

1950-4 PT2

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

NAVY

SECURITY
RELEASE & EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION
POLICY

Retrospect
DORMANT

FOR CROSS REFERENCES SEE INSIDE COVER

NSS: 1950-4 VOL. 2

ROUTING				P.A. & B.F. ENTRIES				REGISTRY ONLY	
REFERRED	REMARKS	DATE OF PASS	INITIALS	DATE OF P.A.	INITIALS	DATE OF B.F.	CANCEL B.F.	DATE RECEIVED	INSPECTED
CR	PA Dormant			21/2/62	RB			FEB 22 1962	
DNI Security	PER REQUEST CR DEC - 3 1963								
CR	PA DORMANT			18.12.65	SB				
D Security	PER REQUEST CR JAN 7 - 1965								
RMD	Dormant Navy			7/12/69	VM				

PARC# AP 635

"B.F." - DO NOT HOLD - THIS FILE WHEN LAPSES IN ACTION MAY EXCEED 48 HOURS

CR 118
M-54 (7798)
15 CR-118

XI. Q. NSS. 1950-4 VOL. 2

DEAD

VOLUME **3** FOLLOWS

NO FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE TO BE PLACED ON THIS FILE



IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE
CSC 8-1
NO.

Department of National Defence

TOP SECRET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
CABINET SECRETARIAT OFFICES,
EAST BLOCK, OTTAWA

28th November, 1949.

C.G.S.
C.A.S.
C.H.S.
C.D.R.B.

Disclosure of Information to Other Countries

1. Reference memorandum CSC 8-1 of 23rd November.
2. At the request of the Chief of the Air Staff, who would prefer not to comment on this subject at this time, this matter will be included on the Agenda of the 455th meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, date to be notified later.

for (J.D.B. Smith)
Brigadier,
Secretary.

VWH:JH

TOP SECRET

NSIS 11560-2 (CHS)

28th November 1949.

**SECRETARY
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE**

**Disclosure of Information to
Other Countries**

With reference to your CSC 8-1 of
23rd November, 1949, I concur with the memorandum from
the Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee.

Despatched by
N. Sec.
.....
Date 28-11-49
Time


CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF.

~~TOP SECRET~~
Classification

C.C. 8-1 of 23/11/49
Reference

URGENT - BY HAND

CHIEFS OF STAFF CTE
~~DEFENCE COUNCIL~~
~~CABINET DEFENCE CTE~~

- VCNS
- ⑤ ACNS (AM - 28/11)
- DWT
- DNA
- D.N.Com
- DSS
- DNPO
- ① DNI (H)
- CNP
- DCNP
- DNR
- CNTS
- A/CNTS (W. & S)
- A/CNTS (Ships)
- A/CNTS (Air)
- DGFA
- DGNO
- SA/CNS

Request your comments hereon for C.N.S. please,
and return to Room 3316 by AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

[Signature]
NAVAL SECRETARY

Date 24/11/49.....

Recommend approval of Chiefs of Staff
Committee on the two attached papers.

2. Attached to the fly leaf is draft copy
of R.C.N. amendment to C.B.O. Form U2D(5)
(1948) Paragraph 65A which will include all
the information contained in these two
papers for the guidance of Commanding
Officers, H.M.C. Ships.

[Signature]
(L.L. Atwood)
Commander, R.C.N.,
D.N.I.

25.11.49.

ASSISTANT CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF
NOV 25 1949
[Signature]

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

CSC 8-1

NO.

TOP SECRET

Department of National Defence

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE


OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
CABINET SECRETARIAT OFFICES,
EAST BLOCK, OTTAWA

23rd November, 1949.

C.G.S.
C.A.S.
C.N.S. ✓
C.D.R.B.

Disclosure of Information to Other Countries

1. Enclosed is copy of a self-explanatory memorandum from the Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee, together with enclosures.
2. May I be advised, please, of your concurrence or remarks in this connection.


(J.D.B. Smith)
Brigadier,
Secretary.

CSC 14-2-1

~~TOP SECRET~~

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

November 22nd, 1949.

The Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Disclosure of Information
to Other Countries

1. I send you herewith copies of the following documents:
 - (a) A paper entitled "Disclosure of Information to Other Countries".
 - (b) A paper entitled "Release of Information to Commonwealth Countries".
2. The former has been approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee who recommended that it be approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee and be forwarded to the Security Panel for their consideration.
3. Since the latter paper is a review of the present practices employed by the individual Services and the Defence Research Board with respect to the release of information to Commonwealth countries, it need only be noted by the Chiefs of Staff Committee at this time. Its object was to achieve a uniform practice amongst the three Services and it was prepared as a separate paper because the Joint Intelligence Committee did not consider it advisable to include any reference to Commonwealth countries in the former paper.
4. I should be grateful if you would include this matter on the agenda for the next meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

(G.H. Newsome)
Wing Commander, R.C.A.F.,
Secretary.

Enc.

TOP SECRET

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

GENERAL

1. The policy described hereunder should be observed with regard to the disclosure of information to other governments, or their representatives, whether civilian or military. It should be borne in mind, however, that, under this policy, information will only be disclosed when appropriate authority has been obtained for such disclosure. The policy in no way relieves officials of their obligations under the Official Secrets Act.

DEFINITION

2. The term "information" is taken to refer to information which is the property of or the primary concern of the Canadian Government. It covers:

- (a) Information - that is to say knowledge of Canadian forces, equipment, research and development, etc. This is further sub-divided into:
 - (i) Scientific information, when this has resulted from fundamental research and development carried out under government auspices or which is allotted a security classification.
 - (ii) Technical information about equipment, manufacturing processes and operational technique.
 - (iii) Non-technical information, such as orders of battle, strengths, locations, operations, training methods, plans, organization and publications.
- (b) Intelligence - that is to say knowledge of foreign countries in all the fields listed in (a) above, possessed by Canada.

CATEGORIZATION OF NATIONS FOR DISCLOSURE PURPOSES

3. In the light of the above, a standard policy has been prepared by which foreign nations are categorized as described below for disclosure purposes. (See Appendix "A" attached) In each of the first four categories, foreign nations may receive, at the discretion of the Canadian Government, information up to and including classification for that category.

Category 1 - Nations who may be given up to and including Top Secret military information.

Category 2 - Nations who, though normally given no higher information than Confidential, may, in the interests of Canadian strategic policy, receive information up to and including Top Secret under special security arrangements such as those devised for the North Atlantic Treaty.

Category 3 - Nations who may be given up to and including Confidential information.

Category 4 - Nations who may be given up to and including Restricted information.

Category 5 - Nations who must be given no classified information except as necessary to ensure reciprocal treatment for Service Attaches, Missions, etc., and never higher than Restricted.

It is emphasized that the rules for disclosure of classified information under each of the categories are permissive. No nation should be given any information unless Canada thereby derives some political, military or economic benefits.

RECIPROCITY

5. It is important that the disclosure of information shall be on a reciprocal basis. With some nations Canadian relations are so close that reciprocity is implicit, while other nations may have nothing to offer that Canada needs, though it may, for instance, be possible to ask for "intelligence" in exchange for "equipment". With the low category nations, reciprocity is essential as a weapon should it be desired to stave off an awkward request by making a counter-request known to be impossible of fulfilment. The counter-request need not necessarily be confined to the requirements of one department. It is considered that the reciprocity rule should be maintained. The responsibility for applying the principles of reciprocity will be assumed by departmental security officers who will, if in doubt, consult the Joint Intelligence Committee or the Security Panel.

INDUSTRIAL PATENTS

6. In order to safeguard industrial interests, information of concern to manufacturers, whether government-owned or privately-owned, will be dealt with in the following manner:

- (a) Wholly Patentable, i.e., the whole of the information can be protected by a patent specification.

If secret, consideration will be given to the possibility of acquiring a secret patent in Canada and disclosure to a foreign government should, as far as possible, be made on the following conditions:

That the information is kept secret and the government of that country will grant to Canada, on request, patent protection of suitable priority.

If not secret, i.e., such that publication in a patent specification is permissible, no problem arises. Government-owned inventions should be examined to see whether foreign patents should be obtained and exploited. In the case of privately-owned inventions, the recipient government should be referred to the owner to negotiate terms.

- (b) Wholly Unpatentable, i.e., the information, while commercially valuable, is not of the kind which can be protected by a patent specification.

Government-owned information should only be supplied if a quid pro quo is obtained - strategic, political or commercial - worth the value of the information.

In the case of privately-owned information, the foreign government should merely be put in touch with the owner, but if the nature of the information is secret, the owner should be warned that he should communicate the information only to accredited representatives of the foreign government who are pledged to maintain secrecy.

- (c) Partly Patentable and Partly Unpatentable. The only important case is where the information as a whole is secret and unpatentable, e.g., the layout, dimensions and specification of an aero engine, while some parts are patentable and may be patented without fear of disclosing the general design, e.g., a magneto.

The patented and unpatented parts should be treated separately as in (a) and (b) above but, in the case of privately-owned patentable information, care should be taken to inspect any patent applications before they are filed in the foreign country by the owner, to make sure that they do not disclose any secret information.

- (d) Departments which are negotiating with foreign governments for the communication to them of information of commercial value may, depending upon the particular circumstances, decide to carry out the negotiations themselves and may lay down the terms upon which the information may be used by those governments, or they may decide to entrust the negotiations, under suitable conditions, to private firms or individuals.

CONDITIONS FOR DISCLOSURE

7. The following conditions should be laid down and agreed to by all nations to whom information is disclosed:

- (a) The information received should be safeguarded under substantially the same rules of security as the Canadian authorities themselves impose.
- (b) The information is disclosed only for the use of the recipient government and such of its contractors, under seal of secrecy, as it may notify to the Canadian Government in writing. Disclosure to any other government or publication to the press or in any other way, would constitute a breach of the agreement.

November 18th, 1949.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

CATEGORIZATION OF FOREIGN NATIONS

1. Foreign nations have been placed in the following categories for the purpose of receiving information:

Category 1 - Nations who may be given up to and including Top Secret information:

United States of America.

Category 2 - Nations who, though normally given no higher information than Confidential, may, in the interest of Canadian strategic policy, receive information up to and including Top Secret under special security arrangements such as those devised for the North Atlantic Treaty:

Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal.

Category 3 - Nations who may be given up to and including Confidential information:

Greece, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey.

Category 4 - Nations who may be given up to and including Restricted information:

All foreign nations not included in the other four categories.

Category 5 - Nations who must be given no classified information except as necessary to ensure reciprocal treatment for Service Attaches, Missions, etc., and in no case higher than Restricted:

The Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Roumania and Yugoslavia.

TOP SECRET

RELEASE OF INFORMATION TO COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES

1. The Joint Intelligence Committee has recently prepared for the concurrence of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and subsequent consideration by the Interdepartmental Security Panel a paper setting out the policy for the disclosure of information to foreign countries. It was not considered advisable to make reference in that paper to the countries of the British Commonwealth, and these now form the subject of this paper.

2. United Kingdom policy, which has heretofore had considerable influence on Canadian practice in these matters, has undergone a change in recent months. Whereas in 1946 the British paper on the subject stated that the Commonwealth countries were all eligible to receive up to TOP SECRET information, a recent revision of the British paper omits all reference to the Commonwealth. The considerations preventing the British from making any declaration of policy which would differentiate between the various countries of the Commonwealth in matters of security are also applicable to the Canadian Government. It is inopportune therefore to seek an expression of government policy on this matter at the present time.

3. Nevertheless, the Armed Services and the Defence Research Board are having to deal with an increasing number of requests from Commonwealth countries to release information and equipment. The Joint Intelligence Committee has, therefore, reviewed the practices of the individual Services in dealing with such requests so that uniformity and consistency can be ensured. Paragraph 4 sets out the findings of the Joint Intelligence Committee, and while there is no immediate necessity for this procedure to be approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, it was considered desirable that the Chiefs of Staff should be aware of the practice which is generally being followed.

4. (a) United Kingdom

Classified information up to and including TOP SECRET is being released to the United Kingdom in accordance with the close military liaison which has always existed with that country. Procedures for clearing such information are those normally applicable under the "need to know" principle and no special safeguards are applied.

O.K.

(b) Other Countries of the Commonwealth

Information up to and including CONFIDENTIAL is being released on a "need to know" basis, subject to evaluation in each case as to the actual benefit, direct or indirect, to be derived by Canada as a result. Information classified SECRET or TOP SECRET is not normally being released to these countries, but should it be considered desirable each case would be considered on its merits and would require the approval of the Chief of Staff of the Service concerned. All information released to these countries is first cleared with the appropriate Directorate of Intelligence.

O.K.

(c) The foregoing takes into account and observes all existing regulations governing security, including recognition of our obligation not to disclose to a third power information received from a second power without the consent of the latter.

November 18th, 1949.

000225

...Top... SECRET...
Classification

...C.C. 8-1 of 6/9/49...
Reference

URGENT - BY HAND

CHIEFS OF STAFF CTE
~~DEFENCE COUNCIL~~
~~CABINET DEFENCE CTE~~

- VCNS
- ACNS / *(Plaus)* Absent on duty until 10 Sep.
- DWT
- DNA
- D.N.Com
- DSS
- DNPO / *[Signature]*
- DNI / *[Signature]*
- CNP
- DCNP
- DNR
- CNTS
- A/CNTS (W. & S)
- A/CNTS (Ships)
- A/CNTS (Air)
- DGFA
- DGNO
- SA/CNS

Request your comments hereon for C.N.S. please,
and return to Room 3316 ~~by~~ AS SOON AS POSSIBLE

[Signature]
for
NAVAL SECRETARY

Date 8/9/49.....

Refer to Para 4(b). This is not practicable in the R.C.N as Commanding Officer of H.M.C. Ships may be in Commonwealth Ports. It is undesirable to restrict C.O.s to requesting authority from C.N.S. Recommend present paper and that R.C.N continue its present practice of releasing information in accordance with U 2 D which prohibits release of T.S. material to ^{NGW} New Commonwealth nations.

[Signature]
L.P.N.P.O.

[Signature]
D.N.

FILE NO. CSC 8-1

TOP SECRET

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
CABINET SECRETARIAT OFFICES,
EAST BLOCK.

DATE: 6th September, 1949.

MEMORANDUM TO: C.G.S.
C.A.S.
C.N.S. ✓
C.D.R.B.


SUBJECT: Release of Information to
Commonwealth Countries

Referred to...	<i>Staff</i>
SEP 7 1949	
File No.	<i>TS 71570-2</i>
Chg'd to	<i>Staff 2:14</i>

I. The following document concerning the above mentioned subject is forwarded herewith:

Memorandum CSC 14-2-1 of 22nd August, 1949,
from Acting Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee.

2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the next meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Committee to be held -----


(J.D.B. Smith)
Brigadier,
Secretary.

Encl.

CSC 14-2-1

TOP SECRET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

August 22nd, 1949.

The Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Release of Information to Commonwealth Countries

1. The categorization of Commonwealth countries, with respect to the disclosure of classified information, has been considered by the Joint Intelligence Committee and the attached paper setting out principles presently followed in dealing with Commonwealth countries has been approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee for consideration by the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

E.F. Gaskell,
Acting Secretary.

Enc.

TOP SECRET

Release of Information to Commonwealth Countries

1. The Joint Intelligence Committee has recently prepared for the concurrence of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and subsequent consideration by the Interdepartmental Security Panel a paper setting out the policy for the disclosure of information to foreign countries. It was not considered advisable to make reference in that paper to the countries of the British Commonwealth, and these now form the subject of this memorandum.

2. United Kingdom policy, which has heretofore had considerable influence on Canadian practice in these matters, has undergone a change in recent months. Whereas in 1946 the British paper on the subject stated that the Commonwealth countries were all eligible to receive up to TOP SECRET information, a recent revision of the British paper omits all reference to the Commonwealth. The considerations preventing the British from making any declaration of policy which would differentiate between the various countries of the Commonwealth in matters of security are also applicable to the Canadian Government. It is inopportune therefore to seek an expression of Government policy on this matter at the present time.

3. Nevertheless, the Armed Services and the Defence Research Board are having to deal with an increasing number of requests from Commonwealth countries to release information and equipment. The Joint Intelligence Committee has, therefore, reviewed the practices of the individual Services in dealing with such requests so that uniformity and consistency can be ensured. Paragraph 4 sets out the findings of the Joint Intelligence Committee, and while there is no immediate necessity for this procedure to be approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, it was considered desirable that the Chiefs of Staff should be aware of the practice which is generally being followed.

4. (a) United Kingdom

Classified information up to and including TOP SECRET is being released to the United Kingdom in accordance with the close military liaison which has always existed with that country. Procedures for clearing such information are those normally applicable under the "need to know" principle and no special safeguards are applied.

(b) Other Countries of the Commonwealth

Information up to and including CONFIDENTIAL is being released on a "need to know" basis, subject to evaluation in each case as to the actual benefit, direct or indirect, to be derived by Canada as a result. Information classified SECRET or TOP SECRET is not normally being released to these countries, but should it be considered desirable each case would be considered on its merits and would require the approval of the Chief of Staff of the Service concerned. All information released to these countries is first cleared with the appropriate Directorate of Intelligence.

(c) The foregoing takes into account and observes all existing regulations governing security, including recognition of our obligation not to disclose to a third power information received from a second power without the consent of the latter.

August 22nd, 1949.

000229

File No. CSC 14-2-1

TOP SECRET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Privy Council Office,
East Block.

Date: August 22nd, 1949.

MEMORANDUM TO: G.G. Crean, Esquire,
Department of External Affairs.
> D.N.I.
D.M.I.
D.I.A.
D.Sc.I. - D.R.B.
D.C.I. - R.C.M.P.
Director, Joint Intelligence Bureau.

Subject: Release of Information to
Commonwealth Countries

I enclose herewith for your information and retention the following:

Letter to the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, from the Secretary, J.I.C., (with attachment) on the above subject.

(F.W.T. Lucas)
Commander, R.C.N.,
Secretary.

Enc.

Referred to <i>Staff</i>
AUG 26 1949
File <i>1/556-9</i>
Closed to.....

C O P Y

CSC 14-2-1

TOP SECRET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

August 22nd, 1949.

The Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Release of Information to Commonwealth Countries

1. The categorization of Commonwealth countries, with respect to the disclosure of classified information, has been considered by the Joint Intelligence Committee and the attached paper setting out principles presently followed in dealing with Commonwealth countries has been approved by the Joint Intelligence Committee for consideration by the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

E.F. Gaskell,
Acting Secretary.

Enc.

TOP SECRET

Release of Information to Commonwealth Countries

1. The Joint Intelligence Committee has recently prepared for the concurrence of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and subsequent consideration by the Interdepartmental Security Panel a paper setting out the policy for the disclosure of information to foreign countries. It was not considered advisable to make reference in that paper to the countries of the British Commonwealth, and these now form the subject of this memorandum.

2. United Kingdom policy, which has heretofore had considerable influence on Canadian practice in these matters, has undergone a change in recent months. Whereas in 1946 the British paper on the subject stated that the Commonwealth countries were all eligible to receive up to TOP SECRET information, a recent revision of the British paper omits all reference to the Commonwealth. The considerations preventing the British from making any declaration of policy which would differentiate between the various countries of the Commonwealth in matters of security are also applicable to the Canadian Government. It is inopportune therefore to seek an expression of Government policy on this matter at the present time.

3. Nevertheless, the Armed Services and the Defence Research Board are having to deal with an increasing number of requests from Commonwealth countries to release information and equipment. The Joint Intelligence Committee has, therefore, reviewed the practices of the individual Services in dealing with such requests so that uniformity and consistency can be ensured. Paragraph 4 sets out the findings of the Joint Intelligence Committee, and while there is no immediate necessity for this procedure to be approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, it was considered desirable that the Chiefs of Staff should be aware of the practice which is generally being followed.

4. (a) United Kingdom

Classified information up to and including TOP SECRET is being released to the United Kingdom in accordance with the close military liaison which has always existed with that country. Procedures for clearing such information are those normally applicable under the "need to know" principle and no special safeguards are applied.

(b) Other Countries of the Commonwealth

Information up to and including CONFIDENTIAL is being released on a "need to know" basis, subject to evaluation in each case as to the actual benefit, direct or indirect, to be derived by Canada as a result. Information classified SECRET or TOP SECRET is not normally being released to these countries, but should it be considered desirable each case would be considered on its merits and would require the approval of the Chief of Staff of the Service concerned. All information released to these countries is first cleared with the appropriate Directorate of Intelligence.

(c) The foregoing takes into account and observes all existing regulations governing security, including recognition of our obligation not to disclose to a third power information received from a second power without the consent of the latter.

August 22nd, 1949.

000232

File No. **CSC 14-2-1**

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Privy Council Office,
East Block.

Date: **26 July 1949**

Referred to *Staff*
AUG 15 1949
File No. *TS 11559-2*
Chg'd to *Staff*

MEMORANDUM TO: G.G. Crean, Esquire,
Department of External Affairs
D.N.I. —
D.M.I.
D.I.A.
D.Sc.I. - D.R.B.
D.C.I. - R.C.M.P.
Director, Joint Intelligence Bureau.

Subject: **Release of information to Commonwealth countries**

I enclose herewith for your information and retention the following:

Memorandum prepared by D.M.I., File HQS TS 711-0 (MI-4) dated 25 July 1949, in accordance with the decision contained in para. 19(b) under Item 39 in the minutes of the 204th meeting of the JIC, held on 29th June, 1949.

This item will be included on the agenda for discussion at the next regular meeting of the JIC.

E.F. Gaskell
(~~E. W. T. Lucas~~)
~~Commander, R.C.M.P.~~
Secretary.

COPY

TOP SECRET

HQTS 711-C (MI-4)

OTTAWA, 25 Jul 49

Release of Information to Commonwealth Countries

1 The Joint Intelligence Committee has recently prepared for the concurrence of the Chiefs of Staff Committee and subsequent consideration by the Interdepartmental Security Panel a paper setting out the policy for the disclosure of information to foreign countries. It was not considered advisable to make reference in that paper to the countries of the British Commonwealth, and these now form the subject of this memorandum.

2 UK policy, which has heretofore had considerable influence on Canadian practice in these matters, has undergone a change in recent months. Whereas in 1946 the British paper on the subject stated that the Commonwealth countries were all eligible to receive up to TOP SECRET information, a recent revision of the British paper omits all reference to the Commonwealth. The considerations preventing the British from making any declaration of policy which would differentiate between the various countries of the Commonwealth in matters of security are also applicable to the Canadian Government. It is inopportune therefore to seek an expression of Government policy on this matter at the present time.

3 Nevertheless, the Armed Services and the Defence Research Board are having to deal with an increasing number of requests from Commonwealth countries to release information and equipment. The Joint Intelligence Committee has, therefore, reviewed the practices of the individual Services in dealing with such requests so that uniformity and consistency can be ensured. Paragraph 4 sets out the findings of the Joint Intelligence Committee, and while there is no immediate necessity for this procedure to be approved by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, it was considered desirable that the Chiefs of Staff should be aware of the practice which is generally being followed.

4 (a) UK

Classified information up to and including TOP SECRET is being released to the UK in accordance with the close military liaison which has always existed with that country. Procedures for clearing such information are those normally applicable under the "need to know" principle and no special safeguards are applied.

- 2 -

(b) Other countries of the Commonwealth

Information up to and including CONFIDENTIAL is being released on a "need to know" basis, subject to evaluation in each case as to the actual benefit, direct or indirect, to be derived by Canada as a result. Information classified SECRET or TOP SECRET is not normally being released to these countries, but it should be considered desirable each case would be considered on its merits and would require the approval of the Chief of Staff of the Service concerned. All information released to these countries is first cleared with the appropriate Directorate of Intelligence.

(c) The foregoing takes into account and observes all existing regulations governing security, including recognition of our obligation not to disclose to a third power information received from a second power without the consent of the latter.

5 Any additional points which appear important to the Chiefs of Staff would be appreciated.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY
PANEL
DOCUMENT

SP-44

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECURITY PANEL:

Exchange of information with foreign
countries: U.S.S.R. and satellites

1. In a letter dated June 1, 1949, addressed to the Chairman, Security Panel, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs expressed concern at the volume of official information which is going from Canada to countries dominated by the U.S.S.R. and to the Soviet Union itself. It was pointed out that this exchange involves possible dangers from the point of view of security and that no serious attempt is being made to withhold information that Canada might give as a quid pro quo in exchange for information from the U.S.S.R. and satellite countries.
2. In the past, other departments have been requested to send all exchanges of information with the U.S.S.R. and satellite countries through the Department of External Affairs, in order that an estimate of the volume and nature of official information being sent to those countries might be made. On balance, the exchange of information with these countries has been one-sided, and it would appear desirable to place future exchanges on a reciprocal basis.
3. While External Affairs is in a position to deal with the problem of organizing these exchanges on a reciprocal basis, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs has suggested that his department should not be made ultimately responsible for dealing with the security aspects of all proposed exchanges. It has been suggested that it might be appropriate to refer all doubtful cases to the Secretary of the Security Panel, who would then consult those members of the Panel who might be particularly interested, or, if the importance of the request warranted it, the matter at issue could be brought before a meeting of the Panel.
4. There would appear to be no great difficulty in implementing the proposed procedure insofar as the Security Panel is concerned, but as the question concerns other departments, and as some procedural questions are apt to arise, it would appear desirable to have the matter thoroughly canvassed by members of the Panel before any procedures are adopted.
5. It has also been suggested that a compilation of material going forward from Canadian government departments to Communist countries, or received in return, should be forwarded to the Panel at regular intervals for the information and guidance of the members in dealing with this problem. A record of exchanges for the month of June, 1949, is attached hereto as Appendix "A", and this indicates that Canada's adverse balance on this exchange is clearly overwhelming.
6. The establishment of a procedure whereby the exchange of information with the U.S.S.R. and satellite countries might be regulated on a quid pro quo basis will, it is considered, be in the interests of national security and at the same time provide Canada with a certain bargaining power in relation to this matter.

E.F. Gaskell,
Secretary.

Privy Council Office,
July 25, 1949.

000236

CSC 14-2-1

TOP SECRET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Referred to	<i>Staff 2nd</i>
JUL 13 1949	
File No.	<i>8-11550-2</i>
Chg'd to	<i>Staff 2nd</i>

June 24th, 1949.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

Disclosure of Information
to Other Countries

1. Item 31, paragraph 8(b) of the 203rd meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee instructed the Secretary to circulate a proposed categorization of foreign nations for discussion at a later meeting.
2. I attach herewith such a proposed categorization for the consideration of the members. It will be noted that no attempt has been made to include either the nations within the Commonwealth or those nations who have recently changed their status within the Commonwealth by constitutional means, e.g., Eire, Burma and India. The Joint Intelligence Committee might wish to consider these nations for categorization purposes.
3. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the next meeting to be held on Wednesday, June 29th.

F.W.T. Lucas
 (F.W.T. Lucas)
 Commander, R.C.N.,
 Secretary.

Enc.

APPENDIX "A"

CATEGORIZATION OF FOREIGN NATIONS

1. Foreign nations have been placed in the following categories for the purpose of receiving information:

Category 1. Nations who may be given up to and including "Top Secret" information:

United States of America.

Category 2. Nations who, though normally given no higher information than "Confidential", may, in the interests of Canadian strategic policy, receive information up to and including "Top Secret" under special security arrangements devised for North Atlantic Treaty ~~talks~~; *negotiations* *such as*

Belgium, Luxemburg, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal.

Category 3. Nations who may be given up to and including "Confidential" information:

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Greece, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey.

Category 4. Nations who may be given up to and including "Restricted" information:

All foreign nations not included in the other four categories.

Category 5. Nations who must be given no classified information except as necessary to ensure reciprocal treatment for Service Attaches, Missions, etc., and in no case higher than "Restricted":

The Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Roumania and Yugoslavia.

Referred to *Staff JNL*
JUL 13 1949
File No. *TS 550-2*
Chg'd to *Staff 22/4*

CSC14-2-1

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

June 22nd, 1949.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

1. With reference to Item 16 of the 201st meeting, paragraph 10(b) and Item 31 of the 203rd meeting, paragraph 8(b), I am attaching herewith, for your information and retention, copy of reply received by the Department of External Affairs from the Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom concerning recategorisation of certain countries under North Atlantic Treaty arrangements.

(P.W.P. Lucas)
Commander, R.C.M.,
Secretary.

Enc.

COPY

Office of the High Commissioner
for the United Kingdom,
Barnscliffe,
OTTAWA.

13th June, 1949.

1095/8

TOP SECRET

Dear Mr. Heeney:

Would you please refer to your letter of 10th May on the question of the disclosure of military information to foreign countries?

In answer to the question raised in your letter I have been asked to inform you that the United Kingdom authorities consider that, until the Atlantic Pact military machinery has been established, it will not be possible to forecast what procedure will be adopted for the exchange of information and intelligence between signatories of the Pact and between the signatories and other countries. They will, however, examine the matter fully when more is known of the lines on which the military organization will be set up.

Yours sincerely,

G. B. Shannon

A.D.P. Heeney, Esq., K.C.,
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

DIRECTORATE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

- INTERNAL MINUTE SHEET -

TOP SECRET

SUBJECT: *Disclosure of Information to Other Countries.* CLASS: *T.S.*
FILE NO. *T.S. 11580-2 V. 1.* DATE: *15.6.49*

REFERRED TO:	INITIALS & DATE	REMARKS
④ NID (1)	<i>llb 10/6</i>	<i>Para 3. What has happened to SECRET Information??</i>
⑤ NID (2)	<i>llb 24/6</i>	
⑥ NID (3)	<i>llb 24/6</i>	
NID (4)		<i>Consider Para 5 (Last two sentences) a large order when read in conjunction with Para 4. which place emphasis on future benefits.</i>
SO (R)		
③ SO (SEC)	<i>llb 24/6</i>	
JIS (N)		
1. D/DNI	<i>llb 12/1</i>	
⑦ DNI		
RCNMR		
OMIR		
C.A.		

NOTE: 1. The appropriate Staff Officer receiving this file is responsible for:
 (a) Either precisising or indicating items of interests;
 (b) Initiating any action required;
 (c) Checking internal distribution and preparing External Minute Sheet for outside distribution considered desirable.

2. The Internal Minute Sheet is NOT to leave the Directorate of Naval Intelligence.

CEC 14-2-1

TOP SECRET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Referral <i>W. H. D. N. J.</i>
JUN 11 1949
File <i>B. d. 11550-2</i>
Chg'd to

June 4th, 1949.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

Disclosure of Information
to Other Countries

1. I attach herewith copy of a memorandum entitled "Disclosure of Information to Other Countries" amended in accordance with the decisions of the 203rd meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee, for your information and retention.
2. The appendix to this paper, which will consist of the categorization of the countries concerned, will be circulated to the members as soon as completed, for their consideration and discussion at a later meeting.

F. W. T. Lucas
(F. W. T. Lucas)
Commander, R.C.N.,
Secretary.

Enc.

TOP SECRET

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

GENERAL

1. The policy described hereunder should be observed with regard to the disclosure of information to other governments, or their representatives, whether civilian or military. It should be borne in mind, however, that, under this policy, information will only be disclosed when appropriate authority has been obtained for such disclosure. The policy in no way relieves officials of their obligations under the Official Secrets Act.

DEFINITION

2. The term "information" is taken to refer to information which is the property of or the primary concern of the Canadian Government. It covers:

- (a) Information - that is to say knowledge of Canadian forces, equipment, research and development, etc. This is further sub-divided into:
 - (i) Scientific information, when this has resulted from fundamental research and development carried out under government auspices or which is allotted a security classification.
 - (ii) Technical information about equipment, manufacturing processes and operational technique.
 - (iii) Non-technical information, such as orders of battle, strengths, locations, operations, training methods, plans, organization and publications.
- (b) Intelligence - that is to say knowledge of foreign countries in all the fields listed in (a) above, possessed by Canada.

CATEGORIZATION OF NATIONS FOR DISCLOSURE PURPOSES

3. In the light of the above, a standard policy has been prepared by which foreign nations are categorized as described below for disclosure purposes. In each of the first four categories, foreign nations may receive, at the discretion of the Canadian Government, information up to and including classification for that category.

Category 1 - Nations who may be given up to and including Top Secret military information.

Category 2 - Nations who, though normally given no higher information than Confidential, may, in the interests of Canadian strategic policy, receive information up to and including Top Secret under special security arrangements such as those devised for North Atlantic Treaty discussions.

Category 3 - Nations who may be given up to and including Confidential information.

Category 4 - Nations who may be given up to and including Restricted information.

Category 5 - Nations who must be given no classified information except as necessary to ensure reciprocal treatment for Service Attaches, Missions, etc., and never higher than Restricted.

- 2 -

4. It is emphasized that the rules for disclosure of classified ~~military~~ information under each of the categories are permissive. No nation should be given any information unless ~~Canada thereby~~ derives some political, military or economic benefits.

RECIPROCITY

5. It is important that the disclosure of ~~military~~ information shall be on a reciprocal basis. With some nations Canadian relations are so close that reciprocity is implicit, while other nations may have nothing to offer that Canada needs, though it may, for instance, be possible to ask for "intelligence" in exchange for "equipment". With the low category nations reciprocity is essential as a weapon, should it be desired to stave off an awkward request by making a counter-request known to be impossible of fulfilment. The counter-request need not necessarily be confined to the requirements of one department. It is considered that the reciprocity rule should be maintained. The responsibility for applying the principles of reciprocity will be assumed by departmental security officers who will, if in doubt, consult the Joint Intelligence Committee or the Security Panel.

INDUSTRIAL PATENTS

6. In order to safeguard industrial interests, information of concern to manufacturers, whether government-owned or privately-owned, will be dealt with in the following manner:

- (a) Wholly Patentable; i.e., the whole of the information can be protected by a patent specification.

If secret, consideration will be given to the possibility of acquiring a secret patent in Canada and disclosure to a foreign government should, as far as possible, be made on the following conditions:

That the information is kept secret and the government of that country will grant to Canada, on request, patent protection of suitable priority.

If not secret, i.e., such that publication in a patent specification is permissible, no problem arises. Government-owned inventions should be examined to see whether foreign patents should be obtained and exploited. In the case of privately-owned inventions the recipient government should be referred to the owner to negotiate terms.

- (b) Wholly Unpatentable, i.e., the information, while commercially valuable, is not of the kind which can be protected by a patent specification.

Government-owned information should only be supplied if a quid pro quo is obtained - strategic, political or commercial - worth the value of the information.

In the case of privately-owned information, the foreign government should merely be put in touch with the owner, but if the nature of the information is secret the owner should be warned that he should communicate the information only to accredited representatives of the foreign government who are pledged to maintain secrecy.

- 3 -

- (c) Partly Patentable and Partly Unpatentable. The only important case is where the information as a whole is secret and unpatentable, e.g., the layout, dimensions and specification of an aero engine, while some parts are patentable and may be patented without fear of disclosing the general design, e.g., a magneto.

The patented and unpatented parts should be treated separately as in (a) and (b) above but, in the case of privately-owned patentable information, care should be taken to inspect any patent applications before they are filed in the foreign country by the owner, to make sure that they do not disclose any secret information.

- (d) Departments which are negotiating with foreign governments for the communication to them of information of commercial value may, depending upon the particular circumstances, decide to carry out the negotiations themselves and may lay down the terms upon which the information may be used by those governments, or they may decide to entrust the negotiations, under suitable conditions, to private firms or individuals.

CONDITIONS FOR DISCLOSURE

7. The following conditions should be laid down and agreed to by all nations to whom information is disclosed:
- (a) The information received should be safeguarded under **substantially** the same rules of security as the Canadian authorities themselves impose.
 - (b) The information is disclosed only for the use of the recipient government and such of its contractors, under seal of secrecy, as it may notify to the Canadian Government in writing. Disclosure to any other government or publication to the press or in any other way would constitute a breach of the agreement.

May 11th, 1949.

CSC 14-2-1

TOP SECRET
"METRIC"

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

May 25th, 1949.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

1. With reference to CSC 14-2-1 of May 11th, 1949, concerning disclosure of information to other countries, I attach herewith copy of a signal received from Brigadier Clark replying to that from the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, of May 9th, 1948.
2. It will be noted that Brigadier Clark, in his reply, refers throughout to Metric Document No. 20. A copy of the relevant paragraphs of Metric Document No. 20 is attached herewith.
3. Members are requested to ensure that this document is treated with the required security precautions and is either filed with other Metric material or destroyed after reading.
4. This matter will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the Committee, to be held on Wednesday, June 1st, 1949.

F. W. T. Lucas
(F. W. T. Lucas)
Commander, R.C.N.,
Secretary.

Enc.

ARMY MESSAGE

TOP SECRET

LONDON ENGLAND

121400A MAY 49.

Secretary C.S.C. (ACTION)

SFC12.

TOP SECRET

Following for Brig Smith from Brig Clark.

PARA ONE

Reference your message 401 of 090610Z May 49.

Regarding disclosure of UK information to various nations, the special security arrangements referred to in COS (48)(180)(0) para six under category two are the metric security regulations contained in Metric Document Number 20 (final edition with American amendments).

PARA TWO

In addition to the security procedure set up in Metric Document Number 20, the Military Committee Franks certain document such as Orders of Battle quote not to be removed from 36 Whitehall unquote. Such papers can be seen only by appropriate members of the Western Union Defence Organisation by visiting 36 Whitehall.

PARA THREE

The Secretary of J.I.C. stated that there are no other special security arrangements except those referred to in paragraph four of COS (48)(180)(0) under the heading agreement with the USA.

CANMILITRY.

30285/CB/152046Z/MAY49.

O
P
Y

SECRET

EXTRACT FROM

METRIC DOCUMENT NO: 20 (COMPLETE)

AGREED SECURITY PROCEDURE TO GOVERN BRUSSELS TREATY
POLITICAL AND MILITARY TALKS AND INFORMATION
EXCHANGED THEREFROM

1. METRIC. All papers comprising joint plans or containing information supplied by the other member nations and tabled at meetings of the Permanent Commission and Military Committee set up under the Brussels Treaty will bear the codeword METRIC in order to indicate their origin and to ensure that they shall only be handled by the special METRIC Registries and distribution machinery established for this purpose. METRIC marking and METRIC procedure need not be applied to papers prepared in Ministries as briefs for delegates or to papers prepared as a result of decisions taken or information exchanged in the Permanent Commission or Military Committee unless such papers unavoidably compromise the security of CLASSIFIED joint decisions or of CLASSIFIED information belonging to another member country.
2. GRADING. The codeword METRIC is a security warning. Within METRIC, documents will be graded TOP SECRET, SECRET, CONFIDENTIAL or RESTRICTED according to their contents. Responsibility for grading will rest with the originating authority, whether this be a Brussels Treaty body or an individual country. Standards for classification of documents in any of the security categories are set out at Appendix A. These are necessarily open to interpretation and the final decision shall rest with the originating authority.
3. DOWNGRADING. No documents will be downgraded without the agreement of the originating authority.
4. DISTRIBUTION LISTS. There will not be an automatic distribution for all METRIC documents according to security grading. Documents marked TOP SECRET may require to be seen by entirely different sets of departments in each country according to their contents. Distribution should, therefore, be laid down separately for each individual document according to its subject matter. This distribution will be agreed by the Committee dealing with the subject concerned. Where a particular document is tabled by an individual country the representatives of the other countries must be in a position to state what distribution of the document will be essential as far as their country is concerned and this will be jointly agreed.
5. DISTRIBUTING MACHINERY. All documents having been graded and distribution agreed as laid down above, will be produced in the requisite quantity of numbered copies by the Secretariat which will also assign a reference number for registration purposes which does not give any indication of the contents. The Secretariat will then issue the requisite number of copies to each Delegation against receipt. The receipt should quote only the serial and reference number of the documents and not its title. No METRIC documents should be copied or paraphrased in full. Departments receiving METRIC documents may, however, include extracts thereof so far as is necessary in papers prepared calling for action by subordinate branches. Additional copies, if necessary, may be obtained from the Secretariat.
6. Each country will set up a Central METRIC Registry and distributive machinery to handle METRIC documents. One end of this organization will be set up by each country concerned in their own capitals. No METRIC material will be passed except through these channels.

The United Kingdom have set up similar special METRIC registry machinery.
7. The METRIC Registries set up by each Country, either at the LONDON or Home end, will be responsible for ensuring the distribution laid down on each METRIC document. These Registries will further be responsible for the security of all METRIC documents in transit and for obtaining receipts at all hand-over points so that the progress of the package can be traced throughout.

8. It will be laid down by the national authority concerned which personnel by name, within each METRIC Registry may handle METRIC documents in each of the four security gradings. METRIC documents will be enclosed in an inner envelope marked with the grading allotted and the word METRIC. They will be enclosed in an outer envelope addressed to the officer in charge of the Metric Registry concerned and franked with a package number for receipting purposes. The word METRIC will NOT appear on the outer envelope. When the mail reaches the Registry the outer envelopes will be opened in the Central Metric Registry, but the inner envelopes will only be opened by Registry personnel on the list entitled to handle documents in the security grading shown on the inner envelope. Where there is a distribution to be made, this will be effected by the Registry personnel responsible for the grading concerned. When it is necessary to ensure that a document will be delivered to one named person only, the inner envelope will be marked accordingly and will not be opened in the Registry. Individual receipts will be attached to each copy of a document individually addressed and will be returned to the Secretariat, signed by the addressee.

9. Telephonic and telegraphic communications will NOT be used for the transmission or the discussion of METRIC information.

10. Transit of documents will in all cases be by accompanied bag.

11. HANDLING OF METRIC DOCUMENTS IN GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS. In the same way as with the Central METRIC Registries, when it becomes necessary for a Government Department or Service to handle METRIC documents selected personnel will be nominated in that department who will be authorized to handle METRIC documents in each of the four security categories. This might involve four lists in each case, the size of which will increase in inverse ratio to the secrecy of the document. All lists, however, will be kept to the workable minimum and must include not only the Ministers or officers who will act on the document, but the Secretaries, typists, registrars, etc. who will have to handle it. It follows therefore that a special registry parallel to the Central METRIC Registry will have to be set up in each of the Ministries concerned as it becomes involved.

12. SCREENING OF PERSONNEL. The security authority appointed for this purpose in each country will be responsible for establishing the reliability of all persons whose names appear on the lists of those who require to have access to METRIC documents, both in the registries and in the Government Departments and Services. In the case of those persons requiring to have access to TOP SECRET or SECRET documents, even if there is no adverse trace in existing records, it may be necessary to conduct positive enquiries.

13. Where there is reason to doubt the reliability of any individual on these lists, the Minister responsible will be advised by the Security authority and it will be suggested that he should nominate an alternative. Personnel with unsatisfactory security records will be transferred outside the METRIC sphere.

14. Personnel engaged in handling METRIC material will be required to sign a document drawing their attention to their special responsibility for safeguarding such material, and their liability to prosecution if either by intent or negligence, they allow it to pass into unauthorized hands. The responsibilities of personnel so engaged should be explained verbally to them in the clearest possible terms.

15. ADMINISTRATIVE SECURITY. Defensive security measures in departments authorized to handle METRIC material will be centrally co-ordinated in each country and will be sufficient to satisfy the responsible Security authority in the country concerned. At Appendix B are notes on the defensive security measures considered desirable.

In particular, each department handling METRIC material will take steps to ensure that access to the special METRIC registry and offices dealing exclusively with METRIC affairs is denied not only to outside visitors but also to other personnel of the department not figuring on the lists.

16. PRESS RELEASES. Where no joint Press communique on any METRIC topic has been agreed by the committee concerned, individual countries wishing to make a release to their own Press will obtain clearance from the Permanent Commission Secretariat before doing so.

- 3 -

I- JOINT SECURITY CONTROL. The Government of each of the countries will appoint a fully qualified and permanent representative either to sit on a permanent Security Committee or to meet the other Security representatives as necessary, in order to discuss and formulate joint security policy to meet developments emerging from the progress of the talks e.g. extension of the field to which METRIC information is to be distributed.

1B. Should the Permanent Commission decide to extend the BRUSSELS TREATY talks to cover economic or financial matters directly relevant to the political or military discussions, the security procedure relevant to any new Committees dealing with such points would have to be reviewed.

METRIC markings and procedure will not be extended to the proceedings of any committee except on the direct ruling of the Permanent Commission, nor will any new Metric Registry be set up, any Government Department, nor any organization whatsoever indoctrinated in Metric without the prior recommendation of the Security Committee and the approval of the Permanent Commission.

Eaton Place,
S.W.1.

15th January, 1949.

CSC 14-2-1

TOP SECRET

Referred to	<i>Staff Sec'd.</i>
MAY 21 1949	
File No.	<i>TS 11 530-2</i>
Chg'd to	<i>Staff 2/4</i>

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

May 11th, 1949.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

1. I enclose herewith a proposed draft of the memorandum for the Security Panel entitled "Disclosure of Information to Other Countries", in accordance with the decision of the 201st meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee.
2. It should be noted that no attempt has been made to list the countries falling under the various categories as it is felt that such a list would be premature at the present time.
3. I also enclose:
 - (a) copy of a letter from the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, addressed to the Acting High Commissioner for the U.K., regarding any changes which the U.K. Government intends to make in their present policy when the Atlantic Treaty comes into force; and
 - (b) copy of a signal from the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee to Brigadier Clark requesting further information on "special security safeguards".
4. This matter will be placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee, to be held on Wednesday, May 18th.

F.W.T. Lucas
(F.W.T. Lucas)
Commander, R.C.N.,
Secretary.

Enc.

TOP SECRET

OTTAWA, May 10, 1949.

Dear Mr. Shannon,

I refer to Sir Alexander Clutterbuck's letter of September 20, 1948, with which he enclosed a memorandum on the disclosure of military information to foreign countries, which embodied the United Kingdom Government's policy on this question, and to Mr. Reid's reply of December 7th.

Consideration is now being given to the revision of Canadian Government policy in the light of the changes which will be brought about when the Atlantic Treaty comes into force. In this regard you should be interested to know whether the United Kingdom Government intends to revise their present policy when the Atlantic Treaty comes into force. I should be grateful for any indication you might be able to give me in this regard and for any information you may have on the changes which might be made in United Kingdom policy.

Should any changes be made in Canadian Government policy I shall, of course, inform you.

Yours sincerely,

(A.D.P. Heeney)
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs

G.E.B. Shannon, Esq.,
Acting High Commissioner for the
United Kingdom,
Earncliffe,
O t t a w a.

C
O
P
Y
ARMY MESSAGE

CSC 14-2-1

(OUTGOING)

OTTAWA ONTARIO

9 MAY 49

THE SECRETARY
CANADIAN JOINT LIAISON OFFICERS
C/O CANMILITARY
LONDON ENGLAND

CSC 1125 TOP SECRET

FOLLOWING FOR BRIGADIER CLARK FROM BRIGADIER SMITH (.)

PARA ONE REFERENCE UK CHIEFS OF STAFF MEMORANDUM ENTITLED DISCLOSURE OF
UNITED KINGDOM MILITARY INFORMATION TO FOREIGN NATIONS (.)

PARA TWO NATIONS LISTED UNDER CATEGORY 2 MAY QUOTE RECEIVE INFORMATION
UP TO AND INCLUDING TOP SECRET UNDER SPECIAL SECURITY ARRANGE-
MENTS SUCH AS THOSE DEvised FOR WESTERN UNION DEFENCE TALKS
UNQUOTE (.)

PARA THREE IN ORDER TO COORDINATE CANADIAN WITH UK POLICY IN THIS REGARD
IT IS REQUESTED THAT MORE DETAILED INFORMATION CONCERNING SUCH
SPECIAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BE FORWARDED TO CANADIAN CHIEFS
OF STAFF COMMITTEE (.)

DISTRIBUTION BY CSC OFFICE

ARMY SIGS (4)

(JDB SMITH) BRIGADIER

ROUTINE

091210Q

TOP SECRET

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

GENERAL

1. The policy described hereunder should be observed with regard to the disclosure of information to other governments, or their representatives, whether civilian or military. It should be borne in mind, however, that, under this policy, information will only be disclosed when appropriate authority has been obtained for such disclosure. The policy in no way relieves officials of their obligations under the Official Secrets Act.

DEFINITION

2. The term "information" is taken to refer to information which is the property of or the primary concern of the Canadian Government. It covers:

(a) Information - that is to say knowledge of Canadian forces, equipment, research and development, etc. This is further sub-divided into:

- (1) Scientific information, when this has resulted from fundamental research and development carried out under government auspices or which is allotted a security classification.
- (ii) Technical information about equipment, manufacturing processes and operational technique.
- (iii) Non-technical information, such as orders of battle, strengths, locations, operations, training methods, plans, organization and publications.

(b) Intelligence - that is to say knowledge of foreign countries in all the fields listed in (a) above, possessed by Canada.

CATEGORIZATION OF NATIONS FOR DISCLOSURE PURPOSES

3. In the light of the above, a standard policy has been prepared by which foreign nations are categorized as described below for disclosure purposes. In each of the first four categories, foreign nations may receive, at the discretion of the Canadian Government, information up to and including classification for that category.

Category 1 - Nations who may be given up to and including Top Secret military information.

Category 2 - Nations who, though normally given no higher information than Confidential, may, in the interests of Canadian strategic policy, receive information up to and including Top Secret under special security arrangements such as those devised for North Atlantic Treaty discussions.

Category 3 - Nations who may be given up to and including Confidential information.

Category 4 - Nations who may be given up to and including Restricted information.

Category 5 - Nations who must be given no classified information except as necessary to ensure reciprocal treatment for Service Attaches, Missions, etc., and never higher than Restricted.

4. It is emphasized that the rules for disclosure of classified military information under each of the categories are permissive. No nation should be given any information unless ~~the United Kingdom~~ ^{Canada} thereby derives some political, military or economic benefits.

RECIPROCITY

5. It is important that the disclosure of ~~military~~ information shall be on a reciprocal basis. With some nations Canadian relations are so close that reciprocity is implicit, while other nations may have nothing to offer that Canada needs, though it may, for instance, be possible to ask for "intelligence" in exchange for "equipment". With the low category nations reciprocity is essential as a weapon, should it be desired to stave off an awkward request by making a counter-request known to be impossible of fulfilment. The counter-request need not necessarily be confined to the requirements of one department. It is considered that the reciprocity rule should be maintained. The responsibility for applying the principles of reciprocity will be assumed by departmental security officers who will, if in doubt, consult the Joint Intelligence Committee or the Security Panel.

INDUSTRIAL PATENTS

6. In order to safeguard industrial interests, information of concern to manufacturers, whether government-owned or privately-owned, will be dealt with in the following manner:

- (a) Wholly Patentable; i.e., the whole of the information can be protected by a patent specification.

If secret, consideration will be given to the possibility of acquiring a secret patent in Canada and disclosure to a foreign government should, as far as possible, be made on the following conditions:

That the information is kept secret and the government of that country will grant to Canada, on request, patent protection of suitable priority.

If not secret, i.e., such that publication in a patent specification is permissible, no problem arises. Government-owned inventions should be examined to see whether foreign patents should be obtained and exploited. In the case of privately-owned inventions the recipient government should be referred to the owner to negotiate terms.

- (b) Wholly Unpatentable, i.e., the information, while commercially valuable, is not of the kind which can be protected by a patent specification.

Government-owned information should only be supplied if a quid pro quo is obtained - strategic, political or commercial - worth the value of the information.

In the case of privately-owned information, the foreign government should merely be put in touch with the owner, but if the nature of the information is secret the owner should be warned that he should communicate the information only to accredited representatives of the foreign government who are pledged to maintain secrecy.

- 3 -

- (c) Partly Patentable and Partly Unpatentable. The only important case is where the information as a whole is secret and unpatentable, e.g., the layout, dimensions and specification of an aero engine, while some parts are patentable and may be patented without fear of disclosing the general design, e.g., a magneto.

The patented and unpatented parts should be treated separately as in (a) and (b) above but, in the case of privately-owned patentable information, care should be taken to inspect any patent applications before they are filed in the foreign country by the owner, to make sure that they do not disclose any secret information.

- (d) Departments which are negotiating with foreign governments for the communication to them of information of commercial value may, depending upon the particular circumstances, decide to carry out the negotiations themselves and may lay down the terms upon which the information may be used by those governments, or they may decide to entrust the negotiations, under suitable conditions, to private firms or individuals.

CONDITIONS FOR DISCLOSURE

7. The following conditions should be laid down and agreed to by all nations to whom information is disclosed:

- (a) The information received should be safeguarded under *substantly* the same rules of security as the Canadian authorities themselves impose.
- (b) The information is disclosed only for the use of the recipient government and such of its contractors, under seal of secrecy, as it may notify to the Canadian Government in writing. Disclosure to any other government or publication to the press or in any other way would constitute a breach of the agreement.

May 11th, 1949.

GC/HT.

FROM:

OFFICE OF

SENIOR NAVAL LIAISON OFFICER
(U.K. SERVICES LIAISON STAFF), CANADA

Referred to *[Signature]*
MAY 11 1949
File No. *1550-10*
Clgd to *[Signature]*

~~115 QUEEN STREET~~ Truro Building,
OTTAWA 10 Albert Street

REGISTERED MAIL

TO: The Naval Secretary,
Department of National Defence,
(Naval Service),
Ottawa, Ont.

SECRET
SNLO UK # S/199

File: 2-8-6-2

Date: 9th May, 1949.

MAY 12 1949

NAVAL STAFF		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
INFORMATION		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
ACTION		
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<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>8.6.49</i>

Subject: Admiralty Secret Office Memorandum No. S.6/49
Disclosure of Military Information to
Foreign Nations.

I am pleased to forward for your information and retention one copy of the above-noted paper.

Would you be so kind as to acknowledge receipt by signing and returning to this office the attached duplicate copy of this memorandum.

[Signature]

R.W. Stirling-Hamilton
Captain, Royal Navy.

COPY /HT.

M.01339/48

FOR ISSUE IN LONDON AND BATH

SECRET OFFICE MEMORANDUM NO. S.6/49.

Disclosure of Military Information to Foreign Nations.

For purposes of receiving British military information, China has been relegated to Category 5. Secret Office Memorandum No. S.16 of 20th September, 1948, should be amended accordingly.

2. An amendment to C.B.O. Form U.2.D.(5)(1948) is being issued.

N.J. ABERCROMBIE

For Secretary
5th April, 1949.

*Noted in Copy # 675
e BO Form U.2 D.(5) (1948).
Coster, 14 May 49.*

SECRET

N.S.T.S. 11550-2
N.S.C. 1950-14 Vol. 2.

MEMORANDUM TO: Naval Secretary.

D.P.P.

C.B.O. Form U2D (5) (1948)

C.B.O. Form U2D (5) (1946) (Flag 1) has been superseded by (1948).

Memorandum to replace Memo on same subject dated 15th May, 1947 (Flag II) is attached for approval and signature.

Memo. to be attached to fly leaf of each copy issued. 100 copies of Memo are required.

Distribution: (a) C.B.O. Form U2D (1948) to be issued to all holders of C.B.'s in the R.C.N. according to regulations.

(b) To be issued to all staff officers, Naval Divisions (personal charge) who are in receipt of C.B.'s.

Attached references:

C.B.O. Form U2D (5) 1946 copy 1176 (Flag I.)

C.B.O. Form U2D (5) 1948 copy 673 (Flag III)


(L.L. Atwood),
Commander, R.C.N.,
Director of Naval Intelligence.

6th May, 1949,
Ottawa, Canada.

Ottawa, 6th May,

9.


SECRET

N.S.T.S. 11550-2

MEMORANDUM TO: HOLDERS OF C.B.O. FORM U2D (5) (1948).

Although C.B.O. Form U2D (5) (1948) is issued as a SECRET C.B., the information contained in paragraph 65 page 10 is classified Top Secret in Canada. Additional precautions must therefore be taken by all holders to ensure against loss or compromise of the C.B. and its contents. C.B.O. Form U2D (5) (1948) is applicable to the R.C.N. with the following qualifications:-

- (1) Naval Headquarters is the competent authority in all instances.
- (2) Parallel Canadian basis with regard to ships, shore establishments, Stations, etc.
- (3) No classified information, documents or other material shall be given to any foreign nationals, authorities or representatives without approval of Naval Headquarters.
- (4) Particular attention is drawn to the R.C.N. relations with the Royal Navy and the United States Navy: viz: No Admiralty classified information, documents or material held permanently or on loan by the R.C.N. may be passed to the U.S. Navy without Admiralty's approval. Similarly no U.S. Navy classified information, documents or material held permanently or on loan by the R.C.N. may be passed to Admiralty without U.S. Navy Department approval. This practice also applies to other Government Departments, Agencies, Civil industry, Firms or individuals in Canada.
- (5) Changes, additions or deletions will be issued from time to time as applicable to the R.C.N.
- (6) Holders of C.B.O. Form U2D (5) (1948) must ensure that the utmost discretion is strictly adhered to in the care and handling of both this C.B. and the information contained therein.


NAVAL SECRETARY.

Referred to: *Staff 670*
MAY 20 1949
File No. *TS-11550-2*
Chg'd to: *Staff 22/4*

File No. **CSC 14-2-1**

TOP SECRET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Privy Council Office,
East Block.

Date: **May 3rd, 1949.**

MEMORANDUM FOR: G.G. Crean, Esquire,
Department of External Affairs.
D.N.I.
D.M.I.
D.I.A.
D.Sc.I. - D.R.B.
D.C.I. - R.C.M.P.
Director, Joint Intelligence Bureau.

Subject: **Disclosure of Information to Other Countries**

1. The following document concerning the above mentioned subject is forwarded herewith:

Comments of members re the above.

2. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the **next** meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee to be held **Friday, May 6th.**

(F.W.T. Lucas)
Commander, R.C.N.,
Secretary.

Enc.

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

Director of Scientific Intelligence:

Reference your memorandum CSC 14-2-1 of April 11, DJIB collaborated with DSI on this problem and I agree with the comments he has forwarded to you.

In addition the JIC might wish to define more clearly the categorization of Commonwealth and ex-Commonwealth countries e.g. Eire and Burma.

It is further suggested that JIC might consider it worth while obtaining expert patent advice concerning the content of paragraph 10 dealing with "Industrial Considerations" in order to ensure whether Canadian patent rights may best be protected by present UK procedure.

Director, Joint Intelligence Bureau

In your memorandum of April 11th your file CSC 14-2-1, you ask for comments on the further consideration of this matter. Presumably the UK paper under discussion will be revised following the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty and it may be supposed that the states ratifying the treaty may be included in category 2. I would suggest that the UK High Commissioner be consulted on this matter through the Department of External Affairs and that as soon as the UK decisions are known the J.I.C. should redraft the Canadian views in the light of that further information.

I agree that China should be placed in category 5 but suggest that no recommendations be forwarded to the Security Panel until the matter can be treated as a whole.

Director of Intelligence (Air)

Reference is made to your CSC 14-2-1 dated 11 Apr 49 and our TS24-14-7 (DIA) dated 8 Nov 48.

DIA finds it impracticable at this time to make a firm recommendation regarding the adoption or otherwise of the UK policy. It is suggested that political policy may be the overriding factor and that a decision will only be possible after a discussion at JIC meeting when other points of view are made known regarding Canada's commitments.

Director of Naval Intelligence

With reference to your CSC 14-2-1 of 11th April, 1949, it is considered that the comments on this subject contained in my memorandum of 2nd November are still valid and that no additional remarks are necessary at this time.

It is noted that para. (d) of my previous memorandum should read "informed of our U.K. Agreement".

- 2 -

Director of Military Intelligence

Reference your memorandum CSC 14-2-1 dated 11 Apr 49 concerning the marginally noted subject.

Our comments of 15 Nov 48 are still valid, and, as Canada is now a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty the following is recommended with regard to the establishing of a Category 2 similar to that in the UK policy:

- (a) That a Category 2 be established to provide for the passing of military information up to and including TOP SECRET if need be, to such signatory countries to the North Atlantic Treaty who might require such information in the interests of North Atlantic strategic policy.
- (b) That special security measures govern the passage of highly classified information to the countries which are included in this category.

It will be necessary to work out special security measures for the passing of highly classified information and it is noted that the UK have such a procedure in respect to the Western Union countries. It is recommended therefore that the JIC ascertain the details of such measures before working out details of a Canadian procedure.

Department of External Affairs

As requested by your letter CSC 14-2-1 of April 11, I wish to give you my comments on the United Kingdom Government's policy on the above subject, as set forth in the memorandum attached to my letter to the Security Panel of September 28th, 1948, as compared to the present Canadian policy which is laid down in a memorandum issued by the Security Panel on October 15th, 1946.

1. In order to postpone a policy decision at the present time as regards the disclosure of military information to other Commonwealth countries, the new memorandum should be called "Disclosure of Military Information to Foreign Countries".
2. Para 1 of our present memorandum should stand.
3. The terms of information to be disclosed, in para 2 of our present memorandum should be expanded along the lines of para 3 of the United Kingdom memorandum, so as to include Intelligence exchanges as well as disclosure of other categories of scientific, technical and non-technical information.
4. Para 4 and 5 of the United Kingdom memorandum need not be included in the revised Canadian memorandum.
5. The system of five categories, rather than three, is an improvement over our present policy and allows for greater flexibility in dealing with countries that are partners in the North Atlantic Treaty. In the Canadian memorandum, we would refer, of course, to the North Atlantic Treaty rather than to Western Union under Category 2.

Under Category 2 we might include all signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty; Category 3 should then include the Argentine, Brazil, Chile, Greece, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey; Category 5 would include China, as suggested in the United Kingdom High Commissioner's letter to Mr. Heeney of March 31st.

6. The reciprocity section is better defined in the United Kingdom memorandum than in our present directive but might be expanded so as to maintain our present method of making exceptions in special circumstances by taking up particular cases with the JIC. If the JIC finds that the requests for exceptions are becoming too numerous, some such machinery as provided for in Para 9 of the United Kingdom memorandum could be instituted.

The sections on Industrial patents might perhaps be referred by the Secretary of the Security Panel to the Canadian Commissioner of Patents for his comments. The United Kingdom memorandum says that discoveries of industrial importance which must for security reasons be classed as secret must be patented by the Government. Present Canadian memorandum says that such discoveries may be. The Defence Research Board may also have views on this question.

7. Para 12 of the United Kingdom memorandum is already covered by Para 5 of the Canadian memorandum.
8. The final paragraphs 13, 14, and 15 of the United Kingdom memorandum are probably redundant and might be omitted.

I have only one general reservation to make on the form of the United Kingdom memorandum, and that is that it is limited to the disclosure of military information. Our present Canadian policy is in the form of a memorandum issued by the Security Panel to all Government Departments and it has the virtue of covering the disclosure of all aspects of information to other countries. Although the J.I.C. may wish to confine its remarks to the disclosure of military information, I expect that the Security Panel may wish to broaden the discussion to include other kinds of information so that the memorandum which may eventually be issued by the Security Panel would be as broad and comprehensive in scope as the present statement of Canadian policy. However, as most categories of information which bear a security classification are in fact classified because of their military implications, I should not think that there would have to be many changes made in a memorandum on the disclosure of military information to make it apply to all types of information. On the other hand, it may be found desirable to confine the scope of the revised Canadian memorandum to military information as has been done by the United Kingdom Government.

So Sec

SECRET

MEMO TO: D.N.I.

Issue of C.B.O. Form U2D (1948)

Recommend that C.B.O. Form U2D (5) (1948) be issued to all holders of C.B.'s in the R.C.N.

Further recommend that if feasible, C.B.O. Form U2D (5) (1948) be issued to the Commanding Officers, Naval Divisions (Personal charge) or to the D.I.O.'s whichever may be the most effective.

Proposed Memo to be attached to fly leaf of each publication issued, for comments or approval.


(H.F. Rankin),
S.O. (Security),

23rd April, 1949,
Ottawa, Canada.

*Approved R.H.
DNI*

SECRET

2-1-3

POLICY FOR RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION
OF U.K. ORIGIN

(a) OLD COMMONWEALTH NATIONS

The Old Commonwealth Nations concerned with this policy comprise Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa.

2. The Admiralty policy with regard to the release of classified information of U.K. origin to Old Commonwealth nations is:-

"It is accepted that the "Need to Know" is established for all Old Commonwealth Nations in respect of all information concerning all ships and aircraft and their equipment, of types existing, or building, or being considered for inclusion, or being modernised in or for or by their Navies and similarly for all shore installations and their equipment."

(b) N.A.T.O. NATIONS

The nations covered by this policy are Belgium, Denmark; France; Iceland, Italy; Luxembourg, Netherlands; Norway and Portugal.

2. The Admiralty policy with regard to the release of items of classified information of U.K. origin to these nations is as follows:-

- (a) it is accepted that the "Need to Know" is established for all N.A.T.O. nations in respect of all light craft used as Trade Protection Escorts, Minesweepers, Amphibious Warfare ships and craft, Coastal Forces craft and Seaward Defence craft. Also of any item of equipment of purely U.K. origin which may be fitted in these ships, or in existing ships of their Navies, which is classified SECRET or below, the prototype of which has been accepted for production;
- (b) similarly, it is accepted that the "Need to Know" is established for N.A.T.O. nations in respect of Naval aircraft and equipment of purely U.K. origin which could be operated from, or fitted to, their aircraft carriers and which is classified SECRET or below, the prototype of which has been accepted for production;
- (c) information concerned with Cryptography, Radio Countermeasures and Mine Assemblies is absolutely excluded from this policy;
- (d) it is Admiralty policy to release any information given in (a) and (b) above to these nations, but, if the consequences of the details of any item reaching an unfriendly nation should be considered to outweigh its usefulness to ourselves, or to our potential Allies, it is the duty of the Division sponsoring it to ensure its inclusion in the list maintained by Director of Tactical and Staff Duties Division of items to be withheld. If any patent rights are involved, the Sponsoring Authority is to seek the necessary approval before making the release;
- (e) drawings and specifications for ships building or projected may be released to N.A.T.O. nations who show willingness to build, provided the drawings do not show details of any equipment excluded by sub paragraphs (c) and (d) above. In the event

of such drawings showing space, tonnage or strengthening in excess of requirements of equipment shown (i.e., for equipment which is not yet releasable), it will be necessary to inform the recipients that this space or tonnage is required for equipment which it is hoped to fit at a later date but which is not yet developed.

(c) NEW COMMONWEALTH NATIONS

The New Commonwealth Nations concerned with this policy are India, Pakistan and Ceylon.

2. The Admiralty policy with regard to the release of classified information of U.K. origin to these nations is as follows:-

- (a) it is accepted that the "Need to Know" is established for all New Commonwealth nations in respect of all light craft used as Trade Protection Escorts, Minesweepers, Amphibious Warfare ships and craft, Coastal Forces craft and Seaward Defence craft. Also of any item of equipment of purely U.K. origin which may be fitted in these ships, or in existing ships of their Navies, which is classified SECRET or below, the prototype of which has been accepted for production;
- (b) similarly, it is accepted that if these nations decide to have Naval aviation the "Need to Know" is established for them in respect of Naval aircraft and equipment of purely U.K. origin which could be operated from or fitted to their aircraft carriers and which is classified SECRET or below, the prototype of which has been accepted for production;
- (c) information concerned with Cryptography, Radio Countermeasures and Mine Assemblies is absolutely excluded from this policy;
- (d) it is Admiralty policy to release any such information given in (a) and (b) above to these nations, but, if the consequences of the details of any item reaching an unfriendly nation should be considered to outweigh its usefulness to ourselves or our potential Allies, it is the duty of the Division sponsoring it to ensure its inclusion in the list maintained by D.T.S.D. of items to be withheld. If any patent rights are involved the Sponsoring Authority is to seek the necessary approval before making the release;
- (e) drawings and specifications for ships building or projected may be released to a New Commonwealth nation who shows willingness to build provided the drawings etc. do not show details of any equipment excluded by sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) above. In the event of such drawings showing space, tonnage or strengthening in excess of requirements of equipment shown, (i.e. for equipment which is not yet releasable), it will be necessary to inform the recipients that this space or tonnage is required for equipment which it is hoped to fit at a later date but which is not yet developed.

- 3 -

3. In the case of books the Sponsoring Division or Department should normally include New Commonwealth nations in the distribution lists for new C.B.'s or S.P.'s with the following exceptions:-

- (a) books containing information of combined U.K./U.S. origin and/or U.S. origin;
- (b) books containing technical information regarding material and equipment not used in the Navy of the New Commonwealth nation concerned;
- (c) books containing TOP SECRET or SECRET information regarding strategical and tactical doctrines;
- (d) books containing Research and Development information;
- (e) those S.P.'s which are Cyphers or related books, for which special arrangements already exist.

MEW/HFL/CCB.11

SECRET

DD/OM

21st April,

9.

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 2

MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY,
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE.

Disclosure of Military Information to Foreign
Countries.

With reference to your CSC 14-2-1 of 11th April, 1949, it is considered that the comments on this subject contained in my memorandum of 2nd November are still valid and that no additional remarks are necessary at this time.

2. It is noted that para. (d) of my previous memorandum should read "informed of our U.K. Agreement".


(L.L. Atwood)
Commander, R.C.N.,
Director of Naval Intelligence.

Distribution:
Copy No. 1 to J.I.C.
" " 2 File.

rd.
2/9.

DD/OM

1950-4-1

OTTAWA, 20th April, 9.

SECRET

NSS.1550-9 (Staff)

From : Director of Naval Intelligence,
National Defence Headquarters,
Ottawa, Ontario.

To : Staff Officer, Intelligence and Trade,
H.M.C. Dockyard,
Halifax, N.S.

Staff Officer, Intelligence and Trade,
H.M.C. Dockyard,
Esquimalt, B.C.

Exchange of Information with United States
Authorities.

Forwarded herewith for information is a statement presented to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence by the Canadian Service Members on behalf of the three Armed Services and the Defence Research Board on the above subject. The Board noted that the Canadian policy regarding disclosure of classified military information was entirely in accord with the policy of the United States Service Departments.

2. In presenting the statement it was pointed out that it deals only with the exchange of classified defence information between the Service Departments of the two Governments, and should not be taken to restrict in any way the exchange of classified information between other Departments of the two Governments. The Canadian Service Members also reaffirmed that the personnel exchange programme, by its nature, is not the appropriate medium for exchanging information between the two Governments. Exchange personnel may, however, request that certain information be forwarded through the appropriate channels.

3. General Principles:

(a) The 34th Recommendation of the PJBD, which was approved by the Canadian Government on May 9th, 1947, states:

"Subject to the national policies of the two Governments, there shall be a free and comprehensive exchange of military information in so far as it affects the security of the two countries, the circulation of which shall be subject to such restrictions as may be specified by the originating country."

.....2

- 2 -

- (b) The national policy of Canada is that all classified defence information may be disclosed to United States Service Departments and agencies, for purposes of collaboration in accordance with the Recommendations of the PJBD, or for other purposes relating to the mutual benefit of the two countries, subject to the following restrictions:
- (1) The policy in no way relieves officials of their obligations under the Official Secrets Act, which requires them to obtain appropriate authority for the disclosure of such information.
 - (ii) Information over which any other country friendly to Canada exercises any degree of control or jurisdiction may not be released without that country's consent.
 - (iii) Information of concern to Canadian manufacturers, whether Government-owned or privately-owned, and whether wholly patentable, wholly unpatentable, or partly patentable and partly unpatentable, may not be released without due consideration of certain prescribed methods of protecting Canadian industrial interests.
 - (iv) Information relating to atomic energy, even if it is military in nature, may not be released without the authority of the Atomic Energy Control Board.
 - (v) Information pertaining to cryptographic devices may not be disclosed except in so far as it may be necessary to implement a formal agreement with the United States.
 - (vi) Certain sources of intelligence information, and methods of acquisition, must remain solely under the control of Canada, and this information may not be released to any other country.
 - (vii) Information released to the United States must be safeguarded under substantially the same rules of security as the Canadian authorities themselves impose, and must not be disclosed to any other country or to the public without the consent of the Canadian Government.


(L.L. Atwood)
Commander, R.C.N.,
Director of Naval Intelligence.

For Despatch... *Fuo*.....
Date... *21.4.49*.....
A.C.N.S. *Bel*.....

000271

CSC 14-2-1

TOP SECRET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

Referred to... *Staff*
APR 13 1949
File No. *511550-10*
C/S to...

April 11th, 1949.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

Disclosure of Information to Other Countries

1. With reference to JIC 1-2-1 of October 14th, 1948, and the relevant correspondence relating to the marginally-noted subject, the Joint Intelligence Committee recommended to the Security Panel that no immediate action should be taken on the proposals put forward by the U.K. Government at that time.
2. One of the reasons for this decision was that "such commitments may apply equally to Canada if and when she becomes a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty." Now that Canada has become a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty, it is suggested that this subject be reviewed by the Joint Intelligence Committee.
3. This matter will be placed on the agenda of a meeting of the Committee to be held during the last week in April and the members are requested to review the previous correspondence on the subject and to inform the Secretary whether their previous comments are still valid or if they wish to revise them.
4. The previous comments were forwarded to the Secretary on the following dates and under the following files:

Director of Naval Intelligence - November 2nd, 1948 - file NSTS 11550-10.
Director of Intelligence (Air) - November 8th, 1948 - file TS 24-14-7 (DIA).
Director of Military Intelligence - November 15th, 1948 - file HQTS 711-0 (ADMI).
Royal Canadian Mounted Police - November 8th, 1948 - file G.355-51 V.6.
5. I am enclosing herewith a further communication from the Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom on the marginally-noted subject.

F.W.T. Lucas
(F.W.T. Lucas)
Commander, R.C.N.,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

Enc.

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM
Earnscliffe,
Ottawa.

1058/8

T O P S E C R E T

Dear Mr. Heeney,

Disclosure of Military Information
to Foreign Nations

In my letter No. 1085/8 of the 20th September, 1948, to Mr. Reid, I enclosed a memorandum setting out the policy of the United Kingdom Government with regard to the communication to other nations of technical information about weapons and equipment. Annexed to this memorandum was an appendix showing the categories into which foreign nations had been placed for the purposes of disclosure of such information.

I have been asked to let you know that the United Kingdom authorities have now decided to place China in Category 5, and to request that the appendix to the memorandum may be amended accordingly.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) Alec Clutterbuck

A.D.P. Heeney, Esq., K.C.,
Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs,
Ottawa.

NOTES

TOP SECRET

EXCHANGE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION CANADA-U.S.-U.K.

1. Canada's position in refusing to agree to these exchanges would be awkward. The only real reason we would have to put forward is that we were not consulted in the first instance. This however, is not entirely valid since we are in fact being consulted now.
2. We should agree in principle to an exchange of classified information on some similar basis to that proposed, with however suitable protection for Canadian source information. This would involve rewording of the agreement along the lines of the attached.
3. We should indicate that we foresee difficulties in keeping a list of documents transmitted and question the usefulness of this procedure. Information on standardisation subjects is already freely exchanged without the necessity of such record; we would therefore like to have more information on this aspect, the reasons for it and the basis of operation envisaged before agreeing to it.
4. It seems unlikely that an agreement of this nature will react to our disadvantage. Intelligence Agencies of all three countries will continue to make their own rules regarding dissemination of Intelligence information as they do now, even internally. There is presumably nothing to prevent any of the three countries from specifying that a particular piece of information must not be passed on by the first addressee (e.g. Guard). The real basis of any objection we might have to such an agreement rests on the premise that more information is passed by both of these countries to Canada than is passed by either of them to the other. Insofar as Intelligence is concerned, it is very doubtful if this is so today, except for Canada-U.S. defence papers which are specially covered in the agreement in any event.
5. The agreement envisaged would be of a tri-partite nature, as indicated by the proposed title.

RES. 10000000

JSC 2-4

2-1-1

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
JOINT SECURITY COMMITTEE

Ottawa 8 Apr 49

DM (M)

→ DNI

DMI

DIA

DRB (D SCI INT)

Release of Classified Service Information
to Government Departments and Agencies

1 Attached hereto for your approval is procedure recommended by the Joint Security Staff for use throughout Department of National Defence in implementation of m/n policy approved by JSC and CSC.

2 Approval of the attached papers will ensure a uniform procedure throughout Department of National Defence.

3 For your concurrence or otherwise, please.



(S M Jenkyns) F/L
Secretary
Joint Security Committee
5326

JSC 2-4

Release of Classified Service Information
to Government Departments and Agencies

Object

1 The object of this paper is to ensure that Classified Service information which must be released on a "need-to-know" basis to other departments of government or government agencies will be safeguarded in accordance with the Canadian Government Booklet on Security.

2 The following procedure is to be used as a guide to implement policy approved by JSC and CSC.

General

3 To ensure that those personnel of departments of government and government agencies into whose hands the classified information must pass are fully aware of the security implications of a document, the following procedure will be taken into effect.

Procedure

4 All requests for classified Service Information from departments of government or government agencies will be assessed on individual merit by the Director concerned who will be the authority to establish the "need-to-know" principle. When doubt exists as to the wisdom of passing a highly classified document to another department or government agency the Directorate of Intelligence of service concerned should be consulted.

5 Each classified document released to a department of government or government agency will be accompanied by two copies of the appropriate acknowledgment slip at Appendix "A". This outlines the security aspects of the document in question. The duplicate copy will be signed by the addressee and returned to the Directorate forwarding the document.

APPENDIX "A"

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT RECEIPT

1 This is a TOP SECRET document and is the sole property of the Department of National Defence. The security interest of this information is paramount. The unauthorized disclosure of this information would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation.

2 The information contained in this document will be disclosed only to such officials of your organization who require such information in the performance of their duties and who are entitled to handle TOP SECRET documents.

3 When NOT in actual use this document will be safeguarded in accordance with regulations contained in Booklet on Security, issued by Interdepartmental Security Panel, as amended from time to time.

4 Reproduction of this document in whole or in part will NOT be made without the approval of the Department of National Defence.

5 This document will not be issued to a civil firm or individual without prior written authority from the Department of National Defence.

6 The duplicate receipt will be signed and returned to (Directorate concerned) Department of National Defence, Ottawa

(SIGNED)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT RECEIPT

1 This is a SECRET document and is the sole property of the Department of National Defence. The unauthorized disclosure of this information would endanger national security, cause serious injury to the interests or prestige of the nation, or would be of great advantage to a foreign nation.

2 The information contained in this document will be disclosed only to such officials of your organization who require such information in the performance of their duties and who are entitled to handle SECRET documents.

3 When NOT in actual use this document will be safeguarded in accordance with regulations contained in Booklet on Security, issued by Interdepartmental Security Panel, as amended from time to time.

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6 The duplicate receipt will be signed and returned to (Directorate concerned) Department of National Defence, Ottawa.

(SIGNED)

Appendix "A" (Cont'd)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT RECEIPT

1 This is a CONFIDENTIAL document and is the sole property of the Department of National Defence. The unauthorized disclosure of this information would be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the nation, would cause administrative embarrassment or difficulty, or would be of advantage to a foreign nation.

2 The information contained in this document will be disclosed only to such officials of your organization who require such information in the performance of their duties and who are entitled to handle classified documents.

3 When NOT in actual use this document will be safeguarded in accordance with regulations contained in Booklet on Security, issued by Interdepartmental Security Panel, as amended from time to time.

4 Reproduction of this document in whole or in part will NOT be made without the approval of the Department of National Defence.

5 This document will not be issued to a civil firm or individual without prior written authority from the Department of National Defence.

6 The duplicate receipt will be signed and returned to (Directorate concerned) Department of National Defence, Ottawa.

(SIGNED)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT RECEIPT

1 This is a RESTRICTED document and is the sole property of the Department of National Defence. This information is NOT to be published or communicated to anyone except for official purposes.

2 When NOT in actual use this document will be safeguarded in accordance with regulations contained in Booklet on Security, issued by Interdepartmental Security Panel, as amended from time to time.

3 Reproduction of this document in whole or in part will NOT be made without the approval of the Department of National Defence.

4 The duplicate receipt will be signed and returned to (Directorate concerned) Department of National Defence, Ottawa.

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(SIGNED)

1950-4-1

(NOTE: As from the Meeting of 11th-12th September, 1947, the Journal is classified TOP SECRET. The Board, however, establishes a classification for each numbered paragraph in the Journal so that those below Top Secret level may receive a wider distribution.)

SECRET

Classification

Referred to	<i>St. A.</i>
File No.	<i>1550-9</i>
Chg'd to	

Date extracted 2nd April '49

N.S.

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE - CANADA/U.S.A.

Distribution		
<i>ACNS</i>	<i>St. A.</i>	
<i>DNE</i>	<i>St. A.</i>	

Bf 10/3/49.

Circulated for information is the following extract from the Journal of Discussions and Decisions at the Meeting of the Board, held in West Point N.Y. on 17-18 Mch 1949.

A. Sinclair
Secretary to
Vice Chief of the Naval Staff.

SUBJECT:

1. (SECRET) Disclosure of Classified Military Information.
 With reference to Para. No. 1 of the Journal of Dec. 16-17, 1948, the Canadian Service members submitted a paper (Appendix No. 1) setting forth the policy in this matter approved by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff. The Board noted that Canadian policy regarding disclosure of classified military information was entirely in accord with the policy of the United States Service Departments.

(Para. No. 1)

S E C R E T

OTTAWA, February 25, 1949.

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE

FROM: THE CANADIAN SERVICE MEMBERS, PJBD

Re: Exchange of Personnel and Information with
United States Authorities

1. At previous meetings of the Board, the United States Service members have reported on the general principles governing the release by the United States Military Establishment of information to the Canadian Government, and the specific policy followed by each of the United States Services in this connection. It was agreed that, at the next meeting, the Canadian Service members would present a parallel statement concerning the principles and policies on the Canadian side.
2. In presenting the statement which follows, the Canadian Service members, on behalf of the three Armed Services and Defence Research Board, desire to point out that it deals only with the exchange of classified defence information between the Service Departments of the two Governments, and should not be taken to restrict in any way the exchange of classified information between other Departments of the two Governments.
3. The Canadian Service members wish to reaffirm, in this context, the view expressed by the PJBD at its meeting on August 19-20, 1948, that the personnel exchange programme, by its nature, is not the appropriate medium for exchanging information between the two Governments. Exchange personnel may, however, request that certain information be forwarded through the appropriate channels.
4. General Principles:
 - (a) The 34th Recommendation of the PJBD, which was approved by the Canadian Government on May 9th, 1947, states:

"Subject to the national policies of the two Governments, there shall be a free and comprehensive exchange of military information in so far as it affects the security of the two countries, the circulation of which shall be subject to such restrictions as may be specified by the originating country."
 - (b) The national policy of Canada is that all classified defence information may be disclosed to United States Service Departments and agencies, for purposes of collaboration in accordance with the Recommendations of the PJBD, or for other purposes relating to the mutual benefit of the two countries, subject to the following restrictions:
 - (1) The policy in no way relieves officials of their obligations under the Official Secrets Act, which requires them to obtain appropriate

-2-

authority for the disclosure of such information.

- (ii) Information over which any other country friendly to Canada exercises any degree of control or jurisdiction may not be released without that country's consent.
- (iii) Information of concern to Canadian manufacturers, whether Government-owned or privately-owned, and whether wholly patentable, wholly unpatentable, or partly patentable and partly unpatentable, may not be released without due consideration of certain prescribed methods of protecting Canadian industrial interests.
- (iv) Information relating to atomic energy, even if it is military in nature, may not be released without the authority of the Atomic Energy Control Board.
- (v) Information pertaining to cryptographic devices may not be disclosed except in so far as it may be necessary to implement a formal agreement with the United States.
- (vi) Certain sources of intelligence information, and methods of acquisition, must remain solely under the control of Canada, and this information may not be released to any other country.
- (vii) Information released to the United States must be safeguarded under substantially the same rules of security as the Canadian authorities themselves impose, and must not be disclosed to any other country or to the public without the consent of the Canadian Government.

MAIN FILE No. 788 1550-9

T.D. No. 1

1950-4-1

SECRET

TEMPORARY DOCKET

NUMBER 788 1550-9 T.D. No. 1

REFERRED	REMARKS	DATE OF PASS	INITIALS	DATE OF P.A.	INITIALS	DATE OF B.F.	CENTRAL REGISTRY	INSPECTED IN C.R. BY
Staff	WITH PAPERS CR	MAR 5	1949					
EPTS		12-3-49	MS					
Staff		10-3-49	EPTS	23-3-49	mm		MAR 25 1949	B

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Extracted 10/3/49...

Secret
.....
Classification
.....1550-9701.....
File Reference

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
~~DEFENCE COUNCIL~~
~~CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE~~

- ② VCNS
- ④ ACNS
- DWT
- DNA
- D.N.Com
- DNPO
- ④ DNI *ACM 11/17, 22/13*
- DSS
- CNP
- DCNP
- DNR
- ① CNTS
- A/CNTS (W. & S)
- A/CNTS (Ships)
- A/CNTS (Air)
- DGFA
- DGNO
- SA/CNS

The following is an extract from the minutes of the 44th Meeting of the above committee held 8/3/49... Referred for information and necessary action.

[Signature]
NAVAL SECRETARY

EXCHANGE OF PERSONNEL AND INFORMATION WITH UNITED STATES AUTHORITIES

20. The Committee had for consideration a paper by the Joint Intelligence Committee, prepared at the request of the Canadian Members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

(Memorandum CSC 14-2-1 of 28th February, 1949, from Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee - CSC 8-1 of 3rd March)

21. The Deputy Minister pointed out that the "certain prescribed methods of protecting Canadian industrial interests" as contained in para. 4 (b) (iii) were not known and that these should be made available before action to approve the paper was taken.

22. The Chairman, Defence Research Board, stated that, as the Defence Research Board was represented on the Permanent Joint Board on Defence when matters of research were involved, para. 2 of the paper should be amended to indicate that the statement of the general principles regarding the exchange of personnel and information was presented by the Canadian Service Members and Defence Research Board.

23. It was agreed, after discussion, to defer decision until clarification of the methods of protecting Canadian industrial interests had been obtained.

.....
Classification

C.S.C. 1 of 3/3/49
Reference

URGENT - BY HAND

CHIEFS OF STAFF CTE
~~DEFENCE COUNCIL~~
~~CABINET DEFENCE CTE~~

Request your comments hereon for C.N.S. please,
and return to Room 3316 by 1630 - 7/3/48

- VCNS
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- DNA
- D.N.Com
- DSS
- DNPO
- ① DNI *At*
- CNP
- DCNP
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- A/CNTS (Air)
- DGFA
- DGNO
- SA/CNS

J. H. Stiller
NAVAL SECRETARY

Date 5/3/49.....

Recommended approval
At

Concur

Stamp: MAR 7 1949
At



FILE NO. CSC 8-1

~~SECRET~~

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
CABINET SECRETARIAT OFFICES,
EAST BLOCK, OTTAWA

3rd March, 1949.

C.O.S.
C.A.S.
C.N.S.
C.D.R.B.

OK Referred to Staff
MAR 5 1949
155029
3 1/2

Exchange of Personnel and Information
with United States Authorities

1. At the request of the Canadian Service Members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, the Joint Intelligence Committee have prepared a statement concerning the principles and policies regarding the marginally-noted subject.
2. The attached memorandum prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee has been submitted for Chiefs of Staff approval.
3. This item will be included in the Agenda for the 442nd meeting of the Committee, date to be notified later.

(J.D.B. Smith)
Brigadier,
Secretary.

CSC 14-2-1

S E C R E T

OTTAWA, February 28th, 1949.

The Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Exchange of Personnel and Information
with United States Authorities

1. I am attaching herewith a self-explanatory paper prepared by the Joint Intelligence Committee for the Canadian Members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence concerning the exchange of personnel and information with United States authorities.
2. I am directed to request that this be considered by the Chiefs of Staff at the earliest possible opportunity as it is required for the Permanent Joint Board on Defence meeting in March.

(F.W.T. Lucas)
Commander, R.C.N.,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

Enc.

NOTICE

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Date Extracted ...10/3/49...

Classification

**CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE
DEFENCE COUNCIL
CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE**

File Reference

- ① VCNS *BE 21-3*
- ③ ② ACNS *AW*
- DWT
- DNA
- D.N.Com
- DNPO
- ② ③ DNI *see list 10/3*
- DSS
- CNP
- DCNP
- DNR
- CNTS
- A/CNTS (W. & S)
- A/CNTS (Ships)
- A/CNTS (Air)
- DGFA
- DGNO
- SA/CNS

The following is an extract from the minutes of the 442nd Meeting of the above committee held8/3/49. Referred for information and necessary action.

[Signature]
NAVAL SECRETARY

Referred to *[Signature]*
MAR 14 1949
File No 1550-9
Cl'd to file 71.2.4.2-3-49

SECURITY OF INFORMATION -
JOINT INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

46. The Chairman, Defence Research Board, reported that a request had been received from the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development for a complete set of JANIS reports, it being understood that these reports were required for the Geographic Bureau of the Department of Mines and Resources. When the Department of Mines and Resources wished to obtain documents of United States origin the appropriate channel of communication between that Department and the U.S. National Military Establishment would appear to be through the Department of External Affairs to the State Department. When, however, the Department of Mines and Resources were carrying out work at the request of the Department of National Defence, and U.S. intelligence material was required, the Canadian Services could make the necessary arrangements direct with the U.S. Services concerned. Requests for information from the Geographic Bureau could be dealt with appropriately by the Joint Intelligence Bureau; other agencies or parts of the Department of Mines and Resources should deal with the Directorate of Scientific Intelligence.

47. The Deputy Minister indicated that this arrangement should be made clear to the Department of Mines and Resources and that it should also be pointed out that the Joint Intelligence Bureau was the logical repository for documents such as JANIS reports.

48. The Committee, after discussion:

(a) approved the arrangement whereby the Services would make necessary arrangements with the U.S. Services for the procurement of any information required by the Department of Mines and Resources when carrying out work on behalf of the Department of National Defence; and

(b) directed that the Department of Mines and Resources be advised that in all other cases where information was required from the United States National Military Establishment, it would be necessary to direct the request to the Department of External Affairs.

C.R.

~~_____~~

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26-2-49.

Referred to.....
FEB 28 1949
File No. <i>1550-9</i>

File No. CSC 17321

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Privy Council Office,
East Block.

Date: February 17th, 1949.


MEMORANDUM FOR: G.G. Crean, Esquire,
 Department of External Affairs.
 D.N.I.
 D.M.I.
 D.I.A.
 D.Sc.I. - D.R.B.
 D.C.I. - R.C.M.P.
 Director, Joint Intelligence Bureau.

Subject: Exchange of Personnel and Information
with U.S. Authorities

1. The following document concerning the
above mentioned subject is forwarded herewith:

Memorandum of February 17th, 1949, from the Acting Secretary, Joint
Intelligence Committee, on the above subject.

2. This matter will be placed on the
agenda of ~~an early~~ meeting of the Joint Intelligence
Committee. ~~to be held~~


 (F.W.T. Lucas)
 Commander, R.C.N.,
 Secretary.

CSC 14-2-1

S E C R E T

Ottawa, Ontario,
17 February, 1949.

MEMORANDUM TO THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE.

Exchange of Personnel and
Information with U.S. Authorities

1. At the August 19-20, 1948 meeting of the P.J.B.D., the U.S.A.F. member tabled a paper outlining the general principles governing the release of information by the United States Military Establishment, as well as the specific policy of the U.S.A.F. in this regard. The U.S. Army and Navy members and the Canadian Service members agreed to table similar statements.
2. As a result, and at the request of the Canadian Service members, the Secretary of the Canadian Section wrote to the Secretary of the J.I.C. asking that preparation of the appropriate papers be undertaken for submission to the Board by the Canadian Service members at the December meeting. In due course, a paper was prepared by J.I.S. which confined itself to general principles (copy attached). As there was some discussion as to whether or not it should include the specific policies of the three Canadian Services and since it had in any case not been approved by J.I.C. and the Chiefs of Staff, it was decided that it should not be tabled at the December meeting.
3. At the December 16-17 meeting the U.S. Army and Navy members submitted papers that were almost identical to that presented by the U.S.A.F. member in August and the Canadian Section indicated that its paper would be ready for tabling at the March 17-18, 1949 meeting.
4. The Canadian Service members have asked that steps now be taken to complete the Canadian paper for presentation to the Board at the March meeting. It is assumed that final consideration will be given to the question of whether or not the Canadian statement should include sections on the specific policies of the individual Services and that it will be referred to the Chiefs of Staff before being tabled.

G. H. Newsome,
Wing Commander, R.C.A.F.,
Acting Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

Privy Council Office.

C
O
P
Y

SECRET

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE

Ottawa, November 27, 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

Re: Exchange of Personnel and Information
with United States Authorities

At the last meeting of the PJBD the United States Air Force member reported on the general principles governing the release by the United States military establishment of information to the Canadian Government, and the specific policy followed by the United States Air Force in this connection. It was agreed that at the next meeting the Canadian service members would present a parallel statement concerning general principles and specific service policies on the Canadian side.

2. In presenting the statement which follows, the Canadian service members desire to point out that it deals only with the exchange of classified defence information between the service departments of the two Governments, and should not be taken to restrict in any way the exchange of classified information between other departments of the two Governments.

3. The Canadian service members wish to reaffirm, in this context, the view expressed by the PJBD at its last meeting that the personnel exchange programme, by its nature, is not the appropriate medium for exchanging information between the two Governments. Exchange personnel may, however, request that certain information be forwarded through the appropriate channels.

4. General Principles:

- (a) The 34th Recommendation of the PJBD, which was approved by the Canadian Government on May 9th, 1947, states:

"Subject to the national policies of the two Governments, there shall be a free and comprehensive exchange of military information in so far as it affects the security of the two countries, the circulation of which shall be subject to such restrictions as may be specified by the originating country."

- (b) The national policy of Canada is that all classified defence information may be disclosed to United States service departments and agencies, for purposes of collaboration in accordance with the Recommendations of the PJBD, or for other purposes relating to the mutual benefit of the two countries, subject to the following restrictions:

- (i) The policy in no way relieves officials of their obligations under the Official Secrets Act, which requires them to obtain appropriate authority for the disclosure of such information.

-2-

- (ii) Information over which any other country friendly to Canada exercises any degree of control or jurisdiction may not be released without that country's consent.
- (iii) Information of concern to Canadian manufacturers, whether Government-owned or privately-owned, and whether wholly patentable, wholly unpatentable, or partly patentable and partly unpatentable, may not be released without due consideration of certain prescribed methods of protecting Canadian industrial interests.
- (iv) Information relating to atomic energy, even if it is military in nature, may not be released without the authority of the Atomic Energy Control Board.
- (v) Information pertaining to cryptographic devices may not be disclosed except in so far as it may be necessary to implement a formal agreement with the United States.
- (vi) Certain sources of intelligence information, and methods of acquisition, must remain solely under the control of Canada.
- (vii) Information released to the United States must be safeguarded under the same rules of security as the Canadian authorities themselves impose, and must not be disclosed to any other country or to the public without the consent of the Canadian Government.

Substantially

Secretary, Canadian Section.

File No. CSC 14-2-1

SECRET

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Privy Council Office,
East Block.

Date: February 17th, 1949.


MEMORANDUM FOR: G.G. Crean, Esquire,
Department of External Affairs.
D.N.I.
D.M.I.
D.I.A.
D.Sc.I. - D.R.B.
D.C.I. - R.C.M.P.
Director, Joint Intelligence Bureau.

Subject: Disclosure of U.S. Military Information
in Canada

1. The following document concerning the
above mentioned subject is forwarded herewith:

Memorandum of February 14th, 1949, from Mr. G.G. Crean
concerning the above-subject.

2. This matter will be placed on the
agenda of an early meeting of the Joint Intelligence
Committee, to be held


(F.W.T. Lucas)
Commander, R.C.N.,
Secretary.

SECRET

February 14, 1949.

MEMORANDUM TO THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

1. At its meeting on November 23, 1948 the Advisory Committee on Northern Development considered the question of appropriate distribution, within the Canadian Government, of the U.S. Services' Monthly Strength Return (showing the disposition of their forces in Canada) and other U.S. Service documents relating to joint defence activities that are received in Ottawa with the marking "For Military Purposes Only". The A.C.N.D. concluded "that the distribution in Canada of information relating to Canada was a matter for decision by the Canadian authorities, irrespective of the source of such information" and that the Canadian Section, P.J.B.D., should so advise the U.S. authorities.
2. As the 34th Recommendation states that distribution of information from military sources "shall be subject to such restrictions as may be specified by the originating country", the matter was later discussed with Mr. Heeney. He felt that this portion of the Recommendation could not have been meant to apply to information relating to Canada gathered by the U.S. Forces and that the Canadian Section, P.J.B.D., should take this line, at the same time making it clear that Canada does not expect the U.S. Services to restrict information relating to the United States that the Canadian Forces obtain there. He also suggested that it be emphasized that U.S. Service information would be distributed only to selected individuals in the Canadian Government.
3. At its meeting on December 14, 1948 the Canadian Section expressed some fear that U.S. Service sources of information might tend to dry up if it tried to induce the U.S. Section to accept the principle proposed by the A.C.N.D. on November 23. It was therefore left to General McNaughton to decide, when the Board discussed the Disclosure of Classified Military Information at its December 16-17 meeting, how the question raised by the A.C.N.D. should be handled. Following is the portion of the Board's Minutes that deals with this point:

"The Canadian Chairman mentioned that there had been some difficulty in Ottawa in deciding how to treat certain classified documents furnished by the United States authorities that bore a label stating that they could be used "for military purposes only". He explained that certain officials of non-military departments and agencies of the Canadian Government were engaged in work that is intimately connected with joint defence and that it was therefore essential for selected officials of such organizations to have access to classified material. He went on to say that every precaution is taken to see that proper security safeguards are observed by such officials and that he felt it both highly important and compatible with proper security that these civilian officials be given classified information appropriate and essential to their work.

"The Board concurred in these views and further agreed that each country should be the one to construe the meaning of the phrase "for military purposes only" within its own country, and decide what agencies within that country should properly receive the information. The Board further recognized that the whole purpose of gathering and exchanging information in connection with joint defence arrangements should be defeated unless the information reached those by whom it was needed."

4. It will be seen that the sense of the Board was that Ottawa was free to use its own judgment as to which selected officials and officers of the Government should receive copies of U.S. classified information relating to joint defence activities - whatever security markings that information bears. General McNaughto made his remarks only after the U.S. Service Members had made very encouraging comments along the lines of the second paragraph quoted. He, incidentally, made it quite clear that the information would sometimes be required by civilian officials (e.g. Geographical Bureau) for non-military purposes, although it was understood that such officials would respect the security classifications attached to the information.

5. D.R.B. has recently pointed out informally to the Canadian Secretary, P.J.B.D., that in several cases, U.S. reports of U.S. Service activities in Canada contain sections on the geography, natural resources and population of Canada which it is desirable to give to non-selected Canadian civilian officials or to make public. In view of this situation D.R.B. has suggested that, after consideration of the matter by J.I.C. (and possibly Chiefs), the Canadian section might take up at the meeting of the P.J.B.D. on March 16-17 the desirability of the Canadian authorities being free to release U.S. information on geography, natural resources and population of Canada to non-selected civilian officials or to publish it, without reference to Washington, on the understanding that no indication would be given that the material had been collected by the U.S. Forces.

6. I would therefore suggest that this matter be discussed at the next meeting of J.I.C. It is, of course, connected with the paper on the disclosure of classified military information that J.I.S. has under preparation for tabling at the next P.J.B.D. meeting.

7. The matter is, of course, also connected with the joint defence publicity directives in force in Ottawa and Washington under which information relating to joint activities may not be released without prior interdepartmental and intergovernmental consultation. Should J.I.C. endorse the suggestion made informally by D.R.B., the Canadian Section, P.J.B.D., would have to make it clear that, should the U.S. authorities themselves also wish to publish sections of their reports dealing with our geography, natural resources or population, without reference to Ottawa, they would have to take care not to indicate that the information had been obtained in Canada by the U.S. Services.

G. G. Crean

P.J.B.D.



Referred to

FEB 19 1949

SECRET

File No. 1550-9

C'd to

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
CANADA

CANADIAN SECTION

OTTAWA, February 16, 1949.

MEMORANDUM TO: The Canadian Section, P.J.B.D.

I have already referred to you a copy of my letter of February 8 to Dr. Solandt regarding his suggestion that the Canadian Section propose at the next meeting of the P.J.B.D. that Ottawa be free to make public in appropriate cases, without reference to Washington, information in U.S. Service reports that relates to Canada.

I have now received a reply from Dr. Solandt in which he agrees that the matter should first be considered by J.I.C. and suggests, at the same time, that the question be confined to information relating to the geography, natural resources and population of Canada.

Attached for your information is copy of a paper of February 14 on this matter which the Chairman, J.I.C., is circulating to that Committee prior to its next week's meeting. Paragraphs 4 to 7, I think, state the problem as it now stands.

Dr. Solandt tells me that the matter is not of direct interest to D.R.B. and that he, therefore, does not wish to press the matter for his own purposes. What he has in mind are requests for information in U.S. Service reports that he receives from time to time from civilian Departments concerned with the north and the desirability of establishing, if possible, a procedure more adapted to the needs of such Departments in order to avoid further misunderstandings arising on their part. Mr. Crean is familiar with the situation which Dr. Solandt has in mind and will, of course, be able to explain it informally to J.I.C.

Christopher Shute
Secretary

NAVAL STAFF		✓
INFORMATION		✓
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REMARKS		
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SECRET

February 14, 1949.

MEMORANDUM TO THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

1. At its meeting on November 23, 1948 the Advisory Committee on Northern Development considered the question of appropriate distribution, within the Canadian Government, of the U.S. Services' Monthly Strength Return (showing the disposition of their forces in Canada) and other U.S. Service documents relating to joint defence activities that are received in Ottawa with the marking "For Military Purposes Only". The A.C.N.D. concluded "that the distribution in Canada of information relating to Canada was a matter for decision by the Canadian authorities, irrespective of the source of such information" and that the Canadian Section, P.J.B.D., should so advise the U.S. authorities.

2. As the 34th Recommendation states that distribution of information from military sources "shall be subject to such restrictions as may be specified by the originating country", the matter was later discussed with Mr. Heeney. He felt that this portion of the Recommendation could not have been meant to apply to information relating to Canada gathered by the U.S. Forces and that the Canadian Section, P.J.B.D., should take this line, at the same time making it clear that Canada does not expect the U.S. Services to restrict information relating to the United States that the Canadian Forces obtain there. He also suggested that it be emphasized that U.S. Service information would be distributed only to selected individuals in the Canadian Government.

3. At its meeting on December 14, 1948 the Canadian Section expressed some fear that U.S. Service sources of information might tend to dry up if it tried to induce the U.S. Section to accept the principle proposed by the A.C.N.D. on November 23. It was therefore left to General McNaughton to decide, when the Board discussed the Disclosure of Classified Military Information at its December 16-17 meeting, how the question raised by the A.C.N.D. should be handled. Following is the portion of the Board's Minutes that deals with this point:

"The Canadian Chairman mentioned that there had been some difficulty in Ottawa in deciding how to treat certain classified documents furnished by the United States authorities that bore a label stating that they could be used "for military purposes only". He explained that certain officials of non-military departments and agencies of the Canadian Government were engaged in work that is intimately connected with joint defence and that it was therefore essential for selected officials of such organizations to have access to classified material. He went on to say that every precaution is taken to see that proper security safeguards are observed by such officials and that he felt it both highly important and compatible with proper security that these civilian officials be given classified information appropriate and essential to their work.

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- 2 -

"The Board concurred in these views and further agreed that each country should be the one to construe the meaning of the phrase "for military purposes only" within its own country, and decide what agencies within that country should properly receive the information. The Board further recognized that the whole purpose of gathering and exchanging information in connection with joint defence arrangements should be defeated unless the information reached those by whom it was needed."

4. It will be seen that the sense of the Board was that Ottawa was free to use its own judgment as to which selected officials and officers of the Government should receive copies of U.S. classified information relating to joint defence activities - whatever security markings that information bears. General McNaughton made his remarks only after the U.S. Service Members had made very encouraging comments along the lines of the second paragraph quoted. He, incidentally, made it quite clear that the information would sometimes be required by civilian officials (e.g. Geographic Bureau) for non-military purposes, although it was understood that such officials would respect the security classifications attached to the information.

5. D.R.B. has recently pointed out informally to the Canadian Secretary, P.J.B.D., that in several cases, U.S. reports of U.S. Service activities in Canada contained sections on the geography, natural resources and population of Canada which it is desirable to give to non-selected Canadian civilian officials or to make public. In view of this situation D.R.B. has suggested that, after consideration of the matter by J.I.C. (and possibly Chiefs), the Canadian Section might take up at the meeting of the P.J.B.D. on March 16-17 the desirability of the Canadian authorities being free to release U.S. information on geography, natural resources and population of Canada to non-selected civilian officials or to publish it, without reference to Washington, on the understanding that no indication would be given that the material had been collected by the U.F. Forces.

6. I would therefore suggest that this matter be discussed at the next meeting of J.I.C. It is, of course, connected with the paper on the disclosure of classified military information that J.I.C. has under preparation for tabling at the next P.J.B.D. meeting.

7. The matter is, of course, also connected with the joint defence publicity directives in force in Ottawa and Washington under which information relating to joint activities may not be released without prior interdepartmental and intergovernmental consultation. Should U.I.C. endorse the suggestion made informally by D.R.B., the Canadian Section, P.J.B.D., would have to make it clear that, should the U.S. authorities themselves also wish to publish sections of their reports dealing with our geography, natural resources or population, without reference to Ottawa, they would have to take care not to indicate that the information had been obtained in Canada by the U.S. Services.

G. G. Crean

DIRECTORATE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

- INTERNAL MINUTE SHEET -

Secret

SUBJECT

Release by US of classified American info

FILE NO.

1650-9

DATE :

21/2/49

REFERRED TO:

INITIALS & DATE

REMARKS

NID (1)

NID (2)

NID (3)

NID (4)

SO(I)

Some where there is a recent decision by the JIC on this subject.

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SO(SEC)

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24/2

see the letter.

JIS (N)

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D/DNI

DD.

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DNI

RCNMR

OMIR

NOTE:

1. The appropriate Staff Officer receiving this file is responsible for:
 - (a) Either precisising or indicating items of interests;
 - (b) Initiating any action required;
 - (c) Checking internal distribution and preparing External Minute Sheet for outside distribution considered desirable.

2. The Internal Minute Sheet is NOT to leave the Direc000302 of Naval Intelligence.

CANADA

UNITED STATES

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE

CANADIAN SECTION


SECRET

OTTAWA, February 8, 1949.

TO:

Gen. The Hon. A.G.L. McNaughton, CH,
CB, CMG, DSO., Chairman.
Rear Admiral F.L. Houghton, CBE. ✓
Major General H.D. Graham, CBE,
DSO, ED.
Air Vice Marshal C.R. Dunlap, CBE.

Referred for your information.



Chilton
Secretary

DNI
for info

000303

P.J.B.D.
CANADIAN SECTION

SECRET

OTTAWA, February 8, 1949.

Dear Dr. Solandt,

I have for acknowledgment your letter of January 26 regarding the discussion of the question of Exchange of Information that took place at the December 16-17 meeting of the P.J.B.D.

The sense of the meeting was, I think, that the authorities in Ottawa should use their own judgment in determining what officers and officials in the Canadian Government should receive classified U.S. information relating to or resulting from joint defence activities. As I understand your letter, it is your suggestion that the matter be carried a stage further and that it be indicated to the U.S. authorities that we feel that Ottawa should be free to pass to non-official persons, or otherwise make public, material contained in classified reports that the U.S. Services prepare as a result of their activities in Canada.

I have made some enquiries about this matter and find that there is some feeling that such a proposal should be examined by the intelligence authorities and the Chiefs of Staff before the Canadian Section of the Board takes it up with the U.S. Section. I gather that our Service authorities might feel that there would be a serious risk of drying up U.S. sources of information if the Canadian Section were to assert what is tantamount to the general principle that Ottawa should be free to declassify sections of the U.S. Service reports. Less information might be forthcoming even if the U.S. Section of the P.J.B.D. agreed to the principle. Possibly the matter could be settled to your satisfaction if, without risking any misunderstanding in Washington by laying down a general principle, individual cases were taken up with the U.S. Services on a Service to Service basis, when it is desired to make public material included in their reports.

Dr. O. M. Solandt,
Chairman,
Defence Research Board,
O t t a w a.

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It would therefore be my suggestion, provided you are agreeable, that before the Canadian Section of the Board takes any action in the matter, your proposal be referred to the Joint Intelligence Committee and, ultimately, to Chiefs of Staff who could give the Canadian Section appropriate instructions.

My understanding is that, in making public information of the type referred to, it would not be your intention to indicate that the U.S. authorities had been responsible for obtaining the data. If this were not the case, I assume that we would have to be careful not to run afoul of the joint defence publicity directive, issued by the Ministers of National Defence and External Affairs on April 1, 1949, under which interdepartmental and intergovernmental clearance of information relating to joint defence activities must precede its publication.

Yours sincerely,



Secretary.

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146/38

NAVAL STAFF - MINUTE SHEET

CLASSIFICATION Secret

FILE NO. _____

SUBJECT Exchange of Classified Information & Selected Personnel REF. _____

Referred to Staff
 FEB 12 1949
 File No. S/5570-9
 Chg'd to DDI 7-2-49

REFERRED TO	For Information	Remarks	Action
D.W.T.		<p><i>N.C.R.</i></p> <p><i>Request this correspondence be logged in & placed on appropriate file.</i></p> <p><i>Relevant excerpts from P.T.B.D. Journals should be on file already.</i></p> <p><i>19/2</i></p>	
D.N. COM.			
D.N.A.			
D.N. INF.			
D.N. P.O. <i>ALL by SOB</i>			
D.N. I.			
D.N. ORG.			
A.C.N.S.			
V.C.N.S.			
C.N.S.			
N. SEC.			
C.N.P.			
D/C.N.P.			
C.N.T.S.			
J.A.F.			
D.M.			
PERS. (N)			
N.A.			
T.S.			
W.S.			

Deputy Secretary (Staff)
 11/2/49

DEPARTMENT OF

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Ottawa, February 7, 1949.

Res. Admiral F. L. Houghton, CBE,

To Vice Chief of the Naval Staff,

RCN HQ, Ottawa.

FOR INFORMATION

Ltd-Stowell

Note & file

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C.C. Eberts,
Secretary,
Canadian Section,
P.J.B.D.

000307

P.J.B.D.
CANADIAN SECTIONSECRET

OTTAWA, February 4, 1949.

Dear Mr. Crean,

At the June 3-4, 1948 meeting of the P.J.B.D., the D.R.B. representative raised the problem of the exchange of classified information and selected personnel between the defence research agencies of the two countries (paragraph 7, P.J.B.D. Journal).

As a result, at the August 19-20 meeting the U.S.A.F. member tabled a paper outlining the general principles governing the release of information by the United States Military Establishment as well as the specific policy of the U.S.A.F. in this regard. The U.S. Army and Navy members and the Canadian Service members agreed to table similar statements at the December meeting (paragraph 13, P.J.B.D. Minutes).

As a result, and at the request of the Canadian Service members, Mr. D. M. Johnson wrote to the Secretary of the J.I.C. on October 14 asking that preparation of appropriate papers for submission to the Board by the Canadian Service members be undertaken. A paper was prepared in due course by J.I.S. which confined itself to general policy. As there was some discussion as to whether it should include the specific policies of the three Canadian Services and since it had in any case not been approved by J.I.C. and Chiefs, it was decided that it should not be tabled at the December meeting.

At the December 16-17 meeting the U.S. Army and Navy members produced papers that were almost identical to that presented by the U.S.A.F. member in August and the Canadian Section indicated that its paper would be ready for tabling at the March 17-18, 1949 meeting. Copies of the draft J.I.S. paper and of the U.S. Army and Navy statements, together with the P.J.B.D. Minute on this question are attached.

The Canadian Service members would appreciate it if steps could now be taken to complete the draft Canadian paper so that it may be available for presentation at the March meeting. I assume that final consideration will be given to the question of whether the Canadian statement should include sections on the specific policies of the individual Services and that it will go before Chiefs before being tabled.

I am enclosing an extra copy of this letter in case you wish to send it, with the enclosures to this letter, to the Secretary of J.I.C. You might like to

G. G. Crean, Esq.,
Chairman,
Joint Intelligence Committee,
East Block,
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bring to his attention at the same time the attached copy of my letter of January 24 to the Secretary, Advisory Committee on Northern Development regarding the question of Ottawa using its own judgment in distributing classified United States information regarding Canada-United States defence arrangements and activities.

Yours sincerely,



Secretary.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

OTTAWA, January 24, 1949.

Dear Sir,

You will recall that, at its meeting on November 23, 1948, your Committee reached the following conclusions:

- "(a) that the distribution in Canada of information relating to Canada was a matter for decision by Canadian authorities, irrespective of the source of such information;
- "(b) that this view be communicated to the U.S. authorities through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, by the Secretary of the Canadian Section; and
- (c) that, when this matter is settled, the Secretaries circulate the monthly report on U.S. personnel in Canada to all members of the Committee, the Cabinet Defence Committee, the Secretary of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (Canadian Section) and the Commissioner of the R.C.M. Police."

As these conclusions could be interpreted as conflicting with the 34th Recommendation of the P.J.B.D., a paper dated December 14, -- enclosed herewith as "Appendix No. 1" -- was prepared in consultation with Mr. Heeney and presented at the December 14 meeting of the Canadian Section of the Board that preceded the full Board meeting held in Montreal on December 16-17, 1948.

At its meeting on December 14, the Canadian Section expressed some fear that U.S. Service sources of information would dry up if it took, at the meeting of the Board, the line suggested in the paper of December 14. In view of this, and as the Board would be discussing the general question of the exchange of information between the two countries, it was agreed to leave it to the Chairman of the Canadian Section to decide, in the light of the expected discussions, how best to raise the point that had caused concern to your Committee.

On the evening of December 16, I drafted, for consideration by the U.S. Secretary of the Board, a minute outlining the discussions on the exchange of information as they had taken place in the Board that day. Attached, as "Appendix No. 2", is a reconstruction of that original minute from which it will be seen that General McNaughton raised the problem of distribution by the Canadian authorities after the U.S. Army Member had made very encouraging remarks about the desirability of an adequate exchange of information.

The Secretary,
Advisory Committee on Northern Development,
East Block,
Ottawa.

- 2 -

When I checked this draft with the U.S. Secretary he felt that the U.S. Service members might not wish to have attributed directly to them the observations that they had made and we therefore submitted to the Board, for approval ... the next day, the minute that I attach as "Appendix No. 3".

The latter minute was reviewed by the Board on December 17 and, as a result of suggestions of the U.S. Army Member, was revised. A copy of the final minute, as approved ... by the Board, is attached as "Appendix No. 4".

You will see from the enclosures that General McKaughton did not have to take the stand that distribution in Canada of information relating to Canada is a matter for decision in Ottawa, since the U.S. Section was of the opinion that Ottawa should use its own judgment with regard to distribution of all information relating to joint defence arrangements.

At his request I am sending a copy of this letter and its enclosures to the Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Northern Development.

Yours sincerely,

Secretary, Canadian Section.

383

Ottawa, December 14, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CANADIAN CHIEF OF STAFF, PERMANENT
JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE:

A problem has recently arisen which affects the interpretation of the 34th recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence which, you will recall, deals with the exchange of military information between the United States and Canada. The 34th Recommendation states that the circulation of such information "shall be subject to such restrictions as may be specified by the originating country."

2. The Canadian authorities recently requested from the United States authorities a monthly report concerning the numbers of personnel and their activities at the various sites in Canada. In its monthly report to the Canadian authorities, the U.S. Air Force placed the following security restriction on details furnished by it in the report:

"This information is furnished with the understanding that it will not be released to another nation without specific approval of the United States of America Department of the Air Force, that it will not be used for other than military purposes that individual or corporation rights originating in the information whether patented or not will be respected and that the information will be afforded substantially the same degree of security as afforded by the United States of America Department of the Air Force."

3. This matter has been discussed with Mr. Heeney, who considers that the distribution in Canada of information relating to Canada is a matter for decision by the Canadian authorities, irrespective of the source of such information. Similarly, the distribution in the United States of information relating to the United States is a matter for decision by the United States authorities. Mr. Heeney does not think that the restrictive clause of the 34th Recommendation could have been reasonably meant to apply to the distribution in our respective countries of information of this kind.

4. It is accordingly suggested that you might raise the matter orally in the Joint Board, and point out the difficulties in applying the restrictive clause in the manner in which the U.S.A.F. has applied it in this case. It could be explained, of course, that we are as conscious of the necessity for security restrictions as our U.S. colleagues, and that there would be no question of distribution beyond high officials of the government. You might add that we would equally not expect to be able to restrict information relating to the United States which we might supply to them. Such an interpretation of the 34th Recommendation would not require a revision of the wording of the Recommendation, and should in no way upset the present exchange of military information between the Services, and the working arrangements whereby the Services in each country respect the security markings of those in the other.

5. For your own information, the Advisory Committee on Northern Development, which consists of senior Government officials, including the Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary to the Cabinet, is particularly interested in having this matter settled.

(The first three paragraphs were the same as in Appendix
No. IV.)

The U.S. Army Member then commented that he had found that there was occasionally some hesitancy, on the part of officers directly concerned, to carry out as full an exchange of information as is desirable and that, therefore, the exchange of information requires positive encouragement from a high level.

The Canadian Chairman mentioned that there had been some difficulty in Ottawa in deciding how to treat certain classified documents furnished by the United States authorities that bore a label stating that they could be used "for military purposes only". (He did not refer to any specific U.S. document.) He explained that certain officials of non-military departments and agencies of the Canadian Government were engaged in work that is intimately connected with joint defence and that it was therefore essential for selected officials of such organizations to have access to classified material. He went on to say that ever, precaution is taken to see that proper security safeguards are observed by such officials and that he felt it both highly important and compatible with proper security that these civilian officials be given classified information appropriate and essential to their work.

The U.S. Army Member expressed agreement with these views, stating that markings of the type mentioned by the Canadian Chairman should be construed by each country in the light of its own organization and needs. The U.S. Navy Member expressed himself as sharing these opinions and stated that the whole purpose of gathering and exchanging information in connection with joint defence arrangements would be defeated unless the information reached those by whom it was needed.

SECRET

(The first three paragraphs were the same as in Appendix No. IV.)

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The Canadian Chairman mentioned that there had been some difficulty in Ottawa in deciding how to treat certain classified documents furnished by the United States authorities that bore a label stating that they could be used "for military purposes only". He explained that certain officials of non-military departments and agencies of the Canadian Government were engaged in work that is intimately connected with joint defence and that it was therefore essential for selected officials of such organizations to have access to classified material. He went on to say that every precaution is taken to see that proper security safeguards are observed by such officials and that he felt it both highly important and compatible with proper security that these civilian officials be given classified information appropriate and essential to their work.

The Board agreed with these views, being of the opinion that each country should construe security markings of the type quoted above in the light of its respective governmental organization and needs, and recognizing that the whole purpose of gathering and exchanging information in connection with joint defence arrangements would be defeated unless the information reached those by whom it was needed.

SECRET

Extract from P.J.B.D. Journal of December 16-17, 1948.

I Disclosure of Classified Military Information

As stated in Paragraph No. 13 of the Journal of the Board's meeting of August 19-20, 1948, on that occasion the U.S. Air Force member presented a paper setting forth the general principles governing the release by the U.S. Air Force of classified information to the Canadian Government. It had been agreed that the U.S. Army and Navy members, as well as the Canadian Service members, would submit similar reports at the next meeting.

The policy of the U.S. Army was accordingly laid before the Board in the form of a memorandum dated October 16, 1948 (Appendix No. 1). The U.S. Navy's paper on the same subject, dated December 6, 1948, was also presented (Appendix No. 2). It was explained that the policy outlined in the U.S. Army and Navy papers was virtually identical to that of the U.S. Air Force, differing only in regard to minor administrative details.

It was reported that the parallel material under preparation by the Canadian Services had not yet been approved by the Chiefs of Staff, but that it was hoped to present it at the next meeting of the Board.

The Canadian Chairman mentioned that there had been some difficulty in Ottawa in deciding how to treat certain classified documents furnished by the United States authorities that bore a label stating that they could be used "for military purposes only." He explained that certain officials of non-military departments and agencies of the Canadian Government were engaged in work that is intimately connected with joint defence and that it was therefore essential for selected officials of such organizations to have access to classified material. He went on to say that every precaution is taken to see that proper security safeguards are observed by such officials and that he felt it both highly important and compatible with proper security that these civilian officials be given classified information appropriate and essential to their work.

The Board concurred in these views and further agreed that each country should be the one to construe the meaning of the phrase "for military purposes only" within its own country, and decide what agencies within that country should properly receive the information. (The Board further recognized that the whole purpose of gathering and exchanging information in connection with joint defence arrangements should be defeated unless the information reached those by whom it was needed.

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The policy of the U.S. Army was accordingly laid before the Board in the form of a memorandum dated October 18, 1948 (Appendix No. 1). The U.S. Navy's paper on the same subject, dated December 6, 1948, was also presented (Appendix No. 2). It was explained that the policy outlined in the U.S. Army and Navy papers was virtually identical to that of the U.S. Air Force, differing only in regard to minor administrative details.

It was reported that the parallel material under preparation by the Canadian Services had not yet been approved by the Chiefs of Staff, but that it was hoped to present it at the next meeting of the Board.

1950-4-1

SECRET

Classification

(NOTE: As from the Meeting of 11th-12th September, 1947, the Journal is classified TOP SECRET. The Board, however, establishes a classification for each numbered paragraph in the Journal so that those below Top Secret level may receive a wider distribution.)

513

31

Date extracted 3rd Jan. 1949

N.S.

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE - CANADA/U.S.A.

Referred to	<i>Staff</i>
JAN 5 1949	
1550-9	

Distribution		
<i>ONE</i>	<i>Staff</i>	

Circulated for information is the following extract from the Journal of Discussions and Decisions at the Meeting of the Board, held in the 16-17 Dec. 1948

A. Sinclair

Secretary to
Vice Chief of the Naval Staff.

SUBJECT:

The Canadian Chairman mentioned that there had been some difficulty in Ottawa in deciding how to treat certain classified documents furnished by the United States authorities that bore a label stating that they could be used "for military purposes only."

He explained that certain officials of non-military departments and agencies of the Canadian Government were engaged in work that is intimately connected with joint defence and that it was therefore essential for selected officials of such organizations to have access to classified material. He went on to say that every precaution is taken to see that proper security safeguards are observed by such officials and that he felt it both highly important and compatible with proper security that these civilian officials be given classified information appropriate and essential to their work.

The Board concurred in these views and further agreed that each country should be the one to construe the meaning of the phrase "for military purposes only" within its own country, and decide what agencies within that country should properly receive the information. The Board further recognized that the whole purpose of gathering and exchanging information in connection with joint defence arrangements would be defeated unless the information reached those by whom it was needed.

S-E-C-R-E-T

UNITED STATES

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE
Washington 25, D. C.

American Section
Room 2E844
Pentagon Building

18 October 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS, PJBD, CANADA-UNITED STATES:

SUBJECT: Department of the Army Policy for the Disclosure
of Classified Military Information to Canada

1. At the 19-20 August 1948 meeting of the PJBD it was agreed that the U. S. Army and Navy members and the Canadian Service members would submit at the next PJBD meeting a statement of their general principles and specific policies governing the release of information to the Canadian Government.
2. The general policy for collaboration between the United States and Canada as stated in the 34th Recommendation and the Recommendation of 20 November 1946, of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense which was approved by the Canadian Government on 16 January 1947, and by the President of the United States on 4 February 1947, has been actively implemented by the Department of the Army.
3. In implementing the above Recommendations, the Department of the Army must determine that proposed releases of classified military information to Canada conform with the following U. S. Armed Forces agreed general principles:
 - a. The Atomic Energy Commission has sole authority over Atomic Energy Information determined to be "Restricted Data", as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, even though items of such information might be military in nature.
 - b. Information pertaining to cryptography and cryptographic devices may not be disclosed unless the information is necessary to implement communication agreements between the United States and Canada.
 - c. Information which is not releasable because of a governmental agreement with a third nation may not be released to Canada without the consent of the third nation. This includes information pertaining to the Philippine Republic which may not be released to Canada without the consent of the Philippine Republic.
 - d. Sources of intelligence (identification of agencies or individuals whose identity as a source of intelligence information requires protection), methods of acquisition, and the degree of success attained may not be released. Virtually all completed intelligence studies and reports are releasable and are freely released to Canada.
 - e. Classified information owned in whole or in part by a private firm or individual may not be released without the consent of the owner.

000318

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET

Memo for Board Members

18 October 1963

f. Classified Catalogue and Program Type Information may not be released unless it is necessary to implement a program mutually agreed upon. Catalogue Type Information means a list, index, or other enumeration of military documents, instructions, organizations, or materiel by title or name. Program Type Information means a syllabus, prospectus, or other document which outlines projected military proceedings, requirements, plans, doctrines, or operations, or past, present, or future projects. This principle is followed in order to withhold classified documents which require careful protection within the continental United States when the documents themselves are not necessary to implement a program mutually agreed upon. This restriction does not hinder the standardization program and nearly all requests for Catalogue and Program Type Information are approved.

g. Classified military information that is derogatory to the United States Government or any agency thereof, prejudicial to U. S. relations with a foreign government with which the U. S. maintains friendly relations, or information derogatory to a U. S. citizen or commercial entity may not be released.

4. Releasable Information - All classified (including TOP SECRET) Department of the Army military information except as indicated in 3 above, may be released to Canada.

5. Conditions of Release - Classified military information is released to Canada with the understanding that it will not be disclosed to another nation without specific approval of the United States Department of the Army, it will not be used for other than military purposes; that individual or corporation rights originating in the information whether patented or not will be respected; and that the information will be afforded substantially the same degree of security as afforded by the United States Department of the Army.

6. Administrative Details - a. Within the Department of the Army, the Director of Intelligence is responsible for formulating security policies under which classified military information may be released to Canada.

b. The Department of the Army channels for release of classified military information to Canada are as follows: to visitors, to students and observers, to accredited representatives, to exchange personnel, through U. S. Standardization Officers in Canada, and through the Intelligence Division, General Staff, U. S. Army. The most important channels with respect to the standardization program and collaboration with Canada are by direct contact with Canadian accredited representatives, Canadian exchange personnel, and U. S. Standardization Officers in Canada. These three channels are defined as follows:

- (1) Accredited Representative - is a military representative of a foreign government who is accredited by the Intelligence Division (Foreign Liaison Office) to a Department of the Army agency for the purpose of receiving classified military information that is within the purview of the Army agency and which the agency is authorized to disclose under current security policies without further reference to the Intelligence Division, General Staff, U. S. Army. The accreditation specifies in what form classified military information may be disclosed. Canadian standardization officers in the U.S. are usually accredited representatives.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

Memo for Board Members

- (2) Exchange Personnel - are military personnel attached to a U. S. Army organization to gain experience in U. S. methods, procedures, training, administration, equipment, etc., by occupying a position in a U. S. Army organization. As "working bodies" in a U. S. organization they may have access to classified military information but are not to be considered as collection agents for their government. Exchange personnel are not permitted to transmit documents to Canada. They may inform their home government of the existence of information, or the U. S. Army agency may forward the information through the Foreign Liaison Office, Intelligence Division to the appropriate military agency of Canada at the request of exchange personnel.
- (3) U. S. Standardization Officers - as the name implies, are U. S. Army officers in Canada who perform a standardization function with the Canadian Government.

c. Information that is not released by direct contact, such as accredited representatives, or which is not released voluntarily by the U. S. Army through approved channels, may be requested by the interested Canadian military representative from the Foreign Liaison Office, Intelligence Division, GSUSA.



CHARLES L. BOLTE
Major General
U. S. Army Member

CANADA

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE
Washington 25, D.C.

UNITED STATES

American Section
Room 2E844
Pentagon Building

6 December 1948

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS, PJBD, CANADA-UNITED STATES:

Subject: Department of the Navy Policy for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Canada.

1. It was agreed at the 19-20 August meeting of the PJBD that the U. S. Army and the U. S. Navy would submit a statement of their policy governing the disclosure of military information to the Government of Canada. Accordingly, there is set forth below the disclosure policy of the Department of the Navy.

A. Releasable Information:

Military information of primary interest to the Navy of all classifications through Top Secret, except as provided below.

B. Non-releasable Information:

- (a) Information pertaining to Atomic Energy, including "Restricted Data" as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. (Such information may be released only by the Atomic Energy Commission.)
- (b) Information pertaining to cryptography and cryptographic devices unless such information is necessary to implement communication agreements between the Department of the Navy and the Government of Canada.
- (c) Information which is derogatory to the United States Government or any agency thereof, prejudicial to United States relations with a foreign government with which the United States maintains friendly relations, or derogatory to a United States citizen or commercial entity.
- (d) Information received by the United States from a foreign nation which, upon request, refuses to authorize its release to a third nation or information which is not releasable by governmental agreement with other nations.
- (e) Sources of intelligence, methods of acquisition and the degree of success attained. (This does not include completed intelligence studies.)

SECRET

CANADA

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE
Washington 25, D.C.

UNITED STATES

American Section
Room 2E844
Pentagon Building

SECRET

6 December 1948

Subject: Department of the Navy Policy for the Disclosure of Classified
Military Information to Canada.

(f) Classified catalog and program type information except that necessary to implement mutually agreed to programs. (This restriction is liberally interpreted in order that all information necessary to implement standardization agreements or to insure an adequate hemispheric defense program is made available to Canada.)

(g) Information which is privately owned, in whole or in part, unless the permission of the owner is obtained.

C. Conditions of Release:

All information is released to Canada on the condition that it will not be disclosed to another government without the specific approval of the Department of the Navy, it will not be used for other than military purposes, that individual or corporation rights originating in the information whether patented or not will be respected; and that the information will be afforded substantially the same degree of security as afforded by the United States Military Establishment.

D. Administrative Procedures:

The Chief of Naval Intelligence is the authority within the United States Department of the Navy responsible for the disclosure of classified information to foreign governments. The Chief of Naval Intelligence, in close cooperation with other interested Navy activities arranges for:

Visits by Canadian Government representatives to Navy and quasi-Navy activities.

The release of documentary data to the Canadian Government either upon request of Canada or by automatic distribution.

The accreditation of Canadian representatives as liaison officers to Navy activities.

The exchange of officers between the military services of the two governments.

SECRET

CANADA

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENSE
Washington 25, D.C.

UNITED STATES

American Section
Room 2E844
Pentagon Building

SECRET

6 December 1948

Subject: Department of the Navy Policy for the Disclosure of Classified
Military Information to Canada.

2. Except for the Administrative Procedures outlined above, the United States Navy's disclosure policy is based upon a National Disclosure Policy adopted by the other military departments of the United States.

3. In implementation of the United States Navy's policy a free and complete exchange of information with Canada is desired and encouraged.

R. E. LIBBY,
Rear Admiral,
U.S. Navy Member.

SECRET

JIC 1-2-1

SECRET

70713 3112

OTTAWA, November 16th, 1948.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

Exchange of Personnel and Information
with United States Authorities

6/1
Referred to... Staff
DEC 7 1948
File 1550-9
Chg'd to Utens 6/24
DINI 7-2

1. With reference to my memorandum of October 16th, 1948, and Item 1057 of the 191st meeting held on October 22nd, 1948, it will be remembered that the Joint Intelligence Committee instructed the Joint Intelligence Staff to prepare the necessary paper, to be completed not later than December 1st, 1948.

2. In view of the unexpected revision of the American-Canadian agreed intelligence estimate and the probability that the Joint Intelligence Staff will be required to return to Washington during the latter part of this month, it is most unlikely that they will be able to satisfactorily complete the paper required by the Joint Intelligence Committee for the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

3. The Joint Intelligence Committee is therefore requested to consider whether this paper should be undertaken in some other way than by the Joint Intelligence Staff.

4. This item will be included in the agenda of the next meeting of the Committee.

F.W.T. Lucas
F.W.T. Lucas, Lt.-Cdr.,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

PA
MKS 11/12/48

TOP SECRET

OTTAWA, November 16th, 1948.

3111

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

Disclosure of Information to Other Countries

1. With reference to my memorandum of October 14th, 1948, and Item 1056 of the 191st meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee, I am attaching herewith a draft submission to the Chairman of the Security Panel which has been prepared on the basis of the replies received from the members.
2. This item will be included in the agenda of the next meeting of the Committee.

F.W.T. Lucas
F.W.T. Lucas, Lt.-Cdr.,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

Enc.

Referred to..... *Staff*
DEC 8 1948
File No. *29/1550-10*
C'd to *Staff ans 8-40-48*

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The Chairman,
Security Panel.

Disclosure of Information to Other Countries

1. The JIC has had under consideration a paper entitled "Disclosure of United Kingdom Military Information to Foreign Nations" submitted by the Office of the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom. In his letter (undated) addressed to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, the U.K. High Commissioner requested information as to whether the Canadian Government had in mind the adoption of a similar policy.

2. I am directed to inform you that the JIC is of the opinion that, while they are in general agreement with the policy outlined in the U.K. paper, no immediate action should be taken on the matter for the following reasons:

(a) The U.K. is a member of the Western European alliance and has, therefore, staff commitments with France and the Benelux countries which do not at present apply to Canada.

(b) Such commitments may apply equally to Canada if and when she becomes a signatory to the North Atlantic Security Pact.

3. It is therefore recommended that further consideration of the U.K. submission and its relation to the policy of the Canadian Government be delayed until such time as the question of a North Atlantic Treaty has been clarified.

F.W.T. Lucas, Lt.-Cdr.,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

A.C.N.S., D.N.P.O. and D.N.I.
INTERNAL MINUTE SHEET

TOP SECRET

FROM:		TO:	
SUBJECT: <i>U.K. Policy - Disclosure of Military Information to Foreign Countries</i>			
N.S. FILE NO. <i>11 550-10 U.I.</i>		DATE: <i>9-10-58.</i>	
REFERRED TO:	INITIALS AND DATE	REMARKS	
SO (S)		<i>Sni</i> <i>Suggest no action be taken until T.S.C. report is received. (Para 3. Sec. C.S.C. letter, refer). Jbs.</i>	
SO (P) (1)			
SO (P) (2)			
SO (O)			
SO (Q)			
SO (T)		<i>In remarks attached file of <u>AD</u></i>	
DNPO			
JPS (N)			
NID (1)			
NID (2)			
NID (3)			
1. SO (I)	<i>Ses 12/10</i>		<i>Miss Girdell</i> <i>Plan BF for next JIC meeting</i> <i>AD</i>
SO (STAT)			
JIS (N)			
2. SO (SEC)			
3. DNI			
4. ACNS			
ACCESSION LIST			
EDITOR			
COMMR			
OAIR			

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- (a) Either precisising or indicating items of interest;
- (b) Initiating any action required;
- (c) Checking internal distribution and preparing External Minute Sheet for outside distribution considered desirable.

2. The Minute Sheet is to be attached to the office copy. It is NOT to leave the Directorate

LLA/OM

TOP SECRET

COPY NO. 2.

OTTAWA, 2nd November, 8.

N.S.M.S.11550-10.

MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY,
JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE.

Disclosure of Military Information to Foreign
Countries.

There does not appear to be any radical changes in the current Canadian policy and it is strongly recommended that:

- (a) Canada adopt policy outlined.
- (b) That foreign nations be re-categorized. .
- (c) That the Department of Trade and Commerce assisted by External Affairs take a more active part in the implementation of paras. 8, 9 and 10.
- (d) If approved, all Naval Commands will be informed of our U.S. Agreement.

2. There is one point, however, which must be taken into consideration when applying the overall U.K. policy to Canada and that is the necessity of overhauling our present Patent Organization to embody the necessary factors which will provide protection to U.K. and U.S. military equipment which may be manufactured in Canada.

(L.L. Atwood)
Commander, R.C.N.,
Director of Naval Intelligence.

DISTRIBUTION:

Copy No. 1 to J.I.C.
" " 2 File.

JIC 1-2-1

TOP SECRET

OTTAWA, 14th October, 1948.

MEMORANDUM FOR JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

2838

Disclosure of Information
to other Countries

1. I am attaching memorandum from the United Kingdom concerning "Disclosure of United Kingdom Military Information to Foreign Nations", together with supporting correspondence. It is requested that the members of the Joint Intelligence Committee consider this memorandum, with particular reference to the advisability of the Canadian Government adopting a similar policy.

2. This matter will be placed on the Agenda of the next meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee.



Exposure of general by 1st March

F.W.T. Lucas
(F.W.T. Lucas) Lt.-Cdr.,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

JIC.

Referred to. <i>PA</i>
NOV 1 1948
File No. <i>11550-10</i>
Chg'd to.....

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TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

Ottawa, September 28th, 1948.

The Secretary of the Security Panel,
Privy Council Office,
East Block,
Ottawa.

You will recall that the Security Panel issued on October 15, 1946, a memorandum for the guidance of Government Departments on "The Disclosure of Information to Other Countries". This memorandum presently governs Government policy on the disclosure of information to other countries, and you will recall that this policy was formulated after consideration of the United Kingdom policy on this subject.

The United Kingdom have now revised their policy and I attach a letter from the United Kingdom High Commissioner dated September 20th, enclosing a memorandum setting out the new United Kingdom policy. I also enclose a copy of a letter of the same date concerning the position of Ireland.

You will note that the United Kingdom Government has asked whether the Canadian Government has in mind adopting a similar policy. I should be grateful if you would place this item on the agenda of a meeting of the Security Panel. I shall let you know the views of this Department in due course.

(Sgd.) G.G. Crean

for Acting Under-Secretary of State
for External Affairs.

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TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM

Earnscliffe,
OTTAWA.

20th September, 1948.

Dear Mr. Reid,

Disclosure of Military Information
to Eire.

In a letter No. 1085/8 of 5th February, 1946, to Mr. Robertson, Mr. Holmes stated that the United Kingdom authorities had decided to treat Eire, for the purposes of the disclosure of military information, as a nation in Category B of the memorandum enclosed in his letter of the 31st December, 1945.

2. The categorization of foreign nations for this purpose has now been revised, and I am sending you in a separate letter a memorandum to which is appended a list of five categories of foreign nations now being followed by the United Kingdom authorities. It has been decided to treat Eire in this connection as a nation in Category 3 of the revised categories.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) Alec Clutterbuck.

E. Reid, Esquire,
Department of External Affairs,
O T T A W A.

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OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM

Earnscliffe,
OTTAWA.

Dear Mr. Reid,

Disclosure of Military Information
to Foreign Nations

Would you please refer to Mr. Holmes' letter No. 1085/8 of the 31st December, 1945, to Mr. Robertson, and to subsequent correspondence, about the United Kingdom Government's policy with regard to the disclosure to other nations of technical information about weapons and equipment.

2. I have now been asked to inform you that, as a result of a recent review of the current situation, the policy of the United Kingdom Government in respect of disclosure of military information to countries other than those of the British Commonwealth has been revised. The enclosed memorandum sets out details of the latest policy and should be regarded as replacing the corresponding portions of the enclosure to Mr. Holmes' letter. I have been asked to point out that the changes now decided on do not imply any alteration in the present policy of the United Kingdom Government towards other Commonwealth Governments.

3. In conveying this information to the Canadian Government I have been asked to enquire whether they have it in mind to adopt a similar policy themselves.

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd.) Alec Clutterbuck.

E. Reid, Esquire,
Department of External Affairs,
O T T A W A.

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TOP SECRET

M E M O R A N D U M

Disclosure of United Kingdom Military
Information to Foreign Nations

The United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff have re-examined the existing policy with regard to the disclosure of United Kingdom military information to foreign nations, and in the light of their recommendations, the United Kingdom Government have adopted the following revised policy. This policy extends to all forms of military information as defined in paragraph 3 below. It is based on the assumption that the disclosure of military information to foreign nations is normally made only with the object of furthering the interests of the foreign and strategic policy of the United Kingdom Government, and that disclosure for commercial reasons is permissible, and indeed desirable, when it does not conflict with that policy. It is also related to the United Kingdom's policy governing the supply of arms to other nations.

2. In general it has been agreed that the existing United Kingdom policy should be confirmed subject to a revision in the categorization of nations. It has also been decided that consideration should be given to clarification and simplification of the procedure for relaxing the strict application of current policy in exceptional circumstances.

3. Military Information

The term military information is taken to refer to information which is the property of, or the primary concern of the United Kingdom Service Departments and the Ministry of Supply, or which is of defence interest. Its disclosure may take the form of the supply of equipment.

It covers:

- (a) Information, that is to say, knowledge of United Kingdom forces, equipment, research and development, etc. This is further sub-divided into:
 - (i) Scientific information, when this has resulted from fundamental research and development carried out under Government auspices or which has been allotted a security classification.
 - (ii) Technical information about equipment, manufacturing processes, and operational technique.
 - (iii) Non-Technical information, such as Orders of battle, strengths, locations, operations, training methods, plans, organization and publications of the fighting Services.
- (b) Intelligence, that is to say, knowledge of foreign countries, in all the fields at (a) above, possessed by the United Kingdom.

- 2 -

4. Agreement with the U.S.A.

The present decisions refer to United Kingdom information. Instructions relating to the disclosure of United States or joint United States-United Kingdom owned military information is the subject of a special agreement with the United States.

5. Policy for grading by Categories

It is proposed to amend the existing Categories B and C in the light of political developments. The United Kingdom now stands in closer relationship to France and the Benelux countries than to other Category B nations, and the deterioration in relations with the Soviet Union and her satellites makes distinction necessary between them and other Category C nations, with some of whom the United Kingdom Government have agreements to assist in training their armed forces. It has therefore unfortunately been found necessary to adopt five instead of the current three categories and to group nations accordingly. The revised grouping is shown in the Appendix to this note.

6. Categorization of nations for disclosure purposes

In the light of the above, a standard policy has been prepared by which foreign nations are categorized as described below for disclosure purposes. In each of the first four categories the foreign nations may receive at the discretion of United Kingdom Departments, information up to and including the classification for that category.

Category 1

Nations who may be given up to and including Top Secret military information.

Category 2

Nations who, though normally given no higher information than Confidential may, in the interests of United Kingdom strategic policy, receive information up to and including Top Secret under special security arrangements, such as those devised for the Western Union Defence talks.

Category 3

Nations who may be given up to and including Confidential military information.

Category 4

Nations who may be given up to and including Restricted military information.

Category 5

Nations who must be given no classified information except as necessary to ensure reciprocal treatment for Service Attaches, Missions, etc. and never higher than Restricted.

7. It is emphasized that the rules for disclosure of classified military information under each of the categories are permissive. No nation should be given any information unless the United Kingdom thereby derives some political, military or economic benefits.

8. The Reciprocity Rule

It is important that the disclosure of military information shall be on a reciprocal basis. With some nations United Kingdom relations are so close that reciprocity is implicit, while other nations may have nothing to offer that the United Kingdom needs, though it may, for instance, be possible to ask for "intelligence" in exchange for "equipment". With the low category nations reciprocity is essential as a weapon, should it be desired to stave off an awkward request by making a counter-request known to be impossible of fulfilment. The counter-request need not necessarily be confined to the requirements of one Department. It is considered that the reciprocity rule should be maintained.

9. Machinery for Interim Adjustments

The security implications of each disclosure, even within the approved Categories, should be examined by the Department proposing to make it. The Department should also be responsible for obtaining the concurrence of other Departments if their interests are involved. Relaxation is required from time to time to allow disclosure of particular information to nations normally barred from receiving it. It is considered that Departments should have discretion to relax the normal rules provided.

- (a) the relaxation relates to information of interest to one Department only, and
- (b) the information is not more than one security grading higher than is permitted under the normal rules.

Guidance may be sought from the Exchange of Military Information Sub-Committee in such cases and in all other cases the Sub-Committee's guidance must be sought. In cases of special difficulty or importance the Exchange of Military Information Sub-Committee should in turn consult the Joint Planning Staff or Joint Intelligence Committee as appropriate.

10. Industrial Considerations

Information may be Government-owned or privately owned; secret or not secret; wholly patentable, wholly unpatentable, or partly patentable and partly unpatentable.

- (a) Wholly patentable, i.e. the whole of the information can be protected by a patent specification. If secret the Government will in all cases acquire the right to a secret patent in the United Kingdom and disclosure to a foreign Government should as far as possible be made on the following condition:

That the information is kept secret and the Government of that country will grant to the United Kingdom on request patent protection of suitable priority.

If not secret, i.e. such that publication in a patent specification is permissible, no problem arises. Government-owned inventions should be examined to see whether foreign patents should be obtained and exploited. In the case of privately-owned inventions the recipient Government should be referred to the owner, to negotiate terms.

- 4 -

- (b) Wholly unpatentable, i.e. the information, while commercially valuable, is not of the kind which can be protected by a patent specification. Government-owned information should only be supplied if the United Kingdom obtains a quid pro quo - * strategic, political or commercial-worth the value of the information. In the case of privately-owned information the foreign Government should merely be put in touch with the owner, but if secret, the owner should be warned that he should only communicate the information to accredited representatives of the foreign Government who are pledged to maintain secrecy.
- (c) Partly patentable and partly unpatentable. The only important case is where the information as a whole is secret and unpatentable, e.g. the layout, dimensions and specification of an aero engine, while some parts are patentable and may be patented without fear of disclosing the general design, e.g. a magneto.

The patented and unpatented parts should be treated separately as in (a) and (b) above but in the case of privately-owned patentable information care should be taken to inspect any patent applications before they are filed in the foreign country by the owner, to make sure that they do not disclose any secret information.

- (d) Departments who are negotiating with Foreign Governments for the communication to them of information of commercial value, may, depending upon the particular circumstances, decide to carry out the negotiations themselves and may lay down the terms upon which the information may be used by those Governments, or they may decide to entrust the negotiations, under suitable conditions, to private firms or individuals.

11. Exchange of industrial information with the United States is subject to a separate agreement.

12. Conditions of Disclosure

The following security conditions should be laid down and agreed to by all nations to whom information is disclosed:

- (a) The information received should be safeguarded under rules designed to give the same standard of security as that maintained in the United Kingdom.
- (b) The information is disclosed only for the use of the recipient Government and for the use, under seal of secrecy, of approved contractors engaged on a relevant defence project. Disclosure to any other Government, or release to the Press or in any other way, would constitute a breach of the agreement.

- 5 -

13. Duration of Proposed Policy

It is considered that the basic policy of disclosure by categories should continue indefinitely, although its application will depend on changing strategic and political factors which will necessitate periodical review. The United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff will therefore review periodically the countries to be placed in each category.

14. Control

Control of disclosure should rest with Departments in London, but they may have discretion to delegate responsibility for disclosure, within the normal rules, to Commanders-in-Chief, Heads of Service Missions, etc. when this is considered essential.

15. Summary

It has been decided that:

- (i) Disclosures are permissible only when they further United Kingdom foreign and strategic policy or for commercial reasons when they do not conflict with United Kingdom foreign and strategic policy. (Paragraph 1).
- (ii) For purposes of disclosure, nations should be re-categorized. (Paragraph 6 and Appendix).
- (iii) Disclosure should be on the basis of reciprocity and should be subject to an undertaking by the recipient nation to afford security safeguards comparable with those in force in the United Kingdom. (Paragraphs 8 and 12).
- (iv) There should be a procedure for relaxing the rules. (Paragraph 9).
- (v) The existing procedure for securing patent protection should be continued. (Paragraph 10).
- (vi) Policy should be kept under periodic review. (Paragraph 13).

A P P E N D I X

CATEGORIZATION OF FOREIGN NATIONS

Foreign nations have been placed in the following categories for the purpose of receiving military information:

Category 1

Nations who may be given up to and including "Top Secret" military information:

United States of America.

Category 2

Nations who, though normally given no higher information than Confidential may, in the interests of United Kingdom strategic policy, receive information up to and including Top Secret under special security arrangements such as those devised for the Western Union Defence talks.

Belgium, France, Holland and Luxembourg.

Category 3

Nations who may be given up to and including Confidential military information.

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey.

Category 4

Nations who may be given up to and including Restricted military information:

All foreign nations not included in the other four categories.

Category 5

Nations who must be given no classified information except as necessary to ensure reciprocal treatment for Service Attaches, Missions, etc., and in no case higher than Restricted.

The Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Roumania, and Yugoslavia.

JIC 1-2-1

SECRET

2839

OTTAWA? October 16th, 1948.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE:

Exchange of Personnel and Information
with United States Authorities

1. With further reference to Item 1051 of the 190th meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee, I am attaching herewith a memorandum received from the Secretary of the Canadian Section, Permanent Joint Board on Defence, and a copy of a memorandum to the members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, submitted to that body by Major-General E. O'Donnell of the United States Air Force.
2. Enclosed also is a copy of the discussion of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence held on August 19th-20th, 1948, referred to in paragraph one of Mr. Johnson's memorandum.

F.W.T. Lucas
F.W.T. Lucas, Lt.-Cdr.,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

Encl.

Referred to...	<i>DA</i>
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PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE

CANADIAN SECTION

Ottawa, October 14, 1948

The Secretary Joint Intelligence Committee.

At the last meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence held on August 19-20, there was some discussion about the exchange of information and personnel by Canada and the United States. I believe you have available a copy of paragraph 13 of the Journal of that meeting together with the paper submitted by the U.S. Air Force member of the Board.

You will note that it was agreed at the meeting "that the Canadian service members would present at the next meeting of the Board a parallel statement concerning general principles and specific policies on the Canadian side."

I have been in touch with the Canadian service members of the Board and they considered that the preparation of this paper was a matter for J.I.C. At their request I agreed to submit the matter to the J.I.C. I should be grateful, therefore, if you would arrange to place this item on the agenda of the next meeting of J.I.C.

(Sgd.) David M. Johnson

Secretary,
Canadian Section.

CSC 8-5

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

SECRET

August 27th, 1948.

The Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.
The Secretary,
Joint Security Committee.

Exchange of Personnel and Information
with United States Authorities

1. You will, no doubt, be interested to learn that the above subject was discussed at a recent meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence held on August 19th-20th, 1948.

2. The following is an extract from the discussion:

"The U.S. Air Force member reported on the general principles governing the release by the U.S. Military establishment of information to the Canadian Government. He also described the specific policy followed by the U.S. Air Force in this connection. The general principles and the specific Air Force policy are set forth in detail in Appendix No. 2, attached hereto. It was agreed that the U.S. Army and Navy members would confirm at the next meeting of the Board the applicability of the general principles to their services and would submit statements of the specific policies of their services. It was also agreed that the Canadian service members would present at the next meeting of the Board a parallel statement concerning general principles and specific policies on the Canadian side. The Board confirmed its view that the personnel interchange programme is not the appropriate medium for exchanging information between the two Governments and that the interchange officers should not act as collection or intelligence agents."

3. I regret I have been able to obtain only one copy of the Appendix No. 2 referred to, which is attached.

(J.A.K. Rutherford)
Lieutenant-Colonel,
Acting Secretary.

Enc.

APPENDIX NO. 2

PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE
Washington 25, D.C.

American Section
Room 2E844
Pentagon Building

File PJB 128-20

16 August 1948.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS, PJBD, CANADA-UNITED STATES:

SUBJECT: Exchange of Personnel and Information with United States Authorities

1. At the last PJBD meeting, Mr. Davies of the Canadian Defence Research Board pointed out that his agency had experienced some difficulty in arranging for exchange of personnel and in obtaining information. Specifically, his difficulty had been experienced in dealing with the U.S. Air Force. He recommended that the PJBD consider these difficulties with a view to extending the provisions of the 34th Recommendation regarding free exchange of military information so as to include information on research and development with defence implications.

2. After a general discussion, the Board considered that it was premature to make any recommendations on this subject and asked the USAF Member to examine the difficulties and make a report on the subject at the next meeting of the Board.

3. It appears appropriate here to state the substance of the most recent agreed policy by the Armed Forces of the United States on disclosure of classified military information to Canada.

General Principles

- (1) The Permanent Joint Board on Defence Recommendation of 20 November 1946 provides that the exchange of military information between the U.S. and Canada shall be subject to the national policy of the two countries. The pertinent policy of the U.S., in so far as it affects the disclosure of military information to Canada relates to: (1) the security of classified military information within the terms of the Espionage Act, and, (2) to the protection of private ownership rights in privately owned information which has been developed under military control and which bears a security classification, the owner thus being prohibited from gaining patent protection.
- (2) In view of the preceding, the U.S. Armed Forces must determine that proposed releases of classified military information to Canada conform with the following general principles:
 - (a) The Atomic Energy Commission has sole authority over Atomic Energy Information determined to be Restricted Data, even though items of such information might be military in nature.
 - (b) Information pertaining to cryptography and cryptographic devices must not be disclosed, except that which may be necessary to implement a formal agreement between the United States and Canada.

- (c) Information over which another nation friendly to the United States exercises any degree of control or jurisdiction will not be released, except that such information may be released to Canada with the consent of the third nation.
- (d) Intelligence, i.e., information pertaining to any matter alien to the United States, shall be released to Canada for purposes of collaboration in accordance with the purposes of the Recommendations made by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, and for other purposes relating to the mutual benefit of the two countries. Certain sources of intelligence, and methods of acquisition, must of necessity remain solely under the control of the United States, however, and for that reason the entire field of intelligence activity is not open to Canadian authorities. Virtually all completed intelligence studies and reports are releasable to Canada and are handed directly to the Canadian Staff in Washington as soon as they are published.
- (e) Information derogatory to the United States or any agency thereof, is for obvious reasons, not normally releasable to Canada. This item does not affect the exchange of information, however, because such material usually is a study or treatise on which there is a difference of opinion between agencies concerned. The actual information should become available for release as soon as it appears in approved, or proven form.
- (f) Information owned wholly or in part by a private firm or individual may not be released without the owners consent. Such information constitutes a very minor part of the volume of technical information of value to Canada, but requires considerable care in administering the programme of exchange of technical information.
- (g) The release of classified military information must be limited to that which is necessary to accomplish the purpose for which the release is made. This item meets the demands of the Espionage Act, in that when this principle is followed it shall be known beforehand that the release of the information shall be beneficial to the United States by being mutually beneficial to Canada and the United States. (It is this principle which causes the Armed Forces to withhold important documents which, in themselves, contain no information pertinent to the collaboration envisaged by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, but which require careful protection within the continental United States.
- (h) Information released must be protected by the Canadian Government substantially in accordance with the security afforded the information by the United States. (The U.S.-Canadian Security Agreement, accepted by Canada in 1947, fulfills this requirement, although the Agreement has not been formally adopted by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.)
- (i) Final decision as to the value of military information and the relative military benefits to be derived from its disclosure rests with the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of the Air Force, in matters of interest to his Department alone; or, with the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and/or the Air Force, acting jointly.

4. U.S. Air Force Policy

(1) Releasable Information. Subject to the general principles outlined in Par. 3 above, all classified military information under the control or jurisdiction of the Air Force, including that classified TOP SECRET may be, and normally shall be disclosed to the Canadian Government. This shall include, but not necessarily be limited to:

- (a) Research and Development information.
- (b) Order of Battle.
- (c) Operational and administrative details.
- (d) Planning, as it affects the security of the United States and Canada.
- (e) Training and tactics.
- (f) Intelligence.

(2) Administrative Details

- (a) The Director of Intelligence, Air Force, is responsible for formulating security policies under which information may be channeled to Canadian Authorities.
- (b) Canadian representatives, military or civilian, who are specialists or are representatives in any special field, may be accredited by the Director of Intelligence, upon certification by the proper Canadian authority, to receive information from the Air Force officials having control over Air Force information in those fields. The Foreign Liaison Branch acts as the central point of contact within the Air Force.
- (c) The personnel exchange programme, by its nature, is not the appropriate medium for exchanging current information between the Air Force and Canada. In the ground rules agreed upon by both countries concerning exchange officers, it was understood that they are not to be regarded as collection or intelligence agents. They are to be trained in the tactics and doctrines of the other nation's armed forces in order that each country may have a cadre thoroughly indoctrinated in the operational policies of the other. Exchange personnel may, however, request that certain specified documents be forwarded to their government.
- (d) Information which is not received by direct contact between USAF officers and Canadian officials, or which is not forwarded to Canada by voluntary action on the part of the Air Force, may be requested by the interested Canadian Service through the Foreign Liaison Branch Directorate of Intelligence.

5. The substance of U.S. Air Force policy concerning disclosure of classified military information to Canada is that everything is interchangeable which is necessary to implement mutually agreed upon programmes.

6. With regard to specific difficulties experienced by the Canadian Defence Research Board with Air Force authorities at Wright Field, it can now be reported that they have been rectified

- 4 -

to the satisfaction of the Defence Research Member of the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington. The request of the Canadian Defence Research Board to place Dr. Watson on one year's duty with the Electronics Sub-Division, Engineering Division, Wright Field, will be granted. Further, the Air Force is prepared, within reason, to accommodate other representatives of the Canadian Defence Research Board on a similar basis. It is felt, however, that each case should be decided upon its own merits. It is believed that in this manner the exchange of personnel will be effected between the Canadian Defence Research Board and the Air Force without difficulty, and that it will not be necessary to alter the Recommendation of November 20, 1946, dealing with the interchange of personnel of the armed forces.

(sgd) EMMETT O'DONNELL, Jr.
Major General, USAF
US Air & Steering Member

S E C R E T

OTTAWA, February 25, 1949.

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD ON DEFENCE

FROM: THE CANADIAN SERVICE MEMBERS, PJBD.

Re: Exchange of Personnel and Information
with United States Authorities

1. At previous meetings of the Board, the United States Service members have reported on the general principles governing the release by the United States Military Establishment of information to the Canadian Government, and the specific policy followed by each of the United States Services in this connection. It was agreed that, at the next meeting, the Canadian Service members would present a parallel statement concerning the principles and policies on the Canadian side.

2. In presenting the statement which follows, the Canadian Service members desire to point out that it deals only with the exchange of classified defence information between the Service Departments of the two Governments, and should not be taken to restrict in any way the exchange of classified information between other Departments of the two Governments.

3. The Canadian Service members wish to reaffirm, in this context, the view expressed by the PJBD at its meeting on August 19-20, 1948, that the personnel exchange programme, by its nature, is not the appropriate medium for exchanging information between the two Governments. Exchange personnel may, however, request that certain information be forwarded through the appropriate channels.

4. General Principles:

- (a) The 34th Recommendation of the PJBD, which was approved by the Canadian Government on May 9th, 1947, states:

"Subject to the national policies of the two Governments, there shall be a free and comprehensive exchange of military information in so far as it affects the security of the two countries, the circulation of which shall be subject to such restrictions as may be specified by the originating country."

- (b) The national policy of Canada is that all classified defence information may be disclosed to United States Service Departments and agencies, for purposes of collaboration in accordance with the Recommendations of the PJBD, or for other purposes relating to the mutual benefit of the two countries, subject to the following restrictions:

- (i) The policy in no way relieves officials of their obligations under the Official Secrets Act, which requires them to obtain appropriate

-2-

authority for the disclosure of such information.

- (ii) Information over which any other country friendly to Canada exercises any degree of control or jurisdiction may not be released without that country's consent.
- (iii) Information of concern to Canadian manufacturers, whether Government-owned or privately-owned, and whether wholly patentable, wholly unpatentable, or partly patentable and partly unpatentable, may not be released without due consideration of certain prescribed methods of protecting Canadian industrial interests.
- (iv) Information relating to atomic energy, even if it is military in nature, may not be released without the authority of the Atomic Energy Control Board.
- (v) Information pertaining to cryptographic devices may not be disclosed except in so far as it may be necessary to implement a formal agreement with the United States.
- (vi) Certain sources of intelligence information, and methods of acquisition, must remain solely under the control of Canada, and this information may not be released to any other country.
- (vii) Information released to the United States must be safeguarded under substantially the same rules of security as the Canadian authorities themselves impose, and must not be disclosed to any other country or to the public without the consent of the Canadian Government.

TOP SECRET

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~~TOP SECRET~~

D.N.I.

Can see no radical changes in the current Canadian policy, with the exception of "an overhaul of the Canadian Patent system", which is out our (J.S.C.) prerogative. This is an essential factor if we are to adopt (and we must) this or a parallel policy.

It is interesting to note that the U.S.A. consider the British Dominions separate countries, (ref. Appendix II para. 5), as far as information passing is concerned. Therefore U.K. cannot pass U.S. military information to Canada.

- Strongly recommend:
- (a) adopting this policy.
 - (b) Re-categorize the Nations.
 - (c) External Affairs and Trade & Commerce take a more active part in assisting in Para's. 8 - 9 and 10.
 - (d) That the Canadian Government examine its Patent organizations to assume the necessary protection
 - (e) That our U.S. agreement be embodied in the Naval aspects in the final notification to Commands, etc.

Consider this nullifies the Top Secret questions to D.N.I. Admiralty, unless you wish to obtain a personal briefing as to its smooth(or otherwise) implementation.


(H.F. Rankin),
S.O. (Security)

13th October, 1948.
Ottawa, Canada.

TOP SECRET

DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION TO OTHER COUNTRIES

Director of Military Intelligence - November 15th, 1948

In accordance with the decision reached at 191st Meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Canadian Army views and recommendations on the marginally noted subject are as follows:

- (a) The old policy was mainly concerned with the release of technical information to foreign countries. In the new UK policy provision is made for the release of intelligence as well.

Comment - There should be NO objection to the change provided that only Canadian Intelligence is used and care exercised with regard to both the country being dealt with and the country being reported upon.

- (b) The old policy placed all countries in three categories (A, B & C). New policy provides two additional categories (1, 2, 3, 4 & 5).

Comment - This appears to be a more realistic classification than the old policy and it is considered that there should be NO objection to the inclusion of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Switzerland and Portugal in category 3 nor the passing of RESTRICTED information to the other countries in category 4. With regard to category 2 it is felt that Canada should create a category 2 and leave for later discussion those countries which should be considered for this category.

- (c) Provision is made in the new policy for the adjustment of the category system in that a department may, if it so desires, pass information to another country one classification higher than the category allows.

Comment - This is only reasonable if a department is to work the reciprocal method with any degree of success; and the policy provides that the information must refer to that one department only.

- (d) The reciprocity rule is more clearly explained in the new policy.

Comment - Paras 7 and 8 should be adopted into the Canadian policy, substituting Canada for UK in para 7.

- (e) One small change in the paragraph on Industrial Considerations is noted. "Quid pro quo" - strategic, monetary or both" has been changed to read "strategic, political or commercial".

Comments - The addition of 'political' into the "quid pro quo" - in the new policy appears to be a worthwhile amendment.

- (f) Paragraph 14 deals with control of disclosure of information which in the old policy was vested in the departments concerned. The new policy ~~allows~~ allows delegation of responsibility to Commanders-in-Chief, Heads of Service Missions, etc., when essential.

Comment - It is NOT considered that this paragraph is applicable to Canada as the Service Missions in Washington and London would hardly appear to be the type referred to in the policy. It is felt that this refers to Missions similar to the British Military Mission to Greece which fulfils a different purpose than the Missions mentioned above. It is recommended that this paragraph be deleted in the Canadian policy.

Recommendations

It is recommended, therefore, that:

- (a) The new policy be adopted as Canadian policy, with the exception of paragraph 14.
- (b) The countries comprising category 2 be the subject of further discussion in the light of Canadian participation in Western Union.

It is noted that this policy does not refer in any way to the Commonwealth Countries, which is a variation from the former policy.

Director of Criminal Investigation - RCMP - November 8th, 1948

With reference to Minutes of the 191st meeting, item 1056, paragraph 9, the following is submitted:

It is not considered that we have enough information before us to justify an alteration in our present procedure, which is set down in the Security Panel memorandum of October 15, 1948.

The special considerations which have caused the United Kingdom to set up a particular category for Belgium, France, Holland and Luxemburg do not seem to apply with equal force to Canada. In any event our present procedure is elastic enough to allow for adequate attention to individual requests.

It is submitted that the External Affairs view should guide us on the question of whether or not Eire should be dropped to a lower category.

Director of Intelligence (Air) - November 8th, 1948

The following comments are offered on the memorandum entitled "Disclosure of UK Military Information to Foreign Nations" as forwarded by your JIC 1-2-1 dated 14 Oct 48:

- (a) It is doubtful whether the reasons for the adoption of the new categorization system by the UK, as stated in para 5 of the memo, apply equally well to Canada at the present time. For instance the new Category 2 was evolved to meet a requirement imposed by UK participation in Western Union Defense talks. Unless and until Canada also participates, this category is considered superfluous.
- (b) The new Category 4, created for the purpose of distinguishing the Soviet Union and her satellites from the rest of the old Category C nations, is likewise considered to be an addition not required by Canadian needs. The UK requirement for this category is primarily caused by UK agreements to assist in the training of certain nations' armed forces, a situation not shared by Canada.

It is considered that any requirement which may arise for a nation to receive information of a higher classification than its security category will permit should continue to be dealt with by the previously established channel; namely, clearance by the JIC. If, in the future, the volume of such requests should render this channel impracticable, consideration can then be given to a modification along the lines of para. 9 of the UK memo.

In summary, DIA does not consider the adoption of the five category system justified by Canadian security requirements. DIA recommends the continuance of the three category system but suggests a review and revision in the listings of individual nations as made necessary by international developments since the adoption of the original policy.

Director of Naval Intelligence - November End, 1948

There does not appear to be any radical changes in the current Canadian policy and it is strongly recommended that:

- (a) Canada adopt policy outlined.
- (b) That foreign nations be re-categorised.
- (c) That the department of Trade and Commerce assisted by External Affairs take a more active part in the implementation of paras. 8, 9 and 10.
- (d) If approved, all Naval Commands will be informed of our U.K. Agreement.

There is one point, however, which must be taken into consideration when applying the overall U.K. policy to Canada and that is the necessity of overhauling our present Patent Organisation to embody the necessary factors which will provide protection to U.K. and U.S. military equipment which may be manufactured in Canada.

FILE NO. CSC 8-1

TOP SECRET

2028



CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
CABINET SECRETARIAT OFFICES,
EAST BLOCK, OTTAWA

7th October, 1948.

Referred to <i>ACNS</i>
OCT 8 1948
File No. <i>TS 11550-10</i>
Chg'd to

✓ C.G.S.
C.A.S.
C.N.S.

U.K. policy - disclosure of military information
to foreign countries

1. Attached is a copy of a U.K. Chiefs of Staff report C.O.S. (48)180(0) dated 13th August, 1948, outlining the policy of the U.K. government in respect of the disclosure of U.K. military information to foreign nations.
2. This report has been forwarded for the information of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff. At the same time copies have been sent to the U.K. High Commissioners in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, requesting them to convey the substance of the report to the governments of those countries and to enquire whether they intend to adopt a similar policy themselves. The policy outlined in the attached report does not imply any change in the present policy of the United Kingdom toward Commonwealth governments.
3. I am informed that enquiry has been made through External Affairs in respect of the Canadian government's intentions and has been passed to the Security Panel for report. The Security Panel has in turn referred the matter to the Joint Security Committee. Provision is made, therefore, for inclusion of military views.

(1) DNI
(2) ACNS

Referred
W.W.
8/10

W.W. Bean
(W.W. Bean),
Group Captain, R.C.A.F.,
Secretary.

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Sec. JKSL S Canada

TOP SECRET

Copy No. *86*

C.O.S.(48)180(0)

13TH AUGUST, 1948

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

DISCLOSURE OF BRITISH MILITARY INFORMATION
TO FOREIGN NATIONS

Report by the Chiefs of Staff.

We have re-examined, in the light of subsequent developments, the existing policy^o of disclosure of military information to foreign nations, which was approved^r by the Defence Committee in November, 1945. We have extended our review to include all forms of Military Information as defined in paragraph 3 below. In preparing our report we have borne in mind that the disclosure of military information to foreign nations is normally made only with the object of furthering the interests of our foreign and strategic policy; disclosure for commercial reasons is permissible and indeed desirable when it does not conflict with that policy. We have also been guided by the policy^t governing the supply of arms to other nations.

2. In general, we consider that the existing policy should be confirmed, with amendment in the categorisation of nations. We also consider that the procedure for relaxing the strict application of current policy in exceptional circumstances should be clarified and simplified.

Military Information.

3. We have taken the term "Military Information" to refer to information which is the property of, or the primary concern of, the Service Departments and the Ministry of Supply, or is of defence interest. Its disclosure may take the form of the supply of equipment.

It covers :-

(a) Information, that is to say, knowledge of British forces, equipment, research and development, etc. This is further subdivided into :-

(i) Scientific information, when this has resulted from fundamental research and development carried out under Government auspices or which has been allotted a security classification.

o D.O.(45)32
r D.O.(45)14th Meeting, Item 3.
+ D.O.(45)11

- (ii) Technical information about equipment, manufacturing processes, and operational technique.
 - (iii) Non-Technical information, such as Orders of battle, strengths, locations, operations, training methods, plans, organisation and publications of the fighting Services.
- (b) Intelligence, that is to say knowledge of foreign countries, in all the fields at (a) above, possessed by the U.K.

Agreement with the U.S.A.

4. Our report refers only to British information. Instructions relating to the disclosure of American or joint American-British owned military information is the subject of a special agreement with the Americans.

Policy for grading by Categories.

5. We propose to amend the existing Categories B and C in the light of political developments. We now stand in closer relationship to France and the Benelux countries than to other Category B nations, and the deterioration of our relations with the Soviet Union and her satellites makes distinction necessary between them and other Category C nations, with some of whom we have agreements to assist in training their armed forces. We have reluctantly been forced to adopt five instead of the current three categories and have grouped nations accordingly in the Appendix to our report.

Categorisation of nations for disclosure purposes.

6. In the light of the foregoing paragraphs, we have prepared a standard policy by which nations are categorised as described below for disclosure purposes. In each of the first four categories the nations may receive at the discretion of Departments, information up to and including the classification for that category.

Category 1.

Nations who may be given up to and including Top Secret military information.

Category 2.

Nations who, though normally given no higher information than Confidential may, in the interests of British strategic policy, receive information up to and including Top Secret under special security arrangements, such as those devised for the Western Union Defence talks.

Category 3.

Nations who may be given up to and including Confidential military information.

Category 4.

Nations who may be given up to and including Restricted military information.

Category 5.

Nations who must be given no classified information except as necessary to ensure reciprocal treatment for Service Attaches, Missions, etc. and never higher than Restricted.

7. We emphasise that the rules for disclosure of classified military information under each of the categories are permissive. No nation should be given any information unless we thereby derive some political, military or economic benefits.

The Reciprocity Rule

8. It is important that the disclosure of Military Information shall be on a reciprocal basis. With some nations our relations are so close that reciprocity is implicit, while other nations may have nothing to offer that we need, though it may, for instance, be possible to ask for "intelligence" in exchange for "equipment". With the low category nations reciprocity is essential as a weapon, should it be desired to stave off an awkward request by making a counter request known to be impossible of fulfilment. The counter request need not necessarily be confined to the requirements of one Department. We consider that the reciprocity rule should be maintained.

Machinery for Interim Adjustments.

9. The security implications of each disclosure, even within the approved Categories, should be examined by the Department proposing to make it. The Department should also be responsible for obtaining the concurrence of other Departments if their interests are involved. Relaxation is required from time to time to allow disclosure of particular information to nations normally barred from receiving it. We consider that Departments should have discretion to relax the normal rules provided

- (a) the relaxation relates to information of interest only to one Department, and
- (b) the information is not more than one security grading higher than is permitted under the normal rules.

Guidance may be sought from the Exchange of Military Information Sub-Committee in such cases and in all other cases the Sub-Committee's guidance must be sought. In cases of special difficulty or importance the Exchange of Military Information Sub-Committee should in turn consult the Joint Planning Staff or Joint Intelligence Committee as appropriate.

Industrial Considerations.

10. Information may be Government-owned or privately-owned; secret or not secret; wholly patentable, wholly unpatentable, or partly patentable and partly unpatentable.

- (a) Wholly patentable, i.e. the whole of the information can be protected by a patent specification. If secret the Government will in all cases acquire the right to a secret patent in U.K. and disclosure to a foreign Government should as far as possible be made on the following condition:

That the information is kept secret and the Government of that country will grant us on request patent protection of suitable priority.

If not secret, i.e. such that publication in a patent specification is permissible, no problem arises. Government-owned inventions should be examined to see whether foreign patents should be obtained and exploited. In the case of privately-owned inventions the recipient Government should be referred to the owner, to negotiate terms.

- (b) Wholly unpatentable, i.e. the information, while commercially valuable, is not of the kind which can be protected by a patent specification. Government-owned information should only be supplied if we obtain a quid pro quo - strategic, political or commercial - worth the value of the information. In the case of privately-owned information the foreign Government should merely be put in touch with the owner, but if secret, the owner should be warned he should only communicate the information to accredited representatives of the foreign Governments who are pledged to maintain secrecy.

- (c) Partly patentable and partly unpatentable. The only important case is where the information as a whole is secret and unpatentable, e.g. the layout, dimensions and specification of an aero engine, while some parts are patentable and may be patented without fear of disclosing the general design, e.g. a magneto.

The patented and unpatented parts should be treated separately as in (a) and (b) above but in the case of privately-owned patentable information care should be taken to inspect any patent applications before they are filed in the foreign country by the owner, to make sure that they do not disclose any secret information.

- (d) Departments who are negotiating with Foreign Governments for the communication to them of information of commercial value may, depending upon the particular circumstances, decide to carry out the negotiations themselves and may lay down the terms upon which the information may be used by those Governments, or they may decide to entrust the negotiations, under suitable conditions, to private firms or individuals.

11. Exchange of industrial information with the Americans is subject to a separate agreement.

Conditions of Disclosure.

12. The following security conditions should be laid down and agreed to by all nations to whom information is disclosed:-

- (a) The information received should be safeguarded under rules designed to give the same standard of security as we maintain.
- (b) The information is disclosed only for the use of the recipient Government and for the use, under seal of secrecy, of approved contractors engaged on a relevant defence project. Disclosure to any other Government, or release to the Press or in any other way, would constitute a breach of the agreement.

(/ To be concluded.)

Duration of Proposed Policy.

13. It is considered that the basic policy of disclosure by categories should continue indefinitely, although its application will depend on changing strategic and political factors which will necessitate periodical review. We therefore propose to review periodically the countries to be placed in each category.

Control

14. Control of disclosure should rest with Departments in London, but they may have discretion to delegate responsibility for disclosure, within the normal rules, to Commanders-in-Chief, Heads of Service Missions, etc, when this is considered essential.

Conclusions .

15. We conclude that:-

- (i) Disclosures are permissible only when they further our foreign and strategic policy or for commercial reasons when they do not conflict with our foreign and strategic policy. (Paragraph 1).
- (ii) For purposes of disclosure, nations should be recategorised. (Paragraph 6 and Appendix).
- (iii) Disclosure should be on the basis of reciprocity and should be subject to an undertaking by the recipient nation to afford security safeguards comparable with our own. (Paragraphs 8 and 12).
- (iv) There should be a procedure for relaxing the rules. (Paragraph 9).
- (v) The existing procedure for securing patent protection should be continued. (Paragraph 10).
- (vi) Policy should be kept under periodic review. (Paragraph 13).

(Initialled)

TEDDER.
J. H. D. CUNNINGHAM.
MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN.

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, S.W.1.

13TH AUGUST, 1948.

A P P E N D I X

CATEGORISATION OF FOREIGN NATIONS

Foreign Nations have been placed in the following categories for the purposes of receiving military information:-

Category 1

Nations who may be given up to and including Top Secret military information:-

U.S.A.

Category 2

Nations, who, though normally given no higher information than Confidential may, in the interests of British strategic policy, receive information up to and including Top Secret under special security arrangements, such as those devised for the Western Union Defence talks:-

Belgium, France, Holland and Luxembourg.

Category 3

Nations who may be given up to and including Confidential military information:-

Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, Eire, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey.

Category 4

Nations who may be given up to and including Restricted military information:-

All nations not included in the other four categories.

Category 5.

Nations who must be given no classified information except as necessary to ensure reciprocal treatment for Service Attaches, Missions, etc., and in no case higher than Restricted:-

The Soviet Union, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Roumania and Yugoslavia.

ANNEX

SECURITY AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM.

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff will make every effort to insure that the United States will maintain the military security classifications established by United Kingdom authorities with respect to military information of U.K. origin, and the military security classifications established by U.K.-U.S. agreement with respect to military information of joint U.K.-U.S. origin or development; will safeguard accordingly such military information; will not exploit such information for production for other than military purposes; and, will not disclose such military information to a third nation without U.K. consent. The British Chiefs of Staff will make every effort to insure that the United Kingdom will maintain the military security classifications established by the U.S. authorities with respect to military information of U.S. origin, and the military security classifications established by U.K.-U.S. agreement with respect to military information of joint U.K.-U.S. origin or development; will safeguard accordingly such military information; will not exploit such information for production for other than military purposes; and will not disclose such military information to a third nation without U.S. consent. This agreement applies to military information disclosed by the United States to the United Kingdom or by the United Kingdom to the United States or exchanged between the United States and the United Kingdom on and after the date of acceptance of this agreement by the United Kingdom. The provisions contained in C.C.S. 953, 953/1, and 953/2 will apply to information disclosed by either country to the other or exchanged between the United States and the United Kingdom between 1 September 1939 and the date of acceptance of this agreement by the United Kingdom.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff and the British Chiefs of Staff agree that insofar as the U.S. and the U.K. are concerned, the safeguards indicated above also apply to information developed by the U.S. and U.K. jointly in collaboration with a third nation.

3. It is agreed that the provisions of C.G.S. 210/4 shall remain in full force and effect until cancelled or superseded by another agreement which shall then be controlling in this respect.

4. It is agreed in respect of classified information communicated by one country to the other, that the recipient country shall use its best endeavours within the framework of its laws and rules to prevent any loss of patent rights in the information. Specifically it is declared and agreed that:

- a. Any rights of the originator to obtain patent protection in the recipient country in respect of the information communicated are not and will not be prejudiced by virtue of the introduction of the information into such country.

- b. The information, so long as it remains classified, will not be used or disclosed by the recipient country in any manner likely to prejudice the rights of the originator to obtain patent protection in respect thereof, but if the recipient country desires to use or to disclose the information in any manner likely so to prejudice the rights of the originator, then the recipient country will immediately notify the country of origin of the full circumstances of such intended use or disclosure, and such use or disclosure shall not be effected until approval is given by the country of origin.

- c. Each country when so requested by the other and to the extent consistent with its laws and rules will use its best endeavours.
 - (1) to have maintained in secrecy any patent application filed in the recipient country in respect of the information for so long as may be desired by the country of origin, and

 - (2) to supply reports of the manner in which the information embodied in a patent application has been used or disclosed.

5. For the purpose of this agreement the United Kingdom, the British Dominions, and India are considered to be separate nations.



FILE NO.

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1950-4

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CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
CABINET SECRETARIAT OFFICES,
EAST BLOCK, OTTAWA

10th August, 1948. 50536

C.G.S.
C.A.S. ✓
C.N.S. ✓
C.D.R.B.

Referred to.....
AUG 11 1948
File No. 1950-13
Chg'd to.....

Release of Classified Service and
Defence Research Board information to
Government Agencies, Government
Departments and non-Government Agencies,
Civil Firms and Individuals

① ACNSB 20/8
② DNI


1. I attach report of the Joint Security Committee regarding the above.
2. This report will be going forward to the Security Panel for consideration by representatives of other departments, and I shall advise you as soon as a decision has been reached. Meanwhile, I presume that you will let me know if the report of the Joint Security Committee is in any way unsatisfactory.

(J.A.K. Rutherford)
Lieutenant-Colonel,
Acting Secretary.

Enc.

C.N.S.

Concurs with this report.



Handwritten initials and date: 20/8 PA

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ORIGINAL AS IS

Security of Information
Release of Classified Service and Defence
Research Board Information to Government
Departments, Government and non-Government
Agencies, Civil Firms and Individuals.

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1 Object

The object of this paper is to outline procedure whereby classified Service and Defence Research Board information may be released, on request, to the following:

(a) Vulnerable Government Departments and Government Agencies.

The Office of the Prime Minister.
Privy Council Office.
Department of External Affairs.
Atomic Energy Control Board.
Canadian Arsenal Limited.
Canadian Commercial Corporation.
National Research Council.
Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
Industrial Defence Board^{*}.

(^{*}Presumably Industrial Defence Board will be declared vulnerable within the meaning of Cabinet Directive No 4)

(b) Non-Vulnerable Government Departments and Government Agencies.

Those Departments and Government Agencies NOT enumerated in Cabinet Directive No 4.

(c) Non-Government Agencies or Individuals.

(d) Civil Firms.

2 Vulnerable Government Departments and Government Agencies.

It is assumed that these Departments and Agencies having been declared vulnerable by Cabinet Directive No 4 will have cleared their personnel from a security standpoint. In consequence of this, a free interchange of Service and Defence Research Board information may take place with these Department and Agencies and the Department of National Defence on a "need to know" basis, subject to conditions in paragraph 7.

3 Non-Vulnerable Government Departments and Government Agencies.

Notwithstanding Cabinet Directive No 4 which states in effect that it is NOT mandatory that all personnel in these Department and Government Agencies should be cleared from a security viewpoint, classified Service and Defence Research Board information may be released on a "need to know" basis, provided that the section of the Department or Agency, requesting such information is declared vulnerable within the meaning of Cabinet Directive No 4.

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- 2 -

4 Non-Government Agencies and Individuals

Classified Service and Defence Research Board information may have to be released to Agencies and individuals carrying out work on behalf of the Department of National Defence, e.g., Arctic Institute of North America, Canadian Ordnance Association. The Service desiring to release classified information to such Agencies or individuals must first obtain security clearance from the Directorate of Intelligence concerned and when requesting such clearance, must submit the name of the Agency and the names and addresses of all individuals into whose hands the information will pass.

5 Civil Firms

Where it is necessary to pass classified Service and Defence Research Board information to civil firms the procedure outlined in the preceding paragraph will apply. Where a civil firm wishes to pass classified Service and Defence Research Board information entrusted to them by the Department of National Defence to another civil firm, permission must be requested from the Department of National Defence. In requesting such permission, full details of the receiving firm and its officials must accompany the request.

6 UK and US Classified Information

Requests for classified United Kingdom or United States information will be cleared by the Director of Intelligence concerned, who will request United Kingdom or United States concurrence before releasing such information. This procedure need not apply in the case of requests from Departments and Agencies declared vulnerable, provided that an assurance has been received as specified in paragraph 7 below.

7 To ensure that classified Service and Defence Research Board information will be protected in the same manner as in the Department of National Defence, it is respectfully suggested that the Deputy Minister be asked to send a letter to all vulnerable Departments and Government Agencies (less those having membership on the Security Panel), detailing security safeguards and requesting their assurance that all such security safeguards will be met. Similarly, a letter to non-vulnerable Departments referred to in paragraph 3, might be sent, requesting their cooperation in declaring certain Sections vulnerable, and their assurance that information requested will be subject to security safeguards as above.

DIRECTOR OF NAVAL PLANS AND INTELLIGENCE
 INTERNAL MINUTE SHEET

FROM:		TO:
SUBJECT:		
NS FILE NO:		DATE:
REFERRED TO:	INITIALS & DATE	REMARKS:
SO (S)		<p>To note.</p> <p>There is a lot of background information on this subject. Where is it placed?</p> <p>Key 11550-2</p> <p>Chg. DRPD, 23.2.46</p> <p>also FD # 3291 - chg to DRPD.</p> <p>On completion of circulation request all relevant files be passed to me.</p>
SO(P) (1)		
SO(P) (2)		
SO (Q)		
D/DNP		
① SO (I)	DD 4/5	
NID (1)	WAW 3-5	
② NID (2)	Alb 813	
NID (3)	Ants 5-5	
SO (T)		
③ SO (STAT)	DD 4/5	
④ JIS (N)	DD 4/5	
⑤ SO (SEC)	1/11/5	
⑥ X/DNI		
DNPI		
CAIR		
ACCESSION LIST		
EDITOR RCN#R		

- NOTE: 1. The first officer receiving this file is responsible for:
- (a) Completing the Staff Index Form.
 - (b) Either precisising or indicating items of interest.
 - (c) Initiating any action required in D.N.P.I.
 - (d) Checking internal distribution and preparing External Minute Sheet for outside distribution considered desirable.
2. The Minute Sheet is to be attached to the office copy.
It is NOT to leave the Directorate.



IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No. N.M.V.S. 11225-1

CANADIAN JOINT STAFF
1760 N ~~2125~~ STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON

1250

TOP SECRET

NAVAL MEMBER

19th April, 1948

FROM: Naval Member, Canadian Joint Staff,
Washington, D.C.

TO: The Naval Secretary,
Naval Service Headquarters, Ottawa.

Subject: Agreement between Australian and U.S.
Governments on the channels to be used in
procuring U.S. classified military informa-
tion for Australian Government civilian
officials (E.G., Their representative in
the British Commonwealth Scientific Office,
Washington, D.C.) Report graded A-1.

Refer to *Staff*
MAY 7 1948
File No. *211637-9*
Orig'd to

Submitted for the information of the Department, for the attention of the Director of Naval Plans and Intelligence.

2. It is understood that the following form of agreement:

- (a) Was drawn up by the three Australian Service Representatives in Washington.
- (b) Is acceptable to the three United States Service Departments.
- (c) Was sent by the Australian Government's Representative in Washington to Australia and there approved on the highest level.

3. The U.S. Service Departments will only recognize requests for classified military information from accredited Service representatives in Washington and any departure from this channel they discountenance. In view of the foregoing, the following is suggested:

Requests for classified military information.

- (a) All requests from Australian Government civilian officials for U.S. classified military information should be sponsored by the Washington representative of the relevant Australian Service Department who will be concerned with safeguarding U.S. conditions of release.

Clearances for Visits of direct interest to the Australian Services.

- (b) All requests from Australia for clearances for Australian civilian officials to visit either U.S. Service establishments or civil plants over which U.S. Service departments hold any security control, should be sponsored by the relevant Australian Service representation in Washington, who will be concerned with safeguarding U.S. conditions of release.

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

350

Clearances for visits of indirect interest to the
Australian Services.

- (c) Australian Government civilian officials requiring such clearances will forward their requests through their Embassy to the U.S. State Department.
- (d) A list of all plants over which U.S. Services exercise security control is being sought.

V. S. Godfrey
(V.S. Godfrey)
Commodore, R.C.N.,
Naval Member, Canadian Joint Staff.

H.Q. 1024

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

311530-2
FILE NO. - ~~TS/SSO-9, Vol. 1~~...

REFERRED TO	REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)
<u>memo for file</u>	Further correspondence on DNP 1's personal file - "Correspondence with C.N.A., Washington" E 15/8/47

TOP SECRET.

Received from the Director of Naval Plans and Intelligence,
Department of National Defence (Naval Services), Ottawa -

T.S. 11550-9, dated 12th July 1947 - Copy No. 3.

Signature *A. G. Lamb*
Rank *W/C*
Date *15 Jul 47*

The Director of Intelligence (Air),
"A" Building.

000368

TOP SECRET.

Received from the Director of Naval Plans and Intelligence,
Department of National Defence (Naval Services), Ottawa -

T.S. 11550-9, dated 12th July 1947 - Copy No. 2

Signature



W. A. B. ANDERSON
COLONEL
D. M. I.

Rank

Date

14 JUL 1947

The Director of Military Intelligence,
"A" Building.

000369

P.C. 11550-9
Vol. "1"

"A" Building

Copy No. 4

12th July, 1947.

TOP SECRETExchange of Classified Information

With reference to your J.I.C. 1-2 dated 8th July, 1947, I concur in paragraph 2 of D.N.I.'s letter H.C.P.G. 722-37 (D.N.I.) dated 9th July, 1947.

The only other matter that is relevant is the fact that personnel are exchanged between Canada and the United States in both Army and Air Force Intelligence organizations. This integration of officers between the two countries greatly facilitates the exchange of intelligence information.

Up to the present, the Chief of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy Department has refused to consider similar exchange of officers with the R.C.N.

E.H. Lay
(E.H. Lay)
Captain, R.C.N.,
Director of Naval Plans
and Intelligence.

566.

Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee,
Room 319,
East Block,
Ottawa, Ontario.

Distribution:

Copy No. 1 - Sec. J.I.C.
Copy No. 2 - D.N.I.
Copy No. 3 - D.I. (A)
Copy No. 4 - P.C. 11550-9
Copy No. 5 - File

Deep 14/4/47
By hand
B

50)

TOP SECRET

HQTS 722-37 (DMI)
9 Jul 47

Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee,
Room 319, East Block,
OTTAWA, Ontario.

1203

Exchange of Military Information with USA

1. In reply to your JIC 1-2, dated 8 Jul 47, it is presumed that it will be in order to refer only to those arrangements for exchange of information which have so far been brought within the scope of the Military Cooperation Committee. As you know, other arrangements have been negotiated direct between the Canadian Army General Staff and the Director of Intelligence, US War Department General Staff, but so far these matters have not been dealt with through MCC channels.
2. On this assumption, the following aspects ought to be referred to in reply to the Secretary, Canadian Section, MCC:
 - (a) The Thirty-Fourth Recommendation has agreed to a complete exchange of military information, subject to the national policies of the two countries.
 - (b) Informal Chiefs of Staff approval has been given by each country to a paper covering the security implementation of the exchange of information under the Thirty-Fourth Recommendation.
 - (c) A draft Appendix to the Basic Security Plan has now been prepared by the Strategic Information Sub-Committee of the Military Cooperation Committee and is awaiting formal MCC concurrence, after which it will receive presumably informal Chiefs of Staff concurrence. This Appendix deals with the compilation and exchange of topographical and environmental information about the northern portion of the Western Hemisphere.
 - (d) A proposal is under consideration by the Joint Planning elements of the MCC to create a Military Intelligence Sub-Committee, which would prepare an Appendix to the Basic Security Plan covering the degree of collaboration in the field of third-power Intelligence. Agreed proposals for the establishment of this sub-committee have not yet been submitted to the MCC for approval.
3. As the foregoing projects, affecting the exchange of military information with the Americans, have all been negotiated by, and are under the control of, the Canadian Joint Planning Committee, it is suggested that any statement prepared by the JIC be submitted through the Joint Planners.



Colonel,
Director of Military Intelligence.

DISTRIBUTION:

→ DNPI,
DIA,
DMO & P

JIC 1-2

TOP SECRET



CANADA

Privy Council Office

Cabinet Secretariat

Ottawa, Canada

July 8th, 1947.

1202

D.N.P.I.
D.M.I.
D.I.A.

Exchange of Military Information

1. The attached communication has been received from the Secretary, Canadian Section, Military Co-operation Committee, regarding the above-mentioned subject.
2. It is requested that I may have a summary of the arrangements at present in force between the Directorates of Naval Plans and Intelligence, Military Intelligence and Intelligence (Air) for the exchange of military information with United States authorities.
3. I understand that certain of the arrangements carried out by the Directorates of Intelligence are more or less of a private nature and I would be grateful for guidance as to those phases of this exchange which you will wish to have officially passed to the Military Co-operation Committee.

F.W.T. Lucas
F.W.T. Lucas, Lt.-Cdr.,
Acting Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

Encl.

TOP SECRET

M E M O R A N D U M

TS.78-2-2 (D/AMAP/P)

7th July 1947.

1202

Secretary, JIC.

Meeting of Cabinet Defence Committee and Canadian Section,
Permanent Joint Board on Defence

1. I have been asked by the Secretary, Cabinet Defence Committee to prepare a series of Progress Reports on various phases of defence co-operation with the United States. These are to be placed before the next joint meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee and the Canadian Section, Permanent Joint Board on Defence.
2. In this regard I should be grateful if you would furnish me with a brief factual report, not exceeding one page, on the present position of the exchange of military information aspect.
3. This memorandum should reach this office by 15th July.

(Sgd.) J.C. Wade

(J.C. Wade) Squadron Leader
Secretary, Canadian Section
Military Co-operation Committee.

DIRECTOR OF NAVAL PLANS AND INTELLIGENCE
INTERNAL MINUTE SHEET

FROM: _____ TO: _____

SUBJECT: _____

NS FILE NO: _____ DATE: _____


REFERRED TO:	INITIALS & DATE	REMARKS
SO(S)		<p><u>VI</u> DNPI</p> <p>SO (Security) is undoubtedly right that the Communist situation in Australia is the reason why that country is omitted.</p> <p>In view of this and our fairly close ties with the R.A.N considers it essential that we ask CNI for similar coverage.</p> <p><u>VII</u> I don't think this can be true. Ask SO(1) NMCS to confirm it was not an omission.</p> <p><u>VIII</u> SO(1) Please draft letter to SO(1) NMCS <i>guy</i></p>
SEC JPC		
SO(P) (1)		
SO(P) (2)		
SO(Q)		
D/DNP		
SO (1)		
OAIR		
NID (1)		
NID (2)		
NID (3)		
SO (T)		
SO (STAT)		
JIS (N)		
SO (SEC)		
D/DNI		
DNPI		
A.A.		
ACCESSION LIST		
INDEX		
SEC		
B.F.		
EDITOR		
RCNMR		

①

NOTE: The first officer receiving this file is responsible for:

- (a) Completing the Staff Index Form. IX *the draft letter as requested enclosed herewith.*
- (b) Either precisising or indicating items of interest.
- (c) Initiating any action required in D.N.P.I.
- (d) Checking internal distribution and preparing External Minute Sheet for outside distribution considered desirable. *SBS.*

This minute sheet is to be attached to the office copy. It is NOT to leave the Directorate.



TOP SECRET

DIRECTOR OF NAVAL PLANS AND INTELLIGENCE
INTERNAL MINUTE SHEET

FROM: Sec. J. J. C.

TO: DNP

JUN 6 1947

SUBJECT: Release by U.K. of Classified American Military Information

NS FILE NO: TS 11550-9 Vol. 1 DATE: 3.6.47

REFERRED TO:	INITIALS & DATE	REMARKS
--------------	-----------------	---------

- SO(S)
- SEC JPC
- SO(P) (1)
- SO(P) (2)
- SO(Q)
- D/DNP
- SO (1)
- OAIR
- NID (1)
- NID (2)
- NID (3)
- SO (T)
- SO (STAT)
- EDITOR RCNMR
- N INF
- SC (SEC)
- D/DN
- DNPI
- ACCESSION LIST
- INDEX
- SEC
- A.A.
- E.F.

This is most interesting. Do you consider we should alter the form U 2 D (5) (1946) policy for the present owing to the variance in US Navy & War Dept's rulings. Our chief supplies in U.S.A. and therefore our policy & procedure still hold.

II
7/16
6/16

III
Concur 7/16

IV
DNPI O/R.

V
D/DN

Find out why Australia is omitted from Navy Dept's instructions.

Also if NMCS thinks we should ask C.N.I. for a similar coverage for U.S. Inf. received to be released to U.K., Australia & N.Z.

①
②
③

✓

This is most disturbed over the Communist activities in Australia. This minute sheet is to be attached to the office copy. Consider it as far as possible that for this reason these countries have been omitted.

Referred to.. *628*.....
JUN 3 1947
File No. *211530-9*.....
Chgd to.....

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

File No. **JIC 1-6-1..**

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

878

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Privy Council Office,
East Block.

June 3rd, 1947.

MEMORANDUM TO: *AS* D.M. Johnson, Esquire,
Department of External Affairs:
AS D.N.P.I.
D.M.I.
D. of I. (Air).
D.Sc.I. - D.G.D.R.
D.C.I. - R.C.M.P. *SM!*
S. P.

I enclose herewith for your information
and retention the following:

Copy of British Joint Staff Mission memorandum regarding
release by the U.K. of classified American military
information.

J.A.K. Rutherford
J.A.K. Rutherford, Lt.-Col.,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

Encl.

C O P Y

BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION
Offices of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Washington

TOP SECRET

26th May, 1947.

878

My dear Gordon

I attach for the information of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission an extract from a telegram which the British Joint Staff Mission sent to the Chiefs of Staff in London last week on recent developments concerning the release to certain Dominions by the U.K. of classified American military information.

The negotiations referred to in paragraph 1 of the telegram began with a letter from Captain Wooten to Admiral Inglis dated 21st March, 1947, copies of which were sent to Commander Pemberton at the time.

Yours sincerely,

(signed)

C.R. PRICE
Brigadier

Air Commodore R.C. Gordon, CBE,
Canadian Joint Staff Mission.

C O P Y

TELEGRAM

From : J.S.M.
To : Ministry of Defence
Date : 23rd May, 1947

SAVINGS

TOP SECRET

J.S.M. 403

Subject - Release to Dominions of U.S. classified military information.

As a result of direct negotiation with the Navy and War Departments, we have received letters from them within the last week giving rulings on the extent to which U.S. military classified information may be released to the Dominions without specific reference to the U.S. authorities.

2. Navy Department ruling reads:

Begins

Decision has been reached that U.S. military information, exclusive of research and development information and classified not higher than secret, may be released to your Government for inclusion in joint United Kingdom-Canadian-New Zealand publications and instructions. Certain restrictions may be placed on particular items of information, in which case the United Kingdom recipient will be so informed by this office.

Ends

3. War Department ruling reads:

Begins

Unless specifically notified to the contrary at the time of release, the War Department authorizes the inclusion of U.S. military information, classified no higher than secret, exclusive of intelligence and research and development information, in joint United Kingdom-Canadian-Australian-New Zealand and training publications and instructions.

Ends

4. You will note that the actual wording of the War Department ruling is more restrictive than that of the Navy Department in that intelligence is excluded and the word "training" has been added in the last line.

5. The insertion of the word "training" in the War Department ruling is not we think particularly significant. The author of the letter in question made it clear that this ruling was intended to alleviate difficulties arising from the attendance of Dominion students at British Service schools as well as the issue of joint pamphlets and circular letters.

6. As regards intelligence, there is a reply outstanding from the Navy Department dealing with the Naval intelligence aspect of the problem, so it should not be assumed that the omission of any reference to intelligence in the Navy letter has any great significance. There is already a working agreement with G.2 in the War Department that intelligence up to Secret may be passed to Australia and it has been confirmed that the above ruling is not intended to disturb existing intelligence arrangements. Canada presents no problem as she has her own working arrangements with the U.S.

7. The above rulings, though admittedly a step in the right direction, do not go as far as we hoped and the exclusion of research and development makes them almost worthless as far as technical services are concerned. We feel however that it would be a mistake to press for anything more at present but we shall try to obtain further concessions in due course. Sir Alwyn Crow agrees with this.

(d) Service Equipment

Quantities, types and technical details of Naval, equipment (including pictures and drawings).

(e) Tactics

Doctrine for employment of Naval units, troops

Referred to *678*
JUN 3 1947
File No *2 11550-2*
Chgd to *21172* 23/12/46

11

877

File No. CSC 7-2.

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
Cabinet Secretariat Offices,
East Block.

2nd June, 1947.

Referred to *678*
JUN 3 1947
File No *2 11550-9*
Chgd to..... MEMORANDUM TO:

- C.A.S.
- C.G.S.
- C.N.S.
- D.G.D.R.

Subject ~~Release of Information by United States~~
~~to British Commonwealth.~~ *of Classified American Military Info.*

The following document concerning the
above mentioned subject is forwarded for information
and retention:

Copy of letter dated 26th May, 1947 from British
Joint Staff Mission Washington. to C.J.S.M.

W.W. Bean

(W.W. Bean)
Group Captain, R.C.A.F.,
Secretary,
CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE.

COPY

COPY

BRITISH JOINT STAFF MISSION
Offices of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Washington

26th May, 1947.

TOP SECRET

877

My dear Gordon

I attach for the information of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission an extract from a telegram which the British Joint Staff Mission sent to the Chiefs of Staff in London last week on recent developments concerning the release to certain Dominions by the U.K. of classified American military information.

The negotiations referred to in paragraph 1 of the telegram began with a letter from Captain Wootten to Admiral Inglis dated 21st March, 1947, copies of which were sent to Commander Pemberton at the time.

Yours sincerely,

(signed)

C.R. PRICE
Brigadier

Air Commodore R.C. Gordon, CBE,
Canadian Joint Staff Mission.

COPY

COPY

COPY

COPY

TELEGRAM

From : J.S.M.
To : Ministry of Defence
Date : 23rd May, 1947

SAVINGS

877

TOP SECRET

J.S.M. 403

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Ends

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Begins

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Ends

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COPY

COPY

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"DMI"

EXAMPLES OF UNOBJECTIONABLE AND OBJECTIONABLE MATTER

Appendix "D"
Reference Paras 7(b) & 8).

Serial (a)	Subject (b)	Unobjectionable matter (c)	Objectionable matter (d)
1.	General	Details of expenditures or statistics which if published in peace time would NOT endanger national Security, for example:-	Details of expenditures and statistics which would endanger national security or which for a particular reason it is desired to safeguard, for example:-
2.	Establishments	(i) Total personnel strength of the Canadian Army (ii) Names of Active or Reserve Units, except those noted at Serial 2, Col (d) (ii)	(i) Details of peace of war establishments (ii) Mobilization or conversion of units to new units for special purposes.
3.	Locations	(iii) Locations of Active and Reserve Force permanent stations. (iv) Locations of field units during training etc, except as noted at Serial 3, col (d) (iii).	(iii) Locations of field units during time of national emergency, or during manoeuvres the nature of which it may be desired to keep classified.
4.	Weapons Ammunition Equipment Stores	(v) General statements to the effect that units are armed with rifles, artillery, tanks, anti-tank artillery etc. (vi) Total expenditures only, which for greater security should be combined with other votes for example; group together the estimates of total sums required for pay, allowances, quartering, equipping and maintaining the Active Force.	(iv) Unit weapon, ammunition, equipment and stores establishments, (Active Force only). (v) Actual weapon, ammunition, equipment and stores strengths of units (Active Force only). (vi) Total weapon, ammunition, equipment, and stores strengths, including reserves, held in ordnance depots of the Canadian Army. (vii) Information concerning any classified weapon, ammunition, equipment or store.
5.	Research and Development	(viii) Welfare, health, medical, dental, educational projects, providing they are unclassified. (viii) Results of the above types of project if unclassified.	(viii) Development of classified types of weapons, ammunition, equipment and stores. (ix) The results of such development, if classified.
6.	Manufacture	(ix) The total expenditures for production of weapons, ammunition, equipment and stores. (For added security should be combined with other votes as in (vi) above.)	(x) Information concerning the manufacture of any classified weapons, ammunition, equipment or stores.
7.	Training	(x) Training of the Reserve Force, including COTC and Cadets. (xi) Total expenditure for all types of training. General purpose of AF Schools of Instruction unless whole subject under instruction classified	(xi) Training programmes, syllabuses and details of Active Force Schools of Instruction.
8.	Defence	(xii) Total expenditures only and to be combined with other votes, where possible.	(xii) Strategic and operational plans dealing with the ultimate security of Canada and the nature and degree of progress of or impletion of such plans.

7. Training
(x) Training of the Reserve Force, including COTC and Cadets.
(xi) Total expenditures for all types of training. General purpose of AF Schools of Instruction unless whole subject under instruction classified

(xi) Training programmes, syllabuses and details of Active Force Schools of Instruction.

8. Defence
(xii) Total expenditures only and to be combined with other votes, where possible.

(xii) Strategic and operational plans dealing with the ultimate security of Canada and the nature and degree of progress of or impletion of such plans.

9. Testing Stations and Military exercises during which tests are made.
(xiii) Locations of testing stations and existence of military exercises, including unclassified matters concerning the stations or exercises.

(xiii) Results of all tests of weapons, ammunition, equipment and stores, and results of military exercises during which tests are made, until all such tests are officially declassified.

10. Quartering Maintenance Pay
(xiv) Estimates of total sums required for pay, allowances, quartering, equipping and maintaining the Active Force.
(xv) Estimates of total sums required for

11	Travel, transportation and freight costs.	(xvii)
12	Medical and Dental	(xviii) Medical and dental stores and service
13	Printing and Stationery	(xix) All types of printing and stationery
14	Pensions and other benefits	(xx) Expenditures on pensions and other benefits. (xxi) Superannuation and retirement benefits.
15	Grants	(xxii) Grants to military associations or institutes.
16	Memorials Graves	(xxiii) War graves and battlefield memorials.
17	Demobilization	(xxiv) Details of demobilization costs.
18	Miscellaneous	(xxv) Miscellaneous maintenance and adjustments (World War I, 1914-18). (xxvi) Sundries, telephones, telegrams, etc.

1950-4

Secret
CLASSIFICATION

1950-13
Reference

Date extracted 2nd June 47

CABINET DEFENCE MINUTE

- D.M.
- D.N.E.I.
- D.W.T.
- D.S.D.
- D.N.A.D.
- D.S.R.D.
- A/C.N.S.
- D.N.O.
- D.E.M.
- A/C.N.A.S. (E)
- A/C.N.A.S. (SD)
- C.N.A.S.
- D.N.R.
- C.N.P.

The following is an extract from the minutes of the 34th Meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee held 28th May 47.

[Signature]
Secretary to the Chief of the Naval Staff.

JUL 12 A.M.

Publication of Service Information; General Policy

The Minister of National Defence reported that the Chiefs of Staff had suggested a general policy covering the publication of Service information.

The general principle was that the maximum amount of Service information of an unclassified nature should be released through the various media, ie, government publications (Estimates, Public Accounts, Canada Year Book); replies to questions asked by members on the Houses of Parliament; official press releases; speeches and press conferences by members of the government, departmental and Service officials; and articles written by government officials and Service personnel.

Such matters as total strength and total expenditures, location of permanent stations, were regarded as unclassified, but details of establishments or estimates were among those classified and therefore not for publication.

An explanatory memorandum had been circulated.

(Memorandum from the Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, 14th May, 1947 - Cabinet Document D.120)

The Committee, after discussion, approved the policy proposed by the Chiefs of Staff.

JUL -8 A.M.

-1950-13

CONFIDENTIAL
CABINET DOCUMENT
No. <u>D/20</u>
Copy No. <u>8</u>

MEMORANDUM TO CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE:

Policy - Publication of Service Information

1. The Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that a comprehensive policy should be adopted to cover release of Service information to the press and other agencies of the public. In general, press releases and publication of articles by Service personnel are covered and can continue to be covered by Service regulations and instructions. A policy to govern publication of Service statistics in government publications and to be followed in answering questions in Parliament has not, however, yet been adopted.

2. It is considered that any policy in this regard should be positive rather than negative; i.e., should be directed toward the regular release of the maximum amount of information permissible.

3. Attached as Appendix "A" is an outline of the proposed policy. Your attention is drawn in particular to paras. 7, 8 and 10.

4. The Chiefs of Staff recommend:

- (a) the adoption of the policy in regard to disclosure of Service information described in Appendix "A", it being noted that action has already been taken in respect of Service press releases and articles by Service personnel; and
- (b) that this policy be administered in a positive manner so as to provide for regular releases giving the maximum amount of information permissible.

W.W. Bean,
Group Captain, R.C.A.F.,
Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

14th May, 1947.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX "A"

POLICY - PUBLICATION OF SERVICE INFORMATION

Principle of the Policy

- 1 As a general principle, the maximum amount of Service information, short of that which would enable foreign powers to assess Canada's ability or readiness to wage war at any time, should be released to the public.
- 2 It can be assumed that any information which is officially released from a government source will be published in some form or broadcast over the radio. Therefore, the rule to be followed is that only unclassified information should be released.

Media

- 3 The following are the media by which military information is officially released:
 - (a) The publication of Service statistics in Government publications, for example:
 - (i) Public Accounts of the Dominion of Canada,
 - (ii) Estimates for the Fiscal Year,
 - (iii) Reports of House of Commons Committee,
 - (iv) Canada Year Book.
 - (b) Replies to questions asked by Members in the House of Commons and by Senators.
 - (c) Official Service press releases.
 - (d) Speeches and press conferences by Government and Service Officials.
 - (e) Articles written by Government officials and Service personnel.
- 4 (c), (d) and (e) above, insofar as Service personnel are concerned, are covered by existing regulations and instructions, but (a) and (b) have not been adequately provided for.
- 5 If detailed Service statistics are published in the texts listed in para. 3 (a) above or in similar documents, there is no doubt that a statistical examination of a single year's texts would provide a potential enemy with a valuable indication of our ability to wage war, and that continuous yearly comparisons would provide him, gratis, with much more definite information.
- 6 Furthermore, quite apart from the security point of view, a system which provides foreign governments with detailed statistics of our Armed Forces, gratis, would have an adverse effect upon our ability to acquire information from those foreign governments on a reciprocal basis.

Policy

- 7 Information on the following will not be published in unclassified documents or released to the public by any means without appropriate authority:
- (a) General: Any information, the unauthorized disclosure of which would,
 - (i) Endanger the national security;
 - (ii) Be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the nation, any governmental activity, or individual;
 - (iii) Cause administrative embarrassment or difficulty;
 - (iv) Be of advantage to a foreign power; or
 - (v) For any reason, be undesirable.
 - (b) Objectionable Matter; i.e., classified information. Included in this category would be such matters as details of peace or war establishments or estimates, development of new classified types of weapons, details of active force schools and instruction, and strategic and operational plans.
- 8 Unobjectionable matter; i.e., unclassified information. Included in this category would be such matters as total strength of the Armed Services, total expenditures for defence, training for reserve forces, generalized descriptions of equipment, locations of permanent stations, etc.

Procedure

- 9 Publication of Service Statistics in Government Publications
- (a) When preparing statistical reports and estimates, the originator will classify the completed reports in relation to their contents, using the above policy as a guide. Where it is practicable, reports may be divided into classified and unclassified parts.
 - (b) The co-ordinator of these reports will approve the classifications. The appropriate Service Directorate of Intelligence will give security advice when requested.
 - (c) The complete report on the detailed Service estimates will be classified SECRET and will continue to be distributed on a very limited basis.
- 10 Replies to Questions in the House
- (a) Service agencies, when preparing replies to specific questions asked by Members of the House of Commons or by Senators, will classify the information contained in the reply according to its contents.
 - (b) General information only, on broad lines, will be given in the House.
 - (c) Information of RESTRICTED classification will be given privately to members on request.
 - (d) Information of CONFIDENTIAL or higher classification will be withheld.

Secret
CLASSIFICATION


1950-13U.1
Reference

Date extracted 16th May 47

DEFENCE COUNCIL
GABINET DEFENCE MINUTE

The following is an extract from the minutes of
the Meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee Council
held 9th May 47.

- D.M. _____
- D.N.P.I. _____
- D.W.T. _____
- D.S.D. _____
- D.N.A.D. _____
- D.S.R.D. _____
- ② A/C.N.S. _____
- D.N.O. _____
- D.E.E. _____
- A/C.N.A.S. (E) _____
- A/C.N.A.S. (SD) _____
- C.N.A.S. _____
- D.N.R. _____
- ① C.N.P. _____


Secretary to the Chief of
the Naval Staff.

3. Policy - Publication of Service Information

After discussion, Defence Council approved the
Chiefs of Staff memorandum of 1 May 1947, to the Cabinet
Defence Committee, regarding the publication of Service C.S.C.
Information.

H.Q. 1024

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

FILE NO. *TS 11550-270726*

REFERRED TO

REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)

*T.S. paper dated 20 Feb. 1947
Cp #14 transferred to
T.S. 11550-2703391.*

*J. Rankin
Asst. Secy.
30/5/47*

Mail No. 0431

IN REPLY PLEASE QUOTE

No.....



Department of National Defence

Naval Service

Ottawa, Canada.

15th May, 1947.

SECRET

NSS 1950-14 Vol. 1

MEMORANDUM TO: HOLDERS OF C.B.O. FORM U2D (5) (1946)

Although C.B.O. Form U2D (5) (1946) is issued as a C.B., para. 48 is classified in Canada as Top Secret. All holders are therefore to take the necessary security precautions. C.B.O. Form U2D (5) (1946) is applicable to the R.C.N. with the following qualifications:-

- (1) N.S.H.Q. is the competent authority in all instances.
- (2) Is applicable on a parallel basis with regard to Ships, Shore Establishments, Stations, etc.
- (3) No Classified information, documents, or other material, shall be given to any foreign nationals or authorities without approval from N.S.H.Q. In this connection particular attention is drawn to R.C.N. relations with the Royal Navy and the United States Navy. No Admiralty classified information, documents, and material, held by the R.C.N. may be passed to the U.S. Navy without Admiralty's approval. Similarly, no U.S. Navy classified information, documents, and material, held by the R.C.N. may be passed to Admiralty without U.S. Navy Department's approval.
- (4) The U.S.S.R. is considered a Category "C" nation.
- (5) Changes and additions will be issued from time to time as applicable to the R.C.N.
- (6) Holders of C.B.O. Form U2D (5) (1946) are to ensure that the utmost discretion is used in the care and handling of both this C.B. and the information contained therein.

H. Northrup
NAVAL SECRETARY.

HFR/JG

S E C R E T

MEMORANDUM TO: NAVAL SECRETARY

C.B.O. FORM U2D (5) (1946)

SECURITY REGULATIONS

APPLICATION TO R.C.N.

Page 8, Section VII, paragraph 48 (a), (b), (c) and (d), and Page 9 Section VII, paragraph 50 (a) (ii) and (b) are classed as Top Secret under the Canadian Government and R.C.N. present policy Flag, (1) (1a) and (2). Section VII, paragraph 48 (d) is included in 3(c) of the Canadian policy.

2. In order to obtain the maximum effectiveness, the contents of this C.B. should be made known to a considerable number of people for administrative purposes, and this cannot be accomplished if the classification of the R.C.N. procedure remains Top Secret. However, as there is very little in the C.B. which is Canadian Top Secret, it is strongly recommended that:

- (a) C.B.O. Form U2D (5) (1946) be issued to all holders of C.B.'s according to regulations (excluding Naval Divisions).
- (b) The attached draft memorandum be approved and placed on the fly leaf of each copy issued so that this C.B. will be brought in line with the present Canadian policy.

3. As this C.B. is being issued as administrative procedure and guidance for the R.C.N. the Security Panel have no objections. The Security classification of Secret is still adequate protection.

4. One hundred copies of memo are required.


(H.N. Lay)
Captain, R.C.N.,
Director of Naval Plans
and Intelligence.

Ottawa,
8th May, 1947.

NSS 1950-14 Vol 1

secretMEMORANDUM TO: HOLDERS OF C.B.O. FORM U2D (5) (1946)


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- (4) The U.S.S.R. is considered a Category "C" nation.
- (5) Changes and additions will be issued from time to time as applicable to the R.C.N.
- (6) Holders of C.B.O. Form U2D (5) (1946) are to ensure that the utmost discretion is used in the care and handling both this C.B. and the information contained therein.

NAVAL SECRETARY.

Ottawa,
/ 5th May, 1947.

4c)



1950-13

CSC 8-5

CONFIDENTIAL

1950-4

c.c. C.A.S.
C.G.S.
C.N.S.
D.G.D.R.

1st May, 1947.

The Secretary,
Defence Council.

Policy - Publication of Service Information

1. Attached is copy of a draft memorandum from the Chiefs of Staff Committee to Cabinet Defence Committee, proposing that a definite policy be established to cover release of Service information to the press and other agencies of the public.

2. This policy originated within the Army but was referred to the Chiefs of Staff by the Deputy Minister with the suggestion that it might be made the basis of a common Service policy. The Chiefs of Staff are in agreement with this view, but consider that the matter should be put before Cabinet Defence Committee since part of the policy concerns answers to questions in Parliament and inclusion of Service statistics in government publications. Before doing so, however, the Chiefs of Staff wished this draft memorandum to be forwarded to Defence Council for consideration and any comments that might appear desirable.

3. I should be grateful, therefore, if this could be included in the Agenda of the next meeting of Defence Council.

Hold for D.C.

(W.W. Bean),
Group Captain, R.C.A.F.,
Secretary.

D R A F T

CONFIDENTIAL

1st May, 1947.

MEMORANDUM TO CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE:

Policy - Publication of Service Information

1. The Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that a comprehensive policy should be adopted to cover release of Service information to the press and other agencies of the public. In general, press releases and publication of articles by Service personnel are covered and can continue to be covered by Service regulations and instructions. A policy to govern publication of Service statistics in government publications and to be followed in answering questions in Parliament has not, however, yet been adopted.

2. It is considered that any policy in this regard should be positive rather than negative; i.e., should be directed toward the regular release of the maximum amount of information permissible.

3. Attached as Appendix "A" is an outline of the proposed policy. Your attention is drawn in particular to paras. 7, 8 and 10.

4. The Chiefs of Staff recommend:

- (a) the adoption of the policy in regard to disclosure of Service information described in Appendix "A", it being noted that action has already been taken in respect of Service press releases and articles by Service personnel; and
- (b) that this policy be administered in a positive manner so as to provide for regular releases giving the maximum amount of information permissible.

W.W. Bean,
Group Captain, R.C.A.F.,
Secretary,
Chiefs of Staff Committee.

Enc.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX "A"

POLICY - PUBLICATION OF SERVICE INFORMATION

Principle of the Policy

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- 2 It can be assumed that any information which is officially released from a government source will be published in some form or broadcast over the radio. Therefore, the rule to be followed is that only unclassified information should be released.

Media

- 3 The following are the media by which military information is officially released:
 - (a) The publication of Service statistics in Government publications, for example:
 - (i) Public Accounts of the Dominion of Canada,
 - (ii) Estimates for the Fiscal Year,
 - (iii) Reports of House of Commons Committee,
 - (iv) Canada Year Book.
 - (b) Replies to questions asked by Members in the House of Commons and by Senators.
 - (c) Official Service press releases.
 - (d) Speeches and press conferences by Government and Service Officials.
 - (e) Articles written by Government officials and Service personnel.
- 4 (c), (d) and (e) above, insofar as Service personnel are concerned, are covered by existing regulations and instructions, but (a) and (b) have not been adequately provided for.
- 5 If detailed Service statistics are published in the texts listed in para. 3 (a) above or in similar documents, there is no doubt that a statistical examination of a single year's texts would provide a potential enemy with a valuable indication of our ability to wage war, and that continuous yearly comparisons would provide him, gratis, with much more definite information.
- 6 Furthermore, quite apart from the security point of view, a system which provides foreign governments with detailed statistics of our Armed Forces, gratis, would have an adverse effect upon our ability to acquire information from those foreign governments on a reciprocal basis.

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 - (ii) Be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the nation, any governmental activity, or individual;
 - (iii) Cause administrative embarrassment or difficulty;
 - (iv) Be of advantage to a foreign power; or
 - (v) For any reason, be undesirable.
 - (b) Objectionable Matter; i.e., classified information. Included in this category would be such matters as details of peace or war establishments or estimates, development of new classified types of weapons, details of active force schools and instruction, and strategic and operational plans.
- 8 Unobjectionable matter; i.e., unclassified information. Included in this category would be such matters as total strength of the Armed Services, total expenditures for defence, training for reserve forces, generalized descriptions of equipment, locations of permanent stations, etc.

Procedure

- 9 Publication of Service Statistics in Government Publications
- (a) When preparing statistical reports and estimates, the originator will classify the completed reports in relation to their contents, using the above policy as a guide. Where it is practicable, reports may be divided into classified and unclassified parts.
 - (b) The co-ordinator of these reports will approve the classifications. The appropriate Service Directorate of Intelligence will give security advice when requested.
 - (c) The complete report on the detailed Service estimates will be classified SECRET and will continue to be distributed on a very limited basis.
- 10 Replies to Questions in the House
- (a) Service agencies, when preparing replies to specific questions asked by Members of the House of Commons or by Senators, will classify the information contained in the reply according to its contents.
 - (b) General information only, on broad lines, will be given in the House.
 - (c) Information of RESTRICTED classification will be given privately to members on request.
 - (d) Information of CONFIDENTIAL or higher classification will be withheld.

CR

File & refer to

DMP please

000401

Document disclosed under the *Access to Information Act* -
Document divulgué en vertu de la *Loi sur l'accès à l'information*

RECEIVED
APR 28 1947
000402

1880-12
1950-13

File No. JIC. 1-A

JOINT INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, 18878
Privy Council Office,
East Block.

April 26th, 1947.

MEMORANDUM TO: D.M. Johnson Esquire,
Department of External Affairs.
D.N.P.I. *ms als*
D.M.I.
D. of I. (Air).
D.Sc.I. - D.G.D.R.
D.C.I. - R.C.M.P.

I enclose herewith for your information
and retention the following:

Memo GSG 8-5 dated April 25th, 1947 - Publication of
Service Information.

J.A.K. Rutherford, Lt.-Col.,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

Encl.

CSC 8-5

SECRET

April 25th, 1947.

The Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

Publication of Service Information

The Chiefs of Staff at their 387th meeting of 22nd April, considered the General Staff Policy Statement on the publication of Service information and agreed that it would be satisfactory as a common policy for the three Services and Defence Research. It was proposed, however, that paragraph 1 be amended to present the statement of principle in a more positive manner. It was the general feeling that any policy of this nature should be positive rather than negative, that is, should provide for the release of the maximum of information permissible.

This matter has formed the subject of a recommendation from the Chiefs of Staff to Cabinet Defence Committee but will be referred to Defence Council for consideration and comments first.


(W.W. Bean),
Group Captain, R.C.A.F.,
Secretary.

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION
1950-13 Vol.1
Reference

Date Extracted 26th April 47 .

387th Meeting of
THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

The following minute is promulgated for information and for necessary action.


Secretary,
Chief of the Naval Staff.

Date: of Meeting: 22nd April 47

D.M.
D.N.P.C. <i>[initials]</i>
D.W.T.
D.S.D.
D.N.A.D.
D.S.R.D.
A/C.N.S.
D.N.O.
D.E.E.
A/C.N.A.S.(E)
A/C.N.A.S.(SD)
C.N.A.S.
D.N.R.
C.N.P.
<i>[Handwritten notes]</i>

[Handwritten initials and marks]

PUBLICATION OF SERVICE INFORMATION

11. The Secretary reported that the Deputy Minister of National Defence had forwarded for the consideration of the Chiefs of Staff (with the object of formulating a common Service policy), a copy of an Army memorandum outlining a proposed policy with regard to publication of Service information. The matter had been referred to the Joint Intelligence Committee, who recommended that the Joint Staff Policy outlined in the Army memorandum be adopted as a common policy for the three Services and Defence Research.

(Army memorandum HQ 650-92-89-4, HQ 8696-1 Vol 5 dated 30th September, 1946 - CSC 8-5 dated 18th April, 1947)

12. Mr. Heeney suggested that the first paragraph of this policy letter be amended to present the statement of principle in a more positive way.

13. The Director General of Defence Research emphasized the necessity for a positive rather than a negative publicity policy. The tremendous amount of speculation in regard to Churchill could probably have been prevented if some information had been released on this project at an early stage and the maximum information possible provided at all times to the press. Accordingly, the general policy should provide for the regular release of the maximum amount of information permissible. This would tend to prevent unhealthy and inaccurate speculation.

14. The Committee agreed, after discussion:

- (a) to concur in the policy outlined in the Army memorandum as a common policy for the three Services and Defence Research, subject to amendment of para. 1 along the lines suggested by Mr. Heeney; and
- (b) to recommend to Cabinet Defence Committee the adoption of this policy; the draft memorandum to Cabinet Defence Committee to be referred to Defence Council for consideration and comments prior to its submission.

1950-13

Secret
CLASSIFICATION

Reference

Date Extracted 21st April 47.

386th Meeting of
THE CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

The following minute is promulgated for
information and for necessary action.

Secretary,
Chief of the Naval Staff.

Date: of Meeting: 15th April 47.

J.M.
D.N.P.I.
D.W.T.
D.S.D.
D.N.A.D.
D.S.R.D.
A/C.N.S.
D.N.O.
D.E.E.
A/C.N.A.S.(E)
A/C.N.A.S.(SD)
C.N.A.S.
D.N.R.
C.N.P.

DISCLOSURE OF SERVICE INFORMATION

41. The Chief of the Air Staff reported that he had received a request from the Canadian representative of "Aeroplane Magazine" for certain very pertinent Air Force information. If all the information requested were provided, it would mean that all relevant information on the post-war Air Force was being released for publication. Much of this information had already been released by the Minister or had been tabled in the House and could be obtained by any interested person after a certain amount of research. It did not seem desirable, however, to give out the complete picture at one time and thus make it easily available to agents of foreign countries.

42. The Secretary reported that a draft policy letter covering all matters of this nature, which had been prepared by the Chief of the General Staff and sent to the Deputy Minister for comments, had been referred to the Committee by the Deputy Minister in order that a common Service policy might be formulated. It was proposed that this policy should then be discussed at Defence Council as it ~~included release~~ of information to members of Parliament, preparation of estimates, etc., a final decision on which could only be taken by the Minister or perhaps by Cabinet.

43. The Committee agreed to defer a decision on the release of information to "Aeroplane Magazine" pending consideration of the over-all policy in this regard.



FILE NO. CSC 8-9

~~SECRET~~

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
CABINET SECRETARIAT OFFICES,
EAST BLOCK, OTTAWA

16th April, 1947.

JH

*C.A.S.
C.G.S.
C.N.S.
D.G.D.R.*

Publication of Service Information

1. Attached is copy of an Army memorandum outlining a proposed policy with regard to publication of Service information. This policy letter has been referred to the Chiefs of Staff by the Deputy Minister, with the request that a common Service policy be formulated prior to consideration of this matter at Defence Council. You will recall that there was a brief discussion in this regard at the last meeting of the Committee, with particular reference to disclosure of Air Force information to "Aeroplane Magazine".

2. The matter has been referred to the Joint Intelligence Committee, who recommend that the general staff policy outlined in the Army memorandum be adopted as a common policy for the three Services and Defence Research. The Defence Research representative on the Joint Intelligence Committee has further suggested that Appendix "B", column (d) (viii) should also include research and be amended to read: "All phases of research and development and the results of such research and development if classified".

3. This item is being included in the Agenda for the 337th meeting, Tuesday, 22nd April.

D. W. Bean
(D. W. Bean),
Group Captain, R.C.A.F.,
Secretary.

..Q. 1024

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

S E C R E T

FILE NO. -

REFERRED TO

REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)

*Concur
tbb*

A.C.N.S. *17/4*
C.N.S.

*OK
R*

*C.N.S.
9.15*

J.C.P.

Publication of Service Information.

I entirely agree in principle with the paper on "Publication of Service Information", drafted by D.M.I.

2. If this is approved by the C.S.C., however, it will be necessary for the Security Section of D.N.P.I. to be strengthened to compete with all the questions of Security as envisaged.

3. At present only 1 officer (Lt.Cdr. Rankin) is employed in the whole R.C.N. on Security duties. D.M.I. on the other hand has a Lt.Col., 6 officers and 11 other ranks employed on these duties at N.D.H.Q. as well as a large number of personnel for security purposes in Military districts and Commands.

4. If you concur, I propose to reply that "D.N.P.I. agrees in principle with the desirability of controlling the Publication of Service Information".

H.N. Lay
(H.N. Lay)
Capt., R.C.N.
D.N.P.I.

Ottawa,
17/4/47

000408

By Hand.

HNL:MT

ESS 1950-13 Vol.1

SECRET

18th April, 1947.

Publication of Service Information

I agree in principle with the General Staff policy statement on publication of Service information - (undated), which you forwarded under cover of your letter JIC 1-4 dated April 16th.

2. While it is obviously desirable to control the publication of Service information, it will not be possible, at the present time, for the R.C.N. to implement this, in view of the fact that only one officer is presently employed at H.S.H.Q. on security duties.



(H.E. Lay)

Captain, R.C.N.,
Director of Naval Plans
and Intelligence.

Lt.-Col. J.A.R. Rutherford,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee,
Room 320,
East Block,
O t t a w a.



CANADA

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

JIC 1-4

SECRET

1950-13.

OTTAWA, April 16th, 1947.

CABINET SECRETARIAT

63790

D.N.P.I.
D.I.A.
D.Sc.I. - D.G.D.R.

Publication of Service Information

1. The Deputy Minister of National Defence has requested the Chiefs of Staff to consider the attached General Staff policy statement on the publication of Service information so that it may be brought before Defence Council as a recommendation endorsed by the three Services and Defence Research. It is desirable that there should be complete uniformity in the three Services and Defence Research in this matter in order that, if necessary, the Minister may clear the policy of the department with Cabinet if he deems this expedient.
2. The Secretary, Chiefs of Staff Committee, prior to submitting the proposal for consideration, has requested that the proposal be reviewed by the Joint Intelligence Committee and that their views be received by noon, Friday, April 18th.
3. As this would appear to be purely a Service matter the Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee, has expressed the view that clearance can be obtained from Service members of the Committee without the need of calling a meeting unless ~~that~~ disagreement arises.
4. May I have your comments, please.


J.A.K. Rutherford, Lt.-Col.,
Secretary,
Joint Intelligence Committee.

att.

GENERAL STAFF POLICY STATEMENT No (DMI)

Publication of Service Information

Principle of the Policy

63791

- 1 As a general principle, the ~~minimum~~^{maximum ??} of service information should be published which would enable foreign powers to assess Canada's ability or readiness to wage war at any time.
- 2 It can be assumed that any information which is officially released from a government source will be published in some form or broadcast over the radio. Therefore, the rule to be followed in determining what is the minimum information to be published or broadcast is that only unclassified information should be released.

Media

- 3 The following are the media by which military information is officially released:
 - (a) The publication of Army and related services statistics in Government publications, for example:
 - (i) Public Accounts of the Dominion of Canada,
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 - (iii) Reports of House of Commons Committees,
 - (iv) Canada Year Book.
 - (b) Replies to questions asked by Members in the House of Commons and by Senators.
 - (c) Official Army press releases.
 - (d) Speeches and press conferences by Government and Army Officials.
 - (e) Articles written by Government Officials and Army personnel.

- 4 Insofar as the Army is concerned (c), (d) and (e) above are covered by security safeguards in the form of the following regulations:
 - (c) by HQS 8696-1 Vol 3, dated 12 Jul 46 which concerns release of information at Command and Area level, attached as Appendix "A"; and HQ 650-92-89-4 dated 30 Sep 46 which concerns release of information at unit level, both Active and Reserve Force, attached as Appendix "B";
 - (d) and (e) by paragraphs 453 and 454 of KR(Can), attached as Appendix "C"
 but (a) and (b) above have not been adequately provided for.

5 If detailed Army statistics are published in the texts listed in para 3(a) above or in similar documents, there is no doubt that a statistical examination of a single year's texts would provide a potential enemy with a valuable indication of our ability to wage war, and that continuous yearly comparisons would provide him, gratis, with much more definite information.

6 Furthermore, quite apart from the security point of view, a system which provides foreign governments with detailed statistics of our Armed Forces, gratis, would have an adverse effect upon our ability to acquire information from those foreign governments on a reciprocal basis.

Policy

7 Information on the following will not be published in unclassified documents or released to the public by any means without appropriate authority.

(a) General: Any information, the unauthorized disclosure of which would,

(i) Endanger the national security;

(ii) Be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the nation, any governmental activity, or individual;

(iii) Cause administrative embarrassment or difficulty;

(iv) Be of advantage to a foreign power; or

(v) For any reason, be undesirable.

(b) Objectionable matter, i.e., classified information. Examples of objectionable matter, which have been considered with particular reference to the government publications listed in para 3(a) above, are included in Appendix "D", attached.

8 Unobjectionable matter, i.e., unclassified information. Examples of unobjectionable matter, which may be published in unclassified documents, for example, Government publications, or may be released to the public by any means, are included in Appendix "D", attached.

Procedure

9 Publication of Service Statistics in Government Publications.

(a) When preparing statistical reports and estimates, the originator will classify the completed reports in relation to their contents, using the above policy as a guide. Where it is practicable, reports may be divided into classified and unclassified parts.

...../3

- (b) The co-ordinator of these reports will approve the classifications. The Directorate of Military Intelligence will give security advice when requested.
- (c) The complete report on the detailed Army estimates will be classified SECRET and will continue to be distributed on a very limited basis.
- (d) Those parts of the detailed Army estimates which are the concern of the Chief of the General Staff, the Adjutant General, the Master General of the Ordnance and the Quartermaster General will be co-ordinated by the Directorate of Staff Duties and will carry a minimum classification of CONFIDENTIAL.

10

Replies to Questions in the House

- (a) Branches or Directorates when preparing replies to specific questions asked by Members of the House of Commons or by Senators will classify the information contained in the reply according to its contents.
- (b) General information only, on broad lines, will be given in the House.
- (c) Information of RESTRICTED classification will be given privately to members on request.
- (d) Information of CONFIDENTIAL or higher classification will be withheld.

Official Army Press and Radio Releases

11

Press releases issued by the Army will be in accordance with the policy contained in HQS 8695-1 Vol 5, dated 12 Jul 46, copy of which is attached as Appendix "A", and H, 650-92-39-4, dated 30 Sep 46 attached as Appendix "B".

12

Army personnel will be governed in these matters by the regulations set out in KR (Can), paragraphs 432 to 434 inclusive, and by "The Official Secrets Act", Chapter 49 of the Statutes of Canada, a digest of which forms Appendix IV, KR (Can).

Lieutenant-General,
Chief of the General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION

For Action

GOsO Commands
Heads of Branches
Vice Heads of Branches,
Deputy Heads of Branches
All Directorates
Comd RMC
Comd Army Headquarters

For Information

Office of the Minister of National Defence
Administration, DND
Other Services
Liaison Staffs
Canadian Military Attaches

"DMI"

Page 1

Appendix "A"
(Reference para 11)

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
- A R M Y -

HQS 8696-1 Vol. 5

OTTAWA, 12 July, 1946.

To: Heads of Branches and Directorates

Release of Information to the Press.

1. HQS. 8696-1 Vol. 5 dated 6 MAY 46 is hereby cancelled and the following procedure concerning press releases will be adhered to in future:

GENERAL

2. Should representatives of the press make enquiries direct to individuals at NDHQ the enquirer will be referred to the Director of Public Relations who is charged with arranging press and radio releases.

3. DPR will bring to the attention of the head of the Branch concerned any request for information which is received by or referred to him. Should however, the request involve matters of policy or entail extensive research it should be referred to the Minister's Office before any action is taken.

4. Otherwise, the branch concerned, through its appropriate Directorate, will prepare a factual statement on the matter, and when approved by the head of the branch, it will be forwarded to the Director of Public Relations for drafting as a press release.

5. Draft press releases so prepared by DPR, together with a copy of the factual statement initiated by the branch concerned, will be submitted by DPR to the Director of Military Intelligence and a Security clearance obtained when matters subject to security classifications are involved. Draft press release and factual statement will be then forwarded by DPR to the Executive Assistant to the Minister through the head of the branch concerned. The latter will indicate clearance as appropriate in respect of military policy as well as the appropriate time for the press release to be issued.

6. The Executive Assistant will clear the proposed press release with the Minister of National Defence in respect of Government and departmental policy and will be responsible for notification to DPR of ministerial approval.

...../5

C
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P
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"DMI"

Page 8

Appendix "A" (cont'd)
(Reference para 11)

7. Announcements will be made on behalf of the Department as follows:

- (a) announcements involving important matters of policy will be made in the name of the Minister of National Defence or in certain cases, in the name of the parliamentary Assistant;
- (b) announcements involving purely factual statements on matters of agreed military policy in the name of the Department of National Defence.

8. DPR will not issue any press releases unless ministerial approval has been obtained, except in regard to junior appointments as indicated in para 9(a).

RELEASES CONCERNING MILITARY APPOINTMENTS

(a) Junior Appointments

Press releases in respect of new junior appointments (up to and including Lt. Colonel and first-grade staff levels) will be initiated by D. Pers. Details of the appointment when approved by the A.G., will be forwarded to D Int, who will give clearance in respect of military Security. The press release will then be forwarded to DPR for automatic release.

(b) Senior Appointments

- (1) Press releases in respect of new senior appointments (above Lt-Colonel and first-grade staff appointments) will be initiated by CGS who will advise AG and DPR particulars of the appointment and date and time fixed for release.
- (11) DPR will then prepare the necessary press release obtaining biographical information as necessary from D. Pers.
- (111) Upon preparation of the release by DPR, the branch of the Adjutant-General will be responsible for verifying the accuracy of the biographical data and a responsible officer will initial the release accordingly.
- (1V) The release will then be passed to CGS for final confirmation that the appointment is being made. The release will then be passed to the Executive Assistant who will clear the proposed release with the Minister. When approved the press release will be returned to DPR for issue.

(sgd) A. Ross
Deputy Minister.

...../6

B

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

- ARMY -

OTTAWA, 30 Sep 46

HQ 650-92-89-4
HQ 8696-1 Vol 5

All General Officers Commanding,
All District Officers Commanding,
Commandant, Royal Military College,
Kingston,
Commander, Cdn Army Staff,
Washington, D.C.
Chief of Staff, Cdn Military Headquarters,
London, England.
Commander, Northwest Highway System,
Whitehorse, Yukon.

Release of Information to Press

1. This directive discusses details affecting commands and districts but the principles are to be applied by all addressees. It should be read in conjunction with HQS 8696-1 Vol 5 of 7 Sep 1946

Relations with the Press

2. Good relationship with the press can only be gained by frequent personal contact. Some doubt appears to exist as to the manner in which Commanders should deal with the press. It is the purpose of this directive to point out what can - and what cannot - be released by GOSC and DOSC to the press.

Policy Matters

3. Matters involving National Policy will not be divulged or discussed with the press without prior submission to and approval of Army Headquarters (GS 30 of 17 May 1946 refers). Once such matters of policy have been determined and their interpretation by Commands decided on, GOSC may discuss them with the press providing the discussions are restricted within the scope of the responsibilities of the Commander concerned. Examples of the above might include:

- (a) Training of Active and Reserve Force units.
- (b) Summer Camps.
- (c) Exercises.
- (d) Composition and organization of Active and Reserve Force units within a Command, or District.
- (e) Moves of units within a Command, or District.

- 2 -

Conferences

4. GOSC and DOSC should hold periodic press conferences. See KR (Can), para 434. In preparing subjects for discussion with the press, full use is to be made of the Command PRO who is able to advise what can and what cannot be discussed. While Command PROs should be present at all press conferences, the responsibility remains that of the commander concerned.

Security Aspects

5. As a guide to GOSC and DOSC, for press conferences, the following treatment of material, from the security standpoint, will be followed:

- (a) Unclassified -- may be discussed with the press.
- (b) Restricted -- may be discussed with the press as "off record" information at the discretion of the GOC or DOC if he feels this is necessary to provide proper background.
- (c) Confidential and above -- may not be discussed with the press.

General Guidance

6. The following instructions will form guidance for GOSC and DOSC:

The orders to Command PROs are that they will --

- (a) Keep themselves fully in the Command military picture at all times.
- (b) Periodically visit all officers at Command HQ, and ensure that as far as possible they are present at all conferences.
- (c) They will gain the confidence of the Commander and his staff and take all steps to continue this understanding.
- (d) Have access to and give direct guidance in PR matters to the GOC.
- (e) Be responsible to the GOC for maintenance of good relations with all news media within the Command area.
- (f) Refer all matters having Command policy aspects to the GOC.
- (g) Maintain continuous personal contact with senior press officials and be ready to assist them in obtaining speedy and accurate replies to legitimate press queries, obtaining appropriate Security guidance from the General Staff.

- 3 -

- (h) Keep the press informed in advance of news-worthy items affecting the Army within the Command, including senior appointments and retirements, when approved by Army Headquarters.
- (j) Maintain frequent contact with acting District PROs to ensure that good relations are maintained between District headquarters and the local press.
- (k) Keep DPR(A) at DND advised of news events requiring photographic coverage so that arrangements may be made to despatch a photographer if this is considered necessary.
- (l) Arrange press coverage of special events, press tours and accreditation through DPR(A) at DND of special feature writers who wish to visit military installations within the Command.
- (m) Arrange for special publicity displays in the theatres, stores, etc., and maintain good relations with radio stations personnel.
- (n) Advise GOC and DPR(A) at DND of adverse press criticism in order to be able to refute such statements with accurate replies, if so directed.

Reports

7. A semi-monthly report on Public Relations activities within the Command will be forwarded by PROs to DPR(A) at DND. It will be initialled, prior to despatch, by, or for the GOC. The following points will be included:

- (a) Number of press releases issued.
- (b) Queries from the press affecting policy which had to be referred to the GOC or DPR(A) for decision.
- (c) Adverse press criticism, if any.
- (d) Number of liaison visits and points discussed and decisions given to acting PROs at District HQ.
- (e) General - describing activities of Command PRO during period under consideration.
- (f) Outstanding future events requiring special news or photographic coverage beyond the capabilities of Command HQ.

cc.

- 4 -

A copy of the report will be passed by PROs to the
Commander to whose HQ they are attached.

CC [Signature]

for

Lieutenant-General,
Chief of the General Staff.

DISTRIBUTION: (for Information)

Deputy Minister
Heads of Branches
Vice Heads of Branches
Deputy Heads of Branches
All Directors, Army Headquarters
Judge Advocate General
Military Secretary
Command PROs (5)
District A/PROs (11)
DPR (Army)
File
War Diary

"DMI"

Appendix "I"
(Reference para 4)

433.

- (a) An officer or soldier is forbidden to publish or communicate, either directly or indirectly, to the press, any military information, or his views on any military subject, without special authority from National Defence Headquarters. Any information of a professional nature which he may acquire while travelling or employed on duty is to be regarded as the property of the Department of National Defence and is not to be published in any form without previously obtaining the permission of National Defence Headquarters. An officer or soldier will be held responsible for all statements contained in communications to other persons which may subsequently be published in the press. He is not to prejudge questions which are under the consideration of superior authority by the publication, anonymously or otherwise, of his opinions, and he is not to take part, in public, in a discussion relating to orders, regulations, or instructions, issued by his superiors.
- (b) An officer or soldier who desires to publish an article will make written application through the usual channels to the Secretary, National Defence Headquarters, for permission to publish such article. The application must be accompanied by the article in duplicate, either in type-written or proof form, together with a statement from the authority, if any, under whom the applicant is immediately serving, that such authority has no objection to permission being applied for. One of the copies so submitted will be retained at National Defence Headquarters for reference. Permission to publish will apply only to the article, etc., as submitted, and no alterations therein, or additions thereto, other than those of a mere editorial nature are to be made subsequently without authority from National Defence Headquarters.
- (c) The permission to publish the article, etc., will not convey official endorsement of its contents, and no statement tending to imply official approval or endorsement is to be included in any part of the publication, nor is the permission to be referred to in any way.

434.

Any communications affecting the Militia generally, or any arm or service thereof which it may be considered desirable to make to the press, will be made by National Defence Headquarters. In military districts, communications to the press may only be made when they solely affect the command concerned, and in this case they will be made through District Headquarters; all applications of press representatives will be referred to an authorized staff officer.

...../7

H.Q. NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET

8/550-9550
FILE NO. - ~~1550-70~~

Vol. 1.

REFERRED TO REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)

DSRD ^{rs.4} To note memo below.
DNPI ^{rs.4} mhs. DNPI
DW T. ^{25/29/47} 25/29/47
for June 1

~~DNPI~~ ^{rs.4} 25/29/47

S ^{rs.4} ~~DNPI~~
N ^{rs.4} ~~DNPI~~
9/5



FILE NO. CSC 8-1

571-
8 1550-9
0616

CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY,
CABINET SECRETARIAT OFFICES,
EAST BLOCK, OTTAWA

15th April, 1947.

C.A.S.
C.G.S.
C.F.S.
D.G.D.R.

63645

U.S. War Department - Release of Information
to Civil Agencies of the Canadian Government

1. Attached is a copy of letter from the President of the National Research Council to the Foreign Liaison Office of the United States War Department and of their reply. This correspondence has been forwarded by the Canadian Joint Staff Mission, Washington, for your information. You will note that the U.S. War Department will not release technical information except through the Canadian Joint Staff Mission.
2. The Canadian Embassy has notified the National Research Council of this policy.

OWP

24/4/47

W.E. Bean
(W.E. Bean),
Group Captain, R.C.A.F.,
Secretary.

Enc.
INDEXED IN C.H.
By *B*

WAR DEPARTMENT
War Department General Staff
Intelligence Div.,
Washington 25, D.C.

0616

MID 350.0511 Canada

1 April 1947

Commander
Canadian Joint Staff Mission
2222 S Street N.W.
Washington 8, D.C.

Dear Sir:

There is attached a letter signed by Mr. G.J. Mackenzie, President, National Research Council, Ottawa, Canada, dated 15 March 1947, requesting that Mr. Raymond A. Frigon be placed on the accredited list to receive technical information from the U.S. Armed Forces. It also states that Mr. Frigon will be assisted by Miss Z. Wesson, who might be signing for and in the absence of Mr. Frigon.

This will confirm the telephone conversation between Colonel Graling and Group Captain Carscallen in which it was stated that War Department policy does not permit the United States War Department to deal directly with civil agencies of the Canadian Government. A recent change in policy limits the War Department to furnishing information to the Canadian Government's recognized military agencies. In other words, we are restricted to dealing only with the Canadian Joint Staff Mission and/or the Canadian Military or Air Attache. Under the Canadian Joint Staff Mission, of course, the R.C.A.F. and Canadian Army Staff are included.

It would be very much appreciated if you would inform the National Research Council of the above and express our regrets that War Department policy does not permit the direct exchange of information with the representative of the National Research Council.

Sincerely yours,

(signed)
FRANCIS J. GRALING
Colonel, GSC
Foreign Liaison Officer

Incl
Ltr dtd 15 Mar 47

Cable Address "Research"

In your reply Please Quote

File No..... F.J.G.

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
Canada

0616

Office of the President

OTTAWA, March 15, 1947

Lt. Col. R. W. Weaver, GSC,
Foreign Liaison Office,
Military Intelligence Division, G-2,
War Department General Staff,
Room 2B-730, Pentagon Bldgs.,
Washington 25, D.C., U.S.A.

Dear Sir:

I have to inform you that Mr. Raymond A. Frigon will shortly take up an appointment in Washington as representative of the National Research Council of Canada. Mr. Frigon will be attached for formal purposes to the Canadian Embassy but will be located at the Canadian (N.R.C.) Scientific Liaison Office in the British Commonwealth Scientific Office, 1785 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington.

I would be grateful if you would place Mr. Frigon on your list of representatives accredited to receive technical information from the Armed Forces.

Mr. Frigon will be assisted by Miss Z. Wesson who may on occasion sign for him in his absence.


Yours sincerely,

(signed)

C. J. Mackenzie,
President.

TOP SECRET

DIRECTOR OF NAVAL PLANS AND INTELLIGENCE
INTERNAL MINUTE SHEET



FROM: *Sec to Cnd*

TO: *Int.*

SUBJECT: *Extract of C.D.C. Minutes - the Disclosure of Information to Other Countries.*

NS FILE NO: *TS 11550-2 Vol. 1.*

DATE: *10.4.47*

REFERRED TO: INITIALS & DATE

REMARKS

- SO(S)
- SEC JPC
- SO(P) (1)
- SO(P) (2)
- SO(Q)
- D/DNP
- SO (1)
- CAIR
- NID (1)
- NID (2)
- NID (3)
- SO (T)
- SO (STAT)
- S/Lt Turner
- N INF
- SO (SEC)
- D/DNI
- DNPI
- ACCESSION LIST
- INDEX
- SEC
- A.A.
- B.F.

Do not consider this requires any change in our present procedure.

tlh

*(1)
(2)
(3)*

This minute sheet is to be attached to the office copy. It is NOT to leave the Directorate.

TOP SECRET
CLASSIFICATION


11550-201
Reference

Date extracted 10th April 47

CABINET DEFENCE MINUTE

The following is an extract from the minutes of the 30th Meeting of the Cabinet Defence Committee held 31st March 47.

- D.M.
- D.H.P.I.
- D.W.T.
- D.S.D.
- D.N.A.D.
- D.S.R.D.
- A/C.N.S.
- D.N.O.
- D.E.E.
- A/C.N.A.S.(E)
- A/C.N.A.S.(SD)
- C.N.A.S.
- D.N.R.
- C.N.P.



Secretary to the Chief of the Naval Staff.

Disclosure of Information to Other Countries

The Minister of National Defence stated that the United Kingdom grouped other countries into certain categories which indicated the security classification of military and technical information which might be given to those countries. Category "A" comprised countries of the British Commonwealth (excluding Eire) and the U.S.A. who could be given all classified information. The United Kingdom, however, had now altered its policy as regarded India in that, though India remained in Category "A", only such top secret and secret technical information as was necessary for her immediate military needs would be given, each item being considered on its merits. The Security Panel had recommended that a similar procedure be adopted for Canadian use as in any event information of British origin could be released only with U.K. concurrence. It was proposed that the Joint Intelligence Committee should consider such individual cases as might arise, being guided by the principle adopted by the U.K.

(Memorandum from Secretary, Security Panel, March 7th, 1947 - Cabinet Document D.110).

The Director General of Defence Research raised the question of the actual administrative policy followed in regard to release of classified information; in particular the manner in which the Joint Intelligence Committee was giving direction. His experience had indicated that the J.I.C. was inclined to take the most restrictive view in each case, and therefore perhaps release of information was being unnecessarily prevented. It appeared that the practice followed by J.I.C. was to release information only if a reciprocal release could be expected from the other country concerned. This policy was applied regardless of the security classification involved.

The Committee, after discussion;

- (a) approved the re-categorization of India in accordance with U.K. policy and,
- (b) agreed that individual requests for releases of information of a top secret or secret nature to India be referred to the Joint Intelligence Committee.

Top Secret
CLASSIFICATION
Cab Doc *D/O* *7/3/47*
Reference

URGENT - BY HAND

CHIEFS OF STAFF CABINET DEFENCE

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	D.N.P.I.	
<input type="checkbox"/>	D.W.T.	
<input type="checkbox"/>	D.S.D.	
<input type="checkbox"/>	D.N.A.D.	
<input type="checkbox"/>	D.S.R.D.	
<input type="checkbox"/>	A/C.N.S.	
<input type="checkbox"/>	D.N.O.	
<input type="checkbox"/>	D.E.E.	
<input type="checkbox"/>	A/C.N.A.S. (E)	
<input type="checkbox"/>	A/C.N.A.S. (SD)	
<input type="checkbox"/>	C.N.A.S.	
<input type="checkbox"/>	D.N.R.	
<input type="checkbox"/>	C.N.P.	
<input type="checkbox"/>		

Request your comments hereon for C.N.S. please,
and return to Room 3316 by *1609 24/3/47*

Date: *22/3/47*

Dalzell
Secretary to the Chief of
the Naval Staff

Concur in the Recommendation of the Security Panel - para. 15 of the Memo, folio down.

DIRECTOR
[Signature]
MAR 24 1947
Naval Plans & Intelligence

CABINET DOCUMENT

No. A 110

Copy No. 8

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA

TOP SECRETMEMORANDUM TO THE CABINET DEFENCE COMMITTEE:Disclosure of Information to Other Countries

1. By authority of the Cabinet Defence Committee, the Security Panel recently issued an administrative memorandum outlining the policy to govern the disclosure of military and technical information to other countries.

2. This policy, which is similar to that pursued in the United Kingdom, groups the nations into three categories "A", "B" and "C", and indicates the security classification of information each may receive. Category "A" comprises countries of the British Commonwealth of Nations (excluding Eire) and the U.S.A., who may receive all classified information.

3. Advice has been received that the United Kingdom policy, as it affects grouping in Category "A" has been amended as regards India. While she will remain in Category "A", only such Top Secret and Secret technical information will be given to her as is necessary for her immediate military needs and each item will be considered on its merits.

4. As our practice is to clear with the United Kingdom authorities if the information to be released is of British origin, the Security Panel deem it desirable that a similar procedure be adopted for Canadian use; also, the Panel believes that in present conditions such a policy is the best one to pursue.

5. The Security Panel therefore recommend that India remain in Category "A" but that requests for release of information of a Top Secret or Secret nature be referred to the Joint Intelligence Committee for consideration in individual cases and that they be guided by the principle that only such information should be passed which is required for her immediate needs.

J.A.K. Rutherford, Lt.-Col.,
Secretary,
Security Panel.

Privy Council Office,
March 7th, 1947.

rec'd 21/3/47

CONFIDENTIAL

File 1950-4

11

Following is Item.....of the minutes of the.....
meeting of the.....^{SP}.....held on.....3/3/47.....

Disclosure of Information to Other Countries;
Categorization of Nations

7. The Acting Chairman referred to the administrative memorandum dated 15th October, prepared by the Security Panel, outlining the policy to be observed with regard to the disclosure of information to other countries, or their representatives either ~~by~~ military or civilian.

The grouping of nations into categories was based on a policy pursued by the United Kingdom and was accepted for Canadian use subject to periodic review by the Security Panel.

The United Kingdom policy, as it affected grouping in Category "A", had been amended as regards India. It had been decided that while she would remain in Category "A" only such Top Secret and Secret technical information should be given to her as was necessary for her immediate military needs and each item would be considered on its merits.

In view of this decision it was for consideration by the Panel as to whether a similar procedure should be adopted for Canadian use.

- 3 -

8. Mr. Crean expressed the view that since clearance from British authorities would be necessary in the release of classified information of British origin it would be desirable to adopt United Kingdom policy in this regard.

9. It was agreed, after discussion, that:

- (a) India should remain in Category "A" but that requests for release of information of a Top Secret and Secret nature be referred to the Joint Intelligence Committee for consideration in individual cases; and
- (b) that this decision be the subject of a report to the Cabinet Defence Committee.

Booklet on Security

10. The Acting Chairman submitted for consideration a draft copy of the Booklet on Security prepared by the Sub-Committee in accordance with decisions reached at meetings of the Panel held on 24th June and 8th July.

(Security Panel Document SP-19).

In the preparation of this material the Sub-Committee, realizing that security requirements within individual departments of government varied greatly, had endeavoured to provide guidance rather than regulations. The emphasis therefore was on the advisory section. All the regulations reproduced in the Appendices had been authorized with the exception of that dealing with security measures in relation to documents. However, this appendix was merely an amplified version of the Panel's memorandum of September 4th, 1946, and did not appear to raise any new questions of policy.

It was intended that the booklet be printed in a form similar to the government telephone directory but in a slightly smaller size, viz. 5½ x 8 inches. Estimates for undertaking this work had been received from Service printing establishments and amounted to \$50.00 for 200 copies. The Privy Council Office would provide the necessary funds for this purpose.

The Sub-Committee had found the United Kingdom booklet on security of considerable help and were also indebted to Mr. George Glazebrook, formerly of the Department of External Affairs, for his advice. Copies of the booklet should be sent to the United Kingdom Security Panel and to Mr. Glazebrook with acknowledgement.

11. Commander Macdonald expressed the view that certain section of Part V dealing with cypher security contained information which should not have the wide circulation proposed for the booklet. Consideration might be given to ~~either~~ restricting the distribution of this chapter to departments which have occasion to send or receive cypher telegrams.

- 4 -

12. The Panel, after discussion:

- (a) approved the draft submitted subject to such amendments as were agreed upon in the discussion and agreed that arrangements be made for the printing of the booklet in the style proposed;
- (b) agreed that initial distribution of the booklet be made departmentally to all Deputy Ministers and Security Officers, and at the discretion of the Chairman to government agencies; and
- (c) agreed that the administrative memorandum on "Security Measures in Relation to Documents" issued under date of September 4th, 1946, be superceded by the instructions contained in Appendix "A" and that the new instructions be circulated forthwith.

J.A.K. Rutherford, Lt.-Col.,
Secretary,
Security Panel.

Privy Council Office,
March 5th, 1947.

File No

(NAVAL SERVICE HEADQUARTERS)

MINUTE SHEET

For the use of Naval Staff.

REFERRED TO:

REMARKS

C.N.S.

A.C.N.S.

D.N.P.I.

D.W.T.

D.N.A.D.

D.S.D.

S.O.(O)

J.A.F.

C.N.A.S.

D.N. INF.

N. SEC.

PERS. (N)

A/C.N.A.S. (S.D.)

A/C.N.A.S. (Ship.)

D.G.F.A.

B.N.O.

D.M.(N)

D.N.H.S.

*at 11:15 AM: For your
convenience please refer
to the attached copy of
the report of the
C.N.S. 1/12*

*What about distribution
to Inspectors?*

ACNS 1/12

*We feel this is political
dynamite and want to keep the
distribution to a minimum. "Warrior"
and "Uganda" will be in company
with the destroyers on most
foreign cruises. If and when
a Capt's is appointed he will
get a copy of the latest edition.
Incidentally this information is
in the new C.B. 3009 which Destroyers will
hold.*

May

000433

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

SECRET
Serial No. 001193P32

6 FEB 1947

My dear Commander Pemberton:

Governmental policy has recently been established making possible the free and comprehensive exchange of classified military information on matters connected with the security of Canada and the United States as provided for by the terms of the "34th Recommendation" of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense.

The disclosure of the aforementioned information to Canada, however, will be contingent upon agreement to the following conditions precedent to its release:

- a. will not be disclosed to a third nation without specific approval of the United States.
- b. will be afforded substantially the same degree of security afforded by the United States.
- c. will not be exploited for production for other than military purposes.
- d. the rights of the individual or concern, originating the development, whether it is patented or not, are to be respected by Canada in accordance with the patent laws of the country of the originator.

Relative to the administration within the Navy Department for the releasing of Navy classified military information to Canada, the Office of Naval Intelligence is the authorized channel through which such data shall be disclosed.

The following is to be followed in all requests for such information, whether for specific items, to make visits to Naval or quasi-Naval activities, or for the establishment of continuing projects or liaison.

Requests for specific data should be addressed direct to the Office of Naval Intelligence which will undertake to obtain the desired information and transmit it to you.

Requests for permission to visit at Naval or quasi-Naval establishments should also be forwarded direct to the Office of Naval Intelligence. Upon receipt of complete information as to the identity of the representative(s) designated to make the visit, the nature and scope of the visit, and the probable frequency and length of visits, if more than one, the Office of Naval Intelligence will arrange for the visit(s) and inform you of the results.

Request for permission to establish continuing projects or liaison, likewise should be forwarded direct to the Office of Naval Intelligence. Upon receipt of complete information as to the identity of the representative(s) designated to perform the business involved and the type of project or liaison desired the Office of Naval Intelligence will also arrange the appropriate liaison within the Naval Establishment.

- 2 -

The foregoing arrangements will include the time and place and personnel for conferences determined to be necessary.

With kindest personal regards.

Very sincerely yours,

(Sgd.)

THOS. B. INGLIS,
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
Chief of Naval Intelligence
by direction.

Commander F.J.D. Pemberton, R.C.N.(R),
Naval Attache,
Canadian Embassy,
1746 Massachusetts Avenue,
Washington, D.C.

N.S.1950-13

1950-4

PA

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF
OTTAWA

CONFIDENTIAL

4th February, 1947

MEMORANDUM


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DISCLOSURE OF SERVICE INFORMATION

Addressees are to ensure that they and all officers and men under their jurisdiction are conversant with the provisions of K.R.C.N. Article 12.73 which prescribes the procedure which serving personnel must follow when disclosing any information of a Service nature, whether written or verbal, to the public.

In addition, personnel at Naval Service Headquarters are hereby forbidden to disclose, under any circumstances, any information of a Service nature to the press or to persons outside the Service, either verbally or in writing.

The only sources of information available to the press or to any other persons outside the Naval Service are the office of the Minister of National Defence and the Director of Naval Information after he has cleared with the appropriate departmental authority.



(H.E. Reid)
Vice Admiral

CHIEF OF THE NAVAL STAFF

TO:
ALL BRANCH HEADS AND DIRECTORS
AT NAVAL SERVICE HEADQUARTERS.

COMMANDING OFFICER, H.M.C.S. "BYTOWN".

H. 024

NAVAL SERVICE - MINUTE SHEET


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REFERRED TO

REMARKS (With Signature, Position & Date)

DNPI 

It is approved to promulgate your draft memo (6 down) on Disclosure of Information to Other Countries, to the addressees you have indicated; memo to constitute temporary instructions for the Naval Service pending Cabinet Approval of the policy involved.


(H.E. Reid)
Vice-Admiral
C.N.S.

26th November, 1946.

000437