



50219- AE 10 12

ACCESS TO INFORMATION L'ACCES A L'INFORMATION EXAMINED BY / EXAMINE PAR: <i>R. D. Reynolds</i> DATE / DATE: <i>July 5, 1989</i>
--

File-Tex Vertical  
Folder No. Sp. 2394-10





TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

FILE No. 50219-AE-40  
FALSE DOCKET No.

FILE SUBJECT:—

Vol. 2

Canada-U.S.A. Meeting of Consultation  
on Threat of Atomic War

SEE CORRESPONDING JACKET AT HQ.

3-1-56

~~23-10-59~~  
~~2-12-57~~

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

PUBLIC ARCHIVES RECORDS CENTRE  
DEPOT DES ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES  
OTTAWA

ACCESS TO INFORMATION  
L'ACCES A L'INFORMATION  
EXAMINED BY / EXAMINE PAR:  
*R. B. Reynolds*  
DATE / DATE:  
*July 5, 1989*

*27779*  
*K-338*

FILE No.50219-AE-40

False Jacket No. .... Vol.2

**CLOSED**



DELEGATION OF CANADA  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL



DÉLÉGATION DU CANADA  
AU CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE-NORD

~~TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL~~

Paris, October 23, 1959

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REVERT A SECRET  
HLS (M&IR)  
FEB 22 1985

Dear Jim,

*Replies.*

*has with*

50219-AE-60	
58	50

I should like to thank you for your letter of August 13 forwarding the record of the Meeting of Consultation held on November 19, 1958. The information contained therein has proved very valuable to this mission.

As requested the copy sent to us is being returned herewith.

Yours sincerely,

*Jules Léger*

Jules Léger

J. J. McCardle, Esq.  
Department of External Affairs  
Ottawa, Canada



File - 50219-AE-40  
Cross Ref 50301-A-40  
50

FM WASHDC SEP29/59 CONFD

TO EXTERNAL 2337 PRIORITY

REF OUR TEL 2297 SEP24

CDA-USA MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE

FOLLOWING FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY:

HAS THERE BEEN ANY DECISION TAKEN ON THE SUGGESTION IN OUR REFTEL THAT NOV9 BE AGREED FOR THE MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE IN WASHDC?

2. IN CONVERSATION WITH MERCHANT THIS MORNING, THIS MATTER AROSE, ALSO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE MINISTERIAL MEETING WOULD BE PRECEDED BY A QUOTE MEETING OF CONSULTATION UNQUOTE. MERCHANT WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR THE LATTER IF HELD DURING OCT AND I THINK IT IMPORTANT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW THAT HE SHOULD ATTEND. HE WILL BE AWAY (IN THE FAR EAST AND ATTENDING THE COLOMBO MEETING AS CHAIRMAN OF THE USA DELEGATION) EARLY IN NOV AND SO WILL NOT RPT NOT BE IN ATTENDANCE WHEN THE MINISTERS ARE HERE.

3. THE AMERICANS WOULD BE HAPPY TO ARRANGE A MEETING OF CONSULTATION IF THAT IS OUR WISH AND I HOPE WE WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE OUR DECISION KNOWN WITH REGARD TO BOTH MEETINGS BEFORE VERY LONG BECAUSE SOME CONSIDERABLE PREPARATION WILL BE REQUIRED. INCIDENTALLY I MENTIONED THE IMPORTANCE IN MY JUDGMENT OF A PRELIMINARY MEETING OF CONSULTATION WHEN SPEAKING TO THE MINISTER IN NY


HEENEY

000275



D.L.(1)/F.M.Tovell/cw

**FILE COPY**



~~TOP~~ SECRET AND PERSONAL

~~DOWNGRAD TO SECRET~~ August 13, 1959.

~~REBUILT A SECRET~~

Dear Jules,

LLS(M&IA)  
FEB 22 1985

The Under-Secretary has asked me to reply to your Top Secret and Personal letter to me of July 30 concerning the record of the last Meeting of Consultation.

The last meeting was held almost a year ago in Washington, on November 19 to be exact, and due to an oversight you were not sent a copy of the record previously. Although most of the discussion does not have the degree of timeliness it once had, attached is a copy for your personal information. Would you be good enough to return it to me when it has served your purpose?

Although Washington, in their telegram, refer to this record as a "draft", in point of fact it is the final version since none of the Canadian participants had any changes to suggest to it.

Best personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

J. J. MCCARDLE

Jules Léger, Esquire,  
Permanent Representative of Canada  
to the North Atlantic Council,  
PARIS.

OC I

DELEGATION OF CANADA  
TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REBUT A SECRET**  
HLS (M21A)  
FEB 22 1985 02 19 - AEF 40



DÉLÉGATION DU CANADA  
AU CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE-NORD  
1, rue Chanez, Paris 16e.

~~TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL~~

July 30, 1959.

*W. G.*

Dear Norman:

You and others in the Department have been extremely thoughtful in recent months, in sending us information about our negotiations with the United States on atomic weapons questions and related matters. I therefore hesitate to make a request which might, at first glance, seem to betray lack of appreciation.

Having made clear that, on the contrary, I am most grateful for the information you are sending me, I will make my simple request which arises out of my having recently run across an exchange of letters between Mr. Holmes and Mr. Wilgress in 1957. On November 19, 1957, Mr. Holmes wrote Mr. Wilgress a personal letter with which he enclosed for Mr. Wilgress' personal information a record of the Meeting of Consultation which was held on September 30, 1957, with United States officials in Washington. Mr. Holmes said that, because of the informal quality of the meetings, the record is not distributed widely, and he asked that in due course Mr. Wilgress return the record to him for destruction. On December 6, Mr. Wilgress replied to Mr. Holmes, returning the record for destruction as requested.

I am not sure if there has been a Meeting of Consultation since you took over but, if there has, I wonder if it would be possible for you to have a record of the meeting sent to me on the same basis as that on which Mr. Holmes sent the previous record to Mr. Wilgress.

Yours sincerely,

*James H. Duggan*

N.A. Robertson, Esq.,  
Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs,  
OTTAWA.

6.8.24(us)

FM JASDC MAR4 JS UNCLAS

TO INTERNAL 523 OPIMMEDIATE

REF YOURTEL DL182 MAR3

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY MCELROY

50219-AE-	40
10	

FILE COPY

WE HAVE SCANNED THE STENOGRAPHIC RECORD OF MR MCELROY'S TESTIMONY GIVEN BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS ON MON MAR2. BRIEFLY THE CONTEXT OF THIS EXCHANGE WAS A STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIKE-ZEUS SYSTEM AND ON THE DETERRENT CAPABILITY OF THE USA. THE SECRETARY HAD SAID THAT THE NIKE-ZEUS SYSTEM "IS THE SYSTEM ON WHICH WE HAVE PLACED OUR BET AS THE ONE WHICH HAS THE BEST PROSPECTS FOR A MODERATELY EARLY OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY" BUT THIS IS STILL SEVERAL YEARS AWAY. IN THE MEANTIME THE DEFENCE IS "THE CAPABILITY OFFENSIVELY TO RESPOND WITH SUCH TREMENDOUS DESTRUCTIVE POWER... THAT THE POTENTIAL ENEMY WOULD NOT RPT NOT INITIATE AN ATTACK AGAINST THIS COUNTRY. THE SECRETARY HAD ALSO SAID, "I THINK FOR SOMETIME TO COME, MR CHAIRMAN, OUR DEFENCE AGAINST INCOMING MISSILES WILL HAVE TO BE A MAINTENANCE OF AN AGGRESSIVE POSITION TO DESTROY ANYONE WHO SENDS THESE IN ON US."

2. THE FOLLOWING IS THE EXCHANGE:

MR MCCORMACK: WELL, MR SECRETARY, WHAT YOU HAVE SAID IN SUBSTANCE IS THAT OUR WHOLE MILITARY POSITION IS PREDICATED UPON THE POLICY THAT UNDER NO CONDITIONS WILL WE ATTACK FIRST.

SECRETARY MCELROY: OUR POLICY IS THAT WE WILL NOT ATTACK FIRST, MR MCCORMACK.

MR MCCORMACK: RATHER AN UNTENABLE ONE FROM A MILITARY ANGLE IN CASE OF GRAVE EMERGENCY, IS IT NOT?

SECRETARY MCELROY: I THINK IT IS A RATHER DIFFICULT ONE BUT I THINK IT IS THE ONE THAT WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY PUBLIC OPINION IN THIS COUNTRY.

MR MCCORMACK: WELL, PUBLIC OPINION IS NOT GOING TO WIN WARS. WE ARE COMING DOWN TO LEADERSHIP.

SECRETARY MCELROY: IN ANY CASE ...

MR MCCORMACK: PUBLIC OPINION IS IMPORTANT, BUT OTHER THINGS WIN WARS.

SECRETARY MCELROY: I AGREE THAT THIS IS A VERY DIFFICULT THING MILITARILY, MR MCCORMACK.

MR MCCORMACK: WELL, WE ARE TIED TO THAT.

DI	
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

15 MAR 1959



PAGE TWO 523

SECRETARY MCELROY: THAT IS OUR POLICY.

MR MCCORMACK: THAT IS DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT AND BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. THAT IS CORRECT, IS IT NOT?

SECRETARY MCELROY: THAT IS CURRENTLY TRUE. WHETHER THAT WILL ALWAYS BE TRUE I THINK COULD BE SOMETHING ELSE, MR MCCORMACK.

MR MCCORMACK: WELL, I AM GLAD TO GET THAT LATTER NOW BECAUSE THAT IS A LITTLE RELAXATION. COULD YOU SEE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THAT WOULD NOT IMPLY?

SECRETARY MCELROY: THIS WOULD AGAIN BE A MATTER OF NATIONAL POLICY WHICH WOULD TAKE QUITE HIGH REVIEW. I THINK I MUST BEGIN BACK WHERE I BEGAN WHICH IS FOR THE PRESENT AND THE INDETERMINATE FUTURE OUR POLICY IS NOT TO ATTACK WITH THE BIG WEAPONS FIRST.

MR MCCORMACK: WHAT DO YOU MEAN NOT TO ATTACK WITH THE BIG WEAPONS FIRST, WOULD WE ATTACK WITH OTHER WEAPONS FIRST.

SECRETARY MCELROY: NO, I THINK WE WOULD NOT ATTACK FIRST EVEN WITH OTHER WEAPONS.

MR MCCORMACK: SO NO MATTER HOW POWERFUL OUR MILITARY MIGHT WE ARE STRICTLY IN A DEFENSIVE POSTURE.

SECRETARY MCELROY: YES, BECAUSE WE ARE NOT AGGRESSORS.

MR MCCORMACK: I JUST WANT TO HAVE THAT ESTABLISHED.

THE DISCUSSION THEN WENT ON TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRINCIPAL DETERRENT FORCE, SAC, IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET DEFENCE CAPABILITIES.

AGAIN MR MCCORMACK ASKED: WE ARE GOING TO STRIKE AFTER WE ARE HIT?

SECRETARY MCELROY: YES, BUT YOU ARE GOING TO USE MOST OF WHAT YOU HAVE LEFT."

3. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A RELEVANT ASSOCIATED PRESS REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT'S PRESS CONFERENCE.

TEXT BAGINS:

EISENHOWER REPLIED WITH A BLUNT NO WHEN ASKED WHETHER HE COULD FORESEE ANY CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THE USA MIGHT ATTACK FIRST IN A CONFLICT. A NEWSMAN REMINDED THE PRESIDENT THAT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MCELROY HAD SAID EARLIER THIS WEEK THAT USA POLICY AT PRESENT IS NOT TO ATTACK FIRST, BUT THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW WHETHER THAT ALWAYS WOULD BE THE POLICY.

PAGE THREE 523

EISENHOWER WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE RIGHT OF SELF-PRESERVATION IS INSTINCTIVE FOR NATIONS AS IT IS FOR INDIVIDUALS. IF WE KNOW, HE SAID, THAT WE ARE UNDER THE THREAT OF ATTACK BY MISSILES OR PLANES, THEN WE HAVE TO ACT AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE TO DEFEND OURSELVES.

BUT SO FAR AS HE KNOWS, EISENHOWER SAID, CONGRESS IS NOT THINKING ABOUT CHANGING THE CONSTITUTION TO SURRENDER TO THE PRESIDENT ITS RIGHT TO DECLARE WAR. TEXT ENDS.

4. PLEASE SEND COPY BY HAND TO GENERAL FOULKES

HEENEY

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

file 77

OUTGOING MESSAGE

FILE COPY

FM: EXTERNAL

TO: EMBASSY WASHINGTON

INFO:

DATE	FILE	SECURITY
MAR.3-59	50219-AE-40 70 50	UNCL
NUMBER	PRECEDENCE	COMCENTRE USE ONLY
DL-182	OPIMMEDIATE	
Original Signed by DOUGLAS LEPAN		

Ref.:  
Subject: BERLIN - STATEMENT BY UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF DEFENCE

PHILIP DEANE'S ARTICLE IN THIS MORNING'S GLOBE AND MAIL READS IN PART -  
"DEFENSE SECRETARY MCELROY SAID TODAY THAT THE PRESENT WASHINGTON POLICY  
IS NOT TO STRIKE THE FIRST BLOW - - 'WHETHER THAT WILL ALWAYS BE TRUE IS  
SOMETHING ELSE' -- AND HE ADDED THE WEST IS MILITARILY READY TO STAND  
FIRM IN BERLIN".

2. WOULD YOU ATTEMPT TO GET AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE THE EXACT TEXT OF  
MR. MCELROY'S STATEMENT. WE NOTE FROM TODAY'S NEW YORK TIMES THAT  
MR. MCELROY SPOKE OF THE BERLIN SITUATION IN TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE  
SPACE COMMITTEE. IT MAY BE THAT DEANE'S QUOTATION IS FROM MR. MCELROY'S  
TESTIMONY IN THIS INSTANCE.

LOCAL  
DISTRIBUTION

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY Original Signed by
SIG. JJ MCCARDLE/ac NAME	DL(I) DIVISION	6-7921	SIG. DOUGLAS LEPAN NAME 000281



MINISTERS OFFICE
<i>Mo C</i>
FEB 24 1959

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REBUILT A SECRET**  
*LHS (M&A)*

~~TOP SECRET~~

February 21, 1959

THE MINISTER

FEB 22 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

*In file*  
*gm*

50219-12
SEEN BY

THE MINISTER

Berlin Situation

I understand that you will be meeting with the Prime Minister and Mr. Pearkes early next week, to discuss what Canadian Government views might be put to the United States Government regarding certain aspects of the Berlin situation.

It seems to me that there are three separate but closely related aspects of the question which merit consideration.

- (a) Contingency planning with respect to the Berlin crisis, including the possible use of force.
- (b) The recent United States request for clearance of a Strategic Air Command Programme of overflights during the next four months.
- (c) The use of NATO alert measures to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union.

The first and more general aspect ((a) above) will be dealt with in a separate memorandum. The other two are dealt with in the attachments to this memorandum.

*Get*  
*Permanor*

We lack sufficient exact information of United States intentions with respect to Berlin to be able to form firm opinions on the course which Canada should follow. I believe we should, as soon as possible, seek United States agreement to a Meeting of Consultation on these problems.

The Meetings of Consultation between senior officials of the two governments were provided for in an Agreed Minute of 1951. The purpose of the meetings as defined in that Minute was "to exchange views on developments in the world situation which might necessitate

MINISTERS OFFICE
<i>Mo C</i>
<i>-   CD</i>
FEB 24 1959

.../2

21.2.4(U.S)

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**

**REBUILT A SECRET**

LLS (M&IR)

**FEB 22 1985**



- 2 -

the use of atomic weapons. The consultations are informal and exploratory and are not to be regarded as involving or implying any commitment on the part of either government as to the action it will take or the position it will adopt in particular circumstances yet to arise". Our last Meeting of Consultation was in November 1958. Normally on the Canadian side the representation at these meetings includes the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Secretary to the Cabinet, the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff and the Canadian Ambassador in Washington. The senior United States representative is usually the Under-Secretary of State.

I favour the calling of such a Meeting of Consultation because the terms of reference of the group cover exactly the situation in which we find ourselves. We need more exact information on United States intentions in the face of a crisis which could conceivably lead to war. It may prove desirable at a later stage that a much higher level of approach be made to the United States Government. It seems to me that we would be best prepared, if such an approach is necessary, if we were first to explore United States thinking at a Meeting of Consultation in the near future.

I would recommend, therefore, that you seek the concurrence of the Prime Minister to the calling of a Meeting of Consultation. I believe there would be no difficulty in arranging such a meeting with the United States authorities, especially if we take the action with respect to the SAC overflight programme which is recommended in the attachment to this memorandum.

  
N.A.R.



SECRET

February 21, 1959

SEEN BY THE MINISTER

Berlin - Canadian Commitments


The primary Canadian commitment in respect of West Berlin derives from the North Atlantic Treaty. Although the Treaty makes no reference to Berlin it has always been clear that an armed attack on the Western occupation forces in Berlin or in Germany would be an armed attack "on the occupation forces of any party in Europe" under Article 6. In such an eventuality, Canada and the other parties to the treaty are obligated under Article 5 to take "such action as it deems necessary" to assist the party attacked.

Attack

At the time of the accession of the Federal Republic to NATO, Canada and the other members of the Alliance formally associated themselves on October 22, 1954, with the declaration of the three Occupying Powers wherein they announced their intention to remain in Berlin as long as their responsibilities required it and "to treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves".

In the light of our association with the Three Power Declaration of 1954 a careful study was made in the Department (in 1956) of the extent of Canadian commitments in the event of an attack by East German forces against the Federal Republic of Germany or Berlin. The main conclusions were:

- (1) Canada and the other Parties to the Treaty are committed to regard an armed attack on West Berlin or the Federal Republic of Germany whether by East Germany, the Soviet Union or the satellites as an armed attack against themselves;



- 2 -

SECRET

- (2) The commitment, however, is not an automatic one in the sense that each party is the judge of whether armed force is required or other action will suffice.

Subsequent developments including the special NATO Berlin communique, to which we subscribed last December, do not invalidate or alter these conclusions. Together they should serve to remind us that we have an important commitment under the Treaty and therefore a legitimate interest in any actions contemplated by the Three Occupying Powers in respect of the present Berlin situation. (A more detailed analysis of our commitments is attached.)

SECRET

APPENDIX

Berlin - Canadian Commitments Under North  
Atlantic Treaty and Related Declarations

Our primary commitment in respect of Berlin derives from the North Atlantic Treaty. Although the Treaty makes no reference to Berlin, it has always been clear that an armed attack on the occupation forces in Berlin would be an armed attack "on the occupation forces of any party in Europe" under Article 6. In such an eventuality, Canada and the other parties to the Treaty are obligated under Article 5 to "assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area". It is important to note, however, that the commitment is not an automatic one. The use of the words "such action as it deems necessary" has always been interpreted as meaning that each party is the judge of the casus foederis and also the judge of whether armed force is required or whether other action will suffice.

At the time of the admission of the Federal Republic to NATO in 1954, Canada and the other members of the Alliance associated themselves on October 22, 1954 with a declaration of the Western occupying powers wherein they announced their intention to remain in Berlin as long as their responsibilities required it and "to treat any attack against Berlin from any quarter as an attack upon their forces and themselves". Canada agreed to associate itself with the declaration on the understanding that it would neither involve any alterations in existing obligations under NATO nor entail any modification in the rights and obligations of the Western occupying powers under the Potsdam agreement. It was recognized at the time that any distinction which might be drawn between an armed attack on Berlin and an attack on the Western occupying powers was more theoretical than real inasmuch as it was difficult to conceive of an attack of any magnitude (i.e. other than a police incident) which would not involve an attack against allied forces. It was also clearly established that in the event of an attack on Berlin SACEUR or his subordinate commanders could not use forces under their command as

(2)

reinforcements for Berlin without first obtaining the agreement of the Canadian Government.

Finally, the special communique on Berlin approved at the 1958 NATO Ministerial Meeting: "recalls the responsibilities which each member state has assumed in regard to the security and welfare of Berlin, and the maintenance of the position of the Three Powers in that city. The member states of NATO could not approve a solution of the Berlin question which .... did not assure freedom of communication between that city and the Free World. The Soviet Union would be responsible for any action which had the effect of hampering this free communication or endangering this freedom."

In 1956, a careful study was made in the Department of the extent of the Canadian commitment in the event of an attack by East German Forces against the Federal Republic of Germany or Berlin. The conclusions were:

- (1) The present commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty are such as to require the Parties thereto to regard an armed attack on West Berlin or the Federal Republic of Germany as an attack on themselves. Canada's association with the Three Power Declaration of October 1954 does not involve any further commitment other than that deriving from the Treaty. The commitment under the Treaty is sufficient in itself to require the implementation of Articles 5 and 6 should West Berlin or the Federal Republic of Germany be attacked from any quarter by any forces.
- (2) No distinction can realistically or validly be drawn between an armed attack by the forces of East Germany, the Soviet Union or the satellites.
- (3) Because of the accepted interpretation of the words "such action as it deems necessary" in Article 5, Canada is not committed automatically to send troops to the aid of Berlin.

(3)

Subsequent developments, including the NATO Berlin  
communique of last December do not invalidate or alter  
the above conclusions. Together they should serve to  
remind us that we have an important commitment under  
the Treaty and therefore a legitimate interest in any  
actions contemplated by the Three Occupying Powers in  
respect of maintaining their position and rights in  
Berlin.

D.L. 1 division  
February 21, 1959

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'Lak' or similar, written in a cursive style.

M. 100
FEB 24 1959

50219-AE-40

~~TOP SECRET~~

February 21, 1959

SEEN BY THE MINISTER

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REBUT A SECRET  
LHS (HAR)

FEB 22 1985

SAC Overflights

The United States request for overflight clearance was dealt with in my memorandum of February 12 which is attached for convenience of reference. The United States authorities have indicated that the SAC programme for which overflight clearance has been requested is simply a continuation of a test exercise which was begun last Autumn to test the ability of SAC units, to keep a proportion of their aircraft in the air at all times under the "Airborne Alert" concept. In response to a query which we put to the State Department, we have been assured that the programme of flights has no direct relationship to the Berlin situation or to European security considerations in general.

2. In spite of this assurance, I believe the Government's response to the United States request must be made having in mind the possible effect which an extensive SAC test programme over the next four months could have on the Berlin situation. It is unlikely that an exercise of such magnitude could be carried out without the Russians being aware of it. It is impossible to predict what the Soviet reaction might be but it is safe to assume that the possibility of a miscalculation by the Soviet Union of American intentions would be increased in a period when the tension over Berlin will be mounting in any case.

3. Again, in spite of the assurance which we have received from the State Department, we cannot dismiss the possibility that, consciously or unconsciously, the United States military authorities may see this test exercise as a part of a general plan to "flex Western muscles" in such a way as to bring pressure on the Russians to negotiate seriously a satisfactory political settlement of the Berlin situation. Some credence is lent to this theory when one considers the number of United States statements which have been made to the effect that force should be used, if necessary, to keep the Western channels of communications with Berlin open. Our lack of exact knowledge on what is in the United States Government's mind on the question of the use of force makes the problem more difficult for us.

MINIS
725
FEB 24 1959

... /2



**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**

**REBUT A SECRET**

LHS(MAIR)

FEB 22 1985

- 2 -

4. In the circumstances, therefore, I think we should tell the United States Government that we would think it unwise at a time of increasing tension over Berlin to mount an exercise by SAC of the type under consideration. We could indicate at the same time, however, our willingness to discuss the matter further with the United States authorities. Our hope would be that in those discussions, we would get some clearer idea of the exact intentions of the United States Government with respect to the use of force over Berlin, and have an opportunity at the same time to put forward our views on that more general question.



Department of External Affairs

MINISTERS OFFICE
<i>Mr. C</i>
FEB 24 1959

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REBUT A SECRET**  
L.S. (H.A.R.)  
FEB 22 1985

10219-AE-40

~~TOP SECRET~~

February 21, 1959

Alerts Measures and the  
Berlin Situation

*file*

Some indications have come to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff are considering the possible use of NATO Alerts as an element of the policy of firmness which they advocate vis a vis the Soviet Union in respect of the Berlin situation. General Foulkes will himself outline the information he has been given to the Meeting of Ministers scheduled for early next week. This memorandum contains a preliminary assessment of the implications of the information which General Foulkes has given to us orally and in great confidence.

2. It seems possible that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff may try to convince their Government to approach the members of NATO with a view to getting their agreement to a declaration of alerts - (a) prior to the outbreak of any violence connected with the forcing of a passage to Berlin if that should be necessary or (b) at the time that violence may occur as a result of blockage of passage over the land routes to Berlin. Such a scheme would, I believe, extend to NORAD as the Command responsible for the air defence of the Canada-United States region of NATO.

3. It is difficult without more exact knowledge of United States thinking to offer firm views on the use of alerts for what might be called "preemptive" purposes. It can be argued that the calling of a full NATO Alert well before anything of a warlike nature has occurred is brinkmanship with a vengeance. It is somewhat analogous to the Nineteenth Century use of mobilization for political effect on one's opponent. Just what effect in 1959 such a move would have on the Russians is an open question. One possibility is that the Russians might regard such an action as the first step in a planned preventative war by the West.

MINISTERS OFFICE
<i>Mr. C</i>
<i>Co.</i>
FEB 24 1959

.../2

~~DOWNGRADED TO SECRET~~

REBUILT A SECRET  
LLS(M&IR)

- 2 -

FEB 22 1985

4. One can take a far less extreme view, however. It can be argued that it is only common sense for any country or any group of countries to increase the state of their military readiness whenever world tension increases and that such an increase in military readiness has no sinister connotation. The whole system of alerts is based on this common sense approach. In both NATO planning and NORAD planning, the Canadian Government has committed itself to the use of a system of alerts. If, therefore, the tension over Berlin increases, it would be difficult, on the face of it, for the Canadian Government to oppose increased states of military readiness both in NATO and in NORAD.

5. In the circumstances what is perhaps required most is clarification of the United States Government's intention on the calling of alerts. If it is found that the views of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff are shared by the United States Government as a whole, you may wish to consider putting to the United States authorities Canadian views along the following lines:

- (a) We have already reached agreement with the United States authorities that NORAD will not declare an increased state of military readiness in time of increasing tension without the approval of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and, therefore, of the Canadian Government. In other words, we have insisted on prior consultation in this instance. We would be consistent if we took the same line with respect to the calling of NATO alerts in a period of increasing tension. Such a stand has the object of reserving the Canadian Government position on the calling of an alert in any situation short of an actual attack.
- (b) A decision to put NATO defences on an alert basis at this particular time would constitute a highly political decision because of the repercussions it might have. For this reason it seems to us that if the United States Government contemplates taking such a step, the matter ought to be discussed in a special secret session of the NATO Permanent Council, where a collective assessment of the political implications of such a step could be made. If one reflects that the Permanent Council is usually asked

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**

**REBUILT A SECRET**

**HLS (H&IA)**

**FEB 22 1985**

- 3 -

to discuss the propriety of conducting a NATO military exercise at a particular time, and in a specific region of the NATO area, the logic of having similar discussions in the Council regarding a matter with far wider implications seems to us unassailable.

6. In any discussion which we may have with the United States authorities concerning the Berlin situation, I think therefore we should raise this specific question of alerts in order to prevent any misunderstanding. We should in any such discussions make it clear that alerts should be called only when it can be proven that there is imminent danger of an attack on our forces and that they should not be used as a means of bringing political pressure to bear on the Soviet Union.

*war*

Department of External Affairs

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

34

	DATE	FILE		SECURITY
		50219-AE-40		
FM: EXTERNAL OTTAWA	DEC 29/58	70	50	<del>TOP SECRET</del>
		NUMBER	PRECEDENCE	COMCENTRE USE ONLY
TO: WASHINGTON		DL-1070	Routine PRIORITY	
<div>COPY in 50210-F-40</div>				
INFO:				
<div>DOWNGRADED TO SECRET REBUT A SECRET 1-15 (M&amp;IR)</div>				

FEB 2 1959

Ref.: YOURTEL 2954 of DEC 4.  
Subject: MEETING OF CONSULTATION.

WE TOOK UP THE POINT RAISED IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE WITH GENERAL FOULKES WHO HAS NOW REPLIED TO OUR ENQUIRY. HIS REPLY READS IN PART AS FOLLOWS:

"I AGREE WITH THE OBSERVATIONS MADE BY OUR EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON REGARDING MY REMARKS IN RESPECT OF STOCKPILING OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN GOOSE BAY. I HAVE CONSULTED THE NOTES WHICH I USED AT THE MEETING, AND IT WAS MY INTENTION TO CLEARLY STATE THAT, AFTER AN AGREEMENT ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES HAD BEEN CONCLUDED, WE WOULD THEN ASK THE CANADIAN GOVT TO GIVE CONSIDERATION TO THE STOCKPILING OF AIR-TO-AIR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT GOOSE BAY; BUT BECAUSE OF THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE STORAGE OF COMPONENTS FOR STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND, WE PREFERRED TO LEAVE THIS MATTER UNTIL WE HAD PROCEEDED WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE STORAGE OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR THE CANADIAN FORCES."

2. YOU MAY, THEREFORE, WISH TO INFORM WILLOUGHBY THAT THE AMENDMENT YOU HAVE PROPOSED TO THE US RECORD IS ACCEPTABLE TO US.

LOCAL  
DISTRIBUTION

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG..... NAME F.M. Toivell/nc	D.L. (1)	6-7509	J. J. MCCARDLE SIG..... NAME.....

~~TOP SECRET~~



DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REBUT A SECRET**  
MS(M&IA)  
FEB 22 1985

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF  
OTTAWA

23 December, 1958.

Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,  
East Block, Ottawa, Ontario.

Attention: ~~Mr. D.V. LePan~~


50219-NE-40	14
55	450

Meeting of Consultation - 19 November 1958

1. With reference to your letter of 8 December, to which you attached Telegram 2954 of 4 December from our Embassy in Washington regarding the disparity between the United States and Canadian records of the meeting of 19 November, I agree with the observations made by our Embassy in Washington regarding my remarks in respect of stockpiling of nuclear warheads in Goose Bay. I have consulted the notes which I used at the meeting, and it was my intention to clearly state that, after an agreement on general principles had been concluded, we would then ask the Canadian Government to give consideration to the stockpiling of air-to-air nuclear weapons at Goose Bay; but because of the political implications of the storage of components for Strategic Air Command, we preferred to leave this matter until we had proceeded with the arrangements for the storage of defensive nuclear weapons for the Canadian forces.

(Charles Foulkes)  
General,  
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.

24.12.2(US)



Ottawa, December 8, 1958.

Dear General Foulkes:

Meeting of Consultation - November 19, 1958.

Attached are three copies of telegram 2954, December 4, from our Embassy in Washington on the above subject from which you will note that the Embassy have now had an opportunity to check their record of the Meeting (as contained in their telegram 2864 of November 21) with that made by the State Department.

2. The only substantive point on which the two records do not appear to agree is that concerning a future agreement concerning the storage of nuclear weapons at Goose Bay. The relevant extract from the State Department's record is quoted in Washington's telegram. The Embassy have suggested to the State Department that their record be altered to bring it more into line with ours, and the particular form of words they have proposed will be found in paragraph 4.

3. Inasmuch as the principle point at issue relates mainly to your own remarks, I should be grateful for your comments before replying to Washington.

Yours sincerely,

Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

General Charles Foulkes, CB, CBE, DSO, CD.,  
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,  
Department of National Defence,  
OTTAWA, Ontario. 9.12.3(US)



*Joseph*  
*De 8/18*  
*Rebut #21*  
*18-19-20*  
*and to be sent to*  
*under letter*  
*dated Dec 8/58*

CR ... 1/4 ... OF 1721  
WASHDC DEC 4/58  
TO SECRETARY  
TO EXTERNAL 2954 OPIMMEDIATE  
REF OURTEL 2764 NOV21  
MEETING OF CONSULTATION

SECRET  
FEB 22 1959  
50219 AE 40  
58

15 DEC 1958

WE ARRANGED WITH WILLOUGHBY (DIRECTOR ENA) OF STATE DEPT TO COMPARE OUR TWO RECORDS OF THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION HELD ON NOV19 HERE. APART FROM MINOR DRAFTING POINTS THE ONLY SUBSTANTIAL POINT WHERE THE TWO RECORDS DID NOT RPT NOT APPEAR TO BE CONSISTENT WAS IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISCUSSION UNDER ITEM A RELATING TO THE CDN ATTITUDE WIT' REF TO A FUTURE AGREEMENT COVERING THE STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR SAC AT GOOSEBAY. SINCE WE THOUGHT THE POINT A RELATIVELY IMPORTANT ONE WE SUGGESTED SOME MODIFICATION OF THE USA DRAFT RECORD WITH WHICH WE HOPE YOU WILL BE IN AGREEMENT.

2. THE ORIGINAL STATE DEPT RECORD ON THIS ASPECT READ AS FOLLOWS:

"MR MERCHANT THEN REFERRED TO THE OUTSTANDING USA PROPOSAL TO STORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR SAC AT GOOSEBAY AND ASKED WHETHER AGREEMENT BY CANADA ON THIS PROPOSAL WOULD DEPEND ON THE TECHNICAL AGREEMENT WIT' CINCNORAD ON STORAGE FOR CDN FORCES. GENERAL FOULKES SAID THE CDN GOVT WOULD ACT ON THIS PROPOSAL WHEN THE AGREEMENT ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES HAD BEEN CONCLUDED.

3. MR IRWIN ENQUIRED WHETHER THE GENERAL AGREEMENT WOULD COVER OTHER THAN THE MB-1 ROCKET, AND GEN FOULKES SAID IT WOULD APPLY TO ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS SINCE THE CDN GOVT CONSIDERED SUCH WEAPONS TO BE DEFENSIVE IN NATURE."

4. IN THE LIGHT OF OUR OWN RECORD OF THIS PART OF THE DISCUSSION, SEE IN PARTICULAR PARAS 12 & 13 OF OUR REF TEL, WE THOUGHT IT ADVISABLE TO SUGGEST AMENDING THE STATE DEPT'S DRAFT IN THE FOLLOWING SENSE:

TO REVISE THE SECOND SENTENCE OF THE FIRST PARA (SEE PARA 3 ABOVE) TO READ AS FOLLOWS: "GEN FOULKES SAID THAT THE CDN GOVT WOULD CONSIDER THIS PROPOSAL AFTER THE AGREEMENT ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES HAD BEEN CONCLUDED". WE ALSO PROPOSED THE ADDITION OF THE COMMENT MADE BY MR ROBERTSON (LAST SENTENCE, PARA 13 OUR REF TEL) AS A FINAL SENTENCE IN THE USA DRAFT, WILLOUGHBY HAS AMENDED THEIR ORIGINAL DRAFT IN THIS SENSE.

5. OUR REASON FOR SUGGESTING THIS AMENDMENT WAS BASED UPON OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE DISCUSSION THAT IN FACT WE MADE A DISTINCTION

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REBUILT A SECRET

LS (H&IR)

FEB 22 1985

PAGE TWO 2954

BETWEEN ARRANGEMENTS COVERING THE ACQUISITION AND CONTROL OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CANADA, AND ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE REQUIRED BY SAC, AND THAT OUR VIEW WAS THAT WE WERE ANXIOUS TO COMPLETE THE FIRST SET OF ARRANGEMENTS BEFORE TAKING UP ARRANGEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT GOOSEBAY.

6. WE DO NOT RPT NOT THINK THE OTHER SUGGESTIONS WE MADE FOR AMENDING THE USA RECORD AFFECT THE SUBSTANCE SUFFICIENTLY TO WARRANT REPORTING THEM TO YOU.

7. WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD LET US KNOW WHETHER THE RECORD ON THE POINT WE HAVE RAISED AS SET OUT IN OUR OWN RECORD AND AS AMENDED BY US IN THE USA RECORD IS ACCEPTABLE TO YOU.

OUTGOING MESSAGE

*1 sent to  
Sec Cab*

*file ac*

FM: EXTERNAL	DATE	FILE		SECURITY
	DEC 1-58	50219-AE-40		<del>TOP SECRET</del>
TO: EMBASSY WASHINGTON	NUMBER	PRECEDENCE	COMCENTRE USE ONLY	
	DL-984	PRIORITY		
INFO: CCOS				
<div>DOWNGRADED TO SECRET REBUILT A SECRET LHS (H&amp;IR) FEB 22 1985</div>				

Ref.:

Subject: MEETING OF CONSULTATION

NEITHER THE UNDER-SECRETARY NOR THE CCOS HAVE ANY COMMENT TO MAKE ON YOUR DRAFT REPORT OF THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION. YOU MAY THEREFORE COMPARE YOUR RECORD WITH THAT KEPT BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION		NO REGULAR DISTRIBUTION	
		SECRETARY TO THE CABINET	
ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	(Signed) PAUL TREMBLAY
SIG... JJ MCCARDLE/ac	DL(I) DIVISION	6-7921	APPROVED BY
		SIG... PJ TREMBLAY/ac	
		NAME...	

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

## OUTGOING MESSAGE

**FILE COPY**

FM: **EXTERNAL**

TO: WASHINGTON

**INFO:**

Ref.: YOUR TEL 2864 NOV 21-58.

**Subject: MEETING OF CONSULTATION**

THE CCOS WILL BE ABSENT FROM OTTAWA UNTIL NOVEMBER 27. WE WILL NOT THEREFORE BE ABLE TO PROVIDE HIS COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT REPORT OF THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION UNTIL THE END OF THIS WEEK.

## LOCAL DISTRIBUTION

NO DISTRIBUTION

ORIGINATOR

DIVISION

PHONE \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED BY

SIG.....  
NAME..JJ MCCARDLE/ac

DL(I) DIVISION

6-7921

SIG.....  
NAME.....PJ. TREMBLAY.

000300

FM WASHDC NOV21/58 ~~TOP~~ SEC

TO EXTERNAL 2864 OPIMMEDIATE

INF T CCOS OPIMMEDIATE FM OTT

FOR UNDERSECRETARY

MEETING OF CONSULTATION

FOLLOWING IS OUR DRAFT RECORD OF THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN  
REPS OF THE CDN AND USA GOVTS HELD ON WED NOV19.

THE MEETING WHICH WAS HELD IN THE STATE DEPT UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP  
OF MR ROBERT MURPHY, THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, WAS ATTENDED  
BY:

MR CHRISTIAN A HERTER, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE; GENERAL NATHAN  
TWINING, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; MR RICHARD B WIGGLESWORTH,  
USA AMBASSADOR TO CANADA; GENERAL HE LOPER, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY LIAISON  
COMMITTEE, AEC; MR LIVINGSTONE MERCHANT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, EUROPEAN  
AFFAIRS; MR JN IRWIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

FOR THE USA GOVT, AND BY

MR NA ROBERTSON, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS; MR AE  
RITCHIE, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AI, CDN EMBASSY; GENERAL C FOULKES, CHAIRMAN,  
CHIEFS OF STAFF; A/V/M MM HENDRICK, CHAIRMAN, CJS(W); MR SF RAE, MINISTER,  
CDN EMBASSY; MR PE UREN, FIRST SECRETARY, CDN EMBASSY  
FOR THE CDN GOVT.

2. THE FOLLOWING USA OFFICIALS WERE ALSO PRESENT:

MR WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH  
AND NORTHERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS; BRIG GEN JF WHISENAND, SPECIAL ASSIST-  
ANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; MR RAYMOND F COURNEY, OFFICE  
OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DISARMAMENT  
AND ATOMIC ENERGY; MR LARUE R LUTKINS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF  
CHINESE AFFAIRS, STATE DEPT; MR JAMES P PARKER, CDN DESK, STATE DEPT.

3. THE AGENDA OF THE MEETING CONSISTED OF 4 MAIN ITEMS AS FOLLOWS:

1. PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH ACQUISITION AND CONTROL OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR  
WEAPONS IN CANADA.

2. PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH DECLARATION BY CINCNORAD OF INCREASED STATES  
OF MILITARY READINESS.

3. OTHER MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED BY CANADA-USA COMMITTEE ON JOINT

H..2

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REBUILT A SECRET  
LLS(HAIR)  
FEB 22 1985



PAGE TWO 2864

DEFENCE.

(A) FUTURE ROLE OF PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE.

(B) USA PROPOSALS FOR REACTIVATION OF COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE.

(C) INTEGRATION OF CANADA-USA DEFENCE PRODUCTION.

(D) COST SHARING ARRANGEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO IMMEDIATE PROGRAMMES IN THE CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCE FIELD.

(E) ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR DEC MEETING OF CANADA-USA JOINT COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE.

#### 4. THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION.

MR HERTER OPENED THE MEETING AT 10:30 AM, WELCOMING THE CDN VISITORS, AND THEN TURNED THE CHAIRMANSHIP OVER TO MR ROBERT MURPHY. MR HERTER REMAINED FOR PART OF THE DISCUSSION ON ITEM 1 OF THE AGENDA.

PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH THE ACQUISITION AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CANADA.

5. GEN FOULKES OPENED THE DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT BY REFERRING TO THE VARIOUS TYPES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHICH ARE REQUIRED BY THE CDN FORCES, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR THE REQUIREMENT FOR NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR THE LACROSSE GUIDED MISSILE FOR USE BY THE CDN BRIGADE IN GERMANY AND FOR BOMARC MISSILES FOR USE BY THE RCAF. HE ALSO REFERRED TO THE FUTURE NEED FOR AIR-TO-AIR AND ANTISUBMARINE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE SAID THAT WE WERE HOPEFUL THAT PROCEDURES SIMILAR TO THOSE BEING WORKED OUT IN NATO FOR STORING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE COULD BE APPLIED IN NORTH AMERICA. THIS, HE THOUGHT, WOULD HAVE THE IMPORTANT ADVANTAGE OF MAKING IT EASIER TO EXPLAIN USA-CDN COOPERATION IN THIS FIELD TO CDNS AND TO OUR NATO ALLIES. IF THESE PROCEDURES WERE ADOPTED WE COULD PRESUMABLY ENTER INTO DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH SACEUR WITH REGARD TO STORAGE AND CUSTODY OF WARHEADS FOR THE LACROSSE IN EUROPE. IN NORTH AMERICA CINCMORAD COULD HOLD THE WEAPONS IN SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME MANNER AS SACEUR, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ANTISUBMARINE WEAPONS WHICH WOULD BE UNDER THE CONTROL OF SACLANT. ULTIMATELY THERE MIGHT BE A REQUIREMENT FOR ANTISUBMARINE WEAPONS ON THE WEST COAST OF CANADA WHICH MIGHT BE ASSIGNED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF CUSRPG, BUT THIS REQUIREMENT WAS NOT SO URGENT AS THE OTHER MENTIONED.

6. GEN TWining REPLIED BY SAYING THAT HE FORESAW NO DIFFICULTIES IN DEVISING PROCEDURES OF THE KIND REFERRED TO BY GEN FOULKES AND THAT THE USA JOINT CHIEFS WERE CURRENTLY WORKING ON THE PROBLEM. GEN LOPER

...3

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REBUT A SECRET  
KLS(M&IR)

FEB 22 1985

FEB 22 1985

REBUILT A SECRET

LIS (HRIA)

PAGE THREE 2864

POINTED OUT THAT THE MAIN DIFFICULTY IN DEVISING ARRANGEMENTS OF THIS KIND WAS TO ARRIVE AT SATISFACTORY CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH NUCLEAR WEAPONS MIGHT BE RELEASED TO OPERATIONAL FORCES. HE THOUGHT THAT THE RULES FOR RELEASE IN NORTH AMERICA MIGHT WELL BE DIFFERENT IN DETAIL FROM THOSE WHICH WE MIGHT WISH TO APPLY IN EUROPE. HE REFERRED IN PARTICULAR TO THE CASE IN WHICH A SINGLE MAN HANDLES THE WEAPON.

7. GEN FOULES ACKNOWLEDGED THIS FACT BUT EMPHASIZED THAT HE HAD IN MIND FOLLOWING THE NATO PROCEDURES ONLY IN A GENERAL WAY AND THAT THE ACTUAL DETAILS OF CUSTODY WITH RESPECT TO NORTH AMERICAN AIR DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS COULD BE WORKED OUT WITH GEN PARTRIDGE. A GENERAL INTER-GOVERNMENTAL NOTE OF THE KIND WHICH WE HAD THOUGHT MIGHT BE EXCHANGED WITH THE USA GOVT WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING PROVISIONS: THAT CUSTODY SHOULD BE VESTED IN THE USA GOVT UNTIL THE WEAPONS WERE RELEASED BY THE PRESIDENT; THAT CANADA WOULD BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE THE STORAGE FACILITIES, INCLUDING ANY SPECIAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WHICH MIGHT BE NECESSARY; AND FINALLY, THAT PRECISE OPERATIONAL DETAILS WOULD BE WORKED OUT WITH THE OPERATIONAL COMMANDERS (CINCNORAD, SACLANT AND SACEUR). GEN FOULKES SAID THAT THE CDN GOVT WOULD PROBABLY WISH TO MAKE SOME KIND OF ANNOUNCEMENT INDICATING BLMATTER AFTER IT HAD BEEN CONSIDERED FURTHER BY MINISTERS IN PARIS AND WHEN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS REOPENED IN JAN. APART FROM THIS, HOWEVER, THERE WAS NO URGENCY ABOUT DEVISING THE SPECIFIC DETAILS OF CONTROL. MR MURPHY AND OTHERS ON THE USA SIDE SAW NO DIFFICULTY IN SUCH AN ANNOUNCEMENT, PROVIDED IT WAS KEPT IN GENERAL TERMS. THE CDN SIDE INDICATED THAT THEY HOPED IT WOULD BE PRACTICABLE TO CLEAR ANY SUCH ANNOUNCEMENT IN ADVANCE WITH THE USA AUTHORITIES.

8. MR IRWIN, THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, POINTED OUT THAT THERE WAS SOME DANGER IN IDENTIFYING THE PROPOSED CANADA-USA PROCEDURE TOO CLOSELY WITH NATO ARRANGEMENTS, SINCE LATER REQUIREMENTS MIGHT NECESSITATE CONSIDERABLE DIVERGENCE FROM NATO ARRANGEMENTS AND THERE MIGHT BE DIFFICULTY IN ACHIEVING THIS IF THE NATO LINE HAD BEEN FOLLOWED TOO CLOSELY IN THE FIRST PLACE. MR ROBERTSON AND GEN FOULKES BOTH EMPHASIZED THAT, IN ANY PUBLIC STATEMENT THAT MIGHT BE MADE BY THE MINISTERS, WE HAD IN MIND ONLY A GENERAL REF TO NATO PROCEDURE WHICH NEED NOT IMPLY A COMPLETE PARALLEL IN DETAILS OF OPERATION. MR ROBERTSON ALSO REFERRED TO TWO



LIS (M81R)

PAGE FOUR 2864

FEB 22 1985

REBUILT A SECRET

ASPECTS OF THIS PROBLEM WHICH HE THOUGHT WERE OF PRIME IMPORTANCE: FIRST, THAT THE CDN GOVT WOULD FIND IT MORE ACCEPTABLE TO MAKE SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE USA UNDER THE GENERAL UMBRELLA OF ITS NATO MEMBERSHIP AND SECONDLY, THAT AIR DEFENCE TECHNICAL PROBLEMS IN NORTH AMERICA MIGHT VERY WELL BE ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THOSE ARISING IN EUROPE IN CONNECTION WITH THE QUESTION OF STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THESE WERE THE TWO ESSENTIAL FACETS OF THE PROBLEM. THE FIRST COULD BE MET BY A GENERAL STATEMENT REFERRING TO ARRANGEMENTS "SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME AS THOSE USED IN NATO" (THIS COULD BE CONSIDERED AT THE MINISTERIAL MEETING) AND THE SECOND BY CONCURRENT WORKING OUT OF DETAILED ARRANGEMENTS, PECULIAR TO NORTHAMERICA, DIRECTLY WITH CINCNORAD AND THE OTHER COMMANDERS.

9. MR MURPHY AND GOVERNOR HERTER AT THIS POINT RE-EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO AVOID WHAT THEY REFERRED TO AS "GETTING IN A BIND" BY BEING TIED TOO MUCH TO NATO IN THIS MATTER. MR ROBERTSON SAID THAT WE HAD NO INTENTION EITHER OF TAKING A LEAD OR OF BEING LAGGARD IN THIS QUESTION AS FAR AS NATO WAS CONCERNED, BUT RATHER WISHED TO ASSOCIATE OURSELVES WITH SIMILAR DEVELOPMENTS IN NATO IN THE GENERAL WAY TO WHICH BOTH HE AND GEN FOULKES HAD PREVIOUSLY REFERRED. HE CONCLUDED THIS PART OF THE DISCUSSION BY INDICATING THAT WE WOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN PREPARING A NOTE ALONG THE LINES REFERRED TO ABOVE.

10. GENERAL FOULKES THEN REFERRED TO THE PROBLEM OF SALVAGE AND SAFETY IN RELATION TO SAC OVERFLIGHTS OF CDN TERRITORY. HE SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN A TOTAL OF ABOUT 800 SAC FLIGHTS OVER CDN TERRITORY IN THE PAST YEAR AND THAT WE WERE INCREASINGLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE LACK OF ADEQUATE SALVAGE ARRANGEMENTS. HE POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD THE RESPONSIBILITY OF CERTIFYING TO THE CDN GOVT THAT ADEQUATE SAFETY ARRANGEMENTS WERE IN FORCE. SO LONG AS SAC FLIGHTS HAD BEEN FEW IN NUMBER, HE HAD FELT THAT THE USE OF USA SALVAGE FACILITIES HAD BEEN ADEQUATE. HOWEVER, IN THE NEW SITUATION OF FAIRLY FREQUENT AND NUMEROUS SAC FLIGHTS, WE WERE OF THE FIRM OPINION THAT CDN SALVAGE FACILITIES MUST BE ESTABLISHED. THE INCREASING NUMBER OF FLIGHTS NATURALLY INCREASED THE LIKELIHOOD OF ACCIDENT ON CDN SOIL AND IN SUCH AN EVENT WE WOULD, AT THE MOMENT, BE OBLIGED TO CALL FOR USA HELP WITH POSSIBLE RESULTING POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT. HE SAID THAT SATISFACTORY DISCUSSIONS ON

...5



125 (HAR)

FEB 22 1985

REBUILT A SECRET

PAGE FIVE 2864

THIS SUBJECT HAD RECENTLY BEEN HELD WITH THE APPROPRIATE USA MILITARY AUTHORITIES AND THE USAF HAD AGREED TO TRAIN CDN TEAMS, BUT IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER ALL THE NECESSARY INFO FOR DEALING WITH SAC ACCIDENTS WOULD BE AVAILABLE. HE ASKED FOR REASSURANCE IN THIS MATTER.

11. GEN LOPER SAID THAT THE CONCLUSION OF A NEW BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF NUCLEAR INFO WOULD BE NECESSARY UNDER THE NEW ACT TO MEET OUR POINT FULLY AS OUTLINED BY GEN FOULKES. HE REFERRED TO AN EXAMPLE OF INFO ON THE SAFETY FACTORS OF THE MK 80 TORPEDO BEING WITHHELD FROM CANADA IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH AGREEMENT. HE SAID THAT WHILE THE PROBABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT, FOR WHICH CDNS WERE NOT ALREADY BEING ADEQUATELY TRAINED, WAS, IN HIS OPINION, EXTREMELY REMOTE, HE UNDERSTOOD THE NEED FOR ARRANGEMENTS OF THE KIND TO WHICH GEN FOULKES REFERRED. HE SAID THAT HIS OFFICE WOULD, IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE, TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN DRAFTING A NEW BILATERAL AGREEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF NUCLEAR INFO AND THAT THIS SHOULD BE READY SOMETIME AFTER MARIO, SINCE ANY NEW BILATERAL WOULD REQUIRE SIXTY DAYS BEFORE CONGRESS. IT WOULD BE SIMILAR TO THE UK AGREEMENT BUT WOULD NOT INCLUDE DESIGN INFO. SUBSEQUENT ADDITIONAL TRAINING OF CDN TEAMS WOULD BE NECESSARY.

12. GEN TWINING THEN MADE A SPECIFIC REF TO THE RELATION BETWEEN THE SUBJECTS WHICH HAD BEEN ALREADY DISCUSSED AND THE STORAGE OF MB-1 NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CANADA ON BEHALF OF THE USA. GEN FOULKES SAID HE THOUGHT WE WOULD BE READY TO GO AHEAD WITH THIS AS SOON AS WE WERE IN A POSITION TO SAY PUBLICLY THAT ARRANGEMENTS WERE ALSO UNDER WAY FOR THE SIMILAR STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR CDN USE. HE SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD FROM GEN PARTRIDGE THAT THIS WOULD MEET THE USA REQUIREMENTS. GEN TWINING CONFIRMED THIS.

13. MR MERCHANT REFERRING TO THE EARLIER PART OF THE DISCUSSION THEN ASKED WHETHER THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT TO WHICH GEN FOULKES HAD REFERRED, ON TRANSFER AND CUSTODY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WOULD BE ARRIVED AT FIRST, OR WHETHER HE ENVISAGED CONCURRENT AGREEMENT ON THIS EXCHANGE OF NOTES AND ON THE TECHNICAL DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN APPROPRIATE COMMANDERS. GEN FOULKES ASSURED HIM THAT THE GENERAL COVER AGREEMENT COULD BE CONCLUDED IN ADVANCE OF THE TECHNICAL AGREEMENT AND THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO GO AHEAD WITH STORAGE OF THE

...6

LLS (M&P)

REBUILT A SECRET

FEB 22 1985

PAGE SIX 2864

MB-1 IN CANADA WITHOUT WAITING FOR AGREEMENT ON THE TECHNICAL ANNEXES. MR IRWIN ASKED WHETHER WE ENVISAGED AN AGREEMENT COVERING BOTH DEFENSIVE WEAPONS AND STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS (AT GOOSE BAY). MR ROBERTSON POINTED OUT THAT WE WOULD HAVE MORE DIFFICULTY IN THE MATTER OF COMPONENTS FOR STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AND THOUGHT THAT THIS PROBLEM MIGHT BE DEFERRED PENDING SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE OTHER CATEGORIES.

14. MR MURPHY THEN REFERRED TO THE XYZ PROCEDURES AND ASKED WHETHER THEY WERE, IN OUR OPINION, SATISFACTORY. GEN FOULKES SAID HE THOUGHT THAT THE WISER PROCEDURE WAS TOO CUMBERSOME AND WAS DUE FOR OVERHAUL. HE THOUGHT THAT IN FUTURE SAC SHOULD SUBMIT ITS REQUIREMENTS TO THE CDN GOVT ON A PROGRAMME BASIS FOR THREE OR SIX MONTHS AND THAT CLEARANCES FOR INDIVIDUAL FLIGHTS SHOULD THEN BE MADE ON A SERVICE TO SERVICE BASIS. MR MURPHY, GEN TWINING AND GEN LOPER ALL EXPRESSED SATISFACTION WITH THIS PROPOSAL AND GEN TWINING PROMISED TO MAKE A SUGGESTION TO THE CDN AUTHORITIES ALONG THESE LINES IN DUE COURSE.

15. GEN TWINING THEN REFERRED BRIEFLY TO MB-1 OVERFLIGHTS AND INQUIRED AS TO OUR VIEW ON THIS MATTER. GEN FOULKES POINTED OUT THAT THE AGREEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT RUNS UNTIL JUL 1959 AND BEFORE THAT TIME THE POSITION WOULD HAVE TO BE REVIEWED AS A SEPARATE ITEM. IN THIS CONNECTION HE UNDERSTOOD THAT CINCNORAD HAD SOME NEW PROPOSALS. THE USA AUTHORITIES WOULD BE MAKING FURTHER PROPOSALS TO US CONCERNING MB-1 OVERFLIGHTS BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE.

PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH DECLARATION BY CINCNORAD OF INCREASED STATES OF MILITARY READINESS

16. GEN FOULKES OPENED THE DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT BY REFERRING TO THE RECENT CRISES IN THE MIDEAST AND THE FAREAST WHICH HAD HIGHLIGHTED THE NECESSITY FOR A CLEARER INTERPRETATION OF THE TERMS OF REF OF CINCNORAD IN REGARD TO HIS AUTHORITY TO DECLARE INCREASED STATES OF COMBAT READINESS. HE REFERRED TO THE TERMS OF REF OF CINCNORAD AND POINTED OUT THAT CINCNORAD IS AUTHORIZED TO "SPECIFY THE CONDITION OF COMBAT READINESS, TO INCLUDE STATES OF ALERT, TO BE MAINTAINED BY ALL FORCES ASSIGNED, ATTACHED OR OTHERWISE MADE AVAILABLE INCLUDING COMMAND FORCES, WHILE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CINCNORAD". HE SAID THERE APPEARED TO BE THREE MAIN ASPECTS TO THIS PROBLEM: FIRST, THAT CINCNORAD SHOULD HAVE AUTHORITY TO ALERT HIS FORCES

...7

000306



PAGE SEVEN 2864

FEB 22 1985

REBUT A SECRET

ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE FOR TRAINING PURPOSES; SECOND, THAT HE SHOULD HAVE AUTHORITY TO ALERT HIS COMMAND ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE IF THE NUMBER OF UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT INDICATED THE NEED; AND THIRD, IN A PERIOD OF INCREASING TENSION, THE CHIEFS OF STAFF WERE IN THE BEST POSITION TO ADVISE CINCNORAD ON THE DECLARATION OF AN ALERT BECAUSE THEY WERE IN A BETTER POSITION TO OBTAIN POLITICAL ADVICE AND HAD AT THEIR DISPOSAL A GREATER VOLUME OF PROCESSED STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE.

17. WE HAD THEREFORE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THE CHIEFS OF STAFF OF THE USA AND CANADA TO COMMUNICATE TO CINCNORAD AN AGREED INTERPRETATION OF HIS INSTRUCTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE DECLARATION OF ALERTS ARISING IN THE THIRD CATEGORY LISTED ABOVE. WE RECOMMENDED THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD FOLLOW THE LINES THAT GEN FOULKES HAD SUGGESTED ABOVE. MR IRWIN POINTED OUT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN ALERT AND AN INCREASE IN THE STATE OF COMBAT READINESS AND STATED THAT THIS WAS A MATTER WHICH WAS UNDER STUDY IN THE USA DEFENCE DEPT. HE THOUGHT THAT THE FORMULA SUGGESTED BY GEN FOULKES MIGHT TURN OUT TO BE TOO INFLEXIBLE AND THAT THEREFORE ALL THAT COULD BE SAFELY SAID AT PRESENT WAS THAT THE MATTER WAS UNDER STUDY. GEN TWINING EMPHASIZED THAT THE USA JOINT CHIEFS ALWAYS WISHED TO BE CONSULTED IN CONNECTION WITH STATES OF ALERT, IF ONLY BECAUSE OF THE COST INVOLVED, EVEN IN INCREASED STATES OF OPERATIONAL READINESS. IN GENERAL, GEN TWINING APPEARED TO BE FAVOURABLY DISPOSED TOWARDS GEN FOULKES' PROPOSALS, ALTHOUGH HIS ATTITUDE WAS SOMEWHAT MODIFIED BY THE REMARKS OF MR IRWIN. THERE APPEARED TO BE GENERAL AGREEMENT, HOWEVER, THAT CINCNORAD'S RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS MATTER SHOULD BE CLARIFIED.

18. GEN FOULKES ALSO REFERRED TO THE QUESTION OF THE DEPLOYMENT OF SAC AIRCRAFT TO REFUELLING BASES IN CANADA IN THE EVENT OF INCREASING TENSION. THIS HE THOUGHT WAS FAR MORE SERIOUS THAN THE QUESTION OF ALERTING NORAD BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBLE SOVIET REACTION TO SUCH DEPLOYMENT. HE THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT VERY WELL ESTIMATE THAT THE FORWARD DEPLOYMENT OF SAC AIRCRAFT WAS THE FORE-RUNNER OF A DELIBERATE PRE-EMPTIVE STRIKE AGAINST THE USSR, AND THAT THEREFORE SUCH DEPLOYMENTS COULD SERIOUSLY INCREASE THE DANGER OF MISCALCULATION. HE BELIEVED THAT IT WAS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE CONSULTATION PRIOR TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF SAC AIRCRAFT. GEN TWINING

...8

PAGE EIGHT 2864

FEB 22 1985

REBUILT A SECRET

UNDEPTOOK TO STUDY THIS PROBLEM AND MAKE APPROPRIATE RECOMMENDATIONS.

19. IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISCUSSION ON CONSULTATIONS IN PERIODS OF INCREASED TENSION, MR ROBERTSON OBSERVED THAT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, STATE DEPT AND EXTERNAL AFFAIRS SHOULD ALSO BE IN CLOSE TOUCH. MR MURPHY AGREED.

20. BEFORE CONCLUDING THE DISCUSSION OF THIS ITEM, GENERAL LOPER INTERVENED TO POINT OUT, IN CONNECTION WITH ITEM 1, THAT UNDER THE LAW THERE WAS NO RESTRICTION ON THE RELEASE OF NON-NUCLEAR ITEMS TO CANADA, SUCH AS CHECK-OUT KITS. HE THOUGHT THAT THE NEW BILATERAL AGREEMENT TO WHICH HE HAD PREVIOUSLY REFERRED SHOULD PROVIDE SPECIFICALLY FOR THE TRANSFER OF SUCH NON-NUCLEAR ITEMS TO CANADA, SINCE THESE WOULD BE ESSENTIAL FOR THE TRAINING AND PREPARATION OF CDN CREWS, AS WELL AS DEALING WITH OTHER ASPECTS OF USA-CANADA COOPERATION IN THE ATOMIC ENERGY FIELD.

OTHER MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE CANADA-USA COMMITTEE ON, JOINT DEFENCE

(A) THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE

21. MR ROBERTSON OPENED THE DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT BY REFERRING TO THE HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE PJBD'S ROLE IN THE COORDINATION OF USA-CDN DEFENCE AND SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO ENSURE THAT WE CONTINUE TO ASSIGN TO PJBD A ROLE IN KEEPING WITH ITS DEMONSTRATED VALUE. HE SAID THAT POSSIBLY WE MIGHT WORK TOWARD THE IDEA OF ASSIGNING TOPICS OF THE KIND DISCUSSED AT THIS PARTICULAR MEETING OF CONSULTATION FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE PJBD IN SUPPORT OF FUTURE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE MEETINGS. BY SO DOING THE MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION COULD RETURN TO THEIR ORIGINAL ROLE WHICH HE REGARDED AS BEING TO PERFORM A KIND OF WATCH FUNCTION, SURVEYING THE VARIOUS CRITICAL AREAS AND SITUATIONS IN THE WORLD WHICH WERE BECOMING OF INCREASING CONCERN TO CANADA. MR MURPHY INDICATED THE GREAT VALUE WHICH THE USA PLACED ON THE CONTINUING WORK OF THE BOARD.

22. GEN FOULKES POINTED OUT THAT THE PJBD HAD BEEN FORMED WHEN THERE WAS NO SUCH THING AS A JOINT STAFF EITHER IN WASHDC OR LDN. MANY OF THE PROBLEMS WHICH WERE ORIGINALLY ASSIGNED TO THE PJBD WERE CURRENTLY RESOLVED BY DIRECT CONSULTATION BETWEEN THE CHAIRMEN OF THE

...9



PAGE NINE 2864

FEB 22 1985

REBUILT A SECRET

RESPECTIVE JOINT STAFFS, OR BETWEEN THE JOINT STAFFS THEMSELVES. HE SAID THAT THE CDN JOINT STAFF AS SUCH WAS NOT REPRESENTED ON THE PJBD AND THAT SOME RE-ARRANGEMENT OF ITS MEMBERSHIP AND TERMS OF REF WAS OBVIOUSLY NECESSARY. HE AGREED THAT THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF THE MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION (IE THE EXAMINATION OF "HOT SPOTS" IN THE CURRENT WORLD SITUATION) WAS AN IMPORTANT ONE AND IT WAS DESIRABLE THAT IT SHOULD BE REVERTED TO WHEN ADEQUATE ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS EXISTED FOR DEALING WITH OTHER MATTERS. GEN TWINING SAID THAT ON THE USA SIDE THE PJBD MILITARY MEMBERSHIP WAS IN FACT RESPONSIBLE TO THE USA JOINT STAFF SO THAT THE PROBLEM WHICH GEN FOULKES HAD OUTLINED MIGHT BE UNIQUELY CDN. MR MURPHY SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR THE TWO CHAIRMEN OF PJBD TO ATTEND THE MINISTERIAL MEETING IN PARIS. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THIS SUGGESTION SHOULD BE FOLLOWED UP.

(B) USA PROPOSALS FOR THE REACTIVATION OF THE CONTINUED POLICY COMMITTEE

23. MR ROBERTSON SAID THAT THE WORKING ARRANGEMENTS ESTABLISHED AT THE END OF LAST YEAR FOR THE COORDINATION ON A TRIPARTITE BASIS OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT HAD PROVED TO BE VERY USEFUL AND THAT HE ASSUMED THAT THE REVIVAL OF THE CPC WAS PRIMARILY TO PROVIDE AN UMBRELLA AND A STIMULUS FOR THIS. IT WAS HIS EXPECTATION THAT THE CDN AUTHORITIES WOULD WELCOME THE PROPOSALS TO REVIVE THE CPC, AND HE HOPED THIS MATTER WOULD BE SETTLED IN PARIS IF NOT BEFORE. IN VIEW OF CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FRANCE, HE WONDERED WHETHER THE USA MIGHT BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP OF THAT COUNTRY TO THE CPC AND WHETHER ANY THOUGHT WAS BEING GIVEN TO CASTING THE NET WIDER.

24. MR IRVIN SAID THAT MR ROBERTSON'S POINT OF CONCERN WAS POLITICALLY VALID BUT IN THEIR MINDS THE SECURITY ASPECTS SO OUTWEIGHED THE POLITICAL, ESPECIALLY IN RELATION TO NUCLEAR AFFAIRS, THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT COOPERATION IN THIS FIELD COULD BE BROADENED. MR MURPHY SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE POLITICAL RISK OF CRITICISM FROM OUR OTHER NATO PARTNERS WAS ONE THAT WE WERE OBLIGED TO TAKE, IN VIEW OF THESE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, ANTICIPATE ANY OBJECTIONS FROM GEN DE GAULLE. MR RAE NOTED THAT THE REACTIVATION OF THE CPC DID NOT CREATE NEW MACHINERY AND THAT THE POSITION WAS THAT WE WERE IN EFFECT CONTINUING AN AGENCY WHICH HAD BEEN IN OPERATION FOR SOME YEARS.

PAGE TEN 2864

LHS (M&P) ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
REBUILT A SECRET

FEB 22 1985

25. THERE FOLLOWED SOME DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION OF PUBLICITY CONCERNING THE CPC. MR MERCHANT AND MR MURPHY BOTH MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE USA WAS ANXIOUS TO AVOID ANY PUBLICITY IN CONNECTION WITH THE CPC, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME RECOGNIZING THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH PRESS REPORTS AS THEY AROSE.

(C) INTEGRATION OF CANADA-USA DEFENCE PRODUCTION.

(D) COST SHARING ARRANGEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO IMMEDIATE PROGRAMMES IN THE CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCE FIELD.

26. THESE TWO ITEMS WERE CONSIDERED TOGETHER. MR ROBERTSON EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS WHOLE SUBJECT TO THE CDN GOVT AND NOTED THAT, IN VIEW OF THE VARIOUS SPECIALIZED MEETINGS WHICH WERE BEING HELD, WE COULD ANTICIPATE AN INTERIM REPORT IN THIS FIELD FOR THE MINISTERIAL MEETING. MR IRWIN SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARIES APPEARED TO BE PROGRESSING IN ITS WORK. MR RITCHIE SECONDED THIS, STATING THAT THE ATMOSPHERE AT THE MEETING ON THE PREVIOUS DAY HAD BEEN GOOD AND ALTHOUGH THE RESULTS REMAINED TO BE SEEN THE PROSPECTS WERE PROMISING. HE SAID THAT, ALTHOUGH IT WAS TOO EARLY TO ANTICIPATE THE KIND OF DISCUSSION WHICH MIGHT TAKE PLACE IN PARIS, IT WAS TO BE HOPED THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME FAIRLY CONCRETE RESULTS BY THAT TIME. ONE PROBLEM RELATING TO THIS WHOLE QUESTION WHICH APPEARED TO HIM TO BE PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT WAS THE BUY AMERICAN LEGISLATION. THIS, HE UNDERSTOOD, WAS UP FOR REVIEW AND WE WERE HOPEFUL THAT THIS REVIEW WOULD RESULT IN A LIBERALIZATION, AT LEAST WITH RESPECT TO CANADA. MR IRWIN AGREED THAT THE REVIEW OF THIS LEGISLATION WAS VITAL TO THE WHOLE PROBLEM.

27. GEN FOULKES SAID THAT ARMS WERE NOW GETTING SO COMPLICATED AND EXPENSIVE THAT THE CDNS WERE BEING PRICED OUT OF THE FIELD. WE NEED SO FEW OF ANY GIVEN ITEM OF EQUIPMENT THAT THE COST OF PRODUCTION PER UNIT WAS ALMOST PROHIBITIVE. IT WAS THEREFORE ESSENTIAL THAT WE SHOULD GET INTO PRODUCTION OF COMPONENTS AND JOINT WEAPONS.

28. MR ROBERTSON ADDED THAT THE PROBLEM WAS BROADER THAN THAT OF COST ALONE. THERE WERE MANY OTHER ASPECTS, INCLUDING OUR CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN DEFENCE INDUSTRY, OUR INVESTMENT IN SPECIALIZED STAFF, THE NUMBER OF CDNS EMPLOYED IN DEFENCE INDUSTRIES AND THE DESIRABILITY OF THE BEST POSSIBLE UTILIZATION OF NORTH AMERICAN RESOURCES.

...11

000310



PAGE ELEVEN 2864

LLS (H&IR)

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REBUT A SECRET

FEB 22 1985

29. GEN FOULKES SAID THAT UNDER A PRODUCTION SHARING SYSTEM A NORTH AMERICAN INDUSTRY WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE MUCH MORE IN HARDWARE TO CONTINENTAL DEFENCE THAN IT COULD WORKING INDEPENDENTLY. MR MURPHY AGREED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT WE MAKE THE BEST POSSIBLE USE OF OUR RESOURCES FOR DEFENCE. HE SAID THAT HE SUSPECTED THAT PER CAPITA DEFENCE PRODUCTION IN THE SOVIET BLOC WAS VERY MUCH BETTER THAN IT WAS IN THE WEST.

30. GEN FOULKES SAID THAT PART OF THE DIFFICULTY IN COST SHARING AND PRODUCTION SHARING WAS THAT THE BEST SCHEME FOR COST SHARING WAS SOMETIMES THE OPPOSITE FROM A DESIRABLE SCHEME FOR PRODUCTION SHARING. FOR EXAMPLE, IN COST SHARING IT WOULD PROBABLY BE LOGICAL FOR THE CDN TO PROVIDE BUILDINGS AND FIXED INSTALLATIONS. THIS WOULD, OF COURSE, LEAVE THE PRODUCTION OF EQUIPMENT TO THE USA WHICH WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE CONCEPT OF PRODUCTION SHARING.

31. MR IRWIN SAID THAT THE DEFENSE DEPT WAS FULLY CONSCIOUS OF OUR PROBLEM AND WAS EARNESTLY STUDYING IT. MR MURPHY CONFIRMED THIS AND ASKED GEN TWining TO GIVE A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE PROCUREMENT PROBLEMS FACING THE USA SERVICES. GEN TWining SAID THAT THE THREE USA SERVICES HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PROCEED ON INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT LINES BUT COSTS WERE NOW SUCH THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO BE HIGHLY SELECTIVE IN SHARING RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION BETWEEN THE SERVICES. THIS PROBLEM, HE THOUGHT, WAS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS THAT BETWEEN CANADA AND THE USA. HE SAID THAT UP TO NOW THE USA JOINT CHIEFS HAD NOT BEEN GREATLY INVOLVED WITH THE USA-CDN ASPECT OF THIS PROBLEM, BUT HENCEFORTH HE WOULD TAKE A GREATER INTEREST IN IT. BOTH MR ROBERTSON AND GEN FOULKES EMPHASIZED THAT ANYTHING HE COULD DO TO HASTEN PROGRESS WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED. (E) ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEC MEETING TO THE CANADA-USA JOINT COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE

32. THERE WAS A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH ANY PUBLICITY FOR THIS MEETING. MR MERCHANT SAID THAT THE USA GOVT WAS ANXIOUS THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO PUBLIC RELEASE IN PARIS. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE CDN MINISTERS MIGHT ANNOUNCE THE PARIS MEETING ON TJNR RETURN TO OTT. MR ROBERTSON SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THIS MIGHT MEET THE POSITION.

## FAR EASTERN SITUATION

113 (H91R) DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REBUILT A SECRET  
FEB 22 1985

33. CONSIDERATION OF THIS ITEM WAS PRECEDED BY A BRIEFING GIVEN BY A LIEUT-COL OF THE DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE OF THE USA JOINT STAFF. THE BRIEFING WAS PRIMARILY CONCERNED WITH DETAILED ORDER OF BATTLE INFO FOR THE VARIOUS COUNTRIES OF THE FAREAST. IT APPEARED THAT, IN GENERAL, THESE COUNTRIES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE GRC, NORTHVIETNAM AND COMMUNIST CHINA, POSSESSED ARMED FORCES IN SUFFICIENT TO DO VERY MUCH MORE THAN MAINTAIN INTERNAL SECURITY, ALTHOUGH IT WAS ESTIMATED THAT SOUTHVIETNAM COULD WITHSTAND AN ATTACK FROM NORTH VIETNAM FOR A PERIOD OF ABOUT FIVE WEEKS. THE MILITARY BUILD-UP IN JAPAN WAS DESCRIBED AS DISAPPOINTING, LARGELY AS A RESULT OF THE POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES FACING THE GOVT IN CONNECTION WITH DEFENCE.

34. THE BRIEFING OFFICER TRACED THE HISTORY OF THE GOVT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN FAMILIAR TERMS. HE MENTIONED THAT DAILY OVER-FLIGHTS OF MAINLAND CHINA BY NATIONALIST AIRCRAFT HAD BEEN VIRTUALLY DAILY OCCURRENCES SINCE THE RETREAT OF THE GRC TO TAIWAN. HE DESCRIBED THE GARRISON ON THE CHINMENS AS CONSISTING OF 6 INFANTRY DIVISIONS, 1 TANK BATTALION AND 1 ARTILLERY GROUP. THERE WERE 23,000 GRC TROOPS ON THE MATSUS AND THE GRC HAD A TOTAL OF 600,000 PERSONNEL IN ITS ARMED FORCES. HE SAID THAT WHILE THE USA GOVT HAD RESTRAINED THE GRC FROM DIRECT ATTACKS ON THE MAINLAND, IT HAD PERMITTED COUNTER-BATTERY FIRE AND COASTAL AIR PATROLS.

35. SINCE THE RESUMPTION OF LARGE SCALE ARTILLERY ATTACKS AGAINST THE CHINMENS, THE USA GOVT HAD AUTHORIZED 347 MILLION DOLLARS IN ADDITIONAL MILITARY AID TO THE GRC. THIS AID WOULD INCLUDE, 145 HIGH-PERFORMANCE FIGHTERS; (F86'S AND F100'S); 16-C119 TRANSPORTS; 130 LANDING CRAFT; 3 LSTS; 2 LSMs; 20,000 CARGO CHUTES; 3 BARCS (CAPACITY 60 TONS OR 200 TROOPS); 12 - 8" HOWITZERS; 39 - 155 MM HOWITZERS; 92 - 105 MM HOWITZERS; 66 - M41 TANKS; 155 SIDEWINDER ADAPTER KITS; 380 SIDE-WINDERS; 55,000 M-1 RIFLES; 48 TRACTORS; 1 NIKE BATTALION.

36. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM GENERAL FOULKES, GEN TWINING REFERRED TO HIS RECENT CONVERSATION WITH THE CHIEF OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST GROUND FORCES. AS HE PROCEEDED WITH HIS ACCOUNT OF THIS CONVERSATION IT WAS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR WHETHER HE WAS STATING HIS OWN OPINIONS OR THOSE OF THE CHINESE COMMANDER, BUT HE GAVE THE GENERAL IMPRESSION THAT HE WAS SUBSTANTIALLY IN AGREEMENT WITH THE COMMANDER'S



PAGE THIRTEEN 2864

LLS (H&IR)

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REBUILT A SECRET

FEB 22 1985

VIEWS. " WAS ESTIMATED THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS HAD BELIEVED THAT THEY COULD TAKE OVER CONTROL OF THE CHINMENS SOLELY AS A RESULT OF ARTILLERY FIRE. THEY HAD OVER-ESTIMATED THEIR CAPABILITIES IN THIS REGARD AND IN SPITE OF A MAXIMUM ARTILLERY EFFORT THEIR ATTEMPT HAD BEEN A FAILURE. THIS HAD BEEN A GREAT SHOCK TO THEM. IT WAS NOW CLEAR THAT THEY COULD NOT TAKE THE ISLANDS IF THE CHINESE NATIONALISTS DECIDED TO DEFEND THEM RESOLUTELY. GEN TWining SAID THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS HAD HAD MIG 19S IN THE AREA BUT HAD NOT USED THEM. THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF A CHINESE AIR-TO-AIR GUIDED MISSILE COMPARABLE TO THE SIDEWINDER AND IT WAS REMARKABLE THAT NO CHINESE-MADE SHELLS HAD BEEN FOUND. THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS HAD USED MOSTLY RUSSIAN SHELLS AND SOME AMERICAN. CHINESE NATIONALIST COUNTER-BATTERY FIRE WITH 8" HOWITZERS HAD BEEN GOOD AND THE SUPPLY OF THE CHINMENS WAS NO LONGER A PROBLEM SINCE ADDITIONAL USA ADVICE AND EQUIPMENT HAD BEEN PROVIDED.

37. IN RESPONSE TO A SPECIFIC QUESTION, GEN TWining CONFIRMED HIS PREVIOUS STATEMENT THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARTILLERY EFFORT AGAINST THE CHINMENS HAD BEEN THE MAXIMUM OF WHICH THEY WERE CAPABLE. HE ADDED THAT THE CHINESE NATIONALISTS HAD NOT FORESEEN THE COMMUNIST ATTACKS ALTHOUGH THEY HAD SOME INTELLIGENCE WARNING. IT WAS ESTIMATED THAT FAULTY COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE ABOUT DECLINING MORALE IN THE GRC MAY HAVE ENCOURAGED THE COMMUNISTS IN THEIR ATTEMPT AGAINST THE CHINMENS.

38. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM MR ROBERTSON, MR MURPHY SAID HE BELIEVED THERE HAD BEEN A DEFINITE CHANGE IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ATTITUDE TOWARD MILITARY ACTION AGAINST THE CHINMENS THEY WERE NOW IN THE PROCESS OF EXAMINING THE GROUNDS FOR THE REVERSE THEY HAD SUFFERED. AS AN INDICATION OF THIS CHANGE HE CITED THE DISMISSAL OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST CHIEF OF THE ARMY STAFF. HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ATTITUDE ON THE WARSAW TALKS BUT HE ESTIMATED THAT THEY WERE NOT SURE ABOUT THEIR NEXT STEP AND A NOTICEABLE CHANGE MIGHT BE SOME MONTHS IN APPEARING. HE THOUGHT CHINESE COMMUNIST CONFUSION WAS QUITE CLEAR FROM A READING OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST DEFENCE MINISTER'S SPEECHES. SHELLING ON ALTERNATE DAYS, HE

...14

PAGE FOURTEEN 2864

LHS (MURPHY)

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

ADDED WAS A PECULIAR AND NOVEL REFINEMENT OF AGGRESSION.

REBUILT A SECRET

FEB 22 1985

39. MR ROBERTSON ASKED MR MURPHY WHETHER HE THOUGHT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS MIGHT RESPOND TO A PROPOSAL TO REDUCE THE SIZE OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST GARRISON ON THE CHINMENS. MR MURPHY REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD NOT. THE CHINESE COMMUNIST POSITION WAS THAT THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE GRC AND THE PEOPLES' GOVT WAS AN INTERNAL MATTER, NOT SUBJECT TO NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USA. MR LUTKINS (FAR EAST DIVISION) CONFIRMED THAT ALTHOUGH THE IDEA OF A REDUCTION IN THE SIZE OF THE GARRISON HAD BEEN INTRODUCED IN THE WARSAW TALKS, THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS HAD REBUFFED THE SUGGESTION.

40. GEN TWINING SAID THAT THE CHINESE NATIONALISTS HAD BEEN CONTINUOUSLY ADVISED SINCE 1955 THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF SUCH A LARGE GARRISON ON THE CHINMENS WAS NONSENSICAL. IN RESPONSE TO A FURTHER QUESTION, GEN TWINING SAID THAT THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LOGISTICAL SITUATION WAS NOT GOOD, THAT THEIR AIR FIELDS WERE DEPENDENT ON ONE RAILWAY WHICH CROSSED A NUMBER OF HIGHLY VULNERABLE, WOODEN BRIDGES AND THESE COULD BE EASILY DESTROYED. IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE TAIWAN SITUATION, GEN TWINING SAID THAT HE CONSIDERED THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD AUTHORIZED THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS TO SEE WHAT THEY COULD DO WITH ARTILLERY BOMBARDMENT ALONE, BUT TO GO NO FARTHER. HE WAS CONVINCED THE USSR WAS ANXIOUS TO AVOID A MAJOR BATTLE IN THE AREA.

41. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF THE ATTACK ON THE CHINMENS HAVING BEEN INITIATED IN ORDER TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE MIDEAST. MR MURPHY AGREED THAT THIS WAS ONE POSSIBLE EXPLANATION, OR CONTRIBUTORY FACTOR, IN THE SITUATION.

42. MR MURPHY CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION BY SAYING THAT THE EFFECT ON USA ALLIES IN THE AREA OF THE SUCCESS OF GRC AND USA POLICIES HAD BEEN VERY SALUTARY.



70

*Co. 7. 6. of 6*

FM WASHDC NOV21/58 ~~TOP~~ SEC  
TO EXTERNAL 2863 OPIMMEDIATE  
INFO TT CCOS FM OTT  
FOLLOWING FOR UNDER SECRETARY  
MEETING OF CONSULTATION

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REBUILT A SECRET**

*LIS(M&IR)*

FEB 22 1985

OUR IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TEL CONTAINS OUR DRAFT REPORT OF THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION HELD IN WASHDC ON NOV19. THIS REPORT HAS NOT RPT NOT YET BEEN COMPARED WITH STATE DEPT. WE WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS AND THOSE OF THE CCOS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER THAT WE MAY DO THIS.

D 204

OUTGOING MESSAGE

50 *File*

FM: EXTERNAL	DATE	FILE		SECURITY					
	NOV 17-58	50219-AE-40		RESTRICTED					
		70	50						
TO: WASHINGTON	NUMBER		PRECEDENCE		COMCENTRE USE ONLY				
	DL-935		OP IMMEDIATE						
INFO: CCOS									

Ref.: YOUR TEL 2798 AND 2804 OF NOVEMBER 14.

Subject: MEETING OF CONSULTATION

CANADIAN GROUP WILL BE TRAVELLING IN RCAF DAKOTA #827. IT WILL BE ARRIVING AT MATS TERMINAL. WHILE WE EXPECT THAT THE TIME <sup>of</sup> ARRIVAL WILL BE APPROXIMATELY 7.30 PM WE SHALL CONFIRM TIME OF ARRIVAL BY TELEPHONE TOMORROW. GEN FOULKES AND MAJOR LISOWSKI ARE GRATEFUL FOR OFFER OF ACCOMMODATION AT THE EMBASSY RESIDENCE AND WILL BE STAYING THERE RATHER THAN IN A HOTEL.

2. THE NAMES OF THE PASSENGERS AND THE CREW ARE INCLUDED BELOW FOR PURPOSES OF CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION CLEARANCE.

PASSENGERS - MESSRS ROBERTSON AND BRYCE, GEN. FOULKES, MAJOR LISOWSKI,  
MAJOR J E STEINBUCKL

CREW - THE CAPTAIN OF THE AIRCRAFT WILL BE F/LT G MACANINCH

OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CREW ARE AS FOLLOWS:-

F/L S HEATH, F/L R E COMICHUK, F/L F C KING, F/O J NOGALO,

LAC G CHARTRAND, LAC K W PERKINS.

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION NO REGULAR DISTRIBUTION

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG..... NAME..... JJ MCCARDLE/ac	DL(I) DIV	6-7921	SIG..... NAME..... PJ TREMBLAY/ac

000317 -

DL(I) Div./J.J. McCardle/ac

*file*

UN SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS.

~~TOP SECRET~~

November 17, 1958.

DL(I) DIVISION

~~TOP SECRET~~  
30219-AE-40  
70  
—  
RECEIVED A SECRET  
LIS(H&IR)

FEB 22 1985

Meeting of Consultation - Canada-United States - November 19, 1958.

- There is attached for your use a book containing commentaries on the items which will be discussed at the Meeting of Consultation with the United States authorities on November 19.

2. Many of the papers are in summary form, others are in memoranda which have already been submitted to you on earlier occasions. Because of your familiarity with the substance of the Agenda items, we have not written new papers in every case. If you wish docketts of additional papers on individual items can be brought together.

3. There is nothing in the book under the item dealing with cost sharing arrangements. These arrangements have been the responsibility of the Department of National Defence and we do not know where the matter stands at the moment. We understand that Gen. Foulkes will be giving you orally this afternoon an outline of progress in this field. Perhaps you could prevail upon him to prepare a paper for your convenience at the Washington Meeting.

4. Copies of papers prepared in this Department with respect to Items 1, 2, 3(b) and 4 of the Agenda have been sent to both Mr. Bryce and Gen. Foulkes.

5. Some of the material in the book has been taken from the files and I should be grateful therefore if you could return the book as a whole to this Division when it has served its purpose.

(Signed) PAUL TREMPER

Defence Liaison (1) Division

000318

FILE COPY

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act  
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

50219-AE-40

38 | 50

*File  
ESM*

FM WASHDC NOV14/58 SECRET

TO EXTERNAL 2804 OPIMMEDIATE

FOR MCCARDLE

REF OURTEL 2798 NOV14

MEETING OF CONSULTATION

WHEN SENDING US THE TIME OF ARRIVAL OF AIRCRAFT, WOULD YOU PLEASE

INCLUD DTAILS OF AIRCRAFT, CREW AND PASSENGERS FOR PURPOSS OF CUSTOMS

AND IMMIGRATION CLEARANCES.

D-1	
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

17 NOV 1958



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

*file*

66

6 FM: EXTERNAL	DATE	FILE		SECURITY			
	NOV 14-58	50219-AE-40		SECRET			
TO: WASHINGTON	NUMBER	PRECEDENCE	COMCENTRE USE ONLY				
	20	50					
	20930	0 PIMMEDIATE					
	<del>X Ref on 50218-B 40</del>		Original Signed by DOUGLAS LE PAN				
INFO: CCOS							

Ref.: YOUR TEL 2778 OF NOV 12-58.

Subject: MEETING OF CONSULTATION

IT IS NOW EXPECTED THAT MR ROBERTSON MR BRYCE AND GEN FOULKES WILL TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT ON NOVEMBER 18 PROBABLY ARRIVING ABOUT 7.30 PM AT MATS TERMINAL.

WE UNDERSTAND YOU ARE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR ACCOMMODATION FOR MR ROBERTSON AND MR BRYCE. GEN FOULKES IS NOW MAKING HIS OWN ARRANGEMENTS AND EXPECTS TO STAY AT THE DUPONT PLAZA HOTEL.

2. WE WOULD HOPE THAT AN OFFICER FROM THE EMBASSY COULD ATTEND THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION TO PARTICIPATE IN THE DISCUSSION AND THAT ANOTHER OFFICER <sup>from</sup> IN THE EMBASSY AS COULD ATTEND WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR KEEPING THE CANADIAN RECORD OF THE DISCUSSIONS/IN THE PAST. WE WOULD HOPE THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE US WITH TELEGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE MEETING IMMEDIATELY UPON CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING TO BE FOLLOWED LATER BY THE NORMAL DETAILED REPORT <sup>as a</sup> FOR OUR PERMANENT RECORDS.

3. WE ARE INCLUDING BELOW WHAT WE UNDERSTAND TO BE THE AGREED AGENDA FOR THE MEETING. WE WOULD NOT ANTICIPATE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF ITEMS 3 (c) AND 3 (d):-

..... 2

(COPY FOR SECRETARY TO THE CABINET)



LOCAL DISTRIBUTION NO REGULAR DISTRIBUTION

*Secretary to Cab*

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY Original Signed by
SIG.....			SIG..... DOUGLAS LE PAN
NAME... DL(I)/JMG/CABLE/ac...			NAME... PJ TREMBLAY/ac

000320



2.

MEETING OF CONSULTATION

CANADA - UNITED STATES

NOVEMBER 19 - AGENDA

1. PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH THE ACQUISITION AND CONTROL OF DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CANADA.
2. PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH THE DECLARATION BY CINCNORAD OF INCREASED STATES OF MILITARY READINESS.
3. OTHER MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE CANADA-UNITED STATES COMMITTEE ON JOINT DEFENCE.
  - (a) FUTURE ROLE OF THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE.
  - (b) UNITED STATES PROPOSALS FOR THE REACTIVATION OF THE COMBINED POLICY COMMITTEE.
  - (c) THE INTEGRATION OF CANADA-UNITED STATES DEFENCE PRODUCTION
  - (d) COST SHARING ARRANGEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO IMMEDIATE PROGRAMMES IN THE CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCE FIELD.
  - (e) ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DECEMBER MEETING OF THE CANADA-UNITED STATES JOINT COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE.
4. THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION.

~~SECRET~~ DIVISION

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET  
hls (M&IK)  
FEB 22 1985

~~TOP SECRET~~

50219-AE-40	
70	50

Ottawa, November 14, 1958.

CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF  
SECRETARY TO THE CABINET

RE: Meeting of Consultation - Administrative Details

The State Department has now given us a list of United States participants for the Meeting of Consultation on November 19. The Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Herter, is expected to open the Meeting but will have to turn the Meeting over to Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs. On the State Department side, it is expected that Messrs. Merchant, Farley, Willoughby and Parker will be present and for the Pentagon, General Twining, John Irwin (Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs), and General Loper will attend. The State Department will arrange for lunch.

For convenience of reference, there is set out in the attachment the Agenda which has now been agreed with the United States authorities. Insofar as administrative arrangements for the Ministerial Committee Meeting in December are concerned, we would at the moment propose to put forward at the Meeting the views which were contained in our telegram DL-850 of October 24, to Washington. We have not yet had United States comments on the suggestions contained in that message. We have already indicated to the State Department we would not expect to enter into detailed discussion of defence production sharing and cost sharing since a good deal of work has been done on proposals in this context through other channels.

..... 2



DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REBUILT A SECRET

LIS (M&IR)

FEB 22 1985

- 2 -

Accommodation is being arranged through the Embassy in Washington for Mr. Bryce and Mr. Robertson. We understand that Gen. Foulkes is making his own arrangements for accommodation. We have informed the Embassy in Washington that the Canadian group will be arriving in Washington by military aircraft on Tuesday evening, November 18, probably about 7.30 p.m.

Finally, it has been agreed, I think, that a meeting should be held in Mr. Robertson's office at 4.00 p.m., on Monday, November 17, to discuss Canadian views on the Agenda items preparatory to the Washington trip.

*Sgt. W V Le Pan*

Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

MEETING OF CONSULTATION  
CANADA - UNITED STATES  
NOVEMBER 19 - AGENDA

1. Problems connected with the acquisition and control of defensive nuclear weapons in Canada.
2. Problems connected with the declaration by CINCNORAD of increased states of military readiness.
3. Other matters to be considered by the Canada-United States Committee on joint defence.
  - a) Future role of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.
  - b) United States proposals for the reactivation of the Combined Policy Committee.
  - c) The integration of Canada-United States defence production.
  - d) Cost sharing arrangements with respect to immediate programmes in the continental air defence fields.
  - e) Administrative arrangements for the December Meeting of the Canada-United States Joint Committee on Defence.
4. The Far Eastern situation.



DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE


~~TOP SECRET~~

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REBUT A SECRET**  
*L.S. (M21R)*  
**FEB 22 1985**

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF  
OTTAWA

13 November, 1958.

Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs:



Meeting of Consultation

1. With reference to your letter of 10 November, in which you inform me that the United States authorities have suggested a meeting of consultation to be held on Wednesday, 19 November, in Washington, beginning at 10.30 in the morning.

2. This timing is quite satisfactory for me and I will arrange to have an aircraft available on Tuesday, 18 November, ready to proceed to Washington in the late afternoon or early evening and return the next day at the conclusion of the meetings. The trip will take about three and one-quarter hours, and it would be appreciated if you could advise me what time you wish to take off from Ottawa. Perhaps we should discuss the time of take-off at the meeting you suggest for Monday, 17 November. I will be available on Monday to discuss the agenda any time in the afternoon. Would you be good enough to advise me of the time of this meeting.

*Spoke to Majors.  
Lisowski. Nov 13*

*- Meeting Monday - 4pm.  
- Accommodation being arranged  
by Embassy.  
J.M.*

*Charles Foulkes*  
(Charles Foulkes)  
General,  
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.

c.c. Secretary to the Cabinet

000325

*For file  
88m.*

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

113 NOV 1958

50219-AE-40  
58 50  
Copy dw  
50218-B-40  
50309-A-40

FM WASHDC NOV 12/58 SECRET  
TO EXTERNAL 2778 PRIORITY  
INFO TT CCOS FM OTT  
REF YOURTEL DL919 NOV 10

MEETING OF CONSULTATION

WE HAVE SPOKE EN TO WILLOUGHBY OF THE STATE DEPT, WHO HAS INDICATED THAT THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS ON THE 19TH INFORMALLY THE ROLE OF THE PJBD WITH REF TO THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE. HE AGREES FURTHER THAT IT WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE NECESSARY FOR THE CHAIRMEN OF THE TWO NATIONAL SECTIONS TO BE PRESENT AT THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION. WITH REF TO THE PROPOSAL THAT THERE SHOULD BE A SPECIFIC ITEM ON THIS SUBJECT FOR THE MINISTERS TO CONSIDER IN PARIS, HIS REAN WAS THAT THIS MIGHT BEST BE LOOKED AT ON THE 19TH WHEN IT WOULD BE CLEARER JUST WHAT MINISTERS MIGHT HAVE TO CONSIDER ON THIS SUBJECT. HE DID INDICATE TO US INFORMALLY THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE MOST USEFUL IF AT THE MEETINGS ON THE 19TH WE COULD BE IN A POSITION TO INDICATE OUR OWN VIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE BOARD IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT, SINCE HE THOUGHT THE CDN VIEW WOULD CARRY A GOOD DEAL OF WEIGHT WITH THE USA GROUP.

2. WITH REGARD TO PARTICIPATION, AS INDICATED PREVIOUSLY, STATE DEPT WOULD LIKE A LIST OF CDN PARTICIPANTS. WE WERE TOLD THAT ON THE USA SIDE GOVERNOR HERTER IS EXPECTED TO OPEN THE MEETING, BUT BECAUSE THE SECRETARY IS AWAY, AND IN VIEW OF HIS OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES, GOVERNOR HERTER WILL TURN OVER THE MEETING TO MR MURPHY. ON THE STATE DEPT SIDE IT IS EXPECTED THAT MR MERCHANT, FARLEY, WILLOUGHBY AND PARKER WILL BE PRESENT, AND FOR THE PENTAGON GENERAL TWINING, JOHN IRWIN (ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS), AND GENERAL LOPER WILL ATTEND.

3. WE GATHER THAT ARRANGEMENTS FOR LUNCH ARE IN STATE DEPT HANDS.

*Letter to CCOS  
See 46 Tab Nov 13.*

*88m*

ACTION COPY

DOWNGRAD TO SECRET  
REBOOT A SECRET

LS (HAR)

FEB 22 1985

Pipele

OM-1

J 8

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

122 NOV 1958

50219. AE-40
58 50

FM WASHDC NOV10/58 TOPSEC  
TO EXTERNAL 2759 PRIORITY  
REF OURTEL 2639 OCT28  
MEETING OF CONSULTATION

THIS WILL CONFIRM OUR UNDERSTANDING, ON THE BASIS OF CONVERSATIONS WITH  
THE STATE DEPT, THAT THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION IS ON THE RAILS  
FOR NOV19, TO BEGIN AT 10:30AM AND CONTINUING THROUGH THE REST OF THE  
DAY IN THE STATE DEPT. STATE DEPT HAVE INTIMATED THAT THEY ARE AGREEABLE  
TO ADOPTING AGENDA WE HAVE PROPOSED AS BASIS FOR DISCUSSION. IN ADDITION  
TO UNDERSECRETARY AND GENERAL FOULKES, WE UNDERSTAND THAT SECRETARY  
OF THE CABINET WILL ALSO BE PRESENT. STATE DEPT HAS ASKED US FOR  
ADVANCE NOTICE OF LIST OF CANADIAN PARTICIPANTS. WE HOPE IT WILL BE  
POSSIBLE FOR PARTY FROM OTT TO ARRIVE ON NOV18. PLEASE ADVISE.

000327

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

6 FM: EXTERNAL OTTAWA	DATE	FILE		SECURITY					
	NOV10/58	50219-AE-40		SECRET					
TO: WASHINGTON	70		50		COMCENTRE USE ONLY				
	NUMBER		PRECEDENCE						
	DL-919		PRIORITY						
X Ref on 50309-A-40									
INFO: CCOS									

Ref.:

Subject: MEETING OF CONSULTATION

MR. SMITH AND MR. PEARKES HAVE AGREED THAT THE ROLE OF THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE VIS-A-VIS THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE SHOULD BE PROPOSED AS AN ITEM FOR DISCUSSION AT THE DECEMBER MEETING OF MINISTERS.

2. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES THEREFORE WE WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO DISCUSS THE SUBJECT INFORMALLY IN THE COURSE OF THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION. IT NEED NOT PERHAPS BE A SPECIFIC ITEM ON THE AGENDA BUT COULD BE DEALT WITH UNDER ITEM C "OTHER MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE CANADA-US COMMITTEE ON JOINT DEFENCE." OUR OBJECT IN HAVING THE MATTER DISCUSSED AT THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION WOULD BE EXPLORATORY. WE WOULD NOT THEREFORE THINK IT ESSENTIAL THAT THE CHAIRMEN OF THE TWO NATIONAL SECTIONS BE PRESENT AT THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION.

3. I WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU COULD LET THE STATE DEPARTMENT KNOW THAT WE WOULD LIKE AT THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION TO HAVE AN EXCHANGE OF PRELIMINARY VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT.

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION				NO REGULAR DISTRIBUTION ONLY TO: SECRETARY TO THE CABINET FIVE COPIES FOR MR. McCARDLE	
ORIGINATOR		DIVISION		PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG..... NAME...J.J.McCardle/ML.....		D.L. (1)		6-7921	sgd. N.A.R. SIG..... NAME....N.A.Robertson.....
000328					



DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REBUILT A SECRET

LHS (M&IR)  
FEB 22 1985

50219-AE-40	SECRET
70	

November 10, 1958.

X Ref on 50309-A-40

CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF  
SECRETARY TO THE CABINET

Re: Meeting of Consultation

We have been informed that the United States authorities have now accepted our suggestion for a Meeting of Consultation and have indicated their hope that the Meeting can be held on Wednesday, November 19, in Washington, beginning at 10.30 in the morning. The United States authorities have as well accepted the agenda which we suggested and which was set out in our telegram DL-849 of October 24.

I should be grateful if you could let us know if the suggested date for the meeting is satisfactory to you. Travel arrangements will have to be made immediately. I suggest that we should plan to go to Washington on Tuesday, November 18. Would it be possible to have arrangements made for transport by service aircraft?

If this date is satisfactory, I hope we can meet to discuss the agenda items before leaving Ottawa, perhaps on Monday, November 17, in my office.

*Sgd: N.A. Robertson*  
Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs.

Copies referred to:- D.M. Def. Prod.  
D.M. Finance  
Embassy, Washington

10.11.18 (US)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: .... FAR EASTERN DIVISION

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REBUT A SECRET**

Security ~~TOP SECRET~~ S.E.G.R.E.T

Date .... November 5, 1958.

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division

LLS (MTR)

File No.

50219-AE-40

REFERENCE: .....

FEB 22 1985

70		—
----	--	---

SUBJECT: Meeting of Consultation with United States Authorities.....

FE  
CIRCULATION

1.....  
2.....  
3.....  
4.....  
5.....  
6.....  
7.....  
8.....  
9.....  
10.....

As you may know, arrangements were made in 1951 for periodic Meetings of Consultation between high level officials of Canadian and United States Governments. The purpose of these meetings is to examine the international situation with a view to spotting developments which might lead to the use of nuclear weapons. In the course of time they have also come to deal with the military threat to North America and problems relating thereto. The last such meeting was held in Washington in September, 1957. We are currently discussing, through our Embassy in Washington, with the State Department the possibility of holding a further meeting in Washington sometime in the week beginning November 17. If the State Department agrees, the meetings will be attended, on the Canadian side, by the Under-Secretary, the Chairman Chiefs of Staff and the Charge d'Affaires in Washington.

2. These Meetings of Consultation are designed to provide for a free-flowing exchange of views not tied too closely to written briefs. The agenda is written in very broad terms in order that the opportunity will be presented to raise any subject which falls broadly in the field of national security.

3. A preliminary list of subjects which might be suitable for discussion at the proposed meeting has been drawn up and submitted to the State Department. We are

CIRCULATION

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REBUT A SECRET**  
LIS (M&IR)

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 - FEB 22 1985

awaiting their comments. In the meantime, however, I thought I should alert you that among the subjects suggested by the Under-Secretary is "The Far Eastern Situation". On the assumption that the Americans will agree, the Under-Secretary will require a paper on this subject. An elaborate brief would not be necessary. It should, however, be directed to the security implications; i.e., those elements in the Far Eastern situation which could lead to the outbreak of hostilities involving the United States and Canada.

4. The main purpose of the Meetings of Consultation has been to have senior United States officials give their Canadian opposite numbers their appreciation of situations which are likely to threaten the peace seriously. It has been found that this purpose can best be met if there is a solid Canadian contribution to the discussion.

5. I assume that you would wish to clear your brief with the Under-Secretary before sending it to us for inclusion with the other papers being prepared for the meeting.



Defence Liaison (1) Division.

## SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

NOVEMBER 5, 1958.

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE UNDER-SECRETARY

This memorandum is to confirm the report to you of my conversation with the Minister of National Defence.

He will be willing to have "the role of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence" put on the agenda for the meeting of the Canada-U.S. Ministerial Committee on Defence to be held in Paris on December 15.

S.H.

50219-AE-40  
58

COPY ...<sup>15</sup>... OF 17  
FM WASHDC OCT28/58 ~~TOP~~ SEC

*2nd Copy No 14 on 50309-A-40*

TO EXTERNAL 2640 PRIORITY

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

INFO NATOPARIS EMBASSYPARIS CCOS

REBUT A SECRET  
LIS (H&IR)

REF YOURTEL DL850 OCT24

FEB 22 1985

MEETING OF CANADA-USA MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE

THE POINTS RAISED IN YOUR REFTEL WERE TAKEN UP WITH DALE OF THE  
STATE DEPT TODAY, AND HE UNDERTOOK TO LET US HAVE STATE DEPT VIEWS AS  
SOON AS POSSIBLE. DALE THOUGHT THAT PROVIDING THE NECESSARY PRE-  
PARATORY WORK HAS BEEN DONE IN ADVANCE, IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR  
MINISTERS AT LEAST UNDER SOME OF THE AGENDA ITEMS WE HAVE PUT FORWARD  
TO REACH AGREEMENTS IN PRINCIPLE. WITH REGARD TO ANY PUBLICITY CON-  
CERNING THE MINISTERIAL MEETING, DALE'S PRINCIPAL POINT WAS THAT THEY  
HOPED THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO AVOID MAKING ANY PUBLIC ANNOUNCE-  
MENTS IN PARIS CONCERNING THE MEETING.

2. WE SHALL LET YOU KNOW AS SOON AS STATE DEPT VIEWS ARE RECEIVED.

COPY 15 OF 17

FM WASHDC OCT28/58 ~~TOP~~SEC

TO EXTERNAL 2639 PRIORITY

INFO NATOPARIS

IT CCOS FM OTT

REF YOURTEL DL849 OCT24

CANADA-USA MEETING OF CONSULTATION

WE TOOK UP WITH DALE, ACTING HEAD OF THE OFFICE OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND NORTHERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, THE POINTS RAISED IN YOUR REFTEL, TOGETHER WITH THOSE RAISED IN YOURTEL DL850 WHICH REFERS TO PROPOSALS FOR A MEETING OF THE CANADA-USA MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE.

2. WE LEFT WITH DALE THE POINTS SUMMARIZED UNDER PARAS 2 AND 3 OF YOUR REFTTEL, AS CANADIAN SUGGESTIONS FOR THE CONTENT OF THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION. ON THE QUESTION OF DATE, DALE THOUGHT, AND WE WERE INCLINED TO AGREE, THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO HOLD THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION AFTER RATHER THAN BEFORE THE SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS ON DEFENCE PRODUCTION SHARING AND COST SHARING, EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE NOT RPT NOT DIRECTLY CONNECTED. THESE MEETINGS, WE UNDERSTAND, ARE NOW SCHEDULED FOR NOV18, SO THAT ON THIS BASIS THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION MIGHT TAKE PLACE TOWARD THE END OF THE WEEK BEGINNING NOV17; ON THE BASIS OF DISCUSSIONS WE HAD YESTERDAY AT THE EMBASSY WITH GENERAL FOULKES, WE TOLD DALE THAT WE THOUGHT THAT IN VIEW OF THE PRESSURE ON THE PARTICIPANTS ON BOTH SIDES, THE MEETING SHOULD BE CONCLUDED IN A SINGLE DAY. DALE UNDERTOOK TO TAKE UP OUR POINTS AND OUR PROPOSALS AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE, AND TO LET US HAVE STATE DEPT VIEWS.

3. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT A MEETING OF CONSULTATION WILL BE HELD AS PLANNED, WE THINK THERE IS MUCH TO BE SAID FOR OUR LETTING THE STATE DEPT HAVE PAPERS ON ANY OF THE AGENDA ITEMS ON WHICH OFFICIAL VIEWS CAN NOW BE PREPARED IN THE BELIEF THAT THIS WILL FACILITATE A MORE PROFITABLE MEETING OF CONSULTATION AND IN TURN WILL ASSIST MINISTERS MEETING LATER IN PARIS IN CONSIDERING THE PROBLEMS RESERVED FOR THE MINISTERIAL GROUP. FOR EXAMPLE, IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR PROPOSED ITEM (B), IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOLLOWING GENERAL FOULKES' RETURN TO PREPARE AN OUTLINE OF OUR VIEWS AND OF THE ARRANGEMENTS THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE FOR SUBMISSION TO THE STATE DEPT PRIOR TO THE MEETING OF

50219-AE-46  
58

*File Copy No 14 On 50309-A-46*

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REBUILT A SECRET

LIS (H&IR)

FEB 22 1985

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REBUT A SECRET**  
LLS(H&IR)

PAGE TWO 2639

FEB 22 1985

CONSULTATION.ON OTHER ITEMS,IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE AT LEAST  
A FULLER INDICATION IN ADVANCE OF THE POINTS WE ARE PARTICULARLY  
ANXIOUS TO TAKE UP.

4.AT THIS SAME MEETING,WE ALSO DREW DALE'S ATTENTION TO THE  
POINTS RAISED IN YOURTEL DL850 OCT24 RELATING TO THE MEETING OF THE  
JOINT MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE(SEE IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING MSG).



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

RESTD.

Security

~~TOP SECRET~~

50214-AE-40		
20		—

Type of Document.....*Tel*..... No. *DL-844* Date.....*Oct. 24/58*.....  
From.....*E.A.*.....  
To.....*N.A.T.O. Paris*.....  
Subject: *Canada - U.S. Meeting of Consultation*

Original on File No.....*50309-A-40*.....

Copies on File No.....

Other Cross Reference Sheets on.....*50216-40 'E'*.....

Prepared by.....

*[Signature]*

50219-AE-40	
43	52

*Orig on 50309-A-40*

FM WASHDC OCT22/58 SECRET  
TO EXTERNAL 2572 PRIORITY  
INFO PERMISNY(FOR MINISTER)

REF OURTEL 2526 OCT17

MEETING OF CONSULTATION

WHEN WE WERE TALKING THIS AFTERNOON ON OTHER MATTERS WITH DALE, THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF BRITISH COMMONWEALTH AND NORTHERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS IN THE STATE DEPT, HE ENQUIRED WHETHER WE HAD HEARD ANYTHING MORE ABOUT YOUR VIEWS ON A POSSIBLE MEETING OF CONSULTATION IN NOV, ESPECIALLY IN RELATION TO THE MEETING OF THE USA-CANADIAN MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON DEFENCE WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE IN PARIS DURING DEC. HE ASSURED US THAT THEY WOULD BE ANXIOUS TO MEET OUR WISHES BUT HE IMPLIED SOME DOUBT ABOUT THE NECESSITY OR PRACTICABILITY OF HAVING SUCH AN UNDER SECRETARY-LEVEL MEETING IN NOV WHEN PRESUMABLY MOST OF THE SAME SENIOR OFFICIALS WOULD BE SEEING EACH OTHER IN PARIS IN CONNECTION WITH THE MINISTERIAL MEETING. HE ADDED THAT NO DOUBT MOST OF THE PREPARATORY WORK ON THE MATTERS WHICH MINISTERS WOULD BE DISCUSSING COULD PROBABLY TAKE PLACE ON AN ADHOC BASIS, AS WAS NOW HAPPENING IN THE CASE OF VARIOUS PROPOSALS FOR PRODUCTION-SHARING AND COST SHARING.

2. WE REPLIED THAT WE DID NOT YET KNOW EXACTLY HOW YOU WOULD FEEL ABOUT A MEETING OF CONSULTATION IN THIS SITUATION. THE FACT THAT MINISTERS WERE PLANNING TO HAVE SUBSTANTIAL DISCUSSIONS IN MIDDEC MIGHT MAKE IT MORE RATHER THAN LESS DESIRABLE THAT ONE OF THE USUAL MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION SHOULD TAKE PLACE BEFORE IN ORDER TO REVIEW SOME OF THE BASIC INFO AND ASSUMPTIONS ON WHICH THE MINISTERS WOULD BE RELYING IN THEIR DISCUSSIONS. CONCERNING THE PREPARATIONS REQUIRED ON SOME OF THE SPECIFIC SUBJECTS TO WHICH MINISTERS WOULD BE ADDRESSING THEMSELVES, WE WERE NOT SURE WHETHER YOU WOULD CONSIDER THAT THESE COULD ALL BE HANDLED ON AN AD HOC BASIS OR WHETHER A MEETING OF CONSULTATION MIGHT HAVE SOME ROLE IN THAT CONNECTION.

3. DALE REITERATED THEY WERE MERELY RAISING THE MATTER WITH US AND THAT THE USA OFFICIALS CONCERNED WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY WISH TO BE AS ACCOMMODATING AS POSSIBLE

RITCHIE

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY

Security ~~TOP SECRET~~

Date October 21, 1958

FROM: DEFENCE LIAISON (1) DIVISION

File No.

50219-AE-40

REFERENCE:

*Please file  
original on*

SUBJECT: Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons - Meeting of Consultation

*7 copy on 50210-F-40*

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REBUILT A SECRET  
LIS (MAIR)  
FEB 22 1985

I attach for your signature, if you concur, a letter addressed to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff and to the Secretary to the Cabinet concerning a possible agenda for a Meeting of Consultation with United States officials. There is attached as well for convenience of reference a docket containing recent important correspondence concerning the problem of the acquisition of nuclear weapons. You may wish to glance over this material.

2. There is a somewhat unusual problem on this occasion which arises in connection with the convening of the Meeting of Consultation. If the Meeting of Consultation were to deal in detail with all the topics which the Ministers will wish to deal with in December, we would be forced to agree to the inclusion in the Meeting of Consultation of representatives of the Department of Defence Production and the Department of Finance. We do not believe that this would be a good precedent for future Meetings of Consultation. For that reason we have suggested in the attached letter, perhaps more strongly than we feel, the lack of a need for discussion at the Meeting of Consultation of integrated defence production and cost sharing arrangements.

*M. Robertson -*

*Attached are two dockets  
of relevant recent papers.  
21.10.31/US*

*Parsons*

Defence Liaison (1) Division

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REBUT A SECRET  
LLS(M&IR)

~~TOP SECRET~~

April 25, 1953.

FEB 22 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

1951 Agreement with the  
United States on Consultation

50219-AE-40	
58	✓

Yesterday afternoon you asked me to let you have a brief note on the agreement reached in 1951 with the United States Government on consultation with respect to the use of nuclear weapons.

2. It can be argued with some degree of force that this agreement gives Canada adequate control of the use to be made of nuclear weapons either in over-flights of Canadian territory or from bases situated in this country. At the time the agreement was negotiated, I was Mr. Pearson's Special Assistant and can remember that one of the purposes of the agreement was to protect the Canadian position in the event of requests being received such as were made to us last December. The wording of the agreed minute also bears out this view, I think.

3. It may well be that the Department of National Defence will urge at this afternoon's meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee that the 1951 agreement is still adequate for our purposes. In that case, you will want to argue vigorously, I imagine, that the circumstances have so changed since 1951 that a more formal agreement is required. There have been at least four changes since 1951 that are relevant, it seems to me:

- (a) The United Kingdom has obtained an agreement with the United States concerning the use to be made of HBN's situated on United Kingdom territory which openly and explicitly reserves to the United Kingdom a veto on the use of these nuclear weapons.
- (b) The nuclear weapons now available are very different from those available in 1951. There are many more of them; they come in a wide variety of shapes and sizes; and their movements are more difficult to police.

..... 2

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REBUILT A SECRET

115 (M41R)

- 2 -

FEB 22 1985

- (c) Public opinion in Canada, as well as in other countries, is now much more knowledgeable about the facts of nuclear life and death than in 1951, and would expect to receive more explicit assurances than could be based on the 1951 agreed minute.
- (d) One of the principal reasons why the minute was neither signed nor initialled was that the United States at that time was unwilling to admit that any foreign country had any measure of veto control over the use of United States nuclear weapons. Since then, however, the relevant position of the United States has undergone substantial change. By 1951 the Soviet Union already was known to possess nuclear weapons, but the preponderance held by the United States was very large. Now the United Kingdom also has nuclear weapons in its armoury, and the position of the United States, in a variety of ways, has become less unique.

4. After recalling at least a number of the ways in which the situation has changed since 1951, you would want, I imagine, to insist that a more formal agreement be concluded that would leave no doubt either about Canadian control of these nuclear weapons or about Canada's right to be consulted concerning circumstances that might lead to their use.

Original Signed by  
DOUGLAS LEPAN

D.V. LeP.



MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION

- |     |                |   |
|-----|----------------|---|
| 1.  | May 25, 1951   | Sec. of State (Amb.)                            |
| 2.  | June 14, 1951  | Sec. of State (SSEA)                            |
| 3.  | July 13, 1951  | Officials                                       |
| 4.  | July 27, 1951  | Officials                                       |
| 5.  | Feb. 29, 1952  | Officials                                       |
| -   | Mar. 10, 1952  | Sec. of State (SSEA)                            |
| 6.  | May 13, 1952'  | Officials                                       |
| 7.  | Oct. 22, 1953  | Officials                                       |
| 8.  | Nov. 6, 1953   | Officials                                       |
| 9.  | Mar. 4, 1954   | Officials                                       |
| 10. | Sept. 24, 1954 | Officials                                       |
| 11. | Feb. 16, 1955  | Talk between SSEA and Sec. of State<br>(Dulles) |
| 11. | Dec. 5, 1955   | Officials                                       |
| 12. | Sept. 30, 1957 | Officials                                       |

*To see*  
*Mr. [unclear]*  
*Mr. Tremblay*  
*Mr. Pearson*  
*file*  
*100 3*  
*Top Secret*

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION

FILE:	50219-AE-30
	50309
	50210-F-40
	43 ✓

For convenience of reference there is summarized below a few facts concerning the Meetings of Consultation which take place from time to time between Canadian and United States representatives.

2. These Meetings of Consultation stem from arrangements made in 1951 which concerned the deployment of aircraft carrying atomic weapons over Canadian territory. The understanding concerning Meetings of Consultation was set out in agreed Minute in the following terms:

"Frequent consultations shall take place in Washington between the Canadian Ambassador and the Secretary of State and such other officers of the United States Government as may be designated by him. The purpose of these consultations is to exchange views on the developments in the world situation which might necessitate the use of atomic weapons. The consultations are informal and exploratory and are not to be regarded as involving or implying any commitment of the part of either government as to the action it will take or the position it will adopt in particular circumstances yet to arise. It would be the hope that by such consultations it will be possible to arrive at common appreciations of situations which may necessitate the use of atomic weapons."

3. The Meetings of Consultation were initiated in 1951. There have been twelve Meetings formally called "Meetings of Consultation". Two additional meetings, on March 10, 1952 and February 16, 1955 between the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the United States Secretary of State were concerned with the same subject matter as that normally dealt with in Meetings of Consultation. A list of the dates on which the Meetings have been held is attached. The U.S. Secretary of State attended the first two regular Meetings of Consultation, and the Secretary of State for External Affairs attended the 2nd Meeting of Consultation. Aside from these two Meetings and the two special Meetings referred to above, representation at regular Meetings of Consultation has been at the official level. The Canadian team has been headed either by the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs or by the Canadian Ambassador in Washington.

4. In each case a record of the discussion has been kept by each side. There has been no agreed record, but the notes compiled by the two sides have been compared to prevent gross discrepancies. The Meetings since 1953 have been dominated to a large extent by discussion of bilateral Canada-United States defence problems.

Defence Liaison (1) Division

February 21, 1958

DELEGATION OF CANADA  
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL



DÉLÉGATION DU CANADA  
AU CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE-NORD

*For file - 50219-AE-40*

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

50219-AE-40	
43	50

6th December, 1957

*Copy #9 destroyed  
Jm. Dec 76*

Dear Mr. Holmes,

I am much obliged to you for your letter of November 19th with which you attached for my personal information a Record of the Meeting of Consultation which was held on September 30th with United States officials in Washington.

I have read over this Record with the greatest of interest and I have found it extremely useful in keeping me up to date on current views of both the United States and Canadian authorities on foreign policy and defence questions. I am returning to you the attached Record for destruction as you requested.

Yours sincerely,

L. D. Wilgress.

J.W. Holmes, Esq.,  
Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs,  
OTTAWA

*13.12.12(us)*

50219-AE	40
13.	50

67432  
2545

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

FM WASHDC DEC2/57 TOPSEC  
TO EXTERNAL 2546

REF OUR TEL 2545 DEC2

MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION

IN VIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EMERGENCY PLANNING AND THE  
MATTERS NORMALLY COVERED BY THE MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION, YOU MAY  
CONSIDER THAT IT WOULD BE BEST TO HAVE THIS SUBJECT INCLUDED IN THE  
DISCUSSION AT THE NEXT MEETING. EVEN IN THAT EVENT IT WOULD  
SEEM DESIRABLE FOR US, IN ADVANCE OF SUCH A DISCUSSION AMONG SENIOR  
OFFICIALS, TO GIVE THE USA OFFICIALS WHO RAISED THE SUBJECT WITH US  
SOME PRELIMINARY INDICATION OF YOUR REACTION TO THE IDEAS REPORTED  
IN THE REF TEL

ROBERTSON

for file - 50219-AE-  
15m.

Head of Division,  
Defence Liaison (2) Division  
Middle Eastern Division  
Far Eastern Division  
United Nations Division  
Defence Liaison (1) Division

PERSONAL AND  
TOP SECRET

November 27, 1957

Meeting of Consultation

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

50219-AE	-40
43	✓

There is attached for your personal information a record of the Meeting of Consultation which was held on September 30 with United States officials in Washington. A series of telegrams early in October from our Embassy in Washington giving an account of the discussions which took place on September 30 were sent to you earlier.

2. The complete record kept by the Canadian side makes up the attachment. This record has been discussed informally with the State Department with the object of ensuring against any major discrepancies in the records kept by the two sides. There is, however, no agreed record between the two authorities.

3. The Under-Secretary has asked me to forward this record to you in this manner. The fact that these meetings took place has been a well-kept secret. Because of the informal quality of the meetings, the record is not distributed widely. I should be grateful, therefore, if you could regard the attachment as for your personal information. Naturally you may wish to discuss points made with officers of your Division but the record should not be passed to others nor should direct reference be made to the Meetings of Consultation as such in your normal correspondence.

4. In submitting the attached report, the Ambassador in Washington has made the following general comment with which the Under-Secretary agrees:

"I should like only to add the general comment that, in my opinion, these meetings were of value,



- 2 -

and although there were a number of important areas which we were unable to cover in the short time available, a useful exchange of views took place in an informal atmosphere which provided a valuable supplement to our continuing discussions with the United States Officials in Washington and in Ottawa. I think too it is important that we should see to it that, consistent with the other obligations of the main participants, such meetings of consultation should be held on as regular a basis as possible."

6. I should be grateful if in due course, you could return the attachment to me for destruction.

(Signed) PAUL TREMBLAY

Defence Liaison (1) Division

Referred to:

D.L.(2) Division	#11
Middle Eastern Division	12
Far Eastern Division	13
United Nations Division	14

DL(1)/JSM/MCL

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

50219-AE -	40
43	50

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

November 21, 1957

Dear Mr. Ritchie,

\*10  
There is attached for your personal information a Record of the Meeting of Consultation which was held on September 30 with United States officials in Washington. The Under-Secretary has asked me to forward this record to you in this manner.

These Meetings of Consultation were initiated in 1951 and have been held intermittently since that time. The purpose of the consultations is to exchange views on developments in the world situation which might necessitate the use of atomic weapons. The consultations are informal and exploratory and are not regarded as involving or implying any commitment on the part of either government as to the action it will take or the position it will adopt in particular circumstances. The fact that such meetings take place has been a well-kept secret.

The attached Record was that kept by the Canadian side. It has been checked informally with the State Department to prevent gross discrepancies between it and the United States Record. There is, however, no agreed Record between the two authorities.

Because of the informal quality of these meetings, the Record is not distributed widely. I should be grateful,

Charles Ritchie, Esq.  
Canadian Ambassador  
The Canadian Embassy  
Bonn, GERMANY

. . . 2

21.11.25/09

000347

2.

therefore, if you could regard the attachment as for your personal information. Naturally you may wish to discuss points made in it with officers at your Mission, but the Record itself should not be passed to others. It would be appreciated if no direct reference be made in your normal correspondence to the Meetings of Consultation as such.

I should be grateful as well if in due course you could return the attachment to me for destruction.

Yours sincerely,

J. W. HOLMES

*Acting* Under Secretary of State for  
External Affairs



**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

50219-AE-40	
43	50

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

November 19, 1957

*X9*  
Dear Mr. Wilgress,

There is attached for your personal information a Record of the Meeting of Consultation which was held on September 30 with United States officials in Washington. The Under-Secretary has asked me to forward the Record to you in this manner.

These Meetings of Consultation were initiated in 1951 and have been held intermittently since that time. The purpose of the consultations is to exchange views on developments in the world situation which might necessitate the use of atomic weapons. The consultations are informal and exploratory and are not regarded as involving or implying any commitment on the part of either government as to the action it will take or the position it will adopt in particular circumstances. The fact that such meetings take place has been a well-kept secret.

The attached Record was that kept by the Canadian side. It has been checked informally with the State Department to prevent gross discrepancies between it and the United States Record. There is, however, no agreed Record between the two authorities.

Because of the informal quality of these meetings, the Record is not distributed widely. I should be grateful,

L. Dana Wilgress, Esquire  
Permanent Representative and Ambassador  
Delegation of Canada to the North Atlantic Council  
Paris, France

2.

therefore, if you could regard the attachment as for your personal information. Naturally you may wish to discuss points made in it with officers at your Mission, but the Record should not be passed to others. It would be appreciated if no direct reference be made in your normal correspondence to the Meetings of Consultation as such.

I should be grateful as well if in due course you could return the attachment to me for destruction.

Yours sincerely,

*J W Holmes*

*Acting* Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs



DL(1)/JJM/McL

cc: Secretary to Cabinet

50219-AE	40
43	50

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

November 19, 1957

Dear General Foulkes,

X  
I refer to your letter of October 31 concerning the distribution of the Record of the Meeting of Consultation which was held on September 30 in Washington. I attach an additional copy of the Record which I hope you will make available to your Minister. I shall arrange for copies to go to the Prime Minister and Mr. Smith.

I agree entirely with the argument in your letter under reference that the minutes of these Meetings of Consultation cannot be interpreted as including policy statements by the participants and that, therefore, the circulation of our Record of the Meetings should be kept to a minimum. On the other hand, if the Meetings are to be of maximum value, the information included in them, I believe, should be made available on a need-to-know basis to a limited number of interested officers.

I have, therefore, decided to distribute the Record not only to the Secretary to the Cabinet but also to Mr. Wilgress in Paris and Mr. Ritchie in New York and to the Head of four interested Divisions in this Department. To meet the apprehensions expressed in your letter under reference, I am arranging that all individuals who receive copies of the Record,

General C. Foulkes, CB, CBE, DSO, CD  
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff  
Department of National Defence  
"A" Building, Ottawa, Canada

. . . 2

20.11.20/051

000351

2.

except the Ministers, will return their copies to us in due course for destruction. To meet your point of view I am not sending a copy of this Record to the Chairman of the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, nor will arrangements be made for distribution of the Report to the Joint Intelligence Committee.

Yours sincerely,

J. W. HOLMES

*Ackling*

Under Secretary of State for  
External Affairs

50219-AE-40	
43	50

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

November 19, 1957

#586  
2  
Dear Mr. Bryce,

I attach two copies of the Record kept on the Canadian side of the Meeting of Consultation which was held in Washington on September 30. It is an expanded version of the series of telegrams which our Embassy sent us early in October, copies of which we referred to you at that time.

The attached Record has been discussed informally with the State Department with the object of ensuring against any major discrepancies in the records kept by the two sides.

The Record is being given very limited distribution. I have sent a copy to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff and have asked him to bring it to the attention of Mr. Pearkes. I should be grateful if you could give the Prime Minister one of the attached copies of the Record. I shall see that Mr. Smith gets a copy as well.

In forwarding the Record of the Meeting to us, Mr. Robertson has made the following general comments, with which I am in agreement:

Mr. R. B. Bryce  
Secretary to Cabinet  
Privy Council Office  
East Block  
Ottawa

. . . 2



2.

"I should like only to add the general comment that, in my opinion, these meetings were of value, and although there were a number of important areas which we were unable to cover in the short time available, a useful exchange of views took place in an informal atmosphere which provided a valuable supplement to our continuing discussions with United States officials in Washington and in Ottawa. I think too it is important that we should see to it that, consistent with the other obligations of the main participants, such meetings of consultation should be held on as regular a basis as possible."

Yours sincerely,

J. W. HOLMES

*Acting* Under-Secretary of State for  
External Affairs

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

SEEN BY THE MINISTER

SD 219-AE-40		TOP SECRET
43	✓	November 19, 1957

*Boyle*  
*85m*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER

Canada-United States Meetings of Consultation

I sent to you under cover of my memorandum of October 9 a series of telegrams from our Embassy in Washington, giving an account of the discussions which took place at the Meeting of Consultation with United States officials in Washington on September 30.

2. A complete record kept by the Canadian side has now been received and a copy of it is attached for your information. It is an expanded version of the series of telegrams which you have already seen. The record was discussed informally with the State Department with the object of ensuring against any major discrepancies in the records kept by the two sides.

3. In submitting the attached report, Mr. Robertson made the following general comment, with which I am in agreement:

"I should like only to add the general comment that, in my opinion, these meetings were of value, and although there were a number of important areas which we were unable to cover in the short time available, a useful exchange of views took place in an informal atmosphere which provided a valuable supplement to our continuing discussions with the United States Officials in Washington and in Ottawa. I think too it is important that we should see to it that, consistent with the other obligations of the main participants, such meetings of consultation should be held on as regular a basis as possible."

4. You will recall from my memorandum of October 9 that these meetings of consultation stem from arrangements made in 1951 which concerned the deployment of aircraft carrying atomic

. . . 2

20.11.20 (os)

000355  
21-11-25-vv. K



2.

weapons over Canadian territory. The understanding concerning Meetings of Consultation was set out in an agreed Minute in the following terms:

"Frequent consultations shall take place in Washington between the Canadian Ambassador and the Secretary of State and such other officers of the United States Government as may be designated by him. The purpose of these consultations is to exchange views on developments in the world situation which might necessitate the use of atomic weapons. The consultations are informal and exploratory and are not to be regarded as involving or implying any commitment on the part of either government as to the action it will take or the position it will adopt in particular circumstances yet to arise. It would be the hope that by such consultations it will be possible to arrive at common appreciations of situations which may necessitate the use of atomic weapons."

J.W. *at*  
for J. L.

TOP SECRET

#8 of 15

RECORD OF THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES  
OF THE CANADIAN AND UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTS HELD ON MONDAY,  
30th SEPTEMBER, 1957

The meeting which was held in the State Department under the chairmanship of Mr. Christian Herter, the Under Secretary of State, was attended by:

General Nathan Twining, Chairman,  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary of State

Mr. Mansfield Sprague, Assistant Secretary of  
Defence

Lieut. General Clovis E. Byers, Military  
Adviser to Department of Defence

Mr. Elbert Matthews, Acting Director of  
Policy Planning, State Department

Brig. General J.F. Whisenand, Special Assistant  
to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Col. Thomas Hanford, Regional Director,  
Western Hemisphere, Department of Defence

Mr. J.L. Nugent, Officer in Charge of Canadian  
Affairs, State Department

for the United States Government, and by

Mr. Jules Leger, Under Secretary of State for  
External Affairs

General Charles Foulkes, Chairman, Chiefs  
of Staff Committee

Mr. N.A. Robertson, Ambassador

Major General H.A. Sparling, Chairman,  
Canadian Joint Staff

Mr. John Holmes, Assistant Under-Secretary of  
State for External Affairs

Mr. S.F. Rae, Minister

Mr. Philip Uren, Canadian Embassy

for the Canadian Government.

2. The agenda of the meeting consisted of seven  
items:

- (a) Welcome by Under Secretary
- (b) The Military Threat to North America
- (c) Developments in Continental Air Defence
- (d) Outline of United States Objectives in  
World's Major Diplomatic Situations,  
including Disarmament
- (e) The Far Eastern Situation
- (f) The Middle East Situation
- (g) NATO Matters

...../2

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

3. Mr. Herter welcomed the Canadian visitors, emphasizing the value which the United States Government attached to these informal discussions with the Canadians of matters of common concern. Mr. Leger, in replying, expressed his appreciation of the opportunity to exchange views with the United States representatives. Mr. Herter then referred to the first item on the agenda and explained that General Twining had arranged for briefings by officers of United States Joint Staff on the military items on the agenda. General Twining then summoned Captain S.H. Gimber, U.S.N., of the United States Joint Staff.

THE MILITARY THREAT TO NORTH AMERICA - TO MID-1961

4. Captain Gimber introduced himself and his subject, and spoke as follows:

5. The Outbreak of War: If a general war should break out within the next four or five years, it would most likely occur as a result of:

- (a) a miscalculation or series of actions and counter-actions by either side which neither originally intended to lead to a general war;
- (b) A Soviet initiative characterized by an atomic onslaught in the belief that it had such military capabilities as to be certain of success.

6. It was assumed that the Soviet Union would hope to achieve an initial knock-out blow against North American facilities. The Soviets would first attempt to destroy our retaliatory capabilities, then our key facilities such as communications and industrial targets, and thirdly, our population centres.

7. Intelligence Warning: In the absence of any penetration of high Soviet positions, a warning from intelligence sources could only be the end product of continuous reasoning from incomplete evidence. Under the most favourable circumstances, intelligence might be able to state that there was a very high degree of probability of attack. On the other hand, there might be no warning at all. The ability to give warning would depend on two interrelated factors:

- (a) The character and level of normal activity;
- (b) The ability of the Soviet Union to initiate an attack at that level, or to conceal any increase.

8. To date there existed no adequate facilities for ensuring strategic warning. It was to be expected that up to mid-1961 Soviet capabilities would be markedly increased. It would also become increasingly difficult to obtain a clear pattern of preparation. It was therefore necessary to assume that there would be little or no warning.

...../3

- 3 -

TOP SECRET

9. Weapons: There was no clear evidence to serve as a guide as to specific types and numbers stockpiled. It was assumed that these would have the general characteristics of those tested. It was also assumed that the Soviets would continue development on small yield, small dimension weapons. There was a capability for a major increase in the number of nuclear weapons in any category.
10. There was an extensive capability in the field of biological and chemical weapons which would continue to expand. It was estimated that the Soviets had a 15 per cent ammunition allocation. It was expected that by mid-1961 they would have developed a variety of munitions suitable for large-scale operations, as well as a capability of dissemination by high speed aircraft and guided missiles.
11. There had been a notable increase in the frequency of Soviet public announcements on guided missiles. Some of these had contained veiled threats which pointed to the conclusion that all was not bluff. These announcements evidenced a strong feeling of confidence. At the present moment, the major capability against North America was in the field of air-to-surface missiles which presented an obvious threat to carrier striking forces and well defined land targets. In surface-to-surface missiles, the Soviet Union had concentrated on ballistic missiles, striving for minimum susceptibility to counter-measures. It was not expected that the Soviet Union would have any real capability to oppose ballistic missiles prior to 1966.
12. Considerable efforts were being made to overcome geographic disadvantages and to reduce the logistic vulnerability of the submarine fleets. Soviet submarines were ranging far and wide over the oceans of the world at a stepped up rate of activity. There was no positive evidence that the Soviet Union had submarines capable of firing guided missiles, but it was necessary to assume that they had. Similarly, there was no positive evidence that the Soviets had nuclear powered submarines, but again it was necessary to assume that they had.
13. Up to mid-1961, it was estimated that long range aviation would be the principal means available to the Soviet Union to attack North America. During this period, such aircraft would be a one-way mission force, as less than 10 per cent of the available aircraft would be capable of two-way deep penetration of the North American continent. It was estimated that by 1961 the figure 10 per cent would have increased to 50 per cent.
14. The principal conclusion which was reached on the basis of the foregoing was that the Soviet Union's capabilities for attacking the North American continent were constantly being increased.
15. Mr. Herter then asked for any comments or questions. In response to a question from General Foulkes as to the exact status of the Soviet long range bomber programme Captain Gimber stated that the United States intelligence community is presently examining this question and the signs are that previous estimates of the size of the Soviet long range air force will be reduced. This does not, however, alter the fact that the threat over the next ten years or so will be mainly from the manned bomber. General Foulkes also raised the question

...../4

000359

TOP SECRET

- 4 -

of whether Military forces would be able to act on a warning supposing that, as SHAPE believed it might, this came 30 days prior to an attack. It was his view that, because of the danger of provoking the Soviet Union by military deployment in response to a false intelligence warning, it might be politically undesirable to react to any warning. Therefore he thought that, because we may not get any warning, and if we did it might not be politically prudent to use such warning, our forces must be maintained in a state of constant readiness so that no obvious mobilization action would be necessary in order to meet an initial Soviet attack. General Twining, while agreeing that the air defence forces should be maintained in constant readiness, thought that some deployment action could be taken if there were a substantial period of warning. For example, it would be possible to deploy certain air defence and Strategic Air Command forces and to take preparatory logistical measures. United States forces are normally exercised frequently enough so that such moves would not be provocative. General Foulkes also commented on the tendency to regard Western Europe and North America as two separate areas for the purpose of warning of attack and alerts; this he thought was a mistake. The various NATO staffs should think in terms of the NATO area as a whole since the warning problem in Europe could not be divorced from that in North America. General Byers (Department of Defence) referred to the complexity of the NATO alert question, giving as an example of contributing factors the unwillingness of Turkey and Greece to give up their alert declaration powers, which tended to make the system very unwieldy.

#### DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCE

16. General Twining then summoned Commander Joseph W. Rayburn of the United States Joint Staff, who spoke as follows:

17. The DEW Line and Its Extensions: The DEW Line was complete and operational. Fifty-seven detector stations were now functioning between Alaska and Baffin Land. Six additional detector stations were under construction in the Aleutian Islands, and would be ready by the fall of 1958. By 1961, six gap filler stations would be completed in Alaska. The seaward extension of the DEW Line would ultimately reach to Midway Island in the Pacific. Interim arrangements have been made for this line to be patrolled by two AEW squadrons, five aircraft patrolling all the time and four divisions of destroyer-escort radar picket ships, five destroyer-escorts patrolling at a time. The Atlantic extension of the DEW Line was now operational, with two AEW squadrons and three divisions of destroyer-escort pickets as far as the Azores. Ultimately, it was hoped to construct a line which would go across Greenland and eventually to the U.K. if the necessary agreements for bases could be negotiated. If that could be accomplished, then the present line would become a "back up" line.

...../5



- 5 -

TOP SECRET

18. The Mid-Canada and Pine Tree Lines: These are now operational.

19. Radar Coverage for the Continental United States: Basic radar coverage for the continental United States was supplied by a system of prime radar stations located around the perimeter and in the interior to give overlapping coverage. There were 120 prime locations now in operation. It was expected that there would be 159 such locations by 1959 and 235 gap filler stations by 1961.

20. There was an urgent need for semi-automatic equipment to replace most of the manually operated equipment. SAGE and the Missile Master co-ordination systems were planned for integration into the air defence system by 1962. The SAGE programme called for eight divisions and 32 sectors. The Missile Master programme was for ten heavily defended areas.

21. Interceptors: Seventy-eight U.S. squadrons of interceptors equipped with Falcon air-to-air missiles were at present available for continental air defence. By 1960 these squadrons would be equipped with F-89J's, F-101B's, F-102's, F-104's and F-106's. The MB-1 missile is now operational in eight squadrons, and it was expected that twelve squadrons would be equipped with them by the end of 1958. It was hoped that one of these four additional squadrons would be based at Goose Bay.

22. Surface-to-Air Missiles:

(a) NIKE-Ajax: There were now 58 battalions equipped with this weapon.

(b) NIKE-Hercules: These had three times the range and much greater lethality. They would be ready to be stockpiled by the end of 1958. It was anticipated that 38 battalions will be equipped with them by the end of 1960.

(c) Hawk: This was a low altitude surface-to-air missile. It would be available by 1959, and four battalions would be equipped with it.

(d) BOWMARC: This was an area defence weapon, and would be operational by 1959. Forty-two squadrons would be operational by 1964.

23. SOSUS: This was a sound surveillance system for long range detection of submarines. Eleven stations had now been equipped with it on the East coast. Four more would have it by January, 1959. There would be six stations established on the West coast by 1959.

24. Integrated Air Defence: Although public announcement had been made concerning the setting up of an integrated air defence, the terms of reference for the integrated command had not yet been completed. No major problems in drafting these terms of reference were anticipated. It was believed that the integrated air defence would greatly simplify the co-ordination of alerts procedures insofar as they referred to air defence warnings. The integrated air command would materially help the defence of North America and the larger problem of neutralizing and destroying

...../6

000361

TOP SECRET

- 6 -

enemy aircraft and missiles at great distances.

25. In addition, Commander Rayburn made reference to the fact that the U.S. Department of Defence had recommended appropriate wording for the U.S.-Canadian Agreement on consultation on alerts. Mr. Leger said he welcomed the fact that progress was being made in this matter which we regarded as being of particular importance in the absence in North America of the political controls which apply in other NATO areas. Commander Rayburn also reported that the integrated air defence command became operational on September 12, 1957, and that its terms of reference were to be submitted to the Chiefs of Staff in the near future. Mr. Leger commented that these terms of reference would, of course, be subject to final governmental approval and was given an assurance on this point.

26. Referring to the suggestion to equip four United States squadrons with the MB-1, one of which will be the Goose Bay Squadron, General Foulkes outlined the difficulties which would face the Canadian authorities in complying with a request for re-arming the Goose Bay Squadron in the near future, pointing to the need for careful prior study and for revision of relevant Canadian regulations before U.S. nuclear weapons could be stored in Canada. He thought this process would take some time and asked that this proposal should be deferred. The U.S. side then emphasized that this was only a planning proposal, that General Foulkes' statement would be taken fully into account before any firm proposal was made, and that the present planning date for the re-arming of these squadrons was 1959.

27. General Foulkes also referred to the existing extension of the agreement regarding the overflight in emergency situations of U.S. squadrons equipped with nuclear weapons. He reminded the United States side that we had hoped it would be possible to discuss the outline of a permanent agreement well before the present arrangements expire so that it would not be necessary to proceed on a short term basis. Mr. Elbrick (Assistant Secretary for European Affairs) referred to United States proposals for discussions in Ottawa in the near future on the technical aspects of air defence at which time he was hopeful that the Goose Bay problem would also be explored.

28. Mr. Leger explained that the problem of eventually stockpiling United States nuclear weapons in Canada could be more satisfactorily dealt with if it were treated as part of the wider problem of stockpiling nuclear weapons on a NATO basis rather than solely in the context of USA-Canadian air defence.

...../7

- 7 -

TOP SECRET

29. Development of the Air Defence System: In discussing the future of the continental air defence system, General Foulkes warned against the danger, particularly in the period up to 1962, of making marginal improvements to our present air defence system at considerable cost. He wished to confirm the present status of the Soviet Bomber programme in order to establish whether the period between the present and 1962 was one in which it would be possible to take calculated risks in order to be in a better position to meet the rather more complex threat after that period. He thought that the Russians were unlikely to go to war deliberately until they had completed development of the ICBM with which they were apparently now having some success. He therefore proposed that all air defence projects put up by the new integrated command should be referred to the Joint Study Group before going to the respective Chiefs of Staff for approval. In addition, it would be useful if the Joint Study Group could make use of the experience of the USA Weapons System Evaluation Group in reviewing any new proposals. He believed that there is a good deal of popular misunderstanding of the value and effectiveness of the present air defence system, particularly since the recent Soviet ICBM announcement which has tended to lead the public to believe that the manned bomber is now obsolete. He therefore thought it important that an agreed concept of continental air defence should be worked out between the two countries to form a basis for future planning by the air defence commanders. This concept might also be used for any public statements by Ministers and officials on the problem.

30. The essential features of such a concept would be to have it made on a joint approach and flexible enough to be able to deal with changing conditions. By this he meant that there should be one system sufficiently flexible to meet all the various types of threat which had been reviewed or any combination of these various types of threat. He was anxious that the anti-ICBM defence should not be approached as a separate problem but as an extension of the present system, using wherever possible facilities already in existence. He believed that by putting the overall control of continental defence under one authority we could ensure that the introduction of new forms of defence against new threats would be made in the most economical way. This was essential in view of the increased costs of equipment in this field and the prospect of serious budgetary troubles over the next few years. The setting up of the Joint Air Defence Command had been a substantial step forward and it had now become essential to examine all new proposals carefully and to fit them into an integrated scheme thereby effecting considerable economies.

31. It was confirmed by General Twining's representative, General Whisenand (General Twining having left the meeting temporarily) that the views of the U.S. Joint Chiefs were substantially the same as those of General Foulkes. No difficulty was anticipated in meeting the Canadian proposals, particularly those concerning the use of the U.S. Weapons System Evaluation Group and the development of an agreed air defence concept. It was understood that General Twining also shared the view that there was a real danger in making costly marginal improvements in our present defence systems, and that he thought every effort should be made to avoid this so that the best use might be made of our joint resources.

OUTLINE OF USA OBJECTIVES IN WORLD'S  
MAJOR DIPLOMATIC SITUATIONS

32. The acting head of the Policy Planning Staff, Elbert Matthews, led off the discussion under this very broad subject. Mr. Matthews emphasized their recognition that the freedom and security of the United States were dependent upon the freedom and security of others. This required the development and strengthening of collective security to which the United States was pledged.

33. The central threat grew from the economic and military power of the USSR to which the vast manpower of Communist China must be added. Despite the changes in the communist leadership which had taken place since the death of Stalin, the USSR was still committed to the doctrine of inevitable conflict, and to their faith in the ultimate victory of communism.

34. Another vital consideration in the policy planning of the United States was the "nuclear equation" which meant that to the threat to freedom must be added the threat to survival. Still a further factor in the contemporary world was the ferment now active throughout Asia and Africa, a ferment which had created emergent and new states and also new tensions. The Mideast area, and in particular the present Syrian crisis, showed how nationalism could go to extremes and play into the hands of the USSR.

35. In general, it was the view of the State Department that the USSR did not now have any intention to precipitate a war. There was, however, reason to be concerned at the prominent role being played by Khrushchev, who was described as an impetuous and foolhardy individual. With his greater role in Soviet scene, the possibilities of risk and miscalculation had increased. The Soviets had alternated between threats of force and "sweet talk", and had continued to exercise their influence throughout the world through various forms of subversion, following a policy line in effect harder than that of a year or two ago.

36. To deter the Soviet threat, considered both from the point of view of the possibilities of a total war and of local conflicts, was a first aim of the United States. It was also necessary to seek to induce the Soviet leadership to pursue policies which would have the effect of making war less likely, and which would serve gradually to break down the barriers between the Soviet and the free world. The United States hoped to see a loosening of the ties within the communist empire, such as appeared to have taken place in Yugoslavia and Poland, just as it hoped to avoid another tragedy on the Hungarian model. In referring to the recent developments in Yugoslav-Soviet relations, including the Tito-Gomulka communique, Mr. Matthews indicated that the Department was "studying carefully" the extent to which a rapprochement between Tito and the Kremlin appeared to be underway, although

.....

they had come to no firm conclusion. A further aim was to strengthen the awareness of the Soviet threat to the free world, and to strengthen resistance to it. To achieve these aims called for the maintenance within the United States of a high degree of political unity and economic stability, coupled with the maintenance of the necessary military strength, including giving priority to research and development.

37. Central to American policy was the complex system of collective security arrangements slowly forged over the last ten years. The importance of these arrangements was not reduced by the prospects of the development of the ICBM. For example, although the military strength of SEATO was not very great, the psychological value of this association was of real importance for the countries in the area. Coupled with these military regional arrangements, was the world-wide system of economic aid, and the information and cultural programmes directed to strengthening the free world and, to the extent possible, to encouraging the satellites to develop a greater measure of independence.

38. In this broad context, the United Nations had significant functions to perform. It could act, as in the case of Hungary, to focus attention on communist misdeeds. Secondly, it could provide a place where tensions within the free world might be reduced. Mr. Matthews referred particularly to the presence of an Afro-Asian "bloc". While on colonial issues this group of states tended to vote as a unit, on broader issues there was less solidarity than was frequently thought. In the State Department view, it was wiser not to assume the rigidity of the Afro-Asian bloc, since this assumption was not wholly justified, and since acting on this assumption would only serve to strengthen the bloc tendency. This was one reason, among others, why the State Department was skeptical of too close or too overt NATO cooperation in United Nations matters. Finally, the United Nations was a forum in which limited negotiations with the Russians might be possible. The State Department was giving some attention to its policy on exchanges with the USSR, recognizing that this was a difficult problem, since exchange arrangements had always to be measured against security considerations. Exchange arrangements which would work for countries like the United States and Canada might cause real difficulties in other areas of the world. In replying briefly to this general outline, Mr. Leger referred to Canada's geographical position between the two great world powers, and to the fact that we were inevitably affected by the policies of our powerful neighbours. A threat to the security of the United States would involve Canada at once, and we therefore welcomed this outline and would comment on the situation on particular problems and in particular areas in the course of the discussion.

39. On the subject of disarmament, in which the interest and contribution of the Canadian side was well known, Mr. Matthews affirmed that the United States policy was to give firm support to the four-power proposals worked

.....



- 10 -

TOP SECRET

out in the sub-committee, and to the four-power resolution now before the Assembly. The Western position was not perfect, but represented a sound and negotiable group of proposals, and a useful point of departure. It was the hope of the United States that these proposals would emerge from Assembly consideration in pretty much their present form. In particular, the United States could not accept an isolated ban on nuclear weapons testing, the very real advantages in continuing testing (e.g., the development of tactical weapons, etc.) could only be given up in exchange for agreement on an effective cessation of new nuclear production for weapons purposes.

40. On the composition of the sub-committee and the disarmament commission itself, the State Department thought that the present membership of each was essentially logical and reasonable, since these bodies included those countries "most directly concerned". The Department would much prefer that no change should take place in membership, and in particular would deplore any development which might take Canada off the sub-committee. It was considered that the composition of these bodies had little to do with the central question of whether the USSR would be prepared to participate in a real negotiation.

41. In the subsequent discussion of disarmament, Mr. Leger, referred to the progress which had been made, particularly in the last session and to the fact that the increasingly technical character of the discussions made it more difficult for Canada to make a useful contribution. While we did not wish to avoid our responsibilities, at the same time we did not wish to stay on the sub-committee if by so doing we were in any way preventing progress. We were prepared to agree that an increase in membership would complicate matters. But on the other hand, it was our calculation that the Indian proposals for widening the membership of the sub-committee had a good chance of going through at the present session and perhaps of gaining a two-thirds majority. On disarmament, our fundamental view was that our best contribution lay in doing what was possible to facilitate direct negotiations between the two powers most directly concerned. Mr. Robertson took up the discussion to point out that the United Nations forum has made possible useful direct discussions with the Russians, and has provided an umbrella under which negotiations could take place. In the Canadian view, private bilateral discussions between the United States and the USSR must have a special place, and the question of membership of United Nations committees was basically irrelevant to the central problem of creating conditions in which an effective negotiation is possible.

42. There was some brief discussion of the role of NATO, and it seemed to be agreed that while NATO consultation was valuable and necessary in some respects and should be continued, it should not be pushed to the point of imposing a barrier on future negotiations either bilateral or in the sub-committee.

43. Finally, the Canadian side raised a suggestion which had been discussed earlier informally within the delegation.

..... 000366

Mr. Robertson referred to the earlier American proposals in 1956 (to which the USSR had not responded) for the setting apart of small test pilot areas in the United States and in the USSR for a trial of inspection techniques. He wondered whether it would not be fruitful to begin with joint US-Canadian studies on a technical and service level to examine practical problems involved in overflight and inspection systems. Thus, consideration might be given to a joint pilot study of an industrial complex in the United States, and possibly of some appropriate zone in the Arctic. At a later stage, the other western partners in the sub-committee might be invited to cooperate in these practical technical studies. This suggestion would fit in with an approach which we hoped to make shortly on the military side for a joint examination of some of the problems involved in Arctic inspection. In this context, General Foulkes emphasized the Canadian view that the more extensive ground control arrangements envisaged in connection with a European inspection zone did not apply to Arctic conditions.

44. While the United States side did not give any definitive comment on the Canadian suggestion, their first reactions, including the first reaction of Mr. Sprague, the Defence Department representative, appeared quite favourable. One sidelight on the suggestion, which was brought out by Mr. Matthews of the Policy Planning staff, was the indication that, at planning levels within the Department, they had been thinking of the possibility of proposing some form of arms control agreement and joint inspection to cover the contested border areas (presumably including Kashmir) between India and Pakistan. Mr. Matthews thought it worth mentioning this suggestion, (which had not in any sense reached the stage of a final proposal), because of Canada's Commonwealth connections.

#### THE FAR EAST

45. General Twining called on Lt. Col. J.H. Lahmer (USAF) of the Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to give a briefing on the military situation in the Far East.

46. Lt. Col. Lahmer said the Soviet Union maintained an army of 445,000 in this area, which was 20 per cent of the Red Army. It was composed of five armies, 11 corps and 31 divisions. Its airforce consisted of 3,500 aircraft, of which 1,700 were jet fighters, 600 were light jet bomber, 100 were jet bombers, 160 were propellor driven medium bombers, and 10 were jet heavy bombers. The navy consisted of two heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, 32 destroyers, 86 submarines and 263 patrol vessels of various types.

47. The North Korean army totalled approximately 375,000 men, made up of 18 divisions and seven brigades. There were eight armoured regiments. All these troops were exceedingly well equipped and trained. The air force had only 600 aircraft, but 420 of these were jet fighters. The

.....

- 12 -

TOP SECRET

North Koreans had 75 light jet bombers. The North Korean forces could cause serious trouble at any moment.

48. The army of Communist China consisted of 2,500,000 men divided into 167 divisions. It was a formidable fighting force. China had an air force of 2,600 aircraft, of which 1,400 were jet fighters and 435 were jet light bombers. Its navy was small, but growing. At present it consisted of four destroyers and 14 submarines. Six hundred thousand Chinese troops were stationed in the general area opposite Taiwan. The logistical problems involved in maintaining these troops in this position had been partially solved by the completion of a railroad along the coast to Amoy.

49. Vietnam had a well-trained and recently re-organized army of 303,000 men, divided into 14 infantry divisions and one armoured division.

50. This briefing was followed by Mr. Herter's personal account of his tour which formed one of the most interesting parts of the discussion, mainly because of Mr. Herter's frank and perceptive report of his personal impressions. En route to the Far East, he said that he had been briefed by the United States military authorities in Hawaii, who were especially concerned at the possibility of a deterioration in the position, particularly in Korea and in Formosa. Despite large military forces in being in these two important areas, there were other factors at work which could adversely affect the internal situation in each, and the military appreciation had pointed to the problems involved in holding the position.

51. In Formosa, although army morale was still good, and the forces (including the air forces) well equipped, Chiang was getting no younger and his position was not strong among the offshore Chinese. The low wage rates in the army (a common soldier received 75 cents a month) and the civil service opened up possibilities of corruption and graft, of which some were no doubt taking full advantage. The country was held together by a sense of mission based upon the hope of an eventual return to the mainland, and the maintenance of a "free China". Since this, however, was a distant hope, the situation, so far as morale is concerned, was precarious. In the minds of the Nationalist Chinese the offshore islands were completely identified with Formosa. Their loss would be a great blow to the Formosan regime and to the morale of its army, probably leading to the loss of Formosa itself to the Communists.

52. It was apparent throughout that the United States side believed that the offshore island situation was still potentially dangerous and should be carefully watched.

53. In Korea, Mr. Herter said the South Koreans

.....

were closer to the enemy. Even here, however, the weakening position of the ageing Syngman Rhee and the uncertain calibre of his political opponents made it difficult to be other than pessimistic about the future. The recent local elections in Seoul (where the opposition had won 40 out of 52 seats) showed the strength of the Rhee opposition, which Mr. Herter thought had a good chance of winning the next national elections.

54. On the other hand, on the Chinese mainland itself, the Communist regime appeared to be facing very real problems. There was considerable evidence of discontent among the farmers over the malfunctioning of the land redistribution and farm collectivisation, and real shortages of foodstuffs over wide areas were creating serious problems. As in other Communist countries, there had been discontent among the intellectuals, including student groups, and there was also evidence that the overcentralization of authority led to discontent within cadres of the Chinese Communist party itself.

55. Turning to South-East Asia, with the exception of Thailand and the Philippines which were partners in SEATO, Indonesia (which he had not visited) Mr. Herter's impression was that the other states in the area, including Malaya, did not wish to align themselves with the United States in military pacts or arrangements. There was some feeling that they could in any event count in a major crisis on the United States deterrent and they were imbued with a desire to assert their newly won independence. This, he thought, was not so much "neutralism" as a determination not to revert to their old colonial status.

56. Burma, for example, found itself in a very difficult squeeze, with a dearth of population and a substantial surplus rice crop. Yet he was convinced that the present Burmese Government, although anxious not to take up a public position (presumably in order not to offend Communist China) was definitely anti-communist and would remain so.

57. Mr. Herter had talked to President Diem in Saigon, who had been worried mainly about Vietnam's borders with Laos and Cambodia. Any invasion route by the Vietminh or the Communist Chinese to the South would logically lie through these two countries, and Diem, therefore, was concerned at strengthening his internal roads and borders with these territories. Diem's firm opposition to communism needed no underlining.

58. In Thailand, as in many other countries in the area, the problem of succession was a difficult one. Malaya had begun its new life under good auspices, and it had a good chance of making the grade. Mr. Herter mentioned that Mr. Richard Casey, whom he had seen at Singapore, had made private soundings of Malaya's interest in SEATO membership but had concluded that it would not be wise to raise this question at this time. The first thing the Malaysians wished to do was to stand on their own feet.

.....

59. Throughout South-East Asia, Mr. Herter thought that the overseas Chinese, while not a strong political force were an overwhelming commercial force, and wanted to be left alone to the greatest extent possible. He remarked that the worst threat which could be made to an overseas Chinese was to speak of deportation to mainland China.

60. Reviewing the overall position, Mr. Herter said that while he had undertaken this mission somewhat in the mood of a "doubting Thomas" (presumably with reference to traditional United States positions and attitudes), he now felt that the maintenance of support for an independent Formosa was vital, and that the United States had nothing to gain and a good deal to lose by any modification of its traditional policy with respect to recognition of the Formosan government. It was necessary for many reasons to keep the idea of a free China alive, and anything Canada could do to support this would be welcomed. He recognized that this policy, which required substantial outlays by the United States might be difficult to maintain, but he thought the effort must and should be made in the period ahead.

61. Mr. Robertson asked whether he would make any distinction between the recognition issue and the loosening of China trade policies. Mr. Herter replied that the expected increase in trade with mainland China would not materialize, and he found pessimism in places like Hong Kong on the score of what could actually be done in the trade field even with strategic controls relaxed. One illustration he gave was of recent arrangements concluded between Ceylon and Communist China for a rubber-rice exchange. Here the Chinese deliveries had run far behind schedule, and disillusionment in Ceylon had been the only result. In this connection, he added that the United Kingdom recognition of China had not been matched by the grant of any preferred trading position, and he thought that the recent revision of the ChinCom regulations would now enable the debate between the United States and its allies on this subject to be assessed on a more realistic basis than heretofore.

62. Trade difficulties were of particular concern to Japan which faced very real financial problems. Despite the good quality of recent rice crops, the pressure of population on resources continued. The Japanese were particularly worried about American tariffs and had been trying hard, although without too much success, to widen their markets in South-East Asia.

63. Finally, Mr. Herter was pessimistic about future election prospects in the Philippines, evidences of corruption, and the lack of any adequate leadership to replace the late President Magsaysay.

64. In conclusion, Mr. Herter said he was convinced that if the United States and free world position should weaken, there was a serious possibility that the position in South-East Asia would deteriorate, and that the regimes in Korea and Formosa would lose hope and turn to the Communists. This, in turn, would have grave consequences for the independence of Japan which already had a strong Communist Party, although one which was under control at the present time. He saw, therefore, no real alternative to the present political and military policies now being pursued by the United States in the Far East. As he put it, it would be necessary to maintain a "stiff upper lip" in that part of the world for some time to come.

.....



- 15 -

TOP SECRET

THE MIDDLE EAST

65. General Twining next called on Lieut. Col. J.E. Phipps, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

66. Lieut. Col. Phipps said that for the purposes of his briefing, the forces of the Arab states were considered as a collective whole. They had army forces approximating 272,000 men or 300,000 men available at M+30. Egypt and Syria were becoming well equipped from Soviet sources. The Arab nations had an air force of 200 jet fighters, and 80 propellor driven fighters. One hundred of these jets belonged to Egypt. The Egyptian air force was now considered to be better trained. The Arab navies were small, the only one of any consequence being Egypt's, which had four destroyers and three submarines.

67. Israel had an army of 55,000 to which must be added a capacity of some 150,000 available at M+2. It had an airforce of 2,500 and a navy of 3,000. The army was divided into three commands, North, Central and South, and could be supplemented by 25,000 paramilitary forces who lived on farms and guarded frontier areas. The Israeli army was well trained and could defend itself or successfully attack any Arab state or any combination of Arab states. The air force was presently equipped with 100 jet fighters and some World War II bombers. Its navy was small, consisting of only two destroyers, but was well trained and could defeat any Arab naval forces.

68. There was no indication of any real intention on the part of any of the Arab states to take immediate overt action against Israel, or vice versa. There was some border tension, but for the next 12 months it was unlikely that the Arab countries would wish to risk hostilities. They were getting arms, learning to use them, and would wish presumably to wait for a sufficient amount to have accumulated. A resumption of large scale Fedayeen raids would be a signal that the Arab states might consider that they were ready to attack. Israel was confident that it could defend itself, but would become more and more concerned as the Arab states built up their stocks of arms. If Israel felt that the point might be reached at which it would be surpassed in strength, it might attack to remove those forces it felt could defeat it.

69. In the general discussion that followed, Mr. Matthews, Policy Planning staff, emphasized that the main motivation of the Arab countries derived from their solidarity against Israel. This tended to overcome any fears they might have about Soviet penetration.

70. In the United States view the main Soviet interest in the area was to exploit existing tensions and to maintain them at a high level. There was no foreseen Soviet "user interest" in Mideast oil (at least over the next ten years) although the USSR would undoubtedly wish to place itself in the position of being able to deny Mideast oil to the west.

...../16

- 16 -

TOP SECRET

71. In his earlier review of "World Diplomatic Situations", Mr. Matthews had referred to Syria as an instance of nationalism having gone to dangerous extremes. The distance to which the present Syrian leadership was prepared to go in the direction of co-operation with the USSR showed how far the mood of nationalism could go in extreme cases. Admittedly in the case of Syria, as was true with all the Arab world, the problem of Israel created special and serious frictions, and made it more difficult to develop a concerted policy.

72. Mr. Leger said that the Canadian Government had welcomed the Eisenhower Doctrine, and considered that it could play a useful part in strengthening the area. In applying it in practical situations, however, the United States faced many difficult problems.

73. He thought the description of Syria as a nation where nationalism had "gone wrong" was apt, and wondered whether there might be some action that could be taken to bring it back to the right road. Mr. Leger then raised the question of whether it might be possible or desirable to try to move the Nasser Government away from the Soviet alignment. Mr. Herter replied that the United States would indeed be anxious to have any reasonable discussions with Nasser that were possible. Experience, however, had seemed to show that his anti-westernism and ambitions were so deep-rooted that useful discussions leading towards a modus vivendi were impossible. Therefore, the United States had decided that its only alternative was to try to limit his influence in the area. If Nasser showed any inclination to be "positively neutral" instead of positively pro-Soviet and anti-western, there might be some hope for direct negotiations with him. Thus far the State Department did not see any basis for hope.

74. There was undoubtedly real worry among the other Arab Governments about the Syrian situation. But the basic desire for Arab unity against Israel was so strong that this concern was easily overcome. The prospects of an Arab rebuff to Syria were therefore negligible. This was true even of such countries as Jordan and Lebanon whose leaders were concerned about Syrian subversive activity. Their leaders however (as the recent Damascus meeting attended by Saud indicated) were reluctant to take up a firm public posture.

75. In a brief discussion of the UN Emergency Force in the Mideast, Mr. Leger pointed out that it was a police force and not a fighting force. Therefore in the event of hostilities in the area, and particularly in the event of an attack against the force, the Canadian Government would feel obliged to withdraw the Canadian component. General Foulkes pointed out that, in view of the fact that the Canadian contingent provides administrative support for the UNEF, this would mean the end of UNEF. There was a brief discussion (and general agreement on) the importance of persuading Israel to accept UNEF on the Israel side of the demarcation line.

...../17

TOP SECRET

- 17 -

76. Mr. Leger also mentioned briefly the problem posed for Canada last year by the Israeli request for F-86's. This request had not been renewed, but if it were the Government's reaction would no doubt be a cautious one.

77. Mr. Leger then referred to the status of the Tripartite Declaration of 1951 which appeared to be no longer effective, and wondered whether, since the USSR is obviously now a power in the area, and would continue to be so, it might be useful to envisage Soviet participation in a discussion of the area with the objective of formulating a quadripartite Declaration or guarantee. This he thought might tend to inhibit the more harmful Soviet activities in the area and force upon the Soviet Government some sense of responsibility.

78. Mr. Matthews, in replying, said that the USSR had made it clear that they would enter into no agreement in the area which did not include the abolition of the Baghdad Pact. Although not a member of this pact, the United States was most anxious that it should continue in existence and the Soviet demand in this regard was therefore quite unacceptable. Further, he saw no reason to believe that the USSR, with its historic ambitions in the Mideast, would agree to a "neutralization" of the area which would be implicit in such a declaration. Finally, there was the fact of Western Europe's dependence on Mideast oil. As had been said before, the main Soviet interest was to keep the trouble brewing.

79. Mr. Robertson, while agreeing that it would be extremely difficult to reach an agreement covering all the points of the Tripartite Declaration suggested that it might be possible to achieve an acceptable and useful minimum. While the arms control provisions would be difficult to apply on a four-power basis, a revision might take the form of a joint undertaking to oppose aggression in the area.

80. Mr. Herter then reviewed the complexity of the problems including the fact that neither side accepted the present Israeli borders, that the Arabs were unified in their opposition to Israel and that Israel had made further statements, as for example on the need for 2,000,000 more immigrants, which tended to give substance to the view that Israel would seek to expand its borders. He thought therefore that the joint undertaking of the kind referred to by Mr. Robertson would do little to solve the fundamental troubles.

81. Mr. Robertson thought that the complexity of the problems and the intransigent attitude of the Mideast nations made it all the more essential that further efforts should be made to associate the powers with permanent seats on the Security Council in a guarantee against aggression from any quarter. Mr. Herter said he thought this would be difficult since the USSR was only interested in keeping the pot boiling, to which Mr. Robertson replied "Yes, but not boiling over."

...../18

TOP SECRET

- 18 -

NATO MATTERS

82. Mr. Leger referred to the fact that while in NATO, the recommendations of SACEUR were considered by the Permanent Council representing NATO Governments, it had struck him that in connection with the new integrated air command, the ultimate responsibility of the two governments was perhaps less clearly defined. He, therefore, welcomed the assurance (which was given by the United States representative) that the terms of reference of the two commanders now in preparation would be submitted to the respective Chiefs of Staff, and through the Chiefs, to governments for final approval.

83. Mr. Leger also raised the question of the state of United States studies mentioned briefly by Mr. Dulles at the NATO Council in May, and later at his press conference on July 16, concerning the establishment of stockpiles of atomic weapons throughout various NATO countries. The discussion (in which General Twining participated) indicated that United States plans were proceeding fairly rapidly in this field. General Twining hoped the picture would be cleared "in the next few weeks", and that it would be possible to outline United States plans by the December meeting of the NATO Council. It was made clear that no change in existing United States legislation was envisaged at this time, that stockpiling was envisaged not for Western-Europe alone, but for the "NATO area" (including North America), and that the essence of the problem was to obtain agreed facilities for storage, with the United States retaining control and responsibility and "holding the keys".

84. In indicating that we would welcome further details, Mr. Leger mentioned our concern over the "fourth country" problem. If it were possible, for example, to convince the French that they should participate in a scheme for stockpiling nuclear weapons, they would be less likely to embark on an independent nuclear arms programme. Mr. Leger also referred to the recent conclusion of negotiations with West Germany for the sale of 500 tons of unprocessed Canadian uranium during the next five years, subject to the conclusion of adequate arrangements guaranteeing its use for peaceful purposes. While we wished to find suitable markets for our uranium production for peaceful use, we recognized the defence needs for some safeguarded plan for nuclear weapons stockpiling.

85. Mr. Elbrick, (Assistant Secretary for European Affairs) expressed the view that the establishment of a NATO nuclear weapons stockpile would not necessarily induce the French, for example, to forego their own programme, although it would be a strong argument for so doing. General Twining added that the central point of French anxiety was the fear that the Germans might at some point start their own weapons programme. It was recognized that these were additional considerations in support of a plan for nuclear weapons stockpiling under NATO auspices.

...../19

- 19 -

TOP SECRET

86. Finally on NATO matters, Mr. Leger referred to the increased importance of political consultation in the NATO Council, and to our view that this should be encouraged, particularly through the active efforts of the major powers. It was recognized that much had been done since the report of the three wise men, and more could be done in future.

87. Mr. Elbrick raised the point whether if word of the meeting of consultation were made public, it might not be necessary to make a brief report to Council. There was little enthusiasm for this course, mainly on grounds that Canada-United States constituted a recognized regional group in NATO and had common problems to discuss.

88. There was unfortunately little opportunity for a discussion of the implications of Mr. Dulles' recent article in "Foreign Affairs", and in particular the aspect of his views put forward in its section IV on United States strategic and tactical doctrine.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REVIEW A SECRET**

TO: .....The Under Secretary.....

Security ..TOP..SECRET.....

Date .....November..8,1957.....

FROM: ...Defence Liaison (1) Division.....

File No.

50215-AE-40

REFERENCE: .....

43

✓

SUBJECT: Meeting of Consultation - Distribution of the Record.....

There is attached for your consideration General Foulkes' letter of October 31 urging the most limited circulation of the Report of the Meeting of Consultation which was held on September 30 in Washington.

2. It seems to me that General Foulkes must have a very low estimate of the discretion of senior members of this Department. We agree entirely that the Minutes of these Meetings of Consultation should not be interpreted as including policy statements by the participants. On the other hand, if the meetings are to be of maximum value, the information included in them should be made available on a need-to-know basis to a limited number of officers who are interested. The kind of distribution which we had in mind is that set out in the attachment to this memorandum.

3. Would you agree that we might proceed to distribute the record to this list of persons, meeting General Foulkes' apprehensions in part by arranging that all the individuals except the Ministers will return their copies to us in due course for destruction?

4. We have omitted General McNaughton's name from the list not because we agree with General Foulkes; indeed, we think the Chairman of the Board should be aware of what is said at these Meetings of Consultation. Because, however, of the uncertainties surrounding the Board at the moment, perhaps we can agree to be guided by General Foulkes' desires in this instance.

Defence Liaison (1) Di...-n

000376

TOP SECRET TO SECRET  
TOP SECRET A SECRET

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR RECORD OF MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION

The Prime Minister

Minister of National Defence

Secretary of State for External Affairs

Mr. Wilgress (Paris)

Mr. Ritchie (New York)

The Heads of Middle Eastern Division

Far Eastern Division

United Nations Division

Defence Liaison (2) (Mr. Crean is also  
Chairman of the Joint Intelligence  
Committee)

Secretary to Cabinet

50219-AE-40

70

DS20/399  
FM 3HDC NOV 5/57 SECRET  
TO INTERNAL 2338 PRIORITY

REF MY TEL 2308 NOV1

STOCKPIILING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN NATO COUNTRIES  
GERARD SMITH TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE USA  
COULD OR SHOULD ANNOUNCE THEIR PLANS FOR THE STOCKPIILING OF ATOMIC  
WEAPONS BEFORE THE NATO CONFERENCE. THIS WAS LIKELY TO BE THE MOST  
IMPORTANT POLICY ANNOUNCEMENT THAT THE PRESIDENT COULD MAKE IN  
PARIS. IT WAS TRUE IT HAD BEEN PRETTY EXPLICITLY FORESHADOWED IN  
DULLES' STATEMENT IN JUL AND WOULD NOT COME TO ANYBODY AS A SURPRISE.  
NEVERTHELESS THEY THOUGHT IT SHOULD BE HELD FOR THE PARIS MEETING.  
2. WHEN SMITH COMPLAINED ABOUT THE DIFFICULTIES CREATED FOR THE PLANNING  
STAFF BY THE PUBLIC RELATIONS BUILD-UP ALREADY GIVEN THE PARIS  
MEETING I ASKED HIM WHY THEY COULD NOT EVEN NOW HANDLE THE  
SPECIAL MEETING OF NATO LIKE A COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' MEETING.  
THEIR SPECIAL VALUE WAS GENERALLY RECOGNIZED TO LIE IN THE OPPORTUNI-  
TY THEY PROVIDED FOR GENERAL STOCK-TAKING AND EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BY  
HEADS OF GOVTS. NOT MUCH IMPORTANCE WAS ATTACHED TO THE FORMAL AGENDA  
AND PEOPLE WERE NOT LED TO EXPECT MAJOR DECISIONS IN THE COMMUNIQUE.  
AT THIS JUNCTURE A MEETING OF LEADERS OF THOSE COUNTRIES IN THE  
FREE WORLD WHICH WERE PREPARED TO COMBINE THEIR DEFENCES AGAINST  
AGGRESSION WOULD BE IN ITSELF A VERY IMPORTANT POLITICAL FACT. I  
THOUGHT IT MIGHT PROVE TO BE UNWISE TO TRY TO DETERMINE IN ADVANCE  
THE THEME OF THE CONFERENCE. GOVTS AND PEOPLES HAD NOT YET SORTED OUT  
THE IMPLICATIONS OF ALL THE QUICK CHANGES IN THESE LAST WEEKS. I WAS  
NOT SURE WE WERE ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS, LET ALONE FINDING THE  
RIGHT ANSWERS. I THOUGHT MR PEARSON'S SPEECH IN MINNESOTA, WHICH WAS  
QUOTED PRETTY FULLY IN THE NEWYORK TIMES, YESTERDAY, RAISED SOME QUES-  
TIONS WHICH WERE NOT DEALT WITH IN THE EISENHOWER-MACMILLAN COMMU-  
NIQUE, BUT WHICH SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND BEFORE WE ATTEMPTED A NEW  
AND INEVITABLY PRETTY RIGID FORMULATION OF OUR NATO POSITION

ROBERTSON

COPY NO. 1

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL



DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF  
OTTAWA

*Boyle*  
*for*

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

31 October 1957

50219-AE-40	
43	50

Dear Mr. Leger:

Thank you very much for your letter of 29 October, to which you attached a copy of the record of the meeting of consultation which was held on 30 September in Washington. I have reviewed this record and have no comments.

With regard to the distribution of this paper, you will recall that on 6 January, 1956, I raised this question of distribution with you and I am quite concerned that if these minutes are given wider circulation than those attending the meeting, plus the ministers concerned, we will run the risk of statements appearing in this record being quoted and perhaps being interpreted as policy, and it may also cause some embarrassment if this gets back to the United States authorities. My understanding of these meetings is that they are free and open exchanges of views and opinions and not in any way agreements or statements that could be used as authorities, and I understood that one of the reasons why no agreed minutes were issued was to keep the discussions on a very informal basis. It is not my intention to circulate these to the Chiefs of Staff for if the report gets into the Chiefs of Staff organization it may by accident be seen by some of the integrated officers or someone may talk about what has appeared in this piece of paper. Therefore I propose only to make some small extracts of discussions between myself and General Twining. Similarly, I do not feel it would be appropriate to issue these to the Joint Intelligence Committee if they are not going to be issued to the Chiefs of Staff. Furthermore, I have some doubts as to whether these should be circulated to the Chairman of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. The other members of the Joint Board will have no knowledge of this report and I am also doubtful whether Dr. Hannah will be sent a copy of the U.S. views. Therefore it would be most unfortunate if General McNaughton were to mention what appears in this paper when no one else was aware of it. I know it is the view of the U.S. authorities that the knowledge that meetings of this kind are held should be kept as quiet as possible.

I would therefore urge that the circulation of this report be restricted to those who attended the meeting and the three ministers concerned, and of course the Secretary of the Cabinet and, if you feel it essential, the Chairman of the Joint Board and the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee should be allowed to read the report.

Yours sincerely,

*Charles Foulkes*  
(Charles Foulkes)  
General,

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Jules Leger,  
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,  
Ottawa, Ontario.

Copy 1 - Mr. Leger ✓  
Copy 2 - Mr. Bryce  
Copy 3 - CCOS file

1.11.8(05)

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
NEUT A SECRET

SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR RECORD OF MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION

The Prime Minister

Minister of National Defence

Secretary of State for External Affairs

Mr. Wilgress (Paris)

Mr. Ritchie (New York)

The Heads of Middle Eastern Division

Far Eastern Division

United Nations Division

Defence Liaison (2) (Mr. Crean is also  
Chairman of the Joint Intelligence  
Committee)

Secretary to Cabinet



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Security *Unclassified*

50219-AE-40		
43		L

Type of Document... *Telegram* ... No. *DL947* ... Date... *Oct. 31/57*  
From... *USSEA* ...  
To... *Candel. New York* ...

Subject:

*Ref. Am tel. DL944*  
*development of Atomic Weapons -*  
*U.S. Press Report*

Original on File No. *50219-AF-40*

Copies on File No. ....

Other Cross Reference Sheets on.....

Prepared by... *J* .....

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

Security ..... *SECRET* .....

50219-AE-40		
43		"

Type of Document... *Telegram* ..... No. *DL 944* ..... Date... *Oct. 30/57* .....  
From... *Al. S. S. E. P.* .....  
To... *Candel, N. Y.* .....

Subject:

*Development of Atomic Weapons - U.S. Press Report*

Original on File No. *50219-AF-40* .....

Copies on File No. ....

Other Cross Reference Sheets on. ....

Prepared by *[Signature]* .....

DS38/386  
FM CANDELNY OCT29/57 SECRET  
TO EXTERNAL 2301 OPIMMEDIATE  
INFO WASHDC

50219-AE-40  
58 50

AS YOU MAY HAVE NOTICED TODAY'S NEWYORK TIMES CARRIES A STORY BY JOHN W FINNEY WITH WASHDC DATELINE TO THE EFFECT THAT THE USA AND UK HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO PROVIDE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEVELOPING FUTURE ATOMIC WEAPONS. IN THIS CONNECTION THE STORY STATES "BEHIND THIS PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT, ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS SAID, WAS A BASIC DECISION THAT THE TWO NATIONS, PERHAPS ALONG WITH CANADA, SHOULD DEVIDE UP THE WORK OF DEVELOPING ATOMIC WEAPONS". WE ARE ASSUMING THAT THIS STORY IS QUITE UNFOUNDED SO FAR AS IT IMPLIES 'CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN ATOMIC WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND IF QUESTIONED BY THE PRESS PROPOSE TO TAKE THE LINE INDICATED BY THE PRIME MINISTER IN HIS PRESS CONFERENCE HERE ON SEP23 THAT CANADA HAD NO INTENTION OF MANUFACTURING ATOMIC WEAPONS.

2. MEANWHILE ANY BACKGROUND INFO WHICH YOU FELT YOU COULD GIVE US FOR OUR OWN INFO REGARDING DISCUSSIONS IN WASHDC BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE UK PRIME MINISTER ON THE SUBJECT OF SHARING OF ATOMIC INFO, OR THE ELABORATION OF A JOINT WEAPONS PROGRAMME, WOULD ALSO BE OF VALUE TO US TO HAVE ANY INDICATION OF YOUR VIEWS ON THIS GENERAL SUBJECT IN VIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP BOTH TO NATO AND DISARMAMENT. IN THIS LATTER CONNECTION THE SUBJECT HAS, AS YOU APPRECIATE, A BEARING ON THE DISARMAMENT SIDE OF OUR ACTIVITIES HERE

RITCHIE

50219-RE-00	
43	50

TOP SECRET (5 of 5)PERSONAL

October 20, 1957

Dear General Foulkes,

I attach for your consideration a copy of the record compiled by our Embassy in Washington of the Meeting of Consultation which was held on September 30 in Washington. It is an expanded version of the series of telegrams which the Embassy sent us early in October and which were dealt with in our letter to you of October 4. The revisions which you suggested with respect to the report of the discussion under the "Continental Defence" item have been taken into account. There may be other revisions which seem desirable to you. I should be grateful to have your comments before any further distribution is made of the attached full record.

2. The Ambassador has informed us that the attached record has been discussed informally with the State Department with the object of ensuring against any major discrepancies in the records kept by the two sides. The Ambassador has also indicated that in the view of the Embassy JIC liaison officer, the intelligence briefings were disappointing in that they were short, superficial and in some aspects, misleading. He has indicated that a more accurate account of current United States views may be obtained from United States intelligence estimates already passed to our JIC.

3. The Ambassador has made the following general comment on the Meetings with which I am in agreement, -

General Charles Foulkes, CB, CBE, DSO, CD,  
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,  
Department of National Defence,  
O t t a w a.

... 2

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

"I should like only to add the general comment that, in my opinion, these meetings were of value, and although there were a number of important areas which we were unable to cover in the short time available, a useful exchange of views took place in an informal atmosphere which provided a valuable supplement to our continuing discussions with United States officials in Washington and in Ottawa. I think too it is important that we should see to it that, consistent with the other obligations of the main participants, such meetings of consultation should be held on as regular a basis as possible."

4. When your final comments on the record are received, I propose to send copies of this report to the Prime Minister, Mr. Pearkes and Mr. Smith. The report will be given limited circulation on a need-to-know basis to a few officers in this Department and to a few Heads of Post abroad. Copies also will be given to the Secretary to the Cabinet and the Chairman of the Canadian Section of the PJBD. There might be some merit as well in sending copies to the members of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

Yours sincerely,

JULES LÉGER

Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

cc--Mr. J.W. Holmes



D.L. (1) / J.J. McCordle / RB

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
MEMORANDUM

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REVIEW A SECRET

TO: ...The Under-Secretary...

TOP SECRET

Date...October 29, 1957

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division

File No.

50219-AE-40

REFERENCE:

43

SUBJECT: Meeting of Consultation--September 30, 1957

There is attached for your signature if you concur, a letter to the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, with which is enclosed the full record of the Meeting of Consultation which took place in Washington on September 30. The proposed distribution of the record is outlined in our letter to General Foulkes although we do not ask specifically for his comments on that distribution. If he has serious objections I am sure that he will register them.

2. An additional copy of this record is being sent to Mr. Holmes for any suggestions as to revision which he may have.

*James M. [Signature]*

Defence Liaison (1) Division

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Washington, DC...

Reference: Our telegram No. 2246 of October 23...

Subject: Meetings of Consultation

Security: Top Secret

No: 1473

Date: 24th October, 1957

Enclosures: Three

Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.

50219-AE-40

70

50

References

DI
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

OCT 28 1957

Internal  
Circulation

Distribution  
to Posts

I am enclosing three copies of a record prepared in the Embassy of the discussions at the Meeting of Consultation held between Canadian and United States officials at the State Department on September 30 last. This record incorporates the basic material which has already been transmitted to the Department either in telegrams forwarded immediately after the meeting or appended to the Embassy's letter of October 11 in the form of summaries of the military intelligence briefings which were read at the meeting. While we have not given copy of this record to the State Department and assume that you will not be doing so through the United States Embassy, the substantive points in the record have been informally discussed with the State Department with the object of ensuring against any major discrepancies in the records kept by the two sides. The main difference in the two records is that while we have included a detailed account of the personal views expressed by Mr. Herter on his Far Eastern tour and on the general situation in the Far East, the State Department record which we saw on this aspect of the discussion was a much briefer version for reasons explained in our telegram under reference.

The Embassy

FILE COPY

TOP SECRET

No 1 of 4 copies

RECORD OF THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES  
OF THE CANADIAN AND UNITED STATES GOVERNMENTS HELD ON MONDAY,  
30th SEPTEMBER, 1957

The meeting which was held in the State Department under the chairmanship of Mr. Christian Herter, the Under Secretary of State, was attended by:

General Nathan Twining, Chairman,  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary of State

Mr. Mansfield Sprague, Assistant Secretary of  
Defence

Lieut. General Clovis E. Byers, Military  
Adviser to Department of Defence

Mr. Elbert Matthews, Acting Director of  
Policy Planning, State Department

Brig. General J.F. Whisenand, Special Assistant  
to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Col. Thomas Hanford, Regional Director,  
Western Hemisphere, Department of Defence

Mr. J.L. Nugent, Officer in Charge of Canadian  
Affairs, State Department

for the United States Government, and by

Mr. Jules Leger, Under Secretary of State for  
External Affairs

General Charles Foulkes, Chairman, Chiefs  
of Staff Committee

Mr. N.A. Robertson, Ambassador

Major General H.A. Sparling, Chairman,  
Canadian Joint Staff

Mr. John Holmes, Assistant Under-Secretary of  
State for External Affairs

Mr. S.F. Rae, Minister

Mr. Philip Uren, Canadian Embassy

for the Canadian Government.

2. The agenda of the meeting consisted of seven  
items:

- (a) Welcome by Under Secretary
- (b) The Military Threat to North America
- (c) Developments in Continental Air Defence
- (d) Outline of United States Objectives in  
World's Major Diplomatic Situations,  
including Disarmament
- (e) The Far Eastern Situation
- (f) The Middle East Situation
- (g) NATO Matters

...../2

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

3. Mr. Herter welcomed the Canadian visitors, emphasizing the value which the United States Government attached to these informal discussions with the Canadians of matters of common concern. Mr. Leger, in replying, expressed his appreciation of the opportunity to exchange views with the United States representatives. Mr. Herter then referred to the first item on the agenda and explained that General Twining had arranged for briefings by officers of United States Joint Staff on the military items on the agenda. General Twining then summoned Captain S.H. Gimber, U.S.N., of the United States Joint Staff.

THE MILITARY THREAT TO NORTH AMERICA - TO MID-1961

4. Captain Gimber introduced himself and his subject, and spoke as follows:

5. The Outbreak of War: If a general war should break out within the next four or five years, it would most likely occur as a result of:

- (a) a miscalculation or series of actions and counter-actions by either side which neither originally intended to lead to a general war;
- (b) A Soviet initiative characterized by an atomic onslaught in the belief that it had such military capabilities as to be certain of success.

6. It was assumed that the Soviet Union would hope to achieve an initial knock-out blow against North American facilities. The Soviets would first attempt to destroy our retaliatory capabilities, then our key facilities such as communications and industrial targets, and thirdly, our population centres.

7. Intelligence Warning: In the absence of any penetration of high Soviet positions, a warning from intelligence sources could only be the end product of continuous reasoning from incomplete evidence. Under the most favourable circumstances, intelligence might be able to state that there was a very high degree of probability of attack. On the other hand, there might be no warning at all. The ability to give warning would depend on two interrelated factors:

- (a) The character and level of normal activity;
- (b) The ability of the Soviet Union to initiate an attack at that level, or to conceal any increase.

8. To date there existed no adequate facilities for ensuring strategic warning. It was to be expected that up to mid-1961 Soviet capabilities would be markedly increased. It would also become increasingly difficult to obtain a clear pattern of preparation. It was therefore necessary to assume that there would be little or no warning.

...../3

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET  
LEVEL A SECRET

- 3 -

TOP SECRET

9. Weapons: There was no clear evidence to serve as a guide as to specific types and numbers stockpiled. It was assumed that these would have the general characteristics of those tested. It was also assumed that the Soviets would continue development on small yield, small dimension weapons. There was a capability for a major increase in the number of nuclear weapons in any category.

10. There was an extensive capability in the field of biological and chemical weapons which would continue to expand. It was estimated that the Soviets had a 15 per cent ammunition allocation. It was expected that by mid-1961 they would have developed a variety of munitions suitable for large-scale operations, as well as a capability of dissemination by high speed aircraft and guided missiles.

11. There had been a notable increase in the frequency of Soviet public announcements on guided missiles. Some of these had contained veiled threats which pointed to the conclusion that all was not bluff. These announcements evidenced a strong feeling of confidence. At the present moment, the major capability against North America was in the field of air-to-surface missiles which presented an obvious threat to carrier striking forces and well defined land targets. In surface-to-surface missiles, the Soviet Union had concentrated on ballistic missiles, striving for minimum susceptibility to counter-measures. It was not expected that the Soviet Union would have any real capability to oppose ballistic missiles prior to 1966.

12. Considerable efforts were being made to overcome geographic disadvantages and to reduce the logistic vulnerability of the submarine fleets. Soviet submarines were ranging far and wide over the oceans of the world at a stepped up rate of activity. There was no positive evidence that the Soviet Union had submarines capable of firing guided missiles, but it was necessary to assume that they had. Similarly, there was no positive evidence that the Soviets had nuclear powered submarines, but again it was necessary to assume that they had.

13. Up to mid-1961, it was estimated that long range aviation would be the principal means available to the Soviet Union to attack North America. During this period, such aircraft would be a one-way mission force, as less than 10 per cent of the available aircraft would be capable of two-way deep penetration of the North American continent. It was estimated that by 1961 the figure 10 per cent would have increased to 50 per cent.

14. The principal conclusion which was reached on the basis of the foregoing was that the Soviet Union's capabilities for attacking the North American continent were constantly being increased.

15. Mr. Herter then asked for any comments or questions. In response to a question from General Foulkes as to the exact status of the Soviet long range bomber programme Captain Gimber stated that the United States intelligence community is presently examining this question and the signs are that previous estimates of the size of the Soviet long range air force will be reduced. This does not, however, alter the fact that the threat over the next ten years or so will be mainly from the manned bomber. General Foulkes also raised the question



TOP SECRET

- 4 -

of whether Military forces would be able to act on a warning supposing that, as SHAPE believed it might, this came 30 days prior to an attack. It was his view that, because of the danger of provoking the Soviet Union by military deployment in response to a false intelligence warning, it might be politically undesirable to react to any warning. Therefore he thought that, because we may not get any warning, and if we did it might not be politically prudent to use such warning, our forces must be maintained in a state of constant readiness so that no obvious mobilization action would be necessary in order to meet an initial Soviet attack. General Twining, while agreeing that the air defence forces should be maintained in constant readiness, thought that some deployment action could be taken if there were a substantial period of warning. For example, it would be possible to deploy certain air defence and Strategic Air Command forces and to take preparatory logistical measures. United States forces are normally exercised frequently enough so that such moves would not be provocative. General Foulkes also commented on the tendency to regard Western Europe and North America as two separate areas for the purpose of warning of attack and alerts; this he thought was a mistake. The various NATO staffs should think in terms of the NATO area as a whole since the warning problem in Europe could not be divorced from that in North America. General Byers (Department of Defence) referred to the complexity of the NATO alert question, giving as an example of contributing factors the unwillingness of Turkey and Greece to give up their alert declaration powers, which tended to make the system very unwieldy.

#### DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCE

16. General Twining then summoned Commander Joseph W. Rayburn of the United States Joint Staff, who spoke as follows:

17. The DEW Line and Its Extensions: The DEW Line was complete and operational. Fifty-seven detector stations were now functioning between Alaska and Baffin Land. Six additional detector stations were under construction in the Aleutian Islands, and would be ready by the fall of 1958. By 1961, six gap filler stations would be completed in Alaska. The seaward extension of the DEW Line would ultimately reach to Midway Island in the Pacific. Interim arrangements have been made for this line to be patrolled by two AEW squadrons, five aircraft patrolling all the time and four divisions of destroyer-escort radar picket ships, five destroyer-escorts patrolling at a time. The Atlantic extension of the DEW Line was now operational, with two AEW squadrons and three divisions of destroyer-escort pickets as far as the Azores. Ultimately, it was hoped to construct a line which would go across Greenland and eventually to the U.K. if the necessary agreements for bases could be negotiated. If that could be accomplished, then the present line would become a "back up" line.

...../5

- 5 -

TOP SECRET

18. The Mid-Canada and Pine Tree Lines: These are now operational.

19. Radar Coverage for the Continental United States: Basic radar coverage for the continental United States was supplied by a system of prime radar stations located around the perimeter and in the interior to give overlapping coverage. There were 120 prime locations now in operation. It was expected that there would be 159 such locations by 1959 and 235 gap filler stations by 1961.

20. There was an urgent need for semi-automatic equipment to replace most of the manually operated equipment. SAGE and the Missile Master co-ordination systems were planned for integration into the air defence system by 1962. The SAGE programme called for eight divisions and 32 sectors. The Missile Master programme was for ten heavily defended areas.

21. Interceptors: Seventy-eight U.S. squadrons of interceptors equipped with Falcon air-to-air missiles were at present available for continental air defence. By 1960 these squadrons would be equipped with F-89J's, F-101B's, F-102's, F-104's and F-106's. The MB-1 missile is now operational in eight squadrons, and it was expected that twelve squadrons would be equipped with them by the end of 1958. It was hoped that one of these four additional squadrons would be based at Goose Bay.

22. Surface-to-Air Missiles:

(a) NIKE-Ajax: There were now 58 battalions equipped with this weapon.

(b) NIKE-Hercules: These had three times the range and much greater lethality. They would be ready to be stockpiled by the end of 1958. It was anticipated that 38 battalions will be equipped with them by the end of 1960.

(c) Hawk: This was a low altitude surface-to-air missile. It would be available by 1959, and four battalions would be equipped with it.

(d) BOWMARC: This was an area defence weapon, and would be operational by 1959. Forty-two squadrons would be operational by 1964.

23. SOSUS: This was a sound surveillance system for long range detection of submarines. Eleven stations had now been equipped with it on the East coast. Four more would have it by January, 1959. There would be six stations established on the West coast by 1959.

24. Integrated Air Defence: Although public announcement had been made concerning the setting up of an integrated air defence, the terms of reference for the integrated command had not yet been completed. No major problems in drafting these terms of reference were anticipated. It was believed that the integrated air defence would greatly simplify the co-ordination of alerts procedures insofar as they referred to air defence warnings. The integrated air command would materially help the defence of North America and the larger problem of neutralizing and destroying

000392

...../o

TOP SECRET

- 6 -

enemy aircraft and missiles at great distances.

25. In addition, Commander Rayburn made reference to the fact that the U.S. Department of Defence had recommended appropriate wording for the U.S.-Canadian Agreement on consultation on alerts. Mr. Leger said he welcomed the fact that progress was being made in this matter which we regarded as being of particular importance in the absence in North America of the political controls which apply in other NATO areas. Commander Rayburn also reported that the integrated air defence command became operational on September 12, 1957, and that its terms of reference were to be submitted to the Chiefs of Staff in the near future. Mr. Leger commented that these terms of reference would, of course, be subject to final governmental approval and was given an assurance on this point.

26. Referring to the suggestion to equip four United States squadrons with the MB-1, one of which will be the Goose Bay Squadron, General Foulkes outlined the difficulties which would face the Canadian authorities in complying with a request for re-arming the Goose Bay Squadron in the near future, pointing to the need for careful prior study and for revision of relevant Canadian regulations before U.S. nuclear weapons could be stored in Canada. He thought this process would take some time and asked that this proposal should be deferred. The U.S. side then emphasized that this was only a planning proposal, that General Foulkes' statement would be taken fully into account before any firm proposal was made, and that the present planning date for the re-arming of these squadrons was 1959.

27. General Foulkes also referred to the existing extension of the agreement regarding the overflight in emergency situations of U.S. squadrons equipped with nuclear weapons. He reminded the United States side that we had hoped it would be possible to discuss the outline of a permanent agreement well before the present arrangements expire so that it would not be necessary to proceed on a short term basis. Mr. Elbrick (Assistant Secretary for European Affairs) referred to United States proposals for discussions in Ottawa in the near future on the technical aspects of air defence at which time he was hopeful that the Goose Bay problem would also be explored.

28. Mr. Leger explained that the problem of eventually stockpiling United States nuclear weapons in Canada could be more satisfactorily dealt with if it were treated as part of the wider problem of stockpiling nuclear weapons on a NATO basis rather than solely in the context of USA-Canadian air defence.

...../7

- 7 -

TOP SECRET

29. Development of the Air Defence System: In discussing the future of the continental air defence system, General Foulkes warned against the danger, particularly in the period up to 1962, of making marginal improvements to our present air defence system at considerable cost. He wished to confirm the present status of the Soviet Bomber programme in order to establish whether the period between the present and 1962 was one in which it would be possible to take calculated risks in order to be in a better position to meet the rather more complex threat after that period. He thought that the Russians were unlikely to go to war deliberately until they had completed development of the ICBM with which they were apparently now having some success. He therefore proposed that all air defence projects put up by the new integrated command should be referred to the Joint Study Group before going to the respective Chiefs of Staff for approval. In addition, it would be useful if the Joint Study Group could make use of the experience of the USA Weapons System Evaluation Group in reviewing any new proposals. He believed that there is a good deal of popular misunderstanding of the value and effectiveness of the present air defence system, particularly since the recent Soviet ICBM announcement which has tended to lead the public to believe that the manned bomber is now obsolete. He therefore thought it important that an agreed concept of continental air defence should be worked out between the two countries to form a basis for future planning by the air defence commanders. This concept might also be used for any public statements by Ministers and officials on the problem.

30. The essential features of such a concept would be to have it made on a joint approach and flexible enough to be able to deal with changing conditions. By this he meant that there should be one system sufficiently flexible to meet all the various types of threat which had been reviewed or any combination of these various types of threat. He was anxious that the anti-ICBM defence should not be approached as a separate problem but as an extension of the present system, using wherever possible facilities already in existence. He believed that by putting the overall control of continental defence under one authority we could ensure that the introduction of new forms of defence against new threats would be made in the most economical way. This was essential in view of the increased costs of equipment in this field and the prospect of serious budgetary troubles over the next few years. The setting up of the Joint Air Defence Command had been a substantial step forward and it had now become essential to examine all new proposals carefully and to fit them into an integrated scheme thereby effecting considerable economies.

31. It was confirmed by General Twining's representative, General Whisenand (General Twining having left the meeting temporarily) that the views of the U.S. Joint Chiefs were substantially the same as those of General Foulkes. No difficulty was anticipated in meeting the Canadian proposals, particularly those concerning the use of the U.S. Weapons System Evaluation Group and the development of an agreed air defence concept. It was understood that General Twining also shared the view that there was a real danger in making costly marginal improvements in our present defence systems, and that he thought every effort should be made to avoid this so that the best use might be made of our joint resources. x

OUTLINE OF USA OBJECTIVES IN WORLD'S  
MAJOR DIPLOMATIC SITUATIONS

32. The acting head of the Policy Planning Staff, Elbert Matthews, led off the discussion under this very broad subject. Mr. Matthews emphasized their recognition that the freedom and security of the United States were dependent upon the freedom and security of others. This required the development and strengthening of collective security to which the United States was pledged.

33. The central threat grew from the economic and military power of the USSR to which the vast manpower of Communist China must be added. Despite the changes in the communist leadership which had taken place since the death of Stalin, the USSR was still committed to the doctrine of inevitable conflict, and to their faith in the ultimate victory of communism.

34. Another vital consideration in the policy planning of the United States was the "nuclear equation" which meant that to the threat to freedom must be added the threat to survival. Still a further factor in the contemporary world was the ferment now active throughout Asia and Africa, a ferment which had created emergent and new states and also new tensions. The Mideast area, and in particular the present Syrian crisis, showed how nationalism could go to extremes and play into the hands of the USSR.

35. In general, it was the view of the State Department that the USSR did not now have any intention to precipitate a war. There was, however, reason to be concerned at the prominent role being played by Khrushchev, who was described as an impetuous and foolhardy individual. With his greater role in Soviet scene, the possibilities of risk and miscalculation had increased. The Soviets had alternated between threats of force and "sweet talk", and had continued to exercise their influence throughout the world through various forms of subversion, following a policy line in effect harder than that of a year or two ago.

36. To deter the Soviet threat, considered both from the point of view of the possibilities of a total war and of local conflicts, was a first aim of the United States. It was also necessary to seek to induce the Soviet leadership to pursue policies which would have the effect of making war less likely, and which would serve gradually to break down the barriers between the Soviet and the free world. The United States hoped to see a loosening of the ties within the communist empire, such as appeared to have taken place in Yugoslavia and Poland, just as it hoped to avoid another tragedy on the Hungarian model. In referring to the recent developments in Yugoslav-Soviet relations, including the Tito-Gomulka communique, Mr. Matthews indicated that the Department was "studying carefully" the extent to which a rapprochement between Tito and the Kremlin appeared to be underway, although

.....



they had come to no firm conclusion. A further aim was to strengthen the awareness of the Soviet threat to the free world, and to strengthen resistance to it. To achieve these aims called for the maintenance within the United States of a high degree of political unity and economic stability, coupled with the maintenance of the necessary military strength, including giving priority to research and development.

37. Central to American policy was the complex system of collective security arrangements slowly forged over the last ten years. The importance of these arrangements was not reduced by the prospects of the development of the ICBM. For example, although the military strength of SEATO was not very great, the psychological value of this association was of real importance for the countries in the area. Coupled with these military regional arrangements, was the world-wide system of economic aid, and the information and cultural programmes directed to strengthening the free world and, to the extent possible, to encouraging the satellites to develop a greater measure of independence.

38. In this broad context, the United Nations had significant functions to perform. It could act, as in the case of Hungary, to focus attention on communist misdeeds. Secondly, it could provide a place where tensions within the free world might be reduced. Mr. Matthews referred particularly to the presence of an Afro-Asian "bloc". While on colonial issues this group of states tended to vote as a unit, on broader issues there was less solidarity than was frequently thought. In the State Department view, it was wiser not to assume the rigidity of the Afro-Asian bloc, since this assumption was not wholly justified, and since acting on this assumption would only serve to strengthen the bloc tendency. This was one reason, among others, why the State Department was skeptical of too close or too overt NATO cooperation in United Nations matters. Finally, the United Nations was a forum in which limited negotiations with the Russians might be possible. The State Department was giving some attention to its policy on exchanges with the USSR, recognizing that this was a difficult problem, since exchange arrangements had always to be measured against security considerations. Exchange arrangements which would work for countries like the United States and Canada might cause real difficulties in other areas of the world. In replying briefly to this general outline, Mr. Leger referred to Canada's geographical position between the two great world powers, and to the fact that we were inevitably affected by the policies of our powerful neighbours. A threat to the security of the United States would involve Canada at once, and we therefore welcomed this outline and would comment on the situation on particular problems and in particular areas in the course of the discussion.

39. On the subject of disarmament, in which the interest and contribution of the Canadian side was well known, Mr. Matthews affirmed that the United States policy was to give firm support to the four-power proposals worked

.....

- 10 -

TOP SECRET

out in the sub-committee, and to the four-power resolution now before the Assembly. The Western position was not perfect, but represented a sound and negotiable group of proposals, and a useful point of departure. It was the hope of the United States that these proposals would emerge from Assembly consideration in pretty much their present form. In particular, the United States could not accept an isolated ban on nuclear weapons testing, the very real advantages in continuing testing (e.g., the development of tactical weapons, etc.) could only be given up in exchange for agreement on an effective cessation of new nuclear production for weapons purposes.

40. On the composition of the sub-committee and the disarmament commission itself, the State Department thought that the present membership of each was essentially logical and reasonable, since these bodies included those countries "most directly concerned". The Department would much prefer that no change should take place in membership, and in particular would deplore any development which might take Canada off the sub-committee. It was considered that the composition of these bodies had little to do with the central question of whether the USSR would be prepared to participate in a real negotiation.

41. In the subsequent discussion of disarmament, Mr. Leger, referred to the progress which had been made, particularly in the last session and to the fact that the increasingly technical character of the discussions made it more difficult for Canada to make a useful contribution. While we did not wish to avoid our responsibilities, at the same time we did not wish to stay on the sub-committee if by so doing we were in any way preventing progress. We were prepared to agree that an increase in membership would complicate matters. But on the other hand, it was our calculation that the Indian proposals for widening the membership of the sub-committee had a good chance of going through at the present session and perhaps of gaining a two-thirds majority. On disarmament, our fundamental view was that our best contribution lay in doing what was possible to facilitate direct negotiations between the two powers most directly concerned. Mr. Robertson took up the discussion to point out that the United Nations forum has made possible useful direct discussions with the Russians, and has provided an umbrella under which negotiations could take place. In the Canadian view, private bilateral discussions between the United States and the USSR must have a special place, and the question of membership of United Nations committees was basically irrelevant to the central problem of creating conditions in which an effective negotiation is possible.

42. There was some brief discussion of the role of NATO, and it seemed to be agreed that while NATO consultation was valuable and necessary in some respects and should be continued, it should not be pushed to the point of imposing a barrier on future negotiations either bilateral or in the sub-committee.

43. Finally, the Canadian side raised a suggestion which had been discussed earlier informally within the delegation.

.....000397

Mr. Robertson referred to the earlier American proposals in 1956 (to which the USSR had not responded) for the setting apart of small test pilot areas in the United States and in the USSR for a trial of inspection techniques. He wondered whether it would not be fruitful to begin with joint US-Canadian studies on a technical and service level to examine practical problems involved in overflight and inspection systems. Thus, consideration might be given to a joint pilot study of an industrial complex in the United States, and possibly of some appropriate zone in the Arctic. At a later stage, the other western partners in the sub-committee might be invited to cooperate in these practical technical studies. This suggestion would fit in with an approach which we hoped to make shortly on the military side for a joint examination of some of the problems involved in Arctic inspection. In this context, General Foulkes emphasized the Canadian view that the more extensive ground control arrangements envisaged in connection with a European inspection zone did not apply to Arctic conditions.

44. While the United States side did not give any definitive comment on the Canadian suggestion, their first reactions, including the first reaction of Mr. Sprague, the Defence Department representative, appeared quite favourable. One sidelight on the suggestion, which was brought out by Mr. Matthews of the Policy Planning staff, was the indication that, at planning levels within the Department, they had been thinking of the possibility of proposing some form of arms control agreement and joint inspection to cover the contested border areas (presumably including Kashmir) between India and Pakistan. Mr. Matthews thought it worth mentioning this suggestion, (which had not in any sense reached the stage of a final proposal), because of Canada's Commonwealth connections.

#### THE FAR EAST

45. General Twining called on Lt. Col. J.H. Lahmer (USAF) of the Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to give a briefing on the military situation in the Far East.

46. Lt. Col. Lahmer said the Soviet Union maintained an army of 445,000 in this area, which was 20 per cent of the Red Army. It was composed of five armies, 11 corps and 31 divisions. Its airforce consisted of 3,500 aircraft, of which 1,700 were jet fighters, 600 were light jet bomber, 100 were jet bombers, 160 were propellor driven medium bombers, and 10 were jet heavy bombers. The navy consisted of two heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, 32 destroyers, 86 submarines and 263 patrol vessels of various types.

47. The North Korean army totalled approximately 375,000 men, made up of 18 divisions and seven brigades. There were eight armoured regiments. All these troops were exceedingly well equipped and trained. The air force had only 600 aircraft, but 420 of these were jet fighters. The

.....

North Koreans had 75 light jet bombers. The North Korean forces could cause serious trouble at any moment.

48. The army of Communist China consisted of 2,500,000 men divided into 167 divisions. It was a formidable fighting force. China had an air force of 2,600 aircraft, of which 1,400 were jet fighters and 435 were jet light bombers. Its navy was small, but growing. At present it consisted of four destroyers and 14 submarines. Six hundred thousand Chinese troops were stationed in the general area opposite Taiwan. The logistical problems involved in maintaining these troops in this position had been partially solved by the completion of a railroad along the coast to Amoy.

49. Vietnam had a well-trained and recently re-organized army of 303,000 men, divided into 14 infantry divisions and one armoured division.

50. This briefing was followed by Mr. Herter's personal account of his tour which formed one of the most interesting parts of the discussion, mainly because of Mr. Herter's frank and perceptive report of his personal impressions. En route to the Far East, he said that he had been briefed by the United States military authorities in Hawaii, who were especially concerned at the possibility of a deterioration in the position, particularly in Korea and in Formosa. Despite large military forces in being in these two important areas, there were other factors at work which could adversely affect the internal situation in each, and the military appreciation had pointed to the problems involved in holding the position.

51. In Formosa, although army morale was still good, and the forces (including the air forces) well equipped, Chiang was getting no younger and his position was not strong among the offshore Chinese. The low wage rates in the army (a common soldier received 75 cents a month) and the civil service opened up possibilities of corruption and graft, of which some were no doubt taking full advantage. The country was held together by a sense of mission based upon the hope of an eventual return to the mainland, and the maintenance of a "free China". Since this, however, was a distant hope, the situation, so far as morale is concerned, was precarious. In the minds of the Nationalist Chinese the offshore islands were completely identified with Formosa. Their loss would be a great blow to the Formosan regime and to the morale of its army, probably leading to the loss of Formosa itself to the Communists.

52. It was apparent throughout that the United States side believed that the offshore island situation was still potentially dangerous and should be carefully watched.

53. In Korea, Mr. Herter said the South Koreans

.....

TOP SECRET

were closer to the enemy. Even here, however, the weakening position of the ageing Syngman Rhee and the uncertain calibre of his political opponents made it difficult to be other than pessimistic about the future. The recent local elections in Seoul (where the opposition had won 40 out of 52 seats) showed the strength of the Rhee opposition, which Mr. Herter thought had a good chance of winning the next national elections.

54. On the other hand, on the Chinese mainland itself, the Communist regime appeared to be facing very real problems. There was considerable evidence of discontent among the farmers over the malfunctioning of the land redistribution and farm collectivisation, and real shortages of foodstuffs over wide areas were creating serious problems. As in other Communist countries, there had been discontent among the intellectuals, including student groups, and there was also evidence that the overcentralization of authority led to discontent within cadres of the Chinese Communist party itself.

55. Turning to South-East Asia, with the exception of Thailand and the Philippines which were partners in SEATO, Indonesia (which he had not visited) Mr. Herter's impression was that the other states in the area, including Malaya, did not wish to align themselves with the United States in military pacts or arrangements. There was some feeling that they could in any event count in a major crisis on the United States deterrent and they were imbued with a desire to assert their newly won independence. This, he thought, was not so much "neutralism" as a determination not to revert to their old colonial status.

56. Burma, for example, found itself in a very difficult squeeze, with a dearth of population and a substantial surplus rice crop. Yet he was convinced that the present Burmese Government, although anxious not to take up a public position (presumably in order not to offend Communist China) was definitely anti-communist and would remain so.

57. Mr. Herter had talked to President Diem in Saigon, who had been worried mainly about Vietnam's borders with Laos and Cambodia. Any invasion route by the Vietminh or the Communist Chinese to the South would logically lie through these two countries, and Diem, therefore, was concerned at strengthening his internal roads and borders with these territories. Diem's firm opposition to communism needed no underlining.

58. In Thailand, as in many other countries in the area, the problem of succession was a difficult one. Malaya had begun its new life under good auspices, and it had a good chance of making the grade. Mr. Herter mentioned that Mr. Richard Casey, whom he had seen at Singapore, had made private soundings of Malaya's interest in SEATO membership but had concluded that it would not be wise to raise this question at this time. The first thing the Malaysians wished to do was to stand on their own feet.

.....

Throughout South-East Asia, Mr. Herter thought that the overseas Chinese, while not a strong political force were an overwhelming commercial force, and wanted to be left alone to the greatest extent possible. He remarked that the worst threat which could be made to an overseas Chinese was to speak of deportation to mainland China.

60. Reviewing the overall position, Mr. Herter said that while he had undertaken this mission somewhat in the mood of a "doubting Thomas" (presumably with reference to traditional United States positions and attitudes), he now felt that the maintenance of support for an independent Formosa was vital, and that the United States had nothing to gain and a good deal to lose by any modification of its traditional policy with respect to recognition of the Formosan government. It was necessary for many reasons to keep the idea of a free China alive, and anything Canada could do to support this would be welcomed. He recognized that this policy, which required substantial outlays by the United States might be difficult to maintain, but he thought the effort must and should be made in the period ahead.

61. Mr. Robertson asked whether he would make any distinction between the recognition issue and the loosening of China trade policies. Mr. Herter replied that the expected increase in trade with mainland China would not materialize, and he found pessimism in places like Hong Kong on the score of what could actually be done in the trade field even with strategic controls relaxed. One illustration he gave was of recent arrangements concluded between Ceylon and Communist China for a rubber-rice exchange. Here the Chinese deliveries had run far behind schedule, and disillusionment in Ceylon had been the only result. In this connection, he added that the United Kingdom recognition of China had not been matched by the grant of any preferred trading position, and he thought that the recent revision of the ChinCom regulations would now enable the debate between the United States and its allies on this subject to be assessed on a more realistic basis than heretofore.

62. Trade difficulties were of particular concern to Japan which faced very real financial problems. Despite the good quality of recent rice crops, the pressure of population on resources continued. The Japanese were particularly worried about American tariffs and had been trying hard, although without too much success, to widen their markets in South-East Asia.

63. Finally, Mr. Herter was pessimistic about future election prospects in the Philippines, evidences of corruption, and the lack of any adequate leadership to replace the late President Magsaysay.

64. In conclusion, Mr. Herter said he was convinced that if the United States and free world position should weaken, there was a serious possibility that the position in South-East Asia would deteriorate, and that the regimes in Korea and Formosa would lose hope and turn to the Communists. This, in turn, would have grave consequences for the independence of Japan which already had a strong Communist Party, although one which was under control at the present time. He saw, therefore, no real alternative to the present political and military policies now being pursued by the United States in the Far East. As he put it, it would be necessary to maintain a "stiff upper lip" in that part of the world for some time to come.

.....



- 15 -

TOP SECRET

THE MIDDLE EAST

65. General Twining next called on Lieut. Col. J.E. Phipps, Joint Intelligence Group, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

66. Lieut. Col. Phipps said that for the purposes of his briefing, the forces of the Arab states were considered as a collective whole. They had army forces approximating 272,000 men or 300,000 men available at M+30. Egypt and Syria were becoming well equipped from Soviet sources. The Arab nations had an air force of 200 jet fighters, and 80 propellor driven fighters. One hundred of these jets belonged to Egypt. The Egyptian air force was now considered to be better trained. The Arab navies were small, the only one of any consequence being Egypt's, which had four destroyers and three submarines.

67. Israel had an army of 55,000 to which must be added a capacity of some 150,000 available at M+2. It had an airforce of 2,500 and a navy of 3,000. The army was divided into three commands, North, Central and South, and could be supplemented by 25,000 paramilitary forces who lived on farms and guarded frontier areas. The Israeli army was well trained and could defend itself or successfully attack any Arab state or any combination of Arab states. The air force was presently equipped with 100 jet fighters and some World War II bombers. Its navy was small, consisting of only two destroyers, but was well trained and could defeat any Arab naval forces.

68. There was no indication of any real intention on the part of any of the Arab states to take immediate overt action against Israel, or vice versa. There was some border tension, but for the next 12 months it was unlikely that the Arab countries would wish to risk hostilities. They were getting arms, learning to use them, and would wish presumably to wait for a sufficient amount to have accumulated. A resumption of large scale Fedayeen raids would be a signal that the Arab states might consider that they were ready to attack. Israel was confident that it could defend itself, but would become more and more concerned as the Arab states built up their stocks of arms. If Israel felt that the point might be reached at which it would be surpassed in strength, it might attack to remove those forces it felt could defeat it.

69. In the general discussion that followed, Mr. Matthews, Policy Planning staff, emphasized that the main motivation of the Arab countries derived from their solidarity against Israel. This tended to overcome any fears they might have about Soviet penetration.

70. In the United States view the main Soviet interest in the area was to exploit existing tensions and to maintain them at a high level. There was no foreseen Soviet "user interest" in Mideast oil (at least over the next ten years) although the USSR would undoubtedly wish to place itself in the position of being able to deny Mideast oil to the west.

...../16

- 16 -

TOP SECRET

71. In his earlier review of "World Diplomatic Situations", Mr. Matthews had referred to Syria as an instance of nationalism having gone to dangerous extremes. The distance to which the present Syrian leadership was prepared to go in the direction of co-operation with the USSR showed how far the mood of nationalism could go in extreme cases. Admittedly in the case of Syria, as was true with all the Arab world, the problem of Israel created special and serious frictions, and made it more difficult to develop a concerted policy.

72. Mr. Leger said that the Canadian Government had welcomed the Eisenhower Doctrine, and considered that it could play a useful part in strengthening the area. In applying it in practical situations, however, the United States faced many difficult problems.

73. He thought the description of Syria as a nation where nationalism had "gone wrong" was apt, and wondered whether there might be some action that could be taken to bring it back to the right road. Mr. Leger then raised the question of whether it might be possible or desirable to try to move the Nasser Government away from the Soviet alignment. Mr. Herter replied that the United States would indeed be anxious to have any reasonable discussions with Nasser that were possible. Experience, however, had seemed to show that his anti-westernism and ambitions were so deep-rooted that useful discussions leading towards a modus vivendi were impossible. Therefore, the United States had decided that its only alternative was to try to limit his influence in the area. If Nasser showed any inclination to be "positively neutral" instead of positively pro-Soviet and anti-western, there might be some hope for direct negotiations with him. Thus far the State Department did not see any basis for hope.

74. There was undoubtedly real worry among the other Arab Governments about the Syrian situation. But the basic desire for Arab unity against Israel was so strong that this concern was easily overcome. The prospects of an Arab rebuff to Syria were therefore negligible. This was true even of such countries as Jordan and Lebanon whose leaders were concerned about Syrian subversive activity. Their leaders however (as the recent Damascus meeting attended by Saud indicated) were reluctant to take up a firm public posture.

75. In a brief discussion of the UN Emergency Force in the Mideast, Mr. Leger pointed out that it was a police force and not a fighting force. Therefore in the event of hostilities in the area, and particularly in the event of an attack against the force, the Canadian Government would feel obliged to withdraw the Canadian component. General Foulkes pointed out that, in view of the fact that the Canadian contingent provides administrative support for the UNEF, this would mean the end of UNEF. There was a brief discussion (and general agreement on) the importance of persuading Israel to accept UNEF on the Israel side of the demarcation line.

...../17

TOP SECRET

- 17 -

76. Mr. Leger also mentioned briefly the problem posed for Canada last year by the Israeli request for F-86's. This request had not been renewed, but if it were the Government's reaction would no doubt be a cautious one.

77. Mr. Leger then referred to the status of the Tripartite Declaration of 1951 which appeared to be no longer effective, and wondered whether, since the USSR is obviously now a power in the area, and would continue to be so, it might be useful to envisage Soviet participation in a discussion of the area with the objective of formulating a quadripartite Declaration or guarantee. This he thought might tend to inhibit the more harmful Soviet activities in the area and force upon the Soviet Government some sense of responsibility.

78. Mr. Matthews, in replying, said that the USSR had made it clear that they would enter into no agreement in the area which did not include the abolition of the Baghdad Pact. Although not a member of this pact, the United States was most anxious that it should continue in existence and the Soviet demand in this regard was therefore quite unacceptable. Further, he saw no reason to believe that the USSR, with its historic ambitions in the Mideast, would agree to a "neutralization" of the area which would be implicit in such a declaration. Finally, there was the fact of Western Europe's dependence on Mideast oil. As had been said before, the main Soviet interest was to keep the trouble brewing.

79. Mr. Robertson, while agreeing that it would be extremely difficult to reach an agreement covering all the points of the Tripartite Declaration suggested that it might be possible to achieve an acceptable and useful minimum. While the arms control provisions would be difficult to apply on a four-power basis, a revision might take the form of a joint undertaking to oppose aggression in the area.

80. Mr. Herter then reviewed the complexity of the problems including the fact that neither side accepted the present Israeli borders, that the Arabs were unified in their opposition to Israel and that Israel had made further statements, as for example on the need for 2,000,000 more immigrants, which tended to give substance to the view that Israel would seek to expand its borders. He thought therefore that the joint undertaking of the kind referred to by Mr. Robertson would do little to solve the fundamental troubles.

81. Mr. Robertson thought that the complexity of the problems and the intransigent attitude of the Mideast nations made it all the more essential that further efforts should be made to associate the powers with permanent seats on the Security Council in a guarantee against aggression from any quarter. Mr. Herter said he thought this would be difficult since the USSR was only interested in keeping the pot boiling, to which Mr. Robertson replied "Yes, but not boiling over."

...../18

TOP SECRET

- 18 -

NATO MATTERS

82. Mr. Leger referred to the fact that while in NATO, the recommendations of SACEUR were considered by the Permanent Council representing NATO Governments, it had struck him that in connection with the new integrated air command, the ultimate responsibility of the two governments was perhaps less clearly defined. He, therefore, welcomed the assurance (which was given by the United States representatives) that the terms of reference of the two commanders now in preparation would be submitted to the respective Chiefs of Staff, and through the Chiefs, to governments for final approval.

83. Mr. Leger also raised the question of the state of United States studies mentioned briefly by Mr. Dulles at the NATO Council in May, and later at his press conference on July 16, concerning the establishment of stockpiles of atomic weapons throughout various NATO countries. The discussion (in which General Twining participated) indicated that United States plans were proceeding fairly rapidly in this field. General Twining hoped the picture would be cleared "in the next few weeks", and that it would be possible to outline United States plans by the December meeting of the NATO Council. It was made clear that no change in existing United States legislation was envisaged at this time, that stockpiling was envisaged not for Western-Europe alone, but for the "NATO area" (including North America), and that the essence of the problem was to obtain agreed facilities for storage, with the United States retaining control and responsibility and "holding the keys".

84. In indicating that we would welcome further details, Mr. Leger mentioned our concern over the "fourth country" problem. If it were possible, for example, to convince the French that they should participate in a scheme for stockpiling nuclear weapons, they would be less likely to embark on an independent nuclear arms programme. Mr. Leger also referred to the recent conclusion of negotiations with West Germany for the sale of 500 tons of unprocessed Canadian uranium during the next five years, subject to the conclusion of adequate arrangements guaranteeing its use for peaceful purposes. While we wished to find suitable markets for our uranium production for peaceful use, we recognized the defence needs for some safeguarded plan for nuclear weapons stockpiling.

85. Mr. Elbrick, (Assistant Secretary for European Affairs) expressed the view that the establishment of a NATO nuclear weapons stockpile would not necessarily induce the French, for example, to forego their own programme, although it would be a strong argument for so doing. General Twining added that the central point of French anxiety was the fear that the Germans might at some point start their own weapons programme. It was recognized that these were additional considerations in support of a plan for nuclear weapons stockpiling under NATO auspices.

...../19

- 19 -

TOP SECRET

86. Finally on NATO matters, Mr. Leger referred to the increased importance of political consultation in the NATO Council, and to our view that this should be encouraged, particularly through the active efforts of the major powers. It was recognized that much had been done since the report of the three wise men, and more could be done in future.

87. Mr. Elbrick raised the point whether if word of the meeting of consultation were made public, it might not be necessary to make a brief report to Council. There was little enthusiasm for this course, mainly on grounds that Canada-United States constituted a recognized regional group in NATO and had common problems to discuss.

88. There was unfortunately little opportunity for a discussion of the implications of Mr. Dulles' recent article in "Foreign Affairs", and in particular the aspect of his views put forward in its section IV on United States strategic and tactical doctrine.

*File Copy.*

*Refer!* **FILE COPY**

COPY 8... OF 8

DS25-0

FM WASHDC OCT23/57 TOPSEC  
TO EXTERNAL 2246

REF YOUR TEL DL893 OCT17

MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION

50219-AE-40	
43	✓

usSEA. — 4

M. Holmes — 5

*file*

50219-AE-40

IT IS CLEAR FROM YOUR MSG THAT THERE HAS BEEN A MISUNDERSTANDING AS TO THE NATURE OF THE REPORTS WHICH WERE TRANSMITTED TO THE DEPT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION ON SEP30 (SEE OUR TELS 2091 2092 2093 2094 2095 AND 2096 OCT1 AND 2112 OCT3) AND POSSIBLY ALSO A MISREADING OF THE OBSERVATIONS MADE IN THE EMBASSY'S LET 1424 OCT11 TO WHICH WERE ATTACHED SUMMARIES OF THE MILITARY BRIEFS PRESENTED BY SERVICE OFFICERS AT THE MEETING. IN FACT THE ORIGINAL SET OF TELS DESPATCHED TO THE DEPT ON AN ITEM-BY-ITEM BASIS WERE NOT SUMMARIES, BUT DETAILED REPORTS OF THE DISCUSSION. THE MAIN MISSING ELEMENTS WERE THE REPORTS ON THE BRIEFINGS GIVEN BY VARIOUS MILITARY OFFICERS, AND, IN THE INTERESTS OF ACCURACY, WE THOUGHT IT BEST THAT WE SHOULD CHECK OUR ORIGINAL NOTES AGAINST THESE BRIEFS (AS WELL AS OTHER MATTERS) INFORMALLY WITH THE STATE DEPT BEFORE REPORTING FINALLY TO YOU. AS SOON AS THE NOTES ON THE MILITARY BRIEFINGS WERE AVAILABLE TO THE STATE DEPT, AN OFFICER OF THE EMBASSY WAS PERMITTED BY THE STATE DEPT TO TAKE DETAILED NOTES ON THE BASIS OF THE ACTUAL BRIEFS USED IN THE SEPARATE PRESENTATIONS AND WE WERE, THEREFORE, ABLE TO CHECK OUR OWN NOTES AGAINST THE ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS FROM WHICH THESE OFFICERS SPOKE.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REMOVED A SECRET

2. IN ACCORDANCE WITH PREVIOUS AND PRESENT PRACTICE, WE ALSO TOOK THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY OF SEEING AND COMMENTING ON THE DRAFT USA REPORT OF THE MEETING, AND HAVE DISCUSSED POINTS OF SUBSTANTIVE DIFFERENCE WITH MR JULIAN NUGENT TO ENSURE CONSISTENCY IN THE TWO REPORTS. AT THE SAME TIME WE SHOULD POINT OUT THAT THE CANADIAN RECORD AS TRANSMITTED TO YOU IS A SUBSTANTIALLY FULLER AND MORE COMPLETE RECORD UNDER EVERY ITEM THAN THAT WHICH HAS BEEN KEPT BY THE STATE DEPT. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH REF TO THE REPORTS UNDER THE AGENDA ITEM DEALING WITH THE FAREASTERN SITUATION. HERE YOU WILL RECALL THAT MR HERTER SPOKE FREELY AND FRANKLY ON WHAT HE EMPHASIZED WAS A PERSONAL BASIS, AND WHILE



PAGE TWO 2246

OUR OWN REPORT(SEE OUR TEL 2094 OCT1)REFLECTS THIS,NUGENT OF THE CANADIAN DESK TOLD US THAT UNDER THIS HEADING HE HAD DELIBERATELY NOT PREPARED A DETAILED RECORD WHICH MIGHT RECEIVE INTERNAL CIRCULATION AND REQUIRE ELABORATE INTERNAL CONSULTATION WITHIN THE STATE DEPT;WE DID NOT SHOW OUR RECORD OF THIS PHASE OF THE DISCUSSIONS TO HIM.

3.TO COMPLETE THE PREPARATION OF A FULL RECORD OF THE MEETING, THEREFORE,AS INDICATED IN OUR LET OF OCT11,THE MAIN QUESTION REMAINING WAS WHETHER THE EDITORIAL WORK OF COMPILING THE REPORT ON THE BASIS OF OUR EARLIER TELS AND THE MATERIAL FORWARDED WITH OUR LET 1424 OCT11 SHOULD BE DONE IN THE DEPT OR HERE.OUR VIEW WAS THAT THIS MIGHT BEST BE DONE IN THE DEPT ON THE LIGHT OF ANY AMENDMENTS OR COMMENTS WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN RECEIVED FROM GENERAL FOULKES OR SENIOR DEPARTMENTAL OFFICERS NOW IN OTTAWA WHO HAD BEEN PRESENT AND HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE DISCUSSION.IF,HOWEVER,DEPARTMENTAL NEEDS CAN BEST BE MET BY HAVING THE EDITORIAL WORK COMPLETED HERE, WE WILL TRANSMIT FULL REPORT TO YOU BY EARLY BAG.

4.I SHOULD ALSO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT OUR MARGINAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS RECEIVED WERE MADE IN ORDER TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE EXISTENCE OF MORE COMPREHENSIVE AND DETAILED INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ALREADY AVAILABLE IN THE DEPT

ROBERTSON

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

FILE COPY

OUTGOING MESSAGE

master made only  
as per tel. with Miss Hughes.

FM: EXTERNAL, OTTAWA	DATE	FILE		SECURITY	
	Oct. 17, 1957	50219-AE-40		TOP SECRET	
		43.	50		
TO: EMBASSY, WASHINGTON	NUMBER	PRECEDENCE		COMCENTRE USE ONLY	
	DL-893	ROUTINE			
INFO:					

NOT TO BE  
REPRODUCED  
WITHOUT A SECRET

Ref.: YOUR LETTER 1424 OF OCTOBER 11

Subject: MEETING OF CONSULTATION  
WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT YOU WOULD BE  
WE ARE DISAPPOINTED TO LEARN THAT YOU ARE EVIDENTLY NOT

~~THINKING OF~~ SUBMITTING A RECORD OF THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF SEPTEMBER 30 OF THE DETAILED NATURE OF EARLIER REPORTS OF MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION (E.G. WASHINGTON DESPATCH 2047 OF DECEMBER 1, 1955). IT IS OBVIOUSLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR OFFICIALS HERE WHO DID NOT ATTEND THE MEETING TO ADD ANYTHING TO REPORTS CONTAINED IN YOUR TELEGRAMS ON THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION WHICH YOU HAVE DESCRIBED AS BEING SUMMARY REPORTS ONLY.

2. THE VALUE OF THE MORE DETAILED EARLIER REPORTS WAS THAT THE VIEWS OF THE UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES ON MILITARY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING THE SECURITY OF NORTH AMERICA WERE BROUGHT TOGETHER IN ONE DOCUMENT WHICH COULD BE CIRCULATED TO INTERESTED MINISTERS. THERE WAS NO NEED TO REFER TO SEPARATE DOCUMENTS SUCH AS THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES. WHATEVER THE SHORTCOMINGS

... 2

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION			
ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG.....			JULES LÉGER
NAME..... J.J. McCardle/RD	D.L.(1)	6-7921	SIG.....
			NAME.....

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

OF THESE BRIEFINGS AT THE MOST RECENT MEETING OF CONSULTATION (AS INDICATED IN YOUR LETTER UNDER REFERENCE) THE VIEWS WERE PUT FORWARD BY SENIOR UNITED STATES OFFICIALS AND THEREFORE DESERVE ATTENTION. OFFICIALS HERE CANNOT KNOW HOW MUCH OR HOW LITTLE OF THE INFORMATION IN THE BRIEFS ATTACHED TO YOUR LETTER WAS READ INTO THE RECORD AT THE MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 30 AND ARE THEREFORE NOT IN A POSITION TO PREPARE A FULLER RECORD OF THE DISCUSSION AS YOU SUGGEST.

3. WE ARE NOT CERTAIN WHETHER OR NOT YOU DISCUSSED YOUR SUMMARY ~~OF~~ REPORTS WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO PREVENT ANY GROSS DISCREPANCY IN THE RECORDS<sup>A</sup> KEPT BY THE TWO SIDES. WE HAVE ALWAYS CONSIDERED THIS CHECK TO BE<sup>A</sup>/USEFUL AND DESIRABLE FEATURE OF THIS PROCESS OF CONSULTATION. THE MOST SATISFACTORY METHOD OF DOING THIS WOULD SEEM TO US TO BE ON THE BASIS OF THE COMPLETE RECORD ~~BE~~ PREPARED BY SOMEONE WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING.

4. WITH THESE THOUGHTS IN MIND THEREFORE WE HOPE YOU WILL RECONSIDER THE QUESTION AND PREPARE FOR US THE FULLER RECORD WHICH WE <sup>NEED</sup> HAD ~~EXPECTED TO RECEIVE~~. WE ASSUME THAT BEFORE FORWARDING THIS FULLER REPORT TO US YOU WILL HAVE DISCUSSED IT WITH WHOEVER ON THE UNITED STATES SIDE KEPT THEIR RECORD.

NO 5 OF 6

DS10/366

FM EXTERNAL OTT OCT10/57 TOPSECRET  
TO WASHDC DL874

50219-AE-40  
58  
DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

REF YOUR TEL 2112 OCT3

MEETING OF CONSULTATION-CONTINENTAL DEFENCE

THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF, HAS AGREED THAT YOUR REF TEL MIGHT BE DISTRIBUTED IN ITS PRESENT FORM. HE WOULD HOWEVER LIKE TO HAVE THE PERMANENT RECORD OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE CONTINENTAL DEFENCE ITEM AMENDED SOMEWHAT. SINCE WE ASSUME THAT YOU WILL BE USING THE MATERIAL IN YOUR REF TEL AS PART OF THE MORE DETAILED RECORD WHICH YOU WILL BE SENDING US IN DUE COURSE, WE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR YOU TO HAVE THESE REVISIONS AT THIS STAGE.

2. THE SUGGESTED REVISIONS ARE THE FOLLOWING:

PARA3.

LINES 6 AND 7: -AFTER THE WORDS "THEREFORE HE THOUGHT THAT" INSERT: "BECAUSE WE MAY NOT GET ANY WARNING AND IF WE DID IT MAY NOT BE POLITICALLY PRUDENT TO USE SUCH WARNING", CONTINUING ON WITH THE REST OF THE SENTENCE.

PARA5

DELETE THE FIRST THREE SENTENCES AND SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING: "IN PRESENTING AN OUTLINE OF THEIR FUTURE PLANS, THE USA INCLUDED THE ARMING OF FOUR ADDITIONAL SQUADRONS WITH THE MBI ROCKET. ONE OF THESE SQUADRONS WAS THE USA SQUADRON AT GOOSE BAY. GENERAL FOULKES OUTLINED THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH WOULD FACE THE CANADIAN AUTHORITIES IN COMPLYING WITH A REQUEST FOR RE-ARMING THE GOOSE BAY SQUADRON IN THE NEAR FUTURE, POINTING TO THE NEED FOR CAREFUL PRIOR STUDY AND FOR REVISION OF RELEVANT CANADIAN REGULATIONS BEFORE USA NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD BE STORED IN CANADA. HE THOUGHT THIS PROCESS WOULD TAKE SOME TIME AND ASKED THAT THIS PROPOSAL SHOULD BE DEFERRED."

PARA5

LINE 13: DELETE THE WORD "ESTABLISHMENT" AND SUBSTITUTE THE WORD "RE-ARMING".

LINE 25: INSERT THE WORDS "UNITED STATES" BEFORE THE WORD "NUCLEAR".

PARA7

DELETE THE FIRST TWO SENTENCES AND SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING:

PAGE TWO DL874

"THE ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF SUCH A CONCEPT WOULD BE TO HAVE IT MADE ON A JOINT APPROACH AND FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO BE ABLE TO DEAL WITH CHANGING CONDITIONS. BY THIS HE MEANT THAT THERE SHOULD BE ONE SYSTEM SUFFICIENTLY FLEXIBLE TO MEET ALL THE VARIOUS TYPES OF THREAT WHICH HAD BEEN REVIEWED OR ANY COMBINATION OF THESE VARIOUS TYPES OF THREAT".

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: THE CANADIAN EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Reference: Our Tels. 2091-96 of Oct. 1 & 2113...  
of Oct. 3

Subject: Meetings of Consultation

Security: TOP SECRET

No: 1424

Date: October 11, 1957

Enclosures: 2 x 4 ✓

Air or Surface Mail:

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.

50219-AE-40

70

58

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REDUIT A SECRET

References

1	DI
2	CSM
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

OCT 15 1957

Our telegrams under reference reported on the discussion under each of the principal agenda items considered during the meetings of consultation held in the State Department on September 30 at which the following officials participated:

United States -

Mr. Christian Herter, Under Secretary of State  
General Nathan Twining, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Mr. C. Burke Elbrick, Assistant Secretary of State  
Mr. Mansfield Sprague, Assistant Secretary of Defence  
Lt. General Clovis E. Byers, Military Adviser to Department of Defence  
Mr. Elbert Matthews, Acting Director of Policy Planning, State Department  
Brig. General J. F. Whisenand, Special Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Colonel Thomas Hanford, Regional Director, Western Hemisphere, Defence Department  
Mr. J. L. Nugent, Officer in Charge of Canadian Affairs, State Department

Canada -

Mr. Jules Leger, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
General Charles Foulkes, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee  
Mr. N. A. Robertson, Ambassador  
Major General H. A. Sparling, Chairman, Canadian Joint Staff  
Mr. John Holmes, Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
Mr. S. F. Rae, Minister  
Mr. Philip Uren, Canadian Embassy

2. To complete the record, the State Department has assisted us by permitting us to take notes on the basis of the military intelligence briefs which were read at the meeting by appropriate United States service officers under the headings of "The Military Threat to North America", "Continental Air Defence", "The Military Situation in the Far East", and "The Military Situation in the Middle East". We are attaching as appendices

Internal Circulation

Distribution to Posts

.../2




--2--

TOP SECRET

the summary of notes taken by an Embassy officer on the basis of these briefs, and would forward them to you with the cautionary comment of the Embassy J.I.C. liaison officer: In Mr. Uren's view, these intelligence and military briefings were disappointing. They were short, superficial and, in some aspects, misleading. The following summary of them necessarily tends to magnify these characteristics. It is therefore recommended that they be read only as an interesting sidelight on the meeting. A more accurate concept of current United States views may be obtained from United States intelligence estimates already passed on to our J.I.C.

3. I should like only to add the general comment that, in my opinion, these meetings were of value, and although there were a number of important areas which we were unable to cover in the short time available, a useful exchange of views took place in an informal atmosphere which provided a valuable supplement to our continuing discussions with United States officials in Washington and in Ottawa. I think too it is important that we should see to it that, consistent with the other obligations of the main participants, such meetings of consultation should be held on as regular a basis as possible.

4. Since General Foulkes and departmental officials may have some textual changes to suggest in our telegraphed reports, I think it best that the preparation of the full record should be left to the Department on the basis of the reports which have been sent from this mission.

  
The Embassy.

APPENDIX "A"

TOP SECRET

THE MILITARY THREAT TO NORTH AMERICA

Summary of brief delivered by Captain S.H. Gimber, U.S.N.

If a general war should break out within the next four or five years, it will most likely occur as a result of:

- (a) a miscalculation or series of actions and counter-actions by either side which neither originally intended to lead to a general war;
- (b) a Soviet initiative characterized by an atomic onslaught in the belief that it has such military capabilities as to be certain of success.

It is assumed that the Soviet Union would hope to achieve an initial knock-out blow against our facilities. It would first attempt to destroy our retaliatory capabilities, then our key facilities such as communications and industrial targets, and thirdly, our population centres.

A Look at the Situation to Mid-1961

(A) Strategic Intelligence Warning

In the absence of any penetration of high Soviet positions, a warning from this source can only be the end product of continuous reasoning from incomplete evidence. Under the most favourable circumstances, intelligence might be able to state that there is a very high degree of probability of attack. On the other hand, there may be no warning at all. The ability to give warning depends on two interrelated factors:

- (a) the character and level of normal activity;
- (b) the ability of the Soviet Union to initiate an attack at that level, or to conceal any increase.

At the present time there do not exist adequate facilities for ensuring strategic warning. It is to be expected that up to mid-1961 Soviet capabilities will be markedly increased. It will also become increasingly difficult to obtain a clear pattern of preparation. We must therefore assume that there will be little or no warning.

(B) Weapon Capabilities

(a) Nuclear Weapons:

There is no clear evidence to serve as a guide as to specific types and numbers stockpiled. We assume that these will have the general characteristics of those tested. It is also to be assumed that the Soviets will continue development on small yield, small dimension weapons. There is a capability for a major increase in the number of nuclear weapons in any category.

.../2

ENDIX "A"

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

(b) Biological and Chemical Weapons:

There is an extensive capability which will continue to expand. It is estimated that the Soviets now have a 15 per cent ammunition allocation. It is expected that by mid-1961 they will have developed a variety of munitions suitable for large-scale operations, as well as a capability of dissemination by high speed aircraft and guided missiles.

(c) Guided Missiles:

There has been a notable increase in the frequency of public announcements on this subject. Some of these have contained veiled threats which points to the conclusion that all is not bluff. These announcements evidence a strong feeling of confidence. At the present moment, the major capability against North America is in the field of air-to-surface missiles which present an obvious threat to carrier striking forces and well defined land targets. In surface-to-surface missiles, the Soviet Union has concentrated on ballistic missiles, striving for minimum susceptibility to counter-measures. It is not expected that the Soviet Union will have any real capability to oppose ballistic missiles prior to 1966.

(d) Submarines:

Considerable efforts are being made to overcome geographic disadvantages and to reduce the logistic vulnerability of the fleets. Soviet submarines are ranging far and wide over the oceans of the world at a stepped up rate of activity. There is no positive evidence that the Soviet Union has submarines capable of firing guided missiles, but we must assume that they have. Similarly, there is no positive evidence that the Soviets have nuclear powered submarines, but again we must assume that they have.

(e) Aviation:

Up to mid-1961, it is estimated that long range aviation will be the principal means available to the Soviet Union to attack North America. During this period, such aircraft will be a one-way mission force, as less than 10 per cent of the available aircraft are capable of two-way deep penetration of the North American continent. It is estimated that by 1961 the figure 10 per cent will be increased to 50 per cent.

(C) Conclusion

The principal conclusion which is reached on the basis of the foregoing is that the Soviet Union's capabilities for attacking the North American continent are constantly being increased.

APPENDIX "B"

TOP SECRET

CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCE

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE LAST MEETING

Summary of Brief delivered by Commander Joseph W. Rayburn, U.S.N.

I The DEW Line

The DEW Line is now complete and operational. Fifty-seven detector stations are now functioning between Alaska and Baffin Land. Six additional detector stations are under construction in the Aleutian Islands, and will be ready by the fall of 1958. By 1961, six gap filler stations will be completed in Alaska. The seaward extension of the DEW Line will ultimately reach to Midway Island in the Pacific. Interim arrangements have been made for this line to be patrolled by two AEW squadrons, five aircraft patrolling all the time and four divisions of destroyer-escort radar picket ships, five destroyer escorts patrolling at a time. The Atlantic extension of the DEW Line is now operational, with two AEW squadrons and three divisions of destroyer escort pickets as far as the Azores. Ultimately, it is hoped to construct a line which will go across Greenland and eventually to the U.K. if the necessary agreements for bases can be negotiated. If that can be accomplished, then the present line will become a "back up" line.

II The Mid-Canada and Pine Tree Lines

These are now operational.

III Radar Coverage for the Continental United States

Basic radar coverage for the continental United States is supplied by a system of prime radar stations located around the perimeter and in the interior to give overlapping coverage. There are 120 prime locations now in operation. It is expected that there will be 159 such locations by 1959 and 235 gap filler stations by 1961.

There is an urgent need for semi-automatic equipment to replace most of the manually operated equipment. SAGE and the Missile Master co-ordination systems are planned for integration into the air defence system by 1962. The SAGE programme calls for eight divisions and 32 sectors. the Missile Master programme is for ten heavily defended areas.

IV Weapons

(a) Interceptors

Seventy-eight U.S. squadrons of interceptors equipped with Falcon air-to-air missiles are at present available for continental air defence. By 1960 these squadrons will be equipped with F-89J's, F-101B's, F-102's, F-104's and F-106's. The MB-1 Missile is now operational in eight squadrons, and it is expected that twelve squadrons will be equipped with them by the end of 1958.

.../2

(b) Surface-to-Air Missiles

- 1) NIKE-Ajax: There are now 58 battalions equipped with this weapon
- 2) NIKE-Hercules: These have three times the range and much greater lethality. They will be ready to be stockpiled by the end of 1958. It is anticipated that 38 battalions will be equipped with them by the end of 1960.
- 3) Hawk: This is a low altitude surface-to-air missile. It will be available by 1959 and four battalions will be equipped with it.
- 4) BOWMARC: This is an area defence weapon, and will be operational by 1959. Forty-two squadrons will be operational by 1964.

(c) SOSUS

This is a sound surveillance system for long range detection of submarines. Eleven stations have now been equipped with it on the East coast. Four more will have it by January, 1959. There will be six stations established on the West coast by 1959.

V Integrated Air Defence

Although public announcement has been made concerning the setting up of an integrated air defence, the terms of reference for the command have not yet been completed. No major problems in drafting these terms are anticipated. It is believed that the integrated air defence will greatly simplify the co-ordination of alerts procedures insofar as they refer to air defence warnings. The integrated air command will materially help the defence of North America and the larger problem of neutralizing and destroying enemy aircraft and missiles at great distances.

APPENDIX "CY"

TOP SECRET

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

Summary of Brief delivered by Lt. Col. J.H. Lahmer (USAF)

Soviet Forces

The Soviet Union maintains an army of 445,000 in this area, which is 20 per cent of the Red Army. It is composed of five armies, 11 corps and 31 divisions. Its air force consists of 3,500 aircraft, of which 1,700 are jet fighters, 600 are light jet bombers, 100 are jet bombers, 160 are propellor driven medium bombers, and 10 are jet heavy bombers. The navy consists of two heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, 32 destroyers, 86 submarines and 263 patrol vessels of various types.

North Korea

The North Korean Army totals approximately 375,000 men, made up of 18 divisions and seven brigades. There are eight armoured regiments. All these troops are exceedingly well equipped and trained. The air force has only 600 aircraft, but 420 of these are jet fighters. The North Koreans have 75 light jet bombers. The North Korean forces could cause serious trouble at any moment.

Communist China

The army consists of 2,500,000 men divided into 167 divisions. It is a formidable fighting force. China has an air force of 2,600 aircraft, of which 1,400 are jet fighters and 435 are jet light bombers. Its navy is small, but growing. At present it consists of four destroyers and 14 submarines. Six hundred thousand Chinese troops are now stationed in the general area opposite Taiwan. The logistic problems involved in maintaining these troops in this position have been partially solved by the completion of a railroad along the coast to Amoy.

Vietnam

Vietnam has a well-trained and recently re-organized army of 303,000 men, divided into 14 infantry divisions and one armoured division.



APPENDIX "D"

TOP SECRET

MILITARY SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Summary of Brief delivered by Lt. Col. J.E. Phipps (USAF)

For the purposes of this paper, the forces of the Arab states are considered as a collective whole. They have army forces approximating 272,000 men or 300,000 men available at M + 30. Egypt and Syria are becoming well equipped from Soviet sources. The Arab nations have an air force of 200 jet fighters, and 80 propellor driven fighters. One hundred of these jets belong to Egypt. The Egyptian air force is now considered to be better trained. The Arab navies are small, the only one of any consequence being Egypt's, which has four destroyers and three submarines.

Israel has an army of 55,000, to which must be added a capacity of some 150,000 available at M + 2. It has an air force of 2,500 and a navy of 3,000. The army is divided into three commands, North, Central and South, and can be supplemented by 25,000 paramilitary forces who farm and guard frontier areas. The Israeli army is well trained and could defend itself or successfully attack an Arab state or any combination of Arab states. The air force is presently equipped with 100 jet fighters and some World War II bombers. Its navy is small, consisting of only two destroyers, but is well trained and could defeat any Arab naval forces.

The General Situation

There is no indication of any real intention on the part of any of the Arab states to take immediate overt action against Israel, or vice versa. There is some border tension, but for the next 12 months it is unlikely that the Arab countries would wish to risk hostilities. They are getting arms, learning to use them, and would wish presumably to wait for a sufficient amount to have accumulated. A resumption of large scale Fedeyen raids will be a signal that the Arab states may consider that they would be ready to attack. Israel is confident now that it can defend itself, but will become more and more concerned as the Arab states build up their stocks of arms. If Israel feels that the point may be reached at which it would be surpassed in strength, it may attack to remove those forces she feels could defeat her.

~~DOWNGRADED TO SECRET~~  
~~SECRET A SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

October 9, 1957.

50219-AE-	40
43	c

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER:

Canada-U.S. Meetings of Consultation

One of the series of Meetings of Consultation was held on September 30 in Washington. I attended the meeting myself. The Canadian Government was represented, in addition, by the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff and our Ambassador in Washington.

2. These Meetings of Consultation stem from arrangements made in 1951 which concerned the deployment of aircraft carrying atomic weapons over Canadian territory. The understanding concerning Meetings of Consultation was set out in an agreed Minute in the following terms:

"Frequent consultations shall take place in Washington between the Canadian Ambassador and the Secretary of State and such other officers of the United States Government as may be designated by him. The purpose of these consultations is to exchange views on developments in the world situation which might necessitate the use of atomic weapons. The consultations are informal and exploratory and are not to be regarded as involving or implying any commitment on the part of either government as to the action it will take or the position it will adopt in particular circumstances yet to arise. It would be the hope that by such consultations it will be possible to arrive at common appreciations of situations which may necessitate the use of atomic weapons."

3. The Meetings of Consultation were initiated in 1951 and have been held intermittently since that time. In each case a record of the discussion has been kept by both sides. There is however no agreed record but the notes compiled by the two sides are compared to prevent gross discrepancies.

4. There is attached for your information a series of telegrams from our Embassy in Washington which give a preliminary report on the discussion of each item which was considered at this most recent Meeting of Consultation on September 30. We expect to receive a more detailed report from the Embassy in the near future. To complete the picture there is attached as well a copy of the brief which was used by the Canadian Section.

- 2 -

The attached telegrams are all worth reading. I would draw your special attention however to the telegram covering the discussion of continental defence, i.e., telegram 2112 of October 3. As reported in paragraph 5 of that telegram the United States representatives indicated at the meeting on September 30 that the United States Government would be approaching the Canadian Government with a request for approval to station at Goose Bay a squadron equipped with MB-1 air to air rockets equipped with nuclear warheads. The present planning date for the establishment of these squadrons is 1959. While, therefore, there is no immediate action required the matter does raise problems which will have to be given serious consideration by the Government.

6. The use of the MB-1 rocket in Canadian air space was provided for in exchanges of notes between the two Governments, the latest of which was completed on June 28 and which is valid until July 1, 1958. The conditions prescribed in these exchanges set very strict limitation upon the deployment of this nuclear weapon in Canadian air space.

7. The desire of the United States to store the MB-1 nuclear rocket at Goose Bay does not come as a complete surprise. There are storage facilities at Goose Bay for nuclear weapons although no such weapons are stored there now. Construction of these storage buildings by the United States was agreed to in October 1950 by the Canadian Government subject to certain conditions, one of which was that there would be no storage of special weapons at Goose Bay without the express approval of the Canadian Government. These storage facilities are located within an area at Goose Bay which was leased to the United States under an exchange of notes between the two Governments of December 5, 1952.

8. When the subject was raised at the Meeting of Consultation I suggested that there might be merit in delaying the United States approach somewhat until the Canadian Government had been able to give adequate study to the implications of the proposal. I suggested the possible advantages of linking the approach to the Canadian Government with the broader scheme envisaged by the United States regarding the establishment of nuclear weapons stockpiles in NATO countries. This matter is covered in telegram 2096 which is among the attachments. You will recognize that the heart of the problem for the United States is to obtain agreed facilities for storage in other countries with the United States retaining control of their responsibility for the weapons.

9. Some preliminary study has already been given by Canadian officials to the problem of what changes, if any, would be required

- 3 -

in Canadian legislation to permit the storage of nuclear weapons in Canada. While this study has not yet been completed it seems likely that it will result in a finding that there need be no revision of ~~existing~~ <sup>legislated</sup> legislation in Canada but that certain new orders may be issued under existing legislation. There remains of course the problem presented by United States legislation, which as it exists at the moment, would require the custody of nuclear weapons even on Canadian soil to be kept in the hands of United States personnel.

10. Officials see some advantage from a domestic political point of view in linking any agreement to the stockpiling of atomic weapons at Goose Bay to the more general United States proposals which may be made concerning the possible stockpiling of nuclear weapons in other NATO countries. Any concessions which might be necessary with respect to the control of these weapons might be more palatable if seen in the light of similar concessions made by our NATO allies. You will note from the attached telegrams that United States officials hope to be in a position to outline United States plans with respect to nuclear stockpiling in NATO countries by the time of the December NATO Council meeting.

11. You may wish to discuss this matter with your Cabinet colleagues. A decision of substance is not required at the moment. Until we have firm United States proposals before us we cannot be certain of what exact commitments the Canadian Government might be asked to assume. We can be certain however that the proposal will raise politically important problems of control which have not so far had to be faced so directly.

RULES LÉGER

J.L.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

*For file  
ssm*

TO: The Under-Secretary

Security TOP SECRET

Date October 9, 1957

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division

File No.

50219-AE 40

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: Canada - U.S. Meetings of Consultation

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
NEED A SECRET

*Sent  
11.10.57*

I attach for your signature if you concur a memorandum to the Minister enclosing the preliminary reports which we have received on the September 30 Meeting of Consultation.

2. We have set out in the memorandum as well the background to the United States approach which may be made concerning the storage of nuclear rockets at Goose Bay.

*P. S. Remula*  
Defence Liaison (1) Division

*P.S. The full report  
promised by the Embassy is  
not yet available. If you  
agree, we propose to bring  
the full report to the atten-  
tion of the P.M. rather than  
this telegraphic one. P.T.*

D.L.(1)J.J.McCardle/RB

50219-AE-40	
43	50

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
~~SECRET A SECRET~~

PERSONAL AND  
TOP SECRET

October 4, 1957

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,  
Department of National Defence.

Meetings of Consultation--Continental Defence

--- There is attached for your consideration, a copy of telegram 2112 of October 3 from Washington which reports on the discussion at the Meeting of Consultation on September 30 of Items II and III of the agenda. We have already given you copies of the other telegrams dealing with the Meeting of Consultation i.e., telegrams 2091 to 2096 inclusive, of October 1. The attached telegram completes the series of reports from Washington on the Meeting of Consultation for the time being. We would expect within a short time to receive from the Embassy, a comprehensive report on the Meeting as a whole.

2. We plan to bring this series of telegrams to the attention of the Prime Minister and to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Before doing so, however, we would be grateful to have your comments particularly on the attached telegram and upon telegram 2096 (NATO Matters). We wish to insure that these telegrams do, in your estimation, provide an accurate and satisfactory preliminary account of the Washington discussions.

3. A copy of the comprehensive report when it is received will also be sent to you for your comments before any distribution is made of it.

PAUL TREMBLAY  
for the

Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs



COPY No. 5 of 13

DS 6/354

FL JASHDC OCT3/57 TOP SECRET  
TO INTERNAL 2112 PRIORITY

FOR UNDERSECRETARY

REF OUR TEL 2091 OCT1

MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION (ITEMS 2 & 3) - CONTINENTAL DEFENCE  
THREAT TO NORTHAMERICA

1. THE THREAT TO NORTHAMERICA AS OUTLINED AT THE MEETING CONTAINED NO MAJOR DIFFERENCES FROM CURRENT CANADIAN AND JOINT USA-CANADIAN INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES. IT WAS EMPHASIZED THAT FOR AT LEAST THE NEXT TEN YEARS THE MAIN THREAT WOULD BE FROM MANNED BOMBERS, SUPPORTED IN THE LATTER PART OF THE PERIOD BY GUIDED MISSILE SUBMARINES AND ICBM'S. THE FIRST OPERATIONAL SOVIET ICBM IS EXPECTED TO BE AVAILABLE IN 1960-61. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM GENERAL FOULKES AS TO THE EXACT STATUS OF THE SOVIET LONG RANGE BOMBER PROGRAMME WE WERE INFORMED THAT THE USA INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS PRESENTLY EXAMINING THIS QUESTION AND THE SIGNS ARE THAT PREVIOUS ESTIMATES OF THE SIZE OF THE SOVIET LONG RANGE AIR FORCE WILL BE REDUCED. THIS DOES NOT HOWEVER ALTER THE FACT THAT THE THREAT OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS OR SO WILL BE MAINLY FROM THE MANNED BOMBER.

#### WARNING OF ATTACK

2. THE BRIEFING ON INTELLIGENCE WARNING OF ATTACK WAS BASED ON A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ALREADY AVAILABLE TO US AND POINTED OUT THAT THERE WOULD PROBABLY BE NO DEFINITE INTELLIGENCE WARNING PRIOR TO A SOVIET ATTACK. THE QUESTION OF SUCCESSIVE INTELLIGENCE WARNINGS IN A PERIOD OF RISING TENSION WAS NOT DISCUSSED.

3. GENERAL FOULKES RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER MILITARY FORCES WOULD BE ABLE TO ACT ON A WARNING SUPPOSING THAT, AS SHAPE BELIEVED IT MIGHT, THIS CAME 30 DAYS PRIOR TO AN ATTACK. IT WAS HIS VIEW THAT, BECAUSE OF THE DANGER OF PROVOKING THE SOVIET UNION BY MILITARY DEPLOYMENT IN RESPONSE TO A FALSE INTELLIGENCE WARNING, IT MIGHT BE POLITICALLY UNDESIRABLE TO REACT TO ANY WARNING. THEREFORE HE THOUGHT THAT OUR FORCES MUST BE MAINTAINED IN A STATE OF CONSTANT READINESS SO THAT NO OBVIOUS MOBILIZATION ACTION WOULD BE NECESSARY IN ORDER TO MEET AN INITIAL SOVIET ATTACK. GENERAL TWINING, WHILE AGREEING THAT THE AIR DEFENCE FORCES SHOULD BE MAINTAINED IN CONSTANT

...2

PAGE TWO 2112

READINESS THOUGHT THAT SOME DEPLOYMENT ACTION COULD BE TAKEN IF THERE WERE A SUBSTANTIAL PERIOD OF WARNING. FOR EXAMPLE, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DEPLOY CERTAIN AIR DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND FORCES AND TO TAKE PREPARATORY LOGISTICAL MEASURES. USA FORCES ARE NORMALLY EXERCISED FREQUENTLY ENOUGH SO THAT SUCH MOVES WOULD NOT BE PROVOCATIVE. GENERAL FOULKES ALSO COMMENTED ON THE TENDENCY TO REGARD WESTERN EUROPE AND NORTHAMERICA AS TWO SEPARATE AREAS FOR THE PURPOSE OF WARNING OF ATTACK AND ALERTS; THIS HE THOUGHT WAS A MISTAKE. THE VARIOUS NATO STAFFS SHOULD THINK IN TERMS OF THE NATO AREA AS A WHOLE SINCE THE WARNING PROBLEM IN EUROPE COULD NOT BE DIVORCED FROM THAT IN NORTHAMERICA. GENERAL BYERS (DEPT OF DEFENCE) REFERRED TO THE COMPLEXITY OF THE NATO ALERT QUESTION, GIVING AS AN EXAMPLE OF CONTRIBUTING FACTORS THE UNWILLINGNESS OF TURKEY AND GREECE TO GIVE UP THEIR ALERT DECLARATION POWERS, WHICH TENDED TO MAKE THE SYSTEM VERY UNWIELDY.

#### CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCE

4. THE PRESENT STATE OF THE CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS WAS REVIEWED AND THE VARIOUS SEAWARD EXTENSIONS AND PROGRESS IN OTHER PLANNED FACILITIES DISCUSSED IN SOME DETAIL. REF WAS MADE TO THE FACT THAT THE USA DEFENCE DEPT HAD RECOMMENDED APPROPRIATE WORDING FOR THE USA-CANADIAN AGREEMENT ON CONSULTATION ON ALERTS. THE UNDERSECRETARY LATER WELCOMED THE FACT THAT PROGRESS WAS BEING MADE IN THIS MATTER WHICH WE REGARDED AS BEING OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN THE ABSENCE IN NORTHAMERICA OF THE POLITICAL CONTROLS WHICH APPLY IN OTHER NATO AREAS. IT WAS REPORTED THAT THE INTEGRATED AIR DEFENCE COMMAND BECAME OPERATIONAL ON SEP 12/57, AND THAT ITS TERMS OF REF WERE TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE CHIEFS OF STAFF IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THE UNDERSECRETARY COMMENTED THAT THESE TERMS OF REF WOULD, OF COURSE, BE SUBJECT TO FINAL GOVERNMENTAL APPROVAL AND WAS GIVEN AN ASSURANCE ON THIS POINT.

#### STORAGE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CANADA

5. IN THE COURSE OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSION, IT WAS STATED THAT THE USA GOVT INTENDS TO APPROACH THE CANADIAN GOVT WITH A REQUEST FOR APPROVAL TO STATION A SQUADRON EQUIPPED WITH MB-1 NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT GOOSEBAY. GENERAL FOULKES OUTLINED THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH WOULD FACE THE CANADIAN AUTHORITIES IN COMPLYING WITH SUCH A

PAGE THREE 2112

RI EST IN THE NEAR FUTURE, POINTING TO THE NEED FOR CAREFUL PRIOR STUDY, AND FOR REVISION OF RELEVANT CANADIAN REGULATIONS BEFORE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD BE STORED IN CANADA. HE THOUGHT THIS PROCESS WOULD TAKE SOME TIME AND ASKED THAT ANY PROPOSALS OF THIS KIND SHOULD BE DEFERRED. THE USA SIDE THEN EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS ONLY A PLANNING PROPOSAL, THAT GENERAL FOULKES' STATEMENT WOULD BE TAKEN FULLY INTO ACCOUNT BEFORE ANY FIRM PROPOSAL WAS MADE, AND THAT THE PRESENT PLANNING DATE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THESE SQUADRONS WAS 1959. GENERAL FOULKES ALSO REFERRED TO THE EXISTING EXTENSION OF THE AGREEMENT REGARDING THE OVERFLIGHT IN EMERGENCY SITUATIONS OF USA SQUADRONS EQUIPPED WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. HE REMINDED THE USA SIDE THAT WE HAD HOPED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS THE OUTLINE OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT WELL BEFORE THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS EXPIRE SO THAT IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO PROCEED ON A SHORT TERM BASIS. ELBRICK (ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS) REFERRED TO USA PROPOSALS FOR DISCUSSIONS IN OTTAWA IN THE NEAR FUTURE ON THE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF AIR DEFENCE AT WHICH TIME HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT THE GOOSEBAY PROBLEM WOULD ALSO BE EXPLORED. THE UNDERSECRETARY EXPLAINED THAT THE PROBLEM OF EVENTUALLY STOCKPILING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CANADA COULD BE MORE SATISFACTORILY DEALT WITH IF IT WERE TREATED AS PART OF THE WIDER PROBLEM OF STOCKPILING NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON A NATO BASIS RATHER THAN SOLELY IN THE CONTEXT OF USA-CANADIAN AIR DEFENCE (THIS SUBJECT IS COVERED MORE FULLY IN SEPARATE TEL).

#### DEVELOPMENT OF THE AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM

6. IN DISCUSSING THE FUTURE OF THE CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM GENERAL FOULKES WARNED AGAINST THE DANGER, PARTICULARLY IN THE PERIOD UP TO 1962, OF MAKING MARGINAL IMPROVEMENTS TO OUR PRESENT AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM AT CONSIDERABLE COST. HE WISHED TO CONFIRM THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE SOVIET BOMBER PROGRAMME IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH WHETHER THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE PRESENT AND 1962 WAS ONE IN WHICH IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO TAKE CALCULATED RISKS IN ORDER TO BE IN A BETTER POSITION TO MEET THE RATHER MORE COMPLEX THREAT AFTER THAT PERIOD. HE THOUGHT THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE UNLIKELY TO GO TO

c o o 4

PAGE FOUR 2112

WAR DELIBERATELY UNTIL THEY HAD COMPLETED DEVELOPMENT OF THE ICBM WITH WHICH THEY WERE APPARENTLY NOW HAVING SOME SUCCESS. HE THEREFORE PROPOSED THAT ALL AIR DEFENCE PROJECTS PUT UP BY THE NEW INTEGRATED COMMAND SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE JOINT STUDY GROUP BEFORE GOING TO THE RESPECTIVE CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR APPROVAL. IN ADDITION, IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF THE JOINT STUDY GROUP COULD MAKE USE OF THE EXPERIENCE OF THE USA WEAPONS SYSTEM EVALUATION GROUP IN REVIEWING ANY NEW PROPOSALS. HE BELIEVED THAT THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF POPULAR MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE VALUE AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRESENT AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE RECENT SOVIET ICBM ANNOUNCEMENT WHICH HAS TENDED TO LEAD THE PUBLIC TO BELIEVE THAT THE MANNED BOMBER IS NOW OBSOLETE. HE THEREFORE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT THAT AN AGREED CONCEPT OF CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCE SHOULD BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES TO FORM A BASIS FOR FUTURE PLANNING BY THE AIR DEFENCE COMMANDERS. THIS CONCEPT MIGHT ALSO BE USED FOR ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS ON THE PROBLEM.

7. ESSENTIAL FEATURES OF SUCH A CONCEPT WOULD BE RELATED TO THE PRINCIPLES OF UNITY AND FLEXIBILITY. BY THIS HE MEANT THAT THERE SHOULD BE ONE SYSTEM SUFFICIENTLY FLEXIBLE TO MEET ALL THE VARIOUS TYPES OF THREAT WHICH HAD BEEN REVIEWED. HE WAS ANXIOUS THAT THE ANTI-ICBM DEFENCE SHOULD NOT BE APPROACHED AS A SEPARATE PROBLEM BUT AS AN EXTENSION OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM, USING WHEREVER POSSIBLE FACILITIES ALREADY IN EXISTENCE. HE BELIEVED THAT BY PUTTING THE OVERALL CONTROL OF CONTINENTAL DEFENCE UNDER ONE AUTHORITY WE COULD ENSURE THAT THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW FORMS OF DEFENCE AGAINST NEW THREATS WOULD BE MADE IN THE MOST ECONOMICAL WAY. THIS WAS ESSENTIAL IN VIEW OF THE INCREASED COSTS OF EQUIPMENT IN THIS FIELD AND THE PROSPECT OF SERIOUS BUDGETARY TROUBLES OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS. THE SETTING UP OF THE JOINT AIR DEFENCE COMMAND HAD BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL STEP FORWARD AND IT HAD NOW BECOME ESSENTIAL TO EXAMINE ALL NEW PROPOSALS CAREFULLY AND TO FIT THEM INTO AN INTEGRATED SCHEME THEREBY EFFECTING CONSIDERABLE ECONOMIES.

8. IT WAS CONFIRMED BY GENERAL TWINING OR BY HIS REP THAT THE VIEWS OF THE USA JOINT CHIEFS WERE SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME AS THOSE OF

PAGE FIVE 2112

GENERAL FOULKES. NO DIFFICULTY WAS ANTICIPATED IN MEETING THE CANADIAN PROPOSALS, PARTICULARLY THOSE CONCERNING THE USE OF THE USA WEAPONS SYSTEM EVALUATION GROUP AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AGREED AIR DEFENCE CONCEPT. IT WAS UNDERSTOOD THAT GENERAL TWINING ALSO SHARED THE VIEW THAT THERE WAS A REAL DANGER IN MAKING COSTLY MARGINAL IMPROVEMENTS IN OUR PRESENT DEFENCE SYSTEMS, AND THAT HE THOUGHT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO AVOID THIS SO THAT THE BEST USE MIGHT BE MADE OF OUR JOINT RESOURCES

ROBERTSON

COPY .%.OF .8...  
DS6/353  
FM WASHDC OCT1/57 TOPSEC  
TO EXTERNAL 2096 PRIORITY

~~REFUGIT A SECRET~~  
~~TO SECRET~~  
~~SECRET~~

FOR UNDER SECRETARY

MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION-(ITEM VII)NATO MATTERS

THE UNDER SECRETARY(MR LEGER)REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT WHILE IN NATO,  
THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF SACEUR WERE CONSIDERED BY THE PERMANENT COUNCIL  
REPRESENTING NATO GOVTS,IT HAD STRUCK HIM THAT IN CONNECTION WITH THE  
NEW INTEGRATED AIR COMMAND,THE ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE TWO GOVTS  
WAS PERHAPS LESS CLEARLY DEFINED.HE,THEREFORE,WELCOMED THE ASSURANCE  
(WHICH WAS GIVEN BY THE USA REPS)THAT THE TERMS OF REF OF THE TWO  
COMMANDERS NOW IN PREPARATION WOULD BE SUBMITTED TO THE RESPECTIVE  
CHIEFS OF STAFF,AND THROUGH THE CHIEFS,TO GOVTS FOR FINAL APPROVAL.  
2.MR LEGER ALSO RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE STATE OF USA STUDIES MEN-  
TIONED BRIEFLY BY MR DULLES AT THE NATO COUNCIL IN MAY,AND LATER AT  
HIS PRESS CONFERENCE ON JUL16,CONCERNING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STOCKPI-  
LES OF ATOMIC WEAPONS THROUGHOUT VARIOUS NATO COUNTRIES.THE DISCUSSION  
(IN WHICH GENERAL TWINING PARTICIPATED)INDICATED THAT USA PLANS WERE  
PROCEEDING FAIRLY RAPIDLY IN THIS FIELD.GENERAL TWINING HOPED THE  
PICTURE WOULD BE CLEARER"IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS",AND THAT IT WOULD  
BE POSSIBLE TO OUTLINE USA PLANS BY THE DEC MEETING OF THE NATO  
COUNCIL.IT WAS MADE CLEAR THAT NO CHANGE IN EXISTING USA LEGISLATION  
WAS ENVISAGED,THAT STOCKPILING WAS ENVISAGED NOT FOR WESTERNEUROPE  
ALONE,EUT FOR THE"NATO AREA"(INCLUDING NORTHAMERICA),AND THAT THE  
ESSENCE OF THE PROBLEM WAS TO OBTAIN AGREED FACILITIES FOR STORAGE,  
WITH THE USA RETAINING CONTROL AND RESPONSIBILITY AND"HOLDING THE  
KEYS".

3.IN INDICATING THAT WE WOULD WELCOME FURTHER DETAILS,THE UNDER  
SECRETARY MENTIONED OUR CONCERN OVER THE"FOURTH COUNTRY"PROBLEM.IF  
IT WERE POSSIBLE,FOR EXAMPLE,TO CONVINCE THE FRENCH THAT THEY WOULD  
PARTICIPATE IN A SCHEME FOR STOCKPILING NUCLEAR WEAPONS,THEY WOULD BE  
LESS LIKELY TO EMBARK ON AN INDEPENDENT NUCLEAR ARMS PROGRAMME.  
MR LEGER ALSO REFERRED TO THE RECENT CONCLUSION OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH  
WESTGERMANY FOR THE SALE OF 500 TONS OF UNPROCESSED CANADIAN URANIUM  
DURING THE NEXT FIVE YEARS,SUBJECT TO THE CONCLUSION OF ADEQUATE  
ARRANGEMENTS GUARANTEEING ITS USE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES.



PAGE TWO 209 6

WHILE WE WISHED TO FIND SUITABLE MARKETS FOR OUR URANIUM PRODUCTION FOR PEACEFUL USE, WE RECOGNIZED THE DEFENCE NEEDS FOR SOME SAFEGUARDED PLAN FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILING.

4. ELERICK, (ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS) EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATO NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY INDUCE THE FRENCH, FOR EXAMPLE, TO FOREGO THEIR OWN PROGRAMME, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD BE A STRONG ARGUMENT FOR SO DOING. GENERAL TWINING ADDED THAT THE CONTROL POINT OF FRENCH ANXIETY WAS THE FEAR THAT THE GERMANS MIGHT AT SOME POINT START THEIR OWN WEAPONS PROGRAMME. IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT THESE WERE ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF A PLAN FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILING UNDER NATO AUSPICES.

5. FURTHER DISCUSSION CONCERNING USA PLANS FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILING AS THESE MIGHT SPECIFICALLY RELATE UNDER AGREEMENTS TO CANADA AT SOME FUTURE TIME IS REPORTED IN OUR SEPARATE MSG DEALING WITH CONTINENTAL DEFENCE.

6. FINALLY ON NATO MATTERS, THE UNDER SECRETARY REFERRED TO THE INCREASED IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL CONSULTATION IN THE NATO COUNCIL, AND TO OUR VIEW THAT THIS SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED, PARTICULARLY THROUGH THE ACTIVE EFFORTS OF THE MAJOR POWERS. IT WAS RECOGNIZED THAT MUCH HAD BEEN DONE SINCE THE REPORT OF THE THREE WISE MEN, AND MORE COULD BE DONE IN FUTURE. ELBRICK RAISED A CURIOUS POINT AS TO WHETHER IF WORD OF THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION WERE MADE PUBLIC, IT MIGHT NOT BE NECESSARY TO MAKE A BRIEF REPORT TO COUNCIL. THERE WAS LITTLE ENTHUSIASM FOR THIS COURSE, MAINLY ON GROUNDS THAT CANADA-USA CONSTITUTED A RECOGNIZED REGIONAL GROUP IN NATO AND HAD COMMON PROBLEMS TO DISCUSS.

7. THERE WAS UNFORTUNATELY LITTLE OPPORTUNITY FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF MR DULLES' RECENT ARTICLE IN "FOREIGN AFFAIRS", AND IN PARTICULAR THE ASPECT OF HIS VIEWS PUT FORWARD IN ITS SECTION IV ON USA STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL DOCTRINE

ROBERTSON

COPY 10...4...OF 8

DS12/353

FM WASHDC OCT1/57 TOPSEC  
TO EXTERNAL 2095 PRIORITY

FOR UNDER SECRETARY

MEETING OF CONSULTATION-(ITEM VI)MIDEAST SITUATION

THE DISCUSSION ON THE MIDEAST BEGAN WITH A USA SERVICE BRIEFING ON THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE AREA.WE HOPE TO SEND YOU A FULLER ACCOUNT OF THE AFTERNOON'S BRIEFING AT A LATER DATE.IN SUBSTANCE,IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT THE ARAB NATIONS TAKEN TOGETHER,AND EVEN EGYPT AND SYRIA ALONE,HAD MORE TROOPS AND BETTER MILITARY EQUIPMENT THAN ISRAEL.HOWEVER THE BETTER TRAINING OF THE ISRAELI FORCES AND THEIR GREATER EFFICIENCY MADE THEM CAPABLE AT THE PRESENT TIME OF DEFEATING ANY SINGLE ARAB STATE OR ANY COMBINATION OF ARAB STATES.

2.IN DISCUSSING ISRAELI AND ARAB INTENTIONS(MATTHEWS,POLICY PLANNING STAFF)IT WAS EMPHASIZED THAT THE MAIN MOTIVATION OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES DERIVED FROM THEIR SOLIDARITY AGAINST ISRAEL.THIS TENDED TO OVERCOME ANY FEARS THEY MIGHT HAVE ABOUT SOVIET PENETRATION.THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF THE INTENTION OF EITHER ISRAEL OR ANY OF THE ARAB NATIONS TO INITIATE MILITARY ACTION WITHIN THE NEXT SIX TO TWELVE MONTHS.IT WAS CONSIDERED THAT THE ARAB NATIONS WOULD WISH TO WAIT UNTIL THE ARMS THEY HAD RECEIVED FROM THE USSR HAD BEEN ABSORBED AND UNTIL THEY WERE ABLE TO USE THEM EFFICIENTLY.THE FIRST INDICATOR OF AN ARAB INTENTION TO MOVE AGAINST ISRAEL WOULD BE AN INCREASE OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY WHICH MIGHT BE UNDERTAKEN IN AN ATTEMPT TO PROVOKE ISRAEL INTO WAR.A DANGEROUS POSSIBILITY WOULD BE AN ISRAELI DECISION TO DESTROY THE ARAB FORCES BEFORE THEY HAD BECOME SUFFICIENTLY POWERFUL TO DEFEAT THE ISRAELIS.

3.IN THE USA VIEW THE MAIN SOVIET INTEREST IN THE AREA WAS TO EXPLOIT EXISTING TENSIONS AND TO MAINTAIN THEM AT A HIGH LEVEL.THERE WAS NO FORESEEN SOVIET"USER INTEREST"IN MIDEAST OIL(AT LEAST OVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS)ALTHOUGH THE USSR WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY WISH TO PLACE ITSELF IN THE POSITION OF BEING ABLE TO DENY MIDEAST OIL TO THE WEST.

4.IN HIS EARLIER REVIEW OF"WORLD DIPLOMATIC SITUATIONS",MATTHEWS HAD REFERRED TO SYRIA AS AN INSTANCE OF NATIONALISM HAVING GONE TO DANGEROUS EXTREMES.THE DISTANCE TO WHICH THE PRESENT SYRIAN LEADERSHIP

PAGE TWO 2095

WAS PREPARED TO GO IN THE DIRECTION OF COOPERATION WITH THE USSR

SHOWED HOW FAR THE MOOD OF NATIONALISM COULD GO IN EXTREME CASES.

ADMITTEDLY IN THE CASE OF SYRIA, AS WAS TRUE WITH ALL THE ARAB WORLD, THE PROBLEM OF ISRAEL CREATED SPECIAL AND SERIOUS FRICTIONS, AND MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO DEVELOP A CONCERTED POLICY.

5. THE UNDER SECRETARY (MR LEGER) SAID THAT THE CANADIAN GOVT HAD WELCOMED THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE, AND CONSIDER THAT IT CAN PLAY A USEFUL PART IN STRENGTHENING THE AREA. IN APPLYING IT IN PRACTICAL SITUATIONS, HOWEVER, THE USA FACED MANY DIFFICULT PROBLEMS.

6. HE THOUGHT THE DESCRIPTION OF SYRIA AS A NATION WHERE NATIONALISM HAD "GONE WRONG" WAS APT, AND WONDERED WHETHER THERE MIGHT BE SOME ACTION THAT COULD BE TAKEN TO BRING IT BACK TO THE RIGHT ROAD. THE UNDER SECRETARY THEN RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE OR DESIRABLE TO TRY TO MOVE THE NASSER GOVT AWAY FROM THE SOVIET ALIGNMENT. MR HERTER REPLIED THAT THE USA WOULD INDEED BE ANXIOUS TO HAVE ANY REASONABLE DISCUSSIONS WITH NASSER THAT WERE POSSIBLE. EXPERIENCE, HOWEVER, HAD SEEMED TO SHOW THAT HIS ANTI-WESTERNISM AND AMBITIONS WERE SO DEEP-ROOTED THAT USEFUL DISCUSSIONS LEADING TOWARDS A MODUS VIVENDI WERE IMPOSSIBLE. THEREFORE, THE USA HAD DECIDED THAT ITS ONLY ALTERNATIVE WAS TO TRY TO LIMIT HIS INFLUENCE IN THE AREA. IF NASSER SHOWED ANY INCLINATION TO BE "POSITIVELY NEUTRAL" INSTEAD OF POSITIVELY PRO-SOVIET AND ANTI-WESTERN, THERE MIGHT BE SOME HOPE FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH HIM. THUS FAR THE STATE DEPT DID NOT SEE ANY BASIS FOR HOPE.

7. THERE WAS UNDOUBTEDLY REAL WORRY AMONG THE OTHER ARAB GOVTS ABOUT THE SYRIAN SITUATION. BUT THE BASIC DESIRE FOR ARAB UNITY AGAINST ISRAEL WAS SO STRONG THAT THIS CONCERN WAS EASILY OVERCOME. THE PROSPECTS OF AN ARAB REBUFF TO SYRIA WERE THEREFORE NEGLIGIBLE. THIS WAS TRUE EVEN OF SUCH COUNTRIES AS JORDAN AND LEBANON WHOSE LEADERS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT SYRIAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY. THEIR LEADERS HOWEVER (AS THE RECENT DAMASCUS MEETING ATTENDED BY SAUD INDICATED) WERE RELUCTANT TO TAKE UP A FIRM PUBLIC POSTURE.

8. IN A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE UN EMERGENCY FORCE IN THE MIDEAST, THE UNDER SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS A POLICE FORCE AND NOT A FIGHTING FORCE. THEREFORE IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILITIES IN THE AREA,

PAGE REE 2095

AND PARTICULARLY IN THE EVENT OF AN ATTACK AGAINST THE FORCE, THE CANADIAN GOVT WOULD FEEL OBLIGED TO WITHDRAW THE CANADIAN COMPONENT. GENERAL FOULKES POINTED OUT THAT, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE CANADIAN CONTINGENT PROVIDES ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT FOR THE UNEF, THIS WOULD MEAN THE END OF UNEF. THERE WAS A BRIEF DISCUSSION (AND GENERAL AGREEMENT ON) THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSUADING ISRAEL TO ACCEPT UNEF ON THE ISRAELI SIDE OF THE DEMARCATION LINE.

9. THE UNDER SECRETARY ALSO MENTIONED BRIEFLY THE PROBLEM POSED FOR CANADA LAST YEAR BY THE ISRAELI REQUEST FOR F-86'S. THIS REQUEST HAD NOT BEEN RENEWED, BUT IF IT WERE THE GOVT'S REACTION WOULD NO DOUBT BE A CAUTIOUS ONE.

10. THE UNDER SECRETARY THEN REFERRED TO THE STATUS OF THE TRIPARTITE DECLARATION OF 1951 WHICH APPEARED TO BE NO LONGER EFFECTIVE, AND WONDERED WHETHER, SINCE THE USSR IS OBVIOUSLY NOW A POWER IN THE AREA, AND WOULD CONTINUE TO BE SO, IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO ENVISAGE SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN A DISCUSSION OF THE AREA WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF FORMULATING A QUADRIPARTITE DECLARATION OR GUARANTEE. THIS HE THOUGHT MIGHT TEND TO INHIBIT THE MORE HARMFUL SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA AND FORCE UPON THE SOVIET GOVT SOME SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY. MATTHEWS, IN REPLYING, SAID THAT THE USSR HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD ENTER INTO NO AGREEMENT IN THE AREA WHICH DID NOT INCLUDE THE ABOLITION OF THE BAGHDAD PACT. ALTHOUGH NOT A MEMBER OF THIS PACT, THE USA WAS MOST ANXIOUS THAT IT SHOULD CONTINUE IN EXISTENCE AND THE SOVIET DEMAND IN THIS REGARD WAS THEREFORE QUITE UNACCEPTABLE. FURTHER, HE SAW NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE USSR, WITH ITS HISTORIC AMBITIONS IN THE MIDEAST, WOULD AGREE TO A "NEUTRALIZATION" OF THE AREA WHICH WOULD BE IMPLICIT IN SUCH A DECLARATION. FINALLY, THERE WAS THE FACT OF WESTERN EUROPE'S DEPENDENCE ON MIDEAST OIL. AS HAD BEEN SAID BEFORE, THE MAIN SOVIET INTEREST WAS TO KEEP THE TROUBLE BREWING.

11. THE AMBASSADOR, WHILE AGREEING THAT IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO REACH AN AGREEMENT COVERING ALL THE POINTS OF THE TRIPARTITE DECLARATION SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE AN ACCEPTABLE AND USEFUL MINIMUM. WHILE THE ARMS CONTROL PROVISIONS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO APPLY ON A FOUR-POWER BASIS, A REVISION MIGHT TAKE THE FORM OF A JOINT UNDERTAKING TO OPPOSE AGGRESSION IN THE AREA. MR HERTER THEN

...4

PAGE FOUR 2095

REVIEWED THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEMS INCLUDING THE FACT THAT NEITHER SIDE ACCEPTED THE PRESENT ISRAELI BORDERS, THAT THE ARABS WERE UNIFIED IN THEIR OPPOSITION TO ISRAEL AND THAT ISRAEL HAD MADE FURTHER STATEMENTS, AS FOR EXAMPLE ON THE NEED FOR 2,000,000 MORE IMMIGRANTS, WHICH TENDED TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THE VIEW THAT ISRAEL WOULD SEEK TO EXPAND ITS BORDERS. HE THOUGHT THEREFORE THAT THE JOINT UNDERTAKING OF THE KIND REFERRED TO BY THE AMBASSADOR WOULD DO LITTLE TO SOLVE THE FUNDAMENTAL TROUBLES. THE AMBASSADOR THOUGHT THAT THE COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEMS AND THE INTRANSIGENT ATTITUDE OF THE MIDEAST NATIONS MADE IT ALL THE MORE ESSENTIAL THAT FURTHER EFFORTS SHOULD BE MADE TO ASSOCIATE THE POWERS WITH PERMANENT SEATS ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN A GUARANTEE AGAINST AGGRESSION FROM ANY QUARTER. MR HERTER SAID HE THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE DIFFICULT SINCE THE USSR WAS ONLY INTERESTED IN KEEPING THE POT BOILING, TO WHICH THE AMBASSADOR REPLIED "YES, BUT NOT BOILING OVER"

ROBERTSON

FILE COPY 116  
50219-AE-40  
58 50

Ref: ccos 8  
Seng W. Lab. 5  
P.F. Div. 1 6  
D.L. 2 7  
J. Lee 4  
J. Lee

done RB  
Oct. 3/57

COP 10, 4... OF 8  
DS2/354  
FM WASHDC OCT1/57 TOPSEC  
TO EXTERNAL 2094 PRIORITY

FOR UNDERSECRETARY

MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION (ITEM V) FAREASTERN SITUATION-OBSERVATIONS  
BY MR HERTER ON HIS TOUR

THIS WAS ONE OF THE MOST INTERESTING PARTS OF THE DISCUSSION,  
MAINLY BECAUSE OF MR HERTER'S FRANK AND PERCEPTIVE REPORT OF HIS  
PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS. EN ROUTE TO THE FAREAST, HE SAID THAT HE HAD  
BEEN BRIEFED BY THE USA MILITARY AUTHORITIES IN HAWAII, WHO WERE  
PARTICULARLY CONCERNED AT THE POSSIBILITY OF A DETERIORATION IN  
THE POSITION, PARTICULARLY IN KOREA AND IN FORMOSA. DESPITE LARGE  
MILITARY FORCES IN BEING IN THESE TWO IMPORTANT AREAS, THERE WERE  
OTHER FACTORS AT WORK WHICH COULD ADVERSELY AFFECT THE INTERNAL  
SITUATION IN EACH, AND THE MILITARY APPRECIATION HAD POINTED TO THE  
DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF HOLDING THE POSITION INDEFINITELY.

2. AS A RESULT OF HIS RECENT AND DIRECT EXPERIENCE, MR HERTER SAID  
HE NOW SHARED THIS CONCERN ABOUT THE POSITION IN FORMOSA AND IN  
KOREA. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT IN SO DOING HE BASED HIS VIEWS NOT ONLY  
ON AMERICAN MILITARY APPRECIATIONS ON THE SPOT, BUT ALSO ON THE  
GENERAL INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE ABOUT CONDITIONS IN THESE AREAS  
THROUGH UK SOURCES IN HONGKONG.

3. IN FORMOSA, ALTHOUGH ARMY MORALE WAS STILL GOOD, AND THE FORCES  
(INCLUDING THE AIR FORCES) WELL EQUIPPED, CHIANG WAS GETTING NO  
YOUNGER AND HIS POSITION WAS NOT STRONG AMONG THE OFFSHORE CHINESE.  
THE LOW WAGE RATES IN THE ARMY (A COMMON SOLDIER RECEIVED 75 CENTS  
A MONTH) AND THE CIVIL SERVICE OPENED UP POSSIBILITIES OF CORRUPTION  
AND GRAFT, OF WHICH SOME WERE NO DOUBT TAKING FULL ADVANTAGE. THE  
COUNTRY WAS HELD TOGETHER BY A SENSE OF MISSION BASED UPON THE  
HOPE OF AN EVENTUAL RETURN TO THE MAINLAND, AND THE MAINTENANCE OF  
A "FREE CHINA." SINCE THIS, HOWEVER, WAS A DISTANT HOPE, THE SITUATION,  
SO FAR AS MORALE IS CONCERNED WAS PRECARIOUS. IN THE MINDS OF THE  
NATIONALIST CHINESE THE OFFSHORE ISLANDS WERE COMPLETELY IDENTIFIED  
WITH FORMOSA. THEIR LOSS WOULD BE A GREAT BLOW TO THE FORMOSAN  
REGIME AND TO THE MORALE OF ITS ARMY, PROBABLY LEADING TO THE LOSS  
OF FORMOSA ITSELF TO THE COMMUNISTS.



PAGE TWO 2094

4.(A MILITARY BRIEFING WHICH PRECEDED MR HERTER'S REPORT HAD OUTLINED COMMUNIST CHINA'S MILITARY PROGRESS OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS, INCLUDING THE BUILDING UP OF A JET AIRFORCE AND A SMALL NAVY.IN PARTICULAR,CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY STRENGTH HAD IMPROVED IN THE TAIWAN STRAITS AREA WHERE THEY HAD CONSTRUCTED SEVEN AIRFIELDS AND A RAILWAY TO AMOY.THEIR ABILITY TO LAUNCH ATTACKS AGAINST THE OFFSHORE HAD THUS BEEN GREATLY IMPROVED.IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE,THE USA SIDE INDICATED THAT THE OFFSHORE ISLAND SITUATION WAS STILL IN THEIR OPINION POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS AND SHOULD BE CAREFULLY WATCHED.)

5.IN KOREA,MR HERTER SAID THE SOUTH KOREANS WERE CLOSER TO THE ENEMY.EVEN HERE,HOWEVER,THE WEAKENING POSITION OF THE AGEING SYNGMAN RHEE AND THE UNCERTAIN CALIBRE OF HIS POLITICAL OPPONENTS MADE IT DIFFICULT TO BE OTHER THAN PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE. THE RECENT LOCAL ELECTIONS IN SEOUL(WHERE THE OPPOSITION HAD WON 40 OUT OF 52 SEATS)SHOWED THE STRENGTH OF THE RHEE OPPOSITION, WHICH HERTER THOUGHT HAD A GOOD CHANCE OF WINNING THE NEXT NATIONAL ELECTIONS.

6.ON THE OTHER HAND,ON THE CHINESE MAINLAND ITSELF,THE COMMUNIST REGIME APPEARED TO BE FACING VERY REAL PROBLEMS.THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE OF DISCONTENT AMONG THE FARMERS OVER THE MALFUNCTIONING OF THE LAND REDISTRIBUTION AND FARM COLLECTIVISATION,AND REAL SHORTAGES OF FOODSTUFFS OVER WIDE AREAS WERE CREATING SERIOUS PROBLEMS.AS IN OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES,THERE HAD BEEN DISCONTENT AMONG THE INTELLECTUALS,INCLUDING STUDENT GROUPS,AND THERE WAS ALSO EVIDENCE THAT THE OVERCENTRALIZATION OF AUTHORITY LED TO DISCONTENT WITHIN CADRES OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY ITSELF.

7.TURNING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA,WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THAILAND AND THE PHILIPPINES WHICH WERE PARTNERS IN SEATO,AND INDONESIA(WHICH HE HAD NOT VISITED)HERTER'S IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE OTHER STATES IN THE AREA,INCLUDING MALAYA,DID NOT WISH TO ALIGN THEMSELVES WITH THE USA IN MILITARY PACTS OR ARRANGEMENTS.THERE WAS SOME FEELING THAT THEY COULD IN ANY EVENT COUNT IN A MAJOR CRISIS ON THE USA DETERRENT AND THEY WERE IMBUED WITH A DESIRE TO ASSERT THEIR NEWLY WON INDEPENDENCE.THIS,HE THOUGHT,WAS NOT SO MUCH"NEUTRALISM"

PAGE THREE 2094

AS DETERMINATION NOT TO REVERT TO THEIR OLD COLONIAL STATUS.

8. BURMA, FOR EXAMPLE, FOUND ITSELF IN A VERY DIFFICULT SQUEEZE, WITH A DEARTH OF POPULATION AND A SUBSTANTIAL SURPLUS RICE CROP. YET HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE PRESENT BURMESE GOVT, ALTHOUGH ANXIOUS NOT TO TAKE UP A PUBLIC POSITION (PRESUMABLY IN ORDER NOT TO OFFEND COMMUNIST CHINA) WAS DEFINITELY ANTICOMMUNIST AND WOULD REMAIN SO.

9. HE HAD TALKED TO PRESIDENT DIEM IN SAIGON WHO HAD BEEN WORRIED MAINLY ABOUT VIETNAM'S BORDERS WITH LAOS AND CAMBODIA. ANY INVASION ROUTE BY THE VIETMINH OR THE COMMUNIST CHINESE TO THE SOUTH WOULD LOGICALLY LIE THROUGH THESE TWO COUNTRIES, AND DIEM, THEREFORE, WAS CONCERNED AT STRENGTHENING HIS INTERNAL ROADS AND BORDERS WITH THESE TERRITORIES. DIEM'S FIRM OPPOSITION TO COMMUNISM NEEDED NO UNDERLINING. IN THAILAND, AS IN MANY OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE AREA, THE PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION WAS A DIFFICULT ONE. MALAYA HAD BEGUN ITS NEW LIFE UNDER GOOD AUSPICES, AND IT HAD A GOOD CHANCE OF MAKING THE GRADE. HERTER MENTIONED THAT MR RICHARD CASEY, WHOM HE HAD SEEN AT SINGAPORE, HAD MADE PRIVATE SOUNDINGS ON MALAYA'S INTEREST IN SEATO MEMBERSHIP, BUT HAD CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE WISE TO RAISE THIS QUESTION AT THIS TIME. THE FIRST THING THE MALAYANS WISHED TO DO WAS TO STAND ON THEIR OWN FEET. THROUGHOUT SOUTHEAST ASIA, MR HERTER THOUGHT THAT THE OVERSEAS CHINESE, WHILE NOT A STRONG POLITICAL FORCE, WERE AN OVERWHELMING COMMERCIAL FORCE, AND WANTED TO BE LEFT ALONE TO THE GREATEST EXTENT POSSIBLE. HE REMARKED THAT THE WORST THREAT WHICH COULD BE MADE TO AN OVERSEAS CHINESE WAS TO SPEAK OF DEPORTATION TO MAINLAND CHINA.

10. REVIEWING THE OVERALL POSITION, MR HERTER SAID THAT WHILE HE HAD UNDERTAKEN THIS MISSION SOMEWHAT IN THE MOOD OF A "DOUBTING THOMAS" (PRESUMABLY WITH REF TO TRADITIONAL USA POSITIONS AND ATTITUDES), HE NOW FELT THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF SUPPORT FOR AN INDEPENDENT FORMOSA WAS VITAL, AND THAT THE USA HAD NOTHING TO GAIN AND A GOOD DEAL TO LOSE BY ANY MODIFICATION OF ITS TRADITIONAL POLICY WITH RESPECT TO RECOGNITION OF THE FORMOSAN GOVT. IT WAS NECESSARY FOR MANY REASONS TO KEEP THE IDEA OF A FREE CHINA ALIVE. HE RECOGNIZED THAT THIS POLICY, WHICH REQUIRED SUBSTANTIAL OUTLAYS BY THE USA MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO MAINTAIN, BUT HE THOUGHT THE

...4

000439

PAGE FOUR 2094

EFFORT MUST AND SHOULD BE MADE IN THE PERIOD AHEAD.

11. WE ASKED WHETHER HE WOULD MAKE ANY DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE RECOGNITION ISSUE AND THE LOOSENING OF CHINA TRADE POLICIES. ON THIS HIS CONCLUSION WAS THAT THE EXPECTED INCREASE IN TRADE WITH MAINLAND CHINA WOULD NOT MATERIALIZE, AND HE FOUND PESSIMISM IN PLACES LIKE HONGKONG ON THE SCORE OF WHAT COULD ACTUALLY BE DONE IN THE TRADE FIELD EVEN WITH STRATEGIC CONTROLS RELAXED. ONE ILLUSTRATION HE GAVE WAS OF RECENT ARRANGEMENTS CONCLUDED BETWEEN CEYLON AND COMMUNIST CHINA FOR A RUBBER-RICE EXCHANGE. HERE THE CHINESE DELIVERIES HAD RUN FAR BEHIND SCHEDULE, AND DISILLUSIONMENT IN CEYLON HAD BEEN THE ONLY RESULT. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE ADDED THAT THE UK RECOGNITION OF CHINA HAD NOT BEEN MATCHED BY THE GRANT OF ANY PREFERRED TRADING POSITION, AND HE THOUGHT THAT THE RECENT REVISION OF THE CHINCOM REGULATIONS WOULD NOW ENABLE THE DEBATE BETWEEN THE USA AND ITS ALLIES ON THIS SUBJECT TO BE ASSESSED ON A MORE REALISTIC BASIS THAN HERETOFORE.

12. TRADE DIFFICULTIES WERE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO JAPAN WHICH FACED VERY REAL FINANCIAL PROBLEMS. DESPITE THE GOOD EQUALITY OF RECENT RICE CROPS, THE PRESSURE OF POPULATION IN RESOURCES CONTINUED. THE JAPANESE WERE PARTICULARLY WORRIED ABOUT AMERICAN TARIFFS AND HAD BEEN TRYING HARD, ALTHOUGH WITHOUT TOO MUCH SUCCESS, TO WIDEN THEIR MARKETS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. FINALLY, MR HERTER WAS PESSIMISTIC ABOUT FUTURE ELECTION PROSPECTS IN THE PHILIPPINES, EVIDENCES OF CORRUPTION, AND THE LACK OF ANY ADEQUATE LEADERSHIP TO REPLACE THE LATER PRESIDENT MAGSAYSAY.

13. IN CONCLUSION, MR HERTER SAID HE WAS CONVINCED THAT IF THE USA AND FREE WORLD POSITION SHOULD WEAKEN, THERE WAS A SERIOUS POSSIBILITY THAT THE POSITION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA WOULD DETERIORATE, AND THAT THE REGIMES IN KOREA AND FORMOSA WOULD LOSE HOPE AND TURN TO THE COMMUNISTS. THIS, IN TURN, WOULD HAVE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF JAPAN WHICH ALREADY HAD A STRONG COMMUNIST PARTY, ALTHOUGH ONE WHICH WAS UNDER CONTROL AT THE PRESENT TIME. HE SAW, THEREFORE, NO REAL ALTERNATIVE TO THE PRESENT POLITICAL AND MILITARY POLICIES NOW BEING PURSUED BY THE USA IN THE FAREAST. AS HE PUT IT, IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN "A STIFF UPPER LIP" IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD FOR SOME TIME TO COME

ROBERTSON

000440

CC NO. 4 OF 8  
DS1/354  
FM WASHDC OCT 1/57 TOPSEC  
TO EXTERNAL 2093 PRIORITY

FOR UNDER SECRETARY

MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION-(ITEM 4)DISARMAMENT

ON THE SUBJECT OF DISARMAMENT, IN WHICH THE INTEREST AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE CANADIAN SIDE WAS WELL KNOWN, MATTHEWS (POLICY PLANNING) AFFIRMED THAT USA POLICY WAS TO GIVE FIRM SUPPORT TO THE FOUR-POWER PROPOSALS WORKED OUT IN THE SUB COMMITTEE, AND TO THE FOUR-POWER RESOLUTION NOW BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY. THE WESTERN POSITION WAS NOT PERFECT, BUT REPRESENTED A SOUND AND NEGOTIABLE GROUP OF PROPOSALS, AND A USEFUL POINT OF DEPARTURE. IT WAS THE HOPE OF THE USA THAT THESE PROPOSALS WOULD EMERGE FROM ASSEMBLY CONSIDERATION IN PRETTY MUCH THEIR PRESENT FORM. IN PARTICULAR, THE USA COULD NOT ACCEPT AN ISOLATED BAN ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING; THE VERY REAL ADVANTAGES IN CONTINUING TESTING (EG, THE DEVELOPMENT OF TACTICAL WEAPONS, ETC) COULD ONLY BE GIVEN UP IN EXCHANGE FOR AGREEMENT ON AN EFFECTIVE CESSATION OF NEW NUCLEAR PRODUCTION FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES.

2. ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE SUB COMMITTEE AND THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION ITSELF, THE STATE DEPT THOUGHT THAT THE PRESENT MEMBERSHIP OF EACH WAS ESSENTIALLY LOGICAL AND REASONABLE, SINCE THESE BODIES INCLUDED THOSE COUNTRIES "MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED". THE DEPT WOULD MUCH PREFER THAT NO CHANGE SHOULD TAKE PLACE IN MEMBERSHIP, AND IN PARTICULAR WOULD DEPLORE ANY DEVELOPMENT WHICH MIGHT TAKE CANADA OFF THE SUB COMMITTEE. IT WAS CONSIDERED THAT THE COMPOSITION OF THESE BODIES HAD LITTLE TO DO WITH THE CENTRAL QUESTION OF WHETHER THE USSR WOULD BE PREPARED TO PARTICIPATE IN A REAL NEGOTIATION.

3. IN THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION OF DISARMAMENT, THE UNDER SECRETARY REFERRED TO THE PROGRESS WHICH HAD BEEN MADE, PARTICULARLY IN THE LAST SESSION AND TO THE FACT THAT THE INCREASINGLY TECHNICAL CHARACTER OF THE DISCUSSIONS MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR CANADA TO MAKE A USEFUL CONTRIBUTION. WHILE WE DID NOT WISH TO AVOID OUR RESPONSIBILITIES, AT THE SAME TIME WE DID NOT WISH TO STAY ON THE SUBCOMMITTEE IF BY SO DOING WE WERE IN ANY WAY PREVENTING PROGRESS. WE WERE PREPARED TO AGREE THAT AN INCREASE IN MEMBERSHIP WOULD COMPLICATE MATTERS. BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WAS OUR CALCULATION THAT

PAGE TWO 2093

THE INDIAN PROPOSALS FOR WIDENING THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SUBCOMTEE HAD A GOOD CHANCE OF GOING THROUGH AT THE PRESENT SESSION AND PERHAPS OF GAINING A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY. ON DISARMAMENT, OUR FUNDAMENTAL VIEW WAS THAT OUR BEST CONTRIBUTION LAY IN DOING WHAT WAS POSSIBLE TO FACILITATE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO POWERS MOST DIRECTLY CONCERNED. MR ROBERTSON TOOK UP THE DISCUSSION TO POINT OUT THAT THE UN FORUM HAS MADE POSSIBLE USEFUL DIRECT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS, AND HAS PROVIDED AN UMBRELLA UNDER WHICH NEGOTIATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE. IN THE CANADIAN VIEW, PRIVATE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR MUST HAVE A SPECIAL PLACE, AND THE QUESTION OF MEMBERSHIP OF UN COMMITTEES WAS BASICALLY IRRELEVANT TO THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF CREATING CONDITIONS IN WHICH AN EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATION IS POSSIBLE.

4. THERE WAS SOME BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE ROLE OF NATO, AND IT SEEMED TO BE AGREED THAT WHILE NATO CONSULTATION WAS VALUABLE AND NECESSARY IN SOME RESPECTS AND SHOULD BE CONTINUED, IT SHOULD NOT BE PUSHED TO THE POINT OF IMPOSING A BARRIER ON FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS EITHER BILATERAL OR IN THE SUBCOMMITTEE.

5. FINALLY, THE CANADIAN SIDE RAISED A SUGGESTION WHICH WE HAD DISCUSSED EARLIER INFORMALLY WITHIN THE DELEGATION. MR ROBERTSON REFERRED TO THE EARLIER AMERICAN PROPOSALS ON 1956 (TO WHICH THE USSR HAD NOT RESPONDED) FOR THE SETTING APART OF SMALL TEST PILOT AREAS IN THE USA AND IN THE USSR FOR A TRIAL OF INSPECTION TECHNIQUES. HE WONDERED WHETHER IT WOULD NOT BE FRUITFUL TO BEGIN WITH JOINT USA-CANADIAN STUDIES ON A TECHNICAL AND SERVICE LEVEL TO EXAMINE THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN OVERFLIGHT AND INSPECTION SYSTEMS. THUS, CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE GIVEN TO A JOINT PILOT STUDY OF AN INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX IN THE USA, AND POSSIBLY OF SOME APPROPRIATE ZONE IN THE ARCTIC. AT A LATER STAGE, THE OTHER WESTERN PARTNERS IN THE SUBCOMMITTEE MIGHT BE INVITED TO COOPERATE IN THESE PRACTICAL TECHNICAL STUDIES. THIS SUGGESTION WOULD FIT IN WITH AN APPROACH WHICH WE HOPED TO MAKE SHORTLY ON THE MILITARY SIDE FOR A JOINT EXAMINATION OF SOME OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN ARCTIC INSPECTION. IN THIS CONTEXT, GENERAL FOULKES EMPHASIZED THE CANADIAN VIEW THAT THE MORE EXTENSIVE GROUND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS ENVISAGED IN CONNECTION WITH A EUROPEAN INSPECTION ZONE DID NOT APPLY TO ARCTIC CONDITIONS.

PAGE THREE 2093

6. WHILE THE USA SIDE COULD NOT GIVE ANY DEFINITIVE COMMENT ON THE CANADIAN SUGGESTION, OUR IMPRESSION IS THAT THEIR FIRST REACTIONS, INCLUDING THE FIRST REACTIONS OF SPRAGUE, THE DEFENCE DEPT REP, WERE QUITE FAVOURABLE, AND WE MAY EXPECT TO HEAR MORE OF THIS SUGGESTION. ONE SIDELIGHT ON OUR SUGGESTION, WHICH WAS BROUGHT OUT BY MATTHEWS OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF, WAS THE INDICATION THAT, AT PLANNING LEVELS WITHIN THE DEPT, THEY HAD BEEN THINKING OF THE POSSIBILITY OF PROPOSING SOME FORM OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT AND JOINT INSPECTION TO COVER THE CONTESTED BORDER AREAS (PRESUMABLY INCLUDING KASHMIR) BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN. HE THOUGHT IT WORTH MENTIONING THIS SUGGESTION TO US, (WHICH HAS NOT IN ANY SENSE REACHED THE STAGE OF A FINAL PROPOSAL), BECAUSE OF OUR COMMONWEALTH CONNECTIONS

ROBERTSON



FILE COPY

COPY NO. 4 OF 8  
FM WASHDC OCT 1/57 TOPSEC  
TO EXTERNAL 2092 PRIORITY

FOR UNDERSECRETARY

Ref: 50219-AE-40  
58 50  
-CCOS. # 8  
-Sec'y 6 Cab. 5  
-F.E. Div. 6  
-Eun. Div. 7  
-D.L. (2) 9  
-M.E. Div. 10  
-U.N. Div. 11  
4

done KB  
Oct. 3/57

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
ROUT A SECRET

MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION-(ITEM 4) OUTLINE OF USA OBJECTIVES IN WORLD'S

MAJOR DIPLOMATIC SITUATIONS(SOVIET POLICIES)

THE ACTING HEAD OF THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF, ELBERT MATTHEWS, LED OFF THE DISCUSSION UNDER THIS VERY BROAD SUBJECT. SOME OF THE SUBJECTS TOUCHED ON, EG THE MID EAST AND DISARMAMENT, ARE TREATED, FOR CONVENIENCE IN SEPARATE MSGS.

2. MATTHEWS EMPHASIZED THEIR RECOGNITION THAT THE FREEDOM AND SECURITY OF THE USA WERE DEPENDENT UPON THE FREEDOM AND SECURITY OF OTHERS. THIS REQUIRED THE DEVELOPMENT AND STRENGTHENING OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO WHICH THE USA WAS PLEDGED.

3. THE CENTRAL THREAT GREW FROM THE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY POWER OF THE USSR TO WHICH THE VAST MANPOWER OF COMMUNIST CHINA MUST BE ADDED. DESPITE THE CHANGES IN THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE SINCE THE DEATH OF STALIN, THE USSR WAS STILL COMMITTED TO THE DOCTRINE OF INEVITABLE CONFLICT, AND TO THEIR FAITH IN THE ULTIMATE VICTORY OF COMMUNISM.

4. ANOTHER VITAL CONSIDERATION IN THE POLICY PLANNING OF THE USA WAS THE "NUCLEAR EQUATION" WHICH MEANT THAT TO THE THREAT TO FREEDOM MUST BE ADDED THE THREAT TO SURVIVAL. STILL A FURTHER FACTOR IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD WAS THE FERMENT NOW ACTIVE THROUGHOUT ASIA AND AFRICA, A FERMENT WHICH HAD CREATED EMERGENT AND NEW STATES AND ALSO NEW TENSIONS. THE MIDEAST AREA, AND IN PARTICULAR THE PRESENT SYRIAN CRISIS, SHOWED HOW NATIONALISM COULD GO TO EXTREMES AND PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE USSR.

5. IN GENERAL, IT WAS THE VIEW OF THE STATE DEPT THAT THE USSR DID NOT NOW HAVE ANY INTENTION TO PRECIPITATE A WAR. THERE WAS, HOWEVER, REASON TO BE CONCERNED AT THE PROMINENT ROLE BEING PLAYED BY KHRUSHCHEV, WHO WAS DESCRIBED AS AN IMPETUOUS AND FOOLHARDY INDIVIDUAL. WITH HIS GREATER ROLE ON THE SOVIET SCENE, THE POSSIBILITIES OF RISK AND MISCALCULATION HAD INCREASED. THE SOVIETS HAD ALTERNATED BETWEEN THREATS OF FORCE AND "SWEET TALK", AND HAD CONTINUED TO EXERCISE THEIR INFLUENCE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD THROUGH VARIOUS FORMS OF SUBVERSION, FOLLOWING A

PAGE TWO 2092

POLICY LINE IN EFFECT HARDER THAN THAT OF A YEAR OR TWO AGO.

6. TO DETER THE SOVIET THREAT, CONSIDERED BOTH FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE POSSIBILITIES OF A TOTAL WAR AND OF LOCAL CONFLICTS, WAS A FIRST AIM OF THE USA. IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY TO SEEK TO INDUCE THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO PURSUE POLICIES WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF MAKING WAR LESS LIKELY, AND WHICH WOULD SERVE GRADUALLY TO BREAK DOWN THE BARRIERS BETWEEN THE SOVIET AND THE FREE WORLD. THE USA HOPED TO SEE A LOOSENING OF THE TIES WITHIN THE COMMUNIST EMPIRE, SUCH AS APPEARED TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN YUGOSLAVIA AND POLAND, JUST AS IT HOPED TO AVOID ANOTHER TRAGEDY ON THE HUNGARIAN MODEL. IN REFERRING TO THE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS, INCLUDING THE TITO-GOMULKA COMMUNIQUE, MATTHEWS INDICATED THAT THE DEPT WAS "STUDYING CAREFULLY" THE EXTENT TO WHICH A RAPPROCHEMENT BETWEEN TITO AND THE KREMLIN APPEARED TO BE UNDERWAY, ALTHOUGH THEY HAD COME TO NO FIRM CONCLUSION. A FURTHER AIM WAS TO STRENGTHEN THE AWARENESS OF THE SOVIET THREAT TO THE FREE WORLD, AND TO STRENGTHEN RESISTANCE TO IT. TO ACHIEVE THESE AIMS CALLED FOR THE MAINTENANCE WITHIN THE USA OF A HIGH DEGREE OF POLITICAL UNITY AND ECONOMIC STABILITY, COUPLED WITH THE MAINTENANCE OF THE NECESSARY MILITARY STRENGTH, INCLUDING GIVING PRIORITY TO RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

7. CENTRAL TO AMERICAN POLICY WAS THE COMPLEX SYSTEM OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS SLOWLY FORGED OVER THE LAST TEN YEARS. THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS WAS NOT REDUCED BY THE PROSPECTS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ICBM. FOR EXAMPLE, ALTHOUGH THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF SEATO WAS NOT VERY GREAT, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL VALUE OF THIS ASSOCIATION WAS OF REAL IMPORTANCE FOR THE COUNTRIES IN THE AREA. COUPLED WITH THESE MILITARY REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, WAS THE WORLD-WIDE SYSTEM OF ECONOMIC AID, AND THE INFO AND CULTURAL PROGRAMMES, DIRECTED TO STRENGTHENING THE FREE WORLD AND, TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, TO ENCOURAGING THE SATELLITES TO DEVELOP A GREATER MEASURE OF INDEPENDENCE.

8. IN THIS BROAD CONTEXT, THE UN HAD SIGNIFICANT FUNCTIONS TO PERFORM. IT COULD ACT, AS IN THE CASE OF HUNGARY, TO FOCUS ATTENTION ON COMMUNIST MISDEEDS. SECONDLY, IT COULD PROVIDE A PLACE WHERE TENSIONS WITHIN THE FREE WORLD MIGHT BE REDUCED. MATTHEWS REFERRED PARTICULARLY TO THE PRESENCE OF AN AFRO-ASIAN "BLOC". WHILE ON COLONIAL ISSUES THIS GROUP

000445

PAGE THREE 2092

OF STATES TENDED TO VOTE AS A UNIT, ON BROADER ISSUES THERE WAS LESS SOLIDARITY THAN WAS FREQUENTLY THOUGHT. IN THE STATE DEPT VIEW, IT WAS WISER NOT TO ASSUME THE RIGIDITY OF THE AFRO-ASIAN BLOC, SINCE THIS ASSUMPTION WAS NOT WHOLLY JUSTIFIED, AND SINCE ACTING ON THIS ASSUMPTION WOULD ONLY SERVE TO STRENGTHEN THE BLOC TENDENCY. THIS WAS ONE REASON, AMONG OTHERS, WHY THE STATE DEPT WAS SKEPTICAL OF TOO CLOSE OR TOO OVERT NATO COOPERATION IN UN MATTERS. FINALLY, THE UN WAS A FORUM IN WHICH LIMITED NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. THE STATE DEPT WAS GIVING SOME ATTENTION TO ITS POLICY ON EXCHANGES WITH THE USSR, RECOGNIZING THAT THIS WAS A DIFFICULT PROBLEM, SINCE EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS HAD ALWAYS TO BE MEASURED AGAINST SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS. EXCHANGE ARRANGEMENTS WHICH WOULD WORK FOR COUNTRIES LIKE THE USA AND CANADA MIGHT CAUSE REAL DIFFICULTIES IN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD. 9. IN REPLYING BRIEFLY TO THIS GENERAL OUTLINE, THE UNDER SECRETARY REFERRED TO CANADA'S GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION BETWEEN THE TWO GREAT WORLD POWERS, AND TO THE FACT THAT WE WERE INEVITABLY AFFECTED BY THE POLICIES OF OUR POWERFUL NEIGHBOURS. A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF THE USA INVOLVED CANADA AT ONCE, AND WE THEREFORE WELCOMED THIS OUTLINE AND WOULD COMMENT ON THE SITUATION ON PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AND IN PARTICULAR AREAS IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION

ROBERTSON

File Copy - 50219-AE-40

FILE COPY

COP 10.4...OF.8...

DS44/352  
FM WASHDC OCT1/57 TOPSEC  
TO EXTERNAL 2091 PRIORITY

FOR UNDER SECRETARY

REF OUR TEL 1989 SEP19

MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION

THE MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION WERE HELD YESTERDAY IN THE STATE DEPT UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE UNDER SECRETARY, MR CHRISTIAN HERTER. THE MEMBERS OF THE USA GROUP WERE AS INDICATED IN MY REF TEL. THE MEETINGS WERE CONDUCTED ON AN INFORMAL AND FRIENDLY BASIS, BUT WERE INTERSPERSED WITH MORE FORMAL BRIEFINGS BY REPS OF THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE GROUP OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF. THESE SERVICE BRIEFINGS PRODUCED A MASS OF DETAILED FACTS AND FIGURES WHICH CAN BEST BE REPORTED WHEN, AS WE HOPE, WE CAN ARRANGE WITH THE STATE DEPT TO RECEIVE COPIES OF THE PAPERS ON WHICH THEY WERE BASED. IT MAY BE USEFUL, HOWEVER, IN ADVANCE OF THE MORE COMPLETE RECORD WHICH WE ARE PLANNING TO SEND YOU, TO FORWARD A SERIES OF SUMMARY REPORTS OF THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, AND THESE SUMMARY REPORTS ARE CONTAINED IN AN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING GROUP OF TELS.

2. AFTER A WARM WELCOME BY MR HERTER, THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE DISCUSSED, ROUGHLY IN THE ORDER GIVEN:

- I) WELCOME BY UNDER SECRETARY.
- II) THE EXTERNAL MILITARY THREAT TO NORTHAMERICA
- III) DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCE
- IV) OUTLINE OF USA OBJECTIVES IN WORLD'S MAJOR DIPLOMATIC SITUATIONS, INCLUDING DISARMAMENT
- V) THE FAREASTERN SITUATION
- VI) MIDEAST SITUATION
- VII) NATO MATTERS.

3. WHILE WE HAD HOPED THAT THE MEETING COULD PASS OFF UNNOTICED BY THE PRESS, AS HAS GENERALLY BEEN THE CASE IN PREVIOUS MEETINGS OF THIS KIND, YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM OUR TEL 2074 SEP30 THAT, ARISING INADVERTENTLY OUT OF THE STATE DEPT'S PRACTICE OF PUBLICIZING THE UNDER SECRETARY'S CALENDAR, IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE DEPARTMENTAL "SPOKESMAN" TO CONFIRM THAT THE MEETING HAD BEEN HELD AND THAT IT WAS ONE OF A PERIODIC SERIES OF REVIEWS OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS THAT THE TWO

PAGE TWO 2091

NEIGHBOURING GOVTS HELD ON AN OFFICIAL LEVEL FROM TIME TO TIME.

4.WE ARE ADDRESSING THIS AND SUCCEEDING MSGS TO THE UNDER SECRETARY,  
SO THAT MR LEGER MAY HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY OF REVIEWING THESE MSGS  
BEFORE THEY ARE GIVEN A WIDER DISTRIBUTION.IN PARTICULAR,IT  
WOULD BE HELPFUL IF GENERAL FOULKES COULD LOOK AT THE MSG DEALING  
WITH CONTINENTAL DEFENCE BEFORE IT IS DISTRIBUTED FURTHER

ROBERTSON

Date **OCT 1 1957** Publication **NEW YORK TIMES**

50219-AE-40	
43	

**U. S.-Canadian Talks Open**  
WASHINGTON, Sept. 30 (AP) — Canada and the United States opened today high-level foreign policy and military talks. Christian A. Herter Jr., Under-Secretary of State, and Gen. Nathan B. Twining, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, headed the United States delegation. Representing Canada were Gen. Charles Foulkes, chairman of Canada's joint chief of staff, Jules Leger, Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Norman Robertson, Ambassador to the United States.

D-1	
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	HL
7	
8	
9	
10	

*b. K. for your file  
P. Clipping  
March 14/58 /Sc.*



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

*File 50219-AE-40*  
*DR*

Subject *U.S.-R. Defence*

Date **OCT 1 1957**

Publication

**MONTREAL GAZETTE**

50219-AE-40  
43

*D. L. 11/5/57*

*D. K. for file*

*Press Clipping*

*502*

*Nov. 28/57*

**Friendly Talks**

WASHINGTON, Canadian and United States officials held a conference at the State Department on political and military matters. Representing Canada were Gen. Charles Foulkes, chairman of the Canadian Joint Chiefs-of-Staff; Jules Leger, Under-secretary of State for External Affairs, and Norman Robertson, the Canadian Ambassador.

D-1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

OCT 1 1957

Refer.  
ccos  
Secy to Lab. *done*  
file *done*  
sm. *done*  
Oct. 2/57

50219-A E-40
581 50

24

DS16/351  
FM WASHDC SEP30/57 UNCLAS  
TO EXTERNAL 2074 OPIMMEDIATE

AP TODAY CARRIED THE FOLLOWING STORY: BEGINS:

CANADA AND THE USA TODAY OPENED A ROUND OF HIGH LEVEL FOREIGN POLICY AND MILITARY TALKS.

UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTIAN HERTER JR AND GEN NATHAN B TWINING, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, HEADED THE AMERICAN DELEGATION AT THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH GOT UNDERWAY AT THE STATE DEPT.

CANADA'S CHAIRMAN OF ITS JOINT CHIEFS, GEN CHARLES FOULKES, AS WELL AS THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, JULES LEGER, REPRESENTED CANADA, ALONG WITH CANADIAN AMBASSADOR NORMAN ROBERTSON.

THE STATE DEPT SAID THE MEETING WAS ONE OF THE PERIODIC TOP LEVEL REVIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS THAT THE TWO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES SCHEDULE.

ENDS.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
MEMORANDUM

*File*  
*gm*  
TO: Defence Liaison (1) Division  
Attention: Mr. ~~McGardie~~ *gm*  
(through Mr. Watkins) *gm*

FROM: Middle Eastern Division

REFERENCE: Our memorandum of September 26

SUBJECT: Notes for Meeting of  
Consultation (September 1957) with U.S. Authorities

Security CONFIDENTIAL

Date September 27, 1957

File No.

50219-AE-40

43

✓

Attached are five copies of a brief on  
Arab-Israeli tensions, in connection with Item V of the  
tentative agenda for the Meeting of Consultation to  
be held on September 30, 1957.

*R. Campbell*  
Middle Eastern Division

D.L. (1) J.J. McCardie/RB

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: .....The Under-Secretary.....

Security .....TOP SECRET.....

Date .....September 27, 1957.....

FROM: .....Defence Liaison (1) Division.....

File No.

50219-AE-40

REFERENCE: .....**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**.....

**REDUIT A SECRET**

SUBJECT: .....Meeting of Consultation with United States Authorities.....

A Brief covering topics to be discussed at the Washington meeting has been prepared for you. There are a number of points, however, concerning the substance of the discussion which it seemed more convenient to treat in a separate memorandum for your use. These points of substance concern item IV of the Agenda, i.e., Continental Defence.

2. From what General Foulkes said at a meeting with us on September 20, he plans to make the following major points in his statement under this agenda item. He will sound a warning on the budgetary limitations which will affect further Canadian contributions to the air defences of North America, and suggest that these limitations will demand a careful screening of marginal improvements in our radar defences no matter how desirable they may be. He will suggest that perhaps between now and 1962 marginal improvements in the radar defences should be deferred and the extra risks involved accepted.

3. His second major argument will concern the missile threat. He will express the hope that it will be possible for interested officials on the two sides of the border to reach an agreed concept along the following lines; that the main threat to North America still lies in the manned bomber; that it will be years before the main element of the Soviet threat will be the intercontinental ballistic missile; and that both governments do all they can to bring this idea home to public opinion.

4. The third point which General Foulkes is likely

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

to make will be that anti-missile defence should be treated as part of the air defence problem and that there should be one authority planning for defence against the manned bomber and missiles whether from land, sea or air. There has been some suggestion that on the United States side an authority distinct from Air Defence Command might be set up to plan and control defences against missile attack.

5. We would see no reason to differ with these major arguments in the National Defence brief. Undoubtedly, General Foulkes, however, will deal in some fashion with the establishment of NORAD, i.e., the new integrated command covering the operations of the air defence forces of Canada and the United States. We have mentioned in the Brief which has been prepared for you on this subject, a number of points which you might wish to make in this context at the Meeting of Consultation. Since you may, however, be showing your Brief to General Foulkes, we have not in it, dealt with a number of controversial points which General Foulkes raised in his meeting with us on September 20. We thought, however, that you should be aware of the points he made and our analysis of them for use in any discussion which you may have with him prior to your meeting with the Americans.

6. General Foulkes indicated at our meeting on September 20 that he still remained unconvinced of the need for an intergovernmental agreement on the setting up of NORAD. He said that the command was quite within the NATO concept and he saw no difficulty in explaining this to Parliament or to the public. The principle of putting national troops under the command of a supreme commander in NATO had been accepted for years and NORAD was a NATO command. He said that the setting up of commands in Europe, e.g. SACEUR, had not required an intergovernmental agreement. When External Affairs officers present argued that there was a real distinction between placing Canadian troops in Europe under foreign command and placing Canadian forces in Canada under foreign command, General Foulkes repeated his argument that all of this was within the NATO concept. He referred in passing to the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group as, in essence, a NATO command.

7. There are, of course, kernels of truth in both of General Foulkes' arguments. It might be difficult to point to a single piece of paper which could be called an intergovernmental agreement governing SACEUR's responsibilities;


... 3000454

- 3 -

TOP SECRET

however SACEUR's command was set up under the terms of the NATO Treaty and each year his forces and his plans are examined by the ministers of the countries which have placed forces under his command. In practice, therefore, everything he does stems directly from intergovernmental agreement reached in ministerial council.

8. It is true as well, that NORAD is "within the NATO concept". It is equally true that the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group is listed in NATO charts in the same category as the major commands of NATO. It is not, however, and never has been, a command proper. As was pointed out to General Foulkes at our meeting on September 20, the Commander-in-Chief, NORAD is not responsible to the Standing Group and indeed nobody desired that he should be. The logic of General Foulkes' argument surely is that if there were difficulty in explaining the creation of NORAD to Parliament, the Government should contend that it was, in truth, a NATO command. An informed questioner, however, could easily embarrass the Government on this point. The NATO Council and the Standing Group were merely informed, for example, that NORAD was being established on the day that it was established. To the best of our knowledge, there is no desire at this point to create in North America a truly NATO command which would leave the way open for the service in it of senior officers of our NATO allies. We doubt that the United States would be willing to accept any interpretation of NORAD which would do more than place it "within the NATO concept". In short, we do not think that use of the NATO argument in Parliament would add anything useful to a discussion of the question of whether or not there should have been an intergovernmental agreement between Canada and the United States on the establishment of NORAD.

  
Defence Liaison (1) Division



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

D.L.(1)/J.J. McCardle/RB

67 to ccos #6  
see #7

OUTGOING MESSAGE

FILE COPY

FM: EXTERNAL, OTTAWA

TO: EMBASSY, WASHINGTON

INFO:

DATE	FILE	SECURITY
Sept. 26 1957	50219-AE-40	TOPSECRET
	43.	50
	NUMBER	PRECEDENCE
	DL-819	PRIORITY
		COMCENTRE USE ONLY

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
RESULT A SECRET

Ref.: OUR TELEGRAMS DL803 AND DL804 OF SEPTEMBER 23, 1957

Subject: MEETING OF CONSULTATION

YOU ARE AWARE FROM CONVERSATIONS WITH THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF CERTAIN CHANGES IN PLANS FOR THE MEETING OF CONSULTATION ON SEPTEMBER 30. THIS TELEGRAM IS MEANT TO CONFIRM THOSE CHANGES.

2. MR. BRYCE WILL NOT BE GOING TO WASHINGTON BECAUSE HE MUST ATTEND THE MONT TREMBLANT CONFERENCE. THE UNDER-SECRETARY AND GENERAL FOULKES WILL GO TO WASHINGTON BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT LEAVING OTTAWA AT 2 P.M. SATURDAY SEPTEMBER 28. THEY WOULD EXPECT TO ARRIVE IN WASHINGTON BETWEEN 5 - 5:30 P.M. AND LAND AT THE MATS TERMINAL. WE ASSUME THAT ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE TO PROVIDE TRANSPORT FROM THE TERMINAL.

3. AS INDICATED IN OUR TELEGRAMS UNDER REFERENCE, WE GAVE OUR SUGGESTED AGENDA TO THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY HERE ON SEPTEMBER 23. WE HAVE NOT HEARD FURTHER FROM THE EMBASSY AND ASSUME THAT THE AGENDA SET OUT IN TELEGRAM DL804 IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES SIDE.

... 2

LOCAL  
DISTRIBUTION

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff  
Secretary to the Cabinet  
J.J. McCardle (5)

#6  
#7  
#8, 9, 10, 11, 12.

done PR.

ORIGINATOR

DIVISION

PHONE

APPROVED BY

SIG.....  
NAME: P. Tremblay

D.L.(1)

2-3402

SIG.....  
NAME.....

- 2 -

YOU WILL NOTE THAT THERE HAS BEEN ONE CHANGE IN THE PLACEMENT OF TOPICS, I.E., THAT DISARMAMENT HAS, ON THE SUBBESTION OF THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY, BEEN MOVED UNDER ITEM II OF THE AGENDA RATHER THAN III.

4. IT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED BY THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF, THAT THE SUBJECTS WITH A MORE PARTICULARLY MILITARY CAST MIGHT BE DISCUSSED EITHER IN THE MORNING OR IN THE AFTERNOON. WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THIS SUGGESTION IF IT IS SATISFACTORY TO THE UNITED STATES SIDE. THAT WOULD MEAN THAT ARRANGEMENTS MIGHT BE MADE TO DISCUSS ITEMS III, IV AND PERHAPS VII IN WHICHEVER HALF OF THE DAY IS MOST CONVENIENT TO THE UNITED STATES SIDE. WOULD YOU DISCUSS THIS SUGGESTION WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND MAKE WHATEVER ARRANGEMENTS SEEM MOST SATISFACTORY. THERE IS NO NEED TO INFORM US SINCE THE INFORMATION CAN BE PASSED DIRECTLY TO THE UNDER-SECRETARY OVER THE WEEKEND IN WASHINGTON.

5. THE LENGTHY RECORDS KEPT OF PREVIOUS MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION, E.G., THAT FORWARDED WITH YOUR DESPATCH NO. 2047 OF DECEMBER 1, 1955, HAVE BEEN MOST USEFUL HERE. WE WOULD HOPE THEREFORE THAT THE OFFICER FROM THE EMBASSY RESPONSIBLE FOR KEEPING THE RECORD OF THIS FORTHCOMING MEETING WOULD FIND IT POSSIBLE TO PROVIDE US WITH A DETAILED REPORT SIMILAR TO EARLIER REPORTS ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

## DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

## MEMORANDUM

TO: DEFENCE LIAISON (1) DIVISION.....

Security TOP.. SECRET.....

Date .September.26,1957.....

FROM: DEFENCE LIAISON (2) DIVISION.....

File No.

50219-AE-40

REFERENCE: .....

43

✓

SUBJECT:.. Briefs for Meeting of Consultation.....

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

I am enclosing six copies of the following briefs for the Meeting of Consultation in Washington.

- (1) A Survey of the Threat to North America from Soviet Attack During the Next Five Years.

This survey is based on agreed Canadian intelligence.

- (2) Soviet Likely Courses of Action During the Next Five Years.

This brief is based on a JIC paper on this subject dated March 1957, six copies of which are enclosed for background purposes.

- (3) Chinese Communist Likely Courses of Action During the Next Five Years.

This brief is based on a draft JIC paper which is now before the JIC for approval. Six copies of the draft paper are enclosed for background purposes.

- (4) Recent Activities in Soviet Foreign and Defence Policy.

This brief is based on a recent meeting on this subject which was held between members of Defence Liaison (2), European, Middle Eastern and United Nations Divisions.

*European have not yet agreed with this minute, although everyone, but Webster agrees that is what was said. You may wish to speak to Mr. Pick, before sending on.*

DEFENCE LIAISON (2) DIVISION

CIRCULATION

The Threat to North America from Soviet Attack  
During the Next Five Years

Nuclear Attacks

1. The Soviet Union has a substantial and rapidly growing stockpile of fissionable material, and the capability of producing weapons in the range from a kiloton or less to as much as 20 megatons.
2. For attacking North America with these weapons, the Soviet Union will have the capability of various methods of delivery. These will include:
  - (a) Manned aircraft (medium and heavy bombers), operating either as bombers or towards the end of the period as launching platforms for air-to-surface missiles;
  - (b) Intercontinental ballistic missiles (towards the end of the period) and short or medium range missiles (for use against Alaska and the Aleutians);
  - (c) Missiles launched from submarines operating offshore.
3. The nature of the attack will change as the development of missiles advances, and its scale will depend upon a variety of factors, including base capacity, crew proficiency, and the Soviet assessment of North American defensive capabilities. In particular, at present, it is difficult to assess future Soviet long-range aircraft production programmes in relation to the programmes for the production of inter-continental and other missiles.
4. The JIC is satisfied that the Soviet Union successfully carried out two firings on August 21 and September 7 of an inter-continental ballistic test vehicle. This does not mean that the Soviet Union has a prototype of an inter-continental ballistic missile but rather that an important step has been taken in developing the ICBM.
5. However, present estimates suggest that the number of heavy bombers that could be launched against North America will vary from about 200 in mid-1958 to over 600 in mid-1961, of which about 150 and 500 aircraft respectively could arrive in target areas, not considering combat losses. Those missions directed at the most distant targets would, if launched from home bases have to employ range-extension techniques.

6. Current estimates suggest that the following numbers of submarines could be available for missile-launching and other operations off the coasts of North America: Some of the submarines will be nuclear-powered towards the end of the period.

Mid-1958:	Atlantic coast:	10	Pacific coast:	7
Mid-1961:	Atlantic coast:	28	Pacific coast:	15

Other Operations

7. A threat exists of airborne operations against lightly-defended targets in Alaska and the Aleutians, and of small-scale raids against targets in Northern Canada such as bridges on the Alaska Highway.
8. The Soviet Union could launch amphibious operations against the Aleutians or commando-type raids from submarines against Canada and the continental United States.
9. Mining and torpedo attacks could be undertaken in North American coastal waters.
10. Soviet-organized attempts at sabotage against selected targets cannot be ruled out, and a programme of subversion can be expected.

TOP SECRET

Soviet Likely Courses of Action During the Next Five Years

1. Soviet objectives for the next five years will be:
  - a. to increase the unity, economic strength and military capabilities of the Soviet Bloc;
  - b. to disrupt NATO, divide the West and undermine the leadership of the United States throughout the world;
  - c. to disrupt the Baghdad Pact, and SEATO, to weaken Western influence and to extend their own particularly in the Middle East, Asia and Africa;
  - d. whenever disruption occurs, to force the withdrawal of Western, particularly U.S., power from forward positions around the Soviet periphery.
2. Of the various methods available for the pursuit of these objectives, it is clear that all rests in the last analysis, on the formidable power of the Soviet Armed Forces. It is probable that Soviet leaders would consider the overt use of armed force as being inconsistent with their overall policy of "peaceful coexistence". In keeping with this general policy it is probable that the Soviet Government will continue to employ the more flexible methods they have adopted since their accession to power, even though they might be forced, as in Hungary, to take measures that did not square with their overall policy.
3. In the Satellites it is probable that the Soviet Union will attempt to follow a policy between the two extremes of a return to Stalinist tactics of control and the development of independent national communist regimes.
4. In Europe the Soviet Union will probably attempt to continue its efforts to lessen international tension, divert attention from Hungary and create an atmosphere of peace in which the maintenance of Western defence efforts would become untenable. Soviet policy toward Germany, which they probably regard as the key stone of their European policy, will be designed to resist pressures for reunification in the hope that time will see the emergence of a new Government in West Germany - one more willing to bargain Western alignment against reunification on Soviet terms. The recent election results in West Germany are unlikely to bring about any fundamental change in Soviet policy towards Germany.
5. The Soviet Government is probably more aware than in the past of the dangers of becoming involved in hostilities in the Middle East. Even so Soviet leaders probably believe that they can avoid any conflict that may develop in the area. It is probable therefore that Soviet policy will continue to be one of undermining Western influence by supporting Arab nationalism, encouraging neutralism and selling arms to susceptible Arab countries.
6. It is probable that the Soviet Government will continue to follow in the Far East a policy designed to appeal to anti-colonial and neutralist sentiment. The main aim of this policy will be to maintain a strong measure of Soviet influence and the main targets of this policy will be India and Japan.
7. Soviet policy toward the United States during this period will be based on an appreciation that the Soviet Union can not risk a frontal attack against U.S. power. The Soviet Government therefore will probably limit its policy to a campaign to weaken U.S. influence and isolate her from her allies.

Internal Developments

8. For a fuller discussion of general internal developments within the Soviet Bloc, see Paras 16 - 21 and 32 - 41 of the enclosed JIC paper.

E.R. Rettig

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: Defence Liaison (1) Division.....

Security ..... **SECRET**

Date ..... **September 26, 1957**

FROM: Middle Eastern Division.....

File No.

**50219-AE-40**

REFERENCE: .....

**43**

**c**

Notes for Meeting of Consultation (September, 1957) with  
**SUBJECT: United States Authorities.**

Attached are five copies each of two briefs  
on the subject matter of Item V of the tentative  
agenda for the Meeting of Consultation to be held  
on September 30, 1957.

2. The attached texts have been cleared with  
Mr. Watkins.

3. A third brief, dealing with Arab-Israeli  
tensions in greater detail, will follow.

*For Campbell*  
Middle Eastern Division

DUPLICATE

COPY NO. 6 OF 8  
DS40/344  
FM WASHDC SEP25/57 TOPSEC  
TO EXTERNAL 2036 PRIORITY

REF YOUR TEL DL804 SEP23

PROPOSED MEETING OF CONSULTATION

WE UNDERSTAND FROM NUGENT THAT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON THE AGENDA, VERY LARGELY ON THE BASIS OF THE OUTLINE GIVEN IN YOUR REF TEL, SUBJECT TO POSSIBLE REVISION OF THE ORDER OF ITEMS TO BE DISCUSSED. THE PRESENT INTENTION IS TO TAKE UP CONTINENTAL DEFENCE IN THE MORNING SESSION, FOLLOWING GOVERNOR HERTER'S MSG OF WELCOME. THIS WE UNDERSTAND IS IN LINE WITH GENERAL FOULKES' PREFERENCE. WE GATHER THAT THE AMERICANS ARE NOT CONTEMPLATING FORMAL BRIEFS OR PRESENTATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE DISCUSSION UNDER "NATO MATTERS", OR ON THE DISCUSSION OF THE MIDEASTERN SITUATION, BUT HOPE IN THESE TWO AREAS TO EMBARK DIRECTLY INTO AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. 2. THE LIST OF USA REPS IS THE SAME AS THAT GIVEN IN PARA 6 OF OUR TEL 1989 SEP19, WITH THE ADDITION OF LT. GEN. BYERS, WHO IS MILITARY ADVISER TO MR SPRAGUE. THE MEETINGS WILL BE HELD BEGINNING AT 9.30AM IN ROOM 5100 OF THE STATE DEPT, LUNCH WILL BE SERVED IN THE SECRETARY'S DINING ROOM, AND THE MEETINGS WILL CONTINUE AFTER LUNCH FOR THE PERIOD REQUIRED

ROBERTSON

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
EXEMPT A SECRET



Far Eastern Division/C.J. Small/pp

CONFIDENTIAL  
September 25, 1957

50219-AB-40

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

Subject: Discussions with United States Officials: 43 ✓  
United States China Policy.

United States China Policy

United States China policy has not changed fundamentally in the past seven years, but recent events have led to speculation that the Eisenhower Administration may be becoming more flexible and that changes are not far distant. In particular, the State Department's partial relaxation of the ban on travel to China to allow a group of reporters to go there, has lent some weight to such views.

2. Since August, 1956, when the Peking authorities invited a group of American reporters to visit China and the State Department banned their journey, the American press has conducted a vigorous campaign for more freedom to obtain news from Communist China. West Coast trade and shipping interests this year have expressed growing doubts about United States China policy. Criticism has mounted in commercial, academic and intellectual circles, and the part of the general public that has views on the subject appears to be moving faster than the Administration in its thinking on Communist China.

3. The most recent authoritative statement on U.S. China policy was made by Mr. Dulles in his June 28 speech in San Francisco. At that time he reiterated that the United States would not recognize the People's Republic of China, would oppose its representation in the United Nations, and would continue to avoid commercial and cultural relations with it. In support of his stand he re-stated the familiar arguments that recognition must be opposed because the Peking regime does not meet even the tests which were met by the Soviet Union prior to its recognition in 1933; recognition would deprive overseas Chinese of a "free China" to which to turn, would discourage Mainland Chinese who oppose the

... 2

communists, would, in effect, be a desertion of the Nationalists, and would undermine Asian resistance to communism. He opposed United Nations representation on the grounds that the People's Republic of China had promoted or participated in five foreign or civil wars in the past seven years, had openly defied the United Nations on the reunification of Korea, and had proclaimed its intention to recover Taiwan by forceful means if necessary. He rejected trade relations with China because all such trade was designed to develop as rapidly as possible a formidable military establishment and a heavy industry to support it. Cultural relations with communist China were of dubious value because any example set by the United States would make it difficult for China's close neighbours not to follow and such exchanges would add to the danger confronting these nations.

4. The fact that Mr. Dulles made the speech at all and that he chose the West Coast commercial and shipping centre of San Francisco for its delivery, is evidence of the growing pressure on the Administration at that time for a change in its China policy. Press criticism which had been mounting in any case, increased again after the May 24 anti-American riots in Taipeh. On May 30, the United Kingdom announced its intention to abolish the China trade differential and to henceforth conduct its trade with Communist China in the same way as with the Soviet bloc. This increased the public debate in the United States on China policy and General Eisenhower's remarks at his June 5th press conference indicating that he would not look with any great disfavour on American trade with China, strengthened the opponents of the Administration in this field.

5. Mr. Dulles' speech in San Francisco did not silence his critics and on August 22 the State Department announced that 24 news gathering organizations would be permitted to send one reporter each to communist China for a trial period of seven months. Our Embassy in Washington has reported that a State Department official who deals with Chinese affairs, has admitted privately that the real reason for this change in policy was simply pressure from the press. The same official categorically denied that this action presaged any further relaxation of the ban on travel to China. He also

.... 3

admitted that the State Department would not be disappointed if, in view of Peking's demand for a reciprocal exchange of newsmen, no American correspondents set foot in China. It appears that the State Department's objective in allowing reporters to travel to China and in refusing to grant reciprocal entry privileges to Chinese correspondents, was to ease the pressure from the press on the Administration and to do it in such a way as to prevent the Chinese Communists from gaining any advantage; if the method adopted did not result in any American newsmen going to China, so much the better. More recently the State Department has announced that individual requests by Chinese correspondents to enter the United States will be considered on their merits. In addition, it has said that Communist Chinese athletes and officials will be granted entry to the United States for the 1960 Winter Olympics.

6. Although these views suggest that United States China policy may be slightly less rigid than formerly, there is no reason to believe that the policy outlined by Mr. Dulles on June 28 has undergone, or will undergo in the near future, any fundamental change. The underlying principle remains to do nothing to strengthen the Peking regime and to undertake everything that might weaken it. The ultimate United States aim appears to be the fusion of the regimes on the mainland and on Taiwan in some undefined form which would represent a truly Chinese Government and which could be given the support of the United States. As an interim solution a "two Chinas" policy might well win the favour of the Administration and a large segment of the United States public.

#### Communist Chinese Intentions

7. Communist China is heavily engaged in its own domestic problems of socialization of agriculture and commerce, raising production in industry and agriculture, power development, road and railway reconstruction, housing and education. For this and other reasons it is unlikely to engage in war-like excursions beyond its borders in the near future. This does not mean that it will abandon its claims to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao and several border areas in South-East Asia. It does suggest that Communist China will be content for the time being to continue by all means other than war to undermine Western influence in Asia and to extend its own influence there and in other regions that offer prospects of high returns for effort expended.

### Suggested Range of Discussions

8. Because there appears to be no prospect of any basic change occurring in United States China policy in the near future, there would seem to be little to be gained from prodding the Americans on this subject in the coming talks. Nevertheless, an informal discussion might reveal more of the trend in United States official thinking on Communist China and particularly on the future of Taiwan. Recent Intelligence reports suggest that military morale is continuing to fall in Taiwan because of deteriorating living conditions. Furthermore, the policy of rejuvenating the Nationalist forces by recruiting Formosans will unquestionably weaken their will to attack the mainland. Finally, it is doubtful whether any senior Chinese Nationalist military or governmental authorities believe that a successful attack on the mainland could be launched from Taiwan without U.S. aid. In these circumstances it would be reasonable to ask the Americans for their views on the future of Taiwan and to seek clarification of their ideas on the fate of both the Peking and Taiwan regimes.

9. During the previous United States-Canadian discussions in 1955 it was suggested that the two governments might benefit from an exchange of papers on China policy. Some preliminary work was done on Canadian papers but ministerial approval was never obtained for them and no papers were received from the United States. Because of the recent change in the Canadian Government we have not sought approval for an exchange of papers on China policy with the Americans. Furthermore, we do not think it advisable to do so at the present time because we are fully aware of basic United States policy and we would not wish to commit the Canadian Government in writing on any policy that might be subject to alteration at a later date.

*AA Measies*  
for J.W. Holmes

CONFIDENTIAL

*File - 50219-AE-40*  
*Sam*

September 24, 1957

50219-AE-40	
43	✓

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY

Subject: DISCUSSIONS WITH UNITED STATES OFFICIALS: INDOCHINA

At the moment, the situation in Indochina appears to be more or less static. There are no pressing problems which threaten the peace and stability of the area. However, there are certain general problems about which we feel some concern and some signs that the present calm may not last indefinitely. There are, therefore, a few topics which might be usefully discussed with United States officials.

2. The General Position of the International Commissions.

Political equilibrium seems to have been generally achieved in the area. In Vietnam particularly, the Commission acts as a symbol of the armistice arrangements and is a stabilizing factor. It keeps a close watch on the neutral Demilitarized Zone between North and South, and provides some insurance against a massive build-up of the military potential of the North. During the past three years the Commission has come to be accepted by the Communists as one of the factors which affect their plans in the area, and although its ultimate strength probably is not great, we believe that it does act as a sanction against any drastic action by the Communists. The Commission in Laos performs roughly the same functions.

3. However, we consider that a substantial reduction in the scale of operations of the Commissions should be possible without affecting adversely the stability of the area. The supervision of the neutral Demilitarized Zone between North and South Vietnam is an important continuing responsibility of the International Commission. In addition, the Commission at present deploys 14 fixed teams along the borders of

..... 2

24.9.64 (us)

000467

Vietnam. Their primary function now is to control the entry and exit of military personnel and equipment, and we are pressing the argument that ports of entry might be limited by agreement to two in the North and two in the South. The Indian Delegation appears to be sympathetic to a gradual reduction of Commission commitments and we hope that our continued pressure will produce results before too long. In Laos we should like to see the Southern teams eliminated, leaving the Commission to concentrate on the Northern part of Laos where the Royal Lao forces and the Pathet Lao confront each other. The Commission in Cambodia has been reduced, largely through our efforts, to a skeleton force, and we are continuing to press for its complete elimination.

4. We should be interested in learning whether the United States Government agrees generally with our assessment of the present role of the International Commissions in Indochina, and particularly whether it considers that present circumstances warrant a gradual but marked reduction in the scale of the Commissions. We should also be interested in any indications the United States has about the South Vietnamese attitude towards these questions.

5. Military Strength of South Vietnam. As you know, the Cease-Fire Agreement, Protocol 23 (which was signed between the French and the PAVN) and certain Commission procedures control the methods by which the parties in Vietnam may import and export military equipment and personnel. Within the Commission, we have tried for some time to ensure that South Vietnam would obtain the right to import quantities of equipment to replace not only those categories specifically laid down in Article 17 of the Agreement (destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cessation of hostilities), but also any material sent out of the country since the Cease-Fire. We have encountered difficulties in this, partly because the South Vietnamese have not followed the procedures which are required. Early in September, our Delegation in Saigon discussed the problem with U.S. Ambassador Durbrow and his staff, and they are cooperating in attempting to get the South Vietnamese to follow the procedures required by the Commission. Once the system itself is operating reasonably efficiently, many of the problems involved in the import of replacement equipment, and much of the criticism which has inevitably been directed at South Vietnam, should be eliminated.

This is one more example of the benefits which can derive from the understanding and close cooperation which has developed between the Canadian Delegation in Vietnam and the United States Embassy in Saigon.

6. We should be interested in hearing United States views on the present strength and capabilities of the South Vietnamese armed forces. It would also be interesting to have some idea of any plans the United States has about support of the armed forces. Do they intend to maintain their present scale of economic military aid, and do they envisage the necessity of providing the South Vietnamese with increased quantities of military equipment during the next few months?

7. Position of South Vietnam in Asia. We assume that the South Vietnamese are not pressing to be admitted as full members of SEATO. We still are of the opinion that the disadvantages of this step would outweigh the advantages. South Vietnam, at present, has the benefits of protection offered by SEATO, while avoiding both the complications which membership would involve in terms of the Cease-Fire Agreement, and the criticism which might come from those of her Asian neighbours who believe in neutralism.

8. There are indications that President Diem is attempting to build up South Vietnam's relationships with most of the countries of Southeast Asia, including the neutralists. It seems possible that he sees South Vietnam fulfilling the role of a bridge between countries such as Nationalist China and South Korea on the one hand, and India, Indonesia and Burma on the other. (The forthcoming Colombo Plan Conference in Saigon could give South Vietnam the opportunity to strengthen its relations and prestige in the whole area.) United States opinions about the future political role of South Vietnam would be interesting.

9. Laos. The governmental crisis in Laos has been passed and the present arrangement in which Katay and Phoui exercise considerable influence in a government headed by Souvanna Phouma appears to be a fairly stable one not too favourable to Communist interests. Presumably some action

.... 4



will be taken by the government to bring about a settlement with the Pathet Lao. There is always the possibility that one side or the other may become dissatisfied with the trend of negotiations, and we would be concerned if either party decided to resort to force in order to resolve the issue. The United States probably has made an estimate of the probable developments in Laos over the next few months and undoubtedly has some ideas about the plans of the Royal Government.

J. W. H.

J.W.H.

CC

D.L. (1)  
Saigon  
Hanoi  
Phnom Penh  
Vientiane  
New Delhi  
Paris  
London

D.L.(2) G.G.Crean/bel

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: MR. HOLMES

Security TOP SECRET

Date September 24, 1957

FROM: G.G. CREAN

File No.

50 219-AE-40

REFERENCE:

43

U

SUBJECT: Exchange of Information with the U.K. on the Results of Atomic Explosions

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**

**REQUIT A SECRET**

You asked me yesterday to check with DRB whether the following remark made by General Foulkes at last Friday's meeting was correct. When discussing the desirability of agreeing to granting the U.K. authorities over-flight privileges when aircraft were carrying nuclear components, General Foulkes said he thought the government had no reason to do so since the British gave us no information on the results of their atomic explosions.

2. Dr. Arnell of DRB tells me that this is not so. While the British did not give us any of the direct results of the explosion on Christmas Island, they did give us samples of debris. This is more than the U.S. ever do, since the most they did for us was to tell us when an explosion was to take place, thus permitting us to collect our own debris. They give us no immediate and direct results from their observations on the ground at the time of one of their own explosions. In addition, there are a substantial number of Canadians in Australia who take part in the British tests there. A joint Canadian-British team of analysts is about to be, or is now established in Canada to examine the debris from U.K. explosions.

3. In these circumstances General Foulkes' remarks seem to be groundless. You suggested you might wish to pass this information to Mr. Bryce. I think it would be preferable to say to Mr. Bryce that we have information that does not support General Foulkes' position and that we suggest that he ask Mr. Zimmerman direct.

CIRCULATION

Mr. Tremblay  
D.L.(1)

Ext. 326 (6/56)

Defence Liaison (2) Division

000471

25.9.12(55)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: .....The Under Secretary..... *For file*

Security .....TOP SECRET.....

Date September 24, 1957.....

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division.....

File No.

50219-AE-40

REFERENCE: .....**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**.....

**NOT A SECRET**

SUBJECT: Meeting of Consultation with United States Officials.....

--- There is attached for your signature if you concur, a memorandum for the Prime Minister concerning the Meeting of Consultation on September 30. It was suggested by Mr. Bryce at our meeting last Friday, that a memorandum outlining briefly the origin and purposes of the Meetings of Consultation should be prepared for the Prime Minister. There is attached to the memorandum a list of the topics to be discussed at the Meeting on September 30.

2. Arrangements for the Meeting seem well in hand. A military aircraft will be available for the trip leaving Ottawa at approximately 9 a.m. Sunday, September 29, and arriving in Washington at approximately 12:30 p.m. The aircraft will stand ready to bring the Canadian party back to Ottawa immediately after the Meeting on September 30.

3. Briefs are being prepared for your use by various divisions, and we hope to assemble them by September 26. General Foulkes has not made available copies of the brief he will have but perhaps arrangements could be made to exchange briefs in Washington when you meet with Mr. Robertson on September 29.

*James Marshall*  
Defence Liaison (1) Division

SEEN BY PRIME MINISTER

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

September 24, 1957

*File*

50219-AE-40	
43	✓

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Meeting of Consultation--  
Senior Canadian and United States Officials

A recent United States invitation extended through the United States Embassy in Ottawa to a Meeting of Consultation on September 30 in Washington has been accepted. I plan to attend the meeting myself. The Canadian Government will be represented in addition, by ~~The Secretary to the Cabinet~~, our Ambassador in Washington, and the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff. It will be a one-day meeting to which absolutely no publicity will be given.

2. This Meeting of Consultation stems from arrangements made in 1951. In January, 1951, a United States request was made for a "canopy" agreement, giving blanket approval for the deployment over Canadian territory of aircraft carrying atomic weapons subject only to routine flight clearances through USAF-RCAF channels. At the same time, the State Department offered to arrange special discussions with the Department of External Affairs on developments in the international situation which might give rise to the necessity for use of atomic weapons. The Canadian Government in reply accepted the offer of special discussions but indicated that the deployment of aircraft carrying atomic weapons over Canadian territory would have to be considered case by case on a government-to-government level. The substance of the agreement reached between the two governments was included in an Agreed Minute of June 14, 1951.

3. The understanding concerning Meetings of Consultation was set out in the Agreed Minute in the following terms, "Frequent consultations shall take place in Washington between the Canadian Ambassador and the Secretary of State and such other officers of the United States Government as may be designated by him. The purpose of these consultations is to exchange views on developments in the world situation which might necessitate the use of atomic

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

weapons. The consultations are informal and exploratory and are not to be regarded as involving or implying any commitment on the part of either government as to the action it will take or the position it will adopt in particular circumstances yet to arise. It would be the hope that by such consultations it will be possible to arrive at common appreciations of situations which may necessitate the use of atomic weapons."

4. The Meetings of Consultation were initiated in 1951 and have been held intermittently since that time. The United States carries on similar consultations with United Kingdom officials but has resisted suggestions that the discussions should be conducted on a tripartite basis on the grounds that any such arrangement might be misunderstood by the French.

5. Prior to 1954 the discussions tended to be generalized, touching on trouble spots all over the world. The March, 1954, Meeting of Consultation dealt with the subject of direct and immediate importance to Canada, i.e., continental defence. Since that time subjects of direct Canada-United States concern as well as more general subjects have been discussed at Meetings of Consultation. The last such Meeting of Consultation took place in December, 1955.

6. The Meetings, designed as they are to provide for an informal and free exchange of views without commitment among senior officials of both governments, have served a useful purpose. Officials concerned are all agreed that they should be continued. It has been the custom for these Meetings to draw up a very general agenda which will allow for wide-ranging discussion. There is attached for your information, the proposed agenda for the forthcoming Meeting of Consultation.

7. A record of the discussion is kept by both sides. There is no agreed record, but the notes compiled by the two sides are compared to prevent gross discrepancies.

*th.*

000474

## Proposed Agenda

### MEETING OF CONSULTATION

- I Welcome by Governor Herter, Under-Secretary of State.
- II Outline of United States objectives in world's major diplomatic situations. (Including disarmament.)
- III Soviet Intentions.
- IV Continental Defence.
- V The Middle Eastern situation.
- VI The Far Eastern situation.
- VII NATO matters.

### Elaboration of Topics

- I United States responsibility.
- II While the initial outline under this heading will be a United States responsibility, we would wish to discuss in general terms where disarmament negotiations go from this point.
- III Estimate of external threat to the continent.
- IV
  - (a) Developments in continental air defence against the background of budgetary considerations.
  - (b) Joint operational control of Canada-United States air defence forces.
  - (c) The development of long-range missiles and their effect on continental air defences.
  - (d) Consultation on alerts.
- V Consideration might be given to Soviet intervention in the Middle East; Arab-Israeli tensions; possible effects of these develop-

- 2 -

-ments on the position of UNEF.

- VI (a) Observations by Governor Herter concerning his Far Eastern tour.
- (b) The military aspects of the Far Eastern situation.
- (c) Recent developments in United States-China policy.
- (d) The Indo-China commissions.
- VII (a) Problems which would be raised by any proposal to stock-pile atomic weapons in NATO countries.
- (b) The desirability of increased political consultation in the NATO Council on all matters of concern to NATO governments.



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

JJMDIARY

FILE COPY

OUTGOING MESSAGE

	DATE	FILE		SECURITY	
	SEPT.23 1957	50219-AE-40		TOP SECRET	
		43	50		
FM: EXTERNAL, OTTAWA		NUMBER	PRECEDENCE	COMCENTRE USE ONLY	
		DL-804	PRIORITY		
TO: EMBASSY, WASHINGTON					
INFO:					

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
SECRET A SECRET

Ref.: OUR TELEGRAM DL-803 SEPTEMBER 23/57  
Subject: PROPOSED MEETING OF CONSULTATION

THE FOLLOWING IS OUR REDRAWING OF THE AGENDA FOR THE MEETINGS ON SEPTEMBER 30 WHICH WE WILL BE GIVING TO THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY TODAY. THE "ELABORATION OF TOPICS" SHOULD BE READ IN THE LIGHT OF OUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE.

- I Welcome by GOVERNOR HERTER, UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE.
- II OUTLINE OF UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES IN WORLD'S MAJOR DIPLOMATIC SITUATIONS. (Including disarmament)
- III SOVIET INTENTIONS. -
- IV CONTINENTAL DEFENCE. →
- V THE MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION. →
- VI THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION. -
- VII NATO MATTERS →

ELABORATION OF TOPICS

- I UNITED STATES RESPONSIBILITY.

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION	Secretary to Cabinet Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Mr.Crean(D.L.2)	Mr.Rogers (Far Eastern Div.) Mr.Ross Campbell (Middle Eastern) Mr.A.G.Campbell (United Nations) Mr. J.J. McCardle (5)	
ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG..... NAME. J.J. McCardle/RB.....	D.L.(1)	6-7921	SIG..... NAME. PAUL TREMBLAY.....

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

II WHILE THE INITIAL OUTLINE UNDER THIS HEADING WILL BE A UNITED STATES RESPONSIBILITY, WE WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS IN GENERAL TERMS WHERE DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS GO FROM THIS POINT.

III ESTIMATE OF EXTERNAL THREAT TO THE CONTINENT.

IV (A) DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCE AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS.

(B) JOINT OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CANADA-UNITED STATES AIR DEFENCE FORCES.

(C) THE DEVELOPMENT OF LONG-RANGE MISSILES AND THEIR EFFECT ON CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCES.

(D) CONSULTATION ON ALERTS.

V CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE GIVEN TO SOVIET INTERVENTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ARAB-ISRAELI TENSIONS; POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE POSITION OF UNEF.

VI (A) OBSERVATIONS BY GOVERNOR HERTER CONCERNING HIS FAR EASTERN TOUR.

(B) THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION.

(C) RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S.-CHINA POLICY.

(D) THE INDO-CHINA COMMISSIONS.

VII (A) PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD BE RAISED BY ANY PROPOSAL TO STOCK-PILE ATOMIC WEAPONS IN NATO COUNTRIES.

(B) THE DESIRABILITY OF INCREASED POLITICAL CONSULTATION IN THE NATO COUNCIL ON ALL MATTERS OF CONCERN TO NATO GOVERNMENTS.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

FM: EXTERNAL, OTTAWA

TO: EMBASSY, WASHINGTON

INFO:

DATE	FILE	SECURITY
SEP.23/ 1957	50219-AE-40	TOPSECRET
	43	50
NUMBER	PRECEDENCE	COMCENTRE USE ONLY
DL-803	PRIORITY	

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

Ref.: YOUR TELEGRAM 1989 SEPTEMBER 19  
Subject: PROPOSED MEETING OF CONSULTATION

WE SHALL INFORM THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY HERE TODAY OF OUR VIEWS ON A POSSIBLE AGENDA FOR THE PROPOSED MEETING OF CONSULTATION. WE SHALL INDICATE THAT SEPTEMBER 30 IS AN ACCEPTABLE DATE AND EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE MEETING CAN BE CALLED TO BEGIN EARLY IN THE DAY SO THAT THERE WILL BE A FULL DAY FOR DISCUSSION.

2. ALTHOUGH ARRANGEMENTS ARE NOT YET COMPLETED WE HOPE THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY, MR. BRYCE AND GENERAL FOULKES TO GO BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO WASHINGTON TO ARRIVE AROUND MIDDAY SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 29. WE SHALL LET YOU KNOW WHEN FINAL ARRANGEMENTS IN THIS RESPECT HAVE BEEN MADE.

3. WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO MARRY THE IDEAS FOR AN AGENDA PROPOSED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT (YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE) AND OUR OWN (OUR TELEGRAM DL-789 OF SEPTEMBER 17). INCIDENTALLY, THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY HERE GAVE US ON SEPTEMBER 20 A SIMILAR OUT-LINE TO THAT CONTAINED IN YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE. OUR RE-

LOCAL  
DISTRIBUTION

Secretary to Cabinet  
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff  
Mr. Crean (D.L.2)  
Mr. Rogers (Far Eastern Div.)  
Mr. Ross Campbell (Middle Eastern)  
Mr. A.G. Campbell (United Nations)  
Mr. J.J. McCardle (5)

ORIGINATOR

DIVISION

APPROVED BY

SIG.....  
NAME..... J.J. McCardle/RB

Defence Liaison(1)

6-7921

SIG..... PAUL TREMBLAY  
NAME.....

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

ARRANGEMENT OF THE AGENDA IS SET OUT IN A FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

4. THE ELABORATION OF THE TOPICS IS MAINLY FOR CANADIAN CONVENIENCE ALTHOUGH WE PLAN WHEN SPEAKING TO THE EMBASSY HERE ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO ITEMS III, IV AND VI, TO MENTION BRIEFLY THE KIND OF TOPICS WHICH WE WOULD EXPECT WOULD NATURALLY BE DISCUSSED UNDER THE MAIN AGENDA ITEMS. WE PLAN TO SPEAK IN SOMEWHAT MORE GENERAL TERMS CONCERNING ITEMS V AND VII. SO FAR AS ITEM V IS CONCERNED, WE DO NOT PLAN TO SAY ANYTHING TO THE EMBASSY ABOUT UNEF. WE PLAN TO BE DELIBERATELY VAGUE AS WELL CONCERNING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISCUSSION UNDER TOPIC VII I.E. NATO MATTERS. WE SHALL INDICATE THAT WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO HAVE AN INDICATION OF THE MOST RECENT UNITED STATES THINKING WITH RESPECT TO THE POSSIBLE STOCK-PILING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN NATO COUNTRIES. WE ARE NOT SO CERTAIN, HOWEVER, AS TO HOW THE MATTER OF THE "GRADUATED DETERRENT" AND ITS POSSIBLE EFFECT ON POLITICAL CONSULTATION WITHIN NATO CAN BEST BE HANDLED. WE KNOW THAT MR. DULLES HAS RECENTLY HAD SOMETHING TO SAY ABOUT THE MATTER OF THE "GRADUATED DETERRENT" IN HIS ARTICLE IN THE CURRENT ISSUE OF "FOREIGN AFFAIRS". WE DO NOT AS YET HAVE A COPY OF THAT ARTICLE, BUT EXPECT TO SEE IT IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO. IT MAY PERHAPS PROVIDE A SUITABLE PEG UPON WHICH TO HANG THE THOUGHTS WHICH WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS ON THIS GENERAL TOPIC. IN ANY CONVERSATIONS CONCERNING THE AGENDA WHICH YOU MIGHT HAVE WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT, YOU MIGHT BE GUIDED BY THE OBSERVATIONS SET OUT ABOVE.

5. BRIEFS WILL BE PREPARED IN THE DEPARTMENT FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY'S USE. YOU MIGHT, HOWEVER, WISH TO ASSEMBLE AS WELL FOR DISCUSSION ON SEPTEMBER 29 WITH THE UNDER-SECRETARY, THE LATEST INDICATIONS IT IS POSSIBLE TO GET OF UNITED STATES THINKING WITH RESPECT TO THE AGENDA ITEMS.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

FILE COPY

11

AE

FM: EXTERNAL, OTTAWA	DATE	FILE		SECURITY	
	SEPT. 23 1957	50219-AE-40		TOP SECR	
TO: EMBASSY, WASHINGTON	NUMBER	PRECEDENCE		COMCENTRE USE ONLY	
	DL-804	PRIORITY			
INFO:					

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REQUIR A SECRET

Ref.: OUR TELEGRAM DL-803 SEPTEMBER 23/57

Subject: PROPOSED MEETING OF CONSULTATION

THE FOLLOWING IS OUR REDRAWING OF THE AGENDA FOR THE MEETINGS ON SEPTEMBER 30 WHICH WE WILL BE GIVING TO THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY TODAY. THE "ELABORATION OF TOPICS" SHOULD BE READ IN THE LIGHT OF OUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE.

- I Welcome by GOVERNOR HERTER, UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE.
- II OUTLINE OF UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES IN WORLD'S MAJOR DIPLOMATIC SITUATIONS. (INCLUDING DISARMAMENT)
- III SOVIET INTENTIONS.
- IV CONTINENTAL DEFENCE.
- V THE MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION.
- VI THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION.
- VII NATO MATTERS

ELABORATION OF TOPICS

- I UNITED STATES RESPONSIBILITY.

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION	Secretary to Cabinet Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Mr. Crean (D.L.2)	Mr. Rogers (Far Eastern Div.) Mr. Ross Campbell (Middle Eastern) Mr. A.G. Campbell (United Nations) Mr. J.J. McCardle (5)
ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	APPROVED BY
SIG. J.J. McCardle/RB.	D.L.(1)	PAUL TREMBLAY
NAME	6-7921	NAME

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

- II WHILE THE INITIAL OUTLINE UNDER THIS HEADING WILL BE A UNITED STATES RESPONSIBILITY, WE WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS IN GENERAL TERMS WHERE DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS GO FROM THIS POINT.
- III ESTIMATE OF EXTERNAL THREAT TO THE CONTINENT.
- IV (A) DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCE AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF BUDGETARY CONSIDERATIONS.
- (B) JOINT OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF CANADA-UNITED STATES AIR DEFENCE FORCES.
- (C) THE DEVELOPMENT OF LONG-RANGE MISSILES AND THEIR EFFECT ON CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCES.
- (D) CONSULTATION ON ALERTS.
- V CONSIDERATION MIGHT BE GIVEN TO SOVIET INTERVENTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ARAB-ISRAELI TENSIONS; POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE POSITION OF UNEF.
- VI (A) OBSERVATIONS BY GOVERNOR HERTER CONCERNING HIS FAR EASTERN TOUR.
- (B) THE MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE FAR EASTERN SITUATION.
- (C) RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN U.S.-CHINA POLICY.
- (D) THE INDO-CHINA COMMISSIONS.
- VII (A) PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD BE RAISED BY ANY PROPOSAL TO STOCK-PILE ATOMIC WEAPONS IN NATO COUNTRIES.
- (B) THE DESIRABILITY OF INCREASED POLITICAL CONSULTATION IN THE NATO COUNCIL ON ALL MATTERS OF CONCERN TO NATO GOVERNMENTS.

## 11

TO: EMBASSY, WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET  
REVIEW A SECRET

000483



- 2 -

TOP SECRET

ARRANGEMENT OF THE AGENDA IS SET OUT IN A FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

4. THE ELABORATION OF THE TOPICS IS MAINLY FOR CANADIAN CONVENIENCE ALTHOUGH WE PLAN WHEN SPEAKING TO THE EMBASSY HERE, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO ITEMS III, IV AND VI, TO MENTION BRIEFLY THE KIND OF TOPICS WHICH WE WOULD EXPECT WOULD NATURALLY BE DISCUSSED UNDER THE MAIN AGENDA ITEMS. WE PLAN TO SPEAK IN SOMEWHAT MORE GENERAL TERMS CONCERNING ITEMS V AND VII. SO FAR AS ITEM V IS CONCERNED, WE DO NOT PLAN TO SAY ANYTHING TO THE EMBASSY ABOUT UNEF. WE PLAN TO BE DELIBERATELY VAGUE AS WELL CONCERNING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISCUSSION UNDER TOPIC VII I.E. NATO MATTERS. WE SHALL INDICATE THAT WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO HAVE AN INDICATION OF THE MOST RECENT UNITED STATES THINKING WITH RESPECT TO THE POSSIBLE STOCK-PILING OF ATOMIC WEAPONS IN NATO COUNTRIES. WE ARE NOT SO CERTAIN, HOWEVER, AS TO HOW THE MATTER OF THE "GRADUATED DETERRENT" AND ITS POSSIBLE EFFECT ON POLITICAL CONSULTATION WITHIN NATO CAN BEST BE HANDLED. WE KNOW THAT MR. DULLES HAS RECENTLY HAD SOMETHING TO SAY ABOUT THE MATTER OF THE "GRADUATED DETERRENT" IN HIS ARTICLE IN THE CURRENT ISSUE OF "FOREIGN AFFAIRS". WE DO NOT AS YET HAVE A COPY OF THAT ARTICLE, BUT EXPECT TO SEE IT IN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO. IT MAY PERHAPS PROVIDE A SUITABLE PEG UPON WHICH TO HANG THE THOUGHTS WHICH WE WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS ON THIS GENERAL TOPIC. IN ANY CONVERSATIONS CONCERNING THE AGENDA WHICH YOU MIGHT HAVE WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT, YOU MIGHT BE GUIDED BY THE OBSERVATIONS SET OUT ABOVE.

5. BRIEFS WILL BE PREPARED IN THE DEPARTMENT FOR THE UNDER-SECRETARY'S USE. YOU MIGHT, HOWEVER, WISH TO ASSEMBLE AS WELL FOR DISCUSSION ON SEPTEMBER 29 WITH THE UNDER-SECRETARY, THE LATEST INDICATIONS IT IS POSSIBLE TO GET OF UNITED STATES THINKING WITH RESPECT TO THE AGENDA <sup>subjects on</sup> ~~ITEMS~~.

*On file*  
*Sept 13 1957*  
TOP SECRET

POSSIBLE TOPICS FOR MEETING OF CONSULTATION

- I Continental Defence
- II Soviet Intentions
- III NATO Matters
- IV The Situation in the Far East

50219-AE-40	
43	✓

These general topics lend themselves to sub-division, and might include discussion of the following items,

- I (a) *N-1)* The effect of budgetary considerations on Canada's defence programme--The United States authorities would probably welcome whatever indication can be given them of any new look which may have been taken by the Canadian government at the defence programme since the last general election. We are aware as well that budgetary considerations are looming large in Washington insofar as the defence programme is concerned. A discussion begun in this vein might lead to general treatment of future projects in continental defence; e.g. extension of the present radar coverage, introduction of automaticity into the air defence system and development of new weapon systems.
- (b) *N-1)* Joint operational control of Canada-United States defence forces--It is highly unlikely that this new development in our defence relations with the U.S. could be overlooked at a meeting of this sort whether or not we took the initiative. A general discussion of what was involved in the new arrangements might give us an opportunity to explore in general terms what kind of inter-governmental agreement on the subject would be acceptable to both sides.
- (c) *N-1)* Consultation on alerts--This subject formed an important part of the discussion at the last Meeting of Consultation in December, 1955. Since that time

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET  
REDACT A SECRET

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

there has been an exchange of letters on indications intelligence. We are still, however, negotiating an exchange of letters on the general question of consultation and an attempt might be made at the meeting to speed these negotiations to a successful conclusion.

II (a) *2000* Disarmament. It might be useful to sound out high level American thinking as to where disarmament negotiations go from this point. Estimates of Soviet intentions in this respect could be exchanged.

*UNEF* (b) The Middle East. The problem for the free world of Soviet mischief-making in the Middle East is one of the major concerns of our two governments and a discussion of the matter in this framework would fit the purpose of the Meetings of Consultation. The discussion, however, could be directed not only to Soviet intentions in the area but also to next moves by the United States and to the Arab-Israeli tensions in the area.

*(a)(b) (c) A.D.* *for Eastern problems* (c) Missiles. The Soviet announcement concerning successful testing of a long-range missile might serve as a useful jumping-off point for a general discussion of this new stage in war-making capability. The effect of the use of missiles both offensively and defensively on our continental defences might also be examined.

III (a) Problems which would be raised by any proposal to stock-pile atomic weapons in NATO countries.

(b) The form and method of political consultation in NATO regarding the use of atomic weapons, particularly insofar as it relates to the concept of the "graduated deterrent" to meet varying degrees of "local conflicts".

(c) The desirability of increased political consultation in the NATO Council on all matters of concern to NATO governments.

... 3

000486

- 3 -

TOP SECRET

IV (a) At the last Meeting of Consultation we were given the United States appreciation of the situation in the Far East and especially of the Chinese Communist threat. Although tensions in the area are not perhaps as high as in December 1955 it may be useful to have the current United States estimate.

(b) The China policy of our two governments was discussed at the last Meeting of Consultation. Since that time there have been some developments in United States policy. There may be some merit in sounding out the United States authorities on these developments.

o

DRAFT

TOP SECRET

T o p i c s

for

Washington Meeting of Consultation September 30/57

- I Welcome by Governor Herter, Under-Secretary of State.
- II Outline of United States objectives in world's major diplomatic situations; *including disarmament*
- III Soviet Intentions.
- IV Continental Defence.
- V The Middle Eastern Situation.
- VI The Far Eastern Situation.
- VII NATO matters.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REQUIR A SECRET

Elaboration of the Topics

- I United States responsibility.
- II " " "
- III (a) Estimate of external threat to the continent.  
*Disarmament.*
- IV (a) Developments in continental air defence against the background of budgetary considerations.  
(b) Joint operational control of Canada-United States air defence forces.  
(c) The development of long-range missiles and *their* effect on continental air defences.  
(d) Consultation on alerts.
- V Consideration might be given to Soviet *action* ~~intervention~~ in the Middle East, Arab-Israeli tensions and the position of UNEF.
- VI (a) Observations by Governor Herter concerning his Far Eastern tour.  
- (b) The military aspects of the Far Eastern situation.  
- (c) Recent developments in the U.S.-China policy.  
- (d) The Indo-China commissions.?
- VII (Our earlier memorandum.)

St. J. Mac G

00000000

Dulles → article →

(1) 2 on 3 tentatives. - ar - après

(1) trip of visit Hamburg

(2) Embassy - party Ed. MacGuire

4-6800-

~~SECRET~~  
Under-Secretary's Office

Defence Liaison (1) Division

SECRET

September 20, 1957

50219-AL	40
43	u

Proposed meeting of consultation with U.S.- Possible topics of discussion

It may be useful to enlarge somewhat on what we have in mind in suggesting as possible topics of consultation items III (a), (b) and (c).

2. Insofar as the problems which will be raised by any proposal to stockpile atomic weapons in NATO countries are concerned, it will be useful to know the U.S. intention concerning the actual formulation of such a proposal. As you know, the only occasion on which this idea has been publicly advanced was at a press conference in Washington on July 16 by Mr. Dulles, when he indicated that the U.S. government was studying the possibility of stockpiling atomic weapons throughout various NATO countries. However, no specific proposal has yet been made in NATO, nor on a bilateral basis to any of the NATO governments. With the advent of increasingly powerful weapons in the hands of the Soviet Union, the need of strengthening the defence means available to the NATO partnership, and thus of reinforcing the "deterrent", is increasing both in urgency and in scope. If therefore the U.S. government is serious about such a proposal, it would be helpful to know when we can expect it to be made, what role would they expect Canada to play in it, how is the implementation being envisaged, etc.

3. Item III (b) raises issues corollary to the previous item. In other words, if stockpiles of atomic weapons are in fact established in NATO countries, what kind of control would the U.S. government be prepared to allow NATO governments to have over the stockpiles? In view of the political directive issued last year by the NATO Council, and the evident evolution in U.S.'s thinking towards the concept of the "graduated deterrent", as again confirmed by an article by Mr. Dulles in the October issue of "Foreign Affairs", what safeguards do the U.S. government envisage for ensuring some form of "multilateral" and "civilian" control over the stockpiles?



- 2 -

4. Item III (c) may be less pressing than the other two, but it would yet be useful, if the occasion permits, to have a U.S. assessment of recent political consultations in NATO Council, more particularly as a result of, and since the publication of the Committee of Three Report. As you know, we have been inclined to consider that a certain revival has taken place in the field of political consultation in NATO since last December, although we recognize that this consultative process might have been made to function somewhat more effectively insofar as Middle-East problems are concerned. It would be interesting to know whether U.S. officials are satisfied with the present state of affairs, and if not, whether they would have any suggestions to improve political consultation in the NATO Council.

Defence Liaison (1) Division

COPY NO. 20 OF 20

14/336

ASHDC SEP19/57 TOPSEC  
TO EXTERNAL 1989 PRIORITY  
IN CANDELNY (FOR UNDER SECRETARY)

REF YOUR TEL DL788 SEP17

PROPOSED MEETING OF CONSULTATION CANADA-USA

IN OUR TEL 1976 SEP18, OUR COMMENTS WERE GIVEN ON THE AGENDA ITEMS SET FORTH IN YOUR TEL DL789 SEP17.

2. WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH INFORMALLY WITH JULIAN NUGENT OF THE CANADIAN DESK, WHO HAS GIVEN US THE FOLLOWING OUTLINE OF TOPICS INTENDED FOR PRESENTATION BY USA REPS AT THE PROPOSED MEETING OF CONSULTATION NOW SCHEDULED FOR SEP30: (1) WELCOME BY UNDER SECRETARY.

(2) OBSERVATIONS BY UNDER SECRETARY CONCERNING HIS FAR EASTERN TOUR.

(3) DEVELOPMENTS IN CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCE AND ESTIMATE OF EXTERNAL THREAT.

(4) REVIEW OF MILITARY ASPECTS OF MID AND FAR EASTERN SITUATIONS.

(5) OUTLINE OF USA OBJECTIVES IN WORLD'S MAJOR DIPLOMATIC SITUATIONS.

3. THE PAPER SUMMARIZING THESE PROPOSED POINTS INCLUDED A BRIEF SECTION OF COMMENTS AS FOLLOWS: "AS IN THE PAST, THE ROLE OF USA REPS DURING MEETING WILL BE LARGELY EXPOSITORY OF GLOBAL PROBLEMS AND THEIR BEARING ON USA-CANADIAN DEFENSE COOPERATION. THIS APPROACH SHOULD INSPIRE INFORMAL BUT BENEFICIAL EXCHANGE OF THOUGHTS CONCERNING TRENDS AND CRITICAL POINTS THEREIN.

"CONSIDERING THE NATURE OF THE MEETING, WHICH IS NOT INTENDED TO INCLUDE NEGOTIATIONS OR RESULT IN RECOMMENDATIONS, THE USA REPS ARE NOT PROPOSING SPECIFIC SUBSTANTIVE ITEMS FOR THE AGENDA. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO DESIRE ON THE USA SIDE TO ESTABLISH ANY RIGID LIMITS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF DISCUSSION, AND, CONSEQUENTLY, NO DESIRE TO DISCOURAGE THE CANADIAN REPS FROM AIRING ANY IMPORTANT BILATERAL SUBJECTS THAT MAY OCCUR TO THEM.

"SOME OF THE ABOVE TOPICS MAY BE SLIGHTLY CHANGED IN TITLE, BUT THE LIST PROVIDES A GOOD IDEA OF THE PROPOSED USA CONTRIBUTION TO THE MEETING."

4. WITH REGARD TO ITEMS (3) AND (4), NUGENT HAS TOLD US THAT ALTHOUGH GENERAL TWINING WILL, OF COURSE, BE PRESENT, IT MAY BE THAT, BECAUSE OF

...2

RECOMMENDED TO SECRET  
SECRET

PAGE TWO 1989

THE FACT THAT HE HAS JUST TAKEN OVER HIS NEW APPOINTMENT, THE BURDEN OF EXPOSITION ON THESE TWO ITEMS WILL FALL PRIMARILY ON AN EXPERT FROM THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. (PRESUMABLY UNDER ITEM 4 YOU WOULD WISH POLITICAL AS WELL AS MILITARY FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED.)

5. SINCE WE UNDERSTAND, AS DOES NUGENT, THAT THE AGENDA IS TO BE FINALIZED IN OTTAWA, AND IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT YOUR OWN PRELIMINARY LIST HAS NOT YET BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF, OR THE SECRETARY TO THE CABINET, WE DID NOT MENTION TO NUGENT IN SPECIFIC TERMS THE ITEMS SUGGESTED IN YOUR TEL DL789 SEP17. WE DID, HOWEVER, INDICATE THAT WE HAD ALSO BEEN THINKING IN TERMS OF ITEMS (3) AND (4), AND THAT YOU WOULD NO DOUBT HAVE OTHER SPECIFIC SUBJECTS TO SUGGEST, INCLUDING THE PROBLEM OF CONSULTATION ON ALERTS (A SUBJECT ON WHICH WE HAVE BEEN DEALING WITH THE DEPT FOR SOME TIME.) WHEN YOUR OWN LIST IS FINALIZED, WE WOULD BE GLAD IF YOU WOULD AUTHORIZE US TO DISCUSS IT WITH THE STATE DEPT, SO THAT THEY CAN BE ADEQUATELY PREPARED IN ADVANCE.

6. FROM NUGENT ALSO WE LEARNED THAT ALTHOUGH A FINAL DECISION HAS YET TO BE TAKEN, THE USA SIDE HAS BEEN PROPOSED AS FOLLOWS: THE UNDER SECRETARY, MR CHRISTIAN HERTER; GENERAL TWINING, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF; MD SPRAGUE, (DEPT OF DEFENCE); ELBERT MATTHEWS, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY PLANNING IN THE STATE DEPT (GERARD SMITH, THE NEWLY APPOINTED ASSISTANT SECRETARY WILL NOT HAVE TAKEN OVER HIS FUNCTIONS AT THAT TIME); BURKE ELBRICK, ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS IN THE STATE DEPT; AND POSSIBLY ONE OR TWO OTHER OFFICIALS FROM THE CANADIAN DESK. NUGENT DOUBTED THAT MR MERCHANT WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR THE MEETINGS.

7. ON PARA 4 OF YOUR REF TEL, IF SEP30 IS FINALLY AGREED, WE WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE THE PARTY ON THE 28TH HERE SO THAT THERE COULD BE PRIOR CONSULTATIONS. PLEASE LET ME KNOW THE EXACT COMPOSITION OF THE CANADIAN GROUP. IN ADDITION TO MYSELF, AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH PREVIOUS PRACTICE, I THINK IT WOULD BE USEFUL, FOR PURPOSES OF CONTINUITY, IF RAE WERE TO ATTEND, WITH POSSIBLY THE ADDITION OF ANOTHER OFFICER TO ASSIST IN KEEPING THE RECORD STRAIGHT

ROBERTSON

000493

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
MEMORANDUM

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

TO: DEFENCE LIAISON (1) DIVISION  
FROM: FAR EASTERN DIVISION  
REFERENCE: Your memorandum of Sept. 18, 1957  
SUBJECT: MEETING OF CONSULTATION WITH UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES

*To see Mr. Tugwell for possible discussion with USSEA*

Security TOP SECRET  
Date Sept. 19, 1957  
File No. 50219-HE-40  
43

1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

SEP 23 1957

Taking into account the main purpose of these meetings as described in paragraph 4 of your memorandum under reference, I should have thought that there was a good case for omitting any discussion of the Far East from the next set of meetings. There has been a general relaxation of tensions likely to lead to an outbreak of hostilities all around the periphery of China. Perhaps there is some virtue in having a discussion to agree that the threat of war has receded, especially in the Formosa straits, but I think that there is some danger in getting into a discussion on China policy.

2. It would unquestionably be interesting to know the inner thoughts of high officials in the U.S. administration about recent developments in the U.S. attitude toward Communist China as exemplified by the decision to permit a limited number of newspapermen to go to China, but there is considerable danger that raising questions affecting U.S. China policy will provoke comparable questions concerning Canadian China policy. With a new Government in office and particularly with a new Secretary of State for External Affairs, none of whom have made any substantive statements on China, or had occasion to consider China policy with any degree of thoroughness, I should be most reluctant to see the matter raised. I should think that the U.S. officials would be intent upon trying to secure an assurance that the new Government will adopt an

CIRCULATION

..... 2

- 2 -

attitude at least as favourable as that of the old Government from the U. S. point of view. There is also a danger that the U. S. officials may raise again the question of an exchange of papers on China policy. In this respect my concern is the same as in the case of oral discussions: I do not wish to see the freedom of action of the new Government circumscribed in any way nor any commitments of any sort entered into until the Government has had an opportunity to give full consideration to the problem of China.

3. Therefore, I should prefer to see this item dropped from the agenda, but if discussion on Far Eastern topics must be included on the agenda, I would prefer to see it turned toward agreement that the outlook is for continuing concern on the part of the Central People's Government with its own domestic affairs with a resultant decrease, for the present at least, in tensions in the Far East.



FAR EASTERN DIVISION.

416 Copy

Classified Sept 19 10

...19... OF 20

DS 12 533  
FM WASHDC SEP18/57 TOPSEC  
TO EXTERNAL 1976 PRIORITY  
INFO CANDELNY(FOR UNDERSECRETARY)

*For file*

Mr Holmes  
CEOS.  
Secy to Lab.  
Middle East Div

*Per*

REF YOUR TEL DL789 SEP17

50219-AE-46  
58 00  
PROPOSED MEETING OF CONSULTATION-CANADA-USA

W.D.V. - Mr Campbell  
P.S. Div - Mr Rogers  
DL 21 - Mr Green

PROPOSED MEETING OF CONSULTATION-CANADA-USA

WE ARE GLAD TO LEARN THAT A MEETING OF CONSULTATION WITHIN THE FRAME-  
WORK OF THE PREVIOUS SERIES IS PLANNED FOR THE END OF THIS MONTH.  
AS YOU KNOW, WE HAVE RAISED THIS SUBJECT WITH THE USA AUTHORITIES  
SEVERAL TIMES IN RECENT MONTHS(SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, OUR TEL 1337 JUN10),  
AND THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT, IF PROPERLY ORGANIZED, SUCH A MEETING CAN  
BE OF VALUE AT THIS TIME.

2. IT MIGHT BE USEFUL, AS A BACKGROUND TO THE PROPOSED MEETING, TO  
SUMMARIZE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE ORIGIN AND PURPOSES OF THESE  
MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN REPS OF THE TWO GOVTS. AS WE UNDER-  
STAND IT, THESE MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION ORIGINALLY DEVELOPED FROM  
AN AGREED MINUTE INITIALLED BY MR ACHESON AND MR PEARSON ON JUN  
14/51. THIS MINUTE PROVIDED FOR FREQUENT CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN CANADA  
AND THE USA AT A HIGH LEVEL IN WASHDC (WITHOUT COMMITMENT TO EITHER  
GOVT) ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE WORLD SITUATION WHICH MIGHT GIVE RISE  
TO THE USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS. THE BACKGROUND WAS, OF COURSE, THE KOREAN  
WAR, AND OUR CONCERN AT THE POSSIBILITY OF THE USE OF ATOMIC WEAPONS  
IN THIS THEATRE OR OTHERS WHERE A SERIOUS THREAT OF WAR MIGHT  
EXIST. AS A RESULT OF PROPOSALS MADE IN 1953, THE CONSULTATIONS HAVE  
GRADUALLY BEEN BROADENED IN SCOPE TO INCLUDE CONSIDERATION OF THE  
THREAT OF WAR GENERALLY, AND TO NORTHAMERICA IN PARTICULAR, IN THE  
LIGHT OF THE LATEST DEFENCE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS.

3. THE COMPOSITION OF THESE MEETINGS HAS BEEN FLEXIBLE. IN THE EARLIER  
PERIOD, THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AND THE SECRETARY  
OF STATE ATTENDED, BUT OVER RECENT YEARS THE MEETINGS HAVE TAKEN PLACE  
AT A HIGH OFFICIAL LEVEL (EG ON THE USA SIDE, THE UNDERSECRETARY OF  
STATE, CHAIRMAN OF THE USA JOING CHIEFS OF STAFF, AND APPROPRIATE  
STATE DEPT OFFICIALS, AND THEIR CANADIAN COUNTERPARTS.) IN

COMPARATIVELY RECENT YEARS, THE FOLLOWING MEETINGS HAVE BEEN HELD:

OCT, 1953: THIS MEETING PROVIDED FOR JOINT DISCUSSION OF THE  
...2

SECRET

PAGE TWO 1976

FOLLOWING TOPICS:USA ESTIMATE OF SOVIET POLICY AND THE RISKS OF WAR;AN APPRECIATION OF SOVIET ATOMIC CAPABILITIES;AND AN EXPOSITION OF USA VIEWS ON ACTION WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION BELIEVED SHOULD BE TAKEN TO STRENGTHEN CONTINENTAL DEFENCE.

NOV,1953:AT THIS MEETING THE CANADIAN GROUP TOOK THE INITIATIVE ARISING FROM THE PREVIOUS SESSION IN RAISING CERTAIN ASPECTS OF CONTINENTAL DEFENCE,AND THE QUESTION OF PARTICIPATION OF PERSONNEL FROM THE CANADIAN ARMED FORCES IN USA EXERCISES INVOLVING ATOMIC WEAPONS IN THE LIGHT OF USA LEGISLATION AND PROCEDURES.

MAR,1954:THE MAIN POINTS ON THE AGENDA INCLUDE A REVIEW OF THE BERLIN CONFERENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS,ESTIMATES OF SOVIET INTENTIONS,AND THE"NEW LOOK"IN USA MILITARY STRATEGY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS,PARTICULARLY REGARDING CONTINENTAL DEFENCE.

SEP,1954:AT THIS MEETING,THE MAIN TOPICS DEALT WITH WERE FORMOSA, EUROPE AFTER EDC,THE SOVIET THREAT,AND CONTINENTAL DEFENCE.

DEC,1955:A SIMILAR AGENDA,TO WHICH THE PARTICULAR PROBLEM OF ALERTS WAS SUBSEQUENTLY ADDED.

4.THERE HAS BEEN NO MEETING OF CONSULTATION SINCE THAT TIME.THE EMBASSY'S REPORT TO THE DEPT(DEC21/55)INDICATES THAT MR HEENEY RECOMMENDED THE CONTINUANCE OF THE PRACTICE OF MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION.

5.THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT THAT MEETINGS OF THIS KIND HAVE SERVED A USEFUL PURPOSE,PARTICULARLY WHEN THEY HAVE BEEN DEVOTED TO STOCK-TAKING AND REVIEW,RATHER THAN TO SPECIFIC POLICY PROBLEMS AND PRACTICAL MATTERS WHICH MAY BE BETTER DEALT WITH THROUGH EITHER THE PJBD OR DIRECT DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.IN VIEW OF THE LENGTH OF TIME WHICH HAS ELAPSED SINCE THE LAST MEETING,THE MANY CHANGES IN PERSONNEL WHICH HAVE OCCURRED,AND THE PACE OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING CONTINENTAL DEFENCE CONSULTATIONS,IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE NEXT MEETING HAS PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE.

6.ON THE SPECIFIC PROBLEM OF THE AGENDA,WE HAD MADE A LIST OF ITEMS WHICH CORRESPONDS VERY CLOSELY TO THOSE PROPOSED IN YOUR TEL DL789 SEP17.OUR MAIN SUGGESTIONS,THEREFORE,RELATE TO EMPHASIS.IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE MIDEAST IS OF SO GREAT IMPORTANCE AT THE  
...3



PAGE THREE 1976

PRESENT TIME, AND THAT THE TENSIONS IN THE AREA ARE SUCH THAT, YOUR ITEM II(B) MIGHT BE MADE A SEPARATE ITEM IV, AND INSERTED UNDER THE MAIN TOPIC HEADINGS BETWEEN ITEM III "NATO MATTERS" AND ITEM IV "THE SITUATION IN THE FAREAST". WHILE THE HEADING MIGHT SIMPLY BE "THE MIDEAST", THE DISCUSSION COULD BE DIRECTED TO BOTH SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE AREA, AND TO USA POLICY, UNDER THE ITEM I(A), AND RELATED ALSO TO ITEM II(A), IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO PROBE AMERICAN THINKING ON THE DEGREE TO WHICH AN AGREED AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF AERIAL INSPECTION IN THE ARCTIC WOULD PERMIT THE TWO GOVTS TO REDUCE FURTHER COMMITMENTS ON RADAR AND EARLY WARNING NETWORKS. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE IDEA OF A POSSIBLE EXCHANGE OF RADAR SITES WITH THE USSR (AN IDEA WHICH WE UNDERSTAND HAS BEEN PRIVATELY CANVASSED IN NATO FOR EUROPEAN RADAR SYSTEMS) MIGHT BE DISCREETLY EXPLORED. OUR ONLY OTHER OBSERVATION RELATING TO THE ITEM DEALING WITH THE SITUATION IN THE FAREAST WOULD BE TO SUGGEST THAT THE ROLE OF THE INDOCHINA COMMISSIONS, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME ALTERNATIVE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM, THROUGH UN OBSERVATION, BEING SUBSTITUTED FOR THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS, COULD BE CANVASSED. FINALLY, ALTHOUGH WE HESITATE TO SUGGEST CUTTING THE ITEMS LISTED, YOU ARE NO DOUBT AWARE OF THE DIFFICULTY OF COVERING SO WIDE A GROUND IN THE TIME WHICH IS LIKELY TO BE AVAILABLE. PROVIDING THE DISCUSSION OF MACHINERY AND PROCEDURES CAN BE REDUCED TO A MINIMUM, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO GET THROUGH THE LIST.

7. YOUR ATTENTION IS DRAWN TO THE FACT THAT, IN REPORTING ON THE LAST MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION, MR HEENEY EXPRESSED THE FOLLOWING VIEWS: (1) THAT WHAT WE GET OUT OF THESE MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION BEARS DIRECT RELATIONSHIP TO THE STRENGTH OF THE VIEWS WE BRING TO THE MEETING; (2) THAT IT IS NOT ESSENTIAL THAT THE CANADIAN PARTICIPANTS ATTEMPT TO SUPPLY NEW INFO ON SPECIFIC TOPICS OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN; (3) THAT IT IS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, THAT THE CANADIAN SIDE HAVE A DEFINITE AND LOGICALLY ARGUED VIEW ON A SPECIFIC SUBJECT IF WE HOPE TO GET A SIGNIFICANT RESPONSE FROM THE USA SIDE; (4) THAT THOUGH THE MEETINGS THEMSELVES ARE BRIEF, THEY CAN PROVIDE A SOUND GROUNDWORK FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION OF TOPICS THROUGH DIPLOMATIC OR OTHER CHANNELS. THEIR IMPORTANCE RESTS LESS IN THE REACHING OF SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS THAN IN THE OPPORTUNITY AFFORDED EACH SIDE TO EXPOSE

PAGE FOUR 1976

FULLY TO THE OTHER THE CONSIDERATIONS WHICH PROMPT IT TO ADOPT  
PARTICULAR COURSES OF ACTION.ABOVE ALL,IT HAS SEEMED DESIRABLE TO  
SEEK,SO FAR AS POSSIBLE,AN INFORMAL AND FREE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS,  
RATHER THAN SIMPLY A MEETING WHERE FORMAL BRIEFS ARE READ OR  
TABLED

ROBERTSON

DUPLICATE

## DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

## MEMORANDUM

TO: Far Eastern Division—  
 Middle Eastern Division  
 United Nations Division

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division

REFERENCE: **DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**  
**REDUIT A SECRET**

SUBJECT: Meeting of Consultation with United States Authorities

Security TOP SECRET

Date September 18, 1957

File No.

50219-AE-40

43

✓

Arrangements were made in 1951 for periodic Meetings of Consultation between high-level officials of the Canadian and United States governments. The purpose of these meetings has been to examine the international situation with a view to spotting developments which might lead to the use of nuclear weapons. The last such meeting was held in December 1955. Recently the United States Embassy suggested that another Meeting of Consultation be held at the end of this month. The Under-Secretary has agreed and the likely date of the meeting will be September 30, in Washington. It will be attended on the Canadian side by the Under-Secretary, the Secretary to the Cabinet and the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff and our Ambassador in Washington.

2. These Meetings of Consultation are designed to provide for a free-flowing exchange of views which are not tied too closely to written briefs. The agenda is written in very broad terms in order that the opportunity will be presented to raise any subject which falls broadly in the field of national security.

3. A preliminary list of subjects which might be suitable for discussion at the proposed Meeting of Consultation later this month has been drawn up. The Under-Secretary agreed that this list of subjects should be discussed with the Secretary to the Cabinet and the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff. We hope to arrange a meeting for discussion of these topics for September 20. We have requested the comments of the Secretary to the Cabinet, the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, and our Ambassador in Washington. A firm Canadian agenda will emerge from this meeting.

M-E	
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

4. In the meantime, I thought I should alert you to the likelihood that subjects affecting your divisions will appear on the agenda. The Under-Secretary will, therefore, require a paper on these subjects. An elaborate brief would not be necessary. The brief should, however, be directed to the security implications of problems dealt with, i.e., those elements in the particular problems which could lead to the outbreak of hostilities involving the United States and Canada. The main purpose of these meetings has been to have the United States government give the Canadian government its high-level appreciation of situations which threaten the peace seriously. It has been found, however, that this purpose can best be met if there is a solid Canadian contribution to the discussion. The particular subject of interest to your division is outlined in an  
--- attachment.

*Rene Tremblay*  
Defence Liaison (1) Division

TOP SECRET

POSSIBLE TOPICS FOR MEETING OF CONSULTATION

(E x c e r p t)

IV The Situation in the Far East

- (a) At the last Meeting of Consultation we were given the United States appreciation of the situation in the Far East and especially of the Chinese Communist threat. Although tensions in the area are not perhaps as high as in December 1955 it may be useful to have the current United States estimate.
- (b) The China policy of our two governments was discussed at the last Meeting of Consultation. Since that time there have been some developments in United States policy. There may be some merit in sounding out the United States authorities on these developments.

o

TOP SECRET

POSSIBLE TOPICS FOR MEETING OF CONSULTATION

(E x c e r p t)

II Soviet Intentions

(b) The Middle East. The problem for the free world of Soviet mischief-making in the Middle East is one of the major concerns of our two governments and a discussion of the matter in this framework would fit the purpose of the Meetings of Consultation. The discussion, however, could be directed not only to Soviet intentions in the area but also to next moves by the United States and to the Arab-Israeli tensions in the area.

o

TOP SECRET

POSSIBLE TOPICS FOR MEETING OF CONSULTATION

(E x c e r p t)

II Soviet Intentions

(a) Disarmament. It might be useful to sound out high level American thinking as to where disarmament negotiations go from this point. Estimates of Soviet intentions in this respect could be exchanged.

o



DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

FILE COPY

OUTGOING MESSAGE

60  
2/6/58  
J. J. McCardle

FM: EXTERNAL, OTTAWA	DATE	FILE		SECURITY
	SEPT.17 1957	50219-AE-40		TOP SECRET
TO: EMBASSY WASHINGTON  CANDEL, N.Y.--For the Under-Secretary	43		50	
	NUMBER	PRECEDENCE		COMCENTRE USE ONLY
	DL-789	PRIORITY		
		PAUL TREMBLAY		
INFO:		DOWNGRADED TO SECRET		
		REDUIT A SECRET		

Ref.: OUR TEL DL-788 OF SEPT. 17

Subject: MEETING OF CONSULTATION

THE FOLLOWING ARE POSSIBLE TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION AT THE  
PROPOSED MEETING OF CONSULTATION IN WASHINGTON:

(COMMUNICATIONS PLEASE REPEAT ATTACHED)

LOCAL  
DISTRIBUTION

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG..... NAME.....J.J.McCardle/RB.	D.L.(1)	6-7921	PAUL TREMBLAY SIG..... NAME...P..Tremblay.....

TOP SECRET

POSSIBLE TOPICS FOR MEETING OF CONSULTATION

- I Continental Defence
- II Soviet Intentions
- III NATO Matters
- IV The Situation in the Far East

These general topics lend themselves to sub-division, and might include discussion of the following items,

- I (a) The effect of budgetary considerations on Canada's defence programme--The United States authorities would probably welcome whatever indication can be given them of any new look which may have been taken by the Canadian government at the defence programme since the last general election. We are aware as well that budgetary considerations are looming large in Washington insofar as the defence programme is concerned. A discussion begun in this vein might lead to general treatment of future projects in continental defence; e.g. extension of the present radar coverage, introduction of automaticity into the air defence system and development of new weapon systems.
- (b) Joint operational control of Canada-United States defence forces--It is highly unlikely that this new development in our defence relations with the U.S. could be overlooked at a meeting of this sort whether or not we took the initiative. A general discussion of what was involved in the new arrangements might give us an opportunity to explore in general terms what kind of inter-governmental agreement on the subject would be acceptable to both sides.
- (c) Consultation on alerts--This subject formed an important part of the discussion at the last Meeting of Consultation in December, 1955. Since that time

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

there has been an exchange of letters on indications intelligence. We are still, however, negotiating an exchange of letters on the general question of consultation and an attempt might be made at the meeting to speed these negotiations to a successful conclusion.

- II (a) Disarmament. It might be useful to sound out high level American thinking as to where disarmament negotiations go from this point. Estimates of Soviet intentions in this respect could be exchanged.
  - (b) The Middle East. The problem for the free world of Soviet mischief-making in the Middle East is one of the major concerns of our two governments and a discussion of the matter in this framework would fit the purpose of the Meetings of Consultation. The discussion, however, could be directed not only to Soviet intentions in the area but also to next moves by the United States and to the Arab-Israeli tensions in the area.
  - (c) Missiles. The Soviet announcement concerning successful testing of a long-range missile might serve as a useful jumping-off point for a general discussion of this new stage in war-making capability. The effect of the use of missiles both offensively and defensively on our continental defences might also be examined.
- III (a) Problems which would be raised by any proposal to stock-pile atomic weapons in NATO countries.
  - (b) The form and method of political consultation in NATO regarding the use of atomic weapons, particularly insofar as it relates to the concept of the "graduated deterrent" to meet varying degrees of "local conflicts".
  - (c) The desirability of increased political consultation in the NATO Council on all matters of concern to NATO governments.

... 3

000507

- 3 -

TOP SECRET

- IV (a) At the last Meeting of Consultation we were given the United States appreciation of the situation in the Far East and especially of the Chinese Communist threat. Although tensions in the area are not perhaps as high as in December 1955 it may be useful to have the current United States estimate.
- (b) The China policy of our two governments was discussed at the last Meeting of Consultation. Since that time there have been some developments in united policy. There may be some merit in sounding out the United States authorities on these developments.
- o

FILE COPY

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

*2 copies sent  
1 to Mr. M.  
1 to Mr. G.*

FM: EXTERNAL OTTAWA	DATE	FILE		SECURITY
	SEPT. 17 1957	50219-AE-40 43. 50		TOP SECRET
TO: EMBASSY WASHINGTON CANDEL, N.Y.--For the Under-Secretary	NUMBER		PRECEDENCE	COMCENTRE USE ONLY
	DL-788		PRIORITY PAUL TREMBLAY	
INFO:				

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REUNIT A SECRET

Ref.: OUR TEL DL533 OF JUNE 13

Subject: MEETING OF CONSULTATION

YOU ARE AWARE THAT THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR RAISED WITH THE UNDER-SECRETARY ON SEPTEMBER 12 THE MATTER OF AN EARLY MEETING OF CONSULTATION AND THAT HE SUGGESTED SEPTEMBER 30 AS A POSSIBLE DATE. THE CHAIRMAN CHIEFS OF STAFF IS AGREEABLE TO THIS DATE BUT WE ARE NOT CERTAIN AS YET THAT IT WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SECRETARY TO THE CABINET. WE WOULD HOPE TO BE ABLE TO SET A FIRM DATE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO ATTEND THE MEETING IF IT IS HELD AT THE END OF SEPTEMBER. IT WOULD BE APPRECIATED IF AS IN THE PAST AN OFFICER OF THE EMBASSY COULD BE MADE AVAILABLE TO MAKE A RECORD OF THE MEETING.

2. THERE IS INCLUDED IN A FOLLOWING TELEGRAM, A PRELIMINARY LIST OF TOPICS WHICH MIGHT BE SUITABLE FOR DISCUSSION AT THE FORTHCOMING MEETING OF CONSULTATION. FOLLOWING THE PRACTICE OF EARLIER MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION, THE TOPICS HAVE BEEN PUT IN MOST GENERAL

LOCAL  
DISTRIBUTION

ORIGINATOR	DIVISION	PHONE	APPROVED BY
J.J. McCardle/RB	D.L. (1)	6-7921	PAUL TREMBLAY
		SIG	NAME P. Tremblay

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

GENERAL TERMS IN ORDER THAT THE DISCUSSION MAY NOT BE TOO CLOSELY BOUND TO SPECIFIC ITEMS. WE HAVE SET OUT IN OUR TELEGRAM CONCERNING THE AGENDA, THE KIND OF QUESTIONS WHICH MIGHT BE DISCUSSED UNDER THE INDIVIDUAL AGENDA TOPICS. THIS PRELIMINARY LIST HAS NOT AS YET BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE CHAIRMAN CHIEFS OF STAFF OR THE SECRETARY TO THE CABINET. WE HOPE TO ARRANGE A MEETING WITH MR. BRYCE AND GENERAL FOULKES FOR FRIDAY MORNING SEPTEMBER 20. I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL, THEREFORE, IF WE COULD HAVE ANY COMMENTS WHICH OCCUR TO YOU IN TIME FOR USE AT THAT MEETING.

3. WE SHALL NO DOUBT BE IN TOUCH WITH THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY HERE AGAIN BOTH ON THE TIMING AND THE CONTENT OF THE PROPOSED MEETING. THERE WOULD NOT SEEM TO BE ANY REASON, HOWEVER, WHY YOU SHOULD NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY OPPORTUNITY WHICH MIGHT PRESENT ITSELF TO OBTAIN FROM THE <sup>STATE DEPARTMENT</sup> ~~STATEMENT~~ ANY VIEWS OFFICIALS MAY WISH TO OFFER ON THE PROPOSED MEETING.

4. THE UNDER SECRETARY SUGGESTED BEFORE HE LEFT FOR NEW YORK THAT IF SEPTEMBER 30 WAS AGREED UPON AS A DATE FOR THE MEETING HE WOULD LIKE THE PARTY FROM OTTAWA TO GO TO WASHINGTON ON SEPTEMBER 28 SO THAT THERE WOULD BE TIME FOR CONSULTATION WITH YOU BEFORE THE MEETING. WOULD SUCH A PLAN BE CONVENIENT FOR YOU?

5. THE UNDER-SECRETARY WILL BE IN NEW YORK UNTIL SOME TIME NEXT WEEK. IT WOULD BE USEFUL, THEREFORE, IF YOU COULD REPEAT ANY MESSAGES ON THIS SUBJECT TO NEW YORK MARKED FOR HIS ATTENTION.

FILE COPY

50219-AE-40
43 50

TOP SECRET

September 17, 1957

Secretary to the Cabinet,  
Privy Council Office.

Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,  
Department of National Defence.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

Possible Meeting of Consultation  
with U.S. Authorities  
on September 30

The United States Ambassador raised recently with Mr. Léger the desirability of an early Meeting of Consultation. He suggested September 30 as a possible date and extended an invitation to hold the meeting in Washington. The Under-Secretary expressed an interest in such a meeting and undertook to give an early reply to the Ambassador as to the date of meeting and the possible topics for discussion. The last such Meeting of Consultation took place in December 1955.

2. Mr. Léger has asked me to seek your comments on the timing and content of the proposed meeting. The Under-Secretary was able before he left Ottawa to discuss the subject with Mr. Robertson prior to the latter's return to Washington.

--- 3. There is attached for your consideration, a preliminary list of subjects which might be suitable for discussion at a Meeting of Consultation. These meetings, as you are aware have been directed primarily to developments in the international situation which might give rise to the necessity for the use of atomic weapons.

4. It has been the custom at these meetings to draw up a very general agenda which will allow for wide-ranging



- 2 -

TOP SECRET

discussion. You will remember Mr. Heeney's comment on the last Meeting of Consultation. He said, in part "our purpose should continue to be that of making the meetings into an informal and free exchange of views among senior officers of both governments rather than simply a meeting where formal briefs are read or tabled". The kind of agenda suggested in the attachment would, I think, make possible the kind of discussion for which these meetings are arranged. We have not as yet been given any indication of what the United States side would wish to discuss but we would expect to hear from the State Department in this respect as soon as a firm date has been decided for the meeting. We shall, as well, ask Mr. Robertson for his views on a possible agenda.

5. The Under-Secretary believed that if the meeting was to take place on September 30 it would be desirable to have a meeting this week for an exchange of views on suitable agenda topics. Mr. Leger has had now to go to New York. I suggest, therefore, if it is agreeable to you that Mr. Holmes might meet with you some time Friday morning, September 20. It would be appreciated if you could let me know by telephone whether such a meeting would be convenient for you.

PAUL TREMBLAY  
for the

Acting Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

TOP SECRET

POSSIBLE TOPICS FOR MEETING OF CONSULTATION

- I Continental Defence
- II Soviet Intentions
- III NATO Matters
- IV The Situation in the Far East

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

These general topics lend themselves to sub-division, and might include discussion of the following items,

- I (a) The effect of budgetary considerations on Canada's defence programme--The United States authorities would probably welcome whatever indication can be given them of any new look which may have been taken by the Canadian government at the defence programme since the last general election. We are aware as well that budgetary considerations are looming large in Washington insofar as the defence programme is concerned. A discussion begun in this vein might lead to general treatment of future projects in continental defence; e.g. extension of the present radar coverage, introduction of automaticity into the air defence system and development of new weapon systems.
- (b) Joint operational control of Canada-United States defence forces--It is highly unlikely that this new development in our defence relations with the U.S. could be overlooked at a meeting of this sort whether or not we took the initiative. A general discussion of what was involved in the new arrangements might give us an opportunity to explore in general terms what kind of inter-governmental agreement on the subject would be acceptable to both sides.
- (c) Consultation on alerts--This subject formed an important part of the discussion at the last Meeting of Consultation in December, 1955. Since that time

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

there has been an exchange of letters on indications intelligence. We are still, however, negotiating an exchange of letters on the general question of consultation and an attempt might be made at the meeting to speed these negotiations to a successful conclusion.

- II (a) Disarmament. It might be useful to sound out high level American thinking as to where disarmament negotiations go from this point. Estimates of Soviet intentions in this respect could be exchanged.
- (b) The Middle East. The problem for the free world of Soviet mischief-making in the Middle East is one of the major concerns of our two governments and a discussion of the matter in this framework would fit the purpose of the Meetings of Consultation. The discussion, however, could be directed not only to Soviet intentions in the area but also to next moves by the United States and to the Arab-Israeli tensions in the area.
- (c) Missiles. The Soviet announcement concerning successful testing of a long-range missile might serve as a useful jumping-off point for a general discussion of this new stage in war-making capability. The effect of the use of missiles both offensively and defensively on our continental defences might also be examined.
- III (a) Problems which would be raised by any proposal to stock-pile atomic weapons in NATO countries.
- (b) The form and method of political consultation in NATO regarding the use of atomic weapons, particularly insofar as it relates to the concept of the "graduated deterrent" to meet varying degrees of "local conflicts".
- (c) The desirability of increased political consultation in the NATO Council on all matters of concern to NATO governments.

... 3

000514



- 3 -

TOP SECRET

- IV (a) At the last Meeting of Consultation we were given the United States appreciation of the situation in the Far East and especially of the Chinese Communist threat. Although tensions in the area are not perhaps as high as in December 1955 it may be useful to have the current United States estimate.
- (b) The China policy of our two governments was discussed at the last Meeting of Consultation. Since that time there have been some developments in united policy. There may be some merit in sounding out the United States authorities on these developments.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
RECEIVED A SECRET

Profile  
Jm

TO: The Under Secretary

Security TOP SECRET

Date September 13, 1957

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division

File No.
50219-AE-40

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: United States Approach regarding Meeting of Consultation

You indicated that the United States Ambassador raised with you on September 12 the desirability of an early Meeting of Consultation and that he suggested September 30 as a possible date. I understand that you believe that any such meeting should take place in Washington. (In June in reply to an inquiry on this subject from our Ambassador in Washington you indicated our hope that the next Meeting of Consultation would be in Ottawa.)

-- 2. There is attached for your consideration, a preliminary list of subjects which might be suitable for discussion at a Meeting of Consultation. They are all, broadly speaking, "security" problems. The Meetings of Consultation have been directed primarily to developments in the international situation which might give rise to the necessity for the use of atomic weapons. At the last such Meeting, in December 1955, a good deal of attention was given to the situation in the Far East. At the moment tension in the area does not seem so acute as it was in December 1955 and it may not, therefore, be necessary to raise Far Eastern questions at this time.

3. It will not be possible until Monday, September 16, to get in touch with Mr. Bryce or General Foulkes to find out whether they could attend the meeting in Washington on September 30 or to get their comments on possible topics of discussion. I understand that you will be seeing Mr. Robertson this evening and will be seeking his

Recognition of  
China should  
be discussed

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

*M. A. R. is  
available*

comments. We have alerted Mr. Rae at the Embassy in Washington to the possible meeting at the end of September. He has indicated that so far as he is aware there is nothing on the Ambassador's agenda which would prevent him from attending such a meeting at that time.

*Mr. H. might  
be available  
during my ab-  
sence.*

*I agree*

4. I suggest for your consideration that it might be desirable for you to arrange to meet at an early date with Mr. Bryce and General Foulkes on the question of suitable topics for discussion with the Americans. There will be very little time to reach a meeting of minds before September 30 if the exchange of views is confined to correspondence. As you are aware, these Meetings of Consultation are designed to provide for a free flowing exchange of views which are not tied too closely to written briefs. In commenting on the last Meeting of Consultation, Mr. Heeney wrote in part, "Our purpose should continue to be that of making the meetings into an informal and free exchange of views among senior officers of both governments rather than simply a meeting where formal briefs are read or tabled".

*Since Mr. Foulkes & Bryce  
have agreed please advise  
Mr. Merchants urgently &  
keep me posted in N.Y.*

*I would suggest we left  
on Saturday 28 so as to have  
time for consultation with M.A.R.  
in Washington before meeting.*

*Could General Foulkes provide  
a plane?*

*Sh.*

*Parasuramala*  
Defence Liaison (1) Division

TOP SECRET

UPGRADED TO SECRET  
REMOVED A SECRET

POSSIBLE TOPICS FOR MEETING OF CONSULTATION

- I Continental Defence
- II Soviet Intentions
- III NATO Matters
- IV THE SITUATION IN THE FAR EAST

These general topics lend themselves to sub-division, and might include discussion of the following items,

- I (a) The effect of budgetary considerations on Canada's defence programme--The United States authorities would probably welcome whatever indication can be given them of any new look which may have been taken by the Canadian government at the defence programme since the last general election. We are aware as well that budgetary considerations are looming large in Washington insofar as the defence programme is concerned. A discussion begun in this vein might lead to general treatment of future projects in continental defence; e.g. extension of the present radar coverage, introduction of automaticity into the air defence system and development of new weapon systems.
- (b) Joint operational control of Canada-United States defence forces--It is highly unlikely that this new development in our defence relations with the U.S. could be overlooked at a meeting of this sort whether or not we took the initiative. A general discussion of what was involved in the new arrangements might give us an opportunity to explore in general terms what kind of inter-governmental agreement on the subject would be acceptable to both sides.
- (c) Consultation on alerts--This subject formed an important part of the discussion at the last Meeting of Consultation in December, 1955. Since that time there has been an exchange of letters on indications intelligence. We are still, however, negotiating



- 2 -

TOP SECRET

an exchange of letters on the general question of consultation and the opportunity might be taken to speed these negotiations to a successful conclusion.

- II (a) Disarmament. It might be useful to sound out high level American thinking as to where disarmament negotiations go from this point. Estimates of Soviet intentions in this respect could be exchanged.
- (b) The Middle East. The problem for the free world of Soviet mischief-making in the Middle East is one of the major concerns of our two governments and a discussion of the matter in this framework would fit the purpose of the Meetings of Consultation. The discussion, however, could be directed not only to Soviet intentions in the area but also to next moves by the United States and to the Arab-Israeli tensions in the area.
- (c) Missiles. The Soviet announcement concerning successful testing of a long-range missile might serve as a useful jumping-off point for a general discussion of this new stage in war-making capability. The effect of the use of missiles both offensively and defensively on our continental defences might also be examined.
- III (a) Problems which would be raised by a <sup>any</sup> United States proposal to stock-pile atomic weapons in NATO countries.
- (b) The form and fashion of political consultation in NATO regarding the use of atomic weapons.
- (c) The concept of the "graduated deterrent" particularly in relation to local conflicts.
- (d) The desirability of increased political consultation in the NATO Council on all matters of concern to NATO governments.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

OUTGOING MESSAGE

AD 852  
Miss G...  
FILE COPY

FM: EXTERNAL OTTAWA	DATE	FILE		SECURITY							
	JUNE 13/57	50219-AE-40 58		TOP SECRET							
TO: WASHINGTON	NUMBER		PRECEDENCE		CONCENTRE USE ONLY						
	DL-533		ROUTINE								
INFO:											

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REBUT A SECRET

Ref.: YOUR TEL 1337 OF JUNE 10.  
Subject: MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION

~~FOLLOWING FROM THE UNDER SECRETARY.~~ I AGREE THAT THERE IS A GOOD DEAL TO BE SAID FOR GIVING CONSIDERATION TO THE HOLDING OF A MEETING OF CONSULTATION SOMETIME LATER THIS YEAR. I AM NOT HOWEVER IN A POSITION AT THE MOMENT TO INDICATE WHEN APPROPRIATE CANADIAN OFFICIALS WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH A MEETING. ~~I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL TO HAVE THE VIEWS OF UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES WHICH EMERGE FROM THEIR EXPLORATION OF THE PROSPECTS OF A MEETING OF CONSULTATION. IN ANY CONVERSATIONS WHICH YOU HAVE WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT ON THE MATTER, YOU SHOULD INDICATE THAT IT MAY BE SOME TIME BEFORE IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO PUT FORWARD FIRM CANADIAN VIEWS.~~ I DOUBT THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE BEFORE LATE IN SEPTEMBER. IF OUR FRIENDS FROM WASHINGTON WERE TO FREE TO COME AND SEE US IN OTTAWA FOR THE MEETING WE WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO WELCOME THEM. LEGER

LOCAL DISTRIBUTION				CCOS SECRETARY TO THE CABINET	
ORIGINATOR		DIVISION		PHONE	APPROVED BY
SIG. J.J. McCardle/ms		D.L. (1)		6.7921	SIG. JULES LÉGER
NAME					NAME

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

TO: The Under-Secretary *For file*

Security TOP SECRET

Date June 13, 1957

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division

File No.		
50219-AE-40		
58	/	/

REFERENCE:

SUBJECT: Meetings of Consultation.

*13.6.57*

There is attached for your signature, if you concur, a telegram to Washington in response to Washington's message 1337 of June 10, which is on top of the attached file.

*J. A. C.*  
Defence Liaison (1) Division

UPGRADED TO SECRET  
SECRET A SECRET

*13.6.57(US)*

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, January 12, 1956

50219-AE-40	
129	50

Dear Mr. Bryce,

Meeting of Consultation

I refer to my letter of December 28, 1955, with which I sent you a copy of despatch No. 2047 of December 21, 1955, from Mr. Heeney, containing the Canadian Record of the meeting of consultation held in Washington on December 5, 1955. I now attach another copy of the despatch in which the Record contains the following amendments, made as a result of consultation with General Foulkes and yourself:

Page 6, para. 23, line 1

The words "sent on to" have been deleted so that the Record now reads "General Foulkes then outlined.....".

Page 7, para. 26, line 2

The last four words have been replaced by "alert the Air Defence System".

Page 7, para. 26, line 3

The phrase "a simple alert" has been amended to read "such an alert".

Page 9, para. 32, line 9

The word "would" has been changed to "should".

Mr. R. B. Bryce,  
Secretary to the Cabinet,  
Privy Council Office,  
O t t a w a, Ontario.

.....2

- 2 -

Page 11, para. 37, sub-para (d)

The word "SAGE" has been spelled out as "semi-automatic ground environment".

Page 11, para. 38, line 3

The word "Government's" has been changed to "Defence".

2. I attach a second copy of the despatch in case you wish to give it to the Prime Minister. I have also given a copy to Mr. Pearson and have sent a copy to General Foulkes for transmission to Mr. Campney. In view of the necessity of guarding the security of the information in this report, I have decided to limit its circulation to those who have received copies of the reports on previous meetings of consultation, and therefore do not intend to send copies of it to anyone else.

Yours sincerely,

JULES LÉGER

Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

D. L. (1)/K.C.Brown/ew

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, January 12, 1956

Dear General Foulkes,

50219-AE-46
129   50

Meeting of Consultation

— I refer to your letter of December 6,  
1956, and enclose for your use a copy of Mr. Heeney's  
despatch No. 2047 of December 21, 1955, including  
the Canadian Record of the meeting, amended in  
— accordance with the suggestions in your letter. I  
attach a second copy in case you wish to give it to  
Mr. Campney.

2. In view of the necessity of guarding the  
security of the information in this report, I have  
decided to limit its circulation to those who have  
received copies of the reports on previous meetings  
of consultation. I have, therefore, sent a copy to  
Mr. Pearson, and to Mr. Bryce, for transmission to  
the Prime Minister.

Yours sincerely,

JULES LÉGER

Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

General C. Foulkes, CB, CBE, DSO, CD.,  
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff,  
Department of National Defence,  
O t t a w a, Ontario.

SEEN  
L.B. PEARSON

50219-AE-40	
109	✓

TOP SECRET

Ottawa, January 12, 1956

MEMORANDUM TO THE MINISTER

Meeting of Consultation

F. 6  
Kc B

I attach for your information a copy of despatch No. 2047 of December 21, 1955, from Mr. Heeney, with which is enclosed the Canadian Record of the meeting of consultation which I attended in Washington on December 5, 1955.

2. This copy of the Record contains a number of minor amendments suggested by General Foulkes and myself, and also has been approved by Mr. Bryce.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to Mr. Bryce and General Foulkes for transmission to Mr. St. Laurent and Mr. Campney.

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET  
RECEIVED A SECRET

*off.*

*Attached copy of  
despatch 2047  
given to Mr. Foulkes  
Jan. 17,  
1956.  
LW*

13.1.9 (SS)  
12.1.37 (US)



1	
2	0800
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

JUN 11 1957

Copy No 1

FM WASHDC JUN10/57 TOPSEC  
TO EXTERNAL 1337

MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION

WHILE DISCUSSING OTHER MATTERS WITH ELBRICK THIS MORNING, I MENTIONED INFORMALLY THE PRACTICE OF ARRANGING MEETINGS OF CONSULTATION BETWEEN APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS OF THE TWO GOVTS, AND REMINDED HIM THAT NO MEETING HAD BEEN HELD SINCE THE AUTUMN OF 1955. HE SAID THAT HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO EXPLORE WITHIN THE STATE DEPT AND PENTAGON VIEWS ON SUCH A MEETING, AND AGREED THAT WITH THE CHANGES IN PERSONNEL SINCE 1955, THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL TO BE SAID FOR CONSIDERING HOLDING SUCH A MEETING, POSSIBLY LATER IN THE YEAR

ROBERTSON

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

50219-AE-40
58   50

ACTION COPY

Refer to  
ccos (1 copy) alone  
Seyb/ab.

000526

Copy 50271-E-40  
5475-GE-40

LA 50271-L-40

8/156

EXTERNAL OTT APR17/57 SECRET  
TO WASHDC V265 OPIMMEDIATE  
INFO LDN EMBASSYPARIS PERMISNY NATOPARIS  
BAG MOSCOW OSLO FM LDN  
BAG TOKYO FM OTT

50219-AE-40  
40

REF YOUR TEL 859 APR11

# DISARMAMENT-NUCLEAR TESTS

IT SEEMS TO US THAT THE USA AUTHORITIES WOULD BE GIVEN A GOOD IDEA OF THE KIND OF DISCUSSION WE WOULD LIKE TO HAVE IF YOU CONVEYED TO THEM A MEMO ALONG THE LINES BELOW. IT NOW IS THE INTENTION THAT THE MEETING SHOULD BE WITH THE DEFENCE RESEARCH BOARD WITH OTHERS FROM THE ZED LIST IN ATTENDANCE. MEMO BEGINS:

2. IN THE MIDDLE OF 1956 THERE BEGAN A REVIEW OF THE CANADIAN POSITION ON NUCLEAR TESTS PROMPTED ESSENTIALLY BY TWO CONSIDERATIONS. THE FIRST DERIVED FROM THE REPORTS OF THOSE EXPERTS WHO ARE CHARGED WITH THE STUDY OF THE POSSIBLE DELETERIOUS EFFECTS OF INCREASES IN BACKGROUND RADIATION CAUSED BY NUCLEAR TESTS. THE INFO AVAILABLE TO THEM TENDED TO SUPPORT THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE REPORTS OF THE BRITISH MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL AND THE USA ACADEMY OF SCIENCES THAT A CONTINUATION OF TESTS AT THE RATES PREVAILING HITHERTO NEED NOT CAUSE ALARM. HOWEVER THEY WERE NOT PREPARED TO ENDORSE REASSURANCES CONCERNING MATERIALLY INCREASED RATES OF PRODUCTION OF ADDITIONS TO THE BACKGROUND RADIATION. THERE WAS ALSO A SUBSTANTIAL AND GROWING BODY OF PUBLIC OPINION IN CANADA CALLING FOR ACTION TO SET BOUNDS TO THE POSSIBLE HAZARDS.

3. THE SECOND CONSIDERATION WAS THAT, ABROAD, THERE WERE SEVERAL GOVTS AND ORGANIZED PUBLIC GROUPS CALLING FOR COMPLETE CESSATION OF NUCLEAR TESTS. A THEME COMMON TO MANY OF THESE PROTESTS WAS THE PRINCIPLE THAT NO GOVT HAD THE RIGHT TO EXPOSE AT THEIR SOLE DISCRETION THE PEOPLES OF OTHER COUNTRIES TO THE HAZARDS WHICH MIGHT RESULT FROM THE CONDUCT OF TESTS.

4. HAVING IN MIND THE NECESSITY TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF DEFENCE, AS WELL AS THE FOREGOING SITUATION. IT WAS CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE TO ADVANCE IN GENERAL TERMS THE CONCEPT OF AN AGREEMENT FOR THE LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR TESTS. THE GENERAL IDEA WAS THAT IT SHOULD BE BASED ON THE RATES OF TESTING PREVAILING HITHERTO,

PAGE TWO V265

THAT METHODS OF ALLOCATION OF QUOTAS SHOULD BE WORKED OUT BETWEEN THE POWERS CONDUCTING TESTS AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE AN ARRANGEMENT FOR VERIFICATION WHICH MIGHT BE BASED MERELY ON THE PROVISION OF INTERNATIONAL STATUS FOR EXISTING NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF DETECTION. THIS GENERAL CONCEPT WAS ADVANCED IN A STATEMENT ON DEC5 IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

5. IT NOW WOULD APPEAR THAT THE ARRANGEMENTS ENVISAGED FOR VERIFICATION OF A LIMITATION AGREEMENT WOULD OR MIGHT BE INADEQUATE TO CHECK SOME TESTS OF RELATIVELY SUBSTANTIAL EXPLOSIVE FORCE. WE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS (A) THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DETECT TOTAL YIELD AND (B) THE REASONS WHY YIELD IN FISSION PRODUCTS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DETECT.

6. THE SECOND PROBLEM APPEARS TO US TO BE CONNECTED NOT ONLY WITH A LIMITATIONS SCHEME, BUT ALSO WITH THE REGISTRATION OF DATA CONCERNING THE ESTIMATED UPPER LIMIT OF FISSION PRODUCTS PRODUCED BY A SERIES OF TESTS EXPLOSIONS AND WHICH WOULD BECOME OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN. IF A STATEMENT OF THE PROSPECTIVE TOTAL YIELD OF A TEST SERIES IN FISSION PRODUCTS WHICH WOULD BE OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN WOULD PROVIDE, IN CONJUNCTION WITH SOVIET LONG RANGE INSTRUMENTATION, A USEFUL GUIDE TO THE DESIGN OF THE WEAPONS BEING TESTED, THERE WOULD APPEAR TO BE SOUND ARGUMENT AGAINST THE REGISTRATION OF SUCH INFO.

7. THE GENERAL PURPOSE OF THE DISCUSSION WOULD BE TO CLARIFY THE TECHNICAL FACTORS WHICH AFFECT THESE QUESTIONS IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE AN UP TO DATE ASSESSMENT OF THEIR SIGNIFICANCE FOR PROPOSALS CONCERNING AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON NUCLEAR TESTS.

D. L. (11) / K. C. Brown / ew  
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: The Canadian Embassy.....  
..... WASHINGTON.....  
FROM: THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.  
Reference: Your despatch No. 2047 of.....  
December 21, 1955.  
Subject:.....  
..... Meeting of Consultation of.....  
..... December 5, 1955.....

Security: TOP SECRET.....  
No: DL-44.....  
Date: January 12, 1956.....  
Enclosures:.....  
Air or Surface Mail:.....  
Post File No:.....

Ottawa File No.	
50219-AE-40	
90	50

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

References

I attach for your information a copy of the letter which I have sent to Mr. Bryce listing the amendments which have been agreed on here to the Record of the meeting of consultation, enclosed with your despatch under reference.

2. As you will see I have limited the distribution of your despatch to those who have received copies of the reports on previous meetings of consultation, i.e. Mr. St. Laurent, Mr. Pearson, Mr. Campney, Mr. Bryce and General Foulkes.

JULES LÉGER

Under-Secretary of State  
for External Affairs

Internal  
Circulation

Distribution  
to Posts

TOP SECRET



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN, CHIEFS OF STAFF

OTTAWA

*January*  
6-December, 1956.

5 029-AE-40	
90	50

*File*  
*KCB*

Dear Mr. *dh* Leger:

Meeting of Consultation - 5 December 1955

With reference to your letter of 28 December enclosing a copy of Despatch No. 2047 of 21 December, forwarding the Canadian record of the recent meeting of consultation; I have reviewed the record and agree with the suggested pencilled changes, and I have a few other comments to add.

Suggested Amendments

Page 6, para. 23, line 1

Delete the words "sent on to" so that it now reads "General Foulkes then outlined...".

Page 7, para. 26, line 2

Delete the last four words and insert "alert the Air Defence System". Therefore the line should now read "the United States were authorized to alert the Air Defence System".

Page 7, para. 26, line 3

The phrase "a simple alert" to be amended to read "such an alert".

Page 9, para. 32, line 9

The word "would" to be amended to read "should".

Page 11, para. 37, sub-para (d)

The word "SAGE" to be spelled out as "semi-automatic ground environment".

Page 11, para. 38, line 3

The word "Government's" to be amended to read "Defence".

....2

Jules Leger, Esq.,  
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs,  
Ottawa, Ontario.

TOP SECRET

000530

6.1.40(us)

TOP SECRET


- 2 -

Page 12, para. 40, line 4

After the word "NATO" insert the words "in Europe".

I have one other observation. You will recall my telephone conversation regarding the circulation of this document. As this particular record contains a great deal of U.S. highly secret research and development information I am very concerned regarding the necessary security of this information, and I would suggest that we give careful examination to the distribution of this record on a "need to know" basis. As you are well aware, the United States have been greatly worried about security in connection with these meetings of consultation and so far they have been carried out without any leakage whatever; but I am concerned that should any of the information in this document get to the notice of U.S. officers in Canada or the U.S. authorities in Washington, this may seriously interfere with the further disclosure of this kind of most useful information. After you have had an opportunity of considering the matter of circulation, would you be good enough to advise me of your intentions.

Yours sincerely,



(Charles Foulkes)

General,  
Chairman, Chiefs of Staff.

TOP SECRET

000531

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA.

NUMBERED LETTER

TO: UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, OTTAWA, CANADA.

FROM: The Canadian Embassy, Washington, DC.

Reference: Your Letters DL-1647 of December 1  
and DL-1734 of December 28, 1955.  
Subject: Meeting of Consultation.

Security: TOP SECRET

No: 3

Date: January 3, 1956

Enclosures: Two

Air or Surface Mail: Surface

Post File No:

Ottawa File No.

50219-AE-40

94

50

References

D-1	
1	
2	
3	
4	
5	
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	

Internal  
Circulation

Distribution  
to Posts

D

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET  
RESULT A SECRET

File  
K.B.

The two binders which you sent us under  
cover of your letter DL-1647 are attached. The  
binders contained documents for use at the Meeting  
of Consultation of December 5.

2. Included in the binders are the documents  
with the blue tags attached, which you specifically  
asked be returned to Defence Liaison (1) Division.

Samuelson  
The Embassy