

D-1-5(e)-2

1960-62

DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Storage  
of Nuclear Weapons in Canada for Use by U.S.  
Forces - Air Defence Weapons

TOP SECRET

FILE NO. D-1-5(e)-2

1960 -62

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE  
CANADA

SUBJECT

DEFENCE

Canada-US Arrangements

Storage of Nuclear Weapons in Canada for Use by U.S. Forces

Air Defence Weapons

EXEMPTED RECORDS FOR FILE D-1-5(e)-2 60-62

Date	Description of Item	Date	Description of Item
1960-62	<p><u>Complete File</u> Defence Canada-US Arrangements Storage of Nuclear Weapons in Canada for Use by US Forces Air Defence Weapons 15(1) (a) (d)</p> <p>File to remain in PCO Review again</p>		

## CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Name or Subject	File No.
<u>DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Storage</u> <u>Air Defence Weapons</u>	<u>D-1-5(e)-2</u>
Regarding	Date
Memo re May Meeting of Permanent Joint Board on Defence - advising that the question of acquisition of nuclear weapons by Cdn forces and the related question of storage of air-to-air defensive weapons in Canada for U.S. use have been on the agenda and that any statements he has made as Chairman of the Cdn Section have been cleared beforehand with either the Secy of State for EA and the Minister of National Defence - commenting on U.S. Section's statement re military aspects on the question in relation to North American defence with particular reference to the BOMARCS and CF-101 interceptors -	May 11, 1962

SEE

Name or Subject	File No.
L.D.Wilgress to R.B.Bryce	<u>D-1-5(a)</u>

**1960**

MEMORANDUM  
Privy Council Office

**SECRET**

Ottawa.....

Ross Martin:

To note and file  
sorted, and  
W.R. to file Re.O.

000186

Sept 20, 1974

(?)

Secret

& personal

- for PCO only

Memo for File

Re: Goose & Hannan Bases  
- Nuclear weapons

The P.M. told me today that  
he did not wish this sent forward  
just at present because

(a) he expected a new minister  
soon at ND & this was a  
major policy decision in his field

(b) it was well not to act while  
the transfer was under  
consideration.

RBB

I have told N.A.R. only.

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

MEMORANDUM

Sept. 9/60

Mr. Bryce

I haven't yet found your copy of the record of the Canada-US meeting on defence in July, but Mr. Tovell's copy is attached for reference.

CC

000188

*Miss Conway*  
*Can you find also here*  
SECRET  
X X  
RHB

D-1-5 (e) - 2

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRYCE

Nuclear Weapons; Canada-US Agreement  
on Goose Bay and Harmon

You asked for the record of Cabinet discussions in June and July on this subject, and for the report of the Canada-US Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence.

The revised Canadian draft of agreement was given to the US last March, and the US had not officially commented on it before the Canada-US Ministerial Committee meeting in July. I believe they did so at that time, and asked for assurances in writing on two or three points. I have not seen the report of the Canada-US Meeting, however, and it has not been filed. I believe it must be in your own files. ] X X

After the Canada-US meeting there was a reference to the proposed agreement in Cabinet on July 14th. This reference is attached, along with the file in which is flagged the revised Canadian draft of last March and the Draft Letter from Mr. Heeney to the Secretary of State which, I understand, awaits the Government's approval.

*[Signature]*  
D.B.D.


Sept. 7th, 1960.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

ROUTING SLIP

DATE  
SECURITY

TO: Mr. Martin



FROM: WJB

The attached is sent to you for:

- |                                      |  |
|--------------------------------------|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> action      | <input type="checkbox"/> onward transmission |
| <input type="checkbox"/> signature   | <input type="checkbox"/> despatch            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> approval    | <input type="checkbox"/> return              |
| <input type="checkbox"/> comments    | <input type="checkbox"/> circulation         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> information | <input type="checkbox"/> file                |
| <input type="checkbox"/> translation | <input type="checkbox"/> destruction         |

COMMENTS: (This space is not for comments of a permanent character which should be formally recorded in a memorandum)

We spoke: Have 2 copies of the draft memo to Cabinet. As you know, it has not yet been signed by SSEA, but I thought it might be useful if the subject came up in Cabinet without papers.

NOTE: This Routing Slip will not be placed on 000190

D  
R  
A  
F  
T

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

S E C R E T

July 15, 1960

MEMORANDUM TO THE CABINET

Proposed Agreement concerning the Storage  
of Nuclear Air-to-Air Defensive Weapons at  
Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base

On September 22 Cabinet approved a negotiating draft of an agreement with the United States Government to provide for the storage of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base. This draft was transmitted to the State Department, which replied in January, 1960, agreeing to the text of the Note but suggesting a number of changes to the annex to the Note in which the detailed terms of the arrangement were set out.

On March 15, 1960, Cabinet approved a revised version of the annex as a basis for further negotiations with the United States, and on March 31, the Canadian Ambassador presented it to the State Department. In his presentation the Ambassador made use of certain explanatory comments provided by the Department of External Affairs and based on the memorandum to Cabinet. In addition, he left with the State Department an unsigned piece of paper giving the text of these comments.

At the Montebello meeting of the Committee on Joint Defence, the United States representative stated that they were prepared to accept the revised annex as proposed by Canada if two points could be met:

.... 2

- 2 -

- (a) The United States wished to have assurance that the requirement of Canadian approval for the movement of the weapons to and from Canada would not be applied to prevent the return of the weapons to the United States when required;
- (b) The United States wished to have the substance of the explanatory comments provided by the Ambassador given some status, i.e. embodied in a letter signed by the Ambassador rather than in an anonymous piece of paper, since it was considered essential that they form a part of the secret presentation which would have to be made to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

In making these proposals, Mr. Merchant, the State Department representative, made it clear that the United States intended and desired that both the agreement itself and the proposed letter should remain secret.

To facilitate consideration of these proposals by Cabinet, the following documents are appended to this Memorandum:

- (a) The draft Note as approved by Cabinet in September, 1959, together with its annex, as approved by Cabinet on March 15, except that a new paragraph 8 has been included which reads as follows:

"The above provisions will be applied in such a manner as to permit the return of the weapons to the United States at any time at the request of the United States Government."

- 3 -

(b) A draft of a letter from the Canadian Ambassador to the Secretary of State incorporating the language used by the Ambassador in the explanatory notes he left with the State Department on March 31, 1960.

Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

APPENDIX "A"

S E C R E T

July 15, 1960

PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONCERNING  
THE STORAGE OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON AIR FORCE BASE

No. \_\_\_\_\_

Sir:

I have the honour to refer to discussions between representatives of the Canadian and United States Governments concerning the strengthening of the continental air defences by a gradual increase in the numbers of air defence weapons with nuclear capability. These discussions have taken into account recommendations by CINC NORAD as to the immediate military requirement for the storage at certain points in Canada of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons.

Recognizing the need to strengthen the continental air defences against the threat which exists, and realizing that the full potential of air-to-air defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads, the Canadian Government is prepared to permit the storage of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons in Canada in accordance with the conditions set out in the attached Annex.

.....

I have the honour to propose that if these conditions are acceptable to your Government, this Note and your reply shall constitute an Agreement between our two Governments, to take effect on the date of your reply.

Ambassador

S E C R E T

July 15, 1960

ANNEX TO THE PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONCERNING  
THE STORAGE OF NUCLEAR AIR-TO-AIR DEFENSIVE WEAPONS  
AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON AIR FORCE BASE

(In this Annex, unless the context otherwise requires, "Canada" means the Government of Canada, "United States" means the Government of the United States of America, "NORAD" means the North American Air Defence Command established by Canada and the United States in an Exchange of Notes dated 12 May, 1958, and "CINC NORAD" means the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD.)

The weapons under consideration are such nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons as may from time to time be made available to United States Forces under the operational control of CINC NORAD.

2. Ownership of these weapons shall remain with the United States in accordance with United States law. They may be stored at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base, Newfoundland. The cost of the establishment, maintenance and operation of the storage facilities shall be the responsibility of the United States Government.

3. Arrangements for the storage of these weapons will be a joint responsibility of Canada and the United States, to be carried out as follows:

(a) The United States shall provide and be responsible for the security of the storage sites in accordance with the terms of the existing agreements concerning the leased areas, i.e. the Agreement of March 27, 1941 concerning Leased Bases in Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base and the Exchange of Notes of December 5, 1952 in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Goose Bay;

(b) Pursuant to its obligations under paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this Annex, Canada will provide a representative or representatives at each base.

4. Safeguards in the design of the weapons will be the responsibility of the United States. The procedure for handling the weapons to afford the maximum protection of lives and property will be subject to the agreement of Canada. Safety procedures for maintenance, transport, loading, storage and salvage will be at least equivalent to United States standards.

5. The transport of these weapons in Canadian territory will be carried out in accordance with Canadian law and with procedures agreed between the appropriate agencies of both Governments.

6. Approval of the use of these weapons will be a joint responsibility of the two Governments. The weapons will only be used in situations of grave emergency in accordance with the plans and procedures governing the operations of NORAD.

7. The removal of these weapons, either for logistic or operational reasons, from the areas utilized by United States Forces (as provided in the Agreement of March 27, 1941, concerning Leased Bases in Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base, and the Exchange of Notes dated December 5, 1952, in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Goose Bay), will require the approval of the Canadian Government in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Annex.

New  
provision

( 8. The above provisions will be applied in  
( such a manner as to permit the return of the weapons  
( to the United States at any time at the request of  
( the United States Government.

9. Any test firing of these weapons which may be required will take place outside of Canada.

10. The terms of this Agreement will be reviewed by the two Governments at the request of either Government and after such review may be terminated by either Government upon six months' notice.

11. Supplementary arrangements or administrative agreements between authorized agencies of the two Governments may be made from time to time for the purpose of carrying out the intent of this Agreement.

APPENDIX "B"

S E C R E T

July 15, 1960

DRAFT LETTER FROM  
THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON  
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

(This letter would carry the same date  
as the Exchange of Notes)

Dear Mr. Secretary,

In connection with the Exchange of Notes taking place this day regarding the storage of air-to-air defensive nuclear weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base, I am authorized by the Canadian Government to transmit to you the following comments on certain provisions in the annex to my Note. (The paragraph references which follow relate to the paragraphs of the annex.)

Paragraph 3:

The text of this paragraph states that the arrangements for the storage of these weapons will be a joint responsibility and then describes how this responsibility is to be carried out. The objective, so far as the Canadian Government is concerned, is related to its responsibility in respect of the provisions of the agreement regarding the circumstances under which the weapons may be removed from the base installations, and concerning safety standards. The statement that the United States for its part shall be responsible for the security of the storage sites in accordance with the terms of the existing agreements concerning the leased areas is intended to specify its obligations as lessee in this matter.

Paragraph 5:

There are two elements involved in this paragraph:

- (1) authorization by the Canadian Government for the transport of nuclear weapons in Canadian territory in accordance with established practice (the procedure would be the same as prescribed in Schedule "B" to Order-in-Council P.C. 2307 of April 17, 1952, for Strategic Air Command overflights); and
- (2) any safety procedures applied by the Canadian authorities in accordance with requirements of the Atomic Energy Control Board and of the safety standards referred to in paragraph 4 of the draft annex.

It should be noted that the phrase "the transport of these weapons in Canadian territory" would include not only the movement of these weapons between

- 2 -

SECRET

Goose Bay or Harmon Air Force Base and the United States but also their movement between Goose Bay and Harmon.

Paragraphs 6 and 7:

These paragraphs should be considered in conjunction with paragraph 5. Paragraphs 5 and 6 set out the procedures which would govern transport of the weapons outside the base, either for logistic or for operational reasons, and paragraph 7 provides that removal of the weapons, either for logistic or operational reasons, will require approval of the Canadian Government in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 6. In other words, the approval of the Canadian Government for transporting the weapons for logistic reasons (following the same procedure as prescribed for overflights under Schedule "B") would at the same time constitute approval for the removal of the weapons from the storage site. Similarly, the authorization of the Canadian Government for the use of the weapons would at the same time constitute authority for their removal from the storage site for this purpose.

Paragraph 7 provides that the area in which the United States Air Force is permitted to handle the weapons shall be "the area utilized by the United States forces" (i.e., the base). This phrase is suggested to provide language to permit practice alerts and to meet training requirements, i.e., practice in arming aircraft and taxiing down the runway but not taking off. A second point arises out of the United States view that the requirement of Canadian approval for removal of the weapons for operational use could seriously impair the ability of CINC NORAD to act rapidly in situations of grave emergency. The new draft deals with this by specifying that the approval of the Canadian Government will be given in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to paragraph 6. These procedures are spelled out in the MB-1 Overflight Agreement of June 30, 1959, and in the Exchange of Letters of September 30/October 2, 1959 between Mr. Heeney and Mr. Herter concerning states of readiness. The Canadian Government regards the measure of control which it exercises through these agreements as essential.

Yours sincerely,

(COPY)

RECORD OF CABINET DECISION

Meeting of July 14th, 1960.

Canada-United States Committee on Joint Defence; Press  
Conference by U.S. Secretary of Defence  
(Previous reference July 8)

The Cabinet noted the report and the discussion on the question of nuclear warheads for United States interceptors at the leased bases at Goose Bay and Harmon Field and for Canada's Forces.

*W.G. Halliday per C.B.*  
Registrar of the Cabinet.

Privy Council Office,  
September 23rd, 1960.

July 12, 1960

(?)

SECRET

DRAFT LETTER  
FROM THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON  
TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

Dear Mr. Secretary,

On March 31, 1960, I gave to officials of your Department the text of a draft agreement to provide for the storage of air-to-air defensive nuclear weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base. The purpose of this letter is to supplement the explanation I gave at that time as to the intent of certain paragraphs in the annex to the draft agreement. (The paragraph references which follow relate to the paragraphs of the annex.)

Paragraph 3:

The text of this paragraph states that the arrangements for the storage of these weapons will be a joint responsibility and then describes how this responsibility is to be carried out. The objective, so far as the Canadian Government is concerned, is related to its responsibility in respect of the provisions of the agreement regarding the circumstances under which the weapons may be removed from the base installations, and concerning safety standards. The statement that the United States for its part shall be responsible for the security of the storage sites in accordance with the terms of existing agreements concerning the leased areas is intended to specify its obligations as lessee in this matter.

Paragraph 5:

There are two elements involved in this paragraph:

- (1) authorization by the Canadian Government for the transport of nuclear weapons in Canadian territory in accordance with established practice (the procedure would be the same as prescribed in Schedule "B" to Order-in-Council PC 2307 of April 17, 1952, for SAC overflights); and
- (2) any safety procedures applied by the Canadian authorities in accordance with requirements of the Atomic Energy Control Board and of the safety standards referred to in paragraph 4 of the draft annex.

It should be noted that the phrase "the transport of these weapons in Canadian territory" would include not only the movement of these weapons between Goose Bay or Harmon Air Force Base and the United States but also

**SECRET**

- 2 -

their movement between Goose Bay and Harmon.

Paragraphs 6 and 7:

These paragraphs should be considered in conjunction with paragraph 5. Paragraphs 5 and 6 set out the procedures which would govern transport of the weapons outside the base, either for logistic or for operational reasons, and paragraph 7 provides that removal of the weapons, either for logistic or operational reasons, will require approval of the Canadian Government in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 6. In other words, the approval of the Canadian Government for transporting the weapons for logistic reasons (following the same procedure as prescribed for overflights under Schedule "B") would at the same time constitute approval for the removal of the weapons from the storage site. Similarly the authorization of the Canadian Government for the use of the weapons would at the same time constitute authority for their removal from the storage site for this purpose.

Paragraph 7 provides that the area in which the United States Air Force is permitted to handle the weapons shall be "the area utilized by the United States forces" (i.e., the base). This phrase is suggested to provide language to permit practice alerts and to meet training requirements, i.e., practice in arming aircraft and taxiing down the runway but not taking off. A second point arises out of the United States view that the requirement of Canadian approval for removal of the weapons for operational use could seriously impair the ability of CINC NORAD to act rapidly in situations of grave emergency. The new draft deals with this by specifying that the approval of the Canadian Government will be given in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to paragraph 6. These procedures are spelled out in the MB-1 overflight agreement of June 30, 1959, and in the exchange of letters of September 30/October 2, 1959 between Mr. Heeney and Mr. Herter concerning states of readiness. The Canadian Government regards the measure of control which it exercises through these agreements as essential.

I trust that the foregoing comments, which have been approved by the Canadian Government, will be of assistance to you in your consideration of the draft agreement.

Yours sincerely,

D-1-5 (e)-2

FM WASHDC JUL11/60 SECRET

TO EXTERNAL 1773 OPIMMED

REF BARTON RAE TELECON JUL9

STORAGE OF AIR TO AIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON  
THIS WILL CONFIRM THAT WILLOUGHBY INFORMED ME ON SAT THAT HE  
BELIEVED THAT THE TEXT OF THE CDN DRAFT OF THE ANNEX TO THE  
PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF NOTES ON THIS MATTER, CONTAINED IN YOURTEL  
DL338 MAR25, WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO USA PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING  
PROVISION COULD BE ADDED TO PARA7 OF THE ANNEX OR, ALTERNATIVELY,  
PROVIDED IT COULD BE ADDED TO THE RELATED PARA IN THE EXPLANATORY  
COMMENTS WHICH YOU AUTHORIZED US IN YOURTEL DL337 MAR25 TO  
INCORPORATE IN A QUOTE PIECE OF PAPER UNQUOTE TO BE LEFT WITH THE  
STATE DEPT. (A COPY OF THIS QUOTE PIECE OF PAPER UNQUOTE WAS  
REFERRED TO YOU UNDER COVER OF OUR LET 501 APRI.) THE ADDITIONAL  
PROVISION WOULD READ: QUOTE IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THESE PROCEDURES  
SHALL NOT <sup>be applied to prevent the</sup> RPT NOT IMPAIR <sup>the</sup> THE RIGHT OF THE USA TO RETURN <sup>of</sup> THE WEAPONS  
TO THE USA WHENEVER IT MAY DEEM IT APPROPRIATE. UNQUOTE.

2. IF IT WERE AGREEABLE THAT SUCH A PROVISION BE INCLUDED IN THE  
EXPLANATORY COMMENTS, THIS WOULD INVOLVE THE COMMENTS BEING GIVEN  
QUOTE APPROPRIATE STATUS UNQUOTE SO THAT THEY COULD BE USED IN  
PRESENTING THE EXCHANGE OF NOTES TO THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL  
COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY. IN OTHER WORDS, THE STATE DEPT WOULD WISH  
TO BE ABLE TO INDICATE THAT THE EXPLANATORY COMMENTS  
REPRESENTED THE CONSIDERED VIEWS OF THE CDN GOVT. IT WOULD BE  
UNDERSTOOD THAT BOTH THE COMMENTS AND THE EXCHANGE OF NOTES  
WOULD REMAIN CLASSIFIED.

3. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IS THE POSITION RECOMMENDED TO USA  
MINISTERS ON THE DISCUSSION OF THIS ITEM IN THE JOINT MINISTERIAL

D-17

cape

NATIONAL DEFENCE

s.c. Nuclear Weapons - Inquiry as to Storage in Canada

brev

On the orders of the day:

Hon. L.B. PEARSON (Leader of the Opposition):

I should like to ask the Prime Minister whether he cares to comment on a report in the press this morning to the effect that nuclear weapons for United States jet interceptors are to be stored in Canada?

Right Hon. J.G. DIEFENBAKER (Prime Minister):

There have been discussions with the United States government regarding the possible conditions under which nuclear weapons for jet interceptors might be stored in United States leased bases in Canada. No agreement has been arrived at.

Mr. PEARSON: I should like to ask a supplementary question. Are these discussions concerned only with the storage of nuclear weapons in leased bases in Canada and in leased bases only?

Mr. DIEFENBAKER: Yes.

Copies on D-1-5(e)-3  
D-1-5(e)-1  
D-1-5(e)

Dropped 3/6  
Dec 12/60

CABINET DOCUMENT
No. 201/60
Copy No. ....

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

D-1-5(e)-2

*In column  
The Boyer has  
policy committee  
as referred to  
the memorandum*

S E C R E T

June 24, 1960

MEMORANDUM TO THE CABINET

NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY

The purpose of this memorandum is to review the current situation with respect to proposals by the United States for storage of nuclear weapons in Canada, and to the question of the acquisition of nuclear warheads for Canadian forces, so that Ministers may give consideration to these matters prior to the meeting of the Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defence to be held on July 12 and 13.

There are five aspects to this general question:

- (a) The United States has sought permission for the storage at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons for use by United States interceptor aircraft under NORAD control.
- (b) The United States has sought permission for the storage of nuclear anti-submarine weapons at the United States Naval Base at Argentia for use by United States Naval Forces operating under the control of the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic.
- (c) The United States has sought permission for the use of existing storage facilities at Goose Bay for the storage of nuclear weapons for the Strategic Air Command.
- (d) The possible acquisition of nuclear warheads for Canadian use in Canada, especially for BOMARC's.
- (e) The possible acquisition of nuclear weapons for Canadian use in Europe for the CF-104 and for the Honest John.

On (a), the Cabinet has given its approval in principle, subject to the conclusion of a satisfactory Exchange of Notes. The first draft of such an exchange was given to the State Department last October, and a second draft, revised in the light of United States comments on the earlier draft and approved by the Cabinet, was conveyed to the State Department last March. Considered United States views on this second draft, a copy of which is attached, are now being awaited. The three most important principles underlying this draft are:

- (i) Arrangements for storage will be a joint responsibility of the two Governments.

- 2 -

SECRET

- (ii) Responsibility for their removal from the base will be shared.
- (iii) Responsibility will be shared for the use of the weapons.

It is understood that the two aspects of this negotiation causing concern to the United States Government are:

- (a) the omission in the draft of any reference to custody, either directly or by reference to the applicability of United States law, and
- (b) the stipulation that with respect to storage at Goose Bay the terms of the Goose Bay Lease would apply. One of the provisions of the Lease is that the RCAF Station Commander shall have access to all parts of the leased area. This would mean that he would have access to the storage site, and presumably to the weapons themselves.

Action Required

Formal reaction of the United States has yet to be received. If the United States raise no objection to the draft, the Exchange of Notes could be completed as soon as desired.

★ ★ ★

The other four aspects were discussed in general terms at the Camp David meeting of the Ministerial Committee last November. One of the main problems in connection with United States storage in Canada has been to develop formulae which, on the one hand, will meet the requirements of United States legislation and, on the other, the concern of Canadian Ministers regarding control over release from storage and over the use of these weapons.

With respect to the storage of naval weapons at Argentia, the United States side at Camp David expressed the view that nuclear weapons carried on board United States navy ships would not be regarded as having been removed from land storage sites. The Canadian side pointed out that under these circumstances, the Canadian Government would not be able to exercise control over release from storage of weapons stored in Canada. Although the United States side urged that an attempt be made to avoid imposing inoperable conditions which would render the defensive use of the weapons more difficult, it was agreed that the question of controls would have to be further explored. However, no further consideration has been given this aspect pending progress on the Exchange of Notes regarding storage of air-to-air nuclear weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon.

Action Required

Nothing further until the texts of the Notes regarding Goose Bay and Harmon have been agreed.

★ ★ ★

- 3 -

SECRET

With respect to the storage of nuclear weapons for the Strategic Air Command at Goose Bay, Canadian Ministers at Camp David made it clear that no decision would be taken for a while. The United States Secretaries stressed the importance they attached to the storage at Goose Bay of nuclear weapons for use by the Strategic Air Command on re-strike missions. The original request had been made as part of the policy of dispersing SAC forces and SAC weapons, a policy which, in the United States view, is becoming more valid as the Soviet missile threat grows in strength. Canadian Ministers expressed the view that storage for SAC in Canada would present great difficulties politically but promised that the question would be further considered by the Government in the light of the views put forward by the United States side. It is to be assumed that the United States Secretaries will raise the matter again.

Action Required

Further consideration of United States proposal by Canadian Ministers before the meeting on July 12.

★ ★ ★

With regard to the acquisition of nuclear warheads for Canadian use in Canada (especially for BOMARC) and Canadian use in Europe (for the CF-104 and the Honest John), a preliminary technical draft agreement was discussed informally some time ago between the Canadian and the United States services and this was subsequently reviewed and revised by officials of the Canadian Government. A new draft of an agreement to cover both these aspects has been prepared by Canadian officials and in it an attempt has been made to provide a formula to meet United States legislative requirements and Canadian Ministers' wishes regarding control over release from storage and for use. This draft has not, however, been considered by Ministers, nor has it been discussed with the United States authorities. The current NATO infrastructure programme includes funds for the construction of storage facilities for nuclear warheads to meet the requirements of the Canadian Brigade in Germany and the Air Division, and the Canadian defence authorities are being pressed by the NATO military authorities to make arrangements to get the construction under way. Arrangements for the storage of nuclear warheads in Europe will have to be made with the host governments in sufficient time before the CF-104 becomes available to the Air Division and the Honest John to the Brigade. A first step, however, would be the negotiation with the United States of an agreement setting out the general conditions for the acquisition of the nuclear weapons.

Action Required

- (a) Decision on the principle of acquiring nuclear warheads;

- 4 -

SECRET

- (b) If that decision is affirmative, formal governmental consideration of the draft general agreement.

Original signed by

H. C. Green

Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

APPENDIX "A"

S E C R E T

REDRAFT OF THE ANNEX TO  
THE PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONCERNING  
THE STORAGE OF NUCLEAR AIR-TO-AIR DEFENSIVE  
WEAPONS AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON AIR FORCE BASE

(In this Annex, unless the context otherwise requires, "Canada" means the Government of Canada, "United States" means the Government of the United States of America, "NORAD" means the North American Air Defence Command established by Canada and the United States in an exchange of Notes dated 12 May, 1958, and "CINC NORAD" means the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD.)

The weapons under consideration are such nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons as may from time to time be made available to United States Forces under the operational control of CINC NORAD.

2. Ownership of these weapons shall remain with the United States in accordance with United States law. They may be stored at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base, Newfoundland. The cost of the establishment, maintenance and operation of the storage facilities shall be the responsibility of the United States Government.

3. Arrangements for the storage of these weapons will be a joint responsibility of Canada and the United States, to be carried out as follows:

(a) The United States shall provide and be responsible for the security of the storage sites in accordance with the terms of the existing agreements concerning the leased areas, i.e., the Agreement of March 27, 1941 concerning Leased Bases in Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base and the exchange of Notes of December 5, 1952 in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Goose Bay;

(b) Pursuant to its obligations under paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this Annex, Canada will provide a representative or representatives at each base.

4. Safeguards in the design of the weapons will be the responsibility of the United States. The procedure for handling the weapons to afford the maximum protection of lives and property will be subject to the agreement of Canada. Safety procedures for maintenance, transport, loading, storage and salvage will be at least equivalent to United States standards.

5. The transport of these weapons in Canadian territory will be carried out in accordance with Canadian law and with procedures agreed between the appropriate agencies of both Governments.

- 2 -

6. Approval of the use of these weapons will be a joint responsibility of the two Governments. The weapons will only be used in situations of grave emergency in accordance with the plans and procedures governing the operations of NORAD.

7. The removal of these weapons, either for logistic or operational reasons, from the areas utilized by United States Forces (as provided in the Agreement of March 27, 1941, concerning Leased Bases in Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base, and the exchange of Notes dated December 5, 1952 in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Goose Bay), will require the approval of the Canadian Government in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Annex.

8. Any test firing of these weapons which may be required will take place outside of Canada.

9. The terms of this Agreement will be reviewed by the two Governments at the request of either Government and after such review may be terminated by either Government upon six months' notice.

10. Supplementary arrangements or administrative agreements between authorized agencies of the two Governments may be made from time to time for the purpose of carrying out the intent of this Agreement.

Mr. Martin *fm*

June 21, 1960  
D-1-5 (e) - 1  
D-1-5 (f)

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRYCE

Arrangements for Nuclear Weapons

I have flagged in the file of papers prepared for the Prime Minister's visit to Washington a summary of the present situation in respect of storage of nuclear weapons in Canada for US use and of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Canada for Canadian use. The situation as described in this paper still obtains. That is, very briefly:

- a. The revised draft agreement on storage of air defence weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon is in the hands of the State Department and we are waiting for a considered US view on it;
- b. No action has been taken on the US requests for storage of weapons at Argentia and Goose Bay (SAC), first made in 1957;
- c. The draft general agreement on acquisition of weapons for Canadian use which was prepared by the Panel on Economic Aspects of Defence Questions in December, 1959, was sent to Mr. Pearkes, Mr. Green and Mr. Fleming. Mr. Pearkes agreed to it, Mr. Fleming had no comments and Mr. Green held it for further consideration. On January 18, 1960, in the Throne speech debate, the Prime Minister stated that negotiations were proceeding with the US

- 2 -

SECRET

"in order that the necessary weapons could be made available for Canadian defence units if and when they are required".

Later in January you conveyed to External Affairs three changes to the draft agreement to reflect the views of the Prime Minister on it. These amendments dealt with the question of joint responsibility for custody, Canadian responsibility for their use by Canadian Forces and provision for review and termination of the agreement. Mr. Robertson accordingly submitted a revised draft general agreement to Mr. Green with a covering memorandum (Flag 'B'), and asked Mr. Green if the department could now seek the comments of the State Department on the draft, or if he wished first to consult further with his colleagues.

I have been told that Mr. Green's reaction to this memorandum was that he did not want to proceed with the matter of acquisition until the agreement on storage of defensive nuclear weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon was concluded.

In a memorandum to Mr. Green of May 6, 1960, ( a copy of which we do not have but which I have seen), Mr. Robertson referred to the revised draft agreement on acquisition submitted earlier, noted what Mr. Green had said about waiting for the Goose Bay-Harmon agreement, and pointed out that National Defence was worried because CF-104 aircraft were coming along and no provision had been made for equipping them with other than nuclear weapons. Under these circumstances, the Under-Secretary asked if Mr. Green would now like to proceed with the general agreement on acquisition. If so, it was suggested that officials should review the

... 3


000211

- 3 -

SECRET

draft general agreement, prior to its submission to Cabinet, to make whatever minor changes in the text that were necessary to bring it into line with the new features which had been introduced into the Goose Bay-Harmon agreement.

Besides the files I have referred to I also attach a press report of Mr. Pearkes' statement in the Defence Expenditures Committee on "negotiations", and a copy of suggested answers to questions which might be asked in the House as a result of Mr. Pearkes' statement. These answers were prepared in External Affairs over the week-end at the request of the Prime Minister.



D.B.D.

June 21st, 1960.

000212

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF CABINET DECISION

Meeting of June 20th, 1960.

Storage and use of nuclear weapons

(Previous reference March 22)

The Cabinet agreed that the Minister of National Defence would prepare for the use of the Prime Minister a statement in reply to an expected question in the House of Commons on the storage and use of nuclear weapons.

*W. E. D. Halliday per CB*  
Registrar of the Cabinet.

Privy Council Office,  
June 22nd, 1960.

Privy Council Office

Ottawa.....June 22nd, 1960.

✓ MR. GUEST (For the Prime Minister)  
✓ MR. PEARKES  
MR. GREEN

For File

For your information.

W.E.D.H.

000214

AW  
RD  
1-2-61  
9.0.0.

COPY.....OF.....  
16 OF 22

FM WASHDC APR22/60 TOPSEC(NO DISTRIBUTION)

TO EXTERNAL 1057 PRIORITY

REF OURTEL 868 MAR31

STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON

WE MET WITH WILLOUGHBY(DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND NORTHERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS) THIS MORNING FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON THIS QUESTION. ALSO PRESENT WERE LANG AND BROWNEZ OF THE DEPT OF DEFENSE, RUTTER(OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ASST TO THE SECRETARY FOR ATOMIC ENERGY), PENDER(LEGAL DEPT) AND BURGESS(CDN DESK). BARTON WAS ABLE TO ACCOMPANY US.

2. WILLOUGHBY BEGAN BY SAYING THAT USA AUTHORITIES DID NOT RPT NOT WISH TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE WORDING WHICH WE HAD SUBMITTED ON MAR31(YOURTEL DL338 MAR25). HOWEVER IT WAS DESIRABLE TO ENSURE THAT THERE WAS A MEETING OF MINDS AS TO WHAT WAS INTENDED BY OUR REDRAFT, IN TWO PRINCIPAL RESPECTS.

3. FOR THE PURPOSE A DRAFT OF A SUPPLEMENTARY LET HAD BEEN PREPARED INCORPORATING USA UNDERSTANDING IN PARTICULAR OF PARAS 4 AND 5 OF OUR DRAFT. FOLLOWING SOME DISCUSSION WE WERE REQUESTED TO SUBMIT FOR CONSIDERATION THE TEXT SET OUT IN OURTEL 1056 APR22.

4. THE PURPOSE OF PARA 3 OF THE DRAFT LET IS, AS INDICATED, TO CLARIFY THAT THE AGREEMENT ON STORAGE, IN PARTICULAR PARA 4, DOES NOT RPT NOT IN ITSELF AUTHORIZE ACCESS BY THE CDN AUTHORITIES TO CLASSIFIED (ATOMIC) INFO NOR TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT THAT ACCESS WOULD BE GOVERNED BY EXISTING OR FUTURE AGREEMENTS. WE POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS ENVISAGED THAT THERE WOULD BE AN EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE TWO DEFENCE DEPTS SIGNIFYING THE QUOTE AGREEMENT OF CDA UNQUOTE AFTER THE RCAF HAS SATISFIED THE CDN GOVT THAT THE WEAPONS TO BE STORED WOULD MEET CDN SAFETY REQUIREMENTS(PARA D(4) OF YOURTEL DL337 MAR25). WE FURTHER SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO MOVE AHEAD QUICKLY WITH THESE ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING SAFETY REQUIREMENTS, SINCE CDN MINISTERS WOULD NO RPT NO DOUBT WISH TO BE SATISFIED

...2

311

PAGE TWO 1057

CONCERNING THESE ARRANGEMENTS BEFORE FINALLY APPROVING THE MAIN AGREEMENT ON STORAGE.

5. WE UNDERSTAND THAT AIR VICE MARSHAL HENDRICK, WHO ACCOMPANIED US TO THE MEETING, INTENDS RAISING THIS MATTER WITH THE RCAF IN OTT. LANG OF THE DEPT OF DEFENSE EXPRESSED THE READINESS OF THAT DEPT TO ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RCAF IMMEDIATELY WITH A VIEW TO REACHING AGREEMENT ON ARRANGEMENTS REGARDING SAFETY REQUIREMENTS. THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 3 IS INTENDED TO TAKE ACCOUNT ON THE ONE HAND, OF THE GOOSE BAY AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDES THAT THE RCAF COMMANDER SHALL HAVE ACCESS TO ANY PART OF THE LEASED AREA, AND ON THE OTHER HAND OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF USA LAW REGARDING ACCESS TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

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

7. THERE IS A FURTHER QUESTION WHICH OCCURS TO US, AND WHICH IS IRRELEVANT TO THE QUESTION OF SPECIFIC AUTHORIZATION, BUT WHICH WAS NOT RPT NOT RAISED BY USA SIDE, THAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT ON STORAGE TO OVERFLIGHT PROCEDURES. IT WOULD SEEM THAT, CONSISTENT WITH THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT ON STORAGE, SCHEDULE QUOTE B UNQUOTE TO PC 2307 SHOULD COVER LOGISTIC FLIGHTS MADE UNDER AGREEMENT. AS PRESENTLY DRAFTED (YOUR LET DL 286 MAR 31) SCHEDULE

PAGE THREE 1057

QUOTE B UNQUOTE COVERS ONLY LOGISTIC FLIGHTS ON BEHALF OF SAC.

8. THE QUESTION OF PUBLICITY WAS RAISED. WE SAID THAT WHILE WE HAD NO RPT NO INSTRUCTIONS IT WAS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE AGREEMENTS WOULD BE CLASSIFIED. AT THE SAME TIME, IN VIEW OF PREVIOUS STATEMENTS MADE IN THE HOUSE ON THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WE THOUGHT THAT, AT SOME STAGE, CONSIDERATION WOULD BE GIVEN TO AN APPROPRIATE STATEMENT POSSIBLY IN THE CONTEXT OF A STATEMENT ON THE ACQUISITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR CDN FORCES.

9. IT IS ENVISAGED BY THE STATE DEPT THAT THE LET INCORPORATING USA UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING THE STORAGE AGREEMENT WOULD BE CONTAINED IN A SUPPLEMENTARY EXCHANGE OF LETS.

10. WILLOUGHBY SAID THAT HE WOULD WANT TO CLEAR WITH HIS SUPERIORS THE FINAL TEXT OF THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT AND OF THE DRAFT LET OF UNDERSTANDING FOLLOWING CONSIDERATION BY CDN OFFICIALS, AND ALSO ANY OUTLINE OF ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE AGREED BETWEEN THE DEPT OF DEFENSE AND THE RCAF CONCERNING SAFETY ARRANGEMENTS. TO FACILITATE CONSIDERATION BY CDN MINISTERS OF THE AUTHORITATIVE VIEWS OF THE ADMINISTRATION, YOU MAY WISH TO LET US HAVE INTERIM COMMENTS AT THE OFFICIAL LEVEL ON THE DRAFT LET

HEENEY

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

DL(1) Div./ F.M.Tovell/ss

Secret  
~~Confidential~~  
Restricted  
Unclassified

Ottawa, 25 April 60

To: X Chairman, Chiefs of Staff - 6 copies  
DM/National Defence  
DM/Finance  
DM/Trade and Commerce  
DM/Defence Production  
DM/Transport  
X Secretary to the Cabinet - 1 copy  
Pres., National Research Council  
Chairman, Air Transport Board  
Chairman, Defence Research Board

USSEA  
American Division  
Commonwealth Division  
D.L. (1) Division  
D.L. (2) Division  
Economic I Division  
Economic II Division  
European Division  
Far Eastern Division  
Finance Division  
Information Division  
Legal Division  
Middle Eastern Division  
United Nations Division

Attached for your information is:

copy of telegram No 1056 dated 22 Apr 60 from WASH DC

*AW*  
*AD*  
*to file*  
*See did you see RLB*  
*discuss with*  
*Minil*  
*Accounting has a copy*  
*WLB*

FM WASHDC APR22/60 SECRET

TO EXTERNAL 1056 PRIORITY

REF OURTEL 1057 APR22

STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON

THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF DRAFT LET OF UNDERSTANDING WITH  
REGARD TO THE MOST RECENT CDN DRAFT OF AGREEMENT: TEXT BEGINS:

I REFER TO THE EXCHANGE OF NOTES, CONCLUDED TODAY BETWEEN OUR TWO  
GOVTS, AUTHORIZING THE STORAGE AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON AIRFORCE  
BASE, NEWFOUNDLAND, OF SUCH NUCLEAR AIR-TO-AIR DEFENSIVE WEAPONS AS  
MAY BE MADE AVAILABLE TO USA FORCES UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL  
OF CINCNORAD.

USA GOVT REGARDS THIS AGREEMENT AS A SIGNIFICANT FORWARD STEP IN  
THE STRENGTHENING OF CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE IN THE INTEREST OF  
BOTH CDA AND USA. WE CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL, HOWEVER, TO ASSURE THAT  
OPERATIONS UNDER THE AGREEMENT WILL IN PRACTICE SATISFY THE IMPOR-  
TANT MILITARY REQUIREMENTS INVOLVED, AND WILL ALSO REMAIN WITHIN THE  
LIMITATIONS APPLICABLE TO ACCESS TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND RELATED  
CLASSIFIED INFO. FOR THIS REASON, I CONSIDER IT APPROPRIATE TO SET  
FORTH THE UNDERSTANDING OF USA GOVT WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN ASPECTS  
OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS.

FIRST, IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT  
DO NOT RPT NOT IN THEMSELVES AUTHORIZE ACCESS BY CDN AUTHORITIES  
TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR RELATED CLASSIFIED (ATOMIC) INFO. SUCH ACCESS  
REMAINS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EXISTING OR FUTURE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN  
THE TWO GOVTS PROVIDING FOR THE TRANSFER OF CLASSIFIED (ATOMIC) INFO  
OR FOR THE AVAILABILITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO CDN FORCES UNDER  
APPROPRIATE CONDITIONS. ACCESS TO THE STORAGE SITES BY CDN PERSONNEL  
SHALL BE THE SUBJECT OF ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN THE APPROPRIATE CDN  
AND USA AUTHORITIES.

SECOND, IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT CDN APPROVAL OF THE PLANS AND  
PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE OPERATIONS OF NORAD CONSTITUTES CDN

...2

PAGE TWO 1056

APPROVAL FOR THE USE OF THE WEAPONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THOSE PLANS AND PROCEDURES. WE WOULD THEREFORE EXPECT THAT WHEN A STATE OF AIR DEFENSE READINESS HAS BEEN DECLARED BY CINCNORAD IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVTS CONCLUDED THROUGH AN EXCHANGE OF LETS DATED SEP30/59 AND OCT2/59, THE WEAPONS COULD BE REMOVED FROM THE LEASED AREAS AND USED OPERATIONALLY UNDER THE APPLICABLE RULES FOR INTERCEPTION AND ENGAGEMENT WITHOUT THE NECESSITY FOR OBTAINING A FURTHER AND SPECIFIC CDN AUTHORIZATION FOR OPERATIONAL USE AT THE TIME. THE EFFECT OF THIS UNDERSTANDING IS SIMPLY TO RECOGNIZE THAT THESE ARRANGEMENTS ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE CONDITIONS GOVERNING OVERFLIGHT OF CDA BY USA INTERCEPTORS ARMED WITH NUCLEAR AIR-TO-AIR DEFENSIVE WEAPONS, AS ESTABLISHED IN THE AGREEMENT OF JUN30/59 BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVTS. IT ALSO ASSURES THAT IN A PERIOD OF EMERGENCY THERE WOULD BE NO RPT NO PROCEDURAL DELAYS WHICH COULD NULLIFY THE MUTUAL DEFENSIVE ADVANTAGES OF THE FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF THE WEAPONS.

I WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR CONFIRMATION THAT THE CDN GOVT SHARES THE FOREGOING UNDERSTANDINGS. TEXT ENDS

*AW  
B.D.  
W.P.M.  
file*

*file*

FM WASHDC MAR31/60 SECRET

TO EXTERNAL 868 OPIMMED

INFO CCOS OTT FM OTT

REF YOURTELS DL337 AND DL338 MAR25

STORAGE OF AIR TO AIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON ACCOMPANIED BY AIR VICE MARSHAL HENDRICK AND NUTT I CALLED ON KOHLER (ASST SECRETARY EUROPEAN AFFAIRS) THIS AFTERNOON AND PASSED OVER TO HIM THE REVISED ANNEX TO THE DRAFT NOTE ON THIS SUBJECT AND ALSO A QUOTE PIECE OF PAPER UNQUOTE BASED ON THE COMMENTS SET OUT IN PARA 3 OF YOURTEL DL337. (COPY OF THIS QUOTE PIECE OF PAPER UNQUOTE WILL GO FORWARD TO YOU BY TOMORROWS BAG.) WILLOUGHBY (DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF COMMONWEALTH AND NORTHERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS) AND BURGESS (CDN DESK) WERE ALSO PRESENT.

2. I COMMENCED BY POINTING OUT THAT THE REDRAFT OF THE ANNEX CONTAINED A CONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF CHANGES OVER BOTH THE PREVIOUS CDN DRAFT AND USA REDRAFT. I STRESSED THAT CDN GOVT HAD MADE THE CHANGES IN ITS ORIGINAL PROPOSALS IN AN ATTEMPT TO MEET THE RIGIDITIES WITH WHICH USA WAS CONFRONTED AND THUS TO FACILITATE AGREEMENT.

3. AFTER READING OVER THE ANNEX AND QUOTE PIECE OF PAPER UNQUOTE KOHLER SAID THAT AT FIRST GLANCE HE THOUGHT THAT OUR SUGGESTIONS CAME CLOSER TO MEETING THE DIFFICULTIES POSED BY USA LAW AND BY OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS. HE SAID THAT THE USA AUTHORITIES WOULD STUDY THE REVISED ANNEX AND OUR QUOTE PIECE OF PAPER UNQUOTE BUT THAT IN THE MEANTIME HE HAD ONE OR TWO PRELIMINARY INQUIRIES. AS YOU ANTICIPATED, HE COMMENTED ON THE OMISSION OF THE WORD, QUOTE CUSTODY UNQUOTE. I INDICATED CDN DESIRE TO AVOID THE WORD AND EXPLAINED THAT IT SEEMED TO US THAT THE QUESTION OF CUSTODY WAS NOT RPT NOT RAISED IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE STORAGE SITES WOULD BE LOCATED ON TERRITORY LEASED BY USA. AS LESSEE USA WOULD BE IN FULL POSSESSION OF WEAPONS STORED ON THE BASES.

PAGE TWO 868

4. KOHLER NEXT ASKED WHAT WOULD BE THE ROLE OF CDN REPS WHICH UNDER PARAS 3 OF THE ANNEX WOULD BE STATIONED AT USA BASES. I SAID THAT AS I UNDERSTOOD IT THEIR FUNCTION WOULD BE TO BE IN A POSITION TO QUOTE CERTIFY UNQUOTE AS IT WERE THAT OBLIGATIONS UNDER PARAS 4 5 6 AND 7 OF THE ANNEX HAD BEEN DISCHARGED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CDN REQUIREMENTS. KOHLER SAID HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE NO RPT NO PROBLEM REGARDING REPS AND SAID THAT HE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THAT CDN GOVT MUST BE ABLE TO CERTIFY THAT ITS REQUIREMENTS HAD BEEN MET.

5. WILLOUGHBY ASKED WHETHER IN SUM OF NEW DRAFT ANNEX REQUIRED ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES FOR OBTAINING APPROVAL OF CDN GOVT OVER AND ABOVE THOSE ALREADY IN EXISTENCE. IN PARTICULAR HE REFERRED TO PROCEDURES CONCERNING TRANSPORT OF WEAPONS FOR LOGISTICAL PURPOSES. WE CALLED HIS ATTENTION TO PARA E OF THE QUOTE PIECE OF PAPER UNQUOTE WHICH CONTAINED COMMENTS REGARDING PARAS 5 OF THE DRAFT ANNEX POINTING OUT THAT THE PROCEDURES ENVISAGED WERE THOSE PRESCRIBED UNDER SCHEDULE QUOTE B UNQUOTE TO ORDER IN COUNCIL PC2307 AND ANY WHICH MIGHT BE ADOPTED BY CDN AUTHORITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL BOARD AND OF THE SAFETY STANDARDS REFERRED TO IN PARA 4 OF THE DRAFT ANNEX. REGARDING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY CONTROL BOARD KOHLER EXPRESSED SOME CONCERN WHETHER THIS COULD RESULT IN UNILATERAL ACTION BY CDA WHICH COULD HAVE THE AFFECT OF PREJUDICING THE STORAGE PROGRAMME. I POINTED OUT THAT ANY REGULATIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE APPROVED BY CDN GOVT AND THAT I ASSUMED THAT WHEREVER PROSPECTIVE REGULATIONS MIGHT APPEAR TO AFFECT ANY AGREEMENT ON STORAGE THERE WOULD BE PRIOR NOTICE TO AND CONSULTATION WITH USA.

6. IN CONCLUSION I EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT IN THEIR FUTURE STUDY OF OUR REDRAFT USA AUTHORITIES WOULD BEAR IN MIND THE EFFORT WHICH THE CDN GOVT HAD MADE TO REACH A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE TEXT. I STRESSED THAT QUESTIONS CONCERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE REGARDED BY CDN GOVT

...3

PAGE THREE 868

AS MATTERS OF HIGH POLICY AND INDICATED THAT CERTAIN PRINCIPLES  
WERE INVOLVED TO WHICH CDN GOVT ATTACHED THE HIGHEST IMPORTANCE.  
I THEREFORE HOPED THAT USA GOVT MIGHT SEE ITS WAY CLEAR TO ACCEPTING  
CDN REDRAFT WITH AS FEW COUNTER SUGGESTIONS AS POSSIBLE

HEENEY

CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF CABINET DECISION

Meeting of March 22nd, 1960.

(Cab. Doc. 67-60 - March 2nd)

Storage of air-to-air defensive nuclear weapons  
at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base

(Previous reference Nov. 10, 1959)

The Cabinet approved a revised draft of a proposed note for negotiations with the United States concerning the storage of nuclear air-to-air defense weapons for use by United States forces at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force base, as recommended by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence with Cabinet Document 67-60 of March 2, 1960.

*W. C. Halliday*

*per R. W.*

Registrar of the Cabinet.

Privy Council Office,  
March 24th, 1960.

CABINET DOCUMENT
No. 67.160
Copy No.

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

D-1-5(e)-2

S E C R E T

March 2, 1960

MEMORANDUM TO THE CABINET

Storage of Air-to-Air Defensive Nuclear Weapons at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base

Cabinet, on September 22, 1959, gave its approval in principle, subject to the conclusion of satisfactory inter-governmental Notes, to the storage at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons for United States Air Force squadrons under NORAD control. The text of a negotiating draft of a proposed Note authorizing the storage of the weapons, and an accompanying Annex setting out the terms which would govern the arrangement, was subsequently transmitted (on October 2, 1959) to the United States authorities for their consideration. The State Department replied on January 15, 1960, making no comment on the Note itself but proposing a number of changes in the text of the Annex.

.... Attached as Appendix "A" to this memorandum, for consideration by Cabinet, is a redraft of the terms originally proposed by Canada. If approved, this redraft, which has been prepared in the light of United States comments, would be transmitted by our Embassy in Washington to the State Department and would serve as the basis for the second round of negotiations. .... Also attached, for convenient reference, as Appendix "B" to this memorandum is a copy of our original draft modified to indicate the changes proposed by the United States, together with the reasons advanced in support of these changes.

The comments which follow relate to Appendix "A" and are intended to explain the reasons for any departures from the language contained in the text proposed by Canada last October.

Paragraph 1: This paragraph has been amended to incorporate useful changes suggested by the United States.

Paragraph 2: This paragraph has been amended in two respects:

- (a) At the suggestion of the United States, the statement that the weapons will be stored at Goose Bay and Harmon has been changed to read may;
- (b) The statement of ownership of the weapons by the United States has been incorporated in this paragraph rather than having it form the substance of a separate paragraph as was the case in the original Canadian draft.

..... 2

- 2 -

The United States proposal to amend the statement of ownership to read "ownership and custody" has not been adopted since it is assumed that this would not be acceptable to the Canadian Government. It is recognized that the omission of any statement which makes it clear that the United States will retain possession of the weapons may be difficult for the United States Government to accept. However, a change which has been introduced in paragraph 3 of the text now under consideration (see below) should give our representative in the negotiations grounds for arguing that reference to custody is unnecessary.

Paragraph 3: This paragraph represents a complete departure from the Canadian draft of last October, which asserted the principle that arrangements for the physical security of the storage sites would be the joint responsibility of the two Governments without indicating how Canada could fulfill its share of this responsibility. The proposed new text begins with the statement that arrangements for the storage of the weapons are a joint responsibility of the two Governments, and then describes how this responsibility is to be carried out. The part of the text which defines the Canadian responsibility is based on the premise that the objective, so far as the Canadian Government is concerned, is to ensure that the provisions of the agreement regarding the circumstances under which the weapons may be removed from the base installation, and concerning safety standards, are observed. For these reasons it is specified that Canada will station a representative or representatives at the bases. The presence of Canadians will also serve to demonstrate the importance attached by the Canadian Government to strict adherence to the terms of the agreement.

The statement that the United States, for its part, shall provide and be responsible for the security of the storage sites in accordance with the terms of the existing agreements concerning the leased areas is intended to specify, in this respect, its obligations as lessee. At the same time, it provides grounds for our representatives in the negotiations to put forward the view that under the circumstances the question of custody does not arise.

Paragraph 4: The substances of this paragraph, which deals with safety standards, was included in paragraph 3 of the original Canadian draft. It has been made the subject of a separate paragraph at the suggestion of the United States and redrafted to improve the expression of its intent.

Paragraph 5: In order to improve the drafting of the provisions in the agreement relating to transport of the weapons in Canada and, at the same time, to take account of a point raised by the United States, this paragraph has been amended to read as follows:

"The transport of these weapons in Canadian territory will be carried out in accordance

..... 3

- 3 -

with Canadian law and with procedures agreed between the appropriate agencies of both Governments."

The procedures referred to above would involve two elements:

- (a) authorization by the Canadian Government of the overflight of Canadian territory in accordance with the provisions of Schedule "B" to Order-in-Council No. P.C. 2307 of 17 April, 1952; and
- (b) any safety procedures applied by the Canadian authorities in accordance with the requirements of the Atomic Energy Control Board and of the safety standards referred to in paragraph 4 of the Agreement.

Paragraphs 6 and 7: These paragraphs should be considered in conjunction with paragraph 5. Paragraphs 5 and 6 set out the procedures which would govern transport of the weapons outside the base, either for logistic or for operational reasons, and paragraph 7 provides that removal of the weapons, either for logistic or operational reasons, will require approval of the Canadian Government in accordance with procedures established pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 6.

There are two points to note in connection with these paragraphs. The first is that paragraph 7 extends the area within which the USAF is permitted to handle the weapons from the "storage site" to "the area utilized by the United States forces" (i.e. the base). The State Department informs us that this extension is necessary to meet training requirements, i.e. practice in arming aircraft and taxiing down the runway but not taking off. Such a concession would seem to be reasonable since a Canadian representative would be present to ensure that the terms of the authorization were not exceeded.

The second point arises out of a United States argument that the requirement of Canadian approval for removal of the weapons for operational use could seriously impair the ability of NORAD to act rapidly in an emergency. It is proposed that our Embassy in Washington should be instructed to inform the State Department that the Canadian Government regards this measure of control as being substantially equivalent to that exercised by the President of the United States and considers it essential for political and policy reasons which are no doubt similar to those of the United States Government.

Paragraph 8: This paragraph has been amended to correspond with the policy with respect to review and termination of agreements in this field expressed by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on January 18, 1960.

..... 4

- 4 -

With the concurrence of the Minister of National Defence, I am submitting this draft for consideration by Cabinet in preparation for the next stage of the negotiations with the United States.

Original Signed by  
HOWARD GREEN

Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

CAB, Doc. 67-60  
March 7, 1960

APPENDIX "A"

S E C R E T

REDRAFT OF THE ANNEX TO  
THE PROPOSED EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONCERNING  
THE STORAGE OF NUCLEAR AIR-TO-AIR DEFENSIVE  
WEAPONS AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON AIR FORCE BASE

(In this Annex, unless the context otherwise requires, "Canada" means the Government of Canada, "United States" means the Government of the United States of America, "NORAD" means the North American Air Defence Command established by Canada and the United States in an exchange of Notes dated 12 May, 1958, and "CINC NORAD" means the Commander-in-Chief of NORAD.)

The weapons under consideration are such nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons as may from time to time be made available to United States Forces under the operational control of CINC NORAD.

2. Ownership of these weapons shall remain with the United States in accordance with United States law. They may be stored at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base; Newfoundland. The cost of the establishment, maintenance and operation of the storage facilities shall be the responsibility of the United States Government.

3. Arrangements for the storage of these weapons will be a joint responsibility of Canada and the United States, to be carried out as follows:

(a) The United States shall provide and be responsible for the security of the storage sites in accordance with the terms of the existing agreements concerning the leased areas, i.e. the Agreement of March 27, 1941 concerning Leased Bases in Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base and the exchange of Notes of December 5, 1952 in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Goose Bay;

(b) Pursuant to its obligations under paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this Annex, Canada will provide a representative or representatives at each base.

4. Safeguards in the design of the weapons will be the responsibility of the United States. The procedure for handling the weapons to afford the maximum protection of lives and property will be subject to the agreement of Canada. Safety procedures for maintenance, transport, loading, storage and salvage will be at least equivalent to United States standards.

5. The transport of these weapons in Canadian territory will be carried out in accordance with Canadian law and with procedures agreed between the appropriate agencies of both Governments.

- 2 -

6. Approval of the use of these weapons will be a joint responsibility of the two Governments. The weapons will only be used in situations of grave emergency in accordance with the plans and procedures governing the operations of NORAD.

7. The removal of these weapons, either for logistic or operational reasons, from the areas utilized by United States Forces (as provided in the Agreement of March 27, 1941, concerning Leased Bases in Newfoundland in respect of Harmon Air Force Base, and the exchange of Notes dated December 5, 1952 in respect of the leased area situated within RCAF Station, Goose Bay), will require the approval of the Canadian Government in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 6 of this Annex.

8. Any test firing of these weapons which may be required will take place outside of Canada.

9. The terms of this Agreement will be reviewed by the two Governments at the request of either Government and after such review may be terminated by either Government upon six months' notice.

10. Supplementary arrangements or administrative agreements between authorized agencies of the two Governments may be made from time to time for the purpose of carrying out the intent of this Agreement.

APPENDIX "B"

SECRET

STORAGE OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS  
AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON AIR FORCE BASE

CHANGES PROPOSED BY UNITED STATES TO  
CANADIAN NEGOTIATING DRAFT

(Deletions proposed by U.S.A. are in square brackets  
and additions by underlining.)

I have the honour to refer to discussions between representatives of the Canadian and United States Governments concerning the strengthening of the continental air defences by a gradual increase in the numbers of air defence weapons with nuclear capability. These discussions have taken into account recommendations by CINC NORAD as to the immediate military requirement for the storage at certain points in Canada of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons.

Recognizing the need to strengthen the continental air defences against the threat which exists, and realizing that the full potential of air-to-air defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads, the Canadian Government is prepared to permit the storage of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons in Canada in accordance with the conditions set out in the attached Annex.

I have the honour to propose that if these conditions are acceptable to your Government, this Note and your reply shall constitute an Agreement between our two Governments, to take effect on the date of your reply.

SECRET

A N N E X

1. The weapons under consideration are such [defensive] nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons as may from time to time be made available to [the] United States Forces under the [command] operational control of CINC NORAD.

Reason: The words "United States" are added for the sake of clarity. The term "operational control" appears to reflect NORAD's terms of reference more accurately than the word "command".

2. These weapons [will] may be stored at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base, Newfoundland. The cost of the establishment, maintenance and operation of the storage facilities shall be the responsibility of the United States Government.

Reason: The word "may" provides the flexibility which the United States considers desirable. In this connection the USAF has decided to withdraw the squadron now stationed at Harmon AFB and, in the light of this decision, CINC NORAD is considering whether nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons should be stored at Harmon for emergency purposes.

3. [Arrangements for the physical security for the storage sites will be the joint responsibility of the Governments of the two countries. Safeguards in the design and handling of these air defence weapons to minimize the possibility of accidental explosion and to afford the maximum protection of lives and property will be the responsibility of the United States Government and will be subject to the approval of the Canadian Government.]

3. The joint responsibility of the two Governments for the physical security of the storage sites shall be exercised in accordance with the following:

- (a) The United States shall provide and be responsible for the internal security of the storage sites;
- (b) In other respects, arrangements for the physical security of the leased areas within which the storage sites are located shall be subject to existing agreements concerning those areas. Safety standards for the maintenance, transportation, loading, delivery and salvage of these weapons shall be at least equivalent to those observed within the United States and, within the scope of existing agreements between the two Governments concerning the transfer of classified (atomic) information, shall be a matter for consultation between the appropriate military authorities of Canada and the United States.

Reason: The U.S.A. has noted the importance which the Canadian Government attaches to the matter of joint responsibility for the physical security of the storage sites and wishes to accede to this request within the limits prescribed by United States legislation and existing arrangements for these bases. The U.S.A., however, would like to know what kind of arrangements the Canadian Government wishes to propose in this regard. Under United States legislation, the U.S.A. is required to retain physical custody of nuclear weapons and thus the U.S.A. draft reflects U.S.A. requirement to be responsible for the internal security of the sites.

It is believed that the other aspects of physical security may be handled according to the terms of the existing agreements for the two bases, but U.S.A. would be pleased to consider alternative Canadian proposals to handle this specific problem.

On the matter of safety standards, U.S.A. has proposed language which the Department of Defense has informally submitted to Canadian military authorities for the Canadian draft Note concerning the storage of atomic weapons in support of Canadian Forces. The Canadian language above suggests that safeguards in the design of the atomic weapons will be subject to the approval of the Canadian Government. This procedure apparently would entail the transmission of restricted data, a course of action not authorized under the terms of the U.S.A. Atomic Energy Act.

4. Ownership and custody of the nuclear warheads shall remain with the United States Government in accordance with United States law.

Reason: By the addition of the words "and custody" the paragraph reflects more accurately the requirements of U.S.A. legislation.

5. Transportation to or from storage facilities of these weapons and warheads through Canadian air space will be governed by Canadian Government regulations. Import and export of these weapons will be subject to Canadian Government regulations, and detailed procedures will be negotiated between the appropriate Government Departments. 7

S E C R E T

Reason: In the absence of knowing what the Canadian regulations would be governing the transport of nuclear weapons in Canada, the U.S.A. would prefer the wording of paragraph 5 to reflect that this is a matter to be worked out jointly. The following language could be used.

5. "The transport of these weapons in Canadian territory will be carried out in accordance with the procedures agreed between the appropriate agencies of both Governments."
6. Joint responsibility for the removal from storage sites and for the use of these weapons will be shared by the Canadian and United States Governments. They  
Consonant with the joint responsibility of the two Governments, these weapons will be used only in situations of grave emergency [and] in accordance with the plans and procedures governing the operations of the North American Air Defence Command as approved by the two Governments.

Reason: The first sentence of the Canadian draft poses two problems:

- (1) It suggests that over and above clearance procedures already in effect with regard to nuclear overflights of Canadian territory and procedures which might be worked out with regard to the movement of nuclear weapons in and out of Canada under paragraph 5 of this Annex, special authorization of the Canadian Government would be required to remove nuclear weapons from storage, say, for return to U.S.A. for periodic checking or other logistical reasons.

(2) It suggests that the agreement of Canada would be required at a time when CINC NORAD would wish to use the weapons in accordance with plans and procedures agreed between the two Governments. In U.S.A. view, this mode of operation could seriously impair the ability of CINC NORAD to act rapidly in situations of grave emergency where action must be taken within minutes.

Accordingly, U.S.A. proposed language omits any reference to "removal from storage" and ties in the "joint responsibility" of the two Governments with use of the weapons "only in situations of grave emergency in accordance with plans and procedures governing the operations of the North American Air Defence Command as approved by both Governments."

7. Any test firing of these weapons which may be required will take place outside of Canada.
8. The terms of this Agreement will be reviewed annually by the two Governments at the request of either Government and after such review may be terminated by either Government upon six months' notice.  
Reason: The purpose of U.S.A. revision is to remove the need to review the Agreement automatically at the end of each year, while preserving the requirements that such a review is mandatory at the request of either Government.
9. Supplementary arrangements or administrative agreements between authorized agencies of the two Governments may be made from time to time for the purpose of carrying out the intent of this Agreement.

January 27th, 1960.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRYCE

Re: History of U.S. Request for Deployment of  
Nuclear Weapons to Existing Storage  
Facilities at Goose Bay

December 12, 1957

In an aide memoire to the Canadian Ambassador in Washington, the U.S. stated its desire, among other things, to deploy nuclear weapons at Goose Bay. (Flag A).

January 10, 1958

The Cabinet agreed that exploratory discussions be held between military authorities of Canada and the U.S. about the U.S. proposal for stockpiling nuclear weapons in Canada. (Flag B).

April 28, 1958

The Cabinet Defence Committee deferred a decision, pending further consideration and further discussions with U.S. authorities, on a recommendation from the Minister of National Defence dated February 10, 1958, that the U.S. request for deployment of nuclear weapons to existing storage facilities at Goose Bay be approved. (Flags C and D).

April 9, 1959

In an aide memoire dealing mainly with the interest of the U.S. in storing defensive nuclear weapons at Goose Bay (the U.S. later added Harmon A.F.B.), the U.S. expressed the hope that Canada would respond favourably to the previous aide memoire of December 12, 1957 on SAC storage at Goose Bay. (Flag E).

Mr. Pearkes did not put forward a recommendation on SAC storage at Goose Bay in his memorandum to the C.D.C. of July 24, 1959 because "certain details of the storage" were not yet available for examination. (Flag F).

October 21, 1959

Mr. Pearkes and the Chiefs of Staff recommended to the C.D.C. that approval in principle be given to the U.S. request for deployment of nuclear weapons to existing storage facilities at Goose Bay. If approval in principle was given, the details of an agreement were to be negotiated by an exchange of notes, including provisions for adequate safety and controls as set out in the annex to the C.D.C. document. (Flag G).

October 29, 1959

The comments of External Affairs were submitted to the C.D.C. (Flag H).

November 5, 1959

The C.D.C. considered the National Defence and External Affairs documents and referred the matter to Cabinet for decision.

November 6, 1959

Cabinet discussed the U.S. request along with other matters to be considered at the Canada-U.S. Joint Ministerial Meeting on Defence at Camp David. No decision was taken on the U.S. request, but Canadian Ministers were to ask the U.S. at Camp David to give the reasons and necessity for this action at this time. If the request were sustained, the matter would be considered and a decision reached later.

November 8 & 9, 1959

Camp David meetings.

November 10, 1959

Cabinet had a report of the Camp David meetings. The U.S. had attached importance to the storage of nuclear weapons at Goose Bay in order to maintain the strength of a deterrent. Canadian Ministers had pointed out that Canadians would regard this step as an unwise one which might be misinterpreted abroad. They had listened to the U.S. case and had given no indication of complying with the request, nor had they mentioned terms. Mr. Pearkes believed that the U.S. would accept any conditions that Canada wished to prescribe for storing these weapons at Goose Bay. No decision was reported.

  
D.B.D.

*file*  
*re*  
SECRET

*As per comment re*

STORAGE OF AIR-TO-AIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON

*file with draft into Campbell's*

Paragraph-by-Paragraph Explanatory Comments:

(A) PARAGRAPH 1:

This paragraph has been amended to incorporate the useful changes suggested by the United States authorities.

(B) PARAGRAPH 2:

We agree with the United States suggestion that, as the United States Air Force has decided to withdraw the squadron now stationed at Harmon, "bill" should be changed to read "may". It will also be noted that the statement of ownership of the weapons by the United States has been incorporated in this paragraph rather than have it form the substance of a separate paragraph as was the case in the original Canadian draft.

(C) PARAGRAPH 3:

This paragraph represents a complete departure from the Canadian draft of last October which asserted the principle that arrangements for the physical security of the storage sites would be the joint responsibility of the two Governments without indicating how Canada would fulfill its share of this responsibility. The new text states that the arrangements for the storage of these weapons will be a joint responsibility and then describes how this responsibility is to be carried out. The objective, so far as the Canadian Government is concerned, is related to its responsibility in respect of the provisions of the agreement regarding the circumstances under which the weapons may be removed from the base installation, and concerning safety standards. The statement that the United States for its part

... 2

SECRET

- 2 -

shall provide and be responsible for the security of the storage sites in accordance with the terms of existing arrangements concerning the leased areas is intended to specify its obligations as lessee in this matter.

(D) PARAGRAPH 4:

The substance of this paragraph was included in paragraph 3 of the original Canadian draft. We have, however, agreed to make it the subject of a separate paragraph as suggested by the United States authorities but re-drafted it to improve the expression of its intent, using for the most part, the language suggested by the United States authorities.

(E) PARAGRAPH 5:

The wording of this paragraph has been altered with a view to both improving the drafting of the provisions in the agreement relating to transport of the weapons in Canada and to take account of the point raised by the United States authorities. The words "with Canadian law and" have been added to the language suggested by the United States rather than merely state that the transport of these weapons will be in accordance with agreed procedures. There are two elements involved here:

- (1) authorization by the Canadian Government for the transport of nuclear weapons in Canadian territory in accordance with established practice (the procedure would be the same as prescribed in Schedule "B" to Order-in-Council PC 2307 of April 17, 1952 for SAC overflights); and
- (2) any safety procedures applied by the Canadian authorities in accordance with requirements of the Atomic Energy Control Board and of the safety standards referred to in paragraph 4.

... 3

000240

SECRET

- 3 -

It should be noted that the phrase "the transport of these weapons in Canadian territory" would include not only the movement of these weapons between Goose or Harwood and the United States but also their movement between Goose and Harwood.

(F) PARAGRAPHS 6 AND 7:

These paragraphs should be considered in conjunction with paragraph 5. Paragraphs 5 and 6 set out the procedures which would govern transport of the weapons outside the base, either for logistic or for operational reasons, and paragraph 7 provides that removal of the weapons, either for logistic or operational reasons, will require approval of the Canadian Government in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to paragraphs 5 and 6. In other words, the approval of the Canadian Government for transporting the weapons for logistic reasons (following the same procedure as prescribed for overflights under Schedule "B") would at the same time constitute approval for the removal of the weapons from the storage site. Similarly the authorization of the Canadian Government for the use of the weapons would at the same time constitute authority for their removal from the storage site for this purpose.

Paragraph 7 extends the area in which the United States Air Force is permitted to handle the weapons from the "storage site" to "the area utilized by the United States forces" (i.e., the base). This phrase is suggested to provide language to permit practice alerts and to meet training requirements, i.e., practice in arming aircraft and taxiing down the runway but not taking off. A second point arises out of the United States view that the requirement of Canadian approval for removal of the weapons for operational use could seriously impair the ability of CINC NORAD to act rapidly in situations of grave emergency. The new draft deals with this by specifying that the approval of the Canadian Government will be given in accordance with the procedures established pursuant to paragraph 6. These procedures are spelled out in the MB-1 overflight agreement of June 30, 1959 and in the

... 4

ORIGINAL DAMAGED

ORIGINAL DAMAGED

exchange of letters of September 30/October 1, 1950  
and Mr. Herter concerning states of readiness  
regards the measure of control which it exercises  
agreements as essential.

(G) PARAGRAPH 8:

No change.

(H) PARAGRAPH 9:

The amendments to this paragraph proposed by the United States authorities  
are acceptable.

(I) PARAGRAPH 10:

No change

ORIGINAL DAMAGED

000242

Jan. 15, 1960

(?)

D-1-5(e)-2

STORAGE OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT GOOSE BAY

AND HARMON AIR FORCE BASE

United States Redraft of Canadian Draft Note

(from Telegram 76 from Washington of January 15, 1960;  
Telegram 83 of January 15 from Washington gives  
further information on the reasons for the  
United States redrafting suggestions).

Note: Deletions from the Canadian draft suggested by the United States are in square brackets; suggested additions are underlined. Reasons given by the United States for the changes they suggest are indented in brackets following the paragraph in the Draft Note to which they refer.

---

I have the honour to refer to discussions between representatives of the Canadian and United States Governments concerning the strengthening of the continental air defences by a gradual increase in the numbers of air defence weapons with nuclear capability. These discussions have taken into account recommendations by CINCNORAD as to the immediate military requirement for the storage at certain points in Canada of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons.

Recognizing the need to strengthen the continental air defences against the threat which exists, and realizing that the full potential of air-to-air defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads, the Canadian Government is prepared to permit the storage of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons in Canada in accordance with the conditions set out in the attached Annex.

I have the honour to propose that if these conditions are acceptable to your Government, this Note and your Reply shall constitute an Agreement between our two Governments, to take effect on the date of your reply.

A N N E X

1. The weapons under consideration are such [defensive] nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons as may from time to time be made available to [the] USA forces under the [command] operational control of CINCNORAD.

(The words "USA" are added for the sake of clarity. The term "operational control" appears to reflect NORAD's terms of reference more accurately than the word "command").

2. These weapons [will] may be stored at Goose Bay and Harmon Air Force Base, Newfoundland. The cost of the establishment, maintenance and operation of the storage facilities shall be the responsibility of the United States Government.

(The word "may" provides the flexibility which the USA considers desirable. In this connection the USAF has decided to withdraw the squadron now stationed at Harmon Air Force Base, and in the light of this decision, CINCNORAD is considering whether nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons should be stored at Harmon for emergency purposes).

3. [Arrangements for the physical security for the storage sites will be the joint responsibility of the Governments of the two countries. Safeguards in the design and handling of these air defence weapons to minimize the possibility of accidental explosion and to afford the maximum protection of lives and property will be the responsibility of the United States Government and will be subject to the approval of the Canadian Government].

The joint responsibility of the two Governments for the physical security of the storage sites shall be exercised in accordance with the following:

- (a) USA shall provide and be responsible for the internal security of the storage sites;
- (b) In other respects, arrangements for the physical security of the leased areas within which the storage sites are located

shall be subject to existing agreements concerning those areas.  
Safety standards for the maintenance, transportation, loading,  
delivery and salvage of these weapons shall be at least equivalent  
to those observed within USA and, within the scope of existing  
agreements between the two Governments concerning the transfer of  
classified (atomic) information, shall be a matter for consul-  
tation between the appropriate military authorities of USA and  
Canada.

(USA has noted the importance which the Canadian Government attaches to the matter of joint responsibility for the physical security of the storage sites and wishes to accede to this request within the limits prescribed by USA legislation and existing arrangements for these bases. USA, however, would like to know what kind of arrangements the Canadian Government wishes to propose in this regard. Under USA legislation, USA is required to retain physical custody of nuclear weapons, and thus USA draft reflects USA requirement to be responsible for the internal security of the sites. It is believed that the other aspects of physical security may be handled according to the terms of the existing agreements for the two bases, but USA would be pleased to consider alternative Canadian proposals to handle this specific problem.

On the matter of safety standards, USA has proposed language which the Department of Defense has informally submitted to Canadian military authorities for the Canadian draft note concerning the storage of atomic weapons in support of Canadian forces. The Canadian language above suggests that safeguards in the design of the atomic weapons will be subject to the approval of the Canadian Government. This procedure apparently would entail the transmission of restricted data, a course of action not authorized under the terms of the USA Atomic Energy Act).

4. Ownership and custody of the nuclear warheads shall remain with the United States Government in accordance with United States law.

(By the addition of the words "and custody" the paragraph reflects more accurately the requirements of USA legislation).

5.  Transportation to or from storage facilities of these weapons and warheads through Canadian air space will be governed by Canadian Government regulations. Import and export of these

weapons will be subject to Canadian Government regulations, and detailed procedures will be negotiated between the appropriate Government departments /.

(In the absence of knowing what the Canadian regulations would be governing the transport of nuclear weapons in Canada, USA would prefer the wording of paragraph 5 to reflect that this is a matter to be worked out jointly. The following language could be used: The transport of these weapons in Canadian territory will be carried out in accordance with procedures agreed between the appropriate agencies of both Governments).

6. / Joint responsibility for the removal from storage sites and for the use of these weapons will be shared by the Canadian and United States Governments. They / Consonant with the joint responsibility of the two Governments, these weapons will be used only in situations of grave emergency / and / in accordance with the plans and procedures governing the operations of the North American Air Defence Command as approved by the two Governments.

(The first sentence of the Canadian draft poses two problems:

(1) It suggests that over and above clearance procedures already in effect with regard to nuclear overflights of Canadian territory and procedures which might be worked out with regard to the movement of nuclear weapons in and out of Canada under paragraph 5 of this Annex, special authorization of the Canadian Government would be required to remove nuclear weapons from storage, say, for return to USA for periodic checking or other logistical reasons.

(2) It suggests that the agreement of Canada would be required at a time when CINCNORAD would wish to use the weapons in accordance with plans and procedures agreed between the two Governments. In USA view this mode of operation could seriously impair the ability of CINCNORAD to act rapidly in situations of grave emergency where action must be taken within minutes.

Accordingly USA proposed language omits any reference to "removal from storage" and ties in the "joint responsibility" of the two governments with use of the weapons "only in situations of grave emergency in accordance with plans and procedures governing the operations of the North American Air Defence Command as approved by both Governments").

7. Any test firing of these weapons which may be required will take place outside of Canada.
8. The terms of this agreement will be reviewed  annually  by the two Governments at the request of either Government and after such review may be terminated by either Government upon six month's notice.

(The purpose of USA revision is to remove the need to review the agreement automatically at the end of each year, while preserving the requirements that such a review is mandatory at the request of either Government).

9. Supplementary arrangements or administrative agreements between authorized agencies of the two Governments may be made from time to time for the purpose of carrying out the intent of this Agreement.

*Prepared by W.H.B.*

*file*

SECRET

STORAGE OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON

AIR FORCE BASE

*- for US use.*

NEGOTIATING DRAFT

I have the honour to refer to discussions between representatives of the Canadian and United States Governments concerning the strengthening of the continental air defences by a gradual increase in the numbers of air defence weapons with nuclear capability. These discussions have taken into account recommendations by CINCNORAD as to the immediate military requirement for the storage at certain points in Canada of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons.

Recognizing the need to strengthen the continental air defences against the threat which exists, and realizing that the full potential of air-to-air defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads, the Canadian Government is prepared to permit the storage of nuclear air-to-air defensive weapons in Canada in accordance with the conditions set out in the attached Annex.

I have the honour to propose that if these conditions are acceptable to your Government, this Note and your Reply shall constitute an Agreement between our two Governments, to take effect on the date of your reply.

S E C R E T

A N N E X

1. The weapons under consideration are such defensive nuclear air-to-air weapons as may from time to time be made available to the forces under the command of CINCNORAD.
2. These weapons will be stored at Goose Bay and Harmon Airforce Base, Newfoundland. The cost of the establishment, maintenance and operation of the storage facilities shall be the responsibility of the United States Government.
3. Arrangements for the physical security for the storage sites will be the joint responsibility of the Governments of the two countries. Safeguards in the design and handling of these air defence weapons to minimize the possibility of accidental explosion and to afford the maximum protection of lives and property will be the responsibility of the United States Government and will be subject to the approval of the Canadian Government.
4. Ownership <sup>and custody</sup> of the nuclear warheads shall remain with the United States Government in accordance with United States law.
5. Transportation to or from storage facilities of these weapons and warheads through Canadian airspace will be governed by Canadian Government regulations. Import and export of these weapons will be subject to Canadian Government regulations, and detailed procedures will be negotiated between the appropriate Government Departments.

- 2 -

*Went to the able to be used  
for account of the part  
and plan.*

6. Joint responsibility for the removal from storage sites and for the use of these weapons will be shared by the Canadian and United States Governments. They will be used only in situations of grave emergency and in accordance with plans and procedures governing the operations of the North American Air Defence Command as approved by the two Governments.
7. Any test firing of these weapons which may be required will take place outside of Canada.
8. The terms of this Agreement will be reviewed annually by the two Governments and may be terminated by either Government upon six months' notice.
9. Supplementary arrangements or administrative agreements between authorized agencies of the two Governments may be made from time to time for the purpose of carrying out the intent of this Agreement.

*File*  
D-1-50-2

*COPY No. 14 of 16 COPIES*

FM WASHDC JAN15/60 TOPSEC

TO EXTERNAL 83 OPIMMED

INFO IT CCOS OTT OPIMMED FM OTT

REF OURTEL 76 JAN15

STORAGE OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON

*for us use*

THE FOLLOWING IS AN OUTLINE OF OUR DISCUSSION WITH USA OFFICIALS CONCERNING THEIR SUGGESTED REDRAFT OF OUR NOTE ON THIS SUBJECT.

2. IN CONSIDERING PARA3 OF USA DRAFT, IT BECAME IMMEDIATELY EVIDENT THAT THE DEFINITION OF QUOTE STORAGE SITES UNQUOTE REQUIRES CLARIFICATION.

USA DEPT OF DEFENSE DEFINES STORAGE SITE AS THE QUOTE IGLOO PLUS THE COMPOUND UNQUOTE RATHER THAN THE BASE THEY WONDERED WHAT WE HAD IN MIND IN SUGGESTING JOINT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF THE SITE. IF FOR INSTANCE WE HAD IN MIND THAT CDA MIGHT PROVIDE FOR QUOTE EXTERNAL SECURITY UNQUOTE WOULD THIS MEAN SECURITY MEASURES IMMEDIATELY OUTSIDE THE COMPOUND OR OUTSIDE THE BASE? IF THE FORMER, THEY WERE CONCERNED THAT THIS WOULD SEEM TO INVOLVE REVISION OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS AT LEAST IN RESPECT OF HARMON. IN ANY EVENT YOU WILL SEE THAT IT IS THEIR DESIRE THAT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS--OTHER THAN WITHIN THE SITE FOR WHICH USA WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE--SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO QUOTE EXISTING AGREEMENTS UNQUOTE BUT THAT THEY ARE QUITE PREPARED TO CONSIDER ANY PROPOSALS WE MIGHT WISH TO MAKE.

3. IT WAS THOUGHT THAT THE PROVISION REGARDING QUOTE SAFEGUARDS UNQUOTE OR QUOTE SAFETY STANDARDS UNQUOTE AS PARA3 OF THE REDRAFT DESCRIBES THEM MIGHT BE THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE PARA. THE LANGUAGE PROPOSED IS GENERALLY THE SAME AS THAT PROPOSED FOR THE GENERAL AGREEMENT WHICH YOU HAVE CURRENTLY UNDER CONSIDERATION. NOT RPT NOT KNOWING YOUR VIEWS ON THIS PARA WE RESTRICTED OUR COMMENTS TO THE QUESTION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY OF USA GOVT AND THE QUESTION OF THE APPROVAL OF SAFEGUARDS BY THE CDN GOVT. WE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT PROVISION FOR QUOTE CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE APPROPRIATE MILITARY AUTHORITIES OF USA AND CDA UNQUOTE WOULD HARDLY MEET YOUR REQUIREMENT BEARING IN

...2

PAGE TWO 83

MIND THE RESPONSIBILITY WHICH WOULD ALSO REST ON THE CDN GOVT, VIS-A-VIS THE CDN PEOPLE. WE WONDERED WHETHER USA COULD ACCEPT A PHRASE REPLACING THAT ALREADY QUOTED WHICH WOULD PROVIDE, QUOTE AND SHALL BE SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE CDN GOVT UNQUOTE, ASSUMING THE REMAINDER OF THEIR REDRAFT WERE ACCEPTABLE TO YOU.

4. REGARDING PARA 4 AND THE SPECIFIC REF TO QUOTE CUSTODY UNQUOTE, THE STATE DEPT CONFIRMED THAT WHILE THE WORD QUOTE CUSTODY UNQUOTE DOES NOT RPT NOT APPEAR IN USA ACT, THIS INTERPRETATION FLOWS FROM SECTIONS 91, 92, 104, 123 AND 144 IN THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ACT. THIS EXPRESSION IS USED IN OTHER BILATERAL AGREEMENTS. IT IN TURN IS INTERPRETED TO MEAN, QUOTE PHYSICAL CONTROL UNTIL RELEASED FOR USE UNQUOTE.

5. IF THE CDN VERSION OF PARA 5 RELATES ONLY TO THE XYZ PROCEDURES OF SCHEDULE B OF ORDER-IN-COUNCIL PC2307 IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. USA CONCERN REGARDING THE FIRST SENTENCE WAS THAT IT MIGHT INVOLVE PROCEDURES OTHER THAN THE XYZ PROCEDURES AND THAT REF TO QUOTE EXPORT AND IMPORT UNQUOTE IN THE SECOND SENTENCE MIGHT INVOLVE CUSTOMS INSPECTION. THE WORD, QUOTE INTRODUCTION UNQUOTE WAS SUGGESTED AS ONE WHICH WOULD AVOID THE INFERENCE REGARDING CUSTOMS INSPECTION IF IT WERE NOT RPT NOT VALID.

6. COMMENTING ON MORE GENERAL TERMINOLOGY SUGGESTED BY USA WE THOUGHT SOMETHING ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES WOULD BE MORE IN KEEPING WITH OUR OWN PROPOSAL: QUOTE THE TRANSPORT OF THESE WEAPONS BETWEEN USA AND CDA AND IN OR OVER CDN TERRITORY WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPROPRIATE REGULATIONS OF THE CDN GOVT, AND PROCEDURES AGREED BETWEEN THE RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES OF BOTH GOVTS UNQUOTE.

7. IN YOURTEL DL810 OCT2 YOU INDICATED THAT MOVEMENT OF THE WEAPONS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE CDN ATOMIC ENERGY ACT AND THAT USA OFFICIALS WOULD BE FAMILIAR WITH THESE REGULATIONS AS A RESULT OF THEIR EXPERIENCE WITH OVERFLIGHT PROCEDURES. UNLESS THE ORDER-IN-COUNCIL

...3

PAGE THREE 83

INCORPORATES THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT THERE WAS SOME DOUBT BOTH ON USA OFFICIALS AND OUR OWN PART AS TO WHAT THESE REGULATIONS MIGHT REQUIRE.

8. IT TRANSPIRED DURING THE DISCUSSION THAT USA HAS IN MIND TRANSPORTING THE WEAPONS TO AND FROM CDA ONLY BY AIR. THE DEFENCE REP DID NOT RPT NOT THINK THERE WOULD BE ANY OCCASION FOR TRANSPORTING WEAPONS BETWEEN GOOSE BAY AND HARMON ALTHOUGH HE ADMITTED THIS POINT HAD NOT RPT NOT BEEN CONSIDERED. AGAIN ON THIS POINT, AS WITH SECURITY AND SAFEGUARDS, WE EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO SPECIFY THE BASIC CDN RESPONSIBILITY.

9. IN PARAS USA DIFFICULTY WITH OUR PROPOSAL FOR JOINT CONTROL OVER REMOVAL STEMS FROM THEIR INTERPRETATION THAT THIS WOULD MEAN JOINT CONTROL OVER REMOVAL FROM THE IGLOO AND COMPOUND FOR SUCH PURPOSES AS PLACING THEM ON AIRCRAFT WHICH IS THE NORMAL PROCEDURE DURING PRACTICE ALERTS WHERE AIRCRAFT ARE BOMBED-UP, TAXI DOWN THE RUNWAY BUT DO NOT RPT NOT TAKE OFF. FURTHERMORE IF STORAGE SITES WERE INTERPRETED TO MEAN THE WHOLE BASE USA OFFICIALS CONSIDER OUR LANGUAGE WOULD SUGGEST THE INTERPOSITION OF CONSULTATIVE REQUIREMENTS OVER AND ABOVE THOSE ALREADY REQUIRED UNDER THE XYZ PROCEDURES. AS A RESULT OF OUR DISCUSSION, THE STATE DEPT PASSED TO US THIS MORNING A FURTHER REVISION OF THE PARA WHICH HAS BEEN DRAFTED BY THE DEFENCE DEPT: QUOTE CONSONANT WITH THE JOINT RESPONSIBILITY OF THE TWO GOVTS, THESE WEAPONS WILL BE REMOVED FROM THE AREAS UTILIZED BY USA FORCES IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE PROCEDURES APPROVED BY THE TWO GOVTS AND WILL BE USED ONLY IN SITUATIONS OF GRAVE EMERGENCY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLANS AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE OPERATION OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE COMMAND AS APPROVED BY THE TWO GOVTS UNQUOTE. THE LATTER PROVISIO IS INTENDED TO REFER TO THE XYZ PROCEDURES.

10. DURING OUR DISCUSSION YESTERDAY WE SUGGESTED THE FOLLOWING TEXT WHICH MIGHT BE MORE ACCEPTABLE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW: QUOTE JOINT

...4

PAGE FOUR 83

RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE REMOVAL OF THESE WEAPONS FROM THE LEASED AREAS WITHIN WHICH THEY ARE STORED AND FOR THEIR USE WILL BE SHARED BY THE CDN AND USA GOVTS. THIS JOINT RESPONSIBILITY WILL BE EXERCISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH EXISTING OVERFLIGHT PROCEDURES AS APPROVED BY THE CDN GOVT AND ALSO IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLANS AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE OPERATIONS OF THE NORTHAMERICAN AIR DEFENCE COMMAND AS APPROVED BY THE TWO GOVTS WHICH PROVIDE FOR THE USE OF THESE WEAPONS ONLY IN SITUATIONS OF GRAVE EMERGENCY UNQUOTE.

11. YOU WILL NO RPT NO DOUBT HAVE IN MIND THE IMPORTANCE OF ENSURING THAT THE AGREEMENT ON GOOSE AND HARMON IS CONSISTENT WITH THE GENERAL AGREEMENT. IN THIS CONNECTION YOU WILL ALSO WANT TO BEAR IN MIND A POSSIBLE FURTHER AGREEMENT REGARDING STORAGE AT ARGENTIA AND PARTICULARLY IN CONNECTION WITH ANY PROVISION REGARDING REMOVAL FROM THE STORAGE SITE. OUR RECOLLECTION IS THAT THIS POINT WAS RAISED AT THE CAMP DAVID TALKS IN CONNECTION WITH THE REMOVAL OF WEAPONS FROM THE SITE AND PLACING THEM ON BOARD SHIP.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

DL(1) Div./WHBarton/akp

Secret  
Confidential  
Restricted  
Unclassified

Ottawa, 15 Jan 60

*file*

To:  Chairman, Chiefs of Staff (1 copy)  
DM/National Defence  
DM/Finance  
DM/Trade and Commerce  
DM/Defence Production  
 Secretary to the Cabinet (1 copy)  
Pres. National Research Council

USSEA  
Middle Eastern Division  
European Division  
Commonwealth Division  
Far Eastern Division  
Information Division  
Economic I Division  
Economic II Division  
D.L. (2) Division  
Finance Division

Attached for your information is:

WASHINGTON TELEGRAM 76 JAN15/60 - STORAGE OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR

WEAPONS AT GOOSE BAY AND HARMON

*- for US use*

000255

FM WASHDC JAN15/60 SECRET

TO EXTERNAL 76 OPIMMED

INFO TT CCOS OTT OPIMMED FM OTT

REFOURTEL 2998 DEC2/59 AND YOURTELS DL810 AND DL813 OCT2/59

STORAGE OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT GOOSEBAY AND HARMON

WE MET YESTERDAY WITH WILLOUGHBY AND OTHER STATE DEPT AND DEFENCE DEPT OFFICIALS AND WERE HANDED A REDRAFT OF THE DRAFT NOTE WHICH WE

PRESENTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS IN YOURTEL DL810

OCT2/59. THE TEXT OF THIS REDRAFT IS SET OUT BELOW. THE SUGGESTED

DELETIONS FROM OUR DRAFT ARE BRACKETED AND THE SUGGESTED ADDITIONS

UNDERLINED. YOU WILL NOTICE ALSO THAT REASONS ARE SET OUT FOR THE

SUGGESTED CHANGES. WE ARE FOLLOWING UP THIS TEL WITH A FURTHER MSG

OUTLINING OUR DETAILED DISCUSSION WITH USA OFFICIALS IN WHICH WE

ATTEMPTED TO ELUCIDATE SOME OF THESE REASONS. SOME SUGGESTIONS WERE

ALSO MADE IN AN ATTEMPT TO BRING THE TWO DRAFTS CLOSER TOGETHER, AND

WE SHALL ALSO REPORT ON THESE. TEXT BEGINS:

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REFER TO DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN REPS OF THE CDN AND

USA GOVTS CONCERNING THE STRENGTHENING OF THE CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSES

BY A GRADUAL INCREASE IN THE NUMBERS OF AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS WITH

NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. THESE DISCUSSIONS HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT RECOM-

MENDATIONS BY CINCNORAD AS TO THE IMMEDIATE MILITARY REQUIREMENT FOR

THE STORAGE AT CERTAIN POINTS IN CDA OF NUCLEAR AIR-TO-AIR DEFENSIVE

WEAPONS.

RECOGNIZING THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN THE CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSES

AGAINST THE THREAT WHICH EXISTS, AND REALIZING THAT THE FULL POTENTIAL

OF AIR-TO-AIR DEFENSIVE WEAPONS IS ACHIEVED ONLY WHEN THEY ARE ARMED

WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS, THE CDN GOVT IS PREPARED TO PERMIT THE STORAGE

OF NUCLEAR AIR-TO-AIR DEFENSIVE WEAPONS IN CDA IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE

CONDITIONS SET OUT IN THE ATTACHED ANNEX.

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO PROPOSE THAT IF THESE CONDITIONS ARE ACCEPTABLE

TO YOUR GOVT, THIS NOTE AND YOUR REPLY SHALL CONSTITUTE AN AGREEMENT

BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVTS, TO TAKE EFFECT ON THE DATE OF YOUR REPLY.

ANNEX

1. THE WEAPONS UNDER CONSIDERATION ARE SUCH (SQUARE BRACKETS) DEFENSIVE

...2

000256

2/17

PAGE TWO 76

(SQUARE BRACKETS END)NUCLEAR AIR-TO-AIR(UNDERLINE)DEFENSIVE(END UNDERLINE)WEAPONS AS MAY FROM TIME TO TIME BE MADE AVAILABLE TO (SQUARE BRACKETS)THE(SQUARE BRACKETS END)(UNDERLINE)USA(END UNDERLINE) FORCES UNDER THE(SQUARE BRACKETS)COMMAND(SQUARE BRACKETS END)(UNDERLINE)OPERATIONAL CONTROL(END UNDERLINE)OF CINCNORAD. REASON:THE WORDS QUOTE USA UNQUOTE ARE ADDED FOR THE SAKE OF CLARITY.THE TERM QUOTE OPERATIONAL CONTROL UNQUOTE APPEARS TO REFLECT NORADS TERMS OF REF MORE ACCURATELY THAN THE WORD QUOTE COMMAND UNQUOTE.

2.THESE WEAPONS(SQUARE BRACKETS)WILL(SQUARE BRACKETS END)(UNDERLINE) MAY(END UNDERLINE)BE STORED AT GOOSEBAY AND HARMON AFB,NFLD.THE COST OF THE ESTABLISHMENT,MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF THE STORAGE FACILITIES SHALL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE USA GOVT.

REASON:THE WORD QUOTE MAY UNQUOTE PROVIDES THE FLEXIBILITY WHICH USA CONSIDERS DESIRABLE.IN THIS CONNECTION THE USAF HAS DECIDED TO WITHDRAW THE SQUADRON NOW STATIONED AT HARMON AFB,AND IN THE LIGHT OF THIS DECISION,CINCNORAD IS CONSIDERING WHETHER NUCLEAR AIR-TO-AIR DEFENSIVE WEAPONS SHOULD BE STORED AT HARMON FOR EMERGENCY PURPOSES.

3.(SQUARE BRACKETS)ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PHYSICAL SECURITY FOR THE STORAGE SITES WILL BE THE JOINT RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOVTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES.SAFEGUARDS IN THE DESIGN AND HANDLING OF THESE AIR DEFENCE WEAPONS TO MINIMIZE THE POSSIBILITY OF ACCIDENTAL EXPLOSION AND TO AFFORD THE MAXIMUM PROTECTION OF LIVES AND PROPERTY WILL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF USA GOVT AND WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE CDN GOVT(SQUARE BRACKETS END).

(UNDERLINE)THE JOINT RESPONSIBILITY OF THE TWO GOVTS FOR THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF THE STORAGE SITES SHALL BE EXERCISED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING(END UNDERLINE):

A.(UNDERLINE)USA SHALL PROVIDE AND BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE STORAGE SITES(END UNDERLINE):

B.(UNDERLINE)IN OTHER RESPECTS,ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE PHYSICAL SECURITY

... 3

PAGE THREE 76

OF THE LEASED AREAS WITHIN WHICH THE STORAGE SITES ARE LOCATED SHALL BE SUBJECT TO EXISTING AGREEMENTS CONCERNING THOSE AREAS. SAFETY STANDARDS FOR THE MAINTENANCE, TRANSPORTATION, LOADING, DELIVERY AND SALVAGE OF THESE WEAPONS SHALL BE AT LEAST EQUIVALENT TO THOSE OBSERVED WITHIN USA AND, WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE TWO GOVTS CONCERNING THE TRANSFER OF CLASSIFIED (ATOMIC) INFO, SHALL BE A MATTER FOR CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE APPROPRIATE MILITARY AUTHORITIES OF USA AND CD (END UNDERLINE).  
REASON: USA HAS NOTED THE IMPORTANCE WHICH THE CDN GOVT ATTACHES TO THE MATTER OF JOINT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PHYSICAL SECURITY OF THE STORAGE SITES AND WISHES TO ACCEDE TO THIS REQUEST WITHIN THE LIMITS PRESCRIBED BY USA LEGISLATION AND EXISTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THESE BASES. USA, HOWEVER, WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHAT KIND OF ARRANGEMENTS THE CDN GOVT WISHES TO PROPOSE IN THIS REGARD. UNDER USA LEGISLATION, USA IS REQUIRED TO RETAIN PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND THUS USA DRAFT REFLECTS USA REQUIREMENT TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE SITES. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE OTHER ASPECTS OF PHYSICAL SECURITY MAY BE HANDLED ACCORDING TO THE TERMS OF THE EXISTING AGREEMENTS FOR THE TWO BASES, BUT USA WOULD BE PLEASED TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE CDN PROPOSALS TO HANDLE THIS SPECIFIC PROBLEM.

ON THE MATTER OF SAFETY STANDARDS, USA HAS PROPOSED LANGUAGE WHICH THE DEPT OF DEFENSE HAS INFORMALLY SUBMITTED TO CDN MILITARY AUTHORITIES FOR THE CDN DRAFT NOTE CONCERNING THE STORAGE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN SUPPORT OF CDN FORCES. THE CDN LANGUAGE ABOVE SUGGESTS THAT SAFEGUARDS IN THE DESIGN OF THE ATOMIC WEAPONS WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE CDN GOVT. THIS PROCEDURE APPARENTLY WOULD ENTAIL THE TRANSMISSION OF RESTD DATA, A COURSE OF ACTION NOT RPT NOT AUTHORIZED UNDER THE TERMS OF USA ATOMIC ENERGY ACT.

4. OWNERSHIP (UNDERLINE) AND CUSTODY (END UNDERLINE) OF THE NUCLEAR WARHEADS SHALL REMAIN WITH USA GOVT IN ACCORDANCE WITH USA LAW.

REASON: BY THE ADDITION OF THE WORDS QUOTE AND CUSTODY UNQUOTE THE

... 4

PAGE THREE 76

PAGE FOUR 76

PARA REFLECTS MORE ACCURATELY THE REQUIREMENTS OF USA LEGISLATION.

5. (SQUARE BRACKETS) TRANSPORTATION TO OR FROM STORAGE FACILITIES OF THESE WEAPONS AND WARHEADS THROUGH CDN AIR SPACE WILL BE GOVERNED BY CDN GOVT REGULATIONS. IMPORT AND EXPORT OF THESE WEAPONS WILL BE SUBJECT TO CDN GOVT REGULATIONS, AND DETAILED PROCEDURES WILL BE NEGOTIATED BETWEEN THE APPROPRIATE GOVT DEPTS (SQUARE BRACKETS END).

REASON: IN THE ABSENCE OF KNOWING WHAT THE CDN REGULATIONS WOULD BE GOVERNING THE TRANSPORT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CDA, USA WOULD PREFER THE WORDING OF PARA 5 TO REFLECT THAT THIS IS A MATTER TO BE WORKED OUT JOINTLY. THE FOLLOWING LANGUAGE COULD BE USED. (UNDERLINE)

QUOTE THE TRANSPORT OF THESE WEAPONS IN CDN TERRITORY WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH PROCEDURES AGREED BETWEEN THE APPROPRIATE AGENCIES OF BOTH GOVTS (END UNDERLINE) UNQUOTE.

6. (SQUARE BRACKETS) JOINT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE REMOVAL FROM STORAGE SITES AND FOR THE USE OF THESE WEAPONS WILL BE SHARED BY THE CDN AND USA GOVTS. THEY (SQUARE BRACKETS END) (UNDERLINE) CONSONANT WITH THE JOINT RESPONSIBILITY OF THE TWO GOVTS, THESE WEAPONS (END UNDERLINE) WILL BE USED ONLY IN SITUATIONS OF GRAVE EMERGENCY (SQUARE BRACKETS) AND (SQUARE BRACKETS END) IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PLANS AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE OPERATIONS OF THE NORTHAMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND AS APPROVED BY THE TWO GOVTS.

REASON: THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE CDN DRAFT POSES 2 PROBLEMS:

(1) IT SUGGESTS THAT OVER AND ABOVE CLEARANCE PROCEDURES ALREADY IN EFFECT WITH REGARD TO NUCLEAR OVERFLIGHTS OF CDN TERRITORY AND PROCEDURES WHICH MIGHT BE WORKED OUT WITH REGARD TO THE MOVEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN AND OUT OF CDA UNDER PARA 5 OF THIS ANNEX, SPECIAL AUTHORIZATION OF THE CDN GOVT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO REMOVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FROM STORAGE, SAY, FOR RETURN TO USA FOR PERIODIC CHECKING OR OTHER LOGISTICAL REASONS.

(2) IT SUGGESTS THAT THE AGREEMENT OF CDA WOULD BE REQUIRED AT A TIME

...5

PAGE FIVE 76

WHEN CINCNORAD WOULD WISH TO USE THE WEAPONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLANS AND PROCEDURES AGREED BETWEEN THE TWO GOVTS. IN USA VIEW THIS MODE OF OPERATION COULD SERIOUSLY IMPAIR THE ABILITY OF CINCNORAD TO ACT RAPIDLY IN SITUATIONS OF GRAVE EMERGENCY WHERE ACTION MUST BE TAKEN WITHIN MINUTES.

ACCORDINGLY USA PROPOSED LANGUAGE OMITTS ANY REF TO QUOTE REMOVAL FROM STORAGE UNQUOTE AND TIES IN THE QUOTE JOINT RESPONSIBILITY UNQUOTE OF THE TWO GOVTS WITH USE OF THE WEAPONS QUOTE ONLY IN SITUATIONS OF GRAVE EMERGENCY IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLANS AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE OPERATIONS OF THE NORTHAMERICAN AIR DEFENSE COMMAND AS APPROVED BY BOTH GOVTS UNQUOTE.

7. ANY TEST FIRING OF THESE WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED WILL TAKE PLACE OUTSIDE OF CDA.

8. THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT WILL BE REVIEWED(SQUARE BRACKETS) ANNUALLY(SQUARE BRACKETS END)BY THE TWO GOVTS(UNDERLINE)AT THE REQUEST OF EITHER GOVT(END UNDERLINE)AND(UNDERLINE)AFTER SUCH REVIEW (ENDUNDERLINE)MAY BE TERMINATED BY EITHER GOVT UPON SIX MONTHS NOTICE. REASON:THE PURPOSE OF USA REVISION IS TO REMOVE THE NEED TO REVIEW THE AGREEMENT AUTOMATICALLY AT THE END OF EACH YEAR, WHILE PRESERVING THE REQUIREMENTS THAT SUCH A REVIEW IS MANDATORY AT THE REQUEST OF EITHER GOVT.

9. SUPPLEMENTARY ARRANGEMENTS OR ADMINISTRATIVE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN AUTHORIZED AGENCIES OF THE TWO GOVTS MAY BE MADE FROM TIME TO TIME FOR THE PURPOSE OF CARRYING OUT THE INTENT OF THIS AGREEMENT.

TEXT ENDS

..

## CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Name or Subject	File No.
<u>DEFENCE - Canada-US Arrangements - Storage</u> <u>of Nuclear Weapons in Canada for Use by U.S.</u> <u>Forces - Air Defence Weapons</u> Regarding	<u>D-1-5(e)-2</u>
<u>FOR PREVIOUS CORRESPONDENCE RE -</u>	See- <u>D-28-3(g)</u>

SEE

Name or Subject

File No.