

# INCOMING MESSAGE

# FILE COPY

# COPY

FROM: THE OFFICE OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, PARIS

*Orig. on 50102-L-40*

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA *f.B*

Security Classification

SECRET

File No.

50030-AB-40

6 | 6

Priority

System

No.

Date

CYPHER-AUTO

860

July 7, 1955.

Departmental Circulation

THE MINISTER UNDER-SEC'Y ASSOC/U/SEC'Y ASSIST/U/SECS POL COOR SECT.

Reference: Your telegram No. 740 of July 4.

Subject: Possible NATO Ministerial meeting in October.

At the Council meeting on July 6, the Canadian proposal for a meeting of Foreign, Defence and Finance Ministers in October was raised orally by the Chairman under Item I on the agenda. In introducing the item, Lord Ismay recalled that during the previous discussion many had considered that the Canadian proposal had good possibilities but doubt had been expressed on the practicability of putting it into effect this year. Delegations and the International Staff had been asked to study the proposal. On consideration, the International Staff felt that a full-fledged Ministerial meeting on the annual review in October would upset the planned procedures and set back the timetable of this year's annual review. Furthermore they considered it would be difficult to prepare papers by October which would be suitable for an annual review Ministerial meeting.

14

References

2. Most permanent representatives gave the views of their governments on the Canadian proposal. The French representative said that their views corresponded with that of the International Staff. The Canadian proposal has been considered with a great deal of interest but they do feel it would be difficult to apply this year. Similar views were expressed by the Netherlands and Norway. The United Kingdom representative, while agreeing with this view, said they thought there was a great deal of merit behind the Canadian proposal, and suggested that the proposal should be considered in connection with the whole question of procedures and timetable of an annual review as soon as possible. In the first instance it might be considered by the International Staff in consultation with delegations. The United Kingdom view was supported by Belgium, Germany, Italy, Denmark and the Netherlands. The Danish representative felt, however, that the Canadian proposal should be taken up and reviewed in light of the experience gained from the 1955 annual review. The International Staff and United States representative supported the view that the Canadian proposal should be fully examined again next January after this year's review had been completed.

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3. We expressed appreciation for the consideration which had been given to the Canadian proposal. In making the proposal we had been aware of course that it was made late in the season and that some adjustments would need to be made in the annual review procedures. Renewal of our suggestion, however, had stemmed from the proposal that a Ministerial meeting of Defence Ministers be held at this stage. Furthermore, we had concluded that the necessary adjustments in the annual review procedures would be little more serious than would be required by a meeting of the Defence Ministers alone; losses in time in the commencement of Stage 2 of the annual review would be offset by the fact that there would be no Ministerial meeting at the end of the annual review process. In addition, we had not felt that there would be any requirement for papers beyond what would be in any event available for the meeting of Defence Ministers and already prepared at the end of Stage I. However, in light of the views of the larger majority of the Council that it would be impracticable this year, we would not press the point. We would want to ensure, however, that the proposal was not dropped, and would be given full and careful consideration in the development of processes and procedures for next year's annual review. We would agree that in the initial stages it might be useful for it to be considered by the International Staff in consultation with delegations. Eventually, however, it should be examined by the Annual Review Committee, possibly through its sub-committee on annual review procedures.

4. Accordingly, the Council decided that there will not be a full-dressed meeting in October this year. The Canadian proposal, however, will be studied further by the International Staff in consultation with delegations and incorporated in the discussions of the Annual Review Committee, commencing next January, in the development of procedures for the 1956 annual review.

5. Turning to the second item on the agenda, the Council took up the question of a meeting of Defence Ministers in October. The Turkish representative indicated that there had been no change in their position. The proposed discussions should be held at the regular Ministerial meeting in December. They would like the effectiveness report discussed then. We pointed out that we too felt that the proposed military briefings should be presented to all Ministers in full session and did not feel that these briefings are of such an urgent character that they could not be postponed until the regular meeting in December. Furthermore, there was the point that a Defence Ministers' meeting in October might interfere with the annual review procedures and delay preparations for the full-fledged Ministerial meeting in December. The United States representative favoured a Defence Ministers' meeting and suggested that it would have the advantage of testing out the ideas behind the Canadian proposal. He did not feel it should interfere with the regular annual review process.

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Similar support for a meeting of the Defence Ministers in October was expressed by the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Portugal and Greece. The Italian representative agreed that such a meeting would be useful but they felt Finance Ministers should also be present since the interest of various Ministers in these questions could not be separated. The Norwegian representative agreed to the meeting and withdrew his previous suggestion that the Military Committee meet in advance. The Danish representative, while previously doubtful, indicated willingness to agree to this informal meeting of Defence Ministers.

6. In the circumstances we agreed to go along with the majority, on the clear understanding, however, that **it was not** to establish any precedent for the future. Several representatives confirmed and it was stressed by the Netherlands representative that the proposal for a Defence Ministers' meeting this year stemmed from a special character of the problems which had developed and did not establish in principle the desirability of a meeting in the autumn of Defence Ministers only. The Turkish representative agreed to report the situation to his government and undertook if possible to confirm their agreement with the majority view.

7. Turning to the question of timing, SGLO reaffirmed that mid-October was the best date by which preparation of briefings would be assured. If the Council so desired an earlier meeting of course could be held. In any event the briefings could not possibly be ready before October 6. On the basis of this change in emphasis on timing by SGLO, the date of October 6 was proposed for the consideration of governments. We understand that the military have been under pressure particularly by the International Staff to move the date forward as far as possible.

8. The United States did not raise in Council their idea of a full Ministerial meeting both in October and in December. After the meeting, however, Perkins told me that his instructions favoured a repetition at the December meeting of the briefings proposed for the Defence Ministers in October. He decided, however, not to raise the point now as it would tend to muddy the waters on their preference for a Defence Ministers' meeting only in October. Presumably they will raise the point after the meeting of the Defence Ministers.

9. Action required. Kindly let us know before the next Council meeting on July 13 if the date of October 6 for the proposed briefing of Defence Ministers only is satisfactory for Mr. Campney. L.D. Wilgress.

# INCOMING MESSAGE

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

# ORIGINAL

FROM: THE OFFICE OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, PARIS

*Copy on 50102-L-40*

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

*9.60*

Security Classification

SECRET

File No.

50030-AB-40

6 | 58

Priority  
IMPORTANT

System  
CYPHER-AUTO

No. 792

Date June 23, 1955.

13

Departmental Circulation

THE MINISTER  
UNDER-SEC'Y  
ASSOC/U/SEC'Y  
ASSIST/U/SECS  
POL COOR SECT.

Reference: Your telegram No. 689 of June 20.

Subject: SACEUR's effectiveness report; possible ministerial meeting.

Addressed Ottawa No. 792 (Important) repeated to London No. 108 and Washington No. 47 (Ottawa please pass to Washington).

At the Council meeting of June 22, the proposal for a meeting of defence ministers to take place in late September or in October was thrown open for discussion; Most of the early speakers accepted the proposal, although the Turkish, Italian and Greek representatives expressed some reservations about the desirability of holding a defence ministers' meeting of this nature without finance ministers also present. The Italian and Greek representatives subsequently accepted the arguments put forward by the proponents of the plan to the effect that such a meeting should be completely informal in character and should provide the opportunity for an exchange of views about the new principles which will affect defence planning rather than for consideration of defence programmes as such.

2. We then made a fairly extensive statement based on your telegram. For the most part our remarks were taken directly from your text, but we added a few comments designed to persuade the military authorities that the proposal for a full-dress ministerial meeting in the autumn would not seriously disrupt their work programme. Subsequently we were asked to prepare a text setting out our proposal in detail for inclusion in the minutes; we are transmitting the prepared text in a separate telegram.

3. A number of speakers considered that there were many attractive features in our plan and that it deserved the most searching examination. The United Kingdom representative, for example, agreed with our criticism of the present December ministerial meeting and stated that it was with such considerations in mind that his authorities had supported the proposal for a defence ministers meeting in the autumn.

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DONE - COMM'S SECTION

Done JUN 24 '55  
Date

References

*Economic Div.  
European Div.  
CCOS(4)  
D/M D.N.D.  
D/M Finance.  
D/M Defense Production.  
Rec. to Cabinet.*

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Done  
Date

All speakers were agreed, however, that the implications of this plan for the entire annual review process were profound and that it would probably be difficult for their governments to think the proposal through and reach clear and constructive conclusions without the lapse of a considerable time. The United States representative, for example, thought that it would take six weeks or more before he could expect to have his government's considered views.

4. It was suggested by the Chairman of the Annual Review Committee that ministers would require some weeks to digest the information and ideas which they would obtain from a meeting such as we proposed, and that this would cause a corresponding delay which would make it impossible to complete the annual review by Christmas. We replied that, on the contrary, we saw no reason for delay; the work of the examination panels, the Secretariat and the military authorities could proceed immediately following the conclusion of the proposed ministerial meeting. While this work was going on, ministers would be able to absorb and assess what they had learned at the meeting, and would thus be better prepared to take prompt and effective decisions upon the recommendations when they emerged.

5. As expected, no one was prepared to take a firm position on our proposal at the moment. A number of speakers, however, expressed the view that the practical difficulties in having the plan accepted for the current year would probably prove insurmountable, regardless of the judgment which the Council might ultimately reach upon the intrinsic merits of the proposal. It was suggested that a more practical line of approach might be to concentrate attention, upon a thorough examination of the value of our plan, for application in whole or in part for next year's annual review. We said that we would not wish to accept this approach until governments had an opportunity to give our proposal some examination, and we accordingly requested that governments should consider the plan as soon as possible. It was finally agreed that in two weeks time the Council would:

(a) consider how best to deal with the Canadian proposal (this presumably would include a decision as to whether or not it is practicable to accept the plan in the current year);

(b) take a final decision concerning the proposal for the meeting of defence ministers in October; and

(c) study in the interval the Canadian proposal as set out in the minutes of a detailed text to be submitted by the Canadian delegation..

6. We made it clear that our proposal was not put forward as an alternative to a defence ministers meeting. If our plan was not accepted, or for various reasons could not be applied in the current year, we would prefer to postpone the briefings and discussions which had been suggested for the proposed defence ministers meeting until the regular December meeting when all ministers concerned could be present.

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7. We are, of course, unable to judge the conclusions which governments will reach in considering our proposal during the next two weeks. On the basis of the discussion yesterday, however, we think it likely that on July 6 a majority of the Council will express the view that, regardless of the merits of our plan, it is a non-starter for this year as it is put forward too late in the annual review process. We would expect, nevertheless, that there will be a good deal of support for a thorough study of our plan with a view to its incorporation in the programme for next year's annual review. If this assessment is correct, the meeting of July 6 will discard our plan as far as the present year is concerned and will then go on to consider whether or not a meeting of defence ministers should be held in mid-October, the date by which the SGLO stated that the military authorities would be in a position to make a useful contribution. Although certain other countries to some extent share our doubts about the wisdom of holding such a meeting, it is probable that those other objectors would come around to the majority view under pressure. We may therefore expect that there will be a fairly determined effort on the part of the sponsors of the plan to persuade us to accept it. Please let us know prior to the meeting whether we should hold out against such a defence ministers meeting, particularly if it appears that the other objectors are prepared to give way.

8. In this connection we should point out that your telegram under reference puts slightly different emphasis upon the nature and purpose of the proposed defence ministers meeting from that underlined by the sponsors. They have taken care to emphasize the informal nature of the meeting they propose, a meeting which would not only not take decisions but which would not concern itself directly with national defence programmes. The purpose of the meeting, as proposed by its sponsors, would be to provide an opportunity for the exchange of views on the military principles and concepts which in future will underlie defence programmes. The Ministers of many of the European countries apparently feel that they know too little about the considerations underlying the new military concepts to be able to assess them properly and form a judgment concerning their application on the national scale. The purpose of the meeting would therefore be primarily instructive, and instructive in a fairly technical sense.

9. In addition to the specific point mentioned in paragraph 7 above, we should be grateful for any comments or instructions which you may have on these various points.

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NOTE: Above telegram passed to Washington  
as requested.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION.

DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM

*File*  
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TO: The Under-Secretary

Security **SECRET**

Date June 24, 1955

FROM: Defence Liaison (1) Division

File No.		
50030-AB-40		
111		111

REFERENCE:

*Copy in 50102-4-40*

SUBJECT: Possible NATO Ministerial Meeting in October

*see June 24*

Attached for your initials if you approve, is a telegram to Washington and London on this subject. You will note in the attached telegram No. 792 of June 23, from our NATO Delegation, that no final decision has yet been taken in the Council on our proposal for a full-dress Ministerial meeting in October, but the prospects of obtaining general approval of it this year do not appear to be very rosy. On the other hand, many delegations still appear to favour having a meeting of defence ministers only in October.

2. The purpose of our telegram is to try to find out from Washington and London whether, in fact, the NATO military authorities will be in a position in October to brief the defence ministers on at least the most important practical consequences of the nuclear planning assumptions approved in M.C. 48. We thought that we should have up-to-date information on this question to give to the Minister on his return next week. We could then decide what to recommend to him both as regards the proposed defence ministers' meeting and our own suggestion for a full-dress meeting.

*S. J. Pratt*  
Defence Liaison (1) Division

INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

FROM: THE OFFICE OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, PARIS.

*Copy on 50102-1-40 J.56*

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

*Copy on 50030-AG-1-40*

Security Classification

**S E C R E T**

File No.

*50030-AB-40*

*6 | 50*

Priority	System	No.	Date
	CYPHER-AUTO	727	June 8, 1955.

Departmental Circulation

THE MINISTER  
UNDER-SEC'Y  
ASSOC/U/SEC'Y  
ASSIST/U/SECS  
POL COOR SECT.

Reference: Your telegrams No. 627 of June 6 and No. 634 of June 7, 1955.

Subject: SACEUR's effectiveness report, 1955.

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In the Council discussion on June 8, it appeared to be accepted by all members that the factual information contained in SACEUR's effectiveness report should be discreetly introduced into the current annual review process in such a way that qualitative as well as quantitative problems would receive full consideration during the review, but without unduly dispersing information of a highly sensitive nature concerning the location and effectiveness of designated units. The discussion thus centered mainly upon the prospect of a ministerial meeting.

2. It appeared that three governments in particular were actively in favour of holding a defence ministers' meeting in connection with this report. The United Kingdom, Belgian and Dutch representatives all thought that such a meeting would be useful not primarily for a detailed discussion of the content of the report but rather in order that the general situation revealed by the report might be brought home to the ministers through a briefing by the NATO military authorities (i.e. SACEUR and the Standing Group) on NATO's present defence posture. Such a briefing would not be confined to the problem of the effectiveness of NATO forces, but would develop as far as possible, the implications for future defence planning of the "new look" concepts introduced in MC-48. It was not suggested that such a meeting should be designed to take decisions; its prime purpose would be to enable defence ministers to be given a general review of NATO's present military position (including the effectiveness problem) and future military problems (in particular those problems likely to arise in the implementation of MC-48 ideas).

3. Not all delegations were prepared at least at present to accept this kind of plan, but it was more difficult to detect a single explicit opposition

References

*Mr. Campney*

*CCOS (4)*

*D/M DND*

*D/M Finance*

*DDP*

*Sec. Cab.*

*Economic*

*European*

*London (bag)*

*Washington (u)*

*J.N.*

*Minister (with memo) (c)*

*European Economic*

*with copies of memo*

*13 June 1955*

Done \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

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view. The United States for example, had no objection to a meeting of defence ministers which would take the form indicated in our previous paragraph, but they felt that such a meeting would be premature unless the military authorities could provide specific information on the following points:

(a) The result of SACEUR's bi-lateral negotiations based on the effectiveness report of last December;

(b) Current information concerning the effectiveness of forces which would bring the report up to date;

(c) Reasonably tangible indications of some of the practical consequences of MC-48.

4. The French representative, without giving clear reasons, let it be understood that his government was opposed to the holding of a ministerial meeting to discuss SACEUR's report. A number of other governments such as Norway and Denmark, were mildly opposed to a meeting of ministers to discuss SACEUR's report, but they said that the kind of meeting outlined in our paragraph 2 above was something rather different and might well be viewed with favour by their governments. For our part, we explained that you had no strong views concerning the proposals for a ministerial meeting, but you felt that if such a meeting were held the timing should be so arranged as to avoid any conflict with the proposed four-power talks. For this reason, we would not favour a meeting in July but we believed that a meeting in the autumn along the lines suggested by the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Belgium might commend itself to you. We would hope that such a meeting, if it were to take place, would be held about September in order that there might be sufficient time for the effects of the meeting to be digested prior to the annual review meeting in December.

5. The United Kingdom supported our view on timing and Belgium and the Netherlands, while previously in favour of a meeting as soon as possible (i.e. July) quickly accepted the point about the relationship to four-power talks and agreed that a meeting in the autumn would be satisfactory. The United Kingdom was disposed to favour October rather than September, but we understand that they have not strong views on the point.

6. It was finally agreed that the matter would be considered again in two weeks time (i.e. June 22) when the Council would seek to decide on the principle of a ministerial meeting and if possible to fix a tentative date. The only explicitly unfavourable reaction to the plan came from France, the French representative stating that his government was opposed to

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a meeting of defence ministers on that subject unless finance ministers also were to attend. He admitted however that his instructions related mainly to a possible meeting in July and it might be that the plan for a meeting in the autumn would be acceptable. It is our own view that the type of meeting <sup>envisaged</sup> would be useful and far more constructive than a meeting devoted only to an arid discussion of SACEUR's report. The success of the meeting, if it takes place, would undoubtedly depend for the most part on the merits of the briefing which would probably be given mainly by Gruenther. Judging by his past performances, he should be able to prepare an expose of NATO's military posture which will be of great interest to defence ministers and which would give them much food for thought. The exchange of views which would follow in the form of a discussion period might also be extremely valuable, although this of course would depend on how freely individual ministers are willing to talk.

7. We should be grateful for any comments you may have in time for the discussion on June 22.  
L.D. Wilgress.

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INCOMING MESSAGE

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ORIGINAL

FROM: THE OFFICE OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE  
 OF CANADA TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL,  
 PARIS

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

*J. 54*

Security Classification	
SECRET	
File No.	
<i>50030-AB-40</i>	
<i>52</i>	<i>50</i>

Priority	System CYPHER-AUTO	No. 706	Date June 2, 1955.
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Departmental  
 Circulation

THE MINISTER  
 UNDER-SECY  
 ASSOC/U/SECY  
 ASSIST/U/SECS  
 POL COOR SECT.

Reference: Your telegram No. 605 of June 1, 1955.

Subject: SACEUR's effectiveness report, 1955.

It so happens that the Council briefly considered in private session on June 1st what future action should be taken in connection with SACEUR's effectiveness report. The most interesting statement was made by the United States representative who agreed that procedural steps could be considered at any time but felt that it was premature to discuss the possibility of a ministerial meeting on this subject until a good deal more information was available about the "new look". It was eventually agreed that a preliminary discussion would be held on June 8th limited purely to procedure for future handling and not touching on the substance of the report. The purpose of this preliminary discussion would be to draw out ideas on possible procedure to be followed, in order that at a later meeting the Council might be able to take a clear decision.

2. It would be useful to receive in time for the June 8th meeting any suggestions you may have concerning the future handling of this subject. You will recall the Council's earlier decision to take this matter up again when governments had had an opportunity to consider the briefing on the subject given to the Council by the SGLO on May 4th. L.D. Wilgress.

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DONE - COM'S SECTION  
 Done *3* JUN 1955  
 Date JUN 03 '55

References

*JM DND*  
*JM Finance*  
*cc (5)*  
*Sec 3 Cabinet*  
*European*  
*D (2)*  
*Report to*  
*Washington - [unclear]*

Done *LPB*  
 Date *June 2/55*

# INCOMING MESSAGE

# COPY

*Original on 50109-40*

FROM: THE OFFICE OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, PARIS

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

SECRET

File No.

50030-AB-40

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Priority

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No.

Date

CYPHER-AUTO

580

May 7, 1955.

10

Departmental Circulation

THE MINISTER UNDER-SEC'Y ASSOC/U/SEC'Y ASSIST/U/SECS POL COOR SECT.

Reference: Our telegram No. 238 of March 2, 1955.

Subject: Revised terms of reference for SACEUR.

At a private meeting of the council yesterday, there was a brief discussion of the proposed revision of paragraph 5 of enclosure C to MCM-14-54 along the lines originally suggested by the Netherlands and Belgian delegations (see paragraph 4 of our telegram under reference)

2. The new paragraph as now suggested by the Netherlands and Belgian delegations and supported by the United Kingdom reads as follows:

"The Supreme Allied Commander Europe is directed to release regularly to the Council of Western European Union information relating to the forces under his control, including reserve formations, of the members of Western European Union on, or based on, the mainland of Europe, acquired as a result of the reports and inspections mentioned in paragraph 10, sub-paragraphs (g) and (h), of the Supreme Commander's revised terms of reference in order to enable that council to establish that the limits laid down in Articles 1 and 2 of protocol No. II on forces of Western European Union are being observed."

3. The French representative, however, strongly opposed this wording which would limit SACEUR's report to WEU council to information on the levels of WEU forces under his command. He again developed his thesis that information about levels of forces is meaningless unless it is supplemented by information related to the effectiveness of these forces. He therefore suggested that the word "all" be inserted in the third line between the words "union" and "information". The Belgian representative would have been prepared to accept this amendment provided the word "necessary" was inserted in the ninth line after the word "reference" and before the words "in order". Mr. Parodi was agreeable to this suggestion but the Dutch representative pointed out quite rightly that the two amendments cancelled each other and he therefore rejected the proposal.

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Date \_\_\_\_\_

References

Done \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

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4. As we seemed to have reached a deadlock I intervened briefly to point out that although we were not directly involved in the details of the controversy, we were concerned over any attempt to alter the original meaning of the Paris Agreements and what appeared to us as the clear intentions of the drafters of the agreements. We opposed the suggestion that a small working group be appointed to reconsider the matter on the ground that this question was of general NATO interest and it was finally decided that Mr. Parodi and Sir Christopher Steel would try to reach agreement informally and report back to council probably during the ministerial meeting.

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# INCOMING MESSAGE

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

# ORIGINAL

**FROM:** THE OFFICE OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE  
 OF CANADA TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL,  
 PARIS

**TO:** THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification	
<del>SECRET</del>	
File No.	
50030-AB-40	
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<b>Priority</b>	<b>System</b> CYPHER-AUTO	<b>No.</b> 547	<b>Date</b> May 2, 1955.
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**Departmental Circulation**

THE MINISTER  
 UNDER-SEC'Y  
 ASSOC/U/SEC'Y  
 ASSIST/U/SECS  
 POL COOR SECT.

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MAY 3 '55

Reference:

Subject: SACEUR's effectiveness report, 1954.

Addressed Ottawa No. 547 repeated CJS London No. 74.

The Permanent Council met with the Standing Group on April 29 to discuss SACEUR's combat effectiveness report.

2. In opening the discussion, SACEUR explained that his current effectiveness report was his personal assessment of the combat effectiveness of units assigned to him and that in this report he was, on instructions from the Standing Group, limiting his assessment to either agreeing or disagreeing with each country's conclusions regarding the state of combat readiness of its forces committed to him. He therefore made no attempt in his current report to make a percentage rating of effectiveness. If he passed judgment that such forces were "not ready" at the time of writing his report, he furnished supporting reasons; but he made no attempt, as had been done in previous years, to give his version of revised readiness dates. He explained that there may have been extraordinary circumstances which might have caused him to have been unduly severe with some countries. He pointed out, for instance, that his assessment of the Canadian Air Force's contribution was done at a time when the Canadian Air Force was in the process of a change-over from one type to a more modern type of aircraft and that consequently the combat effectiveness of that force at that moment was understandably low. He added that the situation would, of course, be corrected when the change-over was completed and he thought this should be some time in mid-summer of this year.

3. The discussion, which incidentally was more constructive and fruitful than most previous meetings with the Standing Group, was focused on the following:

(a) The distribution of all country annexes to SACEUR's effectiveness report to all member nations;

Done MAY 3 1955

Date \_\_\_\_\_

**References**

European  
 D.L. 2  
 CCOS (5)  
 D/M DND  
 D/M Finance  
 Sec. Cab.  
 Washington (air bag)

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(b) The relationship between SACEUR's effectiveness report and the Annual Review;

(c) The question of a ministerial meeting later in the summer for the purpose of taking ministerial action on SACEUR's effectiveness report.

4. The Netherlands' representative argued strongly and persistently for the general distribution of the entire report. The Belgian representative also supported the proposal that the report should be made available to all members of the Council. It was generally agreed that SACEUR's report was the one document in which a full appraisal of the quality of NATO forces appeared although in previous years elements of it appeared indirectly in the Annual Review report, principally in the military recommendations. This had taken place only piecemeal and did not reveal the importance of the general aspects of the whole problem in their proper perspective.

5. The Deputy Secretary-General, who is the Chairman of the Annual Review Committee, argued strongly that in order to conduct an effective annual review, it was necessary for the Secretariat to have this report, otherwise he could not see how the Secretariat could possibly make conscientious and constructive recommendations. Some representatives, including myself, argued that before a decision was taken on whether a ministerial meeting should be held to discuss SACEUR's report, it was necessary to know how much of the report would be made available to ministers. I pointed out that it would hardly be worthwhile to hold a ministerial meeting if each minister were to have available to him only SACEUR's covering letter to his combat effectiveness report and SACEUR's comments on his particular country's forces and not SACEUR's views on the effectiveness of the contributions by the other members of the alliance. I suggested that it might be more useful if the conclusions of SACEUR's report were incorporated and reflected in the annual review process rather than made the subject of a special ministerial meeting this coming summer, such a special meeting would undoubtedly require a full ministerial meeting including defence and finance ministers. In this connection, I referred, for instance, to paragraph 23 of SACEUR's covering letter where he states "the major weaknesses are, unfortunately, bound up closely in the economic, political and financial life of the various countries". It would be difficult to justify such a full-dress meeting or to expect ministers to make a constructive contribution if each government was not aware of the general contents of SACEUR's full report on all countries.

6. General Whiteley (United Kingdom), the Chairman of the Standing Group, explained that the Standing Group fully appreciated the importance of not withholding essential information from the Council but that the Standing Group recommended against the general distribution of SACEUR's full report including all country annexes. They took this stand for two reasons:

(a) A wider distribution of detailed information concerning the combat effectiveness, state of readiness and location of each unit in each country's contributions obviously presented a very serious security problem;

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

- 3 -

(b) Under SACEUR's present terms of reference, he was authorized to deal directly with each national ministry of defence which reported freely, thoroughly and frankly to him on the state of their forces. It was feared that if SACEUR's report were given general distribution, it would violate the confidence with which this information was given and consequently tend to reduce the value of the report in future years.

7. The United States representative proposed as a compromise that a "sanitized" or "expurgated" version of SACEUR's entire report including annexes should be prepared and made available to members of the Council. This suggestion eventually led to general agreement that the SGLO should prepare a sanitized version of SACEUR's entire report including annexes, and that he should give an oral briefing to the Permanent Council at its next meeting on the basis of this version. The Secretariat would then prepare for distribution to all member governments, a record of such a briefing after it was cleared by the SGLO. It was also agreed that the SGLO would retain in his office a copy of the sanitized version of the complete report which would be available there for the representative of each country on the Annual Review Committee to see. A "few senior members" of the international staff involved in the annual review could also see it there on a need-to-know basis. It is generally understood that this sanitized version will contain all the essential information in SACEUR's report relating to the forces of each member country except information of a very sensitive and highly classified nature such as the location and combat effectiveness of specific units etc.

8. It was agreed not to take a decision now on a ministerial meeting to discuss SACEUR's effectiveness report. The Netherlands representative suggested, and the Council agreed, that this decision should only be made after governments have had an opportunity to study the record of the briefing that will be given by the SGLO on the sanitized version of SACEUR's report. Governments will then be in a better position to decide whether such a meeting should be held and whether ministers will have enough information to insure a worthwhile and constructive meeting. It was pointed out that such a meeting would have to be held either before July 14 or after September 1, this being the general holiday period here. Some felt that ministers would not wish to convene again so soon after the forthcoming meeting nor after September 1 in view of the regular ministerial meeting in December when ministers could discuss SACEUR's effectiveness report when they consider the report on the annual review.

# INCOMING MESSAGE

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

# ORIGINAL

FROM: THE OFFICE OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, PARIS

*Copy on 50107-E-40 948*

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

SECRET

File No.

*50030-AB-40*

*6 27*

Priority

System

No.

Date

CYPHER-AUTO

478

April 20, 1955.

8

Departmental Circulation

THE MINISTER  
UNDER-SECY  
ASSOC/U/SECY  
ASSIST/U/SECS  
POL COOR SECT.

Reference:

Subject:

SACEUR's "effectiveness report".

Addressed Ottawa No. 478, repeated to CJS London No. 60 (passed).

At its meeting on April 20 the Council gave preliminary consideration to the problem of how to deal with SACEUR's "effectiveness report". It was the general view that the questions raised by the report were sufficiently important to justify consideration by the Council, but a number of the non-standing group powers (and particularly Belgium and the Netherlands) felt strongly that such consideration would be of little value unless the full report including country annexes were to be made available to all delegations in advance. The standing group powers appeared to consider that general distribution of the country annexes would be undesirable but were unable to produce any convincing answer to the arguments put forward in very determined fashion by the Netherlands representative. It was finally decided that the Permanent Council would invite the standing group to attend a joint meeting on the evening of Friday, April 29 at which time this general problem could be examined more thoroughly. General Gruenther will be invited to attend the meeting as well.

2. The Netherlands' position was that the annual review process would be incomplete and unrealistic unless all the information contained in SACEUR's report were to be made available for consideration during the forthcoming annual review. If this point were accepted, there appeared to be little reason why the report could not be made available in its entirety prior to the annual review in order that the Council would have the necessary information to hold a real discussion of the situation outlined in general terms in the covering brief based on the individual country annexes.

3. The question of a possible ministerial meeting to be held later in the year as proposed by the United States delegation will undoubtedly be considered at the joint meeting with the standing group. We assume on the basis of your earlier telegrams on this subject that you have no

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10	DONE - COMM'S SECTION

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APR 21 1955

References

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D/M Finance  
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JH.*

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Date \_\_\_\_\_

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objection in principle to a ministerial meeting called perhaps in July to consider the implications of the "effectiveness report" and possibly to take up at the same time related matters such as the air defence study which should be completed by that time. (Signed L.D. Wilgress)

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# INCOMING MESSAGE

# COPY

*Original on 50102-J-40*

FROM: THE OFFICE OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, PARIS

Security Classification

SECRET

File No.

*50130-AB-40*  
*58 52*

*7*

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

*re para. 5*

Priority

System

No. 408

Date April 6, 1955.

IMPORTANT

CYPHER-AUTO

Departmental Circulation  
THE MINISTER UNDER-SEC'Y ASSOC/U/SEC'Y ASSIST/U/SECS POL COOR SECT.

Reference: Your telegram No. 326 of April 4 and our telegram No. 398 of April 5.

Subject: Arrangements for NATO ministerial meeting.

Addressed Ottawa No. 408 (Important) / <sup>repeated</sup> London No. 47 Bonn No. 26 (Ottawa please pass to Bonn).

When the Council reassembled at 6:00 p.m. on April 5, the Italian representative reported that he had had further discussions with the authorities in Rome, but was unable to alter his previous position. He could agree to a meeting on May 13 and 14, but he could not agree to May 12, and was doubtful about starting on May 11 with a recess on May 12. He said a final answer on this last possibility (Van Vredenburg's proposal for an interrupted meeting to cover May 11, 13 and 14) would have to wait the return to Rome on April 8 of Scelba and Martino.

2. The Danish and French representatives reported that there was no possibility of changing the date for the visit of President Coty to the King of Denmark, and accordingly Pinay and Hansen would not be available after the evening of May 14. The United Kingdom could accept the Van Vredenburg's proposal or alternatively a two-day meeting on May 13 and 14, but could accept no date after May 14. The Portuguese difficulty about May 13 and 14 had been resolved through putting-off the visit to Lisbon of "the Foreign Minister of a non-NATO country."

3. It was finally agreed, except by Italy, that the meeting should be planned for May 11, 13 and 14, although two or three representatives said they would have to confirm this with their governments. Italy agreed to May 13 and 14 and "took note" that all others were prepared to meet May 11 as well. The final Italian position will be made known at a meeting of the Council to take place probably on the evening of April 8. Several representatives thought it would be simpler to take a final decision now to have a two-day meeting on May 13 and 14, but we vigorously opposed this suggestion, and were backed by several others.

4. As you will see, the French position concerning the dates May 8, 9 and 10, the United Kingdom position with

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regard to any date after May 14, and the complications of the state visit in Copenhagen made it impossible for us to obtain consideration of adding an extra day at the beginning or end. Indeed, as we have pointed out, there was some tendency to reduce the total period of the meeting to two days. We believe on balance that the timetable at present under consideration is not unsatisfactory; while it allows only three days for formal meetings, there is in addition the date of May 12 available for private consultations. It seems to be generally understood that any three-power discussions would take place on that day, and thus would not interfere with the programme for the three days of formal NATO meetings. The blank day would in addition provide an opportunity for the informal discussion among the various Foreign Ministers assembled in Paris.

5. With regard to the agenda, it was agreed that the matter of whether or not the SACEUR "effectiveness report" should be discussed by Ministers would be left for examination by the agenda Working Group beginning on April 12. We were informed privately by the French delegation that Mr. Pinay is strongly opposed to the inclusion of this or any other military item, and that the French Ambassadors in Washington and Ottawa were being instructed to make representations to this effect.

We are inclined ourselves to support the French view on this problem, as we believe that the United States determination to have Ministers exposed to a discussion designed to ginger-up their defence efforts is premature. For most of the European members, not least the Germans, the entry of Germany into the alliance is an important enough event to occupy their full attention, and we think that a certain time should be allowed for this new development to be digested by all concerned before new policy decisions are required. We are afraid that otherwise the general political basis on which such decisions must rest might prove too thin. This is not to say, of course, that the problems which the United States wish to discuss are either unimportant or without urgency; we merely believe that their examination at the May meeting might do more harm than good.

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NOTE: Above message transmitted to Bonn as requested.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION



COPY

# INCOMING MESSAGE

# COPY

**FROM:** THE OFFICE OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, PARIS.

*Original on 58109-40*

**TO:** THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification	
SECRET.	
File No.	
50030-AB-8	
58	52

<b>Priority</b>	<b>System</b>	<b>No.</b>	<b>Date</b>
	CYPHER-AUTO	238	March 2, 1955.

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**Departmental Circulation**

MINISTER  
UNDER/SEC  
D/UNDER/SEC  
A/UNDER/SEC'S  
POL.COOR.SECT.

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Done \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Reference:

Subject: Revised Terms of Reference for SACEUR.

At its meeting on March 2, the Council considered document C-M(54) 125 of December 22, setting out the Military Representatives Committee's recommendations for revising the Terms of Reference and Directives of SACEUR in order to carry out the terms of the Council resolution on Section IV of the Final Act of the London Conference.

2. The Council agreed to accept the Norwegian interpretation of paragraph 10 (a) of the appendix to Enclosure "a" of the Military Committee's paper, as set out in Document C-M(55)10 of January 28. It agreed further that the best means of ensuring that this interpretation should apply was to specify that the cover note to that appendix (i.e. Enclosure "a" itself) should become an integral part of the revised terms of reference. The council took note of the interpretation of the United States Government of para 7 (c) on page 3 of Document C-M(54)85, to the effect that governments seeking SACEUR's authority as provided should, if possible, allow adequate time for SACEUR to obtain political guidance when appropriate. The United Kingdom, France and the Netherlands all endorsed this interpretation. Greece had certain doubts, but was prepared not to challenge the interpretation if it was understood that the Council was not formally approving it as a binding decision.

3. The Council also accepted an amendment proposed by the United States C-M(55)16 of February 8 to include within the area of Allied Command Europe the area of Trieste under Italian administration. Following discussion of the second amendment proposed by the United States in the document quoted in the preceding sentence, it was agreed that the opening clause of para 5 of Enclosure "c" of the Military Committee paper should read: "The North Atlantic Council has agreed....."

4. Finally, the Council turned its attention to amendments proposed by the Belgian and Netherlands

**References**

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- 2 -

delegations in Document C-M(55)24 of February 22. The effect of these amendments would be to limit SACEUR's reports to the WEU to information on the levels of WEU forces under his command, and would exclude from such reports information relating to the effectiveness of forces, their logistic support, and their armaments, equipment and supplies as well as the organization and location of their logistic arrangements. These proposed amendments were supported strongly by the United Kingdom, Norway, and Italy, and more briefly by ourselves, the United States, Portugal and Denmark. The amendments were, however, vigorously opposed by France. In spite of detailed exegesis by both sides of the texts of the Council resolution, the final act of the London conference and other related documents, it was impossible to reach agreement. The political issue involved, namely, whether WEU should be built up or played down, emerged very clearly. It was decided that the points raised should be further considered and an effort made to reach agreement through private consultation. The Council would address itself to the matter again in two weeks' time.

5. The Netherlands and the United Kingdom in particular seem quite prepared to carry the ball in this matter, and we assume it is appropriate to give them general support but not to become involved in the details of the dispute. If you have any particular observations you would wish us to put forward, please let us know prior to the council meeting of March 16.

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INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

FROM: THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, PARIS.

Security Classification

SECRET

File No.

50030-AB-40

3450

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

*Copy on 50030-PI-40  
50172-40*

Priority

IMPORTANT

System

CYPHER-AUTO

No.

335

Date

May 5, 1954. *JH*

Departmental Circulation

Reference: Our telegram No. 315 of April 28.

MINISTER UNDER/SEC D/UNDER/SEC A/UNDER/SEC'S

Subject: Marshal Juin.

POL/CO-ORDIN SECTION 7-

As agreed at the meeting on April 28, a restricted session of the Council (without advisors) was held on short notice today at 5:00 o'clock (5 May) to consider the reply to be given by the Dutch Foreign Minister during a debate tomorrow (May 6) to a statement by a member of the First Chamber of the Netherlands Parliament implying a request for information with regard to Marshal Juin's NATO Command. Mr. Beyen was anxious to say as little as possible, but he felt that in the course of the debate, he might have to give some information, and he wanted to ascertain the views of the Council as to how far he might go.

6 MAY 1954

DONE - COMM'S SECTION

2. The Norwegian representative, on instructions, reported that his government adhered to the principle that NATO Commanders should have the full confidence of their national government, and that if questions were asked in Parliament, there might be no time for consultation to the Council, and it might be necessary to give the whole story.

3. After some discussion the Council approved the following text which had been drafted by the Netherlands delegation:

"Mr. Beyen proposes to say that the NATO Council passed a resolution censuring the public utterances of the Marshal concerning the plan for a European Defence Community and that this resolution was brought to the notice of the Marshal through the appropriate Command channels and moreover published. In making his statement the Minister would quote the text of the resolution. Mr. Beyen would add that Marshal Juin having received the Council resolution has remained in his post from which it is clear that he accepts to abide henceforth by statements of policy of the Council. Mr. Beyen would conclude that the incident can be considered as closed."

4. The Netherlands representative pointed out that the above text gave little scope to his Minister, and

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References

*Mr. Claxton - CCOS (5) - DIM DND - European D.L. (2) - London (lag) Washington (.)  
Majors J.N.  
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- 2 -

at the suggestion of the Belgian representative, the Council agreed that, if pressed, Mr. Beyen could add, "what I have just said means that we are assured that the Marshal in the future will conform to the Council's policy".

5. The Norwegian representative felt that even this additional line of retreat was not quite satisfactory in view of his instructions. His Netherlands colleague was of the opinion that difficulties might arise if the direct question was asked whether the Marshal had given any assurance that he would not make further public utterances against the EDC. After prolonged discussion the Council agreed that if in great difficulty, Ministers might simply indicate that governments had been given such an assurance. In making this decision, the Council expressed, however, the wish that in order not to create difficulties and possibly to re-open an awkward debate in France, Ministers might find it possible to avoid making such a statement. The Norwegian representative undertook to report this view to his government.

6. The French representative reported that a Netherlands newspaper had published in its morning edition of May 5 a story that General Gruenther and Lord Ismay, feeling that a change in senior Commanders was not desirable at this time, had been able to persuade some members of the Council not to compel Marshal Juin to resign; as the story was carried by the Agence France Presse, it was urgent for the Council to meet inquiries from newspaper men to decide on the line to be followed. The Council agreed that the story should be denied and that NATO press officers might reply along the lines of the Dutch statement as approved by the Council (paragraph 3 above).

7. The United States representative, on instructions from his government, recorded their understanding that the assurance given by Marshal Juin extended also to appearances before secret meetings of Parliamentary Committees and that if the Marshal were to be called upon to testify, the matter might have to be considered by the Council in the light of existing circumstances.

8. The Council in conclusion agreed that:

(a) A confidential record of the meeting should be kept in the Secretariat but not distributed to the delegations;

(b) Lord Ismay should advise General Gruenther of the decisions made by the Council in the course of the meeting.

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Council agreed that it pressed Mr. Bevan should  
add "that I have just said means that we are assured  
that the Marshal in the future will conform to the  
Council's policy."

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- (a) A confidential record of the meeting should  
be kept in the Secretariat but not distributed to the  
delegations;
- (b) Lord Jansz should advise General Grenier  
of the decisions made by the Council in the course of  
the meeting.

1954 MAY 5 AM 9:16

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
COMMUNICATIONS  
CLEARED

# INCOMING MESSAGE

# ORIGINAL

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

FROM: THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, PARIS.

Security Classification

**S E C R E T**

File No.

50030-AB-40

32

50

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

*Copy on 50030-P-1-40*

Priority

System

CYPHER-AUTO

No. 315

Date April 28, 1954.

Departmental Circulation

MINISTER UNDER/SEC D/UNDER/SEC A/UNDER/SEC'S POL/CO-ORD'N SECTION

Reference: Our telegram No. 250 of April 6.

Subject: Marshal Juin's NATO appointment.

Addressed to Ottawa No. 315, repeated to Beaver Washington No. 28 (External please pass) and Dominion London No. 53.

The North Atlantic Council, in a restricted session attended by the permanent representatives without any advisors, dealt today with what we hope to be the end of the Juin episode.

2. Lord Ismay acquainted the council with a confidential message he had received from General Gruenther. This was to the effect that General Gruenther had asked Marshal Juin to see him because he knew the case was coming up in council again this week. He asked Marshal Juin if he was going to refrain from making any further public statements on the subject of the EDC. Marshal Juin replied stating categorically that he would not make any further public statements so long as he held his NATO command. He went on to distinguish between his national and international functions and said that now that he had been divested of his national functions he would not consider it consistent with his NATO functions for him to make public statements about the EDC.

3. In view of this assurance from Marshal Juin, General Gruenther recommended to the council that they accept the present position but that no publicity should be given either to the assurances given by Marshal Juin or to the action taken by the council.

4. A lengthy discussion followed in which nearly all of the representatives who spoke referred to the difficult position in which the council had been placed in agreeing to the resolution adopted on April 5 and made public the following day. The council had acted under the belief that this would be followed by the resignation of Marshal Juin from his NATO command or by action being taken by the French Government to request the council to relieve him of his command. The lack of any subsequent action had placed the council in an invidious position. Nevertheless, it was agreed that the only possible course was to accept the proposal of General Gruenther and to recommend to governments that they acquiesce.

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28 APR 1954

References

Mr. Claxton  
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European  
D.L. (2) -  
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~~General (for Mr.~~  
~~Ream) (by bag)~~  
J.N.

Note for file: Copy sent by Minister's office to Minister in Geneva by bag. J.N.

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- 2 -

5. The Belgium representative raised the question as to what would happen if Marshal Juin was called upon to testify before one of the parliamentary committees about EDC. It was agreed that it would not be in accordance with the assurances he had given if he were to give such testimony.

6. The Norwegian representative referred to the questions which had been raised in the parliaments of various NATO countries including his own. It was agreed that the proper procedure would be to refer to the council resolution of April 5 and then to go on to explain that the fact that Marshal Juin had not resigned indicated that he had agreed to accept the reprimand and would not make any further public statements. If, however, a question was framed in such a way that this reply would not be suitable, a meeting of the council could be called on short notice to consider the matter.

7. Lord Ismay, in summing up, said that he would inform General Gruenther orally that the permanent representatives had agreed to recommend to their respective governments that they acquiesce in his proposal and that no publicity should be given. Finally, Lord Ismay said that a confidential record of the meeting would be kept in the Secretariat but would not be distributed to the delegations.

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NOTE: Above telegram passed to Washington,  
April 28, 1954.

Communications Section

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The Belgian representative raised the question as to what would happen if Marshal Juin was called upon to testify before one of the parliamentary committees about EDC. It was agreed that it would not be in accordance with the assurance he had given if he were to give such testimony.

The Norwegian representative referred to the questions which had been raised in the parliament of various NATO countries including his own. It was agreed that the proper procedure would be to refer to the council resolution of April 7 and then to go on to explain that the fact that Marshal Juin had not testified indicated that he had agreed to accept the resignation and would not make any further public statements. It was, however, a question as to whether in such a case that this reply would not be outside a meeting of the committee could be called on short notice to consider the matter.

Lord Jerny, in summing up, said that he would inform General Eisenhower orally that the permanent representatives had agreed to recommend to their respective governments that they acquiesce in his proposal and that no publicity should be given. Finally, Lord Jerny stated that a confidential record of the meeting would be kept in the Secretariat but would not be distributed to the delegations.

NOTE: Above telegram passed to Washington  
April 28, 1954

Communications Section

1954 APR 28 PM 4:05  
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS  
COMMUNICATIONS  
CLEARED

INCOMING MESSAGE

ORIGINAL

FROM: THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, PARIS

*Copy on 50030-P-1-40*  
TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

Security Classification

SECRET

File No.

*50030-AB-40*

*52 40*

Priority  
IMPORTANT

System  
CYPHER-AUTO

No. 248

Date April 5, 1954.

Departmental Circulation  
MINISTER  
UNDER/SEC  
D/UNDER/SEC  
A/UNDER/SEC'S  
POL/CO-ORD'N  
SECTION

Reference: Your telegram No. 213 of April 3.

Subject: Marshal Juin's NATO appointment.

Addressed to Ottawa No. 248, repeated to Beaver Washington No. 15 (External please pass) and Dominion London No. 35.

The council met in restricted session this afternoon and after preliminary discussion it became apparent that the opinion of the majority was in accord with that of the Belgian representative who opened the discussion by declaring something should be done to call Marshal Juin to a sense of his responsibilities. It became clear that the French Government were not disposed to take any initiative and were leaving the matter to the decision of the council. Finally it was agreed to send the following statement to the standing group. Message begins:

"The North Atlantic Council expresses its profound regret at the public statements made by the Commander in Chief Central Europe on 27 March, 1954, and subsequently reiterated. These statements are contrary to the explicit and repeated declarations of policy issued by the council under whose authority all NATO commanders hold their appointments.

The council requests the standing group to convey the above resolution to the Commander in Chief Central Europe through the appropriate channels." Message ends.

2. It was agreed to make no statement to the press at this stage.

Note: Above telegram passed to Washington April 5, 1954.

Communications Section

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DONE-COMM'S SECTION

References

Mr. Claxton  
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European  
DL (2)

*J.N.*  
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*apr 6/54*  
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Done

Date



INCOMING MESSAGE

Document divulgué en vertu de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

COPY

FROM: THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, PARIS.

*Original m 50030-P-1-40*

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

*Copy m 6938-40 "5"*

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Priority <b>IMPORTANT</b>	System CYPHER-AUTO	No. 238	Date April 2, 1954.
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Departmental Circulation

MINISTER UNDER/SEC D/UNDER/SEC A/UNDER/SEC'S POL/CO-ORD'N SECTION

Done \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Reference: Our telegram No. 226 of March 31.

Subject: Marshal Juin.

At a restricted meeting of the Council yesterday Admiral Dick reported the result of an informal conversation he had had with General Gruenther who told him that he had taken no action in regard to the speech of Marshal Juin. He considered that Marshal Juin had a national as well as an international position and for this reason it would not be right for SACEUR to intervene.

2. In reply to a question, Alhand said that the action of the French Government did not affect the position of Marshal Juin in NATO. He had been divested of his powers as Chief Military Adviser to the French Government but remained a Marshal of France on the active list and, therefore, would continue as Commander of the Allied Forces in Central Europe unless and until the Council decided otherwise.

3. As advised in my telegram under reference this subject is coming up for discussion at a restricted meeting of the Council on Monday, April 5. None of my colleagues are very definite as to what they think will be the attitude of their governments. Some are personally of the view that Marshal Juin should be deprived of his NATO Command. Others are more cautious. They fear the effect which any action by NATO may have on the ratification of EDC. While the French Government had justification for their action, in view of the disregard shown by Marshal Juin for the civil power, it might be unwise to make the Marshal a Martyr and give him the opportunity of further mischief against EDC. On the other hand, there is the necessity of upholding the authority of the Council over the commanders.

4. We are still of the view that other NATO countries should not take the initiative in this matter. It should be left to the French Government to explain what action they think NATO should take.

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Done \_\_\_\_\_

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INCOMING MESSAGE

COPY

P-1-70

FROM: THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CANADA TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, PARIS.

TO: THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CANADA

*Original in 500 B*  
*Copy in 500 S*  
*172-40*

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Priority	System CYPHER-AUTO	No. 226	Date March 31, 1954.
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Departmental Circulation

MINISTER UNDER/SEC D/UNDER/SEC A/UNDER/SEC'S POL/CO-ORDIN SECTION

Done \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

Reference:

Subject: Restricted meeting of the Council on March 31 - Marshal Juin's statement on the EDC.

Addressed to External No. 226 repeated to Dominion London No. 28.

In the course of a speech delivered last Sunday (March 28) at Auxerre, Marshal Juin is reported by the press as having stated that: (a) He had never been consulted as to the political substance of the EDC Treaty but only on points of detail and of a technical nature; (b) Many articles in the EDC Treaty were inapplicable and a series of amendments contrary to its express provisions were indispensable; and (c) An alternative solution was to be sought.

2. As can be imagined such a statement elicited strong reactions in the various groups concerned with the EDC and at the Council meeting this morning, at the suggestion of the Belgian representative, it was agreed that the matter should be discussed in private session, immediately after the regular meeting.

3. The Belgian representative made a very able (he never mentioned Marshal Juin's name), forceful and yet careful statement.

4. First, the Belgian representative wondered how it was possible that such a statement could have been made in view of the specific reference to the EDC which was contained in the political guidance (C-M(53)29 final, in particular in paragraphs 11, 17 and 20) which had been provided to Military Commanders and given the repeated declarations of the Council itself that the early ratification of the EDC was of the greatest importance to NATO. In fact, NATO policy was not more affirmative and clear about any other subject. The question arose, therefore, whether senior NATO Commanders could make statements which could only make it more difficult to implement settled policies of the Alliance and whether Military Commanders should implement agreed policies,

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- 2 -

or whether they should be in a position to oppose such policies.

5. The second problem related to the exact meaning of the statement. As on previous occasions when statements had been made concerning the EDC, it was difficult to find out what had been said exactly; the whole statement as reported by the press was contradictory, equivocal and, in some respects, it gave an impression of ignorance as to the real situation. The general impression, however, was one of criticism and the complication was that what had been done hitherto by the EDC governments had been useless.

6. The Belgian representative suggested in conclusion that the four following questions might be put to the competent military authorities (the Standing Group, he thought, personally):

(a) How could such statements be made by a senior NATO Commander in view of the political guidance and of the reiterated Council policy as regards the EDC;

(b) What is the exact meaning of the statement;

(c) How is it possible to clear up any misunderstanding between the international status of Commanders and their national responsibilities;

(d) What steps could be taken to prevent such incidents in the future.

It was important, it was felt, to affirm the authority of the Council and not allow such statements to be made.

7. After some discussion, the Council agreed that:

(a) The matter would be discussed again, in restricted session, Monday next (April 5) at 3.15 P.M.;

(b) The Secretary General and the SGLO would endeavour to ascertain, through informal enquiries, the facts of the situation.

8. It seems to me, however unfortunate Marshal Juin's statement may have been that:

(a) This is not a matter on which we should play too direct or active a part;

(b) It is very important that whatever action may be contemplated should be left to the French Government and not to NATO. French public opinion would react very strongly to what might be considered as criticism or rebuke for the only living French Marshal and the repercussions might be even worse as regards EDC prospects;

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(c) If the matter is drawn to the attention of the Standing Group as it has already been to that of the French Government, the Belgians will have achieved whatever practical results they may have hoped to obtain through their intervention.

9. Action required: I should be glad to learn, before Monday April 5, whether you agree that if a majority are prepared to favour this course we should support the Belgian proposal and submit the four questions to the Standing Group. When the facts of the case and full explanations are available, governments will have again to be consulted as to action, if any, which might be considered.

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