

Joint Intelligence Committee

(~~A.B.C.I.~~ (6 to 14) Soviet Union - General file.

File-Tex Vertical
Folder No. Sp. 2394-10



TOP SECRET

RED REGISTRY

Department of External Affairs

Subject: JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
SOVIET UNION (GENERAL)

File No. 50028-B-40

Volume ONE

From June 14 1946

To ~~Dec 16, 1950~~

JAN-31, 1950

[illegible]

ACCESS TO INFORMATION
L'ACCES A L'INFORMATION
EXAMINED BY / EXAMINE PAR
Diya
DATE / DATE:
Dec 5/94

**FOR SUBSEQUENT CORRESPONDENCE
SEE NEXT PART OF FILE**

TELETYPE Copy No. 1 of 10 copies

from THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES
To THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

IMMEDIATE TOP SECRET

CYPHER - AUTO WASHINGTON, January 16, 1950.

WA-111

50028. B/40
29/29

Joint Intelligence Committee
Done - AMN #2, 5-9 #1
Jan. 16/50 #3 by Liaison
#4 by Disney
#10 Summary

Top Secret. Please pass to Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee, Begins:

2. The establishment strength of the Soviet air forces for 1954 will be approximately 20,000 aircraft of varying types, age and performance capabilities. This number assumes that the establishment strength will remain at about the 1949 level. Included in the Soviet air forces will be the military air force consisting of the various military district air forces and at least 15 tactical air armies; a long range air force; a fighter defense force and a naval air force. Establishment strengths by air forces will be roughly as follows:

Military air force	13,000 aircraft (all types)
Fighter defense force	1,800 " "
Long range air force	1,800 " "
Naval air force	3,400 " "
Total	20,000

12. The 1954 breakdown of Soviet aircraft by type is estimated to be as follows (establishment): These estimates represent maximum capability.

Armed forces:	Fighters
	Jet 5,000
	Conventional 4,000
	Total 9,000
	Bombers
	Jet 500
	Conventional 4,000
	TU-4 (B29 type) 1,200
	Total 5,700

To THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

- 2 -

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

WASHINGTON,

Attack

Jet	?
Conventional	3,300
Total	3,300

13. Military air force. The majority of Soviet aircraft - approximately 13,000 - are assigned to the 15 tactical air armies and the various small military district air forces. This will be a tactical air force whose primary mission is the support of ground forces. Exact strength, composition, and location of the various air units can only be conjectured. There appears to be no standard tables of organization and equipment for a tactical air army and mobility of units has been stressed within the SAF. Based upon present day dispositions and future Soviet strategic considerations it is estimated that the following may be approximate 1954 dispositions of the tactical air armies:

<u>Air army</u>	<u>Military Districts</u>	<u>Regiments</u> +
1	Belo-Russia	13
2	Austria and Hungary	13
4	Poland	14
5	Odessa	17
?	Turkestan	17
11th/- 1 other	Trans Caucasus & N. Caucasus	30
9	Maritime & Dairren-Port Arthur	27
10	Far East	26
12	Transbukal	18
13	Leningrad	10
14	Carpathian	18
15	Baltic	27
16	Soviet zone of Germany	34
17	Kiev	10

14. The long range air force. The long range air force is believed to be operationally independent and under the administrative control of the Ministry of Armed Forces. It will be composed of three air armies consisting of an estimate 1800 aircraft.

TELETYPE

From THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

To THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

- 3 -

WASHINGTON, MAY 11, 1954

Composition by mid-1954 is expected to be approximately 1200 TU-4 (B-29 type) bombers, or modifications thereof, with / authorized T/E's for each type of Soviet air regiment (1949)

<u>Type</u>	<u>Aircraft in T/E</u>
Fighter	50
Attack	42
Light Bomber	42
Medium Bomber	32
Transport	32
Reconnaissance	32

Light bombers, fighters and transport aircraft making up the total. Again, based on present day dispositions and Soviet strategic considerations, an estimated 1954 disposition of this force is as follows:

<u>Air army</u>	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Location</u>
1st LR Air Army	16 regiments	Baltic, Moscow, Belo-Russian and Leningrad military districts.
2nd LR Air Army	17 regiments	Kiev, Carpathian military districts.
3rd LR Air Army	21 regiments	Far East, Transbalkal and Maritime military districts

17. Fighter defense force aircraft are assigned to some 36 air regiments and organized into four fighter defense air armies or organizations as follows:

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Regiments</u>
Central fighter defense	6 Moscow area
Northern fighter defense	8 Arkhangelsk Baltic, Leningrad and White Sea military districts.

TELETYPE

From THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

To THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

- 4 -

WASHINGTON,

Southwestern fighter defense	15	Kiev, Tauric, Trans Caucasus, N. Caucasus, Odessa, Carpathian and Volga military districts.
Far east fighter defense	7	Far East, Maritime, Transbaikal military districts and Manchuria.

20. Trends in aircraft development. The fighter aircraft types in use in 1954 will be considerably improved over the 1951 aircraft. The main advancement will be improved engines, allowing higher ceilings and greater speeds. It is estimated that the best interceptors will have maximum speeds of about 610 knots at sea level, a combat ceiling of 50,000 feet and a combat radius of 250-300 nautical miles. The main reliance for interceptors will be on turbojet and/or rocket powered types. Major developments will probably center around improvements in the pressurization systems and more reliable operation of engines at high altitudes.

21. It is estimated that by 1954 the Soviets will have night and all-weather fighters in use, with speeds of about 610 knots at sea level and with service ceilings up to 50,000 feet and a combat radius of 600 nautical miles. The effective operation of all weather night fighters is problematic.

22. Considering all factors, it is anticipated that an improved TU-4 will still be the principal vehicle for Soviet long range air operations in 1954. However, although there is no evidence that the Soviet Union is developing an aircraft with performance characteristic markedly superior to the TU-4, it must be recognized the Soviets possess a capability for producing such a bomber by 1954, if willing to invest the resources required. It is considered that in planning for new bomber type aircraft the Soviet emphasis may be directed toward fast light and

TELETYPE

From THE CANADIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES

To THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

- 5 -

WASHINGTON

medium types, probably jet powered.

23. Although no information is available to show that the Soviets are developing refueling techniques to increase the range of their long range aircraft, they must be given the capability of so doing. United States-United Kingdom experience has indicated that there are no unsurmountable difficulties.

33. Atomic weapons. It is estimated that the Soviets will have a stockpile of 120-200 atomic bombs of the Nagasaki type by mid-1954. This does not preclude the possibility of development by the Soviets of atomic weapons or greater efficiency or produced from different materials. In 1954 the Soviets will probably have three plutonium production piles in operation, although this number might be increased if new sources of uranium become available well before this time. Bomb production rate for 1954 will be approximately 40 per year. Delivery of atomic weapons will be, for the most part, by air plane. It is not believed that long range guided missiles for this purpose will have been perfected by this time. The Soviets will have sufficient aircraft and the necessary airfields from which to launch their entire stockpile of atomic bombs against the Western Powers. Ends.

CHARGE 'd'AFFAIRES

JOINT INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

- C A N A D A -

XXX SECRET
XXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXX

TO J. George, Esq.,
Department of External Affairs
Room 266, East Block
Parliament Bldgs.,
Ottawa, Ontario.

FILE REF JIBS 922-2100

DATE 12 December 1949.

The documents described below are attached for your information and
retention

xxxxxx
xxxxxx

BRITISH INTELLIGENCE SURVEY
USSR: General Survey

Copies nos. 227 and 228

Also referred to:

G. T. Glazebrook
(G. T. Glazebrook)
Director
Joint Intelligence Bureau



DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
CANADA

DEFENCE RESEARCH BOARD

S E C R E T

OTTAWA, Ontario,
7 December, 1949.

J. George, Esq.,
External Affairs,
OTTAWA, Ontario.

Dear Mr. George:-

British Intelligence Survey
USSR: General Survey

Herewith for your retention are copies
nos. 227 and 228 of the British Intelligence Survey
on the USSR, published by JIB (UK).

Please bear in mind that the information
contained in this Survey dates from mid 1948 and that
in many cases more up-to-date information is available
in the Joint Intelligence Bureau.

Yours sincerely,

for (G. de T. Glazebrook)
Director
Joint Intelligence Bureau

ENCLS.

Document kept in file-procket

TOP SECRET

November 29th, 1948.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR CREAM

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REVIEW A SECRET**

I return herewith Mr Reid's draft of a letter to the Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff, dated October 15th, and a redraft of my own of today's date, regarding the balance of armed strength between the Soviet group of countries and the Western group. I have made the following changes:

- (a) In para 2 I have left the dates blank. While Mr Reid's draft implied that a comparison with 1950 was desired, I think it worth pointing out that 1950, 1952, or 1956 would be equally suitable as far as the JIS is concerned, as we could make use of the valuable material recently collected for the joint Canada-US appreciation; while I understand that either 1950 or 1956 would suit the Planners, in view of what they know of Western rearmament programmes.
- (b) In para 3 I have put the question in such a form that it could be readily incorporated as the opening para of the requested paper.
- (c) In para 4 I have added Czechoslovakia and Luxembourg.
- (d) In para 5 I have mentioned the recent JIB paper on this subject.

GH Southam
GH Southam
JIS (XA)

Italy?
Relate to J.I.C.
programme.

SECOND DRAFT

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

November 29th, 1948

DRAFT LETTER TO THE SECRETARY OF THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

It would appear from the information available to this Department that the principal Western powers are substantially agreed that the present disparity in armed forces in being between the Soviet group of countries and the Western group, especially on the continent of Europe, is now so great that the principal Western powers should, in their dealings with the Soviet Union, attempt to gain time until the balance is somewhat redressed in their favour.

2. One of the assumptions on which this policy is based is that the armed forces of the Western world will be relatively stronger _____ years from now than they are today. This assumption will, of course, be valid only if the Western powers re-arm more quickly during the next _____ years than the Soviet group.

3. In view of the importance of this assumption, I should be grateful if the Chiefs of Staff Committee would have prepared a report on how far they consider this assumption valid. I would suggest, for the purpose of such a paper, that the problem could be stated as follows:

"To assess the present balance of armed strength between the Soviet group of countries and the Western group, and the probable balance in 19____, in order to determine whether the balance may be expected to alter between now and 19____, and, if so, whether the alteration would favour the Soviet or the Western group."

4. By "the Soviet group of countries" I mean the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Roumania, and Bulgaria; and by "the Western group" I mean the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Ireland, Iceland, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

2
5. I might suggest that it would be desirable if a table were annexed to the paper, giving estimates of national defence expenditures during the year 1948 by the countries concerned. and, if possible, estimates of such expenditures for 1949. It would be useful if a column in the table gave the expenditures as percentages of national incomes. As you are aware, JIB has recently undertaken a continuing study of the defence expenditures of most of these countries, and would be able to help greatly in the preparation of such a table.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

November 15, 1948.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRIME MINISTER

Short Term Indications of
Soviet Preparadness for War

Enclosed for your information is a copy of a letter dated October 11, 1948, from the Canadian Joint Liaison Officers, London, giving the views of the United Kingdom Joint Intelligence Committee as to whether the Soviet Union is preparing to go to war in the near future.

I would draw your attention particularly to the fourth paragraph of the letter in which the United Kingdom Joint Intelligence Committee is reported to be of the opinion that, while there is no conclusive evidence that the Soviet Union is preparing to go to war in the near future, Soviet forces are even now sufficiently powerful to undertake a limited offensive without warning.

E.R.

Returned by PM without comment.

23 Nov 48

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

November 15, 1948



**MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS**

Enclosed for your information is a copy of a letter dated October 11, 1948, from the Canadian Joint Liaison Officers, London, giving the views of the United Kingdom Joint Intelligence Committee as to whether the Soviet Union is preparing to go to war in the near future.

I would draw your attention particularly to the fourth paragraph of the letter, in which the United Kingdom Joint Intelligence Committee is reported to be of the opinion that, while there is no conclusive evidence that the Soviet Union is preparing to go to war in the near future, Soviet forces are even now sufficiently powerful to undertake a limited offensive without warning.

A copy of this memorandum, together with the enclosed letter has also been sent to the Prime Minister.

E.R.

Returned by Mr. Claxton without comment.

18 Nov 48

15.11.32(us)

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
OTTAWA

No. 3580

November 6, 1948.

19

*File
446,*

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit to you, herewith, one
copies of the paper mentioned in the subjoined schedule

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

G. G. CREV

The Canadian Ambassador,
Canadian Embassy,
WASHINGTON

for the

Secretary of State

for External Affairs.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET**

NAME AND DATE	SUBJECT
Letter from the Secretary, J.I.C. with enclosure dated 19 Oct 48	Short term indications of Soviet preparedness for war

TOP SECRET & PERSONAL

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET**

file

Ottawa, November 3, 1948.

Dear Brigadier Smith,

I return herewith copy of U.K. Appreciation,
J.I.C.(47) 7/1. Final, "Soviet Interests, Intentions
and Capabilities - General", which Group Captain Bean
was good enough to lend to my predecessor Mr. Teakles.

Yours sincerely,

G.H. Southam

G.H. Southam,
J.I.S.(XA)

Brig. J.B.D. Smith,
Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee,
Department of National Defence,
OTTAWA.



CANADA

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

JIC 1-6

TOP SECRET

Esch Information
M. Reid
M. M. M.
M. M. M.
M. L. M.
M. C. M.
M. George
+ return to
GA Southern

Robert
Aug

Less Secret

Refer Also, with Memo
PM
Acting SSEA

W.ington

CABINET SECRETARIAT

GAES

OTTAWA, October 19th, 1948.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

✓ D.M. Johnson, Esquire,
Department of External Affairs.
D.M.I.

1. I attach herewith copy of a letter received from the Canadian Joint Liaison Officers, London, dated October 11th, 1948, entitled "Short Term Indications of Soviet Preparedness for War."

for F.W.T. Lucas, Lt.-Cdr.,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

Enc.

CJLO (7)

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET REDUIT A SECRET

LIAISON OFFICERS

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

TOPSECRET

11 Hill Street,
London, W.1.

Secretary,
Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee,
East Block, Parliament Buildings,
OTTAWA, Ontario, Canada.

11th October 1948.

SHORT TERM INDICATIONS OF SOVIET PREPAREDNESS FOR WAR

Last week the U.K. J.I.C. examined the evidence which might indicate that Russia is preparing to go to war in the near future. The evidence so considered covered the period from July to 30th September 1948, and the following is the substance of the considerations and conclusions of the U.K. J.I.C.:-

2. Positive indications of Soviet preparations for war in the near future are few, indefinite and not all confirmed. The most significant indications during the period are as follows:-

- (a) The return of Soviet families from posts abroad to the Soviet Union. Comment. Although this might be an indication of Russian expectation of the imminence of war, it is far more likely to be intended either to prevent families from becoming "contaminated" by contact with the West or to keep them as hostages against the defection of their menfolk.
- (b) The possible expansion of the two cadre armies in Germany, and the report, as yet unconfirmed, that two divisions belonging to one of these formations are training near the inter-zonal boundary. Comment. This could be either an

- 2 -

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

exercise to test the expansion machinery inside the cadre formations or a means of keeping up the standard of training of specialists within them.

- (c) The fact that at present large scale manoeuvres are taking place in Germany. Comment. It is possible that these manoeuvres are being used as a cloak for regrouping.

All other positive indications noted can equally be attributed to the war of nerves, economic development and routine military re-equipment and training. As far as the Satellites are concerned, the few warlike preparations which have been made appear to be defensive and precautionary and to arise from the present state of tension in Germany which is causing almost every nation to overhaul its military machine.

3. Negative indications have far outnumbered positive, and provide strong ground for believing that Russia is not making preparations for war in the near future. No change is seen in the rhythm of Russian or Satellite industry which indicates an intention to go to war in the immediate future. There is a marked absence of information on activities which would normally have to precede offensive action. It is believed that evidence of such activity could not be completely concealed.

4. The U.K. J.I.C. are therefore of the opinion that there is no conclusive evidence that the Soviet Union is preparing to go to war in the near future. Nevertheless, they do believe that although no attempt has been made to mobilise the armed forces, or to bring army formations up to their full strength, these forces are even now sufficiently powerful to undertake a limited offensive without warning.

5. It is considered that the above will be of interest to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and the Canadian J.I.C.

R. L. Rayment
(R.L.Rayment) Lieut.Colonel,
Secretary,
Canadian Joint Liaison Officers.



FILE NO. CSC 5-14

TOP SECRET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
CABINET SECRETARIAT OFFICES,
EAST BLOCK, OTTAWA

Ottawa, August 24th, 1948


The Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee

Proposed Long Range Appreciation

1. The Chiefs of Staff at their 429th meeting held on 23rd August 1948, considered the recommendation of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC 1-9-11 of 3 Aug 48) regarding the form and scope of an intelligence appreciation required as a basis for long term strategic planning.

2. It was agreed:

- (a) to approve the preparation of the appreciation as outlined, and
- (b) to authorize a direct channel of communication to other departments and agencies of government, e.g. the Bank of Canada, the Department of Trade and Commerce and the Department of Finance, for their advice and assistance on the economic and demographic aspects of the problem.


(J.A.K. Rutherford)
Lieutenant-Colonel,
Acting Secretary.



FILE NO. CSC 5-14

TOP SECRET

L. B. PEARSON

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
CABINET SECRETARIAT OFFICES,
EAST BLOCK, OTTAWA

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

August 18th, 1948.

L.B. Pearson, Esquire,
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.

Proposed Long-Range Appreciation

1. I attach copy of a memorandum received from the Joint Intelligence Committee outlining the programme and scope of a long-range appreciation.
2. I do not expect the Chiefs of Staff Committee will be meeting this month and would be grateful if you would advise me if the programme and scope proposed meets with your approval.
3. I have asked the Chiefs of Staff to similarly advise me of their views.

(J.A.K. Rutherford)
Lieutenant-Colonel,
Acting Secretary.

Encl.

No suggestions for revision over to me. Could you view. G.R. Aug 18/48.

JIC 1-8-11

TOP SECRET

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET**

OTTAWA, August 3rd, 1948.

The Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

1. The Joint Intelligence Committee have received a request from the Joint Planning Committee for an appreciation giving a reasonable conclusion as to the approximate time at which the U.S.S.R. would be in a favourable position to enter into war against the western democracies.

2. The Joint Intelligence Committee have prepared the attached report with a request that it be submitted to the Chiefs of Staff for their approval and that, if approved, the Secretary to the Cabinet may be asked to secure the fullest co-operation from the relevant departments of government.

F.W.T. Lucas, Lt.-Cdr.,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

Encl.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

30th July, 1948.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 19

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

1. We have been considering, in consultation with the Joint Planning Committee, the form and scope of the Intelligence appreciation planning which is required as a basis for long-term strategic planning.
2. It will be recalled that the short-term strategic plan was based on a study of the probable strategy and tactics of the USSR in the first phase of a war which it was assumed would break out within a specified time. The joint plan for the defence of North America was based on an analysis of the capabilities of a potential enemy to conduct offensive operations against this continent.
3. For long-term strategic planning, however, it may be doubted whether an estimate of strategic notice based merely on Soviet capabilities would be adequate. The first requirement would seem to be an assessment of the period of maximum risk. The Joint Planning Committee are in agreement with this view, and have concurred in the following statement of the object:

To establish, for planning purposes, the period in which there will be the greatest probability of war between the USSR and the Western Powers.
4. In the first part of this appreciation we propose to examine the objectives and methods both of Soviet policy and of the policies of the principal Western Powers with a view to determining, if possible, the political circumstances in which a major war might be expected to occur.
5. The second part of the appreciation would consist of a comparison of the war-making capabilities of the two groups of countries, projected into the future as far as might be necessary to determine the period or periods of significant superiority of one group over the other group in the economic, military and scientific fields.
6. We would conclude the paper by attempting to assess the importance of the various factors which might have a bearing on the likelihood of war, in order to establish the period of greatest probability.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

7. It is clear that such an appreciation would have to be based, in part, on information which Intelligence would not normally be required to know or to assess. Not only would information concerning present Allied strengths be required, but very careful estimates would also have to be made of the economic and demographic trends in the principal Western countries and the probable effectiveness of Western military establishments at various dates in the future.

8. The Joint Planning Committee have undertaken to cooperate with us fully in regard to the military information and estimates. On the economic and demographic aspects of the problem, however, advice and assistance from other departments of government is, we think, essential. We are particularly impressed with the necessity of obtaining the best possible information on the probable economic trends in the USA and the UK, and on their economic and industrial war plans.

9. Accordingly, we submit the following recommendations:

- (a) that approval be given to proceed with the preparation of an appreciation as outlined above;
- (b) that an approach be made to certain other departments and agencies of government, e.g. the Bank of Canada, the Department of Trade and Commerce and the Department of Finance, for their advice and assistance on the economic and demographic aspects of the problem.

(also on E-8-14)
gms



IN REPLY PLEASE REFER

TO

DOWNgraded TO SECRET
REDON A SECRET

Seen by J.I.S.

OFFICE OF THE

HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR CANADA,

CANADA HOUSE,

LONDON, S.W.1.

13th July 1948

File Secret
Union Gen

Dear John,

I have had two discussions with General Strong, the results of which I think may be of interest to the J.I.S. as well as to the Under-Secretary.

You will recall that the general view of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff is on the lines that assuming a war with the Soviet Union at approximately the time when the U.S. has built up its projected 70 group air force that they would be able to defeat the Soviet Union largely by their bombing effort and particularly by the use of atomic bombs. I do not remember precisely what dates the U.S. Joint Chiefs have given as to when they think they might effectively do this but when I last spoke to Hume Wrong he told me that Lovett had expressed the view that they would be able to defeat the Soviet Union, or at least deliver a decisive blow against the Soviet Union, by means of atomic warfare and strategic bombing.

Strong has recently seen all the U.S. Directors of Intelligence and has told them that he feels strongly that their estimates are very seriously at fault. The Air Ministry here has so far withheld its report on the effect of strategic bombing against Germany during the war, largely because the air force shows up rather badly in this report. Their conclusions are briefly that German industrial production was never affected by more than 15% at any time by the strategic bombing carried out on industrial targets by the Allies. In fact at one period during the war Speer managed to increase war production by 2½ times that which existed when the bombing offensive began. This, of course, could be explained by various factors but the general conclusion of the report appears to be that the British greatly over-estimated the effect of bombing on industrial targets and in particular the effect of saturation bombing of towns on war production. As the result of this report the British do not intend to go ahead with the production

/of

J.H. Teakles, Esq.,
Department of External Affairs,
Ottawa.

DOWNGRATED TO SECRET
REDON A SECRET

- 2 -

of atomic bombs until they are satisfied that their effect would fully justify the expenditure of effort entailed in their manufacture. So far the authorities are by no means convinced that the use of atomic bombs on the Soviet Union would have any fundamental effect on their industrial output. It is in this that they differ fundamentally from the present views of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. Strong said that he had seen the briefings which were given to the U.S. Joint Chiefs by their Directors of Intelligence and that broadly speaking what they had done was to mark the industrial areas in large triangles on a map and explained that the blotting out of these areas would effectively hamper or destroy the Soviet industrial effort. Strong feels that this view is far too general and that without getting down to what precise targets might be destroyed one could come to no definite conclusion on the effect that such bombing would have on the industrial effort.

General Strong considers that the danger period for a war with the Soviet Union will probably come during the period 1951/2 when the United States re-armament programme is due to reach its peak. He has gained the impression that the United States Service authorities would probably be ready to risk a war at this time, and might, in fact, do something to precipitate it. This, of course, would produce an awkward situation from the British point of view, as their rearmament programme is designed to reach its peak in 1955/6. General Strong added that while the United States intelligence authorities had until recently feared the likelihood of a war this year, that they no longer took such an alarmist view.

Strong made an interesting suggestion which he pointed out expressed his personal view only. He thought it might pay the Soviet Union to over-run Europe and, rather than attempt to occupy Western Europe, to withdraw in, say, a year, taking with them all capital equipment. There is, of course, no evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union intends to adopt this course of action. It seems to me, however, that such action would effectively delay the possibilities of an offensive against the Soviet Union by the United States, and would avoid the occupation problems which the Germans suffered from during the war.

Strong confirmed the view that Great Britain must hold Cyrenaica and East Africa as supply bases, and must be

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET
1991

- 3 -

prepared to hold Egypt as an operational base, even though for the present they may be required to withdraw all troops. In other words, he felt that they must be prepared, in the event of war, to enter Egypt and hold it. This, of course, fits in with the general British theory about holding bases in the Middle East, and seems to make sense, particularly from the offensive point of view. Strong held out little hope of holding the Middle East (except Egypt) including most of the oil areas, should war occur in the near future.

I have given a copy of this letter to Mr. Robertson.

Yours sincerely,

Bill
—

G.G. Crean.



CANADA

JIC 1-8-11

TOP SECRET

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

CABINET SECRETARIAT

OTTAWA, July 8th, 1948.

*file JIC
JIC*

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

The Chairman,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

Intelligence Appreciation for Long Range Planning

1. I am attaching herewith a letter received from the Director of Military Intelligence with regard to the proposed appreciation referred to in JIC 1-8 of July 6th, 1948.
2. I do not intend to circulate this letter to the other members of the Committee as I expect Colonel Anderson will give his views at the meeting on Monday and the other two Directors most interested; i.e., D.N.I. and D.I.A., are away.
3. May I have this back, please, in time for the meeting on Monday.

F.W.T. Lucas
F.W.T. Lucas, Lt.-Cdr.,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

Encl.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
ARMYTOP SECRET

OTTAWA, Canada

7 Jul 48

The Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

Intelligence Appreciation for Long-Range Planning

1. With reference to your JIC 1-8, dated 6 Jul 48, I feel that the Intelligence paper required by the JPC for the purposes of long-range planning is of such far-reaching importance that the requirement should receive preliminary discussion at a meeting of the JIC before any action is taken by the JIS.
2. It will be seen that the requirement, as expressed in paragraph 3 of the memorandum from the Secretary, JPC, involves a balanced comparison between the war potential of the USSR and her satellites with that of the Western Powers. The information on the Western Powers is not readily available to JIS nor is it a subject with which Intelligence would normally be considered as competent to deal. Paragraph 4 of the JPC memorandum does not define too clearly just what the Intelligence contribution to this balancing of war potentials is to be. comparison
3. A great deal of work will be required if this appreciation is to be done properly, and I suggest that the JIC instruct the JIS to draft terms of reference with the utmost precision which, in their opinion, constitute the maximum legitimate contribution which the JIC can make to this problem. These terms of reference should then be considered by the JIC and passed to the JPC for comments. It is probable that the Secretary, JIC, could carry through this procedure without the necessity of convening a second meeting of the JIC.
4. At the same time, a target date for the completion of the appreciation should be established. I suggest the date be not before 1 Sep 48.

(Sgd) W.A.B. Anderson
Colonel

Director of Military Intelligence

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

File No. JIC 1-8.....

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Privy Council Office,
East Block.

Date: July 6th, 1948.

*File JIC
Junt*

MEMORANDUM TO: D.M. Johnson, Esquire,
Department of External Affairs.
D.N.I.
D.M.I.
D. of I. (Air).
D.Sc.I. - D.G.D.R.
D.C.I. - R.C.M.P.

Subject: Long Range Planning

1. The following document concerning the
above mentioned subject is forwarded herewith:

Memorandum JPC 16-2 of July 5th, 1948, from the Secretary,
Joint Planning Committee.

2. This matter will be placed on the
agenda of the **next** meeting of the Joint Intelligence
Committee to be held.....

Encl.

F.W.T. Lucas, LT. Cmdr.,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

C O P Y

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS MAJESTY'S CANADIAN GOVERNMENT)

JPC 16-2

TOP SECRET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

OTTAWA, 5 Jul 48

Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

Long Range Planning

1. The Joint Planning Committee have under discussion the requirements for Long Range Planning.
2. There is an urgent need for a studied estimate of the approximate time at which the USSR, in the opinion of her leaders, could enter into a war against the Western Democracies with a reasonable degree of success.
3. It is felt that a comparison of the overall economy and war potential of the USSR and her satellites with that of the Western Democracies, together with certain other factors, will indicate the approximate time at which the USSR could go to war under the conditions outlined above.
4. It is requested that the Joint Intelligence Committee prepare a paper on this subject and that the paper be so framed as to give a reasoned conclusion as to the approximate time at which the USSR would be in a favourable position to enter into a war against the Western Democracies.

(Sgd.) R.F. Walker
Major, RCA
Secretary,
Joint Planning Committee.

Mr. Teakles



CANADA

JIC 1-6-1-1

TOP SECRET

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

CABINET SECRETARIAT

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

OTTAWA, July 2nd, 1948.

D.M. Johnson, Esquire,
Department of External Affairs.
D.M.I.
D.N.I.
D.I.A.

file
JIC

*Soviet Union
of Siberia*
Circulate to:
~~Mr Reid~~
~~Mr Maynard~~
~~Mr Wallis~~
~~Mr Southam~~
~~Mr Andrew~~
~~Mr McGill~~
~~Mr Gilman~~
~~Mr MacCollum~~
~~Mr George~~
+ return to
J. M. TEAKLES

U.K. J.I.C. Paper "Evidence of Organization
of Partisan Movements in Europe"

1. On April 17th I forwarded you copies of a U.K. J.I.C. paper on the above subject.
2. The Canadian Joint Liaison officers have now forwarded copies of the main body of the paper (J.I.C. (47) 73 (0)) which I attach for your information.

J.A.K. Rutherford
J.A.K. Rutherford, Lt.-Col.,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

Encl.

3-484

ANNEX I

TOP SECRET
DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

ANALYSIS OF EVIDENCE OF PARTISAN
MOVEMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL BRIGADES

General

The Communist doctrine stresses the necessity for communism to be organized on military lines and for the use of force by the "workers" in their struggle for power. In 1900 Lenin wrote "When we have detachments of revolutionary workers, specially prepared by long training, no police will be able to master them ... what we need is military organization". Again in 1901: "In principle we cannot renounce terrorism. It is an act of war ... indispensable at a certain point of the struggle". Where they have reasonable hope of success, the Communists use constitutional means to gain power as they are now doing in France and Italy. Where it appears that constitutional means cannot bring success, they are quite prepared to use force as they are now doing in Greece. In France and Italy, where their ultimate success by constitutional means is as yet undecided, the Communist Party has a powerful hold over the police. They are thus enabled to build up a para-military force, with which to seize power if this step is forced upon them.

2. If driven to the use of armed force the Communists would undoubtedly prefer to achieve their ends by the spontaneous action of the indigenous Communist forces. Communism is however international, and the use of international forces in support of the indigenous Communists is not only a logical Communist activity but actually occurred in the Spanish Civil War. The evidence indicating the existence of these two types of forces is examined below.

Indigenous Underground Para-Military Forces.

3. Italy. A communist organisation known as the Apparato Para-militare exists in Italy. It is reported to have a vanguard of shock troops numbering 5,000 - 7,500 men, organised into nine zones covering the whole of Italy. The total strength of the force has been given as at least 100,000 with light equipment. It is not considered that it is as yet sufficiently powerful to attempt a coup d'etat in Italy, although it has been reported that it might start an outbreak of guerilla fighting in northern Italy in an attempt to embarrass the present Government. The organisation is believed to have direct contact with Soviet Agencies, and there is fairly reliable evidence that arms are being run from Yugoslavia to the Italian Communists.

4. France. The France Communist Party has an armed force variously estimated at between 100,000 and 285,000. Reliable French and British sources have stated that the Communists, if the element of surprise were achieved, could stage a coup d'etat including the use of force within 48 hours. M. Marty, a prominent French Communist, has been repeatedly reported in connection with covert militant activities with International Brigades and with Soviet and Satellite agencies in France.

5. Trieste. Little information is available as to the Communist armed forces in Trieste, but it is considered that there is sufficient evidence to show that such forces do exist.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

• Other European countries. From the nature of Communism it is logical to expect to find some form of militant activity within the Communist party of any country. There have been indications that such may exist in Belgium, Spain and Austria; but the evidence is slight and it is probable that any activity that exists is on a very small scale.

7. Anti-Communist Partisan Movements. There have been reports of anti-communist movements, which are undertaking guerilla activities in the Ukraine, White Russia, and the Baltic States, in Poland and to a lesser degree in the Balkan States. There is nothing to indicate that these movements amount to more than scattered armed bands of the "White Guard" variety. In France and Italy there are a number of anti-Communist clandestine military organisations. In Italy, individually they are of no importance, but if a means of uniting them were found they would amount to a considerable force. In France, these anti-Communist organisations are believed to be stronger than in Italy, but the disadvantage of lack of co-operation applies as well. In both cases if a communist coup d'état did not go according to plan it would favour the co-operation and organisation of anti-communist movements.

INTERNATIONAL BRIGADES

Recruitment.

8. Almost every country in Europe has been mentioned in reports of International Brigade activities. Reports of recruiting have, however, largely concentrated upon France, northern Italy and the Balkan States. Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Belgium and Germany have also been mentioned fairly frequently. Although reports of the existence of formed International Brigades is contradictory and has in fact been denied in one report, reports of recruitment and the movement of recruits to the Balkans bear some relation to each other. The bulk of reports indicate that recruits are moved under Communist auspices either through Central Europe or from Northern Italy. Reports that volunteers for the Youth Railway were used as a cover for movement of International Brigade recruits have been discredited, but nonetheless large numbers of young and ardent communists have been collected in the Balkans by this means.

9. Reports of recruitment in South West France which were persistent earlier in the year and probably had their origin in the Spanish exiles in that area, have fallen off recently, though a fairly credible report mentioned the fact that certain experienced Spanish guerilla leaders had been invited by Yugoslavia agencies to assist in "the regrouping of international forces". Such agencies as the European Federation of Resistance Movements are said to have been used to collect recruits. In France there is reported to be an organisation known as the "Centre International d'Aide aux Démocraties" which is the headquarters of the movement. This organisation has also been mentioned in another report to have its headquarters in Belgrade. There is also some evidence to connect the indigenous Communist militant forces of France and Italy with the recruiting for the so called "International Brigades".

10. From the information available we believe that an organisation exists under Communist control to recruit communists or communist sympathisers from most countries in Europe. Although the bait of joining a "Brigade" may well be held out to the more fanatical recruits, we do not believe that an International Brigade, in the sense of an armed and organised military formation, has yet been established. Evidence indicates that at present the movement of these communists is directed towards the Balkans although early in

DOWNGRAD-ED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

the year there were reports that the Brigades were destined for operations in Spain. From this we are of the opinion that there is an international organisation of Communist irregulars and that at present it is tactically sound to locate most of them in the Balkan area. We are unable from the evidence available to make any estimate of the numbers of communists that have been recruited, though we believe them to be relatively small.

Control.

11. There is adequate evidence that recruiting and the movement of these recruits is under communist control. Furthermore, many reports indicate that Soviet and Satellite agencies are directly concerned. Certain personalities including known members of Soviet Diplomatic agencies in Europe, have been reported in connection with International Brigade activities. Many reports mention a "Soviet Military Mission", whose headquarters is in Paris, and other reports mention a similar mission in Belgium subordinate to that in Paris. A Soviet Repatriation Bureau is known to exist in both these countries and this may well be concerned with the clandestine movement of communists. Milan has been repeatedly mentioned as a centre of International Brigade activity and this lends colour to many reports that recruiting of communists for International Brigades is being carried out in Northern Italy. Yugoslav agencies are reported to be in charge of the International Brigade activities in Milan, while there have been reports of Polish and Czechoslovak personalities being concerned with similar activities in France.

12. We believe, therefore, that the recruitment and movement of International Communist Irregulars is subject to an overall control from Moscow through Soviet and Satellite agencies in Western Europe. The main centres of this control in the West are probably Milan, Paris and Brussels. Paris has recently been reported as the controlling centre for Communist activities in Palestine and it is possible that a number of Communist Party activities outside the "Red Bloc" may be directed from this advanced Headquarters.

The Object of "International Brigades"

13. Whereas early reports stated that International Brigades were being formed to operate in Spain, the great majority mention Greece as the object of the "Brigades". These reports, which have stated that the Brigades were already on their way to Greece, have clearly been discredited. Furthermore, as we have stated earlier, there is no evidence that International Brigades as military formations exist. If, however, as we believe, communist volunteers are being collected in the Balkans, it is possible that it may be intended to use them in Greece. Recently, Polish and Roumanian politicians have openly called upon their people to assist the Greeks "in their fight against reactionaries". Were the Greek bandits to set up a Communist State in Northern Greece and were this state to be "recognized" by Russia and her satellites, International Brigades might well be used to assist the Greek Communists in a civil war. No doubt belligerent rights would be claimed for the Greek Communists and the Spanish Civil War held up as a precedent. Nor can the possibility be ruled out that in the future the communists may employ a similar procedure in Italy and France, where they have built up a Communist force. There have recently been reports that Communists have claimed that Austria will one day become "another Greece".

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

Degree of Readiness of International Brigades.

14. If International Brigades were being organized into military formations and trained for operations, it is probable that this would be done secretly and it would be unlikely that reliable reports would be allowed to gain currency. For this reason we believe that the many reports giving establishments, armaments and training (including parachute training) are being deliberately put about as part of a war of nerves. On the other hand, the possibility that some training is being carried out secretly in the satellite countries and that International Communist Irregulars have been organised into formations cannot be completely ruled out. There is ample evidence that the Greek Guerillas are being supplied with arms by the Balkan States. The International Brigades, if they are being formed, may therefore be armed from similar sources.

15. On balance, however, we do not believe that International Communist forces have reached a state of organisation or training which would allow them to take part in operations in the immediate future.

ANNEX II

RELIABILITY OF REPORTS ON PARTISAN
ACTIVITIES AND INTERNATIONAL BRIGADES

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

Partisan Movements

There is reliable evidence of an armed organization within the French and Italian Communist Parties. The activities of the Communist bandits in Greece is well known. There is also good evidence that the exiled Spaniards in Southern France include a semi-military body which is under communist control. In the International Territory of Trieste there is evidence of the existence of militant bodies within the Sloveno and Italo-Slovene Communist Parties.

International Brigades

2. Reports of International Brigades, though numerous, are remarkably inconsistent and contradictory. Eighty per cent of the reports available originate from certain special sources whose reliability is generally low. Of the remainder, a number are of Greek origin or are reports based on information whose reliability is not guaranteed. Despite many reports of International Brigades being used in Greece, the Greek Government have not been able to prove the presence of foreign combatants on their soil. There is, in fact, no reliable proof of the existence of an International armed formation in Europe or indeed of the preparation of such a formation.

3. Despite this lack of reliable information, the fact that a hundred reports on International Brigades have been received in six months is in itself significant. There are, however, a number of factors which may give rise to these reports:

(a) The War of Nerves.

Soviet Russia and the Communist party have frequently used threats of armed intervention in order to gain their ends. It is probably therefore that some reports of International Brigades are being deliberately put about by Communist Agencies. It is logical also that such a campaign should at present be directed at Greece. Many reports giving exact details of organization, strength and armament may well have such an origin.

(b) Anti-Communist Propaganda.

There are a number of factions in Europe that wish to discredit the Communists and it is likely that reports of International Brigades and other militant activity may originate from, or be magnified by, such sources. It is clearly in the interest of the Greek Government to prove foreign intervention in Greece and they have been making considerable efforts to produce such proof. A recent report gave details of a Greek attempt to gain evidence of International Brigade activities in Italy, and France. The agent had been unable to obtain any evidence in Italy and the little he obtained in France came from biased sources. Thus, a Communist policy of spreading alarmist reports and anti-communist attempts to publicise communist militant activities are, together, likely to give rise to large numbers of rumours and reports.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

(c) Old Comrade Meetings

A number of reports of International Brigade activities probably originate from meetings organized by ex-members of the resistance movements or ex-members of the original "Brigades". Some support is given to this theory by recent attempts to check up on addresses, stated in reports to be the headquarters of local International Brigade activity. These checks have indicated that the address, although having some connection with left wing elements, has no connection with International Brigade activities.

(d) General Communist Activities

The military atmosphere and discipline that is inherent in the Communist organization may also give rise to reports of International Brigades. This is exemplified in reports of International Brigades being connected with the construction of the Yugoslav "Youth Railway". There is good evidence that the communist youths employed on this project, although subject to a form of military discipline, were in no way an International Brigade in the accepted sense of the word. In addition, the name "International Brigade" has a certain glamour and it is possible that a number of reasonably inoffensive communists claim to be Brigadiers when in fact they are merely part of a Communist cell or organization. A number of reports of International Brigades in south-west France may have originated in this manner from the Spanish exiles in that area, most of whom are Communists.

(e) Reliability of source

It is probably well known to many interested parties that information on International Brigades is good "copy". Reports of International Brigades are easy to manufacture and almost impossible to check.

4. As a result of the above considerations, and in view of the fact that no proof has yet been secured of the presence of International Brigades in any area, we are inclined to suspect all reports of the existence of International Brigades in the sense of an organized and armed military formation. On the other hand, a certain number of reports of recruiting of communists for service in Greece, in which the words International Brigade may or may not be mentioned, do hang together, and cannot be entirely discounted. Furthermore, we have one reliable report dealing with the recruiting of Italians for service in Greece.

Mr. Thatcher

*Entered
A 9*

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET**

*file in JIC file
JIC*

TOP SECRET

File No. JIC.1-8-9..

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Privy Council Office,
East Block.

June 22nd, 1948.

MEMORANDUM TO: D.M. Johnson, Esquire,
Department of External Affairs.
D.N.P.I.
D.M.I.
D. of I. (Air).
D.Sc.I. - D.G.D.R.
D.C.I. - R.C.M.P.


Subject: **Strategic Appreciation of Soviet
Capabilities and Objectives
(JIC 4/48 (Final))**

1. The following document concerning
the above mentioned subject is forwarded herewith:

Memo of DMI - HQTS 715-10-16-1-17 of June 9th,
1948.

2. This matter will be placed on the
agenda of the **next** meeting of the Joint Intel-
ligence Committee to be held.....

Encl.


J.A.K. Rutherford, Lt.-Col.,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

C O P Y

TOP SECRET

HQTS 715-10-16-1-17 (DMI)

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

ARMY

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
9 Jun 48 **REDUIT A SECRET**

The Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

JIC 4/48 (Final)

Strategic Appreciation of Soviet Capabilities and Objectives

1. I understand from the Chairman, Joint Planning Committee that the JPC will be submitting JIC 4/48 (Final) to the Chiefs of Staff for approval in conjunction with the complementary JPC paper.
2. At the same time, I suggest the JIC should arrange to despatch copies of the JIC paper to the JIC, London, and the JIC, Washington.
3. May the procedure and policy involved in this matter be brought before the next meeting of the JIC, please.

(Sgd.) W.A.B. Anderson

Colonel,
Director of Military Intelligence.



CANADA

JIC 1-8-9

TOP SECRET

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

CABINET SECRETARIAT

OTTAWA, June 1st, 1948.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

JIC 4/48 (Final) - An Outline of Soviet
Capabilities and Strategic Objectives in
a War Beginning Before July, 1949

1. I wish to advise that the above appreciation has been approved by all members of the Committee individually and copies have been sent to the Joint Planning Committee for their information.


J.A.K. Rutherford, Lt.-Col.,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

2-1620

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA)

4/48 (Final)

May 31st, 1948.



JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
(Sub Committee CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE)

*Copies 4, 6, 34,
36 + 40 destroyed
1 June 50.
[Signature]*

AN OUTLINE OF SOVIET CAPABILITIES
AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN A WAR BEGINNING
BEFORE JULY , 1949

OBJECT

To determine the strategy of the USSR in a war before 1 July 1949, the operations which this strategy would require and Soviet ability to conduct them.

FACTORS

1. The enemies of the Soviet Union would enjoy naval supremacy and hence would be in a position to strike at Soviet territory from overseas theatres of their own choosing.
2. The only form of attack on its territory which the USSR would have to fear in the initial phase of a war would be strategic bombing.
3. The USSR would not possess the atomic bomb, whereas the allies would.
4. The USSR would not be in a position to seize or neutralize the main allied base - Canada and the United States.

CONCLUSIONS

1. In the initial phase of a war Soviet strategy would be defensive.
2. Implementation of this defensive strategy would impel the USSR to seize or neutralize those areas from which its enemies could strike at Soviet territory. The forms of attack against which the USSR would have to defend itself are (in order of urgency in time):
 - (a) Atomic bombing.
 - (b) Conventional strategic bombing.
 - (c) Land/air invasion.
3. The minimum areas which the USSR would have to seize or neutralize in order to defend itself against these forms of attack are:
 - (a) Western Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg.

-2-

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

- (b) The United Kingdom.
- (c) The Arab States (including the Nile delta) and Persia.
- (d) Greece and Turkey.
- (e) Italy (including Sicily).
- (f) Spain and Portugal.

4. With the exception of the United Kingdom and the Nile delta it is considered that all these areas could be effectively occupied by the USSR in the first phase of a war in the immediate future. The time required by the USSR to complete these operations against present forces is estimated to be:

- (a) Western Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg - D plus 60 (Denmark - D plus 10).
- (b) The Arab States and Persia :
Persian Gulf - D plus 40
Suez Canal - D plus 175.
- (c) Greece and Turkey:
Greece - D plus 40
Turkey - not earlier than D plus 90.
- (d) Italy (excluding Sicily) - D plus 75.
- (e) Spain and Portugal - D plus 180.

As a result the USSR would possess the bases from which to attempt the neutralization and ultimate occupation of the United Kingdom and the Nile delta.

5. There are two further areas the seizure of which would be of strategic advantage to the USSR:

- (a) Norway and Sweden.
- (b) North West Pakistan.

It must remain an open question whether the considerable effort involved would be worth the gain.

6. There would be no compelling strategic reason in the initial phase of a war for the USSR to conduct extensive operations against China.

OUTLINE OF PRESENT PAPER

The present paper consists of two parts. Part I reviews the overriding factors which must determine Soviet strategy and gives a summary of Part II. Part II examines Soviet political, economic and strategic interests and intentions in a number of critical areas throughout the world. While no detailed study has been included of the military factors in these areas, an estimate of Soviet capabilities affecting operations with timing is given in each case.

JIC 4/48 (Final)

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

PART I

1. - In the present paper we have considered Soviet capabilities only in so far as these affect operations which could be undertaken in the initial phases of a war from territory at present available to the USSR. This means that we have not given detailed consideration to the United Kingdom, Africa, South East Asia, the East Indies, Australia, New Zealand and South America. It would be unrealistic, however, to consider the factors affecting Soviet strategy only as they relate to the initial operations of a war. We have accordingly attempted to outline the main strategic factors which would govern the development of the war as a whole.
2. The political alignment of the powers in the world today is so clear-cut that, with few exception, Soviet strategy would not be greatly influenced by political considerations. Most countries are either firmly within the Soviet group or are unequivocally outside it.
3. Sweden represents one of the important exceptions. Swedish neutrality is a question which must seriously affect Soviet war plans in Europe. It is in the interests of the USSR to encourage Sweden to remain neutral. Should Sweden decide to align itself defensively with the West (at the moment this is unlikely) the USSR would be forced to expend a very considerable effort in conquering an economically healthy country which would be of greater use to the Soviet Union if left untouched.
4. Pakistan likewise presents a political problem. In the phase of operations considered in this paper the alignment of Pakistan would be an important factor. If it firmly refused to permit forces of either side to base themselves in its territory this would be a greater disadvantage to Canada and its allies than it would be to the USSR. This is clear from the strategic conclusion that Soviet interest in Pakistan would consist in the main of wanting to deny it to us.
5. There are certain other countries about whose desire to remain neutral there might be some doubt. Spain and Turkey are two important examples. In these cases, however, the strategic necessity of the USSR attacking them is considered to be so clear, that the question of their neutrality is largely academic. The same can be said of the countries in Western Europe, Italy, the Arab States and Persia.
6. In weighing the influence of economic factors on Soviet strategy, two principal conclusions have been applied to each possible theatre of operations. Although this paper does not include a study of Soviet war potential, it is believed that the USSR is economically capable of conducting the vast campaigns which we consider Soviet strategy to require in the initial phase of a war. This question does demand further study, however, in order to locate critical weaknesses in the Soviet war economy which might limit the period during which large forces could be maintained in the field.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT À SECRET

TOP SECRET

7. We believe, secondly, that the food resources, raw materials and industry actually or potentially existing within countries of the Soviet bloc, are of such variety and quantity that unlike Hitler's Germany, the USSR will not for the next few years be influenced in its strategy by the need to seize, for its own use, any economic assets lying in countries now outside its control. We believe that from the economic point of view alone, the USSR will prosper more quickly and more certainly by a systematic development of its own territories, than by the seizure of neighbouring agricultural and industrial areas which are not indispensable to it at its present stage of development, and which might even prove burdensome for a period of a few years.
8. It is true, however, that Soviet strategy will be vitally influenced by the intention to deny to its enemies certain valuable economic areas. The most notable example of this is, of course, the oil of the Middle East. It is not considered that the USSR will itself be dependent on this oil. It is estimated, however, that in 1949 the oil production of the Middle East would meet approximately 30% of the war requirements of the United States, the United Kingdom and their allies. The USSR must be aware of this and would therefore seek to impair the allied war effort by seizing the oil bearing areas of Persia and the Arab States.
9. The same principle would apply to Western Europe. A Soviet conquest of Germany, France and the Benelux countries would mean a staggering loss in manpower and industry to the allies. If the United Kingdom were likewise to be eliminated the resulting allied weakness in manpower alone might prove irreparable.
10. In addition to these general political and economic factors which will affect Soviet strategy in a war in the immediate future, there is a further basic factor, arising out of geographical considerations and the present distribution of armed strength between the USSR and its potential enemies.
11. A Soviet plan for war in the immediate future must be based on the fact that no direct sustained attack can be made on the major enemy - the United States. At the present time the USSR does not possess the means either at sea or in the air of carrying the war to the North American continent which will be the main base of its enemies. It is true that submarines and a small number of long range bombers could reach Canada and the United States. The destruction they could achieve, however, would not seriously interfere with the war effort of these countries.
12. Soviet strategy must be based equally upon the reverse side of this fundamental factor - that its enemies are capable, due to their control of the seas, of overseas operations which could bring the war close to vital Soviet areas. The first and most urgent concern of the USSR must be to keep such operations as remote as possible from territory, the loss of which would cripple its ability to continue the war.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

13. In the initial phase of an early war the overriding concern of Soviet defensive strategy would be to seize or neutralize those areas from which the enemy could launch atomic and conventional bombing attacks.

14. Soviet strategy will, therefore, during the period under consideration, be defensive. In the pursuit of this defensive strategy, however, the USSR will be forced initially to engage in offensive operations. The Soviet Union must extend the depth of its territories in the directions from which its enemies can most effectively attack. At the same time it must seek to deprive its enemies of any resources which would strengthen their ability to sustain such attacks.

15. The further, and unpredictable phase of war which would ensue if the USSR were successful in the defensive phase, forms no part of the present paper.

16. With this double defensive principle in mind a survey of the most probable theatres of war has yielded certain fairly definite conclusions.

17. Norway and Sweden will occupy a secondary place in Soviet war plans. As long as they remain neutral the USSR has nothing to fear from that quarter, and under no circumstances would Scandinavia ever become a serious invasion route. However, Southern Sweden would be of value to the allies in providing advanced fighter bases and anti-aircraft free routes to the borders of the USSR, and to this extent would possess strategic value for the USSR. In the mounting of attacks on the United Kingdom, Sweden would have no value and Norway but secondary value.

18. The conquest of Western Europe, Spain and Portugal, Italy, Greece and Turkey, the Arab States (less Egypt) and Persia will hold the highest priority among Soviet strategic objectives. Although these objectives would require several operations, some independent of others, they are interdependent in their final results, and taken together form the first grand step in a Soviet long range plan to win the war.

19. The conquest of Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands is essential to a subsequent attempt to neutralize or seize the United Kingdom as a strategic bombing base. It is also essential if the enemies of the USSR are not to retain the opportunity of invading from the most favourable area, the most exposed and richest portions of Soviet home territory - namely the areas west of the Urals. An essential part of this intention, at least in the long view, would be to seize the oil producing areas of the Arab States and Persia in order to weaken allied ability to wage war in the Western European theatre.

20. The USSR must assume that its enemies will attempt to secure a strong hold in the Middle East both to protect their oil supply and for the purpose of developing offensive operations in the initial phase, especially strategic bombing. An extension of the Western European campaign into Spain with the object of seizing Gibraltar would deny the allies the shortest sea line of communication to the Middle East and would thus be closely connected with Soviet plans there.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

21. A Soviet thrust through the Caucasus Mountains directed at the oil producing areas in Iraq, Kuwait, Persia and Saudi Arabia would not develop great strength unless it were combined with the overcoming of resistance in Greece and Turkey to permit the opening of a sea line of supply through the Straits, and additional land communications through Turkey. With an undefeated Turkey in the rear and an open flank on the Eastern Mediterranean, penetration southward into Persia and the Arab States would remain precarious. It would appear then that the conquest of Turkey and Greece would form an essential part of any plan to deny the Middle East to the allies. These operations, owing to the difficulty of supplying large forces through difficult terrain, would develop more slowly than in Western Europe, but would probably be attempted simultaneously.

22. We have concluded that the strategic advantages to be gained by occupying Pakistan were limited in such a way that the USSR would be primarily interested in Pakistan remaining neutral. Should it become essential to forestall an allied plan to establish bases there, the USSR would probably attempt an invasion through Afghanistan and Persia even though it would fight under the disadvantage of long and difficult communications.

23. In the Far East, Soviet ability to bring large areas of China under its control is undisputed. Inasmuch as the USSR can not strike directly at vital allied interests in this way, it is not considered that it would accord a high priority to such operations. It will be clear to the Soviet Union that China is not an area from which the allies can threaten its most vital areas. There is in consequence no compelling reason to deny China to the allies and the USSR might spare itself the effort.

24. There is not sufficient evidence to say definitely whether or not China would be invaded. It is more certain that small-scale operations in Korea, the Kwantung Peninsula and possibly the Island of Hokkaido would be undertaken, where she could at small cost strengthen her position in the Far East. During the phase of war being considered in this paper, it would appear that the Far East would not become a major theatre of operations.

~~DOWNGRADED TO SECRET~~
~~REDUIT A SECRET~~

JIC 4/48 (Final)

TOP SECRET

PART II

SCANDINAVIA (Less Finland)

Political

Norway and Denmark could hardly hope to remain neutral in the event of an early Soviet attack in western Germany, since both countries have troops there under British command. It is not impossible that within the next year they may bring themselves to defy the USSR by entering into a long-term defensive alliance with the western European states, even if (as seems likely) Sweden adheres to its traditional view that a policy of strict neutrality affords it the best protection. From the Soviet point of view, the important considerations in deciding whether to attack Scandinavia would be strategic and, to a lesser degree, economic. Political considerations would be subordinate, for it is most unlikely that the USSR would invade any of these countries unless the Soviet Government had made up its mind to occupy the whole of Western Europe. If an attack were made, the Communist Fifth Column would be small in each of the Scandinavian countries, and an anti-Soviet resistance movement would be certain to develop in a short time.

Economic

The merchant shipping of Norway, the food surplus of Denmark, the iron ore exports and technical skills of Sweden, plus the general healthy condition of these three countries make them of definite economic value to the Soviet Bloc and to that extent to the USSR herself. It is not considered that these economic considerations would provide, of themselves, sufficient reason to justify the military effort necessary to conquer the Scandinavian countries.

Armed Forces

Navy

Present Soviet bases in the Baltic Sea are quite adequate for operations of the Soviet Baltic Fleet. Seizure of Swedish Baltic bases would not therefore be a strategic aim of great importance. The use of Gothenburg combined with possession of Danish bases would, however, be necessary to control of access to the Baltic. It is considered that the Soviet Baltic Fleet, under air cover from shore-based aircraft, could defeat the Swedish Navy.

Norwegian bases would have considerable value for submarine and surface craft operations against Great Britain. Should such operations become unnecessary, Norwegian bases would cease to have direct offensive role in the naval war, and would become of value chiefly for defensive operations in the Arctic approaches to the USSR.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

Army

Because of terrain and logistic difficulties it is considered that a Soviet invasion of Norway and Sweden would be in the main airborne and amphibious. If the conquest of Denmark were undertaken it would form a small part of the general battle for western Europe. The Soviet Army, employing 25 divisions, is conceded the ability to overrun the Scandinavian countries, Norway in 60 days, Sweden in 120 days.

Air

Soviet air bases in Norway and Sweden would shorten the range for strategic bombing of the United Kingdom, although if western Europe were overrun the Scandinavian countries would have only secondary value in this respect. Iceland would be brought within extreme airborne range although such an operation would be extremely difficult. However, if these bases in Norway and Sweden were available to the Allies they would provide advance fighter escort for bombing raids on USSR and an anti-aircraft free route to the Russian borders.

The Soviet Air Force has a mixed force of approximately 800 aircraft disposed in northern USSR. This force alone, if simultaneous action is going on in western Europe would have difficulty in winning the air war over Scandinavia.

Conclusion

(a) Of the Scandinavian countries Sweden is the least likely to be attacked for any ascertainable reason. Denmark is most likely to become involved in operations in Western Europe. Occupation of Norway by the USSR would provide bases which extend the range of sea and air units but, on the other hand, Norway and Sweden are advantageous areas from which the allies could carry air operations against the USSR.

(b) Norway and Sweden are thus not objectives of the highest priority to the USSR and their seizure is not an inevitable part of Soviet strategy.

WESTERN EUROPE

Political

France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg are linked to the United Kingdom and to each other by the Treaty of Brussels, which provides for full mutual assistance in the event of an armed attack in Europe. Each of these states also maintains occupation troops in western Germany, which would involve them in war if there were a Soviet attack in that direction. It is inconceivable that a war which began anywhere in the world between the USSR and one of the signatories to the Brussels Treaty would not immediately result in military operations in Germany. It can therefore be taken for granted that France and the Benelux countries would inevitably be involved from the outset in a war between the USSR and the English-speaking countries. In such a war, treasonable activities by French Communists would be a serious, though probably not a critical, factor. The great majority of the population in France, as in the Benelux countries, would be strongly anti-Soviet. Switzerland would certainly attempt to remain neutral.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET TOP SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

Economic

It is unlikely that the USSR would derive any immediately worthwhile economic gain from the occupation of western Europe. However, the manpower and industry of this area might eventually become of considerable importance to the Soviet war effort.

Armed Forces

Navy

The advantage to be gained by occupying this area would be the availability of the Atlantic ports for use as bases from which to attack shipping to and from the United Kingdom and in the North Atlantic Ocean. These ports would be indispensable for mounting any subsequent amphibious operations against the United Kingdom.

Army

The seizure of Western Europe would be indispensable to the neutralization of the United Kingdom and to any subsequent invasion attempt. It would eliminate one of the major groups of Soviet enemies from further action in the war, and would deny the allies the most advantageous area for developing large scale operations against the USSR at some later date. Employing 65 divisions, the USSR could overcome present opposition, subdue Denmark by D plus 10, and all of Holland, Belgium and France by D plus 60. It is assumed that Switzerland would be by-passed in the initial phase.

Air

From the countries of Western Europe the USSR could develop air operations with the object of neutralizing the United Kingdom by attacks both on shipping and land targets. Seizure of this area would have the further advantages of denying the allies air bases from which they could attack western USSR, and of providing increased warning of such attacks. With aircraft based in Germany and Poland supplemented by those in Western USSR numbering approximately 6,500 in all, the USSR would be able to support the rapid overrunning of western Europe by Soviet ground forces.

Conclusions

(a) The rapid crushing of resistance in Western Europe would be indispensable to the mounting of submarine and air attacks against the United Kingdom and to any subsequent invasion attempt. It is considered that the neutralization of the United Kingdom as a strategic bombing base would have first priority in Soviet plans.

(b) The overrunning of Western Germany and France would deprive the allies of the industry and manpower of powerful countries.

(c) The loss of Western Europe would deny the allies the most advantageous approach to Western USSR.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

SPAIN and PORTUGAL

Political

The attitude which Spain would adopt in the event of an early war is not at all clear. It would probably be determined in large part by developments within the country during the initial period before the war reached Spanish borders. The possibility can not be excluded that the present government might try to remain neutral in spite of its ideological professions. It is scarcely conceivable, however, that the USSR would permit this. If a Communist government could not be obtained by an internal upheaval (and this seems improbable, for the Spanish armed forces and police are experienced in dealing with subversive activities, and the Communist party in Spain is small) it is likely that the USSR would decide on direct military action. There remains the possibility that the present regime might be replaced, with the concurrence of the Spanish army, by a government more acceptable to the Western powers. In this case, Spanish participation in the war at an earlier stage might be expected.

Portugal would be unlikely to adopt a policy of active participation unless Spain were also in the war. It would, however, be more disposed than Spain to put its facilities at the disposal of the Western powers without an actual declaration of war.

Economic

Although there is a surplus of agricultural produce, it is not in itself a sufficient strategic reason for attacking Spain and Portugal: nor is the denial of the mineral resources likely to be an important enough economic objective.

Armed Forces

Navy

Although the combined forces of both the Spanish and Portuguese Navies can not be considered to be a worthwhile target, the Spanish Merchant Marine has approximately 900,000 tons. In addition, suitable maintenance and repair facilities exist, particularly in the Mediterranean area, but also in the Atlantic. The USSR would be in a position to operate with increased effectiveness in the Atlantic, to control the Straits of Gibraltar and the western Mediterranean, and would be within easy range of French and Spanish North Africa.

Army

The principal object would be to advance south to the Straits of Gibraltar. There would be an additional negative advantage in denying the Peninsula to the allies as a possible base for a counter-offensive. It is estimated that a total of 40 divisions (15 from the forces used in Western Europe) could overcome Spanish and Portuguese forces by D plus 180.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

Air

Possession of Spain and Portugal would provide the USSR with bases for bombing attacks on North Africa and Mediterranean shipping. In addition, limited attacks could be conducted against the Azores. It can be assumed that no difficulty would be encountered in overcoming the Air Forces of these two countries. After the overrunning of Western Europe, the Soviet Air Force would be able to allot sufficient aircraft to support the ground forces advance.

Conclusions

While ground operations through the Pyrenees and Portugal would present many difficulties, the naval advantages are such as to make the operation profitable to the USSR. With the western entrance to the Mediterranean closed the mounting of allied operations in the Middle East would become critically more difficult. The retention of Crete, Greece and Sicily would perhaps become impossible if direct supply from the west were interrupted.

ITALY

Political

Italy may be admitted in the near future into the Brussels Treaty group of Western European states. This would bring it automatically into a war in which the other members were attacked by the USSR. The country is deeply divided, however, and it is not improbable that civil disturbances in the event of war would be so widespread as to neutralize any effective resistance.

Economic

Italy is not self sufficient in food stuffs, coal, oil, or minerals. Severed from Western Europe, the United States and allied oil resources in the Middle East, Italy would become an economic liability to the USSR.

Armed Forces

Navy

If Italy were overrun simultaneously with Spain, Greece and Turkey the naval advantage to the USSR would lie in the additional submarine bases from which shipping in the Central Mediterranean could be attacked. If Italy (including Sicily) provided at any time the only bases in the Mediterranean from which Soviet submarines could operate, it would of itself seriously interfere with sea traffic to the Middle East. Under suitable circumstances Sicily could be used for mounting amphibious operations against North Africa.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

Army

Ten Soviet plus five Yugoslav divisions which it is considered could be made available, would be capable of defeating the Italian Army and occupying the whole of the country (less Sicily) by D plus 75. This operation could be undertaken simultaneously with that in Western Europe and would be justified on its own merits. It could lead to landings in North Africa, and in any case would deny to the allies one of the major approaches to Central Europe.

Air

Even without assistance from the Soviet Air Force Yugoslavia is considered capable of defeating the Italian Air Force with little difficulty. After the occupation of Italy, air attack in conjunction with submarine operations could probably prohibit the passage of ships through Sicily - Cap Bon waters. In a subsequent phase the Soviet Air Force would be able to support amphibious operations against North Africa.

Conclusions

(a) Italy and Sicily would of themselves provide operating facilities for aircraft and submarines sufficient to interrupt effectively through sea traffic to and from the Middle East. If the Mediterranean were closed at Gibraltar and rendered insecure at the Eastern end, this result would have been attained regardless of the situation in Italy.

(b) In a subsequent phase of the war Sicily would be favourably located for amphibious operations against North Africa.

GREECE and TURKEY

Political

Greece and Turkey are important to the USSR principally because they flank the passage from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. Since control of this passage is a principal object of Soviet policy, it follows that the USSR would wish to see subservient governments in both these countries. The outbreak of a general war would not change the political character of the civil war now being waged in Greece. It is probable that only invasion of its territory or a direct threat to its integrity and independence would induce Turkey to go to war against the USSR. A Soviet attempt to gain complete control of the Straits would be regarded by the Turks as a cause for war. They could also be expected to fight if the USSR attempted to organize a secession movement among the Kurds in the eastern districts of Turkey.

Economic

From the economic point of view, both Greece and Turkey would almost immediately become liabilities to the USSR and produce in return no significant quantity of strategically important materials.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

Armed Forces

Navy

Control of the Straits would be the major objective to be gained by the USSR in the conquest of Greece and Turkey. The Greek Navy is relatively unimportant, although the Greek Merchant Marine would be an appreciable asset. Both the Turkish Navy and Merchant Marine are strategically unimportant. Although there are no major Greek ports, the minor ports taken in conjunction with the Turkish ports of Mersin and Izmit would give the USSR control of the Aegean Sea, and bases from which to operate in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Army

The conquest of Greece and Turkey would deny to the allies a position from which an attack could be mounted against the "under belly" of the USSR. Owing to the difficulties of terrain and communications, particularly in Turkey, Soviet progress would be comparatively slow. It is estimated that the USSR is capable of employing and supporting 5 divisions (plus 10 satellite) in Greece and of overrunning the country by D plus 40. Forty divisions could be made available for operations against Turkey. Of these it is estimated that 15 divisions would be required to pierce Turkish defences in Thrace. Initially some 8 divisions could be maintained in Asiatic Turkey. This number would increase, but as operations progressed southward, supply difficulties would limit the force committed in action to less than 8 divisions. Against Turkish forces alone, the USSR is considered capable of overcoming all opposition by not less than D plus 90.

Air

The Soviet Air Force would experience no difficulty in establishing air superiority over Greece and Turkey from presently occupied Soviet bases. From airfields in Greece and Turkey the Soviet Air Force would be within striking distance of the Arab States, Egypt and shipping in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Conclusion

(a) In securing the Straits and the Aegean Sea the USSR would protect the sea approaches to South West Russia and be in a position to conduct both sea and air operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.

(b) Occupation of Greece and Turkey would advance Soviet air bases to within 500 miles of Alexandria and advance the interception and early warning bases for defence against allied raids.

(c) The seizure of Turkey, which would be a difficult operation, would be essential to protect the flank of an operation to the Persian Gulf and to improve the supply line of operations in the Levant States and Palestine, directed on the Suez. The occupation of Greece and Turkey would deny to the allies a base of very great value in launching a counter-offensive.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

PERSIA and THE ARAB STATES

Political

The chief desire of the States comprising the Arab League is to complete the process of emancipation from foreign control. The patient attempts of the United Kingdom to find an acceptable basis for new agreements with the Arab governments have so far been unsuccessful except in Transjordan. The Arab States have not, however, shown much disposition to turn to the USSR for support, and the Arab communist movements are small and localized.

Dominating all other considerations in the immediate future will be the question of Palestine. Opposition to the establishment in the Arab world of an independent Jewish enclave is intense, and if the Arab cause were to suffer defeat there might be such a wave of anti-foreign feeling as to endanger not only the facilities which the Western powers now have, but the very existence of organized government. Conditions favourable for Soviet penetration would then have been created.

From the political point of view, an attack on the Arab States could only be disadvantageous to the USSR, for it would consolidate opposition in the non-Arab Islamic countries, such as Pakistan, as well as among all the Arab peoples.

A position of predominance in Persia has long been a principal object of Soviet policy. Since the frustration of its attempt to dismember the country in 1946, the USSR has sought by intimidation and by the encouragement of dissident elements to gain its ends. If the USSR were to resort to direct military action, it is unlikely that the Persian government would be able to offer any effective resistance.

Economic

This area possesses over 50% of the world's proved oil resources, and in 1949 would be producing some 30% of the estimated annual wartime requirements of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Western Europe.

It is not considered that any immediate advantage to the Soviet war effort would be obtained by the capture of these areas other than the use by its forces of residual supplies of petroleum stored in the area. Significant quantities of oil could not be moved into the USSR by rail and she has a potential sufficiency of crude oil within her present boundaries.

The importance to the USSR of denying this oil producing area to the allies is beyond question and outweighs the economic advantages they might obtain from occupying Western Europe.

Some 80% of the total oil reserves of Persia and the Arab States would be in Soviet hands if they limited their advance to the occupation of Persia and Iraq.

-9-

TOP SECRET

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

Armed Forces

Navy

The occupation of these areas would permit operations in the Persian Gulf, but by itself would have little strategic significance.

Army

Seizure of the important areas of Persia and the Arab States would result in the Soviet Army outflanking and encircling Turkey, and securing physical control of the oil-bearing areas of Iraq, Persia and Saudi Arabia. The USSR would not be able to support, by an L of C traversing the Caucasus Mountains, any very large force in such operations. It is considered, however, that 4 divisions could thrust to the Persian Gulf area by D plus 40, and some 9 or 10 divisions operating through Baghdad to the Eastern Mediterranean, and thence south to the Suez Canal, would be capable of overcoming Arab resistance by D plus 175.

Conquest of these areas, if combined with the overrunning of Turkey, would deny to the allies any territory closer to Southern Russia than Egypt or Pakistan from which to develop counter-offensive action.

Air

From the air point of view, Soviet possession of bomber bases in these areas would permit air operations to Egypt, the Red Sea and the northern Arabian Sea. The USSR would be primarily interested in denying these bases to the allies as potential bomber bases from which attacks against the main industrial bases of South West Russia could be directed.

Conclusions

(a) Since approximately one-third of the allied oil requirements could be supplied from this area, and the USSR has sufficient indigenous reserves, it is clear that the strategic aim of the USSR in seizing these oil producing areas would be to deny them to the allies.

(b) An advance through these countries is necessary if potential allied base areas at the head of the Persian Gulf and in Egypt are to be brought under attack.

(c) These operations form a necessary complement to operations in Turkey.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REDUIT-A SECRET

TOP SECRET

PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN and INDIA

Political

It seems likely that the Indian Government would attempt to pursue a neutral policy in an early general war. An attack on India by the USSR would be resisted, although resistance might be reduced to some extent by Soviet propaganda among the untouchables and the peasants.

If India were neutral, Pakistan might not feel able to adopt a completely independent policy. Pakistan neutrality is therefore not unlikely at the outbreak of war, although some measure of assistance would almost certainly be given to the allied forces. Sympathy for any other Islamic countries which might be invaded would not by itself be sufficient to bring Pakistan into the war.

An attack on Afghanistan by the USSR might not even be resisted, and there are dissident elements within the country which could and undoubtedly would be used by the USSR to weaken resistance.

Economic

While Pakistan has a food surplus, India has a large food deficit. India has all the potential armament industries.

Neither country would provide the USSR with any economic advantages, but Western Pakistan would be less likely than India to be an economic encumbrance to the USSR.

Armed Forces

Navy

The port of Karachi presents the one naval asset, the securing of which appears to be initially within the bounds of Soviet capability. Submarine and surface craft operating from Karachi could bring sea traffic from and to the Persian Gulf and Red Sea areas under attack.

Army

Because Afghanistan could be occupied with little effort the USSR might advance through the mountains, at least as far as Kabul and Kandahar. This would secure the only invasion routes into the USSR from Pakistan should the allies subsequently attempt this.

The USSR is capable of debouching through the Kyber Pass, the Khojak Pass (Quetta) and Kahidan (through Persia) into North West Pakistan with initially 3 divisions, and after one year about 10 divisions.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

Air

Possession of airfields in the Karachi - Quetta areas would permit air patrolling and attack, in conjunction with naval operations, over the Arabian Sea, thus interfering with sea traffic to and from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. If it were otherwise feasible, the USSR would desire to deny the allies North West Pakistan from which the Central Asian, the Karaganda and the southern portion of the Ural industrial areas could be brought under long range bombing attack.

Conclusion

(a) Possession of North West Pakistan would permit the USSR to conduct limited air and naval operations of an offensive character in the Arabian Sea area.

(b) The advantage to the USSR of denying North West Pakistan to the allies far outweighs its offensive value.

FAR EAST

Political

The Far East is probably regarded by Soviet strategists as an area of tertiary importance in which time is not a critical factor. The outbreak of a general war would not have much effect on the situation in China, where the local Communist armies already control the greater part of Manchuria and North China, and seem capable of maintaining themselves indefinitely against the Chinese National Government. Although the USSR appears to exercise little effective control over the Chinese Communist party, it would probably give any material assistance that might be required to keep the Communist Armies effectively in the field. In Korea, the withdrawal of United States forces would certainly be a Soviet objective, and to this end they would probably encourage an invasion of the South by North Koreans combined with an uprising of sympathetic elements in the US zone. In Japan, it is unlikely that the Soviet sympathizers would be strong enough to create any serious problem for the United States forces of occupations.

Economic

The principal coal, industrial and food areas of China lie north of the Yangtze River. Although appreciable mineral deposits lie in south China it is considered that they are not sufficiently accessible or vital to serve as a sole reason for military operations in this area. There would appear to be no sufficient economic reason for the conquest of China at all. Such action would at the most deny these economic advantages to Nationalist China or Japan.

The machine tool industry and surplus food of southern Korea would be useful to Soviet plans in the Far East.

- 12 -

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET TOP SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

Armed Forces

Navy

From Soviet controlled bases at Vladivostok, Port Arthur and Dairen the USSR is capable of menacing by submarine attack the shipping in the Northern Pacific, and the sea lines of communication through the South Pacific, East Indies and Indian Ocean area. The seizure of bases further south -e.g. Hongkong - would increase this capability. Without air superiority only limited amphibious landings over short distances in confined waters would be possible.

Army

It is considered that the Soviet Army could by employing a total of 40 divisions complete the occupation of Korea in 10 days and the occupation of China as far south as the Yangtze River in 150 days. As such a campaign would have very little direct affect on operations elsewhere, and as the USSR must realize that China is not a base area from which an allied counter-offensive could be undertaken directly against the vital areas of the USSR, it is not considered that Soviet action would be governed by the desire to deny China to the allies.

In addition, from the Army point of view, the difficulties of supplying large forces in the Far East and the lack of direct bearing which events here have on the vital areas of the USSR will probably result in it never becoming a major theatre of operations.

Air

It is not considered that the Soviet Air Force would have any difficulty in overcoming Chinese air resistance, but American intervention from present bases would seriously affect the balance of air power.

Since the occupation of China as far south as the Yangtze River would not give the USSR air bases from which to further attack the allies, the expenditure of effort to overcome the supply problems would not be justified. Nor would the occupation of Central China by the allies provide them with bases from which to attack further areas of the USSR that could not be bombed from presently existing bases in Japan.

Conclusions

(a) If it could be done with little effort the USSR would probably occupy the southern half of Korea.

(b) The USSR is capable of overrunning China as far south as the Yangtze River in 150 days, but there is no compelling reason why she should do so in the initial phases of a war.

13
13
DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT À SECRET

TOP SECRET

(c) In general the USSR would recognize that her vital areas are not exposed to allied action from Far Eastern bases. In consequence, unless at some later stage of a war she was forced to do otherwise she would limit her operations to the strengthening of her permanent Far Eastern interests. This might involve limited operations, in addition to the seizure of Korea, in Hokkaido and the Kwantung Peninsula.

CANADA and THE UNITED STATES

Political

It is assumed that Canada and the United States would be allies in a war against the USSR.

Armed Forces

Navy

As the Soviet surface fleet is not capable of conducting major fleet actions against the combined fleets of Canada and the United States or the movement of large forces by sea, the main naval threat is the submarine arm. Soviet submarines are capable of isolated bombardment of coastal targets and the destruction of Canadian and American shipping.

Army

The USSR is capable of dropping air-borne troops in small numbers on the most western portion of Alaska.

Air

The USSR could attack a small section of Canada and the United States by air on a limited scale. If considered advantageous they would be capable of one-way air attacks covering the industrial areas of the whole continent.

Conclusion

The USSR is not capable by armed action at the present time of seriously interfering with the functioning of North America as the major allied base.

TOP SECRET

OTTAWA, May 8, 1948.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

The Acting Chief of the General Staff,
Department of National Defence,
OTTAWA, Canada.

I refer to General Foulkes's letter of April 10, 1948, under reference HQS 715-10-16-1-6 (DMI), concerning the desirability of instructing the Joint Intelligence Committee to prepare an appreciation of Soviet aims, strategy and capabilities.

I agree with General Foulkes that a comprehensive study by our joint staff of Soviet interests, intentions, and capacity to wage war might well prove useful as a basis for military and strategic planning. As you know, it was felt in this Department that a general analysis would probably be more valuable if based upon a series of studies of Soviet policy in different parts of the world. In present circumstances, however, I agree that it might be worth attempting a general analysis before the completion of the regional studies. I understand that the J.I.S. is already preparing such a study, and I have instructed the Departmental member accordingly.

Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

QUOTE No. HQS 715-10-16-1-6 (DMI)

TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
ARMY

OTTAWA, CANADA,
10 Apr 48

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

The Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
OTTAWA, Ontario.

JIC Appreciation

Soviet Aims, Strategy and Capabilities

1. You will be familiar with the programme for the Joint Intelligence Staff for the period 1948/49 which was circulated by the Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee 29 Jan 48 and was concurred in by all the members of that committee. This programme made provision for an appreciation of the aims, grand strategy and capabilities of the Soviet Union to be completed by 30 May 48.
2. Some weeks ago, the representative of your Department informed the Joint Intelligence Staff that there was some doubt as to whether your Department would be willing to participate in the preparation of such a paper. As a result, no progress in this matter has been made by the JIS to date. I understand, however, that this week your JIS representative has confirmed that your Department will now be willing to contribute to this paper.
3. My object in writing at this time is to stress the importance which I attach to this project. Unless we are to base our military and strategic planning entirely on United Kingdom and United States estimates of the situation, it is urgently necessary that the Canadian JIC produce an independent paper on this subject. I attach Copy No. 28 of a paper which has been prepared hastily in DMI but which may give some indication of the kind of study I have in mind. Admittedly DMI's paper is out of balance, particularly with respect to the opinions expressed outside of the strictly military field. However, I feel it was necessary that at least a preliminary examination of this matter should be made.
4. I would be grateful if you would confirm your agreement with the importance of instructing the JIS to proceed urgently with this project.
5. Kindly acknowledge receipt on the duplicate copy of this letter.

Charles F. Faulkner
Lieutenant-General,
Chief of the General Staff.

TOP SECRET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Cabinet Secretariat Offices,
East Block, Ottawa.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET**

19th March, 1948.

C.G.S.
C.A.S.
C.N.S.

U.K. J.I.C. Appreciation - Russia

1. Attached is copy of a report JIC (47) 7 (Final) by the U.K. Joint Intelligence Committee, assessing the interests, intentions and capabilities of the Soviet Union.
2. The Secretary, Canadian Joint Liaison Officers, London, points out the following:

"It will be noted that this paper is dated 6 Aug 47, and although the J.I.C. recommended that copies of this report should be made available to the Commonwealth Governments, for a number of reasons (mainly political) only a very limited circulation was possible at that time, and the paper was therefore not passed to the Commonwealth Governments. It is also understood that it was the wish of the Prime Minister that only a very limited distribution of this paper was to be made within the Ministry of Defence.

"This report has now been endorsed by the U.K. Chiefs of Staff, who have no objection to it being made available to the Canadian Chiefs of Staff for their personal information, but request that the highest security precautions should be observed in safeguarding this report.

"It is further understood that the H.M.G. do not now intend to issue this report to the Commonwealth Governments, as they feel that the various Governments may consider the paper out of date. In this connection this paper is to be brought up to date and it is intended that the revised report on similar lines will be produced by July 1948. Nevertheless, it is considered that it may be of interest to see the views of H.M.G. which were held in August 1947, and although the paper is out of date in some respects it is still considered valuable as a background paper. In this connection, paragraph 58 to 61 should be fully expunged and the following substituted:-

'61. From calculations based on the available information, we do not think that, before 1957, the Soviet Union will possess enough atomic bombs to achieve a decisive result, by these means only, even against the United Kingdom alone.'

Cont'd

"Further, it is understood the Ministry of Defence feel that the fundamental principles, capabilities and resultant policy which are set out in the paper still hold good, except in so far as subsequent events have overtaken certain countries, e.g., Czechoslovakia and recent Russian pressure on Finland, although although indeed such trends were forecast in the report."

3. You will note that the U.K. Chiefs of Staff request that the highest security precautions be observed in safeguarding this report. I take it that this is intended also as a restriction on circulation.

(Sgd)

J.A.K. Rutherford, Lt.Col

for (W.W. Bean),
Group Captain, RCAF,
Secretary.

Enc.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

28

Copy No.....

14 Feb 48

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

AN APPRECIATION OF THE
WORLD STRATEGIC SITUATION

Prepared at the Direction of the BCS (Plans)
by the Directorate of Military Intelligence

OTTAWA CANADA
14 Feb 48.

TOP SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WORLD WAR II SITUATION

Table of Contents

PART I - OBJECT

Object	1
Assumption	1

PART II - POSSIBILITIES OF WAR

Introduction	1
Aims of the Powers	1
Circumstances under which a war may occur	3

PART III - MILITARY SITUATION OF THE WORLD
PERIOD "A" - 1948 - 1960

USSR and Satellites	4
Western Powers	5

PART IV - SOVIET STRATEGY IN A WAR DURING THE
PERIOD 1948 - 1960

Strategy	6
Objectives	6
Defensive Measures	7
Counter Measures	7
Opposition to be overcome	7
Allocation of Forces	7
Timing	9
Garrisons	10
Subsequent Activity	11

PART V - MILITARY SITUATION OF THE WORLD
PERIOD "B" - 1960 PLUS

USSR and Satellites	11
Western Powers	11

PART VI - SOVIET STRATEGY IN A WAR AFTER 1960

PART VII - CONCLUSIONS

ATTACHMENTS

APPENDIX "A"

Military Situation - USSR and Satellites
Period "A" - 1948 - 1960

APPENDIX "B"

Military Situation - Western Powers
Period "A" - 1948 - 1960

APPENDIX "C"

Military Situation - USSR and Satellites
Period "B" - After 1960

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~
~~REDUIT A SECRET~~

APPENDIX "D"

Military Situation - Western Powers
Period "B" - After 1960

MAP "P"

Estimated Soviet Allocation of Forces
for the invasion of Western Europe
and the Middle East - Period "A".

MAP "Q"

Estimated Soviet Garrison Forces for
the occupation of Europe and the
Middle East - Period "A".

AN APPRECIATION

of

THE WORLD STRATEGIC SITUATION

PART I - OBJECT

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

OBJECT

1. (a) To estimate when and under what circumstances a world war may take place.
- (b) To predict the strategy of the USSR in a world war.
- (c) To assist in the assessment of the military capabilities of the USSR in the event of hostilities.

ASSUMPTION

2. It is assumed that the USSR will be capable of constructing atomic bombs from the year 1952.

PART II - POSSIBILITIES OF WAR

INTRODUCTION

3. The Soviet Union and the United States of America are at present the only nations with sufficient war potential to wage large-scale, long-term warfare. It is likely that they will remain so in the foreseeable future.

4. While certain other nations and blocs of nations may augment considerably their economic and military potential, they will be unable to attack or resist either the USSR or the USA without the active support of the other. This paper therefore deals with the possibility of war between the USSR and the USA. Those other nations which possess significant military potential are considered in relation to this basic question.

AIMS OF THE POWERS

5. USSR

- (a) The Soviet rulers are Communists, and in accordance with their tenets, have as their objective the establishment of Communism throughout the world. They believe in the validity of their philosophy and consider it their duty to establish it by every means at their disposal regardless of its acceptability to the majority of the people in any community or country. At the same time the men in power in the Soviet regime are Russian and are determined to ensure that their country dominates the Communist world which will result from the achievement of their aims.

- (b) They believe that the leaders of the Capitalist states will eventually attempt to precipitate a war with the USSR in order to prevent the establishment of world Communism. They therefore aim to make the USSR militarily invincible and with due regard for the lessons of Russian history are determined to eliminate the economic backwardness which is her chief weakness. The fact that this entails great hardships on the part of the people causes no more concern to the masters than do the ruthless methods employed by the security police for the suppression of the resulting disaffection.
- (c) It is believed that the Soviet rulers sincerely hope to achieve their aim of world domination by actively supporting Communist infiltration and by creating economic chaos within the Capitalist states. If her enemies undertake a preventative war they are determined to have Russia prepared. If, however, infiltration is unsuccessful and the peace is undisturbed, it is believed that as soon as the balance of military power is in her favour, the Soviet leaders will attempt to achieve their aims by force of arms.

6. USA

- (a) The USA, for the first time in its history, finds itself in the position of being the only power capable of leading the defence of its own political philosophy.
- (b) The American leaders are clearly aware of the threat contained in the aims of the Soviet Union. They also realize that the balance of power held by them is the only obstacle to Soviet aggression and their principle aim is to ensure that it does not slip into the hands of the Soviet rulers.
- (c) In order to prevent a transfer of the balance of power the US leaders have decided to oppose any further spread of communism by subversion or pressure and are prepared to do this by military and economic measures. The US Government has stated that it will "support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure". This support has been provided in the form of military aid to Greece, Turkey, and China. The USA has also undertaken to provide material assistance in the form of consumer and capital goods to those countries of Europe whose economic conditions leave them suitable for Communist exploitation.
- (d) The US leaders, supported by the American public believe that by the ensurance of free institutions and the removal of unhealthy economic conditions the remaining countries of the world will not embrace Communism and the expansionist aims of the Soviet rulers will be defeated.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

- (e) In the event that these methods are unsuccessful and the balance of power tips in favour of the Soviet rulers, either through the further spread of Communism or the increased military might of the USSR, the policy which the USA will employ will largely depend on the mood of the American public.

CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH A WAR MAY OCCUR

7. During the next few years, while the balance of military power rests with the USA, the struggle between the expansion of and resistance to Communism will continue. It is not considered probable that either side will, without provocation, commence an aggressive war during this period.

8. There is, however, the possibility that the Soviet rulers may carry their policies of infiltration, actions by armed minorities, diplomatic pressure and violent propaganda too far and convince the US leaders and the US public that their only recourse is to use military force.

9. On the other hand, the USA, inexperienced in international power politics, may pursue her policies in such an aggressive manner, in what the USSR regards as her spheres of influence such as Greece and Turkey, that the Soviet regime becomes convinced that Russia is about to be assaulted. Measures such as the negotiation of a strong alliance against the USSR might equally well be misinterpreted as a threat of aggression and goad the Soviet Union into striking first.

10. The possibility exists that another nation may commit an act which will draw the larger powers into conflict. This is considered unlikely, particularly in the case of the Soviet Satellites whose foreign policies are under the strict control of Moscow.

11. While not considered probable, it is realized that an unpremeditated, accidental, war may start within the next few years.

12. As long as men with the ideology of the present regime in the Soviet Union are the rulers of Russia, and there is no foreseeable possibility of their displacement, they will aim at world Communism. If their efforts, short of war, are unsuccessful, it is believed that they will plan an aggressive war as soon as they have created a sufficient military preponderance to suit their purpose. On the assumption that Soviet scientists will be capable of constructing atomic bombs from the year 1952 and in view of the Soviet programme of economic expansion, it is estimated that without acquiring control of additional industry, the USSR may be able to embark on an aggressive war by approximately 1960.

13. If, in the meantime, the Soviet Union is permitted further territorial expansion this date may be slightly earlier.

14. The possibility of USA launching a premeditated war is not considered in this paper.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REVERT A SECRET

15. With a view to determining Soviet strategy and capabilities in the event of an accidental war a survey follows of the military situation of the world during the period 1948 to 1960 (Period "A").

PART III - MILITARY SITUATION OF THE WORLD

PERIOD "A" - 1948-1960

USSR AND SATELLITES

16. As long as they are under the state police the population of the USSR will be politically reliable. The Satellites are firmly under the control of Moscow but at present only a few of their citizens support Communism. During this period, it is anticipated that police-state methods will improve their reliability considerably. If the Satellites and the USSR are invaded it is reasonably certain that many disaffected citizens would welcome the opportunity to assist in the overthrow of Communism.

17. Soviet economy is at present incapable of supporting a large scale war but ruthless methods and tremendous efforts are being employed to develop her basic industry and resources. The Satellites are included in this program and their economies are being integrated with that of the USSR. As the period progresses Soviet economy will approach a position where a full scale war can be maintained.

18. In the scientific field, the Soviet will probably acquire the atomic bomb and will develop the capacity to employ BW and CW successfully. Although the USSR can employ long range missiles as developed by the Germans, it is unlikely that for greater ranges she will have more than a subsonic V 1 type missile of poor accuracy by 1960.

19. The Soviet Army, fairly well supplied with good equipment, is the strongest in the world. Its staff techniques are primitive and prohibit the high degree coordination of arms and flexibility now standard in the British and US Armies. Training too is somewhat elementary by Western standards. Their doctrine of massing tanks, artillery and aircraft for the support of their infantry together with the calloused acceptance of heavy casualties has proved effective against a first class enemy. While, division for division, they cannot match the US or Britain, their mass is formidable. Satellite Armies are poorly equipped and will remain so until the Soviet rulers are convinced of their political allegiance to Moscow.

20. The Soviet Air Force at the end of World War II was equipped with a large number of aircraft of simple but rugged design mainly intended for the close support of the Army. The Soviet had neither a long-range bomber force nor the facilities to defend herself against one. Since World War II serious efforts have been made to build a strategic air arm and adequate defences for long-range air war but it is believed that only towards the close of the period 1948 to 1960 will her industry be adequate to maintain a full scale long-range air war against targets beyond Eurasia and North Africa.

21. The surface forces of the Soviet Navy are too weak to try conclusions with the British or US Navies. It is unlikely that they will be strengthened sufficiently to alter this position by 1960. The USSR has, however, a strong submarine force and by concentrating on construction of the German Type XXI as developed by the close of World War II she will be capable of seriously threatening the sea communications of the Western Powers.

22. The military situation of the USSR and Satellites during Period "A" is treated more fully at Appendix "A" attached.

WESTERN POWERS

23. Led by the United States and Britain the remaining non-Communist countries of Europe and Asia are endeavouring to retain, or obtain, free political institutions. This battle with the Communists in the political field will probably become more intense year by year. As a counter to the unscrupulous propaganda emanating from Moscow, the US has shown signs of being prepared to adopt more aggressive methods of public enlightening of her own.

24. A war in the immediate future would find many of these countries torn with internal strife and armed Communist bands would take direct action to assist the USSR. However it is believed that as the American efforts to rehabilitate the economy of these countries begins to take effect the attraction for Communism will diminish and as free institutions are strengthened so will the Governments concerned adopt measures to curtail the activities and restrict the power of the remaining Communist fanatics.

25. During the period the economic potential and military strength of the US should increase but Britain and the remaining countries will be fully engaged in a struggle for economic rehabilitation. Very little effort will be spared for military preparedness. The USA has announced its intention of stock-piling certain raw materials not available on the North American continent.

26. The USA and Britain lead the world in scientific achievement. For the duration of the period it is expected that compared with the USSR they will maintain a higher degree of efficiency and more extensive capabilities for the employment of atomic weapons, BW, CW and long range missiles.

27. The US Armed Forces will probably remain at a strength of approximately one million men but if the planned conscription program is introduced, the period required for mobilization should be much shorter than in previous wars. The US Air Forces and Navy are the largest, the most powerful, and the best equipped in the world. They are likely to remain so throughout the period. In the event of war the Army will be mainly dependent on equipment left over from World War II.

28. The Military Situation of the Western Powers during Period "A" is treated more fully at Appendix "B" attached.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REVERT A SECRET

PART IV - SOVIET STRATEGY IN A WAR DURING
THE PERIOD 1948 - 1960

STRATEGY

29. The lack of Soviet military industrial potential vis-a-vis the US will force the USSR, in the event of a war within this period, to acquire such further industrial and natural resources as are militarily within her capabilities in order to accumulate as rapidly as possible, sufficient potential to defeat her major foe, the USA. Her strategy will, of course, further demand that such prizes, once gained, shall be protected from enemy interference. At the same time the USSR will take all measures possible to reduce the war potential and the morale of the Western Powers.

30. The Soviet Union will rely almost entirely on the use of mass to overwhelm her foes. A very strong call will be made to the workers and, in particular, to the members of the Communist Party in foreign countries for direct action to assist in their "liberation" by Soviet forces, but there is evidence to indicate that the Soviet leaders have had ample opportunity to realize that while many foreign nationals embrace Communism as a means of improving their material welfare, there are very few indeed who are willing to become the tools of the Soviet imperialists. Nationalist Governments, provided they show determination, should have little difficulty in eliminating those few disciplined fanatics who are dangerous. It is believed that, in view of this, the Soviet planners will count mainly on superior forces for the attainment of their objectives.

OBJECTIVES

31. It is believed that Soviet capabilities will limit the USSR to the following objectives:

- (a) Western Europe, comprising Denmark, the Low Countries, France, Spain, Portugal and Italy.
- (b) Scandinavia.
- (c) The Middle East, comprising Greece, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Transjordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Lebanon.

These objectives are examined further in paras 32 - 34 below. Lack of amphibious capabilities would prevent seizure of any strongly defended and overseas areas such as the UK, Iceland, the Azores and Japan. It is considered that China and South East Asia offer such meager gains in return for a considerable necessary effort, that they will be disregarded. The same is considered to apply to India and Pakistan, but the oil resources of Northern Afghanistan will be seized.

32. Western Europe is essential on account of its industrial potential, both in order to deny it to the enemy and to exploit it for Soviet use. Further, the occupation of this area would give the USSR a base for the neutralization of the UK and would deny the enemy a lodgement area for a land attack by the easiest route into the Soviet Union. Finally, the occupation of Gibraltar would close the Mediterranean to British and American vessels.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUCED A SECRET

-7-

33. Scandinavia is strategically well-placed as a first step towards the delivery of air attacks on the Western Hemisphere and has, in addition, natural and industrial resources, particularly of iron and steel and possibly uranium. Moreover, the population can only support small defence forces.

34. The Middle East provides perhaps the quickest and easiest return of any of these objectives. The prize of oil in this area is needed both by the USSR and the Western Allies and its capture therefore represents a double advantage. Furthermore, domination of the Middle East interrupts British communications and denies the Western Powers a base for an attack on South Russia.

DEFENSIVE MEASURES

35. The defence of these areas may be considered under two headings:-

- (a) Defence against land and amphibious attack.
- (b) Defence against air attack.

36. Defence against land or amphibious attack entails the provision of sufficient garrisons and sufficient naval craft to destroy attacking forces. Defence against air attack necessitates the occupation of or neutralization of enemy bases, or the ability to destroy enemy aircraft carriers. From bases on Continental Europe and Asia, the Soviet Air and Naval Forces will take aggressive action to neutralize all Allied bases within striking range.

COUNTERMEASURES

37. At the same time the USSR will wish to secure bases from which to interfere with Allied war potential. Easy prizes such as Spitzbergen and South Korea will be seized with this object in view.

OPPOSITION TO BE OVERCOME

38. For the purpose of this paper the only opposition to Soviet aims taken into consideration is that provided by local national forces, i.e. forces of those countries actually invaded, plus the present occupation forces in Western Germany and Greece, and British garrisons in the Middle East. In order to provide for the possibility of further British and US forces being despatched to the assistance of local national forces, the Soviet High Command will retain a powerful reserve.

ALLOCATION OF FORCES (See Map "P" attached)

39. Western Europe

The forces mobilisable within one month by the countries in opposition to the Soviet are estimated to be:-

	Number	Manpower Equivalent in Soviet Divisions
Germany		
US Troops	100,000	4
British Troops	120,000	5
Denmark	35,000	24
Holland	40,000	
Belgium	40,000	
France	490,000	

~~TOP SECRET~~

-8-

Spain	420,000	17
Portugal	60,000	2
Italy	200,000	8

40. The armies of Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France are of fair quality and their terrain is easy for an attacker; the Spanish Army is of moderate quality, while that of Portugal is poor, but the country is difficult for an invader; the Army of Italy is of low quality. It is considered probable that a few divisions would be assigned to watch Switzerland in the initial phase. The allocation of ground forces therefore might be on the following lines:-

	<u>Soviet Divisions</u>	<u>Satellite Divisions</u>
Germany, Low Countries, Denmark & France	60 X	-
Spain & Portugal	25 X	-
Italy	10	5
	<hr/> 95	<hr/> 5

X - 10 of these will be employed in watching Switzerland.

X - A total of 40 Divs will be used, including 15 used in the French campaign.

41. Scandinavia

The forces mobilisable within one month are estimated at:-

	<u>Numbers</u>	<u>Manpower equivalent in Soviet Divisions</u>
Sweden	625,000)	
Norway	50,000)	27

The terrain is very well suited to defence and the quality of the armies is high. The allocation of Soviet ground forces might be 35 Divisions.

42. Middle East

The forces mobilisable within one month are estimated to be:-

	<u>Numbers</u>	<u>Manpower equivalent in Soviet Divisions</u>
Greece	140,000 X	6
Turkey	575,000	23
Iran	85,000)	
Iraq	32,000)	
Palestine	-)	
Transjordan	3,000)	
Egypt	56,000)	11
Saudi Arabia	41,000)	
Syria	17,000)	
Lebanon	6,000)	
Yemen	20,000)	
British troops in Middle East (excl Palestine)	70,000	3
X Plus 5,000 British troops.		

-9-

43. Except for Turkey, the armies are poorly equipped and in some cases morale will be low. Apart from Turkey the country, though flat, in general has poor communications. In Turkey the natural difficulties are considerable, though communications are better. The allocation of troops might therefore be:-

	<u>Soviet Divisions</u>	<u>Satellite Divs</u>
Greece	5	10
Turkey	40	5
Remainder of Middle East	25	
	<u>70</u>	<u>15</u>

44. Apart from the campaigns mentioned above it is estimated that five divisions will be employed in seizing Northern Afghanistan and ten divisions in occupying Korea.

45. The total of troops allocated to these campaigns is 215 Soviet Divisions and 20 Satellite Divisions out of estimated total strengths as follows:-

	<u>Soviet Divisions</u>	<u>Satellite Divisions</u>
M. Day	178	40
M. plus 30	320	60

46. The Soviet Air Force will be employed mainly for the support of the Army and appropriate allotments will be made to Commanders of the ground forces for this purpose. Fighter forces will be disposed to deal with anticipated British and US air attacks while a portion of the Long Range Bomber Force will be directed to carry out raids on the UK and USA from Siberia and Scandinavia.

Any available atomic bombs will probably be used in these raids rather than on Europe and Asia.

47. The operations of the surface forces of the Soviet Navy will be directed in the support of the ground forces with most activity taking place in the waters off Scandinavia and in the Eastern Mediterranean. The submarine force will have as its tasks the interception of enemy naval and amphibious forces, the isolation of the UK and the destruction of US and UK merchant shipping.

TIMING

48. It will be of great advantage to the Soviet High Command to seize these objectives before the British and US can produce field forces. It is therefore believed that all these campaigns will start simultaneously. Very tentative timings of completion are:-

Western Europe

Occupation of Germany, Low Countries, Denmark, France and Italy. D + 60 to D + 90

Occupation of Spain and Portugal D + 150 to D + 270

Scandinavia

Occupation of Norway and Sweden D + 60 to D + 180

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUCED A SECRET

Middle East

Occupation of Greece	D + 30 to D + 40
Occupation of Iran and Iraq	D + 30 to D + 40
Occupation of Turkey	D + 60 to D + 90
Occupation of remainder of Middle East Countries	D + 120 to D + 180
Occupation of Afghanistan and Korea	D + 10 to D + 20

GARRISONS (See Map "Q" Attached)

49. The areas overrun, as described in the preceding paragraphs, will require garrisons:-

- (a) To protect them from enemy assault,
- (b) For internal security purposes,
- (c) To carry out attacks on allied territory, e.g., UK.

50. France, Denmark and the Low Countries are suitable bases for air and eventually amphibious attack on the UK and have an important industrial potential, while, as recent experience shows, their populations are adept at resistance work. Moreover, the Northern coast of France is the most likely point of allied re-entry into the continent. Italy will not provide a considerable internal security problem, although Greece will. Neither of these two countries, however, has any large industrial potential. Spain and Portugal will be a possible area of re-entry into Europe.

51. Scandinavia has some industrial potential, while the population is likely to be difficult to handle.

52. In the Middle East, oil resources in South Persia are vulnerable, but populations, except in Turkey, are not likely to establish significant resistance movements.

53. In every case the great distance of the overrun areas from the USSR, and the inadequacy of the communications, will necessitate reserves being near the scene of possible action.

54. Assuming that the USSR could finally mobilize 500 divisions and the Satellites 60, the distribution of garrisons might be as follows:-

	<u>Soviet Divisions</u>	<u>Satellite Divisions</u>
NW Europe	70	-
Italy	5	10
Spain & Portugal	40	-
Germany & Austria	50	-
Soviet Satellites	25	45
Scandinavia	25	-
Turkey	30	-
Greece	5	5
Rest of Middle East	30	-
Afghanistan	5	-
Korea	10	-
Soviet Far East	80	-
Reserve in USSR	125	-
	<u>500</u>	<u>60</u>

DOWNLOADED TO SECRET
REDUT A SECRET

It is possible that a proportion of the 125 division reserve in the USSR will not be mobilized until militarily necessary, owing to the need for maximum manpower in industry.

SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITY

55. Once the USSR has eliminated any immediate threat to her security she will endeavour to build up a striking force capable of defeating the USA. The final phase will then resemble Soviet strategy in Period "B", 1960 (Part VI).

56. The strategy which will be employed in the event that the USSR is forced to withdraw is not considered in this paper.

PART V - MILITARY SITUATION OF THE WORLD

PERIOD "B" - 1960 PLUS

USSR AND SATELLITES

57. It is believed that the rulers in Moscow will have tightened their control of Russia and the Satellites by 1960 and that they will continue to do so. Economically the Soviet will have approached the stage where a major war can be supported and she will have atomic bombs under production. Her manpower together with that of the reliable Satellites will be adequate for all military requirements and her armed forces including a long-range bomber force will be well equipped with up-to-date material. Her major weaknesses will be the unexpressed dissatisfaction of her people and the extremely centralized system of control. At Appendix "C" is a more detailed description of the military situation in the USSR and Satellites from 1960.

WESTERN POWERS

58. Politically and economically the Western Powers should be in a much stronger position than at present. Militarily their major advantage will be the possession of a larger stock of atomic bombs than the USSR. Their ability to resist or attack the Soviet Union will depend principally on whether their intelligence is able to warn them of Soviet mobilization. Further details are included at Appendix "D".

PART VI - SOVIET STRATEGY IN A WAR AFTER 1960

59. After 1960, as has been seen earlier in this paper, present indications are that the USSR may feel herself strong enough to engage successfully in war with the USA. The succession of five-year plans are designed to enable her to go into full production during the period 1955-60. She will then be in possession of significant numbers of atomic bombs and her technique in BW and CW will have been considerably advanced. In order to take full advantage of surprise, and its consequent effect on morale, it is likely that she will mobilize secretly and open the war by attacks with the above weapons carried by aircraft and rocket firing submarines on the UK and North America in order, if possible, to paralyse her chief opponents from the

-12-

beginning. Targets are likely to be Allied strategic striking forces, morale and economy. They will be attacked continuously. At the same time she will still wish to overrun Europe and the Middle East, and possibly India and China, in order to acquire the industrial resources there located, and to deny them to her enemies. This she will carry out simultaneously with the attacks on Britain and on America.

60. The timing of any significant air or sea-borne landing in America will depend largely on the success of the mass-destruction weapons initially employed. It is likely that some months must in any case elapse before any such attack can be launched. This may or may not be after the end of the campaigns in Europe and the Middle East. In the meantime the course and scope of these operations will depend to a large extent on the success of Communism in these areas. If anti-Communist forces have prevented the spread of Communism, Soviet strategy may be approximate to that described in Part IV, although the Soviet timetable would be slower. If Communism has increased its hold then the Soviet campaign will be proportionately easier, and the military potential available for re-deployment against the American continent will be greater. The success or failure of the attacks on Britain and America will have considerable influence on the attitude adopted by the remaining non-Communist Governments.

PART VII - CONCLUSIONS

61. Unless they achieve their aims by other means, the Soviet rulers, as soon as they believe they are in a military position to do so, will attack the Western Powers. Adequate atomic bombs and industrial potential will be available by approximately 1960.

62. Through a misunderstanding on the part of the USSR or the Western Powers an accidental war may occur before 1960, although this is unlikely.

63. In the event of an accidental war, unless vigorous counter-measures are taken by the Western Powers, the USSR will harass North America, overrun Continental Europe and the Middle East, build up her offensive potential to a point where she can assault Britain and North America with weapons of mass destruction and ultimately invading forces.

64. If she launches a premeditated war from approximately 1960 on, the Soviet will mobilize secretly and strike without warning at the UK and North America with atomic bombs, BW and CW. Simultaneously land forces will attack Western Europe, the Middle East, and possibly India and China. As soon as conditions permit, air and sea-borne forces will attempt to occupy the UK and North America.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

DOWN
REDUIT A SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

MILITARY SITUATION - USSR AND SATELLITES

PERIOD "A" - 1948-1960

USSR

POLITICAL

1. The Soviet people are completely shut off from sources of news outside their own country, and are deluged with propaganda from domestic sources glorifying the Soviet State. This propaganda, together with the deterrent influence of the very powerful Secret Police, has succeeded, and will succeed, in quashing open dissatisfaction, and there is no doubt that the Soviet Government would carry the people with them in a new war. While there is undoubtedly grumbling in private, there is neither the will nor the ability to promote open opposition to the Government and it is unlikely that the opportunity for such opposition will come until the closing stages of an unsuccessful war. At the same time the very centralization which insures such close control over the people is a potential source of weakness, since capture or neutralization of the central authority would lead to disproportionate lack of control. It is believed that provided an invading army gave guarantees not to annex the Russian territory, bound itself to establish a democratic regime, and adhered to humane principles of conduct, any call by the Soviet rulers for a patriotic defence of the USSR would meet with somewhat less response than that which occurred in World War II.

2. It is unlikely that there will be any change in the above conditions in the period up to 1960.

GEOGRAPHIC

3. The accidents of geography have provided the USSR with a number of natural advantages and disadvantages. Firstly, her vast size is strategically at once an advantage and a liability. On the one hand it provides space for manoeuvre and retreat while stretching the enemy's line of communication, and it allows vital industrial areas to be located far from its borders; on the other hand, the enormous length of the Soviet frontiers requires dispersal of the available defending forces and necessitates a vast transport system which today is totally inadequate.

4. From the point of view of topography, the disadvantage of lengthy frontiers is mitigated by the fact that, although they are extremely long they are largely located in regions which are all but inaccessible and their natural defences are thereby strengthened. On the other hand, Russia is a country with virtually no mountain barriers and the whole of her western and most valuable region is ideal country for an invader, as history shows.

5. Climatically, much of Russia is subject to hot summers and very severe winters, and military operations are thereby considerably hampered, especially for those not hardened to such conditions or equipped to meet them.

6. Finally, although many of the newer industrial areas are safe from attack, certain important regions are by virtue of their immovable natural or other resources in a vulnerable position. These are the Caucasus area with its oil, the Ukraine with its food and

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

industrial resources, and Western European Russia with its industrial areas and communications network. These areas will therefore require special measures for defence.

ECONOMIC

7. Assuming that output of basic commodities represents a realistic criterion of economic potential, Russia reached the lowest ebb in her wartime economy at the end of 1942 when at least a third of her pre-war industrial capacity and nearer a half of her total pre-war agricultural capacity was located in territory overrun by the Germans. The 1940 and 1947 production figures in respect to these basic commodities are given below and it will be seen that Soviet production figures have now, in general, reached 1940 level.

8. The present five-year plan ending in 1950 is concerned mainly with the rehabilitation of heavy industry to lay a firm foundation for the development of manufacturing industry in the subsequent five-year plan, 1950/55. To this end Russia is at present not only investing capital to the extent of a quarter of the national income, but also ploughing back into the basic industries many of its products at the expense of the manufacturing industries. Assuming that she achieves her 1950 target for heavy industries and succeeds in her plans for developing the manufacturing industries in the 1950/55 plan, her level of production of finished goods in 1955/60 will exceed quite disproportionately her present level or her level in 1950.

9. The production figures for 1940 and 1947, the planned figures for 1950, and the target figures for 1960, are given below:-

	1940	1947	1950	1960
Coal	165 mil tons	195 mil tons	250 mil tons	Approx double 1950 figures
Iron	15 mil tons	14.6 mil tons	19.5 mil tons	
Steel	18.3 mil tons	21 mil tons	25.4 mil tons	
Oil	51 mil tons	24 mil tons	35.4 mil tons	50 mil tons
Power	48 mldrds of kwhs	56 mldrds of kwhs	32 mldrds of kwhs	Approx double 1950 figures
Motor				
Tot	150,000 units	208,000 units	500,000 units	figures

MANPOWER

10. There can be no doubt that the USSR has more than enough military manpower for any reasonable requirements. Estimated data regarding males is given in the table below:-

	1942	1955	1960
Total Numbers			
aged 19-50	35,600,000	42,150,000	46,300,000
Fit, trained, aged 19-50	11,600,000	16,000,000	19,000,000
Fit, trained aged 19-35	7,600,000	12,300,000	15,300,000

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

SCIENTIFIC

11. Atomic Bombs

The USSR may be expected to produce and test her first bomb sometime between 1950 and 1953, with mid-1952 as the most likely date. Her rate of bomb production should rise somewhat after the first year or two to a maximum of not more than 12 per year. It will be limited by her present supply of uranium ore, assuming, of course, that no other foreign ore becomes available to her and that no additional discoveries of importance are made within her borders.

12. Long-Range Guided Missiles

Development of the V-2 is taking place along lines projected by the Germans. Work is proceeding on design of the A-9 (winged V-2 with about 400-mile range) and there is also a slight indication of preliminary design work on a 900-mile supersonic missile.

The V-2 with 200-mile range could be in production by 1950 at a rate of 25 per day but England would be the only reasonable target. A much longer range - greater than 1000 miles - seems necessary to be useful to USSR against America. It is not believed that a supersonic missile with this range can be developed within ten years, but a radio-guided jet bomber with a fair accuracy could be developed within 5 years if desired.

It is likely that a V-1 type of subsonic missile can be developed within five years with at least 1,000 - mile range, but there is no evidence that the USSR is working on such a project. In any case, this weapon would have poor accuracy and be vulnerable to AA fire and fighter attack.

13. Short-Range Guided Missiles

Interest has been shown by the Soviets in the German Wasserfall, Rheintochter and other A-1 guided missiles. A version of such a weapon with radar guidance and proximity fuzing should be ready for production within five years.

14. Biological Warfare

The USSR undoubtedly has the necessary scientists and facilities for carrying out an extensive BW research and development program. There is evidence to support the belief that such work has been going on for a number of years and the Soviet Union may well be capable of effectively utilizing this mode of warfare at the present time. Certainly the country could wage open, large scale BW before 1960.

15. Chemical Warfare

Soviet scientists have at least as much knowledge of the outstanding German nerve gases as the British and US chemical warfare groups had acquired at the end of World War II.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

In addition to the above, it is probable that Soviet chemists are experimenting with other types of agents, but the likelihood that these will surpass the overall efficiency of the nerve gases by 1960 is not great.

16. Radar and Electronics Equipment

It is believed that Soviets are pushing development of early-warning and AA radar equipments, as well as VT fuzes, remote-control systems for guided missiles, infra-red devices, and microwave links for communications. VT fuzes in usable quantities should be available approximately five years hence. Militarily useful quantities of radar equipments will probably be available in five years.

ARMED FORCES

17. Size

The standing armed forces are estimated in 1948 at:-

Ground forces	2,600,000
Air forces	450,000
Naval forces	600,000
MVD Security troops	400,000
Total	4,050,000

It is estimated that the ground forces could be expanded on mobilization to a total of 320 divisions of approximately 8,000,000 men within one month. The build-up of ground force divisions by types in eight months is estimated to be as follows:-

	<u>1. Day</u>	<u>after One Month</u>	<u>After 8 Months</u>
Infantry	110	235	365
Armoured	45	60	75
Airborne	3	5	10
Cavalry	20	20	50
TOTAL	178	320	500

In view of the need for additional manpower in industry it is believed that the Soviets will aim at a gradual reduction of their armed forces. Such a reduction will, of course, be entirely dependent on the international situation. Provided that no major war appears likely, it is estimated that there might be a reduction in the standing armed forces to a figure of approximately 2.75 million over the period 1948-60. Mobilized strengths will be correspondingly lower.

18. ARMY

(a) Training and Morale

Owing to the lower general standard of education in the Soviet Union it is considered that the overall standard of training will be lower than in Western armies. Much effort will however be put into the establishment of an efficient intelligence service, whose peacetime activities will be aided by the operation of foreign Communist parties.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

The greatest shortcomings are likely to be in the fields of staff work, communications, and command and are likely to be exemplified by lack of speed in executing changes in plan, slowness in mounting new operations, and in lack of adequate control over subordinate units in fluid warfare. It is likely that performance in airborne and amphibious operations will be particularly low, due to the shortcomings mentioned above, as well as to lack of experience.

Morale is likely to be very high, resulting from incessant propaganda, consciousness of victory in the recent war, and the high living standard enjoyed by the Soviet Army compared with the rest of the population.

(b) Equipment

The medium tank is the T-44 which is vastly superior to the T-34(85) which in turn was more than a match for the medium tanks used by the Germans and the Western Allies during World War II. The T-44 tank is armed with either an 85-mm or 100-mm gun with excellent penetrative characteristics. The heavy tank is the "Joseph Stalin 3" which is armed with a 100-mm or a 122-mm gun both of which are excellent weapons. This tank is the best available in quantity to any country including the UK and the USA. The USSR are developing a super-heavy tank which is in reality a super-heavy AFV equipment. The main armament of this vehicle is thought to be the 152-mm gun which would be most useful in close support operations and in an anti-fortification role. Regardless of the eventual production of the super-heavy tank the T-44 medium tank and the JS-3 heavy tank will continue to be the AFV's the Soviet would use in the event of war within this period.

Soviet anti-aircraft guns are on a par with anything the Western Powers can produce. Such necessary modern AFV equipment as VT fuzes and radar fire control devices should be available in quantity within five years. Nevertheless, the training of Soviet specialists is behind schedule and this may limit AFV efficiency.

Soviet Army anti-tank guns are among the best in use anywhere in the world. The USSR have few new model field and medium artillery weapons but the World War II equipment on hand is available in large numbers and these are simple, mass-produced weapons capable of meeting the Soviet tactical concept of mass artillery fire plans and the low standard of technical training common to the Soviet gunners.

Field artillery type rockets have continued to play a large part in the Soviet Army since World War II and at present the Soviet equipment is as good as any in use by the US and the UK.

The USSR have undertaken the large scale production of various American type vehicles which were supplied them under Lend-Lease. By 1960 the Soviets may be expected to have large quantities of these vehicles.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

The Soviets have, it is believed, no large scale amphibious training establishments at present and it is not thought likely that they will produce equipment specifically for amphibious operations by 1960. There are indications, however, that the Soviets are reproducing a version of the US amphibious truck. It is highly probable that the Soviet will, like other powers, tend toward the idea that most if not all organic equipment must be air-transportable. To date there have been no indications of such a trend but it can be expected by 1960.

Air Force

(a) At Present

The overall strength of the Soviet Air Force and Naval Air Force is estimated to be 450,000 with 14,000 aircraft in operational units as of 15 Dec 47. Approximately 45 percent of the Air Force strength is located outside the borders of the USSR. Approximately 5,100 aircraft are in Occupied Europe and 1,150 in Korea and Manchuria. The Yugoslav Air Force, which in all probability would participate in any major Soviet air effort in Europe would of all the Satellites be in the best position to supply aid to the USSR. Only the air units stationed in Germany, Austria and Roumania are considered in assessing Soviet capabilities in Europe. Soviet units in Bulgaria and Roumania are not within tactical striking distance and should hostilities develop, reinforcements from bases in the USSR rather than from the South Balkans probably would be provided.

Soviet air strength now based in Germany, Poland, Austria, and Hungary probably would prove sufficient to support the rapid over-running of Western Europe by USSR Ground Forces.

(b) By 1960

By 1960, technical, scientific, industry and training will have shown a fairly major effect on the Soviet Air Forces. It is estimated that there will be some 1,800 fighters and 3,500 ground attack aircraft as well as 3,000 bombers and transports giving a grand total of 11,300 aircraft. In addition to this war air fleet there will be some 5,000 transports in the Civil Air Fleet, available for troop transport in the event of war. It is further estimated that a likely 70 percent of this huge pool will be disposed in European Russia and Eastern Europe.

By 1960, or even as early as 1955, performance of Soviet aircraft will be almost the same as that of the Western Powers. Bombers may have somewhat a greater range than 5,000 miles while fighters with a service ceiling of 50,000 feet and speed of 630 miles per hour will be armed with a recoilless gun and radar directed rocket or rockets. Radar coverage will probably not exceed a range of 300 miles. With bombers cruising at 550 miles per hour and the limit on radar effectiveness, fighter interception will be difficult.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUCED A SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

-7-

20. Navy

The present strength of the Navy is 587,000 men with the following vessels:-

- 5 battleships
- 1 monitor
- 20 heavy cruisers
- 3 light cruisers
- 100 destroyers
- 49 destroyer escorts
- 308 submarines
- 28 sloops

and miscellaneous craft of varying kinds.

At present, as a naval power, the USSR lags behind the UK and US in naval technique and development. There is a wide gap between the Soviets and the US in the production of ships as well as sea power. It is extremely improbable that by 1960 the situation will be rectified by the construction of conventional ships, particularly heavy ships.

The Baltic Area has been the most important ship-building section of the country, but the Caspian and Far East have been enormously developed and their capacity is unknown.

To embark on a large building program of capital ships at this time would not only alarm the Western Powers into a naval race, but would be very expensive and wasteful for USSR. There would be little chance of overtaking the US and they could expect to find costly vessels obsolete soon after they were completed. Furthermore, the pattern of naval warfare in the future has not yet sufficiently developed to indicate the types of ships which will be most effective in the future.

The only type of ship whose place in future maritime warfare is certain is the submarine. This is largely due to the great lag of anti-submarine methods behind submarine development. It is submarine development and production that would be most profitable to the USSR in the next ten years, particularly in a war against the Western democracies whose economy is dependent on a heavy volume of merchant shipping.

It is estimated that by 1960 between 500 and 2000 "interim" [≡] submarines may be in service and also that the "true" [≡] submarine may be in general production to replace the "interim" models.

≡ "Interim" Submarine - A submersible capable of extended cruises partially submerged (schnorkel) and with a fairly high submerged speed. The German type XXI is an example of this type.

≡ "True" Submarine - A submersible capable of extended cruises, fully submerged and possessing a high under-water speed. (Does not need to snort and has speeds up to 30 knots submerged for considerable periods).

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
/ REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

-8-

APPENDIX "A"

SATELLITES OF THE USSR

The countries here considered as satellites of the USSR are Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Roumania.

POLITICAL

21. The domination exercised by the Soviet Union over these countries is due firstly to the threat derived from their geographical position, and secondly to their Communist parties, whose power varies from country to country. The four Balkan countries are completely under Communist domination, and although there must be a considerable amount of political opposition to the existing regime none of it is vocal. Hungary is only slightly removed from this class. In Poland there has up till recently been more opposition, but since the departure of Mikolajcik a ruthless tightening of control has taken place. Czechoslovakia and Finland are countries where Soviet influence is least felt of all. Both these countries have traditional economic and cultural ties with the West, and opposition to Communism has been able to flourish with comparative freedom. However, for military reasons no less than economic, neither of these countries could survive if the USSR decided to deploy all available force against them, although this might invite reactions by the Western powers which Russia does not desire.

22. In the event of war with the West it is certain that the USSR could bring in with her all the satellites except the last two mentioned, and it is most probable that these would also support her. The opposition in all these countries would, however, form a vast potential fifth column, which, if suitably organized would be valuable to an opponent.

23. The only change in the situation described above likely before 1960 is an intensification of the hold of the USSR over these countries.

GEOGRAPHIC

24. The Soviet Satellites form a defensive bastion for the USSR, protecting that flank from which past invasions of the country have come and about which she feels most apprehensive for the future. In addition Finland protects the approaches via the Baltic. This bastion is of an average depth of some 400 miles and is provided with a communications network superior to that of the Soviet Union. It includes no considerable natural barriers in the shape of mountains, rivers or deserts.

ECONOMIC

25. (a) Czechoslovakia

In Western Czechoslovakia one half the people live by industry and commerce while in the east more than two thirds of the people are peasant farmers. This makes for economic stability. The two most important industries are those producing iron and steel (including important munitions industry) and the textile industry. Economically, Czechoslovakia has the greatest war potential of any of the Satellites, with her well-developed munitions industry, agricultural self-

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REVERT A SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX "A"

-9-

sufficiency, and a source of uranium in Northern Bohemia.

(b) Poland

One of the most important factors in Polish economy is her exportable surplus of coal, while her most serious deficiencies are machinery of all kinds and rolling stock. On a long term view her surpluses will include wood, cereals, textiles, iron and steel.

(c) Roumania

The biggest economic asset is a considerable petroleum industry. Apart from this the country has no military economic importance.

(d) The remainder of the Satellites have little economic importance and are characterized by a preponderance of agricultural production, virtually complete absence of heavy industry, inadequate communications and reliance on the Soviet Union for arms and other items of military economic importance.

MANPOWER

26. It is estimated that the number of fit men of military age in the Satellite countries is approximately 15 million, of whom perhaps, in the event of war, 3 million might be armed and equipped. The number of fit might increase to 20 million by 1960.

SCIENTIFIC

27. The Satellites have no significant scientific potential. Any important scientists will be removed to the USSR.

ARMED FORCES

28. Size

The standing armed forces of the Satellites are estimated at present as under:-

	<u>Ground Forces</u>	<u>Security Troops</u>	<u>Air</u>	<u>Navy</u>	<u>Total</u>
Finland	19,000	3,000	2,000	4,000	28,000
Poland	165,000	130,000	7,000	2,000	304,000
Czechoslovakia	120,000	30,000	9,000	--	159,000
Hungary	10,000	10,000	--	--	20,000
Yugoslavia	240,000	100,000	6,000	13,000	359,000
Albania	50,000	15,000	400	400	65,800
Roumania	100,000	30,000	9,000	3,000	142,000
Bulgaria	<u>60,000</u>	<u>50,000</u>	<u>2,000</u>	<u>3,000</u>	<u>122,000</u>
Total	764,000	368,000	42,400	24,400	1,199,800

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
/ REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

-10-

APPENDIX "A"

It is estimated that these forces might on mobilization increase to about 1,500,000 (60 divisions) ~~By M plus 30.~~ There is no evidence to indicate that any major change in the overall total of satellite troops will take place before 1960.

29. Armies

(a) Training and Morale

The standard of training of these troops will not be high, with the exception of the Czech and Polish armies. Morale will be, in general, low, and there is no doubt that any troops whose reliability was doubtful would not be used outside their own frontiers. These latter might amount to as much as 70 percent of the total.

(b) Equipment

Finland

There is little or no information available on present day Finnish armament. It is highly improbable that in line with the Soviet reparation plan for Finland that there is much more than a small store of small arms weapons in the country. Finland is capable of producing sufficient small arms weapons and mortars to arm troops which she might raise.

Poland

At present Polish first line armament is being supplied by the USSR but to date the supply of arms has fallen far short of that required to arm the standing Army adequately. Poland is known to possess the following items of first class Soviet equipment.

Tanks	- 800
Artillery pieces	-2,700
Med Mortars	-1,000

Czechoslovakia

Armament available to the Czechs early in this period is a collection of German, Soviet, British and Czech equipment of all types. Toward the end of the period the Czechs will have produced a whole series of excellent modern small arms and artillery weapons which will be used to re-equip the Army. Czech tanks which will probably follow German trends will not be comparable to those in use by the USSR, the US and the UK.

Hungary

At the end of World War II Hungary was armed with a collection of German and native Hungarian equipment. Recently, however, the Soviets are known to have been providing arms and equipment but detail as to the type and quantity of this equipment is unknown.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
RESULT A SECRET

-11-

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

Yugoslavia

Yugoslav armament is a collection of German, Italian, British, American and Soviet equipment with the latter predominating. The Yugoslavs have improvised SP equipment by mounting various anti-tank and AA guns on the US light tank chassis. On the whole Yugoslavia possesses a comparatively complete collection of first class arms capable of significant performance.

Roumania

Roumanian first line armament is principally German equipment. However, the recent Roumanian negotiations have probably provided Roumania with various items of Soviet equipment as well.

Bulgaria

Bulgarian first line armament is principally German with a few items of Soviet equipment being used to expedite modern training methods.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REBUT A SECRET

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

MILITARY SITUATION - WESTERN POWERS

PERIOD "A" - 1948 - 1960

Including

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

UNITED KINGDOM

FRANCE

LOW COUNTRIES

DENMARK

GERMANY AND AUSTRIA

ITALY

SWITZERLAND

SPAIN

PORTUGAL

SWEDEN

NORWAY

TURKEY

GREECE

MIDDLE EAST

AFGHANISTAN

INDIA AND PAKISTAN

CHINA

JAPAN

LATIN AMERICA

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TOP SECRET
APPENDIX "B"

POLITICAL

1. It is not anticipated that internal political changes in the US will alter to any appreciable degree the foreign policy of her leaders. The attitude of the American public will have an important influence on the firmness with which the leaders carry out their policy. If the USSR continues with its present unscrupulous propaganda and obstructional tactics there is no reason to suppose that public opinion will withdraw its support for determined action, but it is equally possible that if Soviet propaganda adopts a less offensive tone, the enthusiasm of the American public for firm measures may dwindle. This latter contingency is not considered likely since the dictatorial rulers of the Soviet Union must continually blame some foreign scapegoat for the hardships they are inflicting on the citizens of Russia. Otherwise, the regime, itself, would be the object of criticism.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. The geographic position of the US renders it relatively invulnerable to invasion. The many natural defence lines provide for a defence in depth. Certain strategic areas are, however, extremely vulnerable to air attack, namely, Sault Ste Marie, and the communications and industrial centres of US. Sufficient Air Bases are available which added to the highly developed commercial system provide an excellent system for air operations. Communications are highly developed now and with development will meet the requirements of a future war.

ECONOMIC

3. The USA has the capacity to out produce the Soviet Union by at least 100 percent. This margin will be reduced if Western Europe and the Middle East are overrun. In the production of arms and ammunition, however, the present US preponderance is slim over that of the USSR. Government plans for economic assistance to Europe should eliminate the possibility of a serious business recession during the period. A program is under way which makes provision for the stock-piling of raw materials required in war but not available in the Western Hemisphere. In agriculture, the US is more than self-sufficient except in wool.

MANPOWER

4. Population of the US by 1950 is estimated at 143 millions and by 1960 at 150 millions. During the past war 16 million males were considered the maximum number fit for combat and available. The Armed Forces ceiling was 7,700,000 which included 1,751,000 Army Service Forces, and 2,340,000 Army Air Forces, with the remaining 3,186,000 for 90 Divisions. Peak mobilization reached 14,000,000 men.

5. It is estimated that in 1960 the US will have 48,620,000 males of a military age. Due to the tremendous number required in industry and agriculture, however, it is estimated that 18,000,000 males will be fit and available for military service in 1960. Standards of education and health are high.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

-2-

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

SCIENTIFIC

6. Due to American industrial capacity and the huge sums of money appropriated for research and development by various agencies, both private and civil, the US will maintain her lead in all scientific fields during this period. It is believed that an adequate supply of atomic bombs is available to wage a full-scale war. US BW/CW capabilities will also be such as to enable them to use these weapons operationally. By 1960 they will have numerous supersonic and subsonic carriers for various type warheads but the guiding systems will fall short of the accuracies required by such expensive missiles. US electronic weapons will probably be the best available.

ARMED FORCES

7. Peace time plans for the military forces contemplate a modified form of compulsory military training which is likely to be operative in the near future. At the present time the US Army has a strength of about 500,000 men. Military training will not affect this figure but will make more trained men available in emergency. The total Armed Forces strength asked for by the US Congress is 1,070,000 including Army, Navy, and Air.

8. The US is developing various new first class orthodox weapons in the small arms, artillery and AFV fields. The quantity of these weapons available in case of war in most cases will be very limited. Certain new weapons will become available to particular units but this will be the exception rather than the rule. The bulk of the actual weapons available to the US during this period in case of war will be the stockpiled weapons of World War II.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

9. The traditional strategy has been the defence of the continental US and of the Western Hemisphere. Once she has become thoroughly convinced of a threat to her existence, she has not hesitated to take aggressive action by the despatch of armed forces abroad to eliminate the danger.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR ENEMY

10. During this period, the US is and will remain capable of resisting the attack of a major power on the continental US, and of launching a combined sea, air and land attack at that power.

~~TOP SECRET~~

UNITED KINGDOM

APPENDIX "B"
DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

POLITICAL

1. It is not believed that the foreign policy of the UK will alter to any great extent during this period. The present Government has an economic policy of nationalization of the basic industries which corresponds more closely to that of the USSR than the USA and this has, in many cases, led to a desire for a closer understanding of the Soviet Union but events in the political field have clearly shown that Britain has decided to stand firm with the USA. The British people are by nature opposed to Soviet imperialism.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. The natural defences of the UK consist in its position as an island. However, under modern conditions of warfare the UK will be unable to utilize any natural defences to keep the country free of attack, but will be able to prevent invasion. A tremendous system of air bases built up during World War II are still available. A highly developed communications system is also available.

ECONOMIC

3. The UK is essentially an industrial nation, lacking many natural resources of strategic materials, but possessing a highly developed industrial machine for processing those materials into finished products. It is, however, dependent upon its trade for its economic existence. Even in agriculture the UK is dependant upon outside sources to maintain survival conditions. In the production of munitions of war the UK will be dependent upon the nations of the Commonwealth to support her production. During this period the UK will be devoting her maximum efforts to restore her economy. She will be able to spare very little manpower and resources to her defence forces.

MANPOWER

4. Out of a total working population of 20,047,000, there are 18,122,000 engaged in industry and agriculture. By 1960, the UK will have an estimated 10,972,000 males 18 - 50 of whom approximately 4,000,000 will be fit and available for military service.

SCIENTIFIC

5. If an all-out effort is made, it might be possible for her to have atomic bombs, without US assistance, by 1950 or 1951, but efforts are at present being directed toward the ultimate production of atomic power.

6. It is not likely that a long-range guided missile will be developed within the next 10 years. Most of the British effort in the guided missile field is being put on basic research toward development of an AA missile for ground and shipboard and an air-to-ground missile. It is believed that both these devices may be ready for production within five years.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

UNITED KINGDOM

DOWNGRAD'D TO SECRET
REDUT A SECRET

-2-

7. Biological warfare research in Great Britain, Canada, and the US is very carefully coordinated. It is intimated that progress will be made and that the capability to employ BW will be attained during this period. CW research is progressing along very restricted lines because of the current shortages of scientific manpower and money. This will result in thorough exploitation of the German nerve gases and a limited number of other agents.

ARMED FORCES

8. As of the present time, the UK has approximately 700,000 men in its Army, which in 1948 will be reduced to 590,000. The Territorial Army, the main reserve component will be 700,000 strong. It is estimated that the UK will be able to mobilize 1,750,000 by M plus 30, and 3,500,000 by M plus 180. This is a continuing capability which can not increase due to the downward trend of the UK's population and represent maximum figures. As in the case of US the UK will develop a number of weapons within the period 1948-60. The UK however will be handicapped by the present economic situation the result being that they will have designed and produced fewer new weapons than the USA. Armament available in the event of war within this period will be stockpiled World War II items.

9. The Royal Navy is the strongest in Europe and is more than a match for the USSR. The Royal Air Force is and will remain superior to the Soviet Air Forces in every respect except in the quantity of its equipment. It is believed that the air and naval forces will be able to obtain prototypes of new weapons but that production in quantity will be out of the question until a serious threat develops.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

10. British strategy is to maintain the security of the UK base, the security of sea communications (approaches to the UK, route through the Mediterranean, and routes through and exits from the Indian Ocean), and a firm hold on the Middle East.

CAPABILITIES TO RESIST ATTACK OF A MAJOR ENEMY

11. The UK cannot be considered capable of preventing, during this period, the partial neutralization of the home islands.

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX "B"

FRANCE

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET**

POLITICAL

1. Political stability in France is extremely uncertain. Communism gained considerable headway in the post-war years while the Party operated on constitutional lines but it would appear that the switch in tactics with the obvious aims of challenging the Government and sabotaging the country's economic recovery has resulted in the withdrawal of many of their previous supporters. It is believed that an improvement of the standard of living by means of US aid will further reduce Communist influence. The Communists are reliably reported to control a well-equipped underground army of about 100,000. In spite of this, it is believed that in the main the army is loyal to the Government and will deal effectively with internal opposition.

2. In the event of an aggressive war by the USSR, France can be expected to support the Western Powers, particularly if her own borders are threatened. The average Frenchman is quite consciously nationalistic and ever ready to rally somewhat sentimentally to the defence of La Belle France.

GEOGRAPHIC

3. The physical geography of France does not lend itself favourably to defence. The country is open to invasion by sea on the north, west and south. The industrial heart of the country situated in the north-east is vulnerable to cross-country attack via the historic Channel Plain route. However, as long as France is in the hands of the Western Powers, it provides admirable forward air bases for attacks on the USSR itself and on Soviet lines of communication.

4. France is provided with a good network of metalled roads and railways. In addition there is an extensive canal system which supplements road and rail transportation.

ECONOMIC

5. The economic situation in France is grave, and will continue to be for at least five years. The main obstacles to recovery are shortage of manpower, coal and food, together with a lack of new capital equipment such as machine tools, machinery, and factory space. France is not capable of equipping her own army, let alone contributing to an Allied war effort.

MANPOWER

6. Of a population of almost 42,000,000 there are approximately 8,000,000 physically fit males between the ages of 15 and 49. Since not more than 700,000 can be employed in the army, this leaves over 7,000,000 men available to industry and agriculture as a labour force. This does not include men of 50 or over, or women capable of factory work.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

FRANCE

-2-

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

SCIENTIFIC

7. Not only is France considered unable to produce the atomic bomb within ten years, but there is every indication that she will not even attempt to do so. Her efforts are devoted to basic research, and ultimately to the production of power from the atom. Progress is admittedly far behind schedule and it is considered unlikely that France will have atomic power before 1958.

8. The French have attempted to overcome their inferiority to other military nations in the guided missile field by employing several hundred German experts in at least three large groups in France and are planning to establish a test range in Algeria. They have not yet caught up with the US or the British in this field, but are making rapid progress. In the meantime, they are making preliminary designs for a rocket-type missile with a range of 400 to 1200 miles that will carry a 1,300-lb warhead. It is possible that such a missile can be developed within ten years, but production in quantity, by that time is unlikely. The French have done further work, with German help, on the FX-1400 radio-controlled high-angle bomb and the Hs-293 glide bomb that the Germans used operationally, and it is believed they have also worked on the Wasserfall AA missile. The first two subsonic air-to-ground missiles could be produced at present and a variation of the Wasserfall might be ready for production in five years.

9. France is potentially one of the leading nations of the world in the field of BW. It is likely that the quantities of material needed for open, large-scale biological warfare could be manufactured in France within the next ten years. Although scientists of the French Army know a considerable amount about the German nerve gas, they have been seriously restricted in all their efforts by severe shortages of money, scientific manpower and research facilities and equipment. It seems likely, too, that this condition will persist for a number of years, with the result that few outstanding accomplishments will be achieved. The chemical industry of France is hardly capable of supplying even modest amounts of the material today. This condition can have been changed for the better, however, during the next ten years.

10. France is engaged in as many phases of electronics research as the USSR, but not on a comparable scale. There is considerable scientific and technical ability among French personnel, but sufficient funds are lacking to pursue manufacture on a militarily useful scale. It is not believed that radically new electronic equipment will be developed by the French in the next ten years, and their production at the end of that time will probably be barely sufficient for limited defensive purposes.

ARMED FORCES

11. The present strength of the army is 490,000.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

FRANCE

-3-

These are disposed as follows:-

France	186,000
Germany	75,000
Austria	7,000
North Africa	102,000
Indo-China	80,000
Colonies	40,000

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

In addition, there are about 950,000 fully trained first line reserves under 35 years of age, although the services of these men cannot be used at present due to France's inability to equip more than 700,000.

12. Armament available to France in the event of war within this period will be the collection of French, American, British, and German equipment now on hand. Reserves of this equipment are practically non-existent.

13. Training is of a generally high standard, but is hampered by the serious lack of equipment.

14. The Air Force of 83,000 men is at present of a very low standard and serious efforts will be required to raise its standard. Equipment is poor and training is of a low quality.

15. The Navy has 62,000 men, a few battleships and cruisers, 157 destroyers and 326 submarines. It should be able to give a good account of itself in home waters.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

16. France's traditional National Strategy has been to defend her borders on a perimeter basis with troops raised within the country. Little assistance can be expected from the French Empire. The economic war potential will scarcely be able to supply the needs of the armed forces in action.

CAPABILITIES TO RESIST ATTACK OF A MAJOR ENEMY

17. France cannot resist a major attack for more than a few weeks without outside aid. By 1960, it is felt that the economic situation will have improved sufficiently to warrant maintaining well-equipped army and an effective air force capable of resisting a major attack long enough to permit the mobilization of a reserve of about 2,000,000 men.

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX "B"

LOW COUNTRIES

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

POLITICAL

1. The Low Countries (Belgium and Holland) find their economies so inextricably bound up with the Western Powers that they can have no choice but to support a war against the USSR.
2. As their way of life, tradition, and ideology so closely parallel that of the Western Powers, the majority of the peoples of both countries, whose nationalism was greatly strengthened during the years of the recent German occupation, can be expected to make a willing effort to implement a decision by their Governments to assist in a war against the Soviets.
3. The Communist parties are small in both countries and depend for their strength mainly on the transportation unions. It is reported that the Communists have a plan to paralyse the transportation centres of Antwerp and Rotterdam if conditions warrant.

GEOGRAPHIC

4. As these countries comprise for the most part the great Channel Plain, natural defences to an east-west attack are not insurmountable. It has been adequately demonstrated twice during the last generation with what ease a well equipped army of a major power can overrun this area.
5. There are adequate air-fields in both countries, but these are considered to be too vulnerable for practical use, unless the Western powers were able to assure the defence of these countries by the transfer of superior ground forces to this area before it were overrun.
6. Metalled roads and railways cover both countries adequately. A weakness in both networks, however, is the countless number of bridges required in conjunction with the extensive canal systems.

ECONOMIC

7. The economic war potential of the Low Countries lies in their respective colonies. At home, they cannot hope to do more than supply their own armies with small arms and ammunition. However, both the NEI and the Belgian Congo are rich in critical strategic raw materials. The Congo supplied the Allies during the late conflict with copious quantities of copper and uranium. The NEI are one of the major world suppliers of rubber and oil.

MANPOWER

8. The combined populations of the Lowlands is about 18,000,000. Of this total, it is estimated that there are 3,700,000 physically fit males between the ages of 15 and 49.

LOW COUNTRIES

APPENDIX "B"
~~101 SECRET~~
DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

-2-

9. The Low Countries have no strong military tradition, and malnutrition during the occupation has left its mark. Nevertheless, when given the opportunity, their soldiers have put up a fair showing.

10. Colonial manpower cannot be utilized for the armed forces, or skilled industry.

ARMED FORCES

11. Present Armed Forces strengths amount to about 330,000. The majority of men under arms are in the ground forces. The Navies and Air Forces are efficient but are relatively insignificant in a major war. Until 1960, it is not anticipated that an effective reserve will be built up, due to lack of equipment and materiel.

12. Training has been under British supervision since the liberation, and may be considered fair.

13. Equipment

Developments in the small arms field may be expected particularly by Belgium before 1960. Such development will probably be more in the form of a commercial venture rather than for service use. The Dutch electronics firm of "Phillips" may develop equipment which has a military application but again it will be primarily a commercial venture. The Low Countries in the event of a war before 1960 will be forced to rely upon the World War II British equipment procured subsequent to VE-Day. The reserves of this equipment at present are slim.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

14. The Low Countries recognize the indefensibility of their borders, and rely for protection on: (a) the United Nations, (b) treaties of alliance with their neighbours, (c) full cooperation with the Western Powers, which at the moment entails among other things the maintenance of defence forces far above pre-war levels. In the event of an actual invasion, the Armed Forces will no doubt put up a valiant delaying action. Holland plans to flood the area south of Utrecht and withdraw west to the national redoubt under the protection of twelve divisions.

15. The raw materials production of the colonies will be made available to the Western Powers as long as physically possible.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR ENEMY

16. The Low Countries cannot hope to do more than delay a major attacking force for more than a few weeks.

APPENDIX "B"

DENMARK

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

POLITICAL

1. In the event of a war between USSR and the Western Powers, Denmark would undoubtedly support the Western Allies although strong efforts would be made by its Government to remain neutral. Following VE-Day there was an increase in the number of Communists to the extent that they carried eighteen seats in the Government. This strength has waned during the past year and in the 1947 elections only nine seats were retained. At the present time the Communist Party is not an influential factor in Danish politics.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. Denmark is a flat undulating peninsula and a series of islands between Northern Europe and Southern Sweden. The maximum elevation is 564 feet. The west coast of Jutland is relatively straight and consists almost exclusively of dunes reaching one hundred feet in height, fronted by shallow water beaches. The east coast of Jutland and the islands to the east is generally low, without sand dunes, quite irregular, with numerous bays. These eastern beaches are favourable for landing operations.

3. The road and rail systems are well developed but each with limitations. The road net generally has not the capability of bearing heavy military traffic for any extended period while the railroads have the difficulty of providing satisfactory connections, by bridge and ferry, between the mainland and the islands. There are few good airfields while seaplane bases are good.

ECONOMIC

4. The country is lacking in any of the basic raw materials for industry. Capacity for manufacturing arms and munitions is very limited and is mainly directed to making of small arms such as the Madsen machine gun and rifles.

MANPOWER

5. Denmark has a population of about 4,000,000 with a total available manpower slightly over 2,000,000. The people are not war-like and are mainly absorbed in agriculture. Nevertheless during World War II the Danes proved themselves as excellent saboteurs against the German occupation.

ARMED FORCES

6. The peacetime strength of the Army varies between 24,000 and 35,000 because of the annual release of men and the changes in conscription laws. The main function of the regular troops is to ensure a trained reserve which is currently estimated at 150,000 men. Equipment except for the majority of small arms is a mixture of foreign weapons of which the most part are British.

7. The Danish Navy is little more than a token representation with a present strength varying between 2,500 and 3,000.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET
DENMARK

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

-2-

8. Danish military air power is vested in 950 men with 82 aircraft of which 68 are trainers. Future plans call for expansion and there are some 48 aircraft on order from Britain. The emphasis is to be mainly on fighters, fighter-bombers and light bombers.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

9. In the past, Denmark has followed the policy of neutrality and the present foreign policy is still based on hopes of neutrality. Because of the present low state of the Armed Forces and the lack of the necessary military equipment no workable defence plans have been adopted.

CAPABILITIES TO RESIST ATTACK OF A MAJOR ENEMY

10. Denmark's armed forces are of little account in consideration of any major aggression and it is doubtful that even a token resistance would be openly offered against a major aggressor who could offer a bloodless occupation.

TOP SECRET
APPENDIX "B"

GERMANY AND AUSTRIA

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

POLITICAL

1. It is anticipated that Western Germany and Austria will still be under the supervision of the Western Powers in 1960. Such being the case, they will have no choice but to support a war against the USSR.
2. Nationalism at the moment is at low ebb. There can be no doubt, however, that there will be a great revival of national consciousness when the prerequisites of a civilized economy have been reestablished.
3. Communism has made steady progress in these countries and it is believed that they would accept Soviet occupation in the event of a war rather resignedly. This would be particularly true if Von Paulus and his army reported to number 500,000 men were used to maintain order.

GEOGRAPHIC

4. Germany's only natural defences lie in the South where she is ringed by mountains. She is wide open to attack from both east and west. Germany has excellent road and rail networks. However, much of the rail system is non-effective due to unrepaired war damage. This situation will be rectified by 1960. Austria is entirely exposed to Soviet attack.

ECONOMIC

5. The economic recovery of Western Europe demands a much higher level of German industrial production than the Allies originally intended to permit. Therefore, although war plants are being scrupulously liquidated, German coal and steel production are being encouraged in spite of France's objections. By 1960, it is expected that coal and steel production will be back to pre-war level. Machinery and machine tools will also be produced at pre-war rates, so that although Germany will not have any arms or munitions industries as such, and no stock piles, she will be capable of going into production on about 18 months notice. Austria will do little more than support herself.

ARMED FORCES

6. It is unlikely that the Western Powers will allow Germany and Austria to have more than internal security forces.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET
TOP SECRET
APPENDIX "B"

POLITICAL

1. Politically, Italy is a most troubled state at the present time. The country is governed by central or rightist parties that could be counted on to support the Western Powers in a war with USSR. Nevertheless the Communist element is strong and is making every effort to gain control before the full effect of the European Recovery Program can be effective. In the event of an armed conflict involving Italy and the USSR in the immediate future, the present Government would have considerable difficulty maintaining order in the initial stages. If economic stability returns, this difficulty will gradually be overcome.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. Italy is an elongated peninsula with an area of 116,000 square miles, jutting out from southern Europe into the Mediterranean. It is a mountainous country, with one extensive lowland in the north and small areas of plain along the coasts. The mainland consists essentially of two mountain ranges, the Alps and the Apennines, which are separated by the Northern Plain. Continental Italy embraces the southern slopes of the Alps, the northern slopes of the Apennines, and the plains of the Po valley and of Venetia lying between them. The Peninsular area includes the Apennines and accompanying coastal belts on either side. Italy's communications system suffered heavily during the past war, and is still in a chaotic state with no prospects of immediate major improvement.

ECONOMIC

3. Italian mining is most developed in Sicily, Sardinia, Tuscany and Piedmont. The fuel and mineral resources are wholly inadequate, to meet the needs of the nation. Mines produce coal, iron ore, sulphur, and bauxite in limited quantities. There are well developed water power resources producing cheap electricity for industry. The textile industry is the largest and most important while the chemical industry has greatly developed since 1939. Since the end of World War II there has been no arms production other than small bore ammunition in very limited quantities. Italy is in no way geared for any expansion in industry in the event of war.

MANPOWER

4. The total population at the last census (1943) was 45,681,000. Manpower, between the ages of 15 and 49, available for the armed forces is estimated to be 8,700,000 physically fit for service. There is a high percentage of illiteracy in the country, while morale and the standard of living are low.

ARMED FORCES

5. According to the terms of the peace treaty, Italy is allowed an Army of 250,000 including 65,000 Carabinieri, in addition to a Navy and an Air Force of 25,000 each. Present strength is 205,000 for ground forces, 41,000 for the Navy and 28,000 for the Air Force. The training program is adequate although handicapped by a shortage of arms and equipment.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX "B"

-2-

6. It is not thought likely that Italy will develop or design arms within the 1948-60 period. This is due primarily to the economic situation rather than potential capabilities. The Army will, again depending upon the degree of US aid, be equipped with a mixture of British, Italian and German equipment. Reserves for such a collection will be a serious problem.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

7. Strategic defence plans for the employment of the armed forces in the event of hostilities are unknown.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR ENEMY

8. The Italian armed forces are capable of accomplishing their primary mission of maintaining internal security, but have no offensive capabilities and would be able to offer only limited defence against a well-armed aggressor.

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX "B"

SWITZERLAND **DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**
REDUIT A SECRET

POLITICAL

1. Switzerland cannot be expected to join the Western Powers in a war against the USSR, unless actually invaded by the Soviets. Her traditional policy of strict neutrality would not even permit her to extend limited assistance to the Western Powers. The Swiss, despite their diverse racial groupings, are intensely patriotic. They recognize patriotism as the keystone of their independence, and they are quite willing to make personal sacrifices for the welfare of the state. Communism has made very little progress.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. The Alps provide very strong natural defences. It would require specially trained alpine troops to successfully attack the country, and the administrative problem would be extremely difficult once the attack were launched. Switzerland could provide excellent easily defended air bases. The road and rail systems within the country are good, but due to the nature of the terrain and the number of railway tunnels they are vulnerable.

ECONOMIC

3. Economic war potential is not great. Small amounts of iron and manganese are mined and there is a small automotive industry. The watch industry can be switched to the manufacture of precision instruments if necessary. The arms firms of Solothurn, Hispano-Suiza, and Oerlikon have a significant capacity for the production of small arms and artillery.

MANPOWER

4. Of a population of little over 4,000,000, there are 964,000 physically fit males between the ages of 15 and 49. 500,000 men and 380,000 women are actively engaged in agriculture. There are 850,000 men and 428,000 women employed in industrial establishments. This total of about 2,100,000 represents the maximum labour force available in the country, from which the armed forces, the economy, and the national services must be manned. The general quality of manpower is good. The population is entirely literate, and physique is above average.

SCIENTIFIC

5. The Oerlikon Company is developing a supersonic radio-controlled liquid-fuel anti-aircraft rocket for sale, but without assistance from the Swiss Government. The chances of completing development on this missile within five years seem good. Aside from this, Switzerland can be expected to contribute little to military scientific development.

ARMED FORCES

6. The Armed Forces of Switzerland are based on the Militia system. There is a small permanent cadre of

APPENDIX "B"

~~SECRET~~
~~DOWNGRADED TO SECRET~~
~~REDUIT A SECRET~~

professional soldiers which is responsible for training the army under a universal call-up law. Every fit male is subject to four months compulsory service at the age of 19, and in subsequent years up to the age of 40 undergoes regular periods of refresher training.

7. The Swiss are capable of deploying a well-trained, fully-equipped army of 500,000 within a week of 1. Day. A further 300,000 can be mobilized in the course of three months. Arms and equipment are efficient by Western standards for the role they are expected to play.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

8. The Swiss defence plan embodies four phases:

- (a) The Mobilization Phase, during which the Army mans its battle stations;
- (b) The Frontier Phase, which envisages defence of the frontier by troops especially assigned to this task;
- (c) The Withdrawal Phase, in which the Army, and as much of the populace as possible, withdraw into the fastnesses of the Alps; and

(d) The National Redoubt phase. Detailed plans for the deployment of troops and movement of supplies, carefully worked out in advance for each of these phases, are kept under constant study and are tested in periodic exercises. In the final (National Redoubt) phase, the Army will be provided with all necessary supplies by means of stockpiled materials. At present these stockpiles are estimated to last for a year under full battle conditions.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR ENEMY

9. By taking full advantage of the rugged terrain, the Swiss could maintain an organized defence against a major enemy for about a year. If supplies were flown in, guerrilla resistance could continue indefinitely.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

SPAIN

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

POLITICAL

1. The Government is violently anti-Communist and can be relied upon not to throw in her lot with the USSR in the event of hostilities. Her main object is a prolonged peace to enable her to recover from the Civil War of 1936-39. Individualism is the predominant characteristic of the Spaniard. The remaining hard core of the illegal Communist party of about 25,000 will have little influence unless the country is overrun by the USSR.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. The surface of the Iberian Peninsula in general is unfavourable for military operations, the greater part of the coast line is rocky and precipitous. The southern coast of Portugal and the Atlantic coast of Spain are suitable for landing operations and communications inland exist.

3. Snowblockage of passes can be expected in the northern half of the Peninsula from November to March at 5,000 feet elevation and from September to May at elevations of more than 6,000 feet.

4. Suitable Air Bases

The majority of the air bases are situated on the Central Plateau with facilities for all types of aircraft up to and including heavy bombers. Fighter plane bases are chiefly located along the south, south-eastern and north coasts of Spain and on the island of Mallorca.

5. Communications

The lines of communication of the Peninsula create a spoke-pattern, with most of the lines converging on the city of Madrid as a hub. There are only four exceptions to this generalized pattern. One is the road and railroad line along the Mediterranean Coast connecting the port cities; the second along the Portuguese Coast; a third line runs from the Galician Plateau to France; and the fourth extends from Barcelona to the Basque area, thus connecting the two important industrial areas of the Iberian Peninsula.

The four main invasion routes are down the Atlantic Coast of France through the Basque uplands and the Northern Meseta to Madrid; from Lisbon on the South Coast of Portugal and the Southern Meseta to Madrid; from Cadiz on the South Coast of Spain and the Southern Meseta to Madrid; and down the Mediterranean Coast through Barcelona to Madrid.

ECONOMIC WAR POTENTIAL

6. Raw Materials

Spain has natural resources which in the past have enabled her to maintain a very fair economy. Her coal is almost enough. Coffee, lead, zinc, sulphur, mercury and other minerals have supplied her in the past

APPENDIX "B"

SPAIN

-2-

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDDIT A SECRET

with the needs of industry, and permitted a fair export trade. Her greatest deficiency is petroleum. Her agriculture feeds her people and supplies exportable surplusses in some items, except in times of poor harvest.

7. Arms Production

In view of the present state of army equipment and Spanish efforts to buy arms and ammunition from Switzerland, it is evident that domestic supply is inadequate to maintain an army in the field or even to train an army in modern warfare. Construction of aircraft in Spain is limited to outmoded types. There is no mass production of even these older type planes.

MANPOWER

8. Manpower engaged in industry is approximately 2 percent or about 520,000. The total population is 26,000,000. Manpower engaged in agriculture is approximately 83 percent or about 6,100,000. The available manpower between the ages of 18 and 45 is 5,780,000. Since about 35 percent of each conscription class is turned down each year for physical reasons, there is a maximum of 3,740,000 men fit for military service. Illiteracy in Spain runs from an average of 40 percent to a high of 90 percent in some districts. Living standards are low. The morale in the army is good due to the many privileges and special benefits Franco has given it. On the other hand the morale of the air force is low.

ARMED FORCES

9. The present strength of the Spanish Armed Forces is approximately 468,000. The strength of the army is 422,000, with 17,000 men (of which 1,100 are pilots) in the Air Forces and 29,000 in the Navy. In addition, there are 85,000 men in para-military forces.

10. The training of the Spanish forces at present is rather low. One quarter of the army has had less than one months service and consequently has not completed basic training. The rest of the men have had over a year's service and have had good individual training. Most of the smaller units have had fairly good unit training but there have been few exercises for units of regimental size or larger. The Army is well equipped to offer resistance against an invader but the weapons available, from small arms through artillery to AFV's, are not first class. Reserves will present a problem insofar as most raw materials for the Spanish armament industry must be imported.

11. Material shortages have limited the pilot training program and due to fuel shortages the trained pilots probably have not averaged over two hours flying per month for the past four years.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

12. In the event of hostilities Spain would be compelled to rely on defensive tactics. Once invaded the action would develop into series of delaying actions

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

SPAIN

-3-

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

to the Central Plateau.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR POWER

13. The Spanish Army has few offensive capabilities. Her defensive capabilities are sufficient to defend herself against her neighbours, but not against any of the major powers.

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX "B"

PORTUGAL

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

POLITICAL

1. In a conflict involving the Soviet Union, the Portuguese Government and people, both civil and military, would be overwhelmingly anti-Soviet. Even so, Portugal would probably prefer to retain a non-belligerent status rather than declare war. She would wish, however, to give all possible aid to the anti-Soviet forces, and could be expected to grant rights for bases in any of her possessions.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. The greater part of Portugal is mountainous, and ill-suited for modern military campaigning, but admirable from a defensive or guerrilla point of view. The only feasible strategic routes of approach for invading the country are through the port of Lisbon from the Atlantic, or over the Estramadura Plateau from Spain. Unfortunately, both these routes lead directly to the strategic heart of the country. Rugged highlands adequately protect the remainder of her borders. The Azores, strategically situated off the west coast of Portugal, command the shipping lanes between Europe and the American and Europe and Africa.

3. Highways are inadequate for Portugal's normal peacetime needs. Those in existence are in disrepair. The rail coverage of the country is only fair, and there is a shortage of rolling stock.

ECONOMIC

4. Metropolitan Portugal produces three strategic raw materials in sufficient quantities for export:- cork, tungsten and tin. The larger colonies are valuable for their exports as follows:- Angola in West Africa for corn, sugar, rice, diamonds, copper and lignite; Mozambique on the east coast of Africa for sugar, corn and copra. Portugal is capable only of manufacturing small arms, explosives and ammunition up to field artillery calibre. She cannot produce armoured vehicles or armour plate.

MANPOWER

5. Of a population of about 7,250,000 only 50 percent of the adults are literate. No age tables are available.

ARMED FORCES

6. Peace strengths are as follows:-

Army	57,000
Navy	7,600
Air Force	1,600

The mobilization maximum of the army is 160,000, however, equipment does not exist for more than 80,000, and a great deal of this is obsolete.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

PORTUGAL

-2-

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

7. Training, morale, and discipline are of low quality. Weapons have been indifferent but the UK has undertaken to provide equipment for three divisions. Already 67 Centaur tanks have been provided as well as 30 Valentines.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

8. Portugal has traditionally looked to Britain for diplomatic backing and maritime protection of her overseas possessions. Their relationship will continue. In addition, the combined factors of US strength and Portuguese fear of the Soviet Union have given rise to a desire for completely friendly relations with the Americans.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR ENEMY

9. It is obvious, therefore, that Portugal depends on her two powerful friends for protection of her sovereignty, and can do little more than offer token resistance to an aggressor.

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX "B"

SWEDEN

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

POLITICAL

1. In the event of a war between East and West, Sweden would make every effort to remain neutral, to the point of making extensive economic and political concessions. She would fight if directly attacked, or if the demands on her economy or Government gravely threatened her existence. Sweden's increasing economic involvement with the USSR may weaken her potential and will to fight in the Western cause. Communists are strongest in the Home Guard, particularly in the vital industrial and defence areas, but it is unlikely that they can seriously influence events.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. The largest part of the small population of 6,600,000 is concentrated in the southernmost third of the country. The 1,500 mile coastline offers excellent defensive possibilities. There are few beaches favourable to landing operations, except for short stretches on the Skane Peninsula opposite Denmark. Beaches near Stockholm are unsuitable for landing operations. Typical coastline areas in Sweden have narrow, rocky, short beaches leading to hills or cliffs immediately beyond. Interior defence is favoured by vast mountain and lake areas, swift west-to-east streams and dense forests. The coastline hills rise to elevations of 3,000 and 6,000 feet, the rivers often flow through gorges. The south is an undulating plain traversed by hill ranges and is better suited to mobile military operations.

3. The majority of the 70 or 80 airfields are in the south.

4. The principal highways are concentrated in the south. North of the Oslo-Stockholm line, highway traffic is subject to stoppage due to snow during the winter months. The general pattern of the network in this area does not lend itself to through traffic except along the eastern seacoast. Swedish highways will not stand up under continuous heavy military traffic.

5. Railways provide the prime form of transportation for internal traffic. The two main lines running north and south are single track. A single track railway crosses the northern end of Sweden from Lulea on the Gulf of Bothnia to Narvik, in Norway. Single track capacity is 10 trains per day each way.

ECONOMIC

6. Sweden is one of the world's greatest producers of high-grade iron ore. Her domestic industry uses only a small part of the total produced, the remainder is being exported. Domestic coal production is small and unlikely to increase greatly. No petroleum is produced, but some petroleum products are obtained from shale rock. Sweden is relatively self-sufficient in food production in comparison with most Western European countries. Normally, requirements for breadgrains, sugar and meats are met from domestic production, but feedgrains and fats must be imported.

APPENDIX "B"

SWEDEN

-2-

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

7. A vein of shale containing .02 percent uranium underlies a large part of the south. A program of research on methods of refining this ore is currently in operation. Success in this attempt would render Swedish shale beds an important prize to uranium-poor USSR.

8. Sweden has been able to meet all the requests of her own armed forces for the production of small arms, artillery, explosives and ammunition. A considerable surplus of the country's artillery production is available for export. With the assistance of her small but important automobile industry, Sweden has produced tanks that range up to 22 tons in size. Limited numbers of heavier tanks probably could be produced. Domestic aircraft production is small and must be supplemented by imports. A small number of modern fighters and light bombers are manufactured but no heavy bombers.

MANPOWER

9. Of Sweden's population of 6,600,000 there are 2,000,000 men between the ages of 15 and 54 available for the armed forces. Their living standard, literacy, industrial skills and productivity are high.

ARMED FORCES

10. The peacetime strength of the Army is 50,000 with a trained reserve of 865,000. Besides this there is a Home Guard of 100,000 in the age range of under 17 and 48 and over. Mobilization strength including garrison troops is approximately 625,000 men. Sweden has made numerous contributions in all categories of artillery design through the commercial firm of Bofors. The greater part of these newly designed weapons are for export with the Swedish Army purchasing a comparatively small fraction of the total output. The Army has on hand sufficient quantities of good small arms, artillery of all types, and light AFV's, to render it capable of significant resistance to an invader.

11. The peacetime Naval strength is 16,300 with an estimated reserve of 30,000. It has three cruisers, twenty-nine destroyers and twenty-six submarines.

12. The Air Force at present numbers 11,200 with a peacetime goal of 12,000 backed by a trained reserve of 25,000. It is mainly composed of fighters.

13. Present training stresses defensive fighting in all three services.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

14. It is believed that the defence plan put into effect during the recent war is still workable and would be employed again in case of emergency. The plan is broken down into the main elements, taking advantage of the natural terrain features of the country:-

APPENDIX "B"

SWEDEN

-3-

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

- (a) An initial perimeter (chiefly coastal) defense.
- (b) The northeast defense zone, based on Boden, extending across Sweden.
- (c) The central defense zone based on Stockholm. This last is the critical zone as it contains the bulk of the defence industry.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR ENEMY

15. Well organized, better equipped than most, carefully though insufficiently trained, and efficiently led, the Swedish Forces with reserves could probably put up strong initial resistance to an attack in force by a major power.

APPENDIX "B"

NORWAY

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

POLITICAL

1. In the event of a war between the Eastern and Western Powers, Norway would undoubtedly be more than sympathetic to the Western Allies but would again make every effort to remain a neutral state. The present government is strongly socialist. There is, however, a weak Communist Party element in this government although support to this group diminished slightly in 1947.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. The land mass area is 87,000 square miles with the most inhabitable part being in the south. The country is mountainous with rolling plateaus over 3,000 feet in height. In general these plateaus are highest in the south and are cut by deep narrow valleys. The coastline is deeply indented, precipitous, and unsuitable for landing operations. The only large beach is twenty-eight miles long and is located south of Stavanger.

3. There is a fair road net in southern Norway but in the north there is only one main trunk road and this connects with the Petsamo area in Finland. In general roads are narrow with numerous bridges and ferry crossings. Railroads have the most trackage near Oslo with a few lines electrified. There is trackage between Bergen and Oslo while central Norway is served by a main line between Trondheim and Mo.

4. Air bases are few in number and poor in condition. The main bases are for sea-planes.

ECONOMIC

5. The country is sadly lacking in raw materials with the exception of timber and iron ore. There is coal mined at Spitzbergen but this requires transportation to the mainland. Arms manufacturing capacity is limited to small arms, ammunition, and some light artillery pieces. The total of this production is limited and is insufficient for current military requirements.

MANPOWER

6. The total population is approximately 2,900,000 with available military manpower of men between 15 and 49 years of age estimated at 828,000.

ARMED FORCES

7. The peace strength of the Army is 20,700 with a trained reserve estimated at 150,000 men. Mobilization strength could reach a maximum of 50,000. Maximum future strength of the Army is estimated at three divisions while plans exist for an army of six mountain divisions. Present equipment is a collection of German, British, American, and Norwegian arms. The German coastal equipment, taken over by the Norwegians, is the heaviest equipment on hand and is likely to remain so. It is considered that there will be little change in this equipment except in small annual increases to replace wastage. Little or no reserve supplies are likely to be stock-piled.

APPENDIX "B"

NORWAY

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

- 2 -

8. The present naval strength is estimated at 9,300 which includes coast artillery. Morale is considered good. Equipment held consists of three submarines, ten motor torpedo boats, three British corvettes, nineteen mine sweepers and one destroyer with two more destroyers building.

9. The present strength of the air force is 195 aircraft and approximately 2,500 men consisting of three squadrons (fighter, coastal patrol, and light bomber), two of which are scheduled to become part of a training force. Future plans call for a maximum of six squadrons. Norway will continue to rely on the UK and USA for air equipment and technique.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

10. The foreign policy has always included the policy of neutrality. Although there are strong ties with the Western Powers, the geographic location of the country lying between the two great power blocs has again placed the country in a difficult position of decision whereby neutrality offers the best economic solution.

CAPABILITIES TO RESIST ATTACK OF A MAJOR ENEMY

11. The armed forces of Norway cannot be considered more than a token effort although given material backing from the Western Powers could be of some minor value. No workable defense plans are known to exist.

APPENDIX "B"

TURKEY

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

POLITICAL

1. Turkey is strongly nationalistic and the general feeling is for defence of Turkish sovereignty at all cost. The people are definitely anti-communist, pro-British and pro-American. In the event of a war with USSR, Turkey would support the Western Powers as a means of protecting her sovereignty from her long feared Northern neighbour, the USSR, who has already made official claims for bases in the Straits.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. Eastern Turkey is rugged and offers few invasion routes. The most important route passing through Kars and Erzurum is partially fortified. The long, exposed Black Sea coast is flanked by mountains ranges and there are very few ports. Communications from this area to the interior are very poor. European Turkey across the Dardanelles, would be almost impossible to reinforce. While the railway net is well suited for military needs, rolling stock is inadequate. Few roads are suitable for heavy military traffic and still fewer are open in all kinds of weather. US military aid is being directed toward the improvement of communications. This should increase Turkey's defensive strength.

3. Almost all Turkish air bases are located in western and southwestern Anatolia, and air capabilities in the eastern regions are very small due to the lack of fields and the mountainous nature of that area. The more important air fields are at Eskisehir, Kutahya, Yesilkoy, Adana, Erzifon, and Gazimur.

ECONOMIC

4. Turkey started to expand her industries with a five year plan in 1934 designed for expansion in light industries. In 1937, a second five year plan was begun, with special emphasis on heavy industry including iron steel, and chemicals. Munitions factories have been built, and the industry has had the advice, and aid of British technical experts. Little progress was made before World War II halted further construction. The Turkish factories cannot manufacture more than a small percentage of the country's needs in peace and war. This condition is chiefly the result of the lack of machine tools and replacement parts, shortages of raw and semi-finished material, and lack of skilled labour. The industrial machinery of Turkey is of a heterogeneous nature, much of which originates in countries of continental Europe, where manufacture of replacement parts has not been resumed. The deficiency of skilled labour greatly hampers the efficient manufacturing of essential goods.

5. The extent of Turkish munitions manufacturing to-day is a group of modern and efficient munition factories at Kirikkale, older factories at Ankara, a military explosives plant at Küçük Yozgat, three small privately owned plants at Istanbul, three aircraft assembly plants, a naval mine depot at Golcuk, and a gas-mask factory at Mamak. No tanks or motor vehicles are produced in Turkey, and all heavy motorized equipment must be imported. In the event of war, it is estimated that the industry could furnish only a minor part of the requirements of small arms and artillery ammunition, and a negligible part of the light artillery requirements.

APPENDIX "B"

TURKEY

-2-

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

MANPOWER

6. The total available manpower between ages 15 and 49 for the armed forces, totals 5,000,000, of which 3,700,000 are combat fit and 770,000 are fit for limited service. Seventy-five percent of Turkey's population is rural. Of the rural population, 79 percent are employed in agriculture.

ARMED FORCES

7. Total strength of the Armed Forces (Army, Navy and Air) including the semi-military organization is estimated to be 576,000 men as of 1 Aug 47, constituting about 3 percent of the population.

Army (including Gendarmerie and Customs Guards)	536,000
Navy	13,925
Air Force	26,000

Infantry training in the Turkish Army is based on German lines. British missions have, of recent years, conducted training in artillery, tanks, transportation and certain specialized fields. Training in modern techniques is limited by the low educational level of the troops, the lack of modern equipment and insufficient stocks of ammunition and other supplies needed for training purposes. Training in the Turkish Army is expected to improve with the assistance of US military aid.

8. The present collection of British, German, Czech, Austrian and French equipment is being augmented from US sources but it will be several years before the army will be efficiently supplied.

9. The air force is dependent on foreign equipment and has made efforts to purchase late World War II types of fighters and trainers. Training is far from satisfactory.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

10. Turkey aims at maintaining a force large enough to defend the country against an attack. Her plans call for a defensive withdrawal to the national redoubt area surrounding Adana where a final stand will be made.

CAPABILITIES TO RESIST ATTACK OF A MAJOR ENEMY

11. It is estimated that Turkey alone could resist a major power for a period not exceeding 90 days. If sufficient aid were forthcoming, the time would be increased accordingly.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

GREECE

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET**

POLITICAL

1. Provided that US aid is continued to Greece it is expected that the political and economic situation will improve. The Greeks are intensely nationalistic in spirit and if invaded will support the Western Powers in a war with the USSR. With an improvement in the economic position the present dissatisfaction with constitutional Government should largely disappear.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. Strategically, the Greek mainland and islands flank the Dardanelles. Thrace, the eastward extension of the mainland serves as a land route between Europe and the Dardanelles. Salonika's port is the southern terminus of the historic military route through the mountains between the Danubian Basin and the eastern Mediterranean Sea, and the position of Greece and in particular Crete gives that area limited control over sea routes connecting the eastern and western Mediterranean.

3. The terrain is unfavourable for large-scale military operations since the country is mountainous, and, interspersed with scattered small valleys and basins connected by passes or defiles. However, the Monastir Gap, the Vardar River, and the Struma River afford major invasion routes to the strategic area of Salonika. Supplementary routes into Greek Thrace are along the Nestos and Moritsa River plains. Greece therefore possesses an abundant number of natural defence lines but as demonstrated by the German Army in 1941, a well organized modern land force can readily penetrate the country unless it is opposed by thoroughly prepared defenders.

4. The Royal Hellenic Airforce at the present time has bases at Athens, Salonika and Eleusis. In addition, commercial fields at Athens, Salonika, Ioannina, Agrinion, Kerkira, Drama and Larissa can be militarized.

5. Communications facilities which were never considered to be especially good were heavily damaged during the war. Rebuilding has progressed slowly except in the major urban areas, due to guerrilla activity. It is considered that within the next few years the system with US aid will have been considerably rebuilt.

ECONOMIC

6. The economic war potential of Greece is utterly inadequate to support even a small Greek Force. Greece is, and will continue to be, dependent upon outside sources for war materials, and supplies. There are no armament industries.

MANPOWER

7. The total available military manpower in Greece for ages 15-49 is estimated at 1,763,000, of whom 1,164,000 are fit for combat and 194,000 are fit for limited military service. Educational standards, due to the high illiteracy rate are low. Physical examinations are required for all conscripts.

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX "B"

GREECE

-2-

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

ARMED FORCES

8. Present strength is estimated at 157,400 as follows:-

Army	140,000
Navy	13,100
Airforce	<u>4,300</u>
TOTAL	157,400

In addition the National Defence Corps has 41 battalions at 500 all ranks plus three command organizations at 65 all ranks for an estimated total of 20,700. The National Defence Corps will ultimately consist of 100 battalions plus an unknown number of command organizations.

9. Training of the armed forces has been supervised by the British Military Mission and is along British lines.

10. The Greek Army should be capable of resisting invasion by other third rate powers, if the present terms of the American ERP are fulfilled. They will have on hand British and American small arms weapons and artillery and US type light AFV's. The degree of reserve available will necessarily depend upon the efficiency of US supply.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

11. Greece will employ her armed forces to the maximum extent in defence of the country. If overrun, small contingents would fight for the Western Powers as they did in World War II.

CAPABILITIES FOR DEFENCE AGAINST A MAJOR ENEMY

12. Greece could offer only token organized resistance to a major enemy. Her greatest contribution would be her capability to engage in guerrilla warfare after being overrun.

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX "B"

MIDDLE EAST

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

POLITICAL

1. Arab nationalism is awakening after a very long period of somnambulance. At the present time, the Middle East countries do not have very cordial relations with the Western Powers because of the Palestine problem. However, since political policies are in good measure, dominated by the religious tenets of the people, it is considered that the Middle East countries will support the Western Powers, if those nations furnish some protective forces.
2. Throughout the Middle East, the USSR has become the symbol for class consciousness and atheism. The former has alienated the governing classes while the latter has frightened the devout and superstitious masses of peasantry. Thus Soviet propaganda has failed to penetrate, to any significant depth, the peoples of the Middle East, since it offends their two primary social values - their national cultures and their faiths. Recently the USSR has been placing more emphasis on penetration through exploitation of minorities, both religious and racial, such as: Kurds, Armenians, and followers of the Greek Orthodox faith, at the same time continuing to promote communist doctrine wherever local populations proved receptive. Outside of the Jewish community in Palestine, the Communists have little support.

GEOGRAPHIC

3. The Middle East contains the shortest routes between Europe and Asia. These are generally confined to a corridor stretching from the Levant to the Persian Gulf with the Suez Canal and the Red Sea on the southwest margin, and the coastal plain of Palestine and Syria is on its eastern edge. The natural defences consist mainly of the deserts of Egypt, Saudi-Arabia, Iraq, and the mountains of Iraq and Iran. In that sense, they are military obstacles rather than defence lines.
4. Since countries such as Yemen, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, Palestine and Saudi Arabia have no air forces, no national military air bases are in operation at the present time. Egypt has a base at Almaza and Helwan, Iran at Teheran, the British Mission maintains a field at Taif in Saudi Arabia, and Iraq has one at Baghdad. Commercial fields for international air traffic are in use at Cairo, Egypt, Bosna, Jidda, Aden, and Teheran -- all of which can be militarized. In addition numerous strips for both fighters and bombers were built extensively throughout the whole region during the war.
5. Communications throughout the area vary from fair to extremely poor. In general, each country has a fairly good rail link from its capital to other countries. Roads for the most part are confined to the coastal plains.

ECONOMICS

6. Outside of small coal and copper reserves, the economic potential of the Middle East is significant for its oil production. It has an estimated potential production of 267.3 million barrels of crude oil with a 645,000 barrel daily refining capacity. Industrially it has no potential for weapons and materials of war.

APPENDIX "B"

MIDDLE EAST

-2-

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

MANPOWER

7. Available military manpower of the Middle East countries is as follows:-

- (a) Yemen has an estimated 900,000 men between the ages of 15-49, of which only 50% are considered fit for military duty.
- (b) Lebanon has 150,000 males 15-49, fit and available for military service.
- (c) Iraq is thought to have 500,000 males from 15-49, fit and available for military service, although on a conscription basis, the laws have never been completely enforced. The usual annual levy is 12,000.
- (d) Syria has an estimated 375,000 males, 15-49, fit and available for military service.
- (e) Trans-Jordan has an estimated 45,000 males fit and available for military service.
- (f) Saudi Arabia has 1,500,000 males, aged 15-49. Most of the, due to their hardy life and being trained already in the use of a rifle and horse are fit for military service.
- (g) Iran is estimated to have about 1,900,000 males 15-49 fit and available for military service.
- (h) Egypt has an estimated 4,541,000 males 15-49 available for military service. However, due to the many exemptions, only about 560,000 can be considered fit and available. Conscripts are mainly from the poor and labour class who do not have the necessary \$80.00 with which to purchase their exemption.

ARMED FORCES

8. Presently established military forces are estimated at:

	<u>Army</u>	<u>Airforce</u>	<u>Navy</u>
Egypt	53,000	2,800	1,100
Iran	85,000	700	--
Saudi Arabia	41,000	160	250
Trans-Jordan	9,800	--	--
Syria	17,000	50	--
Iraq	31,000	1,300	--
Lebanon	6,300	--	--
Yemen	20,000	--	--
Total (approx)	263,000	5,000	1,300

Training in the Middle East countries is far below western standards except in Trans-Jordan, where the Arab Legion and Trans-Jordan Frontier Force are British officered and trained. The native forces in the Middle East are with few exceptions poorly equipped. As the period advances, arms left over from World War II will be accumulated by most forces.

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX "B"

MIDDLE EAST

-3-

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

NATIONAL STRATEGY

9. Although the rising tide of Arab nationalism is driving toward complete independence, the Middle East countries have given little thought to national strategy, since they realize clearly that they are and will continue to be completely dependent upon outside help for any worthwhile resistance to attack.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR ENEMY

10. The Middle East countries, in whole or in part, are capable of only token organized resistance to a major power. They are, however, capable of prolonged guerrilla warfare.

APPENDIX "B"

AFGHANISTAN

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

POLITICAL

1. Afghanistan is a constitutional monarchy ruled by the Royal family who control the armed forces.
2. The people, who formerly governed themselves by a tribal system, fiercely resent any form of authority and especially do they resent having to provide conscripts for the army. Many Afghans still place tribal loyalty above loyalty to the nation. The various peoples are fanatical Moslems who traditionally hate the peoples of Russia and Communism is contrary to the doctrines of Islam. Nevertheless there is some agitation among Uzbek tribesmen of Northern Afghanistan for unity with their brethren in Soviet Uzbek.
3. It is considered that Afghanistan would side with the Western Powers in a war with the USSR, and in the event of any Soviet aggression would resist to her utmost.

GEOGRAPHIC

4. The country is open to attack from the USSR since the boundary between the two countries is marked by the Oxus River and the southern edge of the Kuin desert. If Soviet forces wished to enter Afghanistan they could cross the Oxus easily at many points. The border from the Oxus southwest to Iran is not a natural defense line. Russian railroads touch the Afghan border at Kushk Past and between Kilif and Termex. Aircraft have landed on the sand belt south of the Oxus river from Andkui east to Kaanabad and paratroops could be landed at will. The road from Kishk Past to Herat and continuing to Farah and Kandahar through the western section of Afghanistan offers no obstacles to modern mechanized forces.
5. In the eastern section of the Soviet Afghan border, the Hindu Kish Mountains would present a natural defence barrier to an attack launched toward the capital city of Kabul. The attack by land would of necessity be routed by way of the Shibar Pass which presents a bottleneck of 40 miles of one-way trafficable road, through narrow gorges with a depth of nearly 10,000 feet. This route is practically impossible during the winter months by reason of the deep snows. The only practical method of attacking Kabul area from the USSR would be by use of air power.
6. The western boundary would not present any natural defence features against an attack launched through Iran. The mountainous terrain on the southern boundary of Afghanistan and the North West Frontier Province presents a natural barrier accessible only through the Khyber Pass. Farther west on the boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan, there are no natural defence features.
7. Air bases exist at Kabul, Jalalabad, and Kandahar. Of these only the latter two are suitable for year round operations. Flying conditions in the Kabul area are less favourable during the winter months.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

AFGHANISTAN

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

-2-

8. There are no railways in Afghanistan. A number of roads are fit for motor traffic and join up with road systems of all bordering countries. The road systems are lacking in the more mountainous districts except for strategic routes into the North West Frontier Provinces and Pakistan through the Khyber and Shibar Passes respectively. There are practically no navigable rivers in Afghanistan. The only article of commerce transported by water is timber, which is floated down the Kumar and Kabul rivers by raft.

ECONOMIC

9. Most of the mineral resources of Afghanistan are undeveloped. The northern part of the country is reported to have considerable deposits of copper. Lead and iron ore are found in many parts of the country. Iron smelting plants are located in Katagan and Parnal. Considerable coal is available, with the richest deposits located in the northern slopes of the Hindu Kush Mountains. Crude oil deposits have been discovered near Herat and in Northern Afghanistan but are at present not being exploited. Silver, mica, asbestos, chrome ore and sulphur are mined in some quantity.

10. Generally speaking it is impossible to accurately assess the economic war potential since however rich the country may be in natural resources, these have not been greatly developed.

MANPOWER

11. The total population is approximately ten millions. The total number of males between the ages of 15 and 49 is estimated at 1,800,000 (1947). The population is composed mainly of tribes with primitive standards of living. They are, however, hardy and in most cases proud of their being Afghans.

ARMED FORCES

12. The armed forces consist of the Army which includes a small airforce, and the Gendarmerie, a semi-military organization. The Prime Minister exercises direct control over the armed forces in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief.

Present strengths

Army	69,500
Airforce	500
Gendarmerie	20,000
Total	90,000

The maximum total armed forces which Afghanistan is capable of producing is considered to be between 400,000 and 500,000 men.

13. The men of the Afghan tribes are taught from their youth to use the rifle. They are expert marksmen and know all the arts of guerrilla warfare.

TOP SECRET

AFGHANISTAN

APPENDIX "B"

-3-

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REDUIT A SECRET

14. The army has a collection of World War I and II equipment but only in sufficient quantity for the purposes of maintaining internal security.

15. The Air Force training has been haphazard in the past. Foreign instructors including German, Soviet, and Italian have been employed without any standard system.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

16. The Afghan national defence policy is purely defensive, as she has no military establishment capable of waging modern offensive warfare. The chief function of the army is that of maintaining internal security rather than providing defense against invasion.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING ATTACK OF A MAJOR ENEMY

17. Afghanistan is not capable of resisting a major enemy. Any resistance to the Soviet armed forces would be token only.

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX "B"

INDIA AND PAKISTAN **DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**
REDUIT A SECRET

POLITICAL

1. India and Pakistan will support the Western Powers in a war with USSR. The Indian sub-continent in general has been opposed to Communism, and although split into two independent Dominions since August 1947, they are still dependent on British advisers and realize they owe their present status to Western Democratic principles, which would not be possible under Soviet influence. The campaign to attain independence has raised the nationalistic feelings to fever pitch, and this feature is only marred by the communal strife which followed the setting up of the two Dominions.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. There are numerous places along India's 3,700 mile coastline where landings could be made from the sea, but the number of usable ports are few. Due to the absence of protecting islands, the shoreline is subject to storms and strong currents, while the Monsoons effectively prevent all use of landing craft during six months of the year. Her real security from sea-borne invasion lies in the protection offered by British bases which guard the entrance to Indian waters - Aden and the Cape of Good Hope to the West and Singapore and the Far Eastern Dominions to the East.

3. The North-East frontier region with its combination of broad rivers and high mountains is a military barrier of unusual effectiveness. The jungle-covered ridges of the India-Burma frontier have been described as "one of the most formidable barriers to military operations in the world".

4. The North-West frontier is probably the most vulnerable of India's boundaries. Invasions, since before the time of Alexander the Great, have used the passes on the North-West frontier. The most famous route has been via the Khyber Pass, but there are at least four other routes into India between Quetta and Chitral which could be used by a determined invader. From Quetta south to the Arabian Sea, the region is of low mountains and desert, not impassable by camel caravan, but too hot and dry to permit easy movement of an army.

5. There are many good operational air bases in India, which were developed under the aegis of the R.A.F during World War II. The communications systems have been well developed in India, in all but these regions comprising impenetrable mountain ranges. These communications systems, in particular the railways, became very disorganized during the communal rioting following the division of the sub-continent in 1947 into two separate Dominions. Reorganization of resources would be possible in the event of a crisis requiring the unified efforts of both India and Pakistan.

APPENDIX "B"

INDIA AND PAKISTAN

-2-

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

ECONOMIC

6. Prior to 1939, India was one of the eight leading industrial countries in the world. During World War II, Indian munition plants produced a large portion of the armaments used by her own forces, and in addition supplied substantial amounts to the British. Many new plants came into being and commenced production in 1944. The future status of the Indian ordnance factories is most uncertain. All of the plants are located in the newly created Dominion of India, and it is certain that Pakistan will demand that existing factories be divided between the two Dominions so they can support their own armies. Because of the uncertain future and the low rates of pay as compared to wartime salaries there has been a general exodus of trained technicians from the factories, so that only an estimated 5 percent remain. For this reason, many months would be required before these plants regained their wartime production level.

7. It is estimated that, owing to depleted staffs and the shut-down of over one-third of the war-built plants, return of the munitions industry in India to wartime production levels would require at least three years. Any future production capabilities will depend on the further development of India's heavy industry, which can not be undertaken for some time to come. India is rich in practically all raw materials.

MANPOWER

8. India's population of nearly 400,000,000 represents a great manpower pool. During World War II the Indian Army was the world's largest volunteer army with a peak strength of over 2,000,000. The Indians have always been noted for their high fighting qualities. Prior to World War II manpower for the army was chiefly recruited from the so-called "martial" races in northern and northwestern India. During the war several other classes were accepted, although in general, the greater part of the Armed Forces is still drawn from the North. Approximately 80 percent of recruits are illiterate, but with the inclusion of general education in their training program, they have proved adaptable and efficient in specialized and technical training.

9. The chief industry of India has always been agriculture. About 30 percent of the population are engaged in agriculture and great advances have been brought about in its scientific application. India is not agriculturally self-reliant, however, and famines are not uncommon in some districts.

ARMED FORCES

10. When the country was formed into two separate Dominions in 1947, the Armed Forces were divided,

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX "B"

INDIA AND PAKISTAN

-3-

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET**

proportionately and primarily on a communal basis - formations of Moslem composition going to Pakistan and those of Hindu to India. This division of a hitherto well-organized, well-trained, well-equipped and well-led fighting force has resulted in the formation of two armies of lower than average fighting capabilities and communally opposed to each other. Neither army, individually, is capable of more than the maintenance of internal security for the next five years, and will not be capable of defending their separate Dominions by 1960. Any critical situation which may develop internally during this period will seriously decrease their military potential.

11. The division of the Indian Army to the two Dominions gave Pakistan a total of 135,000 personnel and India about 276,000. These figures have been seriously effected by the communal disturbances immediately following the achievement of independence. It is improbable that mobilization strength would exceed a total of 400,000 and only with the combined efforts of both Dominions could the peak figure of 2,000,000 be obtained. Both armies are well equipped with British material.

12. The Royal Indian Navy is a small force designed for escort duty and coastal defence. Their present strength is something less than 20,000 officers and men. Most of their vessels are of the sloop and corvette class but three 6-inch gun cruisers have lately been acquired from Britain. Morale and discipline in the Navy is lower than in combat units of the Army. It is not considered possible for the Navy to defend the shores of India without outside assistance, either by 1960 or for some time thereafter.

13. The Indian Air Force was expanded during the war years under the direction and training of the R.A.F. Its present strength is approximately 15,000 all ranks and has been supplied with modern aircraft and equipment. Its present strength is not sufficient to meet internal needs, and due to the low standard of education of the average recruit, it is not considered possible to train pilots and aircrew in sufficient numbers to materially increase the present strength by 1960.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

14. It is believed that in the event of a threat from outside, they will attempt to defend their frontiers.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR ENEMY

15. India and Pakistan will be neither individually nor collectively capable of resisting unaided a major enemy by 1960.

APPENDIX "B"

~~TOP SECRET~~
DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

CHINA

POLITICAL

1. China's government in practice is by personality, as opposed to representative government practiced in the Western World. Nationalist China is governed by the virtual dictatorship of Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek and the Kuomintang. Within this party there are many personal leaders bound together by common outlook and by common allegiance to the Generalissimo. The strong points of the government are experience and control over the majority of civil servants. Despite exhaustion and strife in the country, the government policy is professed to be the achievement of political stability with a view to creating a modern state.

2. Communism has made great inroads in China. Manchuria is almost entirely in the hands of the Chinese Communists and their influence in recent months has spread rapidly through China proper.

3. China's foreign policy is directed towards building herself up as the strongest power in the Far East, foster nationalist movements in the countries of Southeast Asia, and preventing the USSR from gaining control of her border regions. China will steer a cautious course between that of the USSR and US, but in general her interests will be directed to the Western world. The factors affecting the attainment of these objectives are:

- (a) A strong Communist Party capable of resisting the National Government both politically and militarily.
- (b) Lack of material resources, capital goods, technical and administrative personnel.
- (c) Lack of force to back her commitments, resulting in diplomatic recourse as the only means of implementing her international objectives.

4. It is considered that China, even with substantial aid from the Western World, will, by 1960, be reduced in size by the Communists to such an extent that she will be in no position to help in a war with USSR. By that date she will have lost Manchuria and Sinkiang and that part of North China north of the Yellow river. The only material assistance she would represent thereafter would be a foothold in Southeast Asia for the establishment of bases.

GEOGRAPHIC

5. China can no longer rely, as was once the case, upon the isolation afforded by geographic factors. For centuries the Chinese felt secure with the sea to the south and east, the Great Wall to the north and north-east, bleak desert land to the north-west, and rugged mountain ranges to the west. For decades now the sea has been a water highway rather than an obstacle. In modern warfare the Great Wall is no longer a formidable barrier, and the difficulty of the north-west approach could be overcome by a modern army. Even the rugged mountains to the west do not preclude enemy air action from that direction. Within the country the difficulty of maneuverability for ground forces is a limiting factor in national defense. China is primarily a land of hills and mountains, with level lowlands limited to a few coastal plains, several broad river valleys and some inland basins.

APPENDIX "B"

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

CHINA

-2-

6. Transportation in China is slow, difficult and inadequate. While scattered highway networks and a few airlines have been established, China still depends largely upon antiquated and inefficient river traffic. Inland water transport, except for very light craft, is chiefly confined to the Yangtze and West Rivers, the large Yellow River being almost useless for such purpose, because of silt deposit. Today China, including Manchuria, has approximately 11,000 miles of operable railroads, which is entirely inadequate for her needs.

ECONOMIC

7. China does not offer much in the way of war potential. Arms manufacturing is restricted to small arms of doubtful quality and limited production facilities. What raw materials are available cannot be transported by present transportation facilities to manufacturing centres. The only important industrial concentration is located in Manchuria, and this is destined to be lost to the Communists in the very near future. Once European aid has been successfully undertaken it is believed that the US will give China considerable assistance in the form of industrial equipment.

MANPOWER

8. China has unlimited manpower resources, about 80% of the population being engaged in agriculture. The military profession has never been looked upon with favour in China, and the high morale during the war with Japan has dwindled so that the people are inclined to accept almost any substitute for the present government on the chance of obtaining a measure of economic security. The Chinese soldier does not lack the qualities of a good soldier, but poor leadership, and unstable conditions has lowered his effectiveness.

ARMED FORCES

9. Nationalist forces in China are estimated at about 2,668,000 while the Communists are currently estimated at 1,150,000 regulars and a further 2,000,000 militia or part time soldiers who join their forces when operations spread into their area. The armies are loosely organized, poorly trained and equipped, badly led, and lacking in the industrial support and system of supply found in a modern army. Depending upon the degree of aid China receives from the US she will possess a heterogeneous collection of arms representing practically every arms firm in existence. All equipment will be in such a state of disrepair as to render it capable of performing but a fraction of its normal role. The question of reserves is practically out of the question since the arms shortage requires the immediate use of virtually all armament available.

10. The Chinese Air force with training in the US and directed by US advisers in China has been built up to considerable strength. Most of the aircraft are of US type but there is a shortage of spares and a lack of trained technicians. Recent reports indicate shortage of ammunition for aircraft, which nullifies their potential as a fighting force.

11. The Chinese navy operates under Army control, and consists chiefly of small craft suitable for river patrolling and light river transport services.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

CHINA

-3-

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

NATIONAL STRATEGY

12. China is considered on the whole to be a peace-loving nation. Although internal strife and attacks from without have been frequent in her history, China is a nation not characterized by conquest, and there is no foreseeable desire on her part for territorial aggrandizement. The only powerful nation contiguous to China's border today is the Soviet Union. At the price of important economic concessions, the Chinese Nationalist Government has attempted to buy a reasonable cooperation from this neighbor, at least for the near future. Her war potential in the event of outside hostilities would be effectively neutralized by her pre-occupation in dealing with the internal situation.

CAPABILITIES TO RESIST ATTACK OF A MAJOR ENEMY

13. China is not capable of resisting a major enemy, either by 1960 or in the years following. Her supply of manpower will be her greatest asset, but with the achievements of the Communists continuing as they are China will be divested of much of her economic potential before 1960.

~~TOP SECRET~~
APPENDIX "B"

JAPAN

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

POLITICAL

1. The Japanese Government is elected by the people but is advised, and its actions are controlled by the Supreme Command of the Allied Powers. This elected government is very weak and could not, on its own initiative, bring Japan out of her economic slump. There is no single party in Japan, at present, which is able to command the respect of a majority of the Japanese people, and thus form a centre of stability. In the event of a war between the Western Powers and the USSR, Japan would support the Western Powers.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. Lying off the eastern shores of Asia, the Japanese archipelago is a partly submerged mountain chain which flanks the mainland. The Power dominating the islands and surrounding waters is in a position to control the movement of surface craft between the Soviet Maritime Provinces and the Pacific and probably also to render ineffective the ports of North China.

3. The Japanese railway system, which was operating efficiently prior to the war, suffered some bomb damage but remained relatively intact. The wartime disruption of coastal shipping and poor highway system, place upon the railways the major responsibility for present-day transportation. Failure of maintenance and lack of coal have limited the operation of the railroads since the termination of hostilities. Plans for electrification of many lines have been prepared by the Ministry of Transportation.

ECONOMIC

4. Japan is not able to produce food enough to feed her own population. Imported food stuffs are reported to be in excess of 20 percent of total consumption. The only exports Japan can produce without the aid of imported raw materials are, handicraft, glassware, lacquers, pottery, light machinery, and silk textiles. Arms production is nil.

MANPOWER

5. There are no military organizations in Japan at the present time and manpower is sufficient for the nations needs in all fields. Of the 6,000,000 former members of the Japanese armed forces, over 5,000,000 have been demobilized. These men plus the 10,000,000 in the military age groups, 8,000,000 of whom have had some military training, would add materially to any Power that might undertake to mobilize them. Japanese, as soldiers, are tenacious, stubborn and skilled.

ARMED FORCES

6. The Armed Forces of Japan do not exist. It is likely, however, that the Japanese peace treaty will make provision for some armed forces as in the case of other ex-enemy powers, which will be sufficient to maintain internal security.

APPENDIX "B"

JAPAN

-2-

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

NATIONAL STRATEGY

7. The National Strategy of Japan will be the defence of her home islands.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR ENEMY

8. Japan cannot resist an attack by a major power, nor is it likely to increase its capabilities in this respect in the foreseeable future without considerable material aid.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

LATIN AMERICA

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

POLITICAL

1. Latin America will as a whole support the Western Powers in a war with the USSR, especially if the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro is invoked. Communist infiltration is not considered to be serious.

GEOGRAPHIC

2. Strategically Latin America is comprised of four major important areas:
 - (a) Caribbean Area consisting of Eastern and Southern Mexico, islands of the Caribbean Sea and Gulf of Mexico, the Central American Republics, the Panama Canal Zone, north-eastern Colombia and the northern coast of Venezuela. The importance of this area is essentially due to the Panama Canal which is important to the US.
 - (b) Northwest South America, Western Mexico Area due to its importance in the security of the Panama Canal.
 - (c) The Bulge of Brazil which is only 1700 miles from Africa, and which affords control of shipping from the North to South America.
 - (d) Patagonia Tierra Del Fuego Area which includes all territory south of the 45 degrees south latitude assumes importance if the Panama Canal is not available for use.
3. Natural defences including mountains, jungles and the oceans materially effect Latin American defence capabilities. Communications, however, are only fair to non-existent. All countries have rail lines and roads in varying stages of disrepair except for main lines which are good military assets. Much of the trade and travel is now dependent upon river boats. Air bases, either ex-US or commercial, are plentiful but chiefly on the coasts.

ECONOMIC

4. Latin America, during the past war, provided approximately 80 percent of the US imports of strategic minerals and provided practically all the supplies of antimony, white arsenic, bismuth, vanadium and quartz crystal. Latin America provided over half of the imports of beryllium, cadmium, copper, lead, manganese, molybdenum, tantalite, tin, tungsten, zinc, fluorspar, amorphous graphite and natural asphalt. Cuba for example has the fourth largest iron ore reserve in the world. Food and wool were equally important. In the event that Middle East oil is denied the Western Powers, the oil of Latin America is of prime importance, since its production capacity is 5,344 million barrels of crude oil with a daily capacity of 1,137,200 barrels, twice that of the Middle East. Production of motor vehicles, airplanes, arms and ammunition are negligible.

APPENDIX "B"

LATIN AMERICA

TOP SECRET
DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

-2-

MANPOWER

5. Latin America has an estimated 35,000,000 males 15-49 theoretically fit for military service. The great majority of the population constitute the farm and labour classes. Skilled labour is a constant shortage in all the countries. Physical and educational standards with a few exceptions are low.

ARMED FORCES

6. Latin America's Armed Forces vary from Panama with none to Brazil with 171,000 as follows:-

Army	477,000
Navy	79,8000
Air Force	32,800
Total	

an estimated 1,660,000 trained reserves are available. Training, which in the past has been inadequate and out of date, under the United States Military Mission, is being modernized and advanced to handle large quantities of surplus and lend-lease US material. The mobilization potential is estimated at 23,929,000 of whom 21,687,000 (85 percent) may be fit for some form of military service.

7. Most armies have on hand a high percentage of World War I equipment. Along with this small amounts of modern US material is maintained. During the period, it is expected that further quantities of US equipment will be obtained with a consequent improvement in potential.

NATIONAL STRATEGY

8. Up to the present time the armies of Latin American countries have been mainly employed as a means of keeping Governments in power or of ousting them in favour of others. With the Rio de Janeiro treaty, however, the countries have embarked on a strategy of Western Hemisphere Defence. Much remains to be done in implementation of the treaty, however.

CAPABILITIES OF RESISTING A MAJOR POWER

9. Latin American countries could not resist an attack by a major power except by guerrilla warfare.

~~TOP SECRET~~

APPENDIX "C"

MILITARY SITUATION - USSR AND SATELLITES

PERIOD "B" - After 1960

USSR

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

POLITICAL

1. There is no evidence to suggest a change from the conditions obtaining up to 1960. The greatest single opportunity for any such change would be the death of Stalin, which seems highly probable soon after 1960, if it has not occurred before. However, it is believed that the succession will take place smoothly, and that the MVD will ensure that would-be followers of any individual other than the candidate officially designated by the Party will be ruthlessly suppressed.

ECONOMIC

2. By the period 1955-60 Russia will have built up a considerable heavy manufacturing industry. Her target for 1960 doubles the target capacity for 1950. This might represent approximately a half of the estimated combined British Commonwealth and USA output at the time.

3. It is considered that this target is possible of attainment. From the economic point of view alone it is therefore reasonably certain that Russia could maintain armed forces, of World War II size, in a major war, of several years duration, by the period 1955-60.

MANPOWER

4. In 1960 there will be approximately 40 million fit men of military age in the USSR of whom 22 million might be available for the armed forces. The number of fit men of military age for the following decade will increase by about one million per year.

SCIENTIFIC

5. The Soviet Union should be in a strong position with regard to scientific potential. Production of atomic bombs will be well under way and in the fields of guided missiles, BW, CW, and electronics her lag behind the Western Powers will be considerably less than at present.

ARMED FORCES

6. Size

In the event of a war starting in this period it is believed that the Soviets would have already undertaken some ~~secret~~ mobilization, and the size of the forces on D day would therefore depend on the extent of the mobilization. The size of the standing army is estimated at 1,600,000 (105 divisions), and its build-up by divisions from M day might be on the following lines:

	<u>M day</u>	<u>After one month</u>	<u>After eight months</u>
Infantry	56	165	365
Armoured	35	60	75
Airborne	2	5	10
Cavalry	12	20	50
	<u>105</u>	<u>250</u>	<u>500</u>

~~DOWNLOADED TO SECRET~~
REDUIT A SECRET / APPENDIX "C"

7.

Equipment

Soviet equipment in this period can be expected to be on a par in practically every field, with that used in the US and the UK. It is also probable that the USSR will develop equipment which the US and UK will be forced to adopt if they are to retain their status as well equipped armies. Soviet equipment of this era will however continue to be standardized to facilitate production and to be simple to facilitate its use by all types of educated and uneducated soldiers which the USSR would call-up in the event of war.

8.

Air Force

In the brief period of slightly more than two and one half years since V-E Day, gigantic strides have been made in aircraft development and design. For example, jet planes have been developed, the sonic barrier has been reached, pilotless bombers proven feasible, mammoth load carriers flown, and navigation control improved, all of which were only ideas five years ago. Hence it is difficult to make any estimate or forecast of air power capabilities beyond a period of more than five to seven years. At present, from all indications the USSR has shown capabilities in the design, development and production of modern aircraft equalling the efforts of UK and US. The Soviet aircraft industry has made great strides in modernizing the air force as evidenced by the appearance of jet aircraft and the rapidity with which they have harnessed their industry to the production of bombers of the US B-29 model. It is expected that possibly by 1955 and certainly 1960 Soviet science and industry will be capable of producing a first class air force. It is estimated that from 1960 the USSR will be capable of engaging in large scale interhemisphere aerial warfare.

9.

Navy

From 1960 onward, it is possible that the USSR could surpass the Western Powers in naval development and in the size of a fleet since twelve years is not too short a period for the developments required if forced by the totalitarian government. From 1960 on, a fleet equipped with "true" submarines and whatever types of surface vessels prove needed, will probably be possessed by the USSR. If submarines are the primary type of offensive weapon, 2,000 may be taken as a fair number. The period 1943 to 1960 makes possible the training of the required manpower.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

APPENDIX "C"

SATELLITES OF USSR

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

POLITICAL

10. There is no evidence that any change from the existing situation is likely after 1960, except that, if any alteration does occur, it is likely to be in the direction of intensification of Soviet control.

ECONOMIC

11. The tendency will be towards increasing industrialization, but apart from Poland and Czechoslovakia the industrial potential of the Satellites will be insignificant compared with that of the USSR. In food, these countries will have an exportable surplus.

MANPOWER

12. Starting with a possible 20 million fit men of military age in 1960, the total of this class might increase by half a million a year up till 1970. Possibly up to 4 million of these might be equipped in the event of war.

ARMED FORCES

13. Size

There is no evidence to indicate any change from the estimates for the period 1948-60 of approximately 1,200,000 men, increasing to approximately 1,500,000 men (60 divisions) by 1970. Ten of these divisions might be armoured.

14. Equipment

The Soviet satellite nations will be equipped with Soviet equipment to varying degrees according to the degree of Communist infiltration in that country. Fully communist nations will be completely equipped with first rate Soviet equipment, with other nations scaled according to their degree of allegiance to Moscow. Czechoslovakia would be an exception to this as she possesses an adequate arms industry of her own.

15. The countries likely to be most completely under Soviet control are Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Roumania, and Hungary, in that order.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX 'B'

MILITARY SITUATION - WESTERN POWERS

PERIOD "B" - After 1960

USA

1. It is presumed that the USA will continue to expand its industrial potential as it has in the past. Its program for assisting Europe with consumer and capital goods should ensure that there is no business recession and its plans for the provision of military aid to threatened countries together with its arrangements for standardization of weapons in the Western Hemisphere should be sufficient to retain, in being, an armaments industry of considerable strength. In the technical and scientific fields the US will be unsurpassed and probably superior to the rest of the world. The armed forces will probably undergo rearmament on or near 1960.

UK

2. After Britain has overcome her economic weaknesses she will again possess a very strong war potential. Developments being planned in Africa and the rehabilitation of Europe will contribute in a great measure to this. Her extreme vulnerability to weapons of mass destruction will, however, be a serious weakness and it is doubtful whether scientific discoveries will ever immunise her from their effects.

WESTERN EUROPE

3. The economic and political condition of the countries of Western Europe will depend almost entirely on their own and American efforts in the preceding period. If these are successful, and given sufficient time to mobilize they may be able to put up more opposition to the USSR than previously.

MIDDLE EAST

4. It is estimated that from 1960 on the countries of the Middle East will be in a stronger military position than at present. The rise of nationalism has caused governments to consider the defense of their countries. If, as is possible a united or federalized Arab state is formed, it may make serious steps to provide for its defence.

INDIA and PAKISTAN
and FAR EAST

5. It is difficult to foresee any political, economic or military alterations which will be of significance to the world military situation.

LATIN AMERICA


6. By 1960 it is expected that by standardizing arms with the USA the Latin American countries will have increased their ability to resist invasion.

TOP SECRET

MAP "P"

ESTIMATED
ALLOCATION - SOVIET & SATELLITE - DIVISIONS
FOR THE INVASION OF EUROPE AND THE
MIDDLE EAST PERIOD "A"
1948 - 60

* Plus 15 used in France




ESTIMATED
GARRISONS - SOVIET & SATELLITE - DIVISIONS
FOR THE OCCUPATION OF EUROPE AND THE
MIDDLE EAST PERIOD "A"
1948 - 60

TOP SECRET

MAP "C"

Soviet Far East 80
Korea 10



C O P Y

BY DIPLOMATIC AIR BAG

CJLO (5-3)

CANADIAN JOINT LIAISON OFFICERS

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

11 Hill Street,
London, W.1.

TOP SECRET

10th February 1948.

The Secretary,
Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee,
East Block, Parliament Buildings,
OTTAWA, Ontario, Canada.

Survey of Soviet Strategic Interests and Intentions.
Possibility of War Initiated by Soviet Union Before
End of 1956.

I am enclosing herewith four copies of two Reports which I have compiled on (a) Brief Summary of Soviet Strategic Interests and Intentions, and (b) Possibility of War Initiated by Soviet Union Before End of 1956.

2. The information contained in these reports was obtained through discussion with the J.I.C. and Joint Planners of the Ministry of Defence, but must not be regarded or quoted as the official view of the H.M.G. or the British Chiefs of Staff. However, you may take it that the views expressed are those of the U.K. J.I.C. and Joint Planners. I am making this reservation because it is not proposed to officially distribute the information contained in these reports outside the Ministry of Defence, and even the internal distribution in the Ministry itself is strictly limited to a very few persons.

(Sgd.) R.L. Rayment

(R.L. Rayment) Lieut.Colonel,
Secretary,
Canadian Joint Liaison Officers.

Encs.

002685

Intelligence: JNT

SECRET

10th October, 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PEARSON

I think that you may be interested in the attached copy of a survey of the world's armed forces by the United States War Department. Their conclusions, which contain no surprises, may be summarized as follows:

- (1) The U.S.S.R. is now capable of overrunning, in a relatively short time, wide areas in Europe, the Middle East and the Far East. By about 1956 the U.S.S.R. may have developed "powerful offensive capabilities" against the United Kingdom and the United States, in addition to their continuing military capabilities in Europe and Asia.
- (2) Of the Soviet satellites, only Yugoslavia and Poland are likely to provide a substantial contribution to a possible Soviet war effort, and even these two countries would first have to reorganize their armies for an operational role.
- (3) Sweden could resist a large-scale conventional attack for only a short time unless promptly and effectively aided from the outside. None of the four countries which have reorganized their forces on British lines (Norway, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands) is now capable of offering any substantially effective resistance to a properly equipped invading force.
- (4) The French forces are capable of maintaining security within the French Union, provided no widespread or aggravated uprisings occur, but they are capable of opposing effectively any major aggression against France itself without very substantial and prompt support from the outside.
- (5) The Italian forces are capable of maintaining internal security but could offer only limited defence against a well-armed Power.
- (6) The Spanish Army is sufficiently strong to maintain the Franco regime in power, but it could do little more than offer delaying action if attacked by a major Power.

-2-

SECRET

- (7) The United Kingdom's forces are today capable of little more than maintaining internal and local security in the various occupied and colonial areas, and even this capability may be endangered by further reductions in strength. The development and production of modern armaments are proceeding slowly.
- (8) The Greek Army is barely capable of holding the initiative against the present guerilla strength. It is incapable of conducting large-scale offensive operations against the guerillas and at the same time providing protective detachments. It could not cope with a substantial increase in guerilla strength or an attack by any of the northern neighbors.
- (9) The Turkish Army is capable of maintaining internal security and of defending Turkish territory against any coalition of Turkey's neighbors, not including the U.S.S.R. It could not defend the country successfully against a full-scale attack by a major Power.
- (10) The Persian Army could offer little resistance to serious invasion.
- (11) The Indian and Pakistan forces should be capable of maintaining internal order provided religious riots become no more intense. Their equipment, though now adequate, is becoming worn and obsolescent. Pakistan will be more dependent on outside sources for equipment than will India.
- (12) The Chinese Nationalist Army has steadily declined in effectiveness, though it still maintains numerical superiority over the Communist forces. There is no evidence that the Communists are receiving Soviet material aid. The strategic initiative is gradually passing from the Nationalists to the Communists, but it does not appear that either side can gain a military decision.
- (13) Of the South American countries, only Brazil and Argentina have armies capable of contributing substantially to defence against outside aggression.

Incidentally, it is of some interest that the United States military authorities, before giving this document to the Department of National Defence, deleted all references to armed forces in the Philippines. This explains the gaps on pages 14 and 15.

002687

JIC 1-8

TOP SECRET

*File:
Appreciations
E.H.B.*



CANADA

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

CABINET SECRETARIAT

OTTAWA, September 8th, 1947.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

World Strategic Situation

1. The Committee at their 175th meeting (Item 964) considered an extract from the Joint Planning Committee's paper on the roles and relative sizes of the Canadian Armed Forces entitled "World Strategic Situation".
2. It was agreed to approve the paper
 - (a) subject to various amendments; and
 - (b) inclusion of a new section dealing with the Soviet Air Force to be provided by the Directorate of Intelligence (Air).
3. I attach for your information the final paper submitted by Planners to the Chiefs of Staff and would draw to your attention
 - (a) para 2 (a) - The words "This type of war is most likely to occur in the near future than at a later date" have been added; and
 - (b) para 4 (c) - The new R.C.A.F. contribution.
4. May I have your concurrence, please, to the paper in its present form.

J.A.K. Rutherford

J.A.K. Rutherford, Lt.-Col.,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

~~DOWN GR ADDED TO SECRET~~
~~REDUIT A SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

WORLD STRATEGIC SITUATION

1. The world strategic situation now and, as it will probably develop in the foreseeable future, based in part on the strategic appreciation of the Joint Intelligence Committee, can be summarized as follows:

General Assumptions

- referred specifically*
- (a) The U.S.S.R. is, at present, the only power other than the U.S. with the necessary large manpower resources combined with large economic-industrial potential required to engage in a world-wide modern war. She is therefore the only potential enemy of Canada.
 - (b) There is no prospect of a major change in the direction of Russian foreign policy.

FACTORS

2. Political

- (a) The control of atomic energy and other weapons of mass destruction and the establishment of an effective United Nations security force appear to be prerequisites to a general guarantee of peace and security. Very little progress has been made towards a solution of these two essential issues and therefore little reliance can be placed in a guarantee of peace and security by the United Nations.
- (b) Within the next ten years the Soviet Union will continue to consolidate its gains in Europe and elsewhere, and ~~(it will continue)~~ its efforts to bring countries on the periphery of the Soviet Union within its sphere of influence. *it is considered that* It ~~will~~ *is anticipated that* ~~also~~ *it will* continue by measures short of war to increase its control or influence in all other countries. Non-cooperation, delaying and obstructionist tactics, creation of political and economic difficulties with infiltration of Communists in government and labor unions of non-Communist countries are likely to remain instruments of Soviet foreign policy.
- (c) While the U.S.S.R. will probably act cautiously in the next few years, there is danger that an accidental war might be precipitated. This type of war is more likely to occur in the near future than at a later time. *(added)*
- (d) The period ten to twenty-five years from now is likely to be one of the greatest danger. *it is anticipated that* The Soviet Union will possess and be able to use weapons of mass destruction and towards the end of the period may have improved its relative economic strength somewhat vis a vis the U.S.A.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

- 2 -

Economic

- It is anticipated that*
- (a) The U.S.S.R. will make every effort through the medium of successive five year plans to repair the ravages inflicted on her economy by World War II. Additionally she will strive to close the gap between her economic potential and that of the U.S.A.
 - (b) The U.S.S.R. can be expected to succeed in making good the damage inflicted on her economy by approximately 1950. Economic self sufficiency necessary for a major war of movement may be achieved by 1960. However, failing a large scale depression in the democratic countries, she could not hope to match the potential of the U.S.A. for many years to come. It must be remembered that the availability of weapons of mass destruction and the ability to project them will have more bearing on the U.S.S.R.'s decision to wage war than the relative position of its economy.
 - (c) *It is anticipated that* The U.S.S.R. will make every effort to prevent any economic rehabilitation of Western Europe which appears to them to be a potential threat to her own security.

4. Military

(a) Navy

- (i) The Soviet Navy is extremely weak with respect to surface vessels. It is considered most unlikely that an attempt will be made to rival Anglo-American surface sea-power.
- (ii) There is, however, a serious submarine threat which will increase as the Soviet building program is developed, and as German methods of prefabrication and use of German equipment and weapons are applied to the Soviet submarine arm. Vigorous development of anti-submarine weapons and techniques is imperative if the Soviet submarine fleet is to be prevented from comprising a serious threat to our sea lines of communications.

(b) Army

- (i) The Soviet Army is and will almost certainly remain the largest and relatively the best prepared army in the world. It is and will remain capable of overrunning Europe (possibly exclusive of the U.K.), the Middle East and North China. The possibility of large airborne attacks against the North American continent remains remote pending tremendous increases in the capacity and range of air transport. Small scale lodgements on the periphery are an immediate possibility but the logistical difficulties of air supply would seem to preclude this, except where the Soviet is prepared to sacrifice small bodies of troops for an object they consider of sufficient importance.

(111) Additionally the Soviet Air Force will be able to provide adequate support to the land operations of the Red Army, and will continue to improve the range and capacity of transport aircraft.

(11) The Soviet Air Force will be capable of harassing attacks by small numbers of aircraft with a radius of action of 1500 miles up to 1952. In 1952 and after, attacks of a more serious nature may be possible by up to 500 B-29 type bombers carrying HE and incendiary bombs and employing biological and chemical weapons, and atomic bombs not exceeding 10. By 1957 double this number of high performance jet bombers may be expected on any one raid with a radius of action of 5000 miles. They might employ biological and chemical weapons on a large scale together with atomic bombs not exceeding 25. Supersonic guided missiles of the V-1 types launched from jet bombers might be employed in attacks against heavily defended targets.

(1) There is considerable evidence that the Soviet has placed the emphasis on the development of a strategic air force rather than on the tactical air arm which she operated during World War II. With German technical assistance it is well within Soviet capabilities to eliminate her backwardness in aircraft design.

(c) Air Force

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUCED A SECRET

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

*Copy No. 5 destroyed
1 June 50
M. L. J.*

Copy No. 6

T O P S E C R E T

J.I.C. 1 (Final)

Ottawa, 15th March, 1947.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

STRATEGIC APPRECIATION

APPENDICES

- Appendix A - Political Estimate of the Possibility of the Soviet Union precipitating War against the United States and Canada.
- Appendix B - Economic War Potential of the U.S.S.R.
- Appendix C - Manpower of the Soviet Union, 1947-1957.
- Appendix D - New Weapons.
- Appendix E - Russia's Naval Capabilities.
- Appendix F - Soviet Army.
- Appendix G - Soviet Air Force.
- Appendix H - Threat to Internal Security.

DISTRIBUTION

C.S.C.	- Nos. 1 -4
Department of External Affairs	- 5 -6
D.N.P.I.	- 7 -8
D.M.I.	- 9 -10
D.I.A.	- 11 -12
D.ScI. - D.G.D.R.	- 13 -14
R.C.M.P.	- 15
J.P.C.	- 16 -20
Secretary, C.S.C.	- 21
Secretary, J.I.C.	- 22
Spares	- 23 -35

T O P S E C R E T

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

STRATEGIC APPRECIATION

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REBUT A SECRET

1. AIM

To determine the capabilities of the U.S.S.R. to attack the North American continent within the next ten years including possible forms and scales of attack and an estimate of the probable amount of warning to be expected.

2. ASSUMPTIONS

Since the UK, the USA and the Soviet Union are the only powers emerging from World War II with armed forces and industrial potential capable of engaging in a major war, it is considered that the USSR is the only potential enemy in the next 10 years.

3. FACTORS

(a) Political

Canada/USA
(i) It is considered unlikely that a war between the USSR and the USA, involving Canada, would be embarked on by the Soviet Union, either deliberately or as a result of a succession of accidents, within the next ten years. The possibility of the USA provoking such a war is disregarded for purposes of this appreciation.

(ii) The most important factor is undoubtedly the economic one. Unless the Soviet rulers consider that they have overtaken the present United States preponderance of power within the next ten years, they would be unlikely to embark on a war. It is also unlikely that the Soviet Government would stumble into a war through the action of its agents or satellites. The continuation of friction and disputes is, however, to be expected. *X. Polarity*

(iii) Within the next ten years it is anticipated that the Soviet Government will continue to attempt to consolidate its gains in Europe and elsewhere, and it will continue its efforts to bring countries on the periphery of the Soviet Union within its sphere of influence.

X
(iv) The period ten to twenty-five years from now is likely to be one of great danger. Not only will the Soviet Union possess and be able to use weapons of mass destruction, but its basic economic strength may by the end of that period be approaching that of the United States. Parts of Western Europe may be under governments sympathetic to the Soviet Union. A situation would then have developed in which the opportunities open to the Soviet rulers might seem to them irresistible. If the Western democracies were firm and united, and if they pursued strong but fair-minded policies, the Soviet Government might be disposed to postpone indefinitely the accomplishment of their ultimate aims. The Canadian Government cannot ignore, however, the danger that Soviet policies may end in war.

(v) The probability of war is considered more fully in Appendix "A".

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET
TOP SECRET

- 2 -

(b) Economic

(i) The basic economic strength of the USSR is still well below that of the USA. Although the pre-war level of economic activity may be reached in 1948 or 1949, it must be remembered that Soviet national income just before the war was probably less than half that of the United States. By 1950 the production of oil and, possibly, steel, will still be below the pre-war figures. At present the most serious weakness is transport. Oil and rubber will be limiting factors for some years.

(ii) Economic self-sufficiency for a major war, involving large-scale movements and supply problems, may not be attained before 1960. Economic parity with the USA could not conceivably be reached before 1965-1970, but this may not necessarily be regarded as a prerequisite for waging a major war. The development of new weapons might radically alter the period of time needed by the Soviet Union before it would be in a position to enter upon a new war.

(iii) An assessment of Soviet war potential is included in Appendix "B".

(c) Geographic

(i) The shortest distance joining the industrial heartlands of the Soviet Union and the North American continent lies across the Polar cap and approaches Canada from the North-East. Direct assault and entry by enemy forces from the North are feasible and it is from this direction that the major air effort is expected after 1957.

(ii) An attack via the Pacific based in Asia would require the overpowering first of Asia, then of the outlying bases such as the East Indies, the Phillipines, and the Pacific Islands, requiring a long costly campaign.

(iii) An attack from Siberia via Sakhalin, Kamchatcha, and Komandorski Islands, the Aleutians, Alaska and Canada would be a most difficult and triphibious operation depending for supply on the Trans-Siberian railroad which has only a normal capacity at present of 15,000 tons daily. Therefore, the logistics problem would seriously limit the scale of an attack on the North American continent originating over this route.

(iv) An attack via the North Atlantic would presume a conquered Europe, UK and possibly Africa, and an attack on Europe would probably involve the USA long before a decision in Europe was reached. The distance of the nearest Russian air bases would preclude an attack on the East coast of North America for the present.

(v) It is, therefore, clear that an operation against the North American continent will involve inter-continental movement of troops and supplies. Thus Soviet capabilities for the commitment of men on this Continent will be directly dependent on the capabilities of the air and sea transport of the USSR.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT À SECRET

(d) Manpower

(i) It is estimated that for the period of the next ten years, the maximum number which the USSR can maintain in the armed forces will fluctuate from 4,400,000 to 5,600,000.

(ii) By 1952, in the event of a major war, the USSR could absorb into its armed forces a maximum of 24,000,000 men; by 1957, a maximum of 26,000,000 men. These figures would not represent the total personnel of the armed forces at any one time. Thus, by comparison, during the recent war, the USSR mobilized a total of 22,000,000 men, although no more than 12,000,000 men were under arms at any one time.

(iii) The assessment of Soviet manpower for the present and the next ten years is included in Appendix "C" attached.

(e) New Weapons

(i) It is tentatively estimated that the USSR will not produce any atomic bombs before 1950. By January 1952, their stocks of bombs might be from 5 to 25 and by the end of 1956, 40 to 60. Thus, on the basis of best present estimates, the USSR would not be capable of achieving a decisive result by atomic warfare, even against the UK alone, before 1957. By 1961 the USSR will be capable of producing a sufficient number of bombs to carry out a full scale atom bomb attack against the North American continent. It is thought that an attack on Canada would only follow large scale attacks on US industrial centres. If more than 20 atom bombs were used, then one or two might be launched against Canadian cities.

(ii) The USSR possesses all the potential resources for success in the field of biological warfare, yet it is doubtful if she would base her ability to wage war primarily on biological weapons. It is believed that chemical warfare might play an important part in the ability of the USSR to wage an offensive war, and, if war should occur within 2 - 5 years, it is estimated that the USSR would be more likely to employ chemical rather than biological agents.

(iii) Although the USSR controls many of the German scientific personnel formerly engaged in guided missile research and occupies some of Germany's greatest research centres, it is highly improbable that she will possess guided missiles with which she can bombard North America from presently occupied land bases in less than 10 years' time. However, sea or air-launched attack is now feasible from ranges up to 200 miles.

(iv) A more detailed assessment of present and future capabilities is included in Appendix "D" attached.

(f) Navy

(i) At present the Soviet Navy lacks sufficient surface vessels both Naval and Merchant either to make or support any large scale amphibious operation and such surface forces could not be built within the next ten years. There is, however, a serious submarine threat to our sea communication, which will increase as Russia's building programme is developed, and as German methods of prefabrication and use of German

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

- 4 -

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

equipment and weapons are applied to the Russian submarine arm.

(ii) Shore bombardment by submarine and their use for the transportation of sabotage and raiding forces cannot be overlooked as developments in submarine warfare.

(iii) It must be emphasized that an over-powering submarine force can be developed in a much shorter time and at a fraction of the cost that would be required for an equivalent surface fleet.

(iv) An assessment of present and future capabilities of the Soviet Navy with respect to operations against Canadian Territory is included in Appendix "E" attached.

(g) Soviet Army

(i) The Soviet Army is not prepared for a major war until the current re-organization, re-equipping and mechanization of a large proportion of its divisions is complete.

(ii) Its capabilities are, and, for the next ten years, will remain, those of an army of great numbers, equipped with first-class armour and artillery. Present inferiorities to the British and American armies with respect to mechanization, intercommunications, engineer and airborne equipment, radar, etc. will be steadily reduced.

(iii) Due to numerical superiority and relative general preparedness, the Soviet Army is now capable of overrunning Europe (possibly exclusive of the UK), the Middle East, and North China. Within the next ten years, it will not likely be capable of more than isolated airborne attacks against this continent, of progressively increasing scale, as the capacity and range of air-transport increase.

(iv) At present, it is capable of mobilizing 6,370,000 men by D plus 30, including some 80,000 airborne troops. By 1952, within the same period, the USSR will be capable of mobilizing 10,000,000 men including approximately 200,000 airborne troops. This figure will probably remain steady until 1957.

(v) An assessment of the capabilities of the Soviet Army for the period up to 1957 is included in Appendix "F".

(h) Air Force

(i) Threat of air attack constitutes the primary factor in determining the forms and scales of attack during the period. Present Soviet capabilities are limited; by her lack of a modern strategic air force, to conventional air attacks against Alaska and the north-west fringes of Canada, or one way missions reaching as far as the Western borders of Ontario. Should the Soviet Government give high priority to the development of a strategic air force and long range bomber aircraft of the B-29 type, it is possible that the next five years will bring Western Canada to the borders of Ontario and the US as far south as Los Angeles within range of air attack. By 1957, the USSR is capable of producing a sufficient number of long range bomber aircraft to bring all the North American continent within range of two-way air bombardment.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

- 5 -

(ii) Soviet capabilities of air transporting a large fighting force against the North American continent are limited by the short range of her air transport. As range and lifting capacity of her transport increase, large airborne attacks on the vital areas of the North American continent become an increasing menace.

(iii) An assessment of Soviet air capabilities to attack the North American continent during the period is included in Appendix "E".

(j) Subversive

(i) Communist elements now engaged in penetrating the Canadian democratic system may be expected to lend their active assistance to the Soviet Union by all methods possible, either by the exertion of political pressure prior to the outbreak of hostilities or by resort to force and violence according to the exigencies of the situation and the time proper for this manner of attack. The means adopted will include engagement in espionage and sabotage; the bringing about of conflict between the constituted authorities and Communist dominated groups whose allegiance is to Soviet Russia rather than to Canada; attempts to hamper the war effort of the country and the production of supplies, etc. by calling strikes; and by every means possible the rendering of assistance to the Soviet Union to the detriment of the Canadian defense effort.

(ii) An outline of the Communist apparatus and the development of its programme with respect to a threat to Canada's internal security is included in Appendix "H" attached.

4. CONCLUSIONS

(a) Because of the lack of detailed information any conclusions as to the forms and scales of attack against this continent are only tentative and will require revision as further information becomes available.

(b) It is highly improbable that the Soviet Government will embark on a war likely to involve the Canadian and United States Governments during the next ten years.

(c) Forms and Scales of Attack

If the Soviet Government becomes embroiled in a war that involves the Canadian and United States Governments, the following forms and scales of attack against the North American continent may be expected:

(i) Scientific

In the period 1947-1952 attacks would not involve the use of atomic weapons but might include biological and chemical weapons. Pilotless aircraft could be launched from sea or air, but the range for useful accuracy would be limited to 300 miles.

By 1957 attacks involving, in addition to the above, the limited use of atomic bombs, guided rockets with a range up to 500 miles, and pilotless aircraft launched from sea, land or air with a range up to 1,000 miles can be expected.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

- 6 -

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET
TO SECRET

(ii) Air

Soviet air attacks will change in form and increase in scale with the development of a Soviet strategic air force and new and improved weapons in the next ten years.

Targets in the North-west tip of the North American continent now within range of the Soviet Air Force are not of sufficient importance to require a large force. At present Soviet air raids by up to 100 aircraft carrying HE and incendiary bombs, coupled with the dropping of small sabotage units, can be expected against Alaska and the North-west fringes of Canada only. Aircraft-launched guided missiles of the V-1 type with a range of 200 miles may be employed. Individual aircraft may also undertake one-way missions against high priority targets (such as the plutonium plant at Pasco, Washington) no further East than the Western borders of Ontario and no further South than Los Angeles. After 1948 the increasing use of chemical weapons can be expected in addition to HE and incendiary attack.

By 1952 attacks of a more serious nature can be expected by up to 500 B-29 type bombers carrying HE and incendiary bombs and employing biological and chemical weapons, and atomic bombs not exceeding 10, covering all of the area to the Western borders of Ontario and Western United States as far south as Los Angeles. Aircraft-launched guided missiles of the V-1 type with a range of 300 miles and speed of 600 miles per hour may be employed against heavily defended targets. Individual aircraft may also undertake one-way missions against high priority targets anywhere on the North American continent.

By 1957 attacks can be expected by up to 1,000 high performance jet bombers and improved B-29 type bombers on any one raid covering all of the North American continent and employing biological and chemical weapons on a large scale together with atomic bombs not exceeding 25. Supersonic guided missiles of the V-1 type launched from jet bombers will be employed in attacks against heavily defended targets. These supersonic missiles will be extremely difficult to counteract.

(iii) Naval

The major naval threat at present is that of submarines to sea communications. Russia could keep up to 25 submarines operating continuously in the Atlantic and 12 to 15 in the Pacific, to be used mainly in attacking shipping, although some small scale sabotage missions could be undertaken against coastal targets on either coast.

By 1952 submarines in continuous operation will have increased to 200 in the Atlantic and the same number in the Pacific. They might launch pilotless aircraft against coastal and inland points up to a range of 300 miles and by concentrating large numbers of submarines on these targets, such raids will inflict considerable damage with little or no possibility of detecting or intercepting the submarines.

~~DOWNGRADED TO SECRET~~
~~REDUIT A SECRET~~

- 7 -

If the development of a submarine fleet is given high priority by Russia, as well may be, by 1957 Russia may have as many as 2,000 submarines; they may be capable of launching fairly long range guided missiles, will be equipped with aircraft and may be propelled by atomic energy. By 1957 it is still unlikely that Russia's surface fleet could carry out any significant overseas movement of troops and supplies.

(iv) Airborne - The Soviet Army could mount:

(1) Isolated airborne and coastal-landing attacks, each of not more than a few hundred men, until 1952.

(2) By 1952 airborne attack, increased in scale to a total commitment of a brigade-group; (approximately 3500 men) or, the concentrated commitment of an airborne brigade group.

(3) By 1957, attack by an airborne division (approximately 10,000 men).

(v) Subversion and Sabotage

Subversive activities and sabotage will be extensively used.

(d) Probable Areas of Attack

(i) By 1952 the North-West quarter of the North American continent extending as far south as Los Angeles and East to the Western borders of Ontario. The East coast of North America will also be subject to submarine attack.

(ii) By 1957 the entire North American continent will be vulnerable to attack from Russian bases either from the north-east or by north-west.

(e) Timing of Attack

This will be completely dependent on operations mounted by the USSR in Europe or Asia.

(f) Amount of Warning

Up until 1957, the measure of surprise achieved by the USSR in an action involving the North American continent, despite ample strategic warning, will depend on the unorthodox nature of the campaign to be mounted; i.e., fifth column methods of infiltration and new tactical procedures can be expected. Little or no tactical warning can be anticipated.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

POLITICAL ESTIMATE OF THE POSSIBILITY
OF THE SOVIET UNION PRECIPITATING
WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

1. This appendix is divided into four parts:
 - (1) an introduction;
 - (2) a discussion of the prospects of war during the next decade;
 - (3) a discussion of the prospects of war from twenty-five years from now;
 - (4) a conclusion.

Introduction

2. It is not necessary for the purposes of this discussion to assume that the governing class of the Soviet Union is actively ambitious to dominate the world - that its policy is one of all-out aggression. All we need assume is that the governing class of the Soviet Union is anxious to maintain the existing system in the areas now under Soviet political control and that this involves a desire to expand the defence area of that system. The desire of the members of the governing class to maintain the existing system is partly the result of their desire to retain their own personal power and privileges, partly the result of their belief that the Soviet system is better than the Western system.

3. The governing class of the Soviet Union is afraid of two kinds of attack from the Western World - armed attack and psychological warfare. It believes that the governing classes of the Western world are afraid that the capitalist system which gives them personal power and privileges would be undermined by the success of Soviet institutions and they might, therefore, launch an armed attack against the Soviet Union before the Soviet system has had a chance to demonstrate to the peoples of the Western world its superiority over the Western system. It is afraid of the penetration of the lands on the borders of the Soviet Union (the Soviet defence area) by Western ideas and it therefore resists the Western attempt to introduce Western democratic concepts into those areas.

4. The desire on the part of the Soviet governing class to expand the Soviet defence area may be as dangerous to the security of the West as a desire for all-out aggression would be. By its very nature a desire on the part of a great power to extend its defence area is an illimitable process. The appetite for security grows with eating.

5. The distinction between the two assumptions is, however, of very great importance. If the issue is one of active aggression by the Soviet Union, the responsibility for war is placed entirely on the Soviet side. If, however, the issue is one of a desire to defend themselves against attack from the Western world the responsibility for war, if one should break out, is a joint responsibility and the responsibility for keeping the peace is joint.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REBUT A SECRET**

**DECLASSIFIED TO 3000
REDUIT A SECRET**

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

It is no longer, for example, possible to disregard the possible efficacy of moves and attitudes on the part of the Western world which might minimize the belief on the Soviet side in the necessity of defensive measures; on this assumption provocative actions and attitudes should be avoided.

6. What we are concerned with in this memorandum is the possibility of war between the Soviet Union and the United States. Such a war might be deliberately embarked on by either side or it might occur as the result of a succession of accidents. In this memorandum, the possibility of the United States taking the initiative in precipitating such a war is disregarded, though the concept of a preventive war has been a subject of discussion in the United States. The question at issue so far as this memorandum is concerned is, therefore, the likelihood of the Soviet Union precipitating a war with the United States or stumbling into such a war. For reasons which are developed later in this memorandum, (1) it is believed that the chances of the Soviet Union stumbling into a war with the United States are remote. A war, if one comes, is likely to arise out of a deliberate decision on the part of the Soviet governing class.

7. Given the nature of that governing class, it is highly improbable that they would embark on a course which might lead to war with the United States unless, in their opinion, (a) the balance of forces in the world was such that their chances of winning the war were much greater than the chances of defeat or of a stalemate; or (b) even though their chances of victory were no more than even, the balance was constantly tipping more and more against them and they feared that unless they precipitated a preventive war, they would soon be at the mercy of the United States.

8. To try to assess the balance of forces at any given time is an extremely difficult task since on either side of the balance there are so many factors which cannot be weighed. It is not only, for example, a question of the possession of arms and armaments, strategic positions, and industrial potential, but it is also a question of the willingness of the nations concerned to use their armed forces. Since modern war has to be waged with the total force of a country, it is also essential to take into consideration the unity or disunity of each country in the event of the outbreak of a first-class war and this unity, particularly in the kind of war under discussion, would depend in part on what people in each of the Western countries felt about the issues at stake and the incidents which had precipitated hostilities. Thus it is difficult to assess the nature of the balance today and impossible to assess, with any degree of precision, the nature of the balance at any given time within the next ten or twenty-five years.

9. A great deal will depend upon how successful the Soviet Government is in carrying out their present plans for the industrialization of the Soviet Union. These plans are designed to bring the economic potential

(1) see paragraphs 24 - 25 below

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET
STOP SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

of the Soviet Union, from a military point of view, first up to that of the United States and then beyond it. If the Soviet Union is successful in carrying out these plans, the increase in population of the Soviet Union would then tend to tip the scales of the relative balance of power in favour of the Soviet Union. Doubts are, however, now beginning to arise as to the ability of both the Soviet leaders and the Soviet peoples to undergo the great sacrifices in comfort and leisure necessary to bring to realization the three five-year plans.

10. One factor which is clearly important in trying to assess the nature of the balance in the future is the ability of either of the main combatant states to secure, either by force or persuasion, allies or friendly neutrals. The Soviet Union is today posing as the principal defender of the rights of coloured and colonial peoples. It is also posing as the principal defender of the sovereignty of small powers. It would seem probable that, if the Western powers are unable to remove racial discriminations rapidly and to satisfy the demands of colonial peoples for self-government, the Western powers may have the great majority of the colonial and coloured peoples hostile or unfriendly to them in the event of war with the Soviet Union or at least doing their best to fish in troubled waters. In this context the term "colonial peoples" may well include a considerable section of Latin America, as well as the whole of Asia and Africa and the South West Pacific.

11. The sympathies of the peoples of Western Europe would undoubtedly be divided in the event of a Soviet-American war and, moreover, it is possible that, by the time such a war occurred, Soviet-dominated governments might have succeeded in securing power in such countries as Greece, Italy and France.

12. Even within the hard core of the present Western alliance which exists in fact, though not on paper, (the United States, the British Commonwealth, the Netherlands, and Belgium), there would be differences of opinion within each country in the event of a war between the Soviet Union and the United States and it is impossible to forecast how large and influential a group in each country would either be pro-Soviet or neutral. This depends, in part, on whether, during the next ten years or so, the governments of the Western powers, and particularly the United States, are able to take measures to prevent serious economic depressions. The chances of adequate preventive measures being taken do not appear to be very good. The size and strength of the dissident minority would also, of course, depend on the ability of the governments of the Western powers to convince their peoples that they are in the right should war occur. A dissident minority in a Soviet-American war would not for the most part be pacifists; they would be saboteurs and even rebels. Already Soviet sympathizers have secured a large measure of control of the trade unions in certain communications industries which are vital for war.

13. Thus, what we are dealing with in any discussion of the balance of forces between the Soviet world and the Western world are not for the most part "hard facts" but the imponderable things which go on in the minds of men.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET
SECRET
APPENDIX "A"

14. Moreover, a decision to go to war or to embark on a course knowing that it may lead to war is a decision which is made in the minds of men. The reality with which we are concerned is not the imponderable balance of power but the picture of that imponderable balance in the minds of the members of the governing class of the Soviet Union. What matters is not the actual balance but what people in authority think is the balance.

15. In order to avoid the grave dangers of oversimplification, it is also necessary to keep constantly in mind that an armed attack against North America is scarcely likely to occur until after North America has been subjected to a softening up process and a nibbling away at its outer ring of defences. In order to expand its defence area, the Soviet Union will pursue its orthodox policy of constantly probing for the weak spots in the outer ring of defences of the United States. ~~When it finds a weak spot, that is to say a spot which it has decided it can secure control of without running the danger of precipitating a war, it will secure that control.~~ [Thus if it were to discover that it could secure control of Spitzbergen, it would in due course probe to find out whether it could safely advance its area of control farther west across the North Atlantic bridge. Similarly, it will continue to probe in the Middle East, in China, in Europe, Africa and Latin America.] At the same time, it will try through its many propaganda agencies to strengthen its defensive position by undermining national unity within the United States and other Western countries. It will also try to strengthen its defensive position by promoting economic as well as political instability in the areas outside its control.

16. On the assumption that the Soviet Union is out to secure domination of the world, it is clear that the Soviet Union's ambition would be to secure that domination without recourse to a first-class war. The Soviet Union does not want to inherit a desert but a going concern. The Soviet Union would therefore hope to secure domination as the result of a gradual extension of power - an extension of political power over adjoining territory, and extension of economic power, and extension of power over the minds of men - until the balance was so weighted in its favour that the governments of the remaining Western powers would become more and more under its influence, and would finally become subservient.

17. No attempt is made in this memorandum even to guess at a future more remote than twenty-five years from now. The chances of the maintenance of peace between the Soviet Union and the United States during the whole of that twenty-five year period are not bright. The most we can hope for now is that we can get through that twenty-five-year period without war and that, during that twenty-five-year period, developments in the Western world and in the Soviet world will have made eventual war between them less likely. One thing we can probably count on is that the longer the two worlds live side by side in peace, even if it is an uneasy peace full of frictions and crises, the more similar to each other they will become. There will be more of capitalism in the Soviet system, more of Socialism in the Western system. It is even possible that if the Soviet system produces a greater flow of consumer goods and the population becomes less dissatisfied, there will be less necessity in the Soviet

5
DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET
TOP SECRET
APPENDIX "A"

Union for systematic misrepresentation of the outside world and for intensive state control over the actions and beliefs of individuals. The more similar the two worlds become the more manageable will become the problems and crises which will arise between them. This would not mean that peace was secure but merely that some of the peculiar reasons for conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western World would no longer be so powerful.

17A. On the other hand there is another school of thought who hold the view that if the Soviet leaders are successful during the next ten years or so in accomplishing their ambitious plans for industrialization, this will result not only in a greater flow of consumer goods for the population of the Soviet Union but may also lead the leaders to become convinced that if they intensify their efforts they may be able to surpass the military-economic war potential of the United States. Those who hold this view believe that there is a better chance of avoiding war if the Soviet leaders become discouraged in their efforts to catch up technologically with the United States, and resign themselves to remaining masters in their own sphere while avoiding any clash of interests that might lead to war with the United States.

Prospects of war during the next decade

18. On such information as is available ~~the Canadian Government~~, it appears unlikely that the Soviet Union would be in a position to win a war against the United States in the next decade, and for this reason it is improbable that the Soviet Government would run the risk of deliberately provoking such a war. As a result of the last war, the Soviet Union has suffered so heavily in terms of a general disorganization of its economy, material destruction and loss of manpower that a breathing space seems clearly indicated as a main objective of Soviet policy. It is not possible to do more than guess at the period of time which will elapse before the Soviet Government considers that it is in a position to wage another war should it desire to do so. It may be that the completion of each of the three five-year plans now contemplated will be considered necessary before the Soviet Government feels strong enough for such a struggle. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the Soviet Government will spare no efforts to strengthen the Soviet economy and build up Soviet war potential (already very powerful) at the earliest possible date.

19. This conclusion that it is improbable that the Soviet Union would, during the next decade, precipitate a war with the United States would not be agreed to by a number of authorities. The reasons for their doubts about the validity of the conclusion might usefully be examined.

20. One school of thought believes that the Soviet Union may develop weapons of mass destruction of such a nature or in such quantities as radically to alter in its favour the existing balance of forces. From the information now at our disposal, this contingency seems, however, remote. During the next ten years the United States ought to be able to maintain its present scientific and technological advantage over the Soviet Union in

6 **DOWNGRADED TO SECRET**
REDUIT A SECRET
APPENDIX "A"

ability to use weapons of mass destruction effectively against the other country.

21. Another possibility which ^{should be} is mentioned is a radical change in the balance of forces resulting from a profound economic depression in the United States and other countries of the Western World. Such a depression, if the USSR as seems probable were relatively unaffected, would tend to pull the countries on the border of the Soviet defence area inside that area. National unity in the other Western countries, and most important in the United States, would be adversely affected. However, though a profound economic depression in the Western world would undoubtedly alter the balance of forces to the advantage of the USSR, it is unlikely that it would alter it to such an extent as to lead the governing classes of the Soviet Union to believe that it would be in their interest to precipitate a war with the United States. It is much more likely that they would be content to take advantage of the opportunity to extend their defence area and to intensify their battle for the minds of men in the Western world.

22. A third possibility which is mentioned is that the factors on which our present calculations are based might be materially affected by the situation which might arise in the event of Stalin's death. It seems unlikely, however, that the transfer of power from Stalin to his successor would seriously affect the power of the Communist party in the USSR or the main considerations which affect the decisions on grave issues of peace and war by the governing class in the Soviet Union. Even if the transfer of Stalin's immense political power did not take place smoothly and personal ambitions among potential successors precipitated a crisis in the Soviet Union, it is unlikely that the struggle would be more than a palace intrigue.

23. Finally there is the theory strongly held in some informed quarters that the whole of the preceding analysis of the prospects of the Soviet Union precipitating a war in the next decade is vitiated by the fact that it is based on the assumption that, if a war comes, it is likely to arise out of a deliberate decision on the part of the Soviet governing class and that the chances of the Soviet Union stumbling into a war with the United States are remote. It is contended that, in the past, most great wars have not been deliberately sought but have been accidental. A great power has been dragged into war by an ally which it could not refuse to support for fear of weakening its whole alliance structure. A commander in an area of friction or a diplomat has precipitated a crisis from which it was impossible to escape. A government has been so misinformed about public opinion abroad that it based its policy on the false assumption that it could, without running a risk of war, secure control of a certain area.

24. Soviet generals and Soviet diplomats are, however, so well-disciplined that they would not take any serious step without instructions. If they did and their acts, might precipitate an unwanted war, the Soviet Government would not hesitate to disavow them. Nor would it hesitate to disavow the actions of one of its satellites even if that satellite had been acting under orders from Moscow. While it may well be true that the Soviet Government is

- 7 -

TOP SECRET
~~DOWNGRADED TO SECRET~~
APPENDIX
~~REDUIT A SECRET~~

misinformed by its embassies abroad, it has other sources of information and it is adept at flying kites to test, for example, the possibility of the United States being willing to go to war in defence of Turkey. It would therefore seem reasonable to conclude that the likelihood of the Soviet Union blundering into war with the United States is remote. (If the United States Government were desirous of finding an issue over which to go to war with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government might well provide them with such an issue. The question of the possibility of the United States precipitating a war with the Soviet Union is, however, outside the scope of this memorandum).

Prospects of war ten to twenty-five years from now.

25. While, therefore, we do not consider that there is any substantial likelihood during the next decade of the Soviet Union precipitating a war with the United States, it must be recognized that there are powerful forces at work which may in the end bring about a war between the Soviet Union and the United States.

26. One of these is the idea, which is a basic part of Marxist philosophy, that an ultimate struggle between communism and capitalism is inevitable and that communism will emerge victorious. It is difficult to say how much the present rulers of the USSR are affected by this concept, but it is certainly not without influence on Soviet policy. It may be assumed, however, that Soviet foreign policy will be dictated less by a conviction of the inevitability of conflict than by a realistic estimate of Soviet interests as they are understood in the Kremlin.

27. At the same time the Soviet Union is a police state in which individual liberties and democratic methods of government, as these are understood in the West, can hardly be said to exist. Between such a state and the Western democracies a fundamental cleavage inevitably exists. This conflict of principle runs deep in all the relations of the Soviet Union with the Western world. Moreover, the insecurity which makes it necessary for the Soviet Government to rule by such methods also makes it essential that the peoples of the Soviet Union should not be exposed to the unsettling effects of contact with the Western democracies or their nationals. The Soviet Government, therefore, not only keeps their people in ignorance of our conditions of life, but employs unceasing propaganda to instill into the population fear and suspicion of the intentions of the Western democracies. In addition, there will always be a tendency, when things are going badly in the Soviet Union, for the Soviet Government to distract popular attention from their own shortcomings by starting a campaign of abuse and misrepresentation directed against one or other of the Anglo-Saxon democracies. Such methods are obviously dangerous to international peace.

28. Apart from the desire to further world revolution, the Soviet Government may be led in the direction of war by two other motives. One is the desire for expansion - perhaps for eventual world domination - and the other is fear of a threat to Soviet security by the Western powers.

~~DOWNGRADED TO SECRET~~
~~REBUILT A SECRET~~

- 8 -

29. It is obvious that the Soviet Union is an expanding power. The Soviet Union has annexed Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Koenigsberg district, Eastern Poland, Carpatho-Ukraine, Northern Bukovina, Bessarabia, Tannu-Tuva, Port Arthur, Karafuto and the Kurile Islands. It has taken the Petsamo and Viborg areas from Finland. It is attempting, with considerable success, to establish a zone of exclusive Soviet influence beyond these territories, in Poland, the Soviet zone of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Persia, Azerbaijan, the Mongol People's Republic, Northern Korea, Dairen, and the trunk railways of Manchuria. In Czechoslovakia, Soviet influence is strong but not as yet exclusive.

30. These represent formidable acquisitions of power and influence; and the Soviet Government is undoubtedly willing to extend its influence and power as far as it can safely go. There is perhaps, however, a valid distinction between admitting the Soviet Union's expansionist tendencies and attributing to it schemes for world domination, although the distinction may be rather one of method than of eventual objective. It seems unlikely that the Soviet Government is contemplating grandiose schemes for world domination of the kind which fascinated the restless dictators of the 'thirties'. The Soviet rulers have always despised what they term "bourgeois adventurism". The gambling spirit that is willing to take great risks in the hope of immense returns seems to have little appeal for the Soviet Government. On the record of their past policies, it is rather difficult to imagine the rulers of the Soviet Union unleashing at a stroke a world struggle. It seems more probable that the Soviet Government will pursue a course of deliberate and cautious consolidation of positions already acquired, together with a process of probing for the weak spots in the adversaries' positions. Such a policy might operate on the political, military or economic planes. We have already had ample experience of these methods in negotiation with the Soviet Government. The tactics are familiar: the spun-out negotiation, the bargaining price, the war of nerves, the manipulation of facts for propaganda purposes, the abrupt change of front and the retreats pour mieux sauter. These have become the commonplaces of Soviet diplomatic methods.

31. Behind these tactics, the strategy of the Soviet Government seems to be emerging with increasing clarity. It is to undermine the position of the Western powers, and to weaken and divide them at every opportunity. In pursuit of these aims, the Soviet Government is anxious to prevent the formation of any Western bloc of powers. They strive to separate the United States from the United Kingdom, and to isolate the latter in difficulties over some issue in which they hope that the support of the United States may not be forthcoming. Moreover, the Soviet Government, in its role as defender of the oppressed, is carrying on propaganda against "imperialist" powers in general and against the British and American democracies in particular. In this capacity, the Soviet Government claims to be the champion of the poorer classes in all countries and of all racial minority groups.

32. In our estimation it is no longer possible to doubt that the Soviet Government aims at dividing the Western world against itself and increasing discord and instability. Such policies are plainly incompatible with friendship or co-operation as we understand these terms. On the other

TOP SECRET

- 9 -

APPENDIX "A"

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REOUT A SECRET

hand, they could be pursued for a prolonged period by the USSR without implying that the Soviet Government intended to precipitate a world war. They may very possibly be carried to the length of fomenting civil war in certain countries in which the USSR would give under-cover support to its adherents (e.g. in China and Greece).

33. The Soviet Government will inevitably, whatever its own ultimate objectives, be influenced in its policies by the reaction which it encounters from the Western powers. The Soviet governing classes have a healthy respect for the immense industrial resources of the United States and for its war potential. They are aware of the attraction which Western democratic ideas exercise over the minds of people all over the world. They are alarmed at the possibility that the socialist experiment may succeed in Britain and that the example of this alternative to Communist revolution might undermine their influence among the industrial working classes of Western Europe. So long as they think that the Western democracies (and in particular the United States and the United Kingdom) are strong and united, and so long as firm but fair-minded policies are pursued by those powers in dealing with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government may be disposed to proceed with caution.

34. If, however, they see signs of weaknesses in the internal economies of the Western democracies or instability in the conduct of their foreign affairs, they may be tempted to follow more aggressive policies. They will certainly seize upon any evidence of vacillation as an encouraging sign of weakness. They anticipate, and would exploit to the fullest extent, a serious economic depression in the United States. They are well aware of the fact that such a depression would have incalculable effects in the other Western countries. On the other hand, should they become convinced that the Western powers have aggressive intentions against the Soviet Union, they might feel impelled to provide in haste for their security by further annexations of territory or infiltration into countries in strategic positions. In estimating the possibilities open to them, they will be guided less by reports from their representatives abroad or from Soviet sympathizers than by the reaction to their probing.

35. In our discussion of the prospects of war with the Soviet Union within the next decade, it was not necessary for us to consider the influence of the United Nations. However, an analysis of the possibility of war ten to twenty-five years from now would be seriously incomplete if it did not contain some assessment of the influence of the U.N.

36. The U.N. is an instrument which can be used by both the Soviet Union and the Western world to weigh the balance of forces in their favour. The Western world can use the machinery for economic co-operation provided by the U.N. and the specialized agencies to raise standards of living in the Western world and to diminish conflicts between the Western powers over tariffs, monetary questions, cartels, shipping, aviation and such things. The leading powers of the Western world can use the U.N. as a forge on which to hammer out a greater political and economic unity of the Western world - a potential alliance against the Soviet Union. It is even possible that there may develop, through an agreed interpretation of the Charter or

TOP SECRET

- 10 -

APPENDIX "A"

by the conclusion of a supplementary international agreement, an undertaking by all the Members of the U.N. to go to war against any state which resorts to force even though formal sanctions against that state are vetoed in the Security Council.

37. Similarly, the Soviet Union may try to sabotage the machinery for economic co-operation provided by the U.N. and may use the U.N. as an instrument in psychological warfare against the Western world.

38. Both sides can thus use the U.N. as an instrument against the other. Both sides can also use it as an instrument for resolving conflicts between them, especially in the political field, and for working out compromises. However, it cannot yet be assumed that plans for general disarmament will eventually be realized or that the effective control of atomic energy will be instituted.

Conclusion

39. Thus, while the possibility of the Soviet Union precipitating a war with the United States in the next ten years seems slight, there seems little prospect at present of sincere co-operation with the Soviet Union.

40. Disagreements since the end of the war have been mainly over the peace settlements. It would be unjustifiable to assume that a solution of the German problem, satisfactory to both the Soviet Union and the Western powers, can be reached. The most that can be hoped for is an equality of dissatisfactions. There is, however, danger that the practical result of Soviet policy will be the creation of a closely integrated Eastern German state with a communist or near-communist system of government, well-organized and possibly even powerful. Such a state would have a very considerable attraction for Western Germans, and the Soviet Government must be expected to do everything in its power to increase the communist influence in the zones occupied by the Western powers. Nor will the struggle for the allegiance of Western Europe be confined to Germany; the political future of France and Italy is also in doubt. To a considerable extent the outcome of this struggle will be determined by the international economic policy of the United States. It will be fraught with the gravest consequences for the balance of power in the world.

41. If, at the same time, as seems likely for the reasons outlined in Appendix "B", the basic economic strength of the Soviet Union is approaching and perhaps even surpassing that of the United States, a situation will have arisen in which the opportunities for aggrandizement open to the Soviet rulers may well seem to them irresistible.

42. Undoubtedly the best likelihood of averting such a catastrophe would be for the Soviet Government to be convinced of the strength and unity of the Western democracies, and at the same time convinced that they have nothing to fear from them. It is conceivable that they might then postpone indefinitely the accomplishment of their ultimate aims. The world might settle into a period of uneasy peace.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

- 11 -

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

43. Canada, for its part, should do what it can to foster the strength and unity of the Western world and to avoid provocative actions and attitudes likely to strengthen Soviet determination to extend the Soviet area of defence. Canada cannot, however, ignore the danger that Soviet policies may end in war, and it must, in self-protection, consider the defensive measures entailed by this possibility.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET**

Department of External Affairs,
March, 1947.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

ECONOMIC WAR POTENTIAL OF THE
U.S.S.R.

1. The war potential of the Soviet Union is very difficult to judge with any degree of accuracy, in spite of the knowledge gained during the recent war. Soviet published statistics are meagre and often ambiguous. Restriction of movement and other security precautions make it difficult to obtain confirmation of reports. On economic matters, the principal sources of information are statements by Soviet authorities and articles in the Soviet press.

2. How much reliance can be placed on economic information from Soviet sources? No categorical answer can be given to this question. The Soviet press excels in selection with intent to impress and omission with intent to conceal. Hopes and plans are often, and no doubt deliberately, confused with realities. Competent observers are inclined to lay stress, however, on the limitations rather than on the inherent unreliability of Soviet statistics. Even in regard to estimates in the Plan, there is no disposition to doubt their general feasibility. Soviet planners cannot place the goal so high as to make failure to attain it too pronounced; neither can they place it so low as to give complete fulfilment, or even over-fulfilment, only a meretricious value. In broad outline and on points of main emphasis the objectives of the Plan can probably be achieved.

3. At the present time the USSR has a gross volume of industrial production second in the world only to that of the USA. Its economy is growing rapidly under the impetus of an extremely high rate of capital investment so planned as to realize the most rapid possible increase in war potential. Centralized direction of industry and ruthless control of labour enable the Soviet rulers to defer the satisfaction of consumers' demands.

4. The rate of economic advance is retarded by the necessity of reconstructing the devastated areas, the backwardness of the building industry, the necessity of making up for deferred maintenance, the lack of skilled labour, the lack of adequate incentives for many of the workers (particularly the penal labourers), and the inadequacy of the transport system.

5. Reorientation of industry towards the east, forced on the Soviet Union by the war, is proceeding steadily. The new industrial areas in and beyond the Urals are being made as self-supporting as possible. By 1950 it is planned to have 54.4 per cent of the coal, 65.25 per cent of the steel and 36.8 per cent of the oil produced east of a line connecting Archangel and Astrakhan.

6. There is no economic objective outside Soviet borders or control which might have to be taken by force in order to maintain the national economy. Natural rubber is the only important raw material of which there is not a potential sufficiency, and it cannot be obtained in any appreciable quantity from neighbouring countries. Oil production is restricted not by lack of reserves, but principally by shortage of equipment and technicians.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REPUT A SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

- 2 -

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

7. The USSR is industrially preoccupied with reconstruction and reorganization, and is not at the present time economically prepared for a protracted major war. By 1950 it will probably be stronger economically than it was in 1940, although in many industries (oil and steel being the most important) the volume of production will be lower than had been planned for 1942. Economic self-sufficiency for a major war involving large scale movements and supply problems may not be attained before 1960..

8. In the absence of unforeseen developments, the USSR may be expected to develop its economy more rapidly during the next twenty years than any other nation. The Soviet Union will probably need at least twenty years to become an economic power comparable to the USA. The attainment of economic parity with the United States will not necessarily be regarded, however, as a pre-requisite for launching a major war.

WAR EFFORT, 1941-1945

9. Our information about the economic basis of the Soviet war effort is too limited to support reliable comparisons with other countries.

10. The budget figures for expenditures on the armed forces are known:

(Billions of roubles)

<u>1938</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1941</u>	<u>1942</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>1944</u>	<u>1945</u>	<u>1946</u> (est.)
27.5	56.0	70.9	108.4	124.7	137.9	128.2	72.2

For purposes of comparison, however, these figures must be used very cautiously. The first reason is that we do not know to what extent the Soviet defence expenditure is concealed under investment and other items in the Budget. Secondly, the determination of a suitable rate of exchange presents very great difficulties.

11. The rate of wartime expenditure on goods and services for defence is of such value as a numerical measure of war effort that attempts have been made, despite the difficulties, to estimate it. The following comparisons are based on competent economic studies by unofficial observers. They can be regarded as reasonable approximations:

WAR EXPENDITURES

USSR 1940 as % of USA 1941	USSR 1940 as % of USA 1942	USSR 1943 as % of USA 1943	UK 1943 as % of USA 1943	Canada 1943 as % of USA 1943
87	22	41	37.5	6.6

12. The margin of error in the USSR:USA comparisons is large, but at least it can be stated with certainty that the resources which the Soviet Union was able to devote to war were substantially smaller than the resources committed by the United States.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

- 3 -

NATIONAL INCOME

13. The magnitude to which economic war potential is most closely related is national income. Without modification this is not a very satisfactory index, because total income is less important than the amount remaining after the minimum of consumption, set by physical or political considerations, has been met. The qualification would apply particularly to countries like India and China; it is of less consequence in the case of more highly developed countries where the margin above subsistence is relatively greater. There is some reason to believe that the Soviet Union, in spite of its lower standard of living, was able to devote to war almost as large a proportion of its national income as the United States.

14. The official Soviet statistics of national income are useless. On the one hand, they exclude government, professional, domestic, passenger transportation and housing services; on the other, they contain a large but indefinable element of inflation. If they were to be accepted, it would follow that the real national income of the Soviet Union was five times as large in 1940 as in 1928 - a conclusion which is not only impossible per se, but is also plainly inconsistent with other more reliable Soviet statistics.

15. Attempts to estimate Soviet national income on the basis of the available data have been made by several competent Western economists. It must be emphasized that the margin of error in such calculations is necessarily large.

16. Our observer concludes that the national income of the USSR was about the same size as that of the United Kingdom in 1937, but perhaps 20-35 per cent greater than the British at the time of the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941.

17. The most recent study of this subject includes estimates of Soviet national income for 1940 and comparable figures for the United States for 1941 and 1942. These figures were chosen because the degree of mobilization in the two countries was more nearly comparable than if figures for 1940 had been used in both cases.

NATIONAL INCOME (TOTAL)

	USSR 1940 as % of USA 1941	USSR 1940 as % of USA 1942
Consumer expenditures	27	28
Government outlays and net investment	85	52
TOTAL NET NATIONAL INCOME	44	37

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

NATIONAL INCOME (PER CAPITA)

	USSR 1940 as % of USA 1941	USSR 1940 as % of USA 1942
Consumer expenditures	21	21
Government outlays and net investment	65	41
TOTAL NET NATIONAL INCOME	33	29

18. The important fact to note is that the Soviet net national income was estimated to be 37-44 per cent of the U.S. net national income, or 29-33 per cent on a per capita basis. It is not surprising that the Government's civilian economy contributed in a larger proportion to the Soviet figure than to the United States figure, because of the complete socialization of education and medical care in the USSR. This should be remembered when comparing the figures for current consumption.

POPULATION

19. One of the chief elements in the basic strength of the Soviet Union is the size and rate of increase of its population. It is estimated that the present population within the enlarged boundaries is approximately 190 millions. By 1970 this may have increased to about 244 millions. The States now within the Soviet orbit (including Czechoslovakia) have a present population of about 70 millions.

RESOURCES AND PRODUCTION

20. Another element of basic strength is the wealth of raw materials. In respect of total natural resources, the USSR is almost certainly the most richly endowed of all nations.

21. Published statistics of production are very incomplete, but for the most important products it is possible to give either official Soviet figures or reasonably reliable estimates, and these are set out below in tabular form. Comparable figures for the USA and Canada are also given. It must be noted that these figures take no account of exports or imports, and that ability to supplement national production would be of great importance in war. The statistics are tabulated under the following headings:

Power:	Coal
	Oil
	Electricity
Metals:	Iron and steel
	Non-ferrous metals
Chemicals	
Rubber	
Motor vehicles	
Machinery	
Transport	
Armament Industries	

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

COAL

(Millions of metric tons)

	<u>1938</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1942(Plan)</u>		<u>1950(Plan)</u>
U.S.S.R.	133	165	243	148(1945)	250
U.S.A.	358	465		620(1944)	
Canada	10	13		15(1943)	
U.K.	231	228		196(1944)	

22. The war is officially stated to have resulted in the devastation of 1135 mines with a pre-war production of more than 100 million tons. The highest priority is being given to the rehabilitation of these pits and to the development of new mines, particularly in the eastern regions.

OIL

(Millions of metric tons)

	<u>1938</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1942(Plan)</u>		<u>1950(Plan)</u>
U.S.S.R.	32	31	54	20(1945)	35
U.S.A.	164	183		231(1945)	
Canada	1	1		1(1944)	

23. The disastrous effect of the war is shown by the fact that the target for 1950 is only about 65 per cent of the unfulfilled target for 1942 in the Third Plan. Oil production will probably be a limiting factor in the Soviet economy for some years. The main problems are the shortage of extracting and refining equipment and the inadequate supply of technicians. Drilling and refining machinery are being transferred from countries under Soviet control.

ELECTRICITY

(Billions of kilowatt-hours)

	<u>1938</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1942(Plan)</u>		<u>1950(Plan)</u>
U.S.S.R.	40	50	75	35(1946)	82
U.S.A.	161	180		280(1944)	
Canada	26	30		41(1944)	

24. In the western part of the Soviet Union a large proportion of the electricity is generated in thermo-electric stations. The emphasis in the new Plan is on the construction of hydro-electric stations in the Urals, Central Asia and Transcaucasia. Separate statistics for hydro-electric power are not available; the figures above are for total power-production.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUCED TO SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 6 -

APPENDIX "B"

STEEL

(Millions of metric tons)

	<u>1938</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1942(Plan)</u>	<u>1950(Plan)</u>
U.S.S.R.	18	19	27	15(1946) 25
U.S.A.	29	61		81(1944)
Canada	1	2		3(1944)
U.K.	11	13		12(1944)

25. A target of 60 million tons of steel per year at the end of three Five Year Plans (i.e. in 1960) has been mentioned by Stalin. This is to be achieved by more highly mechanized methods of production and by the development of ore reserves.

NON-FERROUS METALS

(Thousands of metric tons)

	<u>1938</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1950</u>
Copper	115	200	250
Manganese	2700	2900	3670
Aluminum	56.8	?	160(?)
Nickel	3.3	11.2(1943)	21
Wolfram	1.3	?	?
Zinc	80	?	?
Lead	44	?	?

26. Information about production of the principal non-ferrous metals is very unsatisfactory. There are contradictions in the available statistics which cannot be explained. The above figures, therefore, must be regarded as tentative estimates. Tin is not listed; production of tin is known to have been low and inadequate in the pre-war period. Uranium, needless to say, is not mentioned in the Plan. It is believed that a serious shortage of uranium exists and will continue until the Soviet engineers devise methods of extracting it from the comparatively large supplies of low-grade ores, or alternatively until appreciable quantities of high-grade ore are found within the Soviet Union.

CHEMICALS

27. Information regarding chemicals is even more inadequate than that regarding non-ferrous metals. The Third Plan provided for a production in 1942 valued at 13.4 billion roubles. The report on the Fourth Plan merely stated that pre-war production would be increased 50 per cent by 1950.

RUBBER

28. The USSR had to rely on large imports of rubber from the Allies to make up its war-time requirements, and it is thought that there will be difficulty for several years in meeting peace-time needs. Certain latex-bearing plants are being cultivated on a large scale, but substantial production of natural rubber cannot be expected for a long time. The bulk of Soviet production is necessarily synthetic. Total production

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUCED A SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

- 7 -

(including natural, synthetic and reclaimed rubber) in 1938 was given as 87.3 thousand tons; the target figure is 290 thousand tons in 1950. There is some evidence that production in 1946 was of the order of 136 thousand tons. Sixteen major synthetic plants are known, but there is no specific information about new construction. Some synthetic rubber is being obtained from Germany.

MOTOR VEHICLES

29. The Soviet Union suffered from a serious shortage of motor vehicles during the war, in spite of large supplies from the Allies, and it is doubtful if production in 1946 was higher than in 1938. In that year 211,400 cars and trucks were produced. The target for 1950 has been set at 500,000 cars, trucks and buses.

MACHINERY

30. On the development of the machine-tool industry will depend, to a large extent, the rate of growth of those other industries which produce directly for the armed forces. It is characteristic of Soviet economic censorship that little is known about it. The Plan provides that in 1950 the Soviet Union will have an inventory of metal-cutting machine-tools equal to that of the United States in 1940.

TRANSPORT

31. Transport is the most acute weakness of the Soviet Union. Roads and inland waterways are of secondary importance; the restoration and development of railways, however, is fundamental. Without extensive restoration and development of the railway system, the other major objectives of the Plan could not be attained.

32. The most urgent task is to restore the western part of the system, which suffered immense damage during the war. It was stated that 13,000 railway bridges, 15,800 locomotives, 428,000 freight and passenger cars and 65,000 kilometres of track were destroyed or removed. Priority in rehabilitation is being given to the lines serving the Donetz coal basin and Krivoi Rog; a one-time limit of 1948 has been set for this work.

33. The Plan provides for the construction of new lines with a total length of 7,230 kilometres, including the Stalinsk-Magnitogorsk main line. The development during and since the war of new industrial areas in the Urals and Siberia has made railway development in the eastern regions a matter of the highest importance. Electrification is being extended in these areas.

34. The results which it is hoped to achieve may be seen in the following figures for freight haulage:

(Billions of tons-kilometres)

<u>1937</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1942(Plan)</u>	<u>1945(est.)</u>	<u>1950(Plan)</u>
355	415	n.a.	300	532

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

- 8 -

ARMAMENT INDUSTRIES

35. No reliable figures of wartime production in the armament industries are available. It is thought that production of aircraft may have reached a peak of 5,300 per month (including 2,030 fighters, 1400 ground-attack aircraft and 540 bombers). Tank and self-propelled gun production may have reached 2,700 per month.

36. At the present time, aircraft are being produced at a rate of perhaps 2,650 per month (including 1,000 transports, 500 fighters, 400 ground-attack aircraft and 470 bombers). Very little is known about the development of jet-propelled and rocket types of aircraft; it may reasonably be assumed that thorough exploitation of German knowledge and resources would enable the Russians to produce operational jet-propelled aircraft by 1949. As regards present production of tanks, we have no reliable estimate. Construction of warships, never very important in the Soviet Union, has been retarded for a considerable period by war damage to shipbuilding yards.

Department of External Affairs,
March, 1947.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "C"

MANPOWER OF THE SOVIET UNION, 1947-1957

1. Introduction

(a) This attempt to project the manpower of the USSR for the next decade is based on two assumptions. The first is, that the trends of vital rates (birth, deaths, etc.) will be orderly developments of those for the period between the Revolution and 1941. Although violent social, economic and political changes have a disturbing effect on population growth, as well as war, the underlying trends of vital rates have still exhibited considerable stability. For the purposes of this paper, the possibilities of signal politico-economic change, and of war, must therefore be disregarded. Secondly, it is assumed that there will be no major migration of populations, either through emigrations, or through alterations to national boundaries. With the exception of the new Soviet borders, it is impossible to anticipate and consider territorial re-organizations, and still achieve a realistic estimate.

(b) In the absence of specific data from the USSR on the ratio between battle-killed and -wounded, invalidism, rates of non-battle discharges, deaths, etc., it is also assumed for the computation of Soviet war-losses, that data for other armies may be adopted for the Soviet Army.

(c) It is obviously convenient to consider first the present total population of the USSR. When the best current estimate has been established, it will be necessary to examine the numbers of people of working age-groups, which contain the military classes and the entire labour-force. On the basis of material presently available, it is difficult to assess the maximum possible commitment of women industrially and militarily. It has been reported to have been as much as 90% during the war of 1939 - 1945. It is this extraordinarily high figure which permitted the USSR during the recent war to achieve a mobilization of some 63% of its fit manpower.

2. Total Population

(a) The census of 17 Jan 39 showed the population of the USSR to be as follows:

RSFSR:	109,279,000
Ukrainian SSR:	30,960,221
Belorussian SSR:	5,567,976
Azerbaijan SSR:	3,209,727
Georgian SSR:	3,542,289
Armenian SSR:	1,281,599
Turkmen SSR:	1,253,985
Uzbek SSR:	6,282,446
Tadzhik SSR:	1,485,091
Kazhak SSR:	6,145,937
Kirghiz SSR:	1,459,301

170,467,572

Of this total, 81,665,000 were males,
88,802,000 were females,
31,412,232 were children under 8.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET*

APPENDIX "C"

- 2 -

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
 REDUIT A SECRET

(b) The steady drop in the birth-rate which has been general to all the countries of Europe since the latter half of the nineteenth century has also obtained in the USSR. But there, where the birth-rate was still more than 30 per 1,000 in 1939, the rate of decline has been slower than in any other country. More important still has been the marked fall in the death-rate since the Revolution and the Civil War. It has dropped, for instance, from 28.6 per 1,000 in 1913, to 20.3 per 1,000 persons in 1926. This is largely due to the enormous extension of social services, and to considerable appropriations by the Soviet Government for the protection of national health.

Since the beginning of the century, the percentage of women has been consistently greater than that of men in the population of the USSR. Further, the high rate of abortions which resulted from the post-Revolutionary freedom of civil marriage, and the ease of divorce, has been tremendously reduced by the controlling legislation of 1936. The granting of bonuses for families has also been a material factor in maintaining a favourable balance between births and deaths. Another factor to be considered is the coefficient of marriages in the USSR, which has been placed at 10.3 per 1,000 persons, a figure much higher than in any other European country. In 1926, this rose to 12.6 per 1,000 in the cities.

(c) Since 1939, the Soviet Union has acquired additional territories, representing additions to its total population, which have been computed in accordance with the above factors as follows:-

Finno-Karelia:	500,000
Eastern Poland:	12,775,000
Bessarabia:	3,500,000
Estonia:	1,126,413
Latvia:	1,950,000
Lithuania:	<u>2,879,070</u>

22,730,483

The inclusion of Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles would raise this figure to approximately 23,000,000.

(d) The best estimate of the probable population of the present area of the USSR for Jan 46 based on the census of 1939 and taking the above factors into account is thus 214,506,000, without regard to the demographic effects of the war of 1939-1945. The best estimate for the total population loss attributable to the war, including military casualties, non-recoverable prisoners of war, the birth deficit, and excess civilian deaths, is 28,000,000.

(e) Thus the best estimate for the 1946 population of the USSR was 186,493,000. On the basis of an annual increase of 1.3%, the present population would be thus 188,917,409. The most recent check on this figure was furnished through the publication by the Soviet Government of the number of voters registered for the elections of Feb 1946. On the basis of the above figures, that part of the population of 18 years and over would amount to 106,813,000. The number of registered voters published was 101,718,000. The discrepancy of some 4%

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "C"

- 3 -

may possibly be accounted for by those categories (such as criminal and insane) which have been deprived of civil rights.

3. Labour-Force

(a) The Soviet press has announced that the industrial labour-force for 1946 was 30,000,000. It is estimated that farm-labour absorbs 50,000,000 people. In computing the changes to this force during the next ten years, it is probably reasonable to assume that the need for additional workers for reconstruction will be approximately balanced by the decline in employment coincident with a loss of part of the total wartime industrial activity.

(b) As of the 1 Jan 46, the USSR was estimated to contain 37,402,000 males of 17-50 years of age (inclusive). Normally, 27,295,000 of these would be fit for combat, 6,230,000 fit for limited service and 3,877,000 unfit for any kind of military service. It is estimated that 3,783,000 wounded have been discharged as incapacitated for any further military service. At the end of the first quarter of 1943, the Soviet Government claimed that 70% of those so discharged had been rehabilitated, and were gainfully employed. It is likely that this figure remains valid. Thus we have:

Fit for Combat (1 Jan 46):	23,512,000
Fit for limited service:	6,230,000
Unfit for military service:	<u>7,660,000</u>
	37,402,000

Thus there are some 30.5 million men of fit military age in the Soviet Union, inclusive of incorporated territories.

(c) The principle difficulty encountered by the USSR in carrying out its demobilization plan appears to have been that of transportation. Stalin has implied that the eventual goal is the reduction of the armed forces to roughly one third of peak wartime strength. By the middle of 1947, it is expected that the total of persons in the armed forces will have been reduced from somewhat over 12,000,000 to roughly 4,000,000. This appears to be the maximum number which the USSR can maintain under existing peacetime conscription-laws and with presently available manpower.

4. Projected Population and Labour-Force

(a) An estimate of the total population for future years must take into account an estimate of the number of children who will be born in the future and survive to the years in question. To obtain this estimate, Lorimer's estimate of the fertility ratios (ratio of the number of children under 5 to the number of women aged 20-49) have been applied to an estimate of the number of women 20-49 who will be living in 1955 and 1960.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "C"

Total Population of the USSR (present area)
1946, 1955, 1960
(figures are in thousands)

1946 Male	-	
Female	-	85,257
Both	-	101,236
		186,493
1955 Male	-	97,332
Female	-	112,277
Both	-	209,609
1960 Male	-	105,396
Female	-	119,430
Both	-	224,826

(b) The future industrial labour-force has been calculated on the proportion of increase of number of workers to the increase in industrial output between the years 1937 and 1940. This proportion has been applied to the planned 200% increase in industrial output over 1940, to be achieved by 1960. Since the 1940 and 1946 industrial labour-forces are virtually the same, such a method is reasonable. These calculations have again taken into consideration the factors of population growth, industrial expansion and improvement of labour productivity. The results are as shown:

Estimated Total Persons in the USSR (Present area)
Engaged in Industry and Agriculture in 1946, 1955, 1960

Category	Jan 46	Jan 55	Jan 60
Industry	30,000,000	41,400,000	47,700,000
Agriculture	50,000,000	56,000,000	60,000,000
	80,000,000	97,400,000	107,700,000

(c) On a similar basis, the number of combat-fit males from 17-50 years, inclusive, has been estimated:

(i) Jan 55

Combat-fit:	29,699,000
Fit for limited service:	7,484,000
Unfit for military service:	7,891,000
Total:	45,074,000

Under presently existing conscription laws, it is doubtful that the USSR would be able in 1955 to maintain armed forces of over 5,900,000, of which 4,620,000 would be conscripts. Thus the total of fit men of military age should rise by 1952 to some 38,000,000. In the event of a major war at this time the USSR could probably mobilize some 24,000,000 men.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REPUT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "C"

15 -

(ii) Jan 60

Combat fit:	34,120,000
Fit for limited service:	8,119,000
Unfit for military service:	7,613,000
Total	49,852,000

Because of birth-deficits in the war years 1939-1945, the size of conscriptable age-groups will decrease by 1960, and the maximum armed forces should not be in excess of 5,600,000 of which over 4,000,000 will be conscripts. In the event of a major war in 1957, the USSR could probably mobilize some 26,000,000 out of a total of 41,000,000 fit men.

(d) In 1941, there were, within the pre-war boundaries of the USSR, 35,000,000 fit men of military age (17-50). During the recent war, the Soviet Union was able to mobilize 22,000,000 men in her armed forces, although 12,000,000 was the maximum at any one time. By comparison, 12,000,000 men were mobilized in the UK forces and 14,000,000 in those of the USA. On this basis, assuming that mobilization plans and procedures have been firmly crystallized by the middle of 1947, the USSR should be able in 1952 to mobilize 24,000,000 men, and in 1957, 27,000,000.

5. Satellites

Out of a total population of about 70,000,000 in the satellite countries, there are slightly over 15,000,000 fit men of military age. The present strengths of the satellite armies total about 1,000,000 men. Mobilization might increase this figure by D plus 30 to about 1,200,000. It is considered that the reliability of the satellite armed forces would be low, and that, in nature, they will be patterned after the Soviet model. For the purposes of this report, only the Soviet Armed Forces are considered for the future.

6. Conclusions

(a) The present total population of the USSR is 189,000,000.

(b) (i) The 1946 labour-force consisted of 30,000,000 industrial workers, and 50,000,000 agriculture workers.

(ii) These figures will have increased by 1955 to 41,400,000 and to 56,000,000, respectively; by 1960, to 47,700,000 and to 60,000,000, respectively.

(c) Fit males of military age will increase from 30,500,000 in 1947 to 38,000,000 in 1952, and to 41,000,000 in 1957.

(d) The maximum number which the USSR can maintain in the armed forces under existing peacetime conscription-laws and with available manpower will rise from 4,400,000 to 5,600,000 approximately. One estimate for 1956 divides the total as follows:-

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

- 6 -

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "C"

Army:	3,000,000	to	3,750,000
MVD:	450,000	to	600,000
Air Force:	600,000	to	800,000
Navy	300,000	to	500,000
	4,350,000		5,650,000

(e) In 1955, the USSR should be able to mobilize a maximum of 24,000,000 men; in 1960, 26,000,000.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REOUT A SECRET

Department of External Affairs,
March, 1947.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "D"

NEW WEAPONS

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

Atomic Bombs

Providing existing national and international views on atomic warfare continue, there is no reason to foresee that the USSR will, at any time in the future, have a better capacity for producing or have a greater stock of atomic bombs, of the present type, than the USA. Prime requisites for mass production are a large supply of high-grade ore and a great number of highly skilled scientists and technicians. The present manufacturing processes demand the application on a very large scale, of difficult industrial techniques. The USSR, at present, is believed to have neither an adequate supply of atomic bomb raw materials nor the number of skilled technicians required for mass production of the bombs.

It is tentatively estimated that the USSR will not produce any atomic bombs before 1950. Their stock of bombs might be from 5 to 25 by January, 1952, and from 40 to 60 by the end of 1956. It must, however, be remembered that these estimates are based on present production techniques which might be radically changed.

It is thought that some 30 to 120 atomic bombs accurately delivered might cause the collapse of the United Kingdom without invasion. However, the number of bombs required for an actual operation of this nature would likely be in the neighbourhood of 60 to 240. On the basis of best present estimates the USSR would not be capable of achieving a decisive result by atomic warfare, even against the United Kingdom alone, before 1957.

The possibility of a full scale atom bomb attack against the American continent will exist by 1961.

It is thought that an attack on Canada would only follow large scale attacks on US industrial centres. If more than 20 atom bombs were used then one or two might be launched against Canadian cities.

It is improbable that a Russian decision to attack this continent would ever be based on the expectation of having and maintaining a superiority in atomic warfare. However, atom bombs would prove to be relatively more efficient in use against the concentrated industries of the United Kingdom or the USA than against the more dispersed and inaccessible industrial areas of the USSR. This would offset a higher US rate of production.

Biological Weapons

The USSR is believed to be at less disadvantage in the field of biological warfare, although there is no evidence to suggest that there is at present a superiority over the Western Powers. The USSR possesses all the potential resources for success in this field, including a competent medical research organization and the industrial potential, the latter not so highly specialized as is required for production of the atomic bomb. In addition, the fact that production of biological warfare agents is highly dangerous makes it more suitable to a totalitarian regime.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

APPENDIX "D"

However, it must be emphasized that the unknown factors in biological warfare are so great that it may yet prove to be a most deadly weapon or a comparatively harmless one. In any case, it is doubtful if the USSR would base her ability to wage war primarily on biological weapons.

Canada and the United States, as highly organized countries, with unusually good medical services, will likely be able to offer a good defence against biological attack. Our Public Health service is not at present paralleled in the USSR. Problems of immunization against disease are relatively simple here, while in the USSR they might prove to be quite a complex administrative task.

In addition, the USSR is believed to be particularly vulnerable to attack on her food supplies, such as might be launched against cattle (Rinderpest) and cereal and fodder crops.

Chemical Warfare

It is believed that chemical warfare might play an important role in the ability of the USSR to wage offensive war. Much of the German knowledge and experience is now possessed by her. Their chemical industry is probably adequate for the production of large amounts of chemical warfare agents. Present known chemical warfare agents are much more toxic than previous agents, and more stable and easier to handle than are biological weapons.

If war should occur within 2 to 5 years, it is estimated that the USSR would be more likely to employ chemical, rather than biological warfare, agents, for there is a tremendous logistic problem in dealing with materials which are not suitable for long-term storage, because of comparatively rapid deterioration.

Guided Missiles

The following types of guided missiles, for attack against land targets, with reasonable payload and accuracy, should be expected to be available to the USSR by the dates shown. If very low accuracy were acceptable in a surprise attack, pilotless aircraft could achieve much longer ranges.

<u>ROCKET TYPE</u>	<u>WINGED TYPE</u>
1947 Land-launched with a range of 200 miles.	Subsonic velocity, land, sea or air-launched with a range of 200 miles.
1952 Land or sea-launched with a range of 300 miles.	Subsonic velocity, land, sea or air-launched with a range of 300 miles.
	Supersonic velocity, air-launched with a range of 40 miles.

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

APPENDIX "D"

(Cont'd) ROCKET TYPE

WINGED TYPE

1957 Land or sea-launched
with a range of 500
miles.

Subsonic velocity, land
or sea-launched with a
range of 1000 miles.

Supersonic velocity, air-
launched with a range of
200 miles.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET**

Director General of Defence Research,
March, 1947.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET
TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "E"

RUSSIA'S NAVAL CAPABILITIES

Russia is at the present time the world's third ranking sea power. Her surface fleet, however, compared with either the British or American fleets is not imposing, and it is apparent that her present ability to protect any significant overseas movement of troops and supplies is quite limited. Her present Merchant Fleet tonnage is small (about 2½ million tons).

2. The Soviet Government is making great efforts to build up her shipyards and her Merchant Marine. There are indications also that as soon as Russia can afford to divert the necessary supplies and manpower from industry, she will turn her attention to the development of the air and surface components of sea power.

3. The threat to the Western Hemisphere from such a development does not appear to be immediate; any import building program will take at least three years to get under way, and it may be ten years possibly longer before Russia can develop Naval Forces which would be at all comparable to the British or American fleets. Any significant reduction in the British or American fleets would, of course, reduce this time factor in favour of Russia.

4. The only immediate threat to Canadian and United States sea communications is Russia's submarine force which now, in 1947, consists of at least 230 units. One hundred and fifteen of these are considered to be excellent ocean-going modern submarines fitted with all the latest equipment. The other 113, while older, cannot be considered in any way obsolete since they were all built since 1935 and would still be quite effective from an operational point of view. When it is remembered that in 1939 Germany had only sixty U-boats and that in spite of concentrated Allied bombing she added 1,100 to that total during the war, Russia's capabilities of waging effective submarine warfare against our overseas shipping must not be underestimated.

5. Russia's submarines would have been relatively ineffective against the anti-submarine measures developed by the allies in the latter stages of the war. However, the Russians are now in a position to benefit greatly from German experience and developments. At the end of the war the Germans had developed vastly improved types of U-boats. Type XXI had a submerged speed of 16 knots, great submerged endurance and ability to charge batteries in a few hours without surfacing or exposing anything more than the comparatively inconspicuous Schnorkel, and the large propulsion Type XXVI, with even greater submerged speed and endurance. It would be extremely difficult if not impossible to deal effectively with this type with the anti-submarine equipment methods and escort vessels now available. By use of a new type of fuel submerged speeds of well over 20 knots and an almost indefinite submerged range are an immediate possibility and may already have been developed by the Russians. The present effective Asdic speed is 16 knots and effective range 500 to 3000 yards depending on water conditions. Type XXI submarines were to have been turned out in great numbers by a system of sectional prefabrication and assembling, but fortunately only one vessel came into service before the Germans surrendered. It should be noted incidentally, that the schnorkel greatly reduces the effectiveness of radar and almost com-

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET
APPENDIX "E"

- 2 -

pletely counters the use of shore-based or ship-based aircraft in anti-submarine operations. This, when aircraft had become our trump card against the U-boat, is a most serious blow and necessitates completely new developments in anti-submarine methods and equipment.

6. The Russians have obtained 12 modern German U-boats including 8 completed Type XXI. They will probably concentrate on producing a type or types with performance approximating to the German Type XXVI, of which they possess full details, as well as particulars of the Walther Propulsion Unit. Furthermore, they control several German shipyards which were assembling U-boats of the latest class as well as factories producing nearly all the parts and equipment which went into them. As reparations, the Russians have also obtained from elsewhere in Germany machinery used in the manufacture of such U-boats and in addition they have in their hands German scientific personnel both Naval and civilian familiar with all phases of the construction and operation of U-boats.

7. It must be expected, therefore, that Russia will devote considerable effort to the development of her submarine force. With the knowledge of German experience and developments which has been acquired and the assistance of German personnel which is available, Russia would be able to carry out very effective submarine operations against our overseas and coastal shipping, and her submarine force may be expected to increase rapidly. She has an experience of the mass production of submarines and achieved a figure of some 200 between 1936 and 1939.

8. Another possibility in the foreseeable future is the application by the Russians of atomic energy to the propulsion of submarines. German research into the uses of nuclear energy was directed towards the use of such energy for power production rather than explosive purposes, and the results of this research are now in Russian hands. Submarines probably offer the most suitable field for the early application of this form of energy, and such a development would undoubtedly produce a greatly increased speed and range with greatly reduced vulnerability.

9. Certain other developments of submarine warfare cannot be overlooked:

- (a) The use of submarines for the transportation of sabotage and raiding forces. The Japanese I-400 class which had a displacement of about 5,500 tons could carry as many as 300 troops in addition to the regular complement.
- (b) The launching from massed submarines of guided missiles and rockets would provide a satisfactory means of delivering explosives, atomic or otherwise, against targets in both the East and West Coast industrial areas from comparatively close range and with little or no danger of detection or interception.
- (c) There is nothing new in equipping submarines with aircraft. British submarines were so equipped in the 1930's and the Japanese I-400

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

APPENDIX "E"

class carried three planes. Any development of this type of submarine warfare has tremendous offensive possibilities with the new weapons which can be carried by aircraft.

10. A last possibility which should not be overlooked is the use of ordinary merchant ships for launching aircraft and guided missiles.

Conclusions

11. To sum up Russia's Naval capabilities - her surface forces and her merchant marine are weak but if she studies the Naval lessons of the last two World Wars she is capable of developing a most potent submarine fleet against which Canada and the United States would find it difficult to defend their sea communications.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

Director of Naval Plans and Intelligence,
March, 1947.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "F"

SOVIET ARMY

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

1. THE SOVIET ARMY IN 1947

(a) Strength

On 1 Jan 47 the estimated strength of the Soviet Army was about 3,670,000 comprising approximately 290 divisions of which 30 may be armoured and including some 80,000 airborne troops. By the middle of 1947, due to demobilization, this strength may be reduced to 3,390,000 consisting of some 270 divisions.

At the present time mobilization plans are unlikely to be sufficiently advanced to do more than bring existing formations up to full strength by D plus 30 giving a full strength on war footing of 6,370,000 men.

In addition, the Soviet Union might count on the assistance of the following countries:-

Poland
Czechoslovakia
Yugoslavia
Bulgaria
Roumania
Hungary
Albania

These countries have an estimated ground strength of approximately 1,000,000 men composed of 107 divisions.

(b) Weapons and Equipment

In armour and artillery the Soviet Union, at the present time, is at least equal to any in the world. But, the Soviet Army is considered to be inferior to the British and American Armies with regard to mechanization, intercommunication, artillery fire control, engineering equipment, airborne equipment, and radar. Furthermore, the armies of the satellite countries are extremely poorly equipped.

In the field of rockets and guided missile the Soviet Army must be considered abreast of similar developments in other armies.

(c) Capabilities

The Soviet Army cannot be considered fully prepared for a protracted major war until the completion of the present re-organization and re-equipping of a large proportion of its divisions. Even then, lack of the necessary experience and training will be a tremendous difficulty in the execution of large-scale amphibious operations. However, due to its undoubted numerical superiority and relative general preparedness at the present time the

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "F"

- 2 -

Soviet Army is capable of overrunning Europe (exclusive of the U.K.), the Middle East, and North China. Its airborne capability is limited at the moment to small "commando-type" raids.

2. THE SOVIET ARMY IN 1952

(a) Strength

By 1952, it is estimated that the Soviet Army could mobilize at least 10,000,000 men by D plus 30 including approximately 200,000 airborne troops. In addition, they could probably rely on the support of a further 4,000,000 men provided by the satellite countries.

(b) Weapons and Equipment

The Soviet Army will have maintained its armoured and artillery parity with the Western Powers. It will, probably, also have achieved parity with regard to mobility, but, not with regard to such technical devices as radar, artillery fire control and intercommunications.

(c) Capabilities

By 1952, the present re-organization of the Soviet Army should be completed and it must be considered capable of waging a major war anywhere on the continents of Europe or Asia. However, its performance in other areas of the world will be limited by other than ground factors. It would be capable of conducting more extensive airborne "commando-type" raids against the North American continent.

3. THE SOVIET ARMY IN 1957

(a) Strength

By 1957, the Soviet Union would have available some 41,000,000 fit men of military age. Of these, not less than 14,000,000 would probably be fully trained personnel of which 500,000 could be trained airborne troops. The total manpower potential which the Soviet Union would be prepared to mobilize for its armed forces would depend largely on the proportion of the total manpower which they would consider necessary for their essential industries.

In addition, the Soviet Union might have the support of some 20,000,000 fit men of military age in the satellite countries.

(b) Weapons and Equipment

By 1957, the lead which Canada, Great Britain and the United States have had over the USSR in technical matters will have been greatly reduced. However, in the fields of weapon and general technical development, which the Soviet will consider decisive, it is extremely dangerous to

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET**

TOP SECRET

- 3 -

APPENDIX "F"

assume any Soviet inferiority by 1957.

**DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET**

(c) Capabilities

The capabilities of the Soviet Army in any sphere of operations by 1957 would depend on factors not pertaining to ground forces except with regards to the airborne components of the Army. It is appreciated that by this time 200,000 to 300,000 airborne troops would be trained and could be dropped on North America if there were no other commitments and adequate airlift was available.

4. CONCLUSION

(a) While the USSR will possess adequate troops to launch a major attack on this continent by 1952, she lacks experience in amphibious operations; however, her ability to make sea - or air - landings of even a brigade group will be contingent on the development of sea - and air - transport during the next ten years.

(b) A force of 80,000 to 200,000 airborne troops obviously constitutes a strategic weapon of the first importance. In view of the need for holding large proportions of this force for possible use in the Eastern European, the Middle East, and the North China theatres, it is unlikely that more than a very small per cent of this force would ever be committed in a single operation against this continent in the next ten years.

Director of Military Intelligence,
March, 1947.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "G"

SOVIET AIR FORCE

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

1. SOVIET AIR FORCE IN 1947

(a) Strength

On 1 Jan 47 the first-line strength of the Soviet Air Force was estimated to be 15,000 to 20,000 aircraft of all types. There is no evidence to suggest that this numerical strength is being substantially changed. This total comprises approximately 2,700 to 5,000 bombers, 6,000 to 8,000 fighters and 3,000 to 4,000 ground attack aircraft. In addition there are substantial stocks of new aircraft in stored reserves mounting to some 18,000. Almost the entire strength of the Soviet Air Force is disposed west of the Urals facing Western Europe and the Middle East.

The Civil Air Fleet, which performs the functions of a troop carrier in time of war comprises approximately 10,000 aircraft of all types, of which 5,000 are Douglas type transports.

(b) Aircraft and Equipment

The bomber aircraft include some 2,000 twin-engined aircraft of recent design, together with a small number of obsolete four-engined bombers. The maximum range of these bombers does not exceed 3,000 miles with bomb loads of 4,400 pounds or less. New four-engined bombers are coming into production. There are indications that ranges up to 5,000 miles may be expected with 9 - 11,000 pound bomb loads. The Soviet strategic bomber force will be re-armed with these aircraft as they are produced.

The fighters are not equal in performance to the newest British and United States types and operate most effectively at low and medium altitudes. The Soviets also possess 100 to 200 captured German jet fighters together with the necessary production facilities to produce more.

The ground attack aircraft consist mostly of the Stormovik.

The Soviets lack operational equipment such as blind bombing techniques, navigational aids and blind flying instruments of reliability.

(c) Capabilities

While the Soviet Air Force is numerically superior to the combined air forces of the British Commonwealth and the United States, the standard of its operational efficiency is lower. During the recent war, the Russian air effort was directed to close support of the ground forces, and little emphasis was laid on the value of strategic bombing. As a result the Soviet Air Force is largely composed of tactical air units.

Using their present bombers on conventional missions from their present Arctic bases, the Russians would have only Alaska and the extreme north-western

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "G"

- 2 -

tip of Canada within range. One-way missions could reach as far as the Ontario border and almost as far south as Los Angeles. This area contains the uranium ore mine at Eldorado, the Pasco plutonium plant, and the principle cities of Vancouver, Winnipeg, Regina, Seattle and San Francisco.

The possibility of one-way missions must not be discounted by Occidental conceptions of expendability. Russian crews might be trained in sabotage, espionage, and to perform services such as joining subversive movements which would more than compensate Russia for the loss of material and manpower.

The Civil Air Fleet has a total lift capacity of 78,500 fully equipped men over a radius of 500 to 700 miles. It is inadequate for long range operations, but air landings could be made in Alaska as far east as Fairbanks. If the Soviet Union were able to use Spitzbergen as a military air base, airborne landings could also be made on Pearyland in Northern Greenland, from which further airborne and bomber attacks might be launched down through the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.

Due to the lack of very long range aircraft and experience in strategic air operation, the present Soviet Air Force would be no match for the Western Air Powers of Great Britain and the United States. An attack at the present time could be only harrassing.

2. SOVIET AIR FORCE IN 1952

(a) Strength

BY 1952 it is estimated that the Soviet Air Force might have a jet bomber force not exceeding 1,600 aircraft. A force of this size will only be a possibility if captured German aircraft plant and designs, technicians and skilled labour are immediately and efficiently exploited to the maximum. It is unlikely that this maximum estimate can be achieved. A force of 1,000 B-29 type bombers together with a limited number of jet bombers, however, is within Soviet capabilities.

(b) Aircraft and Equipment

The development of Russian bomber aircraft may be expected to follow that of the British and United States trend toward flying wing aircraft powered by jet engines, but the Western Powers will almost certainly maintain a margin of superiority in aircraft performance.

Russian equipment other than aircraft will probably show a wide margin of inferiority, particularly in radar, navigational aids and sighting devices as compared with British and United States types.

A jet bomber force based upon German designs will have a maximum range of 4,000 miles at true air speeds around 500 miles per hour. The operating height of these aircraft will be between 25,000 to 37,000 feet. A bomber force of B-29 type bombers would have a range of about 6,000 miles.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REPUT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "G"

- 3 -

(c) Capabilities

It is highly improbable that during the next five years the Soviet Air Force will attain under peacetime conditions the invaluable experience acquired by the Western Powers in all phases of strategic bombing operations, despite the present intensive study and training by the Russians in this phase of air warfare.

A range increase to 4,000 - 6,000 miles by 1952 will bring all of Canada and almost all of United States industrial capacity within range of one-way missions from present Russian bases. Conventional missions could reach as far as the Ontario border and almost as far south as Los Angeles. Therefore, the North American industrial heartland would still be out of range of conventional missions from Russian Arctic bases. Serious damage to a limited number of industries might be effected, but it is unlikely that the Soviet Union could accomplish decisive damage to any important North American industry.

It is unlikely that Russia will possess a sufficient number of long range transports to carry out a successful air-borne invasion of the North American continent. However, substantial airborne landings in Alaska and the North-west Territories could probably be maintained for a considerable period.

3. SOVIET AIR FORCE IN 1957

(a) Strength

Quantitatively Russia probably could, initially at least, match any combination of air powers by 1957. Certainly a strategic air force of high performance jet bombers numbering over 1,600 (at normal rate of production) becomes a distinct possibility.

By 1957 Russia will probably have more than 5,000 transports with a range of at least 4,000 miles.

(b) Aircraft and Equipment

Performance of jet bombers will probably have been improved by 1957. Operating heights between 37,000 and 45,000 feet may be expected at speeds still in the neighbourhood of 500 miles per hour. Ranges from 5,000 to 10,000 miles may also be expected.

Soviet exploitation of German scientists and technicians and of the technical knowledge and equipment acquired from the Allies during the recent war will undoubtedly have enabled the Soviet Union to narrow the gap by 1957 between her own technical and industrial standards and those of the Western Powers. However, the Western Powers may still expect to maintain a margin of superiority both in aircraft performance and standard of airborne equipment.

(c) Capabilities

In any all out assault upon the North American continent, Russia could be expected to establish bases and refueling points down through Spitzbergen, Pearyland, and

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "G"

- 4 -

the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Not only would these islands provide bases for the Soviet Air Force, and the protection of it, but they could be used as bases from which to launch guided missiles against the heart of the North American continent. Large airborne forces would be used to make the initial seizure of such bases.

The objective of any Russian assault on North America would undoubtedly be a smothering attack upon the administrative centers of Ottawa and Washington, together with attacks on atomic bomb plants, and on the larger urban and industrial centers with the hope of paralyzing the political, industrial and military life of the Continent.

By 1957 the range of Russian bombers will probably be great enough to permit conventional missions from present Russian Arctic bases to any part of the North American continent. The Civil Air Fleet will probably have an air lift capacity of over 200,000 men that could be used for seizure of bases in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago and on the North American continent.

By 1957 a decision in favour of Russia would be a possibility in a surprise attack employing atomic, biological, and chemical weapons. An attack employing atomic weapons alone would probably not be successful until after 1957 due to the difficulty the Soviet Union faces in building up a sufficiently large stock of atomic bombs to make an attack decisive.

A decisive assault by the Russians on the North American continent in any case will not depend on Soviet numerical superiority in long range bombers, but rather on the atomic, biological and chemical weapons available.

Director of Intelligence (Air),
March, 1947.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REQUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "H"

THREAT TO INTERNAL SECURITY

1. In this paper it is proposed to separate the subject into its component parts -

- (a) The threat to internal security from external influences.
- (b) The threat to internal security in its actual physical aspects in relation to the use of force and violence.

The Threat to Internal Security from External Influences

2. Despite the announced dissolution of the Comintern, Communist Parties throughout the world continue to be controlled according to the policies of the Soviet Government. The plans and policies of international Communism are closely integrated with and entirely consistent with the plans and policies of the Soviet Union.

3. Any expansionist aims of the Soviet Government will, therefore, be materially assisted by the growth of its satellite organization in a particular country. The aims and objectives of the Communists both in Canada and the United States are for the Party to increase its influence politically and in the Trade Unions, with a view to obtaining control of the apparatus of government by means of force at an appropriate time.

4. It must not be assumed that because the Communists apply their energies to developing the strength of the Party politically that they mean to gain control by the method of the ballot. All steps preparatory to the taking over of governmental control are based in fact upon revolutionary action and the establishment of a dictatorship with full force and power to resist by armed means any counter-revolutionary elements which might threaten the welfare of the dictatorship once it is in power.

5. Since the Russian Revolution in 1917, world history has shown this technique developing in various countries of the world. Certain countries, as a result of the recent war, have come within the orbit of Soviet domination and in other areas on the Continent and elsewhere Communist influence has increased according to the degree of penetration it has been possible to bring about. As the expansion progresses this, in turn, affects the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the Western democracies in favour of the former, especially where Western Europe is concerned.

6. While Communist penetration has not progressed in the United States or in Canada to the extent that it has in Continental Europe, every effort is being made at the present time to increase the influence of the Soviet Government by means of propaganda and the indoctrination of the public with a sympathy towards Soviet ideals. This is a continually increasing growth.

7. The aim of the Comintern is clearly set forth in the Theses and Statutes adopted at its Second World Congress held in Moscow in July, 1920, from which the following is a quotation:-

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
RÉDUIT À SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "H"

- 2 -

"The Communist International makes its aims to put up an armed struggle for the overthrow of the inter-national bourgeoisie and to create an inter-national Soviet republic."

Nothing has transpired since the time of the Second World Congress which would lead to the belief that this final objective has been changed.

The Threat to Internal Security in Its Actual Physical Aspects in Relation to the Use of Force and Violence.

8. The Communist Party of Canada, as a section or integral part of the Communist International or Comintern is completely subordinated to the wishes of Moscow and instead of determining its own policy, aims and objects, it adopts those of the parent organization; the aims and objects of the Communist International are therefore automatically those of the Communist Party of Canada.

9. A clearer view of the program of the Communist International and its subsidiary bodies based on a detailed examination of the general and special directives of the Comintern and the practice of its depending bodies on a world-wide basis may be gained from the following:-

- (1) Popularization of the Soviet system in all classes as a sovereign remedy for all social and economic evils.
- (2) Inflammation of the population against the Government of the country, the administration of justice, the local authorities, the police, etc.
- (3) Exploitation of all grievances especially among the industrial and agrarian population and in the armed forces.
- (4) Fomentation of class and race hatred.
- (5) Destruction of religion.
- (6) Revolutionizing of the trade unions.
- (7) Establishment of Communist cells in all sections of society, in the armed forces, in the Civil Service and at all key points such as dockyards, munition works, aircraft factories and the mercantile marine.
- (8) Dislocation and aggravation of the economic situation by means of strikes, demonstrations, demands on local authorities, sabotage, etc. Subversion of the armed forces.
- (9) A combination of strikes and armed demonstrations.
- (10) The general strike.
- (11) Insurrection against the State power by the rebellious armed forces in combination with the armed masses.
- (12) Civil War.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "H"

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REBUT A SECRET

While the program outlined above has been set forth in various directives, the method adopted to achieve the objective will of course vary according to the political situation as it exists at any given time, vis a vis the development of revolutionary activity in the trade union field. Although the Communist Party varies its strategic approach towards its main objective according to the necessities of the situation, the final objective viz the ultimate seizure of power remains unchanged. The interim technique in the direction of the development of its program includes within its scope the erection of a screen to effectively camouflage the nature of the organizations which are brought into being by the Communists, to cloak their real aim and purpose, and to bring within their sphere the large mass of population and progressive thinkers who would not ordinarily be sympathetic to the doctrine of this revolutionary body.

10. While Communist propaganda penetrates to all areas which are being attacked through the medium of the newspapers, radio and groups and organizations formed for this specific purpose in the French and English-language fields, even more concerted effort is being made by the Communist-controlled mass language organizations and publishing companies. The purpose in this connection is to sow the seeds of sympathy towards the Soviet Union and to gain adherence in Canada to its cause. At the same time, part of the purpose of this propaganda is to develop in the minds of the public, if possible, a trend of thought which would label all activity in opposition to Soviet interests as bearing the hall-mark of Fascist motivation. It is of interest to note in this connection that strength is now placed on the term "anti-Fascist" by the Communists in the dissemination of its propaganda, thus putting those sections of the public, which are opposed to Communism on the defensive, whereas in actual fact such sections have only the continuation of democratic processes at heart.

11. The main strength of the Communist Party of Canada lies in the foreign-language field. However, it must not be assumed that this strength is confined to the foreign-language groups of population but has spread throughout the country with varying degrees of success according to geographical location. The mass language organizations and publishing companies, up to the time they were declared illegal by the Defence of Canada Regulations in June, 1940, were as follows:-

- The Ukrainian Labor-Farmer Temple Association
- The Canadian Ukrainian Youth Federation
- The Finnish Organization of Canada
- The Finnish Society of Toronto
- The Finnish Society
- The Russian Workers and Farmers Clubs
- The Croatian Cultural Organization
- The Hungarian Workers Clubs
- The Polish Peoples Association
- The Workers and Farmers Publishing Association
- The Road Publishing Company
- The Croatian Publishing Company
- The Polish People's Press
- The Serbian Publishing Company

TOP SECRET

- 4 -

APPENDIX "H"

During the course of the war, which has now terminated, these organizations were all declared to be illegal under the provisions of the Defence of Canada Regulations, as well as the following English-language movements:-

The Canadian Labor-Defence League
The League for Peace and Democracy

The majority of the organizations mentioned above have now gone out of existence or have taken on new life under different names. The most important Communist controlled organizations in the foreign and English-language fields as at present are

The Association of United Ukrainian Canadians
Federation of Russian Canadians
Polish Democratic Association
Finnish Organization of Canada
League of Canadian Croatsians
League of Canadian Slovenes
League of Canadian Serbians
Macedonian Progressive Organization
Council of Canadian South Slavs
German Canadian Federation
United Jewish Peoples Order
National Federation of Democratic Youth

12. Names however mean very little in the development of the Communist program as one organization will cease to exist according to the exigencies of any given situation and will then "mushroom" again under some totally different definition initiated for the purpose of confusing the public regarding the interests it represents. Controlling such organizations will generally be found either persons who are recognized Communist sympathizers or fellow travellers whose position is not made known. Directing such propaganda is the Communist International which is not only a Federation of the Communist Parties of the world but their organizing authority and controlling head. The central organs of the Communist International are permanently situated in Moscow. They are the driving forces of the whole gigantic machine which generates and transmits Communist energy to National sections of the Comintern in about 70 countries.

13. The pre-war strength of the Communist Party of Canada was indicated by Dimitrie Manuilsky in his report of the activities of the Executive Committee of the Communist International given to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union held in March 1939. Describing in detail the strength of the Communist forces throughout the world, Manuilsky stated that the Communist Party of Canada had increased its membership from 8,000 to 18,000. There is no exact information available regarding the present membership of the Party in Canada due to the secrecy preserved in its operations but it is certainly not less than 18,000 and may have gained adherents to its cause through a recent drive for 10,000 additional new members which has been put into effect. It is of interest to note in this connection that during the course of the 1947 Municipal Elections in Canada the Communist vote polled was considerably larger than that of the previous year although due to the polling of an over-all larger total number of votes by the electorate in general, some losses resulted. Stewart Smith, for instance, was defeated as Controller in Toronto, as was Dewar Ferguson for Alderman, although both these individuals obtained more votes in the 1947 election than they had in 1946 when they were elected. It is of

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "H"

- 5 -

undoubted significance to observe that even in an important centre such as Toronto only 30 per cent of the electorate visited the polls thus facilitating the efforts of the Communists - who turn out in force on such occasions - to gain election of their representatives.

14. Even if the figure of 18,000 members given at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is taken as approximately correct in 1939, this does not reflect the actual strength of the Communist movement. Said Manuilsky, "Every section of the Communist International has a following of militant workmen to carry on activities under the guidance of the Party and whose numbers several times exceed the members of the Party. . . Every Party member represents a following of at least 15 to 20 workers." On the basis of a minimum estimate of 10 sympathizers for every Party member, this would mean that there are at least 180,000 sympathizers with the movement in Canada, and possibly considerably more.

15. Communism in its attack on our Democratic system advances on two main fronts:-

(a) Political

(b) Industrial

To undermine and capture the trade union movement of this country has been the Party's main concern ever since its inception more than twenty-five years ago. The Communists have been directly responsible for some of the violence which has been experienced during the past, in connection with industrial disputes in Canada.

16. Some of these Communists are known as such by other members of the labour unions; others, the majority of them, conceal their membership. Many of them, whether open or secret members of the Communist Party, achieve official positions in the unions, and some reach the central executive committees. Generally speaking, the policy which they advocate is that of militant trade unionism, but they are not concerned with the improvement of conditions in industry but with the "political education" of the workers. With this end in view they invariably resist the peaceful settlements of disputes, advise strikers not to accept anything but the complete surrender of the employers, and generally exploit all grievances in order to create among the workers a "class-war" point of view and a feeling of resentment against the employing agencies.

17. The Communist Party policy at the commencement of the recent war affords a useful illustration of what may be expected in the way of Communist activity should our relations with the Soviet Union become definitely and aggressively estranged, or in the event of actual conflict.

18. During the latter part of 1939, subsequent to the announcement of the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact, the Communist Party of Canada (now called the Labor Progressive Party) issued a Manifesto stating inter alia that the war was a war to maintain British Imperialism; that it was not a war to save democracy but the inevitable result of Imperialist intrigues against democracy.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "H"

DECLASSIFIED TO SECRET
REDDIT A SECRET

- 6 -

19. Such slogans as, "Down with the Imperialist War", "Down with Capitalist Reaction", "No Support for the Policy of the Ruling Classes Directed Towards Continuation and Spread of the Imperialist Slaughter" were then adopted and other slogans such as, "Bring our Boys Back from Overseas", "Withdraw Canada from the Imperialist War", "Fight against the Imperialist War" and others of a similar nature came into being.

20. In the May Day 1941 Manifesto of the Communist Party of Canada, its position was clearly stated, or rather reiterated, in the following words:-

"Only the overthrow of the ruling classes can bring peace to the peoples of the imperialist world. Let that lesson burn into our minds; Only the removal from power of the profit-mad capitalists, whose rivalry for colonies, markets, profits, can be fought out only in periodic wars, will bring peace to the world; will free the millions of colonial peoples; will prevent the spreading of the present war and the outbreak of new wars; will stop the insane bombing of open towns and take away the nightmares that haunt the homes of the common folk. For it is a lie that this is a war against fascism! It is a lie that the defeat of Germany by Britain and the Dominions will benefit the people. It is a cheap lie that we are fighting for 'democracy'."

The Manifesto further asserts:

"It is our duty as Canadian democrats to fight against our 'own' ruling class, to remove them from power, to take our destiny as free peoples into our own hands, to defeat big business and the grafters and corrupt war politicians, and to win an Independent People's Government. THE FIGHT LIES IN CANADA! AGAINST OUR OWN REACTIONARIES, WHO HAVE GAGGED THE WORKERS' ORGANIZATIONS CRUSHED THEIR FREE PRESS, INTERNED AND JAILED THEIR COURAGEOUS LEADERS; AGAINST THE CORRUPT FINANCIERS AND INDUSTRIALISTS WHO ARE USING THE OPPORTUNITY THE WAR AFFORDS THEM TO FASTEN A CANADIAN FASCIST REGIME ON THE NECKS OF THE MASSES!"

21. On June 22, 1941 the German Army invaded Russia and the Communist Party carried out a volte-face calling for all-out aid for the Soviet Union. The Party maintained that:-

"The campaign and line of policy herein outlined coincides exactly with the needs of the Canadian people and not by one jot or tittle detracts from their struggle for political and economic liberty as against the reactionary attacks of the financial oligarchy. The fight on the economic and political front for the interests of the Canadian masses remains in full operation."

22. The policy was further explained in a leading article which appeared in "The Toronto Clarion", official organ of the Communist Party of Canada, on June 28, 1941, in which it was asserted that:-

"For the Party and working class movement, the question is simple. The Soviet Union is attacked and everything must be done to ensure the decisive defeat of the fascist aggressor. And that does not

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

mean that the Party and working class has altered its fundamental position on imperialist wars. On the contrary, it means the most consistent, many sided fight against the imperialist government and its imperialist aims - for a People's Government having the wholehearted confidence and support of the Canadian people. Only such a government can defend the real interests of the people of this country. Only such a government can be relied upon to co-operate fully with the Socialist Soviet Union."

23. If such was the policy of the Communist Party of Canada at the commencement of the war in 1939, when the Soviet Union was not in conflict with the Allied war effort but was merely bound by a Non-Aggression Pact with Germany, it is not difficult to foretell the policy of the Party should this country at any time be in conflict with the Soviet Union. Should such a situation occur, the Communists will fight by every means in their power to advance the objectives of the Soviet Union, even though these interests are in direct opposition to the welfare of the Canadian defensive mechanism.

Conclusions

24. The "Trojan Horse" policy adopted by the Soviet Union since the Russian Revolution of 1917 is and continues to be a concerted attempt to penetrate and consolidate the gains which have already been effected towards subversion of the public in the direction of sympathy for Soviet aims and objectives and thus to form a "Fifth Column" within the country concerned which will actively associate itself with Soviet interests in a physical sense when the time is opportune. In time of peace the Communist Party is used to prepare the ground and to pave the way in the manner described in the body of this memorandum towards the realization of the end in view. In time of war, or should a threat of war become imminent, the full resources of the Party, including force and violence, would be applied in the cause of Soviet interests and against the interests of the democracy concerned. Events at the commencement of the 1939 war provide a concrete illustration of what may be expected, even though the Soviet Union at that time was only allied with Germany insofar as a Non-Aggression Pact is concerned and was not in conflict with the war effort of the Allies.

25. Over the period of the next 10 years, it is difficult to estimate the possible growth and influence of the Party as this depends on factors as they arise and on contingencies as they develop. Given a serious depression it can be safely anticipated that the Communists would gain material strength for their cause. Another point upon which this question may hinge to some extent is the subject of the swelling of minority groups with immigrants from European countries within the Soviet sphere of influence and from those areas outside the Soviet sphere where the Communist program has advanced to a major degree during the last few years.

26. Whatever the degree of the growth of the Party, however, the Communists will continue their efforts in an endeavour to weaken Canada internally and to divide the country politically as far as it is able. Should hostilities break out, the Party would be used as a weapon to create unrest and internal dissension in an even more positive sense; to foster espionage and sabotage; to bring about conflict between the adherents and sympathizers and the constituted authorities; to hamper the war effort of the country and the production of

TOP SECRET

- 8 -

APPENDIX "H"

supplies by calling strikes on either a minor or major scale and by every other means in its power to advance the cause of the Soviet Union.

27. There can be no doubt but that however the situation develops the Party will continue to further the aims and objectives of the Soviet Union and to consolidate the gains already achieved. This positive threat to the internal security of the Dominion is only a part of the major program involved - the domination of the world by the Soviet Union and the replacement of all forms of democratic apparatus by a totalitarian all-embracing Communist State. Whether this objective is reached by open hostilities or by the infiltration of Communist doctrine leading towards revolution within the country concerned is merely a question of timing and strategy according to the dictates of each situation as it arises. The final goal to be reached remains unchanged.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

Royal Canadian Mounted Police,
March, 1947.

EGC:JW

TOP SECRET

March 12, 1947.

It is suggested that the following changes might be made in the appreciation concerning the Soviet Union:

1. Paragraph 3(d) Manpower
The first paragraph of this section is very definite. Can we say that this is so? It might be more accurate if it read: "It is estimated that for the period of the next ten years....."
2. Paragraph 3(e) Weapons - Fourth Sentence
Does the possibility of a full scale atom bomb attack against the American continent mean that there would be enough atom bombs to carry out the attack, or does it mean there would be enough aircraft and atom bombs to make the attack possible? I would again suggest that the word "will" is too strong.
3. Paragraph (h) - Third Sentence
Beginning "The Soviet will undoubtedly give high priority to the development of a strategic air force " I can see nothing in the paper which would suggest that high priority will be given to such developments. The Air Force may, of course, have other information. My understanding is that during the war the Soviets concentrated on close support aircraft rather than aircraft for carrying on strategic bombing. The sentence might better read: "Should the Soviets give high priority to the development of a strategic air force....."
4. Paragraph 4(b) - Conclusions
We have stated that an attack on the North American continent within the next ten years is unlikely. This paragraph says the opposite. I would suggest the following as a possible re-wording:

- 2 -

While attacks against the North American continent during the next ten years are considered unlikely, should war occur there are two possibilities-if the Soviet Union has not consolidated her position in Europe and Middle East, the attacks would probably be *of a diversionary* with the object of ~~cutting~~ *pinning* down the United States manpower and war potential, or if the U.S.S.R. has already consolidated her position in Europe and in the Middle East, there would be a danger of an all-out assault on the North American Continent. In either case, it is estimated that the forms and scales of attack, which might be expected, would be as follows.

5. Paragraph (c)(ii) AIR
This section seems to be too definite. I would suggest the changing of the use of "will" to "might" and "can" to "could" throughout. In the final paragraph of this section, the first sentence states that "by 1950 new air force techniques might be expected, which will give the U.S.S.R. one of the finest air forces in the world". This surely depends upon production, and on the degree of priority given by the U.S.S.R. to the building of a strategic air force. Is there any evidence to support this statement?"
6. Probable Areas of Attack (ii).
This would presumably depend on the Soviet completing their two five-year plans by 1957. There is a good deal of evidence already that the first five-year plan will not be completed. This is presumably a theoretical statement on the basis of what would technically be done. Whether the Soviet can produce the necessary weapons to carry it out is a separate question.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REQUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

POLITICAL FACTORS

War between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., involving Canada, might be deliberately embarked on by the Soviet Union or it might occur as the result of a succession of accidents. The possibility of the United States provoking such a war is disregarded.

It is highly improbable that the Soviet Government will provoke a war with the United States during the next decade. The Soviet rulers, though ruthless, are also cautious, and it is inconceivable that the preponderance of power on the side of the United States could be overcome within ten years. It is also very unlikely that the Soviet Government would stumble into a war through the actions of its agents or satellites. A continuation of friction and disputes, however, is to be expected.

The period ten to twenty-five years from now is likely to be one of great danger. Not only will the Soviet Union possess and be able to use weapons of mass destruction, but its basic economic strength may by the end of that period be approaching that of the United States. Parts of Western Europe may be under governments sympathetic to the Soviet Union. A situation would then have developed in which the opportunities open to the Soviet rulers might seem to them irresistible. If the Western democracies were firm and united, and if they pursued strong but fair-minded policies, the Soviet Government might be disposed to postpone indefinitely the accomplishment of their ultimate aims. The Canadian Government cannot ignore, however, the danger that Soviet policies may end in war.

The probability of war is considered more fully in Appendix "A".

ECONOMIC FACTORS

The basic economic strength of the U.S.S.R. is still well below that of the U.S.A. Although the pre-war level of economic activity may be reached in 1948 or 1949, it must be remembered that Soviet national income just before the war was probably less than half that of the United States. By 1950 the production of oil and, possibly, steel, will still be below pre-war figures. At present the most serious weakness is transport. Oil and rubber will be limiting factors for some years.

Economic self-sufficiency for a major war, involving large-scale movements and supply problems, may not be attained before 1960. Economic parity with the U.S.A. could not conceivably be reached before 1965-1970, but this will not necessarily be regarded as a pre-requisite for waging a major war. The development of new weapons might radically alter the period of time needed by the Soviet Union before it would be in a position to enter upon a new war.

An assessment of Soviet war potential is included in Appendix "B".

~~TOP SECRET~~

27 Feb 1947

Appendix "B"

ECONOMIC WAR POTENTIAL OF THE
U.S.S.R.

~~DOWNGRADED TO SECRET~~
~~REDUIT A SECRET~~

1. The war potential of the Soviet Union is very difficult to judge with any degree of accuracy, in spite of the knowledge gained during the recent war. Soviet published statistics are meagre and often ambiguous. Restriction of movement and other security precautions make it difficult to obtain confirmation of reports. On economic matters the principal sources of information are statements by Soviet authorities and articles in the Soviet press.
2. How much reliance can be placed on economic information from Soviet sources? No categorical answer can be given to this question. The Soviet press excels in selection with intent to impress and omission with intent to conceal. Hopes and plans are often, and no doubt deliberately, confused with realities. Competent observers are inclined to lay stress, however, on the limitations rather than on the inherent unreliability of Soviet statistics. Even in regard to estimates in the Plan, there is no disposition to doubt their general feasibility. Soviet planners cannot place the goal so high as to make failure to attain it too pronounced; neither can they place it so low as to give complete fulfilment, or even over-fulfilment, only a meretricious value. In broad outline and on points of main emphasis the objectives of the Plan can probably be achieved.
3. At the present time the U.S.S.R. has a gross volume of industrial production second in the world only to that of the U.S.A. Its economy is growing rapidly under the impetus of an extremely high rate of capital investment so planned as to realize the most rapid possible increase in war potential. Centralized direction of industry and ruthless control of labour enable the Soviet rulers to defer the satisfaction of consumers' demands.
4. The rate of economic advance is retarded by the necessity of reconstructing the devastated areas, the backwardness of the building industry, the necessity of making up for deferred maintenance, the lack of skilled labour, the lack of adequate incentives for many of the workers (particularly the penal labourers), and the inadequacy of the transport system.
5. Reorientation of industry towards the east, forced on the Soviet Union by the war, is proceeding steadily. The new industrial areas in and beyond the Urals are being made as self-supporting as possible. By 1950 it is planned to have 54.4 per cent of the coal, 65.25 per cent of the steel and 36.8 per cent of the oil produced east of a line connecting Archangel and Astrakhan.
6. There is no economic objective outside Soviet borders or control which might have to be taken by force

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

in order to maintain the national economy. Natural rubber is the only important raw material of which there is not a potential sufficiency, and it cannot be obtained in any appreciable quantity from neighbouring countries. Oil production is restricted not by lack of reserves, but principally by shortage of equipment and technicians.

7. The U.S.S.R. is industrially preoccupied with reconstruction and reorganization, and is not at the present time economically prepared for a protracted major war. By 1950 it will probably be stronger economically than it was in 1940, although in many industries (oil and steel being the most important) the volume of production will be lower than had been planned for 1942. Economic self-sufficiency for a major war involving large-scale movements and supply problems may not be attained before 1960.

8. In the absence of unforeseen developments, the U.S.S.R. may be expected to develop its economy more rapidly during the next twenty years than any other nation. The Soviet Union will probably need at least twenty years to become an economic power comparable to the U.S.A. The attainment of economic parity with the United States will not necessarily be regarded, however, as a pre-requisite for launching a major war.

WAR EFFORT. 1941-1945

9. Our information about the economic basis of the Soviet war effort is too limited to support reliable comparisons with other countries.

10. The Budget figures for expenditures on the armed forces are known:

(Billions of roubles)

<u>1938</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1941</u>	<u>1942</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>1944</u>	<u>1945</u>	<u>1946</u> (est.)
27.5	56.0	170.9	108.4	124.7	137.9	128.2	72.2

For purposes of comparison, however, these figures must be used very cautiously. The first reason is that we do not know to what extent the Soviet defence expenditure is concealed under investment and other items in the Budget. Secondly, the determination of a suitable rate of exchange presents very great difficulties.

11. The rate of wartime expenditure on goods and services for defence is of such value as a numerical measure of war effort that attempts have been made, despite the difficulties, to estimate it. The following comparisons are based on competent economic studies by unofficial observers. They can be regarded as reasonable approximations:

- 3 -

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

WAR EXPENDITURES

USSR 1940 as % of USA 1941	USSR 1940 as % of USA 1942	USSR 1943 as % of USA 1943	UK 1943 as % of USA 1943	Canada 1943 as % of USA 1943
87	22	41	37.5	6.6

12. The margin of error in the USSR:USA comparisons is large, but at least it can be stated with certainty that the resources which the Soviet Union was able to devote to war were substantially smaller than the resources committed by the United States.

NATIONAL INCOME

13. The magnitude to which economic war potential is most closely related is national income. Without modification this is not a very satisfactory index, because total income is less important than the amount remaining after the minimum of consumption, set by physical or political considerations, has been met. The qualification would apply particularly to countries like India and China; it is of less consequence in the case of more highly developed countries where the margin above subsistence is relatively greater. There is some reason to believe that the Soviet Union, in spite of its lower standard of living, was able to devote to war almost as large a proportion of its national income as the United States.

14. The official Soviet statistics of national income are useless. On the one hand, they exclude government, professional, domestic, passenger transportation and housing services; on the other, they contain a large but indefinable element of inflation. If they were to be accepted, it would follow that the real national income of the Soviet Union was five times as large in 1940 as in 1928 - a conclusion which is not only impossible per se, but is also plainly inconsistent with other more reliable Soviet statistics.

15. Attempts to estimate Soviet national income on the basis of the available data have been made by several competent Western economists. It must be emphasized that the margin of error in such calculations is necessarily large.

16. One observer concludes that the national income of the U.S.S.R. was about the same size as that of the United Kingdom in 1937, but perhaps 20-35 per cent greater than the British at the time of the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941.

17. The most recent study of this subject includes estimates of Soviet national income for 1940 and comparable figures for the United States for 1941 and 1942. These figures were chosen because the degree of mobilization

- 4 -

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

in the two countries was more nearly comparable than if figures for 1940 had been used in both cases.

NATIONAL INCOME (TOTAL)

	USSR 1940 as % of USA 1941	USSR 1940 as % of USA 1942
Consumer expenditures	27	28
Government outlays and net investment	85	52
TOTAL NET NATIONAL INCOME	44	37

NATIONAL INCOME (PER CAPITA)

	USSR 1940 as % of USA 1941	USSR 1940 as % of USA 1942
Consumer expenditures	21	21
Government outlays and net investment	65	41
TOTAL NET NATIONAL INCOME	33	29

18. The important fact to note is that the Soviet net national income was estimated to be 37-44 per cent of the U.S. net national income, or 29-33 per cent on a per capita basis. It is not surprising that the Government's civilian economy contributed in a larger proportion to the Soviet figure than to the United States figure, because of the complete socialization of education and medical care in the U.S.S.R. This should be remembered when comparing the figures for current consumption.

POPULATION

19. One of the chief elements in the basic strength of the Soviet Union is the size and rate of increase of its population. It is estimated that the present population within the enlarged boundaries is approximately 190 millions. By 1970 this may have increased to about 244 millions. The States now within the Soviet orbit (including Czechoslovakia) have a present population of about 70 millions.

RESOURCES AND PRODUCTION

20. Another element of basic strength is the wealth of raw materials. In respect of total natural resources, the U.S.S.R. is almost certainly the most richly endowed of all nations.

21. Published statistics of production are very incomplete, but for the most important products it is possible to give either official Soviet figures or reasonably reliable estimates, and these are set out below in tabular form. Comparable figures for the U.S.A. and Canada are

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

- 5 -

also given. It must be noted that these figures take no account of exports or imports, and that ability to supplement national production would be of great importance in war. The statistics are tabulated under the following headings:

Power: Coal
Oil
Electricity
Metals: Iron and steel
Non-ferrous metals
Chemicals
Rubber
Motor vehicles
Machinery
Transport
Armament Industries

COAL

(Millions of metric tons)

	<u>1938</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1942(Plan)</u>		<u>1950(Plan)</u>
U.S.S.R.	133	165	243	148(1945)	250
U.S.A.	358	465		620(1944)	
Canada	10	13		15(1943)	
U.K.	231	228		196(1944)	

22. The war is officially stated to have resulted in the devastation of 1135 mines with a pre-war production of more than 100 million tons. The highest priority is being given to the rehabilitation of these pits and to the development of new mines, particularly in the eastern regions.

OIL

(Millions of metric tons)

	<u>1938</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1942(Plan)</u>		<u>1950(Plan)</u>
U.S.S.R.	32	31	54	20(1945)	35
U.S.A.	164	183		231(1945)	
Canada	1	1		1(1944)	

23. The disastrous effect of the war is shown by the fact that the target for 1950 is only about 65 per cent of the unfulfilled target for 1942 in the Third Plan. Oil production will probably be a limiting factor in the Soviet economy for some years. The main problems are the shortage of extracting and refining equipment and the inadequate supply of technicians. Drilling and refining machinery are being transferred from countries under Soviet control.

- 6 -

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

ELECTRICITY

(Billions of kilowatt-hours)

	<u>1938</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1942(Plan)</u>		<u>1950(Plan)</u>
U.S.S.R.	40	50	75	35(1946)	82
U.S.A.	161	180		280(1944)	
Canada	26	30		41(1944)	

24. In the western part of the Soviet Union a large proportion of the electricity is generated in thermo-electric stations. The emphasis in the new Plan is on the construction of hydro-electric stations in the Urals, Central Asia and Transcaucasia. Separate statistics for hydro-electric power are not available; the figures above are for total power-production.

STEEL

(Millions of metric tons)

	<u>1938</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1942(Plan)</u>		<u>1950(Plan)</u>
U.S.S.R.	18	19	27	15(1946)	25
U.S.A.	29	61		81(1944)	
Canada	1	2		3(1944)	
U.K.	11	13		12(1944)	

25. A target of 60 million tons of steel per year at the end of three Five Year Plans (i.e. in 1960) has been mentioned by Stalin. This is to be achieved by more highly mechanized methods of production and by the development of ore reserves.

NON-FERROUS METALS

(Thousands of metric tons)

	<u>1938</u>	<u>1946</u>	<u>1950</u>
Copper	115	200	250
Manganese	2700	2900	3670
Aluminum	56.8	?	160(?)
Nickel	3.3	11.2(1943)	21
Wolfram	1.3	?	?
Zinc	80	?	?
Lead	44	?	?

26. Information about production of the principal non-ferrous metals is very unsatisfactory. There are contradictions in the available statistics which cannot be explained. The above figures, therefore, must be regarded as tentative estimates. Tin is not listed; production of tin is known to have been low and inadequate in the pre-war period. Uranium, needless to say, is not mentioned in the Plan. It is believed that a serious shortage of uranium exists and will continue until the Soviet engineers devise methods of extracting it from the

- 7 -

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

comparatively large supplies of low-grade ores, or alternatively until appreciable quantities of high-grade ore are found within the Soviet Union.

CHEMICALS

27. Information regarding chemicals is even more inadequate than that regarding non-ferrous metals. The Third Plan provided for a production in 1942 valued at 13.4 billion roubles. The report on the Fourth Plan merely stated that pre-war production would be increased 50 per cent by 1950.

RUBBER

28. The U.S.S.R. had to rely on large imports of rubber from the Allies to make up its war-time requirements, and it is thought that there will be difficulty for several years in meeting peace-time needs. Certain latex-bearing plants are being cultivated on a large scale, but substantial production of natural rubber cannot be expected for a long time. The bulk of Soviet production is necessarily synthetic. Total production (including natural, synthetic and reclaimed rubber) in 1938 was given as 87.3 thousand tons; the target figure is 290 thousand tons in 1950. There is some evidence that production in 1946 was of the order of 136 thousand tons. Sixteen major synthetic plants are known, but there is no specific information about new construction. Some synthetic rubber is being obtained from Germany.

MOTOR VEHICLES

29. The Soviet Union suffered from a serious shortage of motor vehicles during the war, in spite of large supplies from the Allies, and it is doubtful if production in 1946 was higher than in 1938. In that year 211,400 cars and trucks were produced. The target for 1950 has been set at 500,000 cars, trucks and buses.

MACHINERY

30. On the development of the machine-tool industry will depend, to a large extent, the rate of growth of those other industries which produce directly for the armed forces. It is characteristic of Soviet economic censorship that little is known about it. The Plan provides that in 1950 the Soviet Union will have an inventory of metal-cutting machine-tools equal to that of the United States in 1940.

TRANSPORT

31. Transport is the most acute weakness of the Soviet Union. Roads and inland waterways are of secondary importance; the restoration and development of railways,

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

however, is fundamental. Without extensive restoration and development of the railway system, the other major objectives of the Plan could not be attained.

32. The most urgent task is to restore the western part of the system, which suffered immense damage during the war. It was stated that 13,000 railway bridges, 15,800 locomotives, 428,000 freight and passenger cars and 65,000 kilometres of track were destroyed or removed. Priority in rebanilitation is being given to the lines serving the Donetz coal basin and Krivoi Rog: a time-limit of 1948 has been set for this work.

33. The Plan provides for the construction of new lines with a total length of 7,230 kilometres, including the Stalinsk-Magnitogorsk main line. The development during and since the war of new industrial areas in the Urals and Siberia has made railway development in the eastern regions a matter of the highest importance. Electrification is being extended in these areas.

34. The results which it is hoped to achieve may be seen in the following figures for freight haulage:

(Billions of tons-kilometres)

<u>1937</u>	<u>1940</u>	<u>1942(Plan)</u>	<u>1945(est.)</u>	<u>1950(Plan)</u>
355	415	n.a.	300	532

ARMAMENT INDUSTRIES

35. No reliable figures of wartime production in the armament industries are available. It is thought that production of aircraft may have reached a peak of 5,300 per month (including 2,030 fighters, 1400 ground-attack aircraft and 540 bombers). Tank and self-propelled gun production may have reached 2,700 per month.

36. At the present time, aircraft are being produced at a rate of perhaps 2,650 per month (including 1,000 transports, 500 fighters, 400 ground-attack aircraft and 470 bombers). Very little is known about the development of jet-propelled and rocket types of aircraft; it may reasonably be assumed that thorough exploitation of German knowledge and resources would enable the Russians to produce operational jet-propelled aircraft by 1949. As regards present production of tanks, we have no reliable estimate. Construction of warships, never very important in the Soviet Union, has been retarded for a considerable period by war damage to ship-building yards.

February 20, 1947.


TOP SECRET

NOTE TO MR. D. JOHNSON:

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

.....

1. I attach a copy, dated February 18, of the memorandum on the possibility of a war with the Soviet Union. Mr. Pearson would be very grateful if you could come to his office on Monday, February 24, at 5:00 p.m. to discuss this paper. It will be necessary for us at that meeting to decide on the final draft of the paper, and I hope therefore that you will come to the meeting prepared to make your suggestions for its revision.



February 18th, 1947.

APPENDIX "A"

TOP SECRET

POLITICAL APPRECIATION OF THE POSSIBILITY
OF THE SOVIET UNION PRECIPITATING WAR
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REBUT A SECRET

1. This Appendix is divided into four parts:
 - (1) an introduction;
 - (2) a discussion of the prospects of war during the next decade;
 - (3) a discussion of the prospects of war ten to twenty-five years from now;
 - (4) a conclusion.

Introduction

2. It is not necessary for the purposes of this discussion to assume that the governing class of the Soviet Union is actively ambitious to dominate the world - that its policy is one of all-out aggression. All we need assume is that the governing class of the Soviet Union is anxious to maintain the existing system in the areas now under Soviet political control and that this involves a desire to expand the defence area of that system. The desire of the members of the governing class to maintain the existing system is partly the result of their desire to retain their own personal power and privileges, partly the result of their belief that the Soviet system is better than the Western system.

3. The governing class of the Soviet Union is afraid of two kinds of attack from the Western world - armed attack and psychological warfare. It believes that the governing classes of the Western world are afraid that the capitalist system which gives them personal power and privileges would be undermined by the success of Soviet institutions

- 2 -

and they might, therefore, launch an armed attack against the Soviet Union before the Soviet system has had a chance to demonstrate to the peoples of the Western world its superiority over the Western system. It is afraid of the penetration of the lands on the borders of the Soviet Union (the Soviet defence area) by Western ideas and it therefore resists the Western attempt to introduce Western democratic concepts into those areas.

4. The desire on the part of the Soviet governing class to expand the Soviet defence area may be as dangerous to the security of the West as a desire for all-out aggression would be. By its very nature a desire on the part of a great power to extend its defence area is an illimitable process. The appetite for security grows with eating.

5. The distinction between the two assumptions is, however, of very great importance. If the issue is one of active aggression by the Soviet Union, the responsibility for war is placed entirely on the Soviet side. If, however, the issue is one of a desire to defend themselves against attack from the Western world the responsibility for war, if one should break out, is a joint responsibility and the responsibility for keeping the peace is joint. It is no longer, for example, possible to disregard the possible efficacy of moves and attitudes on the part of the Western world which might minimize the belief on the Soviet side in the necessity of defensive measures; on this assumption provocative actions and attitudes should be avoided.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
DÉCLASSÉ À SECRET

- 3 -

General Introduction

6. What we are concerned with in this memorandum is the possibility of war between the Soviet Union and the United States. Such a war might be deliberately embarked on by either side or it might occur as the result of a succession of accidents. In this memorandum, the possibility of the United States taking the initiative in precipitating such a war is disregarded, though the concept of a preventive war has been a subject of discussion in the United States. The question at issue so far as this memorandum is concerned is, therefore, the likelihood of the Soviet Union precipitating a war with the United States or stumbling into such a war. For reasons which are developed later in this memorandum,⁽¹⁾ it is believed that the chances of the Soviet Union stumbling into a war with the United States are remote. A war, if one comes, is likely to arise out of a deliberate decision on the part of the Soviet governing class.

7. Given the nature of that governing class, it is highly improbable that they would embark on a course which might lead to war with the United States unless, in their opinion, (a) the balance of forces in the world was such that their chances of winning the war were much greater than the chances of defeat or of a stalemate; or (b) even though their chances of victory were no more than even, the balance was constantly tipping more and more

(1) see paragraphs 24 - 25 below

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

- 4 -

against them and they feared that unless they precipitated a preventive war, they would soon be at the mercy of the United States.

8. To try to assess the balance of forces at any given time is an extremely difficult task since on either side of the balance there are so many factors which cannot be weighed. It is not only, for example, a question of the possession of arms and armaments, strategic positions, and industrial potential, but it is also a question of the willingness of the nations concerned to use their armed forces. Since modern war has to be waged with the total force of a country, it is also essential to take into consideration the unity or disunity of each country in the event of the outbreak of a first-class war and this unity, particularly in the kind of war under discussion, would depend in part on what people in each of the Western countries felt about the issues at stake and the incidents which had precipitated hostilities. Thus it is difficult to assess the nature of the balance today and impossible to assess, with any degree of precision, the nature of the balance at any given time within the next ten or twenty-five years.

9. A great deal will depend upon how successful the Soviet Government is in carrying out their present plans for the industrialization of the Soviet Union. These plans are designed to bring the economic potential of the Soviet Union, from a military point of view, first up to that of the United States and then beyond it. If the Soviet Union is successful in carrying out these plans, the increase in population of the Soviet

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REOUT A SECRET

- 5 -

Union would then tend to tip the scales of the relative balance of power in favour of the Soviet Union. Doubts are, however, now beginning to arise as to the ability of both the Soviet leaders and the Soviet peoples to undergo the great sacrifices in comfort and leisure necessary to bring to realization the three five-year plans.

10. One factor which is clearly important in trying to assess the nature of the balance in the future is the ability of either of the main combatant states to secure, either by force or persuasion, allies or friendly neutrals. The Soviet Union is today posing as the principal defender of the rights of coloured and colonial peoples. It is also posing as the principal defender of the sovereignty of small powers. It would seem probable that, if the Western powers are unable to remove racial discriminations rapidly and to satisfy the demands of colonial peoples for self-government, the Western powers may have the great majority of the colonial and coloured peoples hostile or unfriendly to them in the event of war with the Soviet Union or at least doing their best to fish in troubled waters. In this context the term "colonial peoples" may well include a considerable section of Latin America, as well as the whole of Asia and Africa and the South West Pacific.

11. The sympathies of the peoples of Western Europe would undoubtedly be divided in the event of a Soviet-American war and, moreover,

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

- 6 -

it is possible that, by the time such a war occurred, Soviet-dominated governments might have succeeded in securing power in such countries as Greece, Italy and France.

12. Even within the hard core of the present Western alliance which exists in fact, though not on paper, (the United States, the British Commonwealth, the Netherlands, and Belgium), there would be differences of opinion within each country in the event of a war between the Soviet Union and the United States and it is impossible to forecast how large and influential a group in each country would either be pro-Soviet or neutral. This depends, in part, on whether, during the next ten years or so, the governments of the Western powers, and particularly the United States, are able to take measures to prevent serious economic depressions. The chances of adequate preventive measures being taken do not appear to be very good. The size and strength of the dissident minority would also, of course, depend on the ability of the governments of the Western powers to convince their peoples that they are in the right should war occur. A dissident minority in a Soviet-American war would not for the most part be pacifists; they would be saboteurs and even rebels. Already Soviet sympathizers have secured a large measure of control of the trade unions in certain communications industries which are vital for war.

13. Thus, what we are dealing with in any discussion of the balance of forces between the

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDDIT A SECRET

- 7 -

Soviet world and the Western world are not for the most part "hard facts" but the imponderable things which go on in the minds of men.

14. Moreover, a decision to go to war or to embark on a course knowing that it may lead to war is a decision which is made in the minds of men. The reality with which we are concerned is not the imponderable balance of power but the picture of that imponderable balance in the minds of the members of the governing class of the Soviet Union. What matters is not the actual balance but what people in authority think is the balance.

15. In order to avoid the grave dangers of over-simplification, it is also necessary to keep constantly in mind that an armed attack against North America is scarcely likely to occur until after North America has been subjected to a softening up process and a nibbling away at its outer ring of defences. In order to expand its defence area, the Soviet Union will pursue its orthodox policy of constantly probing for the weak spots in the outer ring of defences of the United States. When it finds a weak spot, that is to say a spot which it has decided it can secure control of without running the danger of precipitating a war, it will secure that control. Thus if it were to discover that it could secure control of Spitsbergen, it would in due course probe to find out whether it could safely advance its area of control farther west across the North Atlantic bridge. Similarly, it will continue to probe in the Middle East, in China, in Europe, Africa and Latin America. At

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REQUIT A SECRET

- 8 -

the same time, it will try through its many propaganda agencies to strengthen its defensive position by undermining national unity within the United States and other Western countries. It will also try to strengthen its defensive position by promoting economic as well as political instability in the areas outside its control.

16. On the assumption that the Soviet Union is out to secure domination of the world, it is clear that the Soviet Union's ambition would be to secure that domination without recourse to a first class war. The Soviet Union does not want to inherit a desert but a going concern. The Soviet Union would therefore hope to secure domination as the result of a gradual extension of power - an extension of political power over adjoining territory, an extension of economic power, an extension of power over the minds of men - until the balance was so weighted in its favour that the governments of the remaining Western powers would become more and more under its influence, and would finally become subservient.

17. No attempt is made in this memorandum even to guess at a future more remote than twenty-five years from now. The chances of the maintenance of peace between the Soviet Union and the United States during the whole of that twenty-five year period are not bright. The most we can hope for now is that we can get through that twenty-five year period without war and that, during that twenty-five-year period, developments in the Western world and in the Soviet world will

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

have made eventual war between them less likely. One thing we can probably count on is that the longer the two worlds live side by side in peace, even if it is an uneasy peace full of frictions and crises, the more similar to each other they will become. There will be more of capitalism in the Soviet system, more of Socialism in the Western system. It is even possible that if the Soviet system produces a greater flow of consumer goods and the population becomes less dissatisfied, there will be less necessity in the Soviet Union for systematic misrepresentation of the outside world and for intensive state control over the actions and beliefs of individuals. The more similar the two worlds become the more manageable will become the problems and crises which will arise between them. This would not mean that peace was secure but merely that some of the peculiar reasons for conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western world would no longer be so powerful.

17A. On the other hand there is another school of thought who hold the view that if the Soviet leaders are successful during the next ten years or so in accomplishing their ambitious plans for industrialization, this will result not only in a greater flow of consumer goods for the population of the Soviet Union but may also lead the leaders to become convinced that if they intensify their efforts they may be able to surpass the military-economic war potential of the United States. Those who hold this view believe that there is a better chance of avoiding war if the Soviet leaders become discouraged in their efforts to catch up technologically with the United States and resign themselves to remaining masters in their own sphere while avoiding any clash of interests that might lead to war with the United States.

Prospects of war during the next decade

18. On such information as is available to the Canadian Government, it appears unlikely that the Soviet Union would be in a position to win a war against the United States in the next decade, and for this reason it is improbable that the Soviet Government would run the risk of deliberately provoking such a war. As a result of the last war, the Soviet Union has suffered so heavily in terms of a general disorganization of its economy, material destruction and loss of manpower that a breathing space seems clearly indicated as a main objective of Soviet policy. It is not possible to do more than guess at the period of time which will elapse before the Soviet Government considers that it is in a position to wage another war should it desire to do so. It may be that the completion of each of the three five-year plans now contemplated will be considered necessary before the Soviet Government feels strong enough for such a struggle. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the Soviet Government will spare no efforts to strengthen the Soviet economy and build up Soviet war potential (already very powerful) at the earliest possible date.

19. This conclusion that it is improbable that the Soviet Union would, during the next decade, precipitate a war with the United States would not be agreed to by a number of authorities. The reasons for their doubts about the validity of the conclusion might usefully be examined.

20. One school of thought believes that the Soviet Union may develop weapons of mass

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

- 11 -

destruction of such a nature or in such quantities as radically to alter in its favour the existing balance of forces. From the information now at our disposal, this contingency seems, however, remote. During the next ten years the United States ought to be able to maintain its present scientific and technological advantage over the Soviet Union in ability to use weapons of mass destruction effectively against the other country.

21. Another possibility which is mentioned is a radical change in the balance of forces resulting from a profound economic depression in the United States and other countries of the Western world. Such a depression, if the U.S.S.R. as seems probable were relatively unaffected, would tend to pull the countries on the border of the Soviet defence area inside that area. National unity in the other Western countries, and most important in the United States, would be adversely affected. However, though a profound economic depression in the Western world would undoubtedly alter the balance of forces to the advantage of the U.S.S.R., it is unlikely that it would alter it to such an extent as to lead the governing classes of the Soviet Union to believe that it would be in their interest to precipitate a war with the United States. It is much more likely that they would be content to take advantage of the opportunity to extend their defence area and to intensify their battle for the minds of men in the Western world.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUT A SECRET

- 12 -

22. A third possibility which is mentioned is that the factors on which our present calculations are based might be materially affected by the situation which might arise in the event of Stalin's death. It seems unlikely, however, that the transfer of power from Stalin to his successor would seriously affect the power of the Communist party in the U.S.S.R. or the main considerations which affect the decisions on grave issues of peace and war by the governing class in the Soviet Union. Even if the transfer of Stalin's immense political power did not take place smoothly and personal ambitions among potential successors precipitated a crisis in the Soviet Union, it is unlikely that the struggle would be more than a palace intrigue.

23. Finally there is the theory strongly held in some informed quarters that the whole of the preceding analysis of the prospects of the Soviet Union precipitating a war in the next decade is vitiated by the fact that it is based on the assumption that, if a war comes, it is likely to arise out of a deliberate decision on the part of the Soviet governing class and that the chances of the Soviet Union stumbling into a war with the United States are remote. It is contended that, in the past, most great wars have not been deliberately sought but have been accidental. A great power has been dragged into war by an ally which it could not refuse to support for fear of weakening its whole alliance structure.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

A commander in an area of friction or a diplomat has precipitated a crisis from which it was impossible to escape. A government has been so misinformed about public opinion abroad that it based its policy on the false assumption that it could, without running a risk of war, secure control of a certain area.

24. Soviet generals and Soviet diplomats are, however, so well-disciplined that they would not take any serious step without instructions. If they did and their acts might precipitate an unwanted war, the Soviet Government would not hesitate to disavow them. Nor would it hesitate to disavow the actions of one of its satellites even if that satellite had been acting under orders from Moscow. While it may well be true that the Soviet Government is misinformed by its embassies abroad, it has other sources of information and it is adept at flying kites to test, for example, the possibility of the United States being willing to go to war in defence of Turkey. It would therefore seem reasonable to conclude that the likelihood of the Soviet Union blundering into war with the United States is remote. (If the United States Government were desirous of finding an issue over which to go to war with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government might well provide them with such an issue. The question of the possibility of the United States precipitating a war with the Soviet Union is, however, outside the scope of this memorandum).

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

Prospects of war ten to twenty-five years from now.

25. While, therefore, we do not consider that there is any substantial likelihood during the next decade of the Soviet Union precipitating a war with the United States, it must be recognized that there are powerful forces at work which may in the end bring about a war between the Soviet Union and the United States.

26. One of these is the idea, which is a basic part of Marxist philosophy, that an ultimate struggle between communism and capitalism is inevitable and that communism will emerge victorious. It is difficult to say how much the present rulers of the U.S.S.R. are affected by this concept, but it is certainly not without influence on Soviet policy. It may be assumed, however, that Soviet foreign policy will be dictated less by a conviction of the inevitability of conflict than by a realistic estimate of Soviet interests as they are understood in the Kremlin.

27. At the same time the Soviet Union is a police state in which individual liberties and democratic methods of government, as these are understood in the West, can hardly be said to exist. Between such a state and the Western democracies a fundamental cleavage inevitably exists. This conflict of principle runs deep in all the relations of the Soviet Union with the Western world. Moreover, the insecurity which makes it necessary for the Soviet Government to rule by such methods also makes it

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REQUIR A SECRET

- 15 -

essential that the peoples of the Soviet Union should not be exposed to the unsettling effects of contact with the Western democracies or their nationals. The Soviet Government, therefore, not only keeps their people in ignorance of our conditions of life, but employs unceasing propaganda to instill into the population fear and suspicion of the intentions of the Western democracies. In addition, there will always be a tendency, when things are going badly in the Soviet Union, for the Soviet Government to distract popular attention from their own shortcomings by starting a campaign of abuse and misrepresentation directed against one or other of the Anglo-Saxon democracies. Such methods are obviously dangerous to international peace.

28. Apart from the desire to further world revolution, the Soviet Government may be led in the direction of war by two other motives. One is the desire for expansion - perhaps for eventual world domination - and the other is fear of a threat to Soviet security by the Western powers.

29. It is obvious that the Soviet Union is an expanding power. The Soviet Union has annexed Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Koenigsberg district, Eastern Poland, Carpatho-Ukraine, Northern Bukovina, Bessarabia, Tannu-Tuva, Port Arthur, Karafuto and the Kurile Islands. It has taken the Petsamo and

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

-16-

Viborg areas from Finland. It is attempting, with considerable success, to establish a zone of exclusive Soviet influence beyond these territories, in Poland, the Soviet zone of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Persia, Azerbaijan, the Mongol People's Republic, Northern Korea, Dairen, and the trunk railways of Manchuria. In Czechoslovakia, Soviet influence is strong but not as yet exclusive.

30. These represent formidable acquisitions of power and influence; and the Soviet Government is undoubtedly willing to extend its influence and power as far as it can safely go. There is perhaps however, a valid distinction between admitting the Soviet Union's expansionist tendencies and attributing to it schemes for world domination, although the distinction may be rather one of method than of eventual objective. It seems unlikely that the Soviet Government is contemplating grandiose schemes for world domination of the kind which fascinated the restless dictators of the 'thirties. The Soviet rulers have always despised what they term "bourgeois adventurism". The gambling spirit that is willing to take great risks in the hope of immense returns seems to have little appeal for the Soviet Government. On the record of their past policies, it is rather difficult to imagine the rulers of the Soviet Union unleashing at a stroke a world struggle. It seems more probable that the Soviet Government will pursue

a course . . .

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

- 17 -

a course of deliberate and cautious consolidation of positions already acquired, together with a process of probing for the weak spots in the adversaries' positions. Such a policy might operate on the political, military or economic planes. We have already had ample experience of these methods in negotiation with the Soviet Government. The tactics are familiar: the spun-out negotiation, the bargaining price, the war of nerves, the manipulation of facts for propaganda purposes, the abrupt change of front and the retreats pour mieux sauter. These have become the commonplaces of Soviet diplomatic methods.

31. Behind these tactics, the strategy of the Soviet Government seems to be emerging with increasing clarity. It is to undermine the position of the Western powers, and to weaken and divide them at every opportunity. In pursuit of these aims, the Soviet Government is anxious to prevent the formation of any Western bloc of powers. They strive to separate the United States from the United Kingdom, and to isolate the latter in difficulties over some issue in which they hope that the support of the United States may not be forthcoming. Moreover, the Soviet Government, in its role as defender of the oppressed, is carrying on propaganda against "imperialist" powers in general and against the British and American democracies in particular. In this capacity, the Soviet Government claims to be the champion of the poorer classes in all

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REQUIT A SECRET

- 18 -

countries and of all racial minority groups.

32. In our estimation it is no longer possible to doubt that the Soviet Government aims at dividing the Western world against itself and increasing discord and instability. Such policies are plainly incompatible with friendship or co-operation as we understand these terms. On the other hand, they could be pursued for a prolonged period by the U.S.S.R. without implying that the Soviet Government intended to precipitate a world war. They may very possibly be carried to the length of fomenting civil war in certain countries in which the U.S.S.R. would give under-cover support to its adherents (e.g. in China and Greece).

33. The Soviet Government will inevitably, whatever its own ultimate objectives, be influenced in its policies by the reaction which it encounters from the Western powers. The Soviet governing classes have a healthy respect for the immense industrial resources of the United States and for its war potential. They are aware of the attraction which Western democratic ideas exercise over the minds of people all over the world. They are alarmed at the possibility that the socialist experiment may succeed in Britain and that the example of this alternative to Communist revolution might undermine their influence among the industrial working classes of Western Europe. So long as they think that the Western democracies (and in

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

- 19 -

particular the United States and the United Kingdom) are strong and united, and so long as firm but fair-minded policies are pursued by those powers in dealing with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government may be disposed to proceed with caution.

34. If, however, they see signs of weaknesses in the internal economies of the Western democracies or instability in the conduct of their foreign affairs, they may be tempted to follow more aggressive policies. They will certainly seize upon any evidence of vacillation as an encouraging sign of weakness. They anticipate, and would exploit to the fullest extent, a serious economic depression in the United States. They are well aware of the fact that such a depression would have incalculable effects in the other Western countries. On the other hand, should they become convinced that the Western powers have aggressive intentions against the Soviet Union, they might feel impelled to provide in haste for their security by further annexations of territory or infiltration into countries in strategic positions. In estimating the possibilities open to them, they will be guided less by reports from their representatives abroad or from Soviet sympathizers than by the reaction to their probing.

35. In our discussion of the prospects of war with the Soviet Union within the next

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

- 20 -

decade, it was not necessary for us to consider the influence of the United Nations. However, an analysis of the possibility of war ten to twenty-five years from now would be seriously incomplete if it did not contain some assessment of the influence of the U.N.

36. The U.N. is an instrument which can be used by both the Soviet Union and the Western world to weight the balance of forces in their favour. The Western world can use the machinery for economic co-operation provided by the U.N. and the specialized agencies to raise standards of living in the Western world and to diminish conflicts between the Western powers over tariffs, monetary questions, cartels, shipping, aviation and such things. The leading powers of the Western world can use the U.N. as a forge on which to hammer out a greater political and economic unity of the Western world - a potential alliance against the Soviet Union. It is even possible that there may develop, through an agreed interpretation of the Charter or by the conclusion of a supplementary international agreement, an undertaking by all the Members of the U.N. to go to war against any state which resorts to force even though formal sanctions against that state are vetoed in the Security Council.

37. Similarly, the Soviet Union may try to sabotage the machinery for economic co-operation

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REPUT A SECRET

- 21 -

provided by the U.N. and may use the U.N. as an instrument in psychological warfare against the Western world.

38. Both sides can thus use the U.N. as an instrument against the other. Both sides can also use it as an instrument for resolving conflicts between them, especially in the political field, and for working out compromises. However, it cannot yet be assumed that plans for general disarmament will eventually be realized or that the effective control of atomic energy will be instituted.

Conclusion

39. Thus, while the possibility of the Soviet Union precipitating a war with the United States in the next ten years seems slight, there seems little prospect at present of sincere co-operation with the Soviet Union.

40. Disagreements since the end of the war have been mainly over the peace settlements. It would be unjustifiable to assume that a solution of the German problem, satisfactory to both the Soviet Union and the Western powers, can be reached. The most that can be hoped for is an equality of dissatisfactions. There is, however, danger that the practical result of Soviet policy will be the creation of a closely integrated Eastern German state with a communist or near-communist system of government, well-organized and possibly even powerful. Such a state would

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REPUT A SECRET

- 22 -

have a very considerable attraction for Western Germans, and the Soviet Government must be expected to do everything in its power to increase the communist influence in the zones occupied by the Western powers. Nor will the struggle for the allegiance of Western Europe be confined to Germany; the political future of France and Italy is also in doubt. To a considerable extent the outcome of this struggle will be determined by the international economic policy of the United States. It will be fraught with the gravest consequences for the balance of power in the world.

41. If, at the same time, as seems likely for the reasons outlined in Appendix "B", the basic economic strength of the Soviet Union is approaching and perhaps even surpassing that of the United States, a situation will have arisen in which the opportunities for aggrandizement open to the Soviet rulers may well seem to them irresistible.

42. Undoubtedly the best likelihood of averting such a catastrophe would be for the Soviet Government to be convinced of the strength and unity of the Western democracies, and at the same time convinced that they have nothing to fear from them. It is conceivable that they might then postpone indefinitely the accomplishment of their ultimate aims. The world might settle into a period of uneasy peace.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
ABOUT A SECRET

- 23 -

43. Canada, for its part, should do what it can to foster the strength and unity of the Western world and to avoid provocative actions and attitudes likely to strengthen Soviet determination to extend the Soviet area of defence. Canada cannot, however, ignore the danger that Soviet policies may end in war, and it must, in self-protection, consider the defensive measures entailed by this possibility.

DOWNGRAD TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

February 13, 1947.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. PEARSON:

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

POLITICAL APPRECIATION OF THE PROSPECTS
OF SOVIET AGGRESSION AGAINST NORTH AMERICA

The J.I.C. is preparing for the Chiefs of Staff a memorandum on possible forms and scale of attack upon the North American Continent. The memorandum, which is being prepared by the J.I.C., starts with a description of the problems set by the J.I.C. for the Chiefs of Staff, goes on to demonstrate that the only likely aggressor is the U.S.S.R. and then summarizes the conclusions reached by the J.I.C.

2. Attached to the report will be a number of appendices on the following factors: political; economic; geographical; manpower; army, navy and airforce; defence research; and subversive activities. Of these appendices the first two are being prepared in this Department and the last one by the R.C.M.P.; the others are being prepared by National Defence.

3. Our representatives on the J.I.C. have taken as a basis for their paper on political factors the memorandum prepared by Mr. Ritchie in December for the Prime Minister, in view of the defence talks with the United States. I attach my copy of this memorandum together with the summary prepared by Mr. Teakles of this Division.

4. A couple of days ago we had a discussion on Mr. Ritchie's paper. There were present Mr. Wilgress, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Crean, Mr. Teakles and myself. In the light of that discussion, Mr. Teakles is revising the paper.

5. Mr. Ritchie's paper was, of course, written not for the purpose for which we now intend to use it but for a different purpose. My feeling is, after our discussion a couple of days ago, that in its present form, even with revisions, it might mislead the Chiefs of Staff because it assumes a comprehension of the complexities of the

.....2


DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

problem which, because of their special training, they may not possess.

6. It has therefore occurred to me that it might be useful if we were to insert a general introduction to our paper on political appreciation. I have tried my hand at preparing such a general introduction and attach a draft, which is dated February 13.

7. In view of the importance of the problems dealt with in this political appreciation and because it, along with the other memoranda being prepared by the J.I.C., will influence the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff on the nature and extent of Canadian defence activities, I hope that you may find it possible to read my memorandum and let me have your suggestions for revision.

8. I am sending a copy of my note to you and of ^{Mr. Teakles} the attached memorandum to Mr. Wilgress, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Teakles, and am asking them for their suggestions for revision. I have spoken to Mr. Wilgress, who feels as I do that our role on the J.I.C. is to emphasize considerations that do not occur to the military mind.



Political II

*Could you show your copy
of this + of my
memorandum with Mr. Teakles
G.R.*

*Comes report to
Mr. Pearson
Mr. Johnson
Mr. [unclear]*

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET
TOP SECRET
February 13, 1947.

POLITICAL APPRECIATION OF THE PROSPECTS
OF SOVIET AGGRESSION AGAINST NORTH AMERICA

appendix
This memorandum is divided into four parts: a

- (1) general introduction; a discussion of the prospects of Soviet
- (2) aggression during the next decade; a discussion of the
- (3) prospects of Soviet aggression ten to twenty-five years from
- (4) now; and a conclusion.

General Introduction

2. What we are concerned with in this memorandum is the possibility of war between the Soviet Union and the United States. Such a war might be deliberately embarked on by either side or it might occur as the result of a succession of accidents. In this memorandum, the possibility of the United States taking the initiative in provoking such a war is disregarded, though the concept of a preventive war has been a subject of discussion in the United States. The question at issue so far as this memorandum is concerned is, therefore, the likelihood of the Soviet Union provoking a war with the United States or stumbling into such a war. For reasons which are developed later in this memorandum, it is believed that the chances of the Soviet Union stumbling into a war with the United States are remote. A war, if one comes, is likely to arise out of a deliberate decision on the part of the Soviet governing class.

3. Given the nature of that governing class, it is highly improbable that they would embark on a course which might lead to war with the United States unless, in their opinion, (a) the balance of forces in the world was such that their chances of winning the war were much greater than the chances of defeat or of a stalemate; or (b) even though their chances of victory were no more than even, the balance was constantly tipping more and more against them and they

.....2

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

feared that unless they precipitated a preventive war, they would soon be at the mercy of the United States.

4. To try to assess the balance of forces at any given time is an extremely difficult task since on either side of the balance there are so many imponderables. It is not only a question of the possession of arms and armaments, strategic positions, and industrial potential; but it is also a question of the willingness of the nations concerned to use their armed forces. Since modern war has to be waged with the total force of a country, it is also essential to take into consideration the unity or disunity of each country in the event of the outbreak of a first-class war and this unity, particularly in the kind of war under discussion, would depend in part on what people in each of the Western countries felt about the issues at stake and the incidents which had precipitated hostilities. Thus it is difficult to assess the nature of the balance today and impossible to assess, with any degree of precision, the nature of the balance at any given time within the next ten or twenty-five years.

5. One factor which is clearly important in trying to assess the nature of the balance in the future is the ability of either of the main combatant states to secure, either by force or persuasion, allies or friendly neutrals. The Soviet Union is today posing as the principal defender of the rights of coloured and colonial peoples. It would seem probable that, if the Western powers are unable to remove racial discriminations rapidly and to satisfy the demands of colonial peoples for self-government, the Western powers may have the great majority of the colonial and coloured peoples hostile or unfriendly to them in the event of war with the Soviet Union. In this context the term "colonial peoples" may well include a considerable section of Latin America, as well as the whole of Asia and Africa and the South West Pacific.

6. The sympathies of the peoples of Western Europe

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

would undoubtedly be divided in the event of a Soviet-American war and, moreover, it is possible that, by the time such a war occurred, Soviet-dominated governments might have succeeded in securing power in such countries as Greece, Italy and France.

7. Even within the hard core of the present Western alliance which exists in fact, though not on paper, (the United States, the Commonwealth, the Netherlands, and Belgium), there would be differences of opinion within each country in the event of a Soviet-American war and it is impossible to forecast how large and influential a group in each country would either be pro-Soviet or neutral. This depends, in part, on whether during the next ten years or so the governments of the Western powers, and particularly the United States, are able to take measures to prevent serious economic depressions and whether they can convince their peoples that they are in the right should war occur. A dissident minority in a Soviet-American war would not for the most part be pacifists; they would be saboteurs and even rebels. Already Soviet sympathizers have secured a large measure of control of the trade unions in certain communications industries which are vital for war.

8. Thus, what we are dealing with in any discussion of the balance of forces between the Soviet world and the Western world are not for the most part "hard facts" but the imponderable things which go on in the minds of men.

9. Moreover, a decision to go to war or to embark on a course knowing that it may lead to war is a decision which is made in the minds of men. The reality with which we are concerned is not the imponderable balance of power but the picture of that imponderable balance in the minds of the members of the governing class of the Soviet Union. What matters is not the actual balance but what people in authority think is the balance.

~~DOWNGRADED TO SECRET~~
~~REDUIT A SECRET~~

10. In order to avoid the grave dangers of over-simplification, it is also necessary to keep constantly in mind that an armed attack against North America is scarcely likely to occur until after North America has been subjected to a softening-up process and a nibbling-away at its outer ring of defences. If the Soviet Union is resolved on aggression against the United States, it will most certainly pursue its orthodox policy of constantly probing for the weak spots in the outer ring of defences of the United States. When it finds a weak spot, that is to say a spot which it has decided it can secure control of without running the danger of precipitating a war, it will secure that control. Thus if it were to discover that it could secure control of Spitsbergen, it would in due course probe to find out whether it could safely advance its area of control farther west across the North Atlantic bridge. Similarly, it will continue to probe in the Middle East, in China, in Europe, Africa and Latin America. At the same time, it will try through its many propaganda agencies to soften up opinion in the United States and other countries. On the assumption that the Soviet Union is out to secure domination of the world, it is clear that the Soviet Union's ambition would be to secure that domination without recourse to a first-class war. The Soviet Union does not want to inherit a desert but a going concern. The Soviet Union would therefore hope to secure domination as the result of a gradual extension of power - an extension of political power over adjoining territory, an extension of economic power, an extension of power over the minds of men - until the balance was so weighted in its favour that the governments of the remaining Western powers would become more and more under its influence, and would finally become subservient.

11. No attempt is made in this memorandum even to guess at a future more remote than twenty-five years from now.

.....5

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

The chances of the maintenance of peace between the Soviet Union and the United States during the whole of that twenty-five year period are not bright. It is, however, not unreasonable to hope that, if we can maintain peace for twenty-five years - even though it is an uneasy peace full of friction and crises - the situation at the end of that twenty-five year period will be much better than it is today, provided that the balance of power has not by then tipped too far in favour of the Soviet Union. After a certain time - we do not know how long, fifteen, twenty, twenty-five years - the chances of a Soviet-American war will probably lessen with every year that passes.



CANADA

JIC 1-6

SECRET

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

CABINET SECRETARIAT

OTTAWA, November 30th, 1946. *file*

R.G. Riddell, Esquire,
Department of External Affairs.

Dear Mr. Riddell:

I am returning herewith the original
of "Analysis of Soviet Strength and Weakness"
and enclose additional copies for your retention.

I have also forwarded a copy to each
member of the Joint Intelligence Committee.

Yours sincerely,

J.A.K. Rutherford, Lt.-Col.,
Secretary,

Joint Intelligence Committee.

att.

101 P
S E C R E T

Moscow, September 9, 1946

SECRET

No. 379

Subject: Transmitting "Analysis of Soviet
Strength and Weakness"

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington 25, D. C.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose twenty-five copies of a study entitled, "Analysis of Soviet Strength and Weakness", prepared by the Joint Working Committee of this Embassy under the able direction of Mr. John Davies. The Committee is composed of representatives of the Chancery, the Military Attache's Office, and the Naval Attache's Office.

The group of officers who wrote this paper includes several who have had considerable experience in the Soviet Union, and the paper represents over three months' careful study, discussion and analysis. On the basis of my experience in the Soviet Union I consider the paper to be a well thought out, objective and profound analysis of Soviet strength and weakness which deserves serious study and consideration.

Because of the importance of the subject to various posts now dealing with Soviet problems, and in order that they may receive the report as soon as possible, copies are being sent direct to the posts enumerated below.

As the paper is a joint effort, the Military and Naval Attaches are sending copies directly to the War and Navy Departments. Twenty-five copies are sent to the Department with the thought that, if the Department deems it advisable, it may forward copies to certain missions other than those listed below.

Respectfully yours,

(Sgd) Elbridge Durbrow

Elbridge Durbrow
Charge d'Affairs ad interim

Dis tribution:

25 copies to the Department
15 copies to the Military Attache, Moscow
5 copies to the Naval Attache, Moscow
1 copy each to: Ankara, Berlin, London,
Nanking, Paris, Tehran, Tokyo

Original and Hectograph to the Department.

EDurbrow:eb

SECRET

**ANALYSIS
OF
SOVIET STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS**

Prepared by
**Joint Working Committee of the American Embassy
Moscow, USSR**

September 1, 1946

Joint Working Committee:

John Davies, Jr., First Secretary	Col. C. E. Shepherd
Louis G. Michael, Attache	Col. James G. Crockett
Thomas P. Whitney, Attache	Col. A. J. Hanna

**Capt. L. H. Hunte
Cmdr. W. B. Ballis
Lieut. Francis X. Prior**

In Consultation and with Assistance of:

**G. Frederick Reinhardt, First Secretary
Frederick C. Barghoorn, Attache
Robert C. Tucker, Attache
Joseph J. Bulik, Attache**

SECRET

CONTENTS

- I. URGES TOWARD EXPANSION
 - II. DEFINITION OF TERMS
 - III. GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS
 - IV. ECONOMIC FACTORS
 - A. Non-Agricultural Economy
 - B. Agricultural Economy
 - V. SCIENTIFIC FACTORS
 - VI. POLITICAL FACTORS
 - A. The Communist Party
 - B. The Government
 - C. Foreign Relations
 - VII. SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS
 - A. Races and Nationalities
 - B. Education
 - C. Religion
 - VIII. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS
 - A. Propaganda
 - B. Morale
 - IX. MILITARY FACTORS
 - A. Army
 - B. Air Force
 - C. Navy
 - X. CONCLUSIONS
-

1.

SECRET

1. SOVIET URGES TOWARD EXPANSION - A BASIC CONSIDERATION

The Soviet Union is a dynamic, expanding state. This dynamism derives from historical, geographic, ideological, institutional and economic factors.

1. The Momentum of History. Russian history is the most striking and grandiose example of the growth of a single political unit. The vitality and fecundity of the Russian people, the absence of well-defined frontiers, and the lack of good maritime outlets, impelled the Russian state to expand. Expansion was rapid in the thinly populated and vaguely bounded Eurasian spaces. It met with bitter but only partially successful resistance from backward Oriental peoples. Only in Europe and by states with superior technology and organization was this process effectively resisted. Russia reached its European limits in the early nineteenth century, was thrown back after the first outward surge of the revolutionary armies in 1919-20, and resumed its march during and after World War II. In Asia Soviet expansion continued at the expense of China and has been accelerated by the collapse of Japan.

2. Ideological. The ideology which became the state creed after the October Revolution teaches that the world is the arena of an irreconcilable struggle between the principles of communism and capitalism. The ultimate victory of communism, now embodied in the USSR, is held to be historically pre-determined. However, it is assumed that the malevolent but decaying capitalist world will probably seek to save itself by making an all-out effort to destroy the Soviet Union. Hence, the Soviet obsession with the achievement of "security" against "capitalist encirclement."

Soviet security aspirations go beyond the tendencies, common to great powers, toward establishment of defensive zones and the command of world seaways. Because of their ideological motivation they tend to become a drive for possession of a preponderance of power over that of the capitalist world.

From this system of thought flow the dynamic impulses characteristic of Soviet ideology: militancy, a sense of sustained crisis, a conviction of mission.

3. Institutional. Dynamism springing from ideology is reinforced and supplemented by that deriving from the interests of the Soviet totalitarian state. The chief instruments by which this state rules its people are: (a) propaganda myths about the uniqueness and superiority of the Soviet system, and (b) police coercion. If more knowledge of and influence from the outside world could reach the Soviet people, the regime's propaganda would lose much of its effectiveness and its police controls would be threatened. Hence, it is natural for the Soviet state to seek to protect itself against foreign influences, not only by processes of insulation but also by aggressively attempting to disrupt or destroy these influences at their source.

- 2 -

SECRET

4. Economic. Because its own economy is relatively under-developed, the USSR tends to seek physical control over and co-ordination within its economy of technologically more advanced and prosperous areas, such as Germany and Czechoslovakia. Potential acquisition of important raw materials enhances the political advantage of the control of such areas as Iran. In short, the dynamism for expansion is reinforced in every sector by the prospect of tangible economic gain.

II. DEFINITION OF TERMS STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS

The strength of any state lies in its ability to develop itself by mobilizing and exploiting its internal resources and to maintain or expand itself in relation to the outside world. On the basis of what has been said in the preceding section, it is assumed that the goal of the USSR is expansion. Hence, the elements of Soviet strength and weakness may be defined as follows: any factor intrinsic to the USSR which enhances the ability of the Soviet regime to develop the country internally or expand its influence abroad is an element of strength; any factor which impairs this ability is an element of weakness. The factors may be classified into seven groups: geographic, economic, scientific, political, sociological, psychological and military.

The ultimate and crucial test of Soviet strength is, of course, the ability of the USSR to wage war--its military potential. However, in view of the importance under contemporary conditions of political techniques of expansion and of the strong Soviet predilection for those techniques, the present report is not limited to an analysis of the Soviet military potential as conventionally conceived but approaches the problem of Soviet strength in terms of the more comprehensive conception set forth above.

III. GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS

Strengths:

1. The position of the USSR, astride the Eurasian land mass and in occupation of the "world heartland." This factor is one of strength only so long as the Soviet Union remains a dynamic state.
2. The vast size of the USSR. This is a historical source of defensive military strength, but one which diminishes in importance with advances in the science of aerial warfare.
3. Climatic extremes. The bitter Russian winters have traditionally proved to be a source of defensive military strength. Russian climate may also in a large measure explain the hardihood of the Russian population.
4. Relatively flat topography facilitating railroad transportation and agriculture.
5. Abundant natural resources in great variety. In overall calculations the USSR is stronger in undeveloped natural resources than any other state.
6. Sufficient areas of rich soil to permit the USSR under normal conditions to be self-sufficient.

- 3 -

SECRET

Weaknesses:

1. Climate and soil. For climate or soil reasons, most of the USSR cannot be intensively developed, and even in much of the intensively developed region climatic conditions are such as to reduce efficiency. Great expanses of the north are frozen wastes during seven to ten months of the year and much of the south is desert. The area of actual and potential intensive development begins as a wide wedge on the western borders, has narrowed considerably by the time it swings south to the Urals and Kazakhstan, and continues from the Kuznetsk Basin as a thin line along the trans-Siberian Railway to the Sea of Japan.

2. The topography of the western frontier of the USSR. The wide plains along the Soviet Union's western borders have been historically a source of weakness.

3. The truncated coastal seas and the north-south course of the rivers. The coastal seas of the USSR are separated by land masses or ice. These factors drastically limit the utility of naval and merchant marine activities.

IV. ECONOMIC FACTORS

A. Non-Agricultural Economy

Strengths:

1. Gross volume of Production. With a large and growing production even at the end of the war of coal, steel, oil, electric power, non-ferrous metals and machinery, the USSR has a gross volume of industrial production, now that Germany has been crushed, second in the world only to that of the United States.

2. Centralized Organization. The totalitarian state-owned and state-operated structure of the economy permits the most effective direction from above, whether in war or peace, for the realization of economic aims of the Communist Party.

3. Planned Development. Soviet economy is rapidly growing under the impetus of an extremely high rate of capital investment so planned as to realize the most rapid possible increase in military-economic potential of the state.

4. Expanding Machinery Industry. The specific industrial basis for carrying out a tremendous program of capital investment or alternatively for production of armaments is the machinery industry. This side of the Soviet economy has received great emphasis, and it is planned by 1950 that the Soviet Union will have an inventory of metal-cutting machine tools equal to that of the United States in 1940.

5. A Large, Regimented Labor Force. The 30 millions of Soviet laborers (excluding penal labor) are strictly and ruthlessly controlled by the state. This enables the Soviet Government to mobilize and transfer labor at any moment for the most vital sectors of the economy, and assures the Government the ability to carry out its policy without the remotest possibility of organized protest from labor.

- 4 -

SECRET

Weaknesses:

1. Large Devastated Areas. The necessity of the complete reconstruction of devastated areas is a drag on economic progress.

2. Antiquated Construction Industry. The backwardness of the Soviet construction industry contributes to slow reconstruction. The USSR cannot become a modern country until Soviet construction workers are capable of erecting on a large scale completely modern buildings.

3. Deferred Maintenance. The necessity during the coming years of making good deferred maintenance which occurred during the war in every sector of industry and transport will absorb considerable resources which could otherwise be devoted to capital investment.

4. Lack of Skilled Labor. Lack of skilled labor, and particularly of good foremen, is a great weakness which it will take many years and vast training programs to eradicate.

5. Penal Labor. The presence of a large proportion of penal labor in the Soviet labor force is a weakness. These prisoner-workers who have very few incentives are a brake on progress. They give an unfortunate tone to the whole labor force, a tone so marked that many "free" Soviet laborers are treated little better than the prisoners.

6. Low Standard of Living. The Soviet production of consumers' goods is so uniformly low that material incentives for advancement by the individual workers are inadequate.

7. Transport. The most acute (and potentially the most easily remedied) weakness of the USSR, at present is railway transport. Devastation of war has left Soviet railways in a worse condition than industry with the result that railways are a bottleneck in the economy.

B. Agricultural Economy

Strengths:

1. Grain and other foodstuffs can be procured from a few thousand and large unit areas as compared with millions of small holdings in western countries. Mechanized cultivation of large areas is on the whole superior to strip farming.

2. Mobilization of man power for war affects agricultural production less adversely than in many other countries because much of the work on farms is normally carried on by women and children.

Weaknesses:

1. Mechanized agriculture is in danger of fuel supply being cut off and mobilization of mechanical draft for military purposes in time of war.

V. SCIENTIFIC FACTORS

- 5 -

SECRET

V. SCIENTIFIC FACTORS

Strengths:

1. A group of brilliant individual scientists.
2. Abundant governmental support for all branches of science, basic theoretical research as well as applied science.
3. A system of material and moral inducements which offer the successful scientist a relatively high standard of living and social security as well as a highly honored position in society leads a large number of intelligent young men to enter on a career in this field, and ensures the human resources for scientific development.
4. The ability of the government to enforce wide-spread adoption of new methods and inventions is important in speeding up the practical application of scientific innovations. In this respect the particular brakes on adoption of new methods, techniques and inventions which labor, monopoly capital and other groups sometimes impose in a capitalist society, are absent in the Soviet Union.
5. The fact that Soviet science has by and large complete access to the findings of foreign science, but is able to conceal its own findings at will behind the Soviet security curtain gives Soviet science a certain advantage over competing systems.
6. A certain freshness of approach and absence of inhibition which has led to rather startling developments at times and will produce more in the future.

Weaknesses:

1. The body of first rate Soviet scientists is not large as compared with the number of first rate scientists in the United States.
2. The general level of technology in the Soviet Union is low. This has its effect in the laboratory where equipment, auxiliary personnel and research techniques are apparently inferior to those of the United States. Further low level of technology in economic enterprises has prevented the application of discoveries and given rise to a tremendous gap between practical technology and theoretical science. One factor in this is the low level of development of industry producing precision instruments and equipment. Another is the lack of skilled personnel to use properly such precision equipment and instruments when available.
3. The absence of an adequate number of highly skilled mechanics--due in part to the cultural characteristics of a primarily agricultural and comparatively primitive Soviet population which retards rapid development of mechanical aptitude and mechanistic mentality.
4. Political authority, jealous of scientific findings which challenge dogmatic Marxism and deeply concerned with purely political exigencies, has put social sciences in a Marxist strait jacket, and occasionally intervened even in natural science to correct heresy. In addition, political authority demands a totalitarian concentration of scientific effort on individual problems to which it gives top priority and retards thereby general scientific development.
5. Soviet bureaucracy has been frequently guilty of retarding the application and development of promising new methods and inventions because of red tape, inertia and unwillingness to accept responsibility.

- 6 -

SECRET

VI. POLITICAL FACTORS

A. The Communist Party

Strengths:

1. Monopoly of power. It penetrates and controls the Government, the armed forces, the trade unions, and all other public organizations. The Soviet Constitution expressly vests in the Party this position of authority.
2. A uniquely centralized internal organization. This combines maximum concentration of authority in the Politburo, which is dominated by Stalin, with maximum penetration of the Party mass through the system of provincial and local committees.
3. Possession of a persuasive, dogmatic, obligatory, official ideology.

These basic strengths of the Party confer the following advantages:

1. Extraordinary power for mobilizing all available resources to execute any program adopted by Stalin and his associates.
2. A high degree of sustained cohesion and discipline.
3. Ability to formulate and execute without diversion or interference long range programs.

Weaknesses:

1. Party bureaucracy. Supreme concentration of power in the hands of a few hundred key executives tends to destroy qualities of initiative and responsibility among the rank and file. It causes administrative confusion and delay on all but matters of highest priority. It also encourages arbitrary abuse of power, particularly by heads of provincial party organizations. It tends to create a gulf between the Party leadership and the mass of members.
2. Police suppression. Maintenance of unrestricted control and regimentation of the national life by the Party dictatorship breeds discontent which can find expression only in conspiracy. This requires a vast suppressive apparatus, the MGB and MVD (Ministries of State Security and Internal Affairs). The operation of this machinery engenders a threefold weakness. Its extraordinary personnel demands drain manpower, quantitatively and qualitatively, from constructive activities. The personal insecurity and frequent terrorization to which its activities subject even the most favored Soviet citizens inhibit initiative and willingness to assume responsibility. Its forced labor and exile system greatly reduces the economic productivity of millions of disfranchized citizens.
3. The problem of succession. The regime ultimately must replace Stalin as man and symbol. A gifted but ruthless leader, he has destroyed most of his potential successors and may have created a political instrument which only he can operate successfully. A new leader at least at first may require even greater ability than Stalin to maintain the efficiency of the Party, since he will lack Stalin's prestige within the ruling circles and the veneration in which he is held among the masses.

B. The Government

- 7 -

SECRET

B. The Government

The Government of the USSR is a vast subordinate bureaucratic machine utilized by the leaders of the Communist Party to execute Party policies on administrative and technical levels. Consequently its strengths and weaknesses derive, in the main, from those of the Party which interpenetrates and controls it. Below are listed strengths and weaknesses in addition to those found in the Party.

Strengths:

1. A facade of constitutional forms and procedures which fosters the illusion of democracy.
2. Freedom of action unhampered by public opposition or criticism.

Weaknesses:

1. The heritage of Russian bureaucracy and caprice which infects its personnel.
2. Inefficiency resulting from excessive size and centralization.
3. Paralyzing effects on its functioning induced by Party interference, based on political rather than technical grounds.
4. Waste and duplication caused by overlapping of Governmental and Party machinery.
5. Generally inferior quality of personnel caused by Party-political factors in appointments and by inadequate education.
6. Venality and corruption, at least on lower administrative levels, springing largely from economic scarcities which create temptation, but reinforced by the lack of effective public control over the conduct of officials.
7. Arbitrary abuse of power by officials unchecked by political opposition or public opinion, resulting in administrative disorganization and public resentment.

C. Foreign Relations

Strengths:

1. Possession of a comprehensive and seemingly plausible ideology which purports to advance the only effective and ultimate solution to all the ills of modern society. This is an asset of enormous significance to the USSR in a world where political and economic instability are rife, offering fertile soil for ideological penetration. A complementary factor of strength is the ability of the Soviet regime, through the operation of its censorship controls, to prevent much knowledge of Soviet reality from reaching the outside world.
2. Influence and control, in varying degrees, over a network of Communist parties and related groups abroad which wittingly and unwittingly function as instruments of Soviet policy in their respective countries. The Pan-Slav movement and Russian orthodox church are further effective instruments of Soviet penetration abroad. Soviet policy also benefits from the strong influence wielded by the USSR in the WFTU and similar international organizations, most of which have been inspired by the USSR.

3. Ability to

- 8 -

SECRET

3. Ability to plan and execute Soviet policy on a strategic long-term basis. The Soviet leadership derives this important advantage over parliamentary regimes from its continuity of tenure.

4. Extreme tactical maneuverability, deriving from the totalitarian character of the Soviet state. This factor enables Soviet policy to operate in an atmosphere of secrecy, to exploit the advantages of surprise action, and in general to assume and retain the offensive in dealings with democratic states whose policy-makers must always receive sanction in their moves from an active and freely expressed public opinion.

5. The multi-national character of the Soviet state, which makes possible the incorporation of non-Soviet nationalities without ostensible sacrifice of national autonomy or native culture.

Weaknesses:

1. The tendency of an expansionist foreign policy to create the very situation in the outside world which the Soviet leaders fear most: a coalition of the great powers in opposition to Soviet expansion.

2. The totalitarian techniques and roughshod economic and military methods employed by the Soviet state extended into the countries which have been brought under its influence. These generate moral-political resistance on the part of the nationalistic and more individualistic European peoples with their relatively advanced cultural and political traditions. A related factor is the decline of Soviet occupation policies in a number of countries.

3. The fundamentally peaceful psychology of the great majority of the Russian people combined with the inability of the Soviet regime thus far to plant the seeds of Marxist messianism in the mentality of the bulk of the Soviet people. This renders problematical positive moral support of the population for the international consequences of an expansionist foreign policy, such as an aggressive war.

4. The tendency of the Soviet leaders to misjudge events and attitudes in the outside world owing to the fact that the data they receive are processed in transit to accord with the leaders' preconceptions.

5. The limited capacity of the Soviet economy to provide the large export surplusses which are necessary in order effectively and with a minimum of friction to integrate European countries into the Soviet economic orbit. This factor may operate only temporarily.

VII. SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS

A. Races and Nationalities

Strengths:

1. The existence in the Soviet Union of such important groups as the Slavs and the Turkic peoples exerts a powerful attractive force on many millions of linguistic-ethnographic relatives beyond its borders.

2. Soviet policy of racial and apparent national equality, to the considerable extent to which it is fulfilled and still greater extent to which it is successfully propagandized is a great source of strength to the regime. Not only does this policy reinforce the appeal of kinship to neighbor peoples, but confers on the USSR prestige among all peoples, particularly minority groups and colonial peoples.

- 9 -

SECRET

Weaknesses:

1. The converse of point 1 above is that foreign peoples related to peoples of the Soviet Union may exert an influence alienating the latter from the USSR.
2. Anti-Semitism, though officially discouraged, exists to a moderate degree and produces harmful effects.
3. Negative attitude of the non-Russian peoples toward the Soviet Regime, ranging from separatism to indifference. The former is widespread in the Baltic area and the Ukraine; the latter among the Central Asian and Caucasian peoples. Strong Ukrainian separatist tendencies were revealed during the war despite the fact that the enemy was the traditionally hated Germans. Among the Crimean and Volga Tatars, the Kalmucks and the Chechen-Ingush peoples there was widespread collaboration with the German invaders. The Caucasian peoples, with the possible exception of the Armenians, took a decidedly passive attitude toward the Soviet war effort.

This factor will diminish in importance as industrialization and the imposition of a common Soviet cultural pattern continue.

B. Education

Strengths:

1. Persistent inculcation of loyalty to the Soviet system by means of a unified curriculum and teaching method.
2. Mass vocational training of administrators, professional men, technicians and skilled workers.

Weaknesses:

1. Intellectual conformity and inhibition of individualism characteristic of totalitarian education.
2. Low quality of primary instruction resulting in poor grasp of fundamentals.
3. Excessive specialization tending to develop technicians incapable of handling more than limited tasks.
4. Relative shortness of school term. A large proportion of the population, the majority in the rural areas, complete only the four year elementary school.
5. High degree of truancy and dropping out of school induced by poor social conditions.
6. Severe shortage of properly qualified teachers.
7. Material handicaps such as acute shortages of buildings, equipment and text books.

The first of these weaknesses derives from the nature of the Soviet regime. The others, particularly the seventh, are continuing to diminish in importance with the progress of reconstruction and the rise in the general economic and cultural level of the country.

C. Religion

- 10 -

SECRET

C. Religion

Strengths:

1. Fostering of patriotism. The major church, the Russian Orthodox, has recently been induced to resume its traditional inculcation of loyalty to Russia and its rulers.
2. Morale-building. Religion is a comfort and source of strength to many Russians who would otherwise be submerged in melancholia induced by the harshness and uncertainty of their lives. It is a concession to this fairly widespread feeling, despite the fact that to the Communist faithful religion is still depicted as "the opium of the people."
3. An instrument of foreign policy. The Russian Orthodox and the Moslem religious bodies within the USSR, both of which are controlled by the state, are employed with some success by Soviet policy makers as a bond with the peoples of the Balkans, the Near East and Middle East. If the USSR is able through its manipulation of Soviet Moslems to assume the role of champion of Islam, it will have achieved a major political gain from Morocco to Mindanao.

Weaknesses:

1. Discontent is aroused by the stingy and restrictive policies of the Government in granting space and facilities for religious worship.
2. More fundamentally, in the long run, if the Church prospers, the outlook engendered by the teachings of religion may clash with totalitarian communism. The Soviet leaders probably hope that with the development of industrialization and the dissemination of intellectual "scientific enlightenment" the emotional and spiritual appeal of religion will disappear. If they are wrong, they or their successors may regret the present policy of toleration, however restricted.

VIII. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS

A. Propaganda

The main goals of the Soviet propaganda system in all its internal operations are to instill in the people an ardent devotion to the Soviet system and its leaders and to mobilize active popular support for the particular policies which the regime is pursuing at any given time.

Strengths:

1. The absolute monopoly exercised by the regime on all informational and propaganda media and its ability to insulate the Soviet people in very large measure from the influence of open or implicit counter-propaganda from outside sources. A corollary strength factor is the cumulative effect of constant unremitting repetition of ideological formulae over a period of many years.
2. The ability of the Soviet regime to lavish unlimited resources on propaganda work and to command the services of a vast disciplined army of Party and Komsomol members, both professional and volunteer agitators, in carrying out its propaganda campaigns.

3. The strong

- 11 -

SECRET

3. The strong and many-sided appeal made by Soviet propaganda to the patriotic nationalist sentiments of the Russian people. The appeal to Russian nationalism is a potent factor of strength in enlisting loyalty to the Soviet regime on the part of many Russians whose patriotism is completely non-Marxist and in forestalling any crystallization of opposition sentiment around a Russian nationalist program.

4. The reliance of the Soviet propaganda machine upon the fundamental technique of persuading the people that all goods and benefits enjoyed by them flow from the Soviet regime as personified by Stalin and that all the hardship, poverty and misery are a product either of aberrant elements within the Soviet system or of the hostile outer environment. In the foreign affairs sphere, Soviet propaganda makes effective use of this technique by representing Soviet policy as a quest for national security and international collaboration against the militarist, aggressive and expansionist designs of Anglo-Saxon imperialism.

Weaknesses:

1. The falsity of the Soviet propaganda picture of a free, happy and democratic socialist society in the USSR. The contradiction between this ideological myth and the oppressive reality of the Soviet police state reveals itself in the daily experience of most Soviet citizens and tends to generate an attitude of cynicism or indifference toward the propaganda itself, regardless of repetition.

2. The infiltration through various channels of unprocessed information concerning superior living standards and greater personal and political freedom abroad. This factor has been powerfully accentuated by the exposure of millions of Soviet troops to European civilization.

3. The interdiction on all free discussion of political values and fundamentals together with the scholastic formalism of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. As a result of this factor, the official ideology, though binding upon all, becomes less and less capable of inspiring vital intellectual allegiance.

B. Morale

As discussed below, morale is a manifestation of the national spirit. It is the spiritual and emotional approach to external phenomena, whether they be war, industrial and agricultural production, food shortages or exile.

Strengths:

1. Natural emotional vigor and enthusiasm of the Russian temperament under certain stimuli.

2. Traditionally powerful attachment to the homeland, particularly developed among the Great Russians.

3. Stoic endurance under hardship and chronic privation.

4. Centuries of habituation to and hence general acceptance of authoritarianism.

5. Remnants of ideological enthusiasm: Some among youth, little among the middle aged, virtually none among elderly people.

Weaknesses

- 12 -

SECRET

Weaknesses:

1. Streaks of stolidity, fatalism and indifference.
2. Subsurface individual anarchistic tendencies.
3. Pervasive discontent with present living conditions.
4. Widespread cynicism regarding promises of Soviet leaders and prospects for Communist prosperity.
5. Fear of security authorities and party discipline together with suspicion of all acquaintances save the closest friends and relatives.

These characteristics may appear to cancel out. They do not because they vary with external conditions, summarized most concisely thus:

Never underestimate Russian morale when the USSR is under external pressure or attack;

Never overestimate Russian morale when the USSR is concerned only with its own internal problems.

IX. MILITARY FACTORS

A. Army

One of the fundamental concepts upon which the Soviet State is built is that of the totalitarian nature of war. Under this concept the military strength and weaknesses of the USSR can be defined only as a resultant of all phases of national life. The acceptance and utilization of this concept is in itself the greatest military strength of the Soviet Union.

The well trained, well equipped battle experienced and patriotic military forces immediately available in strength of approximately 5 million men, with trained reserves equally numerous, all accustomed to hardships of climate and elementary living conditions are another source of great military strength.

Soviet military weaknesses lie in the lag in development of certain techniques, in the necessity for far flung defensive dispositions and in the dangers which excessive political contact bring to the success of military operations.

B. Air

The ability of a nation to be strong in Air Power is dependent largely on the following:

1. Technological development.
2. Manufacturing capacity.
3. Supply of raw materials.
4. Ability to maintain a strong force.

The strength of the Soviet Union at the present time lies in her potential ability. Some of her potential strength such as size, strategic position and extreme secrecy can well be weaknesses.

Strengths.

- 13 -

SECRET

Strengths:

1. Manpower: The unlimited amount of available manpower is one of the great sources of strength and permits her potentially to sustain the largest Air Force in the world.
2. Raw materials: The raw materials available in the USSR makes her almost self-sufficient.
3. Strategic position: The vast size of the Soviet Union would permit, by the use of strategic long range air power, domination of the European continent on the West and from the northern boundaries, control of the shortest route to the Western Hemisphere. It would permit her to be a constant threat to the British life line in the Mediterranean Sea and the Suez Canal. This vast size also makes possible the strategic dispersion of military and industrial facilities.
4. Secrecy: The extreme secrecy imposed on the Soviet Research and development places her in the position of being the unknown quantity, a source of great strength when combined with her manpower, raw materials, and strategic position.
5. The acquisition of German scientists that have industrial and scientific knowledge, coupled with the secrecy of development, permits research and development in fields unknown to other nations.
6. The high priority accorded the Red Air Force by the Soviet Government could permit the rapid development of long range strategic air power and the maintenance of an all-round strong airforce to take advantage of her favorable strategic positions.

Weaknesses:

1. Lines of communications: The Soviet lines of communications, especially of transportation are one of her greatest weaknesses. The lack of transportation does not permit her to exploit fully her strategic positions, by the use of air power. It penalizes her in taking fullest advantage of dispersion of military and industrial facilities, and it retards her ability to supply and support air bases in dispersed areas of greatest strategic value.
2. Intense cold: The intense cold in the north together with lack of transportation limits her ability in the utilization of air routes over the Arctic to the Western Hemisphere.
3. Strategic air power: The lack of very long range aircraft and experience in their use is a present day weakness. Her strategic positions are of little value without the ability to exploit them.
4. National characteristics: The Russian characteristic of copying other producers, her dependence upon foreign industrial research and development, and her extreme secrecy which prohibits a true and wholehearted exchange of ideas and techniques, retard her development of industrial capacity.
5. Care of equipment: The lack of natural mechanical ability, as known in western countries, prevents the complete utilization of equipment and the ability to keep it in combat condition.
6. Lack of civil aviation: A strong civil air fleet stimulates the technological development along aviation lines and also communication lines. In the early stages of conflict it can be the initial source and provide trained personnel in all aviation fields.

Conclusions.

- 14 -

SI ET

Conclusions:

1. The Soviet Union does not at the present time have what we know as air power, the ability to carry on a strategic air war.
2. The Soviet Union by proper utilization of her vast resources could over a period of years build an air force capable of sustained air war and the exploiting by air power of her strategic positions.

C. Navy

In evaluating a modern navy, the principal elements to be considered are naval air forces, surface and sub-surface forces, personnel, bases, mobility, ability to construct and facilities for construction of ships and the technological ability of the country to equip, train and maintain the fleet with particular emphasis on the availability of fuels.

Strengths:

1. Personnel: Unlimited personnel resources to man the factories, ship yards, ships and other supporting naval facilities is a great Soviet strength. At the present time the Navy is estimated to number 400,000 men, plus or minus 10 percent. The Soviet Navy is especially deficient in long-range sea-going experience. It is lacking in training but great efforts are being made to remedy this defect. The morale is good and enthusiasm runs high in the Soviet Navy.
2. Natural resources: The Soviet Union has great natural resources with which to support an extensive building program. Presently, the Soviets must rebuild their ports and yards but having done that and concurrently having developed their great industrial potentialities the desires of the Soviet Government to have large and powerful Navy and Merchant Marine fleets may be fulfilled.
3. Sub-surface: The Soviets have a fair-sized submarine fleet which is their only possible long-range offensive naval weapon. These ships are well built but lack the equipment and efficiency of our submarines. These deficiencies will undoubtedly be overcome with the advance of Soviet technology and the aid of German technicians and German submarine models as guides.

Weaknesses:

1. Bases and mobility: Soviet Union lacks bases external to country and easy access to open sea. Mobility from home bases is restricted in area by geography and by climate. Concentration of fleets is practically impossible.
2. Air: The Soviet Navy has no aircraft carriers from which to launch long range attacks or with which to defend its fleet when it is out of operational range of land-based cover. The lack of carriers therefore practically limits its operation to short range offensives, or to defensive action.
3. Surface: There are four surface fleets supplemented by two flotillas. The fleets are not strong, they are unbalanced in type, and in general, the units of the fleets are old. The augmentation of the Soviet fleets by the addition of units received as war prizes will not to any considerable degree increase their size or power.
4. The fleets are deficient in logistic support and fuel supply.
5. An undeveloped technology, lacking skilled workers, will restrict the building and equipping a modern navy for some years.

- 15 -

SECRET

X. CONCLUSIONS

In drawing up conclusions it is assumed that the Soviet Union will continue to be an expansionist power. Furthermore, as Soviet strength and weakness cannot be realistically assayed as absolutes, unrelated to conditions abroad, this concluding estimate will be based on the assumption that at least the United States will continue to progress in overall strength.

This conclusion will evaluate Soviet strength and weakness on the basis of the present and on the basis of five years from now.

The Present

Intrinsically, Soviet economic and scientific strengths outweigh corresponding weaknesses. The overall Soviet economic and scientific position bulks larger than that of any other European and Asiatic state, but is inferior to that of the United States.

In the political and sociological fields the strengths outweigh the weaknesses largely because the organizational control and suppressive factors are at present more powerful than the disruptive forces. This is not necessarily a stable situation because the preponderance of strength rests on a fundamentally unhealthy relationship between the rulers of the USSR and the people.

Soviet propaganda, despite its ubiquity and vigor, does not offset the unquestionable low morale of the Soviet people, excepting in the case of certain privileged groups such as the Armed Forces and Secret Police. Psychological weaknesses at present outweigh psychological strengths.

In relation to the rest of the world the USSR possesses at the present time and for immediate purposes greater elements of military strength than of weaknesses. It lacks, however, ability to follow through and while it would be strong at the outset of an offensive conflict with the West, its technological and economic weaknesses would soon show up.

Five Years Hence

Only if Stalin continues to live throughout this period and the authority of the present regime remains effective can the strength-weakness equation be projected with any degree of certainty five years hence.

Assuming that Stalin lives for five more years and political equilibrium is maintained, it may be predicted that the economic position of the USSR will advance relatively more rapidly than that of the United States. But the USSR will not in this period overtake the United States.

Under similar conditions, it may be assumed that sociological strength factors will develop. Weakness factors will persist, but may diminish somewhat.

Despite a relatively slight increase in consumers' goods which is anticipated during this period, the oppressive demands imposed on the Soviet masses by the current Five year Plan will probably hold morale at a relatively low ebb.

During the coming five years the USSR will make determined efforts to develop its military potential in relation to the United States. While it may not in the space of the next five years successfully overcome its critical lag in scientific and technological military developments, it will probably make great strides in that direction.

After Stalin.

- 16 -

SECRET

After Stalin

Beyond the period of five years or beyond Stalin's death it is impossible to forecast the nature of the Soviet Union. All turns on internal political developments. The strength-weakness equation set forth in Part VI under Party and Government is crucial.

Doubtless aware of the uncertainties of the future, Stalin is presumably striving resolutely to provide for a continuing equilibrium which will perpetuate the present regime. But the Kremlin autocracy, like all Oriental despotism, carries in itself the seeds of its own destruction. Marxism has not effectively excommunicated guile, intrigue and lust for power. Those proclivities exist and will continue to exist among Stalin's lieutenants. The initial threat to the stability of the regime lies less among the stifled suffering Soviet masses than within the Kremlin itself.

Stalin's death will remove from the Politburo the one compelling force which has ensured effective agreement and an impetus to decisive action. Whatever formula for political stability he may bequeath to his disciples, it cannot promptly replace the sure authority of his personality. In these circumstances there will arise the possibility, which does not now exist, of indiscipline within the Politburo. A rift in the Politburo is an opening for conspiracy against the regime.

A successful revolt in the Soviet Union under normal conditions can originate only in the ruling class. But it can be consummated only with the participation of at least one or key segments of all of the following power groups: the Armed Forces, the MVD-MGB complex or the Party apparatus. (Stalin, it will be remembered, performed his coup d'état initially through the Party apparatus). Without the active, disciplined support of one of these groups, or a horizontal alignment of strong elements in all three, a Kremlin conspiracy will die aborning.

Finally, while the regime may change, Russian absolutism will not. A new body of rulers can come to power only through blood, chaos and subjugation. It can retain power only through terror, oppression and regimentation. Democracy cannot exist in Russia for generations to come. Whoever its rulers and whatever their political philosophy, Russia will continue for the foreseeable future to be a collectivized despotism.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

TOP SECRET

November 30, 1946.

No. 11

MEMORANDUM

POLITICAL APPRECIATION OF THE OBJECTIVES
OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Immediate or short-term prospects of Soviet aggression

On such information as is available to the Canadian Government, it appears most unlikely that the Soviet Union would be in a position to wage another major war in the near future, and for this reason it is highly improbable that the Soviet Government would run the risk of deliberately provoking such a war. As a result of the last war, the Soviet Union has suffered so heavily in terms of a general disorganization of its economy, material destruction and loss of manpower that a breathing space seems clearly indicated as a main objective of Soviet policy. It is not possible to do more than guess at the period of time which will elapse before the Soviet Government consider that they are in a position to wage another major war should they desire to do so. It may be that the completion of each of the three five-year plans now contemplated will be considered necessary before the Soviet Government feel strong enough for such a struggle. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the Soviet Government will spare no efforts to strengthen its economy and build up its war potential (already very powerful) at the earliest possible date.

To this estimate of the short run danger of Soviet aggression, three qualifications should be made.

- (a) The possibility of the development and production in large quantities by the U.S.S.R. of atomic bombs or of some new weapon of mass destruction. *unlikely devel. of new weapon which wd. radically alter balance*
- (b) The situation that might arise in the event of Stalin's death. It seems unlikely that the transfer of power from Stalin to his successor would affect the power of the Communist party in the U.S.S.R. or change the form of Soviet foreign policy. On the other hand, there is always the possibility that the transfer of such immense political power as Stalin wields may not take place smoothly. Personal ambitions may operate to prevent the orderly transfer of power and to produce a crisis in the Soviet Union. However, in our ignorance of the present relationships, motives and ambitions of the members of the ruling group in the Soviet Union, it would be idle to pursue such a speculation. The preservation of the present regime and the advancement of Soviet interests abroad are likely to govern the policies of the Soviet Government, whoever succeeds Stalin.
- (c) There remains the possibility that either some agent of Soviet policy (e.g. a Soviet general commanding troops in an area of friction) or more probably the Government of one of the states forming part of the Soviet bloc (e.g. Yugoslavia) may precipitate a war. It might be that the Soviet Government would be unwilling

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

-2-

for reasons of prestige to withdraw from the position to which it had been committed and thus be drawn into warfare at first local in scale but afterwards becoming a world wide struggle. While this is a possible eventuality, it may be regarded as unlikely. The Soviet Government have not in the past hesitated to disavow either policies or individuals embarrassing to them, nor have they hesitated to retreat into inglorious security when they felt it wise to do so. It seems, therefore, improbable that the U.S.S.R. will become involved in a major war started by any one of the agents of Soviet policy against the will of the Kremlin.

The Long-term Threat of Soviet Aggression

within next decade
While, therefore, we do not consider there to be imminent danger of Soviet aggression, it must be recognized that there are powerful forces at work which may in the end precipitate the struggle between the Soviet Union and the Western World.

by this concept
One of these is the idea which is a basic part of Marxist philosophy that an ultimate struggle between communism and capitalism is inevitable and that communism will emerge victorious. It is difficult to say how much the present rulers of Russia are affected by this concept but it is certainly not without influence on Soviet policy. It may be assumed, however, that Soviet foreign policy will be dictated less by ~~ideological considerations~~ than by a realistic estimate of Soviet interests as they are understood in the Kremlin.

At the same time the Soviet Union is a police state in which individual liberties and democratic methods of government, as these are understood in the West, can hardly be said to exist. Between such a state and the Western democracies a fundamental cleavage inevitably exists. This conflict of principle runs deep in all the relations of the Soviet Union with the Western World. Moreover, the insecurity which makes it necessary for the Soviet Government to rule by such methods, also makes it essential that the people of the Soviet Union should not be exposed to the unsettling effects of contact with the Western democracies or their nationals. The Soviet Government, therefore, not only keep their people in ignorance of our conditions of life, but employ unceasing propaganda to instill into the population fear and suspicion of the intentions of the Western democracies. In addition, there will always be a tendency, when things are going badly in the Soviet Union, for the Soviet Government to distract popular attention from their own shortcomings by starting a campaign of abuse and misrepresentation directed against one or other of the Anglo-Saxon democracies. Such methods are obviously dangerous to international peace. *promotion of division*

Apart from the desire to further world revolution, the Soviet Government may be led in the direction of war by two other motives. One is the desire for expansion--perhaps for eventual world domination--and the other is fear of a threat to Soviet security by the Western powers.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

-3-

It is perfectly obvious that the Soviet Union is an expanding power. The Soviet Union has annexed Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Koenigsberg district, Eastern Poland, Carpatho-Ukraine, Northern Bukovina, Bessarabia, Tannu-Tuva, Port Arthur, Karaputo and the Kurile Islands. It has taken the Petsamo and Viborg areas from Finland. It is attempting, with considerable success, to establish a zone of exclusive Soviet influence beyond these territories, in Poland, the Soviet zone of Germany, Austria, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Persia, Azerbaijan, the Mongul People's republic, Northern Korea, Dairen, and the trunk railways of Manchuria. In Czechoslovakia, Soviet influence is strong but not as yet exclusive.

These represent formidable acquisitions of power and influence; ~~and there are no signs that the Soviet Government is willing to set bounds to its appetite for further expansion.~~ There is, perhaps, however, a valid distinction between admitting Russia's expansionist tendencies and attributing to her schemes for world domination, although the distinction may be rather one of method than of eventual objective. It seems unlikely that the Soviet Government is contemplating grandiose schemes for world domination of the kind which fascinated the restless dictators of the thirties. The Soviet rulers have always despised what they term "bourgeois adventurism". The gambling spirit that is willing to take great risks in the hope of immense returns seems to have little appeal for the Soviet Government. On the record of their past policies, it is rather difficult to imagine the rulers of the Soviet Union unleashing at a stroke a world struggle. It seems more probable that the Soviet Government will pursue a course of deliberate and cautious consolidation of positions already acquired together with a process of probing for the weak spots in the adversary's positions. Such a policy might operate on the political, economic or military planes. We have already had ample experience of these methods in negotiation between the Soviet Government and the Western powers. The tactics are familiar--the spun-out negotiation, the bargaining price, the war of nerves, the manipulation of facts for propaganda purposes, the abrupt change of front and the retreats pour mieux sauter. These have become the commonplaces of Soviet diplomatic methods.

*undoubtedly willing to expand its influence as far as open permits
e.g. Italy*

Behind these tactics, the strategy of the Soviet Government seems to be emerging with increasing clarity. It is to undermine the position of the Western powers, and to weaken and divide them at every opportunity. In pursuit of these aims, the Soviet Government are anxious to prevent the formation of any Western bloc of powers. They strive to separate the United States from the United Kingdom and to isolate the latter in difficulties over some issue in which they hope that the support of the United States may not be forthcoming. Moreover, the Soviet Government, in its role as defender of the oppressed is carrying on propaganda against "imperialist" powers in general and against the British and American democracies in particular. In this capacity, the Soviet Government claims to be the champion of the poorer classes in all countries and of all racial minority groups.

boxing

-4-

In our estimation it is no longer possible to doubt that the Soviet Government aim at dividing the Western world against itself and increasing discord and instability. Such policies are plainly incompatible with friendship or cooperation as we understand these terms. On the other hand, they could be pursued for a prolonged period by the U.S.S.R. without implying that the Soviet Government intended to precipitate a world war. They may very possibly be carried to the length of fomenting civil war in certain countries in which the U.S.S.R. would give under-cover support to its adherents (e.g. in China and Greece).

The Soviet Government will inevitably, whatever their own ultimate objectives, be influenced in their policies by the reaction which they encounter from the Western powers. They have a healthy respect for the immense industrial resources of the United States and for its war potential. They are aware of the attraction which western democratic ideas exercise over the minds of peoples all over the world. They are alarmed at the possibility that the socialist experiment may succeed in Britain and that the example of this alternative to Communist revolution might undermine their influence among the industrial working classes of Western Europe. So long as they think the western democracies and in particular the United States and the United Kingdom are strong and united and so long as firm but fair-minded policies are pursued by those powers in dealing with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government may be disposed to proceed with caution.

If, however, they see signs of weaknesses in the internal economies of the western democracies (or instability in the conduct of their foreign affairs) they may be tempted to follow more aggressive policies. They will certainly seize upon any evidence of appeasement as an encouraging sign of weakness. On the other hand, should they become convinced (perhaps as the result of inaccurate reports from their representatives abroad) that the Western powers have aggressive intentions against the Soviet Union, they might feel impelled to provide in haste for their security by further annexations of territory or infiltration into countries in strategic positions. *depression*

In assessing the possibility of war with the Soviet Union, it can be assumed that the United Nations, in its present form, will not provide the effective means of preventing such a struggle. While the United Nations may be competent to prevent minor wars between smaller nations, it cannot under its present Charter effectively curtail the complete freedom of action of a Great Power. It cannot be assumed that the world disarmament plans now under consideration in New York will eventually become realities or that the effective control of atomic energy on a world scale may be instituted. The Canadian Government for its part will certainly do its utmost to work for these objectives through the United Nations. But the existing international machinery cannot be relied upon as a deterrent to aggression by the Soviet Union. *we can strengthen economies of W + remove some causes of dissension in our direction etc.*

Conclusion in long run
Thus while the threat of immediate aggression seems slight, there is little prospect of sincere cooperation with the Soviet Union. A period of deteriorating relations between the Soviet Union and the Western world is to be anticipated. *mean peace when solidifies*

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

-5-

It is possible
It is all too probable that this situation may end in war. *eventually may lead to war within 25 yrs.*
The best likelihood of averting such a catastrophe would be for the Soviet Government to be convinced of the strength and unity of the western democracies and at the same time persuaded that they have nothing to fear from them. It is possible that they might then postpone indefinitely the accomplishment of their ultimate aims and the world might settle into a period of uneasy peace.

If this analysis is correct, we cannot afford to risk being unprepared in the event of war. The danger that Soviet policies may end in aggression cannot safely be ignored and it becomes essential in self-protection to consider the defensive measures entailed by the possibility of Soviet aggression.

5 September 1946

TOP SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR MR. PIERCE *Smith*

Some time ago the Chiefs of Staff requested the Joint Intelligence Committee to submit a paper ~~comprising~~ *on* "Strategic Appreciation of the Capabilities of the U.S.S.R. to Attack the North American Continent." The attached paper was considered by the Joint Intelligence Committee at its last meeting and it was considered that it did not cover the subject adequately and was not completely up to date.

The feature of the paper which appears unsatisfactory is that it fails to deal adequately with the question of Soviet war potential. Such comments as have been made on this problem you will note are made separately in the Army, Navy and Air contributions. It is thought that it would be more useful if a separate section were produced dealing with war potential with particular reference to Army, Navy and Air Force problems.

The Joint Intelligence Committee considers that it would be more appropriate if the Department produced a section of the paper dealing with Soviet war potential with particular reference to Soviet capabilities of attacking the North American continent. It would seem that your Division would be the most logical one to produce a section of this kind and I should be grateful if you could undertake to do so. Should you wish to discuss the paper in my absence, you might get in touch with Mr. Crean.

W.F. [Signature]

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

August 23, 1946.
GGC:EW

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RIDDELL

With reference to the attached paper submitted to the J.I.C. on the "Strategic Appreciation of the Capabilities of the U.S.S.R. to attack the North American Continent", the following points occur to me concerning the paper:

In its present form the paper does not appear to be suitable for submission to the Chiefs of Staff or other interested bodies. In the first place, there is a certain amount of repetition as between the Army, Navy and Air Force contributions which I feel should be eliminated from the document of this kind. It seems to me that one requires an overall strategic appreciation of Russian capabilities rather than separate appreciations put forward by the Army, Navy and Air Force. The present covering note does not, in my view, perform this function.

Each of the Services is rightly interested in Soviet war potential. It appears to me that this should also be dealt with as an overall matter rather than an estimate reproduced by each of the Services. For example, you will find that the three papers vary in their views concerning the bottlenecks in Soviet production. It seems to me that it would be more appropriate if we produced a note on the overall economic position of the Soviet Union with particular reference to war potential.

I am not sure where the information comes from for Appendix "D" concerning the Communist party in Canada. This is the sort of thing which should be produced by the R.C.M.P. rather than the Services.

It seems to me that the chief value of a paper of this kind is not so much to show how successful the Soviet would be but really to show how difficult operations would be against the North American Continent. This aspect is, I think, important at the

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

- 2 -

present time when Russia's short-term capabilities at least are being seriously over-estimated. My own speculation on the subject is that if the Soviet wish to overrun Europe in the course of the next five to ten years, air attacks of one kind or another might take place on North American industrial centres in order to prevent the flow of supplies to the Western powers in Europe. I can't imagine that a full scale attack against North America would possibly take place without Russia first securing Europe and probably the United Kingdom.

G. G. G.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

1
DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

RUSSIA'S NAVAL CAPABILITIES

Russia is at the present time the world's third ranking sea power. Her surface fleet, however, compared with either the British or American fleets is not imposing, and it is apparent that her present ability to protect any significant overseas movement of troops and supplies is quite limited. Her Merchant Fleet tonnage is small (about 2½ million tons).

2. What little intelligence we have indicates that the Soviet Government is making great efforts to build up her shipyards and her Merchant Marine. There are indications also that as soon as Russia can afford to divert the necessary supplies and manpower from industry, she will turn her attention to the development of the air and surface components of sea power.

3. The threat to the Western Hemisphere from such a development does not appear to be immediate; any important building program will take at least three years to get under way, and it may be ten years possibly longer before Russia can develop Naval Forces which would be at all comparable to the British or American fleets. Any significant reduction in the British or American fleets would, of course, reduce this time factor in favour of Russia.

4. The only immediate threat to Canadian and United States sea communications is Russia's submarine force which consists of at least 200 units. One hundred of these are modern ocean-going submarines fitted with all the latest equipment. The other 100 while older cannot be considered in any way obsolete since they were all built since 1935 and would still be quite effective from an operational point of view. When you remember that in 1939 Germany had only sixty U-boats and that in spite of concentrated Allied Bombing she added 1,100 to that total during the war, Russia's capabilities of waging effective submarine warfare against our overseas shipping must not be under-estimated.

5. Russia's submarines would have been relatively ineffective against the anti-submarine measures developed by the Allies in the latter stages of the war. However, the Russians are now in a position to benefit greatly from German experience and developments. At the end of the war the Germans had developed vastly improved types of U-boats. Type XXI had a submerged speed of 16 knots, great submerged endurance and ability to charge batteries in a few hours without surfacing or exposing anything more than the comparatively inconspicuous Schnorkel. It would be extremely difficult if not impossible to deal effectively with this type with the anti-submarine equipment methods and escort vessels now available. By use of a new type of fuel submerged speeds of well over 20 knots and an almost indefinite submerged range are an immediate possibility and may already have been developed by the Russians. The present effective Asdic speed is 16 knots and effective range 500 to 3000 yards depending on water conditions. Type XXI submarines were to have been turned out in great numbers by a system of sectional prefabrication and assembling, but fortunately only one vessel came into service before the Germans surrendered. It should be noted incidentally, that the schnorkel greatly reduces the effectiveness of radar and almost completely counters the use of shore based or ship based aircraft in anti-submarine operations. This, when aircraft had become our trump card against the U-boat, in a most serious blow and necessitates completely new developments in anti-submarine methods and equipment.

- 2 -

6. At the time of the German surrender submarine designs even more advanced than the Type XXI were in production, and in addition many technical improvements in submarine torpedoes were being developed.

7. The Russians have obtained ten modern German U-boats including at least one completed Type XXI. Furthermore, they control several German shipyards which were assembling U-boats of the latest class as well as factories producing nearly all the parts and equipment which went into them. As reparations, the Russians have also obtained from elsewhere in Germany machinery used in the manufacture of such U-boats and in addition they have in their hands German scientific personnel both Naval and civilian familiar with all phases of the construction and operation of U-boats.

8. It must be expected, therefore, that Russia will devote considerable effort to the development of her submarine force. With the knowledge of German experience and developments which has been acquired and the assistance from German personnel which is available, Russia would be able to carry out very effective submarine operations against our overseas and coastal shipping, and her submarine force may be expected to increase rapidly.

9. Another possibility in the foreseeable future is the application by the Russians of atomic energy to the propulsion of submarines. German research into the uses of nuclear energy was directed towards the use of such energy for power production rather than explosive purposes, and the results of this research are now in Russian hands. Submarines probably offer the most suitable field for the early application of this form of energy, and such a development would undoubtedly produce a greatly increased speed and range with greatly reduced vulnerability.

10. Certain other developments of submarine warfare cannot be overlooked:

- (a) The use of submarines for the transportation of sabotage and raiding forces. The Japanese I-400 class which had a displacement of about 5,500 tons could carry as many as 300 troops in addition to the regular complement.
- (b) The launching from submarines of guided missiles would provide a satisfactory means of delivering explosives, atomic or otherwise, against targets in both the East and West Coast industrial areas from comparatively close range and with little or no danger of detection or interception. There are no effective counter-measures against such hit and run attacks at the present time.
- (c) There is nothing new in equipping submarines with aircraft. British submarines were so equipped in the 1930's and the Japanese I-400 class carried three planes. Any development of this type of submarine warfare has tremendous offensive possibilities with the new weapons which can be carried by aircraft.

11. A last possibility which should not be overlooked is the use of ordinary merchant ships for launching aircraft and guided missiles.

12. To sum up Russia's Naval capabilities - her surface forces and her merchant marine are weak but if she studies the lessons of the last war she is capable of developing a most potent submarine fleet against which Canada and the United States would find it difficult to defend their sea communications.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

PRIVY COUNCIL



CANADA

TOP SECRET

JIC 1-8

OTTAWA. 15th August, 1946.

→ R.G. Riddell, Esq.,
Department of External Affairs.

D.G.D.R.

D.N.P.I.

D.M.I.

~~D. of I. (Air)~~

Assistant Commissioner L.H. Nicholson,
Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

1. I enclose herewith for information and retention, Copy No. 7 of "Strategic Appreciation of the Capabilities of the U.S.S.R. to attack the North American Continent", prepared in accordance with decision reached at the 149th meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee held on 5th July, 1946 (Item 849). Please acknowledge receipt on the attached form.

2. I am advised that two charts are in course of reproduction for insertion in the Naval Section and will be available shortly for distribution.

(J.A.K. Rutherford) Major,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

002818

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
RÉDUIT À SECRET

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

STRATEGIC APPRECIATION OF THE CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S.S.R.
TO ATTACK THE NORTH AMERICAN CONTINENT

1. AIM

The aim is to determine the forms and scales of attack, within the limits of conventional warfare, by a hostile power which may be expected on Canadian territory.

2. ASSUMPTIONS

(a) It can be assumed that the atomic bomb will be available to other countries by 1950 with the possibility that radio active by-products of atomic research will be available before that date.

(b) Technical and scientific progress in foreign countries will keep pace with Canadian and American developments.

3. FACTORS

(a) Possible Enemies

The United Kingdom, United States of America, and the U.S.S.R. are the only powers emerging from World War II with armed forces and industrial potential capable of engaging in a major war, therefore the U.S.S.R. is the only potential enemy for a period of say ten years.

(b) Space and Distance

The factor of space and distance must be considered in relation to the relative position of the centre of gravity of Soviet industry and the centre of North American industry running from the Great Lakes to the New England seaboard. The shortest distance joining these two areas lies across the Polar cap and approaches Canada from the Northeast. Direct assault and entry by enemy forces from the North are feasible and it is from this direction that the major air effort would probably come. It is unlikely that any full scale, co-ordinated attack from any other direction would be successful.

An attack via the Pacific based in Asia would require the overpowering first of Asia, then of the outlying bases such as the East Indies, Phillippines, and the Pacific Islands, requiring a long costly campaign.

An attack from Siberia via Sakhalin, Kamchatka, the Komandorski Islands, Aleutians, Alaska and Canada would be a most difficult triphibious operation depending for supply on the Transiberian Railroad which has only a normal capacity at present of 15,000 tons daily.

An attack via the North Atlantic would presume a conquered Europe, UK and possibly Africa and an attack on Europe would probably involve the U.S. long before a decision in Europe was reached.

An attack via South America and Mexico or the West Indies would probably fail in its infancy.

(c) Soviet Navy

The assessment of present and future capabilities of the Soviet Navy, with respect to operations against Canadian territory is included in Appendix "A" attached.

From this assessment it will be seen that large scale

- 2 -

amphibious operations are unlikely during the next ten years, and that the main Naval threat consists of submarine attack on our sea communications together with possible shore bombardment from submarines with new and improved weapons. The use of submarines for the transportation of sabotage and raiding forces also cannot be overlooked.

(d) Soviet Air Force

The assessment of present and future capabilities of the Soviet Air Force with respect to operations against Canadian territory is included in Appendix "B" attached.

From this assessment it will be seen that the threat of Soviet air attack constitutes the primary factor in determining the forms and scales of Soviet attack during the next ten years. Capabilities for the present are limited attacks against Alaska and bases in the extreme West on two way conventional missions or suicide one way missions covering all of Western Canada as far as the Ontario border increasing to more concentrated attacks including the atomic bomb and other scientific developments by 1950. By 1956 the Soviet air force will be capable of attacking all vulnerable areas in Canada and the USA with guided missiles and very long range air bombardment from captured bases in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.

(e) Soviet Army

The assessment of present and future capabilities of the Soviet Army with respect to operations against Canadian territory is included in Appendix "C" attached.

At the present time and in the next five years, the Soviet Army is capable of over-running the whole of Europe, including the UK and almost any part of Asia, but it could not hope to achieve more than a few commando raids in the Arctic areas of this continent. After 1950 and in the foreseeable future the Russians might be capable of carrying out more serious air-borne operations if they can secure sufficient advance bases.

(f) Internal Security

The assessment of the capabilities of the Communists with respect to a threat to Canadian internal security is included in Appendix "D".

Soviet control, direct or indirect, over the Communist Party continues and it is considered therefore that initially a proportion of the Canadian population would be sympathetic to the Soviet on the outbreak of war. Such a situation would have important repercussions in the fields of sabotage and subversive activity.

(g) Soviet Intentions

It is considered that the Soviet Union does not wish to engage in a major war in the next ten years.

It is quite possible that her present efforts to extend her interests by political and other pressure may involve her in a major war with the Western Powers through some misjudgment of their temper.

If such a war develops the USSR might well attack Canada with the following objectives: (1) to pin down Canadian-US war potential (It is stressed that this is only likely if US intervention takes place or is considered by the Soviets to be inevitable). (2) To secure bases for later attacks against our populated and industrial centres.

- 3 -

4. CONCLUSIONS

(a) In case war breaks out in the next ten years involving Canada and the USA, the following conclusions are made:

- (i) The USSR is the only conceivable enemy, but may have satellite powers in alliance.
- (ii) For the period 1946-50 attacks will be limited in nature against our Northern fringes accompanied by submarine activity on both Coasts. These attacks could be undertaken on a small scale without warning but would be harassing rather than decisive.
- (iii) For the period 1950 on, attacks of a more serious proportion are likely, involving the atomic bomb and other new developments and accompanied by more serious shore bombardments.
- (iv) Subversive activities and sabotage will be extensively used.
- (v) The capabilities of Russian air power will increase from harassing attacks for the period 1946-50 to the likelihood of overwhelming guided missile and very long range air bombardment and the use of large airborne forces by 1956. The following types of attack may be expected:

- Suicide one way missions
- Use of the atomic bomb
- Use of guided missiles with atomic warhead
- Bacteriological warfare
- Radio-active substance warfare

TOP SECRET

ESTIMATED STRENGTH U.S.S.R. NAVY

PERSONNEL : 1,200,000 (1945)

N.B. There has been little or no
Demobilization of Navy Personnel.

<u>SHIPS</u> :	<u>OLD</u>	<u>NEW</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Battleships	3	—	3
Cruisers	3	6	9
Flotilla Leaders	—	5	5
Destroyers	14	29	43
Submarines (approx)	100	100	<u>200</u>
<u>TOTAL</u>			260

CAPABILITIES OF GERMAN S/M's

TYPE	TONS	SURFACE RANGE	SUB. RANGE	SURFACE SPEED	SUB. SPEED(MAX.)
VII - IX	(750)	15,000	100	18	6-8
XXI	(1200)	12,000	100 @ 3 KTs.	16	16
XXIII	(450)	4,000	50 @ 3 KTs.	12	12
XXVI	(800)	8,000	240 @ 20 KTs.	17	24
XVII	(400)	4,000	120 @ 20 KTs.	16	24
XXVIII	(1500)	18,000	240 @ 20 KTs.	18	24

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "B"

CAPABILITIES OF THE RUSSIAN AIR FORCE

1. RUSSIAN AIR FORCE

(a) Present Power of the Russian Air Force

At the present time the Russian Air Force comprises 16,000 first line aircraft operationally assigned to combat units. At the end of World War II there were 82,000 aircraft of all types on hand, including approximately 14,000 of American and 4,000 of British manufacture. Current stock of new aircraft in stored reserves stands at 18,000, among which are to be found most of 2,400 P-63 fighters which are not known to have been used in combat during the war. Total air force strength is divided as follows: 4,350 bombers, 7,850 fighters, and 3,800 ground attack planes.

The 4,350 bomber aircraft include 2,000 TU-2 and ER-4, both twin-engine aircraft of modern design. The ER-4 is powered by diesel engines which give it a range of 3,000 miles with a 4,400 pound load. Two new four-engine bombers, the ER-6 and TU-4, are in process of development but are not known to be in production as yet. Although performance figures are not known, there have been indications that ranges of 5,000 miles with 9 - 11,000 pound loads may be expected. In addition, the Russians possess 3 - 5 American B-29s, at least one of which has been observed in flight recently, and several B-17s and B-24s. It is estimated that with the assistance of German technicians, Russia could place the B-29 in mass production within five years.

Although not equal to performance characteristics of the newest Allied fighters, the Russian fighters are completely modern and represent the most effective non-Allied fighter force at the present time. Its 7,850 planes are all in the 400-mile-per-hour class and operate most efficiently at medium altitudes. The fighter force includes some Spitfire IXs as well as American P-39s, P-47s, and P-63s.

The ground attack strength of 3,800 aircraft consists mostly of the famous Stormovik. A new version, the IL-8, which is in development, is thought to be yet propelled.

The civil Air Fleet, which performs the functions of a troop carrier, comprises 5,000 Douglas-type transports. Five hundred of these are American C-47s with a capacity of 22 fully-equipped men. The remaining 4,500 are Russian with a capacity of 15 men. The Fleet has, therefore, a total lift-capacity of 78,500 men over a radius of 500-700 miles. Production of transport types in December, 1944, was estimated at 200 per month. It is estimated that this figure will rise to 1,000 per month by September, 1946.

The experience of the Russian Air Force has been entirely in tactical and ground support operations. However, the 18th Air Army, the Strategic Air Force located in the Moscow area, is currently undergoing intensive training in all phases of strategic air warfare.

Operational range of current Russian bombers is stated at 3,000 miles. The TU-2 can carry 6,600 pounds of bombs 1,550 miles, and the ER-4 can carry 8,800 pounds of bombs 1,000 miles, but range increases to 3,000 miles if the bomb load is cut to 4,400 pounds.

- 2 -

(b) Future Power of the Russian Air Force

A Long-Range Force has been in existence in Russia for a number of years, but it has never been adequate as a strategic bombardment force. Its inefficiency was due to a number of factors, such as lack of long-range aircraft, lack of modern navigational equipment, and weakness in training. Crises, such as the Battle of Stalingrad, required its use as a tactical force, and with few exceptions, it continued to operate as a short-range bombardment force throughout the war. The Staff of the Long-Range Force has always been considered high above the level of that of the Red Army Air Force as a whole, and when the Long-Range Force was converted into the 18th Air Army of the Red Army Air Force, personnel was retained intact. This staff has never abandoned the concept of purely strategic operations, but only postponed its application. That concept has been strengthened by the lessons learned from the success of the U.S. and British strategic air forces during the war, by the geographical considerations of the USSR, and by the comparative deficiency of Soviet sea power.

Quantitatively, Russia probably could, initially at least, match any first rate air power in 1956, including heavy bombers of the B-29 type. Qualitatively, however, Russia will probably fall short of a maximum goal. A limiting factor in qualitative production would be the loss in continued research development and experimentation during the build-up period which would be necessary for the Russians to acquire a quantitative air force. It should be kept in mind, however, that if Russia intends to expand by force a decision to attack the United States and Canada would necessarily have to have been made by now in order to insure a qualitatively first rate air arm.

In the next ten years, Russian aircraft engineers will undoubtedly have assimilated and adapted to their own requirements all the technical knowledge acquired from the Allies and Germany during the war and will have made some improvements of their own. However, although every effort will have been made to close the gap between Russian aircraft developments and those of the U.S. and Great Britain, the Western Powers will maintain a margin of superiority. The situation in respect to long range fighters will be substantially the same. Russian equipment other than aircraft will probably show a wide margin of inferiority, particularly in radar, navigational aids and sighting devices when compared with like U.S. and British items.

Every effort will be made to keep the training program of the Red Air Force in step with the development of new equipment. However, the low standards in Russia will be a limiting factor in the training of crew and ground personnel to man a strategic air force.

It is highly improbable that during the next ten years the Russian Air Force will attain, under peacetime conditions, the invaluable experience acquired by the U.S. and Britain in all phases of heavy bomber operation during the war.

In 1956, Russia will probably have more than 5,000 transport aircraft with at least C-69 (Constellation) characteristics. The C-69 has a range of approximately 4,000 miles with a maximum load of about 50 men or 20,000 lbs. of cargo. With these aircraft Russia will possess a large potential troop lift for operations against the Aleutians, Alaska, Iceland and possibly Greenland. Airborne troop operations against any of these places in the face of strong counteraction would, however, present supply, reinforcement, and support difficulties which would render ultimate success unlikely. Furthermore, by 1956 the majority of U.S. bases will still probably be out of range for airborne troop operations from bases in territory now owned or controlled by Russia.

- 3 -

Except for bases on Spitzbergen, which might be employed for attacks on Greenland, Iceland, and the northern and eastern parts of the Continental United States, the bases employed in air attacks would probably all be on the mainland of Europe and Asia. Spitzbergen would be vulnerable to attack by air or sea, and transportation difficulties involved in providing ground support or replacing destroyed or damaged facilities and material might make bases in Northeastern Siberia vulnerable to air attack. The other bases likely to be employed do not appear to possess any notably vulnerable features.

(c) Future of Guided Missiles and Atomic Weapons

Although the field of guided missiles was almost a monopoly by Germany during the war, the capture of German scientists and equipment by the Allies has opened the entire field to all. There is reason to believe that as early as 1941 Russia was engaged in research and calculations on this subject. With the benefit of German experimentation and personnel, Russia should be abreast of Allied nations on current development of these weapons.

German scientific thought on guided missiles began in the nineteen-twenties. In 1943 there were 48 different types in various stages of development. In that year all but 12 were eliminated so as to permit concentration of effort. The majority of these were defensive in nature. Most potent of the offensive type was the "A" series of supersonic missiles which succeeded the subsonic V-1, the notorious "buzz-bomb". This comparatively primitive weapon which carried approximately one ton of explosive to a ceiling of 4,000 feet at 350-400 miles per hour was still sufficiently lethal to cause heavy damage in the United Kingdom. The 1,115 V-1 bombs to land in the U.K. cost Germany about 463,000,000 man-hours to produce. The cost to the Allies in terms of damage repair, absenteeism, offensive and defensive countermeasures, amounted to about 1,758,000,000 man-hours.

Next major weapon to be employed offensively was the A-4, which came to be known as the V-2 or "Viper". This was a supersonic rocket-type weapon which included a 2,150 pound warhead in its 24,000 pound total launching weight. It had a range of 230 miles at 3,600 miles per hour. The limit of development for this weapon is considered to be a maximum range of 350 miles with a 3-mile circular error in deflection.

At war's end, work was in progress on the A-9 which was designed for use with the A-10 rocket propulsion unit. The weight of the A-9 was 29,000 pounds and its expected range was 3,000 miles at 5,870 miles per hour. Several of these were constructed, but there is no record of their having been test-fired.

Russia is in control of approximately 50 per cent of German scientific personnel formerly engaged in guided missiles research and occupies some of Germany's greatest research centers: Peenemunde, Nordhausen, Kavelshagen, Leba, and Breslau. Although some equipment was removed from Peenemunde and Nordhausen by American forces before the arrival of the Russians, there can be no doubt that currently Russia possesses all equipment, materials, calculations, and personnel necessary to complete development of an extensive guided missiles program. Greatest deterrents to German accomplishments were hostile bombing and lack of industrial co-ordination. Russia will be immune to these obstacles.

Any discussion of Canadian-American vulnerability to guided missile attack from present Russian bases must devolve into an estimate as to the time which Russia will possess a warhead explosive of sufficient power to justify expenditure of these weapons and the time when A-9 or a similar carrier shall have been perfected. Russia may be expected to possess atomic explosives at some time after 1950 and probably prior to 1956. Completion to operational status of a V-9 type

- 4 -

carrier is more problematical. Estimates of German personnel now in our hands range from one to fifteen years. The utilization of German scientists and German production facilities greatly enhances Russian capabilities to produce atomic power and weapons. When atomic production has been achieved, it will immediately cause a great increase in the strategic air capabilities of Russia, especially for making surprise attacks.

The development of an atomic weapon may be divided into two phases: (1) obtaining sufficient quantities of basic ore and developing the explosive constituent, and (2) constructing a suitable weapon in sufficient quantities. In the attainment of the first, radioactive dust or gas is produced as a by-product. There is, then, the possibility of developing not only explosive weapons, but also weapons to disperse radioactive dusts or gases of extreme toxicity. The practicality of the bomb has been demonstrated to Russia by developments in the United States, and Russian scientists may be expected to devote great efforts in this direction. Although there is no such precedent for building a weapon employing radioactive dusts or gases, efforts by Russian scientists along this line are conceivable and might result in the development of such a weapon by 1956.

Russia is probably capable of developing a supersonic guided missile with a 300 mile range and a satisfactory degree of accuracy at that range and probably will be capable of developing a weapon with a 3000 mile range. It is reasonably certain that they now possess the latter weapon, developed by the Germans. Within about 5 years thereafter Russia may be able to develop ground-to-ground subsonic missiles (such as automatically controlled bombers) of reasonable accuracy with sufficient range to reach outlying U.S. bases in the Pacific from launching sites in territory on the Asiatic mainland now controlled by Russia. This requires a range of 1000 miles or more. By 1956, Russia may have succeeded in applying atomic explosive charges to their long range guided missiles. The assistance of other nations particularly Sweden and France, if available to Russia may be of great assistance in the development of long range guided missiles.

2. OTHER FACTORS GOVERNING THE SUCCESS OF AN AIR ATTACK ON NORTH AMERICA

(a) Russian Industrial War Potential

Although current industrial output is below pre-war, and will remain below for a few years, Russian industry is now probably the third largest in the world, following that of the United States and the British Empire. Worst production shortages are now in aviation petrol, non-ferrous metals, and electronics equipment. The Russians depended on their Allies for 80 percent of their high octane aviation spirit, a large proportion of their rubber and explosives and these resources would probably constitute serious bottlenecks at the present time. There are only a very few shortages in critical materials. Furthermore, having suffered permanent military casualties estimated at 11,200,000 in the recent war, of whom 6,200,000 were fatal, the Russian man-power potential may be considered strained in view of the immense task of rehabilitation still to be performed. Russian rail and road communication have been strained for years and are not in a position to supply a major new effort without serious rehabilitation and expansion.

Any estimate of the near potential of Russia in 5 or 10 years from now must be largely conjectural. It will largely depend on the proportion of the national effort which is applied to war purposes. On the assumption that a large proportion will be so applied, they

- 5 -

would probably have removed entirely their bottlenecks in aviation spirit, rubber, and explosives within 5 years. But their industrial technique and communications will not have reached British and American standards. On the other hand the problem of rehabilitation should have been solved within 10 years and therefore, the manpower situation will have been eased considerably and the Russian air force would then be backed by a formidable industry geared to total war.

(b) Canadian - American Vulnerability

A study of the war making ability of the United States and Canada shows that the most important objectives are industrial, urban, and administrative areas grouped in two major regions. Region one is the North Atlantic Coastal Plain extending from Halifax on the North to Norfolk on the South, and from the Atlantic Ocean on the East to the Appalachians on the West. Region two is the Great Lakes, Ohio River Valley, St. Lawrence Valley.

The vital regions of the U.S. and Canada contain a preponderance of administrative centers; urban centers; communications equipment centers; shipbuilding and repair yards; Navy yards; atomic bomb facilities - mining, processing, and assembly plants; electric power, synthetic rubber plants, petroleum refining, coke, iron, and steel industries; strategic metals - reducing refining and fabricating plants.

At the present time, given a range of 3000 miles, a Russian attack would not have serious consequences because of the relatively small area accessible. Within present range are the Alaskan garrison, Western Canada to the Ontario border, and the west coast of the United States to Los Angeles. This area contains the uranium ore mine at Eldorado, the plutonium plant at Pasco, and the principal cities of Vancouver, Winnipeg, Regina, Seattle, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. This area in 1944 produced 10 percent of all airframes, 12 percent of all merchant shipping, 40 percent of the naval bases and shipyards, and 15 percent of oil, aviation petrol and synthetic rubber. Results of maximum implementation of Russian offensive capabilities at this time would be harassing but not decisive.

In 1948 a range increase to 4,000 miles will bring all of Canada and 98 percent of American industrial capacity within range of Russian bases. In addition to the areas listed above, these additional areas would become subject to attack: the North Atlantic industrial concentrations centering about Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Norfolk; the Great Lakes - Ohio River Valley - St Lawrence River Valley area from Pittsburg through Chicago and Detroit to Toronto and Montreal. Included in this area are the uranium ore refinery at Port Hope and the atomic explosives plants at Oak Ridge and Los Alamos. Maximum employment of Russian offensives capabilities at this time would not accomplish decisive damage to any important industry. However, serious damage to a limited number of them might be effected.

On the assumption that in 1952 Russia will have atomic weapons and aircraft with a 5000 mile range, the more logical targets will be combined urban-industrial areas rather than individual targets. A smothering attack upon the administrative centers of Ottawa and Washington might parallel a similar attack on the atom bomb plants, New York, Detroit-Windsor, Pittsburg, Chicago, Duluth, Montreal, Toronto, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. Bomb damage may be great, loss of life tremendous, war industry and administration might be paralyzed, and a decision in favour of Russia would be a definite possibility.

3. CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE RUSSIAN AIR ATTACKS AGAINST NORTH AMERICA

(a) Direction of Russian Air Attacks

From examination of a map of the Northern Hemisphere, it is at once obvious that the shortest approach to the North American Continent from Russia is via the Polar Cap. It is from this direction that the major air effort, including a missiles attack, would probably come. This would automatically involve Canada. Soviet capabilities are limited to two methods of offensive. The first is from bases on her Arctic frontier. She is firmly established at Uelen and Anadyr in N.E. Siberia. She has established meteorological stations and airfields across Siberia to Archangel. Considerable thought, money, and effort have been put into the development of her Arctic frontier. The other possible concept of attack would be to establish refueling points and bases down through Spitzbergen, Pearyland and the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.

(b) Present Capabilities of the Russian Air Force

Using the TU-2 and B2-4 on two way conventional missions from their present Arctic bases, the Russians would have only Alaska and bases in the extreme west Pacific within range. Suicide one-way missions could reach as far as the Ontario border and almost as far south as Los Angeles. The Pasco plutonium plant would be within range. It is doubtful that attacks of this type could really be damaging, even if complete surprise could be achieved. However, the possibility of such a campaign must not be discounted by accidental conceptions of expendability. For example, their crews might be trained in sabotage, espionage, and to perform services, such as joining subversive movements which would more than compensate them for the loss of material and manpower. An attack at the present would be harassing rather than serious.

(c) Future Capabilities of the Russian Air Force

Russia could be expected to establish bases and refueling points down through Spitzbergen, Pearyland and the Canadian Archipelago. Not only would these islands provide bases for Russia's Strategic Air Force, and the protection of it, but they could be used as bases from which to launch guided missiles against the heart of North America. It will be seen that Ellesmere Island is very nearly as close to Russia's main bases at Archangel as Ellesmere is from the civilized heart of Canada. Large airborne forces would be used to make the initial seizure of such bases.

Assuming that Russia by 1956 will have atomic weapons we can expect attack with guided missiles, rockets on aircraft launched from submarines, and very long range air bombardment of vulnerable areas in Canada and U.S. Russia will attempt to seize further objectives in the sub-arctic regions of Canada, Alaska, and Labrador for the establishment of further offensive bases. We can expect a smothering attack upon administration centers in Ottawa and Washington, together with attacks on atomic bomb plants, and the larger urban and manufacturing centers such as New York, Detroit-Windsor, Pittsburg, Chicago, Duluth, Montreal, Toronto, San Francisco, Los Angeles, etc.

Atomic bomb damage and loss of life would be tremendous. War industries and administration would be paralyzed and the North American Continent politically, industrially and economically might be rendered ineffective.

Top Secret

Document disclosed under the Access to Information Act
Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

PRESENT ORDER of BATTLE

16000 FRONT LINE AIRCRAFT

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REDUIT A SECRET

4350 BOMBERS

- ① ALL MODERN DESIGN
- ② INCLUDES 2000 TU-2's & ER-4 RANGE 3000 MILES
- ③ INCLUDES 3-5 B-29's
- ④ SEVERAL B-17's AND B-24's

7850 FIGHTERS

- ① NOT EQUAL TO PERFORMANCE OF NEWEST ALLIED
- ② COMPLETELY MODERN
- ③ LAG { IN 400 M.P.H. CLASS
YAK
MIG
- ④ SOME SPIT IX's P39, P40, P47, P63's

3800 GROUND ATTACK PLANES

- ① MOSTLY STORMOVIKS Ii-2 & Ii-10

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REDUIT A SECRET

NOTE - 82000 ALL TYPES AT END OF WAR - STORED RESERVE
18000 - AMERICAN 14000 (INCLUDING 2400 P-63's) BRITISH 4000

CIVIL AIR FLEET 5000 DOUGLAS TYPE TRANSPORTS

500 C47's

① CAPACITY 22

4500 L1-2 & P-84

① CAPACITY 15

NOTE - TOTAL LIFT CAPACITY 78,500 RADIUS 500-700 MILES

ESTIMATED PROGRESS

- ① THE B-29 COULD BE IN MASS PRODUCTION BY 1951
- ② TWO NEW 4-ENGINE BOMBERS IN PRODUCTION ER-6, Tu-4 WITH 5000 MILE RANGE 11000 LB. LOAD. BY 1948.
- ③ ESTIMATED CIVIL AIR FLEET PRODUCTION 1000 MONTHLY BY NEXT SEPT.
- ④ JET PROPELLED Ii-8 GROUND ATTACK 1/2 IN PRODUCTION THIS SUMMER.
- ⑤ STRATEGIC AIR FORCE LOCATED MOSCOW AREA UNDERGOING ALL PHASES IN STRATEGIC WARFARE.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REDUIT A SECRET

DISPOSITION OF THE AIR FORCES OF THE U.S.S.R.

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>Nº OF A/C</u>
<u>OUTSIDE U.S.S.R.</u>	
GERMANY	1100
BULGARIA	380
RUMANIA	1760
POLAND	3000
AUSTRIA	300
HUNGARY	450
MANCHURIA	400
KOREA	500
TOTAL OUTSIDE U.S.S.R.	<u>7890</u>

INSIDE U.S.S.R.

FAR EAST MD	750
MARITIME MD	450
TRANSBAIKAL-AMUR MD	550
BALTIC REGION	1500
N.WEST RUSSIA (WHITE SEA MD)	660
TRANSCAUCASUS	1100
TAURIC AND ODESSA MD's	900
TURKESTAN MD	250
MOSCOW-OMSK-STALINGRAD TRIANGLE	1250
NOVOSIBIRSK-KRASNOYARSK-IRKUTSK- "	700
TOTAL INSIDE U.S.S.R.	<u>8110</u>

GRAND TOTAL : 16000 A/C , 2000 ASSIGNED TO
THE RED NAVAL AIR FORCE.

PERSONNEL STRENGTH : 575000 OF WHICH
60000 ARE RED NAVAL AIR FORCE.

NOTE : These figures do not include the MVD
Air Force which is comprised of 400 A/c
and a personnel strength of 5000.

The MVD Air Force is used for border
patrol and for internal communications
of the MVD.

SECRET GUIDED MISSILES

REASON TO BELIEVE RUSSIA ABREAST
OF ALLIED NATIONS ON CURRENT DEVELOP-
MENT DUE TO :

- 1 Engaged in Guided Missile Re-
search early as 1941.
- 2 At present controls 50% German
guided missile scientific personnel.
- 3 Control of Pienemunde, Nordhasen,
Karlstagen, Leba and Breslau.
- 4 Research is and will be immune
from hostile attack due to :
(a) Coordination & dispersal of industry.
(b) Secrecy.

GUIDED MISSILES

V-1 BUZZ BOMB

1. 1 TON EXPLOSIVE
2. 4000'
3. 350 MPH
- 4.

V.2

1. 24000 LB TOTAL WT.
2. 60-70 MILES
3. 1000 M.P.H.

A.9 WITH A.10 PROP UNIT

1. 29000 LB
2. 3000 MILES
3. 5870 MPH

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
REDUIT A SECRET

Top Secret

ADDITIONAL CAPABILITIES BEGINNING ABOUT 1951

1. *Attack with guided missiles, rockets or aircraft launched from submarines.*
2. *Very long range air bombardment of vulnerable areas of the U.S.A. and Canada possibly with Atomic Bombs.*
3. *Seizure of objectives in the subarctic regions of Canada, Alaska or Labrador for purposes of:*
 - (a) *Launching attacks by Guided Missiles, rockets or aircraft against vulnerable areas or aerial minelaying in Coastal & inland waters.*
 - (b) *Launching airborne operations against vital strategic targets.*
4. *A smothering attack upon Administrative centres ~ Ottawa, Washington, together with similar attacks on the Atomic bomb plants, also on New York, Detroit - Windsor, Pittsburg, Chicago, Duluth, Montreal, Toronto, San Francisco and Los Angeles.*

~~~~~  
DOWNGRADED TO SECRET

REDUIT A SECRET

*Downgraded  
June 4/96*

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "C"

CAPABILITIES OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY

1. Soviet Army

(a) Present Strength

(i) On 1 July 1946 the estimated total strength of the ground forces of the U.S.S.R. was 4,000,000 distributed as follows:

|                     |                |
|---------------------|----------------|
| Finland             | 10,000         |
| Germany             | 600,000        |
| Poland              | 300,000        |
| Czechoslovakia      | 5,000          |
| Austria             | 75,000         |
| Hungary             | 50,000         |
| Yugoslavia          | 10,000         |
| Roumania            | 450,000        |
| Bulgaria            | 100,000        |
| Manchuria and Korea | <u>225,000</u> |

|                      |                  |
|----------------------|------------------|
| Total outside Russia | 1,825,000        |
| Total within Russia  | <u>2,175,000</u> |

GRAND TOTAL 4,000,000

This estimate can not be considered in any way firm as very little reliable evidence on the strength and movement or demobilisation of Russian forces has been received since the end of hostilities.

The various sources disagree within wide margins as to the strength of the Russian garrisons in such countries as Poland and Roumania and the figures we have accepted are based on arbitrary assumptions.

(ii) The strength and disposition of Russian forces within the U.S.S.R. are even more problematic than those in the occupied areas abroad. Transcaucasia is the only region about which information is available. It is estimated that a total of 230,000 troops are disposed there.

(iii) State of Training and Organization

There is considerable evidence that discipline throughout the Red Army is being tightened up, but so far there is no confirmation of rumours of a widespread shakeup in the high command of the Red Army.

The annual class which yields an estimated 1,500,000 recruits was called up as usual in 1945 and will undoubtedly be called to the colours in 1946. There is evidence that these recruits are receiving intensive training both at home and abroad on the basis of the lessons of the past war.

There is some evidence that considerable reorganization may be taking place in the establishments of Red Army formations, but so far essential details are lacking. It is probable, however, that the small armoured brigades have been replaced by armoured regiments which are now grouped into armoured divisions.

It is also probable that a greater proportion of infantry divisions have been motorized, giving the Red Army greater mobility than it had at the end of hostilities.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

002834



- 2 -

(iv) Weapons and Equipment

In the artillery field the Soviets are as far advanced as the Western Powers in high velocity guns, but at the moment are behind somewhat in the development of hollow charge shells. However, with expert German aid and captured German stocks they will in the very near future be at least as far advanced in this line as were the Germans.

As for V.T. fuses since huge stocks of these were left by the US forces in the possession of the French Army, there is every reason to believe that the Soviets are in possession of some if not all of the manufacturing secrets of this weapon.

In the heavy tank field it is known that at the end of hostilities the Soviets were as far advanced if not ahead of the Western Powers and there is no reason to believe that if they have not already done so, then in the very near future, they will have developed the light airborne armoured fighting vehicle to a very high degree.

It is believed that Russian industry will be able in the near future, if not now, to produce efficient copies of scientific implements of war received from the USA and the UK under Lend Lease such as radar and the more advanced models of communications equipment.

In the long range rockets and guided missiles field it is known that the Soviets are hard at work on research and it is believed that with the German knowledge they now have in their possession and with the aid of German scientists they have taken back to Russia from the Soviet occupied zones that in probably three years they will be able to produce these weapons in quantity capable of reaching targets at ranges up to 3000 miles.

Little is known of Russian progress in the field of biological warfare, however, USA and UK scientists learned so much about germ warfare during World War II that any enemy thinking about attacking this continent with B.W. is likely to consider what he would get in return.

As far as is known the USSR does not today possess the atomic bomb. However, it is believed that it may require 3 to 10 years for the USSR to produce atomic weapons because of the magnitude of the processing establishments required and special techniques used. The utilization of German scientists and German production facilities greatly enhances the Soviet capabilities to produce atomic power and weapons.

(v) Limiting Factors for Assault on North America Now

The USSR is at present capable of mobilising and equipping an army of 8 to 10,000,000 men. In weapons, equipment and training it would be equal to any army in the world today. However it would be well behind Anglo-American standards in mobility and it would lack the support of an efficient strategic air force and navy.

It would also lack the backing of the Atomic bomb and the immense superiority of the combined industrial capacity of the British Empire and the USA.

The Russian military resources would be undoubtedly sufficient for them to overrun the whole of Europe, except the UK, as well as the greater part of Asia. It is impossible to foresee how long such operations would take and what proportions of their ground forces would be available for operations against North America. However, it is amply clear that the limiting factor will not be man-power but air and naval power.

002835

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

- 3 -

The Red Army could accept casualties at the rate of about 1,500,000 per year without its size being seriously affected but it is probable that shortages with regard to certain vital war materials would develop within a year of the beginning of hostilities. This is particularly true of high octane petrol, explosives and rubber.

In view of this it is improbable that the Russians, within the next five years, could contemplate anything more than airborne commando raids aimed at pinning down the maximum American war potential in defence of North America and destroying vital targets.

(b) Future Strength

(i) Man-power

By 1956 Russia will have a military man-power pool of over at least 40 million men.

The trained reserves should amount to 20 million men.

(ii) Limiting Factors within 10 Years

From the point of view of resources of trained man-power, standards of training, equipment, weapons and supplies of munitions and other resources of war the USSR should possess within ten years a most formidable military machine with capabilities limited by factors which do not primarily concern the ground forces.

It is probable that by this time the Russians will have trained and equipped sufficient airborne forces for major operations even in North America.

2. OTHER FACTORS

(a) Russian Airborne Forces

(i) General

The Soviet Union was the first country in the world to develop an airborne arm and to accept the idea that parachutists could be employed on a large scale in modern warfare. Accordingly, the negligible use by the Red Army of parachute troops in an airborne role during World War II is surprising. The following factors provide a partial explanation:

(a) The necessity for using trained parachutists as elite infantry in a purely ground role at critical points in the war prior to 1944.

(b) the loss, prior to 1944, of trained or potential parachute personnel to other arms, particularly the infantry.

(c) the shortage of aircraft, which were needed for other purposes, and the inadequate training of aircrews, particularly in navigation. At no time during the World War II did the airborne arm have its own aircraft apart from a small training force.

The only major airborne operation undertaken by the Red Army (in the autumn of 1943) was a complete failure. By the time the lessons of this failure had been applied, and the above-mentioned deficiencies to some extent made good, the state of operations against the Germans did not warrant the use of parachute forces by the Red Army. Such troops were however used to occupy key points in the Far East during the short campaign against Japan.

002836



BEST AVAILABLE COPY

- 4 -

It is however important not to lose sight of the fact that a considerable proportion of the resources which might have been used for airborne operations by the Red Army (such as trained parachutists, trained saboteurs and transport aircraft) were in fact used by the Russians to reinforce and supply the large scale partisan movement.

(ii) Strength During Past War

In May 1941 the formation of several airborne corps was begun. These suffered heavily when being used as infantry in a ground role during the initial German offensive. Shortly after the German attack, Stalin ordered the creation of ten three-brigade airborne corps, which were completed about six months later. They received little training in parachute-jumping, since insufficient aircraft and parachutes were available. One of the difficulties of this period was that there were defects in the registration of the trained parachutists of pre-war days and, on general mobilisation, many had been called up for other arms of the service. The airborne forces thus lacked as large a nucleus of trained personnel as might have been expected. For the defence of Stalingrad (August 1942), these airborne corps were hastily converted into guards rifle and artillery formations, which suffered very heavy losses. To compensate for this conversion, further new airborne corps were immediately formed but they again were used as ground infantry in 1943 and were largely destroyed.

By this time, the majority of the airborne personnel had become infantry and were lost to the airborne arm. Only personnel who had happened to be in hospital and a few selected senior officers remained. These remnants were incorporated into new airborne brigades.

These new airborne brigades were called guards airborne brigades from the moment of their creation. The title of "guards" was not, as in the case of most other guards formation, earned as a battle honour. The first of some twenty such brigades was formed in April 1943 and the remainder came into existence by July of the same year. The personnel were at first mostly drawn from the 1924 and 1925 classes (i.e. aged 19 - 20) but the later brigades included personnel of the 1918 - 1923 classes. The officers were in many cases older.

Many of these brigades were still in existence at the end of World War II. The brigades appear to be independent and scanty reports suggesting a divisional organization of three brigades have for the present been discounted. The guards airborne brigades have since their formation been under the Supreme Commander of Airborne Forces.

Two guards airborne brigades took part in an airborne operation in September 43 which was part of a concerted attempt to force a crossing of the river Dniepr (known as the Kanev operation). The two brigades in question were wiped out and the operation failed completely. The Germans appreciated that this was due to the fact that the parachutists were too lightly armed and to the insufficient training of pilots and their lack of practice in cooperation with the parachutists.

The next time that airborne formations were used was in August 1945 for the virtually unopposed occupation of important places in Manchuria and Korea, and the disarming of the Japanese troops.

(iii) Airborne Troops in Partisan Warfare

It is known that during the war with Germany, the Soviet High Command made considerable use of parachutists as a means of reinforcing partisans. These operations ranged from the small groups of parachutist demolition specialists to the single recorded case of an entire brigade, which was dropped behind the German lines near Smolensk in the summer of 1941. Many of the personnel were in civilian

002837

clothes. The brigade cooperated in partisan warfare and sent information back to the Red Army by wireless. Some useful experience in the use of parachute troops was no doubt gained in this way by the Soviet High Command.

(iv) Parachutists in an Intelligence Role

Small parachutist reconnaissance units are normally attached to armies and fronts. Their duties include sabotage and espionage. They appear to have constituted a very important source of intelligence during World War II.

(v) Gliderborne Troops

No information is available about the existence or history of gliderborne troops, beyond the fact that two air regiments for glider training were thought to have existed in 1943. In theory, the Red Army probably contemplated the use of gliders mainly in order to supply a successful landing by parachute troops (The view of the German Commander-in-Chief is that there was little to fear from Russian paratroop gliders). It is however noteworthy that gliders did play a part in supplying the Partisan movement.

(vi) Political Factor

From its earliest history, personnel for the airborne arm have been selected only from politically reliable elements. The percentage of Communist party members amongst airborne personnel is very high in comparison with the rest of the Red Army.

(vii) Organization (See Appendix)

The guards airborne brigades are all under the control of the Supreme Commander of Airborne Troops. He has a Chief of Staff and a comprehensive staff, including representatives of other arms. The Deputy Chief of Staff is also Inspector-General of Airborne Troops.

The Supreme Commander of Airborne Troops also controls some air regiments for training purposes only. Aircraft for airborne operations have to be furnished by the tactical or strategical air forces or even by the civil air fleet.

Under the Supreme Commander of Airborne Troops are also a number of schools and practice areas.

(viii) Future Strength

It must be accepted that during the closing stages of the past war the Russians had organized and trained at least 20 Guards Airborne Brigades of 4,200 men each. Some of these formation were later dissipated in a ground role but the fact remains that over 80,000 men and a headquarters staff provide a formidable nucleus for building up airborne forces.

The limiting factors will be organizational ability in the field of training, supplying and maintaining large airborne forces over considerable distances rather than any shortage of man-power, specialized equipment, aircraft or weapons.

(b) Russian Industrial Potential

In gauging Russian military capabilities in any war involving world domination it is essential to take into account the relative industrial potential of the USSR and other leading powers.



BEST AVAILABLE COPY

- 6 -

Below in tabular form are shown the relative production figures of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the USSR. The goals set by Stalin for the Five Year Plan are shown under the year 1950 for the USSR.

| Production<br>in millions<br>of tons | U.S.A. | U.K.         | U.S.S.R. |      |
|--------------------------------------|--------|--------------|----------|------|
|                                      | 1941   | 1941         | 1941     | 1950 |
| Coal                                 | 556.6  | 206          | 191      | 250  |
| Pig Iron                             | 50     | 7            | 18       | 19   |
| Steel                                | 73     | 12           | 22       | 25   |
| Oil                                  | 229.8  | 12.5(Empire) | 38       | 35   |

From these figures it is evident that even without including the other members of the British Commonwealth or possible Allied powers, the USA and UK together are overwhelmingly superior in industrial potential.

Furthermore, not only are the Soviet goals for their industry in 1950 very modest but indicate a definitely pessimistic outlook for their oil industry. It is also well to bear in mind that the goals set in a five-year plan usually indicate a maximum which is seldom achieved in practice.

With regard to production of weapons the Russians reached extraordinary volume during the past war, but this was achieved at considerable strain and sacrifice to the civilian population.

Thus tanks were produced at the rate of over 2,500 per month and guns at the rate of 10,000 of all calibres.

Within ten years the Russians will probably have overcome such bottle-necks as shortage of explosives, synthetic rubber, and high-octane petrol.

(c) Canadian - American Vulnerability

(i) Present Position

In view of all the evidence available it is clear that at the present time and for at least the next five years the Russians will have neither the industrial war potential or the technical means for assaulting the North American Continent in force and transporting and maintaining large armies on this continent.

However the Russians have available sufficient airborne forces and may be technically capable of sending raiding parties in sufficient strength to seize and hold temporarily advance bases in the Arctic area or such targets as the Radium and Uranium mines on Great Bear Lake.

(ii) Future Position

Within ten years the USSR may have available from 2 to 4 million men trained in airborne operations and have the technical facilities to transport such forces by air and water.

But it is obvious that before the Russians could hope to deploy such vast forces they would have had to penetrate and secure a base for operations as far south as the northern prairies in Alberta and Saskatchewan, the open country immediately north of Winnipeg or the agricultural and industrial area of southern Ontario and Quebec.

To achieve such deep penetration one or more of the following

002839

factors must obtain:

- (a) Overwhelming Russian superiority in the air.
- (b) Complete strategic surprise which would have drawn away a large proportion of the American war potential to another theatre or caught N. America completely off guard.
- (c) A successful Fifth Column which would interfere effectively with N. American mobilization plans and war production.

Conclusions

In examining Soviet capabilities for assaulting the North American Continent, even though one must recognize the inadequate state of our information, it is quite clear that Russian limitations will not lie in the sphere of available man-power or ground forces but in such factors as industrial war potential for a long-drawn out war, scientific and technical achievement and transport organization by sea and air.

At the present time and in the next five years the Red Army is probably capable of over-running the whole of Europe, excluding the UK and almost any part of Asia, but it could not hope to achieve more than a few commando raids in the Arctic areas of this continent.

After 1950 and in the foreseeable future the Russians might be capable of carrying out more serious air-borne operations if they can secure sufficient advance bases. But unless they make some spectacular advance in the science of war, more destructive than the atomic bomb, or succeed in undermining the political stability of this continent, the Russians will not be in a position to engage in an active struggle for world domination due to the serious disproportion in their industrial capacity which can not be materially altered in the foreseeable future.



BEST AVAILABLE COPY

GUARDS AIRBORNE BDE (4200 men approx)

HQ (169 men)  
HQ Pl (3 LMGs)  
Gas Def Pl  
Music Pl

MC Recce Coy  
(116 or 160 men)  
(9 LMGs)

Para Bn

Para Bn  
(699 men)

Para Bn

Tk Bn  
(presence un-  
confirmed - org  
and str unknown)

Arty Bn  
(250 men)

Para A tk Bn

AA Bn  
(170 men)

Sigs Coy  
(62 men)

Engr Coy  
(79 men)

Services  
(incl wksp)

Bn HQ  
HQ Pl (3 LMGs)

Tp  
(each 4 x 76mm  
guns)

Mortar  
Pl  
(4 x 120mm  
mortars)

Coy Coy Tp  
(each 12 x 12.7mm AA MGs) (4 x 37mm AA guns)

Tp Tp Tp Tp A tk Rifle  
(each 4 x 45mm A tk guns) Coy  
(18 A tk rifles)

Rifle Coy  
(each 9 LMGs and 3 x 50mm mortars)

Rifle  
Pl

Rifle  
Pl

Rifle Coy  
Pl

MMG Coy  
(12 MMGs)  
Pl

Mortar Coy  
(6 x 82mm  
mortars)  
Pl

A tk Rifle  
Coy  
(27 A tk  
rifles)

Sigs Pl

Med Pl

pl pl pl  
(each 2 x 82mm mortars)

Allotment of Weapons

8 x 76 mm guns  
4 x 120 mm mortars  
24 x 82 mm mortars  
36 x 52 mm mortars  
16 x 45 mm A tk guns  
4 AA guns  
48 MMGs  
132 LMGs  
24 x 12.7 mm AAMGs  
126 A tk rifles  
1116 sub-MGs

Miscellaneous Eqpt

2 cars  
11 trucks  
5 MCs  
40 bicycles  
approx 4500 paras  
approx 1000 containers

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "D"

THREAT TO INTERNAL SECURITY

1. FACTORS

- (a) Communism is international and knows no boundaries of creed or religion.
- (b) As the only world power under this system of government, Russia dominates the policy of the International Communist Party.
- (c) In turn, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union dominates Russia. It is the State Party and the controlling organ of the country as all matters of national policy must have the approval of the Political Bureau of the Party before being passed to government machinery for attention.
- (d) Communism is found in Canada. The following figures as to strength are considered substantially accurate:

|      |                                                          |                  |
|------|----------------------------------------------------------|------------------|
| 1939 | Communist Party statement of strength                    | 18,000           |
| 1939 | Satellite organizations                                  | 41,000           |
| 1939 | Estimate of sympathizers on basis of 10 per Party member | 180,000          |
| 1946 | LPP Estimate Strength of membership                      | 16,000 to 18,000 |

The Labour Progressive Party is by its own public avowal Communist in doctrine and intention.

(e) The influence of the Communist Party must not be judged by numbers alone as on account of their political experience and methods its leaders exercise more power than indicated by their numerical strength.

(f) The practice of the Communist Party and its satellite organizations is to infiltrate leaders into positions of prominence in bona fide and sincere organizations, such as youth movements, study clubs, labour unions and the Canadian Legion, then to gradually attempt to sway the policy of such organizations along Party lines or to Party objectives. Prominent and patriotic people frequently lend their support unknowingly to a project that is subject to Communist influence and has a camouflaged but well-defined Communist objective. This practice has been and is being followed in Canada.

2. CONCLUSIONS

- (a) The plans and policies of international Communism are the plans and policies of the Soviet Union and vice versa.
- (b) Soviet Russia already has an active Fifth Column in this country which in the event of hostilities could and would be used immediately to influence political thought, to create unrest and internal dissension, to foster espionage and sabotage, and by every means in its power to advance the cause of the Soviet and of international Communism.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER  
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM,  
Earncliffe,  
OTTAWA.

1054/6

23rd July, 1946.

My dear Acting Prime Minister,

In my letter to the Prime Minister of the 28th June I forwarded to him a copy of a paper prepared by the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee in the United Kingdom on Russia's strategic interests and intentions in the Middle East. I now enclose a copy of a further paper on the same subject; this is the first of a series of monthly reviews of the conclusions of the paper enclosed in my letter to Mr. Mackenzie King.

Mr. Attlee was anxious that the Prime Minister should have this for his secret information. I have been asked to mention again that the paper is a staff appreciation and not a statement of Government policy but to say that extreme secrecy of the document would seem to justify exceptional security precautions.

Yours sincerely,

*W. L. Mackenzie King*

The Right Honourable L.S. St. Laurent, K.C., M.P.,  
Acting Prime Minister,  
Ottawa.

LM

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~  
CSC 7-9

14 June 46

USSR  
Disallous

Secretary,  
Joint Intelligence Committee.

Russian troop movements in south-east Europe  
and Persia

1. I enclose herewith a British J.I.C. paper on Russian troop movements in south-east Europe and Persia which has been received from the Canadian Joint Staff Mission, London, under arrangements for the exchange of J.I.C. papers set out in the Mission's message CJSN 82, dated 21 May 46.
2. I am informed that this particular paper is being reviewed by the British J.I.C. regularly and further papers will be forwarded from time to time as they are received.
3. Should the Joint Intelligence Committee deem it advisable to bring the contents of this paper to the attention of the Chiefs of Staff, I would request that this might be done by each Service independently.

(Sgd.) J. W. C. Barclay

(J.W.C. Barclay)

A/Lt. Cdr. (S) R.C.N.,

Secretary,

Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Att.

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET  
REDUIT A SECRET