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Volume 37 From-De 84-02-10 To-À 84-02-15

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DATE

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2007-03-06

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SEMI ACTIVE

TITLE—TITRE:

DISARMEMENT
MEASURES
PLANS AND PROPOSALS
TRUDEAU PEACE MISSION (INITIATIVES)

DESARMEMENT
MESURES
PLANS ET PROPOSITIONS
TRUDEAU MISSION DE PAIX (INITIATIVES)

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MINISTÈRE
DES
AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

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Government of Canada
Gouvernement du Canada

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DATED FROM À COMPTER DU	84-02-10	TO JUSQU'AU	84-02-15
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AFFIX TO TOP OF FILE - À METTRE SUR LE DOSSIER

DO NOT ADD ANY MORE PAPERS - NE PAS AJOUTER DE DOCUMENTS

FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE SEE - POUR CORRESPONDANCE ULTÉRIEURE VOIR	
FILE NO. - DOSSIER N° 28-6-1-Trudeau Peace Mission	VOLUME 32

TRANSCRIPT OF A SCRUM WITH THE PRIME MINISTER FOLLOWING A MEETING WITH KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE USSR, MOSCOW, FEBRUARY 15, 1984.

TRANSCRIPTION D'UNE ENTREVUE SUR LE VIF ACCORDÉE PAR LE PREMIER MINISTRE À LA SUITE D'UNE RÉUNION AVEC M. KONSTANTIN TSCHERNENKO, SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL DU PARTI COMMUNISTE DE L'URSS, À MOSCOU, LE 15 FÉVRIER 1984.

Q. Christopher Young, Southam News: Prime Minister, does this trip complete or end the phase of your peace initiative as far as the travel part of it goes?

A: I can't predict whether there will be any need for further travel. Certainly it completes one cycle. As we left each other, the General Secretary suggested that we could meet again and we could continue the dialogue -- certainly Canada and the Soviet Union. There are no plans for any meeting at this time.

Q: I don't mean just the Soviet Union. I mean other world leaders.

A: Well, that's all I can think of for now.

Q. Jan Lasowski, CBC: Prime Minister, what is the status now of your plan to have leaders of the five nuclear powers come together for a summit conference? Is that still a practical idea as far as you are concerned? Did Mr. Chernenko have anything to say about it, one way or the other?

A: Well I was encouraged that Mr. Gromyko yesterday in the statement referred to the responsibility of the five nuclear powers and I did return to that today in my discussions, urging them that the Secretary General, on some occasion, should get the five together seeing as they are, collectively, that they would be supportive of it. I have no answer to that. We will have to see how events develop.

I did point out to them that there was a political window of opportunity over the next several months -- that is, between now and June -- with the MBFR meeting scheduled for Vienna in March, with the NATO review of East-West political relations to be presented to NATO in May, with another month or so to go in this stage of the meeting in Stockholm, with an economic summit in June where we always

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do return to political questions and East-West and, perhaps, with the fact that, after June, the American presidential election will be in full swing. So, I did try to impress on them that there was a window of opportunity where the politicians could send signals and make positive gestures and take small steps.

I think that one that we must take is on the MBFR: We must answer the Soviet proposal of last June. Mr. Gromyko, in the exchange this afternoon, also returned to that. I think they find it very significant. It will be significant to us, too, what we say there and he insisted on reduction of arms -- not increase of conventional strength, reduction. The words balance and equilibrium came back constantly in his opening, welcoming notes. The General Secretary began, practically, by saying that political dialogue was important, that he valued the Canadian initiative in its usefulness and practicality and, as I suggested earlier, said that we could continue dialoguing on this matter.

Q. Je crois que M. Mauroy a présenté (inaudible) il est un homme ouvert (inaudible). Quelle est votre impression de la personnalité du secrétaire général?

R. Un homme solide, réaliste, qui ne se perd pas dans les mots. Il est arrivé certainement dans mon cas droit au but. Il a voulu parler de l'initiative canadienne de recherche de la paix. Il en a parlé abondamment. Nous avons eu très peu de temps pour les questions bilatérales. Simplement, il a exprimé le voeu que nous puissions les poursuivre à d'autres occasions, mais il paraissait certainement savoir là où il voulait aller, pas de flottement dans les principes et je pense qu'il était remarquable en ce sens qu'il ne rechignait pas à propos du passé. Il n'est pas revenu sur des conditions antérieures, il n'a pas parlé des INF, du déploiement. Il n'a pas parlé du président américain. Il est venu droit au but. C'est un homme parfaitement pratique et je suis convaincu que (inaudible).

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Q. Mark Phillips, CBS: Prime Minister, let me ask a two-part question. The first is, do you still consider your peace initiative to be alive and, if so, what is the next step in it? And, following up on your previous answer here, in the General Secretary's lack of reference to some of the problems in negotiations until now, did you conclude that he was, therefore, open to moving forward in those areas or other types of talks?

A. As for the first part of your question, obviously the whole thrust of the initiative was to inject political energy, to lower the megaphones, and these things are happening. In that sense, the initiative is not only alive, I guess it's becoming practical reality -- now that we are not shouting, now that we are talking, now that we have returned to the political contact in Stockholm and that we will also be resuming in Vienna.

Obviously, the initiative begins to live. However, it will depend on what we can deliver. Gromyko took me up on my window of opportunity and said "yes, there is that window of opportunity and we want to make sure that you put something into it, too". And I said that I did feel that we had a responsibility to answer the Soviet proposal of last June on MBFR, but that if they just let us send signals, and no positive signals come in return, then that window would be closed.

So I feel that there is a double responsibility. We undertook from our point of view within NATO, within the Western Alliance, to make sure that the thrust of the Canadian initiative to assume political responsibility would very much remain alive.

Q. On the second part of that question, though, the future negotiations and the lack of reference to the troubles of the past..?

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A. I found that a positive step, that there was not a return to the recriminations and the stridency and certainly no preconditions. They started, as I say, to talk about the importance of political dialogue and he made two conditions -- but there weren't preconditions -- that they would have to be conducted as between equals, and the second that they would not dialogue only for the sake of dialogue, they would have to lead somewhere. They would have to show progress. And as I pointed out, that's a two-way street. We too feel that we have some answers to give in return for the same thing, but the NATO review which is in process now and which will be reported in May, will be very much influenced by what they also do.

I guess you all noted that in yesterday's speeches there was an apparent effort -- I thought it was significant -- in what they didn't say, as well as what they said. They didn't return once again to INF, to former opinions they have expressed about President Reagan, and so on. So I believe there is an openness on both sides, a readiness, and it would be for politicians everywhere to respond to the desire -- the goals -- to use this improved circumstances. The safety net that we were laying out for post-January 1 has produced one in that sense.

Q. Stuart Gordon, CNN: Did you talk specifically about INF and (inaudible) of the strategic nuclear arms talks, and if so, did he give you any idea that they may be willing to compromise their position?

A. I don't think they know. We didn't talk specifically on that -- certainly not the INF-- but the General Secretary talked specifically of the need to reduce the nuclear threat and reduce the number of nuclear arms significantly in a major way, hoping for real progress.

Q. Jean-Pierre Quittard, Radio-Canada: Il y a, en ce moment, deux attitudes à Moscou. Il y a des optimistes qui pensent qu'avec M. Chernenko il va y avoir un dialogue, et les réalistes qui pensent (inaudible) qu'il n'y a rien à espérer. Dans quelle catégorie vous situez-vous, les réalistes ou les optimistes, et quelle est, pour vous, l'importance de cette nouvelle élection pour votre croisade pour la paix?

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R. Je voudrais me catégoriser dans le groupe des réalistes. Je ne crois pas à l'optimisme. Je crois au désespoir surmonté, comme disait Bernanos. Je crois que ce n'est pas un retour en arrière. C'est un regard en avant mais ça ne veut pas dire qu'il y aura un virage brusque. Le secrétaire général a employé à plusieurs reprises le mot "détente", et je pense qu'il y aura une continuité avec (inaudible). Effectivement le secrétaire général m'a accueilli en se référant à la rencontre que nous avons eue à Helsinki en 1975 et dans ce sens-là il y aura une continuité, mais une continuité dans le dialogue. C'est le mot qu'il a lui-même employé au début. Il n'y avait pas de sentiment de rupture, ni d'immobilisme. Il faut attendre que nous ayons formé notre opinion. Il faut laisser passer le temps, laisser passer les élections. Il n'y avait rien de ça. C'était maintenant, c'est (inaudible). Alors il faut regarder l'avenir avec l'espoir.

Q. Et pour votre mission pour la paix, c'est important?

R. Ma mission, ce n'est pas important. Ce qui est important, c'est que le monde, les leaders politiques marchent vers la paix. Comme il était indiqué, ils semblent, eux, disposés à marcher vers la paix sans récrimination, sans ressasser les vieilles histoires. Je crois que c'est aussi l'attitude de l'Alliance atlantique. Nous l'avons indiqué assez clairement à Bruxelles, en décembre, lorsque nous avons parlé du besoin de renouer le dialogue sur un pied d'égalité, non sur une base de supériorité, de supérieur à inférieur. Nous avons indiqué clairement que nous entendions respecter les intérêts de l'autre, comme nous voulions qu'il respecte les nôtres. Ça, c'est une base politique. De notre côté, à cause de l'hiatus des derniers mois, nous ne savions pas comment eux allaient (inaudible), mais ma conclusion, c'est qu'ils sont tout à fait sur la même longueur d'ondes que nous. Je dois dire qu'effectivement cela prendra un peu de temps.

Q. John Burns, New York Times: Prime Minister, as the head of a NATO government that has supported the deployment of the missiles in Europe, did you find it necessary to speak the NATO position on this or to argue from a NATO position for a Soviet return to the INF negotiations, in particular. And the second part of the question, on a different matter, did Mr. Chernenko, at any point, cite specifically the pronouncements of his predecessor, Mr. Andropov, on this or other arms issues? The most recent major

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Soviet statement on arms was on January 25 by Mr. Andropov, and it would be interesting to know if he is citing that in reference to INF or (inaudible).

A. There was no specific reference to INF. There was no specific reference to any particular forum, Geneva or Stockholm -- with the exception, as I said, of Vienna. You could interpret many of the things he said as being conducted at one or other of those forums. He did talk of confidence-building measures -- that might be Stockholm; he did talk of the need to reduce the nuclear arms drastically -- and that could be Geneva. But there was no indication on his part that he had chosen a forum or the message.

There was a great openness and effort to indicate that they wanted the dialogue to resume in whatever forum, in whatever way that both sides could agree on.

On the first part of your question, the answer is no. I made no effort to justify our past position nor to attack theirs. On the contrary, I indicated that the Canadian initiative sprung from the almost inevitability of a deadlock arising towards the end of 1983. And it is because it was more and more obvious, particularly after the Korean Airline disaster, that there was not a period of fruitful exchange, that there would be a kind of a buildup towards the deadline that had been set in December 1979 -- the deadline of December 1983 -- that the whole Canadian initiative was being concerned with what would happen after, to fill that vacuum. Would both sides slam the door and turn their backs on each other forever? Would they keep shouting during the whole year of 1984 and beyond? Or would our side suggest that we set the megaphones aside and begin serious negotiations, and would their side respond in the same way? We were looking beyond 1983 and, in my talks with the General Secretary, I was looking beyond 1983 because we are here and now. It's a short window, as I say, between now and the end of June.

Q. Any reference to Mr. Andropov's statement?

R. No reference, no quoted reference to his statements. Certainly nothing, as I said earlier, returning to INF specifically. The only conditions that we had heard. No preconditions. The one return to the past, the link to the past, as I said earlier in French, was to détente: at the 1975 meeting we had in Helsinki and to the need to return to that period.

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Q. You said that it was what was left unsaid yesterday which you considered important. I am wondering if you could define whatever signal you may have seen yesterday or may have received in your meeting today that would suggest a departure from the Andropov period, and what fresh opportunities you see now.

A. Mr. Andropov had pretty well to live up to the threat that he had delivered: that if the West deployed, they would break off negotiations. And the whole question -- practically the sole question -- in our minds is how can he come back to the table at some point having said that he would leave. As Churchill always used to say, it's easier to leave than to come back. You say, well that's the opposition that he's talking about. You know, they've left the table, how do they come back? Everyone was conjecturing on the time it would take and what way it would happen and so on. Well, there's a new man there, a man who was not particularly an Andropov man -- he goes back to Brezhnev and the days of detente -- therefore he doesn't have to be saddled with specific positions. I am not suggesting that there will be a turn-around or an interruption of continuity, but there is an occasion to return to the table, or to return to the dialogue in (inaudible) and I can't blame them for saying "well okay, you're using the right words now, but what are going to be your actions?" We use the same language with them, you know. They're trying to talk to you, but what will you do in actions. Both sides are saying the same thing: talk, lower the decibels, (inaudible) something to take a small step. We are telling them "well, you take one, too" and I think that is open of us. It's a new ballgame, a new pitcher.

Q. Newsweek: Could you tell us a little bit about the working style between Mr. Chernenko and Mr. Gromyko. Did Chernenko use notes, how much of a load did he carry as opposed to Mr. Gromyko and what was your impression of Chernenko's ability to deal in specific terms with the issues involved.

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A. Well that's a difficult question. We had thirty minutes together, more or less, and as you know half of it is taken by translation, so it's pretty hard to form a definitive judgement. But certainly Mr. Chernenko had a program. He did have notes. He had a certain number of things he wanted to say. He said them and he repeated some of them, particularly encouraging me to pursue the initiative. They found that it had value, that it was useful and practical. Practical is a word that came back several times. So, I imagine that he knew what he wanted to say in his short period of time, and I imagine it was the same with the other leaders. He was carrying the main thrust of the policy -- the message that they wanted to get through; Gromyko was more ad libbing and referring a bit more to the issues that I had raised.

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P. TRUDEAU-CHERNENKO: 1ST LD: 0415

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1ST LEAD-544 (UPDATED THROUGHOUT)

MOSCOW (AFP-CP) - PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU SAID AFTER A MEETING WITH KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO TODAY THAT THE NEW SOVIET LEADER ALLUDED SEVERAL TIMES TO THE NEED FOR EAST-WEST DETENTE.

THE ONLY CONDITIONS CHERNENKO POSED ARE THAT EAST-WEST DIALOGUE BE CONDUCTED AS BETWEEN EQUALS AND THAT THERE BE NO DIALOGUE JUST FOR THE SAKE OF DIALOGUE, TRUDEAU TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE.

DURING HIS 30-MINUTE MEETING WITH THE NEW COMMUNIST PARTY GENERAL SECRETARY, THE MOST POWERFUL POST IN THE SOVIET UNION, THE CANADIAN LEADER SAID CHERNENKO TALKED ABOUT THE NEED TO REDUCE THE NUCLEAR THREAT AND REDUCE SIGNIFICANTLY THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR ARMS.

BUT HE SAID CHERNENKO MADE NO REFERENCE TO PAST EAST-WEST DIFFERENCES AND REFRAINED FROM DIRECT CRITICISM OF THE NATO DEPLOYMENT OF U.S. INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR MISSILES IN WESTERN EUROPE, WHICH FORCED THE SOVIETS TO BREAK OFF THE GENEVA ARMS TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES.

TRUDEAU DESCRIBED CHERNENKO AS BEING "ON THE SAME WAVELENGTH AS US," BUT SAID THIS DOES NOT NECESSARILY PROMISE ANY SHARP CHANGE IN THE SOVIET POSITION.

HE SAID CHERNENKO IS A "SOLID . . . REALISTIC . . . PRACTICAL MAN (WHO GETS) STRAIGHT TO THE POINT."

"PRACTICAL IS A WORD WHICH CAME BACK OFTEN DURING THE MEETING," TRUDEAU SAID.

FIRST CYCLE OVER

REFERRING TO HIS OWN EAST-WEST PEACE INITIATIVE, BASED ON THE IDEA OF A CONFERENCE AMONG THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS - THE SOVIET UNION, THE UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, FRANCE AND CHINA - TRUDEAU SAID THE "FIRST CYCLE IS OVER," BUT THAT THERE IS NO ANSWER HOW THINGS MAY DEVELOP IN THE COMING MONTHS.

HE DID NOT IMMEDIATELY INDICATE HOW CHERNENKO GREETED HIS PEACE PROPOSALS. TRUDEAU HAD PREVIOUSLY VISITED ALL OTHER MAJOR COUNTRIES CONCERNED WITH HIS INITIATIVE.

TRUDEAU, WHO NOW RETURNS TO OTTAWA, SAID CHERNENKO, ACCOMPANIED AT THEIR MEETING BY FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI GROMYKO, USED NO STALLING LANGUAGE ON A POSSIBLE RESUMPTION OF EAST-WEST DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS.

HE DID NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, SAY SUCH A RESUMPTION WOULD HAVE TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION NEXT NOVEMBER, TRUDEAU SAID.

TRUDEAU HAD MET CHERNENKO FOR FIRST TIME TUESDAY DURING A BRIEF ENCOUNTER AT A RECEPTION FOLLOWING THE FUNERAL OF CHERNENKO'S PREDECESSOR, YURI ANDROPOV.

ALSO ON TUESDAY, TRUDEAU HELD TALKS WITH OTHER FOREIGN LEADERS, AMONG THEM CUBAN PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO, WEST GERMAN CHANCELLOR HELMUT SCHMIDT, SWEDISH PRIME MINISTER OLOF PALME AND PAKISTANI PRESIDENT ZIA UL-HAQ. THE SUBJECTS THEY DISCUSSED WERE NOT DISCLOSED.

NO PICKUP

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15-02-84

OTTAWA (CP) - PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU SAID TODAY THAT NEW SOVIET LEADER KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO PRAISED HIS PEACE INITIATIVE AS "USEFUL AND PRACTICAL" DURING A 30-MINUTE MEETING.

IT ISN'T CLEAR; THE PRIME MINISTER TOLD REPORTERS IN MOSCOW LATER; WHETHER OR NOT THERE WILL BE ANY FURTHER MEETINGS WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS ON HIS PEACE PROPOSALS. BUT TRUDEAU SAID THAT DOESN'T MEAN HIS EFFORT TO PROMOTE NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL TALKS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET SUPERPOWERS ARE CONCLUDED.

"THINGS ARE HAPPENING," TRUDEAU SAID; "THE INITIATIVE IS NOT ONLY LIVE BUT IS BECOMING A PRACTICAL REALITY; NOW THAT WE ARE NOT SHOUTING; NOW THAT WE ARE TALKING; NOW THAT WE HAVE RETURNED TO POLITICAL CONTACT IN STOCKHOLM."

DISARMAMENT TALKS THAT BEGAN IN STOCKHOLM IN JANUARY HAVE ABOUT A MONTH TO RUN.

TRUDEAU SAID HE TRIED TO IMPRESS UPON CHERNENKO THAT THERE IS "A POLITICAL WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY" OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL MONTHS DURING WHICH EASTERN AND WESTERN NATIONS CAN RESUME TALKS AIMED AT REDUCING TENSIONS BETWEEN THE OPPOSING MILITARY ALLIANCES.

FOR HIS PART, CHERNENKO DISPLAYED "GREAT OPENNESS AND EFFORT TO INDICATE THAT THEY WANTED THE DIALOGUE TO RESUME IN WHATEVER FORUM AND WHATEVER WAY BOTH SIDES CAN AGREE ON," TRUDEAU SAID.

THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE MADE A TAPE-RECORDED COPY OF A PRESS BRIEFING IN MOSCOW AVAILABLE TO REPORTERS IN OTTAWA.

MORE LATER

15-02-84 1206ES

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PM-TRUDEAU-CHERNENKO 1ST LD CXN: 0096
URGENT

!!! CORRECTION

MOSCOW 1ST LEAD-551 PARA 9 FAVORABLE
REACTION . . . MONTHS.

THE PRIME MINISTER SAID CHERNENKO REACTED FAVORABLY TO HIS PROPOSAL FOR A FIVE-NUCLEAR-POWER SUMMIT, BUT NO SPECIFIC DATES WERE DISCUSSED AND A U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT WAS NOT PROPOSED BY EITHER THE CANADIAN OR SOVIET SIDE; ALTHOUGH CHERNENKO SAID WOULD WELCOME A MEETING WITH OTHER WORLD LEADERS, TRUDEAU HAD PREVIOUSLY VISITED ALL OTHER MAJOR COUNTRIES CONCERNED WITH HIS INITIATIVE.

TRUDEAU: WHO . . . PARA 10 1ST LEAD-5
51

15-02-84 1214ES

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Q. Stuart Gordon, CNN: Did you talk specifically about INF and (inaudible) of the strategic nuclear arms talks, and if so, did he give you any idea that they may be willing to compromise their position?

A. I don't think they know. We didn't talk specifically on that -- certainly not the INF-- but the General Secretary talked specifically of the need to reduce the nuclear threat and reduce the number of nuclear arms significantly in a major way, hoping for real progress.

Q. Jean-Pierre Quittard, Radio-Canada: Il y a, en ce moment, deux attitudes à Moscou. Il y a des optimistes qui pensent qu'avec M. Chernenko il va y avoir un dialogue, et les réalistes qui pensent (inaudible) qu'il n'y a rien à espérer. Dans quelle catégorie vous situez-vous, les réalistes ou les optimistes, et quelle est, pour vous, l'importance de cette nouvelle élection pour votre croisade pour la paix?

.../5

- 5 -

R. Je voudrais me catégoriser dans le groupe des réalistes. Je ne crois pas à l'optimisme. Je crois au désespoir surmonté, comme disait Bernanos. Je crois que ce n'est pas un retour en arrière. C'est un regard en avant mais ça ne veut pas dire qu'il y aura un virage brusque. Le secrétaire général a employé à plusieurs reprises le mot "détente", et je pense qu'il y aura une continuité avec (inaudible). Effectivement le secrétaire général m'a accueilli en se référant à la rencontre que nous avons eue à Helsinki en 1975 et dans ce sens-là il y aura une continuité, mais une continuité dans le dialogue. C'est le mot qu'il a lui-même employé au début. Il n'y avait pas de sentiment de rupture, ni d'immobilisme. Il faut attendre que nous ayons formé notre opinion. Il faut laisser passer le temps, laisser passer les élections. Il n'y avait rien de ça. C'était maintenant, c'est (inaudible). Alors il faut regarder l'avenir avec l'espoir.

Q. Et pour votre mission pour la paix, c'est important?

R. Ma mission, ce n'est pas important. Ce qui est important, c'est que le monde, les leaders politiques marchent vers la paix. Comme il était indiqué, ils semblent, eux, disposés à marcher vers la paix sans récrimination, sans ressasser les vieilles histoires. Je crois que c'est aussi l'attitude de l'Alliance atlantique. Nous l'avons indiqué assez clairement à Bruxelles, en décembre, lorsque nous avons parlé du besoin de renouer le dialogue sur un pied d'égalité, non sur une base de supériorité, de supérieur à inférieur. Nous avons indiqué clairement que nous entendions respecter les intérêts de l'autre, comme nous voulions qu'il respecte les nôtres. Ça, c'est une base politique. De notre côté, à cause de l'hiatus des derniers mois, nous ne savions pas comment eux allaient (inaudible), mais ma conclusion, c'est qu'ils sont tout à fait sur la même longueur d'ondes que nous. Je dois dire qu'effectivement cela prendra un peu de temps.

Q. John Burns, New York Times: Prime Minister, as the head of a NATO government that has supported the deployment of the missiles in Europe, did you find it necessary to speak the NATO position on this or to argue from a NATO position for a Soviet return to the INF negotiations, in particular. And the second part of the question, on a different matter, did Mr. Chernenko, at any point, cite specifically the pronouncements of his predecessor, Mr. Andropov, on this or other arms issues? The most recent major

- 6 -

Soviet statement on arms was on January 25 by Mr. Andropov, and it would be interesting to know if he is citing that in reference to INF or (inaudible).

A. There was no specific reference to INF. There was no specific reference to any particular forum, Geneva or Stockholm -- with the exception, as I said, of Vienna. You could interpret many of the things he said as being conducted at one or other of those forums. He did talk of confidence-building measures -- that might be Stockholm; he did talk of the need to reduce the nuclear arms drastically -- and that could be Geneva. But there was no indication on his part that he had chosen a forum or the message.

There was a great openness and effort to indicate that they wanted the dialogue to resume in whatever forum, in whatever way that both sides could agree on.

On the first part of your question, the answer is no. I made no effort to justify our past position nor to attack theirs. On the contrary, I indicated that the Canadian initiative sprung from the almost inevitability of a deadlock arising towards the end of 1983. And it is because it was more and more obvious, particularly after the Korean Airline disaster, that there was not a period of fruitful exchange, that there would be a kind of a buildup towards the deadline that had been set in December 1979 -- the deadline of December 1983 -- that the whole Canadian initiative was being concerned with what would happen after, to fill that vacuum. Would both sides slam the door and turn their backs on each other forever? Would they keep shouting during the whole year of 1984 and beyond? Or would our side suggest that we set the megaphones aside and begin serious negotiations, and would their side respond in the same way? We were looking beyond 1983 and, in my talks with the General Secretary, I was looking beyond 1983 because we are here and now. It's a short window, as I say, between now and the end of June.

Q. Any reference to Mr. Andropov's statement?

R. No reference, no quoted reference to his statements. Certainly nothing, as I said earlier, returning to INF specifically. The only conditions that we had heard. No preconditions. The one return to the past, the link to the past, as I said earlier in French, was to détente: at the 1975 meeting we had in Helsinki and to the need to return to that period.

.../7

- 7 -

Q. You said that it was what was left unsaid yesterday which you considered important. I am wondering if you could define whatever signal you may have seen yesterday or may have received in your meeting today that would suggest a departure from the Andropov period, and what fresh opportunities you see now.

A. Mr. Andropov had pretty well to live up to the threat that he had delivered: that if the West deployed, they would break off negotiations. And the whole question -- practically the sole question -- in our minds is how can he come back to the table at some point having said that he would leave. As Churchill always used to say, it's easier to leave than to come back. You say, well that's the opposition that he's talking about. You know, they've left the table, how do they come back? Everyone was conjecturing on the time it would take and what way it would happen and so on. Well, there's a new man there, a man who was not particularly an Andropov man -- he goes back to Brezhnev and the days of detente -- therefore he doesn't have to be saddled with specific positions. I am not suggesting that there will be a turn-around or an interruption of continuity, but there is an occasion to return to the table, or to return to the dialogue in (inaudible) and I can't blame them for saying "well okay, you're using the right words now, but what are going to be your actions?" We use the same language with them, you know. They're trying to talk to you, but what will you do in actions. Both sides are saying the same thing: talk, lower the decibels, (inaudible) something to take a small step. We are telling them "well, you take one, too" and I think that is open of us. It's a new ballgame, a new pitcher.

Q. Newsweek: Could you tell us a little bit about the working style between Mr. Chernenko and Mr. Gromyko. Did Chernenko use notes, how much of a load did he carry as opposed to Mr. Gromyko and what was your impression of Chernenko's ability to deal in specific terms with the issues involved.

.../8

- 8 -

A. Well that's a difficult question. We had thirty minutes together, more or less, and as you know half of it is taken by translation, so it's pretty hard to form a definitive judgement. But certainly Mr. Chernenko had a program. He did have notes. He had a certain number of things he wanted to say. He said them and he repeated some of them, particularly encouraging me to pursue the initiative. They found that it had value, that it was useful and practical. Practical is a word that came back several times. So, I imagine that he knew what he wanted to say in his short period of time, and I imagine it was the same with the other leaders. He was carrying the main thrust of the policy -- the message that they wanted to get through; Gromyko was more ad libbing and referring a bit more to the issues that I had raised.

- 30 -



Office of the
Secretary of State
for External Affairs

Cabinet du
Secrétaire d'État
aux Affaires extérieures

TO/À: IDDZ

Date 17/2/84

FROM/DE: MINA/DUDOIT

REFERENCE/RÉFÉRENCE:

SUBJECT/SUJET: Minister's decision/Décision du Ministre

For your information

Mr. Delisle O/R
[Signature]
file
[Signature]



Government of Canada
Privy Council Office

Gouvernement du Canada
Bureau du Conseil privé


Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0A3

le 15 février 1984

Cher Alain,

Tu trouveras ci-joint le mémoire de M. MacEachen, en date du 8 février, concernant une conversation entre le Premier ministre et le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures à l'égard de propos entretenus entre le Premier ministre et son homologue Tchèque, M. Strougal.

Ce mémoire étant largement dépasser par les événement (la mort de M. Andropov etc.), nous te le retournons sans l'avoir passer au Premier ministre.



Joseph P. Caron
Politique étrangère et défense

Monsieur Alain Dudoit
Adjoint ministériel principal
Ministère des Affaires extérieures
Immeuble Lester B. Pearson
Tour "A" 10^e étage
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0G2

Canada

000023

Deputy Prime Minister
Secretary of State for External Affairs



Vice-premier ministre
Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures

Canada

SECRET

February 8, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

YOUR PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH CZECH PM STROUGAL

I have read with great interest the account of your private conversation with Prime Minister Strougal in the course of which he gave you some information on the state of President Andropov's health and on Soviet thinking regarding the future of the INF and START negotiations. Although I cannot be sure how new this information might be to the USA Administration, I think that it is of direct interest to the USA and should be shared.

If you agree, we might communicate this information to the USA by (a) your sending a personal letter to President Reagan or (b) having our ambassador in Washington pass it on to a senior official in the State Department or (c) transmitting it through existing Canada-USA intelligence channels. In this instance, I think that a démarche by Ambassador Gotlieb might be most appropriate.

I should be grateful for your views on this matter.

A.J.M.
A.J.M.



TRANSMITTAL SLIP - NOTE D'ENVOI


TO/À DMF (through IFB)

FROM/DE IDD

SUBJECT/SUJET INF:Meeting of the Special
Consultative Group (SCG) Feb.20/84

Security Sécurité	CONFIDENTIAL
File Dossier	
Date	February 15, 1984

ATTACHMENT **Memorandum to the Deputy Prime Minister and**
PIÈCE JOINTE **Secretary of State for External Affairs (IDR-0560)**

DISTRIBUTION	RECORD OF CONSULTATION (Names/Divisions) RAPPORT DE CONSULTATION (Noms des individus/Directions)	ACTION/SUITE À DONNER
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IDDZ NDHQ/ADMPOL /CPP /DNACPOL /D STRAT A		REQUIRED BY/DEMANDÉ POUR  J.R. Francis, Acting Director General, Bureau of International Security and Arms Control

TO BE RETAINED WITH FILE COPY - A CONSERVER AVEC L'EXEMPLAIRE DESTINÉ AU DOSSIER

EXT 401

A.A. Després
Defence Relations Division
2-6205

CONFIDENTIAL

February 15, 1984

IDR-0560

Memorandum for:
The Deputy Prime Minister and
Secretary of State for External Affairs

cc: Minister for International Trade
cc: Minister for External Relations

SUBJECT: INF: Meeting of the Special Consultative Group (SCG),
February 20, 1984

PURPOSE:

To report on the last SCG meeting and to recommend for your approval the position Canada should take at the next meeting scheduled for February 20, 1984 in Brussels.

BACKGROUND:

? // The situation with regard to INF remains generally unchanged and prospects for a resumption of the INF negotiations in the foreseeable future have not improved appreciably. It was confirmed during your meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Stockholm last month and his meeting with Secretary Shultz that Moscow maintains its precondition of a halt to NATO INF deployments and a withdrawal of missiles already deployed, although Soviet rhetoric has been toned down slightly. Preparations for the Soviet deployment of new shorter range SS-22 missiles in the GDR are proceeding ostentatiously.

In the broader context, the Stockholm conference seems to be progressing as smoothly as could be expected and the date of March 16 has now been agreed for the resumption of the MBFR talks in Vienna.

? // It is doubtful that the recent change in Soviet leadership will have any short or medium term impact on Soviet policy.

THE LAST SCG MEETING:

The last SCG meeting on January 11 in Brussels focussed on public handling questions and possible options open to the Soviet Union in the wake of their disruption of arms control talks. Without exception, European representatives

.../2

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CONFIDENTIAL

reported a decline in public agitation since the beginning of NATO deployments. It was noted, however, that this was in part due to the holiday season and a need for the "peace" movements to review their tactics rather than reflecting increased public acceptance of deployment or apathy among those opposed. It was considered premature to discuss possible Soviet negotiating options in the absence of clear indications of where the Russians will want to go from here. It was generally believed that the Russians were still engaged in a review of their position and remained undecided on how to proceed.

There was general appreciation of the need to seek to create an East-West climate conducive to the resumption of the negotiations. The importance of the Stockholm Conference was stressed in this context.

FR 6 ?
The Canadian Representative pointed to Canadian efforts to encourage a better East-West atmosphere in which such negotiations as INF, START and MBFR should be conducted. We urged that the SCG be imaginative and active not only in considering public relations issues but also in its discussions of the substance of the INF negotiating position. We also suggested that the SCG should remain active in examining the basis and objectives of these negotiations, without of course taking any steps to suggest to the Russians that they need simply wait for NATO's position to change. Our view received some support, particularly from the Netherlands and Norwegian Representatives.

THE NEXT SCG MEETING:

cdn
Like the last one, the meeting scheduled for February 20 will be a short one, luncheon and a half day of discussions. The Canadian Representative will be Mr. W.M. Beckett, from the Department of National Defence. The group will continue discussions begun at the last meeting on possible Soviet approaches to INF. Although no important policy changes on arms control are expected in the short or medium term, we assume the SCG will wish to consider how the current change in Soviet leadership might affect the future of INF. In addition to the usual intelligence briefing and public handling items, the discussions will focus on East European reactions to INF, in particular to Soviet countermeasures. The Chairman asked that representatives provide any insight they might have gained on this subject through bilateral contacts with Eastern European capitals.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

We propose that Canada should continue to encourage the United States and other SCG participants to remain active in addressing the basis and objectives of the INF negotiations taking into account possible new Soviet approaches to the

.../3

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- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL

negotiations. We would propose that the SCG consider whether there are initiatives the West could contemplate in due course to take advantage of any opportunity offered by the change in Soviet leadership to encourage a more forthcoming attitude from Moscow on INF.

We believe the Canadian Representative should also report on the discussions on INF and related subjects which took place during the recent visit by the Prime Minister to three Eastern European capitals, and during the Rumanian Foreign Minister's visit to Ottawa last week. He will point out that arrangements are being made for a formal briefing to NATO by Mr. Hancock on the Prime Minister's visit to Eastern Europe. A separate delegation will visit Brussels for consultations on the three Canadian discussion papers related to anti-satellite weapons and nuclear arms verification.

Do you agree?

Original Signed by
Original signé par
M. SHENSTONE

M. Shenstone,
Assistant Deputy Minister,
Political and International
Security Affairs.

for de Montigny Marchand

file diary circ div

PSR- 347

Mr. Smith
Mr. McMe

CONFIDENTIAL

OTTAWA, K1A 0G2
February 15, 1984

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Mr. Paul Durand
Mr. Paul Durand
Privy Council Office
Langevin Block
OTTAWA, Ontario

Dear Paul,

Further to my letter to you of February 9, 1984, I was informed this morning by the Indian Acting High Commissioner, Mr. K.P. Fabian, that the Greek Prime Minister, Mr. Papandreou, had accepted Mrs. Gandhi's invitation to visit Delhi for her "peace" initiative meeting. The dates now projected are March 5 and 6. Mr. Fabian indicated that Mrs. Gandhi was "very keen" that Prime Minister Trudeau should participate in the meeting. Mr. Fabian did not, however, know if any of the other invitees had agreed to attend. We indicated to Mr. Fabian that we would pass on to you the above information.

As Mr. Trudeau and Mrs. Gandhi are currently in Moscow for Andropov's funeral, it is possible that this matter has already been discussed between them. Any information you may be able to provide following the return of the Canadian delegation would be welcome.

Yours sincerely,

A.G. Vincent

A.G. Vincent
Director
South & Southeast Asia Relations
Division

Canada

Canada

FILE DIARY DIV CIRC WF

J.A. Fox/6-4528/mer

TO A IDR

FROM DE URR

REFERENCE • Your Telegram 0443 of February 7, 1984
RÉFÉRENCESUBJECT • BRIEFING ON U.S. STRATEGIC
SUJET DEFENCE INITIATIVE

Security/Securité	S E C R E T
Accession/Référence	
File/Dossier	
Date	February 15, 1984
Number/Numéro	URR-0113

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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The referenced telegram on the recent briefing by U.S. officials on the Strategic Defence Initiative has prompted us to provide the following comments intended to supplement your report and to propose a follow-up course of action.

One of the key points made by the briefing team in explaining the rationale for the SDI was that the massive scale of Soviet research efforts in the areas of Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and Anti-Satellite (ASAT) systems would, if they were to proceed unilaterally, make nuclear deterrence impossible to maintain. To prevent such a situation, the briefers argued, the U.S. had really no alternative but to intensify its own R&D efforts although it would not be before 1990 that the feasibility of the proposed SDI could be determined and any decisions regarding deployment taken. While your report refers to this perceived Soviet threat, a proper sense of its apparent magnitude and degree of advancement has not been emphasized. //

The briefers pointed out, for example, that in addition to upgrading the only active BMD system in existence, the Soviets were also developing more advanced BMD systems based on directed energy (lasers and particle beams) and precision sensor technologies. The Soviets also have an operational anti-satellite system (37 tests - nine hits) which has aroused serious concerns about the vulnerability of U.S. satellites. Moreover, although the Soviet Union has abided by the ABM Treaty in respect of numbers, it has nevertheless embarked on a massive program of R&D as indicated by the Pushkino Radar Centre under construction which is expected to house a staff of 9,000 to 10,000 employees. A major issue posed by these Soviet initiatives is the familiar problem of verification. In the case of ABM's, the briefers noted that new Soviet systems would probably be detected only two to three years later.

.../2

SUBJECT
EXT 407

EXT 407

000030


URR-0113

- 2 -

S E C R E T

A brief examination of the proposed funding for the SDI is useful in assessing it within the context of on-going U.S. defence budgeting. Prior to President Reagan's announcement of the SDI in his speech of March 25, 1983, DOD's proposed budget for FY1985 called for expenditures of approximately U.S. \$1.75 billion (an increase of 71% over FY1984) on the various research projects already underway to develop technologies subsequently consolidated and reoriented by the SDI. The President's speech called for a \$250 million or 16% increase for a combined expenditure of \$2 billion out of a proposed \$305 billion DOD budget for FY1985. Thus, viewed in these terms, the SDI represents a modest increase in and share of U.S. defence expenditures, contrary to the impression created by reports in the media.

This U.S. initiative clearly raises a number of questions for Canada which need to be carefully analyzed. As a first step in this process, I propose that a meeting involving interested divisions in this Department as well as DND officials be organized at the earliest opportunity to review the Canadian position on the SDI, particularly vis-à-vis the proposed briefing to Cabinet by Dr. Ikle, assess what affect it might have on Canadian interests (including North American air defence modernization) and consider whether it should be put on the agenda for the next meeting between the DPM/SSEA and Secretary of State Shultz April 1 and 2.


M.G. von Nostitz
Director
United States General
Relations Division



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

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REF YOURTELS YBGR6169 14FEB AND 6173 15FEB, SMITH/HANCOCK TELECON
14FEB

---PM VISIT TO MOSCO AND EASTERN EUROPE:NATO BRIEFING

HANCOCKS ARRANGEMENTS PRECLUDE BEING IN BRU FRI 17FEB.SEE FROM YOUR
SECOND REFTEL THAT MON 20FEB PREFERABLE IN ANY EVENT.PLS PROCEED
WITH INFORMING APPROPRIATE AUTHORITIES AT NATO.HANCOCK WILL ADVISE
TRAVEL PLANS AND HOTEL REQUIREMENTS DIRECT FROM MOSCO.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

G.J.Smith/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

L.A.Delvoie



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

Assistant Deputy Minister Sous-ministre adjoint

Mr. Smith
for info file 16/2
Mr. Delvaud

I spoke to Mrs. O.
about this but did not
give her this paper.

I explained that the
situation was not a "process"
one, but a series of 3
human ones (1 in Moscow -
no report to Dept; 1 in Paris
- no thought even to role
of acting PM; one here -
neither Gary nor I, when I was
told, thought that DPM/SSEA would
have to be informed immediately).
A better process would not guard against
3 errors in success. SSEA had delivered
personnel reprimand. Matter can 000033!
considered closed. She agrees.
MS.



TO/À Mr. Delvois *SD*
FROM/DE • Gary J. Smith

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • Information about PM's Meeting
SUJET with Chernenko

Security/Sécurité
CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
February 15, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0163

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

Here is the sequence of events surrounding the handling of this information on Monday, February 13:

approx. 1630: I was over in Tower A to see Ross Francis about the NATO briefing on the three suffocation proposals, when I received a telephone call from Brian Smith in the PMO telling me he would be transferring a call from the PMO switchboard from Peter Hancock in Moscow.

I received the call from Peter, who told me that a meeting with Chernenko had been set for Wednesday at 1600 hours Moscow time (anticipated length of the meeting and subject were not given), that this should be treated in confidence, and that Brian Smith had been instructed to issue the press release at a time to be determined by the PMO bearing in mind the need to relate this news to that surrounding the budget.

1640: From IDR, I spoke to Brian Smith to determine the nature of the release and its timing. He indicated that it would say "In the context of his initiative, the PM will meet ..." and that the timing of the press release had yet to be determined. I queried whether the proposed language was appropriate, given the fact that the Prime Minister prior to his departure had specifically down-played the initiative element of his presence in Moscow and since we did not know how long the meeting with Chernenko would be (e.g. 10 minutes or an hour) we could not determine how much time would be available to discuss the initiative. I told him I would call back after I had spoken with Hancock again.

...2

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

- 1645: As I was in Tower A, I dropped into Michael Shenstone's office to inform him about the two representations we had received that day from the USA on the three suffocation proposals. We also talked about the contents of Jim Bartleman's memorandum on this subject. During the course of the conversation I mentioned the fact of the Chernenko meeting.
- 1715: I returned to my office and attempted to place a call to Hancock in Moscow. (We were told the waiting time would be anywhere between 1/2 - 1 1/2 hours.) In the interim I wrote three telegrams to Moscow, Washington and NATO concerning the USA démarches as well as the briefing of NATO by Hancock and the proposed briefing team of myself and Calder on the three suffocation proposals.
- During this time John Noble dropped into the office for one of his general chats. I did not inform him about the Chernenko meeting as I first wished to speak to Hancock and Brian Smith. John did not indicate that he was seeking this information and at that time it was not clear when or if the news of the meeting would be made that night.
- 1750: I finally got through to Hancock and spoke about the substance of the press release. He suggested the reference to the initiative could be muted somewhat but not too much.
- 1755: I spoke to Brian Smith, who told me the release was going to be issued immediately and that he had decided to drop all reference to the initiative in the written portion and would deal with it orally.
- 1757: I went to the Press Office to inform John Noble that the press release was going to be issued immediately. I found no one in the Press Office.
- 1815: I left the office for home to get ready for a dinner party.

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- 3 -

CONFIDENTIAL

1930: I understand Alain Dudoit called you,
Barry Mawhinney and Mike Mace to
enquire whether the news stories
about the meeting were correct. I
received no calls myself and left
for dinner at 2000 hours.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'G. J. Smith', with a stylized, cursive script.

G. J. Smith



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -
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MESSAGE

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TO PRMNY

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SUBJ/SUJ

---PM INITIATIVE

WILL BE SENDING YOU BY FAX 16FEB AN EDITED VERSION OF PM 9FEB SPEECH
ON HIS INITIATIVE TO HOUSE OF COMMONS FOR SUBMISSION TO UNDER SEC
GEN MARTENSON IN RESPONSE TO HIS INVITATION FOR PM TO CONTRIBUTE TO
UN JOURNAL QUOTE DISARMAMENT UNQUOTE.

2.THIS REPRESENTS PRIME MINISTER S RECENT THINKING ON SUBJECTS
RAISED BY MARTENSON IN HIS 16DEC LET.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

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SIG J.A. McNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG L.A. DELVOIE

000037

TO/À Mr. Delvoie
FROM/DE • G. J. Smith

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • PM Initiative: USA Embassy Views
SUJET

Security/Sécurité
CONFIDENTIAL
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
February 15, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0161

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

The local Los Angeles Times correspondent, Kenneth Fried, who has just arrived in Canada after four years in Argentina, called on me yesterday, February 14, for a back-ground briefing on the Prime Minister's initiative.

2. He told me that he had been to the USA Embassy that morning and found that the Embassy, which he described as being very "political", had a rather critical view of the PM's initiative and the motives behind it. The Embassy had told him that the initiative should be viewed in domestic political terms and was an attempt by the PM to stir up anti-Americanism, which always had the potential in this country to be an electoral issue. They viewed the current situation as being very much akin to that surrounding the famous Lester Pearson - Lyndon Johnson encounter following Mr. Pearson's Temple University speech on Vietnam, i.e. that we were "pissing in their garden".

3. According to Mr. Fried, the Embassy had said that Prime Minister Trudeau's remarks in Davos had been "irresponsible". They were worried about Alliance unity and the potential being created for the Soviet Union to disaggregate the allies.

4. I informed Mr. Fried that the PM's views on developing good East-West relations were longstanding, and that Canada's outlook on the current situation and suggested remedial action (i.e. high-level East-West dialogue - the "third rail") was a position shared by many of our European allies. Fried said the Embassy tended to dismiss the views of the Europeans as they were driven by their own domestic requirements (e.g. Kohl by Ostpolitik). He did, however, believe that Mrs. Thatcher's new tone and her visits to Hungary and Moscow were significant, as she had been viewed in the USA as being even more hawkish than the Reagan Administration.


G. J. Smith



File

TO/A MINA/Dudoit

FROM/DE • IDDZ

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT • PM Activities in Moscow
SUJET

Security/Sécurité
Unclassified
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
February 15, 1984
Number/Numéro
IDDZ-0160

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

IFB


RGB

RBR

FPR

The following is a summary of the information conveyed to us last night and early this morning by the Embassy in Moscow. This morning the telephone connection was so bad that we cannot be sure that some of the times given are absolutely accurate.

- (a) The Prime Minister has had bilateral meetings with PM Palme of Sweden, Chancellor Kohl of the FRG, President Zia of Pakistan and President Castro of Cuba.
- (b) PM Trudeau is to meet for approximately a half-hour with General Secretary Chernenko at 4:00 p.m. Moscow time (8:00 a.m. EST).
- (c) PM Trudeau is to hold a press conference at approximately 4:30 p.m. Moscow time (8:30 a.m. EST).
- (d) The Embassy hopes to have telegraphic reports to us on the Chernenko meeting and the press conference between 12:00 and 14:00 EST today.
- (e) PM Trudeau and party will depart Moscow at 11:00 p.m. Moscow time today and arrive in Ottawa at 1:00 a.m. Ottawa time on Thursday, February 16.


L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

mf

INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WSHDC UNFC8946 15FEB84

TO BONN

INFO EXTOTT LIDDZ

DISTR UGP FPR

---PEACE INITIATIVE

ARTICLE IN 13FEB84 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR QUOTE US SECURITY
AND LULL IN THE SEARCH FOR ARMS CONTROL UNQUOTE(PART OF GREAT
DECISIONS 84/84 SERIES)WAS WRITTEN FROM BONN BY ELIZABETH POND.
GIVEN HER OBVIOUS INTEREST/KNOWLEDGE OF SUBJECT YOU WILL WANT
TO INCLUDE HER ON YOUR PEACE INITIATIVE LIST(IF SHE IS NOT/NOT
ALREADY ON IT).

UUU/241 161652Z UNFC8946

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR7109 15FEB84

TO EXTOTT LCR DELIVER BY 151200

INFO BNATO LDN/FOR DMF LDN WSHDC BONN PARIS HAVAN PRET LSAKA

HRARE LAGOS STKHM VMFBR PRMNY

DISTR MINA MINE IFB LGB LCD GGB GAD GMR ZSP ZSI FPR IDDZ

---BILATERAL MTG BETWEEN PM AND FIDEL CASTRO

SUBJ MEETING WHICH WAS REQUESTED BY CUBANS WAS HELD FEB14 AT

CDN EMB.CASTRO OPENED BY REFERRING TO HIS FOND MEMORIES OF PM

VISIT TO CUBA AND REITERATED INVITATION FOR PM TO RETURN AT ANY

TIME.HE NEXT INQUIRED AS TO HOW PMS PEACE INITIATIVE WAS FARING

PM RESPONDED BY NOTING THERE WAS A LESSENING OF TENSION,APPEARANCE

OF MORE CONCILITATORY STATEMENTS AND CONVENING OF STKHM CONF AT

LEVEL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS WHICH ALL CONSTITUTED ENCOURAGING SIGNS.

PM REFERRED TO PRES REAGAN STATEMENT THAT NUCLEAR WAR COULD NOT/

NOT BE WON AND THEREFORE SHOULD NEVER BE FOUGHT IN ADDITION,HE

MENTIONED HIS RECENT EAST EUROPEAN TRIP,DECISION TO RECONVENE

MFBR,AND UN SECT GENS AGREEMENT TO CONSIDER PROPOSAL TO GET

FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS TOGETHER PM CONCLUDED BY SAYING THERE HAD

BEEN IMPROVEMENT IN THE WORDS BUT LET US NOW SEE IF WE CAN MOVE

FORWARD TO ACTION.

2.CASTRO ASKED IF MTG OF NUCLEAR POWERS IN NY WOULD BE AT

FOREIGN MINISTERS LEVEL.PM REPLIED THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO BEGIN

AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL BUT WOULD EVENTUALLY BE MOVED TO HIGHER

LEVELS.

...2

PAGE TWO XYGR7109 CONF

3.PM ASKED CASTRO TO COMMENT ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA.CASTRO SAID SOME CONSTRUCTIVE TALKS HAD TAKEN PLACE IN PAST BETWEEN ANGOLA AND SAG AND ALSO WITH USA SWAPO WAS TO HAVE MTG(LDN?)FEB17 TO DISCUSS POSSIBILITY OF APPLYING RESOLUTION 435 IN CONTEXT OF DISENGAGEMENT OF SOUTH AFRICAN FORCES FROM ANGOLA AND CESSATION OF ASSISTANCE TO UNITA.ONCE SAG WITHDRAWAL WAS COMPLETED ANDHELP TO UNITA WAS CUT CUBA WOULD BE PREPARED TO START WITHDRAWING ITS OWN TROOPS.CUBA HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN ANGOLA FOR 8 YEARS AND IS INTERESTED IN BRINGING ABOUT A JUST SOLUTION.ANGOLA MUST BE CAUTIOUS HOWEVER THAT IT DOES NOT/FALL INTO A TRAP,WITH SAG ATTEMPTING DISTABILIZING ACTION AFTERWARDS.THIS COULD BE LIKE CHAD.

4.PM NOTED THAT CDA AS MEMBER OF CONTACT GROUP OBJECTED TO LINKAGE BETWEEN NAMIBIA AND ANGOLA.HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT

SWAPO HAD HAD ITS FIRST FACE-TO-FACE TALKS WITH SAG IN LSAKA

5.CASTRO SAID THAT THEY HAVE LEARNED FROM SAM NUJOMA WHO IS IN MOSCO THAT SWAPO HAD CONTACTS WITH USA EMB IN LSAKA,BUT THEY HAVE NOT/NOT YET RECEIVED DETAILS ON SWAPO MEETING WITH SAG.

CASTRO WAS TO MEET WITH NUJOMA LATER THAT NIGHT AND SUGGESTED PM MIGHT ALSO WISH TO MEET HIM.PM SAID THAT HE HAD MET WITH NUJOMA BEFORE AND EXPECTED TO MEET WITH HIM IN OTT IN A FEW WEEKS TIME

6.TURNING TO BILATERAL AFFAIRS CASTRO MENTIONED RECENT VISITS TO CUBA BY MINISTERS OF AGRICULTURE AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE.

HE ADDED HE HAD FREQUENT CONTACTS WITH CDN EMB AND OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS WERE GOING VERY WELL.PM EXPRESSED HIS PLEASURE AT OPPORTUNITY OF MEETING WITH CASTRO EVEN IF OCCASION FOR IT WAS UNFORTUNATELY A SAD ONE.

CCC/095 151350Z XYGR7109

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6173 15FEB84

TO MOSCO/PMDEL/HANCOCK DELIVER BY 151530

INFO EXTOTT IDR

DISTR DDZ RBD RBR

REF CURTEL YBGR6169

---PMS VISIT TO MOSCO AND EASTERN EUROPE:NATO BRIEFING

INNATL SECRETARIAT HAVE NOW INFORMED US THAT IT WOULD PROBABLY
BE MORE DIFFICULT TO SCHEDULE BRIEFING FEB17 THAN FOLLOWING
MON,FEB20.WE ARE THEREFORE GOING FORWARD WITH PLANS AS SET
OUT PARA 1 REFTEL.GRATEFUL HANCOCK ADVISE ETA AND ACCOMMODATION
REQUIREMENTS

CCC/070 151140Z YBGR6173

MR DELVOIE / MR SMITH

I've just found out that
PPR / Slyfield not in on this mtg - he will reply,

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

copying 1A02

Mr. McNeer

Pls do a two
holding msg

16.2.

Have never heard of this.
Cld you please check with
O/VSS. Thanks

file

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM TOKYO UIGR1550 15FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

DISTR PPR

---PMS INITIATIVE

his office is not aware of this conversation,
but will check with him on his return.

DEATH OF ANDROPOV HAS DRAWN AWAY ATTN OF SOME OF KEY PLAYERS WITH
INTEREST IN PM TRUDEAU'S INITIATIVE; WE HOPE TO HAVE SUBSTANTIVE
SESSIONS WITH OFFICIALS CONCERNED NEXT WEEK, AND PERHAPS
INDICATION OF WHAT WILL BE CONTAINED IN REPLY TO PMS LETTER TO
NAKASOME.

2. KAWASHIMA, DIR FIRST NORTH AMERICAN DIV, INFORMED US TODAY
THAT HE HAS HEARD AMB MIKANAGI RECENTLY HAD INTERESTING DISCUSSION
WITH USS ON SUBJ. GRATEFUL REPORT OF THAT CONVERSATION.

CCC/246 150510Z UIGR1550



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

mission F145

MESSAGE

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

ACTION

FILE/DOSSIER

TOP/TOO

COMMUNICATIONS

FEB 15

U 2 0410

CANADA EMBASSY
WASHINGTON

WDC011/15

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

SECURITY/
SÉCURITÉ

UNCLASSIFIED - FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

FM/DE

FM WREDC POLO783 15 FEB 84

TO/A

INFO

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ/UGB/UR DELBY 151730

DISTR

DRAFT COPY OF SPEECH TO BE DELIVERED BY AMB AT 12 NOON, THURSDAY 16 FEB. GRATEFUL

REF

YOUR COMMENTS - 22 PAGES

SUBJECT

~~MR. DELBY~~ MR. SMITH

3-5 CHERNENKO + DETENTE + PM/CHERNENKO

12 DETERRENCE

17 MBFR

20 PRINCIPLES OF E/W ROW

Overall, the speech seems fine; it is largely a reworking of parts of Speech 3.

Q Draw your attention to four spots that I've queried.

[Signature]

[Signature]

Mr Delvoir is calling Lysyshyn

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APProuvé

SIG

288

SIG

R.J. LYSYSHYN/th

2/2

THIS WEEK A NEW LEADER HAS TAKEN OVER IN THE
SOVIET UNION. THIS FOLLOWS BY A MONTH A MAJOR CHANGE
IN TONE BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN DESCRIBING THE
POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR
AND ITS POTENTIAL. IN THE PAST COUPLE OF DAYS THERE
HAVE BEEN MANY MEETINGS BETWEEN MR. CHERNENKO AND
LEADERS OF THE WEST, INCLUDING VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH,
MRS. THATCHER, CHANCELLOR KOHL, PREMIER MAUROY AND
YESTERDAY, CANADA'S PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU. THIS HAS
ALL BEEN SEEN BY MANY AS A FRESH START. IS IT? IF
SO, IN WHAT DIRECTION WILL IT GO? WHAT ARE ITS
PROSPECTS?

WE HAVE EVEN SEEN SPECULATION ABOUT A "GET
ACQUAINTED" SUMMIT BETWEEN REAGAN AND CHERNENKO. SUCH
OPTIMISM IS OBVIOUSLY LINKED TO THE CONCERN WE HAVE
ALL FELT IN RECENT MONTHS AND YEARS OVER THE
DETERIORATING STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. SOME
OFFICIALS HERE IN THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION HAVE
BEEN SERENE ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE INTERRUPTION
OF PRODUCTIVE CONTACTS AND REGULAR CONSULTATIONS, BUT
MOST OF US HAVE CONSIDERED THE STATE OF AFFAIRS TO BE
DANGEROUS.

- 2 -

3/2

NOW, HOWEVER, AS OPPOSED TO SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, THERE IS OPTIMISM. I DON'T WANT TO SUGGEST THAT THE OPPORTUNITY IS NOT HERE. BUT I DO SUGGEST A LITTLE CAUTION IN OUR APPROACH TO EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN THIS TIME OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION.

AN OPPORTUNITY DOES EXIST, BUT THAT OPPORTUNITY DOES NOT COME FROM THE CHANGE OF LEADERSHIP IN THE SOVIET UNION BUT FROM A CONSCIOUS CHANGE IN THE ATTITUDES AND INDEED IN THE POLICIES BEHIND THE RESPECTIVE APPROACHES OF BOTH SIDES TO THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP AND TO THE QUESTION OF PEACE AND SECURITY. THE CHANGE HAS BEEN MOST EVIDENT IN THE WEST PERHAPS BUT I HOPE WE ARE ALSO SEEING SIGNS OF CHANGE IN THE SOVIET UNION. I TAKE HEART IN MR. CHERNENKO'S EXPRESSIONS THIS WEEK OF HIS WILLINGNESS TO WORK TO DEVELOP EAST-WEST RELATION AND IN SUPPORT HE GAVE YESTERDAY TO PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU'S EFFORTS.

BUT IF WE ARE TO FOSTER THIS CHANGE IN POLICY AND RHETORIC, THIS CHANGE IN THE TREND-LINE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, WE CANNOT BASE OUR HOPES ON CHANGES OF PERSONALITY OR EVEN JUST ON CHANGES IN RHETORIC. POLICY AND ACTS OF STATESMANSHIP MUST BE INVOLVED.

- 3 -

3
HAS ANYTHING REALLY HAPPENED IN MOSCOW WHICH
ARGUES FOR CHANGE? CONTRARY TO WHAT WE HAD SPENT THE
LAST YEAR CONVINCING OURSELVES WOULD HAPPEN, THE
LEADERSHIP OF THE SOVIET UNION CHOSE 72-YEAR OLD
KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO, ONE OF THE OLD-GUARD. THE
CHOICE OF CHERNENKO WAS A RE-AFFIRMATION OF SEVERAL
THINGS BUT FOR US IN THE WEST IT WAS A RE-AFFIRMATION
OF THE FOREIGN POLICY THAT WE HAVE SEEN AND DEALT WITH
FOR THE PAST 20 YEARS. WE MUST THEREFORE IN
DEVELOPING OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION DEAL
WITH THAT POLICY AND ITS VERY IMPORTANT BASIC TENETS.

AS A CLOSE COLLEAGUE OF BREZHNEV, CHERNENKO
MUST BE SEEN AS ALLIED TO THE POLICY OF DETENTE.
BUT HE ALSO MUST BE SEEN AS SHARING IN THE SOVIET
ANGER AT THE FAILURE OF DETENTE. WE ALL KNOW THAT
THERE WERE SERIOUS PROBLEMS OVER DEFINING BOTH THE
STANDARDS OF BEHAVIOUR AND THE SCOPE OF BEHAVIOUR
EXPECTED DURING DETENTE. IN THE WESTERN VIEW, THE
SPIRIT AND THE SUBSTANCE OF DETENTE WERE SIMPLY NOT
ADHERED TO BY THE SOVIET UNION. BUT THAT IS NOT HOW
THE SOVIET UNION SEES IT. DETENTE IN THE SOVIET MIND
WAS AND IS LINKED TO TWO ABSOLUTE REQUIREMENTS. THE
FIRST IS NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF
THE SOVIET UNION. THIS ONE WE HAVE ON THE WHOLE

for RBR to judge

- 4 -

UNDERSTOOD AND MANAGED VERY WELL. WE SUCCEEDED FOR
EXAMPLE IN SEVERELY CRITICIZING SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS
PERFORMANCE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO RESPECT THIS SOVIET
REQUIREMENT.

BUT THE SECOND HAD I THINK BEEN
MISUNDERSTOOD AND THEREFORE LARGELY IGNORED. THIS IS
THE AREA WHERE UNFORTUNATE RHETORIC HAS DONE THE MOST
DAMAGE TO THE RELATIONSHIP.

THE ASPECT THAT I BELIEVE WE HAVE NOT FULLY
UNDERSTOOD IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION SAW IN AND
DEMANDED OF DETENTE FULL RECOGNITION OF EQUALITY
BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. THIS IS A POINT MR.
CHERNENKO TOOK CARE TO STRESS TO PRIME MINISTER
TRUDEAU. IT IS HERE THAT THE QUESTION OF RHETORIC
BECOMES DELICATE. THE SOVIET UNION IS CAPABLE OF USING
SOME OF THE MOST OFFENSIVE LANGUAGE AND RHETORIC.
THEY HAVE IN RECENT TIMES EVEN GONE SO FAR AS TO
PERSONALIZE THEIR RHETORIC BY ATTACKING THE PRESIDENT
AND OTHER OFFICIALS BY NAME. SOVIET CAPACITY TO
ABSORB RHETORIC, OR RATHER TO LET IT SIMPLY BOUNCE OFF
IS HOWEVER COMPLEX. SOME RHETORIC IT CAN DEAL WITH,
BUT RHETORIC THAT ATTACKS THE SOVIET SENSE OF EQUALITY
IS A DIFFERENT MATTER. THUS LANGUAGE THAT SUGGESTS
THE SOVIET UNION IS SOMEHOW INFERIOR, THAT ITS

DETENTE

did he?

- 5 -

6/22

GOVERNMENT IS ILLEGITIMATE, THAT IT CAN BE BULLIED, OR EVEN WORSE, DEFEATED, EITHER MILITARILY OR THROUGH EXPLOITATION OF ITS OWN ECONOMIC WEAKNESSES, CUTS TO THE HEART OF THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF DETENTE AND UNDERMINES ITS WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE IN OTHER AREAS.

RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT BE CONDUCTED ON THE BASIS OF A HOPE OF GETTING A CLEAN SLATE OR OF MAKING A SUDDEN CHANGE IN DIRECTION. WE WILL HAVE TO LIVE FOR A LONG TIME WITH ANY ERRORS THAT WE MAKE. THE MAJOR ERROR THAT BOTH SIDES MAY HAVE MADE IS TO ALLOW THE LACK OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE TO DOMINATE THE RELATIONSHIP, TO ALLOW UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE OTHER'S REAL INTENTIONS TO DETERMINE THE TREND-LINE. CHANGES IN RHETORIC AND TONE ARE THEREFORE IMPORTANT EXPRESSIONS, BUT SPECIFIC ACTS OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING ARE VITAL.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, THE EASING OF STRAINS BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR ARE IMPORTANT FOR THE SECURITY OF ALL NATIONS. ALL OF US MUST GET INVOLVED IN THIS SEARCH FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS. ALL OF US HAVE A ROLE IN RE-ESTABLISHING CONFIDENCE.

- 6 -

7/22

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION AS THE TWO SUPERPOWERS WOULD BE RIVAL WORLD POWERS EVEN WITHOUT A VERY REAL IDEOLOGICAL COMPETITION. THEIR RELATIONSHIP WHICH IS DISTINGUISHED AND UNIQUELY DEFINED BY THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR RIVALRY HAS PROPERTIES ALL OF ITS OWN. AN INCREASE IN THE TENSION OF THAT POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WHEN SEEN AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF AN INCREASE IN DISORDER IN THE WORLD, GENERALLY SEEMS, TO MOST PEOPLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, TO INCREASE THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR.

THE USA ADMINISTRATION ENGAGED AS IT IS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF THAT BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP IS MORE APT TO MINIMIZE THAT THREAT AND TO SEE IT AS A SUB-THEME OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THERE IS OBVIOUSLY CONFIDENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S ABILITY TO MANAGE ITS RELATIONS IN THE SENSE OF AMERICAN INTERESTS. THE PUBLIC IN MY COUNTRY, IN EUROPE, AND I AM SURE IN MANY OF YOUR COUNTRIES TENDS TO SEE THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR AS THE CENTRAL THEME ITSELF IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THERE IS LESS OF A WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE THEME THAT THE SITUATION IS UNDER TOTAL MANAGEMENT. THIS IS NORMAL, TO SAY THE LEAST.

- 7 -

8/22

THE PEACE INITIATIVE THAT CANADA HAS
LAUNCHED AND TO WHICH PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU HAS
DEVOTED HIMSELF ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY IN THE LAST THREE
OR FOUR MONTHS RESPONDS DIRECTLY TO THIS DEEP CONCERN
OF THE CANADIAN PUBLIC. THE SUPPORT THE PRIME
MINISTER HAS RECEIVED FROM THE OPPOSITION PARTIES
ILLUSTRATES THIS POINT VERY WELL. THE INITIATIVE DOES
NOT REFLECT DEFEATISM, NEUTRALISM OR BETTER RED THAN
DEADISM. FAR FROM IT. WE KNOW WHERE WE STAND. WE
ARE MEMBERS OF NATO, WHO BELIEVE FIRMLY THAT THE BEST
SECURITY FOR THE WEST AND FOR THE WORLD LIES IN A
CREDIBLE AND EFFECTIVE DETERRENT. WE THEREFORE
CONTRIBUTE SUBSTANTIALLY TO WESTERN DEFENCE.

PRESIDENT REAGAN REPEATED ON JANUARY 25 THAT
THE USA IS DETERMINED TO ENSURE THAT A NUCLEAR WAR
NEVER TAKES PLACE. BUT THE FEAR OF SUCH A THREAT IS
NONETHELESS REAL IN THE MINDS OF OUR PUBLICS. IT IS
IN THIS CONTEXT THAT IT BECOMES AN IMPERATIVE OF THE
CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY, AS IT IS OF EVERYONE ELSE'S
FOREIGN POLICY, TO DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO HELP ENSURE
THAT NUCLEAR WAR IS AVOIDED. LAST YEAR AT THE
WILLIAMSBURG SUMMIT ALL SEVEN LEADERS OF THE
INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES PROMISED "TO DEVOTE OUR
FULL POLITICAL RESOURCES TO REDUCING THE THREAT OF

- 8 -

9/22

WAR". WE ARE PLEASED TO SEE GROWING EVIDENCE THAT OTHER LEADERS AROUND THE WORLD ARE ALSO TAKING STEPS TO LIVE UP TO THAT STATEMENT.

THE OBJECTIVE IS NOT TO MAKE SUDDEN SHIFTS IN THE STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. I HAVE ALREADY ARGUED THAT THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE. INSTEAD WE SEEK TO CHANGE THE "TREND-LINE" IN TERMS OF THE LEVEL OF TENSIONS IN THE WORLD. THIS MEANS, IN OUR VIEW, TRYING TO POLITICIZE THE PROCESS BY GETTING GREATER CONTROL OF EVENTS IN THE HANDS OF POLITICIANS RATHER THAN TECHNICIANS AND TO ENSURE THAT POLITICAL LEADERS IN THE WORLD ARE IN CONTROL OF EVENTS RATHER THAN VICE-VERSA.

THE IMMEDIATE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR MAY NOT BE GREAT BUT WE MUST REMAIN CONSCIOUS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF MISCALCULATION OR ACCIDENT, ESPECIALLY WHEN COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE PRINCIPALS IS VERY LIMITED. AND WE MUST REMAIN CONSCIOUS OF, AND CONCERNED BY, WHAT THE NEXT TEN YEARS MIGHT BRING IN THE WAY OF PROLIFERATION AND OF INCREASED TECHNOLOGICAL POSSIBILITIES, THE RACE TOWARDS DESTABILIZING SYSTEMS SUCH AS EFFECTIVE ANTI-SUBMARINE, ANTI-SATELLITE, AND EVEN ANTI-MISSILE

- 9 -

10/22

SYSTEMS SHOULD BE EFFECTIVELY HALTED STARTING NOW IF THE MOST SERIOUS THREAT TO WORLD PEACE IS TO BE AVOIDED. THIS IS THE BASIC ISSUE OF CONFIDENCE. IT HAS TO BE TAKEN ON BY POLITICAL LEADERS.

THERE HAS BEEN AN OVER-EMPHASIS IN RECENT YEARS ON THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS AS THE CENTRAL INGREDIENT IN THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND SECURITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. ARMS CONTROL IS IMPORTANT TO IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONS. IT CAN HELP ENHANCE PEACE AND SECURITY PROSPECTS. BUT ARMS CONTROL OR REDUCTION IS ONLY PART OF THE PROCESS. BY ITSELF IT WILL DO LITTLE FOR US. EVEN A 50% REDUCTION ACROSS THE BOARD WOULD NOT ALTER THE THREAT LEVEL IF TENSION, UNPREDICTABILITY AND LACK OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE RECUR. MOREOVER, IN A STATE OF TENSION OF LACK OF CONFIDENCE, ARMS CONTROL IS NOT AVAILABLE. THE POLITICAL PROCESS IS THE KEY.

WE HAVE ALLOWED THE PURSUIT OF ARMS CONTROL TO SLIP AWAY FROM THE POLITICAL PROCESS. POLITICAL INTENTIONS HAVE TENDED TO BE DOWN-GRADED IN THE DEBATE WHICH HAS CHOSEN INSTEAD TO FOCUS ON MILITARY TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES AND EVEN WORSE ON THEORETICAL CAPABILITIES. WE ARE TOLD THAT THE USA MUST PRODUCE

- 10 -

CHEMICAL WEAPONS TO DETER THE SOVIET UNION FROM USING ITS CHEMICAL WEAPONS; WE ARE TOLD THE SOVIET UNION MUST DEPLOY MISSILES THAT CAN REACH THE UNITED STATES IN THE SAME TIME THE SOVIETS MISTAKENLY BELIEVE THE PERSHING II CAN REACH MOSCOW.

IN THE ABSENCE OF POLITICAL WILL AND ENGAGEMENT HOW CAN WE EXPECT THIS PROCESS TO GIVE US GREATER PEACE AND SECURITY? IT HASN'T EVEN GIVEN US ARMS CONTROL. INSTEAD WE HAVE A WAR OF ANALYSIS. ITS FRONTS ARE WINDOWS OF VULNERABILITY AND ITS WEAPONS ARE ASSAULTS AND BARRAGES OF STATISTICS AND A DEBATE OVER BALANCE. ITS RESULT IS AN UNENDING ARMS RACE.

WE ARE THEREFORE LEFT WITH A CRISIS OF DEPOLITICIZATION AND EVEN DEHUMANIZATION OF THE GREATEST PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. THE PURSUIT OF ARMS CONTROL AND EVEN BUILDING NEW WEAPONS TO ENHANCE DETERRENCE ARE NECESSARY PROCESSES. OUR DETERRENCE BECOMES LESS CREDIBLE WITHOUT THEM. BUT THE SUM OF THESE PROCESSES IS NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF THE PURSUIT OF PEACE AND SECURITY. UNENDING SPIRALS OF NEW DETERRENTS IS NOT UNENDING SECURITY. IT IS A VERY GREAT MISTAKE TO ASSUME THAT IT IS.

- 11 -

12/12

THE CANADIAN PEACE INITIATIVE THAT HAS BEEN PURSUED BY PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU WAS LAUNCHED LAST FALL IN THE SHADOW OF THE KAL DISASTER AND WITH INF DEPLOYMENT LOOMING ON THE HORIZON. IT WAS, IT APPEARED, A VERY BLEAK MOMENT. THE INITIATIVE WAS THE OPTIMISTIC OPTION IN RESPONSE TO THE SERIOUS CONCERN FELT BY PEOPLE IN CANADA AND ELSEWHERE. IT'S GOAL IS TO INSTILL POLITICAL WILL--THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE AND THEIR LEADERS--INTO THE SEARCH FOR PEACE AND SECURITY. IN THE ABSENCE OF HIGH POLITICS IN THE EAST-WEST RELATIONSHIP IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT THERE IS NO LONGER TRUST OR CONFIDENCE IN THE INTENTIONS OF THE OTHER SIDE. WHAT WAS MISSING IS TRACES OF WHAT PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU CALLED "POLITICAL CRAFT AND CREATIVITY" WHICH SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN SEEKING TO IMPROVE THE RELATIONSHIP. BY PLACING TOO MUCH FAITH IN A TECHNICAL ARMS CONTROL PROCESS WE WERE "DE-POLITICIZING THE MOST IMPORTANT POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP WE HAVE" AS WELL AS HUMANITY'S GREATEST PROBLEM. WE WERE REDUCING THE POSSIBILITY OF REACHING FIRMER UNDERSTANDING ON INTERNATIONAL CONDUCT, WITHOUT WHICH THERE CAN BE NO GENUINE DETENTE.

IN LAUNCHING HIS PEACE INITIATIVE, THE PRIME MINISTER HAS SOUGHT TO COMPLEMENT THE DETERRENCE

- 12 -

PROVIDED BY THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR ARSENAL WITH THE
DETERRENCE THAT COMES FROM THE APPLICATION OF THE
POLITICAL WILL, OF NOT ONE COUNTRY, BUT OF ALL OUR
COUNTRIES TO THE TASK OF AVOIDING NUCLEAR WAR. THE
EMPHASIS OF THIS INITIATIVE IS NOT TECHNICAL OR EVEN
INSTITUTIONAL. THE INTENT IS TO CHANGE THE TREND-LINE
IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS TO BRING US BACK TO A DIALOGUE
ON A POLITICAL LEVEL, AND ULTIMATELY TO SUFFICIENT
DEFINITION OF EACH OTHER'S INTENTIONS TO PERMIT THE
EMERGENCE OF CONFIDENCE.

13/22
two types of
deterrence

AS I NOTED EARLIER IT SEEMS WE ARE IN FACT
GETTING THERE.

IN THE COURSE OF THE LAST FEW MONTHS, PRIME
MINISTER TRUDEAU HAS TRAVELLED EXTENSIVELY. HE HAS
VISITED BOTH WESTERN EUROPE AND EAST EUROPE. HE HAS
DISCUSSED HIS INITIATIVE WITH THE LEADERS OF THE
COMMONWEALTH NATIONS, WITH THE JAPANESE AND THE
CHINESE. WE ARE FORTUNATE IN THAT CANADA'S ROLE IN
THE WORLD PLACES US SO WELL TO BE ABLE TO HAVE JUST
THESE KINDS OF CONTACTS.

7
~~ISA~~

THE PRIME MINISTER HAS PLAYED A ROLE THAT
FEW, IF ANY OTHERS, COULD HAVE PLAYED. ITS SCOPE HAS

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14/22

BEEN INCREDIBLY BROAD. IN IT ALL HE WAS HEARTENED BY THE CONSENSUS THAT HE FOUND. INEVITABLY THE LEADERS HE MET TOLD HIM THAT THE STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS NEEDED IMPROVING AND MORE IMPORTANTLY THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO WORK AT THIS IMPROVEMENT. THE PRIME MINISTER HAS CARRIED THE NEWS OF THIS GOOD WILL WITH HIM TO EACH SUCCESSIVE MEETING. WE HOPE IT HAS HAD ITS EFFECT. MOST RECENTLY OF COURSE HE HAS MET WITH MR. CHERNENKO. AT THAT MEETING MR. CHERNENKO TOLD HIM THAT HE TOO IS COMMITTED TO IMPROVING THE STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE AND CALLED THE PRIME MINISTER'S INITIATIVE AN IMPORTANT PRACTICAL STEP.

WHEN PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU MET WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN LAST DECEMBER HE TOLD HIM THAT HE AGREED THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO COMMUNICATE TO THE SOVIET UNION OUR STRENGTH AND OUR RESOLVE. BUT HE EMPHASIZED THAT WE MUST ALSO COMMUNICATE OUR PEACEFUL INTENTIONS IF WE ARE TO ARRIVE AT STABILITY THROUGH THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR MILITARY DETERRENT. IT IS A PROBLEM OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION THAT WE FACE AND IT IS ONE THAT THE WESTERN LEADERS ARE NOW ADDRESSING. PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU WAS PARTICULARLY PLEASED WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN'S SPEECHES OF JANUARY 16 AND 23.

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MRS. THATCHER AND OTHERS HAVE ALSO NOW SPOKEN OUT IN SIMILAR TERMS. IN THE MEETINGS MR. CHERNENKO HAS HAD WITH MR. TRUDEAU, VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH AND OTHERS WE HOPE WE ARE SEEING THE FIRST HINTS OF A CHANGE IN THE SOVIET ATTITUDE AS WELL.

IN ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM, WESTERN LEADERS HAVE CHOSEN TO FOCUS ON THREE TRENDS. THESE ARE FIRST THE INCREASING RESORT TO THE USE OF FORCE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES. THERE HAS BEEN IN EFFECT AN ABDICATION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS IN DEFERENCE TO MILITARY SOLUTIONS. THE SECOND TREND IS THE GROWING BILLIONS OF DOLLARS BEING SPENT FOR NUCLEAR AND CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS AND THE STEADY UNRAVELLING OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME DESIGNED TO PREVENT THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE THIRD TREND HAS BEEN THE WORSENING STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND PARTICULARLY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE SUPERPOWERS. PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU SAID IT WAS NECESSARY TO GIVE THESE RELATIONS A "THIRD RAIL OF POLITICAL ENERGY OF DIALOGUE TO REBUILD CONFIDENCE THROUGH ACTIVE CONTACT AND CONSULTATION".

OUR LEADERS ARE TALKING ABOUT THE NEED TO RESPOND TO THE IMPERATIVES OF THEIR POLITICAL OFFICE,

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IMPERATIVES PLACED ON THEM BY THE PEOPLES WHOM THEY SERVE. IN DOING SO THEY TASK ALL WORLD LEADERS AND EVEN ALL OF US WHO ARE INVOLVED, HOWEVER PERIPHERALLY, IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TO WORK TOWARD IMPROVING COMMUNICATIONS AND DIALOGUE, TO BUILDING CONFIDENCE AND TRUST IN ORDER TO ENHANCE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE AND TO ENSURE OUR SECURITY.

IN DOING SO WE IN TURN IMPOSE A CHALLENGE ON THE SOVIET UNION TO RESPOND IN A SIMILAR MANNER. THIS MAY NOT BE EASY TO ACHIEVE, BUT THE DIFFICULTY OF THE TASK DOES NOT EXCUSE US FROM TRYING.

SIMILARLY THE OBSTINANCE OF A DICTATORSHIP DOES NOT EXCUSE US FROM THE IMPERATIVES OF DEMOCRACY. THESE IMPERATIVES DEMAND THAT WE KEEP ON WORKING ACTIVELY TO PROMOTE PEACE AND SECURITY. IT IS NOT ENOUGH TO SAY, AS BOTH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND SECRETARY CHERNENKO HAVE DONE, IF THE OTHER SIDE IS WILLING, IF THE OTHER SIDE PROPOSES SOMETHING WE WILL RESPOND. WE MUST GO BEYOND THAT. WE MUST PROPOSE CONCRETE STEPS. WE MUST FIRST RECOGNIZE AND THEN BUILD ON THE RECOGNITION THAT PEACE AND ENHANCED SECURITY IS IN EVERYONE'S INTEREST.

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THESE CONCRETE STEPS NEED NOT BE LARGE OR NECESSARILY SIGNIFICANT IN THEMSELVES. TAKEN TOGETHER HOWEVER THEY CAN CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS POLITICIZING THE RELATIONSHIP, GIVING IT VITALITY AND CHANGING WHAT I HAVE REFERRED TO AS THE "TREND-LINE". THEY ARE PART OF A BUILDING-BLOCK APPROACH TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF EAST- WEST RELATIONS.

A QUICK CATALOGUE OF THINGS WE CAN AND SHOULD DO NOW WOULD INCLUDE:

1. ENSURE THAT THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE NOW TAKING PLACE IN STOCKHOLM REMAINS A VIABLE, VITAL POLITICAL PROCESS. THIS CONFERENCE INVOLVES ALL THE NATIONS OF EUROPE DIRECTLY IN THE PROCESS OF IMPROVING EAST-WEST RELATIONS. IT HAS YET TO ACQUIRE THE KIND OF BAGGAGE THAT SLOWS DOWN OTHER CONFERENCES AND HAS THE POTENTIAL TO CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY THROUGH MEANINGFUL CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES TO LOWERING EAST-WEST TENSIONS. SOME OF THE PROPOSALS TABLED AT THE CONFERENCE IF ACCEPTED COULD HAVE A VERY BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON EUROPEAN PERCEPTIONS OF THEIR SECURITY.

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MBFR

2. REVITALIZE THE MBFR PROCESS. AS PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU HAS POINTED OUT THERE ARE TWO WAYS OF RAISING THE NUCLEAR THRESHHOLD IN EUROPE. ONE IS TO INCREASE WESTERN STRENGTH TO MATCH SOVIET AND WARSAW PACT STRENGTH IN EUROPE. THE SECOND IS TO CREATE A BALANCE AT LOWER LEVELS OF ARMAMENTS. THE LATTER IS BY FAR THE PREFERRABLE ROUTE. IT IS NOT ONLY CHEAPER, AND THEREFORE REALISTICALLY MORE ACHIEVABLE, BUT SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS OF TROOP STRENGTH IN THE MBFR AREA WOULD HAVE A POSITIVE IMPACT ON THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED.

3. INHIBIT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND PREVENT THE ARMS RACE FROM ENTERING INTO NEW AREAS. OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO CANADA, AND I AM CERTAIN MANY OF YOUR GOVERNMENTS, ARE SPACE AND ANTI-SATELLITE WEAPONS. I HAVE ALREADY MENTIONED HOW NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN ASAT AND ALSO IN ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE AND IN ABM SYSTEMS COULD PROVE TO BE DANGEROUSLY DESTABILIZING. IT IS EASIER TO CUT OFF A SYSTEM BEFORE IT IS DEVELOPED THAN TO ROLL IT BACK ONCE SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN ACHIEVED.

4. RESUME THE INF AND START NEGOTIATIONS. WHAT IS IMPORTANT IS NOT WHETHER OR NOT THERE ARE ONE

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OR TWO SETS OF NEGOTIATIONS. INSTEAD WE MUST REALIZE THAT INEVITABLY THE MISSILE SYSTEMS INVOLVED WILL FORM PART OF A TOTAL ARMS CONTROL PACKAGE. THE RESUMPTION OF THESE TALKS WOULD APPEAR TO REQUIRE TWO IMPORTANT CHANGES IN CURRENT POLICIES. THE FIRST AND MOST IMPORTANT IS THAT THE SOVIET UNION MUST ACKNOWLEDGE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AND ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR SS20 DEPLOYMENT. THE SECOND WOULD APPEAR TO BE THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE TO RETURN TO A PROCESS IN WHICH IT ACCEPTS PROGRESS IN SMALL STEPS. THE AMBITIOUS CUTBACKS CALLED FOR IN INITIAL USA START POSITIONS HAVE PROVEN TO BE UNREALISTIC. SUBSEQUENT USA POSITIONS HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE FLEXIBLE. THIS FLEXIBILITY HAS TO BE MADE CLEAR TO THE SOVIET UNION.

5. AN INCREASED DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND BETWEEN THE USA AND THE USSR ON AREAS OF TENSION. BOTH SIDES MUST BE WILLING TO OFFER CLEAR EXPLANATIONS OF THEIR INTENTIONS AND GOALS IN AREAS SUCH AS CENTRAL AMERICA, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND PARTICULARLY THE MIDDLE EAST IF WE ARE TO AVOID DANGEROUS ESCALATION AND POSSIBLE MISCALCULATION.

6. THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY MUST BE STRENGTHENED. THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY IS UP FOR

- the other bargain was to provide nuclear technology for peaceful ¹⁹ purposes

20/22

RENEWAL IN 1965. IN THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS POWERS UNDERTOOK AS A "QUID PRO QUO" FOR RESTRAINT BY OTHER POWERS IN OBTAINING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, TO REDUCE THEIR STOCKPILES. THEY MUST BE PREPARED TO LIVE UP TO THIS PART OF THE BFT. THEY MUST DO SO IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO STRENGTHEN THE NON-PROLIFERATION SAFEGUARDS. TODAY WE STAND ON THE VERGE OF A DANGEROUS PROLIFERATION AS SEVERAL STATES, AS YOU ARE WELL AWARE, MAY SOON POSSESS NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

7. REHABILITATE THE MULTILATERAL SYSTEM TO ENABLE IT TO PLAY A MORE SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN PROBLEM SOLVING AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT. THE U.N. FOR EXAMPLE HAS A PEACE-KEEPING CAPABILITY THAT WE HAVE NEVER FULLY EXPLOITED. WE MUST TRY AND LEAD IT AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AWAY FROM THEIR UNFORTUNATE POLITICIZATION AND FREQUENT RESORT TO DECLARATORY RESOLUTIONS TOWARDS AN ENGAGEMENT IN PRACTICAL STEPS TO ENHANCE SECURITY.

8. WE MUST WORK TO DEVELOP AND ELABORATE CLEAR MUTUALLY UNDERSTOOD PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE EAST-WEST RELATIONS. WE MUST AVOID THE KINDS OF PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION THAT IN THE END HELPED UNDERMINE THE PERIOD OF DETENTE AND WE MUST TRY AND

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2/22

2
AVOID SITUATIONS IN WHICH THE SUPERPOWERS ARE ACTING
WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING THE RULES OF THE GAME.

9. WE MUST PURSUE IN WHATEVER FORUM
POSSIBLE WHETHER IT IS IN STOCKHOLM ON THE PERIPHERY
OF START TALKS OR IN BILATERAL COMMUNICATIONS
NEGOTIATIONS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FULL RANGE OF
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES.

10. REINSTITUTE A BROAD SPECTRUM OF
EXCHANGES AND OTHER CONTACTS. COMMUNICATION AT UPPER
LEVELS BUILDS ON AND IS FOSTERED BY A BROAD SPECTRUM
OF CULTURAL, EDUCATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC CONTACTS.
THESE HAVE ALL BUT DISAPPEARED. THEIR REVIVAL WILL
HELP ENHANCE COMMUNICATION.

THESE OF COURSE ARE ONLY SOME OF THE THINGS
THAT CAN BE DONE BY WHICH WE CAN BEGIN TO BUILD A BASE
ON WHICH TO IMPROVE EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THEY, WHEN
TAKEN WITH OTHERS, WILL PROVIDE A HOPE FOR MANKIND AND
PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR THE SUPERPOWERS WITHOUT WHOM WE
CANNOT GO VERY FAR. THEY PROVIDE A ROLE AND A
MOTIVATION FOR THE REST OF US WHOSE PEACE AND SECURITY
INEVITABLY REST ON THAT FOUNDATION.

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IT IS THEREFORE IMPORTANT THAT THE MOMENTUM
THAT HAS BEEN GENERATED IN RECENT WEEKS AND MONTHS NOT
BE ALLOWED TO DISSIPATE AND THAT WE WORK TOGETHER TO
OUR COMMON GOAL. PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU PUT IT THIS
WAY. WE HAVE TO SHOW AND I QUOTE THAT WE ARE LOYAL TO
OUR FRIENDS AND OPEN TO OUR ADVERSARIES, THAT WE
LIVED UP TO OUR IDEALS AND THAT WE HAVE DONE WHAT WE
COULD TO LIFT THE SHADOW OF WAR UNQUOTE.

nif

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WSHDC UNFC8946 15FEB84

TO BONN

INFO EXTOTT IDDZ

DISTR UGP FPR

---PEACE INITIATIVE

ARTICLE IN 13FEB84 CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR QUOTE US SECURITY
AND LULL IN THE SEARCH FOR ARMS CONTROL UNQUOTE(PART OF GREAT
DECISIONS 34/84 SERIES)WAS WRITTEN FROM BONN BY ELIZABETH POND.
GIVEN HER OBVIOUS INTEREST/KNOWLEDGE OF SUBJECT YOU WILL WANT
TO INCLUDE HER ON YOUR PEACE INITIATIVE LIST(IF SHE IS NOT/NOT
ALREADY ON IT).

UUU/241 161652Z UNFC8946

Action

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSAW UMGR0275 15FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ IMMED

INFO BONN WSHDC BNATO PARIS LDN VMBFR ROME PRMNY MOSCO BUCST BPEST
PRGUE BGRAD GENEV STKHM/SCDEL HAGUE BRU OSLO NDHQOTT/ADMPOLE/CPP/
CAPOL PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDR IDA RBR RBD RGB URR ZSI CPD RCR

REF BONN TEL ZQGR1020 08FEB

---PM INITIATIVE DEBRIEFING OF FRG-COMMENTS RE STATE OF BRLIN

IN PARA 3 REFTEL IT IS ASSERTED THAT GDR QUOTE HAD THROWN SEVERAL
NEW CURVES UNQUOTE AT PM AND DEL TO INTRODUCE QUESTION OF STATUS OF
BRLIN INTO CONTEXT OF VISIT. WE DISCUSSED THIS IN GUARDED TERMS BY
TELEPHONE WITH AMB MCLAINES WHO WAS IN BRLIN FOR TD RELATED
DISCUSSIONS LAST WEEK AND HE CONFIRMED MOST STRONGLY OUR OWN
IMPRESSION (AS STATED PMDEL BUCST TEL 0033 02FEB THAT EAST GERMANS
HAD GONE OUT OF THEIR WAY TO AVOID EMBARRASSING PM ON THIS VERY ISSUE.

2. TO ENSURE THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO MISUNDERSTANDING IT IS
IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE CHANCE TO COMMENT PRIOR TO SUBMISSION TO
BONN GROUP/AND OR NATO OF ANY ALLEGATIONS REGARDING GDR BEHAVIOUR.
IF, AS IT OCCURS TO US, YOU ARE REFERRING TO INITIAL PROPOSALS THAT
PM LAY WREATH AT MEMORIAL TO VICTIMS OF FASCISM OR THAT HE SIGN
GOLDEN BOOK OF CAPITAL, THESE ARE HARDLY QUOTE NEW UNQUOTE ISSUES.
THEY WERE IN ANY CASE DROPPED EARLY IN PLANNING AFTER CONVERSATIONS
BETWEEN RBD AND GDR AMB IN WSHDC AND WADE AND COP. TO OUR KNOWLEDGE

...2

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ONLY QUESTIONABLE GDR ACTION WAS TO PLACE ARMY ON GUARD AT SCHLOSS
IN PANKOW.

3. AS POSTSCRIPT WE WERE INTRIGUED BY TELTSCHIKS DESCRIPTION OF
HONECKER AS QUOTE MOST COURAGEOUS UNQUOTE LEADER IN EASTERN EUROPE.
WHILE FRG OFFICIALS CAN BE NOTORIOUSLY SOFT ON THEIR FORMER
COMPATRIOTS REASSESSMENT OF HONECKER HIS INCREASINGLY PRAGMATIC
APPROACH TO INTRA GERMAN AFFAIRS AND HIS POSITION ON DISARMAMENT
ISSUES VIS-A-VIS HIS WPO COLLEAGUES (EG SUPPORT OF PMS CALL FOR MTG
FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS) COULD BE USEFUL AND TIMELY EXERCISE.

CCC/235 151155Z UMGR0275

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MF
hjt

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0228 15FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 151500

INFO BONN HAGUE BRU OSLO ATHNS MDRID LSBON ANKRA WSHDC BNATO

LDN PARIS ROME PRMNY VMBFR GENEV WSAW PRGUE BFEST BGRAD

STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR FPR RBR RBD UGB URG RGB RCD

---PM MTG WITH CHANCELLOR KOHL MOSCO 14FEB

SUMMARY:

TRUDEAU MET WITH KOHL AT FRG EMB PRIOR TO ANDROPOVS FUNERAL IN
RED SQUARE. CONVERSATION CENTRED ON PMS PEACE INITIATIVE.

PARTICULARLY:

(A) RESOLUTION MBFR TALKS 16MAR IN VIENN AND WESTERN RESPONSE
TO 83 SOVIET PROPOSAL,

(B) POSSIBLE FIVE POWER MTG

(C) POSSIBLE REAGAN/CHERNENKO SUMMIT

(D) IMPLICATIONS FOR SOVIET DOMESTIC AND INNATL POLICY OF NEW
LEADERSHIP; AND

(E) FUTURE COURSE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS

KHOL WAS IN USUAL EBULLIENT MOOD. HE WAS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT
DEVELOPMENTS IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS, ENCOURAGED THE PM IN HIS
PEACE EFFORTS AND, CONTRARY TO PRESS SPECULATION IN EASTERN EUROPE,
CHANCELLOR SEEMED HEARTENED BY CONSERVATIVE CHOICE OF CHERNENKO
AS GENSECT.

REPORT

2. TRUDEAU CALLED ON CHANCELLOR KOHL AT FRG EMB AND WAS ACCOMPANIED

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BY AMB ROBERTS, FOWLER AND FANCOCK. KOHL WAS ACCOMPANIED BY GENSCHER, FRG AMB TO USSR AND TELTCHICK. FOLLOWING OPENING PLEASANTRIES, TRUDEAU THANKED CHANCELLOR FOR RECEIVING HIM AND NOTED HE WISHED TO BRING KOHL UP TO DATE ON PROGRESS OF PEACE INITIATIVE AND TO SHARE VIEWS ABOUT PROGNOSIS FOR NEGS IN STKHM AND VIENN AS WELL AS COMPARING VIEWS ON IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGE IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP.

3. TRUDEAU CONGRATULATED FRG FOR NATO DECLARATION TO EMERGE FROM DEC MINISTERIAL MTG, STRESSING IMPORTANT ROLE GENSCHER HAD PLAYED AND EXTENT TO WHICH CDA HAD BEEN PLEASED TO SUPPORT THIS INITIATIVE. TRUDEAU MENTIONED THAT HE HAD BREAKFAST THAT DAY WITH SWEDISH PM PALME (SEPARATE REPORT TO FOLLOW WHEN WE CAN DEBRIEF PM) AND THAT SWEDISH PM HAD BEEN REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC OF PROGRESS IN STKHM NEGS. HOWEVER THOSE NEGS DID NOT/EVEN BEGIN TO DISCUSS DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS FOR ANOTHER THREE/FOUR YEARS. IN MEANTIME SOME PROGRESS WAS VITAL. TRUDEAU SUGGESTED THAT CHANCELLOR MAY HAVE HEARD OF VARIOUS STATEMENTS HE PM HAD BEEN MAKING ABOUT NEED TO RENEW NATO STRATEGY; TO UPDATE 67 HARMEL REPORT NOTING THAT IT WAS VITAL TO ENSURE OPEN AND FRANK DIALOGUE WITHIN NATO ON SUCH SUBJS. PM SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR FROM CHANCELLOR ON HOW FRG PERCEIVED DEVELOPMENTS WHEN MBFR NEGS RESUMED IN MARCH; SPECIFICALLY HOW AND HOW SOON WEST WOULD ANSWER SOVIET PROPOSALS. TRUDEAU SAID THAT HE WAS AWARE THAT FRG AS WELL AS CDA HAD BEEN TALKING TO USA ADMIN ABOUT IMPORTANCE OF

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PROGRESS AFTER TEN YEARS OF STERILE NEGS BUT WAS NOT/NOT FULLY UP TO DATE ON WHERE MATTER STOOD. TRUDEAU NOTED CDA WOULD BE TABLING THREE PROPOSALS IN THE CD DURING CURRENT SESSION. HE ALSO REMINDED CHANCELLOR THAT FIVE POWER PROPOSAL WHICH THEY HAD DISCUSSED IN BONN IN NOV WAS STILL VERY MUCH PART OF PEACE INITIATIVE AGENDA 4. KOHL SAID THAT HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS ISSUES RAISED BY MPM BUT FIRST WOULD LIKE TO SAY A WORD ON QUOTE THE GENERAL SITUATION UNQUOTE REGARDING THE CHANGE IN SOVIET LEADERSHIP. CHANCELLOR SUGGESTED IT WAS OBVIOUSLY TOO SOON TO KNOW THE FULL IMPLICATIONS. HOWEVER THERE WAS HE THOUGHT, CAUSE FOR SOME SATISFACTION THE WEST EUROPEAN MEDIA HAD BEEN, HE SAID, FAR TOO QUICK TO PLAY UP THE QUOTE INTELLECTUAL BANKRUPTCY UNQUOTE OF THE CHANGE. HE DID NOT/NOT SHARE THIS PESSIMISM NOTING INSTEAD QUOTE THANK GOD THEY DO NOT/NOT SEEM TO HAVE ANY NEW IDEA UNQUOTE, AND QUOTE (SAVE US FROM THOSE BELOW FORTY WHO WISH TO CHANGE THE WORLD UNQUOTE FACT THAT NEW LEADERSHIP HAD GRANDCHILDREN WOULD, HE THOUGHT, RENDER THEIR WORLD VIEW MORE HUMAN. KOHL SAID HE WAS AWARE KREMLIN-OLOGISTS VIEWED CHERNENKO AS A QUOTE TRANSITIONAL POPE UNQUOTE BUT LOOK AT WHAT JOHN XXIII HAD ACCOMPLISHED. CERTAINLY HE ALLOWED, WE WERE NOT/NOT LOOKING AT A 25 YEAR REIGN A LA BREZHNEV, BUT WE SHOULD NOT/NOT UNDERESTIMATE POSSIBLE IMPACT OF CHANGE.

5. KOHL THOUGHT NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP WOULD BE PREOCCUPIED, (A) BY SECURING REINS OF POWER AND PUTTING NEW TEAM IN PLAY, AND, ON INNA TL FRONT BY (B) QUOTE PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFEAT OF NATO DEPLOYMENT. KOHL BELIEVED SOVIETS HAD BEEN CONVINCED NATO WOULD NOT/NOT DEPLOY. THROUGHOUT EASTERN EUROPE IT HAD BEEN ASSUMED SOVIET STRATEGY WOULD SUCCEED. IT WOULD TAKE SOME TIME FOR WARSAW PACT

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TO COME TO TERMS WITH FAILURE OF THEIR EFFORTS TO PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT.

6. LOOKING TO USA KOHL THOUGHT REAGAN'S REELECTION NEXT NOV WAS
A FOREGONE CONCLUSION AND HE THOUGHT THAT FACT CHERNENKO AND
REAGAN WERE AT ABOUT SAME AGE WAS NOT/NOT INSIGNIFICANT, AS
HE SUGGESTED THEY WOULD SHARE SOME OF SAME PERCEPTIONS AND PER
HAPS A SIMILAR TENURE OF OFFICE. FROM FRG'S POINT OF VIEW, CHANCELLOR
NOTED THAT NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT POINTS HAD BEEN REGISTERED. IN
PROCEEDING WITH DEPLOYMENT FRG HAD DEMONSTRATED IT WAS PREPARED TO
QUOTE KEEP ITS WORD UNQUOTE IN FACE OF ADVERSITY THEY HAD SURVIVED
THE QUOTE SOCIAL PERTURBATIONS AND EMERGED STRONG UNQUOTE THEY
HAD DEMONSTRATED THAT QUOTE BONN IS NOT/NOT WEIMAR UNQUOTE.
HOWEVER NOW THAT DEPLOYMENT IS IN PROGRESS, THE WEST AND FRG ITSELF
HAVE QUOTE A SPECIAL OBLIGATION TO PROCEED WITH TASK OF DISARMAMENT
UNQUOTE AND WHILE HE AGREED THAT STKHM CONF WAS IMPORTANT AND HAD
BEGUN WELL, IT PROMISED NO/NO QUICK RESULTS. HE SAID HE HAD BEEN
HEARTENED BY PRES REAGAN SPEECH ON EVE OF STKHM CONF. HE HAD
STRESSED THIS FACT TO VICE PRES BUSH WHOM HE HAD MET IN MOSCO
13 FEB 84 AND HE WOULD TAKE SAME MSG TO WSHDC IN MARCH. KOHL SAID HE
HAD STRESSED TO HIS COUNTRY THAT THERE WOULD BE DEPLOYMENT BECAUSE
DEPLOYMENT WAS NECESSARY BUT AT SAME TIME HE HAD SOUGHT TO MAKE
CLEAR THAT HIS GOVT WERE NOT/NOT QUOTE MISSILE ADDICTS UNQUOTE.
OBJECTIVES OF WEST MUST NOW BE TO SECURE BALANCED REDUCTIONS.
7. ON PROPOSAL FOR DISCUSSIONS ON ARMS CONTROL AMONG THE
FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS, KOHL REMINDED TRUDEAU OF HIS POSITIVE ATTITUDE
...5

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WHEN THE TWO HAD MET IN BONN IN NOV AND SAID THAT HE WAS NOW
EVEN MORE POSITIVE. HE MOVED ON HOWEVER TO NOTE HE WAS SORRY
THAT PRES REAGAN HAD NEVER MET ANDROPOV AND SAID THAT HE HAD
STRESSED TO BUSH THAT REAGAN SHLD MEET CHERNENKO NOT/NOT FOR
PROPAGANDA PURPOSES BUT FOR QUOTE SENSIBLE TALKS UNQUOTE.
CHANCELLOR PROPOSED QUOTE PIERRE WE WILL PUSH THEM ALONG THESE
LINES. UNQUOTE.

8. KOHL SAID THAT IT WAS MISTAKE TO CONSIDER SOVIET UNION OR
ITS EAST EUROPEAN ALLIES AS MONOLITHIC. HE SAID THAT HE HAD A TWO-
HOUR MTG WITH PRES HONECKER IN MOSCO AND HAD FOUND THAT HONECKERS
ATTITUDE HAD CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY. SO TOO HAD KADARS. EVEN ZHIVKOV
WAS NOW CHANGING BECAUSE HE WAS QUOTE VERY SENSITIVE TO THE
WING FROM ODESSA UNQUOTE.

9. AT THIS POINT GENSCHER INTERVENED TO SPEAK OF THE OPENING OF
STKEM CONF. HE STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF THE FIVE-HOUR GROMYKO/
SHULTZ MTG WHICH HAD FOLLOWED THE DISAPPOINTING ENCOUNTER
BETWEEN THOSE TWO IN MDRID. HE SAID IN THE COURSE OF THEIR MARATHON
MTG THEY HAD MADE QUOTE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS UNQUOTE.

10. GENSCHER ALLOWED THAT AMERICANS DID SEEM WILLING TO SEE SOME
CONCRETE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD WHEN MBFR TALKS RESUMED IN VIENN
QUOTE IF NOT/NOT ON 16MAR THEN SOON AFTER UNQUOTE. IN GENEV HE
HOPED USA WLD BE IN A POSITION TO PROCEED WITH A CHEMICAL
WEAPONS PROPOSAL WHICH FRG CONSIDERED EXTREMELY IMPORTANT

11. KOHL, TURNING TO PRES REAGAN'S STATE ADDRESS, CONSIDERED IT

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IMPORTANT THAT USA PRESIDENT HAD ENDORSED THE DEC NATO DECLARATION AND THAT PRESIDENT HAD SPOKEN OF AMERICAN WILLINGNESS TO SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT WITH USSR. THIS HE SAID WAS VITAL TO SOVIETS WHO DESPERATELY SOUGHT EQUALITY. SUCH A STATEMENT THEREFORE SUGGESTED REAGAN WAS PREPARED TO CONSIDER THE KIND OF RELATIONSHIP WHICH NIXON AND BREZHNEV HAD AGREED TO IN 1972.

12.PM TRUDEAU AGREED THIS CHANGE IN AMERICAN SIGNALS WAS SIGNIFICANT. WEST, HE SAID, WAS NOW MAKING RIGHT MOVES. SOVIETS, HOWEVER, INSISTED ON DEEDS, ON ACTIONS. THUS PM CONSIDERED PROGRESS IN VIENNA WAS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT. USA WAS CONCERNED LEST USA TROOPS ONCE REMOVED FROM WESTERN EUROPE BE PREVENTED FROM RETURNING BY USA ISOLATIONIST SENTIMENTS. WHILE ENDORSING NEED FOR PROGRESS, CHANCELLOR SAID FRG TOO SHARED USA CONCERNS. TRUDEAU SAID HE HOPED CHANCELLOR WOULD BE ABLE TO SECURE AMERICAN AGREEMENT TO SPECIFIC PROPOSALS DURING HIS FORTHCOMING TRIP TO WSHDC.

13. TRUDEAU SAID HE AGREED THAT A REAGAN/CHERNENKO SUMMIT WAS DESIRABLE, BUT IN ADVANCE HE SUGGESTED THERE WERE A NUMBER OF PRINCIPLES WHICH, ONCE AGREED BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS, WOULD ALLOW THEM TO PROCEED WITH MORE CONCRETE MEASURES. THESE PRINCIPLES HAD BEEN ELABORATED IN RECENT SPEECH IN HOFC AND, PM SAID, HE WOULD BE WRITING TO CHANCELLOR TO PUT THEM FORWARD MORE FORMALLY. SUCH PRINCIPLES MIGHT FORM A FOUNDATION ON WHICH DIALOGUE BETWEEN EAST/
...7

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WEST MIGHT BE REBUILT. AN EXAMPLE OF A CONCRETE MEASURE,
PM SUGGESTED, WOULD BE EARLY RATIFICATION OF THE TRESHOLD TESTBAN
TREATY.

14. COMMENTING ON HIS RECENT VISIT TO CZECH/GDR/ROMANIA PM SAID
HE AGREED WITH THE CHANCELLOR THAT EAST EUROPEAN GOVTS WERE
NOT/NOT MONOLITHIC AND THAT LEADERS HE HAD ENCOUNTERED HAD
INDEED BEEN IMPRESSED BY THE CHANGE IN TONE OF POSSIBLE STATEMENTS
EMANATING FROM THE USA ADMIN.

15. KOHL STRESSED THAT HE CONSIDERED TIME WAS NOT/NOT WORKING IN
MOSCOS FAVOUR THUS, HE SAID REACTION OF THE EAST OUGHT TO BE
MODERATE AND REASONABLE. SOMETIMES HE CONSIDERED THE WEST DID
NOT/NOT SEEM TO HAVE FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE LESSONS OF WHAT WAS
HAPPENING IN POLAND. POLAND FOR THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN A TOTAL
IDEOLOGICAL DISASTER RECALLING THE SIGHT OF GEORGES MARCEAIS
PAYING TRIBUT TO YURI ANDROPOVS GRAVE, KOHL ENQUIRED WHAT WAS
LEFT TO INSPIRE WESTERN EUROPEAN COMMUNISTS. THE GLAMOUR, HE
INSISTED, WAS ALL GONE AS A RESULT OF EVENTS IN WSAW. THERE WERE
HARDLY ANY GERMAN COMMUNISTS WHO HAD ANY LOYALTY TO MOSCO. THERE
REMAINED GERMAN COMMUNISTS BUT THEY WERE OF THE QUOTE UTOPIAN
VARIETY UNQUOTE.

16. FOR KOHL THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE POWER RELATION
SHIP WAS THAT OF QUOTE CALCULABILITY UNQUOTE. HE RECALLED THAT
IN 1913-14 THERE HAD BEEN A TOTAL BREAKDOWN IN THE PREDICTABILITY
OF NATIONS. IT WAS ESPECIALLY TO INCREASE THE EXTENT TO WHICH EACH
CLD CORRECTLY INTERPRET AND PREDICT THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE

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PAGE EIGHT XYGR0228 CONFD

OTHER THAT THE CHANCELLOR HAD BEEN CALLING FOR A SUMMIT. FOLLOWING SUCH A SUMMIT THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF THE PERSONALITIES INVOLVED WLD ENSURE THAT QUOTE A WILD SPEECH WLD NOT/NOT RUIN THE SITUATION UNQUOTE.

17. TRUDEAU AGREED THAT THE LESSONS OF POLAND WERE INDEED IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND HE ALSO STATED THAT HONECKER CEAUSESCU. AND HUSAK HAD BEEN DEEPLY PERTURBED BY THE COMBINATION OF NATO DEPLOYMENT ON THE ONE HAND AND REAGAN RHETORIC ON THE OTHER. THAT COMBINATION HAD PRODUCED A DEEP SENSE OF FEAR WHICH HAD DONE MUCH TO UNIFY MEMBERS OF WARSAW PACT. TRUDEAU SAID THAT IN THE AFTERMATH OF AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND. MARXIST LENINIST IDEOLOGY WAS INDEED IN RUINS. THAT WAS WHY WE MUST SEND A CLEAR MSG TO THE NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP THAT WE SOUGHT A GENUINE ACCOMMODATION.

18. KOHL AGREED THAT TO SOME EXTENT DEPLOYMENT HAD ENCOURAGED UNITY WITHIN EASTERN BLOC. HOWEVER RECALLING THE STILL VIVID NAZI EXPERIENCE HE SAID HE BELIEVED THAT EVERY DICTATOR WAS IN NEED OF AN ENEMY, OF SOMEONE TO HATE THIS HE SAID WAS THE REVERSE SITUATION WHICH PERTAINED IN FREE SOCIETIES, WHICH WERE INVARIABLY PLAGUED BY QUOTE SELF TORMENTING DOUBT UNQUOTE. QUOTE THERE IS A GOOD LIVING TO BE MADE IN CULTURAL PESSIMISM UNQUOTE.

19. TRUDEAU, RETURNING TO FIVE POWER THEME, RECALLED THAT PRC PREMIER ZHAO HAD SAID HE WOULD HAVE HIS AMB ATTEND MTG IF THE FIVE WERE CONVENED IN NY AND SUGGESTED THAT CHANCELLOR MIGHT ENCOURAGE AMERICANS TO BE MORE FORTHCOMING REGARDING EVENTUALITY. SUCH

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A MTG TRUDEAU SAID, COULD BEGIN TO RESTORE CONFIDENCE, TO BEGIN TO
CREATE CRISIS MANAGEMENT MECHANISM. PRES REAGAN, PM RECALLED , HAD
NOT/NOT BEEN UNRECEPTIVE TO SUCH AN IDEA WHEN THEY HAD MET
IN DEC.

20. AT THIS POINT MTG ENDED TO ALLOW BOTH LEADERS TO PARTICIPATE
IN FUNERAL CEREMONY IN RED SQUARE.

CCC/095 152040Z XYGR0228

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned 1DDZ

Person D5

Local Time 1500

R E S T R I C T E D

FM MOSCO PDEL0227 15FEB84

TO EXTOTT 1DDZ DELIVER BY 151500

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR RBG RBR FPR IFB MINA DMF

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0155 14FEB

---PM VISIT OVERVIEW

ON ARRIVAL MOSCO 1500 PM WAS GREETED BY D/PM NUREEV AND OTHER OFFICIALS. EVENING ATTENDANCE AT LYING-IN-STATE WAS NOTABLE FOR MUCH LESS SOMBRE MISE-EN-SCENE THAN FOR BREZHNEV INDEED MOSCO SEEMED IN ONLY PARTIAL MOURNING WITH SOME STORES OPEN OLYMPICS ON TV AND STREETS BUSY.

2. TUESDAY. BILATL BREAKFAST WITH PALME AND MTG WITH KOHL PRECEDED OBSEQUIES ON RED SQUARE IN DAMP CHILL OF MORNING. OF EVENT, AND OF KGB FORMATIONS ON GUARD CEREMONY WAS ELABORATE BUT NOT/NOT OVERLY LUGUBRIOUS ANDROPOV FAMILY WERE STUNNED BY DEEP GRIEF. WIFE WAS AIDED THROUGHOUT AND FAINTED AT COFFIN.

3. KREMLIN RECEPTION FOLLOWED CEREMONY ON WHICH AMB WILL NO/NO DOUBT BE REPORTING.

4. LATE AFTERNOON AND EARLY EVENING BILATLS WITH ZIA AND CASTRO. SEPARATE TELS PRECEDED WORKING DINNER WITH AN YAKOVLEV, NOW DIRECTOR OF INSTITUTE FOR WORLD ECONOMY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FORMER SOV AMB OTT. YAKOVLEV IS AUTHOR OF SEVERAL ARTICLES ON USA AND PM PROBED FOR ANY SIGN OF ANY CHANGE OR READ

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PAGE TWO PDEL0227 RESTR

INESS FOR CHANGE IN SOV APPROVAL TO REAGAN. NOT/NOT MUCH FROM THAT SOURCE AT THIS TIME. YAKOVLEV ALSO INDICATED INTENTION TO ADD CDN SECTION TO HIS APPARAT PERHAPS SIGNALLING INTENTION TO CHALLENGE ARBATOV.

5. WEDNESDAY - CURIOUS FLURRY CAUSED BY SOV SUGGESTION THAT TIME OF CALL ON GENSEC BE CHANGED FROM 1600 TO BETWEEN 1000 AND 1400. A PROPOSAL WHICH EVAPORATED EVEN WHILE IT WAS BEING DISCUSSED BY DEL. EMB LUNCHEON BRIEFING PRECEDED MTG WITH GENSEC (SEPARATE TEL) WHICH WAS FOLLOWED BY PRESS CONFERENCE AND PROBABLE FURTHER CONVERSATION WITH YAKOVLEV. DEPARTURE SCHEDULED FOR 2300.

6. TREATMENT OF PM AND CDN DEL WAS POSITIVE AND PUNCTILIOUS. TRUDEAU LET TO TIKHONOV APPEARED IN TUESDAY PRAVDA WORD OF MTG WITH NEW GENSEC WAS VERY PROMPT AND 48 HR NOTICE A RARE COURTESY. CBC-TV ALLOWED PHOTO OP AT MTG AS WAS PMS PHOTOG COOPER AT SEVERAL POINTS ONLY COVERED BY RUSSIAN MEDIA.

7. DECISION TO ATTEND WAS WELL FOUNDED AS PRESENCE OF OTHERS (MAUROY, KOHL, THATCHER, PERTINI, BUSH, ETC) ATTESTS. CHERNENKOS ATTENTION TO PMS INITIATIVE AND OPEN DOOR FOR FURTHER DIALOGUE AT THAT OR OTHER LEVELS IN BILATL OR OTHER FORA ARE ALSO SIGNS AS ENCOURAGING AS CLD BE EXPECTED GIVEN CIRCUMSTANCES OF FUNERAL AND INDICATIONS THAT NEW REGIME HAS NOT/NOT YET FOUND FULL VOICE OF ITS OWN RE E/W RELATIONS.

8. ALSO GRATIFYING WAS SOV RESPECT FOR AND RESPONSE TO PMS FOCUS ON E/W AND INITIATIVE AND RESTRAINT IN PRESSING BILATL ISSUES

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PAGE THREE PDEL0227 RESTR

SUCH AS GANDER MOU. NONETHELESS CHERNENKO CLD NOT/NOT HAVE MASTERED
DETAIL IN TIME AVAILABLE, AND PM WAS ABLE TO FLAG CDN
INTEREST IN HUMANITARIAN ISSUES.

9. BILATL WITH KOHL WAS PARTICULARLY GOOD VALUE AS EXCHANGE OF
IDEAS ALTHOUGH HE WAS SOMEWHAT EVASIVE ON KEY POINTS SUCH AS
MBFR OR 5-POWER.

10. PRESS CONF ATTRACTED GOOD TURNOUT OF MOSCO BASED MEDIA: NY TIMES /
WSHDC POST/AFP/NEWSWEEK IN ADDITION TO CHRIS YOUNG SOUTHAM AND
LAZOWSKI/CBC. IT WENT WELL.

CCC/095 152010Z PDEL0227

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Refected NDHQ/MND
DM
ADM Pol
CPP
DNA CSDC
Division Phoned
Person *file*
Local Time *1442*

Done
15/2/84
as

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0226 15FEB84

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ FLASH

INFO BONN HAGUE BRU OSLO ATHNS MDRID LSBN ANKRA WS4DC BNATO LDN
PARIS ROME PRMNY VMBFR GENEV WSAW PRGUE BPEST BGRAD STKHM/SCDEL
PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/AXWORTHY

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR FPR RBR RBD RBG UGB UGR LSP

--PM MTG WITH CHERNENKO SUMMARY HIGHLIGHTS

MTG TOOK PLACE IN ORNATE CREAM AND GOLD CATHERINE FALL OF GRAND
KREMLIN PALACE APPROACHED THROUGH ENFILADE OF IMPERIAL LUXURY.
CHERNENKO GREETED PM WITH REF TO EARLIER MTG AT HELSINKI IN
1975 AND POSED FOR PHOTOS VERY MUCH AS MAN IN COMMAND.

2.GENSEC OPENED WITH EARLY REF TO IMPORTANCE OF CDA SOV RELATIONS
AND THEIR PART IN INVIGORATING GENERAL SITUATION.HE SAID USSR
SHARED PMS CONCERN AT CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS AND THROUGH
THAT PRISM THEY VALUED PMS INITIATIVE HE ADDED SOVIET
LEADERSHIP WAS PREPARED TO CONTINUE A BUSINESSLIKE EXCHANGE OF
VIEWS ABOUT PMS INITIATIVE IN CONTEXT OF ITS USEFULNESS AND
PRACTICALITY.

3.GENSEC SAID THERE WAS NO/NO NEED TO CONVINCE SOVS OF NEED
FOR POLITICAL DIALOGUE BUT DIALOGUE MUST BE ON BASIS EQUALITY
AND NOT/NOT FROM POSITION OF STRENGTH.ALTHOUGH USA WAS CLEARLY
IMPLIED IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT THERE WERE NO/NO DIRECT REFS
TO REAGAN OR USA ADMIN THROUGHOUT MTG.SECGEN AT SEVERAL POINTS STRUCK
BREZHNEVITE NOTE OF DETENTE AND COOPERATION AND HIS LANGUAGE,AS
IN HIS SPEECHES OVER PAST 72 HOURS WAS DISTINCTLY MODERATE

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4. IN SLIGHTLY SHARPER VEIN ON ARMS CONTROL GENSEC SAID SOVS WERE PREPARED TO AGREE TO LIMIT AND TO REDUCE NUCLEAR ARMS IN QUOTE THE MOST RADICAL WAY UNQUOTE BUT WLD NOT/NOT CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS FOR THEIR OWN SAKE QUOTE TO HELP SOMEONE COVER UP AN ARMS RACE OR TO SERVE ELECTORAL NEEDS UNQUOTE.

5. PM BRIEFLY SKETCHED BACKGROUND OF HIS INITIATIVE STRESSING PERIOD OF CRISIS IN NOV/DEC 1983 FOLLOWED BY SIGNS OF PROGRESS IN CURRENT PERIOD HE EMPHASIZED ROLE OF POLITICAL LEADERS SAYING HE SPOKE AS LEADER OF A COUNTRY BOTH PEACEFUL AND MEMBER OF AN ALLIANCE. PM REVIEWED POSITIVE SIGNALS FROM WEST SUCH AS BRUSSELS DECLARATION, NOTED GENSECS INTEREST IN DEEDS NOT/NOT WORDS, BUT SUGGESTED EVEN SMALL STEPS MUST QUOTE FIND ENCOURAGEMENT FROM THE WARSAW PACT UNQUOTE

6. PM DREW GENSECS ATTENTION TO QUOTE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY UNQUOTE IN MONTHS IMMED AHEAD POINTING TO A STKHM CONF(B) RESUMPTION MBFR (C) NATO REVIEW OF E/W RELS (D) LDN SUMMIT WHICH CLD WELL ADDRESS E/W RELATIONS AS IT HAD AT WILLIAMSBURG AND (E) PERIOD PRIOR TO INTENSIVE USA ELECTION CAMPAIGN. HE SUGGESTED NEW GENSEC TOOK OFFICE AT TIME OF OPPORTUNITY TO RELAX TENSIONS PROVIDED SIGNALS FROM BOTH SIDES WERE POSITIVE AND FOUND RESPONSE.

7. PM NOTED REF TO RESPONSIBILITIES OF ALL NUCLEAR POWERS IN GROMYKO SPEECH YESTERDAY AND EXPLAINED CDN PROPOSAL FOR INFORMAL TALKS UNDER AEGIS SEC GEN FOR FIVE POWERS TO BEGIN TO WORK ON NUCLEAR CONFIDENCE BUILDING.

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PAGE THREE XYGR0226 CONF

8. REFERRING TO QUOTE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY GROMYKO LATER IN CONVERSATION INTERJECTED THAT IT WLD BE GOOD IF THROUGH THAT WINDOW WEST WLD PUT AGREEMENT ON MBFR IN RESPONSE TO SOV PROPOSALS ON TABLE SINCE JUNE. GROMYKO STRESSED NEED FOR SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS. PM AGREED THAT NEXT MOVE WAS UP TO WEST AND SAID CDA WLD DO ITS PART TO ENSURE RESPONSE.

9. IN BRIEF REF TO BILATL RELATIONS GENSEC SAID THERE WAS UNTAPPED POTENTIAL FOR EXPANSION BASED ON MUTUAL INTERESTS AND MUTUAL BENEFITS. PM REPLIED THAT WE TOO VALUED BILATL RELATIONS THERE WERE IMPORTANT ISSUES INCLUDING ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN BUT IN LIGHT TIME AVAILABLE HE HAD CHOSEN TO DEVOTE HIS CONVERSATION TO PREEMINENT QUESTIONS OF PEACE AND SECURITY.

10. GENSEC IN CONCLUSION SAID THIS WAS FIRST MTG NOT/NOT LAST AND THAT IT SIGNIFIED BEGINNING OF DIALOGUE ALONG LINES OF PMS THINKING WHICH GENSEC WLD SUPPORT WHEREEVER THEY CLD AGREE.

11. CHERNENKO STRUCK US AS MAN IN POWER DESPITE HIS MODEST PRESENCE. OCCASIONALLY HALTING DELIVERY AND SOMEWHAT ASTHMATIC CONDITION DEFINITELY ALERT THOUGH GIVEN TO AN INTERMITTEENT NASAL HUM WHILE LISTENING. GROMYKO DEFERRED TO HIM SLIGHTLY BUT IS CLEARLY (AS SHOWN BY FACT OF HIS SPEECH YESTERDAY) ON MORE EQUAL FOOTING THAN HE EVER ACHIEVED WITH BREZHNEV. CHERNENKO, NO/NO DOUBT AFTER YEARS WITH BREZHNEV, SEEMED FULLY AT HOME IN CENTRE OF TABLE. WITH EVIDENT TOUCH OF HUMOUR COMBINED WITH SLIGHTLY BRUSQUE OLD LINE PARTY STYLE. HE OPENED BY READING FROM PREPARED TEXT AND DID NOT/NOT RESPOND EXTENSIVELY TO PMS PRESENTATION.

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12. PRESENT ON SOV SIDE IN ADDITION TO GENSEC AND GROMYKO WERE BREZHNEV/ANDROPOV FOR POL AIDE ALEXANDROV, YOUNGISH CHERNENKO AIDE PRIBYTKOV, AND TRANSLATOR SUKHODREV. ON CDN SIDE PM. AMB ROBERTS AND HANCOCK. MTG LASTED THIRTY MINUTES WHICH IS ABOUT STANDARD FOR WESTERN LEADERS BEING RECEIVED OBTRUSIVE CLOCK ALSO PRESENT ON TABLE.

13. ON WAY OUT PM SAID HE HOPED TO SEE CHERNENKO IN CDA AND IDEA SEEMED OF INTEREST TO GENSEC ALTHOUGH IT WAS CLEARLY NOT/NOT DIRECT INVITATION

14. FORGIVE STACCATO NATURE THIS TEL. IT IS NO/NO MORE THAN ROUGH HIGHLIGHTS PREPARED IN HASTE TO MEET YOUR DEADLINE. SEE ALSO TRANSCRIPT PMS PRESS CONF. ADDRESSEES SELD AWAIT FULL REPORT.

CCC/095 151835Z XYGR0226

R E S T R I C T E D

FM MOSCO XYGR0225 15FEB84

TO EXTOTT PSR DELIVER BY 151200

INFO ISBAD IMMED BNATO WSHDC LDN LDN/FOR DMF PRMNY DELHI TAVIV
PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA MINE DMF IFB PGB PSD PST ZSP ZSI GMD GMR ETN EEA

LIDDZ FPR IMC

---BILATL MTG BETWEEN PM AND PRESIDENT ZIA

MTG WHICH WAS REQUESTED BY PAKISTAN WAS HELD FEB14 AT CDN
EMBASSY. AFTER EXPRESSING HIS GRATITUDE FOR HOSPITALITY SHOWN
HIM DURING HIS VISIT TO CDA IN 1982, PRESIDENT ZIA VOICED THREE
POINTS OF CONCERN (AFGHANISTAN, LEBANON, AND DEVELOPMENT AID) AS
WELL AS COMMENTING ON PMS PEACE INITIATIVE.

2. ON AFGHANISTAN, ZIA REFERRED TO IMPORTANCE FOR PAKISTAN AS
DEVELOPING COUNTRY TO HAVE REGIONAL PEACE. IT WAS ONLY THROUGH
PEACE THAT EXISTING BURDEN OF THREE MILLION REFUGEES CLD BE
REMOVED. AFGHANISTAN WAS PROBLEM OF SOVIET ORIGIN AND THEY WLD
HAVE TO SOLVE IT. ZIA SAID IF ISSUE CAN BE KEPT ON FRONT PAGE
OF WORLD MEDIA 50/50 PER CENT OF PROBLEM WLD BE SOLVED. IT WAS
ISSUE ZIA HOPED TO TAKE UP WITH SOVIETS HERE AND HE EXPRESSED
APPRECIATION FOR CDAS CONTINUED PUBLIC SUPPORT. IN RESPONSE, PM
RECALLED THAT THEY HAD DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE DURING ZIAS VISIT
TO CDA WHEN ZIA PASSED ON ACCOUNT OF HIS DISCUSSION WITH THEN NEWLY
ELECTED GENSECT ANDROPOV THERE WAS HOPE THEN THAT THERE WLD BE SOME
MOVEMENT BUT THIS FAILED TO MATERIALIZE. CDA WILL CONTINUE TO

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REMINDE SOVIET UNION THAT AFGHANISTAN REMAINS A RUNNING SORE
IN WORLD PUBLIC OPINION.

3.ON PEACE INITIATIVE ZIA SAID PAKISTAN WAS MINDFUL OF PMS
PERSONAL EFFORTS FOR PEACE AND ALTHOUGH HIS COUNTRY WAS
NOT/NOT DIRECTLY CONCERNED,HE WANTED TO LET PM KNOW THAT HIS
EFFORTS ARE APPRECIATED IN PAKISTAN.PM SAID WHAT EVER MOVEMENT
TO LESSEN EXISTING TENSION WHICH MIGHT HAVE BEEN EXPECTED
FROM SOVIET SIDE WERE LAID TO NAUGHT BY KAL INCIDENT AND
ANDROPOVS ILLNESS.HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT NEW PAGE WLD NOW BE TURNED,
AND HE WAS URGING SUPER POWERS TO BEGIN MTG PM SUGGESTED USA
AND SOVIET LEADERS CLD MEET WITHOUT HAVING TO PRODUCE CONCRETE
RESULTS,BUT RATHER ESTABLISH COMMON GROUNDS AND AGREE ON BASIC
PRINCIPLES FOR FUTURE RELATIONS.

4.ON LEBANON,ZIA SOUGHT PMS ASSISTANCE IN LESSENING PRESENT
DANGEROUS SITUATION.HE SAID LEBANESE SIT CONTAINED GERMS OF
INSTABILITY THAT IF NOT/NOT SOLVED CLD HAVE NEGATIVE REPERCUSSIONS
THROUGHOUT MIDDLE EAST.HE MENTIONED FRANCES REQUEST TO HAVE UN
TROOPS BECOME INVOLVED AND WONDERED IF THERE WAS SOME WAY OF
SUPPORTING THIS MOVE.UNLESS SOMETHING FUNDAMENTAL IS DONE
LEBANON CLD BECOME DIVIDED IN TWO.IN REPLY PM AGREED THAT IT WLD
BE GREAT TRAGEDY IF LEBANON BECAME BALKANIZED.ISRAEL HAD BEEN
WRONG TO INVAD AND NOW SYRIA WAS TAKING VERY PROPRIETORY
INTEREST IN LEBANON.UNLESS SYRIA WILLING TO SEEK SOLUTION,
LITTLE CLD BE DONE.CDA OF COURSE HAD PARTICIPATED IN MANY UN

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PAGE THREE XYGR0225 RESTR

PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS,BUT THIS IS ONLY DONE WHEN BOTH PARTIES AGREE THERE IS A REQUIREMENT FOR PEACE KEEPER.UN CANNOT IMPOSE PEACE,BUT CAN ONLY HELP SUSTAIN IT ONCE IT IS ESTABLISHED.

ZIA NOTED THAT USA WAS UNABLE TO TAKE ACTION,AND ISRAEL AND SYRIA WERE UNWILLING TO DO SO.THERE WAS SUCH CHAOS THAT A MASSIVE EFFORT WLD BE REQUIRED.PM POINTED OUT THAT UN WAS NOT/NOT ABLE TO MOUNT A MASSIVE EFFORT;AT BEST IT CLD SURVEY A FRAGILE TRUCE SUCH AS HAD BEEN DONE IN CYPRUS.

5.THERE WAS A BRIEF EXCHANGE ON COMWLTH AND POSSIBLE PAKISTAN RE-ENTRY,ZIA SAYING THAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO WAIT AND THEY APPRECIATE OUR EFFORTS ON THEIR BEHALF PM NOTED THAT COMWLTH SEC GEN RAMPHAL WAS ALSO HOPING IT WILL COME ABOUT.

6.TURNING TO BILATL MATTERS ZIA BROACHED SUBJECT OF COPPERMINING PROJECT IN SAINDAK.ON WHICH FEASIBILITY STUDY WAS BEING CONDUCTED.HE HOPED CDA WLD ASSIST IN REALIZATION OF THIS PROJECT ONCE FEASIBILITY STUDY DEMONSTRATED ITS VIABILITY.PM RECALLED THAT PRES ZIA HAD RAISED THIS QUESTION DURING HIS VISIT TO CDA AND UNDERTOOK TO LOOK INTO SITUATION UPON HIS RETURN AND WRITE TO ZIA ABOUT IT LATER.

7.ZIA EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR CDN AID AND ASSISTANCE,WHICH WAS NOT/NOT AFFECTED BY QUOTE MINOR DIFFERENCES WE MAY HAVE ON POLITICAL PLANE UNQUOTE PRESUMABLY REF TO NUCLEAR ISSUE).HE REITERATED INVITATION FOR PM TO VISIT PAK WHENEVER IT SUITED HIM. PM THANKED PRES ZIA FOR INVITATION AND NOTED THAT CDN ASSISTANCE TO PAK HAD BEEN RECIPROCATED BY THAT COUNTRYS FRIENDSHIP AND INTERNATL COOPERATION.

CCC/095 151421Z XYGR0225

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C O N F I D E N T I E L

DE STKHM/SCDEL SCDL0147 15FEV84

A EXTOTT IDA

INFO BNATO CANMILREPNAIO VMBFR GENEV LDN PARIS BONN WSHDC MDRID

BGRAD NDHQOTT/CPP/DNACPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR IDAN IDAO IDD IDDZ IDR RSR RSD RGX RBD RCR RBR

---CONF DE STKEM ALLOCUTIONS:ESPAGNE BULGARIE FRANCE PLENIERE:14FEV

SOMMAIRE:ESPAGNE A REJETE TOUTE VELLEITE D INTERPRETATION MESURES

OCCIDENTALES EN TERMES ESSENTIELLEMENT TECHNIQUES ET A INVITE

CERTAINES DELS APRECISER CE EN QUOI CES MESURES CONSTITUERAIENT

MENACE A LEUR SECURITE.BULGARIE A RAPPEE QUE DETENTE POLITIQUE

CONSTITUE PREALABLE A MESURES DE CONFIANCE ET A INVITE OTAN A

CONSIDERER MESURES CIT POLITICO-MILITAIRES FINCIT,PLUS

PARTICULIEREMENT NON-RECOURS A LA FORCE.FRANCE A DECLARE QUE

MESURES OCCIDENTALES AUGMENTERAIENT EFFICACEMENT SECURITE EN

EUROPE SANS MODIFICATION DES STRUCTURES POLITIQUES ET ELLE A

DONONCE ACCUSATIONS A L EFFET QUE PROP DE L OTAN FACILITERAIT

ESPIONNAGE.FRANCE A AUSSI DECLARE QUE MESURES DE CONTRAINTES NE/NE

POURRAIENT ETRE CONSIDEREES PENDANT PREMIER PHASE DE LA CONF.

2.RAPPORT:ESPAGNE A NIE EXCLUSIVE TECHNICALITE MESURES OCCIDENTALES

EN SOULIGNANT LEUR SUBSTANCE ET EN DECLARANT QUE LEUR ACCEPTATION

SERAIT UN CONTRIBUTION SIGNIFICATIVE A LA BAISSSE DE DE TENSION.

APPEL POUR EXCLUSION POLEMIQUE DES DEBATS ET POUR COMMENTAIRES

APPROFONDIS DES PROPS OCCIDENTALES ET ROUMAINES;PLUS

PARTICULIEREMENT AFIN DE PRECISER ALLEGATIONS A L EFFET QUE

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PAGE THREE SCDL0147 CONF

AMPLEUR ET PLUS SERIEUSES DANS LEUR CONTENU. RAPPORT PALME SOULIGNE IMPORTANCE DESARMEMENT AFIN DE RENFORCER STABILITE DU SYSTEME IN NATL. PROPOSITION ETATS CIT SOCIALISTES FINCIT COMPREND SERIE DE MESURES CARACTERE POLITICO-MILITAIRE. AMELIORATION CLIMATE POLITIQUE FAVORISERAIT ADOPTION MESURES MILITAIRES SIGNIFICATIVES.

6. EN CE QUI CONCERNE MESURES DECLARATOIRES, BULGARIE N/N A ABORDE QUE NON-RECOURS A LA FORCE: CERTAINS ETATS ONT DEJA FAIT DECLARATIONS QU ILS N UTILISERAIENT FORCE QUE POUR SE DEFENDRE, TRAITE EST TOUTEFOIS PREFERABLE CAR CONSTITUE ENGAGEMENT FORMEL A CET EFFET ET CONTRIBUE A ASSURER RELATIONS PACIFIQUES. UN TEL INSTRUMENT JURIDIQUE PREVOYERAIT MESURES DE COOPERATION POUR VERIFIER SON APPLICATION: CIT SUCH COOPERATION MAY TAKE FORM OF JOINT REGULAR REVIEW MTGS BY ALL PARTICIPATING STATES CONCERNING SITUATION IN AREA OF THE TREATY ACTION, AS WELL AS ADOPTION OF FURTHER STEPS, AIMED AT STRENGTHENING PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE AREA FINCIT. REFERENCE AU DISCOURS SOV 31 JAN ET DISCOURS AUTRICHIEN 02 FEV, A L EFFET QUE MESURES DE CONFIANCE MILITAIRE DOIVENT ETRE ELABOREES PARALLELEMENT A MESURES POLITIQUES.

7. FRANCE A SOULIGNE QUE RECHERCHE POINTS DE CONVERGENCE, DONC POSSIBILITES DE DIALOGUE, CONSTITUENT UNE DES REALISATIONS DE NOTRE CONF QUI EST CIT ENCORE A LA RECHERCHE D ELLE-MEME FINCIT. SI VRAIMENT IL Y EUT DETERIORATION DES RAPPORTS, CE N/N EST QU UNE RAISON SUPPLEMENTAIRE DE CONVENIR DE GESTES CONCRETS. PROPOSITION OCCIDENTALE SUGGERE CIRCULATION D INFORMATION ENTRE PARTIES

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PAGE DEUX SCDL0147 CONF

MESURES OCCIDENTALES CONSTITUENT MENACE A LA SECURITE DE CERTAINS ETATS PARTICIPANTS.

3.BULGARIE:TRAVAUX DE LA CONF ONT JUSQUE ICI PERMIS ECLAIRCISSEMENTS SUR POSITIONS RESPECTIVES DES DELS.EXPERIENCE PASSEE MONTRE QUE CETTE ETAPE EST OBLIGATOIRE POUR FAVORISER REFLEXION ESSENTIELLE A LA CONCLUSION DE NOS TRAVAUX.CERTAINES DELS N/N ONT TOUTEFOIS PAS ENCORE FAIT PART DE LEUR POSITION.QUELQUES POINTS DE CONVERGENCE SE SONT DESSINES,POURTANT UN DES OBSTACLES MAJEURS DEMEURE DETERMINATION DE L APPROCHE A SUIVRE.IMPORTANCE DE PROCEDER A L ETUDE DES MESURES DANS LEUR ENSEMBLE,CAR IL EXISTE CORRELATION ENTRE ELLES.EGALEMENT IMPERATIF DE PRENDRE EN CONSIDERATION MESURES POLITIQUES.

4.CONF DE STKHM SE DISTINGUE DES AUTRES DU PROCESSUS CSCE CAR ELLE ABORDE QUESTION DE SECURITE,VITAL POUR LES ETATS,DIFFICULTES DE PROCEDER A DE TELLES NEGOCIATIONS LORSQUE ON PROCEDE AU DEPLOIEMENT ARMES DE PREMIERE FRAPPE.ACCORDS PRESENTS DANS DOCU DE CLOTURE DE HSNKI ONT ETE CONCLUS ALORS QUE DETENTE EXISTAIT:CIT THEREFORE, THE ELABORATIONS OF CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES BECOME POSSIBLE ONLY WHEN A MINIMUM OF POLITICAL CONFIDENCE BETWEEN THE PARTICIPATING STATES HAS BEEN CREATED...MEASURES ADOPTED IN THE FINAL ACT DID NOT/NOT STAND ALONE,THEY WERE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE WHOLE COMPLEX OF EAST-WEST RELATION FINCIT.CBM CONSTITUENT DONC RESULTAT DETENTE POLITIQUE.

5.BULGARIE EST FAVORABLE A DES MESURES ENCORE PLUS LARGES DANS LEUR ...3

PAGE CINQ SCDL0147 CONF

D ACTIVITES N APPARTIENNENT PAS LA PREMIERE PHASE DE LA C.D.E. IL
DEMEURE AUE NOUS POURRIONS DISCUTER D UN APPARTENANCE A TELLE OU
TELLE PHASE DE NOS TRAVAUX ET ESQUISSE CE QUI POURRAIT ETRE UNE
SEQUENCE PARTICULIERE DANS CE DOMAINE. FINCIT

9. FRANCE A EGALEMENT ABORDE QUESTION MESURES COLLATERALES ET
REJETE TOUTE SEPARATION ARTIFICIELLE ENTRE LE CONCEPT DE CONFIANCE
ET CELUI DE SECURITE: CIT... DE MEME, CERTAINES MESURES PORTANT SUR
L INFORMATION ET LES ECHANGES, QUI NE PRENNENT A NOTRE AVIS TOUT
LEUR SENS POLITIQUE ET LEUR SIGNIFICATION MILITAIRE QU EN
COMPLEMENT DU DISPOSITIF DE NOTIFICATION ENVISAGE, POURRAIENT ELLES
ETRE EXAMINEES.

UN DERNIER POINT AVANT DE CONCLURE, MONSIEUR LE PRESIDENT, M AMENERA
A DIRE UN MOT-TROP SOMMAIRE JE M EN EXCUSE-SUR L INTERESSANTE GLOSE
DONT A ETE RECEMMENT ENTOURE LE TITRE DE NOTRE CONFERENCE SUR LES
MESURES DE CONFIANCE ET DE SECURITE. S AGISSANT DE L ADJONCTION DU
SECOND MOT AU PREMIER PENDANT LES NEGOCIATIONS DE MADRID, LA FRANCE
A CONTRIBUE A INTRODUIRE UN CONCEPT-CLE DONT, JE NOTE QUE LE
REPRESENTANT DE L AUTRICHE A DECLARE RECEMMENT QU IL AVAIT CREE
UN CIT NOUVELLE DIMENSION FINCIT. IL EST VRAI QUE LA SECURITE NE
SE CONFOND PAS AVEC LA CONFIANCE. ELLE NE SAURAIT TOUTEFOIS S EN
DISTINGUER AU POINT DE DONNER NAISSANCE A DES IDEES DE MESURES DE
SECURITE, DISTINCTES STRUCTURELLEMENT DE CELLES QUI SONT DESTINEES,
A ACCROITRE LA CONFIANCE. IL Y A LA UN PETIT PROBLEME DE NUANCES.
FINCIT.

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CONCERNEES.CETTE PROP,QUI REPOND AUX PRIORITES DE LA CONF,
RECHERCHE EFFICACITE EN MODIFIANT LE MOINS POSSIBLE STRUCTURE
POLITIQUE EXISTANTE.

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PREPARER LA VOIE A DES REDUCTIONS EFFECTIVES ET VERIFIABLES AU
COURS D UNE AUTRE PHASE DE NOS TRAVAUX.NOUS ESTIMONS DES LORS QUE
LES LIMITATIONS QUI SERAIENT APORTEES A TELLE OU TELLE CATEGORIE

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News Release

British Information Services
80 Elgin Street Ottawa K1P 5Y8 (613) 237-1530

PRIME MINISTER THATCHER'S PRESS CONFERENCE

FOLLOWING IS OPENING STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER AT HER PRESS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW, 14 FEBRUARY 1984:

MRS. THATCHER: PROMOTING A BETTER EAST/WEST DIALOGUE HAS TO BE CONDUCTED ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS. SO LET ME TALK TO YOU ABOUT MY PERSONAL APPROACH TO EAST/WEST POLITICS. I THINK THERE'S BEEN A TENDENCY TO PORTRAY MY VISIT TO HUNGARY AND MY DECISION TO COME TO MOSCOW AS A SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED DEVELOPMENT, THAT'S JUST NOT TRUE. IT WAS PLAIN TO ME AND TO THE FOREIGN SECRETARY LAST SUMMER THAT THE TIME HAD COME FOR A SERIOUS REVIEW OF RELATIONS WITH THE EAST. THE BUILD-UP OF ARMS, THE INCREASING NUMBER OF SS20S AND THE WEST'S NEED TO RESPOND WITH CRUISE AND PERSHING HAD CREATED DISQUIET. THE VARIOUS ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WERE GETTING NOWHERE AND CONTACT BETWEEN EAST AND WEST WAS SO LIMITED THAT THE RISK OF MISUNDERSTANDING WAS GRAVE. THE MATTER OF THE KOREAN AIRLINER DID NOTHING TO HELP, BUT NEVERTHELESS WHEN I VISITED THE UNITED STATES IN SEPTEMBER, THE PROSPECT FOR IMPROVING EAST/WEST RELATIONS WERE RIGHT AT THE TOP OF MY AGENDA WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND WE ESTABLISHED THEN A GREAT DEAL OF COMMON GROUND. I MADE MY WINSTON CHURCHILL SPEECH IN WASHINGTON BUT MY KEY LINES ON MY READINESS TO TALK IN THE RIGHT CIRCUMSTANCES WERE NOT THEN WIDELY NOTICED ALTHOUGH THEY WERE THERE IN THAT SPEECH. THEN CAME THE FOREIGN SECRETARY'S SPEECH TO THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, MY BLACKPOOL SPEECH AND MY GUILDHALL SPEECH. LOOK AT THEM AGAIN IF YOU WILL AND YOU'LL FIND THE COMMON THREAD. IT WAS IN NOVEMBER, NOT FEBRUARY, THAT I DECIDED TO GO TO HUNGARY AND FEW PEOPLE HAVE RECALLED THAT MANY MONTHS BEFORE THEN, I HAD RECEIVED THE HUNGARIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER IN LONDON, SO THE POLICY HAS BEEN EVOLVED OVER TIME AND IT WILL BE APPLIED OVER TIME. I LOOK FOR RESULTS OVER YEARS, NOT MONTHS AND I'M UNDER NO ILLUSIONS AT ALL. I BELIEVE AS STRONGLY AS EVER IN BASIC WESTERN FREEDOMS AND I MAKE IT PLAIN TO ALL IN THE EAST PRIVATELY AND PUBLICLY THAT I WILL DEFEND THEM ANYWHERE ANY TIME, BUT WE MUST AVOID THE TERRIBLE DANGERS THAT COULD FLOW FROM MISUNDERSTANDING AND THAT MEANS ESTABLISHING A NEW CONFIDENCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST AND THAT IN TURN MEANS A RECOGNITION THAT WE HAVE A COMMON INTEREST IN PEACE AND SECURITY AT A LOWER LEVEL OF WEAPONS. I BELIEVE THAT PAST EAST/WEST EXCHANGES HAVE BEEN TOO NARROWLY FOCUSED ON ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS, IF THERE IS TO BE PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL, WHICH I DEVOUTLY WANT, IT WILL COME NOT THROUGH NEGOTIATING SKILL ALONE BUT BECAUSE A BROADER UNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN REACHED THAT WILL ESTABLISH THE CONFIDENCE NECESSARY ON BOTH SIDES FOR THE NEGOTIATORS TO BE GIVEN THE RIGHT INSTRUCTIONS. THE AIM IS THAT BROAD UNDERSTANDING. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER IT CAN BE ACHIEVED, I DO KNOW THAT WE HAVE TO TRY. IT WILL BE AT BEST A LONG, SLOW TASK, THERE MAY BE SETBACKS AND INTERRUPTIONS BUT I EARNESTLY HOPE THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP WILL RESPOND POSITIVELY. IT'LL BE SOME TIME BEFORE WE CAN KNOW, BUT I'M ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT ALL WESTERN LEADERS ARE PREPARED TO WORK FOR THIS GOAL. I'M NOT LOOKING FOR INSTANT BUT EPHEMERAL SUCCESS, I'M LOOKING FOR STEADY AND SUSTAINABLE PROGRESS.

ENDS

cc. 1DD2 ✓



News Release

British Information Services
80 Elgin Street Ottawa K1P 5Y8 (613) 237-1530

PRIME MINISTER'S MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE

FOLLOWING IS EXTRACT FROM PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY THE
PRIME MINISTER PRIOR TO LEAVING MOSCOW LAST NIGHT 14 FEBRUARY 1984

INTERVIEWER: PRIME MINISTER, DID YOU RECEIVE WHAT YOU WOULD DESCRIBE
AS A POSITIVE REACTION FROM THE NEW SOVIET LEADER?

MRS. THATCHER: YES, I THINK SO, WE WERE VERY COURTEOUSLY RECEIVED,
I THINK THEY WERE PLEASED THAT WE HAD COME FOR THIS OCCASION OF
THE FUNERAL OF MR. ANDROPOV AND THE TALKS WERE CONDUCTED IN A
SPIRIT OF CO-OPERATION.

INTERVIEWER: WHEN I MEAN 'POSITIVE' I'M REALLY LOOKING TO THE
FUTURE: DID YOU GET THE IMPRESSION THAT HE TOO IS LOOKING TO
A NEW ERA, A CHANGE OF EMPHASIS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST?

MRS. THATCHER: I THINK THAT WE'RE ALL REALISING THAT THE STATE OF
WEAPONRY THAT WE HAVE NOW IS VERY HIGH, THE PEOPLE ARE DISQUIETED
ABOUT IT AND THAT WE WANT TO KEEP OUR SECURITY, KEEP OUR OWN
FERVENT BELIEF IN OUR OWN POLITICAL SYSTEMS, AT A LOWER LEVEL OF
ARMAMENTS AND WEAPONRY AND THE QUESTION IS HOW TO ACHIEVE THAT.
THERE REALLY ARE THREE WAYS - YOU CAN DO IT BY THE SEVERAL
DISARMAMENT TALKS, BUT SOMETIMES, AS YOU KNOW, THOSE GET A BIT
TECHNICAL, AND THEN YOU CAN DO IT BY ACHIEVING A BETTER
UNDERSTANDING ON A MUCH WIDER FRONT BETWEEN THE LEADERS OF THE
SEVERAL COUNTRIES AND, THIRDLY, YOU CAN DO IT BY TRADING
RELATIONS AND BETTER BILATERAL RELATIONS BUT YOU'RE MUCH MORE
LIKELY TO GET SOMEWHERE ON THE DISARMAMENT TALKS IF YOU HAVE
THE WIDER UNDERSTANDING AND THAT REALLY I THINK IS WHAT WE'RE
WORKING FOR NOW.

INTERVIEWER: DID YOU PRESS HIM THEN ON THIS BUSINESS OF THE
DISCUSSIONS AT THE MOMENT BEING TOO NARROW AND THAT THEY SHOULD
BE WIDENED TO TAKE IN OTHER ISSUES?

MRS. THATCHER: DID ONE PRESS? ONE PUT ONE'S VIEW, LOOK, IT'S
BEEN A VERY EMOTIONALLY EXHAUSTING DAY FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND A
VERY PHYSICALLY TIRING DAY FOR SOME OF THE LEADERS. THEY'VE HAD
THIS GREAT FUNERAL CEREMONY AND THE NEW GENERAL SECRETARY IS
SEEING A NUMBER OF PEOPLE. WHAT ONE WORKS THEREFORE FOR AGAINST
THAT BACKGROUND IS THE BASIS FOR CREATING A BETTER UNDERSTANDING
AND I THINK IT WAS ACCEPTED IN THAT SPIRIT, YOU CAN'T GET INTO
DETAIL, BUT YOU PUT WITH ALL THE SINCERITY AND CONVICTION
AT YOUR COMMAND, THAT ALTHOUGH WE ARE ON TWO DIFFERENT SIDES OF
A POLITICAL DIVIDE, ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE PASSIONATELY AND
FERVENTLY IN OUR VIEW AND WILL DEFEND IT AND DEFEND IT IN ARGUMENT
AND WILL DEFEND IT IF IT'S ATTACKED - AND THEY BELIEVE THEIRS -
IT'S IN OUR COMMON INTEREST TO ENSURE PEACE WITH SECURITY AND IN
OUR CASE PEACE WITH FREEDOM AND JUSTICE, FOR AS FAR AS WE CAN SEE,
AND THE TIME IS SHORT AND WE MUST GET ON WITH IT.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

Mr. Smith
Mr. MacRae
To see & file

TO
À The Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs, OTTAWA (IDDZ)

FROM
De The Canadian Embassy, PRAGUE

REFERENCE
Référence

SUBJECT
Sujet CSSR Media Reaction to Prime Minister
Thatcher's Visit to Hungary

SECURITY
Sécurité RESTRICTED

DATE 14 February 1984

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ENCLOSURES
Annexes

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Attached is a translation of an article that appeared ...
in the Czechoslovak Communist Party daily Rude Pravo reporting
Mrs. Thatcher's recent visit to Hungary.

2. It is interesting that Mrs. Thatcher is condemned for
her efforts to re-establish the east-west dialogue whilst
Mr. Trudeau received rather positive media coverage during his
stay in the CSSR and in articles following his subsequent visits
to East Berlin and Bucharest.

3. The contrast between the reactions to Prime Ministers
Thatcher and Trudeau is attributable to several factors; not
the least of which is that Czechoslovakia cannot forgive Mrs.
Thatcher's past rhetoric, solid support for the United States
in east-west matters and, most terrible of all, her willingness
to station NATO missiles on British territory. Another is that
Mr. Trudeau personally enjoys a reputation here as a NATO
leader not given to anti-communist tirades; he is known for his
sometimes independent views.

J. Siclani
for The Embassy

(a) How to Turn Things Upside Down

As we have already reported, British Prime Minister M. THATCHER visited Hungary last week. A number of comments which appeared in the British press after her return, draw attention to her statement that the visit "was a contribution to East-West relations". However, some British commentators were surprised by her statement in view of the notorious cold-war speeches in which the British Conservative Party leader has not lagged behind the American President. The Morning Star daily put it as follows: "It is, to put it mildly, turning things upside down... In the past five years she has lost no opportunity to reject all peace proposals and to give priority to her own malicious rhetoric...:"

Hella PICK, a commentator of the Guardian, who certainly cannot be suspected of left-wing leanings, said that THATCHER "deceives herself". "In Budapest she made no concession in the West's position on medium-range nuclear missiles," PICK writes. "However, it was precisely the installation of these missiles linked with British and French unwillingness to recognise that their nuclear missiles must be added to the West's nuclear armoury, which led to the interruption of the Geneva talks... She should realise that it is not enough to persuade others of an iron determination to work for a peaceful world, if she is unwilling, besides rhetoric and foreign travel, to show flexibility in matters of substance."

Indeed, one cannot contribute to an agreement by idle rhetoric and by thrashing empty straw (sic). That was shown clearly by the American attitude at the Geneva talks.

As for dialogue, socialist countries do not need to be persuaded by anybody about its usefulness and expediency. Our policy is orientated in this direction. In his replies to the "Pravda" paper's questions, comrade Yuri ANDROPOV re-emphasised on 24 January: "Dialogue must be conducted on the basis of equality, not from a position of strength as proposed by Ronald REAGAN. Dialogue cannot be conducted for its own sake alone. It must be directed to the achievement of concrete agreements. It is necessary to conduct it honestly and not to exploit it for opportunist aims."

The British Premier sticks to just such an opportunist line. She wants to create the idea amongst the public that the stationing of new American nuclear weapons has changed nothing in Europe. She pretends that her Government carries no direct responsibility for the deployment in Britain - against the will of the British people - of American first-strike nuclear weapons aimed at socialist countries with which THATCHER would now like to conduct a dialogue. Heavy, fateful responsibility for consent to the deployment of these American nuclear missiles cannot be denied before the public nor before history. Even the British press has reached these conclusions.

No dialogue with socialist countries can be conducted in the shadow of menacing nuclear weapons. If the British Premier has subscribed to REAGAN's recent "proposition" that "strength and dialogue go hand in hand", then with such an attitude she will achieve nothing in socialist countries.

Miroslav KUBÍN

8th FEBRUARY 1984

(Rudé Právo, p.7 - full translation)

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---PM VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE:NATO DEBRIEFING

FOLLOWING MTG WITH YOU AND OTHERS IN OTT LAST WEEK KINSMAN
DEBRIEFED PALMER OF STATE DEPT ON YOUR IMPRESSSIONS.IT MAY BE
USEFUL FOR YOU TO HAVE INFORMAL MEMO TO FILE WE DID ON THAT
DEBRIEFING PARTICULARLY IF YOU WISH TO CORRECT THE RECORD AND
EMPHASIS WHEN YOU BRIEF NATO.TEXT FOLLOWS:

TEXT BEGINS

ON THURSDAY MORNING FEBRUARY 9, I BRIEFED THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE. MARK
PALMER, ON INFORMAL ASSESSMENTS OF THE PRIME MINISTERS TRIP TO
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GDR AND ROMANIA. ALSO PRESENT WERE JIM MEDAS, THE
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CANADA, AND AN OFFICER FROM HIS STAFF
AND RALPH LYSYSHYN. PALMER IS SCHEDULED TO GO TO EASTERN EUROPE NEXT
WEEK WITH RICHARD BURT AND WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN CANADIAN
IMPRESSIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS THERE. I HAD ALREADY BRIEFED PALMER AT
THE END OF LAST WEEK ON THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PMS TRIP, AS REPORTED
BY TELEGRAMS FROM HIS DELEGATION AND OUR EMBASSIES. THIS BRIEFING,
WHICH I STRESSED WAS MORE IMPRESSIONISTIC THAN FACTUAL, WAS THE
RESULT OF CONVERSATIONS SEVERAL OF OUR COLLEAGUES HAD WITH ME ON

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TUESDAY AND WEDNESDAY IN OTTAWA. IT WAS IN RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL BY PALMER THAT HE PROVIDE ME IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS WITH PRIVILEGED INSIGHTS INTO WHAT THEY EXPECT WILL BE AN INTERESTING PERIOD OF DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE USSR. I AM NOT SURE HE CAN DELIVER BUT THE BRIEFING WAS MEANT TO A LEAST PAY OUR SUBSCRIPTION.

2. THE SPEECH

I BEGAN BY DESCRIBING THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PM SPEECH WHICH WAS TO BE GIVEN AT ABOUT THAT TIME. UNFORTUNATELY, WE STILL DID NOT HAVE A COPY TO HAND OVER

3. ROMANIAN TRIP

THE ERALIER BRIEFING WITH PALMER HAD NOT COVERED ROMANIA, SO I REPORTED ON THE DISCUSSIONS BASING MYSELF ON THE RELEVANT TELEGRAMS.

4. THE REPORT PLACED EMPHASIS ON THE INF SITUATION CEAUSESCU HAD ARGUED FOR THE MORATORIUM IN DEPLOYMENT. MR. TRUDEAU ARGUED THAT SUCH A MORATORIUM WOULD BE SEEN AS A SOVIET VICTORY. CEAUSESCU SAID NATO HAD DEMONSTRATED ITS RESOLVE ON DEPLOYMENT AND HAD ASKED WHY IT WAS NECESSARY TO GO FURTHER. THE PRIME MINISTER ARGUED THAT A RETURN TO THE PREDEPLOYMENT SITUATION WOULD MEAN RETURNING TO A HIGHLY UNEQUAL SITUATION. IT WOULD LEAVE 250 AND MORE SS20S POINTED AT EUROPE. TO CEAUSESCUS ARGUMENT THAT THE SS20S WERE IN COMPENSATION FOR NATOS FORWARD BASED PLANES. SUBMARINES AND CARRIERS. THE PM EMPFASIZED THAT THE USSR HAD SIMILAR SYSTEMS. CEAUSESCU ARGUED THAT HIS PROPOSAL WAS NOT MEANT AS A DEFINITIVE SOLUTION BUT ONLY AS A MEANS OF GAINING

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SUFFICIENT TIME TO NEGOTIATE. THE USSR PROPOSAL TO REDUCE SS20 DEPLOYMENT DOWN TO 150 WAS REASONABLE. HE MADE THE SUGGESTION THAT USA MISSILES IN SICILY WERE IN ANY CASE AIMED AT THE MIDDLE EAST. THE PM SIMPLY DISAGREED WITH ALL THIS.

5. CEAUSESCU THOUGHT THAT SEVERAL COUNTRIES IN WESTERN EUROPE WERE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS ON THE TWO TRACK DECISION IN ANY CASE. THE PM DISABUSED HIM OF THIS NOTION.

6. CEAUSESCU THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT RETURN TO THE INF NEGOTIATIONS AS SUCH. AND DOUBTED THAT THE USA WANTED AN INF AGREEMENT.

7. OTHER CONVERSATIONS INDICATED THAT THE ROMANIANS THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY ANDROPOV WOULD RECOVER AND THAT THE GROMYKO VISIT SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN A FAIRLY TOUGH ONE. ONE ROMANIAN SAID HE HAD SPOKEN WITH GRAVITY ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND HAD OBSERVED THAT NUCLEAR WAR WOULD END ALL HUMAN LIFE.

8. OUR PEOPLE OBSERVED HOW CEAUSESCU WAS TOTALLY IN PERSONAL DOMINATION OVER THE COUNTRY.

9. EASTERN EUROPE COUNTRIES AND USSR RELATIONS

FOLLOWING THE BRIEFING ON THE ROMANINA VISIT, I TURNED TO THE MORE IMPRESSIONISTIC APPRAISALS OUR COLLEAGUES HAD MADE OF THE TRIP. I NOTED THAT MANY OF THE OBSERVATIONS PICKED UP FROM EAST GERMANS WERE MADE FROM SIDE CONVERSATIONS AT MEALS AND ELSEWHERE. I DID VERY LITTLE IDENTIFICATION OF INTERLOCUTORS.

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10. GENERALLY, THE EXPERIENCE TENDED TO SUPPORT THE BONN VIEW THAT THESE COUNTRIES WERE EXERCISING SOMEWHAT GREATER FREEDOM OF MANEUVER FROM MOSCOW. THIS HAD BEEN ENHANCED BY ANDROPOVS ILLNESS. EASTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS CAN TALK WITH WESTERN LEADERS WHILE MOSCOW REMAINS PREOCCUPIED WITH THE SUCCESSION PROBLEM. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE DECISION TO RECEIVE PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU ON ONLY SEVERAL DAYS NOTICE WAS PROBABLY IN THE CASES OF PRAGUE AND BERLIN ANYWAY, AUTHORIZED BY MOSCOW. BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN AWKWARD FOR MOSCOW TO TURN THE VISIT OFF.

11. BOTH THE ROMANIANS AND CZECHS THOUGHT THAT THEY HAD A CERTAIN ROLE IN INFLUENCING MOSCOW. THE ROMANIANS SAID THEY HAD EXERCISED SOME INFLUENCE IN THE WAY OF RESTRAINT; THE CZECHS SAID THAT THEY COULD NOT DO A LOT TO INFLUENCE MOSCOW, BUT COULD DO SOMETHING. HONECKER MENTIONED THAT ANDROPOV HAD CALLED HIM TO CONSULT ABOUT SECURITY MATTERS.

12. THERE WAS ALSO VERY LITTLE DOCTRINAIRE STUFF ONCE THE FORMAL STATEMENTS WERE OVER. TOASTS, OF COURSE, WERE RIGID AND DISAPPOINTING BUT INFORMAL EXCHANGES SEEMED MORE FLEXIBLE AND PRODUCTIVE.

13. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS PUT TO HONECKER DREW A DECISIVE RESPONSE IN THE CASE OF THE FIVE POWER CONFERENCE IDEA, IT HAD BEEN KNOWN FOR SOME MONTHS AND HE WOULD HAVE HAD TIME TO CHECK HIS LINES WITH MOSCOW. BUT IN THE CASE OF THE PROPOSAL FOR SOME SORT OF CONTINUING ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE WITH THE EAST GERMANS, WHICH OUR SIDE HAD ONLY

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DISCUSSED INTERNALLY FOR A COUPLE OF DAYS. HE DID NOT HAVE A CHANCE TO CLEAR HIS LINES; HE NONETHELESS ACCEPTED AFTER ONLY A QUICK EXCHANGE WITH HIS FOREIGN MINISTER.

14. THERE WAS UNHAPPINESS WITH THE OBLIGATION TO COUNTER-DEPLOY AND PERHAPS EVIDENCE OF SOME STRAIN WITH MOSCOW OVER THIS. SEVERAL PRIVATE OBSERVATIONS WERE MADE IN BERLIN ABOUT THE IMPACT OF WEST GERMAN MEDIA ON THE GDR PUBLIC, VIA WHICH THE PEACE MOVEMENT HAD CREATED BELOW THE SURFACE ANXIETY IN THE GDR.

15. OVERALL, MR. TRUDEAU'S INTERLOCUTORS WERE RESPONSIVE TO THE NOTION OF THEIR ROLE AS MIDDLE POWERS.

16. RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

OUR PEOPLE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THESE COUNTRIES ARE KEEN FOR PRODUCTIVE RELATIONS WITH THE WEST, WITH A PARTICULAR ATTRACTION TO FRANCE AND ITALY AS WELL, OF COURSE, AS FRG FOR SPECIAL REASONS. THERE WAS AN IMPRESSION THESE COUNTRIES COULD BE DRAWN OUR WAY TO SOME EXTENT, EVEN IF WESTERN PULL MAY HAVE BEEN REDUCED IN THE LAST FEW YEARS. THERE IS AN ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT ON THE PART OF THE POLITICAL ELITE IN PRAGUE AND BERLIN WHICH IS A CONTRAST TO THE SORT OF SOPHISTICATED AND BARELY CONCEALED PERSONAL ATTRACTION FOR WESTERN STYLE WHICH WAS EVIDENT A FEW YEARS AGO.

17. SOME INTERLOCUTORS SAID THAT THE BUSH SPEECHES ABOUT EASTERN EUROPE HAD EMBARRASSED AND OFFENDED THEM AND MAY, IN FACT, HAVE

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REDUCED THE FREEDOM OF MANEUVER OF THESE COUNTRIES. THE SHULTZ REMARKS ON THE DIVISION OF EUROPE MADE AT STOCKHOLM REINFORCED THIS SENSE OF MALAISE. THEY WERE ANXIOUS TO GET BACK TO A MORE RELAXED SITUATION.

18. THERE WAS GENUINE WORRY ABOUT AMERICAN INTENTIONS. THE USA HARDLINE COMBINE WITH THE EXTENT OF DEFENSE MODERNIZATION AND THE SUGGESTION THAT THE USA WOULD CONTEMPLATE A NEW ARMS RACE WITH SERENITY, AS WELL AS THE TENDENCY OF AMERICAN POLICY TO TAKE A MILITARY APPROACH TO REGIONAL POLITICAL CRISIS, AND THE NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, HAD ALL CONTRIBUTED TO THIS WORRY. BUT THEY HAD TAKEN NOTE OF THE CHANGE IN TONE COMING OUT OF WASHINGTON AND DID NOT DISMISS THIS, EVEN IF THEY WERE WARY. ALL INTERLOCUTORS WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE SHULTZ/GROMYKO MEETING IN STOCKHOLM.

19. I STRESSED THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE PM HAD EXPLAINED REAGANS WISH FOR BETTER RELATIONS AND HAD DEFENDED SOME OF HIS APPROACHES

20. THE INF QUESTION

NOTING THAT THE EURO MISSILE ISSUE HAD DOMINATED DISCUSSIONS, I OFFERED THE ASSESSMENT THAT THE EAST EUROPEANS SEEMED SINCERE IN JUDGING THE INF DEPLOYMENT AS A CONCRETE THREAT BECAUSE OF THE QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT SITUATION WHICH APPLIES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TODAY, AS OPPOSED TO FIVE OR SIX YEARS AGO WHEN EAST-WEST RELATIONS WERE MORE RELAXED AND LESS ADVERSARY GOVERNMENTS WERE IN ...7

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POWER IN THE WEST. OBVIOUSLY OUR PEOPLE OBSERVED THAT THE USSR HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR MUCH OF THE CHANGE IN RELATIONS, BUT THE EAST EUROPEANS STILL SAW DEPLOYMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF A TENSER CLIMATE.

21. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD POINTED OUT IT WAS A SHAME THE USSR HAD LEFT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE USA HAD NOT DONE SO WHEN THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUED TO DEPLOY NEW SS20S DURING THE PAST YEAR. EASTERN EUROPEANS SUGGESTED THAT THE USSR WOULD COME BACK TO A DIFFERENT TABLE TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS BUT INDICATED THERE COULD BE A MIXTURE OF MOTIVES. IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT THE USSR HAD NOT YET DECIDED HOW TO PROCEED. ASSESSING THESE CONVERSATIONS, OUR PEOPLE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SECURITY OF REAGAN'S OWN POLITICAL FUTURE WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT VARIABLE. PROBABLY THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT YET DECIDED HOW OR WHETHER TO TRY TO DAMAGE REAGAN IN THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS. THERE SEEMED TO BE LESS TALK OF A REVIEW IN MOSCOW OF RELATIONS WITH THE USA. THERE IS A KIND OF WAIT AND SEE ATTITUDE AND A READINESS TO MAINTAIN A HARDLINE STANCE FOR AS LONG AS NECESSARY. THE HARD LINE AND A MORE COOPERATIVE APPROACH COULD IN FACT CO EXIST. THE USSR COULD GO BACK TO THE TABLE IN MAY OR JUNE BUT RESERVE THE OPTION OF ISOLATING REAGAN DIPLOMATICALLY OR DAMAGING HIM

22. THOUGH SUCH A STRATEGY MAY SEEM PRETENTIOUS OR UNREALISTIC, PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET CLUMSINESS IN DEALING WITH

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PUBLIC OPINION IN OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES. THERE WERE A COUPLE OF INFORMAL REFERENCES TO THE SUCCESS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IN WINNING THE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENTS WHILE THEY WERE NEGOTIATING WITH THE ADMINISTRATION. IN ANY EVENT, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE EAST EUROPEANS WERE DEEPLY DISTRUSTFUL OF USA MOTIVES AND WHILE OLIVE BRANCHES WOULD BE ACCEPTED, THEY WOULD BE INSPECTED CAREFULLY FOR THORNS.

23. USSR INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

CONVERSATIONS INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS FULLY PREOCCUPIED WITH THE DOMESTIC SUCCESSION ISSUE. NORMAL CONTACTS WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS HAD SHOWN SIGNS OF TAPERING OFF. AS MENTIONS ABOVE, THERE WAS A FEELING ANDROPOV WAS GOING TO DIE SOON

24. THE CZECH MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR THOUGHT THAT HIS DEPARTURE WOULD BE A LOSS BECAUSE HE KNEW EASTERN EUROPE PERSONALLY AND BECAUSE OF HIS PRAGMATISM. HONECKER SAID THAT THEY ALL HAD HIGH HOPES FOR ANDROPOV WHICH WERE NOW NECESSARILY FADING. THERE WAS NOW THE HOPE THAT AT LEAST ANDROPOV HAD BEEN ABLE OR WOULD BE ABLE TO STAY ALIVE LONG ENOUGH FOR A REGENCY TO SUCCEED HIM TO TAKE SHAPE AND IF POSSIBLE, FOR HIM TO BLESS IT.

25. NOW THE PROSPECT WOULD BE FOR ANDROPOVISM WITHOUT ANDROPOV AND THERE WAS A FEELING THAT HIS CONTRIBUTIONS MAY IN SOME RESPECTS BE LASTING. THERE HAD BEEN A SHIFT TOWARD A POLITICAL PROCESS IN THE

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PAGE NINE UNGR2043 CONFD

SOVIET UNION BASED ON ROLES RATHER THAN ON PERSONAL LOYALTY TO THE LEADER, A SORT OF DEPERSONALIZATION OF POWER. HIGHER ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY WAS EVERYBODYS CONCERN AND THE ANDROPOV COMBINATION OF INCENTIVES AND DISCIPLINE TO ACHIEVE THIS REPRESENTED A FORMULA WHICH WOULD PROBABLY ENDURE. A COUPLE OF INTERLOCUTORS MENTIONED THE NOTION OF SEEKING ECONOMIC REFORM SHORT OF DESTABILIZATION AS BEING AN OBJECTIVE.

26. ONE HIGH OFFICIAL SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH AN ARTICLE SIGNED BY ANDROPOV IN THE FEBRUARY ISSUE OF KOMMUNIST REPRESENTED IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES FOR THE WHOLE BLOC IN THE SENSE OF PROVIDING GUIDELINES FOR A MORE PRODUCTIVE SYSTEM FOR ALL.

27. BERLIN

I SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN ABLE TO AVOID EMBARRASSMENT IN EAST BERLIN BUT THAT HE HAD NEED TO THINK FAST ON A COUPLE OF OCCASIONS TO THE POINT THAT HE HAD TO KILL TIME BY BOWLING AND DRINKING BEER WITH STUDENTS SO AS TO AVOID ANY CHANCE OF FINDING HIMSELF IN THE GDR PARLIAMENT WHICH IS ADJACENT TO A RECREATION AND CULTURAL COMPLEX HE WAS VISITING. OUR COLLEAGUES THOUGHT THE BONN GROUP COULD COME UP WITH A NEW LIST OF DOS AND DONTs AND ESPECIALLY A LIST OF DOS FOR NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WHO MIGHT BE VISITING BERLIN AND WHO FIND THEMSELVES WITH TIME ON THEIR HANDS, THAT COULD BE SPENT IN A HARMLESS WAY, SUCH AS THE

...10

PAGE TEN UNGR2043 CONF

VISITS TO THE PERGAMMEN MUSEUM AND THE BRECHT HOUSE WHICH MR.
TRUDEAU HAD DONE.

28. CONCLUSIONS

IN OUR EARLIER MEETING I HAD STRESSED THE EXTENT TO WHICH
THE PM THOUGHT THESE VISITS HAD BEEN USEFUL IN PROVIDING SUBSTANCE
TO HIS STATEMENTS THAT THERE OUGHT TO BE DIALOGUE. OBVIOUSLY, THESE
COUNTRIES WERE NOT INDEPENDENT IN ANY REAL SENSE BUT THERE WAS
PROBABLY UTILITY IN WESTERN MIDDLE POWERS RELATING TO THEM AS
MIDDLE POWERS IN THEIR OWN RIGHTS, AND ON THE BASIS THAT IF YOU
TREATED THEM AS REAL COUNTRIES THEY MIGHT BEGIN TO BEHAVE AS SUCH
IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. I POINTED OUT AGAIN THAT I DID NOT THINK
THAT THE PMS PUBLIC REMARKS IN ONE PLACE OR ANOTHER NEEDED ANY
FURTHER EXPLANATIONS OR DEFENSE FROM US BUT I DID STRESS THE EXTENT
TO WHICH HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE LEADERS OF THESE COUNTRIES AS A
WESTERN LEADER WITH SOLID ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS.

J.K.B. KINSMAN

TEXT ENDS.

CCC/230 141514Z UNGR2043

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

TO
À Le Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures
OTTAWA (LSR)

FROM
De L'Ambassade du Canada
BOGOTA

REFERENCE
Référence

SUBJECT
Sujet Initiative de paix du Premier Ministre

SECURITY
Sécurité NON CLASSIFIÉ

DATE 14 février 1984

NUMBER
Numéro 0043

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	
MISSION	57-9

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

1

DISTRIBUTION

... Nous vous faisons parvenir copie d'un article publié en page éditoriale d'El Tiempo du 26 janvier dernier par Jorge Restrepo, à qui nous avons fourni toute la documentation que vous nous aviez envoyée à ce sujet.

2. Après avoir décrit le blocage actuel est-ouest sur le désarmement et ses causes, Restrepo écrit que, si cette initiative est d'une grande valeur, les difficultés qu'elle comporte sont aussi grandes. Malgré cela, un appui devrait être accordé à la recherche de chemins d'entente de monsieur Trudeau.

L'Ambassade,

Par *[Signature]*



8.6 57-9

SUBJECT/SUJET

PUBLICAT

EL TIEMPO

DATE

JAN 26/84

Vida del mundo

La fórmula de Trudeau

Por JORGE RESTREPO

Muchos observadores señalan el estancamiento presente de las relaciones internacionales. En un punto peligroso, o de incomprensión para no ser alarmistas. Las dos negociaciones de Ginebra están rotas; las de Viena, sobre armamentos convencionales se reanudarán en una fecha imprecisa, pero para Moscú y Washington éstas son "diferentes" a las primeras porque en ellas no están en discusión asuntos capitales. Tampoco dejaron novedades la apertura de la Conferencia sobre desarme de Estocolmo ni la entrevista entre el secretario de Estado norteamericano y el canciller soviético.

Los comentaristas dan explicaciones mediatas e inmediatas de este congelamiento inquietante de la situación mundial. Se habla del emplazamiento de los SS-20 soviéticos en el 76; luego de la invasión a Afganistán en el 79; también de la decisión de la OTAN sobre los Pershings y los Crucero en el 79; igualmente de la elección de Ronald Reagan un año después. Y así sucesivamente se pasa revista a hitos del desmoronamiento de la distensión que habían consagrado los acuerdos de Helsinki en el 75. Inmediatamente se piensa ahora de la crisis de mando en Moscú por la enfermedad del señor Andrópov, de Polonia, de Granada y del interregno forzoso de la política norteamericana por las elecciones presidenciales.

No abundan las soluciones para la encrucijada. Sigue en pie la propuesta —la repitió recientemente Henry Kissinger— de una cumbre Reagan-Andrópov. Sin audiencia y por una razón clara: los dos jefes de Estado que la revista "Time" proclamó como personajes del año no podrían reunirse sino en función de una perspectiva espectacular que correspondiera a la expectativa que generaría un hecho de esas dimensiones. Tal posibilidad no tiene por ahora fundamento.

Hay sin embargo sobre el tapete otra proposición que ha despertado interés. Es del primer ministro del Canadá, señor Trudeau, quien promueve una cumbre de las cinco potencias nucleares. Esta tendría la ventaja de sumar a las conversaciones a China y a Francia e Inglaterra, cuyos arsenales atómicos, según la posición soviética, deben entrar en cualquier pacto de reducción nuclear.

La bondad de su iniciativa es evidente. Sus dificultades, igualmente. Primero las superpotencias no querían diluir su poder; segundo, si dos no se entienden, cinco menos; tercero, Francia e Inglaterra difícilmente renunciarían a fuerzas de disuasión propias que garantizan su dignidad precaria de potencias; ambas sostienen, por otra parte, que lo negociable es el peso masivo de los armamentos nucleares de Estados Unidos y la Unión Soviética. No obstante, alguien debería apoyar vías de entendimiento mundiales como la que abre Trudeau.

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

February 14, 1984

IDDZ-0167

Mr. J.G. Corn and
Dr. Boucek,
Czechoslovak National
Association of Canada,
740 Spadina Avenue,
Toronto, Ontario,
M5S 2J2,

Dear Mr. Corn and Dr. Boucek,

The Prime Minister has referred your telegram of January 19 to the Task Force on East-West Relations and International Security for reply.

While we have no illusions about the character of the government of Czechoslovakia or of its strict alliance with Moscow, the Prime Minister thought it important to open lines of communication with Eastern Europe. In particular, he chose to visit Czechoslovakia and East Germany because they are to receive Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles, hence they occupy a special position in the debate over European security.

No matter what we think of our adversaries, we contend that the West must multiply its contacts with the East in order to give them full exposure to our views on international security. Only by beginning a genuine dialogue with the East can we lessen the threat of war in Europe.

Yours sincerely,

L. A. Delvoie,
Chairman,
Task Force Working Group

c.c. PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)
PCO/Judy Cameron
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston

Ref. PMO No 4020 017



Government of Canada
Privy Council Office

Gouvernement du Canada
Bureau du Conseil privé

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0A3

Date: February 1, 1984....

100
K. J. J.

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. R. Fyfe
Director General, International
Security and Arms Control Bureau (IDD)

Letter to the Prime Minister from:

J. G. CORN

PMO Ref. No: 4020...017.....


We have arranged with the Under Secretary's office that the Department's services can be drawn upon in preparing replies to letters which the Prime Minister has received on foreign affairs.

I would be grateful if you could arrange for a reply (within seven working days) to the attached letter for signature at the appropriate level within the Department of External Affairs and with copies to PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier) and External Affairs/CMR/Johnston. I would also welcome your advice on alternative ways of dealing with the matter, if appropriate.

If you have any questions, please call me at 5-6073.

Maurice D. Archdeacon
Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat

c.c. PMO/Correspondence (Nicole Fournier)
PCO/Judy Cameron
EA/CMR/Ted Johnston



2

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE - BUREAU DU CONSEIL PRIVÉ

CONTROL FORM - PRIME MINISTER'S CORRESPONDENCE

FORMULAIRE DE CONTRÔLE - CORRESPONDANCE DU PREMIER MINISTRE

TO/A: Mr. Fowler

CC: Messrs. Osbaldeston, Darling, Clark (our file)

RE:LETTER FROM/LETTRE DE:
J.G. Corn

DATE:
January 20, 1984

SUBJECT/SUJET:
PM's visit to Prague

CORRESPONDENCE NO/NO DE LA CORRESPONDANCE:
4020 017

Judy Cameron

DATE: January 23, 1984

- ☐ REPLY PREPARED FOR THE PRIME MINISTER'S SIGNATURE.
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DU PREMIER MINISTRE.
- ☐ REPLY PREPARED FOR MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN'S SIGNATURE AND FORWARDED THROUGH JUDY CAMERON.
RÉPONSE PRÉPARÉE POUR LA SIGNATURE DE MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN, TRANSMISE PAR JUDY CAMERON.
- ☐ REFERRED TO ANOTHER MINISTER THROUGH JUDY CAMERON TO MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.
RÉFÉRÉ À UN MINISTRE PAR JUDY CAMERON À MARIE-ANDRÉE BASTIEN.
- ☐ NO FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED. COPY RETAINED IN PCO FOR INFORMATION AND ORIGINAL RETURNED TO JUDY CAMERON.
AUCUNE RÉPONSE NÉCESSAIRE. UNE COPIE EST CONSERVÉE AU BCP À TITRE D'INFORMATION. L'ORIGINAL RETOURNE À JUDY CAMERON.

ADDITIONAL REMARKS/OBSERVATIONS ADDITIONNELLES:

4020 017

*rec'd
Jan 20/84*

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CNCP MSG SVC
GUE949 JAN 19 2311 EST

CTP289
CTE315 INV108 M062 121 NL
TDIN OTTAWA ONT 19
PRIME MINISTER PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU
OTTAWA ONT
ET

WE QUESTION WISDOM AND USEFULNESS OF YOUR VISIT TO PRAGUE TO
DISCUSS THERE YOUR PEACE INITIATIVE. CZECHOSLOVAK GOVERNMENT
BELONGS AMONG THE MOST SUBSERVIENT SOVIET SATELITES AND IT WOULD
BE NAIVE TO ASSUME THAT IT COULD AND WOULD INTERCEDE WITH MOSCOW
YOUR VISIT WILL BE USED BY COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT TO CONFUSE
CZECHOSLOVAK PEOPLE WHO ADMIRE AND TRUST CANADIAN DEMOCRACY. WE
SUGGEST INSTEAD THAT YOU DEMAND THAT THE SOVIET TROOPS
OCCUPYING CZECHOSLOVAKIA FOR 15 YEARS BE WITHDRAWN AND THAT
GOVERNMENT IN PRAGUE STOPS PERSECUTION OF THE CHARTER 77 HUMAN
RIGHTS MOVEMENT WHICH ASK FOR NOTHING ELSE BUT FULLFILMENT OF
PRINCIPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
HELSINKI ACCORDS.

CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CANADA J.G. COEN
PRESIDENT (TORONTO) DOCTOR J.A. BOUCEK SECRETARY GENERAL
(OTTAWA)



740 SPADINA AVE.

M5S 2J2

ORIGINAL TO *R. Fowler (19)*
OF *MOYE A*
C.C. *S*
C.C. DOSSIERS CPM

2+
PMO PCO CTT

mm





Government of Canada
Gouvernement du Canada

MESSAGE

FILE - DOSSIER

FOR COMMUNICATION CENTRE USE - À L'USAGE DU CENTRE DE COMMUNICATIONS

FROM
DE

P. M. O.

TO
À

MR. J.G. CORN
PRESIDENT
CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CANADA
740 SPADINA AVENUE
TORONTO, ONTARIO
M5S 2J2

INFO

NO.

4020 017

DATE

January 20, 1984

PRECEDENCE - PRÉSÉANCE

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ

12

10

ON BEHALF OF THE PRIME MINISTER, I
ACKNOWLEDGE YOUR TELEGRAM OF JANUARY 19.

PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT IT WILL BE
BROUGHT TO MR. TRUDEAU'S ATTENTION.

MARIE-ANDREE BASTIEN
CORRESPONDENCE DIRECTOR

Original to R. Fowler

MAB/lc

DISTRIBUTION

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OF
DE

ORIGINATOR - INITIATEUR

DIVISION

TEL.

APPROVED - AUTORISÉ

M.-A. Bastien

Correspondence

6-4008

GC 45

7540-21-866-6545

2

000115

Department of External Affairs



Canada

Ministère des Affaires extérieures

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

February 14, 1984

IDDZ-0166

Mr. Ivan Kollar,
924 College Avenue,
Regina, Saskatchewan,
S4N 0Y3

Dear Mr. Kollar,

The Deputy Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs has asked me to reply to your letter of January 13 concerning the Prime Minister's initiative and the NATO alliance.

I can assure you that the Government of Canada maintains its long-standing commitment to NATO and to its policies. As recently as his speech in the House of Commons on February 9, the Prime Minister reaffirmed that commitment.

Throughout his current initiative the Prime Minister has made clear that he speaks for a country which is dedicated to the Alliance and its purposes. At the same time we welcomed NATO's decision in December to conduct a review of how East-West relations might be improved. The last such NATO review took place in 1967; it is essential that this new review chart a course for the Alliance to the end of this century.

I should also note that there has been no question of the government reversing its decision to test the cruise missile.

Yours truly,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "L. A. Delyoie".

L. A. Delyoie,
Chairman,
Task Force Working Group



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

From *De* **Ivan Kollar AK Sask.**

No. **A 05552**

Subject *Sujet* **Views on PM's Peace Initiative.**

Action div./Dir. responsable

IDDZ

Letter dated/Lettre en date du

Date rec'd in MINA
Date de réception à MINA

Date sent to div.
Date d'envoi à la dir.

Info. division(s)/Direction(s) informée(s)

84-01-31

84-02-10

84-02-10

Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by
L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par

84-02-17

Comments/Commentaires

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE	Date received/Date reçu Feb 13 1984
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de	Action officer/Agent responsable [Signature]
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction	Disposition IDDZ - C/KC
<input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date Feb 14 1984
<div>ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA REGISTRY LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT</div> <div>5-1047</div>	For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA

Ivan Kollar
924 College Avenue
Regina, Saskatchewan
S4N 0Y3

January 31, 1984

Hon. Allan J. MacEachen, P.C., M.P.
Cape Breton Highlands - Canso
Secretary of State for External Affairs
House of Commons
OTTAWA, Ontario
K1A 0A6

Dear Mr. Minister:

It is becoming clear to me and to the majority of Canadians that the so called peace mission of the Prime Minister serves no other purpose than to undermine the NATO alliance. The replies given by the Acting Prime Minister in the House on January 30, 1984, talking of "debatable points" of NATO policies offered further evidence of the disastrous policy making of the present administration.

In 1968 and 1969 the Prime Minister made several statements with reference to "reshaping" our foreign policy. As an uninvited visitor in some Eastern Block capitals he dignified the most oppressive regimes, and was giving further support to manipulation initiated by him fifteen years ago. Needless to say that his diatribe in Davos seriously damaged the credibility of Canada, although I hope that our allies realize that his mandate is limited by the decision to be made by electorate in the near future.

I noted with interest that his activities are applauded by the anti-cruise groups and other movements hostile to the United States. I have no doubt that his alliance with the New Democratic Party is being strengthened.

cc: Hon. Sinclair Stevens, P.C., M.P.
York-Peel

Yours truly,


Ivan Kollar

FEB
FEV

6 1984

Affaires Affaires extérieures
Canada

TRANSMITTAL SLIP - NOTE D'ENVOI

MINA/Robertson

DE


IDDZ

SUBJECT/SUJET

Prime Minister's Initiative:
Questions in the Senate

Security Sécurité	Unclassified
File Dossier	
Date	February 16, 1984

ATTACHMENT
PIÈCE JOINTE

DISTRIBUTION	RECORD OF CONSULTATION (Names/Divisions) RAPPORT DE CONSULTATION (Noms des individus/Directions)	ACTION/SUITE À DONNER
		<p>Attached is a suggested response to questions in the Senate on the Prime Minister's recent visit to Moscow.</p> <p>REQUIRED BY/DEMANDÉ POUR</p> <p> L. A. Delvoie Chairman Task Force Working Group</p>

TO BE RETAINED WITH FILE COPY - A CONSERVER AVEC L'EXEMPLAIRE DESTINÉ AU DOSSIER

EXT 401

February 16, 1984

The Prime Minister and Soviet General Secretary Chernenko primarily discussed East-West relations and the Prime Minister's initiative in their meeting in Moscow on February 15. The Prime Minister elaborated on some of the basic elements of his initiative and stressed the "window of opportunity" which presented itself over the next few months to take positive steps to improve East-West relations on several fronts. General Secretary Chernenko described the Prime Minister's initiative as useful and practical and encouraged its continuation. He spoke of the importance of political dialogue and détente.

The Prime Minister has said that this meeting with Chernenko "completes one cycle" of the initiative.



MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère de la Sécurité sous cette flèche

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SÉCURITÉ

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TO PMDELMOSCO/HANCOCK

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---PM MTG WITH CHERNENKO

SUBJ/SUJ

GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD PHONE DELVOIE OR SMITH/IDDZ IMMEDIATELY AFTER
PM MTG WITH CHERNENKO (995-5912) TO (A)CONFIRM MTG HAS TAKEN PLACE
(B)TELL US SOMETHING RE DURATION AND ATMOSPHERICS,AND(C)INDICATE
IN GENERAL TERMS HOW CHERNENKO REACTED TO PM PRESENTATION ON PEACE
INITIATIVE.THIS INFO REQUIRED TO PERMIT US TO GIVE DPM/SSEA GENERAL
BRIEFING BEFORE OPENING OF HOFC QUESTION PERIOD.

2.GRATEFUL ALSO FOR ANY REPORTS YOU OR EMB CAN PROVIDE RE PM S
OTHER ACTIVITIES(CEREMONIES,BILATERALS,ETC) FOR DELIVERY BY 150800
OTT TIME.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG L.A.Delvoie/sc

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG L.A.Delvoie



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

Align first character of Security Classification under this arrow
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Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
14 FEB 84 23 05Z 10

SECURITY SÉCURITÉ	UNCLASSIFIED
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DISTR	INFO BNATO VMBFR MOSCO PEKIN PRGUE WSAW LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN
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SUBJ/SUJ	DISTR MINA IFB IDR URR UGP RBR
	---PM INITIATIVE
	FLWG EDITORIAL ENTITLED QUOTE CRUSADE:PIERRE TRUDEAU S PEACE PLAN
	OFFERS A ALTERNATIVE TO NUCLEAR STALEMATE UNQUOTE FROM DETROIT
	FREE PRESS 13FEB.
	(COMCENTRE PLSE COPY ATTACHED QUOTE TO UNQUOTE)

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
 SIG J. McNEE	IDDZ	5-5912	 L.A. DELVOIE

000123

CANADIAN CONSULATE GENERAL - DETROIT

PRESS CLIPPINGS

PUBLICATION: DETROIT FREE PRESS

DATE February 13, 1984

SUBJECT:

CRUSADE: Pierre Trudeau's peace plan offers an alternative to nuclear stalemate

EXCEPT FOR the Canadian press, nobody seems to have noticed Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's latest peace crusade to Europe, Asia and the capitals of three Soviet allies. The nearly complete silence surrounding his initiative is as regrettable as the plan itself is thoughtful.

After the Soviets downed the Korean airliner last September, Mr. Trudeau, worried by that hair-trigger reaction by a nuclear power, asked his advisers what useful role Canada could play in defusing the aggravated conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the end of 1983, he proposed a disarmament conference to be attended by the five countries presently possessing nuclear weapons — the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain and China. He sent emissaries to Moscow and Peking, and he toured Western European capitals to discuss the feasibility of such a summit. President Reagan offered his tentative endorsement of the project.

Then Mr. Trudeau announced his visits to Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Romania, the three Soviet bloc countries that had registered some concern about the state of the nuclear arms reduction talks and had even indicated they would not be happy with the further deployment of the Soviet SS20s. His task was to convince the leaders in Prague, East Berlin and Bucharest that the situation has become too serious to be left to the superpowers alone.

The Soviet bloc is not the monolith it tries to appear; the satellites do debate with the Soviet Union, sometimes in a stormy manner, and usually a consensus is needed to reach decisions on issues regarded as crucial to the bloc's members. Although splits and arguments rarely surface, and although the Russians indisputably have the upper hand in shaping final political decisions, their allies often have more influence on Kremlin policy than we in the West assume. Their role has been growing in recent years. The death of Soviet leader



Trudeau with Reagan in December 1983
Yuri Andropov is unlikely to change this trend.

The very fact that Mr. Trudeau's proposals to discuss the nuclear issue were accepted by the Czechs, East Germans and Romanians is in itself a small success. It opens a new channel of East-West dialogue and offers a chance for political maneuvering when the superpowers' bilateral talks are deadlocked. It also opens interesting, though clearly limited, possibilities for exploiting divisions in the Soviet bloc in a manner not totally dissimilar to the Soviets' dealings with our allies.

Canada's former prime minister, Joe Clark, who spoke with high-ranking administration officials in Washington recently, reported that Mr. Trudeau's mission "did not come up." White House officials obviously believe that the Trudeau initiative is the kind of political extravaganza that cannot bring any significant results.

Mr. Trudeau's effort deserves more attention in Washington. Its premise is realistic: The new Soviet leader will still have to contend with the basic fact that everyone, including his allies in the Eastern bloc, wants to survive. There is little we can lose by trying to do it Mr. Trudeau's way.

MINA (2)

FILE

CMR

R

IDDZ/J. McNee/5-5912/ef

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PLEASE RETURN TO IDDZ AFTER SIGNATURE

DIARY

IDDZ-0153

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

FEB 20 1984
FEV

Mr. John Ducedre
Box 1602
Canmore, Alberta
T0L 0C0

Dear Mr. Ducedre:

Thank you for your letter of January 8 and for your support for the Canadian peace initiative.

It is clear that the Prime Minister is voicing the deep concerns of a great many Canadians when he argues the urgent necessity of reversing the deteriorating trend in East-West relations and of reducing international tensions.

I think you are right in suggesting that all nations, not just the superpowers, have a responsibility to do what they can to work for a more constructive relationship between East and West. But at the same time I think that we in the West must continue to take in those who flee the Soviet bloc because of persecution for their political or religious beliefs.

As for your general argument about the superpowers' global ambitions, we must be realistic in recognizing the fact that some measure of superpower competition is inevitable. Yet we hope that this competition can be moderated by a sense of their heavy responsibilities to each other and the world community for avoiding war in the nuclear age.

Thank you for your support for the government's efforts and for giving me your views.

Yours sincerely,

Original Signed by
Original signé par
ALLAN J. MacEACHEN
Allan J. MacEachen

FEB 15 1984
JDPZ



000125



TRANSMITTAL SLIP - NOTE D'ENVOI


TO/À MINA

FROM/DE IDDZ

SUBJECT/SUJET World peace and disarmament

ATTACHMENT *PIÈCE JOINTE* Letter for signature of DPM/SSEA

Security <i>Sécurité</i>	Unclassified
File <i>Dossier</i>	
Date	February 10, 1984

DISTRIBUTION	RECORD OF CONSULTATION (Names/Divisions) <i>RAPPORT DE CONSULTATION</i> (Noms des individus/Directions)	ACTION/SUITE À DONNER
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Canada

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Canada

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CABINET DU SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

ACTION REQUEST/FICHE DE SERVICE

From De John Ducedre		Alta.		No. No A 05363
Subject Sujet re world peace and disarmament		Action div./Dir. responsable IPA 1DD2		
Letter dated/Lettre en date du 84-0108	Date rec'd in MINA Date de réception à MINA 84-01-31	Date sent to div. Date d'envoi à la dir. 84-01-31	Info. division(s)/Direction(s) informée(s) 84-02-10	
Action to be completed and white slip returned to MINA by L'action doit être complétée et la feuille blanche retournée à MINA par				
Comments/Commentaires				

ACTION REQUIRED/ACTION REQUISE	FOR DIV. USE/POUR L'UTILISATION DE LA DIR.
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for signature of SSEA Réponse pour la signature du SEAE	Date received/Date reçu Feb 14 1984
<input type="checkbox"/> Reply for the signature of Réponse pour la signature de	Action officer/Agent responsable J. McNEE
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Reply by Division Réponse de la direction	Disposition Reply for DPM/SS EA signature
<input type="checkbox"/> For information and any necessary action Pour l'examen et suite à donner, s'il y a lieu	Date Feb 14/84
<div>ALL TRANSFERS TO BE REPORTED TO MINA REGISTRY LE REGISTRE DE MINA DOIT ÊTRE AVISÉ DE TOUT CHANGEMENT</div> <div>5-1047</div>	For MINA use/Pour utilisation de MINA

JOHN DUCEDRE
BOX 1602
CANMORE ALBERTA T0L0C0
JAN. 8 1984

Dear Mr. Mac Eachen
Happy New Year And Best Fortunes And Prosperous
1984!

Congratulation on Prime Minister Trudeau's
and your Peace Initiative!

It is very pleasing, that for once all
members of Parliament back and support
something that is so vital to Canada's and
the World's future...

I take more interest in the peace and
harmony of the world than most people
because I am a traveler, and not tied down
to town, city and provincial viewpoints.

My parents always said that it wasn't
the wealth you collect that makes you rich,
but the number of friends you have.

Since my first trip overseas in 1972 I have
became very rich because I have been fortunate
to have lived ~~in~~ with and visited well over 50
countries. I have ~~try~~ tried to learn from all
these people, their cultures, ideas & thoughts and
politics from down under to SE Asia, Europe
and even in the USSR.

People are great everywhere if you go with a
smile and friendship.

As you can see I have a lot to lose if
war continues around our world.

With that in mind may I make a few
suggestions. First of all you must continue on
your present course of getting together the powers

for disarmament. That in itself is a monumental task. When it does and I think it may some huge barriers will have to be dismantled. The largest of course is mistrust.

Now the second suggestion...

One must attack the problem from other flanks too.

① The powers will have to put their cards on the table. That is :- Does the USSR what to control the world from Moscow? If not, will the USSR allow other nations to practice free enterprise if the people and nation wish to...

- Will the USA allow a democratic government elected by the people to govern for their people if free enterprise is allowed no matter what the political party is elected. Whether it may be of Liberal, Conservative, Communist ideas. - Does the USA what to control the world from Washington.

② With the help of other small peaceful and respected countries such as Norway, Finland, Sweden you may tackle the mistrust. These countries ~~became~~ along with W. Germany have of course many dealings with the USSR and Norway & Finland may have a different understanding and approach to this problem.

One thing that will go a major part of the way is to bring down the iron curtain. If agreement can be reached with bordering countries

To turn back or limit refugees, from the eastern block countries at least for a time, it may be a start. In the long term that unfavorable request would be a bitfit to all. After all from the West point of view it would be difficult to take in so many that we think would leave the east.

Also from the USSR and Eastern Block nation.
point of view why would they want to leave P.N.A.H.A

③ Somehow the peacekeeping nation in the UN must convince the USSR that by even putting a token force on UN peacekeeping duty it would help break down the mistrust.

I realize you have heard all this before, but at this time in our government's mission I thought it may be good to hear it again.

Thankyou for your time

Very Truly yours

John Deedre.

PS. As for my parents I mentioned earlier, my mother was killed with my dad in a car crash in 1969.

She was Catherine MacLellan who grew up in

Strathlone Inverness, Sle and my uncle John A MacLLAN
and my grandmother, ^{MRS HUGH MACLLAN} mentioned you much through your
career. I think they were of some relation of yours, to
which I was never sure. I think 1st COUSINS. You are properly
the reason I always have been interested in politics. Well all the Best
in Mi Trudeau's and your Peace Initiative.

TO/A • IDR
FROM/DE • IDDZ

MANFRED
FILE

REFERENCE •
REFERENCE

SUBJECT • Wehrkunde Miscellany
SUJET

Security/Sécurité

RESTRICTED

Accession/Référence

File/Dossier

Date

February 14, 1984

Number/Numéro

IDDZ-0152

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

4

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WSHDC

Attached for your information are copies of the four main papers given at the 21st International Wehrkunde Conference held in Munich from February 10 to 12, 1984 (IDR only). The papers were given by Manfred Woerner, Minister of Defence of the FRG; Senator John Tower of the USA on behalf of Vice-President Bush; Dr. Horst Ehmke, Parliamentary Vice-President of the Social Democratic Party of the FRG; and Geoffrey Pattie, Minister of State for Defence Procurement of the UK.

2. Although the main interest of the Conference was the opportunity which it provided for private conversations with leading American and European thinkers and doers in the fields of security and arms control, a few items which came out in the course of the official proceedings are worth recording:

(A) Although it does not appear in the text of his remarks, Minister Woerner said that "for the FRG there is no politically acceptable alternative to the strategy of flexible response". While recognizing that there was a lively debate taking place around the concept of flexible response, he characterized as "foolish" those who question the strategy or its value. He went on to say, however, that the Alliance should move rapidly towards decreasing its reliance on "early first use" of nuclear weapons by improving its conventional forces. //

(B) A number of USA and FRG participants suggested that the Alliance should incorporate into its doctrine not only defence and deterrence, but also the concept of "active defence", i.e. that in the event of a WPO attack, NATO would not hesitate to launch offensives into countries such as Czechoslovakia and Hungary rather than simply suffer all the damage to be done to and in Western European countries. If adopted, such a concept would improve the Western deterrent.

...2

HUNTINER

- 2 -

RESTRICTED

- (C) Helmut Sonnenfeldt, now of the Brookings Institute, reminded the audience of two old truths. First, he said that arms control negotiations could make satisfactory progress only if they were "embedded in an existing political dialogue" between East and West (a theme oft repeated by the Prime Minister and taken up by DM Dewar in his intervention at the Conference). Second, he pointed to the continuing relevance of the Harmel message that the success of arms control negotiations depended upon their being intimately linked to defence and deterrence, and to the recognition that there exists no incompatibility or opposition between arms control and defence.
- (D) In the course of a rather long and rambling discourse, Professor Jacques Huntzinger, senior international affairs adviser to the French Socialist Party, made a few interesting remarks. Embarking on the theme "il faut sortir de Yalta", he commended Secretary Shultz for having suggested in Stockholm last month that the division of Europe should not be regarded as irreversible. In another vein, he said that Western Europeans should begin to publicly ask questions about what they can do to ensure their own defence. He emphasized that this question should be raised without any prejudice to the continued existence of NATO and to its trans-Atlantic character; rather, the first step should be to find a distinctive European role within the Alliance, "un pilier européen". The basis for this was to be found in increased Franco-German political and military cooperation, including in such areas as rapid deployment forces and tactical nuclear weapons (!!!). He suggested it could be pursued and broadened under the aegis of the Western European Union (WEU), the only extant European organization with a mandate in the field of security.
- (E) Huntzinger's views on a new role for a revitalized WEU were endorsed by one or two other French speakers with Socialist leanings, but contested by a Gaullist and two German participants. The latter suggested that trying to make arrangements involving the seven member states of the WEU would tend to leave the three other members of the European Community out in the cold, and cut across efforts to improve political cooperation among the Ten.
- (F) General Edward Rowny, chief USA START negotiator, said that he was opposed to any merger of the INF and START negotiations, and that his views were shared by Ambassador Paul Nitze. (The latter, who was also present, did not demur.)

...3

(G) In what at times seemed like coordinated interventions, four USA spokesmen addressed the question of how NATO countries should approach "out-of-area" problems. Their message to European, and particularly West German, participants was quite clear: if Europe expected continued USA support in ensuring its security, the USA had a right to expect European understanding and support for some of the "out-of-area" security issues with which it was confronted, especially in Central America and the Caribbean. Under-Secretary of Defence Iklé spoke of the "subtle threat" to USA security emanating from that area, of the undefended southern border of the largest member of NATO, of the possibility that the "social and demographic stability" of the USA could be undermined by ideological influences and migration from Central America. (Iklé later indicated privately that he believed the USA should consider erecting a fence along the full length of its border with Mexico!) Senator Tower, speaking "more in sorrow than in anger", deplored the fact that several European members of the Alliance had condemned the USA intervention in Grenada and told his audience that it was entirely possible that the fate of Europe might be decided "out of area". Ambassador Komer noted that while the only NATO countries capable of projecting force in a significant way outside the NATO area were the USA, UK and France, other Alliance members could help by picking up any slack which these countries might create in Europe through having to deploy forces elsewhere. Finally, Ambassador Kampleman returned to the theme of the threat posed to USA security by Soviet-influenced forces in the Western hemisphere. Three of these speakers indicated that the USA would welcome the help of its allies in providing security assistance to friendly countries in the Middle East, Africa, Central America and the Caribbean.


L. A. Delvoie

file

CONFIDENTIAL

February 14, 1984

IDDZ-0151

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER (through R.R.Fowler)

Initiative: USA Nuclear Stockpile

As requested, we attach a short descriptive note on the USA nuclear stockpile. It addresses the question of the number of warheads and the destructive capability of these weapons.

L. A. Delvoie

L. A. Delvoie
Chairman
Task Force Working Group

cc: PMO/Axworthy

PCO/Osbaldeston

DND/Anderson

DEA/MINA USS DMF IFB RBR IDR

AN OVERVIEW OF QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USA NUCLEAR STOCKPILE

INTRODUCTION

The Canadian government receives information on USA strategic nuclear weapons principally through the START consultations and related bilateral consultations. It receives information on nuclear weapons in Europe as a consequence of participating in the NATO consultative process where the main fora are the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and the Special Consultative Group (SCG) on INF arms control. The USA does not, however, inform us of the non-strategic weapons held within its own territory or at sea other than in ballistic missile submarines. We do not, therefore, have precise data on total holdings. For a comprehensive picture one has to rely on published sources. The following information is taken from the Nuclear Weapons Databook, Vol. 1: U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities, (1983), which, in our view, can be regarded as essentially correct.

DEFINITIONS

The nuclear weapons stockpile officially includes only those nuclear missile re-entry vehicles, bombs, artillery projectiles and atomic demolition munitions that are in active service. Warheads under development or in production are excluded. The stockpile contains weapons of different categories for different delivery systems at both the strategic and tactical level.

TRENDS IN THE US NUCLEAR STOCKPILE, 1967-83

The number of nuclear warhead in the USA stockpile peaked at 32,000 in 1967 (See Appendix I). Since that time, it has generally decreased with small interim increases appearing sporadically. For example, the stockpile experienced a slight increase in the 1970-1973 period due to the introduction of multiple warheads in the Poseidon and Minuteman forces. It then continued to decrease, reaching its lowest point of 25,000 warheads in 1978. After 1980, however, warhead production increased outpacing the retirement rate as older weapons were maintained in the stockpile until their replacements were deployed or they were upgraded. This has led to an increase in the stockpile which is now estimated to be 26,000 warheads.

- 2 -

It is also important to note in this connection that in terms of megatonnage, the USA stockpile has decreased to one third of its explosive size over the past 20 years, (See Appendix II), while Soviet megatonnage is continuing to increase. The decline in total USA megatonnage was made possible by increases in accuracy of its delivery vehicles which allowed it to deploy smaller warheads.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN USA NUCLEAR STOCKPILE

In the near term, a number of factors are likely to influence the development of the USA nuclear stockpile in both quantitative and qualitative terms. The outcome of the START and INF arms control negotiations may have a significant impact on future weapons programs. Most important, the build-down concept advanced by the USA in START whereby two warheads would be retired for each new warhead entering service would, if implemented, result in a marked decrease in warhead holdings. In addition, the availability of nuclear fissile material may be a constraining factor in the growth of the stockpile as new warhead technologies require different material mixes.

While arms control negotiations and the availability of fissile material may lead to a reduction in the stockpile in largely quantitative terms, a number of emerging technologies characterized by miniaturization, higher accuracy (with an attendant reduction in collateral damage) and enhanced radiation capabilities, will greatly improve the quality of the stockpile at both the strategic and tactical level. In this context, it may be argued that while the stockpile has decreased (both in warheads and megatonnage - see Appendix III) concurrent qualitative improvements (as evidenced by the deployment of Pershing IIs, GLCMs, upgraded nuclear capable aircraft and nuclear artillery) are contributing to increases in capability and lethality.


Thus, a reduction in the number of warheads by no means implies a reduction in capability. On the contrary, the new generation of weapons will permit the deployment of lower yield warheads capable of achieving military effects commensurate with a larger number of less accurate and higher yield weapons systems. The collateral damage associated with the larger and less accurate warheads will be reduced substantially.

APPENDIX I


U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

Year	Number of Warheads
1945	2
1946	9
1947	13
1948	50
1949	250
1950	450
1951	650
1952	1000
1953	1350
1954	1750
1955	2250
1956	3550
1957	5450
1958	7100
1959	12,000
1960	18,500
1961	23,000
1962	26,500
1963	29,000
1964	31,000
1965	31,500
1966	31,500
1967	32,000
1968	31,000
1969	29,000
1970	27,000
1971	27,000
1972	27,500
1973	28,500
1974	29,000
1975	28,500
1976	27,500
1977	26,000
1978	25,500
1979	25,000
1980	25,000
1981	25,000
1982	25,000
1983	26,000

APPENDIX II



APPENDIX III



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Canada Canada

FPR/Jacques Quinn/5-1874:nl

TO/À TRANSCRIPT

FROM/DE FPR

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RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET

CTV - THE NATIONAL: 13 February 1984
Prime Minister Trudeau's Peace Initiative
PM to meet Chernenko - Jim Munson

Security/Sécurité
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FILE
CIRC
DIV

CTV: Konstantin Chernenko, a 72-year-old pillar of the old guard in the Kremlin, is the new leader of the Soviet Union. And it was announced late today that Prime Minister Trudeau will be among the first Western leaders to meet him. Their talks are scheduled for Wednesday afternoon, a day after the funeral of Yuri Andropov. At the top of their agenda will be Trudeau's peace plan. Jim Munson has more.

Jim Munson: When the Prime Minister left for Moscow, there was no indication he would be able to hold a private meeting on his peace initiative.

Trudeau: I have no plans to see anybody in particular.

Munson: That obviously changed overnight. As soon as the Armed Forces 707 touched down at Moscow, Canadian officials requested as a Trudeau aide described it, a meeting with an appropriate level of officials. The same aide said, but the Russians gave us more than we expected. They gave us Chernenko. Here in Ottawa, External Affairs Minister Allan MacEachen says he has no doubt the reason the Soviet leader wants to see the Prime Minister is because of Trudeau's peace efforts.

DPM/SSEA: I'm sure that is why the new Secretary-General has decided to see the Prime Minister, precisely because of the peace initiative. Because you remember, when the Prime Minister went to Mr. Brezhnev's funeral, that he was not seen by Andropov at the time. He was seen by the Premier Tikhonov. So it's obviously an escalation in availability.


.../2

FPR-0158

- 2 -

February 13, 1984

Munson: The dramatic events in the Soviet Union have made it possible for Trudeau to wrap up what MacEachen described as a first phase of the peace mission much sooner than expected. But given the new Soviet leader's conservative views on foreign policy, it's unlikely the meeting will result in any major breakthrough. Jim Munson, CTV News, Ottawa.


John J. Noble,
Official Spokesman
and Director,
Press Office

action

C O N F I D E N T I A L

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---CDN ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS

USA PERMREP SPOKE AT FEB14 ONCHEON ALONG EXPECTED LINES AND

MATHYS REPLIED ON BASIS OF REFTTEL FOR WHICH WE ARE GRATEFUL.

2.HOPE TO RECEIVE SOON INDICATION ABOUT VISIT OF BRIEFING

TEAM(PRESUMABLY FOLLOWING HILEX EXERCISE WEEK).

CCC/298 141703Z YBGR8541

MASTER FILE

ACTION
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---PM VISITS TO MOSCO AND EASTERN EUROPE:NATO DEBRIEFING

BRIEFING BY HANCOCK ON PMS EAST EUROPEAN TRIP AND RELATED SUBJECTS
WOULD BE WELCOME HERE ALTHOUGH PROPOSED DATE POSES SOME PROBLEMS.

MAIN DIFFICULTY IS,AS YOU RECOGNIZE,THAT MOST OF THOSE WHO WOULD
WANT TO PARTICIPATE WILL BE GEARING UP FOR HILEX.POLITICAL COMMITTEE
WILL BE HOLDING JUST MEETING AT 10:15 THAT MORNING.THIS IS NOT/NOT
INSURMOUNTABLE PROBLEM.HOWEVER,AND WE HAVE CONCLUDED,FOLLOWING
SOUNDINGS IN OTHER DELS AND WITH INTERNATIONAL STAFF,THAT BRIEFING
AT DEPUTY PERMREP LEVEL COULD BE FITTED IN AT 11:30 AM.FORMAT WE
ENVISAGE WOULD BE INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY HANCOCK(20-30MIN)FOLLOWED
BY QUESTION AND T85-4 03489\$ 9 -7975 9,3 #974 GRATEFUL IF HANCOCK
COULD COMMENT ON THIS AS WE WOULD WANT TO INCLUDE IT IN LETTER WE
WILL BE SENDING OUT TO OTHER DELS.

2.SCHEDULING DIFFICULTIES WOULD BE EASED WERE HANCOCK ABLE TO MOVE
BRIEFING UP TO FRIDAY 17FEB.IS THIS POSSIBLE?GRATEFUL EARLY REPLY.

CCC/054 141547Z YBGR6169

Division Phoned 55912
Person S.C.
Local Time 1253

MF

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FM WSHDC UNGR2043 14FEB84

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DISTR IDDZ URR

REF IDDZTEL 0146 13FEB

---PM VISIT TO EASTERN EUROPE:NATO DEBRIEFING

FOLLOWING MTG WITH YOU AND OTHERS IN OTT LAST WEEK KINSMAN
DEBRIEFED PALMER OF STATE DEPT ON YOUR IMPRESSSIONS.IT MAY BE
USEFUL FOR YOU TO HAVE INFORMAL MEMO TO FILE WE DID ON THAT
DEBRIEFING PARTICULARLY IF YOU WISH TO CORRECT THE RECORD AND
EMPHASIS WHEN YOU BRIEF NATO.TEXT FOLLOWS:

TEXT BEGINS

ON THURSDAY MORNING FEBRUARY 9, I BRIEFED THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE. MARK
PALMER, ON INFORMAL ASSESSMENTS OF THE PRIME MINISTERS TRIP TO
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, GDR AND ROMANIA. ALSO PRESENT WERE JIM MEDAS, THE
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR CANADA, AND AN OFFICER FROM HIS STAFF
AND RALPH LYSYSHYN. PALMER IS SCHEDULED TO GO TO EASTERN EUROPE NEXT
WEEK WITH RICHARD BURT AND WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN CANADIAN
IMPRESSIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS THERE. I HAD ALREADY BRIEFED PALMER AT
THE END OF LAST WEEK ON THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PMS TRIP, AS REPORTED
BY TELEGRAMS FROM HIS DELEGATION AND OUR EMBASSIES. THIS BRIEFING,
WHICH I STRESSED WAS MORE IMPRESSIONISTIC THAN FACTUAL, WAS THE
RESULT OF CONVERSATIONS SEVERAL OF OUR COLLEAGUES HAD WITH ME ON

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR2043 CONF

TUESDAY AND WEDNESDAY IN OTTAWA. IT WAS IN RESPONSE TO THE PROPOSAL BY PALMER THAT HE PROVIDE ME IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS WITH PRIVILEGED INSIGHTS INTO WHAT THEY EXPECT WILL BE AN INTERESTING PERIOD OF DIPLOMATIC COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE USSR. I AM NOT SURE HE CAN DELIVER BUT THE BRIEFING WAS MEANT TO A LEAST PAY OUR SUBSCRIPTION.

2. THE SPEECH

I BEGAN BY DESCRIBING THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE PM SPEECH WHICH WAS TO BE GIVEN AT ABOUT THAT TIME. UNFORTUNATELY, WE STILL DID NOT HAVE A COPY TO HAND OVER

3. ROMANIAN TRIP

THE ERALIER BRIEFING WITH PALMER HAD NOT COVERED ROMANIA, SO I REPORTED ON THE DISCUSSIONS BASING MYSELF ON THE RELEVANT TELEGRAMS.

4. THE REPORT PLACED EMPHASIS ON THE INF SITUATION CEAUSESCU HAD ARGUED FOR THE MORATORIUM IN DEPLOYMENT. MR. TRUDEAU ARGUED THAT SUCH A MORATORIUM WOULD BE SEEN AS A SOVIET VICTORY. CEAUSESCU SAID NATO HAD DEMONSTRATED ITS RESOLVE ON DEPLOYMENT AND HAD ASKED WHY IT WAS NECESSARY TO GO FURTHER. THE PRIME MINISTER ARGUED THAT A RETURN TO THE PREDEPLOYMENT SITUATION WOULD MEAN RETURNING TO A HIGHLY UNEQUAL SITUATION. IT WOULD LEAVE 250 AND MORE SS20S POINTED AT EUROPE. TO CEAUSESCUS ARGUMENT THAT THE SS20S WERE IN COMPENSATION FOR NATOS FORWARD BASED PLANES. SUBMARINES AND CARRIERS. THE PM EMPFASIZED THAT THE USSR HAD SIMILAR SYSTEMS. CEAUSESCU ARGUED THAT HIS PROPOSAL WAS NOT MEANT AS A DEFINITIVE SOLUTION BUT ONLY AS A MEANS OF GAINING

...3

PAGE THREE UNGR2043 CONF

SUFFICIENT TIME TO NEGOTIATE. THE USSR PROPOSAL TO REDUCE SS20 DEPLOYMENT DOWN TO 150 WAS REASONABLE. HE MADE THE SUGGESTION THAT USA MISSILES IN SICILY WERE IN ANY CASE AIMED AT THE MIDDLE EAST. THE PM SIMPLY DISAGREED WITH ALL THIS.

5. CEAUSESCU THOUGHT THAT SEVERAL COUNTRIES IN WESTERN EUROPE WERE HAVING SECOND THOUGHTS ON THE TWO TRACK DECISION IN ANY CASE. THE PM DISABUSED HIM OF THIS NOTION.

6. CEAUSESCU THOUGHT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT RETURN TO THE INF NEGOTIATIONS AS SUCH. AND DOUBTED THAT THE USA WANTED AN INF AGREEMENT.

7. OTHER CONVERSATIONS INDICATED THAT THE ROMANIANS THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY ANDROPOV WOULD RECOVER AND THAT THE GROMYKO VISIT SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN A FAIRLY TOUGH ONE. ONE ROMANIAN SAID HE HAD SPOKEN WITH GRAVITY ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND HAD OBSERVED THAT NUCLEAR WAR WOULD END ALL HUMAN LIFE.

8. OUR PEOPLE OBSERVED HOW CEAUSESCU WAS TOTALLY IN PERSONAL DOMINATION OVER THE COUNTRY.

9. EASTERN EUROPE COUNTRIES AND USSR RELATIONS

FOLLOWING THE BRIEFING ON THE ROMANINA VISIT, I TURNED TO THE MORE IMPRESSIONISTIC APPRAISALS OUR COLLEAGUES HAD MADE OF THE TRIP. I NOTED THAT MANY OF THE OBSERVATIONS PICKED UP FROM EAST GERMANS WERE MADE FROM SIDE CONVERSATIONS AT MEALS AND ELSEWHERE. I DID VERY LITTLE IDENTIFICATION OF INTERLOCUTORS.

...4

PAGE FOUR UNGR2043 CONF

10. GENERALLY, THE EXPERIENCE TENDED TO SUPPORT THE BONN VIEW THAT THESE COUNTRIES WERE EXERCISING SOMEWHAT GREATER FREEDOM OF MANEUVER FROM MOSCOW. THIS HAD BEEN ENHANCED BY ANDROPOVS ILLNESS. EASTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS CAN TALK WITH WESTERN LEADERS WHILE MOSCOW REMAINS PREOCCUPIED WITH THE SUCCESSION PROBLEM. IT WAS TRUE THAT THE DECISION TO RECEIVE PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU ON ONLY SEVERAL DAYS NOTICE WAS PROBABLY IN THE CASES OF PRAGUE AND BERLIN ANYWAY, AUTHORIZED BY MOSCOW. BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN AWKWARD FOR MOSCOW TO TURN THE VISIT OFF.

11. BOTH THE ROMANIANS AND CZECHS THOUGHT THAT THEY HAD A CERTAIN ROLE IN INFLUENCING MOSCOW. THE ROMANIANS SAID THEY HAD EXERCISED SOME INFLUENCE IN THE WAY OF RESTRAINT; THE CZECHS SAID THAT THEY COULD NOT DO A LOT TO INFLUENCE MOSCOW, BUT COULD DO SOMETHING. HONECKER MENTIONED THAT ANDROPOV HAD CALLED HIM TO CONSULT ABOUT SECURITY MATTERS.

12. THERE WAS ALSO VERY LITTLE DOCTRINAIRE STUFF ONCE THE FORMAL STATEMENTS WERE OVER. TOASTS, OF COURSE, WERE RIGID AND DISAPPOINTING BUT INFORMAL EXCHANGES SEEMED MORE FLEXIBLE AND PRODUCTIVE.

13. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS PUT TO HONECKER DREW A DECISIVE RESPONSE IN THE CASE OF THE FIVE POWER CONFERENCE IDEA, IT HAD BEEN KNOWN FOR SOME MONTHS AND HE WOULD HAVE HAD TIME TO CHECK HIS LINES WITH MOSCOW. BUT IN THE CASE OF THE PROPOSAL FOR SOME SORT OF CONTINUING ARMS CONTROL DIALOGUE WITH THE EAST GERMANS, WHICH OUR SIDE HAD ONLY

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PAGE FIVE UNGR2043 CONF

DISCUSSED INTERNALLY FOR A COUPLE OF DAYS. HE DID NOT HAVE A CHANCE TO CLEAR HIS LINES; HE NONETHELESS ACCEPTED AFTER ONLY A QUICK EXCHANGE WITH HIS FOREIGN MINISTER.

14. THERE WAS UNHAPPINESS WITH THE OBLIGATION TO COUNTER-DEPLOY AND PERHAPS EVIDENCE OF SOME STRAIN WITH MOSCOW OVER THIS. SEVERAL PRIVATE OBSERVATIONS WERE MADE IN BERLIN ABOUT THE IMPACT OF WEST GERMAN MEDIA ON THE GDR PUBLIC, VIA WHICH THE PEACE MOVEMENT HAD CREATED BELOW THE SURFACE ANXIETY IN THE GDR.

15. OVERALL, MR. TRUDEAU'S INTERLOCUTORS WERE RESPONSIVE TO THE NOTION OF THEIR ROLE AS MIDDLE POWERS.

16. RELATIONS WITH THE WEST

OUR PEOPLE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THESE COUNTRIES ARE KEEN FOR PRODUCTIVE RELATIONS WITH THE WEST, WITH A PARTICULAR ATTRACTION TO FRANCE AND ITALY AS WELL, OF COURSE, AS FRG FOR SPECIAL REASONS. THERE WAS AN IMPRESSION THESE COUNTRIES COULD BE DRAWN OUR WAY TO SOME EXTENT, EVEN IF WESTERN PULL MAY HAVE BEEN REDUCED IN THE LAST FEW YEARS. THERE IS AN ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT ON THE PART OF THE POLITICAL ELITE IN PRAGUE AND BERLIN WHICH IS A CONTRAST TO THE SORT OF SOPHISTICATED AND BARELY CONCEALED PERSONAL ATTRACTION FOR WESTERN STYLE WHICH WAS EVIDENT A FEW YEARS AGO.

17. SOME INTERLOCUTORS SAID THAT THE BUSH SPEECHES ABOUT EASTERN EUROPE HAD EMBARRASSED AND OFFENDED THEM AND MAY, IN FACT, HAVE

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PAGE SIX UNGR2043 CONF

REDUCED THE FREEDOM OF MANEUVER OF THESE COUNTRIES. THE SHULTZ REMARKS ON THE DIVISION OF EUROPE MADE AT STOCKHOLM REINFORCED THIS SENSE OF MALAISE. THEY WERE ANXIOUS TO GET BACK TO A MORE RELAXED SITUATION.

18. THERE WAS GENUINE WORRY ABOUT AMERICAN INTENTIONS. THE USA HARDLINE COMBINE WITH THE EXTENT OF DEFENSE MODERNIZATION AND THE SUGGESTION THAT THE USA WOULD CONTEMPLATE A NEW ARMS RACE WITH SERENITY, AS WELL AS THE TENDENCY OF AMERICAN POLICY TO TAKE A MILITARY APPROACH TO REGIONAL POLITICAL CRISIS, AND THE NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, HAD ALL CONTRIBUTED TO THIS WORRY. BUT THEY HAD TAKEN NOTE OF THE CHANGE IN TONE COMING OUT OF WASHINGTON AND DID NOT DISMISS THIS, EVEN IF THEY WERE WARY. ALL INTERLOCUTORS WERE ENCOURAGED BY THE SHULTZ/GROMYKO MEETING IN STOCKHOLM.

19. I STRESSED THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE PM HAD EXPLAINED REAGANS WISH FOR BETTER RELATIONS AND HAD DEFENDED SOME OF HIS APPROACHES

20. THE INF QUESTION

NOTING THAT THE EURO MISSILE ISSUE HAD DOMINATED DISCUSSIONS, I OFFERED THE ASSESSMENT THAT THE EAST EUROPEANS SEEMED SINCERE IN JUDGING THE INF DEPLOYMENT AS A CONCRETE THREAT BECAUSE OF THE QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT SITUATION WHICH APPLIES TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TODAY, AS OPPOSED TO FIVE OR SIX YEARS AGO WHEN EAST-WEST RELATIONS WERE MORE RELAXED AND LESS ADVERSARY GOVERNMENTS WERE IN ...?

PAGE SEVEN UNGR2243 CONF

POWER IN THE WEST. OBVIOUSLY OUR PEOPLE OBSERVED THAT THE USSR HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR MUCH OF THE CHANGE IN RELATIONS, BUT THE EAST EUROPEANS STILL SAW DEPLOYMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF A TENSER CLIMATE.

21. THE PRIME MINISTER HAD POINTED OUT IT WAS A SHAME THE USSR HAD LEFT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE USA HAD NOT DONE SO WHEN THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUED TO DEPLOY NEW SS20S DURING THE PAST YEAR. EASTERN EUROPEANS SUGGESTED THAT THE USSR WOULD COME BACK TO A DIFFERENT TABLE TO PURSUE NEGOTIATIONS BUT INDICATED THERE COULD BE A MIXTURE OF MOTIVES. IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT THE USSR HAD NOT YET DECIDED HOW TO PROCEED. ASSESSING THESE CONVERSATIONS, OUR PEOPLE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SECURITY OF REAGANS OWN POLITICAL FUTURE WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT VARIABLE. PROBABLY THE SOVIET UNION HAD NOT YET DECIDED HOW OR WHETHER TO TRY TO DAMAGE REAGAN IN THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS. THERE SEEMED TO BE LESS TALK OF A REVIEW IN MOSCOW OF RELATIONS WITH THE USA. THERE IS A KIND OF WAIT AND SEE ATTITUDE AND A READINESS TO MAINTAIN A HARDLINE STANCE FOR AS LONG AS NECESSARY. THE HARL LINE AND A MORE COOPERATIVE APPROACH COULD IN FACT CO EXIST. THE USSR COULD GO BACK TO THE TABLE IN MAY OR JUNE BUT RESERVE THE OPTION OF ISOLATING REAGAN DIPLOMATICALLY OR DAMAGING HIM

22. THOUGH SUCH A STRATEGY MAY SEEM PRETENTIOUS OR UNREALISTIC, PARTICULARLY IN THE LIGHT OF SCVIET CLUMSINESS IN DEALING WITH

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PAGE EIGHT UNGR2043 CONF

PUBLIC OPINION IN OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES. THERE WERE A COUPLE OF INFORMAL REFERENCES TO THE SUCCESS OF THE NORTH VIETNAMESE IN WINNING THE SUPPORT OF THE AMERICAN PEACE MOVEMENTS WHILE THEY WERE NEGOTIATING WITH THE ADMINISTRATION. IN ANY EVENT, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE EAST EUROPEANS WERE DEEPLY DISTRUSTFUL OF USA MOTIVES AND WHILE OLIVE BRANCHES WOULD BE ACCEPTED, THEY WOULD BE INSPECTED CAREFULLY FOR THORNS.

23. USSR INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS

CONVERSATIONS INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS FULLY PREOCCUPIED WITH THE DOMESTIC SUCCESSION ISSUE. NORMAL CONTACTS WITH EASTERN EUROPEAN LEADERS HAD SHOWN SIGNS OF TAPERING OFF. AS MENTIONS ABOVE, THERE WAS A FEELING ANDROPOV WAS GOING TO DIE SOON

24. THE CZECH MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR THOUGHT THAT HIS DEPARTURE WOULD BE A LOSS BECAUSE HE KNEW EASTERN EUROPE PERSONALLY AND BECAUSE OF HIS PRAGMATISM. HONECKER SAID THAT THEY ALL HAD HIGH HOPES FOR ANDROPOV WHICH WERE NOW NECESSARILY FADING. THERE WAS NOW THE HOPE THAT AT LEAST ANDROPOV HAD BEEN ABLE OR WOULD BE ABLE TO STAY ALIVE LONG ENOUGH FOR A REGENCY TO SUCCEED HIM TO TAKE SHAPE AND IF POSSIBLE, FOR HIM TO BLESS IT.

25. NOW THE PROSPECT WOULD BE FOR ANDROPOVISM WITHOUT ANDROPOV AND THERE WAS A FEELING THAT HIS CONTRIBUTIONS MAY IN SOME RESPECTS BE LASTING. THERE HAD BEEN A SHIFT TOWARD A POLITICAL PROCESS IN THE

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SOVIET UNION BASED ON ROLES RATHER THAN ON PERSONAL LOYALTY TO THE LEADER, A SORT OF DEPERSONALIZATION OF POWER. HIGHER ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY WAS EVERYBODYS CONCERN AND THE ANDROPOV COMBINATION OF INCENTIVES AND DISCIPLINE TO ACHIEVE THIS REPRESENTED A FORMULA WHICH WOULD PROBABLY ENDURE. A COUPLE OF INTERLOCUTORS MENTIONED THE NOTION OF SEEKING ECONOMIC REFORM SHORT OF DESTABILIZATION AS BEING AN OBJECTIVE.

26. ONE HIGH OFFICIAL SPOKE AT LENGTH ABOUT THE EXTENT TO WHICH AN ARTICLE SIGNED BY ANDROPOV IN THE FEBRUARY ISSUE OF KOMMUNIST REPRESENTED IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES FOR THE WHOLE BLOC IN THE SENSE OF PROVIDING GUIDELINES FOR A MORE PRODUCTIVE SYSTEM FOR ALL.

27. BERLIN

I SAID THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEEN ABLE TO AVOID EMBARRASSMENT IN EAST BERLIN BUT THAT HE HAD NEED TO THINK FAST ON A COUPLE OF OCCASIONS TO THE POINT THAT HE HAD TO KILL TIME BY BOWLING AND DRINKING BEER WITH STUDENTS SO AS TO AVOID ANY CHANCE OF FINDING HIMSELF IN THE GDR PARLIAMENT WHICH IS ADJACENT TO A RECREATION AND CULTURAL COMPLEX HE WAS VISITING. OUR COLLEAGUES THOUGHT THE BONN GROUP COULD COME UP WITH A NEW LIST OF DOS AND DONTs AND ESPECIALLY A LIST OF DOS FOR NATO HEADS OF GOVERNMENT WHO MIGHT BE VISITING BERLIN AND WHO FIND THEMSELVES WITH TIME ON THEIR HANDS, THAT COULD BE SPENT IN A HARMLESS WAY, SUCH AS THE

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PAGE TEN UNGR2043 CONF

VISITS TO THE PERGAMMEN MUSEUM AND THE BRECHT HOUSE WHICH MR.
TRUDEAU HAD DONE.

28. CONCLUSIONS

IN OUR EARLIER MEETING I HAD STRESSED THE EXTENT TO WHICH
THE PM THOUGHT THESE VISITS HAD BEEN USEFUL IN PROVIDING SUBSTANCE
TO HIS STATEMENTS THAT THERE OUGHT TO BE DIALOGUE. OBVIOUSLY, THESE
COUNTRIES WERE NOT INDEPENDENT IN ANY REAL SENSE BUT THERE WAS
PROBABLY UTILITY IN WESTERN MIDDLE POWERS RELATING TO THEM AS
MIDDLE POWERS IN THEIR OWN RIGHTS, AND ON THE BASIS THAT IF YOU
TREATED THEM AS REAL COUNTRIES THEY MIGHT BEGIN TO BEHAVE AS SUCH
IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER. I POINTED OUT AGAIN THAT I DID NOT THINK
THAT THE PMS PUBLIC REMARKS IN ONE PLACE OR ANOTHER NEEDED ANY
FURTHER EXPLANATIONS OR DEFENSE FROM US BUT I DID STRESS THE EXTENT
TO WHICH HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE LEADERS OF THESE COUNTRIES AS A
WESTERN LEADER WITH SOLID ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS.

J.K.B. KINSMAN

TEXT ENDS.

CCC/230 141514Z UNGR2043

action

**NO / NO DISTR
DISTR INTERDITE**

C O N F I D E N T I A L NO/NO OTHER DISTR

FM GENEV YTGR1001 14FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

DISTR IDD

---PM INITIATIVE

IN CONNECTION WITH RECENT CORRESPONDENCE INDICATING THAT IDD/SMITH IS PLANNING A VISIT TO BNATO AND VARIOUS CAPITALS IN SECOND HALF OF MONTH, WOULD SUGGEST THAT HE CONSIDER VISIT TO GENEV AFTERWARDS TO OBSERVE CD AND DISCUSS REACTIONS RECEIVED.

2. YOU MAY ALSO WISH TO CONSIDER WHETHER AMB BEESLEY OR SKINNER MIGHT JOIN SMITH IN BRU FOR NATO DISCUSSIONS

CCC/198 151500Z YTGR1001

ACTION
SUITE A DOMESTIC

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

Mr. Smith
Division Phoned 55912
Person C.F.
Local Time 1342

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM LDN XNGR0343 14FEB84

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ

DELIVER BY 141500

INFO PARIS BONN WSHDC GENEV VMBFR BNATO STKEM/SC DEL

NDHQOTT/CPD/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF RGB RCD RCR RBD RBR IFB IDR IDA IDD

---PM INITIATIVE:DISCUSSION WITH BRITISH

FURTHER TO SCHRAM/SMITH TELEPHONE CONVERSATION,WE WELCOME

SUGGESTION SMITH AND CALDER MIGHT COME TO LDN TO DISCUSS PMS

INITIATIVE WITH BRITISH COUNTERPARTS EARLY BRIEFING ON OTT

THINKING ABOUT FUTURE OF PMS ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS WOULD BE

APPRECIATED HERE,AND OPPORTUNITY FOR SMITH TO DEVELOP CONTACTS

WITH BRITISH DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT COMMUNITY WOULD BE USEFUL

TO HIS CONTINUING RESPONSIBILITIES FOR ARMS CONTROL AND

DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS.AT SAME TIME,HOWEVER,BRITISH PROBLEMS

WITH INITIATIVE GO BEYOND SPECIFICS,AND INVOLVE CONCERNS ABOUT

OUR PERCEPTIONS OF NATO NUCLEAR STRATEGY,UK DETERRENT, MBFR.

NATO REVIEW,AND NATO POLICY COHESION WHICH ARE ONLY LIKELY TO

BE ALLAYED BY EXCHANGES WITH OFFICERS CONCERNED WITH BROAD NATO

POLICY,AS WELL AS ARMS CONTROL.IT MIGHT THEREFORE BE WORTH

CONSIDERING BROADENING TALKS INTO MORE COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL/

MILITARY FORMAT WITH SMALL CDN TEAM LLD PERHAPS BY DELVOIE AND

INCLUDING DND REPS.

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*I cannot go in
foreseeable future.
Brits will get superb
team of GS/KC like
everyone else*

PAGE TWO XNGR0343 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

2. LAST SESSION WITH FCO OF TALKS OF THIS NATURE TOOK PLACE WHEN FCO DEFENCE DEPT HEAD JOHN WESTON TRAVELLED TO OTTAWA IN SPRING, 1983; LAST TIME CDN OFFICIALS (CAMERON, BECKETT) CAME TO FCO WAS SEPTEMBER, 1982. TALKS WERE ORIGINALLY CONCEIVED AS ANNUAL (IF NOT MORE FREQUENT) EXERCISE, IN CDN VIEW TO BE PREFERABLY AT ASST UNDER-SECRETARY LEVEL. THUS MEETING IS NOW DUE. AND WOULD PROVIDE CONVENIENT FORUM IN WHICH TO REVIEW TOTALITY OF CDN OBJECTIVES IN NATO CONTEXT. INCLUDING THOSE INVOLVED SPECIFICALLY IN INITIATIVE. TALKS, IF FCO AGREEABLE, MIGHT BE SCHEDULED FOR EARLY MARCH.

CCC/224 141711Z XNGR0343

Mr. Delaney
Mr. M...
Mr. Smith

J

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT PPR0325 14FEB84

TO TOKYO DELIVER BY 200900

DISTR USS IDDZ PGB PPD CPD

REF YOURTEL UIGR1550 15FEB

---CALL BY JAPANESE AMB ON USS 14FEB

JAPANESE AMBASSADOR MIKANAGI CALLED ON USS 14FEB PREPATORY TO MIKANAGIS DEPARTURE AT END OF NEXT WEEK FOR CONSULTATIONS IN TOKYO.

2.MAIN SUBJ OF DISCUSSION WAS PMS PEACE INITIATIVE.DISCUSSION ALSO TOUCHED ON BILATERAL FOREIGN MIN CONSULTATIONS,BILATERAL POLICY PLANNING CONSULTATION,PEC AND SPORE HOP MTG.

PEACE INITIATIVE:MIKANAGI BEGAN BY NOTING HE WOULD BE SEEING FOREIGN MINISTER ABE AND MIGHT MEET NAKASONE.HE EXPECTED THAT THEY WOULD BE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAUS PRESENT INTENTIONS FOR FUTURE OF HIS PEACE INITIATIVE AND ASKED USS FOR HIS ASSESSMENT.USS REPLIED THAT,AS FAR AS HE KNEW,PM HAD MADE NO/NO FINAL DECISIONS.SPEAKING PERSONALLY,USS SAW SEVERAL OPTIONS.ONE WAS TO ANNOUNCE THAT INITIATIVE HAD CONCLUDED AS SEPARATE EXERCISE.SECOND OPTION WAS TO MOVE TO SECOND STAGE AND FOR PM AND CDA TO SPEAK OUT WITH HIGHER PROFILE IN CUSTOMARY FORA BUT PROPOSE NO/NO INITIATIVES.LONG TERM STRATEGY WOULD BE CONTINUED ASSERTION THAT NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES(NNWS)HAVE STAKE IN WORLD SECURITY AND RIGHT AND DUTY TO CALL FOR SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES BY

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PAGE TWO PPR0325 CONFD

NEGOTIATION RATHER THAN FORCE. THIRD OPTION, WHICH MIGHT BE TERMED
QUOTE ACTIVE SECOND STATE UNQUOTE WOULD BE TO JOIN WITH OTHER NNWS
IN CONCERTED REPRESENTATION TO NUCLE R WEAPON STATES(NWS). USS DID
NOT/NOT CONSIDER IT HIGHLY LIKELY THAT THIRD OPTION WOULD BE ADOPTED.
HE NOTED THAT IMPORTANT FACTOR WOULD BE PMS DECISION ON HIS OWN
FUTURE.

3. MIKANAGI SAID HE HAD IMPRESSION PM TRUDEAU WANTED TO CONTINUE TO
TRY TO INSPIRE NWS LEADERS, PARTICULARLY CHERNENKO AND REGAN. WE
WONDERED IF THERE WERE SOMETHING NAKASONE COULD DO TO HELP. USS SAID
THAT, IN HIS OWN VIEW, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO UNDERLINE NEED FOR TWO TRACK
STRATEGY, IE BE STRONG IN FACE OF ARMED OPPOSIT ON(SOVIETS) BUT AT
SAME TIME CONTINUE TO REITERATE THAT PEACE IS OUR PURPOSE AND NOT/NOT
TO MAKE MOVES THAT COULD BE INTERPRETED AS OFFENSIVE. PLEA BY
NAKASONE FOR PEACEFUL APPROACH WOULD BE VERY USEFUL.

4. MIKANAGI SAID HE HAD NOTED REPORTS THAT CHIN SE ATTITUDE TO PEACE
INITIATIVE HAD CHANGED SOMEWHAT WHEN CHINESE PM WAS IN OTT. USS
REPLIED THAT CHINESE HAD APPARENTLY CONCLUDED THEY HAD NOTHING TO
LOSE BY SUPPORTING INITIATIVE AND HAD DONE SO N WORDS.

5. MIKANAGI NOTED THAT NAKASONE WAS PLANNING TO VISIT CHINA LATER
THIS YEAR AND OBSERVED THAT VISIT MIGHT PRESENT GOOD OPPORTUNITY
FOR NAKASONE TO SPEAK TO CHINESE IN SUPPORT OF INITIATIVE.

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GE THREE PPR0325 CONF D

6. MIKANAGI SAID HE UNDERSTOOD PM TRUDEAU HAD PROPOSED MEETING OF FIVE NWS TO UN SEC GEN AND WONDERED WHAT SEC GEN'S RESPONSE HAD BEEN. USS SAID PROPOSAL WAS THAT AMBS OF NWS MEET FOR PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS. SEC GEN HAD RESPONDED POSITIVELY AND HAD UNDERTAKEN TO CONSIDER PROPOSAL.

7. ASKED FOR HIS ASSESSMENT OF ATTITUDE TOWARDS INITIATIVE OF NEW SOVIET LEADERSHIP, USS SAID HE ASSUMED CHERNENKOS FOREIGN POLICY WOULD BE ALONG SAME LINES AS ANDROPOV'S AND THAT HE WOULD GIVE INITIATIVE SOME SUPPORT AS ANDROPOV.

8. BILATERAL FOREIGN MINS CONSULTATIONS: MIKANAGI NOTED THAT WHILE CDA JPN BILATERAL FOREIGN MINS CONSULTATIONS HAD LAST BEEN HELD IN OCT 82, NEXT CONSULTATIONS WERE NOW TENTATIVELY SET FOR 10 JULY AND EXPRESSED HOPE DATE WOULD HOLD. USS INDICATED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO DPM/SSEA EARLIER IN DAY ABOUT THIS AND THAT, WHILE OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION WAS STILL AWAITED, DPM/SSEA HAD BEEN VERY POSITIVE AND HAD QUOTE BASICALLY AGREED UNQUOTE TO 10 JULY DATE.

9. POLICY PLANNING CONSULTATIONS: MIKANAGI NOTED THAT IT WAS CDAS TURN IN 84 TO HOST ANNUAL POLICY PLANNING CONSULTATIONS AND EXPRESSED HOPE AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED SOMETIME IN NEAR FUTURE ON DATE AND SUBJECTS FOR DISCUSSION. USS SAID WE FOUND POLICY PLANNING CONSULTATIONS VERY USEFUL AND SHARED AMBS HOPE FOR MTG IN 84.

10. MIKANAGI NOTED THAT USS WOULD BE DEPARTING SHORTLY FOR SPORE HOP MEETING AND, AT MIKANAGI'S REQUEST, USS PROVIDED VERY BRIEF

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PAGE FOUR PPR0325 CONFD

OUTLINE OF NATURE OF HOP MTGS AND TYPES OF SUBJECTS THEY ADDRESS.

ONLY OTHER SUBJECT RAISED WAS MIKANAGIS REFERENCE TO PGBS ATTENDANCE
AT BALI PEC SEMINAR AND HIS EXPRESSION OF CLOSE AND POSITIVE
JAPANESE INTEREST IN PEC AND ITS OBJECTIVES.

CCC/032 172337Z PPR0325

MF

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MCSCO XYGR0216 14FEB84

TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 140900

DISTR MINA DMF RGB RBD RBT RBP RBRD IDDZ IDR XDX XDV ZSI IFB FPR
REF YOURTEL RBR0304 13FEB

---PM VISIT:MTG WITH CHERNENKO

FOLLOWING IS INFO NOW AVAIL RE SUBJ MTG:MTG IS TO OCCUR AT
1600 HRS LOCAL 15FEB.MTG AND ITS TIMING WERE PROPOSED BY SOVIET
SIDE SHORTLY AFTER PMS ARRIVAL IN ADDITION TO CHERNENKO,
GROMYKO PLUS INTERPRETER EXPECTED TO BE PRESENT ON SOVIET SIDE.
PM TRUDEAU TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY AMB ROBERTS ONLY.WHILE SOV
SIDE HAS NOT/NOT INDICATED EXPECTED DURATION OF MTG,WE ANTI-
CIPATE APPROX 30-40 MINUTES.DISCUSSION EXPECTED TO FOCUS ON
PMS INITIATIVE IN CONTEXT OF CURRENT INTL SITUATION.DO NOT/NOT
HAVE COMPLETE LIST OF WHO ELSE WILL BE SEEING CHERNENKO,BUT
UNDERSTAND HE EXPECTED TO MEET LATER TODAY WITH,INTER ALIA,PM
MAUROIS,PM THATCHER,CHANCELLOR KOHL AND,PROBABLY,VICE-PRESIDENT
BUSH.

2.PM TRUDEAU MET WITH SWEDISH PM PALME AND WITH CHANCELLOR
KOHL PLUS FM GENSCHER THIS AM.BRIEF MTG WITH PAK PRES ZIA
SCHEDULED THIS PM.

CCC/095 140905Z XYGR0216

UPDATE PROGRAMME
as known at departure

For attendance by the Prime Minister
at the funeral of President Yuri Andropov in Moscow

Sunday: February 12

22:00 - Departure from Ottawa (Uplands) Airport.

Monday: February 13

15:00 - Arrival at Moscow, Sheremetyevo I Airport.
- On-board briefing by Canadian Ambassador, Peter Roberts.
- Greeted by Soviet dignitaries.
- Proceed to hotel; Rossiya requested.
late afternoon - Attend "lying in state" in Hall of Columns, near Red Square. Prime Minister and Ambassador, plus number to be advised.
evening - Optional briefing followed by informal private dinner at Ambassador's residence. Most of delegation plus 2-3 Embassy officers if agreed.

Tuesday: February 14

11:15 - Depart hotel by car for funeral ceremony in Red Square.
11:30 - Prime Minister escorted to place of honour, in front of Lenin Mausoleum, accompanied by Ambassador plus two if Soviets permit. Others to position assigned.
12:00 - Ceremony begins.
- Following ceremony (approx one hour), Prime Minister, accompanied by Ambassador plus two if Soviets permit, escorted past grave.
- From grave to Georgievsky Hall of Kremlin Palace for reception offered by Soviet leaders.
- Remainder of delegation walks by grave and depart

- 2 -

- late afternoon - Open. Possible meeting with Soviet leaders, bilaterals, or free time.
- evening - Informal dinner at Georgian restaurant if desired.

Wednesday: February 15

- morning - Open. Possible meeting with Soviet leaders, bilaterals, or free time.
- 12:00 - Departure from Moscow, Sheremetyevo I Airport.
- 14:15 - Arrival at Ottawa (Uplands) Airport.

NOTES

- We shall get very little advance notice of the meeting with the Soviet leadership, and of the identity of the Prime Minister's interlocutor. Accompanying Soviet security officers may well be the channel, if Prime Minister should be away from hotel.
- The only firm request for a bilateral meeting is from President Zia of Pakistan. No action has been taken so far on this request. Other bilaterals may emerge on the spot. If agreed, they could take place at the hotel or at the Ambassador's residence.
- Press: The only Canadian media at present in Moscow are Chris Young of Southam News and Jan Lazowski of CBC. Young has requested an interview/encounter with the Prime Minister, and Lazowski will probably do the same.
- Wreaths: A wreath in the Prime Minister's name, and one in the name of the Ambassador, will have been placed in the Hall of Columns. No wreath-laying ceremony is required.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT FPR0159 14FEB84

TO MOSCO DELIVER BY 150800

INFO PMOOTT/COLEMAN PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA MINT MINE DMF IFB RGB RBD RBT RBR RBRD LIDDZ IDR ZSI

---PM VISIT:REQUEST FOR INTERVIEW WITH THE JOURNAL

CBC TV THE JOURNAL HAS REQUESTED INTERVIEW WITH AMB ROBERTS

TOMORROW FOLLOWING PMS MTG WITH CHERNENKO.YOU WILL PROBABLY RECEIVE
REQUEST VIA KAREN DODER/WSHDC POST ON BEHALF OF JOURNAL.

2.WE UNDERTOOK TO PASS MSG ON TO YOU WITHOUT ANY COMMITMENT HAVE
DISCUSSED MATTER WITH DPM/SSEA WHO IS OF VIEW THAT AMB AND ANY
OTHER OFFICIAL APPROACHED SHOULD DECLINE INTERVIEW.

CCC/117 141855Z FPR0159

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT FPR0157 14FEB84

TO MOSCO DELIVER BY 150900

INFO WSHDC BNATO PARIS TOKYO DELHI LDN PEKIN BONN ROME STKHM

PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN

DISTR MINA MINE MINT USS DMF DMT CPD IDD IDA IDR/IDDZ RBP RBD RBR

---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE INTERVIEW WITH GEOFFREY PEARSON

FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW ON PMS MTG WITH CHERNENKO

BROADCAST ON CTV CDA AM THIS MORNING TEXT BEGINS QUOTE

CTV:PRIME MINISTER PIERRE TRUDEAU WILL BE ABLE TO CROWN HIS PEACE
PILGRIMAGES TOMORROW WITH A MEETING WITH THE NEW SOVIET LEADER,
KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO IT IS THOUGHT THAT THIS WILL BE THE FIRST
MEETING WITH A WESTERN LEADER.THE MEETING ITSELF WILL BE A VERY
IMPORTANT ONE,AND THE EASE WITH WHICH AND THE SPEED WITH WHICH THIS
MEETING SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN ARRANGED INDICATES THAT ONLY YURI
ANDROPOVS HEALTH PROBLEM SEEMED TO BE BLOCKING TRUDEAUS LONG SOUGHT
VISIT TO THE KREMLIN.FOR A LOOK AT WHAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED DURING
THIS VISIT,DURING THIS MEETING.WERE GOING NOW TO OUR OTTAWA STUDIOS
TO TALK WITH FORMER CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW,GEOFFREY PEARSON.
MR.PEARSON ALSO ACTED AS THE PRIME MINISTERS PERSONAL ENVOY LAST
FALL IN A TRIP TO MOSCOW.GOOD MORNING,MR.PEARSON.

GEOFFREY PEARSON:GOOD MORNING,PAMELA.

CTV:CAN YOU GIVE US SOME IDEA OF WHAT IS ON THE AGENDA FOR THIS
MEETING?DO WE KNOW?

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PAGE TWO FPR0157 UNCLAS

PEARSON:NO.IT WONT BE A VERY LONG MEETING,I DONT THINK.MR.CHERNENKO WILL HAVE TO SEE SEVERAL OTHER PEOPLE,INCLUDING THE PRIME MINISTER OF GREAT BRITAIN,PROBABLY THE FRENCH PRESIDENT SO I WOULDNT IMAGINE MORE THAN AN HOUR AND IF YOU TAKE INTERPRETATION INTO ACCOUNT,THAT LEAVES YOU ABOUT HALF AN HOUR FOR ACTUAL DIALOGUE AND I SUPPOSE IN THAT TIME THEY WILL HAVE MOSTLY TO DISCUSS GENERAL QUESTIONS OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

CTV:WILL THE PRIME MINISTER HAVE TIME THEN.IN THAT SHORT PERIOD,TO LAY OUT HIA PEACE PROPOSAL,OR DO YOU SUPPOSE THAT MR CHERNENKO KNOWS IT QUITE WELL?

PEARSON:I THINK HE KNOWS IT.I AM SURE HES HEARD OF IT,AND HAS BEEN BRIEFED ABOUT IT.AND I EXPECT HE WILL REPLY OR RESPOND IN A GENERAL WAY,PROBABLY NOT/NOT IN ANY DETAIL

CTV:YESTERDAY,IN ONE OF THE FIRST STATEMENTS THAT WEVE HEARD FROM THE NEW GENERAL SECRETARY,MR.CHERNENKO,HE SAID THAT THE USSR IS WILLING TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH ALL STATES WHO ARE PREPARED TO HELP RELIEVE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS WITH SPECIFIC DEEDS.WHAT DO YOU THINK HES GETTING AT?DO YOU THINK HE MEANS MEETINGS?DO YOU THINK HE MEANS SUMMITS?

PEARSON:I DONT THINK HE MEANS MEETINGS AND SUMMITS NECESSARILY WHEN HE TALKS ABOUT DEEDS.I THINK HES REFERRING MAINLY TO CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS.SO HES PROBABLY REFERRING TO STARTING UP THE ARMS CONTROL AND NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA AGAIN.BUT HES ASKING THE WEST TO MAKE THE FIRST MOVE,I WOULD GUESS.

...3

PAGE THREE FPR0157 UNCLAS

CTV:BASED ON YOUR EXPERIENCE IN YOUR TIME IN MOSCOW,WHAT DO YOU KNOW OF MR.CHERNENKO?WHAT DO YOU KNOW ABOUT HIS APPROACH TO EAST WEST RELATIONS?

PEARSON:WELL,I NEVER MET HIM DIRECTLY.I SHOOK HIS HAND AT RECEPTIONS. BUT HE WAS NOT/NOT THE PERSON WHO DEALT WITH FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS AND HE WAS NOT/NOT IDENTIFIED WITH THEM.HE MADE VERY FEW SPEECHES ON THE SUBJECT.AND I DONT EXPECT HIM,THEREFORE,TO BE PARTICULARLY DIFFERENT FROM HIS PREDECESSORS.BUT HE WAS CLOSE TO BREZHNEV,AND I THINK IF YOU WANT CLUES ABOUT WHAT HE MIGHT DO AND SAY,READ BREZHNEVS LAST SPEECHES BEFORE HE DIED.

CTV:AND WHAT CAN YOU FIND,IF YOU READ THOSE SPEECHES?WHAT ARE THE HINTS?WHAT ARE THE CLUES?

PEARSON:WELL,I WOULD SAY THOSE SPEECHES WERE HARKING BACK TO DETENTE.BREZHNEV THOUGHT OF HIMSELF AS THE ARCHITECT OF DETENTE, AND IF CHERNENKO IS IN THAT SHADOW OR INHERITING THAT MANTLE.THEN I THINK HE TOO WILL LOOK FOR WAYS OF BRINGING ABOUT DETENTE AGAIN. THATS MY GUESS.

CTV:DO YOU THINK THEN,GIVING WHAT YOUVE SAID AND WHAT MOST COMMENTATORS ARE SAYING AT THIS POINT,THAT CHERNENKO IS NOT/NOT A MAN WHO KNOWS A LOT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,THAT WAS NOT/NOT HIS AREA, THAT HE WOULD BE ABLE TO MOVE VERY QUICKLY AT THIS POINT?WILL HE NEED TO BE APPRISED OF WHAT HAS GONE ON AND ALL THE FACTS BEFORE HE TAKES ANY STEPS?

...4

PAGE FOUR FPR0157 UNCLAS

PEARSON: WELL, NO, ITS A COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP AND HES BEEN IN THE LEADERSHIP NOW FOR MANY YEARS AS A MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO. HE DOESNT HAVE TO BE BRIEFED IN THAT SENSE. BUT HE WILL BE DEPENDENT, I SUPPOSE, ON THE VETERAN FOREIGN MINISTER, MR. GROMYKO, FOR ADVICE AS MOST OF THEM HAVE BEEN IN THE PAST TWENTY FIVE YEARS. BUT I WOULDNT BE SURPRISED TO SEE HIM PUT HIS OWN STAMP ON AFFAIRS. I DONT THINK HE SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS SOMEONE WHO WONT DO ANYTHING.

CTV: MR. PEARSON, WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR PIERRE TRUDEAU AT THIS POINT? IS HIS VISIT NOW COMPLETE, OR WILL THIS BE ONLY THE FIRST OF MEETINGS THAT HE SEEKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION?

PEARSON: I CANT ANSWER THAT. I THINK IT DEPENDS ON WHAT HAPPENS WHEN HE SEES MR. CHERNENKO IF THEY HAVE A GOOD EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, EVEN THOUGH ITS SHORT, THAT MAY BE ENOUGH. OR IT MAY BE THAT IT WILL BE A MEETING WHICH DOESNT LEAD TO ANY REAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. IN WHICH CASE THERE MIGHT BE NEED FOR ANOTHER ONE. BUT ITS IMPOSSIBLE TO SAY AT THE MOMENT

CTV: ARE YOU OPTIMISTIC?

PEARSON: ABOUT THE MEETING?

CTV: YES.

PEARSON: I THINK IT WILL BE A GOOD MEETING. I THINK, YOU KNOW, THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN... WEVE BEEN ASKING FOR THIS MEETING EVER SINCE I WAS IN MOSCOW IN NOVEMBER WHICH IS WHAT, FOUR MONTHS? AND THEY HAVE BEEN VERY EMBARRASSED BY THEIR INABILITY TO RESPOND. AND NOW WE KNOW WHY. I THINK THEY WILL DO THEIR BEST TO MAKE THE MEETING A SUCCESS.

...5

PAGE FIVE FPR0157 UNCLAS

CTV:MR.PEARSON,VERY GOOD TO TALK TO YOU.THANK YOU.

PEARSON:THANK YOU.

CTV:GEOFFREY PEARSON,FORMER CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW.

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(212) 246-7424

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**ACTION
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Our file/no. dossier:

NYC

41
NO. GRPA - 156 DATE 14 FEBRUARY 1984

PAGES T W O
(incl. cover)
(y compris la page
couverture)

FROM: Canadian Consulate General
DU : Consulat général du Canada
NEW YORK

SECTION: General Relations & Public
Mr./Ms. Affairs
M./Mad. Weatherup

TO : Mr./Ms.
A : M./Mad.

Department:
Service : EXTOTT: 1IDDZ

Phone :
Téléphone :

Subject : NEW YORK TIMES 14/2/84 (A-12)
Objet :

"TRUDEAU TO MEET CHERNENKO TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR ARSENALS"

2/2

ons." NVT 14/2/84 (A12)

Trudeau to Meet Chernenko To Discuss Nuclear Arsenals

OTTAWA, Feb. 13 (AP) — Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau is scheduled to meet the new Soviet leader, Konstantin U. Chernenko, on Wednesday to discuss Mr. Trudeau's proposals for reducing nuclear arsenals, Canadian officials said today.

Mr. Trudeau is in Moscow for the funeral of Yuri V. Andropov. He had planned to return home Wednesday, but decided to stay another day when his request for a meeting with Mr. Chernenko was granted, they said.

Mr. Trudeau had tried for months to arrange a trip to Moscow, but was thwarted by Mr. Andropov's health.

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*return to
myself
16/2/84*

(MIF)

Home Address

400 East 58th Street
New York NY 10022

February 13, 1984

Dear Pierre:

First, let me congratulate you on your remarks at the meeting with the New York Times and at the Davos meeting, also for your statement in Parliament on 9 February. I should like to thank the members of your staff who so kindly sent me the text of your remarks so promptly.

I think that it is very important to maintain and further promote the momentum of your peace initiative. I have some ideas for your consideration:

1. You no doubt already have in mind the possibility of your Ten Principles becoming the basis for a joint statement of agreed principles between the United States and the U.S.S.R. If Reagan and Chernenko sign them jointly, or subscribe to them by simultaneous unilateral declarations, they would become even more important than the 1961 McCloy-Zorin Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (that led to the resumption of the negotiations in the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in 1962, after the Russians walked out of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Committee in 1960). If they would not sign or subscribe to them, I would suggest that you consider submitting a resolution endorsing them to the forthcoming session of the U.N. General Assembly, where they would be adopted by an overwhelming majority. It probably wouldn't be worth submitting them to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, which operates on the

The Rt. Hon. Pierre E. Trudeau
Prime Minister of Canada
House of Commons
Ottawa
CANADA

basis of consensus. There may be other high level meetings, such as NATO, which might endorse them in the meantime.

2. You might wish to consider two more principles, which could be added to the ten or could be put forward separately. These would be:

- (a) A call for or endorsement of "national action" and "reciprocal restraint" in postponing the testing, development and deployment of mobile, unverifiable and other destabilising strategic weapons. "National action" and "reciprocal restraint" could have the same positive effect as "unilateral" measures and initiatives, without using that term;
- (b) A call for or endorsement of "normalisation of relations" between the two super-powers, which could produce the same effect as "detente" or "reduction of tensions."

Some other ideas for your consideration:

1. I think it might have adverse consequences for the proliferation of nuclear weapons if the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty or the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty were ratified. (See my enclosed article on the subject). The U.N. General Assembly never commended them or called for their ratification as it did with the SALT I and II and other American-Soviet Agreements.
2. I think it would have a positive impact not only in Canada but also internationally if you would:
 - (a) speed up the establishment of the Defence and Arms Control Institute (preferably called the Institute for Peace and Disarmament or Peace and Security);
 - (b) announce the appointment of an Ambassador for Disarmament (preferably some person of independent political stature who might carry weight with all three political parties);

I look forward to seeing you in person or speaking to you on the phone for a few minutes to pursue another more personal suggestion I made to you in New York.

With very best wishes.

Yours sincerely,

Bill

William Epstein



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Canada

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Canada

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MESSAGE

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INFO

INFO CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR GENEV PARIS HAGUE

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REF YOURTEL YBGR8539 13FEB, OURTEL IDDZ0148 13FEB TO WSHDC

---CDN ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS

YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM OUR REFTEL THAT USA EMB OTT ALSO HAS BEEN
ACTIVE ON THIS FRONT TODAY.

2. RATHER THAN ^{BECOME} ~~BE~~ ENGAGED ON SUBSTANCE (WHERE WE DO NOT/NOT ENTIRE-
LY SHARE USA VIEWS) SUGGEST THAT YOU LIMIT YOUR COMMENTS AT PERM-
REPS LUNCHEON TOMORROW TO FOLLOWING: (A) PM IN HIS SPEECH TO HOUSE
09FEB STRESSED THERE WOULD BE QUOTE FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR
NATO ALLIES UNQUOTE BEFORE PAPERS WOULD BE CIRCULATED; (B) WE ARE
PREPARING TO SEND BRIEFING TEAM TO NATO TO PERMIT IN-DEPTH DISCUS-
SION OF THREE PROPOSALS BOTH AS TO THEIR SUBSTANCE AND EVENTUAL
FORUM; (C) WE ARE ALSO PREPARED TO CONSULT BILATERALLY, AS APPROPRI-
ATE AND WHERE ANY OF OUR ALLIES MIGHT HAVE PARTICULAR POINTS TO
DISCUSS.

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DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

G.J. SMITH/pec

IDDZ

55912

SIG

GARY J. SMITH



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INFO

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SUBJ/SUJ

---PM/HONECKER FORMAL DISCUSSIONS

GRATEFUL YOU SEND TWO REPORTS BY TEL ASAP SO AS TO ASSIST IN OUR
DEBRIEFING ENDEAVOURS. WE WILL FILL IN GAPS WHERE REQUIRED AND
RETURN COPY OF FINAL PRODUCT TO YOU.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

G. J. SMITH

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

G. J. SMITH



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TO/À TO WSHDC DELIVER BY 140900

INFO

DISTR INFO MOSCO/PMDEL DELIVER BY 140900

REF BNATO BRU BONN LDN PARIS GENEV STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER

SUBJ/SUJ NDHQOTT/CP/ADMPOL/CP/CNADPOL/DSTRATA

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RBR RBD IDR IDA ZSI ZSP RCR URR UGB CPD

REF YOURTEL UNGR 2006 02FEB, OURTEL IDDZ0128 07FEB

---PM INITIATIVE:USA CONCERNS

JOHN ROUSE (MINISTER AT USA EMB) ACCOMPANIED BY BOB MAXIM (FIRST SECRETARY) CALLED ON UGB (ACCOMPANIED BY IDDZ/SMITH) FEB 13 TO QUOTE RE REGISTER USA CONCERNS ABOUT BOTH SUBSTANCE AND FORUM UNQUOTE RELATED TO OUR INTENTION TO TABLE THREE SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS IN CD IN GENEV.ROUSE (WHO SAID HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO CALL ON DMF - WHO IS ACCOMPANYING PM) NOTED WSHDC WAS CONCERNED PAPERS MIGHT BE CIRCULATED BEFORE CONSULTATIONS TOOK PLACE AND EMPHASIZED THAT IN ADDITION TO CONSULTATIONS IN NATO THEY WLD LIKE QUOTE BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS IN WSHDC UNQUOTE.

2.UGB DREW ATTN TO PASSAGE IN PMS FEB 9 SPEECH THAT THERE WLD BE FURTHER CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR NATO ALLIES BEFORE THREE PROPOSALS WLD BE CIRCULATED.ROUSE NOTED THAT IT WAS STILL PMS INTENTION TO CIRCULATE PAPERS.~~HE WAS ASKED WHETHER HE HAD ANY VIEWS ON LEVEL OF CONSULTATIONS.~~

3.SMITH RECALLED THAT FOLLOWING DEPUTY SECRETARY DAMS VISIT HERE IN

...2

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SIG G.J. SMITH	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG G.J. SMITH



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PAGE TWO IDDZ0148 CONF

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MID-NOV WE HAD SENT TWO EXPERTS TO WSHDC FOR CONSULTATIONS ON THIS
SUBJ AND THAT THIS QUESTION DID NOT/NOT ARISE DURING PMS MTG WITH
PRES REAGAN IN WSHDC DEC 15 NOR AT LUNCHEON HOSTED BY SEC SHULTZ
AND ATTENDED INTER ALIA BY EAGLEBURGER, BURT AND ADELMAN. ROUSE RE-
PLIED THAT CURRENT FOCUS OF ATTN IN WSHDC WAS MORE ON FORUM WE
INTENDED TO USE RATHER THAN SUBSTANCE. CD WAS NOT/NOT PLACE FOR
STRATEGIC ISSUES AND WAS FORUM IN WHICH NATO COUNTRIES SHD HAVE
QUOTE UNIFIED RATHER THAT FRAGMENTED POSITION UNQUOTE. SMITH MENTIONED
THAT WE WERE IN PROCESS OF PUTTING TOGETHER BRIEFING TEAM (CONSIS-
TING OF DR CALDER, DIRECTOR OF DSTRATA IN DND AND HIMSELF) TO CON-
SULT DURING SECOND HALF OF THIS MONTH BOTH IN NATO HQ/AND IN CAPI-
TALS WHERE INTEREST HAD BEEN EXPRESSED. TEAM WLD BE ABLE TO DEAL
WITH BOTH POLICY AND TECHNICAL DETAIL. ROUSE WAS ASKED WHETHER USA
HAD ANY VIEWS ON LEVEL OF CONSULTATIONS DESIRED AND UNDERTOOK TO
CHECK BUT OPINED MIDDLE LEVEL PROPOSED LIKELY WAS ~~NOT~~ APPROPRIATE.
4. WILL ADVISE FURTHER DETAILS RE BRIEFING TEAM ^{WHEN} CONFIRMED.



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INFO

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INFO PC00TT/FOWLER BNATO WSHDC LDN PARIS STKHM/SCDEL

REF

DISTR RBR RBD IDR IDA IFB

SUBJ/SUJ

REF YOURTEL XYGR0212 12FEB (NOTAL)

---CDA IN SOVIET PRESS: FIRST USE

TASS STORY OUT OF OTTAWA FEB 11 IS BEING MISCHIEVOUS IN ITS REFEREN-
CE TO PRINCIPLE SIX IN PMS SPEECH. IT DOES NOT/NOT CONTAIN QUOTE
REFUSAL OF THE CONCEPTION OF THE FIRST NUCLEAR BLOW UNQUOTE BUT
RATHER THAT QUOTE BOTH SIDES ARE CONSCIOUS OF THE AWESOME CONSE-
QUENCES OF BEING THE FIRST TO USE FORCE AGAINST THE OTHER UNQUOTE.
2. IN YOUR CONTACTS WITH SOVIET OFFICIALS AND/OR PRESS AND IN
POSSIBLE ENCOUNTER (S) PM MIGHT HAVE IN MOSCO IT MAY BE NECESSARY
TO POINT OUT THAT THIS PRINCIPLE: A) RELATES TO FIRST USE OF FORCE
NOT/NOT FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND B) IS CAST IN VERY GENERAL
TERMS RELATED TO BEING CONSCIOUS OF RESULTS OF USE OF FORCE AND IS
NOT/NOT TO BE TAKEN AS SUPPORT FOR ANY NON-FIRST USE OF ~~FORCE~~ AGMT
OR NON-AGGRESSION ~~PART~~.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

G. SMITH

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

G. J. SMITH

000178



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REF

SUBJ/SUJ

LDN PARIS BONN WSHDC ROME HAGUE BRU GENEV ATHNS ANKRA LSBON PRGUE

WSAW MDRID OSLO COPEN BUCST BPEST BGRAD MINA DMF IFB IDR IDA RBR RBD

RGB RCR ZSI

---PM VISITS TO MOSCO AND EASTERN EUROPE:NATO DEBRIEFING

HANCOCK (RBD) IS CURRENTLY IN MOSCO WITH PMDEL FOR ANDROPOV FUNERAL.

HE IS PREPARED TO STOP OVER IN BRU ON HIS RETURN TO DEBRIEF ALLIES

ON:A)PMS EAST EUROPEAN TRIP (CZECKOSLOVAKIA, G⁹ AND ROMANIA)B)TO

SHARE HIS REFLECTIONS ON CURRENT ATMOSPHERE IN MOSCO AND C)B⁹READ

LINES OF PMS INITIATIVE SHD THIS BE DEEMED DESIRABLE.

2.HE WLD NOT/NOT WISH TO GET INTO IN DEPTH DISCUSSION OF ARMS CON-

TROL ASPECTS OF INITIATIVE AND IN THIS REGARD YOU SHD BE AWARE WE

ARE CONTEMPLATING SEPARATE BRIEFING IN NATO LATER THIS MONTH BY

TASK FORCE MEMBERS ON THREE SUFFOCATION PROPOSALS ABOUT WHICH WE

WILL ADVISE SEPARATELY.WE WILL ALSO BE PROVIDING YOU THIS WEEK WITH

WRITTEN SUMMATION OF PMS EASTERN EUROPEAN TRIP FOR CIRCULATION

WITHIN NATO.

3.BEST TIMING FOR HANCOCK BRIEFING WLD BE MON FEB 20.GRATEFUL YOU

ADVISE SOONEST,COPY TO MOSCO,WHETHER DATE IS SUITABLE (WE ARE AWARE

HILEX EXERCISE WILL BE UNDERWAY)AND LEVEL AT WHICH BRIEFING MIGHT

BEST TAKE PLACE.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

G.J. SMITH

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

G.J. SMITH

000179 -

**ACTION
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Division Phoned 1002
Person CF
Local Time 1520

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR8539 13FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 131500

INFO CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR GENEV PARIS HAGUE
OSLO COPEN ATHENS STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER WSHDC NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/
DACPOL/DNACPOL/PPP/DSTRATA/CIS

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB IDA IDR SCS

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0128 07FEB

---CDN ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS

WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED FROM USA DEL FOLLOWING NOTES WHICH THEIR PERM
REP INTENDS TO BRING FORWARD AT PERMREPS LUNCHEON 14FEB. WE WERE TOLD
INSTRUCTIONS WERE FROM RICHARD BURT. GRATEFUL YOUR COMMENTS ASAP.

2. QUOTE: ---USA IS STRONGLY CONCERNED WITH SUBSTANCE OF AND FORUM
CHOSEN FOR DISCUSSION OF CANADIAN PAPERS ON ENHANCING STRATEGIC
STABILITY. WE ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU
HAS PUBLICLY (FYI - IN PARLIAMENT ON 09FEB) ANNOUNCED HIS INTENTION TO
PROCEED IN THE CD DESPITE STRONG NEGATIVE ALLIED VIEWS.

---THE PROPOSAL REGARDING VERIFICATION IS INHERENTLY UNWORKABLE; IT
WEAKENS LONG STANDING WESTERN POSITION THAT ON-SITE-INSPECTION IS
IN MANY CASES A NECESSARY COMPONENT FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION.

---THE PROPOSAL ON STRATEGIC MOBILITY RUNS COUNTER TO CONCLUSIONS
OF THE SCROWCROFT COMMISSION.

---THE CD IS A COMPLETELY INAPPROPRIATE FORUM FOR CONSIDERATION
OF STRATEGIC MATTERS.

...2

PAGE TWO YBGR8539 CONF

--WE CANNOT AGREE TO DISCUSSION OF CANADIAN PROPOSAL FOR DISCUSSIONS AT THE CD ON BANNING HIGH-LEVEL ASATS. THE INTRODUCTION OF SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD OFFER THE SOVIETS AN UNNECESSARY PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE (TO BE USED PRIVATELY WITH CANADIAN DELEGATION ONLY) AND WOULD DIVIDE THE WESTERN GROUP.

--AS THESE PROPOSALS ALL IMPACT DIRECTLY ON NATO SECURITY, THE ALLIANCE MUST WORK OUT COMMON POSITIONS TO PROTECT ITS SECURITY INTERESTS.

--SUBMITTING THESE PROPOSALS TO THE MULTI-LATERAL CD FORUM WOULD ONLY INCREASE THE DANGER OF POLITICIZING THESE ISSUES WITHIN THE NNAS.

--TO CANADIAN DELEGATION ONLY: WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL PASS THESE VIEWS TO YOUR AUTHORITIES AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AND URGE THAT A RECONSIDERATION OF THE SUBSTANCE AND TIMING OF THE PROPOSALS BE MADE IN LIGHT OF ALLIED VIEWS.

CCC/054 131804Z YBGR8539

MASTER FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR8040 13FEB84

TO EXTOTT RBR

INFOL WSHDC PMDEL/MOSCO PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR DMF MINA IFB RGB UGB URR IDR IDA ZSI (IDDZ

---USA-USSR RELATIONS

MEMBER OF OFFICIAL USA CONTINGENT ATTENDING WEHRKUNDE CONF IN
MUNICH THIS WEEKEND TOLD US THAT DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN IN
WSHDC ON FRIDAY 10FEB TO SEEK SUMMIT MTG BETWEEN PRES REAGAN
AND WHOEVER EMERGES AS ANDROPOVS SUCCESSOR, TO BE HELD QUOTE
WITHIN NEXT TWO MONTHS UNQUOTE. VICE-PRES BUSH WOULD RAISE
MATTER WITH SOVIET AUTHORITIES WHILE IN MOSCO THIS WEEK TO
ATTEND ANDROPOV FUNERAL, IF SUCCESSOR HAD BEEN DESIGNATED BY
THAT TIME.

CCC/070 130845Z YBGR8040

MAJOR FILE

ACTION
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C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM OSLO WGGR3201 13FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS ANKRA COPEN BRU HAGUE
WSHDC PRMNY CNGNY MOSCO GENEV TOKYO WSAW BPEST PRGUE BGRAD BUCST
STKHM/SCDEL VMBFR CNBRA WLGTH VIENN PEKIN DELHI PCOOTT/FOWLER
NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD/DGINFO/DNACPOL

DISTR MINA DMF RGB RCD RCR RBD RBR IFB IDR IDA RSR RSD ZSI

---PMS INITIATIVE:BRIEFING OF NORWEGIAN MFA

DIRECTOR GEN RAVNE OF MFA WELCOMED BRIEFING FEB10 REGARDING PMS
VISITS TO EAST EUROPEAN CAPITALS.HE ASSERTED THAT NORWAY AT BOTH
POLITICAL AND OFFICIAL LEVELS CONTINUED TO SUPPORT INITIATIVE AND
FULLY SHARED CDN OBJECTIVES.RAVNE SAW CONSIDERATION OF INITIATIVE
AS DOMINATED BY NEWS JUST RECEIVED OF ANDROPOVS DEATH.SEVERAL
POINTS EMERGED.

2.(A)RAVNE SAW PURSUIT OF INITIATIVE AS BEING NOW HANDICAPPED BY
IMMINENCE OF MAJOR EVENTS AND DISTRACTIONS,PRINCIPAL ONES BEING RUN
UP TO USA ELECTION AND SUCCESSION IN MOSCOW.THIS SECOND PROBLEM
INTENSIFIED THE DIFFICULTIES.AWARE OF INEVITABILITY OF CDN ELECTION
IN RELATIVELY NEAR FUTURE RAVNE ENQUIRED ABOUT PM TRUDEAUS PLANS
BOTH AS TO INITIATIVE AND THE ELECTION.WITH NO/NO ANSWERS POSSIBLE
HERE ON THIS SCORE RAVNE COMMENTED THAT OUR OWN SITUATION MERELY
REINFORCED HIS COMMENT ABOUT TIMING(B)RAVNE SAW PASSING OF ANDROPOV
AS POSING BY FAR BIGGEST IMPONDERABLE AND FELT THAT IN EFFECT

...2

PAGE TWO WGGR3201 CONFD

EVERYTHING WOULD HAVE TO MARK TIME UNTIL SITUATION IN MOSCOW IS
CLARIFIED(C)RAVNE WAS CLEARLY VERY WELL INFORMED ABOUT PROGRESS OF
PMS INITIATIVE IN ITS VARIOUS PHASES AND HAD ALREADY RECEIVED FULL
TEXT OF PMS ADDRESS TO COMMONS.NORWEGIAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
MAINTAINS KEEN INTEREST IN THIS SUBJECT D)RAVNE INDICATED AWARENESS
THAT DEVELOPMENTS AT DAVOS AS REPORTED IN VARIOUS CHANNELS HAD LED
TO SOME CONCERN ON PART OF USA.DESPITE ASSERTION OF SUPPORT OF CDN
POSITION HE WAS UNRESPONSIVE TO SUGGESTION THAT PUBLIC NORWEGIAN
STATEMENT WOULD BE HELPFUL.INDEED I GAINED IMPRESSION THAT NORWEGIAN
HESITANCY ABOUT PUBLIC STATEMENTS MIGHT STEM FROM USA VIEWS BEING
CONVEYED TO MFA IN OSLO OR ELSEWHERE(E)RAVNE CONFIRMED MFA VIEW
NEVERTHELESS THAT IT WAS RIGHT AND PROPER FOR CDA TO ADVANCE
PROPOSALS AIMED AT IMPROVING THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE.NORWAY MIGHT
NOT/NOT ALWAYS AGREE WITH OUR TACTICS(AS IN CASE OF COMMITTEE ON
DISARMAMENT)BUT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT IN DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE MIDDLE
AND SMALLER POWERS SHOULD NOT/NOT FEEL INHIBITED FROM PUTTING
FORWARD THEIR IDEAS.CDN PERSISTANCE WOULD NOT/NOT BE CRITICIZED BY
NORWAY F)RAVNE WAS APPRECIATIVE OF INFO ON PMS VISITS IN EAST
EUROPE AND PROFESSED ALREADY TO HAVE SOME IDEA OF HOW VARIOUS TALKS
PROSPERED.NORWAY WAS INTRIGUED BY ANNOUNCEMENT OF BILATERAL TO BE
PURSUED WITH DDR.HE HOWEVER CAUTIONED AGAINST DEVELOPING ANY
INSTITUTIONALIZED STRUCTURE RECOMMENDING APPROACH OF VERY INFORMAL
TALKS OF KIND ENGAGED IN BY NORWAY ITSELF(G)IN SUMMING UP RAVNE
...3

PAGE THREE WGGR3201 CONFD

RETURNED AGAIN TO ASKING IN WHAT FORA CDA OR PM HIMSELF WOULD NEXT
PURSUE THIS ISSUE AND MUSED THAT IT MIGHT WELL BE SOME TIME BEFORE
NECESSARY SUBSTANTIVE VISIT TO MOSCO COULD TAKE PLACE TO COMPLETE
THE PROGRAM LAUNCHED LAST AUTUMN

WARDROPER

CCC/061 131355Z WGGR3201

MASTER FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM TOKYO UICR1456 13FEB84

TO EXTOTT PPR IMMED

INFO WSHDC DRIEOTT/FAMR

DISTR PGB EFB PPD PPT PPP UGB URR IDDZ EER EPT

---VISIT OF PPD:MTG WITH DIRGEN,NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS.MFA

MTG WITH KITAMURA REFLECTED PREOCCUPATION WITH QUESTIONS AT ISSUE
BETWEEN JPN AND USA, CONTRASTED WITH QUOTE VERY SATISFACTORY UNQUOTE
RELNS WITH CDA.

2.KITAMURA OPENED MTG BY SAYING THAT PM NAKASONE HAD GREATLY
ENJOYED NOV MTG WITH MR TRUDEAU.HE COMMENTED THAT PRACTICAL
APPROACHES TO PEACE ARE NOT/NOT EASY,BUT THAT JPN BASICALLY
SUPPORTED IDEAS CONTAINED IN CDN PMS INITIATIVE.

3.MCCLOSKEY OUTLINED PURPOSE OF HER VISIT TO TOKYO RELNSHIP HAD
BROADENED SIGNIFICANTLY SINCE 1974/76,AND IT WAS TIME TO ASK
WHERE WE EXPECT IT TO BE IN NEXT FIVE TO TEN YEARS AND HOW TO
GET THERE.KITAMURA THOUGHT THIS WAS REALISTIC APPROACH,AND THAT
DRASTIC NEW DIRECTIONS WERE UNNECESSARY.ONE AREA OF POSSIBLE
COOPERATION,IN HIS VIEW,LAY IN FACT THAT BOTH COUNTRIES HAD
TREMENDOUS RELNSHIP WITH USA,WHILE SHARING MANY COMMON GOALS
AND INTERESTS--THIS MIGHT LEAD TO GREATER SHARING OF VIEWS ABOUT
USA AND PROBLEMS EACH OF US FACES.

4.KITAMURA SPOKE BRIEFLY ON ABE VISIT TO WSHDC,WHICH HE DESCRIBED
AS ENERGETIC ATTEMPT TO UNDERLINE TO USA THAT JPNSE FOREIGN AND
DEFENCE POLICY WOULD REMAIN UNCHANGED UNDER SECOND NAKASONE CABINET.

...2

PAGE TWO UIGR1456 CONFD

MOST IMPORTANT SUBSTANTIVE MSG WAS THAT JPN WOULD WORK HARD TO SOLVE BEEF AND CITRUS QUOTA PROBLEM BY END OF MAR DEADLINE.

RETURNING TO THIS POINT LATER IN DISCUSSION, HE RELATING AGRICULTURAL ACCESS ISSUE TO DOMESTIC POLITICS OF BOTH USA AND JPN IN FAMILIAR TERMS. HE SAID BUSH'S JOB SEEMED TO BE TO COORDINATE RESPONSE TO JPNSE TRADE ISSUES SO AS TO CONVINCE USA PEOPLE AND DEMOCRATS THAT ADMIN WAS CAPABLE OF SOLVING PROBLEMS.

5. LONGER-RANGE DIFFICULTY WITH USA WOULD BE YEN/DOLLAR QUESTION, WHERE, KITAMURA THOUGHT EIGHTY PERCENT OF SOLUTION LAY ON OTHER SIDE OF PACIFIC--USA NEEDED TO DECREASE ITS FISCAL DEFICIT AND BRING DOWN INTEREST RATES. JPN, FOR ITS PART, WOULD NEED TO FURTHER LIBERALIZE MARKET AND INTERNATIONALIZE YEN. ON RELATED QUESTION OF TRADE IMBALANCE, KITAMURA THOUGHT GREATER PENETRATION EFFORTS BY USA WOULD BE MORE IMPORTANT THAN JPNSE LIBERALIZATION, WHICH BY ITSELF WOULD NOT/NOT GREATLY REDUCE DEFICIT. MCCLOSKEY RAISED CONCERN THAT CDA SHOULD NOT/NOT BE DISADVANTAGED BY JPNSE ATTEMPTS TO REGULARIZE TRADE WITH USA AND EC EG, IN COAL. SHE POINTED OUT, TO KITAMURA'S EVIDENT SURPRISE, THAT CDN TRADE SURPLUS HAD DROPPED FROM DLRS ONE BILLION TO DLRS 300 MILLION IN 1983. A STRIKING CHANGE, ATTRIBUTED MAINLY TO LOWER PRICES OF COAL AND WOOD PRODUCTS.

6. KITAMURA RAISED AUTO ISSUE, AND ASKED ABOUT STATUS OF CDN LOCAL CONTENT LEGISLATION WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS POTENTIALLY DAMAGING. MCCLOSKEY POINTED OUT POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS IN CDA OF LARGE JPNSE MARKET SHARE, BUT SAID MR LUMLEY HAD RETURNED FROM HIS VISIT

...3

PAGE THREE UIGR1456 CONF

TO TOKYO FEELING THERE WAS SOME PROGRESS TOWARD ARRANGEMENT
WHEREBY-BOTH COUNTRIES COULD BENEFIT.KITAMURA THOUGHT THIS WAS
HEALTHY DIRECTION AND EXPRESSED OPINION THAT JPNSE INDUSTRY
WANTED TO MOVE ABROAD.IN MORE GENERAL TERMS,HE THOUGHT CDA AND
JPN HAD GRADUATED FROM QUOTE MERE TRADE UNQUOTE TO SITUATION
WHERE THERE WOULD BE SIGNIFICANTLY MORE EXCHANGES OF TECHNOLOGY.
INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL EXCHANGE.

CCC/195 130800Z UIGR1456

35

Master FILE

R E S T R I C T E D

FM HAGUE YWTR0331 13FEB84

TO EXTOTT RBR DELIVER BY 13120

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER MOSCO WSHDC LDN BONN PARI PRGUE WSAW BPEST
BUCST BGRAD PRMNY PEKIN TOKYO BREEC ROME BRU COPEN MDRID BNATO
GENEV ATHNS ANKRA LSBON STKHM HSNKI OSLO NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/CIS
DISTR MINA MINE DMF IFB RGB RBD FPR RBP RBT ZSS ZSI ZSP XDX IDZ RSR
---ANDROPOVS DEATH

DUTCH GOVT HAS ANNOUNED THAT FM HANS VAN DEN BROEK WILL
REPRESENT NETHS AT ANDROPOVS FUNERAL.

2. IN A STATEMENT ISSUED 10FEB84, DUTCH GOVT EXPRESSED ITS
SORROW AT DEATH OF PRES ANDROPOV AND SAID HIS PERIOD IN OFFICE
HAD BEEN TOO SHORT TO SHOW TRUE DISTINCTION OF HIS
POLICIES. STATEMENT ADDED QUOTE IT MUST BE HOPED THAT THE
NEW LEADERSHIP IN MOSCO WILL BE CONSTRUCTIVE IN THE INTERNA-
TIONAL NEGOTIATIONS SEARCHING FOR SOLUTIONS TO THE GREAT
PROBLEMS FACING THE WORLD, AND THEREBY GIVE SUBSTANCE TO RECENT
SOVIET INDICATIONS REVEALING A DESIRE FOR DIALOGUE UNQUOTE.
EMIN REACTING TO ANDROPOVS DEATH, DUTCH POLITICAL PARTIES
STRESSED EFFECT IT COULD HAVE ON INF DEPLOYMENT. OPPOSITION
PARTIES WOULD LIKE TO USE ANDROPOVS DEATH, AND UNCERTAINTIES
OF FUTURE LEADERSHIP, AS REASON FOR DUTCH CABINE TO POSTPONE
DECISION ON SITING OF CRUISE MISSILES IN NETHS. PM LUBBERS
SAID HE STILL RETAINED HOPES THAT GENEV NEGOTIATIONS WOULD
BE RESUMED AND REFUSED TO LINK ANDROPOVS DEATH WITH DECISION
ON NUCLEAR MISSILES. HE RECOMMITTED GOVT TO TAKING DECISION BY JUNE.
CCC/029 131542Z YWGR0331

MASTER FILE

UNCLASSIFIED

FM LDN XNGR0319 13FEB84

TO EXTOTT/RBR DELIVER BY 130800

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER PMOOTT DELIVER BY 130800

BNATO WSHDC STKEM/SC DEL MOSCO

DISTR IDDZ MINA MINE DMF IFB RGB RBD ZSP ZSI FPR RCR

REF OURTEL XNGR0312 10FEB;SCHRAM/DUTY OFFICIER TELCON 11FEB

---DEATH OF ANDROPOV:BRITISH FUNERAL DEL

FURTHER TO REF TELCON CONFIRMING THAT PM THATCHER AND FOREIGN

SECRETARY HOWE WILL LEAD BRITISH DEL TO ANDROPOV FUNERAL,

BRITISH CONTINGENT HAS NOW BEEN BROADENED TO INCLUDE ALL-PARTY

REPRESENTATION WITH MR DENIS HEALEY,LABOUR SHADOW FOREIGN

SECRETARY,MR DAVID STEEL,LEADER.LIBERAL PARTY AND DR DAVID OWEN,

LEADER,SOVIET DEMOCRATS,JOINING MRS THATCHER AT HER INVITATION

ON BRITISH AIRCRAFT(HEALEY IS REPRESENTING LABOUR PARTY IN

ABSENCE IN USA OF LABOUR LEADER NEIL KINNOCK).

UUU/065 130956Z XNGR0319

MF
25

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM PRMNY WKGR0266 13FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER WSHDC MOSCO VIENN CIDA HULL/MUD

BH IDRCOTT/HEAD DE OTT

DISTR MINA MINE DMF DMT EFB EPD EPT ETD EER IFB IDD IDA RBR ETS

EED EEA CPD IMD IMU

CIDA MVP YVP

---INTER-ACTION COUNCIL:INTEREST IN PMS INITIATIVE

UNDP ADMINISTRATOR BRAD MORSE CALLED ON AMBASSADOR FEB10 TO OUTLINE RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING INTER-ACTION COUNCIL.HE NOTED APPARENTLY PARALLEL INTERESTS OF COUNCIL AND PM TRUDEAU IN FINDING PROCESSES WHICH ADVANCED INTL PEACE AND SECURITY.HE FELT FURTHER EXCHANGE OF IDEAS ON BOTH POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES MIGHT BE WARRANTED AT LEVEL OF OFFICIALS AND SUGGESTED POSSIBLE VISIT TO OTTAWA BY MARTIN LEES,UNDP OFFICIAL,COULD BE USED FOR THIS PURPOSE.

2.INTE-ACTION COUNCIL OF FORMER HEADS OF GOVT IS GRP OF SOME 25 FORMER HEADS OF GOVT WITH INTEREST IN WORLD PEACE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.AIM OF COUNCIL IS TO BRING TOGETHER RESPECTED FORMER HEADS OF GOVT,FROM BOTH DEVELOPING AND DEVELOPED COUNTRIES AND FROM EAST AND WEST,TO FOCUS ON LIMITED NUMBER OF KEY INTERNAL ISSUES AND TO DEVELOP REALISTIC PROPOSALS FOR ACTION AND FOLLOW UP.COUNCIL WAS ESTABLISHED BY FOUNDING CTTEE IN VIENN IN MARCH 1983.FIRST FULL SESSION WAS HELD IN VIENN IN NOVEMBER 1983.MEMBERSHIP INCLUDES

...2

PAGE TWO WKGR0266 CONF

FORMER SEC-GEN WALDHEIM AS CHAIRMAN, FORMER JAPANESE PM FUKUDA AS HONOURARY CHAIRMAN AND UNDP ADMINISTRATOR MORSE AS SECRETARY GENERAL. AMONG OTHER MEMBERS ARE CALLAGHAN(UK), CHABAN-DELMAS(FRANCE), FRASER(AUSTRALIA), MANLEY(JAMAICA), SCHMIDT(FRG) AND SENGHOR SENEGAL). WHILE CHINESE AND INDIANS LACK FORMER LEADERS WHO COULD BE MEMBERS AND ARE NOT/NOT REPRESENTED IN COUNCIL, THEY ARE INTERESTED IN PROCESS. SWARAN SINGH, SENIOR ADVISER TO GANDHI, PARTICIPATED AS OBSERVER IN SECOND VIENNA MTG.

3. THREE ADDITIONAL INSTITUTIONS ARE ALSO BEING FORMED: POLICY BOARD STAFFED PART-TIME BY EXPERTS FROM ACADEMIA, BUSINESS, TRADE UNIONS, ETC. WHICH COULD QUOTE POLISH UNQUOTE IDEAS IN VIENN DECLARATION FOR PRESENTATION IN CAPITALS, PLUS COMMUNICATORS CTTEE AND NETWORK OF LOCAL CONTACTS TO ENHANCE IMPACT OF COUNCIL.

4. MORSE STRESSED THAT COUNCIL HAD THREE PRIORITY AREAS OF CONCERN: INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY, ECONOMIC RECOVERY, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. COUNCIL WAS NOT/NOT RESEARCH BODY; SUFFICIENT RESEARCH HAD BEEN DONE AND REPORTS WRITTEN. COUNCIL WAS MORE A PROCESS WHEREBY SMALL GROUPS OF 3 OR 4 FORMER LEADERS COULD VISIT KEY CAPITALS TO PROMOTE SELECTED PROPOSALS. THESE WOULD NOT/NOT BE ONE-SHOT EFFORTS BUT WOULD BE REVIEWED AND SUSTAINED BY COUNCIL AS A WHOLE.

5. MORSE MENTIONED POSSIBILITY SOME COUNCIL MEMBERS VISITING WSHDC AND MOSCO WITHIN NEXT SIX MONTHS IN CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. MORSE STRESSED THAT VIENN MTG LAST NOVEMBER HAD

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PAGE THREE WKGR0266 CONF

PRODUCED REMARKABLE DEGREE OF UNITY, WITHOUT MANIPULATION, INCLUDING CALL FOR QUOTE ZERO OPTION UNQUOTE IN EUROPE. ROMANIANS HAD BROUGHT OWN ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS BUT WENT ALONG WITH CONSENSUS. IN MORSE'S VIEW, THIS REFLECTED IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACHED TO THEIR PARTICIPATION AND PROCESS OF COUNCIL. NOVEMBER MTG IN VIENNA ALSO CALLED FOR REDUCTIONS IN CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS CONTROLS ON ARMAMENTS EXPORTS, AND IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS AT HIGHEST POLITICAL LEVELS.

6. ON ECONOMIC SIDE, COUNCIL CALLED FOR CONCERTED ECONOMIC POLICIES, REDUCED DEFICITS IN SOME MAJOR DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TO LOWER INTEREST RATES AND TO IMPROVE INTEREST RATE STABILITY, AND ATTENTION TO STRUCTURAL IMBALANCES UNDERLYING DEBT BURDENS. COUNCIL THEREFORE PROPOSED URGENT MEASURES, INCLUDING POSSIBLE SHORT TERM MORATORIUMS ON DEBT REPAYMENT, INCREASES IN IMF CONDITIONALITY AND AN INTERNATIONAL MONETARY CONFERENCE IN 1984. COUNCIL ALSO SUPPORTED NEW CODE AGAINST PROTECTIONISM. NOTABLY FOR INDUSTRIAL GOODS AND AGRICULTURAL GOODS AND SERVICES. COUNCIL WILL UNDERTAKE SERIES OF CONSULTATIONS ON INCREASED LONG TERM DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION.

7. NEXT COUNCIL MTG WILL BE HELD IN YUGOSLAVIA BY MID-1984.

8. WE GAINED IMPRESSION THAT MORSE IS ANXIOUS TO HAVE CDA INVOLVED IN COUNCIL'S ACTIVITIES IN SOME WAY, PERHAPS BY PARTICIPATION IN POLICY BOARD. HE MAY ALSO SEEK SOME CDN FINANCIAL SUPPORT, PROBABLY THROUGH IDRC. MORSE REQUESTED THAT MARTIN LEES MEET WITH APPROPRIATE

...4

PAGE FOUR WKGR0266 CONFD

INTERESTED OFFICIALS ON BOTH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SIDE IN OTTAWA. PARTICULAR STRESS WAS PUT ON MEETING OFFICIALS INVOLVED IN PMS INITIATIVE SINCE COUNCIL MEMBERS ARE CONSIDERING PRIORITY ACTION IN THIS AREA, INCLUDING POSSIBLE MISSIONS TO KEY COUNTRIES. MARTIN LEES, WHO IS DIRECTOR FOR UN FINANCING SYSTEM FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT IN UNDP, ALSO ASSISTS BRAD MORSE IN LATTERS CAPACITY AS SEC-GEN TO INTER-ACTION COUNCIL. LEES HAD PROPOSED VISIT TO OTT IN CONJUNCTION WITH SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT (OURTEL FEB13 REFERS). VISIT COULD POSSIBLY PROVIDE USEFUL INSIGHT INTO FUNCTIONING AND PLANS OF INTER-ACTION COUNCIL IN AREA WHERE PM HAS BEEN HIGHLY VISIBLE.

9. COPIES OF BROCHURE OUTLINING ROLE OF INTER ACTION COUNCIL AND FINAL STATEMENT FROM NOVEMBER SESSION OF COUNCIL MTG IN VIENNA HAVE BEEN FORWARDED TO IDDZ AND PCOTT/FOWLER.

10. ADVISE.

CCC/085 140002Z WKGR0266

MASTER FILE

**ACTION
SUITE A DONNER**

Division Phoned 1002
Person Christina
Local Time 1142

R E S T R I C T E D

FM WSAW UMGR0255 13FEB84

TO EXTOTT 1DDZ DELIVER BY 131200

DISTR RBD RBR

---PM/HONECKER FORMAL DISCUSSIONS

UNLESS ADVISED TO CONTRARY WE PLAN TO SEND YOU TRANSCRIPT OF OUR
NOTES TAKEN IN TWO FORMAL SESSIONS IN DIPLO BAG DEPARTING WSAW
16FEB ARRIVING OTT 20 OR 21FEB ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE DISPATCH BY
TELEX ON OR ABOUT 16FEB). FOR MOST OF SESSIONS NOTES REPRESENT
CLOSE TO VERBATIM ACCOUNT ALTHOUGH THERE ARE FEW GAPS AND AREAS
WHICH WILL REQUIRE INPUT FROM YOU.

CCC/235 131545Z UMGR0255

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MF
12

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BUCST UYGR0242 13FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO WSAW BPEST PRGUE GENEV PCOOTT/FOWLER/COLEMAN

DISTR RBD RBR IDA IDR

---PM TRUDEAU VISIT TO ROMANIA

ROMS HAVE BEEN USING TRUDEAU VISIT TO COUNTERACT LARGELY NEGATIVE PRESS ACCOUNTS OF GROMYKO VISIT TO ROMANIA. ACCORDING TO LOCAL MEDIA AND EAST EUROPEAN DIPLOS, ROMS HAVE USED VISIT TO RE-ESTABLISH THEIR CREDIBILITY AS VIABLE MEDIATOR IN INNATL RELNS.

2. TRUDEAU PRESS CONF WAS COVERED IN PART ONLY AND ALL MENTION OF WEAPON SYSTEMS AND WSAW PACT SUPERIORITY WERE DELETED. FEW DIRECT QUOTES WERE INCLUDED AS SUMMARIES ALLOWED MORE POSITIVE NOTE TO EMERGE. AT INFORMAL DINNER AMB NEAGU (ONE OF OFFICIALS SENT BY PRES CEAUSESCU TO EUROPEAN CAPITALS TO EXPLAIN PRES INITIATIVE) STRESSED THAT PRESS HAD FAILED TO REALIZE THAT ROM POSN HAD NOT/NOT CHANGED AT ALL. AS EXAMPLE HE STATED ROMS STILL INTERESTED IN GETTING RID OF ALL INF MISSILES. ACCORDING TO HIM THIS SHOWED DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ROM AND SOV POSN. WHEN ASKED IF THAT MEANT THAT SOVS WISHED RETENTION OF INF HE DID NOT/NOT ANSWER. FULL TEXT OF PRESS COVERAGE WILL BE SENT BAG 16FEB.

CCC/181 131115Z UYGR0242

MF
ED

INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMOOTT PM00163 13FEB84

TO PMDELMOSCO/COLEMEN MOSCO DELIVER BY 140830

INFO EXTOTT (IDDZ)

FROM SMITH

SEVERAL NEWS ORGANIZATIONS ARE ENQUIRING IF SOVIETS WILL LIFT
EMBARGO ON VISAS TO ALLOW CDNS TO COVER BILATERAL WITH CHERNENKO.
SOME MAY EVEN DECIDE TO FLY TO LDN ON SPEC.OBVIOUSLY,AM NOT/NOT
ENCOURAGING THEM.WOULD APPRECIATE CLEAR READING FROM SOVIET
AUTHORITIES SOONEST.

UUU/204 140030Z PM00163

INFO

UNCLASSIFIED

FM PMOOTT PM00162 13FEB84

TO PMDELMOSCO/COLEMAN FLASH

INFO EXTOTT IDDZ

FROM SMITH

UNABLE TO CONTACT YOU BY PHONE AFTER OUR CONVESSATION.HAVE
DECIDED TO ISSUE FOLLOWING RELEASE AT 1800 EST THIS DATE:
QUOTE THE PM ANNOUNCED TODAY THAT HE WILL MEET THIS WEEK WITH
MR KONSTANTIN CHERNENKO,GENERAL SECTY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
THE USSR.

2.THE MTG WILL TAKE PLACE IN MOSCO AT 4:00 PM(8:00 AM,EST),WED,
15FEB.

3.MR TRUDEAU WILL RETURN TO OTT THUR MORNING.UNQUOTE.

4.WILL MENTION INITIATIVE IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS.

UUU/204 132320Z PM00162

MF
WZ

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

UNCLASSIFIED

master File

FM CNBRA YAGR0242 13FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO PRMNY CNGNY BNATO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS
ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE MOSCO GENEV STKHM/SCDEL VMBFR VIENN
TOKYO WLGTN NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/PPP/DGINFO/DNACPOL PMOOTT/FOWLER
DISTR DMF FPR IDA IDR IFB MINA RBD RBR RCD RCR RGB

---PM TRUDEAUS PEACE INITIATIVE

FOLLOWING IS EXTRACT FROM PRES CONFERENCE OF PM HAWKE TO
AUSTLN PRESS IN PEKING, 08FEB84:

QUOTE JOURNALIST: JUST GOING BACK TO THIS DISARMAMENT QUESTION. WAS
THERE ANY DISCUSSION OF PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAUS INITIATIVE.

P.M.: YES ID DID RECEIVE REFERENCE. THE PREMIER REFERRED TO THE
FACT THAT PIERRE HAD COME HERE IN NOVEMBER OF THE LATTER PART OF THE
CHOGM MEETING. THE PREMIER INDICATED WITH REFERENCE TO THAT
INITIATIVE THE BASIC POSITION OF CHINA WHICH IS THAT THERE SHOULD
BE AS A FIRST STEP ACTION BY THE TWO SUPERPOWERS TO REDUCE TO STOP
ANY FURTHER TESTING OR INCREASED SOPHISTICATION OF ON ADDITION TO
THE STOCKPILE OF THE SUPERPOWERS AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE A MOVE
IMMEDIATELY BY THE SUPERPOWERS TO A 50 PERCENT REDUCTION OF THEIR
ARSENALS. AND THEN IN THAT CONTEXT A CONFERENCE OF ALL THE POWERS
CONCERNED. AND CLEARLY THAT APPROACH OF THE CHINESE IS NOT/NOT
CONSISTENT WITH THE TRUDEAU APPROACH WHICH CALLS FOR THE IMMEDIATE
CONFERENCE OF THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS. UNQUOTE.

UUU/276 130330Z YAGR0242

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT FPR0155 13FEB84

TO MOSCO IMMED

INFO WSHDC BNATO PARIS TOKYO DELHI LDN PEKIN BONN ROME STKPM

PCOCTT/FOWLER PMOOTT/COLEMAN

DISTR MINA MINE MINT USS DMF DMT SPC SCS SCI IDD IDA IDR IDDZ

RBD RBP

---PMS PEACE INITIATIVE:INTERVIEW WITH GEOFFREY PEARSON

FOLLOWING IS TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW BROADCAST ON CBC QUOTE AS IT
HAPPENS UNQUOTE 12FEB.TEXT BEGINS QUOTE

CBC:WILL THE DEATH OF YURI ANDROPOV MEAN A MAJOR SETBACK FOR PRIME
MINISTER TRUDEAUS PEACE INITIATIVE? JUST THREE WEEKS AGO,THE PRIME
MINISTER RECEIVED A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT ANDROPOV PROMISING A
PERSONAL MTG PERHAPS LATER THIS SPRING.NOW THE SUCCESSION PROCESS
IN THE SOVIET UNION COULD DELAY A MTG WITH ANDROPOVS SUCCESSOR
INDEFINITELY.GEOFFREY PEARSON IS A MEMBER OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE
PEACE INITIATIVE AND A FORMER CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW

CBC:MR PEARSON,WILL THE DEATH OF ANDROPOV MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE TO
THE PRIME MINISTERS PEACE INITIATIVE?

GEOFFREY PEARSON:YES,IN THE SENSE THAT HE CAN OBVIOUSLY NO/NO LONGER
SEE HIM AND THE INVITATION WAS TO MEET WITH HIM FROM MOSCOW AND
THATS OUT.

CBC:DID IT DEPEND,THEN,VERY MUCH ON PERSONAL CONTACT BETWEEN MR
ANDROPOV AND MR TRUDEAU? YOU KNOW,WAS THERE A SENSE THAT YOU WERE
DEALING WITH THAT ONE MAN ON THIS?

...2

PAGE TWO FPR0155 UNCLAS

PEARSON:NO.I DONT THINK IT WAS A MATTER OF PERSONAL CONTACT PARTICULARLY.IN FACT,THEY ONLY MET BRIEFLY AT THE BREZHNEV FUNERAL, AND THAT WAS ONLY FIVE MINUTES IN A RECEPTION LINE.

CBC:YOU WERENT GIVEN ANY IDEA OF JUST HOW ILL HE WAS,CLEARLY?

PEARSON:I WAS THERE IN LATE NOVEMBER AND NO,I WAS NOT/NOT TOLD. I WAS IN FACT TOLD THAT HE MIGHT BE ABLE TO SEE PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU SOME TIME IN DECEMBER.I GUESS THEY DIDNT KNOW.

CBC:EITHER THEY DIDNT KNOW OR THEY WERE NOT/NOT TELLING.WAS THERE A SENSE,YOU KNOW THERE VE BEEN A NUMBER OF REPORTS TO THE EFFECT THAT ANDROPOV WAS STILL EXERTING CONTROL AND PUTTING HIS PEOPLE IN VARICUS POSITIONS.DID YOU GET THAT SENSE THAT HE WAS,IN FACT,CALLING THE SHOTS EVEN FROM HIS BEDSIDE?

PEARSON:YES,I DID.AND I THINK,AS FAR AS I KNOW,THATS TRUE.SO THE NATURE OF THE ILLNESS,IF IT WAS KIDNEY TROUBLE,MUST HAVE BEEN SUCH THAT HE WAS ABLE TO OPERATE.HE WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL FROM HIS BEDSIDE,OR HIS OFFICE,OR WHEREVER HE OPERATED FROM AND I GUESS THE DOCTORS MUST HAVE TOLD HIM THAT THEY COULDNT PREDICT WHEN HE WOULD, OR IF,HE WOULD GET BETTER.THAT WAS THE PROBLEM.

CBC:DO YOU THINK,MR PEARSON,THAT THERE IS ENOUGH INTEREST,ENOUGH GENUINE INTEREST,IN MOSCOW FOR THE INITIATIVE THAT NO/NO MATTER WHO SUCCEEDS,THERE WILL BE A RE-INVITATION AS IT WERE YOU KNOW,WHILE YOU WERE THERE,THEY OBVIOUSLY COULDNT DO ANYTHING BECAUSE THEY DIDNT KNOW HOW LONG ANDROPOV WOULD LAST.BUT WILL THEY SHOW SOME INTEREST AGAIN?

...3

PAGE THREE FPR0155 UNCLAS

PEARSON: YES, I WOULD ASSUME THEY WILL. NOW, THERE WILL BE A STATE FUNERAL, I UNDERSTAND, AND THERE WILL BE A LOT OF FOREIGN LEADERS AT THAT IF THEY FOLLOW THE SAME PRECEDENCE AS THEY DID WITH BREZHNEV WHEN 60-70 STATE FOREIGN LEADERS WERE IN MOSCOW. SO THERE MAY BE A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF COMPETITION IN TERMS OF PEOPLE WHO GO WANTING TO SEE THE NEW LEADER, AND SO ON.

CBC: IS IT POSSIBLE THOUGH THIS TIME AROUND, GIVEN WHAT HAPPENED IN THE INTERIM, THAT THE CDN PEACE INITIATIVE MIGHT BE USED AS SOME SORT OF SIGNAL TO THE U.S.?

PEARSON: YES, I SUPPOSE THEY COULD USE IT FOR THAT PURPOSE BUT I GUESS MY INTUITION IS THAT THEY WOULDN'T BE READY SO SOON, THAT IS NEXT WEEK, TO DO THAT.

CBC: MOST OF THE SOVIET WATCHERS SEEM TO BE SAYING TODAY THAT BASICALLY THIS DOESN'T MEAN ANY CHANGE. THEY'VE CLEARLY BEEN PREPARING FOR THIS FOR SOME TIME. IS THAT YOUR VIEW? THE NEW TEAM, IN FACT, WILL NOT/NOT LOOK SO NEW?

PEARSON: I THINK WE'LL SEE THE SAME FACES IN DIFFERENT, PERHAPS IN SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT ORDER AROUND THE TABLE AT THE BEGINNING. ANDROPOV TOOK SEVERAL MONTHS TO MAKE CHANGES, AND EVEN THEN HE MADE VERY FEW. I DON'T THINK THEY'RE GOING TO CHANGE QUICKLY. THE SOVIET UNION DOESN'T CHANGE ITS POLICIES QUICKLY. BUT ONCE THEY DECIDE TO DO SOMETHING TO CHANGE COURSE, AND THEY PURSUE IT. RIGHT NOW, I DON'T SEE ANY EVIDENCE OF THAT.

...4

PAGE FOUR FPR0155 UNCLAS

CBC:MR PEARSON, THANKS VERY MUCH.

PEARSON: THANK YOU.

CBC: GEOFFREY PEARSON IS A MEMBER OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE PEACE
INITIATIVE, AND A FORMER CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW. HE SPOKE TO
US FROM OTTAWA. UNQUOTE.

UUU/062 140102Z FPR0155



External Affairs
Canada

Affaires extérieures
Canada

MESSAGE

FILE/DOSSIER

Align first character of Security Classification
Aligner le premier caractère de la Sécurité

SECURITY
SECURITE UNCLASSIFIED

FM/DE DETROIT FAX004 13FEB84

TO/A EXTOTT IDDZ/FPR

DELIVER BY 0900 14FEB84

INFO AM ATNTA BOSTN BFALO CHCGO CLVND CNGNY DALAS LNGLS MNPLS NRLNS PHILA SFRAN SEATL DE DET

DISTR IDA UGP UGB URE URR

REF
SUBJ/SUJ PRIME MINISTER'S PEACE INITIATIVE

ATTACHED IS AN EDITORIAL ON THE PRIME MINISTER'S PEACE INITIATIVE. IT APPEARED
IN THE DETROIT FREE PRESS MONDAY, 13FEBRUARY 1984.

Don MacNeil
D2
36714

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELETYPE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

000204

CANADIAN CONSULATE GENERAL - DETROIT

PRESS CLIPPINGS

PUBLICATION: DETROIT FREE PRESS

DATE February 13, 1984

SUBJECT:

CRUSADE: Pierre Trudeau's peace plan offers an alternative to nuclear stalemate

EXCEPT FOR the Canadian press, nobody seems to have noticed Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's latest peace crusade to Europe, Asia and the capitals of three Soviet allies. The nearly complete silence surrounding his initiative is as regrettable as the plan itself is thoughtful.

After the Soviets downed the Korean airliner last September, Mr. Trudeau, worried by that hair-trigger reaction by a nuclear power, asked his advisers what useful role Canada could play in defusing the aggravated conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the end of 1983, he proposed a disarmament conference to be attended by the five countries presently possessing nuclear weapons — the United States, the Soviet Union, France, Great Britain and China. He sent emissaries to Moscow and Peking, and he toured Western European capitals to discuss the feasibility of such a summit. President Reagan offered his tentative endorsement of the project.

Then Mr. Trudeau announced his visits to Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Romania, the three Soviet bloc countries that had registered some concern about the state of the nuclear arms reduction talks and had even indicated they would not be happy with the further deployment of the Soviet SS20s. His task was to convince the leaders in Prague, East Berlin and Bucharest that the situation has become too serious to be left to the superpowers alone.

The Soviet bloc is not the monolith it tries to appear; the satellites do debate with the Soviet Union, sometimes in a stormy manner, and usually a consensus is needed to reach decisions on issues regarded as crucial to the bloc's members. Although splits and arguments rarely surface, and although the Russians indisputably have the upper hand in shaping final political decisions, their allies often have more influence on Kremlin policy than we in the West assume. Their role has been growing in recent years. The death of Soviet leader



Trudeau with Reagan in December 1983

Yuri Andropov is unlikely to change this trend.

The very fact that Mr. Trudeau's proposals to discuss the nuclear issue were accepted by the Czechs, East Germans and Romanians is in itself a small success. It opens a new channel of East-West dialogue and offers a chance for political maneuvering when the superpowers' bilateral talks are deadlocked. It also opens interesting, though clearly limited, possibilities for exploiting divisions in the Soviet bloc in a manner not totally dissimilar to the Soviets' dealings with our allies.

Canada's former prime minister, Joe Clark, who spoke with high-ranking administration officials in Washington recently, reported that Mr. Trudeau's mission "did not come up." White House officials obviously believe that the Trudeau Initiative is the kind of political extravaganza that cannot bring any significant results.

Mr. Trudeau's effort deserves more attention in Washington. Its premise is realistic: The new Soviet leader will still have to contend with the basic fact that everyone, including his allies in the Eastern bloc, wants to survive. There is little we can lose by trying to do it Mr. Trudeau's way.

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EXTERNAL AFFAIRS - AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

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TO
À
The Under Secretary of State for
External Affairs, OTTAWA (UGP)

SECURITY - SÉCURITÉ
WITH ATTACHMENT(S) / AVEC ANNEXE(S) <i>Act 12</i>
WITHOUT ATTACHMENT(S) / SANS ANNEXE(S)

NO. DATE
Feb. 29, 1984

QUANTITY QUANTITÉ	DESCRIPTION - DESCRIPTION	REFERENCE - RÉFÉRENCE
1	Article in the <u>San Diego Union</u> on Sunday February 12, 1984, titled "Canada Sticks to its Guns supporting NATO Defenses" DISTR SCS IDA CGL TDD IDR DMF URD URR IDD IDDZ PCO/OTT(Fowler) INFO WSHDC CNGNY SFRAN	

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Roz Wolfe
Public Affairs Officer
Consulate General
Los Angeles

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EXT 34/BIL. (REV. 12/70)
7530-21-029-4107

FOR SIGNATURE AND RETURN TO ORIGINATOR - SIGNER ET RETOURNER AU BUREAU D'ORIGINE

Canada sticks to its guns supporting NATO defenses

Canada remains strongly supportive of NATO and U.S. defense initiatives, but believes negotiating contact between Washington and Moscow must be restored, Jacques Jean Blais, Canadian minister of defense, told editors of The San Diego Union in a recent interview. Blais was in San Diego to address a luncheon meeting of the San Diego City Club. Here is the interview.

Question: Mr. Blais, it is frequently asked in the United States whether Canada is doing its share in NATO defense. How do you answer that?

Answer: We have always met our NATO commitment and we continue to meet it. We are the single largest net contributor to NATO's infrastructure costs. We are one of the few countries meeting NATO training standards. We are one of the few that has met the 3 percent real annual growth in military expenditures that we undertook in 1978. The role that Canada plays within NATO is a very serious one and a very worthwhile one.

Q: What does Canada do in NATO in terms of fleet, troops and so on?

A: First of all, we have the Canadian battle group, a mechanized brigade group, in central Europe. We have as well a NATO commitment to protect the north flank of Norway. On the air side, one of the major reasons we purchased the CF-18 was to maintain our air presence with a very modern aircraft in Central Europe. We now have four squadrons in Baden and they will and they will be replaced by three CF-18 squadrons. In addition, Canada recently purchased new tanks — the Leopard variety. As you can understand, tanks are not very useful in Canada, especially at this time of year. They were earmarked for our NATO commitment. So a large portion of our military expenditures and, indeed, our structures, are geared for the NATO commitment. The unification of our forces in 1969 was also mindful of that commitment. Canada has a highly mechanized mobile command — that is, the army element — which is available for NATO and for peacekeeping as well. Our naval role is a NATO anti-submarine warfare role.

Q: What is your nuclear policy?

A: Our nuclear policy since 1969 has been a non-nuclear policy. We were the first nation outside of the United States with a nuclear capacity. As you know, we were a partner in the Manhattan Project in the early 1940s. We were given the responsibility of developing the Allies' heavy water nuclear technology. We did that, and from that start we have marketed internationally

Q: Is that a part of Prime Minister Trudeau's "third rail"?

A: No, the third rail of Prime Minister Trudeau is really an attempt at increasing the level of discussions between the superpowers by removing, as he has put it, the nuclear accountants from the negotiating table and replacing them with high-level politicians.

Q: Isn't the timing of that just a little bit off, in terms of the current confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union?

A: No. That's exactly why there was a requirement for increased dialogue. It wasn't the prime minister who spoke of "megaphone diplomacy." It was the future secretary-general of NATO, Lord Carrington, who described the level of diatribe between two superpowers as being counterproductive. There needs to be an increase in the level of communications, so that individuals responsible for the leadership of their countries find that they can discourse openly with their counterparts. That has borne some fruit, as manifested in the Brussels declarations, in which there was an acceptance by NATO foreign ministers that they should participate actively in the Stockholm discussions. There was also an agreement among the foreign ministers that they ought to review their MBFR position. In my view, and

Q&A

Jacques Jean Blais,
Canada's defense minister

in the view of a large portion of those who observe the behavior of Canada's prime minister, that is due to his peace initiative. As you know, President Reagan took a strong position in Japan, recognizing that no one can come out of a nuclear confrontation the winner, and Mr. Shultz has recognized of the need for an increase in dialogue. In addition to that, because you're in an electoral year, there have been a number of Democratic candidates who have sought to meet with Prime Minister Trudeau or have indicated their support for his peace initiative. Those, in my view, are very significant developments.

Q: Where does Canada stand on deployment of 572 cruise and Pershing II missiles in West Europe?

A: Canada's position has been that of NATO. We par-

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Q: Where does Canada stand on deployment of the 572 cruise and Pershing II missiles in West Europe?

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"If there is going to be an increase in the level of expenditure for conventional arms, that lends some opportunities for additional defense production by individual NATO partners."



our heavy water nuclear generating plant, the most efficient in the international marketplace. So since the 1950s we have had a nuclear capacity, but we made a conscious decision as a government in 1969 of not arming ourselves with nuclear arms. And once we introduce the CF-18 operationally within Canada, we will no longer have nuclear warheads, even controlled by the United States, on Canadian soil.

Q: What is your policy toward the U.S. nuclear deterrent?

A: We are part of NORAD, which involves a nuclear deterrent force. We are also part of NATO, which involves nuclear deterrence, and we, therefore, support the nuclear deterrent policy. However, we also favor what we call the increased nuclear threshold, namely heightening the nuclear threshold in order for conventional forces to be a stronger deterrent in both the European context and in the international context. That, of course, will either require a reduction in the total level of international armaments or an increase in the NATO level of conventional arms in order to counter U.S.S.R. and Warsaw Pact strength.

participated very actively in the debate prior to the adoption of the two-track policy in 1979. We have expressed our support openly, notwithstanding a very high level of political debate in Canada and some popular opposition. Preparations are now going forward for testing of the inertial guidance system of the air-launched cruise missile in Canada, and that is a manifestation of our willingness to support our allies.

Q: Has Canada increased defense spending in recent years in real terms? The reason I ask is that the comparison of defense expenditures published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies showed Canada next to the bottom among NATO countries in 1978 in the percent of GNP spent on defense, and for 1982 still next to the bottom, only spending more than Luxembourg.

A: We've had an increase in our level of expenditures by a cumulative net of 12 percent in terms of capital equipment expenditures from '74 to '77. From '78 to '82 we've had a net increase of at least 3 percent on an annual basis, in terms of total defense expenditures. We've really doubled our defense expenditures since 1975. We've replaced our tanks, as I pointed out. We've

"There needs to be an increase in the level of communications, so that individuals responsible for the leadership of their countries find that they can discourse openly with their counterparts."



replaced our long-range patrol aircraft. We've replaced our fighter aircraft. We're well on the way to replacing our lighter aircraft. We are replacing all of our wheeled vehicles. And we've established a renewed defense industrial base in Canada, which we're still attempting to develop to an increasing degree. But Canada has one of the highest GNPs in the world, and, therefore, when you talk percentage of GNP you're getting a misleading picture. When you talk about the revenues available to the government, 10 percent is devoted to defense, and 40 percent of discretionary expenditures are devoted to national defense in Canada.

Q: But 10 percent is not particularly high, as a percentage of the federal budget.

A: It's not high in terms of your expenditures, but it's high in terms of our available expenditures.

Q: What analysts usually use is a percentage of GNP. Would you have that number?

A: It's 2 percent, but that doesn't include other elements other NATO partners calculate within their military expenditures.

Q: What are you doing to reinvigorate your defense industrial base?

A: One of the areas is in terms of consumable goods. We have rationalized our ammunition industry, both through crown corporations and the private sector. We have apportioned the heavy ammunition to the crown agency called Canadian National. Small arms ammunition has been earmarked for a company called IVI. We have also advanced substantial funds to our aircraft industry in order to permit them to develop a higher economic viability and to assume a larger portion of total production. To date, our air industries have been devoted basically to component manufacturing, but we've also been able to develop stand-alone flying equipment, including the Buffalo aircraft, which has a

States more often than into Europe, in terms of our military procurement. But standardization can't be achieved unless there is some benefit that will flow to Germany, Italy or France relating to it. If they perceive standardization as buying American standards, they're sure to resist.

Q: How does Canada man its military forces, by conscription or volunteers?

A: Canada has volunteer, professional armed forces. Canada unified its forces in 1969. We have a unified command with a chief of defense staff who is responsible for all three elements. We have three commands - Maritime Command, the navy; Mobile Command, which is the army, and the Air Command.

Q: How do you resolve the bilingual issue in the military forces?

A: We have, as you know, a constitutional provision for official bilingualism. There also is a policy to foster the development of bilingualism within the Canadian forces. I haven't seen any evidence of it impairing operational efficiency and competence.

Q: For many years we kept hearing about problems of the DEW (Distant Early Warning) line but lately we haven't heard anything about it. Is the DEW line still operative?

A: It's there and we're negotiating with you for its modernization. And we need to improve radar protection of the North American continent.

Q: Is the problem largely money?

A: You've had problems with Congress in getting the necessary appropriations. We've got our monies identified.

Q: Do Canadians worry about hemispheric security? Would a Soviet base in the Caribbean or Central Ameri-

we've also been able to develop stand-alone flying equipment, including the Buffalo aircraft, which has a military configuration. We also have utilized as best we could off-the-shelf procurement in order to stimulate offset activities. For example, McDonnell-Douglas has, as the result of a contract for the sale of the CF-18s into Canada, negotiated an offset arrangement whereby Canadian economic activity is stimulated. Canadian General Electric has now established a new plant for jet engines in eastern Quebec, and under the long-range patrol aircraft procurement from Lockheed, we secured a plant from Sperry in Winnipeg to produce computers for military configurations.

Q: With these co-production schemes, are you buying, in a sense, Lockheed's or McDonnell-Douglas's technology and paying them royalties, or are you going to develop your own?

A: In some instances there is a direct technology transfer, but with the potential of next-generation development staying in Canada.

Q: Would the market for defense be big enough to support this kind of Canadian industry?

A: Not the Canadian market, of course, but the NATO market should be. One of the areas that is of interest now within NATO is what has been classified as the emerging technologies, and the ability of NATO partners to secure a larger portion of defense production. There is an immense imbalance between the United States and other NATO partners in defense production and defense procurement. This has led to the two-way street concept, which is now receiving some support in Congress. If there is going to be an increase in the level of expenditure for conventional arms, that lends some opportunities for additional defense production by individual NATO partners.

Q: One of the drawbacks of that, as I understand, is the lack of uniformity. There are 14 different standards in NATO, if you will. Is Canada geared to the U.S. standard, a metric standard or what?

A: Canada is becoming rapidly metric, but we are, like other NATO countries, looking for the best equipment and the best price, and with the best terms that can be negotiated. That tends to bring us into the United

Q: Do Canadians worry about hemispheric security? Would a Soviet base in the Caribbean or Central America be perceived in Canada as a threat, once removed, from Canada?

A: We've perceived the threat to be real, not once-removed. We have perceived the ICBM as being an immediate threat, and we're very much aware of the fact that there are submarines under U.S.S.R. control that are able to reach continental North America. We can't remove ourselves from that reality. That's why we're very anxious about establishing a high level of dialogue between the parties.

Q: What was the reaction in Canada to the invasion in Grenada?

A: As you know, Canada is part of the Commonwealth, and so is Grenada. The reaction of the Canadian government was to say, with a great deal of caution, that the evidence presented to us by the American administration did not indicate a necessity for the action which was taken. We didn't pursue the matter.

Q: Is Canada concerned that Nicaragua is being destabilized?

A: No. There are some differences in our attitude vis-a-vis Latin America from that of your administration. We tend not to play an active role within that area. We have an interest, of course, in the English-speaking Caribbean and we've manifested that from time to time. The government's position vis-a-vis Cuba is one example of divergence of opinion between the United States and Canada. Canada has recognized Cuba and is a trading partner with Cuba. That trading arrangement has been mutually beneficial and is on-going.

Q: People in the Contadora Group say they would very much like to have Canada to take a role? Has this been considered?

A: Canada is not a member of the OAS, and that is a matter presently being debated within the cabinet. There are divisions of view as to whether Canada should be a member of the OAS because if we become member, the wishes of the Contadora Group would be much more immediate to our interests.

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The Under Secretary of State for External Affairs,
OTTAWA (UGP)

NO.

DATE

February 16, 1984

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Article in the Los Angeles Times on February 16, 1984, "Chernenko Stressed
Need for Detente, Trudeau Says".

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Chernenko Stressed Need for Detente, Trudeau Says

By ROBERT GILLETTE, *Times Staff Writer*

MOSCOW—Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau said Wednesday that the new Soviet Communist Party chief, Konstantin U. Chernenko, appears to be interested in reviving "the spirit of detente" in relations with the West.

Trudeau, one of about 60 foreign leaders in Moscow for the funeral of President Yuri V. Andropov on Tuesday, spent 35 minutes talking with Chernenko and Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko.

The prime minister told reporters later that the conversation avoided specific issues such as the breakdown of the Geneva talks on medium-range missiles in Europe and on strategic arms reductions. But he said Chernenko emphasized a need for dialogue and detente with the West.

"There was no sense of stalemate, as if, you have to wait. There was none of that," Trudeau said. "It was, 'Now is the time to move, to have a dialogue, to make progress.'"

Trudeau said Chernenko men-

tioned detente several times as he spoke from prepared notes.

He added that the new Soviet party leader seemed likely to reflect the views of his old mentor, the late President Leonid I. Brezhnev, on relations with the West. "I think

Please see **TRUDEAU**, Page 8

WEATHER

U.S. Weather Service forecast:
Today—chance of light morning showers; partly cloudy this afternoon. Tonight and Friday—partly cloudy tonight and sunny Friday but windy at times.

	High	Low
Wednesday	75	49
Today's forecast	near 67	low 50s
Friday's forecast	near 64	upper 40s
Feb. 15 last year	75	57

Record high Feb. 15, 1916 88
Record low Feb. 15, 1903 33

Complete details, Part II, Page 4.

TRUDEAU: Detente

Continued from Page 1

there will be a continuity with the original spirit, which was a spirit of detente," Trudeau said.

The concept of detente arose in 1972 after a meeting between Brezhnev and President Richard M. Nixon at which they agreed on a document entitled "Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union." It amounted to a code of good behavior by the superpowers in an effort to avoid "conflicts or situations" that would serve to "increase international tensions."

However, tensions continued and grew, and in early 1976 President Gerald R. Ford—under campaign pressure from Republican opponent Ronald Reagan—announced that he had stopped using the word to describe U.S.-Soviet relations. Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, the relationship has been chilly.

Chernenko, 72, spent most of the past 30 years serving Brezhnev in one capacity or another, including six years as his administrative aide in the Politburo until Brezhnev's death in 1982.

Trudeau said Chernenko urged him to continue his efforts to bring the leaders of the five nuclear powers together for a summit conference, calling it a practical idea. Trudeau noted, however, that there was little time to discuss specific issues, as half the 35 minutes was consumed by translations.

A report of the conversation by the official Tass news agency said the Soviet Union is ready to work with Canada "to exert efforts with the aim of returning to the road of detente."

'A More Constructive Path' Is Sought

On Tuesday, Vice President George Bush emerged from a 30-minute meeting with Chernenko saying that the new Soviet leader agrees that U.S.-Soviet relations should take "a more constructive path."

Chernenko also met Wednesday with Cuban President Fidel Castro and Nicaraguan leader Daniel Ortega for conversations that indicated no change in Soviet views on Latin American issues.

Chernenko pledged Moscow's "firm support" for Nicaragua and what he called its defense of "freedom and independence."

Tass said Chernenko and Ortega "strongly denounced Washington's intention to whip up tension, to interfere in the internal affairs of countries in that (Central American) region and to impose its writ on them."

Soviet television gave prominent coverage to the Nicaraguan meeting, apparently to signal that the change in Soviet leadership should not be taken as a moment of weakness in Moscow's resolve to support Marxist regimes in Central America.

After Chernenko's meeting with Castro, Tass said the Soviet Union restated its full support for Cuba, which was said to "courageously oppose" the aggressive intrigues of U.S. imperialism, a standard Soviet phrase.

Despite the upbeat reports by Trudeau and Bush, the extent to which Chernenko will actually guide Soviet foreign policy remains unclear. Concerned with ideological questions for most of his adult life, Chernenko has had little direct experience in foreign affairs or domestic economic management.

Gromyko Sits In on Meetings

Some Western diplomats and Soviet observers believe that the new party chief may devote most of his time to familiar pursuits of ideology and internal party administration, leaving foreign affairs to Gromyko, the indomitable foreign minister, and to Defense Minister Dmitri F. Ustinov. Significantly, Gromyko sat in on all of Chernenko's meetings with foreign officials.

Chernenko's health and stamina may also lead him to restrict his activities, some analysts believe.

His labored breathing, evident as he eulogized Andropov at Tuesday's funeral, is the result of emphysema, according to former British Foreign Secretary David Owen, who is a physician. "He has got what we call emphysema," Owen, who attended the funeral, told a radio interviewer after returning to London.

Emphysema, an abnormal swelling of connecting tissue in the lungs, leads to a loss of elasticity and the resulting severe impairment of breathing often precludes physical activity.

In other meetings Wednesday between Soviet and foreign officials, China's Vice Premier Wan Li was received by Soviet Politburo member Geydar A. Aliyev, a first deputy premier. Tass reported that Aliyev said the Soviet leadership has always wanted better relations with China.

Wan is the highest-ranking Chinese official to visit the Soviet Union since the early 1960s, Western diplomats said.

Mr. Delorme
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2. THE FIRST, DATED 11 FEB TASS), DEALS WITH PMS SPEECH CALLING FOR URGENT MEASURES AIMED AT IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE. ROUGH OFFICE TRANSLATION FOLLOWS:

BEGINS NUCLEAR WAR WOULD NOT/NOT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE RIGHT AND THE WRONG, THE RICH AND THE POOR, THE EAST AND THE WEST, THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH. NUCLEAR ARMS PRESENT A THREAT TO THE FUTURE OF HUMANITY ITSELF. THE PM POINTED OUT THAT RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EAST AND THE WEST SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INADMISSIBILITY OF NUCLEAR WAR, ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF IMPOSSIBILITY OF A VICTORY IN A NUCLEAR WAR, REFUSAL OF THE CONCEPTION OF THE FIRST NUCLEAR BLOW AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF MUTUAL LEGITIMATE SECURITY INTERESTS.

PARA STILL, TRUDEAU UNDERLINED THAT CDA WILL KEEP TO THE POLICY OF NATO BLOC. HE ALSO SUPPORTED FURTHER DEPLOYMENT OF AMERICAN MEDIUM-RANGE ROCKETS IN WEST EUROPE. ENDS.

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PAGE TWO XYGR0212 RESTR

3. SECOND ITEM CONSISTS OF LONGISH ARTICLE BY N BRAGIN ON SUBJ OF
CDA-USA FISHERY RELATIONS PARTICULARLY BILATERAL TALKS ON WEST
COAST FISHERIES. CDA IS DEPICTED AS THE EXPLOITED PARTY BY OVERBEARING
AMERICAN NEIGHBOUR.

CCC/095 121233Z XYGR0212

CONFIDENTIAL
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

February 11, 1984

IDDZ-0199

Memorandum

TO: DMF

FROM: IDDZ

Subject: PM's Initiative: The Future

The Prime Minister's speech to the House of Commons on Thursday, February 9 contained the following passage:

"My own personal contribution, though necessarily less intensive than in recent months, will definitely continue. One will understand that 16 countries plus the United Nations in three months is a pace that I could not keep for an entire year. I intend to go to Moscow, whenever circumstances permit. Our initiative will also be taken forward by my Cabinet colleagues, by our ambassadors abroad and by all Canadians who share our purposes."

Where does this leave us? Although the Minister suggested to Louis Delvoie that the Task Force might be wound up on February 10, the Prime Minister asked for a meeting with the Minister and the larger version of the Task Force at 1500 hours on Thursday, February 16 to assess where the initiative is, following his visit to Eastern Europe and his speech to the House.

The key outstanding element of the initiative involving the Prime Minister personally is a visit to Moscow. His attendance at Andropov's funeral is not intended to be a substitute for this, and it is possible (provided the new Soviet leadership is in place during the funeral) that dates will be offered up for an initiative-related visit. If we can go by what the PM was told in Prague on January 26 in the "message from Moscow", i.e. a six-to-eight weeks timeframe, we are looking at some period toward the end of March.

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

The only other element of possible direct PM involvement is related to the idea being pushed by the Parliamentarians for World Order of a grouping of world leaders (Gandhi, Palme, Nyerere, Papandreou, Ceaușescu, de la Madrid, and PM Trudeau) joining together in a peace team and backing a call for a two-year moratorium on missile deployment. As far as we are aware, the Prime Minister has not agreed to participate in such a gathering (in New Delhi in March) nor to support the moratorium. In addition, no decision has been taken on sending a "personal representative" to London this Thursday for a preparatory meeting of this gathering.

Other follow-on to the initiative:

- a) Stockholm: There have been no takers so far to the Prime Minister's suggestion that Foreign Ministers should return to Stockholm should the negotiations bog down.
- b) Vienna (MBFR):
 - (i) NATO's review of the Western position on MBFR is awaiting further consultations between Bonn and Washington on whether we can shift our focus from "data" to verification.
 - (ii) Our idea of having Foreign Ministers attend the Vienna meeting in order to "inject political energy" does not yet have support. The idea in principle has not been rejected but most Western countries first wish to wait and see what sort of substantive package we can agree upon. It is very unlikely that any package will be ready by the time the MBFR negotiations resume on March 16, and therefore there is no intention of having Foreign Ministers attend the opening meeting.
 - (iii) The Minister decided not to pursue the idea of having a NATO ministerial meeting at La Sapinière on MBFR after an initial canvass of delegations in NATO by Ambassador Taylor indicated an almost total lack of support.
- c) Five-Power Conference: We have developed a new step-by-step approach to a five-power conference beginning with confidence-building and crisis management measures. We intend to circulate this paper to the five parties concerned as well as the UN and the FRG, the latter of which is a strong supporter of this idea and has a five-power paper of its own.

CONFIDENTIAL
CANADIAN EYES ONLY

- 3 -

We are also looking to the UN Secretary-General to take the lead in convening the Ambassadors of the five permanent members of the Security Council (either as a group or individually) to begin discussing their responsibilities in this field and their obligations toward the NPT. It is not at all certain how far Perez de Cuellar can or will want to push this idea.

- d) Three Suffocation Proposals: These are currently under discussion in NATO and we are encountering considerable opposition to the substance as well as to the idea of tabling them soon in the CD in Geneva. It is our intention to dispatch a briefing team to several of the capitals with pronounced views (Washington, London and The Hague) as well as to NATO Headquarters to discuss the three proposals in greater detail. The composition of this team has not been finally decided upon but may include myself and Dr. Calder, Director of Strategic Analysis at DND.
- e) Consultations with East Germans: We are not rushing on this. It has been agreed that as a first step each side will exchange drafts of where possible convergence exists between our respective arms control proposals. This might then be followed up by an officials-level meeting. They have suggested this take place in East Berlin. We will want to consult closely with our allies on this subject.
- f) Ten Principles: We are suggesting that the Prime Minister hand over a copy of his ten principles while in Moscow for the funeral. He has also undertaken in his speech to write to "President Reagan, to leaders in both alliances, and to other statesmen" to propose that these are principles upon which both sides can build.



Gary J. Smith
Task Force Working Group

ACTION
SUITE A DOINER

MASTER FILE

Division Phoned D.O.
Person Henderson
Local Time 111042

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0208 11FEB84

TO EXTOTT/IDDZ DELIVER BY 111100

INFO WSHDC LDN BONN BNATO PARIS NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/GPP/CIS

PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RBR RBD RGB IDR IDZ ZSI FPR

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0143 10FEB AND RBD0022 10FEB

---ANDROPOV DEATH:LIKELY IMPLICATION FOR SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
AND PM INITIATIVE

THERE IS NO/NO REASON TO EXPECT ANY EARLY,SIGNIFICANT
CHANGES IN OVERALL USSR FOREIGN POLICY APPROACHES FOLLOWING
ANDROPOVS DEATH.ON CONTRARY PUBLIC EMPHASIS IN NEAR
FUTURE WILL BE ON CONTINUITY OF ESTABLISHED POLICY
APPROACHES.CHANGE OF PARTY LEADERSHIP HOWEVER IS UNLIKELY
TO BE ENTIRELY WITHOUT EFFECT IN MEDIUM TERM.LIKELY
CONSEQUENCES,AT LEAST FOR INTERIM PERIOD,INCLUDE:

-FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF GROMYKO ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY
FORMULATION:AND

-POSSIBLE PROLONGATION OF QUOTE REAPPRAISAL UNQUOTE OF
SOVIET OVERALL APPROACH ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS,DURING WHICH
NEW INITIATIVES OR SUBSTANTIVE MOVES IN VARIOUS INNATL FORA
(EG STKHM CONF,GENEV NEGS,MBFR)WILL BE UNLIKELY.

2.BRIEF PERIOD DURING WHICH SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES
AND PRINCIPLES COULD BE SUBJ TO REVIEW,CONFIRMATION AND/OR
ADJUSTMENT COULD PROVIDE SMALL QUOTE WINDOW UNQUOTE DURING
WHICH SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY THINKING COULD BE MORE THAN

PAGE TWO XYGR0208 CONF

USUALLY INFLUENCED BY OUTSIDE PARTIES OR EVENTS. IF THIS
SPECULATIVE ASSESSMENT ACCURATE, IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR
PM DURING FUNERAL VISIT TO TALK DIRECTLY WITH SUCH SENIOR
SOVIET LEADERS AS MAY BE AVAILABLE WITH VIEW TO EXPLORING
POSSIBILITY OF PM VISIT TO MOSCO IN NEAR FUTURE (IE WITHIN
3-4 WEEKS) TO EXPLAIN PEACE INITIATIVE AND SOLICIT SOVIET
RESPONSES.

CCC/144 111450Z XYGR0208

MASTER FILE

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

Division Phoned DO
Person
Local Time 0952

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM MOSCO XYGR0207 11FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 110900

INFO WSHDC LDN BONN BNATO PARIS NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPD/CIS

PCOOTT/FOWLER

DISTR MINA USS DMF IFB RBR RBD RGB IDR IDZ ZSI FPR

REF YOURTEL IDDZ0143 10FEB

---ANDROPOV FUNERAL:PM INITIATIVE

GREY CALLED ON ZEMSKOV OF SECOND EUROPEAN DEPT TO REVIEW
VARIOUS ARRANGEMENTS FOR CDN DEL.WHILE OUTLINING PROBABLE
SEQUENCE OF CEREMONIES ZEMSKOV INCLUDED POSSIBILITY OF PM
BEING ACCORDED QUOTE HIGHEST POSSIBLE WELCOME UNQUOTE.

2.TO AVOID ANY AMBIGUITY GREY RETURNED TO SUBJ AFTER
COMPLETING DISCUSSION OF ADMIN ARRANGEMENTS TO NOTE WISH OF
PM TO BE RECEIVED BY NEW LEADERSHIP AT HIGHEST POSSIBLE LEVEL
AND TO FOLLOW UP ON HIS EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE WITH
LATE PRESIDENT AND GENSECTY.ZEMSKOV EXPRESSED
UNDERSTANDING,UNDERTOOK TO FOLLOW UP ON OUR REQUEST BUT
CAUTIONED THAT HE QUOTE COULD NOT/PREDICT WHAT THE
DECISION MIGHT BE UNQUOTE.AS PRECAUTION AND IN RESPONSE
TO MFA SUGGESTION FORMAL EMB NOTE CONTAINING DETAIL ON CDN
DEL ALSO MENTIONS SUBJ OF REFTTEL.

CCC/144 111345Z XYGR0207

PLACE	DEPT	CRIS #	DATE	FILE	SECURITY
LIBU	MINISTRE DE LA JUSTICE	NO D'ONIS.	FEB 11		
EXTOTT	IDDZ-	0145	1984.		CONFIDENTIAL

W/DE

PRECEDENCE

S/A

PRAGUE

FO

BONN PCOOTT FOWLER

STR.

RBD RBR

REF YOURTEL WOGRO286 10FEB

SUBJECT: PM INITIATIVE-DISCUSSIONS IN CSSR

AS YOU HAVE SURMISED, THERE WERE PRIVATE COMMENTS MADE TO PM TRUDEAU BY PM STROUGAL DURING COURSE OF THEIR HALF-HOUR TETE-A-TETE AT AIRPORT ON DEPARTURE, INCLUDING QUOTE MESSAGE FROM MOSCO UNQUOTE. PM INSTRUCTED THAT THIS INFO BE CLOSELY GUARDED WITH VERY RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION AND THAT ONLY CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF IT COULD BE USED FOR BRIEFING PURPOSES, INCLUDING THOSE POINTS REFERRED TO IN YOUR REFTEL.

2. APPRECIATE YOUR DIFFICULTIES IN OUR HAVING KEPT YOU SOMEWHAT IN DARK, SITUATION WHICH WE WILL REMEDY.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR

DIVISION/DIRECTION

TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SG Gary J. Smith

IDDZ

5-5912

SG Gary J. Smith

TRANSCRIPT OF A SCRUM GIVEN BY THE PRIME MINISTER UPON HIS ARRIVAL AT
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, OTTAWA, 9:00 A.M., FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1984
TRANSCRIPTION D'UNE ENTREVUE SUR LE VIF ACCORDÉE PAR LE PREMIER
MINISTRE À SON ARRIVÉE LA CHAMBRE DES COMMUNES, LE VENDREDI 10 FÉVRIER
1984 À 9 HEURES

Q. Monsieur le Premier ministre, comment vos projets sont-ils affectés par la mort de M. Andropov, pour votre mission de paix, pour votre voyage à Moscou?

R. Eh bien, je pense qu'il faut en conclure que je n'aurai pas d'entrevue avec M. Andropov.

Q. Est-ce que vous pouvez aller à Moscou rencontrer d'autres gens?

R. On verra. On verra. Le pauvre homme est mort hier. On ne sait même pas quelle sorte de funérailles il aura. J'ai toujours l'intention de continuer le dialogue avec les Soviétiques et, dans ce sens-là, j'attendrai qu'il ait un remplaçant.

Q. Ca peut être long, très long?

R. On n'est pas pressé.

Q. Will you be going to Moscow for the funeral.

A. I think it will depend largely on what type of funeral they have. If it's a small funeral, which presumeably they wouldn't...but if it is a state type of funeral as I presume they would, other world leaders would go too.

Q. What does this mean in terms of your peace mission, sir?

A. Well, it means that I won't be seeing Mr. Andropov, but I imagine there will still be leadership in the Soviet Union, given time. And I will still want to see them.

Q. Will you wait until a new leader becomes clear, if one person doesn't become leader immediately?

A. Well I just can't go there and say "I want to talk to somebody." I'll wait until somebody wants to talk to me.

Q. Could you use a funeral occasion, sir, to (inaudible)

A. Well I could go to the funeral and see somebody else, obviously talking about East-West relations and the importance of peace...



Office of the
Prime Minister

Cabinet du
Premier ministre

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0A2

MTF
28

le 10 février 1984

NOTE A M. LOUIS DELVOIE (via monsieur R. Fowler)
Président du Groupe de travail sur l'initiative
du Premier ministre.

DE: M.-A. Bastien
Directeur, correspondance,
CPM

OBJET: Correspondance destinée à la signature du
Premier ministre

Dans le cadre de sa mission de paix, le Premier ministre a été amené, le 25 octobre 1983, à signer quinze lettres françaises et anglaises destinées à autant de chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement.

Ces lettres n'avaient pas été acheminées au Premier ministre via le canal réglementaire habituel. Comme vous le savez maintenant, toutes ces lettres, sans exception, fourmillaient de fautes graves.

Mis au fait de cette affaire rocambolesque, le Premier ministre m'a prié de vous rappeler l'absolue nécessité pour toutes les lettres destinées à sa signature de transiter d'abord, sans aucune exception, par l'unité de correspondance du CPM.

Je vous remercie à l'avance de la coopération que vous m'apporterez à cet égard, sachant que vous conviendrez avec moi que la qualité des services que nous offrons au Premier ministre, ainsi que l'image qui en découle naturellement, priment sur toute autre considération.

M.A.B.
M.-A. B.

Canada

6&5
working together
travaillons ensemble
Canada

000226



Mr. Schure

TO/À : TRANSCRIPT

FROM/DE : FPR

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET : SCRUM - Jean-Luc Pepin - 10 February 1984
Lebanon and Andropov

*See
PP 6-12*

Security/Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
February 10, 1984
Number/Numéro
FPR-0149

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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FILE
CIRC
DIV

Q.: Mr. Pepin, could you bring us up to date as to the situation and the status of Canadians still in Beirut?

Pepin: First of all, let's acknowledge the fact that this is a rather moving situation and a dangerous one too. So the Department of External Affairs has to rely quite a lot on the Ambassador who is maître à bord après Dieu. You know, he has to react very rapidly to changing circumstances. So the latest development is that eleven people from the staff of the Embassy and two or three dependants of these have been moved out by airplane, by helicopters, from the land to a British ship, and then moved to Cyprus from there. And twelve Canadians of non-staff have also been moved at the same time. You're aware that there are 1850 Canadians living in Lebanon. Most of them, the great majority of them, it's not all of them, are citizens with a double citizenship status. And twelve of those have been moved out, have been evacuated at the same time as the thirteen staff and related staff personnel were.

Q.: What are some of the conditions that you say Canada would have to consider before participating in any United Nations efforts?

Pepin: Well, this is not a new creed for Canada. We have taken part in peacekeeping operations before, even in that part of the world. So it has to be a U.N. force, a U.N.-organized force, and it has obviously to have a certain chance of being successful. And that presumably means that it is at the request of the interested parties. It means that there is a ceasefire, because you don't want to send a peacekeeping operation in a situation that is of military nature. So there are a number of conditions attached to our participation, but I think that this

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is well known by people in the U.N. and well known by the public at large in general.

Q.: So Mr. Pepin, no special instructions have been given to Ambassador Pelletier, as far as a peace-keeping force...

Pepin: Not to my knowledge, not to my knowledge. But I doubt if the initiative would come from the U.S. At least, at this particular moment. I would think the initiative would come from the parties that are at each other's throat at the moment.

Q.: You meant to say the U.N., instead of the U.S.?

Pepin: I didn't say the U.S. nor the U.N. I said, I doubt that the initiative would come from them. If I understand anything of the situation, you have Christians and Moslems shooting at each other. Now I presume that their leaders, at one point, might decide that the time has come to stop that and might think of having a U.N. force to come and help them after a ceasefire has been achieved.

Q.: Mr. Pepin, is the Ambassador going to remain indefinitely or...

Pepin: Well, I said at the very beginning that we are look at it anyway. He is a keyman in the assessment of what the situation is. I compare him to a captain of a ship. He is master on board after God. He is the one who reacts to the changing situation. It's difficult for the Department to give him instructions. He knows best what is possible in terms of evacuation, in terms of the possibilities for himself and a skeleton staff to operate in the circumstances. In other words, if the house goes off, he's got to make decisions fast. But the way I understand him, and by the way, he is in direct contact with you. I heard him this morning on the radio which is a wonderful invention, isn't it? An Ambassador can now report to the public at the same time as he reports to the head office. I heard him say that he would try and maintain a skeleton operation in Beirut as long as it is possible to do so.

Q.: How long do you feel he can stay there, safely?

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Pepin: That's what I just said that I couldn't.

Because I am not there and this is a changing set of circumstances. So that's why the Department gives him some freedom of thinking as to how much and how long he can stand because it is difficult to anticipate what the circumstances will be tonight or tomorrow.

Q.: But you feel it is important that he maintain a presence there?

Pepin: Yes, yes, and the Ambassador does too.

Q.: Is the Embassy itself and the skeleton staff in any danger? Have you got any specific information as to some of the dangers after the Embassy called?

Pepin: Well, obviously it's not comfortable. You all know by now that he himself, the Ambassador, went to see his own apartment and found two people there and pointing guns at him. So, it's certainly not comfortable but he's a courageous man. He wouldn't be in the diplomatic service if he wasn't. And consequently I am quite sure he will stay as long as he possibly can, without endangering the life of his staff.

Q.: Why is that so important? We don't have any direct role, it seems, in determining the future course of events?

Pepin: Well, we have, I said, 1850 people there who claim the citizenship of Canada. And I indicated that twelve of them had left yesterday with the embassy staff. So that gives you a first reason is to take care of Canadians or people with Canadian passports in that area. On that subject, I think I should add immediately that this is not a new situation. It has been going on for almost three-quarters of a decade now. So, Canadians or people of Lebanese origin, presumably in most cases who have Canadian citizenship there, have had a long time to think about should they come back to Canada or should they not? I'm just trying to cover that part of the question which is an important one. Already, you see, yesterday, twelve of them decided in extremis to leave. So it's good to have Ambassador and staff to take care of that kind of people in those situations.

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Q.: Do more want to leave, do we know?

Pepin: No, I don't know. But the presumption is that they do not want to, because they've had plenty of opportunities and a lot of time to think about returning to Canada. These are people presumably, not presumably, surely with double citizenship and consequently they have had opportunities to decide if they were going to come back to Canada or stay there and presumably, in most cases, have decided to stay there.

Q.: The Canadians who went to Cyprus, will they stay on Cyprus for a while or will they come back to Canada?

Pepin: You mean staff?

Q.: Yes.

Pepin: Well, there's a redeployment situation which is being examined now. I don't know. Maybe some of them will be assigned to other embassies. This has not been decided yet.

Q.: You are not planning to bring them all immediately back to Canada?

Pepin: Not to my knowledge. No.

Q.: Have you received any assurances from the British or from the Americans that they could take out to security a certain number of the 1800 dual citizens, if the crisis necessitates it?

Pepin: I don't know, but there's a number of important states who are in the area as members of the international force who have volunteered, I understand, their support to Canadians should they want to be evacuated.

Q.: But just general assurances, not a concrete plan?

Pepin: John Noble, you've got a plan of some kind?

Noble: Some offers have been made today. Because there is a large-scale evacuation of American personnel today, and they offered to help us, if needed.

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Q.: Have Canadians or people with dual citizenship asked to get into that evacuation?

Noble: We have heard of no large-scale numbers, no.

Pepin: There were twelve yesterday...

Noble: This morning, Mr. Pepin.

Pepin: This morning. So this gives you an indication that twelve out of 1850, it's not a mass movement for sure. It's a selective one.

Q.: Une brève mise en situation. Qui a été évacué ce matin? Qui reste à être évacué?

Pepin: Très tôt ce matin, une dizaine de fonctionnaires de l'Ambassade, de diplomates, et dans trois cas, leurs enfants ont été évacués par l'entremise d'hélicoptères anglais, sur un bateau anglais qui fait partie de la force internationale j'imagine, et qui, ces personnes-là, accompagnées de douze Libanais qui ont une citoyenneté canadienne en même temps qu'une citoyenneté libanaise, ont été évacuées sur Chypre. Elle sont là présentement.

Q.: Est-ce que ces opérations-là vont se poursuivre? Il y a d'autres personnes à évacuer, ou ce sont des gnes qui ont demandé à l'être?

Pepin: Alors, je disais justement à d'autres, que dans une situation aussi tendue que celle-là, il faut faire confiance à l'Ambassadeur. Alors, l'Ambassadeur est un peu comme le capitaine du bateau, maître après Dieu, "maître à bord après Dieu", c'est l'expression. Alors, c'est lui qui détermine de qui il a besoin. Alors, si la situation se détériore ou continue à se détériorer, et s'il devient difficile pour les diplomates de vivre dans l'Ambassade où ils sont présentement, il faudrait qu'il les évacue aussi. Mais c'est l'Ambassadeur qui est le mieux en place pour déterminer ce qu'il peut faire. En principe, il essaie de rester le plus longtemps possible. C'est la position du ministère et c'est la position de l'Ambassadeur.

Q.: Entre les batailles de rues, les feux, les tirs, les bombardements et tout ça, est-ce que ces opérations-là sont risquées?

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Pepin: Bien, il fait rapport lui-même à l'opinion publique. Je l'entendais ce matin à la radio, justement, décrivant la situation. Vous savez que lui-même est retourné à son appartement hier pour prendre ses mouchoirs de poche et il a été accueilli par deux militaires avec pistolets et armes à feu. Il a perdu sa radio également au cours de l'opération. Alors, c'est lui qui est en mesure de déterminer combien de temps il peut durer. Il se peut très bien que ce soir, parce que c'est une situation totalement imprévisible, il se peut très bien que ce soir tout rentre dans le calem, et qu'il puisse garder sa dizaine de personnes qu'il a avec lui.

Q.: Est-ce que vous avez une idée de qui pourrait succéder à Andropov? Et sinon, est-ce que vous avez des souhaits?

Pepin: Non, on n'a pas d'idées mais ce matin, on faisait faire le tour! Il y a Genyenko (?) qui était le candidat lors de la mort de Brejnev et qui a perdu. Il y a également Romanov, qui est une personnel d'une soixantaine d'années qui, paraît-il, est un candidat de front aussi. Mais il y a Grobachev, qui est venu ici au Canada il y a quelques années. Je ne voudrais pas le desservir en disant que c'est un candidat qui, pour moi, je parle seulement personnellement, a l'air particulièrement brillant. D'abord, il est beaucoup plus jeune -- il a 53 ans -- comparé aux autres qui sont dans la soixantaine avancée et, deuxièmement, il semble avoir une sympathie particulière pour le Canada. Par hasard, pas par hasard parce que je lis tout ce que je peux, j'ai lu un rapport de la visite de Madame Sauvé et, à ce moment-là, Gorbachev avait exprimé une grande sympathie à l'égard du Canada. Il avait dit qu'une chose qu'il appréciait particulièrement, c'était l'aspect rationnel de notre politique extérieure. Alors, pour ces raisons-là, et pour le fait qu'il est venu ici, pour le fait que Madame Sauvé l'a trouvé sympathique et pour le fait qu'il a dit cette chose agréable à l'égard du Canada, je manifeste une sympathie particulière à son endroit. Mais la majorité des gens que j'ai consultés, d'ailleurs leur opinion ne vaut pas tellement plus que la vôtre ou la mienne, puisque c'est très difficile d'être expert dans cette matière-là, on l'a vu dans bien des circonstances, soutiennent, prétendent que la meilleure expectative, c'est qu'il va y avoir une espèce de coalition, une espèce de groupement qui va inclure les personnes d'un certain âge, pour ne pas dire

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les vieux, et les personnes nouvellement arrivées et qui ont été amenées dans l'"inner circle" par Adropov. Alors que pendant un certain temps, on va voir une coalition se former plutôt que l'émergence rapide d'un seul individu. Il suffit d'avoir dit ça, comme je viens de le faire maintenant, pour apprendre dans quelques heures qu'il y a un seul individu qui vient d'être nommé chef du groupe. C'est ce qui est arrivé quand Brejnev est mort. Moi, je me rappelle d'avoir lu des articles à ce moment-là de personnes chevronnées, des généraux de la pensée soviétique, et qui préoyaient justement une longue période où les jeux allaient se faire. Et quelques heures, quelques jours après, on apprenait qu'Andropov avait déjà émergé du groupe. Alors, c'est un peu imprévisible, mais la thèse que certains soutiennent à l'effet d'une coalition pendant un temps temps m'apparaît fort valable.

Q.: Est-ce que ça risque de retarder l'étape moscovite de la mission canadienne?

Pepin: Bien sûr. Mais alors là, la question est la suivante: Est-ce que Monsieur Trudeau ira pour les funérailles? Et la question qui suit, c'est: Qu'est-ce qu'on fait en URSS au moment des funérailles? La question qui suit, c'est: Est-ce que déjà quelque'un aura émergé dans 5 jours quand les funérailles auront lieu? Toutes ces choses-là sont à étudier. On étudie le nombre de jours qui prévalent de la mort à l'enterrement. Dans le cas de Brejnev, c'est 5 jours. On pense que dans ce cas-ci, ça va être 5 jours. Si c'est 5 jours, c'est le 14 ou le 15 février. Si c'est le 15 février, c'est à deux jours du budget. Toutes ces choses-là sont en branle présentement. Et encore plus important que cela -- je m'excuse, je bavarde un peu, mais c'est intéressant. Moi, du moins, j'en trouve ça intéressant -- c'est de savoir qui va y aller. Est-ce que Reagan y va? Est-ce que Kohl y va? Est-ce que Mitterrand y va? Est-ce que ce sera Mitterrand, ce sera Mauroy ou ce sera Cheysson? Si c'est Cheysson, c'est quelqu'un qui y ira du Canada. Voyez-vous? Tous ces jeux-là se font présentement. Dès qu'on a appris ce matin, toute cette dialectique-là s'est mise en branle.

Q.: Une question tout à fait hypothétique mais est-ce qu'il serait possible, est-ce qu'il serait envisageable que Monsieur Trudeau se rende aux funérailles.

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rencontre quelques personnes là, mais retourne en URSS plus tard pour rencontrer le vrai leader

Pepin: Sûrement. Ce n'est pas inconcevable. Alors je pense que c'est ce à quoi le Premier Ministre pense maintenant. Vous aurez votre réponse dès qu'il aura fini de réfléchir sur ce sujet. Mais il faut qu'il sache qu'est-ce que les autres font pour ne pas manifester des sentiments soit négatifs, soit trop positifs face à cet événement.

Q.: Il est important, évidemment, qu'il rencontre des gens qui vont être au pouvoir dans les prochaines années ou qui vont être influents et non pas des gens de l'ancienne garde.

Pepin: Mais comment est-ce qu'on sait ce qui va arriver? Ecoutez, les Russes ont le secret du mystère. Alors, depuis des semaines, depuis des mois qu'on sait qu'Andropov est mort. Une journée, il est mort; l'autre journée, il est ressuscité. Il se porte mieux; il se porte moins bien, etc. Il y en a qui ne font pas de voyages à l'étranger parce qu'ils s'attendent à la mort de, etc. Il y en a qui sont partis parce qu'ils pensent qu'il va récupérer. Alors ce qu'on sait du caractère interne des opérations du gouvernement russe, c'est très limitée. Ce matin, la première question que j'ai posée, c'est: depuis quand est-ce qu'il est mort? Parce qu'il y a 3 jours, je lisais un article fort intéressant sur Andropov, sur ce qu'Andropov a réalisé depuis qu'il était là. Et, tout à coup, j'ai pensé, mais il est peut-être mort. Alors, peut-être que, au moment où je lisais cet article-là... Alors, ce que je veux dire, c'est le caractère un peu fumeux de tout ça, c'est qu'on ne sait pas grand-chose sur le jeu interne de la politique russe. Vous en savez même plus, beaucoup plus sur le jeu interne de la politique au Canada.

Q.: Just some of that in English. I was interested to know what are our concerns about the momentum. The Prime Minister yesterday talked about the momentum in discussions between East and West. How is the death of Mr. Andropov likely to affect that momentum?

Pepin: Well, it's anybody's guess. My own is this: that there was obviously on the part of Andropov a knowledge -- you're talking about Mr. Trudeau's initiative -- there was first of all a knowledge of

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that initiative, quite an intimate one, I suggest. There was, secondly, a commitment to a certain extent on the part of Mr. Andropov to receive Mr. Trudeau. So these were favourable aspects. What Mr. Andropov thinks, thought in specifics about Mr. Trudeau's specific elements, I don't know. He seemed by wanting to accept and apparently looking forward to the visit that's what he said, didn't he, I'm looking forward the visit of Mr. Trudeau, he seemed to be at least in agreement with the essence of Mr. Trudeau's initiative, which is to create an interest, to create a passion, to create a desire, to create an energy. So, we were a bit ahead. Now, who's going to be the successor of Mr. Andropov? It's anybody's guess. No doubt that, the way I look at it, that it complicates the possibility of Mr. Trudeau getting something substantial from the U.S.S.R. at this point. Now, the next question is obviously, who will succeed Mr. Andropov? That's a very interesting one and nobody knows. That I know anyway. It could be, the general or some opinion expressed by some so-called experts, I say "so-called" because there are not too many on a subject as difficult as this one, is that it would appear that there would be a coalition of people of the old school and people of the new school, some of them brought up by Andropov himself, among the up and coming persons in the Soviet Union is Gorbachev who is rather young, very young by Russian standards, because he is 53 years of age, and he's got, from where I stand, some advantages. First of all, he's been to Canada some months ago, and he has shown great interest, great vivacité, great awareness. When Mme Sauvé went to the Soviet Union, she met him again with a group of parliamentarians, they met him again, and he was again expressing great sympathy and interest for Canada. He said something which I thought at the time was rather nice and justified. It is that he admired Canadian diplomacy because, he says, it was generally extremely rational. That is that we don't jump unnecessarily, that we were cool in international affairs, and active. So, all this to show you that there is one gentleman who knows us at least better than we don't know the others know about us.

Q.: How do you think Mr. Andropov will be judged as a leader of the Soviet Union?

Pepin: Terribly difficult in the sense he was there only for eighteen months. But, in general

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terms, most comments on him were pertaining to his realism, to his cool assessment of facts, and his earthliness, in the sense that he realized there were many changes to make in internal domestic Russian policies and he moved to make them, in terms of paying less attention to ideology and more attention to realities. But I am not in a position, really, to give you a lecture on Andropov the man, and Andropov's objectives and successors.

Q.: Well, Mr. Pepin, will Canada be making any representations, either through our Ambassador in Moscow or to the Soviet embassy here in Ottawa, to the effect that, or asking that a meeting be set up between Mr. Trudeau and whoever it may be on the other side as soon as possible?

Pepin: All the answer is in that "whoever it may be." I am quite sure that the Soviets will do their best to clarify their leadership as early as they can. But I suspect that our desire, the Prime Minister's desire, to meet whoever is the leader will be second in terms of consideration. They'll do their best themselves. Again, they could very well decide to rule from a coalition point of view. You know what the big jobs are. The big jobs are Secretary-General of the Party and President of the country which Andropov cumulated. And apparently he didn't have the job, or did you find that he had the job of the equivalent of the Prime Minister?

Q.: Tikhonov has that.

Pepin: Tikhonov is the one who has that. So, the key one is Secretary of the Party. And a number of them are in line. And nobody knows what is the reality of power now between three or four or five candidates to that job. And usually, in the Soviet Union as elsewhere, when you don't know who's the strongest, you wait a bit, you form a committee, a triumvirate or a committee of five, and you rule as such for a while. This is the way it's done in the Soviet Union. And as time goes by, one of them emerges and becomes the Number One guy.

Q.: I guess so. What I would like to know, Sir: are you going, is Canada going to wait for the Soviet Union to say: yes, we're ready to receive you, Mr.

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Trudeau. Or is Canada going to start making representations soon to set up a meeting with whoever that may be?

Pepin: That's the advantage we had with Andropov when he was alive, because he had committed himself to receive Mr. Trudeau as early as he could, and couldn't obviously because of what happened this morning. The name of the game now will be, whoever is the leader or group of leaders, will have to react to a well-known request by the Prime Minister to pay a visit. And I really don't know, and nobody knows, how long that could take.

Q.: So you're going to wait for them to come to us?

Pepin: No. No, no. No, no. We're activist. I am sure that they know that the Prime Minister wants to meet whoever is in charge. They know that.

Q.: And you will make sure they know?

Pepin: And I am quite sure that it will be repeated by our Ambassador there in the process of normal consultations with the Soviet side.

Q.: This uncertainty in the Soviet leadership does that create kind of a dangerous period for everybody involved?

Pepin: As usual. As usual. As usual. Again, you can look at those things from totally diverse points of view. You can say, well, you know, they will take a bit of time to clear up the ground, clear up the leadership question between them. So, while this goes on, they can't make dramatic decisions, so we're in peace for a while. You know, you can take that position. And you can turn around and say, well, you know, there's going to be confusion and lack of knowledge as to who the leader is, what he thinks and what not. This will add to the confusion, that will add to the uncertainty and consequently is a cause of increased tension in the world. Take the one you want. This is not a science.

Q.: Mr. Pepin, will the budget keep Mr. Trudeau home, or will he go?

.../12

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Pepin: I don't know, really. We'll have to wait and see.

Q.: ... pause then, in the face of this uncertainty?

Pepin: What do you mean? This is a problem for the Soviets to resolve. And I am quite sure that they wouldn't welcome a Canadian indication as to whom the Prime Minister can or would like to talk to as the leader in the Soviet Union. I smiled a bit this morning because I made a bit of a plea for Gorbachev, which I may regret later on. I don't know. I explained why I made that plea, and then I excused myself because it may be that a Westerner speaking in favour of a candidate may render a great disservice to that candidate.

Q.: Is there anything the West can do, though, I mean to ease tensions in this period of uncertainty?

Pepin: Repeat, to repeat the sort of message Mr. Trudeau has made this morning in his speech on the occasion of Mr. Andropov's death. He emphasized the good side and emphasized some of Andropov's accomplishments. He emphasized the function, the role of politicians in the maintenance of peace, that was of paramount importance which has been the leitmotiv of everything he has done for six months.

John J. Noble,
Official Spokesman
and Director,
Press Office

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**ACTION
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REF BONN TELS ZQGR0047 03FEB 1020 08FEB 1022 08FEB

---PM INITIATIVE-DISCUSSIONS IN CSSR

WITHOUT WISHING TO THROW WET BLANKET, WE MUST

EXPRESS CONCERN OVER SOME STATEMENTS IN REFTELS ON INTER-

PRETATION OF CZECHOSLOVAK POSITION AND ON WHAT PM STROUGAL

SAID TO PM TRUDEAU. WE CANNOT/NOT FIND IN OUR NOTES, YOUR

COMPTE-RENDU PMDEL BRLIN PMDL0032 02FEB84), AVAILABLE TEXTS

OR OUR RECOLLECTIONS EVIDENCE FOR SOME OF THESE STATEMENTS.

OF COURSE RELEVANT REMARKS MIGHT HAVE BEEN MADE PRIVATELY

TO PM TRUDEAU AT DINNER, AIRPORT OR OTHER CONVERSATIONS AND

IFSO WE SHOULD APPRECIATE REPORT. WE WOULD BE HAPPY TO

HAVE THE EVIDENCE WE LACK. WITHOUT IT, HOWEVER, WE HAVE

SOME QUESTIONS ON CERTAIN POINTS IN REFTELS.

2. RE ZQGR0047 PARA 2(B) WE HAVE NO/NO REF TO

STROUGAL SAYING WPO WOULD MAKE FURTHER PROPOSALS ON MBFR.

RE PARA 2(F), QUOTE EMPHASIZE QUOTE IS SUBJECTIVE BUT

STROUGAL DID SAY THAT BOTH SIDES SHOULD RETURN TO STATUS

QUO ANTE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW USA MISSILES. WE HAVE NO/NO

RECORD OF STROUGALS PREDICTION ON RETURN TO GENEV TALKS.

...2

PAGE TWO WOGR0286 CONF

3.RE ZQGR1020 PARA 2.IT MAY NOT/NOT HAVE BEEN
CRITICISM BUT STROUGAL DID SAY HE COULD NOT/NOT ACCEPT
GENSCHERS VIEW THAT NOTHING HAD HAPPENED WITH DEPLOYMENT
OF MISSILES.

4.RE ZQGR1020 PARA 3.WE ARE NOT/NOT SURE WHERE
IDEA AROSE THAT STROUGAL HAD MSG FROM MOSCO TO CONVEY.
STROUGAL DID REFER TO HIS OWN REACTION TO STKHM AND TO
DIFFERENT TONE FROM WEST BUT OUR RECORDS HAVE NOTHING MUCH
TO SUPPORT OTHER THREE POINTS OF ALLEGED MSG.HUSAK MENTIONED
A GRADUAL WILLINGNESS TO NEGOTIATE ON ARMS BUT WAS NOT/NOT
SPECIFIC.IT WOULD BE REASONABLE,OF COURSE,TO INTERPRET
EVERYTHING STROUGAL SAID AS BEING WITHIN THE RANGE OF WHAT
MOSCO WOULD APPROVE.

5.RE ZQGR1022 PARA 6.BILAK,WHO IS IMPORTANT
FIGURE IN PARTY BUT HOLDS NO/NO GOVT POSITION,PLAYED NO/NO
VISIBLE ROLE IN VISIT,WHICH WAS HANDLED ENTIRELY BY GOVT.

CCC/175 101600Z WOGR0286



TO/À TRANSCRIPT

FROM/DE FPR

MASTER FILE

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET

CBC The National - 09 February 1984
Prime Minister Trudeau's Peace Initiative

Security/Sécurité
UNCLASSIFIED
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier
Date
February 10, 1984
Number/Numéro
FPR-0147

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

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CBC: Prime Minister Trudeau is keeping his peace mission alive. He said he's already made some progress and there is a good chance he can make more. That's what Trudeau told Parliament today. Then he sat down and listened to what Opposition leaders think about his initiative. We have two reports. First, David Halton.

David Halton: It was the Prime Minister's first full report to Parliament on his peace initiative and he didn't miss the opportunity to claim some credit for easing the crisis in East/West relations that prevailed when he launched the initiative four months ago.

Trudeau: We sought to catalyze a dialogue between East and West and that is happening. We sought to persuade both sides to tone down their rhetoric and that has begun to happen.

Halton: As evidence for that, Trudeau noted that Britain's Margaret Thatcher followed him to Eastern Europe last week in the quest for renewed dialogue between East and West. President Reagan, he said, has also shifted gear and is now taking a more constructive approach towards the Soviet Union. As for the Soviet Bloc countries he has just visited, Trudeau said that, in private, their leaders too expressed a new willingness to curb the nuclear arms race. Trudeau also claimed that Canada helped achieve some other modest steps: the decision of NATO and Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers to attend the Stockholm disarmament conference and to play a more active role in the Vienna negotiations to reduce non-nuclear forces in Europe. As a result of his peace travels, Trudeau said he'd found ten principles on which both East and West can agree in arms control talks. Among the

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principles, Trudeau said both sides agree that a nuclear war cannot be won, that there's a need to eliminate the risk of accidental war or surprise attack, to avoid the spread of nuclear arms to other countries and to respect each other's legitimate security interests.

Trudeau: We intend to draw on these ten principles to develop elements of a common purpose among the leaders of both East and West. We shall be writing to President Reagan and to President Andropov, to leaders of both Alliances and to other statesmen, to propose that these are principles upon which both sides can and should build.

Halton: As for his own involvement in the peace initiative, Trudeau told MPs that it will definitely continue and that he still intends to go to Moscow as soon as Andropov is available. What the Prime Minister carefully avoided today was raising the kind of controversial questions about NATO strategy that got him into trouble on this recent East European trip. But Trudeau didn't exactly skirt the issue either, saying that NATO benefits from open discussion and that Canada will continue being a loyal but not a silent partner in the Alliance. David Halton, CBC News, Ottawa.

Mike Duffy: Opposition leader Brian Mulroney began his speech with words of support for the Prime Minister.

Mulroney: We support the objectives of the Prime Minister's initiatives and welcome his report to Parliament.

Duffy: But the tone quickly changed. Mulroney criticized Trudeau for ignoring Parliament, for undermining NATO by pretending to be a sort of neutral observer of international events and for allowing Canada's conventional military forces to fall into disrepair.

Mulroney: This pattern of neglect of the conventional deterrent, and I refer Mr. Speaker, only to the conventional deterrent, this pattern of neglect, over fifteen years, has and I say with sadness, damaged our reputation for reliability among our allies. It has commensurately, it has commensurately diminished our

.../3

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influence in the same Councils. Such neglect of the conventional deterrent has contributed to an overreliance on nuclear weapons and there is the genesis of the problem set out here today.

Duffy: Mulroney promised that a Conservative government would spend more on military equipment, hundreds of millions of dollars more.


Mulroney: We can't have it both ways.

Broadbent: In the name of reason and in the name of humanity, it's time to call a halt to this kind of madness.

Duffy: NPD leader Ed Broadbent was critical of the government for not doing enough to promote peace. He called on the Prime Minister to renounce the cruise missile testing agreement with the United States and he urged a major change in NATO strategy.

Broadbent: We must openly declare our opposition to the first use of nuclear weapons.

Duffy: Ed Broadbent has said many of these same things over the past few months but today was the first time that Brian Mulroney has been so openly critical of the Trudeau peace initiative. Mulroney clearly feels that Trudeau is vulnerable, that the peace effort has done little to help the Liberals. Mulroney appeared quite comfortable today sketching out a more hawkish position for the Conservative Party, comfortable in the apparent knowledge that by doing so, he's not hurting his Party's standing with Canadian voters. Mike Duffy, CBC News, Ottawa.


John S. Noble,
Official Spokesman
and Director
Press Office

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

MF
WJ

TO
A The Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs, OTTAWA, IDA DDZ FEB 27 1984

FROM
De The Canadian Embassy, ANKARA

REFERENCE
Référence

SUBJECT
Sujet Prime Minister's peace initiative.

SECURITY
Sécurité CONFIDENTIAL

DATE February 10, 1984

NUMBER
Numéro 011

FILE	DOSSIER
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ENCLOSURES
Annexes

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GMR

The Jordanian Ambassador in Ankara has expressed to me his strong interest in the Prime Minister's peace initiative. He expressed this interest in conversation and has now written to me ... an enthusiastic letter about it. This is attached.

2. The Ambassador has close connections with Canada where he has family. He, himself, spent a few years in Canada, being married to a Canadian and teaching in Montreal. He would immigrate to Canada if he could find a suitable job. He looks and acts much more like a North American than a traditional Arab Ambassador.

hies huthen

The Ambassador.

AMBASSADOR OF JORDAN

ANKARA



مفیر المملكة الاردنية الهاشمية

انقرة

February 1, 1984

His Excellency Mr. Gilles Mathieu
Ambassador of Canada
Ankara.

Dear Gilles,

Thank you so much for sending me a copy of the speech presented by the Right Honourable Pierre Elliot Trudeau to the "Conference on Strategies for Peace and Security in the Nuclear Age " which was held in Ontario on October 27, 1983.

I am so gratified to see Canada, through its great Prime Minister Mr. Pierre Elliot Trudeau, take another international initiative which, if allowed to materialize, will bring much hope and peace to the world. In the past, the world became accustomed to Canada taking bold international initiatives in order to make our small planet a safer place to live in. Now, what is at stake is even greater. The very essence of life on earth is being threatened and endangered and all truly great leaders of goodwill must make their concern heard over and over again. It is very becoming of Canada, therefore, to play its traditional role of promoting peace and understanding in international affairs. Infact, Canada will not be Canada without assuming once again its much needed position in world affairs.

AMBASSADOR OF JORDAN

K A R A



مفیر المملكة الاردنية الهاشمية
اتقرة

I therefore commend Canada and its great Prime Minister for this new Canadian vision and concern. I personally would very much like to be associated with this profound international endeavour.

With my best wishes and renewed thanks,

Sincerely,

Waleed M. Sadi

Ambassador of Jordan

Department of External Affairs



Ministère des Affaires extérieures

Canada

OTTAWA, ONTARIO
K1A 0G2

February 10, 1984

IDDZ-0148

Mr. Daniel Reid
202 - 120 Torresdale Avenue
Willowdale, Ontario
M2R 3N7

Dear Mr. Reid:

The office of Mr. Jim Peterson M.P. asked us to send you material on the Prime Minister's initiative.

Enclosed please find copies of the Prime Minister's three public speeches, at Guelph, Montreal and in the House of Commons yesterday. They are the best sources on the initiative and on the Prime Minister's thinking on the subject.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "John Wilson".

for Task Force Working Group

MESSAGE

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act -
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REF YOURTEL WOGRO286 10FEB

SUBJECT | PM INITIATIVE-DISCUSSIONS IN CSSR

AS YOU HAVE SURMISED, THERE WERE PRIVATE COMMENTS MADE TO PM TRUDEAU BY PM STROUGAL DURING COURSE OF THEIR HALF-HOUR TETE-A-TETE AT AIRPORT ON DEPARTURE, INCLUDING QUOTE MESSAGE FROM MOSCO UNQUOTE. PM INSTRUCTED THAT THIS INFO BE CLOSELY GUARDED WITH VERY RESTRICTED DISTRIBUTION AND THAT ONLY CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF IT COULD BE USED FOR BRIEFING PURPOSES, INCLUDING THOSE POINTS REFERRED TO IN YOUR REFTEL.

2. APPRECIATE YOUR DIFFICULTIES IN OUR HAVING KEPT YOU SOMEWHAT IN DARK, SITUATION WHICH WE WILL REMEDY.

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/A'PROUVÉ
SG Gary J. Smith	IDDZ	5-5912	SG Gary J. Smith



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MESSAGE

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SUBJ/SUJ

---PM INITIATIVE: HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATE 9 FEB

FLWG IS A SUMMARY REPORT PREPARED BY MINA OF SPEECHES IN HOUSE OF
COMMONS BY PRIME MINISTER, LEADER OF OPPOSITION AND NDP LEADER 9 FEB
ON THE PM INITIATIVE:

(COMCENTRE PLS COPY ATTACHED)

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TELEPHONE

APPROVED/APPROUVÉ

SIG

J. McNEE

IDDZ

5-5912

SIG

G.J. SMITH

000249

THE PEACE INITIATIVE

The galleries were packed, the Govt and Opposition benches full and an array of Senators, diplomats, including UK High Commissioner Lord Moran, Operation Dismantle's Jim Stark, and Party officials from all sides watched from above as first the PM, clad in his blue pinstripe, then Brian Mulroney, in double-breasted blue, and finally Ed Broadbent in a dark suit, spoke to arms control and disarmament in the context of the peace initiative. All three spoke from notes.

9 NOTE After pointing out the threat of nuclear weapons and, consequently, the Canadian stake in arms talks, the PM related the areas in which the Canadian defence commitment was being strengthened (replacement of Maritime patrol planes, introduction of the leopard tank, frigate programme, phasing out of nuclear weapons) and summarized the main results of his recent trips abroad. Signs of progress, the PM declared could be found in the NATO Foreign Ministers' declaration of Dec 1, 1983, respecting the Soviet's legitimate security interests, the Commonwealth Leaders' GOA declaration of Nov 1983, supporting the PM's efforts, attendance at the Ministerial level early last month at the opening of the stockholm CDE Conference, the meetings between Secretary Schultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko, PM Thatcher's visit to Budapest last week, President Reagan's signals last month to create a constructive tone in US policy towards the USSR and the cautious response from the Soviet Union. The PM listed three conclusions based on his most recent visit to Eastern Europe: 1) the contrast between "the cordial, reasonable and non-ideological private talks and the occasional blast of Warsaw Pact fundamentalism"; 2) the discovery of areas of common interest; 3) the necessity to "grapple with difficult problems of misperception and judgement." The PM then suggested 10 principals of a common bond between east and west: a nuclear war cannot be won; a nuclear war must never be fought; both sides wish to be free of the risk of accidental war; both sides recognize the dangers inherent in destabilizing weapons; both sides understand the need to reduce the cost of security; both sides are conscious of the awesome consequences of using force against one another; both sides recognize each has legitimate security interests; both sides recognize the dangers of horizontal proliferation; both sides recognize the awesome consequences of first use of force; both recognize security cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side. The PM said he would make his decalogue the basis of letters to Presidents Reagan and Andropov. The PM said that new proposals to gear down the momentum of new technology, including a ban on high-altitude satellite systems, restrictions on the mobility of ICBMs, improvements in the verifiability of future strategic weapons would be circulated in due course at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and Canada would continue to press for a Conference of the five nuclear weapons states which would focus on crisis management and the improvement of crisis communications. The PM also called for a review of NATO strategy in the same spirit as that which took place in 1967 at the urgings of Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel. In this regard the PM complemented the efforts of the current Belgian Foreign Minister Leo Tindemans and the ideas of incoming NATO Secretary General Lord Carrington. Concluding, the PM said:

"Let it be said of the other nations that they saw their own responsibility to work to reduce the threat of annihilation, to forego

nuclear weapons, and to serve the purpose of a durable peace.


And let it be said of Canada, and of Canadians: that we saw the crisis; that we did act; that we took risks; that we were loyal to our friends and open with out adversaries; that we lived up to our ideals; and that we have done what we could to lift the shadow of war."

Agreeing with the PM that the "world today is subjected to strains and tensions unique in modern history", the Opposition Leader reconfirmed the support he gave last Nov 14 for the objectives of the PM's initiatives. Mr. Mulroney regretted, however, that until now, Parliament had had to glean its information "from a political ^{meeting} in Montreal...and from the reception halls of eastern Europe." He chastised the PM for refusing to accept his Dec 4 offer to introduce a bipartisan resolution endorsing his initiatives, an endorsement which Mr. Mulroney claimed would have the unanimous approval of the House. In the absence of this, Mr. Mulroney claimed, "the PM could have dismissed as unworthy arguments about the partisan nature of his initiative. With such a mandate, the PM could have properly claimed the support of all Canadians for his initiative." The Opposition Leader suggested that such support could still be given and that it should include a reference to SCEAND to study existing areas of conflict. The SCEAND reference, he argued should also include a study of the proposed Arms Control and Disarmament Centre mentioned in the Throne Speech. Declaring Soviet policies in Europe to be animated by two clear aims - the preservation of Soviet dominance in eastern Europe and the weakening of the western alliance, especially the links between the US and Europe, Mr. Mulroney said that Canadian policy must be guided by three clear principles: 1) "we are a western nation, a member of NATO; 2) we are committed to the ideals of individual and collective freedoms; 3) we are children of liberty and that there must be no compromise on these principles, because "we are prepared to accept neither the inexorable Finlandization of Europe nor a neutralist Canada." Mr. Mulroney went on to criticize the PM for having chided him last Dec 9 for urging consideration of the existing non-first strike policy within the private counsels of NATO Foreign Ministers and then going on to question the determination of NATO allies to carry out existing policies during his Warsaw Pact tour. Mr. Mulroney was also astonished at the decision to establish a committee of officials and ministers with east Germany in order to discuss disarmament. The Opposition Leader then catalogued 15 years of Govt disregard for Canada's conventional defences - an ignorance that had led to the present unhappy situation whereby NATO strategy is heavily dependent upon recourse to nuclear weapons. Mr. Mulroney put forward three fundamental principles for future discussion:

- "Canada's foreign policy should rest on a bi-partisan search for consensus;
- The cornerstone of our security is the NATO framework;
- And, finally, only through the strengthening of the non-nuclear deterrent can we reduce the present reliance on nuclear weapons."

The Opposition Leader concluded that the challenge before us is overwhelming, but, as Browning put it "Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp, or what's a heaven for."

Mr. Broadbent paid tribute to the disarmament groups in Canada and put forward his own five principles for Canadian policy based on the abolition of nuclear weapons, domestically and abroad: 1) all those who seek to achieve this should be supported and he gave as an example the Swedish proposal for a nuclear weapons free zone; 2) increased funding for disarmament research; 3) follow up to the PM's anti-satellite warfare suggestion by, for example, joining the International Satellite Monitoring Agency proposed by France; 4) openly declaring our opposition to the first use of nuclear weapons; 5) not testing the cruise missile and the NDP Leader pointed out that at the Dec 1979 NATO meeting, a decision was made to deploy only the Pershing missile and the ground launched cruise missile. Nothing, the NDP Leader claimed, had been said about the air launched cruise missile, the purpose of which was to buttress US security interests.


D. Colin Robertson
Departmental Assistant

UNQ 407 6



External Affairs Affaires extérieures
Canada Canada

MESSAGE

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SUBJ/SUJ ---ANDROPOV FUNERAL:PM INITIATIVE

DOMINANT THEME OF PMS PRESENCE IN MOSCO IS TO ATTEND ANDROPOV
FUNERAL.COMPOSITION OF DEL REFLECTS THIS.THIS DOES NOT/NOT PRECLUDE
VISIT BY PM TO USSR AT EARLY DATE IN FUTURE SPECIFICALLY RELATED
TO INITIATIVE,DATES FOR WHICH MAY BE CLARIFIED NEXT WEEK.

2.NEVERTHELESS WE TRUST THAT NEW SOVET LEADERSHIP WILL WISH TO
RECEIVE PM FOR CONVERSATION(S) DURING WHICH HIS INITIATIVE
WLD UNDOUBTEDLY AND DESIRABLY BE POINT OF DISCUSSION.IT WLD BE
OUR HOPE THAT THIS CONTACT WLD BE WITH NEW SECRETARY GENERAL OF
PARTY OR WITH NEW PRES AND NOT/NOT WITH PM TIKHONOV WHO WAS PM
TRUDEAUS INTERLOCUTOR DURING BREZHNEV FUNERAL IN NOV 82.GRATEFUL
YOU MAKE BEST EFFORTS ACCORDINGLY AS NEW LEADERS EMERGE.

3.IF THERE WERE STRONGLY COMPELLING REASONS TO DO SO SUCH AS A SIGNIFICANT
MTG OF SUBSTANCE AT HIGHEST LEVEL ON WED PM OR THURS AM, YOU
SHOULD KNOW THERE IS POSSIBILITY PM CLD DELAY HIS DEPARTURE BY
24 HOURS UNTIL THURS NOON.

4.IF IT IS NOT/NOT CLEAR WHO IS IN AUTHORITY IN MOSCO AT TIME OF
FUNERAL WE LOOK TO YOUR ADVICE AND GUIDANCE AS TO WHICH GROUP OF
LEADERS IT WOULD BE MOST PRODUCTIVE FOR PM TO SEE.NAMES OF

...2

DRAFTER/RÉDACTEUR	DIVISION/DIRECTION	TELEPHONE	APPROVED/APPROUVÉ
SIG G.J.Smith/sk	IDDZ	5-5912	SIG G.J.Smith



Align first character of word "PAGE" under this arrow
Alignez le premier caractère du mot "PAGE" sous cette flèche

PAGE 2 IDDZ0143 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

GORBACHEV,GROMKYO AND USTINOV COME IMMED TO MIND.

5.WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ASAP.

main file

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT RBR0293 10FEB84

TO MOSCO DELIVER BY 110700

INFO BNATO WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN BRU OSLO STKHM HSNKI COPEN ATHNS

ANKRA MDRID LSBON ROME WSAW PRGUE BPEST BUCST BGRAD TOKYO

PEKIN PRMNY CNGNY PCOOOTT/FOWLER GGHOTT/NOISEUX NDHQOTT/CIS

DISTR MINA DMF RGB RBD RBT RBP RBRD LDDZ IDR XDX XDV ZSI IFB

---ANDROPOV:LET OF CONDOLENCE FM PM

LET OF CONDOLENCE FM PM TO NIKOLAI TIKHONOV CHAIRMAN OF COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE YOUR EXCELLENCY:I LEARNED TODAY OF THE SAD NEWS OF PRESIDENT
ANDROPOVS DEATH AFTER A LONG ILLNESS.PARA HIS TERM OF OFFICE WAS
TRAGICALLY SHORT,BUT MANY OF US HAD HOPED THAT HE WOULD MAKE A
STRONG CONTRIBUTION TO THE QUEST FOR INTERNATIONAL STABILITY.
MY CORRESPONDENCE WITH PRESIDENT ANDROPOV CONVINCED ME OF HIS
PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO PEACE.I CAN ASSURE YOU OF MY OWN CONTINUED
RESOLVE TO WORK FOR A MORE SECURE AND PEACEFUL WORLD.THE SUPPORT
AND COOPERATION OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS ESSENTIAL IN THIS
ENDEAVOUR.PARA ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF CANADA,
PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE CONDOLENCES AND ALLOW ME TO EXTEND MY
SYMPATHIES TO THE FAMILY OF THE LATE PRESIDENT,AND TO GOVERNMENT
AND PEOPLES OF THE SOVIET UNION.P.E.TRUDEAU UNQUOTE.

UUU/099 110339Z RBR0293

master FILE

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT RBR292 10FEB84

TO MOSCO DELIVER BY 110700

INFO BNATO WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN BRU OSLO STKHM HSNKI COPEN ATHNS

ANKRA MDRID LSBON ROME WSAW PRGUE BPEST BUCST BGRAD TOKYO PEKIN

PRMNY CNGNY PCOOTT/FOWLER GGHOTT/NOISEUX NDHQOTT/CIS

DISTR MINA DMF RGB RBD RBT RBP RBRD (IDDZ IDR XDX XEV ZSI IFB

---ANDROPOV:LET OF CONDOLENCE FROM DPM/SSEA

LET OF CONDOLENCE FROM DPM/SSEA TO FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO FOLLOWS:

QUOTE DEAR MR.GROMYKO,I HAVE JUST HEARD THE SAD NEWS OF PRESIDENT
ANDROPOV S DEATH.HIS PERIOD OF LEADERSHIP WAS SHORT BUT I BELIEVE
THAT HIS PERSONAL QUALITIES AND HIS DEDICATION TO THE SERVICE OF
YOUR COUNTRY WILL BE LONG REMEMBERED OUR FUTURE COURSE MUST BE TO
STABILIZE AND TO STRENGTHEN RELATIONS BETWEEN CANADA AND THE SOVIET
UNION,AS A CONTRIBUTION TO A MORE SECURE AND PEACEFUL WORLD.PARA
PLEASE ACCEPT MY SINCERE CONDOLENCES ON THE PASSING OF YOUR
PRESIDENT AND COLLEAGUE ALLAN J.MACEACHEN UNQUOTE.

UUU/099 102204Z RBR0292

MASTER F. L. W.

UNCLASSIFIED

FM EXTOTT RBR0291 10FEB84

TO MOSCO DELIVER BY 110700

INFO BNATO WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN BRU OSLO STKHM HSNKI COPEN ATHNS
ANKRA MDRID LSBON ROME WSAW PRGUE BPEST BUCST BGRAD TOKYO PEKIN
PRMNY CNGNY PCOOTT/FOWLER GGHOTT/NOISEUX NDHQOTT/CIS

DISTR MINA DMF RGB RBD RBT RBP RBRD (IDDZ IDR XDX XDV ZSI IFB FPR
---ANDROPOV:LET OF CONDOLENCE FROM GOV GEN

LET OF CONDOLENCE FROM GOV GEN SCHREYER TO ACTING PRES VASILY
KUZETSOV FOLLOWS:QUOTE YOUR EXCELLENCY,I LEARNED TODAY WITH DEEP
SORROW OF THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT ANDROPOV.WHILE HIS TIME IN OFFICE
WAS BRIEF,I WAS IMPRESSED BY THE PERSONAL INTEGRITY WITH WHICH HE
PURSUED HIS GOALS OF PEACE AND PROSPERITY FOR THE SOVIET PEOPLE.
PARA ON BEHALF OF THE PEOPLE OF CANADA,PLEASE ACCEPT THIS SINCERE
EXPRESSION OF OUR DEEPEST SYMPATHY.EDWARD SCHREYER UNQUOTE.

UUU/099 102204Z RBR0291

*m. [signature] OR
d. [signature] F. [signature]*

R E S T R I C T E D

FM EXTOTT RCR0242 10FEB84

TO BONN DELIVER BY 130900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER WSHDC LDN PARIS BNATO GENEV/MCPHAIL

DISTR MINA MINE USS DMT DMF RGB TFB IFB IDD RCD IDDZ IDR EPD EPA

REF YOURTEL ZQGR0046 03FEB

---POSSIBLE TELTSCHIK VISIT TO OTTAWA

WE ALSO FIND IDEA OF TELTSCHIK VISIT TO OTTAWA VERY ATTRACTIVE AND WOULD BE PLEASED TO ARRANGE PROGRAM FOR HIM IF HE WISHES TO COME. YOU SHOULD BE AWARE, HOWEVER, THAT DATES OF MARCH 7-9 HAVE BEEN RESERVED FOR MTG OF SENIOR MANAGEMENT OF DEPT ALL ADMS AND DMS) AWAY FROM OTTAWA. FOWLER WOULD ALSO NOT/NOT BE AVAILABLE ON THOSE DATES. MTGS COULD BE ARRANGED WITH RCD/GHERSON, IDDZ /DELVOIE AND OTHER DIRGENS, DEPENDING ON ISSUES TO BE DISCUSSED. ON LATTER, WE AGREE EMPHASIS SHOULD BE ON PMS PEACE INITIATIVE AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS AS WELL AS BILATERAL ISSUES. THERE COULD ALSO BE EXCHANGES OF VIEWS ON OTHER MULTILATERAL POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC ISSUES. INDICATIONS OF TELTSCHIKS INTERESTS IN THIS REGARD WOULD BE USEFUL.

2. SINCE DRAFTING ABOVE, HAVE BEEN ADVISED THAT DMF AND RGB WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR MORNING MTG ON 7MAR AS THEY WILL ONLY DEPART OTT AT NOON. COULD TELTSCHIK ARRIVE OTT EVENING OF 6MAR FOR MTGS EARLY MORNING OF 7?

CCC/099 102340Z RCR0242

mm *2/2/83* *OR*
6 MAR 1983 FICU

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT IDA0203 10FEB83

TO HAGUE

INFO GENEV VIAEA PRMNY WSHDC CNBRA BONN TOKYO PARIS BREEC LDN MOSCO
STKHM COPEN HSNKI CSLO DUBLN WLGTN ROME BNATO NDHQOTT/DNACPOL/
DSTRATA/CORAE/DIPOL

BH AECBOTT/FRASER EMROTT/MORRISON/IERB DE OTT

DISTR DMF DMT RSR ETD IMU JLE RSD IDDZ IDD IDR IDRA IDRL IDAO IDAN
URR RBD RBR

---NPT REVIEW CONF

DUTCH EMB COUNSELLOR BENTINCK CALLED ON IDA FEB09 TO ASK WHAT
CONCRETE MEASURES CDA HAD IN MIND TO STRENGTHEN NPT.DUTCH
INFERRED FROM PMS NOV13 SPEECH WHICH INTERALIA CALLED FOR QUOTE
REMEDIAL ACTION TO SHORE UP NPT UNQUOTE THAT WE WERE PREPARING
SPECIFIC PROPOSALS.WE INDICATED THAT NONE HAD BEEN DEVELOPED
2.IN COURSE OF DISCUSSION WE MENTIONED THAT WORK HAD BEGUN ON
PREPARATION FOR NPT REVIEW CONF.IN THAT CONTEXT POSSIBLE MEANS TO
STRENGTHEN NPT INCLUDED FUNDING TO IAEA FOOTNOTE A PROJECTS
(ETN TEL 0173 03FEB) AND THEREBY PERHAPS ENCOURAGING NON-
SIGNATORIES TO SIGN NPT.HOWEVER,AS PM NOTED IN HIS FEB09 SPEECH
IN HOFB,QUOTE BASIS OF NPT BARGAIN WAS THAT NUCLEAR POWERS WLD
REDUCE THEIR ARMAMENTS IN RETURN FOR NON-NUCLEAR POWERS NOT
BUILDING THEIR OWN AND BOTH WOULD CO-OPERATE IN SHARING

...2

PAGE TWO IDA0203 CONFD

BENEFITS OF PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY. THUS CURRENT NUCLEAR
POWERS BEAR IMMENSE RESPONSIBILITY IN PREVENTING SPREAD OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNQUOTE. WE ADDED THAT OTHER SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
WOULD BE DEVELOPED IN CONSULTATION WITH LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES
AS PART OF RUN-UP TO 1985 NPT REVIEW CONF AND THAT ANY SUCH
PROPOSALS FROM DUTCH MFA WLD BE WELCOME.

CCC/003 110207Z IDA0203

main file

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM EXTOTT RBD0018 10FEB84

TO MOSCO DELIVER BY 110700

INFO BNATO WSHDC LDN PARIS BONN BRU BREEC OSLO STKHM HSNKI COPEN
ATHNS ANKRA MDRID LSBON ROME GENEV BERN CNBRA WSAW PRGUE BPEST
BUCST BGRAD TOKYO PEKIN PRMNY CNGNY PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/CIS
DISTR MINA MINE MINT USS DMT DMF RGB RBR RBT RBP IDDZ IDR XDV
ZSI IFB FPR

---ANDROPOV FUNERAL

IT IS NOW FIRM AND PUBLIC THAT PM WILL GO.

2.OFFICIAL DEL IS:PM PLUS CABINET MINISTER,PROBABLY MIN PEPIN;
PRINCIPAL SEC TOM AXWORTHY;DE MONTIGNY MARCHAND;ASST CAB SEC
R FOWLER;PM EXEC ASST J.E. JOHNSON;P.HANCOCK;RALPH COLEMAN/PCO
PRESS;B.V.JOHNSTONE/ASST CHIEF OF PROTOCOL;MISS C.VIAU,PRIVATE
SEC TO PM;R.COOPER/OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHER;RCMP SUPT R.MUIR;
A.KLEIN/SECURITY GUARD.

3.VIRTUALLY FIRM ETD OTT VIA DND 707 AT 2200 SUNDAY ETA MOSCO
1500 MONDAY.DEPARTURE DAY/TIME NOT/NOT YET FIRM AND CONTINGENT
ON SEVERAL FACTORS.PROBABLY 1200 OR 1300 WEDNESDAY.

4.RE ACCOMMODATION OUR CHOICE IF WE HAVE ONE IS ALL DEL TOGETHER
IN DOWNTOWN HOTEL E.G. ROSSIYA ROOMS ADJACENT TO PM SHOULD BE
ASSIGNED TO SUPT MUIR,TED JOHNSON,CECILE VIAU AND TOM AXWORTHY.

5.ASSUME DRILL WOULD BE A) FOR PM TO GO TO LYING IN STATE
MONDAY AFTERNOON; B) PRIVATE DINNER THAT EVENING; (C) ATTEND

...2

PAGE 2 RBD0018 CONF

FUNERAL TUESDAY(NOON?); (D) HAVE CONVERSATION WITH NEW LEADER(S).
RE MONDAY DINNER WE BELIEVE PREFERENCE WILL BE FOR PRIVATE
EVENT PERHAPS WITH SOME BRIEFING FOR CDN DEL PLUS ONE OR TWO
EMB OFFICERS BUT THIS IS SUBJ TO CONFIRMATION.SIMILAR EVENT AT
BREZHNEV FUNERAL WAS AT HOTEL ROSSIYA BUT WE HAVE ON ENTIRELY
PERSONAL BASIS INDICATED YOU MIGHT WISH TO OFFER RESIDENCE.ADVISE.
6.GRATEFUL IF YOUR FURTHER ADVICE/ASSESSMENTS OR PROGRAM FORECAST
REACH US NOT/NOT LATER THAN 121800.
7.DEVELOPMENTS AFTER TAKE-OFF WILL HAVE TO AWAIT BRIEFING OF PM
BY AMB ON BOARD AIRCRAFT UPON ARRIVAL.
CCC/099 110330Z RBD0018

mm *2/2/84* *OK*
James Filer

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM BNATO YBGR6152 10FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDR

INFO CANMILREPNATO WSHDC BONN LDN PARIS ROME MOSCO BRU PRMNY

GENEV STKHM/SCDEL NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP/DNACPOL/CRAD/DCDS/DTSP/

CADO/CIS/CORAE/DSTRATA PCOOTT/ARCHDEACON

DISTR MINA MINE MINT USS DMF IFB UGB TFB EFB IDDZ CCB CGE ETS

IDA IDRA IDRL URR ZSI EED

REF YOURTEL IDR0474 08FEB

---USA STRATEGIC DEFENCE INITIATIVE(SDI)

USA TEAM(STATE DEPT,DERENSE,ACDA AND CIA)IN BRIEFING

SPC 09FEB ON USA STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE(SDI)

COVERED MUCH SAME GROUND AS ONE WHICH VISITED OTT(YOURTEL

IDR0443 07FEB FOR WHICH WE ARE GRATEFUL).SPEAKING NOTE

WILL BE BAGGED TO YOU ONLY.

2.GIVEN LENGTH OF DETAILED BRIEFING,THERE WAS HARDLY

ENOUGH TIME LEFT FOR DETAILED DISCUSSION.HIGHLIGHTS AS

FOLLOWS:(A)TEAM CHARACTERIZED RESEARCH PROGRAM AS ONE

WITH QUOTE PROMISES AND UNCERTAINTIES UNQUOTE.HOWEVER

EXISTENCE OF CURRENT SOVIET PROGRAM IS SUFFICIENT JUSTI-

FICATION TO GO AHEAD SO AS NOT/NOT TO LEAVE FIELD

EXCLUSIVELY TO THEM. B)PROGRAM HAS NO/NO LOGICAL END

AS IT WILL DEPDND ON RESULTS OF RESEARCH.GIVEN CURRENT

PROVISIONS OF 1972 AMB TREATY.APPLICATION OF TECHNOLOGY

WHICH MIGHT EMERGE WOULD BE INCONSISTENT AS ONLY RESEARCH IS

...2

PAGE TWO YBGR6152 CONF

PERMITTED UNDER TERMS OF TREATY. (C) SYSTEM ENVISAGED WOULD BE CAPABLE OF DESTROYING CURRENT SOVIET SYSTEMS THREATENING EUROPE. THEY WOULD ALSO HAVE ASAT CAPABILITIES. D) ABM

RESEARCH IN BOTH USA AND USSR COULD EVENTUALLY LEAD TO CONCLUSION THAT SOPHISTICATED ABM SYSTEMS ARE FEASIBLE BUT NOT/NOT AFFORDABLE. (E) POLITICAL UNCERTAINTIES WHICH ARISE FROM SDI LOOMS AS LARGE AS TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES. (F) USA RECOGNIZED THAT SDI HAS POTENTIAL FOR MISUNDERSTANDING AMONG PUBLICS PARTICULARLY SINCE IT CAN GIVE RISE TO NOTION THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD NO/NO LONGER BE NECESSARY AS RESULT OF INTRODUCTION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY. USA NONETHELESS WANT TO ADDRESS ISSUE OPENLY BUT RELY ON ALLIES FOR EXTENT TO WHICH OPEN DISCUSSION CAN GO ON AND CONTENT OF SUCH PUBLIC MSG. (G) CONSULTATIONS WITH USSR: INVITATION WAS MADE LAST APR. SOVIET RESPONSE WAS TO ORGANIZE IN STKHM IN JUN MTG BETWEEN SCIENTISTS, NOT/NOT BETWEEN GOVT OFFICIALS. WSHDC REJECTED OFFER ON GROUNDS THAT SUCH MTG COULD EASILY BE TURNED INTO PROPAGANDA CIRCUS. THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO FURTHER DEVELOPMENT ALTHOUGH WSHDC IS APPARENTLY RECOGNIZING NEED TO DISCUSS CONCEPT OF SDI WITH SOVIETS BUT QUOTE DETAILED DIALOGUE WILL PROBABLY HAVE TO WAIT DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGY UNQUOTE, AND (H) EUROPEAN DELS WHO SPOKE (BELGIUM, NETHS, FRG AND NORWAY) WERE OBVIOUSLY UNEASY ABOUT POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS OF SDI FOR NATO STRATEGY AND ARMS CONTROL BUT THEY ALL WELCOMED USA PLEDGE TO CONSULT THEM FULLY AS RESEARCH PROGRAM DEVELOPS.

CCC/298 101410Z YBGR6152

MASRA FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2034 10FEB84

TO EXTOTT RBR URR DELIVER BY 101430

INFO MOSCO LDN PARIS BNATO BUCST BPEST PRGUE WSAW BGRAD PRMNY GENEV
STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWLER NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CPP

DISTR MINA MINE RGB RBRD RCD RSR UGB URR IDD IDA IDDZ ZSI DMF

---DEATH OF ANDROPOV:SHULTZ STATEMENT

SEC OF STATE SHULTZ MADE STATEMENT AT APPROX 1240 TODAY ON DEATH OF
ANDROPOV.HE SAID REAGAN HAD SENT MESSAGE OF CONDOLENCE TO SOV LEADER-
SHIP AND THAT HE HAD SENT SIMILAR MESSAGE TO GROMYKO.

2.SHULTZ REAFFIRMED BASIC USA POLICY WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS BEING
READY FOR CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE USA SEEKS TO FIND SOLUTIONS TO REAL
PROBLEMS NOT/NOT JUST TO IMPROVE ATMOSPHERE.THIS INCLUDES PRIMARILY
ARMS CONTROL.HE INVITED SOV LEADERSHIP TO WORK WITH USA TO FIND WAY
TO PEACE.

3.IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SHULTZ SAID NO/NO DECISION HAS BEEN MADE
ON WHETHER PRES WLD GO TO MOSCO NOR WLD ANY DECISION BE MADE UNTIL
SOVS HAVE INDICATED WHAT FUNERAL ARRANGEMENTS ARE.STATE DEPT CONTACTS
CONFIRM NO/NO DECISION HAS BEEN MADE BUT SAY PRIVATELY THAT THEY
EXPECT USA DEL TO BE LEAD BY VP BUSH.

4.SHULTZ WAS NON-COMMITTAL ON SUBJ OF AN EARLY SUMMIT SAYING SUCH A
MTG WLD DEPEND ON IT BEING ABLE TO ACHIEVE SOMETHING.

5.SHULTZ SAID HE SAW NO/NO REASON WHY SUSPENDED ACD TALKS CLD NOT/
NOT BE RESUMED SOON.HE ALSO DID NOT/NOT THINK DEATH OF ANDROPOV.

...2

PAGE TWO UNGR2034 CONFD

CREATED DANGEROUS SIT IN WORLD USA IS PREPARED TO WORK WITH WHOEVER
EMERGES AS LEADER.

6.SHULTZ HAS SPOKEN TO DOBRYNIN TO EXPRESS CONDOLENCES AND WILL GO
SIGN BOOK OF CONDOLENCES AS SOON AS IT IS OPENED.USA WAS NOT/NOT
INFORMED OF DEATH IN ADVANCE OF PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT. //

7.REAGAN STATEMENT IS EXPECTED SHORTLY.

CCC/059 101842Z UNGR2034

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MF
Division Phoned
Person
Local Time
12400.45 0/2
MASTER FILE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDC UNGR2033 10FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 101500

INFO BNATO CANMILREPNATO BRU MOSCO LDN BONN ROME VMBFR GENEV PARIS
HAGUE OSLO COPEN ATHNS STKHM/SCDEL PCOOTT/FOWIER/AXWORTHY NDHQOTT/
ADMPCL/DACPOL/DNACPOL/CPD/DSTRATA/CIS

DISTR IDD IFB MINA MINE MINT USS DMF IDA RBR RCR RSR RBD RCD RSD CPD
ZSI ZSP UGB URR URT URE LCD LSD IDDZ

---VISIT OF ADMIRAL LAROCQUE

ADMIRAL EUGENE LAROCQUE OF CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFO PHONED TODAY TO
INFORM US THAT HE WILL BE VISITING CDA THIS WEEKEND TO SPEAK ON DIS-
ARMAMENT ISSUE TO CDN UAW ANNUAL CONGRESS. LAROCQUE SSID IT IS HIS
INTENTION TO SPEAK OUT IN SUPPORT OF PMS INITIATIVE.

2. LAROCQUE SAID HE WILL BE PROPOSING THAT AN ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF
FMS ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR.

3. LAROCQUE ALSO SAID THAT HE ESPECIALLY WANTED TO REGISTER WITH US
HIS CONCERN OVER NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND TO SAY HE ESPECIALLY
SUPPORTED PMS INITIATIVES IN THIS AREA.

CCC/059 101908Z UNGR2033

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MF

CDN EYES ONLY
RESERVE AUX CDNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L CDN EYES ONLY

FM LDN INGR0311 10FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ

INFO PARIS BONN WSHDC GENEV STKHM/SC DEL

DISTR MINA DMF RGB RCD RCR RBD RBR IFB IDR IDA IDD

REF OURTEL INGR0243 03FEB;PARIS TEL WIGR3332 08FEB ET AL

---PM INITIATIVE:DE-BRIEFING ON EASTERN EUROPEAN VISIT

FCO DEFENCE DEPT HEAD JOHN WESTON PHONED SCHRAM TODAY TO EXPRESS CONCERN THAT IDDZ/SMITH DID NOT INCLUDE LDN IN HIS POST-EASTERN EUROPEAN BRIEFING TOUR TO PARIS AND BONN. WHILE HE SPOKE IN HIS USUAL FRANK FASHION, HE WAS INTENDING TO PASS ON TO OTTAWA WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS DEPARTMENTAL VIEWS HE SAID FCO WAS QUOTE FRANKLY SMARTING THAT WE HAVE HAD TO BE BRIEFED ON SMITHS CONVERSATIONS IN BONN AND PARIS BY FRENCH COLLEAGUES RATHER THAN BY SMITH HIMSELF: PARTICULARLY IN CONTEXT OF PMS INITIATIVE, THERE ARE NUMBER OF IMPORTANT DEFENCE AND DISARMAMENT ISSUES WHERE DIRECT CONTACT WITH IDDZ/SMITH WOULD HAVE BEEN USEFUL UNQUOTE.

2. IN REPLY, SCHRAM SAID THAT OTTAWA REGARDS CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH UK AS ESSENTIAL; TIME CONSTRAINTS MAY HAVE MADE IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR SMITH TO DEVIATE OFF DIRECT ROUTE BONN-ARIS TO CDA, BUT AMBASSADOR MACLEAN HAD BRIEFED BRITISH COUNTERPART IN EAST BERLIN (IN RESPONSE TO LORD MORANS REQUEST IN OTT); AND IDDZ WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY WELCOME OPPORTUNITY TO GIVE FULL BRIEF TO BRITISH

...2

PAGE TWO INGR0311 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

HIGH COMMISSION IN OTT. SINCE WE OURSELVES HAD NOT BEEN AWARE OF SMITHS PLANS TO TRAVEL TO PARIS AS WELL AS BONN, AND HAD ONLY LEARNED OF TALKS ON RECEIPT OF BRIEFING TELEGRAM 09FEB, WE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO DISCUSS PLANS IN ADVANCE WITH FCO.

3. WESTON ACKNOWLEDGED THAT BRIEFINGS BRITISH HAD RECEIVED IN EAST GERMANY, FROM HIGH COMM HERE AND FROM FRENCH COLLEAGUE WERE HELPFUL IN TERMS OF FACTUAL SUBSTANCE; HE NONETHELESS WANTED UD5GUDC
O

REGISTER POINT THAT IMPLICATIONS OF PM INITIATIVE WERE SIGNIFICANT FOR BRITAIN: THERE ARE A NUMBER OF AREAS WHERE THERE ARE IMPORTANT DIFFERENCES, AND PERSONAL CONTACT BETWEEN CDN OFFICIALS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANNING INITIATIVE AND BRITISH COUNTERPARTS WOULD BE GREATLY APPRECIATED. FAILURE TO INCLUDE LDN IN POST EASTERN EUROPEAN BRIEFINGS WAS THUS REGARDED HERE AS SADLY LOST OPPORTUNITY.

4. COMMENT: WHILE WE IN HIGH COMM HAD BEEN AWARE OF ORIGINAL INTENTION THAT IDDZ/DELVOIE VISIT BONN, WE HAD NOT KNOWN SMITH WOULD ALSO STOP IN PARIS. WE WERE NOT INCLINED TO PRESS FOR EXTENSION OF BRIEFING TOUR TO INCLUDE LDN IF ONLY BONN HAD BEEN INVOLVED, BUT HAD WE KNOWN THAT PARIS WOULD ALSO BE IN SCHEDULE, WE WOULD CERTAINLY HAVE PROPOSED LDN AS WELL. WESTON HAS POINT IN THAT BRITISH REACTIONS ARE IMPORTANT TO LONGER TERM SUCCESS OF INITIATIVE AND WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO AVOID RISKING

...3

PAGE THREE XNGR0311 CONFD CDN EYES ONLY

IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE IGNORING OR DOWNPLAYING SIGNIFICANCE OF
WHAT ARE STRONGLY HELD VIEWS.WE THUS SUGGEST IN CIRCUMSTANCES
THAT,IF YOU HAVE NOT ALREADY DONE SO.YOU CALL IN UK HIGH COMM AS
QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE,AND GIVE THEM FULL BRIEFING ON EAST EUROPEAN
TOUR,AS WELL AS ON FURTHER POST TOUR TALKS IN BONN AND PARIS.
WE WOULD ALSO URGE THAT NEXT TIME IFB OR IDD ARE EUROPE BOUND
THEY SHOULD INCLUDE VISIT TO LDN TO HELP US REASSURE FCO ITS
SENSITIVITIES AND PERCEPTIONS ARE FULLY UNDERSTOOD IN OTT.WE
WILL NEXT WEEK ATTEMPT TO SOOTHE CARTLEDGE,DEPT UNDER SEC FOR
DEFENCE AND WELCOME VISIT BY DMF WHO IS TO MEET POLITICAL
DIRECTOR BULLARD.

CCC/253 101600Z XNGR0311

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MAJ RR
FILE

R E S T R I C T E D

FM WSAW UMGR0246 10FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ IMMED

INFO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMEN PCOOTT/FOWLER WSHDC LDN PARIS MOSCO
PEKIN BNATO VMBFR STKHM PRMNY BONN BRU HAGUE COPEN OSLO MDRID
LSBON ROME ATHNS ANKRA PRGUE BGRAD BPEST GENEV NDEQOTT/ADMPPOL/CPP/
DACPOL

DISTR MINA MINT MINE USS DMF IFB IDR IDA FPR ZSI URR UGB

---PM INITIATIVE:VISIT TO GDR:PRESS ANALYSIS

PM,HIS PEACE INITIATIVE AND REPORTS ON HIS MTGS WITH CHAIRMAN
HONECKER DOMINATED FRONT PAGES GDR NEWSPAPERS 29JAN THRU 03FEB.
REPORTS ON TOURISTIC SIDE OF VISIT WORLD PRESS REACTION AND GENERAL
INFORMATION STORIES ON CDA WERE ALSO WIDELY CARRIED.WITHOUT
EXCEPTION ALL WERE HIGHLY POSITIVE TOWARDS CDA.THERE WAS ALSO
HEAVY COVERAGE ON GDR TV.

2.NEVER BEFORE HAS CDA BEEN FEATURED SO PROMINENTLY BY GDR MEDIA.
FIRST THERE WAS LEAD-UP:NEWSPAPERS ANNOUNCED VISIT WITH FRONT PAGE
PHOTOS AND DETAILED BIOGRAPHY OF PM(SUPPLIED BY US).THEN THERE
WERE EXTENSIVE REPORTS ON ALL ASPECTS OF VISIT WITH MANY PHOTOS
AND DETAILED REPORTS.OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY(ADN)ACCOUNT OF OFFICIAL
MTGS BETWEEN TWO LEADERS WHILE NOT/NOT REVEALING ANY DIRECT
CONFIDENCES COULD ONLY HAVE BEEN RESULT OF EXTENSIVE BRIEFING OF
ADN BY GDR OFFICIALS WHO KNEW EXACTLY HOW TALKS PROGRESSED.DINNER
TOASTS OF PM AND HONECKER WERE CARRIED IN THEIR ENTIRETY(SEE CURTEL

...2

PAGE TWO UMGR0246 RESTR

0243 10FEB), INCLUDING PMS OFF CUFF REBUTTAL TO REMARKS BY HONECKER WHICH HAD PROTRAYED PM IN ANTI-AMERICAN LIGHT.

3. NEWSPAPERS RELIED VERY HEAVILY ON OFFICIAL GDR NEWS AGENCY ADN AND CARRIED VERY SIMILAR OR EVEN IDENTICAL STORIES INCLUDING EDITORIAL TYPE PIECES ON VISIT AND PMS PEACE INITIATIVE. THIS IS OF COURSE NORMAL PRACTICE IN GDR WHERE PRESS IS CLOSELY CONTROLLED.

4. AS PART OF WHAT WE HAVE SEEN FROM THIS EMB AS CONTINUING GDR SEARCH FOR INNATL RECOGNITION AND FURTHER LEGITIMACY, PRESS CARRIED EXTENSIVE REPORTS OF COVERAGE OF VISIT BY WORLDS PRESS. ALL WERE VERY POSITIVE OF COURSE AND THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO MENTION TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF CONSERVATIVE PARTY COMMENTS REGARDING EAST GERMANY IN THE HOFC OR OF DAVOS CONTROVERSY.

5. FROM OFFICIAL CDN POINT OF VIEW WE MUST BE HIGHLY PLEASED BY TREATMENT OF VISIT AND GENERAL EXPOSURE OF CDA IN GDR PRESS. WE SHALL SEND PRESS CLIPPINGS AND LTD TRANSLATIONS PERMITTED BY SCARCE EMB RESOURCES. IN MEANTIME YOU MIGHT WISH TO BASK IN GLOW OF FOLLOWING FRONT PAGE TITLES WHICH HERALDED VISIT:

A. QUOTE NEW STIMULUS FOR E-W POLITICAL DIALOGUE UNQUOTE NEUES DEUTSCHLAND 03FEB

B. QUOTE FOR ELIMINATION OF TENSIONS AND CREATION OF GREATER TRUST UNQUOTE DER MORGAN 01FEB

C. QUOTE DRIVE FOR PEACE, DISARMAMENT AND TRUST TIES CDA AND THE GDR UNQUOTE NEUES DEUTSCHLAND.

6. TODAY'S PRESS NOT/NOT YET RCVD IN WSAW AND WE ARE THEREFORE UNABLE TO COMMENT ON HOW PMS 09FEB SPEECH IN HOFC IS REPORTED.

CCC/127 101525Z UMGR0246

MASTER FILE

CORRECTED COPY
EXEMPLAIRE CORRIGE

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

R E S T R I C T E D

CORRECTED COPY DISTR LINE

FM WSAW UMGR0246 10FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ IMMED

INFO PMOOTT/AXWORTHY/COLEMEN PCOOTT/FOWLER WSHDC LDN PARIS MOSCO
PEKIN BNATO VMBFR STKHM PRMNY BONN BRU HAGUE COPEN OSLO MDRID
LSBON ROME ATHNS ANKRA PRGUE BGRAD BPEST GENEV NDHQOTT/ADMPOL/CP/PP/
DACPOL

DISTR MINA MINT MINE USS DMF IFB IDR IDA FPR ZSI URR UGB RBR RBD

---PM INITIATIVE:VISIT TO GDR:PRESS ANALYSIS

PM,HIS PEACE INITIATIVE AND REPORTS ON HIS MTGS WITH CHAIRMAN
HONECKER DOMINATED FRONT PAGES GDR NEWSPAPERS 29JAN THRU 03FEB.
REPORTS ON TOURISTIC SIDE OF VISIT WORLD PRESS REACTION AND GENERAL
INFORMATION STORIES ON CDA WERE ALSO WIDELY CARRIED.WITHOUT
EXCEPTION ALL WERE HIGHLY POSITIVE TOWARDS CDA.THERE WAS ALSO
HEAVY COVERAGE ON GDR TV.

2.NEVER BEFORE HAS CDA BEEN FEATURED SO PROMINENTLY BY GDR MEDIA.
FIRST THERE WAS LEAD-UP:NEWSPAPERS ANNOUNCED VISIT WITH FRONT PAGE
PHOTOS AND DETAILED BIOGRAPHY OF PM(SUPPLIED BY US).THEN THERE
WERE EXTENSIVE REPORTS ON ALL ASPECTS OF VISIT WITH MANY PHOTOS
AND DETAILED REPORTS.OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY(ADN)ACCOUNT OF OFFICIAL
MTGS BETWEEN TWO LEADERS WHILE NOT/NOT REVEALING ANY DIRECT
CONFIDENCES COULD ONLY HAVE BEEN RESULT OF EXTENSIVE BRIEFING OF
ADN BY GDR OFFICIALS WHO KNEW EXACTLY HOW TALKS PROGRESSED.DINNER
TOASTS OF PM AND HONECKER WERE CARRIED IN THEIR ENTIRETY(SEE OURTEL
...2

PAGE TWO UMGR0246 RESTR

0243 10FEB), INCLUDING PMS OFF-CUFF REBUTTAL TO REMARKS BY HONECKER WHICH HAD PROTRAYED PM IN ANTI-AMERICAN LIGHT.

3. NEWSPAPERS RELIED VERY HEAVILY ON OFFICIAL GDR NEWS AGENCY ADN AND CARRIED VERY SIMILAR OR EVEN IDENTICAL STORIES INCLUDING EDITORIAL TYPE PIECES ON VISIT AND PMS PEACE INITIATIVE. THIS IS OF COURSE NORMAL PRACTICE IN GDR WHERE PRESS IS CLOSELY CONTROLLED.

4. AS PART OF WHAT WE HAVE SEEN FROM THIS EMB AS CONTINUING GDR SEARCH FOR INNATL RECOGNITION AND FURTHER LEGITIMACY, PRESS CARRIED EXTENSIVE REPORTS OF COVERAGE OF VISIT BY WORLDS PRESS. ALL WERE VERY POSITIVE OF COURSE AND THERE HAS BEEN NO/NO MENTION TO OUR KNOWLEDGE OF CONSERVATIVE PARTY COMMENTS REGARDING EAST GERMANY IN THE HOFC OR OF DAVOS CONTROVERSY.

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ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MASTER FILE
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WSAW UMGR0243 10FEB84

TO EXTOTT 1DDZ IMMED

INFO WSHDC LDN PARIS MOSCO PEKIN BNATO VMBFR STKHM PRMNY BONN BPEST
GENEV PMOOTT AXWORTHY/COLEMAN PCOOTT/FOWLER

NDEQOTT/ADMPOLE/CPP/DACPOL

DISTR MINA MINT MINE USS DMF IFR IDR IDA FPR ZSI URR UGB RBR RGB

RBD RCR IMD

REF PM00112 02FEB

---TRANSCRIPTION OF PMS TOAST AT HONECKERS DINNER

TEXT PROVIDED IN REFTEL HAS BEEN CAREFULLY CHECKED AGAINST TEXT
PRINTED ALONGSIDE TEXT OF HONECKER TOAST IN MOST IF NOT/NOT ALL
GDR DAILY NEWSPAPERS. GERMAN VERSION IS COMPETENT TRANSLATION OF
ENGLISH TEXT WITH THREE SMALL DELETIONS. PMS REBUTTAL TO HONECKERS
COMMENTS ABOUT REF TO TRNTO STAR ARTICLE AND USA POLICIES ARE
CORRECTLY TRANSLATED AND CARRIED IN TOTO.

2. DELETIONS FOR RECORD ARE FROM THE FOLLOWING PASSAGES: (DELETIONS
IN BRACKETS)

A. QUOTE NOUS CONNAISSONS BIEN LES PRODRONES DE CETTE MENACE
(NUCLEAIRE: DEGRADATION INQUETANTE DES RELATIONS ENTRE WEST ET
LOUEST) RECOURS CROISSANT A LA FORCE::: UNQUOTE.

B. QUOTE EN EFFET, C EST D ABORD AU NIVEAU POLITIQUE. EN NOUS PARLANT
DIRECTEMENT, COMME NOUS LE FAISONS EN TANT QUE DIRIGEANTS DE NOS

...2

PAGE TWO UMGR0243 UNCLAS

DEUX PAYS, QUE NOUS POURRONS LE MIEUX DEMONTRER LA FORCE DU DIALOGUE
ET SA NECESSITE ABSOLUE(DANS LE MONDE TOURMENTE OU NOUS VIVONS)...
UNQUOTE.

C.JE TIENS DE BONNE SOURCE...QUE VOUS NE CROYEZ PAS AUX MIRACLES.
JE ME SUIS MOI-MEME INTERDIT(DEVANT LA COMPLEXITE DES PROBLEMS
ANQUELS NOUS SOMMES CONFRONTE)D EN PROMETTRE ET ENCORE MOINS..UNQUOTE.
UUU/127 101430Z UMGR0243

ACTION
SUITE A DONNER

MASTER FILE

Division Phoned 1002
Person EF
Local Time 1010

UNCLASSIFIED

FM WSAW UMGR0240 10FEB84

TO EXTOTT IDDZ DELIVER BY 100900

INFO PCOOTT/FOWLER BNATO LDN PARIS MDRID LSBON BONN ROME ATHNS
ANKRA COPEN OSLO BRU HAGUE WSHDC MOSCO PRGUE STKHM/SCDEL VMBFR
BGRAD BUCST BPEST

DISTR DMF IFB RGB RBR IDR IDA FPR

REF BONN 0048 03FEB YOURTEL 0121 06FEB

---CDA-GDR CONTACT ON ARMS CONTROL

AS REQUESTED I CALLED ON KRABATSCH 09FEB AND DISCUSSED
PROCEDURES ON PURSUING PROGRESS ON ARMS CONTROL AS REQUESTED
IN PARA2 OF BONN REFTTEL AS AMENDED BY PARA1 YOURREFTTEL. KRABATSCH
AGREED FULLY AND WILL PREPARE HIS PAPER FOR EXCHANGE WITH YOU
PRIOR TO ANY BILATERAL MTG WHICH LIKELYD WILL TAKE PLACE IN
BRLIN IN PERHAPS A COUPLE OF MONTHS. A FULL REPORT TO FOLLOW ON
MY RETURN BUT THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO LET YOU KNOW THERE IS
AGREEMENT ON NECESSARY STEPS TO BE FOLLOWED.

2. VICE FORMIN NIER HAS PROMISED TO PROVIDE PROPSD DATES FOR
POSSIBLE VISIT BY GDR FORMIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. AT THIS TIME
HOWEVER HE CAN INDICATE NOTHING ELSE MORE THAN THAT IT WILL IN
ALL PROBABILITY BE IN MAY

MCLAINE

UUU/127 101330Z UMGR0240

FEX-3502
(212) 246-7424

MASTER FILE

UNCLASSIFIED
NONCLASSIFIÉACTION
SUITE A DONNER
Facsimile

TRANSMISSION

fac-similé

Our file/no. dossier:

NYC

35

NO.

GRPA - 153

DATE

10 FEBRUARY 1984

PAGES:

TWO

(incl. cover)

(y compris la page
couverture)FROM: Canadian Consulate General
DU : Consulat général du Canada
NEW YORKSECTION: General Relations & Public
Affairs
Mr./Ms.
M./Mad. WeatherupTO : Mr./Ms.
A : M./Mad.Department:
Service :

EXTOTT:

IDDZ URR PCO/fowuse

Phone :
Téléphone :

BH BY OTT: PMO OTT DG OTT

Subject : NEW YORK TIMES (A-5) 10 Feb 1984
Objet :

"REAGAN AND ANDROPOV TO HEAR FROM TRUDEAU"

2/2

IDDZ UNK

THE NEW YORK TIMES, FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1984

Reagan and Andropov To Hear From Trudeau

Special to The New York Times

OTTAWA, Feb. 9 — Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau told Parliament today that he would write letters to President Reagan and Yuri V. Andropov, the Soviet leader, urging them to build on 10 mutually acceptable principles that he said formed a common ground between East and West.

Mr. Trudeau, reporting to the House of Commons on his effort to reduce nuclear arms, said visits to Western Europe, Asia and nations of the Warsaw

Pact had shown that "areas of common interest are beginning to emerge."

These were among the principles: Both sides agree that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, both wish to be free of the risk of accidental war or surprise attack and are conscious of the consequences of being the first to use force against the other, both have an interest in increasing security while reducing the cost and in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, and both "realize

that their security strategies cannot be based on the assumed political or economic collapse of the other side."

Around the World

NYT 10/2/84 (A5)

A-6 Vol. 32

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

To / A: RSN
From / De: B

F: 27 1984

Att'n:

SECURITY
Sécurité

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DATE February 10, 1984

NUMBER
Numéro 011

FILE	DOSSIER
OTTAWA	
28-6-1 - Translating Room	
MISSION	
20-1-1-1 A7	

TO
A The Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs, OTTAWA, IDA

FROM
De The Canadian Embassy, ANKARA

REFERENCE
Référence

SUBJECT
Sujet Prime Minister's peace initiative.

ENCLOSURES
Annexes

DISTRIBUTION

RSR

RWP

ZSP

The Jordanian Ambassador in Ankara has expressed to me his strong interest in the Prime Minister's peace initiative. He expressed this interest in conversation and has now written to me ... an enthusiastic letter about it. This is attached.

2. The Ambassador has close connections with Canada where he has family. He, himself, spent a few years in Canada, being married to a Canadian and teaching in Montreal. He would immigrate to Canada if he could find a suitable job. He looks and acts much more like a North American than a traditional Arab Ambassador.

h. h. h. h. h.
The Ambassador.

000279

AMBASSADOR OF JORDAN

K A R A



سفير المملكة الاردنية الهاشمية

انقرة

February 1, 1984

His Excellency Mr. Gilles Mathieu
Ambassador of Canada
Ankara.

Dear Gilles,

Thank you so much for sending me a copy of the speech presented by the Right Honourable Pierre Elliot Trudeau to the "Conference on Strategies for Peace and Security in the Nuclear Age " which was held in Ontario on October 27, 1983.

I am so gratified to see Canada, through its great Prime Minister Mr. Pierre Elliot Trudeau, take another international initiative which, if allowed to materialize, will bring much hope and peace to the world. In the past, the world became accustomed to Canada taking bold international initiatives in order to make our small planet a safer place to live in. Now, what is at stake is even greater. The very essence of life on earth is being threatened and endangered and all truly great leaders of goodwill must make their concern heard over and over again. It is very becoming of Canada, therefore, to play its traditional role of promoting peace and understanding in international affairs. Infact, Canada will not be Canada without assuming once again its much needed position in world affairs.

AMBASSADOR OF JORDAN

K A R A



مفیر المملكة الاردنية الهاشمية
انقرة

I therefore commend Canada and its great Prime Minister for this new Canadian vision and concern. I personally would very much like to be associated with this profound international endeavour.

With my best wishes and renewed thanks,

Sincerely,

Waleed M. Sadi

Ambassador of Jordan



PM Initiative
Folder

TO/À

IFB/Mr. Shenstone

FROM/DE

ZSP/J.K. Bartleman/cmd (2-7051)

REFERENCE •
RÉFÉRENCE

SUBJECT •
SUJET

Canada/US Relations

Security/Sécurité
S E C R E T
Accession/Référence
File/Dossier 28.6-1-Pruideau
Date February 10, 1984
Number/Numéro ZSP-0038

ENCLOSURES
ANNEXES

DISTRIBUTION

In the course of a luncheon discussion on another subject on February 9, Laurent Saint Georges, Chief of the CIA Station at the US Embassy, made the following comments on Canada/US relations.

2. According to Saint Georges, Canada/US relations had been severely affected by the peace initiative. Many members of the US Administration were of the view that the Canadian Government was deliberately seeking to "pick a fight" with the USA to provoke a USA reaction which could be exploited for electoral purposes in Canada. He said that this view was also shared by members of the US Embassy in Ottawa. A strong body of opinion existed for example that various statements on the part of the Canadian side over the past several months were part of a conscious and deliberate plan. The remarks of the Prime Minister regarding US "pip squeaks", "the "leaking" by the Canadian Embassy in Washington of Eagleburger's remarks in "distorted form", the statement of the Prime Minister at Davos, and the use of the East Berlin airport by the Prime Ministerial party were regarded by many in Washington as part of a deliberate effort. Saint Georges claimed that the most senior members of the Administration, including the President, had been antagonized.

3. There was a great desire on the USA side to avoid reacting in such a way as to allow Canada/US relations to be drawn into an electoral campaign. US officials were well aware of the importance which Canada/US relations had played in Canadian elections going back for more than one hundred years and had no confidence that a rational assessment of the issues would be possible. He anticipated therefore that the US reaction to the peace initiative would continue to be low key, at least for the immediate future.

4. Saint Georges also commented that he had seen reports which indicated that Canada's relations with its NATO partners had also been seriously affected. He claimed "Canadian jokes" were now current at NATO Headquarters. He added that the British were particularly upset.

.....2

- 2 -

S E C R E T

5. I told Saint Georges that the views he had outlined reflected a complete misreading of the situation. I emphasized that the Canadian peace initiative was based on a strongly held belief, shared by a wide cross-section of Canadians, as well as other members of the Alliance, that the state of East/West relations had deteriorated to such an extent over the past year that an effort on the part of interested middle powers was required to stimulate dialogue between the super-powers. I also drew on the arguments which our Ambassador in Washington and DMF had made in response to US démarches.

6. Saint Georges' remarks were made on a private basis, but it cannot be excluded that he was trying to pass a message.



J.K. Bartleman,
Director General,
Bureau of Intelligence
Analysis and Security