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Volume 23 From-De 87.11.01 To-À 88-05-31



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20-USA-1-3-USSR
Vol 23

MIRD

TITLE—TITRE:

POLITICAL AFFAIRS - POLICY AND BACKGROUND
- FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS - UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA - UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST
REPUBLIC

AFFAIRES POLITIQUES - POLITIQUE ET
HISTORIQUE - TENDANCES DE LA POLITIQUE
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88-05-31

AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - À METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER

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VOLUME

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P R O T E C T E D

FM MOSCO XYGR1077 31MAY88

TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 311000

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

INFO WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN ROME HAGUE PRU COPEN OSLO LSPON

MDRID ATHNS ANKRA BERN STKHM HSNKI BPEST BUCST PRGUE WSAW

BGRAD HAVAN PEKIN TOKYO ISBAD DELHI CNBRA WLGTN GENEV WCSCE

VMBFR PRMNY ENATO PCOOTT/HEBERT/IAC PMOOTT/BURNEY

TT NDHQOTT/CIS ADM/DSTRATA/ DE CAF

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---MOSCO SUMMIT:SOUR NOTE

SUMMARY:DURING FIRST FULL DAY OF TALKS AND SOCIAL EVENTS,
HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS CONTINUED TO DOMINATE PUBLIC PRESENTATION
OF SUMMIT NEGOTIATIONS EVEN THOUGH OTHER IMPORTANT ISSUES
WERE DISCUSSED.SOVIETS HAVE CRITICIZED REAGANS MEETING WITH
DISSIDENTS AND PLAYED UP AMERICAN SHORTCOMINGS IN HUMAN RIGHTS.
ATMOSPHERE AT KREMLIN DINNER WAS OBVIOUSLY STRAINED AND GORBACHEVS
TOUGH COMMENTS REGARDING NON/NON INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL
AFFAIRS SEEMED PRIMARILY DESIGNED FOR DOMESTIC CONSUMPTION
EVEN AT SOME RISK OF DAMAGE TO ATMOSPHERICS.INEFFECTUAL
RETURN SPEECH BY PRESIDENT REAGAN DID NOT/NOT COMPENSATE.
2.REPORT:STATEMENTS BY BOTH SIDES SPOKESMEN INDICATE THAT
FULL AGENDA WAS IN PLAY WITH PROGRESS REPORTED IN CERTAIN

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KEY AREAS, EG ON MOBILE ICBMS AND ON CW (OPENING PRIVATE
CHEMICAL FACTORIES TO SAME INSPECTIONS AS STATE FACTORIES
WOULD HAVE TO UNDERGO). NEVERTHELESS, PUBLIC PRESENTATION OF
TALKS HAS CONTINUED TO STRESS HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES. PRESIDENT
REAGAN'S VISIT TO DANILOV MONASTERY, CALL FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM,
AND MEETING AT AMERICAN EMBASSY WITH REFUSENIKS AND DISSIDENTS
WERE COVERED IN DETAIL BY SOVIET TELEVISION. SOVIETS REPLIED
WITH TELEVISED COVERAGE OF AMERICAN INDIANS IN MOSCO PROTESTING
PLIGHT OF THEIR PEOPLES IN GENERAL AND LEONARD PELTIER IN
PARTICULAR. SOVIET PEACE COMMITTEE HEAD GENRIKH BOROVIK
CRITICIZED (ALSO ON TELEVISION) REAGAN'S MTG WITH DISSIDENTS AND
AMERICAN FAILINGS IN HUMAN RIGHTS.

3. THESE EXCHANGES APPEAR TO HAVE CAST A SHADOW OVER SUMMIT
WHICH WAS REFLECTED IN NOTICEABLY STRAINED ATMOSPHERE AT KREMLIN
DINNER. FUNCTION NEVER SEEMED TO DEVELOP AND PARTICIPANTS
APPEARED ILL-AT-EASE EVEN BEFORE GORBACHEV AND REAGAN SPEECHES.
GORBACHEV HIMSELF APPEARED IRRITATED.

4. GORBACHEV'S SPEECH, ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT DISJOINTED, WAS TOUGH
STATEMENT NO/NO DOUBT DESIGNED FOR PUBLIC AND LEADERSHIP CONSUMP-
TION IN USSR. HE DEFENDED, ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, RIGHT OF EACH
NATION TO MAKE ITS SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CHOICE WITHOUT INTER-
FERENCE BY ANYONE IN ITS INTERNAL AFFAIRS. GORBACHEV ALSO STATED

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THAT FAMILY AND PRIVATE PROBLEMS SHOULD NOT/NOT BE TRANSFORMED INTO PRETEXTS FOR INTER-GOVERNMENTAL CONFRONTATION. FURTHERMORE HE ALSO MADE ANOTHER PITCH FOR SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTL SECURITY, STRENGTHENING UN AS WELL AS MASSIVE CUTS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE. REAGAN'S PLATITUDINOUS REPLY, WHICH ATTEMPTED TO USE A FILM PLOT AS PARABLE FOR INTL RELTNS WAS, IN OUR VIEW, WRONG SPEECH IN THE WRONG PLACE.

5. EXCHANGE OF SPEECHES THEREFORE SEEMED TO HAVE ENDED FIRST FULL DAY OF SUMMIT ON A SOUR NOTE. IMPROVEMENT IN ATMOSPHERE WILL NOW DEPEND EVEN MORE ON SUBSTANTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENTS ON REMAINDER OF AGENDA.

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PEKIN TOKYO ISBAD DELHI CNBRA WLGTN GENEV VCSCE VMBFR PRMNY ENATO

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---MOSCOW SUMMIT UNDERWAY

SUMMARY:ARRIVAL OF PRESIDENT REAGAN TOOK PLACE IN NOTABLY INFORMAL
AND FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE,LESSED WITH AUSPICIOUSLY FAIR WEATHER.

REGAN GAVE PROMINENT PLACE AT FIRST MTG TO HUMAN RIGHTS TO EVIDENT
DISCOMFORT OF SOVIET SIDE WHICH GAVE HEAVY PLAY IN MEDIA TO AMERICAN
FAILINGS AS REAGAN ARRIVED.RATIFICATION OF INF TREATY AND
ANNOUNCEMENT OF WITHDRAWAL OF SOME VIETNAMESE TROOPS FROM KAMPUCHEA
NO/NO DOUBT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE OF DISCUSSIONS.

ON NEGATIVE SIDE SOVIET MFA ISSUED TOUGH STATEMENT REGARDING
PAKISTANI FAILURE TO RESTRAIN SO-CALLED ANTI-GOVT FORCES IN AFGHAN,
WHICH MAY RAISE PROFILE OF AFGHAN ISSUE DURING TALKS.RUMOURS ABOUND
THAT USA SIDE MIGHT REACT POSITIVELY TO SOVIET REQUESTS FOR
RELAXATION OF COCOM RULES,IN RETURN FOR UNSPECIFIED CONCESSIONS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

2.REPORT:PRESIDENT REAGAN ARRIVED IN MOSCOW ON A TRULY SPLENDID

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SPRING DAY, THE ATMOSPHERE OF WHICH WAS FURTHER SWEETENED BY THE PARALLEL RATIFICATIONS BY SENATE AND SUPREME SOVIET OF THE INF TREATY. INFORMALITY OF AIRPORT RECEPTION WAS STRIKING, REFLECTING FACT THAT MANY SUMMIT PARTICIPANTS HAVE BECOME OLD ACQUAINTANCES IF NOT/NOT YET FRIENDS. AIRPORT ARRIVAL WAS PURELY BILATERAL AFFAIR; MOSCO DIPLOMATIC CORPS WAS NOT/NOT REPRESENTED, PERHAPS BECAUSE OF PROTOCOL COMPLEXITY POSED BY NATIONALITY OF ITS DEAN-NORTH KOREAN. LATER ON SUNDAY, REAGANS STROLLED DOWN MOSCOWS ARBAT PEDESTRIAN MALL, CENTRE OF SIDEWALK ARTISTS, SINGERS AND HAWKERS.

3. OPENING OF TALKS, IN GILDED SPLENDOR OF ST GEORGES HALL OF KREMLIN, APPEARS TO HAVE GONE WELL. GORPACHEV EXPRESSED FULL CONFIDENCE THAT START AGREEMENT WAS POSSIBLE WHILE TWO LEADERS CONTINUED THEIR CUSTOM OF QUOTING EACH OTHERS NATIONAL PROVERBS AT EACH OTHER. SOME SHADOWS WERE HOWEVER CAST OVER SUMMIT BY DEVELOPMENTS OF WEEKEND: AFGHANISTAN SITU COULD ASSUME GREATER PROFILE THAN EXPECTED IN WAKE OF TOUGH STATEMENT ISSUED BY SOVIET MFA ALLEGING PAKISTANI FAILURE TO CURB ARMED OPPOSITION. ON OTHER HAND, EARLY WITHDRAWAL OF VIETNAMESE TROOPS FROM KAMPUCHEA (ONLY ITEM SHARING FRONT PAGE HERE WITH REAGAN ARRIVAL) WAS CLEARLY CALCULATED TO IMPROVE ATMOSPHERE.

4. HUMAN RIGHTS: IN PRE-SUMMIT BUILDUP SOVIET MEDIA CARRIED NUMBER OF STORIES DESIGNED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE TWO-WAY STREET. DELEGATION OF AMERICAN NATIVE PEOPLE WILL BE PRESENTING TO GORBACHEV PERSONAL MSG FROM SOVIETS FAVOURITE


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AMERICAN POLITICAL PRISONER, LEONARD PELTIER. TASS STORY HAS
ALLEGED THAT 11,000 POLITICAL PRISONERS ARE LANGUISHING IN USA
JAILS AND PRAVDA TODAY RAN PHOTO OF SOUP KITCHEN FOR STREET
PEOPLE SAID TO BE LOCATED ACROSS FROM WHITE HOUSE. FROM OUR
CONVERSATIONS WITH CORRESPONDENTS, MANY OF WHOM ADOPT SOMEWHAT
BORED ATTITUDE TOWARDS SUMMIT, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT HUMAN RIGHTS
WILL CONTINUE TO LOOM LARGE IN COVERAGE OF SUMMIT. ONE RUMOUR
HOLDS THAT USSR WILL REQUEST RELAXATION IN COCOM RULES AND THAT
REGAN WILL CONSIDER IT, POSSIBLY IN RELTN TO PROGRESS ON SOME
UNSPECIFIED HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS. ONE MINOR POINT ON HUMANITARIAN
AGENDA COULD BE WILLINGNESS OF REGAN TO RAISE LOCAL ISSUE
AFFECTING FOREIGNERS: DESIGNATING ONE UNUSED CHURCH IN MOSCO FOR
A PLACE OF WORSHIP FOR CHRISTIANS IN THE GROWING FOREIGN COMMUNITY
ON AN ECUMENICAL BASIS.

5. SUMMIT HAS CERTAINLY OPENED ON POSITIVE NOTE AND WITH GENERALLY
HIGHLY POSITIVE LOCAL MEDIA COVERAGE. SUMMIT HAS GENERATED
PRODUCTION OF TEE-SHIRTS AND SUN VISORS BEARING SLOGANS OF PEACE
AND FRIENDSHIP WHICH HAVE ADDED TOUCH OF COLOUR TO MOSCO STREETS,
AS WELL.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L
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MAY 30 1988

INFO PMOOTT/BURNEY PCOOTT/HEBERT MOSCO BNATO LDN PARIS BONN ROME
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VMBFR VCSCE GENEV PRMNY CIDAULL/MINE

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REF OURTEL UNGR1453 24MAY

---SENATE RATIFICATION OF INF AGREEMENT

SUMMARY:LATE THIS AFTERNOON,SENATE FINALLY VOTED RATIFICATION OF
INF AGMT BY LARGE MAJORITY(93 TO 5),WITH ONLY SENATORS GLENN AND
BIDEN ABSENT.SINCE THREAT OF CLOSURE WAS INTRODUCED BY DEMOCRATIC
AND REPUBLICAN LEADERSHIP IN MID-WEEK,FOCUS SHIFTED FROM AMENDMENTS
PROPOSED BY OPPONENTS OF TREATY DESIGNED TO HOLD UP RATIFICATION,
TO BYRD AMENDMENT WHICH EVEN SUPPORTERS OF TREATY FAVOURED AS
NECESSARY INSURANCE THAT FUTURE INTERPRETATIONS OF TREATY WOULD BE
BASED ON COMMON UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE
BRANCH AT TIME OF RATIFICATION.

2.REPORT:THE INF TREATY DEBATE IN THE FULL SENATE FEATURED MORE
THAN A WEEK OF DISCUSSION OF A SERIES OF AMENDMENTS WHICH GENERALLY
COULD BE CATEGORIZED EITHER AS CATEGORY I:PROPOSED UNDERSTANDINGS
WHICH WOULD REQUIRE THE AGREEMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION(INCLUDED IN
THE CATEGORY ARE MOST OF THE QUOTE KILLER AMENDMENTS UNQUOTE);

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CATEGORY II: PROPOSED UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH WOULD NEED TO BE NOTIFIED TO THE SOVIET UNION BUT NEED NOT/NOT BE EXPLICITLY ACCEPTED BY THE SOVIETS; AND CATEGORY III: PROPOSED UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH ARE INTERNAL TO THE USA AND NEED NOT/NOT BE COMMUNICATED TO THE SOVIETS.

3. WHO'S IN CHARGE:

THE DEBATE OPENED WITH A POINT OF ORDER MOTION BY SENATE HELMS ON MAY 18, STATING THAT THE TREATY WAS NOT/NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE SENATE BECAUSE UNDER ARTICLE 12 OF THE SOVIET CONSTITUTION OF 1977 AND THE 1978 LAW OF THE USSR GOVERNING THE EXECUTION OF TREATIES, GORBACHEV HAD NO/NO AUTHORITY TO SIGN THE TREATY. THIS POINT OF ORDER WAS REJECTED 91 - 6.

4. SOVIET TREATY VIOLATIONS

ON MAY 20 SENATOR SYMMS PROPOSED A LENGTHY AMENDMENT PROVIDING THAT THE INF TREATY WOULD NOT/NOT ENTER INTO FORCE UNTIL THE PRESIDENT CERTIFIED TO THE CONGRESS THAT THE USSR WAS NO/NO LONGER VIOLATING THE TREATIES AS THE PRESIDENT HAD PREVIOUSLY CERTIFIED. THE AMENDMENT ENUMERATED THE VIOLATIONS: THE SALT I, ABM TREATY (7 VIOLATIONS), THE 1965 LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY, THE BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS BANS (2 VIOLATIONS), THE SALT I INTERIM AGREEMENT (4 VIOLATIONS), AND THE SALT II TREATY (18 VIOLATIONS). EACH SET OF VIOLATIONS WAS VOTED ON SEPARATELY. ALL WERE DEFEATED BY 85 TO 11 OR MORE.

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5. CONVENTIONAL BUILD-UP

ALSO ON MAY 20, SENATOR HUMPHREY MOVED AN AMENDMENT PROVIDING THAT THE TREATY NOT/NOT ENTER INTO FORCE UNTIL THE NATO AMMUNITION AND STOCKPILE HAS BEEN INCREASED FROM 7 TO 15 DAYS. THIS MOTION AS DEFEATED 73 TO 8.

7. COUNTING OF SS-20 MISSILES

ON MAY 23 SENATOR HELMS MOVED A MOTION THAT WOULD REQUIRE THE SOVIET UNION TO REAFFIRM THAT IT HAS PROVIDED THE CORRECT NUMBER OF SS-20S WHICH IT POSSESSES. THE AMENDMENT WAS DEFEATED 81-13.

7. PRODUCTION OF SIMILAR ROCKET STAGES

ON MAY 23, SENATOR WALLOP QUESTIONED THE WORDING OF ARTICLE VI OF THE TREATY AND PROPOSED TO DELETE QUOTE BUT NOT/NOT UNQUOTE AND REPLACE IT WITH QUOTE OR UNQUOTE IN THE PROVISION DEALING WITH SIMILAR ROCKET STAGES. THIS MOTION WAS DEBATED 68 TO 26.

8. LINK TO STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS

LATER ON MAY 23 SENATOR HUMPHREY PROPOSED THAT THE INF TREATY NOT/NOT ENTER INTO FORCE UNTIL USA AND THE USSR HAD ALSO RATIFIED A TREATY REDUCING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE MOTION WAS DEFEATED 85 TO 5.

9. ALCMS, SLCMS AND GLCMS

ON MAY 25 THE SENATE ADOPTED THE MOTION, PROPOSED BY SENATOR MARKOWSKI, THAT IN ANY SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS TO LIMIT STRATEGIC WEAPONS THE USA POSITION SHOULD BE THAT NON-NUCLEAR ALCMS AND SLCMS SHOULD NOT/NOT BE RESTRICTED, AND NON/NON-NUCLEAR GLCMS SHOULD NOT/NOT BE FURTHER RESTRICTED IN RANGES NOT/NOT PROHIBITED BY THE INF TREATY.

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10.HUMAN RIGHTS

ALSO ON MAY25 THE SENATE ADOPTED A MOTION BY SENATOR DE CONCINI
REQUIRING THE PRESIDENT TO INFORM THE SOVIET UNION THAT USA
RATIFICATION IS SUBJECT TO THE DECLARATION BY THE SENATE THAT
RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IS AN ESSENTIAL FACTOR IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF FRIENDLY RELNS,AND THAT PRESIDENT WOULD SEEK SOVIET PROGRESS IN
IMPLEMENTING THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT,THE MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT,
THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS AGMT.

11.FALSE DATA

THE SENATE ON 25MAY REJECTED BY 89 TO 5 AN AMENDMENT BY SENATOR
HELMS WHICH WOULD SAY THAT PROVISION OF FALSE DATA OR ANY OTHER
MATERIAL BREACH WOULD GIVE THE OTHER PARTY THE RIGHT TO TERMINATE
OR WITHDRAW FROM THE TREATY.

12.RESTRICTING INF TO NUCLEAR GLCMS

THE SENATE ALSO REJECTED BY 69 TO 20 A MOTION BY SENATOR HUMPHREY TO
RESTRICT THE DEFINITION OF GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES TO ONLY
NUCLEAR GLCMS.

13.ON 26MAY THE SENATE ADOPTED THREE AMENDMENTS:

(A)WEAPON-DELIVERY VEHICLE

-BY UNANIMOUS VOTE,THE SENATE ADOPTED THE NUNN-WARNER AMENDMENT
SEEKING SOVIET CONFIRMATION OF THE UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED ON 12MAY
CONCERNING APPLICATION OF THE INF TREATY TO WEAPONS BASED ON FUTURE

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TECHNOLOGIES, AND ON DEFINITION OF QUOTE WEAPON-DELIVERY VEHICLE UNQUOTE, AND THAT THESE ARE OF THE SAME FORCE AND EFFECT AS THE TREATY.

(B) SITE DIAGRAMS

-THE SENATE ADOPTED THE AMENDMENT BY HELMS CORRECTING THE SITE DIAGRAMS AND CERTAIN TECHNICAL ERRORS.

(C) TREATY INTERPRETATION

-BY A VOTE OF 72 TO 27, THE SENATE ADOPTED THE BYRD AMENDMENT STATING THAT THE TREATY WAS TO BE INTERPRETED BY THE USA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE SENATE AT THE TIME THE SENATE GAVE ITS ADVICE AND CONSENT TO RATIFICATION. SUCH QUOTE COMMON UNDERSTANDING UNQUOTE IS TO BE BASED ON TEXT OF THE TREATY, AND ON THE AUTHORITATIVE REPRESENTATIONS PROVIDED BY ADMIN INSOFAR AS SUCH REPRESENTATIONS WERE DIRECTED TO THE MEANING AND LEGAL EFFECT OF THE TEXT. THE USA SHALL NOT/NOT AGREE TO OR ADOPT A DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION EXCEPT PURSUANT TO SENATE ADVICE OR CONSENT OR THE ENACTMENT OF A STATUTE. IF A QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION ARISES ON WHICH NO/NO COMMON UNDERSTANDING WAS REACHED, PROVISION SHALL BE INTERPRETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH USA LAW.

16. EQUALLY BINDING INTERPRETATIONS

THE SENATE REJECTED BY 53 TO 45 AN AMENDMENT PROPOSED BY SENATOR WILSON PROVIDING THAT THE ONLY INTERPRETATIONS BINDING THE USA ARE THOSE WHICH ARE EQUALLY BINDING ON THE USSR (THIS WOULD HAVE

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UNDERCUT THE BYRD AMENDMENT).

17.ON 27MAY THE SENATE REJECTED PROPOSED AMENDMENTS BY SFNATOR
WALLOP(66 TO 30)AND BY SENATOR PRESSLER(86 TO 10),AND TWO PROPOSALS
FROM SENATOR SPECTOR(67 TO 30 AND 64 TO 33).SENATOR BYRD REFERRED
TO THESE AS QUOTE MICKEY MOUSE UNQUOTE AMENDMENTS.THE SENATE
ADOPTED (94 TO 4)AN AMENDMENT BY SENATOR HELMS,CO-SPONSORED BY
BYRD,DOLE AND SIMPSON,REGARDING FUTURE ARMS CONTROL NEGS.

18.RESOOUTION OF RATIFICATION

FINALLY,THE SENATE 27MAY VOTED 93 TO 5 TO APPROVE THE RESOLUTION
OF RATIFICATION AS AMENDED.

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ACTION
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MAY 30 1988

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VMBFR VCSCE GENEV PRMNY CIDA HULL/MINE

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REF OURTEL UNGR1453 24MAY

---REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT IN MOSCO:(II)

PURSUANT TO REFTTEL, THIS TEL REPORTS ON REGIONAL ISSUES, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND BILATERAL RELNS AT FORTHCOMING MOSCO SUMMIT.

2. REGIONAL ISSUES:

ON HIS DEPARTURE FROM WSHDC, REAGAN APPLAUDED FIRST WITHDRAWALS OF
SOVIET FORCES FM AFGHANISTAN, AND SAID HE WOULD BE URGING SOVIET
GOVT IN MOSCO TO EXERT ITS INFLUENCE TO ADVANCE SETTLEMENT OF
SEVERAL OTHER REGIONAL DISPUTES. HE NOTED IN PARTICULAR ANGOLA/
NAMIBIA PROBLEM, IRAN/IRAQ WAR, SITUATION IN ETHIOPIA AND MIDDLE
EAST PEACE PROCESS. CAMBODIA AND NICARAGUA ARE ALSO LIKELY TO BE
DISCUSSED.

(A) ANGOLA/NAMIBIA

U.S. HAS TWO MAIN OBJECTIVES: THAT SOVIETS AGREE TO UTILIZE
INFLUENCE THEY HAVE WITH LUANDA AND HAVANA TO ENCOURAGE THEM TO HOLD

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ANOTHER MTG WITH SOUTH AFRICANS TO CONTINUE PROCESS OF WORKING OUT
REALISTIC AND MUTUALLY AGREEABLE TIMETABLE FOR CUBAN WITHDRAWALS;
AND THAT SOVIETS CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE PROCESS OF NATIONAL
RECONCILIATION WITHIN ANGOLA. DURING RECENT ADAMISHIN/CROCKER TALKS
IN LSEON (SEE OURTEL UNGR982 24MAY), SOVIETS INDICATED THEY
FAVORED EVENTUAL TOTAL CUBAN TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND RECOGNIZED THAT
UNITA HAD QUOTE SOME ROOTS UNQUOTE (TO USE ARMACOST PHRASE) IN
ANGOLAN POLITICS. THEY SAID THEY WISHED TO BE HELPFUL, BUT THEY
APPEARED TO BE RELUCTANT TO TAKE HARD LINE WITH EITHER ANGOLANS OR
CUBANS IN ENCOURAGING FLEXIBILITY.

(B) IRAN/IRAQ

U.S. WILL BE URGING SOVIETS (AGAIN) TO SHOW SOME INTEREST IN FOLLOW-ON
RESOLUTION, ON GROUNDS IRANIANS HAVE CONTINUED TO RESIST ANY
DEFINITIVE EXPRESSION OF COMPLIANCE WITH RESOLUTION 598. BUT ADMIN
IS NOT/NOT HOLDING OUT MUCH HOPE OF SUCCESS ON THIS COUNT IN
MOSCOW. (OURTEL UNGR0985 25MAY).

(C) ETHIOPIA

U.S. WANTS SOVIETS TO DRAW ON THEIR CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH
MENGISTU, TO URGE HIM TO ALLOW RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS TO OPERATE IN
NORTHERN AREA. THERE IS LITTLE EXPECTATION, HOWEVER, THAT ANY
BREAKTHROUGH WILL BE MADE. (OURTEL UNGR0983 24MAY)

(D) MIDDLE EAST

ACCORDING TO ARMACOST, INTENSIVE US/USSR DISCUSSIONS ON MIDEAST IN
RECENT MONTHS HAVE RAISED HOPES THAT SOVIETS WILL PLAY A MORE

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CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE. SOVIETS ARE NOW PREPARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT ISRAEL'S SECURITY CONCERNS HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. BUT THERE REMAIN WIDE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TWO SIDES ON NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, AND A MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH AT SUMMIT IS NOT/NOT FORESHADOWED.

(E) CAMBODIA

U.S. BELIEVES SOME OF INGREDIENTS FOR FORWARD MOVEMENT ARE PRESENT, AND ADMIN WILL BE PRESSING SOVIETS TO EXERT INFLUENCE ON VIETNAMESE TO ACCELERATE THEIR PROPOSED TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL AND TO TALK DIRECTLY TO SIHANOUK.

(F) NICARAGUA

U.S. WILL ONCE MORE URGE SOVIETS TO CUT OFF MILITARY DELIVERIES TO NICARAGUA, BUT EXPECT TO RECEIVE TRADITIONAL RESPONSE THAT U.S. SHOULD PACE RESTRICTIONS ON AMERICAN MILITARY SUPPLIES TO OTHER CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES. AT WASHINGTON SUMMIT, U.S. THOUGHT IT HAD DETECTED SOVIET INTEREST IN RECIPROCAL CUT-OFF OF SOVIET SUPPLIES TO SANDINISTAS AND U.S. SUPPLIES TO CONTRAS, BUT SOVIETS APPEARED TO HAVE LOST INTEREST IN IDEA FOLLOWING CONGRESS REFUSAL TO APPROVE ANYTHING BUT NON-LETHAL U.S. AID TO CONTRAS.

HUMAN RIGHTS:

3. OVER COURSE OF LAST SEVERAL YRS, ADMIN HAS VERY EFFECTIVELY MANOEUVURED SOVIETS INTO AGREEING THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES SHOULD ROUTINELY FEATURE IN SUMMIT AND FOREIGN MINISTERS MTGS, AND AS AT WASHINGTON MTG REAGAN WILL BE ENGAGING GORBACHEV IN DISCUSSION OF

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NUMBER OF SPECIFIC HUMAN RIGHTS CASES. MOREOVER, PRESIDENT WILL BE BREAKING IMPORTANT NEW GROUND IN PERSONALLY MTG WITH SEVERAL GROUPS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS DURING HIS STAY IN MOSCOW. SOVIETS, FOR THEIR PART, WILL RAISE HOMELESSNESS IN USA AND TREATMENT OF AMERICAN INDIANS.

4. IN ADDITION TO STANDARD LIST OF OUTSTANDING FAMILY REUNIFICATION CASES TO BE RAISED (DIVIDED FAMILIES, DIVIDED SPOUSES, BLOCKED MARRIAGES), AND EXPECTED DISCUSSION OF NEED FOR SUCCESSFUL AND BALANCED (IE SUBSTANTIAL HUMAN RIGHTS DOCUMENT AND AGREED MANDATE FOR CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS IN EUROPE) CONCLUSION TO CSCE REVIEW CONFERENCE IN VIENNA, U.S. PROPOSES TO FOCUS ON THREE BROAD HUMAN RIGHTS AREAS: POLITICAL PRISONERS, EMIGRATION AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM.

5. IN AREA OF POLITICAL PRISONERS, U.S. WILL ACKNOWLEDGE THE SEVERAL RELEASES OF POLITICAL PRISONERS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE GORBACHEV ACCESSION TO POWER (INCLUDING SOME HIGH PROFILE INDIVIDUALS), BUT IT WILL ARGUE THAT THERE ARE STILL FAR TOO MANY PEOPLE IN SOVIET JAILS/CAMPS WHOM REST OF WORLD CONSIDERS POLITICAL PRISONERS.

6. NO EMIGRATION, U.S. WILL LIKEWISE RECOGNIZE THAT THERE HAVE BEEN IMPROVEMENTS IN RATE OF PERMANENT DEPARTURES, MOST RECENTLY FROM LEVEL OF 700 OR 800 A MONTH PERTAINING LAST YEAR TO AROUND 1000 A MONTH NOW. BUT U.S. WILL CITE RANGE OF OBSTACLES WHICH STILL STAND IN WAY OF INDIVIDUALS EXERCISING THEIR FREE CHOICE OF DEPARTURE, AND

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US WILL URGE SOVIETS TO DISPOSE OF THESE.

7. AS FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, U.S. HAS QUOTE TAKEN NOTE UNQUOTE OF GORBACHEVS COMMENTS TO PATRIARCH A FEW WEEKS AGO, RECOGNIZING THAT BELIEVERS CAN ALSO BE SOVIET PATRIOTS AND SETTING OUT THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK WHICH SHOULD PERMIT ALLEVIATION OF SOME OF HARSHEST LEGAL AND PRACTICAL IMPEDIMENTS TO FREEDOM OF WORSHIP. ADMIN'S OBJECTIVE WILL BE TO ENCOURAGE SOVIET GOVT TO GIVE EFFECT TO GENERAL SECRETARY'S UNDERTAKINGS, IN PARTICULAR TO MAKE NECESSARY CHANGES IN SOVIET LAW AND PRACTICE TO PERMIT SUCH THINGS AS TEACHING OF RELIGION OUTSIDE HOME, PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION OF RELIGIOUS BOOKS AND MATERIALS, AND DEVELOPMENT OF LEGITIMATE CONTACTS WITH MEMBERS OF CREEDS AND DENOMINATIONS OUTSIDE USSR.

BILATERAL RELATIONS:

8. THERE HAVE BEEN STEADY EXPANSION OF US/USSR BILATERAL RELNS IN LAST THREE YRS AND MOSCO SUMMIT IS EXPECTED TO REGISTER FURTHER PROGRESS IN AREAS OF PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONTACTS, AND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COOPERATION. FOR MOST PART, ADMIN CHARACTERIZED NEW COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS AS MORE SOBER, SPECIFIC AND BALANCED THAN THOSE WHICH EXISTED DURING THE PERIOD OF QUE DETENTE UNQUOTE, TERM WHICH ADMIN REFUSES TO USE TO DESCRIBE CURRENT PHASE OF US/USSR RELNS.

9. PRESIDENT AND GEN SECTY SIGNED SIX-YEAR CULTURAL EXCHANGES AGMT IN GENEVA IN 1985, AND U.S. SIDE HOPES TO BE ABLE TO REACH AGMT IN MOSCOW ON A NEW THREE-YEAR IMPLEMENTATION PGM. IN ADDITION, THERE IS

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POSSIBILITY OF AGMTS IN FLWING AREAS:

-TRANSPORTATION COOPERATION(EARLIER TRANSPORTATION AGMT LAPSED
IN 1983 FLWING KAL SHOOT-DOWN)

-BASIC SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH(EARLIER SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGMT
LAPSED IN 1982)

-FISHERIES(NEW AGMT WOULD REPLACE SIMPLE ONE-YEAR AGMTS

SIGNED SINCE EARLY 1980S WITH COMPREHENSIVE LONG TERM AGMT)

-COAST GUARD COOPERATION(IN AREAS OF MARINE SEARCH AND RESCUE,
AND MARITIME POLLUTION CLEAN-UP IN THE NORTHERN PACIFIC AND
IN THE BERING SEA).

12.THERE HAS BEEN SOME SPECULATION IN PRESS THAT TWO SIDES WILL ALSO

DISCUSS POSSIBILITY OF AGREEING ON JOINT UNMANNED FLIGHT TO MARS.

SOME PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS HVE IN FACT BEEN HELD,UNDER RUBRIC OF

BILATERAL AGMT ON PEACEFUL COOPERATION IN CIVIL ACTIVITIES IN OUTER

SPACE SIGNED IN APRIL.BUT FOR TIME BEING FOCUS IS ON USA CARRYING

SOME SOVIET EQUIPMENT ABOARD MARS PROBE PLANNED FOR 1992,IN SUPPORT

OF SOVIET MARS PROBES PLANNED FOR 1994 AND 1996.JOINT MISSION WOULD

LIKELY NOT/NOT OCCUR UNTIL 1998(SEE OURTEL UNST7132 25MAY).

CCC/106 272118Z UNGR1455

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR1246 26MAY88

TO EXTOTT/RBR DELIVER BY 261200

INFO WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN ROME HAGUE BRU COPEN OSLO LSBON
MDRID ATHENS ANKRA BERN STKHM HSNKI BPEST BUCST PRGUE WSAW
BGRAD HAVAN PEKIN TOKYO ISBAD DELHI CNBRA WLGTN GENEV VCSCE
VMBFR PRMNY BNATO PCOOTT/HEBERT/IAC PMOOTT/BURNEY
TT NDHQOTT/CIS ADM/ DNACPOL/DSTRATA/ DE CAF
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---USSR/USA RELATIONS ON THE EVE OF THE MOSCO SUMMIT

SUMMARY:ALTHOUGH IT APPEARS CERTAIN THAT THE MOSCO SUMMIT
WILL NOT/NOT BE CROWNED WITH THE ACHIEVEMENT OF AN AGREEMENT
REDUCING STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS,IT NEVERTHELESS COULD
BE SIGNIFICANT EVENT IN THE PROCESS WHICH HAS TRANSFORMED
USSR/USA RELATIONS SINCE THE FIRST GENEVA SUMMIT.ARMS CONTROL
REMAINS CENTRAL ISSUE AND SOVS EXPECT THAT JOINT STATEMENT
WILL RECORD SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN START.MAJOR ISSUES REMAIN,
ESPECIALLY SLCMS,AMB TREATY AND VERIFICATION.FOCUS ON REGIONAL
PROBLEMS WILL SWITCH TO SOUTHERN AFRICA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
AWAY FROM AFGHANISTAN.HUMAN RIGHTS TALKS WILL CONCENTRATE
MORE ON GENERALITIES THAN ON SPECIFIC CASES,ALTHOUGH MANY

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OF THE LATTER REMAIN UNDER CONSIDERATION. BILATERAL AGENDA WILL BE HIGHLIGHTED BY SEVERAL NEW AGENTS. SOVS WILL MAKE CONSIDERABLE EFFORT TO RECIPROCATATE RECEPTION ACCORDED GORBACHEV IN WSHDC. BARRING UNFORSEEN CRISES OVER ISSUES SUCH AS ABM OR CONTINUING PROBLEMS IN AFGHAN, SUMMIT SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO GROWING PREDICTABILITY AND SENSE OF INTIMACY IN SOVIET/AMERICAN RELTNS. AT SAME TIME, MOSCO SUMMIT WILL NOT/NOT (IN SOV VIEW) MARK THE END OF THE REAGAN/GORBACHEV ERA. SOVS EMPHASIZE THEIR DETERMINATION TO WORK WITH REAGAN ADMINISTRATION UP TO ITS LAST DAY ON FULL AGENDA, ESPECIALLY ACD QUESTIONS.

2. REPORT: MOOD IN MOSCO DURING RUN-UP TO SUMMIT HAS BEEN POSITIVE, EMPHASIZING REALISTIC EXPECTATIONS. THIS WAS BORNE OUT WHEN TANGUAY AND FIRST SECRETARY RECEIVED DETAILED ASSESSMENT OF 24 MAY, OF PROSPECTS FROM SUKHODREV OF MFA/USA AND CDA DEPT. IT COINCIDED REMARKABLY WITH VIEWS EXPRESSED TO US THIS WEEK BY SENIOR US EMB OFFICIAL.

3. SUKHODREV EMPHASIZED THAT ARMS CONTROL REMAINED CENTRAL ISSUE AND THAT ALTHOUGH NO/NO START AGREEMENT WOULD BE FINALIZED AT SUMMIT, INTENSIVE WORK WOULD CONTINUE AT GENEV, IN SUMMIT WORKING GROUP BETWEEN FMS, DEFENCE MINS, CHIEFS OF STAFF AND BETWEEN LEADERS. SUBSTANTIVE JOINT STATEMENT ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ABM TREATY WOULD BE RESULT, POSSIBLY INCORPORATED INTO SINGLE JOINT STATEMENT OR AS SEPARATE DOCUMENT.

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PAGE THREE XYGP1046 CONF

SUKHODREV STATED THAT WHILE NEGOTIATIONS COULD NOT/NOT BE DESCRIBED AS BEING ON THE LAST LAP THEY WERE QUOTE WELL PAST HALFWAY MARK UNQUOTE.OUTSTANDING ISSUES WERE NOW SLCMS(SUKHODREV) APPEARED QUITE FIRM IN EXPRESSING SOV OPPOSITION TO UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS,(STRESSING NEED FOR VERIFICATION),ABM TREATY NON/NON WITHDRAWAL AND OBSERVANCE,AND VERIFICATION DETAILS. QUESTIONS OF ALCMS AND MOBILE ICMS MAY HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. CW AND CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS WILL BE DISCUSSED;LATTER MAY PROVIDE SUBSTANCE FOR GORBACHEV TO MAKE DRAMATIC STATEMENT. 4.REGIONAL ISSUES:FOCUS WILL BE SOUTHERN AFRICA.INTERESTINGLY BOTH USA AND SOV CONTACTS THOUGHT MIDEAST/GULF QUESTIONS WOULD BE LOWER ON LIST OF PRIORITIES.AFGHANISTAN,SAID SUKHODREV (QUOTING GEN.POWELL)WILL BE A QUESTION NOT/NOT A PROBLEM ON THE AGENDA.HUMAN RIGHTS DISCUSSIONS WILL FOCUS MORE ON UNIVERSAL PROBLEMS THAN ON SPECIFIC CASES;SUKHODREV STRESSED THAT THIS AREA HAS BECOME A TWO-WAY CONVERSATION BUT AMERICAN EMB CONTACT INSISTED THAT SOV STATEMENTS WOULD BE ESSENTIALLY SOVIET PUBLIC RELTNS EXERCISE AND NOT/NOT REFLECTIVE OF PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS.

5.BILATERAL AGENDA WILL BE HIGHLIGHTED BY SIGNATURE OF SEVERAL AGREEMENTS:ON SEARCH AND RESCUE IN NORTH PACIFIC;NAVIGATION AIDS IN NORTH PACIFIC;NEW THREE-YEAR CULTURAL PROGRAMME; NEW FISHERIES AGMNT;PROTOCOL TO SPACE COOP PROGRAMME;SCIENCE AGMT;TRANSPORT TECHNOLOGY AGRMENT AND JOINT VERIFICATION

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EXPERIMENT.MOST OF THESE HAVE BEEN FINALIZED.SINCE COMMERCIAL RELTNS WERE FOCUS OF RECENT LARGE USSR/USA BUSINESS MTG IN MOSCO,AMERICANS WILL NO/NO DOUBT EMPHASIZE POSSIBILITIES OPEN FOR BILATERAL BUSINESS;SCIENCE AND TRANSPORT AGMNTS COULD LEAD TO COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS.

6.PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAMME WILL REFLECT SOVIET DESIRE TO RECIPROCATE FOR RECEPTION ACCORDED GORBACHEV AT WSHDC SUMMIT WHICH MADE PROFOUND AND POSITIVE IMPRESSION ON RUSSIAN CRAVING FOR ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THEIR STATUS.AMONG MANY EVENTS,REAGANS SPEECH AT MOSCO STATE UNIVERSITY COULD BE ONE OF HIGHLIGHTS OF VISIT,IN BOTH SOV AND AMERICAN VIEWS.

7.SUKHODREVS COMMENTS TYPIFIED OTHERS WE HAVE NOTED RECENTLY WITH THEIR STRESS ON REALISM AND PATIENCE IN THE FACE OF COMPLEX ISSUES,A WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE TO ACHIEVE BALANCE OF INTERESTS, AND A GENERAL SENSE OF PREDICTABILITY IN THE RELATIONSHIP.FEW WISH TO USE THE WORD DETENTE IN CONNECTION WITH THE TRENDS OF SOVIET/AMERICAN RELATIONS BUT A GOOD RESULT IN MOSCO SEEMS LIKELY TO GIVE IMPRESSION OF SOMETHING LIKE IT.SOVS HAVE EMPHASIZED THAT MOSCO SUMMIT WILL NOT/NOT BE CURTAIN ON THE REAGAN/GORBACHEV ERA; WORK WILL CONTINUE ESPECIALLY ON ARMS CONTROL.ANOTHER REYKJAVIK TYPE OF MTG IS NOT/NOT EXCLUDED IN FUTURE SHOULD BOTH SIDES FEEL IT WILL SERVE THEIR LONGER TERM OBJECTIVES.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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TO EXTOTT GMR

IN CAIRO TAVIV DMCUS BGHDD RYADH AMMAN KWAIT ~~TUNIS RABAT ALGER~~
LDN PARIS ROME MOSCO PRMNY BONN TOKYO BNATO CANMILREPNATO ATHNS
VCSCE VMBFR PCOOTT/HAGEN PMOOTT/BURNEY PILLAROTT/CIDAHULL/MINE
WDOAS

TT NDEQOTT/ADMPOL/DM/CDS/DGCPOL/DIPOL/DNACPOL/CIS/CSA/ DE CAF
BAG STKHM ANKRA(BY POL DIV)DE WDC

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URD CPP EED EER ISD ISE ISEO RBD RBR RBP

CIDA YDP BSD YDC

---MIDDLE EAST ISSUES AT MOSCO SUMMIT

ADMIN OFFICIALS ARE DISPLYAING NO/NO SIGNS OF OPTIMISM THAT
MEANINGFUL PROGRESS WILL BE MADE AT MOSCO SUMMIT ON PEACE
PROCESS OR THE GULF.

2.SECTY SHULTZ AND FM SHEVARDNADZE AGREED AT LAST MTG THAT PEACE
PROCESS SHOULD BE ON AGENDA AND USA EXPECTS SOVIETS WILL BE
INTERESTED IN WHAT THEY HAVE TO SAY.IT IS CONSIDERED UNLIKELY
THAT REAGAN AND GORBACHEV WILL SPEND MUCH TIME ON THE SUBJECT
ALTHOUGH SECTY SHULTZ WILL RAISE IT AND IT WILL BE PERTINENT GIVEN
THAT SECTY PROCEEDS FROM SUMMIT TO MIDDLE EAST.

3.DESPITE REPEATED SIGNALS OVER PAST YEAR THAT MOSCO MIGHT BE
PREPARED TO BE MORE FLEXIBLE WHEN AMERICANS HAVE ATTEMPTED
TO ENGAGE SOVIETS IN SPECIFIC DETAILS LATTER HAVE TENDED TO
REVERT TO GENERALITIES.IN USA VIEW USSR FOCUS AT SENIOR LEVELS

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REMAINS SOMEWHAT DOCTRINAIRE.

4. USA DEL WILL NOT/NOT INCLUDE BEVY OF MIDDLE EAST HANDS. ONLY MIDDLE EAST EXPERT IN GROUP WILL BE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, MIDDLE EAST DIRECTOR DENIS ROSS, WHO HAS BEEN KEY INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN JEWISH LEADERS HERE AND ADMIN ON PEACE PROCESS.

5. GULF WAR WILL BE HIGH ON USA AGENDA ACCORDING TO DEPTY ASST SECTY BURLIEGH BUT EARLIER HOPES THAT SOVIETS COULD BE BROUGHT TO SUPPORT SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION TO ENFORCE RESOLUTION 598 HAVE FADED.

6. MOSCOS RELUCTANCE TO PROCEED HAS BECOME MANIFEST IN RECENT MONTHS. IT HAS USED ARGUMENT THAT WAR OF CITIES AND IRAQI USE OF CHEMICAL WARFARE HAVE CREATED ADVERSE POLITICAL CONDITIONS FOR PASSAGE OF ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION. SOVIETS HAVE ALSO INDICATED TO AMERICANS THAT THEY WOULD BE RELUCTANT TO FURTHER CONSIDER AN ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION UNTIL ALL SOVIET FORCES HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN FROM AFGHANISTAN. MOSCOW IS RELUCTANT TO ANTAGONIZE TERAN WHILE TROOP WITHDRAWAL PROCESS IS UNDERWAY.

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INFO PMOOTT/BURNEY PCOOTT/HEBERT BNATO LDN PARIS BONN ROME BRU HAGUE
OSLO COPEN HSNKI MDRID LSBON ATHNS ANKRA TOKYO PEKIN VMBFR VCSCE
GENEV PRMNY TT NDHQOTT/DM/ADMPOL/DGSPOL/DIPOL/DNACPOL/DG POL PLAN/
DE CAF CIDA HULL/MINE

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
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---REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT IN MOSCOW: (I) ARMS CONTROL

SUMMARY:

FOURTH MTG BETWEEN REAGAN AND GORBACHEV IS UNLIKELY TO PRODUCE AGMT
ON START TREATY, BUT IT COULD WELL REGISTER IMPORTANT PROGRESS ON
ARMS CONTROL AND THEREBY ENSURE TREATY ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ISSUES
CAN BE REACHED BY END OF YEAR. EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF
RATIFICATION OF INF AGMT WILL BE A HIGHLIGHT OF SUMMIT, IF SENATE
LEADERS ARE SUCCESSFUL IN TERMINATING RATIFICATION HEARINGS AT END
OF THIS WEEK AND REACHING COMPROMISE ON BYRD AMENDMENT. WHAT COULD
GET MOST ATTN, HOWEVER, COULD BE REAGAN'S PLANNED MTGS WITH CLERICS,
DISSIDENTS, INTELLECTUALS AND MOSCO UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. HE IS REPORTED
TO BE FEELING CONFIDENT ABOUT ISSUES AND, IF HE CAN MUSTER ENERGY FOR
STRONG PUBLIC PERFORMANCE, THESE PUBLIC EVENTS COULD MAKE SUMMIT A
PERSONAL TRIUMPH FOR PRESIDENT. DISCUSSIONS ON REGIONAL ISSUES ARE
NOT/NOT LIKELY TO BREAK MUCH NEW GROUND. U.S. HOPES HOWEVER TO SIGN

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SECRET

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NUMBER OF COOPERATION AGMTS IN FIELDS OF CULTURE, FISHERIES, NAVIGATION, CIVILIAN NUCLEAR ENERGY AND TRANSPORTATION TECHNOLOGY. 2. AGENDA WILL COMPRISE USUAL FOUR ELEMENTS (ARMS CONTROL, REGIONAL ISSUES, HUMAN RIGHTS AND BILATERAL ISSUE), AND EACH IS EXPECTED TO RECEIVE THOROUGH AIRING DURING FIVE MTGS PLANNED BETWEEN PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY. IN ADDITION, THERE WILL BE DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTERS, AND BETWEEN DEFENCE MINISTERS, ALONG WITH CREATION OF WORKING GROUPS TO TRY TO ADVANCE AGMT IN FOUR POLICY AREAS. THIS TEL DEALS WITH ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.

3. REPORT: REAGAN AND GORBACHEV HAVE SET THEMSELVES AN AMBITIOUS AGENDA FOR FIVE DAYS DURING WHICH PRESIDENT WILL BE IN SOVIET CAPITAL (SUNDAY AFTERNOON UNTIL THURSDAY MORNING). FOR REAGAN, AGENDA INCLUDES FIVE WORKING SESSIONS WITH SOVIET LEADER, TWO OFFICIAL DINNERS, PRIVATE DINNER WITH GORBACHEV AFTER BALLET ON LAST EVENING, AND SEPARATE MTGS WITH (A) RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CLERGY; (B) DISSIDENTS AND REFUSENIKS; (C) ARTISTS AND INTELLECTUALS, AND (D) MOSCOW UNIVERSITY STUDENTS. IN LIGHT OF POOR PROGNOSIS FOR MAJOR BREAKTHROUGHS ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, REAGAN'S PERSONAL PERFORMANCE COULD BE PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF INTEREST DURING SUMMIT WEEK. VISIT WILL BE FIRST OF U.S. PRESIDENT SINCE NIXON WENT TO MOSCOW IN 1974, AND COMPARISONS WILL INEVITABLY BE DRAWN. IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES ARE PERSONALITIES OF THE TWO INDIVIDUALS AND THE FACT THAT PGM INCLUDES MTGS WITH PRIVATE SOVIET CITIZENS. SUMMIT COULD TURN OUT TO BE MEMORABLE IF PRESIDENT IS PROPERLY PREPARED (HE IS

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REPORTED TO BE FEELING CONFIDENT)AND IF HE CAN MUSTER INTERNAL RESOURCES TO SHOW HE IS IN COMMAND OF ISSUES AND DISPLAYS HUMAN QUALITIES WHICH HAVE ENDEARED HIM TO AMERICANS FOR SO LONG.AS NOTED SCREEN WRITER AARON LATHAM(AND HUSBAND OF FORMER CBS WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENT LESLIE STAHL)OBSERVED LAST WEEK,REAGAN HAS LAZARUS-LIKE ABILITY TO MAKE COMEBACK WHEN SCRIPT REQUIRES IT.WITH LIGHTS AND CAMERAS ON HIM,REAGANS MOSCOW PERFORMANCE COULD SURPRISE EVERYONE.

4.IN PARALLEL TO REAGAN/GORBACHEV ENCOUNTERS,SHULTZ AND SHEVARNADZE WILL BE MTG AS REQUIRED TO TAKE STOCK OF PROGRESS BEING MADE BY OFFICIALS-LEVEL WORKING GROUPS EXPECTED TO BE STRUCK ON FIRST DAY TO CONSIDER USUAL FOUR ITEMS ON U.S./SOVIET AGENDA.

5.IN ADDITION,DEFENCE SECTY CARLUCCI WILL MEET WITH SOVIET DEFENCE MINISTER YAZOV,CONTINUING THE DISCUSSIONS THEY INAUGURATED A FEW MONTHS AGO.IT WILL BE FIRST TIME A U.S. SECTY OF DEFENCE HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO ATTEND SUMMIT OUTSIDE OF USA SINCE HAROLD BROWN DID SO AT CARTER/BREZHNEV MTG IN VIENNA IN 1979.

6.ARMS CONTROL:START AGREEMENT

SEVERAL MONTHS AGO,PRESIDENT SAID HE DOUBTED START AGMT COULD BE CONCLUDED IN TIME FOR MOSCOW SUMMIT.OFFICIALS DENIED PRESIDENT HAD BEEN PROMPTED TO EXPRESS SUCH VIEW,AND AT TIME(END OF FEB)SOME SAID THEY STILL THOUGHT IT WAS POSSIBLE.FEW NOW DO.BUT NITZE, KAMPLEMAN AND ROWNY ARE LOATH PUBLICLY TO RULE OUT POSSIBILITY ALTOGETHER,BECAUSE SOVIET INTENTIONS REMAIN AN ENIGMA.NITZE SAID AS

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MUCH TO GOTLIEB LAST WEEK AND ON FRIDAY KAMPLEMAN SAID QUOTE WE HAVE A SHOT AT IT UNQUOTE.

7.ACCORDING TO ONE LINE OF ANALYSIS,GORBACHEV SHOULD HAVE STRONG MOTIVATION FOR CUTTING A DEAL WITH U.S. WHILE REAGAN IS STILL IN OFFICE,SINCE TO AWAIT NEW ADMIN WOULD NOT/NOT ONLY DELAY AGMT BY AT LEAST A YEAR BUT ALSO RUN RISK OF UNDERMINING ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF PAST TWO YRS.WITHOUT REAGANS SIGNATURE ON A START AGMT, CONSERVATIVES SHOULD BE EXPECTED TO MOUNT SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO WHOLE IDEA OF 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS.BY THIS LOGIC, GORBACHEV SHOULD CONCLUDE THAT SOVIET INTERESTS WOULD BEST BE SERVED BY HIS MAKING SOME MAJOR CONCESSIONS AT OUTSET OF SUMMIT,SO THAT NEXT FEW DAYS COULD BE DEVOTED TO FIRING UP BASIS OF AGMT TO BE SIGNED AT FURTHER SUMMIT IN FALL.

8.COMPETING LINE OF ANALYSIS IS THAT GORBACHEV WILL WANT TO APPEAR TO BE STANDING TALL AGAINST THE AMERICANS UNTIL AFTER JUNE CPSU CONFERENCE,WHEN IMPORTANT POLICY DECISIONS AND SIGNIFICANT PERSONNEL CHANGES ARE EXPECTED.ACCORDINGLY,HE WILL NOT/NOT WANT TO RUN ANY DOMESTIC POLITICAL RISKS BY APPEARING TO MAKE CONCESSIONS AT THE SUMMIT.BY THIS LOGIC,HE WOULD ADHERE TO EXISTING SOVIET POSITIONS,PROBE FOR AMERICAN FLEXIBILITY,AND ONLY DECIDE LATER WHETHER TO MOVE IN U.S. DIRECTION.

9.THERE ARE FIVE MAJOR AREAS IN WHICH PROGRESS MUST BE MADE BEFORE START AGMT BECOMES POSSIBLE:

(A)FIRST IS TO SETTLE ON SUBLIMITS FOR VARIOUS WARHEADS AND WEAPONS

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SYSTEMS WHICH TWO SIDES HAVE AGREED SHOULD NOT/NOT EXCEED 6000 AND 1600 RESPECTIVELY. SOME CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN THIS AREA, BUT A SUBLIMIT WHICH USA HAS PROPOSED FOR ICBM WARHEADS AND ANOTHER WHICH USSR HAS PROPOSED FOR WARHEADS CARRIED BY BOMBERS HAVE BOTH BEEN RESISTED BY OTHER SIDE.

(B) SECOND RELATED ISSUE IS HOW TO COUNT ALCMS. WHILE AGMT WAS REACHED IN GENEVA TWO WEEKS AGO TO CONSIDER ALL CURRENT ALCMS NUCLEAR-ARMED, TWO SIDES REMAIN APART ON NUMBER OF ALCMS WHICH EACH SIDES BOMBERS WILL BE DEEMED TO CARRY. USA ARGUED NUMBER SHOULD BE 10 (UP FROM 6) WHILE USSR INSISTS IT SHOULD BE BOMBERS ACTUAL COMPLEMENT (BEAR H CARRIES UP TO 8, BLACKJACK PERHAPS MORE, B-52H CARRIES 12 ON WING AND 8 INSIDE, AND B-1B CAN CARRY UP TO 22).

(C) THIRD OUTSTANDING ISSUE IS USA DEMAND TO BAN ALL MOBILE ICBMS (USSR WANTS NUMERICAL LIMITS) UNLESS ADEQUATE VERIFICATION MECHANISMS CAN BE DEvised. AT GENEVA, TWO SIDES AGREED TO EXAMINE FEASIBILITY OF RESTRICTING OPERATING RANGE OF MOBILES TO GEOGRAPHICALLY DEFINED GARRISONING AREAS, AND USA WILL BE PRESENTING SOME IDEAS FOR INSPECTION OF BOTH NON-DEPLOYED AND DEPLOYED MOBILES (E.G. SHORT NOTICE INSPECTION OF PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND SUSPECT SITES).

(D) FURTHER ISSUE IS SOVIET DEMAND TO PLACE LIMITS ON SLCMS, WHICH USA IS RESISTING ON GROUNDS IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO VERIFY WITHOUT PERMITTING UNACCEPTABLY INTRUSIVE INSPECTIONS OF SHIPS AND SUBMARINES. USA HAS PROPOSED DECLARATORY APPROACH, WITH WHICH SOVIETS ARE NOT/NOT SATISFIED. PRIVATE NITZE PROPOSAL TO BAN ALL

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SLCMS HAS SO FAR BEEN REJECTED BY ALMOST EVERYONE, ON GROUNDS THAT THIS WOULD ALSO MEAN ABOLITION OF CONVENTIONALLY-ARMED SLCMS WHICH IS NOT/NOT CONSIDERED FIT SUBJECT FOR START (THOUGHT BOTH CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMED INTERMEDIATE RANGE GLCMS ARE BANNED UNDER INF AGMT).

(E) FIFTH ISSUE IS VERIFICATION PKG, ON WHICH PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE BUT MUCH STILL REMAINS TO BE DONE.

10. FURTHER IMPORTANT AND UNRESOLVED POLICY ISSUE BEARING ON PROSPECTS FOR START AGMT IS WHETHER DEAL CAN BE STRUCK IN SPACE/DEFENCE AREA. TWO SIDES AGREED ON LANGUAGE AT WSHDC SUMMIT WHICH PAPERED OVER THEIR DIFFERENCES, AND LITTLE PROGRESS HAS SINCE BEEN MADE IN CONVERTING THAT LANGUAGE INTO MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TREATY FORM. MAJOR STICKING POINT IS NATURE OF RESEARCH AND TESTING ACTIVITIES TO BE PERMITTED DURING PERIOD WHEN TWO SIDES AGREE TO CONTINUE TO RESPECT ABM TREATY. TO DATE, SOVIETS HAVE REMAINED ADAMANT THAT START AGMT COULD NOT/NOT ENTER INTO EFFECT WITHOUT AGMT ALSO HAVING BEEN REACHED ON PERMISSABLE SPACE/DEFENCE ACTIVITIES.

11. IN EVENT NO/NO START AGMT IS REACHED, TWO SIDES APPEAR TO BE CONSIDERING ISSUANCE OF A WRITTEN STATEMENT REHEARSING AREAS OF AGMT, THOUGHT NO/NO DECISION HAS YET BEEN REACHED ON THIS. WORRY ON USA SIDE IS THAT SOVIETS MIGHT TRY FOR QUOTE FRAME-WORK AGREEMENT UNQUOTE OF KIND REACHED AT VLADIVOSTOK IN 1975, WHICH SOVIETS COULD USE TO LATER ADVANTAGE IN PRESSURING ADMIN PUBLICLY NOT/NOT TO HOLD UP FINAL AGMT OVER QUOTE DETAILS UNQUOTE.

...7

PAGE SEVEN UNGR1453 CONF D

12. OTHER POSSIBLE ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS:

APART FROM START, SUMMIT WILL ALSO FOCUS ON VARIETY OF OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, WITH EXPECTATION THAT SIGNATURES WILL BE PUT TO:

-AGMT ON PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF ALL BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHES (ICBMS OR SLBMS), EXPANDING ON MORE LIMITED AGMTS OF 1971, 1972 AND 1979, AND ON LAST YEARS AGMT IN RESPECT OF NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTES. AGMT REQUIRES LAUNCHING STATE NOW ALSO TO NOTIFY OF LAUNCHES OF MISSILES WHOSE IMPACT POINT IS IN LAUNCHING STATE (WHICH ONLY USSR PRACTICES).

-PROTOCOL TO UNRATIFIED 1976 PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TREATY, SPELLING OUT AGREED VERIFICATION MEASURES FOR EXPLOSIONS OF MORE THAN 50 KILOTONS.

-MOU DETAILING PROCEDURES FOR MONITORING EXPERIMENTAL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS TO BE CONDUCTED AT SEMIPALATINSK ON 17 JUL AND NEVADA 2 AUG (WITH VIEW THEREAFTER TO PREPARATION OF PROTOCOL TO UNRATIFIED 1974 THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY SPELLING OUT VERIFICATION MEASURES TO ENSURE EXPLOSIONS DO NOT/NOT BREACH THRESHOLD OF 150 KILOTONS).

13. LATTER TWO AGMTS WILL IN DUE COURSE PERMIT USA RATIFICATION OF PNET AND TTBT.

14. INF TREATY:

PREMIER ARMS CONTROL EVENT AT SUMMIT SHOULD BE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION OF INF TREATY, PROVIDED U.S. SENATE RATIFICATION HEARINGS ARE CONCLUDED SUCCESSFULLY AND ON TIME (SUPREME SOVIET HEARINGS HAVE REPORTEDLY BEEN CONCLUDED BUT SOVIETS

...8

PAGE EIGHT UNGR1453 CONFD

ARE WITHOLDING RATIFICATION UNTIL IT IS CLEAR USA WILL DO SO).

15. HEARINGS WERE INITIALLY HELD UP BY UNCERTAINTY OVER PRECISE MEANING OF SOME OF LANGUAGE OF TREATY. BUT AT SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MTG IN GENEVA TWO WEEKS AGO, SOME ANCILLARY LANGUAGE WAS AGREED ON WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY SERVED TO SATISFY SENATE. THEREAFTER, SENATOR JESSE HELMS (R-N. CAROLINA) AND SMALL COTERIE OF CONSERVATIVE OPPONENTS OF TREATY SOUGHT TO STRETCH OUT HEARINGS SO THAT RATIFICATION WOULD NOT/NOT BE POSSIBLE PRIOR TO SUMMIT. THROUGH VARIETY OF PARLIAMENTARY MANOEUVRES INCLUDING TABLING OF SEVERAL PROPOSED QUOTE KILLER UNQUOTE AMENDMENTS (EACH OF WHICH WAS VOTED DOWN BY LARGE MARGIN), THEY SUCCEEDED IN DELAYING PROCEEDINGS TO POINT WHERE BOTH REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC LEADERSHIP BECAME ALARMED AND JOINTLY THREATENED CLOSURE (AN ACTION TAKEN ONLY ONCE BEFORE IN RESPECT OF TREATY, DURING HEARINGS ON VERSAILLES TREATY, WHICH SENATE EVENTUALLY REJECTED). HELMS THEN CONCEDED HE WAS QUOTE LICKED UNQUOTE, WHEREUPON ATTN SHIFTED TO ONE REMAINING AMENDMENT WHICH COULD NOT/NOT ONLY DELAY BUT EVEN SCUTTLE RATIFICATION. THAT IS AMENDMENT PROPOSED BY SENATE MAJORITY LEADER BYRD WHICH SEEKS TO BAR PRESIDENT FROM INTERPRETING OR IMPLEMENTING INF TREATY IN ANY WAY WHICH IS INCONSISTENT WITH COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF TREATY SHARED BY PRESIDENT AND SENATE AT TIME OF RATIFICATION (AS PRESIDENT DID IN CASE OF APM TREATY TWO YEARS AGO). SOME COMPROMISE LANGUAGE IS BEING LOOKED AT, BUT IT SEEMS UNLIKELY ISSUE WILL BE RESOLVED UNTIL AT LEAST LATE FRIDAY OR EVEN SATURDAY.

...9

PAGE NINE UNGR1453 CONF

16. WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF (AND FORMER SENATE MAJORITY LEADER)

HOWARD BAKER DID NOT/NOT DEPART WITH PRESIDENTIAL PARTY ON WED, BUT
REMAINED BEHIND TO HELP NEGOTIATE FINAL PASSAGE OF INF TREATY.

IF/WHEN THAT HAPPENS, INTENTION IS FOR BAKER TO FLY DIRECT TO MOSCOW
WITH SENATES APPROVAL OF TREATY IN HIS BRIEFCASE.

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INFO ADDIS LDN BONN ROME PARIS HAGUE OSLO CNBRA BRU MOSCO PRMNY
GENEV NROBI CAIRO RYADH TOKYO PRET LSACA HRARE DSLAM LAGOS DELHI
LSBON PCOOTT/BRADLEY PMOOTT/BURNEY CIDA HULL MINE

BAG STKHM ACCRA DE WDC

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CIDA HULL BCZ BCP YDP BCD BCE MHA MFA CDG SNG YDC YDG BCK

---ETHIOPIA:ADAMISHIN/CROCKER TALKS

ACCORDING TO STATE DEPT, TALKS BETWEEN ASST SECTY CROCKER AND SOVIET
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ADAMISHIN IN LISBON LAST WEEK ON ETHIOPIA
WERE NOT/NOT VERY PRODUCTIVE. ADAMISHIN TOOK A POLEMICAL LINE AND
ACCUSED USA OF BEING GRATUITOUSLY CRITICAL BECAUSE IT DID NOT/NOT
LIKE NATURE OF ETHIOPIAN REGIME.

2. USA COUNTERED THAT IT WAS GENUINELY CONCERNED ABOUT POTENTIAL
HUMAN TRAGEDY IN ETHIOPIA AND FAILURE OF ADDIS REGIME TO TAKE
STEPS TO ADDRESS PROBLEM. CROCKER ALSO POINTED OUT THAT USA POSITION
DID NOT/NOT JUST REFLECT THOUGHTS OF ADMINISTRATION BUT ALSO
REFLECTED STRONGLY HELD BIPARTISAN VIEWS IN CONGRESS.

3. CONTACTS CONTINUE TO SUGGEST THAT THERE IS LITTLE CHANCE OF THIS
ISSUE GOING ANYWHERE AT SUMMIT.

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MINA MINP

---SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE DISCUSSIONS:CENAM

ART BY ALFONSO CHARDY, WSHDC BUREAU CHIEF, IN MIAMI HERALD 17MAY,

REPORTS ON CURRENT SERIES OF TALKS BETWEEN SEC STATE SHULTZ AND
PRE-SUMMIT

FORMIN SHEVARDNADZE FOCUSING ON REGIONAL ISSUES, I.E., ANGOLA,

CAMBODIA AND NICARAGUA, REPRESENTING QUOTE EXTRAORDINARY EXERCISE

IN COOPERATION BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS AND(SIGNALLING THAT)END MAY BE

IN SIGHT TO SO-CALLED REAGAN DOCTRINE OF BACKING ANTI-COMMUNIST

INSURGENCIES UNQUOTE. ART BEING FAXED TO WSHDC, *BONN AND PRMNY.*

2. WHEN MAURICE BUSBY WAS IN OTT 04MAY, HE TOLD US USA WAS QUOTE

SOMEWHAT UNQUOTE ENGAGED WITH USSR ON NICA, BUT THAT DISCUSSIONS

SINCE LAST REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT SHOULD NOT/NOT BE SEEN AS

QUOTE NEGOTIATIONS UNQUOTE, SINCE USA DID NOT/NOT INTEND TO LEGITI-

MIZE SOVIET ROLE IN CENAM. IF CHARDY ARTICLE IS ACCURATE, USA

POSITING WOULD SEEM TO HAVE SHIFTED. GRATEFUL YOU EXPLORE THIS

ISSUE WITH APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES AND ADVISE.

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DGL/mks

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D.G. LONGMUIR

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---US-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS SEEK TO END THREE OTHER CONFLICTS
AS PROMISED IN REFTEL, PLEASE FIND ATTACHED NEWSPAPER ARTICLE
BY ALFONSO CHARDY, WHICH APPEARED IN THE MIAMI HERALD, TUES, 17MAY88.

COMCENTRE PLEASE FAX ATTACHED NEWSPAPER ARTICLE.

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MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

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Subject
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Date TUESDAY, 17 MAY 1988 Publication THE MIAMI HERALD

U.S.-Soviet negotiations seek to end three other conflicts

By ALFONSO CHARDY
Herald Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The Soviet pullout from Afghanistan is the first tangible success in a delicate negotiating process that U.S. and Soviet officials hope will resolve three other regional conflicts before the end of the Reagan administration, U.S. and Soviet officials say.

Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze are personally overseeing the talks, which are now focusing on three conflicts — Angola, Cambodia and Nicaragua — where the United States is backing rebel groups against Soviet-backed governments, the officials say.

The ongoing Shultz-Shevardnadze dialogue has been overshadowed by superpower talks on the reduction of nuclear arms.

But the discussion of regional conflicts represents an extraordinary exercise in cooperation between the superpowers and signals that an end may be in sight to the so-called Reagan doctrine of backing anti-Communist insurgencies.

It has also angered some U.S. conservatives, who now feel that the Reagan administration is betraying the rebel forces it initially encouraged.

"I don't think the administration is very serious about this, anymore," said James Hackett, a Heritage Foundation senior scholar who in January published a report proposing the creation of a new federal department called Resistance Support Agency to coordinate U.S. funding and supplies for anti-Communist rebels around the world.

"Those people at State are some of the world's biggest cowards," said Sen. Gordon Humphrey, R-N.H., who said he worries that U.S. resolve will waver in Afghanistan and Nicaragua, where, he charged, "we continue to permit the Soviets to arm the Sandinistas while we disarm the contras."

"There is no deliberate strategy to settle the regional conflicts in cooperation with the Soviet Union," a Reagan administration official said, "but there is no denying that both the United States and the Soviet Union have a common interest in reducing international tension, and defusing the regional conflicts is one way of doing it."

Soviet officials are more willing to acknowledge that they have changed policies in hopes of settling regional disputes. Previously Moscow had asserted it would never surrender support for a client regime under attack by U.S. proxies.

"In our new way of thinking," a Soviet embassy official said last week, "regional conflicts must be eliminated to reduce tensions in the world, and in this we are cooperating with the United States."

So far, prospects appear good for resolving the conflicts in Cambodia and Angola, the officials say. But the superpower negotiations over Nicaragua are more difficult, both U.S. and Soviet officials say, because of the strong political feelings the conflict has sparked in the United States.

"It is a very emotional issue," a Soviet official said. "We understand that."

Altogether, Soviet officials say that Shultz and Shevardnadze have met 26 times since 1986 and that meetings now take place almost on a regular monthly basis. One took place last week in Geneva in preparation for the May 29 Moscow summit between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

Both Shultz and Shevardnadze have publicly acknowledged that the meetings have included discussion of regional conflicts. But less well known is the fact that both men also exchange letters on the issues and closely monitor the discussions of their respective regional assistants, who meet regularly in various parts of the world.

One such meeting to discuss Central America took place in Rome last month between Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams and a Soviet official in charge of Soviet affairs in Latin America, Yuriy Ivanovich Pavlov. Another regional meeting took place in Paris, also last month, between Assistant Secretary for Asian Affairs Gaston Sigur and his

Soviet counterpart, Igor Rogachev, to discuss Cambodia.

U.S. and Soviet officials said that in their meetings, such as the one last week in Geneva, Shultz and Shevardnadze do not negotiate specific proposals but review progress or hindrance in each of the areas discussed by their assistants.

"Shultz and Shevardnadze are the architects while their regional deputies are the carpenters," a senior Reagan administration official said.

At a meeting in March, for example, Shevardnadze floated the possibility of a drastic cut in

Soviet military supplies to the Sandinistas in exchange for a cut in aid to U.S. allies in Central America, administration officials said. The U.S. rejected the proposal, but a Soviet official in Washington said last week that the offer still stands.

The U.S. and Soviet officials interviewed for this article said they do not expect any breakthrough on Nicaragua until after the Reagan-Gorbachev summit.

Such a breakthrough, they said, might take the shape of an agreement by the Soviet Union to end military supplies to the Sandinistas while a new peace initiative is launched or the U.S. resumes direct negotiations with Nicaragua.

"Everything here is pointing more and more toward a diplomatic solution in Central America," a senior administration official familiar with Nicaraguan affairs said last week.

It would not be unrealistic, he added, to speculate that after the summit and before the November presidential election in the United States, Shultz may offer such an initiative.

While the Nicaraguan conflict may not be resolved soon, American and Soviet officials hope that the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan serves as a model to settle conflicts in Angola and Cambodia.

Of the two, Angola appears most likely to be resolved. During last week's Geneva meeting between Shultz and Shevardnadze, Shultz told reporters that he was beginning to feel optimistic about a negotiated solution in the 13-year-old Angolan conflict.

"More has happened recently than at any time before," Shultz said, referring to seven years of State Department efforts in solving the Angolan conflict.

Optimism concerning Angola widened last week when Sen. Dennis DeConcini, D-Ariz., persuaded a bipartisan group of 30 senators to sign a two-page letter to President Reagan urging him to "vigorously pursue a resolution to the ... conflict in Angola" during the upcoming summit with Gorbachev.

Cuban officials touring Europe and Africa also were projecting an image of flexibility on the conflict. "Cuba is prepared to shorten the proposed four-year timetable for the withdrawal of the 40,000 troops from Angola," Cuba's deputy foreign minister Raul Roa told reporters in Lisbon, Portugal, last week. The timetable has been a major obstacle to agreement, with the administration saying four years is too long and that it prefers a nine- to 12-month timetable similar to the Soviet pullout schedule in Afghanistan.

Roa said Cuba had submitted a new troop withdrawal plan and had informed South Africa that "we are flexible on the timetable."

One potentially disruptive element in the Angola equation was introduced last week, however, when the Reagan administration revealed that Cuba had both increased its troop strength in Angola from 40,000 to 45,000 troops and moved combat units closer to the border with the South African-administered territory of Namibia.

While the U.S. officials who provided the information said Cuba was playing a "risky game," a Cuban official in Washington said the Cuban troop reinforcement and border deployment were part of his country's "negotiating strategy" to increase "pressures on South Africa" to withdraw its troops from southern Angola.

The Cuban official said neither South Africa nor the United States should interpret the Cuban military movements as a threat to the multilateral talks.

"We must show our resolve in the face of South Africa," the Cuban official said. "We must not be seen as the weak element in this."

As with Afghanistan and Nicaragua, U.S. and Soviet officials have met to discuss the Angolan conflict, with Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker meeting a number of times with a Shevardnadze subordinate.

U.S. and Soviet officials said Moscow is encouraging Cuba to follow the Afghanistan example and withdraw its forces from Angola, while Washington is reportedly also trying to convince South Africa to pull out of Angola.

The first face-to-face U.S.-Soviet meeting on the conflict in Cambodia, where more than 140,000 Vietnamese combat troops have been since toppling the murderous regime of Pol Pot in 1979, came last month.

Igor Rogachev, the Soviet deputy foreign minister for Asian affairs, met in Paris in April with Gaston Sigur, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs.

Before the meeting, Rogachev told reporters that the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan could serve as a "model" to resolve the Cambodian conflict.



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DMT CMG RBD IDX INP ^{PSR} GAA ^{PSR} IDAO IDAN ^{GGRS}

---SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING:SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

ON 18MAY, AMB RODIONOV CALLED ON A/RGB TO DELIVER SOVIET

ASSESSMENT OF LATEST MTGS IN GENEV BETWEEN USA SECSTATE SHULTZ

AND SOVIET FORMIN SHEVARDNADZE.RODIONOV DISCRIBED THE TALKS

AS USEFUL AND THAT MANY ISSUES QUOTE MOVED TO THE STAGE OF

DECISION UNQUOTE.

2.ARMS CONTROL: MOST IMPORTANT WAS AGREEMENT ON ⁵ VERIFICATION

DETAILS THAT WOULD ALLOW RATIFICATION OF INF AGREEMENT TO

PROCEED. ON START, IT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT AN AGREEMENT

IN TIME FOR THE MOSCO SUMMIT WOULD NOT/NOT BE POSSIBLE, ALTHOUGH

CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN ACHIEVED TO DATE. THE SOVIETS

REMAIN CONCERNED ABOUT USA COMPLIANCE WITH THE ABM TREATY.

QUESTIONS RELATING TO ALCMS AND SLCMS WERE AGAIN RAISED,

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^{RB} G.N.GREEN/Lj

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995-3555

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G.H. MITCHELL

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WITH THE SOVIETS PROVIDING DATA ON THEIR SLCMS AND OTHER
DETAILS OF THEIR STRATEGIC WEAPONS. THERE WAS A CONVERGENCE
OF VIEWS ON NUCLEAR TESTING AND CW. THE SOVIET SIDE AGAIN
RAISED THE QUESTION OF LIMITING NAVAL FORCES AND PROPOSED
AN EXPERTS MEETING BE HELD, BUT SHULTZ REPORTEDLY WAS QUOTE NOT/NOT
VERY ENTHUSIASTIC UNQUOTE. HE DID HOWEVER PROMISE TO EXAMINE
THE PROPOSALS.

3.REGIONAL ISSUES: ON AFGHANISTAN, SOVIETS URGED USA TO THINK
SERIOUSLY ABOUT WHETHER SUPPORTING QUOTE THE MOST REACTIONARY,
AGGRESSIVE FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPINGS UNQUOTE SERVED ITS BEST
INTERESTS. ON CENTAM, SOVIETS PROPOSED A MUTUAL CESSATION
OF ARMS SHIPMENTS TO THE REGION (EXCEPT FOR SMALL FIRE ARMS.)
AND ON SAFRICA, BOTH SIDES VIEWED THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
POSITIVELY AND AGREED THAT USA-USSR CONSULTATIONS ON THE
REGION WOULD BE HELD SOON.

4.HUMANITARIAN ISSUES:SOVIETS PUT FORWARD PROPOSALS THAT
MIGHT LEAD TO AGREEMENT AT VCSCE.SHULTZ REPORTEDLY VIEWED
THE PROPOSALS WITH GREAT INTEREST AND SAID THEY COULD GIVE
NEW IMPULSE TO ACCELERATE ITS SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION.

5.IN RESPONSE, A/RGB THANKED THE AMB FOR SHARING THE SOVIET
PERSPECTIVE WITH HIM AND REITERATED THAT SUCH VIEWPOINTS
HELPED US IN ASSESSING THE OUTCOME OF THE TALKS. CDA IS PLEASED

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PAGE THREE RBR0891 CONFD

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THAT PROGRESS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED ON INF ISSUES AND ATTACHES
GREAT IMPORTANCE TO PROGRESS ON START AS WELL. ON VCSCE,
CDA IS SEEKING A BALANCED CONCLUDING DOCUMENT AND ENCOURAGES
THE USSR TO TAKE A POSITIVE AND FORWARD LOOKING VIEW. A/RGB
SUGGESTED THAT THE SOVIETS EXAMINE CLOSELY THE NNA DRAFT
CONCLUDING DOCUMENT AND LOOK TO DEVELOP A MOVEMENT IN ALL
THREE BASKETS. ON AFGHANISTAN, CDA IS ENCOURAGED BY THE MOVEMENT
OF SOVIET FORCES TO DATE AND HOPES THAT DISENGAGEMENT CAN
PROCEED EFFECTIVELY, QUICKLY AND IN A WAY THAT PROVIDES THE
BEST CONDITIONS FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

6. FULL TEXT OF SOVIET PAPER TO SELECTED ADDRESSEES BY NEXT
BAG.



TO / À • RBR
FROM / DE • GMR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET

Lettre du Premier Ministre à
M. Gorbachev

Security / Sécurité
CONFIDENTIEL
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File / Dossier
20-USA-1-3-USSR
Date
Le 17 mai 1988
Number / Numéro
GMR-0786

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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GMD

Ci-joint vous trouverez deux paragraphes sur le conflit israélo-arabe et la situation dans le Golfe, pour incorporation à la lettre de M. Mulroney au secrétaire-général du PCUS à l'occasion du sommet de Moscou.

M.S.

C.E. Garrard
Directeur
Direction des Relations avec le
Moyen-Orient

PJ

Note, cette formulation a reçu l'approbation de GMD.

In the Middle East, the uprising in the Israeli occupied territories has underlined the urgency of a political settlement on the basis of Israel's right to security and of the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. I have written to Prime Minister Shamir to urge him to be imaginative and politically courageous in approaching peace negotiations. Your call on the PLO to recognize Israel and take its security interests into account is a positive contribution to the establishment of the climate required for meaningful negotiations. Given your own interests in the region, we hope that you will continue to exert an influence on behalf of moderation and pragmatism.

Elsewhere in the Middle East, my government is deeply concerned about the Iran-Iraq war and the situation in the Gulf. The Security Council must maintain the unanimity that marked the passing of Security Council Resolution 598 in July of 1987, and adopt effective measures designed to bring the conflict to an end.

In the Middle East, the uprising in the Israeli occupied territories has underlined the urgency of a political settlement on the basis of Israel's right to security and of the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. I have written to Prime Minister Shamir to urge him to be imaginative and politically courageous in his response to the initiative of Secretary Shultz. Your active involvement in the peace process is essential for an overall settlement. We hope that you will continue your discussions with the Soviet Union to clarify common objectives and to achieve further progress on the definition of mechanisms appropriate to their achievement.

Elsewhere in the Middle East, we are deeply concerned about the Iran-Iraq war and the situation in the Gulf. We have clearly stated our support for the steady hand of the United States. The Security Council must maintain the unanimity that marked the passing of Security Council Resolution 598 in July of 1987, and adopt effective measures designed to bring the conflict to an end.

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---REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT AND AFRICAN REGIONAL ISSUES

AT MOMENT IT SEEMS VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT ANGOLA WILL BE FOCUS OF
ANY DISCUSSION OF AFRICAN REGIONAL ISSUES AT SUMMIT. SUCCESS IN
ARRANGING QUADRAPARTITE LDN MTG AND RELATIVELY POSITIVE TONE OF
CROCKER/ADAMISHIN DISCUSSIONS LATE APRIL MAKE ANGOLA A REGIONAL
ISSUE USA WILL WANT TO MOVE AHEAD FOR REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT.
CROCKER AND ADMISHIN WILL MEET AGAIN BEFORE SUMMIT. ACCORDING TO
CONTACTS AT STATE THEIR DISCUSSIONS WILL FOCUS ON ANGOLA.
DISCUSSION OF ETHIOPIA LIKELY TO BE LIMITED TO RELATIVELY GENERAL
EXCHANGE.

2. BRIEFING STATE DEPT HAS PREPARED FOR PRESIDENT ON ETHIOPIA FOR
SUMMIT IS ESSENTIALLY LIMITED TO SPEAKING OF USA HUMANITARIAN
CONCERNS AND EXPRESSING HOPE THAT MOSCOW CAN USE INFLUENCE WITH

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ADDIS TO HELP ENSURE THAT STARVING ARE FED.DRAFT LANGUAGE FOR
JOINT COMMUNIQUE(SHOULD ANYTHING BE INCLUDED ON ETHIOPIA)WOULD
APPARENTLY BE LITTLE MORE THAN EXPRESSION OF HUMANITARIAN CONCERN
OVER SITUATION IN NORTH AND REFERENCE TO PARTIES RELIEF EFFORTS.
ACCORDING TO STATE,USA DOES NOT/NOT HAVE NECESSARY INFLUENCE WITH
ETHIOPIANS OR ANY OF PARTIES TO CONFLICT TO ALLOW FOR GREATER
INVOLVEMENT ON ITS PART.

3.USA WILL,HOWEVER,BE MAKING STRONG PITCH TO SECGEN BEFORE HE
VISITS ETHIOPIA LATER THIS MONTH TO ENCOURAGE HIM TO EXERT
INFLUENCE WITH MENGISTU TO PERMIT RETURN OF RELIEF WORKERS.USA
ALSO HOPING THAT SIMILAR PRESSURE MAY BE BROUGHT TO BEAR IN COURSE
OF OAU SUMMIT.

4ON GENERAL QUESTION OF RECENT CRITICISM OF ETHIOPIAN GOVT BY PRES
REAGAN AND CROCKER/ADAMISHIN DISCUSSION OF SITUATION,USA HAS YET
TO HEAR A WORD DIRECTLY FROM ADDIS.AS INTERLOCUTOR NOTED,
HOWEVER,ETHIOPIANS DO NOT/NOT SPEAK TO THEM AND LACK OF RESPONSE
NOT/NOT EXPECTED.

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MESSAGE

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REF PRMNY WKGR6125 05MAY

---ETHIOPIA:CROCKER/ADAMISHIN MTG

GRATEFUL YOU SUPPLY TEXT OF STATEMENT ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS ISSUED IN
LDN BY SOVIET DEPUTY FOREIGN MIN ADAMISHIN 29APR.

RECEIVED IN GAA

MAY 09 1988

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TELEPHONE

0-6577

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---EAST/WEST CO-OPERATION IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

SUBJ/SUJ

MEMO ON EAST/WEST CO-OP IN HORN FOLLOWS. GRATEFUL FOR ANY NEW INFO
ON CROCKER/ADAMISHIN MTG OR ON ETHIOPIA AGENDA ITEM AT REAGAN/
GORBACHEV SUMMIT AS INFO BECOMES AVAILABLE.
2.COMCENTRE PLS FAX ATTACHED TWO PAGES.

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RÉFÉRENCESUBJECT • EAST/WEST COOPERATION IN THE HORN OF
SUJET AFRICAENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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The joint U.S.-Soviet Summit Statement, issued after the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Washington on 7-10 December 1987, noted that the President and General Secretary had discussed a range of regional questions, and had agreed that "dialogue" between the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. on these issues would help parties in regional conflicts to find peaceful settlements, and would improve East-West relations. The joint communiqué listed Afghanistan, Central America and other troubled regions, summarizing the discussion about them; it did not, however, specifically mention the Horn of Africa.

2. The State Department informs our embassy in Washington that the situation in Ethiopia is likely to be a subject at the next Reagan-Gorbachev summit, and will probably be raised by the President himself. In a speech made on 21 April, Mr Reagan said that Ethiopia has "long been on the U.S.-Soviet agenda." He called upon the Soviet Union to intervene with Ethiopian authorities in order that relief efforts should continue, and he asked the U.S.S.R. to join with the U.S. and "other concerned governments" in working towards a peaceful settlement.

3. The State Department has announced that Mr Schultz raised the issue of Ethiopia in his meeting with Mr Shevardnadze in Moscow on 22-24 April. The U.S.A. has made formal and informal representations to Canada and other countries, asking us to discuss the Ethiopian issue with the U.S.S.R.

4. The F.C.O. informs our High Commission in London that Sir Geoffrey Howe broached the subject of the common interest of the U.K. and U.S.S.R. in facilitating relief distribution during a recent discussion with Mr Shevardnadze. Mr Shevardnadze reportedly replied vaguely that "there must be something we could do jointly on aid." The U.K. has also raised the issue with the D.D.R. and Czech governments, apparently without eliciting a response.


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5. Canada made representations to Soviet officials in Moscow on 26 April. The U.S.S.R. is concerned about the situation in Ethiopia, and has discussed the return of relief workers with Ethiopian authorities. The Soviet Union would not, however, be receptive to any diplomatic initiative that might be seen as infringing on Ethiopian sovereignty. Soviet officials noted that the U.S.A. had asked over a year ago for Soviet assistance in coordinating relief efforts, but had not followed up the suggestion with concrete proposals. For a full report on the meeting between Canadian and Soviet officials, see MOSCO XYGR0834 26APR88.



D. S. Proudfoot
Anglophone Africa
Relations Division



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D. S. Proudfoot
Anglophone Africa
Relations Division

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---ETHIOPIA:ISSUE TAKEN UP BY PRESIDENT REAGAN

INFORMED BY STATE DEPT THAT SITUATION IN ETHIOPIAN IS LIKELY TO BE
SUBJECT AT NEXT REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT AND WILL PROBABLY BE RAISED
BY PRESIDENT HIMSELF.USA CONCERNS EXPRESSED LIKELY TO INCLUDE
FAMINE IN NORTH AND OBSTRUCTIONS PLACED IN WAY OF RELIEF OPERATIONS
BY ETHIOPIAN GOVT AS WELL AS DESIRABILITY OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

2.TEXT OF REMARKS PRESIDENT REAGAN MADE ON ETHIOPIAN SITUATION
IN COURSE OF SPEECH TO WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS
FOLLOWS:QUOTE TWO YEARS AGO A PITTYING WORLD BELIEVE THAT AT LAST
THE HOPES OF ALL COMPASSIONATE PEOPLE HAD BEEN REALIZED AND THAT THE
FAMINE IN AFRICA AHD COME TO AN END.HUMANITY PRAYED THAT IT WOULD
NEVER AGAIN SEE PICTURES OF CHILDREN WITH BLOATED STOMACHS OR HEAR
STORIES OF FAMILIES DYING ONE BY ONE AS THEY WALKED DOZENS OF MILES
TO REACH FEEDING STATIONS.BUT NOW,IN ONE COUNTRY,THE FAMINE HAS

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PAGE TWO UNGR0923 PROTECTED

RETURNED.

ETHIOPIA SUFFERS FROM DROUGHT, YES, AND EVEN MORE IT SUFFERS FROM INADEQUATE AGRICULTURAL POLICIES. BUT NOW TO DROUGHT AND FAILED POLICY HAS BEEN ADDED A THIRD, EVEN MORE DEADLY ELEMENT-WAR.

THE ETHIOPIAN ARMY HAS RECENTLY SUFFERED MAJOR DEFEATS IN ITS LONG WAR WITH THE ERITREAN SECESSIONIST FORCES. THE COMBINATION OF DROUGHT AND THE DISLOCATIONS OF WAR IS THE IMMEDIATE CAUSE OF FAMINE IN THAT PART OF THE COUNTRY. BUT THE ETHIOPIAN REGIME RECENTLY ORDERED ALL FOREIGN FAMINE RELIEF WORKERS TO LEAVE THE AFFLICTED NORTHERN REGION. THAT LEADS US TO THE HORRIBLE CONCLUSION THAT STARVATION AND SCORCHED EARTH ARE BEING CONSIDERED AS WEAPONS TO DEFEAT THE REBELLION.

THE SUBJECT OF ETHIOPIAN HAS LONG BEEN ON THE US-SOVIET AGENDA, BUT NOT IT IS MORE URGENT BECAUSE OF THIS TREMENDOUS HUMAN CATASTROPHE IN THE MAKING. IS THE WORLD TO KNOW ANOTHER HOLOCAUST? IS IT TO SEE ANOTHER POLITICAL FAMINE?

THE SOVIET ARE THE PRINCIPAL ARMS SUPPLIER AND PRIMARY BACKER TO THE REGIME IN ADDIS ABABA. THEY ARE ALSO SUPPLYING 250,000 TONS OF FOOD THIS YEAR. THEY CAN STOP THIS DISASTER BEFORE IT HAPPENS, AND I APPEAL TO THEM TO PERSUADE THE ETHIOPIAN REGIME, AS ONLY THEY CAN, TO CHANGE ITS DECISION AND TO ALLOW THE FAMINE RELIEF EFFORTS TO CONTINUE, AND LET ME ADD, I HOPE, AS WELL, THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL JOIN US AND OTHER CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS IN WORKING TOWARD A PEACEFUL, NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR. UNQUOTE.

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(NEW YORK TIMES 23APR88)

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Gorbachev Says Reagan Remarks On Rights Issues Threaten Accords

By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, April 22 — Mikhail S. Gorbachev accused President Reagan today of jeopardizing improvements in Soviet-American relations by reverting to a confrontational approach toward Moscow, the press agency Tass reported.

Mr. Gorbachev's sharp remarks, delivered in a meeting with Secretary of State George D. Shultz, were apparently in response to the President's recent criticism of Soviet actions in the areas of human rights and foreign policy.

In advance of next month's summit meeting in Moscow, Mr. Reagan has been repeating some of his favorite themes, pledging to seek arms agreements, while also criticizing the Soviet Union for its continued restrictions on emigration and for aspects of its foreign policy.

In three recent speeches, President Reagan has angered the Soviet Union

in the way he has discussed issues other than arms control.

He has called on Moscow to allow publications and books to circulate freely, including the works of the exiled dissident writer Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn. Beyond that, he has challenged Moscow to live up to the Helsinki accord on human rights, for example by giving people the freedom to emigrate.

And in an address Thursday in Springfield, Mass., the President used strong language to cast doubt on the Kremlin agreement to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, saying, "The Soviets have rarely before, and not at all in more than three decades, left a country once occupied."

Complaints of Confrontation

On Friday, Mr. Gorbachev, complaining of a "confrontational" American approach to human rights issues, said: "We have so far been showing restraint, but if we reciprocate — and we can do so over a very wide range of issues — the atmosphere in Soviet-American relations can become such that it will make it no longer possible to solve any further issues."

The Soviet leader also warned Americans against attempting to exploit signs of instability in the Soviet leadership, an apparent reference to the recent Western reports of a clash between Mr. Gorbachev and Yegor K. Ligachev, until now the No. 2 Soviet leader.

Mr. Gorbachev said the Americans should get rid of the "delusions" that Soviet leaders will make concessions in negotiations with the Americans "because the position of the present Soviet leadership is unstable" and the leader needs "some foreign policy success."

Some Administration officials have, in fact, recently speculated that the United States might have additional bargaining leverage over Moscow because Mr. Gorbachev might need progress in the arms talks to strengthen his position at home.

Mr. Gorbachev's remarks, coming

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Gorbachev Assails Reagan for Remarks on Rights

Continued From Page 1

the month before his scheduled summit meeting with Mr. Reagan in Moscow, appeared to be a deliberate show of toughness designed for both Soviet and American audiences.

But Tass said that Mr. Gorbachev ended the meeting with Mr. Shultz on a more positive note, holding out hope for "concrete and weighty results" at the summit meeting and promising that "the U.S. President will find here a reputation worthy of relations between two great peoples."

Tass issued its account after the Sec-

retary of State completed two days of talks without making important progress on a new agreement reducing long-range arms. The State Department spokesman, Charles E. Redman, said that he would have no comment on the Tass report.

Firm Response Presented

By making his version of the meeting public, the Soviet authorities presented Mr. Gorbachev as responding firmly to the Americans in defense of Soviet interests.

Last year, Tass also surprised the American side by issuing a detailed account of a meeting between Mr. Gorbachev and Mr. Shultz that American officials later said was generally accurate.

In the talks, the two sides did not resolve their fundamental differences over what sort of Star Wars testing is allowed, among other issues pertaining to anti-missile systems. The Soviet side presented a draft text of an agreement in this area, but this was a procedural step.

On air-launched cruise missiles, American officials disclosed the terms of a new United States proposal about how to distinguish between nuclear-armed and conventionally armed versions of the weapons.

Under the plan, all existing long-

range air-launched cruise missiles would be treated as nuclear systems and, thus, would be subject to treaty limits. A senior Administration official said the United States had a small number of long-range conventionally armed cruise missiles under a sensitive Pentagon program.

In the case of new types of cruise missiles, only nuclear armed versions of the weapons would be limited. These nuclear-armed cruise missiles would be distinguishable from conventional versions under the American plan.

Additionally, bombers that carry the nuclear-armed cruise missiles would also have to have distinguishable features and would be kept at separate bases.

A senior Administration official said some of the questions Soviet officials asked about the plan had a skeptical

tone. In any event, the plan did not resolve separate disputes between the two sides over these weapons, like the question of how many cruise missiles a bomber should be counted as carrying.

The two sides said they made some progress in the area of chemical weapons, and the Americans announced that the two sides would carry out experiments this summer to improve verification of nuclear testing.

On regional issues, there was little progress. The Russians rejected an American request that Moscow put an arms embargo against Iran into practice.

An American official said that the Soviet side explained that it did not want to alienate Iran while it was withdrawing troops from Afghanistan. Some of the Afghan rebel groups are based in Iran, and Moscow would like

to see assistance to their groups curtailed.

On Afghanistan, Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze hinted at a news conference tonight that Moscow might be prepared to cut off military assistance to the Kabul regime.

At the beginning of his meeting with Mr. Shultz in Catherine Hall at the Kremlin, and in the presence of reporters and photographers, Mr. Gorbachev complained about the lack of progress on arms control.

Mr. Shultz rejected the suggestion, at his news conference, that the talks on strategic arms were stalled after his three-hour meeting with Mr. Gorbachev. "We are far from marking time," Mr. Shultz said. "We are keeping time."

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---USA/USSR RELATIONS:DEFENCE MINISTERS MTG 15-17MAR

HAVE MET THE AMERICAN POLITICAL COUNSELLOR TO OBTAIN A US EMB
ASSESSMENT OF THE TWO AND A HALF DAY MTG BETWEEN THE US SECRETARY OF
DEFENCE AND THE SOVIET DEFENCE MINISTER IN BERNE. THOUGH YOU ALREADY
HAVE RECEIVED ALL RELEVANT INFO, WE HOPE THAT OUR CONTRIBUTION MIGHT
SHED MORE LIGHT ON USA/USSR RELATIONS. THE US EMB ASSESSMENT IS THAT
TALKS WERE QUOTE CANDID AND CONSTRUCTIVE UNQUOTE.

2. AS THE FIRST MTG WAS HELD IN THE US EMB, YAZOV RAISED THE FIRST
SUBJECT. HE CHOSE TO ELABORATE ON SOVIET DOCTRINAL CHANGES, THE SO-CALLED
QUOTE SUFFICIENCY UNQUOTE CONCEPT. CARLUCCI TRIED TO UNDERSTAND WHAT
WAS MEANT UNDERLINING THAT US HAS NOT/NOT OBSERVED ANY CHANGE IN THE
SOVIET MILITARY 94:3 '547:5743. CARLUCCI'S PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION IS
THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY ASSESSMENT OF THE ADVERSARY MILITARY FORCES
IS CENTRAL TO THE CONCEPT OF SUFFICIENCY (THUS A SOVIET JUDGEMENT ON
NATO AND OTHER ADVERSARY FORCES). IT IS NOT/NOT VERY WELL DEFINED FOR
THE TIME BEING AND YAZOV, HIMSELF, WAS PROBABLY EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL
CONSEQUENCES OF THIS DIFFERENT DOCTRINE.

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PAGE TWO ZNGR0344 CONFD

3.YAZOV RAISED THE SUBJECT OF MILITARY FORCES IN EUROPE.CARIUCCIS REACTION WAS THAT THEOMTG WAS SET UP TO DISCUSS WORLD-WIDE FORCES NOT/ NOT THE EUROPEAN SITUATION WHICH IS AN ALLIANCE MATTER.YAZOV ACCEPTED THIS POINT AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION.

4.YAZOV TRIED TO PERSUADE CARLUCCI,AND VIA THE US DEFENCE MINISTER WESTERN LEADERS,THAT THE USSR DOES NOT/NOT INTEND TO BE A TEREATENING POWER.THE ANSWER WAS:QUOTE WHY DO YOU BEHAVE AS A THREAT?UNQUOTE; INDEED,THE PROBLEM IS WHAT USSR POSSESSES IN THE FORM OF FORCES AND CAPABILITIES,NOT/NOT A QUESTION OF INTENTIONS.

5.YAZOV STRESSED THE NEW SOVIET OPENNESS ON JEWISH IMMIG,AFGHANISTAN AND HUMAN RIGHTS.

6.CARLUCCI RAISED THE AFGHAN,CAMBODIAN,KOREAN AND NICARAGUAN ISSUES. HE NOTABLY ASKED YAZOV TO EXERT PRESSURE ON VIETNAM TO PULL FORCES OUT OF CAMBODIA AND ON NORTH KOREA TO STOP TERRORIST ACTIONS IN REGARD OF THE SEOUL OLYMPICS.YAZOV DID NOT/NOT GIVE ANY ANSWER ABOUT VIETNAM;HE WAS NOT/NOT RESPONSIVE EITHER ON NORTH KOREAN TERRORIST ACTIONS BUT NOTED THAT HIS COUNTRY WANTS THE OLYMPICS TO BE HELD.YAZOV WAS UNPRE- PARED ON THE NICARAGUAN QUESTION.

7.ARM CONTROLS.THE FULL RANGE OF ISSUES WAS DISCUSSED THOUGH BOTH SIDES AGREED THEY WERE NOT/NOT NEGOTIATING.YAZOV REPEATED THE TRADITIONAL SOVIET STANDARD POSITION ON SDI AND AMB.

8.CONCLUSION:BASIC DIFFERENCE WERE OBSERVED DURING THE TALKS.CARLUCCI AND YAZOV,HOWEVER,AGREED THAT THEY WERE NOT/NOT INSURMONTABLE

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PAGE THREE ZNGR0344 CONF

OBSTACLES WHICH SHOULD PRECLUDE PROGRESS IN MATTERS OF MUTUAL INTEREST.

98. BOTH DEFENCE MINISTERS AGREED THAT THEIR FORCES SHOULD NOT/NOT SHOOT AT EACH OTHER IN PERIODS OF PEACE. THEY SHOULD NOT/NOT USE FORCE. THEY ADMITTED THE NECESSITY OF A BETTER KNOWLEDGE/UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT FORCES ON EACH SIDE WERE DOING. THEY, MOREOVER, CONCLUDED THAT MILITARY CONTACTS ARE DESIREABLE IN PRINCIPLE AND AGREED TO TAKE STEPS TO IMPROVE ACCESS OF MILITARY ATTACHES. THE MATTER WILL BE PURSUED WHEN AKHROMEYEN IS IN WSHDC.

10. CARLUCCI AGREED TO VISIT YAZOV IN MCSCO. IT WAS PRESENTED AND RECEIVED AS A PERSONAL INVITATION AND VISIT COULD TAKE PLACE BEFORE END OF THIS YEAR.

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---USSR:RESURGENCE IN BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE USA

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF RECENT IAC INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON CURRENT
STATE OF USSR-USA RELATIONS.THIS REPORT WILL SERVE AS BASIS FOR
LONGER,MORE DETAILED LOOK AT SUBJ.WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY COMMENTS
OR SUGGESTIONS YOU MIGHT HAVE FOR A MORE IN-DEPTH STUDY.

2.QUOTE:USSR-RESURGENCE IN BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE USA

THE GORBACHEV PERSPECTIVE

1.FOR GORBACHEV,AS FOR HIS PREDECESSORS,RELATIONS WITH THE USA
REPRESENT THE ULTIMATE FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGE.IN THE SOVIET VIEW,
SUPERPOWER STATUS DEPENDS ON ACCEPTANCE AND RESPECT BY THE USA.
GORBACHEV APPEARS TO HAVE JUDGED THAT THE ADVENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
HAS MADE A FINAL ARMED CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE TWO SYSTEMS
IMPOSSIBLE.HE APPEARS TO HAVE RECOGNIZED THAT MILITARY POWER ALONE
IS INSUFFICIENT FOR SUPERPOWER STATUS AND THAT MILITARY COMPETITION
WITH THE USA IS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE,LEADING ONLY TO EXPANDING
SPIRALS IN AN ARMS RACE WHICH THE USSR CAN ILL AFFORD.SUPERPOWER
COMPETITION MUST THEREFORE BE CARRIED OUT IN THE ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL ARENAS,A VIEW WHICH IS NOT/NOT UNIVERSALLY SHARED BY THE
SOVIET LEADERSHIP.BUT THE USSR MUST FIRST PUT ITS HOUSE IN ORDER.
THIS REQUIRES A STABLE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND SPECIFICALLY

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A DURABLE MODUS VIVENDI WITH THE USA.GORBACHEV MAY WELL SUCCEED WHERE HIS PREDECESSORS FAILED.

2.THERE IS LITTLE TO SUGGEST THAT GORBACHEV OR ANY OF HIS ADVISORS HAVE TOTALLY ABANDONED THE TRADITIONAL SOVIET VIEW OF THE USA AS AN IMPLACABLY HOSTILE MILITARY POWER.GORBACHEV APPEARS TO DIVERGE FROM ORTHODOXY IN HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE IMMEDIATE SECURITY THREAT IT REPRESENTS AND IN HIS TACTICS FOR DEALING WITH THE USA.GORBACHEV'S ADVISORS RECOGNIZE THAT USA FOREIGN AND DEFENCE POLICIES REMAIN TO A LARGE DEGREE THE CREATURE OF THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADMINISTRATION.

ARMS CONTROL

3.WITH IMPRESSIVE TACTICAL SKILL,GORBACHEV IS CONDUCTING A FOREIGN POLICY OFFENSIVE WHICH DEALS SYSTEMATICALLY WITH THE MAIN POINTS OF THE USAS OWN AGENDA-ARMS CONTROL(ACD),REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND,TO A LESSER DEGREE,HUMAN RIGHTS.IT IS NOT/NOT SURPRISING THAT USSR-USA RELATIONS ARE PLAYED PRIMARILY IN THE ACD ARENA.ONLY IN THE MILITARY-SECURITY SPHERE DOES THE USSR FEEL GENUINELY EQUAL TO THE USA.WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF THE SPACE RACE AND ATHLETIC COMPETITIONS,ACD NEGOTIATIONS ARE THE ONLY FORUM WHERE THE USA EXTENDS THE RESPECT THE USSR CRAVES.ACD NEGOTIATIONS ALSO OFFER THE WIDEST OPPORTUNITIES FOR A SOVIET CHALLENGE IN ANOTHER AREA TRADITIONALLY DOMINATED BY THE USA:PUBLIC RELATIONS.

4.THE SERIES OF SUMMITS HAVE NOT/NOT ONLY DEMONSTRATED SOVIET EQUALITY ON ACD ISSUES,BUT MAY HAVE REINFORCED A MUTUAL PERCEPTION

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THAT NO/NO DIRECT MILITARY ATTACK IS IMMINENT FROM EITHER SIDE. SUCCESSFUL SUMMITRY LED TO A MAJOR ACD BREAKTHROUGH-THE INF AGREEMENT, GORBACHEV'S FIRST MAJOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUCCESS. THE SUCCESS OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS, DESPITE RAISED INTERNATIONAL EXPECTATIONS AND THE PRESSURE OF THE UPCOMING MOSCO SUMMIT IN MAY, APPEARS TO HAVE DEFUSED MUCH OF THE URGENCY FOR FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS. THE POSSIBILITY OF AN EARLY BREAKTHROUGH ON STRATEGIC OR SPACE WEAPONS IS RECEDING. STRATEGIC REDUCTIONS ARE, MILITARILY, CONSIDERABLY MORE SENSITIVE THAN THE INF ISSUE, BECAUSE OF THE MANY DIFFERENT SYSTEMS INVOLVED, AND BECAUSE VERIFICATION IS MORE DIFFICULT. STRATEGIC NEGOTIATIONS APPEAR TO BE SIMPLY RUNNING OUT OF TIME IN TERMS OF THE MOSCO SUMMIT.

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

5. THE GORBACHEV LEADERSHIP RECOGNIZED THAT AFGHANISTAN REPRESENTED THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT IMPEDIMENT TO REACHING AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE USA. THE ISSUE WAS AMENABLE TO UNILATERAL SOVIET ACTION. THE USSR HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO A WITHDRAWAL REGARDLESS OF THE CONSEQUENCES TO ITS CLIENT REGIME. THIS MOVE WILL NOT/NOT ONLY IMPROVE USSR-USA RELATIONS, BUT ALSO PAY HANDSOME DIVIDENDS WITH THE PRC AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD. THE SETTLEMENT IS CLEARLY BASED ON TACIT USSR-USA ACCEPTANCE OF POLITICAL NEEDS, WITH CYNICAL DISREGARD FOR THE CONTINUED WELL-BEING OF EACH OTHERS RESPECTIVE CLIENTS. REGARDLESS OF SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHAN, IT WILL NOT/NOT BE

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THE SIGNIFICANT IRRITANT IN USSR-USA RELATIONS THAT IT HAS BEEN.

6. IT IS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THE RECENT PROGRESS IN NICARAGUA, AN AREA OF ALMOST OBSESSIVE USA POLITICAL SENSITIVITY, OCCURRED WITHOUT SOVIET PROMPTING OR ACQUIESCENCE. THERE ARE ALSO SOME INDICATIONS THAT THE USSR IS ENCOURAGING ITS VIETNAMESE CLIENT TO DEFUSE THE CAMBODIAN ISSUE. SOVIET SUPPORT FOR AFRICAN CLIENTS, INCREASINGLY VIEWED AS A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC LIABILITY, IS DIMINISHING. FOR ITS PART, THE USA IS CLOSER TO ACCEPTING THE RIGHT OF THE USSR TO PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE IN THE MIDEAST. THE USA ALSO APPEARS TO BE LESSENING ITS OPPOSITION TO SOVIET EFFORTS TO BECOME MORE INTEGRATED IN MULTILATERAL INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS.

HUMAN RIGHTS

7. MORE INTRACTABLE IS THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS, WHICH REFLECTS LONG-ESTABLISHED PHILOSOPHICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN AMERICAN AND SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND STATE. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS REDUCED REPRESSION OR RESTRICTIONS IN SOME AREAS, SUCH AS TRAVEL. GORBACHEV IS SKILLFULLY ORCHESTRATING SOVIET DOMESTIC REFORMS TO DEFUSE THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. BUT DESPITE POSSIBLE SOVIET PUBLIC RELATIONS GESTURES ON JEWISH EMIGRATION OR THE RELEASE OF A NUMBER OF PROMINENT DISSIDENTS, HUMAN RIGHTS WILL CONTINUE TO BE VIEWED BY THE USSR AS AN INTERNAL ISSUE. DESPITE IMPROVEMENTS IN ATMOSPHERE AND THE RESURGENCE OF BILATERAL USSR-USA RELATIONS, THE TWO POWERS WILL

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REMAIN ESSENTIALLY ADVERSARIAL AND COMPETITIVE OVER FUNDAMENTAL SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ISSUES.

PILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

8. THE USSR'S ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE USA ARE MAINLY BASED ON BILATERAL TRADE WHICH, EXCEPT FOR THE GRAIN TRADE, REMAINS AT A RELATIVELY MODEST LEVEL AND DOES NOT/NOT PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN EITHER OF THE ECONOMIES. IN VIEW OF THEIR DESIRE TO MODERNIZE THE SOVIET ECONOMY, THE SOVIET LEADERS WOULD LIKE TO EXPAND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE USA. IN ADDITION TO BOOSTING THE LEVEL OF TRADE, PARTICULARLY IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY WHICH HAS BEEN LIMITED DUE TO USA EFFORTS TO EXTEND AND TO STRENGTHEN COCOM RESTRICTIONS, THE USSR WANTS TO USA TO SET UP JOINT VENTURES IN THE USSR, TO DROP THE JACKSON-VANNIK AMENDMENT WHICH PROHIBITS THE USA GRANTING THE USSR MOST FAVOURED NATIONS STATUS AND BARS EXTENSION OF CREDITS BY THE USA EXPORT-IMPORT BANK TO THE USSR, AND TO REMOVE USA OPPOSITION TO USSR MEMBERSHIP IN THE GATT AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS. THE RECENT IMPROVEMENT IN USSR-USA RELATIONS BRIGHTENS THE PROSPECTS FOR EXPANSION OF USSR-USA ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

OUTLOOK

9. SOVIET DESIRES TO SECURE THE RATIFICATION OF AS MANY TREATIES AS POSSIBLE DURING THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ARE FADING AS THE PROBABILITY OF A BUSH ADMINISTRATION INCREASES AND WITH IT THE

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BELIEF THAT ESTABLISHED POLICIES AND APPROACHES WILL CONTINUE. THE GORBACHEV EFFORT TO REACH ACCOMMODATION WITH THE USA SHOULD SUCCEED AND INDEED RESULT IN A MORE STABLE, PREDICTABLE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THE USSR-USA RELATIONSHIP WILL BE INCREASINGLY BASED, NOT/NOT ON AN UNDEFINED CONCEPT OF DETENTE, BUT ON HARD-HEADED QUOTE REALPOLITIK UNQUOTE WHICH RESPECTS THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE OTHER SIDE. BOTH WILL OPERATE ON A BUSINESSLIKE BASIS IN THE AREAS OF MUTUAL ADVANTAGE, WHILE MAINTAINING FUNDAMENTAL DETERRENCE AND SECURITY CAPABILITIES.

10. WHILE ACD ISSUES WILL CONTINUE TO DOMINATE USSR-USA RELATIONS, NEGOTIATIONS WILL LIKELY BE A SLOW, PAINSTAKING PROCESS, WITH FUTURE AGREEMENTS REACHED ON THE BASIS OF MILITARY AND SECURITY PERCEPTIONS, RATHER THAN ON THE SHORT-TERM NEED FOR POLITICAL THEATRE. EFFECTIVE AGREEMENTS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS, WHICH ARE INCREASINGLY SUSCEPTIBLE TO PROLIFERATION, AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES REDUCTIONS, WHICH ARE ALSO LESS AMENABLE TO PURELY BILATERAL USSR-USA AGREEMENTS, WILL PROVE PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT.

11. THE IMPROVED INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT COULD PROVE TO BE A MIXED BLESSING. SUCCESSIVE USSR-USA AGREEMENTS ON ACD AND ON REGIONAL CONFLICTS, SUCH AS AFGHAN, MAY TEND TO REINFORCE THE SUPERPOWER PENCHANT FOR BILATERALISM AND FOR ESTABLISHING SPHERES OF INTEREST. SUPERPOWER ACCOMMODATION COULD ALSO LEAD TO COORDINATED PRESSURE ON OTHER STATES TO ACCOMMODATE THEMSELVES TO SUPERPOWER INTERESTS.

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RECENT SOVIET INITIATIVES ILLUSTRATE A GROWING TENDENCY TOWARDS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPERPOWER CONDOMINIUMS WHICH ARE ALREADY CREATING CONCERN AMONG A GROWING NUMBER OF COUNTRIES.

CDN IMPLICATIONS

12. A LESSENING OF EAST-WEST TENSIONS AND A POPULAR PERCEPTION OF A DIMINISHING SOVIET THREAT, COUPLED WITH SPECIFIC SOVIET DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES, COULD REINFORCE DOMESTIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST MAINTAINING OR IMPROVING CDAS CONTRIBUTION TO NATO OR CDN DEFENCE IN GENERAL. A GROWING USA TENDENCY TO DEAL WITH THE USSR ON A BILATERAL BASIS AND A CONCOMITANT GROWTH IN WESTERN EUROPEAN COHESION WOULD LIMIT CDAS HISTORIC POSITION AND OPTIONS WITHIN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. CDA WOULD BE INCREASINGLY FORCED TO SIDE WITH EITHER THE USA OR THE WESTERN EUROPEAN POSITIONS OR, ALTERNATIVELY, RISK ISOLATION FROM THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS, THEREBY LOSING SOME OF ITS ABILITY TO INFLUENCE DECISIONS AFFECTING NATIONAL INTERESTS. UNQUOTE.

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External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

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	---SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MEETING: SOVIET PERSPECTIVE		
	ON 06APR, AMBASSADOR RODIONOV CALLED ON RBD TO DELIVER		
	SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF LATEST MTG BETWEEN USA SEC OF STATE		
	SHULTZ AND SOVIET FORMIN SHEVARDNADZE. TALKS IN WSHDC DEALT		
	WITH FOUR MAIN TOPICS: ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, REGIONAL		
	CONFLICTS, BILATERAL MATTERS AND HUMAN RIGHTS. ACCORDING		
	TO RODIONOV, PROGRESS WAS ACHIEVED ON ALL POINTS AND THERE		
	WAS A GREATER UNDERSTANDING ON WHERE TO MOVE AND ON WHAT		
	TO FOCUS IN FUTURE DISCUSSIONS. AMB HANDED RBD A TEXT OF		
	THE SOVIET ASSESSMENT (BEING FORWARDED BY BAG TO SELECTED		
	ADDRESSEES) AND ALSO PROVIDED BRIEF ORAL SUMMARY.		
	2. ARMS CONTROL: SOVIETS STILL BELIEVE IT IS POSSIBLE TO		
	HAVE AN AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS READY FOR		
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SIGNING DURING FORTHCOMING REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT QUOTE
IF POLITICAL WILL IS DISPLAYED UNQUOTE. HOWEVER, SOVIETS
BELIEVE USA HAS NOT/NOT YET MADE VITAL POLITICAL DECISION
ON AN EARLY SIGNING OF SUCH AN AGREEMENT. WHILE USSR REMAINS
READY TO SIGN DURING REAGANS VISIT TO MOSCO, THEY ARE ALSO
WILLING TO SIGN AT A LATER DATE (IE, JULY OR AUGUST) IF
IT CANNOT/NOT BE DONE AT MOSCO SUMMIT.

3. TWO MAIN OBSTACLES TO AGREEMENT REMAIN A) DISAGREEMENT
OVER OBSERVANCE OF ABM TREATY, AND B) SLCM S, WHICH SOVIETS
VIEW AS FIRST STRIKE WEAPONS AND QUOTE VERY DANGEROUS
UNQUOTE. ON CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE,
RODIONOV SAID USA WAS UNPREPARED TO DISCUSS SOVIET PROPOSALS
DEALING WITH SEPARATE TYPES OF ARMS AND QUOTE CONCRETE
REGIONS OF EUROPE FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS UNQUOTE. ON
C/W, THERE REMAIN CERTAIN QUOTE UNACCEPTABLE ELEMENTS
UNQUOTE WITH THE KEY AREAS OF DISPUTE BEING THE USA BINARY
PROGRAM AND ISSUES RELATED TO INSPECTIONS WITHOUT RIGHT
OF REJECTION. DISCUSSIONS REGARDING REDUCTION OF NAVAL
FORCES GLOBALLY WERE VIEWED BY USA QUOTE WITHOUT ENTHUSIASM
UNQUOTE.

4. REGIONAL CONFLICTS: TALKS COVERED ALL MAJOR REGIONAL
CONFLICTS, INCLUDING AFGHANISTAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, SOUTH

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AFRICA, THE MIDEAST AND KAMPUCHEA. BOTH SIDES EXCHANGED
VIEWS, ENUNCIATED PRIORITIES AND EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO
FIND POINTS OF CONVERGENCE TO EASE THESE CONFLICTS. BUT
USA POSITION LED SOVIETS TO CONCLUDE THAT USA IS NOT/NOT
IN A POSITION TO PLAY THE ROLE OF QUOTE HONEST BROKER
UNQUOTE.

5. HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION: ACCORDING TO SUMMARY LEFT BY
RODIONOV, TOPIC WAS DISCUSSED AT INITIATIVE OF SOVIET SIDE
AND WAS MORE CONSTRUCTIVE THAN PREVIOUS SESSIONS WHICH
HAD BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY SOME POLEMICS AND A RELUCTANCE
BY USA TO DISCUSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
IN USA. REAGAN AND SHULTZ RAISED A FEW SPECIFIC CASES WITH
SHEVARDNADZE, PRIMARILY DEALING WITH EMIGRATION FROM THE
USSR. SHEVARDNADZE PROMISED APPEALS WOULD BE EXAMINED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SOVIET LAWS.

6. BILAT RELATS: NO/NO DETAILS WERE PROVIDED OTHER THAN
AN EXPRESSION OF SOVIET BELIEF THAT MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL
AGREEMENTS AND ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE WORKED OUT QUOTE
IN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME UNQUOTE.

7. IN DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWED AMBS SUMMARY, RODIONOV
AGREED WITH RBDS ASSESSMENT THAT SOVIET REPORT ON LATEST
ROUND OF SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE TALKS WAS LESS OPTIMISTIC

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THAN THAT OF EARLIER MTGS. NEVERTHELESS IT REFLECTED A
VERY SERIOUS APPROACH BY BOTH SIDES ON FULL RANGE OF ISSUES
WITH HAPPY ABSENCE OF RHETORIC.

8. IN CLOSING, RBD THANKED RODIONOV FOR PROVIDING ASSESSMENT
WHICH WAS IMPORTANT FOR CANADA IN WEIGHING OUTCOME OF
MEETING AS ASSESSED BY BOTH SUPERPOWERS. IN THIS REGARD
WE COULD NOT/NOT BUT ENCOURAGE THAT THE SOVIET PRACTICE
OF PROVIDING SUCH ASSESSMENTS SHOULD CONTINUE. FACT THAT
MOSCO SUMMIT WOULD PROCEED WITH OR WITHOUT START TREATY
WAS IMPORTANT BUT SET DATES MIGHT NEVERTHELESS PROVIDE
USEFUL STIMULUS TO NEGOTIATORS. AT SAME TIME, IT WAS ACKNOWLEDGED
THAT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT TO HAVE A SOUND AGMT LATER
THAN AN INADEQUATE AGMT DESIGNED LARGELY TO MEET A SET
DEADLINE. AMB AGREED.

The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder

No. 645

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April 11, 1988

RETURN TO RENVOYER AU	FOR FILING PORTER AU DOSSIER	
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WILL THE STATE DEPARTMENT FORCE SOVIET POWS BACK TO THE USSR?

INTRODUCTION

An ugly shadow darkens the pending multinational negotiations over Soviet troops in Afghanistan — the possible forced repatriation to the USSR of the 250 Soviet troops who have defected to the Afghan Freedom Fighters. Moscow before has demanded and obtained the return to the Soviet Union of its soldiers who desperately wanted to remain abroad. If the Soviets are trying to obtain this again, as part of a general peace settlement in Afghanistan, the United States should oppose them. Since it appears that the State Department is considering supporting the Moscow position on the POWs, Ronald Reagan should order the Department not to acquiesce in any such agreement.

The primary parties concerned in the Afghan peace talks are the U.S., Pakistan, the United Nations, the Soviet Union and its puppet regime in Kabul, and the seven-pronged *mujahideen*, a 200,000-man collection of anti-communist Muslim resistance forces.

Bowing to Soviet Demands. At present, after ravaging Afghanistan for approximately a decade, the Soviet Union has stated its willingness to withdraw its 115,000 strong invading force over nine months. But crucial sticking points remain. The Soviet Union, for example, demands that all foreign aid to the popular *mujahideen* Freedom Fighters be terminated before withdrawal commences, while insisting on its right to continue its massive military and economic support for its surrogates in Kabul. Additionally, over the strong objections of Pakistan and the *mujahideen*, the Soviet Union has refused to replace the Kabul dictatorship with an interim coalition government to ensure a peaceful repatriation of some 5 million Afghan civilian refugees currently suffering in Pakistan and Iran.

To encourage some flexibility in the Soviet negotiating posture, the State Department is contemplating pressing the *mujahideen* to bow to Soviet demands to forcibly repatriate all of the 250 Soviet POWs held by the *mujahideen*. Those State Department officials contemplating this should be ordered to stop. Forcible repatriation of Soviet POWs would violate international treaties, longstanding custom, and respect for human life and liberty. It

would be a personal tragedy for the former Soviet soldiers. The State Department instead should offer the U.S. as a sanctuary for Soviet POWs, who could then seek immigration as refugees, and urge the *mujahideen* to resist Soviet demands for a return of all its POWs if the former wishes to receive the Afghan POWs when the hostilities cease.

There is no excuse for a reprise of the shameful Miroslav Medvid affair. In 1986, the U.S. immigration service and State Department forcibly returned Soviet seaman Medvid to Soviet authorities after he had fled his ship in U.S. waters. Despite assurances that Medvid would be treated well, it is now widely believed that he is seriously ill — or even dead — from massive doses of powerful drugs administered by the Soviets to prevent further escape attempts.

POWS: PAST TREATMENT

Historically, warring nations eschewed forced repatriations of POWs. This was because forced repatriation could discourage desertion in future wars. Nations found it in their interest to encourage desertions by their adversaries during wartime.

Examples: The Versailles Treaty of 1919, which officially ended World War I, inveighed against the forcible repatriation of POWs. The repatriation treaty of April 19, 1920, between Germany and the Soviet Union declared, "Prisoners of War and interned civilians of both sides are to be repatriated in all cases where they themselves desire it."

The venerable European tradition against forcible repatriation of civilians or soldiers whose return to their native countries might endanger their life or liberty was initially ruptured in the 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact, which insured Soviet support for Hitler when he attacked Poland, France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, and Great Britain. An unpublished clause in that agreement provided for the exchange of political dissidents or prisoners detained in the other's territory.

"Marched Off to Unknown Destinations." During and immediately after World War II, Britain and the U.S. gave in to Stalin's demands and forced the repatriation to the Soviet Union of millions of Soviet POWs who had surrendered to or fled to the Germans. Upon returning home, all these POWs were either summarily executed or otherwise harshly punished.¹ U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Averill Harriman confirmed the brutal treatment administered by the Soviets to forced returnees in a report to the State Department on June 11, 1945.

It is known that repatriates are met at ports of entry by police guard and marched off to unknown destinations....It is quite possible that persons considered guilty of deliberate desertion or anti-state activity are being shot, while some few with good war records who have been captured when severely wounded or under similar circumstances and have refused service with Germans may be released to return home. Great bulk of

¹ See Nikolai Tolstoy, *The Secret Betrayal, 1944-47* (New York: Scribners, 1977).

repatriates, however, are probably being placed in force labor battalions and used in construction projects in Urals, Central Asia, Siberia or Far North under police supervision.

When the sorry story of forcible repatriation of Soviet POWs was widely publicized through the research and writings of Nikolai Tolstoy, Nicholas Bethell, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, and others, the Prime Minister of Great Britain during the war, Winston Churchill, was harshly criticized. The *Times* of London, the *New York Times*, and the *Washington Post* all carried stories revealing the callous forcible repatriation. A Solzhenitsyn publication criticized both Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt for accepting forcible return of Soviet POWs.

Churchill tacitly conceded his guilt in 1952 when he wrote to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden on the fate of Chinese POWs in South Korea: "It is a matter of honour to us not to force a non-Communist prisoner-of-war to go back, to be murdered in Communist China. This is not a matter of argument, but one of fundamental principles for which we fight and, if necessary, die."

SOVIET INTERESTS AND THE POWS

The Soviet Union is exceptionally vulnerable to disloyalty by its troops because of its oppressive treatment of non-Great Russian nationalities and their religious creeds. During World War II, Ukrainians deserted *en masse* to invading Nazi forces because of hatred for the Soviet Union. Fearing disloyalty from troops sympathetic to Catholicism prevalent in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union in 1968 crushed the "Prague Spring" with soldiers recruited from east of the Ural Mountains. In Afghanistan, Muslim soldiers in the Red Army are largely relegated to supply and logistics tasks far from the front-line fighting against the *mujahideen*. This back-seat deployment of Muslims confirms Soviet fears of military desertion.

PRISONER OF WAR CONVENTION

Dissatisfaction with the treatment of POWs during World War II prompted the 1949 Geneva Prisoner of War Convention, ratified by the U.S. in 1955. Moscow probably will invoke Article 118 of the Convention to justify forcible repatriation of its 250 POWs held by the *mujahideen*. This Article provides: "Prisoners shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of hostilities."

But from its inception, Article 118 has been interpreted as prohibiting involuntary repatriation of POWs. During the Korean War Armistice negotiations, for instance, some 22,000 North Korean and Chinese soldiers detained by the United Nations Command did not want to return home; they instead said that they wanted to waive their POW repatriation rights under Article 118. Article 7 of the Convention, which prohibits waiver of rights by POWs, was invoked by North Korea and China to argue in favor of repatriation under Article 118 on the theory that the POW rights it confers could not be disclaimed.

U.N. General Assembly Resolution. The U.N. Command and the U.S. insisted, however, that no POW would "be repatriated by force" or be "coerced or intimidated in any way." This position did not offend Article 118, the U.S. and U.N. argued, because it should be interpreted in light of conventional and customary international law, and in conformity with moral postulates safeguarding individual freedom. These legal doctrines rejected involuntary repatriation of POWs, and nothing in the purpose or history of Article 118 suggested an intent that it override this longstanding centerpiece of international relations.

The U.S. and U.N. arguments ultimately were accepted by all parties to the Korean War Armistice talks. On December 3, 1952, a U.N. General Assembly resolution affirmed "that force shall not be used against prisoners of war to prevent or effect their return to their homeland."² In furtherance of the resolution, the U.N. placed thousands of North Korean and Chinese POWs in the temporary custody of neutral powers, for resettlement or relocation to the extent possible as they wished.

POWS AND AFGHANISTAN

The Afghan *mujahideen* hold approximately 250 Soviet POWs. Six Soviet military defectors have received asylum in the U.S. since hostilities commenced. More want asylum. Senator Gordon Humphrey, the New Hampshire Republican, presented to the White House and State Department the names of eighteen Soviet defectors who do not want repatriation but want to resettle in the U.S. Ludmilla Thorne, a Freedom House specialist in the Soviet Union, similarly has given U.S. officials notes and letters from Soviet POWs begging for asylum. One letter from a young Ukrainian to Ronald Reagan says:

What I saw in Afghanistan turned my brains inside out. I did not participate in combat operations, but what I saw was enough for me to understand...beginning with the zinc coffins and ending with the cynical stories told by Soviet pilots...I had two choices, either to close my eyes and pay no attention to everything that was happening around me...or to leave...I did not desert because I wanted a pair of American blue jeans — I had them in the Soviet Union. But I left because I did not want people to refer to me as a "Russian Fascist"...I appeal to you that you grant me political asylum in the United States.

If Washington remains silent or indifferent to the issue of forcible repatriation, the *mujahideen* may well give Moscow what it wants.

POWS AND U.S. POLICY

The U.S. should declare the Soviet POWs as refugees. A U.N. Convention defines a refugee as "[a]ny person who, owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons

2 U.N. Doc. No. A/Res./18/VII 1952); Dept. State Bull. 702 (1952).

of...religion or...political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality," and owing to such fear is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.

Based on Soviet maltreatment of its POWs in World War II, a Soviet POW held by the *mujahideen* would possess a well-founded fear of persecution for political opinion if repatriated. Under the Soviet dictatorship, all actions of individuals are political statements. To desert the military is to express opposition to the political tyranny in the Soviet Union.

13-Year Prison Sentence. In the Soviet Union, to prosecute deserters is to persecute for political opinion. One Soviet soldier, Nikolay Ryzhkovy, returned to the USSR after he was urged to do so by Soviet KGB agents in New York. He is now serving a 13-year "strict regime" prison camp sentence in Mordovia. Soviet deserters held by the *mujahideen* would in fact be persecuted for political opinion under the false banner of desertion if repatriated. Thus, they are legally entitled to refugee status under international law.

In addition to morality, practical considerations also call for a strong U.S. policy in support of Soviet POWs. The threat of involuntary repatriation would daunt most would-be deserters from the Soviet Red Army.

The State Department should thus urge the *mujahideen* to recognize Soviet POWs as refugees under international law if the latter so claim. Further, the Department should voice its willingness to accept these POWs as refugee immigrants under the Refugee Act of 1980. The Act's definition of refugee generally echoes that of the U.N. Convention, and authorizes the President to admit refugees in numbers justified by humanitarian concerns or the national interest.³

CONCLUSION

Sergei Busov, a former Red Army deserter in Afghanistan, wrote Reagan from Canada in 1986 describing the situation of many Soviet POWs who remain in Afghanistan:

We have spent many sleepless, anxious nights together with the *mujahideen*...we have shared the last crumbs of bread and the last drops of water....Is it possible that after all of this, my friends and I are destined to live a life of anguish and suffering, without freedom? Can it be, that this is all we deserve?

In response to this, Representative Don Ritter, the Pennsylvania Republican, has introduced H.Con.Res. 169. It so far has 64 cosponsors. This resolution expresses the sense of the Congress that "Soviet defectors and prisoners of war in Afghanistan who request political asylum and are eligible under United States law should be granted political asylum and be transported to the United States by the proper agencies of the United States Government."

³ See 8 U.S. Code 1101(a)(42), 1157.

Experience has taught that Soviet malevolence will greet Soviet defectors and POWs. Ronald Reagan and George Shultz should not repeat the mistake of Winston Churchill in believing otherwise, or in neglecting incentives for Soviet deserters. Nor should the State Department tolerate any repetition of the Medvid fiasco by indulging a possibility of Soviet benevolence toward soldiers who by action or word criticize the regime.

Bruce E. Fein
Visiting Fellow

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URR-0572

The Rt. Hon. Joe Clark, P.C., M.P.
Secretary of State for External Affairs



Le très hon. Joe Clark, C.P., député
Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures

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Excellency:

I wish to thank you for drawing my attention to the speech given by Secretary of State Shultz on February 5 on the theme of U.S.-Soviet relations.

The themes addressed by the Secretary are those which preoccupy the Alliance as a whole and the issues he raises are issues the Alliance should seek to address. The NATO Heads of Government meeting held in Brussels March 2-3, 1988 offered an opportunity to do so.

We followed closely Secretary Shultz' recent visit to Moscow and were encouraged by the wide range of issues covered.

I look forward to reviewing these matters with the Secretary on the occasion of our next bilateral meeting. The forthcoming meeting in Washington between the Prime Minister and President Reagan will also be the occasion to review the East/West and Arms Control agenda.

Yours sincerely,

Original signed by: MINISTER
Original signé par: JOE CLARK

His Excellency
The Honorable Thomas M.T. Niles
Ambassador of the United States of America
100 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1P 5T1

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---SHULZ/SHEVARDNADZE MTG:HUMAN RIGHTS

SUMMARY:ASST SECTY SCHIFTER SPOKE TO NATO EMB REPS FOLLOWING LATEST
ROUND OF SOVIET/USA TALKS TO BRIEF ON USA/SOVIET TALKS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS.

2.SCHIFTER EMPHASIZED THAT TALKS WERE ONLY DESIGNATED TO EXCHANGE
THOUGHTS,NOT/NOT TO PREPARE DOCUMENTS.HE ALSO NOTED THAT ARMS
CONTROL AND HUMAN RIGHTS ARE NOT/NOT LINKED,BUT SOVIETS ARE AWARE
THAT IF THEY ARE NOT/NOT ACCOMMODATING TO SOME EXTENT ON HUMAN
RIGHTS,THEN PROSPECTS FOR SENATE APPROVAL OF AN ARMS CONTROL AGMT
COULD BE AFFECTED.THIS IS IN CONTRAST TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC
COOP WHICH ARE DIRECTLY LINKED BY JACKSON-VANIK AM NDMENT.SOVIETS
HAVE NOT/NOT RAISED THIS ISSUE.

3.HUMAN RIGHTS DISCUSSIONS FOCUSSED ON FOUR TOPICS (A)ABUSE OF
PSYCHIATRY;(B)NATIONAL AND INTL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS;
(C)CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND (D)FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION.

SHIFTER SAID THAT SOVIETS HAVE TAKEN SOME STEPS WHICH COULD LEAD TO
REDUCTION IN ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY,AND SOME SOVIET SPOKESMAN ADMIT
THAT THIS IS A PROBLEM.ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION SOVIETS SAID THAT
THERE IS A GROWING RECOGNITION THAT COMMUNISM AND ATHEISM CAN

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NOTION
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COEXIST WITH QUOTE OTHER UNQUOTE RELIGIONS AND THAT NEXT STEP IS TO ENFORCE LAWS PERMITTING FREEDOM OF RELIGION.

4.REPORT: SCHIFTER NOTED THAT SOVIET DEL HAD BEEN DIVIDED BETWEEN MFA SPOKESMAN WHO WAS CANDID IN HIS ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET PROBLEMS, AND OTHER MEMBERS OF SOVIET DEL WHO CLEARLY HAD RETAINED TRADITIONAL VIEWS.

5.SOVIETS HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO CONTROL ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY USA WAS TOLD.THE DIRECTION OF SPECIAL PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES HAS BEEN MOVED FROM MIN OF INTERIOR TO MIN HEALTH.A STATUTE HAS BEEN PASSED MAKING IT AN OFFENCE TO COMMIT A PERSON TO A MENTAL INSTITUTION KNOWING HE IS NOT/NOT MENTALLY ILL.MEMBERS OF THE FAMILY ARE PERMITTED TO PETITION A COURT TO OBTAIN JUDICIAL REVIEW.USA NOTED WRILY THAT IN REPORTING ON POLITICAL PRISONERS,SOVIET MFA LISTS SUCH PERSONS IN THE SAME BOX AS PERSONS COMMITTED TO PSYCHIATRIC INSTITUTIONS.

6.SOVIETS HAVE AGREED TO MTG OF USA AND SOVIET PSYCHIATRISTS IN MOSCO DURING NEXT SOVIET/USA MTGON HUMAN RIGHTS ON 18APR.THE USA PSYCHIATRISTS AIM IS MUTUAL VISITS AND DISCUSSION OF SPECIFIC CASES.

7.ON FREEDOM OF RELIGION,SOVIETS ADMITTED THEIR LAWS PERMITTING SUCH FREEDOM WERE NOT/NOT BEING ENFORCED,AND SAID THAT THIS WAS BEING CORRECTED.MFA SPOKESMEN ADMITTED THAT PARTICULARLY IN REMOTE REGIONS THE RIGHT OF BELIEVERS TO PETITION TO FORM A CHURCH IS DISREGARDED CITING SOVIET PROVERB QUOTE GOD IS IN HEAVEN AND CZAR IS FAR AWAY UNQUOTE.HOWEVER SOVIETS WERE UNFORTHCOMING ON ISSUE OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION OUTSIDE THE HOME AND ON THE PROHIBITION ON THE

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UKRANIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

S.SCHIFTER CONCLUDED THAT TALKS WERE EXPERIMENTAL, THAT HE DID NOT/NOT KNOW WHERE THEY MIGHT LEAD, THAT USA WILL KEEP UP THE PRESSURE AND THAT AIM IS TO REACH SOVIET BUREAUCRATS WORKING ON ISSUES WHICH USA IS CONCERNED ABOUT AND SOVIETS NO SAY THEY ARE COMMITTED TO. HE EMPHASIZED THAT TALKS WERE STRUCTURED SO AS NOT/NOT TO UNDERMINE HELSINKI PROCESS.

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---SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE TALKS-REGIONAL ISSUES

SUMMARY: DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES DURING SEULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE

TALKS HERE THIS WEEK FOCUSSED ESPECIALLY ON AFGHANISTAN.USA

INDICATED IT WAS UNWILLING TO BE GUARANTOR OF AGREEMENT UNLESS

SOVIETS ACCEPTED MORATORIUM ON PROVISION OF ARMS TO PDPA.

SOVIETS REFUSED AND INDICATED THEY WOULD EXPLORE OTHER OPTIONS

FOR WITHDRAWAL.ON GULF WAR USA TOLD SOVIETS IT INTENDED TO

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FORCE VOTE ON ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION IF U.N. SEC GENS CURRENT EFFORTS TO SECURE COMPLIANCE WITH RES 598 ARE UNSUCCESSFUL.

2. REPORT: BRIEFING BY ASST SECTY RIDGEWAY ON REGIONAL ISSUES COVERED AFGHANISTAN, SOUTHERN AFRICA, MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, GULF WAR AND NICARAGUA.

3. AFGHANISTAN: DISCUSSIONS ON AFGHANISTAN WERE INTENSE, BEGINNING MONDAY NIGHT BY SENIOR OFFICIALS CONTINUING THROUGH TUESDAY AND BEING ADDRESSED BY TWO MINISTERS ON WEDNESDAY.

4. USA MADE CLEAR TO SOVIETS THAT IT WELCOMED THEIR INTENTION TO WITHDRAW AND THAT FRONT-LOADING OF TROOP PULLOUT PROVIDED BASIS FOR AGMT. WSHDC, HOWEVER, TOOK POSITION THAT THERE SHOULD BE A CLEAR BALANCE OF OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN THE GUARANTORS AND THAT CONDITIONS WOULD HAVE TO DEVELOP WHICH WOULD ALLOW REFUGEES TO RETURN TO AFGHANISTAN. USA THEREFORE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT BOTH GUARANTORS AGREE TO A MORATORIUM ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR THE PERIOD OF WITHDRAWAL AND THREE MONTHS THEREAFTER.

5. SOVIETS ARGUED THAT THEY HAD LEGAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS GOING BACK TO 1923 AND THEREFORE COULD NOT/NOT AGREE TO MORATORIUM. USA INDICATED THAT IN THAT CASE IT WAS UNWILLING TO BE GUARANTOR OF GENEVA ACCORD.

6. QUESTION OF AN INTERIM GOVT WAS NOT/NOT DISCUSSED AS IT HAS BEEN OVERTAKEN BY CORDOVEZS AGMT TO WORK IN A PERSONAL CAPACITY

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WITH AFGHANS TO HELP THEM SETTLE INTERNAL PROBLEMS. THIS ALSO,
ACCORDING TO RIDGEWAY SEEMED TO RESPOND TO PAKISTANS CONCERNS.

7. SOVIETS SAID THEY INTENDED TO WITHDRAW WHETHER OR NOT/NOT AGMT
WAS REACHED AT GENEV. THEY WOULD PREFER TO HAVE USA AS A
GUARANTOR BUT IF IT WOULD NOT/NOT JOIN, THERE WERE OTHER OPTIONS
USSR COULD FOLLOW. THESE WERE NOT/NOT DISCUSSED WITH USA SIDE
BUT PRESUMABLY WILL BE RAISED BY SOVIETS WITH AFGHANS.

8. SOUTHERN AFRICA ESPECIALLY ANGOLA WAS DISCUSSED BY SENIOR
OFFICIALS AND REVIEWED BY MINISTERS. BOTH SIDES AGREED TO KEEP IN
TOUCH BUT THERE WERE NO/NO SIGNIFICANT NEW DEVELOPMENTS.

9. ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS DISCUSSIONS UNCOVERED FUNDAMENTAL
DIFFERENCES IN APPROACH ESPECIALLY ON QUESTION OF POWERS OF
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. USA EXPRESSED PREFERENCE FOR DIRECT
BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. POLIAKOV STAYED ON, HOWEVER, AFTER
SHEVARDNEZES DEPARTURE FOR FURTHER INTENSIVE TALKS ON ISSUE
WITH ASST SECY MURPHY. USA SUGGESTING THIS INDICATES REAL
SOVIET INTEREST IN EXPLORING FURTHER POSSIBILITIES FOR
COOPERATION WITH USA EFFORT. (READOUT ON POLIAKOV/MURPHY TALKS
NOT YET AVAILABLE).

10. GULF WAR: SHEVARDNADZE IN PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS APPEARED TO
INDICATE THAT SOVIETS WOULD BE PREPARED TO TAKE STRONG ACTION IN
THE EVENT THAT MTGS OF UN SECY GEN WITH IRAQIS AND IRANIANS ON

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4TH AND 5TH APRIL DONT PRODUCE A DEFINITE COMMITMENT TO
RESOLUTION 598.WHEN USA ENDEAVOURED TO PLACE THIS IN JOINT
STATEMENT,HOWEVER,SOVIETS INSISTED IT BE TAKEN OUT ON GROUNDS
IT WENT TOO FAR.SECTY SHULTZ TOLD SHEVARDNADZE THAT IF SECTY
GENERALS EFFORTS WERE UNSATISFACTORY,THE USA WILL BRING
ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION TO A VOTE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

11.CENTRAL AMERICA:USA INDICATED THAT ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT/NOT
ADMINS POLICY,LETHAL AID HAD BEEN ENDED TO CONTRAS.WHEN
SOVIETS WERE REMINDED OF THEIR OFFER TO REDUCE MILITARY SUPPLIES TO
NICARAGUA TO POLICE ARMS AND OTHER SMALL ARMS,THEY RESPONDED
THAT THEIR PROPOSAL WAS NOT/NOT LIMITED TO USA ENDING LETHAL
SUPPORT TO CONTRAS.THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE RECIPROCITY
CONCERNING OTHER CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES.USA DECLINED TO
FOLLOW UP ON APPROACH WHICH THEY HELD WOULD LEAD TO SOVIETS
BECOMING INVOLVED IN CENTRAL AMERICAL SECURITY POLICY.

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Attached for your
information is copy of U.S.
briefing notes prepared for
the Shultz/Shevardnadze
bilateral.

The document was passed
to us in confidence and is
classified SECRET.

John J. Noble/URD
U.S. Relations Bureau

March 24, 1988

BRIEFING ALLIES ON U.S.-SOVIET MINISTERIALINTRODUCTION

- A TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF WORK TOOK PLACE DURING THE MINISTERIAL.
- WE WRESTLED WITH SUCH TOUGH ISSUES AS NUCLEAR ARMS, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND AFGHANISTAN, AND THE GOING WAS TOUGH.
- WE ACHIEVED GREATER CLARITY ON SOME ISSUES AND CONCRETE PROGRESS IN A FEW.
- WE ALSO AGREED ON SUMMIT DATES -- MAY 29 TO JUNE 2 I MOSCOW.
- ALL IN ALL, THE MEETINGS THIS WEEK MOVED THINGS ALONG
- NOT AS FAR AS WE WOULD HAVE LIKED, BUT THERE'S A LOT IN MOTION IN ALL FOUR AREAS OF THE AGENDA.
- THE SECRETARY WILL MEET WITH SHEVARDNADZE IN MOSCOW NEXT MONTH (APRIL 21-24). THE TWO SIDES ALSO AGREED THERE WOULD BE A MAY MEETING, PROBABLY AROUND THE MIDDLE OF THE MONTH.

SUMMIT

- THE PRESIDENT WILL BE IN THE SOVIET UNION FROM MAY 2 TO JUNE 2.
- SHEVARDNADZE EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE THE SOVIET UNION ATTACHES TO THE VISIT.
- THE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT WE WANT A GOOD MEETING THAT DEALS WITH THE FULL SCOPE OF ISSUES.
- WE ANTICIPATE A SERIES OF SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS WITH THE GENERAL SECRETARY AND OTHER SOVIET LEADERS, AND THE PRESIDENT VERY MUCH LOOKS FORWARD TO CONTACTS WITH SOVIET CITIZENS AND YOUTH.
- SPECIFIC PLANS STILL NEED TO BE WORKED OUT. THE U.S. SITE SURVEY TEAM WILL BE IN MOSCOW THE WEEK OF MARCH 23

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S E C R E T

HUMAN RIGHTS

-- THIS SUBJECT OCCUPIED A GOOD DEAL OF THE TIME. IT WAS THE LEAD ITEM IN THE SECRETARY'S FIRST MEETING, AND IN THE PRESIDENT'S PRIVATE SESSION, WITH SHEVARDNADZE.

-- SHEVARDNADZE DESCRIBED THINGS THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT LOOKING INTO THAT MIGHT HELP WITH SOME OF OUR CONCERNS ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS.

-- FOR INSTANCE, HE SAID, A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT IS BEING GIVEN TO CHANGES IN TREATMENT OF RELIGIOUS OBSERVERS, VISA POLICY, THE NATIONALITIES QUESTION, TRADE UNION RIGHTS.

-- WHAT MATTERS FOR US, OF COURSE, IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION DELIVER ON THE EXPECTATIONS IT IS RAISING.

-- THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT WE SAW NO REASON WHY THE SOVIET UNION COULD NOT RESOLVE ENTIRELY THE CATEGORIES

HUMAN RIGHTS CASES WE HAVE RAISED, SUCH AS DIVIDED SPOUSES, AND RELEASE OF PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE.

-- WE WELCOMED THE PROGRESS WE HAVE SEEN ON GERMAN ETHNIC EMIGRATION AND ARMENIAN EMIGRATION. WE ALSO NOTED THAT VISAS FOR VISITS TO RELATIVES IN THE U.S. HAVE INCREASED

-- BUT AT THE SAME TIME WE STRESSED OUR CONCERN THAT JEWISH EMIGRATION SEEMS TO HAVE REACHED A PLATEAU; THERE ARE MANY MORE WHO WANT TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION.

-- THE DISCUSSIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS ARE CONTINUING -- ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHIFTER WILL MEET AGAIN THIS WEEK FOR A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION WITH SOVIET EXPERTS. THE MEETINGS ARE OCCURRING IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE MINISTERIAL BUT WE VIEW THEM AS SEPARATE, UNIQUE EVENTS

-- SHEVARDNADZE ALSO HAD A LONG LIST OF ISSUES TO RAISE REGARDING THE U.S. (E.G., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT FOR MINORS RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, VISAS FOR SOVIET TRADE UNION MEMBERS).

S E C R E T

BILATERAL AFFAIRS

-- THERE IS A LOT OF WORK UNDERWAY IN THIS AREA ON SUCH THINGS AS COOPERATIVE EXCHANGES, ECONOMIC ISSUES, AND LIVING AND WORKING CONDITIONS FOR OUR DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS.

-- FOR INSTANCE, COMMERCE SECRETARY VERITY WILL BE GOING TO MOSCOW IN APRIL FOR A MEETING OF THE JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION.

-- WE LOOKED WHERE TO GIVE A SPECIAL IMPULSE IN THE WEEK AHEAD, AND THOUGHT A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS LOOKED PARTICULARLY PROMISING: TRANSPORTATION, BASIC SCIENCES, FISHERIES, MARITIME SEARCH AND RESCUE.

-- WE REVIEWED WORK ON CULTURAL EXCHANGES, AND PROPOSED ESTABLISHMENT OF CULTURAL CENTERS IN WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS.

ARMS CONTROL

NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS

-- THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER, AS WELL AS THE ARMS CONTROL EXPERTS GROUP, THOROUGHLY REVIEWED THE MAJOR OUTSTANDING ISSUES IN THE START AND DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATIONS.

-- IN THE START AREA, BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE DEVELOPMENT BY THE GENEVA DELEGATIONS OF JOINT DRAFT TEXTS OF THE THREE VERIFICATION DOCUMENTS -- THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL, THE PROTOCOL ON CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION, AND THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING -- WAS

S E C R E T

GOOD STEP.

- WE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT MANY BRACKETS REFLECTING DISAGREEMENTS REMAIN IN THESE DOCUMENTS AND THUS MUCH WORK REMAINS TO BE DONE IN THIS CRUCIAL VERIFICATION AREA.

-- TO FACILITATE OUR EFFORTS TO DESIGN AN EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION REGIME, WE REITERATED A PROPOSAL WE MADE LAST MONTH IN MOSCOW TO CONDUCT AN EARLY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION AND DATA.

-- THIS WOULD HELP US DEVELOP AND TAILOR VERIFICATION MEASURES FOR EACH CATEGORY OF SYSTEM SUBJECT TO START PROVISIONS. THE SOVIETS WERE NONCOMMITTAL ON THIS IDEA.

-- THE START DISCUSSION ALSO COVERED COUNTING RULES AND DEFINITIONS FOR AIR-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES, OUR PROPOSED SUBLIMIT ON ICBM WARHEADS, THE DIFFICULTIES OF VERIFYING SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES, THE COMPLEXITIES OF VERIFYING MOBILE ICBMS, AND QUALITATIVE LIMITS ON HEAVY ICBMS.

-- ON ALCMS, WE HAVE FOUR ISSUES: HOW TO ENSURE THAT CONVENTIONAL ALCMS ARE NOT CONSTRAINED, THE RANGE AT WHICH ALCMS BECOME "LONG-RANGE" AND THUS SUBJECT TO START LIMITS, THE NUMBER OF ALCMS THAT WOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO EACH TYPE OF BOMBER, AND THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A SUBLIMIT OF 1100 ON HEAVY BOMBER WEAPONS.

-- WE OFFERED THE SOVIETS A COMPROMISE PACKAGE ON THESE ISSUES, AS FOLLOWS:

-- CONVENTIONAL ALCMS WOULD NOT BE CONSTRAINED.

S E C R E T

-- IN THIS CONTEXT, WE COULD CONSIDER RANGES FOR "LONG-RANGE" ALCMS SOMEWHAT LOWER THAN OUR PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED 1500 KM.

-- EACH HEAVY BOMBER EQUIPPED TO CARRY ALCMS WOULD ATTRIBUTED WITH 10 ALCMS, RATHER THAN THE 6 WE HAD PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED. THIS REPRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT STEP ON OUR PART.

-- THE 1100 SUBLIMIT ON HEAVY BOMBER WEAPONS WOULD DROPPED.

-- THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO INSIST THAT THE RANGE FOR LONG-RANGE ALCMS SHOULD BE 600 KM, AND PROPOSED THAT HEAVY BOMBERS BE ATTRIBUTED WITH THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF ALCMS THEY COULD CARRY. THE SOVIETS ALLEGED THAT THIS NUMBER WOULD BE 28 FOR B-52S AND 22 FOR B-1BS.

-- IF WE WOULD AGREE TO THESE ELEMENTS, THEY WOULD DROP THEIR 1100 SUBLIMIT.

-- SO WE REMAIN SOME DISTANCE APART ON ALCMS.

-- ON ICBM WARHEADS, WE REEMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO A SUBLIMIT OF 3300, AND, NOTING THAT ALEXANDER HAD TOLD US THAT THE USSR WOULD NOT EXCEED SUCH A LEVEL IF THERE IS A START AGREEMENT, SAID WE ARE PREPARED TO CONSIDER VARIOUS WAYS TO RECORD THIS COMMITMENT AND ESTABLISH THAT NEITHER SIDE WILL DEPLOY MORE THAN THAT NUMBER.

-- THE SOVIETS REITERATED THEIR PREVIOUS PROPOSAL THAT THERE EITHER BE SUBLIMITS OF 3300 ON ICBM WARHEADS, 3300 ON SLBM WARHEADS AND 1100 ON HEAVY BOMBER WEAPONS, OR SUBLIMITS ON NONE OF THE THREE.

-- WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE LATTER TWO SUBLIMITS, WHICH WOULD CURTAIL A SIDE'S ABILITY TO RESTRUCTURE ITS FORCE TOWARD MORE STABILIZING SYSTEMS.

-- SLCM REMAINS ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT OUTSTANDING ISSUES, DUE TO THE TREMENDOUS VERIFICATION DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH THESE MISSILES.

-- WE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT OUR CAREFUL STUDY OF THEIR SLCM VERIFICATION PROPOSALS LED US TO CONCLUDE THAT THEY WOULD NOT PROVIDE A RELIABLE MEANS OF VERIFICATION.

-- WE SAID THAT OUR OWN EFFORTS TO DEVISE A VERIFICATION SCHEME WERE AS YET FRUITLESS, BUT THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO CONTINUE OUR WORK.

-- WE MADE CLEAR THAT, IN ANY EVENT, CONVENTIONAL SLCM MUST NOT BE CONSTRAINED. AMONG THE REASONS FOR THIS POSITION IS THAT OTHER COUNTRIES ARE FREE TO DEPLOY CONVENTIONAL SLCMS WITHOUT LIMITATION.

S E C R E T

-- THE SOVIETS HAD A FEW ADDITIONAL DETAILS TO ADD TO THEIR PREVIOUS PROPOSALS FOR VERIFYING NUCLEAR SLCMS, ALTHOUGH THIS DID NOT CHANGE OUR VIEWS ABOUT THE INADEQUACY OF THAT SCHEME.

-- THEY ALSO PROPOSED A JOINT EXPERIMENT IN APRIL TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR PROPOSED APPROACH OF DETECTING NUCLEAR SLCMS ABOARD SHIPS WITH AN AIRBORNE OR SEABORNE SENSOR.

-- THE SOVIETS COULD NOT EXPLAIN HOW THIS EXPERIMENT WOULD TELL US MORE THAN WE ALREADY KNOW, WHICH IS THAT SUCH DEVICES WOULD NOT BE EFFECTIVE UNDER REALISTIC CONDITIONS, WHICH INCLUDE SHIELDED NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND RADIATION BACKGROUNDS CREATED BY NUCLEAR PROPULSION UNITS, AND WOULD, IN ANY EVENT, BE UNABLE TO DISCRIMINATE BETWEEN NUCLEAR SLCMS AND ANY OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS ABOARD A SHIP.

-- ON MOBILE ICBMS, WE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT, IF OUR SIDES COULD AGREE ON SPECIFIC MEASURES THAT WOULD PROVIDE FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION, WE COULD CONSIDER ALLOWING A STRICTLY LIMITED NUMBER OF MOBILE ICBMS.

-- THE SOVIETS PROPOSED THAT THERE BE SUCH A SUBLIMIT OF MOBILE ICBMS AT THE LEVEL OF 800 LAUNCHERS.

-- WE RESPONDED THAT ANY SUBLIMIT, IF MOBILES ARE PERMITTED, MUST BE EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF WARHEADS, AS A THE OTHER SUBLIMITS.

-- ON HEAVY ICBMS, THE SOVIETS ASKED FOR A REACTION TO THEIR MOSCOW PROPOSAL THAT NEW TYPES BE BANNED, BUT MODERNIZATION OF EXISTING TYPES AND FLIGHT TESTING BE ALLOWED.

S E C R E T

-- WE REPLIED THAT OUR PROPOSED BAN ON NEW TYPES, BAN MODERNIZATION AND BAN ON FLIGHT TESTING WERE A PACKAGE THAT IMPLIED THE GRADUAL PHASE-OUT OF EXISTING HEAVY ICBMS AS THEY AGED AND NO DEPLOYMENT OF NEW HEAVY ICBMS BY EITHER SIDE.

-- WE NOTED THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO ACCEPT ONLY ON ELEMENT OF THIS PACKAGE WOULD RESULT IN A DECIDEDLY UNBALANCED OUTCOME -- SOVIET RETENTION OF A HEAVY ICBM FORCE INDEFINITELY WHILE THE U.S. WOULD HAVE NO CORRESPONDING RIGHT.

-- TO SUM UP THE START DISCUSSION, BOTH SIDES HAD SOME NEW IDEAS TO OFFER. WE WILL BE STUDYING THE SOVIET IDEAS AND LOOKING FOR THEIR CONSIDERED REACTION TO OURS, BUT MUCH WORK LIES AHEAD.

-- IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE AREA, MUCH OF THE DISCUSSION FOCUSED ON THE PROCESS IN GENEVA.

-- BOTH SIDES REAFFIRMED THE AGREED LANGUAGE OF THE DECEMBER 10 WASHINGTON JOINT STATEMENT, BUT WE DIFFER ON WHAT WE SHOULD DO TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT REACHED BY THE MINISTERS IN MOSCOW IN FEBRUARY TO COMPLETE AN AGREEMENT THAT BUILDS ON THIS LANGUAGE. (INITIALLY, THE SOVIETS RESISTED TABLING THIS LANGUAGE IN GENEVA, BUT IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS THEY FINALLY DID SO.)

-- WE CALLED ON THE SOVIETS TO JOIN US IN PREPARING IN GENEVA A JOINT DRAFT TEXT OF A SEPARATE DEFENSE AND SPACE AGREEMENT THAT WOULD BUILD ON THE WASHINGTON LANGUAGE BY PROVIDING SPECIFIC PROVISIONS TO CLARIFY ASPECTS LEFT UNCLEAR IN THAT LANGUAGE.

-- AS A FIRST STEP, THIS JOINT DRAFT TEXT SHOULD INCLUDE BRACKETED LANGUAGE TO PRESENT CLEARLY THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES ON UNRESOLVED ISSUES.

-- THIS STANDARD NEGOTIATING PROCEDURE WOULD ENABLE THE DELEGATIONS AND THE MINISTERS SUBSEQUENTLY TO FOCUS ON THOSE ISSUES TO SEEK THEIR RESOLUTION. HOPEFULLY, THE SOVIETS WILL JOIN US IN COMPLETING THIS TASK BEFORE THE NEXT MINISTERIAL IN MOSCOW.

-- THE SOVIETS HAVE NOW AGREED TO WORK OUT A SEPARATE AGREEMENT ON DEFENSE AND SPACE, BUT PROPOSE THAT THE AGREEMENT BE LITTLE MORE THAN THE WASHINGTON LANGUAGE PLACED IN LEGAL TERMS, WITH A FEW PROVISIONS ADDED.

-- WHEN WE OBJECTED THAT WE COULD NOT SIGN AN AGREEMENT WITHOUT CLARIFYING AMBIGUITIES SURROUNDING THE WASHINGTON LANGUAGE, THEY SUGGESTED THAT, AFTER THE TREATY WAS COMPLETED, A PROTOCOL COULD BE NEGOTIATED TO ADDRESS OUR CONCERNS.

-- WE WILL CONSIDER THIS PROPOSAL BUT CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THE WHOLE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING ANY PROTOCOLS, BE

S E C R E T

COMPLETED AS A SINGLE ENTITY.

-- FURTHERMORE, THIS AGREEMENT MUST RESOLVE REMAINING DEFENSE AND SPACE ISSUES, INCLUDING THE DURATION OF THE DEFENSE AND SPACE AGREEMENT, THE LENGTH OF THE NONWITHDRAWAL PERIOD, AND THE WITHDRAWAL AND TERMINATION RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE SIDES DURING THAT PERIOD, FOR EXAMPLE, TO PROTECT SUPREME NATIONAL INTERESTS UNRELATED TO A DESIRE TO DEPLOY OR ACQUIRE ABM SYSTEM CAPABILITIES

-- THE SIDES REVIEWED THEIR POSITIONS ON THESE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES, BUT NOTHING NEW WAS OFFERED.

-- IN SUM, WE MADE NO GREAT LEAPS FORWARD THIS WEEK, BUT POSITIONS WERE CLARIFIED ON SEVERAL KEY ISSUES, AND WE HOPE THAT THE BASIS WAS CREATED FOR SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS OVER THE WEEKS AHEAD.

NUCLEAR TESTING

-- WORK ON NUCLEAR TESTING WAS QUITE PRODUCTIVE, EVEN THOUGH IT INVOLVED A SHIFT IN GEARS.

-- LAST MONTH IN MOSCOW, WE THOUGHT THE SOVIETS HAD AGREED ON A "FAST TRACK" FOR NUCLEAR TESTING VERIFICATION. SINCE THEN, HOWEVER, IT BECAME APPARENT THEY WERE NOT READY FOR THAT PACE.

-- WE CLARIFIED MATTERS AND SETTLED ON A DETAILED WORK PROGRAM FOR THE COMING MONTHS.

-- THE WORK PROGRAM INCLUDES THE DESIGN AND CONDUCT OF THE JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT (JVE), AS WELL AS

S E C R E T

DRAFTING OF PROTOCOLS FOR THE TTBT AND PNBT.

- THE U.S. REMAINS READY TO WRAP UP THE PROTOCOLS IMMEDIATELY, BUT THE SOVIETS HAVE INSISTED THAT AT THE JVE IS NECESSARY BEFORE FINALIZING THE PROTOCOLS.

-- PRACTICAL WORK ON THE JVE WILL BEGIN IMMEDIATELY. DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA ARE ALREADY ON THE JOB AND CONCRETE PREPARATIONS WILL SOON BEGIN AT EACH SIDE'S TEST SITE.

-- AS WORK PROCEEDS ON THE JVE, THE NEGOTIATORS WILL CONTINUE IN PARALLEL TO PREPARE DRAFTS OF THE PROTOCOLS

-- THE SECRETARY AND SHEVARDNADZE WILL REVIEW THIS WORK WHEN WE MEET AGAIN IN APRIL. AT THAT TIME, WE HOPE TO HAVE A DETAILED PLAN AND SCHEDULE FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE JVE.

-- IT STILL IS NOT CLEAR EXACTLY WHEN THE JVE WILL TAKE PLACE -- IT IS A VERY LARGE AND COMPLEX PROJECT THAT MAY PROVE TIME-CONSUMING.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

-- THERE WAS A USEFUL EXCHANGE ON THE OUTLOOK FOR CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL, WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO THE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY MANDATE NEGOTIATIONS AMONG THE 2 MEMBERS OF NATO AND THE WARSAW PACT IN VIENNA.

-- WE DISCUSSED WITH THE SOVIETS THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NATO SUMMIT STATEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL, WHICH EMPHASIZING THAT THE PROPER PLACE FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON A MANDATE FOR CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS IS IN VIENNA.

CSCE

-- WE POINTED OUT THAT THE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING IS NOT MAKING THE PROGRESS WE BELIEVE IT SHOULD.

-- THERE MUST BE A BALANCED OUTCOME AT VIENNA BEFORE WE CAN WIND UP THE MANDATE NEGOTIATIONS AND GET ON TO CONVENTIONAL TALKS.

-- WE NEED TO SEE HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE AND A GOOD CONCLUDING TEXT THAT BUILDS ON HELSINKI AND MADRID.

-- SO WE TOLD THE SOVIETS WE'RE PREPARED TO WORK WITH THEM AND WE WILL OF COURSE BE WORKING ON THE BASIS OF ALLIED POSITIONS. BUT THE SOVIETS HAVE GOT TO DO BETTER THAN THEY'RE DOING. WE ARE PREPARED TO WAIT UNTIL THEY DO.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

S E C R E T

-- WE TOOK STOCK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPON

-- BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT PRODUCTIVE WORK HAS TAKEN PLACE ON A BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL LEVEL. WE IDENTIFIED THE MAIN OUTSTANDING ISSUES -- VERIFICATION, SECURITY UNDER BAN, AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING.

-- WE STRESSED TO THE SOVIETS THAT THESE ARE NOT SIMPLE PROBLEMS AND MUST BE TACKLED TO ARRIVE AT AN EFFECTIVE, VERIFIABLE, AND TRULY GLOBAL CW BAN. BOTH SIDES BELIEVE SUCH A BAN IS NECESSARY.

-- THE KEY TO PROGRESS IS CONCRETE, DETAILED WORK, AND HOPE THE SOVIETS WILL JOIN US IN THAT.

REGIONAL ISSUES

-- A GOOD DEAL OF TIME WAS DEVOTED TO A THOROUGH AND DETAILED DISCUSSIONS OF REGIONAL ISSUES.

-- IN MOSCOW LAST MONTH, THE SECRETARY AND SHEVARDNADZE COVERED THE WHOLE RANGE OF REGIONAL QUESTIONS, SO THIS TIME THEY CONCENTRATED ON AFGHANISTAN.

-- THE MINISTERS ALSO WENT OVER THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS IN SOME DETAIL.

-- ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER MET WITH DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ADAMISHIN ON MARCH 21 FOR A LENGTHY EXCHANGE OF SOUTHERN AFRICA.

AFGHANISTAN

S E C R E T

-- WE WELCOME THE MANY DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN, PARTICULARLY THE CLEAR SOVIET INTENTION TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS, AND A COMMITMENT TO "FRONT LOADING" THE WITHDRAWAL (I.E., EARLY REMOVAL OF LARGE NUMBERS OF SOVIET FORCES).

-- WE FEEL THAT A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING IS CLOSE TO BEING ACHIEVED.

-- THERE HAS TO BE A REASONABLE BALANCE OF OBLIGATIONS.

-- MOST IMPORTANTLY, WE NEED TO SEE CONDITIONS IN THE TROOP WITHDRAWAL PERIOD AND BEYOND WHICH ARE AS CONDUCTIVE AS WE CAN MAKE THEM TO THE RAPID RETURN OF THE REFUGEES TO THEIR HOMELAND.

-- WE ESPECIALLY WELCOME AGREEMENT THAT CORDOVEZ SHOULD WORK IN A PERSONAL CAPACITY WITH THE PARTIES TO SETTLE AFGHAN INTERNAL DISPUTES.

-- UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT IS IMPORTANT FOR ALL PARTIES TO AGREE TO A MORATORIUM ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE INITIALLY FOR THE PERIOD OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS AND THREE MONTHS THEREAFTER -- AND POTENTIALLY FOR A LONGER PERIOD IF, AS ALL PARTIES HAVE STATED, THEY ARE ABLE TO PRODUCE A GOVERNMENT THAT WANTS NEUTRALITY.

-- THIS MORATORIUM WOULD BE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ASSERTIONS OF A LEGAL RIGHT TO DO WHAT THE PARTIES WOULD REFRAIN FROM DOING DURING A MORATORIUM.

-- WE PUT THIS IDEA TO THE SOVIETS. THEY DID NOT FEEL THEY WANTED TO AGREE. NEVERTHELESS, OUR IDEA REMAINS ON THE TABLE.

-- IF THE SOVIETS DECIDED THEY COULD ACCEPT THIS IDEA, THE U.S. WOULD BE PLEASED TO BE A GUARANTOR OF THE GENEVA AGREEMENT.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

-- CLEAR FROM THE DISCUSSION THAT THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE SHARPLY DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

-- THE SOVIETS WANT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. WE PREFER BILATERAL, DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS.

-- WE AGREED, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO STAY IN TOUCH ON DEVELOPMENTS. WE'LL KEEP OUR EXPERTS ENGAGED.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

-- ASSISTANT SECRETARY CROCKER HAD DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER

S E C R E T

ADAMISEIN .

-- WE HOPE TO SEE SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE CURRENT MOMENT TOWARD A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

-- THAT SETTLEMENT MUST INVOLVE THE DEPARTURE OF ALL FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES FROM NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA AND NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH UNSC RESOLUTION 435.

-- WE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT A REGIONAL POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WOULD HELP CREATE CONDITIONS FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN ANGOLA.

-- WE AGREED TO STAY IN CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER.

CENTRAL AMERICA

-- SHEVARDNADZE AND I HAD VERY FRANK DISCUSSIONS ON CENTRAL AMERICA.

-- I EMPHASIZED THAT SOVIET MILITARY SUPPLIES TO THE SANDINISTAS DESTABILIZE THE REGION.

IRAN-IRAQ WAR

-- WE DISCUSSED EFFORTS IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO END THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR.

-- THE SECRETARY TOLD SHEVARDNADZE THAT IF THE SECRETARY GENERAL'S CURRENT EFFORTS TO CLARIFY THE BELLIGERENTS' POSITION ON RESOLUTION 598 DID NOT PRODUCE SATISFACTORY

S E C R E T

RESULTS, THE U.S. INTENDED TO BRING A SECOND, ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION TO A VOTE.

-- THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES HOW TO ACT IN THE COUNCIL.

END TEXT OF BRIEFING POINTS

5. ADDITIONAL POINTS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL:

-- ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL, A WORKING GROUP CHAIR BY DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY CHARLES THOMAS AND AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE OLEG GRINEVSKY REVIEWED THE STATUS

THE STABILITY MANDATE TALKS IN VIENNA AND EXCHANGED VIEWS ON THE RECENT NATO SUMMIT STATEMENT.

-- WITH REGARD TO VIENNA, THE SOVIET SIDE CONTINUED TO INSIST ON A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO DUAL-CAPABLE WEAPONS THE "SCOPE" SECTION OF THE MANDATE AND SOUGHT TO WORK THE PROBLEM HERE. THE U.S. SIDE REITERATED NATO'S POSITION THE NON-INCLUSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR A REFERENCE TO DUAL-CAPABLE WEAPONS IN THE MANDATE. WE FURTHER STATED THIS WAS AN ISSUE WHICH SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN VIENNA AMONG OUR NEGOTIATORS.

-- DURING A BRIEF RUN-THROUGH OF THE NATO SUMMIT STATEMENT ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL, THE SOVIETS PROBED U.S. THINKING ON WAYS TO ACHIEVE NATO'S STATED OBJECTIVE OF ELIMINATING CAPABILITIES FOR LAUNCHING SURPRISE ATTACK AND FOR INITIATING LARGE-SCALE OFFENSIVE ACTION.

-- THE SOVIETS, BOTH GRINEVSKY WITH THOMAS AND SHEVARDNADZE WITH THE SECRETARY, URGED U.S. AGREEMENT TO A PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF DATA ON NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES IN ADVANCE OF THE START OF THE ACTUAL STABILITY NEGOTIATIONS. THEY SUGGESTED A NATO-WARSAW PACT MEETING IN MID-APRIL TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE AND AN ACTUAL EXCHANGE OF DATA IN MID-MAY. THE PROPOSED EXCHANGE WOULD NOT BE ON THE BASIS OF AGREED DATA, ONLY ON AGREED CATEGORIES.

-- THE SECRETARY AND THOMAS REPLIED THAT IT WAS AN IDEA THAT HAD TO BE DISCUSSED WITH OUR ALLIES.

-- IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH GRINEVSKY, THOMAS LAID OUT IN SOME DETAIL THE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN SUCH A PROPOSAL INCLUDING:

-- THE GREAT RISK SUCH AN EXCHANGE OUTSIDE THE CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD IRREPARABLY HARM CHANCES FOR A SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOME BY ENMESHING THE TWO SIDES IN MBFR-LIKE IMPASSE;

-- THE SUSCEPTABILITY OF THE PUBLICATION OF SUCH AN UNVERIFIED EXCHANGE TO MANIPULATION WHICH COULD RESULT IN A HARDENING OF POSITIONS IN THE ENSUING NEGOTIATIONS; A

S E C R E T

-- THE LACK OF AGREEMENT ON METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE WHICH WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE CONFIDENCE IN THE RESULTS.

-- THE TWO SIDES ALSO BRIEFLY DISCUSSED A SOVIET

PROPOSAL FOR CONSTRAINTS ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES, ALONG THE LINES OF GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S SPEECHES IN MURMANSK AND MORE RECENTLY IN BELGRADE. THE U.S. POINT TO FUNDAMENTAL CONCERNS ABOUT THE SERIOUS IMPACT ON U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE AND, AGAIN, OUR NEED TO CONSULT WITH OUR ALLIES.

END TEXT OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL POINTS

ACTION
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INFO MOSCO BNATO CANMILREPNATO LDN PARIS BONN_ROME_GENEV_TOKYO_Pekin

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CPD IMU IMH

---SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE TALKS:STATE DEPT BRIEFING 24MAR

SUMMARY:TWO DAYS OF MTGS BETWEEN SECTY SHULTZ AND SOV FOREIGN MIN
SHEVARDNADZE PRODUCED NO/NO MAJOR BREAKTHROUGH.TOUGH ARMS CONTROL
ISSUES WERE TACKLED,BUT THERE ARE STILL SERIOUS DIVERGENCES WHICH
WOULD HAVE TO BE RESOLVED IF START TREATY IS TO BE SIGNED AT 29MAY
SUMMIT.USA POSITION IS THT ATTEMPT SHOULD NOT/NOT BE MADE TO ACHIEVE
PERFECT MATCHES IN ANY REDUCTIONS BUT RATHER AN OVERALL BALANCE.TWO
SIDES ALSO AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE AGMT ON SPACE-BASED MISSILE
DEFENCES(SDI)COMPLETED MORE OR LESS IN PARALLEL WITH START.THEY ARE,
HOWEVER,FAR APART ON LANGUAGE.TWO MINISTERS WILL MEET AGAIN IN LATE
APR AND MID MAY IN PREPARATION FOR SUMMIT.USA SIDE STILL UNDER
INSTRUCTIONS TO DO MAXIMUM TO ACHIEVE START AGMT FOR SIGNATURE BY
TWO LEADERS AT SUMMIT.

2.REPORT:IN DEBRIEFING AT STATE FOR NATO ALLIES BY RIDGEWAY(ASST
SECTY EUROPE AND CDA)AND NITZE(AMB ARMS CONTROL)SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE
TALKS WERE CHARACTERIZED AS GRUELING INCLUDING 11 HRS ON REGIONAL

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ISSUES. ^{PROT 6}ALTHOUGH TALKS WERE SOMETIMES DIFFICULT, BRIEFERS SUGGESTED THAT DID NOT/NOT NECESSARILY MEAN NO/NO PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE AND IN SOME CASES, INCLUDING IN ARMS CONTROL, SOME VERY DIFFICULT ISSUES HAD BEEN TACKLED. GETTING THEM OUT OF THE WAY COULD LEAD TO MORE RAPID PROGRESS SUBSEQUENTLY. USA/USSR DIALOGUE WELL MANAGED AND POSITIVE EVEN IF THERE WAS NOT/NOT SOMETHING TO SIGN AS A RESULT OF EACH BILATERAL MTG.

3. DEFENCE AND SPACE: TWO MINISTERS REAFFIRMED 10 DEC WSHDC STATEMENT. BOTH SIDES HAVE NOW AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE A SEPARATE AGMT ON DEFENCE AND SPACE BUILT ON WSHDC SUMMIT STATEMENT LANGUAGE. THIS APPEARS TO BE REVERSAL OF USA VIEW THAT ISSUE COULD BE TREATED DISTINCT FM STRATEGIC ARMS TALKS. USA NOW PROPOSING THAT AGMTS IN TWO AREAS SHOULD BE COMPLETED MORE OR LESS AT SAME TIME. SOVS HOWEVER ARE ONLY PROPOSING THAT WSHDC LANGUAGE BE PUT IN LEGAL TERMS. (THIS COMES CLOSE TO OLD PENTAGON POSITION). SOVS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT A PROTOCOL COULD BE PREPARED AFTER AGMT SIGNED WHICH WOULD TAKE ACCOUNT OF USA CONCERNS. USA, HOWEVER, FINDS AMBIGUITY OF WSHDC STATEMENT UNACCEPTABLE AND CONSIDERS THAT AMBIGUITY IS NO/NO BASIS ON WHICH TO PROCEED TOGETHER ON ABM TREATY.

4. FROM USA PERSPECTIVE ALTHOUGH THERE WERE NO/NO MAJOR STEPS FORWARD, WSHDC DID SUGGEST A NUMBER OF IDEAS ON HOW TO REDUCE DIFFERENCES AND MANAGE PROBLEMS. THESE INCLUDED SUGGESTION THAT DEPLOYMENT OF SPACE BASED SENSORS BY ONE SIDE NOT/NOT BE OBJECTED TO ...3

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BY THE OTHER ON GROUNDS THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN SENSORS DESIGNED TO PROVIDE EARLY WARNING (THUS A STABILIZING ELEMENT) AND THOSE THAT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR ABMS. PACKAGE OF MEASURES INCLUDING VISITS TO EACH OTHERS LABORATORIES, PRESENCE OF OBSERVERS AT LAUNCHES AND EXCHANGE OF DATA ALSO PROPOSED. GOAL IS TO AVOID POSSIBILITY OF DIFFERENCES ARISING THAT COULD UNSETTLE.

5. START: TWO SIDES REAFFIRMED STRONG COMMITMENT MADE AT WSHDC SUMMIT TO MOVE TOWARDS TREATY ON REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. WORK IS CONTINUING ON VERIFICATION ASPECTS OF AGMT INCLUDING PROTOCOLS OF INSPECTION AND CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AS WELL AS MEMO OF UNDERSTANDING. NITZE EMPHASIZED THAT ALL THREE DOCUS (SIX INCHES DEEP OF TEXT) STILL CONTAINED MANY BRACKETED PARTS. THE LARGEST CATEGORY OF DIFFERENCES WERE MINOR, RELATING TO DIFFICULTIES IN TRANSLATION OR DEFINITION. THEY WERE READILY REDUCIBLE. MAJOR DIFFICULTIES RELATED TO WHAT SYSTEMS OUGHT TO BE REDUCED OR ELIMINATED AND IT WAS IMPORTANT TO WORK ON REACHING AGMT ON THESE IN SHORT PERIOD OF TIME AVAILABLE. AREAS OF DIFFICULTY INCLUDED:

(A) NUCLEAR-ARMED AIR LAUNCHED LONG RANGE CRUISE MISSILES. SPECIFIC PROBLEMS INCLUDED DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ARMED AND AGMT ON NUMBER OF MISSILES EACH BOMBER COULD CARRY. ON LATTER POINT USA OFFERED TO HAVE EACH BOMBER COUNT AS 10 MISSILES UP FROM PREVIOUS SUGGESTION OF 6 AND MAJOR STEP, IN USA VIEW, TO

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MEETING SOV PROPOSAL OF 11. APPROACH WOULD SIMPLIFY VERIFICATION AS IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO HIDE BOMBERS BUT PROBLEM WOULD STILL EXIST OF DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THOSE CARRYING NUCLEAR ARMED MISSILES AND THOSE NOT/NOT. TWO SIDES STILL REMAINED SOME DISTANCE APART ON WHAT CONSTITUTED A LONG RANGE CRUISE MISSILE.

(B) ON MOBILE ICBMS USA SAID THAT IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO FIND ADEQUATE VERIFICATION MEASURES IT WAS PREPARED TO DROP PROPOSAL FOR A BAN AND USA COULD AGREE ON A SUBLIMIT FOR THEM. USSR SUGGESTED A SUBLIMIT OF 800 MISSILES IN WHICH USA SHOWED NO/NO INTEREST TAKING POSITION THAT LIMIT SHOULD BE DEFINED BY NUMBER OF WARHEADS ON MOBILE MISSILES.

(C) SOVS AGREED THAT NEW HEAVY ICBMS SHOULD BE BANNED BUT ARGUED THAT MODERNIZATION OF EXISTING MISSILES SHOULD BE ALLOWED. USA RESPONDED THAT PROPOSAL WAS UNBALANCED AS IT WOULD LEAVE USSR WITH AN ADVANTAGE IN EVER MORE MODERN HEAVY ICBMS.

(D) WITH RESPECT TO SLCMS SOVS PROPOSED THAT THEY COULD ONLY BE PERMITTED AT DESIGNATED FACILITIES WHERE THEY WOULD BE SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION. USA DIDN'T BELIEVE THE SOV PROPOSALS WERE ADEQUATE. THEY WERE NOT/NOT SATISFIED THAT SOV SUGGESTION FOR USING NEUTRON GUNS AS MEANS OF VERIFICATION WOULD WORK. NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD BE SHIELDED EG BY REACTORS, AND IT COULD BE DIFFICULT TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN NUCLEAR ARMED SLCMS AND OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS. USA DID AGREE, HOWEVER, TO EXAM PROPOSALS AND COME BACK.

5. AS GENERAL COMMENT NITZE NOTED THAT SOVS HAD PLACED MORE EMPHASIS

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ON SLCMS THAN SDI. IN HIS VIEW SOVS HAD ALWAYS TAKEN A DIM VIEW OF SLCMS. THEY WERE HARD TO DEFEND AGAINST BECAUSE SUB DIFFICULT TO LOCATE AND THEREFORE HIGHLY STABILIZING WEAPONS.

6. OVERALL BRIEFERS DID NOT/NOT CONCEDE THAT ARMS AGMT AT 29MAY SUMMIT COULD NOT/NOT BE ACHIEVED. ACCORDING TO RIDGEWAY USA SIDE STILL UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO QUOTE GO FOR GOLD UNQUOTE.

7. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL: SOVS PUT FORWARD TWO NEW PROPOSITIONS AT WORKING LEVEL AND IN SHEVARDNADZES MTGS WITH SECTY AND PRESIDENT. FIRST WAS SUGGESTION THAT DATA SHOULD BE EXCHANGED BETWEEN NATO AND WSAW PACT IN ADVANCE OF CONVENTIONAL TALKS. USA REACTION WAS THAT THIS IDEA COULD NOT/NOT BE DISCUSSED BILATERALLY WITH SOVS AS WSHDC WOULD FIRST NEED TO SEEK VIEWS OF ALLIES. USA ALSO MENTIONED TO SOVS THAT MBFR STRUGGLED FOR YEARS WITH DATA ISSUE TO LITTLE REAL PURPOSE.

8. SOVS AS WELL PROPOSED INNATL CONF, WHICH WOULD FOLLOW UP ON THEIR MURMANSK AND MEDITERRANEAN PROPOSALS, TO DISCUSS CONSTRAINTS ON NAVAL ACTIVITIES. USA, SOVS, BRITISH, FRENCH AND QUOTE OTHERS UNQUOTE MENTIONED AS PARTICIPANTS. SECTY SHULTZ DISPLAYED LITTLE INTEREST IN PROPOSAL. RIDGEWAY ON OWN HOOK PUT FORWARD VIEW TO SOVS THAT USA, AS WORLDS LARGEST NAVAL POWER, BELIVES IT DOES NOT/NOT HAVE ENOUGH SHIPS. IT WOULD BE UNLIKELY THEREFORE TO AGREE TO ANY CONSTRAINTS. BRIEFERS MADE CLEAR ADMIN DOES NOT/NOT TAKE EITHER PROPOSAL SERIOUSLY.

9. CONVENTIONAL ARMS TALKS IN VIENN WERE REVIEWED AT SOME LENGTH. PARTICULAR DIFFICULTY WAS EXPERIENCED IN WORKING OUT WORDING FOR

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JOINT STATEMENT.USA PROPOSED QUOTE BALANCED OUTCOME UNQUOTE TO CSCE TALKS.SOVS OBJECTED AND PROPOSED QUOTE SUCCESSFUL UNQUOTE.FROM USA PERSPECTIVE THEY ARE STILL LOOKING FOR BALANCED OUTCOME TO TALKS BUT IT IS CLEAR EACH SIDE WILL HAVE A DIFFERENT DEFINITION OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME.

10.HUMAN RIGHTS:HUMAN RIGHTS WERE GIVEN CONSIDERABLE EMPHASIS IN SHULTZ/SCHEVARDNADZE TALKS AND IN SOV FOR MINS MTG WITH PRESIDENT.USA FOCUSSED ON FAMILY REUNIFICATION,PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE AND JEWISH EMIGRATION.INCREASE ETHNIC GERMAN AND ARMENIAN EMIGRATION AS WELL AS INCREASE IN SOV TOURIST VISAS TO VISIT FAMILIES IN USA WERE WELCOMED. SOVS RAISED TERRORISM IN USA,RACISM AND HARBOURING OF WAR CRIMINALS. SCHEVARDNADZE ALSO BROUGHT UP PROPOSED MOSCO HUMAN RIGHTS CONF BUT IN SUBDUED TERMS.LINE WAS THAT SOVS WANTED IT BUT IF USA STRONGLY OPPOSED THEY WOULD LIVE WITHOUT IT.THEY ALSO DID NOT/NOT WISH TO COMPETE WITH PROPOSED CONFERENCES IN LDN AND PARIS.SUSPICION HERE IS THAT SOV PROBLEMS WITH ARMENIAN MINORITY WAY HAVE LED THEM TO QUESTION WISDOM OF MOSCO HUMAN RIGHTS CONF AT THIS TIME.

11.SEPARATE MESSAGE TO FOLLOW ON REGIONAL ISSUES.

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External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

Accession/Référence 1/9	
File/Dossier	
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TO BNATO **DELIVER BY 230900**

INFO

INFO **BAG P BH** WSHDC CANMILREPNATO DE BNATO

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REF SNIDER/STANSFIELD TELECON 22MAR

SUBJ/SUJ

---SHEVARDNADZE VISIT:BRIEFING FOR NATO AMBS.

ATTACHED IS WSHDC FAX POL-1154 21MAR CONCERNING USA BRIEFING
ON SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE MTG.

2.(COMCENTER-PLSE FAX ATTACHED 8 PAGES)

SECRET

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
R.E.STANSFIELD/KL SIG	IDR	5-9296	R. STANSFIELD SIG 1000377



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

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TO WSHDC **DELIVERY BY 230900**

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TT NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DNACPOL DE CAF

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REF YOUR FAX POL-1154 21MAR

---SHEVARDNADZE VISIT:PRE-MEETING BRIEFING

APPRECIATED RECEIVING SUMMARY OF BRIEFING FOR NATO AMBS.GRATEFUL

HOWEVER YOU TRANSMIT FURTHER REPORTS ON SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE

MTGS BY TEL RATHER THAN FACSIMILE IN ORDER THAT BNATO MAY

HAVE TIMELY INPUT FOR ONGOING EXCHANGES IN NAC ON SUBJECT

THIS WEEK.

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

22 MAR 88 18 43Z

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RETURN TO
RENOYER AU

BIGG

FOR FILING
POUR - ETRE
PORIE AU DOSSIER

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DOSSIER

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DIVISION/DIRECTION

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
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PAGE TWO YBGR6295 CONFID

IMMEDIATE THREAT TO USA OR ITS ALLIES.ON NUMBER OF OCCASIONS YAZOV NOTED THAT PURPOSE OF MTG WAS NOT/NOT TO REACH AGMTS BUT TO IMPROVE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN NATIONS.YAZOV DID MOST OF TALKING FOR SOVIET SIDE WITH GEN CHERVOV CONTRIBUTING FROM TIME TO TIME.LEHMAN DESCRIBED ATMOSPHERE AS QUOTE ALMOST A LOVEFEST UNQUOTE.

2.CARLUCCI PURSUED NOW-STANDARD FOUR PAR AGENDA FOLLOWED BY USA IN BILAT CONTACTS WITH SOVS(HUMAN RIGHTS,REGIONAL ISSUES,ACD,BILATERAL ISSUES)WITH EMPHASIS ON ISSUES OF DEFENCE INTEREST.FROM USA POINT OF VIEW MOST PRODUCTIVE EXCHANGES DEALT WITH DANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITIES(OURTEL YBGR6266)WHERE REVIEW BY CARLUCCI OF AGGRESSIVE SOV BEHAVIOUR(SHOOTING OF LTC NICHOLSON,SHIP BUMPING AND USE OF LASERS AGAINST SURVEILLANCE AIRCRAFT)FIRST DREW DEFENSIVE RESPONSE FROM YAZOV(QUOTE EVERYONE MUST FOLLOW THE RULES TO AVOID SUCH INCIDENTS UNQUOTE IE SOVS HAD REACTED TO INITIAL AMERICAN TRANSGRESSIONS)BUT LATER RESULTED IN AGMT THAT NEITHER SIDE SHOULD SHOOT AT OTHER.CLOSEST SOVS CAME TO ADMITTING WRONG-DOING WAS WHEN YAZOV REFERRED TO CLOSE AIRCRAFT PASSES IN SAME CONTEXT AS HIS EFFORTS TO SUPPRESS QUOTE HOOLIGANISM UNQUOTE IN SOV AIR FORCE.YAZOV DECLINED TO APOLOGIZE FOR DEATH OF NICHOLSON,SAYING THAT SINCE HE HAD NOT/NOT BEEN DEF MIN AT TIME HE WAS NOT/NOT RESPONSIBLE BUT EE UNDERTOOK TO PROVIDE FRTHIER INFO ABOUT INCIDENT IN THE NEAR FUTURE. YAZOV SUGGESTED THAT TWO SIDES SHOULD REVIEW AGMTS COVERING ACTIVITIES OF MILITARY MISSIONS BUT CARLUCCI DECLINED NOTING THAT IT

...3

PAGE THREE YBGR6295 CONF

WAS NOT/NOT AGMTS BUT THEIR IMPLEMENTATION THAT CAUSED PROBLEMS.

CARLUCCI IN TURN PROPOSED THAT TWO SIDES WORK ON SYSTEM OF ADVANCED NOTIFICATION OF ICBM/SLBM TESTS WHERE IMPACT AREA WAS INNATL WATER (IE NEAR HAWAII)OR NATL TERRITORY(IE KAMCHATKA)NEAR OTHER SIDES TERRITORY.

3.USA SIDE SOUGHT TO GAIN FURTHER UNDERSTANDING OF QUOTE NEW UNQUOTE SOV CONCEPTOF QUOE REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY UNQUOTE PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO HOW IT DIFFERED FROM PREDECESSOR DOCTRINE AND WHERE AND WHEN ITS EFFECTS WOULD BECOME EVIDENT IN SOV FORCE STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS.RESULT OF DISCUSSION WAS NOT/NOT ALTOGETHER SATISFACTORY. SOVS COULD ONLY DESCRIBE CONCEPT IN TERMS OF ARMS CONTROL AND FORCE BALANCES.YAZOV ADMITTED THAT SOVS DID NOT/NOT FEEL THREATEND BY EITHER USA OR WEUR BUT QUOTE REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY UNQUOTE WAS NOT/NOT DRIVEN BY HISTORY BUT BY LEVEL OF FORCES FACING THEM.(NOTE: THIS SOUNDS LIKE VARIATION OF OLD SOV THEME THAT USSR IS SECURE WHEN ITS FORCES EQUAL SUM TOTAL OF THOSE OF ITS ADVERSARIES).THEY DECLINED TO DRAW EXPLICITLY ANY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OLD AND NEW STRATEGIES AND IN FACT DESCRIBED BREZHNEV DOCTRINE AS DEFENSIVE.SOVS ALSO CLAIMED THAT THEY WERE ONLY NOW REDRAFTING OPERATIONS MANUALS SO THAT IT WOULD BE SOMETIME BEFORE CHANGES IN TRAINING OR EQUIPMENT WOULD BE SEEN.

4.MOST PUZZLING EXCHANGE OCCURRED ON SUBJ OF MILITARY BUDGETS WHERE YAZOV CLAIMED THAT SOV ECONOMIC PLANNING SYSTEM MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE

...4

PAGE FOUR YBGR6295 CONF

TO PROVIDE CONSOLIDATED BREAKDOWN OF DEFENCE BUDGET-HE COULD NOT/NOT
INDICATE EXPENDITURE ON PROCUREMENT OR ON R AND D BECAUSE THEY WERE
NOT/NOT INCLUDED IN OFFICIAL DEFENCE BUDGET;AND THAT HE HAD NO/NO
WAY OF JUDGING PERCENT OF SOV GDP SPENT ON DEFENCE WHICH
ACKNOWLEDGED COULD BE AS HIGH AS SIXTEEN PERCENT.ON RELATED MATTER
YAZOV PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF DATA ON NATO AND WPO FORCES WITH RESPECT
TO ATLANTIC TO URALS AREA.POINTING OUT THAT USA COULD NOT/NOT SPEAK
ON BEHALF OF ALLIES,CARLUCCI SUGGESTED THAT DATA EXCHANGE CONSIDER
USA AND USSR FORCES GLOBALLY.WHEN QUESTIONED ON CURRENT FORCE
LEVELS,SOVS PREFACED COMMENTS WITH QUOTE ACCORDING TO IISS...UNQUOTE
LEHMAN NOTED THAT HE FOUND IT HARD TO SWALLOW SOV DEF MIN CLAIM OF
IGNORANCE OVER COMPOSITION AND MAGNITUDE OF DEFENCE BUDGET AS IT
SEEMED INCREDIBLE TO HEAR SUCH STATEMENT COMING FROM DEF MIN OF
STATE WHERE SECURITY IS SO IMPORTANT AND CONTROLS ARE OMNIPRESENT.
5.LEHMAN DESCRIBED EXCHANGES ON ACD ISSUES AS WIDE-RANGING ALTHOUGH
THERE WAS NO/NO FORMAL ATTEMPT TO DEAL WITH DETAILS ON TABLE IN
GENEV NST NEGS.HE ADDED THAT AS FORMER START NEGOTIATOR HE WAS QUOTE
CORNERED UNQUOTE DURING INFORMAL GATHERINGS TO DISCUSS SPECIFIC
DETAILS OF START NEGS.USA ATTEMPTED TO GENERATE DISCUSSION ON SDI
BUT MET LITTLE SUCCESS.WHEN CARLUCCI TOLD YAZOV THAT EXISTENCE OF
KRASNOYARSK RADAR COULD CAUSE PROBLEM FOR INF AND START RATIFICATION
LATTER PROPOSED THAT BOTH KRASNOYARSK AND THULE RADARS BE DISMANTLED
CARLUCCI REJECTED EQUIVLENCE.INFORMALLY SOVS WERE ON DEFENSIVE

...5

*Many...
I said many?
How many?
Oh! that is
many.*

PAGE FIVE YBGR6295 CONF

CONCERNING KRASNOYARSK;ONCE AGAIN YAZOV CLAIMED NO/NO RESPONSIBILITY AND CHERVOV SEEMED TO SUFFER IN EMBARRASSED SILENCE. 6.DURING MTG IT WAS AGREED THAT NEXT STEP IN MILITARY TO MILITARY CONTACTS WOULD BE MTG OF ADM CROWE AND MSU AKHROMEYEV,FOLLOWED BY MTG OF USCINCEUR AND COMDR GSFG.TWO CDS WOULD DISCUSS DATA EXCHANGE, DANGEROUS ACTIVITIES AND FURTHER CONTACTS.LAST ITEM PROMPTED FRG AND UK AMBS AS WELL AS SECGEN TO POINT OUT THAT ALLIES HAD AGREED FOLLOWING AFGHAN INVASION TO LIMIT CONTACTS WITH SOV MILITARY TO QUOTE ESSENTIAL BUSINESS UNQUOTE WHICH USA/USSR PLANS SEEMED TO EXCEED.WHEN LEHMAN DODGED ISSUE CARRINGTON REMARKED THAT ALLIES HAD TO BE CONSISTENT IN THEIR ACTIONS AND THAT COUNCIL SHOULD CONSIDER QUESTION IN NEAR FUTURE.

7.ONLY OTHER POINT OF INTEREST AROSE WHEN FRENCH AMB ASKED IF SOVS HAD INDICATED ANY INTENTION/WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS MIL DOCTRINE ON MARGINS OF CST NEGOTIATIONS.NON/NON-COMMITTAL REPLY BY LEHMAN LEAD TO COMMENT BY UK AMB THAT EARLIER ALLIANCE AGMT(IN SPC)TO DISCUSS DOCTRINE WITH WPO ONLY IN EVENT THAT SOVS RAISED IT NOW APPEARED TO BE IN QUESTION.HE RECALLED THAT COUNCIL HAD AGREED ONLY TO DISCUSS MIL DOCTRINE IN CONCRETE TERMS IN CONTEXT OF NEGOTIATIONS-RECENT EVENTS(IE RAIMOND SPEECH IN VIENN FUM)SUGGESTED THIS WAS NO/NO LONGER CASE.WHEN FRENCH AMB DISAVOWED ANY KNOWLEDGE OF AGMT,SECGEN REMINDED HIM OF DEBATE AND EVENTUAL AGMT IN SPC.

CCC/098 211656Z YBGR6295

External Affairs
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ACTION
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MESSAGE
COMMUNICATIONS

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21 MAR 88 75 352

Accession/Reference:

File/Dossier:

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FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

FM WSHCC POL-1154 21MAR88

TO EXTOTT/IDR

MAR 22 1988

INFO PCOOTT/HEBERT NDHQOTT/ADM POL/DNACPOL/DSTRATA LDN PARIS BNATO
BOHN VMBFR VCSCE *de OTT*

DISTR MINA USS DMC DMX IFB IDD IDA RWD RWR URR RBO RBR CPP IDX
IDX IDRL IDRA UGB
---SHEVARDNADZE VISIT:AGENDA

AT STATE THIS AFTERNOON, NATO AND OTHER ALLIES WERE BRIEFED BY NITZE
AND RIDGWAY ON STATE OF PLAY GOING INTO SHEVARDNADZE VISIT. START
TALKS ARE CLEARLY MAIN PREOCCUPATION. TALKING POINTS PREPARED BY
NITZE ON START AND SPACE/DEFENCE ^{ARE} ATTACHED. BEYOND THAT,
FOLLOWING WERE MAIN POINTS MADE BY BRIEFERS.

- MOSCOW SUMMIT. NO/NO DATES FIRM YET. EXPECTATION IS STILL END
MAY OR BEGINNING JUNE. SHEVARDNADZE MAY HAVE CONFIRMATION.
- HUMAN RIGHTS. SEPARATE MTG CO-CHAIRER BY AMB SEC SHIFTER, AND
INCLUDING REPS OF APA.
- REGIONAL ISSUES. FULL RANGE OF MTGS (USUAL SPRING MTGS BEING
HELD NOW). AFGHANISTAN LIKELY TO BE INTENSELY COVERED. ISSUES
INCLUDE "IRREVERSIBILITY", PHASING AND SYMMETRICAL ARMS
SUPPLIES. ON CENTRAL AMERICA, USA LIKELY TO COMPLAIN ABOUT WHAT
THEY REGARD AS UNABATED ARMS DELIVERIES TO NICARAGUA. ON
SOUTHERN AFRICA, CROCKER TO MEET WITH SOV COUNTERPART. ON IRAN-

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P. Heinbecker
P. HEINBECKER

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Affaires extérieures
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PAGE TWO POL-1154 SECRET

- IRAQ, MURPHY TO TELL USSR THAT USA NOT/NOT PREPARED TO GO ON
BEING "JERKED AROUND" ON SECOND UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESN. ON
ME, USA/USSR TO DISCUSS MODALITIES/AUTHORITY OF INNTL CONF.
CAMBODIA AND KOREAN PENINSULA WILL ALSO BE DISCUSSED.
- NUCLEAR TESTING. SHULTZ AND SHEVARDONADZE AGREED IN FEB. TO
PUT ISSUE ON FAST TRACK. SEISMIC AND CORTEX METHODS OF
VERIFICATION UNDER REVIEW. ADMIN APPEARS TO HOPE THAT PNET AND
TTBT MAY BE SUBMITTED YET BY PRES FOR SENATE APPROVAL, PRIOR
TO MAY.
 - CHEMICAL WEAPONS/CONVENTIONAL STABILITY. USA DOWNS NOT/NOT
EXPECT MUCH MOVEMENT.

NO. OF PAGES: 6 PLUS COVER.

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Talking Points on NST

for

NATO Ambassadors

March 21, 1988

3/8

Let me begin by giving you a status report on the current state of play on the NST negotiations; this will be the point of departure from which Secretary Shultz will begin discussion with the Soviet Foreign Minister in attempting to resolve outstanding issues over the next few days.

START

Agreed

- 6000 warheads
- 1600 strategic missiles and bombers.
- 4900 ballistic missile warheads.
- 1540 warheads on 154 heavy ICBMs.
- Throw weight ceiling 50% below the current Soviet level.
- Bomber weapon counting rule dealing with bombs and short-range missiles.
- Counting rule for warheads on existing types of ballistic missiles.

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- A long list of verification ideas building upon and going beyond the INF Treaty, including data exchange, various kinds of inspection, and measures to enhance the effectiveness of NTM.

Not Agreed

- 3300 RVs on ICBMs: U.S. wants. Akhromeyev has said they will not deploy more than 3300, but have political difficulty unless it is balanced by an equal ceiling on SLBMs. Got the impression Gorbachev ready to agree to ICBM only ceiling, if we can work out ALCM counting rule.
- ALCMs: Soviets proposed 1100 sublimit on bomber weapons; we cannot accept. We want a counting rule for each type of bomber equipped for ALCMs and verified by OSI. We also need agreement on range of ALCMs to be counted and the fact that only ALCMs that are nuclear armed will be subject to Treaty limits. If we get Soviets to agree, the 1100 probably will go away. If this and ICBM sublimit are resolved, agreement on sub-ceilings would be virtually complete.
- Mobile ICBMs: We are working on how best to verify land mobiles; if an effective verification regime can be agreed,

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we will reconsider our proposal for a ban. There are, of course, some hard choices to assure both operational flexibility and tight verifiable constraints. Also working on the right number of deployed and non-deployed missiles if we choose to drop our proposed ban.

- **SLCMs:** Had previously been agreed that any limitation will be outside the 6000 W/H number or 1600 SNDV number -- still trying to wrestle with the issue in light of tremendous verification difficulties.

Three Papers

Before going to Moscow we had decided we should focus on getting at verification details early; this had been the long pole in the tent in INF; it could also be the sledge that breaks that pole on START. Accordingly, we pressed the Soviets in Moscow to deal with verification up front and not leave it for the last minute. They agreed and accepted our proposal to have our delegations prepare three papers:

1. Inspection Protocol
2. Conversion or Elimination Protocol

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3. MOU

Although heavily bracketed, preliminary JDT's of these papers are ready for further consideration this week.

Defense and Space

-- As with START, we are working hard to complete a Defense and Space Agreement.

As you may recall, the Joint U.S.-Soviet Summit Statement of December 10, 1987, included the following: "The leaders of the two countries also instructed their delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time." This instruction was reaffirmed by the General Secretary on February 22nd in Moscow. Also, in Moscow there was agreement to build on the language of the Washington Summit Joint Statement in developing Joint Draft Text or JDT.

-- The delegations are now working on such a JDT; however, progress has been slow.

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- The U.S. delegation takes that language as agreed language to be included in the JDT without renegotiation, and seeks to negotiate on unresolved issues while working out a bracketed JDT.
- The Soviet delegation has reaffirmed the sentence quoted above, but claims it is not authorized to negotiate on unresolved issues and so far refuses to work toward a bracketed JDT that reflects both areas of agreement and disagreement.
- The Summit Joint Statement of last December implies three key D&S substantive issues: 1) length and conditions of the period of nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty; 2) the activities contemplated during that period; and 3) activities after the period.
- In large part, the statement itself solved the last point: namely if no agreement is reached on activities after the agreed non-withdrawal period, then each side may choose its own course of action.
- On the first issue, the length of the period appears readily negotiable if the other two issues can be agreed. Conditions governing activities during that period are the

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principal difference. The Soviets want an unconditional nonwithdrawal commitment; we cannot give up our U.S. supreme interest rights or response to a material breach inalienable under international law.

9/8

- In addition to these issues, the question of the Soviet large phased-array radar must also be resolved.

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Canada Canada

SECURE FACSIMILE

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MGTC/DIARY/CIRC/FILE	21 MAR 1988
RENOU/MGTC/JOURNAL/CIRC/DOSSIER/DOSSIER	POUR - ETRE
ACC	Accession/Référence
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FILE	File/Dossier
	20-USA-1-3-USSR
	07-15-NATO-3-1-USA

COMMUNITY
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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TO/A

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---USA/USSR:CARLUCCI/YAZOV MTG

ATTACHED IS A COPY OF THE TEXT OF THE LETTER WHICH DEF SECTY

CARLUCCI SENT TO HIS NATO COLLEAGUES ON 17MAR AND IN WHICH HE GIVES
AN OUTLINE OF HIS TALKS WITH SOVIET DEFENCE MINISTER YAZOV.

A REPORT ON THE LEHMAN BRIEFING REFERRED TO IN THE COVERING LETTER
FOLLOWS.

2.COMCENTRE: PLEASE TRANSMIT THE ATTACHED FOUR PAGES.

NAT005 / 18

MAR 21 1988

Pages 393 to / à 396
are withheld pursuant to sections
sont retenues en vertu des articles

13(1)(a), 13(1)(b)

of the Access to Information Act
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FILE _____ DOSSIER _____
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27-4-NATO-3-1-USA

C O N F I D E N T I A L
FM BNATO YBGR6266 15MAR88
TO EXTOTT IMMED **(4-DR)**

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PARIS PCOOTT/HEBERT

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---USA/USSR RELATIONS:DEFENCE MINISTERS MTG-15-17MAR

USA DEL HAS INFORMED ALLIES THAT IN HIS MTG WITH USSR DEF MIN
YAZOV,USA SECTY OF DEFENCE CARLUCCI WILL PURSUE FOLLOWING AGEDA
AND/OR THEMES:

A)DANGEROUS MILITARY ACTIVITY:EG ATTACKS ON MILITARY CESERVER
PERSONNEL,SPIP BUMPING,HARRASSMENT OF FLTS IN BERLIN CORRIDORS,ETC.
CARLUCCI WILL PROPOSE ESTABLISHMENT OF BILAT MILITARY FORUM TO DFAL
WITH SUCH INCIDENTS;

P)ARMS CONTROL:-TREATY COMPLIANCE INCLUDING ALLEGED SCV VIOLATIONS;
-OFFENCE/DEFENCE RELATIONSHIP;
-NUCLEAR TESTING;
-CW;

C)MILITARY DOCTRINE:CARLUCCI WILL PROBE FOR FURTHER INFO ON QUOTE
REASONABLE SUFFICIENCY UNQUOTE ETC;

D)MILITARY TO MILITARY CONTACTS;CARLUCCI PLANS TO MOVE CAUTIOUSLY
IN THIS AREA INDICATING WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER THOSE CONTACTS
WHICH OFFER MUTUAL ADVANTAGE.N THIS REGARD WE NOTE THAT PRIOR TO

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ACTION
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PAGE TWO YBGR6266 CONF

DEPARTING MOSCO 14MAR YAZOV ANNOUNCED THAT MSU AKHROMEYEV WILL
VISIT WSHDC LATER THIS YEAR.

2.ASST SECTY OF DEFENCE RON LEHMAN WILL BRIEF COUNCIL 18MARON
RESULTS OF TALKS.

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TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 041400

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PMOOTT/BURNEY

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NRCOTT/STONE DE OTT

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JLO CPD INP IND EED EER URE TTS IDD IDR IDA NSX IFB

REF YOURTEL RBR0339 23FEB

---SOVIET APPEAL TO PARLIAMENTARIANS

NEITHER LEGISLATIVE LIAISON UNIT NOR/NOR SOVIET DESK AT STATE IS
AWARE OF ANY INVITATION HAVING BEEN RECEIVED BY USA CONGRESSMEN TO
ATTEND JUN88 CONF ON QUOTE ECOLOGICAL PROTECTION OF REGION UNQUOTE.
STATE CONTACT TOLD US DEPT WOULD PROBABLY COUNSEL SENATORS AND
REPRESENTATIVES NOT/NOT TO ATTEND MOSCOW CONF IF INVITATION
RECEIVED, BUT HE EXPECTED A USA DEL WOULD PROBABLY ATTEND EVENT
ANYWAY. WE UNDERSTAND THAT SEN FRANK MURKOWSKI (R-ALASKA) IS
PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN SOVIET-USA PARLIAMENTARY EXCHANGES AND
ARCTIC COOPERATION AND WOULD LIKELY ARGUE STRONGLY FOR, AND LEAD,
USA PARTICIPATION.

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INFO MOSCO DELIVER BY 180800

DISTR MINA RGB UGB RBD URD IDR

REF MOSCO TEL XYGR0395 17FEB

---USA EMB MOSCO:FIRE

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LINES HAVE ALL BEEN RESTORED.

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TO EXTOTT RBR URR DELIVER BY 170900

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---USA EMB MOSCO:FIRE

THERE WAS SERIOUS FIRE IN USA EMB(OLD CHANCERY)TODAY.MUCH
SMOKE BUT NOBODY INJURED.SWITCHBOARD DOWN.I AGREED USA AIR
ATTACHE COULD USE OUR DIRECT DIAL LINE TO CALL USA EMB OTT
TO REPORT.

2.PLS ENSURE USA EMB/STATE DEPT AWARE OF OUR WILLINGNESS TO
HELP,ESPECIALLY ON EVE OF SHULTZ VISIT.

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EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES
OTTAWA, CANADA

February 8, 1988

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Dear Mr. Minister:

Secretary of State Shultz has asked that I transmit to you the enclosed text of the speech which he gave February 5 at the University of Washington on U.S.- Soviet relations. The speech merits special attention since it was intended to present the U.S. approach to dealing with the USSR under Gorbachev.

The speech deals with the changing nature of the world at large as well as the changes now underway in the Soviet Union.

The peoples who are profiting most from this change -- in fact who are leading it -- are the political democracies and the free market economies of the Western world. We believe that the changes now underway in the Soviet Union are, in the deepest sense, a reaction to the change being led by our side. The changes in the Soviet Union as it tries to catch up to the Western world create the possibility of a more satisfactory U.S.-Soviet relationship.

We have gone far over the last few years to construct a durable framework for building such a relationship, a framework which provides a practical agenda if the Soviets are willing to reexamine their interests in ways that are closer to international norms. That framework is flexible enough to deal with the positive aspects of Soviet behavior but also the negative if that proves necessary.

We do not claim that a fundamental transformation of the Soviet Union is at hand. There is real uncertainty whether Gorbachev can succeed in modernizing the Soviet Union -- and whether, if he succeeds, the Soviet Union will be a greater or lesser threat. That means realism about the Soviet Union; maintaining Western political, economic and military strength, including a strong nuclear and conventional deterrent; and patient, consistent pursuit of dialogue with the Soviets.

The Right Honorable

Joe Clark, P.C., M.P.


Secretary of State for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

-2-

This is an ambitious program but one that is realizable if the Soviet Union is willing to modernize its approach to us and the rest of the world. There is some evidence that such a willingness is there.

The Secretary's address comes at the beginning of an active period of U.S.-Soviet diplomacy. The Secretary will go to Moscow later this month to review the entire range of issues in the relationship and to start paving the way for the Moscow summit. As agreed during Gorbachev's visit to Washington, we plan to hold the Moscow summit in the first half of the year. Consultations with our allies will of course be an important part of this process. As we move forward, we appreciate your support and counsel.

Sincerely,



Thomas M. T. Niles
Ambassador

SHULTZ DETAILS NATURE OF CURRENT U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

Seattle -- Secretary of State Shultz says recent U.S. interaction with the Soviet Union "is a hopeful beginning to a long and purposeful effort to establish a new pattern of more constructive relations."

In a February 5 speech to the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies in Seattle, Shultz said the U.S.-Soviet relationship "will always be unique" and that it seems unlikely it "will ever lose what always has been and is today a strongly wary and at times adversarial element."

Nevertheless, the secretary said, the United States can work to build "a relationship with the Soviet Union that, while remaining competitive, also is less dangerous."

Still America's "security, freedom and prosperity will continue to rest on nuclear deterrence," Shultz said, "on our system of alliances, on our efforts to expand and strengthen democracy and a free international economy, and above all on our own strength and will to defend our interests and values."

Following is text of the secretary's remarks, as prepared for delivery:

-6-

Our relationship with the Soviet Union has preoccupied American foreign policy for nearly half a century. Few public figures in the post-war world have done so much as Scoop Jackson to shape American thinking about that relationship. So I was pleased and honored to be invited here by the Henry M. Jackson School of International Affairs.

Scoop Jackson believed passionately in democracy, and saw clearly the threat that totalitarianism posed to it. He argued that the Soviet challenge came in many forms, and that there was a close relationship among all the Soviet policies and actions that gave us concern, from the Soviet Union's accumulation of military power, to its projection of that power outside its borders, to its denial of the individual's fundamental rights and freedoms. He fought with great energy and skill to marshal the will and resources of the Western democracies to protect their freedom and advance their vision of a peaceful and just world.

Scoop Jackson believed that the West must be realistic about the Soviet Union. He had faith in the West's ability to muster the strength to deal with that reality. He saw that if we maintained both our strength and our realism, and dealt forthrightly with East-West differences, we might ultimately shape the conditions for a new Soviet-American relationship that would secure both peace and freedom.

This vision of the problem and the solution has stood up well. America has restored its strength and stayed realistic; this in turn has had a remarkable impact on the pace, scope and productivity of U.S.-Soviet relations. The change in the tempo of U.S.-Soviet relations is also occurring as part of a larger transformation of our world.

The changes sometimes are subtle, sometimes dramatic. The U.S.-Soviet relationship both influences and is deeply affected by these changes.

The emerging features of global change are evident all around us:
-- The rapidity both of technological innovation and the means to distribute that technology on a global scale. Scientific, economic and political matters are now global in dimension.

-- Increasing economic interdependence, combined with the appearance of new centers of economic wealth, particularly in Asia.

-- The dispersion of political power, although key elements of the bipolar, post-war world endure.

-- And the common thread in all these changes: The imperative of knowledge -- its discovery, its transmission as information, and the education needed to use it. The speed of human transactions is accelerating. Openness and communication are key to the creation and mastery of change.

The net result is a strong and encouraging trend toward democracy, openness and freedom, both within and among nations. The countries that are advancing economically, socially and politically these days are those which have adopted greater freedom in the marketplace and in their political institutions. In a world where information and innovation are the engines for modernity, societies that suppress innovation and imprison information are falling farther and farther behind.

The changes now taking place in the communist world are, in this sense, profoundly reactive, a halting and anxious attempt to catch up to the dynamism and creativity of the West. We hear much of "new thinking" these days. We should be clear what it represents. It is an effort to come to grips with the reality of a world being shaped not by the Soviet Union and its allies, but by the community of free nations -- and the force of freedom.

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One consequence of this change is fresh hope for an eventual end to the grim experiment with totalitarianism that, for most of the 20th century, has mocked mankind's hopes for a human community based on peace and freedom. But that experiment is still with us, and must be dealt with. This means that the American-Soviet relationship will remain a central U.S. concern for decades to come.

The question we confront is whether we can fashion a U.S.-Soviet relationship that permits both of us to devote our energies less to confronting one another, and more to mastering the challenges of global change, both in our countries and as important powers in a complex international environment.

The world which emerged after World War II was a bipolar world. The gravitational pull exerted by the concentration of economic and military power in two such different systems as those of the United States and Soviet Union was enormous. The principal limitation on the actions of the two former allies was the power of the other.

Restraining the abuse of Soviet military power was the focal point of U.S. foreign policy after 1945. Containment sought to deal with the problem directly, and led to the establishment of NATO and a global system of alliance relationships. U.S. efforts to revive the world economic system helped deny Moscow options for expansion.

But the bipolar world which emerged in the post-war era has been steadily eroded by accelerating changes on a global scale -- changes which have widely dispersed political, economic and military power. The rigidly centralized Soviet system, with its insistence on maintaining a monopoly on information, was incompatible with many of the most important trends.

Nevertheless, until quite recently, the Soviet Union largely blinded itself to the significance of these trends. Soviet achievement of strategic parity, and improvements in living standards over the immediate post-war era, coupled with perceptions of U.S. weakness after our withdrawal from Vietnam, temporarily masked the Soviet Union's growing systemic problems and irrelevance as a model for the developing world.

Thus, Soviet leaders talked of a shift in the "correlation of forces," and moved aggressively at home and abroad:

-- The Soviets continued to place an excessive emphasis on military strength, with a military build-up which showed no signs of abating even after the achievement of strategic parity, and which appeared designed for Soviet expansion at the expense of the security of other nations;

-- Moscow continued to rely on force -- or the provision of the means of force -- to extend its influence abroad. This tendency reached its height, but by no means its end, with the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan.

-- Repression of dissidence at home reached a post-Stalin peak in the final years of the Brezhnev leadership, in contravention of solemn Soviet international undertakings, and despite the growing trend toward democracy and openness throughout the world.

By the late 1970s, however, Soviet practices began to confront changing realities. Even the Soviets now describe this period as one of stagnation and misdirection.

The United States, for its part, initially attempted to preserve a one-dimensional detente which had not served as a brake on Soviet unilateralism. But after this period of hesitation, America responded.

In electing Ronald Reagan, Americans in 1980 served notice that they were prepared to do what was necessary to contain Soviet

expansionism, albeit in a world greatly different from that which emerged from the ashes of the Second World War.

From his earliest days, President Reagan has pursued a three-tracked strategy.

Of critical importance was the restoration of American strength -- modernizing our armed forces, rebuilding the confidence and unity of our alliances, strengthening our economy, encouraging the growth of democracy and freedom throughout the world. Western firmness and vigilance were necessary then, are so now, and must continue.

We sought to bring America's restored strength to bear in accordance with a realistic appraisal of the nature of Soviet society and its policies. Rather than focus only on the weapons build-up that is a symptom of the East-West conflict, the administration sought to confront the full range of issues which affected the relationship.

Thus:

-- Rather than satisfying ourselves with half-steps on arms control, we set out to achieve agreements which would actually reduce arsenals, enhance security, and be effectively verifiable;

-- Rather than rail ineffectually against intervention by Soviet forces and Soviet clients in the developing world, we worked with those prepared to defend their freedom to demonstrate that the price of adventurism was high and lasting;

-- Rather than treat human rights as an embarrassing afterthought, we recognized that these issues are a permanent and positive component of international relations that is central both to our vision of the world and to our security. We have made them an integral part of the dialogue, one that takes genuine pride of place in discussions at all levels.

-- Rather than treating bilateral relations as inducements or rewards for Soviet moves in other areas, we have established high standards of reciprocity of benefit in exchanges.

Our emphasis on strength and realism did not preclude dialogue with Moscow. Indeed, we sought to make that dialogue productive in bringing the Soviet Union to understand the importance of changes in its approach to issues in which the United States -- and the world -- had a legitimate interest. We have insisted that the dialogue cover the full range of such interests, from arms control and regional issues to human rights and bilateral affairs, and we have sharply defined American objectives in each of these areas. We have stressed that all of the broad areas of this agenda are closely related, in the conviction that a stable and constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship can be achieved and sustained only if Moscow is willing to take concrete steps to resolve critical problems. The Soviets seem increasingly to understand that reality.

While the interrelationships among the areas are strong and inescapable, we have also maintained flexibility in how we pursue our interests in each. We do not accept the assumption that linkages can be applied indiscriminately, however tempting it might be to try linkage when there is progress in some areas but not in others.

Clearly, we recognize that exceptional circumstances may arise where progress in one area must be made contingent on another, especially in the face of Soviet actions which undermine the foundation of a stable peace.

Yet it is impossible to see how we might expect to get anywhere with a policy which dictates that nothing can be solved until everything is solved. The U.S.-Soviet relationship is too difficult and complex to make that a practical option.

The flaws of indiscriminate linkage as an instrument of policy 000407

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have been demonstrated over the years. As a policy, it deprives us of the opportunity to pursue realistic agreements that serve Western interests. It yields the initiative to the Soviets to set the pace and scope of relations with us and with our allies. It disrupts the consistency and discipline that are essential for successful Western pursuit of a long-term strategy for a more peaceful and democratic world.

And most important, linkage as practiced in the past has not worked. If, for example, the Soviet Union leaves Afghanistan, it will not do so because the United States imposed a grain embargo or withholds arms reduction agreements that make sense for Western security. Rather, the Soviets will return the fate of Afghanistan back to the Afghan people because the Afghans have struggled with courage and determination, and because the world community, led by the United States, ultimately has responded where it matters --- directly on the ground, with material and political support.

Despite such outrages as the Soviet downing of a Korean airliner in 1983, or Soviet espionage against our embassy in Moscow, President Reagan persevered in our agenda, keeping our arms control negotiators in Geneva, and our high-level dialogue with Moscow on track. One result is the INF treaty, which fulfills our negotiating objectives and will make an impressive contribution to U.S. and allied security.

Rather than break contact, we have tailored our responses to the issue at hand. For instance, after the downing of KAL 007, we suspended Soviet Aeroflot service to the United States, even as our arms control negotiators returned to Geneva. We sought new procedures to ensure that a similar tragedy would not recur. We achieved solid results -- an improved civil aviation agreement that guarantees equal benefits for the American carrier, and an agreement on civil air safety in the North Pacific that benefits everyone flying to Japan and Korea.

Thus, our approach is to recognize the interrelationship of our interests in arms reductions, human rights, regional affairs and bilateral relations, and to work toward a global environment in which real, measurable progress is attainable in all. When we have reached agreements that further our interests, we have signed them, while pressing forward with unfinished business. This, in turn, has imparted a consistency and reliability to American foreign policy that have contributed to the confidence of our friends and allies, created strong incentives for the Soviet Union to negotiate realistically, and have produced concrete agreements that enhance Western security.

By the end of the president's first term, the United States and the West had begun to shape new conditions. Even before Mikhail Gorbachev became general secretary, the Soviet Union had begun to respond. Having failed by threat and boycott to force the West to negotiate arms control on Soviet terms, the Soviets returned to the bargaining table at the Nuclear and Space Talks in 1985. Within the Soviet Union itself, the realities of a resurgent, self-confident United States, of a turn to democracy and free enterprise throughout the developing world, of the inability of Soviet client regimes to consolidate their hold on power, and of a rising chorus of international condemnation of Soviet human rights practices, had created a crisis of confidence.

Increasingly, Soviet citizens -- and ultimately their leaders -- came to realize that the Soviet system was no longer working and that the Soviet Union risked falling further behind. The process of coming to terms with present day realities accelerated once General Secretary Gorbachev came to power.

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And in terms of concrete results across the broad agenda the Reagan administration had been pursuing, the record has grown increasingly impressive.

-- The Soviet Union has accepted our realistic and comprehensive framework for dealing in practical ways with the issues that divide East and West. By encompassing the full range of issues in U.S.-Soviet relations, this framework has given structure and direction -- an agenda -- to our dialogue. Clearly, dialogue by itself is not enough; what counts is a change in Soviet conduct. But establishing the framework was an important step toward the progress that has followed.

-- We have concluded the INF Treaty, which is remarkable both for its goal of eliminating an entire class of U.S. and Soviet missiles, and for its unprecedented verification measures.

-- We have made important strides toward conclusion of a treaty that would cut in half the U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals.

-- We have improved government-to-government communications by upgrading the Hotline and through the agreement to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in Washington and Moscow.

-- We have seen some modest progress on human rights and humanitarian issues, and we have established regular exchanges of views on regional conflicts, subjects which the Soviets once dismissed as off-limits or of secondary importance to arms control.

-- We have breathed new life into a program of bilateral cooperative programs ranging from people-to-people contacts among young people, to improved air service between the United States and USSR, to scientific, cultural and educational exchanges. These programs help lower the artificial barriers the Soviets have long maintained and can enrich both countries.

This is a hopeful beginning to a long and purposeful effort to establish a new pattern of more constructive relations.

It is much in vogue now -- perhaps I should say in "time" -- to attribute to Gorbachev the credit for this progress. Clearly the Soviet Union contributed, and we welcome that. As President Reagan once said, "it takes two to tango." Both sides benefit from this process, as they must if it is to endure. We are watching with great interest the Soviet experiment with "openness" and "restructuring," and hope these evolving concepts result in changes which address American concerns. We already see some evidence that they might.

Yet the truth is that the agreements that have been reached recently, and the prospects for future progress, are founded in American "new thinking" and innovation both in our broad strategy and in our solutions to specific problems.

All of the agreements I just mentioned stem from American initiatives and ideas. And there are more, such as deep cuts in strategic nuclear arms, the prospects for negotiated solutions to regional conflicts, and changes in Soviet human rights practices, that have served Western interests well.

Moreover, the process now underway in U.S.-Soviet relations has occurred because it enjoys the broad support of the American people. For the first time in years, American policy towards the Soviet Union enjoys a strong domestic consensus. If this consensus can be maintained -- and it should be -- American policy toward the Soviet Union will be bolstered by an almost unprecedented continuity and stability, and continue to be dynamic and creative in pursuing real solutions to problems.

A better relationship between the United States and the USSR may indeed be possible. Such a relationship would be marked by the cand000409

to recognize our differences, the initiative to solve them where we can, and the ability to manage our differences peacefully where competition endures, as surely it will. During one of his visits to Washington last fall, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze may have been thinking along these same lines. He made a point which left a strong impression on me.

He noted that over the past several years, the United States and the Soviet Union had taken a remarkable number of steps in various areas. We had reached a point, he concluded, where our quantitative progress had created the possibility of a qualitative change in the nature of the relationship. We seemed to be moving, he said, toward a more normal relationship.

I have since thought a lot about the foreign minister's words, and I have decided that I both disagree and agree.

I find it difficult to believe that our relations with the Soviet Union will ever be "normal" in the sense that we have normal relations with most other countries. There are only two superpowers in the world. We are vastly different in the ways we view the role of the individual in our societies, and in the ways we relate to other countries. The relationship between us will always be unique. It seems unlikely that the U.S.-Soviet relationship will ever lose what always has been and is today a strongly wary and at times adversarial element.

Nor do I think that the accumulation of individual agreements or cooperative arrangements will by itself result in a quantum leap to a qualitatively different kind of relationship. The differences between us and the suspicions they generate are too deep. Experience has proved that agreements alone cannot bridge such a divide.

But I believe there is a sense in which the foreign minister was right. The case can be made that we are near a threshold of a sustainable U.S.-Soviet relationship. On the U.S. side, there is for the first time in many years a strong consensus on how we should deal with the Soviet Union. On the Soviet side, there may be for the first time ever, and as a result of necessity -- a willingness to reexamine Soviet security and other interests in ways that are closer to international norms.

One often hears the question, "does the United States want reform in the Soviet Union to succeed or fail?" I believe that posing the question in that way misses the point. We have worked long to put in place a policy that is both flexible and resilient enough to adapt to changing circumstances, and to expand cooperation whenever the Soviets are ready to reach realistic agreements. In short, we are well positioned to deal with the best and worst of Soviet behavior.

As interesting as the changes now taking place in the Soviet Union may be, our concern must be with the way these changes affect, in concrete terms, the interests embodied in our broad agenda. We must deal with the Soviet Union as it is, not as we wish it to be. The Soviet system is just beginning an attempt at economic reform. It has barely scratched the surface at structural political reform. We have not seen changes that suggest the Soviet Union has altered its historical objective of altering the international system to its advantage.

Thus, we should welcome change in the Soviet Union -- and wish the Soviet people well -- precisely to the extent that the Soviet effort at modernization squares with American hopes for a safer world and a more productive U.S.-Soviet relationship. We are convinced, moreover, that progress in the areas of greatest interest to the United States and the world would also best serve the people of the

Soviet Union.

What, realistically, can we expect in U.S.-Soviet relations during a period of change within the Soviet Union and on a global basis?

Our ultimate goal has not changed -- a Soviet Union which deals with other countries and with its own people through dialogue rather than intimidation. This would be a sweeping change, one which would reverse much of this century's international politics. That destination is distant, and getting there will confront us with many ambiguities about the scope, durability and meaning of change in the Soviet Union and in the international environment.

Thus, it would be mistaken and unrealistic to expect to replace, in the foreseeable future, the international security system. Our security, freedom and prosperity will continue to rest on nuclear deterrence, on our system of alliances, on our efforts to expand and strengthen democracy and a free international economy, and above all on our own strength and will to defend our interests and values.

We can, however, work at building a relationship with the Soviet Union that, while remaining competitive, also is less dangerous. Measured progress across our four-part agenda with the Soviet Union provides a blueprint to this end, a framework for steps that will strengthen international stability and foster the conditions for future progress.

These near-term goals are attainable over the coming months and years if we, as a nation, pursue them patiently, steadily and seriously, and if the Soviet Union works with equal dedication to modernizing its relationship with the rest of the world. Achieving these goals would go far toward correcting the Soviet excesses of the last decade or so.

On the military side, our objective over the next few years is to deal with the consequences of the massive Soviet military build-up since the mid-1970s. This will require a continued, strong effort by the United States and our allies to modernize and strengthen conventional and nuclear deterrence. A robust defense budget -- as well as strong security and economic assistance -- are crucial if we are to continue to foreclose Moscow's other options. At the same time, we see greater opportunities than ever before to achieve balanced, effective, verifiable arms control agreements that would redress existing imbalances and impart greater stability and predictability to the military aspects of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

-- The INF treaty would eliminate entirely an important element of the Soviet military build-up of the 1970s, the deployment of the SS-20 missile, as well as the older SS-4 missiles and the threat posed by the Soviets' shorter-range INF missiles. Ratification and full implementation of the treaty will contribute substantially to Western security.

-- The next step is a verifiable treaty which cuts U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive arms in half and establishes a stable strategic nuclear balance. We will work hard to complete a treaty by the time President Reagan goes to Moscow this year. The Soviet Union has pledged a similar effort. Many of the critical elements for such a treaty are already in sight, but much remains to be done, particularly in the area of verification. Completing a treaty in the next few months will depend greatly on Soviet willingness to work cooperatively and creatively with us to solve these complex problems.

-- We also will continue a vigorous SDI program to see whether strategic stability might rest increasingly on defense-based

deterrence rather than exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation. This program is essential both because of Soviet strategic defense programs, and because it may establish a basis in the future for a safer way to secure international peace.

-- We and our allies will persevere in efforts to achieve greater stability and openness regarding conventional military forces in Europe; to achieve a truly global and verifiable ban on chemical weapons; to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and to seek realistic, step-by-step progress on nuclear testing, beginning with needed verification improvements to the existing limitations in the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties.

-- We will continue to insist on concrete Soviet steps toward the freer flow of information, people and ideas set out in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the follow-on documents of the Helsinki process. Without detracting from the positive steps that have been taken in recent months, we will not shrink from insisting that those families who remain divided be allowed to join their loved ones, that those who wish to emigrate be let go, that religious believers be allowed to practice their religion, and that their rights be guaranteed by appropriate institutional safeguards.

-- To Americans, the human rights issue will only be resolved when old abuses are cured and new ones cease to emerge. Given the nature of the Soviet system, that situation may be years off, but there can and must be steady progress toward it. Further, as the president stated in his Berlin initiative last June, one place we will look for a real change of policy is in Eastern Europe.

On regional affairs, we cannot assume that the Soviet Union has abandoned its traditional inclination to extend its political writ and cast its military shadow over other regions of the world. Thus, the United States must be prepared to support those who are willing to fight for their freedom and self-determination. If, however, the Soviet Union is willing to rethink past positions, we will lend our hand to efforts to bring peace and national reconciliation to regions now torn by conflict.

-- On the pivotal question of Afghanistan, the Soviets have professed to recognize the importance of a prompt withdrawal of Soviet forces and of the need to allow the Afghan people to determine their own fate. We look to the Soviet leaders to act on this recognition and to put forward promptly a plan for the rapid, complete and irreversible removal of Soviet forces by the end of this year.

-- Similarly, we will press the Soviet Union to contribute concretely to efforts to bring negotiated political solutions to other regions of the world where Soviet clients are fighting their own people and their neighbors.

On the bilateral side of the relationship, we have already put in place a framework of agreements which serve concrete U.S. interests -- on civil aviation, on space cooperation, and on exchange activities in the cultural and scientific fields. At the Washington Summit, the president and the general secretary identified additional areas where the two sides have much to contribute to each other. Some of these involve potentially valuable activities to deal with changes in our world -- for instance, bilateral and multilateral efforts to study the consequences of changes in the global climate and environment, to explore the prospects for nuclear fusion as an unlimited source of energy, and to harness the potential of such areas of increasing importance as the Arctic.

What can we do to maximize our chances of realizing these objectives?

Our principal job is to continue shaping conditions that will affect Soviet behavior. Western strength and vigilance are key to this.

If we do our job at shaping those conditions, the overall framework which we have already put in place can continue to be an important means to our goals. It is more important than ever that both sides share a certain common approach if we are to create the kind of qualitatively different relationship we seek.

During General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to Washington, I shared with him, in the form of a luncheon toast, a set of guidelines which might apply to both sides as we build on our accomplishments thus far. They are worth repeating.

-- First: The U.S.-Soviet relationship is as important as it is unique. It is important because we each bear an immense burden of leadership in the world. It is unique because the nuclear era demands that we engage each other despite our profound differences. As General Secretary Gorbachev said in his book, "There is no getting away from each other."

-- Second: Our relationship will continue to be a difficult one to manage. We have contrasting philosophies, political systems, and national interests. Our basic values, systems and interests will persist, even as the necessity to work together increases.

-- Third: We must be realistic, avoiding extremes, either of hostility or euphoria, through the ups and downs of our relations. The best approach to dealing with one another is to be down-to-earth, pragmatic and businesslike in seeking to solve concrete problems.

-- Fourth: We must speak with clarity and candor to one another about our differences. This is why we have always stressed to the Soviets the fundamental importance we attach to human rights, as set forth in the universal declaration and the Helsinki Final Act. As the European Community heads of government stated December 5: "Respect for human rights and freedom is a prerequisite for confidence, understanding and cooperation." We have spoken with candor about regional issues, as well. The Soviets have not hesitated to speak their mind to us. And we have made some progress. As President Reagan has said, we owe each other the tribute of candor, and candor will help us get results.

-- Fifth: We must look to the future without neglecting the lessons of the past. Too often, we face the past and back into the future. In five to 10 years, our world will be vastly different from the one we know today, and from the post-war world of the past 40 years, which has conditioned so much of our thinking.

-- This leads to a sixth point: The recognition that openness to ideas, information and contacts is the key to future success. The conceptual breakthroughs embodied in the INF treaty's provisions for verification and on-site verification are but one example of the powerful pull which openness is already exerting in a key area of U.S.-Soviet relations.

I concluded my toast by urging that the United States and the Soviet Union to seek steady progress toward a more open, more predictable, more stable and constructive relationship. In this time of change, I argued, new patterns of interaction also offer new opportunities for cooperation and progress, and we should grasp those opportunities.

The general secretary did not say whether or not he agreed with me. But I am convinced, and experience has shown, that an approach which is less realistic, an approach which is less flexible, an approach which is less forward-looking, will be inadequate to the

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task.

I am also convinced that, for our part, Americans can approach the challenges and opportunities posed by the current moment in U.S.-Soviet relations with the same leadership, confidence and innovation that have characterized our national approach to change in other areas, from politics to technology.

Americans are not afraid of change or new thinking -- in the Soviet Union or anywhere else. Two hundred years ago, we enshrined the concept of new thinking in our national life, and we have lived by it since. We have thrived precisely because we have challenged and questioned and have not shied away from change, but have thirsted for it. We have, as Scoop Jackson advocated, been forthright about both the challenges we confront and about the changing environment in which they play out. We have been strong in dealing with the challenges -- and always, we have tried to make things better, to advance the American vision of a more democratic, more peaceful and more prosperous world. Today, we recognize that a potentially important experiment is getting underway in the Soviet Union. It suggests the possibility of a far more satisfactory U.S.-Soviet relationship than we have known in the post-war era, a relationship which could be a constructive element in a changing world.

Americans are willing to work with dedication and creativity to fashion such a relationship. It is a goal which is achievable, if the Soviet leadership is willing to join us in making change for the better a permanent reality.

(end text)

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CABINET DU SECRETAIRE D'ETAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES

ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

From/De : THOMAS M T NILES, AMBASSADOR
EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. : A-01027-88

Subject/ USA:TEXT OF SPEECH USA/SOVIET RELATIONS
Objet: POLITICS UNITED STATES * POLITIQUE ETATS-UNIS

Action div./Dir. resp.: URD
Info div(s)/Dir(s) informee(s): RBD/IDD/MINA/JUDD

Let./Tel. dated	Date sent to division	Deadline date
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08 FEB 88	15 FEB 88	**29 FEB 88**

Comments/Commentaires

URR for reply - circulated as appropriate
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FOR DIVISIONAL USE
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JOE CLARK APR - 6 1988 |

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LES ARCHIVES DE MINA DOIVENT ETRE AVISEES DE TOUT CHANGEMENT	992-6428

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Blanche Retourner aux archives de MINA lorsque suite a ete donnee	
Yellow - Divisional secretary	Green - File with original incoming letter
Jaune Secretaire de direction	Verte Au dossier avec la lettre recue

ACTION
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JAN 14 1988

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---SHULTZ VISIT TO MOSCO:ALLIANCE CONSULTATION

USA PERMREP INFORMED COLLEAGUES 12JAN THAT SECTY STATE SHULTZ
WOULD MEET WITH SHEVARDNADZE IN MOSCO,PROBABLY DURING THIRD WEEK
FEB.AT PRESENT,HIS INTENTION IS TO RETURN TO WSHDC VIA BRU WHERE
HE WOULD BRIEF COUNCIL ON RESULTS OF MG.SHOULD MTG HERE TAKE
PLACE IT IS EXPECTED THAT ATTENDANCE WOULD BE ON SAME BASIS AS
THAT LAST OCT,IE THOSE FMS WHC WERE ABLE WOULD ATTEND BUT THOSE
WHC HAD PREVIOUS IMPORTANT OBLIGATIONS OR HAD TO TRAVEL LONG
DISTANCES SHOULD NOT/NOT FEEL CONSTRAINED TO PARTICIPATE.WILL
ADVISE WHEN DATES BECOME FIRM AND WHEN PLANS OF OTHER FMS BECOME
KNOWN.

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REF CURTEL WJGR1352 16DEC(NOTAL)

---CHINESE VIEWS ON REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT

SUMMARY:CHINESE WELCOME INF AGREEMENT BUT DOWNPLAY ITS SIGNIFICANCE
IN TERMS OF ARMS CONTROL AND ARGUE ONLY THREE TO FOUR PERCENT
OF NUCLEAR STOCKPILE WILL BE ELIMINATED AS A RESULT.POINTING
OUT THAT IMPACT ON ASIA IS OF COURSE LESS THAN ON EUROPE CHINESE
ARE MORE CONCERNED BY REGIONAL CONFLICTS ON WHICH THEY PROFESS
TO SEE LITTLE MOVEMENT.CHINESE SUGGEST MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE
OF INF IS POLITICAL AND WILL WATCH CAREFULLY TO SEE IF NEW
SOVIET FLEXIBILITY IS MORE THAN TACTICAL.

2.REPORT:FURTHER TO CALL ON MFA(REFTEL),WE PRESENTED COPY
OF PMS STATEMENT TO AND EXCHANGED VIEWS WITH XU YIMIN,SEC
GEN OF PEIJING INSTITUTE FOR INNATL STRATEGIC STUDIES(BISS)
AND AMB GAO E,DEP DIR GEN OF CENTRE OF INNATL STUDIES OF
THE STATE COUNCIL(CIS).

3.PCTH AGREED THAT INF AGREEMENT WAS QUOTE A VERY GOOD THING
UNQUOTE AND QUOTE A SIGN THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR DISARMAMENT
HAVE TAKEN A SMALL STEP FORWARD UNQUOTE.BOTH REITERATED CHINESE
...2

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PAGE TWO WJGR1362 CONF

CALCULATION THAT DESTRUCTION OF INF WEAPONS WILL ONLY ELIMINATE THREE TO FOUR PERCENT OF NUCLEAR ARMS (A FIGURE WHICH MYSTIFIES OUR USA COLLEAGUES). BUT IN TERMS OF ARMS CONTROL, CHINESE POINT OUT LIMITATIONS OF AGREEMENT AND DIFFICULTIES WHICH LIE AHEAD IN IMPLEMENTING IT AND MOVING TO MORE DIFFICULT AREAS SUCH AS STRATEGIC MISSILES, CONVENTIONAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND OF COURSE ARMS RACE IN SPACE - WHICH XINHUA SUGGESTS BOTH SUPERPOWERS WANT TO QUOTE LEGALIZE UNQUOTE SURPRISINGLY, NONE POINT TO MAJOR SUCCESSSES SUCH AS DESTRUCTION OF MISSILES (AND THUS IMPOSSIBILITY TO MOVE THEM FROM EUROPEAN TO ASIAN THEATRE) OR BREAKTHROUGH ON VERIFICATION ISSUE. CHINESE SUGGEST THAT ONLY TIME WILL TELL WHETHER SUPERPOWERS ARE SINCERE IN QUEST FOR REAL DISARMAMENT AND WHETHER THEY WILL HAVE THE NERVE AND DETERMINATION TO COPE WITH NEW PROBLEMS WHICH WILL EMERGE AS FURTHER NEGS PROCEED.

4. XU EXPLAINS INF SUCCESS BY REALIZATION ON BOTH SIDES THAT

(A) SURVIVING DESTRUCTION OF OTHER IS PATENTLY IMPOSSIBLE

AND

(B) THEY MUST CONCENTRATE THEIR EFFORTS ON BUILDING ECONOMIC STRENGTH IF THEY WANT TO AVOID CONTINUED RELATIVE DECLINE IN EMERGING MULTIPOLAR WORLD.

WORLD AFFAIRS WILL LESS AND LESS BE DICTATED BY SUPERPOWERS (A LONG-STANDING CHINESE HOPE).

5. BOTH XU AND GAO WERE MORE INTERESTED IN PROGRESS, OR LACK

...3

PAGE THREE WJCR1368 CONF

THEY SEE LITTLE PROOF THAT GORBACHEV WILL MOVE DECISIVELY ON AFGHANISTAN AND VIETNAM/ KAMPUCHIA AND SUGGEST THAT WAIT AND SEE ATTITUDE IS MOST REALISTIC COURSE OF ACTION. THEY ARE CONCERNED ABOUT SUGGESTION THAT JAPAN COULD PLAY GREATER MILITARY ROLE IN CONTAINING USSR AND ARGUE THAT EVEN MODEST INCREASE IN JPNSE MILITARY EXPENDITURE CAN LEAD TO DANGEROUS PRECEDENT. XU DISMISSED COMPARISON BETWEEN FRANCE/FRG WHO HAVE MOVED FROM MISTRUST TO COOPERATION AND CHINA/JAPAN WHO CANNOT/HAVE TROUBLE-FREE RELATIONSHIP AS LONG AS QUOTE REVANCHIST UNQUOTE ELEMENTS REMAIN ACTIVE IN JAPAN - AND MORE IMPORTANTLY AS LONG AS CHINA REMAINS WEAKER THAN JAPAN. CHINESE RESENTMENT OVER JPNSE ATROCITIES REMAINS STRONG, AND INFERIORITY COMPLEX IRKSOME. XU EVEN ARGUED JAPAN REALLY WANTS TO SEE CHINA REMAIN BACKWARD.

6. WE TOOK OPPORTUNITY OF DISCUSSION WITH GAO WHO SERVED FIVE YEARS IN PYONGYANG TO PROD HIM ON PROSPECTS FOR RELAXATION OF TENSIONS IN KOREAN PENINSULA AND CHINESE INFLUENCE ON PYONGYANG. GAO CONVINCED IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR DPRK TO LAUNCH ATTACK ON ROK WITHOUT CHINESE OR SOVIET SUPPORT, NEITHER OF WHICH WANT WAR IN WHICH THEY COULD BE INVOLVED. HE SAID NORTH KOREANS ARE ACUTELY AWARE THAT DESPITE LARGER INFANTRY, THEIR WEAPONS ARE LESS SOPHISTICATED THAN THOSE PROVIDED TO ROK BY USA.

...4

PAGE FOUR WJGR1368 CONF

ECON WEAKNESS OF NORTH COULD NOT/NOT ENABLE IT TO SUSTAIN
OFFENSIVE.

7.GAO FELT VERY STRONGLY ABOUT ANNUAL TEAM SPIRIT EXERCISES.
A SUBJECT HE HAS DISCUSSED REPEATEDLY WITH USA AND KOREAN
SCHOLARS AND MILITARY EXPERTS.DESPITE USA ARGUMENT THAT EXERCISES
WERE DEFENSIVE IN NATURE,GAO SAID THEY DEEPLY ALARMED DPRK
WHO REACTED BY SEEKING MORE ARMS FROM USSR.LATTER WAS ONLY
TOO READY TO OBLIGE IN EXCHANGE FOR RIGHT OF OVERFLIGHT BY
SOVIET MILITARY AIRCRAFT WHICH FLEW SOUTHWARD VERY NEAR TO
CHINESE BORDER.THUS CHINESE SUFFERED DIRECTLY AS RESULT OF
SITU CREATED BY JCINT ROK/USA EXERCISES,BUT COULD DO NOTHING
IN RESPONSE.

8.GAO ECHOED COMMENTS MADE BY OTHER CHINESE OFFICIALS AND
SCHOLARS ABOUT KOREAN CHARACTER WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS PROUD,
PRICKLY AND INDEPENDENT.GIVEN NORTH KOREANS VERY STRONG SENSE
OF SELF-RESPECT AND LACK OF CONFIDENCE,CHINESE ARE CAUTIOUS
TO DISCUSS ISSUES WITH NORTH KOREANS ON A BASIS OF STRICT
EQUALITY.IF KOREAN MIND IS MADE UP ON CERTAIN POINT,GAO
COMMENTED,ALL THAT CHINESE WOULD OR COULD DO WAS TO EXPRESS
THEIR OWN STAND.HE DID NOT/NOT VOLUNTEER MUCH REASSURANCE
THAT CHINA WOULD HAVE MUCH SWAY WITH THEIR PROUD NEIGHBOURS
IN A TIME OF CRISIS.

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**ACTION
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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cc RBR 20/12
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---PM STATEMENT ON REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT:MTG WITH MFA
AMBASSADOR ACCOMPANIED BY POLITICAL COUNSELLOR CALLED 16DEC
ON LIU HUAQIU,DIRECTOR,AMERICAS AND OCEANIA DEPT TO PRESENT
COPY OF PMS STATEMENT.

2.LIU,WHO HAS RECENTLY RETURNED FROM VISIT TO AUSTRALIA AND
NEW ZEALAND WITH STATE COUNSELLOR GU MU,WELCOMED PRESENTATION
MADE BY AMB AND NOTED BASIC SIMILARITY OF CDN AND CHINESE
STATEMENTS(IE,AGREEMENT ON INF IS IMPORTANT STEP,BUT ONLY
A BEGINNING IN TERMS OF COMPREHENSIVE ARMS CONTROL).LIU
RECOGNIZED SIGNIFICANCE OF PMS STATEMENT AND INDICATED
CONTENTS WILL BE COMMUNICATED TO FM WU.

3.HE SAID US AMB ROWNEY HAD BRIEFED CHINESE SIDE ON SUMMIT
AND HAD EMPHASIZED CONSIDERABLE DIFFERENCES WHICH REMAIN
ON BOTH SIDES RE KEY ISSUES.LIU COMMENTED USSR HAS NOT/NOT
ALTERED ITS GLOBAL GOALS AND STRATEGY EVEN IF NEED TO BUY
TIME TO DEVELOP ECONOMY LED TO MORE CLEVER TACTICS AND MORE
FLEXIBLE/SKILLFUL WORDS.WEAKENED REAGAN ADMINISTRATION,

...2

PAGE TWO WJGR1352 CONF

AND PRESIDENTS DESIRE TO SECURE PLACE IN HISTORY,PRESENTED UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY.CHINESE WELCOMED RESULTS.

4.LIU SAW NO/NO PROGRESS ON QUOTE THREE OBSTACLES UNQUOTE. AMB ASKED FOR CHINESE ASSESSMENT OF RECENT SIHANOUK/HUN SEN MTG,AND VIEWS ON WHAT PRINCE MAY BE UP TO.LIU INDICATED CHINA QUOTE HAS NO/NO OBJECTION TO WHAT HE IS DOING;CHINA WILL SAY NOTHING ABOUT THAT UNQUOTE AND NOTED THAT JAN MEETING UNLIKELY TO BE HELD.LIU LAMENTED THAT SIHANOUK QUOTE KEEPS CHANGING HIS MIND UNQUOTE CONFIRMING CHINESE UNEASE WITH PARIS MEETING(AND APPARENT PLEASURE THAT OBSTACLES TO SIHANOUK INITIATIVE ARE ALREADY CROPPING UP).ASKED ABOUT RUMOURS THAT SIHANOUK MAY TRAVEL TO PRC TO BRIEF CHINESE GOVT,LIU PROFESSED NOT/NOT TO BE AWARE OF ANY PLAN FOR SIHANOUK TO COME SOON.LIU THEN REITERATED WELL KNOWN CHINESE POSITION THAT KEY TO SOLUTION IN CAMBODIA IS FOR USSR TO ADVISE VIETNAM TO WITHDRAW ALL TROOPS.

5.COMMENT:WHILE HE CONFIRMED CHINESE POSITION ON CAMBODIA AND UNEASE WITH SIHANOUK ACTIVITIES,LIU SAID LITTLE ON WASHINGTON SUMMIT EXCEPT TO NOTE THAT CDN AND CHINESE ASSESSMENTS WERE VERY CLOSE.HE WAS NOT/NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT EARLY SETTLEMENT OF AFGHANISTAN ISSUE.HOWEVER,IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN FRANK ASSESSMENT OF CHINESE VIEWS ON EAST-WEST DEVELOPMENTS AS CHINESE

...3

PAGE THREE WJGR1352 CONF D

CONCERNED TO REASSURE US (AND AMERICANS) THAT THERE IS NOTHING NEW IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS OR INDEED ANY CHINESE PERCEPTION THAT THERE MAY BE ANY SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. WHILE LIU RECOGNIZED SOVIET LEADERSHIP WAS COMMITTED TO ECONOMIC REFORM (AS DISTINCT FROM REAL CHANGE OF HEART ON INNATL ISSUES) HE REITERATED CHINESE SCEPTICISM ABOUT IMPLEMENTATION. OLD HABITS ARE MORE ENTRENCHED IN USSR; CULTURAL REVOLUTION HAS PREPARED ALL LEVELS OF CHINESE SOCIETY FOR DEEP AND SIGNIFICANT CHANGES.

6. AMB ALSO RAISED ISSUE OF ANNUAL POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS. SEPARATE TEL WILL FOLLOW.

7. WE WILL IN NEXT FEW DAYS PRESENT PMS STATEMENT AND SEEK VIEWS OF ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS BEIJING INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, CENTER OF INNATL STUDIES OF STATE COUNCIL, AND INSTITUTE OF CONTEMPORARY INNATL RELS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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---REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT: AFGHANISTAN

SUMMARY: AFGHANISTAN DOMINATED DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES
AT THE SUMMIT. ALTHOUGH NO SPECIFIC PROGRESS WAS MADE DURING
THE SUMMIT, DISCUSSIONS WERE FULL AND DETAILED ACCORDING TO
KAMPELMAN IN BRIEFING THIS AFTERNOON. USA IS HOPEFUL THAT
COMING PROXIMITY TALKS IN GENEVA WILL BE PRODUCTIVE.
WASHINGTON IS LOOKING FOR A TIMETABLE ON SOVIET WITHDRAWAL
THAT WOULD BEGIN AND END IN 1988.

2. REPORT: AS EXPECTED, QUESTION OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM
AFGHANISTAN DOMINATED DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES AT SUMMIT.
WHILE THERE HAD BEEN SOME MODEST OPTIMISM HERE THAT SOVIETS
MIGHT MEET USA DEMAND FOR A DATE CERTAIN FOR BEGINNING AND
END OF TROOP WITHDRAWAL, THERE HAD ALSO BEEN CONSIDERABLE

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR1250 CONF

SCEPTICISM. IN THE EVENT ALTHOUGH ISSUE WAS NOT RESOLVED AT SUMMIT BOTH LEADERS DID AGREE THAT SEARCH FOR SOLUTION SHOULD CONTINUE.

3. IN REMARKS AT DEPARTURE CEREMONY AND DURING EVENING ADDRESS TO NATION, PRES REAGAN NOTED THAT DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW HAD BEEN BLUNTLY EXPRESSED ON AFGHANISTAN AND OTHER REGIONAL QUESTIONS, BUT IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO SEARCH FOR REAL POLITICAL SOLUTIONS. THOUGHT WAS ECHOED IN PRESIDENTS ADDRESS TO NATION LAST NIGHT WHEN HE REFERRED TO HIGH HOPES THAT THERE COULD BE MEANINGFUL COOPERATION IN RESOLVING REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND ELSEWHERE. JOINT REAGAN GORBACHEV STATEMENT DID NOT SPECIFICALLY SINGLE OUT AFGHANISTAN DESPITE DOMINANT POSITION IT HAD OCCUPIED IN REGIONAL TALKS.

4. AT FAREWELL PRESS CONFERENCE GORBACHEV WAS MORE SPECIFIC ON AFGHANISTAN BUT HE DID NOT DEPART FROM ESTABLISHED SOVIET POSITIONS INCLUDING MOST RECENT SUGGESTIONS OF TWELVE MONTH WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE:

-USSR WOULD LIKE TO ARRIVE AT A SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO PUT AN END TO THE INTERNAL CONFLICT.

-USSR WAS NOT SEEKING ANY OUTCOME UNDER WHICH THERE HAS TO BE A PRO-SOVIET REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT THE AMERICAN SIDE MUST AGREE NOT TO SEEK TO INSTALL A PRO-AMERICAN REGIME.

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR1250 CONF

-NON-ALIGNED NEUTRAL AFGHANISTAN MUST HAVE GOVT INVOLVING ALL
ELEMENTS AS RESULT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

-USSR HAS TAKEN THE POLITICAL DECISION TO WITHDRAW AND
DECIDED ON A TWELVE MONTH TIMETABLE. IT WOULD BE PREPARED TO
NAME A DATE FOR BEGINNING THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES BUT
THAT DATE WOULD HAVE TO BECOME THE BEGINNING OF AN END TO
MILITARY AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE INSURGENCY FORCES.

5. DESPITE FACT THAT LITTLE IMMEDIATE PROGRESS WAS MADE AT
SUMMIT THERE IS WIDESPREAD ACCEPTANCE HERE OF SOVIET
DETERMINATION TO GET OUT OF AFGHANISTAN. THERE IS ALSO BELIEF
THAT GORBACHEV COULD NOT AFFORD TO MAKE ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT
BE VIEWED AS MAJOR CONCESSION WHILE IN WASHINGTON. NOT ONLY WOULD
THAT HAVE GIVEN AMMUNITION TO CRITICS AT HOME BUT IT WOULD
ALSO HAVE FURTHER SHAKEN THE ALREADY UNSTABLE FOUNDATIONS OF
NAJIBULLAHS REGIME. FINDING FORMULA WHICH WOULD PROTECT
AFGHANI SUPPORTERS FROM A BLOODBATH AND ALLOW SOVIET FORCES TO
DEPART WITH HONOUR REMAINS A PRIORITY.

6. KAMPELMANS BRIEFING TO NATO AMBASSADORS THIS AFTERNOON
SEEMED DESIGNED TO COUNTERACT SOME OF NEGATIVE CONCLUSIONS
BEING DRAWN ABOUT PROGRESS ON THIS ISSUE. IT WAS POINTED OUT
USA HAD NOT BEEN LOOKING FOR FORMAL STATEMENT. WASHINGTON HAD
NO AUTHORITY TO DEAL ON BEHALF OF ISLAMABAD NOR DID MOSCOW
WISH TO APPEAR TO BE SPEAKING FOR KABUL. DISCUSSIONS, HOWEVER,
HAD BEEN FULL AND DETAILED AND IT WAS EXPECTED THE COMING
PROXIMITY TALKS IN GENEVA WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE. USA WAS LOOKING
FOR TIMETABLE ON WITHDRAWAL WHICH WOULD BEGIN AND END IN 1988.

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MESSAGE

BY FACSIMILE

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SECURITY
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SUBJ/SUJ

---TEXT OF INF AGREEMENT

ATTACHED PLEASE FIND TEXT OF INF AGMT RELEASED BY STATE DEPT AS
OF 081300.

(COMCENTRE PLS COPY ATTACHED PAGES.)

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CANADIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

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OTTAWA, Ontario K1A 0G2		DOSSIER <i>20-USA-1-3-USA</i>
December 4, 1987		

Dear George:

I am sorry I had to miss your most recent de-briefing, in Brussels, on your negotiations with the Soviets.

As you know I was, at the time, in the midst of a visit to Central America, a trip I look forward to discussing with you when we next meet in one of our full bilateral sessions. In the course of my travels in Central America I met two members of your Senate, Claiborne Pell and Larry Pressler, who expressed an interest in the paper officials of our Defence Department had drafted on a Central American peace observation organization. I have since sent copies of that document to them; I am enclosing a copy for you together with a copy of my statement to Parliament on my visit to the region.

My officials have suggested to yours that we try to schedule a meeting between us in Canada some time in January at which time I would look forward to discussing with you the situation in Central America together with other items of mutual interest on our bilateral and international agendas.

In the interim I shall look forward to seeing you in Brussels next week, following the Summit in Washington. I wish you the best of fortune in your discussions next week in Washington and look forward to receiving a first-hand report from you in Brussels.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

The Honorable George Shultz
Secretary of State
WASHINGTON, D.C.



OTTAWA, Ontario
K1A 0G2

December 4, 1987

Dear Senator Pell:

I was pleased to see you in San Jose, and trust your visit was productive.

Enclosed is a copy of the paper on peacekeeping which our officials were discussing with representatives of the five governments involved on the Arias Plan. As well, I am including a copy of my statement to Parliament reporting on my visit to the region.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "C. Pell".

The Honorable Claiborne Pell
The United States Senate
SR-335 Russell Senate Office Building
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

OTTAWA, Ontario
K1A 0G2

December 4, 1987


Dear Senator Pressler:

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Enclosed is a copy of the paper on peacekeeping which our officials were discussing with representatives of the five governments involved on the Arias Plan. As well, I am including a copy of my statement to Parliament reporting on my visit to the region.

With best wishes.

Yours sincerely,



The Honorable Larry Pressler
The United States Senate
SR-407A Russell Senate Office Building
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510



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MESSAGE

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SECURITY
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---PRESS CLIPPING WASH POST 03DEC87

SUBJ/SUJ

QUOTE REGIONAL CONFLICTS ELUDE U.S. SOVIET RESOLUTION UNQUOTE.

COMCENTRE PLSE FAX ATTACHED 3 PAGES.

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Regional Conflicts Elude U.S.-Soviet Resolution

Rivalries in Third World Areas Persist

By David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States and the Soviet Union may be on the threshold of a cooperative new era in arms control, but they have yet to make any breakthrough or resolving regional conflicts where they are competing hard for influence.

While administration officials have warmly welcomed a new flexibility and frankness in regular meetings between U.S. and Soviet experts on regional disputes over the past three years, the two sides have yet to move "beyond dialogue to cooperation or a mutual understanding on regional conflicts to eliminate problems at the sources," said a State Department official who has been intimately involved in the discussions.

Nor have they led to any agreement on mutual restraints in U.S.-Soviet Third World rivalries. Instead, the two superpowers view each other with deep suspicion and mistrust, each citing examples of the other's bad faith in trying to settle such conflicts as those in the Persian Gulf, Afghanistan and Angola.

"Regional conflicts have been left behind and we sense they are not going so well as other issues in U.S.-Soviet relations," said the State Department official.

"I don't think we have come to grips with regulating our rivalry in the Third World," said Raymond L. Garthoff, a specialist in Soviet af-

fairs at the Brookings Institution. "Each side finds it useful to have a dialogue but it's on the margins."

The regional conflicts most likely to be on the agenda at next week's summit between President Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev are Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war.

The administration is pressing Gorbachev to set a "date certain" for withdrawal of an estimated 115,000 Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Moscow has hinted strongly it is ready to do this as part of a package deal that includes a U.S. cutoff of military aid to the Afghan resistance and help in setting up a coalition government.

U.S. officials say they are ready to be "helpful" on the first point but say "it's their war" and "up to them," as one put it, to engage the rebels on a political settlement.


Cooperation there could set the tone for other cooperation. "Quite frankly, it's a very important test of the ability of the United States and Soviet Union to cooperate on regional conflicts," said Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Edward P. Iversen.

In the Iran-Iraq war, administration officials want to know if Gorbachev will back a U.N. resolution imposing an arms embargo on Iran for refusing to accept a cease-fire and negotiated settlement with Iraq.

A U.S.-Soviet effort at the United Nations last summer to pressure

See CONFLICTS, A27, Col. 1

REGIONAL CONFLICTS AT ISSUE



NICARAGUA: United States organized and supports a 10,000 to 15,000-man rebel force, known as contras, to fight the Soviet/Cuban-backed Sandinista regime. Soviets now provide \$1 billion in aid to Sandinistas. Cuba has sent hundreds of advisers.

ANGOLA: U.S.-backed rebels have fought the Soviet/Cuban-supported Marxist government since independence in 1975. U.S. now provides rebels with \$15 million in arms, including Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. In October, the biggest battle of the war was fought with rebels claiming a major victory despite \$1 billion in new Soviet arms to the central government.

ETHIOPIA: Soviet Union replaced the United States as main foreign power in 1977. Soviets have provided \$4 billion in arms to Marxist government, while the U.S. has backed several opposition groups with little success.

PERSIAN GULF: Iran and Iraq have been fighting since September 1980, with about one million casualties to date. U.S. has tilted toward Iraq. Soviet Union is a main arms supplier to Iraq but recently sought closer ties with Iran. U.N. Security Council passed a mandatory cease-fire resolution July 20 but Iran refused to accept it.

AFGHANISTAN: Soviet Union sent an invasion force to install a pro-Soviet Marxist government in December 1979. U.S. aid to the Afghan resistance now tops \$600 million annually and includes hundreds of Stinger missiles.

CAMBODIA: Vietnamese forces crossed the border and occupied the capital, Phnom Penh, in January 1979. Soviets currently spend \$1 billion to \$2 billion annually to support the Hun Sen government and a 140,000-man Vietnamese occupation force. U.S. supports noncommunist resistance groups.

UNCLASSIFIED
NON-CLASSIFIED

Resolution of Regional Conflicts Elusive

CONFLICTS, From A25

Iran into negotiation has all but collapsed. U.S. officials say they are "seriously disappointed" by Soviet refusal to begin discussing an embargo resolution.

Hopeful after the superpowers worked together to gain unanimous passage of a U.N. Security Council resolution last July demanding an end to the Iran-Iraq war, U.S. officials now accuse the Soviets of "stalling game" at the United Nations.

The failure to cooperate worries administration officials who remember how the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, following Soviet gains in Ethiopia, Angola and Cambodia, brought the short-lived era of détente to a bitter close and ended any possibility of Senate ratification of the SALT II Treaty.

"It is a truism of détente in the 1970s that regional issues were neglected," a State Department official remarked.

The Soviet actions were seen as violating the Basic Principles Agreement signed by President Richard M. Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev at their 1972

Moscow summit. Among other things, the agreement said that any effort by one side to obtain "unilateral advantage at the expense of the other" in Third World conflicts would be "inconsistent" with the principles of détente.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz said yesterday that "whatever is emerging now" in U.S.-Soviet relations is "quite different from what was so in the 1970s."

The Soviets seem mindful of the impact their Afghanistan incursion has had on relations with the United States, and now they are suggesting readiness to resolve the issue that sealed the SALT II Treaty's fate.

But U.S. officials are wary that Soviet hints of withdrawal from Afghanistan may be only part of a public relations campaign to sell the new intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty to the Senate.

"A cynical view would see it as a way of getting through the INF ratification process here," said a State Department official.

The skepticism reflects general administration doubts about whether substantive change is behind Moscow's new policy of stressing political rather than military solutions to regional conflicts and "national reconciliation" between warring parties to resolve them.

"When we take a hard look at the Soviet positions as they relate to the Persian Gulf, the Arab-Israeli peace process and to a lesser extent Afghanistan, you see this gap between words and deeds and statements of intent and the actual situation on the ground," Djerejian said.

Conservative analysts agree on this. "I don't yet detect any fundamental, genuine longlasting changes in actual Soviet international behavior," said W. Bruce Weiner, a Soviet analyst at the Heritage Foundation, the conservative think-tank here. "But there have been important changes in the packaging of their policies to give the image of greater flexibility."

U.S. officials note that the Soviets have even copied administration terms, such as "national reconciliation," when pressing their allies in Cambodia, Afghanistan and Nicaragua to engage in talks with the opposition.

But in war-ravaged Ethiopia and Angola, the Soviet Union and Cuba continue to provide billions of dollars in arms to help local Marxist regimes impose a military, rather than a political, solution on long-festering political conflicts.

Meanwhile, U.S. officials believe

the Soviets seek "national reconciliation" only on terms that will leave their local communist, or pro-Moscow, allies in power while dissolving the opposition.

They point to the fact that Cambodia's communist leaders, reportedly under Soviet pressure, have just opened talks in Paris with opposition leader Prince Sihanouk, offering him a top government post if he will come home. But there is no evidence they will give him a dominant role in any coalition government.

Soviet officials seem to harbor as much doubt about the administration's real intentions. They note that Reagan has made a "doctrine" out of providing hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid to anti-communist forces around the world to overthrow Moscow's Third World allies.

Soviet officials say they doubt the administration is willing to make real concessions, or deal with Moscow on an equal footing, to resolve regional conflicts. They cite as examples U.S. efforts to shut them out of the Persian Gulf and continuing administration ambivalence about a substantive Soviet role at any Middle East peace conference.

One Soviet official who has been intimately involved in U.S.-Soviet

discussions on a possible Mideast peace conference said here recently the two sides are "still far away" from any agreement. He complained that the United States shows no willingness to accept the notion Moscow, like Washington, has legitimate interests in the Middle East.

Soviet officials also cite as an example of what they call the administration's bad faith its decision early this year to send hundreds of Stinger antiaircraft missiles to the Afghan resistance, just as Moscow was launching its "national reconciliation" policy in search for a way out of Afghanistan.

"It seems to me that this testifies to the fact that you want to inhibit the process of withdrawal of our troops from there," remarked Evgeny Primakov, a chief Middle East adviser to Gorbachev. He was speaking on the recent ABC "Capital to Capital" television program.

U.S. officials say there is no administration intent "to bleed the Soviet Union dry" in Afghanistan, as Djerejian put it, but that Soviet behavior "on the ground" there raises doubts about their real intentions.

They note that the Soviets have so far supported the Afghan communist leader Najibullah in his efforts to set up a coalition government dominated by the Afghan Communist Party and to change the constitution, making himself all-powerful politically.

Administration To Decide on Soviet Eviction

Associated Press

Congressional negotiators on a State Department spending authorization bill agreed yesterday to let the Reagan administration decide whether the Soviets should be evicted from their controversial new embassy site here.

The administration has said it opposes such an eviction. The Senate had voted 70 to 24 to evict the Soviets from their new embassy facilities after conservative Republicans complained the site on a high hill could be used for electronic spying. But the House later rejected the proposal, 216 to 199.

A House-Senate conference committee on the \$3.6 billion spending authorization bill agreed that the Soviets will not be forced to move their embassy to another site if President Reagan tells Congress that it should stay where it is.

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---SUMMIT REGIONAL ISSUES:ANGOLA

ANGOLA IS ON REGIONAL ISSUES AGENDA FOR NEXT WEEKS SUMMIT AND AFRICAN AFFAIRS OFFICIALS AT STATE HOPE IT WILL BE GIVEN THOROUGH AIRING BY REAGAN AND GORBACHEV.ANGOLA DOES NOT/NOT HOWEVER HAVE SAME PRIORITY ATTACHED TO IT HERE AS DO AFGHAN AND GULF WHICH IN EACH CASE INVOLVE SUBSTANTIAL MILITARY FORCES OF ONE PARTICIPANT.WSHDC ATTACHES SPECIAL IMPORTANCE TO OBTAINING MOSCOS AGREEMENT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION EMBARGOING ARMS TO IRAN.IN ADDITION,HINTS OF FLEXIBILITY ON SOV TROOP WITHDRAWAL COMING FROM MOSCO AND KABUL HAVE HELPED TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON AFGHAN.

2.RELATIVELY POSITIVE SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE DISCUSSIONS ON ANGOLA AS REPORTED BY BNATO ARE CONSISTENT WITH READINGS WE GET HERE ON SOV APPROACH TO THAT ISSUE.STATE DEPT INFORMS US THAT SOVS,IF NOT/NOT ACTUALLY BEING HELPFUL,HAVE NOT/NOT RECENTLY DONE ANYTHING TO

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PAGE TWO UNGR1234 CONFD

OBSTRUCT ONGOING USA/ANGOLA TALKS.(SEE OURTEL 1220).NEXT ROUND IS TENTATIVELY PLANNED FOR MID-DEC IN ANGOLA ON OTHER HAND.FEW HERE BELIEVE THAT CUBANS,WHO HAVE NOT/NOT YET BEEN BROUGHT INTO TALKS, ARE SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN TROOP WITHDRAWAL.EVEN THROUGH USA/ANGOLA DISCUSSIONS HAVE SHOWN SOME PROGRESS,CUBAN RESISTANCE COULD EVENTUALLY PROVE MAJOR HURDLE.

3.SOVS HAVE BEEN PERIPHERAL TO TALKS BUT ANYTHING POSITIVE COMING OUT OF NEXT WEEKS SUMMIT COULD PROVE HELPFUL NOT/NOT ONLY WITH ANGOLANS NOW BUT CUBANS SUBSEQUENTLY.WOULD NOT/NOT RULE OUT POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS ON THIS ISSUE,BUT DO THINK THERE IS STRONG LIKELIHOOD ANGOLA MAY BE KEPT ON SIDELINES BY TOPICS SUCH AS AFGHAN AND GULF DURING LIMITED TIME AVAILABLE FOR DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES.

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United States Embassy
Ottawa, Canada, K1P 5T1

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"REALISM, CANDOR" MARK U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS,
PRESIDENT REAGAN SAYS IN DECEMBER 10 ADDRESS TO NATION

Begin Text:

20-USA-1-3-USSR

As I am speaking to you now, General Secretary Gorbachev is leaving on his return trip to the Soviet Union. His departure marks the end of three historic days here in Washington in which Mr. Gorbachev and I continued to build a foundation for better relations between our governments and our peoples.

During these three days we took a step -- only a first step, but still a critical one -- towards building a more durable peace; indeed, a step that may be the most important taken since World War II to slow down the arms build-up.

I am referring to the treaty that we signed Tuesday afternoon in the East Room of the White House. I believe this treaty represents a landmark in post-war history because it is not just an arms control but an arms reduction agreement. Unlike treaties of the past, this agreement does not simply establish ceilings for new weapons; it actually reduces the number of such weapons. In fact, it altogether abolishes an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles.

The verification measures in this treaty are also something new, with far-reaching implications. On-site inspections and short-notice inspections will be permitted within the Soviet Union. Again, this is a first-time event, a breakthrough.

That is why I believe this treaty will not only lessen the threat of war but can also speed along a process that may someday remove that threat entirely. Indeed, this treaty -- and all that we have achieved during this summit -- signals a broader understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is an understanding that will help keep the peace as we work towards the ultimate goal of our foreign policy: A world where the people of every land can decide for themselves their form of government and way of life.

Yet as important as the INF treaty is, there is a further and even more crucial point about the last three days and the entire summit process: Soviet-American relations are no longer focused only on arms control issues; they now cover a far broader agenda, one that has -- at its root -- realism and candor.

Let me explain this with a saying I have often repeated: Nations do not distrust each other because they are armed, they are armed because they distrust each other. And just as real peace means the presence of freedom and justice, as well as the absence of war, so too, summits must be discussions not just about arms but about the fundamental differences that cause nations to be armed.

Dealing then with the deeper sources of conflict between nations and systems of government is a practical and moral imperative. That is why it was vital to establish a broader summit agenda, one that dealt not only with arms reductions but also people-to-people contacts between our nations and -- most important -- the issues of human rights and regional conflicts.

This is the summit agenda we have adopted. By doing so, we have dealt not just with arms control issues but also with fundamental problems such as Soviet expansionism and human rights violations, as well as our own moral opposition to the ideology that justifies such practices. In this way, we have put Soviet-American relations on a far more candid, and far more realistic footing.

It also means that while there is movement -- indeed, dramatic movement -- in the arms reduction area, much remains to be done in that area as well as in these other areas I have mentioned, especially -- and this goes without saying -- in advancing our goal of a world open to the expansion of human freedom and the growth of democratic government.

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So, much work lies ahead. Let me explain:

-- On the matter of regional conflicts, I spoke candidly with Mr. Gorbachev on the issue of Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Cambodia, Angola, and Nicaragua. I continue to have high hopes -- and he assured me that he did too -- that we can have real cooperation in resolving regional conflicts on terms that promote peace and freedom. This is essential to a lasting improvement in our relations.

-- So too, on human rights, there was some very limited movement: resolution of a number of individual cases, in which prisoners will be released or exit visas granted. There were assurances of future, more substantial movement, which we hope to see become a reality.

-- And finally with regard to the last item on our agenda -- scientific, educational, cultural, and economic exchanges -- we agreed to expand cooperation in ways that will break down some of the artificial barriers between our nations. For example, agreement was reached to expand and improve civil air service between our two countries.

But let me point out here that while much work is ahead of us, the progress we have made especially in arms reduction does reflect a better understanding between ourselves and the Soviets.

It also reflects something deeper. You see, since my first meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in 1985, I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants in our discussions. Though it may surprise Mr. Gorbachev to discover that all this time there has been a third party in the room with us, I do firmly believe the principal credit for the patience and persistence that brought success this year belongs to you, the American people.

Your support over these last seven years has laid the basis for these negotiations; your support made it possible for us to rebuild our military strength, to liberate Grenada, to strike hard against terrorism in Libya, and more recently, to protect our strategic interests and bolster our friends in the Persian Gulf. Your support made possible our policy of helping freedom fighters like those in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and other places around the globe. And when last year at Reykjavik, I refused Soviet demands that we trade away SDI -- our Strategic Defense Initiative that could erect a Space Shield against ballistic missiles -- your overwhelming support made it clear to the Soviet leaders that the American people prefer no deal to a bad deal, and will back their President on matters of national security. In short, your support for our foreign policy goals -- building a safer peace as we advance the cause of world freedom -- has helped bring the Soviets to the bargaining table. It makes it possible now to hope for a real, fundamental improvement in our relations.

You know, the question has often been asked whether democratic leaders who are accountable to their people aren't at a grave disadvantage in negotiating with leaders of totalitarian states who bear no such burden. Believe me, I think I can answer that question, I can speak from personal experience. Over the long run, no leader at the bargaining table can enjoy any greater advantage than the knowledge that he has behind him a people who are strong and free -- and alert; and resolved to remain that way. People like you.

And it is this kind of informed and enlightened support, this hidden strength of democratic government, that enabled us to do what we did this week at the Washington summit.

Now that the treaty has been signed, it will be submitted to the Senate for the next step, the ratification process. I will meet with the leadership of Congress here tomorrow morning, and I am confident that the Senate will now act in an expeditious way to fulfill its duty under our Constitution.

To this end, let me explain the background. In the mid- and late-1970's, the Soviets began to deploy hundreds of new, mobile intermediate-range missiles, capable of destroying major cities and military installations in Europe and Asia. This action was an unprovoked, new dimension of the threat against our friends and allies

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on both continents, a new threat to which the democratic nations had no comparable counter.

Despite intense pressure from the Soviets, NATO proceeded with what we called a "two-track policy." First, we would deploy a limited number of our own INF missiles as a deterrent but at the same time, push hard in negotiations to do away with this entirely new nuclear threat. And we set out to do this with a formula I first put forward in 1981 -- it was called the zero-option; it meant the complete elimination of these missiles on both sides.

At first, many called this a mere propaganda ploy, some even here in this country. But we were persistent, our allies steadfast, and eventually the Soviets returned to the bargaining table. The result is our INF treaty.

As you see from the map on the screen now, the Soviet missiles, which will be removed and eliminated under the treaty, have been a major threat to the security of our friends and allies on two continents, Europe and Asia. Under the terms of this treaty, we will be eliminating 400 deployed warheads while the Soviet Union eliminates 1,600, or four times as many.

Now let me also point out that this does not, however, leave NATO unprotected. In fact, we will maintain a substantial deterrent force on the ground, in the air, and at sea. Our commitment to NATO's strategy of being able to respond as necessary to any form of aggression remains steadfast.

And with regard to verification, as I have mentioned, we have the breakthroughs of on-site inspections and short-notice inspections not only at potential missile deployment sites but at the facility where the Soviet SS-20 missiles and their components have been assembled. We have a verification procedure that assures each side that the missiles of the other side have been destroyed and that new ones aren't built.

Here, then, is a treaty that shows how persistence and consistency eventually can pay off in arms negotiations. And let me assure you too that this treaty has been accomplished with unprecedented consultation with our allies and friends. I have spoken personally with the leaders of the major democracies, as has Secretary Shultz and our diplomats. This treaty has full allied support.

But if persistence is paying off in our arms reductions efforts, the question of human rights and regional conflicts are still problems in our relations. But I am pleased that some progress has been made in these areas also.

Now in addition to these candid exchanges on our 4-part agenda, Mr. Gorbachev and I did do some important planning for a Moscow summit next year. We agreed that we must redouble our efforts to reach agreements on reducing the levels of U.S. and Soviet long-range or strategic nuclear arms as I have proposed in the S.T.A.R.T. negotiations. He and I made real progress toward our goal first agreed to at Geneva -- to achieve deep, 50-percent cuts in our arsenals of those powerful weapons. We agreed that we should build on our efforts to achieve agreement on a S.T.A.R.T. treaty at the earliest possible date; and we have instructed our delegations in Geneva accordingly.

Now, I believe deep reduction in these offensive weapons -- along with the development of SDI -- would do much to make the world safer. For that reason, I made it clear that our SDI program will continue, and that when we have a defense ready to deploy -- we will do so.

About the future, Mr. Gorbachev and I also agreed that, as nuclear weapons are reduced, it becomes all the more important to redress the disparities in conventional and chemical weapons, where the Soviets now enjoy significant advantages over the United States and our allies.

I think then from all of this you can see not only the direction of Soviet-American relations but the larger framework of American foreign policy. As I told the British Parliament in 1982, we seek to rid the world of the two great nightmares of the post-war era: The threat of nuclear war and the threat of totalitarianism. That is why,

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by pursuing SDI, which is a defense against offensive missiles, and by going for arms reduction rather than just arms control, we are moving away from the so-called policy of Mutual Assured Destruction by which nations hold each other hostage to nuclear terror and destruction. So too, we are saying that the post-war policy of containment is no longer enough, that the goal of American foreign policy is both world peace and world freedom -- that as a people we hope and will work for a day when all of God's children will enjoy the human dignity that their creator intended. I believe we gained some ground with regard to that cause in these last few days.

Since my first days in office, I have argued that the future belongs not to repressive or totalitarian ways of life but to the cause of freedom -- freedom of the marketplace, freedom to speak, assemble, and vote. And when we see the progress of democracy in these last years -- from Latin America to Asia -- we must be optimistic about the future of our children.

When we were together in Iceland, Mr. Gorbachev told me that this sort of talk is sometimes viewed in the Soviet Union as a threat. I told him then and I have said since then that this is no threat at all but only a dream, the American dream.

And it is a dream that has meant so much to so many -- a dream that still shines out to the world. You know a couple of years ago, Nancy and I were deeply moved by a story told by former New York Times reporter and Greek immigrant, Nicholas Gage. It is the story of Eleni, his mother, a woman caught in one of the terrible struggles of the post-war era: The Greek civil war at the end of World War II, a mother who was tried and executed because she smuggled her children out to safety in America.

It is also the story of how her son secretly vowed to return to Greece someday to take vengeance on the man who had sent his mother to her death. But at the end of the story Nicholas Gage finds he cannot extract the vengeance he promised himself. Mr. Gage writes it would have relieved the pain that had filled him for so many years, but it would also have broken the one bridge still connecting him to his mother, that part of him most like her. As he tells it: "and her final cry...was not a curse on her killers but an invocation of what she died for, a declaration of love." These simple last words of Mr. Gage's mother, of Eleni, were: "My children."

How that cry echoes down through the centuries, a cry for all children of the world, a cry for peace, for a world of love and understanding.

And it is the hope of heeding such words -- the call for freedom and peace spoken by a chosen people in a promised land, the call spoken by the Nazarene carpenter standing at the Sea of Galilee, the carpenter whose birth into the poverty of a stable we celebrate -- it is these words that we remember as the holiday season approaches and we reflect on the events of this week here in Washington.

So, let us remember the children, and the future we want for them. And let us never forget that this promise of peace and freedom -- the gift that is ours as Americans -- the gift that we seek to share with all the world -- depends for its strength on the spiritual source from which it comes.

So during this holy season, let us also reflect that in the prayers of simple people there is more power and might than that possessed by all the great statesmen or armies of the Earth. Let us then thank God for all his blessings to this Nation and ask Him for His help and guidance; so that we might continue the work of peace and foster the hope of a world where human freedom is enshrined.

To sum up then: This summit was a clear success; we made progress on each item in our four-part agenda. Mr. Gorbachev and I have agreed in several months in Moscow to continue what we have achieved in these past three days. I believe there is reason for both hope and optimism.

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External Affairs Affaires extérieures
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MESSAGE

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---WSHDC SUMMIT:REGIONAL ISSUES

WE ARE FORWARDING A COPY OF A BRIEFING PAPER CIRCULATED BY THE USA
DELEGATION WHICH PROVIDES AN OUTLINE OF THE DISCUSSIONS ON REGIONAL
ISSUES WHICH TOOK PLACE DURING THE WSHDC SUMMIT. WE LEAVE TO YOUR
DISCRETION ANY FURTHER DISTRIBUTION OF THIS PAPER TO POSTS.

COMCENTRE: PLEASE TRANSMIT ATTACHED FIVE PAGES
BY SECURE FACSIMILE

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P216

U.S. Delegation

December 15, 1987

SUMMIT TREATMENT OF REGIONAL ISSUES

-- SINCE THE GENEVA SUMMIT, WE HAVE REGULARIZED THE DIALOGUE ON REGIONAL ISSUES, WITH FREQUENT DISCUSSIONS AT MANY LEVELS.

-- THERE WAS A LOT OF DISCUSSION WITH GORBACHEV, PARTICULARLY ON AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN/IRAQ; THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, CAMBODIA, KOREA, SOUTHERN AFRICA, CENTRAL AMERICA WERE ALSO DISCUSSED BOTH BY LEADERS AND DURING SOME SIX HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS IN THE WORKING GROUP.

-- THIS WAS THE MOST REALISTIC AND CANDID REGIONAL DIALOGUE SO FAR.

-- WE ARE READY TO WORK WITH THE SOVIETS IN PRACTICAL WAYS TO HELP THE PARTIES TO REGIONAL CONFLICTS RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES.

AFGHANISTAN

-- THERE WAS A THOROUGH DISCUSSION OF AFGHANISTAN.

-- GORBACHEV INSISTED THAT A WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN SHOULD BE LINKED TO A CESSATION OF "OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE." THE PRESIDENT, NOTING THAT THIS QUESTION HAS BEEN DEALT WITH IN THE GENEVA ACCORDS, REASSURED GORBACHEV THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL STAND BY THE COMMITMENTS IT HAS MADE IN CONNECTION WITH THE GENEVA PROCESS, PROVIDED THERE IS A SATISFACTORY TIMETABLE.

-- BASICALLY, EVERYTHING AT GENEVA HAS BEEN AGREED TO EXCEPT THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS. THIS REMAINS THE KEY TO A SUCCESSFUL SETTLEMENT.

-- THE SOVIETS MENTIONED NAJIBULLAH'S PROPOSAL FOR A TWELVE MONTH WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE BUT DID NOT GET INTO DETAILS.

-- IT IS NOTEWORTHY THAT GORBACHEV STATED THAT FROM DAY ONE WITHDRAWAL, SOVIET TROOPS WOULD NO LONGER ENGAGE IN MILITARY OPERATIONS, EXCEPT IN SELF-DEFENSE.

-- EARLY IN HIS DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT, GORBACHEV HINTED THAT THERE STILL EXISTED LINKAGE OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

-- WHEN PRESSED BY THE U.S. SIDE ON THIS ISSUE, THE SOVIETS FELL OFF SUCH A LINKAGE, AGREEING THAT TROOP WITHDRAWALS COULD START WITHOUT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, SINCE THE LATTER WAS AN EVENT BUT A PROCESS.

-- ALL IN ALL, THE SOVIETS DID NOT OFFER NEW IDEAS ON

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-- BUT THE NEXT GENEVA ROUND COULD BE CRITICAL IN DETERMINING HOW SERIOUS GORBACHEV IS ABOUT REACHING AN EARLY SETTLEMENT THAT WOULD IMPLEMENT THE DECISION, WHICH THE SOVIETS SAY HAS ALREADY BEEN TAKEN, TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN. WE WOULD LIKE THIS TO BE THE FINAL ROUND, BUT THAT DEPENDS ON THE SOVIETS.

-- WE WILL BE WATCHING IN GENEVA TO SEE IF THE SOVIETS PRODUCE A SATISFACTORY TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWING THEIR TROOPS DURING 1988.

IRAN/IRAQ

-- THIS WEEK, FOREIGN MINISTER AZIZ SAID THAT "IRAQ ACCEPTS RESOLUTION 598 IN ALL ITS PARTS."

-- THIS IS UNEQUIVOCAL AND UNAMBIGUOUS.

-- BUT IRAN CONTINUES TO PLAY GAMES WITH THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. THIS IS A DELIBERATE STRATEGY ON TEHRAN'S PART, AND THE SOVIETS SEEM TO RECOGNIZE THAT FACT.

-- DURING THE SUMMIT, THE SOVIETS AGAIN PUSHED US TO SUPPORT ESTABLISHMENT OF A UN FORCE IN THE GULF, WITHOUT PROVIDING A CONVINCING EXPLANATION OF THE PURPOSE OF SUCH A FORCE OR HOW ONE COULD OVERCOME THE MANY PRACTICAL AND POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO ITS CREATION.

-- THE PRESIDENT URGED GORBACHEV TO START WORK ON A SECOND SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION TO PUT TEETH INTO RESOLUTION 598 AND TO MAKE SUCH AN EFFORT PUBLICLY VISIBLE.

-- ALTHOUGH GORBACHEV STATED THAT THE POSSIBILITIES OF RESOLUTION 598 HAD NOT YET BEEN EXHAUSTED, THERE WERE SOME INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE WILLING TO START WORK SOON ON PREPARING AN ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION.

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR THIS. THE SECRETARY GENERAL SEEMED TO BE CALLING FOR THIS WHEN HE ASKED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL GIVE A FRESH AND RESOLUTE IMPULSE TO IMPLEMENTATION 598.

-- THE SOVIETS WILL BE CHAIRING THE SECURITY COUNCIL THROUGH DECEMBER. THIS WILL GIVE THEM A UNIQUE OPPORTUNITY TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE AND SHOULD PROVIDE A REAL TEST OF SOVIET INTENTIONS.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

-- THE PEACE PROCESS WAS DISCUSSED BOTH BY THE TWO LEADERS IN THE REGIONAL WORKING GROUP.

-- AGAIN, VIGOROUS DISCUSSION BUT NOTHING NEW IN THE SOVIET POSITION.

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U.S. Delegation

-- BOTH SIDES AGREE THAT CONFLICT REMAINS DANGEROUS, AND THAT THERE ARE NEW THREATS TO REGIONAL STABILITY POSED BY THE RISK OF ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM. INCREASING DESTRUCTIVENESS OF MODERN WEAPONRY.

-- BUT FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENTS REMAIN ON PROCESS, CENTERING ON CONTINUING SOVIET OPPOSITION TO DIRECT BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS UNLESS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A PLURIPARTISAN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE.

-- THE SOVIETS ARGUED THAT EVEN SHOULD BILATERAL AGREEMENTS REACHED OUTSIDE THE CONTEXT OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, INSTANCE BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL, THEY WOULD BE "BLOWN UP" LIKE THE 1983 LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT, BY THE PALESTINIAN THE SYRIANS, "BY EVERYONE."

-- THE U.S. STRESSED OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONSIDER ALL OPTION BUT THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IS NOT AN END IN ITSELF ANY SUCH CONFERENCE MUST NOT HINDER BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS OR BE ALLOWED TO EXERCISE VETO POWER OVER BILATERAL AGREEMENTS.

-- THE U.S. URGED THAT BOTH SIDES WORK WITH THE REGIONAL PARTIES TO CREATE THE PROPER POLITICAL CONDITIONS TO MAKE NEGOTIATIONS POSSIBLE.

-- THE U.S. SIDE SPECIFICALLY ENCOURAGED MOSCOW TO RESTORE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND ADDRESS THE RELATED QUESTION OF JEWISH EMIGRATION.

-- THE SOVIET SIDE SAID THE SOVIET CONSULAR GROUP CURRENTLY ISRAEL MAINTAINS REGULAR POLITICAL CONTACTS WITH TEL AVIV AND THE SOVIETS INDICATED THAT THE ABSENCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS SHOULD NOT CONTINUE INDEFINITELY, BUT GAVE NO FURTHER SPECIFICS.

KOREAN PENINSULA

-- THE U.S. EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF A SUCCESSFUL OLYMPICS IN 1988.

-- WHILE CONTINUING TO SUPPORT THE NORTH'S PROPOSALS ON

EVENT-SHARING, THE SOVIETS AGREED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF SUPPORTING THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT AND HINTED THEY ARE "95% READY" TO ATTEND SEOUL GAMES. THEY SAID THE DECISION WILL BE MADE JANUARY, 1988, WHEN RESPONSES TO OLYMPIC INVITATIONS ARE DUE.

-- GORBACHEV TURNED ASIDE PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SUGGESTION THAT THE TWO SIDES INCLUDE AN EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR THE OLYMPIC MOVEMENT IN THEIR JOINT STATEMENT.

-- THE U.S. EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF NORTH KOREAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE BOMBING OF THE KAL FLIGHT OVER THE THAI-BURMA BORDER. WE NOTED THAT THE EVIDENCE IS NOT DEFINITIVE, BUT ASKED THAT SOVIETS USE THEIR INFLUENCE TO ENCOURAGE NORTH KOREAN RESTRAINT.

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PS16CAMBODIA/VIETNAM

U.S. Delegation

-- CAMBODIA WAS DISCUSSED BOTH BY PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GORBACHEV, AND WITHIN THE WORKING GROUP.

-- THE PRESIDENT STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF VIETNAMESE TROOP WITHDRAWAL FROM CAMBODIA TO POLITICAL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT THERE.

-- HE ALSO TOLD GORBACHEV SOVIET SUPPORT FOR HANOI ALLOWED VIETNAM'S OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA TO CONTINUE, AND URGED THAT MOSCOW USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH HANOI TO GET IT TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS.

-- GORBACHEV RESPONDED THAT VIETNAM HAD GIVEN THE SOVIETS ASSURANCES IT WILL WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM CAMBODIA BY 1990

-- HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S. AND SOVIET SUPPORT IN PRINCIPLE FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT THERE.

-- GORBACHEV ALSO NOTED THAT CONTACTS HAD BEGUN BETWEEN PRINCE SIHANOUK AND "THE PEOPLE IN POWER" IN CAMBODIA; THEY HAD TALKS AND OTHER FORCES SHOULD BE BROUGHT IN.

-- DURING THE SUMMIT, THE SOVIETS ALSO RAISED FAMILIAR CONCERNS OVER PREVENTING A RETURN TO POWER OF THE KHMER ROUGE AND SUGGESTED THAT THIS ISSUE MIGHT COMPLICATE VIETNAMESE IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR PLEDGE TO WITHDRAW FROM CAMBODIA BY 1990.

-- THE SOVIETS ACKNOWLEDGED THEY ARE TALKING TO VIETNAM ABOUT A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT, AND CLAIMED THE NEW LEADERSHIP IN HANOI HAD REACHED "A NEW UNDERSTANDING" ON THE PROBLEM.

-- THE U.S. STRONGLY REAFFIRMED OUR SUPPORT FOR ASEAN'S POSITION ON CAMBODIA.

-- IN APPARENT ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF VIETNAMESE CONCERNS OVER SINO-SOVIET NORMALIZATION, THE SOVIETS SAID THEY KEEP HANOI INFORMED OF "ALL STEPS" TAKEN IN MOSCOW'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA.

-- OVERALL, THE EXCHANGES REVEALED LITTLE NEW IN THE BASIC SOVIET POSITION; DESPITE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE ON ACHIEVING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, THE SOVIETS SHOWED NO GREATER SENSE OF URGENCY OVER PUSHING VIETNAM TO WITHDRAW ITS TROOPS AND TO TALK TO PRINCE SIHANOUK.

JAPAN

-- THE U.S. BRIEFLY NOTED THE DECEMBER 8 PENETRATION OF JAPANESE AIRSPACE BY SOVIET RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHT AS NOT CONDUCTIVE TO REDUCTION OF TENSIONS; THE SOVIETS DID NOT RESPOND

-- THE U.S. ALSO URGED THAT THE SOVIETS DISCUSS WITH TOKYO JAPANESE CONCERNS OVER THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES; THE SOVIETS BRUSHED THE REQUEST ASIDE, CALLING THIS "A BILATERAL SOVIET-JAPANESE MATTER."

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U.S. Delegation

SOUTHERN AFRICA

-- SOUTHERN AFRICA WAS RAISED DURING THE SUMMIT TALKS AND DISCUSSED EXTENSIVELY IN PRESUMMIT PREPARATIONS.

-- GORBACHEV DID NOT GET INTO DETAILS ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, OTHER THAN TO NOTE THAT THERE WERE NOW "GOOD OPPORTUNITIES" ACHIEVE A POLITICAL RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT.

-- THE U.S. STRESSED THE URGENCY OF A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT TO FACILITATE THE INDEPENDENCE OF NAMIBIA IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435 AND THE RETURN OF ALL FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES IN NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA TO THEIR HOME COUNTRIES.

CENTRAL AMERICA

-- BOTH LEADERS EXPRESSED THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE GUATEMALA AGREEMENT.

-- GORBACHEV HINTED AMBIGUOUSLY AT SOVIET WILLINGNESS TO CEASE SUPPLY OF HEAVY MILITARY HARDWARE, AS A PRACTICAL MEASURE IN SUPPORT OF THE GUATEMALA AGREEMENT.

-- WHEN PRESIDENT REAGAN PRESSED HIM TO INCLUDE SUCH A PLEDGE IN THE JOINT U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT, GORBACHEV DEMURRED.

-- THERE IS SIGNIFICANT VARIANCE BETWEEN GORBACHEV'S STATEMENTS AND SUBSEQUENT REVELATIONS BY MAJOR MIRANDA CONCERNING A PLAN CONCEIVED IN 1986 FOR AN UNPRECEDENTED NICARAGUAN MILITARY BUILD-UP.

-- THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS THE SOVIETS TO FOLLOW UP GORBACHEV'S COMMENTS WITH CONCRETE STEPS TO REDUCE THE SOVIET CONTRIBUTION TO THE SANDINISTA MILITARY BUILD UP.

-- THE U.S. ALSO STRESSED ITS SUPPORT FOR PEACE AND DEMOCRACY IN NICARAGUA, WHICH WILL ONLY BE POSSIBLE ONCE THE SANDINISTAS EXTEND FULL POLITICAL RIGHTS TO THOSE WHO DISAGREE WITH THEM

BERLIN

-- THE PRESIDENT URGED U.S.-SOVIET COOPERATION IN TAKING SMALL, PRACTICAL STEPS TO AMELIORATE THE DIVISION OF THE CITY AND TO SYMBOLIZE THE TWO SIDES' MUTUAL DESIRE TO OVERCOME THE DIVISION OF EUROPE IN A HUMANE AND STABILIZING WAY. HE SAID THE U.S., UK AND FRANCE WOULD BE SPELLING THIS PROPOSAL OUT GREATER DETAIL IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

-- GORBACHEV DID NOT RESPOND.

SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

-- IN THE REGIONAL WORKING GROUP, THE U.S. BRIEFLY RAISED ITS CONCERNS OVER SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. THERE WAS NOTHING NEW FROM THE SOVIET SIDE.

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NATO Foreign Ministers Praise Treaty and Urge Senate Approval

By ELAINE SCOTLAND
Special to The New York Times

BRUSSELS, Dec. 11 — NATO foreign ministers today hailed the Soviet-American accord on intermediate-range nuclear missiles as a "treaty without precedent in the history of arms control," and called for its speedy approval by the United States Senate.

In a joint communiqué, the ministers also stressed the need to move forward quickly in other areas of arms control, particularly toward a treaty limiting strategic weapons.

On a flight Thursday night from Washington to Brussels, where he briefed alliance ministers, Secretary of State George P. Shultz told reporters that agreement on a strategic-arms treaty was "certainly possible" before President Reagan and Mikhail S. Gorbachev were to meet again in the first half of next year.

He said the treaty signed Tuesday on intermediate-range weapons provided an outline for a future accord at the strategic-arms talks. "You can literally see from this document the shape of a START agreement," he said.

"Political Courage"

Particularly proud of the treaty was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's outgoing Secretary General, Lord Carrington, who praised the alliance's "political courage" in agreeing to allow Soviet on-site inspections of missile sites in Europe to verify compliance with the treaty.

It was one of the last appearances as Secretary General of Lord Carrington, who had expressed the wish to leave the job.

Today the foreign ministers congratulated Manfred Wörner, a 53-year-old lawyer and West Germany's Defense Minister, as Lord Carrington's successor beginning July 1, 1988.

In their communiqué, the ministers called the treaty signed in Washington "all the more meaningful because it opens the way to progress in other arms-control areas."

The foreign ministers were only too eager to give Mr. Shultz his due in the sum, as well as to congratulate themselves for what the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, called "not only a momentous week, but a week of hope for all mankind."

Watching him in diplomatic, eupho-



Sir Geoffrey Howe, left, the British Foreign Secretary, signing document yesterday in Brussels that would allow verification inspections by Soviet officials of United States missiles based in Britain. At right was Secretary of State George P. Shultz. Man at center was unidentified.

ria, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of West Germany said the agreement "doesn't reduce but increases the security of Western Europe."

Accord on Inspections

Sir Geoffrey and Mr. Genscher today joined the Foreign Ministers of the Netherlands, Italy and Belgium, countries with missile bases to be deactivated, in signing an agreement with the United States to give the Soviet Union the right to conduct on-site inspections.

The five European countries will exchange diplomatic notes with the Soviet Union next week in the final step

of the basing agreement, which Mr. Shultz called "tangible evidence of the alliance unity."

But after he congratulated them down, some of the long-held European concerns about Soviet strength in conventional and chemical weapons as well as battlefield nuclear weapons became apparent.

The Italian Foreign Minister, Giulio Andreotti, praised the treaty in a briefing with Italian journalists, but he urged caution in not inflating its importance.

"The accord doesn't open the door to paradise," he told them, urging movement to the next phase of arms reduction.

tion.

The most negative commentary came from the French Foreign Minister, Jean-Bernard Raimond, who refused to allow his colleagues to describe the United States-Soviet treaty in their communiqué as "historic."

Mr. Raimond argued that the treaty should be considered only one step on a long, hard process, and not an achievement of overwhelming proportions.

In a briefing with French journalists, he said that if a 50 percent reduction in strategic arms could be negotiated, then the treaty on intermediate-range forces "would have been proven truly useful."

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---REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT:GULF WAR

AMEND REFTTEL PARA 4, PAGE TWO IN PART TO READ AS FOLLOWS:

4.QUOTE ALTHOUGH USSR HAS AGREED THAT IRANIAN INTRANSIGENCE

WAS THE MAJOR PROBLEM,SOVIETS CONTINUED TO TAKE POSITION THAT UN SEC

GEN SHOULD BE ALLOWED MORE TIME TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT FROM IRAN

ON IMPLEMENTATION OF RES 598. UNQUOTE.

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---REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT: CW, NUCLEAR TESTING, CONVENTIONAL FORCES, NPT
SUMMARY: ON BASIS OF JOINT STATEMENT AND DEBRIEFING FOR NATO AMBS
GIVEN BY MAX KAMPELMAN ON 11DEC, IT APPEARS THAT SOME PROGRESS WAS
MADE IN USA/SOVIET DISCUSSIONS ON MULTILATERAL AID ISSUES. JOINT
STATEMENT REAFFIRMS COMMITMENT OF SUPERPOWERS TO CW CONVENTION,
CONVENTIONAL FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE AND TO NUCLEAR
NON-PROLIFERATION. ON NUCLEAR TESTING, DECISION TO PROCEED WITH
JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT AT SEMIPALATINSK AND NEVADA TEST
SITES WITH VIEW TO DEVELOPING AGREED MEANS TO VERIFY TTBT AND PNET
IS POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT.

2. REPORT: ON CW, JOINT SUMMIT STATEMENT EXPRESSED COMMITMENT TO NEGOTIA-
TION OF QUOTE VERIFIABLE, COMPREHENSIVE AND EFFECTIVE UNQUOTE CW CON-
VENTION AND CALLED FOR GREATER OPENNESS AND INTENSIFIED CBMS WITH
RESPECT TO CW BOTH ON BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL BASIS. IN BRIEFING

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FOR NATO AMBS, KAMPELMAN SAID USA SIDE HAD EXPRESSED ITS CONCERN ABOUT CW PROLIFERATION AND USE AND EMPHASIZED THAT BILATERAL TREATY WOULD LEAVE OUT OTHER COUNTRIES POSSIBLY INVOLVED IN CW ACTIVITIES, MENTIONING LIBYA AND IRAN. KAMPELMAN SAID USA APPLIED PRINCIPLE OF DETERRENCE TO CW VIZ THAT A CW SUPPLY IS NEED TO DETER. THIS ACCOUNTED FOR BINARY PROGRAM AND GORBACHEV'S CONCERN FOR BINARY PRODUCTION. KAMPELMAN MADE POINT THAT CW NEGS WERE GOING NOWHERE UNTIL USA BEGAN DEPLOYING THEM. KAMPELMAN ALSO SAID USA SIDE HAD STRESSED THAT DIFFERENT VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS FOR USA AND USSR WOULD HAVE TO BE PUT IN PLACE FOR CW CONVENTION, SINCE USA CW PRODUCTION IS IN PRIVATE SECTOR AND SOVIET PRODUCTION IS IN PUBLIC SECTOR. KAMPELMAN SAID USA TOLD SOVIETS THAT VERIFICATION IS MAJOR PROBLEM NO/NO MATTER WHAT SIZE OF STOCKS ARE. SOVIET VIEW WAS THAT CW PROBLEM QUOTE WOULD WORK OUT IN END UNQUOTE.

3. AT PRESS CONF PRIOR TO DEPARTURE, GORBACHEV SAID NOW THAT THAT INF WOULD BE ELIMINATED AND PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE IN START NEGS, CE AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS ISSUES WOULD COME TO FORE. GORBACHEV SAID CW HAD LONG BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION AND QUOTE UNTIL RECENTLY, THOSE NEGOTIATIONS HAD MADE SOME PROGRESS UNQUOTE. WE BELIEVE HE WAS REFERRING TO USA DECISION TO RESUME BINARY PRODUCTION.

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4.ON NUCLEAR TESTING,KAMPELMAN SAID HE HOPED MOVEMENT IN DISCUSSIONS WOULD LEAD TO RATIFICATION OF TTBT AND PNET.AN AGREED STATEMENT ISSUED ON 09DEC BY SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE CALLED FOR JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT AT USA AND SOVIET TEST SITES TO ELABORATE IMPROVED VERIFICATION MEASURES FOR TWO TREATIES BY MEASURING YIELD OF EXPLOSIONS BETWEEN 100/100 AND 150/150 KT.EXPERIMENT WOULD PROVIDE BASIS FOR AGREEING ON VERIFICATION MEASURES WHICH COULD BE USED BY EITHER SIDE TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH TTBT AND PNET.PRIOR TO EXPERIMENT,TWO SIDES WILL EXCHANGE VISITS OF DELEGATIONS TO SEMIPALATINSK AND NEVADA TEST SITES IN JAN88.

5.KAMPELMAN SAID USA AGREED THAT REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR TESTING SHOULD ACCOMPANY REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARSENALS BUT THAT USA WOULD CONTINUE TESTING AS LONG AS IT RELIED ON NUCLEAR DETERRENT.

6.KAMPELMAN DID NOT/NOT ELABORATE ON SUMMIT DISCUSSIONS ON CONVENTIONAL FORCES BUT SUMMIT STATEMENT CALLS FOR EARLY COMPLETION OF DISCUSSIONS IN VIENNA ON MANDATE FOR NEGS QUOTE SO THAT SUBSTANTIVE NEGOTIATIONS MAY BE STARTED AT THE EARLIEST TIME WITH A VIEW TO ELABORATING CONCRETE MEASURES UNQUOTE.COMMUNIQUE ALSO MADE PRO FORMA STATEMENT ABOUT JOINT USA-USSR COMMITMENT TO NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION AND EXPRESSED SATISFACTION AT ADHERENCE OF ADDITIONAL PARTIES TO TREATY SINCE LAST MTG.

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REF OURTEL UNGR2079 09DEC UNGR2082 10DEC 2086 10DEC

---REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT - INF AGREEMENT

IN BRIEFING NATO AMBS TODAY ON RESULTS OF SUMMIT, STATE DEPT
COUNSELLOR MAX KAMPELMAN SAID BOTH SIDES AT SUMMIT HAD BEEN VERY
PLEASED WITH OUTCOME OF INF NEGOTIATIONS. SOVIETS, HE SAID, HAD
BEEN PARTICULARLY INTERESTED TO LEARN ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR
RATIFICATION.

2. KAMPELMAN SAID IT WAS HIS PERSONAL VIEW TREATY HAD VERY GOOD
CHANCE OF BEING RATIFIED PROVIDED NO/NO SURPRISES EMERGED DURING
SENATES EXAMINATION OF TREATY. MOOD IN SENATE WAS VERY POSITIVE,
AND SENATORS HAD APPLAUDED SECTY SHULTZ WHEN HE VISITED CONGRESS
YESTERDAY, IN TRIBUTE TO INF ACCOMPLISHMENT. PRESIDENTS MTG WITH
CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS THIS MORNING HAD ALSO GONE VERY WELL. EVEN
THOSE WHO COULD BE EXPECTED TO BE OPPOSED HAD NOT/NOT SPOKEN UP.

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KAMPELMAN SAID CHMN OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS CTTEE CLAIBORNE PELL EXPECTED HEARINGS TO CONCLUDE BY EARLY MARCH, MAYBE EVEN END OF FEBRUARY. PRIVATE STATE DEPT POLL SHOWED 77 PERCENT POPULAR SUPPORT FOR TREATY.

3. KAMPELMAN AND ROWNY, WHO ASSISTED WITH BRIEFING, SAID TREATY COULD NOT/NOT HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED WITHOUT SUPPORT TO ALLIES, INCLUDING THOSE IN ASIA. KAMPELMAN SAID HE HAD ASKED KARPOV LAST YEAR WHY USSR WAS INSISTING ON RETAINING 100 MISSILES IN ASIA, AND HE HAD BEEN TOLD SOVIETS NEEDED 33 FOR CHINA, 33 FOR JPN AND 33 FOR KOREA. KAMPELMAN SAID THAT WHEN HE RELAYED THIS INFORMATION TO PEKING, TOKYO AND SEOUL IT HAD HAD MARVELOUSLY CATALYTIC EFFECT.

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TT NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DM/CDS/DGCPOL/DIPOL/DNACPOL/ DE CAF
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REF OURTEL UNGR2079.09DEC;UNGR2082 10DEC;2086 10DEC

---REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT-START AND SPACE/DEFENCE ISSUES

SUMMARY:AT MTG WITH NATO AMBS TODAY,COUNSELLOR OF STATE DEPT MAX
KAMPELMAN BRIEFED ON SUMMIT DISCUSSIONS RELATED TO ARMS CONTROL,
REGIONAL ISSUES AND HUMAN RIGHTS.THIS TEL REPORTS ON START AND
SPACE/DEFENCE ISSUES.OTHERS DEAL WITH INF AGMT,MULTILATERAL ARMS
CONTROL ISSUES,AFGHANISTAN,GULF WAR,CENTRAL AMERICA,AND HUMAN
RIGHTS.KAMPELMAN NOTED HIS BRIEFING DID NOT/NOT COVER ALL ISSUES
(E.G.OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES)AND WE SHALL BE REPORTING ON THESE
NEXT WEEK.

2.ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS,KAMPELMAN SAID SOME IMPORTANT
RESULTS HAD BEEN ACHIEVE AT SUMMIT BUT HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN
NO/NO FURTHER MOVEMENT ON SPACE/DEFENCE ISSUES.PRINCIPAL START
ACCOMPLISHMENTS INCLUDED AGMT ON 4900 SUBLIMIT FOR ICBMS AND SLBMS,
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AND PROGRESS ON COUNTING RULES. AS IMPORTANT, USA SENSES SOVIETS REALLY WANT START AGMT BEFORE END OF REAGAN ADMIN. QUESTION REMAINED WHETHER SOVIETS WOULD CONTINUE TO INSIST ON LINKAGE BETWEEN REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND AGMT ON SPACE/DEFENCE ISSUES. IN KAMPELMAN'S PERSONAL VIEW, SUMMIT HAD NOT/NOT SOLVED ANYTHING IN THIS RESPECT.

3. REPORT: IN WEEKS LEADING UP TO SUMMIT, KAMPELMAN SAID SOVIETS HAD BEEN PRESSING FOR QUOTE KEY ELEMENTS UNQUOTE AGMT ON START ISSUES, BUT ADMIN HAD RESISTED IDEA ON GROUNDS IT WOULD NOT/NOT BE LEGALLY BINDING WHILE NONETHELESS ENCOURAGING CONGRESS TO WITHHOLD APPROPRIATIONS. RATHER THAN FACE PROSPECT OF ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD NOT/NOT BIND SOVIETS BUT IMPOSE UNILATERAL RESTRAINT ON USA, ADMIN SUGGESTED INSTEAD QUOTE INSTRUCTIONS FOR NEGOTIATORS UNQUOTE FORMAT FOR OUTLINING RESULTS OF SUMMIT DISCUSSION ON STRATEGIC ISSUES.

4. AT SUMMIT, BOTH SIDES TOOK AS POINT OF DEPARTURE AGMTS WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN REACHED AT REYKJAVIK: FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTIONS, REDUCTIONS TO EQUAL LEVELS, 1600/6000 CEILINGS ON MISSILES AND WARHEADS RESPECTIVELY, AND SOVIET UNDERTAKING TO REDUCE SS-18 HEAVY MISSILES BY HALF. MOREOVER, IN WEEKS LEADING UP TO SUMMIT, SOVIETS HAD ALSO AGREED THAT REMAINING 154 HEAVIES WOULD CARRY NO/NO MORE THAN 1540 WARHEADS. ACCORDING TO KAMPELMAN, JOINT CHIEFS HAD ARGUED VIGOROUSLY NEED FOR COMBINED CEILING ON ICBMS

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AND SLBMS, AND HAD RECOMMENDED FIGURE OF 4800. AT REYKJAVIK, HOWEVER, GORBACHEV HAD BECOME IMPATIENT WITH WHOLE IDEA OF SUBLIMITS AND IN NEGOTIATIONS WHICH FLOWED IN GENEV SOVIETS HAD CITED GENSECS VIEWS AND REFUSED TO DISCUSS ISSUE. BUT AT MTG IN GENEV TWO WEEKS AGO, MARSHALL AKHROMEYEV HAD BEGUN TO QUOTE PLAY AROUND UNQUOTE WITH ICBM/SLBM- NUMBERS EXCEEDING 5000 (THOUGH WITHOUT MAKING FORMAL OFFER) AND U.S. SIDE HAD THOUGHT FINAL OFFER MIGHT BE 5000, WHICH WAS FIGURE PRESIDENT HAD SUGGESTED IN HIS EUREKA SPEECH. IN EVENT, FIGURE OF 4900 WAS AGREED UPON, THOUGH THIS HAD ONLY HAPPENED AT VERY LAST MOMENT WHILE LEADERS WERE AT LUNCH ON FINAL DAY.

5. KAMPELMAN SAID U.S. WAS STILL PRESSING FOR 3300 SUBLIMIT ON ICBMS TO WHICH SOVIETS HAD YET TO AGREE, AND FOR BAN ON MOBILE MISSILES UNLESS ADEQUATE VERIFICATION COULD BE WORKED OUT; BUT QUOTE BULK OF ISSUE HAS NOW BEEN DEALT WITH UNQUOTE. HE NOTED TWO SIDES HAD AGREED TO TRY TO SET CEILING ON SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES (OUTSIDE OF 6000 LIMIT); BUT GEN ROWNY, WHO ASSISTED AT BRIEFING, SAID IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DEVELOP ADEQUATE VERIFICATION FOR SUCH A CEILING. ACCORDING TO KAMPELMAN, AKHROMEYEV SAID SOVIETS HAD DONE SOME WORK IN AREA AND HAD DEVELOPED HELICOPTER-BORNE RADIO DEVICE WITH CAPACITY TO DETERMINE WHETHER A SUBMARINE CARRIED SLCMS, AND IF SO THEIR NUMBER AND YIELD. BUT KAMPELMAN SAID A SOVIET SCIENTIST HAD TOLD HIM

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PRIVATELY THAT HE DID NOT/NOT BELIEVE DEVICE(WHICH HE ADMITTED IS BEING WORKED ON BY COLLEAGUE NAMED VELIKOV)WAS FEASIBLE.

6.NEXT MAIN ISSUE,KAMPELMAN SAID,WAS TO ARRIVE AT AGREED COUNTING RULES FOR SYSTEMS TO BE LEFT IN PLACE FLWING 50 PERCENT CUTS.ISSUE WAS TECHNICAL BUT VERY IMPORTANT,AND AT REYKJAVIK TWO SIDES HAD AGREED ON COUNTING RULE FOR BOMBERS.IN WSHDC HE SAID SOME FURTHER HEADWAY HAD BEEN MADE,THOUGH NOT/NOT ALL ISSUED HAD BEEN RESOLVED. IN ADDITION,VERIFICATION WAS NOT/NOT GOING TO BE EASY TO WORK OUT.INF REGIME WOULD HELP,BUT IT WAS NOT/NOT ALL ADAPTABLE.HE SAID IT HAD BEEN AGREED NEGS WOULD RESUME 14JAN88.

7.MAIN CONCLUSION U.S.SIDE REACHED WAS THAT START NEGS WERE QUOTE MOVING WELL UNQUOTE,WITH SOVIETS SHOWING SERIOUS SIGNS OF WANTING TO CONCLUDE TREATY WITH REAGAN ADMIN BY MAY AT LATEST. KAMPELMAN EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW THAT GORBACHEV NEEDED START TREATY BEFORE CPSU PARTY CONFERENCE IN JUN,WHICH HE SAID WOULD DETERMINE QUOTE POWER STRUCTURE UNQUOTE FOR LONG TIME TO COME.

8.KAMPELMAN SAID SOVIETS HAD NOT/NOT ABONDONED LINKAGE THEY HAD BEEN INSISTING ON BEFORE ON START AND SPACE/DEFENCE ISSUES,BUT THEY HAD NOT/NOT PERMITTED IT TO STAND IN WAY OF NEGS.THOUGH IT HAD NOT/NOT HAPPENED,KAMPELMAN SAID IT COULD BE CONCLUDED SOVIETS MIGHT ONE DAY BE PREPARED TO DROP LINKAGE.IN MEANTIME,SOVIETS HAVE BEEN MODIFYING THEIR POSN ON ABM TREATY AND NATURE OF RESEARCH THEY

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BELIEVE IS PERMITTED BY TREATY(I.E.THEY ARE NO/NO LONGER INSISTING
IT BE QUOTE NON-PURPOSEFUL UNQUOTE,AND THEY HAVE MOVED AWAY
FROM THEIR INSISTENCE THAT RESEARCH BE KEPT TO LABORATORY).BUT
KAMPELMAN SAID QUOTE SERIOUS FURTHER MOVEMENT DID NOT/NOT TAKE
PLACE UNQUOTE AT SUMMIT,IN PART HE SAID BECAUSE U.S.SIDE DID
NOT/NOT PUSH FOR IT.HE SAID ADMIN WANTED TO RESEARCH AND TEST AND
BELIEVED IT HAD RIGHT TO DO SO,AND IT WAS SOVIETS WHO WERE
DEMANDEURS SEEKING CONSTRAINTS ON TESTING.FINAL STATEMENT,
KAMPELMAN SAID,HAD NOT/NOT SOLVED ANYTHING AND BOTH SIDES WOULD
INTERPRET IT THEIR OWN WAY.IT WAS NOTABLE ONLY FOR SOVIETS HAVING
DROPPED PREVIOUS INSISTENCE ON REFERRING TO OBERVANCE OF ABM
TREATY QUOTE AS SIGNED AND RATIFIED UNQUOTE,AGREEING INSTEAD ONLY
TO FORMULATION QUOTE AS SIGNED UNQUOTE.(ACCORDING TO KAMPELMAN,
SHULTZ HAD SUGGESTED DROPPING QUOTE AS RATIFED UNQUOTE TO AVOID
ISSUE BECOMING INVOLVED IN U.S.DOMESTIC POLITICAL DEBATE.)

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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TO MINDEL/NATO DELIVER BY 120800 EXTOTT LURR IDR

INFO MOSCO BNATO CANMILREPNATO LDN PARIS BONN ROME GENEV TOKYO

PEKIN PRMNY VCSCE VMBFR PCOOTT/HAGEN PMOOTT/BURNEY

TT NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DM/CDS/DGCPOL/DIPOL/DNACPOL/DE CAFE

DISTR MINA USS IFB IDD IDA CPP EER IDRA IDRAc RGB RBD RBR RWR UGB

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REF OURTEL UNGR2079 09DEC UNGR2082 10DEC UNGR2086 10DEC

---REAGAN/GOBACHEV SUMMIT - HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE

SUMMARY:HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES TOOK UP ONLY 22 WORDS IN THE FINAL

SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE BUT ADMIN BELIEVES MSG HAS BEEN

EFFECTIVELY DELIVERED THAT ADMIN,CONGRESS,PRESS AND BUSINESS

ALL REQUIRE PROGRESS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AS INTEGRAL PART OF

USA/USSR DIALOGUE,AND THAT USSR HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THIS REQUIREMENT.

WHILE USSR REMAINS DEFENSIVE,THERE WAS A SERIOUS DIALOGUE.

2.GORBACHEV,WHO BECAME TESTY ON THIS ISSUE ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS

IN MTGS WITH PRESS,CONGRESS AND ADMIN,SAID THAT USSR WAS PREPARED

TO DISCUSS ISSUE,TAKING INTO ACCOUNT DIFFERING VALUES IN USA

AND USSR.HE SAID MATTER SHOULD BE STUDIED AND DISCUSSED AT MTGS

AND SEMINARS EVEN UP TO LEVEL OF SUPREME SOVIET AND USA CONGRESS.

3.ADMIN BELIEVES THERE HAS BEEN SOME RELAXATION IN SOVIET

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PAGE TWO UNGR2090 CONF

EMIGRATION, BUT THERE IS STRONG FEELING ON USA SIDE THAT SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE MUST SHOW MARKED IMPROVEMENTS IN A NUMBER OF KEY AREAS INCLUDING TREATMENT OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS, POLITICAL DISSIDENTS, AND EMIGRATION BEFORE HUMAN RIGHTS CAN CEASE TO BE A SERIOUS IRRITANT IN THE RELATIONSHIP.

4. REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS WAS ONE OF THE FOUR AGENDA ITEMS FOR REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT BUT SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE INCLUDED ONLY 22 WORDS ON THE SUBJ. USA OFFICIALS CONFIDED TO US EVEN BEFORE SUMMIT ENDED THAT NO/NO GREAT PROGRESS WAS MADE DURING TWO MTGS OF THE SUB-WORKING GROUP ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THAT THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE WAS LIKELY TO BE SOMEWHAT DOWNBEAT ON HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE. IN THE END, COMMUNIQUE SIMPLY SAID QUOTE THE LEADERS HELD A THOROUGH AND CANDID DISCUSSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN QUESTIONS AND THEIR PLACE IN THE U.S.-SOVIET DIALOGUE UNQUOTE. THE ONLY OTHER REFERENCE IN COMMUNIQUE WHICH ENCOMPASSED HUMAN RIGHTS WAS THE REAFFIRMATION OF QUOTE THEIR STRONG COMMITMENT TO A VIGOROUS DIALOGUE ENCOMPASSING THE WHOLE OF THE RELATIONSHIP UNQUOTE.

5. IN DEBRIEFING USA ALLIES ON FRIDAY, KAMPELMAN SAID THAT GORBACHEV HAD BECOME TESTY ON THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTRAST WITH PAST BUT THAT IN CONTRAST WITH PAST THERE HAD BEEN A SERIOUS DIALOGUE NOT/NOT A MONOLOGUE, NOR/NOR REPETITION OF SOVIET ACCUSATIONS OF USA INTERFERENCE IN SOVIET INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THE SOVIETS, HE SAID, NOW ACKNOWLEDGE THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF USA-SOVIET

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DIALOGUE.

6. HOWEVER, KAMPELMAN SAID THAT SOVIETS REMAINED DEFENSIVE. IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET COUNTER CRITICISM ABOUT AMERICAN PROTESTOR WHO WAS ARRESTED AND WHOSE CAUSE IS NOW BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, ASST SECTY SCHIFTER INVITED THE SOVIETS TO ACCOMPANY HIM TO COURT WHEN IT HEARS THE CASE. KAMPELMAN SAID THERE HAS BEEN SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN EMIGRATION OF GERMANS AND ARMENIANS FROM USSR, AND RATHER LESS OF SOVIET JEWS. HOWEVER JEWISH EMIGRATION HAS ALREADY REACHED 8000 THIS YEAR AND COULD REACH 9000 BY YEAR END.

7. THERE WAS ALSO AN IMPORTANT CONGRESSIONAL DIMENSION TO HUMAN RIGHTS DISCUSSIONS DURING SUMMIT. IN A LETTER TO GORBACHEV RELEASED ON MONDAY, 250 MEMBERS OF CONGRESSIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS CAUCUS SAID THAT SOVIET UNIONS HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD WILL BE JUDGED BY HOW RELIGIOUS BELIEVERS ARE TREATED. LETTER EMPHASIZED, ACCORDING TO CONGRESSIONAL STAFF, SOVIET MALTREATMENT OF SOVIET CHRISTIANS, HUMAN RIGHTS CAUCUS HAS ALSO CRITICIZED SOVIET UNION FOR MENTAL ILLNESS TREATMENT FOR DISSIDENTS. ALSO, IN A LETTER SENT BY 100 SENATORS LAST WEEK PRESIDENT WAS URGED TO DEMAND EMIGRATION FOR SOVIET JEWS.

8. IN MTG WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AT THE SOVIET EMBASSY ON WEDNESDAY, GORORACHEV DEFENDED SOVIET POLICIES, URGED PATIENCE WHILE THEY ARE RE-EXAMINED AND SUGGESTED THE USA ALSO REVIEW ITS POLICIES. HE ACCUSED USA OF JAILING PEACE DEMONSTRATORS AND

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PAGE FOUR UNGR2090 CONF

CURBING IMMIGRATION FROM MEXICO WHILE CHARGING THE SOVIET UNION WITH HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. HE PROPOSED MTGS BETWEEN USA-SOVIET LEADERS TO AIR AND POSSIBLY RESOLVE DISAGREEMENTS OVER HUMAN RIGHTS.

9. CONGRESSIONAL SOURCES WE HAVE SPOKEN TO CONFIRM IMPRESSION FROM PRESS REPORTS THAT CONGRESSIONAL DISCUSSIONS WITH GORBACHEV ON HUMAN RIGHTS REMAINED VERY GENERAL IN NATURE.

WHAT CONGRESS WILL BE WAITING FOR ON HUMAN RIGHTS IS NOT/NOT A FORMAL REPLY, BUT SOVIET ACTION.

10. DURING GORBACHEV'S MTG WITH USA BUSINESSMEN, DAVID ROCKEFELLER ALSO RAISED THE HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE, EXPRESSING CONCERN THAT SO LONG AS MAJOR HUMAN RIGHTS DIFFERENCES PERSIST, COMMERCIAL LINKS BETWEEN USA AND SOVIET UNION WILL BE GREATLY CONSTRAINED.

11. IN HIS MTG WITH PUBLISHERS AND EDITORS, HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE WAS ONCE AGAIN ON AGENDA. NOT SURPRISINGLY, GORBACHEV FINALLY BECAME TESTY OVER PERSISTANT QUESTIONING. IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT AT PRESS CONFERENCE AT END OF SUMMIT, GORBACHEV COMPLAINED THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED TOO MANY QUESTIONS ABOUT SOVIETS FORBIDDEN TO EMIGRATE, OR STILL IMPRISONED FOR POLITICAL OFFENCES. HE CLAIMED THAT ONLY 22 INDIVIDUALS ARE NOW IMPRISONED IN SOVIET UNION FOR INFRINGING QUOTE THOSE TWO WELL-KNOWN ARTICLES OF OUR PENAL CODE UNQUOTE. HE ADDED THAT ONLY 222 PERSONS HAD BEEN REFUSED PERMISSION TO LEAVE, THOSE WHO HELD STATE SECRETS. HE SAID AGMT HAD BEEN REACHED AT SUMMIT TO STUDY

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HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES, AND REPEATED PROPOSAL THAT USSR SUPREME SOVIET AND THE USA CONGRESS ORGANIZE MTGS AND SEMINARS TO DISCUSS THEM.

12. ASSESSMENT: FORMER USA AMBASSADOR TO THE UN JEAN KIRKPATRICK HAS CALLED THE LIMITED REFERENCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN JOINT COMMUNIQUE A MAJOR CONCESSION BY ADMIN TO SOVIET UNION, BUT SHE WARNED THAT UNTIL SOVIET PERFORMANCE IN THIS AREA IMPROVES SIGNIFICANTLY, US TRUST OF SOVIET UNION WILL BE INHIBITED. ADMIN'S OWN VIEW IS THAT SUMMIT DID PERMIT A SERIOUS DIALOGUE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THAT SOVIETS HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ARE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE DIALOGUE, AND THAT SOVIET TOUCHINESS ON THE ISSUE COULD RELATE TO INTERNAL PROBLEMS. WE CAN EXPECT USA TO CONTINUE PRESSING GORBACHEV, WHILE RECOGNIZING, AT LEAST DE FACTO, THAT GORBACHEV IS PROBABLY LEADING, NOT/NOT TRAILING USSR INTERNAL CONSENSUS ON HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS.

CCC/029 120034Z UNGR2090

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR1251 11DEC87

TO NATO/MINDEL DELIVER BY 120800 EXTOTT URR LCR

INFO SJOSE GTMLA CRCAS LIMA BGOTA BAIRS HAVAN PRMNY PRNCE MOSCO

LDN PARIS STAGO BNATO BREEC TOKYO ROME FOR VTCAN CANMILREPNATO

ROME BONN GENEV TOKYO PEKIN VCSCE VMBFR PCOOTT/HAGEN PMOOTT/BURNEY

CIDAHULL/YDC PILLAROTT

TT NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DM/CDS/DGCPOL/DIPOL/DNACPOL/DECAF

DISTR MINA USS IFB IDR IDD IDA LGB LCD INP LSR URR UG REF DATE

CPD EER IDRA IDRL RGB RBD RBR RWR BCM

REF OURTELLS UNGR1206 19NOV;2079 09DEC; 2082 10DEC

---SUMMIT:CENTRAL AMERICA

ACCORDING TO BRIEFING GIVEN BY AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN TO NATO
AMBASSADORS(PM DEC11),IT APPEARS THAT PRES REAGAN EXPRESSED TO
GORBACHEV HIS UNHAPPINESS ABOUT INCREASE SOVIET SHIPMENTS TO
NICARAGUA.DESPITE WHAT WAS BEING REPORTED,REAGAN NOTED THAT THERE
HAD BEEN NO CUT-BACK IN SOVIET OIL SHIPMENTS,AND THAT ARM SHIPMENTS
AND OTHER KINDS OF SUPPORT TO SANDINISTA REGIME HAD DEFINITELY
BEEN GOING UP.REAGAN APPARENTLY LAID OUT CLEARLY TO GORBACHEV THAT
SITUATION COULD NOT BE TOLERATED.

2.EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THIS TOPIC WAS DESCRIBED AS CANDID,AND
KAMPELMAN SAID THAT PRES REAGAN PERSONALLY FELT THAT SOVIETS

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RETURN TO DECAF POUR - ETRE
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MIGHT DO SOMETHING ABOUT ABOVE-MENTIONED SHIPMENTS. REAGAN
IMPRESSION MAY RESULT FROM TETE-A-TETE DISCUSSIONS HE HAD
WITH GORBACHEV.

3. CONTACTS IN OFFICE OF CENTRAL AMERICAN AFFAIRS IN STATE DEPT HAD
IMPRESSION THAT SOVIETS WERE NOT/NOT TOO FORTHCOMING ON NICARAGUA
AND DEFENDED STATUS QUO IN THEIR SUPPORT OF NIC GOVT.

4. ABOVE INFO SHOULD BE READ IN LIGHT OF OUR PREVIOUS REPORT
(OUR REFTEL UNGR1206 19NOV87(NOTAL)) ON SOVIET/USA TALKS ON CENTRAL
AMERICA AS SUMMARIZED TO AMB GOTLIEB BY ELLIOT ABRAMS
(17NOV). YOU WILL RECALL THAT DURING THOSE TALKS SOVIETS TRIED
TO REASSURE AMERICANS THAT BREZHNEV DOCTRINE DID NOT APPLY TO
NICARAGUA WHEREAS AMERICANS, ACCORDING TO ABRAMS, LAID OUT
THEIR BOTTOM LINE AS FAR AS SOVIET PRESENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA
IS CONCERNED, NAMELY NO MIGS, NO NAVAL OR LAND BASES, NO CUBAN
TROOPS AND NO TERRORISTS ACTS AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS.

CCC/029 120020Z UNGR1251

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L

DE WSHDC UNGR1250 11DEC87

TO MINDEL/NATO DELIVER BY 120800 EXTOTT PSR

INFO LDN MOSCO ISBAD PRMNY GENEV PARIS BONN TOKYO BNATO PEKIN

DELHI ROME CLMBO DHAKA CNBRA WLGTN CANMILREPNATO VCSCE VMBFR

PCOOTT/BRADLEY/HAGEN PMOOTT/BURNEY CIDA HULL/MINE

TT NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DM/CDS/DGCPOL/DIPOL/DNACPOL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS IFB IDD IDA CPP EER IDRA IDRL RGB RBD RBR RWR

UGB URD CPD PGB PGBA PSD PGP IND INP IMU DMC BCM

CIDA/YDP/BSO

---REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT: AFGHANISTAN

SUMMARY: AFGHANISTAN DOMINATED DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES AT THE SUMMIT. ALTHOUGH NO SPECIFIC PROGRESS WAS MADE DURING THE SUMMIT, DISCUSSIONS WERE FULL AND DETAILED ACCORDING TO KAMPELMAN IN BRIEFING THIS AFTERNOON. USA IS HOPEFUL THAT COMING PROXIMITY TALKS IN GENEVA WILL BE PRODUCTIVE. WASHINGTON IS LOOKING FOR A TIMETABLE ON SOVIET WITHDRAWAL THAT WOULD BEGIN AND END IN 1988.

2. REPORT: AS EXPECTED, QUESTION OF SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN DOMINATED DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES AT SUMMIT. WHILE THERE HAD BEEN SOME MODEST OPTIMISM HERE THAT SOVIETS MIGHT MEET USA DEMAND FOR A DATE CERTAIN FOR BEGINNING AND END OF TROOP WITHDRAWAL, THERE HAD ALSO BEEN CONSIDERABLE

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SCEPTICISM. IN THE EVENT ALTHOUGH ISSUE WAS NOT RESOLVED AT SUMMIT BOTH LEADERS DID AGREE THAT SEARCH FOR SOLUTION SHOULD CONTINUE.

3. IN REMARKS AT DEPARTURE CEREMONY AND DURING EVENING ADDRESS TO NATION, PRES REAGAN NOTED THAT DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW HAD BEEN BLUNTLY EXPRESSED ON AFGHANISTAN AND OTHER REGIONAL QUESTIONS, BUT IT HAD BEEN AGREED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO SEARCH FOR REAL POLITICAL SOLUTIONS. THOUGHT WAS ECHOED IN PRESIDENTS ADDRESS TO NATION LAST NIGHT WHEN HE REFERRED TO HIGH HOPES THAT THERE COULD BE MEANINGFUL COOPERATION IN RESOLVING REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND ELSEWHERE. JOINT REAGAN GORBACHEV STATEMENT DID NOT SPECIFICALLY SINGLE OUT AFGHANISTAN DESPITE DOMINANT POSITION IT HAD OCCUPIED IN REGIONAL TALKS.

4. AT FAREWELL PRESS CONFERENCE GORBACHEV WAS MORE SPECIFIC ON AFGHANISTAN BUT HE DID NOT DEPART FROM ESTABLISHED SOVIET POSITIONS INCLUDING MOST RECENT SUGGESTIONS OF TWELVE MONTH WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE:

-USSR WOULD LIKE TO ARRIVE AT A SETTLEMENT WHICH WOULD MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO PUT AN END TO THE INTERNAL CONFLICT.

-USSR WAS NOT SEEKING ANY OUTCOME UNDER WHICH THERE HAS TO BE A PRO-SOVIET REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT THE AMERICAN SIDE MUST AGREE NOT TO SEEK TO INSTALL A PRO-AMERICAN REGIME.

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-NON-ALIGNED NEUTRAL AFGHANISTAN MUST HAVE GOVT INVOLVING ALL ELEMENTS AS RESULT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

-USSR HAS TAKEN THE POLITICAL DECISION TO WITHDRAW AND DECIDED ON A TWELVE MONTH TIMETABLE. IT WOULD BE PREPARED TO NAME A DATE FOR BEGINNING THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES BUT THAT DATE WOULD HAVE TO BECOME THE BEGINNING OF AN END TO MILITARY AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE INSURGENCY FORCES.

5. DESPITE FACT THAT LITTLE IMMEDIATE PROGRESS WAS MADE AT SUMMIT THERE IS WIDESPREAD ACCEPTANCE HERE OF SOVIET DETERMINATION TO GET OUT OF AFGHANISTAN. THERE IS ALSO BELIEF THAT GORBACHEV COULD NOT AFFORD TO MAKE ANYTHING WHICH MIGHT BE VIEWED AS MAJOR CONCESSION WHILE IN WASHINGTON. NOT ONLY WOULD THAT HAVE GIVEN AMMUNITION TO CRITICS AT HOME BUT IT WOULD ALSO HAVE FURTHER SHAKEN THE ALREADY UNSTABLE FOUNDATIONS OF NAJIBULLAHS REGIME. FINDING FORMULA WHICH WOULD PROTECT AFGHANI SUPPORTERS FROM A BLOODBATH AND ALLOW SOVIET FORCES TO DEPART WITH HONOUR REMAINS A PRIORITY.

6. KAMPELMAN'S BRIEFING TO NATO AMBASSADORS THIS AFTERNOON SEEMED DESIGNED TO COUNTERACT SOME OF NEGATIVE CONCLUSIONS BEING DRAWN ABOUT PROGRESS ON THIS ISSUE. IT WAS POINTED OUT USA HAD NOT BEEN LOOKING FOR FORMAL STATEMENT. WASHINGTON HAD NO AUTHORITY TO DEAL ON BEHALF OF ISLAMABAD NOR DID MOSCOW WISH TO APPEAR TO BE SPEAKING FOR KABUL. DISCUSSIONS, HOWEVER, HAD BEEN FULL AND DETAILED AND IT WAS EXPECTED THE COMING PROXIMITY TALKS IN GENEVA WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE. USA WAS LOOKING FOR TIMETABLE ON WITHDRAWAL WHICH WOULD BEGIN AND END IN 1988.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

DEC 14 1987

FM WSHDC UNGR1249 11DEC87

TO NATO/MINDEL

DELIVER BY 120800 EXTOTT GMR/URR

INFO CAIRO TAVIV DMCUS BGHDD RYADH AMMAN KWAIT TUNIS RABAT

ALGER LDN PARIS ROME MOSCO PRMNY BONN ATHENS TOKYO BNATO

CANMILREPNATO GENEV PEKIN VCSCE VMBFR PCOOTT/BRADLEY/HAGEN

PMOOTT/BURNEY PILLAROTT

TT NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DM/CDS/DGCPOL/DNACPOL/CIS/CDPOL/DIPOL/ DE CAF

BAG STKHM ANKRA DE OTT

DISTR MINA USS DMC DMX IFB GGB GMD IMU IND INP GRP GMRD URR

UGB URD CPP CPD EED EER ISD ISE ISEO IDD IDA IDRA IDRL RGB RBR RWR

REF OURTELS UNGR1228 01DEC, UNGR2079 09DEC, UNGR2082 10DEC

---REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT:GULF WAR

SUMMARY:SOVIET UNION HAS SHOWN NO DISPOSITION TO MOVE ON

QUESTION OF SECURITY COUNCIL ARMS EMBARGO ON IRAN IN ORDER TO

ENFORCE RESOLUTION 598.IN DEBRIEFING THIS AFTERNOON,KAMPELMAN

REITERATED USA VIEW THAT SOVIETS REMAINED MAIN OBSTACLE TO

ACHIEVEMENT OF SUCH A RESOLUTION.USA EXPRESSED VIEW TO SOVIETS

THAT FAILURE TO ACT THREATENED UN S INTEGRITY AND GORBACHEV

REITERATED SOVIET SUPPORT FOR UN.

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2. SOVIETS WERE PUT FIRMLY UNDER ADVISEMENT THAT USA INTENDED TO PROCEED WITH EFFORTS TO OBTAIN ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION.

WASHINGTON WILL BE ATTEMPTING TO COORDINATE POSITION ON OBTAINING UN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST IRAN WITH LDN AND PARIS.

2. REPORT: THE GULF WAR (TOGETHER WITH AFGHANISTAN) HAD BEEN ONE OF REGIONAL ISSUES TO WHICH USA ATTACHED HIGHEST PRIORITY AT SUMMIT. HOPE HAD BEEN THAT USSR COULD BE BROUGHT TO SUPPORT UN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST IRAN GIVEN INTRANSIGENT POSITION OF THAT COUNTRY ON SC RES 598. USA BELIEVES THAT IF SOVIETS COULD BE WON OVER TO ARMS EMBARGO CHINESE WOULD FOLLOW SUIT.

4. LITTLE IN RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (INCLUDING LAST MONTHS SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE TALKS) HAD SUGGESTED THERE WAS MUCH CHANCE OF SOVIETS BUDGING ON ISSUE AT SUMMIT, AND IN EVENT THEY DID NOT. ALTHOUGH USSR CONTINUED TO TAKE POSITION THAT UN SEC GEN SHOULD BE ALLOWED MORE TIME TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT FROM IRAN ON IMPLEMENTATION OF RES 598. IN BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE STATEMENTS, GORBACHEV MADE CLEAR THAT USSR DID NOT BELIEVE ALL POSSIBILITIES HAD YET BEEN EXHAUSTED FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF RES 598. SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN STATED DURING COURSE OF VISIT THAT USSR DID NOT AGREE TIME HAD YET COME FOR UN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST IRAN.

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5. SIZE OF USA AND WESTERN NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE GULF AND DESIRABILITY OF UN NAVAL PRESENCE WERE RAISED DURING SUMMIT BY GORBACHEV. HOWEVER, COMPLAINTS ABOUT WESTERN NAVAL PRESENCE WERE NOT STATED WITH GREAT FORCE AND USA DID NOT HAVE IMPRESSION SOVIETS WERE VERY SERIOUS ABOUT IDEA OF UN NAVAL FORCE. USA CONTINUES TO CONSIDER LATTER IDEA A NON-STARTER.

6. IN DEBRIEFING FOR NATO AMBASSADORS THIS AFTERNOON, CHIEF ARMS NEGOTIATOR MAX KAMPELMAN ADDED ADDITIONAL DETAIL AND FLAVOUR INCLUDING REITERATION OF USA VIEW THAT SOVIETS WERE THE MAJOR BARRIER TO OBTAINING SEC COUNCIL RES ENFORCING 598. OF PARTICULAR NOTE WAS THE EMPHASIS PLACED ON THE INTEGRITY OF THE UN WHICH KAMPELMAN ARGUED WAS AT STAKE. USA DID NOT SEE HOW THERE COULD BE MUCH HOPE OF STRENGTHENING THE UN IF IT WAS UNABLE TO BRING IRAN TO ACCEPT OBLIGATIONS UNDER RES 598. GORBACHEV REAFFIRMED, ACCORDING TO KAMPELMAN, THE SOVIET UNIONS SUPPORT FOR UN. GORBACHEV WAS ALSO PLACED FIRMLY UNDER ADVISEMENT THAT USA INTENDED TO PRESS ON WITH ITS EFFORTS TO OBTAIN A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION EMBARGOING ARMS TO IRAN.

7. UNDERSTAND USA WILL BE CONSULTING BRITISH AND FRENCH TO DETERMINE HOW THEY MIGHT NOW PROCEED TO OBTAIN FORWARD MOVEMENT ON SECURITY COUNCIL ENFORCEMENT RESOLUTION AGAINST IRAN IN LIGHT OF SUMMIT RESULTS.

CCC/029 120030Z UNGR1249

CONFIDENTIAL
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BY FACSIMILE

Alliance for Peace
Canada

MESSAGE

RE/UP TO
RENOYER AU

MTC/DIARY/CIRC/FILE
MTC/JOURNAL/CIRC/DOSSIER

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

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DATA

TO EXTOTT/URR IDR

FLASH

INFO

MINDEL/BNATO

(SFAX)

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BAG
INFO MOSCOW BNATO CANMILREPNATO LDN PARIS BONN ROME GENEV TOKYO

INFO

PEKIN PRMNY VCSCE VMBFR PCOOTT/HAGEN PMOOTT/BURNEY TT

INFO

NOHQOTT/ADMPO/DM/CDS/DGCPOL/DIPOL/ACPOL/ DE-CAF

DISTR MINA USS IFB IDD IDA CPP EER IDRA IDRL RGB RBD RBR RWR UGB

URD CPD GMR GMD GGB GGBS GAA PSR PNR PSD LCR LCD LGB LGX LSR LSD

IMD IMU IMH

---REAGAN/GOBACHEV SUMMIT: JOINT STATEMENT

ATTACHED IS TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT ISSUED AT CONCLUSION OF THE
REAGAN/GOBACHEV SUMMIT TODAY.

(COMCENTRE PLS FAX ATTACHED 8 PAGES.)

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DIVISION/DIRECTION

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December 10, 1987

JOINT U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT STATEMENT

Ronald W. Reagan, President of the United States of America, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, met in Washington on December 7-10, 1987.

Attending the meeting on the U.S. side were Vice President George Bush; Secretary of State George P. Shultz; Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci; Chief of Staff Howard H. Baker, Jr.; Acting Assistant to the President Lieutenant General Colin L. Powell; Counselor of the Department of State Ambassador Max M. Kampelman; Ambassador-at-Large and Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Paul H. Nitze; Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters Ambassador Edward L. Rowny; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr.; Ambassador of the U.S. to the USSR Jack F. Matlock; and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Rozanne L. Ridgway.

Attending on the Soviet side were Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Eduard A. Shevardnadze; Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Alexander N. Yakovlev; Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly F. Dobrynin; Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Vladimir M. Kamentsev; Chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhromeev; Assistant to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly S. Chernyaev; Head of the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee Valeriy I. Boldin; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh; Ambassador of the USSR to the United States of America Yuri V. Dubinin; Member of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Victor P. Karpov; and Ambassador-at-Large Aleksey A. Obukhov.

During the course of the official visit, which had been agreed during the two leaders' November 1985 meeting in Geneva, the President and the General Secretary held comprehensive and detailed discussions on the full range of issues between the two countries, including arms reductions, human rights and humanitarian issues, settlement of regional conflicts, and bilateral relations. The talks were candid and constructive, reflecting both the continuing differences between the two sides, and their understanding that these differences are not insurmountable obstacles to progress in areas of mutual interest.

They reaffirmed their strong commitment to a vigorous dialogue encompassing the whole of the relationship.

The leaders reviewed progress to date in fulfilling the broad agenda they agreed at Geneva and advanced at Reykjavik. They took particular satisfaction in the conclusion over the last two years of important agreements in some areas of this agenda.

The President and the General Secretary affirmed the fundamental importance of their meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik, which laid the basis for concrete steps in a process intended to improve strategic stability and reduce the risk of conflict. They will continue to be guided by their solemn conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. They are determined to prevent any war between the United States and the Soviet Union, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.

The two leaders recognized the special responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union to search for realistic ways to prevent confrontation and to promote a more sustainable

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and stable relationship between their countries. To this end, they agreed to intensify dialogue and to encourage emerging trends toward constructive cooperation in all areas of their relations. They are convinced that in so doing they will also contribute, with other nations, to the building of a safer world as humanity enters the third millennium.

I. ARMS CONTROL

The INF Treaty

The two leaders signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. This treaty is historic both for its objective -- the complete elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms -- and for the innovative character and scope of its verification provisions. This mutual accomplishment makes a vital contribution to greater stability.

Nuclear and Space Talks

The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive arms. They noted the considerable progress which has been made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50-percent reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature of the treaty during the next meeting of leaders of state in the first half of 1988. Recognizing that areas of agreement and disagreement are recorded in detail in the Joint Draft Treaty Text, they agreed to instruct their negotiators to accelerate resolution of issues within the Joint Draft Treaty Text including early agreement on provisions for effective verification.

In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50-percent reductions achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the Joint Draft START Treaty Text being developed in Geneva, including agreement on ceilings of no more than 1600 strategic offensive delivery systems, 6000 warheads, 1540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles; the agreed rule of account for heavy bombers and their nuclear armament; and an agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs and SLBMs will be reduced to a level approximately 50-percent below the existing level, and this level will not be exceeded by either side. Such an agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner.

As priority tasks, they should focus on the following issues:

- (a) The additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic stability. This will include a ceiling of 4900 on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6000 total.
- (b) The counting rules governing the number of long-range, nuclear-armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber. The Delegations shall define concrete rules in this area.

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- (c) The counting rules with respect to existing ballistic missiles. The sides proceed from the assumption that existing types of ballistic missiles are deployed with the following numbers of warheads. In the United States: PEACEKEEPER (MX):10, MINUTEMAN III:3, MINUTEMAN II:1, TRIDENT I:8, TRIDENT II:8, POSEIDON:10. In the Soviet Union: SS-17:4, SS-19:6, SS-18:10, SS-24:10, SS-25:1, SS-11:1, SS-13:1, SS-N-6:1, SS-N-8:1, SS-N-17:1, SS-N-18:7, SS-N-20:10 and SS-N-23:4. Procedures will be developed that enable verification of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type. In the event either side changes the number of warheads declared for a type of deployed ballistic missile, the sides shall notify each other in advance. There shall also be agreement on how to account for warheads on future types of ballistic missiles covered by the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.
- (d) The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs. Such limitations will not involve counting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6000 warhead and 1600 strategic offensive delivery systems limits. The sides committed themselves to establish ceilings on such missiles, and to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations, which could include the employment of National Technical Means, cooperative measures and on-site inspection.
- (e) Building upon the provisions of the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the measures by which the provisions of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms can be verified will, at a minimum, include:
1. Data exchanges, to include declarations by each side of the number and location of weapon systems limited by the Treaty and of facilities at which such systems are located and appropriate notifications. These facilities will include locations and facilities for production and final assembly, storage, testing, and deployment of systems covered by this Treaty. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the Treaty is signed and updated periodically after entry into force.
 2. Baseline inspection to verify the accuracy of these declarations promptly after entry into force of the Treaty.
 3. On-site observation of the elimination of strategic systems necessary to achieve the agreed limits.
 4. Continuous on-site monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production and support facilities to confirm the output of these facilities.
 5. Short-notice on-site inspection of:
 - (i) declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;

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- (ii) locations where systems covered by this Treaty remain after achieving the agreed limits; and
- (iii) locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).
6. The right to implement, in accordance with agreed-upon procedures, short-notice inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.
7. Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by national technical means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.
8. Measures designed to enhance observation of activities related to reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms by National Technical Means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party.

Taking into account the preparation of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, the leaders of the two countries also instructed their delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time. Intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action. Such an agreement must have the same legal status as the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, the ABM Treaty, and other similar, legally binding agreements. This agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner. Therefore, they direct their delegations to address these issues on a priority basis.

The sides shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability, to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Other Arms Control Issues

The President and the General Secretary reviewed a broad range of other issues concerning arms limitation and reduction. The sides emphasized the importance of productive negotiations on security matters and advancing in the main areas of arms limitation and reduction through equitable, verifiable agreements that enhance security and stability.

Nuclear Testing

The two leaders welcomed the opening on November 9, 1987, of full-scale, step-by-step negotiations, in accordance with the joint statement adopted in Washington on September 17, 1987, by the Secretary of State of the United States and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR:

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The U.S. and Soviet sides have agreed to begin before December 1, 1987, full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations which will be conducted in a single forum. In these negotiations the sides as the first step will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the U.S.-USSR Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process. This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination. For the purpose of the elaboration of improved verification measures for the U.S.-USSR Treaties of 1974 and 1976 the sides intend to design and conduct joint verification experiments at each other's test sites. These verification measures will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached.

The leaders also welcomed the prompt agreement by the sides to exchange experts visits to each other's nuclear testing sites in January 1988 and to design and subsequently to conduct a Joint Verification Experiment at each other's test site. The terms of reference for the Experiment are set forth in the statement issued on December 9, 1987, by the Foreign Ministers of the United States and the Soviet Union. The leaders noted the value of these agreements for developing more effective measures to verify compliance with the provisions of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The President and the General Secretary reaffirmed the continued commitment of the United States and the Soviet Union to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in particular to strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The two leaders expressed satisfaction at the adherence since their last meeting of additional parties to the Treaty, and confirmed their intent to make, together with other states, additional efforts to achieve universal adherence to the Treaty.

The President and the General Secretary expressed support for international cooperation in nuclear safety and for efforts to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, under further strengthened IAEA safeguards and appropriate export controls for nuclear materials, equipment and technology. The leaders agreed that bilateral consultations on non-proliferation were constructive and useful, and should continue.

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

The leaders welcomed the signing on September 15, 1987, in Washington of the agreement to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in their capitals. The agreement will be implemented promptly.

Chemical Weapons

The leaders expressed their commitment to negotiation of a verifiable, comprehensive and effective international convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. They welcomed progress to date and reaffirmed the need for intensified negotiations toward conclusion of a truly global and verifiable convention encompassing all chemical weapons-capable states. The United States and Soviet Union are in favor of greater openness and intensified confidence-building.

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with respect to chemical weapons both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis. They agreed to continue periodic discussions by experts on the growing problem of chemical weapons proliferation and use.

Conventional Forces

The President and the General Secretary discussed the importance of the task of reducing the level of military confrontation in Europe in the area of armed forces and conventional armaments. The two leaders spoke in favor of early completion of the work in Vienna on the mandate for negotiations on this issue, so that substantive negotiations may be started at the earliest time with a view to elaborating concrete measures. They also noted that the implementation of the provisions of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is an important factor in strengthening mutual understanding and enhancing stability, and spoke in favor of continuing and consolidating this process. The President and the General Secretary agreed to instruct their appropriate representatives to intensify efforts to achieve solutions to outstanding issues.

They also discussed the Vienna (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction) negotiations.

Follow-Up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

They expressed their determination, together with the other 33 participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to bring the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Conference to a successful conclusion, based on balanced progress in all principal areas of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document.

II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS

The leaders held a thorough and candid discussion of human rights and humanitarian questions and their place in the U.S.-Soviet dialogue.

III. REGIONAL ISSUES

The President and the General Secretary engaged in a wide-ranging, frank and businesslike discussion of regional questions, including Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq War, the Middle East, Cambodia, southern Africa, Central America and other issues. They acknowledged serious differences but agreed on the importance of their regular exchange of views. The two leaders noted the increasing importance of settling regional conflicts to reduce international tensions and to improve East-West relations. They agreed that the goal of the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union on these issues should be to help the parties to regional conflicts find peaceful solutions that advance their independence, freedom and security. Both leaders emphasized the importance of enhancing the capacity of the United Nations and other international institutions to contribute to the resolution of regional conflicts.

IV. BILATERAL AFFAIRS

The President and the General Secretary reviewed in detail the state of U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations. They recognized the utility of further expanding and strengthening bilateral contacts, exchanges and cooperation.

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Bilateral Negotiations

Having reviewed the state of ongoing U.S.-Soviet negotiations on a number of specific bilateral issues, the two leaders called for intensified efforts by their representatives, aimed at reaching mutually advantageous agreements on: commercial maritime issues; fishing; marine search and rescue; radio navigational systems; the U.S.-USSR maritime boundary; and cooperation in the field of transportation and other areas.

They noted with satisfaction agreement on the expansion, within the framework of the U.S.-Soviet Air Transport Agreement, of direct air passenger service, including joint operation of the New York-Moscow route by Pan American Airways and Aeroflot, and on the renewal of the U.S.-Soviet World Ocean Agreement.

People-to-People Contacts and Exchanges

The two leaders took note of progress in implementing the U.S.-Soviet General Exchanges Agreement in the areas of education, science, culture and sports, signed at their November 1985 Geneva meeting, and agreed to continue efforts to eliminate obstacles to further progress in these areas. They expressed satisfaction with plans to celebrate jointly the 30th anniversary of the first Exchanges Agreement in January 1988.

The two leaders reaffirmed the importance of contacts and exchanges in broadening understanding between their peoples. They noted with particular satisfaction the progress made in the development of people-to-people contacts under the initiative they launched at their 1985 meeting in Geneva -- a process which has involved tens of thousands of U.S. and Soviet citizens over the past two years. The leaders reaffirmed their strong commitment further to expand such contacts, including among the young.

Global Climate and Environmental Change Initiative

With reference to their November 1985 agreement in Geneva to cooperate in the preservation of the environment, the two leaders approved a bilateral initiative to pursue joint studies in global climate and environmental change through cooperation in areas of mutual concern, such as protection and conservation of stratospheric ozone, and through increased data exchanges pursuant to the U.S.-Soviet Environmental Protection Agreement and the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes. In this context, there will be a detailed study on the climate of the future. The two sides will continue to promote broad international and bilateral cooperation in the increasingly important area of global climate and environmental change.

Cooperative Activities

The President and the General Secretary supported further cooperation among scientists of the United States, the Soviet Union and other countries in utilizing controlled thermonuclear fusion for peaceful purposes. They affirmed the intention of the U.S. and the USSR to cooperate with the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATO) and Japan, under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in the quadripartite conceptual design of a fusion test reactor.

The two leaders noted with satisfaction progress under the bilateral Agreement on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy towards establishing a permanent working group in the field of nuclear reactor safety, and expressed their readiness to develop further cooperation in this area.

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The President and the General Secretary agreed to develop bilateral cooperation in combatting international narcotics trafficking. They agreed that appropriate initial consultations would be held for these purposes in early 1988.

They also agreed to build on recent contacts to develop more effective cooperation in ensuring the security of air and maritime transportation.

The two leaders exchanged views on means of encouraging expanded contacts and cooperation on issues relating to the Arctic. They expressed support for the development of bilateral and regional cooperation among the Arctic countries on these matters, including coordination of scientific research and protection of the region's environment.

The two leaders welcomed the conclusion of negotiations to institutionalize the COSPAS/SARSAT space-based global search and rescue system, operated jointly by the United States, the Soviet Union, France and Canada.

Trade

The two sides stated their strong support for the expansion of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations. They instructed their trade ministers to convene the U.S.-USSR Joint Commercial Commission in order to develop concrete proposals to achieve that objective, including within the framework of the Long-Term Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation. They agreed that commercially viable joint ventures complying with the laws and regulations of both countries could play a role in the further development of commercial relations.

Diplomatic Missions

Both sides agreed on the importance of adequate, secure facilities for their respective diplomatic and consular establishments, and emphasized the need to approach problems relating to the functioning of Embassies and Consulates General constructively and on the basis of reciprocity.

V. FURTHER MEETINGS

The President and the General Secretary agreed that official contacts at all levels should be further expanded and intensified, with the goal of achieving practical and concrete results in all areas of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

General Secretary Gorbachev renewed the invitation he extended during the Geneva summit for President Reagan to visit the Soviet Union. The President accepted with pleasure. The visit will take place in the first half of 1988.

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---REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT - DAY THREE

SUMMARY: THIRD AND FINAL DAY OF SUMMIT FEATURED REPORTS TO LEADERS
ON RESULTS OF WORKING GROUPS AND LAST MTG BETWEEN PRINCIPALS TO
HAMMER OUT FINAL POSNS. DESPITE BEST EFFORTS OF NEGOTIATORS, IT
APPEARS DIFFERENCES STILL REMAINED TOO LARGE BY MID-MORNING FOR
PARTIES TO CONSIDER DELAYING END OF SUMMIT BY A DAY IN HOPE OF
ACHIEVING BREAKTHROUGHS. AS RESULT, WHEN TWO LEADERS APPEARED FOR
FINAL FAREWELLS, THEIR EMPHASIS WAS ON PROCESS OF CONSULTATIONS
WHICH HAD BEEN SET IN TRAIN RATHER THAN SPECIFIC AGMTS WHICH HAD
BEEN REACHED (OR NOT/NOT). BOTH DESCRIBED SUMMIT IN VERY POSITIVE
TERMS, NOTING IN PARTICULAR SIGNING OF INF AGMT AND FRANKNESS WITH
WHICH DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON OTHER ISSUES HAD BEEN DEALT WITH.
BOTH BELIEVED GOOD RELATIONSHIP HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED WHICH WOULD
BEAR FRUIT OVER LONG TERM. EACH SAID THERE HAD BEEN QUOTE SOME
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PROGRESS UNQUOTE ON STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS, BUT REAGAN MADE IT CLEAR THAT DISCUSSIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND REGIONAL ISSUES HAD NOT/NOT BEEN VERY PRODUCTIVE. NEITHER MENTIONED POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER SUMMIT IN MOSCOW IN MAY, ALTHOUGH SUMMIT WAS LATER PROTECTED FOR MID-YEAR.

2. FULLER ANALYSIS OF CONTENTS OF DISCUSSIONS FOLLOWS TOMORROW.

3. REPORT: MOOD WAS BIT MORE EXPECTANT AS THIRD DAY OF SUMMIT COMMENCED, BUT AS MORNING PROGRESSED IT BECAME EVIDENT THAT WASHINGTON SUMMIT WOULD NOT/NOT END WITH ANY BIG SURPRISES. PGM FOR DAY WAS DELAYED BY ABOUT AN HOUR, AFTER WORKING GROUPS REPORTED TO PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY ON RESULTS OF THEIR LABOURS OVER PREVIOUS THREE DAYS AND EACH THEN CAUCUSSED SEPARATELY AT WHITE HOUSE AND SOVIET EMBASSY. BUT DELAY DID NOT/NOT PORTEND ANY BREAKTHROUGHS, AND AS ONE OBSERVER NOTED NEGOTIATORS QUOTE JUST GAVE UP UNQUOTE IN FACE OF GREAT DIFFERENCES WHICH STILL HAD TO BE OVERCOME.

4. MOOD OF LEADERS THEMSELVES REMAINED RELATIVELY UPBEAT DURING MORNING, WITH GORBACHEV EVIDENTLY ENJOYING BRIEF OPPORTUNITY HE GAVE HIMSELF TO STOP HIS LIMOUSINE IN DOWNTOWN WSHDC TO SHAKE HANDS WITH PEDESTRIANS. AFFECTION ACCORDED HIM AND SPONTANEOUS APPLAUSE WHICH SENT HIM ON HIS WAY ATTESTED BOTH TO HIS POLITICAL SKILLS AND TO DEEP-ROOTED DESIRE OF AMERICANS FOR MORE RELAXED RELATIONSHIP WITH SOVIET UNION.

5. THAT DESIRE, EVIDENTLY SHARED BY GORBACHEV AND HIS ENTOURAGE, APPEARS TO HAVE DICTATED HOW TWO LEADERS WOULD CHARACTERIZE THEIR

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SUMMIT MTG WHEN THEY MET ON SOUTH LAWN OF WHITE HOUSE FOR THEIR FAREWELL SPEECHES. REAGAN SAID THREE DAYS HAD BEEN EXCITING ONES AND HE WAS QUOTE PLEASED TO REPORT THAT THE SUMMIT HAS BEEN A CLEAR SUCCESS UNQUOTE. TWO LEADERS HAD TALKED CANDIDLY AND RESPECTFULLY, WITHOUT HIDING THEIR DIFFERENCES, AND IT WOULD BE IMPORTANT QUOTE TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON OUR COMMITMENTS AND TO TAKE THE NEXT STEPS UNQUOTE. GORBACHEV SPOKE IN VERY SIMILAR VEIN. VISIT HAD, ON THE WHOLE, QUOTE JUSTIFIED OUR HOPES UNQUOTE HE SAID. GOOD DEAL HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, NOTABLY THAT TWO SIDES HAD BEEN ABLE QUOTE TO FORMULATE A KIND OF AGENDA FOR THE FUTURE UNQUOTE. SUMMIT HAD PUT SOVIET/AMERICAN DIALOGUE ON QUOTE A MORE PREDICTABLE FOOTING UNQUOTE AND THAT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE CONSTRUCTIVE FOR THE FUTURE.

6. ON ARMS CONTROL, BOTH LEADERS LAUDED INF TREATY SIGNING AS MAJOR ACHIEVEMENT AND DESCRIBED IT AS IMPORTANT STEP IN PROCESS OF ARMS CONTROL. REAGAN SAID HE WAS PLEASED QUOTE SOME PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE TOWARD START AGMT UNQUOTE, WHILE GORBACHEV SAID QUOTE SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON THE CENTRAL ISSUED OF ACHIEVING REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC ARMS UNQUOTE. BUT BOTH ALSO SAID THAT A LOT OF WORK STILL REMAINS TO BE DONE.

7. REAGAN ALONE DISCUSSED OTHER ISSUES AT ANY LENGTH IN HIS FAREWELL SPEECH. ON HUMAN RIGHTS, HE SAID TWO LEADERS EXCHANGE HAD UNDERSCORED PRIORITY WHICH WESTERN DEMOCRACIES PLACED ON THIS

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SUBJECT AND HAD ENSURED QUOTE A CONTINUING DIALOGUE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS ON OUR GOVTS UNQUOTE. BUT THERE WAS NO/NO MENTION OF ANY PARTICULAR SOVIET UNDERTAKINGS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. SIMILARLY ON REGIONAL CONFLICTS, PRESIDENT SAID DISCUSSION HAD BEEN POINTED AND BLUNT, AND FOR THAT REASON USEFUL. TWO SIDES HAD AGREED THAT IT WAS QUOTE NECESSARY TO SEARCH FOR REAL POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO THESE CONFLICTS UNQUOTE, BUT THERE HAD HAD BEEN NO/NO MEETING OF MINDS ON AFGHANISTAN. GORBACHEV SAID ONLY THAT DISCUSSIONS HAD CLARIFIED POSITIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS, BUT HE DID HOLD OUT HOPE THAT QUOTE WE CAN SOON IDENTIFY SPECIFIC SOLUTIONS, SATISFACTORY BOTH TO US AND TO OTHER COUNTRIES UNQUOTE.

8. IN CLOSING, REAGAN SAID HIS GOAL WAS MORE CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AMERICAN AND SOVIET GOVTS, AND LONG LASTING RATHER THAN TRANSIENT IMPROVEMENTS. GORBACHEV EVIDENTLY SHARED THIS GOAL. HE REFERRED POINTEDLY TO MTGS HE HAD HAD WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND OTHER PUBLIC FIGURES, WHICH HE SAID HAD BEEN DESIGNED QUOTE TO ENABLE US TO GAIN A BETTER AND MORE PROFOUND KNOWLEDGE OF EACH OTHER UNQUOTE. MTGS HAD PROVIDED QUOTE A WEALTH OF OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHECKING ONES VIEWS, ASSESSMENTS AND EVEN ESTABLISHED STEROTYPES UNQUOTE AND HE HOPED THEY HAD HELPED AMERICANS TO ADOPT QUOTE A MORE CORRECT AND TOLERANT PERCEPTION OF MY COUNTRY, THE SOVIET UNION UNQUOTE.

9. CONCLUSION: THERE HAVE BEEN FEW SOVIET/AMERICAN SUMMITS AND FEWER
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STILL IN WSHDC.THERE IS NOT/NOT A LOT TO GO ON, THEREFORE, IN
ESTABLISHING CRITERIA BY WHICH TO JUDGE THEIR SUCCESS OR FAILURE.
BUT THERE IS A REAL SENSE IN THIS TOWN THAT WHAT HAS HAPPENED HERE
MARKS A DISTINCT CHANGE FROM POST PATTERNS OF AMERICAN/SOVIET
EXCHANGE, AND THAT BARRING SOME NEW CRISIS WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW
ARE GOING TO GET ALONG BETTER.

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---REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT:DAY TWO

SUMMARY:SECOND DAY OF SUMMIT FEATURED FURTHER TWO HOUR MTG. IN OVAL
OFFICE AND CONTINUED EFFORTS ON PART OF WORKING GROUPS TO BREAK NEW
GROUND ON ARMS CONTROL,REGIONAL ISSUES ESPECIALLY AFGHAN,AND HUMAN
RIGHTS.BUT THERE WAS LITTLE SIGN OF ANY BREAKTHROUGH,ADN SOME OF
OPTIMISM OF FIRST DAY HAD EVAPORATED BY TIME OFFICIALS DEBRIEFED ON
THE DAYS PROCEEDINGS.INDEED,SOV SPOKESMEN APPEARED TO BE ENGAGED IN
EFFORT OF LOWER EXPECTATIONS,IN ONE CASE ARGUING THAT QUOTE WITH THE
IMPROVEMENT IN ATMOSPHERE REPRESENTED AT TALKS,OUR WORK HERE IS
MOSTLY COMPLETED UNQUOTE.PUBLIC SILENCE ON ARMS CONTROL TALKS
SUGGESTED MORE PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE IN THIS AREA THAN ANY OTHER,
BUT IT APPEARED UNLIKELY TWO SIDES WOULD REACH AGMT ON AFGHAN
PULL-OUT OR ON HUMAN RIGHTS.

2.INTRACTABILITY OF MANY OF ISSUES UNDER DISCUSSION WAS EVIDENT IN

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GORBACHEVS MTG WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AT SOV EMB, AND THERE WAS SOME TESTINESS ON GORBACHEVS PART WHEN HE WAS BADGERED BY PUBLISHERS ON HUMAN RIGHTS. PUBLIC OPTIMISM WAS STILL DE RIGUEUR AT SOV-HOSTED DINNER, BUT SMILES WERE NOT/NOT QUITE SO BROAD AND SOV LEADER LET HIS GUARD SLIP A LITTLE WHEN HE DESCRIBED HIS TALKS WITH PRES AS PROCEEDING IN QUOTE A FRANK AND BUSINESSLIKE WAY UNQUOTE.

3. REPORT: MAIN EVENT OF SECOND DAY WAS TEN MINUTE TETE-A-TETE BETWEEN LEADERS (WITHOUT NOTETAKERS) FOLLOWED BY TWO HOUR PLENARY SESSION AT WHICH ARMS CONTROL AND AFGHAN WERE MAIN ISSUES DISCUSSED. THERE WAS SPECULATION THAT TETE-A-TETE HAD BEEN ARRANGED TO TEST FOR FLEXIBILITY ON SDI/ABM, BUT THERE WAS NO/NO BREAKTHROUGH IN THIS AREA EVIDENT BY END OF DAY. IN FACT, MAIN VENUE FOR ARMS CONTROL DISCUSSIONS HAS BEEN NITZE/AKHROMEYEV WORKING GROUP, WHICH HAS BEEN MTG ALMOST CONTINUOUSLY SINCE IT FIRST CONVENED ON TUE. THAT PACE WAS CONSIDERED ENCOURAGING BY MANY, AND THERE HAS BEEN ONE REPORT THAT NEGOTIATORS HAVE BEEN MAKING PROGRESS ON ESTABLISHING SUB-LIMITS ON STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. NITZE HAS SAID NOTHING IN PUBLIC BUT AKHROMEYEV HELPED TO KEEP SPIRITS UP WITH BRIEF REF (AT PENTAGON ON HIS WAY TO MEET CARLUCCI) TO QUOTE MUTUAL DESIRE ON BOTH SIDES SHOWN TODAY TO SEEK PROGRESS IN THE FIELD OF REDUCING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS UNQUOTE. WORKING GROUP HAS BEEN REPORTING PERIODICALLY TO LEADERS AND IS EXPECTED TO PRESENT QUOTE FINAL REPORT UNQUOTE THU MORNING.

4. ON AFGHAN, GORBACHEV HAD RAISED EXPECTATIONS AT BEGINNING OF DAY ...3

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WHEN HE REMINDED PRESS AT PHOTO SESSION THAT SOME TIME AGO HE HAD SAID QUOTE WE ARE READY TO WITHDRAW FROM AFGHAN UNQUOTE. WHAT HE WAS GOING TO DISCUSS WITH PRES, HE SAID, WOULD BE QUOTE MORE SPECIFIC UNQUOTE. IN EVENT, GORBACHEV WAS LESS FORTHCOMING THAN HAD BEEN HOPED (PROMPTING ONE WHITE HOUSE OFFICIAL TO COMMENT THAT QUOTE YOU DONT HEAR IN THE MTGS WHAT YOU HEAR IN THE PUBLIC COMMENTARY BY GORBACHEV UNQUOTE). ANOTHER OFFICIAL CALLED GORBACHEV QUOTE DOCTRINAIRE UNQUOTE ON AFGHAN, REFUSING TO SET A DATE FOR WITHDRAWAL UNTIL USSR COULD BE ASSURED AFGHAN WOULD BE NON-ALIGNED, AND DEMANDING TO KNOW WHEN USA AID TO MUJAHADEEN WOULD END. AFTERWARDS, PRES TOLD JOURNALISTS GORBACHEV HAD REPEATED TO HIM THAT HE WANTED TO GET OUT OF AFGHAN, BUT THAT USA WANTED TO KNOW QUOTE WHEN AND HOW UNQUOTE. THOSE TWO QUESTIONS ARE AT TOP OF AGENDA OF RIDGWAY/BESSMERTNYK WORKING GROUP, BUT RIDGWAY HERSELF TOLD NBC NEWS SHE HAD NOT/NOT SO FAR SEEN ANY SIGN OF DRAMATIC MOVEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL. SOME SPECULATED THAT IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT POLITICALLY FOR GORBACHEV TO SET A DATE FOR WITHDRAWAL WHILE IN THE UNITED STATES, BUT THAT SOVS MIGHT BE READY TO DO SO WHEN NEXT ROUND OF UN-SPONSORED TALKS ON AFGHAN CONVENES IN FEB. (A SOV OFFICIAL IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD UNDERSECRETARY MICHAEL ARMACOST THAT NEXT ROUND SHOULD BE LAST).

5. ON RELATED REGIONAL ISSUE, USA OFFICIALS HAVE REPORTED NO/NO SHIFT SO FAR IN SOV POSN ON IRAN/IRAQ WAR, AND AT NOON PRESS CONF SOV FOREIGN MILITARY SPOKESMAN GERASIMOV SAID TIME QUOTE HAS NOT/NOT COME

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PAGE FOUR UNGR2082 CONF D

YET UNQUOTE TO IMPOSE ARMS EMBARGO TO IRAN.ON OTHER HAND,HE SAID TWO SIDES HAD BEEN DISCUSSING SOV PROPOSAL THAT USA NAVAL FORCE IN REGION BE REPLACED BY UNITED NATIONS FORCE.

6.RIDGWAY/BESSMERTNYK WORKING GROUP ESTABLISHED TWO SUB-GROUPS TO LOOK SPECIFICALLY AT HUMAN RIGHTS AND BILATERAL ISSUES,BUT IT SEEMS UNLIKELY ANY PROGRESS WILL BE POSSIBLE ON FIRST OF THESE.AT BEGINNING OF DAY,GORBACHEV HAD HAD MTG WITH CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS AT SOV EMP(AS SUBSTITUTE FOR ADDRESS TO JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS THWARTED BY CONSERVATIVES).GORBACHEV HAD SEEN MTG AS OPPORTUNITY TO SELL CONGRESS ON INF AGMT,AND IN HIS REMARKS HE DID JUST THAT EXPRESSING HOPE THAT BOTH CONGRESS AND SUPREME SOVIET(SIC)WOULD RATIFY TREATY.BUT HE ALSO SAID THAT PAST CONGRESSES HAD IMPEDED USA/SOV RELATIONSHIP BY HANDING DOWN ULTIMATUMS QUOTE DEMANDING TOTAL CHANGE IN EMIGRATION,DEMANDING THAT WE CHANGE SOCIALIST SYSTEM UNQUOTE.

7.RESPONSE FROM CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS WAS PREDICTABLE.SENATE MAJORITY LEADER BYRD,FOR INSTANCE,SAID INF RATIFICATION WOULD BE QUOTE EXPEDITED UNQUOTE WERE SOV LEADER TO ANNOUNCE WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHAN, AND SENATOR CRANSTON TOLD SOV LEADER THAT RATIFICATION PROSPECTS WOULD BE HELPED BY CHANGES IN SOV EMIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES.GORBACHEV REPLIED THAT SOV UNION ALSO BELIEVED IN HUMAN RIGHTS,IN PARTICULAR RIGHT TO A DECENT STANDARD OF LIVING AND RIGHT TO PERSONAL SECURITY,AND HE SAID SOV GOVT LIMITED EMIGRATION ONLY IN CASES OF QUOTE SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION UNQUOTE.HE

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PAGE FIVE UNGR2082 CONF D

SUGGESTED SENATORS EXAMINE USA RECORD:QUOTE YOU WONT LET EVERYBODY INTO YOUR COUNTRY WHO LEAVES SOME OTHER COUNTRY,OR WISHES TO.YOU SEEM TO ACCEPT EVERYONE WHO WISHES TO LEAVE THE SOVIET UNION,BUT YOU DO NOT/NOT ACCEPT EVERYONE WHO WISHES TO LEAVE MXICO FOR YOUR COUNTRY UNQUOTE.HE SUGGESTED CONGRESS AND SUPREME SOV HOLD A JOINT SEMINAR ON SUBJECT.

8.LATER IN DAY,WHEN GORBACHEV MET WITH SELECTION OF USA PUBLISHERS AND EDITORS,HE WAS CHALLENGED AGAIN ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THIS TIME REACTED MORE HEATEDLY.HE COMPARED SOV CRIMINAL CODE FAVOURABLY WITH THAT OF USA(AND OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES)AND NOTED THAT USA HAD NOT/NOT RATIFIED INNATL CONVENTIONS ON SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS.HE SAID WESTERN LEADERS WOULD GET NOWHERE PUTTING USSR IN DOCK ON HUMAN RIGHTS.AS HE HAD TOLD PRES,QUOTE YOU ARE NOT/NOT THE PROSECUTOR AND I AM NOT/NOT THE ACCUSED.WE HAVE TO STRIKE A BALANCE HERE,OTHERWISE YOU WILL GET NOTHING/NOTHING OUT OF US UNQUOTE.

9.BY END OF DAY,WHICH WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN FITZWATER DESCRIBED AS ONE OF QUOTE HEAVY LIFTING UNQUOTE,SOME OF EARLIER EUPHORIA WAS BEGINNING TO DISSIPATE WITH SOV SPOKESMAN SEEMINGLY INTENT ON LOWERING EXPECTATIONS.ACCORDING TO VALENTIN FALIN OF NOVOSTI,QUOTE MAIN POINT IS NOT/NOT TO MAKE NEW PROPOSALS BUT TO FIND COMMON GROUND FOR POSITIVE CHANGES IN THE FUTURE UNQUOTE,AND HE SUGGESTED THAT ADMINS COMMITMENT TO ACCELERATE NEGS ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND TO QUOTE RESPECT UNQUOTE SOV UNIONS EFFORT TO END ITS MILITARY

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PAGE SIX UNGR2082 CONFD

INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHAN WERE ENOUGH TO CALL SUMMIT SUCCESSFUL. OTHERS
SPOKE IN SIMILAR VEIN.

10. IN FINAL ANALYSIS, MAYBE IMPROVEMENT IN ATMOSPHERE AND JOINT
DETERMINATION TO WORK OUT SOLUTIONS TO PROBLEMS COULD BE SUMMIT'S MAIN
ACCOMPLISHMENTS. IF SO, A DECADE OF COLD WAR WILL BE BEHIND US, AND WE
WILL BE INTO NEW ERA DESCRIBED YESTERDAY BY FYODOR BURLATSKY OF
LITERATURNAYA GAZETA AS QUOTE DETENTE WITHOUT ILLUSIONS UNQUOTE.

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DELIVER BY 091400

INFO OSLO/MINDEL MOSCO BNATO CANMILREP NATO LDN PARIS BONN ROME

GENEV TOKYO PEKIN PRMNY VCSCE VMBFR PCOOTT/HAGEN PMOOTT/BURNEY

NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/DM/CDS/DOCPOL/DIPOL/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA USS IFB IDD IDA CPP EER IDRA IDRL RGB RBD RBR RWR UGB

URD CPD

REF OURTEL UNGR2070 04DEC

---REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT-DAY ONE

SUMMARY: REAGAN/GORBACHEV SUMMIT IS OFF TO GOOD START. SOVIET
LEADERS AIRPORT STMT WAS CONSTRUCTIVE AND UPBEAT, AS WAS SHULTZ
RESPONSE, AND AT OPENING CEREMONY AT WHITE HOUSE TUES MORNING, BOTH
PRES AND GEN SECTY SPOKE WITH PERCEPTIVE SINCERITY OF THEIR
INTEREST IN IMPROVED RELNS AND MOVING ARMS CONTROL PROCESS
ALONG. ^{LITTLE OF} CONTENTS OF TWO WORKING SESSIONS WHICH FOLLOWED ^{HAS} ~~HAVE NOT~~
~~NOT~~ BEEN DIVULGED, BUT THEY APPEAR TO HAVE GONE WELL JUDGING FM
WARMTH WHICH CHARACTERIZED LEADERS STMTS PRIOR TO SIGNING OF INF
AGRMT EARLY IN AFTERNOON AND AT STATE DINNER. HUMAN RIGHTS AND
~~ARMY CONTROL ISSUES~~
~~REGIONAL CONFLICTS~~ WERE ~~SCHEDULED TO~~ LEAD OFF DISCUSSION, BUT BOTH
^{ALSO} SIDES HAVE SHOWN ~~SERIOUS~~ INTEREST IN GETTING TO WORK ON ^{REGIONAL AND BILATERAL} ~~STRATEGIC~~
^{ARMY TIMELESS, START} ISSUES. ~~AND THESE~~ WILL LIKELY DOMINATE BALANCE OF LEADERS TIME.

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TELEPHONE

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P. HEINBECKER
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2. REPORT: GORBACHEV^V ARRIVED ON SCHEDULE MONDAY AFTERNOON, ACCOMPANIED BY LARGE DEL WHICH INCLUDED SHEVARDNADZE, YAKOVLEV, DOBRYNIN, VORONTSOV, ARBATOV AND MARSHALL AKHROMEYEV (BESSMERT^NYK^K CAME EARLY WITH ADVANCE PARTY). AT AIRPORT, HE ASSURED AMERICANS OF SOVIET INTEREST IN IMPROVING RELNS AND FOCUSED IMMEDIATELY ON SOVIET INTEREST IN REDUCING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. HE SAID HE WLD HAVE QUOTE SOMETHING TO SAY UNQUOTE ON THAT SUBJ, HINTING AT SOVIET FLEXIBILITY, AND SAID HE HOPED TO HEAR QUOTE SOMETHING NEW UNQUOTE FM AMERICANS. IN RESPONSE, SECTY OF STATE SHULTZ SAID QUOTE WE ARE READY UNQUOTE. LATER, WHEN PRES HEARD GORBACHEV HAD CONCLUDED HIS ARRIVAL STMT WITH QUOTE MAY GOD HELP US UNQUOTE, HE SAID: QUOTE IF HE IS TALKING TO GOD, WE OUGHT TO GET ALONG, BECAUSE SO AM I UNQUOTE.

3. PGM INCLUDED NO/NO OFFICIAL EVENTS MONDAY NIGHT, IN ANTICIPATION OF VERY FULL DAY TUES BEGINNING WITH OFFICIAL CEREMONY ON WHITE HOUSE LAWN, COMPLETE WITH HONOUR GUARD AND 21 GUN SALUTE. PRES SPOKE FIRST IN A TONE WHICH WAS BOTH REALISTIC AND FORWARD-LOOKING. EARLY IN HIS ADDRESS, HE SAID QUOTE I HAVE OFTEN FELT THAT ~~OUR~~ WE PEOPLE SHLD HAVE BEEN BETTER FRIENDS LONG AGO UNQUOTE. A FAR CRY FM REAGANS EARLIER QUOTE EVIL EMPIRE UNQUOTE PERSPECTIVE ^{ON} ~~OF~~ SOVIET UNION. PRES DID NOT/NOT DISGUISE FACT THERE WERE QUOTE WEIGHTY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR GOVTS AND SYSTEMS UNQUOTE, BUT HE

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CITED RUSSIAN PROVERB TO EFFECT POOR PEACE WAS BETTER THAN GOOD
QUARREL AND HE DISPLAYED SERIOUS INTEREST IN SUMMIT WHICH WENT
BEYOND ROUTINE EXCHANGE OF OPINION AND MADE PROGRESS ON ^UHUMAN
RIGHTS, REGIONAL CONFLICTS, HUMAN CONTACTS AND (ABOV^E ALL) START
AGRMT. GORBACHEVS REPLY ADOPTED REMARKABLY SIMILAR TONE, NOT/NOT
OVERLOOKING DIFFERENCES WHICH SEPARATE TWO COUNTRIES (QUOTE WE
ARE DIVIDED NOT ONLY BY OCEAN^S BUT BY PROFOUND
HISTORICAL, IDEOLOGICAL, SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL
DIFFERENCES), UNDERSCORING SOVIET INTEREST IN ADVANCING TO FIFTY
PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND IN HAVING
QUOTE MOST SERIOUS AND FRANK DIALOGUE ON OTHER ISSUES
UNQUOTE. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY WAS INTIMATELY LINKED TO
PERESTROIKA HE SAID. AFTERWARDS, GORBACHEV REMARKED ON SIMILARITY
OF SPEECHES AND COMMON OUTLOOK THEY REPRESENTED. IT IS HARD TO
IMAGINE THERE CLD HAVE BEEN BETTER BEGINNING FOR SUMMIT, AND BY
END OF FIRST DAY LEADERS WERE ON RON AND MIKHAIL BASIS.
4. OFFICIAL TALKS WHICH FOLLOWED BEFORE NOON FEATURED ONLY
PRINCIPALS PLUS NOTETAKERS AND INTERPRETORS, BUT AFTERNOON SESSION
~~RESUMED~~ ^{RESUMED} PLENARY FORMAT. SO FAR LITTLE INFO HAS EMERGED AS TO ^{THEIR} ~~ITS~~
CONTENTS, BUT IT SEEMS UNLIKELY ANY SERIOUS TENSIONS CLD HAVE
ARISEN SINCE POSITIVE ATMOSPHERE WAS VERY MUCH IN EVIDENCE WHEN
LEADERS MET EARLY IN AFTERNOON TO SIGN INF TREATY AND WAS STILL

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THESE AT STATE DINNER. WHITE HOUSE SOURCE SAID GORBACHEV HAD
OFFERED QUOTE NO SURPRISES OR NEW ^{PROPOSALS} ~~PROSPECTS~~ UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT
~~ONE AND THE SAME MORNING SESSION~~
REAGAN HAD LED OFF WITH HUMAN RIGHTS, IN PARTICULAR JEWISH
EMIGRATION AND DIVIDED FAMILIES, AND THAT GORBACHEV HAD REPLIED
SOVIET GOVT WAS SEEKING TO IMPROVE ITS PERFORMANCE IN THESE AREAS.
~~GORBACHEV, FOR HIS PART, RAISED~~
~~WHILE ALSO RAISING~~ QUESTIONS ABOUT USA HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES. IN
KEEPING WITH USUAL FORMAT, LEADERS AGREED TO CREATION OF TWO
WORKING GRPS TO PURSUE DISCUSSIONS IN DEPTH: ONE HEADED BY ASST
SECTY OF STATE RIDGWAY AND DEPTY FM BESSMERTHYKH DEALING WITH
HUMAN RIGHTS, REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND BILATERAL ISSUES; OTHER HEADED
BY ARMS ADVISOR PAUL NITZE AND MARSHALL AKHROMEYEV ON ARMS
CONTROL. (IN A MAJOR BREAK WITH PRECEDENT, AKHROMEYEV WILL MEET
TODAY WITH SECTY OF DEFENSE CARLUCCI AND CHAIRMAN OF JOINT CHIEFS
OF STAFF ADMIRAL CROWE, AND WILL BE GIVEN TOUR OF PENTAGON'S NATL
MILITARY COMMAND CENTRE.)

5. INF SIGNING CEREMONY PROVIDED OCCASION FOR BOTH LEADERS TO
REPEAT THEMES OF THEIR SPEECHES ON SOUTH LAWN AND AT SAME TIME
LAUD INF TREATY AND ENCOURAGE ITS ACCEPTANCE, ESPECIALLY IN
CONGRESS. REAGAN SAID TREATY HAD REQUIRED DRAMATIC SHIFT IN
THINKING, AND HE NOTED (POINTEDLY) THAT QUOTE IT TOOK CONVENTIONAL
WISDOM SOME TIME TO CATCH UP UNQUOTE. REACTION TO THE TREATY, HE
SAID, HAD BEEN MIXED QUOTE TO SAY THE LEAST UNQUOTE, BUT IT HAD

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ELIMINATED ENTIRE CLASS OF NUCLEAR MISSILES. GORBACHEV AGREED WITH REAGANS VERDICT ON IMPORTANCE OF TREATY AND EXPRESSED HOPE THAT ITS SIGNING WLD ^{MARK} ~~WAVE~~ WATERSHED SEPARATING QUOTE ERA OF INCREASING RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR FM ERA OF DEMILITARIZATION OF HUMAN LIFE UNQUOTE. TWO ENGAGED IN SOME GOOD-HUMoured BANTER ON VERIFICATION, BUT IT WAS CLEAR THEY WERE BOTH CONTENT WITH FACT TREATY CONTAINED (IN REAGANS WORDS) QUOTE MOST STRINGENT VERIFICATION REGIME IN HISTORY UNQUOTE.

6. SIGNING TOOK PLACE IN EAST ROOM OF WHITE HOUSE, TO WHICH SEVERAL HUNDRED DIGNITARIES INCLUDING CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS HAD BEEN INVITED. NUMBER OF SENATORS, NOTABLY JESSE HELMS, BOYCOTTED EVENT; BUT SHORTLY BEFORE SIGNING, MAJORITY LEADER ^{BYRD} ~~ROBERT~~ PREDICTED THAT, THOUGH SENATE MIGHT ATTACH RESERVATIONS, IT WLD APPROVE AGRMT WITHOUT CRIPPLING AMENDMENTS. OTHERS ~~AGREED~~, AND EVEN ^{ARCH} ~~ANTI~~-OPONENT SENATOR ^A ~~WOLLOP~~ SUGGESTED HE HIMSELF MIGHT IN END AGREE TO RATIFICATION PROVIDED USA WLD BE FREED FM TREATY OBLIGATIONS IN EVENT OF SIGNIFICANT SOVIET VIOLATIONS (WHICH, OF COURSE, IT WLD BE).

7. FIRST DAY CONCLUDED WITH GORBACHEV MTG AT SOVIET EMB WITH SELECTION OF AMERICAN QUOTE INTELLECTUALS UNQUOTE, OBJECTIVE OF WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN TO SELL THEM ON PERESTROIKA AND ON PROPOSITION THAT ^{WISE} ~~THE~~ MAN DEFINES HIS INTERESTS SO BROADLY AS TO

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INCLUDE EVERYONE ELSE'S. INTELLECTUALS RANGED FROM HENRY KISSINGER,
JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH AND GEORGE ^{KENNAN} ~~HEWITT~~ TO SINGER JOHN DENVER
AND YOKO ONO.

8. WHITE HOUSE STATE DINNER WAS USUAL GLITZY AFFAIR WITH
ATTENDANCE RANGING FROM DAVID ROCKEFELLER TO ACTRESS CLAUDETTE
COLBERT AND GYMNAST MARY LOO RETTON. HIGHLIGHT WAS MIKHAIL AND
RAISA JOINING DOBRYNIN AND PIANIST VAN CLIBURN ^{RN} IN RENDITION OF
MOSCOW NIGHTS.

9. FOR WESTERN SOVIETOLOGISTS, ONE OF REAL HIGHLIGHTS OF FIRST DAY
WAS RE-EMERGENCE OF VICTOR SUKH ^{O R} ~~AD~~ ^{DEV}. LEGENDARY LINGUIST, WHOSE
FIRST APPEARANCE ON BEHALF OF SOVIET LEADERSHIP DATED BACK TO
KHRUSHCHEV'S VISIT TO USA IN 1959, ^S ~~L~~ SERVING DURING THIS SUMMIT AS
TRANSLATOR FOR GORBACHEV'S PUBLIC STMTS.

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---TEXT OF INF AGREEMENT - DATA BASE MOU

ATTACHED ARE SECTIONS I, II, V, VI AND VIII OF SECRET MOU REGARDING
ESTABLISHMENT OF DATA BASE FOR INF TREATY. SECTIONS III AND IV,
WHICH EXCEED 50 PAGES IN LENGTH, LIST LOCATIONS OF LRINF AND SRINF
MISSILES, LAUNCHERS AND SUPPORT STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT
RESPECTIVELY. UNLESS WE HEAR TO CONTRARY, PROPOSE TO BAG THESE TO
YOU 10DEC.

(COMCENTRE PLS FAX ATTACHMENT.)

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CANADIAN EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

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
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MISSILES, LAUNCHERS AND SUPPORT STRUCTURES AND EQUIPMENT
RESPECTIVELY. UNLESS WE HEAR TO CONTRARY, PROPOSE TO BAG THESE TO
YOU 10DEC.

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8 DEC 87 13 40Z
CANADIAN DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENCE
OTTAWA

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MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
REGARDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DATA BASE
FOR THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE
AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the UNITED STATES OF America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties have exchanged data current as of November 1, 1987, on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers.

I. Definitions

For the purposes of this Memorandum of Understanding, the Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination and the Protocol on Inspection:

1. The term "missile production facility" means a facility for the assembly or production of solid-propellant intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs, or existing types of GLCMs.

2. The term "missile repair facility" means a facility at which repair or maintenance of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place other than inspection and maintenance conducted at a missile operating base.

3. The term "launcher production facility" means a facility for final assembly of launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles.

4. The term "launcher repair facility" means a facility at which repair or maintenance of launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place other than inspection and maintenance conducted at a missile operating base.

5. The term "test range" means an area at which flight-testing of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place.

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6. The term "training facility" means a facility, not at a missile operating base, at which personnel are trained in the use of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles and at which launchers of such missiles are located.

7. The term "missile storage facility" means a facility, not at a missile operating base, at which intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or stages of such missiles are stored.

8. The term "launcher storage facility" means a facility, not at a missile operating base, at which launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles are stored.

9. The term "elimination facility" means a facility at which intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, missile stages and launchers of such missiles or support equipment associated with such missiles or launchers are eliminated.

10. The term "support equipment" means unique vehicles and mobile or transportable equipment that support a deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile. Support equipment shall include full-scale inert training missiles, full-scale inert training missile stages, full-scale inert training launch canisters, and training launchers not capable of launching a missile. A listing of such support equipment associated with each existing type of missile, and launchers of such missiles, except for training equipment, is contained in Section VI of this Memorandum of Understanding.

11. The term "support structure" means a unique fixed structure used to support deployed intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles. A listing of such support structures associated with each existing type of missile, and launchers of such missiles, except for training equipment, is contained in Section VI of this Memorandum of Understanding.

12. The term "research and development launch site" means a facility at which research and development booster systems are launched.

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II. Total Numbers of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and Launchers of Such Missiles Subject to the Treaty

1. The numbers of intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles for each Party are as follow:

	<u>USA</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Deployed missiles	429	470
Non-deployed missiles	260	356
Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed missiles	689	826
Aggregate number of second stages	236	650
Deployed launchers	214	484
Non-deployed launchers	68	124
Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers	282	608

2. The numbers of shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles for each Party are as follow:

	<u>USA</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Deployed missiles	0	387
Non-deployed missiles	170	539
Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed missiles	170	926
Aggregate number of second stages	175	726
Deployed launchers	0	197
Non-deployed launchers	1	40
Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers	1	237

V. Missile Systems Tested, But Not Deployed, Prior to Entry into Force of the Treaty

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The following are the missile support facilities, their locations and the numbers, for each Party of all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and launchers of such missiles, which were tested prior to entry into force of the Treaty, but were never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of the Treaty. Site diagrams for agreed missile support facilities, to include boundaries and center coordinates, are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding.

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Missiles

Launchers

Support
Equipment

(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

(1) Pershing IB

Missile Production
Facilities:

NONE

Launcher Production
Facilities:

NONE

Missile Storage
Facilities:

NONE

Launcher Storage
Facilities:

NONE

Missile/Launcher Storage
Facilities:

NONE

Missile Repair
Facilities:

NONE

SECRET

SECRET

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Missiles

Launchers

Support
Equipment

Launcher Repair
Facilities:

NONE

Missile/Launcher Repair
Facilities:

NONE

Test Ranges:

NONE

Training Facilities:

NONE

Elimination Facilities:

NONE

Missiles, Launchers,
and Support Equipment
in Transit:

NONE

(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

(i) SSC-X-4

Missile Production
Facilities:

NONE

SECRET

SECRET

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Missiles

Launchers

Support
Equipment

Launcher Production
Facilities:

Experimental Plant of the
Amalgamated Production
Works "M. I. Kalinin
Machine Building Plant,"
Sverdlovsk

0
with
launch
canister

0

54 47 24 N 060 47 03 E

Missile Storage
Facilities:

NONE

Launcher Storage
Facilities:

NONE

Missile/Launcher Storage
Facilities:

Jelgava

56 40 N 024 06 E

84
with
launch
canister

6

Missile Repair
Facilities:

NONE

Launcher Repair
Facilities:

NONE

Missile/Launcher Repair
Facilities:

NONE

Test Ranges:

NONE

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SECRET

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9/15

Missiles

Launchers

Support
Equipment

Training Facilities:

NONE

Elimination Facilities:

Jelgava

56 40 N 024 06 E

0
with
launch
canister

0

Missiles, Launchers,
and Support Equipment
in Transit:

NONE

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VI. Technical Data

Following are agreed categories of technical data for missiles and launchers subject to the Treaty, support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers and the relevant data for each of these categories. Photographs of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment listed below are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding.

1. Intermediate-Range Missiles

	<u>P-II</u>	<u>BGM-109G</u>	<u>SS-20</u>	<u>SS-4</u>	<u>SS-5</u>	
(a) <u>Missile Characteristics:</u>						
(i) Maximum number of warheads per missile	1	1	3	1	1	1
(ii) Length of missile, with front section (meters)	10.61	6.40	16.49	22.77	24.30	8
(iii) Length of						
1st stage	3.68	-	8.58	18.60	21.62	
2nd stage (meters)	2.47	-	4.60	-	-	
(iv) Maximum diameter of						
1st stage	-	0.53	-	1.63	2.40	8
2nd stage (meters)	1.02	-	1.79	-	-	
	1.02	-	1.47	-	-	
(v) Weight of GLCM, in metric tons (without front section; for liquid-fueled missiles, empty weight)	6.78	-	-	3.35	4.99	
1st stage	4.15	-	26.63	-	-	
2nd stage	2.63	-	8.63	-	-	
Missile in canister	-	-	42.70	-	-	
(vi) Weight of assembled GLCM, in metric tons (with fuel)						
In canister	-	1.71	-	-	-	8
Without canister	-	1.47	-	-	-	1

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P-II BGM-109G SS-20 SS-4 SS-5 SS-9

(b) Launcher Characteristics:

(i) Dimensions (maximum length, width, height in meters)	9.60 2.49 2.86	10.64 2.44 2.64	16.81 3.20 2.94	3.02 3.02 3.27	- - -
(ii) Maximum number of missiles each launcher is capable of carrying or containing at one time	1	4	1	1	-
(iii) Weight (in metric tons)	12.04	14.30	40.23	6.90	-

(c) Characteristics of Support Structures Associated With Such Missiles and Launchers

Dimensions of support structures are as follows (maximum length, width, height in meters):

(i) Fixed structure for a launcher	-	-	27.70 9.07 6.82	-	-
(ii) Launch pad shelter	74.00 14.60 10.00	-	-	-	-

(d) Characteristics of Support Equipment Associated With Such Missiles and Launchers

Dimensions of support equipment are as follows (maximum length, width, height in meters):

(i) Launch canister (Diameter)	-	6.94 0.53	19.32 2.14	-	-
(ii) Missile transporter vehicle (number of missiles per vehicle)	-	-	17.33 3.20 2.90 (1)	22.85 2.72 2.50 (1)	-
(iii) Missile erector	-	-	-	15.62 3.15 3.76	-
(iv) Propellant tank (Transportable)					
Fuel	-	-	-	11.38 2.63 2.96	-
Oxidizer	-	-	-	10.70 2.63 3.35	-

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	<u>Pershing IA</u>	<u>Pershing IB</u>	<u>SS-12</u>	<u>SS-</u>
2. Shorter-Range Missiles				
(a) <u>Missile Characteristics:</u>				
(i) Maximum number of warheads per missile	1	1	1	1
(ii) Length of missile, with front section (meters)	10.55	8.13	12.38	7.
(iii) Length of				
1st stage	2.83	3.68	4.38	5.
2nd stage (meters)	2.67	-	5.37	-
(iv) Maximum diameter of				
1st stage	1.02	1.02	1.01	0.
2nd stage (meters)	1.02	-	1.01	-
(v) Weight of GLBM, in metric tons (without front section)	4.09	4.15	8.80	3.
1st stage	2.45	-	4.16	-
2nd stage	1.64	-	4.64	-
(b) <u>Launcher Characteristics:</u>				
(i) Dimensions (maximum length, width, height in meters)	9.98 2.44 3.35	9.60 2.49 2.86	13.26 3.10 3.45	11. 3. 3.
(ii) Maximum number of missiles each launcher is capable of carrying or containing at one time	1	1	1	1
(iii) Weight (in metric tons)	8.53	12.04	30.80	24.
(c) <u>Characteristics of Support Equipment Associated With Such Missiles and Launchers:</u>				
Dimensions of support equipment are as follows (maximum length, width, height in meters):				
Missile transporter vehicle (number of missiles per vehicle)	-	-	13.15 3.10 3.50 (1)	11. 3. 3. (1)

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VII. Research and Development Booster Systems

Following are the numbers and locations for each Party of launchers of research and development booster systems.

	<u>Number of Launchers</u>
1. Research and Development Launch Sites	
(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	
Eastern Test Range, Florida	1
28 27 N 080 42 W	
Eglin AFB, Florida	5
30 36 N 086 48 W	
White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico	4
32 30 N 106 30 W	
Green River, Utah	2
38 00 N 109 30 W	
Poker Flats Research Range, Alaska	6
65 07 N 147 29 W	
Roi Namur, Kwajalein	3
09 25 N 167 28 E	
Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii	4
22 06 N 159 47 W	
Western Test Range, California	1
34 37 N 120 37 W	

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14/15

Number of
Launchers

Cape Cod, Massachusetts

1

42 01 N 070 07 W

Wake Island

2

19 18 N 166 37 E

Wallops Island, Virginia

1

37 51 N 075 28 W

(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

Plesetskaya

3

62 53 N 040 52 E

Kapustin Yar

2

48 32 N 046 18 E

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Each Party, in signing this Memorandum of Understanding, acknowledges it is responsible for the accuracy of only its own data. Signature of this Memorandum of Understanding constitutes acceptance of the categories of data and inclusion of the data contained herein.

This Memorandum of Understanding is an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.

DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA:

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

President of the United States
of America

General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the CPSU

SECRET

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

to file

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2070 04DEC87

TO EXTOTT *ERR* IDR DELIVER BY 071200

INFO MOSCO BNATO CANMILREPNATO LDN PARIS BONN ROME GENEV TOKYO

PEKIN PRMNY VCSCE VMBFR PCOOTT/HAGEN PMOOTT/BURNEY

TT NDHQOTT/ADMPOLE/DMPOL/DGCPOL/DIPOL/DNAGPOL/-DE-CAF

DISTR MINA USS IFB IDD IDA GPP EER IDRA IDRL RGB RBD RBR RWR UGB


URD CPD

---WSHDC ON THE EVE OF THE SUMMIT

SUMMARY:WSHDC IS REACTING NERVOUSLY AND EXPECTANTLY TO THE
PROSPECT OF MIKHAIL GORBACHEVS ARRIVAL ON MONDAY.ADVOCATES OF
DETENTE HAVE BEEN MUTING THEIR ENTHUSIASM.WHILE HARDLINE
CONSERVATIVES HAVE MOUNTED A MAJOR CAMPAIGN TO WARN POPULATION
AGAINST BELIEVING EVERYTHING THEY ARE ABOUT TO HEAR FROM SOVIET
LEADER.NBCS MEDIA COUP IN ARRANGING PERSONAL INTERVIEW WITH
GORBACHEV FOR BROADCAST ON PRIME TIME TUESDAY NIGHT APPEARS TO
HAVE GALVANIZED ADMIN INTO PUBLIC RELATIONS COUNTER-ATTACK,AND
PAST WEEK HAS SEEN HOST OF QUOTE BACKGROUND UNQUOTE BRIEFINGS BY
SENIOR OFFICIALS CULMINATING IN PRESIDENTS MTG WITH NETWORK
ANCHORMEN YESTERDAY,ALL DESIGNED TO PUT ADMIN CASE TO PEOPLE.
2.NERVOUSNESS HAS ALSO SURROUNDED END-GAME OF INF NEGS.TENSIONS
WERE HIGH AT BEGINNING OF WEEK WHEN SOVIETS HAD STILL NOT/NOT
DELIVERED ALL INF DATA PROMISED.DATA WAS FINALLY RECEIVED ON
WEDNESDAY,AND WAS PRONOUNCED BY SHULTZ TODAY AS VERY CREDIBLE,

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PAGE TWO UNGR2070 CONFD

BUT DELAY HAS ENCOURAGED OPPONENTS OF ARMS CONTROL AGMTS TO WARN AGAIN OF DANGERS OF TRUSTING SOVIETS AND SEVERAL PROMINENT RIGHT-WING REPUBLICANS, INCLUDING FOUR OF SIX PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, HAVE SUGGESTED THEY MIGHT OPPOSE RATIFICATION OF INF TREATY. ADMIN ITSELF CONTRIBUTED TO ANXIETY WITH SUBMISSION TO CONGRESS THIS WEEK OF FURTHER EDITION OF ITS SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE REPORT, BUT PRESIDENT AND OTHERS HAVE BEEN SPEAKING REASSURINGLY OF STRINGENT VERIFICATION PROVISIONS THEY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO NEGOTIATE IN INF TREATY.

3. MOOD OF EXPECTANCY HAS BEEN GENERATED BY REPORTS THAT US/SOVIET DISCUSSIONS ON START HAVE BEEN PROGRESSING WELL AND THAT SUMMIT MIGHT BE OCCASION FOR SOMETHING MORE THAN JUST REHEARSAL OF STANDARD POSITIONS (AND DIFFERENCES). ACCORDING TO RETIRING ACDA DIRECTOR, IKEN ADELMAN, AGMT ON PRINCIPLES MIGHT BE IN OFFING. BUT PRESIDENT'S MORE CONSERVATIVE ADVISORS HAVE SOUGHT TO PROTECT AGAINST EVENTUALITY OF MAJOR CONCESSIONS ON SDI BY SCHEDULING REAGAN APPEARANCES AT FUNCTIONS WHERE SDI HAS ASSUMED STATUS OF AN ICON (IE HERITAGE FOUNDATION). ADELMAN CONCURRED WITH GOTLIEB INTERPRETATION THAT ADMIN GOAL ON SDI/ABM IS FOR TWO SIDES TO AGREE TO AGREE TO DISAGREE. BOTTOM LINE, FAILING THAT, IS TO AGREE NOT/NOT TO DISAGREE TO AGREE TO DISAGREE.

4. MEANTIME A MILD GORBACHEV MANIA HAS BROKEN OUT HERE AND FREE-ENTERPRISE MERCHANTS ARE SAID TO BE DOING A VERY BRISK BUSINESS IN SOUVENIRS.

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PAGE THREE UNGR2070 CONF

5.REPORT:GORBACHEVS ARRIVAL IN WSHDC MONDAY NIGHT HAS STIMULATED ENORMOUS AMOUNT OF PUBLIC INTEREST.AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE WANTED SUMMIT FOR YEARS,NOT/NOT JUST FOR REASSURANCE IT PROVIDES THAT WAS IS DISTANT PROSPECT,BUT FOR OPPORTUNITY IT REPRESENTS TO DEVELOP BETTER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN PEOPLES.MORE THAN MOST, AMERICANS WANT TO BE LIKED,AND MANY TEHUSANDS HAVE BEEN WRITING TO BOTH WHITE HOUSE AND KREMLIN ENCOURAGING GORBACHEV TO COME TO THEIR PART OF COUNTRY TO SEE QUOTE THE REAL AMERICA UNQUOTE.

6.BUT THE POPULATION HAS ALSO BEEN RECEIVING STERN LECTURES OVER LAST SEVERAL WEEKS WARNING AGAINST BEING DECEIVED BY NEW FACE OF SOVIET COMMUNISM.WARNINGS HAVE COME NOT/NOT JUST FROM TRADITIONAL CONSERVATIVE SOURCES,BUT ALSO FROM THOSE WHO HAVE LONG BEEN CRITICAL OF REAGAN ADMIN'S CONFRONTATIONAL POSTURE TOWARDS MOSCOW. MEMORIES OF DASHED EXPECTATIONS OF 1970S SEEM TO HAVE CAUTIONED EVEN MOST ENTHUSIASTIC OF PROPONENTS OF EAST/WEST DETENTE TO RESERVE JUDGEMENT ABOUT NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP UNTIL SOVIET WORDS HAVE BEEN MATCHED BY DEEDS.

7.SHORTLY AFTER SUMMIT DATES WERE ANNOUNCED,IT WAS CLEAR ADMIN WAS PREPARING TO MOUNT MEDIA CAMPAIGN IN PREPARATION FOR GORBACHEVS ARRIVAL.BUT NEWS THAT NBC NETWORK HAD SECURED EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH GORBACHEV WHICH WOULD BE BROADCAST ON PRIME TIME TUESDAY BEFORE SUMMIT GALVANIZED ADMIN INTO ORGANIZING MAJOR COUNER-OFFENSIVE.AS IT TURNED OUT,GORBACHEV INTERVIEW WAS GENERALL WELL RECEIVED AND NOT/NOT EVEN THE EFFORTS OF ALL THE

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PRESIDENTS MEN HAVE BEEN ABLE TO UNDERMINE IMAGE HE PRESENTED OF AN INTELLIGENT AND ENERGETIC SOVIET LEADER, TRYING TO REFORM INTERNALLY AND TO DO RIGHT THING INTERNATIONALLY. PRESS BACKGROUNDEERS BY SEVERAL LEADING OFFICIALS IN ADMIN SERVED TO ENSURE MEDIA REPORTED ACCURATELY WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN SOVIET/AMERICAN NEGOTIATIONS OVER LAST SEVERAL WEEKS AND WHAT STILL REMAINS TO BE DONE, NOTING IN PARTICULAR DISTANCE STILL TO BE COVERED ON ARMS CONTROL AND CONTINUED SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN. BUT BY END OF WEEK, PRESIDENT FOUND HIMSELF CHARACTERIZING CONSERVATIVES WHO OPPOSED HIS ARMS CONTROL POSITIONS AS APOSTLES OF THE INEVITABILITY OF NUCLEAR WAR, AND ADOPTING CONCILIATORY ATTITUDES TOWARDS GORBACHEV ON SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN.

8. ON EVEN OF SUMMIT, THEREFORE, THERE IS TENTATIVE AND AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE ON PART OF AMERICAN PEOPLE AND ADMIN, TORN BETWEEN A DESIRE FOR LESS STRESSFUL RELATIONSHIP WITH SOVIET UNION AND AN APPRECIATION OF REALITIES THAT CANNOT/NOT BE OVERLOOKED.

9. WHEN SUMMIT BEGINS TUESDAY MORNING, EARLY ORDER OF BUSINESS WILL BE SIGNING OF INF AGREEMENT INITIALED BY SHULTZ AND SHEVARDNADZE IN GENEVA LAST MONTH. BUT UNTIL FEW DAYS AGO, THERE WAS STILL SOME QUESTION AS TO WHETHER AGREEMENT COULD OR WOULD BE SIGNED SINCE SOVIETS HAD NOT/NOT YET TRANSMITTED AGREED DATA ON NUMBER AND LOCATION OF SOVIET INF FORCES WHICH WOULD FORM QUOTE BASELINE COUNT UNQUOTE ON

...5

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WHICH VERIFICATION REGIME WOULD BE BASED. DATA WAS FINALLY TURNED OVER IN GENEVA ON WEDNESDAY (AND GENERALLY CONFIRMED ACCURACY OF PREVIOUS USA ESTIMATES). BUT IN MEANTIME THERE WERE SOME ANXIOUS MOMENTS, AND CRITICS OF ARMS CONTROL JUMPED ON SOVIET DELAY AS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF MOSCOW'S LACK OF TRUTHWORTHINESS. (THERE WAS SPECULATION SOVIETS HAD DELIBERATELY DELAYED SPECIFYING LOCATION OF SOME MISSILES SO THAT THEY COULD FIRST BE MOVED AWAY FROM SENSITIVE FACILITIES WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN SUBJECT TO U.S. INSPECTION).

10. CURIOUSLY, THE MOST VOCAL CRITICS OF INF AGMT HAVE BEEN FOUND IN REPUBLICAN PARTY, THOUGH SOME CONSERVATIVE DEMOCRATS HAVE ALSO CAST DOUBT ON ADVISABILITY OF RATIFYING AGMT. FOR MOST PART, THESE CAN BE DIVIDED INTO THREE GROUPS: (A) OLD REAGAN REPUBLICANS, SUCH AS SENATOR MALCOLM WALLOP, (B) OLD SOLDIERS, SUCH AS ALEXANDER HAIG AND BERNARD ROGERS, AND (C) OLD INTELLECTUALS-IN-GOVERNMENT, SUCH AS HENRY KISSINGER, ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI AND WILLIAM HYLAND. FIRST GROUP IS OPPOSED IN PRINCIPLE TO SENATE RATIFYING ANY AGMT WITH USSR, SECOND WILL ENCOURAGE SENATORS TO ATTACH CONDITIONS TO THEIR APPROVAL, ABOUT LINKAGE (TO START OR TO CONVENTIONAL LEVELS) AND THIRD WILL POINT OUT TREATY'S VARIOUS DEFICIENCIES BUT IN END URGE THAT IT BE RATIFIED.

11. TREATY IS SURE TO BE SUBJECTED TO RIGOROUS SCRUTINY BY SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS CTTEE, AND PROBABLY BY SENATE ARMED SERVICES AND

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INTELLIGENCE CTTEES AS WELL (ACCORDING TO RELIABLE STATE DEPT SOURCE), WITH HEARINGS STRETCHING OVER SEVERAL MONTHS. QUESTION IS WHETHER, AT END OF THIS PROCESS, SENATE WILL ATTACH INTERPRETATIONS OR AMENDMENTS WHICH REQUIRE TREATY TO BE RENEGOTIATED WITH SOVIETS. AT PRESENT, IT APPEARS TREATY MIGHT GO THROUGH ON STRAIGHT VOTE, SINCE IT IS UNLIKELY ANY SENATOR WOULD BE PREPARED TO ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR KILLER AMENDMENT THAT SCUTTLED RONALD REAGANS TREATY.

12. NONETHELESS, ADMIN ITSELF HELPED TO STROKE CONCERNS ABOUT VERIFIABILITY OF INF AGMT BY TABLING THIS WEEK LATEST EDITION OF ITS REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON SOVIET NON-COMPLIANCE WITH PREVIOUS ARMS CONTROL AGMTS. THESE REPORTS HAVE NOT/NOT USUALLY BEEN MODELS OF OBJECTIVITY. IF ADMIN HAD WANTED TO DEFER SUBMITTING LATEST REPORT, ON THIS OCCASION IT FOUND ITSELF BOUND BY CONGRESSIONALLY IMPOSED REQUIREMENT TO DO SO BY 1 DEC. IMPACT ON POLITICAL ATMOSPHERICS WAS PREDICTABLY SOUR AND PRODUCED EXPECTED (AND VERY PROMPT) SOVIET REBUTTAL. PRESIDENTS SUBSEQUENT EFFORTS TO REASSURE PUBLIC AND CONGRESS THAT INF AGMT WILL BE CARRY MOST STRINGENT VERIFICATION PROVISIONS EVER SEEN IN ARMS CONTROL TREATY HAVE HELPED SOMEWHAT. BUT ACID TEST OF ACCEPTABILITY OF THESE PROVISIONS WILL COME WHEN TREATY IS SIGNED AND MADE PUBLIC, TUESDAY.

13. DESPITE ALL THE ANXIETIES AND UNCERTAINTIES, THERE HAS ALSO BEEN AIR OF EXPECTANCY IN WSHDC THIS WEEK, LARGELY BECAUSE OF

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REPORTS WHICH HAVE BEEN APPEARING SUGGESTING THAT USA AND USSR HAVE BEGUN TO NARROW THEIR DIFFERENCES ON START ISSUES. UNLIKE INF AGMT, WHICH IS CONSIDERED HERE LARGELY A MATTER OF EUROPEAN SECURITY, START ISSUES ARE THE ONES ABOUT WHICH AMERICANS CARE MOST.

14. ONE OF PRINCIPAL STICKING POINTS FOR START AGMT, ISSUE OF SUBCEILINGS ON PARTICULAR SECTORS OF TWO SIDES STRATEGIC ARSENALS (THEY ARE AGREED ON CEILINGS OF 1600 DELIVERY SYSTEM AND 6000 WARHEADS), NOW SEEMS ON ROAD TO RESOLUTION. YESTERDAY, RETIRING DIRECTOR OF ADCA, KEN ADELMAN, HELPED TO CONFIRM GROWING OPTIMISM ABOUT START AGMT WHEN HE TOLD REPORTERS HE THOUGHT ADMIN COULD LIVE WITH SOMETHING LESS THAN FULL 50 PERCENT REDUCTION IN SOVIET WARHEADS ON LAND-BASED MISSILES. IF SOVIETS ARE, IN TURN, PREPARED TO MAKE COMPARABLE CONCESSION ON U.S. SEA-BASED SYSTEMS, BASIC ELEMENTS OF AGMT WILL HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED.

15. FEW WEEKS AGO, ADELMAN TOLD US CONFIDENTIALLY HE DID NOT/NOT BELIEVE START AGMT WAS POSSIBLE BEFORE END OF REAGAN PRESIDENCY, AND AT LUNCH WITH GOTLIEB YESTERDAY HE STILL THOUGHT IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE. DESPITE FACT THAT MUCH OF VERIFICATION REGIME NEGOTIATED FOR INF WAS TRANSFERABLE TO START, STRATEGIC SYSTEMS WERE FAR MORE COMPLICATED AND THERE WERE FAR MORE OF THEM. BUT HE SAID TWO SIDES WERE NOT/NOT SO FAR APART ON SUBLIMITS, AND HE THOUGHT THERE WAS GOOD POSSIBILITY AGMT COULD BE REACHED QUOTE ON PRINCIPLES UNQUOTE PERHAPS EVEN AT SUMMIT NEXT WEEK. HE SAID WHITE HOUSE NOW THOUGHT START AGMT COULD BE COMPLETED NEXT YEAR.

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16. OTHER MAJOR STICKING POINT, OF COURSE, IS SDI. HERE, NO/NO CONCESSIONS ARE EXPECTED, AT LEAST IN SHORT TERM. INDEED, PRINCIPAL PRPONENT WITHIN ADMIN FOR SOME COMPROMISE ON SDI, PAUL NITZE, IS BEING THREATENED (BY SENATOR WALLOP) WITH FBI INVESTIGATION FOR HIS QUOTE UNAUTHORIZED UNQUOTE NEGS WITH SOVIETS ON THIS SUBJECT. (ONLY IN AMERICA). PRESIDENT, FOR HIS PART, HAS BEEN MAKING VERY UNCOMPROMISING SPEECHES ON SDI DURING LAST FEW WEEKS, APPARENTLY AS RESULT OF ENTREATIES FROM SDI SUPPORTERS. THUS, ONE EVE OF LAST SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MTG, PRESIDENT SENT A TAPED MSG TO AMERICAN DEFENCE PREPAREDNESS ASSOCIATION (FUNDED IN PART BY SDI CONTRACTORS) COMPARING SDI TO LIFE-SAVING MEDICAL RESEARCH; A WEEK AGO HE MADE SUPPORTIVE VISIT TO MARTIN MARIETTA CORP IN DENVER WHERE PREPARATIONS ARE UNDER WAY FOR QUOTE ZENITH STAR UNQUOTE TEST OF ORBITING LASER AND WHERE HE WAS TOLD THAT QUOTE TESTING RESTRICTIONS ARE DEATH-KNELL OF SDI UNQUOTE; AND ON MONDAY OF THIS WEEK, PRESIDENT ADDRESSED HERITAGE FOUNDATION, TELLING GATHERING THAT QUOTE SDI IS A VITAL INSURANCE POLICY, A CORNER STONE OF OUR SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE 1990S AND BEYOND UNQUOTE.

17. NOTWITHSTANDING THESE TRANSPARENT EFFORTS TO LIMIT POSSIBILITY OF COMPROME ON SDI AT SUMMIT NEXT WEEK (REMINISCENT OF WEINBERGERS LEAKED LET TO REAGAN ON EVEN OF FIRST GENEVA SUMMIT), THERE HAS BEEN MOVE WITHIN ADMIN TO OPEN UP SOME ROOM FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON SDI, IN RECOGNITION OF ITS LINKAGE TO START AGMT.

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FOCUS OF EFFORT, WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE BACKING OF CHMN OF JOINT CHIEFS, ADMIRAL CROWE, IS TO CONVINCE PRESIDENT VERY LITTLE OF SDI TESTING PGM WOU BE AFFECTED BY SOVIET-SOUGHT LIMITATIONS. HOW SUCCEDSSFUL EFFORT WILL BE, HOWEVER, IS ANYONES GUESS.

18. AT PRESENT, BEST THAT CAN BE EXPECTED AT SUMMIT IS THAT USA AND USSR WILL REACH AGMT ARRANGEMENT (TO BE CONFIRMED IN NEW YEAR) UNDER WHICH TWO SIDES ACKNOWLEDGE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW ON SDI BUT DO NOT/NOT ALLOW THESE TO STAND IN WAY OF START AGMT (I.E. THEY AGREE TO AGREE TO DISAGREE). FAILING THAT, IT IS HOPED SOVIETS WILL AT LEAST NOT/NOT OBJECT TO AN INTERIM ARRANGEMENT OF THIS KIND (IE THEY AGREE NOT/NOT TO DISAGREE TO AGREE TO DISAGREE).

19. HOWEVER IT COMES OUT NEXT WEEK, IT IS CERTAIN TWO LEADERS WILL SPEND GOOD DEAL OF TIME ON SDI AT ABM TREATY.

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ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

RETURN TO RENNVOYER AU	B160	FOR FILING POUR - ETRE PORNE AU DOSSIER
ACC	REF	DATE
530864		
FILE	DOSSIER	
800-USA-13-USA		
800-AFGHAN-14		

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR1231 02DEC87

TO EXTOTT PSR

INFO LDN MOSCO ISBAD PRMNY GENEV PARIS BONN TOKYO BNATO PEKIN DELHI
ROME CLMBO DHAKA CNBRA WLGTN PCOOTT/BRADLEY CIDA HULL/MINE
DISTR PGB PGBA PSD PGP IND INP IMU DMC RBR UGB URR BCM
CIDA YDP BSD

REF OURTEL UNGR1211 20NOV

---AFGHANISTAN AND THE REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT

SUMMARY:ADMINISTRATION IS TREATING WITH SOME DISCRETION RECENT
PRESS SPECULATION THAT SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS COULD BE MADE ON AFGHAN-
ISTAN DURING DISCUSSION OF REGIONAL ISSUES AT NEXT WEEKS SUMMIT.
USA CONTINUES TO CALL FOR QUOTE DATE CERTAIN UNQUOTE FOR BEGINNING
AND ENDING OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL.PRIVATELY OFFICIALS REMAIN
SOMEWHAT SCEPTICAL ARGUING THAT THEY HAVE RECEIVED HINTS FROM SOVIETS
BUT LITTLE SPECIFIC.NONETHELESS,THEY ARE CAUTIOSLY OPTIMISTIC AND
DO NOT/NOT RULE OUT CHANCE THAT GORBACHEV WILL COME FORWARD WITH
MEANINGFUL PROPOSAL THAT COULD LEAD TO SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS.

2.REPORT:OVER COURSE OF LAST TEN DAYS PRESS HERE HAS CARRIED A
NUMBER OF ARTICLES SUGGESTING AFGHANISTAN LIKELY TO BE MAJOR
FOCAL POINT FOR REGIONAL ISSUES DISCUSSIONS AT UPCOMING SUMMIT.
SPECULATION ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF MOVEMENT ON ISSUE HAS BEEN FUELED
BY SOVIET AND AFGHAN HINTS OF FLEXIBILITY AS WELL AS ARMACOST/VORONT-
SOV AND SHULTZ/SHEVARDNADZE MTGS HERE AND IN GENEVA LAST MONTH.

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3. MONDAYS STATEMENT BY NAJIBULLAH THAT SOVIET TROOPS WOULD WITHDRAW FROM AFGHANISTAN IN TWELVE MONTHS IF USA AND PAKISTAN CUT OFF AID TO MUJAHIDEEN, AND GORBACHEV SUGGESTION DURING NBC INTERVIEW THAT IF USA WANTED POLITICAL SOLUTION IT COULD BE DONE VERY QUICKLY, HAVE GIVEN RISE TO RENEWED SPECULATION.

4. BOTH PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY ADMINISTRATION IS TREATING POSSIBILITY OF PROGRESS ON AFGHANISTAN AT SUMMIT WITH SOME CAUTION.

5. IN PRE-SUMMIT BRIEFING MONDAY, UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, ARMACOST GAVE HIS IMPRESSION THAT MOSCOW NO LONGER SPEAKING OF A WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE CONTINGENT UPON FORMATION OF AN INTERIM GOVT. THIS WAS IMPORTANT BECAUSE IF SO IT MEANT TIMING OF TROOP WITHDRAWAL COULD NOT/NOT BE STRUNG OUT INDEFINITELY. HOWEVER NEED FOR A QUOTE DATE CERTAIN UNQUOTE FOR BEGINNING AND END OF SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL STRONGLY EMPHASIZED. ENDING OF USA AID TO MUJAHIDEEN DEPENDED ON SOVIET TAKING THAT FUNDAMENTAL DECISION. IN SPEECH TO HERITAGE FOUNDATION, PRESIDENT REAGAN ALSO STRESSED NEED FOR A DATE CERTAIN FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, ONCE THAT DECISION TAKEN, USA PREPARED TO BE HELPFUL DIPLOMATICALLY BUT QUOTE IN THE MEANTIME STRUGGLE AGAINST TYRANNY WILL CONTINUE. UNQUOTE.

6. PRIVATELY STATE DEPT OFFICIALS ADMIT TO A LITTLE MORE OPTIMISM THAN IN THE PAST BUT ARGUE THAT THEY ARE STILL GETTING HINTS BUT NOTHING SUBSTANTIAL FROM MOSCOW. NONETHELESS THEY ARE NOT/NOT RULING OUT CHANCE THAT SOVIETS WILL DECIDE TO COME UP WITH CONCRETE PROPOSALS ON TROOP WITHDRAWAL AT SUMMIT. IN CONVERSATION TODAY RESPONSIBLE DIRECTOR SPECULATED THAT FOCUS FOR DISCUSSION ON REGIONAL ISSUES COULD BE AFGHANISTAN. THIS WOULD DEPEND, HOWEVER, ON WHETHER SOVIETS HAD SOMETHING SUBSTANTIAL TO OFFER. IF NOT/NOT HE FORESAW NUMEROUS OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES, INCLUDING GULF AND ANGOLA TO WHICH USA COULD DIRECT ATTENTION.

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20-1-2-BRAZIL

P R O T E C T E D

FM BRSLA ZTGR3056 04FEB88

TO EXTOTT ~~CCP~~ CPP

INFC MOSCO WSHDC BONN PARIS LEN ROME ATHNS VIENN BAIRS MXICO

HAVAN VCSCE VMBFR BNATO BREEC PRMNY GENEV PCOTT/HEBERT

TT NDHQOTT/DNACOPL/ DE CAF

DISTR MINA USS DMC DMX DMT IFB RGB UGB LGB GGB IDX IDR

ILA RBD RBR RWD RWR RGBA URD URR CPE CPD LSR LSD

REF YOURTEL CCP0498 11DEC

---PM STATEMENT ON REAGAN-GOREACHEV SUMMIT:BRAZILIAN RESPONSE

HAVE RECEIVED LETTER FM SEC GEN OF BRAZILIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY

PAULO TARSO, IN REPLY TO LET FM AMBASSADOR FORWARDING TO HIM COPY

OF PRIME MINISTERS STATEMENT CN WASHINGTON SUMMIT AND EAST/WEST

RELATIONS.IT IS SOMEWHAT UNUSUAL TO RECEIVE A SUBSTANTIVE RESPONSE

LIKE THIS FM HEAD OF BRAZILIAN MINISTRY,AND ALTHOUGH RESPONSE

IS SHORT ON DETAIL IT DOES REPRESENT CONSIDERED AND SERIOUS EXPRE-

SSION OF BRAZILS APPROACH TO DISARMAMENT AND CONTEXT IN WHICH IT

CONSIDERS EAST/WEST RELATIONS.THESE SUBJECTS MERIT FURTHER EXPLO-

RATION ON THE PART OF OUR OFFICIALS PERHAPS IN THE CONTEXT OF

THE NEXT POLITICAL AFFAIRS CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN CANADA AND BRAZIL,

AS WELL AS BETWEEN OUR DELEGATES IN THE RELEVANT MULTILATERAL FORA.

2.EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF LETTER AS FOLLOWS.

3,BEGINS

DEAR AMBASSADOR

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I HAVE THE HONOUR TO ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF A LETTER OF 17DEC, 1987 FORWARDING YOUR COPY OF THE STATEMENT OF HIS EXCELLENCY MR. BRIAN MULROONEY, PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA, ALLUDING TO THE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT FOR ELIMINATION OF MEDIUM AND SHORT-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION SIGNED IN WASHINGTON LAST 08DEC. IN THANKING YOU FOR THIS COMMUNICATION I WOULD LIKE TO INFORM YOU THAT I HAVE EXAMINED WITH ATTENTION THE STATEMENT OF PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY WHICH STRIKES ME AS VERY CLEAR AND LUCID EXPOSITION OF THE CANADIAN POSITION IN RESPECT OF THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT MEETING AND THE NEW EVENTS OBSERVED IN EAST/WEST RELATIONS. IN REPLY IT GIVES ME GREAT PLEASURE TO REAFFIRM THE SATISFACTION WITH WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF BRAZIL WELCOMED THE CONCLUSION OF THE FIRST EFFECTIVE AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT THAT WAS NOT/NOT SIMPLY AN ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT, AND THE HOPE WHICH WE SUSTAIN THAT THE WASHINGTON TREATY WILL RESULT IN NEW AGREEMENTS EVEN MORE WIDERANGING IN OTHER AREAS OF DISARMAMENT. IN THIS PROCESS, THE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT CONSIDERES ITS INDISPENSABLE THAT DUE IMPORTANCE BE GIVEN TO THE NECESSITY OF RESTRAINT IN THE GEOGRAPHIC DISSEMINATION OF ATOMIC ARSENALS, WHICH WAS ONE IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INITIATIVE FOR A ZONE OF PEACE AND COOPERATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC CO-SPONSORED BY BRAZIL (AT THE UNGA). IT IS EQUALLY NECESSARY IN FUTURE DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS SUCH AS THE CONVENTION ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS ALREADY BEING WORKED OUT IN THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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THAT RESPECT FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF UNIVERSALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION BE SAFEGUARDED. BRAZIL ALONG SIDE MANY OTHER NATIONS HAS UNDERSCORED THE NECESSITY OF MAINTAINING A CLOSE LINK BETWEEN BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS AND EFFORTS DEVELOPED IN MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENT FORUMS AND IN PARTICULAR THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN ORDER TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE LEGITIMATE INTEREST OF ALL COUNTRIES IN PARTICIPATING IN DECISIONS ON THIS MATTER. YOU WILL RECALL IN THIS CONTEXT THAT BRAZIL'S SUPPORT FOR THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY HAS CONSTITUTED A BASIC VECTOR OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY WHICH NOW TENDS TO TAKE ON A RENEWED IMPORTANCE WITH THE RETURN OF BRAZIL IN 1988 TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. IN REITERATING MY THANKS FOR YOUR MESSAGE I WISH TO REAFFIRM MY DISPOSITION TO DISCUSS WITH YOUR EXCELLENCY ON OPPORTUNE OCCASIONS THE THEMES CONTAINED IN THE MESSAGE OF PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY AND OTHER QUESTIONS OF COMMON INTEREST TO BRAZIL AND CANADA. I AVAIL MYSELF OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO YOU THE EXPRESSION OF MY HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

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SIGNED

PAULO TARSO FLECHA DE LIMA,
SECRETARY GENERAL OF EXTERNAL RELATIONS.

ENDS

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