

CLASSIFIED

File No. Dossier 12-3-U.S.A.
 Volume ONE From - De 72-04-01 To - À 74-09-30

CLASSIFIÉ

TITLE — TITRE:

ACIX / ACIR

INTEGRATION OF THE GOVERNMENT EXTERNAL OPERATIONS -
 PLANNING, COORDINATING AND INTEGRATING SERVICES -
 COUNTRY -
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

ACIX / ACIR

Retention period - Période de retention:

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DEPARTMENT
OF
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MINISTÈRE
DES
AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES



CLOSED VOLUME VOLUME COMPLET

DATED FROM À COMPTER DU 72-04-01 TO JUSQU'AU 74-09-30

AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - À METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER

DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS

FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTÉRIEURE VOIR

FILE NO. - DOSSIER N°

12-3-USA

VOLUME

2

PDA/L.J. O'Toole/re ✓ 12-3-USA

SEP 13 1974

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September 12, 1974.

12-3-USA

MEMORANDUM TO GWU


c.c. PDQ AFP ECP GWP APP APR APO APD CRR ECL AFB AFM ICER PDMI

National Revenue Offices in USA

Thank you for your report of August 28 on the National Revenue proposals. I agree with you on the need for a Departmental meeting to begin the assessment process.

2. You mention a number of valid questions on the role of and need for Revenue officers stationed in the USA. Those questions are, in my view, equally valid in terms of other countries and it would be a great help if ECP/ECL could reach agreement with all the Departments concerned on DNR's global role and mandate before proceeding with programme decisions in any one country. Following my meeting with Mr. Burns of ITC and Mr. Senecal of DNR in early July, that was envisioned as the next logical step in the process.

3. Therefore, while it seems best to begin by considering the specific suggestions that have been made to you, I would hope the timing could be arranged to allow ECP/ECL to undertake the consultations I have mentioned and which you have called for in your memorandum of August 28 to AFP. This is all the more necessary as Mr. Campbell's letter to you does not deal with the unresolved question of the Washington position. If you agree that time permits this approach, I understand from ECP that her Bureau will try to deal with the matter expeditiously.


L.J. O'Toole
PDA

12-3-USA

SEP 10 1974

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FM EXTOTT GWU314 SEP6/74

TO ATNTA BOSTN BFALO CHCCO CLVND DALAS DTROT LNGLS MNPLS

NRLNS PRMNY PHILA SFRAN SJUAN SEATL WSHDC

INFO ITCOTT MANDIOTT NATREVOTT CANTRAVELOTT TBOTT

DISTR GWP PDM PDMI PDA ICER

---COUNTRY PGM AND HOP MTG

ICER SECRETARIAT WILL BE MAILING INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETION OF COUNTRY PGM APPROX SEP9. INSTRUCTIONS INDICATE PGMS ARE TO BE COMPLETED BY NOV15.

2. AFTER CONSULTATION HERE, DEADLINE FOR USA COUNTRY PGMS HAS BEEN EXTENDED TO DEC15. THIS WILL ALLOW DISCUSSION OF COORDINATION AND OVERVIEW OF USA ACTIVITIES AT HOP MTG NOV20-21. WE ANTICIPATE BASIC DOCUMENTATION WILL BE IN YOUR HANDS EARLY ENOUGH TO ALLOW COMPLETION IN DRAFT PRIOR TO HOP MTG AND FINAL REPORT SHOULD BE COMPLETED IMMEDIATELY AFTER MTG.

3. WE EMPHASIZE THAT DEC15 DATE MUST BE MET IN ORDER TO PERMIT IMPLEMENTATION OF COUNTRY PROGRAMMING PROCESS AT HEADQUARTERS.

END/117 091343Z 00150

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

SEP 12 1974

TO
À All U.S.A. Posts

SECURITY UNCLASSIFIED
Sécurité

FROM
De Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs, Ottawa

DATE August 27, 1974

REFERENCE
Référence GWU telegram no. 298 of August 21

NUMBER
Numéro GWU-(M)-307

SUBJECT
Sujet Liaison Visits Program to U.S.A. Posts:
1974-75

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	12-3-USA
MISSION	

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

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ITC

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CGOT


TB/Marson

With the agreement of the Director-General, Western Hemisphere Affairs, a program of liaison visits from U.S.A. Division to U.S.A. posts has been developed for the coming year. A copy of the itinerary is attached. All posts except Minneapolis have been included in the itinerary and we expect to work that post into the program during the year.

2. The visits are intended to provide improved liaison with headquarters and are to be concerned primarily with post operations, management coordination and policy implementation. We will, of course, be prepared to participate in contributing to post programs by giving speeches or interviews, etc., where you consider this useful to the post, but the central purpose of the program is to ensure that posts feel they are well served from headquarters in all aspects, to enhance liaison between headquarters and the field, and to discuss with you where changes might be made in post programs and activities.

3. We would be grateful for your comments on the itinerary and for assurance that the dates will pose no problems for discussions with heads of post. We have invited the Trade Commissioner Service, the Department of Manpower and Immigration, and the Travel Bureau, where possible, to join us on the visits to provide an all round opportunity to discuss post programs.

4. We will welcome your suggestions for a detailed schedule for each visit to ensure that the post, as well as ourselves, derive maximum benefit from this program.


Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

PROPOSED ITINERARY FOR DIRECTOR USA DIVISION

1974 - 1975

CANCELLED

September 15 (Sun.) - 18 (Wed)	Ottawa-Buffalo-Washington-Ottawa
September 30	Parliament Opens
October 14	Thanksgiving Day/Columbus Day
<u>October 22 (Tues) - 25 (Fri)</u>	<u>Ottawa-Boston-New York-Ottawa</u>
October 28	Veterans' Day (USA)
November 11	Remembrance Day (Canada)
November 11-22	Heads of Post Meeting
November 28	Thanksgiving (USA)
<u>December 8 (Sun.) - 13 (Fri.)</u>	<u>Ottawa-Detroit-Cleveland-Chicago-Ottawa</u>
December 25 (Wed.)	Christmas
January 1	New Year's Day
<u>January 15 (Wed.) - 26 (Sun.)</u>	<u>Ottawa-Dallas-New Orleans-Atlanta-San Juan-Ottawa</u>
February 17	Washington's Birthday (USA)
March 28	Good Friday
March 30	Easter Sunday

NEW FISCAL YEAR

<u>April 13 (Sun.) - 23 (Wed.)</u>	<u>Ottawa-(Edmonton-Victoria)-Seattle-San Francisco-Los Angeles-Ottawa</u>
May 19	Victoria Day
<u>May 21 (Wed.) - 23 (Fri.)</u>	<u>Ottawa-Philadelphia-Washington-Ottawa</u>
May 26	Memorial Day (USA)

GWU/E.R. Johnston/mb

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

AFFAIRES EXTERIEURES

AUG 26 1974

12-3-USA

MEMORANDUM



TO
A

ECP ECT ECL ECS FAP FAI FAC FAR SAM DFP DFR UNS
CRP CRO CRR AFP AFF AFB AFS AFM FCP FCO FCF UNO
FLP FLA FLO APP APO APR APD PSP PSI PSS UNP

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FROM
De

GWU

DATE

August 23, 1974

REFERENCE
Référence

NUMBER
Numéro

SUBJECT
Sujet

GWU Visits to USA Posts

FILE	DOSSIER
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12-3-USA	
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ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

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WSHDC

With the agreement of the Director General, Western Hemisphere Affairs, a program of visits by USA Division to USA posts has been developed for the coming year. A copy of the itinerary is attached. All posts except Minneapolis have been included in the itinerary and we expect to work that post into the program during the coming year.

2. The visits are intended to provide improved liaison with headquarters and will be primarily concerned with post operations, management, coordination, and policy implementation. Support to post programs, such as giving speeches or making presentations, can be considered for these visits but we would stress that this would be secondary to the purpose of the visit. We are more concerned to ensure that posts feel they are well served from headquarters in all aspects, and to discuss our views on where changes might be made in post programs and activities. We have invited the Trade Commissioner Service, the Department of Manpower and Immigration and the Travel Bureau to accompany us on the visits, to provide an all-round opportunity to discuss post programs.

3. By this memorandum we are canvassing bureaux and divisions for comments or guidance they might wish to make on these visits, either the overall program or individual posts. We plan to issue reminders prior to each visit so that detailed comments might be forwarded at that time.

4. We might point out that the USA heads of post meeting is to be held in Ottawa, November 20, 21 and 22 and this will afford some opportunity for matters to be raised with heads of post. We also regard the heads of post meeting and the visits program as being directly in support of the country programming exercise.

U.S.A. Division

PROPOSED ITINERARY FOR DIRECTOR USA DIVISION

1974 - 1975

<u>September 15 (Sun.) - 18 (Wed.)</u>	<u>Ottawa-Buffalo-Washington-Ottawa</u>
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May 26	Memorial Day (USA)

GWU/E. R. Johnston/bq

JUL 30 1974

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO ICER
À

SECURITY UNCLASSIFIED
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FROM GWP
De

DATE July 29, 1974

REFERENCE Johnston-Brady telecon July 26 and ICER memorandum
Référence of July 19

NUMBER 12-3-USA
Numéro

SUBJECT USA Country Program Review
Sujet

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	12-3-USA
MISSION	

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

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GWU
Washington

On the basis of an earlier discussion with Mr. Rau, we decided to hold the USA Heads of Post Meeting in Ottawa in the mid-to-latter part of November to ensure co-ordination of timing with the CPS. Heads of Post in the USA were advised to block off November 11-22 for the meeting; our present view is that the meeting would take place November 20-21-22.

2. We would hope that Heads of Post would have initiated a first draft of their report by the time of the HOP meeting so that fruitful discussion and co-ordination could be achieved. They would then return to their posts to complete the reports.

3. We would ask, therefore, that USA country programs be given a return deadline of December 15, rather than the proposed November 15, and that in the schedule of reviews the Western Hemisphere Bureau be placed towards the end rather than the beginning.

Bureau of Western Hemisphere
Affairs

*Phone Johnston
Prescience presentation
for HO PQ meeting
by B. Buntson
J.W.*



Interdepartmental Committee on External Relations
Comité interministériel sur les Relations extérieures

UNCLASSIFIED

OTTAWA, July 29, 1974

12-3-USA

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: File

FROM: P.F. Brady
ICER Secretariat

SUBJECT: ICER Country Programming System - U.S.A.

Ted Johnston of GWU telephoned me on July 26 in response to our request for comments on the country program instructions. He indicated that GWU had had previous discussions with Mr. Rau concerning the timing of completed country programs and that it had been agreed that the U.S.A. program could be submitted to Headquarters after the proposed Heads of Posts' meeting (i.e. November 11 to 22, 1974).

I indicated that this "special dispensation" for the U.S.A. program should not present any serious problems and suggested that GWU may wish to consider having the U.S.A. program in our hands between December 15 and January 1st, 1975. With this timing in mind, I suggested to Mr. Johnston that the country program meetings for the U.S.A. should be among the last to be held to permit adequate time for the reproduction, distribution and study by departments of the U.S.A. program. This seems to be acceptable to GWU.

P.F. Brady
Assistant Secretary

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES



File d.
seal

MEMORANDUM

TO *A*
FROM *PDM*
De *GWU*
REFERENCE
Référence
SUBJECT
Sujet

Most interesting.
Could you give me a list of things that you think are interesting?
SR
July 14

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DATE July 5, 1974

NUMBER
Numéro

12-3 USA

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	
<i>12-3-USA</i>	
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Consular Operations in the United States

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

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- FAP
- GWP

Since our first Consulate General was opened in April 1943 in New York there have been a number of assessments of consular operations in the United States, notably in 1947, 1949, 1954 and 1965. In 1971 we began another such exercise by attempting to clarify consular functions, then to identify problems, and find solutions. Having since concluded three country planning cycles it may be useful to take stock of progress so far achieved in some areas and to remind ourselves of problems remaining in others.

Nature of the Problems

A summer student was employed in 1971 to research changing perspectives of the objectives, functions and role of the consulates. From the attached study it is clear that there has from the beginning been considerable preoccupation about the proper function and role of the consulates in the United States. Interestingly enough, the participation of other government departments in consular operations has waxed and waned. In the early post-war years, IT&C remained highly sceptical about the commercial usefulness of maintaining trade officers in the United States. Similarly, there was little demand for immigration services after 1943. Travel promotion, then under the Department of Mines and Resources, tended to be operated from Ottawa with a few street-level locations in the U.S. Until 1960 the primary purpose of maintaining consulates in the USA was essentially concentrated on the dual objective of informing the United States about Canada and of offering consular services to the public.

The emphasis gradually shifted over the years from these functions towards trade promotion; most Consulates General came to have large commercial sections and during successive periods of austerity the information and consular programs were cut back. Moreover the expansion of Canadian representation in the United States between 1960 and 1971 entirely took the form of trade offices designated as Consulates rather than Consulates General. These were Detroit, Buffalo, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Minneapolis, Dallas and San Juan. Until the integration of support staff in April 1971 the Consulates were staffed, financed, and operated by IT&C. Indeed, they

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continue today to be largely outside the ICER system in that the Consul-in-Charge is directly appointed by IT&C without an obligation to consult other departments or ICER. This emphasis was strengthened during the austerity measures of 1969 when the External Affairs component (personnel, files and function) were entirely removed from the Consulates General in Chicago and Seattle as well as being reduced drastically elsewhere e.g. Los Angeles, Boston, etc. Some passport facilities were then built in Detroit and Minneapolis. However, until 1972 the functions and activities of all other trade consulates were exclusively confined to trade matters; information, film, passport and consular services to the public were minimal, there being virtually no provision in the posts' PPB for non-trade activities.

The programs of other governmental Departments and agencies in the U.S.A. also tended to operate separately including the Travel Bureau, NFB, Defence Production, National Revenue, Manpower and Immigration. Apart from the tendency towards fragmented rather than coherent representations of the full range of the Government's interests this situation had implications for such operational questions as:

- a) The status of the Head of Post at Consulates General, his coordinating responsibility and ability to participate usefully in some of the specific departmental programs at his post;
- b) At most Consulates the Head of Mission is constrained by the system to concentrate on his specific departmental program at the expense of the more general role he could assume
- c) Difficulty of applying a national program throughout the U.S.A.
- d) Granting of consular status and commissions to officers who are sometimes untrained or unprepared to carry out consular services.
- e) Uncertain status of some other representatives.
- f) Overlapping territorial jurisdictions established by various agencies and departments.
- g) Uneven distribution of resources including operational staff as well as such working aids as film and book libraries, official vehicles, crown leased residences etc.
- h) Lack of program coordination between Ottawa and the posts as well as between Washington and the posts.
- i) Need for providing the government with regional information, analysis and advice on questions of interdepartmental concern.
- j) Improved protection of Canadian citizens and interest.

These then were the principal organizational deficiencies we found in 1971 although there were also program deficiencies in the information, cultural, consular services, policy guidance and communications fields. We were at the time uncertain of the procedure to adopt for improving this situation. Our initial inclination was to prepare yet another report to senior management but this no longer seemed to conform with the new managerial and organizational arrangements within the Department as well as with the ICER system between Departments. We accordingly decided as a Bureau to utilize the integration of support services and the country programming system as the vehicle for achieving the improvements we considered desirable, taking advantage of what we assumed would be a general thrust towards integrated FS activity abroad.

Functions

Making our posts in the USA more responsive to a wider range of the Government's interests did not prove to be an easy task. There were no program personnel from External Affairs at ten of our posts in the United States. Moreover, the few External Affairs personnel assigned to some of the other posts were largely obliged by scarce resources to concentrate on unavoidable consular and administrative problems. It accordingly seemed to us in late 1971 that we stood little chance of making our posts more responsive to the entire span of Canadian interests merely by adding personnel from External. The numbers involved would be too large and we needed rapid action to respond to the situation created by the New Economic Policy and the "irritants" issues introduced by the U.S. in the fall of 1971. An alternative was to use the large resources already posted in the U.S.A. Moreover, personnel who had been accorded Consular Commissions should, it seemed to us, be prepared to perform a wider range of recognized consular work. We therefore, as an initial approach, mounted a two-pronged effort: to increase the External Affairs component at major centers like Chicago, Los Angeles and Seattle where it was minimal; and to broaden the responsibilities of persons from other departments already en poste to assume work outside their departments' competence.

For example, we considered that the public affairs expertise and contacts of Travel officers could be utilized to a greater extent in promoting a larger spectrum of the information program. We thought that National Revenue officers could take on some administrative duties such as the post budget. Immigration officers have a background and training which could be helpful with passport and consular matters. Trade Commissioners could further their departmental objectives by broadening their range of speaking engagements and other information activities beyond the business community; they could also assist the Embassy and Departments in Ottawa by a wider range of general reporting.

We accordingly proposed in the autumn of 1971 that this outlook be applied as an immediate remedy for the problems in Chicago through the CPM. We also introduced these concepts to a regional Trade Commissioners Conference in early 1972. Later in response to an ICER program we began

discussions with IT&C for revised terms of reference which resulted in an agreed new perception of the role of all consular officers in the United States. A copy of the Objectives for a Trade Consulate (Buffalo) and for a Consulate General (San Francisco) are attached. You will notice that trade consulates were thereby authorized to expand their activities beyond trade promotion. The acceptance of this enlarged statement of objectives has been surprisingly warm at posts in the United States. There has however since been difficulty in its full and continued application because of renewed emphasis in most departments on the primacy of departmental activities. This dilemma is particularly glaring in the case of the trade consulates.

Structural Problems

Even with the broadening of functions at all consular posts in the United States and with resource increases there still remained a number of problems which needed to be settled. These included:

a) Policy Guidance:

There was no recognized system for quickly preparing and disseminating policy guidance to all posts in the U.S.A.

b) Communications:

All posts have commercial telex facilities but there were no provisions for secure communication either by courier or by cypher.

c) Information:

Few posts were in a position to mount information programs. There were no cultural programs and not all posts received news summaries direct.

d) There was no francophone program

e) Rationalization of Territories:

Almost each department operated in a different territory although consular commissions for all officers from all departments only cover consular services territory. In other words some departmental officers are operating in territory which is not covered by their Commission.

f) The status and functions of some governmental agencies remained doubtful. U.S. authorities regarded the NFB, CBC, and CGOT as coming under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

Consular Conference

We accordingly attempted to resolve some of these problems separately but at the same time to create circumstances through the country programming system and through committees on post management, which would permit posts to respond better to new requirements.

Something more was needed, however, in spreading the new word and we accordingly proposed that a Consular Conference be held in October 1972. As a heads of post meeting for the Caribbean was being organized by the Bureau at that time, the meeting of U.S. heads of post was postponed until May of 1973. However, because of changes in our policy towards the ICSC in Vietnam, it was then considered desirable for our chiefs of mission to remain at their post. The Conference accordingly took place October 31 and November 1, 1973. In the interim work proceeded, posts were consulted, and the annexed policy papers were prepared dealing with a wide range of questions but the year's delay proved to be an unfortunate handicap because of the impact of earlier program changes.

Information

If the staffing and organizational arrangements at consular posts made it difficult to implement a nation-wide information program in the U.S., these essentially reflected similar problems in Ottawa. Our initial approach to quickly overcoming some of these difficulties was to propose the formation of an interdepartmental committee which would coordinate information activity and ensure that the separate departmental operations in the USA were instructed to implement special programs. A meeting of the subcommittee of ICER was held in February 1972 to discuss the matter. The preference was, however, for augmenting External's public affairs resources. GWU accordingly prepared a submission to Cabinet in March 1972 seeking augmented personnel and other resources to be assigned initially on a regional basis in the USA. The thought was that a few specialists assigned to our Consulates General would devise and implement information programs with the assistance of the consulates. This was shelved in favour of preparing a world-wide information program which began being put into effect in April 1974. One important structural implication for the U.S.A. will be the addition of an External Affairs manyear to each post including the trade posts considerably changing their character and composition.

Francophone

The recent increase in Franco-American aspirations raised many delicate issues of policy about the degree to which we should respond to a linguistic and cultural minority in a foreign country. A number of proposals were prepared by GWU and several regional meetings were held to produce an improved approach to these questions which have resource implications. However, we have not yet had formal discussions with the State Department on an issue where we would be creating precedents in an area of considerable Canadian vulnerability.

MandI Expansion

In February 1973 MandI decided to deploy some of its officers to the United States from posts where they were underemployed. Before this operation could be implemented there was a change in immigration policy which increased the requirement for stationing immigration officers at consulates throughout the United States. Because of its obvious impact on post operations, resource allocation, office space, building leases, and related questions we attempted to implement this resource transfer through the medium of the country committee. Special meetings were called in the

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spring of 1973 to study MandI requests and seek businesslike and efficient solutions. However, we found that MandI had already made up its mind on the posts to which it wished to place its officers and on the number of program and support staff required in each location. When some of these unilateral departmental decisions were questioned in the Country Committee, MandI withdrew from the meeting and bypassed the Committee by appealing directly to senior management.

Other Departmental Programs

We are passing through another period of changing interest and priorities in departmental activity in the USA.

MandI - operations as mentioned above are now established in eleven consulates;

CGOT - operations have moved from store front to adjacent upstairs premises;

Defence Production - (IDPB) personnel are being transferred from military bases to consulate offices, e.g. Dallas;

Information officers from External are being installed in all posts including trade consulates;

National Revenue - has during the past two cycles proposed the extension of its representation beyond New York, Chicago and San Francisco.

This process has placed considerable strain on all posts in the U.S.A. It has had appreciable managerial implications which have tended to be treated piecemeal because of the uncoordinated interdepartmental approach. However, the greatest impact has probably been on the Consulates. It is clear that the trade posts are no longer carrying out a single function (trade promotion) on behalf of a single department (IT&C); they have become multidepartmental operations. With the integration of the MandI and IDPB personnel into the FS classification it is likely that officers with the same rank but from several departments will find themselves at the same Consulate thereby raising questions about who is in charge. Moreover, the advisability, or at least the priority of trade promotion in the USA is increasingly being questioned. The Third Option policy probably indicates the reallocation of such skilled resources to more marginal areas. Also the inability to meet many USA requests because of full production in many Canadian economic sectors raises doubts about whether IT&C will continue to devote such large numbers to trade promotion in the USA. We may be faced with the reallocation of IT&C resources to other areas. For these reasons alone the "trade" posts or consulates would benefit from being incorporated more completely into the ICER system.

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Coordination

We have consistently experienced considerable problems in achieving the proper degree of coordinated operations in the USA in part because of the more fragmented nature of consular, as opposed to diplomatic missions. Moreover the North American environment, proximity to headquarters and ease of telephone communication has facilitated reliance on direct consultation with Departments in Ottawa. The status of Heads of Post and of CPMs in the USA is unclear. Efforts to achieve a higher degree of consultation and coordination during the HOP Conference in November 1973 ran into considerable difficulty. The compromise formula which was arrived at by a restricted drafting group has scarcely been applied. Moreover, attempts during the Washington Facility Study (Orwell Report) in June 1974 to strengthen the Embassy's coordinating role have not received immediate support or acceptance by IT&C.

Nuts and Bolts

In addition to the basic organizational questions already mentioned, mixed progress has been made with a number of other issues which also have an operational impact. These include:

CGOT

Travel offices are important Canadian operations in the U.S.: They have a large budget and numerous staff engaged in promotional and information activities at all consular sites and at some additional cities. Their programs are separate from ours and IT&C; they are not FS, but they are moving from store front operations upstairs into our consulates. However, travel offices are not defined by the Vienna Convention or recognized by the United States Government as forming part of consular functions and services. Their integration into our offices might have jeopardized the status of our consulates (viz the Cuban Consulate in Montreal). It is also agreed they may occupy offices adjacent to Consular premises provided there is a separate door, although their staff may be integrated with ours.

FARA

The U.S. Department of Justice considers a number of Canadian operations in the U.S. as falling under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. These include the CGOT, NFB, CBC, Information Canada, Provincial representatives and Olympic Coin Sales. Some of FARA's requirements are onerous, including the need for special identification of "Political Propaganda". Discussions have begun with the State Department to improve this situation.

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Communications and Security

Only Washington and New York have cypher equipment in the U.S.A. Our capacity for delivering classified information is accordingly limited. We devised a five-year program of improving security arrangements and a system for delivering material to large centres in the U.S.A. initially by couriers and later by cypher equipment. However, our proposal to include 3 CM positions in the "B" budget, for 1975-76, as a first step has been turned down.

We will need to reopen these questions. It would also be advantageous to resume studies of our proposals for using tie-lines and facsimile reproduction equipment for reducing staff on some operations e.g. consular, National Revenue, Immigration, etc.

Off-hour Services

It was agreed at the HOP Conference in October 1972 that consular posts must be able to provide emergency services during off-hours. Contingency instructions have been issued and a survey to review the situation is underway.

Federal-Provincial Relations

Provincial relations with the Consulates in the U.S.A. are good but a survey to obtain more information about improving facilities to the Provinces is being completed (in consultation with FCO).

Training Programs

Consular and passport training programs are available to personnel from other departments. We are attempting to expand this into a broader briefing program within External for all personnel being posted to the United States. We are however having difficulty in extending the excellent facilities in Ottawa to the training of locally engaged staff from our posts in the United States.

Territories

After many months of discussion we have produced a reconciliation between consular and trade territories and a clear tabulation of immigration and other territories. Hopefully these will be finalized soon and will not be changed in future without prior consultation.

Conclusions

We are in a position now where our consular posts in the United States are in healthier condition than they have been for a long time. Nevertheless, we have not been able to solve the basic dilemma of responding to the full range of the government's interest by either adding sufficient personnel from External and other Departments or by sufficiently expanding the purview of personnel already at the post. Moreover, they are facing a new range of problems and we are uncertain how these can best be met. One important observation to be drawn from the above is the apparent inappropriateness of leaving a major renovation task of this nature to a geographic division. Apart from questions of minimal resources and restricted terms of reference there are also problems of perspective. During the initial period we found by accident that there were several other consular studies underway e.g. John Timmerman's, Andre Bissonnette's and GEO's concern with European consulates which were never properly coordinated.

Nevertheless many of the issues which have preoccupied ICER for some years remain in much more salient relief in the USA than in many other geographic areas. Each one of the posts is being radically transformed by changes in the programs of the three foreign service departments. However, few of these changes are being achieved through the ICER process or by established mechanisms. Other operations such as National Revenue, CGOT and NFB are evolving. The seven trade posts accordingly are in the most anomalous position; they do not even have CPMs. Only three of the 15 posts (Washington, New York and Boston) are headed by External Affairs personnel with previous experience in the coordination of interdepartmental programs abroad.

It also seems clear that the Country Programming system is better suited to minor adjustments in program resources requirements than to major changes. (GWU's First Law of ICER Dynamics). It took 18 months to put one Consular officer into Chicago; the post still does not have the film and other resources it needs. After three program cycles there are still deficiencies in other Consular services and administration functions throughout the U.S.A. We have only been able to add a total of three-man-years in this sorely pressed sector. In contrast 12 man-years were added in 1972 and 10 in 1973 for MandI operations, and 16 program plus 9 support man-years were provided in 1974 for information activities. It is almost axiomatic that new programs will absorb all available resources at the expense of old programs. (GWU's Second Law of ICER Dynamics).

Perhaps even more critical is the function and status of the Country Committee. In effect it has become very difficult to scrutinize the proposals of other government departments against many criteria of managerial effectiveness. It is similarly difficult to apply systems and methods criteria to the operations of other departments abroad. We have testimonials to demonstrate their resistance in both areas. For most purposes the country programming system has meant that only External Affairs programs are subjected to meaningful scrutiny. (GWU's Third Law of ICER Dynamics).

Recommendations

A number of obvious solutions would leap to the mind of an outside Board of Directors. However, the following proposals fall within the present rules of the game.

1. Subject all operations abroad to the same ICER system, i.e. the Consulates in the USA should be brought more completely within the ICER system and given many of the same advantages as Consulates General.

2. Major program changes which have resource or policy implications for a post or region should be raised initially in ICER with Country Committee participation. It might then be easier to avoid having several Bureaux coping separately with the same general problem.

3. Since the need for changes also carries with it an opportunity for making improvements, we suggest that the next steps towards fuller integration could be made in the U.S.A. The word "integration" as it applies to the foreign service would benefit from definition but we have in mind

- a) requiring a head of post to make recommendations on all resource requirements needed to meet whatever range of objectives are assigned to his post
- b) authorizing him to reassign resources to meet changing requirements at the post between planning cycles
- c) the departmental source of the resources would then be a less vital factor; ICER would provide the bridge

Our thought is that the consulates in the United States, by the very nature of their work and by the easy environment in which they exist, offer one of the best opportunities for creating integrated missions. Eight of the posts are Consulates General ostensibly under the direction of External Affairs. Seven of the posts are so-called trade offices ostensibly directed by IT&C, but which are rapidly being transformed with new functions. Moreover our Embassy in Washington is unique in having representation and reporting as almost its sole function. At the Embassy there are no separate departmental programs such as immigration, trade promotion etc.

There is accordingly considerable balance between various departmental interests in the USA: Full integration would merely confirm the existing situation in a more formal way at each post.

RESTRICTED

If authority of the above nature were accorded on a trial basis for say, two years, it might be possible to work out coordination and other systems in Ottawa under circumstances that are attractive and acceptable to all participants.



K.W. MacLellan
Director
U.S.A. Division

FAI/D.R. LAMBIE/GG/12-3-14
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

12-3-14
MAR 28 1974

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



MEMORANDUM

TO : GWU

SECURITY
Sécurité

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM : OM

FAI

DATE

March 27, 1974

SUBJECT
Référence

Your Memorandum of March 14 ← See 12-3-NFB

NUMBER
Numéro

TOPIC
Sujet

U.S. FILM PROGRAMME

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	12-3-USA
MISSION	

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

- WP
- AP
- AC
- FPC
- PRL
- PD
- CER

We agree that a useful purpose would be served by your proposed meeting to discuss the subject of NFB operations in the United States related to the recent ICER decisions, and the matter of consular and film territories in the United States.

ORIGINAL SIGNED
A. B. ROGER

Information Division

Mr Schellenberger

Noted real
29/3

Mr. Raw

GWU/E. R. Johnston/bq

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

12-3-NFB
✓12-3-USA

File
NFB
Cond
11/2/74
JDH
RSC

TO K. W. MacLellan

FROM E. R. Johnston

REFERENCE
Référence

SUBJECT NFB Operations in the United States
Objet

SECURITY UNCLASSIFIED
Sécurité

DATE March 1, 1974

NUMBER
Numéro

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA 12-3-USA	
MISSION	

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

GWP
FAI
JPMI
FLA
AFPC

I spoke with Tom Binden of the National Film Board (Distribution) on February 28 about the USA operations generally and in particular about San Francisco and Chicago.

2. Both San Francisco and Chicago NFB offices are in support of the Canadian Government Office of Tourism; in effect they are contract services to CGOT rather than commercial agents of the Board. They are responsible for the distribution and promotion of Canadian travel films supplied by CGOT from their own (federal) resources, from the provinces, and from private/commercial stocks. This travel film library operation is carried on only in the United States and is supported by a separate NFB headquarters staff in Montreal. They are devoted entirely to the travel promotion program. If the NFB did not provide the service, the CGOT would probably establish its own "film branch".

3. The Chicago office is funded 100 per cent by the CGOT and is 100 per cent devoted to travel film promotion and distribution. It has no operational relationship with the Consulate General, but there is clearly a "kinship" relationship as evidenced by Miss Leah's research (her memo of February 26) and they do, I believe, sit in on post management committee meetings. (Mr. Binden and I agreed it is a relationship more cursory than real). The NFB office in Chicago has recently moved to new quarters which are separate both from the Consulate General and the CGOT office. The present officer in charge is about to be replaced by the NFB representative now in Buenos Aires.

4. The San Francisco office is funded 70 per cent by the CGOT; the other 30 per cent of its funding is derived from general NFB program activity. They undertake a research or investigatory role for commercial or theatrical opportunities, but the actual commercial work (contracts, etc.) is handled by and from the New York office. As we know from the Director-General's own experience in San Francisco, the NFB representative is considered very helpful to that post and, to a degree, to the other two west coast posts; this is acknowledged by the NFB as part of its program activity.


5. The Country Program for New York includes a section on the National Film Board operation and notes that the Canadian Travel Film Library is to expand in the coming year to cover the northeast quarter of the United States. The NFB offices and the CTFL are on the 16th

(C TFL)

floor and could clearly be considered to be within consular premises even with their separate entrance. NFB, through DFW, pays 22.5 per cent of the rent.

6. The property maintenance aspect of the NFB/CGOT offices in San Francisco and Chicago is managed by the Department of Public Works.

7. My reading of the ICER documentation relating to a separation of the NFB operations from integrated services suggests to me that San Francisco and Chicago were not considered as part of the NFB operations abroad, which then leads one to believe they must be regarded by ICER, the NFB and the CGOT as part of the CGOT operation. As such, and so long as CGOT is within the ICER framework, they could be a management/administrative responsibility for External Affairs, although they have not been regarded as such up to the present time. In the ICER documentation there is no mention of Chicago and San Francisco operations; only Tokyo, London, New Delhi and New York.


E. R. Johnston

Feb 18, 1974

U.S.A COUNTRY PROGRAMME REVIEW

12-3-USA

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DEPARTMENT</u>	<u>TELEPHONE</u>
J. Dove	ICER Secretariat	6-7884
M. A. Schellenberger	ICER Secretariat	6-6100
D. Bresnahan	Treasury Board	6-6389
Keith Plowman	Treasury Board	6-1999
D. Branion	IT&C (W.H. Bureau)	2-4638
C. J. Kelly	IT&C (W.H. Bureau)	6-5471
D. H. Cheney	IT&C (TCS)	2-5561
A. D. Rackow	IT&C (D.P.B.)	5-7386 5-7486
H. J. Schramm	IT&C (CGOT)	5-6685
B. F. Campbell	IT&C (CGOT)	6-8454
T. L. Hill	IT&C (CGOT)	2-7355
W. B. Schumacher	IT&C	2-5456
R. P. Puddester	M&I (W.H.D.)	2-5539
N. E. Derrick	M&I (W.H.D.)	2-5539
K. B. Campbell	National Revenue (C&E)	2-2351
C. Frank Reid	National Revenue (C&E)	6-9485
K. H. McCammon	National Revenue	2-2869
Tom Bindon	National Film Board	
Robert Letendre	External Affairs (GWU)	6-4274
I. W. Robertson	External Affairs (GWU)	2-7560
E. R. Johnston	External Affairs (GWU)	2-9682
M. C. Kelly	External Affairs (APR)	6-2456
R. D. Jackson	External Affairs (PDMI)	6-8885
L. M. Kelly	External Affairs (FAI)	2-9580
R. H. N. Roberts	External Affairs (FAI)	
Ron Stapledon	External Affairs (FPO)	5-7633

- 2 -

<u>NAME</u>	<u>DEPARTMENT</u>	<u>TELEPHONE</u>
Claude Chatillon	External Affairs(CRR)	
C. S. Gadd	External Affairs (AFPC)	2-8981
Roman Staranczak	External Affairs (ECS)	6-8574
J. D. Gardner	External Affairs (DFR)	2-9263
R. H. G. Mitchell	External Affairs (FCO)	2-8717
C. J. Bowie-Reed	Ministry of Transport	6-6484
S. G. Harris	Energy, Mines, & Resources	4-9748
Major G. R. Harper	DND/Di Pol 3	2-2497
Capt. P. H. Cayley	DND/Di Pol	2-2395
G. Kamoff	DND/DGIS	2-5983
M. A. Hendrick	Washington	

FEB 18 1974

AGREED PROPOSED CHANGES TO U.S.A. PROGRAMMES 1975-76

ATLANTA

ITC - CGOT Reduce by one - transferred to Dallas
Manpower & Immigration FS
National Revenue PM

BUFFALO

External Affairs FS (Consular/General Relations/Admin.)
*

CLEVELAND

External Affairs FS (Consular/General Relations)

DALLAS

External Affairs FS (General Relations/Admin./Consular)

ITC-CGOT

CO1



(One position to be transferred from Atlanta)

IS2

National Revenue PM

DETROIT

ITC - TCS CO

LOS ANGELES

External Affairs LEIO

FS (Admin/General Relations)

Manpower & Immigration FS

National Revenue PM (To create position on establishment.
Position has been "on loan" from
San Francisco)

MINNEAPOLIS

External Affairs LEIO

NEW YORK

External Affairs FS (Administration/General Relations)

FS (Information)

Manpower & Immigration FS

FS

000027

FEB 1977

NEW YORK (Continued)

National Revenue

PA (By Conversion)

SAN FRANCISCO

External Affairs

FS (Consular)

Manpower & Immigration

FS

National Revenue

PA (By Conversion)

(Confirm and fill two establishment positions)

SEATTLE

External Affairs

FS (Consular/General Relations)

Manpower & Immigration

FS

WASHINGTON

FS (Consul General)

FS (Provincial Interests)

FS (Information)

PA (General/Political)

FS (Energy)

FS (Revenue)

FS (Transport)

CHICAGO

IT&C - IDPB

FS (Rock Island, Illinois)

FEB 18 1974

AGREED PROPOSED CHANGES TO U.S.A. PROGRAMMES
1975-76

DEPARTMENT	POST	POSITION	DEPARTMENTAL PRIORITY		CPR PRIORITY
<u>External Affairs</u>					
	Washington	FS (Energy)	1		
	Washington	FS (Provincial)	2		
	Los Angeles	FS (Gen./Admin.)	3		
	New York	FS(Gen/Admin.)	4		
	Seattle	FS (Gen./Consular)	5		
	Washington	PA (Gen.)	6		
	New York	LEIO/FS	7		
	Dallas	FS(Gen/Admin/Consular)	8		
	Washington	FS (Gen.) Consul General	9		
	Washington	FS (Transport)	10		
	San Francisco	FS (Consular)	11		
	Washington	FS (Info.)	12		
	Buffalo	FS (Gen/Admin/Consular)	13		
	Cleveland	FS (Gen/Admin/Consular)	14		
	Minneapolis	LEIO	15		
<u>Industry, Trade, & Commerce</u>					
TCS	Detroit	CO	1	3	
CGOT	Atlanta	-TPO (Transferred to Dallas)	0		
CGOT	Dallas	TPO			
CGOT	Dallas	TPA	1	2	
IDPB	Chicago (Rock Island)	CO-CB	1	1	

FEB 18 1974

DEPARTMENT	POST	POSITION	DEPARTMENTAL PRIORITY	CPR PRIORITY
<u>Manpower & Immigration</u>				
	New York	FS	1	
	Seattle	FS	2	
	Atlanta	FS	3	
	Los Angeles	FS	4	
	San Francisco	FS	5	
	New York	FS	6	
<u>National Revenue</u>				
	Washington	PM	1	
	Los Angeles	PM	2	
	Atlanta	PM	3	
	Dallas	PM	4	
	New York	PA (By conversion)	5	
	San Francisco	PA (By conversion)	6	

BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA COUNTRY PROGRAM REVIEW

12-3-USA

February 14-15, 1974

--- The program review for posts in the United States was held February 14 and 15 in the Department of External Affairs. Attached is a summary of program changes approved by the meeting, along with a participants list.

2. The Director-General, J. S. Nutt, opened the review with an overview statement on Canada-U.S. relations and the operational response to policy changes. He noted that the Embassy in Washington is "unique in the entire foreign service, as the only mission abroad that exclusively performs general relations functions". As far as programs at the Embassy are concerned, he foresaw a period of adjustment in Canada-U.S. relations calling for interdepartmental coordination and all our negotiating skills, both to resolve policy issues in accordance with government policy toward the U.S., and to do so in a way that satisfies Canadian aspirations. The sense of involvement on the part of the Provinces must be strengthened, he said, and we must improve our ability to convince U.S. public opinion of our position. There must also be better coordination between the Embassy and the Consulates and, he noted, the new thrust will have the most impact on the Consulates. The highest degree of interdepartmental cooperation and coordination will be needed to achieve a system that recognizes overall priorities as well as individual Departmental ones.

3. The Director of the United States Division, External Affairs, K. W. MacLellan, as Chairman of the Review Meeting, commended the quality of program reports from posts but noted there is still a tendency to report in compartmentalized units and there is little, if any, attempt to provide a coordinated review of all post activities. He took special note of the growth both in posts and programs in the USA during the past decade and how this has affected the basic administration of missions. Program needs have been serviced to the detriment of post management and this cannot be allowed to continue. Heads of Post are burdened with day-to-day administrative matters and as a result are unable to perform their other appointed duties. Integration of the foreign service support activities under External Affairs' management and the growth in programs and activities has contributed to the problems of general administration. He warned that programs may have to be reduced if adequate resources and full co-operation of program departments is not forthcoming.

4. Mr. MacLellan, repeating the Director-General's words on strengthening general relations activities at the Consulates, indicated that External Affairs intended to make posts more responsive to the entire range of the Government's interests in the USA and to improve reporting in several politico-economic areas. He expressed the hope that the "New Look" information program, and the new cultural program to be initiated by External Affairs, would have

- 2 -

the cooperation of all departments and post managers. Increased demands on consular activities were foreseen by the Chairman; he noted that service to Canadians abroad is highly visible and very important - "ultimately more important than anything else we might do at each post". He reported that a feasibility study for a new chancery in Washington was to be undertaken this year with a view to construction getting underway by late 1975 or early 1976. Five other missions in the United States have completed or are about to embark on moves to new premises or to expand present quarters.

5. Other developments foreseen by Mr. MacLellan were the relationship between posts and customs and immigration pre-clearance staffs under the air agreement, and the possibility of new posts or honorary consuls being appointed in Florida, Colorado and Alaska.

6. The Chairman drew attention to the remarkable situation where almost every program at every post in the USA is in the process of change. This not only impinged on administration but had an impact on staff resources, office space and other factors. Leases were being renegotiated in several areas. Modification of accommodation is in process and the resultant costs were not reflected in the PPB.

7. In general observations on other programs, he noted the proposed integration of IDPB officers with TCS and raised the possibility of bringing both IDPB and DSS officers directly under the Economic Minister in Washington. He expressed pleasure over the "no expansion" staffing policy of Industry, Trade & Commerce at United States missions, but raised the question of whether trade should continue to be so actively expanded with the United States when the "Third Option" is seeking diversion from reliance on that country. He expressed similar concern over the continued growth of the tourism trade. He made special note of the change of policy by the Office of Tourism to move its offices away from retail to wholesale orientation and the effects this has for post administration. The question of registering tourism offices under the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) is still unresolved.

8. The Director urged Manpower & Immigration to seek ways of reducing the demand for manpower resources in the United States. The program growth has posed considerable problems for support staffing (at the expense of other programs), and he asked whether a competent systems study could be undertaken, by the departments involved or the Treasury Board, to determine ways of improving procedures and reducing the administrative workload.

9. National Revenue's proposed program expansion also posed problems for the support system and the Chairman asked that other alternatives to posting officers into the USA be examined.

10. The Department of National Defence, noted the Chairman, is part of the Washington program only, but in fact their liaison and

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- 3 -

exchange officers are found all across the country and can often be helpful to post general information activities. He expressed the hope that cooperation between posts and DND representatives would continue to grow.

11. The following points were made in the general discussion: IT&C noted that integration of the IDPB officers with Trade Commissioner Service is still under very active negotiation. It was not yet known whether the IDPB officers would continue to operate on U.S. military bases or move into the Canadian missions in the United States. The Chairman pointed out the implications of moving more program officers into the missions. The Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce noted that in order to encourage small Canadian firms to become interested in the export market, they first had to make efforts close to home and for this reason IT&C found it difficult to support fully the Third Option.

12. The Chairman commented that the Country Program system does not seem to work as well in the United States as it may in other countries because of the enormous amount of flux and increase in both programs and posts. We were now going through the third cycle of planning since support staff integration, but we had not yet been able to meet the very real requirements of some posts. The system did not seem to respond well to cases involving new posts or old posts where considerable change is involved. His Division would be going to senior management to suggest a case study be made to seek a more appropriate base for the allocation of resources where they are required and where the priorities say they are required.

13. Industry, Trade & Commerce and Manpower & Immigration both agreed that support staffing is a major problem for all departments. Immigration said it had no alternative but to service the immigrant demand pending implementation of policy recommendations from the Canadian Immigration and Population Study (CIPS). The United States is a market which Immigration wants to service because applicants are of high quality in all respects. Immigration representatives, at the urging of the chair, agreed to raise within their department the possibility of re-examining processing systems with a view to relieving pressure at the posts. To the Immigration representatives' contention that such a study should apply to all programs, the Chairman said CPM's could do this, but pointed out that Immigration man year "modules" posed the most serious problem.

14. ICER, in response to an enquiry from National Revenue, said that a proposal on the status and relationship of preclearance personnel in the United States is under consideration.

15. In the post-by-post examination of Consulates, there were two items of major discussion:

- (1) National Revenue posting plans and program
- (2) Support Staffing

(1) National Revenue

The Trade Commissioner Service doubted the need for expansion of National Revenue activity in the United States on the grounds that it contributed to the welfare of USA exporters, there is no reciprocal service in Canada by U.S. Customs, and much of the investigative work is done by officers or teams from Canada. After considerable discussion, the Chairman noted that the review meeting is not entitled to question whether a department should be represented abroad, but it can examine its mode of representation. It was agreed by the review meeting that the proposed new Customs positions should stand for 1975-76 but that the possibility of using other systems and methods as an alternative to officers in the field would continue to be investigated.

(2) Support Staffing

Specific requests for support staff were not discussed in the review meeting, but the need for departments to re-examine their requirements for support staff and the need to investigate and consider alternatives - such as centralized regional support, toll-free telephone lines, increased mechanization - was a recurring theme. As indicated in his opening remarks, the Chairman repeated that this matter would be pursued with External Affairs management and the Treasury Board.

Embassy Washington (February 15)

16. Discussion of the country program review submitted by the Embassy, Washington was held February 15.

17. The Chairman congratulated the Embassy on its program review, but said that he felt it did not accurately reflect the role and organization of that mission. He said there is an impression of distortion of program to fit the artificial framework of the review process.

- 5 -

18. The Department of National Defence representative drew to the attention of the meeting that the "cosmetic" problem of marginally operationally staff being described as "program" staff was a continuing difficulty in Washington and London. He also noted that the Washington program had wrongly included officers not in Washington, although they come under the CDLS commander.

19. The Chairman, in light of his and GWP's remarks earlier on the unique character of this mission, questioned the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce on the emphasis of "trade" and "trade promotion" activity at the Embassy when these activities are normally carried out from Philadelphia. There is also, for instance, considerable emphasis and priority given to "trade access" but most of this activity is performed by a LES. The Chairman, in response to the Office of Tourism's proposal to increase the International Meetings and Convention staff by a program officer in 1974-75 (drawing from their Ottawa establishment), asked why this office was located in Washington and not, say, at New York. The Office of Tourism explained that other U.S. centres had been considered and rejected. Washington was the headquarters for most association representatives and especially for a clearing house organization, the American Society for Association Executives. These are the prime targets for IT&C/CGOT. Other cities did not have this broad range of representatives on hand. Another reason is to stay abreast of U.S. legislation affecting the travel market so that CGOT may sensibly deploy its resources and plan reasonable programs in advance.

DSS Program Staff

20. ICER reported that all DSS staff are classed "program" as a result of an interdepartmental agreement of 1971. The Chairman said he would ask that this be re-examined.

Provincial Interests

21. The Chairman gave a Bureau commitment that if the need arises, the provincial interests position would be adequately staffed in 1974-75, but pending clarification of such need the position is recommended for 1975-76.

Transport

22. The Department of Transport representative expressed disappointment over the Embassy's reduction of time allocated for transportation activities and asked that this be re-opened for discussion with a view to an officer position being assigned for 1975-76. This was agreed, with the possibility of the man year being shared with Communications.

23. In the course of this discussion the Chairman posed the possibility of all positions at the Embassy being assigned to

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- 6 -

External Affairs. He said that it would provide the mission with greater flexibility to respond to demands as they arise. He noted that there is a feeling that not all IT&C officers have been fully utilized, but the Ambassador does not have the authority to re-deploy resources to best advantage.

Science

24. The Ministry of State for Science and Technology representative raised the matter of the Deputy to the Science Counsellor having been absorbed full time on environmental matters and not able to provide the assistance originally planned for general scientific liaison. The Chairman agreed that the science counsellor is overstretched, but questioned if under more flexible circumstances assistance might not be arranged from the Defence Research Board unit in Washington. DND undertook to bring the Chairman's suggestion to the attention of DRB, and proposed in the meantime that the Embassy discuss the problem with DRB in Washington. The Chairman thanked DND for their intervention (and noted that the Washington division only reflects the division in Ottawa's scientific community).

Energy

25. The Energy, Mines and Resources spokesman said that his department would be prepared to transfer the Washington position to External Affairs, and to transfer a second position now on their Ottawa establishment to External Affairs for use at the Embassy. The Chairman thanked the representative for this offer and it was agreed that the two departments would meet to discuss this in detail.

Defense

26. The Chairman raised the matter of DND officers in the United States needing information and being available to help the general information program. DND suggested the coordination would be best done through direct Embassy-CDLS discussion.

National Revenue

27. National Revenue, in support of its argument for an officer in Washington, pointed out that the United States is adopting Brussels nomenclature and a new evaluation system. In both cases Canada would benefit from having an officer present to liaise with the changes. The officer could also maintain a watching brief on anti-dumping activity, on the DISC surveillance program, customs formalities and procedures, and make enquiries into allegations of harassment of Canadian exporters. The Department had envisaged a man of senior rank being assigned to the Embassy, but could agree to the Embassy counterproposal to assign a more junior officer assigned to the general economic relations section. Industry, Trade and Commerce

. . . 7

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supported the officer position for Washington, but suggested the position called for a senior officer in order to carry our representational duties at senior levels in the U.S. Government. IT&C objected to the Chairman's suggestion the officer be seconded to External Affairs, arguing that under the International Units paper the officer would more properly be an integral part of the commercial policy section and thus seconded to Industry, Trade and Commerce. National Revenue was agreeable to secondment and the question of to whom was left in abeyance.

28. There being no further business, the Chairman adjourned the meeting, thanking all participants for their cooperation and their forthright contributions to the examination of the USA programs.

February 28, 1974
U.S.A. Division

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



GWU/ E. R. Johnston/bq
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES *File*

12-3-11

12-3-USA

SECURITY UNCLASSIFIED
Sécurité

DATE February 12, 1974

NUMBER
Numéro

K. W. MacLellan

OM E. R. Johnston

REFERENCE
référence

SUBJECT U.S.A. Country Programme Review - Background Notes
let

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA <i>12-3-USA</i>	
MISSION	

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

Robertson

Letendre

P

L

J

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R

DR 7

Attached for your information and guidance are:

- a summary of programme changes for 1974-75 which need to be confirmed or rejected;
- forecasts, based on post reports and inputs from headquarter departments for 1975-6 and 1976-77.

E. R. Johnston
E. R. Johnston

PROGRAMME STAFF

1974-75 Changes

1. External Affairs is proposing to change "New Look" locally-engaged officer positions:

- (a) from Buffalo to Cleveland (no objection from post or HQ)
- (b) from Philadelphia to Detroit (no objection from post or HQ)

The New Look Information Officers will be assigned to:

1. Washington	1 FS	4 LEIO
2. Atlanta	1 LEIO	
3. Boston	1 LEIO	
4. Chicago	1 FS	
5. Cleveland	1 LEIO	
6. Dallas	1 LEIO	
7. Detroit	1 LEIO	
8. Los Angeles	1 LEIO	
9. Minneapolis	1 LEIO	
10. New York	1 FS	
11. San Francisco	1 LEIO	
12. Seattle	1 LEIO	

Totals: 3 FS; 13 LEIO

2. External Affairs may propose two new FS positions at the Embassy in Washington:

- (a) Provincial Interests Officer (approved at last year's review, dropped from "B" Budget and now reinstated)
- (b) New Energy Position (possibly charged to EER)

3. Manpower and Immigration Headquarters makes no proposed changes in the U.S.A., but Atlanta has included one additional M&I officer in 1974-75 requirements.

4. Trade Commissioner Service proposes only one change - delete one officer position from Atlanta. Seattle and Detroit have each requested one locally-engaged Commercial Officer, but we are advised by TCS that only Seattle is approved.

5. Canadian Government Office of Tourism headquarters makes no programme changes, but Chicago has put in for a Travel Promotion Officer; HQ does not support the request.

6. National Revenue both from the posts and headquarters has made the following programme requests for 1974-75:

- 1. One CB officer to Washington (not supported by the post)
- 2. One CB officer to Atlanta (supported by the post)

3. One PA in New York
4. One PA or LE Officer for San Francisco, but this could be held to 1975-76

For both New York and San Francisco the ST serving National Revenue would be taken on in the programme position.

In summary we are faced with proposed 1974-75 programme changes:

1. Atlanta	Manpower and Immigration	FS
2. Atlanta	Trade Commissioners Service	-FS
3. Atlanta	National Revenue	FS
4. Detroit	TCS	LE-CO (HQ not support)
5. Seattle	TCS	LE-CO (confirmed)
6. Chicago	CGOT	TPO (HQ not support)
7. New York	National Revenue	PA
8. San Francisco	National Revenue	PA (LE) (to 1975-76)
9. Washington	External	FS (Provincial)
10. Washington	External (or EN&R)	FS (Energy)
11. Washington	National Revenue	FS
12. Washington	CGOT (conventions)	TPO (HQ support)

PROGRAMME STAFF

1975-76 Forecast by Post

Atlanta	1.	National Revenue	PM
	2.	Manpower & Immigration	FS
Boston			
Buffalo	3.	External	FS (Admin/Consular/Info)
Chicago		no forecast	
Cleveland	4.	External	FS (Admin/Consular/Info)
Dallas	5.	CGOT	TPO (HQ will intro TPO)
	6.	National Revenue	PM
Detroit	7.	TCS	CO
Los Angeles	8.	National Revenue	CBO
	9.	Manpower & Immigration	FS
	10.	CGOT	TPA (LE) - HQ not defend
	11.	External	FS (General Relations/Info)
Minneapolis		No forecast	
New Orleans		No forecast	
New York	12.	External	FS (Admin/General Relations)
	13.	External	FS (Info)
	14.	National Revenue	PA (also 1974/75)
Philadelphia		No forecast	
San Francisco	15.	Manpower & Immigration	FS or PA
	16.	National Revenue	PA (also 1974/75)
San Juan		No forecast	
Seattle	17.	External	FS Consular

Washington	18.	External	FS General Relations
	19.	External	FS General Relations
	20.	External	FS Information

PROGRAMME STAFF

1975-76 Forecast by Department

External Affairs	1.	Buffalo	FS (Admin/Consular/Info)
	2.	Cleveland	FS (Admin/Consular/Info)
	3.	Los Angeles	FS (General Relations/Info)
	4.	New York	FS (General Relations/Admin)
	5.	New York	FS (Information)
	6.	Seattle	FS (Consular/Admin)
	7.	Washington	FS (General Relations)
	8.	Washington	FS (General Relations)
	9.	Washington	FS (Information)
Trade Commissioner Service	10.	Detroit	CO
Canadian Govern- ment Office of Tourism	11.	Dallas	TPO (New Office)
	12.	Los Angeles	TPA (LE)
Manpower & Immigration	13.	Atlanta	FS
	14.	Los Angeles	FS
	15.	San Francisco	FS or PA
National Revenue	16.	Atlanta	PM
	17.	Dallas	PM
	18.	Los Angeles	PM
	19.	New York	PA
	20.	San Francisco	PA

PROGRAMME STAFF

1976-77 Forecast (Based on Post Report)

Atlanta		No Forecast	
Boston		No Forecast	
Buffalo		No Forecast	
Chicago		No Forecast	
Cleveland		No Forecast	
Dallas	1.	CGOT	TPO (HQ not defend)
	2.	CCOT	TPA (LE) (defend when necessary)
	3.	External	FS (Admin/Consular/General Relations)
Detroit		No Forecast	
Los Angeles	4.	CGOT	TPO (defend when necessary)
Minneapolis	5.	M&I	FS
New Orleans		No Forecast	
New York	6.	External	FS (Information)
	7.	CGOT (NYC)	TPO (HQ will defend for NYC office)

Philadelphia		No Forecast	
San Francisco	8.	IT&C (TCS)	FS/CO
San Juan		No Forecast	
Seattle		No Forecast	
Washington	9.	External	FS (Information)

PROGRAMME STAFF

1976-77 Forecast by Department (Based on Post Reports)

External Affairs	1.	Dallas	FS (Admin/Consular/Info)
	2.	New York	FS (Information)
	3.	Washington	FS (Information)
Trade Commissioner Service	4.	San Francisco	FS or PA
Canadian Govern- ment Office of Tourism	5.	Dallas	TPO
	6.	Dallas	TPA
	7.	Los Angeles	TPO
	8.	New York	TPO
Manpower & Immigration	9.	Minneapolis	FS

CRR/M.COWLING/2-7814/gb
/C.CHATILLON/6-4106

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

USA
✓ 12-3-~~6~~ SP
12-3-11

TO
À

GWP

SECURITY
Sécurité

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM
De

CRR

DATE

February 1, 1974

REFERENCE
Référence

Our memorandum of January 24, 1974

NUMBER
Numéro

SUBJECT
Sujet

Country Program Review

Consular Activities at Posts

FILE	12-3-USA	DOSSI
OTTAWA	80-24	
MISSION		

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

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DISTRIBUTION

✓ PDMI

Further to our referenced memorandum, attached are two tables of statistical data reflecting consular activity at each post under GWU areas of responsibility. The tables have been arranged in groups corresponding to the posts to be reviewed during the morning and afternoon meetings each day.

2. The observations in our referenced memorandum apply equally to these tables.
3. The figures shown for Philadelphia deserve special comment. The Consulate had not been reporting regularly and in response to our reminder it submitted April-September reports in late November. These reports have been compiled so incompletely that they are virtually meaningless. The only category of consular work for which figures are given is passports; the officer and support staff man hours, grand total hours, and language columns are mixed up; and there are no figures given for documents processed, financial assistance, deaths, detentions, hospitalization, repatriation or other assistance. On the other hand, their Country Program 1974/75 indicates that while their consular activities are not burdensome they do handle some of the usual consular matters including "serious consular cases". We are reviewing all reports and comments received from posts to-date with a view to provide them with additional guidance and, generally, to improve our consular report system.
4. Standard distribution will be done by PDMI.

C. CHATILLON

Claude Châtillon
Director

Consular Policy and Research Division

of Consular activities at Posts.

BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS (GWP)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DIVISION (GWU)

POST	PERIOD	DOCS PROCESSED OTHER THAN PPTS.	REGISTRATION OF RESIDENTS	ASSISTANCE		DETAINED OR JAILED		DEATHS	HOSPITALIZED	REPATRIATED	GRAND TOTAL HOURS
				FINANCIAL	OTHER	DRUGS	OTHER				
Los Angeles	March-November	309	0	196	13,118	7	74	13	19	29	8,833.0
San Francisco	March-November	148	0	22	324	8	16	2	2	0	4,278.75
Seattle	March-November	182	0	10	14,033	10	30	2	0	6	1,487.5

Dallas	March-November	37	0	0	1,240	6	11	0	0	0	1,256.5
New Orleans	March, August-September	7	0	0	220	1	10	0	0	0	71.5
Atlanta	March-November	57	0	1	478	20	137	0	6	3	1,885.0
San Juan	March-November	40	52	2	219	0	1	1	0	1	400.0

Reports from March 1, 1973 to November 30, 1973
of Consular activities at Posts.

BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS (GWP)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DIVISION (GWU)

POST	PERIOD	DOCS PROCESSED OTHER THAN FPTS.	REGISTRATION OF RESIDENTS	ASSISTANCE		DETAINED OR JAILED		DEATHS	HOSPITALIZED	REPATRIATED	GRAND TOTAL HOURS
				FINANCIAL	OTHER	DRUGS	OTHER				
Minneapolis	March-November	218	0	4	2,660	4	16	1	5	0	1,846.9
Chicago	March-November	18	0	1	1,273	0	16	3	1	4	1,214.99
Detroit	March-November	210	0	1	45	0	7	0	0	0	3,320.5
Cleveland	March-November	26	0	0	6,104	0	0	0	0	0	1,931.0
Buffalo	March-November	30	0	0	702	4	2	0	0	0	220.0
Boston	March-September	97	0	2	3,350	0	3	5	0	0	1,785.5
New York	March-November	665	0	6	3,263	18	41	9	20	36	5,506.75
Philadelphia	April-September	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	319.0
Washington	March-November	301	0	0	5,400	1	17	12	9	4	2,534.0

GPP/A.J. Andrew/jhb

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

JAN 14 1974

File
and

TO
A PDM

SECURITY
Sécurité

CONFIDENTIAL

FROM
De GPP

DATE January 11, 1974

REFERENCE
Référence My Memorandum of April 2, 1973

NUMBER
Numéro

12-3-USA

SUBJECT
Sujet Canada-USA Information Clearing Centre -
DG Meeting January 17, 1974

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	<i>12-3-USA</i>
MISSION	

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

1

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- PDMI
- MIN/Malone
- MIN/Graham

Since the memorandum under reference was written, there have been a number of significant developments that reinforce the view that USA foreign policy under Dr. Kissinger will be conducted in a manner that will eventually oblige us to undertake much closer coordination of our USA operations than has been the case up to now.

2. Traditionally, the Canada-USA relationship has permitted us to deal with individual issues largely on their own merits with virtually no overt linkage between one and another. There was, of course, always in the background the knowledge that in many fields the USA could easily establish links among topics to our disadvantage if we obliged them to do so. We have normally succeeded in avoiding this and indeed have managed to get the Americans themselves to go along with the idea that there was something inherently immoral about linking matters that were not intrinsically related.

3. The Kissinger approach to USA geopolitical interests have, however, been characterized by quite a different approach; i.e. a highly integrated attack on the broadest possible front. The Shanghai communique and the understanding reached in Moscow which laid down the general principles of USA-PRC and USA-USSR relationships have clearly pointed in this direction. The Year of Europe concept and the idea of a declaration of the Industrialized Democracies can leave no doubt that the broad front approach and linking such "unrelated" problems such as monetary reform, trade and defence costs have become a permanent feature of USA diplomacy.

4. Moreover, it makes good sense from the USA point of view that it should seek to use its strong points (e.g. its defence capability) to compensate for its weak ones (e.g. balance of payments and resources supply).

5. It seems, therefore, that we will not escape from the application of the Kissinger diplomacy to the Canada-USA relationship particularly if we cannot be dealt with under an EEC umbrella. Sooner or later within the next three years, Canada can expect to have its "year" (probably somewhat compressed) and a request that we cooperate in an exercise to express our total relationship in a set of principles designed to cover the whole spectrum of the Canada-USA relationship and, no doubt, ideally, to fit ourselves into the place reserved for us in the Kissingerian view of the world.

.../2

CONFIDENTIAL

6. We may well decide to try to resist this sort of exercise first by cooperating in the construction of an umbrella which would help us avoid dealing with the USA on a one-to-one basis. Our parallel defense is, of course, to try to keep the Americans to the case-by-case approach which has served us so well in the past. To deal with the new situation at all we must be able to assess the extent of the USA interests involved and therefore to know much more about USA interests in Canada than is available in any one place at the present time. Without this sort of information readily available, our position in a one-on-one, broad-front negotiation with the USA can easily be imagined.

7. An excellent start has been made on collecting information in the form of Inventory of issues although it is admittedly incomplete even in respect of contacts at the level of federal governments. This could be expanded and further systematized. Attached is a description prepared by ACP of a system which could be put into operation this calendar year if there was an early decision to proceed and funds were made available.

8. We have discussed this with Ivor Bowen of SRB and it was agreed that for a host of reasons it would not be appropriate for his Bureau to undertake this task. Nevertheless it should be done. Without, at this stage, casting its net in the provincial or private sectors, an information clearing house should be able to obtain information not only from federal government sources but from a systematic analysis of published material, something we do not seem to be doing.

9. What might well be required, as a start, is an organization, probably within the Western Hemisphere Bureau (or a new USA Bureau), charged with the dual role of (a) collecting, collating and, as appropriate, disseminating information on current issues outstanding between the two federal governments in a regular and systematized way; and (b) collecting, collating and disseminating, as appropriate, information respecting USA points of view and interests in Canada as available from published and other overt sources.

10. The information produced would be available to persons engaged in bilateral relationships and negotiations as background to their regular work and, if necessary, in preparation for possible broad-front negotiations.

11. At some future time, when we have the apparatus in place, steps might be taken to try to expand the operation to cover USA contacts by other levels of government and by non-governmental organizations, but the creation of the basic apparatus need not await a decision on this politically sensitive point.

12. The mass of information involved as matters now stand suggest that it could best be processed through the use of an information retrieval system. The organizational and systemological preparations should not wait on one another but should go forward together.

13. This memorandum has been discussed with GWP and ACP although the views expressed are not necessarily shared by them.

A. J. Andrew,
Director General

A. J. Andrew,
Director General,
Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs.
000047

Records Management - Computerized Indexing System

The computer application envisaged for the Records Management Division is essentially an automated index which is intended to increase the probability and the speed of the operation of retrieving documents.

2. The input will consist of key words identifying the original correspondence (telegrams, letters, etc.) received by or originating within the Department, including substantive inter-office memoranda. The actual correspondence will be stored on microfilm in a system providing for automatic retrieval, visual recognition and quick reproduction. Equipment is readily available for this system.

3. The two major problems which must be dealt with before ACR can install computerized indexing are:

(a) the development of a thesaurus of standard key words; and

(b) the staffing of the important classifier-analyst positions.

The development of a thesaurus may not pose too many difficulties because we have obtained the thesaurus in use in the State Department and believe that with a certain amount of Canadianization it will meet our requirements. The personnel problem is one created essentially by the classification process although it may also involve training and perhaps recruitment.

4. The system proposed for Records Management Division is essentially the same that would be necessary for an information clearing centre on Canada-United States relations. The goal of speedy retrieval of all relevant aspects of the relationship could be achieved in the same manner. The same thesaurus could be employed. The volume of the material to be handled by the proposed information centre would, however probably exceed that proposed by ACR because it would include data made available by other departments, statistics, press reports and so on. A group of classifier-analysts separate from those in ACR may be required to produce the input for the centre. An even larger group of people would be involved with research into the information which would be available from the stored documents.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

12-3-USA

TO
A Multiple Letter to Posts Listed Below

SECURITY
Sécurité UNCLASSIFIED

FROM
De Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs - OTTAWA

DATE August 1, 1973

REFERENCE
Référence

NUMBER
Numéro GWU-(M)-219

SUBJECT
Sujet 1973-74 Country Programmes

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA 12-3-USA	
MISSION	

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

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ICER

Thank you for your interesting and well-prepared 1973-74 Country Programme. We very much appreciate the time, effort and care which you devoted to its preparation and we believe that on the basis of this year's experience, posts' country programmes are becoming a more useful tool for the management of Canada's foreign relationships. Although much remains to be done in improving the use of the country programming system, Country Committee members were generally agreed that this year's country programmes represented a significant advance over last year's efforts, although, as is to be expected with a relatively new system, country programming still has significant weaknesses.

2. These weaknesses are discussed in some detail in the minutes of the meeting on Western Hemisphere Country Programmes distributed to you under cover of our letter GWU-104 of April 17. In particular, there must be closer and franker examination both by posts and Headquarters of requirements for programme and related support staff increases. Also some of the weaknesses might be traced to the natural tendency to develop country programmes from generalized country objectives which, in the case of the U.S.A. consulates, were originally drafted at Headquarters and may not reflect with sufficient precision Canada's interests in the territory concerned.
3. With respect to your incremental resource proposals, we should like to make several general comments insofar as the Department of External Affairs is concerned before passing on to specific comments on each post's proposals. With respect to the incremental programme staff requests from Departments other than External Affairs, posts may wish to correspond directly with the relevant Department (sending copies to us for information).
4. In the case of External Affairs programme staff, we considered that for fiscal year 1974-75 an all-out effort should be made to implement

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Canadian Embassy
Washington, D.C.

Consulates
San Juan
Cleveland Buffalo
Dallas
Detroit
Minneapolis
Philadelphia

Consulates General
Atlanta
Boston San Francisco
Chicago Seattle
Los Angeles
New Orleans
New York

UNCLASSIFIED

- 2 -

the "New Look" information programme. As you will recognize, the "New Look" information programme may play a major role over the next few years in ensuring that Canadian policies are understood by opinion and decision makers in the U.S.A. For the United States as a whole, out of 25 incremental programme staff requests included in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs "B" Budget submission, 23 are related to the "New Look" information programme. Posts will understand that this had to be done at the expense of a number of requests in the general relations and administration fields. The only two requests that were not part of the "New Look" information programme are an Executive Assistant to the Ambassador and a Provincial Interests officer in Washington. These positions were given top priority because of the overriding importance of the Embassy to the management of the Canada-U.S.A. relationship and the contribution which each could make to the management of that relationship. We hope that in future years more weight could be given to posts' requests for additional programme staff in the administration and, to a lesser extent, the general relations fields. As consular services are a responsive programme which posts cannot defer and which contribute heavily to the image of Canada's foreign operations as a whole, every effort was made to meet the majority of Posts' requests for additional consular assistance.

5. With respect to support staff in general, we proceeded from the assumption that if a given post programme is approved in terms of the totality of the Canadian Government's interest and priorities, it should be adequately supported. In a large proportion of those cases where programmes did not appear to be adequately supported, we requested additional support after consultation with all concerned. In addition we believe each post should be adequately provided for in terms of common services for the post as a whole (post administration, driver messengers, switch board operators, etc.). However, it may well be more difficult to define and obtain incremental resources in this area than in the area of direct support for post programmes.

6. We are happy to report that significant progress was made in 1973-74 in the provision of support services to posts and we are hopeful that the results of our "B" Budget submission will enable further progress to be made in 1974-75. Specific comments on individual posts resource requests follow. Unfortunately, the format of this year's country programme was such that it often proved impossible to determine with certainty exactly what additional resources posts were requesting. The difficulties were often compounded by posts' misinterpretation of what should be included under their 1973-74 manpower ceilings. Additional manpower resources being requested should, of course, not have been included in arriving at total figures. We should be grateful, therefore, for your indulgence if our interpretation of what you were requesting did not wholly accord with what you had in mind.



JS Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

ATLANIA

We identified the following requests in your Country Programme.

<u>Programme</u>	<u>Request</u>
Consular	1 Consular Clerk 1973/74
Cultural/Information	1 CB Officer, 1 LE Support 1974/75
General Relations	1 CB Officer, 1 LE Support 1974/75
Customs Administration	1 LE Support, 1974/75
Administration	1 LE Support, 1974/75
Tourism	1 CB Officer, 1974/75

In 1973/74 you were provided with 1 LE consular clerk and a PA (M&I). We could find little justification in the body of your Country Programme for additional resources in the General Relations or Administrative Support areas. In addition, Treasury Board was most reluctant to see increments at recently opened posts whose establishments have been approved by Cabinet. These requests were accordingly set aside. As a result of consideration of your programme by the Country Committee the following was budgeted for in 1974/75 by this or other Departments:-

- 1 LE Information Officer
- 1 CB Tourism Officer
- 1 CB Customs Administration Officer, 1 LE Support
- 1 LE Support - Immigration

BOSTON

We identified the following requests in your Country Programme.

<u>Programme</u>	<u>Request</u>
Immigration	3 LE Support 1973/74
Cultural/Information	1 LE Information Officer 1974/75

In 1973/74 you were provided with the following positions:-

- 1 FS - Manpower & Immigration
- 1 PA - Manpower & Immigration
- 1 LES - Manpower & Immigration
- 1 FS - Cultural/Information

In addition the Country Committee recommended that the following positions be provided in 1974/75:-

- 1 LE Officer - Cultural/Information
- 1 LES - Cultural/Information
- 2 LES - Manpower & Immigration

BUFFALO

We identified the following requests in your Country Programme.

<u>Programme</u>	<u>Request</u>
Immigration	- 1 Programme Assistant 1973/74 - 1 FS 1973/74 - 2 LES
Admin/Consular/Information	- 1 FS
Tourism	- 1 Travel Counsellor and 1 LES 1973/74

In 1973/74 you were provided with the following:-

Tourism	- 1 Travel Counsellor
Immigration	- 1 FS, 1 PA, and 1 LES

In addition the Country Committee recommended the following for 1974/75:-

Information	- 1 LE Officer
Tourism	- 1 LES
Immigration	- 1 LES

We recognize the administrative problems you are faced with as a result of growth of your post. This problem was noted by the Country Committee and applies to a number of posts in the U.S.A. While we can make no promises we shall endeavour, once the results of this year's "B" Budget exercise are known to provide you with an Administrative Support position. If a locally-engaged position were acceptable to you, we might find it rather easier to obtain.

CHICAGO

We identified the following requests in your Country Programme:-

<u>Programme</u>	<u>Request</u>
Consular	- 1 LES
Information/General Relations	- 2 LES, 1974/75
Immigration	- 1 LES 1974/75 - 1 LES
Tourism	- 1 CB Officer, 1974/75 - 1 LES 1973/74

You have already been provided with the following:-

Tourism - 1 LES

In addition the Country Committee recommended the following items be placed in the "B" Budget submission of this or other departments:-

Information	1 CB Officer, 1 LES
Tourism	1 CB Officer
Consular	1 Consular Clerk

We are in receipt of your letter #102 of May 31, 1973. In this year's country programming exercise, we were presented with incremental staffing requests from almost all posts in the United States. Unfortunately, it was not possible to meet all requests in 1973/74 or place them in Departmental "B" Budgets for 1974/75. The Country Committee which reviewed your Country Programme agreed to recommend only those requests noted above. We understand that, if Treasury Board approves the Information position for Chicago, the position would be filled by a Canada-based Information Officer.

We agree with your comment that a Canada-based Consular Clerk is not necessary for Chicago and have changed this item to a locally-engaged position.

CLEVELAND

We identified the following requests in your Country Programme:-

Tourism - 3 LES (1 for each of Cleveland, Cincinnati,
and Pittsburgh), 1973/74

After discussion in the Country Committee it was recommended that these requests be placed in the 1974/75 "B" Budget. We shall inform you of the results of that submission as soon as they are available.

DALLAS

We identified the following staffing requests in your 1973/74 Country

Programme:-

<u>Programme</u>	<u>Request</u>
Administration	1 Locally-engaged Officer 1974/75 1 CR
Information	1 CB Officer 1974/75 1 LE Officer 1974/75 2 LES 1974/75
Customs Administration	2 CB Officers 1974/75 2 LES
Trade Promotion (IDPB)	1 FS 1973/74 1 LES 1973/74
Immigration	1 Programme Asst. 1973/74 1 LES 1973/74
Tourism	1 CB Officer 1974/75

In 1973/74 you were provided with the following:

Trade Promotion - 1 FS and 1 LES

After discussion in the Country Committee, it was recommended that the following be budgeted for in 1974/75:-

Information - 1 CB Officer
- 1 LE Officer
- 1 LES

Customs - 1 CB Officer
- 1 LES

Immigration - 1 LES

DETROIT

We identified the following requests in your Country Programme:-

<u>Programme</u>	<u>Request</u>
Trade Promotion	1 CO, 1 LES 1974/75
Immigration	1 FS, 1 PA, 3 LES 1973/74
Tourism	.6 my's support, 1973/74 1 LES 1974/75
Administrative Support	1 Driver Messenger 1973/74

As a result of discussions in the Country Committee it was recommended that the following be provided in 1973/74.

1 Driver Messenger

1 LES - Immigration

You have already been provided with 1 LES (Immigration), however, it was not possible to provide a Driver Messenger in 1973/74. This item has however been placed in our "B" Budget for 1974/75 and if approved we shall make every effort to fill the position in this fiscal year.

The following items were placed in the "B" Budget of this or other Departments for 1974/75:

1 LES (Driver Messenger)

1 CO - Trade Promotion

1 LES - Tourism

1 LES - Immigration

LOS ANGELES

We identified the following requests in your 1973/74 Country Programme:-

<u>Programme</u>	<u>Request</u>
Customs	1 CBO, 1 LES 1973/74 1 CBO, 1 LES 1974/75
Information	1 FS Info. 1973/74 1 LE Information Officer 1973/74 2 LES 1974/75 1 LES 1974/75
Administration	1 AS 1973/74 1 Clerk 1973/74
Consular Services	1 Clerk 1973/74
Immigration	1 FS 1973/74 1 PA 2 LES 1974/75
Tourism	1 CB Officer 1 LE Officer 1973/74 1 LES 1973/74 1 LES 1974/75

You have already been provided with the following:

Consular Services - 1 CR

Immigration - 1 FS, 1 PA

Customs - 1 CB Officer

The Country Committee recommended that the following be placed in

Departmental "B" Budget submission for 1974/75:-

Information	- 1 CB Officer - 1 LE Officer - 1 LES
Customs	- 1 CB Officer - 1 LES
Tourism	- 1 LES
Immigration	- 2 LES

We shall inform you of the results of this submission as soon as available.
You should note that the additional Customs Officer, if approved, would not be a net addition to your staff but would replace the officer stationed in

Los Angeles

- 2 -

Continued

San Francisco now on temporary duty in Los Angeles.

We appreciate that growth of your posts has placed added pressure on your administrative section and that, in due course, additional help will be needed there. However, because of other demands having higher priority we were not able to recommend any additional administrative personnel for 1973/74 or 1974/75.

MINNEAPOLIS

We identified the following requests in your 1973/74 Country Programme:

<u>Programme</u>	<u>Request</u>
Immigration	1 FS 1974/75 1 PA 1973/74 1 LES 1973/74
Administration/Immigration	1 LES 1973/74
General Relations/Consular	1 LES 1973/74 (160P Secretary)
Administration	1 LES (Driver/Messenger) 1973/74

You were provided with the following in 1973/74:-

Immigration	1 PA 1 LES
General Relations	1 LES

The request for a Driver/Messenger although recommended by the Country Committee was turned down by Departmental management which did not agree this item should be placed in the "B" Budget for 1974/75. However, we are hopeful sufficient additional resources will be provided to make a man-year available later this year or early in 1974. The following items were placed in Departmental "B" Budgets for 1974/75:-

Immigration	1 FS, 1LES
Information	1 LE Information Officer

NEW ORLEANS

We identified the following requests in your 1973/74 Country Programme:-

<u>Programme</u>	<u>Request</u>
Information/Cultural Relations	1 FS 1974/75
Immigration	1 PA 1973/74

We understand you have already been provided with an Immigration PA.

The Country Committee agreed that we should not recommend the establishment of the FS position requested until such time as we are better aware of the extent to which your post will become involved in francophone programmes in the U.S.A.

NEW YORK

We identified the following requests in your Country Programme:-

<u>Programme</u>	<u>Request</u>
Information	2 FS's, 1 LES 1974/75
Tourism	2 CB Officers 1974/75 3 LES 1973/74 1 LES 1974/75
Administration	1 AS 1974/75 1 CR 1973/74
Immigration	1 PA 1973/74 2 LES 1974/75

While recognizing the increased pressure placed on the administration section of your post by growth in recent years, the Country Committee was unable to attach high priority to providing relief in this area at this time. In 1973/74 you were provided with the following:

Tourism	1 CR Officer 1 LES
Immigration	1 PA

Although recommended by the Country Committee, departmental management was unable to make sufficient resources available to provide you with an additional Driver/Messenger in 1973/74. Furthermore, it was not agreeable to placing this item on External Affairs 1974/75 "B" Budget submission.

The Country Committee recommended that the following items be placed in the appropriate departmental "B" Budgets for 1974/75:-

Information	1 CB Officer 1 LE Officer 1 LES
Tourism	1 Programme Asst. 1 LES

PHILADELPHIA

Although not requested in your Country Programme, the Country Committee recommended that the Department of External Affairs budget for the following in 1974/75:-

Information	1 CB Officer
	1 LE Officer
	1 LES

We shall let you know the results of this submission as soon as they are available.

SAN FRANCISCO

The following requests were identified in your Country Programme:

<u>Programme</u>	<u>Request</u>
General Relations	1 FS 1974/75
Information	1 FS 1974/75 1 LE Info. Officer 1974/75 1 LES 1974/75
Consular Services	1 LES 1974/75
Tourism	1 LES 1974/75

The Country Committee did not attach a high priority to a General Relations officer or an additional officer to provide consular services or another Canada-based information officer at this time. After discussion it was agreed that the following should be budgeted for in 1974/75:-

1 LE Information Officer

1 LES - Tourism

SAN JUAN

The following requests were identified in your Country Programme:

<u>Programme</u>	<u>Request</u>
Cultural/Information	1 FS 1975/76
Trade Promotion	1 LES 1974/75
	1 CO 1973/74
	1 LES

You have already been supplied with an additional CO and related support position. The Country Committee agreed that the Department of External Affairs should request a locally-engaged information officer in its 1974/75 "B" Budget submission. We shall let you know the result of this request as soon as available. The Country Committee was doubtful that the extent of Canadian interests in Puerto Rico would justify posting a Canada-based Information Officer to San Juan.

SEATTLE

The following requests were identified in your Country Programme:-

<u>Programme</u>	<u>Request</u>
Cultural/Information/Consular	1 FS 1973/74 1 LES
Immigration	1 FS 1973/74 3 LES

You have to date been provided with the following:-

Manpower & Immigration	1 FS 1 LES 1 FA
External Affairs	1 FS 1 LES

The Country Committee agreed that the following items should be placed in the appropriate departmental "B" Budget for 1974/75:-

1 LE Information Officer
1 LES (Manpower & Immigration)

We shall inform you of the outcome of these requests as soon as possible.

12-3-USA
NOV 23 1972

Notes of the meeting held in the small Conference Room
Daly Building, First Floor, Thursday 23 November, 1972
at 1530 hours
on expansion of facilities for and by MandI in the U.S.A

Present

- Mr. R.K. Henry, AFP
- ~~Mr. S.G. [unclear], ICER~~
- Mr. J. Carriere, APRL
- Mr. R.B. Barr, MandI
- Mr. E.F. Muise, MandI
- Mr. R.A. Girard, MandI
- Mr. J. Knox, AFB
- Mr. D. McCue, AFPC
- Mr. B. Clark, G&U
- Mr. H.J. Schramm, ITC/CGTB
- Mr. P. Aubin, ITC/TCS
- Mr. J.E. Cuddihey, AFM

12-3-USA

Intoduction

The major and controlling problem before the meeting was quickly attacked and resolved as follows:

- a. The funds required to support the expansion this year will be provided by MandI. An FE in the amount of \$250,000 will be provided by MandI and the meeting determined the basic costs listed below.
- b. A joint effort by the Ministers of External Affairs and MandI should be arranged for the preparation and support of supplementary estimates in 1973-74 to provide funds and to establish the requirement for budget purposes in the years to come. If no funds become available from Treasury Board we should expect that NO ACTION will be taken on further expansion. This requires planning now for 1973-74 and it should be the subject of a separate meeting which should include the problem and cost of release of staff in Rome, etc.

General

Increase cost for postage, registry work load increase, increased telephone costs, etc. not budgeted for in 1972-73 for six posts is estimated at \$25,000.

The question of removal advances, etc. was raised by Mr. Bob Barr, who was time tabled to go to Seattle on Sunday, 26 November 1972 and it was thought that these funds would be from MandI budget.

Space was considered to be available in New Orleans, Dallas and Atlanta for 1973-74 expansion.

Facts relating to the six posts selected for immediate expansion are listed in the chart attached. Mr. D. McCue, AFPC will be the co-ordinator.

NOV 23 1972

Conclusion

After a long discussion it was agreed that the present problems before the meeting were resolved and that the plan of action was accepted.

The problem regarding expansion in 1973/74 has not been resolved and it was made the subject of another meeting to be called by Mr. Henry on an appropriate date.

J.E. Cuddihey

c.c. Mr. T. Sweetman, AFBM
Mr. J.S. Hubbard, AFMU
Mr. C. Gadd, AFPC
Mr. F.S. Lemon, AFMA

NOV 23 1972

Los Angeles	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Available - 1 Officer - 1 Support staff 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Basic available 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Okay 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - \$7000/year - 4 months - \$2,500 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 1 from M&I - 1 from APRL - Total 1 1/2 - APRL to answer action tel 	
Minneapolis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Temporary for 1972-73 - 1 Officer - 1 support staff needed for 1973-74 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Temporary for 1972-73 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No typewriter \$400 - \$500 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - \$7,00/year - Therefore \$2,500 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - AFB not in picture re space for 173-74. This will need another FF. AFPC, Mr. McCue will coordinate with AFB and AFM.
Seattle	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Available - AFB will authorize more space adjacent to CGTB - more rent 1973/74 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Okay 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Okay 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - \$3,500 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - APRL to confirm resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - AFB must go to Seattle and provide estimate of cost to M&I and to Mr. McCue, coordinator.
Boston	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Temporary for 1972-73 - 3 yr. leases approved by AFB for 1 Apr. 1973 less fit up time 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Okay 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Okay 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - \$2,500 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - APRL to confirm resources 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - AFB must send someone to post. 1,345 sq. ft. \$10,087/year. - 1973-74 - 2 officers and 3 support staff
Buffalo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Temporary 1972-73 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Post to buy \$2,000 L.E.S. - \$2,200 - Rep Office 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Post to buy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - \$2,500 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Mr. D. McCue to coord. furniture chargeable to M&I F.E.
Detroit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Temporary until 1 March 1973 	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>NEEDED</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">\$2,500</p> <p>odds</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - typewriter 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - \$2,500 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - AFB and M&I must decide on space options.

NOV 23 1973

NOV 23 1973

Mr. [unclear]
Mr. [unclear]
Mr. [unclear]
4/11/71
Your file / Votre référence
Our file / Notre référence
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Manpower and Immigration

Main-d'œuvre et Immigration

12-3-USA	Your file / Votre référence
12-3-M+1	Our file / Notre référence

OTTAWA, K1A 0J9
October 30, 1972

OCT 30 1972

The Under Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
Ottawa, Ontario

ICER
PDMI

Refer APO
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U.S.A. Div.	
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Attention: Director, United States
of America Division -
Keith MacLellan

Re: Expansion of Facilities in
the United States of America

As suggested at the meeting of the Country Committee yesterday, the attached summary has been prepared, estimating staff and space needs to adequately meet our program requirements in the United States.

Operationally, our processing will be minimal in 1972/73. We will, however, require sufficient space to receive and counsel clients as well as adequate accommodation for the one support staff member. There will undoubtedly be some strain on both reception and mailing facilities, which we would hope to share until the acquisition of additional support staff.

Additional space will be necessary in 1973/74 when our operational load will increase due to the phasing out of other functions presently carried out by the processing office in Ottawa. At that time, more floor space will be required for storage of informational and promotional literature and for the registry function. It may be necessary at this phase of our operations, depending on budgetary considerations to reallocate or rearrange whatever space is then available through CPM consultations.

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- 2 -

To accommodate full processing facilities in 1974/75, we have estimated requirements on the basis of previous experience. It is suggested that the figure for 1974/75 should be borne in mind, particularly in those cases where consolidations of operations at any of the posts is being considered.



M.G. Clark,
Director General,
Foreign Service.

POSTS IN ORDER OF PRIORITY	OPENING DATE	STAFF NOW AVAILABLE AT POST	1972/73		1973/74						1974/75						ACCOMMODATION		
			STAFF REQUIRED IMMEDIATELY		ADDITIONAL STAFF			TOTAL			ADDITIONAL STAFF			TOTAL			INITIAL	1973/	74/75
			FSO	SUPP. (STN)	FSO	SUPP.	PA*	FSO	SUPP.	PA*	FSO	SUPP.	PA*	FSO	SUPP.	PA*			
1. Los Angeles	Dec., 1972	½ M.Y.	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	0	2	0	2	4	1		1200 sq. ft.	2000 sq. ft.
2. Boston	Dec., 1972	½ M.Y.	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	0	2	0	2	4	1		"	"
3. Seattle	Dec., 1972	None	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	1	0	2	0	2	4	1		"	"
4. Buffalo	Dec., 1972	None	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	1	0	1	0	1	3	1		"	1500 sq. ft.
5. Minneapolis	Jan./Feb., 1973	None	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	1	1	1	0	2	3	1		"	"
6. New Orleans	Jan./Feb., 1973	None	1	1	0	1	1	1	2	1	0	0	0	1	2	1		"	"
7. Detroit	Sept., 1973	None	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	0	1	3	1		"	"
8. Atlanta	June, 1973	½ M.Y.	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	2	0	1	3	1		"	"
9. Dallas	June, 1973	½ M.Y.	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	2	1		"	"
10. Washington	June, 1973		0	0	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0		"	"

* - Man Year for the P.A. (Program Assistant) will be supplied by M&T.

R

File



Deputy Minister
Manpower
and Immigration

Sous-ministre
Main-d'œuvre
et Immigration

RECEIVED
OCT 24 1972

October 20, 1972

12-3-1741
12-3-USA

DDF
CP

Mr. A.E. Ritchie,
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
OTTAWA, Ontario.

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FOR ACTION

ICE
cc AFP
CEC (2 copies)
GWL (2 copies)
AF
FCF
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Dear Mr. Ritchie:

Re: Establishment of Manpower and Immigration
Presence at Canadian Missions Abroad and
at Non Represented Centers.

On October 19 I wrote to you about attaching Manpower and Immigration Officers to certain Canadian Missions abroad during the 1973-74 fiscal year and solicited your concurrence with our proposals in order to effect early implementation of the plan.

I also mentioned this Department's policy of universality in immigration matters, our intention to provide Manpower and Immigration officer presence where the M & I activity level reaches 0.5 years of more and our proposals to develop new sources of Francophone immigration to Canada from countries where a potential of qualified immigrants exists.

Looking forward into the 1974-75 fiscal year we have formulated plans to improve our service by adding further to our facilities for the processing of applicants through the establishment of Manpower and Immigration presence in the following posts:

- a) because of workload volume and demonstrated interest by other agencies
 - i) Ankara/ Istanbul, Turkey (requested by HOM on basis of M & I workload of .69 man years in 1971)

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
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- ii) Bogota, Columbia (requested formally by HOM on basis of M & I workload of .63 man years in 1971)
 - iii) Mexico City (requested by HOM on basis of M & I workload of 1.0 man year in 1971)
 - iv) Melbourne, Australia (improvement of M & I service to 40% of immigrant movement from Australia who now travel 1200-1600 miles for interview at Sydney)
- b) because of Francophone potential
- i) Strasbourg/Metz/Nancy, France (representation in one of these centers to strengthen Francophone immigration to Canada. At present there is no Canadian Mission representation in any of these). Prior to the beginning of fiscal year 1974/75, consideration will be given to withdrawal of our facilities in Bordeaux in the event that our operation there is no longer viable.
 - ii) Dakar/Abidjan, West Africa (representation is one of these centers to balance universality between Francophone and Anglophone West African source countries).

In view of the expressed interests of the Government of Quebec in being represented in areas which produce immigrants destined to that province, we will shortly be approaching the Quebec Ministry of Immigration to advise them of our intentions and to invite their comments concerning the operation of their own programs in such areas.

The implementation of the foregoing will greatly assist this Department in achieving its goals for Manpower and Immigration representation abroad in 1974-75 and I would request your favourable consideration of our plans. Your early concurrence will enable officials of our respective departments to arrange for in depth working discussions thus preparing the way for program fulfillment to take place on a smoothly defined schedule in 1974/75.

Yours sincerely,


J.M. DesRoches,
Deputy Minister.



Deputy Minister
Manpower
and Immigration

Sous-ministre
Main-d'œuvre
et Immigration

12-3-1791
✓ 12-3-USA
October 19, 1972.

NOT SEEN BY USIA

Mr. A.E. Ritchie,
Under Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
OTTAWA, Ontario.

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FOR ACTION
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Dear Mr. Ritchie:

Establishment of Manpower and Immigration
Presence at Canadian Missions Abroad.

You may recall an exchange of letters between the Honourable Mitchell Sharp and the Honourable Bryce Mackasey in which Mr. Sharp expressed his agreement with our plans to attach Manpower and Immigration Officers to additional Canadian Missions in the United States.

In keeping with this Department's policy of universality in immigration matters and in context with our stated intention to provide Manpower and Immigration Officer presence where the immigration activity level reaches 0.5 man years or more we plan some redeployment of our resources to increase the effectiveness of our programs.

Our proposals will also corroborate this Department's commitment to Cabinet to develop new sources of Francophone immigration to Canada from source countries where a potential for the selection of qualified immigrants exists.

Our plan, therefore, within the context of policy coordination is to strengthen facilities for processing applicants by establishing Manpower and Immigration presence in the following posts in 1973-74:

- a) because of workload volume and demonstrated interest by other agencies -
 - i) Seoul (already approved by Cabinet)
 - ii) Kuala Lumpur (originally for opening in 1972/73, has been postponed to 1973/74 in view of supporting resource allocations by DEA)

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
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Ottawa K1A 0J9

300 rue Rideau
Ottawa K1A 0J9

- iii) Nairobi (Formal opening as for Kuala Lumpur, but events in Uganda may necessitate a temporary operation commencing earlier).
 - iv) Warsaw (orally suggested by respective Heads of Mission, formal written report shortly forthcoming. Eastern European Division au courant of our intentions pending DEA agreement).
 - v) Moscow (as for Warsaw)
 - vi) Georgetown (Western Hemisphere Affairs aware of our intention to maximize M&I services in Guyana)
- b) because of Francophone potential -
- i) Rabat, Morocco (replacing initially forecasted Tunis endorsed by the HOM at the Maghreb conference in May).
 - ii) Guadeloupe/Martinique (to balance universality between Francophone and Anglophone Caribbean source countries).

I would therefore request your cooperation in making the implementation of this program possible. If you concur, I would suggest that officials of our respective departments meet without delay to work out the details of implementation to bring the plan into effect.

Yours sincerely,


J. M. DesRoches,
Deputy Minister.

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ICER/D.R. Taylor/fr

12-3-USA

RESTRICTED

MEMORANDUM

OTTAWA, September 28, 1972

TO: Mr. J.R. Maybee
FROM: D.R. Taylor
SUBJECT: Allocation of Manpower and Immigration
Resources at Canadian Posts in the
United States

The meeting that I attended yesterday afternoon (September 27, 1972) turned out to be a meeting of what the Chairman, Mr. Keith McLellan described as the "United States Country Committee". The Committee apparently is envisaged by Mr. McLellan as the primary interdepartmental instrument for managing Canadian posts in the United States.

There were two main results to the meeting:

- a) The Committee accepted Mr. McLellan's suggestion that departmental representatives at the meeting consult their principals about three basic points concerning the rules for operating a country committee:
 - i) Is the proposed program (or program change) in the general interest of the Canadian Government?
 - ii) What are the implications of the proposed program (or program change) in terms of office accommodation, personal accommodation, support staff requirements, finances, transportation, etc.?
 - iii) What priority does the proposed program (or program change) command relative to other programs in the United States and in the whole of the Western Hemisphere?

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- b) It was agreed that in the meantime, representatives of departments at the working level should meet to identify as well as possible the implications referred to in (a)(ii) above, so that rapid progress could be made when the basic questions referred to (a) above had been resolved.

I did not have a very clear idea what to expect of the meeting, and I had no knowledge of the background of the questions that were discussed, but I was surprised at the turn of events. And if I was surprised, John Zawisza who represented Manpower and Immigration was irritated and annoyed, although this was not evident at the meeting.

The rub, so far as I could tell was that there had been an exchange of correspondence between Ministers (Mackasey and Sharp) concerning a proposal by M&I to allocate a large number of officers to posts in the U.S.A. Mr. Zawisza clearly thought that the policy decision had been taken by the Ministers and that there remained to be worked out the "modalities" of how to make the necessary arrangements to post those officers to posts in the U.S.A. Little wonder he was taken aback when he heard Mr. McLellan say that this was the occasion for establishing the ground rules by which country committees would operate, including establishing the rules for coordinating policy. Mr. Zawisza found it difficult to dispute the logic of Mr. McLellan's position (ground rules for country committee's do have to be worked out) but he was clearly under the impression that the Mackasey-Sharp exchange of letters contained the necessary policy and program approval.

I am in no position to judge whether what was done at the meeting was right or wrong, but I was surprised that the basic questions of policy coordination (if any coordination is needed) and of program coordination had not been settled, or at least discussed before the meeting was called. (As I understand it, and clearly, this was Mr. Zawisza's expectation, yesterday's meeting was called to discuss the modalities, i.e. those items that Mr. McLellan said should be examined under (a)(ii) above. And somehow, I had the feeling that External Affairs had put itself into a position where they could be accused of delaying or obstructing the legitimate program aims of another department that has a large stake in Canada's foreign operations.

The "U.S.A. Country Committee" will meet again on this subject, at a date to be determined. My recommendation is that if someone from the ICER Secretariat attends the next meeting, it should be someone who is actively involved in policy coordination, or program coordination, or preferably both. I doubt the question of posting coordination will be a significant factor; if it is, it will be significant only in respect of the postings of support staff who may be required at posts if M&I succeeds in their plan to post officers to posts in the U.S.A.

D.R. Taylor



Interdepartmental Committee on External Relations
Comité interministériel sur les Relations extérieures

MEMOIRE

Août-septembre 1972.

A J. R. Maybee, Secrétaire, ICER/CIRE

DE G. Desbiens, Secrétariat, ICER/CIRE

12-3-USA

SUJET Analyse de Mémoires au Cabinet sur les relations canado-américaines.

L'analyse de ces Mémoires au Cabinet sur les relations Canada - Etats-Unis, à la lumière de "Politique étrangère au service des Canadiens", demande d'abord que l'on rappelle le cadre conceptuel fourni par le Livre Blanc sur la politique extérieure. Ensuite, nous verrons s'il est possible d'envisager les Mémoires dans cette optique.

2. Le Livre Blanc avance que "la politique étrangère est...essentiellement le résultat de l'évaluation par le Gouvernement des objectifs et des intérêts nationaux et leur réalisation dans le milieu international...le prolongement de la politique nationale à l'étranger" (p. 9). Le Rapport affirme que le Canada doit à l'avenir développer ses politiques extérieures d'une manière cohérente et en accord avec des objectifs nationaux bien définis établis par le Gouvernement (p. 41). En d'autres mots, "l'action à l'étranger doit émaner directement des politiques nationales établies au Canada et servir les mêmes fins". (p. 8-9).

3. Le cadre d'analyse qui se dégage de la revue de politique étrangère con-

siste en six paliers dont quatre (les deux premiers et les deux derniers) peuvent être considérés opérationnels en un certain sens. Il s'agit des grands buts nationaux (basic national aims), des orientations de politique (policy themes), des objectifs nationaux, des politiques, des programmes et des opérations. Les grands buts nationaux, que devrait fixer le Gouvernement et qui recouvrent d'une façon ou d'une autre les objectifs nationaux particuliers ou sectoriels, sont au nombre de trois: maintien de l'indépendance politique et de la sécurité, prospérité générale et croissante pour tous les citoyens, développement de valeurs à conserver et à enrichir dans la vie des Canadiens et leurs rapports avec le reste de l'humanité. (p. 10-11)

Ensuite l'on retrouve les six grandes orientations de la politique nationale qui, selon le concept du prolongement (extension), représentent également le cadre général à l'intérieur duquel se développe la politique extérieure du Canada. Ces grandes orientations sont les suivantes:

- # stimuler la croissance économique
- # préserver la souveraineté et l'indépendance
- # travailler à la paix et à la sécurité
- # promouvoir la justice sociale
- # enrichir la qualité de la vie
- # maintenir l'harmonie du milieu naturel

Les objectifs nationaux sont ceux que le Gouvernement devrait établir et choisir à un moment donné selon les priorités de l'heure. Ce sont des buts spécifiques touchant les secteurs ou sous-systèmes de la société canadienne. Les politiques sont les lignes d'action que développeraient les ministères

et organismes du gouvernement. Ce sont des stratégies visant à réaliser les objectifs nationaux. Les programmes et les opérations sont également préparés et dirigés par les ministères et autres agences. Ce sont des plans particuliers pour la réalisation des objectifs établis.

4. Le premier document à analyser présente trois options politiques pour la conduite à l'avenir des relations canado-américaines (surtout économiques). Le second Mémoire, pour sa part, tente de dégager le contexte où ces relations sont susceptibles de se développer. Deux facteurs doivent être pris en considération dans le choix d'une politique plutôt que d'une autre. Il faut tenir compte des aspirations, besoins et volontés exprimés par les citoyens du Canada. Par ailleurs, il ne faut pas oublier de "voir ce qui, à un moment donné, est possible" (Politique étrangère au service des Canadiens, p. 6). Tout gouvernement réaliste s'efforce de répondre aux désirs de la population dans la limite de ses moyens et celles qu'impose l'environnement. Des facteurs externes interviennent souvent qui restreignent la capacité et la liberté d'action des gouvernants. La situation internationale est en constante évolution, d'où les contraintes qu'elle exerce nécessairement sur les décisions concernant les politiques à long terme. La dynamique des relations entre nations force les "decision-makers" à adopter des politiques souples, capables d'adaptation aux changements survenus dans l'environnement.

5. Tout gouvernement doit donc évaluer les avantages et les inconvénients des options qui s'offrent à lui. Il lui faut relever les facteurs positifs et les éléments négatifs qui influencent une politique afin d'obtenir une vision claire de la route à suivre avec ses difficultés potentielles repérées.

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Le Mémoire sur les options pour l'avenir fait mention des pour et des contre reliés à chaque option étudiée. Nous ne nous pencherons que sur la troisième option, à titre d'illustration et dû au fait également qu'elle semble avoir reçu l'approbation du Cabinet. Elle s'énonce comme suit:

une stratégie globale délibérée et
à long terme pour développer et
renforcer l'économie canadienne.

Ses buts consistent à "diminuer, avec le temps, la vulnérabilité de l'économie canadienne aux facteurs externes (Etats-Unis surtout) et affermir notre capacité de promouvoir les objectifs canadiens fondamentaux, à la fois économiques et politiques, y compris le développement d'un sentiment plus fort de l'identité et de l'unité nationales" (Memorandum to Cabinet, September 29, 1971, pp. 9-10).

6. Un aspect limitatif de cette option, et qui est reconnu dans le Mémoire et le Livre Blanc, est que "la prédominance économique et technologique (américaine) se maintiendra sans doute encore durant la prochaine décennie (et qu'elle) continuera à se faire sentir au Canada dans les domaines politique, économique et social" (Politique étrangère au service des Canadiens, p. 23). Bien qu'il soit reconnu que "cette évolution devrait favoriser la croissance économique du Canada...il faudra y porter une attention soutenue et en contrôler constamment le développement, pour éviter le danger qu'elle comporte d'une érosion de la souveraineté, de l'indépendance et de la personnalité nationales du Canada" (Idem, p. 24).

7. Ce dernier point est important puisqu'il réfère à l'identité même du Canada. C'est à travers cette recherche d'une identité plus distincte qu'in -

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tervient le facteur positif, soit l'opinion publique canadienne, laquelle supporte une plus grande indépendance de notre pays vis-à-vis des Etats-Unis. Les Canadiens, pour la majorité, souhaitent que le Canada prenne ses distances à l'égard des Etats-Unis. La plupart des Canadiens craignent une plus grande intégration avec notre puissant voisin du Sud. Le nationalisme canadien s'est développé ces dernières années, un indice que les citoyens du pays désirent que le Canada projette l'image d'un pays ayant une personnalité individuelle propre (Memorandum to Cabinet, September 29, 1971, p. 9). Le Livre Blanc remarque la tendance "à s'insurger de plus en plus... à l'idée de vivre dans l'ombre des Etats-Unis et de leur politique étrangère, de dépendre économiquement de la prospérité américaine et de subir l'influence envahissante de cette forte et vigoureuse société dans sa vie de tous les jours" (p. 7).

8. Maintenant, il serait utile de considérer s'il est possible, et de quelle manière, de rattacher cette option politique envers les Etats-Unis aux trois grands buts nationaux établis par le Gouvernement. Eu égard au premier but, à savoir que "le Canada maintiendra en toute sécurité son indépendance politique", il faut admettre que cette option favorise cette orientation. En ce qui touche les questions de sécurité, le Canada continuera de participer à l'effort commun de défense nord-américain et nord-atlantique; les Etats-Unis auront besoin, bien qu'à un degré moindre certainement, de la collaboration canadienne au cours des prochaines années pour assurer la sécurité maximale du continent. L'effort pour consolider l'économie canadienne et cette tentative pour diversifier nos rapports économiques constituent des facteurs positifs militant pour une plus grande indépendance politique.

9. C'est avec le second grand but national, soit que "le Canada et tous les Canadiens jouiront d'une prospérité générale et croissante", que le choix de la troisième option pourrait entrer quelque peu en conflit, en ce sens qu'un dégageant de l'emprise américaine serait susceptible de provoquer à court terme des effets regrettables sur l'activité économique canadienne. Ce but pourrait rencontrer des obstacles, vu que "la majorité (de la population du pays) semble avoir pour objectif d'atteindre le plus haut niveau de prospérité compatible avec le maintien de l'indépendance politique" (Politique étrangère au service des Canadiens, p. 10; c'est nous qui soulignons).

10. Mais il existe peu de doute que cette option représente à long terme une politique saine et salutaire pour le Canada, aussi bien économiquement que politiquement. Il est peu probable que les Etats-Unis réagissent inconsiderément à cette orientation canadienne, car nous leur sommes encore de quelque utilité, si ce n'est que dans le domaine de l'approvisionnement en ressources naturelles dont les Etats-Unis commencent à ressentir un besoin de plus en plus pressant et dont le Canada est un important réservoir, malgré les affirmations divergentes récentes de Herman Kahn à l'effet que les Etats-Unis n'ont pas un besoin absolu des richesses naturelles canadiennes et que c'est un cadeau qu'ils font au Canada en les lui achetant.

11. Le rapport avec le troisième grand but national, à savoir que "tous les Canadiens trouveront dans leur vie et dans leurs rapports avec les autres peuples des valeurs à conserver et à enrichir", est plus difficile à établir. On peut dire, cependant, que les échanges économiques entre les

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nations peuvent être un premier pas vers des échanges plus valables et plus fructueux, tels ceux dans le domaine culturel et des valeurs et des contacts humains. Il est vrai, toutefois, que le scénario inverse est susceptible de se développer aussi...

12. Le Livre Blanc et le Mémoire à l'étude soulignent tous deux l'importance de la coordination de la politique, si l'on veut qu'elle soit efficace. Le second document favorise la mise sur pied d'un mécanisme pour recueillir et étudier toutes les informations et données ayant trait aux relations canado-américaines (p. 14). En attendant la création d'un tel système, il est de la responsabilité du CIRE (ICER) de "veiller à ce que la planification des ministères soit conforme aux intérêts du Gouvernement à l'étranger" (Politique étrangère au service des Canadiens, p. 40).

Etant donné que l' "intégration (structurelle) aussi poussée que possible des services étrangers" du Gouvernement ne semble pas progresser, il faut s'attacher à développer et renforcer les mécanismes existants de consultation entre les divers ministères afin d'assurer la meilleure coordination de la politique. Et ce qui est peut-être en fin de compte plus important, il faut travailler à promouvoir un esprit de coopération franche et ouverte entre les individus et organismes concernés par les relations avec l'extérieur. L'on doit viser à une intégration d'attitude, la seule qui puisse conduire à une véritable collaboration interministérielle et interpersonnelle.

13. Tenter de relier l'objectif national contenu dans l'option 3 aux grandes orientations de politique peut être considéré comme un exercice de l'esprit, mais, si l'on y regarde de plus près, cela peut s'avérer utile. Il nous

est possible alors de voir dans quelle mesure un thème ou l'autre reçoit plus d'attention. Et comme ces thèmes ou orientations forment le cadre de la politique étrangère également, "la tendance de cette politique étrangère à un moment donné sera déterminée par l'importance relative que le Gouvernement attribue à ces orientations politiques générales" (Politique étrangère au service des Canadiens, p. 14).

La relation est surtout visible avec les deux premiers thèmes et nous ne nous pencherons que sur ceux-là, à savoir "stimuler la croissance économique" et "préserver la souveraineté et l'indépendance".

14. A court terme, cet objectif peut paraître entrer en contradiction avec le développement de l'économie canadienne, mais à longue échéance cela la rendra plus forte et plus compétitive. Il nous sera plus facile de résister à l'attraction croissante des Etats-Unis et d'éviter de tomber dans l'orbite américaine. Cette attitude canadienne ne doit pas être confondue avec de l'anti-américanisme, mais elle doit être interprétée comme un désir manifeste d'une spécificité canadienne. Nous ne voulons pas que notre image soit submergée par notre voisin. Mais il faut admettre que cette volonté de vivre en harmonie avec les Etats-Unis et distincts d'eux simultanément a rencontré de plus en plus de difficultés au cours des 25 dernières années. Ces deux buts peuvent sembler conflictuels aux yeux des dirigeants américains... lorsqu'ils nous considèrent... En effet, nous devons nous résigner au fait que "nous ne sommes qu'un élément dans le panorama des intérêts, responsabilités et engagements globaux des Etats-Unis" (Memorandum to Cabinet, September 29, 1971, p. 1). Les Etats-Unis peuvent nous causer des dommages économiques sérieux seulement en prenant des décisions sans avoir regardé les effets po-

tentiels pour le Canada.

Cette situation est le résultat d'une évolution: "l'impact des Etats-Unis devient un facteur plus important pour nous alors que nous semblons compter moins dans la perception qu'ont les Etats-Unis de leur intérêt national" (Idem, p. 2). Cette perception devient plus étroite et est reliée aux préoccupations, problèmes et priorités domestiques.


Atteindre l'objectif de l'option 3 contribuera certainement à la préservation de la souveraineté et de l'indépendance du Canada, laquelle constitue la seconde grande orientation de politique. Cependant, la marche vers la réalisation de cet objectif devra être graduelle si l'on veut parer à d'éventuelles mesures de représailles de la part des Etats-Unis. Le document souligne l'importance pour le Canada de "relations fondamentalement harmonieuses avec les Etats-Unis" (Idem, p. 5). Force nous est de reconnaître que ces rapports "spéciaux" avec les Etats-Unis ont continué à nous offrir des avantages remarquables, contribuant à un haut niveau de vie, à la sécurité du point de vue militaire et un accès facile à ce qui demeure, sous tous les rapports, la société la plus dynamique et la plus vigoureuse du monde" (Idem, p. 1).

15. Cette insistance du gouvernement sur les deux orientations citées plus haut vont façonner la politique extérieure du pays, en vertu du concept du prolongement. A l'étranger, cela signifiera la protection des intérêts économiques et commerciaux canadiens, la promotion de nos exportations vers de nouveaux marchés, de meilleurs programmes culturels et d'information destinés à présenter une image plus juste de la personnalité et de l'individualité du Canada.

16. Essayons maintenant de voir s'il n'est pas fait mention d'"objectifs nationaux" dans ces documents. Mais auparavant, étudions quelque peu la notion d'"objectif national". On a dit plus haut que l'objectif national était fixé par le Gouvernement en accord avec les priorités du moment.⁽¹⁾ Il concerne un secteur ou un sous-système de la société canadienne. Le Canada, dans son ensemble, peut être considéré comme le système total. Ce système comporte plusieurs sous-systèmes, comme par exemple le sous-système politique, le sous-système économique, les sous-systèmes culturel et social, etc... En vue de réaliser ses grands buts nationaux, le Gouvernement établit des objectifs nationaux correspondant à ces sous-systèmes de la société canadienne. Ces objectifs doivent concourir à l'actualisation des grands buts fondamentaux. Ils y parviennent en s'attachant aux grandes orientations de politique qui, elles, rejoignent les grands buts nationaux. D'autre part, il faut garder à l'esprit que ces sous-systèmes sont eux-mêmes l'agglomération de sous-sous-systèmes. Ainsi, le sous-système économique englobe les sous-sous-systèmes agricole, industriel, des pêches, etc... qui, eux aussi, se subdivisent en catégories. Ces catégories et sous-sous-systèmes doivent avoir également leurs objectifs particuliers. Ces objectifs correspondent grosso modo à ceux que l'on rencontre dans le Livre bleu du Budget des Dépenses (Estimates Blue Book) au titre des objectifs principaux et objectifs de programmes des ministères. Nous avons donc affaire à une structure pyramidale d'objectifs qui doivent se supporter et s'im-

(1) Il est à remarquer qu'il s'agit là, et dans la suite du paragraphe, d'un modèle proposé et non de ce qui existe explicitement dans la réalité.

briquer les uns les autres. De plus, les objectifs combinés de tous les sous-systèmes doivent tendre vers les grands buts nationaux à travers les grandes orientations de politique. Le dessin ci-dessous illustre ces interrelations à différents niveaux.



17. Le sous-système analysé dans les Mémoires est celui de l'économie. Encore une fois, nous concentrerons notre réflexion sur la troisième option pour les motifs énumérés plus haut. Il n'est pas inutile, à ce stade, de répéter l'objectif national qu'elle renferme: "réduire, avec le temps, la vulnérabilité de l'économie canadienne aux facteurs externes, en particulier à l'influence américaine, et développer notre capacité de promouvoir les buts fondamentaux du Canada, aussi bien économiques que politiques, y compris le développement d'un sentiment plus fort de l'identité et de l'unité nationales" (Memorandum to Cabinet, September 29, 1971, pp. 9-10). Cet objectif rejoint les deux grands buts nationaux relatifs à l'indépendance politique et à la prospérité du pays par l'intermédiaire des deux premières orientations de politique, soit "stimuler la croissance économique" et "préserver la souveraineté et l'indépendance". L'un des buts de l'option 3 est de relancer l'économie sur une base plus rationnelle, plus efficace et moins vulnérable afin qu'elle soit concurrentielle sur les marchés intérieur et mondial (Idem, p. 10).

18. Il est indispensable de peser les contraintes et d'évaluer les soutiens lorsque l'on établit un objectif. Ainsi, dans le cas qui nous intéresse, le fait que "des rapports canado-américains harmonieux resteront une importante nécessité pour la mise en oeuvre réussie de la stratégie canadienne de réduction de la vulnérabilité économique du Canada aux facteurs externes et de renforcement de sa capacité d'action" représente une certaine contrainte (Memorandum to Cabinet, January 1972, p. 8). Une autre restriction provient du fait que l'objectif, pour être mieux atteint, doit être poursuivi "dans un environnement fondamentalement multilatéral

régi par le principe de la nation la plus favorisée (Most Favoured Nation) /bien que/ cela n'exclut pas d'envisager certaines ententes commerciales préférentielles" (Memorandum to Cabinet, September 29, 1971, p. 10). Il faut donc que le contexte des échanges commerciaux internationaux demeure grosso modo ce qu'il est aujourd'hui, ce qui n'empêche pas une certaine évolution. Il est important également d'avoir à l'esprit l'influence que peuvent exercer les Etats-Unis sur l'environnement commercial global et les effets que cette influence peut entraîner pour les objectifs poursuivis par le Gouvernement canadien. Nous sommes tenus de nous rappeler que "le Canada, au cours de son histoire, a été dépendant de l'accès aux marchés extérieurs pour vendre ses produits de base, ses matières premières et ses biens manufacturés" (Idem, p. 2).

Comme éléments favorables, nous pouvons citer le processus de maturation par lequel l'économie canadienne est passée ainsi que l'opposition grandissante des Canadiens à l'afflux de larges investissements américains au Canada comme la facture à acquitter pour pouvoir vendre sur le marché américain (Idem, p. 5). Le nationalisme canadien a pris de l'ampleur et il commence à se faire sentir dans la sphère économique. D'autre part, le résultat recherché représente lui-même un facteur d'appui.

19. Retrouve-t-on des politiques nationales à l'intérieur de ces documents? Avant de répondre à cette question, rappelons brièvement la définition d'une "politique nationale". Il s'agit d'une stratégie destinée à réaliser un objectif national. Bien qu'elles ne soient pas très élaborées, on rencontre ici et là des politiques suggérées, que l'on dit pouvoir contribuer à l'atteinte de l'objectif national établi. Souvent, on ne fait

que citer les domaines où une politique serait d'une grande utilité. On mentionne, par exemple, une politique active pour diversifier notre commerce. On propose une politique de développement de l'industrie secondaire afin de la rendre saine et plus spécialisée" (Idem, p. 10). L'Annexe au Mémoire du 29 septembre énumère une série de politiques favorisant l'objectif national. En voici quelques-unes. Une politique de développement industriel par secteur et de rationalisation de la production constituerait un grand apport. Une politique commerciale appropriée viendrait prêter main-forte à la précédente. Une politique de l'énergie et des ressources, qui permettrait aux entreprises canadiennes de se procurer celles-là aux meilleures conditions possibles, pourrait être mise en place. La politique touchant les investissements étrangers annoncée il y a quelque temps par le Gouvernement est un pas dans la direction de l'option 3, bien que l'importance du pas demeure discutable. Il y a aussi les politiques fiscale, scientifique et technologique, de main-d'oeuvre, etc... (Idem, pp. 15-16-17).

20. Pour que l'action combinée de ces politiques ait un plus grand impact, une coordination étroite et continue est d'une nécessité vitale. Et non seulement ces politiques, d'ordre économique surtout, doivent-elles être coordonnées entre elles, mais il faut également s'assurer qu'il y a coordination avec les politiques d'une autre nature, telles que sociale, culturelle et autres.

21. Les autres éléments du cadre conceptuel, soit les programmes et les opérations, n'apparaissent pas clairement dans ces documents.

12-3-USA file

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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THEMES, PRIORITIES AND COORDINATION
IN THE
ACHIEVEMENT OF COUNTRY OBJECTIVES
(Annex to Statement of Country Objectives)

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Washington, D. C.
April 1972
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

**THEMES, PRIORITIES AND COORDINATION
IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF COUNTRY OBJECTIVES**

(Annex to Statement of Country Objectives)

A Statement of Country Objectives is a "translation of Canada's national interests and goals into objectives for the organizational unit abroad at the level at which it is practical to frame plans and programs, estimate specific resource requirements and assign specific responsibility for execution". The Statement is not meant, however, "to be an all-encompassing document providing the only bridge between the general definition of Canada's overall policy and the actual programs of the individual country unit". It should be "closer to the daily preoccupations of the post than to the broader themes of Canadian foreign policy". The Manual recognizes that providing "bridges" between overall policy and programs is a "continuing and complex process", possibly requiring "sectoral reviews", "statements for geographic regions, etc."

2. At the risk of attempting the impossible we might try, however, to impose some key concepts of theme, priority and coordination on the mass of business conducted by Canadian Government offices in the United States. These would constitute a type of bridge between foreign policy and daily activity but not one which provides all the guidelines required nor one which replaces the Statement of Country Objectives. The Statement provides an outline of all activities in an organizational sense and an explanation of the reasons for such allocation of resources to activity in the USA. The concern of this paper is rather with areas of choice in the implementation of national policy in the USA and with how objectives of a very general nature can be implemented more effectively.

3. We recognize, of course, that a good deal of the business transacted by offices of the Canadian Government in the USA does not permit of any significant choice not, at least, of any choice requiring coordinated discussion and decision interdepartmentally or at a high policy level. There are several reasons for this. The business in question may be highly specialized and dependent on prior decisions made in Ottawa about the provision of such services and activities (e.g. consular services, channels for liaison between military or transport authorities, intelligence liaison). It may lie in the field of administrative support for other activities. It may be routine and responsive in meeting need for information and service in support of promotional activities (e.g. trade and travel promotion and general factual information about Canada). At a higher level in all these fields, however, there must be choice about tactics, and image and a need for coordinated discussion. The business in question might also be of a policy type involving discussions with agencies such as State, Defence, Commerce, White House or

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Treasury and might therefore be unpredictable, responsive and sensitive to the extent that no general guidelines can be laid down. There is obviously a need for defining priorities within these fields but they are either reasonably self-evident in terms of normal function, must be determined by good judgment at the time or would not benefit from any attempt to create general guidelines or to consult "across the board".

4. Nevertheless the Embassy and in a somewhat different way, other Canadian Government offices are supposed to be, according to the Country Planning Manual "responsive to the full spectrum of national interests as they may influence or be affected by events and attitudes in the host country". The Head of Mission has an obligation to ensure "mutual harmonization, local acceptability and consistency with Canada's foreign policy objectives". The problem lies in knowing how to ensure that this will be done with an effort which is efficient in terms of expenditure of resources. Somewhere between useless statements of "quasi-universal applicability" and statements equally pointless at the other extreme of specialization, there are some areas of sufficiently general concern to warrant discussion and an attempt at a rational consensus about priorities. These are areas of choice in the implementation of policy and it is only in this sense that the phrase "policy coordination" could be used of this exercise. "Policy coordination" strictly speaking, of course, is an Ottawa function if basic national interests are at stake; even the Embassy in Washington can only perceive and comment on a need for such coordination.

AREAS OF CONCERN

- (A) THEMES IN THE PROJECTION OF THE CANADIAN IMAGE
- (B) CONCENTRATION OF EFFORT, REGIONALLY OR FUNCTIONALLY
- (C) THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF COORDINATION

(A) THEMES IN THE PROJECTION OF THE CANADIAN IMAGE

5. While there are some sectors of Canadian Government activity which have no impact on the US public and its image of Canada, it is, nevertheless, the informational-representational dimension of our work (for whatever particular departmental purpose) which is the most recognizable common element in planning and programming. Officers whose attention is very much focussed on "back-room" discussions with US officials about some esoteric realm of international political or economic affairs cannot help being aware of the long-term significance of understanding or misunderstanding,

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sympathy or irritability of a general nature with respect to Canada in various circles of US society (including the bureaucratic ones with which they are dealing). Senior officers with this orientation are likely to have to devote part of their time to speech making and representational activity in which the choice of appropriate points to make is not easy. Officers in fields of specialization requiring little public exposure or "information" activity as such are often able to communicate something of general value within the circles of normal contact.

6. It is a legitimate question with some very practical implications, therefore, to ask whether it is possible to reach a consensus about the main thrust of the Canadian message, expressed in terms of the major points which we would like to see firmly imbedded in the consciousness of Americans. Traditionally that thrust has been provided in a quite pragmatic and responsive way as a reaction to "problems", as a courteous reply to a request for a talk on a particular subject in repetition of points made by a member of the Government in Ottawa or (most likely) on the basis of the personal judgment by the officer concerned in Washington or elsewhere. While there can never be any exact rules about an official function which, by its very nature, requires careful judgment on each occasion, tact and a sense of an audience, perhaps a consensus about what ideally we would like to get across would provide very helpful practical guidelines to the speaker and accordingly provide some guidance for information work generally and generally for our "ideological stance" in contacts with Americans.

7. We will never be able, even if we agree on all the main points, to make all of them to any one audience. We must also start with the wishes of audience; if they know that all they want to be informed about is fishing in northern lakes, Eskimo sculpture, killing seals, or trade in particular commodities, there is little point in trying to tell them why we recognized the People's Republic of China, or what our major domestic problems are. We are considering rather a potential audience of any size which manifests some interest in "what's it like in Canada, what's going on there, how are you getting along with the US Government, what do Canadians think about the things that bother us in the world and at home?" If the curiosity and receptivity are that broad, we have an invitation to provide a balanced account which might leave the audience with a genuine sense of Canadian perspectives recognizably different from their own. The question to which we have to address ourselves is "what are some of the main ingredients of that balanced account, under present circumstances?"

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8. The following points are provided primarily by way of example and for purposes of discussion. Defining the main thrust of our approach to the Americans will require further consideration of the implications of our Gallup Poll "Attitudes of the U.S. Public toward Canada", and a contribution from offices throughout the country (the Washington perspective is, of course, inevitably biased towards the problems of the moment in Government-to-Government relations).

Some Selected Themes

- (i) It is always tempting to catalogue differences and similarities as between Canada and the USA and to respond to American protestations of friendship with assurances of undying amity and similarity of viewpoint. The essential point of departure in understanding Canada-USA relations is that Canada is, and will clearly remain, a foreign country so far as the USA is concerned in ways which many Americans are only beginning to realize. Our political orientation, domestic and foreign, and our historical experience are quite distinct from those of the USA and the passage of time since we became completely independent of Great Britain earlier in the century and exercised our own judgment in world affairs has simply made that fact more obvious.

We must expect, therefore, to have the conflicts of interest and judgment which characterize relations between independent states, even friendly ones. That Canada is and will remain within the ranks of nations having close and friendly relations with the USA is clear; mutual interest demands this; the history of our relations since Canada assumed control of its own external relations following the first world war bears testimony to an impressive degree of effective collaboration, development of institutional means of conducting relations, ability to overcome differences of opinion and parallel action in many international organizations to achieve political stability and to stimulate economic and social progress. We have tended in the recent past to describe all of this as a "special" relationship and to let it appear at times as though there were some law of automatic friendship (based on social, cultural or linguistic ties) which meant that we had achieved a relationship which was unique in kind as between two sovereign states. In

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fact our relations are unique in the degree of mutual involvement and interdependence but they require the same determined effort as in the case of other states to reach accommodation of diverging interests. Mutual respect and friendship are the fruits of the successful achievement of such accommodations not necessarily the basic conditions with which we begin, even in the case of the Canadian and American peoples.

- (ii) Canada's principal domestic political problem is to achieve a more stable and satisfying relationship between the two linguistic and cultural communities and to reduce the threat of separatism. The political survival of Canada in this sense is a matter for Canadians to deal with but there are some external implications in Canada-USA relations. To the extent that our external economic policies in some fields may have to recognize certain unique problems of protecting Canadian society and may at the same time run counter to US expectations, we may have problems. It would appear to be in the US interest to view sympathetically the reasons for such action. The continuing existence on its northern frontier of the Canadian Confederation as a politically stable and economically prosperous state is in the best interests of the USA from any standpoint.
- (iii) Canada's principal economic concern is to help develop, along with other major developed and trading nations, the best conditions for a maximum flow of trade across national frontiers and for confidence and stability in monetary affairs. Relatively external trade is much more important for Canada than for the USA. If Canadians seem to become unduly exercised over questions of principle with respect to liberal trading conditions this is not a theoretical or long-term political concern. It is related to very immediate questions of national prosperity. Canadian protests about the surcharge were a reflection of this kind of concern. Canada must of course try to develop its own economy in such a way that it can compete effectively with much larger political and economic trading units, not in order necessarily to diminish the overall

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importance of trade for the economy but to ensure a reasonable degree of flexibility and resiliency in the event of unforeseen changes or crises in other areas where Canadian influence on the broad direction of economic policy may be very limited. This is the context in which Canada-USA economic relations must be understood.

- (iv) Canada as a "foreign" nation, with its own kind of domestic preoccupations and external interests, is nevertheless and will continue to be a very open society which tolerates a high degree of external influence in sensitive sectors (university education) and of political choice (toleration of legal separatist party). It welcomes the easy movement of people, commerce and ideas across its border with the USA and will do whatever it can to protect this open and friendly relationship because of the benefits which this brings to its own people. Any limits placed on such penetration or control from outside do not spring from opposition in principle to a welcome degree of social and cultural integration and general international interdependence with a number of peoples, only to a corruption of such movement which would be reflected in the development of a USA-Canadian "bloc". We wish to retain our capacity to be open to and on good relationships with France, the Commonwealth, Western Europe, etc. where the benefits of types of integration and influence are also very important to us.
- (v) In a limitationist phase of foreign policy with Americans particularly conscious of the costs and frustrations of maintaining a world role, there is a natural tendency to think of allies as those who are protected as an act of generosity and far-sighted wisdom by the USA. In this atmosphere it is easy to forget the extent to which vital interests of the USA are protected by international security systems to which others contribute. Canada cannot allow itself to be lumped in with the European members of NATO on the "burden sharing" issue; its position is quite distinct from that of European NATO members and from that of the USA which can determine a balance of power in Europe by its presence there. The important question is not why Canada reduced and changed the nature of its small force in Europe but why there are any Canadian forces there at all. Canadian commitments, under the

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defence policy announced last year, to protection of the US strategic deterrent and to full participation in NATO as a military and political association may have to be stressed to avoid any assumption that we are given our security as a "gift" by the USA.

(vi) It may be necessary to stress as a theme the fact that any Canadian emphasis on our "vulnerability" to developments in the USA or on the disparity of power between the two countries must not be misunderstood as a claim for sympathy, "special consideration" or particular generosity on the part of the USA. Canada has no reason or need for any greater generosity of spirit on the part of the USA than it is prepared to manifest itself towards its neighbour. Our standard of living is close to that of the USA; our economy has developed in recent decades in such a way that we can compete effectively with a wide range of manufactured goods to supplement exports of resources. Obviously it is the strength and competitive nature of the Canadian economy which produces some of the present strain in present relations. Canadian prosperity offers good market prospects for Americans (and vice versa) and although we continue to benefit considerably from the capital and technology we get from the USA we have over the years contributed in many ways to continental development (extended and secure markets for US, immigration of talented Canadians, etc.). Because of the disparity in total power, however, the USA could by its trading and monetary policies, injure Canadian interests in such a way that the smaller nation would have to alter its economic and trading policies, to its own loss in the short term but also probably to the loss of the USA, both in economic and political terms. We believe, however, that the interests of two expanding economies are compatible and "negotiable".

(vii) Following on the theme above, the range of products offered for sale in the USA, the range and sophistication of tourist services, the conditions advantageous to US interests to be found in the Canadian market and the advantages for immigrants might be emphasized in order to create a "contemporary" image of Canadian society favourable to our interests.

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(viii) So far as Canadian foreign policy and world outlook in general are concerned, we are probably approaching the point at which it is not necessary to be explaining away too much our divergences from the USA on matters such as recognition of China, Cuba, or NATO. Where it is necessary to clarify such matters of policy because there clearly is misunderstanding we should do so but where we have a choice of emphasis we might simply let it be taken for granted that our judgments are bound to diverge on some matters because our policies are formulated independently on the basis of differing national interests. We could then concentrate on explaining something of our interests and world perspectives and on considering current and future problem areas in terms of "what are we to do", in areas where there is already a strong Canadian interest and input to international thinking: international environmental control, new relationships with USSR and Eastern European nations, efficacy of UN. In all of this, we have no need to proclaim "independence" as an objective or to imply that we can be the mentor and conscience of the USA; we will have more influence and earn more respect if we have some cogent arguments about international action in areas where US and Canadian interests are much the same.

9. It will never be possible, as we have emphasized, to develop all of these themes in any one speech or before one audience. In the case of some audiences, it may be possible to assume that these points are well enough understood now; we could accordingly concentrate on the detail of some current and interesting development or some specialized interest of the audience in question. Obviously developing these broad themes means that we must rely on (a) the Speakers' Handbook for detailed documentation of Canadian policy on current and sensitive matters, (b) on all the general information resources of Canadian offices for projecting Canada (publications, films, etc.) and (c) the specialized resources of agencies of the Government responsible for promotion of specific Canadian interests. So far as the promotion of specific Canadian interests (trade, tourism, immigration) are concerned, there may be no need to rely on broad themes at all for most regular work. The themes are intended as guidelines, where appropriate, for our collective effort to cultivate the correct general impressions among the more perceptive and influential Americans.

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(B) CONCENTRATION OF EFFORT, REGIONALLY OR FUNCTIONALLY

10. Selectivity in informational themes should be matched by selectivity with regard to targets, whether these be geographic areas, organizations or channels in the mass media. As in the selection of themes, the areas of choice for the Embassy and other offices are limited. We are committed to institutional arrangements in the form of Canadian Government offices (whose existence depends on earlier judgments about regional concentration of effort) and to functional responsibilities in terms of normal operational duties (see Statement of Country Objectives) which settle most questions of priority. The major and most effective channels in the mass media are known. The problem is to find the right subject, contact or opportunity to inject what we want and this is an area of work to which a good deal of time and expertise is already devoted. Nevertheless, in recognition of the fact that "integration" is still at an early stage, that our efforts in the USA tend to proceed departmentally and that there are some choices to be made (e.g. where Ambassador and senior officers of the Embassy might travel or speak in the USA or where Consuls-General and Consuls might do the same in their own territories) it is worth asking ourselves whether our separate visions of the USA in terms of working priorities and general importance are logically related one to another and mutually reinforcing or whether they need coordination and revision.

11. It is impossible to have any helpful discussion of tangible matters of Canadian interest without noting first how the USA looks from a number of different vantage points. Separate notes will have to be prepared on the landscapes as seen from those points but by way of illustration the following are possible subjects:

(i) THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

(In terms of personnel and offices how do we rank the various areas of the USA; can the other offices measure even roughly the amount of time devoted to areas outside the city of location?)

(ii) AMERICANS AS CONSUMERS OF CANADIAN PRODUCTS

(From trade promotion angle only)

(iii) AMERICANS AS TOURISTS

(Canadian Government Travel Bureau)

(iv) AMERICANS AS POTENTIAL IMMIGRANTS

(Manpower and Immigration)

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(v) AMERICANS AS AUDIENCE

(Information Section: i.e. channels, newspapers, etc.)

(vi) AMERICANS AS INFLUENTIAL INTELLECTUALS

(Information Section: leading universities, government-related centres, etc.)

(vii) AMERICANS AS AMERICANS

(Do we assume that, regardless of Canadian interests, the levers of power, must be identified geographically with concentrations of populations and industry and nationally-oriented organizations; where will they be in the next ten years?)

(viii) WHERE ARE THE CANADIANS?

(Consular offices are established partly in recognition of the existence of groups of Canadians, or former Canadians in the USA. Have their location been determined recently? We have a 1972 Almanac of Congress which provides "ethnic" breakdown for every House of Representative constituency. Canadians are identified. We hope to have the figures put together in this context.)

12. Depending on the results of the survey indicated above, we could consider questions such as the following:

- (i) Are the different sets of priorities logically determined?
- (ii) Where there are major differences in geographic concentration, does this arise from natural and effective choice of goals for different purposes or have we simply allowed ourselves to proceed in different directions for other reasons altogether?
- (iii) Where we have some choice (in Washington), do we always give priority to reinforcing a Canadian presence or to opening up something new?
- (iv) Are we to consider all employees of the Canadian Government as in effect "information agents" or do we get more effective work done by recognizing important distinctions between "experts" (in terms of the substance of particular interests),

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"promoters" (of specialized interests in relations with the public) and "information specialists". The last of these, along with the heads and senior members of offices, would therefore bear the burden of projecting Canada in the more general sense.

(C) THE RIGHTS AND WRONGS OF COORDINATION

13. If new light comes to us as a result of our attempt to apply logical standards of selectivity with regard to theme and target, there remains another well-debated question of how to coordinate (a) all our efforts (ref. Statement of Country Objectives, principles of integration, etc.) and (b) any new effort judged necessary as a result of discussion along lines indicated above. Since this is an aspect of Governmental activity with regard to which it is much easier to bemoan failures, state principles, hold meetings and invent schemes than to improve the actual quality of performance, this paper is unlikely to produce any instant solutions to the problems which are the by-products of having a great many people doing jobs which are different enough by nature that they rarely require anything which we could call "coordination", not certainly in any day-by-day sense. Normally, as between one branch and another, coordination takes place because the officer responsible perceives a need for it. It is right that this should be the normal practice because the officers concerned should be expected to use their wits and take responsibility for achieving coordination or for deciding that they can go it alone. Within branches, of course, coordination means a close working relationship, exchange of paper and an attempt to make sense out of policies, tactics, activities which belong closely enough together to be comparable. One tourist office will certainly want to coordinate its message with another one on the merits of the specific Canadian tourist facilities and different officers in the political and economic branches of the Embassy will want to ensure that the messages they are conveying at different levels to the State Department on sensitive matters of Canadian policy are consistent one with another and with declared policy in Ottawa. A good part of the work of these latter sections is devoted to an attempt to help Departments in Ottawa and eventually the Cabinet to coordinate policy and reconcile conflicts of interest. A large part of the work of the Information Section is devoted to the attempt to ensure coordination between policy and the public statement of policy.

14. As opposed to this specialist and pragmatic approach to coordination, of course, it can fairly be argued that all Canadian offices should have a more or less common basis of information and views about current

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policies which can be used to project Canada and to guide those offices in choices they may have to make about priorities. Intelligent perceptions of the need for coordination (reference remarks made above) do depend on up-to-date knowledge of what people in other branches are doing and worrying about and on a general understanding about division of functions and national objectives. Apart from anything that can be achieved by circulation of paper and general directives, there is obviously a need for personal contact, meetings on varying scales at regular intervals and debate focussed on real choices in some of the areas mentioned above. Perhaps, in addition to meetings of branches in Washington of representatives of all offices in the USA on a yearly basis, or of mixed groups in Ottawa, and in addition to what is achieved now by travel of Washington-based information officers or by travel of the Ambassador and others for speaking purposes, there would be grounds for establishing a liaison branch in Washington concerned with all the elements of coordination between the central office and the posts around the country.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

123-USA

STATEMENT
OF
COUNTRY OBJECTIVES

Washington, D.C.
April 1972
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

STATEMENT OF COUNTRY OBJECTIVES

B R O A D O B J E C T I V E S

- a) To obtain optimum advantage for Canada, both at home and abroad, from our exceptionally wide range of interaction with the United States, while at the same time augmenting our distinct identity, reducing our vulnerability and maintaining a harmonious relationship.

Because of its superpower status, its economic, commercial and financial predominance, its scientific and technological pre-eminence and its political and social dynamism, the United States has inescapable significance for Canada. These basic poles of international attraction and influence are amplified in Canada's case by the affinities of shared origins, history, language and culture as well as by contiguity of continental dimensions. Such factors and the disparity of power between the two countries contribute to making the United States the single most important foreign entity with which Canada must contend. Few aspects of Canadian life escape involvement and our economic prosperity, cultural identity and national sovereignty are thereby exposed and are sometimes vulnerable to a high degree of U.S. influence. Although there are 16 bilateral consultative bodies of an official nature, the Embassy and Consular offices remain the principal continuing instruments for concerted action at the government's disposal.

- b) To keep the Government well informed about U.S. foreign policy objectives and activities as well as to make representations when instructed about Canadian views on these matters.
- c) To exercise an influence, through representations, bilateral consultations and negotiations, on the domestic and international economic, financial and commercial policies of the United States as they effect the maintenance and expansion of access for Canadian goods and services in the United States and abroad, particularly fully manufactured and high technology products, as well as contributing to economic development and social well-being in Canada.

The United States is, by far, Canada's largest foreign market and currently accounts for two out of every three dollars of our export earnings. The U.S. economic measures in 1971

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underlined the sensitivity of Canada's secondary manufacturers to the U.S.A. market and the necessity of maintaining close relationships with decision makers at Washington, as well as receiving regional inputs from Canadian offices located throughout the United States.

- d) To analyze, consult, report and negotiate, within policies designed to ensure the sovereignty and security of Canada, on all aspects of the air, land and sea defence of North America.

The defence relationship involves the vital interest of both countries, but is complicated by an asymmetry of power and responsibility, devolving from the international commitments and interests of the United States which greatly exceed those of Canada.

- e) To promote Canada's economic growth and cultural enrichment through extensive immigration and other programmes related to human resource development.

The United States of America represents a large actual and potential source of immigrants covering a wide range of occupations. In 1970, the USA provided almost 17% of Canada's total immigration movement. In 1971, it replaced the United Kingdom as our principal immigrant source country. American immigrants adapt readily to the Canadian social and economic environment. They have played a major role in the development of Canada in the past, and will have much more to contribute to our national character and prosperity in the future. While immigration programmes will largely be implemented through consular offices, the USA has extensive sophisticated programmes for the development of her manpower resources, which the Embassy should follow and report on.

- f) To promote an accurate understanding of Canada's national purposes, to elaborate as required on the federal nature of the Canadian constitution and the division of powers between the federal and provincial governments and to reflect as appropriate the interests of the provinces, to increase general knowledge about the bilingual and multicultural character of Canada, and to foster recognition of Canada's achievements in

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all fields of endeavour to ensure that Canadian interests and Canadian culture distinctness are favourably known and interpreted among the public, policy-making and decision-taking institutions throughout the United States so as to create conditions conducive to the achievement of Canada's national goals.

The incessant creativity of American culture, the sophistication and extent of communications media and the existence of a common language present problems for Canada in maintaining and developing its cultural distinctness and national identity. Nevertheless, the very existence of these factors also provide the means for countering the impact of USA influence and for creating conditions conducive to the achievement of Canadian objectives in the economic, political and social environments. Because of the importance and magnitude of the task, coordination is essential and the Embassy is accorded such responsibilities for the entire USA and will maintain liaison with consular offices to this end.

- g) To protect and promote the interests of Canadian nationals, both individuals and bodies corporate, within the limits permitted by international law.

O B J E C T I V E S B Y P R O G R A M M E

I. G E N E R A L R E L A T I O N S

(a) Coordination and Management

To attain the optimum utilization of financial, personnel and material resources (currently totalling over 150 officers, 225 support staff from ten government departments) to accomplish programme objectives in the fields listed below. This involves the implementation of management techniques for improved direction, coordination and control so that the Canadian Government receives the timely services and accurate information it requires and that the United States Government obtains the impression of Canadian views and policies best calculated to influence the formulation of U.S. programmes and policies in Canada's general interest.

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Under governmental regulations and departmental instructions, the Embassy has liaison and coordination responsibilities for Canadian Consulates General and Consulates within the USA. This includes such programmes as cultural and information activities, political, economic and social reporting and other programmes having a nation-wide context.

(b) Political/Social

1. To maintain contact with the Executive Branch of the US Government so as to communicate Canadian Government views, seek US Government views, make representations and conduct negotiations on matters of a bilateral and international political nature;
2. To follow trends and to exert effective influence over significant sections of the legislative branch;
3. To follow activities and assist in the work of the bilateral consultative mechanism comprising 16 groups, committees and commissions;
4. To report to the responsible agencies of the Canadian Government such current developments in the US and in US Government policies as are relevant to Canadian international and domestic objectives;
5. To analyze medium and long-term developments so as to assist in the formulation of Canadian foreign policy. Specific subject areas for reporting, liaison, discussions or negotiation include:
 - (i) United States foreign policy in particular regions such as Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, South East Asia; in international organizations such as the UN and NATO; and in relation to particular problems such as India/Pakistan, relations with PRC, etc.
 - (ii) Current international developments on which information useful to the Canadian Government is available in Washington.

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- (iii) Defence policy; political-military issues; arms control; and disarmament.
 - (iv) United States domestic politics.
 - (v) Liaison with international organizations and agencies.
 - (vi) The exchange of intelligence and assessments of intelligence about international situations having a bearing on Canadian national security and Canadian foreign, defence and economic policies.
 - (vii) Provision of staff services for the large number of ministerial and official delegations which frequently visit Washington for liaison and negotiations with U.S. authorities.
- (c) Economic/scientific/Technological

To maintain effective contact with the Executive Branch of the US Government so as to communicate Canadian Government views, seek US views, make representations and conduct negotiations on the full range of national and international economic questions;

To report to the responsible agencies of the Canadian Government such current developments in the USA and in US Government policy as may affect Canada's bilateral and international economic relations;

To analyze economic and related developments of a medium and long-term nature so as to assist in the formulation of Canadian domestic and international economic policy. This activity will include contacts, representations, negotiation, analysis and reporting in such areas as:

- (1) Financial questions as balance-of-payments, foreign investment, taxation, fiscal and monetary policy and affairs.
- (2) Economic and social policy such as US economic game plan, budget, tax reform, anti-trust policies, social developments including consumer protection, law enforcement, drugs, transportation and communications, energy, commodities, resources.

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- (3) Liaison with such international organizations as the World Bank, IMF.
- (4) See also Trade and Industrial Development programme (p.10)

To maximize the advantage available from the world's most technologically advanced and industrially innovative society through liaison, representations, analysis reporting and negotiations in such fields as:

- (a) U.S. science and planning for pure and applied research;
- (b) space questions;
- (c) atomic energy;
- (d) Arctic/northern research, oceanography;
- (e) environmental questions of a bilateral and international nature including water and air pollution, IJC activities, Stockholm conference, etc.

To analyze, report on and make representations about agricultural and fisheries questions having implications for Canada.

To analyze, report on and make representations to ensure access for Canadian metals, minerals and other commodities to the United States and other markets.

II. CONSULAR

1. To provide protection, assistance and appropriate services for the 1,500 Canadian residents in the consular territory, and for some 3,000 Canadian visitors, and to provide appropriate consular and notarial service for foreign nationals.

Consular work is essentially responsive but it involves a service to the public and has a large public relations content; its efficient and polite performance can engender much goodwill; failure to do so even in a few isolated areas, particularly those of a compassionate nature, can cause harm out of all proportion to their number.

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All holders of a Consular Commission are empowered and have an obligation to perform the full range of consular functions set forth in the Consular Manual whatever their other functions may be.

2. To keep in touch with appropriate authorities in order to be aware of changes in legislation in the consular field, particularly with regard to matters concerning immigration, visas and selective service, and to keep headquarters and consular offices in the USA informed accordingly.

III. CULTURAL AND INFORMATION

To sponsor cultural and information programmes including the mounting of exhibitions, showing of films and dissemination of information through the mass media and other means, the promotion of Canadian studies in universities and other Canadian institutions and such other programmes as will produce a wider and more accurate awareness of Canada, thereby creating favourable conditions for the accomplishment of Canadian objectives in policy areas.

The Embassy's cultural and information responsibilities extend throughout the whole of U.S.A. territory and therefore involve the coordination and assistance with respect to programmes of the thirteen consular posts in this territory.

IV. DEFENCE LIAISON SERVICES

1. To provide liaison between the Canadian Forces and the U.S. armed forces, by means of relations with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defence, to advise the Ambassador on such matters and along with other branches of the Embassy, to contribute to the assessment of defence policy referred to under "Political/Social" and covered by the broad objective of ensuring the security of Canada.
2. To analyse and report on the policy, plans, organizational and technical developments of the U.S.A. armed forces for both materiel and personnel which have significance for Canada.
3. To prepare contingency plans.

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4. To provide administrative support for all Canadian forces personnel on duty in the United States, including personnel located in various centres throughout the United States for liaison purposes.
5. To obtain, analyse and report on scientific research programmes and developments in the United States in the field of defence and to provide liaison with appropriate agencies and institutions concerning Canadian research relating to the defence field.
6. To provide CFHQ regularly with current U.S. intelligence assessments of international political/military developments.

V. IMMIGRATION

- a) To offer responsive service to immigration enquiries and directing candidates to the appropriate area office. To provide facilities for the selection, counselling and processing of immigrants on a periodical basis and as required.
- b) To prohibit the entry of undesirables as well as of persons inadmissible under the Canadian Immigration Act.
- c) To provide liaison with U.S. Government departments involved in enforcement of immigration laws and in domestic security in order to facilitate the exchange of information of mutual concern and to provide interpretation and clarification of policy.

VI. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

To analyze, report and provide liaison with appropriate agencies in the field of assistance to developing countries, including their programmes and activities.

To keep CIDA informed of policy and programme development in the Agency for International Development (AID).

To provide liaison between AID and CIDA on national programmes and to coordinate participation in multi-lateral programmes.

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VII. MANPOWER

To assist in the development and utilization of Canada's human resources by evaluating and reporting on policies, programmes and trends in human resource development in the United States of America and, as disclosed at international conferences, in other countries.

To encourage the free exchange of information, to the mutual benefit of both countries, by explaining Canadian manpower policies and activities to officials of the government and other interested agencies in the United States of America.

To encourage Canadians studying at United States institutions in the Washington area to return home on completion of their studies by providing them with information about opportunities for employment in Canada.

There are many similarities in the economic and social structures of Canada and the U.S.A. Because of these similarities, the strong and increasing emphasis on human resource development in both countries, and the relative accessibility of relevant information, the United States of America is an important source of ideas and models covering a wide range of manpower programmes. Our manpower activities in the U.S.A. are of major importance to Canada.

VIII. TOURISM

To ensure the sustained and orderly growth of travel from the Washington territory to Canada; in particular, to identify short and long term opportunities for travel market development; to motivate the consumer market to travel to Canada by advertising, publicity and promotional programmes; to stimulate and assist the local travel trade; to cooperate with and assist provinces, municipalities and interested elements of the Canadian tourist industry in the development and promotion of their tourist programmes; to provide a specialized travel counselling service consistent with consumer and trade demand, and to identify short and long term opportunities for the development and promotion of the convention business consistent with the Canadian plant capability.

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IX. TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

a) Environmental Improvement

To analyse, report, consult and negotiate, as appropriate upon all aspects of United States commercial policy affecting Canada-U.S.A. trade, and the world trading environment.

To represent Canada's policies and attitudes at appropriate levels of the host government and to report upon relevant U.S. policies and attitudes.

To contribute to the formation of Canadian economic, commercial and industrial development policies through continuing analysis of the American economy and of American domestic and international policies.

(See also General Relations - Economic, p. 5)

b) Production Efficiency

To report on industrial research and development carried out through the United States Government.

c) Product Innovation

No specific objectives owing to the absence of a manufacturing base in the territory.

d) Market Development

To promote the use of Canadian goods and services for international development programmes through liaison with multilateral agencies such as the World Bank.

To identify and develop specific export opportunities in Washington.

To develop the optimum defence export market in the United States of America for the goods, services and technology of Canadian industry of identifying, stimulating and pursuing United States Government interest in utilizing Canadian industrial capability to satisfy their requirements.

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X. OTHER PROGRAMMES

(a) Labour

To maintain liaison with governmental bodies, trade unions and other associations so as to report on developments in the labour, health, education and social welfare fields, both within the United States and abroad, which could have significance for Canada.

(b) Supply and Services

To negotiate contracts for the purchase of U.S. military and other equipment in the United States, and to provide advice concerning the sale of Canadian defence products.

XI. ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES

To provide the full range of administrative services for a large Embassy, which includes representatives of many departments of government, involving:

arrivals and departures for staff as well as for ministerial and other official delegations;

budgetary and financial administration;

personnel administration;

integrated support services;

building management and maintenance.

DATE: APR 15 1982
 CHECKLIST - PREPARATION OF SUBSTANTIVE FILES FOR MICROFILMING
 LISTE DE CONTROLE - EXAMEN DE DOSSIERS - MATIERES POUR FINS DE MICROPHOTOGRAPHIE

File No./Dossier no: 12-3-USA
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Subject/Sujet: Integration of the Joint Expt. Operations - Planning, Coordinating & Integrating Services - Ctry - USA

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