/MINA USS DMF IFB RBR IDR UGB

February 7, 1984 *file*

DRAFT LETTER TO THE PRIME MINISTER

My dear Prime Minister,

Shortly after it was announced in the Speech from the Throne last December that it was the Government's intention to create a publicly-funded centre to deal with defence and arms control issues, I asked Geoffrey Pearson to study this question in all its aspects and to submit a report and recommendations to me.

Last week I received Pearson's report, in which he suggested that further consideration needed to be given to the matter before any final decisions were reached on creating a defence and arms control institute. On reading his report and the tentative conclusions to which he has come, I can only agree that more time is required to study the matter in the depth which it deserves.

I think it may be useful, however, for me to give you my own preliminary thoughts on the question while making it clear that they do not in all instances reflect the views of Geoffrey Pearson.

Let me first say that I do not think the Government should endeavour to create a research institute. To do so would merely risk duplicating the work already being done in the fields of defence and arms control by a number of institutions across the country, many of which have been long established (partial list attached).

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Furthermore, the number of people in Canada with expertise and experience in these fields is limited. To establish a research institute of any size in Ottawa would require raiding existing institutions and government departments for scarce human resources. In other words, it would mean "robbing Peter to pay Paul".

I believe that it would be preferable that any government institute be mandated to stimulate, fund and, to the extent possible, coordinate research work being done in existing institutions. Most of these already receive government grants or work under contract to government departments but are still generally inhibited in their work by a lack of funds. More generous government funding would permit them to realize their potential more fully.

The Government's institute could also have among its objectives bringing to the attention of the public the results of research conducted both in Canada and abroad through an active publication program. It could further pursue this educational function by organizing conferences and seminars to which both specialists and members of the general public would be invited.

It could also constitute a data bank and documentation centre available to scholars, specialists, and libraries.
Finally, I see the Government's institute as having a significant role to play in the development of expertise in Canada in defence and arms control studies. The institute should have the funds required to operate an ambitious program of fellowships and scholarships for

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university students and others interested in pursuing their studies in these fields. This would ~~in-itself~~ not only help Canada to build up a fund of expertise but would also help to develop and expand programs which already exist in universities across the country.

For the sake of its credibility with the general public, I believe that the institute should enjoy an "arms length" relationship with the Government. While receiving broad policy guidance from the Secretary of State for External Affairs, to whom it would report annually, the institute should enjoy a measure of operational autonomy in setting its priorities. I think that the Director of the institute should be appointed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and I intend to make proposals to you on this score as soon as feasible.

I ^{believe} ~~believe~~ that you will find these preliminary thoughts of interest, and I can assure you that I shall write to you again as soon as our ongoing studies permit me to give you some more definitive views on the shape the institute should take.

Yours sincerely,

Allan J. MacEachen

Some Institutions Dealing with Defence and Arms Control Affairs

- 1) Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University
- 2) Centre for Conflict Studies, University of New Brunswick
- 3) Centre Québécois des Relations Internationales, Laval
University
- 4) Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton
University
- 5) Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, Ottawa
- 6) Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, Toronto
- 7) Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Toronto
- 8) Research Program for Strategic Studies, York University
- 9) Centre for International Relations, Queens University
- 10) Strategic Studies Program, University of Calgary
- 11) Institute of International Relations, University of British
Columbia



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MESSAGE

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REF WSHDC TEL UNGR 2006 02FEB

---PM INITIATIVE:USA CONCERNS

SUMMARY:USA CHARGE JOHN ROUSE CALLED 03FEB ON DMF, ACCOMPANIED BY UGB AND IDDZ/DELVOIE, TO MAKE A QUOTE PARALLEL DEMARCHE UNQUOTE (TO THAT MADE IN WASHDC 02FEB TO GOTLIEB) TO CONVEY USA CONCERNS ABOUT:

- 1)CDN PLANS TO TABLE THE THREE ARMS CONTROL MEASURES AT THE CD.
- 2)THE PM S REMARKS IN EUROPE ON NATO STRATEGY AND US COMMITMENT TO EUROPE.ROUSE RE-STATED BASIC POINTS MADE TO GOTLIEB BY ACTING ASST SEC OF STATE JOHN KELLY.

REPORT:

2.ROUSE BEGAN WITH THE PRIME MINISTER S THREE ARMS CONTROL MEASURES BY SAYING THAT WHILE THEY APPRECIATED CANADA S VERY ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN DISARMAMENT ISSUES, THE USA IS QUOTE VERY CONCERNED UNQUOTE THAT THE CANADIAN PROPOSALS NOT/NOT BE TABLED FEBRUARY 7 IN THE CD.HE SAID THE US AND MOST NATO ALLIES HAVE SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS ON ALL THREE AND HOPED FOR FULL BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL

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DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG J. McNEE	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG L.A. DELVOIE



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CONSULTATIONS BEFORE THE PAPERS ARE TABLED. HE ARGUED THAT AS THE THREE PROPOSALS BEAR ON US STRATEGIC INTERESTS AND NATO POLICY, THERE WOULD BE VALUE IN CONSULTATION BEFORE TABLING THEM.

3. DMF MADE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN TABLING AND CIRCULATING THE PAPERS; ROUSE SAID CIRCULATION WOULD HAVE VERY MUCH THE SAME IMPACT AS TABLING. DMF EXPRESSED CANADA'S DETERMINATION TO HAVE THESE IDEAS CIRCULATED, BUT UNDERTOOK TO CONVEY THESE REPRESENTATIONS TO THE DPM/SSEA. DMF NOTED THAT THERE HAD ALREADY BEEN EXTENSIVE CONSULTATIONS WITH STATE DEPT, ACDA AND THE PENTAGON WHEN OUR EXPERTS VISITED WASHDC IN EARLY DEC. THE PAPERS HAD BEEN SLIGHTLY REVISED AFTER THOSE CONSULTATIONS. SINCE THE BEGINNING WE HAVE KNOWN THEIR VIEWS ON THE ^{PM'S} ~~PRIME MINISTER'S~~ SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS, BUT THE ^{PM} ~~PRIME MINISTER~~ FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT THE IDEA THAT OUR PROPOSALS SHOULD BE NEUTRALIZED. ROUSE REPLIED THAT THIS WAS ^{NOT} THEIR REQUEST.

4. DELVOIE EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD NEVER FIXED 07 FEB AS THE DATE OF CIRCULATION. OUR PLAN WAS TO DO SO FAIRLY EARLY ON IN THE CD SESSION, WHICH RUNS THROUGH FEB-MAR. THE INTENTION WAS TO CIRCULATE THEM AS QUOTE DISCUSSION PAPERS UNQUOTE TO OTHER DELEGATIONS.

5. DMF QUERIED KELLY'S ASSERTION ^{PARA 5} (REFTEL) THAT THE PROPOSAL ON MOBILITY RAN COUNTER TO THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS AS HE HAD DISCUSSED IT SOME TIME AGO WITH SCOWCROFT, WHO DID ^{NOT} REJECT THE IDEA.

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6. ON THE PM S RECENT REMARKS IN EUROPE, ROUSE SAID THE US WAS QUOTE DISTURBED UNQUOTE BY HIS COMMENTS WHICH APPEAR TO QUESTION THE VIABILITY OF NATO S MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE CREDIBILITY OF THE US COMMITMENT TO EUROPE. IT WAS HARMFUL TO ALLIANCE COHESION; THEY WERE QUOTE SURPRISED AND DISMAYED UNQUOTE, PARTICULARLY AS CANADA HAS NOT RAISED THESE MATTERS IN NATO OR BILATERALLY. THEY HOPE THAT CANADA WILL TAKE STEPS TO CORRECT THE IMPRESSION OF AN ALLIANCE IN DISARRAY CREATED BY THESE REMARKS.

7. DMF SAID THAT THE ^{PM} ~~PRIME MINISTER~~ HAD RAISED THIS LINE OF THINKING AT LUNCH WITH SHULTZ IN WASHDC, WHO HAD SAID THAT ONCE NATO S REVISTATION OF THE HARMEL REPORT WAS FINISHED THESE QUESTIONS COULD BE LOOKED AT. THUS THE PM HAD BROACHED THE SUBJECT AT LEAST ONCE WITH A SENIOR US INTERLOCUTOR.

8. THE PM HAD REITERATED QUESTIONS OTHERS HAD ON THEIR MINDS AND HE HAD MADE A SPECIFIC POINT OF NOT ^{NOT} INTENDING TO UNDERMINE INTRA-ALLIANCE CONFIDENCE. THERE WERE RISKS IN SPEAKING IN PUBLIC ON THESE ISSUES, BUT WE HAD ARGUED THAT BUILDING CONFIDENCE SHOULD BE ON THE AGENDAS OF POLITICAL LEADERS: BY REITERATING OUR EMPHASIS ON CONFIDENCE WE MAY APPEAR TO HAVE DOWNPLAYED DETERRENCE, WITH ITS ELEMENT OF UNCERTAINTY. DMF SAID THERE MAY BE A TRADE-OFF BETWEEN CONFIDENCE (AND CERTAINTY) AND DETERRENCE (AND UNCERTAINTY).

9. THE ^{PM} ~~PRIME MINISTER~~ AND PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD INVOKED FREE PUBLIC DEBATE AS ONE OF THE SUPERIOR ASSETS OF WESTERN DEMOCRACIES;

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SUGGESTIONS OF INHIBITING THAT DEBATE WOULD RUN AGAINST THE BASIC NATURE OF OUR SOCIETIES.

10. DMF NOTED THESE AS SERIOUS REPRESENTATIONS AND UNDERTOOK TO RELAY THEM TO ~~THE DM AND~~ DPM/SSEA.

11. ROUSE SAID THE ^{PM} ~~PRIME MINISTER~~ IN HIS INITIATIVE HAD MADE CLEAR ~~HE WAS WORKING FROM A NATO ALLIED CONTEXT, BUT~~ THAT HE SEEMED TO HAVE DEPARTED FROM THIS LINE LAST WEEK. DELVOIE RECALLED THAT CANADA HAD LONG BEEN AN ADVOCATE OF USA ENGAGEMENT IN EUROPE AND, AS WE HAD TOLD THE US EMBASSY EARLIER THIS WEEK, CANADA REMAINS FULLY COMMITTED TO NATO AND ITS POLICIES. THIS COMMITMENT WAS FULLY ENDORSED BY THE PM.

12. DMF SAID THAT IN THE WAKE OF THE CRUISE TESTING DECISION, THE ^{PM} ~~PRIME MINISTER~~ FEELS A STRONG OBLIGATION TO VARIOUS CDN CONSTITUENCIES TO SUPPORT ROBUST INTELLECTUAL DEBATE ABOUT THE WISDOM OF FUNDAMENTAL STRATEGIC QUESTIONS.

13. ROUSE SAID THAT BEYOND THE STATE DEPT S INITIAL STATEMENT AFTER DAVOS THEY HAD ^{NO} INTENTION OF ENGAGING IN PUBLIC DEBATE ON THIS ISSUE.

14. ROUSE WAS CLEARLY SPEAKING FROM HIS INSTRUCTIONS, ESP ON PM S DAVOS STATEMENTS, AND DID NOT GO BEYOND POINTS MADE BY KELLY TO GOTLIEB.

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TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE — NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO **The Canadian Embassy/SCDEL**
 À **ST, KHOLM/Sweden**

NO. **IDDZ-0127** DATE **07 Feb. 84**

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION — DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE — RÉFÉRENCE
	<p>As requested please find attached copy of PRMNY Tel WKGR0059 11JAN concerning PM's meeting with UN Secretary General.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">John McNee Task Force Working Group on East/West Relations and International Security</p>	<p>Ref: Yourtel SCDL 0102 03FEB</p>
<p>RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION</p> <p>DATE _____</p> <p>SIGNATURE _____</p>	<p>RETURN TO / RETOURNER À</p> <p>IDDZ/EXTOTT</p>	



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SUBJ/SUJ

BUCST STKHM/SCDEL VMBFR CNBRA WLGTN VIENN PEKIN DELHI ATNTA BOSTN

BUFLO CHCGO CLVND DALAS DETRT LNGLS MNPLS NRLNS PHILA ^{SFRAN} SFRSCO SEATL

NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP/DGINFO/DNACPOL PLOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA DMF RGB RCD RCR RBD RBR IFB IDR IDA

REF YOURTEL YBGR2055 06FEB

---PM INITIATIVE:REQUEST FOR BRIEFING

IN BRIEFING OR RESPONDING TO MEDIA QUERIES ON PM INITIATIVE, WE
SUGGEST YOU HOLD OFF UNTIL AFTER PM SPEECH TO HOUSE OF COMMONS
09FEB ON INITIATIVE.

2.PM SPEECH WILL BE SENT TO YOU BY FASTEST MEANS FOLLOWING DELIVERY
THURS ABOUT 1100 HRS OTT TIME, TOGETHER WITH PRESS GUIDANCE.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

SIG J. McNee/sc

DIVISION/DIRECTION

IDDZ

TELEPHONE

5-5912

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG L.A. Delvoie



TO/À : IDDZ
FROM/DE : IFB

Mr. Smith
Mr. Calder

↓ MASTER
FILE

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET : PM Initiative Papers: United Kingdom's
opposition to circulation

Security/Sécurité CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier 20-1-1-1
Date February 7, 1984
Number/Numéro IFB-0179

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

- MINA
- DMF
- IDD
- IDA
- IDR
- RSD
- RCR
- IDDZ/Calder
- UGB
- URR
- LONDON
- GENEVA
- WASHINGTON
- PRMNY
- CANDELNATO
- DND/ADMPOL
- CPP
- DNACPOL

The British High Commissioner called yesterday afternoon to register the deep reservations held by the United Kingdom concerning both the tactics and substance of the three papers developed as part of the Prime Minister's initiative. The United Kingdom strongly supports the view of the United States that these papers should not receive wider international circulation. Lord Moran suggested that these views were shared by others and drew attention to the serious lack of consultation within the Alliance on issues which were of consequence to the Alliance as a whole. He questioned the wisdom of circulating the papers in the CD in Geneva and felt such action could create a counter-productive effect.

2. Turning to the specific papers, Lord Moran commented that (a) the paper on verification represented a radical change of policy by placing the onus on the deploying state. This proposed shift required consultation within the Alliance since it was basic to every ACD negotiation in which the Alliance or Alliance members were engaged in; (b) the paper on ICBM mobility was in direct conflict with the strategic doctrine of the Scowcroft Commission which had suggested moving from large MIRV systems to small mobile single warhead systems; and (c) the paper on ASAT was raising an issue at a time "when the US Administration was not well disposed to even sensible proposals" on the arms control in outer space issue. From the UK perspective it seemed likely that the Canadian paper could drive the USA to adopt a "hard and fast" decision to reject limitation which the European allies, and presumably Canada, desired. The allies had worked hard to move the United States into a more flexible position on the issue in the CD and it would be in no one's interest as this stage to see the United States retrench.

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.....2

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

4. I replied that the points he had raised would receive serious consideration but that, while timing remained flexible to a degree, the papers would be ultimately circulated in some form.



Michael Shenstone,
Assistant Deputy Minister,
Political and International
Security Affairs

R E S T R I C T E D

FM EXTOTT RBR0264 07FEB84

TO BGRAD

INFO PCOOTT/LORTIE/CARON

DISTR RBD RBRD RGB RBP RBT (IDDZ

REF YOURTEL ZLGR3157 25JAN,OURTEL RBR0221 01FEB

---PRES SHIVKOV'S INVITATION TO PM

FOLLOWING IS PMS LETTER TO PRES ZHIVKOV DECLINING HIS INVITATION TO VISIT BULGARIA.QUOTE DEAR PRESIDENT ZHIVKOV,

I WAS MOST GRATIFIED TO RECEIVE YOUR KIND INVITATION TO VISIT THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA.

INDEED,I HAVE DELAYED REPLYING IN THE HOPE THAT MY SCHEDULE MIGHT PERMIT ME THE OPPORTUNITY OF MEETING YOU IN SOFIA.

I REGRET TO SAY,HOWEVER,THAT LONG-STANDING COMMITMENTS IN CANADA FORCED ME TO RETURN TO OTTAWA DIRECT FROM BUCHAREST,AND WILL PREVENT ME FROM ACCEPTING YOUR INVITATION IN THE CURRENT PERIOD. BUT I SHALL,WITH YOU PERMISSION, KEEP YOUR INVITATION OPEN AGAINST SOME FUTURE TIME WHEN MUTUALLY CONVENIENT DATES MIGHT BE AGREED.

LET ME ADD THAT I WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED TO HEAR OF YOUR INTEREST IN THE CANADIAN PEACE INITIATIVE DESIGNED TO REDUCE EAST/WEST TENSIONS AND TO PROMOTE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN ARMS CONTRCL AND DISARMAMENT.I VALUE YOUR READINESS TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THOSE GOALS.I ALSO SHARE YOUR PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, AND I LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER PROGRESS IN THE POLITICAL,ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND HUMANITARIAN DIMENSIONS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

YOURS SINCERELY,PE TRUDEAU UNQUOTE.

2.PLEASE DELIVER AT APPROPRIATE LEVEL.ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW BY BAG.

CCC/134 081533Z RBR0264

mf

R E S T R I C T E D

FM WSAW UMGR0212 07FEB84

INFO

TO PCOOTT/FOWLER DELIVER BY 070900

INFO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN

EXTOTT DDZ RBD

DISTR MINA USS DMF RGV RBR RBRD RBP RBI IDD IDA IDR FPR

---LETTERS OF THANKS:PMS VISIT TO GDR

AS REQUESTED WE FORWARD DRAFT TEXT FOR LETS OF THANKS FROM PM TO GDR HOSTS. IF YOUR APPROVAL (OR REDRAFT) COULD REACH US BY 080830 AMB COULD TAKE OPPORTUNITY OF 08-11FEB TRIP TO BRLIN TO DELIVER ADVANCE TEXT OF LETTERS TO ADDRESSEES. TEXT OF THIRD LET OF THANKS FROM FOWLER TO CHIEF OF PROTOCOL WILL FOLLOW.

LETTER FROM PM TO CHAIRMAN H

DEAR MR CHAIRMAN,

I AM WRITING TO EXPRESS MY GREAT SATISFACTION OVER THE RESULTS OF MY VISIT TO THE GDR AND TO EXTEND MY WARMEST THANKS TO YOU AND TO THOSE OF YOUR OFFICIALS WHO WORKED SO HARD TO MAKE THE VISIT SUCH A SUCCESS.

PROMISE AND HOPE DOMINATED THE ATMOSPHERE OF OUR FIRST MEETING IN HELSINKI NEARLY EIGHT YEARS AGO. I THINK IT IS NOT TOO MUCH TO CLAIM THAT THE WARM AND CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH WE WERE ABLE TO ADOPT IN OUR MORE RECENT TALKS, ONE WHICH HAS BEEN ECHOED IN MY OTHER MEETINGS WITH WORLD LEADERS, PORTEND A RETURN TO AN IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP WITH A RENEWED POLITICAL WILL AND DETERMINATION

...2

PAGE TWO UMGR0212 RESTR

ON THE PART OF BOTH SIDES TO ACHIEVE LASTING SUCCESS IN ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS.

I THANK YOU ONCE AGAIN MR CHAIRMAN FOR YOUR KIND HOSPITALITY

YOURS SINCERELY

PIERRE E TRUDEAU

LETTER FROM PM TO FOREIGN MINISTER

DEAR MR FISCHER,

I SHOULD LIKE TO THANK YOU, AND THROUGH YOU THE MEMBERS OF THE
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, FOR THE EXCELLENT ARRANGEMENTS MADE AT
SUCH SHORT NOTICE FOR MY VISIT TO THE GDR. AMBASSADOR MCLAINÉ HAS
SPOKEN TO ME OF THE OUTSTANDING COOPERATION EXTENDED BY YOUR
OFFICIALS IN THE PLANNING OF THE VISIT AND I CAN PERSONALLY ADD MY
WORD OF CONGRATULATIONS ON A SUPERBLY ORGANIZED PROGRAM.

EQUALLY COMMENDABLE WAS THE CONTRIBUTION YOU AND YOUR OFFICIALS
MADE TO THE SUCCESS OF OUR OFFICIAL TALKS. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE
ENCOURAGEMENT AND MOMENTUM GENERATED BY THESE TALKS WILL ENSURE
THAT OUR DISARMAMENT EXPERTS ARE SUCCESSFUL IN THE TASKS WE HAVE SET
THEM AND THAT BY THE TIME OF YOUR TRIP TO CANADA BOTH SIDES WILL
HAVE BEEN ABLE TO TABLE ITEMS OF COMMON INTEREST WHICH HAVE THE
POTENTIAL FOR REAL AND POSITIVE IMPROVEMENT IN THE EAST-WEST
DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL DEBATE.

YOURS SINCERELY

PIERRE E TRUDEAU

CCC/127 071215Z UMGR0212

External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

IDA/F.R.CLEMINSON/2-1892/pec

TO/A *mf* IDDZ

FROM/DE IFB

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • PM Initiative Papers: United Kingdom's
SUJET opposition to circulation

Security/Sécurité CONFIDENTIAL
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
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CONFIDENTIAL

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Michael Shenstone,
Assistant Deputy Minister,
Political and International
Security Affairs

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6142 07FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO GENEV PRMNY LDN WSHDC PARIS BONN BRU ROME HAGUE OSLO COPEN
ATHNS ANKRA MDRID LSBON MOSCO CANMILREPNATO VMBFR STKHM/SCDEL
PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DNACPOL/CPD/DSTRATA/CIS/DIPOL
DISTR MINA MINE MINT USS DMF IFB IDDZ IDD IDAO IDAN IDR RBR RCR
RSR RBD RCD RSD CPD ZSI ZSP URR

REF YOURTEL IDA0173 03FEB

---PM INITIATIVE:WORKING PAPERS ON ARMS CONTROL

THERE WAS FURTHER BRIEF EXCHANGE IN POLITICAL CTTEE 07FEB ON CDN
WORKING PAPERS.BELGIAN,FRG,ITALIAN AND UK DELS CIRCULATED TEXTS OF
COMMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN FORWARDED SEPARATELY TO SELECTED ADDRESSEES.

WE INDICATED THAT CIRCULATION OF WORKING PAPERS IN CD WAS BEING
DELAYED TO ALLOW MORE TIME FOR ALLIES TO DISPATCH THEIR COMMENTS.

2.DISCUSSION DWELT LARGELY ON PROCEDURE AND REFLECTED CONCERN
EXPRESSED EARLIER AND IN OTHER FORUMS RE OUR INTENTION QUOTE TO GO
PUBLIC UNQUOTE WITH WORKING PAPERS PRIOR TO MORE AMPLE CONSULTATION
AMONG ALLIES.

3.FRENCH REP SAID HIS AUTHORITIES CONSIDERED EARLY CIRCULATION OF
WORKING PAPERS IN CD PREMATURE.THEY STRONGLY FAVOURED CONSULTATIONS
AMONG ALLIES AND WOULD WELCOME EXTENSIVE AND DETAILED EXCHANGE IN
NATO ON THEMES BROACHED IN CDN WORKING PAPERS.FRENCH REP OBSERVED
THAT SUCH AN EXCHANGE HAD BEEN REQUESTED BY NUMBER OF DELS FOR SOME

...2

PAGE TWO YBGR6142 CONFD

TIME. (ASIDE FROM ASAT ISSUE, WE ARE UNAWARE OF SUCH A REQUEST.) HE SAID HE HAD NOT/NOT RECD DETAILED COMMENTS ON CDN PAPERS AND SUGGESTED THAT SUCH COMMENTS WOULD BE WITHHELD PENDING POSSIBLE FUTURE EXCHANGE AMONG EXPERTS.

3. NETHS, BELGIAN AND UK REPS ALL VERY STRONGLY URGED THAT ANY FURTHER STEPS IN CDN INITIATIVE AWAIT FULL AND IN DEPTH ALLIANCE CONSULTATIONS.

4. WE QUESTIONED FRENCH COLLEAGUE FOLLOWING MTG CONCERNING THEIR VIEWS ON INITIATIVE. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DELAY IN PROVIDING COMMENTS WAS IN PART FAULT OF DEL WHICH WAS SLOW IN DISPATCHING TEXTS OF WORKING PAPERS TO PARIS. HE WAS NOT/NOT IN POSITION TO GUESS WHAT PARIS REACTION WOULD BE TO CONTENT OF PROPOSALS BUT HINTED THAT ASIDE FROM CONCERN OVER PROCEDURE, THERE WAS SOME DEGREE OF SATISFACTION THAT WORKING PAPERS WERE FORCING CONTENTIOUS ISSUES OUT INTO THE OPEN. HE WOULD NOT/NOT BE DRAWN ON QUESTION OF WHETHER THIS ATTITUDE APPLIED TO ALL THREE PAPERS.

CCC/054 071710Z YBGR6142

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6138 07FEB83

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO GENEV PRMNY WSHDC NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD/DNACPOL PCOOTT/FOWLER
LDN

DISTR IDAO IDAN IDR IDDZ

---PM INITIATIVE:WORKING PAPERS ON ARMS CONTROL

FOLLOWING ARE UK COMMENTS ON THREE WORKING PAPERS.UK DEL IS NOT/NOT
FOR PRESENT AWARE OF ANY INTENTION ON LDNS PART TO PROVIDE MORE
DETAILED COMMENTS.

2.TEXT BEGINS,QUOTE:

MEASURE I:A BAN ON HIGH-ALTITUDE ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS

THE UNITED KINGDOM ATTACHES IMPORTANCE TO THE PREVENTION OF AN
ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE.AT THE END OF THE LAST SESSION OF THE
COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT IN 1983,WE WERE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A WORKING GROUP TO REVIEW EXISTING INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS IN THIS DOMAIN.WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT FOR THE
MOMENT THIS IS THE BEST WAY TO PURSUE A SUBJECT OF REAL SECURITY
INTEREST TO THE WEST.IT IS TO BE FEARED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL
EXPLOIT THE CANADIAN PAPER TO ADVOCATE LAUNCHING OF NEGOTIATIONS ON
THE BASIS OF THE SOVIET DRAFT TREATY.

MEASURE II:VERIFIABILITY OF NEW STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS

THIS PROPOSAL REPRESENTS A RADICAL CHANGE IN THE APPROACH TO
VERIFICATION IN THAT IT PUTS THE ONUS ON THE STATE DEPLOYING A

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PAGE TWO YBGR6138 CONFD

STRATEGIC SYSTEM TO DEMONSTRATE ITS VERIFIABILITY TO THE SATISFACTION OF OTHER STATES (AS OPPOSED TO UNDERTAKING NOT/NOT TO IMPEDE SURVEILLANCE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS). THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO OF THE PROPOSAL, BOTH MILITARY AND FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF LONG-TERM NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES, NEED TO BE CAREFULLY THOUGHT THROUGH BY THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE.

MEASURE III: RESTRICTED MOBILITY FOR ICBMS

THIS PROPOSAL APPEARS TO RUN COUNTER TO THE STRATEGIC DOCTRINES OF THE SCOWCROFT COMMISSION REPORT (PARTICULARLY ON THE STABILISING EFFECTS OF MOVING FROM LARGE MIRVED ICBMS TO SMALLER SINGLE RV MOBILE SYSTEMS), WHICH WAS ENDORSED BY THE USA ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORTED BY OTHER ALLIED GOVERNMENTS.

I AM COPYING THIS LETTER TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AND TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY STAFF.
UNQUOTE.

CCC/054 071640Z YBGR6138

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6137 07FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO GENEV PRMNY WSHDC NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD/DNACPOL PCOOTT/FOWLER
ROME

DISTR IDAO IDAN IDR IDDZ

---PM INITIATIVE:WORKING PAPERS ON ARMS CONTROL

FOLLOWING ARE ITALIAN COMMENTS ON THREE WORKING PAPERS.

2.TEXT BEGINS QUOTE...

SOME PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON THE CDN PROPOSALS FOR ENHANCING
STRATEGIC STABILITY.

IN PRINCIPLE WE FAVOUR INITIATIVES AIMING AT ENHANCING
STRATEGIC STABILITY AND BALANCE AND THEREFORE WE DO APPRECIATE THE
CONSTRUCTIVE AIM OF THE CDN PROPOSALS.

MEASURE I:A BAN ON HIGH-ALTITUDE ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS

THE ATTITUDE THAT WE HAVE CONSTANTLY MAINTAINED WITH
REGARD TO OUTER SPACE DISARMAMENT IN GENERAL AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS IN PARTICULAR IS WELL KNOWN.IN OUR
VIEW THE MEASURE PROPOSED BY CDA SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO DUE
ACCOUNT SINCE THE SATELLITES OF MORE VITAL IMPORTANCE RESIDE IN
FACT AT HIGHER ALTITUDE AND SINCE ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS WHICH
HAVE ALREADY BEEN TESTED ARE ONLY ABLE TO OPERATE AGAINST
SATELLITES IN LOW ORBIT.HOWEVER A MORE EXHAUSTIVE EVALUATION OF THE
CDN PROPOSAL COULD ONLY BE MADE AFTER THE AMERICANS HAVE COMPLETED
THEIR UNDERGOING REVIEW OF THE PROBLEMS INHERENT TO DISARMAMENT IN
OUTER SPACE.

MEASURE II:VERIFICABILITY OF NEW STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS

WE HAVE ALWAYS SUPPORTED THE PRINCIPLE THAT AGREEMENTS IN

...2

PAGE TWO YBGR6137 CONFD

THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT SHOULD BE VERIFIABLE.
HOWEVER WITH REFERENCE TO THE SPECIFIC CDN PROPOSAL WE THINK
THAT ONE CANNOT UNDERVALUE THE DIFFICULTY OF REACHING AN AGREE-
MENT ON THE VERIFICATION OF NEW STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS THAT IS
NOT RELATED TO AN AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION AND THE REDUCTION
OF THE STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS.

MEASURE III:RESTRICTED MOBILITY FOR ICBMS

IN GENERAL,AS IT IS RECOGNIZED BY THE CDNS
THEMSLEVES,MOBILES MISSILES HAVE A STABILIZING EFFECT WITH REGARD
TO THE STRATEGIC BALANCE SINCE THEY DIMINISH THE RISKS OF
VULNERABILITY.WE HAVE THEREFORE SOME RESERVATIONS AS TO CERTAIN
ASPECTS OF THIS MEASURE,AS WELL AS TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
SPECIFIC MODALITIES WHICH ARE SUGGESTED TO RESTRICT MILITY.
UNQUOTE.

CCC/298 171640Z YBGR6137

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6136 07FEB83

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO GENEV PRMNY WSHDC NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD/DNACPOL PCOOTT/FOWLER
BRU

DISTR IDAO IDAN IDR IDDZ

---PM INITIATIVE:WORKING PAPERS ON ARMS CONTROL

FOLLOWING IS FIRST DRAFT OF BELGIAN COMMENTS ON THREE WORKING PAPERS
WHICH WAS PASS TO US PRIVATELY.TEXT WILL BE EDITED AND CIRCULATED
TO OTHER DELS.

2.TEXT BEGINS,QUOTE:

VOTRE RAPPORT D ORDRE 104 DU 26JAN SOUMETTAIT A MON EXAMEN TROIS
PROPOSITIONS QUE LE CANADA ENVISAGE DE DEPOSER A LA PROCHAINE
SESSION DE LA CONFERENCE DU DESARMEMENT QUI DEBUTE LE 07FEV
PROCHAIN.

LE DELAI TRES COURT QUI M EST IMPARTI NE PERMET GUERE UN EXAMEN
APPROFONDI DE PROPOSITIONS PASSABLEMENT COMPLEXES.IL CONVIENT EN
OUTRE DE DISTINGUER ENTRE CELLE QUI CONCERNE LES SYSTEMES ANTI-
SATELLITES(ASAT),PROBLEME DONT LE CD EST DES A PRESENT SAISI,ET LES
DEUX AUTRES QUI CONCERNENT LE CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS NUCLEAIRES
STRATEGIQUE.

POUR CE QUI REGARDE LA PROHIBITION DES ESSAIS ET DU DEPLOIEMENT
DE SYSTEMES ANTI-SATELLITES A HAUTE ALTITUDE,UNE REMARQUE LIMINAIRE
DOIT ETRE FAITE.

...2

PAGE TWO YBGR6136 CONFID

LE CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS DANS L ESPACE EXTRA-ATMOSPHERIQUE EST UN PROBLEME DANS LEQUEL LES ETATS-UNIS SONT TOTALEMENT ISOLES, Y COMPRIIS DE LEURS ALLIES A L EXCEPTION DU ROYAUME-UNI. IL EST PARFAITEMENT CLAIR QUE, QU STADE ACTUEL, WASHINGTON REFLUSE D ENVISAGER TOUTE RESTRICTION A LA MISE AU POINT ET AU DEPLOIEMENT DE SYSTEMES ANTI-SATELLITES. CERTES, LES ESSAIS AUXQUELS LES ETATS-UNIS VIENNENT DE PROCEDER, IL Y A PEU DE JOURS, NE CONCERNENT QUE LES SATELLITES A BASSE ALTITUDE, NON/NON VISES PAR LE PROJET CANADIEN.

MAIS L ENSEMBLE MEME DU NOUVEAU PROGRAMME SPATIAL ANNONCE EN MAR83 PAR LE PRESIDENT REAGAN EST INCOMPATIBLE AVEC UNE LIMITATION QUELCONQUE DES ASAT. AINSI QUE LE CANADA LUI-MEME LE CONSTATAIT DANS SON DOCUMENT DE TRAVAIL DE MAR82 CIT ARMS CONTROL AND OUTER SPACE FINCIT AU PARAGRAPHE 7 (CIT ANTISATELLITE DESTRUCTION MECHANISMS FINCIT), TOUT SYSTEME ANTI-BALLISTIQUE A, TRES PROBABLEMENT, UNE CAPACITE ANTI-SATELLITES, ET DOIT DONC FAIRE L OBJECT DES MEMES LIMITATIONS.

DEVANT CETTE POSITION DES ETATS-UNIS, QUI VIENT D ETRE ENCORE REAFFIRMEE LORS DE LA 38E SESSION DE L ONU, L INITIATIVE CANADIENNE EST-ELLE OPPORTUNE?

EN PREVISION DE LA REPRISE DES TRAVAUX DU CD LE 07FEV, LES OCCIDENTAUX SONT CONVENUS DE DEFENDRE, FACE AU GROUPE L EST, UN MANDAT DE TRAVAIL PUREMENT EXPLORATOIRE, QUE NE PREJUGE MEME PAS LA

...3

PAGE THREE YBGR6136 CONFID

NECESSITE DE NOUVELLES MEASURES DE CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS DANS
L ESPACE ET DONT LE MOT CIT NEGOCIATION FINCIT A ETE SOIGNEUSEMENT
BANNI (TELEX 08 DE BELDISCOM). LE DEPOT DE LA PROPOSITION CANADIENNE
NE SEMBLE PAS S INSCRIRE DANS CETTE LIGNE ET NE POURRA MANQUER
DE DIVISER LE GROUPE OCCIDENTAL.

EN PRESENCE D UNE DIVERGENCE DE VUES FONDAMENTALE QUI, SUR UN
PROBLEME MAJEUR, SEPRE LES ETATS-UNIS DE LA PLUPART DE LEURS
ALLIES, IL CONVIENDRAIT PLUTOT QUE L OTAN SE SAISISSE RESOLUMENT DE
LA QUESTION ET PROVOQUE UN DEBAT SUR LE FOND. DES EFFORTS DANS CE
SENS ONT DEJA ETE ACCOMPLIS A PLUSIEURS REPRISES AU COURS DES DEUX
DERNIERES ANNEES. LES RESULTATS EN ONT ETE TRES DECEVANTS, EN RAISON
DES RETICENCES CERTAINES DES ETATS-UNIS A ACCEPTER LE DEBAT. CECI
NE DEVRAIT PAS NOUS DECOURAGER CAR LES AUTRES PAYS DE L ALLIANCE NE
PEUVENT SE DESINTERESSER DE LA POLITIQUE SPATIALE DES ETATS-UNIS ET
C EST AU SEIN DE L ALLIANCE QUE LA QUESTION DOIT ETRE TRAITEE.

QUANT AUX DEUX AUTRES PROPOSITIONS ELLES ONT EN COMMUN DE CONCERNER
EXCLUSIVEMENT LES ARMES NUCLEAIRES STRATEGIQUES. ETANT DONNE QUE
DEUX PAYS SEULEMENT NEGOCIENT ENTRE EUX DES ACCORDS DE CONTROLE
PORTANT SUR CE TYPE D ARMES, LES ACCORDS INTERNATIONAUX ENVISAGES
PAR LE CANADA CONSTITUERAIENT EN QUELQUE SORTE UN CADRE DONT
DEVRAIENT S INSPIRER EGALEMENT AMERICAINS ET SOUVIETIQUES. LE FAIT
VAUT D ETRE RELEVÉ CAR IL EXPOSE LES AUTEURS DE PROJET AU REPROCHE
D CIT EQUIDISTANCE FINCIT. ATTITUDE A LAQUELLE LES ETATS-UNIS ONT

...4

PAGE FOUR YBGR6136 CONFD

MONTRE QU ILS ETAIENT SENSIBLES.AUSSI IMPORTERAIT-IL QUE ,LORS DES DEBATS A CE SUJET AU SEIN DE L ALLIANCE,IL APPARAISSE BIEN QUE L INTENTION SOUS-JACENTE EST D AIDER LES NEGOCIATEURS AMERICAINS ET NON/NON DE LEUR IMPOSER DES CONTRAINTES.

LE PROJET QUI PORTE SUR L INTRODUCTION D UNE CLAUSE DE VERIFICABILITE DANS LES FUTURS ACCORDS DE CONTROLE DES ARMEMENTS STRATEGIQUES PARAIT LE PLUS ATTRAYANT, AU REGARD DES RETICENCES AVEREES DE L UNION SOVIETIQUE DANS CE DOMAINE.TOUT AU PLUS POURRAIT-ON RELEVER QU EN RAISON DES ATTITUDES TRES DIFFERENTES DES DEUX PAYS CONCERNES EN MATIERE DE PUBLICITE DE LEURS PROGRAMMES DES DEFENSE,LES EVENTUELLES CONTROVERSES SUR LA CIT VERIFICABILITE FINCIT D UN NOUVEAU TYPE D ARME SE SITUERONT AUX ETATS-UNIS, AU STADE DE LA CONCEPTION ET, EN UNION SOVIETIQUE, A CELUI DE LA MISE AU POINT, VOIRE DU DEPLOIEMENT.

LE PROJET VISANT A RESTREINDRE LA MOBILITE DES FUTURS MISSILES INTERCONTINENTAUX EST PLUS TROUBLANTL, SANS MEME PARLER DE L ASSOCIATION D IDEES QU IL PROVOQUE NATURELLEMENT AVEC LES CONCLUSIONS DU RAPPORT SCOWCROFT.

EN EFFET, SI LA MOBILITE EST CIT EN TERMES GENERAUX FINCIT(II,4)UNE REPONSE ADEQUATE AU PROBLEME DE LA VULNERABILITE.POURQUOI LA LIMITER?LA REPONSE DONNEE A CETTE QUESTION NE PARAIT PAS TRES CONVAINQUANTE;PARCE QUE DES ARMES MOBILES SONT DIFFICILEMENT VERIFIABLES ET QU EN LIMITANT-VOIRE EN DELIMITANT-LES ZONES DE

...5

PAGE FIVE YBGR6136 CONFD

DEPLOIEMENT, ON REDUIT LE RISQUE D INFRACTIONS. EST-CE BIEN CERTAIN?
ON POURRAIT AUSSI BIEN AFFIRMER QUE CE SONT PRECISEMENT LES ZONES
OU NE DEVRAIENT PAS SE TROUVER D ARMES MOBILES QU IL DEVIENDRA
ALORS INDISPENSABLE DE CONTROLER SOIGNEUSEMENT. ET IS LA PRESENCE
DE CES ARMES EST SI DIFFICILE A DECELER, C EST LE PAYS LE PLUS
FERME QUI AURA LES MEILLEURES POSSIBILITES D EN DISSIMULER.
UNQUOTE.

CCC/054 071640Z YBGR6136

S E C R E T

FM STKHM/SCDEL SCDL0121 08FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDA DELIVER BY 080900

INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO LDN BONN ANKRA PARIS ROME WSHDC OSLO

COPEN VMBFR NDHQOTT/PPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR IFB RGB RGX RBR IDD IDDZ IDR IDAO IDAN RSR

REF YEGR6123 06FEB(NOTAL)

---STKHM CONF CSBM PACKAGE:TURKIS PROBLEM

MATTER OF TURKIS INTRANSIGENCE ON CSBM PACKAGE HAS NOT/NOT COME
UP IN STKHM AT ANY RECENT WESTERN CAUCUS PROBABLY BECAUSE ALLIANCE
VIEWS ARE WELL KNOWN TO TURKISH DEL AND LATTER HAD MADE KNOWN
VIES OF CAUCUS TO ANKRA.

2.WE HAVE NO/NO MAGIC FORMULA TO SOLVE IMPASSE BUT AGREE END OF
LINE HAD BEEN REACHED AND ALTHOUGH TURKISH FOOTNOTE TO DOCU NOT/NOT
IDEAL,IT COULD BE ACCEPTED AS DOCU ITSELF WOULD BE FOR ALLIANCE
USE AND NOT/NOT FOR TABLING.WE ARE THEREFORE INCLINED TO TRY IT
ON TURKS.HOPEFULLY THEY MAY ACCEPT ALLIANCE FORMULATION RATHER
THAN ACCEPT PROSPECT OF ISOLATION.

CCC/152 081130Z SCDL0121

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6135 07FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO GENEV PRMNY WSHDC NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD/DNACPOL PCOOTT/FOWLER
BONN

DISTR IDAO IDAN IDR IDDZ

---PM INITIATIVE:WORKING PAPERS ON ARMS CONTROL

FOLLOWING ARE FRG COMMENTS ON THREE WORKING PAPERS:

TEXT BEGINS QUOTE...

1. AGREEMENT TO BAN THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF HIGH-
ALTITUDE ANTI-SATELLITE SYSTEMS

WE SHARE THE CDN VIEW THAT THE CREATION OF A SANCTUARY
FOR SATELLITES IN HIGH ORBIT WOULD BE IN THE INTEREST OF ALL
COUNTRIES CONCERNED IN VIEW OF THE LARGE AND STILL GROWING
IMPORTANCE OF THESE SATELLITES. SINCE THE SOVIET UNION ALREADY
HAS AN OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY AND THE TEST PHASE OF THE US
ASAT IS ABOUT TO BEGIN (IOC PROBABLY IN 1987), WE CONSIDER
THAT A COMPLETE ASAT BAN WILL HARDLY BE REALISTIC. ON THE
OTHER HAND, IF AN AGREEMENT BANNING THE TESTING AND DEPLOY-
MENT OF HIGH-ALTITUDE ASAT WERE ACHIEVED, THE EXISTING ASAT
CAPABILITIES COULD BE LIMITED TO ONE SYSTEM ON EACH SIDE
WHICH CAN BE USED AGAINST SATELLITES IN LOW ORBIT. SUCH AN
ARRANGEMENT COULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT STABILIZING EFFECT.

AS FAR AS THE EARLY INTRODUCTION OF THE CDN PAPER IN
THE CD IS CONCERNED, THIS SHOULD ONLY BE DONE IN AGREEMENT

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WITH THE UNITED STATES.

2. AGREEMENT THAT STATES MUST DEMONSTRATE AND ENSURE THE
VERIFIABILITY OF NEW STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS

WE WELCOME THE FACT THAT THE CDN PAPER STRONGLY UNDER-
LINES THE IMPORTANCE OF VERIFICATION. NATIONAL TECHNICAL
MEANS (NTM) ARE INDEED INCREASINGLY PROVING INADEQUATE FOR
VERIFICATION AS THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW STRATEGIC SYSTEMS
GOES ON. WE WONDER, HOWEVER, WHETHER THE CDN PROPOSAL
THAT THE CONTRACTING PARTIES SHOULD UNDERTAKE TO ENSURE THE
VERIFICATION OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW WEAPONS BY MEANS OF
NTM OR TO MAKE PROPOSALS FOR ALTERNATIVE MEANS BY WHICH
THE SYSTEM IS TO BE VERIFIED CAN CONTRIBUTE TO PRACTICABLE
SOLUTIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT EVERY AGREEMENT SHOULD
SPECIFY IN VERY CONCRETE TERMS HOW VERIFICATION IS TO
BE OPERATED; OTHERWISE, RECIPROCAL ACCUSATIONS CON-
CERNING THE NON-RESPECT OF COMMITMENTS ARE INEVITABLE.

3. AGREEMENT TO RESTRICT THE MOBILITY OF INTERCONTINENTAL
BALLISTIC MISSILES (ICBMS)

THE CDN PAPER RIGHTLY CALLS ATTENTION TO THE STABILITY-
INCREASING EFFECT OF LESS VULNERABLE ICBMS. ESPECIALLY THE
MIDGETMAN SYSTEM (SJCM WITH ONE WARHEAD, WEIGHT LIMITATION,
MOBILITY) AND ITS SOVIET EQUIVALENT (SSX 24) OFFER LONG-
TERM CHANCES OF A STABILITY-INCREASING RE-STRUCTURING OF

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PAGE THREE YBGR6135 CONF

THE CIBM POTENTIAL OF THE TWO SIDES.

ON THE OTHER HAND, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF FURTHER CDN
CLARIFICATIONS, WE ARE NOT QUITE CONVINCED OF THE JUSTIFICATION
OF THE CONCERN THAT MOBILE SYSTEMS MAY NOT BE
ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE. WITHIN THE INF FRAMEWORK, THE
MOBILITY OF THE SYSTEMS WAS NOT REGARDED AS A DECISIVE PROBLEM
OF VERIFICATION. A PROBLEM WHICH REALLY RAISES DIFFICULT
QUESTIONS AND TO WHICH THE CDN PAPER CALLS
ATTENTION IS THAT OF THE RELOADABILITY OF THESE SYSTEMS.
THIS PROBLEM MUST BE SOLVED; HOWEVER, SUCH A SOLUTION
WOULD NOT BE FACILITATED BY RESTRICTIONS ON THEIR MOBILITY.
AT ANY RATE, WE WOULD LIKE TO ADVISE AGAINST PLACING THE
STABILITY-PROMOTING EFFECT OF MOBILITY TOO MUCH INTO THE
FOREGROUND AS A BASIS FOR ARMS CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS.
UNQUOTE.

CCC/298 071642Z YBGR6135

MASTER FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6130 07FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDR DELIVER BY 070900

VMBFR DELIVER BY 071300

INFO CANMILREPNATO MOSCO STKHM/SCDEL WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN PRMNY

GENEV PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADM POL/CPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR MINA DMF IFB (IDDZ IDD IDRA IDRL IDA

REF VMBFR TEL XTDR0019 03FEB YOURTEL IDR0417 03FEB

---MBFR:RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS

SPC/MBFR QUICKLY AGREED 06FEB THAT FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE MADE BY BELGIAN MFA TO POLISH AMB IN BRU:(A)RECONFIRMATION OF WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF 16MAR AS DATE FOR RESUMPTION;(B)ADJOURNMENT DATE FOR NEXT ROUND IS TO BE DEALT WITH IN VIENN AND(C)PRESS COMMUNIQUE SHOULD BE LEFT TO CAPITALS THEREFORE NO/NO NEED FOR JOINT EAST/WEST TEXTS.

2.BELGIAN REP TABLED PROPOSAL FOR PRESS RELEASE WHICH HE THOUGHT CAPITALS MAY WISH TO DRAW UPON.IT WAS AGREED THAT TIMING AND CONTENTS OF ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD BE LEFT TO CAPITALS ALTHOUGH IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT ANY ANNOUNCEMENT SHOULD NOT/NOT BE MADE UNTIL AFTER BELGIANS HAD CONTACTED POLES.

3.FINALLY,FOLLOWING GUIDANCE FOR NATO SPOKESMAN FOR USE ON RESPONSIVE BASIS WAS AGREED UNDER SILENCE PROCEDURE(DEADLINE 081200) QUOTE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS AT THE MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS(MBFR)TALKS IN VIENNA WERE UNABLE TO AGREE AT THE END OF THE LAST ROUND TO A DATE FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

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THEY HAVE NOW MADE A PROPOSAL FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THE VIENNA TALKS ON 16MAR84. THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE ACCEPTED THIS PROPOSAL. ACCORDINGLY THE 32ND ROUND OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BEGIN IN VIENNA ON THIS DATE UNQUOTE.

4. WE OBSERVED THAT FIRST SENTENCE WAS PERHAPS TYPE OF FORMULATION TO AVOID SO AS NOT/NOT TO ENGAGE IN POLEMICS AND RECRIMINATIONS AND STRESSED NEED FOR NATO LINE TO BE AS ANODYNE AS POSSIBLE. WHILE WE WERE SUPPORTED BY OUR DUTCH COLLEAGUE, BELGIAN REP INDICATED THIS WAS LINE AGREED BY COUNCIL 21JAN. HE ALSO EMPHASIZED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO TELL WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION THAT IT WAS EAST THAT HAD LEFT TABLE. WE SIMPLY NOTED THAT IN LIGHT OF YOUR CONCERN WE HAD TO RESERVE OUR POSN ON FIRST SENTENCE. GRATEFUL YOUR VIEWS NO/NO LATER THAN 080900.

CCC/054 071117Z YBGR6130

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM GENEV YTGR0825 7FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDA

INFO BNATO

DISTR IDAO IDAN IDR IDDZ

REF YOURTEL IDA0174 3FEB OURTEL YTGR0438 24JAN

---PM INITIATIVE:PROPOSALS

HAVE NOW RECEIVED THREE PAPERS INTENDED FOR CIRCULATION IN CD.

2. STRONGLY AGREE WITH YOUR DECISION TO DELAY CIRCULATION OF PAPERS TO CD DELS UNTIL NATO ALLIES HAVE HAD CHANCE TO PROVIDE DETAILED COMMENTS.(SEE PARA 3 OF OURTEL YTGR0342 29JAN.)AS YOU HAVE INDICATED (YOURTEL IDA0173 3FEB),WE HAVE RECEIVED NEGATIVE OR RESERVED REPLIES FROM USA,UK AND NORWAY;AND EVEN THE DUTCH SUGGEST FURTHER NATO CONSULTATIONS.

3. WHILE OURTEL YTGR0342 INDICATED THAT FROM CD PERSPECTIVE PRESENTATION OF THREE DISCUSSION PAPERS WAS BOTH TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE(AND THIS REMAINS OUR VIEW),THIS ASSESSMENT WAS MADE ON ASSUMPTION THAT INITIATIVE WOULD BE CLEARED WITH NATO ALLIES IN LIGHT OF IMPORTANCE AND SENSITIVITY OF PROPOSALS.REPORTS FROM CDN MISSIONS SO FAR SUGGEST THAT AMERICANS AND PERHAPS TO A LESSER EXTENT BRIT,SEEM PARTICULARLY OPPOSED.

4. IN THIS CONTEXT, YOU MAY WISH TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT EFFECT PRESENTING THESE PAPERS WOULD HAVE ON CDN ABILITY TO MAINTAIN AN EFFECTIVE ROLE VIS A VIS CD AS A WHOLE,(AS WELL AS WITHIN WESTERN

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PAGE TWO YTGR0825 CONFD

GROUP), SHOULD THIS INITIATIVE FAIL TO BE CORRECTLY UNDERSTOOD, OR PERHAPS MORE SERIOUSLY, SHOULD IT BE ACTIVELY AND OPENLY OPPOSED BY ANY OF OUR ALLIES.

5. PENDING YOUR FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THIS MATTER (AND SUCH FURTHER CONSULTATIONS IN NATO AND ELSEWHERE AS YOU MAY THINK FIT), YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO CONSIDER WHETHER IT WOULD REALLY BE USEFUL AT THIS STAGE FOR MISSION TO PREPARE TEXT OF CDN SPEECH FOR GENERAL DEBATE WITH NO/NO REF TO CDN INITIATIVE AT ALL. WHATEVER DECISION MAY BE MADE ON TIMING AND MEANS OF PRESENTATION OF PAPERS, WE WILL NEED STRONGEST POSSIBLE ARGUMENTS TO SUPPORT THEM, AND DO NOT/NOT CONSIDER IT DESIRABLE TO MAKE POLICY STATEMENT IGNORING THIS MOST SUBSTANTIVE INITIATIVE AT THIS STAGE AND LEAVE IT OPEN TO A LATER DECISION WHETHER TO INCLUDE OR NOT/NOT.

6. GRATEFUL YOUR COMMENTS.

CCC/198 071700Z YTGR0825

MATTER FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR0272 07FEB84

TO EXTOTT/RBR DELIVER BY 070900

INFO BNATO WSHDC BONN PARIS MOSCO ROME BRU HAGUE COPEN MDRID

WSAW STKHM/SC DEL GENEV PRMNY ATHNS VMBFR BPEST BCUST PCOOTT/

FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/CORAE/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/CIS

DISTR RBD RGB DMF RCR IDR IDA IDD IDDZ IFB ZSI CPD ZEP

REF OURTEL XNGR0185 26JAN

---EAST/WEST RELATIONS:PM THATCHER VISIT TO HUNGARY 02-04FEB
SUMMARY:AS HAD BEEN EXPECTED HERE,MOST SIGNIFICANT ASPECT OF PMS
OTHERWISE ROUTINE(IF SUCCESSFUL)VISIT TO HUNGARY,WAS THAT IT
TOOK PLACE AT ALL.WHILE NOTES OF PMS PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS WITH
PRESIDENT LOSONCZI,FIRST SECRETARY KADAR AND PM LAZAR ARE NOT
YET AVAILABLE,OFFICIALS ARE CLEARLY ENCOURAGED BY POLITICAL
IMPULSE VISIT HAS GIVEN BROADER EAST/WEST RELATIONS.PMS ESSENTIAL
FOCUS WAS TO CONVEY MESSAGE THAT WEST,AND IN PARTICULAR PRESIDENT
REAGAN,IS SINCERE IN SEEKING PEACE.WHILE CONCEDED NOTHING IN
TERMS OF ALLIANCE STRATEGY,SHE MADE EVIDENTLY SUCCESSFUL EFFORT
TO ASSURE HUNGARIAN LEADERSHIP THAT EAST/WEST DIALOGUE WAS
POSSIBLE EVEN IN TIMES OF TENSION,AND THAT EAST IS NOT DEALING
WITH FACELESS,UNFEELING AND UNKNOWN LEADERSHIP IN WEST.VISIT
PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY AS WELL FOR HER TO REINFORCE FOR BRITISH
PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENT,HER GOVTS COMMITMENT TO PRAGMATIC EAST/WEST

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PAGE TWO XNGR0272 CONF

DIALOGUE. LONDON PRESS HAS SPECULATED THAT THATCHER VISIT WAS PRELUDE TO EARLY TRAVEL TO MOSCOW, BUT BOTH SHE AND OFFICIALS IN FCO HAVE BEEN QUICK TO QUELL WHAT THEY FEAR MAY BE UNDULY HIGH EXPECTATIONS: WHILE PM URGED HUNGARIAN LEADERSHIP TO ENCOURAGE EASTERN BLOC MINISTERIAL VISITS TO WEST, WE ARE TOLD SHE IS NOT PLANNING VISIT TO MOSCO IN 1984, AND IS UNLIKELY TO BE IN POSITION TO VISIT ANY OTHER EASTERN BLOC COUNTRY IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. ON OTHER HAND, FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWE IS KNOWN TO BE LOOKING FOR INVITATION TO SOVIET UNION TOWARDS MIDDLE OF THIS YEAR, AND MAY ALSO GO TO ROMANIA AND BULGARIA.

2. REPORT: FCO EASTERN EUROPEAN DEPT CLEARLY VIEW PMS HUNGARY VISIT AS CONSIDERABLE SUCCESS IN PROVIDING POLITICAL IMPETUS TO BROADER EAST/WEST TIES, IN REAFFIRMING UK COMMITMENT TO PRAGMATIC EAST/WEST DIALOGUE AND IN ENCOURAGING PROMISING BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS. UK INTEND TO BRIEF NATO PARTNERS THIS WEEK ON EAST/WEST IMPLICATIONS OF PMS TRIP.

3. PM MET FOR SOME 45 MINUTES WITH PM LAZAR, FOR TWO HOURS WITH FIRST SECRETARY KADAR. EAST/WEST RELATIONS WAS FOCAL POINT OF CONVERSATIONS, AND PM WAS ANXIOUS TO ASSURE HUNGARIAN LEADERSHIP

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PAGE THREE XNGR0272 CONF D

OF WESTERN, AND IN PARTICULAR PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SINCERITY IN HIS COMMITMENT TO BETTER EAST/WEST RELATIONS AND SUCCESSFUL ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. SHE DREW ON WHAT SHE DESCRIBED AS PERSONAL FRIENDSHIP WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, AS WELL AS ON QUOTE HER EXPERIENCE AS PM UNQUOTE TO EMPHASIZE BOTH REAGAN'S 16 JAN SPEECH, AND WESTERN PROPOSALS AT STOCKHOLM. TELLING KADAR (AND SUBSEQUENTLY BRITISH PRESS) QUOTE THIS IS NOT TIME FOR EMPTY CHAIRS IN GENEVA UNQUOTE, MRS THATCHER URGED EARLY RESUMPTION OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. SHE GAVE NOTHING AWAY OF WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION, BUT APPARENTLY LEFT HUNGARIANS IN NO DOUBT THAT SORT OF PRAGMATIC DIALOGUE SHE HAS IN MIND CAN TAKE PLACE EVEN UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, IF IT IS PURSUED ON BASIS OF MUTUAL RESPECT. BRITISH WERE ENCOURAGED THAT HUNGARIANS DID NOT DISSENT FROM PMS INSISTENCE THAT ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVE MUST BE TO GET ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS RESTARTED, AND BY THEIR EVIDENT ACQUIESCENCE IN HER VIEW THAT WEST WAS PREPARED TO DO QUOTE SERIOUS BUSINESS UNQUOTE WITH SOVIETS. HUNGARIAN LEADERSHIP STRESSED ADHERENCE TO WARSAW PACT TENETS, AND PLAYED QUOTE TRADITIONAL RECORD UNQUOTE OF EASTERN VIEWS ON INF/START. YET ASIDE FROM APPARENTLY DISAPPOINTING ORTHODOX SPEECH LAZAR GAVE AT DINNER, THERE WERE NO POLEMICS.

4. ON BILATERAL ISSUES, HUNGARIANS SEEMED QUOTE MILDLY ENTHUSIASTIC

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UNQUOTE.PM THATCHER EVIDENTLY GOT ALONG WELL WITH HUNGARIAN LEADERSHIP,AND BOTH SIDES WERE ABLE TO LAY GROUNDWORK FOR BROADER BILATERAL COOPERATION,PARTICULARLY IN COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL SPHERES:THUS EVEN WITHIN EVERPRESENT CONSTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY HUNGARYS DESIRE TO REEMPHASIZE THEIR STATUS AS LOYAL MEMBER OF WPO,OFFICIALS FEEL VISIT HAS REINFORCED CONCEPT OF QUOTE POSITIVE DISCRIMINATION UNQUOTE,WHILE AVOIDING POTENTIAL PITFALL OF EMBARRASSING HUNGARIANS IN THEIR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION.

5.LOOKING AHEAD,OFFICIALS HERE SAY THEY ARE FRANKLY SURPRISED AT MEDIA COVERAGE WHICH VISIT HAS RECEIVED,AND AT IMPLICATIONS THERE THAT IT IS FORERUNNER OF UK/SOVIET SUMMIT.THEY SUGGEST THIS GIVES VISIT AURA WHICH DOES NOT REFLECT REALITY,AND THAT IN FACT BOTH PM AND OFFICIALS ARE NOW CONCERNED TO FIND NEW MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE TAKEN TO REINFORCE INITIAL THRUST WHICH VISIT HAS GIVEN IN PMS EFFORTS TOWARD BROADER EAST/WEST DIALOGUE. THEY ASSURE US THERE ARE NO PLANS FOR PM TO TRAVEL TO MOSCO IN 1984.FOREIGN SECREARY HOWE WOULD LIKE TO GO TO SOVIET UNION BEFORE NEXT GENERAL ASSEMBLY,-POSSIBILITY WHICH HE SUGGESTED INDIRECTLY IN HIS CONVERSATIONS IN STOCKHOLM WITH GROMYKO,BUT WHICH HAS NOT YET BEEN TAKEN UP BY SOVIETS.FCO HAVE ALSO RECOMMENDED THAT FOREIGN SECRETARY CONSIDER GOING TO ROMANIA

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AND BULGARIA. HE HAS NOT YET AGREED TO THIS RECOMMENDATION, THOUGH HE HAS OUTSTANDING INVITATION FROM ROMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI AND IS CONSCIOUS THAT NO UK MINISTER HAS EVER BEEN TO BULGARIA IN WHAT IS NOW 104 YEARS OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. THERE ARE NO PLANS FOR HIGH LEVEL VISITS TO CSSR, AND WHILE BRITISH WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO SEND MINISTER, OR EVEN PM, TO POLAND, THEY RECOGNIZE THAT ALLIANCE COHESION IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN ADVANTAGES TO BE GAINED FROM SUCH A VISIT. THEY ARE THUS NOT WILLING TO GO AGAINST EXISTING ALLIANCE POLICY (HOWEVER QUOTE ABSURD UNQUOTE FCO OFFICIALS SUGGEST IT MIGHT BE), MUCH LESS EMBARK ON INITIATIVE WHICH WOULD ANNOY AMERICANS.

6. EMPHASIS IN LONDON PRESS ON FOLLOWUP TO VISIT, WHILE PERHAPS OVERSTATED, DOES REFLECT PM THATCHER'S OWN PREOCCUPATION SINCE HER NORTH AMERICAN TOUR WITH QUOTE THAWING EAST/WEST RELATIONS UNQUOTE THROUGH CREATING BROAD WEB OF EAST/WEST TIES WHICH WILL EXTEND WELL BEYOND ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS. FINANCIAL TIMES HAS THUS REPORTED THAT PM USED SPEECHES IN BUDAPEST TO STRESS IDENTITY OF HER VIEWS WITH THOSE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN: QUOTE SHE GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT SHE SEES HER ROLE AS AN INFORMAL EAST/WEST ENVOY FOR A US PRESIDENT PREOCCUPIED ON THE HUSTINGS UNQUOTE. BOTH THE FINANCIAL TIMES AND THE TIMES HAVE GIVEN PROMINENCE TO HER STATEMENT THAT QUOTE WHILE I AM KNOWN AS THE IRON LADY, I

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ALSO HAVE AN IRON RESOLVE FOR EASING TENSION AND FOR A FAIR
AND MORE PROSPEROUS WORLD UNQUOTE AND HAVE REPORTED HER HUNGARY
MISSION FAVOURABLY AS (TO QUOTE MRS THATCHER) A VERY CONSIDERABLE
FIRST STEP UNQUOTE IN THIS PROCESS.

CCC/224 071318Z XNGR0272

Master File

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM LDN XNGR0267 07FEB84

TO EXTOTT/IDA DELIVER BY 070900

INFO GENEV DELIVER BY 071200 WSHDC BNATO PRMNY BONN PARIS

DISTR IDAE IDAN IDD IDR RCR IDDZ

REF GENEV TEL YTGR0402 23JAN

---CD:BRITISH VIEWS

SUMMARY:OFFICIALS IN FCO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DEPT
EXPECT FIRST WEEKS OF CD TO BRING WRANGLE OVER REESTABLISHMENT
OF NUMBER OF WORKING GROUPS,AND OVER CHEMICAL WEAPONS,WHERE
THEY SUGGEST SOME DELS MAY WANT TO HOLD UP PROGRESS IN CW
PENDING WESTERN MOVEMENT ON AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO
THEM.THEY SEE SPECIAL DIFFICULTY ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN,WHERE USA
AND UK WILL CONTINUE TO RESIST NEGOTIATING MANDATE FOR WORKING
GROUP;ON OUTER SPACE,WHERE(DESPIE FOREIGN OFFICE INCLINATION
PRIVATELY TO URGE AMERICANS TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING)THEY EXPECT
STRONG AMERICAN RESISTANCE;AND ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WARFARE,
WHERE DESPITE UK SEARCH FOR QUOTE MORE UPBEAT WESTERN POSITION
UNQUOTE,OFFICIALS EXPECT FRG AND^{FR}ENCH OPPOSITION TO PREVENT
ALLIANCE AGREEMENT ON COMMON STANCE;BRITISH ARE FRANKLY CONCERNED
AT IMPLICATIONS OF TABLING OF CANADIAN INITIATIVES IN CD.BRITISH
HIGH COMM WILL BE ASKED TO RELAY THIS CONCERN IN OTTAWA.

(SEE OURTEL XNGR 243 03FEB).

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PAGE TWO XNGR0267 CONFD

2.REPORT:PRIMARY BRITISH FOCUS IN FORTHCOMING CD SESSION WILL BE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS.BUT EVEN HERE,WHERE UK SEE GREATEST CHANCE OF PROGRESS,FCO DISARMAMENT OFFICIALS RECOGNIZE THAT OTHER DELEGATIONS MAY PLACE MORE EMPHASIS ON OUTER SPACE,NTB AND OTHER PERENNIAL ISSUES,AND MAY BE INCLINED TO HOLD UP PROGRESS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS UNTIL THEY SEE SOME PROGRESS ON THEIR OWN IDEAS:BRITISH THUS EXPECT OPENING WEEK OR TWO TO BE QUOTE RATHER UNCOMFORTABLE EXPERIENCE UNQUOTE,FOR WEST IN GENERAL,AND FOR USA/UK IN PARTICULAR.

3.ON NTB,OFFICIALS HERE ARE BRACING FOR QUOTE CRUNCH UNQUOTE, WITH USA AND UK UNDER GREAT PRESSURE,BUT STILL RESISTING NEGOTIATING MANDATE FOR WORKING GROUP.UK WILL CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THEIR PAPERS ON PNES AND VERIFICATION BE DISCUSSED IN DEPTH,AND WILL SUGGEST THAT UNTIL THESE AND OTHER AREAS ARE COVERED SATISFACTORILY,MANDATE WILL NOT BE EXHAUSTED.LOOKING AHEAD FOR NEXT MONTH OR SIX WEEKS,BRITISH ARE EVEN PREPARED FOR EVENTUALITY OF SOVIET WALKOUT IF THERE IS NOT SOME MOVEMENT IN USA/UK POSITION.WHILE IMPRESSION GIVEN IS THAT UK,LEFT TO OWN

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DEVICES, WOULD NOT TAKE SUCH AN ADAMANT POSITION, OFFICIALS
HERE POINT TO RECENT LONDON CONSULTATIONS IN SUPPORT OF CONTENTION
THAT AMERICANS ARE ABSOLUTELY FIRM IN THEIR REFUSAL TO MOVE ON
NTB.

4. CHEMICAL WEAPONS: OFFICIALS ARE FRANKLY SOMEWHAT AT SEA:
NOTING THAT SITUATION IS COMPLICATED BY SOVIET PROPOSAL (NOT YET
SUBMITTED TO CD, NOR WITH ANY INDICATION THAT IT MIGHT BE);
AND BY USA PROPOSAL STILL TO COME (WHERE OFFICIALS CITE
CONFLICTING REPORTS AS TO WHETHER IT MIGHT BE TABLED WITHIN
QUOTE MONTHS UNQUOTE OR IN MARCH), FCO ARGUE THAT MOST ESSENTIAL
FACTOR WILL BE TO ENSURE WESTERN CONSULTATIONS WITHIN NATO, AT
GENEVA OR EVEN BILATERALLY. THERE IS SOME SENSITIVITY HERE TO
POSSIBILITY THAT, IN RUSH TO GET SOME PROPOSAL ON TABLE, USA
ITSELF MIGHT BE INCLINED TO ALLOW QUOTE SOMETHING TO SLIP
THROUGH ON VERIFICATION UNQUOTE. ON SOVIET PROPOSAL, OFFICIALS
NOTE FAVOURABLY GENERAL NATO AGREEMENT NOT TO TURN IT DOWN
OUT OF HAND; AT SAME TIME, BRITISH WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO HAVE CD
EXAMINE PROPOSAL RELATING ONLY TO EUROPE. FOREIGN MINISTER LUCE
WILL TRAVEL TO GENEVA FEB 13/14 TO INTRODUCE NEW BRITISH PAPER
ON CW VERIFICATION. OTHERWISE, HIS SPEECH WILL CONTAIN QUOTE NO
NEW GOODIES UNQUOTE, AND WILL BE AIMED IN MAJOR PART AT
RESTATING FOR BRITISH PUBLIC GOVTS COMMITMENT TO DISARMAMENT

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AND ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

5. OUTER SPACE: BRITISH OFFICIALS ARGUE THAT MOST PROMISING AVENUE OF APPROACH WOULD BE TO PICK UP WHERE LAST SESSION LEFT OFF. FOREIGN OFFICE TEAM IS CURRENTLY ENGAGED IN PREPARING TABLE OF EXISTING AND POTENTIAL LEGISLATION ON OUTER SPACE WHICH THEY INTEND TO USE AS BACKGROUND FOR INTERVENTIONS IN GENEVA. THEY RECOGNIZE THAT SOVIETS AND NON-ALIGNED MAY PRESS FOR REFERENCE IN RENEWED MANDATE TO NEGOTIATIONS. IN PRIVATE INTERVENTION (PLEASE PROTECT) ARMS CONTROL OFFICIALS HAVE TOLD US THAT FCO IS IN NO DOUBT OF NEED FOR SOME CONSTRAINT ON ARMS DEVELOPMENT IN OUTER SPACE. BUT BRITISH DEFENCE MINISTRY IS DESCRIBED AS EXTREMELY RELUCTANT TO PRESS USA BECAUSE OF UK DEPENDENCE ON AMERICANS FOR, EG., SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS. BRITISH EMPHASIS WILL THUS BE ON DISCUSSION OF EXISTING MATERIAL. AT SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THEY EXPECT TO INTERVENE BILATERALLY WITH USA IN ATTEMPT TO CONVINCING THEM THAT THERE IS NECESSITY TO TACKLE ARMS CONTROL IN OUTER SPACE. (IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY TELL US THAT THERE IS SOME SYMPATHY WITHIN FCO FOR QUOTE INSPIRATION UNQUOTE BEHIND CDN INITIATIVE, IF NOT FOR METHODS). BUT WHATEVER SYMPATHY THERE MAY BE FOR PHILOSOPHY BEHIND CDN INITIATIVE, OFFICIALS HERE ARE FRANKLY QUOTE DISMAYED UNQUOTE AT CDN INTENTION OF RAISING ASAT IN CD CONTEXT WITHOUT HAVING AGREEMENT ...5

PAGE FIVE XNGR0267 CONF D

OF AMERICAN AND OTHER NATO ALLIES.

6.PNW:IN BRITISH VIEW,THIS IS AREA WHERE WEST COULD LOOK BETTER. UK WERE HOPING FOR MORE POSITIVE WESTERN POSITION,BUT IN VIEW OF RECENT LONDON TALKS,NOW FEEL THAT FRG AND FRENCH OPPOSITION IS LIKELY TO PRESENT INSURMOUNTABLE BLOCK TO MORE FORTHECOMING WESTERN ATTITUDE ON PNW.THERE CONTINUES TO BE RELUCTANCE HERE TO AGREE TO GET INTO WORKING GROUP ON SUBJECT,THOUGH OFFICIALS ADMIT THEY ARE NOT AS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO IDEA AS USA,-AND THAT MUCH MAY DEPEND ON HOW OTHER AGENDA ITEMS PROCEED.WE UNDERSTAND OFFICIALS HERE ARE LOOKING AT POSSIBLE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES IN NUCLEAR FIELD WHICH COULD BE SUBSUMED UNDER THIS ITEM;WHILE THEY TELL US THEY HAVE NOT YET IDENTIFIED ANY SINGLE QUOTE SEXY UNQUOTE ITEM THEY ARE ATTEMPTING TO STRING NUMBER OF PROPOSALS TOGETHER.THEY ARE NOT SANGUINE HOWEVER THAT THEY WILL COME UP WITH SOMETHING THAT FRANCE AND FRG CAN AGREE TO.

7.RW:BRITISH OFFICIALS ARE RESIGNED TO CONTINUING IMPASSE ON THIS ITEM.THEIR APPROACH WOULD BE TO ATTEMPT TO SHIFT FOCUS OF WORK RE ATTACKS ON NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS TO ICRC FRAMEWORK, BUT ON THIS THEY ARE NOT HOPEFUL.

8.CPN AND NSAS:CPN BRITISH REGARD AS PRETTY WELL DEAD.ON NSAS, THEY SEE LITTLE ENTHUSIASM,PARTICULARLY IN CONTEXT OF RECENT

...6

PAGE SIX XNGR0267 CONF

LONDON TALKS, FOR ANY NEW EFFORTS.

9. QUESTION OF CD ENLARGEMENT: BRITISH IMPRESSION IS THAT MAJORITY OF NATO WILL AGREE TO BACK NORWAY AS FRONT RUNNER. THEY NONETHELESS ASK QUOTE WHY RUSH UNQUOTE?, AND BELIEVE THAT WEST SHOULD LET NNA AND SOVIETS COME UP WITH THEIR NOMINATIONS FIRST. BRITISH ARE NOT INCLINED TO STAND IN WAY OF SOVIET NOMINATION, NO MATTER HOW INEFFECTUAL NOMINEES PARTICIPATION MIGHT EVENTUALLY BE.

10. CDN ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS: COMMENTS CONCERNING OUTER SPACE PROPOSAL ARE RELATED ABOVE. BRITISH HAVE ATTEMPTED TO EXAMINE ALL THREE PROPOSALS IN EFFORT TO IDENTIFY QUOTE POSITIVE AREAS UNQUOTE FOR CD CONSULTATION. THEY TELL US FRANKLY THAT THEY HAVE DIFFICULTY GETTING OVER THEIR CONVICTION THAT INTRODUCTION OF ANY OF THREE CDN PROPOSALS (INCLUDING ASAT), IN CD RATHER THAN ON BILATERAL BASIS OR AMONGST ALLIES, WILL BE COUNTER PRODUCTIVE, AND WILL ONLY SERVE TO HARDEN AMERICAN IDEAS. DEFENCE AND ARMS CONTROL DEPTS BOTH TELL US THAT THEY ARE ON VERGE OF INSTRUCTING HIGH COMMISSIONER OTTAWA TO MAKE STIFFLY WORDED REPRESENTATIONS TO EFFECT THAT CDN INITIATIVES WOULD BETTER BE DEALT WITH AMONGST ALLIES THAN BE TABLED OR CIRCULATED (AND THEY ARE UNABLE TO SEE DIFFERENCE) IN CONTEXT OF CD.

CCC/224 071108Z XNGR0267

S E C R E T

FM WSAW UMGR0226 07FEB84

TO EXTOTT RCD

INFO BUCST LDN PRGUE PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR IFB IFD USS DMF RGB RBD RBR } I D D Z I D R I D A R C R

REF YOURTEL RCD0027 30JAN

---BRIT ENQUIRIES ABOUT PMS IMPRESSIONS RE EAST EUROPEAN VISIT
FOR MRS THATCHER

AS REQUESTED I CALLED ON BRIT AMB MAXEY IN BRLIN 01FEB TO CONVEY
PMS GENERAL IMPRESSIONS OF VISITS TO CZECH AND GDR. BACKGROUND TO
CALL WAS EXPLAINED IN TERMS YOUR REFTEL AND MAXEY PROMISED TO IMMEDIATELY
CONVEY OUR VIEWS TO LDN. MY BRIEFING WAS IN TERMS FAMILIAR TO YOU BUT
ON QUESTION OF WHETHER OR NOT/NOT THEY APPEARED TO BE marginally
MORE ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE AMONG WPO STATES IN ABSENCE OF ANDROPOV,
MAXEY AGREED THIS SEEMED TO BE THE CASE ALTHOUGH CONFIRMATION
WAS DIFFICULT TO PINPOINT.

2. ON 02FEB DANISH AMB CONVENED EXTRAORDINARY MTC OF NATO AMBS FOR
GENERAL BRIEFING ON PMS VISIT. OCCASION WAS MOST USEFUL AND
APPRECIATED FROM ALL POINTS OF VIEW

MCLAINE

CCC/127 081315Z UMGR0226

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PRGUE WOGRO217 07FEB84

TO EXTOTT LDDZ

INFO PMOOTT/COLEMAN

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

DISTR RBR RBT FPR

---PMS VISIT:CZECHOSLOVAKIA MEDIA REACTION

FOLLOWING IS TRANSLATION OF FRONT PAGE ARTICLE IN

01FEB TVORBA, COMMUNIST PARTY POLITICAL AND CULTURAL WEEKLY
MAGAZINE PUBLISHED BY RUDE PRAVO.

2.TEXT BEGINS:CDN PM PIERRE TRUDEAUS FIRST VISIT

TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA COINCIDES WITH A PERIOD OF EXTRAORDINARILY
COMPLICATED INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THIS IS WHY ANY SUMMIT
TALKS HELD TODAY ARE DOUBLY IMPORTANT FOR, IN THE WORDS OF
THE CDN PREMIER, QUOTE STATESMEN OF ALL COUNTRIES SHARE THE
DUTY OF STRIVING FOR THE RELAXATION OF TENSION AND AVERSION
OF A WAR THAT NEITHER PARTY CAN WIN UNQUOTE.

IN PRGUE, TRUDEAU HELD TALKS WITH GUSTAV HUSAK AND LUBOMIR
STROUGAL. A BROAD EXCHANGE OF VIEWS COVERED MAJOR INTERNATIONAL
ISSUES AND THE POSSIBILITIES FOR EXPANDING A BUSINESSLIKE AND
CONCRETE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE.

IT MAY BE TOO EARLY TO ASSESS PIERRE TRUDEAUS MISSION.
HOWEVER HE HIMSELF HAS SAID THAT QUOTE THE TIME OF CERTAIN
HOPE FOR THE RESTORATION OF CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY HAS COME
UNQUOTE. HE IS ALSO THE FIRST NATO LEADER TO RECOMMEND A
RETURN TO THE PROPOSALS OF THE WSAW PACT POLITICAL DECLARATION

...2

PAGE TWO W0GR0217 UNCLAS

AS QUOTE A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION UNQUOTE. AT THE SAME TIME HE EXPRESSED HIS SUPPORT FOR THE RESUMPTION OF THE VIENNA DISARMAMENT TALKS ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND TROOPS IN CENTRAL EUROPE BECAUSE QUOTE THERE IS NOW THE POSSIBILITY OF TAKING UP LAST YEARS WSAW PACT PROPOSAL WHICH COULD CONSTITUTE A GOOD BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION UNQUOTE. PREMIER TRUDEAU STAYED ONLY TWO DAYS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA. BESIDES THE OFFICIAL PROGRAMME HE MANAGED, HASTILY, TO VISIT PRGUE GOTHIC AND BAROQUE MONUMENTS AND THE AUSTERLITZ MEMORIAL. NO/NO DOUBT HIS BRIEF VISIT HAS OPENED NEW POSSIBILITIES IN CZECHOSLOVAK-CANADIAN RELATIONS. TEXT ENDS.

UUU/175 080700Z W0GR0217

IDA/F.R.CLEMINSON/2-1892/pec

MF

TO/À • IDDZ
FROM/DE • IFB

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • PM Initiative Papers: United Kingdom's
SUJET • opposition to circulation

Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	20-1-1-1
Date	February 7, 1984
Number/Numéro	IFB-0179

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

- DISTRIBUTION
- MINA
 - DMF
 - IDD
 - IDA
 - IDR
 - RSD
 - RCR
 - IDDZ/Calder
 - UGB
 - URR
 - LONDON
 - GENEVA
 - WASHINGTON
 - PRMNY
 - CANDELNATO
 - DND/ADM POL
 - CPP
 - DNACPOL

The British High Commissioner called yesterday afternoon to register the deep reservations held by the United Kingdom concerning both the tactics and substance of the three papers developed as part of the Prime Minister's initiative. The United Kingdom strongly supports the view of the United States that these papers should not receive wider international circulation. Lord Moran suggested that these views were shared by others and drew attention to the serious lack of consultation within the Alliance on issues which were of consequence to the Alliance as a whole. He questioned the wisdom of circulating the papers in the CD in Geneva and felt such action could create a counter-productive effect.

2. Turning to the specific papers, Lord Moran commented that (a) the paper on verification represented a radical change of policy by placing the onus on the deploying state. This proposed shift required consultation within the Alliance since it was basic to every ACD negotiation in which the Alliance or Alliance members were engaged in; (b) the paper on ICBM mobility was in direct conflict with the strategic doctrine of the Scowcroft Commission which had suggested moving from large MIRV systems to small mobile single warhead systems; and (c) the paper on ASAT was raising an issue at a time "when the US Administration was not well disposed to even sensible proposals" on the arms control in outer space issue. From the UK perspective it seemed likely that the Canadian paper could drive the USA to adopt a "hard and fast" decision to reject limitation which the European allies, and presumably Canada, desired. The allies had worked hard to move the United States into a more flexible position on the issue in the CD and it would be in no one's interest as this stage to see the United States retrench.

3. In closing, Lord Moran reiterated the strong doubts of the United Kingdom re the tactical wisdom of the proposed Canadian action. He requested that the ASAT paper not be circulated in the CD and that attention of the CD not be focussed on the other two.

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- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

4. I replied that the points he had raised would receive serious consideration but that, while timing remained flexible to a degree, the papers would be ultimately circulated in some form.



Michael Shenstone,
Assistant Deputy Minister,
Political and International
Security Affairs

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0172 07FEB84

TO EXTOTT RBR

INFO BNATO WSAW PRGUE BPEST BUCST BGRAD WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN ROME

GENEV VIENN VMBFR NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DIPOL/CIS/CP/ORAE

PCOOTT/FOWLER STKHM/SCDEL

DISTR DMF RGB IFB RBD IDD IDDZ IDR RBP RGX IDA RBRD ZSP ZSI

REF BNATO TEL YBGR6099 26JAN

---USSR RELATIONS WITH WSAW FACT ALLIES

SUMMARY:FRG ASSESSMENT DISCUSSED REFTTEL STRIKES US AS VENTURE-

SOME AND AT LEAST PREMATURE IN SOME OF ITS GENERALIZATIONS.

SEEN FROM MOSCO, EAST-EUROPEAN GOVTS APPEAR TO HEW AS CLOSELY

AS EVER TO MOSCO LINE ON ALL MAJOR POLITICO-SECURITY ASPECTS OF

FOREIGN POLICY AND PURSUE ECONOMIC/TRADE RELATIONS WITH WEST

NO/NO MORE INDEPENDENTLY THAN DURING 1970S. IN AREA OF DOMESTIC

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT, ON OTHER HAND, WPO GOVTS

SEEM INDEED TO HAVE ACQUIRED/BEEN GRANTED SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER

SCOPE FOR EXPERIMENT. HOWEVER, POSSIBLY PARTLY AS RESULT OF INF

DEBATE, SOCIO-POLITICAL CURRENTS MAY HAVE BEEN SET IN MOTION

WHICH CLD EVENTUALLY RESULT IN EFFECTIVE, INTERNALLY-GENERATED

PRESSURES ON EAST EUROPEAN GOVTS TO PURSUE INDEPENDENT FOREIGN

POLICY LINES OF KIND WHICH FRG PAPER SEES AS PRESENT REALITY.

REPORT:OUR EMBS IN INDIVIDUAL EUROPEAN CAPITALS ARE BETTER

POSITIONED THAN WE TO COMMENT ON FRG ASSESSMENT DISCUSSED

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PAGE TWO XYGR0172 CONF D

REFTEL. OUR GENERAL REACTION TO IDEAS IN FRG PAPER MAY NEVERTHELESS BE OF SOME USE. (CAUTION: OUR IMPRESSIONISTIC VIEWS MAY BE UNDULY INFLUENCED BY LARGE DAILY DOSES OF SOVIET MEDIA ITEMS PROCLAIMING EVER GREATER HARMONY, UNITY OF PURPOSE AND MATERIAL ACHIEVEMENT AMONG WPO MEMBERS).

2. FOR REASONS WHICH SHLD BE OBVIOUS, WE THINK IT OF LITTLE UTILITY TO COMPARE CURRENT SITUATION TO THAT WHICH EXISTED IN FIRST FEW YEARS FOLLOWING WWII. OF GREATER INTEREST IS EFFORT TO DISCERN TRENDS WITHIN PAST FEW YEARS, E.G. DURING PERIOD OF PERCEIVED DISINTEGRATION OF E-W DETENTE. FOR ANALYTICAL PURPOSES, IT IS USEFUL TO DISTINGUISH AMONG: (1) POLITICAL/SECURITY ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY; (2) ECONOMIC/TRADE ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY; AND (3) DOMESTIC POLITICAL/ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT.

3. POLITICAL/SECURITY ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY: FRG ASSESSMENT ASSERTS THAT, SPECIFICALLY AS CONSEQUENCE OF NATO IMPLEMENTATION OF TWO-TRACK DECISION, QUOTE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE WP MEMBER STATES CAN NOW EVEN ARTICULATE THEMSELVES IN FORMS WHICH INTERFERE WITH IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY OPERATIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION UNQUOTE. WE SEE LITTLE EVIDENCE TO BACK UP THIS ASSERTION. MOST NOTABLE RENEGADE IN WPO CAMP, OF COURSE, IS ROMANIA. THIS IS NOT/NOT A RECENT DEVELOPMENT SINCE THAT COUNTRY HAS FOR YEARS BEEN THUMBING ITS NOSE AT ASPECTS OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, SOMETIMES IN SUBSTANTIVE WAYS (E.G. NO/NO WPO TROOPS IN ROMANIA, DIPLO

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PAGE THREE XYGR0172 CONF D

RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, SUBSTANTIVELY COOPERATIVE RELATIONS WITH
PRC). AS FOR ROMANIAN POLICY ON INF, WHILE IT CLEARLY INVOLVES
TACTICAL AND PRESENTATIONAL ASPECTS WHICH SOVIETS FIND ANNOYING,
IT DOES NOT/NOT SEEM TO US AS QUOTE ALMOST COMPLETELY DIFFERENT
FROM THAT OF REST OF WSAW PACT UNQUOTE. AS WE UNDERSTAND THEM,
ROMANIAN INF PROPOSALS WLD, FOR AT LEAST INDEFINITE PERIOD, LEAVE
USSR WITH ESSENTIALLY WHAT IT WANTS ON INF, I.E. MONOPOLY OF
THIS TYPE OF WEAPON SYSTEM IN EUROPE. OTHER WPC GOVTS HAVE,
TO OUR KNOWLEDGE, DUTIFULLY TOES SOV LINE ON INF AS WELL AS ON
OTHER E-W ARMS ISSUES. GDR AND CZECH GOVTS HAVE AGREED TO
OFFER TERRITORY FOR QUOTE COUNTER-MEASURES UNQUOTE. RE BULGARIA,
WHILE THERE HAVE BEEN PLAUSIBLE RUMOURS OF SOVIET INTEREST IN
DEPLOYING SS-20S THERE, AS EMB BGRAD POINTS OUT (THEIR TEL
ZGGR3201), SOVS THEMSELVES HAVE THEIR OWN POLICY INHIBITIONS
ON THIS SCORE (ESPOUSAL OF BALKAN NWFZ CONCEPT) AND DEPLOYMENT
POSSIBILITY MAY NOT/NOT HAVE BEEN PRESSED ON BULGARIANS.

3. ABOVE IS NOT/NOT TO SUGGEST THAT SITUATION IN EAST EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES IS NOT/NOT CHANGING. INTENSE AND PUBLIC DEBATE THROUGH
1983 ON INF AND OTHER ACD ISSUES HAS DOUBTLESS BEEN QUOTE
CONSCIOUSNESS RAISING UNQUOTE EXERCISE FOR EAST EUROPEAN AND
SOVIET) POLULATIONS WHICH HAS MADE THEM AWARE, AS PROBABLY NEVER
BEFORE, OF THEIR HIGHLY UNCOMFORTABLE ROLE IN EAST-WEST STRATEGIC
EQUATION. AS FRG ASSESSMENT SUGGESTS, INDICATIONS OF
POPULAR UNEASE WERE PARTICULARLY NOTICEABLE IN DEPLOYMENT
COUNTRIES-GDR AND CSSR. GOVTL AWARENESS OF THIS FACTOR MAY

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PAGE FOUR XYGR0172 CONFD

ACCOUNT FOR DIFFERENCES IN TONE BETWEEN CERTAIN EAST EUROPEAN GOVT PRONOUNCEMENTS AND THOSE OF USSR. SIMILARLY, COLLECTIVE WPO STATEMENTS/DECLARATIONS ON INF AND OTHER MAJOR EAST-WEST ISSUES USUALLY HAVE HAD SOFTER, MORE CONCILIATORY TONE THAN MANY SOVIET STATEMENTS. 1983 MAY THEREFORE HAVE WITNESSED NEW KINDS OF STIRRINGS AND QUESTIONING BY EAST EUROPEAN PUBLICS WHICH CLD, IN COMING FEW YEARS, RESULT IN INTERNAL PRESSURES WHICH GOVTS WLD BE COMPELLED TO HEED.

4. ECONOMIC/TRADE ASPECTS OF FOREIGN POLICY: FRG PAPER SEEMS TO IMPLY THAT CONTINUANCE OF SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC/TRADE COOPERATION WITH WEST BY EAST EUROPEAN GOVTS IS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF THEIR FOREIGN POLICY INDEPENDENCE. THIS IS NOT/NOT SELF-EVIDENT. AS WE UNDERSTAND CURRENT SITUATION, ALTHOUGH E-W ECONOMIC/TRADE COOPERATION REMAINS SUBSTANTIAL, IN PROPORTIONATE TERMS, THIS TYPE OF COOPERATION BETWEEN EAST EUROPE AND WEST MAY ALREADY HAVE PEAKED OUT. FOR MOST EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, PROPORTION OF TRADE WITH WEST IS STAGNANT OR IN DECLINE WHILE PERCENTAGE OF TRADE WITH COMECON PARTNERS IS IN MOST CASES INCREASING (ALBEIT SLOWLY). SIMILARLY, MOST EAST EUROPEAN GOVTS ARE ATTEMPTING TO REDUCE THEIR DEGREE OF RELIANCE ON WESTERN FINANCE AND TO REDUCE INDEBTEDNESS. REASONS FOR THESE TRENDS ARE NOT/NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR.

5. IT IS TRUE THAT IN POLICY PRONOUNCEMENTS OF LAST FEW YEARS,

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PAGE FIVE XYGR0172 CONFD

SOVIETS HAVE PUT SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON DANGERS OF OVERRELIANCE ON WEST FOR TRADE AND FINANCE WHILE TRUMPETING ADVANTAGES OF INTEGRATION WITHIN COMECON. (POLISH EXPERIENCE IS FREQUENTLY CITED AS CAUTIONARY EXAMPLE). CURRENT TRENDS MAY CONCEIVABLY BE, TO SOME EXTENT, RESPONSE TO SUCH SOVIET URGINGS. HOWEVER IT SEEMS MORE LIKELY THAT VARIETY OF OTHER, LARGELY NON-POLITICAL, FACTORS ARE LARGELY RESPONSIBLE FOR LATEST SHIFTS IN E-W ECONOMIC/TRADE PATTERNS, E.G. WORLD RECESSION, DIFFICULTIES IN ASSIMILATING WESTERN TECHNOLOGY, INCREASED CAUTION ON FINANCIAL MATTERS BY BOTH WESTERN BANKS AND EAST EUROPEAN GOVTS, ETC.

6. IT NEVERTHELESS IS FACT THAT ECONOMIC/TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST EUROPE AND WEST REMAIN SUBSTANTIAL AND SEEM UNLIKELY TO BE SHARPLY REDUCED FOR POLITICAL REASONS IN NEAR FUTURE. DOES THIS SIGNIFY SUCCESS OF EAST EUROPE GOVTS, IN DEFIANCE OF MOSCO PREFERENCES, IN ISOLATING ECONOMIC/TRADE RELATIONS FROM INF-RELATED POLITICAL FALL-OUT? THIS IS FAR FROM CLEAR.

7. AS FRG POINTS OUT, USSR ITSELF HAS NOT/NOT YET TAKEN ACTION TO REDUCE SIGNIFICANTLY THEIR OWN ECONOMIC/TRADE RELATIONS WITH WEST. MONTHS-LONG DRUMBEAT OF APOCALYPTIC SOVIET WARNINGS ABOUT CONSEQUENCES FOR BILATL RELATIONS, ESPECIALLY WITH DEPLOYMENT COUNTRIES, OF NEW INF DEPLOYMENTS, STUDIOUSLY AND CONSISTENTLY LACKED PRECISION. FRG AND UK OFFICIALS HAVE YET TO REPORT ANY SOVIET OR EAST EUROPEAN ACTION TO REDUCE ECONOMIC/TRADE COOPERATION. MOREOVER SOV OFFICIALS MUST BE AWARE THAT THIS TYPE

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OF COOPERATION IS NOT/NOT WITHOUT BENEFITS TO THEMSELVES, E.G. ACCESS TO TECHNOLOGY AND KNOWHOW, STRENGTHENED EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIES. OUR BEST GUESS IS THAT USSR HAS NOT/NOT (YET) TAKEN DECISION TO URGE WPO ALLIES TO REDUCE SIGNIFICANTLY THEIR ECONOMIC/TRADE RELATIONS WITH WEST, AND MAY NOT/NOT EVER TAKE SUCH DECISION. A POSSIBLE OUTCOME WLD BE SOV-PROMOTED EFFORT TO HAVE WPO ALLIES GRADUALLY CHANGE PATTERN OF EAST/WEST COOPERATION BY GIVING PREFERENCE TO NON-DEPLOYMENT COUNTRIES. ANY EVENTUAL REALIZATION OF SUCH OBJECTIVE WLD BE INDICATOR OF CONTINUING EAST EUROPEAN ACQIESCENCE IN MOSCOS POLICY PREFERENCES.

8. DOMESTIC POLITICAL MANAGEMENT: FOR MANY YEARS SOV GOVT HAS BEEN ADAPTING ITSELF TO REALITY OF QUOTE DIVERGENT PATHS UNQUOTE OF SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT AMONG ITS PACT ALLIES. UNDER ANDROPOV, SOV OFFICIAL VIEWS RE THIS PROCESS MAY BE SHIFTING FROM POSITION OF RELUCTANT ACCEPTANCE TO ONE OF WELCOMING LIMITED FORMS OF POLITICO-ECONOMIC EXPERIMENT BY WPO GOVTS. SEVERAL ANDROPOV PRONOUNCEMENTS, E.G. DURING KADARS VISIT TO MOSCO LAST YEAR, SUGGEST SOV AUTHORITIES ARE COMING TO REGARD DIVERSITY OF POLITICO-ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUES AMONG ALLIES AS UNEXPECTED QUOTE ENRICHMENT UNQUOTE OF SOCIALIST TRADITIONS. WITH ACCOMPANYING REALIZATION THAT TRIAL-AND-ERROR MANAGEMENT APPROACHES BY EAST EUROPE GOVTS DE FACTO PROVIDES USEFUL HALF QUOTE SOCIO-ECONOMIC LABORATORY END HALF-QUOTE FROM WHICH USSR CAN PICK AND

...7

PAGE SEVEN XYGR0172 CONF

CHOOSE TECHNIQUES POTENTIALLY APPLICABLE TO ITS OWN DEVELOPMENT NEEDS. SOV ACCEPTANCE OF POLISH CONSTITUTIONAL ENTRENCHMENT OF PRIVATE AGRIC SEEMS ESPECIALLY NOTABLE EXAMPLE OF BROADER LATITUDE NOW BEING GRANTED TO SOCIALIST ALLIES. SOVS NEVERTHELESS REMAIN ADAMANT THAT COMMUNIST PARTY MUST IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES RETAIN ITS QUOTE CENTRAL GUIDING ROLE UNQUOTE AND MONOPOLY OF POLITICAL POWER. (WIDELY PRESUMED SOVIET READINESS TO MOVE WEST AT HEIGHT OF POLISH CRISIS, TOGETHER WITH NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF SUCH CONTINGENCY PLANS, REFLECTS BOTH SCOPE AND LIMITS ON LEEWAY FOR AUTONOMOUS ACTIONS BY EAST EUROPEAN GOVTS.).

9. CONCLUSION: DIFFERENTIATION BASED ON INDIVIDUAL WFO MEMBERS FOREIGN POLICY PERFORMANCE APPEARS PREMATURE FROM MOSCO PERSPECTIVE BUT THOUGHTS IN REFTEL ARE SUFFICIENTLY THOUGHT PROVOKING TO WARRANT RESPONSES TO BNATO INVITATION FOR COMMENTS FROM ADDRESSEES, INCLUDING THOSE RECENTLY IN PRGUE, BERLIN AND BUCST.

CCC/144 081430Z XYGR0172

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

UNCLASSIFIED

FM MOSCO XYGR0171 07FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO BUCST LDN PARIS BONN ROME BNATO BREEC WSHDC PRGUE WSAW BGRAD
BPEST PRMNY PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINE MINT USS DMF DMT IFB EFB UGB URR LGB SFB PGB RGB RSD
RCD RBD RBR IFB GGB CCB FPR

---PM INITIATIVE:VISIT TO BUCST

SOV CENTRAL PRESS HAS NOT/NOT PUBLISHED REPORTS ON PMS VISIT TO
BUCST.FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF TASS ENGLISH REPORT FEB03/03
DATELINED BUCST QUOTE PRESIDENT NICOLAE CEAUSESCU OF ROMANIA
AND PRIME MINISTER PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU OF CANADA,WHO WAS ON
A VISIT HERE,EXCHANGED VIEWS IN THE COURSE OF THE TALKS ON THE
PRESENT LEVEL OF ROMANIAN-CANADIAN RELATIONS AND ON TOPICAL
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES.

THE SIDES EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE AGGRAVATION OF INTERNATIONAL
TENSIONS AND THE ARMS RACE.ABOVE ALL,OF NUCLEAR ARMS.THEY
STRESSED THE NEED FOR STEPPING UP EFFORTS FOR THE PREVENTION OF
THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR.IT WAS CONFIRMED THAT IT IS NECESSARY
IN THE INTERESTS OF PEACE AND STABILITY THAT ALL THE CONFLICTS
SHOULD BE RESOLVED SOLELY THROUGH TALKS.

TOUCHING UPON THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING
MEASURES,SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE,THE LEADERS OF THE
TWO STATES VOICED HOPE THAT THAT MEETING WOULD PRODUCE POSITIVE
RESULTS.END QUOTE.

UUU/095 071336Z XYGR0171

Trudeau's bright ripostes can turn out to be dumb

Feb 6

As we all know, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau is a very skilled debater. As we tend to forget he is also, every now and then, a quite exceptionally dumb one.

Once caught up in the excitement of a verbal contest, and caught up even more by his own excited need to win the contest — an odd trait this in someone so self-disciplined — he loses control. He lets loose, that is to say, any random thoughts that happen to be skulking around in the back of his mind. In the result, he wins the debate of the moment at the cost of losing the argument.

"Where's Biafra?" as an example. "Zap, you're frozen," as another. Clever-clever lines that, right after he'd uttered them, had become manifestly dumb.

The current example is Trudeau's rhetorical question to former French prime minister Raymond Barre during a debate between them at Davos, Switzerland, last weekend: "Do you really think the president of the U.S., in answer to an overrunning of Europe by Soviet conventional forces, will want to start World War Three, an atomic war?"

In saying this, Trudeau was saying the unsayable. It's unsayable, or should

have been for someone in Trudeau's position and with the responsibilities he bears, because, as any first-year student of international affairs knows, the answer is: "No, or at least not in certain circumstances."

A Soviet probing attack along one flank of NATO, or a limited intervention in response to a call for help from a revolutionary government following a civil war, in Greece, say, and not unlike what happened in Afghanistan, would not necessarily provoke a U.S. president to risk the lives of his own people in a nuclear exchange.

Western experts, here and in Europe, have long known this. The Russians no doubt have long suspected it. Trudeau now has confirmed their suspicions, and so, potentially, has encouraged them.

A considered case can be made that NATO should abandon its reliance upon tactical nuclear weapons to deter a Soviet conventional attack. This case was made last summer by former U.S. defence secretary Robert McNamara in an article in the prestigious *Foreign Affairs Quarterly*.

McNamara, though, had thought



Richard Gwyn

through his case. He proposed that NATO spend an additional \$26 billion, over five years, to build up its conventional defences so that they could match those of the Warsaw Pact.

Doing this won't be easy. The appeal — the lethal appeal, literally so — of nuclear weapons is that they are cheap. The Western Europeans have consistently been unwilling to pay the full bill for their conventional defence, and have relied on the U.S. to achieve balance with its nuclear weapons. Today, with 18 million unemployed, the Europeans have far better uses for their available money than to spend it on more tanks and guns.

Even McNamara didn't face up to one weakness in his rationally persuasive

argument. The irrational consequence of a Europe defended exclusively by conventional weapons could be to make it a "safe" territory for conventional wars. With no fear of a particular conflict escalating into a nuclear exchange, each side might be tempted into adventures. The West in Poland, for instance, if further troubles break out there, or Russia in Yugoslavia.

This isn't the first time Trudeau has indulged in verbal indiscretions during the disarmament debate. He did so last May, but on the other side of the argument. Then, in an open letter to the newspapers, he denounced anti-cruise missile protesters as favoring "unilateral disarmament" and told them they were "hypocrites" because: "They're eager to take refuge under the American umbrella but don't want to help hold it."

Those comments were dumb. They left Trudeau committed to helping to hold up the American umbrella by approving the testing of cruise missiles here, even though the "Canadian" version is quite different from the cruise missiles now being deployed in Europe as part of the collective NATO strategy.

Ever since, the testing of the cruise missiles has represented a glaring inconsistency embedded within Trudeau's peace initiative.

He now has damaged his peace initiative in a quite different way. Clearly, it is glaringly inconsistent for him to say, on the one hand, that he doubts that the U.S. missiles in Europe will ever be used, and on the other hand, to travel around saying they must be removed. In other words, he has devalued the urgency of the problem he is devoting so much energy to trying to solve.

In reply to Trudeau, Barre said: "I would never put such a question because, if I put the question, there is no longer credibility."

Credibility is the single substantive asset Trudeau carries with him on his travels. Everyone knows Canada has no — almost — divisions. Everyone knows he is close to the end of his term. By saying the unsayable, Trudeau has handed to our European allies an excuse to dismiss all his other proposals as being simply not credible. Dumb, dumb, dumb. But that's our Trudeau whenever he gets testy and lets fly, on one wing.

Anti-terrorist body to include Canada

LONDON (UPI) — The United States, Canada and other Western allies have held talks on creating an international anti-terrorism network reportedly aimed at preventing attacks during the summer Olympics at Los Angeles, officials said Wednesday.

A British Foreign Office spokesman said the meeting was called by the Central Intelligence Agency and centred on problems of combating terrorism. The spokesman described as "correct" a report that officials of Britain, West Germany, France, Japan, Italy and Canada attended the talks in Washington.

Reports said one of the network's tasks would be "to collate information on foreign terrorist groups, especially those with links to Iran, who it is thought would be the most likely to try to disrupt the games."

MR SYCRAH (OIR)

The best article / comment

on Davos

MAURER FILE

Travel controls on Canada's cabinet cited as reason for 'makeshift' aid delegation

By James Travers
Southam News

LUSAKA, Zambia — Uncertainty about Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's retirement has left Canada with a makeshift delegation at a conference where it will commit \$125 million in aid to southern Africa.

In a move that caught organizers by surprise, the federal government named senator and former Liberal party president Alasdair Graham to head the 12-member team attending the pivotal Southern Africa Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) meeting here this week.

Graham, visiting Africa for the first time, is expected to announce Thursday that Canada has recognized the nine-nation SADCC group as the region's prime aid organization and will channel \$125 million through it over the next five years.



Graham

Conference officials had announced earlier that Agriculture Minister Eugene Whelan, who is also president of the World Food Council, would also attend the meeting, and there was speculation that he would make the statement.

But, according to sources here, Whelan's trip was cancelled after Trudeau, vexed by overt campaigning by cabinet ministers anxious to succeed him, imposed strict travel controls.

Over tea at the conference centre, Graham said External Affairs Minister Allan MacEachen had called him from New York last week and asked him to stand in.

Asked whether the political situation at home had led to that request, Graham replied: "There was a general feeling that too many people were travelling."

There has also been speculation among Canadians here that senior cabinet ministers may be reluctant to travel at a time when Trudeau might announce his retirement.

Whatever the reason, the Canadian delegation is one of the few not led by a minister or a senior bureaucrat

with aid responsibilities.

Britain, which is not expected to make any aid announcement, has sent Timothy Raison, the minister of overseas development, and France, which has a lower profile than Canada in anglophone Africa, has sent a 15-member team led by a minister of external relations.

While the Canadian team lacks a leader easily identified with Africa or with aid, its depth is indicative of the importance the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) is now placing on SADCC. Graham is being supported by CIDA vice-president Charles Bassett and by six others with southern African experience.

The conference, the fourth since Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe formed SADCC in 1980, is focusing on the drought that has plagued the region for three years.

On Thursday, the first day of the conference, the nine member states will ask about 50 international donors attending the meeting to provide the region with about \$1 billion in emergency relief.

WASHINGTON — A new debt crisis is brewing in Latin America. As 1982 was the year of the Mexican debt crisis and 1983 was the year of the Brazilian debt crisis, so 1984 is the first year of a more serious Latin American debt and political crisis with implications for the United States' own economic recovery.

This year's crisis will develop because, not in spite of, the conclusion of International Monetary Fund agreements by the major debtor countries; because, not in spite of, the renegotiation of their debt; and because of, not in spite of, the difficult transition to democracy in several Latin American countries.

The dilemma for Latin America is how to reconcile the stiff austerity programs required by the International Monetary Fund with rising popular demands for relief from negative economic growth and widespread distress. The austerity programs have had high domestic social costs: double-digit unemployment, reduced public sector spending and an absolute decline in per capita income in countries with virtually no social safety net.

The harsh adjustments required by the fund and foreign bankers have hit all social classes and called into question the ability of even the new democratic regimes to avoid pressures for extremist solutions. Western-trained economic managers in financial ministries throughout the hemisphere are trying to resist calls for less orthodox policies from those who

Sally A. Shelton, who was United States Ambassador to the Eastern Caribbean from 1979 to 1981, is vice president of International Business-Government Counselors Inc., a firm that analyzes country risks for investors. Richard Nuccio is a program associate at the Latin American program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

The Next Latin Debt Crisis

By Sally A. Shelton and Richard Nuccio

have been hit hardest by the financial crunch: urban workers, the lower-middle class, government employees small businesses and even the newly emerging middle classes, which are already slipping backward down the social and economic scale.

From the point of view of these groups, the banks, the International Monetary Fund and the multinational corporations bear a good share of responsibility for the crisis. These people also resent the United States — with its high interest rates, protectionist trade patterns and big deficits — for its apparent lack of concern. They have been hit hard by new United States legislation to discourage banks lending overseas just when new money — \$60 billion — is desperately needed to service loans and provide new productive investment. There is virtually no new bank lending, and the multinationals are reluctant to expand investment at a time of recession and uncertainty.

Some Latin Americans are increasingly bitter about those supposedly responsible for the debt crunch: They are reluctant to repay their debts on what they see as inequitable terms and are loath to make the business concessions necessary to attract new foreign investment. This line of thought is still seen as extreme, but it is becoming more common and may

pose a challenge to governments trying to work their way out of the debt crisis in a responsible way. The pragmatic Latin American governments being elected today recognize the need for structural adjustments in their economies and are beginning to create a business environment that can attract new investment. They cannot, however, manage to remain democratic and austere without help from the industrial countries — particularly the United States.

How can Washington encourage responsible Latin American governments to carry out these tough economic reforms?

First, it should support Paul A. Volcker, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, encouraging the banks to soften loan conditions and cautiously increase new lending. Washington should relax rather than tighten controls over the banks.

Second, it should encourage the International Monetary Fund to relax its stringent loan requirements, taking more account of the human costs of its programs.

Third, it should set its own house in order by cutting the Federal deficit and lowering interest rates.

Fourth, and most difficult in an election year, it should establish a one-way free-trade zone for all of Latin America. This would remain in effect for a limited time while Latin American governments begin to put their own economies in order and nurse their fledgling democracies to adulthood.

Finally, it should consider a commodity stabilization program.

Economic deterioration can become a fertile breeding ground for extremists of many shades, including radical nationalists, demagogic and anti-American militants. To prevent this and encourage the survival of the new pragmatic leadership in Latin America should be the primary goal of United States policy.

Sent by M. Arch - MF.
decoz/100 20 Feb.

4044 (26)

The City of Toronto
Arthur C. Eggleton
Mayor

February 6, 1984

The Right Honourable
Pierre Elliott Trudeau
Prime Minister's Office
Langevin Block
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A2

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your attempts to inject political will into the effort for world peace have encouraged many ordinary citizens to think about how they can assist the process of building trust and confidence. Among the ideas suggested is one which I would enthusiastically endorse, and be willing to co-host with the Toronto Board of Education. I am referring to the one-week summer camp for mothers and five-year-olds from USA, USSR and Canada which Bonnie Diamond and Maude Barlow of your office discussed with Fiona Nelson of the Toronto Board of Education last Friday.

The non-partisan, family-oriented nature of this project would overcome so many suspicions and doubts on all sides. I am convinced that this endeavour would encourage many other citizen-to-citizen contacts.

I hope that you will give this project your blessing and would suggest that several small camps would be much more appropriate than one large one. Since Winnipeg and Vancouver already have close links with Soviet cities, they might be ideal sites to consider.

My very best wishes to you in your continuing efforts to ensure a secure future for all our children.

Sincerely,

[Handwritten signature]

M. Barlow (19)
cc: H. P. Kishin
S. Brennan

CHILDREN'S PEACE CAMPS

In keeping with the Prime Minister's Peace Initiative, this project's purpose is to bring Soviet, American, and Canadian children and their mothers to Canada to participate in a summer camp experience. It involves, potentially, three cities, Toronto, Vancouver, and Winnipeg, all of which are twinned with three Soviet cities.

In discussion with many Canadian women who have brought this concept to us as a method of promoting individual dialogue between women and children of different nations, the preliminary plan is as follows:

- Three small camps to operate in the summer of 1984 each hosting 30 children and their mothers with equal representation from each nation.
- Kindergarten aged children appear ideal as mother's accompaniment is natural, the language of play is universal, and different political ideologies is not a factor. Also they represent the future and the hope of bridging political differences to succeed in negotiating lasting peaceful co-existence.
- As a woman's initiative, many women from the three nations would participate in the design stage, thereby providing the planners the opportunity to share their philosophical views regarding world tension, the tasks of the next generation, children in society, role of play, etc. Because the focus is children the people involved have a large investment in survival and would be motivated to work through their different philosophies, toward a common goal, using a nonconfrontational and open style.
- Because the children are so young the duration of the camp should be limited to 8-10 days.

.../2

FEASIBILITY

No budget has as yet been drafted. It is felt that a preliminary planning committee should be struck to assess the cost. That committee should have representation from:

- The Prime Minister's Office
- External Affairs
- Each of the three host cities

As it is a camp for children and mothers and the concept originated with Canadiana women it is important that the planners be women.

Cost may be shared as follows:

- As the host country the Canadian Government could provide funding for the planning activities and the travel expenses of the Soviet and American participants and all staffing expenses incurred.
- The host cities could provide the camp "sites", the accomodation and the food for all those in attendance.

Federal funding could be requested from allotment for the peace initiative administered through external affairs.



NATIONAL OFFICE;

175 CARLTON STREET,
TORONTO, ONTARIO.
M5A 2K3

Tel: (416) 922-2997

February 7, 1984

Ms. Maude Barlow
Office of the Prime Minister
House of Commons
Ottawa, Canada

Dear Ms. Barlow:

Since our last meeting with you our Conference Organizing Committee has prepared a "Request for Contribution" and supporting documents, which we are submitting to Mr. Shig Ueyama, Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs. (See enclosed copies.)

We are also in process of contacting a number of National Women's Organizations whom we think may be interested in participating in our proposal for an International Women's Conference and regional and local supporting events such as mini conferences. I enclose a copy of our letter and a list of the Organizations which we have contacted. We would be happy to extend the invitation to other groups and organizations which you might feel are appropriate.

It is our hope that we will have the skeleton of a National Organizing Committee in place and that we can hold a meeting before the end of March. We are applying to Ms. Lise Blanchard, Women's Program Secretary of State, to assist with immediate funding to conduct this meeting and to help us to defray initial organizing costs. I enclose a copy of this application also.

We are encouraged by the verbal responses made by telephone to the idea of Canadian Women sponsoring such a conference. The notion that women have a part to play in peace negotiations seems to be timely and reactions have been favorable.

Thank you for your assistance and your interventions on our behalf.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads 'Marion Kerans'.

MARION KERANS
Chairman Organizing Committee,
International Conference

Reply to:
6236 Willow St.
Halifax, N.S. B3L 1N9
Canada.

BUDGET

Operational Costs

Staff

Program Coordinator 36 weeks x 600.	21,600	
Conference Organizer 36 weeks x 600.	21,600	
Support staff - 2 (36 weeks x 350.)	25,200	
Bookkeeper	<u>2,000</u>	70,400

Office Space	2,000	
Office Supplies & Equipment	3,200	
Printing & Photocopying	5,000	
Mailing	2,000	
Telephone	<u>3,600</u>	15,800

National Planning Meetings (2)

12 Canadians		
Travel 2 meetings (12 x 300.)	7,200	
Per diem 2 (27 x 2 x 12)	1,296	
Accommodations 2 (60 x 2 x 12)	<u>2,880</u>	11,376

International Planning Meeting (1)

8 persons (2 Canadian, 6 International)		
Travel		
Canadian 2 x 300.	600	
International 6 x 1500.	9,000	
Accommodation 3 nights (60 x 8)	1,440	
Per diem 3 (27 x 8)	<u>648</u>	11,688

Pre Conference Planning

Translators (papers)	2,000	
*Printing Brochures	1,500	
Posters	1,700	
Conference Notice	800	
Conference Newsheets	<u>800</u>	6,800

*Distributions Costs to be absorbed by individual organizations.

BUDGET PAGE 2

Conference

Simultaneous Equipment - 2 days 2 (5 languages x 500)	5,000	
Interpreters 2 (350. x 10)	<u>7,000</u>	12,000
Facilities 2 (400)	800	
Reception(150 x 8.00)	1,200	
Banquet (150 x 15.00)	2,250	
Accommodation 2(100 x 60)	12,000	
Coffee 2 (150 x 80)	240	
Pastry 2 (150 x 80)	<u>240</u>	16,730
Travel 1500 x 50	75,000	
300 x 50	<u>15,000</u>	90,000
Per diem 2 (27 x 100)	5,400	
Honoraria 3 x 400	1,200	
Resource persons 6 x 200	1,200	
Papers 4 (1500)	6,000	
Conference Kits & Badges	<u>2,000</u>	15,800

Post Conference

Translation	2,000	
Printing	250	
Mailing	250	
Broadsheet (Popular Report)	<u>800</u>	3,300

Contingency12,695

TOTAL:

266,589



NATIONAL OFFICE;

175 CARLTON STREET,
TORONTO, ONTARIO.
M5A 2K3

Tel: (416) 922-2997

February 7, 1984

Ms. Lise Blanchard
Director, Women's Program
Department of Secretary of State
15 Eddie Street
Hull, P.O.
K1A 0M5

Dear Ms. Blanchard:

Further to my conversation with you in early January and following the recent advice of Ms. Tamara Levine, I am submitting on behalf of Voice of Women, Canada, a budget for the early planning and conceptual development of a Canadian International Women's Conference entitled "THE URGENCY FOR TRUE SECURITY: WOMEN'S ALTERNATIVES FOR NEGOTIATING PEACE".

As I explained to Ms. Levine, we are submitting the total budget to the Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs. I enclose a copy of this budget and its supporting documents.

You will note that we are inviting many Canadian National Women's Organizations to endorse this conference and to join with us in co-sponsoring it. The Conference Organizing Committee will consist of representatives from all co-sponsoring groups. It is to assist with costs incurred in planning and bringing together the Canadian Organizing Committee in mid March that we are applying to the Women's Program of the Secretary of State. At a later date we expect that it would be appropriate to also request assistance in funding regional and local mini conferences for women throughout Canada on similar themes.

I understand that Mme. Huguette Labelle has been in conversation with Ms. Maude Barlow, Office of the Prime Minister, and with Ms. Maureen O'Neill of the Status of Women concerning this project. Each has expressed enthusiasm to us about this proposal.

We will be happy to keep you abreast of developments as we hear from other National Women's Organizations. Thank you for considering our request.

Sincerely yours,

Reply to:
6236 Willow Street
Halifax, N.S. B3L 1N9

MARION KERANS, Chairperson 001419
Organizing Committee,
International Conference



NATIONAL OFFICE;

175 CARLTON STREET,
TORONTO, ONTARIO.
M5A 2K3

Tel: (416) 922-2997

BUDGET

Women's Program
Secretary of State

Developmental Meeting

Secretarial Services	250	
Materials & Photocopying	200	
Postage	100	
Telephone	400	
Travel 12 x 300.	3,600	
Per diem 2(12 x 27)	648	
Accommodation 2(12 x 60)	<u>1,440</u>	6,638



VOICE OF WOMEN
LA VOIX DES FEMMES

NATIONAL OFFICE;

175 CARLTON STREET,
TORONTO, ONTARIO.
M5A 2K3

Tel: (416) 922-2997

Dear

We know that women all over Canada are concerned about peace and human survival. All of us worry about the failure of disarmament talks, the growth of the arms race and the menace of nuclear war. We want to support the Canadian Government's peace initiative with initiatives from women throughout the country.

We in the Voice of Women are having urgent discussions about what more we can do right now. To us nothing could be more dangerous than the present threat laden negotiations of the super powers. We believe that peace and our ultimate survival will not happen without the involvement of women, and that women have a particular interest in the non-violent resolution of international conflict.

For the past two months we have been talking with our membership about the feasibility of an International Women's Conference to explore alternatives in peace negotiation. We have begun to seek government assistance in funding a gathering of a hundred women, fifty international and fifty Canadian. These would represent women who are active in international affairs and women who are active in peace and social justice in their respective countries and organizations.

Our members have expressed much enthusiasm and many ideas are coming in. There is a general sense that women are looking for a broadly based discussion about disarmament proposals, new techniques for reducing threats, and ways of finding non violent solutions to international conflicts. Our representative who has just returned from the current Conference on Security at Stockholm, Sweden, informs us that many European Women's organizations are engaged in similar dialogue, although none have as yet sponsored an international forum to focus on women's contribution to negotiating peace.

... /2

The conference we are planning is in keeping with the theme of the United Nations Decade of Women. One aspect of the conference will be the relationship between peace and development.

And finally with regard to the purpose of the conference, it is our hope that the planning for this conference will generate local mini conferences throughout Canada.

A meeting of our National VOW Coordinating Committee endorsed the proposal that we sponsor an International Conference on Negotiating Peace, and invite other Women's Organizations to join us. A Conference Organizing Committee was appointed and this committee generated the enclosed statement:

"THE URGENCY FOR TRUE SECURITY: WOMEN'S ALTERNATIVES
FOR NEGOTIATING PEACE:

We are inviting your organization and a number of other Canadian Women's organizations to participate with us in endorsing and holding such an international conference. We realize that your organization's involvement could take place in one or more of the following ways:

1. to respond with your reactions to this proposal and to share your ideas concerning women and peace negotiating;
2. to continue to receive and distribute information about the conference themes and to consider how they might be explored further by your organization;
3. to consider holding local and regional events such as speakers, films, mini conferences that will promote discussion of conference themes;
4. to help raise money to bring women from other countries especially the developing and less developed countries;
5. to ensure that Canadian Women are well represented;
6. to co-sponsor the conference with the Voice of Women and to participate on the Conference Organizing Committee in order to develop an educational program for Canadian groups and to pursue funding for the international conference.

We hope very much to hear from you at your earliest convenience. If it is possible we would appreciate receiving the name of one or two persons in your organization to whom we might send future information.

Do join us in this Canadian Women's peace initiative.

Yours in peace,

Reply to:

6236 Willow St.

Halifax, N.S. B3L 1N9

Tel. (902) 425-3573

Marion Kerans, Chairperson,
International Conference Organizing Committee,
Voice of Women

001422



NATIONAL OFFICE;

175 CARLTON STREET,
TORONTO, ONTARIO.
M5A 2K3

Tel: (416) 922-2997

LIST OF NATIONAL WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS

- National Association of Women and The Law
124 O'Connor St., Ottawa. K1P 5M9 Tel. (613) 238-1544
- YMCA of Canada
1901 Yonge St. 10th Fl., Toronto M4S 2Z5 Tel. 481-1151
Exec. Dir. Dana Stehr.
Pres. Vera deBues, 18 Riverside Dr. Winnipeg
R3T 0E8.
- Canadian Association for Adult Education
29 Prince Arthur Ave. Toronto M5R 1B2 Tel. 964-0559
- Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies
151 Slater St., #302, Ottawa K1P 5H3
- Canadian Congress for Learning Opportunities for
Women, 692 Coxwell Ave., Toronto M4C 3A6 Tel. 461-9264
Exec. Direct Susan Vandervogt
- Canadian Federation of Business & Professional
Women's Club, 56 Sparks St., #308, Ottawa
K1P 5A9. Sect'y Hazel Joy Tel. (613) 234-7619
- Canadian Research for the Advancement of
Women, 151 Slater St., #415, Ottawa K1P 5H3 Tel. (613) 563-0681
- CUPE, Jeff Rose, President
21 Florence St. Ottawa K2P 0W6
Attn: Women's Affairs Tel. (613) 237-1590
- United Church of Canada, Women's Division
85 St. Claire Ave. E, 7th Fl., Toronto M4T 1M8 Tel. 925-5931
- Canada Labour Congress, Women's Section
2841 Riverside Dr., Ottawa. K1V 8X7



NATIONAL OFFICE;

175 CARLTON STREET,
TORONTO, ONTARIO.
M5A 2K3

Tel: (416) 922-2997

LIST OF NATIONAL WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS
PAGE 2.

Federation Women's Institutes of Canada
46 Elgin St., Rm.28, Ottawa K1P 5K6
Pres: Box 297, R.R.5 Gloucester Ont.,
K1G 3N3

Tel. (613) 234-1090

Tel. (613) 521-4924

Canadian Federation of University Women
Malaspina College, Wakesiah Campus
900 Fifth St., Nanimo, B.C. V9R 5S5
Margaret Strongitharm, Pres.

Tel. (604) 753-6233

National Council of Women
270 MacLaren St., Rm.20, Ottawa K2P 0M3
1979 Pres. Mrs. W. C. Hinkley
Matawatchan Rd. R.R.3, Dacre, Ont. K0J 1N0

Tel. (613) 233-4953

National Council of Jewish Women
1111 Finch Ave. W., Ste. 401
Downsview, Ont. M3J 2E5
Pres. Bunny Gurvey
Exec. Dir. Eleanor Appleby

Tel. (416) 665-8251

Catholic Women's League
1722 MacPherson Ave.
Regina, Sask. S4S 4C9
Pres. Jean Mahoney



NATIONAL OFFICE;

175 CARLTON STREET,
TORONTO, ONTARIO.
M5A 2K3

Tel: (416) 922-2997

"The Urgency for True Security:
Women's Alternatives for Negotiating Peace"

Fear and threats of violence are controlling the world's social systems today. This is what fuels the arms race. The nuclear and new conventional weapons now being built destroy any illusion that we can be defended or feel secure.

Canadian women, like women the world over, are deeply disturbed that human kind may not survive. Women want genuine Disarmament Talks that result in an immediate freeze and reversal of the arms race. We want the removal of threat as the means of dealing with conflict. We want the reduction of all forms of violence including nuclear and conventional war, starvation, violation of human rights and violence in our communities. We know that our security is not brought about through the power of military force. Our definition of security is not military force which is institutionalized violence.

To date, women are not included in major international negotiations for arms reduction and the resolution of international conflicts. It is time that the experience of millions of women who work for peace and justice, be brought to the negotiating table. Women's power to bring about social change must be channelled into the stalemated disarmament talks.

Women have something new to bring to the peace discussions. Research shows that women's understanding, their moral sense and judgement do differ from that of men. As primary custodians of the next generation women are particularly sensitive to the connections between peace and development.

We want to confirm our convictions and our experiences. Together with women of other countries and backgrounds we want to explore new strategies for reducing threat, resolving conflict and learning to live together non-violently.

In the spirit of the United Nations Decade for Women, whose theme is Equality, Development and Peace, The Voice of Women, Canada, invites Canadian Women's Groups to join with us in co-sponsoring an International Women's Conferenced entitled:

"The Urgency for True Security:
Women's Alternatives for Negotiating Peace"

Reply to Marion Kerans Telephone: (902) 425-3573
Chairperson, Working Committee, International Conference,
6236 Willow Street,
Halifax, Nova Scotia
Canada
B5L 1N9

REQUEST FOR CONTRIBUTION

I. (a) Name of organization or individual requesting financial assistance:

VOICE OF WOMEN, CANADA

(b) Address:

175 Carlton Street
Toronto, Ont. M5A 2K3

(c) Telephone Number:

(416) 922-2997

(d) Date of Request:

January 30, 1984

(a) Type of program/project for which assistance is requested:

INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S CONFERENCE

(b) Short summary of program/project:

An International Meeting of women committed to disarmament and the resolution of international conflicts, will meet to explore creative, peaceful and non violent solutions to the threat of global violence. Women engaged in the research and practice of peaceful alternatives will explore their application to international negotiations.

(c) Objectives of program/project

To bring into international focus the perspective and negotiating skills of women -- the missing participants at disarmament talks. To examine and propose strategies to change the definition of Security from a state of affairs maintained by military force and institutionalized violence to a security maintained by acknowledging mutual interests and building trust through international cooperation. To further education in non-violent conflict resolution.

(d) Length of program/project:

3-day Conference. 9 months planning during which time a series of mini conferences will be held across Canada.

(e) Scope of program/project:

Global.

III(a) To your knowledge, has this program/project been undertaken before?

VOW conducted International Conferences in 1962 and 1967 with similar objectives. According to our research no international organization has undertaken a conference specifically to examine women's role in negotiating peace.

(b) What sectors of the public will the program/project reach?

Students Academics Business
 Church Groups Community Groups
 Workers Others (indicate) governments.

(c) How many people will come in contact with the program/project?

Directly: Under 100 _____ 100 - 500 500-1000 _____
 1000 - 5000 _____ Over 5000 _____
 Indirectly: Under 500 _____ 500 - 1000 _____
 1000 - 5000 _____ Over 5000

IV (a) How many people will be involved in the operation of the program/project and what will their duties be?

Non Paid

- 8 on International Planning Committee to prepare the conference schedule, call for papers and prepare invitation list.
- 12 on National Organizing Committee to service the Planning Committee and to organize the conference.
- 50 -
- 100 volunteers to organize local events, to promote study and discussion of conference themes.

Paid

- 1 Conference Planner
- 1 Conference Organizer
- 2 Office support staff

(b) What sort of information material, if any, will be used in connection with the program/project?

Existing disarmament proposals, educational material on non violent resolution of conflict and measures of confidence building; published research on the social psychology of women with respect to perceptions, judgement, conflict resolution; historical background of achievements towards international disarmament, e.g. treaties, UN Conventions, Charters, etc.

(c) Are any other organizations providing financial assistance or other forms of involvement?

National Women's Organizations are currently being approached to co-sponsor. We intend to approach foundations, individuals and women's groups and peace groups.

(d) How will the funds requested from this Department be used?

1. To fund the Planning Committee
(see attached summary of Organizing Committee plans).
2. To organize the conference including hiring staff
(see above).
3. To provide transportation and other expenses
associated with bringing resource people,
including volunteer organizers within Canada
and from other countries.
4. To publish conference findings.

(e) Attach a detailed budget for the program/project.

Attached.

V. How does the program/project relate to the subject of
disarmament and arms control?

The conference is exclusively to do with the subject.

VI. On completion of the program/project, what if any follow-up
action is planned?

International and national dissemination of conference
findings. Voice of Women and co-sponsoring Women's
organizations will promote the implementation of peace
strategies generated by the conference at the
international, national and local levels.

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

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SUMMARY OF CANADIAN ORGANIZING COMMITTEE AND INTERNATIONAL
PLANNING COMMITTEE PLANS TO DATE:

Event: International Women's Conference

Title: "The Urgency for True Security: Women's Attempts
for Negotiating Peace"

Scope: Global

Sponsorship: The Voice of Women and other interested
Canadian women's groups

Date: Fall 1984 (tentative)

Location: Ottawa (tentative)

Purpose: To explore new strategies for reducing the use of
threat, resolving conflict and learning to live
together non-violently

Participants: 100 women representing the women of every
continent, including 50 Canadian women

Resource people and participants should
include:

- 1) women with negotiating skills
- 2) women with government experience in
international affairs; these women
may come from elected or official
positions and backgrounds
- 3) women from organizations concerned
about peace; from women's groups
which support the spirit of the
U.N. Decade for Women and its theme
of Equality, Development and Peace.

Planning Structure:

Funding will be sought to set in place an international planning
committee whose function will be to develop an invitation list,
call for papers and plan the conference program.

The Organizing Committee will be comprised of representatives
of various Canadian women's organizations. Its role will be
to service the International Planning Committee, to assist in
locating materials and human resources, to promote mini
conferences in Canada, and to maintain communication with
national, regional and local women's groups.

Funds will be allocated to hire 2 staff persons to coordinate
the activities of the Organizing and Planning committees, and
for 2 support staff persons.

MR DEWOTE This is a draft statement by Mr. Mulhoney of last week. I think that it was eventually released in this form.

I and my party have supported the objectives of the Prime Minister's initiative from the beginning. Last December, in a speech to which the Prime Minister referred yesterday, I urged the government to take a series of steps which would promote disarmament. Indeed, you will recall that I specifically urged the Secretary of State for External Affairs -- who was then about to depart for a NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels -- to raise with our allies within NATO's councils consideration of policies designed to reduce our recourse to nuclear weapons in Europe. The cornerstone of my proposals has been and continues to be NATO solidarity. That is the forum in which to discuss NATO policy. It is quite another matter however, to -- in the course of a tour of Warsaw Pact countries -- call into question the determination of NATO allies to carry out existing policies of the alliance. As former Prime Minister Barre pointed out, to do so, as Mr. Trudeau has done, is to undermine the foundation of security in Europe. And that is something I don't propose to do and I would urge the Prime Minister not to risk.

MF

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

Le 6 février 1984.

M. R.R. Fowler
Secrétaire adjoint du cabinet
(Affaires extérieures et défense)
Bureau du Conseil Privé
Edifice Langevin
Ottawa K1A 0A3

Bob,

...

Ci-joint, tel que requis, des projets de lettres de remerciement. J'ai essayé de les personnaliser un peu. J'espère que le style n'en est pas trop différent de ce que le PM emploie d'ordinaire. Je n'ai pas mis les formules d'appel et je présume que si les salutations les terminant ne sont pas celles qu'on utilise ici vous avez des formules usuelles.

Si le texte ne convient pas, n'hésitez pas (à me contacter) à RBR.

J.T. Simard
Ambassadeur du Canada
Roumanie

Ministère des Affaires extérieures/
Direction des Relations avec l'URSS
et l'Europe de l'Est (RBR)/2-9425/
Ambassadeur J.T. Simard

PROJET DE LETTRE

OTTAWA K1A 0A2

Quelques lignes, Monsieur le Président, pour vous exprimer encore une fois personnellement, mes remerciements les plus vifs pour l'accueil si chaleureux que vous m'avez accordé ainsi que pour l'hospitalité que le peuple roumain m'a manifesté à l'occasion de mon bref séjour au Racunt.

Je crois que nos discussions ont été fructueuses. Elles ont permis une meilleure compréhension de nos positions réciproques et dégagé de larges perspectives d'accord eu égard aux objectifs que nous poursuivons pour la réduction des tensions internationales et pour la création d'un équilibre plus stable et plus équitable entre les nations.

J'ai grandement apprécié votre volonté de paix et votre active contribution à la solution des problèmes qui la menacent, particulièrement en Europe.

.../2

Son Excellence Nicolae Ceaușescu
Président de la République Socialiste de Roumanie
Bucarest, Roumanie

- 2 -

J'ai regretté que mon court séjour ne me permette pas cette fois d'explorer plus avant la beauté et la diversité de votre pays et j'espère sincèrement que ce n'est que partie remise.

En terminant, Monsieur le Président, je me permets encore une fois de vous réitérer l'invitation la plus cordiale à venir au Canada.

Je vous prie, Monsieur le Président, d'accepter encore une fois mes remerciements et l'expression de ma très haute considération.

P.E.T.

Ministère des Affaires extérieures/
Direction des Relations avec l'URSS
et l'Europe de l'Est (RBR)/2-9425/
Ambassadeur J.T. Simard

PROJET DE LETTRE

OTTAWA K1A 0A2

Je vous prie d'accepter mes remerciements pour m'avoir accueilli de façon si amicale et avec tant de chaleur à Bucarest. Je garde un excellent souvenir de nos conversations, particulièrement lors de notre dîner officiel. Vous êtes maintenant associé dans mon souvenir à Panaft Istrati et à la Roumanie. J'espère que nous aurons l'occasion de nous revoir un de ces jours.

Je vous prie, Monsieur le Vice-président du Conseil d'état d'accepter l'expression de ma considération très distinguée.

Son Excellence X Radulescu
Vice-président du Conseil d'état
République Socialiste de Roumanie
Bucarest, Roumanie

Ministère des Affaires extérieures/
Direction des Relations avec l'URSS
et l'Europe de l'Est (RBR)/2-9425/
Ambassadeur J.T. Simard

PROJET DE LETTRE

OTTAWA K1A 0A2

Permettez-moi de vous remercier de m'avoir accueilli si aimablement et si chaleureusement lors de mon bref séjour à Bucarest. Je sais par expérience combien vos fonctions sont lourdes et je vous suis reconnaissant d'avoir trouvé le temps de me recevoir, d'avoir assisté au dîner du 1er février et de m'avoir accompagné lors de mon départ. Je garde un souvenir excellent de mon passage chez-vous, j'espère avoir éventuellement l'occasion d'y retourner d'une manière qui me permette d'en apprécier plus longuement les richesses, la beauté et la diversité. J'espère qu'il vous sera aussi possible ainsi que je vous l'ai dit de venir un jour me rendre la pareille au Canada.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Premier Ministre, mes sentiments de très haute considération.

Le Très Honorable Constantin Dascalescu
Premier Ministre
République Socialiste de Roumanie
Bucarest, Roumanie

Ministère des Affaires extérieures/
Direction des Relations avec l'URSS
et l'Europe de l'Est (RBR)/2-9425/
Ambassadeur J.T. Simard

PROJET DE LETTRE

OTTAWA K1A 0A2

Ma visite à Bucarest fut brève mais je crois qu'elle marque une étape importante dans le renforcement des relations entre nos deux pays et dans la recherche de solutions qui conduisent à la diminution des tensions en Europe et à la recherche d'une paix fondée sur une meilleure compréhension entre les états. J'ai apprécié le rôle actif que vous avez joué dans le déroulement harmonieux de cette visite et je connais votre importante contribution au renforcement dans tous les domaines des relations entre nos deux pays (j'ai eu l'occasion de vous exprimer tout ceci de vive-voix lors de votre passage à Ottawa mais je me permets encore une fois de vous le réitérer). Je ne peux que souhaiter que vous poursuiviez encore pour de nombreuses années votre action si importante dans le domaine des relations internationales ainsi que dans le développement de nos relations bilatérales.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires étrangères, mes sentiments de très haute considération.

Monsieur Stefan Andrei /
Ministre des Affaires étrangères
République Socialiste de Roumanie
Bucarest, Roumanie

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT GMR0253 06FEB84

TO ALL POSTS/TOUTES LES MISSIONS PRIORITY/PRIORITIE
INFO RCMPOTT/SS/FSD NDHQOTT/CIS/ADM POL/DCDS EANDIHULL DOTOTT DOCOTT
DSSHULL EPCOTT FINOTT HWCOTT SOLGENOTT DRIEOTT CIDA HULL/BCD/MUD
PMOOTT PCOOTT/FOWLER
DISTR GENERAL

---BERUT:TELECOMMUNICATIONS EMBARGO

---BERUT:EMBARGO SUR TELECOMMUNICATIONS

DUE TO PRESENT SITUATION IN BERUT, FOLLOWING TELECOMMUNICATIONS
EMBARGO HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE: (A) TRANSMISSION
OF ALL/ALL TELS WHETHER CLASSIFIED OR UNCLAS, ORIGINATING FROM WITHIN
EXTAFF OR ANY OTHER GOVT DEPT MUST BE AUTHORIZED BY EXTAFF MIDDLE
EASTERN DIVISION(GMR); (B) POSTS MUST REFRAIN FROM SENDING TELS TO
BERUT UNLESS TELS REQUIRE ACTION DIRECTLY RELATED TO SECURITY OF
MISSION PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES OR MAINTENANCE OF ESSENTIAL
SERVICES SUCH AS TELECOMMUNICATIONS OR CONSULAR ASSISTANCE.

A CAUSE DE LA SITUATION ACTUELLE A BERUT, AVONS MIS EMBARGO SUIVANT
SUR TELECOMMUNICATIONS AVEC BERUT JUSQU A AVIS CONTRAIRE: (A) TRANS-
MISSION DE TOUS/TOUS LES TELEGRAMMES QU ILS SOIENT CLASSIFIES OU NON
CLASSIFIES PROVENANT DU MINISTERE DES AFFEXT OU DE N IMPORTE QUEL
AUTRE MINISTERE DOIT ETRE AUTORISEE PREALABLEMENT PAR LA DIRECTION
DU MOYEN-ORIENT(GMR) DU MINISTERE DES AFFEXT: (B) MISSIONS DOIVENT

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PAGE TWO GMR0253 UNCLAS

S ABSTENIR DE TRANSMETTRE TELEGRAMMES A BERUT A MOINS QU ILS
TRAITENT DE MESURES A PRENDRE RELATIVES A LA SECURITE DU PERSONNEL
DE LA MISSION ET DES INSTALLATIONS OU AU MAINTIEN DES SERVICES
ESSENTIELS TELS LES TELECOMMUNICATIONS OU ASSISTANCE CONSULAIRE.

UUU/099 062229Z GMR0253



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

Accession/Référence
File/Dossier

MESSAGE

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SECURITY
SÉCURITÉ

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

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FM EXTOTT ^{IDDZ} 0124 06FEB84

TO BNATO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU

DISTR HAGUE WSHDC VMBFR

REF INFO GENEV MOSCO BGRAD BPEST BUCST PRGUE WSAW

SUBJ/SUJ REF PARIS TEL WIGR3310 06FEB PMDEL BUCST ^{TEL} 0033 02FEB ^{OURTEL} 19 03FEB

---PM INITIATIVE: EASTERN EUROPEAN VISIT

*PRMNY
ROMANIA
STKHM/SCDEL*

*PRGUE/181
30 JAN
TEL*

PRIORITY

FOR BNATO AND NATO POSTS:

AS APPROPRIATE AND ON A RESPONSIVE BASIS YOU MAY BRIEF YOUR HOST GOVTS ON THE PM S RECENT EASTERN EUROPEAN TRIP USING AS A BASIS THE MAIN REPORTING REFTELS. YOU SHOULD EMPHASIZE (A) ATMOSPHERE EACH VISIT (B) WHAT EAST EUROPEANS TOLD PM.

2. MAIN REPORTING TELS WILL BE ~~BAGGED TO YOU~~ ^{SENT} POSTS WHICH HAVE ~~NOT~~ ^{NOT} RECD THEM.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

J. McNEE
SIG J. McNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

L.A. DELVOIE
SIG L.A. DELVOIE

001439



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

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SECURITY
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TO STKHM/SCDEL PRIORITY

INFO PRMNY BNATO

DISTR IDA

REF YRTEL SCDL0102 03FEB

---STKHM CONF:PRESENTATION BY UN SEC GEN

WE ARE SENDING YOU BY BAG THE REPORT ON PM S MTG WITH UN SEC GEN IN
NEW YORK 11JAN.WE HAVE HAD NOTHING FURTHER FROM ^{SEC GEN} HIM E.G.ON FIVE
POWER CONFERENCE.

2.AS FOR OVERALL STATUS OF PM INITIATIVE,THE PM PLANS TO REVIEW HIS
INITIATIVE AND WHERE IT NOW STANDS IN SPEECH TO HOUSE OF COMMONS
09FEB.THAT SPEECH WILL PROVIDE BEST OVERALL UPDATE.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
 SIG J. McNEE	IDDZ	5-5912	 SIG L.A. DELVOZE



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY/ SÉCURITÉ **C O N F I D E N T I A L** 7 FEB 84 200 042 10

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 TO/À TO BNATO **DELBV 070900**
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 REF REF YRTEL YBGR6124 06FEB BONN TELZQGR0047 03FEB
 SUBJ/SUJ ---PM S VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE:ARMS CONTROL ISSUES
 YOU MAY DRAW ON BONN REFTEL FOR PRELIMINARY ORAL BRIEFING OF ALLIES,
 BUT ^{TEXT}TEL SHOULD NOT/NOT BE CIRCULATED.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG J. MC NEE	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG L.A. DELVOIE



MESSAGE


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---CDA-GDR CONTACT ON ARMS CONTROL
WE AGREE TO GENERAL APPROACH TO CDA-GDR CONTACT ON ARMS CONTROL,
AS OUTLINED PARA 2 BONN TEL 0048 03FEB, BUT NOT/NOT TO SUGGESTION
THAT A PAPER MIGHT BE REFERRED TO MINS DURING FISCHER STOPOVER IN
CANADA IN MAY AS THAT WOULD TEND TO FORECLOSE OUR OPTIONS.
2. MCLAINÉ MAY DISCUSS THIS WITH KRABATCZ ALONG THESE LINES.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG  J. McNEE	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG  L.A. DELVOIE



file

TO/À LSR
FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Visit of the Colombian Foreign Minister:
SUJET • Back Brief on The Prime Minister's
Initiative.

Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	February 6, 1984.
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0120

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

-1-

DISTRIBUTION

Attached, as requested, is an up-to-date
brief on the Prime Minister's initiative.

L.A. Delvoie

L.A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group
on East-West Relations
and International Security

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE

ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

ISSUE

The purpose of this brief is to discuss the current status of the Prime Minister's initiative.

BACKGROUND

The Prime Minister's central purpose is to try to stop and reverse the worsening trend in East-West relations, and thus reduce international tensions and risks of confrontation. His chief proposal addresses the need to restore confidence and re-establish high-level political dialogue between East and West, and particularly between the two superpowers. The PM is interested in seeing if by opening lines of communication to Moscow more propitious conditions can be created for political dialogue between Moscow and Washington.

The initiative involves a number of specific proposals - (a) a conference of the five nuclear weapon states to limit strategic nuclear arsenals (b) a concerted political effort to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime (c) a substantive Western response to the Eastern proposals on MBFR and a meeting at the Foreign Minister level in Vienna (d) the inauguration of the Stockholm CDE Meeting at senior political level.

Also related to the initiative, but not pursued personally by the PM with other governments, are proposals for (a) a ban on the testing and deployment of high altitude anti-satellite systems (b) a requirement that future strategic systems be verifiable by National Technical Means and (c) restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs.

REACTIONS

The reactions of other governments may be roughly summarized as follows:

European allies have given encouraging support. The Western Europeans share his analysis of the dangerous state of East-West relations and the need for the re-establishment of political dialogue.

- 2 -

The French were generally supportive, with reservations as to timing. Their statements on the five power conference have been contradictory, but generally reserved. The Germans were positive and generally supportive (and have subsequently endorsed the five power conference idea). The British were generally supportive of the broad purpose, but have reservations about specific proposals (especially the five power conference). The Dutch and Belgians reacted very positively, with some reservations as to timing (they think such an initiative may be most needed in the spring of 1984 once INF deployment has taken place). The Italians were generally supportive and have publicly endorsed the idea of a five power conference. (Also, there have been very positive and fully supportive written responses from the Danes and Norwegians and a very positive reactions from the Spaniards and Turks. The Greeks generally support the initiative, but disagree with NATO's INF deployment.)

PM Nakasone of Japan was very receptive and fully supportive when the PM visited Tokyo on November 19.

Commonwealth Heads of Government specifically endorsed PM Trudeau's initiative in the Goa Declaration on International Security.

The Chinese are mildly supportive of the broad political purpose, but do not support the call for a five power conference or the NPT. They argue that the first priority is concentrating pressure on the superpowers to reduce their arms.

The Soviets are interested, but cautious and non-committal. They claim to have had sad experiences with high-level contact with the US, hence they were "reserved" about the idea of the higher level of contact the better. While they appreciated the PM's view on the importance of discussions of intentions and goals, they claimed that Washington, in deploying new missiles was acting on a different basis. They were non-committal on a five power conference and reserved judgement on the question of political level representation at CDE and MBFR.

The USA has assured the Prime Minister of its support for the broad political objectives he is pursuing in East-West relations, while laying most of the blame for the current state of those relations on Soviet attitudes and actions. The USA administration has reservations about most of the specific arms control measures put forward by the Prime Minister.

- 3 -

U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar has commended and encouraged the Prime Minister's efforts.

The Eastern Europeans the Prime Minister has visited, the Czechoslovaks, East Germans and Romanians, have given general support to the Prime Minister's basic political purposes.

RESULTS

The degree of support which the Prime Minister has garnered for the main purposes of his initiative is of itself a positive result insofar as it may have a beneficial effect on the climate of East-West relations. The decisions taken at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels in early December were particularly significant in furthering the purposes of the initiative:

- (a) an undertaking by NATO foreign ministers to attend the opening of the CDE in Stockholm (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (b) an undertaking to review NATO negotiating position in the MBFR negotiations (Canadian delegation in the lead);
- (c) the "Brussels declaration" which places heavy emphasis on genuine détente and dialogue in East-West relations (an FRG initiative, actively supported by the Canadian delegation);
- (d) a mandate given the permanent NATO Council to review the current state of East-West relations and to report to the next NATO ministerial meeting on what actions might be taken to improve them.

TALKING POINTS

You might wish to review the current status of
the Prime Minister's initiative.



TO/A - LST LSD LCR RCM ETN SPF SCC RBR IDDZ

FROM/DE - LSR

REFERENCE / RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT / SUJET • Visit to Canada of the Foreign Minister of Colombia, Sr. Rodrigo Lloreda Caicedo, 20-21 February 1984: Briefing Book

Mr. McNeel
One of your specials please

Security / Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
Accession / Référence	
File / Dossier	
Date	January 24, 1984
Number / Numéro	LSR-0149

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

2

DISTRIBUTION

Agriculture /
ILS/MDD

CIDA/SEL

BDC/Jean-Jean

LSR will coordinate the briefing book for the visit of Sr. Lloreda. We would remind contributors that briefs must not exceed two pages with Talking Points on a third. The Talking Points should be double spaced. Briefs should be delivered to LSR (Rice) by 3 February, and be properly cleared with relevant Divisions and Departments. ... Only lead Divisions have been noted on the attached.

2. The following guidelines should be followed in the preparation of the briefs:

- They should be prepared according to the format attached and single spaced. Background briefs, such as Quebec interests in Latin America, may waive the standard format.

- While developments might be anticipated which could influence the thrust of the brief, this should not interfere with the production schedule. Supplementary briefs can be prepared, if necessary.

- Briefs which do not conform to the standards indicated will be returned to the originator for retyping and, if necessary, reduction in length.

- Briefs should be delivered as clean originals. Photocopies are not acceptable since they do not reproduce satisfactorily.

3. The attached annex lists the briefs and the Action Divisions and Departments concerned. Addressees may wish to add to the suggested list or revise certain titles.

4. Please consult with Eber Rice at 5-1053 if there are any questions about the preparation of these briefs.

Richard Belliveau

Richard Belliveau
Acting Director
South America Relations Division

BRIEFING BOOK

- 1) COUNTRY PROFILE ----- LSR
- 2) BIOGRAPHIES ----- LSR
- 3) COLOMBIAN DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC SITUATION ---- LSR
- 4) COLOMBIAN FOREIGN POLICY ---- LSR
- 5) OVERVIEW OF CANADA-COLOMBIAN RELATIONS ----- LSR

MULTILATERAL ISSUES

- 6) CENTRAL AMERICAN SITUATION - LCR
- 7) CONTADORA EFFORTS AND POTENTIAL ----LCR
- 8) CARIBBEAN SITUATION, INCLUDING THE CARIBBEAN BASIN INITIATIVE ----
--- LCR
- 9) ROLE OF CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION IN THE CARIBBEAN BASIN -- LCR
- 10) CANADA AND THE OAS ----- LSR
- 11) EAST/WEST RELATIONS ----- RBR
- 12) PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S PEACE INITIATIVE ----IDDZ
- 13) FUTURE OF THE ANDEAN PACT -- LSR
- 14) CANADIAN EXPERIENCE WITH THE FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT WITH THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ----- RCM
- 15) IMPACT OF THE CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT IN VENEZUELA AND ARGENTINA -LSR

BILATERAL ISSUES

- 16) CANADA-COLOMBIA TRADE INTERESTS AND ISSUES ----- LST
- 17) CIDA AND COLOMBIA ----- CIDA/SEL
- 18) THE EDC AND COLOMBIA ----- EDC
- 19) QUEBEC INTERESTS IN COLOMBIA AND LATIN AMERICA IN GENERAL -- SPF
- 20) CANADA/COLOMBIA AGRIFOOD RELATIONS --- AGRICOTT/ILS
- 21) CANADA/COLOMBIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION ----- ETN
- 22) CANADA/COLOMBIA CULTURAL RELATIONS: POSSIBILITY OF
----- SCC

CLASSIFICATION (caps and underlined)

Drafter
Division
telephone number

TITLE OF BRIEF (caps and underlined)

ISSUE:

BACKGROUND:

CANADIAN POSITION:

COLOMBIAN POSITION:

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Mr. Smith

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM WSHDC UNGR1019 06JAN84

TO EXTOTT (IDDZ)

INFO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR IDA UGB IDR IFB URR

---PMS INITIATIVE:USA NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PEACE

RETURN TO RENVOYER AU		0100	FOR FILING POUR - ETRE PORTE AU DOSSIER
ACC.	REF	DATE	
FILE	28-6-1-Trudeau Peace		DOSSIER
Mission			

WE ARE BAGGING TO YOU SOME MATERIAL ON PROPOSED USA NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PEACE WHICH PMO-AXWORTHY HAD ENQUIRED ABOUT. THIS MATERIAL INCLUDES REPORT OF CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION, LATEST INFO BULLETINS OF ACADEMY FOUNDATION, LEGISLATION BEING CONSIDERED BY SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPS.

2. ACADEMY FOUNDATION OFFICIALS TELL US THAT SENATE LEGISLATION HAS CLEARED CTTEE STATE AND HOUSE LEADER BAKER HAS PROMISED TO BRING IT TO FLOOR EARLY THIS SESSION. HOUSE OF REPS IS HOLDING OFF ACTION UNTIL SENATE PASSES ITS BILL.

3. FOR FURTHER BACKGROUND INFO THAT IS IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE IN OTT WE REFER YOU TO FOLLOWING MATERIAL. OURLET 206 03MAR82 TO XDA, OURLET 1154 17DEC81 TO DFD, OURLET 1054 16NOV81 TO DFD AND YOURLET DFD077 16JAN81.

CCC/086 061929Z UNGR1019

Mr. Debra

4044 (26)



The City of Toronto
Arthur C. Eggleton
Mayor

MF

February 6, 1984

The Right Honourable
Pierre Elliott Trudeau
Prime Minister's Office
Langevin Block
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0A2

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Your attempts to inject political will into the effort for world peace have encouraged many ordinary citizens to think about how they can assist the process of building trust and confidence. Among the ideas suggested is one which I would enthusiastically endorse, and be willing to co-host with the Toronto Board of Education. I am referring to the one-week summer camp for mothers and five-year-olds from USA, USSR and Canada which Bonnie Diamond and Maude Barlow of your office discussed with Fiona Nelson of the Toronto Board of Education last Friday.

The non-partisan, family-oriented nature of this project would overcome so many suspicions and doubts on all sides. I am convinced that this endeavour would encourage many other citizen-to-citizen contacts.

I hope that you will give this project your blessing and would suggest that several small camps would be much more appropriate than one large one. Since Winnipeg and Vancouver already have close links with Soviet cities, they might be ideal sites to consider.

My very best wishes to you in your continuing efforts to ensure a secure future for all our children.

Sincerely,

[Handwritten signature]

M. Barlow (19)
cc: *H. P. Kishin*
S. Chenna

CHILDREN'S PEACE CAMPS

In keeping with the Prime Minister's Peace Initiative, this project's purpose is to bring Soviet, American, and Canadian children and their mothers to Canada to participate in a summer camp experience. It involves, potentially, three cities, Toronto, Vancouver, and Winnipeg, all of which are twinned with three Soviet cities.

In discussion with many Canadian women who have brought this concept to us as a method of promoting individual dialogue between women and children of different nations, the preliminary plan is as follows:

- Three small camps to operate in the summer of 1984 each hosting 30 children and their mothers with equal representation from each nation.
- Kindergarten aged children appear ideal as mother's accompaniment is natural, the language of play is universal, and different political ideologies is not a factor. Also they represent the future and the hope of bridging political differences to succeed in negotiating lasting peaceful co-existence.
- As a woman's initiative, many women from the three nations would participate in the design stage, thereby providing the planners the opportunity to share their philosophical views regarding world tension, the tasks of the next generation, children in society, role of play, etc. Because the focus is children the people involved have a large investment in survival and would be motivated to work through their different philosophies, toward a common goal, using a nonconfrontational and open style.
- Because the children are so young the duration of the camp should be limited to 8-10 days.

.../2

FEASIBILITY

No budget has as yet been drafted. It is felt that a preliminary planning committee should be struck to assess the cost. That committee should have representation from:

- The Prime Minister's Office
- External Affairs
- Each of the three host cities

As it is a camp for children and mothers and the concept originated with Canadian women it is important that the planners be women.

Cost may be shared as follows:

- As the host country the Canadian Government could provide funding for the planning activities and the travel expenses of the Soviet and American participants and all staffing expenses incurred.
- The host cities could provide the camp "sites", the accomodation and the food for all those in attendance.

Federal funding could be requested from allotment for the peace initiative administered through external affairs.

INSTRUCTIONS.

FOR USE WHEN SIGNATURE ACKNOWLEDGING RECEIPT OF DOCUMENTS IS NEEDED. ORIGINATOR TO COMPLETE BOTH SECURITY BLOCKS.
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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS — AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL AND RECEIPT NOTE — NOTE D'ENVOI ET DE RÉCEPTION

TO The Under-Secretary of State
 A for External Affairs, OTTAWA ATTN: IDDZ

SECURITY — SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S)
UNCLASSIFIED
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NO. 0205 6 Feb 1984

MF

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION — DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE — RÉFÉRENCE
2 reports	<p>Copies of translated newspaper articles from the Czechoslovak News Agency - Daily News & Press Survey re: Prime Minister Trudeau's visit to Prague.</p> <p>**Note, The Post has also sent a copy of the attached material to EXTOTT/RBR.</p>	

RECEIPT ACKNOWLEDGED / ACCUSER RÉCEPTION

24/2/84
 DATE

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RETURN TO / RETOURNER À

J.E. Sinclair
 Canadian Embassy, PRAGUE

DBZ

ce teka daily news and press survey

27.01.1984

domestic news

bon 1

::trudeau

prague - canadian prime minister pierre eliot trudeau ended his visit to czechoslovakia and left prague on thursday.

the canadian guest was seen off at the airport by czechoslovak premier lubomir strougal, at whose invitation the visit took place; the deputy premiers of the federal government; foreign minister bohuslav chroupek and other government officials.

x x x

earlier in the day president gustav husak of czechoslovakia received canadian prime minister pierre eliot trudeau to discuss the most important issues of the present complicated international developments.

the meeting was also attended by czechoslovak premier lubomir strougal

gustav husak stressed that czechoslovakia constantly strives, together with other warsaw treaty states, for the relaxation of tension in the world and for a halt to armament, especially in the nuclear sphere. he recalled in this connection the prague political declaration of the warsaw treaty states of january 1963; the documents of the moscow meeting of leading party and state officials of the socialist countries in june 1963; and soviet peace initiatives.

pierre eliot trudeau acquainted gustav husak with his proposals of the end last year, concerning in particular nuclear disarmament, nuclear weapons non-proliferation, and the de-militarization of outer space. he voiced his conviction about the usefulness of a dialogue and cooperation of states with different social systems in the interest of stronger peace and international security.

gustav husak emphasized that the warsaw treaty states are ready to assess positively all proposals which would effectively help ease international tension and limit and reduce nuclear weapons, while respecting the principles of equality and equal security.

(cont.)

cetexa daily news and press survey

27.01.1984

domestic news

bdn 2

the dangerous situation in europe is a consequence of the aggressive policy of militarist forces which strive to upset the existent balance of forces and gain military superiority in the world. this policy involves the siting of new american medium-range missiles in several west european countries, which further raises tension in europe and the world.

the socialist countries, including czechoslovakia, were forced to respond to this step with such measures as would safeguard their security. but the socialist countries are willing to solve the problem of nuclear weapons in europe on a constructive and mutually acceptable basis to prevent another round of the arms race. however, the united states and nato must show willingness to return to the state which existed before the start of the deployment of the new american missiles, the president stressed.

gustav husak went on to stress that czechoslovakia regards as the most urgent task of these days to do everything for the strengthening of peace in the world in the spirit of the conclusions of the helsinki conference. in this context he appreciated the endeavour of the canadian prime minister aimed at improvement of the international atmosphere, strengthening of confidence between states, and solution of questions of disarmament and international cooperation.

gustav husak and pierre eliot trudeau voiced interest in the development of czechoslovak-canadian relations and expansion of mutually advantageous cooperation, especially in the economic sphere. they confirmed the will to continue a political dialogue between the two countries in the interest of easing international tension.

x x x

also on thursday canadian prime minister pierre eliot trudeau told journalists that he came to czechoslovakia as a representative of a nato member state whose citizens are worried by the increasing tension between the east and the west.

the chief aim of his visit were talks with czechoslovak

(cont.)

ceteka daily news and press survey

27.01.1984

domestic news

odn 3

officials on the canadian peace initiative and the stand taken on it by the individual member states of the warsaw treaty and nato.

canada was not at the round table in geneva, but it takes the view that political officials from all countries must strive to ease tension, the prime minister stressed and said that he had confirmed again when he was received by president gustav husak of czechoslovakia that he supports many proposals contained in the prague declaration of the warsaw treaty political consultative committee of january 1983. he said that he has always been favouring a dialogue and talks between the two sides. the prague declaration was a step in the correct direction and the west should respond to it positively, pierre eliottr Trudeau said.

the canadian prime minister went on to say that during his talks with the supreme czechoslovak officials both sides voiced determination - although views on the causes of the worsened international situation differed - to support all step leading to a successful course and conclusion of the arms reduction talks in vienna and the stockholm conference. he added that the main task in the present stage of international relations is to ease east-west tension.

speaking about czechoslova-canadian relations, pierre eliottr Trudeau said that need had been stressed during the talks for their promotion, especially in the sphere of economy and trade, but also in the sphere of culture and sports.

the canadian prime minister also said that a role should be played in the coming period by countries of the third world which are interested in eased tention, especially for means now spent on armament to be able to be spent on their development.

ceteka

of the daily news and press survey

25.01.1984

domestic news

bdr 1

:husak - congratulatory

prague - czechoslovak president gustav husak sent a congratulatory telegram to president giani zail singh of india on the occasion of his country's national day.

on the same occasion, czechoslovak premier lubomir strougal sent a telegram of congratulations to his indian colleague indira gandhi.

also czechoslovak foreign minister bohuslav chnoupek sent a congratulatory telegram to his indian counterpart narasimha p.v. rao.

ceteka

:husak-australia

prague - czechoslovak president gustav husak has sent a congratulatory telegram to australian governor-general ninian martin stephens on his country's national day.

a similar telegram went from czechoslovak foreign minister bohuslav chnoupek to australian foreign minister william hayden.

ceteka

:trudeau

prague - canadian prime minister pierre elliot Trudeau arrived here wednesday for a visit at the invitation of federal premier lubomir strougal.

the canadian guest was welcomed at ruzyne airport by premier strougal and other government officials.

x x x

prime ministers lubomir strougal of czechoslovakia and pierre elliot Trudeau of canada later opened talks, attended also by svatopluk potac, czechoslovak deputy minister and chairman of the state planning commission; foreign minister bohuslav chnoupek and other officials; canadian ambassador to czechoslovakia Hugh david peel; the premier's head secretary

(cont.)

CZECHIA daily news and press survey

26.01.1984

domestic news

adn 2

thomas exworthy, and other canadian officials.

lubomir strougal explained the chief principles of the czechoslovak foreign policy, based on the endeavour of the people to live in peace and assert all steps towards this goal. he stressed that the latest measures to increase the defence capability of czechoslovakia were enforced by the siting of american missiles in western europe and upsetting of the military balance to the benefit of nato states.

czechoslovakia welcomed the stockholm conference on confidence- and security-building measures; lubomir strougal said and added that adoption of soviet peace proposals would be a significant step towards improvement of the present international situation.

he welcomed the canadian prime minister's visit to czechoslovakia as a contribution to efforts to ease international tension, and to the promotion of peaceful cooperation and friendly relations between the nations of czechoslovakia and canada.

pierre eliot Trudeau acquainted lubomir strougal with his views and peace initiative which is to help ease international tension and disarmament. he underlined the importance of a constant east-west dialogue for stronger confidence and security and for the development of cooperation between states with different social systems.

recently there have been signs of a halt of the dangerous development, and it is a cause of all realistically thinking politicians to seek ways of stabilizing and supporting this trend to rid the world of the danger of a nuclear clash, the canadian prime minister said.

the two premiers discussed several questions of their countries' economic and cultural relations.

after the talks, lubomir strougal and pierre eliot Trudeau met with czechoslovak and canadian journalists to inform them of the course of the meeting.

they appreciated the frank exchange of views on the

(cont.)

r teka daily news and press survey

26.01.1984

domestic news

bdn 3

main international issues and stressed the significance of an east-west dialogue. there is no more important task at this time than to exert every effort to ease tension; strengthen confidence and mutual understanding as prerequisites for peaceful development and cooperation in the world.

x x x

czechoslovak premier lubomir strougal gave a dinner wednesday night in honour of his canadian colleague pierre eliott Trudeau.

also present were czechoslovak deputy premier and ministers and other representatives of czechoslovak political and public life; canadian ambassador to czechoslovakia hugh david peel and members of the canadian prime minister's entourage.

proposing a toast, lubomir strougal stressed the importance of the frank discussion of representatives of countries which took part in the helsinki conference on security and cooperation in europe, but which are divided by different social systems and belonging to different military groupings. the meeting takes place in an extraordinarily complicated international situation; when new american missiles were sited in western europe in an effort to upset the strategic military balance and thus to threaten the socialist countries.

the czechoslovak premier explained the reasons for the development of missile complexes of operational-tactical designation on czechoslovak territory. however, these defence measures have changed nothing in czechoslovakia's desire for co-existence and faith in peace.

czechoslovakia's stand on vitally important issues remains unchanged; lubomir strougal said and pointed to the proposals contained in the political declaration of the warsaw treaty states; and czechoslovakia's active participation in the stockholm conference.

in conclusion, he appreciated pierre eliott Trudeau's personal stand on east-west relations; the policy of detente;

(cont.)

Ceteka daily news and press survey

26.01.1984

domestic news

bdn 4

and disarmament, and voiced the conviction that his visit will contribute to the promotion of czechoslovak-canadian cooperation.

in his reply, pierre eliot trudeau said that the situation in europe gives rise to serious concern. this is a reason why the desire for peace is so distinct in europe, a continent which has suffered in many wars. canada's security and future will be closely linked with the future of europe, he said and added that statesmen have a particular duty to do everything to ease tension and halt the arms race.

czechoslovakia and canada, which do not rank among powers and are members of different alliances, must find a field in which they can best help preserve peace, and this, in his view, is the political sphere. all means must be used in it to install confidence and increase mutual understanding. the current stockholm conference should contribute to this effort, pierre eliot trudeau said.

ceteka

:commission

prague - the czechoslovak state commission for scientific-technological development and investments held its constituent meeting here on wednesday in the presence of milos jakes, member of the czechoslovak communist party presidium and central committee secretary.

the chairman of the commission, federal deputy premier jeronir obzina, spoke about the main mission of the commission ensuing from the 16th congress of the czechoslovak communist party and the 8th session of its central committee.

the main task of the commission is to elaborate the scientific-technological policy of the state and cooperate in preparations of the conception of the state's investments policy, and to coordinate international cooperation in the two spheres.

(cont.)

Ceteka Daily News and Press Survey

25.01.1984

domestic news

Don 1

:trudeau

prague - canadian premier pierre eliot Trudeau will arrive here wednesday for a visit to czechoslovakia at the invitation of czechoslovak premier ludomir strougal.

official diplomatic relations between czechoslovakia and canada were established after world war i. they were preserved during the occupation of czechoslovakia by fascist germany. on october 12, 1940, canada recognized the provisional czechoslovak government in london. on august 21, 1962, diplomatic missions were promoted to embassies.

economic and trade relations are based on the trade contract of march 15, 1928 and the agreement on the renewal of its effect of july 24, 1945. the talks between czechoslovak and canadian government delegations which took place in 1954 contributed to the normalization and revival of trade relations.

czechoslovakia exports to canada textiles, footwear, rolled material, machine tools, sport goods, bicycles, bearings, tractors, car tyres, glass, artificial jewellery and cars, and imports oil and flax seeds, hide, asbestos and skins. the turnover of goods in 1982 was 481,2 million crowns.

cultural relations have mainly the form of tours of professional ensembles. of great significance is also regular participation of czechoslovakia in the international exhibition "man and his world" in montreal.

Ceteka

:congratulatory - algeria

prague - czechoslovak premier ludomir strougal has sent a congratulatory telegram to new algerian premier abdal hamid brahimi.

Ceteka

TO/À
FROM/DE
REFERENCE
RÉFÉRENCE
SUBJECT
SUJET

TRANSCRIPTION
FPR
Radio-Canada - 08h00 - Le 6 fév. 1984
Winnipeg - conférence pour la paix

Security/Sécurité	NON CLASSIFIE
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	Le 6 février 1984
Number/Numéro	FPR-0123


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CBC: De leur côté, les opposants aux essais des missiles Cruise en territoire canadien n'ont pas abandonné la partie. A la conférence pour la paix, qui se tenait en fin de semaine à Winnipeg, ils ont décidé d'organiser un ralliement monstre à Ottawa et d'orchestrer leurs actions.

Yves Desautels: Malgré les nombreux organismes présents, les 170 délégués à la conférence pour la paix ont oublié leurs divergences pour dégager un concensus sur les objectifs à atteindre et les moyens pour y parvenir. Le but de la conférence était de dénoncer Ottawa qui veut permettre l'essai des missiles Cruise au Canada et de faire déclarer le Canada zone libre de toute arme nucléaire. Les moyens pour y parvenir sont la mise sur pied de pétitions partout au pays, pétitions qui seront acheminées à Ottawa lors d'un immense rassemblement qui aura lieu probablement le 6 octobre. La conférence nationale pour la paix qui avait lieu à Winnipeg a réuni des participants représentant un éventail complet de la société: des groupes d'étudiants, de femmes, des organismes religieux, des syndicats, Greenpeace, tous y étaient présents avec un but commun: promouvoir la paix dans le monde en travaillant pour le désarmement nucléaire. Yves Desautels, à Winnipeg.


John J. Noble
Director
Press Office



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

W.A. Hunsberger Ont.		No. A 05664 N°
Subject Remarks on the PM's peace Initiative. Sujet		Action div./Dir. responsable IDDZ
Letter dated/Lettre en date du 84-02-06	Date rec'd in MINA Date de réception à MINA 84-02-16	Date sent to div. Date d'envoi à la dir. 84-02-16
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par		84-02-23
Comments/Commentaires		

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE	Date received/Date reçu 17 FEB 1984
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de	Action officer/Agent responsable J. McNEE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction	Disposition AS PER TELCON WITH MINA 17 FEB,
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date NO ACTION REQUIRED
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298 Bridge St., W.,
Waterloo, Ont., N2K 1L2,
February 6, 1984.

Mr. Brian Mulroney, M.P.,
Leader of the Opposition,
House of Commons,
Ottawa, Canada.


Dear Mr. Mulroney,

Your recent comments on the Prime Minister's peace initiatives were disheartening, the performance of the Hon. Sinclair Stevens in the House of Commons doubly disappointing and revealing the trifle of a tired and unimaginative mind. My first response on hearing his comments was to say, "What puerile blather". The "Globe and Mail" says it well in the editorial of February 4, and the accompanying cartoon, sadly enough is appropriate.

Surely you must realize that we are now facing the gravest issue of all time, the very survival of humankind. At this urgent moment can you not concede to this reality, set aside partisan politics and give full support to the efforts of bringing the major powers together as a first step in the vital communication process now so dangerously suspended?

Canada needs the support of all parties in this unique and vitally urgent effort.

Yours sincerely,




W. A. Hunsberger

copies:
Walter McLean, M. P. Waterloo,
The Hon. Allan J. MacEachen,
Minister of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

GTM . Feb . 4 / 84

BLAH! BLAH! BLAH! BLAH! BLAH! BLAH!
BLAH! BLAH! BLAH! BLAH! BLAH! BLAH!



Loose Lips Sincing The Ship.

Speak for himself

GTM . Feb . 4 . 1984

Who knows the evil that lurks on the loose lips of Canadians? The shadow external affairs minister knows. In fact, Sinclair Stevens has felt compelled to warn Canadians that they can't keep a secret and should not expose themselves to encounters in which they would be expected to do so.

Speaking of spilling the beans, Mr. Stevens has now gone and done it himself. All this time, our allies in the Western alliance have been sharing vital defence information with Canada on the assumption that our lips were sealed. Little did they suspect that the moment a Canadian diplomat finds himself discussing arms control with an East German, he will be seized by an

uncontrollable urge to blab. "As a rule, ongoing discussions lead to informal discussions," says Mr. Stevens. "At what point, then, do they run that terrible risk of revealing something that would be extremely beneficial to the Warsaw Pact countries?" The moment they open their mouths, if we're to judge by the lack of confidence the Tory MP has in Canada's envoys.

They've been accused of many faults, those striped-pants denizens of the Lester B. Pearson Building, but no journalist who has tried to pry information out of them ever had cause to doubt that the password of the External Affairs Department remains 001467 Diplomacy.

Division Phoned _____

Person _____

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6124 06FEB84

TO EXTOTT 1DDZ DELIVER BY 060900

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REF BONN TEL ZQGR0047 OURTELS 8024 27JAN 8026 31JAN

---PMS VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE:ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

BONN REFTTEL GIVES INFORMATIVE SUMMARY AND COULD BE USEFULLY
DRAWN ON HERE TO PROVIDE ALLIES WITH PRELIMINARY BRIEFING
ON PMS VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE.GIVEN DEGREE OF DETAIL
AND FACT THAT IT SUMMARIZES DISCUSSIONS IN THREE COUNTRIES,
WE WOULD HAVE PREFERENCE FOR CIRCULATING REPORT IN WRITING.
GRATEFUL REPLY BY 070900 IF POSSIBLE.

CCC/070 061340Z YBGR6124

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JD

**ACTION
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--- PM INITIATIVE: VISIT TO BONN

DE SMITH: FOLLOWING ARE SOME VIGNETTES PICKED UP IN BONN PRIVATELY FROM ANTON ROSSBACH, SENIOR MFA OFFICIAL ATTACHED TO CHANCELLOR KOHL'S OFFICE (PLEASE PROTECT).

(A) ROSSBACH AND HIS COLLEAGUES HAVE PREPARED TWENTY PAGE DISCUSSION PAPER ON IDEA OF FIVE POWER CONFERENCE. IT IS CURRENTLY WITH KOHL'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER, TELTSCHIK, AND DEALS PRIMARILY WITH HOW POSSIBLE MERGING OF INF/START NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT BE RELATED TO FIVE OR FOUR(MINUS CHINA)POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE.ROSSBACH SAID HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO GIVE COPY OF PAPER TO OUR EMB IN BONN. WE INFORMED HIM WE HAD PREPARED OUR OWN REFINED VERSION OF FIVE POWER PAPER WHICH WE SAID WOULD LIKELY BE MADE AVAILABLE IN BONN SOON.

(B) DURING KOHL'S VISIT TO WSHDC IN MARCH HE WILL FOCUS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND NEED TO MOVE FORWARD IN MBFR. HE WILL ALSO RAISE STAR WARS ISSUE ABOUT WHICH FRG IS VERY CONCERNED. ROSSBACH SAID THEY BELIEVE KOHL MUST SEE WEINBERGER IN ORDER TO REGISTER PROGRESS AS HE IS KEY PLAYER ON POLITICO/MILITARY SUBJECTS;

...2

PAGE TWO WIGR3314 CONFD

(C) ROMANIAN FOREIGN MIN ANDREI TOLD GENSCHER RECENTLY THAT ANDROPOV WAS SUFFERING FROM DIABETES AS WELL AS KIDNEY DISORDER AND QUOTE WAS UNLIKELY EVER TO RECOVER UNQUOTE;

(D) EUROPEANS ARE WORKING TOWARD DEVELOPING NEW DEFENSIVE COOPERATION AND COPRODUCTION WITHIN CONTEXT OF WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION. IT WOULD INCLUDE ONLY FRG/FRANCE/UK/ITALY/BENELUX COUNTRIES. GREECE WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED BECAUSE OF POLICY DIFFERENCES. DANES AND IRISH WOULD ALSO BE LEFT OUT BECAUSE OF THEIR PACIFIST ATTITUDES;

(E) FRANCE WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT FRG DRIFT TO NEUTRALISM. ROSSBACH SAID FRANCE HAD MADE IT VERY CLEAR THAT IT WAS PREPARED TO TAKE EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES TO QUOTE BIND UNQUOTE FRG TO WESTERN EUROPE AND ENSURE THAT DEFENCE OF FRANCE BEGAN ON FRG EASTERN BORDERS RATHER THAN AT FRENCH BORDER. FRG WAS NOT SURE WHAT TO MAKE OF THIS FRENCH ATTITUDE AND HOW FRENCH DEMANDEUR POSITION SHOULD BEST BE PLAYED AND UTILIZED FOR GERMAN INTERESTS.

CCC/118 061641Z WIGR3314

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21
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INFO PRGUE MOSCO WSAW BGRAD BUCST BPEST WSHDC LDN ROME PRMNY
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PEKIN CNBRA PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP/DNACPOL/CIS
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA RBR RBD RGD RCR URR CPD ZSI

--- PMS MEETING WITH CZECH PM STROUGAL

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MEETING PREPARED BY EMB PRAGUE AND
PMDEL. FULL COMPTE RENDU HAS BEEN SENT SEPARATELY.

IN TWO AND HALF HOUR MET JAN25, PM TRUDEAU AND PM STROUGAL BROKE
CONSIDERABLE ICE. STROUGAL, WHO APPEARED IN REASONABLY GOOD
HEALTH AND RECOVERED FROM RUMOURED BOUT WITH CANCER, WAS IN GOOD
FORM AND PROVED TO BE SYMPATHETIC AND ACCOMMODATING INTERLOCUTOR.
IN PARTICULAR, HE DID NOT/NOT, AS EXPECTED, BEGIN WITH LONG MONOLOGUE
(AND TOWARDS END OF MTG PUT AWAY HIS NOTES TO ENGAGE IN REAL
DIALOGUE). RATHER HE GAVE FLOOR TO TRUDEAU WHO BY RESPONDING
ACCORDINGLY ENSURED ATTENTION REMAINED FOCUSED ON RECENT IMPROVE-
MENTS IN INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE, NEED FOR DIALOGUE, AND RESPONSIBI-
LITY OF POLITICAL LEADERS TO CONTROL MILITARY AND ENERGIZE
STOCKHOLM AND MBFR MTGS. AS RESULT THERE WERE NO/NO CONTENTIOUS
MOMENTS OR WORDS IN SPITE OF STROUGALS LARGELY PRO FORMA EXPOSE
OF WPO VIEWS ON ORIGINS OF CURRENT TENSIONS, CRITICAL OF USA, AND

...2

PAGE DEUX WIGR3310 CONF D

WPO POSITION ON VARIOUS DISARMAMENT AND EAST-WEST ISSUES. AT
SAME TIME STROUGAL SEVERAL TIMES REFERRED TO PMS SINCERITY AND
NOTED IT WAS NOT/NOT TRUDEAU WHO HAD QUOTE MILITARIZED FOREIGN POLICY
OR CALLED FOR CRUSADE AGAINST SOCIALIST COUNTRIES UNQUOTE. TRUDEAU
RESPONDED THAT WHILE REAGAN MAY HATE COMMUNISM, WPO LEADERS SHOULD
NOT/NOT CONCLUDE USA PRES WANTED TO START WAR. SIMILARLY, US PRESIDENT
SAW NEW OUTER SPACE WEAPONRY NOT/NOT AS DESTABILIZING FACTOR BUT AS
WAY TO STOP WAR. MEETING CONCLUDED WITH STROUGAL EXPRESSING
APPRECIATION FOR TRUDEAU'S FRANKNESS AND OPENNESS.

2. ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT/NOT REFER SPECIFICALLY TO ANDROPOV'S MOST
RECENT COMMENTS IN PRAVDA INTERVIEW, STROUGAL DID INDICATE
DEPLOYMENT OF 32 CRUISE AND PERSHING MISSILES WAS KEY ISSUE WHICH
WAS INTENDED TO GIVE MILITARY SUPERIORITY TO NATO GLOBALLY AS WELL
AS IN EUROPE. CZECHOSLOVAKIA, SMALL CENTRAL EUROPEAN COUNTRY WHICH
HAD BEEN DRAWN INTO VIRTUALLY EVERY EUROPEAN WAR IN LAST THOUSAND
YEARS AND HAD BEEN PUSHED AROUND BY HISTORY, COULD NOT/NOT BE PASSIVE
IN FACE OF INF. IT HAD BEEN QUOTE COMPELLED UNQUOTED TO TAKE
COUNTERMEASURES WHICH WERE QUOTE TACTICAL AND DEFENSIVE MEASURES
NOT/NOT TAKEN AT OUR INITIATIVE UNQUOTE. IF THE USA QUOTE SHOWS
WILLINGNESS UNQUOTE TO RETURN TO THE POSITION PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT
WE WILL DO THE SAME. GENSCHER WAS WRONG IN SAYING THAT NOTHING
HAD BEEN CHANGED BY BUNDESTAG VOTE. STROUGAL COULD NOT/NOT UNDERSTAND

...3

PAGE THREE WIGR3310 CONF D

WHY USA HAD REJECTED LAST SOVIET INF OFFER AND SAID WPO FULLY SUPPORTED SOVIET WALKOUT.ON MBFR CZECHOSLOVAKIA DATA HAD BEEN UNJUSTLY REJECTED BY NATO AS INCORRECT.WITH SMALL DENSELY POPULATED TERRITORY CZECHOSLOVAKIA COULD NOT/NOT HIDE NUMBER OF TROOPS, THEIR STATIONING OR MOVEMENTS.STOCKHOLM MTG WAS JUST BEGINNING BUT ALREADY IT WAS EVIDENT WPO MILITARY/POLITICAL APPROACH DIFFERED FROM NATOS MILITARY/TECHNICAL.AGREEING RHETORIC HAD TO CHANGE,STROUGAL NOTED GROMYKO WAS CRITICIZED BY WESTERN PRESS FOR HIS HARSH COMMENTS IN HIS STOCKHOLM SPEECH.SCHULTZ HOWEVER, HAD BEEN ALSO HARSH AND EVEN INCLUDED DOUBTS ABOUT PEACEFUL ARRANGEMENTS IN EUROPE(IE BORDERS).WPO WAS NEVERTHELESS READY TO NEGOTIATE AND PROPOSALS IN PRAGUE DECLARATION SHOULD BE MORE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED.

3.TRUDEAU EMPHASIZED THAT HIS BEING IN PRAGUE WAS ALONE WORTH GREAT DEAL AS SYMBOL THAT TWO COUNTRIES WITH NO/NO HOSTILITIES BETWEEN THEM COULD MEET TO REDUCE TENSION.HE EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING WITH CZECHOSLOVAK FRUSTRATIONS OVER LACK OF NATO RESPONSE TO PRAGUE DECLARATION.PROPOSALS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS WERE ALREADY BEING DISCUSSED AND ADVANCED.GENERAL LACK OF RESPONSE HOWEVER PROVED HIS MAIN POINT IE THAT TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY,PROPOSALS MUST BE MADE IN CLIMATE OF GOODWILL RATHER THAN POLITICAL AGGRESSION.PRAGUE DECLARATION HAD COME AT TIME

...4

PAGE FOUR WIGR3310 CONFD

OF HEIGHTENED TENSION WHEN NATO WAS NOT/NOT PREPARED TO LOOK SERIOUSLY AT WPO PROPOSALS. AGGRESSIVE LANGUAGE USED IN DECLARATION WAS ANOTHER NEGATIVE FACTOR. IF DECLARATION HAD BEEN MADE IN TIME OF DETENTE EG 1974 WPO WOULD NOT/NOT HAVE USED SUCH STRONG LANGUAGE AND DECLARATION WOULD NOT/NOT HAVE BEEN IGNORED. TRUDEAU EXPRESSED HOPE THAT IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE WOULD PERMIT PROPOSALS SUCH AS PRAGUE DECLARATION TO BE ASSESSED MORE OBJECTIVELY AND LESS PASSIONATELY THAN YEAR AGO. IMPROVED CLIMATE MIGHT SIMILARLY LEAD TO MORE PRODUCTIVE NEGS AT MBFR. IF EITHER BECAME BOGGED DOWN STROUGAL, TRUDEAU AND OTHER LEADERS SHOULD GO THERE TO ENERGIZE DISCUSSIONS. PROOF OF MERIT OF INVOLVEMENT OF POLITICAL LEADERS WERE DEVELOPMENTS SINCE WILLIAMSBURG: DETENTE WAS NO/NO LONGER DIRTY WORD AND NATO LEADERS INCLUDING THATCHER AND CRAZI WERE TRAVELLING TO EASTERN EUROPE. CONTACTS HAD TO BE ESTABLISHED TO ENSURE PROPOSALS SUCH AS PRAGUE DECLARATION WOULD BE LOOKED AT SERIOUSLY IN ATMOSPHERE OF CALM AND DETENTE RATHER THAN SUSPICION.

4. TRUDEAU SAID IT WAS UNACCEPTABLE TO HIM AS POLITICIAN THAT CSBMS WOULD TAKE SIX YEARS TO NEGOTIATE IN STKHM. CDA AND OTHER NATO COUNTRIES AGREED WPO MBFR PROPOSALS WERE GOOD BASIS FOR RENEWED DISCUSSION; IE THAT WE SHOULD FORGET ABOUT EXACT NUMBER OF TROOPS AND WORK TOWARDS REDUCTION TO 900,000 TROOPS ON EACH SIDE, BUT INSISTING ON VERIFICATION. WITHOUT PREDICTING CHANCES

...5

PAGE FIVE WIGR3310 CONF

OF SUPPORT OR SUCCESS, TRUDEAU EXPRESSED GENERAL HOPE THAT NATO
COULD ESPOUSE TREATY ON QUOTE NON-FIRST USE OF FORCE UNQUOTE
DOCTRINE PROPOSED IN PRAGUE DECLARATION, IF TWO SIDES COULD FIRST
ESTABLISH EQUILIBRIUM IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES.

5. IN CONCLUDING STROUGAL SUMMARIZED CZECHOS RESPONSE AS FOLLOWS
ON VARIOUS CDN SUGGESTIONS: (A) CONF ON FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS WAS NOT/NOT
NEW, AND THERE WAS NO/NO GUARANTEE OF SUCCESS, BUT SHOULD BE SUPPORT-
TED. USA AND SOVIETS WERE MOST IMPORTANT; (B) NPT 1985 REVIEW
CONF WOULD BE IMPORTANT AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA WOULD BE INTERESTED IN
CDN IDEAS; AND (C) ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS IN LOW AS WELL AS HIGH
ALTITUDE HAD TO BE INCLUDED AND NEGOTIATIONS HAD TO PROCEED
RAPIDLY ITS OUTCOME WOULD AFFECT MILITARY BALANCE AND HAVE
DECISIVE INFLUENCE.

6. IN SUM, GOOD ATMOSPHERE ESTABLISHED AT MTG WAS WELCOME STEP
FORWARD AND LAID EXCELLENT BASIS FOR MTG WITH PRESIDENT HUSAK.
CZECHOSLOVAKS TOOK OBVIOUS INTEREST IN PMS VISIT WHICH WAS FIRST
ONE BY CDN PM AND FIRST VISIT BY NATO HEAD OF GOVT SINCE WILLY
BRANDT VISITED PRAGUE IN 1973. THIS WAS REFLECTED IN FULL TURN
OUT OF MINISTERS AT AIRPORT AND OFFICIAL DINNER.

CCC/047 060949Z WIGR3310

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PARIS WIGR3309 06FEV84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 060900

INFO WSAW PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR DMF IFB RGB RBD RBR IDR IDA

FROM SMITH

REF BONN TEL ZQGR0048 03FEB

---CDA-GDR CONTACT ON ARMS CONTROL

AMB MCLAINE WILL BE DEPARTING FROM WSAW WED FEB 8 FOR EAST
BERLIN. IF YOU AGREE WITH LINE OF APPROACH OUTLINED PARA 2
REFTEL RE CDA-GDR CONTACT ON ARMS CONTROL GRATEFUL YOU INFORM
MCLAINE BY 080900 PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE SO HE CAN FOLLOW
UP WITH KRABATCZ.

CCC/047 060949Z WIGR3309

R E S T R I C T E D

FM BNATO YBGR2055 06FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO LDN PARIS BONN ROME HAGUE BRU WSHDC NDHQOTT/ADMPOC/CPD/DGINFO

DNACPOL PMOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA DMF RGB RCD RCR RBD RBR IFD IDR IDA IDD

REF LDN XNGR0243 03FEB

---PMS INITIATIVE:REQUEST FOR BRIEFING

WE WERE APPROACHED BY ATLANTIC NEWS/NOUVELLES ATLANTIQUES,
(BRUSSELS BASED TWICE WEEKLY PUBLICATION DEALING WITH ALLIANCE
MATTERS)REGARDING PMS INITIATIVE.AS SMITH WILL RECALL
ATLATNIC NEWS IS FAVOURABLE TO NATO AND IS USUALLY KEPT QUOTE
WELL INFORMED UNQUOTE BY UNNAMED OFFICIALS WITHIN
INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT AS WELL AS BY FEW DELEGATIONS
INCLUDING USA DEL AND OCCASIONALLY OURSELVES.WE HAVE
DELAYED MEETING WITH ATLANTIC NEWS JOURNALIST UNTIL
NEXT MONDAY 13FEB.IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF YOU COULD PROVIDE US WITH
TALKING POINTS BY THEN,WHICH WOULD LIKELY APPEAR NEARLY VERBATIM.
CCC/298 061700Z YBGR2055

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM DELHI WBGR1051 06FEB84

TO EXTOTT PSR DELIVER BY 060900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR PSD IDDZ

REF YOURTEL PSR0228 01FEB

---GANDHI-TRUDEAU MESSAGE

ON RECEIPT OF REFTEL 06FEB WE OBTAINED FOLLOWING INFO FROM GHAREKHAN IN PRIME MINISTERS OFFICE. PWL DEL MET PM GANDHI 20JAN. IT CONSISTED OF SILKIN(UK), GRIMSON(ICELAND) AND DUNLOP(EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF PWO). MEETING OF SENIOR OFFICIALS HAS BEEN FIXED FOR 16-17FEB IN LDN. PWO REPS, MOST PROBABLY SILKIN AND DUNLOP, WILL BE PRESENT. INDIANS FAVOUR SHORT STATEMENT(IE MUCH SHORTER THAN GOA DECLARATION). THEY ASSUME LEADERS MAY WISH TO LOOK AT DRAFT STATEMENT BEFORE REPLYING TO INVITATION TO COME TO DELHI.

2. WHILE NO/NO DATE HAS BEEN SET FOR DELHI MEETING, GHAREKHAN SAID THEY WERE LOOKING AT WEEK OF MARCH 05. HE DOUBTED THAT ALL SEVEN LEADERS WOULD BE ABLE TO COME BUT THOUGHT THERE WAS GOOD CHANCE THREE OR FOUR WOULD BE PRESENT WITH OTHERS ASSOCIATING THEMSELVES WITH DECLARATION.

3. NO/NO OFFICIAL REPLIES HAVE BEEN RECEIVED YET. GHAREKHAN CONFIRMED THAT PWO HAD CONTACTED MEXICO.

CCC/282 061042Z WBGR1051

5

~~Smith IDDZ?~~

Division Phoned _____
Person LB
Local Time 9:5

MF
LD

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSAW UMGR0193 06FEB84

TO EXTOTT LRBR DELIVER BY 060900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR RBD IDD RBR

SMITH FROM MCLAINE

---PMS VISIT TO GDR

I HAVE AKSED FOR AND EXPECT APPOINTMENT WITH KRABATSCH IN BRLIN
ON 09 OR 10FEB.AS I LEAVE WSAW MORNING OF 08FEB IT WOULD BE MOST
APPRECIATED IF ANY COMMENTS OR INSTRUCTIONS YOU MAY HAVE FOR MTG
COULD REACH ME BVY 080800. *Done*

CCC/127 061145Z UMGR0193

*MAS
FILE*

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM VMBFR XTDR0021 06FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDR

INFO BNATO MOSCO STKHM/SCDEL WSHDC LDN BONN PRMNY GENEV

NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/ CPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR IDD IFB IDDZ IDRA IDRL IDA

REF COURTEL XTDR0019 03FEB84

---MBFR: OPENING OF ROUND

AHG RODAY AGREED ON BRIEF SPECIAL REPORT TO NAC CONCERNING EASTERN
PROPCSALS ON MODALITIES FOR OPENING OF NEXT ROUND.

2. IN SUMMARY, REPORT

(A) SUGGESTS THAT BELGIAN AUTHORITIES SHOULD RECONFIRM TO POLES
WESTERN ACCEPTANCE OF 16MAR STARTING DATE, NOTING WESTERN DELS ARE
ALREADY IN VIENN;

(B) RECOMMENDS THAT NATO SHOULD NOT/NOT ENGAGE WITH EAST IN
COMMUNIQUE DRAFTING EXERCISE, LEAVING EACH SIDE TO HANDLE PRESS
MATTERS AS IT SEES FIT; AND

(C) REQUESTS THAT POLES BE INFORMED THAT IN ACCORDANCE WITH
ESTABLISHED PRACTICE, QUESTION OF END OF ROUND DATE, ALONG WITH
OPENING DATE OF SUCCEEDING ROUND, SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY DELS OF
BOTH SIDES IN VIENN.

3. FULL TEXT OF REPORT GOING OUT TODAY UNDER NATO-WIDE WCA/IS 424
061105Z FEB84.

CCC/076 070913Z XTDR0021

MASTER FILE

PROGRAMME DE LA VISITE A PARIS
de M. Gary Smith
----- du 5 au 7 février 1984 -----

Le 5 février 1984

19H15 - Arrivée à CDG I vol LH 128

- hébergement à l'hôtel St-James et Albany
202, rue de Rivoli

Le 6 février 1984

9H45 - une voiture vous prendra à l'hôtel

10H00- rencontre avec M. Jacques Montpetit

11H00- rencontre au Ministère des Relations extérieures

seront présents: Mme Isabelle Renouard
Chef du Service des Affaires stratégiques
et du désarmement

M. Benoît d'Aboville
Sous-directeur au désarmement

M. Alain Richard
Sous-directeur de l'Europe orientale
(à confirmer)

13H00- Déjeuner offert par M. Montpetit, au restaurant
"La Bourgogne", 6, avenue Bosquet, Paris 7e
(voir liste ci-jointe des participants)

15H30 - Rencontre avec Monsieur l'Ambassadeur Dupuy

- Soirée libre

Le 7 février 1984

- Coordonnées et dispositions de départ à préciser

DEJEUNER OFFERT PAR M. JACQUES MONTPETIT
Le lundi, 6 février à 13H00
Restaurant la Bourgogne
6, ave Bosquet, Paris 7e-----

A l'occasion du passage de M. Gary Smith, directeur
du contrôle des armements et du désarmement au
Ministère des Affaires extérieures et Conseiller
du Premier Ministre pour son initiative de paix

INVITES

Mme Isabelle Renouard
Chef du Service des Affaires stratégiques et
du désarmement
Direction des affaires politiques
MRE

M. Benoît d'Aboville
Sous-directeur du désarmement
Direction des Affaires politiques
MRE

M. Alain Richard
Sous-directeur de l'Europe Orientale
Direction de l'Eruope
MRE

Gilles Landry
Premier Secrétaire
Ambassade du Canada



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
February 8, 1984

WITH COMPLIMENTS
OF THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

AVEC LES HOMMAGES
DU
MINISTÈRE
DES
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

IDDZ -

R.P. McDougall
Deputy Director
East Asia Relations Division/PER



Copied to: PED
 IDDZ
PER/Davidson o/r

PRIME MINISTER • PREMIER MINISTRE
OTTAWA K1A 0A2

le 5 février 1984

MASTER FILE

Monsieur Michel,

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Je tiens à vous remercier de l'aide inestimable que votre personnel et vous-même m'avez apportée lors de ma récente "visite éclair" en Chine.

Mes entretiens avec les dirigeants chinois ont été opportuns et fort utiles. Ils ont en outre donné tous les résultats que l'on pouvait légitimement en attendre, compte tenu des préoccupations particulières des Chinois et de leur optique face aux grands problèmes mondiaux mettant en cause les superpuissances. J'ai été particulièrement satisfait d'avoir pu recueillir leurs vues avant la visite du premier ministre Zhao au Canada.

Je vous saurais gré de transmettre mes remerciements les plus sincères à tous les membres de votre personnel pour avoir si généreusement payé de leur personne à cette occasion.

Avec mes hommages à madame Gauvin, je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, l'assurance de ma très haute considération *et de mon amical souvenir.*

Qin S. T.

Monsieur Michel Gauvin
Ambassadeur du Canada
en République populaire de Chine
10, chemin San Li Tun
Secteur Chao Yang
Beijing

EPB/MICHAEL SHENSTONE 3-4228/jpt

cc IDDZ
IDA (Pearson)



Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA K1A 0G2,
January 4, 1984.

Professor John E. Trent,
Professor,
Department of Political Science,
University of Ottawa,
OTTAWA, Ontario K1N 6N5.

RETURN TO RENOYER AU	3100	FOR FILING POUR - ETRE PORVE AU DOSSIER
ACC	REF	DATE
FILE	DOSSIER	
28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission		

Dear John,

I am sorry about the delay in acknowledging your letter of November 28, in which you raised the possibility of collaboration by the International Political Science Association with Prime Minister Trudeau's peace initiative. I was absent at the Commonwealth Conference in India when your letter was received, and got caught up in some other issues on my return.

You mentioned that from the point of view of the Association, collaboration would be dependent on the Prime Minister's endeavour becoming a longer term undertaking. The future of the Canadian initiative beyond a fairly short time-frame of weeks or months is still largely indeterminate, so it is rather difficult at present to foresee how a dialogue with the Association could be translated into practical cooperation, despite the very interesting ideas indicated in your letter.

Let us resume contact on this subject in a month or so. I should also like an opportunity to chat with you about a number of other topics on the peace and disarmament front.

Yours sincerely,

Michael Shenstone,
Assistant Deputy Minister,
Political and International
Security Affairs.

001486

with the
compliments of

avec les
compliments de

Justice D. Archdeacon



Government of Canada
Privy Council Office

Gouvernement du Canada
Bureau du Conseil privé

Louis

*This letter was passed directly to the PM
by Dan Heap M.P. We have just received it.*

Canada

001487

S. W. Stillich c/o
S. W. STILLICH & ASSOC. (Translators)

SUITE 704 - 185 BAY STREET
TORONTO, ONTARIO, CANADA M5J 1K6
TELEPHONE (416) 364-5666

file
SD

Feb 4th, 1984

Department of External Affairs
Ottawa, Ontario K1A 0G2

28-6-1-TRUDEAU
9

Attention: Mr. Louis A. Delvoie,
Chairman,
Task Force Working Group

Your file no.
IDDZ-0018

Re: Suggestions for a new attempt to ask the Soviets to
invite Prime Minister Trudeau

Dear Mr. Delvoie,

Thank you for your letter of January 10th, 1984. I am glad that my views on the psychological approach of the Soviets were of interest to you..

This time I have an additional suggestion which I already indicated to you over the telephone Friday last week.

Through the media I learned that the Prime Minister had approached President Yuri Andropov. I think such an attempt would not lead to anything but a formal display of courtesy, though this would undoubtedly have a high publicity value for the Prime Minister among the Canadian public. However, a talk with President Andropov would bypass the decisive personalities among the Soviets, because the CENTRAL COMMITTEE is the sole body where the decisions are made. The Central Committee appoints the various politicians to their posts. "Free elections" in the Western sense are not the way in which the Soviet hierarchy is formed. There are certainly a lot of intrigues going on behind the scenes in Moscow and it is difficult to know who is more influential and who is not, though it seems that, due to President Reagan's hard-line policy, the Soviet military was won the upper hand. But the decision making personalities are all on the Central Committee. Addressing the Supreme Soviet or the Polit Bureau would not lead to any change in Soviet attitude. The Prime Minister should insist on speaking to the assembled Central Committee or, if this is not possible at all, to several members of the Central Committee individually.

May I, therefore, suggest that the Prime Minister make another attempt to establish contact by suggesting that he would like to get personally acquainted with the members of the Central Committee and address them on the general question of possibilities for rapprochement between East and West as seen from the Canadian

point of view. It should be pointed out that he would not discuss the withdrawal of atomic missiles.

After many years of animosity between the two superpowers it cannot be expected that now - all of a sudden - they will change their attitudes and make friends. What is needed, is a transitional period during which every effort should be made to prepare the grounds for a climate that facilitates the resumption of talks on disarmament.

The address of the Prime Minister before the Central Committee would be more of an academic nature but have favourable repercussions for the Prime Minister in Canada.

Within this framework the Prime Minister will have an opportunity to make constructive suggestions to the Soviets for preparing the grounds for a better relationship to the West.

You would certainly be able to design several campaigns for the Prime Minister to suggest to the Soviets, the US and elsewhere, to promote better understanding.

For example, the Soviets could be exposed to the following plan which would provide them with a possibility of promoting understanding of Soviet attitudes in the US (of course, such plan would have to be submitted to the Secretary General of the UN after testing Soviet reaction):

I would like to suggest an organized effort by the UN to have member countries host groups of politicians from other countries in order to expose them to their problems. All member states would be interested in promoting their own political philosophy or ideas. Therefore, the Secretary General of the UN would have their cooperation. For example, a group of American personalities might spend a whole year in the USSR, studying the culture of the Soviets, their economic system, policies, literature, social fabric, history etc. The other way round, a group of Soviet personalities would spend a year in the US. Each member country of the UN would select its own group and finance the hosting of the visiting foreign group. Of course, not only politicians holding office at the present time should be included in these groups but also future politicians, for example members of the Department of External Affairs who have chosen a diplomatic career and expect to be promoted to higher responsible positions in the future.

The same could be done with groups of journalists and other media personnel. Also, newspapers in the US should reserve a column for Soviet ideas at regular intervals, e. g. weekly. Vice versa, Pravda and other Soviet newspapers could do the same for American views. E. g. the New York Times could negotiate such an agreement with Pravda.

In this way large numbers of leading people would be exposed to opposing intellectual climates. They would not only visit one country but several, preferably areas of international tension. This plan could be organized by the UN.

When the Prime Minister will be in Moscow a decision could be made to establish a Soviet-Canadian Committee to work out various ways of easing international tension.

The US should also be approached and invited to do its part in creating a better international atmosphere. Example: It should be explained to the US administration that the best policy to avoid Soviet influence in Central America and other Third World countries is to improve social conditions in these countries by building schools so people will no longer be kept illiterate, to build hospitals to help people improve their health, to distribute funds - not to the governments, the banks or big companies but to channel them directly to the people who need them. This would avoid situations in which the governments concerned, in their desperation look for "help" to the USSR.

If the US would pursue such a policy systematically, East-West tensions in the Third World would disappear.

Let us learn from Cuba where Cosa Nostra had a great influence and prostitution was big business. Now Cuba has a Social Security System which is better than that of other Central American countries. Cuba would not have come under Soviet influence, if the US would have helped the country to focus on these problems.

Another example: Nicaragua under Somoza swallowed huge sums of money from the US but aid was watered down and did not reach those in need. But now the Country's industrial production is already exceeding that of Guatemala and Salvador. Illiteracy has been cut down considerably. New forests are planted; electrification has started on a larger scale. All this could have been done by the US and Soviet influence or aid could have been avoided.

Consequently, East-West tension can be sublimated, if US policies follow these lines.

o

I consider the Prime Minister's present attempts just a beginning of a much greater mission which will last several years.

I hope these few ideas will be interesting enough for you to consider.

Thank you for your attention.

Yours truly,


S. W. Stillich

OFFICE OF
THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



CABINET DU
SECRETARIE D'ETAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES

C5

Mr. McMeed
IDD

MEMORANDUM

To
A Office of the Under-Secretary

From
De MINA

Security UNCLASSIFIED
Sécurité

Reference
Référence

Date February 3, 1984

Subject
Sujet Parliamentary Report - February 3

ON THE HILL

The House met at 11:00. Following Question Period it considered John Fraser's opposition motion condemning the Govt "for having taken no action to resolve the problems facing the Pacific Coast fishery primary among which is the govt's Pacific Fisheries Policy, described by the Pearce Report as resulting from "uncertain objectives, weak and out-dated legislation, bad organization, contradictory programs and confusion", and which undermines the viability of the Pacific Coast fishery, reduces fish stocks, and threatens the livelihood of Canadians who depend upon this important resource."

Yesterday, Mr. Sargeant's bill designed to declare Canada a nuclear weapons-free zone was defeated in a voice vote without debate. Mr. Sargeant chose not to speak to his bill and the Speaker failed to recognize our Parliamentary Secretary, Madame Beauchamp-Niquet, when she rose to speak to it. When the Speaker called for a voice vote, he judged that the motion was lost. When less than five NDP Members rose to request a voice vote, a fact pointed out by both Deputy Opposition Leader Erik Nielsen and Minister de Bané, the Speaker declared the motion lost.

Yesterday in the Senate, Senator Frith spoke to Senator Asselin's concerns on the peace initiative and in response to questions from Senators Guay and Roblin included in the debates the Garrison Joint Technical Committee Joint Press Line and Garrison Quadrupartite Technical Committee, Terms of Reference

Q.P. questions of departmental interest: PM'S PEACE INITIATIVE.

Member Statements of departmental interest: Joe Reid spoke about Soviet oppression in the Baltic States and Poland and Stanley Hudecki said that there was a need to tolerate pluralism and co-existence between different ideologies in Central America. The Liberal Member also called for the establishment of a Canadian Embassy in Managua, Nicaragua.

SENSE OF THE HOUSE

The PM returned after making his foray across the Iron Curtain. While George Hees welcomed back his old sparring partner, saying that "punching the bag and skipping the rope" had been a little difficult while the PM was away, other Opposition spokesmen used his presence to different effect. Statistics Canada reported this morning that unemployment had risen last month and both the NDP and Conservatives used this as evidence that the Govt's economic recovery and job creation programme was bankrupt. Doug Lewis recalled a speech made by the PM in Jan 1980 at the University of New Brunswick where he declared that the next great challenge was to create jobs especially for young people. Jim Hawkes reminded the PM that he had said that economic recovery had begun and Sinclair Stevens pointed out that OECD figures failed to support Minister Lalonde's claim that Canada's economic record was comparable to that of the US. Shouting "you've blown it", NDP Leader Ed Broadbent

- DPM/SSEA (2)
- MINA (11)
- MINE/Jalbert/
Laverdure
- MINT/Burbridge/
MacDonald
- PMO/Fairbairn
- PCO/Adam/Fadden/
Elcock/Mitchell
- USS LCD
- CMR (2) LCR
- DMT MCB
- DMF NAX
- CCB PED
- CCBR PPD
- SFB PSD
- TFB RBD
- IFB RCD
- EFB RGB
- LGB RGX
- PGB RSD
- SCD
- FPR SCS
- ACB SCI
- ADA SCH
- APD SFP
- APZ SID
- CCBM SIS
- CCBA TAD
- CGD TID
- CGE UGB
- CGL URD
- CGS XDX
- CMD ZEP
- CML ZSP
- CPD ZSS
- EED IMU
- EPD
- ETD ESD
- GAD TGX
- GGB
- GMD
- IDD TDD
- IDDZ TED
- IMD UTD
- JCD


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said that the net result of the Govt's economic recovery programme was 1.5 million unemployed Canadians and Canadian taxpayers' money being used by Canadian banks to buy US financial institutions. For his part, the final Opposition speaker, John Crosbie, who like the PM, has also returned after an absence from the House, claimed that the same "old obfuscation" lay on the other side.

Replying for the Ministry, the PM invited the Opposition to await next week's budget, while Minister Lalonde argued that growth in Canada was about equal to that in the US last year.

PM'S PEACE INITIATIVE

Paul McRae, the Member from Thunder Bay, congratulated the PM on his Eastern European visits and asked whether after pointing out "that the emperor, i.e. NATO, has no clothes" would he not pursue the idea of alternate NATO strategies. The PM said that while he did not actually say the emperor had no clothes, he had remarked that a number of others, including Opposition Leader Mulroney, had. But since then, the Opposition "who are paranoid about anything a third-level official in the Pentagon might say" had changed their views. The PM said that contact with the Warsaw block was important and he noted that British PM Thatcher was making a trip to Czechoslovakia "presumably in the same spirit."



D. Colin Robertson
Departmental Assistant



Distribution: MINA (9)
USS
FPR
MIA

HOUSE OF COMMONS BOOK - BRIEFING NOTE
RE DE LA CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES - NOTES D'INFORMATION

Section
PM's Task Force

Subject/Highlights / Sujet/Points saillants

Bilateral consultations between Canada and the German Democratic Republic (GDR)

Source

Press reports

Assessment / Évaluation

Classification

CONFIDENTIAL

Our report from the Prime Minister's delegation reads: "The Prime Minister and Honecker agreed that disarmament experts from each side would study the opposite alliance's positions, and inaugurate bilateral Arms Control and disarmament consultations. Smith (Task Force) and Ernst Krabatcz (Director of Policy Planning in GDR MFA) were given the task of coming up with a list of proposals from the two alliances which have potential for acceptance by both sides. The study will cover all NATO and WPO proposals, including those to ban weapons in space and chemical weapons."

Suggested Reply / Réponse suggérée

The Prime Minister and General Secretary Honecker agreed that bilateral consultations between Canadian and GDR officials be held to identify common ground in the positions of both sides on arms control issues.

Prepared by / Préparé par
John McNee/IDDZ

Division / Direction
Task Force Working
Group on PM's ini-
tiative (IDDZ)

Date
03 FEB.1984

Tel. no. / N° de té
995-5912
001493



Government
of Canada

Gouvernement
du Canada

**ACTION FICHE DE
REQUEST SERVICE**

To — A

File No. — Dossier N°

Date

MF

From — De

Please call
Prière d'appeler

Tel. No. — N° de tél.

Ext. — Poste

Returned your call
Vous a rappelé

Will call again
Vous rappellera

Wants to see you
Désire vous voir

Date

Time — Heure

Message received by
Message reçu par

Action
Donner suite

Approval
Approbation

Note & return
Noter et retourner

Comments
Commentaires

Draft reply
Projet de réponse

Note & forward
Noter et faire suivre

As requested
Comme demandé

Signature

Note & file
Noter et classer

Approved by DMF 6/2/84
+ given to MINA/Robertson
for DPM + (presumably)
PM

001494

CONFIDENTIAL

Notes On A Call By The USA Chargé d'Affaires
On de Montigny Marchand, February 3.

John Rouse, USA chargé d'affaires, called on de Montigny Marchand, accompanied by UGB/Burney and IDDZ/Delvoie, to make a "parallel demarche" to that made yesterday in Washington D.C. by Acting Assistant Secretary of State Kelly to Gotlieb to convey USA concerns about Canada's plans to table the three arms control measures at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva and the Prime Minister's remarks in Europe on NATO strategy and the US commitment to Europe. (Essentially, Rouse re-stated the basic points made to Gotlieb in Washington).

Rouse began with the Prime Minister's three arms control measures by saying that while they appreciated Canada's very active participation in disarmament issues, the USA is "very concerned" that the Canadian proposals not be tabled February 7 in the CD. He said the US and most NATO allies have substantive problems on all three and hoped for full bilateral and multilateral consultations before the papers are tabled. If not, they would not have had a full opportunity to affect our thinking. He argued that as the three proposals bear on US strategic interests and NATO policy, there would be value in consultation before tabling them.

Marchand made a distinction between tabling and circulating the papers; Rouse said circulation would have very much the same impact as tabling. Marchand expressed Canada's determination to have these ideas circulated, but noted their suggestion that more time elapse for further consultations. He undertook to convey these not unreasonable representations to the Deputy Prime Minister and to advise the US embassy. Marchand noted that there had already been extensive consultations with the State Department, ACDA and the Pentagon when our experts visited Washington in early December. We have benefitted from having some of their views and the papers had been slightly revised after those consultations. Since the beginning we have known their views on the Prime Minister's suffocation proposals, but the Prime Minister found it difficult to accept the idea that our proposals should be "neutralized". Rouse replied that this was not their request.

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CONFIDENTIAL

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Delvoie explained that we had never fixed February 7 as the date of circulation, rather our plan was to do so fairly early on in the CD session, which runs through February and March. Our intention was for the Canadian delegation to circulate them as "discussion papers" to other delegations as two of the papers did not fall directly under the CD agenda, though in general we thought the CD the suitable cadre for circulating these papers.

Marchand queried Kelly's assertion that the proposal on mobility ran counter to the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations as he had discussed it sometime ago with Scowcroft, who did not reject the idea.

On the Prime Minister's recent remarks in Europe, Rouse said the US was "disturbed" by his comments which appear to question the viability of NATO's military strategy and the credibility of the US commitment to Europe. It was harmful to Alliance cohesion; they were "surprised and dismayed", particularly as Canada has not raised these matters in NATO or bilaterally. He said the *raison d'être* of the Alliance continues and they hope that Canada will take steps to correct the impression of an alliance in disarray created by these remarks.

Marchand said that the Prime Minister had raised this line of thinking at lunch with Shultz in Washington, who had said that once NATO'S revisitation of the Harmel Report was finished these questions could be looked at. Thus the Prime Minister had broached the subject at least once with a senior US interlocutor.

The Prime Minister had reiterated questions others had on their minds and he had made a specific point of not intending to undermine NATO policy or intra-alliance confidence. There were risks in speaking in public on these issues, but we had argued that building confidence should be on the agendas of political leaders: by reiterating our emphasis on confidence we may appear to have downplayed deterrence, with its element of uncertainty. There may be a trade-off between confidence (and certainty) and deterrence (and uncertainty).

The Prime Minister and President Reagan had invoked free public debate as one of the superior assets of Western democracies; suggestions of inhibiting that debate would run against the basic nature of our societies. This was not to say that Alliance solidarity was no more. On the Eastern European trip the Prime Minister had been operating at the intersection of these ideas.

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- 3 -

Marchand noted these as serious, strongly-felt representations from a friendly country and leader of our side and undertook to relay them to the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister.

Rouse said the Prime Minister in his initiative had made clear that he was working from a NATO allied context, but that he seemed to have departed from this line last week.

Delvoie recalled that Canada had long been an advocate of USA engagement in Europe and, as we had told the US embassy earlier this week, Canada remains fully committed to NATO and its policies, and this commitment was fully endorsed by the Prime Minister.

Marchand said that in the wake of the CRUISE testing decision, the Prime Minister feels a strong obligation to various constituencies to support robust intellectual debate about the wisdom of fundamental strategic questions. He stressed the Prime Minister's strong beliefs and the necessity of political discourse in an adult democracy.

Rouse said that beyond the State Department's initial statement after Davos they had no intention of engaging in public debate on this issue.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TRANSMITTAL SLIP - NOTE D'ENVOI

TO/À MINA (via DMF)

FROM/DE IDDZ

SUBJECT/SUJET PM's Private Conversation with Czech PM Strougal

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ	SECRET
FILE DOSSIER	
DATE	February 3, 1984

RECORD OF CONSULTATION - RAPPORT DE CONSULTATION

COPIES SENT TO: (DIV. SYMBOLS) EXEMPLAIRES ADRESSÉS À: (SYMBOLES DE DIR.)	PREPARED IN CONSULTATION WITH (NAMES OF INDIVIDUALS AND DIVISIONAL SYMBOLS) ÉTABLI EN CONSULTATION AVEC (NOMS DES INDIVIDUS ET SYMBOLES DE DIRECTION)
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PMO
MINA
DMF
IFB
IDDZ ✓

For your signature,
if you agree.

Original Signed by
de MONTIGNY MARCHAND

TO BE RETAINED WITH FILE COPY - A CONSERVER AVEC L'EXEMPLAIRE DESTINE AU DOSSIER

EXT. 934/BIL. (REV. 7/71)

Deputy Prime Minister
Secretary of State for External Affairs

OTTAWA

Ministre des Affaires étrangères
Ottawa

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

YOUR PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH CZECH PM STROUGAL

I have read with great interest the account of your private conversation with Prime Minister Strougal in the course of which he gave you some information on the state of President Andropov's health and on Soviet thinking regarding the future of the INF and START negotiations. Although I cannot be sure how new this information might be to the USA Administration, I think that it is of direct interest to the USA and should be shared.

If you agree, we might communicate this information to the USA by (a) your sending a personal letter to President Reagan or (b) having our ambassador in Washington pass it on to a senior official in the State Department or (c) transmitting it through existing Canada-USA intelligence channels. In this instance, I think that a démarche by Ambassador Gotlieb might be most appropriate.

I should be grateful for your views on this matter.

A.J.M.

FEB - 6 1984

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Files
Division Phoned UGB
Person Pat
Local Time 1245

C O N F I D E N T I A L

REF 330765 JUN 20 1984

FM WSHDC UNGR2010 03FEB84

28-6-1-TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION

TO EXTOTT IDDZ UGB FLASH

INFO MOSCO BNATO CANMILREPNATO LDN ROME PARIS BONN VMBFR HAGUE
PEKIN TOKYO PRMNY GENEV OSLO COPEN ATHNS WSAW BUCST BPEST
STKHM/SCDEL NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/DACPOL/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/CIS
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR RBD ZSIMINE MINT UGB IDD RBR RCR
RSR RCD RSD CPD ZSP URT URE LCD LSD RGB URR

REF OURTELS UNGR1094 27JAN UNGR1075 24JAN NOTAL

---PM S INITIATIVE:USA CONCERNS

SUMMARY:RETELS MAKE CASE FOR CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH ADMIN ON
EAST-WEST ISSUES AND FOR DEBRIEFING ADMIN ON PM S RECENT TRIP TO
EASTERN EUROPE. THIS CASE IS ENHANCED BY USA STATE DEPT COMPLAINTS
(REPEATED YESTERDAY BY ASST SECTY BURT TO AMB)WHICH ARE BASED ON
ADMIN NERVOUSNESS OVER CONTINUING POST-DEPLOYMENT SIT IN EUROPE
AND SENSITIVITY TO ADMIN HARDWARE PROPOSALS IN ELECTION YEAR.

2.REPORT:OURTEL UNGR2006 02FEB REPORTS ON DEMARCHE MADE BY ADMIN
TO EXPRESS CONCERN OVER PM TRUDEAU S OBSERVATIONS AT DAVOS SEEMING
TO USA TO QUESTION NATO STRATEGY AND CREDITIBILITY OF USA LINKAGE
TO WESTERN EUROPE.ISSUE CAME UP IN SIMILAR TERMS IN LATER DISCUSSIONS
INCLUDING OBSERVATIONS TO GOTLIEB FROM ^R_^ BUT THAT STATE DEPT CONSIDERS
PM REMARKS GO TO HEART OF USA-EUROPE POLITICAL RELATIONS.

3.WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CLEAR UP SOME OF DISTORTED IMPRESSIONS THAT
PRESS AND OTHER DECRPTIONS OF PM S REMARKS HAVE CREATED AND TO

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PAGE TWO UNGR2010, CONFID

REASSURE STATE DEPT ONCE AGAIN ON CDA S BASIC COMMITMENTS. PM
TRUDEAU S TRIP TO EASTERN EUROPE IS CONSISTENT WITH NATO
DECLARATION IN DEC AND POLICY OF ADMIN ITSELF ON DIFFERENTIATION.
THERE IS NO/NO PROBLEM IN MAKING ASSESSMENT THAT TRIP HAS BEEN FROM
EVERY POINT OF VIEW WORTHWHILE.

4. INDEED, THIRD RAIL OF EAST-WEST POLITICAL DIALOGUE ASPECT OF PM S
PEACE INITIATIVE HAS NOT/NOT REALLY BEEN QUESTIONED AT ANY TIME
BY KNOWLEDGEABLE OFFICIALS HERE EXCEPT TO OBSERVE LATELY THAT EVENTS
HAD ALREADY MOVED USA POLICY IN DIRECTION OF RESTARTING DIALOGUE.

5. AMERICAN CONCERNS ARE REALLY WEST-WEST IN CHARACTER AND ARE DIRECTED
TOWARD TWO AREAS. (A) QUESTIONING OF POLITICAL ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING
NATO STRATEGIC DOCTRINE WHICH CLD TEND TO REINFORCE ARGUMENTS AND
POTENCY OF ANTI-DEPLOYMENT GROUPS AND NEUTRALISTS IN WESTERN EUROPE;
AND (B) PUBLICLY PURSUED ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS WHICH SEEK SPECIFICALLY
TO ADJUST, LIMIT OR OTHERWISE AFFECT, MILITARY HARDWARE PROGRAMS OF
USA WITHOUT ADEQUATE POLICY CONSULTATIONS HERE BEFOREHAND, AND WHICH
THEN PROPOSE DISCUSSION OF SUCH PROGRAMS IN MULTILATERAL FORUM JUDGED
TO BE INAPPROPRIATE.

6. IT SEEMS THAT USA HAS CONCLUDED CDA HAS OFFENDED ON BOTH OF ABOVE
TWO COUNTS AS INDICATED IN OURTEL UNGR2006 AND PAPER OUTLINING
PRELIMINARY USA VIEWS ON OUR CD PROPOSALS SENT TO YOU BY FAX.

7. THESE ARE INDEED DIFFICULT QUESTIONS. THERE IS HIGH POTENTIAL FOR
ANXIETY HERE ON QUESTIONING OF ESTABLISHED POSITIONS OF ALLIANCE.

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PAGE THREE UNGR2010 CONF

USA POSITION MILITARILY AND DIPLOMATICALLY IS PROBABLY BOUND TO SUGGEST A PREFERENCE THAT CDA NOT/NOT ENGAGE IN ANY INITIATIVES OR MAKE PUBLICLY ANY OBSERVATIONS ON SUCH SENSITIVE ISSUES, PARTICULARLY DURING ELECTION YEAR WHEN USA/USSR RELNS AND ARMS CONTROL ARE POTENTIALLY HIGHLY VULNERABLE AREA FOR ADMIN POLITICALLY. SINCE THIS PREFERENCE IS INCONSISTENT WITH CDN FOREIGN POLICY VOCATION AND NEED TO TACKLE ISSUES OF GREAT PUBLIC CONCERN THERE HAS TO BE EMPHASIS ON CONSULTATIVE PROCESS TO ENSURE THAT USA INTERESTS ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. OBVIOUSLY, HOWEVER, THERE ARE LIMITS. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, PRE REAGAN CAN MUSE PUBLICLY ABOUT HIS QUOTE DREAM UNQUOTE OF DEVELOPING DEFENSES AGAINST STRATEGIC WEAPONS VIA ABM PROGRAM WHOSE PURSUIT WLD IN FACT BE DESTABILIZING, IT IS CLEARLY PERMISSIBLE FOR OTHER LEADERS TO SUGGEST THAT REAGAN S GOAL OF PEACE MIGHT WELL BE BETTER SERVED BY SUFFOCATION OF SUCH TECHNOLOGY AT THE OUTSET. BUT SUCH VALID POINT HAS TO BE PHRASED IN CONSTRUCTIVE AND NON-CRITICAL WAY WHICH REDUCES POLITICAL FALL-OUT NOT/NOT JUST FOR SAKE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS BUT FOR SAKE OF EFFECTIVENESS OF PEACE INITIATIVE ITSELF.

8. THERE ARE, AS WE HAVE SAID SO MANY TIMES, DIFFERENT SCHOOLS OF VIEW IN ADMIN ABOUT ARMS CONTROL. IT IS TRUE THAT THERE ARE IMPORTANT OFFICIALS WHO WLD CONTEMPLATE A STRAIGHT COMPETITION WITH USSR SERENELY IF AMRS CONTROL AGMTS SATISFACTORY IN SENSE OF USA SECURITY NEEDS ARE NOT/NOT AVAILABLE. BUT REAGAN IS SINCERE IN WANTING AGMT.

OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS NEED TO DEMONSTRATE PM S DECLARED RESPECT FOR THAT SINCERITY IF WE ARE TO BE POLITICALLY EFFECTIVE IN MOVING OUR OWN OBJECTIVES AHEAD.

CCC/230 061658Z UNGR2010



Mr. Calder

Sydney

MASTER
FILE

TO/À : IDDZ
FROM/DE : IDA
REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE •
SUBJECT •
SUJET : PM's Initiative: Proposals

Security/Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	20-1-1-1
Date	February 3, 1984
Number/Numéro	IDA-0170

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

IDR
IFB

The Netherlands Embassy Counsellor, Baron Bentinck called on IDA on February 2 to leave a copy of the working paper on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space which the Dutch had circulated in NATO for discussion next month. He also read from a telegram providing the Dutch reaction to the Canadian papers that had been circulated in NATO. This reaction had been conveyed by one of the Directors General of the MFA to our Ambassador.

2. The Dutch had little to say about the papers on NTM's and mobility of ICBM's except that they belonged in START, not in the CD. As for the ASAT paper, the main message was that NATO should be given more time to consider it and to discuss it together with the Netherlands paper. It could be submitted to the CD in the spring.

3. The Dutch reasoning was based on both tactical and substantive considerations:

(a) Tactical: - While the Netherlands welcomed the fact that Canada came forth with a proposal, it regretted that hardly any time had been given for discussion either in NATO or the Western Group in Geneva. They wondered why the rush. There was no urgency for submitting it without proper consultations. Such consultations on the complex problem of avoiding an arms race in space was all the more important because the subject had not been discussed in NATO. The Netherlands paper was meant to serve as a basis for such a discussion. On the basis of the Netherlands paper, NATO could consider the matter and decide on an approach. The Canadian paper does not provide time for consideration of ways and means.

- One of the Dutch concerns was that the CD still had to establish a working group on outer space and that the submission of our paper at this point would take time away from that discussion and delay the creation of a working group.

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- The Dutch also questioned whether it was prudent to come with an opening bid that was limited to high altitudes instead of high and low altitudes.

- (b) Substantive: - Baron Bentinck pointed out that thinking about high altitude ASAT's was not new. This was one of the options mentioned in the Netherlands paper (which, however, gave priority to low-orbit ASAT's and foresaw concentrating on high-altitude ASAT's only if the verification problem made agreement on low-altitude ASAT's impossible). The Dutch wondered whether, from the point of view of strategic stability, the high-altitude ASAT's measure brought advantages.

- The ban we proposed excluded the questions of development, production, possession and destruction of high-altitude ASAT's.

- For the Dutch, however, the greatest problem with our proposal was that it would have the effect of legitimizing ASAT's in low-altitude. They wondered whether the Canadian proposal would not simply lead to greater technical problems since low-altitude ASAT's could be further perfected. It might, moreover, be technically possible to test high-altitude satellites in lower altitudes (e.g., using heavier boosters). For these reasons, the Netherlands had urged at last year's CD that satellites be declared inviolable and that there be a ban on testing, deployment and use of ASAT's.

- In view of the above, the Netherlands urged Canada to give its allies more time to discuss the Canadian proposal and other options. They wished to see the Canadian paper discussed together with the Dutch paper.

4. Throughout the discussion it was clear that the Dutch viewed the Canadian papers as concrete proposals which we wished to press at the CD. It was also clear that Mr. Bentinck, at least, understood the political imperatives behind the Canadian papers.

5. While many of the Dutch points reflect reservations that were expressed by IDA during internal discussions at the time of the re-drafting sessions, we explained at some length the rationale of focussing on high-altitude ASAT's in order to reach agreement in an area where systems had not yet been developed (and, contrary to the Dutch point, would not, therefore,

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CONFIDENTIAL

have to make provision for destruction). We also stressed the potential value which such an approach might have in encouraging agreement on low-altitude ASAT's.

6. We undertook to consider the Dutch points but gave no indication what our plans were for submitting our papers to the CD.



O.A. Chistoff,
Acting Director,
Arms Control & Disarmament
Division

MESSAGE

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Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
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DISTR IFB UGB

REF CLARK VISIT - 8 PAGES

CANADIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

MF

Division Phoned _____
Person _____
Local Time _____

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED / APPROUVÉ

SIG

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[Signature]
R. J. JYSIYIN/th

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PROGRAM

VISIT OF MR. JOE CLARK

January 29 - February 1, 1984

Sunday, January 29

17:30 Arrival at airport, Eastern Airlines Flight 529.
To be met by Ambassador Gotlieb and R. Lysyshyn.

Accommodation Ritz-Carlton
2100 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Telephone: 293-2100

19:00 Private dinner arranged by David MacDonald

Monday, January 30

07:55 Depart Hotel

08:00 Breakfast at Residence, with Ambassador Gotlieb, Jeremy Kinaman
and Ralph Lysyshyn.

10:00 Briefing on current arms control negotiations: John Hawes,
Director, Office of Security and Political Affairs, European
Bureau, State Department.

10:30 Meeting with Kenneth Adelman, Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency.

11:30 Meeting with Admiral Jonathan Howe, Director, Bureau of Politico-
Military Affairs, State Department.

13:00 Lunch with Ambassador Gotlieb at Maison Blanche.

Maison Blanche
1725 F Street, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
842-0070

14:30 Meeting at the Embassy with Mr. Jerry Hough, Academic Expert on
the Soviet Union.

16:00 Threat Briefing at The Pentagon.

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- 16:30 Meeting with Dr. Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, The Pentagon.
- 17:30 Approx. Return to Hotel.
- 20:00 Dinner with Mr. Kinsman with John Steinbruner, Director, Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Institution and Maureen Steinbruner, Policy Director, Institute for Policy Studies.

Tuesday, January 31

- 09:15 Depart Hotel
- 09:30 Meeting with Mr. Gerard Smith, Chairman of the Board, Arms Control Association. Other Board Members may also attend.
- Arms Control Association
1616 H Street, N.W.
Suite 420
WASHINGTON, D.C.
797-6450
- 10:45 Meeting at the National Security Council with Jack Matlock, Special Assistant to the President, European Affairs, and Ron Lehman, Special Assistant to the President, Arms Control. NSC Adviser McFarlane joined meeting at about 11:45.
- Old Executive Office Building.
- 12:15 Lunch with Leslie Gelb, National Security Correspondent, New York Times.
- Vincenzo
1606 20th Street, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
667-0047
- 15:00 Meeting with Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State, State Department.
- The Honourable Kenneth W. Dam
Deputy Secretary of State
Office of the Deputy Secretary
State Department
Room 7220
WASHINGTON, D.C.
632-9640
- 15:30 Meeting with Senator Cohen of Maine (Republican).

4/8

Senator William S. Cohen
Senate Hart Office Building
Room 530
WASHINGTON, D.C.
224-2523

17:15 Meeting with Roger Molander, Chairman of the Board, and Theo Brown, Executive Director, Ground Zero.

Ground Zero
808 15th Street, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
638-7402

20:00 Dinner at the Residence.

Wednesday, February 01

09:10 Depart Hotel.

09:30 Meeting with Senator Larry Pressler (Republican).

Senator Larry Pressler
Senate Russell Office Building
Room 407A
WASHINGTON, D.C.

11:00 Meeting with Dr. James Billington, Executive Director, Woodrow Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution.

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Smithsonian Institution
1000 Jefferson Drive, S.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
357-2429

12:00 Attendance at the Kennan Forum. Guest Speaker Jeremy Azrael.

Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Smithsonian Institution
1000 Jefferson, S.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
357-2415

5/8

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13:00 Lunch with Dr. Billington and other Soviet experts.

16:00 Meeting with Senator Ted Kennedy (Democrat).

Senator Ted Kennedy
Senate Russell Office Building
Room 113
WASHINGTON, D.C.
224-4543

16:45 Press Debriefing
Embassy Library
1746 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
785-1400

17:30 Departure for Airport.

19:00 BWI Departure

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LUNCH AT THE WOODROW WILSON CENTER

Dr. Billington's office tells us that the lunch he is organizing for February 01, will include the following people:

General Bill Smith, a fellow of the Woodrow Wilson Center, working on "Strategic Arms Control: The Way Ahead". General Smith is from the USA Department of Defense.

Dr. Peter Redway, a fellow of the Woodrow Wilson Center from the London School of Economics. He is working on "Dissent in the Soviet Union."

Michael Howard, a fellow of the Woodrow Wilson Center from Oxford University. He is working on "Analysis of War".

Professor Gifford, Deputy Director, Woodrow Wilson Center.

Jeremy Azrael, the day's guest speaker at the Kennan Forum and a member of the Policy Planning Council at the State Department.

Herb Ellison, Secretary of the Kennan Forum.

Dr. Billington's office said 2 or 3 other people may be added to the list.

19 7/10

**DINNER HOSTED BY AMBASSADOR AND MRS. GOTLIEB
IN HONOUR OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JOE CLARK
TUESDAY, JANUARY 31, 1984, 8:00 P.M.
AT THE RESIDENCE -- INFORMAL**

- HOST AND HOSTESS:** 2 Ambassador and Mrs. GOTLIEB
GUEST OF HONOUR: 3 The Right Honourable Joe CLARK
STAFF: 4 Ms. Peggy MASON
Staff Assistant to Mr. CLARK

ACCEPT

- 6 Dr. and Mrs. James BILLINGTON
Director, Wilson Center
- 8 Ambassador Stephen BOSWORTH and Ms. Rutledge
Chairman, Policy Planning Council
- 10 Mr. and Mrs. Thomas BRADEN
Writer, Columnist
- 12 Mr. and Mrs. Joseph KRAFT
Syndicated Columnist
- 14 Dr. and Mrs. Ronald F. LEHMAN
National Security Council
- 15 Miss Flora MacDONALD
Member of Parliament
- 17 Ambassador and Mrs. Jack MATLOCK
National Security Council
- 19 Mr. James MEDAS and Ms. Sheryl Morris
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Canadian Affairs
- 20 Ambassador Paul NITZE
Special Representative for Arms Control and
Disarmament Negotiations
- 22 Dr. and Mrs. James SCHLESINGER
Senior Advisor, Georgetown University,
Center for Strategic Studies
- 24 General Brent SCOWCROFT, USA Ret.
Vice-Chairman, Kissinger Association, Inc.

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8/8:

- 25 The Honourable Helmut SONNENFELDT and Mrs. SONNENFELDT
Guest Scholar, Brookings Institute
- 27 Mr. Raymond SAINT-PIERRE and Ms. Sylvianne TRAMIER
Correspondent, TV News, French Network, CBC
- 29 Ambassador and Mrs. Ronald I. SPIERS
Under Secretary of State for Management
- 31 Mr. and Mrs. PAUL WARNKE
Senior Partner, Clifford and Warnke

Canadian Embassy

- 32 Mr. Jacques Roy
Deputy Head of Mission
- 34 Mr. and Mrs. Jeremy KINSMAN
Minister, Canadian Embassy
- 36 Mr. and Mrs. Ralph LYSYSHYN
Counsellor, Canadian Embassy

Accept

- 37 Mr. Grant Reuber
President, Bank of Montreal

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDA0174 03FEB84

TO GENEV DELIVER BY 060900

DISTR IDAO IDAN IDR IDDZ

REF YOURTEL YTGR0438 24JAN

---PM INITIATIVE:MEASURES

AS INDICATED OURTEL IDA0173 03FEB, WE SHALL DELAY CIRCULATION OF PAPERS TO CD DELEGATIONS UNTIL NATO ALLIES HAVE HAD CHANCE TO PROVIDE DETAILED COMMENTS. AS THIS MAY TAKE SOME TIME, YOUR GENERAL DEBATE SPEECH SHOULD BE PREPARED WITHOUT REFERENCE TO OUR INTENTIONS REGARDING THESE PAPERS. WE MAY PROVIDE CONTRIBUTION RELATING TO PM INITIATIVE FOLLOWING PMS STATEMENT TO HOFIC EXPECTED TO BE MADE 09FEB.

CCC/104 032346Z IDA0174

mf

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDA0173 03FEB84

TO BNATO DELIVER BY 060900

INFO GENEV PRMNY LDN WSHDC PARIS BONN BRU ROME HAGUE OSLO COPEN

ATHNS ANKRA MDRID LSBON MOSCO CANMILREPNATO VMBFR STKHM/SCDEL

PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DNACPOL/CPD/DSTRATA/CIS/DIPOL

DISTR MINA MINE MINT USS DMF IFB IDDZ IDD IDAO IDAN IDR RBR RCR

RSR RBD RCD RSD CPD ZSI ZSP URR

REF YOURTEL YBGR8034 02FEB(NOTAL)

---PM INITIATIVE:PROPOSALS

FOR MOMENT, DETAILED COMMENTS ON WORKING PAPERS OUTLINING PMS THREE PROPOSALS (RE ASAT, NATL TECHNICAL MEANS, ICBM) WHICH WERE SUBMITTED TO NATO COLLEAGUES LAST WEEK HAVE BEEN RECEIVED ONLY FROM USA, NETHERLANDS, NORWAY. IT IS CLEAR FROM REACTIONS OF THESE ALLIES AS WELL AS BRITISH AND BELGIANS (WHOSE DETAILED COMMENTS WE DO NOT/HAVE YET) THAT NATO PARTNERS DO NOT/NOT SEE URGENCY IN OUR PRESENTING PAPERS TO CD AND WANT TIME TO CONSULT WITH US. SECONDLY, ALTHOUGH ALLIES QUESTION TACTICAL WISDOM OF SUBMITTING ASAT PROPOSAL TO CD, THEY DO NOT/NOT QUESTION APPROPRIATENESS OF CD AS FORUM. THIRDLY, THEY DO, HOWEVER, QUESTION SUBMISSION OF THE OTHER TWO PROPOSALS TO CD AND, WITH EXCEPTION OF USA WHICH IS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO WHOLE INITIATIVE, THEY CONSIDER START AS MORE APPROPRIATE FORUM.

2. YOU WILL BE AWARE OF PMS PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THESE PAPERS

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PAGE TWO IDA0173 CONF

WOULD BE PRESENTED TO CD.AS INDICATED IN OURTEL IDA0094 23JAN
(NOTAL)IT IS OUR INTENTION TO CIRCULATE PAPERS TO CD DELEGATIONS.
ALTHOUGH WE HAD ENVISAGED DOING,SO AT BEGINNING OF CD SESSION,WE
ARE PREPARED TO SHOW SOME FLEXIBILITY ON TIMING IN ORDER TO OBTAIN
DETAILED COMMENTS OF ALLIES.WE WOULD NOT/NOT INTEND TO QUOTE TABLE
UNQUOTE OUR PAPERS BUT WOULD CIRCULATE THEM IN A FORM THAT WOULD
TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE VIEWS OF OUR ALLIANCE PAPTNER.S.ABOVE HAS BEEN
CONVEYED TO-DAY TO BRITISH HICOM BY IFB AND TO USA CHARGE BY DMF.
3.GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD ENCOURAGE THOSE WHO HAVE NOT/NOT YET
SUBMITTED COMMENTS AND WHO WISH TO DO SO TO PROVIDE THEM SOON SO
THAT THEY MAY BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

CCC/104 032346Z IDA0173

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ	C O N F I D E N T I E L	12	10
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FM/DE DE EXTOTT IDDZ0119 03FEV84

TO/À A BUCST

INFO INFO MOSCO BONN HAGUE BRU OSLO ATHNS MDRID LSBON ANKRA WSHDC BNATO

DISTR LDN PARIS ROME PRMNY VMBFR GENEV WSAW PRGUE BDPST BGRAD STKHM/SCDEL

REF PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMAN

SUBJ/SUJ DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR FPR RBR RBD RBG UGB UGR

---INITIATIVE DU PM:VISITE EN ROUMANIE

SOMMAIRE:

AU COURS D'UN PEU PLUS DE QUATRE HEURES D'ENTRETIEN PM TRUDEAU ET
 PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU ONT PROCÉDE A UN ECHANGE DE VUES ET A UNE DIS-
 CUSSION SUR LEURS INITIATIVES ET LEURS POSITIONS SUR LA SITUATION
 EN EUROPE A LA SUITE DE L'INTERRUPTION DES NEGOCIATIONS SUR LES
 MISSILES A PORTEE INTERMEDIAIRE. DISCUSSION A PERMIS UNE MEILLEURE
 COMPREHENSION DES POSITIONS RESPECTIVES SANS CEPENDANT DEGAGER
 ACCORD SUR SUBSTANCE DES PROPOSITIONS, BIEN QU'UNE ASSEZ LARGE
 CONVERGENCE SUR LES OBJECTIFS A LONG TERME ET L'ESPRIT QUI ANIME
 DIVERSES INITIATIVES AIT ETE SOULIGNE.

TEXTE:

1ER FEVRIER, PM TRUDEAU EUT PLUS DE DEUX HEURES DE DISCUSSIONS AVEC
 PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU QUI FURENT POURSUIVIES PENDANT DINER OFFICIEL
 ET SUIVIES D'UN AUTRE DEUX HEURES 2 FEVRIER. CEAUSESCU COMMENCA
 PAR AFFIRMER QU'IL LUI SEMBLAIT QUE LA ROUMANIE ET LE CANADA PARTA-

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
<i>Amb. J. T. Simard</i> SIG AMB. J. T. SIMARD	IDDZ	995-5912	<i>L. A. Delvoie</i> SIG L. A. DELVOIE



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PAGE DEUX IDDZ0119 CONF

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GEAIENT POSITIONS SEMBLABLES SUR MAINTS PROBLEMES PARTICULIEREMENT
SUR LA QUESTION ESSENTIELLE DE LA DEFENSE DE LA PAIX. IL ATTRIBUA
LA DEGRADATION DE LA SITUATION INTERNATIONALE AU DEPLOIEMENT DES
MISSILES AMERICAINS EN EUROPE ET AUX CONTRE-MESURES SOVIETIQUES.
COMME UNE GUERRE NUCLEAIRE ENTRAINERAIT LA DESTRUCTION DE CELUI-
MEME QUI L'AURAIT DECLENCHE, LE PROBLEME DE L'EQUILIBRE SE POSE EN
TERMES NOUVEAUX. IL MENTIONNA QUE GROMYKO, AVEC QUI IL VENAIT D'AVOIR
DEUX JOURS D'ENTRETIENS, LUI AVAIT AFFIRME QUE SAVANTS SOVIETIQUES
ETAIENT CONVAINCUS QU'UNE GUERRE NUCLEAIRE DETRUIRAIT LA VIE. POUR
REMEDIER AU PROBLEME, IL FALLAIT ARRETER LE DEPLOIEMENT AMERICAIN,
SUSPENDRE LES CONTRE-MESURES SOVIETIQUES ET REPRENDRE LES NEGOTIA-
TIONS POUR ELIMINER TOUS LES MISSILES A MOYENNE PORTEE D'EUROPE.
CEAUSESCU AFFIRMA QUE GROMYKO LUI AVAIT CONFIRME QUE L'URSS ETAIT
PRETE A REVENIR SUR LES CONTRE-MESURES SI LES AMERICAINS REVENAIENT
A LA SITUATION ANTERIEURE.

2. SELON LE PRESIDENT CELA AVAIT ETE UNE ERREUR APRES HELSINKI DE
LAISSER AUX SEULS SOVIETIQUES ET AMERICAINS LE REGLEMENT DE CES
QUESTIONS. CEAUSESCU APPUYAIT L'IDEE D'UNE CONFERENCE DES CINQ
PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES MAIS TOUT D'ABORD LES ETATS-UNIS ET L'URSS
DEVAIENT METTRE AU POINT UN PROGRAMME STOPPANT LE DEVELOPPEMENT DE
LEURS ARMES ET ENTAMER REDUCTION DE LEURS ARSENAUX NUCLEAIRES ALORS
LES TROIS AUTRES PUISSANCES NUCLEAIRES ACCEPTERAIENT DE PARTICIPER.

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DEPLOIEMENT DES EURO-MISSILES CONSTITUE UNE VIOLATION PAR LES
ETATS-UNIS ET L'URSS DU TRAITE SUR LA NON-PROLIFERATION (TNP)
3. PROPOSITION DU PACTE DE VARSOVIE SUR LA NON UTILISATION DE LA
FORCE MERITE UN EXAMEN PLUS SERIEUX DE LA PART DE L'OTAN. BIEN SUR
CET ENGAGEMENT EST DEJA CONTENU DANS CHARTE DES NATIONS-UNIES MAIS
UN TRAITE ENTRE BLOC ET ETATS LE RENFORCERAIT. SUR NEGOCIATIONS DE
VIENNE, CEAUSESCU AFFIRMA QU'URSS ETAIT D'ACCORD POUR FAIRE PLUS A
VIENNE ET QUE LES PROPOSITIONS DEJA PRESENTEES PAR LES DEUX ALLIAN-
CES CONTENAIENT DES ELEMENTS D'UN ACCORD IMPARFAIT. CONFERENCE DE
STOCKHOLM PERMETTAIT DE RENOUER LE DIALOGUE, D'ABOUTIR A DES MESURES
PARTIELLES MAIS DANS LA BONNE DIRECTION. PUISSANCES MOYENNES DOIVENT
ASSUMER UN ROLE PLUS GRAND DANS RECHERCHE DE LA PAIX SANS ATTENDRE
QUE LES ETATS-UNIS ET L'URSS PARVIENNENT A UN ACCORD COMPLET.
4. PM TRUDEAU REQUIT ECLAIRCISSEMENTS SUR PROPOSITIONS ROUMAINES:
SI LES ETATS-UNIS REVENAIENT AU STATU QUO ANTE ET QUE L'URSS SUS-
PENDAIT SES CONTRE-MESURES, COMBIEN DE SS20, DEMEURERAIENT?
CEAUSESCU EXPLIQUA QU'IL FA~~L~~AIT REVENIR A LA SITUATION DE NOVEMBRE
83. LES ETATS-UNIS DEVAIENT ARRETER LE DEPLOIEMENT PENDANT LA
PERIODE DES NEGOCIATIONS. QUANT A L'URSS, ELLE DEVAIT SUSPENDRE
MISE-EN-ŒUVRE DE SES CONTRE-MESURES, REVENIR AU MORATOIRE SUR
DEPLOIEMENT DES SS20 ET NEGOCIER. BUT DES NEGOCIATIONS DOIT ETRE
L'ELIMINATION DE TOUS LES EURO-MISSILES. LES MISSILES FRANCAIS ET

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BRITANNIQUES POURRAIENT N'ETRE PRIS EN COMPTE QU'ULTERIEUREMENT.
IL N'EST PAS ACCEPTABLE QUE FRANCE ET ROYAUME-UNI FASSENT CE
QU'ILS VEULENT QUANT AU DEVELOPPEMENT DE LEURS ARMES NUCLEAIRES
SANS IMPACT SUR PROBLEME DES EURO-MISSILES. LES PAYS MEMBRES DE
L'OTAN ET DU PACTE DE VARSOVIE N'ONT PAS A PARTICIPER DIRECTEMENT
AUX NEGOCIATIONS MAIS DOIVENT ETRE CONSULTES.
5.PM TRUDEAU RETORQUA QUE SI PROPOSITION ROUMAINE ETAIT ACCEPTEE
ON SE RETROUVERAIT AVEC UNE POIGNEE D'EURO-MISSILES AMERICAINS D'UN
COTE ET PLUS DE 250 SS20 POINTES SUR L'EUROPE OCCIDENTALE, D'OU
DESEQUILIBRE MARQUE. QUEL BESOIN L'URSS AVAIT DE DEPLOYER, TANT DE
SS20? CEAUSESCU SOUTINT QUE DESEQUILIBRE N'ETAIT QU'APPARENT. SS20
ETAIENT EQUILIBRES PAR AVIONS AMERICAINS BASES EN EUROPE, PAR PORTE-
AVIONS ET SOUS-MARINS, DE SORTE QU'AMERIQUE N'ARRIVAIT PAS AVEC LES
MAINS VIDES AUX NEGOCIATIONS. PM TRUDEAU SOULIGNA QUE L'URSS
DISPOSAIT EGALEMENT DE SOUS-MARINS ET DE BOMBARDIERS, ET QU'IL Y
AVAIT RUPTURE D'EQUILIBRE EN EUROPE SUITE AU DEPLOIEMENT DES SS20.
PAYS DE L'OTAN NE POUVAIENT ACCEPTER PROPOSITIONS ROUMAINES.
CEAUSESCU INSISTA QU'IL NE PROPOSAIT PAS MAINTIEN DE CETTE SITUA-
TION POUR UNE LONGUE PERIODE MAIS SIMPLEMENT LE TEMPS D'ARRIVER A
UN ACCORD. PARTANT SUR UNE TANGENTE, IL AFFIRMA QUE LES MISSILES
AMERICAINS BASES EN SICILE N'AVAIENT PAS POUR BUT DE DEFENDRE
EUROPE DE L'OUEST MAIS COMME OBJECTIF LE PROCHE-ORIENT OU L'AFRIQUE
DU NORD.

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6. RETOURNANT A L'EUROPE, PM TRUDEAU MENTIONNA QUE L'URSS DISPOSAIT D'UNE LARGE SUPERIORITE EN ARMES CONVENTIONNELLES CE QUI LUI PERMETTAIT D'EXERCER CHANTAGE. IL EXPLIQUA HISTOIRE ET RATIONALITE DE LA DOUBLE DECISION DE L'OTAN DE DECEMBRE 79. CEAUSESCU AFFIRMA QUE PLUSIEURS MEMBRES EUROPEENS DE L'OTAN AVAIENT DEPUIS MODIFIE LEURS VUES. PM TRUDEAU REPLIQUA QUE SES RECENTES CONSULTATIONS AVEC DE NOMBREUX LEADERS OCCIDENTAUX L'AVAIENT CONVAINCU DU CONTRAIRE ET QU'EUROPEENS EVIDEMMENT SOUHAITAIENT UN ACCORD SUR EURO-MISSILES MAIS QU'ILS NE POUVAIENT ACCEPTER CE QUE CEAUSESCU PROPOSAIT POUR Y ARRIVER. QUAND DE NOUVEAU IL Y AURAIT EQUILIBRE, LA SITUATION SERAIT DIFFERENTE.

7. CEAUSESCU SOUTINT QUE TOUS LES EUROPEENS AURAIENT PREFERE PROLONGEMENT DES NEGOCIATIONS. PM TRUDEAU DIT QUE SEUL PAPANDREOU AVAIT PROPOSE UN DELAI QUE TOUS LES AUTRES AVAIENT REJETE SAUF PEUT ETRE DANEMARK. OTAN AYANT DEMONTRE QUE DEPLOIEMENT SE FERAIT, CEAUSESCU DEMANDA S'IL ETAIT NECESSAIRE D'ALLER PLUS LOIN. PM AFFIRMA QUE DEMONSTRATION N'ETAIT PEUT ETRE PAS SUFFISANTE ET QU'ELLE DEVAIT ETRE PLUS FERME. UN GEL DU DEPLOIEMENT AMERICAIN MAINTENANT SERAIT UNE VICTOIRE SOVIETIQUE. CEAUSESCU MENTIONNA QUE SUITE A SES ENTRETIENS AVEC GROMYKO, IL ETAIT CONVAINCU QU'URSS NE POUVAIT ACCEPTER DEPLOIEMENT AMERICAIN ET NE RETOURNERAIT PAS AUX NEGOCIATIONS DANS CETTE SITUATION. PROPOSITIONS SOVIETIQUES DE L'AUTOMNE DERNIER DE REDUIRE MISSILES AUTOUR DE 150, DE DETRUIRE

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LES AUTRES ETAIENT RAISONNABLES.LA POURSUITE DES NEGOCIATIONS AU-
RAIT PU MENER A UN ACCORD SUR UNE BASE ACCEPTABLE.IL FALLAIT AGIR
DANS CETTE DIRECTION ET C'EST CE QU'IL AVAIT VOULU FAIRE DANS
L'APPEL CONJOINT AVEC PAPANDREOU.PM TRUDEAU CONSTATA QU'AMERICAINS
N'AVAIENT PAS QUITTE LES NEGOCIATIONS ALORS QUE L'URSS CONTINUAIT
DE DEPLOYER SS20.A SON AVIS AUCUN AUTRE MEMBRE DE L'OTAN NE SUI-
VRAIT PAPANDREOU.PRESIDENT REAGAN EMPLOYAIT RECEMMENT UN LANGAGE
NOUVEAU AUQUEL URSS DEVRAIT PORTER ATTENTION.CEAUSESCU LE RECONNUT
MAIS AFFIRMA QUE DECLARATIONS N'ETAIENT PAS SUFFISANTES.IL DOU-
TAIT DE LA VOLONTE AMERICAINE D'ARRIVER A UN ACCORD SUR EURO-
MISSILES.PM TRUDEAU SUGGERA DE POURSUIVRE DIALOGUE PAR VOIE
DIPLOMATIQUE PUISQU'IL ETAIT EVIDENT QU'A CE STADE-CI IL EXISTAIT
DES DIVERGENCES FONDAMENTALES.

TO/A DMI
FROM/DE • IDDZ

Security/Sécurité	UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	February 3, 1984
Number/Numéro	IDDZ-0118

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • QUESTION IN THE HOUSE ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S
SUJET REMARKS ON NATO STRATEGY.

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

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Before your meeting with the USA ambassador this afternoon, we wished to advise you of the exchange in today's Question Period in the House on the Prime Minister's recent comments on NATO strategy (the following is a summary, not a verbatim report):

Paul McCrae (L-Thunder Bay Atikokan) congratulated the Prime Minister on his latest trip and said now that the Prime Minister had pointed out that the emperor (i.e. NATO) had no clothes, would he pursue debate within NATO as to whether a policy of first use of nuclear weapons (which could totally destroy Europe) makes a lot of sense as a defence, and whether some other defence is necessary.

The Prime Minister saluted McCrae as a firm supporter of the government's peace initiative and expressed gratitude for McCrae's own initiatives. He observed that he didn't actually say that the emperor had no clothes on; he had said that "a lot of people" had been pointing out that the emperor had no clothes on, including the Leader of the Conservative Party in the fifth point of his December speech, although since then he had been repudiated by his colleagues who are paranoid of anything a third level official in the US might say.

The importance of establishing contact with the Warsaw Pact countries is self-evident, but for those Tories who always cringe at such things he pointed out that Mrs. Thatcher was going to Hungary today, presumably in the same spirit of establishing dialogue between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

L. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group
on East-West Relations
and International Security

Security / Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
Accession / Référence
File / Dossier
Date
February 3, 1984
Number / Numéro
FPR-120

TO/À FILE
FROM/DE FPR

REFERENCE / RÉFÉRENCE
SUBJECT / SUJET
SCRUM-DPM/SSEA- 03 February 1984
Peace Initiative and Cruise Missile Discussion

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

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Q.: In a report from Washington, yesterday, Bogdan Kipling was suggesting that there are some low-level talks being conducted between Washington and Ottawa on the possibility of installing Cruise missiles in the far north of Canada, should the Soviets install...

SSEA: Haven't heard a word about it.

Q.: So there's no such discussions going on?

SSEA: I don't know what... low level officials is the word you used.

Q.: Well, quiet discussions I guess.

SSEA: I doubt it very much and if I ever heard that they were happening, I'd stop them.

Q.: discuss this peace group or disarmament group he's got together with the East Germans on ?

SSEA: Well, I don't think that's quite the way to put it. I think what has been agreed and discussed is some bilateral discussions about disarmament proposals.

Q.: So you've talked to him about it?

SSEA ; No, I have not, but I have informed myself on the discussions which took place in East Germany and that is the nature of the discussion. I think that it would involve bilateral discussion between officials on disarmament proposals that have been put forward by the Warsaw Pact countries and by the NATO countries. And I think that's quite consistent with the whole process of dialogue, which was so thoroughly endorsed at the NATO Foreign Ministers' meeting in December.

Q.: When are you going to meet with the Prime Minister to review the Peace Mission ?

FPR-120 UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

SSEA: Well, I talked to him in the House. I meet him at twelve o'clock and I'll be meeting him very frequently.

Q. Could you elaborate just slightly on that previous question as to why you would stop such talks?

SSEA: Well, as I understand your question, it was whether there were discussions at some level of officialdom about the installation of Cruise missiles in Canada. And I said that if they were taking place, I would have them terminated, certainly by officials from my Department, because it is not the intention of the Government at any time to establish nuclear missiles in Canada.

I can't tell you. We've just had a brief discussion in the House. I'm going to a meeting with him now, so I don't know when the assessment will be finished. It hasn't begun yet.

Q.: Did you interpret Mr. Trudeau's comments about nuclear strategy as saying the emperor has not clothes or as just simply raising the question that others have raised ?

SSEA: Well, I think that the answer speaks for itself. He explicitly said that he hadn't said that expression.

Q: It certainly came across that way at the time.

SSEA: Well, beauty is in the eye of the beholder, I suppose.


John J. Noble
Director
Press Office



TO/À FILE

FROM/DE FPR

REFERENCE
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Scrum-DPM/SSEA, February 2, 1984 -
SUJET Peace Initiative

Security / Sécurité

UNCLASSIFIED

Accession / Référence

File / Dossier

Date February 3, 1984

Number / Numéro
FPR-119

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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SSEA: What is the report?

Q.: The report is that the Canadian government will set up a group to discuss with a similar group of East German officials about issues of disarmament.

SSEA: I know nothing about it. I haven't been in touch with the PM's group for some days. There may be some ideas developing there that are unknown to me, but in reply to the question put in the House, there has been no decision of the government.

Q.: What kind of review will you do with the Prime Minister when he gets back from his peace mission? Review in terms of concluding it or carrying it on?

SSEA : I think it would be a good thing at this stage, after the very extensive travel program has been completed, to sit down and assess what have been the results. There have been some very concrete results, I believe, but I think it would be very good to evaluate what has happened and what lessons we can draw from it. But I don't see anything further in terms of review than that.

Q.: Should it continue? Is there another phase to go on the peace initiative?

SSEA: I don't think there's any doubt but that the peace initiative, in a broad sense, has to be continued. The atmosphere between East/West is not going to suddenly thaw. It's going to take some time. It's going to take effort. I think the Prime Minister's doing his share, in terms of trying to establish a dialogue. I think other Western leaders will do the same thing before this year is out and, in that sense, the peace initiative will be continuing.

SSEA BOOK

MINA/
Robertson
Riley
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FPR/Quinn

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IDR
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PMO/Coleman
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FILE
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FPR-0119 UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

Q.: Is the Prime Minister's role in the initiative then coming to an end? Is that what you're saying?


SSEA: No, I'm not saying that at all. But I think it's rather wrong conclusion to say simply that the intense activity which has characterized the effort so far has to be continued in order to maintain the peace momentum. That's what I'm saying.

Q.: Based on what has happened so far, would you call it a success?

SSEA: I certainly would. I gave a rather complete analysis of aspects of the peace initiative in the House just before I left for Davos and I think that there are quite a number of very specific areas in which Canadian points have been registered. But the big thing of course is the atmosphere that we want to change.

Q.: So the Prime Minister can hang up his peace hat now?

SSEA: You can never hang up the peace hat.


John J. Noble
Director
Press Office

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned 1007
Person _____
Local Time 1712

**CDN EYES ONLY
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Mr. Smith
MASTER FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM WSHDC UNGR2012 03FEB84

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ DELIVER BY 031700

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EER IDD

REF OURTEL UNGR2011 03FEB

---ARMS CONTROL:VISIT OF RT HON JOE CLARK

ADMIN BRIEFINGS ARE SUMMARIZED IN OURTEL 2003 WHICH DESCRIBES IN
EXTENSO REMARKS BY NSC ADVISER MCFARLANE.THIS IS OVERALL REVIEW.
2.MR.CLARK HAD EXPOSURE TO WIDE RANGE OF VIEWS ON ARMS CONTROL NEGS
AND ON USSR.VIRTUALLY EVERYONE TO WHOM HE SPOKE BELIEVES IN REAGANS
SINCERITY IN WANTING TO LEAVE LASTING PEACE AS A PERSONAL LEGACY.
CRITICS FROM PRESS(GELB),THINK TANKS(STEINBRUNNER)AND CONGRESS(KENNEDY)
ALL JUDGED THE COMBINATION OF REAGANS PERSONAL IGNORANCE,LACK OF RES-
OLVE ON PART OF SUBORDINATES,AND EXTREMELY ADVERSARY APPROACH TO USSR
WLD MAKE CONCLUSION OF ARMS CONTROL AGMTS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT.BUT FROM
ADMIN,NSC SPOKESMAN WERE MOST ENCOURAGING ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR ARMS
CONTROL AGMTS AND ABOUT USA-USSR COOPERATION ON BROADER FRONT,INCL
SOME SORT OF AGMTS ON MIDDLE EAST.DEFENCE DEPT(IKLE)SAW POSSIBILITY
OF USSR COMING AROUND TO VIEW ARMS CONTROL AGMTS WERF DESIREABLE TO

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LIMIT ARMS COMPETITION WHICH USA WLD DEFINITELY WIN BUT HE WAS SERENE ABOUT ENGAGING IN SUCH A COMPETITION IF NECESSARY.

3.MOST ADMIN INTERLOCUTORS ACKNOWLEDGED USSR WLD NOT/NOT COME BACK TO INF TABLE AND SOME SORT OF MERGER WITH START TALKS WLD BE INEVITABLE, THROUGH PERHAPS A SEPARATE NEGOTIATING EXERCISE INITIALLY.IMMED POLITICAL SIT IN EUROPE WAS JUDGED SURPRISINGLY SATISFACTORY.LONGER-TERM SIT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED TO BE PROBLEMATIC PARTICULARLY IN FRG.INTERLOCUTORS WERE ASKED IF POLITICAL OBJECTIVE OF USSR WAS TO FORCE WITHDRAWAL OF USA FROM EUROPE(OURTEL UNGR1012 05JAN)AND ALL AGREED USSR NEEDED USA MILITARY PRESENCE IN WESTERN EUROPE FOR STABILITY THERE. IT WAS MADE CLEAR BY 3 OR 4 OF ADMIN SPOKESMEN THAT AN ATTACK ON WESTERN EUROPE REMAINED AS AN ATTACK ON USA.

4.AS TO LONGER-TERM USA-USSR RELNS,WHICH WERE MAIN FOCUS OF MTGS OUTSIDE ADMIN,VIEWS RANGED WIDELY BUT EVERY ONE APPLAUDED AT LEAST THE FACT THAT REAGAN HAD DROPPED THE RHETORIC THOUGH A FEW JUDGED HE STILL THOUGHT IT.CLOSER POLITICAL RELNS WERE JUDGED DESIREABLE BUT MOST THOUGHT THEY CLD NOT/NOT BE IMPOSED FROM TOP DOWN,AND NEEDED THE RESTORATION OF PROG OF MULTIPLE EXCHANGES TO ENABLE GREATER CONFIDENCE TO EMERGE.ADMIN SPOKESMEN EMPHASIZED HOTLINE MTGS AND OTHER CONSULTATIONS AS BEING PRODUCTIVE.IT WAS RECOGNIZED USSR WAS IN TOUGH BIND ECONOMICALLY BUT DIFFERENT VIEWS EMERGED AS TO WHETHER THIS MADE THEM MORE OR LESS LIKELY TO SEEK BETTER RELNS WITH USA.

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6. THERE WERE FEW IF ANY MR CLARK SPOKE WITH WHO BELIEVED THAT PRESENT STATE OF USA-USSR RELSN REPRESENTED IMMED THREAT TO PEACE. NO ONE AGREED A WINDOW OF STRATEGIC VULNERABILITY EXISTED TODAY. GREATEST THREAT TO PEACE SEEN BY THOSE FROM OUTSIDE ADMIN WLD COME IN DECADE OR TWO FROM TECHNOLOGICAL DEPTHS LIKELY TO PERMIT PRE-EMPTIVE FIRST STRIKES, SUCH AS ANTI-SUBMARINE CAPABILITIES, ANTI COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS AND MANOEUVERABLE WARHEADS. NO ONE IN ADMIN OR OUT AGREED THAT ABM WORK WAS LIKELY TO LEAD ANYWHERE CONCLUSIVE, AND NO ONE OUTSIDE ADMIN HAD ANYTHING POSITIVE TO SAY ABOUT IT. EVEN IN ADMIN LITTLE WAS OFFERED TO DEFEND CONCEPT TECHNICALLY.

7. MR CLARK DISCUSSED ELECTION POLITICS ONLY ON HILL. IMPRESSION LEFT WAS CLEARLY THAT REAGAN IS AHEAD BUT THAT ELECTION IS BY NO MEANS A SURE THING.

CCC/059 032046Z UNGR2012

ACTION
DATE A DONNER

Division Phoned 1DDZ
Person _____
Local Time 1938

CDN EYES ONLY
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Mr. Smith
to see & file
[Signature]

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

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TOKYO PRMNY NDHQOTT/ADM POL/CPP/DACPOL/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/CIS GENEV OSLO
ATHNS WSAW BUCST STKHM/SCDEL BREEC COPEN

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR RBD ZSI MINE MINT UGB IDD RBR RCR RSR
RCD RSD CPD ZSP URT URE LCD LSD RGB EFB PPD PPT PPR FTE EPD EPG EED
EER URR

REF OURTEL UNGR2003 31JAN

---ARMS CONTROL:VISIT OF RT HON JOE CLARK

SUMMARY:THIS TEL PROVIDES IN CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER REPORTS ON MTGS MR
CLARK HAD DURING HIS THREE-DAY VISIT TO WSHDC.MR CLARKS INTERESTS IN
WSHDC WERE TO LEARN AS MUCH AS HE CLD ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR PROGRESS
ON ARMS CONTROL FOR THE MEDIUM TERM FUTURE.MR CLARK WAS LESS INTERES-
TED IN THE SPECIFICS OF THE NEGS THAN IN GENERAL THINKING ON NATURE
OF THE USA/USSR RELS,THEIR EFFECTS ON ARMS CONTROL NEGS,CURRENT
AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE SOV UNION AND THE USA/USSR RELATIONSHIP,
THE NATURE OF PUBLIC CONCERN ABOUT THESE ISSUES AND TO A LESSER EXTENT
WET KIND OF ROLE A COUNTRY LIKE CDA SHLD PLAY IN THE PROCESS.MR CLARKS
OWN BASIC THRUST WAS THAT CONCERN WITH THESE SUBJS IN CDA WAS EX-
TREMELY HIGH;SO MUCH SO THAT HE CALLED THE ISSUE THE QUOTE FEAR ISSUE
UNQUOTE AND THAT IT WAS HIS PURPOSE TO LEARN SOMETHING ABOUT THE SUBJ
TO AS TO BE ABLE TO MAKE POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS TO HIS PARTY.PMS

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PEACE INITIATIVE DID NOT/NOT ENTER INTO CLARKS CONVERSATIONS EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT CLARK STRESSED THAT PEACE WAS NOT/NOT A PARTISAN ISSUE IN CDA, AND THAT HIS PARTY GENERALLY SUPPORTED PMS INITIATIVE.

2. REPORT: WE HAVE FAXED TO YOU COPY OF MR CLARKS PROGRAM WHILE HE WAS IN WSHDC, COPY OF GUEST LIST FOR AMBS DINNER, AND COPY OF GUEST LIST FOR LUNCH HOSTED BY DR BILLINGTON AT WOODROW WILSON CENTER. PRIVATE DINNER ARRANGED BY DAVID MACDONALD INCLUDED SEVERAL AMERICANS WHO WE UNDERSTAND WERE MAINLY HILL STAFFERS. EMB WAS NOT/NOT INVITED TO THIS DINNER SO WE ARE UNCERTAIN AS TO WHO WAS THERE AND CANNOT/NOT REPORT ON WHAT TRANSPIRED.

3. BREAKFAST AT RESIDENCE: AT THE BREAKFAST MTG CLARK OUTLINED FOR EMB HIS GENERAL GOALS AND PURPOSES IN THIS VISIT (SEE ABOVE). AMB AND STAFF IN TURN WENT THROUGH PROGRAM WITH CLARK PROVIDING HIM WITH SOME PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS OF THOSE FIGURES CLARK WLD BE MTG AND OUTLINING WHICH QUESTIONS VARIOUS FIGURES WERE BEST PLACED TO PURSUE.

4. BRIEFING ON ARMS CONTROL NEGS: HAWES PROVIDED PROFESSIONAL AND MODERATE FACTUAL BRIEFING ON CURRENT STATE OF VARIOUS EAST/WEST ARMS CONTROL NEGS. HAWES EXPLAINED THAT USA IS IN THE MIDDLE OF A POLICY REVIEW ON MBR AND THAT ADMIN HOPED TO BE ABLE SOON TO PRESENT ALLIANCE NEW POSITION FOR CONSIDERATION. HAWES EMPHASIZED HOWEVER THAT USA DID NOT/NOT CONSIDER IT POSSIBLE TO COMPLETELY IGNORE THE DATA PROBLEM. DISCREPANCIES THAT EXIST NOW ARE BROADER THAN SIMPLY DIFFERENCES OVER NUMBERS OF PEOPLE. THEY INVOLVE DIFFERENT COUNTING RULES.

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THIS PROBLEM WLD NOT/NOT BE OVERCOME BY SIMPLY PRETENDING THE DISCRE-
PANCY IS NOT/NOT THERE AND MOVING TO VERIFICATION AFTER CUTS.THE MOST
LIKELY RESULT IS THAT DISCREPANCY WLD STILL REMAIN.THE ARGUMENT WLD
STILL FOCUS ON COUNTING RULES AND WE WLD BE NO/NO FURTHER ALONG THAN
WE WERE BEFORE.(LATER ON,NSC STAFF POINTED OUT THAT ALL OF THIS MASKED
REAL PROBLEM INHERENT IN FACT USSR TROOPS WERE IN EASTERN EUROPE FOR
COERCION AND OCCUPATION,NOT FOR DETERRENCE,SO WHOLE MBFR EXERCISE HAD
LITTLE SIGNIFICANT HOPE.)ON INF HAWES SAID THAT AT THE VERY END OF
THE NEGS PARTICULARLY WHEN ONE CONSIDERS THE PROPOSALS THAT CAME OUT
CF THE WALK IN THE BOTANICAL GARDENS,THE TWO SIDES WERE VERY CLOSE ON
INF NUMBERS.HOWEVER THE TALKS WERE STILL BOGGED DOWN BY THE ISSUE OF
WHETHER OR NOT/NOT THE SOVS CAN SIGN AN AGREEMENT THAT FORMALLY
LEGITIMIZES THE USAS MISSILES IN EUROPE.THIS ARGUED FOR MERGER WITH
START TALKS.

5.KEN ADELMAN:ADELMAN TOLD CLARK THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE INF NEGS
THE USA HAD SHOWN CONSIDERABLE FLEXIBILITY OF POSITION.THERE HAD BEEN
MOVEMENT WITH REGARD TO MISSILES IN ASIA,USA HAD SHOWN SOME WILLING-
NESS TO INCLUDE AIRCRAFT(BOTH IN INF AND START)BUT THAT THE PRINCIPLE
OF EQUALITY BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WAS ONE THAT ABSOLUTELY HAD TO
REMAIN.THE USA CLD NOT/NOT INCLUDE UK AND FRENCH MISSILES IN ANY CAL-
CULATION OR ANY AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVS.CONGRESS SIMPLY WLD NOT/NOT
ACCEPT ANY AGREEMENT WITHOUT USA/USSR EQUALITY.IT WLD BE HARMFUL TO
TEE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS TO HAVE ANOTHER NEGOTIATION AGREEMENT REJEC-
TED BY CONGRESS.IN ADELMANS VIEW SOV UNION WLD NOT COME BACK TO INF

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TABLE AS SUCH ALTHOUGH THE USA WLD PREFER NOT/NOT TO MERGE INF TALKS WITH START TALKS THERE MAY BE NO/NO CHOICE. HOWEVER IF THE TALKS ARE MERGED USA WLD PREFER TO HAVE AN INF QUOTE HOUSE UNQUOTE WITHIN THE START TALKS THUS ENSURING THESE TALKS WERE TREATED AS A SEPARATE ENTITY. THE ALLIES SHLD KNOW THAT THE USA WILL NOT/NOT RETURN TO TALKS ON BASIS OF ANY USSR PRE-CONDITIONS. BY THIS ADELMAN WAS REFERRING TO SOV ARGUMENTS SUCH AS USA MUST AGREE TO ELIMINATE ITS INF MISSILES BEFORE THE TALKS BEGIN AGAIN. USA WLD JUST REFER TO ANY SUCH CONDITIONS AS BEING A USSR POSITION TO BE NEGOTIATED. THE START PROCESS HAD APPEARED A LITTLE MORE HOPEFUL BEFORE THE INF TALKS BROKE DOWN BUT THE BREAK DOWN OF THE INF TALKS HAVE COMPLICATED THE START PROCESS AS WELL. MERGING THE INF AND START TALKS FORMALLY WLD FURTHER COMPLICATE THE ISSUE.

6. WITH REGARD TO THE EAST/WEST AND PARTICULARLY THE SUPERPOWER RELATIONSHIP ADELMAN WAS VERY SANGUINE. HE SAID THAT USA/USSR RELS WERE NOT/NOT DANGEROUS AND COMPARED CURRENT STATE OF RELS WITH PERIODS SUCH AS KENNEDYS 1000 DAYS OR THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR IN 1967. ADELMAN ALSO REITERATED THE ARGUMENTS THE PRES HAS BEEN MAKING ABOUT THE BUILD-UP OF USA STRENGTH AND SHOW OF DETERMINATION CONTRIBUTING TO CREATING A MORE STABLE SITUATION. ADELMAN DID ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SOVS ARE VERY POOR AT ASSESSING WHAT IS GOING ON IN THE WEST AND EVEN POORER AT ASSESSING WHAT THEY SHLD DO IN REACTION TO IT. THEIR DEFEAT ON THE INF ISSUE WITH FRG POLITICAL PROCESS ILLUSTRATED THIS VERY CLEARLY. ADELMAN CONCEDED THAT SOVS WERE ANGRY AT THE USA AND THAT THIS ANGER MAY INHIBIT RETURNING TO THE TALKS SOMETIME SOON.

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7. ADELMAN SAID THAT USA VALUES CONSULTATIONS WITH ITS ALLIES ON ALL ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. HOWEVER PROCESS VARIES. FOR EXAMPLE ON INF THE USA CONSULTS ITS ALLIES BUT IN START IT INFORMS THEM. ADELMAN PLAYED DOWN TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY OF ABM OR STRATEGIC DEFENCE, BUT SAID USSR WAS DEFINITELY WORKING ON ONE OF THEIR OWN.

8. ADMIRAL HOWE: ADMIRAL HOWE, LIKE ADELMAN, WAS EXTREMELY UPBEAT ON THE ATMOSPHERE OF USA/USSR RELS SAYING THAT THEY WERE IN VERY GOOD SHAPE. HE STRESSED PROCEDURE HOTLINE TALKS. HOWE DID NOT/NOT SEE WHY SOVS MIGHT WANT TO HOLD OUT FOR A VERY LONG TIME ON RETURNING TO ARMS CONTROL TALKS. IN HIS VIEW THE START TALKS WERE MOST UNLIKELY TO RESUME BEFORE THE MBFR GOT UNDER WAY ON 16 MAR. HOWE WENT TO GREAT LENGTHS TO DESCRIBE REAGAN'S DESIRE TO ACHIEVE ARMS CONTROL AND TO ARGUE THAT HE WAS A MAN OF PEACE. WHEN TOLD BY MR CLARK THAT IMPRESSION WAS NOT/NOT NECESSARILY SHARED OUTSIDE USA HOWE SEEMED NOT/NOT TO UNDERSTAND THAT THIS COULD BE CASE. ACCORDING TO HOWE, USA/USSR HAD TO RETURN TO ARMS CONTROL TALKS BECAUSE THEY WERE IN THEIR INTEREST. THE USSR SIMPLY CANNOT/NOT AFFORD TO COMPETE WITH THE USA IN ANY ARMS RACE. USA MAY IN THE FUTURE BE MORE FLEXIBLE IN START AND INF NEGS BUT WILL CERTAINLY NOT/NOT DO ANYTHING TO DRAW USSR BACK TO THE TALKS.

9. JERRY HOUGH: HOUGH IS A PROFESSOR AT DUKE UNIVERSITY AND IS ALSO ASSOCIATED WITH BROOKINGS INSTITUTION. HOUGH TOLD CLARK THAT HE VIEWS THE USA/USSR RELATIONSHIP AS AN INEVITABLE RIVALRY BETWEEN TWO GREAT SUPERPOWERS, WITH IDEOLOGY BEING A SECONDARY ADVERSARY INGREDIENT.

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SOVS HAVE IN RECENT YEARS EXHIBITED SOME REAL STUPIDITY ESPECIALLY IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH THE WEST E.G.THEIR HANDLING OF THE KAL DISASTER AND THE INSTALLATION OF SS20S WHICH HE SAID SHLD NOT/NOT HAVE BEEN DONE SECRETELY OR WITHOUT SPECIFIC LIMITS PUT ON THEM.WHETHER PROBLEMS WERE CREATED BY COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY OR INATE RUSSIANISM OR THE INCOM-PETENCE OF A GENERATION THAT HAS HUNG ON TOO LONG HOUGH JUST DOES NOT/NOT KNOW.HOWEVER THOSE IN POWER ARE PEOPLE WHO PLAY IT BY INSTINCT AND OLD RULES,RULES THAT WERE FORMED WHEN THE USSR WAS INDEED IN AN INFERIOR POSITION.HOUGH IS HOPEFUL THAT WITH A NEW GENERATION THEY WILL BEHAVE WITH MORE CONFIDENCE.THEY MAY FOR EXAMPLE REALIZE THAT SOV OBSESSION WITH SECRECY IS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS.SOVS HAVE IN RECENT YEARS MADE GESTURES TOWARDS THE WEST BUT THE WEST HAS NOT/NOT RES-PONDED.THE USA HAS SINCE 1978 BEEN INVOLVED IN A MASSIVE ARMS BUILDUP BUT THE USSR HAS NOT/NOT BEEN BUILDING UP IN THAT PERIOD.THE CURRENT SOV LEADERSHIP THINKS THAT A THREATENING IMAGE IS GOOD DETERRENCE. THIS IS HOWEVER A WRONG POLICY IN THE LONG TERM.

10.THREAT BRIEFING:MR CLARK WAS GIVEN A VERY ANODINE SHORT THREAT BRIEFING AT THE PENTAGON.THREAT BRIEFING CONTAINED NO/NO NEW INFO AND DID NOT/NOT PROVIDE MR CLARK ANY INSIGHT INTO USA NTM CAPABILITIES. HE WAS FOR EXAMPLE SHOWN NO SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY.EVEN SOME OF THE CHARTS THAT MR CLARK WAS SHOWN HAD PARTS OF THEM BLACKED OUT,NOTABLY NUCLEAR YIELDS,PROBABLY BECAUSE MR CLARKS STAFF ASST DID NOT HAVE HIGH ENOUGH CLEARANCE.

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11.DR IKEL:IKLE ARGUED THAT THE USA DOES NOT/NOT NEED ARMS AGREEMENTS. SIMILARLY THE SOVS DO NOT/NOT NEED THEM.IN DR IKLES VIEW ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS ARE THE PRODUCT OF THE INTELLECTUAL COMMUNITY AND ARE NOT/NOT PARTICULARLY RELEVANT TO THE DEFENSE OF EITHER COUNTRY.ACCORDING TO IKLE RELS BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR ARE QUITE GOOD.RECENT TALKS ON NON-PROLIFERATION AND ON AN ENHANCED HOTLINE HAVE SHOWN THAT COOPERATION IS WORKING AND CAN BE QUITE EFFECTIVE. IKLE THOUGHT THAT MORE USEFUL COOPERATION CLD BE ACHIEVED IN THE AREA OF CBMS BOTH IN THE CONTEXT OF THE STKLM CONFERENCE AND BILATERALLY. ACCORDING TO IKLE SUCH CMBS ARE(A)MORE ACHIEVABLE AND(B)PROBABLY MORE USEFUL THAN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS.IF IT IS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS IKLE SUGGESTED THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES SHLD GO FOR SOMETHING SIMPLE LIKE THE ATMOSPHERIC TEST BAN TREATY WHICH IS NOT/NOT COMPLICATED BY THE PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION AND THE ASSYMETRY OF THE FORCES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.

12.JOHN STEINBRUNER:STEINBRUNER WAS EXTREMELY CRITICAL OF POLICY MAKERS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FIELD WITHIN THE REAGAN ADMIN.HE SAID THAT WHILE THE PRES MAY BE PERSONALLY SINCERE ABOUT HIS DESIRE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND FOR IMPROVING USA/USSR RELS HE VERY MUCH DOUBTED THE ABILITY/WILLINGNESS OF HIS OFFICIALS TO DO THIS.STEINBRUNER EMPHASIZED ENTIRE ADEQUACY TODAY OF USA STRATEGIC DETERRENT AND STRESSED USA START OFFER WAS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE AS SERIOUS APPROACH TO USSR INTERESTS.

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13.GERARD SMITH:SMITH TOLD CLARK THAT HE IS SCEPTICAL THAT REAGAN WILL BE ABLE TO PRODUCE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN EAST/WEST RELS.THE PRES MAY BE SINCERE BUT THOSE AROUND HIM ARE NOT/NOT IN FAVOUR OF THE KIND OF ARMS CONTROL THAT IS FEASIBLE.THESE PEOPLE BELIEVE YOU CAN OUTSPEND OR OUTTECHNOLOGIZE THE RUSSIANS.REAGANS RHETORIC ABOUT NEW USA STRENGTH IS MISLEADING.THERE IS VERY LITTLE NEW IN THE USA ARSENAL BUT THE REAL POINT IS THAT TO SAY WE ARE BEHIND AS THE REAGAN ADMIN HAS DONE IS TO PERPETRATE A HOAX THAT HAS BACKFIRED BECAUSE IT GENERATED SEVERE ANXIETIES.SMITH CHARACTERIZED REAGANS HOPES FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AS A QUOTE INCREDIBLE IMPOSSIBLE DREAM UNQUOTE.BMD IS DANGEROUS BECAUSE IT SPURS THE ARMS RACE AND RAISES A FIRST STRIKE THREAT.SMITH BELIEVES THAT REAGAN WILL PUSH FOR SOME KING OF START AGREEMENT THIS YR EVEN AN INTERIM ONE.SMITH EXPRESSED GREAT ANXIETY ABOUT CRUISE MISSILES PARTICULARLY SLCMS BECAUSE WITH SLCMS EVERY ATTACK SUBMARINE BECOMES A STRATEGIC WEAPON AND NUCLEAR FORCES CAN BE QUADRUPLED QUICKLY.SMITH WAS MOST DUBIOUS ABOUT USA CHARGES OF SOV NON-COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING AGREEMENT.HE POINTED OUT THAT THREE OF THE SEVEN SUPPOSED VIOLATIONS RELATE TO TREATIES THAT THE USA HAS NOT/NOT RATIFIED.(THIS POINT WAS MADE BY SEVERAL OTHERS OUTSIDE ADMIN.) SMITH SAID THE ARMS RACE IS LIKE A GAME OF TIC-TAC-TOE,IF YOU KNOW HOW TO PLAY YOU CANNOT/NOT LOSE.HE SAID THAT THE IDEA OF USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO DEFEND EUROPE IS NOT/NOT A SERIOUS ONE THEREFORE NO/NO FIRST USE POLICY IS A GOOD ONE.TECHNOLOGY IS MOVING FORWARD TO HELP THE WEST DEVELOP A NO/NO FIRST USE POLICY.SMITH SAID THAT CDA CLD

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PLAY AN ACTIVE ROLE IN ARMS CONTROL BY SUPPORTING SACEUR POLICY OF GETTING A LESSER DEPENDENCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS.CDA CAN ALSO BE EFFECTIVE BY NUDGING THE PRES ALONG IN HIS CONVERTED ARMS CONTROL POSITION.

14.NSC ADVISER MACFARLANE:MTG WITH MACFARLANE WAS REPORTED IN REFTEL. EARLIER PART OF MTG WITH MATLOCK AND LEHMAN DEALT FIRST WITH USA/USSR RELS AND THEN WITH BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE.MATLOCK STRESSED THAT PRES IS SINCERE IN HIS DESIRE TO CREATE MORE EFFECTIVE AND DEEPER RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR.THE ADMIN WILL BE TRYING TO BEGIN SUBSTANTIVE TALKS WITH THE SOV UNION IN A WIDE RANGE OF AREAS.REAGAN CAN DELIVER SENATE.CARTERS INABILITY TO DO SO DEEPLY FRUSTRATED USSR. THIS WAS PERIOD OF INITIATIVES.USA WLD BE FLEXIBLE ON INF AND START. THERE WAS NO WISH TO RESTRUCTURE USSR START COMPLEMENT.USA HAS COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE RELATIONSHIP IS PURSUED MOST EFFECTIVELY AWAY FROM THE PUBLIC EYE.FOR THIS REASON SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WERE NOT/ NOT PUT FORWARD IN ANY OF REAGANS SPEECHES.MATLOCK SAID THE USA STILL DOES NOT/NOT HAVE ANY SPECIFIC INFO ABOUT THE STATE OF ANDROPOVS HEALTH AND CONTINUES TO WONDER ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE LEADERSHIP RIGHT NOW.NEVERTHELESS THEY HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT HE MUST BE SERIOUSLY ILL.

15.MATLOCK ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE CURRENT USA/USSR RELATIONSHIP LACKS SUBSTANCE ON WHICH TO BUILD.THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE ON THE ECONOMIC SIDE.ON POLITICAL SIDE,IF USA AND USSR CLD NOT REDUCE COMPETITION, THEY CLD AT LEAST AVOID CONFRONTATION.THIS WAS COMMON GROUND ON MID-

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EAST AND OTHER REGIONAL SITS AND CONSULTATION ON THESE WLD BE INTENSIFIED BUT NOT IN SENSE OF JUST PUTTING MORE PEOPLE AT TABLE. LEHMAN TALKED ABOUT PRESIDENTS CONCEPT OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE. THE THRUST OF LEHMANS PRESENTATION WAS THAT PRESIDENTS BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE IDEA IS A FORWARD LOOKING VISION AND HOPE RATHER THAN A SPECIFIC CONCEPT. PEOPLE WHO GOT HUNG UP ON CONCEPTS OF LASERS AND SIMILAR ITEMS PROBABLY HAVE MISSED THE POINT. FUTURE FOR BMD LIES IN RAPID ADVANCES IN COMPUTER PROCESSING. THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION OF COUPLING/DECOUPLING. USSR INTEREST IS SERVED BY COMMITMENT OF USA NUCLEAR ARSENAL TO DEFENCE OF EUROPE BUT USSR STILL LIKE TO DRIVE A WEDGE INTO ALLIANCE WITHOUT GOING ALL THE WAY.

16. LESLIE GELB: GELB SAID THAT PAST ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR WERE RELATIVELY SPEAKING QUOTE MICE UNQUOTE. NEVERTHELESS THEY WERE VALUABLE MICE AS THEY MAINTAINED AN IMPORTANT PROCESS. THIS WAS THE ONLY KIND OF ARMS CONTROL THAT IS POSSIBLE AT THIS TIME. GELB DOES NOT/NOT FORESEE THE POSSIBILITY OF QUOTE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT UNQUOTE ARMS CONTROL FOR AT LEAST TEN YEARS. THE BIGGEST INHIBITION IS THE ASSYMETRY IN USA AND USSR FORCES AND INADEQUATE VERIFICATION. BECAUSE THE ADMIN IS PURSUING DEEP CUTS AND ATTEMPTING TO ACHIEVE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENTS IT IS PURSUING THE WRONG TRACK. EFFORTS SHLD BE GOING INTO THOSE AREAS WHERE A LID MUST BE PUT ON TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS WHICH WILL CREATE, IF THEY ARE ACHIEVED, FAR MORE INSTABILITY THAN CURRENTLY EXISTS.

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GELB SAID THAT AREAS OF DEVELOPMENT HE FEARS MOST ARE IN ASW,ASAT, AND ABM.IF MAJOR BREAKTHROUGHS SHLD OCCUR IN ALL OF THESE AREAS WE CLD WELL BE FACED WITH A VERY UNSTABLE SITUATION.

17.KENNETH DAM:MTG WITH DAM WAS MTG THAT CLARK CHARACTERIZED AS LEAST INFORMATIVE OF HIS CALLS AS DAM GAVE VERY STANDARD DEFENSE AND OUTLINE OF USA WILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH THE SOV UNION,WILLINGNESS TO GET BACK TO THE ARMS CONTROL TABLE AND WILLINGNESS TO GO FORWARD.HE SAID USA HAS BEEN ENCOURAGED TO CONTINUE ON ITS CURRENT PATH BY THE REACTIONS THEY HAVE HAD SO FAR FROM THE SOV UNION.DAM ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE DID NOT/NOT EXPECT USSR WLD COME BACK TO THE INF TABLE AND SAID IT MAY INDEED BE NECESSARY FOR THE INF AND START TALKS TO BE MERGED AS A WAY OF GETTING THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED AGAIN.

18.SENATOR COHEN:SENATOR COHEN SAID THAT HIS READING OF PRES REAGANS SHIFT TO THE POLITICAL CENTER ON EAST/WEST RELS WAS THE RESULT OF PUBLIC INSISTENCE THAT THE USA DO MORE ON IN IMPROVING THE RELATIONSHIP.COHEN EXPLAINED HIS OWN OPPOSITION TO THE NUCLEAR FREEZE SAYING THAT IT WLD INHIBIT IMPORTANT MAJOR PROGRESS SUCH AS THE MIDGETMAN. COHEN ALSO DEFENDED HIS PARTICIPATION WITH NUNN IN PUTTING FORWARD THE BUILD DOWN PROPOSAL.HE SAID THAT THIS WAS A CONCEPT RATHER THAN A PRACTICAL PROGRAM.ITS IMPORTANCE WHICH IS LARGELY IN ITS SYMBOLIC VALUE IS THAT IT PUTS ON THE TABLE THE CONCEPT THAT IF NEW WEAPONS ARE TO BE DEPLOYED OLD ONES HAVE TO BE TAKEN OUT.LARGE PART OF CONVERSATION WITH COHEN FOCUSSED ON ELECTORAL POLITICS IN MAINE WITH COHEN EXPLAINING TO CLARK HOW HE PROJECTS HIMSELF AS A REPUBLICAN

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WERE LESS THAN TWENTY PERCENT OF THE PEOPLE ARE REGISTERED AS REPUBLICANS(HE DOESNT).HE ALSO TALKED ABOUT HOW HE BRIDGES LIBERAL POLITICS ON SOCIAL ISSUES WITH CONSERVATIVE VIEW ON ECONOMICS AND DEFENSE ISSUES.HE ALSO SPENT SOME TIME TALKING ABOUT HIS DEALINGS WITH THE RIGHT TO LIFE GROUPS .

19.GROUND ZERO:ROGER MOLANDER OUTLINED FOR CLARK HIS CONCERN THAT THE ARMS CONTROL ESTABLISHMENT HAD COME TO FOCUS TOO MUCH ON THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF ARMS CONTROL WHEN IN FACT ARMS CONTROL IS NOT/NOT PER SE THE PROBLEM.YOU CLD REDUCE THE NUMBER OF ARMS IN THE WORLD DRASTICALLY AND YOU WLD STILL NOT/NOT HAVE MADE THE WORLD VERY MUCH SAFER.THE IMPORTANT THING IS TO GET PEOPLE TO CONFRONT THE REAL ISSUES.TO LOOK AT THE STATE OF THE EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIP AND TO WORK AT ELABORATING MEANS OF IMPROVING THAT RELATIONSHIP.THIS INVOLVED AMONG OTHER THINGS ELABORATION OF GUIDELINES FOR DEALING WITH SPECIFIC PROBLEMS IN THE ARENA OF EAST/WEST RELS.HE POINTED FOR EXAMPLE TO THE FACT THAT MOST PEOPLE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT A WAR BETWEEN THE SOV UNION AND USA IS MOST LIKELY TO BREAK OUT AS A RESULT OF SPILLOVER OF A REGIONAL CONFLICT AND YET THE ATTENTION OF MOST PEOPLE IS STILL DIRECTED TOWARDS EUROPE AND NUCLEAR ARMS RATHER THAN TO THE REAL CAUSES OF DANGER.ACCORDING TO MOLANDER ORGS SUCH AS GROUND ZERO HAVE THEIR VALUE IN THAT THEY BRING QUOTE PEOPLE INTO THE TENT UNQUOTE.THIS IS THE MAIN REASON THAT GROUND ZERO PUT SO MUCH EMPHASIS ON THE EDUCATIONAL ASPECTS OF ITS ACTIVITIES.MOLANDER SAID HE IS VERY DISAPPOINTED THAT DEMOCRAT PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES HAVE NOT/NOT YET GRASPED THIS POINT AND ARE

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FOCUSSING INSTEAD ON THE NARROW ISSUES OF ARMS CONTROL INSTEAD OF TAKING A BROADER VIEW OF THE PROBLEM AND THE DANGER POINTS IN EAST/WEST RELS.

20. SENATOR PRESELER: PRESELER OUTLINED FOR CLARK HIS EXPERIENCE OF HIS VISIT LAST SUMMER TO THE SOV UNION. HE STRESSED HOW DIFFICULT IT HAD BEEN FOR HIM TO RECONCILE HIS PERSONAL DESIRE TO SEE DISSIDENTS WITH THE NEED TO DEAL WITH SOV OFFICIALS. PRESELER TALKED ABOUT RECENT STUDIES DONE BY THE OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY FOR BREAKTHROUGH IN THE DEFENSE SYSTEMS. PRESLER SAID HE THOUGHT THAT PRES REAGAN WAS SINCERE IN HIS DESIRE TO IMPROVE RELS WITH THE SOV UNION BUT THE PROBLEM IS IN ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE POLICY. HE LIKE SENATOR COHEN SAID REAGAN HAS A FAR BETTER CHANCE OF GETTING AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT THAT HE NEGOTIATES RATIFIED BY THE SENATE THAT ANY DEMOCRAT WHO SUCCEEDS HIM WLD. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF PRES REAGAN'S PROGRAM FOR COOPERATION IN SPACE. PRESELER EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THIS PROGRAM WAS NOT/NOT INTENDED PRIMARILY FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES HOWEVER THERE WLD INEVITABLY BE SOME DEFENSE-RELATED USE OF SUCH A PROGRAM. PRESELER ALSO TALKED ABOUT HIS HOME CONSTITUENCY (SOUTH DAKOTA) AND HOW IT IS A CENTER OF IDEALISM AND ANTI-MILITARISM WHICH HE HAS TO BE CAREFUL TO REFLECT.

21. WOODROW WILSON CENTER: AT THE WOODROW WILSON CENTER DR BILLINGTON SPOKE TO CLARK LARGELY ABOUT THE ACADEMIC NATURE OF THE CENTER AND ITS ROLE AS A CENTER FOR INTELLECTUAL ACTIVITY IN A CITY THAT WAS LARGELY PUBLIC POLICY ORIENTED. DR ELLISON THE DIRECTOR OF THE KENNAN

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CENTER WHICH IS PART OF THE WILSON CENTER, SPOKE TO CLARK ABOUT HIS VIEW OF SOV POLICY WHICH CONTRASTS WITH THAT OF JERRY HOUGH. ELLISON SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW SOV POLICY IS OUTWARD DYNAMIC AND AIMED AT DESTABILIZING THE WORLD. SOV DOCTRINE IS INTERNATIONALIST AND IS NOT/ NOT SEEKING A STABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WEST BUT IS SEEKING INSTEAD TO GAIN AN ADVANTAGE. SOV UNION HAS BEEN SEEKING TO BUILD HEGEMONY IN EURASIA. OUTSIDERS EVALUATING THE SOV UNION OFTEN MISS THE DYNAMIC AND COMPREHENSIVE NATURE OF SOV POLICY. SOV CONTROL HAS BEEN CHALLENGED IN EASTERN EUROPE IN MINOR WAYS RECENTLY BUT THE TRENDLINE SHOWS CONTINUING CONSOLIDATION OF SOV POWER AROUND THE WORLD. SOVS HAVE GREAT STAYING POWER AND A WILLINGNESS TO PAY HIGH PRICE IN ANY CONFRONTATION WITH THE USA. THEY ARE ABLE TO CONTROL INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS OF THE PROBLEMS AND THEREFORE HAVE A POLICY ADVANTAGE. SEVERAL WESTERN GOVTS HAVE BEEN INTRIGUED BY THE POSSIBILITY FOR ECONOMIC DISRUPTION OF THE SOV UNION BUT SO FAR THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS ON SOV UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE HAVE BEEN TO MAKE EASTERN EUROPE MORE DEPENDENT ON THE SOV UNION.

22. AT THE KENNAN FORUM, JEREMY AZRAEL OF STATE DEPT SPOKE ABOUT HIS VIEW OF THE ANDROPOV SUCCESSION. THE MAIN POINT HE MADE WAS THAT THE ANDROPOV SUCCESSION VIOLATES THE RULES OF PREVIOUS SUCCESSIONS. HE COMPARED IT TO THE DEFEAT OF BERIA IN HIS GRAB FOR POWER AND SAID THAT THE WILLINGNESS OF THE SOV UNION TO CHOOSE A QUOTE POLICEMAN UNQUOTE AS A LEADER AT THIS TIME IS THE RESULT OF THE INSECURITY THEY FEEL OVER THEIR CONTROL OVER THEIR OWN PEOPLE AND EASTERN

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EUROPE AT THIS TIME. THE LEADERS FEARED DISORDER AND THEREFORE CHOSE SOMEONE WHO IS A VERY EFFECTIVE COP AND VERY GOOD AT POLICING THE COUNTRY AND THE EMPIRE.

23. DISCUSSION WITH OTHER SOV EXPERTS OVER LUNCH FOCUSED ON MANNER SOV UNION ENFORCES CONTROL OF ITS PEOPLE.

24. SEN KENNEDY: KENNEDY SAID THAT HE WAS GLAD MANY MORE PEOPLE IN WSHDC COMMUNITY WERE COMING TO SHARE HIS VIEW THAT THE BASIC EAST/WEST RELATIONSHIP IS OUT OF KILTER. THE FREEZE CLIENTELE, AND FREEZE MOVEMENT, IS STRONGER THAN EVEN. THE FREEZE CAN BE CRITICIZED LIKE ANY OTHER ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL AND WLD BE AS DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE. HOWEVER LIKE GELB, KENNEDY FELT THAT THE REAL DANGER IN THE ARMS CONTROL FIELD IS IN FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS. PERMISSIVENESS FOR THINGS SUCH AS THE MIDGETMAN CAN BE BUILT INTO A FREEZE. KENNEDY CRITICIZED THE REAGAN ADMIN REPORT ON SOV COMPLIANCE SAYING THAT THERE WAS NOT/NOT ENOUGH EVIDENCE THERE TO SERIOUSLY ACCUSE THE SOV UNION OF VIOLATION. THIS KIND OF ISSUE SPLD HAVE BEEN DEALT WITH PRIVATELY AND NOT/NOT MADE PUBLIC. HE WAS NOT/NOT DEFENDING THE SOV UNION BUT RATHER SAYING THE CHANCE OF REPAIRING THESE THINGS WAS GOING TO BE SMALLER NOW THAT THE USA HAD GONE PUBLIC. KENNEDY SAID THAT HE IS GOING TO THE SOV UNION THIS YR. IN KENNEDY'S VIEW REAGAN CAN BE BEATEN AND THERE WAS CONSIDERBLE DISCUSSION OF DOMESTIC USA POLITICS.

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**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Refer to PCO/Fowler
Division Phoned IDDZ
Person Sheila
Time 1245
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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TO EXTOTT IDDZ UGB FLASH

INFO MOSCO BNATO CANMILREPNATO LDN ROME PARIS BONN VMBFR HAGUE
PEKIN TOKYO PRMNY GENEV OSLO COPEN ATHNS WSAW BUCST BPEST
STKHM/SCDEL NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD/DACPOL/DNACPOL/DSTRATA/CIS
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR RBD ZSIMINE MINT UGB IDD RBR RCR
RSR RCD RSD CPD ZSP URT URE LCD LSD RGB URR

REF OURTELS UNGR1094 27JAN UNGR1075 24JAN NOTAL

---PM S INITIATIVE:USA CONCERNS

SUMMARY:REFTELS MAKE CASE FOR CLOSE CONSULTATIONS WITH ADMIN ON
EAST-WEST ISSUES AND FOR DEBRIEFING ADMIN ON PM S RECENT TRIP TO
EASTERN EUROPE. THIS CASE IS ENHANCED BY USA STATE DEPT COMPLAINTS
(REPEATED YESTERDAY BY ASST SECTY BURT TO AMB)WHICH ARE BASED ON
ADMIN NERVOUSNESS OVER CONTINUING POST-DEPLOYMENT SIT IN EUROPE
AND SENSITIVITY TO ADMIN HARDWARE PROPOSALS IN ELECTION YEAR.

2.REPORT:OURTEL UNGR2006 02FEB REPORTS ON DEMARCHE MADE BY ADMIN
TO EXPRESS CONCERN OVER PM TRUDEAU S OBSERVATIONS AT DAVOS SEEMING
TO USA TO QUESTION NATO STRATEGY AND CREDITIBILITY OF USA LINKAGE
TO WESTERN EUROPE.ISSUE CAME UP IN SIMILAR TERMS IN LATER DISCUSSIONS
INCLUDING OBSERVATIONS TO GOTLIEB FROM BUT THAT STATE DEPT CONSIDERS
PM REMARKS GO TO HEART OF USA-EUROPE POLITICAL RELATIONS.

3.WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO CLEAR UP SOME OF DISTORTED IMPRESSIONS THAT
PRESS AND OTHER DECRPTIONS OF PM S REMARKS HAVE CREATED AND TO

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PAGE TWO UNGR2010 CONF

REASSURE STATE DEPT ONCE AGAIN ON CDA S BASIC COMMITMENTS.PM

TRUDEAU S TRIP TO EASTERN EUROPE IS CONSISTENT WITH NATO

DECLARATION IN DEC AND POLICY OF ADMIN ITSELF ON DIFFERENTIATION.

THERE IS NO/NO PROBLEM IN MAKING ASSESSMENT THAT TRIP HAS BEEN FROM
EVERY POINT OF VIEW WORTHWHILE.

4.INDEED,THIRD RAIL OF EAST-WEST POLITICAL DIALOGUE ASPECT OF PM S
PEACE INITIATIVE HAS NOT/NOT REALLY BEEN QUESTIONED AT ANY TIME
BY KNOWLEDGEABLE OFFICIALS HERE EXCEPT TO OBSERVE LATELY THAT EVENTS
HAD ALREADY MOVED USA POLICY IN DIRECTION OF RESTARTING DIALOGUE.

5.AMERICAN CONCERNS ARE REALLY WEST-WEST IN CHARACTER AND ARE DIRECTED
TOWARD TWO AREAS.(A)QUESTIONING OF POLITICAL ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING
NATO STRATEGIC DOCTRINE WHICH CLD TEND TO REINFORCE ARGUMENTS AND
POTENCY OF ANTI-DEPLOYMENT GROUPS AND NEUTRALISTS IN WESTERN EUROPE;
AND(B)PUBLICLY PURSUED ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS WHICH SEEK SPECIFICALLY
TO ADJUST,LIMIT OR OTHERWISE AFFECT,MILITARY HARDWARE PROGRAMS OF
USA WITHOUT ADEQUATE POLICY CONSULTATIONS HERE BEFOREHAND,AND WHICH
THEN PROPOSE DISCUSSION OF SUCH PROGRAMS IN MULTILATERAL FORUM JUDGED
TO BE INAPPROPRIATE.

6.IT SEEMS THAT USA HAS CONCLUDED CDA HAS OFFENDED ON BOTH OF ABOVE
TWO COUNTS AS INDICATED IN OURTEL UNGR2006 AND PAPER OUTLINING
PRELIMINARY USA VIEWS ON OUR CD PROPOSALS SENT TO YOU BY FAX.

7.THESE ARE INDEED DIFFICULT QUESTIONS.THERE IS HIGH POTENTIAL FOR
ANXIETY HERE ON QUESTIONING OF ESTABLISHED POSITIONS OF ALLIANCE.

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PAGE THREE UNGR2010 CONFID

USA POSITION MILITARILY AND DIPLOMATICALLY IS PROBABLY BOUND TO SUGGEST A PREFERENCE THAT CDA NOT/NOT ENGAGE IN ANY INITIATIVES OR MAKE PUBLICLY ANY OBSERVATIONS ON SUCH SENSITIVE ISSUES, PARTICULARLY DURING ELECTION YEAR WHEN USA/USSR RELNS AND ARMS CONTROL ARE POTENTIALLY HIGHLY VULNERABLE AREA FOR ADMIN POLITICALLY. SINCE THIS PREFERENCE IS INCONSISTENT WITH CDN FOREIGN POLICY VOCATION AND NEED TO TACKLE ISSUES OF GREAT PUBLIC CONCERN THERE HAS TO BE EMPHASIS ON CONSULTATIVE PROCESS TO ENSURE THAT USA INTERESTS ARE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. OBVIOUSLY, HOWEVER, THERE ARE LIMITS. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, PRE REAGAN CAN MUSE PUBLICLY ABOUT HIS QUOTE DREAM UNQUOTE OF DEVELOPING DEFENSES AGAINST STRATEGIC WEAPONS VIA ABM PROGRAM WHOSE PURSUIT WLD IN FACT BE DESTABILIZING, IT IS CLEARLY PERMISSIBLE FOR OTHER LEADERS TO SUGGEST TPAT REAGAN S GOAL OF PEACE MIGHT WELL BE BETTER SERVED BY SUFFOCATION OF SUCH TECHNOLOGY AT THE OUTSET. BUT SUCH VALID POINT HAS TO BE PHRASED IN CONSTRUCTIVE AND NON-CRITICAL WAY WHICH REDUCES POLITICAL FALL-OUT NOT/NOT JUST FOR SAKE OF BILATERAL RELATIONS BUT FOR SAKE OF EFFECTIVENESS OF PEACE INITIATIVE ITSELF.

8. THERE ARE, AS WE HAVE SAID SO MANY TIMES, DIFFERENT SCHOOLS OF VIEW IN ADMIN ABOUT ARMS CONTROL. IT IS TRUE THAT THERE ARE IMPORTANT OFFICIALS WHO WLD CONTEMPLATE A STRAIGHT COMPETITION WITH USSR SERENELY IF AMRS CONTROL AGMTS SATISFACTORY IN SENSE OF USA SECURITY NEEDS ARE NOT/NOT AVAILABLE. BUT REAGAN IS SINCERE IN WANTING AGMT. OUR PUBLIC STATEMENTS NEED TO DEMONSTRATE PM S DECLARED RESPECT FOR THAT SINCERITY IF WE ARE TO BE POLITICALLY EFFECTIVE IN MOVING OUR OWN OBJECTIVES AHEAD.

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ACTION
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TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO PRGUE WSDHC LDN MOSCO ROME PARIS BNATO VMBFR WSAW BUCST
BPEST BGRAD HAGUE BRU OSLO ATHNS MDRID LSBON PRMNY VIENN
GENEV/ATTN MCPHAIL STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/ARCHDEACON NDHQOTT/ADMPO/
L/ADMPOL
CPP/DACPOL

DISTR MIN USS DMF IFB IDA ZSI RBR RBD RGB RCR URR UGB CPD

---PM INITIATIVE:VISIT TO GDR

FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF ARTICLE CARRIED IN FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
02FEB84:

QUOTE

HONECKER SUPPORTS TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE FOR NUCLEAR POWERS CONFERENCE
AGREEMENTS AND OPPOSING VIEWS/CANADA AND GDR WANT TO EXTEND
COOPERATION.

AS IN PRAGUE,PM TRUDEAU HAS NOW RECEIVED BACKNG FROM GDR HEAD OF
STATE ERICK HONECKER FOR THIS PROPOSAL OF A CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE
FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS.HONECKER HAS AGREED TO EXPRESS HIS SUPPORT FOR
THE IDEA VIS-A-VIS MOSCOW.

THIS VISIT BY TRUDEAU IS PART OF HIS EFFORTS TO REVITALISE THE
DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST,AND TO MOVE OVER FROM CONFRONTATION
TO NEGOTIATION.RATHER THAN LOOKING AT PAST MISTAKES,BELIEVES
TRUDEAU,CONFIDENCE SHOULD BE CREATED FOR THE FUTURE.THE SUPER-
POWERS IN PARTICULAR SHOULD BE BROUGHT AWAY FROM THEIR CONCENTRATION

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PAGE TWO ZQGR1031 UNCLAS

ON MILITARY THINKING. IN A SPEECH IN MONTREAL IN NOVEMBER, TRUDEAU HAD PROPOSED A CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS TO DEFINE GLOBAL LIMITS FOR NUCLEAR ARMS, WITH A VIEW TO SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF THEIR NUCLEAR ARSENALS. SINCE THEN, CANADA'S PM- ALWAYS CONFIRMING HIS COUNTRY'S LOYALTY TO NATO- HAS OBTAINED THE AGREEMENT OF CHINA, GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE AND THE USA TO HIS PROPOSAL. HE STATED THAT ANDROPOV HAD WRITTEN SAYING THAT HE ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO A MEETING WITH TRUDEAU, FOR WHICH A DATE HAD YET TO BE ARRANGED.

FOLLOWING HIS TALKS WITH HONECKER, TRUDEAU ALSO SAID THAT THE WARSAW PACT CONFERENCE IN JANUARY LAST YEAR HAD PRODUCED A NUMBER OF PROPOSALS WHICH COULD BE ACCEPTED BY THE WEST, THOUGH THE WEST HAD NOT/NOT CONSIDERED THEM SERIOUSLY ENOUGH. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE WARSAW PACT HAD NOT/NOT REACTED RIGHTLY TO NATO'S PROPOSALS MADE FOLLOWING THE ALLIANCE'S DECEMBER CONFERENCE- SOME OF WHICH PROPOSALS WERE ALSO PERFECTLY ACCEPTABLE TO THE EAST. IN THE TALKS, HONECKER REPEATED THAT THE GDR WAS PREPARED TO ENTER IMMEDIATELY INTO TALKS ON A TREATY ON THE MUTUAL RENUNCIATION OF MILITARY FORCE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE WP AND NATO, WHICH WOULD HAVE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON ENDEAVOURS TOWARDS ARMS LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT. TRUDEAU IS SCEPTICAL ABOUT THIS IDEA, CONSIDERING THAT THE RENUNCIATION OF FORCES IS ALREADY ENSHRINED IN THE UN CHARTER, AND THAT SUCH A TREATY WOULD ONLY BE OF A

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DECLAMATORY NATURE UNLESS ACTUAL PROGRESS ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE IN STOCKHOLM. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN DECLAMATORY TREATIES IN EUROPE BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR, BUT THESE HAD NOT/NOT BEEN ABLE TO PREVENT THE WAR.

TRUDEAU ADDED THAT THE STOCKHOLM TIMETABLE ENVISAGED THE ACHIEVEMENT OF MILITARY CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES BY 1986, BUT THAT THIS WAS TOO LONG TO WAIT FOR PROGRESS IN ARMS REDUCTION, AND THAT HE THEREFORE HOPED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WLD RETURN TO THE TABLE AT GENEVA. HE ALSO WELCOMED THE FACT THAT MBFR TALKS WOULD BE RESUMED ON 16MAR; IT WAS NOW UP TO THE WEST TO RESPOND TO EASTERN PROPOSALS HERE.

IN AN AFTER-DINNER SPEEC IN TRUDEAUS HONOUR, HONECKER SAID THAT THE GDR HELD TRUDEAUS PEACE INITIATIVES IN HIGH ESTEEM AND WAS SUPPORTING THEM BY JOINT AND PARALLEL STEPS. QUOTE YOUR PROPOSAL FOR NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS ON GLOBAL ARMS LIMITARIONS, THE GAINING OF ACCEPTANCE FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY, THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A BALANCE OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS, THE BANNING OF ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPON SYSTEMS IN SPACE, THE CONTINUATION OF A REGULAR EAST-WEST DIALOGUE, ABOVE ALL BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR, THE RETURN TO DETENTE, THE STRENGHTENING OF COOPERATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, THE COMPLETE BANNING OF NUCLEAR TESTING, THE BANNING OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, THE REFUSAL TO PRODUCE AND STATION NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CANADA-ALL THIS MEETS WITH OUT FULL APPROVAL, UNQUOTE SAID HONECKER. OF HIS TALKS WITH TRUDEAU, HONECKER

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SAID THAT DESPITE VARIOUS DIFFERING VIEWPOINTS ON A NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS, THEY HAD AGREED THAT—AFTER PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE—PRIORITY SHOULD BE GIVEN TO EFFORTS FOR PEACE, ARMS LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT, DETENTE AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING. DURING THEIR TALKS HONECKER AND TRUDEAU EXPRESSED THEIR INTENTION ON INTENSIFYING BILATERAL COOPERATION. THE GDR NEWS AGENCY ADN REPORTED THAT TRUDEAU'S VISIT HAD GIVEN AN IMPORTANT STIMULUS TO THIS AIM. CANADA WAS THE LAST NATO COUNTRY TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE GDR. IN HIS AFTER-DINNER SPEECH HONECKER RECALLED THAT AT THE CONFERENCE IN HELSINKI IN 1975 TRUDEAU AND HIMSELF HAD QUOTE SEALED THE TAKING UP OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH A HANDSHAKE UNQUOTE. HOWEVER NEITHER STATE HAS AN EMBASSY IN ITS RESPECTIVE PARTNER COUNTRY. CANADA HAS HAD ITS AMBASSADOR IN WARSAW ACCREDITED IN EAST BERLIN TOO, AND THE GDR IS REPRESENTED IN OTTAWA THROUGH ITS AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON. FOUR BILATERAL AGREEMENTS HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE GDR AND CANADA TO DATE: A FISHERIES AGREEMENT AND A POSTAL PARCEL AGREEMENT IN 1977 AS WELL AS A LONG-TERM TRADE AGREEMENT AND A SPORTS PROTOCOL. THE TRADE VOLUME BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES HAS BEEN VERY SMALL THUS FAR. FOREIGN TRADE BETWEEN THE GDR AND CANADA IN 1982 AMOUNTED TO AN TOTAL OF ONLY 89.7 MILLION VALUTA MARKS, . THIS CORRESPONDS APPROXIMATELY TO FOREIGN TRADE BETWEEN THE GDR AND LEBANON. HOWEVER LAST YEAR CANADA BECAME A NEW GRAIN SUPPLIER TO THE GDR. UNQUOTE.

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MESSAGE

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REF ---CLARK VISIT - 8 PAGES

SUBJ/SUJ

CANADIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

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DIVISION/DIRECTION

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APPROVED/APProuvé

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J. J. YSISHYIN
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PROGRAM

VISIT OF MR. JOE CLARK

January 29 - February 1, 1984

Sunday, January 29

17:30 Arrival at airport, Eastern Airlines Flight 529.
To be met by Ambassador Gotlieb and R. Lysyshyn.

Accommodation Ritz-Carlton
2100 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Telephone: 293-2100

19:00 Private dinner arranged by David MacDonald

Monday, January 30

07:55 Depart Hotel

08:00 Breakfast at Residence, with Ambassador Gotlieb, Jeremy Kinaman
and Ralph Lysyshyn.

10:00 Briefing on current arms control negotiations: John Hawes,
Director, Office of Security and Political Affairs, European
Bureau, State Department.

10:30 Meeting with Kenneth Adelman, Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency.

11:30 Meeting with Admiral Jonathan Howe, Director, Bureau of Politico-
Military Affairs, State Department.

13:00 Lunch with Ambassador Gotlieb at Maison Blanche.

Maison Blanche
1725 F Street, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
642-0070

14:30 Meeting at the Embassy with Mr. Jerry Hough, Academic Expert on
the Soviet Union.

16:00 Threat Briefing at The Pentagon.

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- 16:30 Meeting with Dr. Fred Ikle, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, The Pentagon.
- 17:30 Approx. Return to Hotel.
- 20:00 Dinner with Mr. Kinsman with John Steinbruner, Director, Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings Institution and Maureen Steinbruner, Policy Director, Institute for Policy Studies.

Tuesday, January 31

- 09:15 Depart Hotel
- 09:30 Meeting with Mr. Gerard Smith, Chairman of the Board, Arms Control Association. Other Board Members may also attend.
- Arms Control Association
1616 H Street, N.W.
Suite 420
WASHINGTON, D.C.
797-6450
- 10:45 Meeting at the National Security Council with Jack Matlock, Special Assistant to the President, European Affairs, and Ron Lehman, Special Assistant to the President, Arms Control. NSC Adviser McFarlane joined meeting at about 11:45.
- Old Executive Office Building.
- 12:15 Lunch with Leslie Gelb, National Security Correspondent, New York Times.
- Vincenzo
1606 20th Street, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
667-0047
- 15:00 Meeting with Kenneth W. Dam, Deputy Secretary of State, State Department.
- The Honourable Kenneth W. Dam
Deputy Secretary of State
Office of the Deputy Secretary
State Department
Room 7220
WASHINGTON, D.C.
632-9640
- 15:30 Meeting with Senator Cohen of Maine (Republican).

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Senator William S. Cohen
Senate Hart Office Building
Room 530
WASHINGTON, D.C.
224-2523

17:15 Meeting with Roger Molander, Chairman of the Board, and Theo Brown, Executive Director, Ground Zero.

Ground Zero
808 15th Street, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
638-7402

20:00 Dinner at the Residence.

Wednesday, February 01

09:10 Depart Hotel.

09:30 Meeting with Senator Larry Pressler (Republican).

Senator Larry Pressler
Senate Russell Office Building
Room 407A
WASHINGTON, D.C.

11:00 Meeting with Dr. James Billington, Executive Director, Woodrow Wilson Center, Smithsonian Institution.

Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Smithsonian Institution
1000 Jefferson Drive, S.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
357-2429

12:00 Attendance at the Kennan Forum. Guest Speaker Jeremy Azrael.

Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
Smithsonian Institution
1000 Jefferson, S.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
357-2415

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13:00 Lunch with Dr. Billington and other Soviet experts.

16:00 Meeting with Senator Ted Kennedy (Democrat).

Senator Ted Kennedy
Senate Russell Office Building
Room 113
WASHINGTON, D.C.
224-4543

16:45 Press Debriefing
Embassy Library
1746 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
785-1400

17:30 Departure for Airport.

19:00 BWI Departure

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LUNCH AT THE WOODROW WILSON CENTER

Dr. Billington's office tells us that the lunch he is organizing for February 01, will include the following people:

General Bill Smith, a fellow of the Woodrow Wilson Center, working on "Strategic Arms Control: The Way Ahead". General Smith is from the USA Department of Defense.

Dr. Peter Redaway, a fellow of the Woodrow Wilson Center from the London School of Economics. He is working on "Dissent in the Soviet Union."

Michael Howard, a fellow of the Woodrow Wilson Center from Oxford University. He is working on "Analysis of War".

Professor Gifford, Deputy Director, Woodrow Wilson Center.

Jeremy Azrael, the day's guest speaker at the Kennan Forum and a member of the Policy Planning Council at the State Department.

Herb Ellison, Secretary of the Kennan Forum.

Dr. Billington's office said 2 or 3 other people may be added to the list.

#9 2/10

DINNER HOSTED BY AMBASSADOR AND MRS. GOTLIEB
IN HONOUR OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE JOE CLARK
TUESDAY, JANUARY 31, 1984, 8:00 P.M.
AT THE RESIDENCE -- INFORMAL

- HOST AND HOSTESS: 2 Ambassador and Mrs. GOTLIEB
GUEST OF HONOUR: 3 The Right Honourable Joe CLARK
STAFF: 4 Ms. Peggy MASON
Staff Assistant to Mr. CLARK

ACCEPT

- 6 Dr. and Mrs. James BILLINGTON
Director, Wilson Center
- 8 Ambassador Stephen BOSWORTH and Ms. Rutledge
Chairman, Policy Planning Council
- 10 Mr. and Mrs. Thomas BRADEN
Writer, Columnist
- 12 Mr. and Mrs. Joseph KRAFT
Syndicated Columnist
- 14 Dr. and Mrs. Ronald F. LEHMAN
National Security Council
- 15 Miss Flora MacDONALD
Member of Parliament
- 17 Ambassador and Mrs. Jack MATLOCK
National Security Council
- 19 Mr. James MEDAS and Ms. Sheryl Morris
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Canadian Affairs
- 20 Ambassador Paul NITZE
Special Representative for Arms Control and
Disarmament Negotiations
- 22 Dr. and Mrs. James SCHLESINGER
Senior Advisor, Georgetown University,
Center for Strategic Studies
- 24 General Brent SCOWCROFT, USA Ret.
Vice-Chairman, Kissinger Association, Inc.

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- 25 The Honourable Helmut SONNENFELDT and Mrs. SONNENFELDT
Guest Scholar, Brookings Institute
- 27 Mr. Raymond SAINT-PIERRE and Ms. Sylvianne TRAMIER
Correspondent, TV News, French Network, CBC
- 29 Ambassador and Mrs. Ronald I. SPIERS
Under Secretary of State for Management
- 31 Mr. and Mrs. PAUL WARNKE
Senior Partner, Clifford and Warnke

Canadian Embassy

- 32 Mr. Jacques Roy
Deputy Head of Mission
- 34 Mr. and Mrs. Jeremy KINSMAN
Minister, Canadian Embassy
- 36 Mr. and Mrs. Ralph LYSYSHYN
Counsellor, Canadian Embassy

Accent

- 37 Mr. Grant Reuber
President, Bank of Montreal

Mr. Smyth OVR
MF
RD

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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INFO WSHDC LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN OSLO
BRU MOSCO BNATO PRMNY GENEV TOKYO PEKIN PRGUE WSAW BGRAD BUCST
BPEST STKHM/SCDEL PCOTT/FOWLER PMOTT/AXWORTHY NDHQOTT/ADMPOC/CPP
DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB CPD PER IDR IDA IMU RBR RSR RSD RBD RGB
---PMS INITIATIVE

SUMMARY: AFTER BROAD REVIEW OF PMS INITIATIVE WITH JACOBVITS,
DIRGEN OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS AT MFA, HE COMMENTED THAT DUTCH WRE
STILL LARGELY SUPPORTIVE OF INITIATIVE BUT EXPRESSED SOME CAUTION
OF HOW FAR USSR WOULD WISH TO GO AFTER MILD THAW IN STOCKHOLM.
DURING USA ELECTORAL YEAR HE DOUBTED RUSSIANS WOULD BE INTERESTED
IN ENGAGING IN SERIOUS POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS. DUTCH REACTION TO
FIRST WEEK OF STOCKHOLM CONF WAS LARGELY POSITIVE BUT JACOBVITS
THOUGHT PROCESS WOULD BE A PROTRACTED ONE WITH WARSAW PACK
COUNTRIES PROPOSING DECLARATORY MEASURES AND WEST WISHING TO
DISCUSS ONLY CONCRETE PROPOSALS. JACOBVITS WAS VERY CRITICAL OF
CDN INTENTION OF TABLING IN DISARMAMENT CTTEE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
RELATED TO SUFFOCATION IDEAS OF PM. IN HIS VIEW THEY HAD SECURITY
IMPLICATIONS WHICH NEEDED TO BE THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED. IN NATO BEFORE
TEXTS COULD BE PUT ON TABLE IN GENEVA. JACOBVITS SUGGESTED THAT
CDA REFRAIN FROM TABLING THEM FOR TIME BEING.

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PAGE THREE YWGR0341 CONFID

AGREEMENT TO RESUME MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WAS ANOTHER SIGN THAT A CERTAIN MOVEMENT, ALTHOUGH SMALL, HAD BEEN CREATED WHICH COULD IMPROVE INNATL CLIMATE. JACOBVITS WAS NOT/NOT CONVINCED, HOWEVER, THAT DIALOGUE WOULD OR COULD GO MUCH FURTHER FOR THE MOMENT. DURING USA ELECTORAL YEAR, HE THOUGHT THAT USSR WOULD NOT/NOT BE INTERESTED IN ENGAGING IN SERIOUS POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS. HE PERSONALLY DID NOT/NOT BELIEVE IN THEORY THAT, IF IN COURSE OF ELECTION CAMPAIGN IT BECAME APPARENT THAT PRES REAGAN WAS TO BE RE-ELECTED, USSR WOULD BECOME MORE EAGER TO ENGAGE IN NEGOTIATIONS IN HOPE THAT REAGAN MIGHT BE MORE ACCOMMODATING BEFORE ELECTIONS THAN AFTER. JACOBVITS FELT RUSSIANS WOULD REMAIN HARD NOSED UNTIL AFTER ELECTIONS AND WOULD NOT/NOT WANT TO GIVE REAGAN ISSUE WHICH WOULD IMPROVE HIS CHANCES OF WINNING ELECTION.

4. ON MBFR, JACOBVITS COMMENTED THAT ALTHOUGH 16 MARCH HAD BEEN MENTIONED BY AMERICANS AS DATE FOR RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS, IT HAD NOT/NOT BEEN ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY IN MOSCOW. FURTHERMORE PRES REAGAN HAD ALSO INDICATED THAT HE HAD NOT/NOT CHANGED ATTITUDE TOWARDS MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. THIS CURIOUS ATTITUDE DISPLAYED BY AMERICANS COULD ONLY HAVE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON USSR. JACOBVITS THOUGHT THAT AMERICANS SHOULD BE MADE AWARE AGAIN THAT MOVEMENT ON SPECIFIC ISSUES WAS NEEDED IN MBFR NEGOTIATIONS AND THEY SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED TO TRY AND MOVE FORWARD DURING PREPARATORY PROCESS.

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5. COMMENTING ON GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS ON INF, JACOBVITS DID NOT/NOT SEE HOW RUSSIANS COULD RESUME NEGOTIATIONS IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. RUSSIANS WOULD NOT/NOT RETURN TO NEGOTIATING TABLE WHILE DEPLOYMENT WAS STILL GOING ON. THIS DID NOT/NOT IMPLY, IN HIS VIEW, THAT THEY WERE NOT/NOT INTERESTED IN TALKING. BUT SOME SORT OF DEVICE WOULD HAVE TO BE FOUND TO BRING USSR BACK ON THE TABLE.

6. ASSESSING SOVIET SCENE, JACOBVITS SAID SO LONG AS SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAD TO CONVEY IMPRESSION THAT PRES ANDROPOV WAS STILL IN CHARGE AND SO LONG AS ANDROPOV REMAINED ILL, WEST COULD EXPECT NO/NO SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE OF ATTITUDE OR POLICIES FROM KREMLIN. TO THINK OTHERWISE WAS WISHFUL THINKING. SOVIET MACHINERY MOVED SLOWLY, THERE WERE WARRING INTERNAL FACTIONS AND COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP COULD NOT/NOT TAKE INITIATIVES OR RESPOND TO THOSE FROM WEST. THUS WE NEEDED GREAT PATIENCE.

7. EARLIER IN CONVERSATION I HAD INDICATED TO JACOBVITS THAT CDA INTENDED TO TABLE IN FEB IN DISARMAMENT CTTEE (CD) IN GENEVA THREE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS RELATED TO SUFFOCATION IDEAS OF PM. JACOBVITS REACTED VERY STRONGLY. HE INDICATED THAT DUTCH EMBASSY IN OTTAWA HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE DEMARCHE UNDERLINING DUTCH DOUBTS ON OUR PROPOSED ACTION. DUTCH WERE NOT/NOT QUESTIONING SO MUCH SUBSTANCE OF THESE PROPOSALS (THOUGH THEY HAD STRONG RESERVATIONS ABOUT ASAT PROPOSAL AS THEY UNDERSTOOD IT) BUT FACT THAT THEY ALL HAD SECURITY IMPLICATIONS WHICH HAD NOT/NOT YET BEEN EXAMINED BY ALLIES. HE BELIEVED NATION ALLIES SHOULD HAVE OPPORTUNITY OF DISCUSSING THEM THOROUGHLY BEFORE THEY WERE

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SUBMITTED IN CD. JACOBVITS SAID DUTCH HAD PREPARED A PAPER ON SOME ASPECTS OF THESE QUESTIONS AND THEY WOULD VERY MUCH HAVE LIKED TO HAVE STUDIED POSSIBILITY OF JOINT APPROACH. DUTCH FEARED THAT, WITHOUT PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION IN NATO, IMPRESSION OF DISARRAY MIGHT BE CREATED IN CD. IN FACT, JACOBVITS WENT AS FAR AS TO SUGGEST THAT WE REFRAIN FROM TABLING PROPOSALS IN GENEVA. I SIMPLY INDICATED I WOULD PASS COMMENTS ON TO YOU.

8. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS ABOUT STOCKHOLM CONF, WHERE JACOBVITS HAD JUST BEEN WITH HIS MINISTER, HE SAID DUTCH ASSESSMENT OF FIRST WEEK WAS ON THE WHOLE POSITIVE. THIS EVEN APPLIED TO GROMYKO SPEECH WHICH, IN HIS VIEW, HAD BEEN LARGELY UNDONE BY HIS BILATERAL MTGS WITH SCHULTZ AND OTHER WESTERN FOREIGN MINISTERS. SOVIET PROPOSALS OF TWO AGREEMENTS ON: (1) NON-FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND (2) NUCLEAR FREE ZONE IN EUROPE, WERE NOT/NOT WHAT WEST WAS LOOKING FOR. ON THE OTHER HAND, NEGOTIATIONS OF CONCRETE MEASURES AS PROPOSED BY WEST WOULD NOT/NOT BE EASY. HE UNDERSTOOD WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WERE SURPRISED IN STOCKHOLM THAT WEST HAD READY PACKAGE OF CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR DISCUSSION. FOR THEIR PART, HOWEVER, NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES SEEMED TO BE RELIEVED THAT THEY WOULD HAVE SOMETHING TANGIBLE TO FOCUS ON.

9. GENERALLY JACOBVITS HOPED WE COULD KEEP IN CLOSE TOUCH ON THESE IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL ISSUES AND SAID HE WOULD WELCOME BEING KEPT INFORMED OF CDN THINKING AS IT EVOLVED

SMITH

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PAGE TWO YWGR0341 CONF D

2. I MET WITH JACOBVITS, DIRGEN OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS AT MFA, TO REVIEW WITH HIM PMS INITIATIVE AND TO OBTAIN DUTCH VIEWS AND COMMENTS. HE SEEMED INTERESTED IN HAVING SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS SINCE PMS VISIT HERE LAST NOV AND OUR ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT STAGE OF EAST/WEST RELATIONS. FOR PURPOSE OF TALK I DREW ON VERY USEFUL GUIDANCE YOU HAVE BEEN PROVIDING (INCL YOURTELS IDDZ0046 17JAN AND 0050 18JAN). AGAINST ORIGINAL CDN OBJECTIVES I ATTEMPTED TO SHOW THAT CDN INITIATIVE OVER LAST FEW MONTHS HAD HAD NUMBER OF MARKED SUCCESSES AND HAD BEEN TAKEN PERSONALLY BY PM TO LARGE NUMBER OF CAPITALS AND LEADERS, THOUGH INABILITY TO VISIT MOSCOW REMAINED DISAPPOINTMENT. AREAS FOR SATISFACTION INCLUDED INVOLVEMENT AT HIGHEST POLITICAL LEVELS IN MANY COUNTRIES, RESUMPTION OF DIALOGUE IN VARIETY OF FORA, INCREASED UNDERSTANDING AND REDUCED TENSIONS, MODIFICATIONS IN AT LEAST PUBLIC MESSAGES COMING FROM KEY COUNTRIES SUCH AS USA OR CHINA, ENCOURAGEMENT FROM UN SECRETARY GENERAL AND POSITIVE RESULTS IN NATO, STOCKHOLM, VIENNA AND ELSEWHERE. I STRESSED HOWEVER THAT IMPROVEMENTS WERE FRAGILE AND GAVE NO/NO GROUNDS FOR SATISFACTION. MUCH REMAINED TO BE DONE IN WHICH WE WOULD WELCOME CONTINUED CLOSE COOPERATION WITH NETES GOVT.

3. JACOBVITS AGREED BROADLY WITH CDN ASSESSMENT AND REITERATED GENERAL DUTCH SUPPORT FOR CDN INITIATIVE. STOCKHOLM HAD DEMONSTRATED THAT DIALOGUE BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS WAS NOT/NOT ENTIRELY FROZEN.

...3



External Affairs Canada / Affaires extérieures Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

FACSIMILE

WDC006/03/086

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow / Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY / SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED

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CLARK TRANSCRIPT

IMMEDIATE

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CANADIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON
FEB 3 19 15 '84
FOR THE COMMUNICATIONS

1/21

FOLLOWING TRANSCRIPT OF COMMENTS MADE BY
JOE CLARK TO CANADIAN PRESS FOLLOWING HIS
WASHINGTON MEETINGS.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APProuvé

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PUB. AFFAIRS

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F. GOSSAGE

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CANADIAN EMBASSY

2/24

Press Briefing with
The Right Honorable Joe Clark

Washington, D. C.
February 1, 1984

P R O C E E D I N G S

VOICE: Mr. Clark, you've met both of these gentlemen. You know who they represent, and you've already started, I think, to describe the purpose of the visit and who you've seen so far. 3/21

MR. CLARK: Well, the purpose of the visit, just to get through that, as you know, Brian asked me to explain the basis to him, personal recommendations have not been requested, a broad consensus on the general field of arms control and disarmament. And I've been talking to a variety of people and intend to continue doing that in Canada and abroad.

I've been to Europe twice, I guess, since the assignment, once to Geneva and London and once to Stockholm and (inaudible). I am a little behind in my Canadian consultations because the invitation to go to Stockholm came very late, and the decision was taken by external -- by the government to have (inaudible) observers and (inaudible) a couple of days before (inaudible). And I had to (inaudible) private consultation (inaudible).

But my meetings here, as you can see from the agenda, were principally a variety of people helping me, not just on the American position, although I was

interested in that, obviously, but also some other questions. I had a very useful lunch today with some people (inaudible) the Soviet Union. One of the things that became clear to me very early as I got into this was that my state of my knowledge about the Soviets generally is not what it has to be (inaudible) Soviet (inaudible) list. 4/21

And we were lucky because people like Michael Howard (inaudible) were in town for three or four months at the Woodrow Wilson Center. So we could take advantage of their presence.

But that's by and large what I'm doing. I'm here because of your interest, not because -- I -- that's why I wanted (inaudible) session. I didn't think that I (inaudible) and skip out.

QUESTION: What is your feeling about the American approach now?

MR. CLARK: What are they going to do, you mean?

QUESTION: Yes, and what is their general attitude?

MR. CLARK: I want to avoid, first of all, being judgmental. I'll tell you what, I think, first of all I'm going to do, is accept them at their word and then we'll see what happens. What they tell me (inaudible). I

would not want this attributed to any one person. The impression I have from talking to the Americans is that, first of all, they -- I think it's fair to say -- are relieved that NATO came through the deployment exercise in as unified a state as it did, as together as it did.

There was some apprehension that there might be more difficulties with NATO countries or with NATO governments than there appeared to be. And then consider it, I suppose, a success from their perspective, that they have got through the deployment phase.

What they're doing -- my impression of what they're doing now is that while they would very, very much prefer to have started an INF, continue separately, they doubt that will happen. They need to be prepared to respond to a Soviet proposal that involves some degree of merger (inaudible) discuss the nature of the merger, perhaps one conference with two hats or something.

And my impression is that they believe that it is now up to the Soviets to make the proposals that might be the basis of any reconstituted discussions.

And I should also say that I think they expect some response. I think they expect that there will be meetings under Start auspices or the twin -- Start and INF issues discussed under Start auspices.

QUESTION: The -- is there a feeling that at all there ought to be -- these talks have to be widened as well as merged to include the European side? 6/24

MR. CLARK: Well, I guess that's one of the reasons they don't -- they're worried about merging this because they don't see how they can be productive without involving others.

And there is among some of the people -- I should distinguish here, these are not officials, but certainly some of the people who might be speaking are non-officials, but people who I would think are current with administration thinking, who believe that the question as to how you involve the Europeans; that is going to be a very difficult one to deal with.

But implicit in that description of the problem is the sense that they have to deal with that problem; in other words, they were not saying to me that they can't be widened. They were saying widening them would be difficult but not impossible. That's just the impression I have of their view of that next phase.

I don't think they're looking for procedural (inaudible). In other words, for a whole bunch of reasons I think that the Americans are -- will express very strong

preferences about procedures for the next round of Start, Stroke, and INF talks. But I don't think they want to do battle with them.

QUESTION: In the round of talks you had, what sort of reaction have you received from the Americans vis-a-vis the Trudeau peace mission and the _____ version of the same? Is there any -- is there puzzlement on their part? What are you doing (inaudible).

MR. CLARK: No. And I don't want to be misinterpreted on this. But the fact is that no one in any of the consultations I had has raised Mr. Trudeau's name. It has not come up. The mission has not come up.

QUESTION: Why is that?

MR. CLARK: With this exception: that when I explain why I'm here, I indicate what Brian has asked me to do and I indicate that I'm carrying it out in two phases. One phase is until an election or until the Trudeau (inaudible) winds down; the other is post-election. So I raise the name as a means of explaining why I'm here. And I tend to get onto the issue.

Why is it that they don't (inaudible)? Your guess is as good as mine. They don't do it, including no one has -- no one has even indirectly ask me to -- suggested

that I explain what was being said at (inaudible) or anything of that kind. It's just -- I get the impression that it's not a major part of their consciousness or this is an interpretation open to -- they want to leave the impression that it's not part of their consciousness. 8/21

QUESTION: Can --

MR. CLARK: Why do they talk to me? They're interested in talking to me because I'm here. I'm a former prime minister and I'm here with specific tasks that I'm undertaking. They acknowledge the importance of it. And we're having conversations, some of them obviously more forthcoming than others, generally forthcoming. I've generally had, I think, a high degree of frankness in conversations.

QUESTION: Do you -- I just didn't -- about the earlier part about the two phases.

MR. CLARK: Well, we're naturally interested in keeping track of what Mr. Trudeau is doing while he's doing it, and that for two reasons: one is because it might become a political issue in Canada, an issue of division between the two parties. And I take it as part of my responsibility to deal with that in the event that it does.

But also I think it important that, as you know, my support for the essence of the mission, not its details, but its purpose, I think it important in a matter of this kind that people outside Canada understand that this is not a subject of partisan dispute. And I can symbolize that. But very much an important -- I guess it becomes more evident in a city like this than it might in some others; when the government changes here, there are widespread changes in the public service in the bureaucracy.

9/21

And people who have been -- let's assume there's a change in government. People who have been interested in the arms control issue, who are not now of the party in office, can move into those offices very quickly.

In our case, being ready to -- able to move quickly on some of these issues involves bringing some understanding of the issues to the parliamentary cause. We're going to (inaudible) establishing policy. Part of my -- part of what I hope to do is to get on and involve some of my colleagues in some of the discussions, particularly some of the more interested people I've talked to.

It might be useful for some of us to sit down and talk privately with some (inaudible) which I've seen, just because that is such an unknown, central question as

to what they're up to. And I -- you know -- I believe that the members of my caucus would, regardless of their ideological starting point, would find very interesting some of the kinds of things that I have heard about, let me say, the state of knowledge, really, the very incomplete state of knowledge or a great deal of uncertainty with which policy matters have to operate in relation to the Soviets.

QUESTION: Did you get the impression with your discussions with the Americans that they saw your presence here as perhaps a harbinger of future dealings with the Canadian government?

MR. CLARK: Could be. I mean, I was pleased with the level of people I was able to see. And a few of them asked me about the election in Canada. I don't know whether that was because there was a lull in the conversation or because that was really why they came to see me. I don't know. That's up to -- you know -- a hunch. Yeah, a hunch. I'm sure that they were.

But I put it in very -- everyone was very proper and nobody was -- I have a hunch as to how a number of the people I met might vote when they vote in the Canadian election. But certainly nobody said -- I guess

10/21

what I'm saying is I think people are -- you know -- they want to -- they are warned about what has happened to me and what is happening, my intention to stay in (inaudible).

They have seen that I at least expect that I'll be in the conservative government, and they've read the polls and they (inaudible). It's most basic. They're being polite to somebody who they think might be -- at least polite and helpful to somebody they think might be in a Canadian administration, should that arise. See how low key I'm being.

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: Would it be fair to take from what you were saying there about being able to move quickly, that if the conservatives win the election the peace initiative will be continued?

MR. CLARK: I think -- I think it's fair. It is my expectation that a peace initiative will be continued. And let me just back into -- come into this for a second. I think that we have some -- first of all, I don't exaggerate Canada's role in all this, but I think that we have a very real, if limited, role to play that is based on two traditions.

One tradition has been a clear, forthright involvement in an alliance. There's never been any attempt to fudge that. When successful, there's never been any attempt to fudge that. We are part of -- we believe in western values and we are prepared to extend ourselves actively to defend them.

But, in addition to that, we are not confined by that alliance, and we've also been prepared to play a much larger role internationally, including very actively in peace keeping.

You know, I suppose, the best period of that, the most consistent period was the Lester Pearson to Howard Green period because they were both -- they came from different parties, but they were both deeply in that tradition. I think part of the trouble that Mr. Trudeau has is that people remember that in the early days of his period as prime minister, there was some question of the degree to which he was interested in maintaining the strength and the traditional associations.

His actions, up until the other day, up until he lost his temper internationally, his actions, I think, have offered a return to the Canadian tradition.

I think that we are unequivocally within that

Canadian tradition, and I don't think -- my reading of the world that there's going to be a need for us to exercise that kind of influence in November or December of 1984 (inaudible). 13/21

QUESTION: I'd like to come back to (inaudible) and ask you again (inaudible) substantively. Surely they must be questioning what they heard or reports of what they heard (inaudible). Maintain a strong presence (inaudible) Germany (inaudible) remarks (inaudible).

MR. CLARK: None of them -- nobody -- nobody said or implied anything to me about that in any of the conversations that I had. I have a view. I read the transcript and I made a comment before I left Canada. I wasn't particularly concerned about the dam discussion. That to me was not the central issue. The central issue was what he said and then as prime minister of Canada in a public forum repeated the questioning of the fundamental basis of deterrents.

I didn't find it incredible. I, unfortunately, found it typical because we've had that kind -- there was a pattern to it. I have been in some arguments with Pierre Trudeau. I've won a few and lost some. And whenever I won he would always come back with sort of an

extra shot afterwards. He could not leave the field without an unnecessary remark or gesture.

He made an unnecessary remark or gesture in Dallas. I thought Barr, by the way, was brilliant and _____ response was among the best I've seen to Trudeau, serious response, including quoting philosophers. I thought that was great. He must have been reading Canadian politics for awhile.

Of course, that's an old (inaudible).

QUESTION: Just as a supplementary on that same subject. Even when Mr. _____ (inaudible).

MR. CLARK: No, no (inaudible) very careful (inaudible). But it didn't come up, and (inaudible). It wasn't my business to come down here and see what Pierre Trudeau was up to.

QUESTION: What was your impression overall or in detail about -- about the initiative, just that, as you said earlier, that there was no particular interest, no -- I've forgotten the word -- no --

MR. CLARK: Yeah, I -- yes. I mean, obviously the people I was talking to, whether in the administration or not, know what has occurred. And they said nothing disparaging about it. They said nothing encouraging about it.

14/21

It just did not come up. I think that I would deduce from the conversations I had about Canada generally that Americans recognize the limitations to -- just to a super power dialogue that has left us in this situation. And then somebody else has to help.

One of the academics today at lunch, Soviet matters, one person talked about the role that could be played by a country like Canada, again more -- I think it's fair to say in response to my being at the table. I don't want to exaggerate that.

But somebody else then came in and made the point quite legitimately that the role that is open to Canada is also open to a number of other countries, which the person then named, and that is the case. So I've had the view for a long time (inaudible). I've had the view for a long time that the Trudeau initiative was of more interest in Canada than anywhere else, and nothing I have seen in Washington has changed that view.

QUESTION: Did you get the impression at all from the people that you spoke to that there is an element of optimism (inaudible).

MR. CLARK: That's curious. You see, I think what is happening -- and I think it's going to endure -- and

I'm going to come to your question -- but I think what's happening and I think it's going to endure is that I think there is a larger constituency -- one almost has to call it a constituency here about these issues in our country (inaudible), although I am interested in the news that there are church related protest movements in East Germany, and obviously those have to do with specific deployments, but I think they probably also (inaudible). 16/24

So I think we have a situation where there is a populace, probably an ordinary populace, although my instincts will not -- my antenna really only operate in Canada. I can only comment on that. A populace that is becoming increasingly concerned about the possibility of war.

I think that it would be fair to say, fair to characterize the mood of the American administration as thinking that things are under control, not at all complacent, but that there is a process in place that the Soviets will probably be back to (inaudible), probably be back to Starts or back to (inaudible) and that there is a process that will be in place.

So I think what is curious is that I think there is -- and the President's language certainly is much more

reassuring now. And -- but I think there is still and very significant gap between the sense of very real concern, unusual concern because things are unusually dangerous, that I think is a public -- in the sense that I think I picked up in Washington that usual processes, once we establish, will remove us from danger. 17/21

QUESTION: You're going back tonight?

MR. CLARK: going back to night.

QUESTION: (Inaudible).

MR. CLARK: (Inaudible).

QUESTION: (Inaudible).

MR. CLARK: (Inaudible). We probably are. Our contributions will be more modest than that.

QUESTION: Do you have a timetable for recommendations?

MR. CLARK: Yeah. I hope to have some recommendations to Mr. _____ in March or more likely April. And my expectation is that (inaudible).

QUESTION: Do you have support staff?

MR. CLARK: Peggy and Paul Donne from our research office is helping us. We have had some support from -- I think some volunteer support and we're operating on a budget that allows us to -- we have to call in people for special (inaudible). And, you know, they're not my

support staff at all, but I have to say that the external people, both here and when I've been in Ottawa and when I've been in Stockholm, when I've been in Geneva have been extraordinarily helpful. 18/6/74

In fact, they're -- that is their instruction, but they are also doing that fully, and I'm very appreciative of that.

QUESTION: (Inaudible).

MR. CLARK: (Inaudible).

(Laughter.)

QUESTION: (Inaudible).

MR. CLARK: I don't know. I think the most significant thing that's happened -- I think a couple of things have happened. One is I believe -- I said at the time right after our convention that I thought that Trudeau would hold his decision to see how well Brian did, which is I think if Brian had done badly, Trudeau would have been very strongly tempted to stay.

And I always thought he would delay a decision until sometime around or after Christmas. Brian has done well and that opportunity hasn't been afforded the prime minister.

I think he's taking a look at the polls and he

realizes it would be pretty tough for him to win. But what's more (inaudible) is that I think that he has begun to remove the office of Mr. Turner (inaudible). Jerry Rapstein (phonetic) is now a Senator and some of the other things that (inaudible) going on that we're seeing could quite correctly be seen as obstacles to that candidacy (inaudible). M/A

So I -- the future of the liberal party today is in the hands of Gary _____. And when he decides to allow -- to free the prime minister of his Canadian burdens, I suppose (inaudible) convention hall and see what happens then.

I expect an election bracketing one way or the other the American election.

QUESTION: How do you see that in terms of timing? Some quarters will argue that coincidental elections will be beneficial to -- depending on how the U. S. election is going (inaudible) conservative.

MR. CLARK: I think the liberal party wants to run against an administration, and if Turner, he'll try to run against two, try to run against whatever the natives think is wrong with the American administration. We always think we're more pro-Democratic. And when

you're also running against the Trudeau administration,
against Trudeau (inaudible). but perhaps more ferocious.
In any event, that they will welcome the diversion of
an election in the United States. *20/2*

QUESTION: (Inaudible).

MR. CLARK: Yeah.

Well, there are always (inaudible). I believe --
this is not -- I think we're going to -- I think this
time we are finally going to win it. We are going to win
it but not the majority to stay there. But I'm not at
all sanguine about the next several months. It is --
since I (inaudible) intensely difficult to keep an opposition
party out of trouble when somebody else is setting the
agenda. We're in that position now. (Inaudible) helps
every day in every way, but nonetheless, it's a perilous
position.

Somebody -- some academic -- maybe I'll -- in
my week at York when I put on my gown, I'll inspire somebody
to do a study on how many leaders of the opposition actually
ever win an election. (Inaudible). Just because -- the
state of the union thing was quite interesting. I watched
it. I was quite frankly channel flipping and I came in
early and was just rivetted by the speech. It was a

masterful presentation. But what struck me as being particularly interesting was that right after that instead of having them put poor Walter Mondale or poor John Glenn or poor somebody else up there unprepared to answer all that sophisticated, carefully orchestrated stuff, they could have some -- they could have an impersonal presentation. Our system can't do that. The prime minister does all the preparations and sets everything up and then the opposition has to walk in there and appear to be as expert as the operating (inaudible).

QUESTION: (Inaudible).

MR. CLARK: Sometimes, rarely a text. Sometimes (inaudible). Okay?

QUESTION: Mr. Clark, thank you very much.

MR. CLARK: Thank you.

QUESTION: I should say that we had a -- we had a rather --

(End of proceedings as recorded.)

MASTER

Mr. Smith of R
Division Phone *for action*
Person *pl*
Local Time *RD*

CDN EYES ONLY **ACTION**
RESERVE AUX CDNS **SUITE A DONNER**

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---PMS INITIATIVE: EASTERN EUROPEAN TOUR

WESTON, HEAD OF FCO DEFENCE DEPT, TELEPHONED BEATTIE TODAY ON QUOTE
PERSONAL BASIS UNQUOTE TO SAY THAT REPORTS BEING RECEIVED IN FCO
FROM POSTS ABOUT POSITIONS TAKEN BY PM DUING HIS EASTERN EUROPEAN
TOUR WERE CAUSING FCO QUOTE ANXIETY AND MISGIVING UNQUOTE. STANCES
ATTRIBUTED TO PM ON MBFR AND BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH GDR TO
ARRIVE AT QUOTE COMMON POSITIONS UNQUOTE ON DAC ISSUES SEEMED AT
VARIANCE WITH COMMON NATO POLICIES. WESTON WAS IN PARTICULAR
TROUBLED BY REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO PM WHEN IN PRAGUE WHICH HAD
IMPLICATION CDA WAS CALLING INTO QUESTION NATO POSITION ON MBFR.
WITHOUT COMMENT WESTON ALSO DREW ATTENTION TO PAGE ONE STORY IN
HERALD TRIBUNE THIS MORNING ON PMS EXCHANGE WITH BARRE IN DAVOS
ON NATO FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (WE HAD NOT/NOT SEEN PAPER
WHEN WESTON CALLED BUT HAVE SINCE FOUND IT CONTAINS SUGGESTION
ATTRIBUTED TO OTT COMMENTATORS THAT PMS DAVOS COMMENTS WERE
INTENDED AS A DEVICE TO ASSURE A RECEPTIVE HEARING IN SOVIET BLOC).
2. WESTON REMARKED THAT HE DID NOT/NOT THINK IT WAS QUOTE HELPFUL

...2

PAGE TWO XNGR0243 CONF CDN EYES ONLY

UNQUOTE THAT CDA HAD TAKEN DAC PROPOSALS TO EASTERN EUROPEAN CAPITALS WITHOUT HAVING CONSULTED IN NATO REGARDING ITS INTENTIONS. HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT AN EARLY REPORT BE GIVEN IN NATO ON PMS TRIP.

3.WE REGRETTED HEARING OF MISGIVINGS WHICH WE THOUGHT MUST ARISE FROM INACCURATE PRESS ACCOUNTS.WE WERE NOT/NOT AWARE OF ANY NEW AND DIFFERING CDN STANCE ON MBFR.WE EXPRESSED DESIRE QUICKLY TO PROVIDE CLARIFICATIONS IF FCO GAVE MORE PRECISIN TO ITS CONCERNS. WE SUGGESTED THAT WITH RETURN BY PMDEL TO OTT DEPT WOULD BE IN POSITION TO GIVE UK HICOMM FULL REPORT ON TRIP AND THAT IN ANY EVENT WE WOULD DISCUSS IT WITH FCO AS SOON AS MORE INFO AVAILABLE TO US.WESTON RESPONDED THAT APPROPRIATE PLACE FOR BRIEFING WAS IN NATO.

4.ALTHOUGH WESTON DESCRIBED HIS COMMENTS AS QUOTE PERSONAL UNQUOTE, THEY WERE EVIDENTLY ADVANCED IN EXPECTATION THEY WOULD BE REPORTED. ALTHOUGH WESTON HAS SOMEWHAT FORCEFUL PERSONALITY,HIS SENIORS MAY WELL BE TROUBLED AND WE MAY TAKE CALL TO BE BY WAY OF LOW KEY REMONSTRANCE.AS WE HAVE LEARNED FROM TELECON TODAY WITH DELVOIE THAT MACLEAN GAVE UK AMB IN EAST BERLIN ACCOUNT OF PM VISIT TO PRAGUE AND EAST BERLIN,FCO DIFFICULTY APPARENTLY IS NOT/NOT LACK OF INFO BUT WITH CDN APPROACH.WE CAN IMAGINE FCO OFFICIALS ARE QUIZZICAL ABOUT PMS REMARKS IN DAVOS,DO NOT/NOT LIKE PURSUIT OF ...3

PAGE THREE XNGR0243 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

FIVE NUCLEAR POWER TALKS IN BLOC CAPITALS AND WILL LOOK ASKANCE AT IDEA OF CDN/GDR CONSULTATION ON DAC ISSUES WHEN IN FCO VIEW WE WERE DEFICIENT IN CONSULTING OUR ALLIES. WE HAVE NOT/NOT YET IDENTIFIED HOW WE HAVE OFFENDED THEM ON MBR OTHER THAN BY SUGGESTING ONUS IS ON NATO TO RESPOND TO WP PROPOSALS.

5. BEATTIE HAD ALREADY SOUGHT OUT LUNCH WITH JENKINS, ASST UNDERSECTY FOR EUROPE, TO EXCHANGE INFO ON THATCHER/TRUDEAU TRIPS BUT TIME IS NOT/NOT YET SET. GRATEFUL TO HAVE YOUR THOUGHTS ON HOW TO RESPOND TO LIKELY QUERIES WITHOUT SEEMING TO BE ON DEFENSIVE. YOU MAY PREFER TO BRIEF UK HICOMM AS NORMAL COURTESY. IF TASK TO BE LEFT TO THIS END WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO HAVE GUIDANCE, PARTICULARLY ON PRESENTATION OF PMS DAVOS COMMENTS, PURSUIT OF FIVE NUCLEAR POWER TALKS IN EAST BLOC, AND PROPOSED GDR/CDA DAC CONSULTATIONS.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE GROUP SUMMARY

SELECTED ITEMS OF CURRENT INTEREST SUBMITTED BY

VARIOUS NATIONS AS INDICATED, COMPILED BY THE NATO HEADQUARTERS

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE GROUP, VIDE C-M(71)1(REVISED).

1. USSR: ANDROPOV S ABSENCE (DIA WASHINGTON)

2. ANGOLA: AIR FORCE DEVELOPMENTS (DIA WASHINGTON)

1. USSR: ANDROPOV S ABSENCE

DIA WASHINGTON (02 FEBRUARY 1984) REPORTED:

A. (NC) ANDROPOV S FIVE-AND-HALF MONTH ABSENCE HAS

PAGE 2 RFWZ 0237 N A T O S E C R E T

SPAWNED REPORTS THAT THE SOVIET LEADER IS SO ILL HE MAY NOT REAPPEAR.

B. (NC) ALTHOUGH NEWS MEDIA CONTINUE TO PROJECT THE IMAGE OF ANDROPOV S LEADING ROLE, THERE ARE ALSO SIGNS OF THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY HIS AILMENTS. HE HAS MISSED A SERIES OF MAJOR FUNCTIONS SINCE NOVEMBER, AND A HOST OF FOREIGN LEADERS APPARENTLY HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO ARRANGE MEETINGS WITH HIM.

C. (NC) ACCORDING TO UNCONFIRMED REPORTS CIRCULATING IN MOSCOW AND WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS ABROAD, AND QUOTE ORGANIZATIONAL UNQUOTE CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM WILL BE HELD IN MARCH FOLLOWING SCHEDULED SUPREZ SOVIET ELECTIONS. THERE ARE ALSO RUMOURS THAT, WITH DEFENSE MINISTER USTINOV S BACKING, THE DECEMBER CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM NAMED POLITBURO MEMBER GORBACHEV TO REPLACE ANDROPOV AS GENERAL-SECRETARY, AND POLITBURO MEMBER VOROTNIKOV TO REPLACE TIKHONOV AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS.

D. NC) AT 52, GORBACHEV, WHOSE RESPONSIBILITIES INCLUDE PARTY OVERSIGHT FOR AGRICULTURE, IS THE YOUNGEST POLITBURO MEMBER. HIS AREAS OF AUTHORITY APPZAR TO HAVE EXPANDED CONSIDERABLY OVER THE PAST YEAR AS HE HAS MADE TRIPS ABROAD, MET WITH FOREIGN VISITORS IN MOSCOW, AND REPRESENTED ANDROPOV ON SEVZRAL

PAGE 3 RFWZ 0237 N A T O S E C R E T

OCCASIONS DURING HIS ABSENCE. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS UNLIKELY GORBACHEV HAS BEEN SELECTED AS THE NEXT GENERAL-SECRETARY IN- AS MUCH AS A DECISION OF THIS NATURE WOULD NORMALLY BE ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY AND BECAUSE HE HAS APPARENTLY BEEN ON VACATION IN THE BLACK SEA AREA SINCE THE DECEMBER PLENUM. MOREOVER, EVEN IF AN INFORMAL AGREEMENT WAS REACHED, THERE IS NO GUARANTEE IT WILL BE HONOURED ONCE ANDROPOV IS NO LONGER ON THE SCENE. HOWEVER, THAT SUCH RUMOURS ARE CIRCULATING IS IN ITSELF A SIGN OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF ANDROPOV'S SITUATION.

E. (NC) OVERALL, WHILE THERE CONTINUE TO BE SIGNS OF ANDROPOV'S AUTHORITY, THERE ARE ALSO REMINDERS OF HIS PHYSICAL LIMITS. THEREFORE, THE LONGER HIS ABSENCE CONTINUES, THE GREATER THE LIABILITY AND POTENTIAL DETRIMENT IT BECOMES.

2. ANGOLA: AIR FORCE DEVELOPMENTS

DIA WASHINGTON (02 FEBRUARY 1984) REPORTED:

A. (NS) THE AIR FORCE IS APPARENTLY ABOUT TO RECEIVE

ITS FIRST SQUADRON OF MIG-23/FLOGGERS FROM THE SOVIET UNION.

B. (NS) ON 26 JANUARY THE SOVIET MERCHANT SHIP QUOTE KAPITAN ALEKSEY- EV UNQUOTE REPORTEDELY CARRYING A DECK CARGO OF TWELVE FLOGGER-TYPE A AIRCRAFT CRATES AND FOUR FLOGGER-ASSOCIATED CRATES, WAS TRAVELLING

PAGE 4 RFWZ 0237 N A T O S E C R E T

SOUTHWEST OFF THE COAST OF SENEGAL. IF IT IS BOUND FOR LUANDA, IT
COULD ARRIVE AT ANY TIME, PRESUMING THE SHIP MAKES NO INTERMEDIATE
PORT CALLS. EARLIER IN JANURAY, ANGOLA RECEIVED AT LEAST TWO
MIG-23 TRAINERS, MARKING THE FIRST DELIVERY OF FLOGGERS TO SOUTHERN
AFRICA.

C. (NS) UNLESS THE PROFICIENCY OF ANGOLAN OR CUBAN
PILOTS IMPROVES DRAMATICALLY IN COMING MONTHS, THE ACQUISITION OF
FLOGGERS WILL BE ONLY A POTENTIAL RATHER THAN AN ACTUAL IMPROVEMENT
IN ANGOLA S AIR POWER. THE SAME ASSESSMENT PERTAINS IF LUANDA
RECEIVES A GROUND-ATTACK VARIANT OF THE FLOGGER.

BT

CCC/168 031645Z WFWZ0237

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Mr. McNeil
Pls speak to me about
this

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM STKHM/SCDEL SCDL0102 03FEB84

TO EXTOTT IMD LIDDZ

INFO PRMNY BNATO

DISTR IDA

---STKHM CONF:PRESENTATION BY UN SECGEN

AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARRANGEMENTS AGREED TO AT HSNKI PREP CONF, GOVT OF SWEDEN HAS INVITED UN SECGEN TO MAKE PRESENTATION TO CONF ON THUR 16FEB.ON ASSUMPTION THAT WE CONTINUE FROM NOW UNTIL THEN WITH ONE FORMAL MTG PER DAY,SECGEN WILL ADDRESS CONF UNDER CDN CHAIRMANSHIP.THIS MEANS THAT I WILL CHAIR PLENARY AND ACT AS HOST AT LUNCH WHICH WILL FOLLOW.

2.I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO HAVE ANY COMMENTS YOU MAY THINK WOULD BE HELPFUL TO ME BY WAY OF CDN BACKGROUND FOR THESE MTGS, BEARING IN MIND THAT I WILL BE ACTING IN FIRST INSTANCE AS REP OF CONF AS A WHOLE AND ONLY SECONDARILY AS CDN REP.I WILL, HOWEVER, BE SPENDING A FAIR BIT OF TIME WITH SECGEN AND I WOULD WELCOME AN OPPORTUNITY TO REFRESH MY MEMORY OF PMS TALKS IN NYORK SOME WEEKS AGO.THIS, AS WELL AS AN UP-DATE ON WHERE MATTERS STAND AND WHERE WE SEE POSSIBILITY OF SOLUTIONS EMERGING, WOULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL.IN THIS LATTER CONNECTION, I AM THINKING IN FIRST INSTANCE OF FIVE-POWER CONF CONCEPT AND POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITY COUNCIL.THERE MAY BE OTHER ASPECTS IN WHICH SECGEN IS INTERESTED AND IN RELN TO WHICH HE MAY BE PARTICULARLY RELEVANT

DELWORTH

CCC/152 031115Z SCDL0102

001594

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Planned *MF*
Person *D*
Local Time _____

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR0048 03FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 031200

INFO WSHDC CNGNY BNATO PRMNY DUBLN HAGUE HSNKI LDN BGRAD BUCST

BPEST COPEN MOSCO OSLO PRGUE STKHM VIENN WSAW ATHNS GENEV PARIS

ROME PEKIN CNBRA TOKYO WLGTN ANKRA LSBON BRU MDRID DELHI

NDHQOTT/DGINFO

BAG BRLIN DE BON

REGAM ATNTA DE OTT

SFAX CHCGO LNGLS SFRAN BOSTN DE OTT

DISTR IDR CPD IDA UGB UGP URD URR RBP RBR RCM IMU PPR PPP RWP FPR

FROM SMITH

REF PMDEL/BUCST TEL 0033 02FEB YOURTEL SCS0348 02FEB

SMITH/DELVOIE TELECONS 31JAN FM EAST BRLN AND 03FEB FM BONN

---PM VISIT:CDA-GDR CONTACT ON ARMS CONTROL

AS WE HAVE REPORTED IN FIRST REFTEL,PM PROPOSED AND HONECKER

READILY AGREED THAT DISARMAMENT EXPERTS FM EACH SIDE QUOTE WLD

CONTROL CONSULTATIONS UNQUOTE.KRABATCZ(GDR DIRECTOR OF

POLICY PLANNING IN MFA)AND SMITH(IDDZ)WERE GIVEN TASK OF

COMING UP WITH LIST OF PORPOSALS FM TWO ALLIANCES WHICH HAVE

POTENTIAL FOR ACCEPTANCE BY BOTH SIDES.WE WLD NOT/NOT

NECESSARILY CALL THIS ARRANGEMENT A QUOTE WORKING GRP UNQUOTE

BUT RATHER ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTACT BETWEEN TWO INDIVIDUALS

...2

PAGE TWO ZQGR0048 CONF

2. AMB MCLAIN FM WSAW WILL BE VISITING EAST BERLN AGAIN NEXT THU 09FEB AND WILL MEET WITH KRABATCZ TO DISCUSS HOW WE SHLD PROCEED. OUR INITIAL SUGGESTION WAS THAT BOTH KRABATCZ AND SMITH SHLD EACH PREPARE THEIR OWN DRAFT WHICH CLD BE EXCHANGED VIA DIPLO CHANNELS. THIS CLD BE FOLLOWED UP BY VISIT (KRABATCZ PROPOSED SMITH VISIT TO EAST BERLN WLD BE EASIER THAN VICE VERSA). PAPER MIGHT THEN BE REFERRED TO MINS DURING TIME OF FISCHER STOPOVER IN CDA IN EARLY MAY TO SEE DPM/SSEA. SMITH STRESSED TO KRABATCZ THAT CDA WLD WANT TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH NATO ALLIES AS WE ASSUMED GDR WLD WITH WPO. PAPER CLD ALSO INCLUDE IDEAS FM PMS INITIATIVE AS WELL AS ANY INDIVIDUAL PROPOSALS GDR MIGHT WISH TO PUT FORWARD.

3. DURING VISIT TO FRG TODAY, WE WERE INFORMED THIS SUBJ HAS RECEIVED CONSIDERABLE PLAY IN WEST GERMAN PRESS BUT AS STRAIGHT-FORWARD FACTUAL REPORT. CHANCELLOR KOHLS FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER TELTSCHIK DID NOT/NOT COMMENT ON IT NOR DID MFA. FEDERAL GOVT COMMISSIONER FOR DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL, AMB RUTH, DID HOWEVER SEEM TO RAISE AN EYEBROW AND MENTIONED POSSIBLE QUOTE PITFALLS UNQUOTE ALTHOUGH FRG DID HAVE ITS OWN REGULAR ARMS CONTROL CONSULTATIONS WITH GDR. RUTH ECHOED OUR COMMENT THAT CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH NATO ALLIES WLD BE REQUIRED.

CCC/005 031702Z ZQGR0048

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

MF
ED
Division Phoned 1002
Person Rene
Local Time 1340

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR0047 03FEB84

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ DELIVER BY 031200

INFO WSHDC BNATO PARIS LDN VMBFR ROME PRMNY MOSCO WSAW BUCST

BPEST PRGUE BGRAD GENEV STKHM/SCDEL HAGUE BRU OSLO

NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/CACPOL PCOOTT/ARCHDEACON

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA RBR RBD RGB URR ZSI CPD

FROM SMITH

---PM VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE:ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

FOR YOUR INTERIM USE UNTIL FULL REPORTS ARE COMPLETED,

FOLLOWING IS SUMATION OF COMMENTS MADE BY EAST EUROPEAN LEADERS

IN PRGUE,EAST BERLIN AND BUCST ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.SMITH

DREW ON THESE NOTES IN BRIEFINGS IN BONN TODAY OF CHANCELLOR

KOHL'S FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR,HORST TELTSCHIK;FEDERALGOVT

COMMISSIONER FOR DISARMAMENT AND ARMS CONTROL,AMB FRED RUTH;

AND DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN AFFAIRS IN

MFA,DR VON BRAUNMUEHL.

2.(A)GENERAL:ALL THREE COUNTRIES AGREED TO WORK TO REDUCE
EAST-WEST TENSION AS QUOTE MIDDLE POWERS UNQUOTE:ROMANIANS IN
COMMUNIQUE,GDR AND CZZR PRIVATELY,LATTER STATED THEY QUOTE
WOULD USE THEIR INFLUENCE,EVEN THOUGH IT WAS LIMITED UNQUOTE.

(B)ALL THREE MADE POSITIVE STATEMENTS ABOUT WANTING TO
ACHIEVE PROGRESS IN VIENNA AND WELCOMED PMS COMMENTS THAT
WEST SHOULD REPLY TO PROPOSALS TABLED LAST YEAR BY WPO AND

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PAGE TWO ZQGR0047 CONF D

THAT NATO WAS WORKING ON THIS.

-CZZR WAS UPSET ABOUT DATA AND WITH PEOPLE CALLING THEM LIARS;
HOW COULD THEY HIDE INFO ABOUT SIZE OF THEIR FORCES?

-STROUGAL SAID WPO WAS PREPARED TO MAKE QUOTE FURTHER PROPOSALS
UNQUOTE IF NECESSARY TO SHOW THEIR GOOD FAITH,

-GDR DIRECTOR OF NORTH AMERICAN DIV STATED TO CDN JOURNALIST
TRAVELLING WITH PM PARTY THAT WPO WAS QUOTE PREPARED TO FURTHER
CONCRETIZE THEIR PROPOSALS.

-PMS IDEA OF FOREIGN MINISTERS ATTENDING VIENNA MTG AT SOME
STAGE IN ORDER TO INJECT POLITICAL WILL WAS LISTENED TO WITHOUT
COMMENT.

(C)STKHM CONF:-STROUGAL SAID PACKAGE OF CSBMS NATO TABLED,
WITH SOME EXCEPTIONS, HAD BEEN WELCOMED IN MOSCO. THERE WAS
ENOUGH IN NATO PACKAGE TO SHOW WEST WANTED MOVEMENT. THIS WAS
QUOTE QUITE ENCOURAGING UNQUOTE.

-SEULTZ-GROMYKO MTG HAD BEEN QUOTE USEFUL UNQUOTE.

-NO/NO COMMENT ON FMS RETURNING TO STKHM.

(D)FIVE POWER CONF:-RESPONSE INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH WAS
DIFFERENTIATED; HONECKER WAS VERY POSITIVE AND SUPPORTED IT
PUBLICLY; CZZR SUPPORTED IN PRINCIPLE BUT BELIEVED FIRST STEP
WAS UP TO USA-USSR TO REDUCE; ROMANIANS ADOPTED SIMILAR ATTITUDE
AND POINTED OUT CHINESE, BRITISH AND FRENCH PRECONDITIONS.

(E)PRGUE DECLARATION:-BOTH GDR AND DZZR REFERRED TO
DECLARATION INCLUDING CALL FOR NON-AGGRESSION PACT AND NON FIRST-
USE AGREEMENT.

...3

PAGE THREE ZQGR0047 CONF

-PM INDICATED THAT THERE WERE SOME POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN PRGUE DECLARATION (MENTION OF NEED FOR DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION, CHEMICAL WEAPONS, OUTER SPACE AND NPT). NON-AGGRESSION PACT WAS SOMETHING THAT SHOULD COME LATER AFTER CONFIDENCE AND TRUST IS RESTORED AS IT IS DECLARATORY MEASURE. THERE WERE ALSO POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN NATO DOCUS SUCH AS BRU COMMUNIQUE THAT EAST SHOULD LOOK AT POSITIVELY. ONE OF MAJOR FAULTS OF PRGUE DECLARATION WAS THAT IT HAD BEEN ENCASED IN HARSH RHETORIC AND WAS MADE AT TIME WHEN EAST-WEST RELATIONS WERE BAD AND MISTRUST HIGH.

(F) INF: -ALL THREE (FDR, CZZR, BUCST) WERE WORRIED ABOUT CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WAR (HONECKER, HUSAK AND STROUGAL ALL SAID THEY HAD SEEN FILM QUOTE THE DAY AFTER UNQUOTE), WITH CZZR AND GDR LEADERS SAYING THEIR COUNTRIES WOULD BE COMPLETELY WIPED OUT IN ANY NUCLEAR EXCHANGE.

-THEY BLAMED USA, NOT/NOT FRG, FOR WESTERN DEPLOYMENT.

-GDR AND CZZR LEFT IMPRESSION THEY HAD BEEN QUOTE COMPELLED OR OBLIGED UNQUOTE TO COUNTERDEPLOY.

-GDR AND CZZR DID NOT/NOT EMPHASIZE REQUIREMENT FOR RETURN TO STATUS-QUO ANTE BEFORE GENEV TALKS COULD BE RESUMED.

-STROUGAL SAID ANDROPOVS LATEST APPEAL SHOWED SOVIETS WANTED REAL MOVEMENT AND PREDICTED THAT NOT/NOT IN JA, FEB OR MARCH BUT IN QUOTE FIRST HALF OF THIS YEAR UNQUOTE, USSR WOULD FIND

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PAGE FOUR ZQGR0047 CONFD

WAY TO RETURN TO GENEV. SOME FACE-SAVING DEVICE SUCH AS
COMBINING INF/START NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED.

-CEAUSESCU ATTEMPTED TO HAVE PM SIGN ON TO HIS PROPOSAL FOR FREEZE
ON NATO DEPLOYMENTS AND USSR COUNTERDEPLOYMENTS AS PAPANDREAOU
DID. ISSUE WAS DISCUSSED HEADTEDLY FOR CONSIDERABLE PFRIOD OF
TIME. PM REJECTED IDEA IN NO/NO UNCERTAIN TERMS STRESSING THAT
ROMANIAN PROPOSAL WAS UNEQUAL AS IT WOULD LEAVE SOVIETS WITH
CONSIDERABLE ADVANTAGE IN TERMS OF THEIR SS-20S WHICH WAS
UNACCEPTABLE.

CCC/005 031642Z ZQGR0047

BF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BONN ZQGR0046 03FEB84

TO EXTOTT RCR

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER WSHDC LDN PARIS BNATO GENEV/MCPHAIL

DISTR MINA MINE USS DMT DMF RGB TFB IFB IDD RCZ IDDZ IDR EPD
EPA

REF OURTEL ZQGR0031 24JAN

---POSSIBLE KOHL VISIT TO OTT

DURING IDA(SMITH)DEBRIEFING ON PM INITIATIVE TODAY,

TELTSCHIK VOLUNTEERED INFO THAT KOHL WOULD HAVE NO/NO

TIME DURING 03-06MAR VISIT TO WSHDC TO INCLUDE OTT.

TELTSCHIK HAD HOPED TO ARRANGE TRIP TO NYORK BUT THERE WAS
NOT/NOT EVEN TIME FOR THAT.

2.HOWEVER WHEN WE SUGGESTED THAT TELTSCHIK MIGHT GO UP TO
OTT FOR CONSULTATIONS PERHAPS AT CONCLUSION OF WSHDC VISIT,

HE DID NOT/NOT REJECT IDEA.WE THINK SUCH A VISIT WOULD BE
VERY USEFUL.AS YOU KNOW TELTSCHIK IS EXTREMELY INFLUENTIAL

IN DETERMINING KOHLS FOREIGN POLICY VIEWS AND HAS BEEN VITAL
INTERLOCUTOR IN CONNECTION WITH PMS INITIATIVE.TELTSCHIK

MTGS WITH PCO AND SENIOR EXTAFF OFFICIALS WOULD IN OUR

VIEW FURTHER REINFORCE FRG SUPPORT FOR PM INITIATIVE AND

ALSO PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS CERTAIN BILATERAL ISSUES.

GRATEFUL BE INFORMED ASAP WHETHER WE MAY PURSUE QUESTION WITH
TELTSCHIK.

CCC/242 060840Z ZQGR0046

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MF
W

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

FM BONN ZQGR0045 03FEB84

TO EXTOTT LIDDZ

INFO WSAW MOSCO BUCST BPEST PRGUE BGRAD WSHDC BNATO PRMNY

PARIS ROME LDN GENEV VMBFR STKHM/SCDEL HAGUE BRU OSLO

NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP/DACPOL PCOOTT/ARCHDEACON

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA RBR RBD RGB URR ZSI CPD

FROM SMITH

REF PMDEL BUCST TEL 0033 02FEB

---PM VISIT TO GDR:HONECKERS COMMENT

FOLLOWING ARE NOTES OF DEBRIEFING PM PROVIDED US ON

AIRCRAFT BETWEEN EAST BERLIN AND BUCST OF PRIVATE CHATS HE

HAD WITH GENERAL SECRETARY HONECKER.IN ADDITION TO TWO SETS OF

OFFICIAL TALKS WITH HONECKER(REPORTED IN SEPARATE TEL FROM

BUCST)PM ALSO HAD ANIMATED CONVERSATION WITH HIM AT OFFICIAL

DINNER,AT GUEST HOUSE AND ON ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE FROM

AIRPORT.CONVERSATIONS WERE HELD THROUGH INTERPRETER IN

FRENCH/GERMAN.

2.IN RESPONSE TO PMS QUESTION ABOUT POSSIBLE REUNIFICATION

OF GERMANY,HONECKER LAUNCHED INTO LONG EXPOSE OF HOW

MANY BILATERAL VISITS THERE HAF BEEN TO GDR INCLUDING:MAYOR

OF BERLIN,SCHMIDT,GENSCHER,AND ONLY LAST WEEK CHEYSSON.

HE WENT TO GREAT PAINS TO SHOW GDR WAS NOT/NOT ISOLATED.

HE STRESSED SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM WERE LIKE OIL AND WATER-

THEY DID NOT/NOT MIX.THERE WAS THEREFORE NO/NO PROSPECT

...2

PAGE TWO ZQGR0045 CONF D CDN EYES ONLY

FOR REUNIFICATION, BUT ONLY IF FRG BECAME SOCIALIST. PM NOTED THAT HONECKER WAS BORN IN SAHR AND MUST HAVE SOME QUOTE SENSE OF FEELING UNQUOTE OF REUNIFICATION. HE ASKED WHETHER THIS FEELING OR FACT THAT HE WAS A SOCIALIST PREDOMINATED IN HIM. HONECKER MADE NO/NO COMMENT EXCEPT TO REMARK THAT HIS WIFE WAS FROM KONIKSBURG AND THEREFORE THERE WERE ALL KINDS OF MIXTURES.

3. (IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT HONECKER DID NOT/NOT CRITICIZE FRG EITHER IN PUBLIC OR PRIVATE. IN SEPARATE CONVERSATION WE HELD WITH GDR MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS ALL TO WHOM WE SPOKE SAID THERE WAS NO/NO ALTERNATIVE TO COOPERATING WITH FRG IN POLITICAL/ECONOMIC/CULTURAL FIELDS. DEPLOYMENT OF PERSHING IN FRG THEY SAID DID NOT/NOT ALTER THIS FACT).

4. ON ANDROPOV'S HEALTH, HONECKER SAID IN STRAIGHT-FORWARD MANNER THAT QUOTE IT WILL BE NICE WHEN AT END OF FEB ANDROPOV WOULD BE ABLE TO TAKE OVER AGAIN UNQUOTE. ANDROPOV HAD TO SHOW UP FOR 04MAR ELECTIONS IN USSR AND HONECKER WAS SURE HE WOULD BE THERE. (PM TOLD US THIS WAS NOT/NOT MSG FROM HONECKER BUT RATHER COMMENT MADE MORE BY-THE-BY).

5. HONECKER SAID HE HAD SPOKEN TO SCHMIDT RECENTLY WHO REGRETTED FACT NO/NO AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED ON INF.

6. PM SAID HE ISSUED INVITATION TO HONECKER TO QUOTE DROP IN UNQUOTE ON HIS WAY TO CUBA OR ELSEWHERE. HONECKER REPLIED QUOTE I ACCEPT UNQUOTE. (PM EXPRESSED VIEW TO US THAT IF CEAUSESCU COULD BE INVITED TO CDA, WHY NOT/NOT HONECKER)?

CCC/242 030820Z ZQGR0045